

## 1967

*The mass mobilisation phase of the Cultural Revolution began as a student movement on the campuses of Beijing's universities and middle schools in the summer of 1966. However, under the direction of cadre 'work teams', the movement quickly degenerated into a crisis over political representation. Fought to a stalemate, the withdrawal of the work teams triggered a new stage of direct but also violent political action that paralysed Party and state administrations by the end of the year. Worker mobilisation in Shanghai led to the usurpation of the municipal government in early 1967, signalling a new phase in the movement. The so-called 'January Storm' (一月风波), a dramatic wave of rebel power seizures in which workers figured prominently, swept the country. Its apogee was the declaration of the Shanghai People's Commune in early February; yet its denouement came only a few weeks later, when the rebel workers agreed to reorganise as a 'revolutionary committee', uniting forces with some of the cadres they had dispossessed, as well as local military leaders. The January Storm thus marks an unresolved dilemma in the Party's history: the Cultural Revolution originated in a crisis over the Party's role in political representation, which the Maoist leadership sought to overcome through the direct political action of students and workers with the nominal aim of self-rule. But the Party's monopolisation of power deprived rebel workers of the resources necessary to build and sustain a lasting alliance. When it quickly collapsed, Party leaders gradually reverted to the flawed mechanism of representation through delegation that triggered the initial crisis. This chapter focuses on labour's role in the rise and fall of the Shanghai People's Commune through the problématique of labor's representation in PRC.*

### FROM REPRESENTATION TO ACTION AND BACK AGAIN

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In January 1967, as China's Cultural Revolution transitioned from a largely student-based upsurge into a worker movement, a wave of rebel power seizures of Party and government agencies swept the country. For many, the so-called 'January Storm' (一月风波) marked the culmination of the Cultural Revolution: what had begun as a sustained rebellion of high school and university students in Beijing widened not only to include the working class, but it also quickly spread beyond the capital, to major cities up and down the coast and into the hinterland. The grassroots efforts of rebel workers in Shanghai to overturn the municipal government, and the subsequent declaration of the founding of the Shanghai People's Commune (上海人民公社), was an instance not only of direct political action by the working classes, but of the proletariat in China acting *for* itself as a political subject, rather than *in* itself as an object. Alessandro Russo hails the Commune's founding as the culmination of a process of 'experimenting with a new political existence for workers who were no longer under the sway of the Stakhannovite model, and, hence, were able to organize their collective existence regardless of whether the party-state could endorse such an action.'<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, as Alain Badiou observed, this triumphant achievement was 'immediately paradoxical.'<sup>2</sup> The Shanghai People's Commune may have been originally intended as 'a complete countermodel of the party-state', but because the existing political landscape of the Cultural Revolution was already oversaturated, the newborn Commune could 'obtain only a fragile unity'. Thus, he argued, 'the entrance onto the scene of the workers' marked 'a spectacular broadening of the revolutionary mass base,' and 'the short-lived outline of a new articulation between the popular political initiative and the power of the state' that ultimately could not challenge, but only reproduce, the existing structures of power.

Others are considerably more sceptical about the grassroots nature of the Shanghai takeover and the upheavals of the January Storm, casting doubt on official portrayals of the event as worker-led. Independent historian He Shu argued that Central Cultural Revolution Small Group (CCRS) members Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan not only failed to support, but actively suppressed, repeated attempts by rebel workers to topple the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. He argues that although the CCRSG members Zhang and Yao were in principle not opposed to power seizure per se, they actively thwarted any effort that they did not directly control.<sup>3</sup> More recently, Walder described the 1967 national power seizure movement as 'a top-down process of diffusion [that was] essentially a form of collective

behavior by party-state cadres” responding to signals from the central leadership in Beijing.<sup>4</sup> In his analysis, the rapid diffusion of the power seizures to areas without large student and worker insurgencies alongside the participation of cadres in these events, suggest that it was driven by Party-state officials, calling into question basic assumptions about who, precisely, was seizing power from whom.

However, debates about the spontaneity of the January Storm power seizures elide a more profound dilemma in the Party-state’s history: the unresolved problem of mass political representation, and its relationship to direct political action. This chapter focuses the January Storm, and what the brief life of the Shanghai People’s Commune tells us about the unresolved question of labour’s representation in the history of the PRC.

### *‘Real’ and ‘fake’ Party members*

The mass phase of the Cultural Revolution began in May 1966 with the hanging of a wall poster at Beijing University denouncing the university’s president and Party secretary, and two other municipal officials, as ‘revisionist elements’ linked to a recently purged ‘antiparty clique’. The accusation created an uproar on campus, exacerbated by tensions within the faculty and student body that had been simmering for at least several months, if not years, and resulted in the widely-publicised removal of the removal of those accused.<sup>5</sup> This, however, did not prevent instructors and students at other campuses from posting similar accusations, particularly following the publication of the poster on the front page of the *People’s Daily* a week later.<sup>6</sup> As the month wore on, Party and state officials attempted to defuse escalating unrest on school campuses by dispatching cadre work teams to investigate, instruct, and contain rebellious young activists, who had already begun forming the loose autonomous associations that came to be known as Red Guards.

At the forefront of the escalating tensions between the student activists and work team members were questions of political representation: who had the right to speak on behalf of student interests, who represented various Party and state departments, and, finally, who represented the Party Centre and the revolutionary agenda itself? The *People’s Daily* front page commentary had described the members of the ‘anti-Party clique’ as the representatives of a ‘fake’ and ‘revisionist’ Communist Party (假共产党, 是修正主义的党), and warned readers that anyone who opposed the instructions of Mao or the Party Central Committee—

‘no matter what banner they carry or how high their position or qualifications are’— were in reality ‘representing’ (代表) the interests of the overturned bourgeoisie, thereby placing the question of who was representing the ‘real’ Communist Party up for public debate and speculation as tensions soared.<sup>7</sup>

At Qinghua University, third-year chemical engineering student Kuai Dafu (蒯大富) was singled out by the work team as a troublemaker, and sequestered in his dorm room in early July. During his confinement, he produced his own wall poster arguing that the political power previously monopolized by the school’s discredited Party Committee, overthrown by student rebels, had been in effect transferred to the work team. Kuai called upon all ‘revolutionary leftists’ on campus to ask themselves: ‘does this power *represent* (代表) us? If it represents us, then we’ll support it, if it doesn’t represent us, then we’ll seize power again!’<sup>8</sup>

This broader battle ended in stalemate with the withdrawal of the work teams from Beijing’s schools in August, and inaugurated the start of a new phase marked by direct, and sometimes violent, political action: self-authorized student rebels and activists fanned out across the city and the country, seeking to mobilise support for various agendas, many of which targeted Party and state officials and agencies. The dislocation and disruption caused by student activists roaming the country in such large numbers succeeded in completely ‘paralysing’ (瘫痪) nearly a third of provincial capital administrations by the end of 1966.<sup>9</sup>

### *From Students to Workers*

The first major delegation of Red Guard representatives from Beijing arrived in Shanghai during the so-called ‘blood red August’ of 1966. Disembarking from the main train station, the members of the visiting Red Guard contingent announced that they were the representatives of a genuine revolutionary movement seeking to ‘light a fire’ (点火) by spreading the Cultural Revolution to the Paris of the East.<sup>10</sup> They were not pleased with what they saw. Despite the fact that an official welcome had been staged for them at the city’s Cultural Square, the delegation inveighed that their reception had been insincere and sub-par. Within days, the Red Guard delegation followed up with additional complaints. First, they had been turned away at several Shanghai schools because they lacked proper letters of

introduction; they were also dismayed to find that they had to purchase tickets when boarding public transportation, when they had become accustomed to free passage elsewhere; and, finally, the delegation members were frustrated that it had been difficult to arrange meetings with local Party leaders. Upon receiving the complaints, the Municipal Party Committee offered its apologies, but the Red Guard delegates were not appeased. On the morning of 31 August, more than a dozen Beijing Red Guards marched to Yan'an Road, demanding a meeting with the municipal Party leadership. A crowd of over a thousand onlookers quickly gathered as the visiting Red Guards angrily rushed the building. They found Mayor Cao Diqu inside meeting with two other self-described Beijing Red Guard representatives who had likewise demanded an official audience. In the fracas that ensued, Deputy Mayor Song Liwen was struck on the head by one of the Beijing Red Guard representatives, and the glass front door of the building was shattered.<sup>11</sup>

A few days later, on 10 September, a second wave of tens of thousands of Beijing Red Guards organised into divisions and battalions arrived in the city, calling themselves the 'Southern Touring Regiment of Capital Universities and Institutes' (首都大专院校红卫兵司令部南下兵团). Defying the Central Committee's September 1966 ban against allowing the Cultural Revolution to disrupt industrial production, the Beijing Red Guard representatives entered factories and workplaces around Shanghai in the name of establishing the 'Worker Student United Movement' (工人学生联合运动).<sup>12</sup> A third group, dispatched by CCRSG members Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao, arrived in early October and quickly established links with rebel workers in nearby factories with the goal of overturning the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee.<sup>13</sup>

### *Labour Ascendant*

One month later, on 6 November, the Capital Red Guards Liaison Station in Shanghai organised a meeting that attracted at least thirty workers from seventeen different factories; on that occasion, the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebels General Headquarters (上海工人革命造反总司令部, heretofore WGH) was founded with Number 17 Cotton Mill security officer Wang Hongwen as its chair. At its inaugural meeting held on the city's Cultural Square, the organisation demanded that the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee

recognise it as a legitimate revolutionary mass organisation. The mayor and municipal Party secretary refused, with support from the Party Centre, arguing that the WGH was riddled with internal contradictions, and detrimental to maintaining industrial production.<sup>14</sup> When the mayor further declined to attend the 9 November inaugural ceremony, and moreover refused to ‘participate, recognise, or support’ the new organisation, over a thousand angry workers surrounded the municipal Party Committee building and staged a sit-in, before deciding to take their protest to Beijing.

Well over a thousand self-declared representatives of the rebel workers headed to Shanghai North Station the next morning to board three trains bound for the capital, seeking recognition from the central leadership. A State Council directive from Premier Zhou Enlai halted the trains, snarling national rail lines for hours. The train that happened to be carrying WGH leader Wang Hongwen and two thousand members was stopped outside of Anting station, approximately 45 km from the Shanghai city centre, leading to a standoff between the workers and local authorities. The WGH put forward five demands: a) that the WGH be officially recognised as a legitimate revolutionary mass organisation; b) that the WGH’s founding meeting and the Anting incident be classified as revolutionary actions; c) that the East China Bureau and the Shanghai Party Committee be held responsible for their part in the matter; d) that the mayor offer a public self-criticism; and e) that the WGH receive assistance from the Party and local government.<sup>15</sup>

The CCRSG dispatched Zhang Chunqiao to mediate the conflict. Within only a few hours, he conferred official recognition on the new rebel workers organisation in violation of the instructions of the enlarged Politburo Standing Committee meeting held just prior to his dispatch, claiming to be ‘representing’ (代表) the Party Central Committee in so doing. At the Politburo meeting the following day, Mao supported Zhang’s decision to recognise the workers’ right to organise, based on their constitutional right to do so.<sup>16</sup>

The official recognition of the rebel WGH as a legitimate mass organization triggered a flurry of grassroots organization-building as other interests likewise sought official recognition conferring the associated right of representation in the new and still-emerging political hierarchy. For example, within days, Shanghai’s ‘conservative’ workers-- who supported the existing municipal Party committee and enjoyed a close relationship with local Party authorities—sprang into action, demanding a voice and a seat at the table as well. Li Jianyu, the soon-to-be local leader of the Scarlet Guards (赤卫队) at the Number 31 Cotton Mill,

approached the work team leader at his workplace, requesting permission to assist in destroying ‘black materials’ following a call that ‘representatives of all factions’ participate.<sup>17</sup> Because the work team at the mill composed one of the factions there, and the rebel workers another, the team leader retorted, ‘We represent organisations; what do you represent?’ [Li] said, ‘Then I’ll establish an organisation, too!’ The mill’s Scarlet Guard unit was founded a mere two hours later, and quickly joined forces with like-minded conservative workers across the city. Although short-lived, the organization faced off against the rebel forces in two high-profile incidents in December before their popular support dwindled amid the widespread strikes, work stoppages, and slowdowns that paralysed the city.

Word of the founding of the WGH in Shanghai set off a flurry of rebel activity across the country. Within days of the WGH’s official recognition, over a thousand rebel workers from Sichuan’s Chengdu headed to Beijing to petition central authorities, who hastily assembled forces to turn them back at Wuhan.<sup>18</sup> Hundreds of temporary workers in Beijing banded together to establish the All-China Red Labourer Rebels’ Headquarters, colloquially known as the Quanhongzong (全红总), and quickly established branches in more than a dozen provinces. Throughout December and into early January, the organisation staged rallies and sit-ins targeting the official All-China Federation of Trade Unions (heretofore ACFTU) and the Ministry of Labour in Beijing, demanding official recognition and labour policy reforms, while mobilising their branches elsewhere to engage in similar protests.<sup>19</sup>

Labour unrest had become sufficiently protracted in Nanjing by the end of 1966 that the municipal Party Committee was dispatching ranked officials into factories to read aloud their self-criticisms to contingents of rebel workers in hopes of placating them. In Guangzhou, rebel workers succeeded in invading and closing down the two major Party news offices in mid-December. In the smaller city of Shijiazhuang, a clash at a textile mill that wounded 300 rebel workers in early December escalated into calls to ‘bombard’ (跑打) municipal authorities, leading to an invasion of a municipal government office on the 25<sup>th</sup>. The net effect of these events, ranging from rebel invasions of Party-government offices, to the seizure of local officials, and the formation of sweeping coalitions of rebel workers, succeeded in paralysing Chinese cities, from provincial-level Shanghai down to prefectural-level small centres across the country.<sup>20</sup>

The power seizure that occurred in Shanghai on 6 January 1967—the first such seizure at the provincial level<sup>21</sup>—was chiefly motivated by the aim on the part of rebel coalitions to restore public order and resume public services to municipalities in which Party and government offices had effectively collapsed. Although the WGH and a coalition of allied rebel organisations staged a mass meeting to ‘drag out’ the municipal Party secretary, the mayor, and other high-level cadres and subject them to public criticism, criticising local authorities was not the WGH’s initial objective. Instead, at the organization’s core was a skeletal ‘Frontline Command Post to Grasp Revolution and Promote Production’ (上海市抓革命、促生产火线指挥部), with the relatively modest ambition of restarting Shanghai’s transportation networks. One WGH leader at the time recalled how, on the evening of 7 January, the new Frontline Command Post’s key concern was merely to reopen the rail links and Shanghai’s main port, because the paralysis to which the city had succumbed was clearly ‘a ploy by capitalist roaders to destroy production and suppress revolution.’<sup>22</sup> The grander ambition of self rule seems to have been suggested by CCRG members Zhang Chunqiao and Yaou Wenyan, who in an early meeting with the Frontline Command Post declared: ‘This is a newly born thing, a new form of political power. We really must sum up this experience.’

Meanwhile, on 8 January, Mao extolled Shanghai and its rebel coalition; the following day, the *People’s Daily* published an ‘Urgent Letter to the People of Shanghai’, adding an editorial comment commending them for responding to Mao’s call for workers to ‘grasp revolution, promote production’, underscoring that the lessons learned were not just relevant for Shanghai but for the entire country.<sup>23</sup> The national media lavished praise on the WGH’s takeover of the city beginning less than a week later, in a series of articles and radio broadcasts urging rebels across country to follow Shanghai’s example.<sup>24</sup> The *People’s Daily* on 16 January claimed that, in the ‘experience of seizing power from a handful of capitalists within the Party’, Shanghai’s rebel coalition had ‘provided correct principles, policies, forms of organisation and methods of struggle.’<sup>25</sup> Less than a week later, the newspaper called for a national bottom-up seizure of power through a great alliance to ‘shake China’ to its very core.<sup>26</sup>

By the end of January, more than half of China’s 2,215 cities and counties had experienced power seizures, and by the end of March, more than 75 per cent had been overturned.<sup>27</sup> Only days after the publication of the ‘Urgent Letter,’ rebel organisations of workers in Shanxi

established a ‘grand alliance’ (大联合) with ‘revolutionary cadres’ (革命干部) and members of the military, and announced that they had ‘seized power’ (夺权) at the provincial level.<sup>28</sup> Permutations of the Shanxi experience involving alliances of cadres and army units alongside ‘rebel revolutionary’ workers soon followed in Shandong and Guizhou. Finally, on 31 January 1967, Heilongjiang became the first provincial power seizure carried out by a self-declared ‘revolutionary committee’ (革命会), so named for the governing organ of the Paris Commune that had figured prominently in official newspaper commentaries during the earliest throes of the Cultural Revolution. Within the week, a coalition of 32 different rebel workers’ groups declared the establishment of a ‘People’s Commune’ in the place of their municipal government.

However, across the country the January Storm had already taken events in a new direction. It was the model primarily developed in Heilongjiang of a ‘revolutionary committee’ (革命委员会) formed as a ‘triple combination’ (三结合) uniting local military commanders, representatives of rebel mass organisations, and local revolutionary cadres—that Mao favoured, and that was formally adopted in Shanghai before the month’s end. The autonomously formed WGH thus inaugurated and completed the five-week political sequence of the power seizure movement by serving as both midwife and gravedigger for the newborn Shanghai People’s Commune, closing the circle from political representation to direct action and back again.

### *After the Storm*

On the final day of January, in an article reprinted on the front page of the *People’s Daily*, *Red Flag* referred to the power seizures collectively as the ‘January Revolution’, claiming that ‘the great storm of revolution started in Shanghai’.<sup>29</sup> Shanghai’s model status notwithstanding, less than three weeks later, the Shanghai People’s Commune was renamed a ‘revolutionary committee’ in accordance with Mao’s 23 February instruction, conforming to the ‘triple combination’ arrangement that Shanxi, Shandong and Heilongjiang had inaugurated weeks before.<sup>30</sup> Zhang assumed chairmanship and Yao was appointed its first deputy chairman. Locally, rebel worker Wang Hongwen, soon to be elevated to a seat on the CCRSG, served as their principal deputy.<sup>31</sup>

More importantly, perhaps, the name change marked the beginning of the end of a political sequence: if the first battles of the Cultural Revolution were waged by students as struggles over political representation, and the second by workers as contests over direct political action, the renaming of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee signalled the closing down of the rebel worker's brief experiment in nominal self-rule by forcing them into a power-sharing arrangement with some of the authorities they had overthrown. In 1972, the WGH likewise renamed itself the 'Shanghai Workers' Representative Congress' (上海市工代会); subordinate rebel units followed suit. By the following year, the former leadership of the WGH was absorbed into the Shanghai Municipal Federation of Trade Unions (上海市总工会), the local branch of the ACFTU, which had ceased its operations when the Cultural Revolution began, but resumed functioning in 1970 under rebel worker control. Following the reopening of the municipal ACFTU, subordinate rebel units thereafter become known as 'union' branches, and have largely remained as such down to the present day.<sup>32</sup>

Writing in 2006, Li Xun remarked that, prior to the Cultural Revolution, whatever representation workers enjoyed in the political system had been merely 'symbolic' (象征性的). Those designated worker representatives that did exist were actually the heads of the Shanghai municipal ACFTU, cadres who had led the CCP's underground labor organizations before 1949; none hailed from working class backgrounds, and all had only limited contact with those whose interests they were appointed to represent. Of the 33 key post-holders in the Shanghai Municipal Government in 1950-- including the municipal Party secretary and Party standing committee members—only 4 were local ACFTU members. This number had dropped to a single representative by December 1965, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution.<sup>33</sup>

Although the events of January and February 1967 changed the structure of political representation for Shanghai's workers dramatically, it did so only temporarily, and only at the local level: the worker representatives who made it to positions on the revolutionary committee had to compete against the more experienced cadre members for political influence under the "triple combination" power-sharing system, and were frequently accused of putting the interests of the union above those of the Party. A series of political campaigns targeting rebels in 1969 and 1970 further reduced their numbers. Of the 'worker rebels' who served in 10 district government agencies under the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, 135, or 43.5%, had been purged by 1971.<sup>34</sup>

On a deeper level, the new revolutionary committees also failed to resolve the crisis over political representation. Questions over who had the right to speak on behalf of particular collective interests, and who was authorized to represent the Party and the revolutionary agenda, were effectively taken off the table: the new revolutionary committees were not poised to ‘represent’ the masses so much as to *be* representative of them. On the 19<sup>th</sup>, Central Committee issued a notice that the newborn organs of political power ensure that under the ‘triple combination’ system, the representatives who are leaders of revolutionary mass organizations ‘that truly represent the broader revolutionary masses’ (真正代表广大群众的革命群众).<sup>35</sup> A March 1967 *Red Flag* editorial republished in the *People’s Daily* stipulated that, as provisional organs of revolutionary political power, all revolutionary committees must both display ‘representativeness’ (有代表性) and exercise ‘proletarian authority’ (有无产阶级权威的).<sup>36</sup> Mass representatives were enjoined to bring the masses ‘into full play’ (充分发挥), value the opinions of the masses and warned to never ‘use them as a foil’ (当做陪衬); but beyond such blandishments, the central leadership declined to put into place formalized practices of accountability at the national level.

This failure undermined the ostensible aim of the revolutionary committee: to increase and institutionalize the political representation of revolutionary and rebel workers within the system. Political power in the PRC flows from the center downward by design: it is invested in local organs of government and grassroots actors through mechanisms of authorization and delegation. The power seizure movement in 1967 thus triggered a desperate scramble at the grassroots, in Shanghai as elsewhere across the country, among local actors and groups seeking central authorization to legitimate various political agendas. The Central Committee’s order regarding the “triple combination” arrangement of revolutionary committees attempted to guarantee ‘genuine’ mass representation in the newborn organ of governance. Yet by failing to designate methods of selection and recall, the actual mechanism of representation under the ‘triple combination’ system was left largely to local cadres to determine, virtually extinguishing the possibility of a radically new political existence for workers that the Cultural Revolution had promised to deliver.

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- <sup>1</sup> Alessandro Russo. 2020. *Cultural Revolution and Revolutionary Culture*. Duke University Press, 193.
- <sup>2</sup> Alain Badiou. 2005. "The Cultural Revolution: The Last Revolution?" *positions: East Asia Cultural Critique* 13, 3: 496-97.
- <sup>3</sup> He, Shu 何蜀 2001. 文革中所谓的‘上海一月革命’——毛泽东制造的一个‘文革样板’[The CR's so-called 'January Revolution'—Mao Zedong's manufactured 'CR model'] *当代中国研究 [Contemporary China Research]* 2001: 2-4.
- <sup>4</sup> Andrew G. Walder. 2019. *Agents of Disorder: Inside China's Cultural Revolution*. Harvard University Press, 103.
- <sup>5</sup> Hao, Ping. 1996. 'Reassessing the Starting Point of the Cultural Revolution.' *China Review International*, 3,1: 66-86.
- <sup>6</sup> Commentator 评论员 1966 'Cheer the big-character poster at Beijing University' 欢呼北大的一张大字报, 《人民日报》 [ *People's Daily* ], June 02, 1.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>8</sup> Qinghua University Jिंगgangshan 清华大学井冈山, no date. 清华大学大字报选 (蒯大富 同志大字报) [Selected Big Character Posters by Qinghua University Students (Comrade Kuai Dafu's Big Character Posters) Tianjinshi Diyi Mianfenchang Hanwei Mao Zedong Sixiang Zaofandui.
- <sup>9</sup> Walder 2019, 83.
- <sup>10</sup> Shanghai Party Committee 'Cultural Revolution' Historical Materials Compilation Team 上海“文革”史料整理编纂小组上海 1992, '文化大革命'史话 (送审稿) [ *The History of the 'Cultural Revolution' (Draft for Review)* ], 内部发行 [Internal circulation], heretofore WDGSH, 61-71.
- <sup>11</sup> Li Xun 李逊, *革命造反的年代 (上本)* [ *The Age of Revolutionary Rebellion, Volume 1* ] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 122-28.
- <sup>12</sup> WDGSH, 152-53.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid., 79-81.
- <sup>14</sup> Li Xun 李逊 (2015), 289-98.
- <sup>15</sup> WDGSH, 162-63.
- <sup>16</sup> WDGSH, 168-70.
- <sup>17</sup> Elizabeth J. Perry and Li Xun, 1997. *Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution*, Westview Press, 78, 84.
- <sup>18</sup> Li Xun 李逊 2015, 378.
- <sup>19</sup> Wu Yiching 2014, *The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis* (Harvard University Press), 108-9.
- <sup>20</sup> Walder 2019, Chapter 3.
- <sup>21</sup> Shanghai is a direct-controlled municipality 直辖市, which is an administrative designation on par with a province in the PRC.
- <sup>22</sup> Perry and Li 1997, 146-48; WDGSH 247-48.
- <sup>23</sup> Editor 编者 1967 'Grasp revolution, promote production and completely smash the new counterattack of bourgeois reactionary line—an Urgent Letter to All the People of Shanghai' 抓革命, 促生产彻底粉碎资产阶级反动路线的新反扑——告上海全市人, 《人民日报》 [ *People's Daily* ], January 9, 1.
- <sup>24</sup> See, for example, *People's Daily, Red Flag* 人民日报, 红旗 1967 '反对经济主义 粉碎资产阶级反动路线的新反扑' 《人民日报》 《红旗》杂志 [A new counterattack against economism and crushing the bourgeois reactionary line] 《人民日报》 [ *People's Daily* ], January 12, 1.
- <sup>25</sup> *People's Daily* 人民日报 1967 无产阶级革命派联合起来 [Proletarian revolutionaries, unite!] 16 January, 1.
- <sup>26</sup> *People's Daily* 人民日报 1967 无产阶级革命派大联合, 夺走资本主义道路当权派的权! [The proletarian revolutionaries have joined forces to take the power of those in power on the capitalist road!] 22 January, 1.
- <sup>27</sup> Walder 2019, 294-95.
- <sup>28</sup> Jean Christophe Mittelstaedt, "Revolutionizing the State: The 1975 Chinese State Constitution." Unpublished University of Oxford doctoral thesis (2018), 31-41.
- <sup>29</sup> *People's Daily* 人民日报 1967 论无产阶级革命派的夺权斗争 [On the proletarian revolutionaries' struggle to seize power] 31 January, 1.
- <sup>30</sup> WDGSH, 263.

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<sup>31</sup> MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006, 168-69.

<sup>32</sup> Perry and Li, 37; Li Xun 李逊 2006 ‘工人阶级领导一切?—‘文革’中上海‘工人造反派’及工人阶级的地位’ [The Working Class Leads All? The positions of ‘rebel workers’ and the working class in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution], *当代中国研究* [Contemporary China Research], 2: 2-4.

<sup>33</sup> Li Xun 2006.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Party Central Committee 1967 ‘中共中央关于夺权斗争宣传报导问题的通知’ 中发 [ 67 ] 57 号 [‘CCP Central Committee Notice on Propagandising and Reporting of the Struggle to Seize Power’ Issued by the Center [1967] No. 57] 19 February. *中国文化革命文库* [Chinese Cultural Revolution Database] (University Services Centre for China Studies: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013).

<sup>36</sup> *People’s Daily* 人民日报 1967 论革命的三结合 [ On Revolution's 'Triple Combination' ] 10 March, 1.