

The logic of ballistic missile defence procurement in Japan (1994-2007): from hedging through self-imposed restraints toward hedging from the position of military strength

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ABSTRACT

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Thesis title: The logic of ballistic missile defence procurement in Japan (1994-2007): from hedging through self-imposed restraints toward hedging from the position of military strength

This thesis asks why Japan decided to procure BMD if it meant building an infrastructure which, because of its technological nature, had the potential to disrupt Japan's preferred security strategy of hedging, that is, maintaining ambiguity of commitment, vis-à-vis China and the US.

The investigation was divided into three parts dealing with the following questions – Why did Japan's BMD procurement matter? Who mattered? Why were the BMD and related decisions made? Such a structure of research was informed by “neoclassical realism,” according to which the relative material power of a country sets the parameters of its foreign policy, but the policy choices within these international constraints are made by political elites.

A range of policymaking heuristics were used to investigate the domestic element of the approach. In addition to the conventionally specified policymaking actors such as MOD, MOFA, Prime Ministers, an original attempt was made to identify the possible influences of several elite networks.

On the basis of the notes from the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference, two elite networks were analysed, namely Japan's Congressional National Security Research Group and the Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange. It was concluded that they have probably had some influence on shaping Japan's BMD decisions.

The conclusion of this research is that BMD was procured despite its disruptive potential because it was a tool of shifting Japanese policy from one hedging policy to another, that is, from one based on self-imposed restraints toward one exercised from the position of military strength. An analysis of international relations in East Asia in 1994-2007 and an analysis of the views of the security elites make Japan's transition toward a military strength-based hedging appear rational and confirm BMD's utility as a tool in this transition. Some negative consequences of a possible disruption to hedging, induced by BMD, can be contained exactly because of such a reformatting of hedging.

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GLOSSARY OF THE MAIN UNUSUAL ABBREVIATIONS

ABL	Airborne Laser
ASDF	Air Self Defence Force, euphemism for Japan Air Force
BMD	Ballistic missile defence
BMC4I	Battle management command control computers communication and intelligence
CPCE	Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange
C4ISR	Command control computers communication intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
DPC	Defence Production Committee of the Japan Business Federation
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FS-X	Fighter Support Experimental
GSDF	Ground Self Defence Force, euphemism for Japan Army
GSOMIA	General Security of Military Information Agreement
HRSC	House of Representatives Security Committee (Japan)
JDA	Japan Defence Agency
IGS	“Information-gathering” satellites, euphemism for spy satellites
IHI	Ishikawajimaharima Heavy Industries
ISR	See BMC4I
JCP	Japan Communist Party
JIIA	Japan Institute for International Affairs
KHI	Kawasaki Heavy Industries
LDP	Liberal-Democratic Party
LM	Lockheed Martin
M&A	Mergers and acquisitions
Melco	Mitsubishi Electric Company
MHI	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
MITI/METI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry, from 2001 Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSDF	Maritime Self Defence Force, euphemism for Japan Navy
NCW	Network-centric warfare
NDPO/ NDPG	National Defence Programme Outline; called Guidelines in English since 2004
NEC	Nippon Electric Company
NSRG	National Congressional Security Research Group (Japan)
NTW	Navy Theatre Wide; an upper-tier, mid-course, sea-based type of BMD
PAC-3	Patriot Advanced Capability Three, a ground-based lower-tier interceptor
PARC	Policy Affairs Research Council (of a political party)
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
RIPS	Research Institute for Peace and Security (Tokyo)
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
SM-3	Standard Missile Three, a sea-based interceptor
SSC	Japan-US Security Strategy Conference
THAAD	Theatre High Altitude Area Defence, a ground-based upper-tier type of BMD

TMD	Theatre Missile Defence, a type of BMD
WESTPAC	Strategic Defence Initiative Office Western Pacific Missile Defence Architecture Study (1989-1993)

The titles of the following periodical publications and news releases have been abbreviated in the footnotes:

Aviation Week & Space Technology - AWST

The Daily Yomiuri – TDY

Japan Economic Newswire - JEN

The Japan Times – TJT

The New York Times – TNYT

The Nikkei Weekly – TNW

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION.

The central research question and the preferred answer to it

The central research question of this thesis is: Why did Japan decide to procure BMD if it meant building an infrastructure which had the potential to disrupt the preferred security policy strategy of hedging vis-à-vis China¹ and the US?

Hedging, according to the definition adopted by Evelyn Goh, is understood here as a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, band-wagoning, or neutrality. Instead they cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side [or one straightforward policy stance] at the obvious expense of another.²

My answer in the most concise form can be formulated as follows. BMD was procured despite its disruptive potential because it was a tool of shifting Japanese policy from one hedging policy to another, that is, from one based on self-imposed restraints toward one exercised from the position of military strength. An analysis of international relations in East Asia in 1994-2007, undertaken in the thesis, and an analysis of the views of a circle of security elites make Japan's transition toward a military strength-based hedging appear rational and confirm BMD's utility as a tool in this transition. Some negative consequences of a possible disruption to hedging, induced by BMD, could be contained exactly as a result of such a reformatting of hedging.

The premise of the question

The problem encapsulated in the central question lay in the potential of BMD, stemming from the system's technological nature, to disrupt a hedging strategy.

1 Unless otherwise stated, "China" in this thesis refers to the PRC.

2 Evelyn Goh, "Understanding 'Hedging' in Asia-Pacific Security," PacNet 43 (August 31, 2006): 2, accessed November 8, 2009, <http://www.stratad.net/downloads/PacNet%2043.pdf>.

Christopher Hughes's analysis, which appeared in 2001 as a working paper of the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation and in 2002 as a chapter of a book on the Chinese-Japanese relations in the twenty-first century,¹ elaborated the premise of the question by drawing on Glenn Snyder's work on the security dilemma in alliance politics.²

Glenn Snyder, a prominent exponent of security dynamics in alignment politics, developed in 1984 the concepts of the primary and secondary alliance security dilemmas, as well as a composite security dilemma involving both the allies and adversaries, on the fundamental realist assumption that no state can be sure of other states' peacefulness³ and that, as a result, each state must pursue power-maximisation for defence through armament, territorial growth, and alliance building.⁴ The primary dilemma characterises the process of alliance formation and relates to the decision whether to ally or not (and with whom). It follows the logic of the N-person prisoners' dilemma⁵ when the best outcome is forming an alliance while others do not, and the second-best outcome is a universal abstention from alliance-building, which is unattainable because of pervasive uncertainty about the others' intentions. This leads to a prediction that alliances will form. The secondary dilemma emerges after an alignment process has started and implies decisions about the strength and nature of commitment to the partner, that is, how strongly to "cooperate" and when to

1 Christopher Hughes, "Sino-Japanese Relations and Ballistic Missile Defence," University of Warwick: the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Working Paper 64/01 (2001), <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/2001/wp6401.pdf>; Christopher Hughes, "Sino-Japanese Relations and Ballistic Missile Defence," in *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Marie Soederberg (London, NY: Routledge, 2002).

2 Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984).

3 Ibid., 461. One of the earliest Western-world accounts of the durability of power politics and of uncertainty of the peacefulness of others (and other states) due to human nature is: Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner, ed. MI Finley (London: Penguin, 1954). Current adherents of realism in international relations often trace the roots of their thinking to Thucydides.

4 Ibid. Also in: Hans Joachim Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 7th ed., rev. Kenneth Thompson and W. David Clinton (McGraw-Hill Companies, 2006), 190-208.

5 The original story behind the prisoners' dilemma, used by game theorists, is as follows. There are two players who are accused of conspiring in two crimes: one minor crime for which they can be convicted without any confessions, and one major for which they can be convicted only if at least one confesses. Both are offered a deal by the prosecutor that if one confesses, the confessor will be released but the other will be jailed for six years. If both confess they will both go to jail for 5 years. If neither confesses, they will only have to serve a one-year sentence. The best outcome for one is when one confesses while the other does not; the second best is when both choose not to confess, and so on. In: Roger B. Myerson, *Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard UP, 1991), 97.

“defect.” “Abandonment” by an ally and “entrapment/ entanglement” in the ally’s conflicts when they only serve the interest of one ally are the key concepts here. States seek to reduce the risks of being abandoned or entangled by their partners. Both risks are considered to be in an inverse relationship when a stronger commitment while reducing the probability of abandonment increases the chances of entrapment and vice versa.

The above was an “alliance game” considered in isolation. But the “alliance game” always interacts with the “adversary game” creating the composite security dilemma against the background of which the central concern of this thesis was identified. This dilemma arises from uncertainty over how expansionist the adversary is. In the case of an aggressive opponent, a firm policy may deter him. If the opponent is for the status quo, then a tough attitude can have a counterproductive effect by provoking him. Similarly, a conciliatory approach can resolve tension in the case of a non-expansionist opponent but may encourage an aggressive adversary to increase his pressure and demands. The interaction between the “alliance game” and the “adversary game” means that strategies in one game can have positive and negative consequences in the other game. Snyder elaborated several examples of side effects on the alliance game of strategies in the adversary game. An adversary strategy of toughness will reassure an ally who doubts one’s loyalty. At the same time, the ally’s confidence in one’s support may increase the risk of entrapment by the ally. An adversary strategy of conciliation will restrain the ally by decreasing his confidence in one’s support in a crisis. Conciliating the opponent also enables one’s option of re-aligning with him. But the most negative consequence of conciliating the adversary is the probability of abandonment by the ally which becomes possible after the ally, because of his fear of one’s realignment, re-aligns with the adversary pre-emptively.¹ Snyder also described what he called “straddle strategy” which is referred to as hedging in this thesis. In his terms, a straddle implied a mixed conciliation-firmness strategy in both the alliance and the adversary

1 Snyder, “Dilemma,” 471.

games, that is, strategic ambiguity.¹

Drawing on Snyder's expositions, Hughes in his paper reasoned based on the understanding that the relations between each pair of the countries in the US-Japan-China "triangle" were decisively, but to varying degrees, influencing each other pair of relations within that "strategic nexus."² The US-Japan alliance created for Japan's China policy a security dilemma, according to which, in an anarchical international environment, potential adversaries (Japan and China) trigger a spiral of insecurities by taking defensive military and alliance measures (Japan and the US) and countermeasures.³ Hughes observed that in such an environment Japan deployed a hedging strategy in its relations with the US and China.⁴ To illustrate how this strategy was successfully deployed by Japan in recent times, Hughes analysed how the country handled the revision process of the 1997 US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines.⁵

The point of contention in these Guidelines was the definition of the concept of "areas surrounding Japan" (*shuuhen*), to the defence of which Japan was committing itself as part of the US-Japan bilateral cooperation. Hughes evaluated the government's management of the issue positively⁶ and concluded that by introducing the idea of "situational need" into the delineation of the country's geographic sphere of security interests the government left itself the option of action both inside and outside Japan's commitment to the "Far East" from the period of the 1960 revision of the Security Treaty. By emphasising the "situational nature" of "areas surrounding Japan," Japan was able to avoid repeating an unequivocal commitment to the security of Taiwan and thus win some room for conciliation with China.⁷ On the other hand, while retaining in principle the ability to intervene on the side of the US

1 Ibid., 482-483.

2 Hughes, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 7-10.

3 Ibid., 12-20.

4 Ibid., 20-26.

5 Ibid., 23-26.

6 Ibid., 26. Hughes referred to the *shuuhen* as an "ingenious method."

7 Ibid., 25.

in the Taiwan Strait in the event of a military confrontation, Japan retained the ability to restrain the US from excessive behaviour towards China because Japan did not guarantee its commitment if a crisis in the Straits did not meet the criteria of “situational need.”¹

Furthermore, Taiwan was thus restrained from declaring independence and China reminded of the possibility of involvement of the US-Japan alliance in China's military clash with Taiwan.²

It was against this background of the ability of the government of Japan to successfully utilise the “hedging strategy” and alleviate its security dilemmas, that Green³ briefly noted and Hughes elaborated the contradiction between BMD and the country’s capacity to “hedge.” The contradiction, as has been pointed out by RAND researchers in 2001,⁴ lay in the military and technological nature of the BMD system which had the potential to circumscribe Japan’s ability to conduct effective policy towards China and the US. This potential arose from the fact that the BMD under research in Japan in 2001 together with the extended US nuclear deterrent could allow Japan to negate China’s capabilities of deterrence, especially short and intermediate range ballistic missiles, with significant consequences for any war over Taiwan. On the other hand, Hughes argued that BMD required stronger reliance on the US technology and intelligence information and thus necessitated that Japan’s military command systems “implicitly... assume[d] a subsidiary position within the structure of alliance due to their dependence upon information filtered top downwards from the US”⁵ Hughes concluded that in the case of BMD, any carefully constructed hedging strategy would collapse, as Japan is forced to make a choice between cooperation with the US, entrapment and an explicit adversarial relationship with China, or abandonment and an uncertain strategic relationship with China.⁶

1 Ibid., 25-26.

2 Ibid., 26.

3 Michael Green, “The Challenges of Managing US-Japan Security Relations after the Cold War,” in *New Perspectives on US-Japan Relations*, ed. Gerald L. Curtis (Tokyo, NY: JCIE, 2000), 248.

4 Swaine et al, *Japan and BMD* (RAND, 2001), 7-8, 79-83.

5 Hughes, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 37.

6 Ibid., 44.

Furthermore, that hedging was still a preferred choice even after the case of the revised US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines can be supported by the evidence that the ban on the exercise of the right to collective defence was not cleared for future use even as late as in 2010 or that the arms export ban was not overturned but simply relaxed in 2004 – these and other BMD-related episodes were in their entirety signs of continuity in hedging. Yet the ability of BMD to force Japan to “choose one side [or one straightforward policy stance] at the obvious expense of another” justified questioning the details of the BMD policy.

Research questions of the second order

As will be argued throughout the thesis, it is the consideration of all BMD-related questions within one explanatory scheme that can provide a convincing and consistent explanation of the overall logic of Japan’s BMD procurement, seen against the background of the country’s security policy of hedging, and of each of the more technical and narrow aspects of the procurement. Such a research strategy, which seeks to find a coherent explanation for both the logic of the BMD procurement and related puzzling episodes, has the benefit of strengthening the argument. The most important of these BMD-related questions, which have thus inadvertently become important research questions of the second order in this thesis, are first briefly presented and then substantiated in greater detail below.

The first question asks: Why did Japan sign GSOMIA, the General Security of Military Information Agreement, in 2007 after successfully resisting it for several decades?

The second question refers to the way the BMD procurement was structured: Why did the 1998 Taepo-dong “shock” lead to Japan's decision on advanced sea-based interceptor co-research rather than to the improvement and earlier procurement of available technologies, the decision on which was made in 2003?

The question of GSOMIA

The US has put pressure on Japan to conclude GSOMIA since 1980 to prevent leakage of military technology to the USSR.¹ It was, however, only on August 10, 2007 that Foreign Minister Taro Aso and US Ambassador Thomas Schieffer signed the agreement making Japan the 65th signatory of the agreement with the US.² Why did Japan sign on after decades of resistance, especially since the country has legislation protecting secret information of its own? Indeed, Japan has the 1954 Secret Protection Law To Implement the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and Other Related Agreements between Japan and the USA. (Law No 166), the 1952 Law on Special Measures concerning Criminal Cases to Implement the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the USA, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of US Armed Forces in Japan (Law No 138), the 1956 US-Japan Technology Agreement (To facilitate the Exchange of Knowledge Relating to Patents and Technology for the Purpose of Defence),³ and the 2003 revision of the Self-Defence Forces Law which includes provisions for up to 5-year long sentences for leakage of military information (this also applies to company employees).⁴ At the same time, it should be noted that, apparently, unlike in the US, UK, and most other countries, even Japanese technology patents with possible military application until recently had to be published after lapse of 18 months in the intellectual property digital

1 Takehiko Yamamoto, "Technological Innovation and Industrial Security: Emerging Frictions between Japan and the US," *Pacific Focus* III, no. 2 (1988): 52.

2 "Japan, US Sign Deal on Military Secrets," *Reuters*, August 10, 2007, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUST15688920070810>.

3 *The 1956 US-Japan Technology Agreement*, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19560322.T1J.html>.

4 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the USA Concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/agree0708.html>; Fumio Kyuma's statement at the Tokyo US-Japan Security Strategy Conference in 2005, 2-4, accessed September 30, 2009, <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/kyuma11.pdf>.

library IPDL.¹ Furthermore, a senior representative from the US Under-Secretary of Defence² Office in his speech at the RIPS-organised symposium in Tokyo on October 8, 2010 repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with and puzzlement at the absence of a clear distinction between intellectual property rights on civilian- and military-use technologies.³

An argument could be made that GSOMIA and the BMD co-development from 2005 (and the likely future BMD co-production), which can only proceed on the premise of rigorous protection of shared classified information, are strongly related. That said, it may be productive to identify and consider the evidence on the views held by government organisations and elites with regard to the connection between GSOMIA and BMD.

The question of the 1998 and 2003 BMD decisions

The “Taepo-dong shock” of August 31, 1998, when the North Korean rocket⁴ overflowed Japanese territory before plunging into the Pacific,⁵ provided “strong impetus”⁶ for the decision on joint research on BMD, even if the government officials asserted that progress toward BMD was influenced only “partly.”⁷ This seems trivial, but if we unpack this sentence by using data on the broader context of BMD procurement we obtain the

1 Author's email communication with Junichiro Yoshime, an official from METI Industrial Science and Technology Policy and Environment Bureau from January 26, 2009. Also note that from 2008 METI decided on the policy of non-disclosure of civilian technology patents with possible military applications, in line with the practice in the US and European countries: IPDL website, accessed August 9, 2010, <http://www.hkd.meti.go.jp/hokip/chizai/ipdl/index.htm>.

2 Note that British spelling will be used for the word “defence” even in the names of institutions and offices in the US and Japan.

3 Author's notes from the RIPS symposium in Tokyo, Ichigaya Hotel, October 8, 2008.

4 “The Pentagon and State Dept. have concluded the North Koreans tried to launch a satellite with what US officials now say was a three-stage Taepo-dong I booster.” See David A. Fulghum, “North Korean Space Attempt Verified,” *AWST*, September 21, 1998. As Saadia Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu, as well as Joan Johnson-Freese correctly argued, space technologies are “inherently dual-use.” Consequently, it is difficult to imagine such a thing as only a civilian space programme. This makes it difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive space technologies. (Saadia Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy* (Stanford UP, 2010), 2, 12, 223, 225; Joan Johnson-Freese, *Space as a Strategic Asset* (Columbia UP, 2007), 6-7.) This influences not only the classification of the Japanese or American space activities, but also North Korea's efforts in the area.

5 Tony Emerson, Hideko Takayama and BJ Lee, “Going Ballistic,” *Newsweek*, September 14, 1998, 44.

6 Gary Klintworth, “TMD Pluses Matched by Risks,” *TJT*, January 8, 1999.

7 “Cabinet Ministers Agree to Join US TMD Research,” *TJT*, December 19, 1998. (Reference to Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka's statement that “North Korea's launch of a Taepo-dong type ballistic missile in August [31.08.1998] partly influenced Friday's [18.12.1998] Cabinet decision.”)

following: the “Taepo-dong I shock” of 1998 led to the positive decision on BMD co-research on track II. The BMD procurement – the fact to which I was made attentive by Sugio Takahashi, Deputy Director of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Strategic Planning Office¹ – runs on two tracks:² deployment on track I is about feasible/ available technology and was sanctioned in 2003 – track II is about future technology, was initiated in 1998 as research³ into the advanced components of the SM-3, and was continued by the 2005 Security Council and Cabinet decision on the development of SM-3 Block IIA.⁴ So why did a perceived threat from North Korea,⁵ which in Japan's case was, admittedly, a medium-range ballistic missile threat from No-dong missiles,⁶ lead to the decision on co-researching advanced missiles capable of intercepting long-range missiles (using SM-3 IIA)⁷ rather than on the technologically less ambitious Aegis SM-3 Block IA, which was to be deployed following the 2003 decision by Japan, and is also, reportedly, capable of dealing with the short- and medium-range missiles,⁸ including the North Korean No-dongs and Taepo-dongs I?

These secondary-order questions – on GSOMIA and the content of the 1998 co-research decision – as will be argued in the thesis, can be productively approached alongside the central concern of the thesis inside one comprehensive explanatory scheme which will

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- 1 Author's interview with Sugio Takahashi, November 21, 2008, Tokyo. A full list of interviews conducted for this thesis are attached as Appendix A. The Japan Defence Agency was elevated to the Ministry of Defence status in January 2007.
 - 2 Takahashi, “Emerging Missile Defence Issues,” *NIDS News* no. 114 (2007): 4.
 - 3 *Dandou misairu bouei (BMD)-ni kakaru nichibei kyoudou gijutsu kenkyuu-ni kansuru naikaku kanbouchoukan danwa [Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Regarding the Joint US-Japan Technology Research on BMD]*, December 25, 1998, MOD's website: http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2008/2008/html/ks312000.html.
 - 4 *Dandou misairu boueiyou nouryoku koujougata geigeki misairu-ni kansuru nichibei kyoudou kaihatsu-ni kansuru naikaku kanbouchoukan danwa [Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Regarding the US-Japan Joint Development of an Advanced Interceptor for BMD]*, December 24, 2005, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyokan/koizumi/2005/1224danwa.html>.
 - 5 Akinori Uchida, “US Sees North Korea as 'Near-Term Danger,’” *TDY*, February 3, 1999. (Reference to the Pentagon's Defence report released to US President Bill Clinton and US Congress.)
 - 6 *Theatre Missile Defences in the Asia-Pacific Region*, A Henry L. Stimson Centre Working Group Report, Report No. 34 (June 2000) (Washington DC), 62; Swaine et al. *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defence*, 13.
 - 7 “RIM-161 SM-3 Upgrades,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, accessed April 1, 2010, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3-upgrades.htm>.
 - 8 “Raytheon Delivers 100th Standard Missile-3 Block IA to Missile Defence Agency,” *Raytheon News Release*, May 4, 2010, <http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1552&pagetemplate=release>.

focus on the country's security policy strategy and draw on the evidence from the history of international relations in East Asia and the views of security elites with regard to the relevant issues and developments.

The theoretical approach and methodology

The approach, which informed the logic of this research, is what Gideon Rose in a review article termed “neoclassical realism.”¹ According to “neoclassical realists,” the relative material power of a country sets the parameters of its foreign policy but the foreign policy choices within these international systemic parameters are made by the political elites.² Such an approach requires a realist investigation of the systemic constraints and an analysis of domestic element. The latter will be done from the perspective of a broader interpretation of the government ministries³ and from a more eclectic perspective paying attention to a variety of actors. A detailed elaboration of the theoretical approach and methodology of this thesis will be undertaken in Chapter Three.

As regards the evidence analysed in this thesis, the core is represented by the data on the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference (SSC)⁴ and two elite networks – the Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange (CPCE)⁵ and the Congressional National Security Research Group (NSRG, Japan).⁶ This evidence and its significance will be discussed in great detail in Chapters Two, Three, Seven, and Eight. The availability of such data and the history of Japan’s progress toward BMD conditioned the chronological limits of my analysis – 1994-2007.⁷ Two appendices summarising the information on the Conference proceedings

1 Gideon Rose, “Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998).

2 *Ibid.*, 147.

3 As summarised in Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1999), 144-183.

4 Data on the Japan-US SSC available at the NSRG's website: <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum.htm> (accessed August 9, 2010).

5 The website of the CPCE: <http://www.ja-cpce.jp/> (accessed August 9, 2010).

6 The website of the NSRG: <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/> (accessed August 9, 2010).

7 Since the detailed data on these networks only exist for 2000-2007, when the elites met in the format of the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference (called Japan-US Security Forum until 2002), it is justified to set

in the author's translation from Japanese are attached at the end of the thesis.

A number of other primary sources, which mostly consisted of the Japan Business Federation's Defence Production Committee bulletins and Japanese government publications, were also used. Of some value were memoirs/ or longer statements by several Japanese public figures. Access to the informants was limited but I have succeeded in conducting some interviews. The period of negotiating the availability of MOD officials and going through the necessary clearance procedures was 4-5 weeks, which further decreased the number of interviews I was able to conduct. One meaningful and lengthy interview has been conducted with an official from METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry)¹ and one with Sugio Takahashi from MOD's Strategic Planning Office.² Of help for developing my methodological framework was also an interview with John C. Campbell.³ A number of short (5-10 minutes) interviews were conducted in October 2008 and are detailed in the appendix. All the interviews, some of which are discussed in some detail in various chapters, were of certain value for shaping my thinking but, in the end, they turned out to be of secondary importance for this thesis as compared to the data on the Conference and to the periodical publications and analytical works on international relations in East Asia.

The Japanese- and English-language secondary literature, a wide spectrum of newspaper and journal articles were also used extensively.

Significance and novelty of the argument

Chapter 2 will provide extensive and detailed evidence in support of the following

2007 as the upper chronological limit. The BMD decisions under review in this thesis have been made by 2007. In setting the lower limit, the following points had to be taken into account. The Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange functioned under a different name since 1947 but the "Congressional" Group started meeting in 1994. Since this was the year when the post-SDI BMD debate was initiated, the author decided to consider 1994 as the first year of the analysis.

- 1 Author's interview at METI, Tokyo, November 21, 2008. MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) was reorganised into METI in 2001.
- 2 Author's interview with Sugio Takahashi, Tokyo, 2008.
- 3 Author's interview in Tokyo, November 17, 2008.

claims of originality and significance of this thesis for the literature of Japan's BMD and security policy.

- 1) New evidence about elite networks that have probably had some influence in shaping Japan's BMD decisions was uncovered. On the JDA/ MOD-MOFA relationship and power-sharing, it was established that these elite networks were probably dominated by the JDA Directors General.
- 2) An explanation of the apparent puzzle of why Japan adopted BMD, if it can disrupt the country's security policy of hedging, is offered on the basis of an analysis of the evidence on specific elite networks and international relations.
- 3) An overall explanatory scheme is proposed for the BMD decisions, linking together all relevant broad and narrow aspects of the procurement, many of which have either been ignored or only unsatisfactorily answered in the extant literature.

The theoretical significance of the thesis

Speaking in broader theoretical terms, the following can be said about the relationship of the argument of this thesis to alternatives conceived within realism and constructivism, broadly defined. These statements will be fully substantiated in Chapter 2.

The present thesis will be complementary to the realist writings on Japan's continuing remilitarisation in demonstrating BMD's utility and place in the country's military build-up and security strategy. It will be compatible with the existing body of realist accounts of Japan's BMD policy with their emphasis on the North Korean and Chinese threat, and the US pressure, and will improve these accounts through the elucidation of the probable influences of key elite networks on the BMD and related decisions. The contribution of this thesis also consists in posing and answering significant novel questions about the procurement of BMD which are referred to as the central or second-order questions here and

which have been neglected or unsatisfactorily approached in the realist literature.

As regards the relationship of this thesis to key constructivist publications, it can be said that except for some differences in allocating degrees of importance to external and domestic “variables” (or sets of processes), some compatibility, in a broader sense, can be established between the argument of this thesis and key alternative interpretations of Japan's security policy. It will be shown that the constructivists' emphasis on “norms,” “cultures,” and “identity” offers a perspective for understanding such BMD-policy and related aspects, as the country's slow evolution toward the 1998 co-research decision and the nature of the revision of the arms export ban. It will be ascertained that the central and subordinate questions of this thesis were totally ignored by the constructivists. Yet it is not difficult to imagine how the central argument and the evidence on the elite networks discussed in the thesis could be used by constructivist followers to update their arguably flexible arguments on “identity shift” and policy evolution.

Structure of the thesis

The thesis consists of nine chapters, of which the first three present introductory material and the remaining six could be grouped in three substantive parts, each dealing with the following questions:

- 1) Why and how does Japan's BMD procurement matter?
- 2) Who mattered in the procurement of BMD?
- 3) Why were specific BMD and related decisions made?

Such a “double-layered” organisation of the thesis permits a sharper focus on the logic of the investigation and reflects the emphasis of “neoclassical realism” on the international systemic parameters (Why and how does BMD matter?) within which the elites (Who matters?) make choices (Why were the BMD decisions made?).

The first chapters substantiate the research basis of the thesis. In Chapter One, the central and subordinate questions of the thesis are presented and justified, and a short statement of the argument is provided. Chapter Two discusses the extant literatures on Japan's BMD policy and relates the argument of the thesis to the alternatives offered by realism and constructivism in international relations. In many ways, the theoretical review in Chapter Two will also identify and defend some of those elements of the methodological framework of the thesis that relate to the international relations component of neoclassical realism. The methodological underpinnings of the analysis of the domestic element, as well as other issues pertaining to the logic of this research, are specified in Chapter Three. The case for the novelty and appropriateness of the evidence of the argument about the elites is defended in both Chapter Two and Three. Chapter Three will serve as a methodological roadmap for the thesis.

The three substantive parts employ an inductive-deductive approach, allowing the argument to build from chapter to chapter.¹ Part I answers the questions why and how Japan's BMD procurement mattered. The questions are answered by identifying a range of parameters and constraints within which Japan's BMD policy unfolded. For this part, two chapters were written. In the first chapter (Chapter Four), international systemic parameters are analysed. In the first section, a historic approach is used to outline the history of missile defences in Japan and across the world, putting the country's efforts of the 1990-2000s in an international and historic context. The second and the third sections look at North Korea and China, identifying key events and developments which likely had an effect on the course of Japan's progress toward BMD.

1 To very briefly illustrate how this mixed approach worked, it can be noted that inductive reasoning was, for example, applied in the instant when the evidence on the elite networks was discovered from the current affairs news reports in autumn 2007. After my suspicions increased, as I worked through the evidence, that these networks possibly had some influence on the BMD decisions, the evidence and the concept of transnational elite networks were analysed and integrated into the thesis. Deductive reasoning was used, for example, when the central concern of the thesis was substantiated in this chapter, or when the roles of the government organisations in the BMD policy were investigated.

The following chapter (Chapter Five) considers the potential of BMD in reformatting the country's security policy and extends such a discussion beyond the central concern of the thesis. The significance of this chapter is in demonstrating that BMD contained different potentialities within the systemic parameters established in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five, I argue that BMD was likely an instrument of military and military-industrial modernisation for the purpose of longer-term foreign policy management. This argument is developed in three sections. Firstly, how Japan's BMD fits into the US's global power projection and military production systems is discussed, with this theme further developed in the second section on BMD as a tool of implementing the "revolution in military affairs" in Japan. The potentiality of BMD to strengthen the US-Japan alliance while at the same time creating new options for Japan is established. The central question of the thesis can be situated at the heart of this range of potentialities. The chapter is concluded with an analysis of how the build-up of BMD, in light of its potentialities, fits within the country's formal security framework.

Having established the ways in which Japan's BMD procurement is significant, I proceed to Part II, at the centre of which is the question: who mattered in Japan's BMD decisions in 1994-2007? In the first chapter of Part II (Chapter Six), the decisionmaking weight of organisational actors, such as the JDA/ MOD, MOFA, and MITI/ METI is investigated. While allowing me to draw some conclusions about the gains and losses of these organisations from BMD, this analysis will be shown to be insufficient for conclusively answering the "who mattered"- question.

This justifies exploring the subject by using a different lens in the following chapter (Chapter Seven) where a more eclectic approach is employed, paying attention to a variety of actors. This perspective, first, prompts me to investigate the possible influences of the Prime Ministers, then the involvement of political parties in BMD. It is, however, on the basis of the notes from the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference, which, if we count its

predecessor fora, ran from 1994 until 2007, that in the final section of the chapter I am able to investigate two transnational/ transgovernmental elite networks that have probably had some influence on shaping the country's BMD decisions.

The naming of the groups and individuals, who have probably had some influence on the BMD decisions, enables me to progress to Part III, in which I analyse why specific BMD and related decisions were made. In the first chapter of this part (Chapter Eight), the core argument of the thesis is developed in response to the main question about why Japan procured BMD if it could lead to a discontinuity in the country's hedging security policy. Through three sections of the chapter, I propose an answer. In the first section, a logical structure of the BMD procurement's implications is designed, which shows that BMD related to space security, international relations management, and defence industrial base, and that each of these "nodes" of interests is in a mutually implicative relationship with one another. Importantly, I conclude that the country's BMD together with the associated questions and issues, the list of which is expanded beyond those mentioned in Chapter One, can be adequately understood inside this logical structure. In the second section of the chapter, I illustrate what the objectives of the security elites were. I also investigate what they did, as acknowledged by themselves, or likely did, as can be presumed on the basis of the evidence, to steer the BMD procurement process in their preferred direction, creating a situation which became the central and the second-order concerns of the thesis. Each of the questions receives an answer in the third section. There, I conclude that, while a "nodal" structure is appropriate for considering the BMD's implications and questions in an ordered way, a hierarchical structure of causes in line with neoclassical realism explains the country's move toward BMD. In the second chapter of Part III (Chapter Nine), which is also the concluding chapter of the thesis, the argument and the statement of the significance and novelty of the argument are provided, the post-2007 evidence on the BMD policy reflected

upon, and questions for future research presented.

Summary

The introductory material of this thesis, that is, the research question, its premise, the theoretical approach, and methodology, was organised in three chapters – with Chapter One giving a concise version of this material, Chapter Two being an extensive literature review written for the purpose of demonstrating the place of this thesis within a range of alternative approaches to the research topic, and Chapter Three elaborating the theoretical and methodological framework. Such an organisation was justified on the ground that the central concern of the thesis points to a complex issue area which lies at the intersection of weapons procurement and security policy considerations and which has many “moving parts.” As a result, a comprehensive but “streamlined” introductory chapter with an emphasis on the research questions was advisable, complemented by a separate, very detailed investigation of the literature, followed by an exhaustive consideration of the theoretical-methodological underpinnings of the present research.

Below are seven points recapitulating the contribution of Chapter One.

Firstly, the main research question and my preferred answer were clearly and concisely presented at the very beginning of the chapter: BMD was procured despite its military-technological potential to disrupt the current hedging strategy vis-à-vis the US and China because it helps to move Japanese policy from one hedging policy to another, that is, from one based on self-imposed restraints toward one exercised from the position of military strength, with the implication that such a reformatting of hedging minimises the potential disruptiveness of BMD.

Secondly, the premise of the core question was described at length as having its origin in the “security dilemma” in alliance politics.

Thirdly, subordinate research questions were identified and justified. These questions were: Why was GSOMIA signed after decades of successful resistance by Japan? Why was the decision on co-research of an advanced sea-based interceptor (SM-3 IIA) made in 1998 and the decision on deploying an earlier version of the SM-3 interceptor taken only in 2003?

Fourthly, neoclassical realism was presented as the approach of this thesis with its focus on the systemic parameters within which elites make security policy choices.

Fifthly, the relationship of the whole argument of this thesis to the alternative realist and constructivist interpretations was briefly described as, in different ways and to varying degrees, complementary to, compatible with, or challenging the BMD policy-related arguments contained in extant publications. Providing extensive evidence for this claim is the purpose of Chapter Two, in particular, but also, to some extent, the whole thesis. In Chapter Two, the extant arguments will be discussed and challenged in a manner indicating and defending the ways in which this thesis seeks to contribute to knowledge.

Sixthly, new evidence was proposed as an important part of the basis of the analysis of the BMD decisions. The evidence referred to the proceedings of the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference which, together with its predecessors, ran from 1994 to 2007, thus setting the chronological limits for this research. This evidence is important for many of the novel conclusions of this research. The significance of this evidence will be defended in Chapters Two, Three, and Seven.

Seventhly, the structure of the thesis was clearly described as consisting of two layers. On one level, it consists of three substantive parts answering the following, somewhat pointedly formulated questions: Why and how does Japan's BMD procurement matter? Who mattered in the procurement of BMD? Why were specific BMD and related decisions made? On the other level, each part comprises two chapters drawing on a number of theoretical perspectives. The three parts are preceded by three introductory chapters of lead-in material.

CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL AND LITERATURE REVIEW.

In this chapter, I would like to test my main argument against a range of alternatives and thus also to bolster the argument by showing how it relates to other compatible and/ or competing propositions.

The discussion will proceed in the following two big steps. Firstly, an extensive review will be undertaken of a selected range of literature published from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s. The literature in that section can be described as being part of the realist paradigm, broadly defined. The material will be organised chronologically, which will permit demonstrating the development of knowledge in the field, since these publications were appearing as the BMD process itself was unfolding, presenting new evidence at different times of the period. This extensive review of the realist literature will be preceded by an outline of key tenets of realism and some variations within that approach to studying international relations. Three mainstream, general realist accounts of Japan's recent security policy will also be dwelt upon. The review will be followed by a summary of how the existing body of the realist literature on BMD dealt with the thesis subject and the core question, and how the argument put forward in the thesis compares to extant research. This necessarily large realist section will be followed by a discussion of a popular alternative explanation of Japan's security policy, that is, constructivism.¹ As with realism, the theoretical approach, on the insights from which the researchers under review drew, will be presented in general terms, followed by a selection of constructivist appraisals of Japan's security and BMD policy.

1 It should be noted that in many publications the authors were quite eclectic and relied on a number of models. As a result, the line between the realist and constructivist literatures on Japan's security policy and BMD is drawn on the basis of the role attributed by the authors to the effects of material capabilities on security policy. Admittedly, this distinction can sometimes be questionable. Furthermore, a note should also be made of the fact that apart from the broader realist and constructivist appraisals, a domestic/ bureaucratic politics model is also thinkable. A theoretical discussion of this model and some of the underlying literature will be undertaken in Chapter Three where it will strengthen the methodological framework of the thesis. And in this chapter, some aspects of this model will be covered from the perspective of the ways in which they were utilised to explain Japan's security and BMD policy in the literatures roughly classified here as realist and constructivist.

2.1. Realism and Japan's BMD policy

2.1.1. Overview of Realism¹

A basic feature of the realist theory and practice of international relations is a deeply pessimistic view of human nature² which led one scholar to justly conclude that “much of realism can be read as a sophisticated form of fatalism.”³ Thucydides, as an antecedent of classical realism, established this dark tone in discussions of human nature followed by other realists.⁴ He wrote of human nature as “always ready to offend even where laws exist” and “as something incapable of controlling passion.”⁵ This “ineradicable tendency to evil” is often cited as the first realist assumption.⁶ Further assumptions include the emphasis on state as the only really important (and unitary) actor of anarchic⁷ international politics,⁸ the struggle for power as a persistent characteristic of social life,⁹ and, most importantly, that a rational analysis of “interests defined in terms of power”¹⁰ can yield an understanding of international politics.¹¹

Despite the fact that these general propositions are typically shared by realist writers, realism appears in the literature in a “variety of guises.”¹² Different classifications of realist works and researchers exist,¹³ and are sometimes controversial,¹⁴ but for the purposes of this

1 This subsection is meant as a very basic and selective outline. The footnotes will provide some more depth and breadth to the outline. The purpose is to present the pool of realist insights on which the BMD researchers have explicitly or presumably drawn in their work. These insights will also be used in Chapter Four of this thesis where the international systemic constraints on Japan's BMD policy will be discussed.

2 Michael Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Louisiana State UP, 1986), 1.

3 Barry Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?” In *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge UP, 1996), 61.

4 Smith, *Realist Thought*, 9.

5 Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, book III, sec. on Civil War in Corcyra, par. 84, 245.

6 Smith, *Realist Thought*, 219.

7 “Anarchic” here implies absence and even impossibility of any structure of authority above states to which they would voluntarily consent. *Ibid.*, 3.

8 *Ibid.*, 219.

9 *Ibid.*, 1, 220.

10 Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5.

11 Smith, *Realist Thought*, 221.

12 *Ibid.*, 3.

13 For example, “practical realism” versus “technical realism” in: Richard Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests,” *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (1981); or a more popular distinction between “classical realism” and “structural realism” referred to, for example, in: Chris Brown, “Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature,” *International Relations* 23, no. 2 (2009); or “classical” and “neo-realism” (structural realism) in, for example: Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom,” 47-51.

14 Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed.

thesis a common, simplistic distinction into classical and neo- or structural realism is used, according to which classical realists, in particular Hans Morgenthau,¹ focussed on the human nature as the source of power politics,² and neo-realists³ were mostly pre-occupied with the structure at the international system level.⁴

The neo-realist literature is very rich and diverse. Two works can be cited as representative of “defensive”⁵ and “offensive” realism. One is Kenneth Waltz’s “Theory of international politics” from 1979,⁶ the other is John Mearsheimer’s “The tragedy of great power politics” from 2001.⁷ Both works argue that the anarchic structure of the international system, that is, the absence of an international authority to impose order, is the root of security competition between states. Where Waltz and Mearsheimer diverge is over the question how states maximise security. For Waltz, the “self-help” international system induces states to maintain a balance of power: “The first concern of states is not to maximise power but to maintain their positions in the system.”⁸ Waltz further clarified this point by saying, “The expectation is not that a balance, once achieved, will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another.”⁹ Mearsheimer did not find such “defensiveness” of states plausible and argued that “survival mandates [calculated] aggressive behaviour”¹⁰ with the ultimate objective of achieving regional hegemony which

Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). In his chapter, Gilpin vigorously rebutted Ashley's classification of Gilpin's approach as “neo-realism.” (Ashley's contribution in the same volume: Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Keohane).

1 Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*.

2 *Ibid.*, 4.

3 The most notable example is: Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston, 1979).

4 Although it must be noted that realism uses all three levels – system, unit (mostly, state), individual (and on the sub-levels between – sub-system/ regional, bureaucratic) – while favouring the systemic and the individual levels. Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom,” 51-52.

5 Some other notable and, as some would argue, more accurate examples of defensive realism than Waltz (1979) are: Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994-1995); Charles Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (1997); Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” *International Security* 24, no. 1 (1999).

6 Waltz, *Theory*.

7 John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (NY and London, 2001).

8 Waltz, *Theory*, 126.

9 *Ibid.*, 128.

10 Mearsheimer, *Tragedy*, 21.

means that in a self-help system of international politics the best guarantee of survival for a great power is “to be the most powerful state in the system.”¹

The concept of the balance of power is an “ancient notion” in the field of international relations.² Its critics in the scholarly community have described it as an “ambiguous concept” with “too many meanings.”³ The following colourful statement by a statesman in the nineteenth-century Britain is also sometimes quoted by critics: “the theory of a balance of power is a mere chimera – a creation of the politician's brain – a phantasm, without definite form or tangible existence – a mere conjunction of syllables, forming words which convey sound without meaning.”⁴ Nevertheless, while remaining a highly contested concept,⁵ the balance (and balancing⁶) of power has remained central to realist thinking.⁷

2.1.2. Broader realist views of Japan's current security policy developments

Three experts, a selection of whose works will be dwelt upon below because of their centrality to the mainstream literature, concurred at a general, paradigmatic level on

1 Ibid., 33.

2 Inis Claude, *Power and International Relations* (NY: Random House, 1962), 11.

3 Ibid., 13-39. Claude wrote his book before Waltz's *Theory* but after the publication of Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*.

4 Claude, *Power*, 13. (Richard Cobden's words.)

5 For example, John Vasquez, among other scholars, criticised semantic reformulations to save realism as degenerative (in Lakatosian terms) when he discussed Stephen Walt, who on the material of the Middle East diplomacy concluded that states did not balance power, as Walt predicted, but balanced against threats, which clearly falsified Waltz but was called by Walt a “refinement of traditional balance of power theory.” John Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism* (Cambridge UP, 1998), 251-86; Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1987).

6 In addition to (external) balancing outlined above and in the section on the premise of the core question, other key concepts to describe balance-of-power politics include bandwagoning, which means allying with the strongest power, or hegemon, rather than against it (Waltz, *Theory*, 126); buck-passing when states “count on third parties to bear the costs of stopping a rising hegemon.” (Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” *International Organisation* 44, no. 2 (1990): 138.) The economic aspects of such strategies, aimed at accumulating economic wealth which could be translated into power and an independent policy if the need arose at some point, were, for example, discussed by: Mark Brawley, “The Political Economy of Balance of Power Theory,” in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, ed. TV Paul, James Wirtz and Michael Fortmann (Stanford UP, 2004), 76-99. Applied to Japan's case, the relationship between economic and military power in the country's security policy was dealt with in: Hughes, *Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea* (London, NY: Routledge, 1999).

7 Michael Sheehan, *Balance of Power: History and Theory* (London, NY: Routledge, 1996), 196; An attempt at exploring new relevance of balancing of states in current international politics by paying great attention to the difference between hard and soft balancing (ie, tacit, short of formal alliances) is: *Balance of Power*, ed. Paul et al.

pragmatism/ realism¹ as the defining features of Japan's foreign and security policy and on "normalisation"²/ "remilitarisation" as the trend, towards which it was geared. These renowned researchers of Japan's security policy and military affairs are Michael Green (US), Christopher Hughes (UK), and Richard Samuels (US).³ In 2001, Michael Green observed that in Japan there was "a greater focus on balance of power"⁴ and "a more determined push for 'independent' foreign policy."⁵ Significantly, Green concluded that as a result of international material changes, domestic power anxieties, and aspirations for a national identity "reluctant realism" was emerging, which he called at the time "a strategic view" rather than "a coherent strategy."⁶ Interestingly for the discussion of hedging in this thesis, Green also noted that "political leadership in Japan still required leaders to act with ambiguity" and that the "changing patterns of foreign and security policy were therefore not being trumpeted with strategic concepts or doctrines."⁷

In 2004, Christopher Hughes offered a stronger conclusion when he argued that Japan was "undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive or 'normal' military power."⁸ Hughes also predicted a further shift in the overall security strategy away from a "traditionally low-profile approach to regional military affairs."⁹ In

1 Green's "reluctant" realism can be interpreted as paying some attention to cultural norms and identity. Michael Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism. Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (NY: Palgrave, 2001).

2 The term "normal state" (in reference to Japan) was occasionally invoked in public discourse in postwar Japan. An important exponent of the concept (as *zairaigata kokka*) in the 1980s was Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. Later, the concept (as *futsuu-no kuni*) was popularised by a prominent political figure Ichiro Ozawa. Essentially, the term came to imply the country's ability of military power projection, or, as Ozawa put it, a nation that can participate in international (UN) peacekeeping activities. (Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan: the Rethinking of a Nation* (NY: Kodansha International, 1994), 93-121.) It must be admitted that the term was conceived by Ozawa to include not only a set of traditional security requirements but also a wider range of pro-active efforts in areas of international development, trade, environmental protection.

3 The views of Green, Hughes, and Samuels are certainly not the only voices in the mainstream research of Japanese security policy. Nevertheless, in addition to being correctly considered authoritative, they are also representative of the core of the mainstream, realist scholarly literature, particularly as relevant to the main concern of the thesis.

4 Green, *Reluctant Realism*, 6.

5 *Ibid.*, 7.

6 *Ibid.*, 8.

7 *Ibid.*, 74.

8 Christopher Hughes, "Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power," *IISS Adelphi Papers* 368-9 (2004), 18.

9 *Ibid.*, 21.

2009, when analysing Japan's security stance, Hughes re-emphasised the country's "continuing remilitarisation."¹ Hughes's "remilitarisation" argument was convincing on the whole because of the comprehensiveness of his assessment of this process, tracing down indicators of "remilitarisation" in the changes of the military doctrines and capabilities, civilian-military relations, domestic and transnational military-industrial complexes, external military power projection, formal and informal "antimilitaristic principles."

Another observer of Japan Richard Samuels proclaimed in 2007 that "there has been no more pragmatic or more rational state than Japan."² He then indirectly picked an argument with Green by calling Japan's leaders, "whether mainstream or antimainstream," "persistent rather than 'reluctant' realists."³ Regarding any pacifist alternative, Samuels noted that its role in public discourse was "important," but that the pacifists were "indulged" and "used" by mainstream conservatives.⁴ In tune with Hughes, Samuels was also emphatic about Japan acquiring "a more expeditionary [military] profile" and about it being "poised to assume a global role."⁵

On the security policy strategy, Samuels in 2007 made a prediction about the "Goldilocks consensus" replacing the Yoshida doctrine.⁶ He explicitly unpacked the meaning of this "Goldilocks strategy" in an earlier article of 2006. There Samuels envisioned that Japan would create a "post-Yoshida policy space" where it could play "selectively pivotal" roles in world affairs.⁷ On its way to this condition, Japan would be "cautious," "normal" and would "hedge".⁸ Furthermore, according to Samuels, it would be "neither too close to China nor too far from the United States,"⁹ or as he put it in the book, "[neither] too dependent on

1 Hughes, "Japan's Remilitarisation," *IISS Adelphi* 403 (2009), 19.

2 R. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Cornell UP, 2007), 7.

3 *Ibid.*, 189.

4 *Ibid.*, 189.

5 *Ibid.*, 181.

6 *Ibid.*, 209.

7 Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2006): 125.

8 *Ibid.*

9 *Ibid.*

the United States [n]or too vulnerable to China.”¹ He also expected the consensus to be “not too hard but not too soft, not too Asian and not too Western.”² Samuels reported in passing about the existence of those in Japan who “worry” that the BMD-induced operational coordination “will entangle Japan in a [US] pre-emptive strike”³ but the way he presented this reference demonstrated to me his avoidance of this point.

It can be concluded that the main concern of this thesis was not directly addressed in the core realist publications reviewed above. At the same time, it can be noted that the puzzling questions of Japan's BMD procurement were not entirely unanswerable within the frameworks proposed by Hughes and Samuels. Specifically, some aspects of the role of BMD in the country's remilitarisation will be identified in the following sections of the literature review in this chapter and in the main parts of the thesis. Furthermore, the “Goldilocks consensus” argument which points to a putative replacement for the Yoshida doctrine is clearly in a complementary relationship with the argument put forward in this thesis. In this sense, the present thesis is a continuation of these publications.

In a similar way, this thesis will corroborate and bring up to date with reference to BMD Green's earlier finding from 2001 about “a more determined push for 'independent' policy”⁴ in Japan. In relation to his overall argument of Japan's “reluctant” realism,⁵ evidence on the potentialities of BMD and the elite networks will be discussed in this thesis to support, to a certain degree, the proposition that Japan has in fact pro-actively devised its security strategy and BMD policy.

1 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 9.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 175.

4 Green, *Reluctant Realism*, 7.

5 Green wrote that “the debate over Japan's identity and strategy at the dawn of the twenty-first century... has established one new principle that will have important implications for the conduct of Japanese foreign policy in the future. That principle is simply that Japan must take more pro-active steps to defend its position in international society and that these steps can no longer be defined by the US-Japan alliance or by facile assumptions about economic interdependence alone...” (ibid., 31-32)

2.1.3. Chronological review of extant realist attempts at explaining Japan's BMD procurement¹

This subsection is organised in three categories reflecting an important international event and a BMD policy decision: research on Japan's BMD procurement policy completed before the August 1998 Taepo-dong launch, and before and after the 2003 deployment decision.

This subsection will argue the following:

Firstly, it will be shown that US pressure, and the Chinese and North Korean threat are the most frequently invoked explanatory "variables," often as part of a multifactorial mix.

Secondly, it will be ascertained that the main concern of the thesis was in most cases left unaddressed, in some cases – mentioned but not elaborated, with no sustained engagement with it available in the literature with the exception of Hughes's work from 2001/2002.

Thirdly, evidence will be provided to demonstrate how confused and even contradictory, when considered collectively, the available realist interpretations of Japan's BMD decisions are. To cite one specific example of opposite explanations, the 2003 procurement decision by the government of Japan was described as "forced" by the US in one respected publication² and as taken independently by Japan in another one³ both of which were published in the US in 2006-2007.

Fourthly, examples of mainstream literature will be presented in which it is argued that some issues were "delinked" from the the procurement of BMD for the purpose of managing public opinion. The particular issue reviewed was the "delinking" of the spy

1 The author would like to note that the literature reviewed here gives a representative picture of the state of the extant research of BMD, even with its emphasis on the English-language publications. (Two key recent Japanese-language publications from 2007 are included in the review).

2 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 104.

3 Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy*, 107, 107-109.

satellites programme from the BMD debates. Such an observation stimulated this research in the direction of analysing all other such “delinked” aspects of Japan’s security policy and BMD procurement inside one logical structure.

Fifthly, some interesting observations will be noted on the potential of BMD in implementing security policy change, particularly with respect to exercise of collective defence and the terms of the US-Japan security alliance. Such arguments strengthened the emphasis of this research on the relationship between Japan’s security policy and BMD.

Sixthly, one scholarly mention of the evidence on the two elite networks under investigation in this thesis – the National Security Research Group and Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange – as important examples of US-Japan military, industrial, and political links was uncovered. The rich and publicly available evidence on these elites was not researched in the literature, suggesting an area in which this thesis will contribute to knowledge.

Just before the 1998 Taepo-dong “shock”: Two American and two Japanese views

There are several publications that I would like to review for this period. The authors of these publications are Michael Green, a defence policy expert Michael O’Hanlon, and, on the Japanese side, Masahiro Matsumura, an academic with expertise in Japan-US security relations and military technology cooperation. In 1997, Green predicted that as a result of regional “strategic uncertainties” and proliferation of WMDs, BMD would “likely remain a central focus of the US-Japan alliance well into the next century.”¹ Parallel to his invocations of the ballistic missiles proliferation, he made a statement in which he implicitly expressed that there was only one option he envisaged for Japan, that is, to participate in the US BMD: Some TMD system (certainly lower-tier and probably upper-tier) will be deployed by the US

1 Green, “Theatre Missile Defence and Strategic Relations with the People’s Republic of China,” in *Restructuring the US-Japan Alliance: Toward a More Equal Partnership*, ed. Ralph Cossa (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1997), 111.

forces around the globe in the next century, regardless of the political decision taken by Japan. It is not politically tenable for the United States to protect its forces in Japan and leave the Japanese population exposed.¹

Regarding the main concern of this thesis, Green noted that the “greatest challenge” to the US-Japan BMD cooperation was “its impact on the strategic relations with the People’s Republic of China,”² but he did not dwell on all the implications for Japan. An interesting and characteristic recommendation he made, which could be seen as addressing the interests of both the US and Japan, was that Japan and the US “should use missile defence cooperation as a tool to pry open Chinese nuclear doctrine and capabilities to greater international scrutiny.”³ As my review of Green’s subsequent publications on BMD will demonstrate below, he has not repeated such a prescription afterwards.

Michael O’Hanlon from the Brookings Institution also urged Japan in 1997 to fully participate in BMD cooperation even though he considered the promise of BMD as “unclear because of technical uncertainties over the systems being developed and an uncertain future security environment in Northeast Asia.”⁴ O’Hanlon opined that the systems, including the navy upper-tier, could work against a “simple threat,” such as a North Korean or an accidental or unauthorised Chinese attack, but he expected that Japan’s deployment of the next-generation BMD “would not make it safe from Chinese [full-fledged] attack in any case.”⁵ He emphatically repeated this point six years later.⁶ In 2003, he concluded that more technologically promising than mid-course interceptors, such as the SM-3 under research, was the boost-phase interception, that is, immediately after a missile launch before it separated various rocket stages, acquired high speed, and had a chance to deploy decoys.

1 Ibid., 112-113.

2 Ibid., 111.

3 Ibid., 116.

4 Michael O’Hanlon, “Theatre Missile Defence and the US-Japan Alliance,” in *Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring US-Japan Security Relations*, ed. Mochizuki (Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 179, 187.

5 Ibid., 185-186.

6 O’Hanlon, “The ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and Security in Asia,” in *Reinventing the Alliance: US-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change*, ed. John G. Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (NY, 2003), 170, 183.

O'Hanlon underscored that such a system, based on land, at sea, or in the air, was "more likely to be consistent with good relations with China" since it could not engage intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from China's interior.¹ Overall, O'Hanlon believed that there would be no "serious problems" with Japan's deployment of BMD.²

A view diverging with the above was expressed in Matsumura's essay "Deploying Theatre Missile Defence Flexibly: A US-Japan Response to China."³ It was published in 1998 but was very likely completed before the end of 1997, that is, before the August 1998 Taepo-dong launch. Matsumura argued in the following way. Since China posed a "great potential threat," about which there was "uncertainty," he urged the US and Japan to devise a policy towards China consisting of both the stick and the carrot.⁴ Theatre Missile Defence, in his opinion, was "a primary component of the stick, designed to send countereffective signals to China's nuclear missiles."⁵

In 1997, Japan still had not officially decided on the configuration of the BMD system it desired from among four types of systems. Matsumura reasoned that the choice of the system, as well as the decisions on the R&D, production, and deployment should be made as "a stage-by-stage flexible response to an evolving geostrategic environment in East Asia."⁶ The only "factor" of this "environment" that Matsumura ever mentioned was China. In a fairly lucid manner, he elaborated three "policy packages" in response to China's possible strategic choices. If China chooses to follow an accommodative path with an emphasis on global interdependence, which Matsumura considered unlikely "for the foreseeable future",⁷ Japan and the US "should not deploy any TMD system in Japan or any

1 Ibid., 171.

2 O'Hanlon, "Theatre Missile Defence," 187.

3 Masahiro Matsumura, "Deploying Theatre Missile Defence Flexibly: A US-Japan Response to China," in *Old Issues, New Responses: Japan's Foreign & Security Policy Options*, ed. Masashi Nishihara (Tokyo, New York: JCIE, 1998). Matsumura's essay was also published in Japanese as: Matsumura, *Nichibei doumei to gunji gijutsu [US-Japan Alliance and Military Technology]* (Tokyo: Keisou Shobou, 1999), Chapter 6.

4 Matsumura, *Deploying*, 103.

5 Ibid., 104.

6 Ibid., 105.

7 Ibid., 112.

part of Northeast Asia.”¹ If China decides to follow a prudent *realpolitik* path, Japan should deploy PAC-3 (a ground-based lower-tier system) and send a political signal to China by conducting R&D for the sea-based upper-tier interceptor.² If China follows a hegemonic path, Japan and the US should deploy PAC-3, indicate that they are prepared to install THAAD (a ground-based upper-tier system), and complete R&D for the sea-based upper-tier missile which was then known as LEAP (Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile).³

Matsumura concluded in a prescriptive manner:

If strategic stability should break down in Northeast Asia, the United States and Japan would need to accelerate and complete R&D activities for the LEAP projects, and then form an effective sea-based upper-tier TMD shield against China. ... Thus it is critically important for Japan to make a general but explicit commitment to R&D projects for sea-based, upper-tier TMD systems as soon as possible.⁴

– Invocation leads to epiphany, par excellence? Has Matsumura unlike many researchers, who produced volumes on Japan’s security policy and BMD after 1998, simply been fortunate to have been able to publish before the “fog” of the North Korean threat “descended” on everyone? Or did Matsumura produce his article “under the fumes” exhausted by the Chinese missiles in the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996?⁵

Matsumura’s “policy-prescriptive” argument, if it indeed represented all of the thinking behind Japan’s BMD policy, would have made the main concern of this thesis, as well as some of the questions I put in in this chapter redundant because many of the questions stop making sense if Japan’s BMD was always exclusively conceived of as a means of addressing “China’s rise.” I am in many ways sympathetic to Matsumura’s argument because I can share his “realist” inclinations, “uncontaminated” by the “variable” of the North Korean missile threat or any other “factors.” There are several other essays which Matsumura also wrote in 1997-1998. Those essays focused more on the alliance

1 Ibid., 113-114.

2 Ibid., 114-115.

3 Ibid., 115-116.

4 Ibid., 116.

5 The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 will be considered in Chapter Four.

management issues arising from the procurement of BMD. This indicates that while on the basis of his contribution to Nishihara's volume, reprinted in other publications too, his China policy prescriptions could be interpreted as the most significant aspect of Japan's BMD policy, his work on the implications of BMD procurement for the command and control systems within the alliance justified my core question. His work on command and control structures and BMD will be touched upon later.

Research completed before Japan's deployment decision of 2003: Setting the parameters of the subsequent BMD policy analysis

A trio of authors – Patrick Cronin, Paul Giarra, and Michael Green – discussed BMD in their chapter of a book on the US-Japan alliance which appeared in 1999 and hence incorporated the “Taepo-dong shock” evidence.¹ Their overall interpretation of the BMD rationale could be interpreted as having been expressed in their opening sentence:

In a world in which law-abiding nations like the United States and Japan could be subjected to blackmail by nuclear or biologically tipped missiles controlled by Kim Jong-il or Saddam Hussein, the strategic arguments for bilateral cooperation on Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) are compelling.²

Having communicated their enthusiasm for Japan's involvement with BMD in this way and on many other occasions throughout their text, the authors designated BMD as a “manifold political, strategic, doctrinal and technical challenge for the alliance.”³ In their chapter, Cronin et al. tried with some success to unpack the content of that challenge, as seen in Tokyo and Washington, and offered policy prescriptions.

Cronin et al. discussed at some length the background of the current BMD. They traced BMD back to the 1989-1993 Westpac missile defence study. They described Japan's involvement until 1993 as “excruciatingly distant official technical participation” which was

1 Patrick Cronin, Paul Giarra and Michael Green, “The Alliance Implications of Theatre Missile Defence,” in *The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Green and Cronin (NY: CFR, 1999).

2 *Ibid.*, 170.

3 *Ibid.*

“marginal” to the US programme.¹ By 1993, with the aggravation of trade tensions, Washington recalibrated its BMD approach to Japan in terms of “technology reciprocity,” which produced little positive effect. When the Americans realised that they “overplayed their hand,” they recast BMD as an “alliance management” issue. Following that, according to Cronin et al., the JDA had “concluded internally” by 1997 to cooperate on NTW which is an upper-tier sea-based interceptor system. The authors noted that the US and Japan Navies, the Japanese shipbuilding industry exerted “significant pressure” to that effect.² Yet the formal decision had to be postponed “due to lack of consensus” inside Japan and “because of pressure from Beijing.”³ On the lack of consensus, Cronin et al. expressed their surprise that within the LDP there were concerns about the opposition to BMD from China “despite the clear implications for Japanese security of China’s demonstration of the ballistic missile capabilities of the PLA against Taiwan in March 1996.”⁴

Calling a procurement strategically imperative because of a threatening external environment and describing the technology used in the procurement as cost-ineffective and unreliable; calling strategic arguments for BMD compelling and ascribing significant influence on the definition of the procurement process to the US and Japanese Navies and industries, which should be assumed to be pursuing self-aggrandisement rather than national interests, – is anything but unequivocal. Such a lack of parsimony in explaining BMD could be attributed to the nature of BMD itself as Cronin et al. indicated: “There are now so many moving parts to TMD that management of its progress would be very difficult.”⁵ Whether as the result of the BMD procurement process itself or of the convictions of the beholder, such a “multi-factorial” approach became a kind of a standard for most general BMD-policy analyses by the late 2000s.

1 Ibid., 172.

2 Ibid., 173.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 180.

Regarding my main question, Cronin et al. dwelt on the implications of BMD for Japan's security policymaking toward the US, but largely ignored what BMD meant for Japan's security policy capacity towards China and the underlying strategic thinking in Japan. Their best paragraph on the BMD's "implications for strategic relations [of Japan] with China" indicates a lack of sustained attention to the issue:

Japan is increasingly willing to hedge in its long-term view of Chinese intentions and stability, but remains focused on improving relations with Beijing. Fear of confrontation with China over defence-related issues such as TMD can have a major impact on internal Japanese decision-making.¹

Curiously, in contrast to the enthusiasm for BMD almost universally displayed by the US experts on Japan (with the most notable exception of Anthony DiFilippo²), the China specialists, who were analysing the security dilemma in East Asia around the same time, considered the development of the US theatre missile defence without the Japanese participation. This was, for example, Thomas Christensen's view in 1999.³ He argued that the US development of missile defences without Japan could lead to multiple benefits for the stability of international relations in East Asia and for the longevity of the US-Japan alliance.⁴ Military experts outside the circle of "Japan handlers" have also drawn attention to the availability of alternatives in the missile defence procurement. Patrick O'Donogue, a US Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel, while advocating TMD for Japan and South Korea, elaborated in 2000 the alternative of pursuing THAAD instead of NTW (SM-3 Aegis), that is, upper-tier land-based rather than an upper-tier sea-based BMD.⁵ Because of land-based THAAD's "relative immobility," O'Donogue argued, it would not cover Taiwan and hence

1 Ibid., 178.

2 Anthony DiFilippo, *The Challenges of the US-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment* (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2002).

3 Reprinted later as: Thomas Christensen, "China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," in *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, ed. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (Columbia UP, 2003), 25-56.

4 Christensen, "China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (1999): 75-78.

5 Patrick M. O'Donogue, *Theatre Missile Defence in Japan: Implications for the US-China-Japan Strategic Relationship* (2000), 23-24.

be more palatable to China.

Of course, this would raise new US-Japan concerns, particularly with cooperative development and less Japanese industrial participation in a more mature system. But it may be worth this price not to overtly antagonise Beijing.¹

RAND researchers in 2001 observed that toward the end of the Clinton administration, the “US enthusiasm” for Japanese involvement in TMD lessened “because of the continued lukewarm level of Japan’s actual involvement.”² In light of this, as well as O’Donogue’s statement and Christensen’s argument, I felt compelled to pause for a moment to “think the unthinkable” within the mainstream literature – was it the “US pressure” which led to Japan’s decisions on the upper-tier interceptor research in 1998, the two-tier BMD procurement in 2003, and the upper-tier BMD development in 2005 or rather the “Japan pressure” which induced the US to support Japan’s decisions?!

Returning to the mainstream Japan experts in the US, Michael Green in a single-authored essay in 2000 concluded that considerations of Beijing’s reaction played a role in Japan’s BMD decisions, but not in the way suggested by Matsumura. For Green, “Beijing’s resistance complicated Japan’s participation in TMD.”³ On the major determinants of Japan’s decisions, Green concluded that, “Years of US prodding and a growing recognition in Japan of the [North Korean] missile threat finally paid off,”⁴ when Japan agreed to joint research with the US in 1998.

Green in 2000 noted that “technology was exacerbating Japan’s dilemma between entrapment and abandonment.”⁵ He made this remark when discussing the RMA, or the “revolution in military affairs,” of which the US-Japan cooperation was presented as an “example.” Green envisioned that if the 1998 co-research decision subsequently enabled joint development and deployment in Japan, “the two nations will face a virtually integrated

1 Ibid., 24.

2 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 22-23.

3 Green, “The Challenges of Managing US-Japan Security Relations after the Cold War,” in *New Perspectives on US-Japan Relations*, ed. Curtis (Tokyo, NY: JCIE, 2000), 255.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 248.

command and control unlike anything experienced in the previous five decades of the alliance.”¹ Japan’s dilemma of whether to “plug in” to such a system or not was worsened by the possibility that the US, as a result of such operational integration, “may be tempted” to unilateral action at the expense of Japan since the RMA would leave little time for decision coordination in a crisis.² As can be inferred from Green’s words, he probably saw little problem in such a possible sidelining of Japan:

Strategically, it is difficult to argue that regional stability or US and Japanese interests would be enhanced by changing the configuration of the alliance to give Japan a military role more symmetrical with that of the US.³

Green observed in 2000 that after Jiang Zemin’s November 1998 visit to Tokyo, “Japan’s view of China had shifted from a faith in economic interdependence to a reluctant realism.”⁴ Green’s emphasis on “reluctant realism” as an analytical construct capturing the shifts in Japan’s security policy grew into a more elaborate and lengthy argument in the form of a book in 2001,⁵ on which I shall dwell in the theoretical part of the literature review. For Green in 2001, BMD, “though costly and uncertain in terms of technical feasibility,” enjoyed the support of Japanese industry, the JDA, and MOFA “as an alliance-enhancer, a technology driver, and a buttress for the US nuclear deterrent against North Korean and Chinese ballistic missiles.”⁶ Green reported that the BMD co-research “was seen in Tokyo and Washington as stabilising and reinforcing the status quo against new threats.”⁷ Furthermore, after the Taepo-dong launch, “Chinese objections alone were no longer enough to derail TMD.”⁸ This could be interpreted to mean that in 2001 as in 2000, unlike in 1997, Green did not consider the BMD procurement process as a tool of managing “China’s rise” and of encouraging Beijing to more transparency in the doctrinal and numerical objectives of China’s nuclear strategy.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 261.

4 Ibid., 253.

5 Green, *Reluctant Realism*.

6 Ibid., 92.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., 93.

Green in 2000 briefly mentioned the challenge that the BMD and RMA technology posed to Japan's security dilemma, but, as is clear particularly from the concluding chapter of the 2001 book, he did not pay much attention to this point. In the Conclusion, Green proposed that in the event of China's decision to use force against Taiwan, Japan's foreign policy may suffer a "sudden and discontinuous change."¹ But when deliberating about what Japan would do "immediately," "in the short term," and "in the longer term," depending "on the nature of the attack, the provocation or reason, and the manner in which the United States called on Japan for support,"² Green apparently forgot about the point he himself made in 2000 about the RMA and BMD that "there will be no time for cabinet meetings" when the US and Japanese air defence commanders will have to respond to hostile missiles "in a matter of minutes."³

Overall, I can conclude that Green's own view after 1998 on why BMD was procured was probably expressed when he wrote of "US prodding" and "a growing recognition of the [North Korean] missile threat." Characteristically, when he wrote of the roles of BMD as "alliance-enhancer," "technology-driver," "status-quo stabiliser," he framed it as reports about what "the JDA," "the Japanese industry," "MOFA," "Tokyo," and "Washington" thought or "saw." The only other occasion, which can be interpreted as the case when Green expressed his own opinion, was probably when he wrote about BMD being "costly and uncertain in terms of technical feasibility." Yet it was also Green who in 2000 enthusiastically called BMD an "example" of what the US dominance of the information dimension of the battlefield, unmatched by any rival or ally, will mean.⁴

I would now like to review two more substantive studies of Japan's BMD

1 Ibid., 276.

2 Ibid.

3 Green, "The Challenges," 248.

4 Such great attention to Green's publications is warranted by the fact that he is one of the most senior US experts on Japan. Demonstrating how confused the BMD-policy research record of such a distinguished researcher was over a fairly short period of time is significant because it indicates the "muddled" overall state of knowledge about the subject for which further evidence will be presented below.

procurement published in the US in 2000 and 2001 by the Stimson Centre and RAND Corp. respectively.

The Stimson Working Group on theatre missile defences in the Asia-Pacific region, that included among its members Michael Green and Mike Mochizuki, produced a collective report in 2000.¹ The section on BMD for Japan contained important arguments interpreting the causal mechanism behind the procurement and indicating its foreign policy consequences relevant for my main concern. On the historical process leading to the 1998 co-research decision, the Working Group observed that it was the 1998 Taepo-dong launch that led to “sharp discontinuity” in Japan’s policy which was probably because BMD provided the government with “a quick response to the surge in public concern about the North Korean threat.”² Significantly, in the opinion of the report authors, the No-dong launches earlier in the 1990s, “although presenting a real capability to threaten Japan, had failed to spur” the government’s commitment to BMD.³ Importantly, after the 1998 commitment to research, the Working Group expected that Japan was “likely to proceed with TMD through the development and deployment phases,” regardless of any changes in North Korea’s diplomacy.⁴

Parallel to these developments in the “threat” environment in Northeast Asia, the US pressure was described as a “powerful factor impelling” Japan towards BMD from an early stage.⁵ The US expected Japan to get access to BMD at some point in the future in any case so the Americans decided to push Japan to participate in BMD from the R&D stage onwards to facilitate technology sharing. “Such expectation from the US side was not based on regional circumstances or Japan’s actual defence needs, but on the assumption that Japan

1 *Theatre Missile Defences in the Asia-Pacific Region*. A Henry Stimson Centre Working Group Report, (2000), Washington DC.

2 *Ibid.*, 61.

3 *Ibid.*, 62.

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*

should support US global leadership generally.”¹ This approach held until the mid-1990s when it was recalibrated as described earlier in this review.

Regarding the thesis question, the Stimson Working Group noted that if the upper-tier BMD system were deployed by Japan, it could have “significant foreign policy consequences for Japan.”² These “consequences” were supposed to be the result of the command and control transformation necessary for a joint operation of the Japanese and US BMD systems.³ But the only thing that the report did with respect to this point was to recommend that “the US and Japanese governments jointly assess in depth the diplomatic, political, and military ramifications of Japanese NTW [upper-tier BMD] for Sino-Japanese relations and Sino-American relations.”⁴ A separate investigation of why Japan would risk such “ramifications” and an explanation of the underlying decisionmaking was not undertaken by the Stimson authors. Their main points in explaining the overall BMD procurement could be summarised as US pressure, the instrumentality of BMD as a tool of pacifying public concerns heightened by the North Korean threat, and the confluence of interests between the JDA, MSDF, MITI, and some military contractors, although the latter point was left unspecific and unelaborated.⁵

The most substantive study of the politics of Japan’s BMD procurement in the period before the 2003 deployment decision was authored by Michael Swaine, Rachel Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami and was published by the RAND Corporation in 2001.⁶ Their study was designed as “multi-factorial” and included a more or less detailed elaboration of a variety of aspects of the country’s BMD procurement in the areas of domestic politics and international relations. Some of these aspects were already mentioned in Chapter One and some will be

1 Ibid., 65.

2 Ibid., 74.

3 Ibid., 71.

4 Ibid., 74.

5 Ibid., 66-67.

6 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*.

dwelt upon in the following chapters of the thesis. I would like to concentrate on the essence of their argument here. According to Swaine et al., two main factors influenced Japan's decisionmaking: the potential threat of ballistic missiles and the US policies. On the threat, they noted that it was not the Taepo-dongs (in 1998) but No-dongs (tested in 1993) that were a real concern.¹ Regarding the issue of cruise missiles raised earlier in this chapter, the authors discounted the North Korean potential but confirmed that China had cruise missiles deployable against Japan.² On the IGS, or spy satellites,³ Swaine et al. explained that their acquisition was "delinked" from the procurement of BMD because the satellites were not placed under the JDA's control and were designated multi-purpose. This was "a way around confrontational debates" on whether a ballistic missile early warning system would violate the prohibition on collective defence.⁴ This strengthened my intention to consider all BMD and BMD-related questions inside one "linked" logical structure in order to explain them the way they were possibly meant by the policymakers and not just "sold" to international and domestic audiences.

On the core question of the thesis, Swaine et al. dwelt in some detail. When reporting the views of the critics and supporters of BMD within Japan and the US, Swaine et al. on several occasions mentioned the perceptions on the side of the Japanese critics about BMD exacerbating Japan's security dilemma by leading to entrapment. In an explicit reference to the Stimson Working Group report, the Japanese supporters were also reported as believing that through BMD Japan could become "less passive and more influential" by using BMD as a leverage against Washington.⁵ Beyond this repetition of the reports from past publications, Swaine et al. observed that "the China factor had not played a decisive role" in

1 Ibid., 13.

2 Ibid., 14.

3 Known formally as "multi-purpose information-gathering satellites," these spy satellites, initiated in 1998, could be seen as challenging Japan's policy of peaceful use of space. This peaceful purposes policy resulted from the adoption in 1969 of a Diet resolution declaring Japan's commitment to the peaceful of outer space.

4 Ibid., 37.

5 Ibid., 64.

the Japanese BMD decisions.¹ At the same time, they expected that considerations of China would play a greater role at the time of the decisions on the development and deployment of the upper-tier BMD. They emphasised this point by quoting an anonymised interviewee as saying that disputes over the effect of these decisions on China could become the core of the domestic debates on BMD and even lead to “a revision of the political landscape in Japan.”²

On the related issue of the underlying decisionmaking, Swaine et al. made several statements which exerted a significant influence on my thinking and the research strategy. They concluded that there was no consensus in Japan on BMD and in favour of the development and deployment of BMD, and that there was no “informed and detailed public or even elite discussion on BMD issues.”³ But they also noted that funding for the key components of a future BMD system might be provided “without any prior debate or decision” on ballistic missile defence “outside the defence budget via supplemental or off-line allocations to existing programmes or through indirect – and largely undisclosed – subsidies to key Japanese manufacturers.”⁴ Swaine et al. added that if these systems are effective “on some level,” “a basic decision on the construction of a more complete and integrated BMD architecture will almost certainly need to be made at some point.”⁵ This would be in line with the prediction of the Stimson report that, “Even with significant shifts in North Korea’s diplomatic orientation, Japan is likely to proceed with TMD through the development and deployment phases.”⁶

I would like to underline that when you emphasise that there is no public consensus on something, but also say that smaller and clandestine steps “might” be made, which eventually will impel a given decision regardless of the absence of the consensus, a natural thing for a researcher to do is to investigate who makes these steps and why. To my surprise,

1 Ibid., 82.

2 Ibid. (Reference to the authors’ interviewee in Tokyo in June 1999).

3 Ibid., 82, 85.

4 Ibid., 90, 70.

5 Ibid., 90.

6 *Theatre Missile Defences* (Stimson Centre), 62.

having made such far-reaching claims, the RAND authors failed to grasp the importance of a full investigation of this set of processes. This encouraged me to think that the key to my main concern, as well as to the explanation of the BMD procurement and the related aspects, probably lay in some powerful segment within the establishment.

Pointing in a similar direction are also some other publications. Richard Cronin produced his Congressional Research Service report on the bilateral BMD cooperation in 2002, that is, after the Bush administration eliminated the distinction between two types of BMD – NMD for the defence of the US territory and TMD for the defence of the US forward-deployed troops.¹ Preservation of such a distinction allowed the Japanese government to maintain that Japan’s participation in joint research on BMD did not amount to an exercise of collective defence which is considered banned under the Constitution. Cronin observed that the Bush administration’s changes “created consternation but have not affected Tokyo’s interest in cooperation.” Furthermore, Japanese officials were reported as “avoiding addressing” this constitutional issue and “concentrating on protecting Japan’s option to acquire a BMD capability.”²

It is worth putting this point in a broader context of published analyses of BMD in that period. Matsumura in 1999/2000 discussed the options of coordinating the work of the missile defence command and control systems. He concluded that Japan “has to create a national TMD command which has a separate and parallel structure vis-à-vis the US counterpart command, so as to secure sovereign control over its TMD system.”³ Charles Ball, a senior scientist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, saw things differently in his chapter published in 2001. He wrote,

1 Richard Cronin, *Japan-US Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defence: Issues and Prospects*, CRS Report for Congress RL31337 (Washington, DC, March 19, 2002), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf>.

2 *Ibid.*, 11.

3 Matsumura, “Redesigning Japan’s Command and Control System for Theatre Missile Defence,” *Defence & Security Analysis* 16, no. 2 (2000): 160. This article also appeared in Japanese in: Matsumura, *Nichibei doumei*, ch. 8, 131-152.

More likely, Japan will possess capabilities that in theory could provide an independent defence but that in practice would require American or jointly controlled assets (such as early-warning satellites) in order to work effectively.¹

Significantly, in 2001/2002, Hiromichi Umebayashi, founder and president of Peace depot, a non-profit organisation for peace research and education in Japan, argued that in June 1999, that is, before the August 1999 signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on joint research, Japan knew that there was a clear possibility of applying an NTW system, which became the subject of joint research, to the US NMD system.² Umebayashi also concluded on a related subject in 2007 on the basis of an analysis of documentary evidence, especially, the US Navy deck logs from November 2005 to October 2006 that the operations by the US naval vessels home-ported in Yokosuka were “tasked with ballistic missile defence of the US itself” which was not provided for under the Security Treaty.³ What these recommendations, predictions, and conclusions suggest is that BMD might have been used as a tool of a *de facto* reinterpretation of the constitutional ban on collective defence and the bilateral security arrangement. For my core question, this could mean that BMD was procured in order to discontinue the current hedging strategy. What remained to be done to complete such a proposition was to investigate the structure and content of decisionmaking which underlay such a policy. Otherwise, justifiable forms of a claim about this matter and about the direction of Japan’s security policy would look like something already found in the mainstream literature:

- 1) BMD will pressure Japan to reconsider collective self-defence.⁴
- 2) Japan’s near-irreversible dependence on the US, and its conviction that it is better to be

1 Charles Ball, “The Allies,” in *Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defences and the Future of World Politics*, ed. James Wirtz and Jeffrey Larsen (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 271.

2 Hiromichi Umebayashi, “TMD: Higashi ajia-no shinrai hakai souchi [TMD: a tool of destroying confidence in East Asia],” in *Misairu bouei – oinaru gensou: touzai-no senmonka nijuunin-ga hihan suru [The great illusion of missile defence – Criticisms from twenty specialists from East and West]*, ed. David Krieger and Carah Ong, trans. Hiromichi Umebayashi and Akira Kurosaki (Tokyo: Koubunken, 2002), 70.

3 Hiromichi Umebayashi, *Missile Defence Response to the July 5, 2006 North Korean Missile Test by US Naval Vessels Home-Ported at Yokosuka*, special report 07-054A: July 24, 2007, accessed April 21, 2008 at the website of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07054Umebayashi.pdf.

4 Hughes, *Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions* (Boulder, London, 2004), 187.

entrapped than abandoned by its US ally, may mean that it is forced to fight alongside the US in any future conflict and even one against China.¹

Research completed after Japan's deployment decision of 2003: Reinforcing a "multi-factorial" research tradition of Japan's security policy

In a similar way, Daniel Kliman in 2006 pointed out two instances of a "de facto, albeit narrowly oriented [that is, towards the US and BMD-specific] reinterpretation of collective defence."² But he refrained from elaborating on the underlying decisionmaking and only cursorily referred to the "political" and "national security elites."³ Among these "elites," on the basis of his interview with a "JDA official" in March 2004, he emphasised the role of one individual in particular: "If any official deserves credit for facilitating Japan's decision to acquire BMD, that individual is Shigeru Ishiba."⁴

Considered against Kliman's overall argument on BMD, I concluded that this "de facto reinterpretation" was for him a by-product of the country's BMD procurement and played no role in the causal mechanism leading to the procurement. What "decisively influenced Japan's consideration of missile defence" was the North Korean threat by which Kliman meant the emergence of "an operational nuclear force" between October 2002 and December 2003.⁵ I found this point unconvincing, but shall elaborate on it in Chapter Four when discussing uncertainty and tensions on the Korean peninsula. Yet Kliman added an aspect to his "North Korean threat" with which I could sympathise more – "North Korea-phobia." He persuasively argued that, "Popular fear of a North Korean attack – whether spontaneous or the product of elite rhetoric – decisively influenced the fate of Japanese

1 Hughes, "Japan's Re-emergence," 147; Hughes, *Ballistic Missile Defence and US-Japan and US-UK Alliances Compared*, GARNET Working Paper: No 11/06 (2006), 5, <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/garnet/workingpapers/1106.pdf>.

2 Daniel Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World* (Westport: Praeger/CSIS, 2006), 107.

3 *Ibid.*, 93-111.

4 *Ibid.*, 109.

5 *Ibid.*, 111, 97.

BMD.”¹ Given the accents in Kliman’s overall narrative, he probably meant that it was the elites who must have felt genuinely threatened by North Korea.

On another “exogenous variable” – US pressure – Kliman concluded that Washington “played a minimal role in the Japanese government’s decision to purchase missile defence.”² He reasoned that following September 11 and the Iraq war, “resisting Washington’s calls for greater BMD cooperation had few repercussions for the alliance, provided that Tokyo assisted the United States on more important fronts” – and Tokyo did.³ In short, his rebuttal of the US pressure hypothesis was that missile defence provided Tokyo with “the highest financial cost for the least alliance payoff.”⁴ Curiously but characteristically for the research field, another American scholar, writing on the same subject around the same time, offered an opposite view by saying that Japan’s preparations for the deployment decision, which eventually was made in 2002/2003, could have “continued indefinitely, but the United States forced Japan’s hand.”⁵ This confirms that the existence of a range of mental predispositions and theoretical and methodological lenses for selecting evidence sometimes leads to a proliferation of contradictory interpretations of the same fact or process. Concluding on Kliman, true to his overall analytical scheme of “transitional realism” identified as a process of “Japan’s resocialisation into a dangerous world”⁶ and underpinned by a combination of four “variables” – foreign threats, US policy, executive leadership, and generational change, he also emphasised that BMD was “an item of cross-generational consensus” among legislators.⁷

I am aware of two doctoral dissertations on Japan’s BMD procurement policy submitted in 2007/2008 – one by Kaori Urayama⁸ (Boston University) and the other by

1 Ibid., 103.

2 Ibid., 107.

3 Ibid., 108-109.

4 Ibid., 109.

5 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 104, 105.

6 Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy*, 157.

7 Ibid., 94, 110.

8 Kaori Urayama, “Missile Defence, US-Japan Alliance and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1983-2007” (PhD diss.,

Aaron Matthews¹ (Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales) – but I shall only dwell on Matthews's thesis as it was more articulate theoretically, methodologically, and in terms of conclusions despite some factual and other inaccuracies.² Like those before him, Matthews produced a thoroughly “multi-factorial” study of the procurement periodised as follows: 1993-1994 – “stonewalling,” 1995-1998 – “cautious advance,” 1999-2000 – “relative neglect,” and 2001-2003 – “rapid affirmation.”³ Not unlike his predecessors, Matthews identified three security policy objectives as central – Japan’s commitment to strengthening the alliance, concerns over domestic political fallout, and the marginal influence of China’s objections to BMD.⁴

There were, however, several interesting and potentially important points with which I could sympathise. By referring to neoclassical realism Matthews framed his conventional findings in a way I found attractive. He concluded that “the primary driver” of Japan’s involvement with BMD was “the commitment of the government and officials to bolster the US-Japan alliance.”⁵ And the trajectory of Japan’s participation in BMD “reflected the attempt by the Japanese government to balance alliance expectations against domestic political realities.”⁶ Faced with the domestic restraints, the elites chose to proceed through a “careful and gradual build up of [public] support” to enable the procurement of BMD

Boston University, 2008). Urayama’s research question was “why, after responding with much reluctance in the 1980s and early 1990s, was there an apparent shift in Japan’s BMD policy” from 1998 (ibid., 5)? Throughout her thesis Urayama rarely failed to emphasise that “neither external nor domestic context alone explained the evolution of Japan’s BMD policy” (ibid., 273). For example, in the concluding chapter, Urayama summarised that, “For sure, Japan’s primary reason for opting for missile defence is the North Korean missile threat” (ibid., 264). A few pages later, she concluded that, “the fact of the matter is, [that] the [BMD] debate is still being dictated by the US-Japan alliance arrangement” which, in turn, was also “influenced” and “framed” by other forces (ibid., 274).

- 1 Aaron Matthews, “Japan’s Approach to Missile Defence Cooperation from 1993 to 2003: Examining the Structure of Cooperation to Determine the Relative Influence of Key Security Objectives” (PhD diss., University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, 2007).
- 2 For example, in several places he noted that in December 2003 Japan agreed simultaneously to advance BMD co-research to the development phase and to acquire BMD for deployment, which is simply wrong because the development decision was made in 2005 (Matthews, “Japan’s Approach,” 2, 279, 282). At least once he referred to “proving” his hypotheses, which is a questionable endeavour from the point of view of social science methodology (ibid., 4).
- 3 Ibid. (His fourth period left out the development decision of 2005.)
- 4 Ibid., 5
- 5 Ibid., 297.
- 6 Ibid.

according to their “perceptions of the security environment.”¹ On these perceptions, Matthews wrote that the ballistic missile threat towards Japan was “the fundamental cause and public rationale” for the Japanese BMD decisions.² Indirectly on the main concern of this thesis, Matthews argued that Japan “appeared to be prepared to alienate China”³ and that a decrease in Japanese security policy autonomy was “accepted where the strategic and political rationales were compelling.”⁴

I found Matthews’s argument attractive but unconvincing because the underlying elite policymaking dynamics, while being frequently referred to, were not uncovered. And I cannot believe his allusions to this elite “black box” based on his purported confidential access to the establishment.⁵ The only time when in the scholarly literature possible researchable candidates of these elites were mentioned was in Hughes’s *Adelphi* book of 2009. There he referred to the Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange and the Congressional National Security Research Group as examples of “the strengths of US-Japan political, military and industrial links.”⁶ Hughes did not elaborate on his reference to these elite networks which meant that I could attempt to do the first analysis of the possible influences of these networks with regard to BMD.

In connection with this, worth mentioning is also, perhaps, Andrew Oros's article on the spy satellites.⁷ It is, however, not the issue of the satellites and their relationship to BMD which will receive attention at this point, but a different aspect of Oros's work. In his article, Oros referred to a number of current and former politicians, bureaucrats, and industry figures, several of whom were also prominent in the networks discussed in this thesis.

1 Ibid., 303.

2 Ibid., 289.

3 Ibid., 294.

4 Ibid., 287.

5 Ibid., 43.

6 Hughes, “Japan’s Remilitarisation,” 75-76, 176.

7 Andrew Oros, “Explaining Japan’s Tortured Course to Surveillance Satellites,” *Review of Policy Research* 24, no. 1 (2007): 29-48.

Moreover, the few interactions of these individuals, mentioned by Oros,¹ resembled the type of frequent and regular visitations to the US and group meetings that characterised the networks documented in this thesis for more than a decade. Oros concluded that the interactions of a limited number of the politicians, bureaucrats, and industry figures “determined the future course of the surveillance satellite programme.”² Assuming, but also despite the fact that the BMD procurement decisions are essentially comparable with the satellites decision as a policy area, the author of this thesis is unable to describe the role of the elite networks on BMD as a “determinant” of Japan's BMD policy, even though richer data were analysed on the elite networks here. This is because to a sufficiently sceptical mind the data about “interactions” remained insufficient for such strong claims about the actual policymaking. At the same time, it must be said, Oros's observations did contribute to this thesis by sharpening and strengthening its focus.

Two Japanese-language publications from 2007 may also be reviewed here for a fuller picture of realist interpretations of Japan's BMD policy. One book is by the director of the Okazaki Research Institute Hideaki Kaneda.³ The first six chapters – more than half of Kaneda's book – are introductory, reference-type material.⁴ It is in Chapter 7 that the details of Japan's BMD and regional security concerns were considered.⁵ Kaneda dwelt at length on North Korea's missiles and its role in missile proliferation,⁶ as well on Chinese missile programmes and alarming military growth rates.⁷ At the same time, Kaneda also underlined which of the threats should actually occupy the minds of policymakers. In Japan, Kaneda argued, the focus of attention was on the North Korean threat, and the China factor was

1 Ibid., 36, 42-44.

2 Ibid., 36.

3 Hideaki Kaneda, *Misairu gaku - Kore-ga kyōi-no jittai da! [Missile Science – This Is the Actual Condition of the Threat!]* (Tokyo: Futamishobou, 2007).

4 These chapters dealt with the definitional distinctions between missiles and rockets, cruise and ballistic missiles, strategic and tactical missiles; the chapters also covered the history of missile development in Germany, the US, the USSR, and Japan, as well as the features of missile warhead, homing system, engines, and fuel.

5 Kaneda, *Misairu gaku*, Chapter 7, 168-206.

6 Ibid., 168-169, 201-203.

7 Ibid., 182-183.

almost never brought up, whereas, in fact, the really terrifying thing was the scores of China's IRBMs aimed at Japan.¹

Kaneda also covered several other points of relevance for this thesis. One is cruise missile defence. Some background information is in order here. Cruise missiles are inexpensive to acquire; they can carry biological, chemical, and nuclear warheads and require countermeasures different from ballistic missiles² because, powered by jet engines, cruise missiles can fly at very low altitudes whereas ballistic missiles spend the mid-course of their flight in or close to the exo-atmosphere. China already has amassed and continues upgrading a stockpile of cruise missiles.³ Moreover, reducing the ballistic missile threat arguably raises the cruise missile threat.⁴ As Gormley argued in his 2001 Adelphi paper, If cruise-missile proliferation proceeds unimpeded and becomes widespread, it may combine with the further spread of ballistic missiles to give multidimensional offence a distinct advantage over layered defence – no matter how much is invested in such a defence.⁵

Although the threat from cruise missiles had formally been taken up by the Japanese government subsequently,⁶ the question remained of why Japan was initially so adamant about ballistic missiles for a long time but from around 2008 started paying some attention to cruise missiles. Kaneda claimed that protection against cruise missiles requires an air defence network and system which was totally impossible under the present defence budget.⁷ Unfortunately, no formal or private estimates were provided by Kaneda comparing the costs of BMD and CMD. Moreover, no evidence was provided on officials speaking in terms of budgetary constraints forcing Japan to forego cruise missile defence in favour of BMD. This

1 Ibid., 183-184.

2 Dennis Gormley, "Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles," *IISS Adelphi Papers* 339 (2001), 53-55. Chase et al., for example, confidently stated that: "Even the best BMD system is incapable of defending US land targets against [for example, China's] SLCMs [submarine-launched cruise missiles] and LACMs [land-attack cruise missiles]." Michael Chase, Andrew Erickson and Christopher Yeaw, "Chinese Theatre and Strategic Missile Force Modernisation and its Implications for the United States," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 1 (2009): 83.

3 Sieff, "BMD Watch: Japan Fears Cruise Missiles," *UPI*, February 1, 2008.

4 Gormley, "Cruise Missiles," 76, 95.

5 Ibid., 11.

6 Sieff, "BMD Watch: Japan Fears Cruise Missiles."

7 Kaneda, *Misairu gaku*, 197.

point was thus left unsubstantiated, even if intuitively quite appealing.

On the exercise of the right to collective defence, Kaneda emphasised the connection between BMD, collective defence, and the maintenance of the US alliance. Writing about an enemy missile heading to Guam, Hawaii, or the US mainland, he insisted that Japan must be absolutely able to intercept such a missile, if it were physically possible.¹ He argued in broader strategic terms that the effect of the US nuclear umbrella for Japan will get lost if the US mainland becomes vulnerable to a nuclear attack.² Kaneda's position in favour of Japan exercising collective defence is understandable and his nuclear-umbrella argument is fairly convincing in indicating why Japan would want to ensure the security of the US mainland from long-range missile attacks.³

On the 1998 decision on the co-research of SM-3 IIA, Kaneda argued that this new interceptor was good against China's modern IRBMs.⁴ He left, however, one important question unexplained: What was the thinking about the seemingly imminent North Korean threat? Why did the decisionmakers think they could afford postponing the deployment decision (using an earlier SM-3 IA) until 2003?⁵ This is the second-order question of the thesis. On the central question, which has not even been mentioned in the book, it could be presumed that Kaneda considered entanglement with the US against China to be better than abandonment by the US.

Similar criticism could be brought against some points made by the head of the political section of Fuji TV Nobuyuki Nose in his book on missile defence.⁶ Like Kaneda's

1 Ibid., 193.

2 Ibid.

3 An argument in favour of general deterrence over missile defences as a measure of protection against missile attacks is made in, for example: Gerald Segal, "The Risks of Fearing North Korea's Missiles," *TJT*, September 16, 1998.

4 Kaneda, *Misairu gaku*, 198. Kaneda also emphasised other strategic implications of joint research including the deepening of the US alliance (ibid., 199).

5 In other words, could they not have pushed harder to ensure that the SM-3 IA are fully available for deployment at an earlier date if they had not wasted political and economic resources on the 1998 co-research decision on the interceptor's IIA-variant?

6 Nobuyuki Nose, *Misairu bouei – Nihon-ha kyōui-ni dou tachimukau-no ka? [Missile Defence – How Does Japan Confront the Threat?]* (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2007).

volume, Nose's book is also of a detailed, reference type, where chapters 1 and 5 contain an argument of relevance for this thesis.¹ This argument refers to the subordinate question of this research about the 1998 decision. Nose argued fairly persuasively that the SM-3 IIA under co-research from 1998 had strategic benefits, the most important of which was the interceptor's utility in countering future emerging threats, including the long-range Taepo-dong II.² Nose asserted that such a new type of ballistic missile threat was acknowledged by the JDA in 2005.³ At the same time, Nose posited that the biggest threat for Japan emanated from the large number of medium-range No-dong missiles⁴ and that an earlier version of the SM-3 interceptor SM-3 IA was developed precisely for intercepting No-dongs (and Scuds-C).⁵

An obvious question arises about why Japan decided on the co-research into the advanced SM-3 IIA in 1998 and waited until 2003 to make the decision on SM-3 IA if the threat from No-dongs was “the biggest” one for Japan and should have dominated the missile security agenda from the mid-1990s. Moreover, no evidence was presented by Nose, on the basis of which it could be argued that this new type of threat, acknowledged in 2005, was apparent in 1998. The big scare of 1998, judging from the mass media publications of the time and the statements of public and government figures, was the North Korean Taepo-dong I (especially, if it was given the capability to carry nuclear warheads).⁶ So why did Japan think that it had another 5-10 years before it had to deploy a BMD system (using the earlier SM-3 IA) against the existing threat from No-dongs and that it could use this time to

1 Other chapters deal at length with some operational features of BMD, including identification of enemy missile capabilities, as well as technical aspects of missile launch detection and missile interception.

2 Ibid., 180.

3 Ibid., 173-174.

4 Ibid., 160, 173.

5 Ibid., 173.

6 “Mideast Links Seen in Growing North Korean Threat,” *TDY*, December 11, 1998; Tamotsu Asami, “National Insecurity Growing,” *TDY*, December 2, 1998; Yoshimichi Hironaka, “North Korean Mystery Gets Murkier,” *TDY*, September 9, 1998; “N. Korea Act Calls for Firm Response,” *TDY*, September 3, 1998, 6; “North Korea Rattles a Sabre,” *TJT*, September 2, 1998; Steven Lee Myers, “Missile Test by North Korea: Dark Omen for Washington,” *TNYT*, September 1, 1998, sec. A; Akinori Uchida, “US Sees North Korea as 'Near-Term Danger,’” *TDY*, February 3, 1999.

prepare for future threats?¹ Nose has not provided an answer to this question. The central concern of the thesis was also not addressed.

Succinct summary of the place of this research in the body of realist appraisals of Japan's security strategy and BMD policy

To summarise this section on realist thinking on BMD and Japan's security policy, I can state that the present thesis will be in some respects a good complement to the extant research and in other respects a significant improvement. It will be complementary to the realist writings on Japan's continuing remilitarisation in demonstrating the utility and place of BMD in the country's military build-up and security strategy. It will be compatible with the existing body of realist accounts of Japan's BMD policy with their emphasis on the North Korean and Chinese threat, and US pressure and will improve these accounts through the elucidation of the possible influences of key elite networks on the BMD policy. The contribution of this thesis also consists in posing and answering significant novel questions about the procurement of BMD which are referred to as the central or second-order questions here and which have been neglected or unsatisfactorily approached in the realist literature.

2.2. Constructivism and Japan's BMD

2.2.1. Overview of Constructivism

Constructivist approaches have many diverse roots.² It was, however, in the late

1 The deployment of SM-3 IIA, as of September 21, 2010, was planned to start from 2018. Thus, the planning at the time of the 1998 decision might have been that it would take about 20 years (or, likely, longer) before the deployment of the system could start. See, for example: "US Urges Japan to Export SM-3s: Interceptor Missiles for Europe Sought but Face Export Ban," *TJT*, October 25, 2009; Jim Wolf, 21.04.2010. "Japan Sticks to Key Missile Shield Deal: US General," *Reuters*, April 21, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63K5V020100421>.

2 Wittgenstein's works on the importance of language as a mirror or picture of the logic of an objective world (1922) and of language use as analogous to making moves in a game (constitutive view of language, 1958) were arguably the "most important roots" of the constructivist approaches. See: Karin Fierke and Knud Erik Joergensen, introduction to *Constructing International Relations: the Next Generation*, ed. Fierke and Joergensen (NY, London: ME Sharpe, 2001), 4; Fierke, "Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 46, no. 3 (2002): 332. See also: Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, trans. CK Ogden, intr. Russell (London, 1981); Wittgenstein,

1980s, that the term constructivism was introduced to the international relations scholarship by Nicholas Onuf¹ and popularised by Alexander Wendt.² The context for this was the waning years of the Cold War, the end of which was left unanticipated and unexplained by the mainstream international relations theorists,³ and an intensifying epistemological debate challenging the dominant positivist (and empiricist) underpinnings of the academic discipline of international relations.⁴ The label of constructivism, as was correctly noted by some of its adherents, “means different things to its diverse practitioners and critics alike.”⁵ Notwithstanding such a state of affairs, an agreement on two basic ontological points exists, namely: intersubjectivity and co-constitutiveness of structures and agents – and a concern for the interest- and identity-formation. These two points, which are central to constructivism, and some of the differences among constructivist positions are reviewed below on the basis of the author's reading of some works by Wendt, Onuf and, to a lesser extent, Kratochwil,⁶ as well as selected samples of the more recent review literature in the field.

By drawing on the “structurationist school”⁷ and the sociology of symbolic

Philosophical Investigations, trans. GEM Anscombe (Oxford, 1958). Other sources of inspiration for constructivism included: Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York, 1966); Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge: Polity, 1984); Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002 (1969)).

- 1 Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 1, 35-65.
- 2 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organisation* 46, no. 2 (1992).
- 3 John Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security* 17, no. 3 (1992-1993).
- 4 A good overview of the epistemological debate is: Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge UP, 1996); A contemporary view is: Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era,” *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (1989).
- 5 Audie Klotz, “Can We Speak a Common Constructivist Language?” in *Constructing International Relations: the Next Generation*, ed. Fierke and Joergensen (NY, London: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 223.
- 6 Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge UP, 1989). The author would like to remind the reader that this outline is consciously written as a grossly simplified summary of the intellectual leanings of “constructivists” and is meant to reflect not the richness and inconsistencies of “constructivist” thinking but to indicate some of its distinguishing points to illustrate the broader tradition, on which the researchers of Japan's security policy and BMD have drawn explicitly or implicitly, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
- 7 In his earlier work, Wendt explicitly followed a more inclusive definition of the term “structuration theory.” See Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” *International Organisation* 41, no. 3 (1987): 336, footnote 2. In this inclusive definition, the “structurationist school,” uniting the works

interactionism,¹ Wendt produced in 1992 in response to debates between realist and idealist/liberal theories of international politics an influential article,² the title of which summed up his argument – “Anarchy is what states make of it.”³ In that article, Wendt developed his argument in the following way as a refutation of the neorealist claim that “self-help” is given by the anarchic structure exogenously to process.⁴ He assumed an anthropomorphic nature of states⁵ and suggested that “people [and consequently, states] act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.”⁶ By participating in such collective meanings, states acquire identities, that is, “relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self.”⁷ “Identities are the basis of interests”⁸ with the implication that, for example, “without the cold war's mutual attributions of threat and hostility to define their identities, these states [the USA and USSR] seem unsure of what

by Giddens, Pierre Bourdieu, Roy Bhaskar and some other scholars, shared four concerns: 1) antifunctionalism; 2) the duality of social structures (ie, a dialectical synthesis of a structural-determinist and voluntarist approaches); 3) “a need for an explicit theory of practical reason and practical consciousness that can account for human intentionality and motivation;” 4) a need for a “conjoint” theorising of social, temporal, and spatial structures. See Nigel Thrift, “On the Determination of Social Action in Space and Time,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 1 (1983): 28-32, 30.

- 1 For example: Herbert Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method* (Prentice-Hall, 1969). Symbolic interactionism is based on three principles: 1) “human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them,” 2) “the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows,” 3) “these meanings are handled in, and are modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters” (ibid., 2).
- 2 In his earlier theoretical article, Wendt demonstrated some potential for constructivist thinking by engaging at great length with structuration theory which he advocated as a replacement for Waltz's and Wallerstein's “structuralism.” He considered (human) agents and (social) structures as “co-determined” or “mutually constitutive yet ontologically distinct entities.” This, essentially, implies complex loops: “Social structures are the result of the intended and unintended consequences of human action, just as those actions presuppose or are mediated by an irreducible structural context.” (Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem, 360).
- 3 Wendt, *Anarchy*.
- 4 Wendt was also critical of the similar rationalist assumption of the liberal scholarship that the actors' interests and identities are exogenously given. Ibid., 391-393.
- 5 Ibid., 397. Footnote 21.
- 6 Ibid., 396-397. (Wendt's reference to Blumer, *Interactionism*, 2).
- 7 Ibid., 397. The claim that the identity- and interest-formation is not exogenously given – as the realists and rationalists would argue – but endogenous to the structured interaction among states (at the systemic level) is important to Wendt (Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (1994): 384, 387.) and other constructivists (for example, Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Cornell UP, 1996); Paul Kowert, “Agent versus Structure in the Construction of National Identity,” In *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert (NY, London: ME Sharpe, 1998); Ronald Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Katzenstein (Columbia UP, 1996); Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Katzenstein).
- 8 Wendt, *Anarchy*, 398.

their 'interests' should be.”¹ The sets of identities and interests, called “institutions,” are “fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works.”² But Wendt insisted that this should not be taken to mean that the institutions are not objective and real – “institutions come to confront individuals as more or less coercive social facts,” while remaining a function of intersubjective knowledge, that is, of what actors collectively know.³ Self-help is then for Wendt one of such institutions, “constituting one kind of anarchy but not the only kind.”⁴ Wendt elaborated at some length how such an institution appears and summarised it in the following manner: “Self-help security systems evolve from cycles of interaction in which each party acts in ways that the other feels are threatening to the self, creating expectations that the other is not to be trusted.”⁵ In light of that, Wendt called realism “a self-fulfilling prophecy,”⁶ and, furthermore, noted that despite their socially constructed nature, the malleability of the worlds of power politics was not guaranteed⁷ (even if possible in principle, through self-conscious efforts).

The above was an outline of aspects of Wendt's constructivism.⁸ But there is “more than one constructivism” in IR.⁹ This paragraph will sketch some ontological and epistemological points, emphasised by Onuf in his major book of 1989¹⁰ and in some of his

1 Ibid., 399.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 401.

5 Ibid., 406.

6 Ibid., 410.

7 Ibid., 411.

8 The author's concentration on Wendt's 1992 article with cursory references to the 1987 and 1994 articles should not be interpreted as a lack of awareness of some evolution in Wendt's thinking during this short but eventful period of time. But the 1992 article and such cursory references do provide a “taste” of Wendt's approach and the constructivist agenda. The author is also fully aware of the critique of Wendt's work from within constructivism and his own disciples in, for example: Erik Ringmar, “Alexander Wendt: a Social Scientist Struggling with History,” in *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* ed. Iver Neumann and Ole Waever (London, NY: Routledge, 1997). Ringmar's main point of criticism is that Wendt provided “no convincing theory of action” and that the problem of agency was “never properly addressed” (ibid., 283). Ringmar went as far as calling even the late Wendt (post-1992) “a highly reluctant” constructivist (ibid., 282).

9 Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivisms in IR: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil,” in *Constructing International Relations: the Next Generation*, ed. Fierke and Joergensen (NY, London: ME Sharpe, 2001), 54, 71.

10 Onuf, *World of Our Making*.

later publications,¹ which distinguish them from Wendt's.² The main difference between the approaches of Onuf and Wendt is the way they dealt with the role of language in the construction of reality or, rather, in the way it was neglected by Wendt in his article, summarised above,³ and in the centrality of language for Onuf. In addition to drawing on the insights of Giddens's structuration theory,⁴ Onuf critically reviewed Wittgenstein's expositions on language and based his constructivism on deeds, that is, physical actions and speech acts, which carry meaning as a result of the existence of statements called rules, which make up the social world.⁵ Rules make human activity meaningful⁶ but also constitute conditions of rule, or social/ political order, in which rules “always distribute privilege, and always preferentially.”⁷ For Onuf, then, “world and words are mutually constitutive.”⁸ In the same vein: “A 'deed' is intelligible only as jointly a social construction and natural event, produced by mind yet phenomenal in its own right.”⁹ In light of such expositions, Onuf naturally and importantly noted about the impossibility of neutral knowledge that, “We are always within our constructions, even as we choose to stand apart from them, condemn them, reconstruct them.”¹⁰

Such a constructivist view of the intersubjective context of meaning and

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- 1 A very simplified, concise version of his 1989 book is: Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User's Manual,” in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Onuf and Paul Kowert (NY, London: ME Sharpe, 1998); Nicholas Onuf, “The Politics of Constructivism,” In *Constructing International Relations*, ed. Fierke and Joergensen.
 - 2 The author was originally made attentive to the differences between the constructivist approaches by Zehfuss in: Zehfuss, *Constructivisms in IR*; and Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge UP, 2002).
 - 3 Wendt did refer to the process of “signalling, interpreting, and responding” in the creation of intersubjective meanings but these were explicitly conceived as “gestures” and not as language (or speech). Wendt, *Anarchy*, 404-405, 416.
 - 4 Onuf, *World of Our Making*, 52-65.
 - 5 *Ibid.*, 43-52.
 - 6 A similar point is made, for example, in: Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*, 11.
 - 7 Onuf, *World of Our Making*, 128.
 - 8 *Ibid.*, 94 (Chapter 2. Law and Language)
 - 9 *Ibid.*, 43.
 - 10 *Ibid.*, 43. A similar point is made in, for example: Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*, 229. “...the characterisation of actions whether in the legal or in the practical discourse is not a description at all, but rather an *appraisal*; it is an evaluation of 'facts' in terms of some normative considerations. ... what acquires here the status of an 'objective' fact is not the thing described but rather the intersubjective *validity* of a characterisation upon which reasonable persons can agree.” (Chapter 8. The Path of Legal Arguments)

interpretation, which enables understanding of human action, is not unproblematic, as some adherents of postmodernism¹ in IR noted. Several quotes challenging this basic assumption are appropriate here to “wrap up” the outline of constructivism:²

To claim to be able to deal appropriately with the reality of matters is powerful not only in politics but also, it appears from the debates, in academia. Constructivism implicitly or explicitly makes such a claim by positing some given, intersubjectively accessible 'reality' as a starting point. The existence and character of this reality is rendered unproblematic.³ ... By positing 'reality' as a starting point [states for Wendt, rules for Onuf, norms for Kratochwil⁴], constructivism seems to chase the elusive confirmation that its claims are right and indeed that to some extent reality requires us to carry on as we are.⁵ ... we fail to go beyond restating the ethico-political dilemmas of international relations and responding to them in tried and tested, but ultimately unsatisfactory ways.⁶

Crucially, Zehfuss charged that “the act of construction, and the representation of it in constructivism – which is always already implicated in the act of construction itself – is political, more political than is admitted.”⁷ This is to say that practitioners of constructivism, and politics itself, should not obscure, by claiming to simply take such reality and circumstances into account, their own impact on them.

2.2.2. *Constructivist appraisals of Japan's current security and BMD policy developments*

Four “classic” works, emphasising the importance of ideational factors in Japan's security policy, will be reviewed here. The works are Thomas Berger's “Cultures of Antimilitarism,”⁸ Peter Katzenstein's “Cultural Norms and National Security,”⁹ Glenn Hook's

1 Zehfuss, who is cited later, explicitly drew in her post-modernist expositions on Derridean philosophy, which was, for example, succinctly summarised in the following collection of interviews: Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. and ann. Alan Bass (Chicago UP; London, 1981).

2 This is by no means the only way of criticising the tenets of constructivism, but it is cited here as a fairly typical and strong way of challenging constructivism.

3 Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations*, 261.

4 Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*.

5 Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations*, 262.

6 *Ibid.*, 263.

7 *Ibid.*, 261.

8 Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (The Johns Hopkins UP, 1998).

9 Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Cornell UP, 1996).

“Militarisation and Demilitarisation,”¹ and Andrew Oros's “Normalising Japan.”² Berger's and Katzenstein's works were chosen because of their centrality to the constructivist literature on Japan's security. Hook's book will be reviewed because it can provide a further illustration of the body of constructivist literature with its special attention to the roles of discourses and rhetorical devices in policy. Oros's volume will be included in the review since in addition to proposing a broad perspective on Japan's recent security policy evolution, it has engaged explicitly with the country's BMD policy. The purpose of this subsection, as of the whole chapter, is to establish how the central and subordinate arguments of this thesis relate to the arguments contained in extant publications.

Berger started his book by expressing his puzzlement at Japan (and Germany) as “historical anomalies.”³ The countries were anomalous because they contradicted the view that great powers seek to equalise the level of their military capabilities with their economic strength and international political status. In other words,

Although both [Germany and Japan] have built up formidable military establishments, they have gone to great lengths to minimise the size of their armed forces and, whenever possible, they have placed stringent limitations on the kinds of weapons their militaries may acquire and the missions they may perform.⁴

For Berger, this “aversion to military power” was “all the more striking” since it was so radically different from the German and Japanese militarism pre-1945.⁵

In response to this purported paradox, he proposed an answer rooted in the “political-military cultures” of antimilitarism. Berger defined political-military culture as “that subset of the larger historical-political culture that encompasses orientations related to defence, security, the military as an institution, and the use of force in international affairs.”⁶ Berger also identified the ways in which such a culture is supposed to influence defence policy.

1 Hook, *Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan* (London, NY: Routledge, 1996). Hook's discourse analysis is very much related to constructivism and will be reviewed in this subsection.

2 Oros, *Normalising Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice* (Stanford UP, 2008).

3 Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, 1.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 15.

According to him, the political-military culture exerted its influence on security policy by supplying the fundamental goals and norms of political actors, by determining their perception of the domestic political environment and influencing their assessment of the international situation, and also by strongly conditioning their ability to mobilise the national resources for military purposes.¹ This list of the mechanisms of influence also reasserted a deeper, but explicit eclectic aspect of Berger's methodology. For him, the rational actor and the culturally bound actor are two “modes of cognition” that “exist side by side in every individual or group” and, “arguably,” “complement one another.”²

Berger's main research question and methodological preferences led him to identify evidence and marshal it into a story which stresses continuity³ in post-World War II German and Japanese approaches to foreign and defence policy and emphasises a “graduated”⁴ (“gradualist”⁵), evolutionary⁶ nature of the changes to policies (which gave Berger an impression of taking place “at a sometimes maddeningly sluggish pace.”⁷) He conducted a “longitudinal analysis”⁸ of the evolution of Japan's and Germany's policies after their defeat in World War II and came up with some fairly convincing conclusions. To cite just one strong example, there should very likely be little doubt that the two countries' delayed response to the Gulf War shock and the security threats emerging after the dissolution of the Soviet Union could be explained by the “antimilitary animus that informs Germany's and

1 Ibid., 16.

2 Ibid., 19. A similar emphasis on the usefulness of combining investigations of domestic and international political factors in explaining foreign policy can be found throughout the book and in the concluding chapter (ibid., 203).

3 Berger, for example, referred, in particular when explaining Japan's and Germany's delayed response to the post-Cold War international environment, to: “the continued strength of the antimilitary animus” (ibid., 191), “deeply sedimented antimilitarist values” (ibid., 192), “time-tested patterns” of handling national security issues (ibid., 178), antimilitary beliefs and values as “permanent features of their political cultures” (ibid. 198) etc.

4 Ibid., 132.

5 Ibid., 87.

6 Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Antimilitarism,” *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993): 148.

7 Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, 209.

8 Ibid., 20.

Japan's political-military cultures.”¹ At the same time, the value of some of his predictions is questionable even if not entirely alien when considered in the context of the time. For instance, in the above-footnoted article from 1993 Berger tried to reassure his readers that it was “highly unlikely” that Japan would decide to become “a military superpower.” Does the pre-“military superpower” level of military capabilities, which presumably warrants the expectation of a rise to the superpower status, really fit into the “rampant”² “antimilitary animus” scheme?!

On the important matter, though, of how the argument of this thesis relates to Berger's, it can be stated that they are compatible in two ways. Firstly, both arguments favour a prediction of an incremental evolution for Japan's security policy. Secondly, Berger's political-military culture of Japan is continuing “to evolve and develop in response to changes in ... external circumstances,”³ which is “reminiscent” of neoclassical realism. Incrementalism is, of course, not easy to assess since it is only after a period of time that it is likely to become clear whether the size or degree of the increment and of the whole trajectory was established adequately. Yet it seems justified to say that at some point in the future, when more evidence is available, Berger's book could be expanded to include an argument about the transition from one hedging strategy to another as part of Japan's “sluggish” cultural evolution, using the evidence from this thesis. Should, however, an abrupt disruption to hedging eventuate, which is a possibility pointed at in the core question, then Berger's argument would also be adapted easily by positing that this disruption led to a “rapid shift in attitudes”⁴ occurring “when the type of behaviour that a culture produces no longer meets its basic needs.”⁵

Katzenstein preferred a different ideational concept to explain national security –

1 Ibid., 191. (On the Gulf War, see *ibid.*, 171-192.)

2 Ibid., 198. Berger called the “antimilitary animus” “rampant” when concluding on the state of the two societies during the Gulf War.

3 Ibid., 209.

4 Ibid.

5 Berger, “*From Sword,*” 148.

norms. He particularly favoured constitutive norms, that is, those that “express actor identities that also define interests and thus shape behaviour,”¹ as indispensable for understanding Japanese security policy.² While not discarding alternative explanations of state security, that is, realism and liberalism, entirely by calling them “not wrong but incomplete,”³ he nonetheless repeatedly made an unequivocal emphasis on norms as the most useful explanatory variables. To put it in Katzenstein's words: “Institutionalised norms proved more important than the imperatives and incentives of the international system. Norms, not the system, show us why and how Japan's security policy adapts in a changing world.”⁴

This thesis challenges Katzenstein's argument in two instances and is complementary to it in, at least, one. Firstly, Katzenstein's carefully worded statement that Japanese policymakers were “much more attuned to finding an appropriate economic and political role than to developing national military options”⁵ gives an impression, when considered in the given context, that the policymakers were not just not very accustomed to devising “military options,” but also not particularly capable of it. The evidence discussed in this thesis will suggest that the policymakers are becoming much more attuned to military matters. Secondly, Katzenstein observed that, “Transnational links act as conduits of political pressure, information, and contacts designed on the American side to enlarge Japan's military efforts.”⁶ This thesis will attempt to show that some transnational links were designed and maintained on the Japanese side, signifying the pro-activeness of Japanese security elites. Thirdly, Katzenstein noted about Japan's military build-up in the 1980s that rather than being

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- 1 Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms*, 18. Constitutive norms were juxtaposed to regulatory norms that “define standards of appropriate behaviour that shape interests and help coordinate the behaviour of political actors” (ibid.)
 - 2 Ibid., 5.
 - 3 Ibid., 22.
 - 4 Ibid., 130.
 - 5 Ibid., 157-158.
 - 6 Ibid., 144.

“merely a smart, tactical concession to American pressure,”¹ it signified that Japan was creating “new options”² for its policy. Such an observation strengthens the argument of this thesis about BMD by confirming that it is not unusual for Japan to pursue “closer defence cooperation with the US” while actually creating for itself “a broader range of choice [in security and foreign policy].”³ The BMD's function of strengthening the cooperation with the US and, at the same time, increasing the degree of Japan's potential future independence in security policy will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five but also later in the thesis.

Hook in his book particularly succeeded in demonstrating the utility of discourse analysis in explaining selected episodes of Japan's security policy.⁴ His main preoccupation in the book is how the “uneasy contradiction between the demilitarisation of state and society... and the (re)militarisation of the state within a bilateral alliance... has shaped defence and security policies.”⁵ And Hook found his preferred explanation in Japan's “antimilitaristic identity.” He put repeated emphasis on popular attitudes.⁶ Yet Hook's other statements on who and how mattered on some occasions in security policy make aspects of his argument compatible, if not complementary, to this thesis. Thus, when writing about the continuing strength of “antimilitaristic” attitudes after the Cold War, Hook had to admit that many people were giving “*post-factum* legitimacy” to government's national security policies.⁷ This, in his interpretation, indicated “a level of [the politicians'] success” in shaping popular opinion.⁸ Importantly, Hook also noted that “‘reality’ [to the majority of people] in so far as security is concerned is what political leaders say about it.”⁹ Such an

1 Ibid., 149.

2 Ibid., 151.

3 Ibid., 152.

4 See Hook, *Militarisation*, 132-140, for a discussion of euphemisms; and *ibid.*, 140-157, for an analysis of metaphors in Japanese security policy.

5 *Ibid.*, 3.

6 For example: *ibid.*, 99-101, 194, and throughout the book.

7 *Ibid.*, 125, 126.

8 *Ibid.*, 126.

9 *Ibid.*, 129. Indicative is also the following quote: “One of the tasks of those with vested interests in militarisation has been to highlight, shade, or obfuscate certain aspects of reality at the expense of others in an attempt to undermine an essentially antimilitaristic macro-discourse” (*ibid.*, 9).

aspect of Hook's thinking is certainly compatible with the findings of this thesis on the possible influence of elites in the BMD decisions. On his discourse analysis, one can easily imagine how it could be expanded by a follower to include the manipulative focus of debates on the defensive and some other features of the system, purportedly constructed to be congruent with the “antimilitaristic identity” or “constrained” by it.

Another take on “identity” is Oros's “Normalising Japan” from 2008. His recent constructivist appraisal of Japan's security policy, including BMD, contains many points to which this thesis can be productively related. For analysing the Japanese security policy and its evolution, Oros proposed a framework he termed “Japan's postwar security identity” of “domestic antimilitarism.”¹ He also emphasised the eclectic nature of his methodology by promising to bring together the “approaches and concerns” of identity construction and international power dynamics² and by positing that “neither ideational nor material explanations alone can explain the policy evolution.”³

Oros argued that security identity influenced policy by influencing policy rhetoric, structuring public opinion and “the coalition-building opportunities this enables,” and through its institutionalisation into the policymaking process.⁴ These three “mechanisms”⁵ do, indeed, provide a perspective on some aspects of Japan's BMD policy. For example, the rhetorical mechanism relates BMD to the country's identity when the policymakers' emphasis on BMD's defensiveness or the linguistic manipulations regarding the “information-gathering” military satellites are considered.⁶ Two other aspects of Japan's

1 Oros, *Normalising*, 1, 6. Oros's designation of security identity as that of “domestic antimilitarism” is not unproblematic but a definitional debate over this is not useful here. He defined this antimilitarism as “focusing on limits to the reemergence of militarist elements at home, yet still accepting as legitimate a defensive role for the military at home” (ibid., 6). Furthermore, such an “antimilitarist” identity accepts military activity by other states and the US (ibid., 5). The “central tenets” of this identity are “no traditional armed forces, no use of force by Japan except in self-defence, no participation in foreign wars” (ibid., 5).

2 Ibid., 6.

3 Ibid., 13. A similar statement can also be found on p. 32: “... a focus on Japan's security identity of domestic antimilitarism alone is not enough to understand security policy outcomes in Japan today or in the past.”

4 Ibid., 32, 33.

5 Ibid., 159.

6 Ibid., 161, 140.

BMD could be approached using the lens of the above mechanisms. One is “the tepid initial Japanese response to the US [BMD] initiative,”¹ and the other concerns the arms export ban. On the first point, Japan indeed appeared to be slow with its BMD policy. The BMD collaboration offer first came from the US in spring-autumn 1993.² Yet it took five years for the Japanese decision on the BMD co-research to mature. Furthermore, North Korea-related missile and nuclear controversies were flaring up constantly in the 1990s with, reportedly, two failed No-dong A launches in May 1990 and June 1992, and a successful test on May 29-30, 1993.³ Japan's “tepid” response to the US initiative in a seemingly threatening regional security environment may, indeed, be productively interpreted within an identity framework.

The same applies to the arms export ban. The Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda released a statement on December 10, 2004, in which it was confirmed that the country's possible future participation in joint development and production of BMD systems with the US would not be subject to the arms exports ban.⁴ Moreover, he stated that the BMD-unrelated joint development and production with the US would be decided on the basis of an “individual examination of each case.” Why was the application of the ban merely revised in 2004 and not abandoned altogether? In other words, why does Japan still have no substantive policy for arms exports and continues relying on “ad-hoc”⁵ policies or “cosmetic revisions?”⁶ The point deserves further elaboration before proceeding to complete

1 Ibid., 149.

2 “Cooperative TMD Proposal,” *AWST*, 139(14), October 4, 1993, 15; “US Proposes Panel for Missile Development,” *Kyodo News Service*, September 22, 1993; “Technology Transfer, Theatre Missile Defence: Touchy Issues with Japan,” *Aerospace Daily*, 169(50), March 15, 1994, 397.

3 “North Korea Missile Test Alarms Government,” *TDY*, June 13, 1993; David Sanger, “Missile Is Tested by North Koreans,” *TNYT*, June 13, 1993, 7; “A Lonely State of Defiance,” *Jane's Defence Weekly*, August 8, 1992, 26-27; Charles Vick, “No-dong A,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, 2006, accessed April 1, 2010, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nd-1.htm>.

4 *Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary*, December 10, 2004, Cabinet Office website, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2004/1210statement_e.html.

5 Yukari Kubota, “Japan's New Strategy as an Arms Exporter: Revising the Three Principles on Arms Exports.” *RIPS Policy Perspectives* No. 7 (2008), Tokyo: RIPS, 2-3, http://www.rips.or.jp/from_rips/pdf/japans_new_strategy.pdf.

6 *Buki Yushutsu Sangensoku to Bukichoutatsu: Genjou to Kadai [Japan's Arms Exports Ban and Arms Procurement: Present Conditions and Challenges]*, symposium report (Tokyo: RIPS, October 5, 2007), 1.

the review of Oros's argument.

Historically, the arms export ban was introduced in 1967 by Prime Minister Sato under opposition party “continued harassment”¹ and in response to the Japan Socialist Party's strong criticism of Japan's logistical support for US forces in the Vietnam War.² The ban consisted of Sato's statements, which later became official policy, prohibiting weapons exports to communist countries, to states under UN sanctions, and to parties to international disputes. Opposition party pressures led to extending export restrictions by Prime Minister Miki to cover all countries in 1976.³ But soon the ban was challenged by the US interest in accessing Japanese technology.⁴ The 1978 US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines provided a “major impetus” for technology cooperation.⁵ There were also pressures from within Japan at the time. Keidanren's Defence Production Committee, interested in keeping abreast with the technological advances in Europe and the US urged in 1980 joint development of cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions.⁶ Under such pressures, in 1980, the Systems and Technology Forum was initiated with little initial effect, partly explained by MITI's fears of losing technological advantages to the US, but most importantly by Prime Minister Suzuki's fears of virulent opposition and public opinion.⁷ It was not until January 1983 that Prime Minister Nakasone, as a result of a “consensus” of the LDP leadership on the need to strengthen the defence ties with the US, managed to revise the ban to allow technology transfers to the US. The Joint Military Technology Commission, established later that year, produced meagre results in bilateral technology transfers with only fourteen cases of formal exports of technologies by the Japanese firms to the US

Reference to the “cosmetic revision” of the ban in 2004 (*keshou naoshi*) by Professor Yuzo Murayama, Doshisha University.

- 1 Joseph Keddell, *The Politics of Defence in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures* (Armonk, London: ME Sharpe, 1993), 43.
- 2 Kubota, “Japan's New Strategy,” 1.
- 3 Keddell, *The Politics of Defence*, 44.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 119.
- 5 *Ibid.*
- 6 *Ibid.*
- 7 *Ibid.*, 120.

between 1983 and 2005.¹

The industrial lobby has been calling for a repeal of the ban ever since it was imposed in 1967² even if, as Reinhard Drifte, Marie Soederberg, Masako Ikegami-Andersson and other researchers have established, Japan was exporting weapons “on a very small scale”³ and, especially, multi-purpose/ dual-use products⁴ and small arms.⁵ Samuels concluded that the “first substantive breakthrough came bundled inside the decision” on the co-development of BMD.⁶ Nevertheless, this was not a widely shared perception. For example, even in 2007, participants of the Japanese Research Institute for Peace and Security-organised symposium on the present conditions and challenges of Japan's arms exports ban and arms procurement were dissatisfied with the country's weapons export policy. One of the speakers, Nishiyama Junichi, advisor to the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Aerospace Division, complained about how extremely difficult it was for the industries to work under the three export restrictions.⁷ Nishiyama wanted to see a clear definition of a weapons exports policy.⁸ Yuzo Murayama from Doshisha University also urged an elucidation of the policy and called for a liberalisation of weapons exports, but limited to “defensive technology” which included missile defence, saying that even though it was technically extremely difficult to draw a line between exportable and non-exportable items, it was politically meaningful and was necessary to establish an area of exportable items.⁹

Arguably, under such persistent pressures, especially from the vocal industrial lobby, and given the evolution of the exports ban, BMD presented an opportunity for a real

1 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 90.

2 Ibid., 106.

3 Reinhard Drifte, *Arms Production in Japan. The Military Applications of Civilian Technology* (Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1986), 73.

4 Marie Soederberg, *Japan's Military Export Policy* (Stockholm, 1986), 168-169; Masako Ikegami-Andersson, *The Military-industrial Complex: the Cases of Sweden and Japan* (Hants: Dartmouth, 1992), 92.

5 Robin Ballantyne, “Japan's Hidden Arms Trade,” *Japan Focus*, November 29, 2005.

6 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 106.

7 *Buki Yushutsu*, symposium report (Tokyo: RIPS, October 5, 2007), 3. Reference to Junichi Nishiyama's statement during the symposium.

8 Ibid., 5.

9 Ibid., 2, 5. Reference to Yuzo Murayama's words during a symposium session (RIPS, Tokyo, 2007).

breakthrough of repealing the ban altogether in the changed international circumstances of a post-USSR world and new domestic political developments rather than simply relaxing the ban's application. Why was this opportunity not exploited? Oros's framework of the identity of domestic antimilitarism¹ offers a perspective on both the lack of a substantial revision or abandonment of the ban and its limited reinterpretation.

Yet the central argument put forth in this thesis challenges some aspects of Oros's argument and his interpretation of BMD. “Numerous factors have affected Japan's policy course over missile defence, but one factor has exercised an extraordinary influence: the security identity of domestic antimilitarism.”² As was concluded earlier in the review, Oros's identity framework is appropriate for approaching selected aspects of Japan's BMD policy but neoclassical realism is more adequate for dealing with the main concern of this thesis. Oros underlined that his approach was not that of security strategy “in the sense of an approach to the world developed by the elites – but [that of] a resilient identity...”³ The evidence discussed in this thesis will support the view that Japan's BMD policy in its aspect captured in the central concern of the thesis was more likely the result of a security strategy developed by the elites than of a “resilient antimilitarist identity.” At the same time, some compatibility between the two should not be overlooked since both perspectives pay attention to elite manipulations in security policy, even if in different ways and to varying degrees.

One other point makes this thesis an improvement over Oros's publication. His conclusions on the post-1998 “policy innovations”⁴ are, when considered collectively, equivocal. In one place, Oros concluded that the missile defence policy, the relaxation of the arms export ban, and the spy satellite programme “underscored how even departures from

1 Oros, *Normalising Japan*, 90-121.

2 Ibid., 168. It should be noted that in a different place Oros emphasised a more diffuse approach: “The security identity of domestic antimilitarism, the changing nature of foreign pressure, and the interaction between these two provide the best explanation...” (ibid., 154).

3 Ibid., 3.

4 Ibid., 197.

past practice buttressed – and further reified – the continuity of limits of the past.”¹ Yet he also elaborated that these post-1998 developments “began to call into question the commitment to continuity apparent in security policy change of the 1990s”² and that they “chafed against the hegemonic security identity.”³ So did they “buttress” past patterns or did they “chafe” against them? Or does the BMD policy provide evidence for both interpretations? This thesis will consider this point and will attempt to discuss less equivocally how BMD is, in fact, the “engine of change”⁴ in Japan's security policy.

Succinct summary of the relationship of this research to four “classic,” recent constructivist appraisals of Japan's security and BMD policy

To summarise, it can be said that except for some differences in allocating degrees of importance to external and domestic “variables” (or sets of processes), some compatibility, in a broader sense, can be established between the argument of this thesis and four reviewed alternative interpretations of Japan's security policy. The area of compatibility includes in particular, but not exclusively, attention to elite manipulations and incrementalist policy change. It was confirmed that the constructivists' emphasis on “norms,” “cultures”, and “identity” offered a perspective for understanding such BMD policy and related aspects as the country's slow evolution toward the 1998 co-research decision and the nature of the revision of the arms export ban. Yet it was also ascertained that the central and subordinate questions of this thesis were ignored by the constructivists.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter, an extensive literature review was undertaken in order to show the

1 Ibid., 194.

2 Ibid., 197.

3 Ibid., 8.

4 Ibid., 149. Oros stated that the name “engine of change” was given to BMD by JDA officials in their interviews with him in December 2005 and/ or January 2006.

place of this research within the body of extant literature on Japan's security policy and BMD. The extant literatures were considered in two theoretical categories of international relations – realism and constructivism, broadly defined. The following statements summarise the core findings of the chapter.

Firstly, basic assumptions of the international relations realism were presented: states as unitary actors of anarchic international politics; persistent interstate struggle for power; a belief that a rational analysis of “interests defined in terms power” can yield an understanding of international politics.

Secondly, selected broad accounts of Japan's security policy by Green, Samuels, and Hughes were reviewed and a complementary relationship between them and the argument of this thesis was established.

Thirdly, a chronologically organised review of major English- and Japanese-language realist attempts to explain Japan's BMD was conducted. It allowed to establish, among many other points, that realist researchers left the central question unanswered or simply unaddressed. It was also confirmed that an analysis of elite networks will be the first such analysis and will be an important way in which this thesis seeks to contribute to knowledge.

Fourthly, a basic outline of international relations constructivism was offered. In one sentence, constructivists share a focus on intersubjectivity and co-constitutiveness of structures and agents, as well as a concern for interest- and identity-formation.

Fifthly, four “classic” recent works by Thomas Berger, Peter Katzenstein, Glenn Hook, and Andrew Oros, emphasising ideational factors of Japanese security policymaking were reviewed. Aspects of the central argument of this thesis and the constructivist publications were found to be broadly compatible.

Sixthly, it was established that constructivism offered a perspective on some BMD-policy and related aspects, especially the arms export ban and Japan's early course toward

BMD in the 1990s. Yet it can be concluded that the constructivists under review were less adequately equipped to ask some security strategy questions as could be surmised from the fact that the central and subordinate questions of this thesis were left unaddressed.

Building on the conclusions of this chapter about the successes and failures of extant research on BMD, the following chapter will further elaborate and defend the methodological underpinnings of this research.

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY.

The purpose of this last chapter of introductory material is to defend the logic of the investigation beyond a statement of why it is original in comparison to the extant publications and of how it relates to and improves the existing interpretations of Japan's BMD policy. In many ways this will be a continuation of the theoretical literature review, but unlike the preceding chapter, it will focus on the methodological guidelines of this research. In the following opening section of this chapter, the course of the enquiry to be taken in the main parts of the thesis will be recapitulated, the contribution of the chapter to the enquiry clarified, and the structure of the chapter presented.

3.1. A methodological roadmap for the thesis.

The overall logic of this research is informed by neoclassical realism, according to which elites make security policy choices within the constraints imposed by the international system.¹ The international systemic parameters will be discussed in the following chapter, first, on the basis of a historical approach and then by drawing on the international relations realism. The BMD-related domestic politics component of neoclassical realism will be investigated in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight.

The historical section of Chapter Four will outline the history of missile defences in Japan and parts of the world. Sections two and three will identify key events and developments in North Korea and China in the 1990s-2000s that likely affected Japan's BMD policy.² Some caution is in order when trying to apply the historical approach to recent history, especially to a still unfolding process of BMD procurement. This is further

1 Rose, "Neoclassical Realism."

2 The historical approach is understood here simplistically as "describing and explaining the connections between a series of events." (Jack Levy, "Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (1997): 32) In such an approach, theories are used "primarily to structure their [ie, the historians'] interpretations of particular events" (ibid.). By comparison, political scientists are said to be "formulating and testing general theoretical propositions about relationships between variables or classes of events" (ibid.).

complicated by an expectation that some significant evidence about the policymaking is likely to be guarded as a state secret and to remain inaccessible for a period of time. Consequently, the evidence base of the thesis is limited to official government publications, journalistic accounts of events, a few interviews, and secondary literature. Yet despite these limitations, a simple historical analysis of international relations with its important emphasis on “synoptic judgement”¹ will add to the factual dimension of the thesis and will serve as a reminder of the time-boundedness of the argument. The historical elements of the chapter will be complemented by social science-focused conclusions on the strategic implications of Japanese geography and on regional power balancing, dealing particularly with the status of such intertwined security issues as the security of sea lanes, regional territorial disputes, potential conflicts over resources, and military build-up in the region.

Such an outline of systemic parameters, together with an analysis of the BMD's potentialities of reformatting Japan's security policy in Chapter Five, will form a basis for the investigation in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight. That investigation will focus especially on how government ministries and an important sample of elites operated within these systemic constraints and evolving diplomatic processes and the degree to which they likely influenced the country's BMD policy. Such a research of domestic politics within international parameters is key to the argument of the thesis. Since the tenets of the international relations realism and the analytical patterns in the realist literature have been dealt with in the previous chapter, this chapter will serve as a methodological roadmap for the investigation of domestic politics.

The identification of the methodological underpinnings of Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight will be done in the following steps. Firstly, the case for investigating domestic politics

1 The term “synoptic judgement” was likely first coined by Louis Mink in: Louis Mink, “The Anatomy of Historical Understanding,” *History and Theory* 5, no. 1 (1966): 24-47. The author's attention to the phrase was drawn by Paul Schroeder in: Paul Schroeder, “History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit,” *International Security* 22, no. 1 (1997): 68. Synoptic judgement implies a broad understanding of a phenomenon involving the identification of its origins, its meaning, and “what understanding of it best integrates the available evidence” (ibid.).

will be strengthened by reviewing the literature of Japan's past weapons procurements.

Extensive evidence will be provided to support the view that an explanation of aspects of the domestic political arrangement can shed light on the procurement-related decisionmaking. A review of the studies of Japan's past military acquisitions will justify the need for analytical lenses to approach the roles of government organisations and elites in policymaking. These lenses will be identified in this chapter along the following lines.

Several models and heuristics of relevance for the thesis will be outlined to organise the investigation of the BDM policy evidence. For considering the evidence on the roles of government ministries, the organisational behaviour paradigm will be presented. According to it, policy outcomes are regarded as organisational outputs. To discuss the policy influences of domestic elites, several major examples of the literature containing substantive interpretations of policymaking in Japan will be reviewed with reference to the argument of the thesis. These interpretations will be helpful as signposts for the investigation of actors other than government ministries. Since the core new evidence of the thesis relates to the work of transnational elite networks, an attempt will be made to strengthen the case for using such inductively generated evidence by positioning its analysis with regard to two extant studies of transnational networks in other functional sectors and geographic areas. A note will also be made of discourse analysis and its potential usefulness discussed. The chapter will conclude with a section seeking to identify the influence of my identity on the research by explaining the evolution of my puzzlement at Japan's BMD policy and some inadvertent features of the evidence base.

Before proceeding to the core of the chapter, a possible charge of such a methodological make-up as eclectic must be countered. A strong theoretical case for eclecticism in analysing Japan's security policy (and recently world politics more broadly) has been made by Peter Katzenstein in several co-authored works. In an earlier publication

in 2002, Katzenstein and Okawara wrote in defence of an “agnostic epistemological stance” and “epistemological flexibility that supports a problem-driven” eclectic position.”¹ In June and September 2010, Sil and Katzenstein published an article and a book in which they advocated analytic eclecticism for comparative politics and international relations. They identified the nature of eclecticism as depending on “the multiplicity of connections between the different mechanisms and social processes analysed in isolation in separate research traditions.”²

This thesis could be said to be eclectic in Sil and Katzenstein's sense to the extent that it fulfils the goal of analytical eclecticism to demonstrate substantive connections between stories and narratives from different approaches.³ An attempt to specify such connections is made in the first three introductory chapters of the thesis. At the same time, the thesis is not entirely eclectic in their sense because the main concern of the thesis is unequivocally formulated within the realist paradigm and because the argument does not systematically “capture the interactions among different types of causal mechanisms normally analysed in isolation from each other within separate research traditions.”⁴ These points are two of three distinguishing characteristics⁵ or markers⁶ of Sil's and Katzenstein's analytic eclecticism. In any case, a certain degree of eclecticism apparent in this chapter can be considered typical, if not a virtue, given the nature of the subject and the persistence of multifactorial and sometimes methodologically fairly inclusive accounts of Japan's security and BMD policy reviewed in the previous chapter.

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- 1 Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/2002): 184. Epistemological agnosticism implies absence of an *a priori* commitment to the primacy of agency or structure, idealism or materialism.
 - 2 Rudra Sil and Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions,” *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 2 (June 2010): 415.
 - 3 Sil and Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics* (London, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 3.
 - 4 Sil and Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism,” 412.
 - 5 *Ibid.*
 - 6 Sil and Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms*, 19-23.

3.2. Strengthening the case for investigating the domestic element of neoclassical realism with regard to Japan's BMD policy.

The subject of most of the scholarship on Japan's past military procurements is the country's aircraft and missile programmes. Four "variables" in particular figured prominently in explanations of weapons acquisitions. These "variables" are "technonationalism," alliance policy, political leadership, and organisational interests. This section will outline how these "factors" have been approached typically in the past. The goal is to explore the insightfulness of such analytical patterns for explaining military procurements and, on the basis of such a review, to specify how to structure most promisingly the investigation of the domestic element of neoclassical realism in this thesis.

"Technonationalism," at the core of which is the conviction that technology is a property of national security, was often described as the initial impulse and the driving force of Japan's weapons procurement.¹ Japan's pre-² and postwar military procurements,³ especially its civilian and military aircraft programmes, were cited as an example of industrial aerospace policy with a "three-note chord" of "import-substituting indigenisation"⁴ of know-how, "diffusion of this know-how throughout the economy," and "the nurturance of a capacity to innovate and manufacture."⁵ Industrial policy was shown to be a significant motivator behind many of Japan's postwar military procurement decisions.⁶

On pre-BMD missile defence, too, the preferred interpretation of Japan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) decisions was that the country's response to the US Initiative was of a "technonationalist" nature which was characterised by a preoccupation with the technological and industrial matters of weapons procurement rather than its international

1 Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army*, (Cornell UP, 1994); Green, *Arming Japan*, 11-13.

2 Samuels, *Rich Nation*, 108.

3 *Ibid.*, 154.

4 The term "Indigenisation" is used here, as in many research publications, synonymously with "kokusanka," or "national production-isation." See, for example, Green, *Arming Japan*, 2; Samuels, *Rich Nation*, ix.

5 Samuels, *Rich Nation*, 33, 42-56.

6 Samuels, *Rich Nation*; Green, *Arming Japan*, 13-20; Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence* (1992), 165-183; Arthur Alexander, *Of Tanks and Toyotas: An Assessment of Japan's Defence Industry* (RAND, 2001), 25-31.

strategic implications.¹ In its handling of SDI, Japan was in many ways not dissimilar to the West European nations. Like Japan, they encouraged their defence contractors to engage in SDI and related anti-missile research while giving limited political support for the Initiative in the form of Memoranda of Understanding or, as in the case of Mitterrand's France, refraining even from such partial commitment to the US offer as MOU.² However, the West Europeans, especially the West Germans and French given their security environment with the perceived centrality of Western Europe to the Cold War confrontation, were much more concerned than Japan about the impact of SDI research and deployment on the credibility of the US extended nuclear deterrence and, consequently, the European defence.³

"Technonationalism" was a useful hypothesis in the case of SDI, particularly if one paid attention to the US-Japan wrangling over FS-X.⁴ The latter was intensifying at the time of Prime Minister Nakasone's decision to participate in the SDI research on September 9, 1986,⁵ followed by a formal bilateral agreement concerning the participation in the SDI research on July 21, 1987.⁶ All this was taking place in a climate of an acute politicisation of the trade imbalance and the surfacing of the politically explosive "Toshiba incident."⁷

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- 1 The dominance of this view is observable in the conclusions of the secondary literature published at the time (and more recently) and contemporary accounts. See Toshio Iwaide, *SDI to Nippon: senryaku bouei kousou-no seijigaku [SDI and Japan: The Political Science of the Strategic Defence Initiative]* (Tokyo: Hara Shobou, 1987); Yasushi Kibino, *Nichibei haiteku masatsu: SDI to Nihon-no mirai. SDI and High Technology War [US-Japan High-tech Frictions: SDI and the Future of Japan]* (Tokyo: Gijutsu to Ningeng; Nihon-no kagaku/gijutsu to SDI [Japan's science/ technology and SDI]. Collection of Symposium reports, 1987); Masako Ikegami-Andersson, *Military Technology and US-Japan Security Relations: A Study of Three Cases of Military R&D Collaboration, 1983-1998* (Uppsala, 1998), 80; Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 189-90; Peter Westwick, "The International History of the Strategic Defence Initiative: American Influence and Economic Competition in the Late Cold War," *Centaurus* 52 (2010): 338-351; Neil Davis, "Private Firms Have Strong Interest; SDI: A Potential Boost for Japanese Technology?" *The Japan Economic Journal*, May 3, 1986; "MITI to Set Guidelines for SDI Participation," *JEN*, September 10, 1986; Neil W. Davis, "Japan Sees Opportunity in SDI," *Aerospace America*, January, 1987; "Japan Wants Star without Wars," *The Economist*, August 2, 1986.
 - 2 Michael Froman et al., "Strategic Implications of SDI for France and West Germany," *The RUSI Journal* 132, no. 2 (1987): 51.
 - 3 *Ibid.*, 51-56.
 - 4 FS-X stands for next-generation fighter support experimental, which was later based on General Dynamics F-16. The "support fighter" category of aircraft itself was "invented by Japan for political reasons." (See Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence*, 133) A brief outline of the FS-X selection controversy follows later.
 - 5 "Japan to Join US Star Wars Project," *The Times (London)*, September 10, 1986.
 - 6 "Japan, US Sign SDI Research Accord," *JEN*, July 22, 1987.
 - 7 "Toshiba incident" refers to a situation when a Toshiba machine-tool making company, in violation of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls rules, provided the USSR with computerised milling machines that could make submarines difficult to detect because of the decreased noise level

Another prominent “factor” of Japan's past procurements is the country's alliance policy.¹ The impact of Japan’s prioritisation of its alliance over other considerations on weapons acquisition was observed in a number of cases, among which the most widely known episode is the FS-X selection of 1985-1987.² Originally, the FS-X of that period was expected by all interested parties in Japan to become an “indigenous” fighter (even if that definition included a foreign airframe and licensed engine).³ These expectations proved wrong when some US Congressmen and military contractors General Dynamics and McDonnell-Douglas started petitioning the US Departments of Commerce, State, and Defence to intervene in Japan’s FS-X selection process and induce Japan to purchase FS-X from the US. The issue, which was mostly an internal Japanese question with no signs of the US government’s intention to interfere as late as 1986, suddenly became politicised into “the most important bilateral problem in the late 1980s.”⁴ A significant consequence of the FS-X case noted by Green was “a vague recognition that the future integrity of Japan’s defence industrial base demanded some integration with the US.”⁵

The FS-X episode may have been unprecedented in the scale of its “explosion,” but certainly not in terms of the decisive nature of the American impact on the course and outcome of the procurement. For example, the decision on the Lockheed P2V-7 sea patrol aircraft of 1957 was shown to have been linked to alliance policy and to the desire to please President Eisenhower’s administration with proof of accelerated defence spending and a

produced by the smoothened surface of propeller blades. “Japan, US Agree on SDI Participation,” *AWST*, July 27, 1987.

- 1 The original, formal basis for the US influence on Japan's defence matters is the 1954 Mutual Security Act (MSA) and the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty and Related Agreements that locked Japan in an exclusive security arrangement with the US with the implication that Japan only needed military capabilities sufficient to repel an initial attack on the country before the US moved its main forces to help Japan. Other important documents solidifying the bilateral relationship are the 1976 National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO), the 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, and their revised versions of 2004 and 1997.
- 2 Masaru Kohno, “Japanese Defence Policy Making: the FS-X Selection, 1985-1987,” *Asian Survey* 29, no. 5 (1989).
- 3 *Ibid.*, 458.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 478.
- 5 Green, *Arming Japan*, 108.

“powerful souvenir” of P2V-7 orders.¹ The role of the US contractor Lockheed in affecting negotiations between the private sector, the JDA, and MITI was also highlighted in the decisions in favour of Lockheed’s F-104 fighter (1959) and P3-C patrol aircraft (PXL, 1972-1977).² The latter PXL episode can be viewed in many ways as a harbinger of what was to become the FS-X controversy since bilateral trade issues were also one of the prime considerations in Japan’s defence issues around the time of P3-C selection in the 1970s.³

Green also noted a number of cases in which “the element of industrial policy was undeniable,”⁴ without any visible intervention from the US or signs of alliance maintenance considerations. These were the T-2 jet trainer, the FST-2 ground support fighter (which became Japan’s first domestic fighter F-1),⁵ XT-4 trainer,⁶ OH-X (Kawasaki Heavy Industries-designed observation helicopter),⁷ and some others. It has been pointed out that alliance management concerns sometimes had a stimulating effect on “indigenisation” debates, based on the idea that a strong defence industrial base in Japan could improve the country’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the US. Yet it has also been argued that “blaming (or crediting) a decision on that [US] pressure also has helped cover up the other pressures within Japan for higher defence spending and a more visible defence role.”⁸

In view of such likely cover-ups of domestic pressures, the emphasis on alliance maintenance in Japan’s defence does not directly and immediately translate into policy, especially in situations when internal forces are promoting their interests in an organised and concerted way. When a deadlock between interests emerged Prime Ministerial intervention through his chairmanship of the National Defence Council has been shown to be decisive.

1 Ibid., 44.

2 Ibid., 44-46, 67-68; Sungjoo Han, “Japan’s ‘PXL’ Decision: The Politics of Weapons Procurement,” *Asian Survey* 18, no. 8 (1978): 780.

3 Green, *Arming Japan*, 69.

4 Ibid., 50.

5 Ibid., 62.

6 Ibid., 92.

7 Ibid., 129.

8 Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence*, 10.

Researchers highlighted the role of political leadership in the case of P2V-7 selection when Prime Minister Kishi's intervention was critical for the final decision on procurement.¹ Prime Minister Tanaka's move against his own government's consensus decision led to domestic production of T-2 trainer and FST-2 (F-1) fighter jets.² Tanaka also exercised "considerable" influence on the decision to procure Lockheed's P3-C as PXL.³

Some other high-ranking politicians have also been ascribed important roles in determining the course of procurement projects. Finance Minister Sato played a key role in choosing Lockheed's F-104 as the post-F-86 fighter jet against the consensus of the JDA and the opinions in the private sector.⁴ Nakasone's assertive leadership was important in the promotion of large-scale autonomous defence on the conceptual level but did not survive the end of his tenure as JDA Director General in the period of détente.⁵ Nakasone's JDA Directors General Koichi Kato and Yuko Kurihara, and JDA administrative vice-minister Seiki Nishihiro are described as having "made a difference" in the FS-X selection process.⁶

These individuals were acting through their immediate institutional environments of the Prime Minister's Office and the JDA. These and other organisational actors were said to be important policymaking actors in most research cases. They were assigned distinct interests that buttressed their positions developing according to circumstances. A brief outline of the conclusions of extant research on the organisational actors' roles in weapons procurements follows.

The National Defence Council and the Prime Minister's Office are described as "the most effective points for external pressure... [against] *pro-kokusanka* factions inside MITI and the JDA."⁷ The Council is not normally visible in Japan's routine defence affairs, but its

1 Green, *Arming Japan*, 44.

2 Ibid., 64.

3 Ibid., 68; Han, "PXL," 774, 782.

4 Green, *Arming Japan*, 44.

5 Ibid., 53-60, 60.

6 Ibid., 89-91, 97, 101-102, 113; Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence*, 2.

7 Green, *Arming Japan*, 46.

participation becomes significant when a deadlock in a procurement process needs to be overcome.¹ The JDA's role in the security bureaucracy has been characterised as of "secondary" importance² until the FSX episode when it "played a far more significant role" than in previous procurement debates and Japan's uniformed services used "a far more authoritative voice."³ The uniformed services were characterised for their competition with each other over the allocation of funding for weapons. The SDF branches often preferred purchasing systems from the US, but would temporarily side with the "kokusan" faction to make the US more willing to release certain components for licensed production, as was the case, for example, with the MSDF in the PXL debate.⁴ Other concerns motivating the Self Defence Forces to support the "indigenisation" of weapons production were, reportedly, of logistical nature: US companies did not always have a good reputation in matters of providing spare parts, doing repairs and the like.

MOFA with its broad mandate for security policymaking, supported by its role in the management of security treaty related matters, was attributed a lead role in "setting the course" of security policy.⁵ This influence was shared with MITI/ METI and Ministry of Finance (MOF), among others. Both agencies would exercise their authority through the Security Council and through seconding officials to high positions in the JDA.⁶ MITI's role was said to be in encouraging defence spending if it led to an increase of Japan's industrial and economic competitiveness; MOF's credo was fiscal health, which often resulted in restraining defence expenditures.⁷

Political parties as actors in the procurement process have received rather limited attention in research. The emphasis there was on specialised committees of the LDP Policy

1 Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence*, 22-23.

2 *Ibid.*, 2.

3 Green, *Arming Japan*, 112, 113.

4 *Ibid.*, 66-67.

5 Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence*, 12, 13.

6 *Ibid.*, 17, 20.

7 *Ibid.*, 19-20; Samuels, *Rich Nation*, 333;

Affairs Research Council (PARC). Although some authors dedicated several paragraphs to discussing PARC on the general level, no substantive attempt at elucidating the power of the council committees in the deliberations on specific procurement items appears to have been made.¹ This may be due to the fact that no minutes are taken at PARC meetings, and it is hard to ascertain the contribution of relevant committees. A related group of individuals known as defence “policy tribe,” or *bouei zoku* (*kokubou zoku*),² has been mentioned in research.³ Yet publications did not contain systematic conclusions about the “tribal politicians” roles in managing the country's security policy after the Cold War or in influencing specific procurement decisions. As regards the opposition parties, they were normally mentioned in discussions of general government guidelines on the peaceful use of space, the weapons export ban, and the one-percent cap on defence spending.⁴ Their role in individual procurement cases, however, was largely neglected except for the time when the Socialist Prime Minister Murayama’s move to recognise the constitutionality of the SDF and the alliance in 1994-95 was balanced by the party’s subsequent opposition to TMD.⁵

The private sector’s involvement in procurement processes has not escaped the attention of researchers and was acknowledged as significant. It was pointed out that the industries participated in policymaking either individually or through one of their umbrella organisations, the most important of which was the Defence Production Committee (DPC) of the Japan Business Federation (*Nihon keizaidantai rengoukai*, or *Nippon Keidanren*). Among

1 Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence*, 21; Green, *Arming Japan*, 49, 85, 120, 121.

2 The defence “tribe,” or “clan,” was an informal grouping of LDP parliamentarians with an interest and expertise in and influence over national security issues. Similar “tribes” formed from the 1970s in various policy areas, especially transport, education, posts and telecommunications, social welfare. These “tribes” were presented as particularly cohesive in a classic study of the subject. (See Takashi Inoguchi and Tomoaki Iwai, *Zoku giin-no kenkyuu. Jimintouseiken-wo gyuuujiru shuyakutachi-no shousai [A Study of “Policy Tribe” Diet Members. Details about the People Who Control LDP Governments]* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1987), 257-60, 215-34). Politicians also coalesced into “tribes” in the areas of agriculture, construction, and commerce. These “tribes” had large memberships because engagement in these areas could offer political funding opportunities and votes. (Inoguchi and Iwai, *Zoku giin*, 133.) All LDP factions had their members in the defence “tribe” (*ibid.*, 304).

3 Keddell, *The Politics of Defence*, 13, 20, 86-89, 106, 110-112, 128, 133, 136, 144-146, 182-183.

4 *Ibid.*, 43-44, 44-46, 55, 64, 94-100.

5 Green, *Arming Japan*, 26, 137-38.

the companies with stakes in defence production the dominant player was Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), but all other heavy industries, as well as many electronics and trading companies, reportedly, also tried to influence defence policy and procurement decisions.¹ The MHI's role as an unofficial negotiator with the US on procurement, prior to any formal governmental decision, has also been emphasised.² The DPC figured very prominently in two publications and was at the core of two other studies.³ Their common position could be summarised in the words of one of the researchers that the DPC "provided the business community with an organisational mechanism within which the specialised interest of this [military-industrial] sector could be aggregated and then presented to the bureaucracy, the government, and the LDP."⁴

This brief review of the literature of Japan's past weapons procurements strengthened the case for integrating as part of the analysis of the thesis an investigation of the domestic political dimension of the procurement of BMD. Extant literatures have productively approached the subject by developing arguments that refer to the roles of alliance and industrial policy consideration, as well to the policymaking input of organisations and individual actors. Importantly, past research suggests that an interpretation of military procurement decisionmaking can in some cases productively pay attention to the stages of the decisionmaking process. Furthermore, it was reported that certain formal and informal groupings of individuals also played a part in procurement decisions and that "US pressure"

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- 1 Samuels, *Rich Nation*, 132-318; Green, *Arming Japan*, 65, 87-88; Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence*, 23, 79-82, 110; Alexander, *Of Tanks*, 19-24; Chinworth, "Country Survey XIII: Japan's Security Posture and Defence Industry Prospects," *Defence and Peace Economics* 11, no. 2 (2000): 381-382.
 - 2 Chinworth, "Industry and Government in Japanese Defence Procurement: The Case of the Patriot Missile System," *Comparative Strategy* 9, no. 3 (1990): 224.
 - 3 Samuels, *Rich Nation*, 136, 142-257; Green, *Arming Japan*; David Hopper, "Defence Policy and the Business Community: the Keidanren Defence Production Committee," in *The Modern Japanese Military System*, ed. James Buck (Sage Publications, 1975), 113-47; John Weste, "The Allocation of Expectations: the Post-war Development of the Japanese Military-industrial Lobby" (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 1995).
 - 4 Hopper, "Defence Policy," 143. Weste's study of the DPC's interactions with the conservative elites in the 1950s was a rich illustration of the committee's role in forging a postwar consensus over the degree of military rearmament. Weste called the DPC "the pivot" for military-industrial interests (Weste, "The Allocation of Expectations," 169).

could be used domestically as a “cover-up” for internal Japanese proponents of military build-up. On the evidence base of these studies, it could be observed that the DPC bulletins¹ and current affairs news were important sources.

It can be concluded that this thesis, in many respects, falls within the rich tradition of scholarship on Japan's pre-BMD military procurements. This thesis will take that tradition a step further through its careful consideration of the data on transnational elite networks, which included defence *zoku* members,² and through its analysis of the international systemic constraints of the BMD policy. The following sections will outline the analytical lenses through which the evidence on the domestic element of neoclassical realism will be investigated in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight.

3.3. The heuristics for investigating the domestic politics element of neoclassical realism.

Policymaking has attracted considerable attention among researchers who have produced a variety of models with which to think about policy. This section will specify the scholarship helpful for an elaboration of the insights drawn from the literature on Japan's past military procurements. The section will deal with those insights in the following order. Firstly, several major examples of the literature containing substantive interpretations of the general nature of policymaking in Japan will be reviewed with reference to the argument of the thesis. These interpretations will also serve as signposts, or anchors, for investigating the BMD decisions. Secondly, some underpinnings of the organisational behaviour paradigm will be outlined as a lens for analysing part of the evidence on BMD pertaining to the

1 The “sine qua non” character of the DPC bulletins for the research on the military-industrial lobby was noted, for example, in Weste, “The Allocation of Expectations,” 6.

2 In the period of interest for the thesis (1994-2007), the defence *zoku*, based on the broad definition of the term, most likely included Taku Yamasaki, Fukushiro Nukaga, Shigeru Ishiba, Gen Nakatani, Fumio Kyuma. (See, for example, Masayuki Fukuoka, *Kawaru! Seiji-no shikumi. Political Structures [Political Structures]* (Kyoto, Tokyo: PHP Research Institute, 2010), 91.) These individuals, with the exception of Yamasaki, were key to the broader elite networks which will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight. Yamasaki was very likely the oldest member of the defence *zoku*, mentioned already in 1987 (Inoguchi and Iwai, *Zoku giin*).

government ministries. Including a theoretical discussion of the organisational behaviour model will allow discussing a portion of the evidence in a more organised manner in a separate chapter (Chapter Six). Thirdly, the usefulness of the transnational elite networks heuristic will be highlighted by reviewing how the heuristic has been applied to explain policy in scholarly publications. Such a theoretical review is important since the evidence on the networks was discovered inductively and recourse to it needs to be further justified. Fourthly, a popular alternative model by Kingdon will be mentioned, given its renown in the policymaking literature, with reference to the framework of this thesis.

Analytical signposts for examining policymaking in Japan

The power elite model is historically the most prominent one, to the point of being called an “orthodoxy.”¹ The model, also known as “iron triangle,” implies a triad of conservative politicians, senior bureaucrats, and business leaders, complementing each other in a ruling alliance. Numerous early proponents of such an analytical model were well reviewed by Haruhiro Fukui in 1977.² But the model has retained some salience as a reference benchmark even in the 1990s-2000s,³ as was also suggested in the military procurements literature in the previous section. Different authors have ascribed dominance to different members of the triumvirate,⁴ with some authors emphasising the “coordinating”

1 Haruhiro Fukui, “Studies in Policymaking: A Review of the Literature,” in *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, ed. TJ Pempel (Cornell UP, 1977), 23.

2 *Ibid.*, 24-35.

3 See, for example, Leonard Silk and Tom Kono, “Sayonara, Japan Inc.,” *Foreign Policy* 93 (1993-1994): 126; Richard Colignon and Chikako Usui, “The Resilience of Japan’s Iron Triangle: Amakudari,” *Asian Survey* 41, no. 5 (2001): 865-95; Gavan McCormack, “Breaking the Iron Triangle,” *New Left Review* 13 (2002): 14.

4 Chitoshi Yanaga, for example, emphasised the “decisive role” of big businesses in a number of policymaking areas. (Chitoshi Yanaga, *Big Business in Japanese Politics* (Yale UP, 1968), 63-64. Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, on the other hand, concluded that bureaucrats “administered in the shadow of the LDP.” See J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth, *Japan’s Political Marketplace* (Harvard UP, 1997), 120, 99-141.

nature of the relationship.¹ But the bureaucrats were historically the overall favourites.²

More recently, however, in the area of foreign policy, publications have appeared with arguments about the Diet and the Prime Minister's Official Residence (*Kantei*) as important sources of foreign policy in Japan. In his study of Japanese foreign policy after World War II, especially of the “human element” of changes after the Cold War, Kevin Cooney argued in 2007 that a process of power transfer from the bureaucracies to the elected officials was taking place³ and that the Diet's influence on foreign policy was growing at the expense of MOFA.⁴ He predicted that the Prime Minister's Office would “more likely be providing leadership,” while the Diet would provide “direction,” with MOFA being “reduced to a moderating role.”⁵ Naturally, with the growth of the Diet's control, Cooney also concluded that the country's foreign policy would be “less stable and predictable”⁶ and the country would be “less likely to behave in a highly risk-averse way.”⁷ At the same time, in his conclusions, Cooney noted that policy choices including those made under Koizumi could change. Moreover, he asserted that after the LDP and Koizumi are eventually replaced, “The conservative bureaucracy and the public, constrained by fear of North Korea, will limit any change in policy.”⁸ This thesis will corroborate some of Cooney's above observations and projections to an extent, through its investigation of elite networks which contain a large detachment of senior LDP politicians and Diet members.⁹ His observations will serve as

1 John K. Emmerson, *Arms, Yen, and Power: The Japanese Dilemma* (New York, 1971), 316. In his somewhat sensational argument about a “paralysed superpower,” Karel van Wolferen claimed that in the triad, “Nobody is boss, but everybody, in some way or other...” (Karel van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation* (New York, 1990 (1989), 41).

2 See, for example, TJ Pempel, “The Bureaucratisation of Policymaking in Postwar Japan,” *American Journal of Political Science* 18, no. 4 (1974): 647-64; Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford UP, 1982), 20-21, 50; Johnson, *Japan, Who Governs?* (NY, 1995), 115-140. For a balanced discussion of the relative influence on policymaking by bureaucrats and politicians, see Byung Chul Koh, *Japan's Administrative Elite* (UC Press, 1989), 204-218, 257.

3 Kevin Cooney, *Japan's Foreign Policy since 1945* (Armonk, London: ME Sharpe, 2007), 3.

4 *Ibid.*, 181.

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.*, 182.

7 *Ibid.*, 183.

8 *Ibid.*, 203.

9 The participation of DPJ and Komeito politicians, as well as some defence bureaucrats and defence-industrial leaders, in the networks possibly helped to ensure the durability of Japan's BMD policy. I

signposts for the investigations in Chapters Six and Seven.

In his book on “*Kantei* diplomacy,” Tomohito Shinoda also concluded that MOFA lost “a great deal of influence” under the Koizumi Cabinet and indicated the danger of politically motivated foreign policy “narrowing windows for serious diplomacy.”¹ Shinoda applied a concentric circles model to illustrate the top-down approach to policymaking employed by the Koizumi Cabinet in three cases – the adoption of the 2001 Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law,² the 2003 Emergency Laws,³ and the 2003 Law Concerning the Special Measures on the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities and Security Support in Iraq.⁴ Shinoda chose these cases because they were examples where the *Kantei*, defined as the entire body of the Cabinet Secretariat along with the Prime Minister,⁵ provided organisational support for foreign affairs after the January 2001 administrative reforms, which saw *Kantei*'s power boosted.⁶ The *Kantei* together with top executives of the LDP occupied the core of Shinoda's model.⁷

Surprisingly – or not – Shinoda chose to ignore BMD in his expositions. This thesis will not seek to fill that gap because, as he correctly stated, “There is limited information on what happens inside the *Kantei*, and the actual workings of the institution are kept very much out of sight.”⁸ But Shinoda's observations about the role of Prime Ministers, as well as Chief Cabinet Secretaries who, in his opinion, were “much more involved” in policymaking than

predicted this durability from 2008 (in my transfer examination), and the new DPJ government has so far, as of November 2010, done nothing to overturn my prediction.

1 Tomohito Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defence Affairs* (University of Washington Press, 2007), 134, 143-144. It must be noted that while listing the possibility of domestic politics intervening in foreign policy on pp. 143-144, Shinoda was overall in favour of political leadership, legitimacy, and accountability in foreign policymaking (ibid., 146-153).

2 Ibid., 86-98.

3 Ibid., 99-112.

4 Ibid., 113-132.

5 Ibid., 10.

6 Ibid., 11, 19. It can be mentioned that an opinion has also been expressed by other researchers that the administrative reforms of 2001 “have not generated sufficient power to override the entrenched policymaking structures in which the forces opposed to [economic] reform [ie, bureaucrats and LDP politicians] are embedded.” See Aurelia Mulgan, “Japan's 'Un-Westminster' System: Impediments to Reform in a Crisis Economy,” *Government and Opposition* 38., no. 1 (2003): 89, 91.

7 Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 14-15, 133.

8 Ibid., 17.

Prime Ministers, will direct productively some of my attention in Chapter Seven.

Consequently, few systematic connections between the argument of the thesis and Shinoda's points about the *Kantei* will be made. It can, however, be said that the emphasis of this thesis on the elite networks does not diminish the potential significance of the *Kantei*, as the entire body of the Cabinet Secretariat, in the BMD policymaking. The evidence on the Prime Ministers, Chief Cabinet Secretaries, and other senior LDP politicians reviewed in the thesis suggests that a degree of compatibility could be established between the conclusions of a detailed study of the role of *Kantei* in BMD, if it is ever undertaken, and the argument of the thesis.

Before moving on, a brief summary of some of the progress made in this chapter so far may be helpful. This chapter mostly concerns itself with identifying the methodological underpinnings of analysing the domestic politics element of neoclassical realism. The literature on Japan's past military procurements was reviewed first in order to identify anchors to organise better the analysis of the BMD decision. The review suggested the usefulness of scrutinising the roles of government ministries (in particular, MOFA, MOD, METI), the Prime Ministers, and military contractors. To gauge better the salience of these actors and to identify signposts for analysing them, the power elite model was reviewed in the previous subsection along with an outline of several key arguments pertaining to the recent trends in Japanese foreign policymaking. Three things remain to be done to complete this section of policymaking heuristics: firstly, to outline in some detail a theoretical model for investigating government ministries; secondly, to anchor my analysis of transnational elite networks in the relevant international literature; thirdly, to outline a popular policymaking model by Kingdon and explain why it was not applied in the thesis.

Allison's organisational behaviour paradigm

The organisational behaviour paradigm is discussed here as conceived in Graham Allison's revised classic study of the Cuban missile crisis.¹ The first edition of the book from 1971 has been criticised for “major misunderstandings about the nature of bureaucracy and governmental policymaking.”² In the new edition of 1999, co-authored with Philip Zelikow, the revisions of the theoretical framework of model I (rational actor) and model II (organisational behaviour) were described as “impressive,” but model III (governmental politics) as wanting and even as “a grave disappointment.”³ Partly as a result of such theoretical flaws, only Allison and Zelikow's model II of organisational behaviour will be used as an analytical lens for thinking about the evidence.

The following excerpts provide a succinct summary of the model.

... the subjects in Model II [the organisational behaviour paradigm] explanations are organisations, and their behaviour is explained in terms of organisational purposes and practices common to the members of the organisation, not those peculiar to one or another individual.⁴

... If a nation performs an action of a certain type today, its organisational components must yesterday have been performing (or have established routines for performing) an action only marginally different from today's action. At any specific point in time, *t*, a government consists of an established conglomerate of organisations, each with existing notions of critical tasks, special capacities, programmes, and repertoires. The characteristics of a government's action in any instance follows from those established routines, and from the choice made by government leaders – on the basis of information and estimates provided by existing routines – among established programmes. Model II's [the organisational behaviour paradigm's] explanatory power is achieved by uncovering the special capacities, repertoires, and organisational routines [standard operating procedures] that produced the outputs that comprise the puzzling occurrence.⁵

Such a model is based on the notion of bounded rationality and implies

1 Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*.

2 Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond, “Rethinking Allison's Models,” *The American Political Science Review* 86, no. 2 (1992): 319.

3 Jerel Rosati, “Ignoring the Essence of Decisionmaking,” review of *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, by Allison and Zelikow, (NY, 1999), *International Studies Review* 3, no. 1 (2001): 178-181. A comprehensive review of the criticisms levelled at Allison's earlier work is available in: Steve Smith, “Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of the Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 9, no. 1 (1980): 21-40.

4 Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 144.

5 *Ibid.*, 175.

incrementalism of change. Bounded rationality is rationality, or rational choice, that emphasises the limitations of the decisionmakers' knowledge and computational capacity.¹ In such circumstances, the appropriateness of developing time-saving information-processing “habits” and routines becomes clear.² Such habits assume that many changes in the world are slow, incremental, and can be predicted.³ Partly grounded in such reasoning, model II posits as the main feature of organisational activity “its preprogrammed character: the extent to which behaviour in any particular case is an enactment of pre-established routines.”⁴

Allison and Zelikow's model will serve as a lens for identifying and interpreting the evidence on the key ministries' roles in BMD in Chapter Six. It will focus on MOFA, MOD, and METI. The review of the BMD policy explanations and of Japan's past military procurements literature has already mentioned some pre-established routines, such as METI's drive for the indigenisation of weapons production (*kokusanka*), or MOF's “creed” of maintaining the country's fiscal soundness. Incrementalism was also shown as a popular reference benchmark in the analysis of Japanese foreign and security policy. The ministries will be considered in Chapter Six against such a background.

Transnational elite networks in policy analysis

This subsection will review two major works on transnational elite networks in order to anchor the investigation of Japanese transnational elite networks in an international scholarly field. This can help to strengthen the argument about these networks because the relevant evidence was discovered inductively, leaving it open to methodological criticisms.

1 Herbert Simon, *Empirically Grounded Economic Reason*, vol. 3 of *Models of Bounded Rationality* (MIT Press, 1997), 291. An influential early publication containing an argument relevant to bounded rationality is Herbert A. Simon, “A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 69, no. 1 (1955): 99-118. This was followed by a classic book in the field: James March and Herbert Simon, *Organisations* (NY, 1958). A succinct and general summary of the evolution of the notion of human rationality in the social sciences can be found in Herbert Simon, “Bounded Rationality in Social Science: Today and Tomorrow,” *Mind & Society* 1, no. 1 (2000): 25-39.

2 Simon, *Empirically Grounded Economic Reason*, 173-176.

3 Ibid.

4 Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 168.

Various networks were typically observed in the Japanese politics, as can be expected of many other political systems. Some important samples of these networks, such as policy “tribes” and informal alliances between LDP politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders, were outlined earlier in this chapter. More could be mentioned.¹

The US-Japanese networks in different policy areas, including security, are obviously not limited to the networks investigated in this thesis in Chapters Seven and Eight.² But the wealth of data on the networks documented in this thesis and their relevance to Japan's BMD policy makes them special. The contribution of this section is in demonstrating theoretical connections and differences between these Japanese networks and the transnational networks researched in the international literature. Two major international publications will be reviewed. The treatment of networks in one will resemble the investigation of elite networks in this thesis. The other will offer a contrasting example of what the networks analysed in this thesis are not. Specifically, Anne-Marie Slaughter's work³ will be reviewed to show a degree of compatibility of her argument with the conclusions of my investigation of the Japanese networks. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's book⁴ will be presented as an

1 For example, the “old boys” networks are discussed jointly with the phenomenon of *amakudari*, or “descent from heaven,” which implies reemployment of retired government officials in private or semi-private corporations where they draw on their government experience to facilitate the interactions between government and businesses. “OB” refers to such privately reemployed former government officials. An explanation is offered in: Ulrike Schaede, “The ‘Old Boy’ Network and Government-Business Relationships in Japan,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 21, no. 2 (1995): 293-317.

2 The joint US-Japan TMD Working Group, established in December 1993, can be considered as an example of such other networks. The Working Group falls into the category of government networks. Little is known even about its membership – on the Japanese side, it was said to include representatives from MOFA and JDA/ MOD. Consequently, the network will be mentioned in the thesis, but the scarcity of available information on it makes it fairly unhelpful for the purposes of the thesis. Furthermore, while the Group was established to provide a forum for discussing TMD and related political and strategic issues, RAND researchers concluded on the basis of their interviews in Tokyo in 1999 that “the group has focused primarily on technical issues and conducted very few discussions of the political and strategic aspects relating to Japanese acquisition of BMD systems.” See Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 32. See also US Department of Defence, *Report to Congress on Theatre Missile Defence Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region*, May 4, 1999, www.dod.gov/pubs/tmd050499.pdf, p. 7; Takashi Kawakami and Ken Jimbo, “Dandou misairu bouei-to nichibei doumei” [BMD and US-Japan Alliance], in *Misairu bouei. Atarashii kokusai anzenhoshou-no kouzu [Missile Defence. The Shape of New International Security]*, ed. Satoshi Morimoto (Tokyo: JIIA, 2002), 268.

3 Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order: Government Networks and the Disaggregated State* (Princeton UP, 2004).

4 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, (Cornell UP, 1998).

illustration of what different types of networks may still have in common.

Slaughter's argument is grounded in debates about the effect of globalisation on the state and about modes of global governance. Her argument stands in contrast to the liberal-internationalist preference for international organisations at the expense of states and to the “new medievalist” position on the demise of the Westphalian state-centred system of international relations.¹ For Slaughter, the state was “disaggregating rather than disappearing.”² She supported her proposition about the disaggregation of the state with evidence about the rise of government networks and even their proliferation “in every place we have eyes to see,”³ particularly in the area of transgovernmental regulatory,⁴ judicial,⁵ but also legislative cooperation.⁶

In a chapter contribution to an edited volume on globalisation preceding the publication of her own book, Slaughter spent much time defending her propositions against theoretical rivals and countering criticisms levelled against transgovernmentalism.⁷ But only three points made by Slaughter about government networks really need to be mentioned for the purposes of the thesis. Firstly, networks take “a variety of forms” and perform “a variety of functions.”⁸ Secondly, Slaughter's definition of networks emphasised government units or institutions.⁹ At the same time, an “eclectic mix of actors,” including corporations, can participate in government networks.¹⁰ Thirdly, the networks' influence on decisionmaking

1 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks,” in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalisation Debate*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), 199.

2 Ibid.; Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 12.

3 Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 11.

4 Ibid., 36-64.

5 Ibid., 65-103.

6 Ibid., 104-130.

7 Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy,” 189-202. Slaughter focused on three criticisms: lack of accountability of the “new technocratic elite,” “a minimalist and exclusionary policy agenda,” and “marginalisation and displacement of traditional international organisations” (ibid., 193). See also Slaughter's book: Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 217-260.

8 Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy,” 190.

9 Slaughter defined networks broadly: “a network is a pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the 'domestic' from the 'international' sphere.” Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 14.

10 Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy,” 192.

was described as “subtle and hard to track;”¹ they were supposed to work through engagement and persuasion.²

Against the background of these points, the national security networks discussed in this thesis in Chapters Seven and Eight can be considered as further evidence for Slaughter's framework, expanding it to include the security area. It is not that Slaughter did not cover networks in the security area, but she devoted only scant attention to the successes of “assemblies” within NATO and OSCE, and mentioned some other networks.³ The Japanese-US security networks are investigated in this thesis at much greater length.

The networks, on which Keck and Sikkink focused, are different in many ways. In their definition of transnational advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink underlined that it concerned interactions of non-state actors with different types of international actors.⁴ The authors concerned themselves with the networks of human rights activists. Keck and Sikkink concluded that they had identified a series of international issues “characterised by the prominence of principled ideas and a central role for nongovernmental organisations.”⁵ This sets their interpretation apart from Slaughter's government networks and the networks documented in this thesis with their strong legislative and governmental presence. Yet these interpretations of networks share some common ground in their attention to the strategic use (and usefulness) of information.⁶

1 Ibid., 193.

2 Ibid., 202.

3 Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 108-111, 111-125.

4 Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 1.

5 Ibid., 199. Keck and Sikkink's emphasis on “principled ideas” is reminiscent of Peter Haas's networks of knowledge-based experts. Haas referred to them as “epistemic communities” which were characterised, in part, by a “shared set of normative and principled beliefs,” but also had “shared notions of validity” and a “shared policy enterprise.” See Peter Haas, “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” *International Organisation* 46, no. 1 (1992): 2-3. “Epistemic communities” possibly had influence on some security policy decisions, as, reportedly, in the case of NATO's decision to deploy Pershing II missiles at the end of the 1970s. (See Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Programme,” *International Organisation* 46, no. 1 (1992): 387, footnote 51; Fred Kaplan, “Warring over New Missiles for NATO,” *TNYT*, December 9, 1979.) But the European-American Workshop in question consisted of academics, consultants, and analysts (Kaplan, “Warring over New Missiles for NATO,” 55). The mixed membership of the networks documented in this thesis makes it difficult to call them “epistemic communities.”

6 Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 2; Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 19.

Keck and Sikkink specified four types of tactics that networks use to influence policy. They termed them information politics (that is, the ability to generate “politically usable information”), symbolic politics (that is, efforts to invoke symbolic units “to make sense of a situation”), leverage politics (that is, the ability to ask powerful actors to influence a situation), and accountability politics (or efforts to hold actors to their stated policies).¹ Slaughter's notions of “persuasion and discussion” as tools of “soft power,”² as well as her designation of some types of networks as information-sharing and policy-coordinating,³ are compatible with the tactics identified by Keck and Sikkink. In light of that and in reference to the elite networks discussed in this thesis, it can be said that the format of the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference, in which the networks met and operated, is self-evidently related to information-sharing. Moreover, given the relatively high status of the network participants from both private and public sectors and the participation of Japanese legislators,⁴ some policy influence was also likely, as will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.

Kingdon's model

There is another popular, even “classic,” model of policymaking that could have been employed in this thesis. It is John Kingdon's multiple-streams model from 1984.⁵ Yet it was not selected because the literatures on Japan's BMD and pre-BMD military procurements suggested the more straightforward alternatives of investigating government organisations and elites. In hindsight, the appropriateness of these choices can be maintained. At the same time, some potential compatibility could be noted between the policymaking heuristics of

1 Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 16.

2 Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 27.

3 *Ibid.*, 131.

4 Writing on legislative networks, Slaughter concluded that legislators were “able to exercise a more direct transgovernmental role on specific policy issues [than regulators and judges].” See Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 15.

5 John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, (NY, 1997).

this thesis and Kingdon's model.

When writing his book, Kingdon was preoccupied with the processes of agenda setting and alternative specification, that is, “why some subjects rise on governmental agendas while other subjects are neglected.”¹ He drew on the stages model² and adapted the “garbage can” model to the US government's policy output.³ In Kingdon's framework, agendas are set and alternatives selected when three independent “streams” of actors and processes are coupled through a “window of opportunity,”⁴ that is, a point in the policymaking when the problem,⁵ policy,⁶ and politics “streams”⁷ are brought together by policy entrepreneurs.⁸

Kingdon's scheme could, in principle, be applied to Japan's BMD policymaking, provided that extensive interview data and an overall rich evidence base are available. One instance of the scheme's potential could be cited for illustration. Kingdon's idea of the “policy window,” when solutions become joined to problems, reminds me of Urayama's

1 Ibid., 196, 1.

2 The stages model considers the policy process as “sequential, differentiated by function, and cumulative.” (See a critical appraisal of the model in Robert Nakamura, “The Textbook Policy Process and Implementation Research,” *Policy Studies Review* 7, no. 1 (1987): 142). Functional activities in a series have been designated differently by different scholars – Kingdon's agenda setting and alternative selection are one example. James Anderson referred to the sequence as: problem formation, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation. (James Anderson, *Public Policy Making* (NY, 1975), 26). There is a broad overlap between different classifications. Compare several examples in: Nakamura, “The Textbook Policy Process,” 142-143. In the strongly worded opinion of one critic, the stages heuristic has received “devastating criticisms” and “has outlived its usefulness and must be replaced.” (Paul Sabatier, “Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24, no. 2 (1991): 147; Sabatier, “The Need for Better Theories,” in *Theories of the Policy Process*, ed. Sabatier (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007), 7).

3 The focus of the “garbage can model of organisational choice” is on “organised anarchies,” that is, on organisations with problematic preferences, unclear technology (procedures), and fluid participation. (Michael Cohen, James March and Johan Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organisational Choice,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (1972): 1). Their example of such organisations was colleges and universities (ibid., 11-17). In the model of Cohen et al., a decision is an outcome of four independent “streams” within organisations (ibid., 2-3). The streams are of problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities (ibid.). The interrelations, or “intermeshing,” between these streams could best be summarised in Cohen et al. words: “... an organisation is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work” (ibid., 2).

4 Kingdon, *Agendas*, 165-166.

5 On problem recognition, see Kingdon, “Chapter 5. Problems,” in *Agendas*, 90-115.

6 On the progress of ideas and policy proposals, see Kingdon, “Chapter 6. The Policy Primeval Soup,” in *Agendas*, 116-144.

7 On the political stream, which includes swings of national mood, government or legislative turnovers, and interest groups pressure campaigns, see Kingdon, “Chapter 7. The Political Stream,” in *Agendas*, 145-164.

8 Kingdon, *Agendas*, 165-166, 181.

reference to her interviews with “high-ranking” MSDF officers in 1999-2001 who stated that they were “even 'grateful' to Pyongyang [after the August 1998 Taepo-dong launch “shocked” Japan] for 'helping' our [their] cause to move on ahead with missile defence.”¹ Such reasoning is compatible with the thrust of the argument developed in this thesis. But Kingdon's framework was not applied in this thesis.

Similar to Kingdon's book, this thesis specified the possible policymaking players.² Yet Kingdon's book went on to analyse the processes of agenda setting and alternative selection, or the “the game itself,” as he put it.³ This thesis, however, ended after establishing, where appropriate, the degrees of influence of policy actors and their likely interests in BMD and related issues for two reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, such an analysis provided sufficient clues for addressing the research questions. Thus, in hindsight, the non-application of Kingdon's model is defensible. The second reason concerns the limitations of the evidence base. A full specification of the pre-decision processes might have been possible with further evidence, especially interviews, and probably beneficial, but an adequate explanation of the main concern of the dissertation was possible within a neoclassical realist framework where the policymaking lenses were of subordinate importance.

3.4. A minimalist, two-layered structure of the national security discursive structure.

A lot of the evidence of this thesis is textual, especially on the elite networks. An argument could be made that such evidence requires discourse analysis. The author of this thesis does not share this opinion, but admits that discourse analysis is, indeed, a thinkable option. To satisfy a reader interested in discourses, an intuitive scheme will be offered below that the reader can keep in mind when perusing the thesis and Chapters Seven and Eight, in

1 Urayama, “Missile Defence,” 153-154.

2 Kingdon analysed policymaking participants in chapters 2 and 3 (Kingdon, *Agendas*, 21-70).

3 *Ibid.*, 16.

particular.

There are many traditions within discourse analysis (DA), and many of them have deep philosophical roots.¹ The following scheme is developed through a very basic kind of DA which is a digested outline of DA derived from the version of DA used by Ole Waever in a study of European discourses in Nordic countries.² In a summary form, the following points are important. Discourses consist of statements.³ The regularities displayed by the relations between statements create the unity and coherence of a discourse.⁴ There is typically a bias toward statements by leading political figures.⁵ Language is central, and it is understood differentially, as a “separate stratum of reality,” where meaning is located in the differences among concepts.⁶ “Structures within a discourse condition possible policies.”⁷ Discourses create spaces for certain subjects and delimit “what can be said and what not.”⁸ DA has two parts. The synchrony identifies patterns and structures as analytical tools.⁹ The diachron specifies context and interactions, or “how structures constrain or suggest arguments and positions.”¹⁰

This simplistic DA outline allows us to identify a minimalist version of the national security discourse in Japan, as relevant to its BMD decisions. The discourse of antimilitarism and its elements, especially the constraints on collective defence, arms exports, and use of space, have been reviewed in the previous chapter. But such a discourse can be integrated

1 These traditions include conversation analysis, interactional or sociolinguistics, discursive psychology, critical discourse analysis, and Foucauldian genealogical research. For samples of contributions on each tradition see *Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis*, ed. Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon Yates (London, 2001). Several of the philosophical roots of discourse analysis were referenced in Chapter Two in the subsection of the theoretical outline of constructivism.

2 Ole Waever, “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory,” in *European Integration and National Identity: the Challenge of the Nordic States*, ed. Hansen and Waever (London, NY: Routledge, 2002), 20-49.

3 *Ibid.*, 29.

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*, 42.

6 *Ibid.*, 29.

7 *Ibid.*, 27.

8 *Ibid.*, 29.

9 *Ibid.*, 41.

10 *Ibid.*

into a broader framework which is offered below as a two-layered structure. The first layer captures the basic conceptions of the state of world affairs, with reference to Japan. Here, the evidence on the networks, that is, elites' statements at the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference, suggests feelings of uncertainty about international security, with a multiplicity of threats including advancements in missile and nuclear technology and their proliferation in Asia.

Such a threatening environment and uncertainty condition the second layer which contains a constellation of security policy options. Here, the independent but interconnected options can be derived from the elites' statements. One is the US-Japan alliance, another is antimilitarism (with the constraints on collective defence, arms exports, and space use); the third is Japan's sovereign defence strategy (*shutaiteki bouei senryakuron*). The third option implies maintaining and developing Japan's military production and military projection capability. It also implies creating and maintaining new security options. As a result, it connects the other two options while allowing them some independence. The connections between the three options are multiple and complex – the procurement of BMD is at their heart and is constrained and encouraged by them. This was the synchronous part. The diachron was addressed, in part, when reviewing Hook's and Oros's books in Chapter Two, where they showed how these structures “constrained and suggested arguments and positions,” but also how these structures were resisted as in the case of the reinterpretation of the antimilitarist markers in Oros's book.

While DA is not explicitly done in the thesis, this framework or its aspects could be seen as implicitly present in many interpretations of the thesis and its central argument. This intuitive scheme, developed through the basic DA, may help readers of other theoretical and methodological persuasions to follow the argument of the thesis.

3.5. “Spying for Moscow – in Tokyo, using the University of Oxford cover and British money...” – a farce, or an act of reflexivity in the thesis.

The following story will add a further dimension of methodological reflexivity to the analytical framework of the thesis. It will be a brief summary, without the more colourful details, of a part of my experience of doing research on Japan's BMD policy. The section will outline how I ended up being expelled from a respectable, conservative think-tank and how my identity, as (mis)perceived by others, possibly affected the course of the research. Acknowledging such possible influences with the help of an account of an episode of the actual research process may also provide background information helpful for understanding more accurately some of the statements and references made in the thesis, as well as its methodological and empirical-work limitations. The presentation of the story may be somewhat unconventional for a doctoral thesis, but the nature of the story supports the style.

On October 9, 2008, after 2 pm, I was preparing for an interview with Akio Watanabe at the premises of RIPS in Tokyo. The Director of the Institute, who was also my host, asked me to come to his office. I was told that from the following week I was not supposed to approach the RIPS building and that all my name cards with their institutional logo were to be returned. This was the “zenith” of my research trip to Japan in October-November 2008.

My journey to the office of the RIPS Director on October 9 began in Sheffield in March 2008 where I was kindly invited by the local Institute of Japanese Studies to a seminar on global governance and the then-upcoming G-8 summit in Toyako, Hokkaido. At the seminar, I was able to meet many interesting people with whom, in addition to global governance issues, I also tried to discuss my doctoral research on Japan's BMD. (Under the influence of Chinworth's, Green's, and Samuels's publications, I was then interested in the roles of the military-industrial lobby in Japan's BMD policy.)

One of the individuals with whom I managed to speak was Mr Masahiro Atsumi, a

very kind gentleman and a researcher at the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) in Tokyo. It was with him that I continued my communications on the subject by email. I was asking him questions about obtaining data on the Japan Business Federation's Defence Production Committee, which was the natural object of enquiry for someone who was interested in Japan's military-industrial lobby. Negotiating on such questions was never supposed to be too easy, especially by email. So I asked Mr Atsumi if I, perhaps, should come over to Tokyo and join his think-tank as an intern. I should note here that an affiliation with the right kind of institution in Japan is almost indispensable for successful research.

It took another month after I provided Mr Atsumi with my brief CV and research proposal until I received an indication from him that a different think-tank may be willing to accept me for an internship. That institution was RIPS. As soon as its Director, Dr Masashi Nishihara, who as I later discovered was a very kind and generous man, confirmed by email his willingness to host me in his institution, I started preparing for my trip. First, I had to secure sufficient funding. I received travel grants from Merton College and the Oxford Sasakawa Committee. I was also allowed to use in Japan the maintenance grant that I was receiving for Oxford from the Hill Foundation. Secondly, being a Russian national, I also had to obtain an entry visa for Japan. For this I asked Dr Nishihara to issue a formal letter of invitation with which, I told him, I had to apply for a visa at the Embassy of Japan in London.

On October 5, I arrived in Tokyo, enthusiastic and ready to produce path-breaking research. And the first four days of my time in Japan suggested there was every chance I would succeed. Things were unfolding very nicely for me, indeed. I had the Institute's secretary, a very kind and helpful lady, organising interviews at my request with the Japanese individuals I considered important for my research. It was incredible – some of the busiest and most inaccessible people would respond to her requests for an interview with me in less

than an hour. The RIPS network of professional contacts was very wide and deep. On day two, I started negotiating through Dr Nishihara access to the Japan Business Federation's library, especially the DPC papers. As my internship at RIPS was limited to two months, I also started negotiating starting after the completion of my period at RIPS an internship at the National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS).

On day three, I was invited to a RIPS-organised symposium that was already mentioned in Chapter One. At that symposium about measures of protecting classified military security information within the US-Japan alliance, I was also able to exchange my name cards and have mini-interviews about my research with many individuals which even included a charming lady, whose name card said “counterintelligence advisor” at a US government body, and representatives from several Japanese and US military contractors. The following day was the last one before I was informally “declared” unwelcome at RIPS. The rumour spread instantly. Some of the individuals, whom I emailed about the interviews scheduled for later that month, would respond by email with messages like: “I know your situation. I am very sorry to say that the Cold War still continues. Please let me know your schedule and I will get back to you.”¹ This message hardly requires a translation even for the uninitiated.

What happened? – Dr Nishihara did not know I held Russian citizenship. It was, as far as I understand, only after he received a letter from Oxford thanking him for accepting me for the internship – which is usual protocol in such situations – that he learnt about my citizenship. Neither my name, CV (where Russian was clearly indicated as my native language and where all my education until 2006 was completed in Russia), nor the fact that I needed his formal letter of invitation for the explicit purpose of applying for an entry visa signalled to him my citizenship. A young male Russian with foreign language skills, who managed to penetrate one of the most conservative national-security think-tanks in Tokyo

1 Email from Akira Kato, OBIRIN University, October 13, 2008.

with a Bodleian card, could only be an agent from Moscow.

[Sir Humphrey is suspected of having once been a Russian spy.]

Sir Humphrey: So what do you think I should do, Arnold?

Sir Arnold Robinson: [calmly pours his coffee] Hmm, difficult. Depends a bit on whether you actually were spying or not. [notices Sir Humphrey's horrified expression] One must keep an open mind.

*Sir Humphrey: But I couldn't have been! I wasn't at Cambridge!*¹

It was, I suppose, unfortunate for everyone involved in the situation. This situation resulted from the presumption on the Japanese side of the story that an Oxford student had to be British and from a degree of negligence on my part (probably under the influence of Oxford's intellectual atmosphere) about the possibility that some people may think they must keep “an open mind” about such matters while exhibiting a degree of inattention to security clearance.

Has this episode of my research experience influenced the course of the research? –It has certainly restricted the evidence base, especially the interviews, even if I was eventually able to record a number of successes. This farcical experience also changed the direction of my research by forcing a change of the central research question – the military-industrial lobby became a subject I could not effectively investigate in the new circumstances within the remaining two years of my course. But the unfolding of my research trip and Dr Nishihara's repeated, but still polite requests that I changed the research subject could not have failed to strengthen my determination to persevere with the important questions of this research. It is less easy to appraise other possible influences this farce in Tokyo exerted on my research. Having acknowledged the possibility of such influences, I shall leave it to a perceptive reader or those with imaginative minds to draw the conclusions. Personally, I now, certainly, have a story, especially in its complete version, with which to entertain my grandchildren in the future.

1 “One of Us,” in *Yes Prime Minister*, BBC TV Series, episode 8, 1986.

Concluding remarks

The introductory material of the thesis was organised in three chapters. The first chapter concerned itself with justifying the central and subordinate research questions. It presented an outline of the thesis and put forward its central argument for defence. It also indicated that neoclassical realism with its emphasis on the systemic constraints, within which elites make and/ or influence foreign policy choices, was selected as an approach to the central question. The second chapter was written to demonstrate the novelty of the research questions and to provide initial justification for the choice of methodology and evidence, the evidence on transnational elite networks, in particular. Practically, the second chapter was a near-exhaustive review of the literature on Japan's BMD decisions. It also contained a discussion of theoretical alternatives to the argument of the thesis in the field of international relations. Connections and differences between those alternatives and the thesis argument were established.

The purpose of the third chapter was to provide a methodological roadmap for the reader as pertains to the investigation of the domestic element of neoclassical realism, in particular. A review of the literature on Japan's pre-BMD weapons procurements was undertaken first in order to “ground” the methodological propositions and conclusions from Chapters One and Two in the specialised literature dealing with the country's past military procurement decisionmaking. Such a review offered further evidence in support of analysing a number of key government ministries, as well as some individual political actors and their groupings. To put these findings in a theoretical perspective and to be able to organise more effectively the investigation of these actors in the thesis, a range of policymaking heuristics were presented and discussed. Some of them, especially, the organisational behaviour paradigm and the transnational elite networks heuristic were justified as legitimate ways of approaching the subject and the evidence. Several fashionable models and theoretical

perspectives were also outlined to show potential compatibility and differences between them and the argument of this thesis. These perspectives included Kingdon's model and discourse analysis, in particular.

The framework unveiled in the first three chapters is eclectic, to a degree. But eclecticism has been productively utilised in past analyses of Japanese matters. Moreover, attempts were recorded in the third chapter which aimed at enhancing the theoretical status of analytic eclecticism. What was important was the research questions.

The next in the thesis are its three substantive parts addressing the central and subordinate research questions. Part I will seek to identify international constraints within which the BMD decisions were made in Japan. Part II will investigate important actors of the country's BMD policy, culminating in the original attempt to identify the possible influence of several transnational elite networks. Such a division of the investigation into the stages of first identifying systemic constraints and then analysing the policy choices and influences by distinct types of elites is the author's choice of organising the analysis of the BMD policy evidence within a neoclassical-realist framework. An attempt at bringing together the key insights from Parts I and II will be made in Part III where an explanation to the central concern of the dissertation and answers to the related questions will be proposed.

PART I. WHY AND HOW DOES JAPAN'S BMD PROCUREMENT MATTER?

CHAPTER 4. DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC PARAMETERS OF JAPAN'S BMD POLICY – A FOCUS ON CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.

This chapter will seek to investigate how Japan's diplomatic and strategic parameters favoured and constrained its progress toward BMD. In the first section, the history of missile defences in postwar Japan and the present international trends of missile defence build-up will be outlined to put Japan's recent BMD efforts in a historical perspective and in an international context. It will be established that Japan's case is special in that it went farther in the intensity and scale of collaboration with the US on researching, developing, and deploying BMD than any other US ally.¹ The remaining two sections will identify key events and developments concerning Japan, North Korea, and China from the early 1990s which likely influenced the course of Japan's involvement with BMD. The physical (geographic) constraints on Japan's security policy will also be discussed as favouring the acquisition of BMD. In line with the systemic element of neoclassical realism, considerations of sea lane security, regional territorial disputes, potential conflicts over resources, and military build-up in the region will figure prominently in this attempt to explain the rationality of Japan's move toward BMD.

4.1. Overview of the history of missile defence in Japan and present international BMD efforts.²

The first missiles in Japan's postwar history were Nike systems. Nike-Ajax missiles were used in Japan in the 1950s until the replacement by Nike-J started in 1963. The Nike series was to reach obsolescence by the mid-1970s with its technology becoming out-of-date, but Japan continued deploying Nikes until the 1980s. These missiles were designed to

1 The Air Force Lieutenant General Henry Obering III, Director of the US MDA, was reported as saying that Japan was America's most significant international partner in developing BMD systems. See Sieff, "BMD Focus," *UPI*, March 24, 2006.

2 My understanding of the pre-BMD history of Japan's air and missile defences derives, to a large extent, from: Chinworth, "Industry and Government in Japanese Defence Procurement," 195-243.

carry nuclear warheads to be used against a potential high-altitude saturation bombing by the Soviet Union. Accuracy was not a priority – the aim was to divert targets by a massive mid-air explosion. Japan later moved to use conventional warheads, which further limited the missiles' effectiveness.

The Hawk surface-to-air (SAM) missile system was developed by the US for lower-altitude threats in the 1950s. Japan was purchasing these missiles from the US until in 1970 it started deploying domestically produced Hawks. Various piecemeal improvements were introduced to Hawks in the 1980s as part of the Improved Hawk programme. In the 1980s, Japan was also producing medium-range Sparrow and short-range Sidewinder air-to-air missiles under licence. Japanese corporations were also involved in a number of projects of developing and manufacturing various types of missiles, for example, Keiko-SAM, TAN-SAM, AAM-1, ASM-1.

The piecemeal nature of any improvements to the Nikes and, later, Hawks were fuelling a search for a comprehensive and more efficiently integrated system from as early as the 1960s, which took form of the US Army's SAM-D (surface-to-air missile/developmental) programme. After a long and complicated evolution, SAM-D became "Patriot" in 1976. The Japanese were debating the "post-Nike" problem and from among three options, namely, the Patriot system, the Improved Hawks, and the Nike-Phoenix (updated Nike missiles with a new guidance package), and eventually chose Patriot. This choice was to become Japan's most expensive missile programme in the postwar period until the BMD commitment. Patriot was a significant technological advancement compared to the previous systems, but "hardly a cure-all."¹ Post-Patriot speculations began even before the system's initial deployment in 1991.²

Before the Japanese government announced its decision to conduct joint research

1 Chinworth, "Industry and Government," 226-227.

2 Ibid., 223.

with the US on BMD in 1998, there was an episode in the 1980s called SDI, a Reagan proposed project, often dubbed as the “Star Wars Initiative,” which was briefly mentioned in the previous chapter. The idea was to have a combination of ground- and orbit-based weapon systems. Prime Minister Nakasone displayed interest in SDI, but Japan only passively committed itself to the project by signing in July 1987 an MOU (memorandum of understanding) with the US on SDI participation. The subsequent Westpac (Western Pacific Missile Defence Architecture) study (1989-1993) was conceived as a contract between the US government and a number of leading Japanese companies.¹ What place did the SDI episode occupy in Japan’s strategic thinking? It appears reasonable to conclude that it was a slight aberration on its course to more advanced missile defences as the requirements on an SDI system, as conceived by Reagan, were close to impossible because the necessary technology did not exist. Nevertheless, SDI appears not as a diversion but rather as a case of prematurity.

The Japanese chu-SAM, medium-range surface-to-air missile replacement for Hawks, was in the late 1980s meant to be incorporated into the Japanese air defence system designated at the time as ADI (Air Defence Initiative), based on the US concept of GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strike). The programme’s funding was halted in the US in 1992 and subsequently various TMD options topped the agenda.

The ballistic missile defence system that Japan is now jointly building with the US is a layered defence capability in which, at the moment, the Aegis BMD and Standard Missile Three (SM-3) on Kongo-class destroyers constitute the upper-tier and the Patriot Advanced Capability Configuration-3 (PAC-3) occupies the lower tier.² The first PAC-3 missile launcher was introduced by the US at Kadena Air base in Okinawa in October 2006.³ Japan

1 Hideaki Kaneda et al., *Japan’s Missile Defence: Diplomatic and Security Policies in a Changing Strategic Environment* (Tokyo: JIIA, 2007), 54.

2 Japan MOD, *Japan’s BMD. Overview* (Tokyo: MOD, February, 2009), 5, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/bmd/bmd2009.pdf.

3 Tanja Vestergaard, “US Finalises Installation of Missile Defence System in Japan,” *Global Insight*, October 2, 2006; “Patriot Battalion Arrives at Kadena,” *US Fed News*, October 14, 2006.

deployed its first ever unit at Iruma Air base in Saitama prefecture in March 2007.¹ Sixteen PAC-3 batteries around major cities and air bases and SM-3 interceptors on Japan's four Aegis destroyers are expected to be deployed by March 2012.² The operational requirement of PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles is to shoot down incoming short- and mid-range tactical ballistic and cruise missiles in their terminal phase, that is, between the re-entry into the atmosphere and impact. The SM-3 is navy-launched surface-to-air anti-ballistic missile designed to intercept incoming missiles in their mid-course around the Earth's atmosphere. The coordination of Japan's air defence was performed by a computerised system BADGE (Base Air Defence Ground Environment) since 1968. Although each of the SDF services has their own BMC4I (Battle Management Command, Control, Computing, Communications and Intelligence) systems the Japanese government has decided to upgrade its ASDF BADGE system as the principal coordinator for BMD.³

The BMD procurement process is divided into research, development, and deployment stages – which supposedly only flow into each other partially and under certain conditions, that is, not everything from the research phase is carried on to the development stage which, in turn, may not result in actual deployment.⁴ What is important to repeat here here is that the development stage has two tracks. Track one is characterised by the use of available technology (Patriot and SM-3 Block I missiles) in response to current threats while on track two the focus on potential future security challenges.⁵ The first track was set in motion by the Security Council (SC) and Cabinet decision of 2003 and has provisions for the acquisition of the components listed above plus new-type FPS-5 and upgraded FPS-3 radars, and other items. The second track is currently about developing SM-3 Block IIA advanced

1 Reiji Yoshida, "PAC-3 Patriot Missiles Debut at Iruma Air Base," *TJT*, March 31, 2007.

2 Japan MOD, "Special Feature: Successful PAC-3 Flight Test," *Japan Defence Focus* 11 (October 2008): 5, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/pdf/jdf_no11.pdf.

3 Hughes, "Japan's Re-emergence," 84. BADGE was renamed JADGE ("J" stands for Japan).

4 Sugio Takahashi, "Emerging Missile Defence Issues," *The National Institute for Defence Studies News* no. 114 (2007): 4.

5 *Ibid.*

interceptor capable of covering the whole area of Japan even if deployed on only one Aegis destroyer.¹ This interceptor is a product of the Japan-US co-research initiated by the Cabinet and SC decision of 1998.

This brief overview of Japan's postwar missile defences from a perspective of their operational capabilities demonstrates a progressive trajectory of Japan's missile programmes which have evolved from Nike through Hawk to Patriot and BMD with improvements to the relevant BMC4I software and hardware. Whether the country is actually safer with each new procurement, "the answer can only be – perhaps" – as Michael Chinworth, one of the most astute observers of Japan's defence policy, has noted when comparing Patriot to Nike-J.² Considered in the context of Japan's other military procurements, missile defences were not a priority of the order of military aircraft projects which were high on the government's agenda until the 1990s. This further justified attention to Japan's enhanced BMD efforts.

Japan's BMD can be considered as part of an international trend of missile defence build-up. In Europe, trilateral cooperation is taking place between the US, Germany and Italy on creating the Medium extended air defence system (MEADS) which is a mobile medium-range surface-to-air missile system. The programme entered the design and development phase in 2005. Initial flight tests are scheduled to start in 2012 with the system entering low rate initial production in 2015.³ The baseline interceptor is PAC-3 missile segment enhancement (MSE). MEADS is widely expected to be integrated into NATO's Active layered theatre ballistic missile defence (ALTBMD) alongside other national European missile defences Patriot and French-Italian SAMP-T.⁴ The UK has not yet given a green light to stationing US BMD elements on its territory but the US government was interested in the

1 Ibid.

2 Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence*, 92.

3 BC Kessner, "MEADS Integration Tests to Begin at Year's End," *Space & Missile Defence Report*, November 22, 2010; "Weapons; MEADS Life Cycle Costs Significantly Lower Than Fielded Systems, With Coverage Eight Times Greater," *Defence & Aerospace Week*, October 6, 2010.

4 "Weapons; MEADS Demonstrates Interoperability with NATO Air Command and Control System in Joint Test," *Defence & Aerospace Business*, October 13, 2010; Tom Kington, "MEADS Evolves to Take on German, NATO Plans," *Defence News*, April 28, 2008.

ballistic missile early-warning radar facility at the Royal Air Force base at Fylingdales, Yorkshire.¹ The UK, Italy, and France have developed and started serial production of Aster-15 and Aster-30 missiles which are part of a naval air defence system known as PAAMS (Principal Anti-Air Missile System).² Spain and Norway are also using Aegis capabilities on their warships.³

In North America, the Canadian government said “no” to the US BMD proposal in February 2005.⁴ In the Middle East, the US-Israel developed Arrow TMD and its second configuration. Turkey and India were displaying interest in purchasing these systems and/or their components.⁵ Turkey also considered other options, such as PAC-3, Chinese FT-2000, and Russia’s S-300.⁶ In the Asia-Pacific, Australia selected in 2004 the Aegis weapons system which is the basis of the Aegis BMD for its new Air Warfare Destroyer programme.⁷ As regards another important US ally in the region, South Korea, in 1999 its government announced that it would not buy or participate in the US TMD.⁸ South Korea seeks to build an independent missile defence system with the capability to intercept short- and intermediate-range missiles from North Korea.⁹

1 Jeremy Stocker, *Britain's Role in US Missile Defence* (Carlisle, 2004), 13-20.

2 See the official website of the MBDA Missile Systems, a multinational company and a “world leader in missiles and missile systems”: http://www.mbda-systems.com/mbda/site/ref/scripts/EN_Aster-15---30-PAAMS_89.html.

3 “Lockheed Martin Awarded \$1 Billion Contract for Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence,” *Defence & Aerospace Business*, November 11, 2009.

4 Brian Bow, “Defence Dilemmas: Continental Defence Cooperation, From Bomarc to BMD,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 15, no. 1 (Spring 2009); David Rudd, “NORAD Yes, BMD No? The Fudge Thickens,” *The Globe and Mail (Canada)*, February 26, 2005; Mike Blanchfield, “Sovereignty over Skies Intact: PM Martin Defends Missile Decision. Opposition Member Says PM Is 'Delusional' for Expecting Talks in Event of Attack,” *The Gazette (Montreal)*, February 26, 2005.

5 Ilan Bergman, “Israel, India, and Turkey: Triple Entente?” *The Middle East Quarterly* IX, no. 4 (Fall 2002). <http://www.meforum.org/504/israel-india-and-turkey-triple-entente>.

6 “Turkey May Use Russian S-300 Systems to Build Missile Shield,” *RIANOVOSTI*, April 30, 2008, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20080430/106302644.html>.

7 Mark Forbes, “Son of Star Wars: the How and Why; Security,” *Sunday Age (Melbourne, Australia)*, July 11, 2004; “Australia Chooses Aegis Radar for New Air Warfare Destroyer,” *Inside the Navy*, August 23, 2004.

8 Victor Cha, “The Rationale for 'Enhanced' Engagement of North Korea: After the Perry Policy Review,” *Asian Survey* 39, no. 6 (1999): 847, 864-866.

9 Ibid.; Jung Sung-ki, “South Korea Negative on Joining US Missile Shield,” *The Korea Times*, September 22, 2009. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/10/205_52311.html; Sieff, “South Korea Takes Different Path to Japan for Missile Defence,” *UPI*, December 28, 2006. http://www.spacewar.com/reports/South_Korea_Takes_Different_Path_To_Japan_For_Missile_Defense_999.html.

To resume the above observations, the history of Japan's missile programmes suggests that the country has been on a path to BMD for a long time incrementally improving the quality of its missile and air defences. In that sense, BMD can be considered a "natural" product of a historical process, "rather than [as] emerging in a historical vacuum."¹ Moreover, a review of other national and international missile defence projects shows that Japan is certainly not unique in its desire to establish better BMD which is a trend in many parts of the world. Japan could have been just one more country in a range of states making/pursuing that trend but Japan's case is special in that it went farther in the intensity and scale of collaboration with the US on researching, developing, and deploying BMD than other US allies. Furthermore, as will be elaborated in the next chapter and throughout the thesis, with BMD Japan has started setting up a military infrastructure which is likely to impact its foreign policymaking and security in ways impossible in other countries because of the idiosyncratic institutions designed in the past to keep Japan militarily secure but without far-reaching, unequivocal, and "entrapping" military commitments to others. BMD has acquired the potentiality to disrupt these institutions and practice, in contrast to the preceding missile defences, as a result of interplay between the system's technological specifications and the country's policymaking solutions in the security environment in the world after the USSR.

The remaining two sections will identify those episodes of international relations in East Asia and globally after the dissolution of the USSR, but especially in 1994-2007, which likely constrained or favoured Japan's progress toward the BMD decisions taken from 1998. These episodes in the systemic element of neoclassical realism most importantly concerned the DPRK and China. Some of the strategic and geographic constraints on the Japanese security policy will be reviewed in support of the central argument of the thesis and in tune with the unifying theme of this chapter about the uncertainty and instability of the regional security environment. The conclusion of this part of the chapter in a summary form is that

1 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 188, 189, 194.

some diplomatic processes probably inhibited Japan's progress toward BMD, but the failure of so many diplomatic efforts and the military build-up in the region favoured the procurement of BMD.

4.2. Uncertainty on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea's nuclear provocations in the 1990s-2000s were a contributor to elevated tensions in the region. A pattern of “spiralling mistrust”¹ could be observed in North Korea's interactions with the US, as well international bodies and regional powers in this period. An explanation of the pattern, even if some historical exceptions can be recorded, is summarised by Er-win Tan:

... both Pyongyang and Washington have preconceived assumptions that the other is implacably hostile. In so doing, they fail to consider alternative explanations for the other side's apparently aggressive military postures and actions. Both sides are unable to enter into the other's counter-fears and contemplate how their own demonstrations of military strength to assert resolve may actually be seen as provocative by the other side.²

To illustrate the “spiralling mistrust” between North Korea and the US, a brief outline of North Korea's nuclear and missile developments is in order.

Historically, North Korea's interest in weapons of mass destruction probably first strengthened during and in the wake of the Korean War when confronted with the US military might. As Leon Sigal summarised it, “No country has been the target of more American nuclear threats than North Korea...”³ Predictably, there were “ambivalent feelings”⁴ in Pyongyang about the restrictions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on acquiring nuclear weapons. The first practical step in Pyongyang's nuclear programme was

1 Er-win Tan, “A Comparison of Offensive Realist, Defensive Realist, and Constructivist Perspectives on the US-North Korean Security Dilemma 1992-2001” (PhD diss., Aberystwyth University, 2008), 100, <http://hdl.handle.net/2160/1552>.

2 Ibid., 88-89, 96-99.

3 Leon Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton UP, 1998), 20.

4 Georgiy Boulychyov and Alexandre Vorontsov, “North Korea – an Experiment in Nuclear Proliferation,” in *At the Nuclear Threshold. The Lessons of North Korean and Iranian Crises for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* [in Russian], ed. Alexey Arbatov (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment, 2007), 21. Boulychyov and Vorontsov are senior researchers on Korea in the Russian Academy of Sciences.

made in 1965 when the Soviet Union presented the country with a small research uranium reactor.¹ Under the USSR pressure, it was placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards the following year.² The USSR also provided civilian education for North Korean physicists. An argument has been made that “the political decision on the commencement of work on nuclear weapons in the DPRK was made at the outset of the 1970s.”³ The decision was probably motivated by “clear signs of nuclear arming by South Korea.”⁴ Seoul abandoned the programme under the US pressure and signed the NPT in 1975.⁵

In 1982, the US asked the USSR to cooperate on developing a common approach to Pyongyang's nuclear plans.⁶ But Moscow continued its nuclear energy cooperation with Pyongyang. It was only in 1985 that North Korea agreed to join the NPT. North Korea's decision was made under the Soviet pressure and in exchange for the Soviet help in building a nuclear power plant.⁷ As a kind of a reward, the Soviet Union delivered to North Korea a research uranium reactor which was installed in Yongbyong and placed under the IAEA's safeguards in 1986.⁸ It should be noted that North Korea's *juche* ideology, which includes the idea of economic self-reliance,⁹ likely played a role in Pyongyang's drive for nuclear energy.¹⁰ This is to say that creating indigenous facilities for uranium enrichment for the country's nuclear power generation was in line with this ideology. Additionally, from the mid-1980s, with the transformation of the Soviet foreign policy, Pyongyang might have felt

1 Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*, 20.

2 Boulychyov and Vorontsov, “North Korea,” 16.

3 Ibid., 17. Boulychyov and Vorontsov referred in their chapter to an Open SVR Report from 1995 whose electronic address could not be accessed in December 2010. (SVR is one of Russia's intelligence agencies.)

4 Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*, 20.

5 Ibid.; “South Korea Profile: Nuclear Overview,” October 2010, James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the Nuclear Threat Initiative NTI website, accessed December 6, 2010, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/skorea/nuclear/index.html.

6 Boulychyov and Vorontsov, “North Korea,” 17.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Selig Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement* (Princeton UP, 2002), 15.

10 Boulychyov and Vorontsov, “North Korea,” 25.

increasingly isolated. Given the country's poor economic situation, it might have contributed further impetus to its nuclear programme.¹

In 1989, the US expressed their concern about Yongbyong's reactor. The US inter-agency National Security Review 28 was completed in the spring of 1991.² It contained provisions for “comprehensive engagement” which implied a combination of deterrence against North Korea with dialogue between the two Korean governments.³ North and South Korean talks started in 1990.⁴ As part of its general policy, the Bush Administration withdrew American nuclear weapons from South Korea in December 1991.⁵ On December 31, 1991, the North-South Denuclearisation Declaration was signed.⁶ Following that, the DPRK agreed to the IAEA's inspections which started with Pyongyang's declaration to the IAEA in May 1992.⁷

Six inspections took place between 1992 and 1993 and were a prelude for the first nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1993-1994. The IAEA was unsatisfied with some findings and its director Hans Blix requested special, more intrusive inspections.⁸ Pyongyang rejected the request and after the US began its joint military exercises Team Spirit with South Korea on March 8, 1993, Pyongyang announced on March 11, 1993 its intention to withdraw from the NPT.⁹ The “semi-war alert status,” which was declared on March 8, was abandoned on March 19 following the conclusion of the military exercises.¹⁰ The United States opened

1 Sigal summarised: “By the late 1980s, North Korea was in a parlous position militarily, economically, and politically.” Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*, 23.

2 Ibid., 27.

3 Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman and Robert Galucci, *Going Critical: the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis*. (The Brookings Institution, 2004), 7; Tan, “Perspectives,” 93.

4 US Department of State, *Background Note: North Korea*, accessed November 30, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm>.

5 Tan, “Perspectives,” 93; “Reassure North Korea on Arms,” *TNYT*, December 28, 1991; Wit et al., *Going Critical*, 9-10; Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*, 29-30.

6 Wit et al., *Going Critical*, 10.

7 Ibid., 13.

8 These inspections were special because before they have only been conducted twice in the history of IAEA – in Romania and Sweden. See Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*, 49.

9 Wit et al., *Going Critical*, 26; Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*, 50. See also John Farrell, “A Case Study of Military Exercises as a Show of Force in the Aftermath of Combat Operations,” *Air and Space Power Journal*, Fall 2009 (September 1, 2009), <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/fal09/farrell.htm>.

10 Wit et al., *Going Critical*, 29.

talks with the DPRK in June 1993 which eventually led in October 1994 to a compromise agreement, known as the Agreed Framework, for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. This has peacefully resolved the crisis which, arguably, put the Korean peninsula on the brink of war.¹

More details on the negotiating process could be added to the above and whole books written on the topic.² But it would be superfluous to the purposes of this thesis and inadequate to the central question. It is sufficient to indicate the US's concerns about North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons. As regards Japan, its unpreparedness for a military contribution in a hypothetical escalation of the crisis can be noted here. As the US was preparing for a possible worsening of the crisis, it asked Japan to provide or get ready to provide various forms of rear-area logistical support for a possible military action. But Japan's response was "indecisive"³ largely because of insufficient prior contingency planning.⁴ Such handling of the hypothetical military aspect of the crisis heightened perceptions of crisis in the US-Japan alliance, which had to be addressed in subsequent years and will be discussed in the following chapter.

The series of the US's and international diplomatic efforts aimed at denuclearising North Korea in the 1990s and 2000s were punctuated with North Korea's efforts to build nuclear warheads and reliable means of their delivery to the target. It must, however, be noted that, as suggested in the above outline of North Korea's early steps toward nuclear weapons, the responsibility for the pattern of "spiralling mistrust" did not always fall exclusively on North Korea. A selection of some important developments after 1994 can

1 For a recent review of the positions and major publications with regard to the extent to which the Korean peninsula was on the brink of war in 1994, see Tan, "Perspectives," 114-126.

2 See, for example, Wit et al., *Going Critical*; Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*. See also such classic examples as Michael Mazarr's 1995 book *North Korea and the Bomb* and Don Oberdorfer's 1997 book *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*.

3 Hughes, *Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea* (London: Routledge, 1999), 94.

4 David Fouse, "Japan's Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging toward Autonomy?" *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 31, no. 2 (2004): 107. See also Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (NY: CFR, 1999), 282-286, 286-288; Green, *Reluctant Realism*, 120-121.

serve as an illustration.

The Agreed Framework of 1994 offered a compromise for both sides. Importantly, it contained provisions for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and an agreement to “move toward full normalisation of political and economic relations.”¹ As a result, North Korea's nuclear programme was formally frozen for eight years. At the same time, the implementation of the Framework was slow and limited.² On one hand, this can be explained by changes in the domestic political disposition in the US – the Clinton administration may have found it difficult to implement its foreign policy agenda following the Republican Party's victories in the Congressional mid-term elections of November 1994, that is, less than three weeks after the conclusion of the Agreed Framework.³ The Republicans gained control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. On the other hand, the role of the “widespread belief that the North was doomed to collapse [after Kim Il Sung's death in July 1994]” was noted as a cause of the “incoherence and *ad hoc* character of US policy,” an example of which was the 1994 Agreed Framework.⁴ This was called by some “a fatal mistake” which undermined the Agreed Framework.⁵ In such a view, the Agreed Framework never had a value of its own.⁶ The slow and limited implementation of the Agreed Framework is probably best explained by mutual mistrust complicated by the above circumstances.

In such an environment, North Korea intensified its efforts in missile development to which the provisions of the Agreed Framework did not apply.⁷ These efforts culminated on August 31, 1998 when a North Korean rocket Taepo-dong I overflew Japanese territory before plunging into the Pacific. From 1999 until 2005, North Korea maintained a voluntary

1 The text of the Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the USA and the DPRK on the IAEA website: www.iaea.org.

2 For an analysis of the US-North Korean interactions and obstacles when implementing the Agreed Framework between 1994 and 1998, see Tan, “Perspectives,” 159-179.

3 Tan, “Perspectives,” 161. See also the reaction of Christopher Warren, the US Secretary of State in 1993-1997: Warren, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era* (Stanford, 1998), 217-218.

4 Harrison, *Korean Endgame*, xvii.

5 Boulychyov and Vorontsov, “North Korea,” 23-24.

6 Ibid.

7 The Agreed Framework. www.iaea.org.

moratorium on testing of long-range missiles.¹

If and how did North Korea-related developments in this period affect Japan's BMD decisions? The period of diplomacy following the adoption of the Agreed Framework could, in principle, be said to have affected the slow pace of progress toward BMD between 1993 and 1998. North Korea can also, perhaps, offer an answer to one of the subordinate questions of this thesis about why North Korea's launch of Taepo-dong in 1998 led to the decision on co-research of advanced interceptor components rather than to the speedier deployment of a less sophisticated defence system. A possible answer would be that the co-research decision was meant to send a signal to North Korea about the potential future futility of their nuclear and missile programmes. But would it not be a bit too costly and unproductive a signal to send? The possible cost of such a signal would be especially high in terms of the premise of the central question laid out in the first chapter.

The new George W. Bush administration was less interested in a policy of engagement. On January 29, 2002, Bush designated North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”² The second nuclear crisis was initiated in October 2002 after a US delegation “confronted North Korea with the assessment that the DPRK was pursuing an undeclared uranium enrichment program, in violation of North Korea's IAEA safeguards obligation and its commitments in the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and the Agreed Framework.”³ In late 2002 and early 2003, North Korea restarted its existing plutonium-based facilities at Yongbyong and withdrew from the NPT.⁴ To defuse the crisis, the diplomatic process of Six-Party Talks between North Korea and the US, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia was

1 US Department of State, *Background Note: North Korea*.

2 The President's State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html>.

3 US Department of State, *Background Note: North Korea*.

4 Ibid. Text of North Korea's Statement on NPT Withdrawal, January 10, 2003, <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/DPRKNPTstatement.shtml>.

initiated in August 2003.¹

The negotiations were producing mixed results from the start.² Examples from the subsequent rounds of talks can also be cited for illustration. At the fourth round of Six-Party Talks in July-September 2005, a Joint Statement was issued, “in which the six parties unanimously reaffirmed the goal of verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.”³ But the fifth round of talks in November that year “ended inconclusively” after North Korea boycotted the talks, “citing the 'US hostile policy.’”⁴ The culminating events of the last years of the period of 1994-2007 were: North Korea's launch of six short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and one of possible intercontinental range on July 4-5, 2006 and the country's announcement on October 9, 2006 that it had successfully tested a nuclear explosive device.⁵

This fragmented and brief recapitulation of some of the important events and developments related to North Korea between 1994 and 2007 suggests pervasive uncertainty surrounding the situation with North Korea. It also indicates, in hindsight, a trajectory of North Korea's efforts to acquire effective nuclear military capabilities and a series of failed international efforts, which in 1994, arguably, put the Korean peninsula on the brink of war,⁶ to reverse such a trajectory.

North Korea's actions, overall, are probably well explained by the combined effect of two points, namely, North Korea's desire for explicit security guarantees from the US and North Korea's bargaining for economic assistance, especially food and energy supplies. The

1 “North Korea Accepts 6-Party Talks,” *Yonhap (South Korea)*, August 1, 2003, Nexis UK; Seo Hyun-jin, “Talks Start Amid Low Expectations,” *The Korea Herald*, August 27, 2003; Nicholas Eberstadt, “A Deal with North Korea? Dream On,” *The Washington Post*, August 26, 2003

2 On the first round of talks, see Joseph Kahn with David E. Sanger, “North Korea Disdains More Nuclear Talks,” *TNYT*, August 31, 2003; Seo Hyun-jin, “After Beijing Talks, Still Long Way to Go; North Korea Refuses to Disarm before Getting US Security Guarantee,” *The Korea Herald*, August 30, 2003; “Losyukov Describes Situation at Six-Party Talks in Beijing as 'Quite Delicate,’” *RIA Novosti*, August 27, 2003; “Parties to North Korea Talks Lack Unity,” *TNW*, August 25, 2003;

3 US Department of State, *Background Note: North Korea*.

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*

6 For a recent review of the positions and major publications with regard to the extent to which the Korean peninsula was on the brink of war in 1994, see Tan, “Perspectives,” 114-126.

first point implies that a sufficient number of deployable nuclear weapons raises the cost for a possible US-backed invasion of the country.¹ The second point refers to North Korea's poor economic situation after the dissolution of the USSR and is premised, to a degree, on extortionary practices, according to which every advancement in nuclear and missile technology could be “frozen” in exchange for economic help or literally traded to buyers in other regions of the world.²

The connection between the 1998 Taepo-dong launch and Japan's BMD was already discussed above. Another argument about the North Korean influence on Japan's BMD decisions could also be made. As indicated earlier, in October 2002, North Korea's uranium enrichment programme became news. On December 12, 2002, North Korea announced its decision to restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyong.³ This could be interpreted as a “decisive influence” on the Japan's decision on December 19, 2003 to deploy BMD. However, bearing in mind a likely correlation between the US 2002 moves toward the deployment of BMD and Japan's 2003 deployment decision,⁴ one can also remember that the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on June 13, 2002⁵ after formally

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- 1 One of the classified US diplomatic telegrams from February 22, 2010, leaked through Wikileaks.org on November 29, 2010, suggested that even some circles in China's establishment, which was traditionally seen as North Korea's last ally, reportedly, “would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the US in a 'benign alliance' – as long as Korea was not hostile towards China.” See the classified telegram from the US Embassy in Seoul from February 22, 2010, accessed November 30, 2010, <http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10SEOUL272.html>. It is difficult to imagine that Pyongyang remained completely unaware of the build-up of such alleged sentiments in Seoul and Beijing. This could have further strengthened the North Korean determination to pursue their nuclear programmes.
 - 2 See Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea* (NY: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 103, 109; Scott Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behaviour* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 85-86; US Department of State, *Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations*, October 12, 1999, 3-4, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/unclasreport.pdf>; Sharon Squassoni, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade between North Korea and Pakistan*, CRS Report for Congress RL 31900, Washington, DC, November 28, 2006, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA467226>; Thomas Berger, “Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia,” *Review of International Studies* 26, no. 3 (2000): 414; Richard Lloyd Parry, “Weapons Sales Are Hard Cash Lifeline for Crippled Country,” *The Times (London)*, December 12, 2002; “North Korea's Uranium Programme Heightens Concern,” *IISS Strategic Comments* 17, no. 2 (January 2011); Kaneda, *Misairu gaku*, 169.
 - 3 Yinhy Ahn, “North Korea in 2002: A Survival Game,” *Asian Survey* 43, no. 1, A Survey of Asia in 2002 (2003), 60-61.
 - 4 See, for example, Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 104-105.
 - 5 Dana Milbank, “US Withdraws from Missile Treaty; Bush Presses Congress for \$7.8 Billion for Defence System,” *The Washington Post*, June 14, 2002;

notifying Russia of its intention to do so in December 2001¹ with moves in that direction dating back to 1998.² This was well before “the character of the missile threat changed qualitatively between October 2002 and December 2003 as North Korea developed an operational nuclear force.”³ The withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could be interpreted as paving the way for the upper-tier BMD deployment,⁴ irrespective of the North Korean actions in 2002, which themselves were possibly an opportunity for Japan's BMD policy and in this mode influenced the 2003 decision.

Moreover, there are indications in the literature which could possibly be interpreted to mean that the 1998 launch could have been used by some in Japan as a pretext for the co-research (and “information-gathering” satellites) decision. See, for example, Urayama's reference to her interview with “high-ranking” MSDF officers, who were “grateful” to Pyongyang for the 1998 launch for allowing them to move with their agenda.⁵ See also Hughes's correct description of North Korea as “a catch-all proxy threat,” or more colourfully “Japan's security bogeyman,” which created a general sense of crisis in Japan's security policy that [has] legitimised other changes in defence capabilities and doctrines only marginally connected to the North, or even completely unconnected.⁶

While some “legitimising” influence of North Korea on Japan's BMD is arguable, it is a more straightforward conclusion that North Korea's provocative actions were an important contributor to international relations tensions in East Asia. Furthermore, an

1 David Sanger and Elisabeth Bumiller, “US to Pull Out of ABM Treaty, Clearing Path for Antimissile Tests,” *TNYT*, December 12, 2001.

2 “Talbot Tries to Persuade Russia to Go Along with Changing ABM Treaty,” *AP*, December 22, 1999; Bill Gertz, “US May Pull out of ABM Treaty over Missile Defence Plan,” *The Washington Times*, November 6, 1999; Sheila Foote, “House Leaders Call for US Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty,” *Defence Daily*, September 10, 1998.

3 Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy*, 96-97.

4 See, for example, a report of US officials saying that the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty “made it possible to explore much more aggressive sea-based [BMD] options down the road.” Kerry Gildea, “Navy Gears up for Sea-Based Missile Defence Test This Month,” *Defence Daily*, January 9, 2002. For an overview of a number of positions on the ABM Treaty and missile defences in the mid-1990s, see Paul Mann, “ABM Treaty at 25: Relic or Rebirth?” *AWST*, February 24, 1997.

5 Urayama, “Missile Defence,” 153-154.

6 Hughes, “Super-sizing the DPRK Threat. Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea,” *Asian Survey* 49, no. 2 (2009): 303, 311.

agitated state of the government and public in Japan over North Korea at certain times in 1994-2007 is a fact – including, especially, after the 1998 Taepo-dong launch, over the North Korean spy ship intrusions, the issue of the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea¹ (which will be outlined in Chapter Seven in the section on the Prime Minister Koizumi), and the 2006 missile and nuclear tests. Such agitation favoured the making of Japan's BMD decisions. The link is apparent in the case of the North Korean missile launches and nuclear test of 2006 that predictably encouraged Japan and the US to announce their intention to accelerate the procurement of BMD.²

Yet this is not to discount North Korea's influence on Japan's BMD since the possibility of military action on the peninsula could not be excluded. And BMD may or may not provide a measure of protection against North Korean missiles – we will find out for sure only in an unmoderated combat situation. But we can claim with more confidence that the upgraded military and related infrastructure, induced by and accompanying BMD, is likely to be helpful in maintaining Japan's superiority in aspects of possible battle management in the region – this theme will be the subject of the following chapter.

In this section, though, it remains to note that North Korea is not the only factor of regional instability associated with the peninsula. The prospect of a unified Korea, which might inherit South Korea's sovereignty dispute with Japan over the Tokdo/ Takeshima islets,³ is potentially no less troubling for Japan's security policy than the existing DPRK.⁴ As

1 See, for example, David Fouse, "Japan's Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging toward Autonomy?" *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 31, no. 2 (2004): 102, 110-111, 115-116; Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 12, 61-63; Oros, "Surveillance Satellites," *Review of Policy Research* 24 (2007): 35-36; Junko Takahashi, "Tokyo Hopes for Another Meeting," *TJT*, August 30, 2003; "Keep Pressure on North Korea," *TDY*, August 26, 2003.

2 Sieff, "BMD Focus: Geopolitics of Japan's BMD," *UPI*, November 24, 2006; Sieff, "BMD Watch: Raytheon Booms on BMD Contracts," *UPI*, August 1, 2006; "Abe, Bush Agree to Accelerate Missile Defence, Cooperate on North Korea," *JEN*, November 18, 2006; Keizo Nabeshima, "Abe, Bush to Strengthen Ties," *TJT*, November 27, 2006.

3 The Tokdo islands (or Takeshima, in Japanese) are currently occupied by South Korea and claimed by Japan. This sovereignty dispute can be considered as stemming from the disposition of "Korea" in Article 2(a) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. For an extensive, documentary-evidence based treatment of the subject, see Kimie Hara, *Cold War Frontiers in the Asia Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System* (Abingdon, NY: Routledge, 2007), 15-49.

4 See also Green, *Reluctant Realism*, 142-143, 277.

a dated, but still relevant study of the issue concluded: “For Japan, a united Korea could become either a commercial and political rival, susceptible to Beijing's influence, or an even closer partner and ally.”¹ Crucially, such a prospect sheds light on Japan's “huge interest” in assuring the non-nuclear status of a unified Korea.² Should a scenario of a nuclear unified Korea eventuate, Japan may find it increasingly imperative to develop its own nuclear forces, in which case a mature BMD would be a meaningful complement.

The potential meaningful link between BMD and nuclear weapons could be in the improved command and control infrastructure (necessary for BMD procurement) which, if robust, can, in theory, help manage an escalation of nuclear exchange from the position of dominance and prevent a limited conflict from turning into an all-out nuclear war.³ A related link is in the potential of BMD itself to help defend the command and control infrastructure from missile attacks, which is essential for successful warfare.⁴ The following chapter will attempt to substantiate strategic aspects of the military modernisation induced by or accompanying BMD.

Next in this chapter is an investigation of another element of uncertainty in the regional security environment which, along with or imaginably even without the North Korean background, set constraints on Japan's security policy that were favourable to the procurement of BMD.⁵ This “element” is frequently called “the greatest challenge for Japanese security over the long term.”⁶

1 Michael Armacost and Kenneth Pyle, “Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for US Policy Coordination,” *NBR Analysis* 10, no. 1 (March 1999): 30.

2 *Ibid.*, 37.

3 See, for example, Desmond Ball, “Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?” *IISS Adelphi Papers* 169 (1981): 1-2, 35-38. It must be noted that Ball concluded his paper in 1981 by calling the concept of controlled nuclear war a “chimera” because of difficulties of maintaining effective control during the early stages of nuclear exchange (*ibid.*, 38).

4 Joellen Pretorius, “Revolution in Military Affairs, Missile Defence and Weapons in Space: the US Strategic Triad,” *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 33, no. 1 (2005): 72-88.

5 Drifte wrote, for example, that the Chinese missile programme “has been playing an important part in moving Japan towards BMD,” but “for diplomatic reasons, ... the North Korean developments have been highlighted” by Japan and the US. Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Security Relations with China since 1989: from balancing to Bandwagoning?* (London, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 94.

6 Hughes, “Japan's Military Modernisation: a Quiet Japan-China Arms Race and Global Power Projection,” *Asia-Pacific Review* 16, no. 1 (2009): 87. Or see Drifte, *Japan's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century: from*

4.3. The rise of China¹ – China and Japan's “simmering rivalry.”²

The analysis of the parameters China (and its rise) set for Japan's security policy will be done in the following steps. Firstly, the potential of Sino-Japanese conflict over disputed territories will be considered. The historical Cold War origins and the current status of territorial disputes will be outlined along with their strategic implications for resources and sea lane security. Secondly, how these implications are potentially aggravated by China's military build-up and militarisation of space will be discussed – Japan's advances on this front in connection with BMD will be analysed in the following chapter. The section will conclude that a rising China, with all its internal contradictions and risks, created an environment favourable to Japan's decisions to proceed with BMD.

“Cold War frontiers” in Sino-Japanese relations

“Even to this date... the regional Cold War structure... essentially remains in the Asia-Pacific.”³ The politics surrounding North Korea, as discussed above, certainly illustrates this statement.⁴ A look at the Cold War genesis of current territorial disputes directly involving

Economic Superpower to What Power? (London, NY, 1998), 56. See also Kaneda, *Misairu gaku*, 182-184.

- 1 Some scholars may find such a headline cringe-worthy. And their reaction may be justified since it is, indeed, a fairly overused “journalistic” notion, but more so because nothing is inevitable, or “preordained,” (see reference to Foot below) as was also once the case with Japan's putative rise to “number one.” (See, for example, Herman Kahn, *The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response* (1970), 130; Ezra Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (1979.) It is, however, a fact that China's economic and military strength has been increasing relative to Japan's power in the 1990s-2000s. In that sense, the rise of China is an acceptable reference point. See, for example, Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,” *International Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2006): 77-78, 90.
- 2 Kent Calder, “China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry,” *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (2006).
- 3 Hara, *Frontiers*, 189. The same line of argument can also be found in Japan's Defence White Papers. See, for example, an excerpt from the Defence White Paper of 2006: “...the pattern of disputes among countries and areas [in the Asia-Pacific region] remain intact even in the post-Cold War era...” Japan MOD, *Defence of Japan 2006*, 3.
- 4 An argument has also been made that international politics in Northeast Asia after the end of the Cold War has become “more fluid” and that there was a “gradual breakdown of the Cold War structure of international politics in Asia.” See Hughes, *Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea* (1999), 68-69. Some specialists also saw that Asia was “a region undergoing fundamental change.” See David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia Reshaping the Regional Order,” *International Security* 29, no. 3 (2004/05): 99. It seems, though, to be a matter of perspective: there are aspects of international politics which have indeed become “more fluid,” but there are aspects which could be seen as “essentially unchanged.” Both perspectives are not incompatible, but, as will be argued, the presence of “realist tensions” and the possibility, however small, of their unfolding into military conflicts justifies BMD. All countervailing trends were not insignificant, but they did not eliminate the military risks.

China and Japan can also be instructive about the condition of the present regional order of international relations and its conflictual potential. A discussion of two sovereignty disputes with a potential to affect the regional order and Japan's security policy is undertaken below. The disputes concern the status of Taiwan and of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands. The Senkaku/ Diaoyu dispute is an issue clearly involving Japan and China. The status of Taiwan is also important and relevant because a China-Taiwan military conflict can trigger US security guarantees for the island¹ and implicate Japan in military action. The controversy, mentioned in Chapter One, over the definition of “*shuuhen*,” that is, areas surrounding Japan, to the defence of which Japan was committing itself in the 1997 US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines, demonstrates just how delicate the nature of the issue is.

An outline of the Cold War structure that supports the political status quo in the region can help explain its implications for Japan's policy. The essence of the current political regional order with regard to the Chinese question can be summarised in simple words: “The basic structure of the regional Cold War centring around China, in which two Chinas confront each other across the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan is protected by the US umbrella, has not changed to this date.”² The historical origins of this situation can be traced to 1895 when as a result of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese war Taiwan was ceded to Japan. Taiwan remained a Japanese colony for the following fifty years. Following Japan's defeat in World War II, the governance of Taiwan was entrusted to the Republic of China (ROC). After the ROC's defeat to the Communists in the Chinese civil war and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek's

1 The US-ROC security relationship is based on an act of Congress – the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. The Act has figured prominently in the 1995-96 crisis, which will be outlined later. Goldstein and Schriver's observations, probably, best summarise the effect and nature of the TRA: “To argue that it is the equivalent of a treaty or that it has assured the security of Taiwan since its passage is to ignore this dependent and variable quality. Similarly, to argue that the United States's actions since 1979 have represented a retreat from its original commitments is to miss entirely the ambiguity of those commitments.” Steven Goldstein and Randall Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship: the United States, Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act,” *The China Quarterly* 165 (2001): 170.

2 Hara, *Frontiers*, 70.

Nationalist Party KMT (*Kuomintang*) fled to Taiwan and established an authoritarian regime under the title of the ROC.

In the Peace Treaty, Japan “renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores [Peng-hu].”¹ This short clause of the Peace Treaty contained “seeds of future disputes” over the sovereignty of Taiwan and Senkaku/ Diaoyu.² The Peace Treaty can be considered as a “foundation” of the cross-Taiwan Strait problem because the Treaty did not specify the authority to which Taiwan was renounced.³ As a result, put in the simplest form, a situation developed over a period of time in which the notion of two Chinas with an independent Taiwan was challenged by the idea of one China with only one legitimate government in Beijing. As regards the Senkaku/ Diaoyu problem, its formal basis can also be found in the wording of the Peace Treaty. The clause on Taiwan (article 2-b) did not specify the exact limits of Taiwan, that is, whether the geographically adjacent Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands were included, while the article relating to Okinawa (article 3), to which, it can be argued, Senkaku/ Diaoyu belonged, did not contain the final disposition of territorial sovereignty. That is to say, it neither specified Japan's renunciation of sovereignty nor confirmed Japan's title. In an oral statement at the San Francisco Peace Conference, Secretary of State Dulles said for a number of strategic reasons that Japan retained “residual sovereignty” over Okinawa and some other Pacific islands.⁴ These islands and Okinawa were formally reversed to Japan by the early 1970s.⁵ But the dispute over Senkaku/ Diaoyu between Japan and the PRC/ ROC remained; in fact, it emerged around the time of Okinawa's reversion to Japan.⁶ As Okinawa was occupied by the American military together with Senkaku/ Diaoyu, these smaller islands returned under Japan's administration together

1 Ibid., 13, 51. See the full text of the Treaty of Peace with Japan:
<http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/peace1951.htm>.

2 Hara, *Frontiers*, 9.

3 Ibid., 9.

4 Ibid., 175-176.

5 Ibid., 159.

6 Ibid., 178.

with Okinawa.¹

Before proceeding to discuss the course of the disputes in later periods and their current status and relevance, it is worth repeating the metaphor of “sown seeds” with regard to major disputes in the region. A convincing and fairly straightforward argument has been made that the Peace Treaty was “a by-product of the Cold War,”² and that the non-specification of the final devolution and precise limits of the territories was “neither coincidence nor error; it followed careful deliberation and several revisions [by the US, in particular, though, with input from the UK and some other governments].”³ Furthermore, the unfolding Cold War of the time created an environment in which US leaders, in particular, chose to abandon wartime Allied agreements with their clearer terms of territorial devolution in the region.⁴ They decided to install “wedges,” or “walls,” between actors in East Asia in order to tie Japan to the US-led Western bloc.⁵ This made strategic sense since around the time of the San Francisco Peace Conference the US reckoned that the ROC and Korea could be “lost” to the Communists.⁶ It can also be argued that with the passage of time such a “purposely left”⁷ structure of territorial disputes in the region contributed to the preservation of the political status quo and the conservation of the US military presence through the dependence of the ROC/ Taiwan, ROK, and Japan on the US for their external security.⁸ The PRC also appeared content with the US military presence in Japan believing in the moderating role of the US presence on Japan's putative military ambitions.⁹

A few words on how the situation with the disputes unfolded in later periods, especially in the 1990s-2000s, is in order before discussing how the regional Cold War

1 Ibid., 179.

2 Ibid., 187.

3 Ibid., 186.

4 Ibid., 187.

5 Ibid., 188.

6 Ibid., 183, 188.

7 Ibid., 186.

8 Ibid., 193-94.

9 The then commander of the US Marine Corps in Okinawa Henry Stackpole has less diplomatically described the US-Japan Security Treaty as the “cap in the bottle” of Japanese militarism. See Fred Hiatt, “Marine General: US Troops Must Stay in Japan,” *The Washington Post*, March 27, 1990.

structure could change and why the possibility of such a prospect favours Japan's BMD and related decisions.

The regional Cold War configuration in East Asia went through several changes in the 1970s when against the background of an ongoing split between the USSR and PRC and the course of the Vietnam war, the US and PRC underwent a rapprochement.¹ The PRC started representing “China” in the United Nations Security Council, replacing the General Assembly-ousted ROC.² The US and Japan established official diplomatic relations with the PRC abandoning official diplomatic ties with the ROC.³ In 1978, the PRC initiated important economic reforms which allowed the country over time to increase its overall economic prosperity and to become more closely integrated with the world economy. Politically, though, the PRC has continued to oppress the opposition. As regards the PRC's perspective on the ROC, Beijing has never renounced its claim on the island. At the same time, some change was apparent in the early 1980s when Beijing aired its proposition for the idea of “one country, two systems” which implied that areas, such as Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, could retain their economic and social systems but within one China, that is, the PRC.⁴ The ROC did not embrace that idea.⁵

The ROC's rapid, export-driven economic growth from the 1960s allowed it to become one of the most dynamically developing economies of the region. In December 1986, with the election of the first two-party legislative body,⁶ a democratisation process was started that eventually put an end to a decades-old authoritarian regime that carried out the

1 Hara, *Frontiers*, 6-7, 68-69.

2 *Ibid.*, 69; Lung-chu Chen, “Taiwan's Current International Legal Status,” *New England Law Review* 32 (1997-98): 678.

3 For a contemporary discussion of the negotiations between the PRC and Japan which despite an incident “of near-crisis proportions” over Senkaku/ Diaoyu led to the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, see Daniel Tretiak, “The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude,” *Asian Survey* 18, no. 12 (1978): 1235-1249.

4 George Edwards, “Applicability of the 'One Country, Two Systems' Hong Kong Model to Taiwan: Will Hong Kong's Post-Reversion Autonomy, Accountability, and Human Rights Record Discourage Taiwan's Reunification with the People's Republic of China?” *New England Law Review* 32 (1997-98): 754-55.

5 *Ibid.*, 753, 757-59.

6 Daniel Sutherland, “Opposition Party Gains in Taiwanese Election; Vote Seen as Step in Move to Democracy,” *The Washington Post*, December 7, 1986.

country's industrialisation.¹ Importantly for our discussion, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was elected alongside the long-time ruling KMT, did not share its rival party's policy of "unification" with "China" and was in favour of the ROC/ Taiwan's independence.² The country's democratisation led to the "legalisation of calls for independence"³ and of pro-independence political advocacy which "emerged from underground as the explicit platform of the DPP."⁴ The prominence of the pro-Taiwan independence views in Taiwan's public life served as a background to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.

The crisis began when the PRC felt they were provoked by the Clinton administration's approval of a visa for the ROC President Lee Teng-hui to unofficially visit the US to speak at the Cornell University alumni reunion.⁵ It should be noted that it was the PRC's usual policy to isolate the ROC and its leaders diplomatically.⁶ It was under the US Congress's pressure that the Department of State issued a visa to President Lee despite the administration's prior policy not to do so.⁷ The PRC, believing with some evidence that the US policy after the Cold War was "encouraging Lee Teng-hui to seek sovereignty for Taiwan,"⁸ wound up its vitriolic diplomatic response by staging highly provocative military exercises and missile tests in July and August, as well as in November 1995.⁹ In March 1996, the PRC staged another set of missile tests and amphibious exercises in waters near Taiwan¹⁰

1 Masahiro Wakabayashi, "Democratisation of the Taiwanese and Korean Political Regimes: a Comparative Study," *The Developing Economies* XXXV, no. 4 (1997): 422.

2 Ibid., 434-35; Sutherland, "Opposition Party Gains in Taiwanese Election," *The Washington Post*, December 7, 1986;

3 Wallace J. Thies and Patrick C. Bratton, "When Governments Collide in the Taiwan Strait," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 27, no. 4 (2004): 560.

4 Che-Fu Lee, "China's Perception of the Taiwan Issue," *New England Law Review* 32 (1997-98): 698.

5 Thies and Bratton, "When Governments Collide," 559.

6 Ibid., 560.

7 Ibid., 561-562; Robert Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and Use of Force," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (2000): 91.

8 Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation," 92-93, 123.

9 Ibid., 94, 97, 102. Note that in May and August 1995, as well as in June and July 1996 the PRC conducted four underground nuclear tests before signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in September 1996. These nuclear tests were not part of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis story. See "Coalition Parties Draft Diet Protest against France, China," *TDY*, July 28, 1995; "China Stages Nuclear Test and Vows to Join Ban after One More," *TNYT*, June 9, 1996; "Nuclear Powers Sign Pact to Outlaw Test Explosions," *The Times*, September 25, 1996.

10 Thies and Bratton, "When Governments Collide," 572-573. They described the exercises as "unprecedented for the PLA."

which, in part, were intended to influence the public in the ROC against voting in the presidential elections for pro-independence candidates.¹ In response, after consultations with the National Security Council and State Department officials, Secretary of Defence William Perry ordered the deployment of two carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan.²

“The United States observed the remainder of China's exercises, Taiwan conducted its first presidential election, and neither war nor a Taiwan declaration of independence was forthcoming.”³ The crisis did not escalate further, possibly, because these episodes of the PRC's coercive diplomacy were intended by Beijing only as signals to Taipei and Washington about its displeasure with Taipei's independence activities and because Washington exercised restraint while succeeding to increase “regional confidence in its presence in Asia.”⁴ But the underlying sovereignty dispute between Beijing and Taipei has not been resolved and the possibility remains that it can yet result in a military confrontation. The materialisation of such a possibility may trigger the situation captured in the main concern of this dissertation, as was outlined in the first chapter. Robert Ross's conclusion sums up the danger of a future escalation: “The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait confrontation further reveals how easy it can be for the United States and China to stumble into a collision.”⁵ Thies and Bratton struck a chord: “In 1995-96 China was content to limit itself to threatening gestures. Next time its actions may not be so restrained.”⁶

In 1996, the Senkaku/ Diaoyu dispute also experienced a period of heightened tensions after Japan declared an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles including the disputed islands on February 20.⁷ This dispute, the formal basis for which was,

1 Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation,” 107-110.

2 Ibid., 110.

3 Ibid., 112.

4 Ibid., 122. Ross argued that both sides, ie, the US and PRC, achieved their strategic objectives even if at a price (ibid., 88, 112-122). Thies and Bratton judged “China's attempts to coerce Taipei and Washington to have been largely unsuccessful.” Thies and Bratton, “When Governments Collide,” 576.

5 Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation,” 123.

6 Thies and Bratton, “When Governments Collide,” 577.

7 “Cabinet Agrees to Declare 200-mile Economic Zone,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 21, 1996; Peregrine Hodson, “Tokyo and Seoul Declare Rival Zones in Islands Dispute,” *The Times*, February 21, 1996. It must be noted that China undertook a similar action earlier when in 1992 it promulgated the Territorial Waters

arguably, “purposely” laid in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, reawakened in the early 1970s, at the time of the transfer of these islands together with Okinawa from the US military administration under Japan's administration.¹ Two significant factors played a role. In 1969, the United Nations' Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East released a report which announced that “a high probability existed that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world.”² This could have hardly failed to awaken the Chinese and Japanese interest in the area. Furthermore, the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which started in 1973, led in 1982 to the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which became effective from 1994.³ The Convention stipulated the right of the coastal nation declare a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, in which it enjoys sole exploitation rights on all natural resources contained therein. Having administered the islands since their transfer from the US, Japan chose to declare an EEZ around the disputed islands, which could not have failed to incite protests in the PRC, ROC, and Hong Kong. And protests and mutual provocations have continued to flare up from time to time ever since, often linked to such sentimentally charged issues as colonial- and war-time history interpretations in Japanese textbooks and equivocal commemoration by some of Japan's public figures of the country's war dead, including convicted militarists, at Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo.

1996 saw, as mentioned above, a period of high tensions with frequent incursions of ships with Chinese activists into the waters in the disputed area. All sides to the dispute provided focal points for mutual vitriol. The declaration of the EEZ by Japan's government,

Law in which the PRC claimed sovereignty on an area that overlapped with the zone claimed by Japan and included a claim on Senkaku/ Diaoyu. See Toshiaki Arai, “Island Dispute Threatens Japan-China Relations,” *TDY*, March 14, 1992; Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Vietnam Woos ASEAN as Ally Against China,” *TDY*, July 12, 1992.

1 Hara, *Frontiers*, 178, 183, 186.

2 See John Tkacik, “China Tests US-Japan Alliance; Asia Behemoth Flexes its Muscles in Japanese Waters,” *The Washington Times*, October 5, 2010; Seokwoo Lee, “Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands,” *Boundary & Territory Briefing* 3, no. 7 (2002): 6.

3 Daniel Hollis, Tatjana Rosen, Dawn Wright, “United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982,” in *Encyclopedia of Earth*, ed. Cutler Cleveland (Washington, DC), [http://www.eoearth.org/article/United_Nations_Convention_on_Law_of_the_Sea_\(UNCLOS\),_1982](http://www.eoearth.org/article/United_Nations_Convention_on_Law_of_the_Sea_(UNCLOS),_1982).

the establishment of a “lighthouse” on one of the islands by a group of Japanese in July 1996,¹ and other visits by Japanese activists to the area were “met” with frequent penetrations of this area by Chinese activists, but also by oil-exploration, ocean research ships, fishing boats, and military vessels.² The Japan Coast Guard and MSDF took action in response to what the government considered were violations of Japanese territory.³ At times, there were human casualties, such as the accidental drowning of David Chan, an activist from Hong Kong,⁴ or damage to property on all sides.

The spring of 2005 saw particularly vehement anti-Japanese protests. They were caused by a combination of factors which included opposition to Japan's bid to win a permanent seat after proposed reforms of the United National Security Council and anger over the Japanese government's approval of a controversial series of history textbooks for junior high schools written by right-wing historians.⁵ East Asian countries were particularly infuriated by what they saw as attempts to whitewash Japan's World War II-time atrocities.⁶ But this extended episode of very high tensions over the sentimental issues of history interpretation exposed a linkage with another conflictual aspect of the Sino-Japanese relations, namely the exploitation of the mineral resources in the East China Sea.⁷ The crux of the matter lay in the definition of the EEZ borders. China defined its EEZ with reference to its continental shelf; Japan included the disputed islands in its zone when defining it from the shoreline.⁸ The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea does not specify how such a

1 Masahiko Sasajima, “Storm over Senkakus: How to Deal with Hot Nonissue,” *TDY*, October 2, 1996.

2 Michio Sakamura, “Japanese in Hong Kong Fret about Island Ire; Political Groups Drive Sovereignty Protests over Senkaku-Diaoyu Dispute,” *TNW*, October 14, 1996; “Senkaku/ Diaoyutai Islands,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, accessed December 12, 2010, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm>; Calder, “China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry,” 130.

3 Tatou Takahama, “Time to Stop Waltzing around Territorial Issues,” *TDY*, October 9, 1996.

4 Edward Gargan, “Man Drowns during a Protest over Asian Islets,” *TNYT*, September 27, 1996.

5 “Troubling Events in China,” *TJT*, April 13, 2005; Joseph Kahn, “Riot Police Called in to Calm Anti-Japanese Protests in China,” *TNYT*, April 10, 2005.

6 Anthony Faiola, “Japanese Schoolbooks Anger South Korea, China; Militaristic Past Is Seen as Whitewashed,” *The Washington Post*, April 6, 2005; Kiroku Hanai, “Koizumi Policy Seeded Storm,” *TJT*, April 25, 2005.

7 James Brooke, “For Japan and China, Strains from a Line in the Sea,” *TNYT*, April 14, 2005.

8 “Oil and Gas in Troubled Waters; Japan and China,” *The Economist (US Edition)*, October 8, 2005; Drifte,

conflict should be resolved. This created an area of overlapping interests in which large gas and oil fields lie.¹ The median line, suggested as a solution to the dispute along with other measures, has not solved the problem since the Japanese side remained concerned that the Chinese might be “sucking” gas from the Japanese-claimed side the disputed area.² A compromise is not unthinkable, but “thirst for energy”³ and nationalism on both the Chinese and Japanese sides of the dispute makes it difficult to achieve.⁴

There is, however, another issue that is linked with the cross-Taiwan Strait relations, the Senkaku/ Diaoyu dispute, and is, in fact, connected to other territorial disputes in the region, the origin of which could also be found in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The issue is sea lane security. From the perspective of geopolitics, “the military and economic importance of securing lines of communication over the sea remains a strategic constant for maritime states.”⁵ The “strategic imperative” of maintaining secure sea lanes fully applies to Japan because of the country's import dependence and vulnerability to sea-borne supply disruptions.⁶ A conflagration over Taiwan or the adjacent Paracel and Spratly islands, which are disputed between the PRC, ROC, and several Southeast Asian nations,⁷ could endanger the safety of the extremely important shipping lane from the Strait of Malacca through the South China Sea and the Bashi Channel (south of Taiwan), through which, reportedly, 60% of Japan's sea traffic has to pass.⁸ In light of Japan's memory of its vulnerability as an insular

“Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea – From Missed Opportunities to Negotiation Stalemate,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal (Japan Focus)* 22-3-09 (June 1, 2009), <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Reinhard-Drifte/3156>.

1 “Oil and Gas in Troubled Waters; Japan and China,” *The Economist*.

2 Ibid.

3 Calder, “China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry,” 130. See also Drifte, “Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea.”

4 As matter of fact, the “delimitation issue is made more complex by the claims of the ROK, which borders the East China Sea in the north.” Drifte, “Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea.”

5 Euan Graham, *Japan's Sea Lane Security, 1940-2004: a Matter of Life and Death?* (Abingdon, NY: Routledge, 2006), 229.

6 Ibid., 8, 8-33, 229.

7 Hara, *Frontiers*, 143.

8 “Status Quo Must Be Upheld,” *Taipei Times*, August 28, 2004, <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/08/28/2003200571>. For a broader discussion of the wider implications of a conflict in the South China Sea, see Ralph Cossa, “Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict,” *A Pacific Forum CSIS Special Report*, March 1998, 3-7. The 2010 Annual Report to Congress on China's military developments stated that 80% of

nation in World War II and during the 1973 oil shock, but also in an environment of recurrent tensions over regional territorial disputes, whether involving Japan directly or not, pursuing a security policy with a realist-informed core makes perfect sense. It will be shown in the following chapter that BMD makes a meaningful contribution to such a realist policy. A further small subsection, however, is in order below to illustrate how the the implications of the Cold War regional configuration, whose persistence and genesis through a selection of its episodes was described above, are aggravated by the military aspect of China's rise.

China's military modernisation

Does China have the military infrastructure to claim and sustain a rising role in the region? – The course of the PRC's military modernisation suggests that an increasingly sophisticated military infrastructure has been installed. Little is, of course, inevitable about the future. Some aspects could be observed in the international relations of Northeast Asia which could be interpreted as countervailing the tensions outlined in this chapter.¹

Admittedly, it is also true that China's "core goals" include "economic development and domestic stability."² At the same time, Drifte's admonition that "we have to part with the preconception that growing wealth will somehow inescapably lead to stability"³ is not entirely *malapropos*:

...there is equally no historical determinism guaranteeing the benevolent outcome of economic development. Greater wealth can also sustain a more forceful foreign and security policy, particularly in view of China's historical baggage...⁴

China's rapidly modernising military infrastructure can be expected to become at some point

crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan flows through the South China sipping lanes. See US Department of Defence, Office of the Secretary of Defence, *Annual Report to Congress. Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC, 2010), 17.

- 1 For an argument against the "Chinese hegemony" thesis, see Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia Reshaping the Regional Order," *International Security* 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05): 64-99.
- 2 Foot, "Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global Order," 80, 84, 99.
- 3 Drifte, *Japan's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century*, 53.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 57. See also a recent comment by Shinichi Kitaoka, Japan's Ambassador to the UN (2004-06), in connection with an incident involving Chinese fishing boats near Senkaku: "What Beijing has done vis-a-vis the Senkaku incident makes it evident that we can hardly count on what China claims to be its peaceful rise." Kitaoka, "Establish Quiet, Firm Diplomacy," *TDY*, October 4, 2010.

capable of effective military operations regionally.

If its military modernisation continues to accelerate, it will not matter so much for the others what China actually does, but what it *could do* with its growing prowess. ... In the end, it will not be the quality of interaction that determines stability in Asia, but the change in the distribution of material capabilities and the aptitude to convert them into influence.¹

Given the aspects of conflictual potential in the region outlined earlier in the chapter and the risks and contradictions, which at some stage accompany the modernisation, and democratisation, of political systems² – be it in China or elsewhere, – the risk that China's military infrastructure could be used disruptively for the region cannot be excluded.

An excerpt from the US Quadrennial Defence Review Report, published in 2010, succinctly summarises contemporary trends in China's military modernisation which has been aided by the country's economic successes.

China is developing and fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defence systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems. China has shared only limited information about the space, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernisation programmes, raising a number of legitimate questions regarding its long-term intentions.³

Japan's annual Defence White Papers also used carefully chosen words to express their concerns: “It is necessary to keep paying attention to these modernisation trends and to carefully evaluate whether the modernisation of China's military forces exceeds the level necessary for its national defence.”⁴ The 2010/2011 edition of the National Defence Programme Guidelines, while being outside the scope of this research, could also be cited as an illustration of Japan's perspective: “Military modernisation by China and its insufficient

1 Jonathan Holslag, “Trapped Giant: China's Military Rise,” *IISS Adelphi Papers* 50, no. 416 (2010): 139.

2 See, for example, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005). “...democratising states are disproportionately war-prone when they lack the coherent political institutions needed to manage intensified domestic political competition and to prevent it from provoking foreign conflicts” (*ibid.*, 21). See also Alastair Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003): 49-50.

3 US Department of Defence, *Quadrennial Defence Review Report* (Washington, DC, 2010), 31. The QDR of 2010 referred to the evidence outside the scope of this research (1994-2007), but its publication date is not too distant, so it is believed here that the QDR's conclusions about aspects of China's military trends can be invoked in this thesis.

4 JDA, *Defence of Japan 2005 (Annual White Paper)* (Tokyo: Japan Defence Agency, 2005), 13.

transparency are of concern for the regional and global community.”¹

The PLA has implemented various reforms and build-up of its forces in the 1990s-2000s. Being of particular relevance to the issues covered in this section of the chapter and the thesis, the following aspects of the PLA's modernisation can be emphasised: the military build-up to secure dominance in a cross-Taiwan Strait confrontation; the PLA Navy's enhancements for power projection beyond Taiwan; and measures aimed at improving the PLA's ability to “conduct local wars under conditions of informatisation” and build-up of capacity to disrupt the enemy's space-based command and control infrastructure.

On Taiwan, China's continued build-up across the Strait has led the authors of the 2010 Annual Report to US Congress, entitled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,” to conclude that: “The balance of forces continues... to shift in the mainland's favour.”² This is the result of China's deployment of many of its “most advanced systems” to the areas opposite Taiwan.³ These advanced systems include a range of ballistic and cruise missiles.⁴ Indeed, several researchers observed that as part of its military modernisation programme in the 2000s “the PRC has clearly prioritised the improvement of its [conventional and nuclear] missile capabilities.”⁵ The PLA Navy has also the “largest force in Asia” of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships.⁶ China's 2008 Defence White Paper described the PLA Navy as a “strategic service,

1 *Summary of National Defence Programme Guidelines FY 2011-*, 2, accessed December 17, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/summaryFY2011-.pdf. (Provisional translation by Japan Ministry of Defence)

2 US Department of Defence, Office of the Secretary of Defence, *Annual Report to Congress. Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China* (Washington, D.C., 2010), 6. A similar conclusion can be found in Japan's 2005 Defence White Paper: “Taiwan recognises that unless the Taiwanese forces effectively improve their strength, the military superiority would be gradually shifting to the Chinese side in and after 2006.” JDA, *Defence of Japan 2005*, 14.

3 US Department of Defence, *Military and Security Developments*, 1. See also Hughes, “Japan's Military Modernisation,” 87.

4 US Department of Defence, *Military and Security Developments*, 1-2.

5 Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher Yeaw, “Chinese Theatre and Strategic Missile Force Modernisation and its Implications for the United States,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 1 (2009): 67. For a brief review of prominent opposite arguments, see *ibid.*, 68-69.

6 US Department of Defence, *Military and Security Developments*, 2-3.

developing the capability to operate in 'distant waters'¹ [that is, beyond Taiwan, and “over the long term... possibly deep into the western Pacific Ocean.”]² The PLA Air Force has hundreds of aircraft with a growing percentage of newer and more advanced aircraft within unrefuelled operational range of Taiwan.³

As regards the PLA's emphasis on building forces “to win local wars under conditions of informatisation”⁴ and the capability to conduct “integrated joint operations,”⁵ there remained “serious challenges... through at least 2010,”⁶ but the PLA continued to “selectively acquire new generation technologies in some areas, while deferring new acquisitions in others in favour of upgrading older, but capable, systems for networked operations.”⁷ Also importantly for our discussion in the following chapter, which will expand on this point with reference to Japan's BMD, is that China was making progress with building a capacity to disable the enemy's space assets.⁸ A PLA analysis reportedly stated that “destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors... will deprive the opponents of initiatives on the battlefield and [make it difficult] for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play.”⁹ These are, of course, fragments of a broader and complex picture of the developments in China's military. But these pieces of evidence do suggest that “the PLA is capable of increasingly sophisticated military action against Taiwan”¹⁰ and beyond, although action beyond Taiwan is “not preordained.”¹¹ And Japan, cognizant of the developments outlined above, is, in Hughes's words,

1 Ibid., 22.

2 Ibid., 37.

3 Ibid., 3-4. For an interesting discussion of Chinese debates and the prospects of the PLA Navy's shift of emphasis from littoral, or “brown-water,” to “blue-water” ambitions, see David Lei, “China's New Multi-faceted Maritime Strategy,” *Orbis* 52, no. 1 (2008): 141-46, 154-57.

4 US Department of Defence, *Military and Security Developments*, 22.

5 Ibid., 5.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 3.

8 Lei, “China's New Multi-faceted Maritime Strategy,” 147-48.

9 US Department of Defence, *Military and Security Developments*, 25.

10 Ibid., 51.

11 Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic global order,” 89-90. The exact quote was: “China may in time seek to challenge other states such as India, Japan, Russia and the United States itself; but I would argue that the outcome is not preordained” (ibid., 90).

in many cases engaged in something of a quiet arms race with China: matching Chinese growing air power with its own enhanced air defensive power, countering Chinese growing blue-water naval ambitions with its own more capable anti-submarine and carrier assets, and attempting to nullify Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles.¹

Concluding remarks

This chapter dealt with several aspects of the systemic element of neoclassical realism, in particular the constraints of the regional environment within which Japan's BMD decisions were made. First, a brief outline of Japan's postwar and current international efforts at missile defence concluded that Japan was part of a worldwide interest in missile defences, but also that Japan was unusual because of its unique, idiosyncratic security-policymaking framework. In the main part, the chapter focussed on a selection of key episodes in the history of the regional security environment which demonstrated the region's high conflictual potential, including over energy resources and sea lanes. The security situation surrounding North Korea in the 1990s-2000s was presented as an example of volatility in the regional security environment. A case for pervasive uncertainty was also made by discussing some of the regional disputes involving China from the perspective of their Cold War genesis. In light of the recent history of tensions in the region, it was concluded that an expectation of a reordering of international relations through the eventual unification of China and/ or Korea was not an unreasonable expectation. What matters for the purposes of this thesis, is that the possibility of such a reordering, however distant or small, favoured BMD procurement in Japan because it helped to create and maintain security policy options that Japan might find useful when the Cold War configuration outlined in this chapter begins to change radically. These options and BMD, however, will be investigated in the following chapter.

Considered from a different perspective, the findings of this chapter can be reworded to link them to the argument of the next chapter and the whole thesis in the following way.

Japan is not facing the regional security challenges entirely alone. The framework of the

¹ Hughes, "Japan's Military Modernisation," 96.

country's alliance with the US was implicit throughout this chapter and in references to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Cold War structure of disputes. Features of the regional security environment described in this chapter, considered together with the idiosyncrasies of Japan's security policymaking identified in the first chapters of the thesis, made efforts aimed at preserving the alliance with the US from the mid-1990s appear rational. BMD could be seen as contributing to the alliance reaffirmation processes, about which some detail will be provided in the following chapter. The impact of BMD on the alliance reaffirmation also included the risks and dangers outlined in the premise of the core question and the introductory part of the thesis. At the same time, in light of the conclusions of this chapter and from the point of view of managing the risks for the alliance with the US, BMD also offered ways to prepare better for these dangers and control the risks. In that sense, BMD could be productively considered not as a result of "US pressure," or not just as its result, but also as a result of Japan's deliberate policy, that is, policy designed on the Japanese side. It is the aspects of this deliberate policy of creating options through BMD that the next chapter and Parts II and III of the thesis will investigate.

CHAPTER 5. BMD AS A TOOL OF MILITARY AND MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL MODERNISATION FOR LONGER-TERM FOREIGN-POLICY MANAGEMENT.

The purpose of this chapter is to substantiate the difference that the BMD infrastructure is likely to make to Japan's foreign and security policy by specifying the security policy options the infrastructure can create. The analysis will be done in the following steps. In the first section, evidence on the BMD's role in Japan's further incorporation into the US's global power projection and military production systems will be reviewed. This, it will be argued, is one end of the spectrum of the BMD's potentialities. The remainder of the chapter will present evidence on the other end of the spectrum, that is, the BMD's role in implementing the modernisation of the military along the lines of the “revolution in military affairs” and intensified space exploration which, arguably, enhances the country’s capacity for a more independent and pro-active security policy. Specifically, section two will investigate the BMD's role in the country's “revolution in military affairs” and seek to identify links between Japan's space militarisation and BMD. The third section will consider how such potentialities of BMD relate to the country's overall security framework. The chapter will conclude with a statement that BMD can be seen both as strengthening Japan's alliance with the US and creating new options for a more independent security policy. This conclusion will remain in the background of the analysis of policy-making and policy-influencing actors in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight where an attempt to identify likely supporters of each potentiality will be made. It is in the BMD's potentialities that the answer to the central research question lies.

5.1. Japan and the US's global power projection and military production systems.¹

An argument can be made in support of the view that Japan by pursuing BMD is getting ever more dependent on the US, becoming an important component of the US's global power projection and military production systems. This section will critically review the argument of Japan essentially relinquishing some of its sovereignty to the US as a result of the procurement of BMD. I shall explain if and why it may be rational for Japan to get integrated into the US's military production and power projection systems. An assessment of the counterevidence will follow.

Japanese military contractors and BMD

PAC-3 missiles and launchers deployed in 2006-2007 were purchased by Japan from Lockheed Martin through the Foreign Military Sales channel.² However, the portion of PAC-3 procured from 2008 was MHI-produced, which was enabled by the Lockheed Martin-MHI licence production agreement that followed the US-Japan Memorandum of Understanding signed in March 2005.³ Reportedly, from August 2006, in order to accelerate the domestic deployment of PAC-3, the JDA had considered setting up a system of subsidies amounting to 5% of the total order aimed at MHI and ten collaborating companies.⁴

Regarding the SM-3 Block I, Japan has purchased these interceptors up to a value of 458 million USD.⁵ SM-3s are installed on Aegis-equipped destroyers. The production of the hulls of these destroyers for the deployment in Japan has so far been the business of the

Japanese heavy industries – five vessels by MHI and one vessel by KHI. However, the Aegis

1 Note that the first two subsections here (p. 139-146) are the author's abridged translation of parts of two articles, unless otherwise indicated: Ayumu Hirasawa, "Misairu bouei. Nichibei gunji sangyou-no hokanteki ittaika [Missile Defence: Complementary Unification of Japan-US Military Industries]," *KEIZAI* (July 2007): 72-85; Hirasawa, "Misairu bouei-no kougekiteki seikaku to gusanfukugoutai [The Offensive Nature of Missile Defence and the Military-industrial Complex]," *ZEN'EI* (September 2008): 69-86. Where necessary, Hirasawa's data and conclusions were strengthened with references to further sources.

2 "US Wants Japan to Share Missile Defence Radar Data," *TDY (Tokyo)*, July 20, 2005.

3 "Japan, US Agree on Licensed Production of PAC-3 Missiles in Japan," *Kyodo News International*, July 19, 2005.

4 Hirasawa (2007), 79.

5 Hirasawa (2008), 77.

system needed for air defence has originally been procured entirely from Lockheed Martin (LM). This was until a licence agreement between four Japanese companies and LM was finalised in 2001 authorising “*kokusanka*”/ domestic production of a part of the Aegis system to be deployed from 2007.¹ The companies in question were Mitsubishi Electric (Melco), which by combining US and Japanese systems produced some of the software; MHI, which was responsible for the vertical launch units enabling series of multiple launches; and Oki Electric Industry, which together with the NEC-affiliated Nippon Avionics using multi-purpose technologies worked on the computer and software.² But the high-precision radar and the central system which were supposed to automatically detect and destroy the missile target were to be procured from the US. As a result of these agreements, in the 2002 budget request, the JDA included 150 billion yen for Aegis, of which only one third, 50 billion yen, was meant for the support of *kokusanka*, the trend towards domestic production.³

Possibly, as Hirasawa reported, the US did not have serious reservations about collaboration with Japanese contractors on the current Aegis system because the next-generation system was already being developed in the US.⁴ Additionally, considerations of strengthening the bilateral defence cooperation and technological role-sharing were important. It was in this vein that the Second Armitage Report “US-Japan alliance: Getting Asia right through 2020,” published in 2007, recommended discussion of the joint development of the core and peripheral systems and technologies for the Next Generation Cruiser CG-X, part of the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser class of ships.⁵ The CG-X is to play a “critical”⁶ role in the national air defences against missile and other future threats.

1 “Japan Firms to Make Aegis Parts,” *TNW*, November 5, 2001.

2 *Ibid.*

3 Hirasawa (2007), 79.

4 *Ibid.*

5 Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, *The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020* (Washington: CSIS, 2007), 27.

6 *Ibid.*

The advanced SM-3 Block II is being co-developed by the US and Japan. The need for a more advanced SM-3 was explained as motivated by the fact that the SM-3 Block I may only be effective against No-dong missiles capable of reaching Japanese territory but not against Taepo-dongs which, reportedly, can strike the US territory. Japan's BMD research was accelerated after the May 1993 No-dong I and, more importantly, the August 1998 Taepo-dong I launch. In September 1998, LM and Melco signed a comprehensive agreement of cooperation in areas of military-use electronics.¹ Both companies agreed to exchange military technology information, to propose jointly new products and technologies to the JDA, and that Melco would be the preferred partner for the licence production of LM's electronic devices. Hirasawa suggested that with this agreement Melco and LM from the start targeted TMD.² Subsequently, within the US-Japan joint research, Melco became a strong candidate for leadership in the projects on the seeker and missile-homing system. Furthermore, there was speculation that in preparation for the next-generation Aegis destroyers, Melco wanted to take charge of the licence production and relevant repairs.³ In September 2004, the JDA decided on the direction towards the US-Japan co-research on the Aegis system.

The US-Japan joint technology research on TMD started in 1999. The co-development of the SM-3 Block II was formally agreed upon in 2006, after the JDA and DOD signed an MOU in December 2004. The JDA designated MHI as the main contractor which cooperates with six other Japanese companies: Melco, Toshiba, KHI, Fujitsu, Nissan Motors, Ishikawajima-harima Heavy Industries (IHI). Each company took charge of a field of their specialisation, for example, Melco and Toshiba got involved in the work on the infrared seeker to detect and track a missile target, Nissan Motors used its Aerospace

1 "New Defence Alliance Goes on Offensive. Mitsubishi Electric, Lockheed Martin Said to Be Seeking Contract on Missile-interception Pushed by US," *TNW*, September 7, 1998.

2 Hirasawa (2007), 80.

3 *Ibid.*

Division's expertise for the two-stage rocket motor, while MHI and Raytheon took the overall responsibility for managing the joint research.¹ As part of the co-research into the SM-3's advanced components, the Japanese side promoted work on the infrared seeker, nose cone, kinetic warhead which is supposed to directly hit the incoming missile, and the second stage propulsion system/ rocket motor of the three-stage interceptor. The US side was to develop the missile guidance system and booster. The military-technological functions of these components are as follows. For the warhead to directly hit the enemy missile, the technology of the infrared seeker detecting and hitting the target is crucial. The nose cone, protecting the seeker and the kinetic warhead from getting damaged in the atmosphere, separates in the exoatmosphere to allow the seeker to fulfil its role.

The above dealt with the advances in Japan's BMD procurement in the fields of ground- and sea-based missile interception. However, the concept of boost-phase interception, which refers to disabling the enemy missile's progress immediately or very soon after its launch using laser technology, has also led to increased US-Japan military technology cooperation facilitated by the North Korean missile and nuclear overtures. After the July 2006 missile launches by North Korea, Japanese companies expressed to their US counterparts their "eagerness" to explore the opportunities of the airborne laser (ABL) project.² The Japanese government was also reported as "extremely interested" in studying the US Missile Defence Agency's ABL programme.³ In the aftermath of the October 2006 nuclear test by North Korea, the JDA and DOD conducted detailed discussions, after which the US government informed the government of Japan of its intention to implement in five years time three types of the lasers. In reaction to this, the MOD decided on May 12, 2007 to start from 2008 the research and development of a laser weapon.⁴

1 Elements of this arrangement were aired as early as 2000. See "Mitsubishi Elec, Toshiba, Kawasaki, Others in Japan-US Defence Research," *AFX European Focus*, January 5, 2000.

2 Sieff, "BMD Focus: Abe's BMD Boost for Bush," *UPI*, October 5, 2006.

3 Sieff, "BMD Focus: Japan's Passion for BMD," *UPI*, March 24, 2006.

4 Christina Mackenzie, "Japan Planning to Develop High-power Laser Weapons," *Aerospace Daily & Defence Report*, May 16, 2007; Bradley Perrett, "Stopgap Upgrades," *AWST*, September 8, 2008.

When the SM-3 joint R&D project enters the production and deployment stage, the components for which the Japanese contractors are responsible would have to be provided not only to the MSDF Aegis destroyers but also to the US Navy. The latter essentially meant weapons exportation. To confirm Japan's commitment to the BMD projects and US military cooperation, the Chief Cabinet Secretary issued a statement on December 10, 2004 saying that:

We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based. If Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defence systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-US Security Arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan...¹

A related episode in Japan's progress towards further integration with the US's military production system took place in 2007 when GSOMIA was signed. GSOMIA is likely to create conditions in which the Japanese contractors will be able to do some necessary maintenance/ repairs for the US Navy and the US-owned BMD-related infrastructure. MHI Chairman Takashi Nishioka, who was naturally also the head of Keidanren's DPC, is said to have actively promoted the conclusion of the agreement on a number of occasions, most notably, at the Eighth US-Japan Security Strategy Exhibition and Conference that took place in Tokyo in August 2006.²

A similar and related argument was also made about Japan becoming more closely incorporated into the US's global power projection system.

Japan's BMD as part of the US's global power projection

The US-promoted ballistic missile defence can be construed as a measure of

1 Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, December 10, 2004, MOD website, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/pdf/statement.pdf.

2 *Mitsubishi juukou-no shoutai [The True Face of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries]* (Tokyo: Shuukan Kinyoubi, March 25, 2008), 109-111.

strengthening the US's offensive/ power projection capability. The near-universal official rhetoric in defence of BMD globally seems to have been based on the consideration of malicious/ intentional missile attacks by an identifiable nation such as Iran and North Korea, or accidental launches by criminal groups within these nations or elsewhere. However, the Russians and the Chinese were concerned that the US's global BMD system with a number of regional terminals, of which Japan could be considered to be one, is a means, by which the US could achieve/ maintain strategic military superiority over Russia and China in a future conflict.¹ The Russian and Chinese strategists reasonably assumed that it was not the pronouncements of current governments that counted but the military infrastructure and long-term national interests which might clash in East Asia. Upgraded editions of the US's global BMD can give the US and Japan an advantage over their strategic rivals in the future. This deserves attention.

The evidence of Japan's BMD playing the role of a regional terminal in the US's worldwide power projection system can be considered in three blocks describing the complementarity of the US and Japanese sensors, interceptors, as well as command, control, and communications systems. Sensors are used to detect the launch, identify the nature of the incoming missile and implement the guidance of the interceptor. The early warning system aimed at detecting and communicating the enemy missile launch has at its core the Defence Support Programme (DSP) satellites which are capable of discovering the missile firing through its infrared signatures. Japan relies for this system on the US.² The detected enemy object is then tracked by improved early warning radars and X-band radars (FBX-T). The

1 James Mulvenon et al., *Chinese Responses to US Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defence* (RAND Corp, National Defence Research Institute, 2006), 99; Urayama, "Missile Defence," 160-171; Drifte, *Japan's Security Relations*, 99-101. Takeshi Oda, "Rift Grows between US, Russia over Missile Defence Plan," *TNW*, May 7, 2007; Bruce Blair, "Some Sensible Options for US Missile Defence," *The Moscow Times*, June 3, 2000; Richard Lloyd Parry, "Japan's Missile Shield Upsets the Neighbours," *The Times*, December 20, 2003; "Russia's Rogozin Expresses Alarm over TMD Research," *JEN*, December 17, 2000.

2 To cite one example, in April 2009 Tokyo learned about the launch of a North Korean rocket from the US DSP. "Defence Minister Says Japan to Consider Deploying Early Warning Satellite," *BBC Monitoring*, April 9, 2009.

US has five improved early warning radars worldwide, namely in California, Alaska, Massachusetts, England, and Greenland, and plans to have a network of four Raytheon developed X-band radars, one of which was installed in Japan in June 2006 in the ASDF Shariki base.¹

Regarding the interceptors, for the current edition of BMD Japan procures the US-developed PAC-3 and SM-3, which contributes to further US-Japan weapons “interoperability.” That term can be interpreted to mean Japan’s military infrastructure increasing its capacity to fulfil US military tasks jointly with US forces. The deployment of both types of interceptors on the Japanese territory has been proceeding apace. In August 2006, the US Navy deployed to its base in Yokosuka an SM-3-tipped Aegis-equipped Shiloh destroyer. Furthermore, it was planned that two of nine Aegis destroyers from the Yokosuka base would be refurbished for BMD functionality. From September 2006, the US Air Force base in Kadena was provided with PAC-3. The Japanese military has also made advancements in this area. In 2007, the MSDF Aegis destroyer Kongo was tipped with SM-3s after the cruiser’s radar’s refurbishment. Sixteen PAC-3 batteries around major cities and air bases and SM-3 interceptors on Japan’s four Aegis destroyers are expected to be deployed by March 2012.²

The third area of evidence about Japan getting more closely integrated through the procurement of BMD into the US’s global power projection system is command, control, and communications architecture. BMD, being a multilayered structure and consisting of a chain of sensor and interception equipment, requires a networking capability of the level of BMC4I to be able to function as a system. BMC4I stands for Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence.

The US’s global early-warning system is about the signals from the DSP satellites

1 “Stratcom Completes Forward-based X-Band Radar Study,” *Inside Missile Defence*, June 18, 2008.

2 Japan MOD, “Special Feature: Successful PAC-3 Flight Test,” *Japan Defence Focus* 11 (October 2008): 5, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/pdf/jdf_no11.pdf.

being transferred to four bases around the world in the US, Australia, and Germany, which are then comprehensively analysed at the Colorado Falcon Air Force base. In the cases of Japan and South Korea, the DSP signals are received and analysed by mobile Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS).¹ The first JTAGS on Japanese soil was opened in Misawa air base in October 2007.² Before that, the DSP signal would be received by a station in Korea, analysed, and transferred via satellite to the US Pacific Command in Hawaii, after which the information was relayed to the US Command Centre in Japan. The information was then passed to the US Army Japan, the JDA Central HQ, and the ASDF General HQ.

The basis of Japan's own air defence system BADGE (Base Air Defence Ground Environment) has also undergone considerable evolution since 1968 when it was first introduced. In 1988 the operation of a new BADGE system with 28 radars located throughout the country has started. It could automatically detect and track incoming objects by combining the functions of command and control, air defence warning, and communications control. It was planned that from 2009 the upgraded BADGE system will connect FPS-XX/5 and FPS-3 improved radars, Aegis destroyers and BMD sensors. An integration of the JSDF BADGE, or JADGE, and US BMD networks has been proposed in the May 1, 2005 US-Japan Roadmap for Military Realignment Implementation. According to the roadmap, the BJOCC established at Yokota airbase in fiscal 2010 will include a "collocated air and missile defence coordination function. The USG [US government] and GOJ [government of Japan] will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared-use equipment and systems."³

1 For background information on DPS and JTAGS, see Nose, *Misairu Bouei*, 77-88, 77-123.

2 Eric Talmadge, "In Shadow of Nuclear North Korea, Japan and US Rush to Erect Anti-missile Shield," *AP*, January 29, 2008; "US Installs Missile-tracking System in Japan," *Agence France Press*, October 12, 2007; "Missile Info Processing System to Be Deployed at US Base in Aomori," *JEN*, October 11, 2007.

3 US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, May 1, 2006, MOFA website, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html>.

If and why is Japan rational in this story?

The above was the evidence marshalled into such a story that Japan appeared as becoming closely integrated through the procurement of BMD into the US's military production and global power projection systems. Is Japan rational if we assume that this story reflects what Japan actually does with BMD? – Yes, Japan seems rational. In military production, the country is rational because learning from the post-Cold War experience of European and US large scale mergers in the defence sector and motivated by a desire to maintain and develop a domestic infrastructure of advanced weapons production in worsening fiscal conditions, it naturally pursued a closer military industrial consolidation with the US. The security situation immediately after the end of the Cold War was such that governments in Europe, the US and elsewhere started reorganising their military doctrines to make their forces compact, multi-purpose, and mobile. This had a predictable impact on the trend of defence market restructuring in these countries towards mergers and acquisitions (M&A), especially after 1993.

In July 1993, a dinner was organised in the US by the Pentagon to which about 15 CEOs of military contractors were invited. The dinner was later dubbed “the Last Supper of the defence industries” because of Deputy Defence Secretary William Perry’s table speech, in which he called the contemporary defence production capacity excessive and said: “We expect companies to go out of business, and we will stand by and let that happen.”¹ Such a position is understandable given that the DOD reportedly projected in 1988 that by the early 1990s the defence budget would be “well above 600 billion USD.”² However, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in 1991, the defence budget “passed

1 Masahiro Shigemura, *Status of Japanese Defence Industry and Maintenance of Industrial Bases*, A Defence Research Centre Publication (Japan, 2002), accessed June 28, 2009. <http://www.drc-jpn.org/AR-6E/shigemura-e02.htm>.

2 Norman Augustine, “The Last Supper, Revisited,” *Defence News*, June 26, 2006, the website of The Integrator, a “weekly product of the 66th Air Base Wing Public Affairs Office designed to give ESC decision makers a snapshot of news affecting the C4ISR community,” accessed February 14, 2010, <http://integrator.hanscom.af.mil/2006/June/06292006/06292006-13.htm>.

through” 300 billion USD and was “heading steeply downward.”¹

Figure 5.1. US defence budget 1988-2004 (in millions of US dollars).²

Function & Subfunction	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
National Defence: Procurement	80,053	79,390	81,375	71,739	62,952	52,787
Total, National Defence	292,008	299,567	303,263	288,878	295,070	281,076
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
National Defence: Procurement	44,141	43,646	42,589	42,961	44,818	51,113
Total, National Defence	263,322	266,389	266,186	270,366	271,049	292,252
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	
National Defence: Procurement	54,972	62,608	62,739	78,495	83,073	
Total, National Defence	304,035	334,732	362,033	456,043	490,560	

The then-CEO of Lockheed Norman R. Augustine, who was seated next to the Defence Secretary Les Aspin and who actually gave the dinner the sobriquet of “the Last Supper,” claimed in 2006 that “the events that took place that evening [in June 1993] forever changed the character of the US defence industry.”³ The industry was quickly reformatted in such a way that out of more than 60 military suppliers in the early 1990s only 5 consolidated companies remained in 2001 – General Electric Aerospace merged with Martin Marietta, which combined with Lockheed; McDonnell Douglas joined Boeing, Grumman joined Northrop.⁴ A more recent merger led to Northrop Grumman taking over TRW (Thompson

1 Ibid.

2 Source: The Budget for Fiscal Year 2009, Historical Tables, table 5.1. – Budget Authority by Function and Subfunction: 1976-2013, p. 87-89. The website of the US Government Printing Office, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/USbudget/fy09/pdf/hist.pdf>.

3 Augustine, “The Last Supper.”

4 Ibid.

Ramo Wooldridge Inc.), making the number of the biggest contractors in the US market four.¹ Similar developments were observed in Europe where the most prominent examples of M&A in military business were BAE Systems (British Aerospace BAe and Aero & Defence section of Marconi Electronic Systems), EADS European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (Daimler Chrysler Aerospace AG, Aerospatiale Matra of France and CASA of Spain), THALES (Thomson-CSF, Racal).²

The awareness of these international trends in Japan is a fact.³ Indeed, in April 1995, two military contractors – IHI and Sumitomo Heavy Industries – announced plans to create a joint venture of their military ship-building groups.⁴ However, for any large-scale market recalibrations to be implemented in Japan, the degree of procurement budget decline and the structure of the defence market had to be similar to Europe and the US. As Yoshio Shono, the Executive Director of Tokyo Defence Research Centre, which is a “government-authorized” foundation, and Kozo Oikawa, Chairman of Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, confirmed at a Tokyo symposium in 2007, Japanese defence budget reductions in the 1990s were of a much smaller scale than in Europe and the United States so that even when the JDA and MITI considered M&A for the Japanese defence contractors at the beginning of the 1990s, “it simply did not match with the industrial culture of the time.”⁵

1 “USA Aerospace Industry Consolidation, 1990-1998,” *SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Project*, June 2003, <http://projects.sipri.se/milex/aprod/m&a/usaconsolidation.pdf> .

2 Shigemura, *Status of Japanese Defence Industry*. For detailed information, see “Concentration in the Arms Industry: Data on Mergers and Acquisitions,” SIPRI, http://archives.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/aprod/m_and_a_jv.html.

3 *Buki Yushutsu Sangensoku to Bukichoutatsu: Genjou to Kadai [Japan's Arms Exports Ban and Arms Procurement: Present Conditions and Challenges]*, symposium report (Tokyo: RIPS, 2007).

4 Neil Davis, “Adversity Toughens Japan's Aerospace Companies,” *Aerospace America*, September, 1995.

5 *Buki Yushutsu*, 11-12.

Figure 5.2. Japan defence budget 1988-1998 (Unit: 100 million Yen).¹

Function	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Total, National Defence	37,003	39,198	41,593	43,860	45,518	46,406
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	2007
Total, National Defence	46,835	47,236	48,455	49,414	49,290	47,818

Figure 5.3. Japan defence budget: total and procurement expenditures 1998-2007 (Unit: 100 million Yen).²

Function	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Procurement	9,442	9,629	9,141	9,178	9,206	9,028
R&D	1,277	1,307	1,205	1,353	1,277	1,470
Total, National Defence	49,290	49,201	49,218	49,388	49,395	49,265
	2004	2005	2006	2007		
Procurement	8,806	9,000	8,594	8,663		
R&D	1,707	1,316	1,714	1,445		
Total, National Defence	48,764	48,301	47,906	47,818		

This “industrial culture” seems to have changed by the early 2000s as evidenced by a survey conducted by Keidanren’s DPC in 2001-2002.³ The Committee undertook a survey of 41 of its member companies in December 2001 – January 2002 to assess the conditions of the overall defence production, developments related to the defence industrial and technology base, and some other questions. While 10 out of 25 DPC member companies said that because the level of dependency on military contracts was small, the developments in

1 *Bouei Handobukku Heisei 19-han/ Hand book for Defence 2007* (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 2007), 334. Note that these data do not include the Japan Coast Guard budget which rose from 122 billion yen in 1988 to 198 billion yen in 2007, and the pensions to surviving families and ex-service personnel which declined from 1,6 trillion yen in 1988 to 840 billion yen in 2007. (The budget figures on the JCG and the pensions were extracted from: Hughes, “Japan’s Remilitarisation,” 149-150.) Also note that the slight rise in the defence budget figures in the 1990s, notwithstanding the economic downturn, is the result of the system of “deferred payments” according to which the payments for major procurements are “rolled over” to future years, often to the final years of the order.

2 *Bouei Handobukku Heisei 19-han*, 338.

3 *Wagakuni bouei seisan/ gijutsu kiban-ni kansuru chousa houkoku [Research Report on the Defence Production and Technology Base in Japan]*, Bulletin No. 265 (Tokyo: Keidanren, DPC, 2002).

defence production as seen in the US and Europe were unlikely in Japan; 23 companies confirmed that in the case of worsening incomes they deemed consolidations with the defence sections of domestic companies possible; and 17 companies were already strengthening their cooperation and partnerships with foreign firms.¹

Another fact to bear in mind is that Japan's commitment to ballistic missile defence is estimated to be between 800 billion and one trillion yen through 2012 and may rise further as Japan pursues more advanced options.² Table 3 shows that the country's annual defence budget has been around five trillion yen for more than a decade now. If we subtract from this sum the personnel and provisions cost (almost one half of total), past liability expenditures (one third), and base expenses including "host nation" support for US bases in Japan, we can observe that the average yearly outlays for BMD of around 140 billion yen³ occupy what even researchers in conservative, government-affiliated think-tanks describe as a "huge proportion" of procurement expenses in the defence budget.⁴

In light of the above, because it would make military production cheaper, it seems fairly rational for Japan to pursue closer military industrial cooperation with the US, with BMD as an implementation tool of such a consolidation. A similar argument in support of the country's rationality in getting integrated into the US's global power projection system can be made on the presumption that an alliance with the strongest power in the uncertain regional security environment of East Asia is Japan's best option.

Without proposing any new evidence and with reference only to what was discussed earlier in the thesis, I can make two counterarguments to the story of BMD as an account of Japan's military and military-industrial consolidation with the US. One is that the drive for *kokusanka*, or the indigenisation, of weapons production, which has characterised Japan's

1 Ibid., 10.

2 Takahashi, "Emerging Missile Defence Issues," 5.

3 The exact published figures for BMD deployment are: 106,8 billion yen (2004), 119,8 billion yen (2005), 139,9 billion yen (2006), 182,6 billion yen (2007) plus for future BMD R&D 21,7 billion yen. Source: *Bouei Handobukku Heisei 19-han/ Hand book for Defence 2007*, 161-162.

4 Takahashi, "Emerging Missile Defence Issues," 5.

post-World War II policymaking, has not abated with BMD. The evidence is the country's push for licence production of PAC-3 and SM-3s,¹ as well as, more importantly, the enhancement of ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities through indigenous development and production of the spy satellites, notwithstanding the fact that their first generation is inferior to the US satellites. Regarding the hypothesis of Japan becoming integrated into the US's global power projection system through BMD, it is falsified by the hedging strategy evident in, for example, the country's adherence to its self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right to collective defence. A situation, in which an enemy missile from East Asia is on a course towards the US, flying over Japan, but is not intercepted by Japan because of this ban, is not entirely compatible with the purported condition of being incorporated into the US's global military projection system.

What these and other counterarguments point to is the difficulty of estimating the degree of US-Japan military and military-industrial consolidation and/ or its irreversibility. In the next section, I shall investigate the relationship between BMD, the RMA, and RMA-related issues, which will bring into sharper focus the perceived difficulty of establishing what BMD really means for the direction of Japan's foreign and security policy. However, what if this perceived difficulty is not entirely explained by the limitations of the evidence at a researcher's disposal? The evidence on the influence of BMD on Japan-US relations reviewed above is fairly strong. But could BMD-related evidence be marshalled into a story where BMD serves to bolster Japan's capacity for a more independent/ pro-active security policy? The next section will attempt to make such an argument.

The idea that BMD helps to modernise Japan's military to enhance the country's capacity to deal with some aspects of its regional security environment is important for the argument of this thesis. It is, however, equally important to recognise that it is in the nature of the hedging policy, outlined in Chapter One, to be reasonably ambiguous about one's

1 Sieff, "BMD Focus: Japan's Passion for BMD," *UPI*, March 24, 2006.

military build-up and intentions, to send appropriate, often different signals to different audiences. BMD helps to do exactly that, as will be elaborated later in this section and in the following chapters.

5.2. BMD as a tool of “revolutionising military affairs.”

The current RMA in the US has its origins in the late 1970s. At the time, there was the Warsaw Pact’s Europe-based numerical advantage in conventional military power indicators, such as tanks, artillery, manpower.¹ The US, in addition to strengthening its nuclear capabilities, decided to compensate for their quantitative inferiority by introducing high technology military systems which could deliver precision strikes through improved intelligence and reconnaissance systems.² These and related IT-driven developments led in the early 1990s to their conceptualisation as “revolution in military affairs.” A standard definition of the RMA, which is often referred to as a starting point of discussing the recent RMA, was formulated in 1993 by Andrew Marshall, the then-Director of the Office of Net Assessments of the US Department of Defence and one of the leading proponents of the RMA in the US,³ according to whom

a Revolution in Military Affairs is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.⁴

Even though the above definition is fairly dated, it has not lost its relevance because of its reference to a complex of technological, doctrinal, operational, and organisational warfare innovations, the purpose of which is quick victory through information dominance on the battlefield.

1 Dima Adamsky, *The Culture of Military Innovation: the Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel* (Stanford, 2010), 59.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 65-69, 69-74.

4 Quotation from the Information Warfare Site, accessed July 6, 2009, <http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/>.

Such an RMA demonstrated some of its first tangible results in the Gulf War of 1991 when GPS, radar, laser, and other guidance systems enabled the US to bomb targets with more accuracy and lethality than previously possible.¹ Other American-led wars, including the Afghan War and the Second Iraq War (“Operation Iraqi Freedom”), offered opportunities for US forces to deliver military results by utilising the C4ISR system which stands for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and implies an information grid linking Special Forces during their missions.²

C4ISR, C2BMC (command, control, battle management, and communications) are part of the RMA jargon, and constitute the core of network-centric warfare (NCW). NCW refers to a complex of strategies, tactics, techniques, procedures, and organisations “that a fully or even partially networked force can employ to create a decisive warfighting advantage.”³ It is in light of the C4ISR, C2BMC architectures, and network-centric warfare that BMD can be better appreciated. C4ISR and C2BMC require space-based assets (eg, reconnaissance and communication satellites) in order to function. On the other hand, secure control of space can be challenged by a strike from the ground. This possibility, in turn, can be minimised by a global missile defence system. Such reasoning allowed Joellen Pretorius to speak of a “US strategic triad” of the RMA, BMD, and space weapons.⁴ Additionally, it is not only the US and Japan’s war waging capacity but also their economies that are dependent on space assets. Republican Terry Everett, ranking member of the strategic forces subcommittee, has put it more emphatically (and colourfully), “...if an enemy destroyed satellites used by major credit card companies, and satellites used by Federal Reserve, that could stop commercial transactions and bring the largest economy on the planet to its

1 Pretorius, “Revolution in Military Affairs,” 79.

2 Ibid., 80.

3 Office of Force Transformation, Pentagon, *The Implementation of NCW*, 2005, 3. Pentagon’s report used the original quote from: John Garstka, “NCW Offers Warfighting Advantage,” *Signal*, May 2003, 58.

4 Pretorius, “Revolution in Military Affairs,” 72.

knees.”¹

Japan ostensibly rationalises its build-up of C2BMC, C4ISR, under which BMD is supposed to work, as a measure of national defence against enemy missiles fired from North Korea. The US motivates its BMD deployment by referring to the threats from North Korea, Iran, and other “rogue” states and terrorist groups. Chinese missiles are less often referred to explicitly as a threat, especially, in Japan and, even then, normally only in the context of discussions of future Taiwan crisis scenarios. While the January 11, 2007 anti-satellite test, which China carried out under the guise of shooting down an old weather satellite, provoked negative reactions from the US, Japan and elsewhere, references to BMD were, to the best of my knowledge, rarely made in Japan, and BMD was furthermore not officially ascribed any value in addressing this emerging threat. But the value is undeniable, as Joan Johnson-Freese argued:

A missile that can target another missile in flight (missile defence) can also target orbiting satellites. ... From a technical perspective, it is not difficult to conceive of a missile defence system as an offensive antisatellite (ASAT) weapon.²

To make this statement less abstract, just one small illustration of “how a defensive BMD could be relatively easily reconfigured into an offensive ASAT weapon”³ should suffice. In early 2008, the US, likely in response to China's ASAT test a year earlier, used a temporarily modified SM-3 IA in a successful intercept of its failing intelligence satellite.⁴ The SM-3 IA of the currently deployed BMD and the SM-3 IIA, which is being co-developed by the US and Japan, are a technology to which Japan “has access along with the underlying software and processes it has developed and can duplicate for further such ASAT missions [against satellites and other projectiles] in the future.”⁵ No official statement or

1 David Ahearn, “Hunter: US Needs BMD to Protect Military, Financial Space Assets,” *Defence Daily*, February 1, 2007.

2 Johnson-Freese, *Space as a Strategic Asset*, 7.

3 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 159.

4 *Ibid.*, 159, 171, 193.

5 *Ibid.*, 193. See also Amy Butler, David Fulghum and Craig Covault, “Missile Fallout; US Insists SM-3 Is Geared for Missile Defence, Not ASAT,” *AWST*, March 3, 2008.

even a hint should, of course, be expected from the official Japan on something like that. (Constructivism and cognate approaches are well equipped for approaching such issues, as was shown in Chapter Two.) Concluding the above observations about BMD, I think the system is, in part, an example of the US and, by extension, Japan employing the strategy of “openly repairing gallery roads while sneaking through the passage of Chencang”¹ which in a poetic form describes the use of typical/ predictable means to cover up unusual/ less obvious/ publicly less attractive actions. In other words, it seems reasonable to assume that by “selling” BMD as a “normal” way of countering the North Korean or other state/ non-state missile threat, the US and Japan are, in fact, trying to achieve space warfare superiority, of which BMD and its next generation editions are important components, as was noted above.

Before turning to a discussion of how justified, beyond the above example, it is to refer to Japan as pursuing similar objectives “by extension,” and what Japan’s RMA is about, I would like to dwell briefly on the broader international context of the RMA by exploring China’s RMA and repeating some of the conclusions from the previous chapter, as this should give clues about the content of Japan’s related policies. China’s security strategy requires maintenance of three types of forces – flexible elite forces for regional contingencies, large forces for internal security and conventional defence, and strategic nuclear forces for deterrence.² The country’s RMA is thus logically part of preparations for regional contingencies. The doctrine underlying such military modernisation is called “strategic attack.”³ In a way not dissimilar to Russia, China’s RMA is based on the concept of “asymmetric warfare” which emphasises the importance of pre-emptively disabling the enemy’s C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,

1 It is one of The Thirty-Six Stratagems, a collection of ancient Chinese proverbs which can be applied to any sphere of life, but is more suitably applied in the fields of politics, diplomacy, war, and espionage.

2 Woondo Choi, “RMA and Strategic Intelligence: The case of China and Japan,” *Global Economic Review* 33, no. 1 (2004): 55.

3 Ibid.

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) nodes and C2 (command and control) platforms, space-based or otherwise, in order to compensate for the technological backwardness of its main forces which are likely to remain pre-RMA.¹

As is suggested above, in both the US and China the RMAs and national security doctrines imply each other. How does Japan conceptualise its own RMA within its broader security strategy, given its regional security environment? How does Japan implement such an RMA? And why can BMD be considered a suitable tool in realising the RMA in Japan?

BMD and Japan's "revolution in military affairs"

It is difficult to imagine that such crucial military developments in the US, China and elsewhere could have gone unnoticed in Japan. It was, however, only in 2000 that the Research Office of the JDA Defence Policy Section published a report "On the Information-RMA" which was compiled on the basis of the Research Office's "fundamental" investigation of the RMA conducted in 1999-2000.² This 27-page document consists of two parts which deal with the RMA's concept in the US, the nature of future warfare as altered by the RMA, and with the JDA and SDF's thinking on the RMA for Japan's needs.

As is clear from the report's title, Japan conceives of the RMA as "information-RMA" stimulated by the general IT-revolution in the economy and society. The predicate "information" can be easily dropped as it does not in any way distinguish Japan's RMA from any other country's current RMA. While explaining the importance of their research, the report authors reiterated the supremacy of an info-RMA type of military vis-à-vis conventional, terrorist, and guerrilla forces. They emphasised the RMA's potential in minimising Japanese casualties in the case of a war, especially if the fighting takes place on Japanese soil. The researchers further noted that the country's superior IT-industrial base

1 Ibid., 55-57.

2 JDA, *Jouhou-RMA-ni tsuite [On the Information-RMA]* (Tokyo: JDA Defence Policy Section, 2000).

should help to effectively promote the RMA; they also underlined the need for Japan to move forward with the RMA debates as part of the alliance management with the US.¹

The report then presented six factors specific to Japan's environment which had to be considered in the country's RMA.² Firstly, by noting that the US RMA is premised upon the forward deployment and power projection strategy, the report distinguished it from Japan's proclaimed passive, exclusively defence-oriented security strategy, according to which the country can resort to its defence capabilities only after receiving a military attack. This implies that fighting on Japanese soil is not unimaginable which, unlike in the US case, necessitates more rigorous measures for protection of the domestic information infrastructure. Secondly, as a US ally, Japan should promote the RMA as a tool of maintaining/ strengthening forces interoperability.

Thirdly, the report stressed the need to maintain a level of preparedness to counter an attack by pre-RMA forces as the possibility of an asymmetric war against an enemy using WMDs or against terrorist and guerrilla groups could not be ruled out. The fourth factor to be considered was the multiplicity of roles the SDF were expected to play worldwide, especially humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. The fifth concern was related to the progressing informatisation of the society which required contingency planning for situations where the public information infrastructure was subjected to a cyber-attack. Lastly, the RMA's implementation will take place in tight fiscal conditions requiring measures of streamlining defence equipment and organisation.

On the basis of the above considerations the report outlined seven prescriptive principles of Japan's RMA.³ The first was informatisation, or maintenance and use of networked information. The idea behind it was to improve battlefield awareness and combat capability by effectively utilising the function of C4ISR shared by all uniformed services.

1 Ibid., 13-14.

2 Ibid., 14-15.

3 Ibid., 16-20.

Because of Japan's passive defence posture, an early warning system became essential.

Furthermore, a variety of sensors should be developed and deployed with the aim of early enemy detection and of distinguishing one's own troops from hostile forces in closer combat situations.

The second principle was referred to as integrated defence capability which described such a tactical, organisational, and equipment level coordination between the three SDF branches that they could effectively and jointly perform their missions. With the third point the report authors called for establishing a swift decisionmaking cycle which would be capable of responding to a rapidly changing battlefield environment. For this end, artificial intelligence nodes were to be used in the development of decisionmaking support systems; additionally, in order to compress the time needed for the manoeuvres in response to an attack, maintenance of high troops' mobility was desired.

The fourth principle aimed at increasing combat efficiency of troop units by making use of precision-guided munitions and improved battle management capability based on advanced information systems. From the perspective of war waged on Japanese soil, to minimise damage to the civilian infrastructure in a contingency, organisational and tactical arrangements necessary for an effective use of precision-guided munitions had to be made. The fifth principle was about maintaining flexible, needs-responsive units. The underlying logic was that, in order to accurately respond to a rapidly changing, RMA-modified battlefield situation with a multiplicity of required military functions, it was necessary to create, as far as possible, standardised and versatile manpower and equipment units which can be quickly and flexibly reconfigured at a needed level into a force of a required functionality corresponding with the contents of their mission.

The sixth guideline for the RMA implementation in Japan that the report authors proposed was the acquisition of anti-cruise- and anti-ballistic missile capability with which it

should be possible to strengthen the network security and prevent the disabling of or damage to the information systems. The information networks' multi-layeredness and invulnerability had to be maintained in such a way so that even in the case of damage the discharging of missions was not interrupted. Japan's idiosyncratic, exclusively defence-oriented security policy also necessitated stronger protection for sensors in order to achieve the country's survivability. The seventh principle prescribed for the RMA in Japan was forces' interoperability with the country's allies. The motivation behind it was the indispensability of achieving real-time information sharing through networks which would enable swift bilateral US-Japan operations in the battlefield. In cases of the country's participation in the UN-led peacekeeping operations, an elaboration of the provisions for information sharing with the non-US troops was recommended.

The most significant point relevant for my research that this document on Japan's RMA, published in 2000 by the JDA, did was making explicit reference to BMD as a key component of the country's current IT-centred military modernisation. A key purpose of BMD, as this government publication made clear, was, as in the US, to protect the information infrastructure, space-based or otherwise, which was the core of the country's economic life and security policy. This is to say that missile defence can be thought of as a tool of achieving medium- and longer-term security within the network-centric and space warfare paradigm. Indeed, a strong argument has been made in the literature that BMD is "just another stage in Japan's space militarisation trend."¹

An awareness of such potential of BMD is evident also in some other studies done by government-related think-tanks. For example, the 2006 report on missile defence by the Japan Institute for International Affairs emphasised the importance of establishing an advanced C2BMC architecture and reiterated the same type of argumentation found in the

1 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 194.

JDA's document.¹ Importantly, I can also find no evidence which would falsify a statement about Japan procuring BMD as a tool of its RMA and as a measure of defence for its civilian and military space assets, while there is plenty of evidence in support of a judgment that Japan is moving in this direction.

Japan long ago traversed space support [ie, the ability to get to and manoeuvre in space with functioning launch vehicles and spacecraft], is now deeply engaged in space force enhancement [ie, the ability to increase the combat and success potential of a combat force], and may well have discrete elements of both space control [ie, the ability to reap advantages of space assets while others cannot through surveillance, protection, prevention, and negation] and space force application [ie, the ability to overtly engage in space weaponisation] well under way.²

This evidence includes, *inter alia*, the facts of 2003 and 2006/ 2007 launches of domestically developed and produced optical and radar spy satellites (IGS) at a cost of “nearly” the entire annual space budget of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency JAXA;³ additionally, by 2022, some in Japan have called for at least 16-20 further satellites,⁴ and it is these next-generation satellites that are expected to be “key” in terms of the country's real qualitative improvement of security capabilities.⁵ With these satellites and their planned upgrades Japan has arguably acquired its own military image intelligence. From the military perspective, one and the same security concern has motivated Japan and other countries to acquire space surveillance capability: “Perhaps most importantly to Japan... utilisation of the IGS system assures that none outside the government will know what they are looking at.”⁶ This trend has been further fortified by the passage of the Basic Space Law in May 2008 which provided a legal framework for national security-related space activities in Japan, thus eliminating some of the ambiguity which existed in this area after the 1969 Diet resolution

1 Kazumasa Kobayashi, “Nihon-no C2BMC-ni tsuite [On Japan's C2BMC],” in *Misairu Bouei [Missile Defence]* (Tokyo: JIIA, 2006), 45-60.

2 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 2-3, 243-244.

3 Eiichiro Sekigawa, “Recce Recovery,” *AWST*, February 7, 2005.

4 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 138.

5 Johnson-Freese and Gatling, “Security Implications of Japan's Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) System,” *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 3 (2004): 550.

6 Johnson-Freese and Gatling, “Security Implications,” 546. Furthermore, industry experts observed that “the specific details of the IGS programme remain shrouded in secrecy” and are not even registered with the UN. See Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 138.

on the peaceful use of space. To be precise, the Basic Space Law changed the country's space-use policy from strictly non-military to simply non-aggressive.¹

In the area of space exploration, including civilian IT-use, and space militarisation, which could be considered as trends of one process, with the militarisation, arguably, becoming the dominant trend from the early 2000s, Japan has made a lot of specific progress in addition to the IGS. Just to cite one example of developing ultra-precise navigation technologies which, as is the case with the US GPS, facilitate many diverse areas of public life, but also help “American bombers dropping precision-guided munitions on Iraq.”² Japan has started making “constructive steps” aimed at building its own regionally operational GPS system called QZSS (Quasi-Zenith Satellite System).³ Some concluded that the commercial case for QZSS was “somewhat suspect;” and Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu argued that QZSS may well be important and even “necessary” for enhancing Japan's national security because “it could use that information not only to move troops, but also to target forces and munitions.”⁴

Such developments in the space exploration/ militarisation were complemented by new acquisitions of airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) which provide surveillance, command & control, and communications irrespective of weather conditions. The E-2C Hawkeye, in service since 1983, was supplemented in 1998 by four new Boeing 767-200 AWACS, the radar of which has a range of more than 375.5 km for low-flying targets and farther for aerospace vehicles at higher altitudes.⁵ Acquiring mid-air refuelling capability from 2000, outlined in the 1996-2000 Midterm Defence Build-up Plan, can be interpreted as a measure of enhancing such airborne ISR (information, surveillance, reconnaissance) assets. The 2004 National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) can be

1 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 245.

2 Johnson-Freese, *Space as a Strategic Asset*, 1.

3 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 134, 201.

4 *Ibid.*, 134, 201, 38.

5 Choi, “RMA,” 63.

read as a document further pushing Japan along the path toward the RMA by prescribing a “multifunctional, flexible and effective” defence force deployable for both national territory defence and international operations.¹ We have noticed the same “multifunctionality, flexibility, effectiveness” requirements in the JDA report on the RMA earlier in this section. Another thing the NDPG did was, of course, urging the introduction of BMD.

What these pieces of evidence on the ISR capability and the defence posture reformulation point to is that Japan is firmly on its way toward bringing its military forces doctrinally, organisationally, and in terms of equipment to the RMA standards which the country defines in ways similar to the US. The key role of BMD, considered from the perspective of the RMA, is in protecting the country’s information flows through space-based infrastructure which is the heart of the nation’s economic life.² “...in line with the Revolution in Military Affairs... the SDF no doubt recognises that its advantage over regional rivals... is bound to come in the technological and qualitative enhancements in space-based resources.”³ In this BMD-RMA nexus, BMD can be considered as a tool for enhancing the country’s capacity for an independent and pro-active foreign and security policy. This is not to say, that BMD cannot be considered a tool for other ends. As discussed in the first section, some evidence on BMD could be interpreted to mean that BMD is tying Japan further to the US strategy, making Japan more dependent. It is argued here that such is the nature of BMD and Japan's hedging strategy that it allows and even supports such ambiguity, while permitting the country to prepare through military modernisation for a more pessimistic scenario of international relations in East Asia.⁴

1 See the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the occasion of the approval of the 2004 NDPG on December 10, 2004: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2004/1210statement_e.html.

2 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 131, 134.

3 *Ibid.*, 8.

4 The idea that “closer defence cooperation” with the US creates “a broader range of choice for Japan” is, of course, nothing new. See, for example, Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms*, 151-52. At the same time, the idea can hardly be found in the literature on BMD and is, thus, fairly novel.

5.3. Japan's overall security posture and BMD.

In order to appreciate how BMD formally fits into Japan's official security strategy it makes sense to first briefly review the core of the National Defence Programme Outlines (which are since 2004 called Guidelines in official English translations), a document which captured the changes in the evolution of the country's defence organisation and force structure, as well as the underlying security principles.¹ The first NDPO of 1976 emphasised the "minimum necessary defence capability," the importance of which stemmed from the country's reliance on deterrence as a measure of protection against an aggression. An attack on the archipelago itself was rightly deemed unlikely in the conditions of the Cold War, so preparations for a full-scale invasion of the islands were not a priority even if the anti-tank, anti-submarine, and anti-air warfare equipment and personnel had not been subjected to downsizing until the 2004 NDPG. The 1995 revision of the Outline did not introduce any substantial changes to the basic defence concept although it already featured the triad of military forces' characteristics central to the 2004 Guidelines: "multifunctionality, flexibility, and effectiveness."

The 2004 Guidelines spelled out two objectives for the country's defence policy: "to prevent direct threats to Japan" and "to improve the international security environment." As a means of achieving these objectives, an "appropriate combination" of the following three approaches was postulated: the country's own efforts, cooperation with the allies, and the international community. Regarding the allies, the Guidelines pointed to the US-Japan security arrangements as indispensable for the security of Japan and, more broadly, the Asia-Pacific region.

The focus of the 2004 concept of defence capabilities shifted from the previous "deterrent effect-oriented" to "response capability-oriented." This was, essentially, a

1 My understanding of NDPO and the quotations used in the following paragraphs dealing with NDPO/G are extracted from JDA, Defence of Japan 2005 (Annual White Paper) (Tokyo: JDA, 2005), 19-25, Japan MOD website, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2005/2.pdf.

reference to the defence forces' roles which were defined as "effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies," "pro-active efforts to improve the international security environment," and "preparation to deal with full-scale invasion," the possibility of which was still "expected to remain modest." The Guidelines listed four measures aimed at enabling the forces to perform the above roles: "to enhance joint operation capabilities," "to strengthen intelligence capabilities," "to incorporate the progress in science and technology into our defence forces," and "to utilise human resources more efficiently."

The document, which was meant to elaborate the exact plans of equipment procurement and uniformed services "rationalisation" in order to materialise the defence concept outlined in the Guidelines, was the Mid-Term Defence Build-Up Plan (FY 2005-2009) adopted on the same day as the NDPG, on December 10, 2004.¹ It contained concrete measures of streamlining the military force units and downsizing some procurement items, such as battle tanks and main artillery equipment. Some military-related procurement was not mentioned in the plan, namely the work on the new spy satellites ("information-gathering satellites"). All this evidence can be construed as logically deriving from the NDPG.

Such is, perhaps, the general and inclusive nature of the Outlines/ Guidelines that if one looks for corroborative evidence of how certain equipment items fit into the "defence concept" one is very likely to find it. The same, as it can be argued using the verificatory approach, applies to consistency of BMD with the NDPO/ NDPG. The command and control, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructures which are upgraded in the BMD procurement process should help both Japan's ability to address regional contingencies and to jointly perform expeditionary missions abroad with its allies.

However, to answer a more interesting question about if there are any ways, in which BMD unequivocally damages the country's overall defence capacity beyond the hypothetical

1 Mid-Term Defence Programme (FY 2005-2009), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/pdf/mid-term_defense_program.pdf.

point suggested in the central concern of the dissertation, I would need an independent and scrupulous analysis of the BMD's current- and next-generation true capabilities which can probably be only obtained after the system's engagement in actual combat not moderated by Japan or the US. An attempt at falsifying the hypothesis of BMD having a positive effect on Japan's military capability is also complicated by the fact the military budget is not an exact reflection of the country's military build-up as, for example, the case of the modernisation of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) demonstrates. It can be noted that the BMD-related expenditures even in April 2009 have produced a rather dubious combat value as evidenced by the "computer errors" when detecting North Korean missiles.¹ Yet BMD occupies a significant portion of the country's procurement budget. At the same time, a look at such a division of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism as the JCG reveals that this sea paramilitary force has become a "de facto fourth branch of the Japanese military,"² serving the country's objective of developing a capability for defending vital sea lanes while being independent from the military budget. Hughes noted in his 2009 Adelphi book a curious fact that the JCG's Shikishima-class PLH (patrol large helicopter) vessel displaces approximately 6,500 tonnes and is larger than the MSDF Kongo-class BMD Aegis destroyers.³

With this exposition on the JCG, I wanted to emphasise that it is close to impossible to determine if and how BMD does any harm to Japan's overall security. There is, however, plenty of evidence which can be marshalled into a story of Japan benefiting from missile defence procurement, especially through the RMA implementation and related aspects of space security. Some conjectures about the damaging impact of BMD on the country's security can be made in terms of the system's stimulating effect on the WMDs' proliferation

1 Jun Hongo, "Two False Alarms Leave Japan Egg-faced," *TJT*, April 5, 2009; Tetsuya Harada, "Can SDF Become Real Tiger? Missile Launch Response Errors Raise Questions about Capabilities," *TDY*, April 10, 2009.

2 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 77.

3 Hughes, "Japan's Remilitarisation," 50.

in East Asia and worldwide (“for a stronger shield there will always be a sharper sword”). But it can be not unreasonably, but still quite conjecturally argued that even though missile defence is more difficult and expensive to build than offensive weapons, the efforts of some potential adversaries to build WMDs and means of their delivery may be thwarted because these adversaries may not have enough resources to keep up with the future improvements in BMD technology and performance.

Concluding remarks

On balance, how does BMD relate to the country's formal, overall security framework? – BMD fits into the overall framework, as described in the National Defence Programme Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defence Build-Up Plan, quite well because such a framework is designed to be fairly inclusive. Is there any way in which BMD helps the country's security, but it is not frequently explicitly stated in public debates? – BMD's connection to the RMA and space, including space warfare, superiority is one such example. Are there any ways in which BMD damages Japan's capacity to conduct foreign and security policy? – This is difficult to judge, but it is more likely that the country's security was enhanced rather than weakened. This can be considered as true from the perspective of BMD linking the issues of maintaining the US-Japan alliance, of aiming to establish advantages for Japan's military space power, and keeping a range of security policy options for the future. How the uncertainty over Japan's regional security environment, especially China's rise, conditioned these issues and favoured BMD was analysed in the previous chapter.

This chapter sought to demonstrate that elements and processes of the procurement of BMD can be rationally interpreted as indicating both Japan's further military and military-industrial consolidation with the US and Japan's increasing capacity for a security policy less dependent on the US. What has been missing to a large extent from the investigation so far

are the voices of Japanese actors involved with the procurement of BMD. To explain the central research question, which is inside the range of BMD's potentialities, an investigation of the domestic element of neoclassical realism will be attempted in Parts II and III (Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight).

PART II. WHO MATTERED IN THE PROCUREMENT OF BMD?

CHAPTER 6. GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES AND BMD.

The chapter consists of five sections. The structure of the chapter is such that before refocusing my analysis in the fifth section on if and how the government organisations might have produced the situation captured in the core concern of the thesis, I shall proceed through four steps of a broader analysis of the evidence, guided by the questions if and how the capacities and practices of government organisations have contributed to the overall decisionmaking background of the procurement. In this analysis, I shall explore the organisational interests, the organisations' vulnerability to US pressure (or, in other words, whether there was a realistic option of not following the US lead on BMD), their susceptibility to the pressures from the private sector, and their positions on BMD's adequacy to the task of countering the WMDs' and ballistic missile technology proliferation. These four sections will be written as a discussion of four hypotheses, in which each of these aspects is invoked.

The analysis of the evidence from the perspective of BMD as organisational output in this chapter will offer the following conclusions.¹

Firstly, it will be contended that the JDA/ MOD, MITI/ METI, and MOFA had various direct and indirect interests in BMD – both on the level of ministries and their subunits, and in terms of funding increases/ decreases and prestige gains/ losses. However, on the basis of the evidence reviewed, these organisations did not seem to have internally consistent, consensual interests in BMD.

Secondly, it will be maintained that any organisational options unsupportive of BMD and the US, probably, did not have a chance.

Thirdly, a number of mechanisms/ channels which made government organisations susceptible to some forms of pressure by the industries will be identified.

¹ The analysis will draw on Allison and Zelikow's organisational behaviour paradigm and its underlying ideas discussed in Chapter Three. For a summary, see Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 164-183.

Fourthly, some evidence will be presented to support the hypothesis that it is because organisations perceived BMD as the best countermeasure for ballistic missiles and missile technology proliferation that Japan procured BMD.

Fifthly, evidence will be provided in support of the view that MOFA can be said to be more concerned with maintaining the alliance and the JDA with modernising the country's military infrastructure. At the same time, no documentary evidence was uncovered on the basis of which tension between the two ministries over BMD and BMD-related issues could be established. An interpretation of this observation will be offered, according to which a closer integration with the US and the strengthening of the national military capacity for a more independent security policy are two processes that BMD allows to run parallel to each other.

6.1. BMD and the interests of government organisations.

Hypothesis: BMD was procured because it was in the interests of organisations involved in the decisionmaking.

Which government organisations could have benefited in terms of increased prestige and/ or funding from the positive decisions on BMD research and deployment and BMD-related activities? All major ministries/ agencies and many of their subunits had a say on BMD. The following government organisations and some of their divisions can be said to have been involved in the decisionmaking on missile defence – the JDA/ MOD, MITI/ METI, and MOFA.

One winner among these government bodies was the JDA/ MOD. What evidence is available to support this claim? The best evidence is in the fact that the JDA was the principal agency charged with assessing missile defence from the military security

perspective¹ – this was an improvement over its past reputation as a “shopping ministry.”² However, the JDA’s opinion was not entirely consensual and there were sceptical voices from within the military establishment.³ For example, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council Tetsuya Nishimoto (GSDF) was quoted as saying in 1998 that “Right now there is no way of countering ballistic missiles. All you can do is give early warning and evacuate. Patriots hit less than one in a million.”⁴ Or, senior JDA officials were reported as saying that Japan's 1998 decision was premised more on the “importance of the US-Japan alliance than the actual feasibility of the project.”⁵

In some cases, that is, with the highest ranking and retired GSDF officials,⁶ the critical attitude towards BMD can be explained by the fact that the GSDF is the biggest loser in this situation as, apparently, all BMD infrastructure is managed by its rival services the MSDF and ASDF.⁷ Indeed, the MSDF was most enthusiastic about BMD as it meant additional Kongo-class destroyers and increased the chances of the MSDF becoming “the most important element of the Japanese military,”⁸ while the funding for it was expected to come at the expense of other services and through central government subsidies. As regards the ASDF, it is in charge of the lower tier of BMD, that is, PAC-3, and is interested in modernising its command and control infrastructure which is a precondition for a successful missile defence system.⁹

Can the JDA be considered as a winner of BMD procurement overall? – Quite likely

1 See “Agency to Develop Antimissile System,” *TDY*, December 31, 1993; Takehiro Fukuda, “Japan, US Agree to Explore Missile System; Tokyo Remains Concerned over Cost, Constitutionality,” *TNW*, October 4, 1993; Toshio Hiei, “Defence Agency Has Many Questions about NMD,” *TDY*, May 17, 2001.

2 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 55-56.

3 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 46.

4 Ibid. Note that the RAND Note authors used the wrong first name of General Nishimoto – they called him Tetsuji Nishimoto. The quote originally appeared in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 7, 1998.

5 Hughes, “Sino-Japanese Relations and Ballistic Missile Defence,” in *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Marie Soederberg (2002), 81. The original quote was in: *Asahi Shimbun*, August 15, 1999 and November 6, 1999.

6 Author's interviews October 5-8, 2008.

7 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 47.

8 Ibid., 49. Reference to the 2000 Stimson report on TMD in the Asia-Pacific.

9 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 48.

so as its opinions were part of the deliberations on BMD throughout the 1990s and beyond, formally starting with the Japan-US TMD Working Group in 1993 and the establishment of the Office of BMD Research in 1995. Apart from this rise in the JDA's prestige and status, the JDA is also a winner because the BMD decisions set in motion the RMA efforts of enhancing the uniformed services' BMC4I capabilities, of launching the first generation of the IGS and reforming the country's intelligence infrastructure. The IGS assets and data may not yet be directly relevant for MOD, but the IGS and the passage of the Basic Space Law have facilitated a discussion and acquisition of early-warning satellites – and for “early warning” to work, it had to be placed under MOD’s command thus further increasing MOD’s weight in security policymaking relative to MOFA. The same also applies to the Cabinet Office – the development and supervision of the early-warning satellites lies with MOD, not with the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Centre which oversees the IGS.¹ Could these space assets and infrastructure have been acquired without BMD? – It is difficult to say, but what is clear is that “a sophisticated early-warning system is imperative to an effective BMD response.”²

Can it be said that Japan procured BMD because of the JDA's organisational pressure? – Maybe, to some degree. Although, as we learnt from the literature, the JDA had always been concerned about its subordinated status in the bureaucracy and they routinely tried to improve on that by acquiring prestigious, state-of-the-art weapons, little evidence is available in support of the view that the JDA as a whole had a coherent view on BMD. To be sure, the JDA conducted a number of studies on TMD – most notably, a large-scale simulation research which, reportedly, concluded by 1997 that a combination of the upper tier (NTW) and lower tier (PAC-3) missile defence was the best option.³ However, the data

1 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 58.

2 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 207.

3 Taku Ishikawa, “Japan: Harmony by Accident?” *Contemporary Security Policy* 26, no. 3 (2005): 641; “Japan to Join US Missile Project,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 15, 1997; cf, “Japan Postpones Decision on Joining US Missile Plan,” *JEN*, August 9, 1997.

for that study were provided by the US, which led Taku Ishikawa to a conclusion that the JDA's choice of a two-tier system was "urged by the US,"¹ rather than internally generated. It is notable that while the opinions of military officers and analysts were divided over the appropriateness of BMD for Japan's defence needs, the JDA's Directors General and, later, the Ministers of Defence, who are political appointees, have been strong proponents of the system, becoming especially vocal in times of the North Korean nuclear and missile controversies. Their voices likely mattered in shaping the public debate on BMD and related issues. Where did they derive their preferences? – Probably, from within the "hawkish" wings of the LDP and similar elements of the JDA.

Another important actor in Japan's involvement with BMD was MITI/ METI. It would be natural to expect METI to be involved with BMD if its procurement had implications for the country's industrial development. The 2001 RAND Note concluded that "unlike the case with the joint US-Japan development of the FS-X (F-2) fighter and the effort to build Japanese surveillance satellites, no strong coalition of pro-BMD 'techno-nationalists' existed within the Japanese government at present."² However, even if there was no "coalition" for BMD *per se*, MITI has had a clear interest in advanced command and control systems (C3I, BMC4I etc.) since the 1990s, and in August 2000 established a Study Group on the Defence Technology Base which focused on two areas – the air platforms for the next-generation patrol and transport aircraft and also the C3I systems.³ But these C3I IT systems are the core of a BMD system that allows it to work as such. It is thus justified to state that the ministry had, at least, an indirect interest in BMD because of expected command and control improvements.

Another area, in which the ministry likely had an interest, was the contribution of BMD to rocket-making and, more broadly, space technology. The 1999 US-Japan MOU was

1 Ishikawa, "Japan: Harmony by Accident?" 641.

2 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 76.

3 *Ibid.*, 33.

about improving technologies of four missile components – sensor technology, kinetic energy warhead, second stage propulsion for the SM-3, and lightweight nose cone – which are “some of the very basic technologies to which Japan's experienced rocket makers could contribute and also learn from.”¹ Importantly, it can also be maintained that these updates and improvements may well reverberate into advances in other rocket programmes, such as the Advanced Solid Rocket (ASR) and other space launch vehicles.² Although, unsurprisingly, METI's 2006 document “Aerospace Industry Policy”³ did not mention BMD, it is highly unlikely that the above mentioned space technology improvements were not on METI's agenda.

One more area that must have made METI's voice important for the procurement of BMD was the ministry's role in the patent and industrial secrets regulation. Japan signed GSOMIA in 2007 and has been in the process of harmonising its domestic legislation with the new agreement since then. It was as part of these efforts that METI published in 2008 a report⁴ on what a “fair management” of technology information should be like.

Such efforts at creating a rigorous system of protecting military security and technology information, accelerated by the US-Japan collaboration on BMD, may have implications for the status of dual-use technologies in Japan which is something, with which METI is closely concerned. Chinworth's and Samuels's observations summarise the historical background of this situation well:

In essence, Japan's defence technology base and its commercial technology base are indistinguishable... As evidenced by the priority on developing dual-use technologies with multiple applications, Japan's technology policies are generated and implemented in a

1 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 191.

2 See *ibid.*, Chapter 6, 178-80. “With no commercial narrative for its development, the ASR/ Epsilon has been designed primarily to refine extant solid rocket technology to develop a cheap, reliable, accurate and responsive (quick and easy to launch) vehicle” (*ibid.*, 178).

3 *Keizai sangyoushou-no koukuuki sangyoushisaku-ni tsuite [On METI's Aerospace Industry Policy]* (Tokyo: METI, 2006), accessed April 16, 2009 through the website of the Ministry of Education, www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/gijyutu/gijyutu2/004/shiryo/06062211/009.pdf.

4 Japan METI, *Gijutsujouhoutou-no tekiseina kanri-no arikata-ni kan suru kenkyuukai. Houkokusho. [Report on What the Fair Management of Technology Information Should Be Like]* (Tokyo: METI, 2008), <http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20080728006/20080728006.html>.

manner that merges economic, security, and industrial policy considerations. As a result, the line between defence and civilian technologies is consciously blurred to ensure maximum utilisation of emerging applications and processes.¹

...technology readily travels between the military and civilian sectors of the economy.² Defence production became firmly embedded in the institutions of the commercial economy.³

It may well be that by acquiring a world leading position in many technology areas, some of the Japanese companies may no longer be benefiting from the existing patent legislation which makes no distinction between defence- and commercial-use technologies. It is not easy to imagine that the BMD procurement's catalysing effect on this issue could have been lost on METI.

The above is all evidence of an indirect interest in BMD on the part of the ministry. The question, however, is whether if MITI/ METI had such a strong interest in or was so averse to missile defence it would put pressure on the government to that effect. The best answer I can give is that in an environment of intensifying international competition over space exploration/ militarisation the ministry could not have ignored BMD's potential contribution to Japan's competitiveness or leadership in the area. METI's role in pushing for a positive decision on BMD and determining the course of procurement is impossible to ascertain on the basis of the evidence that I could find.

The third government body with stakes in BMD was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described once as "the most important government ministry in articulating security policy in Japan,"⁴ deriving its power in this area from its authority in alliance matters embodied in the past in the privileged position of the North American Affairs Bureau and the US-Japan Treaty Office within the ministry. RAND researchers described MOFA as the "central player"⁵ in the decisionmaking on BMD. MOFA's overall position on BMD has been

1 Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence*, 38-39.

2 "Reinventing Security: Japan since Meiji." *Daedalus* 120, no. 4 (1991): 56.

3 Samuels, *Rich Nation*, 322, 320-24.

4 Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence*, 12.

5 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 49.

poignantly expressed by one senior official paraphrased by RAND authors: “the ultimate success or failure of the system itself is secondary because if the system fails in the development phase, ‘the fact that Japan contributed will remain.’”¹ This prioritisation of the symbolism of Japan’s collaboration with the US over the specific security implications of BMD may be the routine attitude that dominated MOFA’s behaviour in the major procurements of the past.² However, MOFA, similar to other ministries and agencies, is not a monolith – it consists of a number of competing regional/ country and issue desks. In the case of BMD, the divisions likely concerned were the Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, North American and Treaty, and Arms Control/ Non-Proliferation.³

The China desk, probably, had a stronger moderating influence on the BMD decisionmaking until the September 1998 visit to Japan of Jiang Zemin when his inflexible and provocative position on the history interpretation issues between China and Japan made a conciliatory approach towards China a less popular option.⁴ This, I think, might have contributed to clearing the road to the 1998 decision on BMD co-research. The alliance managers got the upper hand on BMD within the ministry.⁵ Similarly, the disarmament section might have been opposed to BMD.⁶ However, the North Korean nuclear and missile activities may have contributed to weakening the critical attitude toward missile defence. Furthermore, we have MOFA’s Director General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs Yukiya Amano saying in 2003 that

...BMD can affect disarmament both positively and negatively. Theoretically, it has the potential for diminishing the role of offence by increasing that of defence, and Japan hopes that it would function in this way. On the other hand, BMD may disturb the disarmament process. Russia and China may strengthen their nuclear arsenals as a response to the US...⁷

1 Ibid., 51. Reference to the original quote in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 21, 1999.

2 Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defence*, 169.

3 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 49-51.

4 Green, *Reluctant Realism*, 96-98 and footnote 57.

5 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 50.

6 Ibid., 49.

7 Yukiya Amano, “A Japanese View on Nuclear Disarmament,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 9, no.1 (2002): 143.

On the basis of the above it is possible to conclude that the initially present critical voices within MOFA lost some of their salience as a result of changes in Japan's strategic position and the crisis environment enhanced by the media. Can it be said that MOFA was instrumental in bringing about the positive decisions on BMD research in 1998 and deployment in 2003? – Possibly, in part, but the efforts of BMD proponents within the ministry might have been less successful if they had not been able to capitalise on external events, especially the North Korean nuclear and missile crises, and if they had not had the support of various elites.

To conclude my discussion of the first hypothesis, I would like to state that the JDA/ MOD, MITI/ METI, and MOFA had various direct and indirect interests in BMD – both on the level of ministries and their subunits, and in terms of funding increases/ decreases and prestige gains/ losses. However, on the basis of the evidence reviewed above, all I can say about the interests of these organisations as drivers of the procurement of BMD is that these organisations did not seem to have internally consistent, consensual interests on the military aspects of BMD. It was, to some degree, external events such as Jiang Zemin's inflexible approach to Japan during his visit in 1998, North Korea's WMD experiments, and developments in the US that have helped to solidify the pro-BMD positions within these organisations.

6.2. The Government of Japan and the alternative of rejecting collaboration with the US on BMD.

Hypothesis: BMD was pursued because relevant organisations did not have options of responding to the US TMD collaboration offer other than acceptance.

A natural first step in reacting to this hypothesis is to look at the past of the US-Japan relations to ascertain if Japan had a history of rejecting the US invitations for collaboration

on weapons. The only previous offer, which fell short of full governmental approval in Japan and which has been documented, is, to the best of my knowledge, the SDI project announced in 1983 and “joined” by Japan through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 1987.¹ I put Japan’s action as “joining” in quotation marks because the subsequent Westpac Missile Defence Architecture Study was done on the Japanese side by defence contractors without the government’s formal involvement.² As regards other major procurements of the past, that is, aircraft, Japan would normally be led by its strategic and industrial policy considerations except for cases when bilateral trade became an issue. This was the case with the P3-C and FS-X, when Prime Ministerial intervention was necessary to break the interorganisational deadlock and resolve the matter – in the form of the P3-C purchase from Lockheed Martin and a compromise on the FS-X. We can thus conclude that Japan rarely, if ever, immediately and unconditionally surrendered to the US demands or offers if it was completely against the organisational definitions of Japan’s national interests, especially MITI’s aerospace industrial policy, and the interests of other actors.

What reasons could the Japanese government organisations have come up with to reject the US TMD collaboration offer in the 1990s? I can think of at least four such reasons:³ 1) Advanced components/ capabilities of BMD may lead to a breach of the constitutional provision prohibiting the exercise of the right to collective defence and the Diet resolution on the peaceful use of space. 2) Joint research on BMD may lead to a

1 Pierre Langereux, “Allied Star Wars Support Remains Spotty,” *Aerospace America*, February, 1986; “US, Japan Sign SDI Pact,” *Defence & Foreign Affairs*, September, 1987; “Japan, US Agree on SDI Participation,” *AWST*, July 27, 1987.

2 “Japan-US Consortium Applies to Join SDI Study,” *JEN*, August 1, 1988; “Japanese Armaments; Meet the New Arms Exporters,” *The Economist*, August 6, 1988; Hironobu Sakamoto, “Japanese Firms Win SDI Research Contracts,” *The Japan Economic Journal*, December 17, 1988; Takashi Oda, “With Missiles Here, There and Everywhere, Government Makes Plans for Nonnuclear Shield,” *TDY*, June 29, 1993; Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 90-91.

3 See, for example, Klintworth, “TMD Pluses Matched by Risks,” *TJT*, January 8, 1999. See also Komeito's Shigeki Sato's questions in the House of Representatives Security Committee on December 3, 1998, NDL website, database of National Diet Minutes, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/144/0250/main.html>; see the JCP's Mutsumi Sasaki's remarks about the huge cost of the future system and its potential impact on the regional arms race in the HRSC, November 18, 1999, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/146/0015/main.html>;

violation of the “arms export ban” guideline which may cause a domestic backlash. 3) Procuring a BMD system may exacerbate tensions in East Asia, especially, with China and Russia. 4) Given the contradictory views on BMD’s feasibility and performance, the system may not be able to neutralise the North Korean WMD threat. Organisations and their subunits representing these views were not strong enough in the face of external factors favouring a pro-BMD domestic consensus with related constitutional, regulatory, and strategic policy implications. The pro-BMD shift was further, arguably, aided by the forces at work in the realignment and reaffirmation of the alliance as the pillar of Japan’s security policy in the form of the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation and 2004 NDPG. In such an environment and given the incrementalism of how organisations generally function and change, it is not easy to imagine a central government organisation taking a lead in reversing these processes, of which BMD could be seen as an instance.

To resume my discussion of hypothesis two, I would like to conclude that the relevant organisations, possibly, could not have reacted to the US TMD collaboration offer other by accepting it given the strategic environment, in which the decision had to be made. The environment included North Korea-phobia, the inertia of some of the alliance reaffirmation processes, and the ever-present alliance maintenance concerns exemplified, in part, by the fact that President Clinton did not stop in Tokyo during his July 1998 visit to China.¹ Any organisational options unsupportive of BMD and the US in this environment, probably, had little chance. It is then, however, a question of if and how this situation was instrumentalised domestically to suit specific organisational and other interests.

1 Richard Lloyd Parry, “Tokyo Slighted as US Cosies up to Old Enemy,” *The Independent*, July 1, 1998; Nicholas Kristof, “Albright Hugs Wary Tokyo Smarting from Beijing Trip,” *TNYT*, July 5, 1998; Christopher B. Johnstone, “Japan’s China Policy: Implications for US-Japan Relations,” *Asian Survey* 38, no. 11 (1998): 1082; Robert Scalapino, “The United States and Asia in 1998: Summitry amid Crisis,” *Asian Survey* 39, no. 1 (1999): 5-7.

6.3. The susceptibility of government organisations to the business pressures and BMD.

Hypothesis: BMD was procured because government organisations were vulnerable to the pressures from the private sector.

The government ministries, through which the Japanese private sector could influence BMD, were MITI/ METI and the JDA/ MOD. The companies had some potential to do so as a result of *amakudari* practices or the practice of weapons assessments by firms. *Amakudari*, or “descent from heaven,” which was briefly mentioned in Chapter Three, implies “the reemployment of top-level bureaucrats in high-level positions in private and public corporations as well as their movement to national political office.”¹ The data on *amakudari* to the private sector are not scarce, but much attention in these data is devoted to MITI, MoF, and Construction rather than MOD.² Four publications with references to the JDA/ MOD can be cited here to illustrate some degree of intensity and depth of *amakudari* flows from the military establishment to private corporations (and to forms of public entities). One booklet from 1998 has one page dedicated to the staff flows between MITI, the JDA, and various private/ semi-private corporations.³ This page contains a table with twelve names of people who entered government work between 1942 and 1964 and at some point in their careers occupied the position of the head of the JDA’s Defence Equipment Division. Their *amakudari* positions were wide ranging – only two people held positions with defence contractors Sony and KHI, and one person was the Director General of the Defence Equipment Industry Association. The second publication is from 2001.⁴ Using the 1995 Directory of personnel in politics and the bureaucracy, published by *Toyo keizai shinposha*, the authors compiled a table in which there were 26 cases of *amakudari* and 5 cases of a

1 Richard Colignon and Chikako Usui, *Amakudari: the Hidden Fabric of Japan's Economy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2003), 2, 11-12, 20.

2 *Ibid.*, 20, 57-81.

3 *Kanryou amakudari mondai. Kenkyuu shiriizu 3. Tsuusan kanryou [The Issue of the Bureaucrats' Amakudari. Research Series 3 – MITI Bureaucracy]* (Tokyo, 1998).

4 Colignon and Usui, “The Resilience of Japan's Iron Triangle: Amakudari,” *Asian Survey* 41, no. 5 (2001).

variant of *amakudari* called *wataridori*¹ from the JDA (including the Defence Administrative Agency) onto the board of directors of companies in 1994.² By comparison, this table referred to 213 cases of *amakudari* from MoF (and 81 of *wataridori*), 180 cases from Ministry of Construction (and 58 of *wataridori*), 115 cases from MITI (and 53 of *wataridori*) and so on.³

The third and fourth publications are articles published by *Shimbun Akahata*, the newspaper of the JCP, in 2006 and 2007. In 2006, the newspaper reported the findings of the JCP Diet member in the House of Representatives Hidekatsu Yoshii who had analysed materials released by the JDA.⁴ The article alleged that it had uncovered a trend according to which the higher the intake of *amakudari* individuals in a defence-related company, the bigger the orders from the JDA for that company. The total number of *amakudari* individuals employed in 120 corporations was estimated to be 718, with MHI employing 39 people, KHI – 27, Melco – 40, Toshiba – 30, IHI – 19 and so on, as of October 2005.⁵ In 2007, an *Akahata* article also alleged that there was this correlation.⁶ The article claimed that 15 largest defence contractors, which received 70% of military contracts (by value), employed 475 *amakudari* people as of April 2006. However, with this second similarly brief article, the alleged correlation between the allocation of military contracts and *amakudari* became even less straightforward than it was in the 2006 article. For example, in 2006 it was reported that MHI employed 39 *amakudari* people and received 2,710 trillion yen in JDA contracts – in 2007, *Akahata* reported that the number of ex-JDA's *amakudari* employees in MHI increased

1 *Wataridori* (or 'migratory bird') refers to "serial retirements [of bureaucrats] in the public and/ or private sector." Colignon and Usui, *Amakudari*, 11.

2 Colignon and Usui, "The Resilience," 880.

3 *Ibid.*

4 "Amakudari ooi kigyuu juchuu mo zou; boueichou," [The Orders of Enterprises, Who Employ Many *Amakudari* Employees, Also Rise; Japan Defence Agency] *Shimbun Akahata*, April 12, 2006, http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik4/2006-04-12/2006041215_01_0.html.

5 *Ibid.*

6 "Boueishou amakudari 475 nin gunju joui 15 sha juchuu nanawari jimin-ni tagaku kenkin," [15 Biggest Companies Which Receive 70% of Military Orders and Make Large Contributions to the LDP Employ 475 JDA-*Amakudari* Individuals] *Shimbun Akahata*, October 28, 2007, http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik07/2007-10-28/2007102801_01_0.html.

to 62, but the value of its contracts remained almost unchanged at 2,776 trillion yen. Many other examples could be cited. KHI's *amakudari* employees rose from 27 to 49, but the value of its contracts decreased from 1,429 trillion yen to 1,306 trillion yen. The number of Melco's *amakudari* employees more than doubled from 40 to 98, but the value of contracts did not rise “correspondingly” – from 1,036 to 1,177 trillion yen. The alleged correlation is also not unproblematic for the data in the same year. For example, Hitachi in 2006 employed 59 *amakudari* individuals, that is, more than KHI, but the value of Hitachi's contracts was more than six times smaller than KHI's. The 2007 article also provided data on the political donations by corporations which went to the LDP, but the interpretation of the data was not unproblematic.

It is not the purpose of this thesis to add to this list of diverging estimates. Rather, it sufficed here to quote these four publications from three different sources to confirm the possibility of some degree of collusion between military bureaucrats, politicians, and industries and to maintain that *amakudari* was a channel through which military contractors could influence procurement decisions. It is up to the public prosecutors and judges to establish if the collusion was as strong as alleged by *Akahata* authors. By way of a small digression, it can be noted that reliable and detailed data on *amakudari* from the military establishment to the private sector are not easy to obtain, possibly, because of fears by people concerned that the national-security and business links will be exposed in a virulent environment of procurement scandals. This can be illustrated by an instance from the “spy story,” of which I was one of the protagonists, from Chapter Three. Among four Japanese industry-representatives from IHI, NEC, and Raytheon International, Inc., to whom I managed to talk at the RIPS-organised symposium on military-security information protection in October 2008, only one stated on his name card that he was a retired ASDF Major General and the Director of the Business Development Office of the Japan branch of

Raytheon. However, his former ASDF affiliation was only given in English – the Japanese reverse characteristically contained no such entry.

Another channel, through which the private sector could influence the government organisations, was the practice of defence contractors conducting studies assessing alternative weapon systems. This is a routine and rational part of any procurement process because the security establishment can devise numerous operational requirements and procurement plans, but the domestic industries must be actually able to produce and service such equipment. As regards weapons assessments relevant to BMD, industries led by MHI and its American counterparts conducted a Westpac Missile Defence Architecture study in 1989-1993. They did a simulation research with the North Korean No-dong-I data and concluded that in the case of a limited missile attack on Japan an anti-missile shield with Patriot interceptors only might have a failure rate of 46.6%; however, if enhanced by THAAD, the probability of interception failure would decrease to 33%.¹ To put it short, the Westpac study recommended a two-tier missile defence system – on December 19, 2003 the Security Council and the Cabinet formally announced the decision to introduce a two-tier BMD system. These early Westpac study findings probably played a role in promoting within the JDA the perception of BMD's feasibility and the desirability of BMD's two-layered structure because the Japanese government had no institutions for assessing weapons systems other than the industries and, admittedly, itself. This fact can be considered as increasing the vulnerability of the government to pressure from the industries with their developed information-producing infrastructure.

One more curious mechanism of how defence contractors could influence government organisations is the so-called “designated supplier” ties when certain companies have strong informal links to uniformed services. Historically, in the case of missiles, the

1 Takashi Kawakami and Ken Jimbo, “Dandou misairu bouei-to nichibei doumei” [BMD and US-Japan Alliance], in *Misairu bouei. Atarashii kokusai anzenhoshou-no kouzu* [Missile Defence. The Shape of New International Security], ed. Satoshi Morimoto (Tokyo: JIIA, 2002), 265.

GSDF deployed Hawks and Improved Hawks which was a Melco-Toshiba production effort – the ADSF deployed Nike-J licence produced by MHI. At the time of the Patriot’s introduction it was at MITI’s intervention that MHI was favoured over Melco, reportedly, to prevent Melco’s monopoly in missile defence production.¹ Subsequently, it was not the GSDF, that originally had good chances of fielding Patriots because they were deployed by the US Army – and the Japanese services normally follow the pattern of deploying weapons to the same military branches as in the US – but the ASDF that deployed the new interceptors. At an early stage of my research, I thought that although Chinworth did not go that far in his 1990 article, the reasons for the GSDF’s virtual exclusion from BMD might well, in part, be lying in that act of MITI’s industrial policy and MHI and the ASDF’s mutual support at the expense of the GSDF-Melco link in missile production. However, with all the evidence on the BMD-RMA nexus, Melco’s eventual success with the IGS project, and Japan’s strategic environment, I am more inclined to think that an application of the “designated supplier” hypothesis to explain the BMD decisions from the angle outlined in this paragraph would be far-fetched.

A related issue, though, is that the long-term involvement of industries in the research on air and missile defences, coupled with the prevalent R&D practice when industries were expected to do the necessary R&D investments themselves with the hope of getting these expenses defrayed at the contract allocation and production stage, produced a situation in which government organisations probably lost some of their autonomy in decisionmaking, especially in crisis situations. In crises, the government would be presented with ready solutions by the companies and, under time constraints and the pressure of public concerns over one or another threat, the government would opt for one of the projects developed by the industries. As was arguably the case with the IGS, it was the “painstakingly acquired civilian satellite technology base that already existed and that allowed Melco and Japan’s spy

1 Chinworth, “Industry and Government in Japanese Defence Procurement,” 208.

satellites programme to actually move forward.”¹ In connection with this, Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu emphasised that the close match between Melco's ideas about the IGS and the actual satellites revealed “the great degree to which the Japanese government's security policies are dependent on what the corporations can actually do.”²

To conclude my discussion of the hypothesis, can it be said that Japan became involved with BMD because the decisionmaking government organisations were vulnerable to the pressure from the industries? – I do not have the evidence to support a statement worded like that. At the same time, a number of mechanisms/ channels that made government organisations susceptible to some forms of pressure by the industries were identified.

6.4. BMD and the organisations' views on its utility in countering the proliferation of WMDs.

Hypothesis: BMD was pursued because relevant organisations perceived such a system as the best way of addressing the WMDs' proliferation in the region.

Which organisations were expected to deliver an opinion on the ways of dealing with the WMDs' proliferation and the missile threat? These included MOFA's regional/ country and arms control desks, the JDA/ MOD, and Tokyo-based security establishment-related think-tanks. How have these actors and groups of actors reacted to the WMDs' proliferation in the region? And, was BMD considered the best countermeasure?

MOFA's position as a whole can be characterised as supportive of the efforts of creating an international regime of non-proliferation. BMD was regarded by some as a measure complementary to Japan's diplomatic efforts in the area of strengthening the Missile Technology Control Regime (an export control mechanism since 1987), promoting the 2000

1 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 143, 131.

2 *Ibid.*, 146.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and implementing the Proliferation Security Initiative since 2003. However, it could not have been lost on MOFA that neither the NPT nor any other international agreement had prevented countries from entering the “nuclear club” following the NPT conclusion. This evidence should have weakened the position of those advocating only the diplomatic efforts, especially in the face of recurrent North Korean nuclear and missile controversies and China's continued military modernisation. It was, probably, this environment that led to a situation in which MOFA's Director General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs Amano said in 2003 that “BMD could affect disarmament both positively and negatively.”¹ It would have been hardly comprehensible to me if the wisdom accumulated in any culture that “for a stronger shield there will always be a sharper sword,” perpetuating the arms race, could have been ignored by arms control specialists.

There exist a number of think-tanks with very close links to the establishment, such as RIPS, Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS), and Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). Each of these organisations conducts research on aspects of Japan's foreign and security policy, and it can be assumed that the organisations' opinions are received by the government with some attention. It is JIIA that published two comprehensive reports on BMD's role in Japan's security. The 2002 report² concluded on BMD's effect on the ballistic missiles proliferation that it had both pluses and minuses and that, having a less than 100% chance of missile interception, the system should be used alongside a range of other diplomatic measures.³

The section on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in JIIA's 2007

1 Amano, “A Japanese View on Nuclear Disarmament,” 143.

2 Satoshi Morimoto, ed., *Misairu bouei. Atarashii kokusai anzenhoshou-no kouzu [Missile Defence. The Shape of New International Security]*.

3 Hirofumi Tosaki, “Dandou misairu bouei to gunbikanri/ fukakusan” [Ballistic Missile Defence and Arms Control/ Non-Proliferation], In: *Misairu bouei. Atarashii kokusai anzenhoshou-no kouzu [Missile Defence. The Shape of New International Security]*, ed. Morimoto, 239-242.

report¹ was, on the whole, written along the same lines, but it contained at least two clearly contradictory statements. On page 120, the authors asserted that “if the BMD system is sufficiently effective, then adversaries will have fewer incentives to possess or increase such capabilities, which in turn will promote non-proliferation.” It was only three pages later that the authors called BMD “a double-edged sword” by reasonably noting that “the introduction of a BMD system does not necessarily work favourably for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. There is always a possibility that such action may bring military build-ups, or further proliferation of ballistic missiles and other weapons.”² This inconsistency in the reasoning of security experts on BMD’s potential effects on non-proliferation seems indicative of the thinking in related government units, but probably also reflects the very nature of BMD. On the whole, it can be concluded that there is some evidence in support of the view that it is because organisations perceived BMD as a countermeasure for ballistic missiles’ and missile technology proliferation, applied alongside diplomatic efforts, that Japan procured BMD.

Where do these observations about the ministries leave me with my central question?

6.5. The JDA, MOFA and the central question.

Hughes in his 2001 paper on BMD described the JDA as “generally subordinate”³ to MOFA in policymaking, which was a dominant view among the researchers of Japan. This is also clear from the RAND Note where MOFA was nominated as “the central player”⁴ in the decisionmaking on BMD. If we assume for a moment that this was true, then there are several explanations of how the central question came about from the perspective of government organisations as the only decisionmaking units. One is that MOFA was fully

1 Hideaki Kaneda et al., *Japan’s Missile Defence: Diplomatic and Security Policies in a Changing Strategic Environment* (Tokyo: JIIA, 2007).

2 Ibid., 123.

3 Hughes, *Sino-Japanese Relations and BMD*, 43.

4 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 49.

aware of the longer-term implications of BMD, has devised plans to address the situation predicted in the core question,¹ and that it has so far been able to effectively manage the procurement process, domestically and internationally, jointly with the JDA by compartmentalising the process along two tracks each running through three stages of research, development, and deployment. Another possibility is that MOFA was unaware of or made miscalculations about BMD's disruptive potential – this, we shall find out in the future.² However, another explanation is also thinkable – that MOFA declined in influence over security policymaking relative to the JDA,³ with the JDA pushing for an end to MOFA's hedging.

On the nature of the relationship between MOFA and the JDA in security and in the procurement of BMD, the evidence reviewed in the preceding sections suggests that MOFA officials were successful at producing a professional image, according to which the ministry, as in the past, was concerned to a great degree, but not exclusively with the alliance management and that it held the view that BMD was important mostly because of its contribution to the alliance maintenance, irrespective of how successful the project would end up being from the military-technological perspective.⁴ As regards the JDA, the agency's official publications were recommending the research and procurement of BMD to counter the North Korean threat; however, within the JDA, some present and retired high-ranking voices were publicly or in their conversations with me critical of the BMD programme.⁵

1 Hughes, "Sino-Japanese Relations and BMD," 79-81.

2 Yoshihide Soeya claimed in 2000 that: "In the minds of Japanese policymakers, Japan's participation in the embryonic stages of TMD is an act of security cooperation with the US, and as such is an end in itself... There is no indication that the Japanese government has given any serious consideration to the strategic dimension of the TMD programme." Soeya, "In Defence of No Defence," *Look Japan* 45, no. 527 (2000): 23. Soeya's quotes was originally found in Hughes, "Sino-Japanese Relations and BMD," 79, note 34.

3 Shinoda has, for example, argued that MOFA's relative power has decreased relative to the *Kantei*. Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 83-85. The *Kantei*'s possible role will be discussed in the following chapter.

4 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 51. Reference to the original quote by a senior MOFA official in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 21, 1999. Compare with Hughes's observations in 2001 about MOFA's other reported concerns about BMD's feasibility, costs, and its impact on the relations with China in: Hughes, "Sino-Japanese Relations and BMD," 79-81.

5 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 46. Joint Chief of Staff Nishimoto Tetsuya's quote, in which he claimed that "right now there is no way of countering ballistic missiles," originally appeared in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 7, 1998. Author's interviews with two retired GSDF generals, Tokyo, October 2008. See also

Concluding remarks

Thus, on balance, and in light of my conclusions in Part I, I can note that the two ends of the spectrum of material potentialities that BMD brings with itself, that is, Japan's closer military/ military-industrial integration with the US and enhancement of the capacity for an independent and pro-active security policy, can be only approximately associated with MOFA and the JDA, respectively. But, as general trends, MOFA can probably be said to be more concerned with maintaining the alliance, while admittedly emphasising its concerns for the broader security in the Asia-Pacific, and the JDA with modernising the country's military infrastructure. I found no documentary evidence, on the basis of which I could confirm explicit tensions between the two ministries over BMD and BMD-related issues, even if some competition over the general status of the JDA in relation to MOFA cannot be denied.¹ My explanation of it is that a closer integration with the US and strengthening the military capacity for a more independent security policy are two processes that BMD allows to run parallel to each other.

On how the government organisations contributed to the emergence of the situation captured in the core concern of the thesis, I can conclude that the organisational capacities and practices within the government were such that they allowed a range of influences on the security policy. These influences included the broader interministerial rivalry and pressures from the US and military contractors. I reckon that this could have led to a situation where the potential of BMD to disrupt the hedging policy towards the US and China was either miscalculated or factored into the definition of the country's medium- to long-term security policy by some of the decisionmaking actors. This supposition encourages a further investigation of the evidence surrounding the procurement of BMD in the next chapter from

Hughes, "Sino-Japanese Relations and BMD," 81.

1 For example, JDA Director General Shigeru Ishiba complained that MOFA regarded the JDA in the same way as the Security Section of MOFA's North American Affairs Bureau. Shigeru Ishiba, *Kokubou [National Defence]* (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2005), 124.

a more eclectic perspective of the BMD decisions being a result of different influences by diverse individuals and their groups.

CHAPTER 7. BMD AND ELITES.

In 2008 a joint report was published by the UK Royal United Services Institute and a Japanese national-security policy institute the Asian Forum Japan. Its contributors included Christopher Hughes, Renya Inagaki of the Defence Research Centre (Japan), and Ichiro Shinkai of the Asian Forum Japan. They analysed the opportunities for building a “new Japan-Europe relationship” arising from the Japanese “[military] procurement culture” that was “likely to change” so that the “possibility of looking up one day and seeing a European fighter flying in the skies of Japan was increasingly likely.”¹ A quote from the report, which explains why this “new relationship” and military-industrial cooperation between Japan and Europe, Japan and the UK was considered possible, is appropriate here:

Japanese defence industry policy has been marked by two contradicting ideologies, ‘dependence on the United States’ and ‘self-development’. For those focusing on the dependence on the United States, the alliance between the two countries is seen as indispensable with defence equipment unification being the first priority. With a focus on subduing the Japanese defence industry profile rather than strengthening its foundation, this approach also avoids any criticism from the US. On the other side of the issue, there are those who support the idea of ‘self-development’. They believe that the alliance with the United States will not last forever. They believe that the Japan-US security system was created in the Cold War and with this particular security scenario being over, there is no longer a reason for the US to support Japan unconditionally. Since the Japan-US alliance is not viewed as indestructible, they highlight the dangers of having no national defence infrastructure.²

This observation of the report editors and contributors about the existence of “those” who consider the US alliance indispensable and “those” who think the alliance “will not last forever” is compatible with my conclusions in the previous chapter and in Part I about the potentialities of BMD satisfying both constituencies. My failure to identify sufficient evidence, on the basis of which I could neatly associate “them” with the formal government organisations such as MOFA and the JDA/ MOD, justifies trying a more eclectic analytical perspective, looking at a variety of elites and their groupings.

The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I shall identify the

1 Alexander Neill et al., eds., *Delivering Defence Industrial Change* (RUSI, AFJ, 2008), 62-64.

2 *Ibid.*, 38.

existing security policy visions, their political support base, and how BMD fit into these visions. This will essentially be a review of the perceptions and preferences for the nature of the country's security policy held by the main political parties. I would also like to dwell on why alternative projects unfavourable to BMD failed – did they have no chance at all? In the second section, I shall explore possible influences of the Prime Ministers on the BMD decisions from the perspective of the central concern of the dissertation. In the third section, I shall analyse a circle of political, military, and industrial elites, which probably characterise some aspects of the actual BMD policymaking and reflects the diversity of actors and their interests, the confluence of which likely had some influence on shaping the country's BMD decisions.

The findings of this chapter will be as follows:

Firstly, a literature review will be undertaken, typologising Japan's post-World War II and current security policy visions as consisting of a durable collection of alternative policy options which include "pacifism," "mercantilism," "normalism," and "neutralism." This will be interpreted as explaining, in part, the persistence of "hedging" in Japan's security policy. This conclusion is important for the argument of this thesis about the shift of policy from one hedging strategy to another in that it strengthens the basis of the argument.

Secondly, it will be argued that the "pacifist" opposition, represented by the JCP and JSP/ SDP, had little or no chance of determining the outcome of the country's BMD procurement because the mainstream "pragmatists," including the LDP, Komeito, and the DPJ, irrespective of internal differences, welcomed or, at least, reconciled themselves with BMD either as a way of managing the alliance or as a tool of advanced military build-up.

Thirdly, the evidence on each Prime Minister's (1994-2007) possible influences on BMD will be analysed, on the basis of which it will be contended that the Prime Ministers, especially Koizumi, played some role in shaping the nature of Japan's involvement with

BMD, but in ways compatible with the security-policy perspectives identified in Chapter Four and with the argument about the potentialities of BMD identified in Chapter Five.

Fourthly, an analysis of evidence on the elite networks – Japan’s Congressional National Security Research Group, Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange, and Japan-US Security Strategy Conference and Exhibition – will be undertaken to argue that these networks have likely had some influence on shaping the BMD and related decisions. Details of the actual government policymaking on BMD, which would unequivocally confirm the roles of the interactions of business, military, and other government elites in bringing about the BMD decisions will not be provided.

7.1. Security policy visions, political parties and BMD.

A sensible way of ordering the menu of security policy visions, which find their expression in Japanese politics, is that by Richard Samuels who proposed that the security policy preferences of contemporary Japanese politicians could be sorted out along two axes. The first represents “a measure of the value placed on the alliance with the US” – the second reflects “the willingness to use force in international affairs.”¹ Using these coordinates, Samuels identified four broad post-Cold War groups, namely: “pacifists,” “middle-power internationalists,” “neoautonomists,” and “normal nation-alists.” This is a broader and more nuanced representation than that assumed in the RUSI-AFJ report or the one observed in various chapters of this thesis. It makes sense to review these groups of preferences in detail.

The hallmark, but not the only feature, of Japanese “pacifism” is in defending a strict interpretation of the Constitution prohibiting the use of war as a foreign policy tool. The principal political proponent of “pacifism” is the Japan Communist Party which has quite consistently called for an “abrogation of the Japan-US Security Treaty, a military alliance treaty, to put an end to policies of subservience to the United States so Japan can truly

1 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 111.

contribute to friendship and peace with the rest of Asia and the World.”¹

The Socialist Party² turned out to be a less principled “pacifist” when Tomiichi Murayama, upon entering a coalition government with the LDP and the New Party Sakigake in June 1994, accepted the constitutionality of the Self-Defence Forces and the legitimacy of the alliance with the US.³ Reconstituted as the Social Democratic Party, it has resumed some elements of its pre-Murayama security stance but has so far failed to regain its past support with the voters. The number of the JCP seats in the House of Representatives has also declined after 1996 to single digits.⁴

The “middle-power internationalists” “continue to oppose use of force and question whether muscularity, incremental or otherwise, is really the best path towards national security.”⁵ Within this group Samuels distinguished between “mercantile realists” who emphasise the centrality of the US-Japan alliance structure to the country’s economy-centred security and “middle-power Asianists” who are soliciting a better balance between the US and Japan’s neighbours. Samuels observed that the “mercantilists” are predominantly affiliated with the LDP while the “Asianists” are mostly members of the DPJ.

The defining characteristics of the “neoautonomists” are an aggressive criticism of Japan’s subordinate position within the alliance and an acute perception of the degradation of people’s moral values as a result of their loss of national identity, spiritual traditions, and history. A common denominator of the varied visions of Japan proposed by the

1 *Japanese Communist Party Manifesto*, House of Councillors Election 2007, June 16, 2007, http://www.jcp.or.jp/english/jps_weekly07/20070616_manifesto.html.

2 The Japan Socialist Party was the usual English name for *Nihon shakaitou* until 1991 when the English name changed to Social Democratic Party of Japan; *Nihon shakaitou* did not change its name to *Shakai minshutou* until 1996. See Hook et al., “A Note on the Text,” in *Japan’s IR*, xxxvii.

3 “Murayama Says SDPJ Will Keep New SDF Policy,” *TDY*, October 14, 1994; Mutsumi Nishida, “SDP’s Fatal Choice Was Power over Principle; Murayama’s Efforts Tore Apart Party He Sought to Save,” *TNW*, October 21, 1996.

4 “Editorial: Voters Opt for Stability, Responsibility,” *TDY*, October 22, 1996; Yoshimichi Hironaka, “JCP Seeking to Drum up Support among Young People,” *TDY*, September 20, 2000; “Voters Indifferent to Communists, Social Democrats,” *JEN*, November 9, 2003; “Japan’s Milestone Election,” *TJT*, November 17, 2003; “Election 2009 – Battle for Power; Nation Votes for Change; DPJ to Take over Government after Crushing Victory at Polls,” *TDY*, August 31, 2009.

5 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 127.

“neoautonomists,” among whom we find such “colourful” persons as Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, academics Susumu Nishibe, Terumasa Nakanishi, and cartoonist Yoshinori Kobayashi, is a militarily more autonomous player in world affairs which has an independent diplomatic strategy.

Those who are euphemistically referred to as the “normal nation-alists” share an understanding that Japan should be a nation which can use war as a foreign policy tool. Samuels distinguished between three strands within this project. The “globalists,” exemplarily personified in Ichiro Ozawa, emphasise that Japan discharge its international military function under the UN aegis. Both the “straightforward realists” and “ideological neoconservatives” consider the defence alliance with the US important but they diverge on issues of history interpretation – the “neoconservatives” are less apologetic about Japan’s war history. The option of Japan acquiring a military nuclear capability is thrown out for public discussion from time to time by supporters of all of the above projects with the exception of the “pacifists” and “globalists.”

Samuels’ axes typologising Japanese security policy options are a useful way of representing a complex matter, but the “groups” he identified are neither new nor unique. More than two decades before Samuels, Kenneth Pyle classified four comparable approaches to “Japan’s future role in the world.”¹ Pyle’s “progressives” with their vision of an unarmed and neutral Japan are clearly evocative of Samuels’s “pacifists.” His “liberal realists” were as much opposed to the “pacifist” utopian emphases as Samuels’s “normal nation-alists;” predictably, they insisted on incrementally increasing defence expenditures so that Japan could pursue its national interests “in a cooperative defence relationship with the liberal democracies.”²

Pyle’s “mercantilists” projecting Japan as a great merchant nation and “new

1 Kenneth Pyle, “The Future of Japanese Nationality: An Essay in Contemporary History,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 8, no. 2 (1982): 242.

2 *Ibid.*, 247.

nationalists” seeing the international anarchical environment as necessitating measures aimed at building up “military power commensurate with economic power”¹ correspond well with Samuels’ “middle power internationalists” and “neoautonomists.” Another researcher, Mike Mochizuki, has produced in the 1980s a classification concordant with Pyle’s and Samuels’s. Mochizuki’s four “schools of strategic thought” consisting of “political realists,” “unarmed neutralists,” “Japanese Gaullists,” and “military realists” have straightforward parallels with Samuels’s.² The same applies to a more recent review of “pacifists,” “mercantilists,” “normalists,” and “neutralists” by Keiko Hirata.³

What the above expositions by Pyle, Mochizuki, Samuels, and Hirata point to is the persistence of “hedging” in Japan’s security policy where “hedging” refers to a strategy of avoiding unfavourable outcomes by simultaneously betting on a collection of alternative policy options. Post-World War II Japan has been successfully hedging against a number of regional threats including the US alliance failure through entanglement or abandonment. Alliance failure may be as big a concern after the Cold War, if not bigger and more fundamental, as it was during the bipolar confrontation.

The above pages outlined the menu of security policy directions from which Japan can choose. However, if we refocus our attention using the lens of BMD, this picture of security views with a number of diffused centres will be automatically simplified. It will be simplified to an image of “pacifism” versus “pragmatism.” It will be an image where the marginalised “pacifists,” embodied in the JCP and JSDP, oppose any military build-up including BMD.⁴ On the other side, the ruling and opposing mainstream “pragmatists,” including within the LDP, Komeito, and the DPJ, irrespective of internal differences and

1 Ibid., 257.

2 Mike Mochizuki, “Japan’s Search for Strategy.” *International Security* 8, no. 3 (1984): 152-79.

3 Keiko Hirata, “Who Shapes the National Security Debate? Divergent Interpretations of Japan’s Security Role,” *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 35, no. 3 (2008): 123-51.

4 “Party Opposes TMD Defence System,” *UPI*, September 28, 1993; Doug Struck, “Japan Divided on US Call for Missile Defence; Constitutional Bar Creates Anxiety,” *The Washington Post*, February 8, 2001; “SDP Blasts Koizumi Reform in Election Manifesto,” *JEN*, August 18, 2005; “Japan Enacts 1st Law Allowing Use of Space for Defence Purposes,” *JEN*, May 21, 2008; Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 60.

varying ideological accents welcome or, at least, can reconcile themselves with the procurement of BMD¹ because, either as a way of “contributing” to the alliance or as a tool of advanced military build-up, missile defence is attractive to any “realist” audience, be it Samuels’s “middle power internationalists,” “normal nation-alists,” or “neoautonomists.”

To illustrate this point, it was under the “normaliser” Koizumi that the 2003 BMD procurement, the arms export ban relaxation, the 2005 SM-3 BLK IIA development, and some other decisions were made. At the same time, there was the “mercantilist” Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka who was a critic of Prime Minister Koizumi and someone who criticised the government’s response to the US “war on terror” and urged in 2003 to proceed by “adjusting” the interests of the US, Japan, and the international community rather than simply following the US.² This individual was described by RAND researchers as Prime Minister Obuchi’s “chief liaison to the Diet... credited with shepherding funding for Japan’s contribution to the joint research [on BMD SM-3] through the potential political minefields in the Diet.”³ Views of some of the prominent representatives of the LDP, Komeito, and the DPJ will be identified in the following chapter.

The implication of my conclusion on “pacifism” versus “pragmatism” is that the “pacifist” opposition had little or no chance of determining the direction of the procurement of BMD. Who the subjects of the decisionmaking were, is not a trivial question. Although it is the elected Diet members who vote on the budget for defence and other allocations as well as relevant pieces of legislation, the mainstream political parties – the LDP and its immediate splinters in the 1990s, the DPJ and its predecessors – appear to be, as was noted above, entities with rather amorphous, even if overall pragmatic, views of the country’s security. As

1 See, for example, supportive views by Komeito's Masao Akamatsu, the DPJ's Shu Watanabe, and the LDP's Norihiko Akagi in the House of Representatives Security Committee, June 14, 2005, National Diet Minutes, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/162/0015/main.html>. See also the DPJ's 2004 Manifesto for the House of Councillors elections, http://www.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/images/Manifesto_2004.pdf, p. 18.

2 Hiromu Nonaka, *Rouhei-ha shinazu. Nonaka Hiromu: Zenkaikoroku [Old Soldiers Never Die. The Complete Memoirs of Hiromu Nonaka]* (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2003), 246-247.

3 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 43.

Pyle put it in 1982, “leaders of the LDP borrow freely of the rhetoric and ideas of all four approaches [to security policy] as suits their convenience.”¹ So, it is difficult to consider parties as the driving forces behind the security policymaking and military procurement, including the missile defence build-up.

In this case, attention should probably be directed to the segments of the political establishment proposing these security policy “projects.” However, the question how to identify and designate these putative segments does not have a quick and straightforward answer. The mainstream political parties are amalgams of diverse groupings of people displaying a variance in their views of the country’s foreign and security policy. This calls for an assessment of the sub-party level politics and entities. One type of such entities remains factions, even though their influence has decreased in some areas after the revision of the electoral law in 1994.² Factions have generally been considered as structures responsible for the distribution of party and cabinet positions and for providing campaign funds; for the LDP’s factions, in particular, in contrast to the JSP, “ideological or even policy commitment... was of little importance.”³ Some general leaning towards one of the security projects within the LDP factions is not unthinkable, in principle. Most recent “normalising” Prime Ministers – Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda – were from the LDP’s

1 Pyle, “The Future of Japanese Nationality,” 242.

2 Under the previous electoral system between 1947 and 1994, voters cast a single non-transferable vote for one individual candidate. Under such a system, for example, in a three-seat electoral district the top three vote-getters (including from the same party) would be elected. This often produced a situation where LDP candidates, for example, were running against their colleagues from the party. After the reform, the multi-member district system was replaced with 300 single-member districts and 200 proportional representation seats (with undisclosed lists). As a result, intra-party rivalry decreased, but factions arguably continued performing some of their old functions. Gary Cox, Frances McCall Rosenbluth and Michael Thies, “Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party,” *British Journal of Political Science* 29, no. 1 (1999): 55-56; Steven R. Reed, “Evaluating Political Reform in Japan: A Midterm Report,” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 2 (2002): 253-54; Stockwin, *Governing Japan* (2008), 192; Patrick Koellner, “Factionalism in Japanese Political Parties Revisited or How Do Factions in the LDP and the DPJ Differ?” *Japan Forum* 16, no. 1 (2004): 93-94.

3 George Totten and Tamio Kawakami, “The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics,” *Pacific Affairs* 38, no. 2 (Summer 1965): 119-21; van Wolferen, *The Enigma*, 139-140; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, *Japan’s Political Marketplace*, 11, 59, 78-79; Cox and Rosenbluth, “Factional Competition for the Party Endorsement: The Case of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party,” *British Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 2 (1996): 259-97; Kohno, *Japan’s Postwar Party Politics* (Princeton, 1997), 90, 91-115; Curtis, *The Logic of Japanese Politics* (1999), 80-85, 226; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies, “Electoral Reform,” 35-37; Koellner, “Factionalism,” 93-94; Stockwin, *Governing Japan*, 32, 139-40, 191-92.

Machimura faction.¹ However, factions have also produced senior government officials supporting different security policy options. This was, for example, the case with the LDP's Tsushima faction with which the "mercantilist" Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka, but also the "normalising" Ministers of Defence Shigeru Ishiba, Fumio Kyuma, and the JDA Director General Fukushima Nukaga were affiliated (as was Ichiro Ozawa before defecting from the LDP).²

These observations suggest that focusing on factions is unlikely to be productive for this research and that the defence and weapons procurement preferences in the 1990s-2000s have been negotiated and strengthened, probably, in different fora. The prime candidates for an analysis among such fora are Japan's Congressional National Security Research Group (*Anzenhoshou giin kyougikai*), an NPO called Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange (*Nichibei heiwa bunka kouryuu kyokai*), and Japan-US Security Strategy Conference and Exhibition, with their overlapping cross-party membership, often including the US and Japanese members from the industries and bureaucracy, but also many defence "tribe" members (*bouei zoku/kokubou zoku*). Before analysing the circle of security elites partaking in these frameworks, I would like to investigate possible influences of the Prime Ministers of Japan on the BMD decisions. The following section is not meant as an exhaustive account of BMD-related events that happened and statements that were made

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- 1 The Machimura faction was known before October 2006 as Mori faction, before December 1998 as Mitsuzuka faction; it was established by Takeo Fukuda at the end of the 1970s as *Seiwa seisaku kenkyuu kai*, or The Clean and Amiable Policy Study Group. "The Koizumi Years; Factions Reeling after 5 years," *TDY*, April 26, 2006; "Machimura Tipped to Replace Mori as Faction Leader," *TDY*, October 19, 2006; Takaharu Yoshiyama and Takeshi Endo, "Fukuda's Support Based on Faction Loyalty," *TDY*, September 18, 2007; "Land of the Rising Shadow; Japan's New Prime Minister," *The Economist (US Edition)*, September 29, 2007; Koichi Akaza, "Will Revived LDP Faction Prevail?" *TDY*, January 19, 2008; Koichi Akaza, "Top LDP Faction Relishing Power," *TDY*, May 28, 2008; Masami Ito, "Top LDP Faction Faces Crisis over Aso-Koike Split," *TJT*, September 17, 2008; "Some LDP Factions Less Than Pleased with Lineup," *TNW*, September 29, 2008; Masami Ito, "LDP – a Party Defined by Factions," *TJT*, October 15, 2008.
 - 2 The Tsushima faction was previously led by Kakuei Tanaka, Noboru Takeshita, Keizo Obuchi, Ryutaro Hashimoto; the faction was known as *Heisei kenkyuu kai*, or Heisei Research Group, following efforts by Takeshita and Shin Kanemaru. "Hashimoto to Be Probed over Accountability," *TDY*, August 31, 2004; "Koizumi's Ex-allies – out in the Cold; How the LDP's Once Almighty Heiseiken became Divided and Fell," *TDY*, May 12, 2006; "Scrap for Abe's Cabinet Posts Begins," *TDY*, September 21, 2006; "Candidates Look beyond Factions for LDP Support," *TDY*, September 11, 2008; Yuji Anai and Kohei Kobayashi, "Factions Hold Less Influence in LDP Race," *TDY*, September 11, 2008.

during each Prime Minister's time in office. The section will rather attempt to identify important points about their contribution to Japan's BMD policy from the perspective of the central question.

7.2. The Prime Ministers and BMD.

It was the latter part of the year 1993 that we could consider as the beginning of Japan's journey toward BMD.

Prime Minister Hosokawa (09.08.1993 – 28.04.1994), the leader of Japan New Party, led a fragile coalition government with the Cabinet consisting of 20 ministers drawn from the newly emerged minor parties and the old opposition parties excluding the LDP and the JCP.¹ Internal differences inside such a Cabinet would not have allowed Hosokawa to move Japan into the US TMD even when the US DOD officially de-coupled the Perry Initiative, which was re-dubbed the Technology-for-Technology (TFT) Initiative, from TMD in October 1993. Michael Green contended in 1995 that the objective of the Perry Initiative was to “use large projects such as TMD to entice the Japanese government into providing access to areas that had thus far been beyond the reach of the JMTC [Joint Military Technology Commission] and S&TF [Science and Technology Forum] structures,”² that is, dual-use technology. Secretary of Defence Les Aspin was then quoted as saying: “We do not want to hold security hostage for commercial technology.”³ At the same time, the implication of the Pentagon's move with the TFT Initiative was that if there was no mutual technology

1 David Sanger, “The World; Even Japan Can't Tell What It Has Elected,” *TNYT*, July 25, 1993; Yoshiaki Itoh, “Hybrid Coalition Posed for New Era; Unlikely Allies Gloss over Issues, with Political Reform Seen as Sole Common Cause of post-LDP Government,” *TNW*, August 2, 1993; Masahiko Ishizuka, “Having Ousted the LDP, Coalition Must Prove Itself Viable; Members Appear Lacing in Strong Policies,” *TNW*, August 9, 1993; “Editorial; Birth of Hosokawa's Coalition Cabinet,” *TDY*, August 10, 1993; “Government Coalition Weakens Further,” *TDY*, February 10, 1994; Toshihiro Ando, “Possibility of Cabinet Reshuffle Puts Coalition Partners at Odds; Hosokawa Alienates Former Confidant in Power Struggle,” *TNW*, February 21, 1994; Yasuhiro Tase, “Premier Seems to Be Losing Touch with Public, Advisers; Lack of Direction Threatens Domestic, Foreign Policies,” *TNW*, April 4, 1994; Hidenaka Kato, “Hosokawa's Japan New Party Wracked by Internal Feud; Former Premier Seen as Both Liability and Asset,” *TNW*, May 16, 1994; “Hosokawa Plagued by Variety of Woes,” *TDY*, March 25, 1994.

2 Green, *Arming Japan*, 139.

3 David Sanger, “US Presses Japan on Missile Project,” *TNYT*, November 3, 1993.

exchange Japan would be left only with the option of buying off-the-shelf.

Americans started “courting” Japan over TMD around the same time. The US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Frank Wisner was pushing the idea of Japan introducing TMD during his meeting with the JDA Director General Keisuke Nakanishi¹ in August 1993. In September, Pentagon Acquisition chief John Deutsch and BMDO director US Army Major General Malcolm O’Neill proposed establishing a working group for developing a TMD programme.² In November, Defence Secretary Les Aspin met with the JDA Director General and other officials to discuss TMD.³

On balance, Hosokawa did not go as far as endorsing Japan’s involvement in TMD, but he considered the US offer to be a “matter of interest [to the Government of Japan],”⁴ and negotiations on the utility of TMD for Japan continued under him. In May 1999, then a special adviser to the Japan Times, Hosokawa wrote an article in which he claimed that during his time in office as Prime Minister he “flatly rejected a funding request for TMD research.”⁵ The only formal achievement I can note is the US-Japan agreement to establish the Joint US-Japan TMD Working Group. At the same time, an interesting fact can be noted about a special advisory panel, which later became known as the Higuchi panel, that Hosokawa commissioned in 1994 to report on how to revise the 1976 NDPO. The panel recommended in their final report titled “The Modality of the Security and Defence Capability of Japan,” *inter alia*, “positive efforts” toward introducing a missile defence system in collaboration with the US.⁶ Hosokawa’s successor Tsutomu Hata only stayed in office for two months and cannot be said to have contributed much to BMD (he was foreign

1 Urayama, “Missile Defence,” 103.

2 “Party Opposes TMD Defence System,” *UPI*, September 28, 1993; “Japan’s Prime Minister Urges Debate over TMD Proposal,” *Aerospace Daily*, October 6, 1993.

3 Yuji Sasaki, “Aspin Seeks Japan’s Help on Defence Plan,” *TDY*, November 3, 1993.

4 David Sanger, “Japan’s Premier Stands Firm on Trade,” *TNYT*, September 25, 1993.

5 Morihiro Hosokawa, “A De Facto Treaty Revision,” *TJT*, May 31, 1999. Compare with: “Japan’s Prime Minister Urges Debate over TMD Proposal,” *Aerospace Daily*, October 6, 1993; “Hosokawa Says Cabinet to Debate Antimissile System,” *JEN*, October 4, 1993.

6 “Appendix A: The Modality of the Security and Defence Capability of Japan,” in Cronin and Green, “Redefining the US-Japan Alliance,” *McNair Paper* 31 (1994): 52.

minister under Hosokawa). However, Hata and his successor Tomiichi Murayama supported the work of the Higuchi Panel and the revision process of the NDPO.¹

The Higuchi report was completed at the time when Tomiichi Murayama became Prime Minister. The report asserted that Japan had “the responsibility” of playing “an active role in shaping a new order.”² For this, Japan was urged to develop a “a coherent and comprehensive security policy” which consists of the promotion of multilateral security cooperation, strengthening of the functions of the US-Japan alliance, and “possession of a highly reliable and efficient defence capability based on a strengthened information capability and a prompt crisis-management capability.”³ Specifically, the report also made references to various aspects of the SDF participation in “various forms of multilateral cooperation” for security including peacekeeping operations;⁴ it elaborated on issues aimed at enhancing the US-Japan security cooperation relationship including a call for the conclusion of an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the US,⁵ promotion of mutual cooperation in equipment (especially C3I systems);⁶ the report also made recommendations with regard to specific ground, air, and maritime defence capabilities Japan should develop and/ or maintain;⁷ it emphasised the “extreme importance” of maintaining a domestic defence industry capable of producing sophisticated equipment.⁸ Mochizuki evaluated this report as “essentially a conservative document affirming Japan's commitment to a strictly defensive military posture and a security alliance with the United States.”⁹ Furthermore, Mochizuki concluded that the document “resonated more with the

1 Mochizuki, “Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy,” *RAND Monograph Reports* (1995): 72.

2 “Appendix A,” in Cronin and Green, 30.

3 *Ibid.*, 30, 60.

4 *Ibid.*, 36-42.

5 *Ibid.*, 43.

6 *Ibid.*, 48.

7 *Ibid.*, 48-55.

8 *Ibid.*, 56-58.

9 Mochizuki, “Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy,” 77. It must be said though that the report's apparent emphasis on multilateral cooperation led to much criticism from some security policy circles in the US. See Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, 231-38.

civilian power vision of Japan, than the normal country vision.”¹

Under Murayama, the Department of Defence issued in February 1995 a report entitled “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region.”² It was prepared under the supervision of Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye.³ This report confirmed the importance of the US-Japan Security Treaty for the US policy, as well as the US commitment to maintain approximately 100,000 troops in East Asia “for the foreseeable future.”⁴ The subsequently revised NDPO, unveiled in November 1995 and called by the Asahi journalist Funabashi “the Japanese counterpart” to the February 1995 Nye Report,⁵ was characterised by a “lack of radicalism in terms of reshaping actual SDF capabilities.”⁶

As regards Murayama and TMD, several observations can be noted here. When entering the governing coalition as the leading party, the Socialists accepted the SDF and the alliance’s legitimacy which eventually undermined their opposition party credentials, but they did express their anti-TMD position from the start,⁷ even though some possible inconsistency in maintaining this position was noted by journalists who pointed out that the

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- 1 Mochizuki, “Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy,” 77. For other contemporary views, see Satoshi Morimoto, “Basic Defence Policy Should Remain Intact,” *TDY*, August 18, 1994; Satoshi Isaka, “Panel Calls for Fuller Role by SDF in UN Actions; Sweeping Proposals May Trouble Murayama,” *TNW*, August 15, 1994; Eiichiro Sekigawa, “Panel Urges Overhaul of Japan’s Military,” *AWST*, August 22, 1994.
 - 2 Hook et al., *Japan’s IR*, 158.
 - 3 For a detailed journalistic account of the evolution of the Nye Initiative, see Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, 227-30, 248-76.
 - 4 US Department of Defence, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, DC, February 1995), i, 10, 32. Hook et al., for example, stated that the report confirmed the US’s “determination to maintain, for at least the next twenty years [sic], around 100,000 troops in east Asia.” (Hook et al., *Japan’s International Relations*, 158) In the report we can read: “Concerns about American withdrawal heard today were voiced twenty years ago as well, in the years following the Vietnam War. For the security and prosperity of today to be maintained for the next twenty years, the United States must remain engaged in Asia, committed to peace...” (*United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 1) This accidental historical reference was the only place where “the next twenty years” were mentioned in the report as a simple way of rhetorically linking the past, present and future. The report gave no other indication which could be interpreted in the way claimed by Hook et al. in their unsupported claim about the US’s commitment to maintain 100 000 troops “for at least the next twenty years.” The same formulation “foreseeable future” was also repeated in the 1998 revision of the strategy report, and predictably the 1998 report did not contain the 1995 report’s almost lyrical reference to “the next 20 years” (or the like). US Department of Defence, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* 1998, 59.
 - 5 Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, 292.
 - 6 Hughes, *Japan’s Security Agenda*, 169-70.
 - 7 Green, *Arming Japan*, 138 and 179, note 44.

Social Democrats did not object to the JDA's 1995 budget request to study TMD.¹ On the basis of this budget allocation under Murayama, the Japan-US Joint Study on TMD was initiated and the TMD Research Office established under the JDA.

The North Korean nuclear crisis and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96 were among the factors which heightened the sense of insecurity in Japan, but the government was still cautious in extending support for the US TMD collaboration offer. This reluctance to fully embrace the US missile defence project under Murayama is comprehensible in the context of the coalition politics prevalent at that time.² Yet even then TMD was not completely off the agenda as the initiation and establishment of various study groups and research offices, created under Murayama to study missile defence cooperation with the US, indicate.

The following Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (11.01.1996 – 30.07.1998) was observed as early as October 1993, when he was the LDP PARC Chairman, urging the government to accept the US TMD proposal.³ Hashimoto continued taking an active interest in TMD during his time in office as Prime Minister. Although I cannot notice any formal successes in the US-Japan TMD negotiations under Hashimoto, they had certainly been gaining momentum as part of the redefinition and strengthening of the alliance which started with the Nye Initiative and culminated under Hashimoto in the 1995 NDPO, the 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century and the 1997 US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines.⁴

The main controversy with the 1996 Joint Declaration was over geographic terminology – the critics charged that the Declaration's reference to “Asia Pacific” rather

1 “New Socialist Defence Platform Derided as Unrealistic, Impossible to Implement,” *TNW*, September 5, 1994.

2 Unidentified MOFA officials reportedly said that “the Murayama coalition was like 'walking on eggs' when it came to security issues.” In Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, 266.

3 “Government to 'Debate' US Proposal on TMD,” *Kyodo News Service*, October 4, 1993.

4 Akira Saito, “Time to Firm up Japan-US Alliance,” *TDY*, April 19, 1996; Ralph Cossa, “Restructured Japan-US Alliance Is Not a Threat,” *TDY*, January 23, 1997; Mikiko Miyakawa, “Premier Weighs Japan-US Security Ties,” *TDY*, June 25, 1997; Tsutomu Wada, “New Guidelines Broaden Defence Scope; US-Japan Accord to Expand Cooperation Aims to Reassure but Arouses Concerns in Part of Asia,” *TNW*, September 29, 1997; “Cabinet Endorses New Defence Guidelines,” *TDY*, September 30, 1997.

than “Far East,” as in the 1960 treaty, extended the scope of the security treaty.¹ The controversy over the reference to “areas surrounding Japan” in the 1997 US-Defence Cooperation Guidelines has been outlined in Chapter One. But the Guidelines also contained concrete ways in which Japan was asked to cooperate in responding to situations in these “areas.” The most important of them was the ability of the SDF to offer non-combat logistical support for US forces.² Several pieces of legislation in support of the Guidelines were passed under Hashimoto's successor Keizo Obuchi. This legislation was composed of: the Law on Emergencies in Surrounding Areas, the revision of the Self-Defence Law, and the ratification of the revised US-Japan ACSA.³

It was during Obuchi's term in office that the August 1998 North Korean launch of Taepo-dong took place which allowed the domestic and US forces behind TMD/ BMD to consolidate their position and to push through a formal decision on the US-Japan TMD co-research in December 1998. The North Korean rocket launch appears to have been used to legitimise TMD research/ development. What matters for my discussion, though, is that Japanese Prime Ministers hesitated to unconditionally embrace the US TMD for many years citing “fear of offending China” and “overspending scarce military resources” as the reasons for it. Senior MOFA officials, reportedly, viewed neither Hashimoto nor Obuchi as “having articulated a long-range strategic view on BMD.”⁴ At the same time, formal and informal negotiations continued at different levels until the North Koreans launched the rocket which allowed Obuchi and his team to approve the US-Japan joint research on parts of the sea-based upper-tier missile interceptor.

In a summary form, the following aspects of BMD-relevant policy done under Hashimoto and Obuchi can be mentioned. These include Hashimoto's administrative reform

1 See Hook et al., *Japan's IR*, 160.

2 Ibid., 161.

3 Ibid. See also “Lower House Committee Approves Guidelines Bills,” *TJT*, April 27, 1999; Sayuri Daimon and Yoko Hani, “Defence Bills Define Strategy, But Lacked Debate,” *TJT*, April 27, 1999. Note that the US-Japan ACSA entered into force in October 1996, under Hashimoto.

4 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 43.

initiative aimed, in part, at increasing the Prime Minister's policymaking power, start of the reform of the intelligence infrastructure and creation of the Defence Intelligence Headquarters (January 1997),¹ the Obuchi government's announcement of its intention to domestically develop and deploy spy satellites (December 22, 1998), and the country's involvement with the TMD/ BMD joint research (December 18, 1998 – Security Council decision, August 1999 – Memorandum of Understanding).²

Returning to the decision on BMD co-research in December 1998, the government managed to structure the debate on the country's involvement with missile defence in a skilful way so as to contain the controversy and limit debate.³ This was achieved by dividing the BMD procurement process into three phases – research, development, and deployment – and claiming that progression to each stage was not automatic and would necessitate a separate decision by the government.⁴ So, after the 1998 decision on co-research, whenever challenged by opposition parties on the Diet floor or elsewhere with questions about the cost-effectiveness, higher risks of proliferation, peaceful use of space resolution, arms export ban violation, BMD's incompatibility with the prohibition on the exercise of collective defence, and related issues, the government officials would call a discussion of these questions premature for the research stage, thus killing the criticism.⁵

1 Norihide Miyoshi, "Integrated Security HQ Set up by Defence Agency to Enhance Operations," *TDY*, January 25, 1997; "Defence Agency Unifies Intelligence in Bid to Enhance Crisis Management Centre to Process All Security Data," *TNW*, January 27, 1997; "The main Danger Could Come from the Korean Peninsula' – 'We Are Not Japan's CIA: We Do Not Indulge in Undercover Operations' – 'The Eyes and Ears of Japan;' Tokyo's New Director of Intelligence Talks Exclusively to Roger Faligot on East-West Relations," *The European*, April 10, 1997.

2 "Spy Satellite Plan Ok'd; Yen 11,3 Billion Budget Set," *TJT*, December 23, 1998; "Cabinet Ministers Agree to Join US TMD Research," *TJT*, December 19, 1998;

3 See Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 54-56.

4 *Dandou misairu bouei (BMD)-ni kakaru nichibei kyoudou gijutsu kenkyuu-ni kansuru naikaku kanbouchoukan danwa [Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Regarding the Joint US-Japan Technology Research on BMD]*, December 25, 1998, http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2008/2008/html/ks312000.html.

5 *Ibid.*, 54-56. For specific examples, see the JDA's Defence Division Chief Ken Shigeki's response to Komeito's Shigeki Sato's question about the government's view on the compatibility of TMD with the resolution on the peaceful use of space and the arms export ban in: HRSC, December 3, 1998, National Diet Minutes, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/144/0250/main.html>; see the JDA Director General Hosei Norota's response along the same lines to the questions by the JCP's Mutsumi Sasaki about the huge costs of the future BMD system and its potential impact on the regional arms race: HRSC, May 13, 1999, National Diet Minutes, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/145/0015/14505130015004a.html>; see

Another important issue of managing the internal political debates and domestic/regional public opinion on missile defence, with which the Japanese government had to deal in the late 1990s-early 2000s, was the US redefinition of the distinction between NMD (for the defence of the US territory) and TMD (for the protection of the US forward-deployed troops) and its implications. As was mentioned in Chapter Two, around 2001, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and President Bush started indicating that they no longer saw a big gap between the two systems. Part of the explanation for that, probably, lay in the US's intention to reassure the allies that they would be covered by a single missile defence system. However, given the idiosyncratic system of defence-related guidelines in Japan and especially the prohibition on the exercise of the right to collective defence, this caused complications for some officials in Japan. Blurring the boundary between the US national and theatre missile defences made it more difficult for the Japanese government to ignore opposition and public concerns over the country's compliance with the collective defence-related restriction. Before that, Japanese officials could more easily avoid this contentious issue by claiming that NMD and TMD had little in common referring to the separation of both systems by the US.¹

This situation started developing under Yoshiro Mori (05.04.2000-26.04.2001). The Prime Minister's views on this issue were ambivalent,² and during the 2000 G-8 Summit in Okinawa, which was before Bush's initiative noted above, Mori would prefer to distance himself from the US NMD and the associated explosive controversies of collective defence for Japan and its implications for arms control. The latter was a contested subject because of NMD's nature undermining the 1972 ABM Treaty which was considered a pillar of arms

also the JDA Director General Nakatani's response to the DPJ's Eisei Ito's questions and Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka's response to the DPJ's Shu Watanabe's questions in the HRSC, June 28, 2001, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/151/0015/main.html>.

- 1 See, for example, the JDA Director General Nakatani's response to the question by the DPJ's Eisei Ito about the BMD's implications for Japan's collective security restraint in the HRSC, June 14, 2001, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/151/0015/main.html>.
- 2 Naoko Aoki, "Focus: US Missile Shield Plan – Summit Headache for Mori," *JEN*, July 18, 2000.

control efforts. After causing some initial debate, the concerns over the nominal erasure of the distinction between the US NMD and TMD faded away. Regarding Mori's contribution to the procurement of BMD, it seems that the RAND Note authors rightly asserted that "Mori was viewed as lacking both the political base and the necessary stature with regard to foreign and defence policy to take a definitive stance on such a complicated and divisive issue."¹ Observers even called him "the hapless lame duck Prime Minister [in spring 2001]."²

Japan continued its cautious approach to BMD in 2001-2002 under Junichiro Koizumi, that reported "dyed-in-the-wool pro-American."³ Koizumi was probably the first Prime Minister who was able to benefit to a large extent from the Hashimoto-initiated administrative reform which aimed, in part, at empowering the government chief's policymaking authority.⁴ Specifically and importantly, the Prime Minister was given the right to introduce policy initiatives,⁵ the cabinet staff was expanded and cabinet-level councils were created to support and advise the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in policymaking.⁶

Koizumi's talent in the security policy area manifested itself in the series of post-9/11 pieces of legislation and measures enabling Japan's contribution to the US "war on terror" in terms of manpower, even if for fuel supplies and social work-like activities. After less than three weeks and thirty three hours of Diet debate, following the September 11 attacks in the US, the Diet comparatively rapidly passed in October 2001 the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law which allowed despatch of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean to support the US-led coalition in their war in Afghanistan.⁷ Following the US-led intervention in Iraq, Koizumi pledged "understanding," and the Law Concerning Special Measures on

1 Swaine et al., *Japan and BMD*, 44.

2 John Miller, "The Glacier Moves: Japan's Response to US security policies," *Asian Affairs: an American Review* 30, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 136.

3 Akihiko Miyamoto, "Koizumi Cosies up to US in Political Tightrope Act," *TNW*, July 9, 2001.

4 Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 11, 64, 63-85.

5 *Ibid.*, 76-79, 133.

6 Mulgan, "Japan's 'Un-Westminster' System," 86-91.

7 "Koizumi's Statement on Passage of Antiterrorism Law," *JEN*, October 29, 2001; Natsuko Segawa, "Anti-terror Bill Expands SDF Role," *TNW*, November 5, 2001. See also Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 86-98.

Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq was passed sanctioning the SDFs' deployment in a number of new, but still non-combat roles.¹

BMD was not high on Koizumi's agenda until December 2002 when the Bush administration announced its plan to quicken BMD deployment, apparently based on the logic that "any system is better than nothing."² While until then the JDA did not think the deployment would start earlier than 2005/ 2006, the US decided to begin the deployment by 2004, which reportedly turned out to be a big surprise for Tokyo.³ Tokyo had to adjust its plans accordingly and on December 19, 2003 published its decision to adopt a ballistic missile defence system composed of Aegis capability with the SM-3 Block IA in the upper tier and PAC-3 for the lower tier.

Many within the JDA reportedly viewed such a move as a "very top-down, extremely political decision."⁴ Furthermore, the defence industries were reportedly upset because the December 2003 decision was about introducing BMD through the foreign military sales (FMS) channel, rather than licence production for which the defence industries had been lobbying for years.⁵ For a fuller picture, it must be noted that MHI later, during 2005, did obtain a licence from LM to produce Patriots starting from 2008, although the Patriots to be deployed from 2006 until then were off-the-shelf purchases.⁶

How can this "very top-down, extremely political" decision be interpreted and what other related points should be considered to appreciate Koizumi's and his team's contribution

1 Kanako Takahara and Hiroko Nakata, "Koizumi's Iraq Pledge Wins Thanks from Bush," *TJT*, October 18, 2003; Tetsuo Hidaka, "Landmark Decision – SDF Despatch to Iraq; Koizumi's Message to SDF Not the Whole Story," *TDY*, December 13, 2003; Nao Shimoyachi, "Koizumi OKs SDF Deployment Plan," *TJT*, December 19, 2003; "SDF to Have Autonomy in Iraqi Mission; Will Be Allowed to Reject Requests from International Force," *TDY*, June 16, 2004. See also Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 113-132.

2 Jan Cienski, "Missile Defence May Be Deployed without Full Tests: Embryonic Technology," *National Post (Canada)*, February 25, 2003. The US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was quoted as saying that: "In the case of missile defence, I think we need to get something out there."

3 Urayama, "Missile Defence," 203-204.

4 *Ibid.*, 216. Reference to Urayama's interviews with JDA officials in 2003-2004. Such a "top-down" policymaking style is characteristic of Koizumi's key foreign policy decisions. See Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 133-141. Compare with Japan's "traditional" bottom-up policy process: Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 23-25; Mulgan, "Japan's 'Un-Westminster' System," 76-86.

5 *Ibid.*, 215-216.

6 "MHI to Get Licence to Produce PAC-3 Interceptor Missiles," *TJT*, July 20, 2005.

to the procurement of BMD? This “top-down” decision can appear curious when considered against the fact that in the spring 2001 at a press conference preceding the meeting with Bush, Koizumi “urged him to consider the effects US plans for missile defence would have on regional relations.”¹ Koizumi's response to the Bush administration's “urging” that Japan join the US missile defence plan was “noncommittal.”² In this case, one may find considering the international context of Japan’s policymaking useful, especially issues of the bilateral alliance, relations with North Korea and China.

On the alliance management front, we have observed that the Bush administration’s December 2002 announcement of an earlier-than-planned BMD procurement had an impact on accelerating Japan’s progress toward BMD even if before the two countries were moving in that direction at different speeds with Japan lagging behind in its assessments and, consequently, deployment plans. Japan-US military cooperation was revitalised through the Nye Initiative, the East Asian Strategy Report (“Nye report”), the 1995 NDPO, the 1997 Defence Cooperation Guidelines, and other related efforts. It continued intensifying after 9/11 with Koizumi’s anti-terrorism endeavours, 2004 NDPG, and 2003-2006 Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) aimed, in part, at increasing operational integration between the US and Japan’s armed forces and establishing joint command centres, in particular, the BJOCC in Yokota Air Base to facilitate communication on BMD operations. With the DPRI, Japan also agreed to the relocation of the command functions of the US Army First Corps from Washington State to Japan (Camp Zama). It could be interpreted as signifying Japan's further integration into the US's global power projection system, as was elaborated in Chapter Five. A number of other base and personnel relocations within Japan and from Japan (US Marine Corps) to Guam were also agreed as part of the process of the US Global Posture Review and the bilateral DPRI.

1 See Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 5 (2002): 121.

2 Miller, “The Glacier Moves,” 136-37.

On the North Korean front, Japanese public perceptions apparently spiralled out of Koizumi's control. When the Prime Minister went to Pyongyang in September 2002, hoping for a breakthrough in bilateral relations, he came back with the Pyongyang Declaration which, on the North Korean side, included an apology for the abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s.¹ However, this admission of the facts of abduction, even if initially it might have appeared as a possible basis for the normalisation of bilateral relations, triggered some bitter domestic reaction.² It was further exacerbated by the exposure of North Korea's enriched-uranium programme in October 2002.³ Koizumi's second mission to Pyongyang in 2004 and a deal on aid in exchange for the return of some abductees was perceived as the government's failure.⁴

On China, too, the early period of Koizumi's tenure saw some positive steps when he went to China for a summit in October 2001 and visited sites commemorating Japan's colonial history in China.⁵ But Japan's increasing military assertiveness under Koizumi and his provocative visits to the Yasukuni shrine could not have failed to heighten bilateral tensions. In the 1990s, the Sino-Japanese relations saw several periods of tensions. The dialogue was interrupted after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. The bilateral relations

- 1 "Ruling Parties Give Visit Thumbs Up," *TDY*, August 31, 2002; Tetsuya Harada, "Koizumi's Epochal Visit; Koizumi Hoping for Breakthrough," *TDY*, September 1, 2002; "Visit to Pyongyang Offers Closure Chance," *TNW*, September 9, 2002; Takeshi Uemura, "Time Will Tell Value of Accord between Japan, North Korea," *TDY*, September 27, 2002.
- 2 Junko Takahashi, "Kim Admits Abductions," *TJT*, September 18, 2002; "8 Abductees Dead, 5 Alive," *TDY*, September 18, 2002; Keiko Iizuka, "Japan-North Korea – after the Summit; Public Anger May Stall Normalisation Talks," *TDY*, September 20, 2002; Eric Johnston, "Media Coverage of Abductions Criticised," *TJT*, September 21, 2002; "Koizumi Puts Abductees First," *TDY*, September 28, 2002; Philip Brasor, "When Mourning Makes Straight Talk Taboo," *TJT*, September 29, 2002; Ralph Cossa, "Confessions from North Korea," *TJT*, October 21, 2002; "Government Split over Abductees' Return," *TDY*, October 28, 2002; Takuya Asakura, "Media Held Hostage by Abduction Sympathy," *TJT*, December 5, 2002.
- 3 "Pyongyang Nuclear Programme Climbs Revised Talks Agenda," *TNW*, October 21, 2002; Tetsuya Harada, "Koizumi Fails to Explain Policy Changes," *TDY*, October 19, 2002;
- 4 James Brooke, "North Korea and Japan Sign Deal on Abductions," *TNYT*, May 23, 2004; James Brooke, "Koizumi's Trip Gets Lukewarm Reviews," *TNYT*, May 24, 2004; "North Korea Trip Falls Short of Billing," *TNW*, May 31, 2004; "Few Support Provision of Aid to North Korea," *TDY*, September 17, 2004; Akinori Uchida, "North Korea Talks Bring Little Joy; Insufficient Info on Abductees Puts Government Policy Under Pressure," *TDY*, September 28, 2004; "70% Say Government Wrong to Give North Korea Aid," *TDY*, October 1, 2004.
- 5 "Koizumi to Mend Ties in Beijing; Prime Minister to Express Remorse for Japan's 'aggression' in China," *TDY*, October 8, 2001; Eric Eckholm, "Japanese Leader, Visiting China, Is Mildly Rebuked on Army Role," *TNYT*, October 9, 2001;

“warmed up particularly”¹ under Hosokawa who issued an apology for Japan's “war of aggression” in China and even “expressed some support for China vis-a-vis the US on human rights by employing Asianist norms.”² The Sino-Japanese relationship went through a period of tensions in 1995-1996 in connection with the Taiwan Strait missile crisis and China's nuclear tests which were outlined in Chapter Four. By 2004, tensions between China and Japan were intensifying. In such an environment, the 2004 NDPG, unlike the 1995 NDPO, included China (and North Korea) in the review of national security concerns, which was a logical result of a number of factors including China's military modernisation, bilateral territorial disputes, and other incidents solidifying Japan's threat perceptions.³ But Koizumi's provocative visits to Yasukuni also had an important domestic political dimension with a number of “ulterior [political] motives”:

wresting the issue of the control of history away from potential right-wing rivals, asserting his authority over the control of Japan-China relations, stimulating a debate on whether Japan should stop letting history impede it from assuming a more active diplomatic and security role, and asserting Japan's new refusal to automatically placate China and South Korea on issues of history.⁴

The above observations indicate, in line with the overwhelming weight of scholarly opinion on the subject, that Koizumi after 9/11 sought to strengthen the security relationship with the US and expand the boundaries of the US-Japan alliance by shifting it to a status of a “global” alliance (*sekai-no naka-no nichibei doumei*).⁵ Koizumi's successes in bringing Japan closer to the US were comparable to his diplomatic clumsiness and failures in Northeast Asia. There, ostensibly over issues of colonial history interpretations, especially Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine, but also in the context of territorial dispute incidents, and other developments outlined in Chapter Four, Japan's relations with its neighbours went through a period of high tensions.

1 Hook et al., *Japan's IR*, 197.

2 Ibid., 197.

3 Hook et al., *Japan's IR*, 167.

4 Hughes and Krauss, “Japan's New Security Agenda,” *Survival* 49, no. 2 (2007): 163.

5 *Mainichi Shimbun*, October 20, 2005; quoted in Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 193.

Koizumi's successor Shinzo Abe (26.09.2006 – 26.09.2007) presents a case of a politician intoxicated with nationalism, whose behaviour and words, as well as those of his ministers, occasionally bewildered both the domestic and the international audience.¹ Nonetheless, despite some aberrations by Abe and his team, some progress on BMD was made under the Prime Minister who was seen as a strong BMD supporter.² Under him, the JDA's transformation into MOD in January 2007 was completed; the government approved Essential Emergency Response Guidelines allowing the Defence Minister to order interception of incoming ballistic missiles by PAC-3 without the Prime Minister's prior authorisation;³ GSOMIA was signed in August 2007. Another crucial victory Abe was trying to score was the revision of the constitution to create a firm legal basis permitting the exercise of collective defence. For this purpose Abe created in April 2007 the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security.⁴ The Cabinet's weakness and Abe's resignation pushed this issue down the priorities' list for the time being, but Abe did succeed in creating the bill to establish procedures for a national referendum to revise the constitution which did not exist before and which was a necessary step for constitutional amendments.⁵

In connection with Koizumi and Abe, in particular, Gavan McCormack's observation can tie all these episodes together: "The link between militarisation, service to the US, and patriotic and nationalist ideology has been plain at successive stages of Japan's postwar

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- 1 "Fury as Minister's gaffe on 'Child-bearing Machines,'" *The Times*, January 29, 2007; "Gaffes Dog Abe's Leadership," *TJT*, February 5, 2007; "Abe: No Apology over US 'comfort women' resolution," *TDY*, March 6, 2007; "Editorial; Don't Misinterpret Comfort Women Issue," *TDY*, March 7, 2007; "Abe Puts WWII Sex-Slave Controversy on Front Burner," *TNW*, March 12, 2007; "A-bomb Gaffe Sinks Kyuma; Abe Appoints Koike to Replace Outspoken Defence Minister," *TDY*, July 4, 2007; "Angry at Abe," *The Times*, July 26, 2007; Norimitsu Onishi, "Premier's Sudden Resignation Leaves Japan in Disarray," *TNYT*, September 13, 2007; Koichi Akaza, "After Abe; Prime Minister's Decision Incomprehensible," *TDY*, September 13, 2007; Gregory Clark, "Getting Japan's Politics Wrong," *TJT*, October 8, 2007.
 - 2 "Under Fukuda, Japan Accelerates BMD Cooperation with the US," *WMD Insights*, February 2008, accessed May 9, 2009, http://www.wmdinsights.org/I22/I22_EA5_JapanAcceleratesBMD.htm.
 - 3 "Government OK's Emergency Response Guideline against Missile Attack," *JEN*, March 23, 2007; Shingo Ito, "Japan Deploys Own Ballistic Missile Defences," *AFP*, March 30, 2007.
 - 4 "Referendum Bill Passes Diet; Law – Key to Amending Constitution to Be Enforced after 3 Years," *TDY*, May 15, 2007; Yuji Anai and Shozo Nakayama, "Constitutional Revision Now on Front Burner," *TDY*, May 16, 2007;
 - 5 The Referendum Law passed in May 2007 took effect three years later in 2010. See Jun Hongo, "Referendum Law in Effect But No Amendments Eyed," *TJT*, May 18, 2010.

political evolution.”¹ McCormack's argument in *Client State* may be a bit far-fetched in some places, but the “fusion of nationalism, militarisation, and enthusiasm to serve the US”² is a productive perspective on Koizumi's and Abe's foreign and domestic policies.³ The BMD decisions, given the system's potentialities to serve different audiences emphasised in the previous chapters, fit rather well into such a scheme.

Koizumi, compared to Abe, likely played an important role in BMD, but it is difficult to judge Koizumi's case even though many BMD-related decisions were made while he was Prime Minister. These key decisions included: the deployment decision of 2003 on track I, decision to relax the application of the arms export ban in the case of BMD, and development decision of 2005 on track II. But what changed between 2001, when he was reluctant on BMD, and the time of these positive decisions? Could it be that the US blurring of the distinction between NMD and TMD played a role in the initial reluctance? – Yes.⁴ Could it be that the US's decision to speed up its BMD programme played an important role in accelerating Japan's decisions?⁵ – Yes. Could it be that North Korea's nuclear news in 2002 directly contributed to Japan's progress toward the deployment of BMD?⁶ – Yes. On the important and even determining nature of the latter two points there seems to be a kind of a consensus in the “mainstream” literature, as was shown in the review in Chapter Two. The neoclassical-realist framework of this thesis also emphasises the importance of the systemic parameters, but it emphasises their importance from the security-policy and technological perspectives identified in Chapter Five. The evidence on the Prime Ministers does not substantiate some of the claims, for example, because Prime Ministers' statements linking BMD and the country's space (including space militarisation) efforts have not yet been

1 Gavan McCormack, *Client State. Japan in the American Embrace* (Verso, 2007), 201.

2 Ibid.

3 See also Takahiko Tennichi, “Koizumi Can't Be Both Right- and Left-wing,” *TDY*, July 8, 2001.

4 Toshio Hiei, “Defence Agency Has Many Questions About NMD,” *TDY*, May 17, 2001; “US May Press Japan to Clarify NMD Stance,” *TNW*, June 11, 2001.

5 Takao Hishinuma, “US to Press Japan to Build Missile Shield,” *TDY*, November 8, 2002.

6 Akio Mori, “Government to Study Missile Defence Development,” *TDY*, December 18, 2002.

uncovered, to the best of my knowledge, even though such links are almost certain. But the evidence on the Prime Ministers reviewed above is compatible with the security-policy perspectives identified in Chapter Four and with the argument about the potentialities of BMD identified in Chapter Five.

As regards Koizumi and the *Kantei*, in particular, one important point should be made here. While I find it rather difficult to identify the exact role of the *Kantei* in the BMD decisions, one observation is instructive. Assuming a connection between BMD and Japan's space efforts, substantiated in the previous chapters, it can be argued that the *Kantei* likely played an important role in BMD, too. Historically, from the 1970s through 2002, Japan's space policy concerned itself with “lofty” concepts and “generalities.”¹ However, from the early 2000s, “subtle but important steps” in publicising the connection between space planning and defence of Japan were made.² The “pivotal role” in this was ascribed to the then newly created Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP) which is subordinated to the Cabinet Office.³

Then, in 2005, a group called the National Space Strategy Planning Group (NSSPG) and led by Koizumi's Education, Science and Technology Minister Takeo Kawamura emphasised using space for national security. Kawamura's and the NSSPG's activities set Japan “more openly down the path toward space security consciousness as never before.”⁴ Specifically, Kawamura started calling for a broader interpretation of the resolution on the peaceful use of space as not strictly non-military but simply non-aggressive in 2005⁵ and later participated in the drafting of the Basic Space Law.⁶ Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu

1 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 34.

2 *Ibid.*, 35.

3 *Ibid.*

4 *Ibid.*, 39, 169.

5 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 39

6 “Taro Aso Cabinet Profiles: Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura,” *TJT*, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cabinet/cabinet_profiles_m.html; “Profile: Kawamura Contributed to Basic Law on Space Use,” *JEN*, September 24, 2008; “DPJ Joins Ruling Camp on Space Bill,” *TDY*, May 23, 2008.

believed that “[through its initiatives] the NSSPG sought to find ways to dispel long-standing frustrations voiced by some in the LDP, the JDA, and defence-related corporations.”¹ Koizumi and the *Kantei* likely played an important role in this process of space development (and militarisation).² But so did several other types of actors. The following section will outline a circle of these actors which, as could be seen from Appendix C, included, *inter alia*, representatives of the *Kantei*.

7.3. Elite networks and BMD.

The status of transnational elite networks as legitimate and promising objects of scholarly policy-analysis was confirmed in Chapter Three. Keck and Sikkink's and Slaughter's publications were reviewed there to indicate the similarities and differences between the elite networks documented in this thesis and in those publications. The networks analysed in this thesis, closer to Slaughter's, are characterised by an “eclectic mix of actors,” including corporations,³ with a strong legislative and governmental presence. The implication of such a mix of high-ranking figures is that these networks possibly had some influence on the country's security decisions. It is one of the theoretically relevant contributions of this thesis to say that it is potentially productive for the field of the Japanese security policy research to analyse the activities of elite networks with eclectic memberships including US and Japanese corporate executives, legislators, and government officials (present and former).

As I have indicated in the previous chapters of this thesis, the most explicit and transparent way in which these security elite networks manifested themselves in the period

1 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 40.

2 Eiichiro Sekigawa, “Koizumi Consolidates Japan's Space Agencies,” *AWST*, September 3, 2001; Sumiko Oshima, “Industry-friendly Space Policy Emerges from Koizumi Review,” *AWST*, July 1, 2002; Frank Moring, Jr. and Michael Mecham, “One JAXA; Restructured Japanese Space Agency Has Big Plans, But Uncertain Funds,” *AWST*, November 28, 2005; Sawako Maeda, “Transformation of Japanese Space Policy: From the 'Peaceful Use of Space' to the 'Basic law on Space,’” *The Asia-Pacific Journal (Japan Focus)*, November 2, 2009, <http://japanfocus.org/-Maeda-Sawako/3243>.

3 Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy,” 192.

of interest and with reference to BMD was in the format of Japan's Congressional National Security Research Group (*Anzenhoshou giin kyougikai*, NSRG), an NPO called Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange (*Nichibei heiwa bunka kouryuu kyoukai*, the Centre), and the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference and Exhibition (the Conference), formerly known as the US-Japan Security Forum.

The involvement of these elite networks in military procurement affairs in Japan came to light, in particular, in the autumn of 2007 when Takemasa Moriya, soon after his retirement from the post of the administrative defence vice-minister, was accused of accepting free golf trips from a former executive of Yamada Corp., a defence equipment trading company, knowing that they were “in return for favours and incentives for future special treatment.”¹ At the end of November, Moriya and his wife were arrested.² One year later, Moriya, who was once known as the “shadow defence minister”³ and “defence emperor,”⁴ was convicted in court of accepting bribes from a defence equipment company (and for giving false testimony to the Diet) in exchange for his recommendations on government weapons procurement which included the 2004-2005 purchase of General Electric (GE) engines for Japan's next-generation transport aircraft C-X.⁵ GE's trading agent in Japan was Nihon Mirise, a firm set up by the former Yamada executive Motonobu Miyazaki in 2006. If Moriya influenced some of the procurement for the C-X, which is a

1 “A fresh Defence Scandal,” *TJT*, October 28, 2007; “Mr Moriya's Testimony,” *TJT*, November 1, 2007; Setsuko Kamiya and Masami Ito, “Moriya Implicates Former Defence Chiefs,” *TJT*, November 16, 2007.

2 According to the sources of the *Daily Yomiuri*, Moriya's wife Sachiko served as an executive of *Mihatokai*, a social group comprising wives of senior officials; she also reportedly played a central role in the group; she was released because prosecutors concluded she played a minor role. “Moriya Calm before Turning Himself In,” *TDY*, November 29, 2007; “Prosecutors Eye Action against Moriya,” *TDY*, November 27, 2007; “Ex-vice Defence Minister Arrested,” *TNW*, December 3, 2007; “Moriya Rearrested over Bribes,” *TDY*, December 19, 2007.

3 “Moriya Built Web of Info Providers; Former Vice defence Minister Earned Nickname 'Shadow Defence Minister,’” *TDY*, October 30, 2007.

4 Justin McCurry, “Japan Rocked by Bribery Scandal,” *The Guardian*, November 30, 2007.

5 “Moriya Teed off as SDF Toiled; Free Golf Sessions Continued Regardless of Natural Disasters,” *TDY*, December 1, 2007; “Miyazaki: Moriya Never Paid for Golf,” *TDY*, December 6, 2007; “Moriya Expresses Regret for 'Crimes'; Contrite-looking Former Top Defence Bureaucrat Admits Causing 'Serious Trouble,’” *TDY*, April 22, 2007; “Judge Blasts 'Shadow Minister,’” *TDY*, November 6, 2008; “Moriya Sentenced to 2-1/2 Years for Bribery,” *TDY*, November 6, 2008; “Prison Sentence for Ex-vice Defence Minister Upheld,” *JEN*, December 22, 2009; “Jail Sentence Becomes Final for Ex-Japan Defence Official,” *Jiji Press Ticker Service*, August 31, 2010; “Former Top Defence Bureaucrat Put in Prison,” *JEN*, September 21, 2010.

fact, must we not expect that some BMD relevant decisions had also been made in similarly questionable ways, with vested interests influencing or even dominating the process? Such a suspicion is strengthened by the fact that Moriya was a leading figure in the TMD Working Group from 1994¹ and was the head of the JDA's BMD Research Office, one of the earliest study groups established within the JDA in 1995 to investigate missile defence for Japan.² Furthermore, in October 2006 Moriya received an international award recognising his contribution to advancing missile defence concepts, programmes, and technology.³

The “Moriya scandal” also led to the exposure of Naoki Akiyama,⁴ a person sometimes described as a mediator between the politicians, military establishment and military-related industries. Akiyama, in turn, was on the Executive Directors board of the Centre, had strong links to the NSRG, and promoted the Conference. Many sessions of the Conference which took place twice a year in Washington and Tokyo were dedicated to issues of missile defence. It is probably also not unremarkable that the Centre’s directors board included, among others, Yoshihiko Yonezu, President and CEO of Yamada Corp.⁵ According to the *Daily Yomiuri*, Yamada's former senior managing director Miyazaki, who was convicted for bribing Moriya, also served on the board of the Centre.⁶

In light of the such observations, one may be fairly tempted to suspect that the key individuals in these networks would not have left such a major procurement as missile defence without their “guidance.” This initial suspicion, on my part, justified a detailed

1 “Japan, US to Start TMD Research,” *Jiji Press Ticker Service*, October 26, 1994.

2 The JCP Diet member Akira Kasai's remarks in the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on December 7, 2007, National Diet Minutes, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/168/0005/main.html>.

3 The David Israel Award is presented annually by the International Programme Committee (which consists of the US, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and the UK), American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and the US MDA to people who contributed to advancing missile defence concepts, programmes, and technology. Israel was the chief engineer and Deputy Director of the US SDI Office. On the award information, see Boeing's official website, accessed January 6, 2010, http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2002/q2/nr_020604v.html; for Moriya's award news, see MOD's official website, news updates rubric for October 2006, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/update/2006.html>.

4 “Moriya Suspected of Favouritism in 7 Defence-related Deals,” *TDY*, December 20, 2007.

5 “Moriya Cautious in 2nd Diet Appearance,” *TDY*, November 16, 2007; “Defence Scandal Takes New Twist,” *TNW*, November 19, 2007;

6 “Editorial; Paying for Golf Judged Tantamount to Bribery,” *TDY*, November 29, 2007; “Former Top Defence Bureaucrat Put in Prison,” *JEN*, September 21, 2010.

translation and comparison of membership lists of the NSRG, the Centre, as well as the Conference’s organisers and speakers. Regarding the Conference, the availability of meeting notes from some years will allow me to analyse the views of important elites on BMD in order to establish if and why they might have influenced the BMD decisions.

Identifying the members of the Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange and the National Congressional Security Research Group

I have access to the membership list of the Centre for 2007 and 2009. The 2007 list is extracted from an issue of *Shuukan Kinyoubi*, the credibility of which I evaluate as moderate. We learn about the 2009 members from the Centre’s official website. Whether everyone who is involved with the Centre’s activities is included on the website’s list is an open question, but the displayed names can be accepted as true.

Figure 7.1. Directors board of Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange (2007).¹

<i>Name</i>	<i>Selected affiliations and positions held</i>
Tamisuke Watanuki	Former Lower House speaker, Secretary of LDP, leader of People’s New Party, NSRG
Tsutomu (/Riki) Kawara	JDA Director General (1987-88, 1999-2000, 2000), LDP, National Security Research Group (NSRG)
Fumio Kyuma	Minister of Defence (2007), JDA Director General (1996-1998, 2006-2007), LDP, NSRG
Fukushiro Nukaga	Minister of Finance (2007-2008), JDA Director General (1998, 2005-2006), LDP PARC Head (2003-2004), NSRG
Takashi Nishioka	Mitsubishi Heavy industries (MHI) Chairman, Keidanren Defence Production Committee (DPC) Chairman
Ichiro Taniguchi	Mitsubishi Electric Company (Melco) Adviser
Tokuichiro Tamazawa	JDA Director General (1994-1995), LDP, NSRG
Gen Nakatani	JDA Director General (2001-2002), LDP, NSRG
Shigeru Ishiba	Minister of Defence (2007-2008), JDA Director General (2002-2004), LDP, NSRG
Kiichi Inoue	Former Minister for Special Missions (Natural Disasters, Emergencies), LDP, NSRG
Masao Akamatsu	Lower House member, New Komeito Party, NSRG
Seiji Maehara	Former President of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), NSRG

1 *Mitsubishi juukou-no shoutai [The True Face of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries]* (Tokyo: Shuukan Kinyoubi, 2008), 19. The affiliations and positions of some of the members in the table have been extracted from a number of other sources, including these individuals’ and companies’ official websites by the author. Note that all directors except for Akiyama are part-time.

Noboru Hoshuyama	Former Head of Defence Facilities Administrative Agency (1994-1995)
Tatsuo Sato	Mitsubishi Corporation Executive, Head of Aerospace Division
Toshitsugu Saito	JDA Director General (2000-2001), LDP, NSRG
Tsutomu Takebe	Former LDP Secretary General (2004-2006), NSRG
Ken Sato	Former Administrative Defence Vice-Minister (2000-2002)
Kazuhiro Sugita	Former top official in the Cabinet Crisis management Office
Hiroo Kinoshita	Former Director of Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (METI), Director of the Japan Association of Defence Industries (JADI)
Hidetsugu Horikawa	Vice-President of Aerospace Division, Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI)
Junichi Nishiyama	Adviser to MHI Aerospace Division
Mamoru Yamashita	Head of Aerospace Defence Business Headquarters, NEC
Kunizo Sakai	Chair and C.E.O. of Hitachi Defence Systems Business Unit
Yasuyuki Watanabe	Head of Aerospace Business Headquarters, Ishikawajima-harima Heavy Industries (IHI)
Masashi Koizumi	President of Toshiba Electro-Wave Products Co., Ltd.
Nobuyuki Kasagawa	President of Aerospace and Electronics Company, Itochu Corp.
Yoshihiro Fujiura	Head of Ship, Aerospace and Transport Systems Headquarters, Sumitomo Corp.
Yoji Yamashita	Marubeni Aerospace
Michiharu Sora	Head of Ship and Aerospace Division, Sojitz Corp.
Jun Tanaka	Managing Executive Officer, Director of Engineering Business in Machinery Engineering Company, Kobe Steel, Ltd.
Keiichi Hatakeyama	Professor of International Relations, Gakushuin Women's College
Naoki Akiyama	Executive Director of the Centre
Yoshiyuki Kasai	Chairman of Central Japan Railway Company
Miyuki Inoue	Board member of Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention and some other NPOs
Yoshihiko Yonezu	President and CEO of Yamada Corp.
William S. Cohen	President Clinton's Defence Secretary (1997-2001)
William Schneider, Jr.	Chairman of US Defence Science Board, Member of the Commission of the US Aerospace Industry
Edwin J. Feulner	President of the Heritage Foundation ¹
Michael Armacost	US Ambassador to Japan (1989-1993), President of the Brookings Institution (1995-2002)

1 The Heritage Foundation (HF) and the Brookings Institution (BI) are sometimes described as the leading players in policymaking on the Capitol Hill with the more conservative HI allegedly "having clout" under the Republicans in Congress and the BI being more influential under the Democrats. A WSJ reporter observed in 1995: "With the Republicans' rise to control of Congress, think-tank power in the nation's capital has shifted to the right. And no policy shop has more clout than the conservative HF." Christopher Georges, "Conservative Heritage Foundation Finds Recipe for Influence: Ideas + Marketing = Clout," *The Wall Street Journal*, J, A10, August 10, 1995. See also Frank Fischer, "American Think Tanks: Policy Elites and the Politicisation of Expertise," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration* 4, no. 3 (July 1991): 332-53; Val Burris, "Elite Policy-planning Networks in the United States," *Research in Politics and Society* 4 (1992): 111-34. For further journalistic views, see "The Carousels of Power," *The Economist*, May 25, 1991; Mark Tran, "Inauguration: Think-Tanks Fill as 'Government in Exile' Sets up in Washington," *The Guardian*, January 20, 1993; "The Charge of the Think-tanks," *The Economist*, February 15, 2003.

The Centre's directors board has been significantly trimmed by April 2009, probably under the "toxic" influence of the "Moriya scandal." Compared to 2007, the 2009 board includes no representatives from the industry. Additionally, the news rubric on the Centre's website, as of September 16, 2009, contained a one-sentence announcement about the "suspension of the Centre's previous activities."¹

This "suspension of activities" has some history, of which one episode is highly instructive. In 2005, as was confirmed by a MOFA official at the Foreign Affairs Committee meeting in the House of Representatives on December 7, 2007,² the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "ordered" the US-Japan Society for Cultural Promotion, also known as Japan-American Cultural Society (*Nichibei bunka shinkoukai*, the Society), which was the name of the Centre before 2006, to "stop the dissemination of defence information" (*kokubou jouhou haishin-no jugyou*) because this activity was found to be in violation of the Centre's statute.³ Prompted by the committee member from the JCP Akira Kasai, the MOFA official Tadamichi Yamamoto explained that the "dissemination of defence information" referred to, for example, procurement and industrial relations information being distributed between the research institutes and companies with membership in the Centre.⁴ At the same meeting, the issue of the Centre's participation in the organisation of defence equipment exhibitions, which were held between 2003 and 2007 concurrently with the Conference, was brought up.⁵ Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura promised to take "appropriate measures" in the case this was confirmed.⁶ It is difficult to find out what "appropriate measures" were taken, and taken they should have been because there is plenty of even photographic evidence on the NSRG website.

1 The Centre's official website, accessed September 15, 2009, http://www.ja-cpce.jp/whats_new.htm.

2 The National Diet Library website, database of National Diet Minutes, accessed September 15, 2009, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/168/0005/16812070005005a.html>.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

Figure 7.2. Directors board of Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange (2009).¹

<i>Name</i>	<i>Selected affiliations and positions held</i>
Tamisuke Watanuki* ²	Former Lower House speaker, Secretary of LDP, leader of the People's New Party, NSRG
Tsutomu (/Riki) Kawara*	JDA Director General (1987-88, 1999-2000, 2000), LDP, National Security Research Group (NSRG)
Fumio Kyuma*	Fourth Chairman of the Centre, Minister of Defence (2007), JDA Director General (1996-1998, 2006-2007), LDP, Chairman of NSRG
Tokuichiro Tamazawa*	JDA Director General (1994-1995), LDP, NSRG
Kiichi Inoue*	Former Minister for Special Missions (Natural Disasters, Emergencies), LDP, NSRG
Noboru Hoshuyama*	Former Head of Defence Facilities Administrative Agency (1994-1995)
Toshitsugu Saito*	JDA Director General (2000-2001), LDP, NSRG
Naoki Akiyama*	Executive Director of the Centre
Keiichi Hatakeyama*	Professor of International Relations, Gakushuin Women's College
Mitsuyoshi Urashima	Medical scientist, Panellist at the 2006 Security Strategy Conference – panel title “Countering biological and chemical terrorism”
Hiromitsu Ogawa	Possibly a scientist at a university in Tokyo
William S. Cohen*	President Clinton's Secretary of Defence (1997-2001)
William Schneider, Jr.*	Chairman of US Defence Science Board, Member of the Commission of the US Aerospace Industry
Michael Armacost*	U.S. Ambassador to Japan (1989-1993), President of the Brookings Institution (1995-2002)
Anthony T. Tu	University Professor (biochemistry, molecular biology, toxicology), Author of “Chemical terrorism: Horrors in Tokyo subway and Matsumoto City”
Taku Asada	Director General of the Centre

How should this recent purge of businessmen from the directors board be interpreted? – As an aberration in the long history of “cultural exchange” between bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and politicians from both countries in the military area? Or was the collusion apparent in the 2007 directors list an exception? An understanding of this issue is important because it can suggest the possible strength of the Centre's influence on Japan's BMD decisions.

I see three complementary ways of addressing this point. The first of them can be

1 The Centre's official website, accessed September 15, 2009, http://www.ja-cpce.jp/directors_list.htm.

2 The asterisk* indicates a director who has also been on the Centre's board in 2007.

called “reputational approach” which involves identifying pieces of past research which ascribed to the Centre some decisionmaking role in the country’s post-World War II weapons procurement. Chinworth, Samuels, and Green in their well-known books,¹ as well as other researchers of the subject,² did identify links between industrial policy and defence equipment acquisition; they also pointed to the centrality of bilateral connections between bureaucrats, politicians, and the private sector to policy outcomes. The conclusions of some of them were, it must be said, a bit far-fetched. For example, without providing evidence on the actual policymaking, Oros made an assertion, referring to one former Foreign Minister, one former and one then-JDA Director General, a few LDP Diet members, US Defence Secretary Cohen and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, that: “The interaction among these politicians and bureaucrats, and with key industry figures, determined the future course of the surveillance satellite programme.”³ But no studies of Japan’s procurements, to the best of my knowledge, have dealt explicitly with the Centre, at least until the “Moriya scandal.”

Another way of appreciating the Centre’s possible influence on the country’s security policy is by reviewing the directors names at the time of the Centre’s establishment. We know the names of the members in 1968 when the Japan-American Society for Cultural Promotion (*Nichibei bunka shinkoukai*) was recognised by MOFA as the first “public-service corporation” (*koueki houjin*), from the Centre’s Statute of 2006.⁴

Figure 7.3. Directors board of Japan-U.S. Society for Cultural Promotion (1968).⁵

<i>Name</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Jiuji Kasai	Chairman, founder of the Society, Author of “The New US-Japan Era” (1976)
Naka Funada	JDA Director General (1955-1956), LDP, Lower House Diet member
Umekichi Nakamura	Lower House Diet member, several Cabinet level positions, LDP

1 Chinworth, *Inside Japan’s Defence*; Samuels, *Rich Nation*; Green, *Arming Japan*.

2 Kohno, “FSX;” Han, “PXL;” Oros, “Surveillance Satellites.”

3 Oros, “Surveillance Satellites,” 36.

4 The Statute of the Centre from its official website, accessed September 21, 2009, http://www.ja-cpce.jp/info_data/Teikan.pdf.

5 *Ibid.*, 11-12. Information on the individuals in the table has been compiled from a variety of online sources including the dictionaries on <http://kotobank.jp>.

Den Takase	Diet member; Socialist Party, then Reform Party (Kaishinto), then LDP
Shiro Kiuchi	Upper House Diet member, LDP, Director of Science and Technology Agency (1968-1970)
Haruhiko Uetake	Upper House Diet member, LDP, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications
Eber Riggi	
Kiyoshi Yamagata	
Roku Ando	Possibly Chairman of Odakyu Electric Railway
Yoshio Akao	Chairman of Cultural Broadcasting (<i>Bunka Housou</i>) and Japan Education Television (<i>Nippon Kyouiku Terebi</i> , present day TV Asahi) companies
Ryo Iwatere	
Takeo Ogawa	
Kiyoshi Ichimura	Founder of Ricoh, Mitsubishi Corp., Mitsubishi Oil, Nippon Risu (All parts of the Ricoh-Mitsubishi Group)
Kinjiro Ohki	Possibly Professor of Economics, Aoyama Gakuin
Takeshi Ohno	
Minoru Segawa	President and Chairman of Nomura Securities Co., Ltd.
Sohachi Yamaoka	Popular writer of historical novels; pen name of Fujino Shozoh
Shozoh Fujino	Real name of Sohachi Yamaoka ¹
Kenichi Yamaoka	Founder of JUKI Corp.
Kiyokazu Yoshikawa	
Yoshio Yoshimoto	
Shigeki Tashiro	President of Toyo Rayon Co. (Toray)
Ichiro Osuga	
Toshihiro Tahara	
Kizaburo Kisha	
Mitsuji Oda	
Keizo Obata	
Kiichiro Sugino	
Isao Matsudaira	Upper House Diet member, Fukushima Governor
Shouhei Kamada	
Kenneth Lloyd Cole	
Kazuo Ozeki	
Kiyoo Senmasa	

While I was unable to identify half of the names on the above list, if we look at the known names we can conclude that the industrial world and the elected politicians had a substantial representation in the Society. The military bureaucracy in the Society at this point, unlike in 2007, when the Centre appeared like Japan's military planning headquarters, had only one identified high-ranking official – the JDA Director General Naka Funada. Moreover, even interpreting the consistent presence on the Society's/ Centre's board of

¹ Yamaoka Sohachi and Fujino Shozoh were names of one person but, strangely, probably by mistake, these names appear on the list as different people.

Mitsubishi and other industrialists as more than just an expression of profound interest on the part of the private sector in Japan-US-related security affairs would also be a little far-fetched. This is so because Mitsubishi’s affiliates would have numerous representatives at different levels of hierarchy in many other national security related think-tanks in Tokyo, including RIPS.¹ I thus have insufficient evidence to claim that the Centre was programmed from its inception to serve as a hub for some actors from the US and Japan in negotiating military affairs and weapons acquisition, even after taking into account the personality of the Society’s founder Jiuji Kasai, the author of “The New U.S.-Japan Era” (1976), who had a reputation of a “fixer” deeply involved in managing US-Japan postwar relations.

The third way of illuminating if the year 2007 was an aberration for the Centre, whereas at other points in time the directors board would not be exceptional compared with other similar institutions in the Japanese society, is by analysing the Centre’s sister organisation – the NSRG – and the notes from the Conference which was organised by both groups. The membership list of the NSRG used to be available online but is no more so I am relying on the notes I made in 2007 from their website.²

Figure 7.4. Directors board of the National Congressional Security Research Group (2007).³

<i>Name</i>	<i>Selected affiliations and positions held</i>
Tamisuke Watanuki* ⁴	Honorary Adviser to NSRG, Former Lower House speaker, Secretary of LDP, leader of People’s New Party
Tsutomu (/Riki) Kawara*	Chairman of NSRG, JDA Director General (1987-88, 1999-2000, 2000), LDP
Fumio Kyuma*	Vice-Chairman of NSRG, Minister of Defence (2007), JDA Director General (1996-1998, 2006-2007), LDP
Fukushiro Nukaga*	Minister of Finance (2007-2008), JDA Director General (1998, 2005-2006), LDP PARC Head (2003-2004)
Tokuichiro Tamazawa*	JDA Director General (1994-1995), LDP

- 1 Nobuyuki Masuda (MHI, Counsellor) as Chairman of the RIPS Directors Board, Tatsuo Sato (Mitsubishi Corporation, Corporate Advisor), Yokichi Hirota (Melco, Corporate Advisor) as trustees. Most major contractors from NEC to KHI are also represented on the RIPS Directors and Trustees Boards. See the official English and Japanese versions of the website of RIPS: http://www.rips.or.jp/english/about_rips/board_members.html and <http://www.rips.or.jp/institute/yakuin.html>, accessed September 22, 2009.
- 2 The official website of the NSRG, accessed September 22, 2009, <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/>,
- 3 Ibid., accessed in 2007.
- 4 The asterisk* indicates that the individual was also on the board of the Centre in 2007.

Toshitsugu Saito*	JDA Director General (2000-2001), LDP
Shigeru Ishiba*	Minister of Defence (2007-2008), JDA Director General (2002-2004), LDP
Kiichi Inoue*	Former Minister for Special Missions (Natural Disasters, Emergencies), LDP
Tsutomu Takebe*	Former LDP Secretary General (2004-2006)
Gen Nakatani*	JDA Director General (2001-2002), LDP
Masao Akamatsu*	Lower House member, New Komeito Party
Seiji Maehara*	Former President of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
Shigeki Sato	Chief of New Komeito Foreign Policy and Security Research Group
Yasukazu Hamada	Minister of Defence (2008-2009), LDP
Masahiro Tabata	Deputy Head of New Komeito Security Division
Otohiko Endo	Former Acting Head of New Komeito Foreign Policy and Security Division
Yoshinori Suematsu	DPJ, official in a number of Lower House security related committees
Hiroshi Imazu	Former JDA Administrative Vice-Minister, LDP
Taro Kimura	Former JDA Vice-Minister, LDP
Takahide Kimura	Former Defence Vice-Minister
Takeaki Matsumoto	Former Head of Policy Affairs Research Council , DPJ
Masazumi Gotoda	Possibly Formerly Mitsubishi Corporation, Parliamentary Secretary (Finances), LDP
Kosaburo Nishime	Deputy Head of LDP Committee on Security Relations Organisations

The notes on the Conference are posted online on the NSRG website – I assume that these notes and conference schedules are likely to be authentic; additionally, they have been frequently brought up as evidence in Diet committee hearings related to the “Moriya affair.” My immediate objective in analysing the Conference notes is to investigate who participated in these conferences between 2000 and 2007.


My discussion of the data on the Conference participants below is based on my translation and summary of the Conference notes appended to the thesis. Appendix B contains the information on the US-Japan Security Strategy Forum (2000-2003). In May 2003, the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference was inaugurated as a successor to the Forum. The hosts of the Conference remained the same – the NSRG, The Heritage Foundation, the National Policy Research Institute (*Chuuseiken*), and the US-Japan Cultural Society (from 2006 known as the US-Japan Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange). The Conference would typically take place twice a year – in May in Washington, DC, and in

November in Tokyo. In total, ten conferences were held until 2007. For each event except for the meetings in Washington in 2003 and 2004, fairly detailed notes are available on the NSRG website. Tables in the Appendix C summarise the same information as for the Fora above but thanks to the availability of speech transcripts and panel minutes it also includes a synopsis version of the views on missile defence and/ or related issues brought up by participants.

Analysing the members of the Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange and the National Congressional Security Research Group


Here, I would like to identify the types of the Conference participants. The most straightforward typology I can do is based on their formal affiliations. Let me graphically summarise and compare the data on the CPCE directors, NSRG members, and Conference participants on the basis of Appendices B and C.

Figure 7.5. Types of the Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange directors by affiliation in 2007.




As the diagram shows, two groups with the largest representation on the directors board of the Centre are the largest Japanese military contractors and the JDA/ MOD officials. Characteristically, eight out of nine such officials had an experience of occupying the highest defence posts of the JDA Director General, Minister of Defence, or – no less significantly for procurement matters, as we learn from the “Moriya affair,” – administrative defence vice-minister.

Figure 7.6. Proportion of the CPCE directors holding membership in the NSRG (2007).




The 31% overlap between the formal board members of the Centre and the NSRG is not unremarkable, especially, because the NSRG, by virtue of its name, can include only the Diet members with an interest in national security affairs.

Figure 7.7. Party affiliation of the NSRG members in 2007.



While the overwhelming dominance of LDP representatives among the NSRG members is no surprise and the presence of four Komeito affiliates can be explained by coalition politics, the membership of three DPJ parliamentarians positioned the NSRG as a cross-party collective. Having on the board 48% of Diet members who had experienced formal work in the highest positions of the defence establishment makes the NSRG appear as a rather well-connected group that has probably had some resources to exert some influence on procurement decisions.

Figure 7.8. Proportion of the NSRG members with experience of JDA Director General/ Minister of Defence, Defence Vice-Minister posts in 2007.



The SSC process, which under a different name started in 1994 – around the same time as collaboration on BMD was “offered” by the US – and continued until November 2007, was a joint undertaking of the two groups. This is evident not only from the fact that the two groups have publicly acknowledged sponsorship of the Conference together with the National Policy Research Institute of Japan and the Heritage Foundation of the US, but also from the following diagrams showing the dominance of the groups’ members among the SSC participants.

Figure 7.9. Proportion of the NSRG members participating in the Tokyo SSC in 2003.




Figure 7.10. Proportion of the NSRG members participating in the Tokyo SSC in 2006.




Figure 7.11. Proportion of the CPCE members participating in the Tokyo SSC in 2003.






Figure 5.12. Proportion of the CPCE members participating in the Tokyo SSC in 2006.




The following diagrams describe the SSCs held in Tokyo in 2003 and 2007. My motivation in this selection was to demonstrate a typical Conference composition. To make the diagrams more representative I chose the Conference from the first year (2003) on which sufficiently detailed information is available and the last Conference which took place after the “Moriya scandal” erupted in August 2007 causing a series of attendance cancellations by key figures and leading to the discontinuation of the SSC format of policymaking in the following year.

Figure 7.13. Types of announced participants of the Second Japan-US Security Strategy Conference by affiliation (November 2003, Tokyo).



Note: The number of US businesses comes from one announced speaker from Boeing Vice-President and three presentations from LM, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon.

Figure 7.14. Proportion of high ranking JDA and GOJ officials, USG officials, Japanese and US military contractors among participants of November 2003 SSC.



The diagrams describing the Conference in November 2003 clearly show the presence of five main groups of participants with the JDA and US government officials delivering the largest number of speakers/ panellists.

Figure 7.15. Types of announced participants of the Tenth Japan-US Security Strategy Conference by affiliation (November 2007, Tokyo).





Figure 7.16. Proportion of high ranking JDA and GOJ officials, USG officials, Japanese and US contractors among participants of November 2007 SSC.



While 2007 saw some changes in the number of those who represented five main groups of participants in 2003 with a stronger contingent of the Japanese government “delegates” who would come mostly from the national security and intelligence bodies, and a bigger turn-out by the US and Japanese academics/ think-tank researchers, I would like to put it in perspective before drawing any final conclusions.

Figure 7.17. Types of announced participants of the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference by affiliation (2003-2007, Tokyo only).

Year Affiliations	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Academics, policy think-tank members	2	4	4	5	5
Other LDP	1	1	1	1	1
Komeito	0	0	1	0	2
DPJ	1	1	2	2	1
JDA/MOD	6	4	7	6	9
Other GOJ	4	2	2	2	6
USG	5	5	5	5	5
Japan contractors	4	5	4	5	2
US contractors	4	6	5	7	5

Over time, all types of individuals by institutional affiliation summarised in the table displayed a fairly stable pattern of participation in the Conference with the largest number of

speakers and panellists supplied by the JDA/ MOD. In light of the prominent place of Shinoda's argument on the *Kantei*, it can also be noted that each year in 2003-2006 at least one present or former *Kantei* member officially participated in the Conference in Tokyo. In 2007, three participants from the *Kantei* were formally registered. As can be seen from Appendix C, the *Kantei* people at the Conference were often from the Cabinet Office on National Security and Crisis Management and from the Cabinet Intelligence Office. This signifies the regular presence of the *Kantei* in the networks and suggests their interest in participating in these networks. Empirical work on what exactly the *Kantei*'s presence in the networks meant for Japan's security policy and BMD could not be done. At the same time, the data discussed in this and the following chapter collectively suggest that the networks probably had some influence on shaping Japan's BMD decisions. The participation of the *Kantei*'s members in the meetings of the networks points to both the networks' possible influence on some decisions and to the possibility of the *Kantei*'s important role in making security decisions relevant to BMD. Such an analysis makes it compatible with Shinoda's argument summarised in Chapter Three.¹

Another point is that in my analysis I rely solely on the official Conference programmes. These publicly advertised data do provide much evidence for research, but omission of information on the presence of “fixers” like Naoki Akiyama and Takemasa Moriya, who very likely took part in the SSC in some capacity, and on various procurement-related agreements reached during coffee/ smoking breaks, drinks receptions, and dinners does leave some room for the possibility of distortion in my conclusions. However, until new substantial evidence about such informal meetings is uncovered, I shall assume that any such gaps in the data do not lead to significant distortions in my overall reasoning.

A possible characteristic of the BMD policymaking suggested by my expositions above is that important types of people with interests in security policy and missile defence

1 See Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, Chapters 3-6, 133-141.

had convened regularly between 1994 and 2007 in Washington and Tokyo to discuss their views. These people often had present or former connections with the US government and the Japanese government, and were very senior representatives of the US and Japanese military contractors (appearing mostly as Vice-Presidents for missile defence matters within the largest defence companies in the US and Japan). The Japanese and US academics and policy think-tank members either chaired the panels or spoke at the sessions on biological and chemical weapons terrorism. However, most notable at the Conference was the strong detachment of the JDA Directors General, Defence Vice-Ministers, and one Minister of Defence. Overall, I can conclude that the Centre had a considerable history of bringing together important business leaders and government figures from the US and Japan and that the 2007 reformatting of the names from the directors board was likely an emergency measure in response to the “toxicity” of the “Moriya scandal.”

Evaluating the authenticity of the data

The NSRG website with the files of the Conference proceedings is an important source of information with a potential to illuminate some aspects of Japan's BMD decisions. These records, posted online, present a valuable source of well-organised data on the views of people who occupy significant positions in the security establishment. An appropriate thing before any future discussion of these data in the following chapter is to evaluate how reliable they are.

Given the fairly sensitive nature of the subject, the authenticity of the files can at first appear questionable. Just some of such statements from Appendix C are:

I think that through the good offices of the National Congressional Security Research Group, regarding missile defence cooperation, Japan has become the most affirmative nation among the US-friendly and allied nations. This is not an accident. That is why I would like to express my appreciation to all members of the NSRG and to Mr Akiyama.¹ (Baker Spring,

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-94-baker.pdf>, p. 1, accessed September 30, 2009.

senior researcher at The Heritage Foundation, August 2006)

The fact that the US relies on Japan as the only supplier of PAC-3 components for its military does not simply indicate a strengthening of the cooperation between industries, it signifies a virtual integration of the defence production bases of both countries.¹ (William Cohen, Former Secretary of Defence, August 2006)

This time, as a result of responding to the North Korean missile programme, the promotion of missile defence is “easily acceptable” (*ukeire-yasui*) so we must promote industrial cooperation.² (William Cohen, November 2003)

Even if North Korea weren't exactly a threat to Japan, other threats are likely to emerge – it is because of this that the time is probably coming when Japan has to consider involvement in the airborne laser (ABL) programme.³ (Benjamin Cassidi, Boeing Missile Defence Systems, November 2004)

From last year, I/ we have lobbied both governments to introduce licence-produced BMD from the very beginning; however, regrettably, I appreciate that as a result of procedural issues in the government the procurement of BMD in its first year had to go through the Foreign Military Sales Channel (FMS).⁴ (Takashi Nishioka, MHI Chairman, Vice Chairman of Keidanren, Chairman of Keidanren Defence Production Committee, November 2004)

How reliable are such records if they are found posted on the website of one of the organisations convening the Conference? I find them fairly reliable. A number of points can be made in support of my assessment. Firstly, as soon as the Moriya scandal broke out in 2007, the following Conference in November saw attendance cancellations by most political figures in Japan who were initially scheduled to participate (see Appendix C). Secondly, the speech texts for that November Conference contained no or almost no mentions of BMD, GSOMIA, weapons exports, or military industrial cooperation, whereas in previous conferences these themes were central – it is not easy not to relate it to the scandal. Furthermore, the Conferences stopped taking place afterwards, at least in the same format.

This latter point needs to be elaborated given that new evidence emerged in 2010.

With a delay of 18 months, notes on the 14th Visit to the US of the Diet members specialising in the US-Japan security matters (30.04.2008-09.05.2008) were posted on the NSRG website

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-101-cohen.pdf>, p. 1, accessed September 30, 2009.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2003-2/f2003-2-report.htm>, accessed September 30, 2009.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov12open02.pdf>, p. 8, accessed September 30, 2009.

4 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov12open01.pdf>, p. 15, accessed September 30, 2009.

around January 10, 2010.¹ The visit was essentially compatible with, if not identical to, the format of the Security Strategy Conferences. A most likely accidental and almost anecdotal note can be made of the “influence” of the new US administration on the venue of the meeting: the 2010 meeting took place at the Brookings Institution with its purported closeness to the US Democratic Party, and not at the Heritage Foundation with its more conservative leanings.² The 9-page long document containing the notes from the meeting at the Brookings Institution had, similarly to the last (and nearly cancelled) Conference of 2007, zero mentions of BMD even when their discussion touched upon China, North Korea, Russia, India, Pakistan, US-Russia relations and many other security aspects of international relations.³ A surprising delay in uploading these innocent notes, the absence of any other related postings, and the contents of the notes noticeably different from 2000/2003-2007, that is, pre-”Moriya scandal,” – all suggest a manipulative nature of the document. For this reason, I shall not discuss it any further in the thesis.

The third reason for considering the notes from 2000/ 2003-2007 fairly reliable is that the JCP members of the House of Councillors would regularly refer to these files as evidence in Diet committee hearings, from which the minutes were mentioned earlier in this section.⁴ Fourthly, to remove these files after the eruption of the scandal would justify unwanted attention to these files and would increase media attention. Fifthly, the decision to post these files initially at all might have been motivated by the Group’s desire to explain security policy to the Japanese public. The DPJ’s Seiji Maehara called it “responsibility to explain” (*setsumei-sekinin*).⁵ And sixthly, had these files been forged or manipulated in any way pre-

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum.htm>, accessed February 22, 2010.

2 See Christopher Georges, “Conservative Heritage Foundation Finds Recipe for Influence: Ideas + Marketing = Clout,” *The Wall Street Journal*, J, A10, August 10, 1995

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/houbei2008gw/brookings2008gw.pdf>, accessed February 22, 2010.

4 Apart from the Foreign Affairs and Security Committees, issues relating to the Centre, Group, and the Conference were also brought up in the Budget Committee. See the questions the JCP member of the House of Councillors Mikishi Daimon on November 22, 2007. Upper House Budget Committee, November 22, 2007, National Diet Minutes, accessed September 15, 2009, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/168/0060/main.html>.

5 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/maehara10.pdf>, p. 4, accessed September 30, 2009.

2007, it would have been exposed by the JCP members or other public figures, including the Conference participants themselves, during or after the publicly significant “Moriya scandal.”

What is important for this chapter and part of the thesis, in which I seek to identify who mattered in the BMD procurement and related decisions, is that the NSRG and the Centre have probably had some influence on shaping the BMD decisions. The indirect evidence for this claim is the above quote by Baker Spring from the Heritage Foundation and the following statements by former Secretary of Defence William Cohen:

Through the good offices of Director General Nukaga who started this Conference and, especially, Mr Kyuma, this conference has become an extremely useful place for exchange of defence-related opinions by decisionmakers and opinion leaders from our two countries. Including a major defence exhibition, which is the result of Mr Kyuma’s efforts, has made this Conference even more important.¹ (August 2006)

Mr Kyuma is playing an extremely important leadership role with regard to the GSOMIA and the measures of effective control of secret information within Japan.² (August 2006)

Saying that Japan’s affirmative (*sekkyokuteki*) stance on BMD is “not an accident” and thanking certain individuals for bringing about this attitude by name in their presence without eliciting self-humbling remarks from them in their own speeches – speakers would often make cross-references to the contents of other speakers – is circumstantial evidence of the NSRG’s and the Centre’s possible influence on the BMD and related decisions. So the people, whose statements and actions it can be productive to consider in the following chapter, are clear from the above and the appended tables.

As I anticipate, one potential caveat the readers of this section may want to see is how my above expositions on the Conference relate to the broader environment of other national security policy themed conferences, seminars, and meetings held in Tokyo and Washington. Indeed, the Conference is not the only significant event where aspects of the

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-101-cohen.pdf>, p. 1, accessed September 30, 2009.

2 Ibid., 2.

subject of this thesis were discussed. Any esteemed security policy think-tank, of which there are at least a dozen in Tokyo, would regularly organise interesting seminars. One example is the symposia run by RIPS, with which I was briefly affiliated in October 2008. I am aware of two such symposia taking place in October 2007 and 2008, in particular. The 2007 symposium was dedicated to the analysis of the weapons export principles and weapons procurement; the 2008 symposium, which I attended, was about classified military information protection within the US-Japan alliance. There exists a thirteen-page, publicly accessible report on the first symposium and a brief online outline of the 2008 symposium, but neither comes close to the depth of the transcripts available for the Conference. Additionally, the two symposia reports have been edited by the RIPS staff before being posted – I know because I was invited to participate in editing the 2008 report myself when I was “one of them” (see Chapter Three). At the same time, some transcripts from the Conference appear to be verbatim representations from the proceedings in English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation. Furthermore, the participation by Japanese political figures at the RIPS symposia has been minimal – possibly, under the influence of the “Moriya scandal,” – which limited their usefulness for my research.

Concluding remarks

In this Part, I attempted to identify those who have likely had some influence on the BMD decisions. I decided to approach this task by considering the likely roles of government ministries, the possible influences of a selection of Prime Ministers, and elite networks that probably were important for the BMD decisions. The organisational behaviour paradigm, according to which the procurement can be considered as organisational output, allowed me to confirm some of the conventional notions about the distribution of interests and authority in security policymaking between the JDA and MOFA with reference to BMD.

It was also concluded that the organisational capacities and practices within the government were such that they allowed a range of influences on the security policy. I was, however, only able to allude to the existence of segments within the ministries which could be regarded as the possible drivers of the procurement.

Then, by using a more eclectic perspective, I first reviewed the security policy preferences held by the main political parties. I concluded that mainstream “pragmatists,” including the LDP, Komeito, and the DPJ, irrespective of internal differences and varying ideological accents welcomed or, at least, could reconcile themselves with the procurement of BMD because, either as a way of managing the alliance or as a tool of advanced military build-up, missile defence was attractive to any “realist” audience. In light of that, the “pacifist” opposition had little or no chance of influencing the direction of the procurement. This consideration of security policy visions and political parties led me to consider the possible influences of the Prime Ministers on the BMD decisions. I observed that the evidence on the Prime Ministers was compatible with the security-policy perspectives identified in Chapter Four and with the argument about the potentialities of BMD identified in Chapter Five.

A further analysis enabled me to argue that the Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange, together with its twin National Congressional Security Research Group, have probably had some influence on shaping the BMD and related decisions. On the basis of the consideration of these networks in this and the following chapter and in light of some aspects of Slaughter's argument about government networks from Chapter Three, a theoretically relevant point is made here that in the research of the country's security decisions it is potentially productive to analyse specific elite networks. This applies particularly to networks with mixed memberships which include US and Japanese corporate executives, legislators, and government officials. At the same time, in contrast to Keck and

Sikkink's work on the networks of human rights activists and Slaughter's optimistic view of government networks which allowed her to envision a new system of global governance, the networks documented in this thesis demonstrated their potential for facilitating government corruption in military procurement.

Having identified the systemic parameters of Japan's security policy and how BMD matters in that regard in Part I, and having pinpointed a circle of organisational and other actors who likely influenced the country's BMD decisions in this Part, I can now attempt to propose an explanation of the central concern of the dissertation and offer answers to the subordinate questions surrounding BMD in the next Part of the thesis.

PART III. WHY WERE SPECIFIC BMD AND RELATED DECISIONS MADE?


CHAPTER 8. EXPLAINING JAPAN'S BMD DECISIONS.

The structure of this chapter is designed in the following way. In the first section, I shall arrange the central and other BMD-related questions in a meaningful relationship to each other. The order of this relationship will serve as the basis for an organised discussion of the Conference notes in the second section. This discussion, in turn, together with the conclusions of Parts I and II in the background, will allow me to propose an explanation of the central and some of the associated questions in the third section.

8.1. A logical structure of BMD's interests and implications (1994-2007).

The logical structure of the interests and implications of Japan's BMD procurement can be conceived of as follows.


Figure 8.1. Nodes of implications and interests of Japan's BMD procurement.



This figure is a simple representation of my observations and conclusions from the previous chapters. The country's BMD procurement has implications for its international relations, RMA implementation, and defence industrial base. The figure shows these aspects as "nodes" of interests and consequences because they are fundamentally mutually implicative among themselves: the realisation of the RMA requires an appropriate industrial base no less than such a base bolsters the capacity for an independent foreign policy which, in turn, benefits from the availability of an RMA-standard military force and so on also in the reverse direction; the BMD system and its procurement process also influence these nodes while being influenced themselves.

This simple logical structure of the BMD procurement-related interests and implications can be further elaborated to include various questions and issues accompanying this procurement. A selection of such questions follows. I present them in three groups corresponding with the nodes from figure 8.1. Such a classification is quite approximative because many issues have implications beyond what is suggested by their group designation, but discussing these issues in groups offers a chance to strengthen the proposed structure of nodes with their multidirectional connectivity.

Figure 8.2. Logical structure of BMD-related questions.



I would now like to summarise each of the questions, which I identified in the course of my research, some of which were already introduced and justified in the introductory chapters. Indeed, as the literature review in Chapter Two showed, productive perspectives have been offered for many, but not all of these questions. This chapter will include a consideration of these “answered” questions to strengthen the explanatory framework for the questions of this thesis.

In the RMA node, where BMD essentially appears as a tool of creating an infrastructure for the protection of space- and ground-based information assets, a question

that could be asked is why Japan decided to start its own spy satellite programme in 1998 if such satellites, at least the optical and radar satellites launched between 2003 and 2007, are significantly inferior to the US satellites?

In the weapons production node, three episodes could be noted. The first two were outlined in Chapter One as subordinate research questions. Firstly, why did the “Taepo-dong shock” of 1998 lead to the decision on joint research of advanced components of the SM-3 Block IIA rather than to the decision on deploying or accelerating the earlier and more readily available technology of the Aegis SM-3 Block IA (which was made in 2003)? Secondly, why did Japan decide to become the 65th (!) signatory of GSOMIA with the US after successfully resisting it for several decades?

The third issue has been approached in the literature. The international relations constructivism, in particular, offered a productive perspective on it.¹ The question is about the 2004 arms ban review, or more precisely, why it was a mere reinterpretation of the application of the “three principles of weapons non-export” rather than a revision of the “principles” themselves. The previous relaxation of the application of the “ban” took place under Nakasone in 1983-84 when “military technology” transfers to the US were permitted.² The 1998 decision on track II co-research, which could be considered as covered by Nakasone’s reinterpretation of the arms export ban, did necessitate the subsequent decision in 2004 on the ban relaxation to allow the project to move on to the next stages of joint development and production in 2005. Thus, the timing of the relaxation is because it had to accompany the track II development decision. However, the question about why Japan did not revise the “principles” themselves did receive deserved attention in the literature. This thesis did not seek to offer anything path-breaking in this regard, but will include this issue within a broader explanatory framework and will use the evidence on the elite networks.

1 See Oros, *Normalising*, 119-120, 162-163.

2 For background information, see section 2.2.2 of this thesis and Oros, *Normalising*, 110-116, 113-114.

The central concern of the thesis about why Japan procured BMD if the system has the potential to disrupt the hedging strategy towards the US and China is part of a larger, international relations node of the country's BMD policy. Two more questions merit attention. Firstly, why did Japan choose a more costly and arguably less effective way of addressing the putative North Korean missile threat to the country, that is, BMD, rather than a cheaper and more effective alternative – Tomahawk cruise missiles? Cruise missiles can work for defence through their deterrent effect – and this does not necessarily imply their problematic pre-emptive use because Tomahawks can still be launched against the enemy after Japan was hit first which would make the price of attacking Japan in the first place unacceptable to any nation.

The international relations management node also includes the question about why Japan still adheres to its self-imposed ban on the use of its right to collective defence. Imagine a situation when an enemy missile from East Asia is on a course towards the US; Japan is likely to be in the position to intercept it. If Japan lets this missile go and leaves it to the US to intercept it or allows it to cause damage to Americans, the alliance may suffer a reputational damage which it will be very difficult to contain. Why did Japan not discontinue its formal self-restraint on collective defence upon introducing BMD when such a system exposes the alliance to an additional risk of failure?

These two latter questions can also be productively approached from constructivist perspectives which were summarised in Chapter Two. Some broad compatibility between those perspectives and the argument of this thesis was noted and justified in Chapter Two. While acknowledging that these questions and some issues noted earlier could be and were effectively approached in constructivist analyses,¹ this chapter simply attempts to put them into a broader context of the BMD-related issues. Putting all important BMD-related issues into one framework, even though some of its elements can be considered on the basis of a

1 See, in particular, Oros, *Normalising*, 90-121, 117-120, 162-163, 166-168.

variety of theoretical assumptions and methodological preferences, will strengthen my proposed explanation of the central concern of the thesis because it is consistent or compatible with the explanations of all other issues, as I claimed in the introductory chapters and in Chapter Two, in particular.

Before proceeding to the concluding stage of my investigation in the third section, I would like to analyse the views of the elite networks that I have identified in the previous chapter. The organising principle of this analysis is captured in the figures 8.1 and 8.2. The elites' statements will be discussed in the following order: international relations and foreign policy strategy, the RMA, and industrial policy. Such data will give some further substance to the relevance of the systemic parameters identified in Chapter Four and Five and the military-technological issues covered in Chapter Five. And with these data, an answer to the central question will be proposed and perspectives on other questions offered.

8.2. Views of the security elites on the BMD and related issues.

Fukushiro Nukaga, the man who started the Conference and who was also on the Directors board of the Centre and the Group, which is credited with making Japan “the most affirmative nation [on BMD] among the US-friendly and allied nations,”¹ has formulated his vision of a long-term goal for Japan. Nukaga’s vision was sovereign defence strategy (“*shutaiteki bouei senryakuron*”) that he defined as taking “independent decisions by pro-actively evaluating the country’s national interests and thinking in terms of its own grand design.”² Despite his tenacious, repetitive emphasis on “sovereign defence,” Nukaga’s expectation that the “strategy of sovereign defence” would be included in the NDPG of 2004 did not materialise.³ This longing for “sovereignty” was also implicit in, for example, the

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-94-baker.pdf>, p. 1, accessed September 30, 2009.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-9/f9panel1-nukaga.pdf>, p. 1, accessed October 10, 2009. Nukaga repeated the same idea every year between 2003 and 2007 (see Appendix C).

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov11open01.pdf>, accessed September 30, 2009.

words of the JDA Defence Policy Section chief Kazuo Ofuru about both countries being “perfectly equal partners” in the co-development of BMD.¹ Nukaga, furthermore, did not fail to emphasise that Japan had “independently decided” (“*shutaitekini kettei shita*”) to introduce BMD ahead of the US’s other allies². Significantly, the DPJ’s then “shadow Cabinet defence minister” and present foreign minister Seiji Maehara insisted that Japan needed to strengthen its own intelligence capability in order to preserve its strategic nature (“*senryakusei*”) and sovereignty of action (“*shutaisei*”).³

While these invocations may be the result of an ideological preference independent of rational calculations, the consideration of future threats to security voiced by the SSC participants strengthens the significance of BMD in those elites’ views of Japan’s defence policy. Indeed, Nukaga’s understanding that the role of military force in maintaining international order should be expected to become more important⁴ provides a good background for appreciating the place of BMD in the country’s planning for future contingencies.

SSC speakers across the spectrum of their affiliation types, likely, shared William Cohen’s view that effective policy should be based not on thinking about the threats and requirements of the next few years but on the possible threats and requirements in 20-30 or 40 years.⁵ This future-orientedness in the thinking manifested itself in the principle of “spiral development” in military procurement, according to which new equipment is introduced on the assumption that the system is sufficiently flexible to be constantly upgraded as new performance and threat assessment or/ and foreign policy management data become available at later stages. BMD was procured in the US and Japan on the premise of “spiral

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-93-ofuru.pdf>, p. 4, accessed September 30, 2009.

2 *Ibid.*, 2.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/maehara10.pdf>, p. 4, accessed September 30, 2009.

4 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2003-2/f2003-2-report.htm>, accessed September 30, 2009.

5 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-101-cohen.pdf>, p. 6, accessed September 30, 2009.

development.”

The content of concerns about future threats that the elites expected Japan to face can be inferred from their perceptions of today’s international relations. There, China’s rapid military modernisation caused anxiety among the Conference participants. Shigeru Ishiba claimed that China’s military power “by far exceeds its national defence needs.”¹ Ishiba’s colleague in the defence policy business Tokuichiro Tamazawa emphasised the widely held doubts about the true intents of China’s external strategy more colourfully than anyone when he compared China to Hitler’s Germany and said that the way Hitler was appeased by Chamberlain in Munich in 1938 must not be repeated in the China-Taiwan question.²

North Korea’s missile development caused genuine concerns over missile proliferation across the world. However, the “threat” of a missile attack by Pyongyang has been explicitly instrumentalised by some elites. William Cohen’s statement – “This time, as a result of responding to the North Korean missile programme, the promotion of missile defence is “easily acceptable” (*ukeire-yasui*) so we must promote industrial cooperation”³ – is priceless in explaining what was actually important for some elites and what merely provided a “valuable opportunity.”⁴ The attitude demonstrated by a high representative from Boeing Missile Defence Systems when he said that “even if North Korea weren’t exactly a threat, other threats are likely to emerge”⁵ does appear to be an example of excessive self-indulgence on the part of a corporate executive, but it very likely did not sound alien to many VIPs at the Conference.

The backdrop for the choice of tactics appropriate in the international environment, perceived and projected to develop as above, was summarised by Nukaga when he said that there must be no taboos on discussing how to implement the exclusively defensive defence

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/isiba10.pdf>, p. 2, accessed September 30, 2009.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-7/forum7-tamazawa.pdf>, accessed September 30, 2009.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2003-2/f2003-2-report.htm>, accessed September 30, 2009.

4 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/cohen10.pdf>, p. 4, accessed September 30, 2009.

5 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov12open02.pdf>, p. 8, accessed September 30, 2009.

in order to protect the nation in the current international situation.¹ Here, the US-Japan “enduring partnership” was unchallenged as the “most important bilateral relationship in the world,” as Howard Baker put it.² This was confirmed on the Japanese side most explicitly by Ishiba when after praising the potential of BMD in widening the country’s diplomatic options through the system’s “deterrence by denial,” Ishiba said that BMD was also an excellent tool for Japan in strengthening its relations with the US.³ Even when referring to Japan’s security cooperation with India and Australia, Nukaga presumed that this “indirect balancing” was a way of strengthening the effect of the US-Japan alliance on the regional peace and stability.⁴ Masao Akamatsu of the LDP coalition partner Komeito explained the party’s approval of the arms export ban relaxation as an illustration of appropriate burden sharing by Japan within the alliance.⁵ The DPJ’s Maehara also struck a chord by invoking the alliance in his plea for a change of the country’s interpretation of its right to collective defence “so that from now on Japan could exercise this right to intercept a missile heading toward the US.”⁶

However, while there seemed to be a strong and widely shared support for the revision of either the interpretation of the ban on the use of the right to collective defence or/ and of the relevant Constitutional provisions themselves, some reticence was apparent on the Japanese side in embracing the role of the “world’s leader in BMD.” The vision of Japan as the “world’s leader in BMD” was promoted by a senior executive of the US Computer Sciences Corporation on the basis of his expectation that Japan alongside the US and Israel would be the only country in the world that will possess the necessary “knowledge base” and “operation experience.”⁷ Indirectly responding to such a bold vision, the advisor to MHI

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov11open01.pdf>, p. 15, accessed September 30, 2009.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2003-2/f2003-2-report.htm>, accessed September 30, 2009.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-91-ishiba.pdf>, p. 1, accessed September 30, 2009.

4 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-9/f9panel2-nukaga.pdf>, p. 4, accessed October 10, 2009.

5 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-5/speech04.pdf>, p. 2, accessed September 30, 2009.

6 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-9/f9panel1-maehara.pdf>, p. 2, accessed October 10, 2009.

7 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov12open02.pdf>, p. 18, accessed September 30, 2009. Aaron

Space Division Junichi Nishiyama trod carefully, emphasising the uniqueness of Japan's conditions which would lead to the construction of an original/ independent Japanese BMD system.¹

On acquiring Tomahawks, Ishiba said in 2005 that Japan had no plan of acquiring an enemy base strike capability.² This was in line with the Conference proceedings of the previous years when, for example, Riki Kawara in 2003 described the bilateral relationship as more important than the UN because Japan depended on the US for the enemy base strike capability.³ However, in 2007 in Washington before the "Moriya scandal" led to the suspension of the SSC format (at least for some time), the more assertive chief of Japan's defence policy Nukaga put it more ambiguously:

For this purpose [=the existing legal capability to strike the enemy base after receiving a missile attack], in order to minimise the damage to the people, by complementing the US strike power, and as a capacity of pro-actively defending the country from a missile attack, I think it is necessary to rationally conclude after sufficient deliberations, as part of a broader debate about the entirety of armaments Japan must possess, whether Japan needs to possess high-precision guided weapons such as Tomahawk cruise missiles.⁴

I would now like to investigate how the elites' views in the areas of the RMA and defence industrial base conjugated with BMD. On the RMA-BMD connection, the Americans provided unequivocal support for the hypothesis about the mutually implicative nature of BMD and the RMA. Importantly, William Schneider emphasised that the structural basis of the command and control system, which is the core of BMD and lies at the centre of the recent RMA, was especially important for the modernisation of Japan's defence so that it was capable of responding to situations in the 21st century.⁵ The key transition in this modernisation was from platform- to network-centric warfare.⁶

Fuller, President of enforcement, security and intelligence within CSC's North American Public Sector Division.

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov12open02.pdf>, p. 20, accessed September 30, 2009.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/isiba10.pdf>, p. 3, accessed September 30, 2009.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2003-2/f2003-2-report.htm>, accessed September 30, 2009.

4 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-9/f9panel1-nukaga.pdf>, p. 2, accessed October 10, 2009.

5 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/schneider11.pdf>, p. 1, accessed September 30, 2009.

6 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov12open01.pdf>, p. 13, accessed September 30, 2009.

Baker Spring from the Heritage Foundation expressed at a different time what many at the Conference thought these “situations” were likely to be – China’s rise, nuclear proliferation, and the “weaponisation” of space.¹ Spring further asserted that the sea- and space-based BMD capability was the most effective approach to future missile defence. He further explained that because an important flight period of long-range ballistic missiles takes place in space, defence in space offering a “multiple deterrent power” would become necessary in an environment of weapons proliferation we might face in the future.²

This theme, as any other, was far from being dominated by Americans. Ishiba correctly captured the core of the RMA in the word “connectivity” when he said that as long as the “spiral approach” was applied to the system’s procurement, from the point of view of the cost-effectiveness ratio, it became urgently necessary to build a network of US-Japan sensors, weapons, and launchers so that the current sensors, weapons, launchers, and information connectivity could produce the biggest effect.³ Other JDA Directors General, for example, Nukaga⁴ and Kyuma,⁵ have called for strengthening the country’s intelligence-gathering and evaluation infrastructure. The Japanese contractors, including the Vice-President of KHI’s Aerospace Division⁶ and, especially, the head of NEC’s Aerospace Defence Business Headquarters,⁷ have also shown a nuanced appreciation of these issues and the details of the underlying C2BMC architecture. The DPJ’s Maehara endorsed the views compiled in this paragraph by displaying strong support for the consolidation of the intelligence-gathering systems and the enhancement of the information analysis capability.⁸

Related to everything written above and underpinning it according to the logical

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-94-baker.pdf>, p. 6, accessed September 30, 2009.

2 Ibid.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-91-ishiba.pdf>, p. 3, accessed September 30, 2009.

4 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-5/speech01.pdf>, p. 3-5, accessed September 30, 2009.

5 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-103-kyuma.pdf>, p. 3, accessed October 8, 2009.

6 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov12open02.pdf>, p. 9-11, accessed September 30, 2009.

7 Ibid., 14-17.

8 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-5/speech03.pdf>, p. 3, accessed September 30, 2009.

structure of BMD's interests and implications, my analysis of the defence industrial base issues will start with the voices of two people who had crafted Nakasone's edition of the weapons' export ban in 1983-84 which allowed "transfers" of military technology to the US. On the US side, Gregg Rubinstein, who then worked at the US embassy in Tokyo, made clear that even in 2004 the US government supported Japan's three weapons non-export principles and, more significantly, that the revision of the ban had not started because of US pressure.¹ Rubinstein further elaborated that the US had an interest in the revision of the ban if it enabled Japan to participate in international programmes, but the US had no intention of turning Japan into a weapons exporting country.² According to Rubinstein, Japan needed to develop a weapons export policy and policy implementation processes where it would achieve a balance between its security, industrial base considerations, and international obligations. He resumed that the revision of the arms export ban was no more than a symbolic effort for a bigger agenda including the reform of bureaucratic control and the need to nurture active ("*jihatsuteki*") industries.³

Rubinstein's Japanese counterpart in the 1980s Hiroo Kinoshita, who during the SSC process served as the Director of the Japan Association of Defence Industries (JADI), confirmed that the US-Japan defence related relations were not a "one-way street." He elaborated that Japan was not and/ or was not willing to be a passive partner in the alliance when he emphasised the need for a framework of weapons exports to third countries when not only Japan would need to obtain the permission from the US when exporting US technology, but also the US would have to seek Japan's permission to export Japanese technology.⁴

Moving beyond this symptomatic posturing into the substance of the views behind

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov12open01.pdf>, p. 22, accessed September 30, 2009.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 22-23.

4 Ibid., 19.

the recent ban reinterpretation, a reference to MHI's Chairman is appropriate. Takashi Nishioka formulated that with regard to the arms export ban the Japanese industries had two issues which needed to be resolved: one was that the joint US-Japan development and production of equipment would be impossible if exports to the US were prohibited; the second was that the technology transfer was limited to programmes approved by both governments, as a result of which industries could not participate in or even negotiate the details of equipment programmes that the SDF were not planning to procure.¹ The first point was resolved in December 2004 when, although the non-export principles were left unchanged, the application of the principles was relaxed in the case of BMD, allowing the procurement's progress from joint research to development and production; additionally, non-BMD cooperation was to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The second issue of company-level studies and technology exchange in programmes not agreed upon by both governments has not yet been cleared.

A common thread in the words of the elites who expressed themselves on the defence industrial base is most succinctly represented in Cohen's statement that the joint project of developing, building, and deploying the current and future missile defence would be a good model for cooperation in other areas of defence production.² Indeed, individuals ranging from Nishioka to the JDA Directors General would regularly talk about expanding BMD-type cooperation to the next-generation fighter jet, airborne laser, future combat systems, unmanned aerial vehicle systems and so on. Another objective that the same elites wanted to achieve with the relaxation of the ban was doing repairs on the equipment of the US Navy and Air Force during their stopovers in Japan. Concurring with the Conference speakers on the above at earlier meetings, the DPJ's Maehara in May 2007 at the Conference in Washington called the revision of the arms export ban "inescapable" and insisted that it

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/nisioka11.pdf>, p. 2, accessed September 30, 2009.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-101-cohen.pdf>, p. 2, accessed September 30, 2009.

should open a way for Japan to participate in joint weapons development with countries other than the US as well.¹

Such future-orientedness of discussions of Japan's military build-up and related broad and narrow issues made "inescapable" a discussion of the details of the BMD joint development. The JDA's Defence Policy Section Chief Kazuo Ofuru dedicated his talk in August 2006 to explaining the US-Japan business of the joint development of BMD to meet future threats, that is, track II of the country's BMD procurement. Ofuru expected the project to take around 10 years from (2006-2016) at an expected cost of 2.1-2.7 billion US dollars; the work share had not yet been decided upon, but he expected that Japan would do 45% of the work, the US – 55%; the US would concentrate on the warhead's electronics whereas Japan would do parts of the rocket.² The remarkable thing is that the JDA bureaucrat Ofuru described the current US-Japan BMD co-development "with fairly little exaggeration as historically unprecedented."³ It was echoed by Cohen at a later session of the same Conference when he said that,

The fact that the US relies on Japan as the only supplier of PAC-3 components for its military does not simply indicate a strengthening of the cooperation between industries, it signifies a virtual integration of the defence production bases of both countries... Furthermore, the US agrees that Japan plays a leading role in the joint development of a more capable SM-3.⁴

Such fairly bold views became possible, probably, because they were expressed after it became clear that Japan would sign GSOMIA – which it did in August 2007 – which was supposed to mitigate the fears of leakage of classified technology that JADI's Kinoshita called "a factor retarding joint research, development, and production [of BMD]."⁵ Speaking

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-9/f9panel1-maehara.pdf>, p. 3, accessed October 10, 2009.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-93-ofuru.pdf>, accessed September 30, 2009.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-93-ofuru.pdf>, p. 4, accessed September 30, 2009.

4 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-101-cohen.pdf>, p. 1-2, accessed September 30, 2009.

5 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2003-2/f2003-2-report.htm>, accessed September 30, 2009.

on behalf of the Japanese contractors, MHI's Chairman Nishioka affirmed that the "industrial world in Japan" would like to proceed with debates on GSOMIA and the domestic legislation adjustments to promote the bilateral US-Japan industrial cooperation. Nishioka's announcement that the significance of the existence of an intergovernmental agreement on classified information was extremely high, if we started from the question that the company-level participation in programmes not sanctioned by both governments could proceed, further substantiated one of the long-term objectives of the Japanese contractors.

However, to Nishioka's, Kyuma's and others' regret, GSOMIA did not cover the situation where Japanese companies are contracted directly by the US government to do repairs on their equipment. Kyuma, who was praised by Cohen for playing "an extremely important leadership role"¹ with regard to GSOMIA and the measures of effective control of secret information within Japan, did call for attention to this point,² but, to my knowledge, this has yet to lead to any tangible results. The DPJ's Maehara also showed his strong support for and thus strengthened the overall opinion at the Conference about better legislation of classified information protection. Maehara explained his support on the basis of his expectation that by expanding technology development cooperation from missile defence to other areas and on the premise of Japan strengthening its secrecy legislation, the "black-boxing" of military procurement from the US should disappear and sharing of military technology information promoted.³

Concluding my observations of the SSC process related to the implementation of the RMA in Japan and the maintenance of the defence industrial base, I can observe that there has been a strong convergence of views on the part of all types of US and Japanese participants around an understanding that the "spiral development" in BMD procurement is a

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-101-cohen.pdf>, p. 2, accessed September 30, 2009.
2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/kyuma11.pdf>, p. 2, accessed September 30, 2009.
3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-5/speech03.pdf>, p. 3, accessed September 30, 2009.

tool to these ends. The US representative's acceptance of Japan's "leading role" in the BMD co-development on track II was very likely welcomed by the JDA Directors General and top defence bureaucrats present at the Conference with great satisfaction because it was in line with their views.

8.3. Explaining the central concern of the thesis and other issues.

Why did Japan procure BMD if it had the potential to disrupt the country's hedging policy toward the US and China? – In a summary form, the following explanation is proposed here. BMD was procured despite its disruptive potential because it was a tool of shifting Japanese policy from one hedging policy to another, that is, from one based on self-imposed restraints toward one exercised from the position of military strength. An analysis of international relations in East Asia in 1994-2007, undertaken in the thesis, and an analysis of the statements of the security elites with respect to their policy preferences make Japan's transition toward a military strength-based hedging appear rational and confirm the utility of BMD as a tool in this transition. Some negative consequences of a possible disruption to hedging, induced by BMD, could be contained exactly as a result of such a reformatting of hedging.

In more detail, the following could be said. In Chapter Four, Japan's regional security environment was analysed with an emphasis on North Korea and China. The history of North Korea's missile and nuclear programmes in the 1990s and 2000s was outlined as a factor that likely influenced the timing of BMD decisions. It also contributed to the overall uncertainty over the future of the international relations in Northeast Asia. China, however, with its rapidly proceeding military modernisation (including in missile and counterspace capabilities), multiple long-standing territorial disputes, and a potential for aggressive external policy stemming from the nature of its political system, was identified as an

arguably more important, potential element of the regional uncertainty.

BMD can be considered as a means of responding to such real and potential security challenges because it contributed to the modernisation of the military and military-industrial infrastructure, on the basis of which at least two related objectives could be achieved: maintaining the US-Japan alliance and enhancing the capacity for Japan's control over its foreign and security policy. In this sense, BMD increased the range of security policy options available to Japan, which suggests a shift of the country's hedging policy from one based on self-imposed restraints toward one exercised from the position of military strength. This, in turn, created the possibility that some of the negative consequences of the potential hedging policy disruption suggested in the central question could be mitigated exactly because of the BMD's contribution to setting up a formal and physical infrastructure for such a shift in the hedging strategy.

This conclusion can be further strengthened if considered inside a broader perspective on the procurement of BMD and alongside the puzzling episodes of its three mutually implicative nodes of interests and implications, namely the RMA/ space security, military-industrial base, and international relations.

Explaining other BMD-related issues

Choosing to spend more than two billion USD on the IGS despite their initial performance inferiority asks to be explained as an industrial policy measure with an added benefit, from the point of view of traditional national security, of increasing national intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance potential in the context of a hitherto traditional overall dependence on the US for such data. The designation of the defence-industrial node issues as such mostly explains them to some extent. The hypothesis of the instrumentalisation of the 1998 "Taepo-dong shock" for the promotion of advanced research

into space technologies can be supported by the fact that the object of co-research and then co-development was “some of the very same basic technologies to which Japan's experienced rocket-makers could contribute and also learn from”¹ and that these updates and improvements may well reverberate into advances in other rocket programmes such as the Advanced Solid Rocket (ASR).² Whether, as some researchers argued, “SLV [space launch vehicles] makers have been central [and “critical”] to the advent of BMD,”³ is still an open question. But the evidence on the elite networks offers some support for such a claim.

As regards the sequence of the decisions queried in the second subordinate question, it suggests the importance of an early initiation of track II of future technologies, which was to be later linked with track I in the form of “spiral development.” A correlation between these decisions and external circumstances, such as the North Korean and US activities, is present; at the same time, other aspects of Japan's systemic constraints (that is, China) and longer-term interests on the Japanese side (space development, the RMA) were also likely important.

The conclusion of GSOMIA may be interpreted as indicating a deeper integration between the defence industrial bases of the US and Japan, especially if the calls by MHI and the DPC Chairman for company-to-company level cooperation on military R&D even without prior government authorisation of the project and for enabling Japanese firms to do repairs of the US military equipment on Japanese territory materialise. William Schneider's words in October 2007 can be quoted to support such an interpretation: “By signing GSOMIA, the US and Japan have made it possible to move from licence production to joint development and production of modern military strength.”⁴ This also suggests that the timing of GSOMIA in 2007 was not uncorrelated with the 2005 decision on the co-development of

1 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 191.

2 *Ibid.*, Chapter 6.

3 *Ibid.*, 188.

4 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-10/schneider-ks1107-c10.pdf>, p. 2, accessed October 10, 2009.

the SM-3 on track II.

The causes of the limited nature of the arms export ban relaxation are twofold. The legalistic explanation is that such a reinterpretation of the ban was to provide an appropriate juridical basis for the SM-3 joint development decision of 2005 which would not have been covered by Nakasone's edition of the ban from 1983-84 as it was confined to "technology transfers" then. The symbolic explanation is that the 2004 rendition of the ban with its clause for the possibility of further "case-by-case" loosening of the ban's application was a tool of managing domestic and international expectations vis-à-vis Japan and signalling to all interested audiences that there would be continuity in Japan's foreign and security policy without any precipitous radical shifts.

I answer the questions of the international relations node on why Japan has not yet decided to procure cruise missiles and not done away with its prohibitive interpretation of the right to engage in collective defence as follows. Japan is procuring BMD with currently only limited changes in the node of international relations management because BMD is a tool of implementing a longer-term strategy of achieving defence policy sovereignty, or of implementing what the key security elites figure Nukaga put as "*shutaiteki bouei senryakuron*."¹ Japan's present avoidance of procuring cruise missiles appears rational since such a policy choice – because cruise missiles are generally considered a suitable first-strike weapon – might have precipitated domestic and international anxiety over Japan's intentions and thus narrowed the country's freedom of policy action.

At the same time, as Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu correctly argued, "the best way to prevent ballistic and cruise missile attacks on a country, such as Japan, is by having that country acquire the capability to strike enemy facilities directly on foreign soil in the boost phase."² The BMD and related infrastructure with its emphasis on the RMA improvements,

1 <http://www.ja-nsrc.or.jp/forum2003-2/f2003-2-report.htm>, accessed September 30, 2009, Security Strategy Conference notes of 2003 and all following years.

2 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 193.

has contributed to establishing advanced ISR assets which are necessary for the operation of BMD and related functions. One example is AIRBOSS, which is an infrared missile detection and tracking system designed to detect and track ballistic missiles in the boost phase, that is, in the short time period following the missile launch. The development of AIRBOSS began in 2000. A successful test of the system took place in December 2007. At that time, “the AIRBOSS was tested on the SM-3 itself – an act that suggests Japan may well go on to acquire the capability of first tracking, and from there possibly destroying, a ballistic missile launch in the boost phase on foreign soil.”¹

In connection with this, important figures in Japan have been calling for an enemy-base strike capability. Nukaga advocated the enemy strike capability. The other minister who pointed out that the enemy strike capability was a subject “worth considering” was Ishiba.² Furthermore, Koizumi's security policy panel in October 2004 called for Japan to consider acquiring offensive capabilities to strike enemy missile bases.³ The panel's proposal did not make it into the 2005-2009 Mid-Term Defence Build-Up Plan. Abe, as Chief Cabinet Secretary, also expressed his support for Japan's right to hit enemy missile bases “if there were no other way to prevent the attack” in July 2006.⁴ Prime Minister Koizumi urged “to think about this [enemy-base strike capability] cautiously.”⁵ At the same time, industry experts suggest the possibility of rapid change in this issue area “in the face of a triggering event”⁶: “Japan has assembled, tested, and successfully developed a complete 'toolkit' of

1 Ibid.

2 Patricia Parmalee, “Japan Orders Feasibility Study on Introduction of Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” *AWST*, April 14, 2003; David McNeill, “Japan Warns That It Will Attack if North Korea Aims Missile,” *The Independent*, September 15, 2003; “Panel to Call for Pre-emptive Strikes on Enemy Bases,” *JEN*, September 30, 2004; “Japan Raises First-strike Question,” *CNN.com*, October 1, 2004 (Nexis UK).

3 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 95. NIDS also published a report on the subject in December 2004. One of the undisclosed report authors was reported as saying: “We need to study practical options to attack enemy bases now that Japan faces threats of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.” In “North Korea's Nuclear Threat; SDF's Strike Capability – Time to Pick up the Pike as well as the Shield?” *TDY*, March 26, 2007.

4 “Calls Grow for Equipping SDF with Offensive Capability,” *TNW*, July 18, 2006.

5 Ibid.

6 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 129.

technologies and infrastructure needed to construct intercontinental ballistic missiles.”¹


As a point related to the central concern of the thesis, BMD also makes it easier for Japan to overcome its once self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right to collective defence. This result can be achieved because, as the DPJ’s Maehara put it, Japan cannot allow a missile launched in East Asia to hit the US while having the capability to intercept it. The rhetorical exercises with that intent are, of course, neither new nor unique –the absurdity of Japan’s abstention from collective defence was emphasised in the past no less vividly when describing an imagined situation when Japan would have to refrain from helping the US Navy if the US vessel got into trouble while rescuing a Japanese Navy ship from an armed attack by a third party – but BMD may become the tipping point for a *de facto* reinterpretation of the self-restraint.²

It makes sense to recapitulate the above expositions in a graphic form.

1 Ibid., 128.

2 Formally lifting the government's restrictive interpretation of Japan's Constitution as banning the exercise of the right to collective defence has become part of a bigger process of constitutional revision with many factors playing a role in it. See Hughes, “Japan Remilitarisation,” 112-129. An important step in the process was taken in May 2007 with the adoption of the referendum law (Law on the Constitutional Amendment Procedure) which came into force in 2010. As the analysis of the elites' views suggests, BMD has become an important rhetorical tool in support of Japan's right to engage in collective defence.

Figure 8.3. Logical structure of BMD procurement's questions readjusted to reflect their explanations.



In this figure, the “sovereignty of defence policy,” the security environment in the 1990s-2000s and considerations of “security threats in 30-40 years” lead to the procurement of BMD characterised by the industrial policy and space security questions discussed in this chapter. The punctuation of the bidirectional arrow between the “sovereign defence strategy” and international security assessments is meant to signify the lack of evidence at my disposal on the basis of which I could conclude whether it was the security considerations that led to the emergence of the “strategy” or the original ideological preference for “sovereignty” in defence policy that was not derived from rational calculations – either is compatible with the rest of my argument on BMD and does not interfere with the logic of the figure. The punctuation around “hedging through self-imposed restraints” signifies a probably terminal weakening of this tactic.

CHAPTER 9. FINAL CHAPTER.

To end a lengthy piece of writing, it makes sense to return to its beginning and, perhaps, even to re-title it in a novel, but complementary way. An article from the late 2010 by Japan's former UN Ambassador Kitaoka in the *Yomiuri Shimbun* comes to mind. Kitaoka concluded his article by quoting President Theodore Roosevelt's preferred dictum which, as can be inferred from the article, Kitaoka invoked as a model for Japan.¹ Indeed, what better way to end an essay on Japan's security policy than by referring to an American President!?

– *The logic of Japan's BMD procurement: 'speak softly and carry a big stick.'* This seemingly flippant reformulation of the title, in fact, fairly adequately captures serious aspects of the argument.

Summary of the argument

The main argument put forward in this thesis can be resumed as follows. Japan procured BMD because – with reference to neoclassical realism – the country's systemic constraints favoured it and because BMD resonated in a number of ways with the views of important domestic actors. The systemic constraints, many of which were explained by reference to the Cold War configuration in the region, included the uncertainty over North Korea and China's overall “rise” and military modernisation, in particular. The country's dependence on the space infrastructure in its civilian life and for RMA-type operations was also emphasised in the context of the rising danger of improving counterspace capabilities by a number of states. Some evidence was reviewed in support of the BMD's possible role in defending such information assets and in attacking foreign assets.

As regards the domestic element of neoclassical realism, that is, the appeal of the potentialities of BMD to different actors in Japan, it was concluded that different types of actors could satisfy themselves with the BMD decisions. Several possible reasons were

1 Shinichi Kitaoka, “Establish Quiet, Firm Diplomacy,” *TDY*, October 4, 2010.

identified for this: BMD, including the related decision on the arms export ban relaxation, was seen by some as contributing to the alliance; BMD and the related C4ISR/ space assets modernisation could be seen as enhancing the country's capacity for a more independent security policy; BMD co-research, including its possible reverberations for “civilian” space launch vehicle technologies, could not have escaped the companies' attention; the contribution of BMD to strengthening the position of those arguing in favour of allowing Japan to use its right of collective defence was also suggested.

Such systemic constraints and instances of BMD's appeal to different domestic actors favoured the BMD decisions. Such observations can be interpreted as evidence in support of the view that Japan's hedging security strategy vis-a-vis China and the US is gradually moving from being based on self-imposed restraints toward being exercised from the position of military strength. In other words, BMD contributes to both Japan's military modernisation and to loosening policy constraints and, thus, allows the country's improving military strength to become more important in its hedging policy. Consequently, some of the disruptive potential of BMD, suggested in the central question of the thesis, can be contained.

The so-called Yoshida doctrine of security policy, carefully crafted for the circumstances of the Cold War, was developed over time to consist of eight self-imposed, military-related restraints: no overseas deployment of Japanese troops, no participation in collective defence arrangements, no power projection capability, no nuclear arms, no arms export, no sharing of defence-related technology, no more than one percent of the GNP for defence expenditure, and no military use of space. Many of these restrictions were eased in the 1990s-2000s.¹ The connection of BMD with the relaxation of some of these constraints was identified in this thesis in ways similar to the extant literatures on the subject. I have, *inter alia*, also identified that there was a prevailing opinion among the different types of

1 See, for example, Pyle, *Japan Rising*, 363-369.

elites in the networks in favour of Japan abandoning its restrictive interpretation of its right to collective defence. For the reasons discussed in the thesis, BMD can make the case for such a change compelling.

Significance and novelty of the argument

Apart from explaining the central concern of the dissertation, this thesis also offered several theoretical and methodological insights. One finding of this research is that security policy-related decisions in Japan have been possibly influenced by several elite networks. A recent indication about the possible significant influence of elites on Japan's security policy came in October 2009 from the DPJ Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano when he said: "We will have to show political leadership in making decisions, rather than rubber-stamping the recommendations of an expert panel."¹ There was probably more posturing than substance to this pledge because, as the Conference notes suggest, the DPJ members were among the elites who have been involved with the country's security policy and BMD procurement for at least a decade. What Hirano's statement very likely implied was that some part of the country's policymaking should be done more publicly.

My investigation of the elite networks has a possible implication for designing future research about Japan's security policy. The interpretation of the Congressional National Security Research Group and the Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange as probably having had some influence on shaping Japan's BMD decisions suggests a potentially productive area for future research of the role of elite networks in Japan's security policy. In broader terms and in reference to the prominent publications on elite networks by Keck and Sikkink and Anne-Marie Slaughter, it can be noted that the networks documented in this thesis through their Conference meetings have in common with the networks of those

1 "Okada Wants to Fast-track Bill for North Korea Cargo Inspections," *TJT*, October 21, 2009.

authors an emphasis on the strategic use (and usefulness) of information-sharing.¹ More like Slaughter's government networks, the networks described in this thesis are characterised by an eclectic mix of actors, including corporations, legislators, and government officials. At the same time, the networks analysed in this thesis exhibit potential for facilitating government corruption in military procurement. This sets them apart, to some degree, from Keck and Sikkink's networks of human rights activists and from Slaughter's networks which allow her "to envision a genuinely new world order," or a system of "global governance," "for greater peace and prosperity."² The networks documented in this thesis look to me pretty much like "an old world order."

It can also be noted that the meetings of these networks were frequented by officials from the *Kantei*. As a matter of fact, between 2003-2006 at least one present or former *Kantei* member officially participated in the Conference in Tokyo. In 2007, three participants from the *Kantei* were formally registered. As can be inferred from Appendix C, the *Kantei* people at the Conference were often from the Cabinet Office on National Security and Crisis Management and from the Cabinet Intelligence Office. Empirical work on what exactly the *Kantei*'s presence in the networks meant for Japan's security policy and BMD could not be done since "the actual workings of the institution [*Kantei*] are kept very much out of sight."³ At the same time, the participation of the *Kantei*'s members in the meetings of the networks suggests both the networks' possible influence on some decisions and the possibility of the *Kantei*'s important role in making security decisions relevant to BMD. Such an analysis makes it compatible with Shinoda's argument about the rise of the *Kantei* in Japan's foreign and defence policymaking⁴ and makes it even complementary to it – even if tangentially – since Shinoda chose to avoid BMD in his expositions.⁵

1 Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 2; Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 19.

2 Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 15.

3 Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 17.

4 See Chapter Three of this thesis and Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, Chapters 3-6, 133-141.

5 Ibid.

A broader methodological insight from this thesis is in highlighting the usefulness of “neoclassical realism” in the study of some of the recent developments in Japan’s security policy. As was suggested in Chapters Two and Three, however, constructivists also offer productive perspectives on the country's security policy. The limited relaxation of the arms export ban,¹ Japan's “tepid” initial response² to the BMD collaboration offer are among the security policy aspects which can adequately be dealt with by using constructivist insights. The central and subordinate concerns of this thesis were, however, neglected in constructivist appraisals, as was identified in Chapter Two. At the same time, the possibility of a broad compatibility, if not complementarity, between the argument of this thesis and, for example, Berger's “culture” argument and Oros's identity-focused framework was suggested in Chapter Two. Such possibility arises because these arguments have the idea of change and responsiveness to external circumstances built into them,³ which is reminiscent of neoclassical realism.

As regards the relation of the core argument of this thesis to the realist literature, it can be said that in some ways the thesis continues Hughes's work on Japan's continued remilitarisation and suggests contours of the “Goldilocks consensus” predicted by Samuels. Specifically, Hughes's reference to “arguable manifestations of deepening structural collusion between civilian industry, politicians, bureaucrats and the military”⁴ was substantiated at some length in this thesis. The same can be said about Hughes's reference to the “erosion of domestic anti-militaristic principles”⁵ – where BMD can play a triggering role – and the long-term changes to the structures of the country's military capabilities – in particular, the space militarisation.⁶ As concerns the “Goldilocks consensus,” Samuels expects that, if successful, it “will strike a balance between national strength and national

1 Oros, *Normalising*, 90-121.

2 Ibid., 149.

3 Berger, *Cultures*, 209; Oros, *Normalising*, 24-25.

4 Hughes, “Japan's Remilitarisation,” 67-77, 141.

5 Ibid., 99-138, 116-117, 124-125.

6 Ibid., 48-50.

autonomy to create new security options for Japan.”¹ The argument of this thesis suggests that the contours and objectives of this “consensus” are still “brewing” and BMD plays an important role.

Post-2007 developments in Japan’s BMD: no evidence disconfirming the argument (yet)?

Can anything that happened after the elite policy networks stopped meeting in the format of the Conference in autumn 2007, following the Moriya procurement scandal, challenge my argument? Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (26.09.2007 – 24.09.2008), who was generally seen as more moderate than his predecessor Abe, in terms of security issues, was busy mostly with extending the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law. But the BMD deployment under him continued apace. On December 17, 2007,² Japan conducted a successful test of the SM-3 Block IA, and became the first US ally to successfully intercept a target in the exoatmosphere using the Aegis capability on the JS Kongo destroyer and the SM-3 IIA interceptor. In March 2008, Japan completed installing PAC-3 interceptors for the Tokyo region, and in July conducted the first full-fledged MD exercises in Tokyo.

After Fukuda, Taro Aso (24.08.2008-16.09.2009), who had strongly supported BMD at least since his time as Foreign Minister in 2005-2007,³ displayed a cautious attitude toward BMD and collective defence, which could be explained by the LDP’s uncertainty over the 2009 Lower House elections. Under Aso, the JS Chokai destroyer participated in another SM-3 firing test in which the target was not intercepted. Japan had also a chance to test and demonstrate its new BMD-related radar and communication capabilities when on April 4, 2009 North Korea test-launched yet another rocket. What followed was described by a journalist as a “meteoric embarrassment”⁴ for Tokyo – the first false alarm of missile

1 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 9.

2 On the BMD intercept flight test record, see the US Missile Defence Agency website, accessed April 22, 2010, <http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/testrecord.pdf>.

3 Sieff, “US, Japan Boost BMD Cooperation,” *UPI*, November 20, 2006.

4 Jun Hongo, “Two false alarms leave Japan egg-faced,” *TJT*, April 5, 2009.

launch was caused by a “computer error” in the GSDF Command, the second false alarm resulted from an error in the Air Defence Command’s radar installation. In addition to that, the Air Defence Command also “mistakenly thought”¹ that the U.S.-shared early warning missile-firing signal had been sent which led to a nationwide alert in Japan. While some scepticism is always in order, I am far from being dismissive about BMD’s technological feasibility as a result of the above facts. The experiences of the US and USSR in the nuclear arms race and space exploration suggest that complex projects evolve to success through trial and error. Increased media attention to present errors does not eliminate the underlying logic of technological development with unavoidable failures along the way gradually leading to improvement: The SM-3 test-launched from the JS Myoko destroyer on October 27, 2009, that is, after the DPJ came to power, intercepted the target successfully.

Regarding the DPJ-led governments' position on BMD, my forecast immediately after the 2009 elections was that the procurement of BMD would not suffer any serious reductions since the BMD's attractive potentialities and the country's strategic constraints favoured the procurement regardless of its fiscal conditions (absent a complete breakdown of the economy). The DPJ government's endorsement of the revised NDPG on December 17, 2010 was in line with my prediction. Moreover, earlier that year, on October 29, Japan conducted a further successful missile intercept test using its fourth upgraded destroyer – the JS Kirishima.² The BMD project is likely to continue developing for the foreseeable future.

Alternative research questions

What are other questions which could have lain at the centre of my research on the BMD policy? What might such research and its insights have looked like? And why did I not pursue these alternative projects?

1 Ibid.

2 “Joint Japan-US Missile Defence Flight Test Successful,” *Missile Defence Agency News Release*, October 29, 2010, <http://www.mda.mil/news/10news0016.html>.

The broadest thinkable question, which could have served as an organising principle of the research on BMD, is if and why BMD made Japan safer. The question is related to the central question chosen for this thesis but requires a different analytical strategy. A thesis aiming to answer this question has to successfully complete four tasks: an accurate assessment of the available technologies and military R&D in Japan, China, the US, both Koreas, Russia, and existing and emerging non-state actors; an accurate estimate of security policymaking trends in these countries and non-state actors; a reliable prognosis for domestic politics, international relations and technology developments; and a detailed knowledge of the procurement process in Japan, especially the non-publicised planning of the procurement and the items which had to be postponed or abandoned because of BMD. However, since a precise comprehension of the performance of even the available technologies is impossible to obtain outside an actual war situation, developing a thesis around such a question means engaging in an essentially futile exercise.

Another way of organising a research of BMD policy is to concentrate in greater detail on one of the smaller questions identified in this thesis – Why did Japan sign the GSOMIA after decades of successfully resisting it? However, while the narratives answering this and similar questions are likely to be structured differently from this thesis, I appreciate that their explanation will be more successful inside the logical structure of BMD's implications and interests elaborated here. The question about GSOMIA, which was on the table since the early 1980s, is most intriguing because of its implications for the country's industrial policy and its legal system, especially patent legislation. It is also a question that, to my knowledge, has received no substantive attention.

One more question that I could have chosen to guide my research on BMD is about the contribution of certain types of stake-holders on the policymaking, most interestingly the military contractors. Such a research could have been structured as an investigation of the

DPC and MHI with a view to uncovering examples of the BMD policy changing its speed or direction because of the industries' intervention in the process. I was not fortunate to identify such evidence but as a result of my research I can more confidently discard the explanation of the Japanese industries' involvement in BMD as "driven by patriotism." This "patriotism" hypothesis was suggested to me by Nishihara.¹ On the basis of my analysis of the elites, I am also inclined to discard the view expressed by a US government official in a brief interview to me about the Japanese contractors being coerced into the BMD project by the government of Japan. As the Conference notes and the recent secondary literature demonstrate, the industries had a number of strong interests in the BMD-related contracts.²

These expositions show that the most interesting research question I could have chosen with a hope of effectively approaching it was the one about which I wrote this thesis.

Suggestions for future research of BMD

Where does my argument point to in terms of promising directions for a follow-up analysis of the theme? Here, of interest are the BMD-related industrial matters and developments: If and how will the Japan-US cooperation on BMD serve as a model for the following procurement projects, especially the next-generation fighter jet (F-X)? If and how will collaboration with European countries proceed? If and how is the research on BMD "feeding" the country's space exploration, and vice versa? No less absorbing will it be to observe the courses of the development of China's and Japan's air-defence strategies. Apart from a successful anti-satellite test on January 11, 2007, China succeeded in intercepting a missile outside the earth's atmosphere on January 11, 2010, joining an exclusive club of countries with an anti-ballistic missile capability.³ IISS experts evaluated it as "an important step in its [China's] development of a multi-tiered air-defence strategy, designed to integrate

1 Tokyo, RIPS, October 2008.

2 See Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, *In Defence of Japan*, 194 and Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7.

3 "China's Successful Anti-missile Test," *IISS Strategic Comments*, volume 16, comment 6 (February 2010).

both offensive and defensive space operations with China's conventional air-defence network."¹ If and how are the air-defence programmes of the two countries correlated?

However, the most interesting thing to observe in the near future is the removal of the restriction on the right to engage in collective defence. In this thesis, I suggested that BMD is likely to play a significant role in this process either as a rhetorical tool or as an actual instrument. The government of Japan has the power to falsify this hypothesis by resorting to other means to implement the change, but, in any case, it will be intriguing to watch if and how BMD plays a role in the annulment of this self-restraint Japan has kept from the Cold War. The underlying policymaking also merits attention.

To conclude, it remains to say that analyses of the Japanese security policy have tended to either overestimate or underestimate the degree of its remilitarisation and demilitarisation. This thesis is more in the camp of those who emphasise a degree of Japan's remilitarisation. The thesis has identified certain circumstances and some facts which suggest this trend. On the basis of this investigation, but also admittedly with a touch of policy-oriented vanity, I expect the foreseeable future to unfold along the suggested lines.

1 Ibid.

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Aerospace Daily

Aviation Week & Space Technology

Defence Daily

Defence News

The Daily Yomiuri

The Economist

The Japan Times

The New York Times

The Nikkei Weekly

The Times

The Washington Post

Yomiuri Shimbun

APPENDIX A. INTERVIEWS.

List of longer interviews (≥1hr)

Name	Position	Date, place
Campbell, John C.	University of Michigan, Professor University of Keio, Visiting Professor	17.11.2008, Starbucks Coffee Shop in Roppongi, Tokyo
Drifte, Reinhard	LSE, Visiting Research Fellow	20.02.2008, Oxford train station
Hyodo, Shinji	National Institute for Defence Studies, Senior Research Fellow	29.10.2008, Ministry of Defence, NIDS, Tokyo
Ishikawa, Takeshi	Embassy of Japan in the UK, Counsellor (Defence)	20.03.2008, Japan Embassy in the UK, London
Kato, Akira	Obirin University, Professor	Scheduled for 14.10.2008 but cancelled, RIPS, Tokyo
Nishihara, Masashi	Research Institute for Peace and Security, Director; National Academy of Defence (Japan), former President	06.10.2008, RIPS, Tokyo
Takahashi, Sugio	Strategic Planning Office, Defence Policy Bureau (Japan Ministry of Defence), Deputy Director	21.11.2008, Ichigaya Hotel Cafe, Tokyo
Yoshioka, Masatsugu	R&D Promotion Division, Technology and Environment Policy Bureau, METI, Deputy Director	17.10.2008, METI, Tokyo
Watanabe, Akio	RIPS President, one of the authors of the Higuchi Report of 1994 (“The Modality of the Security and Defence Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21 st Century”)	Scheduled for 09.10.2008 but cancelled, Tokyo, RIPS

List of e-mail communications on the thesis topic (the experts below answered a number of questions on such aspects of Japan's BMD policy as the US-Japan defence cooperation, Japanese technology policy, patent legislation and matters regarding the protection of intellectual property rights on military technology)

Name	Position	Date of email response
Kato, Akira	Obirin University, Professor	13.10.2008
Matsumura, Masahiro	St Andrew's University (Momoyama Gakuin Daigaku), Osaka, Professor	27.10.2008
Murayama, Yuzo	Doshisha University, Business School, Professor (Japanese technology policy)	28.10.2008
Yoshime, Junichiro	METI Industrial Science and Technology Policy and Environment Bureau, official	26.01.2009

APPENDIX B. INFORMATION ON THE US-JAPAN SECURITY FORUM 2000-2002.¹

<i>Participants' Names</i>	<i>Affiliations</i>	<i>Functions at Forum</i>
<i>May and October 2000 Forum "Countering Cyber-terrorism"</i>		
John J. Hamre	CSIS Director, positions in the US Congress Budget Office, Senate Military Commission, Under Secretary of Defence	Special speaker at the Forum
Other participants not disclosed		A regular seminar on missile defence "inaugurated"
<i>November 2001 Forum Dedicated to the 50th Anniversary of the US-Japan Treaty</i>		
Tsutomu (/Riki) Kawara	JDA Director General (1987-88, 1999-2000, 2000), LDP, National Security Research Group (NSRG), Centre	Opening remarks Panellist
Tamisuke Watanuki	Former Lower House Speaker, Secretary of LDP, Leader of People's New Party, NSRG, Centre	Special Speaker
Howard Baker, Jr	US Ambassador to Japan	Invited Speaker
Fukushiro Nukaga	Minister of Finance (2007-2008), JDA Director General (1998, 2005-2006), LDP PARC Head, NSRG, Centre	Keynote Speech Panellist
William Schneider, Jr	Chairman of US Defence Science Board, Member of the Commission of the US Aerospace Industry, Centre	Keynote Speech Panellist
John J. Hamre		Special Lecture Panellist
Tomohisa Sakanaka	Former Director of Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS, Tokyo)	Panel Chair
Masao Akamatsu	Lower House member, New Komeito Party, NSRG, Centre	Panellist
Shozo Azuma	Lower House Diet member, Komeito→Shinshinto →Liberal Party→DPJ	Panellist
Tokuichiro Tamazawa	JDA Director General (1994-1995), LDP, NSRG, Centre	Panellist
<i>November 2002 Forum "Legislation of US-Japan Emergency Situations and New Wars in the 21st Century"</i>		
US-Japan Cultural Society		Main organiser
Security Research Institute		Main organiser
NSRG		Co-host
The National Policy Research Institute (<i>Chuseiiken</i>)		Co-host

1 From the official website of NSRG, accessed September 25, 2009, <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2000/f2000.htm>; <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2001/f2001.htm>; <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2002/f2002.htm>. NB: US-Japan Security Forum is the immediate precursor of the Security Strategy Conference.

Session on Cyber-terror

Yoshio Taniguchi	Chairman of Information and Computer Systems Security Society	Chair
Paul Curts (カーツ)	US NSC, Special Assistant to the President	
James Louis	CSIS Special Research Fellow	

Session 2

Tsutomu (/Riki) Kawara		Host speech
Tamisuke Watanuki		
Shigeru Ishiba	Minister of Defence (2007-2008), JDA Director General (2002-2004), LDP, NSRG, Centre	

Howard Baker, Jr

Panel Discussion “On Biological and Chemical Weapons Terrorism”

Atsuyuki Sassa	Former Head of Cabinet Security Office	Panel Coordinator
Stephen Reeves	US Army Major General	Panellist
David Heyman	CSIS Special Research Fellow	Panellist
Edwin Pechos (ペチヨス)	Associate Member of the Operational Evaluation Division, Institute for Defence Analyses	Panellist
Robert Marson	Chairman of Columbia District Hospitals Association	Panellist
Makoto Iritani	Cabinet Office, Counsellor	Panellist
Senya Toyama	JDA, Sanitary Officer	Panellist

Lecture “On New Wars in the 21st Century – ‘Wars Against Terrorism’”

William Schneider, Jr		
Edward Smith	Research Member of the Operational Evaluation Division, Institute for Defence Analyses	
Yukio Sato	JIIA Director, Member of the National Public Safety Commission, former Ambassador to the U.N.	

Fukushiro Nukaga

Panel Discussion “On US-Japan Emergency Situations Legislation”

Noboru Hoshuyama	Former Head of Defence Facilities Administrative Agency (1994-1995), Centre	Panel coordinator
Fumio Kyuma	Minister of Defence (2007), JDA Director General (1996-1998, 2006-2007), LDP, NSRG, Centre	Panellist
Fukushiro Nukaga		Panellist
Shozo Azuma		Panellist
Yoshinori Suematsu	DPJ, official in a number of Lower House security-related committees, NSRG	Panellist
Kurt Weldon	US House of Representatives	Panellist
Christopher Cocks	US House of Representatives	Panellist
William Schneider, Jr		Panellist

James Auer	Director of Centre for US-Japan Studies, Vanderbilt University	Panellist
Edward Smith		Panellist

APPENDIX C. INFORMATION ON THE JAPAN-US SECURITY STRATEGY

CONFERENCE (2003-2007, WASHINGTON, DC AND TOKYO).¹

<i>Names</i>	<i>Affiliations</i>	<i>Functions at Conference; Views on BMD and Related Issues (summaries, paraphrases, quotes)</i>
The Second Japan-US Security Strategy Conference (11.2003, Tokyo) ² “The New Defence Strategy and Missile Defence; The Biological and Chemical Weapons Anti-terrorism Policy”		
<i>Session Theme “On US-Japan Defence Strategy”</i>		
Keiichi Hatakeyama	Professor of International Relations, Gakushuin Women’s College	Chair
Tsutomu (/Riki) Kawara	JDA Director General (1987-88, 1999-2000, 2000), LDP, National Security Research Group (NSRG), Centre	Host’s speech; emphasis on the emergence of new security threats; North Korea as a threat; Japan’s dependence on the US for the enemy base strike capability makes the bilateral relationship more important than the U.N.; having realised the importance of enhancing one’s own defence capability, Japan is pushing forward a discussion of missile defence, protection against cyber-attacks, and terrorism; it was recognised that the upgrade of the JDA’s status to ministry, interpretation of the right to collective self-defence, amendment of the Constitution go to the heart of the defence reform.
Tamisuke Watanuki	Former Lower House Speaker, Secretary of LDP, Leader of the People’s New Party, NSRG, Centre	Emphasis on the importance of this Conference in a situation of challenges from North Korea and terrorism.
Shigeru Ishiba	Minister of Defence (2007-2008), JDA Director General (2002-2004), LDP, NSRG, Centre	The international security situation has changed from “post-Cold War” to “post-9/11”; US-Japan alliance and the U.N. are not antinomies; an important question will be how the UN will influence the new international law and order while reflecting the will of the US and Japan.
Howard Baker, Jr	US Ambassador to Japan	The US-Japan enduring partnership is the most important bilateral relationship in the world; the US’ concerns about China and North Korea are the US’ concerns about Japan’s security; missile defence is a “defensive weapon”.
William S.	President Clinton’s	Keynote speech: On the Development of the US

1 The official website of NSRG: <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum.htm> (Accessed between September 26 and October 10, 2009)

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2003-2/f2003-2-report.htm>.

Cohen	Defence Secretary (1997-2001), Centre	Defence Strategy; the US expects Japan to do its utmost in the area of defence; for this end, Cohen lists five tasks focusing on enhancing interoperability between forces and various kinds of interactions; the fifth task is the promotion of security dialogue through various channels – government, academy, think tanks, businesses; the development of missile defence is extremely important; “This time, as a result of responding to the North Korean missile programme, the promotion of missile defence is “easily acceptable” (<i>ukeire-yasui</i>) so we must promote industrial cooperation” (<i>kono sai, kitachousen-no misairu taisho-no tame, MD-no suishin-ha ukeireyasui mono de ari, sangyoukyouryoku-wo suishin shite ikubeki de aru</i> ¹); the US and Japan share ideals, national interests, and enemies.
Yukio Sato	JIIA Director, Member of the National Public Safety Commission, former Ambassador to the U.N.	Keynote Speech: The Roles of the US-Japan Alliance and the U.N.; while the U.N is flawed there is no substitute; the U.N. Security Council’s permanent members’ veto power is out of touch with the state of current international affairs; insistence on Japan’s acceptance into the Security Council.
Noboru Hoshuyama	Former Head of Defence Facilities Administrative Agency (1994-1995), Centre	Chair and Panellist
James Jay Carafano	The Heritage Foundation, senior research fellow	Panellist
Fukushiro Nukaga	Minister of Finance (2007-2008), JDA Director General (1998, 2005-2006), LDP, NSRG, Centre	Keynote speech: On Japan’s New Defence Strategy; currently, the emphasis is on the independent defence strategy (<i>shutaiteki bouei senryakuron</i>) whereas before Japan relied on the force of others; it is time to think about “Japan’s defence”; the US and Japan benefit from the world’s stability, their responsibility to maintain such security is big; the role of military force in maintaining order should be expected to become more important; the concept of collective defence may need to be adjusted.
Seiji Maehara	Former President of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), NSRG, Centre	Panellist

After the session, presentations by Boeing and Lockheed Martin were planned

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2003-2/f2003-2-report.htm>.

Session Theme “US-Japan Defence Armaments and Technology Exchange” and “The Biological and Chemical Weapons Anti-terrorism Policy”

Noboru Hoshuyama		Chair
Fumio Kyuma	Fourth Chairman of the Centre, Minister of Defence (2007), JDA Director General (1996-1998, 2006-2007), LDP, Chairman of NSRG	Keynote speech: On Questions of Japan’s Defence Technology; Japan must possess equipment reflecting the latest military science and technology; a domestic defence industry must be maintained; in 1959 I failed the second stage of pilot exams because the fighter jet was not suitable for the size of a Japanese body with short legs; the JDA’s budgetary conditions are severe; a 15% decrease of companies in defence industry was noted from 1995 to 2000; the arms export ban must be reviewed; with the introduction of missile defence (MD) the defence industry’s decline enters a crisis – domestic licence-production and export of weapons components must be pursued; emphasis on the need to enable Japan to participate in international collaboration on weapons production.
James Jay Carafano		Keynote speech: On US-Japan Defence Equipment and Technology Exchange; civilian-military technology cooperation should be understood broadly as an element of national security policy.
James Bodner	Former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy	Panellist; for licence production of MD and PAC-3 Japan needs to improve/ reform (<i>kaizen</i>) its export restrictions; 90% of components of North Korean missiles are made in Japan – Japan must improve its situation to contribute to technology control in the whole of Asia.
Charles M. Cupperman	Boeing Vice-President, Division for Advanced Systems and Missile Defence System Development	Panellist; emphasis on the promotion of bilateral armaments and technology exchange.
Takashi Nishioka	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) Chairman, Keidanren Defence Production Committee (DPC) Chairman	Panellist; Japan’s defence industry is in an extremely severe condition; licence production of BMD related armaments is necessary, however, budget-wise other procurements make experience a squeeze heightening a sense of crisis; in the case of BMD production, a solution to the problem of the three weapons non-export principles must be found; the progress from joint research to joint development to joint production is necessary ¹ .

¹ Ibid.

Hiroo Kinoshita	Former Director of Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (METI), Director of the Japan Association of Defence Industries (JADI)	Panellist; emphasis on the construction of a framework facilitating joint production and development; while Japan continues its three non-export principles, the reality is such that Japanese high technology is being exported to enemy countries; the fear of leakage of missile defence technology is a factor retarding joint research, development, and production (<i>MD gijutsu-mo kaigairyuushutsu you deareba nihon-no gijutsu kanri-no mondai. Nichibei kyoudo kenkyuu kaihatsu seisan-he no sogaiyouin¹</i>).
Other participants Q&A		Is a contraction or transformation of Japan's defence industry possible? – A situation of a stronger company absorbing a weak company is unsuitable (<i>soguwana</i>) for Japan. Derivation from civilian technology is wide-spread so a reformatting of the defence industry into one company would be policy-wise inappropriate (<i>futekitou</i>).
Keiichi Hatakeyama		Chair
Stephen Reeves	US Army Major General	Keynote speech on biological and chemical terrorism (BC)
Makoto Iritani	Cabinet Office Counsellor	Discussant; BC terrorism.
Tatsuya Nagai	National Policy Agency	Discussant; BC terrorism.
Norihiro Hara	JDA, Sanitary Office	Discussant
After the session, presentations by Northrop Grumman and Raytheon were planned		
<i>Session Theme "On the New Missile Defence Concept"</i>		
Noboru Hoshuyama		Chair
William Schneider, Jr	Chairman of US Defence Science Board, Member of the Commission of the US Aerospace Industry, Centre	Keynote speech; panellist; in countering the WMD's proliferation, the missile defence is an indispensable, core competence; it is important for Japan to allow itself the use of the right to collective self-defence.
James Jay Carafano		Panellist; as a result of "spiral development" a flexible system is to be created which could address new threats.
Shigeaki Tsukihara	Diet Upper House Member, former JDA official	Panellist
Seiji Maehara		Panellist; the DPJ basically (<i>kihontekini</i>) recognises that missile defence is necessary; a number of issues need to be resolved: cost-

1 Ibid.

		effectiveness ratio (how to select other necessary procurement items within a limited defence budget?), legal adjustments (the question of collective self-defence and the dependence on the US for intelligence gathering), revision of the weapons export ban, explanations (reassurance?) to regional powers, especially China.
Junichi Nishiyama	Advisor to MHI Space Division, Head of Guidance Equipment Section	Panellist; while Japan has the capability to develop missile defence (capacity to intercept missiles), what's important is the development of a reliable system; it is essential to construct a more effective system by expanding joint research with the US and gradually introducing components (=“spiral development”).
Hiroshi Tajima	Japan representative on the BMD International Committee	Panellist; spiral-type cooperation on technology with regular revisions of progress is vital.
After the session, presentation by CSC (Computer Science Company). Parallel to the Conference an exhibition of BMD related equipment with real models of PAC-3 and SM-3 took place.		
The Fourth Japan-US Security Strategy Conference (11.2004, Tokyo)¹ “The Evolution of US-Japan Alliance and International Cooperation”		
Keiichi Hatakeyama	Professor of International Relations, Gakushuin Women's College	Chair
Tsutomu (/Riki) Kawara	JDA Director General (1987-88, 1999-2000, 2000), LDP, National Security Research Group (NSRG), Centre	Host's speech
Howard Baker, Jr	US Ambassador to Japan	Guest speech
Tsutomu Takebe	LDP Secretary General (2004-2006), NSRG, Centre	Guest speech
Yoshinori Ohno	JDA Director General (2004-2005)	Guest speech planned but cancelled.
<i>Session Theme “The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance and the International Cooperation”²</i>		
Noboru	Former Head of	Chair

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/f2004-4.htm>.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov11open01.pdf>.

Hoshuyama	Defence Facilities Administrative Agency (1994-1995), Centre	
William Schneider, Jr	Chairman of US Defence Science Board, Member of the Commission of the US Aerospace Industry, Centre	Keynote speech
Fukushiro Nukaga	Minister of Finance (2007-2008), JDA Director General (1998, 2005-2006), LDP Policy Affairs Research Council Head (2003-2004), NSRG, Centre	Keynote speech; speech started with an emphasis on the need to identify the origin of the unknown nuclear submarine that intruded into Japanese territorial waters on the day of the conference; emphasis on Japan's independent defence strategy (<i>shutaiteki bouei senryakuron</i>) that Nukaga expected to be incorporated into the 2004 NDPG; by not permitting itself the exercise of the right to collective self-defence Japan does not fulfil its international and alliance responsibilities and avoids contributing to international cooperative activities; Japan's attitude to collective self-defence must be revised; in December 2003, Japan decided to introduce BMD – currently, the only effective measure against ballistic missiles; Nukaga finds the decision on BMD appropriate (<i>datou</i>); on the enemy base strike capability Nukaga notes that the Japanese Constitution has no provision for “sitting and waiting for the death to come” – there must be no taboos on discussing how to protect the nation in the current international situation ¹ ; the right to self-defence must be introduced into the Constitution.
Peter Brooks	Director of Asian Research Centre, the Heritage Foundation	Keynote speech; the US-Japan alliance should be developed into a truly global partnership.
Seiji Maehara	Former President of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), NSRG, Centre	Keynote speech; emphasis on the US forces transformation and military bases relocation; concerns about the US current activities in the Middle East.
<i>Session Theme “Biological and Chemical Anti-terrorism Policy”</i>		
Keiichi Hatakeyama		Chair
Atsuyuki Sassa	Former Head of Cabinet Security Office, Centre	Keynote speech
Anthony T. Tu	University Professor, US (biochemistry,	Keynote speech

1 Ibid., 15.

molecular biology, toxicology), Author of “Chemical Terrorism: Horrors in Tokyo Subway and Matsumoto City”

Sergei Popov	Professor of George Mason University, Deputy Director of National Centre for Bio-defence and Infectious Diseases; former Soviet bio-weapons scientist	Keynote speech
Stephen Reeves	US Army Major General	Keynote speech
		At the end of the first day, presentations by Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Computer Science (CSC)
<i>Session Theme “US-Japan Defence Equipment and Technology Exchange”¹</i>		
Noboru Hoshuyama		Chair
David Shear	Political Minister Counsellor at US Embassy in Tokyo	Guest speech
Fumio Kyuma	Fourth Chairman of the Centre, Minister of Defence (2007), JDA Director General (1996-1998, 2006-2007), LDP, Chairman of NSRG	Keynote speech; three reasons why the weapons export ban should be revised (at least vis-à-vis the ally US, for the possibility of joint production of BMD and BMD components export to the US): the need for Japan to access the latest advanced technology through international collaboration and joint development, the desire to strengthen the alliance relationship with the US, the idea of broadening the field in which Japan can contribute with its technology (bullet-resistant vests, gas masks, anti-piracy patrol ships etc.) to the world’s peace and stability; Japan must acquire the capability to domestically produce and repair SM-3 and PAC-3 missiles. ²
William Schneider, Jr		Keynote speech; emphasis on the modernisation of the US military from platform to network centric warfare, and systems of systems; permeability between civilian and military technology. ³
William S. Cohen	President Clinton’s Defence Secretary (1997-2001), Centre	Keynote speech; by mentioning the international collaboration on the F-35 fighter, Cohen notes that the project participants are able to modernise

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov12open01.pdf>.

2 Ibid., 4.

3 Ibid., 13.

		their military production; Japan could significantly decrease its military expenditures if it chose to partake in such cooperative projects; emphasis on China's military modernisation but also its potential to constructively contribute to the world's political and economic order.
Takashi Nishioka	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) Chairman, Vice Chairman of Keidanren, Keidanren Defence Production Committee (DPC) Chairman	Panellist; From last year, I/ we have lobbied both governments to introduce licence-produced BMD from the very beginning, however, regrettably, I appreciate that as a result of procedural issues in the government the BMD procurement in its first year had to go through the Foreign Military Sales Channel (FMS). (<i>sakunenrai raisensu seisan-ni yoru BMD dounyuu-no tounsho-kara toiu koto de, nichibeiryouseifu-ni onegai shite maitta wake desu ga, zannennagara, seifu-no tetsuzuki ga doushitemo maiawanai to, hatsunendo-ha FMS-de ugokazaru-wo enai joukyou de iru to rikai shite orimasu¹</i>); the industrial world in Japan values the conclusions of the Araki Commission on the relaxation of the arms export ban; the ban revision should not be limited to BMD co-production or the US ² ; Nishioka expresses his desire for the Japanese to participate in joint research and development of airborne laser, future combat systems, unmanned aerial vehicle systems ³ .
Hiroo Kinoshita	Former Director of Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (METI), Director of the Japan Association of Defence Industries (JADI)	Panellist; describes himself as a person who was in charge (<i>tantou</i>) of preparing Nakasone's decision in the 1980s to allow the "transfer" of Japanese weapons technology to the US ⁴ ; emphasis on the need for a framework of export to third countries when not only Japan would need to obtain the permission from the US when exporting US technology but also the US would have to seek Japan's permission to export Japanese technology.
Gregg Rubinstein	Director of GAR Associates, Inc. (real estate valuation and consulting services); long-term work experience in the US Embassy, Tokyo	Panellist; worked with Kinoshita Hiroo on the 1983 decision by Nakasone on technology transfers to the US ⁵ ; the US government supports Japan's three weapons non-export principles (<i>beikokuseifu-ha, nihon-no bukiyushutsu sangensoku-wo shiji suru-to kurikaeshi hyoumei shiteimasu⁶</i>); the revision of the ban has started not because of US pressure (<i>tashikani,</i>

1 Ibid., 15.
2 Ibid., 16.
3 Ibid., 17.
4 Ibid., 19.
5 Ibid., 20.
6 Ibid., 22.

*bukiyushutsu seisaku-no minaoshi-ha beikoku-no presshaa-kara hajimatta wake deharimasen*¹); the US has an interest in the revision of the ban if it enables Japan to participate in international programmes but the US has no intention of turning Japan into a weapons exporting country (*beikokuseifu-ha, nihon-ga kokusaitekina proguramu-he sanko dekiru to iukoto-de, bukiyushutsu seisaku-no minaoshi-ni kanshin ga arimasu ga, sore ijou-no koto dehaarimasen*²); Japan needs to develop a weapons export policy and policy implementation processes where it would achieve a balance between its security, industrial base considerations, and international obligations; the revision of the arms export ban is no more than a symbolic effort for a bigger agenda including the reform of bureaucratic control and the need to nurture active (*jihatsuteki*) industries.

Robert Chaplin	US Navy, Japan Representative of Raytheon International, Inc.	Panellist
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*Session Theme “Missile Defence Policy”*³

Noboru Hoshuyama		Chair
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William Schneider, Jr		Keynote speech; the essence of BMD is C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and C&C (command and control). ⁴
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Junichi Nishiyama	Advisor to MHI Space Division, Head of Guidance Equipment Section	Panellist; pledges to push for licence production of SM-3 and PAC-3 in Japan (<i>raisensu kokusanka-ni mukete desu ne, zehi, katsudou-wo susumete itadakitai, aruiha souiu fuu-ni ugokitai-to omotte orimasu</i>) ⁵ ; enemy cruise and ballistic missiles are likely to be used simultaneously (reference to Schneider) which requires appropriate measures for cruise missile defence (CMD) ⁶ ; emphasis on the uniqueness of Japan’s conditions which will lead to the construction of an original/ independent Japanese BMD system (<i>nihondokuji-no shisutemu-no kouchiku</i>). ⁷
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Benjamin Kashdi (?)/ 葦	Boeing Missile Defence Systems	Panellist; “Even if North Korea weren’t exactly a threat to Japan, other threats are likely to emerge
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1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov12open02.pdf>.

4 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2004-4/nov12open02.pdf>, p. 3.

5 Ibid., 5.

6 Ibid., 6.

7 Ibid., 20.

– it is because of this that the time is probably coming when Japan has to consider involvement in the airborne laser (ABL) programme.”
*(kitachousen-ga tashika-ni sou itta koto denakunatta to shitemo, sono ta-no kyoui-ga dete kuru koto de arimashou. Dakarakoso nihon toshite-ha, eaaboon reezaa, aruiha ABL proguramu-heno kanyo-wo kentou subeki jiki-ni kite iru nohanaika-to omoimasu).*¹

<p>Hidetsugu Horikawa²</p>	<p>Vice President of Aerospace Division, Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI), Centre</p>	<p>Keynote Speech; since 1988 for 4.5 years, KHI was primary subcontractor in one of the two WESTPAC Study teams led by LTV Company’s (present day Lockheed Martin); KHI was tasked with a missile defence architecture study for Japan and the surrounding areas; things about BMD that KHI considers important: construction of a system that corresponds with the conditions in Japan (emphasis on the need for a quick reconnaissance, information gathering and transmission system), creation of an effective, multifunctional, and flexible system to respond to threats other than ballistic missiles.</p>
<p>David Kier</p>	<p>Former Under Secretary of Defence, Vice President and Managing Director of Lockheed Martin</p>	<p>Panellist</p>
<p>Patrick P. Caruana</p>	<p>Retired USAF Lieutenant General, former TRW Inc. Vice President and Managing Director of the Space Based Infra-red System Low Programme; Northrop Grumman</p>	<p>Panellist; ABL is a joint production project of Northrop Grumman and Boeing.</p>
<p>Mamoru Yamashita</p>	<p>Head of Aerospace Defence Business Headquarters, NEC, Centre</p>	<p>Panellist; emphasis on the functional definitions of the C2BMC architecture of a BMD system.</p>
<p>Aaron B. Fuller III</p>	<p>President of Enforcement, Security and Intelligence within CSC’s North American Public</p>	<p>Panellist; by adding missile defence to its defence arsenal, Japan can become the world’s leader in BMD alongside the US and Israel, the only countries in the world that will possess the necessary “knowledge base” and “operation experience”.³</p>

1 Ibid., 8.
 2 Ibid., 9-11.
 3 Ibid., 18.

Sector Division		
At the end of the day, presentations by Lockheed Martin, the Boeing Company Concurrently with the Conference, a missile defence weapons exhibition takes place.		
The Fifth Japan-US Security Strategy Conference (05.2005, Washington DC) (11 th annual visit of the NSRG to Washington)		
Fukushiro Nukaga ¹	Minister of Finance (2007-2008), JDA Director General (1998, 2005-2006), LDP Policy Affairs Research Council Head (2003-2004), NSRG, Centre	Panellist; as in previous years' speeches, emphasis on Japan's independent defence strategy (<i>shutaiteki boueisenryakuron</i>) implying a pro-active, national interest-informed assessment of the country's security and defence as fundamental items on the nation's agenda; the interpretation of the right to collective self-defence must be changed; emphasis on the importance of an integrated defence force using a variety of diplomatic and economic tools alongside the military force; SDF's international activities should be recognised not as "contribution" (<i>kouken</i>) but as responsibility (<i>sekinin</i>) and obligation (<i>gimu</i>) for the peace and stability of the international society; attention to the US forces and base transformation in Japan – the need to think about both the maintenance of deterrent power and the lessening of the burden on the people; emphasis on strengthening of intelligence gathering and evaluation infrastructure and measures of sensitive information protection against leakage. ²
Fumio Kyuma ³	Fourth Chairman of the Centre, Minister of Defence (2007), JDA Director General (1996-1998, 2006-2007), LDP, Chairman of NSRG	Panellist; Kyuma was for the revision of the arms export ban in 2004; appropriate support for the US Navy presence in the world (the concept of sea-basing) is extremely important ⁴ ; Japan is geographically ideally placed to help maintain naval presence in both the Indian and the Pacific Oceans; Kyuma discusses the benefits of possible joint companies servicing US naval vessels (or transport aircraft, fighter jets, etc.) during their stopovers in Japan – two obstacles to this are black-boxing of equipment provided by the US to Japan and the three principles of weapons export ban. ⁵
Masao Akamatsu ⁶	Lower House Member, New Komeito Party,	Panellist; Komeito approved of the weapons export ban relaxation limited to missile defence – this act is described by Akamatsu as an

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-5/speech01.pdf>.

2 Ibid., 3-5.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-5/speech02.pdf>.

4 Ibid., 1.

5 Ibid., 2-3.

6 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-5/speech04.pdf>.

NSRG, Centre

illustration of appropriate burden sharing by Japan within the alliance (*nihon-no oubun-no futan to iu koto-no ittan-no reishou dehanaika to omoimasu*).¹

Shigeki Sato	Chief of New Komeito Foreign Policy and Security Research Group, NSRG	
Seiji Maehara ²	Former President of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), “DPJ shadow Cabinet Defence Minister,” NSRG, Centre	Panellist; the DPJ agrees to BMD procurement ³ ; strong support for the consolidation of the intelligence gathering systems and the strengthening of the information analysis capability ⁴ ; strong support for better legislation of classified information protection ⁵ ; by expanding technology development cooperation from missile defence to other areas and on the premise of Japan strengthening its secrecy legislation, the black-boxing of military procurement from the US should disappear and information sharing promoted ⁶ ; in light of Japan’s huge budget deficit, a review of expenditures, including expenditures on defence, will become inevitable; efforts will be required to keep the cost of imported military procurement as low as possible; emphasis on the gap between the price of weapons imports requested from Japan and the price of the same equipment in the US. ⁷
Takeaki Matsumoto	Former Head of Policy Affairs Research Council , DPJ, NSRG	
James Bodner	Former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy	Panellist
Balbina Hwang	Northeast Asia Senior Policy Analyst, the Heritage Foundation	Panellist

The Sixth Japan-US Security Strategy Conference (11.2005, Tokyo)⁸

1 Ibid., 2.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-5/speech03.pdf>.

3 Ibid., 1.

4 Ibid., 3.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 3-4.

8 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/f2005-6-program.htm>.

Keiichi Hatakeyama	Professor of International Relations, Gakushuin Women's College	Chair
Tsutomu (/Riki) Kawara	JDA Director General (1987-88, 1999-2000, 2000), LDP, National Security Research Group (NSRG), Centre	Host's speech
John Thomas Schieffer	US Ambassador to Japan	Guest's speech
Tsutomu Takebe	LDP Secretary General (2004-2006), NSRG, Centre	Guest speech
Yoshinori Ohno	JDA Director General (2004-2005)	Guest speech
<i>Session Theme "The Rise of India and China and the Deepening of the US-Japan Alliance"</i>		
Noboru Hoshuyama	Former Head of Defence Facilities Administrative Agency (1994-1995), Centre	Chair
William S. Cohen ¹	President Clinton's Defence Secretary (1997-2001), Centre	Keynote speech; panellist; joint development and sharing of roles [in weapons procurement] is becoming a norm around the world; emphasis on various benefits Japan could obtain from participating in international collaboration on weapons production; "In the security environment of the present-day world, the US and Japan are in a political situation which produces a valuable opportunity for the US and Japan to jointly approach the questions of their defence industrial base." (<i>kyou-no sekaitekina anzenhoshoukankyou-no naka-de, nichibei-ha boueisangyoukiban-no mondai-ni kyoudou-de torikumu kichouna kikai-wo erareru seijiteki joukyou-ni aru-to omoimasu</i>). ²
Fukushiro Nukaga	Minister of Finance (2007-2008), JDA Director General (1998, 2005-2006), LDP Policy Affairs Research Council	Keynote speech

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/cohen10.pdf>.

2 Ibid., 4.

	Head (2003-2004), NSRG, Centre	
William Schneider, Jr ¹	Chairman of US Defence Science Board, Member of the Commission of the US Aerospace Industry, Centre	Keynote speech; attention to the environment where China and India are undergoing a military modernisation; emphasis on a fundamental integration of the US and Japanese military forces after which joint missions may be developed.
Seiji Maehara ²	Former President of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), “DPJ shadow Cabinet Defence Minister,” NSRG, Centre	Keynote speech; emphasis on “comprehensive security” (<i>sougouanzenhoshou</i>) – food, energy, large-scale disasters – a broader definition of security not limited to military affairs; “from the point of view of deterrence, the DPJ recognises the necessity of promoting missile defence while acknowledging the need for serious debates over its implementation tempered with the system’s cost-effectiveness ratio” (<i>touzen, yokushi-no men-deha misairubouei-no suishin-toiu koto-ha wareware-mo sore-no hitsuyousei-wo mitometeiru tokoro degozaimasushi, kongo hoyoutaikouka-no men-mo shikkari-to kami-wo shinagara kore-ni tsuite-no jujitsu-toiu mono-wo donoyouni hakatte iku ka toiu koto-ha shinken-ni giron shite ikanakuteha narimasen</i>) ³ ; activation of military technology exchange is necessary but it cannot proceed without adjustments in Japan’s secrecy legislation ⁴ ; to preserve Japan’s strategic nature (<i>senryakusei</i>) and independence of action (<i>shutaisei</i>), Japan needs to strengthen its own intelligence capability which will contribute to enhancing Japan-US mutual intelligence; the responsibility to explain (<i>setsumei sekinin</i>) diplomacy and security policy to people is extremely important ⁵ .
Shigeru Ishiba ⁶	Minister of Defence (2007-2008), JDA Director General (2002-2004), LDP, NSRG, Centre	Panellist; in response to China’s rapid modernisation of its Air Force and Navy, it is natural (<i>touzen-no koto</i>) that the US-Japan alliance must possess a capable deterrent ⁷ ; China’s intentions have to be carefully evaluated in light of the fact that its military power by far exceeds its national defence needs ⁸ ; Japan has no intention of possessing a nuclear capability; at the moment, Japan has no plan of acquiring an

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/schneider10.pdf>.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/maehara10.pdf>.

3 *Ibid.*, 2.

4 *Ibid.*, 4.

5 *Ibid.*

6 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/isiba10.pdf>.

7 *Ibid.*, 2.

8 *Ibid.*

enemy base strike capability¹; debates over the medium- to long term prospect of a transfer of US bases under the SDF control are necessary; even closer cooperation with the US on missile defence must be pursued alongside addressing other cooperation issues including FX, UAV, CX etc.²

Akihisa Nagashima	Lower House Diet Member, DPJ	Panellist
Shigeki Sato	Chief of New Komeito Foreign Policy and Security Research Group, NSRG	Panellist
Peter Brooks	Director of Asian Research Centre, the Heritage Foundation	Panellist
Balbina Hwang	Northeast Asia Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation	Panellist

At the end of the day, presentations by the Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin Corporation; plus, a special F-X (fighter experimental) presentation (F-X 用特別プレゼンテーション)

Session Theme “US-Japan Defence Technology Exchange Accompanying the US-Japan Joint Development of Missile Defence”

Noboru Hoshuyama		Chair
Fumio Kyuma ³	Fourth Chairman of the Centre, Minister of Defence (2007), JDA Director General (1996-1998, 2006-2007), LDP, Chairman of NSRG	Keynote speech; when the government decided to introduce BMD in December 2003, no change was regrettably made to the arms export ban; for the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance and for the preservation of the latest defence technology base in Japan, the relaxation of the arms export ban alone is insufficient and necessitates a cooperation of the US and Japanese defence industries in production ⁴ ; it is necessary to create a basis for Japanese companies to implement repairs on the US equipment in Japan ⁵ ; why debate the GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) now if the legislation protecting secret information already exists in Japan? ⁶ – reference to the 1954 Secret Protection Law To Implement the Mutual

1 Ibid., 3.

2 Ibid., 5.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/kyuma11.pdf>.

4 Ibid., 1.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 1, 2-4.

Defence Assistance Agreement and Other Related Agreements between Japan and the USA, the 1952 Law on Special Measures concerning Criminal Cases to Implement the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the USA, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of US Armed Forces in Japan, and the 2002 revision of the SDF Law which includes provisions for up to 5 year long sentences for leakage of SDF's defence information (this also applies to company employees); Kyuma gives two reasons for why GSOMIA is being brought up now – the administrative procedures within the US government which has GSOMIA with all its partners and the easiness of intra-firm audit when there is only one uniform contract template; the US and Japan must quickly agree on a framework of secrecy protection – politicians will take the necessary decisions after the deliberations by experts from both countries; by signing the GSOMIA Japan will be obliged to certify the suitability of each of the companies the government contracts for defence production; if Japanese companies are contracted directly by the US government to do repairs on their equipment, the GSOMIA will not be covering this – this point requires attention.

William Schneider, Jr¹

Keynote speech; the structural basis of the command and control system which is the core of the BMD system is especially important for the modernisation of Japan's defence so that it is capable of responding to situations in the 21st century; emphasis on IT's role in improving the fighting capability of the US military, drawing on the comparison between the Iraq wars in 1991 and 2003; some emphasis on GSOMIA as one of the questions arising from BMD and similar defence projects that will be gradually taken up and resolved.

Takashi Nishioka²

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) Chairman, Vice Chairman of Keidanren, Keidanren Defence Production Committee (DPC)

Keynote speech; the security situation with which Japan is faced continues to be severe: November 2004 Chinese submarines' intrusions into Japanese waters, the North Korean missile and nuclear programme, terrorism in Southeast Asia; on the basis of the 2004 NDPO calling for an multifunctional, flexible, and effective force, the latest Mid-Term Defence Build-Up Plan includes

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/schneider11.pdf>.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/nishioka11.pdf>.

Chairman

plans for the provision of BMD, new fighter jet etc.; regarding the arms export ban, the Japanese industries had two problems which needed to be resolved; one was that joint US-Japan development and production of equipment are impossible if exports to the U.S are prohibited; the second was that the technology transfer is limited to programmes approved by both governments as a result of which industries cannot participate in or even negotiate the details of equipment programmes that the SDF are not planning to procure¹; the first point was resolved in December 2004 when although the non-export principles were left unchanged the application of the principles was relaxed in the case of BMD – non-BMD cooperation would be decided on a case-by-case basis; regarding this case-by-case judgment, the Japanese industries are pushing with preparations to produce early results on the following concrete matters: the export to the US of equipment produced under the US licence (reference to the enquiries from the US on Patriot components, its launchers etc.), the questions of intellectual property rights in US-Japan cooperation on the new fighter jet, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), etc., and repairs of US naval vessels and aircraft by Japanese companies.

Marvin K. McNamara²
US Air Force,
Deputy Director of
US Missile Defence
Agency

Keynote speech; presentation of general, well-known information on the structure of BMD; emphasis on the approach of investing into the knowledge base (*chiken beesu-no toushi apuroochi*) – [in tune with the “evolutionary and spiral development” approach to procurement according to which an adaptable system must be created so that its required military functionality changing over time in response to the threat environment can be swiftly revised and achieved].

Session Theme “On Japan’s Missile Defence Design”

William
Schneider, Jr

Panellist

Charles M.
Cupperman
Boeing Vice-
President, Division
for Advanced
Systems and Missile
Defence System
Development

Panellist

James J.
Vice President,

Panellist; praise of Japan as a nation “further

1 Ibid., 2.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2005-6/macnamara11.pdf>.

Quinn ¹	Missile and Space Defence, North Grumman Space Technology	along than any other US ally” in developing the BMD; Japan invests more than 1bn US dollars a year in BMD; “Instead of starting fresh with some entirely new system, it made obvious sense to field an existing capability like the PAC-3 and the Aegis and then upgrade them over time. By following this principle of capabilities-based acquisition, Japan has cut years off the timeline for deployment of an operational missile defence”; emphasises the importance for Japan to create Japan Missile Defence Centre linked to the Joint National Integration Centre; Quinn urges Japan to elect North Grumman developed space systems, such as DSP – Defence Support Programme, SBIRS-H – Space-Based Infrared System High, and STSS – Space Tracking and Surveillance System, which “could serve as a great adhesive, binding our missile-defence forces with interoperable technologies and joint technological awareness”.
David Kier	Former Under Secretary of Defence, Vice President and Managing Director of Lockheed Martin	Panellist
Junichi Nishiyama	Advisor to MHI Space Division, Head of Guidance Equipment Section	Panellist
Hidetsugu Horikawa	Vice President of Aerospace Division, Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI), Centre	Panellist
Mamoru Yamashita	Head of Aerospace Defence Business Headquarters, NEC, Centre	Panellist
		At the end of the day, presentations by the Computer Science Company (CSC), Raytheon, Northrop Grumman Corporation.
Tokuichiro Tamazawa	JDA Director General (1994-1995), LDP, NSRG Chairman, Centre	Host’s speech
Hiroshi Imazu	Former JDA Administrative Vice-	Guest’s speech

1 Quinn’s official remarks at the conference available in English from the company’s website: http://www.northropgrumman.com/missiledefense/Docs/Japan_Speech_APPROVED_R1.pdf.

Minister, LDP

Session Theme “Biological and Chemical Anti-terrorism Policy”

Keiichi Hatakeyama		Chair
Shigeru Ishiba		Keynote speech; panellist
Stephen Reeves	US Army major General	Keynote speech; panellist
Kazuhiro Sugita	Former top official in the Cabinet Crisis management Office, Centre	Keynote speech; panellist
Mitsuyoshi Urashima	Medical scientist	Panellist
Concurrently with the Conference, a missile defence weapons and biochemical terrorism themed exhibitions take place.		
The Seventh Annual Japan-US Security Conference “The Evolving US-Japan Alliance: Quadrennial Defence Review [2006] and a New Joint Strategy” (May 2006, Washington, DC) ¹		
Fumio Kyuma ²	Fourth Chairman of the Centre, Minister of Defence (2007), JDA Director General (1996-1998, 2006-2007), LDP, Chairman of NSRG	Presenter; support for GSOMIA (<i>GSOMIA-wo musubu-beki dehanai ka to teian shite orimasu</i>) ³ ; Kyuma first suggested GSOMIA at the Sixth Conference and he notes that 6 months later the government level negotiations had “finally” (<i>youyaku</i>) started; emphasis on strengthening the partnership with the US ⁴
Tokuichiro Tamazawa ⁵	JDA Director General (1994-1995), LDP, NSRG Chairman, Centre	Presenter; China as a communist, authoritarian state causes big concerns; Tamazawa recounts China’s military interventions post World War II to support his position of doubt about the true intent of China’s external strategy which, as he came to believe, is in using military force to achieve political goals; the way Hitler was appeased by Chamberlain in Munich in 1938 must not be repeated in the China-Taiwan question.
Gen Nakatani ⁶	JDA Director General (2001-2002), LDP, NSRG, Centre	Presenter
Stanley O. Roth	Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs	Presenter

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-7/f2006-7.htm>.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-7/forum7-kyuma.pdf>.

3 Ibid., 2.

4 Ibid., 3.

5 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-7/forum7-tamazawa.pdf>.

6 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-7/forum7-nakatani.pdf>.

James Bodner	Former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy	Presenter
Balbina Hwang	Northeast Asia Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation	Chair
Kim Holmes	Vice President, Foreign and Defence Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation	Host
The Eighth Japan-US Security Strategy Conference (August, 2006, Tokyo) “The New QDR Strategy and the Expectations towards the US-Japan Alliance”¹		
Concurrently with the Conference an Integrated Defence Equipment Exhibition takes place.		
Keiichi Hatakeyama	Professor of International Relations, Gakushuin Women’s College	Overall Chair
National Congressional Security Research Group		Host
US-Japan Cultural Society (Centre)		Host
The National Policy Research Institute (<i>Chuuseiken</i>)		Host
The Heritage Foundation		Host
<i>Session Theme “On the New US-Japan Missile Defence Framework”</i>		
Tsutomu (/Riki) Kawara	JDA Director General (1987-88, 1999-2000, 2000), LDP, National Security Research Group (NSRG), Centre	Host’s speech
Noboru Hoshuyama	Former Head of Defence Facilities Administrative Agency (1994-	Moderator

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8.htm>.

<p>Shigeru Ishiba¹</p>	<p>1995), Centre Minister of Defence (2007-2008), JDA Director General (2002-2004), LDP, NSRG, Centre</p>	<p>Keynote speech; when the Cabinet made a decision “On the establishment of the BMD system in 2003” and from 2004 decided to introduce the system there was a lot of criticism about the precipitousness of such a move, however, when last month [July 2006] North Korea launched its missiles the system’s deployment was criticised as too slow – amid such criticism Director General Nukaga has announced his decision on the acceleration of the deployment of PAC-3; for Japan, missile defence is a tool of deterrence against ballistic missiles by denial which widens the country’s diplomatic options²; BMD is also an excellent tool for Japan in strengthening its relations with the US³(<i>beikoku-tono kankeikyoka ni oitemo sugureta tsuuru de aru to iemasu</i>); the Aegis BMD and PAC-3 on which the procurement decision have been made are not the only things we are thinking about – it is necessary to aim for their [Aegis, PAC-3] constant improvement (<i>tsuneni sono appugredo-to nouryokukoujou-wo mezashite iku hitsuyou ga arimasu</i>⁴); a number of measures are necessary to keep abreast with the US in procurement – among them are information protection measures requires for bilateral information sharing and joint research; Japan’s missile defence system is the country’s one and only mainland defence system but viewed from the US missile defence system’s perspective Japan’s system is a theatre defence system – even in this sense Japan’s independent (<i>shutaiteki</i>) operation of the system is vitally necessary (<i>hitsuyoufukaketsu</i>); however, as long as the spiral approach is applied to the system’s procurement, from the point of view of cost-effectiveness ratio, it becomes urgently necessary to build a US-Japanese sensors, weapons, launchers, and information network so that the current sensors, weapons, launchers and information connectivity can produce the biggest effect; Nukaga said he would like to avoid going at length about technical problems and would rather like to hear the proposed solutions from the expert audience – the problems referred to</p>
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1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-91-ishiba.pdf>.

2 Ibid., 1.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 2.

		included: FPS-XX radar's detection and cuing, time loss ensuing from BADGE system's control of the target object information, the Data link system of information exchange, the capability-wise unbalance of the 21 inch missile and SPY-1D radar etc.; cruise missile defence must not be neglected.
Marvin K. McNamara ¹	US Air Force, Deputy Director of US Missile Defence Agency	Keynote speech; the important thing is a complete integration of sensors, fire control and weapons – this operational integration should not be limited to the US system but should involve friendly and allied countries; such capability is optimised from the perspective of command and control, and battle management; fully integrated sensors and fire control are essential because of extremely short time span available for response to a launched enemy missile; several times, emphasis on C2BMC (command, control, battle management, and communications) and integrated capability; BMD as a system of systems, family of systems must be realised; praise for BMD's leading role in the US-Japan cooperation – the success of SM-3 flight tests using Japanese nose cones (March 2006), successful SM-3 intercept tests, installation of X-band radar in Shariki airbase; our next goal is to maintain a position ahead of the enemy (<i>kono-no gooru toiu monoha teki-ni senkou shita ichi-wo tamochitsuzukeru koto desu</i>); with the enemy continuously improving its missile defence technology we must be swift and flexible in our response (<i>teki-ha dandou misairu-no fukuzatsukatou- ni taishitemo keizokuteki gijutsu-wo kaihatsu shi, jinsoku ni juunansei-wo motte taiou shinakereba narimasen</i> ²).
Kazuo Ofuru ³	JDA, Defence Policy Section Chief	Keynote speech; his talk is dedicated to explaining the US-Japan business of joint development of BMD to meet future threats; the project is expected to take around 10 years from now [2006-2016] at an expected cost of 2.1-2.7 billion US dollars; the work share is not yet decided upon but it is expected that Japan will do 45% of the work, the US 55%; the US will concentrate on the warhead's electronics – Japan will do parts of the rocket; comparing missile intercepts with “a bullet hitting a bullet” are wrong – missiles are sufficiently large, weigh

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-92-mcnamara.pdf>.

2 Ibid., 5.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-93-ofuru.pdf>.

more than 1000 kg (to be detected by a radar) and need 8-10 minutes to hit the target – all these factors make the technology of missile intercept possible; some attention to the US strength in space technology and Japan’s strength in miniaturising and precision technology which will be pooled together in the project; the US and Japan share perceptions of security threats; based on this common situation awareness, strategic and classified information is being exchanged; the level of the alliance relationship is such that both countries make plans for joint measures vis-à-vis such threats, implement training in support of such planning; the current US-Japan BMD co-development can be described with fairly little exaggeration as historically unprecedented (*soutou sukoshi oogesa-ni iimasu to rekishijou mo zenrei-no nai katachi-ni natte oru kana toiu koto-to*) and both countries as perfectly equal partners (*nichibei ryoukoku-ga kanzenna iikooru paatonaa toiu wake dehanai ka to omoimasu kedomo*)¹.

Baker Spring² The Heritage Foundation, Senior Research Fellow (defence spending, ballistic missile defence)

Keynote speech; “I think that through the good offices of the National Congressional Security Research Group, regarding missile defence cooperation, Japan has become the most affirmative nation among the US-friendly and allied nations. This is not an accident. That is why I would like to express my appreciation to all members of the NSRG and to Mr Akiyama”³ (*Anzenhoshouginkyougikai-no gojinryoku-no kekka, misairubouei kyouryoku-ni kanshite ha nihon-ha amerika-no yuukoukoku, doumeikoku-no naka de mottomo sekkyokutekina kuni ni natte iru, to watakushi-ha kangaete orimasu. Kore-ha guuzen dehanai-to omoimasu. Desu kara, anzenhoshouginkyougikai-no senseigata soshite akiyamasama-ni kansha-wo moushi agetai-to omoimasu*); in his talk Spring presents the gaming exercise done by The Heritage Foundation (designed for an environment with seven players on of which is roughly equal to North Korea and possesses nuclear weapons and means of their delivery); the most effective approach to future missile defence is the sea- and space-based capability⁴; the most useful thing in

1 Ibid., 4.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-94-baker.pdf>.

3 Ibid., 1.

4 Ibid., 6.

developing a missile defence capability is the US-Japan cooperation; especially with regard to developments in China, it is important to cooperate to hold China in check; it is important to promote efforts aimed at prohibiting the “weaponisation” of space; an important flight period of long-range ballistic missiles takes place in space which makes it the most attractive defence point for the US, the friendly and allied nations; because boost phase and mid-course interception is possible, defence in space offers a multiple deterrent power; this will become necessary in an environment of weapons proliferation that we may face in the future.¹

Panel Discussion “The New US-Japan Missile Defence Framework and Technology Exchange”

Noboru Hoshuyama		Moderator
Walter F. Doran	President of Raytheon Asia, US Navy Admiral (Ret.)	Panellist
James J. Quinn	Vice President, Missile and Space Defence, North Grumman Space Technology	Panellist
David Kier	Former Under Secretary of Defence, Vice President and Managing Director of Lockheed Martin	Panellist
Junichi Nishiyama	Advisor to MHI Space Division, Head of Guidance Equipment Section	Panellist
Shinichi Suzuki	MHI	Panellist
Mamoru Yamashita	Head of Aerospace Defence Business Headquarters, NEC, Centre	Panellist

At the end of the day, presentations by Raytheon Company, Computer Science Corporation (CSC), and Boeing Company were planned.

Session and Panel Discussion Theme “The New QDR Strategy and Expectations for the US-Japan Alliance (including GSOMIA)”

Tsutomu (/Riki)		Host’s speech
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¹ Ibid., 6.

Kawara		
Tsutomu Takebe	LDP Secretary General (2004-2006), NSRG, Centre	Guest speech
Joseph R. Donovan	Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy in Japan	Guest speech
Taro Kimura	Former JDA Vice-Minister, LDP	Guest speech
Noboru Hoshuyama		Moderator
William S. Cohen ¹	President Clinton's Defence Secretary (1997-2001), Centre	Keynote speech; panellist; Through the good offices of Director General Nukaga who started this Conference and, especially, Mr Kyuma, this conference has become an extremely useful place for exchange of defence related opinions by decisionmakers and opinion leaders from our two countries. Including a major defence exhibition which is the result of Mr Kyumas's efforts, has made this Conference even more important. (<i>kono kaigi-wo sutaato saseto nukagachoukan, mata tokuni kyuumasensei-no gojinryoku-ni yori, kono kaigi-ha kyou-ni okeru boueikanren-no gidai-ni taishite-no, wareware ryoukoku-no seisakuketteisha ya opinionriidaatchi-no ikenkoukan-no ba-to shite hijouni yuuekina mono-ni natte iru-to omoimasu. Kyuuma-sensei-no goikou-ni yori shuyouna boueikanren tenjikai mo fukumare, kore-ga kono kaigi-wo yori juuyouna mono-to shite iru-to kangaemasu</i> ²); the efforts towards missile defence development from the 1990s, on which Japan and the US agreed, were justified by North Korea's behaviour [missile launches] (<i>kitachousen-no koudou-ni yotte nichibei-ga goui shita, 1990 nendai -karano misairu bouei kaihatsu-heno jinryoku-ga seitouka sareta to ieru deshou</i> ³); the technology Japan develops is indispensable (<i>fukaketsu</i>) for SM-3 ⁴ ; Important parts of the PAC-3 production process are transferred to Japan. The fact that the US relies on Japan as the only supplier of PAC-3 components for its military does not simply indicate a strengthening of the cooperation between industries, it signifies a virtual integration of the defence production

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-101-cohen.pdf>.

2 Ibid., 1.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

bases of both countries. Furthermore, seen from the US, Japan should supply not only the US but also other friendly countries if they have an interest in PAC-3. (*mata PAC3 ni okeru shuyouna seisankoutei-ha nihon-ni ikou sareru deshō. Beikoku-ha nihon-wo yuitsu-no PAC-3-no buzai-no beigun-heno choutatsusaki-to shite tayori ni shi, kore-ha tanni sangyoukan-no kyouryoku-no kyouka-to iukoto dehanaku, ryoukoku-no boueisangyoubeesu-deno jisshitsutekina tougou dearu to ieru deshō. Mata beikokugawa kara mimasu to, nihon-ha taibeikoku-tai dake denaku, ta-no yuukoukoku-ga kono PAC-3-ni kyōumi-wo shimesu no deareba, sorera-no kuniguni-ni mo kore-wo teikyou surubeki de aru to watakushi-ha kangaete orimasu¹*); the US agrees that Japan plays a leading role in the joint development of a more capable SM-3(*matanihon-ha yori nouryoku-no takai SM-3-no kyoudou kaihatsu-ni oite shudouteki yakuwari-wo ninatte ori, kore-ni tsuite beikokumo goui itashite orimasu²*); The joint project of developing, building, and deploying the current and future missile defence will be a good model for cooperation in other areas of defence production (*genzai sohite shouraitekina misairubouei-no kaihatsu, kensetsu, haibi-no tame-no kyoudoukeikaku-ha, sono ta-no boueisangyou-deno kyouryoku-ni tottemo yoi moderu-to narimasu³*); Mr Kyuma is playing an extremely important leadership role with regard to the GSOMIA and the measures of effective control of secret information within Japan (*kyuuma-sensei-ha wareware nikakokukan seifu-deno GSOMIA-no teiketsu-he mukete, mata nihon-ni oite kimitsujouhou koukatekina touseishudan-ni kanshite hijouni juuyouna riidaashippu-wo totte orimasu⁴*); one more instance of praise for Kyuma’s “leading role” in the missile defence project⁵; it takes ten or more years for the development of defence equipment items; once deployed, the equipment serves for 20-30 or 40 years; therefore, be it the revision of the Constitution, or missile defence, or other defence projects, the most effective thing to do is not thinking about the threats and requirements of

1 Ibid., 1.

2 Ibid., 2.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 2.

5 Ibid., 3.

the next few years but of the possible threats and requirements in 20-30 or 40 years. (*shitagatte, gidai-ga kempou-no minaoshi deare, misairubouei deare, sono ta-no boueikanren-no keikaku deare, yuukou dearu-noha konosaki suunenkan-no kyoui ya youkyuu dakedehanaku, wareware ryoukoku-ga ima-kara 20-30 nen mata 40 nen-no uchi-ni chokumensuru youna kyoui ya youkyuu-made kangaeru koto deshous*¹).

James Auer ²	Director of Centre for US-Japan Studies, Vanderbilt University	Keynote speech; panellist; Auer was the one who proposed GSOMIA in 1981 [the previous QDR].
Fumio Kyuma ³	Fourth Chairman of the Centre, Minister of Defence (2007), JDA Director General (1996-1998, 2006-2007), LDP, Chairman of NSRG	Keynote speech; panellist; Japan develops BMD in response to the North Korean missile programme; missile defence costs around 1 trillion yen, but “exclusively defensive defence” cannot be cheap (<i>senshubouei-no seisaku-wo iji shiteiku ue-deha, hiyou-ga kakaru koto-ha yamu-wo enai-to omoimasu</i>); the policy of “exclusively defensive defence” is appropriate and still necessary ⁴ ; emphasis on the need to pursue the most advanced technology, to develop the intelligence gathering and analysis capability, to protect security information (support for GSOMIA), to appropriately increase the defence budget.
Takeaki Matsumoto ⁵	Former Head of Policy Affairs Research Council, DPJ, Centre	Keynote speech; panellist; Matsumoto, personally, and the DPJ, basically (<i>kihontekini</i>) recognise that missile defence is necessary.
Takashi Nishioka ⁶	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) Chairman, Vice Chairman of Keidanren, Keidanren Defence Production Committee (DPC) Chairman	Keynote speech; Nishioka repeats two questions related to the weapons export ban from the previous year’s Conference and notes that the second issue – the company-level studies and technology exchange in programmes not agreed upon by both governments – has not been cleared ⁷ ; the industrial world in Japan would like to proceed with debates on GSOMIA and the domestic legislation adjustments to promote the bilateral US-Japan industrial cooperation; if we stand on the premise that the company-level participation in programmes not sanctioned by both governments proceeds, the significance of

1 Ibid., 6.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-102-auer.pdf>.

3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-103-kyuma.pdf>.

4 Ibid., 2.

5 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-104-matsumoto.pdf>.

6 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2006-8/f2006-8-koenkiroku/forum8-105-nishioka.pdf>.

7 Ibid., 1.

the existence of an intergovernmental agreement on classified information is extremely high (*korekara nichibei-no boueisoubigijutsukyouryoku-ga sarani fukamari, minkanreberu-no kouryuu, seifukan-de goui sareta proguramu igai-heno kigyoreberu-deno sankaku-ga susumu toiu zentei-ni tateba, seifukan-ni kimitsujouhou-no torikime-ga sonzai suru koto-no igi-ga taihen takai-to kangaerare, bukiyushutsu sangensoku-to awase, gkentou-wo onegai shitai-to kangaemasu*⁸); the defence industrial base is weakening amid severe budget conditions.⁹

Greg Hyslop	Boeing Missile Defence Systems Airborne Laser Programme	Panellist
Masahiro Matsumura	Momoyama University, Professor	Panellist
		At the end of the day, presentations by Northrop Grumman Corporation, BAE Systems (UK), IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries), Lockheed Martin Corporation.
<i>Session and Panel Discussion Theme “Homeland Security and Questions of NBC Anti-terrorism Policy”</i>		
Toshitsugu Saito	JDA Director General (2000-2001), LDP, NSRG, Centre	Opening speech
Keiichi Hatakeyama		Moderator
Tom Ridge	The First US Secretary of Homeland Security (2003-2005)	Keynote speech; panellist
Yoshiyuki Kasai	Chairman of Central Japan Railway Company, Centre	Keynote speech; panellist
Stephen Reeves	US Army Major General	Keynote speech; panellist
Seiji Maehara	Former President of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), “DPJ shadow Cabinet Defence Minister,” NSRG, Centre	Keynote speech
Kazuhiro Sugita	Former top official in the Cabinet Crisis	Keynote speech; panellist

8 Ibid., 2.

9 Ibid.

	Management Office, Centre	
Mitsuyoshi Urashima	Medical scientist, Panellist at the 2006 Security Strategy Conference – panel title “Countering biological and chemical terrorism,” Centre	Panellist
		At the end of the day, presentations themed “Thinking about the F-X fighter” by Eurofighter, Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin Corporation and others.
The Ninth Japan-US Security Strategy Conference (May 2007, Washington, DC) “On the US-Japan Partnership in a Turbulent Security Environment of East Asia” ¹		
Becky Norton Dunlop	Vice-President, External Relations, The Heritage Foundation	Opening speech
Bruce Klingner	Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Centre, The Heritage Foundation	Chair
<i>Panel Theme “The present Condition and Questions of the US-Japan Bilateral Cooperation”</i>		
Fukushiro Nukaga ²	Minister of Finance (2007-2008), JDA Director General (1998, 2005-2006), LDP Policy Affairs Research Council Head (2003-2004), NSRG, Centre	Presenter; the visits to the US with the purpose of exchanges between US-Japan parliamentarians specialising in security and security experts started in 1994 [took place at least 13 times] ³ ; emphasis on the need for Japan’s independent security strategy (<i>shutaiteki boueisenryakuron</i>) – “I use the word “shutaiteki” (independent) because on the fundamental national questions of security and defence, Japan is required to make independent decisions by proactively evaluating the country’s national interests and thinking in terms of its own grand design” (<i>watashi-ga shutaiteki-to iu kotoba-wo tsukau-noha, anzenhoshou ya bouei-to itta kuni-no konkan-ni kakawaru mondai-ni tsuite, wagakuni-ga kokueki-ni terashite sekkyokutekini handan shi, mizukara-ga gurando dezain-wo egakitsutsu, shutaiteki-ni handan shite iku koto-ga wagakuni- ni motomerarete iru to kangaete iru kara de arimasu</i>) ⁴ ; the introduction of the BMD system in

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-9/f2007-9.htm>.

2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-9/f9panel1-nukaga.pdf>.

3 Ibid., 1.

4 Ibid.

Japan is indispensable for protection against a ballistic missile attack (*fukaketsu*)¹; ahead of the US's other allies, Japan independently decided to introduce BMD (*shutaitekini kettei shita no desu*)²; even though the reliability of the BMD system is extremely high (*BMD shisutemu-no shinransei-ha kiwamete takai mono desuga*)... discussions must continue on whether relying solely on the BMD system for defence is the best choice³; on the capability to strike the site where the missile attack originated, it is legal and is included in the right of self-defence to strike the site after receiving the attack; "For this purpose [enemy strike capability], in order to minimise the damage to the people, by complementing the US strike power, and as a capacity of proactively defending the country from a missile attack, I think it is necessary to rationally conclude after sufficient deliberations, as part of a broader debate about the entirety of armaments Japan must possess, whether Japan needs to possess high-precision guided weapons such as Tomahawk cruise missiles"⁴; the revision of the constitution clarifying that Japan can use its right to collective self-defence is necessary, but before the constitution is revised, the constitutional interpretation that Japan cannot use this right must be changed⁵ (*kempoukaisei-made no aida-ha, kempou kaishaku-wo minaosu koto-ni yori, shuudanjieiken-no koushi-wo mitomerubeki da-to kangaemasu*); Nukaga notes that it is extremely significant (*kiwamete igibukai koto*)⁶ that on May 1 [same day as the Conference] both countries at the meeting of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee reached agreement on measures to protect secret military information in the GSOMIA [it was signed by Taro Aso and Ambassador Schieffer on August 10, 2007].

Seiji Maehara ⁷	Former President of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), "DPJ shadow Cabinet Defence Minister," NSRG, Centre	Presenter; Japan faces three security issues – North Korea, neighbouring countries (<i>shuuhenkoku</i>), especially China's growing military might, and the terrorist threat; concurrently with the deployment of missile defence, the diplomatic route of the Six Party
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1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., 2.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 2.

5 Ibid., 6.

6 Ibid., 7-8.

7 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-9/f9panel1-maehara.pdf>.

talks must be tenaciously pursued¹; Japan must not possess nuclear weapons²; at least the current constitutional interpretation of the right to collective self-defence must be changed; it is necessary to change the current constitutional interpretation of the right to collective self-defence so that from now on Japan could exercise this right to intercept a missile heading towards the US³; while the revision of the constitution is the desired outcome (*nozomubeki*), the requirement now is to create environment where Japan can exercise its right to collective self-defence by changing the constitutional interpretation; a revision of the arms export ban is inescapable and it must open a way for Japan to participate in joint weapons development with countries other than the US as well.⁴

William Breer CSIS, Senior Counsellor (in charge of Japan policy) Presenter

Panel Theme “US-Japan Cooperation and Regional Security”

Fukushiro Nukaga⁵ Presenter; India’s strategic significance; Japan’s security cooperation with India and Australia will strengthen the effect of the US-Japan alliance on the regional peace and stability and will broaden the region experiencing such an effect⁶.

David Usher/ アツシャー(?) Senior Researcher, The Heritage Foundation Presenter

Dennis Blair Former US Navy Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command Presenter

The Tenth Japan-US Security Strategy Conference (November, 2007, Tokyo)
“The New Asia and the US-Japan Alliance”⁷

Concurrently with the conference a weapons exhibition takes place. The NSRG website includes one photograph subtitled “MOD TRDI (Technology Research and Development Institute) Exhibition – Nose Cone.”

National Host

1 Ibid., 1.

2 Ibid., 2.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 3.

5 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-9/f9panel2-nukaga.pdf>.

6 Ibid., 4.

7 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-10/f2007-10.htm> and <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-10/Program-c10.pdf>.

Congressional Security Research Group		
US-Japan Cultural Society (Centre)		Host
The National Policy Research Institute (<i>Chuuseiken</i>)		
The Heritage Foundation		Host
<i>Session Theme “The New Asia and the US-Japan Alliance”</i>		
Keiichi Hatakeyama	Professor of International Relations, Gakushuin Women’s College	Overall Chair
Tsutomu (/Riki) Kawara ¹	JDA Director General (1987-88, 1999-2000, 2000), LDP, National Security Research Group (NSRG), Centre	Host’s speech; in the text by Kawara posted on the NSRG website for this Tenth Conference, there was no single mention of BMD, GSOMIA, or weapons exports, or defence industrial cooperation.
John Thomas Schieffer	US Ambassador to Japan	Guest speech; attendance cancelled ²
Bunmei Ibuki	Member of the Lower House, LDP Secretary General	Guest speech; attendance cancelled
Shigeru Ishiba	Minister of Defence (2007-2008), JDA Director General (2002-2004), LDP, NSRG, Centre	Guest speech; attendance cancelled
Noboru Hoshuyama	Former Head of Defence Facilities Administrative Agency (1994-1995), Centre	Moderator
Fumio Kyuma ¹	Fourth Chairman of the Centre, Minister of Defence (2007),	Special Lecture; attendance cancelled; in the text by Kyuma posted on the NSRG website for this Tenth Conference, there was no single mention of

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-10/kawara-ks1107-c10.pdf>.

2 Notes on the cancellation of attendance available from the NSRG official website: <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-10/f2007-10.htm>. The information on the originally planned roles of the participants form the Conference programme: <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-10/Program-c10.pdf>.

1 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-10/kyuma-ks1107-f10.pdf>.

	JDA Director General (1996-1998, 2006-2007), LDP, Chairman of NSRG	BMD, GSOMIA, or weapons exports, or defence industrial cooperation.
William S. Cohen ²	President Clinton's Defence Secretary (1997-2001), Centre	Keynote speech; in the text by Cohen posted on the NSRG website for this Tenth Conference, there was no single mention of BMD, GSOMIA, or weapons exports, or defence industrial cooperation.
William Schneider, Jr ³	Chairman of US Defence Science Board, Member of the Commission of the US Aerospace Industry, Centre	Keynote speech; "Japan's decision to acquire BMD was a decisive step towards deterring the proliferation strategy in Northeast Asia"; "By signing the GSOMIA, the US and Japan have made it possible to move from licence production to joint development and production of modern military strength" ⁴ – are the only two sentences on BMD, GSOMIA, or weapons exports, or defence industrial cooperation.
Kim R. Holmes ⁵	Vice-President for Foreign and Defence Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation	Keynote speech; missile defence is extremely important for us – the North Korean nuclear issue persists despite the efforts by the Six Party Conference ⁶ ; the MOD needs additional funds to build missile defence alongside conventional military power ⁷ .
Seiji Maehara	Former President of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), "DPJ shadow Cabinet Defence Minister," NSRG, Centre	Keynote speech; attendance cancelled
Shigeki Sato ⁸	Chief of New Komeito Foreign Policy and Security Research Group	Keynote speech; in the text by Sato posted on the NSRG website for this Tenth Conference, there was no single mention of BMD, GSOMIA, or weapons exports, or defence industrial cooperation.

Panel Theme "Japan's Responsibilities under the US-Japan GSOMIA"

Noboru Hoshuyama		Moderator
William S. Cohen		Panellist
Masahiro Matsumura	Momoyama University, Professor	
William Schneider, Jr		Panellist

- 2 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-10/cohen-ks1107-c10.pdf>.
3 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-10/schneider-ks1107-c10.pdf>.
4 Ibid., 2.
5 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-10/holmes-ks-c10.pdf>.
6 Ibid., 1.
7 Ibid., 3.
8 <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/forum2007-10/sato-ks-c10.pdf>.

Kim Holmes		Panellist
Fumio Kyuma		Panellist; attendance cancelled
Seiji Maehara		Panellist; attendance cancelled
Tetsuya Nishikawa	Former Chief of the Secretariat of the Ministry of Defence	Panellist
At the end of the day, presentation “On Japan’s future defence framework” by Lockheed Martin Corporation and Northrop Grumman Corporation.		
<i>Session Theme “The New Missile Defence Design”</i>		
Noboru Hoshuyama		Moderator
William Schneider, Jr		Keynote speaker or panellist
K. Anderson	US Missile Defence Agency, Deputy Director for Technology	Keynote speaker or panellist
James Bodner	Former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy	Keynote speaker or panellist
Seiji Maehara		Keynote speaker or panellist; attendance cancelled
Hironori Kanazawa	MOD, Director of Defence Policy Division	Keynote speaker or panellist; attendance cancelled
Hirofumi Katase	METI, Manufacturing Industries Division, Chief of Aerospace Industry Section	Keynote speaker or panellist
<i>Panel Theme “Missile Defence and US-Japan Defence Technology Exchange”</i>		
Noboru Hoshuyama		Moderator
Hirokazu Hokazono	MOD, Head of System Armaments Section	Speech; attendance cancelled
Mira Ricardel	The Boeing Company, Vice-President for Business Development and Missile Defence Systems	Panellist
Douglas Graham	Lockheed Martin Corporation, Space Systems Company,	Panellist

	Vice-President of advanced programmes, Strategic and Missile Defence Systems	
James J. Quinn	Vice President, Missile and Space Defence, North Grumman Space Technology	Panellist
Timothy Carey	Raytheon Company, Vice-President, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Systems, Space and Airborne Systems	Panellist
Junichi Nishiyama	Advisor to MHI Space Division, Head of Guidance Equipment Section	Panellist
Mamoru Yamashita	Head of Aerospace Defence Business Headquarters, NEC, Centre	Panellist
At the end of the day, presentations “On our countries’ C-X and P-X development” and “On Japan’s future defence design” by the Boeing Company and Raytheon Company.		
<i>Session theme “Anti-NBC Terrorism Policy in the US”</i>		
Keiichi Hatakeyama		Moderator
Stephen Reeves	US Army Major General	Keynote speaker or panellist
James Bodner		Keynote speaker or panellist
Masahisa Sato	Upper House Member, first Head of Iraq Reconstruction Troops Unit	Keynote speaker or panellist
Kazuhiro Sugita	Former top official in the Cabinet Crisis Management Office, Centre	Keynote speaker or panellist; attendance cancelled
Makoto Saito	Cabinet Secretary (security and crisis management)	Keynote speaker or panellist; attendance cancelled
Mitsuyoshi Urashima	Medical scientist	Keynote speaker or panellist

Session Theme “The Expanding Military Threat from China”

Keiichi Hatakeyama		Moderator
Richard Fisher	Deputy Director of International Assessment and Strategy Centre	Keynote speaker or panellist
William Schneider, Jr		Keynote speaker or panellist
James Bodner		Keynote speaker or panellist
Tokuichiro Tamazawa	JDA Director General (1994-1995), LDP, NSRG Chairman, Centre	Keynote speaker or panellist
Gen Nakatani	JDA Director General (2001-2002), LDP, NSRG, Centre	Keynote speaker or panellist; attendance cancelled
Masao Akamatsu	Lower House Member, New Komeito Party, NSRG, Centre	Keynote speaker or panellist; attendance cancelled
Seiji Maehara		Keynote speaker or panellist; attendance cancelled
<i>Session Theme “Anti-cyber Terrorism Policy”</i>		
Keiichi Hatakeyama		Moderator
William Schneider, Jr		Keynote speaker or panellist
Martin Carmichael	McAfee Inc Chief Security Officer	Keynote speaker or panellist
Mitsuo Suzuki	Cabinet National Intelligence Security Centre, Cabinet counsellor	Keynote speaker or panellist; attendance cancelled; instead of Suzuki, Kobayashi Masahiko (Former (!) Cabinet Intelligence Security Centre) is delegated.
Masahiko Kobayashi	Former Cabinet Intelligence Security Centre	
Satoshi Ruizaki	MOD, Operational Planning Division, Information Communication and Research Section Chief	Keynote speaker or panellist