



THE ALTRUISTIC LOBBYISTS:  
THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS  
ON DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN CANADA AND BRITAIN

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D.Phil.  
Hilary 1994



## ABSTRACT

### THE ALTRUISTIC LOBBYISTS: THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN CANADA AND BRITAIN

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The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has sparked increased interest in recent years as they have grown in prominence and international activity. The thesis looks at British and Canadian NGOs concerned with overseas development assistance, and asks what influence they have wielded in the formulation of their own governments' development policies. Based on recent policy community writing, a "conceptual map" is devised which suggests that six elements are important for any analysis of influence: context, content, motivations, resources, tactics, and channels. Chapters two to five use these elements to look at the broad "policy communities" in which official development policy is formulated, and to examine the increasing roles and activities of NGOs as lobbyists. Chapters six and seven take a closer look at two specific "policy networks" within those communities: the relationships created around the World Food Conference in 1974 are compared with those existing at the time of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit). The thesis concludes that NGOs have had an increasing but limited influence on government policy, given (1) an increase in the activity and influence of NGOs, (2) the greater relevance of certain "elements of influence" over others, and (3) the comparatively stronger influence of Canadian NGOs in relation to their British counterparts. The thesis' contribution to knowledge is based on its use of extensive and original primary sources and interviews in both countries, its application of a policy community approach to a new field in international relations, and its systematic attempt to answer evolving questions about this growing, international, and non-governmental force.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many of the debates which shape the relationship between NGOs and government are part of an oral rather than a written history. The assistance of the people interviewed in these pages has therefore been particularly valuable; their names are listed in Appendix One. I am further indebted to the private records loaned to me by Paul Rogers (University of Bradford), Anne Sieve (one time of the International Planned Parenthood Federation), and Tony Clarke (Action Canada Network); the copies of *Pan* which Peter Willetts (City University, London) allowed me to see; the advance copies of work shown to me by Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (OECD), Cranford Pratt (University of Toronto), and Robert Miller (Parliamentary Centre); as well as the theses of Marlene Jacques and Brian Stevenson.

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Finally, special words of acknowledgment are set aside for the efforts of my supervisor, Dr. Andrew Hurrell at Nuffield College. Many thanks.

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A note on the use of NGO funding data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) may be in order here. Following mostly on Smillie's work, it is worthwhile to point out that:

1. The definition of what counts as an NGO differs widely in member country accounts. For example, Canada's figures include non-governmental institutions such as universities, while other countries' do not.
2. Funding for NGOs may come from different departments within a government, and there may be no overall consolidation of figures in the final reporting.
3. Even within a given department, the support given to NGOs under different programs may not be consolidated in the total funding figures; Canada, with a plethora of funding windows, is a particular offender on this count.
4. Flows of resources to NGOs acting as contractors (as opposed to outright grants) are generally under-reported.
5. There is no calculation of the value of tax-relief accorded to NGOs -- many in Canada and Britain are charities and benefit significantly from lowered taxes.
6. Support to Southern NGOs is often not reported in the general figures, thereby under-representing their role.
7. The estimates of total NGO contributions to the development effort (called "grants by voluntary agencies" in the OECD's Development Assistance Committee [DAC] reports) are often highly speculative. Few are based on NGOs' actual reports.
8. DAC reports over the years are inconsistent in the manner in which NGO contributions, and contributions to NGOs, are reported. It is thus difficult to make year-to-year comparisons, and difficult to determine what groups and what monies are included under each of the changing categories.

Smillie thus suggests that "the broad statistics reported to the OECD are virtually meaningless for comparative purposes. They are also, in most cases, under-reported."<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, these are the only figures on NGOs currently available for comparison, and so are used (with caution) in the illustrations throughout the text.

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<sup>1</sup>Ian Smillie, "Changing Partners: Northern NGOs, Northern Governments," in Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (editors), *Stakeholders in Development: Issues in Government/NGO Relationships*, OECD: Paris, 1993, (pp. 40-41).

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|         |                                                                                                        |
|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AQOCI   | <i>L'Association québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale</i>                           |
| ATP     | Aid and Trade Provision, ODA                                                                           |
| BESO    | British Executives for Service Overseas                                                                |
| BOND    | British Overseas NGOs for Development                                                                  |
| CAFOD   | Catholic Agency for Overseas Development                                                               |
| CANSAVE | Canadian Save the Children Fund                                                                        |
| CANZ    | United Nations group composed of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand                                    |
| CARE    | Coalition for American Relief in Europe                                                                |
| CCCB    | Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops                                                                |
| CCIC    | Canadian Council for International Cooperation                                                         |
| CCODP   | Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace                                               |
| CECI    | <i>Centre canadien d'études et de coopération international</i>                                        |
| CEN     | Canadian Environmental Network                                                                         |
| CESO    | Canadian Executive Services Overseas                                                                   |
| CIDA    | Canadian International Development Agency                                                              |
| CIIR    | Catholic Institute of International Relations                                                          |
| CPCU    | Canadian Preparatory Committee for UNCED                                                               |
| CPRE    | Council for the Protection of Rural England                                                            |
| CSD     | Commission on Sustainable Development, UN                                                              |
| CUSO    | Canadian University Services Overseas                                                                  |
| DAC     | Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)                                                         |
| DD2     | UK Standing Conference on the Second Development Decade                                                |
| DEC     | Disasters Emergency Committee                                                                          |
| DoE     | Department of the Environment, UK                                                                      |
| EA      | Department of External Affairs, Canada (also known as External Affairs and International Trade Canada) |
| EAO     | External Aid Office, Canada (1960-1968)                                                                |
| EC      | European Community                                                                                     |
| ECOSOC  | Economic and Social Committee of the United Nations                                                    |
| ENGO    | Environmental Non-Governmental Organization                                                            |
| ERA     | Eritrean Relief Association                                                                            |
| FAO     | Food and Agriculture Organization                                                                      |
| FCO     | Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK                                                                    |
| FoE     | Friends of the Earth                                                                                   |
| G77     | Group of 77, United Nations group of developing countries                                              |
| GATT    | General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs                                                                 |
| GEF     | Global Environment Facility                                                                            |
| GNP     | Gross National Product                                                                                 |
| ICCHRLA | Inter-Church Coalition on Human Rights in Latin America                                                |
| ICFID   | Interchurch Fund for International Development                                                         |
| ICVA    | International Coalition of Voluntary Agencies                                                          |
| IDA     | International Development Association, World Bank                                                      |
| IDEA    | International Development Executives Association                                                       |
| IDRC    | International Development Research Centre                                                              |
| IDS     | Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex                                                 |
| IFAD    | International Fund for Agricultural Development                                                        |
| IGBA    | Independent Group on British Aid                                                                       |

|          |                                                                               |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| IIED     | International Institute for Environment and Development                       |
| IMF      | International Monetary Fund                                                   |
| ITC/IT&C | Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Canada                            |
| ITDG     | Intermediate Technology Development Group                                     |
| JFS      | Joint Funding Scheme                                                          |
| LDCs     | Less Developed Countries                                                      |
| MAFF     | Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, UK                               |
| MEP      | Member of the European Parliament                                             |
| MP       | Member of Parliament                                                          |
| NADEC    | National Association of Development Education                                 |
| NATO     | North Atlantic Treaty Alliance                                                |
| NGO      | Non-Governmental Organization                                                 |
| NGDO     | Non-Governmental Development Organization                                     |
| NIEO     | New International Economic Order                                              |
| NSI      | North-South Institute                                                         |
| oda      | official development assistance                                               |
| ODA      | Overseas Development Administration, UK                                       |
| ODI      | Overseas Development Institute                                                |
| ODM      | Ministry of Overseas Development, UK (1964-1970; 1974-1979)                   |
| OECD     | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development                         |
| OPEC     | Oil Producing and Exporting Countries                                         |
| P&P      | Priorities and Planning Committee                                             |
| PAC      | Partnership Africa Canada                                                     |
| PEC      | Primary Environmental Care                                                    |
| PM       | Prime Minister                                                                |
| PPP      | Public Participation Program                                                  |
| REST     | Relief Society of Tigray                                                      |
| SAP      | Structural Adjustment Program                                                 |
| SCEA(N)D | Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs (and National) Defense, Canada |
| SCEAIT   | Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Canada        |
| SCF      | Save the Children Fund                                                        |
| SSEA     | Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada                               |
| SUCO     | <i>Service universitaire canadien outre-mer</i>                               |
| UN       | United Nations                                                                |
| UNA      | United Nations Association, UK                                                |
| UNDP     | United Nations Development Program                                            |
| UNAC     | United Nations Association of Canada                                          |
| UNCED    | United Nations Conference on Environment and Development                      |
| UNCTAD   | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development                            |
| UNEP     | United Nations Environment Programme                                          |
| UNEP-UK  | United Nations Environment Programme - UK                                     |
| UNHRC    | United Nations Human Rights Committee                                         |
| UNICEF   | United Nations Children's Fund                                                |
| VCOAD    | Voluntary Committee for Overseas Aid and Development                          |
| VSO      | Voluntary Service Overseas                                                    |
| WDM      | World Development Movement                                                    |
| WHO      | World Health Organization                                                     |
| WUSC     | World University Services of Canada                                           |
| WWF      | World Wide Fund for Nature                                                    |
| YMCA     | Young Men's Christian Association                                             |

## INTRODUCTION

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are taking an increasingly prominent role on the international stage. As interest in transnationalism has grown in recent years, the growth of the NGO sector has raised questions about the extent of its influence in a world that has long been dominated by interstate activity. In order to answer some of these questions, this thesis examines a small part of that international stage: the influence of two communities of NGOs which are both interested in development and active in lobbying their home governments' development policies. From this narrow and empirical case-study perspective, a clearer view of the larger picture may be gained.

This introduction therefore begins by laying out the debate on transnationalism and the rise of NGOs before centering on the specific questions examined in the thesis and the manner of treatment and sources used. From this starting point, the thesis will show the reader that while development NGOs in particular have become more influential over time, this influence has been limited to specific issues and institutions. For the moment, the "transnational world" is still very much dominated by national forces.

## THE NEW TRANSNATIONALISM

The specific questions which concern this thesis are part of a vibrant debate in the field of international relations today. A growing interest in transnational civil society, the limits of statist perspectives, and the influence of domestic groups on foreign policy have become central themes of the early 1990s' debate.<sup>1</sup> This resurgence of interest in transnationalism dates in part from the tumultuous events in Eastern Europe in 1989 and looks to the shape of an international relations no longer dominated by military superpowers but now concerned with a host of new issues. While few claim that the state has lost its relevance in this "new

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<sup>1</sup>For a sampling of the debate, see the special issue of *Government and Opposition*, called "Globalization: The Interweaving of Foreign and Domestic Policy-Making," vol. 28, no. 2, Spring 1993.

world order," there has been a consensus that statist perspectives alone cannot explain some of the radical changes now occurring.

Ideas about transnational non-state actors are not new, of course; the 1970s produced a vigorous debate about the rise of new actors and the possible demise of the nation-state system.<sup>2</sup> With the intensification of superpower rivalries in the 1980s, however, statist and realist perspectives returned to dominate the international relations literature, questioning whether the state ought to have been so quickly dismissed as the most powerful element in international affairs.<sup>3</sup> Yet since 1989, the growing intervention of the UN (in the Gulf War and Somalia in particular) and the rise of new issues to international prominence, the transnational/globalist debate has been re-inaugurated. Have we indeed entered a "new world order?"<sup>4</sup> If so, who are the relevant actors in the evolving international system?<sup>5</sup> Among those actors are counted transnational corporations, international banking systems, international organizations of greater or lesser degrees of governmental participation (including the UN), trade unions, social movements, liberation movements, voluntary agencies, academic networks, and the media.

In order to grapple with these additions to the repertoire, international relations has returned to the idea of "civil society" to understand better how domestic and international non-

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<sup>2</sup>The most significant works are: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction," in *International Organization*, vol. 25, 1971, pp. 329-349, and *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977; Richard W. Mansbach, Yale H. Ferguson, Donald E. Lampert, *The Web of World Politics: Nonstate Actors in the Global System*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976; and Seyom Brown, *New Forces in World Politics*, Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1974.

<sup>3</sup>A good review of these changes in emphasis is found in: M.J. Peterson, "Transnational Activity, International Society, and World Politics," in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1992, pp. 371-388. Key works include: Gabriel A. Almond, "The Return to the State" in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 82, no. 3, September 1988, pp. 853-874; Hedley Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs" in *Daedalus*, Fall 1979, pp. 111-123; Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (editors), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985; Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978; and Eric A. Nordlinger, Theodore J. Lowi and Sergio Fabbrini, "The Return to the State: Critiques" in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 82, no. 3, September 1988, pp. 875-901.

<sup>4</sup>Many believe we have. See: James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*, New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements and the Civilizations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*, London: Sage, 1992. For a more sceptical account, see: Adam Roberts, "A New Age in International Relations?" in *International Affairs*, vol. 67, no. 3, July 1991, pp. 509-525.

<sup>5</sup>See Evan Luard, *The Globalization of Politics: The Changed Focus of Political Action in the Modern World*, Basingstoke, Hamps and London: MacMillan, 1990.

governmental organizations are capable of shaping the foreign policies of states.<sup>6</sup> Regime theories have so far only touched on the role of domestic groups in regulating and implementing rule-based international agreements, however.<sup>7</sup> Putnam's work on two-level games is thus promising; he has emphasized the role of domestic groups in shaping officials' negotiating behaviour at the international level.<sup>8</sup> The civil society debate may have thus begun to "usefully [focus] attention on a set of institutions that has long made major contributions to the alleviation of human problems throughout the world, but has gone largely overlooked in both scholarly inquiry and public debates -- the private, nonprofit or voluntary sector."<sup>9</sup> The organizations working in this hitherto neglected sector have in recent decades taken on a greater role in international affairs through their networking skills, their access to localized information, and their ability to activate change at the grassroots level, all attributes which the traditional inter-state players lack. In an international milieu where the agenda has shifted to concentrate on issues such as democratic growth, environmental protection, and sustainable development, these skills have made NGOs indispensable. Northern development NGOs in particular have become increasingly involved with the traditional development institutions of international relations. What the thesis explores is whether these connections have been translated into real influence.

#### THE GROWING PROMINENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS

The thesis is concerned with the role of one group of players in the larger debate on international civil society: the growing prominence of non-governmental development

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<sup>6</sup>For a detailed discussion of the resurgence of the civil society debate, see: Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1992; and John Keane (editor), *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*, London: Verso Press, 1988. See also: Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1992, pp. 389-420. For an in-depth discussion of how changes in international relations have affected the concept and practice of sovereignty, see Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Aldershot, Hants and Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1992.

<sup>7</sup>On the weakness of regime theory in incorporating domestic elements, see: Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," in *International Organization*, vol. 41, no. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 491-517.

<sup>8</sup>On two-level games, see: Robert A. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," in *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 427-460.

<sup>9</sup>Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier, *Towards an Understanding of the International Nonprofit Sector*, Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 1991; cited in Ian Smillie, "Changing Partners: Northern NGOs, Northern Governments," in Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (editors), *Stakeholders in Development: Issues in Government/NGO Relationships*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1993, (p. 16).

organizations. The terms *NGO* or *NGDO* will be used to refer *only* to development organizations, although it should be acknowledged that *NGO* in the broader sense refers to other kinds of agencies as well.<sup>10</sup> Throughout the 1980s, development practitioners have been chronicling the rise of NGOs in both Northern and Southern countries, a rise in numbers, activities, incomes, and efficacy.<sup>11</sup> For many government and private donors, NGOs presented a way to "do" development better than official development agencies, and for some, NGOs represented the key for the struggling development effort:

These groups are different from other non-governmental groups, such as most private firms, in that their aim is to promote the economic and social well-being of peoples in the Third World. They are the private development movement, and to me they are currently the most interesting phenomena in Third World development. I also argue that they may well be the element of greatest significance in Third World development today.<sup>12</sup>

The recent growth in the numbers of NGOs in the North, as well as the increase in their funding from Northern governments, has been founded on the kind of reputation described by Berg. The membership of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), including Canada and Britain, has dramatically increased its attention to and funding of NGOs over the course of the last decade.<sup>13</sup> As early as 1981, the OECD was exploring possibilities for increasing its collaboration with NGOs. The strengths of NGOs were seen to

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<sup>10</sup>The thesis borrows its definition from the International Coalition of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). The term "NGO,"

signifies any association or organization (i) which is non-profit-making and non-governmental, and (ii) whose activities are of a humanitarian character, and (iii) whose activities are related to any of the following: aid to people in need of assistance by the international community; assistance for refugees and migrants; aid in cases of natural or man-made migrants; aid in cases of natural or man-made disasters; or the advancement of social, economic and cultural development, (ICVA, "Definitions of 'Non-Governmental Organization,' 'Voluntary Agency' and Related Terms," mimeo, Geneva, September 1983).

Building on that definition, the thesis further defines NGOs as organizations which are *primarily* devoted to non-profit-making <sup>distributing</sup> overseas development concerns, are run by non-governmental boards of directors and paid or voluntary staffs, and have a significant Canadian or British component in their activities -- either in fundraising, volunteering, or education. NGOs may be entirely funded by government, or may be wholly self-supporting. They may or may not be registered charities. There may be no paid staff, or staffing in the hundreds. They may organize and implement projects overseas, or be entirely concerned with their own government's overseas policies. The thesis considers all of these to be NGOs. Refer to the notes in Appendix Two for further details.

<sup>11</sup>A good overview of the state of NGO activity in the late 1980s is: Anne Gordon Drabek (editor), *World Development*, supplement entitled "Development Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs," vol. 15, Autumn 1987.

<sup>12</sup>Robert J. Berg, *Non-Governmental Organizations: New Force in Third World Development and Politics*, Center for Advanced Study of International Development, Michigan State University, Distinguished Speaker Series, no. 2, May 1987, (p. 2).

<sup>13</sup>OECD, *Voluntary Aid for Development: The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1988.

include a grassroots base, experience, cost-effectiveness, expertise, and innovation, and the OECD therefore concluded it would be more fruitful for its members' aid agencies to develop and diversify their collaboration with NGOs.<sup>14</sup> Throughout the 1980s, more than 4% of the overseas development assistance (oda)<sup>15</sup> offered by OECD countries went to NGOs (see figure 0.1).<sup>16</sup> In absolute terms, there has been a steady rise of official donations to NGOs by members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD over the course of the last two decades (see figure 0.2). The amount of private donations (included in the higher of the two lines) has risen at a somewhat higher rate than government funding, indicating that NGOs have also cultivated a broadening public constituency.

Other international organizations concerned with development have also paid close attention to NGOs in recent years. Since 1976, the European Community (EC) has collaborated with NGOs in funding both development projects overseas and development education at home. The NGO-EC Liaison Committee in Brussels acts as an umbrella for some 600 European NGOs seeking to gain co-funding for development work from the EC and to express opinions on EC development or North-South policy.<sup>17</sup> There has also been a great deal of interest in NGOs throughout the UN system. Although the UN has been long involved with many kinds of NGO through its Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC), voluntary agencies have also become more prominent in UNICEF, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Food Program and World Food Council, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN High Commission for Refugees, the UN Fund for Population Activities, and the UN Relief and Works Agency.<sup>18</sup> The UNDP, for instance, set up a division for NGOs in 1986 to exchange information, consult on national strategies, coordinate assistance, and strengthen local NGOs.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, NGOs

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<sup>14</sup>"Private Aid and Official Development Assistance -- Towards Closer Collaboration," in *OECD Observer*, no. 112, September 1981, pp. 5-8.

<sup>15</sup>The acronym *oda* is used to differentiate overseas development assistance from the Overseas Development Administration, or *ODA*.

<sup>16</sup>OECD, *International Cooperation and the Institutional Strengthening of Non-Governmental Development Organizations in Africa*, no. 88/4, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1988, (p. 3).

<sup>17</sup>Interview with Gordon Deuchars of the Liaison Committee of Development NGOs to the European Communities, in Brussels, on 30 March 1991.

<sup>18</sup>Larry Minear, "NGOs Today: Practitioners of Development Strategies and Advocates for the Poor," in *Development: Seeds of Change*, vol. 4, 1987, pp. 96-99, (p. 98).

<sup>19</sup>Elizabeth Morrison and Randall B. Purcell, *Players and Issues in US Foreign Aid: Essential Information for Educators*, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1988, (p. 95).

Figure 0.1: Percentage of Canadian, British, and DAC  
oda allocated to NGOs, 1974-1991

Source: OECD DAC reports, various years





Figure 0.2: Funding to and Expenditure by DAC NGOs,  
1974-1990 in \$US millions

Source: OECD DAC reports, various years



of many kinds have also become more prominent in UN conferences on human rights, women's rights, disarmament, peace, environment, and development. The UN also maintains a central NGO liaison service that regularly publishes newsletters and organizes data banks for NGO use. Another major institution with an interest in NGOs is the World Bank, which in 1982 set up the World Bank-NGO Committee to facilitate its cooperation with NGOs. By 1989, some 202 of its projects involved NGOs (5% of the total number of projects), and the Bank had produced studies demonstrating the importance of local organizations and advocating increased NGO involvement.<sup>20</sup> This kind of international recognition has been based on what seems to be the comparative advantage of NGOs in delivering and designing aid in a cost-effective, socially responsive manner, using networks and contacts unavailable to official agencies and achieving greater success in maintaining long-term "development."<sup>21</sup> In an era in which the prospects for the success of international development assistance seems generally bleak, NGOs' lauded skills have appeared to offer something like a panacea to government donors.<sup>22</sup>

The high profile acquired by NGOs as grassroots development "providers" generates important questions about their influence on the broader international stage. Their reputation has greatly boosted their legitimacy in the eyes of their own governments, now increasingly concerned with issues of democratization, good governance, and environmental protection, as well as efficient development. For some NGOs, this privileged reputation has meant that their potential influence over government policy has increased. This high profile raises a number of questions. First of all, what *kinds* of influence are these agencies wielding? Although there are many more NGOs and much more support from official Northern donors in recent years, how important is NGO activity? Do NGOs affect the development process elsewhere but at their acknowledged grassroots level? The thesis thus seeks to understand how the

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<sup>20</sup>See: Samuel Pau, *Community Participation in Development Projects: The World Bank Experience*, World Bank Discussion Paper no. 6, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1987; Michael M. Cernea, *Nongovernmental Organizations and Local Development*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, October 1988, and "Farmer Organizations and Institution Building for Sustainable Development," in *Regional Development Dialogue*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1987, pp. 1-19; and Lawrence F. Salmen and A. Paige Eaves, *World Bank Work with Non-Governmental Organizations*, Working Paper WPS 305, Washington, DC: The World Bank, December 1989, (p. iii).

<sup>21</sup>Alan Fowler, "Doing it better? Where and How NGOs Have a 'Comparative Advantage' in Facilitating Development," in *AERDD Bulletin*, University of Reading, Agricultural Extension and Rural Development Department, vol. 28, February 1990, pp. 11-20.

<sup>22</sup>See Chapter Four of Peter Burnell, *Charity, Politics and the Third World*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

increased *prominence* of NGOs may have affected their *capacity to influence* policy. A second set of questions looks at the change in NGOs' desire to become involved in the policy process in the first place. As some agencies are turning to policy work, often with very green thumbs, they are themselves interested in the scope of their possible influence on broader policies issues.<sup>23</sup> However, for these agencies, getting involved with policy work is a complicated endeavour. One difficulty is that the range of issues potentially involved is enormous: International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs, reforms in commodity agreements and the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and World Bank), the international debt crisis, and reform in trade practices all rate highly on the list of NGO concerns,<sup>24</sup> but the expertise required to deal with these issues is lacking in many such organizations. Another factor shaping NGOs' willingness to undertake policy work is the cost of pursuing policy change. One important cost may be the loss of private donors: if the agency is expected to build roads in the Sahara (a traditional kind of development project), yet chooses to become involved in campaigning the IMF on the repercussions of structural adjustment programmes, will donors retreat? Will the NGO lose its donor base, and so undermine its own potential for success? Another disadvantage could be the loss of government funding should NGOs pursue more controversial political agendas. As we shall see, in Britain and Canada there are both legal and informal restrictions on the activities of charitable organizations; most NGOs are registered charities, dependent on their tax exempt status, and many receive considerable additional funds from the oda budget. Indeed, official contributions to NGOs have *averaged* 35% in DAC countries in recent years (see figure 0.3). The question of NGO influence is thus a complex and important field of inquiry.

Until recently, however, this question has been ignored in the literature. Farrington et al write that academia is only:

beginning, belatedly, to respond to the reality of grassroots organizations' and NGOs' work in rural development. These analyses begin to link this NGO activity to debates on democracy, development and civil society. This academic response has been


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<sup>23</sup>A good general overview is: Smillie, "Changing Partners," 1993.

<sup>24</sup>See list suggested by Morrison and Purcell, *Players and Issues*, 1988:61.

Figure 0.3: Percentage of the total expenditure of DAC NGOs contributed by DAC governments, 1974-1990

Source: OECD DAC reports, various years



slower than that of those development agencies who earlier on realized the significance of this NGO activity.<sup>25</sup>

This academic neglect may be explained in a number of ways. As the next chapter illustrates, the field of international relations has maintained its focus on the state and on the international system while largely ignoring the role of other international players. NGOs have thus been conceptually "invisible" to international relations theorists.<sup>26</sup> For Willetts, this combined neglect is a serious failing:

The real theoretical importance of transnational NGOs is that they are the agents of global change .... We cannot understand the dynamics of world politics until we study in more detail the origins, the growth, the capabilities, the interactions and the influence of transnational actors in a complex, multi-centric, multi-issue global system.<sup>27</sup>

#### THE THESIS PROJECT

The thesis therefore aims to explore the origins, growth, capabilities, interactions, and influence of a narrow segment of the NGO community. The following chapters attempt to understand the comparative influence of the Canadian and British NGO communities on the making of development policy by their own governments, to explore the nature and extent of their influence, and to understand the factors which determine the degree of that influence. Under what conditions have NGOs been influential? Over what kinds of issues? In what circumstances? In the comparison between these two countries, the thesis hopes to bring into relief the most prominent of these factors.

The scope of the thesis focuses on the influence of NGOs on their home governments in particular. It is not primarily concerned with examining public opinion or the media in a

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<sup>25</sup>John Farrington and Anthony Bebbington with Kate Wellard and David J. Lewis, *Reluctant Partners? Non-governmental Organizations, the State and Sustainable Agricultural Development*, London and New York: Routledge, 1993, (p. 13). See also: Paul Ghils, "International Civil Society: International Non-Governmental Organizations in the International System," in *International Social Science Journal*, no. 133, August 1992, pp. 417-429, (p. 425); Robin Broad, John Cavanagh, and Walden Bello, "Development: the Market is not Enough," in *Foreign Policy*, no. 81, Winter 1990-91, pp. 144-162; and Pekka Seppala (editor), *Civil Society in the Making: People's Organizations and Politics in the Third World*, report no. B26/1992, University of Helsinki, Institute of Development Studies.

<sup>26</sup>For an exposition of international relations' failure to take into account the effect of non-governmental movements, see the introduction in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Ken Conca (editors), *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

<sup>27</sup>Peter Willetts, *Transnational Actors and Changing World Order*, Occasional Papers Series no. 17, PRIME, International Peace Research Institute Meigaku, Meiji Gakuin University, Yokohama Japan, 1993, (p. 36).

given country (although these are discussed in context), nor does it look directly at NGOs' influence on international agencies or other governments. Furthermore, the thesis does not look at the implementation, regulation, or evaluation of a particular policy, but only at its formation process. Even within these parameters, however, the project remains substantial.

### **Manner of Treatment**

The project begins with an exploration of the existing literature on NGOs and the surrounding writing on interest groups. However, much of this literature is not very helpful. While most of the work on interest groups is descriptive and detailed, it is not much concerned with *how* influence works; the literature often leaps from the micro level of group characteristics to the macro level of state behaviour. The broader theoretical literatures, including statist, pluralist, and bureaucratic politics approaches, explain *why* a particular group may influence the state, but not the mechanics of *how* it may do so. While more comprehensive than the interest group work, much of this writing nonetheless leaps from the macro level to the micro. More promising is an approach borrowed from the policy community literature in the field of comparative public policy. As the next chapter explains in greater depth, the thesis adopts from the policy community writers an emphasis on detailed observations of particular relationships over specific issues, and extracts a set of "elements of influence" in a "conceptual map" which will help us understand the process of influence. Six of these elements are used as headings at the conclusions to each part of the thesis: they ask us to look more closely at the *context* in which decisions are made, the *content* of the issue under debate, the *motivations* of the players involved, the *resources* available to NGOs to engage in lobbying work, the *tactics* wielded to gain influence, and the kinds of *channels* to decision-making processes which help or hinder NGOs' lobbying efforts.

Parts I and II (chapters two to five) of the thesis look at the broad history of the NGO-government relationship in Canada and Britain. At this broad level, the discussion pulls some of the main themes, parameters, and issues that have characterized those relationships for the past 30 years in order to understand changes in NGOs' advocacy work. The thesis looks to these countries in particular for a number of reasons. Each has an active community of organizations involved in lobbying; the parliamentary and bureaucratic systems in which each community works are similar; the status of the official agencies in charge of development are comparable; and each set of NGOs works under a similar legal code governing political

activities. These elements suggest that the influence of NGOs in either country may well be similar. Yet there are, nonetheless, significant and interesting differences: Canadian NGOs have blossomed with significant amounts of government funding in comparison to their British counterparts and are generally better coordinated as a community, yet while there are similar numbers of agencies in both countries, British NGOs have been more publicly prominent. The conclusion to each part pulls the most relevant "elements of influence" from the histories of NGO-government relations in that country to make initial assessments about the strength of NGO influence.

Against this background, the two chapters in Part III look at two specific cases of NGO lobbying on their governments' policies on development issues. Because the background chapters can only offer superficial references to particular NGO successes (and failures) in the policy realm, chapters six and seven attempt to take a much closer look at specific examples. Two UN conferences were chosen because both Canadian and British NGOs were on hand and both governments were involved. Furthermore, because the NGOs' lobbying was focused on a particular event, there existed in both cases a limited set of issues debated in a specific time-frame. Under these circumstances, comparison becomes easier. The 1974 World Food Conference in Rome and the 1992 Earth Summit (UNCED, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development) in Rio were chosen for further reasons. The WFC had been acclaimed as the entry point for many Canadian NGOs into lobbying work, and for British NGOs, the conference was held at a point when many were beginning to develop a "radical" lobbying agenda. At Rome, however, few believed that NGOs made much of a difference to their governments' positions, despite the loud noises made by some of the voluntary groups. Eighteen years later, many changes had affected the NGO-government relationship in both countries, and by the time the Earth Summit concluded, NGO participation was hailed among its greatest achievements. Part of the project of the thesis is to understand how those changes came about.

The concluding chapter returns to these broad issues by systematically looking at the elements of influence introduced in Chapter One. This kind of analysis is important because it deals with a largely unexamined area of international civil society in a comparative, longitudinal fashion. Comparisons of this type help clarify current questions about the role of civil society in the "post-international" world by looking at a particular set of organizations in particular instances, across time, and in two countries. The thesis contributes to this field of knowledge

by challenging some of the prevailing assumptions about the strength of this burgeoning civil society. Looking at the debate over the role of NGOs on the international stage, the thesis asks whether the claims made for their rising dominance are not overdrawn. In a world that is seen to be undergoing a great social transformation, what kind of influence will these civil society groups wield?

## Sources

As noted earlier, there are surprisingly few direct sources on the influence of the NGO community on development policy in either Canada or Britain. Material for the following chapters has thus been culled from a variety of sources, and one of the thesis' main contributions to knowledge has been in the gathering and drawing together of these disparate strands. In England, research involved library work in Oxford, London, and Sussex; in Europe, at the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague; and in Canada, in Peterborough, Ottawa, Toronto, and Winnipeg. In many cases, NGO files and personal collections were made available, and in other instances, materials were collected at international and national development conferences. However, there are often no written records about NGO events at all, sometimes because the events and issues are too current to have been chronicled. Particular weight in the case studies, for example, is thus given to evidence garnered in interviews; in all, 110 meetings with NGO representatives, officials and academics were undertaken, mostly in 1992 and 1993.

There has also been a startling dearth of background empirical material on the development communities themselves. Therefore, most of the information provided in chapters two to five on the numbers, diversity, incomes, and activities of NGOs in Canada and Britain have been analyzed and presented in a previously unpublished form, from a variety of existing raw sources of data.<sup>28</sup> These numbers, as we shall see, are important in strengthening the argument that NGOs are indeed a growing force in British and Canadian development efforts.

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<sup>28</sup>The main sources are: OECD, *Directory of Non-Governmental Development Organisations in OECD member countries*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1990; The Charity Aid Foundation, *Charity Trends*, 15th edition, Tonbridge, Kent, 1992; ODA, "ODA Grants to NGOs 1989/90," mimeo distributed by the Joint Funding Scheme Office, ODA, East Kilbride, Glasgow, 1991; Roger East, Miles Smith, and Martin Wright (compilers and editors), *World Development Directory*, Harlow, Essex: Longman International Reference, 1990; Jane Bailey, raw data collected for NGO project, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 1990; Shirley Giles, *The Third World Directory: A Guide to Organisations Working for Third World Development*, London: Directory for Social Change Publications, 1990; CIDA, corporate memory files, 1992; and Tim Brodhead, Brent Herbert-Copley, and Anne-Marie Lambert, *Bridges of Hope? Canadian Voluntary Agencies and the Third World*, Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1989.

Another important source of information was the Department of External Affairs in Canada. For six months in 1992-93, I was fortunate to be the Norman Robertson Research Fellow in the department's policy planning division. Under a confidentiality agreement, almost complete access to departmental files and generous use of information found in them was permitted. Most of this information has never been published in any form. The reader will be aware that the level of British government information in the text is much less detailed; the 30-year rule (and a certain amount of bureaucratic unwillingness) has meant considerable difficulty in getting information about the British government's position in the various cases. However, once again, individual officials whom I interviewed have been open and generous with their time and most of any "insider information" in the text has been from them.

Other primary sources have been published and unpublished NGO, government, and UN publications, as well as general aid statistics and OECD reports. Supplemented by a growing body of secondary material on the NGO-government relationship in the North (including a dozen research essays, masters and doctoral theses), these form the foundation of the thesis. Where particular sources are used frequently in the text, a footnote explains their importance to the argument.

## CHAPTER ONE: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL MAP: THE ELEMENTS OF INFLUENCE

The introduction argued that the recent increase in research on transnational forces has spurred interest in the role and influence of groups in civil society -- including the role of NGOs. Even with this kind of enthusiastic interest, however, it is surprising that so little analytical attention has been paid to NGOs specifically as increasingly important members of the international development system. There have been few attempts to understand the influence of NGOs in a systematic fashion, and while there are plenty of useful agency-specific policy papers, surveys, and directories, little of that writing looks at the NGO community as part of a *policy-making* system.

In some ways, this neglect is hardly surprising. To understand the role and influence of a set of groups in a complex policy environment is an arduous task -- in part because the literature is *both* voluminous *and* piece-meal. However, there are a number of theoretical entry points to the problem of understanding and discussing influence. From among them, the thesis adopts a policy community approach from the field of public policy, and garners from other perspectives the additional tools needed for understanding the influence of development NGOs on development policy in particular. This chapter explains why these choices were made, elaborates the strengths and weaknesses of adopting a policy community approach, and justifies the use of ideas from other literatures. Using this theoretical collage, the chapter constructs a conceptual map of six "elements of influence" which will guide the discussion in the chapters to follow.

### ADOPTING A POLICY COMMUNITY APPROACH

How are we to analyze the influence of NGOs on policy? The dominant theoretical entry point is the corpus of pluralist writing on the role, characteristics, activities, and influence of interest groups in general. The strengths of this literature are its empirical foundations and its focus on the specific activities and characteristics of a broad range of groups interested in

changing policy. Yet as far as the thesis is concerned, the literature poses two major difficulties: one, in not dealing systematically with any given policy area, it has largely failed to come to conclusions about the relative importance of certain elements over others; we are given shopping lists of factors, applied to disparate cases, with little discussion to explain why one group was successful on one issue and not another. Two, a further weakness is in the *assumption* of influence. Much of the interest group research involves the identification of points of contact between domestic groups and policy-makers, and from that evidence, extrapolating conclusions about influence. The weakness lies in the jump from empirical observations (about the numbers of meetings and such) to conclusions about the influence of society on the state; this leap from the micro to the macro is substantial. It is not that there is insufficient research, but rather that the corpus of theory has largely not dealt coherently with the existing findings. As Whiteley and Winyard explain in their work on poverty groups in Britain, "the question of interest group effectiveness is probably the least adequately researched aspect of the study of pressure groups;"<sup>1</sup> and in Canada, as Munton complained, "the problem in the study of Canadian pressure groups lies not in the paucity of the literature, but in the poverty of its analytical approach."<sup>2</sup>

In the past decade, however, a more sophisticated analytical approach has evolved. Out of the wider pluralist literature on interest groups has come a body of work on policy communities. This approach suggests that in order to understand a particular policy outcome, one must not only examine the characteristics of both state actors and domestic groups, but also their *on-going relationships*. To do so, policy community writers have concentrated on detailed, empirical studies of *policy communities* (defined as the population of state and non-state actors interested in a particular realm of policy), and of the *policy networks* formed within them (the institutionalized relationships between those players generated around specific issues).<sup>3</sup> The primary rationale for taking up a policy community approach is that it overcomes some of the weaknesses of the interest group research by encouraging a structured, detailed, and multi-

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<sup>1</sup>Paul F. Whiteley and Stephen J. Winyard, *Pressure for the Poor: The Poverty Lobby and Policy Making*, London and New York: Methuen, 1987, (p. 111).

<sup>2</sup>Donald Munton (editor), *Groups and Governments in Canadian Foreign Policy*, proceedings of a Conference in Ottawa, 9-11 June, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982, (p. ix).

<sup>3</sup>These definitions are fairly standard, although not universally accepted in the literature. See William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad, *Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada*, Missasauga, ON: Copp Clark Pitman, 1989, (p. 25).

dimensional analysis of the many factors which may contribute to influence. Although there is much debate about the definition of the terms and the ways in which types of communities or networks ought to be classified,<sup>4</sup> there is a consistent core in the literature. The approach emphasizes the meso level (or inter-organizational level) of analysis, focusing on the relationships between governmental and non-governmental institutions in order to understand specific policy processes and outcomes. Described in the next few paragraphs, the methodology of this approach illustrates its links to other familiar theoretical sources. The discussion will show that the literature stems partly from pluralist writings on state-society relations, partly from the statist's new institutionalist project, and partly from behavioural sociology's focus on the dynamics of inter-organizational relationships.

In the early 1980s, the academic community (particularly in the US) began a revivalistic movement to "Return to the State."<sup>5</sup> Premised on a critique of the pluralist writing that dominated the 1960s and 1970s,<sup>6</sup> statist argued that the pluralists had altogether neglected the state as an independent factor in policy making.<sup>7</sup> In concentrating on the state as an identifiable body of particular officials and agencies, each with their own values and preferences, the statist revival drew from corporatist and sub-government writing to produce a set of neo-institutionalist<sup>8</sup> works, designed in part to show that the 1970s' fascination with pluralism, transnationalism, and the "demise of the state" had been, at the very least, premature. This work differed from earlier state-centered research in that it was concerned

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<sup>4</sup>See: van Waarden, "Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks;" R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, "New Directions in the Study of Policy Networks;" and Grant Jordan and Klaus Schubert, "A preliminary ordering of policy network labels," all three in the *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 21, 1992, pp. 29-52, 181-205, and 7-27 respectively. See also: R.A.W. Rhodes, "Policy Networks: A British Perspective," in *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, vol. 2, no. 3, July 1990, pp. 291-317.

<sup>5</sup>See footnote <sup>3</sup> in the introduction.

<sup>6</sup>The pluralist writings most under scrutiny have included: Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Action and the Theory of Groups*, Cambridge, MT and London: Harvard University Press, 1965; Robert A. Dahl's *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1961; and Grant McConnell's *Private Power and American Democracy*, New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.

<sup>7</sup>See: Gabriel A. Almond, "The Return to the State" in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 82, no. 3, September 1988, pp. 853-872; Eric A. Nordlinger, Theodore J. Lowi and Sergio Fabbrini, "The Return to the State: Critiques," in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 82, no. 3, September 1988, pp. 875-901, (p. 876); and Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 85, no. 1, March 1991, pp. 77-96.

<sup>8</sup>March and Olsen are generally thought to be the heralds of the renewed institutional project: James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," in the *American Political Science Review*, vol. 78, September 1984, pp. 734-749; and *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, New York: The Free Press (Macmillan), and London: Collier Macmillan, 1989.

with detailed studies of particular agencies; the state was seen not as a monolithic entity, but rather as a warren of agencies and individuals whose particular characteristics contributed to particular outcomes.<sup>9</sup>

The pluralists, who perhaps justly denied that they had "abandoned the state," launched a rebuttal which paralleled the neo-institutionalists' project.<sup>10</sup> By focusing on pressure groups as organizations with their own internal logics and dynamics, the pluralists and policy community writers were in turn borrowing from a booming behaviouralist trend in sociology. There, researchers were examining organizations as "organic units" in and of themselves, not simply as the sum of their members' preferences. This kind of structural theory argued that institutions had the capacity to *create* identities and interests for their membership.<sup>11</sup> It was thus not enough to look at the institution as a *medium* for individuals to affect the state (micro to macro level); the emphasis now was to look at how institutions *actively shaped* the values of the individuals within them; and hence the motivations and actions of both influencers and "influencees." The policy community approach, which came into use among public policy specialists in the early 1980s, grew in the light of these debates.<sup>12</sup>

The origins of the approach probably predate these battles between statist and pluralists, however. Peter Katzenstein, generally accredited with the beginnings of policy community work, argued in his 1976 study on foreign economic policies that *domestic structures* affect policy as much as does the nature of the policy itself. His conclusion was that domestic structures themselves needed to be examined in conjunction with the more familiar levels of international and state factors.<sup>13</sup> Picking up on this idea, Hugh Heclo described the concept

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<sup>9</sup>Michael M. Atkinson, "Public Policy and the New Institutionalism," in Atkinson (editor), *Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy*, Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada, 1993. For a somewhat different characterization of the development of these streams, also see: Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, "Introduction," in Powell and DiMaggio (editors), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991, (pp. 3-8).

<sup>10</sup>A critical comparison of the American neo-institutionalism and British policy community work is found in: Grant Jordan, "Policy Community Realism *versus* 'New' Institutional Ambiguity," in *Political Studies*, vol. 38, no. 3, September 1990, pp. 470-484.

<sup>11</sup>Powell and DiMaggio, "Introduction," 1991.

<sup>12</sup>Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, "Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance," in *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, vol. 5, no. 2, April 1992, pp. 154-55.

<sup>13</sup>Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," in *International Organization*, vol. 30, no. 1, Winter 1976, pp. 1-45.

of issue networks,<sup>14</sup> and Jordan and Richardson began to use to these ideas analytically as a way to organize the various kinds of relationships active in society. As we shall see below, the major contributors to the policy community corpus currently are: Paul Pross, Michael Atkinson and William Coleman in Canada; and in Britain, Wyn Grant, R.A.W. Rhodes, David Marsh, Grant Jordan and J.J. Richardson.<sup>15</sup>

#### THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE POLICY COMMUNITY APPROACH

The policy community approach is particularly useful in looking at some of the issues and institutions addressed in the thesis. As Atkinson and Coleman argue, the concepts used in the approach are "both encompassing and discriminating in describing the policy process: encompassing because they refer to actors and relationships in the policy process that take us beyond political, bureaucratic relationships; discriminating because they suggest the presence of many communities and different types of networks."<sup>16</sup> One of the approach's great strengths, therefore, is in choosing not to generalize; its emphasis lies on the dynamics among institutions within a particular policy field. Its borders thus dissuade the kind of all-purpose "type literature" that is common in the field of interest group literature; a vast, almost undifferentiated catalogue of groups involved with innumerable issues. The approach further insists that one needs to do more than chronicle events; one must understand foremost the *relationships* among institutions, over time and particular policies and debates. In order to do so, detailed empirical work is to be organized "sociologically;" a concentration on the behaviour, resources, activities, strategies, etc., of a given policy community (in the broad

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<sup>14</sup>Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in A. King (editor), *The New American Political System*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978.

<sup>15</sup>A. Paul Pross, *Group Politics and Public Policy*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986 and 1992; *Canadian Pressure Groups in the 1970s: Their Role and Their Relationship with the Public Service*, Toronto: Institute for Public Administration, 1974; (as editor), *Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics*, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975. Michael M. Atkinson (editor), *Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy*, Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada, 1993. William D. Coleman, *Business and Politics: A Study of Collective Action*, Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988. Coleman and Skogstad, *Policy Communities*, 1989. Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, "Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies," in *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 19, 1989, pp. 47-67. Wyn Grant, *Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain*, London: Philip Allan, 1989. David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes (editors), *Policy Networks in British Government*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. David Marsh, *Pressure Politics: Interest Groups in Britain*, London: Junction Books, 1983. A.G. Jordan and J.J. Richardson, *British Politics and the Policy Process--An Arena Approach*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1987; and *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson (editors), *Lobbying in the European Community*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

<sup>16</sup>Atkinson and Coleman, "Policy Networks," 1992:156.

sense) and of particular policy networks within it (the organized relationships among groups concerned with a specific issue). The thesis adopts this approach by choosing to look at two *policy communities* (the collection of officials and voluntary organizations concerned with development policy in Canada and Britain), as well as two specific *policy networks* (the organized relationships among NGOs and officials in preparation for two world conferences).

A further strength of the approach is that it concentrates on the meso level of inter-organizational relations (a neglected element in international relations theory in particular), and focuses on the participation of *both* sets of actors. It is for this reason that a chapter is devoted to both governmental and NGO actors in each country; an assessment of influence is impossible without a full picture of both sets of players. Another strength in the approach, this time a methodological one, is its emphasis on empirical, detailed, and structured studies. Much of the interest group and transnational writing has taken a piecemeal approach to the subject of influence, drawing examples from a wide range of groups and activities, with little indication of the relative importance of factors among groups or across time. Moreover, because this kind of empirical research is multi-faceted and fairly sophisticated in comparison with its pluralist predecessors, it permits a more systematic assessment of the *comparative* relevance of various factors. With this kind of comparison, the thesis hopes to arrive more easily at conclusions about NGO influence. The discussion therefore draws much from primary empirical material (interviews, reports, personal accounts, strategy papers, and the like) organized under a multi-faceted set of elements (or headings) similar to many used in policy community work. This conceptual framework made up of six elements of influence thus shapes the whole of the thesis.

In further borrowing from the policy community approach, the thesis organizes the chapters around a set of similar questions about the NGOs and bureaucracies involved. To examine the NGO policy communities (chapters three and five), the thesis adopts a set of criteria taken from work by Wyn Grant and Frans van Waarden to describe the organizations and their relationships.<sup>17</sup> Of each policy community, the thesis asks questions about its origins, its size (the numbers and incomes of NGOs in each country), its function (the diversity of its

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<sup>17</sup>van Waarden, "Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks," 1992; and Grant, *Pressure Groups*, 1989:44-5, 117.

activity), and how these have affected the role and structure of NGOs within the broader community. The thesis' goal in looking at these characteristics is to understand the role of these voluntary agencies in the making of overall development policy in both countries, and to assess their capacity for undertaking and succeeding in lobbying work. In turning to the government chapters (two and four), the thesis examines the history of aid policy in both countries (including the origins of the state institutions charged with development), and assesses the bureaucratic culture of policy-makers. Following work by Denis Stairs,<sup>18</sup> the thesis incorporates ideas about the constraints affecting decision-makers, the pressures brought to bear on the aid agencies' policies, and the ways in which agencies have interacted with NGOs and other groups. Against this general background, the case study chapters (six and seven) take a more intimate look at the process of influence in two particular instances. These chapters examine the NGO-government experience at Rome and at Rio in order to understand the extent of NGO influence on the policies generated specifically for those conferences. In this way, the thesis as a whole parallels the policy community project by beginning with a description of the *policy community* itself before assessing the particular failures and successes of two of the *policy networks* working at a given time and place within it.

Yet there are weaknesses in the policy community literature that need to be recognized and overcome if we are to come closer to understanding the influence of NGOs. The thesis addresses some of these failings directly. First, there is comparatively little work on policy communities involving voluntary groups;<sup>19</sup> most of the writing has paid disproportionate amounts of attention to economic or producer groups (including business, unions, and professional associations).<sup>20</sup> Moreover, when non-profit groups are discussed, little analytical distinction is made between these groups and economic bodies, and we have few ways of

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<sup>18</sup>Denis Stairs, "Publics and Policy-Makers: The Domestic Environment of the Foreign Policy Community," in *International Journal*, vol. 26, Winter 1970-71, pp. 221-48.

<sup>19</sup>This is also the finding of Les Pal, who is working on a similar project involving human rights NGOs and public policy in Canada, titled *The Canadian State and Human Rights NGOs: Domestic Sources and Foreign Policy Impact*. His work on minorities is one of the few examples of work on voluntary agencies: "Official Language Minorities and the State: Dual Dynamics in a Single Policy Network," in William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad (editors), *Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A Structural Approach*, Missasauga, ON: Copp Clark Pitman, 1989.

<sup>20</sup>Part of this emphasis on producer groups naturally derives from the school's corporatist background and its emphasis on labour-capital-state tripartism. For a discussion of the development of corporatist thought and corporatism, see Alan Cawson (editor), *Organized Interests and the State: Studies in Meso-Corporatism*, London: Sage, 1985.

knowing whether the models applied will be relevant to non-profit groups as well. The neglect is significant because there are differences in motives, issues, the nature and source of resources, and the groups' rationale for involvement with government. As Pross points out, specific issue-oriented groups may take up different issues and use different means to lobby than will larger, institutionalized groups.<sup>21</sup>

Second, the policy community approach does not deal specifically with the question of influence. For work on the influence of domestic groups on policy, the thesis borrows from the writing on the domestic sources of foreign policy -- a part of the Foreign Policy Analysis approach.<sup>22</sup> Discussed more fully below, the main sources in Canada have been Cranford Pratt, Denis Stairs, and Kim Richard Nossal.<sup>23</sup> In Britain, William Wallace is the greatest contributor,<sup>24</sup> but otherwise as Jordan and Richardson point out, "there is no major British contributor to theory [on pressure groups]."<sup>25</sup> The contributions of these authors will help us organize and prioritize the elements of influence discussed in the next section.

Third, as Atkinson and Coleman suggest, there has been little comparison between countries in the policy community approach. They argue that policy community research has emphasized the differences *within* a nation's system to the neglect of comparisons *between*

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<sup>21</sup>This is also the conclusion of Whiteley and Winyard, *Pressure for the Poor*, 1987, chapter five.

<sup>22</sup>For a cogent review of the Foreign Policy Analysis approach, see: Brian J.R. Stevenson, *Domestic Pressures, External Constraints and the New Internationalism: Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America, 1968-1990*, Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, Canada, July 1992, (chapter 5)

<sup>23</sup>For an overview of the Canadian literature, see: Tom Keating, "The State, the Public and the Making of Canadian Foreign Policy," in Robert J. Jackson, Doreen Jackson, and Nicolas Baxter-Moore (editors), *Contemporary Canadian Politics: Readings and Notes*, Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall, 1987. See also: Cranford Pratt, "Canadian Foreign Policy: Bias to Business," in *International Perspectives*, vol. 3, no. 6, November/December 1982, pp. 3-6; "Ethics and Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada's Development Assistance," in the *International Journal*, vol. 43, Spring 1988, pp. 264-301; "Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter Consensus," in the *International Journal*, vol. 39, Winter 1983-4, pp. 99-135; and "Canadian Policy Towards the Third World: Basis of an Explanation," in *Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review*, no. 13, September 1984, pp. 27-55. See also Kim Richard Nossal, "Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy," in the *International Journal*, vol. 39, Winter 1983-84, pp. 1-22; *Statism, Realism and Canadian Policies Towards the Third World*, University of Toronto, Development Studies Program, Working Paper no. A9, 1984; and *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall, 1989; "Allison Through the (Ottawa) Looking Glass: Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy in a Parliamentary System," in *Canadian Public Administration*, vol. 22, no. 4, Winter 1979, pp. 610-626. And also see: Denis Stairs, "Publics and Policy-makers," 1970-71; and "Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the Domestication of Canadian Foreign Policy," in *International Journal*, vol. 33, no. 1, Winter 1977-78, pp. 128-149.

<sup>24</sup>William Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977.

<sup>25</sup>Jordan and Richardson, *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain*, 1987:53.

states,<sup>26</sup> and has thus placed too little emphasis on the nation-specific factors which allow a given policy community to function.<sup>27</sup> The thesis, one of a growing number of policy community efforts to attempt an international comparison, specifically isolates some of these "nation-specific" factors affecting influence.

Fourth, the policy community research has largely neglected the internationalization of many policy areas by concentrating on the domestic dynamics of policy making. Issues that involve international agencies or agreements (such as the environment, trade, or development) are rarely explored. One of the goals of the thesis subsequently is to account for the impact of international agencies and events in the policy outcomes of the communities under study, particularly by looking at two cases set in UN fora.

The fifth and final criticism made of the policy community literature has been its inadequate explanation of change in communities; "If policy network approaches are to make a more lasting contribution to comparative public policy, they must first explain how policy networks change."<sup>28</sup> How does one account for the inclusion or exclusion of groups from a policy community? How does one take into account evolving ideas and theories about policy? -- and what about other external changes (like a turnover of administration)? It is in this light that the thesis makes the further effort of identifying forces which have accounted for change in the relationship between NGOs and governments in Canada and Britain. Indeed, one of the main arguments raised in the pages to follow is that as circumstances and capacities have evolved, so has the nature of the relationship shifted to a closer, more "insider" rapport. As parts of the development policy community thus manoeuvre into this more intimate kind of relationship, NGOs have been allowed a greater measure of influence.

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<sup>26</sup>Atkinson and Coleman, "Policy Networks," 1992:164.

<sup>27</sup>One exception is: Wyn Grant, "Models of Interest Intermediation and Policy Formation Applied to an Internationally Comparative Study of the Dairy Industry," in the *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 21, 1992, pp. 53-68.

<sup>28</sup>Atkinson and Coleman, "Policy Networks," 1992:172.

## GENERATING A CONCEPTUAL MAP

Given a policy community approach to the problem of influence, how are we to account for the influence of NGOs in these particular policy environments? This section of the chapter suggests a conceptual map which will identify the main elements (or categories) which may usefully be examined before drawing conclusions about "influence." While the headings are borrowed partly from the policy community writings, there are clearly relevant hypotheses evident in other parts of the interest group literature. In taking ideas from these works, the thesis will conclude which of these elements have been the most relevant in the determination of NGO influence.

A set of six elements roughly divides the analysis: context, content, motives, resources, tactics, and channels. The discussion suggests that we must look at each of these elements when examining any interaction before we can come to a conclusion about NGO influence. None of these overlapping categories are to be taken as distinct and separate elements; they are simply convenient ways of looking at different aspects of a more complex whole. It may also be worth noting that the thesis is not particularly novel in proposing such a list of elements (the literature is rife with lists) but it does lay claim to having laid out a comprehensive and clear set of headings to guide the building of the thesis' arguments.

**Context - Where in current and past history does the interaction take place?**

One of the acknowledged difficulties with the policy community approach has been its supposed neglect of "externalities;" factors from outside the network which affect how it functions.<sup>29</sup> In the thesis, this element includes electoral concerns (to what extent does vote-winning and election timing affect decisions?), the role of parties (do parties, either in government or opposition, markedly affect the influence of NGOs?), and other domestic and international events that may have little directly to do with the issue under debate, but may determine the comparative importance of one group or issue over another.

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<sup>29</sup>Coleman and Skogstad, *Policy Communities*, 1989:314-315; and Rhodes and Marsh, "New Directions," 1992:193-197.

Electoral timing, for example, was a big part of Barry's 1975 study. His work on Canadian NGO lobbying efforts during the 1968 Biafran war is one of the few studies concentrating on the context in which development groups have tried to influence policy.<sup>30</sup> One of his compelling arguments is that the timing of the NGO intervention was crucial; it was in an election year at a time when Parliament was looking for a politically contentious issue -- the parliamentary equivalent of a "slow news day." Another example of an important contextual factor may be the influence of partisan politics on the formulation of development policy. The thesis will argue, for instance, that the state of party politics in Britain had a significant impact on the shape of its development policy, such that the Labour-NGO affiliation would in turn affect the NGOs' ability to influence policy. Additional examples of external factors include contemporary political or economic trends: To what extent did the growth in government funding in 1970s' Canada contribute to the influence of NGOs? How did the 1973 oil crisis affect the willingness of both governments to listen to development groups? In the early 1980s, did the international debt crisis and the birth of structural adjustment conditionality affect the potential of NGOs to influence their counterpart agencies in government?

### **Content - What is the nature of the issue under debate?**

Another set of questions refers to the subject and nature of the issue under debate. In the case of the World Food Conference, for example, the debate concentrated on food aid, international coordination, and trade reform; while at UNCED, there were literally hundreds of environmental, aid, trade, and development issues on the table -- a veritable policy smorgasbord. In order to assess the relevance of a given issue, and to compare the approaches taken in either country, the thesis discusses the issue's importance in terms of both national interest (the statist debate on high vs. low policy issues), and its salience in the broader population (looking at public opinion and the media).

(a) *Low vs. High Politics.* One concern with the issues debated by NGOs and governments is the issues' proximity to perceived "national interest." Realists would argue that states are unwilling to change policies which threaten vital security or economic interests but they may

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<sup>30</sup>Barry, "Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process," 1975:117-47.

be more open to change on peripheral or "low" policy issues. Nossal's work and the writings of William Wallace, for example, argue that the potential success of an interest group's intervention depends on the nature of the issue under debate.<sup>31</sup> Nossal's description of state behaviour assumes that there are pre-determinable borders around certain decisions which indicate what policy changes might be *possible*, given the importance of the issue to national interest.<sup>32</sup> NGOs lobbying on the international debt crisis are therefore dealing with a "higher" issue than are those groups concerned with the aid administration, and are thus likely to be less influential. Rhodes and Marsh concur, arguing that "the more peripheral issues are to the government's programme and electoral fortunes and the more limited the range of interests affected, the greater the capacity of the network [of NGOs and other participants] to run its own affairs."<sup>33</sup> Breheny's stark conclusion about the NGO situation in Britain in particular is even more striking: he argues that the success of NGO lobbying is in *inverse* proportion to the importance of the issue at hand.<sup>34</sup> Gillies, in a similar vein, has argued that the key factor in decisions about development assistance has been the potential for economic gain in Canada. While he finds that NGOs have some potential influence on policy through credible and informed advocacy, the bottom line in decision-making is the relevance of the given issue to economic growth.<sup>35</sup>

A related set of questions arise from this debate if we accept that there is a growing prominence of low issues on the international agenda. Issues surrounding the environment, minorities, and communications, for example, are increasingly important in international fora/- does this make a difference to the ability of NGOs to influence policy? In some ways, one would expect so. One reason is that many issues are so new that there may not exist an established government position to defend. Where policy-makers have little evident preference for one solution over another, we can assume that NGOs may have a greater

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<sup>31</sup>Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process*, 1977:11-14.

<sup>32</sup>Nossal, "Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy," 1983-84; *Statism, Realism and Canadian Policies Towards the Third World*, 1984; and *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 1989.

<sup>33</sup>David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Policy Communities and Issue Networks: Beyond Typology," in Marsh and Rhodes (editors), *Policy Networks in British Government*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

<sup>34</sup>Breheny, *State and International Aid Charities*, 1988:384-5.

<sup>35</sup>In David Gillies, "Do Interest Groups Make a Difference? Domestic Influences on Canadian Development Aid Policies," in Irving Brecher (editor), *Human Rights, Development and Foreign Policy: Canadian Perspectives*, Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989, (p. 455).

capacity to shape policy. Another reason is that many of these issues are technical and highly complex in nature, and are the "wards" of specific departments. As Jordan and Richardson suggest, "the sectorization of policy-making and the development of policy communities may well work towards the disaggregation of all policy issues into 'low' and 'manageable' problems."<sup>36</sup> Where NGOs have an on-going relationship with these specific agencies, their capacity for influence may grow. A further critical variable determining the extent of influence, however, is the "high policy" issue of cost. Options which are easy or inexpensive to implement, all other things being equal, will be preferred to those which involve significant change or expense. As we shall see, this "economic ceiling" was a significant factor in both 1974 and 1992.

(b) *Salience*. The question of "salience," the relevance of an issue to both the broader public and to government, is another important factor. It includes assumptions about public opinion (that issues which rate highly in polls will engender more rapid policy change), about the role of NGOs (that NGOs themselves raise or create issue salience), and about media involvement (that media support of an issue will make it more difficult to ignore). Public opinion in Canada, for example, is seen to have become an increasing force in overall government decision-making, but it is not always clear how NGOs affect and are affected by that public force.<sup>37</sup> Stairs has written that the influence of the public has been significant; sometimes spurred by specific groups, the public has been able to set the agenda and parameters of decision-making.<sup>38</sup> Breyman, in recent work on environmental NGOs for example, agrees that their most potent role has been in this agenda-setting capacity.<sup>39</sup> In Britain, as we shall see, there has been much less official attention paid to opinion polls; indeed, there have been remarkably few polls on foreign policy at all (let alone development policy). One of the

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<sup>36</sup>Jordan and Richardson, *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain*, 1987:161. This same point is emphasized by Mazey and Richardson in looking at lobbying in the EC: Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, "Introduction: Transference of Power, Decision Rules, and Rules of the Game," in Mazey and Richardson (editors), *Lobbying in the European Community*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, (p. 18).

<sup>37</sup>Thomas Keating, *Exploring Public Attitudes on Foreign Policy Issues: The Erosion of the Foreign Policy Consensus*, paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, 8 June 1983, Vancouver, BC. Stairs, "Public Opinion and External Affairs," 1977-78:128-149.

<sup>38</sup>Denis Stairs, "Publics and Policy-Makers: The Domestic Environment of the Foreign Policy Community," in *International Journal*, vol. 26, Winter 1970-71, pp. 221-48.

<sup>39</sup>Steve Breyman, "Knowledge as Power: Ecology Movements and Global Environmental Problems," in Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Ken Conca (editors), *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, (p. 138).

questions arising out of this neglect then asks whether the foreign-policy making system in the UK is indeed more closed to public intervention than the Canadian.<sup>40</sup> It would follow that this impermeability would curtail NGOs' access to and influence over the process.

The media, while acknowledged to be an important element in the making of public opinion, has also been little examined in its role in influencing development policy. Certainly, there is a general literature: Grant identifies six distinct uses made of the media by pressure groups -- for visibility, information, climate, reactive response, influence and content.<sup>41</sup> Yet studies specific to development issues are rare: Walker's and Schroeder's reviews of Canadian news coverage of North-South issues are only surveys;<sup>42</sup> the BandAid phenomenon in 1984-5 was widely discussed but little serious academic attention has been addressed to the event.<sup>43</sup> The thesis points to ways in which public opinion and the media have been wound up in the lobbying efforts of NGOs, and asks to what extent the NGOs' own salience-raising efforts contribute to their success on policy issues.

### **Motives - Why do NGOs and officials engage in these interactions?**

Another range of questions focuses on the reasons why NGOs approach government (and sometimes, on the reasons why governments approach NGOs). There are three broad aspects to an explanation for increased NGO-government interaction: one, that each *needs* the other; two, that the force of events has compelled the one into the other's company; and three, that there are localized, pragmatic and "secular" reasons for closer collaboration.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Zara Steiner, "Decision-making in American and British Foreign Policy: An Open and Shut Case," in *Review of International Studies*, no. 13, 1987, pp. 1-18.

<sup>41</sup>Grant, *Pressure Groups*, 1989:81-85.

<sup>42</sup>John Walker, *Third World News Coverage: A Survey of Leading Canadian Dailies*, Ottawa: North-South Institute, September 1989. Dennis Schroeder, *A Survey of Coverage of Third World Affairs in Canadian Newspapers and Magazines*, Ottawa: CCIC, 1977.

<sup>43</sup>For an example of the coverage, see: "Band Aid's Bandwagon," in *The Economist Development Report*, February 1986, pp. 1-3; and Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, "People Aid: A New Politics Sweeps the Land," in *Marxism Today*, July 1986, pp. 10-14.

<sup>44</sup>Useful texts are: Jeffrey M. Berry, *Lobbying for the People: The Political Behavior of Public Interest Groups*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977; and R. M. Kramer, *Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. The key theoretical works on the economic and political rationales for the voluntary sector are: Burton Weisbrod, *The Voluntary Nonprofit Sector*, Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1977; and "Towards a Theory of the Non-Profit Sector," in Edmund S. Phelps (editor), *Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory*, New York, NY: Russel Sage Foundation, 1975; as well as: James Douglas, *Why Charity?*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983.

(a) *Structural, Mutual Need for One Another.* There are two main bodies of theory in the literature on voluntary organizations which explain why governments and agencies of the "third sector" are involved in a symbiotic relationship. Exchange theory suggests that there are needs in society that cannot effectively or adequately be met by government or the private sector<sup>45</sup> -- in this case, the need for cost-effective and responsive development assistance. James Douglas argues that the existence of the third sector thus arises from the twin failures of government and the private sector to meet all the social goals of its citizens.<sup>46</sup> On a more structural level, a second explanation suggests that states need NGOs because of an overall decline of the welfare state system. As the Keynesian state becomes unable to manage the vast number of tasks it has acquired, theorists argue that it has been forced to "devolve" some of its activities onto the private sector -- including voluntary organizations.<sup>47</sup>

(b) *New Issues and Movements.* Other factors are also involved in motivating NGOs and states to associate, however. The growing literature on social movements noted in the introduction has argued that the increasing complexity of the modern world has rendered traditional forms and institutions of politics largely irrelevant to the concerns of its citizens.<sup>48</sup> In the search for change outside traditional political systems, grassroots movements have blossomed throughout the world, and have included a growing population of groups concerned with development. Particularly relevant to the thesis, Southern NGOs have thus begun to place pressure on their Northern counterparts to take up new issues and new campaigns. As

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<sup>45</sup>See, for example, overview articles in: Walter Powell (editor), *The NonProfit Sector: A Research Handbook*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987. Relevant articles include: Henry Hansmann, "Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization," pp. 27-42; James Douglas, "Political Theories of Nonprofit Organization," pp. 43-54; and Lester M. Salamon, "Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations," pp. 99-117.

<sup>46</sup>Douglas, *Why Charity?*, 1983.

<sup>47</sup>See Johan P. Olsen, *Organized Democracy: Political Institutions in a Welfare State, The Case of Norway*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983. For an example of this debate in Britain, see: Alan Ware (editor), *Charities and Government*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1989.

<sup>48</sup>Jurgen Habermas, "New Social Movements," in *Telos*, no. 49, Fall 1981, pp. 33-37. Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," in *Social Research*, vol. 52, no. 4, Winter 1985, pp. 817-868. Carl Boggs, *Social Movements and Political Power: Emerging Forms of Radicalism in the West*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. Richard Falk, "The Global Promise of Social Movements: Explorations at the Edge of Time," in *Alternatives*, vol. 12, no. 2, April 1987, pp. 173-196. R.B.J. Walker, *One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, London: Zed Books, 1988. Ronnie D. Lipshutz and Ken Conca (editors), *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press. Among these works, James Rosenau provides the most articulate link from the social movement literature into international relations. See his *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*, New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990; and "A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading interdependence," in *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 3, September 1984, pp. 245-305.

we will see, it is partly under these forces that Canadian and British NGOs have been compelled to take up lobbying work with their own governments.

(c) *Pragmatism*. Of course, there are also a number of more secular and local reasons why NGOs lobby governments and why governments consult with NGOs. Jordan and Richardson outline some of the governments' pragmatic motives: attempts to pre-empt conflict with non-governmental groups, a need for their expertise by the bureaucracy, an anticipation of need for those groups during later implementation of projects, a cultural bias to consensus, and an acceptance that participation is, of itself, a "good thing."<sup>49</sup> On the motivations from the voluntary side, Jorgen Lissner argued in his 1977 *Politics of Altruism*<sup>50</sup> that NGOs may choose to engage in lobbying as part of an income maximizing rationale. He suggests that their choice to take up advocacy work thus depends on the possible risk to their funding sources. In Brian Smith's 1990 *More than Altruism*<sup>51</sup> (a comparison of the relationships between American, Canadian, and European NGOs and their governments), he argues that choices about advocacy work depend on the desire of both sides to maintain the stability of their relationship.

Drawing from these and other works, the thesis suggests that there is a complicated constellation of motives for interaction on either side. For NGOs, the force of ethical arguments, experience, and peer pressure has *compelled* some agencies to undertake lobbying. On the official side, there is a broad range of roles that NGOs play in/for government that make them needed parts of the process: they complement government services, undertake contracting work on its behalf, administer and coordinate parts of the aid program, act as ally in public and interdepartmental disputes, help to circumvent difficult political problems overseas, and advise on policy. Furthermore, in Canada where the relationship has many more points of contact than in Britain, this menu of roles has meant Canadian NGOs have had a greater capacity to influence policy.

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<sup>49</sup>Jordan and Richardson, *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain*, 1987:93-94.

<sup>50</sup>Jorgen Lissner, *The Politics of Altruism: A Study of the Political Behaviour of Voluntary Development Agencies*, Geneva: Lutheran World Federation, February 1977.

<sup>51</sup>Brian Smith, *More than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.

## Resources - What kind of resources are needed for NGOs to engage in influence work?

A further set of elements involves the resources wielded by NGOs and official agencies. As the discussion illustrates, NGOs' perceived monopoly on certain kinds of information and skills has allowed them greater access both to funding and to the decision-making process itself.

(a) *Funding.* Because NGOs are almost entirely reliant on private donations and government funding, the choice to engage in policy work has become a complicated calculation. In justifying their activities to both private and government donors, NGOs may find their lobbying work circumscribed, either because there are legal and other restrictions on the use of government funds, or because private donors have indicated preferences for "on-the-ground" versus policy work. Indeed, Breheny's contention is that the state's control over much of NGO income (by way of direct funding and indirect tax relief) has meant that the state can shape NGO behaviour to a much more significant level than NGOs may be able to influence the state. The thesis questions, however, whether funding dependency is *as* important to assessing NGOs' influence as Breheny and others propose. Even where the funding situation is significantly different (as in Britain and Canada during UNCED), there seems to be little to suggest that funding conditionality on the private or government front was the *primary* factor in determining the capacity or willingness of a given group to engage in policy work.

(b) *Expertise and Credibility.* Other questions centre on the less tangible resources belonging to NGOs: their expertise and credibility. If we accept that this specialized expertise has become one of the key trading goods in NGOs' relationship with government, we must ask how that may affect their ability to influence policy. One set of factors has to do with changes in the kinds of knowledge needed by government.<sup>52</sup> A growing literature on epistemic communities (the population of academics and specialists within particular knowledge areas) suggests that the modern state apparatus increasingly relies on knowledge

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<sup>52</sup>Rhodes and Marsh, "New Directions," 1992:193.

and advice from outside its corridors.<sup>53</sup> As the thesis illustrates, just as academic writing on climate change and pollution spurred the environmental movement, changes in our ideas about development have affected the policy role of NGOs.

(c) *Skills and Experience*. It also seems reasonable to argue that those NGOs with the skills to engage in lobbying, as well as the experience in dealing with government, are likely to be more influential than those which do not share these attributes. Part of NGO success has been knowing how to play the insider game -- in phrasing demands in a "reasonable" fashion and dovetailing suggestions into the existing decision-making structures. As Jordan and Richardson explain, this process of earning legitimacy involves acceptance by government departments that the group is making "reasonable" demands which deserve attention; "The repeated refrain is *credibility*. To pass the 'gate-keepers' certain conditions pertain: in one phrase from a lobbyist, 'No hippies.'"<sup>54</sup> The thesis goes on to argue that direct influence on policy-making has most often (but not always) come in this incremental, insider manner.

### **Tactics - How do NGOs attempt to influence officials?**

It follows that lobbying efforts carried out *within* an insider relationship, combined with a drawn-out decision-making period, are further critical aspects of a successful effort at influence. This hypothesis comes primarily from the work of Grant on insider/outsider status and from Stairs' writing on the stages of the decision-making process.

(a) *Insider/Outsider*. Grant's typology divides the corpus of pressure groups into insider and outsider camps, and argues that the *tactics* pursued by groups depend very much on their *relationship* to government. Ideological outsider groups like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, for example, would have different strategies available to them than would high profile insider groups like the Confederation of British Industry.<sup>55</sup> Outsider groups are far more likely to stage public demonstrations, write letters to newspapers, lobby

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<sup>53</sup>See the Winter 1992 issue of *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 1, for a current account of the debate, including a particularly interesting study of changes in the international food aid regime: Raymond F. Hopkins, "Reform in the International Food Aid Regime: The Role of Consensual Knowledge," pp. 225-264.

<sup>54</sup>Jordan and Richardson, *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain*, 1987:29, 40.

<sup>55</sup>See pages 15-21 and chapters three and four of: Grant, *Pressure Groups*, 1989.

parliamentarians, and release provocative critiques of government policy; all in efforts to raise the salience of an issue and shape the policy environment in which particular decisions are made. Insider groups, conversely, are more likely to hold regular meetings with officials, be involved in roundtable discussions, be consulted early on in a policy process, and work out their differences with officials behind closed doors. It is noteworthy that Grant makes a distinction between sectional (or economic) groups and cause (or non-profit) organizations, arguing that non-profit groups are far more often "on the outside looking in," rather than sitting at the table alongside sectional groups. Grant suggests that this insider/outsider status need not necessarily be permanent, however; changes in status may be achieved through changing tactics, a shift in government, the rising salience of a particular issue, or other factors. This metamorphosis is evident in the following chapters. In comparing the situation in 1974 to the events of 1992, the thesis argues that NGOs both in Canada and in Britain (to a lesser extent) are indeed altering their tactics. This new consensual approach (though controversial) has evolved precisely so that agencies may gain access to the insider route and, subsequently, to greater influence over policy.

(b) *Timing/Stage in the Decision-Making Process.* A related factor is the timing of NGO intervention in the policy process; noting, of course, that insiders are more able to gain a foothold earlier on in the game than are outsiders. Stairs in particular has stressed that the *stage* of policy-making is another critical factor in determining what kind of strategies for lobbying are appropriate. His oft-quoted 1977-78 article points to four stages in particular: agenda setting (in the public arena and more formally, in government), policy setting, detail setting, and implementation.<sup>56</sup> His analysis suggests that the capacity of a given group to influence policy depends in part on the stage of the policy decision within the overall process, arguing that groups are more likely to be influential if they are able to shape the agenda at the outset. There is broad agreement in the literature on Stairs' assessment,<sup>57</sup> but some question

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<sup>56</sup>Stairs, "Public Opinion and External Affairs," 1977-78:128-149. Stairs' approach is not unusual, of course, although he was the first to apply this stage-setting to foreign policy work in Canada. For a modern version of this kind of approach, see: John M. Bryson and Barbara C. Crosby, *Leadership for the Common Good: Tackling Public Problems in a Shared-Power World*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1992.

<sup>57</sup>W.T. Stanbury, "Lobbying and Interest Group Representation in the Legislative Process," in William A.W. Neilson and James C. MacPherson (editors), *The Legislative Process in Canada*, Institute for Research on Public Policy, Toronto: Butterworth, 1978, (p. 185); and Fred Thompson and W.T. Stanbury, *The Political Economy of Interest Groups in the Legislative Process in Canada*, Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1979, chapter 5. See also: Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 1989; and Grant, *Pressure Groups*, 1989:49.

why NGOs (as in the case of the World Food Conference described here) have often rallied at the latest possible moment in the decision-making process. One hypothesis is that access to the earlier stages, the informal network of officials that initially generate proposals, is simply not open to voluntary groups. As the thesis demonstrates in the case of UNCED, when NGOs are introduced earlier and "on the ground floor," their influence increases significantly.

**Channels - What kinds of institutions and precedent exist for NGO-government interaction?**

The thesis also asks about the existence of formal, institutionalized channels between NGOs and their official counterparts. Adopting an argument which suggests that institutions shape the issues and memberships within, the thesis demonstrates that the presence of institutionalized routes of access into the policy-making process (committees, standard operating procedures, and working groups) allows NGOs greater influence on policy-making.

(a) *Access and Precedent.* It is perhaps self-evident that groups which are closer to government agencies will be more likely to be involved in policy-making. The thesis assumes that without legitimate, on-going communication with officials in charge of decision-making, any group will be less likely to influence decisions. In the Canadian case, where there has been a long history of interaction between NGOs and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), we will see that voluntary organizations had a more prominent role in determining Canada's position at UNCED. In Britain, where the history of interaction has been more sparse, the success of the British NGO contingent in Rio depended far more on the personal skills of their members.

(b) *Institutional Relevance.* In the policy community vein, the thesis acknowledges that the state is not a monolith. One must have contact with the *appropriate* officials and agencies. In the development policy field, there are a number of specific departments and institutions charged with policy making, each hierarchically ranked within government, such that NGOs with a "channel" to one part of the state apparatus may have little access to players in a different part of the system. As we will see, the status of CIDA and the ODA have had significant effect on the potential of NGOs to influence certain policies rather than others.

One also needs to account for changes in the policy-making process itself, and how these may affect the channels of influence available for NGOs. One prominent concern is whether Parliament has declined in importance in the policy-making system, and if so, why interest groups have nevertheless chosen to approach Parliament with their lobbying campaigns.<sup>58</sup> According to some, interest groups in Canada are increasingly turning towards Parliament in the 1980s because of its renewed relevance.<sup>59</sup> Pross, for example, argues that a diffusion of power in the Canadian system has removed a measure of decision-making from the bureaucracy, and in doing so, has made government agencies more reliant on interest groups and Parliament.<sup>60</sup> In Britain, on the other hand, Jordan and Richardson suggest that the NGO focus on Parliament does not infer the relevance of Westminster, but rather the lack of access to other governmental bodies. Parliament is thus "perhaps particularly important for environmental, social issue, and other cause groups" *precisely because* they are "without good connections to Whitehall and the Civil Service."<sup>61</sup> Nevertheless, following Pross's argument about the diffusion of power, they suggest that attention to the British Parliament may not be misplaced, especially for cause groups with few other bureaucratic points of access. Parliament remains a legitimating institution, and as in Canada, there may be a slight resurgence in its policy roles.<sup>62</sup>

#### FOLLOWING THE MAP

While somewhat cumbersome, this "conceptual map" has been aimed at helping us to understand when, and under what kinds of circumstances, NGOs have influenced policy-making. The problem with producing yet another list of "elements," however, is that there is no inherent mechanism to categorize or prioritize their importance; evidently, the more

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<sup>58</sup>In Canada, there is a significant literature on the role of Parliament in policy-making: David Taras, *Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy*, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985; A. Paul Pross, "Parliamentary Influence and the Diffusion of Power," in *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 18, June 1985, pp. 235-266; and Stanbury and Thompson, *The Political Economy of Interest Groups*, 1979. In Britain, the literature includes: Marsh, *Pressure Politics*, 1983; chapter 5 of Grant, *Pressure Groups*, 1979; and Charles Carstairs and Richard Ware (editors), *Parliament and International Relations*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991.

<sup>59</sup>Gillies, "Do Interest Groups Make a Difference?," 1989:437. Interview with Bob Miller, Deputy Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa, 5 October 1992.

<sup>60</sup>Pross, "Parliamentary Influence and the Diffusion of Power," 1985.

<sup>61</sup>Jordan and Richardson, *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain*, 1987:252.

<sup>62</sup>Jordan and Richardson, *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain*, 1987:286.

interesting part of such an exercise. Therefore, at the end of each part of the thesis, a concluding section raises issues under each of these elements of influence, and in the final chapter, an overall assessment of the influence of NGOs is suggested. The goal of this chapter will have been met if the reader is able to follow the organization of the chapters and the rationale for their conclusions, and can easily pull from those discussions the more important elements of influence. In each broad policy community discussed, and in both policy network studies, the approach adopted here ought to allow us to draw strong conclusions about the role and influence of NGOs in Canadian and British development policy.

## CHAPTER TWO: CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Canadian development policy has undergone a series of profound changes in the forty years of its existence. The first part of this chapter examines the broad forces involved in those changes, including the role of non-governmental organizations. The main argument is that NGOs have become an important part of Canada's development program because they are *needed* to implement, administer and advise on aid projects, legitimize the official aid program to the public, and support CIDA's policy agenda within government. These roles have assured NGOs a place in Canada's aid machine. However, this place has not guaranteed NGOs influence over policy; there are substantial limits inherent in the decision-making structure for development policy. This chapter argues that CIDA's institutional ranking is too low to allow NGOs much influence over issues which fall outside the agency's jurisdiction; that Canada's pre-occupation with deficit reduction has put an immovable cap on oda expenditure; that the political predilections of the governing party allow only limited policy movement; and that aid as an issue has always been susceptible to multiple foreign policy goals. NGOs advocating changes in policy have been constrained by these very real limits on their influence.

This chapter is closely tied to the one which follows. While the discussion here focuses on aspects of the NGO-government relationship from the official standpoint, the following chapter examines the relationship from the non-governmental point of view. In the conclusion to these two Canadian chapters, the thesis offers an assessment of NGOs' history of advocacy work in Canada before going on to look at the different sets of circumstances and groups involved in Britain.

### A HISTORY OF CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY

This first section thus begins by looking at the history of Canada's development program. Divided into four chronological blocks, the discussion touches on the broad international

forces working on aid policy, as well as the domestic issues affecting the government of the day. The main themes suggest that aid has had a long history of positive support in Canada and that CIDA has benefitted from this goodwill. However, as other issues have crowded the agenda and as CIDA has become ensconced in interdepartmental debates, its influence over development policy-making has been circumscribed.

### The Colombo Years, 1950-1968

Canada's post-1945 foreign policy was in a state of flux as the nation looked for a role in the new world order. Entwined in the United Nations, NATO, and North America's dominance on the world stage, Canadian foreign policy took on a multilateralist and internationalist tone that was to characterize policy for many decades. Aid became an important element of this new policy, particularly under the eye of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (and later Prime Minister), Lester Pearson. His brand of "Pearsonian Internationalism" and his vision of Canada as a mediating middle power enshrined oda<sup>1</sup> as a permanent part of Canadian foreign policy.

Officially, Canada's introduction to international development cooperation came in 1950 with the Colombo Plan to assist South and Southeast Asia.<sup>2</sup> Involving Britain, Canada, and other Northern countries, the Colombo Plan had been devised in response to the poverty of the region and to the perceived threat of Chinese communism to Korea and Indochina.<sup>3</sup> Colombo was to deliver technical assistance, food aid, and some economic assistance,<sup>4</sup> based on the assumption that the creation of a carry-over period was sufficient to get the region to its feet. Markets were to be built, industry established, and communism deterred; and all of

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<sup>1</sup>The OECD definition of oda covers official funds administered for the prime purpose of promoting the economic development and welfare of developing countries, designed as concessional in character, and containing a grant element of at least 25%.

<sup>2</sup>For a closer look at Canada's involvement with the Colombo Plan, see David R. Morrison, "The Geopolitics of Canadian Bilateral Aid 1950-1990," paper prepared for the Annual Conference of the Canadian Association for the Study of International Development, Queen's University, 3-5 June 1991, (pp. 3-8).

<sup>3</sup>Keith Spicer, *A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966, (p. 95). See also the Report by the Commonwealth Consultative Committee, *The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia*, London, September-October 1950, (p. 43).

<sup>4</sup>Capital grants formed 48% of Colombo Plan disbursements in the early years; industrial commodities and food aid, some 45%; and technical assistance accounted for 3.4%, (Irving Brecher, "Canada's Foreign Economic Aid," in *The Canadian Banker*, vol. 69, no. 4, Winter 1962, p. 41).

this was to be accomplished as quickly as possible, just as the Marshall Plan had succeeded in doing in Europe. After ten years of insufficient change in the region, however, disillusionment with the Colombo Plan set in. The UN declared its first development decade, and countries throughout the North began to expand their aid programs in other ways. In Canada, the aid program grew with the addition of programs to the Caribbean in 1958, the African Commonwealth in 1960, Francophone Africa in 1961, and Latin America in 1964.

Administratively, this expanding responsibility placed an increasingly heavy burden on the bureaucratic machinery put in place to deal with Colombo. The first administrative system had been an ad hoc deal, in tune with the perceived temporary nature of the development problem, and was the shared responsibility of three powerful central Ministries. The Department of External Affairs (EA) was its political sponsor, the Department of Trade and Commerce was in charge of its daily administration, and the Department of Finance controlled its budget.<sup>5</sup> By 1960, this tripartite apparatus had become unwieldy.<sup>6</sup> Coinciding with the beginning of the first development decade in 1960, the government set up the new External Aid Office (EAO) under Herbert Moran's directorship. For the next eight years, the EAO expanded the number of programs and the volume of spending devoted to Canadian aid: in its first five years of life, it allocated more than the Canadian Colombo Plan programs had in the previous ten.<sup>7</sup> The new centrally controlled bureaucracy was meant to corral all aid administration within one office, although it continued under the supervision of the other departments -- the External Aid Board, which determined policy for the new office, continued to hold representation from Trade and Commerce, EA, Finance and the Bank of Canada. Aid, though still under the influence of many wings of government, had become a permanent and more important part of foreign policy.

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<sup>5</sup>Spicer, *A Samaritan State?*, 1966:105-6.

<sup>6</sup>The Interdepartmental Group on Capital Assistance and the Interdepartmental Group on Technical Assistance later developed into an agency under Trade and Commerce; the International Economic and Technical Co-operation Division. The agency was elevated to branch level in 1957, and renamed the Economic and Technical Assistance Branch, although it remained essentially the same organization, was run by the same small staff (only 16 in 1957, according to Spicer in *A Samaritan State?*, 1966:98), and organized under the same interdepartmental system, (p. 11 in Thomas Bruneau et al, *C.I.D.A.: The Organization of Canadian Overseas Assistance*, McGill: Centre for Developing Area Studies, 1978).

<sup>7</sup>Canadian oda from 1950-1959 totalled in the region of US\$367 million; from 1960-1965, the amount was US\$408 million, (OECD DAC sources).

The activity of NGOs working overseas during this period was also expanding. In 1964, the EAO helped fund the highly successful voluntary agency, CUSO (Canadian University Services Overseas); and three years later, set up CESO (Canadian Executive Service Overseas) as a parallel executive volunteer organization. Other NGOs were also being established in response to the growing demands in developing countries, and many had established projects and volunteers overseas. The experience of the Suez crisis in 1956, the Cuban revolution, growing concern with apartheid in South Africa, American intervention in Southeast Asia, and the Biafran civil war all contributed to a rise of interest and social activism in Canada.<sup>8</sup> As the first volunteers from CUSO and SUCO (its Québécois equivalent, *Service universitaire canadienne à l'outremer*) returned in large numbers to Canada, that awareness took on a greater immediacy and the beginnings of a formal aid lobby in Canada took shape.

### The Early Trudeau Years, 1968-1977

For those interested in Canada's North-South agenda, the influence of new Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was significant. Like Pearson in his internationalist stature, Trudeau had a well-developed philosophy concerning Canada's role within the community of states -- Canada should mediate, intervene, and become an "honest broker" between North and South. Unlike Pearson, however, Trudeau was more immediately concerned with Canada's political and economic well-being within that international community. His was a harder-nosed internationalism, and his influence on the development of Canada's aid policy was substantial.

Trudeau's 1970 White Paper, *International Development: Foreign Policy for Canadians*,<sup>9</sup> was one of the first signs of change. As it came to be known, the Trudeau Doctrine represented a step away from Pearsonian internationalism and his view of Canada as "boy scout of the world."<sup>10</sup> The new policy placed a priority on Canadian economic interests, including the

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<sup>8</sup>Brian K. Murphy, "Canadian NGOs and the Politics of Participation," in Jamie Swift and Brian Tomlinson (editors), *Conflicts of Interest: Canada and the Third World*, Toronto: Between the Lines, 1991, (p. 170); and Donald Barry, "Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: The Case of Biafra," in Paul Pross (editor), *Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics*, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975.

<sup>9</sup>Canada, *International Development: Foreign Policy for Canadians*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970.

<sup>10</sup>Real P. Lavergne, "Determinants of Canadian Aid Policy," in Olav Stokke (editor), *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden*, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1989, (p. 44).

long-term cultivation of markets and good will in the South -- provided, of course, that Canadian interests were not jeopardized. It is important that the change also came at a time when development practice was going through substantial scrutiny. The world in 1968 was a different place than in 1950 when the Colombo Plan had first taken root: the UN's first development decade was being assessed as a failure, Canadian foreign aid was heavily criticized, and a rethinking of the modernization paradigm was being attempted. In line with these trends and after urging by the EAO's last director, Maurice Strong, the new Prime Minister remade the EAO into CIDA in 1968. Strong was responsible for the establishment of new programs designed to lessen the bilateral (government to government) aspect of aid in favour of multilateral programs (in tune with Trudeau's multilateralist philosophy) and in favour of the private sector. The Non-Governmental Organizations Program and the Business and Industry Program were set up in CIDA, and the International Development and Research Centre, an independent Crown corporation, was also founded. Gradually, the emphasis of CIDA projects moved away from the Colombo Plan priorities in Asia to reflect other Canadian issues: Québec's interest in Francophone Africa,<sup>11</sup> Canada's tightening relationship with its allies, the availability of more efficient multilateral channels, and CIDA's increasing professionalization.<sup>12</sup>

The new agency was specifically designed to implement a larger vision of development, one that went beyond the simple distribution of material aid. In order to reach this goal, Strong pushed for a tremendous expansion of the agency's staff and budget, and under Trudeau's patronage, the agency expanded far more rapidly than other departments within the government: CIDA's 1971-72 budget alone expanded Canada's oda from 0.29% to 0.41% of GNP. By the end of Trudeau's period in office, CIDA's budget was among the highest in the federal government, and its expenditures were over three times those of the Department of External Affairs, its institutional parent. By the mid-1970s, the bureaucracy had grown from

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<sup>11</sup>Federal-Québécois politics were especially volatile during the early 1970s. Lyon writes that, "Canadian assistance to Francophone West and Central Africa was intended to counter de Gaulle's campaign, aided and abetted by a number of Québec politicians and officials, to gain international status for that province," (p. xli in Peyton V. Lyon, "Introduction," in Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael (editors), *Canada and the Third World*, Toronto: Macmillan, 1976).

<sup>12</sup>Keith Spicer, "Clubmanship Upstaged: Canada's Twenty Years in the Colombo Plan," in the *International Journal*, vol. 25, Winter 1969/70, pp. 23-33, (p. 24).

its 1950s staffing level of under 20 employees to reach a level of 980 staff and 1,988 contract workers.<sup>13</sup>

The evolution of Canadian policy towards the South in the early part of the 1970s was further shaped by a series of economic events which crystallized in 1973. The OPEC oil crisis was the pivotal point, not only in underlining the North's apparent vulnerability to the South, but also in bringing into sharper focus the uncertain state of the international economy. The rising cost of Northern manufactures and the unstable price of Southern commodities were detrimentally affecting the balance of payments of Southern economies. High interest rates, rising protectionism, unstable exchange rates, and widespread famines (the catalyst for the 1974 World Food Conference) further contributed to the worsening situation.<sup>14</sup> Canada acknowledged these difficulties and, in line with Trudeau's vision of the country as an international broker, became involved in the NIEO (New International Economic Order) negotiations initiated by the non-aligned Group of 77 developing nations at the UN (G77). Taking strength from the successful OPEC example, the G77 looked toward establishing a radical new international order that would, among other measures, stabilize the prices of their exports, reduce Northern protectionism, and control the prices of needed imports. Canada was officially sympathetic to these demands, in part because the early 1970s were a time when Canadian links with the Commonwealth and *la Francophonie* were being strengthened -- and the NIEO remained an integral part of its foreign policy statements until the end of the decade.<sup>15</sup>

This mood of accommodation towards the South was also characteristic of CIDA's overall policy review in the early 1970s. Maurice Strong's successor as CIDA's president was Paul Gérin-Lajoie (1970-1977), a flamboyant character concerned with expanding the agency's budget and changing policy away from an exclusive concentration on science and technology

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<sup>13</sup>Robert Carty and Virginia Smith, *Perpetuating Poverty: The Political Economy of Canadian Foreign Aid*, Toronto: Between the Lines Press, 1981, (p. 31).

<sup>14</sup>John O'Manique, "The Global Political Economy and International Development," in Brian Tomlin and Maureen Molot (editors), *Canada Among Nations: A Time of Transition/1984*, Toronto: James Lorimer, 1985, (p. 114).

<sup>15</sup>The NIEO debate eventually foundered at the disappointing Conference on International Economic Cooperation which Canada co-chaired in Paris in 1977, (p. 40 in North-South Institute, *In the Canadian Interest? Third World Development in the 1980s*, Ottawa, 1980).

to reflect more "social development" concerns.<sup>16</sup> The new approach was to compensate for previous failures in international aid programs by focusing on rural development, agriculture, and primary health care,<sup>17</sup> and was enshrined in the White Paper, *Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980*.<sup>18</sup> However, it is important to note that this shift to a "basic human needs" emphasis, even though it was very much in vogue among Northern donors at the time, was not a smooth one. The *Strategy* was the hard-won outcome of fierce departmental conflict between CIDA and Trade and Commerce over both the untying of aid<sup>19</sup> and the program's emphasis on the poorest countries. Furthermore, the *Strategy's* proposals for significant change alarmed some within the CIDA bureaucracy (a notoriously risk-averse group)<sup>20</sup> as well as the entrenched interests of the Department of Trade and Industry and External Affairs. Moreover, Gérin-Lajoie's term in office was also a time of organizational turmoil; internal and external issues rocked the agency and influenced the kinds of programs and policy produced within it.<sup>21</sup> Public criticism was directed at the quality, priorities and effectiveness of oda,<sup>22</sup> and the agency repeatedly went under parliamentary review. In the end, however, it was probably Gérin-Lajoie's notorious reputation that accelerated the demise of the *Strategy*. There had been accusations from the opposition that Gérin-Lajoie ran a fiefdom,<sup>23</sup> and hard-nosed elements in EA considered him "woolly-minded and careless about finances."<sup>24</sup> Moreover, the *Strategy* immediately preceded the recession of the mid-1970s, and oda allocations subsequently fell from their

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<sup>16</sup>Gérin-Lajoie, in John Saywell (editor), *Canadian Annual Review for 1971*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971, (p. 280).

<sup>17</sup>For a review of Canada's treatment of the "basic human needs" approach, see Jeffrey S. Steeves, "The Canadian International Development Agency, The Policy Process and the Third World, 1968-1979," paper prepared for the Workshop on Development Policy, Centre for Development Projects, Dalhousie University, March 1980. For a view of the history of BHN as an idea within the international development community, see J. Stephen Hoadley, "The Rise and Fall of the Basic Needs Approach," in *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 16, 1981, pp. 149-164.

<sup>18</sup>Canada, CIDA, *Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980*, Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974.

<sup>19</sup>Cranford Pratt, "Ethics and Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada's Development Assistance," in the *International Journal*, Spring 1988, vol. 43, pp. 264-301, (p. 276).

<sup>20</sup>North-South Institute, *In the Canadian Interest?*, 1980:54.

<sup>21</sup>Saywell, *Canadian Annual Review*, various years; and David Morrison, *Canadian Development Assistance 1950-1990*, forthcoming study commissioned by the North-South Institute, Ottawa.

<sup>22</sup>Martin Rudner, "The Evolving Framework of Canadian Development Assistance Policy," in Brian Tomlin and Maureen Molot (editors), *Canada Among Nations: A Time of Transition/1984*, Toronto: James Lorimer, 1985, (p. 128).

<sup>23</sup>Saywell, *Canadian Annual Review*, 1975:261.

<sup>24</sup>Carty and Smith, *Perpetuating Poverty*, 1981:34.

all-time peak of 0.54% of GNP in 1975 to 0.42% in 1980. CIDA was "seen as having overplayed its hand and was quickly thereafter brought to heel."<sup>25</sup> In 1977, bracketed by media and parliamentary turmoil, Gérin-Lajoie was replaced by Michel Dupuy, a career bureaucrat mandated to streamline CIDA's budget and administration.<sup>26</sup>

During these turbulent years, Canadian NGOs were growing in numbers and activity, partly as a result of increasing CIDA funding. Established in 1968, CIDA's NGO Program grew from 1% of oda in 1968 to a peak of 10% in 1986, (or, from \$5 to \$249 million) and significantly supplemented the income NGOs earned from voluntary sources. The Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), set up with government funding in 1968,<sup>27</sup> had become the NGOs' main umbrella organization and voice for their concerns to government. Many individual organizations were becoming active as lobbyists as well, dating in particular from the 1974 World Food Conference. Geared to the UN's NIEO agenda, the more radical NGOs in Canada had developed a broad agenda covering human rights, the conduct of multinationals, international trade, the quantity and quality of Canada's official aid, and reform of the IMF and World Bank. By the end of the decade, disillusioned by the impotence of the UN system, Canadian NGOs began to take a much closer look at the aid policies of their own government.

### **The Leaner, Later Years under Trudeau, 1977-1979 and 1980-1984.**

By the late 1970s, the NIEO had to all intents and purposes fallen from the world agenda and new pressures were being felt on development policy. The *North-South* Brandt report was published,<sup>28</sup> the cold war once again heated up, and another recession was grinding the Canadian economy to a sluggish pace. These were the leaner years of Trudeau's commitment to CIDA and to North-South issues. The constellation of forces present at the beginning of the decade would mark Canadian policy with a new stamp: the philosophy of mutual interests.

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<sup>25</sup>Pratt, "Ethics," 1988:276.

<sup>26</sup>"The 20 Years of CIDA: From Maurice Strong to Margaret Catley-Carlson," in *Development* (the CIDA magazine), Summer-Autumn 1988, pp. 38-69, (p. 63).

<sup>27</sup>John Kirton and Blair Dimock, "Domestic Access to Government in the Canadian Foreign Policy Process 1968-1982," in the *International Journal*, vol. 39, no. 1, Winter 1983/84, pp. 68-98, (p. 93).

<sup>28</sup>World Bank, Independent Commission on International Development Issues, *North-South: A Program for Survival*, (the Brandt Report), London: Pan Books, 1980.

The notion of mutual interests was key to foreign policy in the early 1980s, a theme underlined in the 1980 Brandt report, *North-South: A Program for Survival*. This study, like its predecessor Pearson Report, *Partners in Development*, published eleven years earlier,<sup>29</sup> reinvigorated waning official interest in the South.<sup>30</sup> By emphasizing "mutual interests," the Brandt report had argued that the South had become *both* commercially *and* environmentally critical,<sup>31</sup> and the moral imperative of oda was thus backed up by a regenerated interest in self-preservation. In Canada, a special parliamentary committee on North-South Relations was set up to review the report,<sup>32</sup> and its full endorsement of Brandt's findings was representative of the policy mood at the beginning of the 1980s: mutual interests had become the focus of foreign policy.<sup>33</sup>

Yet Canada was going through a tumultuous time on the domestic front in the early 1980s, and development issues were of low priority. Trudeau(~~s successor, John Turner~~) was(~~quickly~~) defeated by Conservative Joe Clark in the 1979 elections and the government was in disarray. The key issues were problems in separatist Québec and fears that the province's sovereignty association referendum would, if passed, signal the end to a federal Canada. When Trudeau returned as Prime Minister after Clark's brief nine-month term, he turned his full attention to the drafting of a Canadian constitution. Moreover, the economic situation was precarious; inflation and unemployment were rising, and criticism of aid policy increasingly focused on "getting a return for Canada."<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>World Bank, Commission on International Development, *Partners in Development*, (the Pearson Report), New York: Praeger, 1969. The report's recommendations for a social development philosophy marked an important change of thinking away from big infrastructure projects as the sole means of generating development. Of the Commission's recommendations, the most influential was its restatement of the UN's longterm goal of 0.7% of GNP to be spent on oda. This figure has since become the norm of comparison among donor states: both Britain and Canada have accepted the 0.7% target, but Britain has never set a date to reach that goal, and Canada has consistently pushed its target date forward. See figure 2.1 for a comparison of the two countries' records.

<sup>30</sup>For an analysis of Trudeau's subsequent involvement in North-South negotiations, refer to: Kim Richard Nossal, "Personal Diplomacy and National Behaviour: Trudeau's North-South Initiatives," in *Dalhousie Review*, vol. 62, no. 2, Summer 1982, pp. 278-287.

<sup>31</sup>However, the North-South Institute suggests that this emphasis on mutual survival was triggered as much by a concern that the humanitarian motive was losing force (welfare fatigue) as by concern that the developing world was gaining power, (*In the Canadian Interest?*, 1980:26).


<sup>32</sup>Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations, *Report to the House of Commons on the Relations between Developed and Developing Countries*, Herb Breau, chair, 1st session, 32nd Parliament, Ottawa: 1980.

<sup>33</sup>Kirton and Dimock, "Domestic Access," 1983/4:80.

<sup>34</sup>North South Institute, *In the Canadian Interest?*, 1980:28; and O'Manique, "The Global Political Economy," 1985:119.

Figure 2.1: oda as a percentage of GNP, 1950-1991

Source: OECD DAC reports, various years



"Getting a return for Canada" meant that CIDA was under pressure to justify its expenditures to the public, and the agency responded by increasing its appeal to business. Dupuy's tightening of the books had been accompanied by a decline of CIDA's budget in real terms between 1977 and 1980, and by a series of reviews which led policy toward a greater emphasis on the benefits of Canada's oda to Canadian business.<sup>35</sup> The concentration on development as a means to expand markets for Canadian goods had of course always been an element in policy decisions,<sup>36</sup> but in the latter half of the 1970s, its emphasis intensified. When Marcel Massé, a former World Bank economist, replaced Dupuy in 1980 for his first term at the head of CIDA,<sup>37</sup> this theme continued. The new president inaugurated a country-focus system for designing aid programs (discussed later in the chapter), undertook managerial reform, cultivated a new public image, increased the proportion of oda to the least developed countries, and geared programs toward human resource development and the use of NGOs in the implementation of bilateral aid.<sup>38</sup> Many of these changes were designed to increase CIDA's efficiency and shift the agency into one which *managed* Canadian oda, rather than one which *delivered* aid. The change demanded among other measures a move into the private sector, and structural changes within and around CIDA reflected this openness to commercial interests. First among these was External Affairs' absorption of the international trade wing of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce between 1980 and 1982,<sup>39</sup> a move which expanded EA's mandate to incorporate a larger Canadian trade goal: "to pursue aggressively international export markets and to give greater priority to economic matters in the development of foreign policy."<sup>40</sup>

During these years, the CCIC remained the main spokesperson for NGOs, but its political engagement with changing government plans and policies had been sporadic. NGOs were concerned about CIDA's growing commercial emphasis, the country-focus program, human

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<sup>35</sup>Lavergue, "Determinants," 1989:46.

<sup>36</sup>Martin Rudner, "Trade cum Aid in Canada's Official Development Assistance Strategy," in Brian Tomlin and Maureen Molot (editors), *Canada Among Nations: Talking Trade/1986*, Toronto: James Lorimer, 1987, (p. 127).

<sup>37</sup>According to Lavergne, Dupuy's insistence on mutual benefits had been considered too extreme by Cabinet, which preferred to soften the tone to "mutual interdependence," (in "Determinants," 1989:46).

<sup>38</sup>Rudner, "Evolving Framework," 1985:132-4, 138-40.

<sup>39</sup>Cranford Pratt, "Canadian Policy Towards the Third World: Basis for an Explanation," in *Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review*, no. 13, September 1984, (p. 46).

<sup>40</sup>Cited in Pratt, "Canadian Policy," 1984:46.

rights conditionality, the international debt crisis, and support to the African National Congress and the Sandinistas. When the new Conservative government took over in 1984, NGOs were prepared for an even greater shift to commercial goals. In the end, however, their forecast turned out to be misleading.

### **The Mulroney Years, 1984-1993**

Conservative Brian Mulroney's election victory in 1984 marked an important turning point in aid policy. Unlike Trudeau, Mulroney had very little personal involvement in North-South issues (other than with South Africa), but his impact on Canadian assistance was significant nonetheless. While the emphasis on oda's commercial importance grew as expected, there were also unexpected improvements in the quality and quantity of its programs: tied aid rules decreased, the level of oda recovered somewhat, and more emphasis was given to environmental issues and the involvement of women at the grassroots level. As this section explains, the changes can be attributed to Mulroney's "politics of differentiation."

The early 1980s had been a turbulent period internationally. Perhaps the critical factor was the international debt crisis, exacerbated by the recession and gross mismanagement by Northern banks. Beginning with the threatened Mexican moratorium on debt service payments in 1982, international financial markets were raked with upheaval; Southern solidarity over trade and debt issues fell apart as debtor countries spent far more in debt service payments than they received in investment and aid flows;<sup>41</sup> and many in the South were also battling under the austerity programs introduced under IMF structural adjustment programs.<sup>42</sup> And, while the debt problem panicked bankers throughout the North, another significant issue was coming to the forefront. In 1987, the Brundtland Report of the World

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<sup>41</sup>By 1985, the inflow of debt service and other payments from the South to Canada exceeded public and private outflows by some \$300 million a year, (Rudner, "Aid cum Trade," 1987:130).

<sup>42</sup>For a recent review of some of the political issues surrounding adjustment from an economist's standpoint, see: Jean-Dominique Lafay and Jacques Lecaillon, *The Political Dimension of Economic Adjustment*, OECD Development Centre: Paris, 1993; and other works in the same series edited by Christian Morrisson. The pivotal text, however, is: Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Richard Jolly, and Frances Stewart (editors), *Adjustment with a Human Face*, (Vol 1: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth; Vol II: Country Case Studies), UNICEF study, Oxford: Clarendon, 1987 and 1988.

Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*,<sup>43</sup> raised the issues of ozone depletion, desertification, and global warming to an even greater public prominence. An issue long on the foreign policy sidelines, "the environment" had taken on a new urgency; without significant change, Northern and Southern nations were both seen to be endangering the global ecology, (themes taken up again in the chapter on UNCED). A third significant event was the 1984-85 Sahelian famine. Unlike other disasters in the developing world, the famine was relayed over television in an unprecedented fashion and an acute awareness of Ethiopian, Sudanese, and Somali hunger was marked all through the North. In Canada, the disaster picked CIDA and EA out as the focus institutions for public attention, and the government was under substantial pressure to act immediately.

Domestically, other issues were also brewing. Since Mulroney's election, the Conservative government's attention had been focused on free trade with the US, deficit reduction, the Meech Lake (and later Charlottetown) constitutional reforms, a new election (which returned Mulroney to his seat in 1988), and a highly controversial goods and services tax. Domestic politics were especially volatile over this period<sup>44</sup> and Secretary of State Joe Clark had often been solitary in his defence of the aid program in Cabinet. Overall, however, there was much interest in aid in parliamentary circles, and there was subsequently a more consistent interest in development under the Conservatives than there had been under the Liberals.<sup>45</sup> The next section tries, in part, to explain why.

The beginning of Mulroney's term was a "feeling out" period in foreign policy circles, and a whole host of green papers and parliamentary reports on foreign policy issues were generated over the middle of the decade. In part because of the high salience of the African famines and the turmoil in Central America, the parliamentary committees' critical findings (especially the Winegard report, *For Whose Benefit?*)<sup>46</sup> received broad coverage, and were answered

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<sup>43</sup>World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, (the Brundtland Report), Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

<sup>44</sup>Indeed, for a while in Canada in 1989, the standing joke was that there were more Canadians who believed that Elvis was still alive (15%) than would vote again for Mulroney (14%).

<sup>45</sup>David R. Morrison, "Canada and North-South Conflict," in Maureen Appel Molot and Brian W. Tomlin (editors), *Canada Among Nations: A World of Conflict/1987*, Toronto: James Lorimer, 1988, (p. 155).

<sup>46</sup>Canada, Parliament, SCEAIT, *For Whose Benefit?*, Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on Canada's Development Assistance Policies and Programs, W.C. Winegard, chair, Ottawa, May 1987.

sympathetically by government. In 1988, the government tabled *Sharing Our Future*,<sup>47</sup> the first White Paper since the 1975 *Strategy*, and the new policy seemed to promise implementation of some of the Winegard recommendations, including the partial untying of aid procurement to poorer countries and the decentralization of aid administration.<sup>48</sup> Why this spate of activity on aid policy, when many observers had assumed the Conservative government had little interest in aid? In his masters' thesis on changes to Canadian aid policy in the 1980s, Christopher LeClair argues that one of Mulroney's prime concerns was to differentiate his government from its Liberal predecessors, and so was *looking* for change.<sup>49</sup> LeClair suggests that Mulroney's desire for a non-Liberal policy meant that the aid program was open for substantial alterations -- distrustful of a bureaucracy that had ruled for an almost uninterrupted 16 years under Trudeau, Mulroney encouraged public consultation, parliamentary reviews on policy, and widespread reorganization of departments. In this atmosphere, NGOs had an unprecedented governmental audience, and by the end of the 1980s, CIDA had altered many of the policies that had been at the centre of NGO lobbying. A new public outreach plan was set up, the Africa 2000 project was established in response to the Sahelian famines, a five-year Women in Development program was inaugurated, and in 1986, <sup>SEA</sup> Joe Clark announced that all new oda disbursements would be on a grant rather than on a loan basis.

Buoyed by these changes, many NGOs were taken by surprise when the budget was substantially cut in 1989, and many were forced to rethink their relationship with CIDA. Tempers flared over the ways in which the cuts were implemented, and the relationship between CIDA and NGOs soured very quickly. Moreover, as the events in Eastern Europe in <sup>the early</sup> 1990<sub>9</sub> were focusing the government's attention on the new themes of democratization and good government, NGOs became concerned that aid to Southern countries would be diverted to Eastern Europe. Thus, while Mulroney's policy of differentiation meant that NGOs were

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<sup>47</sup>Canada, CIDA, *Sharing Our Future: Canadian International Development Assistance*, Hull: Supply and Services, 1987.

<sup>48</sup>For a fuller discussion of the history of the decentralization debate, see: the North-South Institute, *Review '88, Outlook '89: The Wider World, Challenges for the Second Mulroney Mandate*, Ottawa, 1989, (p. 9). In 1991, deemed by External Affairs to have been an expensive failure, the plan's decentralized staff were recalled despite CIDA's findings that the program had indeed been beneficial, (Canada, CIDA and External Affairs, *Evaluation of Aid Decentralization*, annual report, Ottawa, June 1990).

<sup>49</sup>Christopher A. LeClair, *The Politics of Foreign Policy-Making: The Case of Official Development Assistance Reform, 1984-1987*, MA thesis, McMaster University, June 1990.

being increasingly consulted on changes to oda policy, there is little evidence that NGOs had permanently earned their say. It was against this tense political background and severe financial crisis that NGOs began to meet with government in preparation for the 1992 Earth Summit.

### THE ROLE OF NGOS WITHIN GOVERNMENT

The history of Canadian development policy has thus been marked by a broad range of international and domestic factors -- including the lobbying of Canadian NGOs. Over the course of that history, NGOs have been involved not only as lobbyists but also in many other roles. This section takes a more analytical look at the interaction between NGOs and the Canadian aid machine, and attempts to trace the roles that NGOs have played in development policy. What we find is that CIDA's institutional status within government has made it dependent on NGO support, and that the quality of CIDA's aid has relied on NGO service-delivery and expertise. As one CIDA official admitted, "Politicians and high bureaucrats despise NGOs, but they can't do without them."<sup>50</sup>

#### The Complementor

In the writings and speeches of CIDA officials in the 1980s and 1990s, NGOs have been given the greatest credit for providing assistance that *complements* official aid. The official view is of a partnership of effort in the grand task of development; CIDA managing the large-scale programs, NGOs specializing in grassroots work, each working to their comparative advantage. The realization that large-scale projects alone could not engender "development" has made CIDA dependent on NGOs' activity and expertise in certain areas, and it is this dependence that has opened the doors for NGO influence on policy. This idea of a complementary relationship between NGOs and government is by no means a novel one, of course. As early as 1964, NGOs were noted as playing a "unique and highly significant role, quite out of proportion to their importance in purely financial terms."<sup>51</sup> Since the installation

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<sup>50</sup>Interview with Michel Archembault, Director of the Educational Institutions Program, Institutional Cooperation and Development Services Division, CIDA, Hull, 9 October 1992.

<sup>51</sup>Argyrios A. Fatouros and Robert N. Kelson, *Canada's Overseas Aid*, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964, (pp. 89-90).

of the NGO Program in CIDA in 1968, this recognition had grown to rather rapturous dimensions by the mid-1980s. As president Catley-Carlson said,

I see the NGOs of Canada as a major, central element in our country's efforts to promote world development -- not a frill, not an optional accessory, but an essential component. Without that NGO component, Canada's role would be unrecognizable -- certainly, it would be sadly diminished and impoverished. This is in part because of the substantial amount of funds and expertise provided through our NGOs, and it is in part because of the massive public involvement and participation that takes place through NGOs.<sup>52</sup>

The virtues ascribed to NGOs made them increasingly attractive to governments seeking to improve the efficiency of their aid: on the ground, NGOs are perceived as being much better than governments in innovating programs, linking with communities, mobilizing private resources, involving beneficiaries, gaining access to local sources of information, and creating sustainable development environments.

### The Contractor

Yet the view of NGOs as a complement to official efforts has an alternative interpretation. For some, the increase in official funding for NGOs under CIDA's country-focus program, its planned policy changes, and the growing use of NGO consortia, has turned voluntary agencies into *contractors* for official aid.

One of the reasons that government is interested in NGOs is that they are also seen to be far more cost-effective than official aid agencies. Only about 13% of their average income is spent on administration and fundraising,<sup>53</sup> and unlike government, they are exempt from tying regulations, enjoy preferential shipping rates because of their charitable status, and are able to work with lower salaries and overhead. Yet Canadian NGOs have been concerned by the implication that their activities were simply cheaper versions of official aid. Of the government policies which raised concern, Massé's country-focus policy was the most worrisome. In 1981, the CIDA president inaugurated a new approach to funding, one which

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<sup>52</sup>Margaret Catley-Carlson (President of CIDA), "Moving ahead in the Eighties: CIDA and Canada's NGOs," notes for an address to the CCIC's Briefing on Government, 6 October 1983, (p. 3).

<sup>53</sup>Tim Brodhead, Brent Herbert-Copley, and Anne-Marie Lambert, *Bridges of Hope? Canadian Voluntary Agencies and the Third World*, Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1989, (p. 100).

was supposed to achieve both integrated and cost-effective development assistance. An overall picture was drawn of the development goals to be reached in a given country, and the component parts were then to be tendered out to the private and voluntary sectors for implementation. The advantage for NGOs was that it opened up new avenues for funding: where normally a maximum matching grant of three to one was available, under this new program, grants of up to nine to one were possible, provided that NGOs were already committed to doing what CIDA had planned. Yet the danger, as NGOs saw it, was that NGOs would be lured by these generous levels of funding into a subcontracting role.<sup>54</sup> Similar worries were voiced over the subcontracting roles ascribed in the 1991 SECOR report on CIDA management,<sup>55</sup> and over the practice of funding special NGO coalitions (such as the Asia Pacific Foundation or the South African Education Trust Fund) to undertake specific CIDA projects.<sup>56</sup> As "contractors," however, NGOs have earned a measure of influence. A CCIC report explained that "further contracting-out of the bilateral programmes offers more, not fewer opportunities for NGOs" to become involved in the design of projects. Although the SECOR report "gives the responsive programme," whereby NGOs request funding for their own work, "short shrift, it does recognize [the NGO community's] importance as a stakeholder, and begins to accept its legitimacy in the policy arena."<sup>57</sup>

### **The Administrator and Coordinator**

As the number of NGOs and the level and complexity of government funding to NGOs has increased, another outcome has been the delegation of administrative responsibility to NGOs themselves.

The continued funding and support of the CCIC to facilitate (and sometimes coordinate) the activities of its membership is a particularly notable example.<sup>58</sup> As one senior CIDA official

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<sup>54</sup>For expressions of that concern, see: CCIC, "Consultation on Country Focus," report on the proceedings of the NGO-CIDA Meeting in Ottawa on 17 February 1982; "CCIC Paper: NGO Perspectives on CIDA's Country-Focus," February 1982; and "Report of the Task Force on Government Funding," June 1982.

<sup>55</sup>CCIC, "CCIC Response to the SECOR Report on CIDA's Strategic Management Review," Ottawa, 2 March 1992, (pp. 3-6).

<sup>56</sup>Terry L. Mooney (Senior Policy Advisor, CIDA), "Canadian NGOs: A Community in Transition," mimeo, 29 February 1992, (pp. 8-9).

<sup>57</sup>CCIC, "Comments on the SECOR Report," 1991:6, 8.

<sup>58</sup>Some 85% of the CCIC's funding is from CIDA.

explained, the CCIC "facilitates CIDA's work; if it did not exist, we would have to create a co-ordinating and servicing mechanism of this kind with the NGOs or do the job ourselves at much greater cost, and probably with less efficiency and effectiveness."<sup>59</sup> Another of the NGOs' administrative roles has been the management of CIDA funds disbursed to other NGOs. Usually allocated to <sup>regional NGO funding groups, or</sup> consortia like Partnership Africa Canada, these funds are administered to other NGOs working in the area -- PAC itself does no programming of its own. Similar arrangements are made through the South Asia Partnership, Solidarité Canada Sahel, Cooperation Canada Mozambique, Program Angola, and the Cross Border Coalition, among others,<sup>60</sup> and Smillie suggests that coalitions have thus been "a convenient way of exporting administrative expenses out of the CIDA budget."<sup>61</sup> However, this devolution has also made the NGO community more valuable to CIDA, and may have increased its scope for influence on policy.

### The Departmental Ally

NGOs also play a role as CIDA's ally in public and interdepartmental disputes. Because of the agency's weak institutional position and because of the shallowness of public support for aid, it has been in CIDA's interest to buttress NGOs' lobbying efforts in support of development.

As we shall see in the next chapter, public support for development in Canada has been "a mile wide but an inch thick."<sup>62</sup> NGOs, whose autonomy from government has lent them a greater public legitimacy, are better able to buttress that thin level of support than government. In a speech by CIDA's president to NGOs in 1983, Catley-Carlson said that she wanted to make sure that,

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<sup>59</sup>Internal CIDA memorandum, March 1977.

<sup>60</sup>See Tim Brodhead and Cranford Pratt, "CIDA and Canadian NGOs: Paging the Piper," in Cranford Pratt (editor), *Canadian International Development Assistance: A Contemporary Appraisal*, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, forthcoming 1994.

<sup>61</sup>CCIC, Ian Smillie, "A Time to Build Up New Forms of Cooperation Between NGOs and CIDA," a study commissioned by the CCIC, Ottawa, December 1991, (p. 24).

<sup>62</sup>Bob Miller, "The People versus Canadian Aid: A Summary of the Prosecutor's Case," workshop paper with the IDRC, Ottawa: Parliamentary Centre, 1992.

... a great deal more information about the Third World and Canadian assistance is made available to the public. In this, I urgently need your help. I am not asking you to become flacks or press agents for CIDA, but I *am* asking you to cooperate with us in this field -- to do what you can, for example, to reflect the fact that official financial backing -- CIDA -- is vital to your work, or to help guide CIDA's own efforts to reach the public, or to see that CIDA gets a fair shake among your own media [and] friends. This is not only in the interests of CIDA; it is in the interests [of] the promotion and expansion of *all* Canadian development assistance.<sup>63</sup>

Indeed, so reliant has CIDA been on the legitimacy of the NGO community to raise public support for aid, that in 1981 it had tried to *create* a development education NGO, the Futures Secretariat, to raise awareness for the upcoming North-South conference in Cancun. It is noteworthy that in an intradepartmental letter, the SSEA explained that, "after considering several options I came to the conclusion that a non-governmental body would be preferable to a government one on the grounds of cost, flexibility and acceptability to the Canadian public."<sup>64</sup> The NGO community railed against the proposal, however, arguing that its government origins would forever jeopardize its credibility,<sup>65</sup> and that it might duplicate their efforts or detract from their funding sources. The Secretariat was to raise public awareness of North-South issues, but without support from other NGOs and without support from the broader public,<sup>66</sup> it faded from the scene.

This dependence on NGOs' public support has been a sensitive point at CIDA. Criticism from NGOs is perceived an attack on international development itself, and so undermines CIDA's efforts to raise support in public and within government for its own overseas assistance. As CIDA president Catley-Carlson said, "If your voices of criticism are louder than your voices of support for CIDA, we all stand to lose."<sup>67</sup> Indeed, over-zealous criticism has occasionally frustrated NGOs' working relationships with CIDA; a recent example was the

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<sup>63</sup>Catley-Carlson, "Moving Ahead in the Eighties," 1983:7-8.

<sup>64</sup>Internal memorandum, External Affairs, Fall 1981.

<sup>65</sup>See the minutes of the CCIC Executive meeting of 7 May 1981, at which members of the new Futures Secretariat unsuccessfully attempted to solicit CCIC support. As one board member said, "The Futures Secretariat is seen as ... resulting from the failure of CIDA to change the course of existing organization[s]. As long as it remains independent it's fine, but to what extent will this organization be a vehicle to pursue the wishes and aims of bureaucrats?"

<sup>66</sup>The secretariat was not able even to raise the minimum private funds required in order to qualify for the generous government matching funds allocated, and the organization's finances were bailed out by Cabinet in 1982.

<sup>67</sup>Margaret Catley-Carlson (President of CIDA), "The Future Role of Canadians in International Development," notes for an address to the Annual Conference of the Canadian Save the Children Fund (CANSAGE) and the Canadian Hunger Foundation (CHF), 30 September 1983.

CCIC report card on CIDA published in December 1991. External Relations Minister Monique Landry was infuriated with the Council's unsympathetic assessment of CIDA's record in reaching the goals set out in *Sharing Our Future*, and the incident evidently caused over six months of tense relations.<sup>68</sup> NGOs were perceived to have joined "the chorus of discontent," and to have taken on "carping" about government instead of using their specialized knowledge more usefully.<sup>69</sup> Yet NGOs' cooperation on other issues has made them relevant players nonetheless. As CCIC's Communication Officer Chris Pinney explains, "the bottom line is that NGOs have the capacity to make a public constituency; government doesn't; and CIDA needs it."<sup>70</sup>

NGOs are also important as allies in conflicts *within* government. Their ability to bring an issue to the public arena has sometimes raised CIDA's clout within government and has helped them turn the tide in the agency's favour. For example, when External Affairs' proposed a reorganization of aid policy in February 1993, officials at CIDA were alarmed. Meant to concentrate aid on middle-income countries and Eastern Europe rather than the poorest countries, the proposal threatened a substantial change in policy. Someone leaked the draft discussion document to NGOs, a media campaign to oppose the planned change was immediately put into action, and the papers were subsequently filled with accusations that Canada was "turning our back on the needy."<sup>71</sup> Officials took notice of the furore, but before any decisions could be made, the Prime Minister announced his resignation, and the proposal was temporarily shelved. The example suggests that in cases where CIDA is unable to fight its own battles in public, NGOs have been able to carry the cause into the public domain on its behalf.

However, there is also the danger that a lack of NGO support will subvert CIDA's interdepartmental goals. Because there was little public outcry over the 1989 cuts to CIDA's budget, for example, Finance was able to argue that there was an insubstantial constituency in

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<sup>68</sup>Interview with Marc Dolgin, Director of the NGO Division, CIDA, Ottawa, 29 August 1991.

<sup>69</sup>Interview with Lewis Perinbam, then Vice-President of CIDA's Special Programs Branch, Ottawa, August 1991.

<sup>70</sup>Interview with Chris Pinney, Communications Officer, CCIC, Ottawa, 19 October 1992.

<sup>71</sup>For a summary of NGO views on the proposal, see: North-South Institute, "Time for Plain Speaking About Aid," mimeo distributed to the members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade and its subcommittee on development and human rights, 15 February 1993.

support of oda in Canada. Furthermore, when in 1991 the Interchurch Fund for International Development published *Diminishing Our Future*,<sup>72</sup> a critical assessment of aid policy, CIDA President Massé was infuriated. He told a group of NGOs that the report had directly cost the agency one billion dollars in lost budgets over the next five years, arguing that, "we have to find ways of discussing these disagreements among ourselves without giving to the outside community the impression that we stand for different things, that we work at cross purposes, that we can't live with each other, and that we teach different types of values."<sup>73</sup> His accusation that NGO activism had *cost* the oda program a portion of its budget angered many NGOs; they argued that CIDA and NGOs could only be allies on certain issues, under certain circumstances. They emphasized that their own claim to public legitimacy does not stem from their alliance with government.

### The Political Proxy

NGOs have also held important roles as proxies for official intervention. In situations or countries where direct government intervention has been politically sensitive, NGOs have lent support where direct government-to-government aid would be difficult or politically unwise. As CIDA President Maurice Strong once said,

In some countries, where governments change and we don't like the government, or we do not trust the government, we have to moderate our conduct -- we don't just withdraw aid. That's when the non-governmental element is so important, because we can still selectively support development without challenging political authority, but without supporting political authority of a kind that we don't believe in or trust.<sup>74</sup>

A recent example was the role of NGOs in Eritrea and Tigray. Canadian organizations had long been lobbying CIDA to support the work of two Ethiopian NGOs -- REST (Relief Society of Tigray) and ERA (Eritrean Relief Association) -- both doing development and relief work. However, direct assistance to either organization had been strictly forbidden by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), on that grounds that,

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<sup>72</sup>Interchurch Fund for International Development, *Diminishing Our Future, CIDA: Four Years after Winegard, A Report of Recent Developments in Canadian Development Assistance Policies and Practice*, October 1991.

<sup>73</sup>Marcel Massé (President of CIDA), Transcript of remarks to the annual consultations between CIDA and non-governmental organizations, Hull, 15 October 1992, (pp. 6, 7).

<sup>74</sup>Maurice Strong in CIDA, "The 20 Years of CIDA," 1988:62.

a) development programmes as against relief assistance could imply some form of recognition of rebel groups within Eritrea or Tigray; b) some greater recognition or implied recognition for these rebel groups would quite likely be deeply resented and possibly negatively affect our working relationship with govt [*sic*] of Ethiopia; c) ability to supervise or effectively administer such development assistance is very seriously questioned; d) ... any useful role we might play in encouraging some form of peace process could ... be seriously jeopardized.<sup>75</sup>

Yet the Canadian government and CIDA continued to be concerned with the worsening situation in the region. After long discussions between CIDA and EA in 1984, the Canadian coalition African Emergency Aid was allowed to provide aid for distribution through ERA and REST. CIDA first transferred the funds to the CCIC, which dispensed the money through the coalition to another Canadian NGO before the funds eventually found their way to REST and ERA. CIDA was careful that there was no direct contact between the government of Canada and the two Ethiopian organizations. The NGOs' willingness to continue to work in Ethiopia thus allowed Canada to distribute assistance indirectly, and so avoid political recriminations.

### The Policy Advisor

The most recent role played by Canadian NGOs has been as advisors on policy. On certain issues, NGOs have been consulted by CIDA and EA officials on the actual creation and implementation of policy. As CIDA president Catley-Carlson said, "the fact is that many of those NGO-inspired innovations have been absorbed into official development assistance programs. Smaller projects, decentralized control, more focus on people, attention to women -- these are just a few of the many reforms and improvements that started with you."<sup>76</sup>

As we will see in the chapter on the World Food Conference, the government's interest in consultation with NGOs had increased after their fierce lobbying in Rome in 1974, and many were subsequently asked to comment on Canada's position at a range of international fora. While there has always been scepticism on the NGO side about the influence of these consultations, there is evidence in some cases that government has made use of their advice.

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<sup>75</sup>Interdepartmental telex, External Affairs, December 1986.

<sup>76</sup>Margaret Catley-Carlson (President of CIDA), "Making Choices: The Future Roles of NGOs," notes for a talk to the NGO/Special Programs Branch consultation, Ottawa, 15 February 1988, quoted in: CCIC, "Mind if I Cut In?," the Report of the CCIC Task Force on CIDA-NGO Funding Relationships, Ottawa: CCIC, October 1988, (p. 7).

In the late 1980s, for example, CCIC and CIDA increased their consultation over CIDA's controversial Philippines program and succeeded in creating a new cooperative arrangement under the non-governmental Philippines-Canada Human Resource Development Program.<sup>77</sup> The success of this exercise among others (including the consultations for UNCED) has created an important precedent. In 1992, CIDA agreed to set up a permanent NGO-CIDA consultative body to discuss policy,<sup>78</sup> and according to a recent report made by a CCIC staff member,

The past three years have seen dramatically increased NGO contact with all levels of Government: Federal and Provincial Environment Ministries, External Affairs, Finance, and Parliament. CCIC was represented on the official Canadian delegation to UNCED, and has participated in a follow-up stake-holders' process to build a Canadian sustainability plan, supported by the Minister of the Environment. Access to decision makers is increasing demonstrably but influence much less so.<sup>79</sup>

Indeed, whether NGO influence has grown with the increase in consultation is another matter; CCIC's Pinney suggests that consultation is only the latest development fad.<sup>80</sup> The next section thus suggests some of the reasons why their influence over government may be significantly limited.

#### THE CONSTRAINTS ON NGO INFLUENCE

While NGOs have gained prominence within government, their influence has nonetheless had very real limits. This final section suggests that the main factors involved have been CIDA's low status within the government hierarchy, the financial ceiling imposed upon aid expenditures, differences in the behaviour of parties in government, and the rank of aid policy among other foreign policy goals.

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<sup>77</sup>Tim Brodhead, "Macrotrends and Microwaves," in *Contact*, CCIC, vol. 2, no. 4, February 1989, p. 2; and Murphy, "The Politics of Participation," 1993:200-201.

<sup>78</sup>The committee, which "will meet on a needs basis in order to discuss and, I hope, solve the various problems that can come up and in order to find ways of expressing our different points of view," was announced by CIDA president Marcel Massé at the annual consultation between CIDA and non-governmental organizations, (in his transcripts, 1992:7).

<sup>79</sup>Ian Filewod, "Canada," in Judith Randel and Tony German (editors), *The Reality of Aid: An Independent Review of International Aid*, London: ActionAid, ICVA, EUROstep, June 1993, (p. 12).

<sup>80</sup>Interview with Pinney, October 1992.

## CIDA as Low Man on Totem Pole

CIDA's low ranking in the decision-making hierarchy means that while it has a great deal of autonomy on administrative changes, it has been subordinate to the broader foreign policy goals of the government. In this on-going institutional rivalry among the bureaucracies, efforts made by NGOs to influence policy have therefore been limited by the status of CIDA, their closest institutional ally in government.

While CIDA is organizationally a distinct department from External Affairs, its minister in Cabinet is the Secretary of State for External Affairs.<sup>81</sup> The policy-making system responsible for CIDA's activities has therefore placed the agency under the close scrutiny of more powerful elements in the bureaucracy, including EA's international trade wing. Note, for example, the controversy generated over Gérin-Lajoie's plans in his 1975 *Strategy*; Trade and Commerce fought against the untying of aid, and other members on the Canadian International Aid Board (the main policy committee for aid active in the 1970s) debated its choice to focus on the poorest countries. Within two years, Gérin-Lajoie had left, untying was not achieved, and oda contributions dropped. From the outset, it has been the case that,

The definition of CIDA's functions gives it no prescriptive right to a voice in the formulation of non-aid policy of concern to developing countries, for example in the trade, investment and monetary fields. These matters are almost exclusively the concern of the Departments of Finance, Trade and Commerce, and External Affairs.<sup>82</sup>

One of the most striking examples of CIDA's role in decision-making is its place in the budget allocation process (see figure 2.2). In the spring of every year, the all-powerful Priorities and Planning Committee (P&P) sets the priorities for government spending for the following year (1), and each department prepares a Strategic Overview and an Operational Plan to outline its specific plans (2). The overview goes to the Cabinet policy committee in charge of its envelope (its budget), which in turn organizes all the overviews it receives into a Sector Outlook for P&P. Canadian oda is disbursed from the International Assistance

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<sup>81</sup>Until the summer of 1993 (when the position was eliminated), CIDA was also under the direct jurisdiction of one of the SSEA's junior ministers, the Minister for External Relations and International Development. The agency now answers directly to the SSEA.

<sup>82</sup>George Cunningham, "Canada," in Cunningham (editor), *The Management of Aid Agencies: Donor Structures and Procedures for the Administration of Aid to Developing Countries*, London: Croom Helm, in association with the Overseas Development Institute, 1974, (p. 122).




Figure 2.2: The Canadian Budgetary Process

Envelope introduced in 1991, from which aid to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is also disbursed. The envelope is controlled by the Committee on Foreign and Defense Policy, chaired by the SSEA and attended by EA's other ministers and the Minister for Defense.<sup>83</sup> In the summer, the Committee's sector outlook (including EA, CIDA, Defense, and International Trade) goes to P&P, along with the Economic Outlook (a draft budget) from Finance, and an Expenditure Outlook (detailing expected expenditure trends) from the Treasury Board (3). Meanwhile, all the departments' operational plans are reviewed by the Treasury Board and in the autumn are funnelled into the Main Estimates which are then sent off to the Expenditure Review Committee (4). Once the estimates are approved, P&P revises the budget, sends it to the House of Commons, and if approved (5), funnels a budget and a list of priorities back to the relevant policy committees. A set of policy priorities and a cash package (the envelope) is then divided up internally between Defense and EA (which apportions the figures for International Trade and CIDA).<sup>84</sup>

This budgetary process reinforces the conflict-prone administrative set-up which oversees aid expenditure. According to Wyse, from early on, the arrangement was that "CIDA sold influence over the aid program in return for verbal support at budget time, while government departments acquired influence over the aid program even though supporting it cost them nothing."<sup>85</sup> Development assistance goes through the same mechanisms as other programs, but because the allocation of aid is thus partly determined by the demands of EA, International Trade, and Defense, these mechanisms have subordinated the policy goals of CIDA's development assistance to the policy goals of its more powerful neighbours. According to Gray, the new envelope system "means that the Minister for External Relations must defend the overall size of the envelope in pre-budget discussions, then negotiate with sharper elbowed colleagues at Finance and Trade for CIDA's share of a shrinking pie."<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>83</sup>Richard Van Loon, "Planning in the Eighties," in Richard D. French (editor), *How Ottawa Decides: Planning and Industrial Policy Making 1968-1984*, 2nd edition, Toronto: James Lorimer, 1984, (p. 162).

<sup>84</sup>Brian Anthony (editor), *How Government Works*, Ottawa: Canadian Conference of the Arts, 1983; and J.C. Strick, "Budgeting and Financial Management," in *Canadian Public Finance*, Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1992, (pp. 51-79).

<sup>85</sup>Peter Wyse, *Canadian Foreign Aid in the 1970s: An Organisational Audit*, Occasional Monograph Series no. 16, Montreal: McGill University, Centre for Developing-Area Studies, undated but probably 1978, (p. 29).

<sup>86</sup>Charlotte Gray, "New Faces in Old Places," in Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher Maule (editors), *Canada Among Nations 1992-93: A New World Order?*, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992, (p. 24).

CIDA's subordinate status has meant that NGOs access into the policy realm is not through its strongest member. Because NGOs have been predominantly linked with CIDA, they can have only limited influence on policy. NGOs may indeed have influenced CIDA on a number of issues concerning the emphasis or administration of existing programs, but in certain key areas, CIDA has been unable to influence the rest of government.

### The Economic Ceiling

As we have seen, one of these areas has been the budget and Canada's subsequent failure to reach its commitment to the 0.7% oda/GNP goal. The country has had what Morrison calls an "on-again, off-again commitment" to the 0.7% target: as various deadline dates go by (1980, 1985, 1990) the current commitment is to reach 0.7% "eventually."<sup>87</sup> Over the course of the 24 years since Pearson's recommendation, NGOs have continued to call for fulfilment of the goal, partly because it has been a politically potent measurement of Canada's declining performance against other countries. From a peak of 0.54% in 1975, the oda/GNP figure had slipped to 0.50% at the end of Trudeau's reign, and then slowly sank to the 1992 figure of 0.45% under Mulroney.

The receding willingness of the government to allocate resources to development assistance has been a significant limit on the influence of CIDA. As its budget decreases, and as it lays off staff,<sup>88</sup> CIDA's ability to act independently from External Affairs has also decreased. In the face of biting recession in the 1980s, the lowered allocation has been part of an overall budget reduction scheme put in place by Finance,<sup>89</sup> arguing that "owing to the seriousness of the fiscal situation," ODA would have to be capped.<sup>90</sup> In this tight economic environment, given the process of budget allocation, there is little that CIDA or NGOs have been able to do to raise the ceiling imposed on aid.

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<sup>87</sup>Morrison, "The Geopolitics of Canadian Bilateral Aid," 1991:43.

<sup>88</sup>Maureen O'Neil and Andrew Clark, "Canada and International Development," in Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher Maule (editors), *Canada Among Nations/1992-93*, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992, (p. 223).

<sup>89</sup>For a review of Canada's budget-reduction efforts, see: Canada, Finance, *Federal-Provincial Study on the Cost of Government and Expenditure Management*, Ottawa, May 1992, (pp. 182-188).

<sup>90</sup>Canada, Finance, *The Budget*, Ottawa, 26 February 1991, (p. 70).

## Party Differentiation and Philosophical Barriers

Another limit on NGOs' possible influence on policy has been the beliefs and practices of the party in government. Changes in Canadian development policy have owed themselves to two further factors: one, the incoming party's wishes to differentiate its policies from its predecessors; and two, more substantial differences in policy from one administration to the next.

As noted earlier, LeClair suggested that the changes in aid policy over the 1980s (the sympathetic response to parliamentary reports, along with improvements to the quality of aid, even though the oda/GNP figure was falling) was due not so much to the Conservatives' political philosophy per se, as it was due to Mulroney's desire to differentiate his government from that of his predecessor. LeClair argues that,

On a general level, the desire of the new government in 1984 to chart its own course in foreign policy provided the initial impetus for the rethinking of various aspects of conventional statecraft, like ODA. ... Through the course of [the 1985 policy review *Competitiveness and Security*], many of the disputed practices of ODA were identified as possible areas where policy reform should occur.<sup>91</sup>

Part of this push for change cultivated NGO input. Indeed, Michel Archembault, a director at CIDA, says that the Conservatives generated a flurry of consultation with NGOs in 1984 *simply because* the Liberals had done little consultation themselves.<sup>92</sup> NGOs had, almost circumstantially, earned themselves a greater voice in the ear of the new government.

Yet part of the change in policy was linked to a more entrenched party philosophy. The Conservatives maintained a stronger emphasis on strict economic reform and free-market enterprise that affected the aid program. Both of Mulroney's ministers in charge of CIDA, Monique Vezina (1984-86) and Monique Landry (1986-93), attempted to increase the role of private enterprise in development. Examples included renewed annual consultations with the private sector; strengthening of CIDA's Business Cooperation Branch to increase investment in the developing world (a notoriously low figure);<sup>93</sup> growth in the Branch's centrepiece

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<sup>91</sup>LeClair, *The Politics of Foreign Policy-Making*, 1990:145.

<sup>92</sup>Interview with Archembault, October 1992.

<sup>93</sup>Rudner, "Trade cum Aid," 1987:133.

program, the Industrial Cooperation Division, from .04% of oda in 1978 to 2% in 1990; and the announcement of an Aid-Trade Fund (much like the British Aid and Trade Provision discussed in chapter four).<sup>94</sup> In 1991, while Landry imposed a cap on the bilateral funding of NGOs, CIDA created a new responsive program solely for the business sector (the Private Sector Development Initiative Fund)<sup>95</sup> and increased allocations to its already existing industrial cooperation program. Further evidence of the Conservatives' pro-commerce stance was the re-appointment of Marcel Massé as CIDA president in 1989; he consistently argued the "need for stronger links between aid and the market-oriented adjustment programs demanded by official lenders and creditors."<sup>96</sup>

Of these changes, NGOs were most alarmed at Massé's support for structural adjustment conditionality. They feared that the linking of aid to the implementation of IMF reforms would further diminish the quality of Canadian assistance. Concern was also generated when Special Programs (the branch which had housed the NGO division) was absorbed into Business Cooperation to make up the present Partnership Branch. NGOs feared that CIDA's commitment to supporting their work had eroded, and that in the pro-business mood of the government, they were now perceived as "contractors" in the same vein as for-profit firms.<sup>97</sup>

NGOs working to influence the Conservative government after a long history of Liberal support were thus met with a mixed situation. Anxious to differentiate their policies from that of the Liberals, the Conservatives allowed parliamentary committees (and the NGOs who made appeals through them) more influence: recommendations to untie aid, forgive debt, increase spending on the poorest countries, concentrate on women in development and the

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<sup>94</sup>This fund, also called the Trade and Development Facility, was one of a number of concessional export financing windows operating or contemplated in the early 1980s in Canada. By 1983, Canada ranked second among OECD countries in the volume of this kind of financing. (Rudner, "Trade cum Aid," 1987:135-9). However, because the planned fund was permanently "deferred" with the oda cuts in 1986, it was never put into place.

<sup>95</sup>Brodhead and Pratt, "CIDA and Canadian NGOs," forthcoming; and Canada, Minister for External Relations and International Development, "Firms From Across Canada to do International Development Work," communiqué, 12 December 1991.

<sup>96</sup>Gerald Schmitz, "Aid to Developing Countries," Current Issue Review 79-16E, Political and Social Affairs Division, Research Branch, Library of Parliament, 17 August 1979, revised 10 September 1990, (p. 10).

<sup>97</sup>NGOs' role as contractors was indeed increasing. In 1985, NGOs had been responsible for 16% of CIDA's contracting work, and private sector organizations accounted for 23%. By 1990, the portion allocated to NGOs had risen to 20%, while the private-sector proportion had declined to 20%. By 1995, the forecasts were that 25% would be allocated for NGOs. (The remainder goes to other wings of government, international institutions, other governments, or non-Canadian NGOs. From confidential sources).

environment -- all met with a remarkable level of success. However, that influence was limited by the broader parameters of Conservative philosophy. Deficit reduction was a priority (and so no new aid would be allocated), and the virtues of free-market economic development were to be emphasized. For NGOs worried that the commercial emphasis would subordinate development concerns to Canada's trade ambitions, the Conservatives' philosophical "barrier" seemed a high one indeed.

### A Moving Place on the Agenda

Yet it would be a mistake to argue that the Conservatives were alone in their emphasis on commerce; accusations of mixed motives for oda have been made by NGOs and others for decades.<sup>98</sup> Among their concerns have been the additional political and economic uses to which aid has been put; most recently, the expansion of the international assistance budget to include aid to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. As aid is used to serve many policy goals apart from "development," the influence of NGOs can only be piecemeal.

CIDA and its predecessor, the External Aid Office, have never disguised their multiple motives; aid has always been seen as a complementary part of an integrated foreign policy package, and part of that package has always included international trade. The pressure to include trade, for example, has come from the trade department (eager that aid policy be geared to middle-income countries where trade was more promising),<sup>99</sup> and one of the main vehicles for promoting trade has been procurement tying, or tied aid. For critics within the NGO community, however, tied aid has substantially diminished the quality of oda: in obliging recipients to purchase Canadian goods with Canadian oda, the value of aid is estimated to decrease around 20%.<sup>100</sup> Even government studies have found tied aid to be a

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<sup>98</sup>Spicer, *A Samaritan State?*, 1966; Cranford Pratt, "Canadian Policy Towards the Third World: Basis of an Explanation," in *Studies in Political Economy*, September 1984, No. 13, pp. 27-55; Monique Dupuis, *Crise mondiale et aide internationale: Strategie canadienne et developpement du Tiers-Monde*, Montreal: Nouvelle Optique, 1984; and Leonard Dudley and Claude Montmarquette, *The Supply of Canadian Foreign Aid: Explanation and Evaluation*, sponsored by the Economic Council of Canada, Hull: Supply and Services Canada.

<sup>99</sup>Morrison, "The Geopolitics of Canadian Bilateral Aid," 1991:37-38.

<sup>100</sup>See Richard C. Owens, "For No One's Benefit: Canada's Use of Foreign Aid to Subsidize Exports," in the *University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review*, vol. 46, no. 1, Winter 1988, pp. 303-314; and John Hendra, "Only 'Fit to be Tied': A Comparison of the Canadian Tied Aid Policy with the Tied Aid Policies of Sweden, Norway and Denmark," in the *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1987, pp. 261-281.

poor source of domestic economic subsidy,<sup>101</sup> yet the pressures to maintain the policy have been strong and tying regulations were not loosened until 1988 when Mulroney's policy sweep had pushed the requirements down to 50% for sub-Saharan Africa and 66% in other countries, figures which are nonetheless high. Aid continues to be presented to Canadian business as one of Canada's conscious trade promotion activities.

Most recently, concern over allocations to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has been another issue for NGOs, fearing that oda is being used to ease Canada's economic relations with newly opened eastern markets at the expense of the South. Although Massé assured NGOs that oda funds were safe, and that "there is no capacity to cope with the amount required [for Eastern Europe] within existing ODA resources,"<sup>102</sup> oda resources were nonetheless affected. When the new International Assistance Envelope was created (from which CIDA's and EA's overseas programs are funded), \$57 million was initially set aside for Central and Eastern Europe *in addition to* oda. However, in 1992, *when oda was cut*, another \$100 million was set aside for Eastern Europe. A 1992 CCIC report on the new budget claimed that the minimal "planned increases to Third World aid are scaled down so that the government can help Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union."<sup>103</sup>

What this means for NGOs is that the development purposes of oda have had a variable place on the agenda. As pressures for economic growth in Canada increased, so had pressures for the tying of aid; as pressures for aid to Eastern Europe were felt, so were pressures on the aid budget to encompass the new demands. NGOs working in this environment were only one element among the many competing pressures on government: oda has never been entirely reserved for the purpose of development.

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<sup>101</sup>One of the first was reported in: Canada, CIDA, "The Costs of Tying Aid," one of six studies by Prof. Benjamin Higgins for CIDA's policy review, Hull, 1969.

<sup>102</sup>Report on a meeting of CIDA's president with the CCIC Executive, 10 January 1990.

<sup>103</sup>CCIC, Chris Neal (CCIC Public Affairs Officer), fax to CCIC members entitled "Urgent One-Page Fax on Federal Budget," 25 February 1992.

### CHAPTER THREE: AN ACCOUNT OF ADVOCACY IN THE CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

Why have Canadian NGOs become more involved with advocacy work? Why have their interests and roles grown in the last decade in particular? Chapter two traced some of the forces at work shaping Canadian oda policy and the relationship between NGOs and their official counterparts. This chapter takes a look at that relationship from the perspective of the NGO community itself by examining its origins, its size and relevance in overall aid efforts, and the diversity of its activities. After a review of the main forces, agenda issues, and tactics involved in NGOs' advocacy history, the final discussion turns to look at some of the issues affecting the capacity of NGOs to influence policy.

#### THE COMMUNITY SPECTRUM TODAY

The size and diversity of the NGO community are significant, not only in terms of Canada's overall contribution to development, but also as a way of explaining the community's rise to a heightened involvement in policy. The chapter thus begins by taking a brief look at the origins of the NGO community in Canada to understand their evolution.

#### Origins

Many of the first voluntary organizations were offshoots of 19th century missions overseas; connected by an institutionalized church, members of Canadian congregations were informed of poverty elsewhere in the world. Many of today's highly organized and institutionally "mature" NGOs remain church-affiliated: the Mennonite Central Committee, Lutheran World Relief, The Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (CCODP), the Inter-Church Fund for International Development, and Ten Days for World Development are all important examples. Unlike countries such as the Netherlands, Canada's NGOs have not been

split along religious/secular lines; while today most (72%) are secular,<sup>1</sup> those that maintain a religious affiliation are often involved in cross-denominational committees, coalitions, and joint efforts. The CCIC's membership includes secular and religious groups alike, as does its Québec equivalent AQOCI (*l'Association québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale*). Secular organizations like the Red Cross had become active in Canada early in the century, but it was not until the immediate post-war period that secular humanitarian organizations began to outnumber their church-based counterparts.

By the 1960s, the NGO community's philosophy had expanded from its missionary and relief-oriented foundations to embrace new issues. In Canada, the experience of the Suez crisis in 1956, the Cuban revolution, growing concern with apartheid in South Africa, and American intervention in Southeast Asia all contributed to a rise of Canadian activism and social organization.<sup>2</sup> New members in the development community began to focus their efforts on "community development" rather than on relief aid, especially as volunteers from CUSO and SUCO, the first volunteer sending agencies, returned in large numbers to Canada. The United Nations had called for a concerted effort in its first and second development decades, and in the increasing concern over the persistence of poverty, the academic community generated increasingly ambitious theoretical explanations of the causes of poverty. Among others, ~~Southern~~ <sup>from a southern perspective</sup> writers such as André Gunder Frank, Walter Rodney, Franz Fanon, and Samir Amin contributed to the debate on "dependency," a set of theories which identified the global system as the primary cause of poverty.<sup>3</sup> Many NGOs increasingly took on this structuralist critique.

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<sup>1</sup>In Québec, however, the majority of NGOs retain their Catholic orientation. Lachance's survey of Québécois NGOs points to the missionary origin of many groups, although she notes that the process of secularization common in the rest of the country is also underway in the province, (Gabrielle Lachance, "La coopération au développement; Le point de vue des organisations non gouvernementales québécoises," in the *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1986, pp. 117-126.)

<sup>2</sup>Brian K. Murphy, "Canadian NGOs and the Politics of Participation," in Jamie Swift and Brian Tomlinson (editors), *Conflicts of Interest: Canada and the Third World*, Toronto: Between the Lines, 1991, (p. 170).

<sup>3</sup>André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967; Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972; Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967 and 1990. Samir Amin, *Les effets structurels de l'intégration internationale économies pré-capitalistes; Une étude théorique du mécanisme qui a engendré les économies dites sous-développées*, Paris, 1957.

At home, Trudeau encouraged the growth of social organizations as an "attempt to harness, if not co-opt, the social activism of the late sixties and early seventies."<sup>4</sup> This move was evident in CIDA, where Maurice Strong set up the NGO division in 1968 and the Public Participation Program (PPP) in 1971 in order to support NGO work.<sup>5</sup> Throughout the 1970s, the number of Canadian NGOs continued to grow, spurred both by the evolving debate on the New International Economic Order that was politicizing official development circles, and by the open environment under Trudeau's benevolent sponsorship of CIDA. While criticism of CIDA policy was always present, NGOs were a cultivated constituency and their funding grew spectacularly (see figure 3.1).

## Size

The number of NGOs active in Canada today is impressively high. Figures differ, but a reasonable minimum would count 350, the number of organizations collected in the thesis survey (338, see Appendix Two) plus at least another twelve established in the interim.<sup>6</sup> Most of the development NGOs came into being in the 1970s, and as figure 3.2 illustrates, a high rate of growth in the numbers of new NGOs continued into the 1980s. From the information collected in the appendix, on average, a Canadian NGO in the late 1980s had 13 staff members at home, 63 away and some 206 local volunteers in addition to 65 abroad.<sup>7</sup> If

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<sup>4</sup>Murphy, "The Politics of Participation," 1991:166. A number of the NGO leaders interviewed agreed with Murphy's description. CUSO Executive Director Lyse Blanchard said, "When the government decided to fund NGOs and other social action groups in the 1960s, the decision was the Liberals' attempt to both recognize public opinion, and deradicalize the growing student and women's movements. Student leaders were hired by the Secretary of State primarily. It is hard to say how 'calculated' this decision was; in many cases, it was a 'natural choice' to take on activists because they were the experts," (interview in Ottawa, 29 October 1992). Ex-Executive Director of the CCIC, Tim Brodhead, concurred: "Part of the growth of NGOs in the 1960s had to do with Pearson's support to civil society groups, but the generation of baby boomer activists were also demanding more power. What happened was that government mopped up the leaders of the movement, and (inadvertently) co-opted a whole generation of activists," (interview in Ottawa, 2 October 1992).

<sup>5</sup>Tim Brodhead, Brent Herbert-Copley, with Anne-Marie Lambert, *Bridges of Hope? Canadian Voluntary Agencies and the Third World*, Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1989, (p. 21). This work is the only attempt to systematically measure the activities of Canadian NGOs. In addition to the survey information gathered for the thesis, this work provides the main source of empirical evidence used here. In 1982, CCIC published a study which mentioned that in 1968, CIDA supported 37 NGOs; by 1972 the number had grown to 108; and by 1978, there were 205 on its funding list, (CCIC, "Report of the Task Force on Government Funding," Ottawa, June 1982).

<sup>6</sup>Smillie and Filewod reported the additional number in: Ian Smillie and Ian Filewod, "Canada," in Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (editors), *Stakeholders in Development: Issues in Government/NGO Relationships*, Paris:OECD Development Centre, 1993.

<sup>7</sup>The average is calculated from a sample of 174 organizations which reported they had 13,298 staff positions (2,340 at home and 10,958 overseas, including foreign nationals), and some 46,895 volunteers (35,683 at home and 11,212 away). There are, evidently, problems with the figures (particularly in overestimating overseas staff and

Figure 3.1: oda to Canadian and British NGOs,  
1971-1991 in \$US millions

Source: OECD DAC reports, various years





Figure 3.2: Distribution of sample of 193 Canadian NGOs by date of foundation

Source: Appendix Two



we can extrapolate the figures for the whole community of 350 organizations (admittedly, only an estimate), we reach a total of some 4,550 staff working in Canada, and another 72,100 Canadians volunteering at home. Overseas development thus claims an active domestic constituency of over 76,000 Canadians.

The income of half of those organizations was less than one million dollars (see figure 3.3), and just over half of that income came from private sources; about 46% from donations and 9% from self-generated sources (such as goods trading). In 1992, World Vision was the highest earner with CDN\$81 million, of which CDN\$69.6 million came from private donations.<sup>8</sup> It is noteworthy that the volume of private support in Canada has been particularly high; in 1988, Canadians each privately contributed about US\$8.40 to NGOs, twice as much as did Britons at US\$4.20 apiece.<sup>9</sup> Government support to NGOs has also been stronger in Canada than in Britain and most of the rest of the OECD, both as a percentage of NGO income and as a percentage of government expenditure on oda. Of the NGOs which gave information in the survey, 45% of their total income was reported to come from government sources; and of government spending, some 8.69% of oda in 1991 was allocated to NGOs, higher than all in the member states but Belgium, Switzerland and the United States, (Britain spends only 0.45% of its oda on NGOs; refer again to figure 0.1). Indeed, if one combines the high level of Canadian private and government support, NGOs as a whole have maintained control over some 10-18% of total Canadian overseas assistance throughout the past twenty years (see figure 3.4). In numbers alone then, the NGO community in its size and in the monetary volume of its activity represents a sizeable presence on the domestic development scene.

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volunteer numbers), but the home figures are likely to be more accurate.

<sup>8</sup>Smillie and Filewod, "Canada," 1993:103.

<sup>9</sup>The total spent by citizens in Britain, the larger country, is of course somewhat higher: US\$218 million in Canada compared to US\$238.7 million in the UK. The volume of private contributions is higher only in Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic Countries, Switzerland and the US. Henny Helmich, "Nouveaux partenariats pour la coopération au développement," in *Répertoire des organisations non gouvernementales de développement dans les pays membres de l'OCDE*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1990, (p. 198).

Figure 3.3: Distribution of income among sample of 127 Canadian NGOs

Source: Appendix Two





Figure 3.4: Percentage of total Canadian aid (private and official donations) contributed by NGOs, 1971-1990

Source: OECD DAC reports, various years  
"Government sources" = contributions to NGOs,  
and "Private Donations" = grants by voluntary agencies



## Diversity

Yet the community of NGOs working in Canada is a varied and sometimes conflict-ridden group. The following section looks at the diversity of work undertaken by NGOs and introduces some of the issues which have affected their role as advocates. The section which follows picks up some of these ideas to look more closely at the role of advocacy itself.

(a) *Project Work Overseas.* By far the greatest number of NGOs are involved in the provision of funds for overseas projects; some ~~67~~<sup>2</sup>% of agencies which gave information in the thesis survey were involved in project work, (see figure 3.5).<sup>10</sup> Generally, however, Canadian NGOs are not primarily involved in the implementing of projects; many are instead channels, consultants, and intermediaries for projects proposed by local organizations. Oxfam-Canada, for example, does not implement projects "on the ground" but instead funds partner NGOs in the South, as does CCODP, MATCH International, and Inter Pares.

(b) *Material Assistance.* Sending goods overseas continues to be a popular form of aid for NGOs; some 25% of the NGOs in the survey sent material overseas in 1987. Food, books, clothes and farm/hospital equipment have been the most common items, and a few agencies (like Tools for Peace, which sends farm equipment to Nicaragua) are specialized in material provision. Official food aid, though decreasing as a proportion of total aid, is also increasingly channelled through NGOs; perhaps as much as 30%-50% of the total.<sup>11</sup> However, there have been concerns about the appropriateness of sending materials overseas; worries about the cost of shipping, the appropriateness of materials sent, the difficulty of finding replacement parts or qualified operators, as well as the more serious problem of displacing indigenous manufactures or trades if the assistance is long term. Many NGOs have subsequently dropped their material donation programs; 12 of the 18 organizations primarily active in this area in 1975 had by 1985 reduced their involvement.<sup>12</sup>

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
<sup>10</sup>In Brodhead's survey, some 58.9% of total NGO expenditures went to overseas programs in one shape or another, (Brodhead et al, *The Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:34).

<sup>11</sup>Smillie and Filewod, "Canada," 1993:109.

<sup>12</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:32.

Figure 3.5: Activities of Canadian and British NGOs  
(sample of 318 British NGOs and 218 Canadian organizations)

Source: Appendix Two



(c) *Child and Family Sponsorship.* Individual sponsorship, though one of the most attractive activities for fundraising efforts, has also fallen out of favour with many NGOs and only 2% of the thesis survey's respondents indicated that they used sponsorship programs. A few of the more prominent organizations do promote sponsorship, however; CANSAVE (the Canadian Save the Children Fund) and Foster Parents' Plan of Canada both make fundraising appeals based on the poverty of a given child.<sup>13</sup> The primary objection is that children are singled out for help, worsening the disparity of income within a community.

(d) *Emergency Relief.* Groups involved in emergency relief during times of environmental or man-made crises are the most familiar NGOs, even though only 10% of agencies in the thesis survey are involved in emergency relief work. This figure may be increasing however;<sup>14</sup> while most of the established NGOs had begun to move away from relief and material assistance, agencies created between 1980 and 1985 devoted greater proportions of their incomes to these causes, more than twice that of agencies founded before 1980),<sup>15</sup> and by the end of the decade, increased CIDA funding was further made available for relief work.<sup>16</sup> Competition for funds and mis-coordination have caused serious problems in administering aid on the ground,<sup>17</sup> however, and have generated image problems for the whole sector at home.<sup>18</sup> Unlike Britain, whose Disasters Emergency Committee coordinates NGO assistance, Canada has no overarching relief administration body.

(e) *Volunteer Sending.* For a long time a high profile activity, the sending of volunteers abroad has also decreased, although the thesis survey found that 33% of organizations did have staff or volunteers overseas. The number of Canadians working as volunteers overseas in the late 1980s numbered about 11,000, sent by groups like CUSO/SUCO, Canadian

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<sup>13</sup>In 1975, 17 agencies were involved in child sponsorship, but by 1985, 13 of those had dramatically cut their involvement, (Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:32).

<sup>14</sup>Murphy, "The Politics of Participation," 1991:175.

<sup>15</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:33-34.

<sup>16</sup>Murphy, "The Politics of Participation," 1991:175.

<sup>17</sup>On the ground activity contributes to the friction. Brodhead et al report that of the 44 Canadian agencies funding famine relief in one African country in 1984, 20 had never worked in the country before and of the others, ten had some relief experience elsewhere, four were supporting development in the country, and ten had neither any relief experience nor experience in that country prior to the drought, (*Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:38).

<sup>18</sup>The BandAid example discussed in a later chapter is a case in point. Spurred by the famines in the Sahel in the mid-1980s, a series of sports and music fundraising events were held by celebrities as an *alternative* to the traditional voluntary agencies, seen to be inefficient or inept in disbursing aid.

Executive Service Overseas, the Mennonite Central Committee, World University Service of Canada, the *Organisation canadienne pour la solidarité et le développement*, <sup>CECI</sup> ~~the~~ (Centre canadien d'études et de coopération internationale), and education exchange programs like Canada World Youth and Canadian Crossroads International. However, agencies are becoming less convinced of the suitability of sending cooperants overseas, even though the demand by Canadians wishing to volunteer has continued to grow. Reservations include concerns that Canadian volunteer labour might replace qualified indigenous personnel and that Canadian skills and world-view may be inappropriate to the host country. In the 1960s, the average cooperant was a new graduate looking for a "year out;" by the end of the 1980s, the average profile described a much older, much more specialized worker. In 1993, CIDA announced that it would not fund any new volunteer-sending organizations.

(f) *Development Education*. Development education takes up about 3% of the oda funding allocated to NGOs from CIDA, yet its importance to the NGO community is far more substantial -- over 23% of agencies in the thesis survey reported doing at least some development education. Indeed, the work done by these groups "may have been the most significant activity and contribution of the NGOs, with more lasting effect than the millions of dollars the NGOs used in programs in the Third World in the same period."<sup>19</sup> Sponsored almost entirely by the Public Participation Program (PPP) in CIDA, learner centres are chronically underfunded; very little is raised from private sources, and other NGOs (unlike in Britain) do not generally contribute to their operation. Development education centres usually house small local "alternative" libraries on development issues, organize workshops for teachers and students, and prepare curriculum materials. DEC, the Development Education Centre in Toronto, is the largest and sends resources nationwide. Other kinds of development education groups include Ten Days for World Development which organizes activities through church groups every October, or CUSO, Oxfam-Canada and the YMCA, which undertake public awareness programs.<sup>20</sup>

(g) *Research*. Much of the specialized academic research is concentrated in the government-funded but academically independent North-South Institute in Ottawa. The NSI supports

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<sup>19</sup>Murphy, "The Politics of Participation," 1991:171.

<sup>20</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:18.

research aimed at public education and policy (particularly on aid, trade, and finance), publishes report cards on government performance, and does the greatest amount of policy analysis among the NGOs. This respected research role is particularly important for the NGO community's credibility, because CIDA's openness to NGO advocacy depends largely on the quality of the submissions presented in CIDA-NGO consultations, parliamentary standing committees, and other working groups.<sup>21</sup> There are also specialized development studies departments in a number of Canadian universities, most prominently at the University of Toronto.

\* \* \* \* \*

Given the diversity of NGO activity and development philosophy, it is not surprising that the issue of advocacy as a new undertaking has gone through heated discussion. Some groups feel that any political work is inappropriate; that NGOs' credibility as humanitarian organizations is premised on their *apolitical* nature. Others argue that development is itself an inherently political activity, and that political means, i.e. engagement with governments over policy, must be used in order to propel change. The next section goes on to suggest the main elements of the rise of this debate on policy.

#### A HISTORY OF ADVOCACY

Only 5% of the organizations in the thesis survey identified lobbying as one of their prime activities, but the importance of policy work has been increasingly acknowledged throughout the community. This section looks at the history of lobbying undertaken by the NGO community in Canada, and unearths the kinds of issues involved, the rationale for adopting these kinds of macro issues, and the tactics wielded to bring about NGO influence.

Within the mainstream community of NGOs, the most prominent lobbying agency is the CCIC. The Council represents some 120 institutional members across Canada under a mandate to provide "a mixture of service to members, representation and defence of NGO

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<sup>21</sup>Interview with Lewis Perinbam, then Vice-President of Special Programs Branch, CIDA, Ottawa, 26 August 1991.

interests, and promotion of information-sharing among NGOs."<sup>22</sup> As NGOs have increasingly become concerned with government relations, the CCIC has honed this role in particular.<sup>23</sup> In 1975, the Council developed a governmental mandate, formed a working group on government in 1977, and in 1979, hired a full-time member of staff. As the main voice of the community, the CCIC has a measure of influence in government that smaller groups feel they cannot wield alone. Yet conflict among members about the Council's proper role in advocacy work has diluted its lobbying efforts; too often its pronouncements have been "unfocused, reactive, and poorly researched"<sup>24</sup> or have been seen to be thinly representative of its community's views.<sup>25</sup> Other criticisms point to the CCIC's "parochial" activism -- rather than concentrating on substantive issues (such as aid and trade policy), some critics suggest that the CCIC's efforts are wasted because they remain "tied to the government agenda"<sup>26</sup> by concentrating on the details of NGO funding and on CIDA's administrative demands. Some of these issues will be taken up again later in the chapter.

Another source of advocacy work has come from the church coalitions such as ICFID (Interchurch Fund for International development) and ICCHRLA (the Interchurch Coalition on Human Rights in Latin America); organizations which are generally more generously funded than the secular organizations and also less dependent on government sources for their income. Moreover, the churches have been involved in advocacy longer than many other NGOs, and they have been involved in some of the most contentious issues to face the community: apartheid, human rights in Latin America, structural adjustment and debt.<sup>27</sup> With the CCIC and a few of the more prominent NGOs, the churches complete the vanguard of NGO advocacy work.

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<sup>22</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:19.

<sup>23</sup>Maury Arnold Miloff, *The Role of Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations in Building Support for International Development*, MA research essay, Carleton University, 1981, (p. 75).

<sup>24</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:54.

<sup>25</sup>Miloff, "The Role of Canadian NGOs," 1981:127.

<sup>26</sup>Miloff, "The Role of Canadian NGOs," 1989:78.

<sup>27</sup>See, for example, the proceedings of a conference held in the early 1980s: Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt (editors), *Church and State: The Christian Churches and Canadian Foreign Policy*, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982.

Since the early days of CCIC's government relations work, there has been a shift in the kinds of issues debated. Advocacy work has changed from a primarily bread-and-butter interaction (over NGO funding conditions or the administration of aid) to a more substantive agenda. Further, as the issues have changed, the tactics used to advocate a particular policy have slowly altered as well. This next section takes a closer look at the bread-and-butter transformation and the tactics wielded to bring it about.

### The NGO Agenda

When NGOs started looking at CIDA policy in the 1970s, some critics suggested that NGOs were more concerned with the administration of aid policy than with its substance; that the main topics of conversation during meetings were "the size and conditions of financing. The CCIC is most assertive and cohesive when consulting about these 'bread and butter' issues," rather than about broader development concerns.<sup>28</sup> Even CIDA officials involved in these meetings have found NGO performance less than expected; Vice-President Lewis Perinbam voiced his disappointment with many of the NGOs who had submitted evidence to him in committee. Poorly researched, vague, and focused on NGO funding, many of the presentations he received were of little use in planning policy. He suggests that "they thus missed an opportunity to influence policy and to bring about the changes they were seeking."<sup>29</sup>

Yet while the focus on bread-and-butter issues has been a prominent element, the macro-economic agenda has always been present. Dating from the late 1960s, a small number of groups were expressly concerned with the debates being voiced in the UN on the NIEO, debt, commodity indexation, and special drawing rights. Over the course of the 1970s, groups also became involved in domestic and international solidarity activities (such as infant formula campaigning, seed bank resource protection, and lobbying against drug dumping overseas) as well as related Canadian issues (such as the Mackenzie Valley pipeline, or agribusiness

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<sup>28</sup>Miloff, *The Role of Canadian NGOs*, 1981:103. John S. Clark, *Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations and Their Influence on Canadian Development Policy*, University of Toronto, Development Studies Program Working Paper no. A.17, October 1985, (pp. 57-58).

<sup>29</sup>Interview with Perinbam, August 1991.

domination at home).<sup>30</sup> Many of these more politically controversial issues have been undertaken by the few groups which do not accept official funding; The Latin American Working Group, the Ecumenical Council for Economic Justice (previously, GATT-Fly, the main player in the World Food Conference), and ICCHRLA are prominent examples.<sup>31</sup> In the 1980s, the community of interest in macro-economic issues grew as the broad NGO agenda took on structural adjustment programs (SAP),<sup>32</sup> debt alleviation, human rights, trade rules, and other issues. Smith writes that in the mid-1980s, for example, Canadian NGOs were involved with efforts to get aid renewed or increased to Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua and Kampuchea; to force more stringent restrictions on South Africa and Guatemala; to have import duties lifted from Tanzanian goods; and to have government place a greater emphasis on basic needs and human rights in its aid programs.<sup>33</sup> Tim Brodhead explains that while there is still a tendency to leave advocacy up to the CCIC, there is a great deal undertaken today that would have been unlikely only five years ago. Even World Vision now takes stances on human rights abuse in Indonesia (albeit behind the scenes), and some like Inter Pares have switched almost entirely away from project work to policy research. Others, like ICFID, have become more involved discussing issues such as structural adjustment on a more formal basis with CIDA. While the bread-and-butter element has been a necessary element of the CCIC's relationship with CIDA, there is thus evidence that the proportion of more substantive issues has been rising on the NGO agenda.

### The Rise of Advocacy

The rise of NGO interest in macro-economic and broader foreign policy questions has come from a number of sources: ethics, experience, and peer pressure. The combination of these factors has made it difficult for the NGO community to ignore the option of greater advocacy work.

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<sup>30</sup>Murphy, "The Politics of Participation," 1991:181.

<sup>31</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:66.

<sup>32</sup>See Clark for a general discussion of NGO involvement with structural adjustment programs: John Clark, *Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations*, London: Earthscan Publications, 1991, Chapter 12.

<sup>33</sup>Brian H. Smith, *More Than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990, (p. 143).

(a) *Ethics*. The ethical rationale for undertaking policy work is typified in the civil society writings of David Korten.<sup>34</sup> In his *Getting to the 21st Century*, Korten argues that there are "generations" of institutional development within the NGO community which mark an organization's progress from a role as service deliverer to a more genuine partnership with Southern organizations. Because Korten's typology has been central in the most recent debates about NGO institutional change, it implies a normative improvement for NGOs choosing to enter the governmental arena. In a field of endeavour that is intrinsically value-based, such categories have a great deal of force: if advocacy means that an NGO is doing ethically *better* work, as opposed to simply *different* work, then the argument becomes especially compelling.

(b) *Experience*. Other explanations for the rise of advocacy among NGOs come from their day-to-day experience, including an awareness of the limitations of official aid in bringing about development. Brodhead explains that "aid alone is bound to fail, given its small part in resource transfers, unless it is linked to other changes in the international economy."<sup>35</sup> If NGOs are to improve "development," they must engage in non-traditional aid issues such as domestic trading practices, international lending conditionality, and economic reform. The NGO decision to take up a position in opposition to structural adjustment, for example, was made on the grounds that,

The problem is persistent, pervasive, undermines all efforts to overcome the economic crisis, has demonstrated particularly harmful effects on the poorest and most vulnerable, and is sabotaging efforts to rebuild democratic societies in many regions of the world. It is a complex, technical issue of the kind typically shunned in the past as too "macro" for NGOs to tackle.<sup>36</sup>

Because these and other macro issues are being acknowledged as fundamental limits on the efforts of NGOs, Brodhead argues that the nature of the problem has thus forced a change in NGO activity.

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<sup>34</sup>David C. Korten, *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda*, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1990, (p. 117).

<sup>35</sup>Tim Brodhead, "NGOs: The Next 25 years," in *CUSO Journal*, 1986, p. 21.

<sup>36</sup>Tim Brodhead, "Development Education, a Northern Perspective," presentation to the 14th General Assembly of the Development Non-Governmental Organizations, Brussels, 18-21 April 1988, (p. 11).

(c) *Southern Peer Pressure*. Another element explaining the rise of NGO activism has been a growing demand for change in Northern NGO activity from the South.<sup>37</sup> As the number of Southern NGOs has grown, they have begun to press for a re-orientation of their relationship with their Northern "partners" to a two-way exchange of information and experience.<sup>38</sup>

Principal among their demands has been a greater measure of advocacy work from Northern agencies on policy issues.

Northern NGOs must become familiar with development struggles in their own societies, confront political and other constraints to development in the South which originate in the policies of bilateral and multilateral institutions controlled by the North, and work together with Southern partners to redress the power imbalance in their relationships.<sup>39</sup>

For Canadian organizations that had built their legitimacy on ideas such as "partnership" and "empowerment," these demands for a *new* type of development work could only be ignored with difficulty.

## Tactics

Taking on this advocacy role has involved a broad range of techniques for soliciting government support. As we will see, NGOs have begun to use less obtrusive insider tactics as their access to decision-making has improved over the last decade. Beginning with the "traditional" repertoire of outsider tactics, this section chronicles that change of approach.

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<sup>37</sup>See, for example, papers offered in: CUSO and the North-South Institute, *Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations in International Development: Mobilization, Partnership and Effectiveness*, Ottawa, 15-17 October 1986; Anne Gordon Drabek (editor), *World Development*, supplement entitled "Development Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs," vol. 15, Autumn 1987; Yash Tandon, "Foreign NGO's, Uses and Abuses: An African Perspective," paper read at the Roundtable organised by the African Association of Public Administration (AAPAM) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Special Action Programme in Administration and Management -- Regional Project (ECA/SAPAM), Abuja, Nigeria, December 1990; Alan Fowler, "Building Partnership between Northern and Southern Development NGOs: Issues for the Nineties," paper presented to the Society for International Development 20th World Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 6-9 May 1991; Sithembiso Nyoni (interviewed by John Best), "Zimbabwe: exploring 'partnership,'" in *Bulletin*, University of Reading Agricultural Extension and Rural Development Department, 28 February 1990, pp. 30-36.

<sup>38</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:133. See also Partnership Africa Canada in collaboration with the Pan African Institute for Development, "Partnership: Matching Rhetoric to Reality," discussion paper, undated but probably 1990.

<sup>39</sup>CCIC, "The Critical 90's: CCIC Organizational Review," discussion paper, 15 November 1990, (p. 5). Similar points continued to be made during the 1992 CIDA-NGO consultations: Betty Plewes, the new CCIC Executive Director, argued that while the Council's partners still requested funding assistance, the main focus was on improved North-South policy dialogue among NGOs, and more links to indigenous social movements.

(a) *Media-Focused Actions.* The use of mainstream media to influence government has not been a particularly successful tactic for NGOs in Canada. Only 5.27% of the news space in the major papers over the past twenty years has recounted North-South news, a figure which has not changed substantially over the period.<sup>40</sup> NGOs lack of success in increasing North-South coverage is a particular problem for two reasons: one, most Canadians learn about the world primarily via TV, radio, and newspapers;<sup>41</sup> and two, time-pressed officials scan the newspapers more than any other single source for indications of public opinion. In order to generate broader media coverage of their issues, then, NGOs' publications have been geared to more sensationalist topics, usually the failure of the government to deal with one or another issue. The "report card" has been one such method. ICFID's 1991 *Diminishing Our Future* is a noteworthy example (one which caused CIDA's president to blame NGOs for a billion dollar cut in his budget),<sup>42</sup> but there have also been regular report cards from the North-South Institute on government policy, and the CCIC's 1991 review of CIDA.<sup>43</sup> This recent review, which criticized CIDA's success in meeting the goals laid out in *Sharing Our Future*, particularly raised the ire of the minister; Landry is reported to have been so incensed by its publication that her relations with NGOs were soured for at least six months afterward.<sup>44</sup>

(b) *Public Demonstrations.* The history of mass demonstrations over North-South issues in Canada has been minimal. Given the size of the country, it has been difficult to organize mass gatherings like those orchestrated by British NGOs on Westminster (described in the next chapters). Exceptions have included the Miles for Millions walks organized in the late 1960s, and other more localized fundraising events. The nearest approximation may be NGOs' lobbying in international fora; as the chapter on the World Food Conference illustrates, the UN has traditionally been the main focal point for NGO activism in Canada. Canadian NGOs were involved throughout the 1970s in UN conferences on the environment (1972), population (1974), food (1970 and 1974), housing (1976), and trade (the UNCTAD I-

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<sup>40</sup>John R. Walker, *Third World News Coverage: A Survey of Leading Canadian Dailies*, Ottawa: North South Institute, September 1989.

<sup>41</sup>CCIC, "The Critical 90's," 1990:9.

<sup>42</sup>Interchurch Fund for International Development, *Diminishing Our Future: CIDA: Four Years After Winegard, A Report on Recent Developments in Canadian Development Assistance Policies and Practice*, Canadian Council of Churches, October 1991.

<sup>43</sup>CCIC, "Report Card on the Government of Canada's Foreign Aid Program," Ottawa, February 1991.

<sup>44</sup>Interview with Marc Dolgin, Director of the NGO Division, CIDA, Ottawa, 29 August 1991.

VI meetings). Telegrams to officials and the media, meetings with ministers and reporters, attendance at NGO parallel meetings, badgering of delegates, and other public actions while at the conference have all been elements of their lobbying. The focus on UN institutions waned by the end of the 1970s, however, as NGOs became frustrated with the slow pace of reform at the UN and the imperceptibility of their own influence over the proceedings. Until the Earth Summit in Rio, UNCTAD VI in 1979 was the last UN conference Canadian NGOs attended in significant numbers.

(c) *Letter-writing Campaigns.* NGOs have used letter writing campaigns to ministers and to MPs in order to lobby for a wide variety of issues: government correspondence files include letters of support for the NIEO, concern over cuts to the NGO budget, international debt relief, and increases in oda.<sup>45</sup> Letter-writing is a common tactic, but NGOs acknowledge that the influence of such campaigns are limited and depend on the quantity of letters, the nature of the issue, and the identity of the recipient. If a large number of letters are received about a given issue, officials may well take notice (as we will see in the World Conference chapter), but any letter generated as part of an organized NGO campaign is usually discounted. Another factor is that senior officials do not, of course, answer their own mail; much of CIDA's and EA's outgoing correspondence is generated from a small External Affairs division and only the number of letters received is communicated to senior management.

(d) *Research.* NGOs have also sought to alter government policy through the presentation of their own research. In certain cases, as we have seen, NGO expertise has often been cultivated by government: advice on putting a "human face" on SAP, or on integrating women better in grassroots projects. In other cases, NGOs have been less successful in bringing their findings to government attention, such as when the ICCHRLA unsuccessfully tried to persuade SSEA MacEachen to alter his policy in Central America, and ended up pursuing more public lobbying routes.<sup>46</sup> In the 1990s, however, as NGOs have been considering insider approaches, many are eschewing controversial publication of their research. In a

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<sup>45</sup>From a review of correspondence in government files.

<sup>46</sup>See a copy of ICCHRLA's letter to MacEachen dated 8 December 1982, in Matthews and Pratt, *Church and State*, 1982: Appendix B. See also Brian J.R. Stevenson, *Domestic Pressures, External Constraints and the New Internationalism: Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America, 1968-1990*, Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, Canada, July 1992.

recent case, the CCIC commissioned a study on the Horn of Africa and presented its findings to CIDA's minister, Monique Landry. The 1990 study criticized the government's approach to famine in Ethiopia and made recommendations for substantial policy change, and during a subsequent meeting, while CIDA questioned the report's findings, the agency indicated a wish to work more closely with NGOs on the issue. The CCIC then made the interesting decision "not to issue the report publicly but to share it with interested NGOs, to test CIDA's stated willingness to consult and share information with NGOs, and to monitor closely CIDA's future response to the famine."<sup>47</sup> The use of research in this way – avoiding embarrassment to the government – is evidence of a slow shift of tactics among NGOs to a longer term, insider strategy.

(e) *Focus on Parliament.* Where NGOs have not been successful raising an issue in camera, they have traditionally focused their lobbying attention on Parliament. Bob Miller, the research director of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT), argues that NGOs value and use parliamentary channels because both are marginalized (business avoids and dismisses Parliament), because it is an existing and established forum for debate, and because it *does* have an effect *in* the system.<sup>48</sup> NGOs have concentrated their efforts on two of those channels: MPs in the House of Commons, and the standing and subcommittees of Parliament.

In order to cultivate a sympathetic constituency for development in Parliament, the CCIC's original government relations mandate was to monitor the activity of MPs and to solicit their opinions on North-South issues. However, as these issues have rarely made it to main House debates, NGOs have concentrated on the special parliamentary committees, especially SCEAIT and its International Development subcommittee. Over the course of the 1980s, as parliamentary committees generally have been attributed with a growing influence over government policy,<sup>49</sup> it seems that NGOs' indirect influence may have also grown. While

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<sup>47</sup>CCIC, Tim Brodhead (CCIC's Executive Director), letter to CCIC member agencies, entitled "CCIC Report: Discounting Famine: An Assessment of the Canadian Response to the Ethiopian Famine 1989-90," 24 January 1991.

<sup>48</sup>Interview with Bob Miller, Deputy Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa, 17 October 1992.

<sup>49</sup>See David R. Morrison, "Evaluating Development Assistance, 1987," in Don Munton and John Kirton (editors), *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1992.

NGO briefs on aid and related policies (tied aid, immigration, NIEO, oda volume, NGO funding, and development education) had been presented to SCEAIT since the mid-1970s,<sup>50</sup> it was only in the mid-1980s (as discussed in the last chapter) that NGOs began to make regular appearances in committee.<sup>51</sup> NGO presentations to the North-South Task Force (a parliamentary study group set up after the Brandt report in 1980) had unambiguously contributed to the task force's conclusion that Canada's tying policy was inappropriate. Their report, *For Whose Benefit?* was the catalyst document which eventually propelled the government to put together its *Sharing Our Future* White Paper, and may well have influenced *Sharing's* decision to reduce Canadian tying requirements from 80% to 50% for sub-Saharan Africa, and 66.6% for other regions.

(f) *Meetings and Consultations with Government.* Throughout NGOs' history, they have also also been engaged in informal and formal meetings with CIDA, and increasingly also with the Department of External Affairs. In the early 1990s, after a tense period in NGO-government relations, NGOs were beginning to enter these meetings intent on "rapprochement" rather than controversy, and government has similarly seemed more willing to consult with NGOs (on certain issues) than previously. The move to a more cooperative style of advocacy is illustrated by CCIC's new executive director, Betty Plewes, who argued at the 1992 CIDA-NGO consultations that NGOs needed *both* to do better policy work *and* to collaborate better with government. A recent example was Inter Pares' work with CIDA's Asia Branch over the policy framework for Bangladesh: over a two year period, the NGO consulted with CIDA in camera, helping to plan the framework with local NGOs and the Bangladeshi government. Part of the reason CIDA ascribed success to that consultative arrangement was Inter Pares' agreement to keep information confidential,<sup>52</sup> and as CCIC ex-Director Tim Brodhead argues, future advocacy work will be increasingly selective and quiet.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>50</sup>See, for example: CCIC/CUSO, "CCIC/CUSO Brief to the Sub-Committee on International Development of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense," February 1976; and CCIC, "Summary of Briefs," presented by non-governmental organizations to the Sub-Committee on International Development of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense, 2 May 1977.

<sup>51</sup>CCIC, "Government Relations Report," notes from the CCIC's 13th annual general meeting, Ottawa, 25-27 May 1981.

<sup>52</sup>These points were discussed in the policy analysis and dialogue workshop at the 1992 CIDA-NGO consultations in Hull, Québec.

<sup>53</sup>Interview with Brodhead, October 1992.

In another example, for NGOs working on traditionally conflict-ridden human rights issues, this new conciliatory approach has also made headway. Every year, External Affairs meets with the human rights NGO community to discuss its position going into the annual UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva. Officials there explained that many NGOs have become better prepared and more professional: detailing the changes they wish to see in the UNHRC's approach to controversial countries, specifying the resolutions they believe Canada ought to endorse, and being well-attuned and well-versed in the workings of the UN system. Furthermore, it has become apparent that NGOs' less confrontational approach has meant that they are taken more seriously. Officials acknowledged that groups which best know the UN and Canadian decision-making systems and know what is possible, like Amnesty International and Pen (a journalist-based NGO), have thus had the most influence.<sup>54</sup>

If this move to an insider approach has allowed NGOs a greater measure of credibility and influence, according to officials themselves, what kinds of impediment remain in their way?

#### ISSUES AFFECTING ADVOCACY

Given the growing momentum of NGOs interested in advocacy work, and their menu of sometimes influential tactics, there nevertheless remain significant obstacles to their influence over government policy. This last section outlines some of the major internal and external forces which may impede their say on policy.

#### Conflicts of Vision

One of the limits to NGOs' potential influence over policy has been divisiveness within their own ranks; not all agencies are *willing* to engage in policy work. The point is important because government has often sought consensus from the NGO community; when disagreements arise within the community, they have been used to justify discounting the

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<sup>54</sup>Confidential remark made at the annual human rights consultation held at External Affairs, Ottawa, 13-14 January 1993.

value of NGO arguments. As one CIDA official explained, "if we hear the same thing often, it is a consensus we pay attention to."<sup>55</sup>

(a) *Philosophy.* One element of the conflict is philosophical; taking on substantially new issues is not merely a question of capacity, but of philosophy. Inevitably, the choice of taking up policy work has forced a divide in the consensus; what has been called "the breakdown of the polite fiction that as NGOs we are really all in this together."<sup>56</sup> In 1986, for example, disagreements within the CCIC over the role of NGO advocacy led to the creation of a parallel umbrella group, the International Development Executives Association (IDEA). Within the CCIC itself, some members objected to the *methods* of dealing with government; as CCIC staff member Tim Draimin argues, it has been difficult to make the change to insider advocacy work without accusations of selling out, of succumbing to the "hot tub syndrome"<sup>57</sup> (of excessive intimacy). When, in 1992, CIDA announced a new liaison committee for regular policy dialogue with NGOs (in the hopes of diffusing the tensions that had arisen out of spending cuts, SAP controversy, and the critical *Diminishing Our Future* and CCIC report card on CIDA) some expressed concern that NGOs were perhaps on the road to willing co-optation.

(b) *Scepticism.* A further factor affecting the choice to engage in policy work is scepticism. A number of NGOs question how effective policy work could possibly be, even though most acknowledge that the issues at the core of advocacy work are critical ones. As a representative from CODE at the CIDA-NGO consultations in 1992 asked, "What *could* we do, given the political reality?" CIDA's Marc Dolgin argues, indeed, that most groups have *not* turned to advocacy work, and Brodhead points out that many NGOs still do not see how or why they should be involved with policy at all.<sup>58</sup> In some cases, NGOs have felt that effort would be only be wasted on advocacy work; MATCH staff member Cynthia King explained, "NGOs decided ahead of time that it would be wasted effort to oppose structural adjustment, so agreed among themselves to initiate regular formalized meetings. They were

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<sup>55</sup>This comment was made by an official at the 1992 CIDA-NGO consultations held in Hull in October.

<sup>56</sup>Brodhead, "NGOs: The next 25 years," 1986:22.

<sup>57</sup>Interview with Tim Draimin, CCIC, Ottawa, 19 October 1992.

<sup>58</sup>Interviews with Dolgin, August 1991; and with Draimin, October 1992.

aware that CIDA staff could not affect CIDA's policy of SAP."<sup>59</sup> Her view was that the CCIC should be left to organize what advocacy work it could, given MATCH's own time constraints and the limited amount of policy change possible. On grounds of sceptical pragmatism, a number of agencies have thus opted out of the policy circuit.

## Resources

Other limits to the possible influence of NGOs are related to the "resources" voluntary organizations have on hand, including: expertise needed, costs in time and money allocated to advocacy work, knowledge of the governmental process, and the organizational capacity to coordinate and collaborate among agencies.

(a) *Expertise*. NGOs' legitimacy has come in part from their ability to provide alternative and innovative information about development; as Brodhead writes, "to be credible and effective, they must do their own research and analysis in order to mount a coherent alternative set of proposals."<sup>60</sup> However, NGOs traditionally have been seen as experts only in a limited realm of issues. There was an illustrative case in 1976, when NGOs were perceived by officials to have put forward recommendations out of their ken; the breadth of issues covered (including the NIEO, guaranteed annual income, the rights of migrants, and the conduct of multinationals within Canada), was perceived to be too wide, and the CCIC's credibility as a research organization was subsequently questioned.<sup>61</sup> The scope of "legitimate topics" for NGO intervention has since widened somewhat, but not all agencies have become particularly skilled in developing expertise in these "new" macro fields. Despite their emphasis on special knowledge, remarkably few NGOs do much work on information coordination, dissemination, and research; the North-South Institute, the Latin American Working Group, and the *Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe* are among the exceptions.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup>Interview with Cynthia King, MATCH International, Ottawa, 2 October 1992.

<sup>60</sup>Tim Brodhead, "Macrotrends and Microwaves," in *Contact* (CCIC newsletter), vol 12, no. 4, February 1989, p. 2.

<sup>61</sup>Miloff, "The Role of Canadian NGOs," 1981:80.

<sup>62</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:48.

(b) *Funding.* Another concern is the cost of advocacy work, either in financial or opportunity cost terms. As one CCIC staff member pointed out, NGOs need "to be clear that our investment in a particular process is a priority for the community and worth using the often considerable resources required."<sup>63</sup> Part of the problem is raising the money in the first place; a common complaint is, "where do we get the resources to do policy work? People won't give us money to do that."<sup>64</sup> As we will see later, CIDA regulations forbid the use of government money for direct advocacy work, and for organizations heavily dependent on government funding, cost thus becomes an especially strong deterrent. Cynthia King at MATCH explains that "advocacy at MATCH is limited because CIDA is not prepared to finance it. Most groups cannot afford to do that *and* projects *and* development education, and so leave most of the work to the CCIC or the church coalitions." This delegation of advocacy work to a few umbrella groups has been one way of transferring the cost of advocacy, and has naturally led to a concentration of advocacy work among a small number of agencies.

(c) *Knowledge of the governmental process.* Only very few NGOs have expertise working with government. In her masters thesis on the influence of Canadian NGOs, Jacques argues that one of the most important limits on NGO influence is their lack of knowledge about government administration and decision-making.<sup>65</sup> As CCIC Ex-Executive Director Richard Harmston pointed out, however, there is much greater pressure now for NGOs to escape from their reputation as amateurs, both in and out of their interactions with government.<sup>66</sup> This push toward professionalism in lobbying, including a greater knowledge of the governmental process, generated the 1993 series of CCIC workshops on "Building NGO Capacity for Policy Development," where many NGOs *began* the process of thinking about their potential work with government policy. NGOs at the workshop, however, often spoke of a lack of time, leadership, and confidence to undertake such work, exacerbated by worries over possible risks to their funding.

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<sup>63</sup>CCIC, notes from the Annual General Meeting, 29 May 1992.

<sup>64</sup>Comment made during the policy workshop of the 1992 CIDA-NGO consultations held in October in Hull.

<sup>65</sup>Marlène Jacques, *L'influence des organisations non-gouvernementales sur la politique canadienne de coopération au développement international*, M.Sc. Université de Montréal, Canada, May 1991, (p. 85).

<sup>66</sup>Interview with Richard Harmston, now Executive Director of the South Asia Partnership, in Ottawa, 20 October 1992.

(d) *Networks and Coordinating Ability.* Another limited resource is the system of networks connecting NGOs, as well as their capacity to coordinate advocacy activities.<sup>67</sup> As Brodhead et al note, "there is a constant tension in the NGO community between agencies' desire to preserve their individualism, and their recognition of the practical benefits of cooperation. The very diversity of NGOs makes coordinating activities difficult."<sup>68</sup> Some agencies are reluctant to let go of any portion of their autonomy even to present a united front, and for every NGO, coordination costs scarce time and money. This diversity means that organizations like the CCIC spend more of their time accommodating their membership than working toward other goals. Yet coordination is critical for many of the CCIC's policy-centred activities; for its own credibility, the Council must be seen to present a consensus view.

The case of the failure of the joint funding proposal is one example. CIDA, concerned with the severity of the African drought in 1991 and limited in its own funds, contemplated organizing a public fundraising campaign jointly with NGOs. When CIDA met with the voluntary agencies, however, it faced a mixed response. Midst muted approval and some pragmatic reservations (about the scope and timing of the campaign), organizations registered concern that some could lose part of their donor base to other agencies, and that it would be difficult to agree on the composition of the group of participating NGOs. In particular, some indicated that World Vision (the largest income earner among NGOs and one of the most prominent relief organizations), would be unwelcome on the grounds that its evangelical mandate and controversial "starving-children" fundraising imagery were inappropriate. In the end, CIDA concluded that "it is not likely that we will be able to assemble a sufficiently credible and representative group around a joint public campaign that could be pre-planned to respond to a future disaster."<sup>69</sup> These kinds of territorial skirmishes among NGOs have long made coordination difficult, and according to the executive director of CUSO, Lyse

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<sup>67</sup>The issue of poor NGO coordination and cooperation is relevant throughout the OECD. See Smillie's discussion in "Changing Partners: Northern NGOs, Northern Governments," in Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (editors), *Stakeholders in Development: Issues in Government/NGO Relationships*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1993.

<sup>68</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:19.

<sup>69</sup>Intradepartment memo, External Affairs, August 1991.

Blanchard, it was probably only the devastating budget cuts in 1989 that forced NGOs to begin to get together in the 1990s in earnest.<sup>70</sup>

### Autonomy

A further limit on the influence of NGOs is their dependence on official funding and the concern about autonomy which it generates. NGOs fear that both explicit and implicit strings are tied to government funding, and that those conditions will curtail their plans for advocacy work. It is relevant to stress that Canadian NGOs receive a larger proportion of official funding than any other OECD country, barring Switzerland;<sup>71</sup> and that the ratio of public to private support of NGOs is furthermore increasing. About 39% of the agencies working in 1975 received more than half their funding from government, but by 1984, that figure had risen to 59%.<sup>72</sup> As we have seen, this growth in official funding has been phenomenal (refer again to figure 3.1), but as cuts in the 1990s bit into the budget, it is equally noteworthy that Canada has been alone in the OECD in decreasing allocation for its NGOs.<sup>73</sup>

NGOs are funded through myriad channels.<sup>74</sup> Outside of income earned through provincial contributions and tax relief, CIDA dominates as the source of government funds, and although official responsibility for NGOs rests with the NGO Division, in reality there are many divisions and officers involved.<sup>75</sup> The primary funding mechanism is the responsive program, whereby NGO projects are co-funded at a ratio of 1:1 or more, depending on the program (in some coalition work, the ratio has been as high as 9:1). Increasingly, other funding windows have also been created to provide special incentives for NGOs to take up particular programs or countries - population control or child immunization are examples.

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<sup>70</sup>Comment made at the 1992 CIDA-NGO consultations held in October in Hull, Québec.

<sup>71</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:25.

<sup>72</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?* 1989:57. By the end of the 1980s, according to the thesis survey, the figure was 46%.

<sup>73</sup>Smillie and Filewod, "Canada," 1993:116.

<sup>74</sup>For an overview, see: F.L.A. Ward (Director General, NGO Division, CIDA), "Evolving Patterns of NGO Support," mimeo, Ottawa, 15 August 1987.

<sup>75</sup>CCIC, Ian Smillie, "A Time to Build Up New Forms of Cooperation Between NGOs and CIDA," Ottawa, December 1991, (p. 17).

There are at least fourteen special funds, five mainstream funds, and many specific bilateral desk programs open for NGO intervention, more than in any other DAC country.<sup>76</sup>

This kind of multi-faceted funding policy has fueled the debate about NGO autonomy, which has in turn concentrated on the issues raised by the country-focus funding program. The program has shown phenomenal growth, and NGOs have made use of a large portion of the funds available through it: over 50% of country-focus funding currently goes to just five agencies (CARE, UNICEF, WUSC, CUSO, and CECI),<sup>77</sup> and NGOs overall were estimated to have received upwards of one-fourth of their total official revenue from country-focus in 1985-86.<sup>78</sup> Indeed, in some cases, NGOs have become financially overextended because of their dependence on country-focus programming; WUSC, the Canadian Hunger Foundation and Plenty Canada, all heavy users, all required special arrangements by CIDA to overcome their financial problems. WUSC eventually even went into temporary receivership.

This growing dependence on official funding has always been worrisome for NGOs. The words of the Executive Director of SUCO in 1970 are typical; "can we realistically pretend we can remain independent of a government agency indefinitely, when we collect 94% of our budget from them?"<sup>79</sup> Some agencies have volunteered to limit their own acceptance of government funds: Oxfam, for example, early on chose to accept no more than 10% of its income from government sources.<sup>80</sup> When country-focus was inaugurated in the early 1980s, however, the worries over funding dependency deepened; were NGOs taking advantage of increased funding windows for their own projects, or were they being led by a funding carrot to do the government's work on the cheap?<sup>81</sup> CUSO's Lyse Blanchard argues that NGOs

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<sup>76</sup>Smillie and Filewod, "Canada," 1993:116.

<sup>77</sup>Murphy, "The Politics of Participation," 1991:173.

<sup>78</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:61. Funding to the country-focus program is no longer growing, however, either in absolute terms or as a proportion of oda. External Minister Monique Landry had said that CIDA needs to justify its expenditures via non-profits, given the availability of for-profit firms in the sector.

<sup>79</sup>Paul Hitschfeld, *Neuf organisations non-gouvernementales de coopération internationale: Évolution de leurs relations avec le public canadien et avec l'Agence canadienne de développement international*, research essay, University of Ottawa, 1973, (p. 55), translated by this author. SUCO later became more rebellious in its relationship to CIDA, particularly in pushing for the overthrow of white governments in Southern Africa. While less confrontational, SUCO's English-speaking counterpart CUSO also began to break bonds in the early decade, (Donna M. Pegg, *The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Canadian International Development*, research essay, Carleton University, April 1975, pp. 69-70).

<sup>80</sup>Oxfam-Canada, *White Paper on Political Affairs*, Toronto, 1972; cited in Hitschfeld, 1973:56.

<sup>81</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:59-60.

were ahead of government on development initiatives 20 years ago because of their on-the-ground experience, but this is no longer true. Part of the reason, she argues, is that NGOs have followed government funding priorities and have *allowed* themselves to be co-opted. Brodhead goes further to argue that with the shrinkage of government services in the 1980s and the increase of funding to NGOs as alternate service providers, NGOs have thus suffered a growing measure of "occupational angst."<sup>82</sup> In a community where dependency on government funding is high, the concern is that NGOs will themselves chose not to engage in advocacy work for fear of losing their funding.

Many Canadian NGOs have already moved to relatively safe territory. The matching arrangement with CIDA ... has resulted in a long slow encroachment of CIDA's inherent restrictions within NGOs. The temptation of having dollars matched acts as an overpowering magnet for NGO resources. These dollars become subject to the parameters of CIDA's accountability and explicit and implicit priorities. Gradually, many Canadian NGOs have begun to lose their desire and capacity to take risks.<sup>83</sup>

If funding dependency generates these kinds of concern about CIDA's *implicit* influence over policy work, what kinds of *explicit* conditions *are* attached to government funding? Although CIDA money is not permitted for lobbying work (which must instead be raised from other sources), there is no record that the agency has ever overtly threatened cuts in project funding for agencies which also carry out lobbying.<sup>84</sup> NGO concerns over funding conditionality have dated from the 1970s, but even early critics have suggested that NGOs may have over-emphasized the threat of constraint. In 1975, for example, Pegg reported that while a number of organizations "complain that CIDA makes too many 'suggestions' of projects to undertake and [has] the coercive power of refusing grants if they are not followed," she reports that "this occurs very rarely."<sup>85</sup> Indeed, it is important to note that, historically, the threshold of CIDA tolerance has been high: in the early 1970s, it surprisingly let pass the provocative Oxfam-Québec slogan, "Québec-Angola, zones à libérer;"<sup>86</sup> and has frequently and generously

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<sup>82</sup>Interviews with Blanchard and Brodhead, October 1992.

<sup>83</sup>CCIC, "Mind if I Cut In?," report of the Task Force on CIDA-NGO Funding Relationships, Ottawa, 1988, (p. 8).

<sup>84</sup>Clark, *Canadian NGOs*, 1985:12.

<sup>85</sup>Pegg, "The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations," 1975:66.

<sup>86</sup>Hitschfeld, *Neuf organisations*, 1973:60. The slogan, meaning "Quebec and Angola: Areas to Liberate," was contentious at the time because of a particularly violent spate of separatist actions by the *Front de libération du Québec*. Fuel was added to the fire when visiting French General de Gaulle saluted a public assembly with "Vive le Québec libre!," and so incited a fierce political row in English-speaking Canada.

funded controversial organizations like CUSO, (which actively lobbied against investment in Chile, Guatemala, and South Africa, published anti-Israeli pamphlets, brought Saharan guerrillas and Patriotic Front members to speak in Canada, and engaged in other such activities).<sup>87</sup> Up to the 1990s, indeed, even the most vocal critics of Canadian aid policy (Oxfam or CUSO, for example), have not found their CIDA grants threatened.<sup>88</sup>

The change which does seem to have occurred, however, is in the level of CIDA and EA *sensitivity* to political work. Richard Harmston of South Asia Partnership suggests that the tolerance level for lobbying by government-funded groups is lessened today, partly due to an official "mood" that special interest groups are living off government largesse.<sup>89</sup> While NGOs have not, by and large, crossed the magical "political line," there are indications that government may have drawn that line more tightly. Murphy argues that,

CIDA has been very sensitive to the lobbying of the NGOs and the use of government funds to directly or indirectly criticize government policy. This has been especially true since the concentrated campaign against the reopening of bilateral aid to El Salvador in 1984-5. The relationship between the NGOs and CIDA has begun to reach a fundamental turning point, largely ~~th~~rough not solely as a result of the role of activist NGOs in making formal presentations to parliamentary committees.<sup>90</sup>

Murphy's argument here is supported by government correspondence in 1991, in which CIDA officials were thinking about ways to soften the advocacy work of the agencies it funded. After looking at the existing conditions of funding (which include the ruling that no government money be spent on policy work), the agency decided that because the CCIC's advocacy activities were separately funded, "some reduction in CCIC's programme would have little, if any, impact on its advocacy activities; nevertheless it is an option, e.g. by funding its core program on a 1:1 rather than a 3:1 basis and by reducing or stopping our contributions to Special Projects."<sup>91</sup> In the end, however, the idea was dropped, perhaps to avoid further antagonism, and no special reduction in CCIC's funding was made.

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<sup>87</sup>Paul Malvern, *Persuaders: Influence Peddling, Lobbying and Corruption in Canada*, Agincourt, ON: Methuen, 1985, (pp. 91-93).

<sup>88</sup>Tim Brodhead and Cranford Pratt, "CIDA and Canadian NGOs: Paging the Piper," in Cranford Pratt (editor), *Canadian International Development Assistance*, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, forthcoming 1994.

<sup>89</sup>Interview with Harmston, September 1992.

<sup>90</sup>Murphy, "The Politics of Participation," 1991:181-2.

<sup>91</sup>Intradepartmental memo, CIDA, March 1991.

## Public Support

Perhaps one of the greatest impediments to the influence of the NGO community is the scarcity of decided public support for development. Canadians are, on the whole, benignly interested in helping the poor, just as long as it doesn't take too long or cost too much. Moreover, and this is the concern for "politicizing" NGOs, the support that NGOs *do* receive has been based on a very different welfare approach to development. The image of the "do-gooder well-digger" dominates NGO fundraising and campaigning efforts, contributes to internal conflict within the community, and sometimes inhibits NGOs from taking on policy work.

Polls have anxiously prodded and analyzed public opinion over the past twenty-five years, but the results have been mixed. On the one hand, the long-standing consensus (see figure 3.6)<sup>92</sup> is that more than 75% of Canadians believe that Canada should help other countries and that development criteria should predominate in our allocation of aid.<sup>93</sup> On the other hand, these polls also indicate a low level of public interest in and/or knowledge of development issues generally; only sporadically high interest during publicized emergencies; quick criticism of government inadequacies and NGO failings; and a general precedence given to home economic difficulties over those elsewhere. As the 1990 Synergistics Consulting report commissioned by the CCIC found,

The public, bombarded with competing messages, is apathetic because of the low visibility and credibility of NGOs. It suffers from attitudinal problems generated by more and more frequent appeals for emergency relief, is concerned about recession at home, and suffers from "aid fatigue." This is manifested in a stagnating donations base and a weak response to cutbacks in government aid programs.<sup>94</sup>

This public apathy is a particular problem for NGOs concerned about their credibility at home. How much support could they claim in their lobbying to government, for example,

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<sup>92</sup>See also the appendix in: Peter Wyse, *Canadian Foreign Aid in the 1970s: An Organisational Audit*, Montreal: McGill University, Centre for Developing-Area Studies, Occasional Monograph Series No. 16, undated but probably 1978.

<sup>93</sup>Real P. Lavergne, "Determinants of Canadian Aid Policy," in Stokke, Olav (editor), *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden*, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1989, (pp. 37-8).

<sup>94</sup>Smillie, "A Time to Build Up," 1991:6.

Figure 3.6: Canadian Public Opinion Polls on Foreign Aid and Development Assistance<sup>95</sup>

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| Date | Source     | Should help? | More? | Same? | Cut? | Should tie? | Most important problem?                           |
|------|------------|--------------|-------|-------|------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| 1971 | CCIC       | 97%          |       |       |      |             |                                                   |
| 1974 | Buckridian | 88%          | 39%   |       |      |             |                                                   |
| 1975 | Gallup     | 72%          | 53%   | 35%?  | 35%? |             |                                                   |
| 1980 | CIDA       | 65%          | 35%   | 34%   | 20%  | 28          | Hunger 21%, War 19%                               |
| 1984 | EA         |              | 16%   | 53%   | 27%  |             |                                                   |
| 1985 | EA         |              | 24%   | 59%   | 17%  |             | War 36%, Hunger 17%, Environment 3%, Economy 13%  |
| 1987 | EA         |              | 21%   | 52%   | 25%  |             | War 46%, Hunger 14%, Environment 6%, Economy 14%  |
| 1988 | CIDA       | 86%          | 34%   | 45%   | 18%  | 33%         | War 39%, Hunger 14%                               |
| 1989 | CIDA       | *82%         | 31%   | 45%   | 16%  | 28%         | Environment 18%, War 15%                          |
| 1990 | CIDA       | *80%         | 32%   | 39%   | 21%  | 31%         | Environment 38%, Hunger 35%                       |
| 1990 | CCIC       |              | 32%   | 38%   | 20%  |             | 1st Environment, 2nd Hunger                       |
| 1991 | EA         |              | 15%   | 49%   | 35%  |             | Environment 23%, War 20%, Hunger 10%, Economy 14% |
| 1992 | EA         |              | 18%   | 46%   | 33%  |             | Hunger 25%, Environment 18%, War 14%, Economy 13% |

when there appeared only a "deafening silence" after the cutting of aid programs in 1989?<sup>99</sup>

Voluntary support for NGOs is sporadic, dependent on the presence of televisable emergencies and, to some extent, the absence of serious economic problems in Canada. NGOs have

<sup>95</sup>Rakid Buckridian, "Canadian Attitudes to International Development: A Pilot Study in the National Capital Region," MA thesis in International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1974; Peyton V. Lyon, "Introduction," in Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael (editors), *Canada and the Third World*, Toronto: Macmillan, 1976, (p. 1); CCIC, "Youth on Development: Survey of Opinions of Canadian Youth on International Aid and Development," Ottawa 1971; Canada, CIDA, Angus Reid Group, *Final Report: International Development Groups*, Vancouver, December 1990; Canada, CIDA, *A Report on Canadians' Attitudes Toward Foreign Aid*, Ottawa, November 1980; Canada, CIDA, *Report to CIDA: Public Attitudes Toward International Development Assistance*, Ottawa, 1988 and same report in 1990; Canada, EA, Decima Research, *External Affairs, An Investigation of Canadians' Attitudes Toward International Affairs for External Affairs and International Trade Canada*, Ottawa, February 1992; Canada, EA, Decima Research, *Perspectives of a Changing World: What Canadians Think about International Affairs, Update 1992*, Ottawa, September 1992.

<sup>96</sup>These figures indicate the percentage of respondents who chose a humanitarian response to the question, "Why should Canada assist poor countries?" or answered yes to the question, "Should Canada assist poor countries?" or to a question with a similar intent. The figures marked by (\*) are estimates derived from converting the scale used in the poll to percentage values.

<sup>97</sup>These numbers are the percentages of respondents who chose "aid [should] be given on condition that the country receiving the aid buys Canadian products or services with some of the money," or an answer with a similar intent.

<sup>98</sup>Listed here are the percentages for the most frequent responses to the questions, "If you had to name one issue or problem which you feel is the most important one facing the world ...?" and "What are the most important problems affecting the world today?"

<sup>99</sup>Smillie, "A Time to Build Up," 1991:39.

only sporadic legitimacy as "agents of the Canadian people," and so lack a mass vocal constituency to back them up in their representations to official agencies, even though, as we have seen, NGOs can claim the active support of some 76,000 Canadians. Moreover, partly as a result of diminishing private contributions, NGOs have become increasingly dependent on official sources to maintain their activities, further jeopardizing their legitimacy as independent agents.

## Law

The last limiting factor this chapter examines is the law on political activity by charities. While the legal foundations in Canada and Britain are identical (based on the 1601 statute discussed in chapter five), it is interesting that while Canadian courts have almost never acted on alleged trespasses, the British Charity Commission frequently presses voluntary agencies to the letter of the law. The result is that Canadian NGOs, while sometimes guilty of transgression, have not been significantly hindered by law.

There are two laws particularly relevant to the political activity of NGOs. The first governs charitable spending abroad; as it stands, Canadian charities are forbidden under the Income Tax Act, paragraph 149(1), to give charitable monies to third parties over whom the charity has no control, obviously a problem for NGOs working overseas. The CCIC tried to clarify the law in 1973, again in 1975, and yet again after a 1978 Revenue Canada challenge to a number of NGOs on just this ruling. As Brodhead and Pratt point out, however, "the issue was allowed to drop when it was pointed out that these 'illegal' practices were virtually universal in the NGO community, and were furthermore supported and encouraged by another arm of the federal government, CIDA!"<sup>100</sup> In 1991, the CCIC again tried to clarify the government's position on taxation. In a letter to the minister in charge, the CCIC wrote that their main worry was "how these regulations might affect the idea and practice of 'partnership' with the Southern partner organizations with whom we work; will they be willing to assume contractual responsibilities imposed on them by the regulations of Revenue Canada governing the operations of Canadian NGOs? It is a basic assumption of 'partnership' that it involves the transfer of resources and control to indigenous leadership."<sup>101</sup> In the

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<sup>100</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:53.

<sup>101</sup>CCIC, Pierre Véronneau (President), letter to Otto Jelinek, Minister of National Review, 29 January 1991.

end, unable to alter the rule of the law in a satisfying manner, Revenue Canada has chosen simply not to follow up on its "abuse."

The second set of legal constraints has to do with the level of permitted "political" activities for Canadian charities. Charitable status provides significant tax relief to NGOs and their supporters every year,<sup>102</sup> but that status also involves constraints on political behaviour. No organization whose primary intent is to bring about changes in law or policy, or to persuade the public to adopt a particular view, can qualify for charitable status,<sup>103</sup> and if an existing charity takes on political work as its primary activity, its status may be revoked, meaning a loss of tax exempt status, a revocation of the right to issue donation receipts, and a possible repayment of tax on its non-charitable expenditures.<sup>104</sup> Up until 1987, the official restrictions on political activity were quite stringent. While charities could prepare briefs or make representations to ministers or their staffs, technically "they were prohibited from actually undertaking any action in support of their goals (such as organizing a letter-writing campaign, or suggesting legislative changes). To some, it appeared to be the difference between merely seeking to influence, and actually being effective."<sup>105</sup> After a storm of protest, and in reaction to the growth of charities which clearly had a political element, the law was changed to allow for a greater allocation of resources to political activity. The 1987 Revenue Canada information circular explained that while political activity must remain "incidental" (taking up less than 10% of expenditure) it could now include efforts to influence and mobilize public opinion in order to pressure officials to take a certain course of action, including letter-writing, public demonstrations, and the distribution of literature.<sup>106</sup> However, as in the British case, "the Canadian legislation is vague and allows Revenue Canada a great deal of discretion in determining when NGOs have violated it. Although no NGO has lost its tax-exempt status so far, investigations have made several uneasy."<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>102</sup>Registration allows an organization to issue official donation receipts which reduce the donor's income tax, allows the charity to be exempt from paying income tax itself, and under certain conditions, allows the charity to special provisions under the Goods and Services Tax.

<sup>103</sup>Canada, Revenue Canada Taxation, "Registering Your Charity for Income Tax Purposes," form T-4063 E, (p. 15).

<sup>104</sup>Letter to the author from Carl Juneau, Chief, Technical Interpretations and Communications Section, Revenue Canada, 13 October 1992. Revocation happens as a result of an audit generated by public complaints, random selection, and/or a review of the charity's annual return.

<sup>105</sup>Brodhead et al, *Bridges of Hope?*, 1989:51.

<sup>106</sup>Canada, Revenue Canada Taxation, "Registered Charities -- Ancillary and Incidental Political Activities," information circular 87-1, 25 February 1987.

<sup>107</sup>Smith, *More than Altruism*, 1990:213.

Throughout the community, however, this uneasiness over the law has not on the whole translated itself into an active limit on advocacy work. Concerned with more fundamental obstacles on their way to influence, NGOs have continued to show a growing interest in entering the policy realm.

## CONCLUSIONS: NGOS AND GOVERNMENT IN CANADA

What do these histories of Canadian development policy and NGO advocacy tell us about the influence of nongovernmental organizations? This brief conclusion to Part I returns to the elements of influence introduced in Chapter One, and suggests an initial assessment of their influence.

First of all, the **context** in which Canadian development policy is made has been particularly favourable to NGOs. Overriding factors have been Pearson's internationalism and Trudeau's enthusiasm, both of which have guaranteed development assistance a permanent, if low status, place on the agenda. However, Canada's historical and trade links with the South are limited and the government's commitment to aid has depended on other factors; particularly, the state of the domestic economy and the intensity of public opinion. The varying interest of the Canadian public in development issues has made the decision to undertake advocacy a more difficult one; both NGOs and government are aware that there is little groundswell of support for substantial changes in policy.

This apathy is an additional problem as the **content** of the NGO agenda has changed; with the re-invigoration of NGO interest in macro-economic issues in the late 1980s, we have seen more consistent efforts to lobby on debt, trade, and structural adjustment. However, as NGOs take on these larger issues (ones primarily outside the realm of influence of their traditional ally, CIDA, and outside the interest of the broader public), their potential influence on policy is additionally circumscribed.

Contributing factors have been the strong forces affecting NGOs and governments' **motivations** for interaction. As NGOs' on-the-ground experience increased (particularly in dealing with the effects of SAP), and as the demands from their Southern partner organizations became stronger, some agencies have felt the ethical pull toward advocacy. Yet

even before NGO interest in government policy was beginning to expand, CIDA's interests in the community had already been established. As we have seen, NGOs have come to play particularly strong roles inside the interbureaucratic circle that makes development policy: as complementor, contractor, administrator, coordinator, policy advisor, political proxy, and ally.

Given this closer relationship, however, there has been debate over the consequences of NGOs' resource dependency on CIDA. As the generous official financial resources tighten, some have chosen not to take up advocacy work while others have decided to devote most of their resources toward lobbying. There is evidence that NGO skills in lobbying and their willingness to coordinate their activities is growing, but these resources still place a limit on their capacity to influence.

With these factors as background, one of the more interesting conclusions has been about the subsequent shift in NGO tactics. When the cosy relationship between CIDA and the NGO community began to sour with the introduction of the country-focus in the early 1980s and subsequent cuts in the aid budget, the impasse brought NGOs to a tactical turning point. Many have subsequently moderated their adversarial stance to take on a more collaborative insider approach, which is likely to improve their influence on issues involving CIDA decisions, but perhaps only with issues where the bureaucracy has been looking for assistance or has itself been contemplating change.

The last element in assessing influence has to do with the institutional channels available for NGO-government interaction. Canadian NGOs have had <sup>many</sup> more routes of access into government <sup>(particularly in comparison with Britain, as we shall see.)</sup> ~~than have voluntary organizations in other countries~~ but the difficulty, of course, is that NGOs have access only to those areas of policy in CIDA that are deemed to affect them, and very little to areas of policy that fall outside of CIDA. These institutions have guaranteed NGOs a place at the table, but their influence once they arrive cannot be assured. The status of the NGO community is variable, and its credibility and legitimacy depend on a host of factors: the importance of the issue; the NGO's own skills, expertise, and public support; as well as the broader policy trends within government.

## CHAPTER FOUR: BRITISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY

This chapter begins by laying out a broad history of NGO-government interaction in Britain. The discussion suggests that as NGOs have become more interested in government policy, and as the government itself has become increasingly interested in NGOs and their comparative advantage in development, there has been a greater scope for NGO influence. Yet, as in Canada, there are firm constraints on that potential influence; constraints which derive from over-riding concerns with Britain's economic health, differences in Labour and Conservative approaches to development, and the status of the aid department within Whitehall.

This chapter thus begins a comparison similar to the one made for Canada. It examines the NGO-government relationship from the official point of view,<sup>1</sup> before chapter five goes on to take up issues evident from the NGOs' standpoint. And, as after the previous two chapters, a brief conclusion suggests a set of "influence elements" most relevant in the history of British NGO-government relations.

### A HISTORY OF BRITISH AID POLICY

Divided into four historical blocks, this first section of the chapter offers an overview of the domestic and international pressures working on aid policy. Prominent themes in the history include bi-partisan support for aid, tempered by mutual concern for a struggling economy. The partisan differences arise with debates over the quality of aid and the role of the overseas ministry in charge of it. It is in this environment that NGOs have crossed over into the field of advocacy.

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<sup>1</sup>It may be relevant to note here that Britain's history of involvement in development aid is more difficult to unearth than the Canadian. Much specific information is classified under the 1911 Official Secrets Act, and former civil servants and ministers are prevented from discussing certain issues by the Thirty Year Rule.

## The Years of Decolonization and the Colombo Plan -- WWII-1964

Dating from before the Second World War and accelerating afterward, Britain has paid close attention to the South, particularly to its ex-colonial trading partners. Aid, designed to keep the Commonwealth together and to support Britain's struggling post-war economy, thus became a permanent and sometimes important part of foreign policy.<sup>2</sup>

Following the war, new considerations needed to be made for a post-Imperial Britain. Markets and sources of raw materials from the Commonwealth were still required, but the political and military commitments entailed in keeping the markets within the Empire had become burdensome. In the decade after the war, Britain had troops in Germany, Greece, Persia, India, Egypt, Palestine, and the far East -- all sustained at an enormous expense.<sup>3</sup> The Korean war of 1950-53, the Iranian crisis in 1951, the Kenya Mau Mau movement in 1952, the Suez crisis in 1956, the beginnings of discord in Biafra, and guerilla activity in Malaysia were still further strains. Britain could no longer afford, nor perhaps was willing, to support this level of external military commitment. The Empire needed to reassess its relationships, and part of that reassessment involved strengthening the Commonwealth and the remaining colonies through its aid programs.

British aid policy had originally been based on ~~an~~ two pre-war acts. Designed to fund the growth of dependent colonies, The Colonial Development Act of 1929 and the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 (and later versions) outlined the extent of British responsibility for colonial development. Self-governing territories (such as India, Burma and Southern Rhodesia) were not eligible for assistance on the grounds that government funds

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<sup>2</sup>This is also the main finding of Peter Atkinson's detailed and impressive history of development policy and party politics in Britain; Peter Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries as an Issue in British Politics, 1945-1972*, Oxford University B.Litt, 1977. Another valuable study is Judith Young's *Evolution of an Aid Lobby in Britain 1962-1970*, MA thesis, Manchester University, 1970. This chapter relies heavily on their archival searches of the early history of aid policy in Britain, an under-researched subject.

<sup>3</sup>For a summary of the forces backing British decolonization, see: Donald Maclean, *British Foreign Policy since Suez 1956-1968*, London: Hodder Stoughton, 1970, (pp. 136-145); and T.O. Lloyd, *Empire to Welfare State: English History 1906-1985*, 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, (pp. 270, 276-277).

should be spent only where the UK itself was responsible.<sup>4</sup> A strict demarcation line had been drawn at sovereignty.

Yet Britain could not maintain this minimalist stance for very long. There were a host of international pressures bearing on the growth of Britain's aid: the force of independence movements ~~had~~<sup>after 1957</sup> swelled the ranks of the new Commonwealth; Truman's inaugural speech had included a "Fourth Point" for US aid which set an example to Northern countries; the United Nations was, for the first time, setting specific national goals for aid during its first development decade; and the fear of the colonies' "seduction by Communism, loss of their geographic or material strategic value, or even ultimate military confrontation of rich and poor"<sup>5</sup> was a further concern. Partly in response to these pressures, Britain's extension of aid to independent members of the Commonwealth and a handful of other countries in 1963 was a sign both of the growing importance of the Commonwealth and the permanence of aid.

Another factor in the growth of the aid program was the 1945 Labour government's fascination with aid as part of its own internationalist philosophy. After the war, aid "seemed a new idea, well suited to Labour's wartime global idealist terminology ('a world of peace and plenty,' a 'world plan of mutual aid,' a world 'war on want') yet relevant also first to pragmatic economic needs for world resources, later to Cold War rivalries."<sup>6</sup> The party's 1950 campaign called for 1% of GNP to be spent on aid (the figure long espoused by the UN) and its 1951 manifesto called development an issue "equally" as important as rearmament in the pursuit of peace. While the Conservative governments of 1951-1964 were less concerned with Labour's brand of internationalism, the aid programme continued to grow (especially under Macmillan), and was generally blessed with bipartisan (or more accurately, tripartisan) support.

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<sup>4</sup>As explained in the 1957 White Paper, Britain's responsibility ceased when the colonies achieved independence; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, *The United Kingdom's Role in Commonwealth Development*, Cmnd 237, London: HMSO, July 1957. See also Goran Ohlin, *Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1966, (p. 13).

<sup>5</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977:39-40.

<sup>6</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977:22, 42, 46.

Aid at this time consisted largely of technical assistance (sending professionals and volunteers overseas and training overseas students in Britain), as well as grants and loans for large infrastructure projects. Allocations grew substantially after the war: annual assistance levels in the early 1950s more than doubled from US\$190 million to US\$420 million in the early 1960s. Loan conditionality for developing countries was loosened in this early period, making it easier for countries to borrow, and the UK even considered (although did not implement) the untying of aid.<sup>7</sup>

In order to manage this growing aid commitment, a series of institutions were set up within Whitehall. In 1948 the first of these, the Colonial (later, the Commonwealth) Development Corporation, was founded to provide technical assistance to developing countries.<sup>8</sup> When Britain joined the 1950 Colombo Plan, its contributions were managed by a number of other departments: the Department of Technical Cooperation was created in 1961 to coordinate and increase technical assistance; capital aid was distributed by the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office; and many of the multilateral programs were distributed by other line departments: the Ministry of Agriculture dealt with the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization, Education dealt with UNESCO, and Health with the World Health Organization, etc.<sup>9</sup> As in Canada, however, by the beginnings of the 1960s there was growing dissatisfaction with this way of organizing Britain's aid program. In particular, the Labour Party lobbied for a ministry in charge of development, arguing that the existing Department of Technical Cooperation would only become a Cinderella in Whitehall.<sup>10</sup> As we shall see with the arrival of Harold Wilson's 1964 Labour government, a new ministry was indeed put in place.

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<sup>7</sup>The suggestion <sup>ion was only to</sup> ~~would~~ be implemented on the <sup>condition</sup> ~~provision~~, of course, that all other donor countries followed suit, (Ohlin, *Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered*, 1966:13-16). For a view on the UK's subsequent tying policies, see the government's 1971 response to the Select Committee on Overseas Aid's report: United Kingdom, House of Commons, *Report from the Select Committee on Overseas Aid*, Session 1970-71, Observations by the Minister for Overseas Development, June 1971, (p. 5, point 13). For a description of aid tying throughout the OECD, the following is a clear account: Catrimus J. Jepma, *The Tying of Aid*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1991.

<sup>8</sup>William Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977, (p. 193).

<sup>9</sup>Judith Hart, *Aid and Liberation: A Socialist Study of Aid Policies*, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1973, (p. 180).

<sup>10</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977:129. This view was also argued by others: in a report by the nongovernmental Overseas Development Institute in 1963 and in a 1964 Fabian Society study, there were similar recommendations for an independent ministry; Young, *Evolution of an Aid Lobby*, 1970:33.

There were relatively few British voluntary organizations working overseas in this period, but those few were growing both in size and in their interest in aid policy. The largest NGOs, Oxfam and Christian Aid, were expanding their relief work to other countries, and were beginning to turn to longer term development work as well. As the next chapter describes in more detail, there was also a growing body of groups in Britain lobbying for increased aid in particular. War on Want had been set up in 1952 specifically to lobby on aid issues, and was blooming; the 1960 UN Freedom from Hunger Campaign spawned over 750 groups in the UK; and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), also founded in 1960, had become the main research centre on aid policy. Further, in addition to the colonial independence organizations also active at the time, the churches were becoming involved in development issues. A Lambeth Conference resolution urged Christians to lobby government on poverty issues, and a 1964 delegation from the Society of Friends pressed the Government to note the "extreme urgency that aid should be both accelerated and increased."<sup>11</sup> Slowly, there began the makings of a disjointed but growing aid lobby in Britain.

### **Labour and the New Ministry -- 1964-1970**

In 1964, Harold Wilson's Labour government came to power with a commitment to development enshrined in its new manifesto. The notion of aid as a necessary link to the Commonwealth remained, but it was now underscored with socialist ideas of humanitarianism and generous plans for growth in oda. As increasing economic pressures bore down on the new government, however, it could not maintain its high profile commitment to development assistance. Britain's aid program, though graced with a new ministry of its own, fell to the bottom of the government's agenda, and the budget was cut by the end of its term in office.

Barbara Castle (the first development minister) and Harold Wilson's 1953 book, *The War on World Poverty*, argued that aid should form a significant part of the GNP of developed nations.<sup>12</sup> The subsequent creation of the new Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) had thus been an important part of Labour's 1964 manifesto, as was the party's commitment

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<sup>11</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977:63, 106-7, 196, 200.

<sup>12</sup>Dudley Seers and Paul P. Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies under Labour," in W. Beckerman (editor), *The Labour Government's Economic Record: 1964-1970*, London: Duckworth, 1972, (pp. 118-119).

to reaching the 1% of GNP target for aid.<sup>13</sup> Yet the provision of aid was evidently an insufficient platform for a foreign policy; the new government was met with unsolved problems in Rhodesia and Biafra, at the same time as Europe and the evolving Economic Community were becoming central to the heart of Whitehall. Additionally, there were more fundamental concerns growing about Britain's diminishing economic role in the world. Labour had re-appeared in 1964 with the promise to redress the faltering balance of payments, but its subsequent economic policies were controversial; its devaluation of the pound (implemented against election promises), was seen to worsen unemployment levels, trigger the dock strike, and enrage Labour supporters.<sup>14</sup> These issues overwhelmed the government's agenda, and aid, while given a push at the beginning of the period, was therefore not a central issue.

During Labour's six years in office, however, significant changes in Britain's approach to development did take place. The ODM itself represented a significant change of thinking in the UK; it was to be responsible for executing all aspects of Britain's relationship with the third world, *including* aid and trade, and was thus designed to improve the quality of Britain's contribution to development. In taking over responsibility from other parts of Whitehall, particularly the Foreign Office, the ODM was further to be insulated from non-developmental foreign policy concerns. The political prominence of the ODM's first minister, Barbara Castle, lent credence to the new Ministry, and her permanent secretary, Sir Andrew Cohen, brought with him a core of specialist economists from the Department of Technical Cooperation. Outlined in the 1965 White Paper, *The Work of the New Ministry*, the new approach was seen to be more optimistic in tone, more sophisticated in approach (it used, for the first time, detailed economic analyses), and most importantly, more holistic than previous programs had been.<sup>15</sup> Greater efforts were to be made to coordinate aid policy with other donors, top priority was to be given to technical assistance (i.e. training), countries were to receive interest-free loans, forward planning (versus year by year approaches) was to be better

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<sup>13</sup>The one percent total was divided into 0.7% from oda, and the remaining 0.3% from private investment and grants.

<sup>14</sup>Lloyd, *Empire to Welfare State*, 1991:415.

<sup>15</sup>United Kingdom, ODM, *Overseas Development: The Work of the New Ministry*, Cmd 2736, London: HMSO, August 1965, (p. 6, para. 2).

implemented,<sup>16</sup> and in 1968, even a special parliamentary Select Committee on Overseas Aid was established to explore further issues.

These changes were not only due to Labour's political philosophy, but also to international pressures to improve and increase oda programs. The UN had specified yet another set of goals for its second development decade; the OECD's Development Assistance Committee began to keep league tables of members' aid performances; the G77 were making increasing demands for increased aid and trade access; and even in the IMF and GATT, changes were afoot to offer developing countries some kinds of preferential access.<sup>17</sup> This kind of pressure was significant -- when the influential World Bank Pearson report was published in 1969, ODM Minister Judith Hart responded by quickly committing Britain to the 0.7% oda/GNP goal when few other countries had,<sup>18</sup> (refer again to figure 2.1 for a record of Britain's oda/GNP history).

Despite the impetus initially given to the new ministry, however, its political momentum could not be sustained. Administratively, the ODM ran into problems with other ministries -- it could not dislodge the Treasury from its seat at the World Bank, nor could it wrestle from the Board of Trade its leadership of the British UNCTAD delegation.<sup>19</sup> Internally, it suffered from a rapid turnover in leadership; from 1964 to 1970, there were five Labour Ministers of Overseas Development, and while the first Ministers (Barbara Castle, Anthony Greenwood, and Arthur Bottomley) had held seats in Cabinet, by 1967, ODM had also lost this potential political leverage point.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the budget was in danger. The new ministry

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<sup>16</sup>Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies," 1972:124.

<sup>17</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977:224-34.

<sup>18</sup>The UN's 1% of GNP target was to be made up of both private and official contributions; later, with the Pearson report, the proportion to be contributed by official development assistance was fixed at 0.7%. The goal was never reached in Britain however; the Conservative government retracted the 0.7% pledge in 1971 (House of Commons, *Report from the Select Committee on Overseas Aid*, 1971:4, point 10), and subsequent governments have not fixed a timetable for reaching it. See also: Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies," 1972:132-3 for the British case; as well as the Commission on International Development, *Partners in Development* (the Pearson report), New York: Praeger, 1969, for the initial recommendations.

<sup>19</sup>Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies," 1972:149.

<sup>20</sup>Castle was replaced by Anthony Greenwood for a short six month period before he was moved to Housing and Local Government in 1966, when Arthur Bottomley "whose ministerial career was in rapid decline" took over. In January of 1967, Wilson reduced the size of the Cabinet and the ODM lost its Cabinet seat, although its last minister, Reg Prentice, retained his Cabinet rank and salary, (Young, *Evolution of an Aid Lobby*, 1970:37).

suffered as government priorities shifted to solving balance of payment problems;<sup>21</sup> aid was curtailed, and expenditure actually dropped between 1967 and 1968. Throughout the 1960s, aid levels stagnated around US\$450 million, indicating an overall decline in real figures. At the end of the decade, even though ODM ministers Reginald Prentice and Judith Hart had been successful in stemming the downturn in the aid budget, the battle with the Treasury was still being fought. In 1969, this interdepartmental confrontation caused Prentice to step down in frustration in order to continue lobbying for more aid from the back benches.<sup>22</sup> The ODM's status had declined as aid slipped from the government's list of priorities; throughout the period, the overseas ambitions of the party simply could not override other Labour commitments to increase the rate of domestic growth, reduce balance of payment deficits and maintain Britain's role as a global power.<sup>23</sup> Development may have been one of Labour's central policies, but as in Canada, it was a concern contingent on the health of the domestic economy.

Just as the government's commitment to aid seemed to be shrinking, however, interest in the NGO community was growing. As the next chapter describes in more detail, new groups and coalitions were being formed to combat the fall in oda, and the government (particularly in 1969-1970) was flooded with letters and subjected to rallies from a broad spectrum of groups. In 1969, a coalition of NGOs including Christian Aid, the ODI, Oxfam, War on Want, and the Catholic Institute for International Relations came together to set up the first political action coalition, Action for World Development. At the same time, over one million people had signed the *Churches' Declaration on World Poverty*, a "sign-in" which pressed for greater public awareness of development issues and increased oda.<sup>24</sup> Throughout the country, World Poverty Action Groups were being set up to debate development issues and to organize letter-writing campaigns on the aid budget, and youth became heavily involved. By the end of the 1960s, an aid lobby was firmly in place in Britain.

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<sup>21</sup>John White, *The Politics of Foreign Aid*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974, (p. 279).

<sup>22</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977:255, 271.

<sup>23</sup>Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain*, 1977:197; and Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies," 1972.

<sup>24</sup>United Kingdom, ODM, *An Account of the British Aid Programme*, Text of the United Kingdom Memorandum to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, London: HMSO, 1970, (p. 26).

## The Years of Party Battles -- 1970-1979

First of all it is important to note that over the course of the 1970s, Britain's central concern with the Commonwealth had begun to fade in favour of growing interests in Europe. The 1969 Duncan Committee and 1977 Berill reports had both recommended an increase of diplomatic resources within OECD countries, especially as the development of the EC came to the forefront of Foreign Office concerns.<sup>25</sup> Among other foreign policy issues in the 1970s were the worsening situation in Ireland, the continuing problem in Rhodesia, and concerns about the growth of Communist governments in Angola and Mozambique. In terms of government priorities, development assistance had decidedly taken a back seat.

The Conservative Party re-entered Westminster in 1970, full of plans for reorganizing government, including the re-absorption of the ODM into a department of the Foreign Office. The chief of their promises, however, was to regain control of the unions - a goal that preoccupied the government and eventually brought about its collapse four years later. Heath's efforts to quell union demands were met with fierce resistance, and unemployment was rising. Added to the government's burden was the 1973 rise in commodity prices (although Britain was partially insulated within the EC), and a growing energy crisis exacerbated by the coal strike and the OPEC price rise. When Wilson was returned to government in 1974, Labour was by then supported only by a slim majority of increasingly anti-union voters, tired of Labour's big 1960-style promises. In this political climate, overseas aid was a non-issue; the government focused its energies on getting the miners back to work and rectifying the deficit in the balance of payments. While Labour did attempt to redirect the aid program, the status of the ODM and the role of oda had by then been permanently damaged; economic concerns at home had firmly capped possible increases to oda. This concern applied equally to both parties, even though Labour's 1974-1979 government had initiated a number of important *qualitative* improvements to the aid program. When James Callaghan took over from Wilson as head of the party, conflict with the unions over wage freezes and unemployment had reached a critical point. The winter of 1978/79 was

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<sup>25</sup>Peter Byrd, "Foreign Policy and Overseas Aid," in Anuradha Bose and Peter Burnell (editors), *Britain's Overseas Aid since 1979: Between Idealism and Self-interest*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991, (p. 58); and United Kingdom, Central Policy Review Staff, *Review of Overseas Representation* (the Berrill report), London: HMSO, 1977; and United Kingdom, Review Committee on Overseas Representation, *Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation 1968/69* (the Duncan report), Cmnd 4107, London: HMSO, 1969.

Callaghan's "Winter of Discontent," and quickly brought Labour down, and Conservative Margaret Thatcher to office, in 1979.

Just because the ODM and its successor, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), took a back seat to central policy, of course, does not mean that changes in North-South relations had gone unnoticed. The impact of the world economic crisis of the early 1970s was an issue debated in British development circles as it had been in Canada. In addition, the famines in the Sahel, Ethiopia and Bangladesh in 1972-74 had made the inadequacy of British government aid efforts clear to an even larger circle, including an attentive media. Public pressure and activism was mounting -- as the chapter on the World Food Conference discusses in greater detail. The early 1970s was also a time when the modernization theories that had guided development practice up to that date were undergoing criticism, and new ideas about "balanced growth" and "basic human needs" were being debated. In this context, the World Bank's 1973 decision to shift resources toward small-scale agricultural production and away from "simple growth" policies was a significant sign of changing philosophy in key northern development institutions.<sup>26</sup> In response to these trends, British aid underwent a series of important changes in its own policy and philosophy, changes which were broadly supported by both parties.<sup>27</sup> Heath's Conservative government, for example, followed a liberal set of development policies to do "our best" to reach the 1% figure, and further implemented an aid program more geared to basic needs which emphasized family planning, rural development, intermediate technology and technical assistance. Moreover, as returning prosperity lightened the balance of payments problem, the Conservatives' Treasury "abandoned its role as bugbear," and allowed the aid budget to grow in line with Labour's projections.<sup>28</sup> Even

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<sup>26</sup>Independent Group on British Aid (IGBA), *Real Aid*, London: IGBA, 1982, (pp. 7-8).

<sup>27</sup>At the outset of the decade, indeed, there seems to be little to mark the difference between administrations other than the shift of the ODM under the FCO and the termination of the House Select Committee on Overseas Aid. In fact, Heath's Conservative government generated a higher volume of aid than had Labour in the 1960s, perhaps due in part to the Tories' less urgent concern for the weak balance of payments. Overall, the shift from a Labour ODM to a Conservative ODA seemed to make little difference to policy. When a Conservative policy review was first conducted in 1971-72, there was only a marginal shift in emphasis from the 1965 White Paper's concentration on technical assistance and improved coordination. Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process*, 1977:203; Hassan M. Selim, *Development Assistance Policies and the Performance of Aid Agencies: Studies in the Performance of DAC, OPEC, the Regional Development Banks and the World Bank Group*, London and Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1983, (p. 60); and Bruce Dinwiddy (editor), *European Development Policies: The United Kingdom, Sweden, France, EEC, and Multilateral Organizations*, London: Praeger and the Overseas Development Institute, 1973, (p. 30).

<sup>28</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977:352-4, 358.

more substantive policy changes were made with the return of Labour in 1974. When Judith Hart took over the rechristened ODM, she took the aid program even further away from the modernization model. In her 1975 White Paper, *More Help for the Poorest*, the ODM was to emphasize rural vs. urban development and to stress the basic human needs approach; a striking parallel with Canadian Gérin-Lajoie's 1975 *Strategy* and other such policies being inaugurated throughout the OECD.<sup>29</sup> From 1975, a new rural development branch was established within the ODM, and all oda to poorer countries was changed to grant form rather than concessional loans.<sup>30</sup> By 1979, the grant element of British aid in total had risen from its 1971 figure of 49% to reach 97%, and there was some indication that funds were increasingly spent in poorer countries. Further, a development education fund to raise domestic awareness was established, roughly parallel to Canada's Public Participation Program;<sup>31</sup> and from 1973 to 1979, the House Select Committee reappeared under a broader mandate than in 1964 to consider not only ODM policy, but UK development assistance more generally. While overall budget cuts announced in 1976 reduced the plans for oda growth, British oda in the late 1970s nevertheless showed impressive gains (refer again to figure 2.1).

The change of the ODM's status at the beginning of the decade, however, was to have a significant and permanent influence on UK policy thereafter. The movement of the new ODA to the FCO under the Conservatives did not significantly affect the content of Britain's development policy, but the change in the status of the department was nonetheless noticeable. The institutional weight of an agency is an important factor in assessing the importance that its policies carry within the rest of government. When the ODM's ministry status was downgraded in 1970 to the level of an FCO department, it initially managed to retain "considerable independence under the FCO's umbrella,"<sup>32</sup> yet when Tory minister Richard

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<sup>29</sup>United Kingdom, ODM, *The Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policies: More Help for the Poorest*, Cmnd 6270, London: HMSO, October 1975. See also: United Kingdom, ODM, *Basic Needs: The British Position*, Overseas Development Paper No. 11, London: HMSO, May 1978; and *Realities: Development, Basic Needs, and Human Rights*, Lecture delivered at the University of Guyana by Judith Hart, Minister for Overseas Development, Overseas Development Paper No. 12, London: HMSO, 10 January 1978. For a brief comparison of the details of the Canadian and British policies, refer to David Jones, "Changing the Emphasis on Aid: An Analysis of British and Canadian Reappraisals of Policies," in *Commonwealth*, April/May 1976, pp. 6-8.

<sup>30</sup>IGBA, *Real Aid*, 1982:9.

<sup>31</sup>Between 1976 and 1979 (when it was cut back), the fund had spent one million pounds, (Adrian Hewitt and Mary Sutton, "British Aid: A Change of Direction," in *ODI Review*, no. 1, 1980). The fund was later resurrected, but at lower levels of financing, (p. 44 in Independent Group on British Aid, Charles Elliott et al, *Aid is Not Enough: Britain and the World's Poor*, London: IGBA, 1984).

<sup>32</sup>Byrd, "Foreign Policy and Overseas Aid," 1991:58.

Wood took over from his Labour predecessors in 1970, the post had become administrative. Even under Labour, the ministry had not been able to function as the specialized agency it was designed to be, in charge of all aspects of developing world relations. The initial impetus that had established the Ministry had paled in the wake of more urgent concerns:

In the Labour Party, much of the old internationalist commitment has ebbed in the wake of the powerful tide of Britain's industrial and political decline, and the perceived need to provide national solutions to what is seen as largely a national problem. ... the Party's attempts in office to fashion positive policies have stemmed mainly from a handful of dedicated ministers and a rather weak sense of generalised goodwill from the remainder.<sup>33</sup>

So even while the ODM was officially reinstated under Labour in 1974, it had become "more clearly subordinate to the Foreign Office, with the Foreign Secretary assuming overall responsibility for development in 1975 and representing the Minister in Cabinet after 1976."<sup>34</sup> By the end of the period and even under Labour, the ODM was firmly in charge of the administration -- and not the making -- of development policy.

These events were noted by an increasingly attentive development lobby in Britain. Their prime focus in 1970 had been the protection of the ODM (which they saw as their advocate in government) from absorption within the FCO. They argued that development was essentially a long-term process which needed to be protected from the short-range political concerns of the donor. Though these NGOs had been growing from the late 1960s, however, most of Whitehall continued to consider their moral motivation to lack an analytical edge,<sup>35</sup> such that with the exception of the ODI think tank, their contributions to the debates were largely ignored. The realignment of the ODM under the FCO and the disbandment of Labour's Select Committee therefore took few in the NGO community by surprise.<sup>36</sup> Over the course of the decade, the relationship between NGOs and the ODM/ODA remained a positive one, partly because organizations like the new World Development Movement were increasing their lobbying efforts beyond aid to include trade, institutional reform, and the New

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<sup>33</sup>Vincent Cable, *British Interests and Third World Development*, London: Overseas Development Institute, 1980, (p. 23).

<sup>34</sup>Hewitt and Sutton, "British Aid: A Change of Direction," 1980:4.

<sup>35</sup>White, *The Politics of Foreign Aid*, 1974:287-88.

<sup>36</sup>The changes were not made, however, without considerable debate in the House of Commons. Bruce Dinwiddy (editor), *Aid Performance and Development Policies of Western Countries: Studies in US, UK, EEC, and Dutch Programs*, London: Praeger, Overseas Development Institute, 1973, (p. 30).

International Economic Order agenda; changes often supported by officials of the ODM/ODA if not by the rest of Whitehall.

### **The Conservative Reign -- 1979-1992**

In 1979, a radical policy review of British aid and other programs occurred with Thatcher's expenditure review plan, *The Right Approach*. Development policy took on her other concerns with communism and the expansion of British trade interests, and the mood in Whitehall was that self-interest in the aid program was part of a legitimate combination of motives. This section argues that the new emphasis altered the philosophy of a now much reduced British development program, thus adding "philosophical" limits to the existing economic ones.

While relations with the Commonwealth evidently remained "an unchallenged given,"<sup>37</sup> other foreign policy issues came to the surface. Conflict over Britain's relationship with South Africa was a prominent issue internationally, Eastern Europe and EC negotiations had taken centre stage in the foreign policy debate, and the early 1980s were further inundated with international crises that more fully occupied the FCO than aid. In the year 1979 alone, Zimbabwe was recognized, Afghanistan was invaded, Poland was rocked by martial law, Nicaragua's revolution succeeded, and the Shah of Iran was overthrown. In addition, Thatcher's government had added a further three elements to long-standing foreign policy goals: the promotion of market economies, an increasing concern with the environment, and after 1989 in particular, a concentration on "democracy and good government." The domestic climate that served as a backdrop for these foreign policies was also conflict ridden. The early years of the 1980s were marked by increasing prices and unemployment in Britain, a second oil crisis and recession; strains which were greeted by government concentration on privatization, expenditure restraint, and confrontation with the unions. By the end of the 1980s, public dissatisfaction, though partially remedied by the Falklands victory and a mid-decade upturn in the economy, was rife.

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<sup>37</sup>Byrd, "Foreign Policy and Overseas Aid," 1991:52.

It was in this environment that the new emphasis on commercial and political gains through the aid program took root. Under Thatcher's policy framework, *The Resolute Approach*, aid was to be geared towards the expansion of economic and trade interests overseas. While this element was certainly not new in aid considerations,<sup>38</sup> its prominence was. New policies were made and old policies (like the Aid and Trade Provision described below) were strengthened. In a Parliamentary statement on 20 February 1980, Thatcher's first ODA Minister Neil Marten was clear in laying out the government plan: "We believe that it is right at the present time to give greater weight in the allocation of our aid to political, industrial and commercial considerations alongside our basic developmental objectives."<sup>39</sup>

This Britain-first theme echoes ideas present at the same time in the Canadian case, but the emphasis in the UK was much stronger. The centrepiece example has been the growing and controversial Aid and Trade Provision (ATP); from 1979, it grew from 3.5% of oda to 5.4% in 1991, an increase from £29 to £101 million.<sup>40</sup> Even more than aid procurement tying, the ATP has become the focus both of the British business lobby (set on expanding the ATP's funding provisions), and of the NGOs who believe that its concentration on wealthier countries serves as a poor source of development assistance. Set up under Labour in 1978,<sup>41</sup> the ATP functions as an export subsidy whereby up to 50% of the cost of a given project overseas is offered as grant aid, while the remainder is to be paid by the host country with commercial credits.<sup>42</sup> Because few countries have sufficient credit, most ATP financing goes

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<sup>38</sup>It would be misleading, for example, to contrast the new emphasis with a "pure" developmental motivation born during Labour's program; political and commercial factors had always been a part of Hart's *More Help for the Poorest*. See Steven H. Arnold, *Implementing Development Assistance: European Approaches to Basic Needs*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982, (p. 145); and R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, "A Foreign-Policy Model of the Distribution of British Bilateral Aid, 1960-70," in the *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 8, no. 3, 1978, pp. 313-31.

<sup>39</sup>United Kingdom, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, vol. 979, 1st session of the 48th Parliament, session 1979-80, 18-29 February 1980, (cols. 464-472).

<sup>40</sup>Table 5, in Christian Aid, Jessica Woodroffe, *British Overseas Aid, 1975-1991*, London: Christian Aid, 1993.

<sup>41</sup>There has been criticism that Hart, author of *More Help for the Poorest*, was strangely incongruous in her aid policy by endorsing the "away-from-the-poorest" ATP. Toye suggests that she was merely responding to strong pressure from the business lobby by offering a balance to both business and aid groups, (pp. 98-99 in John Toye, "The Aid and Trade Provision of the British Overseas Aid Programme," in Anuradha Bose and Peter Burnell (editors), *Britain's Overseas Aid since 1979: Between Idealism and Self-interest*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991; and IGBA, *Real Aid*, 1982:14). Arnold suggests a more bureaucratic explanation; that the provision was a trade-off among departments for an agreement to increase the development assistance budget, (*Implementing Development Assistance*, 1982:147).

<sup>42</sup>Oliver Morrissey, "The Commercialization of Aid: Business Interests and the UK Aid Budget 1978-88," in *Development Policy Review*, vol. 8, 1990, pp. 301-22 (p. 303).

to wealthier nations, and there are concerns that continuing support of the ATP may have seriously undercut the value of British oda.<sup>43</sup> The provision has been reviewed externally twice (by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee)<sup>44</sup> and three times internally. Indeed, one of these, the Byatt report in 1983, concluded that the ATP was if nothing else a relatively expensive way of providing publicly subsidized employment.<sup>45</sup> While aware of these criticisms, the government has remained committed to the program; responding in 1983, ODA Minister Timothy Raison conceded that while mixed credit schemes such as the ATP could be "bad aid," he argued that other countries used aid this way and that Britain could not afford to lose whatever edge the provision generated for British trade.<sup>46</sup>

Overall, the changes in policy were thus not so much a disinterest in aid as an interest in using it better to Britain's advantage. Of great concern to NGOs was the significant decrease in oda: slated by Labour to grow 6% in real terms by 1983, oda underwent a cut of more than 14% in Thatcher's first budget.<sup>47</sup> Whereas in 1978 aid absorbed 0.46% of GNP, nine years later that figure had tumbled to 0.28% (its lowest point since the beginning of DAC record keeping in 1950) and by 1991, had only climbed back to 0.32%, (refer again to figure 2.1).

The changes not only affected the size of the aid program, but also the status of the ODA itself. Its staff numbers declined, its policy-leverage over the growing ATP continued to be shared with the much stronger Department of Trade and Industry, and its status under the FCO was again more directly subordinate.<sup>48</sup> In some ways, however, the administration was blessed with the Conservatives' lack of interest in aid policy generally. During the period, the

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<sup>43</sup>Toye, "The Aid and Trade Provision," 1991:103.

<sup>44</sup>United Kingdom, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, *Bilateral Aid: Country Programme*, 2nd report, session 1986-87, London: HMSO, 22 April 1987.

<sup>45</sup>Cited in Toyé, "The Aid and Trade Provision," 1991:103; and Ronald S. May and Mohammed H. Malek, "Overseas Developing Countries and the United Kingdom's Own Regions: Alleviating Two Problems with One Programme" in Malek (editor), *Contemporary Issues in European Development Aid*, Aldershot: Avebury, 1991, (p. 42). See also: Ronald S. May, D. Schumacher, and Mohammed H. Malek, *Overseas Aid: The Impact on Britain and Germany*. New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, (especially pp. 221-235).

<sup>46</sup>IGBA, *Aid is Not Enough*, 1984:44.

<sup>47</sup>Arnold, *Implementing Development Assistance*, 1982:145; and Hewitt and Sutton, "British Aid: A Change of Direction," 1980.

<sup>48</sup>James T. Winpenny, "Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Overseas Development Administration," in Anuradha Bose and Peter Burnell, *Britain's Overseas Aid since 1979: Between Idealism and Self-interest*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.

government did not publish any white papers on oda, but instead restricted themselves to occasional replies to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Given that oda retained a low public profile generally, and few debates were organized in the House,<sup>49</sup> internal policy-making was largely left to the ODA and the many departments which had a say in its activities. Indeed, such was their autonomy that by the end of the decade there had been "a partial withdrawal from the ideological preoccupations of 1979, and a re-emergence of 'aid first' considerations in the management of the aid programme."<sup>50</sup> The distribution of aid between bilateral and multilateral programs, for example, shifted to the multilateral side (generally a higher quality aid); and within bilateral programs, there was evidence that the poorest countries were being allocated a somewhat larger aid proportion.<sup>51</sup>

Part of this resurgence also had to do with changes in the upper echelon of the ODA. After Neil Marten (1979-1983) and Timothy Raison (1983-1985) had presided over the administration and left,<sup>52</sup> Chris Patten ("the rising star of the wet wing of the party")<sup>53</sup> was appointed to head the ODA. Patten not only boosted the moribund mood of the ODA when he took over in 1985, but he also raised the administration's profile; "for Conservative ministers, the ODA had been a step on the route to political oblivion, and in the Labour Party only Barbara Castle had advanced from it to higher office."<sup>54</sup> Patten changed this dismal vision by responding to the growing interest generated by the Brundtland report and its concern with sustainable development.<sup>55</sup> While he maintained Thatcher's emphasis on the political and commercial elements of oda, Patten was successful in dovetailing environmental

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<sup>49</sup>There were few debates on oda in the 1980s, with the significant exception of the controversy over Britain's response during the Sahelian famine of 1984-85.

<sup>50</sup>Byrd, "Foreign Policy and Overseas Aid," 1991:59.

<sup>51</sup>The proportion of multilateral aid grew from 28% of oda in 1980 to 44% in 1991; mostly disbursed through the United Nations, the World Bank, and the European Community. In 1979, the allocation of bilateral aid to the poorest countries was 25%; by 1982, it peaked at nearly 35%, and by 1991, it had settled at 30%, (OECD sources).

<sup>52</sup>While Marten had successfully managed to cut the budget in 1979, he had little understanding of aid and, at odds with the ODA, resigned in 1983. He was followed by Timothy Raison, a man who was considered equally competent in budgetary management but more sensitive to social welfare issues. However, Raison was soon brought down over Britain's inadequacy in the face of the Ethiopian famine in 1984-85: Ethiopia had initially been removed from Britain's list of aid recipients because of its Marxist-Leninist government, and even though emergency aid was eventually made available, it came too late and in too little quantity.

<sup>53</sup>Byrd, "Foreign Policy and Overseas Aid," 1991:60. See also: "Profile: Chris Patten, born-again Thatcherite," in *The Independent*, 28 November 1987.

<sup>54</sup>Byrd, "Foreign Policy and Overseas Aid," 1991:60.

<sup>55</sup>World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, (the Brundtland Report), Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

policy with the aid program -- a move that was popular with many NGOs. When Patten left ODA in 1989 to take over as Minister of the Environment, he was succeeded by Lynda Chalker, another minister of some standing. Chalker had previously been a Minister of State at the FCO, responsible for British relations with African states, and was there identified as another in the line of "wet" Tories allocated to the ODA.<sup>56</sup> In the summer of 1991, in tune with the policy of the new Prime Minister John Major, Chalker spoke widely of "good government" as the ODA's new prime criterion for choosing aid recipients, arguing that UK aid was to be better focused on countries "adopting sound economic policies and good government, including respect for human rights."<sup>57</sup> As the dissolution of the Soviet bloc rose to the centre of FCO concerns, this concern for "good government" and commercial advantage was reflected in the 1991 budget by including <sup>new</sup> amounts of aid for Eastern Europe that were <sup>increases planned for the</sup> greater than the whole of the traditional oda budget for the developing world.<sup>58</sup>

Although these policies worried NGOs, concerned that developmental priorities would be further eroded, Chalker's approach to the NGO community has generally been seen to be supportive.<sup>59</sup> Part of the reason, of course, is that the idea of "good government" entails a greater participation of civil society in development and NGOs are seen to be central in that endeavour. Although the ODA has never had as intimate a relationship with NGOs as has CIDA, Chalker has made herself available for meetings with NGOs, and has supported many aspects of NGO work (including a fund for matching NGO project money, described later on in the chapter). As ~~the~~ chapter seven describes, the NGO-ODA consultations prior to the Earth Summit in 1992 were a particularly strong example of a warming relationship between the ODA and NGOs. In 1993, an international NGO study reported that:

Relations between ODA and British NGOs have improved substantially since the early 1980s when aid cuts, the weakening of ODA's poverty focus, and the removal of Government support for development education were major sources of disagreement.

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<sup>56</sup>Byrd, "Foreign Policy and Overseas Aid," 1991:60.

<sup>57</sup>Stephen Fidler, "Enhanced UK Aid to Developing World," in *Financial Times*, 7 November 1991, p. 27. See also Chalker's first speech after being appointed in 1989: Lynda Chalker, *The Aid Programme: Into the 1990s*, address to the All-Party Group on Overseas Development, 8 November 1989; and a later talk: *Good Government and the Aid Programme*, speech given at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 25 June 1991. A recent summary of good government policy is given in: United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Aid and Good Government*, economic background brief, Issue 15/92.

<sup>58</sup>Fidler, "Enhanced UK Aid to Developing World," 1991.

<sup>59</sup>Chalker, *The Aid Programme*, 1989:5.

The readiness of the present Minister to meet NGOs regularly for discussions has helped to ensure a constructive dialogue on issues such as environment and women.<sup>60</sup>

By the beginning of the 1990s, NGOs that had been active in public lobbying throughout the decade re-entered the Whitehall fray through their institutional ally, the ODA. To a greater extent than before, NGOs were consulted - if not necessarily heeded - in the making of Britain's development policy.

### THE ROLE OF NGOS WITHIN GOVERNMENT

Why has the British government been more concerned with NGOs at the beginning of the 1990s? The answer lies in the changing roles of the NGO community within Whitehall policy-making circles. One of these roles has been a constant: as in Canada, NGOs have functioned, sometimes unwittingly, as the ODA/ODM's departmental ally in Whitehall policy conflicts. Another role has been as a proxy for British interests in delicate political situations abroad. A third role has been that of "the expert," a necessary complement to official aid. Acknowledged to possess a growing comparative advantage over government, particularly in the implementation of projects, NGOs are thus grudgingly being asked to implement and advise on British oda. Unlike in Canada, however, where NGOs have a higher level of interaction with CIDA, British NGOs have only recently begun to be involved in the process. We will see in the following chapter what repercussions those differences entail.

#### The Departmental Ally

The NGOs' role as ally to the ODA/ODM has a long history. As early as 1965, the ministry actually *proposed* the creation of an NGO coalition to stimulate public interest in development.<sup>61</sup> Initially suggested by the ODM Permanent Secretary Sir Andrew Cohen, the Voluntary Committee for Overseas Aid and Development (VCOAD) was founded that year with a membership of eight NGOs and an ODM observer. According to Young's study of the early aid community, the ministry's support seemed "a sure indication that the ODM was

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<sup>60</sup>Tony German, "United Kingdom," in Judith Randel and Tony German (editors), *The Reality of Aid: An Independent Review of International Aid*, Published in London by ICVA, EUROstep and ActionAid, June 1993.

<sup>61</sup>ODM, *The Work of the New Ministry*, 1965:44, para. 129. Note that this is an interesting parallel with CIDA's attempt to found a Futures Secretariat much later.

already eager to encourage the creation of a body which would help to educate the electorate about overseas development and thus create more support for the work of the ODM."<sup>62</sup> This feeling of joint effort was reinforced in 1967, when the Ministry again proposed a project for NGOs. Sir Albert Oram, the ODM's parliamentary secretary, suggested that NGOs organize a joint campaign to call for more aid. Young posits that,

Presumably either Oram or the Minister felt that it was time to run a world poverty campaign, and yet the ODM could not be directly associated. The 'warm relationship' existing between the ODM and VCOAD in which each gives help and advice to the other, probably encouraged Oram to use VCOAD as a 'front' for the ODM. Since the Ministry could not tell the public of its struggle with the rest of the Government over overseas aid for obvious constitutional reasons, it encouraged VCOAD to do so.<sup>63</sup>

Through this kind of support, a mutually reinforcing ally relationship was being built.

According to interviews at the time, NGOs similarly felt that the ODM was their most potent ally in government:

'The ODM is the best aid lobby of all' and 'There's no point in lobbying the ODM: they want more aid just as much as we do' are common sentiments in the non-governmental aid lobby. The lobby as a whole feels very strongly that the ODM is in complete sympathy with it, and indeed continues the work of the lobby inside the government.<sup>64</sup>

This tone continued to characterize NGO-ODA relations throughout the 1970s. Even when the relationship had soured in the early 1980s with the cutting of oda and NGO funding, there remained a feeling, at least on the part of the ODA, that NGOs and the administration ought to remain allies in pursuit of a common cause. In 1984, Timothy Eggar, private secretary to the Foreign Minister, warned NGOs that since "more people in Britain are against than for aid," NGOs "must protect the credibility of their case and our mutual cause by not becoming blinded by their own enthusiasm,"<sup>65</sup> in this case, in criticizing the new commercial emphasis of the aid program. His words note an important issue, one which we have noted as important in Canada as well. Despite the changes in policy toward a Britain-first approach, the ODA remained concerned about its tentative support in Parliament and Whitehall. The

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<sup>62</sup>Young, *Evolution of an Aid Lobby*, 1970:57.

<sup>63</sup>Young, *Evolution of an Aid Lobby*, 1970:61.

<sup>64</sup>Young, *Evolution of an Aid Lobby*, 1970:118.

<sup>65</sup>Timothy Eggar, MP, "British Government Policy and the Poorest of the Third World," in Anthony Jennings (editor), *Our Response to the Poorest of the Third World*, Oxford: Pergamon, 1984, (p. 25).

changes under Thatcher, moreover, increased the confrontational aspect of the government's relationship with NGOs, and the ODA thus found itself on poorer terms with its firmest source of domestic support. For the ODA, NGOs have thus been an important ally in its pursuit of greater aid allocations. As we will see in the case studies, NGOs active in this environment have thus been able to count on ODA support on some issues, but their influence is constrained by the limited jurisdiction of their "patron" agency. While NGOs may have earned access to government, it has been to one of its weakest wings only.

### The Political Proxy

To a lesser extent than in Canada, NGOs in Britain have also played a role in extending Britain's political or diplomatic presence. As Burnell points out, the work of VSO, Oxfam, and SCF in Bhutan, for example, ensures a token British presence in the country without offending the Indian government, (which views the country as its own political client). In another example, Oxfam has been the only British presence in Cambodia throughout the 1980s, alone with other voluntary organizations in providing information about the abuse of UN-donated food aid by Khmer Rouge military forces in the border camps with Thailand, and the movement of forces back to Cambodian combat zones.<sup>66</sup> By sometimes making use of NGO communication and aid channels, Burnell argues that the government can maintain contact with those even in FCO-proscribed countries like Cambodia. He suggests that this strategy "diminishes the risk of precipitating the sort of fiasco which could happen if a high-profile diplomatic initiative was taken and rebuffed. It can also reduce the chances of there being a political backlash at home, or of causing offence to third party governments with whom the foreign ministry wishes to maintain good relations."<sup>67</sup> It is noteworthy, for example, that some 70% of total UK food aid is distributed via NGOs working on the ground,<sup>68</sup> often in conflict ridden situations. While the links between NGOs and the FCO in

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<sup>66</sup>Peter Burnell, *Charity, Politics and the Third World*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, (pp. 146, 147).

<sup>67</sup>Burnell, *Charity, Politics and the Third World*, 1991:148.

<sup>68</sup>Ian Smillie, "Changing Partners: Northern NGOs, Northern Governments," in Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (editors), *Stakeholders in Development: Issues in Government/NGO Relationships*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1993, (p. 33).

the diplomatic realm are not extensive, they do exist and add to the value of voluntary activity abroad.

### The Expert

Beginning from the mid-1980s, there was a growing recognition that NGOs had yet another use in oda. NGOs were judged to be gifted with a comparative advantage over government, particularly in the implementation of projects overseas, and so growing amounts of money were made available for NGO efforts, sub-contracts to undertake government project work were offered to them, and increasingly, NGOs were invited to comment on official policy.

This willingness to become involved with NGOs at a substantive level is a relatively new occurrence. Early reports from the 1960s claimed that the level of NGO-ODA interaction was positive but minimal; NGOs provided training programmes for overseas visitors and experts going overseas, while the government sometimes helped provide minimal funding or secretarial services for NGOs. The guidelines outlining the parameters of NGO-government collaboration were very narrow: first, the NGOs' request for assistance was to fall into a "properly governmental" field of activity; second, it was to be in the public interest that NGOs, rather than government, carry out the task (on grounds of pragmatism or principle); third, the task was to be of a technical nature, and separable from the agency's other goals (religious or political); and fourth, the assistance was to be channelled through the recipient country's government, rather than through a British NGO working there.<sup>69</sup> Yet by the 1990s, British NGOs were in receipt of significant levels of official funding (some £28 million annually); they dealt with a number of projects which were no longer solely technical in nature (although the restriction on missionary and "political" work remained); and the field of "properly governmental" activity had swollen to include the promotion of democracy, agriculture, cooperative training, relief, and a myriad other causes, including development education at home.

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<sup>69</sup>Peter Williams and Adrian Moyes, *Not By Government Alone: The Role of British Non-Government Organizations in the Development Decade*, London: ODI, 1964, (pp. 35-37).

British government funding to NGOs comes from four main sources. The largest is the JFS, or Joint Funding Scheme, set up by Labour in 1975 and continued, with growing allocations, under the Conservatives. From less than £500,000 in 1976, the JFS was spending £28 million by 1992,<sup>70</sup> still, however, less than 0.5% of oda. The scheme provides project-by-project funding on a 50/50, pound for pound basis<sup>71</sup> (or up to 100% for family planning projects). For a group of five agencies (Oxfam, Christian Aid, CAFOD, Worldwide Fund for Nature, and SCF), the scheme further provides yearly block grants for suitable projects which pass the standard criteria: the sponsoring agency must be a registered British charity; the project must be new, and designed for long-term development rather than relief or welfare purposes; the grant must not be used for core funding (i.e. administrative costs), or for retroactive funding of established projects, cannot be extended past a maximum of five years, and cannot be for use in FCO-proscribed countries. Preference is given to projects which involve local people (especially women), do not discriminate on the basis of religion; are environmentally and economically sustainable; and involve well-planned monitoring and evaluation.<sup>72</sup> While criticism has been made about the narrowness of the criteria (particularly in terms of retroactive funding, and support of welfare or relief programs),<sup>73</sup> the government's own evaluation in 1986 reported that there were no complaints from NGOs.<sup>74</sup>

A second source of funding within the ODA is the British Volunteer Programme which provides the greater part of the incomes of four agencies: Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO), the Catholic Institute for International Relations, Skillshare Africa, and the United Nations Association International Service. The third source is routed through the Disaster and Refugee Units which fund NGOs for local emergency relief activities, or occasionally for material assistance such as blankets, tents, medicines and transport needed at short notice.<sup>75</sup> The fourth source is the sectoral programme, through which NGOs are contracted to carry out

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<sup>70</sup>United Kingdom, ODA, "The Joint Funding Scheme," mimeo, March 1992.

<sup>71</sup>Recommendations by an internal report made in 1986 suggested raising the maximum to 75%, (R.S. Porter, *Evaluation of the Joint Funding Scheme*, covering report EV38511, ODA, November 1986).

<sup>72</sup>United Kingdom, ODA, "The Joint Funding Scheme: Guidelines on Project Proposals," mimeo, undated.

<sup>73</sup>Oxfam made these claims in a submission to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1982. See Peter Burnell, "Charity that Begins Abroad: Issues in Government Funding," in Alan Ware (editor), *Charities and Government*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989, (p. 123).

<sup>74</sup>Porter, *Evaluation of the Joint Funding Scheme*, 1986:ii.

<sup>75</sup>United Kingdom, ODA, "ODA Support for Voluntary Organisations," mimeo, 1990.

specialist projects on behalf of the government. This is the case with the Intermediate Technology Development Group, the Plunkett Foundation (which trains NGO cooperatives), the Trade Union Congress (which trains trade unionists), and the National Alliance of Women's Associations (which assists other NGOs in improving the gender component of their programs). In this category is also included the Small Enterprise Development Fund, which makes grants to agencies for "pump priming" (advising and training) for micro-enterprise projects overseas.<sup>76</sup> Recently, another category has been created for international voluntary agencies, but as of 1991-92, only the Red Cross and the International Planned Parenthood Federation were recipients.<sup>77</sup>

The international debates of the 1980s on the comparative advantage of NGOs had been heard by the ODA, aware that its financial support to NGOs fell well below the OECD average (see figure 0.1 for a comparison). At the same time as NGOs were accelerating their advocacy work with government, the government itself was undertaking a review of its relationship with NGOs. In February 1992, it published its *Report of Working Group on ODA/NGO Collaboration*, which recommended extending the ODA's relations with NGOs. A good part of the report dealt with recommending an increase in the amount and scope of funding, debating the options for using more NGOs to implement official projects within the bilateral programs, and increasing funding to Southern NGOs directly. NGOs were seen to be more cost-effective, to use more appropriate methods for the implementation of projects and involvement of beneficiaries, and to better involve the British public. NGOs were further seen to have specialist knowledge of their Southern counterparts, and a potential to weed out suitable ones for direct government sponsorship.<sup>78</sup> On the whole, the working group felt that there was significant room for expanding the funding and use of NGOs both at home and elsewhere, and the substantial increase to the JFS and Volunteer Programme announced a few months later seemed to indicate government agreement.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>United Kingdom, ODA, *Report of Working Group on ODA/NGO Collaboration*, February 1992, (pp. 9-13).

<sup>77</sup>Ian Smillie, "United Kingdom," in Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (editors), *Stakeholders in Development: Issues in Government/NGO Relationships*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1993, (p. 290).

<sup>78</sup>ODA, *ODA/NGO Collaboration*, 1992: Summary.

<sup>79</sup>A 22% increase in JFS funding (to bring the total to £28 million), coupled with an increase of 12% to the Volunteer Programme (to £17.8 million) was greeted by Baroness Chalker, with: "This very substantial increase demonstrates the government's continuing confidence in, and commitment to, the contribution made by British voluntary organisations to developing countries," (p. 1 in *British Overseas Development* (the ODA newsletter), no. 23, May 1992).

This kind of support to NGOs allows the government to both lend encouragement to the private sector and deflect criticism that its own commitment to the alleviation of poverty has been watered down.<sup>80</sup> For NGOs, the government's report promised not only a growing source of funds and a greater potential route for influence on policy, but it also generated fears that NGOs could be overwhelmed in the process.<sup>81</sup> These concerns, of course, were familiar for Canadian NGOs, funded for a longer period of time and to a greater level by CIDA. As we shall see, however, worries about a loss of autonomy through accepting official funding have been overblown. This funding has been most significant as a sign of recognition of NGOs' legitimate place at the table and it is this recognition that has allowed them a somewhat greater say. For most British NGOs, the growing access to funds may promise only greater access to the decision-making circle. By the beginning of the 1990s, the increases in funding and the evident interest in institutionalizing consultation with NGOs indicated that NGOs were being considered *needed* parts of Britain's aid program.

#### THE CONSTRAINTS ON NGO INFLUENCE

Yet while government may have increased its interaction with NGOs and its dependence on their expertise, there are a number of limits to NGOs' potential influence on British policy.

##### A Moving Place on the Agenda

One of the first parameters is the government's policy agenda; if NGOs want to be influential in shaping policy, the issue must have a place on the decision-makers' agenda. As we have seen, aid has maintained a permanent if low status place on the government's list of priorities. As a means to maintain important economic and political connections within the Commonwealth without the responsibility and burden of Empire, aid has continued to be significant, if of waning importance. The acceptance of aid as a legitimate part of

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<sup>80</sup>Mark Robinson, "Uncertain Partnership: The Overseas Development Administration and the Voluntary Sector in the 1980s," in Anuradha Bose and Peter Burnell (editors), *Britain's Overseas Aid since 1979: Between Idealism and Self-interest*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991, (p. 176).

<sup>81</sup>There were indeed sceptics in the community. When in the spring of 1993, the government announced as part of its plans for rapprochement that it would fund a new government-NGO liaison committee, BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development), some felt that the new organization was a way to divert radicalism and advocacy. IGBA's Charles Elliott called it a "cordon sanitaire," voicing fears that it was a move to distance officials from the lobbying of individual agencies, (interview held in Cambridge, 13 May 1993).

government spending meant that NGOs, as they began to lobby the government on its policies in the 1960s, were dealing with an accepted item of business. Aid has always been a legitimate subject for debate, just as long as NGOs were advocating changes in oda, as opposed to trade or international institutional reform, as we will see in the next chapter. In short, while the salience of oda has fluctuated, the presence of the aid program itself has been a constant on the official agenda. Other North-South issues that have taken precedence on the NGOs' agenda, however, have not found the same assured place at the table.

### **The Common Economic Ceiling**

While the post-imperial rationale for aid had made a place for aid on the agenda, there were nevertheless definite limits on its growth. This is one of the main points of Atkinson's research on aid policy; he argues convincingly that "aid has always been a secondary issue in British domestic politics," and that as the balance of payments rose to the top of official priority lists, the salience of aid declined. For much of the 1960s, for example, "Whitehall's biggest gun, the Treasury" was "trained upon ODM. ... The Chancellor contended that 'without the great burden of overseas defence and overseas aid ... Britain would have a balance of payments surplus.'"<sup>82</sup> This hostile inter-departmental environment eventually caused Prentice's resignation in 1969; despite the good wishes of the party, Labour was unwilling to raise the aid ceiling. When later in the 1970s the aid budget was raised under both parties, it was in the context of a healthier balance of payments environment. In this environment of fiscal pre-occupation, NGOs were not and could not have been influential in changing the quantity of oda. Aid has remained subordinate throughout its history to the health of the domestic economic situation, regardless of the party in government.

### **Parties and Philosophical Barriers**

Where the quality and not the volume of aid has been an issue, however, we can identify more areas of potential influence. The most significant factor in determining NGO influence has been the party in government: Labour has traditionally supported the more profound changes advocated in the NGO community, and has been more willing to listen to their

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<sup>82</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977: v. and 309.

petitions. Labour has included development on its party platform, and had created a new ministry charged with its management (a recommendation long made by NGOs), made qualitative improvements to the program (as in *More Help for the Poorest*, which had been supported by NGOs), and in the later 1970s (although the party's earlier record had been weak) had increased the funds devoted to aid. The NGO community's initial link with the Labour Party in the 1950s and 1960s (with the Fabian Society, War on Want, VCOAD, and support to the aid budget campaign) had thus been a politically significant one.

Yet when Thatcher's 1979 government ushered in a free-market emphasis that put development assistance closer to the bottom of the government's list of priorities, NGOs fell out of the influential circle. The remaining aid program became explicitly subordinate to political and commercial concerns such as the ATP. Because NGOs were interested in redirecting oda to more developmental concerns, including larger trade and debt issues, they were lobbying for changes in an area where the government had expressed contrary intentions. In the face of these differences of emphasis and philosophy, NGOs could have little scope for influence.

### Low Man on Totem Pole

Yet perhaps the greatest limit to the scope of NGO influence has been the status of the ODA within Whitehall itself. In a policy area where civil servants rather than parliamentarians make many of the day-to-day policy decisions, the status of the ODA vis-à-vis its neighbours is significant. While NGOs may have developed strong links with the ODA, the department has not been much of a significant player in Whitehall. Part of the reason has to do with the collaborative policy process <sup>(3)</sup> ~~in Whitehall~~ <sup>in Whitehall</sup>. As Winpenny explains, the 1980s saw the ODA fall to a diminished position in Whitehall, supported by fewer resources and under a greater pressure to become more efficient at the same time as its "territory" was open to intervention from other sides.<sup>83</sup> A review of the budgetary process, similar to Canada's, provides a short illustration (see figure 4.1). Every year, the Treasury first devises guidelines for spending for all government programs (1), and while it may consult with departments like the ODA, these have no final say in the levels set. The guidelines frame the specific figures for the upcoming

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<sup>83</sup>Winpenny, "Efficiency and Effectiveness," 1991.




Figure 4.1: The British Budgetary Process

year, as well as the planning figures for the following three years, that are in turn presented in the Public Expenditure Survey (2) submitted to Cabinet. With the spending levels thus set, the aid program then enters into discussion in the Joint Aid Policy Committee (3), an interdepartmental group made up of senior civil servants from core ministries, including the Treasury, the FCO, and the Department of Trade and Industry. The committee is responsible for approving the "aid framework" which the ODA has prepared, and for outlining various expenditures planned for the four years covered by the Public Expenditure Survey. Once ratified, it becomes the control document for new commitments managed by the ODA (4). If consensus is not reached in committee, the dispute may be turned over to the appropriate ministers, but in an effort to avoid ministerial involvement, a compromise document is often produced. Since the emphasis on commercial and political matters has been introduced, meetings have lasted longer as other ministries take an increasingly active interest in the potential of the oda budget to further the departmental aims of each. The spending figures under discussion remain confidential and are reported neither to the recipient countries in question nor to Parliament, and while Parliament is required to approve all government expenditures (5), its approval is very much a technicality; budget estimates are approved piecemeal throughout the year, and the House never has the opportunity to debate the development budget separately.

This collaborative process also means that the ODA, like CIDA, bears the burden of having to please many domestic bureaucratic interests; "Aid, even more than other public expenditures, is characterised by fundamental inter-departmental disagreement concerning the purpose of those expenditures, which make a coherent aid policy hard for any government to sustain."<sup>84</sup> Part of the reason for that disagreement, of course, lies in the failure of the 1964 vision to take root; Judith Hart argues that from the beginning, "the conception of the Ministry as a *development* Ministry rather than an *aid* Ministry, with a voice and representation in all issues affecting development, never really took hold in Whitehall."<sup>85</sup> Yet while aid has increasingly become part of the arena of interest of other departments, the ODA has been unable to stretch

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<sup>84</sup>IGBA, *Real Aid*, 1982:6. See also: Anuradha Bose, "Aid and the Business Lobby," in Anuradha Bose and Peter Burnell (editors), *Britain's Overseas Aid since 1979: Between Idealism and Self-interest*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991; and Arnold, *Implementing Development Assistance*, 1982:150.

<sup>85</sup>Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies," 1972:149.

its own concerns into the policy areas of others; from early on, it had become a "sort of vacant parking lot on which other policies were free to encroach."<sup>86</sup>

Breheny's thesis on British NGOs suggests that this interdepartmental weakness of the ODA has furthermore grown during the 1980s, and has affected the potential influence of interest groups working through the administration. "With the ODA more constrained, indeed 'more subservient' in the policy making process at the interdepartmental level, the capacity of those working with it, and through it, to influence foreign policy has declined."<sup>87</sup> So while Patten and Chalker's administrations have recently given the ODA somewhat higher profiles politically, neither the aid budget nor the policy system has reflected any growing influence of the ODA within Whitehall. The importance of the Treasury and other agencies in the budgeting of aid, and the critical importance of the collaborative committee system which develops aid policy underlines its dependence.<sup>88</sup> As such, NGOs trying to work through and with the ODA on changes to policy have faced an uphill struggle.

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<sup>86</sup>White, *The Politics of Foreign Aid*, 1974:296. For a detailed description of the early situation of the ODA within Whitehall, see: George Cunningham, "United Kingdom," in Cunningham (editor), *The Management of Aid Agencies: Donor Structures and Procedures for the Administration of Aid to Developing Countries*, London: Croom Helm in association with the Overseas Development Institute, 1974.

<sup>87</sup>James C.R. Breheny, *State and International Aid Charities in Britain, with Particular Reference to Oxfam UK, 1979-1988*, Ph.D. thesis, University of London, August 1988, (p. 267).

<sup>88</sup>Arnold, *Implementing Development Assistance*, 1982:151-3.

## CHAPTER FIVE: AN ACCOUNT OF ADVOCACY IN THE BRITISH DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

In the previous chapter, the thesis argued that British NGOs have become a more prominent feature on the government's development policy landscape, but that a host of impediments inherent in the decision-making system have circumscribed their possible influence. This chapter picks up the discussion to look more closely at the issues affecting the NGO-government relationship from the perspective of the NGOs themselves. In a fashion parallel to the Canadian NGO chapter, the discussion begins by examining the origins, size and diversity of the NGO community itself. This overview then leads to a closer look at the history of advocacy, including an overview of the issues involved, an analysis of the reasons for the increased interest in advocacy work among voluntary organizations, and a description of the change in tactics in recent years. Given this increase in policy work, the last section then examines the main issues which have placed limits on NGOs' political activity and their capacity to influence policy.

### THE COMMUNITY SPECTRUM TODAY

This first section looks at the origins and the current size and diversity of the NGO community.<sup>1</sup> The description makes clear a number of important points about NGOs' potential for influence: first, the size of the community (in numbers and volume of expenditure) has made it a prominent player on the UK development scene. Second, the breadth of activity and philosophy in the community has made it difficult for agencies to collaborate on lobbying efforts except in particular cases. While these inter-agency disagreements are perhaps inevitable, they weaken the credibility of the sector as a whole, regardless of the volume and the quality of their contributions to development.

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<sup>1</sup>For a more detailed account of the NGO community in Britain, see Peter Burnell, *Charity, Politics, and the Third World*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

## Origins

As in Canada, the beginnings of the NGO community in Britain are found in 19th century church missionary work in Africa and Asia. In the course of their evangelical tasks, missionaries had become involved in early "development" work, and the first education and health programs introduced by Britons in Southern countries came through mission-based schools and hospitals. Although the role of missionaries has subsequently become a controversial issue,<sup>2</sup> they played a significant role in educating their home parishes about life in the colonies, and in triggering the charity impulse that still fuels the NGO community. While mission-based groups were the dominant "development" agencies in the late 19th and early 20th century, they were overtaken in numbers by secular agencies after the second world war. Only some 13% of the NGOs identified for this study<sup>3</sup> remain church-based, although of these, many have maintained their prominence in the community; Christian Aid and the Catholic Agency For Overseas Development (CAFOD) are the most familiar examples.

The secular NGOs found their roots in the UK after the world wars. The Save the Children Fund (SCF) was established in 1919 by Eglantyne Jebb to help Austrian children starving under the Allied blockade; Oxfam was established in 1942 to help children in Nazi-occupied Greece; CARE (Coalition for American Relief in Europe), founded in 1945, set out as an American effort to provide relief after the war; and Christian Aid (originally Interchurch Aid under the British Council of Churches), was established to help in the reconstruction in Europe. Founded as relief organizations for Europeans, all of these groups eventually shifted their activities to longer term community work in countries of the developing world.

By the mid 1960s, the numbers of NGOs had grown to well over 60 groups. Increasingly involved in project work in developing countries, organizations with domestic agendas also came into being; development education centres were set up to help teach British people about development issues, specialized institutes for technological or economic research were established, and campaigning came to the fore. This domestic agenda, often focused on

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<sup>2</sup>One of the remaining controversies surrounding some church-affiliated groups is "Ricebowl Christianity," the practice of exchanging aid for the recipient's conversion to Christianity. While it is today a relatively rare occurrence, secular agencies have been wary of the value of aid offered by some Christian groups (particularly World Vision and the Tear Fund (the Evangelical Alliance Refugee Fund) and this suspicion has been a dividing factor in the community. Many Christian and other religious organizations are, of course, devoted to development work without proselytization. See "Leading from the Front," in *British Overseas Development*, (the ODA newsletter), no. 31, September 1993, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup>See Appendix Two for the thesis survey's listing of British NGOs.

Britain's performance in reaching UN goals, grew in the 1970s and was the origin for NGOs' political work today. By the end of the 1970s, there were well over 100 organizations active in Britain. Focused on a basic human needs strategy, many groups concentrated on community development projects in rural areas with an emphasis on agricultural, health and education programs. In the 1980s, accelerated by the weight of international debt, indigenous development agencies began to increase in numbers. Groups in Britain then began the process of rethinking some of their roles; many now believe that inter-agency coordination, increased involvement with political and economic issues at home, and the funding of indigenous groups is a more appropriate kind of development work for Northerners. Coming into the 1990s, with numbers reaching well over 350 groups,<sup>4</sup> British NGOs have maintained their concentration on project work (although increasingly through the funding of other agencies); have maintained but better coordinated their emergency relief efforts; and have undertaken a self-examination about their political role at home.

## Size

Part of the difficulty of counting NGOs in Britain lies in their diversity and the way in which they are categorized; whether a greater or lesser involvement in overseas development (among other activities) qualifies an organization for inclusion.<sup>5</sup> This question applies particularly to religious groups, organizations which service development groups (consultants), and large multi-service organizations like the Red Cross and Help the Aged. As the notes to Appendix Two explain, the thesis has taken a broad definition, and has excluded from its listing only those groups with a *primarily* evangelical or for-profit mandate. A reliable minimum figure for the early 1990s is 361, the number gathered for the thesis survey.

In all, these organizations employ a significant number of paid and voluntary staff. The total number likely includes some 10,800 paid members of staff and over 10,900 involved in varying degrees of full or part-time voluntary work in Britain, a total minimum home


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<sup>4</sup>See figure 5.1. Fully a quarter of today's NGOs were founded since 1981; a sign of significant continuing growth in the sector.

<sup>5</sup>The OECD's criteria for inclusion in both its 1981 and 1990 directories was to "limit inclusion to those non-governmental, non-profit bodies involved in [...] (a) development education, i.e. the education of public opinion in the OECD member countries on Third World development problems; (b) Development aid, i.e. financial, material, technical or personnel assistance in Third World countries." OECD, *Directory of Non-Governmental Development Organisations in OECD Member Countries*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1990.

Figure 5.1: Distribution of sample of 234 British NGOs by date of foundation

Source: Appendix Two



constituency of over 21,000. Another 6,600 volunteers work overseas in addition to some 15,600 overseas staff (including British and indigenous personnel); an average of 30 staff members at home, 43 overseas, and 30 home volunteers in addition to 18 volunteers working abroad.<sup>6</sup>

The total volume of NGOs' income and spending is correspondingly difficult to estimate, but the 1990 figure for grants by UK voluntary agencies is US\$327 million, about 12% of *total* assistance by Britain, if one tallies both official and privately raised funds, (see figure 5.2). Oxfam has frequently been the top income earner; in 1991, it raised £69.2 million, the second greatest earner among all charities (after the National Trust).<sup>7</sup> The distribution of income between these extremes is also not even, of course: as in Canada, 50% had budgets of less than half a million dollars, and only 10% spent more than US\$10 million (see figure 5.3). Altogether as a sector, development groups have long been prominent income earners among charities in other fields. Figure 5.4 shows that nearly 20% of the total charity sector's income in 1991 (for the top 400 earners only) was made by international aid agencies. Indeed, Charity Aid Foundation figures include 35 NGOs among the top 400; prominent among these groups are well-known agencies like Oxfam (2nd place), Save the Children (6th), Christian Aid (17th), Action Aid (19th), the Tear Fund (25th), and CAFOD (28th). Moreover, the spending by these and other agencies has been growing. Refer to figure 5.5 which compares the similar growth patterns in the expenditure of Canadian and British NGOs; in both countries, slow growth or stagnation in the 1970s had speeded up by 1980, plummeted during the recession of the early 1980s, and shot up again in the middle of the decade, (prompted by media coverage of famine in Africa). Most of that growth, moreover, has been due to increases in private support rather than government funding to NGOs. Late in the 1980s, NGOs as a sector had a quarter (25% in the thesis survey) of their funding from government sources (less than half the figure of their Canadian counterparts), and few organizations received any funding from the ODA (only about 100).<sup>8</sup> Another 26% of NGO income was raised from self-financing (Oxfam and Save the Children, for example, raise a considerable proportion of their earnings from their shops), and 49% was raised from private donations. In

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<sup>6</sup>See the notes to Appendix Two for an explanation of these figures.

<sup>7</sup>Charity Aid Foundation, *Charity Trends*, 15th edition, Tonbridge, Kent, 1992.

<sup>8</sup>Ian Smillie, "United Kingdom," in Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (editors), *Stakeholders in Development: Issues in Government/NGO Relationships*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1993, (p. 283). In comparison, in Canada in 1990-91, 79 NGOs, 60 NGIs (non-governmental institutions, such as universities), and 18 international NGOs were funded by CIDA, (CIDA, *Annual Report, 1990-91*, Hull, 1992).

Figure 5.2: Percentage of total British aid (private and official donations) contributed by NGOs, 1971-1990

Source: OECD DAC reports, various years  
"Government Sources" = contributions to NGOs,  
and "Private Donations" = grants by voluntary agencies




Figure 5.3: Distribution of income among sample of 137 British NGOs

Source: Appendix Two. Sterling figures were translated into \$US and then into 1987 dollars by means of OECD deflator figures




Figure 5.4: International aid income as a proportion of total income of the top 400 British fundraising charities in 1991

Source: Charity Aid Foundation





Figure 5.5: Expenditure by Canadian and British NGOs, 1970-1990

Source: OECD DAC reports, various years



stark contrast with Canadian organizations, British groups have not been significantly reliant on government funding. These figures suggest that the size, labour force, and earnings of the sector (in comparison not only with government, but also with the larger charity sector) make NGOs significant players in Britain's overall development effort.

### Diversity

While lobbying has been an increasing activity for NGOs, the community has largely maintained its focus on more traditional activities. This section touches on the range of tasks undertaken today.

(a) *Project Work Overseas.* As in Canada, the greatest number of agencies and the greatest amount of expenditure is devoted to the implementation and/or funding of projects and programs overseas: some 40% of agencies in the survey indicate they undertake overseas project work (refer to figure 3.5). The main focus of this activity abroad has been on health, education, agriculture, and local infrastructure, and growing attention is also being paid to micro-enterprise development, women's involvement, refugees, the environment, and the strengthening of local institutions (including indigenous NGOs). As in Canada, while some groups such as SCF and ActionAid implement projects directly, many (like Oxfam, Christian Aid and CAFOD) are funding intermediaries between British donors and Southern organizations.

(b) *Material Assistance.* Material assistance (in the form of clothing, books, tools, and other equipment) remains a surprisingly prominent part of NGO activity, even though there are doubts about the appropriateness of this kind of aid. The thesis survey indicates that about 19% of agencies use material aid in some form in the course of their work. Some is food aid, administered primarily during periods of emergency; in all, about 70% of official food aid (compared to 30-50% in Canada) is channelled through NGOs.<sup>9</sup> Some groups provide only specialized kinds of material assistance: Survive-MIVA is restricted to supplying vehicles to missionaries involved in development work, for example, and groups like Books for Development, the Joint Mission Hospital Equipment Board, Send A Cow, Equipment to

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<sup>9</sup>Ian Smillie, "Changing Partners: Northern NGOs, Northern Governments," in Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (editors), *Stakeholders in Development: Issues in Government/NGO Relationships*, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1993, (p. 33).

Charity Hospitals Overseas, and Tools for Self-Reliance have all carved specific niches in the sector. At least eight groups are specifically devoted to material collection, but dozens of others also send material goods overseas as a part of their other activities. Specialized technical assistance also comes under this heading, and in some cases has been a highly successful use of transferred material aid. The most prominent of these organizations is the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) inspired by E.F. Schumacher (author of the influential *Small is Beautiful*),<sup>10</sup> which researches and encourages the production of appropriate technologies.

(c) *Sponsorship*. As in Canada, few British organizations continue to run child sponsorship programs in Britain (only 2.2% of the sample), although many of these often have a high public profile: ActionAid, Plan International, SCF, Christian Children's Fund of Great Britain, the Tear Fund, World Vision, and International Christian Relief are frequently in the public eye. Concerns remain that sponsorship may pick out a particular family in a community and worsen rather ameliorate income disparities, and so many organizations have reviewed their practice.<sup>11</sup> Plan International, for example, thus attempts broader community projects *on behalf of* a given child, with whom the British donor maintains a personal connection.<sup>12</sup>

(d) *Emergency Relief*. A growing number of British organizations in the late 1980s provide relief in emergency situations, sometimes including food aid. At least 28 agencies carry out relief as a main part of their activities (about 9% of the community, similar to the Canadian figure), including big name NGOs like BandAid, the Salvation Army, Oxfam, CAFOD, SCF, and Christian Aid. A specialist group forms the Disasters Emergency Committee which coordinates fundraising campaigns during the largest disasters, and is made up of Oxfam, Christian Aid, the Red Cross, CAFOD, SCF, Action Aid, and Help the Aged.<sup>13</sup> It is important to note that the growing income of NGOs involved in 1991 and 1992 can in large part be traced to an increase in funding for disasters specifically; Oxfam, in its record income-earning year, claimed that its *development* budget in contrast grew by only 1%.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>E.F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered*, London: Blond and Briggs, 1973.

<sup>11</sup>See the *New Internationalist*, no. 111, May 1982; no. 148, June 1985; and no. 194, April 1989.

<sup>12</sup>"The Changing Face of Sponsorship," in *British Overseas Development*, (the ODA newsletter), no. 25, September 1992, p. 11.

<sup>13</sup>ODA, "ODA Support for Voluntary Organisations," ODA Briefing Paper 2, 1990.

<sup>14</sup>Peter Burnell, "Debate: Third World Charities in Britain Towards 2000," in the *Community Development Journal*, vol. 28, no. 1, January 1993, pp. 66-81, (p. 70).

(e) *Volunteer Sending.* Often in conjunction with project work, a number of groups have long been involved in the sending of volunteers overseas. While many agencies have volunteers abroad, less than 25% of British NGOs are solely devoted to volunteer placement. The most recognized of these is probably the VSO (80% supported by the ODA, similar to Canada's CUSO), but there exists also the government-funded British Executives for Service Overseas (BESO, based on Canada's CESO), the British Volunteer Programme, Indian Volunteers for Community Service, International Voluntary Service, Engineers for Disaster Relief, the Bureau for Overseas Medical Service, and World University Service.

(f) *Development Education.* Another prominent activity among NGOs is their development education work; some 27% in the thesis survey indicate that it is a part of their mandate. The "DevEd" community includes the major charities, development education centres, various campaign organizations (like One World Week), a few umbrella organizations, and international organizations particularly within the EC.<sup>15</sup> Coordinated by the network organization NADEC (National Association for Development Education Centres), most of the development education centres in Britain concentrate on school visits and curriculum work, and are funded by the EC and other NGOs rather than by government.<sup>16</sup>

(g) *Research.* Another important area of NGO activity in Britain has been research; about 6% of the community undertakes research in one form or another. Carried out in a number of fora, academic research on development studies is concentrated in the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex, as well as in the Universities of Oxford, East Anglia, Swansea, and London. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London is the centrepiece organization and its role is in many ways analogous to the North-South Institute in Canada. A significant amount of research is also carried out within generalist NGOs like Oxfam and Save the Children, and in specialist organizations like the Panos Institute, ITDG, and the International Institute for Environment and Development

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<sup>15</sup>Stephen H. Arnold, "Constrained Crusaders? British Charities and Development Education," in *Development Policy Review*, vol. 6, 1988, pp. 183-209.

<sup>16</sup>While acknowledged to be of increasing importance, development education in Britain is especially underfunded. Except for the Centre for World Development Education in London, (considered to be too apolitical by other groups), and Scottish Education and Action for Development, few agencies are funded directly by government. The sector received a large cut at the beginning of Thatcher's first term in 1979, and the level of government funding, while somewhat increased, has not since returned to 1979 levels. The British record thus does not look strong in relation to other OECD countries; with Italy, Britain is at the bottom of the DAC list in both absolute and per capita terms for support of development education. Peter Burnell, "Charity that Begins Abroad: Issues in Government Funding," in Alan Ware (editor), *Charities and Government*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989, (p. 120).

(IIED), particular issues like sustainable development, intermediate technology, and the environment and development link are examined.

### A HISTORY OF ADVOCACY

Growing from these activities, lobbying and campaign work have become increasingly important to NGOs in Britain: about 10% in the thesis survey indicate that lobbying is an important part of their mandate (more than in Canada). According to Smillie, "over the past decade, British NGOs have become significantly more involved in efforts to influence government and the public on key development issues, devoting increasing levels of money and staff time to research, analysis and communications."<sup>17</sup> Most of the traditional confrontational lobbying is carried out by the radical left of the community in groups like War on Want, Third World First, and the World Development Movement (WDM). Yet other groups in the middle of the community's political spectrum (Christian Aid, CAFOD, and Oxfam) have also long been involved in campaigning work.<sup>18</sup> Even ActionAid, considered to be a fairly conservative agency, has recently put into place a public policy unit; and Save the Children, also considered conservative, has done substantial critical work on structural adjustment. According to Ivan Nutbrown and Harriet Lamb at WDM, there have been increasing campaigning efforts in the recent past among even the mainstream NGOs.<sup>19</sup> While interest in policy work has recently been rekindled, it is important to note that there has been a long history of advocacy work in the UK; the current novelty has only been in the numbers of groups recently willing to become involved.

### The NGO Agenda

Perhaps the earliest pressure group concerned with development was the Fabian Colonial Bureau. "From its inception in 1940 it developed into a vital and much-used channel of communication linking the colonies, the Labour Party, and the Colonial Office (which was,

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<sup>17</sup>Smillie, "United Kingdom," 1993:292.

<sup>18</sup>For a polemic view of NGOs and their political affiliations, see Rachel Heatley, *Poverty and Power: The Case for a Political Approach to Development and its Implications for Action in the West*, London: Zed Press and Returned Volunteer Action, 1979.

<sup>19</sup>Interviews with Ivan Nutbrown and Harriet Lamb (Communications Officers) and Harriet Lamb, World Development Movement, London, 14 June 1993.

however, "deeply suspicious" of the Bureau.)"<sup>20</sup> Until the early 1960s, the Fabians were the most articulate members of the growing aid lobby, and they enjoyed sympathetic treatment when Labour was in Whitehall. At the time, there had also been Victor Gollancz's Association for World Peace, Fenner Brockway's Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism, and the churches all interested in aid.<sup>21</sup> Among the mainstream development organizations, however, there was little involvement in policy work until War on Want's foundation in 1952.

By the beginning of the 1960s, the number of organizations was increasing at a surprising rate; "Charitable organisations rebounded and turned more political; churches' concern hardened; new, frequently youth-oriented and radical, groups mushroomed."<sup>22</sup> Over the course of the decade, these politicized groups focused their attention on food and aid issues and later, on the crisis in Biafra in 1968,<sup>23</sup> also a catalyzing event for Canadian NGOs. The older NGOs, particularly Oxfam and Christian Aid, were then the mainsprings of pressure and they were joined by the churches. Oxfam's political activities at the time were in large part spurred by its deputy director, Rev. Stacey, who had been inspired by the Shelter Group's political work in combatting homelessness. Over the period, NGOs sponsored a "youth movement" complete with beat and folk-song clubs, magazines, fund-raising walks, fasts, and concerts. The Churches, for their part, articulated progressive positions on aid policy: *World Poverty and British Responsibility* and *Christians and World Development* were published; The Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal Heenan wrote to the PM to encourage him to accelerate the reaching of the 0.7% goal; and the church-organized "sign-in" of the winter of 1969-70 collected over a million signatures in favour of increased aid.

In the 1970s, NGOs continued to focus on the 0.7% target as well as the protection of the ODM and the select committee from absorption under the FCO when the Conservatives came to power. Central in these campaign efforts was WDM, set up in 1970 as a non-charitable political campaigning organization and funded by other NGOs to look at some of the new agenda items raised by the decade. Many saw that their work in other countries was threatened by unstable commodity prices, the price of oil, unfavourable terms of trade, and

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<sup>20</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977:19.

<sup>21</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977:63, 107.

<sup>22</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977:316-323.

<sup>23</sup>Nightingale identifies the 1968 civil war in Biafra as one of the key factors in promoting the politicization of NGOs; he argues that the war "undoubtedly encouraged several agencies to become more political," (p. 244 in Benedict Nightingale, *Charities*, London: Allen Lane, 1973).

badly conceived international aid programs. Throughout the decade, the NGO agenda therefore focused on the UN debate. The UK Standing Committee on the Second Development Decade was set up, the Freedom from Hunger Campaign gathered momentum, and a host of conferences drew NGO participants; as we have seen, the early 1970s saw international meetings on the environment (1972), food (1970 and 1974), population (1974), housing (1976), and trade (the many sessions of UNCTAD). Voluntary development agencies had been expanding their own interests to include these larger issues, and the New International Economic Order (NIEO, a radical proposal by the developing countries for change in global trading and aid practices adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974) was their central document. Indeed, more than 60% of the NGOs active today were founded since 1970, a testimony to the vibrancy of the community during the decade.

By the end of the 1970s, however, NGOs were turning away in frustration from the slowness of UN processes and the UN's apparent impotence in changing the conditions of international trade and aid. British NGOs and others thus began to focus their attention on their own governments. Part of the reasons for the change of focus was disenchantment with Britain's commercial emphasis in its aid program, but other reasons stemmed from larger events: the debt crisis in Latin America and Africa came to world attention in 1982 with Mexico's threat to renege on its debt service payments. Subsequent rescue plans involved stringent economic recovery conditions managed by the IMF under the rubric of structural adjustment programmes (SAP). The massive reduction in government spending required from debtor nations had meant that social services (health, education, housing) were the first to suffer. Almost overnight, many NGOs in Britain were struck by the impact of SAP on their own work, and turned to lobby the government on its debt forgiveness policies, the lending policies of Britain's commercial banks, and (through the British delegation) the SAP policies of the IMF. Links were strengthened with other NGOs active in the EC, primarily through the NGO-EC Liaison Committee concerned with EC aid (especially the Lomé conventions), trade (including GATT), and immigration. In the 1990s, debt and SAP remained one of the central issues of concern for NGOs involved in lobbying work.

### **The Rise of Advocacy**

As NGOs have increased their advocacy work, they have entered into debate on the appropriate approaches to take. Essentially, the controversy is about the politicization of NGO

activity; many feel that it is inappropriate to the nonpartisan character of the NGO community to intervene in the political process, whether at home or abroad. Other agencies argue that development is itself an inherently political activity, and that *political* activity does not necessarily mean *partisan* advocacy. Yet even in organizations that have decided that politicization is desirable, there is considerable debate about its repercussions on the agency's image, its supporters, its funding, and its charity status. Nonetheless, the pressures to increase advocacy are strong and stem from at least three sources: ethics, experience, and peer pressure.

(a) *Ethics*. The philosophical argument for taking on policy work is rooted in the literature on the "evolution" of NGOs: from charitable organizations to change-oriented solidarity movements. As in Canada, the essential argument echoes Korten's work; policy advocacy ranks highly among the activities of the "highest" generation in the institutional hierarchy, and as Dolan writes, these evolutionary writings have strengthened the ethical pecking order among NGOs;

Korten's model is initially attractive for several reasons. By identifying a regular dynamic of change in NGOs it appears to have some predictive power. It also appears to have normative or prescriptive power; later generations of NGOs are better than earlier ones, as development assistance is better than humanitarian assistance. Thirdly, it stresses the distinction between governmental and non-governmental organisations, making governments clear targets for blame, and NGOs advocates for necessary changes.<sup>24</sup>

Advocacy work thus identifies the inner group from the outer, and further pinpoints government policy as the next front for the war on poverty. As such, advocacy becomes a necessary element for belonging to the community; Judith Randel of ActionAid suggests that the increase in political advocacy among NGOs can partly be attributed to a kind of "me-too'ism," a kind of inter-institutional peer pressure.<sup>25</sup>

(b) *Experience*. NGOs have also been pushed to a greater advocacy role because of their own experiences working overseas and their dissatisfaction with official aid. Certainly the dissatisfaction with official aid has been long-standing; as early as 1968, the Haselmere Group

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<sup>24</sup>Chris Dolan, "British Development NGOs and Advocacy in the 1990s," in Michael Edwards and David Hulme (editors), *Making a Difference: NGOs and Development*, London: Earthscan, 1992, (p. 204).

<sup>25</sup>Interview with Judith Rendal, one-time Policy Coordinator at ActionAid, London, 9 June 1993.

(a coalition of radical NGO youth members)<sup>26</sup> wrote, "We cannot continue to merely be polite, respectable, and ineffective lobbyists for 'more and better aid' when we have lost all faith in the ability of our governments to respond realistically to the desperate human need of the poor world .. we therefore intend to become involved in a political campaign."<sup>27</sup> This frustration sounds familiar to some of today's NGOs, struggling once again with macro-economic issues. As Charles Elliott from the Independent Group on British Aid argues, in many cases, NGOs have had little choice in deciding whether to deal with debt or structural adjustment issues for these have directly affected their projects and have underlined the inadequacy of the project approach in dealing with large processes.<sup>28</sup> In this way, few *non-political* options seem appropriate. John Clark makes a similar argument while writing about Oxfam's experiences with structural adjustment in Africa. He says that NGOs are at a stage now "where they simply cannot ignore these broad macro-economic policy issues."<sup>29</sup>

(c) *Southern Peer Pressure*. Another point of pressure toward more advocacy work has been campaigning by Southern agencies. Clark argues that the influence of Southern NGOs has become increasingly important in Britain; as Southern NGOs are taking over the "hardware" of development projects, Northern NGOs are placing more importance on their own "software" (ideas, research, empowerment, and networking) and are thus heading for a higher profile in international lobbying.<sup>30</sup> This assertion may be particularly true of some of the bigger agencies: Christian Aid stepped up its policy work because Southern partners were concerned about the debt crisis,<sup>31</sup> Oxfam's agenda has been increasingly "driven from the South," and even more politically-cautious agencies like Save the Children are paying close

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<sup>26</sup>Refer to Young's description for a fuller account: Judith Young, *The Evolution of an Aid Lobby in Britain, 1962-1970*, MA thesis, Manchester University, 1970, (pp. 75-76).

<sup>27</sup>Cited in: Ian Williams, *The Alms Trade: Charities, Past, Present and Future*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, (p. 146).

<sup>28</sup>Interview with Dr. Rev. Charles Elliott, member of the Independent Group on British Aid, Cambridge, 13 May 1993. The *project* approach, meaning concentration on individual organizations or projects in a community, has come under scrutiny because it has been seen to be insufficiently holistic. The *program* approach is supposed to partly remedy the problem by encompassing a broad range of activity, including individual projects and international and domestic advocacy.

<sup>29</sup>John Clark, *NGOs and Structural Adjustment*, part of Occasional Paper no. 3, Geneva: The UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service, 1987, (p. 19).

<sup>30</sup>John Clark, "Policy Influence, Lobbying and Advocacy," in Michael Edwards and David Hulme (editors), *Making a Difference: NGOs and Development*, London: Earthscan, 1992.

<sup>31</sup>Interview with Jessica Woodroffe, Policy Unit, Christian Aid, London, 6 May 1993.

attention to the demands of Southern agencies.<sup>32</sup> The push from the South came from a number of sources. In 1987, *World Development* published the report of the first major North-South NGO meeting in London.<sup>33</sup> Widely read, the report cited demands from African and Latin American NGOs for greater advocacy work in the North on the macro-economic issues of debt, SAP, and trade. Similarly, the 1989 Manila Declaration, the 1989 report of a Southern NGO meeting held in Tanzania, and the 1990 South-North conference held in Zimbabwe also called on Northern NGOs to monitor and campaign on broader policy issues.<sup>34</sup> Among other recommendations, Northern NGOs were being exhorted to delve more deeply into politics at home; as the coalition ACORD explained, "African partners are rightly saying that northern NGOs must take a more courageous political stance in their own countries and regions on issues such as sanctions and debt."<sup>35</sup> Southern demands have carried weight; without partners, Northern NGOs feel in danger of losing their legitimacy and sliding back to the bottom of their evolutionary scale.

## Tactics

The tactics with which NGOs have approached advocacy have varied enormously. Traditionally, tactics have been part of an overall outsider strategy designed to raise the salience of the issue under debate. It is only recently that development NGOs have chosen to, and have been able to, undertake insider campaigns. Starting from the outsider end of the spectrum, this section touches on some of the main activities shouldered in the pursuit of influence.

(a) *Media-Focused Actions*. In comparison with Canada, British NGOs have made significant use of the mainstream media for their campaigns, a process perhaps made easier by the high public profile of the top agencies. Because of this easy recognition, NGO views on government policy are more frequently given pride of place in the mainstream press, and so

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<sup>32</sup>Interview with Mike Parkinson, Parliamentary Officer, Oxfam, Oxford, 21 May 1993.

<sup>33</sup>Anne Gordon Drabek (editor), "Development Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs," special supplement to *World Development*, vol. 15, Autumn 1987.

<sup>34</sup>Clark, "Policy Influence," 1992:195; John Clark, *Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations*, London: Earthscan Publications, 1991, (p. 146); and *International South/North Linking for Development Conference*, report of meeting held in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 28-30 November 1990.

<sup>35</sup>ACORD, "ACORD Orientation Plan 1991-5," mimeo, September 1990, (p. 18).

common tactics have included newspaper advertisements (like Oxfam's massive 1992 "It's Time for a Fairer World" campaign), organized media events (like the Debt Crisis Network's campaign against the major banks), or War on Want's media blitz to avert 1992 cuts in the aid budget.<sup>36</sup>

(b) *Mass Demonstrations.* Demonstrations involving large numbers of protesters have also been more common in Britain than in Canada, in part because of the smaller size of the country. The three most notable mass demonstrations took place at Westminster in 1981, 1985, and 1987: triggered by the release of the Brandt report (and organized by WDM),<sup>37</sup> the May 1981 lobby involved 10,000 people, and included not only the churches but also 23 other non-governmental development and peace organizations.<sup>38</sup> In October 1985, another WDM-organized "Fight World Poverty" lobby of Westminster was organized to protest low oda levels, and this time involved 20,000 participants.<sup>39</sup> In May 1987, yet another demonstration at Westminster was organized "involving thousands," this time called "Walk for the World" and focused on the quality of UK oda policy.<sup>40</sup> These kinds of mass lobbies are few and far between, however, and while effective in raising issues in Parliament, NGOs acknowledge that oda and North-South relations are only rarely parliamentary issues.

(c) *Letter-Writing Campaigns.* A more consistently wielded tactic has been the letter-writing campaign. Dating from the 1969 protest over oda cuts, seen by ODA minister Reg Prentice to have been critical in stemming the budget's decline, British NGOs have had a long history of organizing mass letter lobbies. Indeed, Grant suggests that pressure groups generally are writing to MPs more often; in 1987, MPs were estimated to be receiving nearly twice as many

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<sup>36</sup>The NGOs' combined efforts to protect the ODA budget in 1992 is credited with having been an effective deterrent. Smillie, "Changing Partners," 1993:29.

<sup>37</sup>While the Brandt report met lukewarm response elsewhere in the OECD, in Britain it was "one of the most talked about of all initiatives in development education (notching up sales in excess of 150,000 copies)," (Burnell, *Charity, Politics and the Third World*, 1991:254). The report provoked a critical review of aid policy by the Foreign Affairs Committee, although little policy change followed on the report (John Vogler, "British North-South Relations," in Michael Smith, Steve Smith, and Brian White (editors), *British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

<sup>38</sup>John Mitchell, "Public Campaigning on Overseas Aid in the 1980s," in Anuradha Bose and Peter Burnell (editors), *Britain's Overseas Aid since 1979: Between Idealism and Self-interest*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.

<sup>39</sup>Although further cuts had been rumoured, the subsequent budget allocated an additional £47 million to oda.

<sup>40</sup>WDM, "WDM in 1992," 1993 brochure, London.

letters as in the early parts of the decade.<sup>41</sup> Recent NGO letter-writing campaigns have included Third World First's efforts to have the UK cancel third world debt, and War on Want's campaign to avert projected cuts to the aid budget.

(d) *Focus on Parliament.* Even though groups are aware that most policy-making is carried out elsewhere, NGOs have nonetheless focused on Parliament for demonstrations, letter-writing, and as in Canada, for lobbying of parliamentary committees.<sup>42</sup> The reason for this Westminster focus has to do with access; as Jordan and Richardson explain, "Parliamentary activity is perhaps particularly important for environmental, social issue, and other cause groups without good connections to Whitehall and the civil service."<sup>43</sup> In some cases, the choice of strategy is thus not strictly voluntary; at best, NGOs can expect Parliament to be concerned only with issues of high public interest which come with a simple set of recommendations (such as more aid, or more aid to the poorest, or more immediate relief). Yet in questions of policy where Parliament has little interest (such as details of UNCED's Agenda 21, the administration of SAP, or particular aspects of Britain's aid program in a given country) parliamentary activity may only have limited effect. It may help put an issue into the political arena, but it is unlikely to direct the shape of policy.

(e) *Meetings and Consultations with Government.* There has also been a long history of insider relations between NGOs and officialdom although to a markedly lesser extent than in Canada. The Fabian Bureau, for example, had very close links with Labour governments in the post-war period; such that "so prolonged and productive an interchange of ideas between a pressure group and a minister would be hard to parallel in recent political history."<sup>44</sup> Although non-partisan, the Bureau's modern equivalent, the ODI, has similarly maintained tight relations with the ODA and is perhaps one of its most respected sources of information on aid practice. Other insider work is undertaken in the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) which coordinates NGO relief activities in partial collaboration with government and is largely

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<sup>41</sup>Wyn Grant, *Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain*, London: Philip Allan, 1989, (p. 68).

<sup>42</sup>Peter Burnell, "Charity Law and Pressure Politics in Britain: After the Oxfam Inquiry," in *Voluntas*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1993, pp. 324-325, (p. 323).

<sup>43</sup>A.G. Jordan and J.J. Richardson, *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, (p. 252).

<sup>44</sup>Atkinson, *Aid to Developing Countries*, 1977:60. The citation is taken from *Papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau*, but the details of the work are not footnoted.

responsible for detailing UK relief policy, and is incidentally one of the few windows through which NGOs have immediate access to government funding. However, on the whole, these substantive interactions are few enough;

No third world charity can be said to be an insider group ... in the sense that it is guaranteed regular consultation by the government, especially with respect to the high politics of foreign policy, although a few prominent voluntary agencies have frequent opportunities to communicate with civil servants on the details of aid programme administration.<sup>45</sup>

As we shall see, however, there may be some indication of change in the situation. UNCED involved an unusually close collaboration between UK NGOs and the government officials preparing for Rio, and the NGOs' behind-the-scenes contributions were credited (in some cases) with directly shaping parts of the British position. Following on Rio, there now seem to be further attempts at "cross-fertilization," evidenced in the series of workshops organized by the ODA for NGOs on project design, reporting, and evaluation; and workshops by NGOs for the ODA on popular participation and indigenous NGOs.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, these kinds of insider strategy have been undertaken by NGOs in recent years with more energy. As Clark explains, the global issues which have appeared on the NGOs' agendas have propelled a "sophistication" of tactics. In the 1980s,

The campaigns tended to focus on aid, trade, international finance and foreign policy in the governmental domain; and buying, selling, investing and employment practices in the corporate sphere. The major trends have been an *increasing strength* of the 'NGO lobby,' a more *strategic approach* to advocacy, closer *integration* of lobbying and public campaigning/education, and more attention to the use of the *media*.<sup>47</sup>

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It is clear that the interrelationship between the choice of issue and appropriate tactic is an important one. Concern with the aid budget, for example, involved public lobbying (petitions, demonstrations, letter-writing in both the 1969 and 1981 campaigns) *precisely because* NGOs could not gain access to the decision-makers (the Treasury and Cabinet) *except* via Parliament. Their institutional ally, the ODA, was itself powerless in budgetary battles and indeed worked

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<sup>45</sup>Burnell, "Charity Law and Pressure Politics," 1993:323.

<sup>46</sup>Smillie, "United Kingdom," 1993:294.

<sup>47</sup>Clark, "Policy Influence," 1992:198.

to have NGOs lobby in the public domain in its stead. Similarly, the UK response to the NIEO's trade recommendations was in the hands of British decision-makers outside of NGO reach (the Department of Trade and Industry along with Cabinet) and so entailed *public* campaigning in the mid-1970s. On the other hand, a basic human needs emphasis, concern over the environmental aspects of development, or administration of the JFS (issues which have also been important to NGOs) have fallen *within* the ODA's policy capacity. Under these conditions, NGOs' access to the ODA has meant their lobbying has been more fruitful. It is in this manner that issues "choose" a department of government, and that NGOs' access to the chosen department thus shapes the strategy undertaken. As their access has increased (because of their perceived comparative advantage), NGOs have been able to choose a more "sophisticated" insider strategy.

#### ISSUES AFFECTING ADVOCACY

Before the choice of issue and tactic arises, however, NGO decisions about advocacy are already bordered by a set of external factors. Some of these are legal (such as charity law), some are external (such as concern over public support for lobbying), and some are internal to the community (fears of constraint by dependence on government funding, and difficulties in coordinating advocacy work). This final section explores these limits to see how far they actually shape NGOs' capacity to take up advocacy roles.

#### Conflicts of Vision

Part of the advocacy debate has to do with broad differences over vision and values, sometimes within the same agency. There is debate not only over the proper vision of the North-South relationship to be transmitted (compassion, charity, solidarity, empowerment, enlightened self-interest, etc), but also about the manner in which that image and message should be put across to the public. Should the agency provide information, encourage criticism, mobilize others toward action, lobby directly, or enter into consultations with government?<sup>48</sup> As Breheny writes in his Ph.D. on British NGOs, "impartiality at home -- avoiding party politics, not telling the government what to do 'in detail,' allowing the state to

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<sup>48</sup>Arnold, "Constrained Crusaders?," 1988:188-9.

make the state's policy -- has often appeared the most contentious issue facing the agencies."<sup>49</sup> Conflicts over vision, for example, led to War on Want's departure from the Disasters Emergency Committee in the 1970s partly on the grounds that the committee's actions were colonialist and paternalist.<sup>50</sup> Within big agencies, this conflict is most starkly felt between fundraisers who feel that a compassion-based approach will provide the most funding, and policy workers who often promote a more political solidarity approach.<sup>51</sup> Conflicts of vision have repercussions on the credibility of the NGO community as a whole because they affect their ability to mount joint-campaigns and to present consensus. The diversity of their activity has meant that NGOs are not easily gathered under one coordinating banner; they are involved in many different, and sometimes conflicting, kinds of work. Disputes are common and divisive.

Radical NGOs -- North and South -- see the non-radicals as a considerable threat. They compete for donations, capture government funds and distort development work. ... The radicals are trying to change the images by which the Third World is conventionally portrayed in the North ... Other NGOs, including some of the resource-abundant evangelical charities such as World Vision, suffer nothing of this inhibition. They go straight for the artery connecting heart and wallet. No image is too harrowing for them; no technique too tacky.<sup>52</sup>

Still other conflicts have been over the share of government and private funding. Donor lists are safeguarded from competing agencies, and efforts have had to be made to avoid stepping on the toes and turf of other agencies.<sup>53</sup> Perhaps one of the most public discussions of inter-agency conflict arose during the BandAid/LiveAid/SportAid phenomenon in 1984-85. Musician Bob Geldof argued that both official and voluntary agencies had dragged their feet in dealing with the famine, and so created a new organization to meet the need, one which was wildly successful in generating a whole new constituency of young donors.<sup>54</sup> Many in the established agencies were concerned that BandAid's focus on images of desperation in Africa and on charity in the North were counter-productive to their broader efforts to promote

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<sup>49</sup>James C.R. Breheny, *State and International Aid Charities in Britain, with Particular Reference to Oxfam UK, 1979-88*, Ph.D. thesis, University of London, August 1988, (p. 366).

<sup>50</sup>Mark Lawson, "Sweet and Sour Charity," in *The Independent Magazine*, 25 August 1990, (pp. 23, 25).

<sup>51</sup>See, for an example of the outcome of that debate at SCF, a brochure entitled: "Impact of Images: Guidelines for writers, editors, advertisers and photographers," May 1988.

<sup>52</sup>Clark, *Democratizing Development*, 1991:44.

<sup>53</sup>Arnold, "Constrained Crusaders?," 1988:195.

<sup>54</sup>"BandAid's Band-Wagon," in *The Economist Development Report*, February 1986, pp. 1-3. Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, "People Aid: A New Politics Sweeps the Land," in *Marxism Today*, July 1986, pp. 10-14.

ideas about social justice. The conflict among charities is recognized, of course, and there are numerous oaths devoted to rectifying the situation. Christian Aid promises to "strengthen our ties with sister agencies in Europe, moving from information sharing to sharing resources, skills, techniques and specific work on campaigns."<sup>55</sup> Similarly, Oxfam plans closer coordination; "if you want to make a real impact on the British public it doesn't make a lot of sense to each run separate campaigns. I also think that the public is more sympathetic to agencies when they see us working together. We've been talking a little too much recently of our 'competitors' rather than our 'sister agencies.'"<sup>56</sup> These pledges, based on pragmatic reasons as well as concerns over image, may be earnest but they face an ingrained competitiveness.

Yet coordination does exist in certain circumstances. In 1979, for example, Oxfam set up a consortium of thirty-one voluntary agencies to mount a joint aid effort in post-Pol Pot Cambodia.<sup>57</sup> The DEC's seven-agency membership has long coordinated appeals for disaster relief, (although some NGOs consider the DEC to be something of a closed shop, run by "The Cartel" of the central agencies). Indeed, particularly in the early 1960s, there were a number of coordinating bodies: the Standing Conference of Voluntary Organisations Cooperating in Overseas Social Service and the Voluntary Societies' Committee for Service Overseas (including government and industry representation).<sup>58</sup> Currently there are at least 20 formal NGO networks in Britain devoted to aid, debt, environment and other issues.<sup>59</sup> The recent announcement of BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development), an ODA-funded but NGO-run coordination body, may be a move in the direction towards more consolidated

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<sup>55</sup>Christian Aid, "The Next Five Years: A Summary of Christian Aid's Plans for 1991-1996," February 1991, (p. 10).

<sup>56</sup>David Bryer (in interview), "New Director, New Directions?," in *Oxfam News*, Spring 1992, pp. 8-9, (p. 9).

<sup>57</sup>Oxfam, Information Department, "A Brief History of Oxfam," mimeo, September 1989, (p. 3); and Burnell, *Charity, Politics and the Third World*, 1991:191-95.

<sup>58</sup>Peter Williams and Adrian Moyes, *Not by Government Alone: The Role of British Non-Government Organizations in the Development Decade*, London: ODI, 1964, (pp. 31-33).

<sup>59</sup>Interview with Angela Penrose, Senior Overseas Information Officer, Save the Children Fund, London, 14 June 1993. Edwards points out that these groups do not necessarily mean a *coordination* of activity, however; "there are some NGO networks (such as the British Overseas Aid group -- BOAG, the Aid and Environment Group, Debt Crisis Network, EC-NGO Liaison Committee and others) but thus far their function has been to share information and/or organise joint events at donor meetings, rather than to co-ordinate inter-agency action on global campaigns over the longer-term," (pp. 16-17 in Michael Edwards, "'Does the Doormat Influence the Boot?' Critical Thoughts on UK NGOs and International Advocacy," mimeo, London: Save the Children Fund, 1993).

advocacy work,<sup>60</sup> as are the increasing numbers of joint-policy workshops. In July 1992, for example, 21 development and environment NGOs gathered for a "Policy Forum" organized by WDM and ODI to discuss the main policy issues in each organization.<sup>61</sup> The participants were arguing whether they should have a common agenda, which issues needed to be addressed, whether their relationships with one another ought to be changed, and how to address the question of "style" in lobbying. Parallel to the Canadian effort in March 1993, this meeting may foretell an increase in the capacity of NGOs to better organize their lobbying efforts.

## Resources

Besides conflicts of vision, other limits to NGO influence on policy are the scarce resources of expertise, funding, and knowledge of the governmental process.

(a) *Expertise.* Increasingly, NGOs' greatest resource in dealing with government has been their expertise. By the 1990s, NGO expertise had been publicly acknowledged by government; according to WDM's Lamb, SCF's Penrose, and IGBA's Elliott, the more well-researched the NGO, the more successful it has been in plying its case. Credited with knowing more about certain aspects of development than government (grassroots project development and implementation, relief activities, cultural factors, longterm sustainable approaches), NGOs are increasingly funded by the public purse, and their advice on government projects is sometimes taken on board. It is chiefly because of that expertise that NGOs have gained access to various parts of the governmental system, although primarily to the ODA. Writing on Oxfam, Peter Burnell argues that some NGOs have thus enjoyed if not insider status, at least a measure of "accepted status,"

For many years officers from the charity have been asked to give oral evidence to relevant sessions of the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs ... the charity enjoys a good working relationship with the Overseas Development Administration ... in connection with emergency relief operations and co-funded

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<sup>60</sup>Initially, however, BOND has been set up as a link between the ODA and the NGO community for exchange of advice and information. Lobbying and advocacy work are not foreseen in the initial stages. Smillie, "United Kingdom," 1993:284; and ODA, "BOND, British Overseas NGOs for Development," mimeo, no. KC 28.1.93, 1993.

<sup>61</sup>Minutes of the WDM/ODI Policy Forum, mimeo, held 17-18 July 1992, at St. Mary's College, Twickenham.

development projects. Indeed, when he was the Minister for Overseas Development (1986-9) Christopher Patten said that Oxfam's director had virtually unlimited access to him; ... and the 1990 survey by the National Council for Voluntary Organisations found that, of all Britain's voluntary organisations, the overseas development agencies meet ministers most regularly.<sup>62</sup>

However, few agencies have developed expertise in the "new" debt, SAP, and trade issues. While their expertise on traditional development topics has allowed them through the door, NGOs once inside may lose their credibility in addressing larger issues. The human resource investment required to approach these policies is thus a significant limiting factor.

(b) *Funding.* Yet beyond expertise and the access that it may bring, there are other resources that NGOs have needed. One such element is financial ability; the larger NGOs such as Christian Aid, Oxfam, SCF, ActionAid, and CAFOD have been better able to devote resources to lobbying than the smaller agencies. Of course, the financial ability of an agency is linked to its willingness to devote time and money to lobbying activities; in the early 1960s, few agencies other than War on Want, Oxfam, and Christian Aid did. It must be willing to accept the opportunity cost of foregoing "on the ground" work elsewhere. Official funding, discussed a little later on, is a further factor, both because of its growing impact on the overall income of the agency and because of the restrictions it may impose on advocacy work.

(c) *Knowledge of the Governmental Process.* Another resource in relatively short supply is NGO knowledge of the governmental process. Few organizations other than the campaigning NGOs (War on Want Campaigns, WDM, and "the Cartel" of Oxfam, SCF, ActionAid, Christian Aid and CAFOD), have an intimate awareness of the interbureaucratic and political environment in which development policy is made. For most, relationships with individual officials are by and large limited to the small NGO staff stationed in East Kilbride, outside of Glasgow. As NGOs begin to contemplate greater advocacy work, they have had to pay closer attention both to broader political factors and to the inter-bureaucratic elements affecting development policy.

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<sup>62</sup>Burnell, "Charity Law and Pressure Politics," 1993:324-325.

## Autonomy

Another aspect of the British NGO-Government relationship is funding. NGOs in receipt of large grants have been concerned that their autonomy to undertake political work will be implicitly or explicitly circumscribed. Overall, British NGOs have been less dependent than their Canadian neighbours on official grants, however, and even though there has been a funding window since 1974, it has remained small in comparison with other OECD countries. Indeed, few agencies admit to feeling coerced in their funding relationship with government; Smillie argues that most NGOs are not particularly dependent upon the ODA and would likely survive more or less intact if their funding was curtailed.<sup>63</sup> Burnell reports that regulation and funding conditions have had very little impact on NGOs, arguing that the sums involved are too small and the loopholes too large to have made much of an impact.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, as many organizations have self-imposed restraints on the amounts they are *willing* to accept from government; Oxfam, Christian Aid, and CAFOD have all imposed limits of 10 - 25%, and Save the Children has indicated that it, too, wishes to keep the proportion of its official funding low.<sup>65</sup> SCF's senior information officer, Angela Penrose, voices a common concern by arguing that it is "important that SCF maintains independence so that can stand outside the system in order to comment."

Still, the absence of a stick -- the threat of profound change if official grants are cut -- does not mean that there are not other influences acting on NGOs' decisions. Carrot-like incentives may also have real consequences. John Clark, longtime with the policy department at Oxfam, writes that the appeal of funding may turn some agencies into contractors for government (he points out, for example, that both CARE and the Emergency Social Fund carry out ODA-designed programs in Bolivia),<sup>66</sup> may encourage agencies to shift the focus of their

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<sup>63</sup>Smillie, "United Kingdom," 1993:284.

<sup>64</sup>Burnell, "Charity that Begins Abroad," 1989:127-128.

<sup>65</sup>Note, however, that official funding is still one of the largest sources of funds for each of these block-funded agencies.

<sup>66</sup>Clark, *Democratizing Development*, 1991:41.

programming,<sup>67</sup> or may actually bring new agencies into being that are specifically geared to donor, rather than partner/beneficiary, priorities:

Very frequently ... the official funding goes not to established NGOs but to new organizations conforming to models defined by, and oriented to, priorities chosen by the donors. This may be the case with the present expansion of official funding for NGOs in Ghana under the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment. In such situations there is a danger of the public sector corralling the voluntary sector, whether or not the services provided are welcomed by the poor. This could not only deflect NGOs from their chosen functions but it could bring the whole sector into disrepute.<sup>68</sup>

It is thus that official funding has not actively dissuaded British NGOs from pursuing advocacy work, although it may well have imposed an opportunity cost of diverting agencies to perform other kinds of work. Official funding has been such a small a proportion of the sector's income (particularly in comparison with Canada) that the threat of the stick is much less credible than concerns posed by carrot-like incentives.

### Public Support

Another factor affecting the advocacy debate is the issue of public support. NGOs are nervous about the possibility of alienating their supporters by taking on too much, or not enough, of an advocacy role. Breheny, for example, argues that many NGOs would not enter the political realm even if they felt they legally could, simply because advocacy is not seen to be part of an income-maximizing strategy. An NGO may remain "equivocal, ambiguous, or silent with regard to more 'fundamental'" causes of war, poverty, etc, and so "avoid any clear definition of its objectives and present itself as all things to all people."<sup>69</sup> Indeed, as one NGO worker explained, "The [charity] commissioners are often used by charity directors as

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<sup>67</sup>Burnell argues in a similar vein: "The possibility cannot be entirely ruled out that a form of power might be exercised over the agencies through the mechanism of anticipatory responses by them, and a more or less unconscious self-regulation of priorities at the margin -- away from an advocacy role at home, towards uncontroversial relief and development projects abroad," (Burnell, "Charity that Begins Abroad," 1989:128). ODI Fellow Mark Robinson supports these arguments, and suggests that newer NGOs in particular have become supply-driven, highly attuned to sources of official funding. While he does not find that funding has had a deleterious effect on the choice of sectors or countries, he suggests that the "carrot" principle is in effect, and that NGOs are choosing service-delivery types of projects, rather than ones designed to mobilize the poor that they may have otherwise undertaken in the same sector, (Robinson, "An Uncertain Partnership," 1991:169).

<sup>68</sup>Clark, *Democratizing Development*, 1991:64.

<sup>69</sup>Breheny, *The State and International Aid Charities*, 1988:126, 335-336.

bogeymen to keep the reds quiet. They wouldn't 'go political' even if they could legally do so."<sup>70</sup> The fear here is that NGOs would lose the financial support of their own donors, seen to be reluctant about giving money meant for "charitable" purposes to "political activities."

This aspect of the debate is certainly a familiar one. As early as 1969, there was the well publicized case of Rev. Nick Stacey, Deputy Director of Oxfam, who left the charity over a dispute about his plans, rejected by the Council of Management, to devote 25% of Oxfam's income to educational work and lobbying. While the Council cited the charity laws as the reason for the censure, some argued that their real motivation was fear that change would drive away supporters.<sup>71</sup> Today, the debate remains. Even though Oxfam maintains a high political profile, it is still concerned about supporter misapprehension of its advocacy work. On the other hand, there is evidence to support the contention that advocacy work can increase an agency's supporter base. Woodroffe at Christian Aid says that advocacy has increased its supporters, arguing to the contrary that policy work has therefore been a good fundraising technique.<sup>72</sup> Indeed, War on Want's donor base, more radical than in other organizations, pushes the agency to *increase* its political work.<sup>73</sup>

Yet this political interest has not been widespread in the British public. The lack of committed public support for advocacy has been a critical issue for NGOs; their funding, legitimacy, and a growing part of their work depends on educating an often apathetic public about the importance of dealing with political issues at home in order to work toward the alleviation of poverty overseas. In comparison with Canada, however, attempts to measure the opinions and knowledge of the British public on development issues have been rare. There have been few polls conducted by the ODA on public attitudes toward aid, and those that have been commissioned in the past twenty years seem to show little overall change in either support for, or knowledge of, aid and development. In general, somewhat better than half of

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<sup>70</sup>Peter Burns, former director of War on Want, quoted by Whitaker and cited in Arnold, "Constrained Crusaders?," 1988:197.

<sup>71</sup>Peter Gill, *Drops in the Ocean: The Work of Oxfam, 1960-1970*, London: Macdonald Unit 75, 1970, (pp. 156-157). Young, however, describes the conflict as one between Director Leslie Kirkley's wish to have Oxfam do its political work through VCOAD, and Stacey's desire for a separate internal policy unit, (in *The Evolution of an Aid Lobby*, 1970:11).

<sup>72</sup>Interview with Woodroffe, May 1993.

<sup>73</sup>Interview with Martin Hughes, Deputy Director of War on Want, London, 29 April 1993.

respondents are in favour of British aid on humanitarian grounds, mediated by concern for the domestic economy (see figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6: British Public Opinion Polls on Foreign Aid and Development Assistance<sup>74</sup>

| Date↓ | Source | Should Britain Help? | More?       |
|-------|--------|----------------------|-------------|
| 1969  | Rauta  | 62%                  | 40% approx. |
| 1977  | Bowles | 47%                  |             |
| 1981  | Gallup | 49%                  | 34%         |
| 1983  | Gallup | 61%                  |             |
| 1987  | Gallup | 53%                  | 43%         |
| 1992  | Gallup |                      | 50%         |

The 1977 poll had the interesting additional question of support for voluntary agencies; many respondents vastly overestimated NGO spending: 45% thought NGOs gave the same or more than government! 64% recognized Oxfam, and smaller numbers could identify the Red Cross, SCF, Christian Aid, War on Want and the Salvation Army. 65% were willing to give money to all or one of them, with particular favour to SCF (because of its work with children) and Oxfam (because of its reputation for efficient use of funds and its familiarity). The small percentage of respondents preferring not to give to particular agencies most commonly cited fear of waste or misuse of funds, concern that funds would not reach the people, ignorance about the agency itself, and in the case of Christian Aid, a fear that its religious basis might mean that it imposed Christianity on beneficiaries. Significantly, only a very small percentage cited the overtly political nature of the agency as a reason to withhold support.<sup>75</sup>

What these studies mean to NGOs, of course, is important. If only vaguely, they identify not only the levels of support for aid generally, but also the attitudes of Britons to voluntary

<sup>74</sup>United Kingdom, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Social Survey Division, I. Rauta, *Aid and Overseas Development: A Survey of Public Attitudes, Opinions and Knowledge*, London: HMSO, 1971, (pp. 7-10). United Kingdom, Central Office of Information on Behalf of the Ministry of Overseas Development, T.S. Bowles, *Survey of Attitudes towards Overseas Development*, London: HMSO, 1978, (pp. 13-16, 46-54, 96-98). Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd, *Overseas Aid 7-11 January 1983*, Office of Population Censuses and Services; *Gallup Political Index*, report no. 326, October 1987, (table 28); and the Gallop poll published in Michael Simmons, "Defense Savings 'Should go to Poor Countries,'" in *The Guardian*, 5 March 1992, p. 11.

<sup>75</sup>Bowles, *Survey of Attitudes towards Overseas Development*, 1978:13-16, 46-54, 96-98.

organizations, to the problems of development, and to their own communities and economies.<sup>76</sup> NGOs are much concerned with their reputation within this environment of opinion; not only do their pounds come predominantly from the private purse, but their legitimacy in the eyes of their own government and their partners abroad depends on sound public backing. They feel they must be seen to promote the will of a sizeable portion of British society. It is no doubt gratifying that the level of support is generally positive, and that NGOs seem to be accorded a high level of trust in relation to government, but the consistent beliefs about first "getting our own affairs in order," coupled with only superficial knowledge of the issues in question, are obstacles for NGO activity, and in particular, for greater advocacy work.

### The Charity Commission

Most British NGOs are registered charities, and while charity status confers significant benefits, it also imposes significant restrictions. The advantages include diminished taxes and increased legitimacy in the public eye;<sup>77</sup> the disadvantages include restrictions on allowable activity, particularly in regard to politics, as well as tight financial accountability regulations. Many of the groups with an overtly political agenda (like the World Development Movement or Third World First) have thus been ineligible for registration with the Charity Commission, the government body charged with regulating the sector.<sup>78</sup>

As in Canada, the laws on charities in Britain continue to be based on the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses, and even though the statute was removed from the books in 1960, it continues to form the basis for current legal definitions.<sup>79</sup> The present interpretation of the statute's restriction on political activity is laid out in a 1991 pamphlet by the Commission: the bones of the law are that charities may not petition to have laws changed or policies

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<sup>76</sup>For a discussion of the problems involved in looking at the influence of public opinion on British foreign policy more generally, see: J.B. Donnelly, "Public Opinion and the Making of British Foreign Policy," paper for the Royal College of Defense Studies, 1991.

<sup>77</sup>The element of legitimacy was stressed during an interview with Youssef Hajar, Director of the Information and Policy Division of the Refugee Council, in London on 18 May 1993. He argues that charity status indicates to the public that a given position *has* been thought through by the charity, is serious, and carries weight.

<sup>78</sup>Burnell, *Charity, Politics and the Third World*, 1991:6-9.

<sup>79</sup>Nightingale, *Charities*, 1973:39; and Alan Ware, *Between Profit and State: Intermediate Organizations in Britain and the United States*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, (pp. 77-80).

advocated unless these activities are part of its mandate *and* are ancillary to its activities.<sup>80</sup> However, the extent to which *any* political activity can be undertaken is not fixed; it depends on "the nature of the charity itself, its trusts, the public issue; and the way in which the charity conducts its publicity and brings an issue into public discussion."<sup>81</sup> On the one hand, a charity can respond, comment, advise, suggest, and supply information on those issues that are seen to directly affect its area of activity; but on the other, it may not petition, exhort, or otherwise promote change in any area of legislation other than private bills and proposed changes to its grants, unless its political activities are understood to be ancillary to its mandate. The definitions of *ancillary*, *education*, *promotion* and other words are unclear, and it is little wonder that NGOs' negotiations in and around the law have been on a trial and error basis.

In response to the vagaries of the law, a substantial literature has been generated on the idiosyncrasies and history of the charity regulations in Britain.<sup>82</sup> With archaic laws, inconsistent rulings, and an inability to pursue the majority of transgressions (due to the extraordinarily large body of charities in Britain), the Charity Commission's task, as well as NGOs' efforts to pre-interpret its rulings, is complex. First, the Commission lacks the resources to police charities once they are registered. Second, many charities are involved in political activities alongside their more traditionally charitable ones, and it is difficult to assess the extent to which politics are subordinate to, "ancillary to," charity. Third, investigations are usually made only when there has been a complaint made, rather than on a spot-check basis.<sup>83</sup> Fourth, many organizations have been able to re-organize their affairs so that they

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<sup>80</sup>The guidelines are: (i) A trust for the attainment of a political object is not charitable since the Court has no way of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit; (ii) to promote changes in the law, or maintenance of the existing law, is a political purpose and not charitable; (iii) nor are attempts to change a political administration or policy; (iv) political propaganda in the guise of education is not charitable; (v) the word "political" is not confined to party politics; (vi) a trust for education of the public in one set of political principles is not charitable; (vii) but an association which has legislative promotion as an ancillary part of its activities may be charitable; and (viii) research must be publicly available in order to be charitable. See Appendix B in: Charity Commissioners for England and Wales, *Political Activities by Charities*, 1991.

<sup>81</sup>Charity Commissioners, *Political Activities by Charities*, 1991:3.

<sup>82</sup>For a particularly thorough review of the literature on charity law and NGOs, see: Breheny, *State and International Aid Charities*, 1988:196-256.

<sup>83</sup>Indeed, the bane of British NGOs is more likely the small group of conservative organizations which have lodged complaints against them, rather than the Commission itself. Western Goals, the UK subsidiary of the American right-wing organization, the Heritage Foundation, has been responsible for a number of these. Their Domestic Affairs Unit (Charities) claims to be carrying out "a highly successful series of research and media operations against a number of Third World Relief operations -- most notably War on Want, Christian Aid, and Oxfam which have been subverted to leftist objectives and which have become increasingly noted for their anti-Western anti-capitalist stance," (cited in Williams, *The Alms Trade*, 1989:164. See also: Ann Montague, "The Changing Face of Charity," in *New Society*, 13 May 1988, pp. 22-24, (p. 23). The International Freedom

do not transgress the more obvious restrictions: charitable War on Want has its non-charitable War on Want Campaigns, and the non-charitable United Nations Association has its charitable educational trust.<sup>84</sup> Other strategies to circumvent the law include a form of self-restraint in delegating campaigning to other organizations such as the World Development Movement.

It must also be remembered that the Commission works in a very public environment, and has been under considerable pressure to account for the actions of the some 170,000 charities in the £17 billion a year sector.<sup>85</sup> Rumours of corruption or mismanagement within charities have thus occasionally spurred official scrutiny,<sup>86</sup> as in 1987 when the Home Office and Treasury published a report on the efficiency of the Commission. The Commission has therefore been under pressure to maintain a firm stance on political advocacy work, and when the International Freedom Foundation, a conservative advocacy group, submitted a complaint about Oxfam's "Front Line Africa" and Nicaraguan campaigns, the Commission was compelled to act quickly. Its May 1991 ruling was firm; "The Commissioners accordingly require the trustees to accept that some of their current campaigning work is political and not charitable. The unacceptable political activities of the charity must cease."<sup>87</sup> The grounds were that the charity did not distinguish between stating a possible solution to a problem in reasoned fashion, and campaigning to have that solution adopted (advocating among other

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<sup>83</sup>(...continued)

Foundation, another free-market pressure group, was specifically responsible for the Charity Commission's inquiry into Oxfam's activities in 1991; it submitted 42 pages of evidence purporting abuse of Oxfam's charitable status. See Burnell, "Charity Law and Pressure Politics," 1993:312; and Dolan, "British Development NGOs," 1992:207.

<sup>84</sup>Nightingale, *Charities*, 1973:55.

<sup>85</sup>Figures from: "Bill Aims to Tackle Fraud in Charity Fund-raising," in *The Independent*, 6 November 1991, p. 9.

<sup>86</sup>Such was the case in 1987 with the Home Office and Treasury report on charities, (Sir Philip Woodfield, Graham Binns, Richard Hirst, and David Neal, *Efficiency Scrutiny of the Supervision of Charities*, Report to the Home Secretary and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, London: HMSO, 1987). It recommended an increase in the ability of the Commission to deal with malpractice and inefficiency by allowing quicker action when foul play was suspected, regulating more conditions for trustees of charities, and requiring greater financial accountability. It was at this time that War on Want was called to account for the irregularities of its own accounting techniques. The Commission's investigation exposed incompetence rather than dishonesty, and led to the temporary dissolution of the agency. This investigation added fuel to the fire under the Commission, and in 1989, the government released a White Paper on charities, *Charities: A Framework for the Future*, which called for action on charities abuses and in 1992, a new act was put into place which fulfilled many of the 1987 report's recommendations, (pp. 41-44 in Tom Lloyd, *The Charity Business: The New Philanthropists*, London: John Murray, 1993). Yet, to the apparent dismay of some Tory backbenchers, it did not tighten the restrictions governing political activity, (David Millward, "Bill Aims to Crack Down on the Charity Cheats," in the *Daily Telegraph*, 6 November 1991, p. 5).

<sup>87</sup>Charity Commissioners for England and Wales, *Oxfam: Report of an Inquiry*, submitted to the Charity Commissioners 8 April 1991, including the response of the Commissioners and a note of the Commissioners' published guidance on political activities by charities, London: HMSO, 1991, (p. 2).

things further aid, cancellation of debt, and the maintenance of sanctions in South Africa); and that it had funded partisan groups and taken sides in conflict situations in other countries. Because the Commission decided that the trustees had acted in good faith, however, no punitive action (such as the reimbursement of misapplied funds, or removal of charity status) was taken other than to insist on the correction of (what the Commission felt) was the charity's "flawed understanding" of charity law.<sup>88</sup> While the initial reactions among NGOs was caution (the ruling had "made the whole community more conservative")<sup>89</sup> there did not seem to be a change in their political agenda subsequently. Indeed, many believe the Commission to be broadly sympathetic to their political work. As the Director of Oxfam said after its 1991 inquiry, the "Commission has endorsed most of the political activity of the charity and by inference much of the political activity of other charities,"<sup>90</sup> and even the Deputy Director of the radical War on Want suggests that UK charity law is not as restrictive as it seems.<sup>91</sup> In this environment, groups have inferred that "anything is allowable as long as it is not strident,"<sup>92</sup> and have instead used less public or confrontational means to pursue their existing agenda.

The sum effect is that while the Commission has issued warnings from time to time, particularly since the 1987 scrutiny, when War on Want and Oxfam were both taken on as test cases,<sup>93</sup> the Commission has been unable to monitor the whole of the sector and has been unwilling moreover to press the law on political activity unless compelled to do so. In practice, it has generally acquiesced to campaigning activities that thirty years ago it would have refused.<sup>94</sup> There are no publicized cases in which it has withdrawn tax relief from a registered charity on the grounds of political activity,<sup>95</sup> and of the 400 inquiries completed by the Commission by 1991, only 3% involved complaints of political activity by any charity.<sup>96</sup> As Smith concludes in his study for the World Bank on British NGOs, "the major NGOs do not find themselves unduly restrained by these guidelines, although some find the

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<sup>88</sup>Charity Commission, *Oxfam: Report of an Inquiry*, 1991:9.

<sup>89</sup>Interview with Woodroffe, May 1993.

<sup>90</sup>Bryer, "New Director, New Directions?," 1992:8.

<sup>91</sup>Interview with Hughes, April 1993.

<sup>92</sup>Interview with German, June 1993.

<sup>93</sup>Interview with Hughes, April 1993; and with Parkinson, May 1993.

<sup>94</sup>Ware, *Between Profit and the State*, 1989:226.

<sup>95</sup>Ware, *Between Profit and the State*, 1989:227.

<sup>96</sup>Cited in Burnell, "Charity Law and Pressure Politics," 1993:331.

need to take legal advice frequently,"<sup>97</sup> especially following the 1991 ruling on Oxfam. Nonetheless, such is the overall difficulty and unlikelihood of the law being pressed to the letter, that NGOs have continued their campaigning efforts, albeit at a more subdued volume, and have continued to emphasize contentious arguments about the structural causes of poverty and the ways in which British policy must be changed.

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<sup>97</sup>Derek Smith, *Study of the Role of United Kingdom NGOs in Providing Development Aid*, prepared for the World Bank, July 1987.

## CONCLUSIONS: NGOS AND GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN

The previous two chapters have outlined the history of NGO-government involvement in Britain, and have suggested that there are a number of parameters within which NGOs' lobbying activities have evolved. This section takes another look at these "elements of influence" and offers a set of preliminary conclusions.

As in Canada, the **context** in which British foreign policy has evolved (largely to support its Commonwealth links) has guaranteed a permanent and legitimate place for development assistance. However, NGOs which have tried to extend the development agenda to include issues more controversial than oda, (such as trade reform, changes in the Bretton Woods institutions, control over multinationals), have had a much more arduous history. Part of the reason that many of these macro issues have not infiltrated the agenda is that there is an absence of a sustained public interest in development; while generally benign, public concern has been only sporadically invigorated to action, and then only by humanitarian relief efforts, or, as at the end of the 1960s, by clear-cut single issue campaigns like the oda budget. It is in this political environment that the governing party has also been a relevant factor: the chapters have argued that Labour has generally, but not always, been more sympathetic to NGO policy aims than have the Conservatives.

The **content** of the proposed policy is another relevant factor in NGOs' capacity to influence government. Elliott, of the Independent Group on British Aid, stressed the importance of distinguishing the types of policy in any advocacy undertaken. We have seen that NGOs have generally faced a more receptive audience on debates over the *kind* rather than the *quantity* of aid; on aid issues rather than on trade ones; and on specific administrative issues rather than on global problems. In lobbying for such "low policy" changes, NGOs have generally been greeted with greater success.

Of course, one of the other important elements in determining influence over any level of policy is the **motivations** of the players involved. Although the NGO-government connections are weaker in Britain than in Canada (where purse strings tightened the

relationship), the ODA has been dependent on the NGO community for a measure of public support throughout its history and, in recent years, the Administration has become increasingly dependent on NGOs for their expertise. On the NGO side, as in Canada, pressures toward increased advocacy have come from numerous sources: increased frustration with official aid (particularly in conjunction with structural adjustment), demands from Southern partner organizations, and arguments about the next institutional stage for their development work. Given the presence of the Charity Commission, however, some organizations have questioned the wisdom of undertaking lobbying altogether, while others have made the choice to engage in a different kind of lobbying strategy alongside their traditional concerns. The insider track, involving controversial collaborative and consultative measures on both parts, have thus begun to be sought even by the more confrontational members of the community.

Part of the motivation for interaction, of course, is government need for NGO expertise on certain issues, and this resource has been one of the main reasons that NGOs have gained access to various parts of the governmental system. Other resources are also evidently needed; the financial ability of the larger NGOs such as Christian Aid, Oxfam, SCF, ActionAid, and CAFOD has meant that they have been better able to devote resources to lobbying, once they have accepted the opportunity cost. A related resource is the ability and willingness of agencies to coordinate in joint-lobby efforts; born of differences in philosophy and a measure of excessive individualism, few agencies are coordinated on a sustained basis.

The chapters have also argued that there has been a move toward more "professional" insider tactics, even among the more traditionally confrontational agencies like War on Want. This "more strategic approach" identified by Clark has been an effort to ease NGO access to more issue areas and to more decision-makers. Yet for many NGOs and over many issues, an insider strategy has not been possible either because the ODA (the one easy-access agency for NGOs) is unsympathetic (over issues such as debt alleviation or procurement tying) or because the ODA is not responsible for the decision to be made (the oda budget, GATT reform, trade barriers). Where access is closed, public tactics are undertaken to force the issue onto the agenda.

Yet the inside track itself is a complex of governmental **channels**; there are myriad institutions governing NGOs' access to and relationship with "government." Made wary by the Charity Commission, husbanded by the ODA, only occasionally taken up in Parliament,

and ignored by the other reaches of Whitehall, NGOs' influence is confined to a fairly narrow institutional corridor. There are no advisory boards, only a small funding program, and except for the new BOND organization (which is run outside of government), no regular point of access. The issue is that, unlike in Canada, there has been little institutional precedent for the ODA to consult regularly with NGOs. This has changed in recent years as NGOs have gained in reputed "comparative advantage," and as Britain is pressed by the example among DAC countries to consult more extensively with its own NGOs.<sup>1</sup>

1. Confidential DAC sources.

## CHAPTER SIX: THE 1974 WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE

The World Food Conference, held in Rome from 5-16 November 1974, was for many voluntary organizations their first springboard into advocacy work. The high-publicity lobbying of the Canadian NGO team, the most prominent group of activists present, may have helped shape the Canadian position, while its British NGO counterpart played a less conspicuous role, more concerned with observing than with influencing. The difference in their success has a great deal to do with their respective organizational skills and their abilities to generate publicity. In comparison with other organizations, the success of the Canadian effort, while modest in absolute terms, was nevertheless so remarkable that it led to the creation of new coalitions in both countries designed to take up lobbying in subsequent international meetings. The experience of the NGOs in Rome was to shape their approach to the UN thereafter.

Following an overview of the origins, events, and outcomes of the conference, the chapter takes a closer look at the domestic context in Canada and Britain, the motivations of the players involved, the resources available to the NGOs, the decision-making channels they were trying to affect, the tactics undertaken to influence their governments' policies, and finally, the content of the issues under debate in Rome. The final section steps back from the details of the case study, discusses the influence of NGOs from a variety of angles, and concludes that while NGOs in neither country can point to a fundamental change in policy caused by their activities, they were able to set a precedent for later, more successful lobbying in fora that 18 years on would include the Earth Summit in Rio.

The story of NGO participation at the conference is drawn from a number of sources. On the Canadian side, beyond the primary materials collected, the research is supplemented by two detailed studies of Canadian NGO activity at the conference, and by press clippings and

secondary material in the academic literature. The two studies are particularly useful:<sup>1</sup> Kim Killeen's masters thesis provides a day by day itinerary of the NGOs' activities prior to and during the conference, as well as a set of conclusions about their influence over the Canadian proceedings. Don Page, part of EA's research department, supplements Killeen's research with an overview of official sources. The thesis builds on their work by uncovering further primary sources, interviewing other participants on both the official and voluntary sides, and organizing conclusions about their influence in a broader framework. On the British side the thesis presents entirely original information. Although there have been significant difficulties in uncovering the British perspective,<sup>2</sup> the interviews, primary sources, and analyses presented here shed light on an unexamined period of the early life of UK NGOs as lobbyists.

#### BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

The World Food Conference took place in a mood of international urgency. The catalyst was a critically weakened world food supply and extensive hunger: between 1972 and 1974, the African famine affected Chad, the Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Niger, and Ethiopia; and in other parts of the world, famine affected populations in Eastern Brazil and in Bangladesh. The crisis was the result of a host of conditions: among them a fertilizer shortage, an over-dependency on green revolution hybrids, high population growth, the rising costs of manufactured inputs, and bad weather.<sup>3</sup> World food production had diminished by

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<sup>1</sup>Kim B. Killeen, *Interest Groups in the Canadian Foreign Policy Formulation Process: the case of the World Food Conference*, MA thesis, Dalhousie University, 1982. Don Page, "Participation d'un groupe de pression canadien à la conférence mondiale de l'alimentation, 1974," in the *Revue Études internationales*, vol. 15, no. 2, June 1984, pp. 239-349.

<sup>2</sup>One of the difficulties of the research in Britain has been the age of the NGO participants and the inaccessibility of government documents. Of the major NGO actors involved in Rome (Donald Tweddle of the UK Standing Committee on the Second Development Decade, Leslie Kirkley of Oxfam and ICVA, Leslie Farrer-Brown of VCOAD, and Alan Booth of Christian Aid), all have passed away or have been unreachable. I have been able to find only two NGO activists who were present (Paul Rogers, who represented the Human Ecology Council and WDM; and Anne Sieve, who represented IPPF), and two others who were active in Britain on food issues at the time and remembered the conference (John Tanner and Chris Stockwell of WDM). Furthermore, other than files at WDM and Christian Aid, all the other agencies involved had disposed of their records: Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, and VCOAD. I faced similar difficulty finding officials who were active in and around Rome. Alan Vickery, part of the official delegation, was able to speak with me but Fred Peart (Minister of Agriculture), Judith Hart (ODM Minister), and Ted Smith (delegation member) had all passed away, and Basil Cracknell (delegation member from the ODA) remembers little. Repeated requests to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food for copies of public documentation available for the conference have been acknowledged but left unanswered.

<sup>3</sup>Paul Rogers, "Food in Our Time -- But Not Just Yet," a report on the World Food Conference, London:WDM, 1974, pp. 1-5.

33 million tons in 1974, and cereal stocks diminished to the lowest levels since the Second World War, tripling the price of wheat.<sup>4</sup>

Against this crisis background, other forces would also shape the conference. The 1973 OPEC oil price rise had sent shock-waves through the international system and had lent power to the NIEO debate in the UN (a declaration was adopted in May 1974, six months before the Rome conference). The OPEC crisis meant that economically nervous Northern governments were becoming more interested in the multilateral institutions of the UN, and were more attentive to its agenda.<sup>5</sup> The early 1970s were also a time when global issues were frequently debated in world conferences such as the 1970 Second World Food Conference in the Hague, the 1972 Stockholm conference on the environment, UNCTAD III in Santiago in 1972, the 1973 Law of the Sea conference in Caracas, and the 1974 conference on population in Bucharest. In this internationalist mold, it followed that a world conference would also be organized to look into the food crisis of 1973-74.

By September 1973, indeed, the world food situation was acknowledged to be critical. At a Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Algiers, the idea for a world conference was first suggested by President Boumedienne. Later in the month, US Secretary of State Kissinger proposed the conference at the UN,<sup>6</sup> and during the ECOSOC and General Assembly meetings that December, the conference was officially convened for November 1974. It was to be organized by the FAO under the auspices of ECOSOC. It is important to emphasize the speed of the proceedings; less than a year of preparation went into the conference, one of the fastest in UN history. Three sessions of an international preparatory committee then followed to develop the conference agenda and to work out some of the initial broad issues.<sup>7</sup> Under the guidance of the Secretary-General of the Conference, Egyptian Sayed Marei, the conference Secretariat prepared the initial assessment documents and proposals for increased food production, food aid, and fertilizer commitments. Initially, there was a great deal of

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<sup>4</sup>Page, "Participation d'un groupe," 1984:330.

<sup>5</sup>Asbjorn Lovbraek, *A Review of International NGO Work on Trade and Development*, paper presented to the Pre-UNCTAD VII NGO Workshop, Geneva, 11-14 April 1987, DERAP Working Paper A 367, Bergen, 1987, (p. 3).

<sup>6</sup>It is possible that Kissinger followed up on Boumedienne's proposal because he felt that the Conference might gain support from the normally adversarial Group of 77.

<sup>7</sup>The sessions were held in New York from 11-15 February 1974; in Geneva from 4-8 June 1974; and in Rome, from 23 September to 5 October 1974.

difficulty setting the agenda; in line with NIEO demands, the G77 was eager that the conference look at trade issues, while many of the industrialized nations were intent on keeping the conference focused on food production issues. In the end, the agenda was set and divided into three broad topics: in Committee I, delegates dealt with proposals for increased food production; Committee II dealt with food security issues (including information on food stocks, food reserves, food aid, and follow-up); and Committee III dealt with food-related trade issues.

Some 112 governments were represented in Rome, largely headed by agriculture, development, and foreign ministers, although only two heads of state were present. Also present were a host of other observers, including agribusiness representatives and voluntary organizations. In all, there were about 400 NGOs present, a few of whom participated in an NGO steering group organized by ICVA (the International Council of Voluntary Agencies), and most of whom were active in the parallel NGO conference. However, many observers felt that the overall organisation of the voluntary agencies was poor, with the exception of the Canadian NGO team.<sup>8</sup> Few understood how the UN system worked, how to lobby while there, and what issues might have been amenable to change during the proceedings. To the credit of the ICVA committee, however, the NGOs did organize a well-received newspaper called *Pan*, held morning briefings for NGOs, launched minor lobbying efforts, and eventually published an NGO declaration broadly in support of the conference's resolutions.<sup>9</sup>

It is important to stress the relevance of NGO participation at Rome. In the early 1970s, national NGOs were attending international events and following their deliberations for the first time in history, usually as observers set up in parallel camps outside the main meetings. After Stockholm, Caracas, and Bucharest, there were already the beginnings of an international NGO network in place: groups of organizations that maintained contact, shared information and occasionally formed coalitions to lobby on specific issues. It was in this capacity that ICVA pushed for NGO involvement at the Rome conference: the Council

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<sup>8</sup>Paul Rogers, "A Note on WDM participation at the 1974 World Food Congress," an unpublished report for the WDM, probably prepared in January 1975. See also: Edwin McC. Martin, *Conference Diplomacy, A Case Study: The World Food Conference, Rome, 1974*, Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1979, (p. 21.)

<sup>9</sup>"Full text of NGO declaration," in *Pan*, 16 November 1974, p. 6.

published documents, sent representatives to the PrepComs and to the conference, organized NGO meetings, sponsored *Pan*, and set up the steering committee.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, in response to the volume of NGO activity around these conferences, the UN system itself began to open up to NGO participation. A broad range of NGOs were invited to apply for observer status; an NGO Coordinator, Hans Dall, was appointed to look after their facilities; some funding for Southern NGO participation was made available; and NGOs on the whole were allowed more freedom than they had had in other conferences -- they were permitted to speak in committees (at the discretion of the chair), attend drafting committees, circulate statements, and submit amendments to proposals. Some delegations, like the Belgian and Egyptian, even had NGO representatives on them. The UN rationale was in part to encourage public interest -- Secretary-General Marei said that he "wanted them here from the first .... They are the ones who form public opinion at home, and we need them."<sup>11</sup>

In November 1974, after two weeks of deliberation in Rome, the conference was heralded as a substantial success by UN standards: the three committees had addressed their set issues, a somewhat watered down set of proposals and resolutions were passed, and two new institutions created. Committee I, devoted to increasing food production, created the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) to fund research into food production, (OPEC contributed its initial funding, although by the end of the conference it remained undersubscribed). Committee II successfully agreed on a World Food Security Plan, which included the Secretariat's goal of 10 million tons of food aid to be committed for each of the next three years (yet contributions were left voluntary, and only a few countries, including Canada, committed new aid). An Early Warning System (to track world food stock levels) was also agreed on a voluntary basis, but the international food reserve proposal that had also been put on the table was rejected; nations were unwilling to give up national control over their food stocks, and would allow only voluntary coordination. Committee III, the "impossible" committee devoted to trade reform,<sup>12</sup> passed a similarly non-binding resolution calling for the abolition of restrictive trade practices, fairer prices, integrated commodity programs, and more cooperation. Many of these resolutions were to be overseen by the

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<sup>10</sup>ICVA, *News*, no. 66, July-September 1974, (p. 9); and no. 67, October-December 1974, (p. 6).

<sup>11</sup>"NGOs Seek their Role," in *Pan*, 10-11 November 1974, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup>Melvyn Westlake in "The Committees," in *Pan*, January 1975, pp. 4-7, (p. 6).

second new institution; a World Food Council established under ECOSOC, designed to coordinate the activities of all the UN agencies' programmes in food production, nutrition, food security and food aid.<sup>13</sup> For many of the NGOs attending the Rome conference, these results were hardly satisfactory.

## THE CAMPAIGN

### Context

The Canadian government in particular felt it had a role to play in Rome. Among the world's food exporting nations, Canada was a recognized player; it was one of the few countries to benefit from the oil price rise, and it remained one of the four net food exporters and the second net exporter of grain. It had contributed substantially to bilateral, FAO, and World Food Security Program food aid plans in the past, and so much of the world attention would turn to Canada during the Conference for generosity.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, the crisis occurred at a time when Canada under Trudeau was expanding its multilateral and bilateral aid, and so was cultivating its image as an honest broker between North and South. As early as June 1973, Canada was seriously thinking about what it might do about the food shortages in Africa and Asia, anticipating a "truly critical situation."<sup>15</sup>

In comparison, the British government was less well prepared going into Rome. Replacing Heath's Conservative Party, the Labour Party under Harold Wilson had returned to Westminster in February of 1974, and ~~were~~<sup>was</sup> reinstated in the second general election in October, less than a month before the conference opened. There were few signs that the bureaucracy had been given much policy guidance beforehand and officials preparing for Rome thus took on a minimalist stance, partly because the government was in disarray, partly because Britain was itself facing a fertilizer shortage, and partly because the country had no exportable food surplus of its own. The foreign minister did not attend (even though Kissinger was there), and the agriculture and development ministers stayed only a few days. In an interview, the World Development Movement's Rome envoy, Paul Rogers, explained

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<sup>13</sup>For an early assessment of the new council, see: Tony Loftus, "WFC: Cash Could Cripple the Concept," in *Pan*, January 1975, pp. 14-15.

<sup>14</sup>Page, "Participation d'un groupe," 1984:330.

<sup>15</sup>Confidential letter from External Affairs to other departments, June 1973.

that while the PM and ODM Minister Judith Hart had been sympathetic to the conference's goals,<sup>16</sup> they were pre-occupied with the domestic problems facing the new government.

It is also important to note that agribusiness and farming lobbies were active in the debate in both countries. Agribusiness, though it was largely quiet at Rome, had been well organized lobbying the FAO<sup>17</sup> and both governments beforehand.<sup>18</sup> Their views fell roughly in line with the OECD position: they were resistant to having trade on the agenda; in favour of increased funding for fertilizer and technical assistance; against internationally controlled grain reserves; and in favour of the proposed early warning system and the emphasis on rural development. Their views, and the views of other groups, made the decision-making environment more complex. As one Canadian document explained, "Taking account of non-governmental views may be more difficult, if only because of the wide spectrum of interest -- and interest groups -- involved. Producers, consumers, development-oriented or food aid groups, agro-industry, and various parts of the academic community all have obvious concerns."<sup>19</sup> Against this complicated background, both countries' delegations went to Rome eager to make a good impression but, as we shall see, they were prepared to offer different kinds of concessions.

### Players' Motivations

Going into Rome, the Canadian and British delegations not only had an official agenda to negotiate, each also had an attentive lobby of NGOs prepared to push them further. This

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<sup>16</sup>Note that Hart's *More Help for the Poorest* was published the following October, supporting a view of development and the food crisis that was more in line with the NGO view than that of the previous government.

<sup>17</sup>According to Weiss and Jordan, "Agribusiness multinationals have been more successful than have non-profit, non-governmental organizations in working out specific and ongoing cooperative arrangements with the Food and Agricultural Organization by means of the ICP, the Industry Cooperative Programme," originally set up by the FAO to speed up the time between the conceptualization of ideas in the FAO and their implementation in industry. Thomas G. Weiss and Robert S. Jordan, *The World Food Conference and Global Problem Solving*, New York and London: Praeger, 1976, (p. 136).

<sup>18</sup>According to a report by Dennis Howlett of GATT-Fly on a meeting of the ICP, it was explicitly suggested that agribusiness should lobby national governments at home while keeping a low profile at Rome. See summary in GATT-Fly, "Reflections on the World Food Conference," Toronto, February 1975, (p. 3), and see Dennis Howlett, "Report on the Consultation with Agro Industrial Leaders in Preparation for UN World Food Conference, 9-11 September 1974," mimeo, Toronto: GATT-Fly.

<sup>19</sup>Restricted intradepartmental memo, External Affairs, September 1974.

section looks at the motivations of each set of voluntary and official players involved and the relationships among them.

Because of Canada's high level of interest in the conference, both Agriculture Minister Eugene Whelan and SSEA Allan MacEachen made appearances in Rome. Whelan, considered to be "affable" by the NGO contingent, recounts meeting with voluntary organizations at a local restaurant after the day's events, where they reported to *him* the outcomes of various meetings. MacEachen, the more restrained senior minister, seemed less sympathetic to the NGOs' concerns; he was unable to meet with them over the summer, and met with NGOs just once during the four days at the conference. Canada's ambassador to Rome, Klaus Goldschlag, was the senior civil servant present and was head of the delegation. Reported to be "aloof" from NGO lobbying, he headed a weighty delegation of twenty-three members, including three MPs and representatives from EA, Agriculture, CIDA, and Finance.

Canadian NGOs were also turning an eye to Rome. In the early years of the decade, thanks in part to the growth of CIDA funding, NGOs had been increasing in both numbers and areas of interest. The CCIC had sent delegations to Stockholm and to Bucharest (just months prior to Rome, where an NGO member even sat on the government delegation), and had set up preparatory conferences (one on population, and later, one on food) in Canada beforehand. In particular, many of the groups attending UNCTAD III in Santiago in 1972 had felt that a closer link needed to be made between development and trade. The main Canadian NGO participants in Rome were among them, including GATT-Fly, the CCIC, and the United Nations Association of Canada (UNAC). Named after the bothersome gadfly, GATT-Fly had been founded a year before the conference to research and lobby the GATT proceedings. The founders included John Dillon, Russel Hatton and Dennis Howlett, and they worked with the support of the Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic and United Churches. Their activities were based on detailed research about Canada's participation in North-South trade issues (including food), and it followed that one of their first campaigns would thus be focused on the World Food Conference. Their main partner was the CCIC, headed by Angus Archer and later Richard Harmston, and supported by a small staff including Pat Mooney. Together, this group planned and implemented a concerted lobbying campaign, and 13 members of their coalition went to Rome.

There was similar activity going on in Britain among voluntary organizations. A newly established NGO was also taking an interest in the conference; the World Development Movement (WDM) had decided that the conference would become the centrepiece in their own on-going food campaign. The agency's move into the international arena had been spurred by staff member Chris Stockwell after his return from UNCTAD III in 1972, one of the first times that British NGOs had become involved in UN fora. WDM took up the campaign also because the agency had developed an expertise on food issues -- it was, according to WDM notes at the time, an "old stamping ground."<sup>20</sup> As well, other more long-standing agencies were taking their cues from the growing interest in the UN: Oxfam, Christian Aid, and VCOAD were involved with the United Kingdom Standing Conference on the Second United Nations Development Decade (DD2) in coordinating the overall NGO effort heading into Rome. The British NGOs were not able to cooperate as well as the Canadians, however. As Stockwell reports, there was significant jealousy among NGOs at the time: VCOAD, originally meant to have taken on a substantial policy role, had neglected its mandate and so raised the ire of the agencies which had provided its funding; Oxfam's director, Leslie Kirkley, was determined to put Oxfam at the top of the charity community and was unwilling to work with other agencies; and among the other agencies, few were willing to prepare or coordinate their efforts, despite attempts by DD2 Chair Donald Tweddle to organize a joint public awareness campaign beforehand.<sup>21</sup> In Rome, some of these prominent British agencies dominated the NGO steering committee organized by ICVA: Donald Tweddle (who had experience as the Director General of the 1970 Hague Food Conference); Leslie Kirkley, head of Oxfam and Chair of committee; Alan Booth, Director of Christian Aid; and Leslie Farrer-Brown of VCOAD. The lack of any tight coordination among agencies meant that in the end, while WDM organized its own publicity campaign in Britain during the summer, it had no organized presence in Rome; and while other NGOs were indeed represented in Rome, they were only part of the rather ineffectual NGO steering committee.

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<sup>20</sup>WDM, "Food Campaign," Council Paper 7 (a), 13 July 1974, p. 4.

<sup>21</sup>For references to these meetings, see: VCOAD, Frederick Lees, form letters to VCOAD members, 1 and 15 October 1974, found in Christian Aid's archives at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, box CA2/E/3, file Italy 22.

The British government was represented by Minister for Agriculture Fred Peart and ODM Minister Judith Hart, each of whom stayed for a few days. Unlike in Canada, the foreign minister did not attend; according to Alan Vickery, one of the delegation members, the conference was seen to fall under agricultural rather than foreign policy, and besides, only the ODM, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), and the Treasury seemed to be interested.<sup>22</sup> Hart, newly re-appointed to Labour's ODM, was popular with NGOs: she was the only official to discuss overconsumption issues, one of the NGOs' main issues;<sup>23</sup> she proposed a follow-up Commonwealth Conference on Rural Development;<sup>24</sup> and she met with the NGOs there on at least one occasion.<sup>25</sup> Peart, considered by NGOs to be "one man who did nothing at all for his reputation in Rome," did not have a background in development issues and spoke against many of the NGOs' lobbying points, including the curbing of meat consumption.<sup>26</sup> Otherwise, the British delegation approached the conference inconspicuously; they wanted to be seen "on the side of angels,"<sup>27</sup> and Peart was quoted saying that Britain was prepared to "participate rather than dominate" in Rome.<sup>28</sup> This was the Britons' minimalist stance, and it was maintained throughout the proceedings.

## Resources

For the NGOs from both countries heading into Rome, there was only a limited store of resources available to undertake lobbying. The strongest was their expertise in food issues; both WDM and GATT-Fly had been gathering material for their lobbying campaigns, and each had a well articulated (although, as officials saw them, overly "radical") set of proposals. Each also had a sense of the government decision-making systems, and each had geared their lobbying strategies to them (described later in this chapter). Both sets of agencies also had a modicum of experience; WDM and the CCIC each had attended previous UN conferences,

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<sup>22</sup>Interview with Alan Vickery, British delegation member to Rome, part of the Ministry of Agriculture, and Food, over the telephone, 25 August 1993.

<sup>23</sup>Pat Mooney in "Canada Takes the Prize," in *Pan*, 16 November 1974, p. 5.

<sup>24</sup>Anthony Harris, "Rome -- No Place for Idealism but Starvation made its Case," in *Pan*, January 1975, pp. 16-17.

<sup>25</sup>Weiss and Jordan, *The World Food Conference*, 1976:132-3.

<sup>26</sup>"A Grain of Sense for Mr. Peart," in *Pan*, January 1975, p. 17. See also: Rogers, "Food in Our Time," 1974:11-12.

<sup>27</sup>Interview with Vickery, August 1993.

<sup>28</sup>Rogers, "Food in Our Time," 1974:11.

and had begun to build a network of contacts in other countries -- including with members in each other's groups.

However, there were also serious limits on the kinds of resources NGOs had available. The main one was financial; while WDM had made a commitment to lobbying at home, there was little money to send delegates to Rome. Paul Rogers, who went as the official representative of the Human Ecology Council, was the WDM's only (and unofficial) delegate. The Canadians were luckier in having CIDA funding for part of their travels, which meant that a large contingent was on hand in Rome; their efforts cost an estimated \$23,000. CIDA's role is important; its funding "represented, inter alia, an attempt by CIDA to take the lead in the policy process within government (on questions relating to LDCs) from External Affairs, Finance, and ITC.<sup>29</sup> *(the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce)* Because of Gérin-Lajoie's apparent desire to have CIDA supervise *all* relations with LDCs, including trade, the agency supported NGO lobbying for a more holistic assistance program. The agency had thus occasionally leaked documents to NGOs, and had funded NGO delegations to Santiago as they were later to do to Rome. The presence of a generous, but muted, patron was one of the primary distinctions between the British and Canadian contingents.

### Channels

Another important element in the NGOs' success or failure was their access to the official decision-making process, their institutional channels. The earlier that NGOs were able to intervene, the more scope they assumed they would have for influence. However, in neither case was the government decision-making process open to their recommendations, particularly at the outset, and so other outsider means had to be pursued.

By the summer of 1974, eager to be seen moving ahead of the game, External Affairs had pretty well worked out a tentative policy. There was surprisingly little interdepartmental consultation in the preparation of the policy, however. It was not until October that the Ministry of the Environment contributed its "two cents,"<sup>30</sup> or that CIDA submitted its own

<sup>29</sup>Interview with Eric Bergbusch, External Affairs official involved in preparations in 1974, in Ottawa, 9 March 1992.

<sup>30</sup>Letter from the Ministry of the Environment to External Affairs, October 1974.

recommendations.<sup>31</sup> As an EA official explained in responding to CIDA, "I was concerned at the late receipt of these very detailed recommendations for food aid policy and did not see how they could possibly be incorporated in our current draft Memorandum to Cabinet."<sup>32</sup> By October, Cabinet was looking at the details of Canada's commitments and the other agencies had been too late to make an impact; CIDA, slow on the uptake, had missed its chance.

This decision-making process not surprisingly left little room for NGO input. Their one institutional ally had missed the boat, and NGOs had (as we shall see) little success in meeting with officials from Agriculture and EA during the summer policy-making stage. However, here was the possibility that NGOs might have been included on the official delegation, as had been the case in Bucharest.<sup>33</sup> According to an early internal memo, the rationale for having the NGOs present would have been partly to improve Canada's image at home:

If we were confident that the Conference will be a great success and that Canada will appear as the protagonist of constructive initiatives, an extensive publicity campaign would reflect credit on the Canadian government. The danger, however, is that we would be drawing attention to Canadian positions which would not seem sufficiently forthcoming (or commercially advantageous) in the eyes of the beholders.<sup>34</sup>

These risks were compounded by the possibility of political friction on the delegation. In Bucharest, bad feelings developed among provincial representatives about the NGOs' role on the delegation, resulting in outbursts within the delegation, to the press, and at home to their provincial governments. Officials looking toward Rome warned that Bucharest "indicates some of the perils of turning loose a large and heterogenous Canadian delegation, especially in terms of the potential for unfortunate publicity at home."<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, there is little indication they would have been allowed to intervene on policy matters. Indeed, the government's initial rationale for including NGOs was to raise public awareness of the issues,

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<sup>31</sup>Confidential memorandum to External Affairs from CIDA, October 1974.

<sup>32</sup>Confidential intradepartmental memorandum, External Affairs, October 1974.

<sup>33</sup>On 23 October, MacEachen answered a question in the House from Conservative MP Hamilton, and intimated that the delegation to Rome "may even include representatives from non-governmental organizations who wish to go," (p. 658 in Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 2 October 1974).

<sup>34</sup>Restricted intradepartmental memorandum, External Affairs, May 1974.

<sup>35</sup>Restricted interdepartmental memorandum, External Affairs, September 1974.

rather than involve them in policy-making.<sup>36</sup> The government's alternative to having them on the delegation, already of an unwieldy size, was to sponsor a few to attend the conference's parallel NGO forum.<sup>37</sup> Canadian NGOs that had attended that summer's parallel conference in Bucharest (GATT-Fly, the CCIC, and the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops) were, however, frustrated by the parallel conference set-up. Some felt that the system was "finessing" NGOs -- in theory involving them, but actually excluding them from the real goings-on, such that "never the twain shall meet."<sup>38</sup> Officially and unofficially, there seemed few secure channels for NGOs into the policy process.

In Britain, there is evidence that the decision-making process during the government turnover was slower than in Canada; it was likely well into October before an agreed position was formulated,<sup>39</sup> and there may thus have been much greater scope for NGO intervention at the early stages. Part of the slowness of the process had to do with interdepartmental rivalry, as well as a lack of political direction offered during the last weeks of the <sup>election</sup> ~~Conservatives'~~ campaign. A regular interdepartmental system had been established to plan for the conference, but there were evident conflicts and ODA officials had "made it clear that they found it difficult to battle against MAFF and the Treasury."<sup>40</sup> Had officials been more receptive to the NGO proposals, the late decision-making may well have given them increased influence. As it was, however, the NGOs were not able to infiltrate the process. Oxfam's Kirkley wrote in retrospect that "I think we would be more successful in our influencing role, vis-a-vis our Governments, if we started our discussions with them well in advance of any conference; it is much more difficult to secure any changes during the progress of the

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<sup>36</sup>As was the case for Rome, "part of the justification for the extensive provincial and non-governmental components of the Bucharest delegation was the desire to educate a wide spectrum of Canadian leaders and opinion makers in a field where Canadian policy was as yet undeveloped," (restricted interdepartmental memorandum from External Affairs, September 1974).

<sup>37</sup>Restricted interdepartmental memorandum, September 1974.

<sup>38</sup>Interview with Richard Harmston, in 1974 with the CCIC, in Ottawa, 20 October 1992.

<sup>39</sup>The evidence for the timing of the government's decision-making is indirect. When NGOs were preparing to meet with officials in October, one of Tweddle's associates argued that,

It is most important that we speak coherently and strongly at the Seminar for Mr. Tweddle gained the impression on the occasion of a recent visit to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food, that in many respects that Ministry is not fully geared up to the problems involved at the World Food Conference. An effective contribution at the Seminar may therefore have a useful influence on the Ministry's thinking, (VCOAD, Frederick Lees, form letter to VCOAD members, 1 October 1974).

<sup>40</sup>WDM, "Food Campaign," Council Paper 5, December 1974, (p. 2).

conference, when they are speaking from well prepared and agreed positions."<sup>41</sup> As we will see in the next section, however, attempts to gain early access in either country were stymied.

## Tactics

In trying to gear their lobbying to the governments' decision-making processes, NGOs in both countries set a four-part strategy: in the spring, attempts were made to meet the responsible officials; in the summer and early fall, NGOs tried to increase publicity for the conference; in November, NGOs lobbied delegations in Rome; and in the aftermath, the agencies looked at ways of pressing their governments to follow up on the conference's resolutions.

(a) *Meeting The Bureaucracy.* The shape of the British strategy for both WDM and the other groups was probably devised by Donald Tweddle after his experiences with UNCTAD III and the World Population Conference. For WDM, under Tweddle's encouragement, there were two goals to the campaign: one, "to produce a fairly concentrated blast in Britain on food prices and the world food situation through our own network, by cooperation with other interested organisations and by arousing interest in the media and Parliament;" and two, to influence the British delegation "to make a strong and constructive contribution at the Conference."<sup>42</sup> In order to achieve this second goal, however, they first needed to identify the government's positions.

WDM circulated a memorandum to officials in the spring, got member groups to write to their MPs, and had hoped to have gathered sufficient information from the Government and from other organizations by the end of June to be able to feed the campaign.<sup>43</sup> Other organizations seemed to show little interest, however, and WDM only managed to have three meetings with fellow NGOs by the end of July. Similarly, while WDM was able to meet with Ted Smith and Alan Vickery of MAFF and Basil Cracknell of the ODA over the summer,<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>Leslie Kirkley, "The Message for the NGOs: Follow Up Now," in *Pan*, January 1974, p. 11.

<sup>42</sup>WDM, "Campaign on World Food Crisis," Conference Paper 7, 15 June 1974, (p. 1).

<sup>43</sup>WDM, "Report World Food Conference," Council Paper 6 (iii), 23 March 1974.

<sup>44</sup>WDM, "Food Campaign Report," Council Paper 7 (i), September 1974, (p. 1).

they found MAFF was "as destructive and obstructive as Mr. Peart was at Rome,"<sup>45</sup> and while the ODA/ODM was more sympathetic, it was seen as the weakest member of the ODA-MAFF-Treasury group involved.

By the end of the summer, nonetheless, the British NGOs had at least made their presence felt. According to Vickery, MAFF was aware there was "terrific interest" in the conference, and so organized a consultation meeting with NGOs three weeks before the conference was to begin in Rome, one of the first government-NGO meetings of its kind in Britain. In issuing the invitation, MAFF's P.F. Delaney wrote that, "the aim of the Seminar will be to provide a forum at which interested Organisations will have an opportunity to present to the Government their views on the Conference."<sup>46</sup> Held on 11 October, the day after the election ~~(of the new government)~~ and three weeks before Rome, the seminar was not followed by any particular policy reconsideration, so confirming WDM's assessment of the "Government's supine attitude."<sup>47</sup> MAFF official Vickery acknowledged that while the meeting was legitimately meant to register the NGOs' concerns, it had little direct influence on the delegation's position.

The Canadian NGOs had a similar strategy to meet first with the bureaucracy. One of their initial goals was to collect information on the government's plans for the conference, and so in early May, requests were made to the Ministry of Agriculture and to EA for conference documents and existing policy proposals. Their requests were unheeded, although the failure to respond probably indicated in part that the interdepartmental consultations were still underway, and that no policy had yet been agreed. In order to gain access to the information, another route was taken up. GATT-Fly accepted a CIDA offer to prepare a report on the world crisis, on the condition that the NGO be allowed to have access to the preparatory documents being circulated in government. Thus aided by their ally, it was then that GATT-Fly became aware of the focus of the Canadian position: the promotion of agricultural assistance and food aid. While they agreed that these were important areas for Canadian involvement, NGOs were concerned about the lack of mention of trade or institutional reform

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<sup>45</sup>WDM, "Food Campaign," Council Paper 5, December 1974, (p. 2).

<sup>46</sup>United Kingdom, MAFF, P.F. Delaney, letter to Vernon Littlewood of Christian Aid, date unavailable, found in Christian Aid's archives at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, box CA2/E/3, file Italy 22.

<sup>47</sup>WDM, "Food Campaign," Council Paper 5, December 1974, (p. 2).

they felt was necessary for any long term solution to the food crisis.<sup>48</sup> In the course of the writing of the report, GATT-Fly established links with the Ministry of Agriculture, External Affairs, and Finance, and through those channels tried to present its criticisms of the evolving plan. However, the GATT-Fly was shelved at CIDA, and there is no record of its suggestions, or those of other NGOs, in any of the External Affairs files.

Attempts to meet with more senior officials over the summer were also frustrating. While SSEA MacEachen had declined meetings all summer, an appointment with Agriculture Minister Whelan was arranged by the Canadian Catholic Conference of Bishops on the 30 October. Killeen suggests that the number of letters to the Prime Minister's Office orchestrated by the NGO coalition, coupled with increasing attention given to the conference in the House of Commons and media, was sufficient to guarantee at least one senior meeting such as this.<sup>49</sup> During that encounter, GATT-Fly presented Whelan with a position paper based on both its CIDA study and the outcome of its Ottawa conference (discussed below). It may have influenced Whelan to push for a greater aid allocation when the Cabinet met the next day and decided to raise its food allocation contribution from 750,000 to 1 million tons.

(b) *Raising Public Awareness.* The WDM's summer tactics looked to influencing both public and Parliament. In July, questions on the food crisis were posed to MPs, and a few articles were written in the mainstream press. In August, the preparation and distribution of a mass publicity effort was completed.<sup>50</sup> In September and October, WDM's member groups were activated and a full onslaught on the media was undertaken. However, while WDM members were effectively motivated to write to their representatives, and WDM's network of World Poverty Action Groups <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ organized to hold local conferences on the crisis, there was in the end only very little media coverage about Rome and Britain's role while there.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>Dillon's report emphasized that trade concessions were imperative, that increased aid and larger grant concessions were necessary, and that the developing world needed help to increase agricultural development and self-sufficiency, (GATT-Fly, *Conditions of Crisis and Canada's Response to the Less Developed Countries*, unclassified report prepared for CIDA, Toronto, 11 July 1974).

<sup>49</sup>Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:74-75.

<sup>50</sup>WDM, "Campaigns -- Food" Council Paper 7 (iii), 18 May 1974, (p. 3). August was seen to be the most crucial time of the campaign because it was then that officials would be deciding Britain's position, (p. 2 in WDM, "Food Campaign," Council Paper 7 (a), 13 July 1974).

<sup>51</sup>WDM had two letters and a couple of articles printed in the national newspapers prior to the conference, had staff members interviewed on radio and television some five times, and held a press conference that got some coverage beforehand, (WDM, "Food Campaign," Council Paper 5, December 1974).

In Canada, the NGOs' summer goal was similarly to increase public interest in the conference, and hence, it was hoped, political pressure on the government. Joined by UNAC and the Canadian Hunger Foundation, the CCIC and GATT-Fly had begun preparations for a conference of their own. Held in Ottawa in October, this preparatory conference was organized by CCIC's Geoffrey Grenville-Wood in order both to drum up resolutions to present to the official delegation on its way to Rome, as well as to generate public interest and lend pressure to the government's deliberations.<sup>52</sup> Unlike the NGO consultation held by MAFF at about the same time, there is evidence that the Ottawa conference made a somewhat greater mark on the government's position. The officials in charge of conference preparations certainly took note of the NGOs' efforts, and suggested that some of their number attend "to try to get some more accurate reading of the strength and direction of Canadian concern about the Conference issues."<sup>53</sup> This attention to the Ottawa conference, attended by some 200 participants including some 15 officials,<sup>54</sup> indicated that the government felt a need to at least take account of the arguments presented by the non-governmental community.

During this time, the NGOs were also turning their attention to more public means of pressure. From September to November, GATT-Fly and CCIC pursued their publicity strategy, now also joined by the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (CCCCB). The plan included public education campaigns such as the nation-wide statement through the churches called *Sharing Daily Bread*, and other publications including *Canada and the Food Issue* and "What is the Food Crisis?"<sup>55</sup> Other efforts concentrated on local public awareness projects organized by CCIC's Development Education Animateur Program. While media coverage had remained slim until the middle of October,<sup>56</sup> these efforts gradually generated a stream of letters to the Prime Minister's office.

As in Britain, another aspect of the publicity plan was a focus on Parliament. Based on the assumption that if MPs could force the government to reveal its position, then the policy

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<sup>52</sup>Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:54.

<sup>53</sup>Restricted interdepartmental memorandum from External Affairs, September 1974.

<sup>54</sup>Page, "Participation d'un groupe," 1984:335-336; and Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:71.

<sup>55</sup>CCIC and CCCC, (editors), *Canada and the Food Issue*, Ottawa: CCIC, 1974; and CCIC, GATT-Fly, CCCC, UNAC, "What is the Food Crisis?," leaflet, Ottawa: CCIC, 1974.

<sup>56</sup>Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:71, 74-75.

might engender greater public debate,<sup>57</sup> the plan involved sending information to MPs in an effort to have questions raised in the House of Commons. As the month of October wore on, questions on the WFC were indeed brought up on at least 15 occasions.<sup>58</sup> Members of the opposition, including Conservative MPs David MacDonald and Doug Roche along with New Democrat MP Andrew Brewin (one of the delegation members), were among the NGOs' prime advocates in Parliament.<sup>59</sup>

(c) *Lobbying at the Conference.* By the time the conference began, however, the similarities between the Canadian and British strategies ceased. Eschewing both the parallel conference and ICVA's steering committee, the Canadian coalition decided that it should send a small group to tail the individual members of the official delegation and to report developments immediately to a team of their colleagues stationed in Ottawa. GATT-Fly had spent the preceding year detailing the food situation and was well prepared, CCIC had a regional network system in place that could handle the fast communication plan envisioned, and with CCCB, the group had a broad membership which could be called on to participate. Furthermore, the NGOs insisted on meeting officially with the Canadian delegation daily; they had made it clear "that they would not be satisfied with anything less in the way of consultative arrangements with the delegation than they had had in Bucharest, namely regular meetings with a representative cross-section of delegation."<sup>60</sup>

In contrast, the British non-governmental contingent had almost no visible presence in Rome outside of the ICVA steering committee, and it had no planned strategy linking the events at Rome to NGO efforts back in the UK. WDM emissary Paul Rogers observed the proceedings, but he had not been charged with undertaking "lobbying" per se, although he did take note of the Canadians' efforts. Three times, Roger<sup>6</sup> phoned WDM's director in London, Ian Haig, to inform him of the evolution of debate in the hopes of generating pressure from the UK side.<sup>61</sup> The efforts of the other British NGOs in Rome were concentrated on the

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<sup>57</sup>Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:70.

<sup>58</sup>Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:75.

<sup>59</sup>Page, "Participation d'un groupe," 1984:340.

<sup>60</sup>Restricted telex to External Affairs from the Canadian delegation in Rome, November 1974; text altered for clarity from its original abbreviated form.

<sup>61</sup>Interview with Paul Rogers, in London, 2 July 1993.

ICVA steering committee, which was, however, unsure even in the middle of the conference whether its role was to lobby as a united front on a set of given issues, or to facilitate individuals lobbying their own countries' delegations.<sup>62</sup> Some groups of NGOs independently succeeded in having resolutions sponsored and passed by participating countries; there was one on population and food supplies, and one on women in food production. By the second week, the ICVA committee decided to concentrate its efforts on Committee II: it tried to uncover the levels of existing food and fertilizer stocks in donor countries;<sup>63</sup> it pressed for increased contributions in both areas; and ~~to its credit, it~~ was later credited with having visibly "depoliticized" the Committee, a move which may have speeded up its deliberations.<sup>64</sup> The ICVA group held meetings every evening at the conference centre for all attending NGOs, and at the end of the conference, it coordinated a joint NGO declaration broadly in support of the conference's resolutions. While weak in pressuring for change in official policy, the committee may thus have at least gone a step further in strengthening the international NGO network present.

The Canadian strategy was far more structured, and because it became the "Rome Model" used in NGO lobbying in years to come, it bears some further elaboration here. The first element was meetings with the ministers. On the evening of the first day of the conference, the NGOs met with MacEachen (notably, in the presence of CIDA President Paul Gérin-Lajoie), and another formal meeting took place four days later with Whelan. Both ministers' willingness to meet with the team (especially after MacEachen had avoided them all summer) may be partly attributed to the volume of mail received in the days immediately preceding the conference; between the 28th and the 31st of October, 549 letters (59% of the total mail received by the Prime Minister and his cabinet) pleaded with the government to be active at the Conference.<sup>65</sup> Much of the mail had been orchestrated by the coalition's "home team" in

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<sup>62</sup>"NGOs Seek their Role," in *Pan*, 10-11 November 1974, p. 6.

<sup>63</sup>In this task, the committee was abetted by the staff of the Conference Secretariat. According to Rogers, the Secretariat leaked official documents on country fertilizer stocks for use in the NGO campaign.

<sup>64</sup>Weiss and Jordan, *The World Food Conference*, 1976:133.

<sup>65</sup>Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:82.

Canada and, according to officials, the letter-writing campaign was responsible for the granting of interviews with both ministers.<sup>66</sup>

During the first meeting, NGOs presented MacEachen with a petition of 2,300 names, detailed their public awareness activities in Canada, and asked MacEachen to divulge Canada's food aid pledge; up until the conference, these figures had been kept under lock and key. Officials present were reportedly impressed by the presentation; and would have been more impressed had they known the source of some of the NGOs' research. The previous day, Pat Mooney had been secretly handed, under brown paper cover, a copy of the 384 page briefing book for the delegation. At the time of the meeting with MacEachen, the NGOs had not even been able to go through the whole document; they had been travelling on the same plane as a number of the government officials, and were anxious not to be caught <sup>in possession of the book.</sup> ~~(in flagrante delicto)~~

At this initial meeting with MacEachen, the minister outlined the government's policy, but provided no detail and no numbers. Despite the SSEA's refusal to detail the government's position, the activists felt they had nonetheless been influential. When the following day MacEachen announced that one million tons had been pledged,<sup>67</sup> 250,000 more than had been indicated in the NGOs' copy of the briefing book, the NGOs credited themselves with the increased figure.<sup>68</sup> They would have been dismayed to learn that, in fact, Cabinet had decided much earlier, on the 31 October, that Canada should commit one million tons. Rather than having been swayed by their argument, MacEachen had simply been following a pre-arranged script.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>According to interviews with Des Doran (Agriculture), Nic Norcott (CIDA), and Hans Hermans (CIDA), carried out by Killeen in November 1979, (Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:83).

<sup>67</sup>Canada, External Affairs, *Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, To the World Food Conference, Rome, November 6, 1974.*

<sup>68</sup>According to reports made to Pat Mooney by members on the official delegation, MacEachen had been on the phone to the Prime Minister twice the day following the NGO meeting, and it was only then that he decided to use the one million ton figure, (Interview with Pat Mooney, part of the "Rome Team," Ottawa, 4 November 1993). However, a more likely explanation is that the NGOs' copy of the briefing book was incomplete. In order to prevent leaks, it has been common (if unofficial) practice to have edited briefing books circulating where there might be a danger of disclosure.

<sup>69</sup>MacEachen says that the major impediment to increasing Canada's food aid contribution before that date was the hesitance of the Minister of Finance, (Interview with Senate Leader Allan J. MacEachen, SSEA in 1974, in Ottawa, 29 March 1993). It was not until the 31 October Cabinet meeting that the minister, Donald McDonald, agreed to raise the amount to one million tons, a cost of about \$140 million, which was at any rate roughly in line with the planned growth of CIDA's budget.

For the rest of the conference, the NGOs' lobbying strategy pivoted on their information gathering. In Rome, they hounded the delegation, sat in on debating sessions, attended press conferences, collected information, and telexed and phoned the news back to Ottawa the same day in the form of a Daily Report. The team in Ottawa received the news at 7:30 or 8:00 a.m. and by noon would have simultaneously prepared questions for opposition MPs in Question Period that day (often before MacEachen, who had returned to Ottawa, could be briefed by his own staff), would have prepared news briefings for the 17 some interested press representatives (who in the end published a great deal of the NGOs' news verbatim), and would have also sent that information to a network of NGOs throughout Canada. This Canadian network would in turn organize telegram and phone calls back to the government in Ottawa and the delegation in Rome. The group in Rome kept up links with the Canadian press there; sometimes attended the meetings of other national delegations unnoticed; and importantly, maintained good relations with the FAO Secretariat. Indeed, one of the FAO interpreters who sympathized with the NGO efforts regularly transmitted news of current deliberation<sup>5</sup> received by his/her colleagues. The team kept close contact with the official members of the sympathetic Danish and Norwegian delegations, who let them know the status of the industrialized nations' meetings, and they received particularly useful information from the Belgian NGOs who were on their own government's official delegation. Daily intimate breakfast meetings were also held with other sympathetic NGOs; the location changed every day so that the meetings would not be overrun by NGOs who were deemed to be rather uselessly concentrated on the parallel conference. Through contacts with their Latin American NGO counterparts, the team members received further information about the deliberations of the G77. Indeed, among the NGOs in Rome, the Canadians had the best intelligence about closed-door deliberations, and many other NGOs offered information in the hopes of sharing in that intelligence. Back in Canada, over the course of the two weeks, questions appeared almost daily in the House of Commons and articles were published with equal frequency in a largely sympathetic press. According to Page, "the Canadian public was much more aware of the daily deliberations of the conference than of any other previous international conference."<sup>70</sup> To the NGOs' surprise, an unplanned campaign of sorts was even set up mid-way through the conference when the New Democratic Party used its Opposition day to condemn the government's foot dragging in Rome. Fuelled by questions put together by the

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<sup>70</sup>Page, "Participation d'un groupe," 1984:343.

NGOs in Rome, the party challenged the government on grain price indexing, on its level of food aid, and its refusal to include fertilizer in its aid.<sup>71</sup> By the end of the conference, the Canadian NGOs had certainly made themselves heard.

(d) *Pressing the Issues Afterward.* After the conference, the Canadian NGOs stood back to assess their efforts. They felt that their work on the World Food Conference was complete, and their concern was with how to extend the "Rome model" to the upcoming UN Special Session and the International Oil Conference in 1975, UNCTAD IV in 1976 and the 1978 Federal Election.<sup>72</sup> Their new campaign's theme was "the struggle over the control of the world's resources," and the coalition continued to focus on the structural causes of poverty and the food crisis.

In Britain, however, WDM carried on its campaign and continued both to press the government to keep its promises and to expand its commitments. WDM's goals were to have the government increase its fertilizer commitments, push for an increase in EC grain contributions, donate money for food aid, and support the new agricultural development fund. As in Canada, an Early Day Motion was tabled by sympathetic MP Nigel Spearing on behalf of WDM to express disappointment in the government's overall performance. WDM itself organized a couple of post-Rome parliamentary briefings with MPs and peers, and WDM members were urged to write to MAFF to ask about the government's policy after Rome. Indeed, "they wrote so many letters asking about the Government's policy for Rome that when we asked MAFF for a meeting, they said they did not have the time because they were so busy answering WDM letters."<sup>73</sup> In the end, WDM claimed partial credit for getting the government to subsequently raise its fertilizer commitment to 35,000 tons, and to increase its food aid contributions through the EC,<sup>74</sup> a figure that rose in the end from £20 to £28

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<sup>71</sup>Page, "Participation d'un groupe," 1984:344-345.

<sup>72</sup>Tony Clarke and Dennis Howlett, "Evaluation of Food Conference Action," memo to membership, Toronto, 19 November 1974; and GATT-Fly, "Post-W.F.C. Consultation," notes on the follow-up meeting on 13-14 January 1975.

<sup>73</sup>WDM, "Food Campaign," Council Paper 5, December 1974, (pp. 2, 4).

<sup>74</sup>WDM, "Annual Report 1974-75," Conference Paper no. 4, 14 June 1975, (p. 1); and WDM, "The Food Campaign," January 1975.

million.<sup>75</sup> With that final part of the campaign under wraps, WDM left the World Food Conference issue and went on to look at other food debates in Britain. The role of sugar imports in the EC was to be its next battle.

## Content

While there had been a broad range of issues under debate, the main dividing line between the voluntary and official delegations was essentially their assessment of the cause of the crisis. NGOs considered the world food crisis to be a political problem, based in the structure of North-South relations, while their governments felt it to be largely a technical problem, exacerbated by difficult weather. GATT-Fly's assessment was typical of the NGO community;

Although balance of payments, population growth, monetary instability, increased oil and food prices are important ingredients in the present "conditions of crisis," the ultimate issue is that the world economic system has long been responsible for conditions of hunger and malnutrition in large areas of the world. The present conditions of crisis did not create but only expose and compound the problem.<sup>76</sup>

The recommendations the Canadian NGOs made were thus similarly far-reaching: redistribution of IMF special drawing rights, debt alleviation, fairer pricing, extended commodity agreements, increases in food aid, establishment of grain and fertilizer pools, integrated agricultural production assistance, and better access to Northern markets through GATT. The Canadian government's position, not surprisingly, was less global and more technical. Trade was not to be included, nor were significant changes in institutions or in the "world order" to be contemplated; food aid was to be generously endorsed in the short term, but in the long-term, the focus was to be put on the developing countries to improve their own productivity.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>Judith Hart (ODM Minister), "The Food Crisis and Third World Development: Implications for United Kingdom Policy," 19 February 1975, in *The World Food Crisis and Third World Development: Implications for U.K. Policy*, first report from the Select Committee on Overseas Development, London: HMSO, 18 February 1976, (p. 3, para. 12).

<sup>76</sup>GATT-Fly, *Conditions of Crisis*, 1974:3.

<sup>77</sup>Confidential internal memo, External Affairs, August 1974.

It is clear that officials were aware that the NGOs' analysis was different from their own; they just did not think their analysis was necessarily "reasonable."<sup>78</sup> Reporting on the pre-Rome NGO conference in Ottawa, officials described the attending agencies as divided between two schools of thought; the "pragmatic" versus the "moralistic." The pragmatists' view appeared "to coincide rather well with the approach of the government," emphasizing the gap between food production and the increase in population as the central problem, and looking for ways in which it might be narrowed. The camp of the moralists, including GATT-Fly, argued that the problem lay in the whole world economic structure, and that only far-reaching structural change could remedy the global crisis. While most of the radical resolutions were passed by a two-thirds majority, the reporting official nonetheless dismissed the conference's findings as those of an unrepresentative fringe.<sup>79</sup> This fundamental difference of view does not necessarily mean that the Canadian NGOs countered the government's position on all things; there was a substantial area of agreement on priorities within existing aid and development programs, including the importance of forward planning, increased multilateralism, and a generous food aid commitment.<sup>80</sup>

While the British NGOs shared this structuralist critique, they offered a set of proposals more closely linked to the conference's official agenda. Outlined by Tweddle and passed around at preparatory committees, the ICVA proposal recommended that the conference adopt the following resolutions: (1) a five-year moratorium on interest and capital repayments on LDC debt; (2) a program to increase food production in the poorest countries; (3) a broad-based UN committee to oversee technical assistance and aid to those countries; (4) new food aid grants rather than loans; (5) untied assistance; (6) increased technical assistance; and (7) adequate supplies of fertilizer and other inputs at subsidized prices.<sup>81</sup> Similarly, the WDM's early agenda was also linked to the official agenda, and included support for the Secretariat's ideas about an international grain reserve, a fertilizer fund, immediate food aid, and increased agricultural production.<sup>82</sup> By September, WDM had decided to concentrate on Britain's fertilizer commitment and, switching to the "unofficial" agenda, to lobby on Britain's overconsumption of meat.<sup>83</sup> The UK government's position, however, was that the food problem required more "sensible" solutions than those being offered even on the official

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<sup>78</sup>Confidential interviews with two EA officials, Spring 1992.

<sup>79</sup>Restricted interdepartmental memorandum, External Affairs, October 1974.

<sup>80</sup>Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:58.

<sup>81</sup>"Here's a Lead from the NGOs," letter to *Pan* from Donald Tweddle, Leslie Kirkley, Alan Booth, and Leslie Farrer-Brown, 7 November 1974, p. 7.

<sup>82</sup>WDM, "Campaigns -- Food," Council Paper 7 (iii), 18 May 1974, p. 1.

<sup>83</sup>WDM, "Food Campaign Report," Council Paper 7 (i), September 1974, p. 1.

agenda. Furthermore, the feeling among officials was that NGOs had little that was reasonable to contribute; Vickery says that the NGOs had talked up the crisis to apocalyptic proportions, making "realistic" debates difficult to conduct. Preserving the government's minimalist position at the conference, the UK delegation would have been unwilling in any case to take on a new set of proposals. The rest of the section takes a closer look at some of these specific issues.

(a) *Trade*. It follows that trade would be one of the main items of contention. Over the course of the preparatory meetings, the G77 had insisted that trade be included, and against the wishes of the Group B countries (the OECD), a watered down set of proposals were set aside to be debated in Committee III. For the Canadian and British delegations, their positions on trade were clear: as delegation leader Klaus Goldschlag told NGOs, the government did not think it profitable for the conference "to dissipate its energies debating the general problem of the place of the developing countries in the current world trading framework."<sup>84</sup> Neither the Canadian nor the British delegations would budge from this standpoint, despite the energetic efforts of the NGO team tailing the Canadians in Rome, and the failure of the trade issue would remain one of the NGOs' main disappointments.<sup>85</sup>

In the Canadian case, however, the trade issue raised another debate which *did* get press. On the sixth day of the conference, Mexico submitted a proposal to the trade committee to curb speculation on food commodities. Canada was not happy with the proposal, and while it did not want to exclude all discussion of commercial issues, it would have preferred that the "overambitious" proposal be dealt with in other circles, preferably UNCTAD or the GATT.<sup>86</sup> A lengthy debate followed in the committee, and given that the G77 had a majority, Group B feared the resolution would be passed without its consent. They wanted to propose softer resolutions that could be passed unanimously, and in order to convince the G77 of the difficulty in implementing the proposal, Group B decided to present each of their country's objections separately to the Committee. A member of the Canadian NGO team overheard a conversation in the hallway which suggested that Group B was actually planning a stalling tactic, and the NGOs quickly determined that a Canadian-inspired filibuster was in the making. One of the FAO representatives who had forgotten to return his headset noticed that he could still hear the deliberations of the group outside of the room, and he alerted Pat

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<sup>84</sup>Bernard M. Daly, "Things to See Around the World Food Conference," unpublished report, Toronto: GATT-Fly, 1974, (p. 3).

<sup>85</sup>Canadian Church Observers, "An Analysis of the Canadian Statement at the World Food Conference," press report no. 1, Ottawa, 6 November 1974, (p. 3).

<sup>86</sup>Telex from External Affairs to the Canadian Embassy in Rome, November 1974.

Mooney. Mooney then used his press pass to get a hold of a recording of the conversation, while at the same time John Dillon received news from three sympathetic OECD country delegation members of the plan underway in Group B. The news was relayed back to Ottawa the following day and fed into the media stream where it was given national TV and radio coverage. The Canadians were accused of filibustering; of using up the time for discussion in order to defer any serious consideration of the Mexican proposal, and the Minister was cornered in the House.<sup>87</sup> The delegation quickly wired back to the Minister to explain that a filibuster had not been intended,<sup>88</sup> and were in turn instructed to opt out of further deliberations.<sup>89</sup> While the filibuster scare may not have moved the government's position on trade, it certainly communicated a public concern that Canada should not be seen on the side of food commodity speculators. The action thus forced a more cautious approach.

(b) *Food and Fertilizer Aid.* While Canada's comparatively generous food aid pledge was well-received,<sup>90</sup> and NGOs initially claimed the increase to be one of their greatest influences at Rome, the amount committed was actually no higher than existing plans for food aid expenditure, and was actually less than had been pledged in 1970-71.

For its part, Britain made no food aid commitment at the conference itself although it later boosted its food aid commitment through the EC from £20 to £28 million.<sup>91</sup> According to a report in *Pan*, one of the UK delegates explained that Britain was against food aid on principle because "if a country knows that it will receive food supplies come what may then it may well be tempted to divert some of its immediate effort away from agriculture."<sup>92</sup>

Vickery explains that the UK position was that only a limited amount of grain could usefully be given because of distribution problems, and that the Secretariat's 10 million ton estimate for immediate aid was too high to be accurate. A similar story could also be told about aid for nitrogen fertilizer. On this issue, British NGOs had made a concerted effort to get the government to pledge a substantial commitment, and while Peart announced that Britain would increase its contribution from 5,000 to 25,000 tons "in the next year or so," NGOs

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<sup>87</sup>*Debates*, 12 November 1974, (p. 1222).

<sup>88</sup>Confidential telex from the Rome delegation to External Affairs, November 1974.

<sup>89</sup>Confidential telex to the delegation in Rome from External Affairs, November 1974.

<sup>90</sup>"They've Come up Trumps," in *Pan*, 7 November 1974, p. 2.

<sup>91</sup>Hart, "The Food Crisis and Third World Development," 1976:3, para. 12.

<sup>92</sup>Colin Tudge, reporting in "The Committees," in *Pan*, January 1975, p. 6.

argued that Britain could have easily donated 50,000 tons without harming its own agriculture.<sup>93</sup> In the end some 35,000 tons were committed, although it is unclear to what extent NGO lobbying may have been a factor.<sup>94</sup> Vickery says that the government was hesitant to pledge more fertilizer because it feared its own shortages, a stance similar to the one made by the Canadian delegation, which declined to make any commitment for fertilizer aid at all.<sup>95</sup> The Canadian position was that its domestic supply was itself very tight, but that Canadian financial and technical assistance instead might help LDCs to increase their own fertilizer production, then estimated to be working at only 60-65% of capacity.<sup>96</sup> It was evident that NGO support for the Secretariat's proposed fertilizer fund thus had little discernable impact on proposed contributions.

(c) *The Grain Reserve.* Another issue was the Secretariat's proposal for an internationally controlled grain reserve. Canadian NGOs felt that the government could have easily contributed to the reserve; between 1-8 November, orchestrated by the NGO coalition, the PM's office received 759 letters specifically asking the government to support this proposal.<sup>97</sup> Along with the rest of the OECD, the government rejected the notion, hesitant to offer control over its national stocks to an international body. Britain, too, refused to endorse the proposal. Vickery reports that the government was resistant both because the plan seemed too simplistic and because it was unclear whether the plan was designed for famine relief or as a world commodity agreement. If the latter, it would have been very difficult to negotiate, and so the British approach to the debate was cautious.

The grain reserve issue generated considerable public outcry in Canada, however, once Kissinger's alternative proposal for a multilateral coordination of cereal stocks was announced; a proposal its detractors called a "food cartel." The notion was that a food exporters group would commit itself to "leadership" in the distribution of agricultural products, including the

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<sup>93</sup>Rogers, "Food in Our Time," 1974:12. This view was repeated in CAFOD's and Christian Aid's submission to the Select Committee the following spring: "Memorandum submitted by the Voluntary Committee on Overseas Aid and Development and the United Kingdom Standing Conference on the Second United Nations Development Decade," annex C: The Catholic Fund for Overseas Development and annex D: Christian Aid, evidence submitted on 26 March 1975; cited in the Select Committee, *The World Food Crisis*, 1976:92-93.

<sup>94</sup>WDM, "Annual Report 1974-75," Conference Paper no. 4, 14 June 1975, (p. 1); and WDM, "The Food Campaign," January 1975.

<sup>95</sup>Canada's 1970 levels of aid for nitrogen fertilizer had fallen from 150,000 tons in 1970 to zero in 1974, (Canadian Church Observers, "Canada Says No Fertilizer Commitment Possible," press report no. 3, Ottawa, 8 November 1974).

<sup>96</sup>Restricted intradepartmental memo, External Affairs, May 1974.

<sup>97</sup>Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:103.

transfer of funds and reserves.<sup>98</sup> The G77 and many NGOs felt that the proposal amounted to an exporters' cartel instead of the internationally-controlled grain reserve on the agenda. The Canadian NGOs sent information on the proposal racing back to Ottawa; Team Rome had been concerned that while many on the delegation were opposed to the plan, there nonetheless existed pressures to take a serious look at Kissinger's proposal.<sup>99</sup> The NGOs knew from the briefing book that Canada had not (after some debate) intended to support the proposal (initially voiced in September), but they felt it was important to generate attention about the Canadian position. By 13 November, the delegation had received "innumerable" telexes denouncing Kissinger's alleged food cartel,<sup>100</sup> the media picked up the story, and the Opposition posed questions in the House on the plan.<sup>101</sup> The accusation that Canada was planning to support the proposal was eventually denied in Parliament, forcing the government to play its hand sooner than was planned.<sup>102</sup> Again, while NGOs were not able to *move* either government's position, in the Canadian case, they may have lent support to the rejection of a possible policy. This kind of "negative influence," or parameter-setting, may thus have been a significant part of the NGO record at Rome.

#### NGO INFLUENCE

Given this constellation of events, we may be able to make a clear assessment of the influence of the NGOs lobbying around the World Food Conference. While neither group was able to substantially alter their governments' broad policies, the Canadian coalition certainly influenced the generosity of its government's aid contribution; a significant outcome in comparison with its British counterparts. The Canadians' activity in Rome had further tangible results because they were able to set a precedent which has lent them greater influence subsequently. The British groups, unable to make much of a mark at Rome, nonetheless took note and began to organize better their international lobbying efforts in the conference's aftermath.

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<sup>98</sup>United States, Department of State, *Address by the Honourable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Before the World Food Conference, Rome, Italy, November 5, 1974*, press release no. 477.

<sup>99</sup>Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:105.

<sup>100</sup>Restricted telex to External Affairs from the delegation in Rome, November 1974. Killeen reports that another 300 telegrams were received in Rome specifically about that proposal, (Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:110).

<sup>101</sup>Conservative MP Douglas Roche asked the government to explain its position toward this "Rich Man's Club," in Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 7 November 1974, (p. 1141).

<sup>102</sup>Page, "Participation d'un groupe," 1984:343.

At the end of the conference, the Canadian coalition was initially elated. GATT-Fly member Dennis Howlett said that "our actions on the World Food Conference has [sic] exceeded all our expectations. We feel that finally we have been able to have some impact on government policy."<sup>103</sup> Even government officials agreed that NGOs had certainly "made it easier to get the numbers higher."<sup>104</sup> In retrospect, however, this optimism became muted:

For our efforts, we got front page coverage, a special debate in the House of Commons, an occasion to embarrass the government, more letters sent to members of parliament than on any other issue at the time, and the establishment of action groups around the country. In terms of government policy, the only tangible result was a pledge for \$50 million in food aid, which ran directly against what we were trying to achieve.<sup>105</sup>

We had not called for increased food aid: arguing that policies such as land reform, income redistribution and stabilizing commodity prices through commodity agreements were what was needed to deal with long-term solutions to the food crisis. Yet the Canadian government's response to the largest number of letters ever received by the Prime Minister's office on a single issue was to increase its food aid.<sup>106</sup>

It is clear that on no issue (other than the quantity of food aid) did the government *change* its policy from that espoused in its first policy decisions in August.<sup>107</sup>

Looking at the British delegation, it is even more difficult to find evidence of direct influence by NGOs. While WDM claimed credit for getting the government to subsequently raise its fertilizer commitment, there is little in the records to support the claim. In spite of the precedent-setting mass NGO meeting with MAFF prior to the conference, the WDM's lobbying and media efforts, and the presence of a number of high-profile British NGOs in Rome, there is little direct evidence of NGO influence on any of the larger policy issues. Even WDM staff member John Tanner explained that the World Food Conference was an "educational experience" for WDM rather than an example of successful influence, admitting that "we were out of our depth."<sup>108</sup> Indirectly, one can argue that the NGOs on the steering committee had a *broad* influence on the proceedings: governments knew that they were being

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<sup>103</sup>Clarke and Howlett, "Evaluation of Food Conference Action," 1974.

<sup>104</sup>Interview with Bergbusch, March 1993.

<sup>105</sup>Dennis Howlett, reported in Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt (editors), *Church and State: The Christian Churches and Canadian Foreign Policy*, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982, (p. 18).

<sup>106</sup>Draft mimeo by Dennis Howlett, "Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice: Actions and Reflections," mimeo, 8 September 1992, (p. 3).

<sup>107</sup>Killeen, *Interest Groups*, 1982:94.

<sup>108</sup>Interview with John Tanner, Oxford, 12 August 1993.

monitored; *Pan* was important in raising and publicising issues; and governments may have been compelled by NGOs to at least declare their positions on certain issues. It is difficult, however, to make any more precise links between those broad-brush lobbying efforts and subsequent policy decisions.

In the longer term, however, a strong argument can be made that the NGOs' activity, particularly in Canada, managed to put voluntary agencies onto the agendas of future delegations. According to "home team" member Tony Clarke, it was the first time that NGOs were seen as a legitimate, extra-parliamentary *political* force in opposition to government. Despite (or because of) their antagonistic approach, NGOs had succeeded in setting a precedent for closer consultation with officials.<sup>109</sup> While relations were tense, a relationship of a kind had been established where once there had been no relationship at all. Canadian officials were right when they reported early on that "NGOs are looking for ammunition to support their claim for some form of institutionalized relationship with Canadian delegations to future conferences beginning perhaps with forthcoming special session of UNGA."<sup>110</sup> This is exactly what happened: from 1974 onward, NGOs were invited to participate in some of the government's deliberations for future UN conferences, as was the case for the 1975 UN Special Assembly. From November 1975, the Cabinet pointedly decided to consult more widely with private groups interested in Canadian development assistance.<sup>111</sup> Moreover, even in Britain, where NGOs remained resolutely on the sidelines, Vickery argued that NGOs may have been indirectly influential because they had raised the atmosphere of concern, and had buttressed the government's willingness to contribute what it did.

A longer-term outcome of NGO lobbying at Rome was the formalization of international NGO networks. The coalition that had put together the campaign in Canada became the Coalition for a Just Economic Order which went on to apply the Rome model to the UN's

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<sup>109</sup>NGOs had certainly not won many friends on the delegation; they had harassed and irritated their official counterparts, and a mood of hostility had grown around their relationship. The Canadian delegation feared that the NGOs were spying on them, bugging their meetings, and spreading rumours, (Page, "Participation d'un groupe," 1984:346). Officials were furthermore suspicious about the "close consultation" between delegation member Andrew Brewin, an opposition New Democrat MP, and the Canadian NGOs.

<sup>110</sup>Restricted telex to External Affairs from the Canadian delegation in Rome, November 1974; text edited from its original abbreviations for legibility.

<sup>111</sup>Confidential interview with External Affairs official, February 1993.

1975 Special Assembly and to UNCTAD IV in Nairobi in 1976.<sup>112</sup> In Britain, WDM member Chris Stockwell went on to found the International Coalition for Development Action (ICDA). This new international organization included the Canadian NGOs involved in Rome, and it followed their style of lobbying at international meetings. For British NGOs, the apex of this "Rome Model" came with UNCTAD IV when 30-40 British team members went to Nairobi as part of ICDA's highly visible monitoring group.

The World Food Conference had been an important catalyst for NGO advocacy work. Combined with the NIEO negotiations and the North-South dialogue alive at the time, the WFC had generated the attention of a whole new set of NGO actors and had propelled them onto the international stage. It was this fledgeling network that would bring about the more substantial changes 18 years later in Rio.

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<sup>112</sup>Richard Harmston, "Coalition for a Just Economic Order," in *Action* (a CIDA magazine), no. 3, Winter 1976, pp. 2-3.

## CHAPTER SEVEN: THE 1992 EARTH SUMMIT IN RIO

The Earth Summit, otherwise known as the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), was one of the largest and most public conferences ever held. Attended by record numbers of governments, NGOs, international agencies, and journalists, UNCED produced an impressive collection of resolutions and conventions. UNCED was also the locus of a massive international NGO lobby, and many commentators have argued that these organizations made a particularly indelible mark on the proceedings. This chapter looks at the activities of the Canadian and British NGOs interested in the development side of the conference to see how instrumental they may have been in influencing their own governments' positions. The term NGDO will be used in this chapter to differentiate these groups from environmental NGOs (or ENGOS), while reserving the term NGO to identify both groups. In these two countries, the chapter argues that NGOs did make a mark in Rio, but that their influence was strictly limited to certain issues. The following discussion attempts to explain why.

The chapter is organized in much the same way as the previous chapter on the World Food Conference: after a brief discussion of the build-up to the conference and an overview of its outcomes, the chapter looks at six elements of the NGDO-government relationship. The chapter focuses on the NGDOs active at Rio, and pays particular attention to their efforts to affect Agenda 21, the blueprint document designed to shape future national development-environment policies. The chapter argues that early access to the Canadian decision-making process and coordinated NGDO effort were the keys to the Canadian NGDOs' greater influence over policy. The British record, despite significant improvements since 1974, allowed NGOs only limited access, and thus only limited influence.

## BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

The predecessor to the Earth Summit was the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. ~~On 1972, it~~<sup>It</sup> had given birth to a number of important institutions and recommendations, including the Stockholm Action Plan, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), and considerable new research on environmental change.<sup>1</sup> One of the conference's other important outcomes was a growing consensus on the need to link environmental change with development,<sup>2</sup> a prominent issue at Rio. Despite the optimism that met this first conference's resolutions, however, the world's environmental record had continued to worsen. The deteriorating situation spurred the 1984 establishment of the Brundtland Commission (the World Commission on Environment and Development), and its provocative document, *Our Common Future*, was released in 1987.<sup>3</sup> This extensive study described the world's failure to achieve sustainable development and outlined some of the drastic measures that would be required to stave off environmental disaster, including an integrated approach to development planning. This report would be one of the major catalysts for the Earth Summit.

Over the same period, due to the strengthening of the environmental movement, "the environment" had meanwhile risen near the top of the public agenda as an important *political* issue, as well as an acknowledged ecological one.<sup>4</sup> The advocacy of ENGOS in particular and the growth of scientific knowledge about environmental change had added new issues to the agenda, including climate change, acid rain, ozone depletion, desertification, biodiversity, deforestation, and a concern about the interactive roles of developmental and environmental practices. The rising level of public concern throughout the West, in combination with the prominence of the Brundtland report, had set the scene for Rio.

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<sup>1</sup>Lynton Keith Caldwell, *International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions*, 2nd edition, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990, (p. 331); and John McCormick, *The Global Environmental Movement: Reclaiming Paradise*, London: Belhaven Press, 1989, (p. 101).

<sup>2</sup>McCormick, *The Global Environmental Movement*, 1989, chapter eight.

<sup>3</sup>World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (the Brundtland Report), Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

<sup>4</sup>Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, *Global Environmental Politics*, Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991.

In December 1989, the new conference was convened with resolution 44/228, and was set for June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. Four preparatory meetings followed: PrepCom I took place in August 1990 in Nairobi, and set the conference's terms of reference; at PrepCom II, in Geneva in March of 1991, the participating nations began to prioritize the issues outlined by the Secretariat; at PrepCom III, again in Geneva five months later, governments began negotiations on Agenda 21; and at the final PrepCom in New York in March 1992, most of the negotiations were largely finalized.<sup>5</sup> The outstanding issues from PrepCom IV included financing, poverty and consumption, institutions, major groups, technology transfer, atmosphere, and forests: all major chapters in Agenda 21, and thus among those discussed later on in this chapter. Rio, expected to be the backdrop for a large-scale signing ceremony and photo opportunity, instead became the locus for further intense negotiations.<sup>6</sup> In the end, the conference produced a new international institution (the Commission for Sustainable Development), and five documents (two framework conventions on biodiversity and climate change, Agenda 21, the Earth Charter [which became the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development], and the Authoritative Statement on Forest Principles).

In order to understand the involvement of NGDOs in this process, one needs first to note some of the other factors involved. Of these, the conference Secretariat was one of the most important, headed by the Secretary-General of both the 1992 and 1972 conferences, Canadian Maurice Strong. Strong's dominance in the environment-development field, both with prominent international NGOs and with the Canadian government,<sup>7</sup> has been especially important for NGOs. He had strongly welcomed NGO involvement in 1972 and 1992, had funded their attendance to both conferences, and his consistent pressure on Rio delegations to

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<sup>5</sup>The framework conventions on biodiversity and climate change had been hammered out in other preparatory fora prior to Rio.

<sup>6</sup>Johannah Bernstein, Pamela Chasek, and Langston James Goree VI, *The Earth Summit Bulletin: A Summary of the Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 3-14 June 1992*, 16 June 1992, (p. 1).

<sup>7</sup>Strong had been the president of the External Aid Office, of CIDA, and of the IDRC; he had headed the UN Environment Program in Nairobi (UNEP) and the Canadian YMCA; and he had been involved with the North-South Roundtable, the Club of Rome, the Rockefeller Foundation, the World Wildlife Fund, the World Federation of UN Associations, and the World Economic Forum. Moreover, these private involvements were in addition to a long controversial history of business and investment in oil, energy, gas and real estate; and a close relationship with the Canadian Liberal Party, (Elaine Dewar, "Mr. Universe," in *Saturday Night*, June 1992, pp. 17-83 with breaks).

increase their involvement with non-governmental organizations was particularly significant.<sup>8</sup> Further strength in the Secretariat was added by Tommy Koh, the Chair of the four sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Koh worked particularly hard to allow NGOs greater access to the meetings, and his stance was reportedly that "NGOs bring to the proceedings valuable experience and expertise which would otherwise be lacking."<sup>9</sup> The UNCED Secretariat in turn made accreditation for NGOs much easier than at previous UN conferences; normally, an NGO would need to go through the laborious ECOSOC process (as had been the case with the accredited observers at the 1974 World Food Conference, a group which included ICVA but not GATT-Fly). This time, with little more than a statement of interest and a copy of an annual report, any NGO accredited to PrepCom IV (whether or not it attended) would be eligible to attend the Rio meeting, and with similar provision to attend the PrepComs beforehand. In the end, 1,420 NGOs were officially accredited to the conference and an estimated 15,000 NGO representatives attended the parallel NGO conference, the Global Forum.<sup>10</sup> Their input into the process, especially at the PrepCom level, was thus unprecedented:

For the first time in the history of UN Conferences, NGOs have been provided the opportunity to take part in the preparatory process in a capacity beyond that of mere observer. NGOs are now permitted to make written presentations to, and address plenary meetings of the UNCED Preparatory Committee and meetings of the Working Groups. As well, NGOs are able to attend ... (at the discretion of the Working Group chairs), the behind-doors 'informal consultation' sessions (the forums where the real decision-making occurs) which were hitherto off-limits.<sup>11</sup>

It is also significant for NGOs that UNCED attracted an unprecedented collection of government players: out of the 182 participating states, there were 120 Heads of State

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<sup>8</sup>See the text of a speech made by Strong after Rio for a sense of his approach to UNCED: Maurice Strong, *Beyond Rio: A New Role for Canada*, O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture, Vancouver, 10 November 1992, published by External Affairs and International Trade Canada.

<sup>9</sup>Unclassified report of the Canadian Delegation to PrepCom III, 12 August to 4 September 1991, Geneva, section on "Non-Governmental Participation," undated, (p. 3).

<sup>10</sup>The United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service's *E&D File 1992*, No. 30, July 1992, cites 15,000 NGO participants and over 100,000 visitors at the Earth Summit. Tim Leah, the UNCED-NGO Coordinator at Environment Canada, recounts that 400,000 people went through the gates of the Global Forum, (interview in Ottawa on 4 April 1993).

<sup>11</sup>Johannah Bernstein, "CPCU Coordinator Commentary," in *Rio-Watch Canada*, vol. 1, no. 1, July-August 1991.

attending,<sup>12</sup> in comparison with the two present in 1972, and the absence of any in Rome in 1974. The prominence given to the conference meant that significant amounts of government money were to be spent on NGOs in Canada, Britain and other countries. Indeed, one Canadian official explained that the million dollars spent on Canadian NGOs in preparation for UNCED had been justified on the grounds of the particular grandeur of the occasion.<sup>13</sup> Besides, given the high level of public concern, it would have been politically difficult for Canada or Britain to address the environment-development debate without some reference to their own NGOs. NGOs -- NGDOs and ENGOs alike -- are better trusted than governments to present an honest assessment of the state of the world. Governments which cannot lay claim to such trust must depend on their association with voluntary groups.

## THE CAMPAIGN

### Context

In both countries, governments had been taking a keener interest in environmental policy in the 1980s. In Canada, environmental worries topped public opinion polls from the mid 1980s onward,<sup>14</sup> and in Britain, a similar wave of public opinion was rising.<sup>15</sup> NGDOs, encouraged by the success of their ENGO counterparts, would follow on their prominence at Rio.

Christopher Patten, one-time ODA minister and from 1989 the Minister of the Environment, had convinced PM Thatcher to "go green" in the late 1980s for a number of reasons. First of all, it was noteworthy that the Green Party had won a significant 15% of the European parliament vote in 1989, and that environmental issues were consistently in the polls as the

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<sup>12</sup>Figures in the secondary literature differ substantially on the numbers of participants. The 182 figure is drawn from: *Adoption of the Report of the Conference*, draft report, A/Conf.151/L.2, 10 June 1992, Agenda item 12, copied in Stanley Johnson, *The Earth Summit: The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)*, International Environmental Law and Policy Series, London, Dordrecht, Boston: Graham & Trotman Martinus Nijhoff, 1993.

<sup>13</sup>Interview with Alison LeClaire, one-time Communications Officer with External Affairs' UNCED Task Force, Ottawa, 27 October 1992.

<sup>14</sup>David Runnalls (from the Institute for Research on Public Policy), "What Should be Said at UNCED? Institutional Choices for the Rio Conference," in *From Stockholm to Rio*, 1991:1.

<sup>15</sup>For an overview of the greening of ODA policy, for example, see: Brian Walker (President of IIED from 1985-1989), "Britain's Aid and the Environment," in Anuradha Bose and Peter Burnell (editors), *Britain's Overseas Aid since 1979: Between Idealism and Self-interest*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.

second most important concern among Britons after health and social services.<sup>16</sup> "The environment" became an increasing element in Britain's policy statements by the end of the decade, and thus would compel the government to take positive action at Rio. However, partly because of the UK's unwillingness to make extensive financial commitments and partly because of its close alliance with the intransigent US position, Britain was to take a relatively low profile at the Earth Summit.

There were a number of similar elements present in Canada in 1988. The Conservative Party had just been re-elected at a time when interest in environmental issues was on an up-swing. Feeding into this rising public concern, the government launched an ambitious new environmental policy, *The Green Plan*, and the PM played a prominent role in environmental issues in a series of meetings at the Hague, Dakar, Paris, and Kuala Lumpur. By the time that the preparations for UNCED were fully underway, however, Canada was facing a particularly tense political period: the constitutional debate was front-page news, the recession was worsening, and *The Green Plan* had suffered politically (largely because of a lack of consultation in its initial formulation).<sup>17</sup> In the end, some suggested that Canada's lead on certain UNCED issues (it was the first of the industrialized nations to sign the biodiversity treaty, for example), was meant partly to overshadow the constitutional crisis, and partly to demonstrate independence from the Americans at a time when free trade was a controversial issue.<sup>18</sup> Cooper and Fritz suggest that one of the government's motivations for including NGOs in UNCED was the hope of tempering these other criticisms:

Domestically the dynamic of a closer relationship between the government and societal actors on the environment, if not likely to attract votes directly, was intended to temper the critical reviews from the green movement. Getting NGOs 'on side' lent greater credibility to the government's efforts to identify itself with popular issues.

This is not to suggest, however, that government's response represented only a technique of management with regards to its influential publics. For one thing, there were also important technical/administrative reasons for drawing societal groups more fully into the policy making process. ... there remained a strong bureaucratic impetus for bringing societal groups into the decision making process. A good client base

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<sup>16</sup>Interview with Gavin Watson, Under Secretary for Environmental Policy and Analysis, Department of the Environment, London, 1 July 1993. See also Steven Yearley, *The Green Case: A Sociology of Environmental Issues, Arguments, and Politics*, London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991, (pp. 79, 92-96).

<sup>17</sup>Interview with Michael Small, one-time UNCED Coordinator at External Affairs, on the telephone from the Canadian Embassy in Costa Rica, 24 March 1993.

<sup>18</sup>Désirée McGraw and Susana Lopez, *Making Sense of UNCED: The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*, unpublished paper, December 1992, (p. 20).

provided a useful instrument from both an interdepartmental and administrative perspective.<sup>19</sup>

The Canadian government's enthusiasm for UNCED thus also had links to domestic issues, and a positive image at Rio was needed to raise PM Mulroney's flagging popularity at home.

### Players' Motivations

The players assembled to prepare for Rio, both environmental/developmental and voluntary/official, had a mixed collection of goals, and as we shall see, these would become important elements in the capacity of NGDOs to exert influence over the proceedings.

In Canada, an unusual departmental triangle was responsible for the official preparations. First of all, the Department of External Affairs (EA), Environment Canada, and CIDA were *jointly* responsible for generating the Canadian position, (the usual practice is for one department to lead a group of others).<sup>20</sup> Given this unusual arrangement (and the historically strained relationship between CIDA and External Affairs), it is remarkable that so little conflict did surface over the two years of preparation; where these difficulties did arise, by all accounts they did not de-rail the process.<sup>21</sup> This cooperation was particularly significant for NGDOs whose history involved a mixed relationship with the three departments. CIDA, of course, had had a long history of consultation with development NGOs and was just then beginning to cultivate a relationship with environmental groups as well, while Environment Canada had already begun to develop its own "client" community among ENGOs. On the other hand, EA has traditionally been seen as "benignly hostile" to NGO participation on policy issues. Yet by the end of the UNCED process, even EA officials had developed a good relationship with some of the NGO representatives. This differing history of clientelism is *especially* important in light of the tri-corner responsibility for the conference; if External

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<sup>19</sup>Cooper and Fritz, *Commitment and Convenience*, 1992:13.

<sup>20</sup>At the senior policy level, Bob Slater from Environment Canada, John Bell from External Affairs, and Nicole Sénécal from CIDA met twice a month to prepare for the Conference. Each of these was supported by an UNCED team in their own departments at the operational level.

<sup>21</sup>The conflict that *did* exist centred on the senior composition of the delegation. According to one official, "the process was not without its growing pains," (McGraw and Lopez, *Making Sense of UNCED*, 1992:34). CIDA's Barbara Brown suggests that part of the problem was that most of the civil service was not used to working in close cooperation. On the whole, she felt that the day-to-day relationship with the other officials was very supportive, (interview with Barbara Brown, Policy Advisor, CIDA, Ottawa, 29 October 1992).

Affairs had been the lead department, it would have been less likely to involve NGOs in the UNCED preparations to the same extent. NGOs were involved in large part because of CIDA's and Environment Canada's institutionalized rapport with the voluntary sector, and these weaker departments brought External Affairs along with them.

Both at the working and political levels, a broad consensus evolved among officials that NGOs were important to the success of the conference. Environment Minister Jean Charest, the senior minister involved (apart from the PM), was an enthusiastic advocate for increased NGO involvement and held daily one-hour briefing sessions with them throughout the conference, an unprecedented use of ministerial time. Charest's special advisor (and the PM's personal representative) was Arthur Campeau, a Montreal lawyer recently involved with environmental issues who had also encouraged NGO participation throughout the process.<sup>22</sup> At Environment Canada's UNCED Secretariat, Executive Director Vic Buxton felt that encouraging NGOs to participate was important; he argued that a "get them all under the tent" strategy would improve the delegation's success,<sup>23</sup> and in order to further facilitate NGO participation, Environment Canada set aside a full-time staff position, served by Tim Leah, to deal with NGO relations for the conference; again, a precedent in NGO-government relations. At EA, the lead civil servant was the SSEA's special advisor, John Bell, an ex-Ambassador to Brazil who had, according to NGDOs, repeatedly made a point of including and informing them during the PrepCom sessions. His view was that NGO participation was "crucial" to the success of the proceedings.<sup>24</sup> Working under Bell was Michael Small, head of External Affairs' own UNCED unit, who also felt that NGO participation was critical if other Canadians were to get to learn about UNCED's goals.<sup>25</sup> At CIDA, not unexpectedly, there were other sympathetic voices. At the agency's Environment and Development Policy Division, George Greene was convinced of the necessity of having NGOs involved, as was his

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<sup>22</sup>The NGOs' involvement was a heavily debated issue from the outset, and there were debates even into PrepCom IV on the extent to which NGOs not on any country's delegation should be allowed to participate. At PrepCom I, Campeau had held up one of the meetings until the issue of NGO participation was resolved. A resolution was forced against the better wishes of some delegations and NGOs were subsequently allowed to participate freely in the PrepCom deliberations.

<sup>23</sup>Interviews with David Runnalls, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2 October 1992; and with Barbara Brown, Policy Advisor, CIDA, 29 October 1992.

<sup>24</sup>Interview with John Bell, one-time Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for External Affairs for the Environment, External Affairs, Ottawa, 2 November 1992.

<sup>25</sup>Interview with Small, March 1993.

environmental policy advisor Barbara Brown. One-time a member of CUSO herself, Brown specifically invited NGOs to help in the deliberations of the interdepartmental working group on poverty she chaired. As we shall see, it was through these working groups that NGOs were able to make one of their most visible marks on policy. This cross-departmental openness to NGO participation is important, given that *each* of the three departments had NGO advocates at the working level, and that all three departments had set up UNCED centres (rather than having one centrally controlled secretariat, as officials complained afterward). NGOs not only had more entry points into the system, but also much more sympathetic access.

The openness to NGO participation in Britain was also greater than usual, although the degree of enthusiasm was not as great as it had been in Canada. At the political level, John Major had shown an unprecedented interest in NGOs; convinced by Sir Crispin Tickell (one of the PM's unofficial advisors) that NGO involvement at the conference was important, Major met with a select group of agencies in February of 1992<sup>26</sup> and again at Rio,<sup>27</sup> and in the interim wrote to UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar to encourage NGO involvement. Unlike in Canada, the Department of the Environment (DoE) led the preparations for UNCED, and Under Secretary Gavin Watson, one of the key figures in promoting NGO involvement, set a tone of amicability in the government's overall approach to NGOs. Tom Burke, the Personal Environment Advisor to then Environment Minister Michael Heseltine, was another central figure at the DoE. As one-time director of Friends of the Earth and the Green Alliance, Burke was one of the ENGOS' main supporters inside government. The ODA, naturally an advocate for NGDO participation, considered them to be important sources of information and expertise on poverty issues. Head of the ODA's preparations, David Turner felt that NGDOs had a special competence in integrating development and environment concerns, and while he

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<sup>26</sup>Preparations for the PrepComs in both countries involved a number of large-scale meetings and conferences with officials; the CPCU was funded by the International Development Research Council (IDRC) to organize a two day strategy meeting in preparation for PrepCom IV, addressed by SSEA Barbara McDougall and involving Arthur Campeau. On another occasion, a two-day consultation was held at the Museum of Civilization in May, and was addressed by the Prime Minister. In the UK, the main meeting of this type was the unprecedented meeting with Major in February, when he discussed with representatives from six NGOs (including Oxfam and ActionAid) and five business organizations the possible outcomes from Rio. However, according to confidential sources, the government was concerned that too much hype was being produced over Rio, and that the key to ensuring good political results was to lower expectations. The meeting with the NGOs had thus been partly meant to tone down those expectations.

<sup>27</sup>Interview with Sir Crispin Tickell, currently Warden of Green College, Oxford, 28 May 1993.

suggested that some had "become lost in lobbying activities," still others had developed important negotiating skills.<sup>28</sup> This openness to "negotiation" was evident in Oxfam and ActionAid's close dealings with the ODA as it worked out its own position papers.<sup>29</sup>

The focal institution for NGO preparation in Britain was UNEP-UK, a national committee originally established to promote the UN Environmental Programme and the cause of "the environment" in international affairs. Partly funded by the DoE, UNEP-UK's Secretariat was based at the prestigious International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), and was managed by Koy Thomson, an environmental policy worker previously employed with the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature and Friends of the Earth; strong voices in the environmental movement. Organized to improve the flow of information among agencies, UNEP-UK took on the role of advising and informing both NGDO and ENGO communities about the UNCED process, and while it did not claim to *represent* the views of any part of the non-governmental community, it sought to bring more groups into the debate and to raise public awareness of the conference. Of the NGOs involved with UNEP-UK, there were perhaps only four *development* groups which took substantial part in the preparations: Oxfam, the WDM, the United Nations Association (UNA), and ActionAid. Of those, only Oxfam and ActionAid were involved at the outset in lobbying the UK's PrepCom and Rio delegations directly (although WDM and UNA later also came on board).

It is noteworthy that Oxfam, the most prominent and experienced of the four, had paradoxically found it difficult to organize its involvement at Rio; its environmental policies had been wrought with a fair amount of internal turmoil and the organization was not sure until late in the process how it intended to approach the environment-development debate. Consequently, it devoted only one position to preparations for the conference, split between Joan Davidson and Dorothy Myers.<sup>30</sup> By the end of the PrepComs, Oxfam's representatives would focus on only the broadest agenda issues: the inclusion of trade and debt on the agenda, the commitment to the 0.7% figure, and an increase on the focus on poverty. There

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<sup>28</sup>Interview with David Turner, Head of ODA's Natural Resources Branch, London, 7 May 1993.

<sup>29</sup>Interview with Koy Thomson, one-time UNEP-UK Coordinator, IIED, London, 18 May 1993.

<sup>30</sup>Interview with Dorothy Myers, one-time Oxfam's UNCED Coordinator, Oxford, 29 May 1993.

is some suggestion, therefore, that in this broad-brush approach, Oxfam's direct influence on specific issues was not as strong as might otherwise have been.

ActionAid, on the other hand, had become firmly committed as early as PrepCom II and had devoted two full-time positions to the preparations. More organized at the outset than Oxfam, ActionAid's Vicky Johnson and Ana Toni lobbied throughout the process to promote the agency's vision of sustainable development, including the promotion of the familiar 0.7% figure; the role of public participation in the alleviation of poverty; responsible population measures; trade reform and debt relief; and the creation of new sustainable development institutions.<sup>31</sup>

Meanwhile, the other two development NGOs concentrated their efforts on raising public awareness at home. WDM focused on the trade aspects of Rio, organized a conference on the financial issues arising out of Agenda 21, and was the central figure in the parliamentary lobby (discussed later). Like WDM, the UNA was primarily concerned with organizing public education efforts and encouraged by IIED, undertook a series of 21 local conferences (attended by some 4,000 people);<sup>32</sup> organized a rally at Westminster and a demonstration in front of the American Embassy; and at Rio, organized three breakfast meetings with UK ministers and NGOs; and set up daily evening information sessions for gathered voluntary organizations.<sup>33</sup>

These four were the most active of the development NGOs involved, but there were also a number of environmental groups making separate preparations. The most prominent were Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature UK, the Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE), the Tropical Forestry Institute and the Green Alliance. Few of these agencies chose to undertake broad collaborative efforts in preparing for UNCED other than in preparing the well-received *Putting Our House in Order*, (a list of specific recommendations for British environmental policy signed by 24 ENGOS). As Fiona Reynolds of the CPRE

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<sup>31</sup>Interviews with Ana Toni, Development Policy Analyst, ActionAid, London, 21 May 1993 and with Vicky Johnson, Environmental Policy Analyst, ActionAid, London, 13 August 1993.

<sup>32</sup>For a report of those conferences, see: UNA, Felix Dodds and Tim Spence (compilers), *Our Earth, Our Future: A UK People's Declaration*, United Nations Association, London, 1992.

<sup>33</sup>Interview with Felix Dodds, one-time UNCED Coordinator, United Nations Association, London, 1 July 1993.

explained, many organizations are reluctant to join permanent coalitions or to subjugate their policy to joint decision-making coalitions (via UNEP-UK or another organization) partly because the compromises needed for consensus might threaten the values and purposes on which their individual reputations are based.<sup>34</sup> Outside of participation with *Putting Our Own House in Order*, then, few ENGOs were concerned with lobbying the government on UNCED directly: Friends of the Earth had decided that UNCED was not worth the diversion of effort from other campaign issues, and sent only one member to lobby on forests and biodiversity;<sup>35</sup> and Greenpeace UK had stepped aside to let its international branch become involved.<sup>36</sup> Partly because of the ENGOs' reluctance in joining any collaborative effort, the development NGOs gained a much higher collective profile and may thus have done more to pressure the government on the UNCED agenda.<sup>37</sup> By the end of the PrepCom process, ActionAid and Oxfam were easily the most central figures advocating for Agenda 21 in Britain.

In Canada, the situation was significantly different. Back in the fall of 1990, the Canadian Participatory Committee for UNCED (the CPCU) was established, spurred by Strong's invitation to NGOs to participate in the conference. The main initiator was Geoffrey Grenville-Wood of the United Nations Association in Canada (UNAC), who had also been instrumental organizing NGOs during the World Food Conference. The committee represented a bewildering array of umbrella groups, each representing substantial constituencies of their own: environmental interest groups were represented by the Canadian Environmental Network (CEN); public policy groups were represented by UNAC; development by the CCIC; indigenous groups by the Native Council of Canada, Indigenous Survival International, the Assembly of First Nations, and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference; youth by Canada's Youth '92 Secretariat; interfaith groups by the United Church of Canada; labour by the Canadian Labour Congress; peace organizations by the Canadian Peace

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<sup>34</sup>Interview with Fiona Reynolds, Director, Council for the Protection of Rural England, London, 20 May 1993.

<sup>35</sup>Interview with Andrew Dilworth, Environment Development Coordinator, Friends of the Earth, London, 8 July 1993.

<sup>36</sup>CPRE's Reynolds explained that most of ENGOs got involved later on in the process because ENGOs are institutionally geared toward short-term actions rather than longer term campaigning efforts.

<sup>37</sup>Bichsel's study of NGOs at UNCED found that "in contrast to other countries, where the environment NGOs took the most interest in UNCED, in Britain development NGOs took the lead." Anne Bichsel (Swiss Aid Agencies Coalition), *A Review of NGO Political Participation at the National and International Level*, commissioned by the Swiss Department for Development Cooperation, Bern, May 1992, (p. 16).

Alliance; and women by Women and Environment Education and Development, as well as the National Action Committee on the Status of Women. This ambitious coalition, which met as a whole only seven times in its two year existence, was run by a steering committee composed of five individuals: Peter Padbury of CCIC, Angus Archer of UNAC, Dan Smith of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Mario Lavoie of Canada Youth '92, and Elizabeth May of Cultural Survival. The steering committee worked in conjunction with the CPCU's secretariat in Ottawa, staffed by well known environmental lawyer Johannah Bernstein and her assistant, Lynn Broughton.

It is important to point out how significantly diverse these groups were. The rationale for the committee's structure was in part simply organizational (it was the central information point for Canadian umbrella groups interested in UNCED), yet the structure was specifically keyed to the composition of the government's delegation. Early on, it was made clear by officials that there would be five observer seats available for NGOs on the Canadian PrepCom and Rio delegations, and that these five were to represent development, environment, aboriginal, public policy, and youth groups (the youth representative was, in turn, to represent women and labour). The committee was then to choose whom among its members would attend. In effect, this access structure meant that the CPCU also coordinated the "NGO view" as a whole; any organization with a position to advocate was effectively obliged to lobby through the CPCU. This system gave a greater voice to the committee in its dealings with officials, but it engendered significant problems; as we shall see, some ENGOs found the compromise view disabling.

## Resources

Both sets of NGOs were graced with a substantial amount of funding from government coffers. In Canada, the amounts were especially significant: for the three year budget period, the CPCU was initially granted \$753,000 by Environment Canada. Some of the CPCU members (the CEN and indigenous groups) raised a fuss midway, and lobbied to have one year's worth of their share dispensed directly to them. When these separate allocations are added to the total, it meant that \$945,000 went to the CPCU and its members, nearly a million dollars. Because many of the NGOs had a substantial part of their total income during those

years through the CPCU, this dependency was probably one of the primary adhesives that bound the committee together.<sup>38</sup> On top of the CPCU budget, CIDA contributed an additional \$850,000 to the CCIC for its efforts, as well as another \$642,529 to other non-CPCU NGOs, mostly for public information and conference work.<sup>39</sup> By way of contrast, British NGOs had far fewer public funds offered to them. Beginning in 1989, the Department of the Environment allocated a total of some £150,000 to UNEP-UK to run a program of consultations, seminars, debates, and information campaigns, as well as to make a compilation of NGO positions on UNCED issues.<sup>40</sup> The amount was less than a third of what had been allocated to the CPCU, and had to be supplemented by UNEP-UK to the tune of an additional £58,000 from other sources.

But resources other than finances were also important. One was the NGOs' knowledge of the debates on the agenda; for development NGOs, their on-the-ground experiences had qualified them as experts on many of Agenda 21's chapters. In both countries, officials frequently cited the competence of NGOs, particularly in negotiating the chapter on poverty. Moreover, as Small stresses, governments *need* NGOs in order to carry out the plans envisioned in Agenda 21,<sup>41</sup> and as we will see, poverty, consumption, and the major groups chapters were areas where their wording was actually inserted into the UN texts.

Another important "resource" was NGOs' knowledge of the governments' and UN decision-making system. One of Thomson's arguments was that while NGOs were institutionally placed to be influential at UNCED (either as part of a delegation, as an advisor to Maurice Strong, or as an ally of the sympathetic Secretariat), it was crucial that they knew the workings of the system. Ana Toni, for instance, complained that one of ActionAid's greatest

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<sup>38</sup>One major issue was the allocation of the committee's resources. The CEN had been used to receiving all of its funding from Environment Canada, and was concerned that the growing membership of the CPCU would compete for this limited funding; as such, CEN's constituency was nervous that a limited pie was being sliced into even narrower slices, (Mia Benjamin Robinson, *Report to the International Affairs Caucus Regarding its Experiences with Canadian Preparations for UNCED and Implications for Future Endeavours*, October 1992).

<sup>39</sup>Canadian UNCED Secretariat, *Internal Report*, undated, Annex 1 of Chapter 3. The comparative generosity for UNCED funding was due in part to a fortunate ministerial overlap. Small and others have suggested that the Treasury Board approved External Affairs' large UNCED budget proposal because it was submitted in the six weeks during which Robert de Cotret was *both* Treasury Board and Environment Minister; was just heading off to sign the Montreal Protocol; and had wanted to be able to make a statement on Canada's contribution to the environmental effort, (interview with Small, March 1993.)

<sup>40</sup>Bichsel, *A Review of NGO Political Participation*, 1992:10.

<sup>41</sup>Interview with Small, March 1993.

difficulties was its ignorance of the workings of the UN system; particularly in comparison with the long history of UN interaction at the IIED. In Canada, the inclusion of NGOs on some of the government's pre-PrepCom working groups as well as on the PrepCom delegations themselves, allowed voluntary agencies an expanding insider knowledge of the government and UN decision-making processes. The next section describes how this process may have helped or hindered their influence.

### Channels

The Canadian government's decision-making process for Rio involved a series of interdepartmental working groups, negotiations during the PrepComs, and some final critical decisions made at the summit itself. At all stages, NGOs were at least partly involved. A total of 26 interdepartmental working groups had been set up to cover those issues in Agenda 21 which particularly concerned Canada; and, in order to affect their deliberations, the CPCU set up parallel NGO groups to cover 21 of those same issues. Over the course of the first year of preparations, many in the CPCU groups struck up a good relationship with their official counterparts, and at least ten of the official groups took on NGO experts as well. Another important aspect of NGO participation was their presence on the official delegations. Although they did not directly participate in negotiating the texts with other governments, the NGOs assisted the delegation in the writing of Canada's interventions, in the channelling of information from other Canadian NGOs, and in advising the delegation on wording and technical points,<sup>42</sup> a far greater level of participation than had been the norm for observers on other UN conferences.

An important part of this growing interaction with the delegation during the long weeks at the preparatory committee meetings was the gradual building of trust. Members from both sides repeatedly stressed this point: for the first time, NGOs and officials worked side by side over a long period of time, engaged in joint-problem solving. There were restrictions on their influence, as we shall see, but the process of the delegation work had both improved officials'

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<sup>42</sup>Johannah Bernstein, *Canadian Primer for PrepCom IV*, 31 January 1992, (pp. 6-7).

respect for the agencies' expertise and professionalism,<sup>43</sup> and increased NGO understanding of the constraints faced by government. According to both NGO and government officials interviewed, this quasi-collaborative process leading up to Rio was crucial to the success of their relationship. As Environment Minister Jean Charest explained:

The Rio experience was a watershed. The advantage of being together for fifteen days is that you can't pretend. So there is no veil, no smoke screen, no mirrors behind which [government] can hide ... Rio was the reconciliation of what governing is, in the best sense of the term ... Democracy in governing is more than counting votes to decide who is in charge. The essence of democracy is the capacity of persuasion and consensus.<sup>44</sup>

By way of comparison, the British government's position was worked out the usual interdepartmental fashion, unlike in Canada where special UNCED units were set up within each department and a large number of relatively open working groups were established. Other than quarterly meetings between the deputy secretaries of the three main departments (the Foreign Office, DoE, and ODA), and the biannual interdepartmental meetings chaired by Gavin Watson, no special institutional arrangements were made in preparation for UNCED. The interdepartmental group had the primary responsibility for deciding Britain's course of action for UNCED and for debating the proposals generated at the working level.<sup>45</sup> The FCO's involvement was small during the preparatory phase, and during the conference itself, its instructions were limited to cautionary instructions against any move that might involve commitment in new funds or new institutions. Unlike in Canada, there was no broad working group system open to NGOs; and none of the existing committees where participation by voluntary agencies was welcome were relevant to the NGOs' agenda.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>This cheek-by-jowl working relationship was not welcomed by all members of the CPCU, however: "There was an ongoing disagreement between those individuals/sectors who were ready to work within 'the system' and those who felt that collaboration with government was a form of cooption. This led to difficulties in the building of a shared consensus around fundamental questions." Others further expressed cautiousness about the "new cosy relationship" that was developing between NGOs and officials; they were concerned that the government was using NGOs for public relations purposes without taking their positions seriously. See: Johanna Bernstein and Lynn Broughton, *Final Report of the Canadian Participatory Committee for UNCED (CPCU): An Evaluation of the CPCU Process and Assessment of Future Needs for Canadian NGOs*, 24 September 1992, (p. 8 and appendix 1, p. 5).

<sup>44</sup>Cited in McGraw and Lopez, *Making Sense of UNCED*, 1992:51.

<sup>45</sup>Interview with Watson, July 1993.

<sup>46</sup>However, there were working groups on tropical timber and biodiversity which had involved ENGOs in the drafting of particular paragraphs of the British position.

Outside of the later PrepComs, it appears that it was only during infrequent meetings with the two leading departments, the ODA and DoE, that NGDOs had any direct contact with the officials preparing Britain's position, (although there were more frequent consultations with ENGOs on specific issues such as marine pollution and biodiversity). The meetings that did take place (perhaps seven with the Minister in all) dated from the European regional preparation conference in Bergen in May 1990 where NGOs were, for the first time, involved in the debates.<sup>47</sup> What was unusual for Britain, however, was the place set aside for an NGO representative on the PrepCom delegations. Koy Thomson of UNEP-UK was chosen both because of the organization's cross-sector perspective, and because of his own environmental policy skills. While Thomson was excluded from reading some of the communication from Whitehall and was constrained by "Chatham House rules" (a confidentiality agreement), he was otherwise equally involved in the delegation.<sup>48</sup> He communicated openly with the other British NGOs present at the PrepComs, and he worked particularly closely with ActionAid and Oxfam on the delegation's position on poverty. He argues that these two agencies, as practitioner NGOs with an acknowledged expertise, therefore had no difficulty gaining access to the other delegation members as well; Toni and Johnson, for example, cited examples from PrepCom IV when ActionAid was thus asked for specific technical advice on the institutional, population, and poverty chapters. On occasion, the delegation also met with NGOs formally during the negotiations, but Thomson indicates that these meetings were less relevant than the frequent and informal consultations held with individual NGOs.

However, outside of these delegation meetings, NGDOs seemed to have had little interaction with policy-makers. Part of the reason has to do the NGDOs' own lack of collaboration. In comparison to the CPCU, their non-collaborative approach may have allowed government to disregard or treat the agencies' views lightly on the grounds that their views were

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<sup>47</sup>At Bergen, groups from business, local government, and voluntary agencies were represented, and from these three sectors, the British NGO observer group was formed, (interview with Tom Burke, Personal Environment Advisor to the Minister of the Environment, London, 23 April 1993.)

<sup>48</sup>Initially, the involvement of NGOs in DoE policy and the appointment of Tom Burke in particular was seen by some senior civil servants to be "catastrophic." However, by the time that Koy Thomson was invited to join the UK delegation, there was much greater trust from the DoE and ODA, and only a few of the more traditional diplomats opposed his participation, (interview with Fiona McConnell, one-time Head of the International Division at the DoE and member of the UNCED delegation, in London, 13 August 1993 and subsequent correspondence dated 15 November 1993.)

unrepresentative of public concern. As Turner explained, "the number and different interests of British NGOs meant that on some issues they were unable to present a sufficiently concerted view to influence effectively the Government's formulation of its position."<sup>49</sup> Even had the British NGOs been able to work collectively, however, it is doubtful they would have made a stronger impression on the government delegation. Although, as in the Canadian case, there were certainly NGO advocates at the senior and working levels, there was very little institutional precedent for NGO involvement. While in Canada the patron-client relationships already developed through CIDA and Environment Canada had set the standard for further NGO involvement, in Britain there had been less of a history of interaction.

### Tactics

Other than the work on the delegations and working groups, what kind of activities were being undertaken by NGDOs? In contrast to the tactics undertaken in 1974, this section demonstrates that NGDOs in both countries consciously developed an "insider" strategy.

(a) *Lobbying at the PrepComs.* In preparing for the PrepCom sessions, a wide array of tactics were undertaken by Canadian and British NGDOs. One was the publication of their research on sustainable development. Out of UNEP-UK's many activities, the main publication was its February 1992 synthesis of NGO views, *The UK NGO Agenda for the Earth Summit*, which collected some 262 recommendations garnered from conferences and meetings, and presented these to the DoE. Oxfam prepared one of the other main documents in the British NGDO community, entitled "Primary Environmental Care: A Practical Approach to Dealing with Poverty and the Environment,"<sup>50</sup> perhaps the most successful of Oxfam's official policy efforts. It was Oxfam's John Clark who personally convinced the ODA's David Turner of the importance of the idea of "primary environmental care" as a practical approach to environment-development problems.<sup>51</sup> Another of Oxfam's major efforts was the publication of its brief, "Oxfam's Action Agenda on Poverty and the Environment," later

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<sup>49</sup>Interview with Turner, May 1993.

<sup>50</sup>Oxfam, "Primary Environmental Care: A Practical Approach to Dealing with Poverty and the Environment," mimeo, August 1991.

<sup>51</sup>Interview with Turner, May 1993.

elaborated in a book entitled *No Time to Waste: Poverty and the Global Environment*, published only a month before the Conference.<sup>52</sup> The book could have only limited influence on the proceedings because of its late publication, but it nonetheless affected Oxfam's capacity to influence. The agency's preoccupation with finishing the book had a significant opportunity cost; Myers and Davidson could not adequately attend to PrepCom business, NGO networking, or spend time lobbying officials as forcefully as ActionAid was able because of the deadline pressure imposed by head office. These activities, Myers argued, might have meant greater capacity for influence for the agency.

The main Canadian NGO publications were the CPCU "primers" for the PrepComs. Designed by Bernstein to help organize NGOs (rather than to influence the delegation directly), these detailed how NGOs might meet with delegation members, present their proposals, and attend the preparatory sessions.<sup>53</sup> It is also noteworthy that Canadian NGOs were involved in the preparation of Canada's national report on its own environmental issues and priorities; Elizabeth May and Johannah Bernstein, in conjunction with Dan Smith of the Native Council of Canada and Lorraine Brooke of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, were responsible for pushing the inclusion of more controversial domestic environmental issues in the final document.<sup>54</sup>

(b) *Raising Public Awareness.* Other parts of the activity around the PrepComs were attempts to raise public interest. In the spring of 1992, later criticized for being too late a date, the CPCU made money available for local groups to undertake public education projects on a broad range of issues relating to UNCED. In the end, relatively little publicity work was undertaken in comparison with Britain,<sup>55</sup> partly because the groups involved in the CPCU were wrapped in the official preparatory process. In Britain, however, where the focus of UNEP-UK's program was specifically on raising public awareness, there was much greater activity. UNEP-UK's programme involved (1) a pre-and-post-Bergen Conference meeting for

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<sup>52</sup>Oxfam, "Oxfam's Action Agenda on Poverty and the Environment," briefing no. 2, January 1992; and Joan Davidson and Dorothy Myers, with Manab Chakraborty, *No Time to Waste: Poverty and the Global Environment*, Oxford: Oxfam, 1992.

<sup>53</sup>Bernstein, *Canadian Primer for PrepCom IV*, 1992:29-31.

<sup>54</sup>"CPCU Involvement in Canada's National Report," in *Rio-Watch Canada*, vol. 1, no. 1, July-August 1991, (pp. 1, 11).

<sup>55</sup>Bernstein, *Canadian Primer for PrepCom IV*, 1992:7-8.

some 100 NGOs, with a report later submitted to the DoE; (2) a conference organized jointly with the World Development Movement to explore the costs anticipated for sustainable development;<sup>56</sup> (3) a conference organized with the Global Environment Research Centre and the UNA on the need for institutional reform; (4) a series of roundtable meetings with industry, NGOs, unions, and academics on the topic of industrial and commercial innovation and sustainable development; and (5) a two-day conference with over 200 NGOs, called *Our Agenda for UNCED*, designed to focus on the environmental and developmental priorities for UNCED.<sup>57</sup>

Other public awareness raising efforts involved lobbying Parliament in both countries. In October 1990, members of the CPCU steering committee organized a task force with the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Environment to look into holding public consultations on UNCED,<sup>58</sup> although these and other parliamentary efforts came to nought. ActionAid and WDM had rather more luck in the UK; there had been briefings to sympathetic MPs and a number of questions were subsequently posed in the House of Commons. Especially prior to the 199<sup>2</sup>~~1~~ general election, Labour MPs had been keen to make use of NGOs in their own campaign against the government, and NGOs in turn made use of their sympathetic connections with Ann Clywd, the shadow development minister, and Ian Smith, the shadow environment minister.

By the time that June 1992 rolled around, NGDOs in both countries had, in some measure, made their presence felt. Their traditional "outsider" activities (public rallies, parliamentary work, letter-writing) were noticeably less pronounced than in earlier campaigns, however. In Britain, where access to the official "insider" process remained relatively circumscribed, it is interesting that comparatively more attention continued to be paid to the outsider realm of conferences and rallies, although even these were tightly linked to the official agenda. Once at Rio, however, many NGOs would abandon the official agenda altogether.

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<sup>56</sup>See the proceedings of the conference, published as: WDM, Robert Wilkinson (editor), *Costing the Earth: Striking the Global Bargain at the 1992 Earth Summit*, London: World Development Movement, 1991.

<sup>57</sup>For more detail of UNEP-UK's activities, see: UNEP-UK, Koy Thomson (editor and compiler), *The UK NGO Agenda for the Earth Summit*, UNEP-UK National Committee 1992 "Earth Summit" Report, Executive Summary: 28 February 1992.

<sup>58</sup>Canada, House of Commons, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Environment*, Chair, David MacDonald, issue no. 63, 13 December 1990.

(c) *Lobbying at the Conference.* In order to understand this shift of focus, it is important to describe the backdrop to the event. Protected by stiff security, the official conference was held at Rio Centro, on the city's outskirts, while some 40 km away, the Global Forum was set aside for NGO activities. Some 400,000 people passed under its gates, and some 15,000 NGO representatives, (including those with the 1,420 or so organizations officially accredited), were on hand, all debating, networking, and preparing alternative resolutions. In comparison, only a small number of organizations were actually involved in lobbying official delegations at Rio Centro, and fewer still were development specialists rather than environmentalists. There are a number of explanations for this division of activity on site: one reason was that travel between the two centres involved a torturous one to two-hour bus trip, which for Southern representatives was also prohibitively expensive. CPCU member Elizabeth May complained that few of the Canadian NGOs were present at Rio Centro even though they had been lobbying for years for this chance to be closer to the deliberations; only 16 or so NGO representatives actually attended the daily debriefing meetings headed by Charest.<sup>59</sup> A second impediment was the high level of security at Rio in comparison to the PrepComs, which meant that NGOs had much greater difficulty gaining access to delegation members in meeting rooms or corridors, or attending even the relatively open "formal" meetings of the conference. In an issue of *CrossCurrent*, one observer noted that,

This time, the best NGO lobbyists have barely set foot at Rio Centro. They've been too occupied organizing demonstrations or negotiating the NGO treaties at the other end of the city at the Global Forum. ... Even if they do come to the Conference, they find the same difficulties encountered by the journalists here: high levels of security and a lack of adequate space to meet and talk with delegates ... Yet, most importantly, compared to the negotiations at PrepCom IV, the meetings underway in Rio have been hermetically sealed to NGOs.<sup>60</sup>

Against this difficult background, the Canadian contingent was nonetheless again prominent among the gathered NGOs. Under the energetic coordination of Bernstein, the CPCU carried out a highly organized lobbying and monitoring program at Rio Centro. Reminiscent of the efforts of the NGO team at the World Food Conference 18 years earlier, the CPCU published

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<sup>59</sup>Interview with Elizabeth May, one-time CPCU steering group member and Director of Survival International Canada, Ottawa, 13 October 1992.

<sup>60</sup>François Coûtu, "Mais où sont donc les ONG?," in *CrossCurrents*, 6 June 1992 (translated with permission). *CrossCurrents* is an NGO newspaper published periodically -- at the PrepComs, UNCED, and during the follow-up -- by CONGO, the Planning Committee for UNCED of the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Status with ECOSOC.

a primer for UNCED, organized daily briefings with Minister Charest, set up daily strategy meetings for Canadian NGOs, jointly organized with the Canadian delegation a large-scale meeting for 150 NGOs and Charest, prepared a daily report summarizing Canadian official and NGO activity, jointly published a daily Earth Summit Bulletin (which a number of official delegations transmitted back to their own governments in lieu of daily reports), and gave frequent briefings to journalists (70 Canadian media representatives were present).<sup>61</sup> The five NGO members on the delegation worked throughout the proceedings both to inform their counterparts of Canadian deliberations, and to advise the delegation.

On the British delegation to Rio, even though there were now not one, but ten non-governmental observers, access to information on the negotiations became more difficult than it had been at the PrepComs. The NGOs who were part of this observer group (including ActionAid and Oxfam) admittedly had access to some of the official meetings and did meet daily with the British delegation,<sup>62</sup> but these were largely information meetings rather than consultations. In comparison to the PrepCom meetings, NGOs were not called upon to help the delegation, and Toni and others felt that the inclusion of the observer group was designed to improve the government's image rather than to have them involved in the substantive negotiations.<sup>63</sup> Myers reported that access to documents was often difficult,<sup>64</sup> and Jackie Roddick, a member of Scottish environmental organizations present at Rio, said that the press releases published by the Brazilian delegation were often more informative than the supposedly confidential British delegation meetings held with NGOs.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, when at the end of the conference PM Major announced Britain's initiatives to support UNCED, including a mass meeting of British NGOs planned for the following year, NGOs were not even informed ahead of time.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>Johannah Bernstein, *CPCU Report on Canadian Government and NGO Participation at United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)*, 25 June 1992, (pp. 1-2).

<sup>62</sup>Two industry representatives were among the 10 observers, as well as two from local government bodies.

<sup>63</sup>A further problem was that participation of NGOs was uneven. Many of those who had been involved at the working level during the PrepComs were replaced on the Rio observer team by their more high profile, but less experienced, senior officials. Koy Thomson, for example, was replaced by IIED President Richard Sandbrook.

<sup>64</sup>Interview with Myers, May 1993.

<sup>65</sup>Phone interview with Jackie Roddick, Coordinator of the Scottish Academic Network on Global Environmental Change, University of Glasgow, 7 July 1992.

<sup>66</sup>According to Myers, Major's plan to organize this mass NGO meeting (called "Partnerships for Change") in September 1993 was not what the NGOs would have suggested themselves.

It is important to note that in comparison with Canada, however, the UK voluntary agencies were not very well coordinated to lobby for more information or access at Rio. Felix Dodds of UNA reports being startled at the lack of coordination among UK NGOs at the conference, and so spent the whole of his time arranging inter-NGO and NGO-government meetings. His complaint was that NGDOs' piecemeal approach had meant that the eventual point of focus was the tired and familiar 0.7% GNP goal, an issue which many knew would make little headway, rather than another, more focused subject where change might have been more possible.<sup>67</sup>

Given these obstacles, however, it is striking how much activity was nonetheless going on at Rio Centro. There were Canadian and British NGDOs present on the delegations, in a largely sympathetic environment, who were actively lobbying for changes in their governments' positions. Whether that activity had much influence on either country's position, however, has partly to <sup>do</sup> ~~do~~ with the content of the issues under debate.

## Content

While UNCED dealt with resolutions in five substantial documents, development NGOs concentrated their efforts primarily on Agenda 21. It is important to emphasise that among its 40 chapters, there were already broad areas of agreement between NGDOs and officials, such that the debate on poverty, women, and indigenous peoples (for example) took place on friendly ground.<sup>68</sup> What we find is that the scope for NGO influence was greatest in areas of Agenda 21 where governments had no existing policy, were broadly in favour of the proposals put forward, and had little fear that they would be compelled to commit substantial new resources. It is thus that working on the margins, NGOs may have had their greatest success. This section of the chapter illustrates the argument by dealing with two issues that entailed significant disagreements, and two issues where a more harmonious solution was reached.

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<sup>67</sup>Interview with Felix Dodds, one-time UNCED Coordinator, UNA, London 1 July 1993.

<sup>68</sup>Interview with LeClaire, October 1992. Note, for example, that the poverty chapter went to Rio with only three disputed paragraphs (on finance), and that the chapters on major groups had been similarly uncontentious, (Johnson, *The Earth Summit*, 1993:17).

(a) *Macro-Economic Reform*. The most substantive disagreement between official and voluntary representatives lay with the familiar question of macro-economic reform, a subject which would not, and perhaps could not, be debated at Rio.<sup>69</sup> Including trade and debt provision reforms, this "unsaid agenda"<sup>70</sup> nonetheless constituted a powerful undercurrent to the resolutions on other chapters, and remained at the core of NGO disappointment with the conference's eventual outcome.

On the whole, Canadian NGOs felt that the lack of structural reform would only serve to undermine the success of other resolutions: "Agenda 21 itself is seriously flawed by failing to address the macro-economic questions of debt, structural adjustment and trade, as well as the political issues around human rights, democratization, and demilitarization."<sup>71</sup> The official Canadian position, however, was clear; while accepting the need for a supportive international economic environment to promote sustainable development, Canada would not agree to preferential market access, commodity price stabilization or subsidization of commodity prices and the transfer of technology on non-commercial and preferential terms. These issues were clearly excluded from the agenda.<sup>72</sup> A similar Macro agenda lay behind the efforts of some of the British NGOs, including ActionAid and Oxfam. They stressed that issues such as the debt burden, structural adjustment, reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, and commodity price stabilization could not be divorced from the more visible ecological concerns of the conference.<sup>73</sup> Itemized in *The UK NGO Agenda*, the NGOs' sweeping recommendations for reform were criticized by some British officials on the grounds that they did not fall into the conference's official mandate.<sup>74</sup> As at the WFC 18 years earlier, not all NGO recommendations had been deemed sufficiently "reasonable" to earn a place on the agenda.

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<sup>69</sup>*From Stockholm to Rio*, 1991:4.

<sup>70</sup>McGraw and Lopez, *Making Sense of UNCED*, 1992:14.

<sup>71</sup>Bernstein, *Canadian Primer for PrepCom IV*, 1992:24.

<sup>72</sup>Bernstein and Broughton, *CPCU Daily Report*, issue no. 6.

<sup>73</sup>Thomson, *The UK NGO Agenda*, 1992:13-14, recommendations 22-29.

<sup>74</sup>This NGO report was met with derision in some quarters at the DoE, for example. According to one official, it was a "useless, all-encompassing, naive consensus document" that did not relate to the negotiating texts, arguing that in contrast, *Putting Our House in Order* (a point-form list of recommendations prepared by a group of ENGOs) was a more useful document because it was geared specifically toward policy.

(b) *Finance: Commitments and Institutions.* Unlike macro-economic reform, the question of new financing for UNCED was on the agenda. New financing for Agenda 21, a predictably controversial debate, focused on two related issues: "additionality" (the introduction of new funding), and the question of funding mechanisms (whether or not to use the GEF, or Global Environment Facility). Few industrialized nations were willing to contribute the substantial sums that the Secretariat had estimated: a total of US\$125 billion would have to be put up by the industrialized nations, in addition to US\$500 billion by the developing countries.<sup>75</sup> In a final minute decision on the last day, the wording of the finance chapter was finally resolved: some money was pledged (a relatively minor US\$2.5-3 billion), a re-affirmation of the 0.7% ODA/GNP goal was offered, consideration was given to an Earth Increment to the IDA,<sup>76</sup> relief measures were reviewed, governments agreed to report to the General Assembly on their financial commitments, and no new conditions were attached to the GEF. In terms of financial commitments, NGOs saw this compromise as a lowest common denominator approach.

The official Canadian position on new commitments had been clear; the government felt that the public would not sanction substantial new expenditures, claiming that Canadians, when polled, indicated that existing money ought to be spent in different ways. The government did not pledge to meet its 0.7% goal for ODA in the near future, and while it did promise new money for a series of environmental projects,<sup>77</sup> Canadian NGDOs were predictably unhappy with the outcome.<sup>78</sup> The British government's stance on financial contributions was even more minimalist. Confidential sources indicate that the UK wanted to avoid a "pledging conference" at UNCED, although the government did acknowledge (in line with the US view) that additional and new sources of funding were going to be difficult to avoid. The government was, after all, anxious for public relations reasons that it be able to announce

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<sup>75</sup>McGraw and Lopez, *Making Sense of UNCED*, 1992:24.

<sup>76</sup>The International Development Association, the World Bank's concessionary financing wing, was coming up for renewal in the autumn of 1992. There had been hope that an additional \$5 billion might be pledged as an "Earth Increment" to its next tranche.

<sup>77</sup>In the end, Canada increased its contribution to \$115 million for forest management in developing countries, allocated \$16.6 million to the Brazilian Rainforest Pilot Program, traded \$145 million of ODA debt in Latin America for new environment and development projects, contributed \$25 million to the Global Environment Facility, and along with a number of smaller commitments, pledged \$50 million in humanitarian assistance in Africa, ("Canada's Next Steps" and "Canadian Announcements," information circulars published by Canada in 1992).

<sup>78</sup>Bernstein, *CPCU Report on Canadian Government and NGO Participation*, 1992:7-8.

some kind of long-term commitment at the conference, and it was important that the Treasury had early on indicated that incremental increases would indeed be made available. The UK's preference, however, was that these increases "should be financed from domestic resources and traditional development assistance (ODA) programmes."<sup>79</sup> In the UNEP-UK synthesis, British NGDOs had argued for a different approach; that funds for sustainable development programs should be generated through a combined package of policy changes, not just from the ODA's existing and overstretched sources:

The UK government should take the lead in encouraging the adoption of an integrated and mutually reinforcing approach to the 'resources required for sustainable development' at the Earth Summit. This will require coordinated policies on development assistance, trade, debt, and economic management, to release the maximum possible resources for sustainable development.<sup>80</sup>

In the end, while both Canada and Britain did contribute new money, these funds were not spectacular. The goal of reaching Strong's figure of \$125 billion in additional funding among industrialized nations was hardly touched. Canada's financial commitment had been worked out by the Treasury Board, an agency without any connections to the NGO community, and was firmly set. In Britain, similarly, the limits on new funding had been set by the Treasury and FCO. In neither case were the officials working on policy in control of the amount of funding to be promised; these were political decisions made outside of the official circles in which the NGOs were working. Regardless of the quality of the relationships built up with officials, NGOs could not (and would not have been able to) persuade the government to change its position on finance.

(c) *Poverty*. On a policy issue considered to be within the NGDOs' purview and expertise, on the other hand, voluntary agencies in both countries were far more influential in shaping their delegations' submissions. The chapter on poverty was partly the outcome of intense international NGO efforts very early on in the process, and some felt that this was the area where NGDOs as an international body had made the largest difference.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup>United Kingdom, DoE, *UK Paper on Institutions for Environment and Development*, no. SS1AAD, undated but 1992. This policy generated concern among officials in the ODA that new commitments would thus come out of their existing budget, and that the Treasury, backed by a recalcitrant Cabinet, would in turn not allow further substantial allocations. Strangely perhaps, it was thus that the ODA was the most adamant that no new funding be promised, (interview with Watson, July 1992).

<sup>80</sup>Thomson, *The UK NGO Agenda*, 1992:21, recommendation 83.

<sup>81</sup>Interview with Tim Draimin, CCIC staff member, Ottawa, 19 October 1992.

From early on, NGDOs struggled to make sure that development concerns were not neglected. Throughout the preparatory process, there had been a constant tension between the environmental and developmental agendas; virtually every industrialized country had regarded UNCED as an environment conference and had sent their environment ministers to represent them during negotiations.<sup>82</sup> In efforts to redress the balance, a group of 12 international NGOs had successfully lobbied the UNCED Secretariat in Geneva to add poverty to Agenda 21.<sup>83</sup> It was an important addition, and although the first draft of the chapter was weak,<sup>84</sup> the document was strengthened by further NGO lobbying in later PrepComs. By PrepCom IV, the international group working on the issue reported that about 90% of their proposals had been incorporated,<sup>85</sup> and with the help of Myers, Toni, Johnson, and Thomson, the international group had changed the title, structure, and some of the content of the draft. British NGDOs also reported success in getting their wording into the UK delegation's *revisions* for the chapter, and Gavin Watson argued that their expertise had been particularly helpful in working out the government's position; as Toni explained, "the government wanted *our* language in the poverty chapter." Many felt that without this NGDO activity, the government's development focus overall would have been much weaker.<sup>86</sup> A similar situation was evident in Canada, where many of the final amendments came out of the interdepartmental working group on poverty chaired by CIDA's Barbara Brown, which included CCIC's Peter Padbury and other NGO representatives. The position paper that evolved from these Canadian deliberations in particular eventually found its way to the text of Agenda 21 itself.

Both groups of NGDOs had thus been successful in having wording inserted into their delegations' poverty chapter submissions. It was a significant success because it had involved NGDOs early on in the decision-making process and had further produced tangible policy outcomes, even if the final documents did not carry the desired muscle. What is perhaps more significant, however, was that the NGDOs were successful in keeping a focus on poverty throughout Agenda 21 when the document initially had no chapter on poverty at all.

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<sup>82</sup>McGraw and Lopez, *Making Sense of UNCED*, 1992:42.

<sup>83</sup>Interview with Padbury, October/November 1992.

<sup>84</sup>Bernstein, *Canadian Primer for PrepCom IV*, 1992:24.

<sup>85</sup>Bernstein et al, *Earth Summit Bulletin*, 1992:2.

<sup>86</sup>Interview with Myers, 29 May 1993.

(d) *Institutions and Major Groups*. The chapter on institutions focused on the establishment of the new Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD), and the nine chapters on major groups identified the key players to be involved throughout the implementation of Agenda 21. It is most of all in these chapters that NGOs were accorded something akin to official status on the world stage.

The proposed CSD was to be a new organization under ECOSOC, designed to monitor implementation of Agenda 21's goals and the attainment of the 0.7% oda/GNP target, to promote the Earth Charter, and to take NGO input into account throughout. When the debate over the CSD arose, the official Canadian delegation actually fought for the inclusion of NGOs on the commission. According to its final report, "several delegations ... reiterated that, though NGO input was welcome, the Commission should be primarily an intergovernmental body. ... Canada emphasized that NGO participation was key to the Commission's success as a body."<sup>87</sup> The delegation's support of the CSD won favour with the CPCU, which in turn urged its members to commend the delegation, but also to encourage Canada to push for an even stronger role for voluntary agencies.<sup>88</sup> This commitment to the Commission seemed a genuine one on the part of the Canadian government, and even in private correspondence it "strongly advocated" their role on the Commission.<sup>89</sup>

In Britain, official support for the CSD was much thinner. While NGOs had fully supported some version of the new commission,<sup>90</sup> the government was initially opposed; the conference's "desired results will be achieved more rapidly by improving and strengthening existing institutions, in particular UNEP, and by enhancing co-operation between them. We do not favour setting up new bureaucracy for its own sake, which will serve only to divert valuable resources away from environment and development goals," adding that, "there is no reason to think that any new piece of machinery would perform any better than those which already exist."<sup>91</sup> By PrepCom III, however, there were suggestions that the delegation needed to rethink its position on institutions. There was a growing feeling that "something needed to be done," and that moreover, as the CSD was likely to happen anyway and was

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<sup>87</sup>Issue Report on "Chapter 38: International Institutional Arrangements," in Canada, EA, *Final Reports for the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development*, Autumn 1992.

<sup>88</sup>Bernstein and Broughton, *CPCU Daily Report*, 10 June 1992, issue no. 5.

<sup>89</sup>Telex from the Canadian delegation at UNCED to External Affairs, June 1992.

<sup>90</sup>Thomson, *The UK NGO Agenda*, 1992:40, recommendations 246, 247, and 255.

<sup>91</sup>DoE, *UK paper on institutions*, undated, (para. 2 and 5).

more acceptable than the demand for a new funding body regardless, officials concluded that it would be in Britain's interest to make sure the commission was shaped in the least expensive and least harmful fashion.<sup>92</sup> There is some speculation about the direct cause of this shift in opinion. A senior member of the UK's mission to the UN is credited for organizing the position change during PrepCom IV,<sup>93</sup> and it is likely that he was responding in part to pressures and arguments presented by a small number of NGOs.<sup>94</sup> A critical article had appeared in the *Earth Summit Bulletin*, widely read by delegates, which reported on the activities of the NGO Task Group on Institutions at PrepCom IV (a group which included Jackie Roddick, Vicky Johnson, and Dorothy Myers), which had generated a widely supported petition for a revised CSD. The group had argued that the current plans to turn over the monitoring of Agenda 21 to ECOSOC, a traditionally weak institution, would undermine the potential for the agenda's success. They argued that an open access organization akin to the UN Human Rights Commission might be more appropriate.<sup>95</sup> In a meeting with British NGOs at which these arguments were again presented, the senior official may have been convinced to change his, and the government's, mind on support for the CSD. The UK led the negotiations for a G7 alternative, and the delegation's turnaround was key in persuading other Northern countries to accept a compromise solution.<sup>96</sup> In the end, the CSD was established as an intergovernmental body only, but one which allowed extensive access to NGO observers.

Another set of issues was raised in the chapters on major groups. These chapters called on governments, the UN, and other bodies to increase collaboration with NGOs and other civil society organizations. Canada was strongly in favour of further NGO involvement, particularly of women's organizations and indigenous groups.<sup>97</sup> John Bell and one of his officials, Alison LeClaire, both asserted in separate interviews that the delegation would not

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<sup>92</sup>Interview with Watson, July 1993.

<sup>93</sup>According to Roddick and Watson in interviews during July 1993.

<sup>94</sup>I attempted to reach the official this autumn to confirm the account of his participation, but missed him in a transfer to an African mission.

<sup>95</sup>The group supported Malaysian Ambassador Razali Ismail's Draft Proposal for Working Group III, (A/Conf.151/PC/WGIII/CRP.3), that was based on submissions from Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico, and was later supported by a number of African countries.

<sup>96</sup>Interview and private correspondence with Roddick, by phone on 7 July 1993, and by letter on 14 November 1993.

<sup>97</sup>At PrepCom III, Canada supported two key decisions put forward by NGOs: one was a position prepared by the International Women's Working Group to ensure that women's role was fully recognized; the second decision acknowledged the role of indigenous traditional knowledge and resource management, (Canada, EA, Unclassified report of the Canadian Delegation to PrepCom III, "Non-Governmental Participation," undated).

have been as creative as it was over the major groups chapters without the interventions of Dan Smith of the Native Council of Canada and Mary Smith of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, nor would there have been as fulsome a treatment of women without Myriam Wyman of Women and Environment Education and Development.<sup>98</sup> Barbara Brown, who headed the interdepartmental working group on poverty, shared this conviction, arguing that NGOs were particularly successful in influencing the government's position on poverty and on women.<sup>99</sup> In the end, Canadian NGOs had no complaint with their government's support of these chapters.

British NGOs had a similar set of goals. On the involvement of major groups, both within and outside of Agenda 21, they encouraged the government to include participants from business, trade unions, environment and development groups, youth, and local government in its own domestic consultations, stressing "the development of mechanisms for encouraging dialogue, consensus-building, cooperation and partnership in design and implementation of environment and development policy" at all levels.<sup>100</sup> Britain agreed to Agenda's 21's major groups chapters, and while it was silent on the extent to which NGOs would be included in future decision-making, it announced an enormous NGO conference, held in September 1993. Aware the NGO participation was among UNCED's most lauded accomplishments, Britain had made sure it was seen on board the non-governmental train.

#### NGO INFLUENCE

After June 14th, the delegations to Rio went home with mixed feelings. In many respects, of course, the conference had been an enormous success. The greatest number of heads of state ever gathered for a UN conference had successfully produced serious "documents of intent" about environmental and developmental change. It could perhaps only be expected that the documents were in some places weak; there were no legal obligations inherent in the signing of the agreements, and no significant amounts of money were pledged. Governments felt that a political obligation had been generated, the Earth Summit had not been stalemated, and progress had occurred.

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<sup>98</sup>Interviews with Bell, November 1992 and with LeClaire, October 1992.

<sup>99</sup>Interview with Brown, October 1992.

<sup>100</sup>Thomson, *The UK NGO Agenda*, 1992:7.

Yet for NGOs, the snail-like version of UN progress was frustrating and as many gathered to review their performance afterwards, doubts mixed with their much-lauded success. On the Canadian side, while there was a broad consensus that NGOs had directly influenced Canada's approach to Agenda 21, some felt that overall the "CPCU impact was minimal -- all process and no substance. In the end, policy was formed outside of NGO efforts."<sup>101</sup> Some of the more cynical members like Grenville-Wood suggested that while the Canadian stance on Agenda 21 appeared very forward looking, when the crunch came, in terms of financial resources or national interests, Canada "played very close to the chest."<sup>102</sup> On the other hand, the CCIC's Peter Padbury was more enthusiastic in his assessment; "given the historical record, the CPCU was a success. We moved from being critics to co-creators of policies which require community cooperation for implementation. ... This trend toward co-creation is an international one, and is growing."<sup>103</sup> He and others argue that this kind of success is nonetheless relevant and important, though incremental and marginal. Many of the Canadian officials agreed, and credited NGOs with pushing the parameters of the debate further than would have been the case without their intervention.<sup>104</sup> NGOs had indeed moved the Canadian position, if only by small steps.

In Britain, similarly controversial assessments were being made. Pessimistic accounts were offered by those like Fiona Reynolds at the CPRE, who also believes that NGOs influenced the British position at Rio only at its margins.<sup>105</sup> Part of the marginality was due to the government's relatively closed policy-making system (in comparison with the Canadian), but also to the choice of tactics by most NGOs, which emphasized public education work rather than the parallel textual preparations organized by the Canadians. The scope for building up the needed working relationships with individual officials was thus more limited. A more optimistic assessment, however, notes the success of the voluntary contingent in having their wording inserted in the British texts, in having NGO representatives present on and around the delegations, and perhaps also in convincing the delegation to change its stance on the CSD.

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<sup>101</sup>Bernstein and Broughton, *Final Report*, 1992:8-9, Appendix III, pp. 2-3.

<sup>102</sup>Interview with Geoffrey Grenville-Wood, one-time member of the CPCU, Ottawa, 26 October 1992.

<sup>103</sup>Interview with Padbury, October/November 1992.

<sup>104</sup>Interview with LeClaire, October 1992.

<sup>105</sup>Interview with Reynolds, May 1993.

These contending assessments point to a broader issue. Is the NGO focus on national policies the most important part of their activity? Is their influence on the world stage perhaps linked more closely to the kinds of networking and public awareness work carried out in venues like the Global Forum instead? Disillusionment with the NGDOs' government-focus struck some NGOs early on: "just as UNCED entered its most critical phase -- the Earth Summit -- many NGOs had already given up on the official proceedings and put off their lobbying efforts vis-a-vis country delegates in order to negotiate their own global treaties" at Global Forum.<sup>106</sup> Even some on the government side have questioned the relevance of the NGOs' focus on the wording of UN texts. CIDA's Kendel Rust suggests that while this kind of document-based incrementalism may be worthwhile, the really exciting thing coming out of UNCED has been the increasing network of official and voluntary contacts, globalized information-sharing, community level exchanges, and the growing treaty process among NGOs.<sup>107</sup> Others like Padbury disagree, and argue that it makes sense to pursue an international agenda with national delegations provided the relations with one's own government are good, because "national policy is made along international lines." Certainly, the interactions among NGO and official representatives during the PrepCom process emphasized the importance this national-international link. The UK's Thomson and Toni, for example, had frequent contact with members of many other countries' delegations, including the Canadian, and during PrepCom IV, "the CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), the British, the U.S. and the Nordic delegations regularly held briefing sessions that were open to all NGOs. Members of EC delegations participated in several EC briefings for NGOs. The G77 (block of the developing countries) also held question and answer sessions for NGOs."<sup>108</sup> In this tightly interactive realm, many saw the NGO-delegation link to be an important part of the policy process.

Given these controversies over the assessment of NGDO success, a convincing argument might nonetheless be made that NGDOs did make a real mark on their delegations' positions at Rio, depending on the issues under debate, the NGOs' skills and expertise, and their access to the decision-making process. The most tangible direct successes were the initial inclusion of the poverty chapter and subsequent wording in later versions; an emphasis on women,

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<sup>106</sup>McGraw and Lopez, *Making Sense of UNCED*, 1992:46.

<sup>107</sup>Interview with Kendal Rust, Director of the Program Support Unit, NGO division, CIDA, Ottawa, 5 November 1992.

<sup>108</sup>Bichsel, *NGO Political Participation*, 1992:20.

indigenous peoples, and the environment-development link throughout; support for the CSD; and in a omnipresent manner, support for the inclusion of NGO participation in the activities to follow. Yet while some NGOs may have contributed to the wording of the major group and poverty chapters and to the general mood of the conference, there was (as in Rome) little movement on the hard issues of finance and macro-economic reform. In the long-term, however, the inclusion of NGOs in Agenda 21 has perhaps set an even more important precedent: "Rio represented a push forward, a raised profile, and an added recognition by governments and international organisations."<sup>109</sup> In Canada, the conference "made NGO consultation a necessary element for legitimacy of government position-taking,"<sup>110</sup> such that officials could no longer credibly generate policy on environmental or developmental issues without some form of public consultation. In Britain, too, as the ODA's Turner emphasized, government decision-making *in areas concerning NGO expertise* can no longer be made without reference to NGO participation. Voluntary agencies are now considered "stakeholders;" as Burke argues, UNCED has not only highlighted the important and complex relationship between NGOs and governments, it has also institutionalized the involvement of voluntary groups. While "involvement" alone does not mean influence, it has been a step closer toward insider status.

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<sup>109</sup>Johan Holmberg, Koy Thomson, and Lloyd Timberlake, *Facing the Future: Beyond the Earth Summit*, London: IIED, 1993, (p. 19). For example, ECOSOC is currently undertaking a review of the participation of NGOs in UN activities after UNCED (possibly to include more formal consultations), and in preparations for the 1995 World Summit for Social Development, accreditation for NGOs has remained as open as for Rio. See: UN, Non-Governmental Liaison Service, *Go-Between*, no. 40, April 1993, (p.1); and no. 42, October 1993, (p. 20).

<sup>110</sup>Bernstein and Broughton, *Final Report*, 1992:8-9. Charest subsequently called for a "projet de société" to call the major sectors of Canadian society together to discuss the implications of Agenda 21, a multi-stakeholder process carried out through the National Roundtable on the Environment and Economy.

## CHAPTER EIGHT: ARGUMENTS FOR THE INCREASING BUT LIMITED INFLUENCE OF NGOS

This final chapter returns to the main themes presented in the thesis, and pulls together a set of conclusions about the comparative influence of NGOs in Canada and Britain. The main conclusion is that NGOs have earned an increasing but nonetheless limited influence over policy, largely because they have become essential parts of the international aid machine. This conclusion is drawn from at least three (by now familiar) arguments made in the preceding pages: one, that both the activity and influence of NGOs are indeed increasing; two, that certain "elements of influence" are, however, more important than others in determining the extent of that influence; and three, that the Canadian and British circumstances are sufficiently different to allow Canadian NGOs a greater scope for influence than their British counterparts.

In adopting an approach taken from policy community writing, the thesis has illustrated its utility in dealing with these kinds of voluntary groups and relationships; a relatively neglected area of analytical research. The approach served both as an organizing principle for the thesis and as a source for the analytical headings used within. Chapters three and five thus concentrated on the history of NGO interest in, and capacity for, advocacy work; and chapters two and four focused on the constraints and pressures existing among bureaucrats charged with organizing the policy-making process -- these chapters described the broad *policy community* in which voluntary and governmental actors had created a changing relationship. In the case-study chapters (six and seven), the thesis narrowed its focus to look at the detailed interaction of two *policy networks* formed around specific events. The approach thus strengthened the thesis in focusing on detailed interactions at the meso-level, suggesting elements for the categorization of influence, and providing a two-level *community* and *network* analysis.

## THE CENTRAL CONCLUSIONS

Based on this approach to the history of NGO-government interaction, the thesis has drawn out at least three major themes. Have NGOs indeed been successful in influencing government policy? If so, under what conditions has that been possible?

**Argument 1: Over time, there has been an increase in both NGO activity and influence**

(a) *Activity*. The thesis has consistently argued that forces on both the official and non-governmental sides of the fence have increased their interaction over policy issues. On the one hand, there has been an increase in the size of the communities: some 350 organizations in Canada and 361 in Britain are primarily concerned with overseas aid; and a *minimum* constituency of 76,000 paid and voluntary staff in Canada and 21,000 in Britain<sup>1</sup> is keenly interested in their activities. While there has always been concern about the low level of public awareness generally, this growing population of agencies and supporters has nonetheless kept the aid program on the agenda.

There has also been an increase in the private and public income of NGOs. Over a 21 year period (1969-90), NGO expenditure in Canada rose from US\$26 million to US\$226 million (an increase in real terms of 243%), and in Britain, from US\$40.3 million to US\$327 million (an increase in real terms of 145%).<sup>2</sup> Moreover, it is worthwhile reiterating that some 12% of the total aid contribution by Britons is currently funnelled via NGOs (figure 5.2); and in Canada, the number is even higher, about 18% (figure 3.4). Within this expenditure, an increasing percentage has been garnered from official sources (currently about one-third in the UK, and one-half in Canada). These growing resources have meant that NGOs have not only had greater scope for development work (both on the ground and in the policy realm), but also that they have become more closely linked with the government agencies that fund them. In 1974, CIDA's funding of NGOs to Rome was highly conspicuous; by 1992, this kind of

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<sup>1</sup>See notes for Appendix Two for an explanation of these figures.

<sup>2</sup>These figures are drawn from the same sources used in figure 5.5. The percentage increase in real terms was derived from OECD deflator figures.

support had become the norm in Canada, was adopted by Britain, and had become part of official behaviour throughout the OECD.

An additional element has been the change in the motivations of NGOs to affect larger policy issues, and the willingness of governments to listen. Some of the most prominent organizations are taking a renewed interest in advocacy work; partly for ethical reasons, partly because changes in the international environment (the debt crisis in particular) have forced a reassessment of their activities, and partly because their Southern partners are pushing them to change direction. Policy work has thus become one of the development imperatives for the 1990s, and many are devoting increased time and resources toward developing their capacity in the field. At the same time, there has also been a change over the years in the level of government activity devoted to interacting with voluntary agencies. NGO roles in relation to government have proliferated as they have become *needed* parts of the aid machinery: as complementary aid providers, contractors, administrators and coordinators, experts, political proxies, allies, and advisors on policy. It is worthwhile to point out just how remarkable this change is: in 1974, while NGOs were acknowledged as sideline participants in the parallel conference process, there was little recognition that they had any more substantive role in policy formulation or implementation. By 1992, the situation had changed: NGOs were seen to possess critical expertise about the issues under debate, and it was acknowledged that many of the conference's resolutions could not be implemented without their support. In Canada, they were well funded and extensively involved in parts of the government's preparation work; and in Britain, they were funded to unprecedented (although comparatively modest) levels, and were consulted at least intermittently.

(b) *Influence*. Yet in arguing that there has been an increase in activity (the "input" to the process), can it also be argued that NGOs have gained an equally greater measure of influence over policy (its "output")? The link between activity and influence is not straightforward, of course, but the thesis has made a number of arguments designed to support this hypothesis.

First, the content of the issues under debate has altered over the course of the years in a manner which emphasizes the relevance of NGO contributions. The increased public salience of issues which were traditionally seen as "low" on the list of national priorities (such as the

environment and overseas development) means that the expertise of NGOs has become increasingly relevant. Remember that while there had been only two heads of state in Stockholm in 1972, some 180 attended the Rio conference, evidence of its greater public salience and hence its "higher" policy role. Given the history of civil society groups' involvement in the environmental movement (which allowed development NGOs to piggyback on the proceedings), as well as current official concern with "good government" practice at home, it was clear that UNCED *could not* have legitimately taken place without NGO participation. One illustration is the somewhat startling assertion from NGOs and officials in both countries that the government *wanted NGO wording* in the official texts of Agenda 21 in order to legitimate the process and its outcome. NGO expertise had, moreover, earned them the right to participate early in the process, one of the more important factors in determining the likelihood of influence. As these traditionally "low" policy issues have risen on the public agenda in either country, other national circumstances shaping NGO involvement have also altered. In Canada, for example, the Mulroney Government had based its early policy-making on a "policy of differentiation" from its Liberal predecessors, a process which emphasized public consultation. The failure of *The Green Plan* to consult adequately, however, had become an embarrassment prior to UNCED (just when the Government was facing other domestic troubles at home), thus forcing a re-doubled effort to involve NGOs in the process. Similarly, in Britain, the rise of green politics had elevated "the environment" as a high *political* issue, to the point where the Prime Minister himself was cajoled into an unprecedented tête-à-tête with a roundtable of NGOs preparing for UNCED. This high-level consultation with the voluntary community has been particularly unusual for the UK, where the policy-making process has been notoriously insular. What seems to have changed over the intervening years, then, are some of the definitions of high and low policy. In Rome, few of the issues debated were open to NGO intervention because the debates were seen in high-level interstate terms only. Even though the practice of development work had normally been seen to be low policy work, the public pledges made in an international conference were seen to be strictly high policy. By 1992, the situation was different because the salience of these policy issues had risen on the international stage, carrying along with it a group of NGOs into the higher policy realm.

Second, the extension of the role of the state into larger policy realms have meant that NGOs have also been needed to take care of the low policy, low salience aspects of an extended state: administration, coordination, and service delivery, among other roles. This day-to-day dependency has meant that NGOs have increased influence over these policies in particular, but it has also meant they have had greater access to decision-makers, and hence greater opportunities for influence in certain policy realms. NGO access to these decision-making channels depends on whether their expertise is considered relevant, whether there exists any kind of routine institution whereby their opinions were sought (liaison committees, working groups, advisory boards and such like), and whether there exists any normative or procedural imperative to consult with non-governmental organizations. In the case of the World Food Conference, Canadian and British activists tried to meet with both working level and senior officials over the preceding summer, but neither were particularly successful. Even though in each case the official aid agencies were sympathetic (indeed, CIDA directly funded the NGO lobby), the governments' positions were decided in other fora; CIDA had little input on the Canadian position and the ODA was hampered by its tense relationship with the Treasury and MAFF. Although it is noteworthy that MAFF organized a precedent-setting mass consultation with NGOs the week prior to Rome, and that the Canadian government contemplated having NGOs on board the delegation, there was simply too little precedent for NGO involvement in policy in 1974. In the case of UNCED, however, NGOs were more closely involved with the initial decision-making stages: members of the CPCU were involved on ten of the working committees, were part of the PrepCom delegations, and were in close contact with their official counterparts; and in Britain, while NGOs were not significantly involved at the working level, they had much greater influence at the PrepComs through Koy Thomson and through their own relationships with individuals members on the delegation. In both cases and in stark contrast to the situation in Rome, the channels for NGO access had opened up at the early policy stages. Even though this access began to be closed off at the conference itself (because of tightened security, problems of travel, and a re-establishment of the state-centred mood of the proceedings), this early and relatively open access had borne fruit in the final wording of Agenda 21.

Third, NGOs have also increased in influence as the agenda begins to take on *new* issues. Where there is no existing policy (and hence no traditional "high" or "low" labels), NGOs

have an additional advantage in areas where their expertise is deemed relevant. At UNCED, for example, note that NGOs and the Canadian and British governments agreed on many of the issues under debate at UNCED; LeClaire suggests that in Canada they shared many of the same broad objectives,<sup>3</sup> and in Britain similarly, both parties agreed on significant areas of policy. When policy is "up for grabs," NGOs have had greater scope for influence.

In most instances, of course, the determination of influence is not clear or is mediated by other factors. Was it relevant, for example, that the wording in Agenda 21 was changed, given that there is no binding international commitment to its promises? Did the increase in the Canadian food allocation in 1974 really count, given that NGOs were far more concerned with trade issues than food aid, and that the government might well have contributed a million tons regardless? Furthermore, in looking at broader policy issues, how indeed could one measure whether NGOs had made any impact on the British policy to support structural adjustment, for example, or had in any way influenced trading practices in Canada? It is thus important to underline the differences in the level of change envisioned: changes in the environment in which agendas are conceived, changes in the agenda itself, and changes in particular policies. Success in one may not entail success in another, and the debates over advocacy work within the community often touch on these distinctions. Under what conditions are NGOs most likely to be successful? As we will see below, success is dependent on a host of inter-related elements, including the level of change envisaged.

**Argument 2: Some factors have seemed more important than others in determining NGO influence**

Although many "elements of influence" are involved in the analysis and many overlap, a reasonable conclusion would emphasize three. NGOs appear to wield the most influence when (1) an issue has some measure of public and/or institutional *salience* and has thus become part of the tabled agenda; (2) the issue falls under the heading of *low policy* and the NGOs' expertise is seen to be relevant and reasonable; and (3) NGOs are accorded privileged *access* to the decision-making system on the grounds of their legitimate involvement in the

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<sup>3</sup>Interview with LeClaire, October 1992.

issue and the success of their insider strategies. Of course, other elements (such as funding dependency or conditionality) are important, but are secondary to the broader assessment.

(a) *High Salience*. One of the most important prerequisites for influence is salience; there can be no change generated in government policy if an issue is not on "the agenda." Whether a formal agenda is involved (as in the UN conferences) or whether a less formal set of policies is under scrutiny (which a government is willing to consider or support), it is clear that few debates can begin without an initial agreement on what is to be discussed. In instances where an issue deemed important by NGOs is not "accessible" for debate (such as reform of international trading practices or the Bretton Woods system), public pressure must be raised in order to put the item on the table in the first place, obviously a difficult task.

It is in this way that changes in particular policies can be made only once an issue has reached the agenda, and that agendas can in turn be shaped (with greater difficulty) by public pressure. One of the problems in getting these issues onto the agenda, of course, is the low salience of development issues generally. This lack of support has been important for both ODA/CIDA and for NGOs; in both countries, the public has shown a benign humanitarianism, and has only occasionally been spurred to action when the media broadcasts news of disaster and famine. When cuts to oda were being made in the 1980s, for example, only a "deafening silence" was heard in Canada; and from the British government, warnings were issued that the public was "more against than for aid." The effort to keep existing aid programs on the table has been difficult enough, and has in some cases forced an alliance between the marginalized ODA/CIDA departments and their allied NGOs. It is thus noteworthy that in worrying about the 1992 cuts to CIDA's budget (and clout), Massé had urged voluntary organizations to suspend criticism and participate in a needed "joint effort."

The difficulty of getting North-South issues onto the agenda is even greater given the still lower public interest which exists over some of the specific campaigns undertaken by voluntary agencies. Take the case of the World Food Conference: there was high public concern over the famine conditions that had led to the conference and in support, the Canadian government had been especially keen to make a mark in Rome. In this rather open milieu, NGOs had attempted to introduce a whole range of other issues onto the agenda,

including trade reform, a debate which had recently been discussed during the UN's NIEO negotiations. NGOs tried to raise public awareness through their letter-writing and media campaigns, but were simply unable to elicit sufficient interest in anything other than the "filibuster" and the "food cartel" threats. These may have provided the media with opportunities for embarrassing the government, but they generated little movement toward the larger NGO agenda. In the case of the food aid pledge, however, we saw that the high volume of letters received by the Prime Minister's office encouraged the Cabinet to take on a higher commitment than had originally been contemplated. In cases like food aid where an issue is already on the agenda, outsider strategies have sometimes successfully raised the salience of an issue and hence contributed to policy change.

Where the salience of a set of issues is already high, there has been much more institutional room for NGO intervention. The high profile of environmental issues, meant that all NGOs were given wide-ranging access to UNCED preparatory meetings; significant funding was made available for NGO public awareness-raising; a special tri-corner departmental system was set up which opened access for NGOs in Canada; and even in Britain, where a more muted approach to the conference was adopted, the delegation took the unusual move to include NGOs in the delegation. The high visibility of "the environment" as an issue had opened space for NGO activity on development issues as well, thus allowing them to integrate a further set of concerns into the formal agenda: an emphasis on poverty alleviation and concern for the environment-development link.

(b) *Low Policy*. When an issue falls under the heading of "low policy," NGOs are also likely to be more influential. As we have seen, part of the reason is that there has been a policy vacuum around many low issues, even though some have subsequently risen in international prominence. In this vacuum, NGOs credited with having appropriate expertise are *needed* to help quickly generate policy; hence the situation at UNCED, when British officials (under tremendous time constraint to deal with a multitude of issues) were seen to duck out of negotiation meetings to ask NGO representatives what ought to be included in the chapters on poverty, indigenous peoples, or women in development.

Another reason for NGO influence on these issues is that "low policy" has generally been undertaken by weaker members of the bureaucracy, the agencies with whom NGOs have historically had stronger relations. In cases where the ODA or CIDA has jurisdiction over a set of policy decisions (country focus planning, basic human needs, development education, administrative arrangements), then NGOs' capacity to influence is comparatively higher. That persuasiveness becomes particularly strong in instances where the NGO is seen to be the department's ally in the face of public or intra-governmental conflict. This notion of allied effort is important, for NGOs considered to be on the inside are more likely to have their suggestions deemed "reasonable" and "relevant." Note the assessment of the External Affairs official who reported on the NGOs' 1974 pre-Rome conference in Ottawa: the report divided the unreasonable "moralizers" (the majority) from the reasonable "pragmatists" (the minority, which held views more consonant with the Government's), and then claimed that the conference's majority findings were part of an unrepresentative fringe! Indeed, throughout the interviews, the use of the term "reasonableness" was surprisingly and frequently used as one of the principal criteria for including or excluding NGO submissions. In some cases, it has been clear that it is not so much the nature of the issue which rendered its proponent "unreasonable," but rather the manner in which it was presented (insider vs. outsider), the solutions (if any) proposed for it, and the extent of responsibility ascribed to the government for solving it.

An NGO's viewpoint may also be dismissed if the organization is seen to be taking positions on matters outside of its recognized areas of expertise. NGOs' credibility (their access-ticket to decision-makers) is dependent on this expertise, but it has rarely been fungible. Aid policy is clearly an issue relevant to NGOs; they have a long history of involvement with grassroots development, and at home they command a substantial amount of time and income from domestic constituencies. Structural adjustment is not such a clear issue, however. While it is acknowledged that NGOs have a clear claim as witnesses to its effects (and have therefore been invited to help the World Bank give SAP a "human face"), there has been little room for more fundamental critiques of the politics surrounding SAP in the first place. NGO expertise has rarely been considered relevant in international economic debates.

(c) *Privileged Access.* The last primary element of influence is access. For many issues and for many years, NGOs have had very little access to the most relevant decision-making bodies, and so have depended on outsider tactics to raise the salience of the issue they wish addressed. This traditional focus on outsider strategies explains why the attention of Parliament has often been sought, even though it has traditionally been seen as a weak policy-making body. There is evidence that parliamentary committees on North-South issues in both countries have been able to introduce items onto the government's agenda and have eventually managed to produce concrete policy change. Canadian NGOs' longterm cultivation of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, for instance, may have been directly responsible for the Mulroney government's partial untying of aid in 1986; and in Britain, it is clear that concern voiced in Parliament over aid to Ethiopia in the mid-1980s actually brought down ODA Minister Tim Raisin. The rising prominence of the parliamentary committee system may further bode well for NGOs; in attempting to introduce new issues onto the agenda, Parliament has sometimes abetted the NGO agenda.

In recent years, however, there has also been a significant increase in access to decision-making in both countries. Based on NGOs' legitimacy and their success in undertaking insider strategies, this opening of privileged access to NGOs has greatly improved their capacity to influence policy. First and foremost, NGOs have earned a measure of access because governments *need* them. Take the example of UNCED, where a relationship was cultivated with NGOs both because they wielded expertise in areas where the government had little or no expertise of its own, and because governments knew that NGOs would be critical to the implementation of Agenda 21, and so *had* to be involved early on if the plan was to succeed. Governments have needed NGOs for other reasons as well, of course, such as the parochial interests of CIDA in funding NGOs to attend the World Food Conference, or the FCO's "use" of NGO information from restricted countries like Cambodia.

Besides the degree of government need for NGOs, agencies have also gained access and legitimacy by way of precedent; an assumption that NGOs *belong* somewhere in the decision-making process. While there was little precedent for consulting NGOs prior to the World Food Conference, the Canadian government subsequently did make real efforts to involve NGOs in its preparations for international conferences, partly because of the efforts of the

Canadian NGOs active in Rome. Their example spread, and British NGOs involved with the newly established ICDA also began to set a precedent for "legitimate" NGO attendance and lobbying in later conferences.

As the legitimacy of the NGO community has risen and opened access for them, thus multiplying the *opportunity* for insider activity, so too has there been a rise in NGOs' *use* of insider tactics. Consider the example of the Canadian NGO efforts at UNCED: the CPCU was designed to dovetail with the composition of the delegation, its working groups paralleled (and were partly integrated with) the government's working groups, and its set of "primers" were essentially tactical insider guides to the process of PrepCom and conference negotiations. NGOs have become aware that agencies which are better versed in these tactics and know the workings, idiosyncrasies, and timing of the system are more likely to be influential in the shaping of particular policies. As noted earlier, it is significant that in both countries a series of NGO meetings and workshops have been held recently to increase the level of this type of insider lobbying skill. Moreover, it is significant that the adoption of insider strategies has a disarming effect on the officials involved; it implies that controversial and embarrassing tactics have been dropped in favour of a more "reasonable" approach to an issue, even in instances where the NGOs' criticisms remain substantive. Insider strategies thus mean that NGOs are taken more seriously, as in CIDA and Inter Pares' work on the country framework for Bangladesh, or in Koy Thomson's participation on the official British delegation. Further, the pursuit of an insider strategy allows NGO and government staff to spend significant amounts of "personalized" time together. The importance of this contact was frequently underscored in the course of the interviews with UNCED participants; the building of trust between one-time adversaries had a calming effect which allowed NGOs a more serious audience. As Koy Thomson emphasized, it was not the NGO presence at official delegation meetings *per se* that mattered, but the personal interactions in the corridors outside.

**Argument 3: Canadian NGOs have consistently shown a greater influence over policy than their British counterparts**

The third and final theme is that the differences of circumstance and history in Canada and Britain are significant in determining the comparative influence of NGOs working within their borders. First of all, it is noteworthy that the shape of the communities differ. While there

are similar numbers of NGOs in either country, there is a core of groups in Britain which have gained particular prominence in the public eye, in part because they are older, and in part because they have traditionally and more frequently undertaken high publicity campaigns. Canadian agencies, on the other hand, are less well recognized publicly (partly because they have used media and demonstrations less often), but they have been more skilled in coordinating what lobbying efforts they have undertaken. Much was made by NGO and official observers alike of the role of CPCU as a coordinating body, for example; the committee was successful because it had sound leadership in the person of Bernstein; because it was well-funded; because it gathered together credible, knowledgeable members; and, importantly, because the government was receptive to its formation. In Britain, on the other hand, it is more difficult to assess the tactical strength of the NGOs involved. Only two of the development agencies were involved to any great extent, and while UNEP-UK was competently led, it played an information and guidance role rather than a coordinating one. The "lobbies" in either country therefore had much different shapes, and it is interesting to surmise what would have happened had the British NGO community chosen to present themselves as a joint, cross-sectoral, organized lobby like the CPCU.

A related factor underscored throughout the thesis is that the history of the relationship between NGOs and government in either country has differed significantly. There is far more funding available to Canadian NGOs and a much longer history of interaction with CIDA; by contrast, access to British policy institutions has traditionally been much more difficult. In 1974 in Canada, for example, there had already been at least six years of CIDA-NGO interaction through the NGO program, and there was evidently substantial interest in their views (evinced by official attention to the Ottawa conference held beforehand), and even some debate about their participation on the delegation. In contemporary Britain, however, with almost no institutionalized link to the NGO community, there had been only one consultation meeting. Up to the end of the 1980s, indeed, there remained relatively few routes of access for British NGOs into the system, a situation which goes some way to explaining the higher level of outsider tactics undertaken by British NGOs. In comparison, the historically high level of interaction between government and NGOs in Canada partly explains NGOs' more concerted insider attempts as well as the need for a broad, full-time umbrella body like the CCIC. It is important to note that Britain has not been untouched by the wave of NGO

involvement in countries like Canada, however. Perhaps aware that the UK falls to the bottom of OECD league tables on NGO involvement, the government decided at the time UNCED was evolving that they would have to be involved in the preparatory process. It is interesting, therefore, that the ODA's recent search for closer relations with the community has produced BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development), the new quasi-umbrella agency to help ease NGO access to the department. The new agency may be a sign that British agencies will be taking on a closer resemblance to their Canadian counterparts, as well as adopting a closer, insider approach to policy.

#### THE RELEVANCE OF NGO PROMINENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE

Returning to the some of the ideas presented in the introduction, can we thus argue that NGOs have become one of the rising, central features of international relations? In looking at development issues and the politics of North-South relations in particular, the answer is predictably a "modified yes."

First of all, it is clear that NGOs are strikingly more prominent today than they were only twenty years ago. Comparing Rio to Rome, it seems difficult to believe how firmly this transformation of the NGO community from "outsiders-looking-in" to "stakeholders" has been made. After UNCED, there seems to be little question that NGOs are to be involved in the policy circle at the international level; the CSD has entrenched their involvement, Agenda 21 promises to include NGOs at all stages of its implementation, the rules for NGO access to subsequent conferences has been loosened, and the debates surrounding UN issues can no longer be made without conscious reference to their participation. In Canada, there exists a new policy liaison group with CIDA, the long-standing and increasingly involved CCIC, and an open commitment to increased consultation in departments like Environment Canada and EA. Even in Britain, notorious for the closed nature of its policy system, there are indications that change is afoot: the ODA published its 1990 report on the need for increased collaboration with, and funding of, NGOs; the ground-breaking liaison group BOND was set up with ODA financial help; and NGOs working on UNCED gained an unprecedented level of access to the policy process and to officials in other departments. Throughout the OECD, there is much talk about the new age of NGO internationalism; lauded with an impressively

long list of virtues, NGOs have become entrenched as legitimate stakeholders in the development process.

Second, however, it is clear that NGOs are nonetheless limited, constrained and circumscribed in the level and kind of influence they are able to wield. One such limit is the status of the government agencies to which NGOs have gained greater access; the "low men on the totem pole." An element of the subordinate status of the ODA/CIDA is evident in the "parking lot syndrome," whereby their policies and budgets are seen to belong to a number of other departments as well, or are subject to the significant "philosophical" changes which accompany changeovers of the governing party. Disputes over the commercialization of aid, political conditionality, and the diversion of aid to Eastern Europe are significant examples of such intragovernmental jostling. Furthermore, when the issues proposed by NGOs do reach into higher policy realms, the limits become even more firm. The economic ceiling, the subsidiarity of aid to other foreign policy concerns, the primacy of trade relations in both countries; all these set policy caps on what the official development agencies are allowed to do, regardless of the lobbying of their NGO client groups. Another institutional limit is the outright rejection by certain departments or governments that NGOs do indeed have a legitimate place at the policy table. Despite the high salience of UNCED issues and the acknowledged expertise of the NGOs involved, for example, there was little uniform international acceptance of their legitimacy as "stakeholders;" note the battles over NGO involvement held during PrepComs, the difficulty of access at Rio Centro, and the exclusion of NGOs on many delegations.

Still other limits on potential influence involve the skills and relationships of NGOs themselves; built-in frictions over image, approach to lobbying, activities, evangelicism, and funding have sometimes undermined their credibility. The lack of concerted efforts among British NGOs interested in UNCED, for example, may have meant that they did not take advantage of whatever access to officials did exist. Of course, the reasons for a lack of concertation are many; was it relevant that ENGOS and NGDOs in Britain did not collaborate as in Canada? Was it relevant that Oxfam, which could have been a more prominent player, did not devote much energy or staff-time to UNCED? It is interesting and perhaps ironic to note that while the Canadians involved at Rio were better organized than their British

counterparts, their solidarity was not entirely due to experience, but in part to their financial ties to the CPCU; they were held together partly because of the *government's* purse strings.

Sometimes there are also limits to NGO access that have little to do with their own efforts. The World Food Conference was held just after the second election that year of a new Labour government, and while the NGOs might have been able to count on a more sympathetic hearing had the conference been held a few months later, the new government was then pre-occupied and the bureaucracy could only take on a minimalist stance. The length of time set aside for preparation is still another limiting factor; several years were set aside for UNCED, and less than a year went into the World Food Conference preparations, suggesting that the governments' *capacity* to consult with NGOs, regardless of their willingness, had differed significantly. Other limits have to do with the different laws and regulations governing charitable lobbying, particularly in regards to the powers of the British Charity Commission. If anything, however, we have seen that the legal restrictions on lobbying may have encouraged the development of insider lobbying strategies rather than the curtailment of lobbying altogether

In short, while there is a strong case that NGOs have indeed gained in prominence and influence, there nonetheless exist very real limits on that influence. Looking to the future, it seems equally clear that the growing presence of NGOs on the international scene will continue to pose new questions. One of these is whether NGOs' real significance is not in their influence over government policy, but rather in their role within an ever more powerful civil society. The solidifying of NGO networks at UNCED -- indeed, the indifference of many NGOs at the Global Forum to the official proceedings altogether -- is witness to a possible change in focus. It pays homage to the assertion that our dependence on the formal institutions of the state to solve the new issues of modern life may be fading. As the literature on the new civil society grows, researchers will thus need to look at the question of influence in a new light; it may no longer be appropriate to ask what influence specific national NGOs have on particular national policies. As the thesis has only begun to do, we may need to focus on the even more complicated realm of international networking among NGOs, institutions, and governments; a realm where the line between public and private, official and "altruistic," is already difficult to discern.

**APPENDIX ONE:  
LIST OF INTERVIEWS**

|                    |                      |                                                                                                      |
|--------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Michel Archembault | 09 10 92             | Director, Educational Institutions Program, CIDA, Ottawa                                             |
| Sandy Bearpark     | 07 02 91             | Head of Information and Emergency Aid Department, ODA, London                                        |
| Pierre Beemans     | 07 10 92             | Senior staff member, International Development Research Council, Ottawa                              |
| John Bell          | 02 11 92             | One-time Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for External Affairs for the Environment, Ottawa  |
| Eric Bergbusch     | 24 09 93             | Policy Advisor at External Affairs, then coordinator of the New Economic Order Group                 |
| Lyse Blanchard     | 29 10 92             | Executive Director, CUSO, Ottawa                                                                     |
| John Borton        | 16 06 93             | Researcher, Overseas Development Institute, London                                                   |
| Tim Brodhead       | 03 09 91<br>02 10 92 | Ex-Executive Director, CCIC, Ottawa                                                                  |
| Lynn Broughton     | 24 09 92             | One-time Executive Assistant, CPCU, Ottawa                                                           |
| Barbara Brown      | 29 10 92             | Advisor, Environment and Development Policy Advisor, CIDA, Ottawa                                    |
| Tom Burke          | 23 04 93             | Personal Environment Advisor to the Minister of the Environment, DoE, London                         |
| Jacques Champagne  | 15 10 92             | Executive Director, AQOCI, (meeting in Hull)                                                         |
| Paul Charles       | 30 04 91             | Staff member, Oxfam-Belgique, Brussels                                                               |
| John Clark         | 23 04 91             | One-time Development Policy Advisor, Oxfam, Oxford                                                   |
| Tony Clarke        | 02 04 93             | President of the Action Canada Network, and one-time member of GATT-Fly, involved in the Ottawa team |
| Francois Coûtu     | 10 11 92             | Communications Officer, United Nations Association of Canada, Ottawa                                 |
| Anne Dale          | 29 04 93             | Director, National Roundtable on the Economy and Environment, Ottawa                                 |
| Gordon Deuchars    | 30 03 91             | Staff member, Liaison Committee of Development NGOs to the European Communities, Brussels            |
| Andrew Dilworth    | 08 07 93             | Environment and Development Coordinator, Friends of the Earth, London                                |

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|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Marc Dolgin             | 29 08 91<br>08 10 92 | Director, NGO Division, CIDA,<br>Ottawa                                                                                                             |
| Felix Dodds             | 01 07 93             | One-time UNCED Coordinator, United Nations<br>Association, London                                                                                   |
| Tim Draimin             | 19 10 92             | Staff member, CCIC, Ottawa                                                                                                                          |
| Charles Elliott         | 13 05 93             | Dean, Trinity Hall Cambridge, and member of the<br>Independent Group on British Aid                                                                 |
| Ian Filewod             | 29 09 92             | Staff member, CCIC, Ottawa                                                                                                                          |
| Valpy Fitzgerald        | 10 05 91             | Lecturer, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague                                                                                                    |
| Alan Fowler             | 23 04 93             | Development Consultant, Brighton                                                                                                                    |
| Tony German             | 09 06 93             | One-time Policy Coordinator, ActionAid, London                                                                                                      |
| Steve Godfrey           | 29 10 92             | Senior staff member, South Africa Educational<br>Trust, Ottawa                                                                                      |
| Geoffrey Grenville-Wood | 26 10 93             | President of the United Nations Association -<br>Canada, part of the Ottawa team at WFC, and one-<br>time member of the CPCU                        |
| Arthur Hansen           | 30 07 92             | President, International Institute for Sustainable<br>Development, Winnipeg                                                                         |
| Richard Harmston        | 20/28 09 93          | Executive Director of South-Asia Partnership and<br>one-time director of CCIC and part of the Ottawa<br>team                                        |
| Youssef Hajjar          | 18 05 93             | Director, Information and Policy Division, Refugee<br>Council, London                                                                               |
| Darlene Henderson       | 12 08 91             | Director, Manitoba Council for International<br>Cooperation, Winnipeg                                                                               |
| Martin Hughes           | 28 04 93             | Deputy Director, War on Want, London                                                                                                                |
| Vicky Johnson           | 13 08 93             | Environmental Policy Analyst and one-time<br>member of ActionAid's UNCED team, London                                                               |
| Carl Juneau             | 17 09 92             | Chief, Technical Interpretations and<br>Communications Section, Charities Division,<br>Revenue Canada, Taxation, (telephone interview in<br>Ottawa) |
| Joanna Kerr             | 01 10 92             | Women in Development Coordinator, North-South<br>Institute, Ottawa                                                                                  |
| Cynthia King            | 02 10 92             | Staff member, MATCH International, Ottawa                                                                                                           |

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|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Harriet Lamb         | 14 06 93             | Communications Officer, World Development Movement, London                                                        |
| Yianna Lambrou       | 23 09 92             | Staff member, International Development Research Council, Ottawa                                                  |
| Tim Leah             | 04 04 93             | One-time NGO Liaison Coordinator, UNCED Secretariat, Environment Canada, Ottawa                                   |
| Alison LeClaire      | 27 10 92<br>etc.     | One-time Communications Officers of the UNCED Taskforce, External Affairs, Ottawa                                 |
| Jim Lovett           | 09 10 92             | Desk officer, Economic Relations with Developing Countries Division, External Affairs, Ottawa                     |
| Allan MacEachen      | 29 03 93             | Leader of the Senate, one-time SSEA and present at Rome                                                           |
| Elizabeth May        | 13 10 92             | One-time member of the CPCU, and Director, Cultural Survival, Ottawa                                              |
| Elizabeth McAllister | 01 10 92             | Director, Americas Branch, CIDA, Ottawa                                                                           |
| Fiona McConnell      | 13 08 93             | One-time Head of the International Division of the DoE, and member of the UK delegation to UNCED, London          |
| Don McRae            | 20 10 92<br>etc.     | Director, Voluntary Action Directorate, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, (telephone interviews in Ottawa) |
| Bob Miller           | 17 09 92<br>05 10 92 | Deputy Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa                         |
| Maury Miloff         | 01 10 92             | Consultant, IntraDelta, Ottawa                                                                                    |
| Pat Mooney           | 04 11 93             | Director of RAFI, one-time CCIC staff member, present at Rome                                                     |
| Terry Mooney         | 01 10 92             | Senior Policy Advisor, Partnership Branch, CIDA, Ottawa                                                           |
| David R. Morrison    | 03 08 91             | Dean of Arts and Professor of Comparative Development Studies, Trent University, Peterborough, Canada             |
| Brian Murphy         | 19 10 92             | Staff member, Inter Pares, Ottawa                                                                                 |
| Dorothy Myers        | 29 05 93             | One-time UNCED Co-coordinator, Oxfam, Oxford                                                                      |
| Ivan Nutbrown        | 14 06 93             | Communications Officer, World Development Movement, London                                                        |

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|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Maureen O'Neil    | 06 10 92             | Director, North-South Institute, Ottawa                                                                                        |
| Les Pal           | Fall 92              | Professor of Public Administration, Carleton University, Ottawa                                                                |
| Peter Padbury     | 27 10 92<br>04 11 92 | Staff member, CCIC, Ottawa                                                                                                     |
| Mike Parkinson    | 21 05 93             | Parliamentary Officer, Oxfam, Oxford                                                                                           |
| Angela Penrose    | 14 06 93             | Senior Overseas Information Officer, Save the Children Fund, London                                                            |
| Lewis Perinbam    | 26 08 91             | Vice-President, Special Programs Branch, CIDA, Ottawa                                                                          |
| Franco Pillarella | 24 03 93             | External Affairs official, part of the Canadian delegation to Rome                                                             |
| Chris Pinney      | 19 10 92             | Communications Officer, CCIC, Ottawa                                                                                           |
| Cranford Pratt    | 04 09 91             | Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto                                                                          |
| Gabriel Régallet  | 30 07 92             | Staff member, International Institute for Sustainable Development                                                              |
| Judith Rendal     | 09 06 93             | One-time Policy Coordinator, ActionAid, London                                                                                 |
| Fiona Reynolds    | 20 05 93             | Director, Council for the Protection of Rural England, London                                                                  |
| Sheila Riordan    | 05 11 92             | Policy Analyst, Policy Branch, CIDA, Ottawa                                                                                    |
| Mark Robinson     | 07 03 91             | Then Research Fellow, Overseas Development Institute, London                                                                   |
| Jackie Roddick    | 07 07 93             | Coordinator, Scottish Academic Network on Global Environmental Change; and Member of the Scottish Environmental Forum, Glasgow |
| Paul Rogers       | 02 07 93             | WDM member and observer at Rome                                                                                                |
| David Runnalls    | 02 10 92             | Senior staff member, Institute for Research on Public Policy, Ottawa                                                           |
| Robin Russell     | 23 04 92             | Head, NGO Section, ODA, East Kilbride, Glasgow                                                                                 |
| Kendel Rust       | 05 11 92             | Director of Program Support, NGO Division, CIDA, Ottawa                                                                        |
| Clyde Sanger      | 08 10 92             | Staff member, North-South Institute, Ottawa                                                                                    |

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|----------------------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Anne Sieve           | 26 06 93   | One-time IPPF Information Liaison Officer, was at Rome                                                                        |
| Michael Small        | 24 03 93   | One-time UNCED Coordinator, External Affairs, Ottawa                                                                          |
| Ian Smillie          | 14 11 92   | Development Consultant, Ottawa                                                                                                |
| Chris Stockwell      | 17 08 93   | One-time WDM board member                                                                                                     |
| John Tanner          | 12 08 1993 | One-time WDM staff member                                                                                                     |
| Koy Thomson          | 18 05 93   | One-time UNEP-UK Coordinator, IIED, London                                                                                    |
| Sir Crispin Tickell  | 28 05 93   | Warden, Green College Oxford and Advisor to the Prime Minister, one-time UK Ambassador to the United Nations, Oxford          |
| Ana Toni             | 21 05 93   | Development Policy Analyst and member of ActionAid's UNCED team, London                                                       |
| David Turner         | 07 05 93   | Head, Natural Resources and Environment Division, ODA, London                                                                 |
| Ellen van Steenburgh | 16 10 92   | Staff member, Environmental Policy Division, CIDA, Ottawa                                                                     |
| Alan Vickery         | 23 08 93   | One-time MAFF official, then member of MAFF's External Relations division and a member of the British delegation to Rome      |
| Gavin Watson         | 01 07 93   | Assistant Undersecretary for Environmental Policy and Analysis, DoE, London                                                   |
| Eugene Whelan        | 29 03 93   | President, Agricultural International Development Associates of Canada, one-time Minister for Agriculture and present at Rome |
| Susan White          | 21 07 92   | Director, Oxfam office, Winnipeg                                                                                              |
| Rob Wiles            | 28 11 91   | Chief, Development Research Unit, CIDA, (meeting in London)                                                                   |
| Frits Wils           | 10 05 91   | Lecturer, Institute of Social Studies, the Hague                                                                              |
| Peter Willetts       | 23 04 93   | Senior Lecturer in International Relations, City University, London                                                           |
| Jessica Woodroffe    | 06 05 93   | Communications Officer, Christian Aid, London                                                                                 |

## APPENDIX TWO: NGO DATA

APPENDIX TWO:  
NOTES ON NGO DATA

A note on the use of the following data may be in order. As noted earlier, these lists were collated from a number of directories and other sources which do not all use the same rules for inclusion. When the "genuineness" of an NGO was in doubt, it has been left in; only those organizations with a *primarily* evangelical mandate (many of the missionary organizations), or with a profit motive (including most of the "third world" trading organizations) have been left out. A number of solidarity organizations and human rights groups, often not included in NGO listings, have also been retained in the appendix when they have appeared in the directories.

However, given the different ways in which data was collected for the directories, caution needs to be used in manipulating the figures for staffing and volunteers in particular. In order not to skew the averages for the whole community, the calculations for British NGOs have excluded Christian Aid (which lists 400,000 home volunteers), St. John's Ambulance (90,000), Oxfam (25,000), SCF (10,000), and Y Care (1,000). Because the numbers cover different categories of paid and volunteer workers, the estimates on "minimum constituency" are therefore to be taken as rough guides only. The data in the following pages is derived in large part from the 1990 OECD directory: it is *only indicative* of NGO activity and does not purport to be statistically accurate. The column headings are, in order: the number of charities, their name, their date of foundation, their activities, the total number of staff, the total number of volunteers, their income in US\$ millions in 1987, their income in sterling, the year for which their income in sterling was recorded, the total number of staff at home, the total number of staff overseas, the total number of volunteers at home, the total number of volunteers working overseas, the percentage of total income derived from self-financing (trade, sales, services), the percentage of income derived from private donations, and the percentage of income derived from government sources.

For the list of activities, the method of calculation is the following:

Each entry in the directory gave an indication of the group's main activities: project work, development education, networking, and so on. Each activity was then coded:

|         |                                |     |                                |
|---------|--------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------|
| j:      | project work                   | n:  | networking                     |
| d:      | development education          | s:  | support work                   |
| uk/cda: | work in the UK or Canada       | a:  | academic work                  |
| r:      | relief/humanitarian assistance | ch: | church-based (for information) |
| md:     | media/publications             |     |                                |

Then, the *means* of supporting that activity was coded:

|    |                    |     |                      |
|----|--------------------|-----|----------------------|
| x: | overseas personnel | \$: | financial assistance |
| m: | material provision | sp: | sponsorship          |

Then, for the sake of illustration, some of the *issues* undertaken were also coded:

|     |               |    |                |
|-----|---------------|----|----------------|
| h:  | health        | e: | education      |
| g:  | goods trading | o: | food aid       |
| w:  | women         | k: | children/youth |
| hr: | human rights  | b: | bank/business  |

|    |                      |     |                     |
|----|----------------------|-----|---------------------|
| t: | technical assistance | p:  | population control  |
| f: | refugee work         | ag: | agriculture         |
| v: | environment          | u:  | union/co-operatives |
| l: | lobbying             | cs: | construction        |

The notation in the appendix thus reads something like this: d j: \$ m : h e w, meaning that the organization did development education and project work overseas, using financial aid and material assistance, and concentrated on health, education, and women’s issues.

British NGO Data Bank

|     | Charities                       | Fdn  | Activities             | t:Staff | t:Vols | \$m 87 | £m      | Year  | h:Staff | a:Staff | h:Vol  | a:Vol | Self | Private | Public |
|-----|---------------------------------|------|------------------------|---------|--------|--------|---------|-------|---------|---------|--------|-------|------|---------|--------|
| 1   | ACORD                           | 1976 | J n: \$ x: t ag b      | 626     | 0      | 11.44  | 6.629   | 88    | 26      | 600     | 0      | 0     | 0%   | 71%     | 13%    |
| 2   | ActionAid                       | 1972 | J r: l: sp             | 3150    | 80     | 24.87  | 17.114  | 89    | 150     | 3000    | 80     | 0     | 0%   | 75%     | 25%    |
| 3   | Action by Christians Ag Torture | 1984 |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 4   | Action for World Dev Fund       |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 5   | Action Health 2000              | 1983 | J: x \$ m: h           | 3       | 195    | 0.03   | 0.025   | 89    | 3       | 0       | 195    | 0     | 49%  | 51%     | 0%     |
| 6   | Action on Disability and Dev    | 1985 | J: h e                 | 26      |        |        | 0.389   | 89    | 21      | 5       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 7   | Action Water                    | 1985 | J: m                   | 2       |        |        | 0.016   | 88    | 2       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 8   | Afghanaid                       | 1983 | J: o f                 | 119     |        |        | 1.395   | 89    | 5       | 114     |        |       |      |         |        |
| 9   | Afghan Relief                   |      | r: \$: h e             |         |        |        | 0.162   | pa    |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 10  | Africa Centre                   | 1964 |                        | 8       | 0      | 0.38   | 0.279   | 89    | 8       | 0       | 0      | 0     | 50%  | 10%     | 40%    |
| 11  | Africa Educational Trust        | 1958 |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 12  | Africa Inland Mission           | 1895 | ch J: x \$: ag e g     | 116     | 22     | 1.41   | 1.052   | 89    | 14      | 102     | 2      | 20    | 0%   | 100%    | 0%     |
| 13  | Africa Now                      | 1982 | J: \$ x: b w t ag      | 8       | 4      | 0.41   | 0.411   | 89    | 8       | 0       | 1      | 3     |      |         |        |
| 14  | Africa Watch                    | 1988 |                        | 8       |        |        |         |       | 3       | 3       |        |       |      |         | 0%     |
| 15  | African Med and Res Fdn-AMREF   | 1956 | J: \$ x: h             | 3       |        |        | 7.575   | 89    | 3       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 16  | African Pastor Fund             | 1974 | J ch: m x \$           | 3       |        |        | 0.084   |       | 3       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 17  | African Refugee Housing Actn Gp | 1979 | uk: \$: f cs           | 3       | 35     | 0.17   |         |       | 3       | 0       | 35     | 0     | 50%  | 5%      | 45%    |
| 18  | Afro-Carib Ed'l Resource Proj   |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 19  | Aga Khan - UK                   | 1973 | J: x \$: ag f          | 6       |        |        | 2.500   | 89    | 6       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 20  | Aid Armenia                     |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 21  | Aid for Destitute Victims of Op | 1984 | J: \$ m x: f w k       | 1       | 20     | 0.04   |         |       | 1       | 0       | 8      | 12    | 20%  | 60%     | 20%    |
| 22  | Aid for India                   | 1980 | J r: \$ x: e h f       | 9       | 20     | 0.49   | 0.337   | 88    | 8       | 1       | 20     | 0     | 0%   | 95%     | 5%     |
| 23  | Aid to the Church in Need       | 1947 | J ch: \$ m             | 5       |        |        | 0.892   | 89    | 5       | 0       | 0      | 0     |      |         |        |
| 24  | Alternative for India Developme |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 25  | Ambika Ltd                      | 1986 |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 26  | Amnesty International (UK)      | 1961 |                        | 275     | 35     |        | 1.458   | 88    | 275     | 0       | 35     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 27  | Ancsa Merchandise               |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 28  | Anglo-Arabian Med Services      |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 29  | Anti-Apartheid Movement         | 1959 | d l md: apartheid      | 23      | 0      |        | 0.935   | 89    | 23      | 0       | 0      | 0     |      |         |        |
| 30  | Anti-Slavery Society            | 1839 | d l a md               | 7       |        |        | 0.159   | 89    | 7       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 31  | ApT Design and Development      | 1959 | J: x: e                | 3       | 1      |        | 0.647   | 88    | 3       | 0       | 1      | 0     |      |         |        |
| 32  | Appropriate Health Resources    | 1977 | J a md: x \$ m: h      | 17      | 0      | 0.82   | 0.919   | 89    | 15      | 2       | 0      | 0     | 0%   | 10%     | 90%    |
| 33  | Article 19                      |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 34  | Associate Country Women of the  | 1933 | J r: \$: w h e ag      |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 35  | Associated Housing Adv Serv for | 1978 | uk: cs                 |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       | 100% | 0%      | 0%     |
| 36  | Assn of Cmnwth Universities     | 1913 | e                      |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 37  | ATD Fourth World                |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 38  | Baby Milk Action                | 1979 |                        | 4       | 0      | 0.05   |         |       | 4       | 0       | 0      | 0     | 10%  | 90%     | 0%     |
| 39  | Band Aid Trust                  | 1984 | J r: \$: h e ag cs     | 6       | 3      | 8.99   | 140.000 | total | 3       | 3       | 3      | 0     | 0%   | 100%    | 0%     |
| 40  | Baptist Missionary Society      | 1792 | ch J: \$: ag e h       | 57      |        |        |         |       | 48      | 9       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 41  | Bishop Ambrose Reeves Trust     | 1966 | d a md: apartheid      | 1       |        |        |         |       | 1       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 42  | Books for Change                |      | md                     |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 43  | Books for Development           | 1983 | m: e                   |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 44  | Box Aid                         | 1987 | : m: g v               | 0       |        |        | 0.001   | pa    | 0       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 45  | Boys Brigade                    |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 46  | Britain-Nepal Medical Trust     | 1968 | J: x m \$: h           | 102     | 0      | 0.49   | 0.334   | 88    | 3       | 99      | 0      | 0     | 0%   | 66%     | 34%    |
| 47  | Britain-Tanzania Society        | 1975 | J: \$ m x: h e ag      | 0       | 9      | 0.04   |         |       | 0       | 0       | 6      | 3     | 0%   | 93%     | 7%     |
| 48  | British Council Prev Blindness  | 1976 | a: \$: h               | 2       |        |        | 0.131   | 90    | 2       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 49  | British Executives Overseas     | 1972 | x                      | 11      | 140    | 0.64   | 0.476   | 90    | 11      | 0       | 0      | 140   | 0%   | 25%     | 75%    |
| 50  | British Leprosy Relief Assn     | 1924 | J: \$: h               | 39      |        |        | 2.301   | 88    | 39      | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 51  | British Overseas Aid Group      | 1977 | n                      |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 52  | British Overseas NGOs for Dev   | 1993 | n                      | 1       |        |        |         |       | 1       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 53  | British Red Cross, Overseas Div | 1863 | r                      |         |        |        | 37.200  | 89    |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 54  | British Refugee Council         | 1981 | uk: f                  |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 55  | British Volunteer Programme     | 1982 | x                      |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 56  | Brothers to All Men             | 1965 | ch J:                  |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 57  | Bureau for Overseas Med Serv    | 1981 | J x: e h               | 3       | 0      | 0.08   | 0.060   | 89    | 3       | 0       | 0      | 0     | 30%  | 70%     | 0%     |
| 58  | Busoga Trust                    |      | J ch: m \$: h ag       |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 59  | CAFOD                           | 1982 | ch l J: ag h e g       | 62      | 0      | 12.14  | 12.297  | 89    | 62      | 0       | 0      | 0     | 0%   | 86%     | 14%    |
| 60  | Canon Collins Ed'l Trust for SA | 1976 | a s: \$ x m: e         | 3       |        |        | 0.317   | 88    | 3       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 61  | CARE - UK                       | 1985 | J: x m \$              | 16      |        |        | 9.277   | 89    | 16      | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 62  | Caribbean Development Fdn       |      | n                      |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 63  | Caterham Overseas Aid Trust     |      | : m:                   |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 64  | Catholic Inst for Intl Relation | 1940 | md ch a J x ag h e t   | 105     | 54     | 2.13   | 1.580   | 89    | 35      | 70      | 0      | 54    | 0%   | 0%      | 100%   |
| 65  | Central Br Fd for Jewish Relief | 1933 | ch J: \$: h e          | 22      | 0      | 0.45   |         |       | 22      | 0       | 0      | 0     |      |         |        |
| 66  | Central Bur Ed'l Visits & Exchg |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 67  | Centre Advancemt Respv Travel   |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 68  | Centre for Alternative Technolo | 1974 | d a t: e               | 31      | 0      |        | 0.218   | 88    | 31      | 0       | 0      | 0     | 95%  | 5%      | 0%     |
| 69  | Centre for Global Education     | 1982 | d: e                   | 10      |        |        | 0.140   | 89    | 10      | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 70  | Centre for International Briefl | 1953 | d                      | 60      |        |        | 0.937   | 89    | 60      | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 71  | Centre for World Dev Education  | 1977 | d                      | 11      | 3      | 0.42   | 0.297   | 89    | 11      | 0       | 3      | 0     | 17%  | 45%     | 38%    |
| 72  | Change                          | 1979 | l a n w                | 0       | 3      |        |         |       | 0       | 0       | 3      | 0     | 100% | 0%      | 0%     |
| 73  | Charity Projects                | 1984 | \$                     | 19      |        |        | 34.261  | 89    | 19      | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 74  | Child Hope                      |      | d J: \$: k             |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 75  | Child to Child                  | 1978 | J md: \$: e            | 3       |        |        | 0.114   | 89    | 3       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 76  | Child Rescue Intl               |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 77  | Children's Intl Summer Villages | 1951 |                        | 4       | 2000   | 0.27   |         |       | 4       | 0       | 1000   | 1000  | 95%  | 5%      | 0%     |
| 78  | Chile Cmtee for Human Rights    |      | l: hr                  |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 79  | Chile Democratico               |      | uk::                   |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 80  | Chile Solidarity Campaign       |      | J l md: \$: h w u      |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 81  | Christian Aid                   | 1944 | ch l J r: \$: ag h b w | 210     | 400000 | 36.79  | 28.292  | 89    | 210     | 0       | 400000 | 0     | 0%   | 80%     | 20%    |
| 82  | Christian Children's Fund of GB | 1983 | ch J: sp \$: h e       | 10      |        |        | 1.512   | 88    | 10      | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 83  | Christian Outreach              | 1967 | ch J: \$ x: b k e      | 1148    | 48     | 0.41   | 1.160   | 89    | 8       | 1140    | 1      | 47    | 0%   | 31%     | 69%    |
| 84  | Christians Abroad               | 1973 | ch d s                 | 5       | 80     |        | 0.084   | 88    | 5       | 0       | 0      | 80    |      |         |        |
| 85  | Church Action on Namibia        |      | d ch:                  |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 86  | Church Missionary Society       | 1799 | ch: x \$               | 390     |        |        | 4.936   | 89    | 90      | 300     |        |       |      |         |        |
| 87  | CLEAR Unit                      |      | s: x                   |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 88  | Colin Winter Centre for Namibia | 1985 | J s: \$                | 1       |        |        | 0.033   | 89    | 1       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 89  | Co-operative Bank               |      | s: b                   |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 90  | Cmtee for Intl Justice & Peace  |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 91  | Cmwth Human Ecology Council     | 1969 | J: \$ m x: p w e       | 4       | 520    | 0.05   |         |       | 4       | 0       | 20     | 500   | 10%  | 40%     | 50%    |
| 92  | Cmwth Linking Trust             |      | n: e                   |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 93  | Cmnwth Society for the Deaf     | 1959 | s: h                   | 4       |        |        | 0.201   | 89    | 4       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 94  | Cmwth Trade Union Council       | 1979 | J: u e                 | 9       | 0      | 0.87   |         |       | 5       | 4       | 0      | 0     | 0%   | 25%     | 75%    |
| 95  | Cmwth Youth Exchange Council    | 1970 | d: x                   | 4       |        |        | 0.249   | 89    | 4       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 96  | Concern Universal               | 1976 | J r: \$ m x: e o h k   | 4       | 166    |        | 1.500   | pa    | 3       | 1       | 163    | 3     | 2%   | 33%     | 65%    |
| 97  | Concord Films Council           | 1959 | d md                   | 18      | 0      |        | 0.267   | 89    | 18      | 0       | 0      | 0     | 100% | 0%      | 0%     |
| 98  | Conservation Foundation         |      |                        |         |        |        |         |       |         |         |        |       |      |         |        |
| 99  | Cooperation for Development     | 1983 | J: \$ m x: b e ag      | 4       | 8      | 1.64   | 1.390   | 88    | 4       | 0       | 8      | 0     | 1%   | 10%     | 89%    |
| 100 | Council for Ed In W Citizenship | 1939 | d md                   | 5       | 0      |        | 0.080   | pa    | 5       | 0       | 0      | 0     |      |         |        |
| 101 | Cusichaca Trust                 |      | a: ag                  | 10      |        |        | 0.052   | 88    | 10      | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 102 | Daneford Trust                  | 1982 | d: k                   | 1       |        |        | 0.014   | 89    | 1       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 103 | David Livingstone Intl          | 1974 | ch J: \$: h e          | 4       |        |        |         |       | 4       | 0       |        |       |      |         |        |
| 104 | Development Planning Unit       | 1971 | s: x: e                | 14      | 0      | 1.31   |         |       | 13      | 1       | 0      | 0     | 100% | 0%      | 0%     |

| British NGO Data Bank |                                 |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|------|----------------------|---------|--------|--------|--------|------|---------|---------|-------|-------|------|---------|--------|
|                       | Charities                       | Fdn  | Activities           | t-Staff | t-Vols | \$m 87 | £m     | Year | h-Staff | a-Staff | h Vol | a-Vol | Self | Private | Public |
| 105                   | Dev and Project Planning Centre | 1969 | ad e                 | 52      |        |        |        |      | 52      | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 106                   | Disasters Emergency Committee   | 1963 | nt r \$              | 7       | 0      | 0.34   |        |      | 7       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 0%   | 91%     | 9%     |
| 107                   | Disaster Relief Communications  |      | r s                  |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 108                   | Dolen Cymru/Wales-Lesotho Link  | 1985 | n                    | 1       |        |        | 0 006  | 89   | 1       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 109                   | DPOCN                           |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 110                   | Earthscan                       | 1975 | sn v                 | 20      | 0      |        |        |      | 20      | 0       | 0     | 0     | 0%   | 25%     | 75%    |
| 111                   | Education for Development       |      | d amd                | 2       |        |        |        |      | 2       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 112                   | El Sal & Guat Cmtees for HRs    | 1981 | j l md: \$: hr       |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 113                   | Emmanuel Intl                   | 1975 | ch j \$: h           | 11      |        |        | 0 002  | 89   | 1       | 10      |       |       |      |         |        |
| 114                   | Engineers for Disaster Relief   | 1980 | r: x: t              | 3       | 0      | 0.08   |        |      | 3       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 40%  | 60%     | 0%     |
| 115                   | Equipment to Charity Hospitals  |      | m: h                 |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 116                   | Eritrean Relief Organization    | 1975 | r: \$                | 5       | 0      |        |        |      | 5       | 0       | 0     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 117                   | Evangelical Union of South Am   | 1981 | ch r j               | 70      |        |        | 0 357  | 89   | 10      | 60      |       |       |      |         |        |
| 118                   | Exchange Resources              |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 119                   | Fairshares                      |      | - \$                 |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 120                   | FARM Africa                     | 1985 | at ag                | 4       |        |        | 0 178  | 88?  | 4       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 121                   | Farmers' Third World Network    | 1985 | d ag                 | 1       | 0      | 0 05   |        |      | 1       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 5%   | 45%     | 50%    |
| 122                   | Feed the Minds                  |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 123                   | Find Your Feet                  | 1967 | j: \$ x: o w leaf    | 2       | 3      | 0 06   | 0 062  | 88   | 2       | 0       | 2     | 1     | 0%   | 79%     | 21%    |
| 124                   | Foster Parents' Plan UK         | 1971 | ch: sp               | 14      | 30     | 1 36   |        |      | 14      | 0       | 30    | 0     | 1%   | 97%     | 2%     |
| 125                   | Friends of Ngora Hospital       | 1982 | ch m: \$: h          | 0       | 4      | 0.16   |        |      | 0       | 0       | 3     | 1     | 0%   | 10%     | 90%    |
| 126                   | Friends of the Assn Sarva Seva  | 1988 | d s                  | 0       | 15     |        |        |      | 0       | 0       | 15    | 0     |      |         |        |
| 127                   | Friends of the Earth            | 1971 | d l v                | 90      |        |        | 1 996  | 89   | 90      | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 128                   | Friends of Urambo and Mwanhala  | 1964 | j: \$ m: h e t       | 0       | 2      | 0 06   |        |      | 0       | 0       | 2     | 0     | 0%   | 65%     | 35%    |
| 129                   | Friends of Vellore              | 1940 | j: x m: h ag         | 3       | 14     | 0 15   |        |      | 3       | 0       | 14    | 0     | 2%   | 93%     | 5%     |
| 130                   | From Africa with Love           |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 131                   | Gandhi Foundation               |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 132                   | GAP Activity Projects           |      | x                    |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 133                   | Gemini News Service             | 1957 | md                   | 6       | 130    |        | 0 150  | 89   | 6       | 0       | 0     | 130   |      |         |        |
| 134                   | Global Coop for a Better World  |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 135                   | Goal                            |      | j                    |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 136                   | Good Fdn                        |      | . \$: h              |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 137                   | Green Deserts                   | 1979 | n: \$: v t           | 5       | 3      |        | 0 025  | 89   | 5       | 0       | 3     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 138                   | Greenet                         | 1986 | s                    | 2       | 0      | 0 08   |        |      | 2       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 50%  | 50%     | 0%     |
| 139                   | Hand in Hand                    |      | n j: \$ x: ag        |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 140                   | Harvest Help                    | 1985 | j: \$: ag            | 7       | 0      | 0.33   |        |      | 7       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 18%  | 82%     | 0%     |
| 141                   | Health Unlimited                | 1983 | j: x: h              | 36      | 10     | 0.23   | 0 232  | 88   | 26      | 10      | 10    | 0     | 0%   | 100%    | 0%     |
| 142                   | Heights                         | 1987 | d                    | 3       |        |        |        |      | 3       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 143                   | Hekima Trust                    | 1986 | m e                  | 2       | 0      | 0 02   |        |      | 2       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 0%   | 100%    | 0%     |
| 144                   | HelpAge International           | 1983 | j: l: \$ x m: h e cs | 93      | 0      | 2.10   | 0 023  | 88   | 21      | 72      | 0     | 0     | 0%   | 100%    | 0%     |
| 145                   | Homeless International          | 1987 |                      | 2       |        |        |        |      | 2       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 146                   | Hunger Project Trust            | 1977 | j md: \$             | 8       |        |        | 0 207  | 88   | 8       | 0       |       |       |      |         | 0%     |
| 147                   | Impact Foundation               | 1983 | j: \$: h             | 8       |        |        | 0 207  | 88   | 8       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 148                   | India Development Group         |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 149                   | Indian Volunteers for Cmty Serv | 1981 | j: x \$              | 1       | 13     | 0.06   | 0 002  | pa   | 1       | 0       | 12    | 1     | 2%   | 98%     | 0%     |
| 150                   | Initiatives for Deaf Ed in 3W   | 1985 | j md: \$: e h        | 0       |        |        |        |      | 0       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 151                   | Institute of Cultural Affairs   | 1976 | j: x \$: h b e t     | 2       | 17     | 0 08   |        |      | 1       | 1       | 2     | 15    | 1%   | 34%     | 65%    |
| 152                   | Institute Development Studies   | 1966 | a                    | 62      | 0      |        | 2 900  | 88   | 62      | 0       | 0     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 153                   | Intercultural Ed'l Programmes   |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 154                   | Intermediate Technology Dev Grp | 1965 | a j: \$ x m: t       | 150     | 5      | 5 94   | 4 510  | 89   | 100     | 50      | 5     | 0     | 21%  | 31%     | 48%    |
| 155                   | Intl Agricultural Training      |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 156                   | Intl Alert                      | 1985 | d l: hr              |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 157                   | Intl Assn of Lions Clubs        | 1950 | r: \$: o             | 4       | 40     |        |        |      | 4       | 0       | 40    | 0     | 0%   | 100%    | 0%     |
| 158                   | Intl Boys Town Trust            | 1965 | j: \$ x: k ag e      | 20      | 188    | 0.67   | 0 619  | 89   | 15      | 5       | 87    | 101   | 10%  | 79%     | 11%    |
| 159                   | Intl Broadcasting Trust         | 1982 | md                   | 6       | 2      |        | 0 466  | 89   | 6       | 0       | 2     | 0     | 75%  | 2%      | 23%    |
| 160                   | Intl Childcare Trust            | 1982 | j: ag h k            | 9       |        |        | 0 061  | 88   | 2       | 7       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 161                   | Intl Christian Relief           | 1978 | ch r: sp: o          |         |        |        | 1 191  | 89   | 11      |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 162                   | Intl Defense & Aid Fund for SAf | 1950 | s d \$               |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 163                   | Intl Disability Ed & Awareness  | 1981 | d                    | 4       |        |        | 0.062  | 89   | 4       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 164                   | Intl Emergency Action           | 1976 | r: x                 | 0       |        |        |        |      | 0       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 165                   | Intl Extension College          |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 166                   | Intl Institute for Env and Dev  | 1971 | a l s: v             | 30      |        |        | 1.345  | 89   | 30      | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 167                   | Intl Medical Relief             |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 168                   | Intl Nepal Fellowship           | 1952 | ch j: h              | 103     |        |        | 0 292  | 88   | 3       | 100     |       |       |      |         |        |
| 169                   | Intl Planned Parenthood Fdn     | 1952 | j: \$ m: p           | 150     | 0      | 81 00  | 68 424 | 89   | 150     | 0       | 0     | 0     | 2%   | 3%      | 95%    |
| 170                   | Intl Rescue Corps               | 1981 | r: x                 | 0       | 60     |        |        |      | 0       | 0       | 60    | 0     | 0%   | 100%    | 0%     |
| 171                   | Intl Vol Service/Skillshare Afr | 1934 | x                    | 35      | 87     | 0 40   | 1 017  | 89   | 35      | 0       | 2     | 65    | 6%   | 19%     | 75%    |
| 172                   | Interserve                      |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 173                   | *INTRAC                         | 1992 | s                    | 2       |        |        |        |      | 2       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 174                   | Iran Aid                        |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 175                   | Jacob's Well Appeal             |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 176                   | Jalchatra Project               |      | j: \$                |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 177                   | Jane Mann                       |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 178                   | Joint Agencies' Group           |      | d                    |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 179                   | Joint Mission Hospital Equip Bd | 1967 | m: h                 | 72      | 0      | 8.01   |        |      | 72      | 0       | 0     | 0     | 96%  | 4%      | 0%     |
| 180                   | Justice                         |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 181                   | King Mahendra Trust             |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 182                   | Latin America Bureau            | 1977 | a md                 | 5       |        |        | 0 123  | 89   | 5       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 183                   | Leonard Cheshire Foundation     | 1955 | j: \$ m: h cs        | 6       | 1      | 0 41   | 0 021  | 88   | 3       | 3       | 1     | 0     | 0%   | 80%     | 20%    |
| 184                   | Leoprosy Mission International  | 1874 | j: \$ x: h           | 110     | 0      | 9 11   | 5 878  | 88   | 30      | 80      | 0     | 0     | 0%   | 90%     | 10%    |
| 185                   | Living Earth                    |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 186                   | Local Govt Intl Bureau          |      | n                    |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 187                   | Ludhiana British Fellowship     |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 188                   | Lutheran World Federation       |      | ch.                  |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 189                   | Marie Stopes International      | 1971 | j: \$: p h           | 8       | 0      |        | 1 460  | 89   | 7       | 1       | 0     | 0     | 0%   | 42%     | 58%    |
| 190                   | Medical Aid for Palestinians    | 1984 | j: \$ m: h           |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 191                   | Med & Sci Aid Viet Laos Camb    |      | j: m: h              |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 192                   | Mega Cities Project             |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 193                   | Methodist Church Overseas Div   | 1973 | ch x \$: e h ag      | 61      | 0      | 6.97   | 4 514  | 89   | 61      | 0       | 0     | 0     | 0%   | 100%    | 0%     |
| 194                   | Methodist Missionary Society    | 1816 | ch                   |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 195                   | Minority Rights Group           | 1969 | d md uk: hr          | 7       |        |        |        |      | 7       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 196                   | Money for Madagascar            | 196  | ch j: \$: ag         | 1       |        |        | 0 033  | 89   | 1       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 197                   | Movemt for Compassionate Living |      |                      |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 198                   | Muslim Aid                      | 1985 | ch j r: \$ m:        | 5       |        |        | 0 581  | 89   | 5       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 199                   | NADEC-Natl Assn Dev Ed Centres  | 1980 | nd                   |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 200                   | Namibia Refugee Project         | 1981 | j: \$ m x: e ag f    | 2       | 0      | 0 33   | 0 056  | 89   | 2       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 0%   | 90%     | 10%    |
| 201                   | Namibia Support Committee       |      | s                    |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 202                   | Natl Adult School Orgn          | 1899 | j: \$ m: h e         | 2       | 0      |        |        |      | 2       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 0%   | 100%    | 0%     |
| 203                   | Natl Children's Home Overseas   | 1869 | j l: \$ x: k         |         |        | 43 49  | 0 285  | 89   |         |         |       |       | 7%   | 23%     | 70%    |
| 204                   | NCVO-Natl Council for Vol Orgs  | 1919 | s n                  |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 205                   | New Economics Foundation        | 1986 | a                    | 3       |        | 0 03   | 0 080  | 90   | 3       | 0       |       |       | 1%   | 95%     | 0%     |
| 206                   | New Internationalist            |      | md                   |         |        |        |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 207                   | Newsvision                      | 1988 | md                   | 5       |        |        |        |      | 5       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 208                   | Nicaraguan Health Fund          | 1986 | j: \$: cs h          | 2       | 1      | 0 20   | 0 163  | 88   | 2       | 0       | 1     | 0     | 3%   | 97%     | 0%     |

| British NGO Data Bank |                                 |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|------------|--------------------------|--------|-------------|--------|------|---------|---------|-------|-------|------|---------|--------|
| Charities             | Fdn                             | Activities | t:Staff                  | t:Vols | \$m 87      | £m     | Year | h:Staff | a:Staff | h:Vol | a Vol | Self | Private | Public |
| 209                   | Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign   | 1978       | l                        | 5      |             | 0 200  | 89   | 4       | 1       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 210                   | Ockenden Venture                | 1952       | uk j: f e b h c s        | 150    |             | 2 370  | 89   | 100     | 50      |       |       |      |         |        |
| 211                   | One World Action                | 1989       | l d j: \$                | 6      | 0           | 1 000  | 90   | 6       | 0       | 0     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 212                   | One World Broadcasting Trust    | 1987       | d                        | 2      | 0 0.03      |        |      | 2       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 50%  | 50%     | 0%     |
| 213                   | One World Centre                | 1986       | l d                      | 3      | 2 0.04      |        |      | 3       | 0       | 2     | 0     | 7%   | 0%      | 93%    |
| 214                   | One World Week                  | 1977       | d                        | 2      | 3 0.07      | 0.043  | 88   | 2       | 0       | 3     | 0     | 25%  | 75%     | 0%     |
| 215                   | Operation Raleigh               | 1984       | d j: x: k                | 43     |             | 3 131  | 88   | 37      | 6       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 216                   | Opportunities for Women         | 1988       | j: \$: h b e w           | 9      | 0           | 0.150  | 89   | 8       | 1       | 0     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 217                   | Outward Bound Intl Secretariat  | 1946       |                          | 350    | 0 4.09      |        |      | 250     | 100     | 0     | 0     | 95%  | 3%      | 2%     |
| 218                   | Overseas Development Group      | 1967       | s                        |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 219                   | Overseas Development Institute  | 1960       | a                        | 40     | 0           | 1 000  | pa   | 40      | 0       | 0     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 220                   | Oxfam                           | 1942       | j l r: \$ x m: a g h e   | 1181   | 25000 68.69 | 66 718 | 89   | 1064    | 117     | 25000 | 0     | 41%  | 40%     | 19%    |
| 221                   | Oxford Development Ed Unit      |            | d m d s                  | 3      |             | 0 050  | pa   | 3       | 0       | 0     |       |      |         |        |
| 222                   | Oxford Mission                  | 1979       | ch j: k h w              | 1      |             | 0 248  | 88   | 1       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 223                   | Panos Institute                 | 1986       | a e m d: \$ x: v         | 33     | 2           | 1 500  | 89   | 33      | 0       | 2     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 224                   | Pestacides Trust                | 1987       | d: v                     | 1      | 0           |        |      | 1       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 10%  | 80%     | 10%    |
| 225                   | Pestalozzi Children's Village T | 1959       | j e: k                   | 40     |             | 0 887  | 89   | 40      | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 226                   | Plan Intl UK                    | 1937       | j: sp: k                 | 94     |             | 1 654  | 89   | 14      | 80      |       |       |      |         |        |
| 227                   | Plunkett Foundation             | 1919       | e x: b                   | 20     | 0           | 0.407  | 89   | 16      | 4       | 0     | 0     | 100% | 0%      | 0%     |
| 228                   | Population Concern              | 1972       | j: \$: p w               | 10     | 25          | 0 667  | 89   | 10      | 0       | 25    | 0     | 0%   | 50%     | 50%    |
| 229                   | Project Trust                   | 1968       | j: x: k h                | 13     | 30 0.50     | 0 411  | 89   | 12      | 1       | 15    | 15    | 0%   | 100%    | 0%     |
| 230                   | Quaker Peace and Service        | 1978       | ch j: \$: k h a g u      | 80     | 14 2.48     | 1 434  | 89   | 25      | 55      | 2     | 12    | 60%  | 32%     | 8%     |
| 231                   | Ranfurly Library Service        | 1954       | m: e                     | 20     |             | 0 132  | 88   | 20      | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 232                   | Reed Charities                  |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 233                   | Refugee Action                  | 1981       | uk s: f                  | 23     | 2 0.57      |        |      | 23      | 0       | 2     | 0     | 2%   | 3%      | 95%    |
| 234                   | Refugee Council                 |            | d j: l: f                | 160    |             | 5 712  | 89   | 160     | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 235                   | Regional Conf on Intl Vol Servi |            | n: x                     |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 236                   | Relief & Dev Institute          |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 237                   | Relief Society of Tigray        | 1978       | m: a g h e               | 3      |             |        |      | 3       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 238                   | Returned Volunteer Action       | 1960       | n: x                     | 3      | 0           | 0 055  | 87   | 3       | 0       | 0     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 239                   | Richmond Fellowship             |            | j: \$ m x: h             | 268    | 25 6.27     |        |      | 268     | 0       | 25    | 0     | 2%   | 7%      | 91%    |
| 240                   | Rufiji Leprosy Trust            | 1982       | j: \$ m x: h             | 0      | 7 0.06      |        |      | 0       | 0       | 5     | 2     | 0%   | 25%     | 75%    |
| 241                   | Rural Dev Counsellors for Chr C | 1971       | ch d: ag                 | 4      | 8 0.00      |        |      | 3       | 1       | 1     | 7     | 2%   | 16%     | 82%    |
| 242                   | Ryder Cheshire Mission          |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 243                   | Safer World Project             |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 244                   | Salvation Army                  | 1865       | ch j: n: o h e           |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 245                   | Sandy Gall's Afghanistan Appeal | 1983       | m: m: h f                |        |             | 0 203  | 89   |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 246                   | 'Save the Children Fund         | 1919       | j: n: sp: h r k o h w    | 2300   | 10000 56.41 | 50 433 | 89   | 300     | 2000    | 10000 | 0     | 5%   | 75%     | 20%    |
| 247                   | Schools Partnership Worldwide   | 1985       | n: m \$ x                |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 248                   | Scottish Cath Intl Aid Fund     | 1965       | ch r j: \$: e a g h w o  | 11     | 20 0.26     | 1.524  | 89   | 11      | 0       | 20    | 0     | 4%   | 88%     | 8%     |
| 249                   | Scottish Churches Action for W  | 1972       | ch i d                   | 2      | 0           | 0 025  | pa   | 2       | 0       | 0     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 250                   | Scottish Ed and Action for Dev  | 1977       | d j: \$ m w h f b        | 4      | 0 0.16      |        |      | 4       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 5%   | 75%     | 20%    |
| 251                   | Scottish Medical Aid Nicaragua  | 1981       | l j: m: h e              |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 252                   | Semi-Aid Lands Training Live    |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 253                   | Send a Cow                      |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 254                   | Sightsavers                     | 1950       | j: \$ x: h               | 55     |             | 6 371  | 88   | 55      | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 255                   | SIM International UK            | 1893       | ch j:                    | 16     |             | 2 903  | 88   | 16      | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 256                   | Soroptimist International       | 1921       | j: \$: w h               | 16     | 0           |        |      | 16      | 0       | 0     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 257                   | SOS Children's Villages UK      | 1966       | j: \$ m: e k             |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 258                   | SOS Sahel Intl UK               | 1981       | j: \$ m x: c s v e       | 18     | 14 0.38     | 0 578  | 89   | 8       | 10      | 10    | 4     | 0%   | 45%     | 55%    |
| 259                   | South America Missionary Soc    | 1844       | ch j \$ m x: h a g e k   | 91     | 105 1.47    | 0.887  | 88   | 21      | 70      | 100   | 5     | 10%  | 80%     | 10%    |
| 260                   | Special Projects in Christ Miss |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 261                   | Spread                          |            | \$                       |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 262                   | St. Francis Leprosy Guild       | 1890       | j: \$: h                 | 2      |             | 0 326  | 88   | 2       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 263                   | St. John Ambulance              | 1877       | j: m: h                  | 125    | 120000 6.54 |        |      | 100     | 25      | 90000 | 30000 | 70%  | 30%     | 0%     |
| 264                   | St. Joseph's Hospice Assn       | 1966       | j: \$ m x: o h           | 146    | 40 0.13     | 0.780  | 88   | 106     | 40      | 20    | 20    | 100% | 0%      | 0%     |
| 265                   | Survival International          | 1969       | j l: \$ m x: h           | 18     | 8 0.25      | 0.195  | 88   | 12      | 6       | 6     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 266                   | Survive-MIVA                    | 1974       | ch m:                    | 8      | 0           | 0 460  | 87   | 8       | 0       | 0     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 267                   | Teaching Aids at Low Cost       | 1965       | m: e                     | 22     | 0           |        |      | 22      | 0       | 0     | 0     | 95%  | 5%      | 0%     |
| 268                   | Tear Fund                       | 1969       | ch j x \$ m: h a g e f   | 220    | 0 17.85     | 14 187 | 89   | 120     | 100     | 0     | 0     | 6%   | 90%     | 4%     |
| 269                   | Third World First               | 1969       | j l: \$: a g w e         | 5      | 0 0.21      | 0.110  | 88   | 5       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 10%  | 85%     | 5%     |
| 270                   | Third World Foundation          |            | s m d n                  |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 271                   | Third World Info Network        | 1985       | g n: \$ x m:             | 11     | 5 0.16      | 0.272  | 89   | 10      | 1       | 5     | 0     | 25%  | 75%     | 0%     |
| 272                   | Third World Media               | 1978       | d                        |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 273                   | Tibet Foundation                | 1985       | uk j ch: \$: g f e       | 0      |             | 0.035  | 89   | 0       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 274                   | Tibet Soc and Tibet Relief Fund | 1959       | : sp: f c s h e          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 275                   | Tools for Self-Reliance         | 1978       | m: \$: b e w             | 10     | 300 0.10    | 0.115  | 89   | 10      | 0       | 300   | 0     | 20%  | 70%     | 100%   |
| 276                   | Tower Hamlets Intl Solidarity   | 1981       | s d j: \$ m: f h         | 2      | 10 0.05     |        |      | 2       | 0       | 10    | 0     | 2%   | 96%     | 2%     |
| 277                   | Trade Union Intl Research & Ed  | 1976       | a: u                     | 4      | 0 0.22      | 0 146  | 89   | 4       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 60%  | 40%     | 0%     |
| 278                   | Traidcraft Exchange             | 1979       | j: \$ m x: b w           | 7      | 0 0.23      | 0.129  | 89   | 7       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 100% | 0%      | 0%     |
| 279                   | Transnationals Info Centre Ldn  | 1984       | d                        | 3      | 0 0.10      |        |      | 3       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 55%  | 5%      | 40%    |
| 280                   | Transvaal, Zimb & Botswana Assn |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 281                   | Trax                            |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 282                   | Trust for Ed and Development    | 1967       | d                        |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 283                   | Uganda Development Services     | 1988       | s r: \$                  | 0      | 2           |        |      | 0       | 0       | 2     | 0     | 100% | 0%      | 0%     |
| 284                   | Uganda Society for Disabled Ch  | 1988       | j: \$: h k               |        |             | 0 376  | 89   |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 285                   | UK Committee for UNICEF         | 1956       | d                        |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 286                   | UK Council for Computing Dev    | 1981       | s m d                    |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 287                   | UK Fdn..Peoples..South Pacific  | 1981       | j: \$ x: b e p t         | 6      | 14 0.11     |        |      | 1       | 5       | 3     | 11    | 5%   | 70%     | 25%    |
| 288                   | UK One World Linking Assn       | 1985       | n s                      | 0      |             |        |      | 0       | 0       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 289                   | UNIPAL                          |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 290                   | UN Association                  | 1945       | d m d                    |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 291                   | UN Assn Ed'l Trust fr Scotland  | 1986       | d: k                     |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 292                   | UN Intl Service                 | 1953       | j: x: h v b a g          | 12     | 42 1.38     |        |      | 7       | 5       | 0     | 42    | 0%   | 40%     | 60%    |
| 293                   | UNICEF UK                       |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 294                   | United World Colleges           | 1962       | e                        | 60     | 0 0.96      |        |      | 10      | 50      | 0     | 0     | 100% | 0%      | 0%     |
| 295                   | United World Ed & Research Trst |            | m d                      |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 296                   | Urban Aid                       | 1987       | k: \$ x: j e             | 1      |             | 0.132  | 89   | 0       | 1       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 297                   | Vegfam                          |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 298                   | Vetaid                          | 1987       | j: x: a g                | 12     |             | 0 023  | ?    | 9       | 3       |       |       |      |         |        |
| 299                   | Vietnamese Refugee Cmty in Ldn  | 1984       | uk: f                    |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 300                   | Voluntary Missionary Movement   | 1969       | ch j: x: h w a g e h     | 10     | 900 0.26    | 0.140  | pa   | 8       | 2       | 800   | 100   | 100% | 0%      | 0%     |
| 301                   | Voluntary Service Overseas      | 1959       | x                        | 190    | 1200 1.64   | 12.500 | 90   | 130     | 60      | 0     | 1200  | 0%   | 10%     | 90%    |
| 302                   | Welfare State Intl              |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 303                   | Winds of Friendship             |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 304                   | War on Want                     | 1952       | d j: m \$: c s h e a g b | 26     | 0           |        |      | 26      | 0       | 0     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 305                   | War on Want Campaigns           |            | l                        |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 306                   | WaterAid                        | 1981       | l j: t                   | 25     | 1010 2.88   | 2 266  | 89   | 10      | 15      | 1000  | 10    | 0%   | 80%     | 20%    |
| 307                   | Welsh Centre for Intl Affairs   | 1973       | d j: \$ x: a g w         | 6      | 0 0.10      | 0 081  | 88   | 6       | 0       | 0     | 0     | 65%  | 15%     | 20%    |
| 308                   | Womenaid                        |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 309                   | Womankind                       | 1989       | j: \$: e v h w           |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 310                   | Women's Corona Society          |            |                          |        |             |        |      |         |         |       |       |      |         |        |
| 311                   | W Assn for Christian Comuncn    | 1975       | s ch j: \$ m x:          | 21     | 0 2.87      |        |      | 21      | 0       | 0     | 0     |      |         |        |
| 312                   | World Assn of Girl Guides & Sco | 1928       | j: \$ m x: k w           | 30     | 0 1.43      |        |      | 30      | 0       | 0     | 0     | 90%  | 10%     | 0%     |



| Canadian NGO Data Bank |                                 |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|------|----------------------|--------|--------|--------|---------|-------|---------|--------------|------|---------|------|
|                        | Organizations                   | Fdn  | Sectors              | tStaff | aStaff | hStaff | tVols   | aVols | hVols   | Budget US\$K | Self | Private | Govt |
| 1                      | Action Matadi-Luozi Inc.        | 1979 | f d j: \$: e cs      | 13     | 0      | 13     | 13      | 1     | 12      | 41 055       |      | 51      | 49   |
| 2                      | Adventist Dev and Relief Agency |      | j: m x \$            | 2      | 1      | 1      | 2000    | 0     | 2000    | 3866 110     |      |         |      |
| 3                      | Africa Evangelical Fellowship   |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 4                      | African Canadian Council        |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 5                      | African Inland Mission          | 1953 | ch j: m: e ag t h r  | 99     | 96     | 3      | 0       | 0     | 0       | 1606 522     |      |         |      |
| 6                      | African Medical & Research Fdn  | 1973 | j: \$ x: h e k s     | 2      | 0      | 2      | 32      | 0     | 32      |              |      |         |      |
| 7                      | African Wildlife Husbandry Assn |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 8                      | Aga Khan Fdn                    |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 9                      | O&T Agdevco Ltd                 |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 10                     | Agricultural Dev Coop of Sask   |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 11                     | Agricultural Inst of Canada     |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 12                     | Agrosysts                       | 1978 | s: t e ag            | 12     | 2      | 10     | 2       | 2     | 0       |              | 60   | 40      |      |
| 13                     | Aide medical Intle a l'enfance  | 1974 | j: x \$ sp: h e      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 60      | 0     | 60      | 451 731      | 6    | 80      | 14   |
| 14                     | Aide medicale pour la Palestine | 1983 | j: m x \$: h         | 2      | 0      | 2      | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 15                     | Alles de l'esperance            |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 16                     | Alternet Communications Assn    | 1988 | s                    |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 17                     | Anglican Church of Canada       |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 18                     | L'Arche                         |      | j \$ h k cs          |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 19                     | Arusha Centre                   | 1971 | d                    | 10     | 0      | 10     | 40      | 0     | 40      |              |      |         |      |
| 20                     | Asia Pacific Fdn                | 1984 | d                    |        |        |        |         |       |         | 1686 006     | 0    | 22      | 78   |
| 21                     | Asst medicale Intle             | 1967 | m: h                 | 13     | 0      | 13     | 450     | 0     | 450     |              |      | 20      | 80   |
| 22                     | Assn cdne pr l'aide a l'enfance | 1919 | j: \$ x: k           |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 23                     | Assn des cooperants/vol de rtr  | 1988 | dn                   |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 24                     | AUCC Assn of Cdn Cmty Colleges  | 1970 | e x m \$             | 47     | 0      | 47     | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 25                     | Assn Granby... villes jumelees  |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 26                     | Assn of Kinsmen Clubs           |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 27                     | Assn pour le dev participe      |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 28                     | Assn Q des org coop Intl -AQOCI | 1976 | n ds: \$             | 14     | 0      | 14     | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 29                     | Assn Q pour l'avancemt des NU   |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 30                     | Baptist Union in W Canada       |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 31                     | Barbara Ward Centre             |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 32                     | Boy Scouts                      | 1908 | k                    | 2      | 0      | 2      | 714     | 0     | 714     |              |      |         |      |
| 33                     | BC Council for Intl Coop        |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 34                     | Bureau de la Coop Intle         | 1985 | a f                  | 7      | 0      | 7      | 0       | 0     | 0       | 301 600      |      | 80      | 20   |
| 35                     | Call of the Poor                | 1982 | j: \$ h e ag         | 0      | 0      | 0      | 255     | 0     | 255     | 801.235      | 100  | 0       | 0    |
| 36                     | Calmeadow Charitable Fdn        | 1983 | j: \$: b             | 8      | 1      | 7      | 0       | 0     | 0       | 499 229      |      |         |      |
| 37                     | Camrose Intl Inst               | 1977 | j d: \$ e ag         | 6      | 0      | 6      | 150     | 0     | 150     | 479.453      | 3    | 10      | 87   |
| 38                     | Cda-Carib C Am Polky Alternati  | 1982 | a                    | 3      | 0      | 3      | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 39                     | Cda-Asia Working Group          |      | ch n a d             | 2      | 0      | 2      | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 40                     | Canada-India Village Aid        |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 41                     | Canada World Youth              | 1971 | x                    | 120    | 70     | 50     | 800     | 800   | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 42                     | Canada-South Africa Coop        |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 43                     | Cdn Aid for Sn Africa Refugees  | 1977 | j r \$: e h hr       |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 44                     | Cdn Assn of Sov Order Malta     |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 45                     | Cdn Baha'i Intl Dev Services    |      | j ch: h e            | 0      | 0      | 0      | 6       | 0     | 6       |              |      |         |      |
| 46                     | Cdn Baptist Fed                 | 1944 | r j: \$: ag h e      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 47                     | Cdn Baptist Overseas Mission Bd | 1911 | ch j: S x            | 140    | 125    | 15     | 1       | 0     | 1       | 3770.000     | 0    | 92      | 8    |
| 48                     | Cdn Baptist Relief & Dev Ctee   |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 49                     | Cdn Bureau for Intl Ed, CBIE    | 1966 | e                    | 32     | 0      | 32     | 0       | 0     | 0       | 1457.471     |      |         |      |
| 50                     | Cdn Cath Org for Dev and Peace  | 1967 | d j ch: m x \$: e h  | 66     | 0      | 66     | 5000    | 0     | 5000    | 15690.966    | 0    | 60      | 40   |
| 51                     | Cdn Consortium of Mgmt Schools  |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 52                     | Cdn Coop Assn                   | 1987 | j: x m \$: ag ed w s | 48     | 13     | 35     | 0       | 0     | 0       | 0.000        | 20   | 80      |      |
| 53                     | Cdn Council of Churches         | 1944 | n                    | 10     | 0      | 10     | 0       | 0     | 0       | 377.000      |      |         |      |
| 54                     | Cdn Council Christian Churches  |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 55                     | CCIC                            |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 56                     | Cdn Crossroads Intl             | 1958 | j: S vl              | 21     | 0      | 21     | 602     | 102   | 500     | 1567.187     | 2    | 18      | 80   |
| 57                     | Cdn Environmental Network       |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 58                     | Cdn Executives Serv Org - CESO  | 1967 | x                    | 91     | 46     | 45     | 5000    | 2500  | 2500    | 4147.000     | 0    | 6       | 94   |
| 59                     | Cdn Feed the Children Society   |      | j: m                 | 2      | 0      | 2      | 0       | 0     | 0       | 1797.278     | 0    | 100     | 0    |
| 60                     | Cdn Food for Children           |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 61                     | Cdn Foodgrains Bank             | 1983 | r S: s ag            | 7      | 0      | 7      | 350     | 0     | 350     | 16588.000    | 17   | 18      | 65   |
| 62                     | Cdn Fdn for Carib Dev & Coop    |      | j: m x \$: t ag e h  | 30     | 0      | 30     | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 63                     | Cdn Fdn for World Dev           | 1976 | j: x \$: h           | 0      | 0      | 0      | 42      | 12    | 30      | 196.040      | 0    | 100     | 0    |
| 64                     | Cdn Friends Service Cmtee       | 1931 | j r d: \$ x: e h f   | 3      | 0      | 3      | 350     | 50    | 300     | 253.396      |      |         |      |
| 65                     | Cdn Home Economics Assn         | 1939 | u: x                 | 6      | 2      | 4      | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 66                     | Cdn Hunger Fdn                  | 1961 | j: ag t              | 12     | 0      | 12     | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 67                     | Cdn Inst for Cultrual Affairs   | 1976 | j: \$ x m: ag e s    | 18     | 4      | 14     | 25      | 0     | 25      |              |      |         |      |
| 68                     | Cdn Jesuit Missions             | 1955 | ch j: \$ m x: h p cs | 52     | 44     | 8      | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 69                     | Cdn Labour Congress             | 1956 | u                    | 89     | 4      | 85     | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 70                     | Cdn Lung Assn                   |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 71                     | Cdn Lutheran World Relief       | 1946 | ch j r: \$ f         | 7      | 0      | 7      | 400     | 0     | 400     | 5556.536     | 0    | 40      | 60   |
| 72                     | Cdn Medical Assn                | 1867 | e: \$ m x            | 200    | 0      | 200    | 0       | 0     | 0       | 3770.000     |      |         |      |
| 73                     | Cdn Medical Aid Program         |      | m: h                 | 20     | 10     | 10     | 10      | 10    | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 74                     | Cdn Natl Inst for The Blind     | 1918 | \$ x: h              | 4      | 0      | 4      | 0       | 0     | 0       | 0.000        | 0    |         |      |
| 75                     | Cdn Nature Federation           |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 76                     | Cdn Org for Dev Thru Education  | 1959 | j: \$ m: e           | 30     | 27     | 3      | 200     | 0     | 200     | 4639.233     | 0    | 8       | 92   |
| 77                     | Cdn Org for Rehab Thru Training | 1952 | : \$ \$: e           | 16     | 0      | 16     | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 78                     | Cdn Physicians for Aid & Relief | 1983 | j: x: h ag           | 40     | 35     | 5      | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 79                     | Cdn Red Cross Society           | 1896 | j: \$ m x: h         | 6215   | 15     | 6200   | 2500000 | 0     | 2500000 | 188500.000   |      |         |      |
| 80                     | Cdn Rotary Club                 |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 81                     | Cdn Save the Children Fund      |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 82                     | Cdn Teachers' Fed               | 1920 | u: \$ m x: e         | 42     | 2      | 40     | 900     | 0     | 900     | 50518.000    | 0    | 78      | 22   |
| 83                     | Cdn UNICEF Committee            | 1955 | d                    |        |        |        | 1650    |       |         | 1056 000     | 23   | 28      | 49   |
| 84                     | Campaneros Project              |      | d j: \$ m: e         |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 85                     | Capracan Intl                   | 1983 | j: \$ x: ag          | 5      | 2      | 3      | 3       | 0     | 3       |              |      |         |      |
| 86                     | Cardinal Leger et ses oeuvres   | 1969 | j: \$: h e ag        | 10     | 0      | 10     | 100     | 0     | 100     | 4524 000     | 0    | 60      | 40   |
| 87                     | CARE Canada                     | 1946 | j: \$ m x: h ag b r  | 65     | 35     | 30     | 0       | 0     | 0       | 185.000      | 0    | 15      | 85   |
| 88                     | Carrefour de solidarite Intle   | 1973 | j: \$ m: ag t u ed   | 8      | 0      | 8      | 300     | 0     | 300     |              | 0    | 52      | 48   |
| 89                     | Carrefour des cedres            | 1979 | j: \$: h e u         | 4      | 0      | 4      | 20      | 1     | 19      | 320.000      | 0    | 15      | 85   |
| 90                     | Carrefour Intle                 |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 91                     | Carrefour Latino-Americain      | 1981 | Cda s f              | 5      | 0      | 5      | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 92                     | Carrefour Tiers-Monde           | 1969 | d                    | 4      | 0      | 4      | 50      | 0     | 50      | 139 000      | 0    | 20      | 80   |
| 93                     | Cause Canada                    |      |                      |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 94                     | Ctre amitie solida Intl de l'Am | 1982 | j \$ x: ag e         | 2      | 0      | 2      | 28      | 0     | 28      | 121.000      | 15   | 10      | 75   |
| 95                     | Centre d'ed et coop Intle-CECI  | 1958 | j \$ x h e w         | 100    | 50     | 50     | 300     | 250   | 50      | 10556.000    | 5    | 5       | 90   |
| 96                     | Centre de solidarite Intle      |      | j \$: w e ag         |        |        |        |         |       |         |              |      |         |      |
| 97                     | Centre d'etudes arabes pour dev | 1984 | j d ch: \$           | 1      | 0      | 1      | 30      | 0     | 30      | 40.000       | 40   | 0       | 60   |
| 98                     | Centre d'Info/doc sur le Moz e  | 1982 | d                    | 4      | 0      | 4      | 0       | 0     | 0       | 0 000        | 0    | 0       | 0    |
| 99                     | Centre for Intl coop-Thunder Ba | 1971 | sp: \$ m x: e        | 0      | 0      | 0      | 25      | 0     | 25      | 9 000        | 0    | 100     | 0    |
| 100                    | Ctre Intl solidarite ouvriere   | 1975 | u: \$                | 3      | 0      | 3      | 0       | 0     | 0       |              |      |         |      |
| 101                    | Centre missionaire Oblat        | 1958 | ch j: \$ m x: e ag h | 4      | 0      | 4      | 7       | 4     | 3       | 23 000       | 20   | 40      | 40   |
| 102                    | Change for Children             | 1977 | j: \$: ag h g        |        |        |        |         |       |         | 427 000      | 0    | 50      | 50   |
| 103                    | Child Haven International       | 1985 | j: \$ m x k h w      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 5       | 0     | 5       |              |      |         |      |
| 104                    | Children's Intl Summer Villages | 1961 | \$: k e              |        |        |        |         |       |         | 10.000       | 0    | 100     | 0    |

Canadian NGO Data Bank

|     | Organizations                   | Fdn   | Sectors                    | tStaff | aStaff | hStaff | tVols | aVols | hVols | Budget US\$K | Self | Private | Govt |
|-----|---------------------------------|-------|----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|--------------|------|---------|------|
| 105 | Christian & Miss Alliance in Cd |       | ch j: \$ m x: h p          |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 106 | Christian Asst for Underdev Soc | 1984  | ch j: x \$: h, r e a g     | 8      | 5      | 3      | 8     | 3     | 5     |              |      |         |      |
| 107 | Christian Blind Mission Intl    |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 108 | Christian Children's Fund of Cd |       | ch j r: x \$ b a g v h p k | 33     | 7      | 28     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 5299 000     |      |         |      |
| 109 | Christian Farmers Fed of Albert |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 110 | Christian Med Dental Soc of Cda |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 111 | Christian Missions in Many Land |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 112 | Christ'n Reformed World Relief  | 1982  | j ch: \$ m x: a g h e      | 55     | 0      | 55     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 5091 000     | 0    | 100     | 0    |
| 113 | Citizens for Public Justice     |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 114 | Club 2/3 Inc.                   | 1970  | d j: \$ e h a g p b        | 12     | 0      | 12     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 2299 000     |      |         |      |
| 115 | Co-development Canada           |       | d j: \$ e h h r u          |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 116 | Collaboration sante Intle       | 1975  | m                          | 7      | 0      | 7      | 1600  | 1500  | 100   | 1464 000     | 0    | 67      | 33   |
| 117 | Compassion of Cda               | 1964  | j: \$: f r o e t w h       | 19     | 1      | 18     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 645 000      | 2    | 84      | 14   |
| 118 | Comite de solidarite de Tiers M |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 119 | Cmte de solidarite de Trois Riv | 1975  | d j: \$ m: a g             | 3      | 0      | 3      | 25    | 0     | 25    |              |      |         |      |
| 120 | Cmte reg d'ed dev... Lanaudiere | 1976  | d                          | 4      | 0      | 4      | 60    | 0     | 60    | 69 000       | 10   | 5       | 85   |
| 121 | Community Dev Canada            |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 122 | Cooperation Canada Mozambique   |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 123 | Cooperation nord-sud en educati | 1982  | j: \$: e                   |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 124 | Co-operative Union of Cda       |       | j: \$ m: u                 |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 125 | Cooperative Dev Foundation      |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 126 | Council of Muslim Communities   | 1973  | ch j r: \$: h              |        |        |        |       |       |       | 299 000      |      |         |      |
| 127 | Coup de pouce - Ayuda           |       | s                          | 0      | 0      | 0      | 7     | 0     | 7     |              |      |         |      |
| 128 | CREDI-Lanaudiere                |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 129 | Croix-d'or                      | 1948  | j: \$: o k c s             |        |        |        |       |       |       | 361 000      | 0    | 67      | 33   |
| 130 | Cross Border Coalition          | 1988  | n r t: \$ o                | 2      | 0      | 2      |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 131 | Crossroads Christ'n Communicat  |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 132 | CUSO                            | 1961  | j: \$ m x: h a w           | 277    | 168    | 109    | 0     | 0     | 0     | 19076 000    | 0    | 16      | 84   |
| 133 | Developing Countries Farm Radio | 1979  | s                          | 11     | 0      | 11     | 806   | 800   | 6     | 375 000      | 0    | 54      | 46   |
| 134 | Dev Ed Centre                   |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 135 | Dev Ed Co-ord'g Council of AB   | 1981  | d n                        | 3      | 0      | 3      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 122 000      | 0    | 14      | 86   |
| 136 | Dev Ed Resource & Info Centre   | 1973  | d                          | 2      | 0      | 2      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 60 000       | 15   | 10      | 75   |
| 137 | Development Education Centre    | 1971  | d                          | 20     | 0      | 20     | 100   | 0     | 100   | 905 000      | 70   | 5       | 25   |
| 138 | Dev Intl des etudiants coll/uni | 1985  | j: m x: h                  | 0      | 0      | 0      | 10    | 10    | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 139 | Development Workshop            | 1981  | j: m x: e                  | 11     | 8      | 3      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 226 000      | 10   | 0       | 90   |
| 140 | Disabled Peoples Intl           | 1981  | :x: e                      | 14     | 0      | 14     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 700 000      | 2    | 8       | 90   |
| 141 | Dr Daphne Da Costa Mem Fdn      |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 142 | Eastern and Sthn Afr Mgmt Inst  |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 143 | Economic Dev Intl Assn Inc      |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 144 | Ecumenical C'ncl for Ec Justice | 1973  | l                          | 4      | 0      | 4      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 145 | Edmonton Learner Centre         | 1973  | d                          | 3      | 0      | 3      | 150   | 0     | 150   | 115 000      | 33   | 1       | 66   |
| 146 | Emmanuel Relief and Rehab Intl  | 1975  | j r: \$ m x: a g           | 0      | 0      | 0      | 60    | 30    | 30    | 1885 000     | 2    | 38      | 60   |
| 147 | Energy Probe                    | 1974  | d: v                       | 17     | 0      | 17     | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 148 | Entraide Missionarie Inc.       |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 149 | Eritrean Relief Assn In Canada  |       | j r: \$: f                 | 3      | 0      | 3      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 150 | Ethiopia Airlift/Adopt-a-Villag |       | j r: \$: f                 | 3      | 0      | 3      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 151 | Evangelical Medical Aid Society | 1948  | ch: m x: h                 | 2      | 0      | 2      | 300   | 0     | 300   | 441 000      | 10   | 90      | 0    |
| 152 | Farmers for Peace               |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 153 | Federated Women's Instl of Cda  |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 154 | Fed of Cdn Municipalities       |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 155 | Fellowship of Evang Baptist Ch  |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 156 | Fond Batisseurs d'espoire Haiti |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 157 | Fond' Crudem Canado-Haiti       | 1974  | j: \$ x                    | 10     | 10     | 0      | 30    | 0     | 30    | 189 000      | 0    | 50      | 50   |
| 158 | Fond' Guadeloupe Inc            |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 159 | Fond' Intle Roncalli            |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 160 | Fond' Jules et Paul-Emile Leger | 1981  | ch j: \$ m x: e c s w k e  |        |        |        |       |       |       | 5429 000     | 0    | 67      | 33   |
| 161 | Fond' P Gerin-Lajoie coop Intle |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 162 | Fond' de la Salle               |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 163 | Fond' temoignage frater partage | 1964  | j sp: \$ m x: h c s b      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 20    | 10    | 10    | 23 000       | 10   | 90      | 0    |
| 164 | Fdn TAB, Inc.                   |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 165 | Fdn for Intl Training           | 1976  | j: x \$: b s               | 29     | 8      | 21     | 6     | 3     | 3     | 3619 000     | 0    | 10      | 90   |
| 166 | Foster Parents Plan of Cda      | 1937  | sp j: m x: t a g h e c s k | 5857   | 5802   | 55     | 13    | 0     | 13    |              | 0    | 81      | 19   |
| 167 | Fraternite Vietnam              | 1977  | j: \$ m: k e h             | 1      | 0      | 1      | 20    | 0     | 20    |              |      |         |      |
| 168 | Fredericton YM-YWCA Intl Dept   | 1858  | d j: \$: k c s e           |        |        |        |       |       |       | 45 000       | 0    | 25      | 75   |
| 169 | Friends of SOS Children's Villa | 1969  | j: \$ x: k                 | 1      | 0      | 1      | 5     | 2     | 3     | 4 000        | 0    | 90      | 10   |
| 170 | Friends of the Earth            | 1979  | d: v                       | 5      | 0      | 5      | 30    | 0     | 30    | 125 000      | 4    | 67      | 29   |
| 171 | Frontiers Foundation            | 1964  | s: e                       | 0      | 0      | 0      | 94    | 4     | 90    |              |      |         |      |
| 172 | Gestion Nord-Sud                |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 173 | Girl Guides of Canada           | 1910  | j: \$: w b v e k a g o     |        |        |        |       |       |       | 73 000       |      |         |      |
| 174 | Global Ed-med Supplies Inc.     | 1982  | j: \$ m x: h c s e o a g b | 4      | 0      | 4      | 20    | 0     | 20    | 792 000      | 0    | 89      | 11   |
| 175 | Global Community Centre         | 1974  | d                          | 5      | 0      | 5      | 75    | 0     | 75    | 117 000      | 5    | 22      | 73   |
| 176 | Global Village (Nanaimo)        | 1976  | d                          | 4      | 0      | 4      | 2     | 0     | 2     | 63 000       | 5    | 20      | 75   |
| 177 | Gouv du Quebec-Intl Affaires    |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 178 | Govt of Nova Scotia-Dept Fish   |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 179 | Groupe Action Nord-Sud          |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 180 | Groupe d'appui & dev Instl-GADI |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 181 | Gurkha Welfare Appeal Canada    |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 182 | Habitat for Humanity Canada     | 1968  | j: \$: c s                 | 2      | 0      | 2      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              | 0    | 100     | 0    |
| 183 | Help a Village Effort           |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 184 | Help the Aged                   | 1975  | r j: \$ m: h o c s         | 3      | 0      | 3      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 185 | Hope Intl Dev Agency            | 1975  | j: \$ m x: a g h e b k     | 21     | 5      | 16     | 15    | 3     | 12    | 317 000      | 12   | 48      | 40   |
| 186 | Horizons of Friendship          | 1973  | j: \$: f w h e             | 14     | 2      | 12     | 10    | 10    | 0     | 1211 000     | 0    | 70      | 30   |
| 187 | Human Concern Intl              |       | j: \$: f a g h e           | 152    | 150    | 2      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 188 | The Hunger Project              | 1977  | l                          | 11     | 0      | 11     | 1000  | 0     | 1000  | 445 000      | 0    | 100     | 0    |
| 189 | Infant Feeding Action Coalition | 1979  | l                          | 2      | 0      | 2      | 200   | 0     | 200   |              | 0    | 70      | 20   |
| 190 | Inst cdn d'education d' adultes | 1956  | l                          |        |        |        |       |       |       |              | 0    | 30      | 70   |
| 191 | Inst Card Leger contr la lepre  | 1962  | j: \$: h                   | 4      | 0      | 4      | 10    | 0     | 10    | 1288 000     | 0    | 77      | 33   |
| 192 | Inst of Cult Affairs Canada     |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 193 | Inst for Dev Ed Through the Art | 1976  | d                          | 3      | 0      | 3      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 194 | Inst for the Study/App of Integ | 1975  | j: \$ m x: w a g t b       | 7      | 5      | 2      | 16    | 0     | 16    | 449 000      |      |         |      |
| 195 | Inst pour culture et la coop    | 1964  | j: m: e h k                | 4      | 0      | 4      | 3     | 0     | 3     | 50 000       | 0    | 69      | 31   |
| 196 | Inter Pares                     | 1976  | j: \$: e d u a g           | 14     | 1      | 13     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 2985 000     | 8    | 46      | 46   |
| 197 | Inter-Ch Ctee on HRs LA-ICCHRLA |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 198 | Inter-Ch Fund forIntl Dev-ICFID | 1975  | j: \$: h a g               | 2      | 0      | 2      | 2     | 2     | 0     | 1734 000     | 34   | 0       | 66   |
| 199 | Inter-Cultural Dev Ed Assn      | 11972 | d                          | 3      | 0      | 3      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0 000        |      |         |      |
| 200 | Intl Assn for Students of Ec    |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 201 | Intl Assn Transform of Man      | 1979  | j: \$ x: a g e h k         |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 202 | Intl Centre, Queens' U          |       |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 203 | Intl Child Care (Cda) Inc       | 1973  | j: \$ m x: h p t k         | 200    | 198    | 2      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 687 000      | 0    | 31      | 69   |
| 204 | Intl Council for Adult Educatio | 1973  | l n                        | 17     | 0      | 17     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1209 000     | 0    | 50      | 50   |
| 205 | Intl Council on Social Welfare  | 1926  | e: \$ x                    | 1      | 0      | 1      | 150   | 0     | 150   | 29631 000    |      |         |      |
| 206 | Intl Def & Aid Fund for Sn Afr  | 1980  | d: hr                      |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 207 | Intl Dev Ed Cmtee of Ontario    | 1975  | d n                        | 5      | 0      | 5      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 208 | Intl Dev Ed Resource Assn       | 1974  | d                          | 4      | 0      | 4      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 75 000       | 25   | 0       | 75   |

## Canadian NGO Data Bank

|     | Organizations                   | Fdn  | Sectors                    | tStaff | aStaff | hStaff | tVols | aVols | hVols | Budget US\$K | Self | Private | Govt |
|-----|---------------------------------|------|----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|--------------|------|---------|------|
| 209 | Intl Dev Enterprises Assn Inc   |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 210 | Intl Dev and Refugee Fdn        |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 211 | Intl Dev Office, AUCC           | 1978 | s: e                       | 24     | 0      | 24     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1722 362     |      |         |      |
| 212 | Intl Ed Centre, St. Mary's U    | 1972 | d                          | 11     | 0      | 11     | 100   | 0     | 100   | 164.000      |      |         |      |
| 213 | Intl Family Farm Exchange Assn  |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 214 | Intl Inst for Sust Dev - IISD   |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 215 | Intl Needs Canada               |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 216 | Intl Social Service Cda         | 1979 | j: hr f                    | 7      | 0      | 7      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 217 | Intl Sound Found Society        |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 218 | Jamaican Hosp and Med Equip Soc |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 219 | Jamaican Self-Help Org          |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 220 | JMJ Children's Fund of Cda Inc. | 1972 | j sp: m \$: h o p k        |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 221 | Jesuit Centre for Soc Faith Jus | 1979 | ch j r: \$ x: f c s ag b h | 20     | 0      | 20     | 20    | 0     | 20    | 584.000      | 15   | 77      | 8    |
| 222 | Jeunesse du Monde               |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 223 | Jewish Assn for Development     |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 224 | KW Overseas Aid                 | 1967 | d                          | 0      | 0      | 0      | 15    | 0     | 15    | 347.000      | 0    | 100     | 0    |
| 225 | Kirathimo International         | 1965 | j: \$ m x: h               |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 226 | The Leprosy Mission of Canada   |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 227 | Lion Bob McAllister Foundation  |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 228 | London Cross-Cultural Learner C |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 229 | Mahatma Gandhi Kendra Soc Cda   | 1985 | j \$ x: ag b e h           |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 230 | MB Council Intl Coop - MCIC     | 1974 | n                          | 5      | 0      | 5      | 100   | 0     | 100   | 151 000      | 5    | 20      | 75   |
| 231 | MB Interch Cmtee for W Dev Ed   |      | ch d                       |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 232 | The Marquis Project             |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 233 | MATCH Intl Centre               | 1976 | j: \$: w                   | 7      | 0      | 7      | 100   | 0     | 100   | 435.000      | 2    | 21      | 77   |
| 234 | Mennonite Brethren Missions     | 1945 | ch r j: \$ m x: e h ag     | 151    | 140    | 11     | 22    | 22    | 0     | 3959 000     | 7    | 88      | 5    |
| 235 | Mennonite Central Cmtee (Cda)   |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 236 | Mennonite Ec Dev Assn           |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 237 | Mission Aviation Fellowship     | 1973 | j: \$ m x: t h             | 41     | 33     | 8      | 2     | 0     | 2     | 1350 000     | 0    | 93      | 7    |
| 238 | Moravian Mission Dev Fund       |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 239 | My World                        | 1985 |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 240 | National Farmers' Union         | 1969 | j: \$: ag                  | 14     | 0      | 14     | 7000  | 0     | 7000  | 452.000      | 0    | 100     | 0    |
| 241 | National Spiritual Assmb Bahais |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 242 | Nepal School Projects           | 1974 | j: m x: e cs h t           |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 243 | North-South Institute           |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 244 | Oeuvres de Deur Moussa, les     |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 245 | One Sky The SK Cross-Cult Ctre  | 1973 | d                          | 4      | 0      | 4      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 128 000      | 25   | 10      | 65   |
| 246 | ON Council for Intl Coop - OCIC |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 247 | ON Intl Dev Programme           |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 248 | Operation Blessing Guyana       |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 249 | Operation Eyesight Universal    | 1983 | j: \$ m x: h               | 14     | 0      | 14     | 250   | 0     | 250   | 3279.000     | 6    | 62      | 32   |
| 250 | Operation Lifeline              |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 251 | Org cdne pour l'ed service dev  | 1959 | j: \$ m x: e               | 38     | 3      | 35     | 100   | 0     | 100   | 7924.000     | 33   | 52      | 15   |
| 252 | Org cdne pour la solid et le de | 1983 | j: \$ x: f ag b r b        | 53     | 30     | 23     | 288   | 200   | 68    | 4901 000     | 0    | 8       | 92   |
| 253 | Org for Coop in Overseas Dev    | 1973 | x: e                       | 6      | 2      | 4      | 199   | 119   | 80    | 754.000      | 0    | 0       | 100  |
| 254 | Overseas Missionary Fellowship  |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 255 | OXFAM-Canada                    | 1983 | j: \$: h e ag f p u b      | 46     | 2      | 0      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 6978.000     |      |         |      |
| 256 | OXFAM-Quebec                    | 1973 | i j: \$: h e ag f p u b    | 15     | 0      | 15     | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 257 | Partenaires l'assn chret haupte | 1988 | ch j: \$                   | 2      | 0      | 2      | 30    | 0     | 30    |              |      |         |      |
| 258 | Partnership Africa Canada       | 1986 | j: \$: ag a h e            | 8      | 0      | 8      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 7540.000     | 0    | 0       | 100  |
| 259 | Pentecostal Assemblies of Cda   | 1919 | ch r j                     | 57     | 55     | 2      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 3260.000     |      |         |      |
| 260 | Plan NAGUA                      | 1989 | j: \$: ag e b v t          |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 261 | Planned Parenthood Fed of Cda   | 1989 | j: \$: p                   | 2      | 0      | 2      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 262 | Plenty Canada                   | 1976 | j: \$ m x: ag t e h        | 14     | 7      | 7      | 8     | 8     | 0     | 1508.000     | 30   | 10      | 60   |
| 263 | Potatoes Canada                 |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 264 | Presbyterian World Service      | 1956 | j r d: \$ x: ag h          | 55     | 50     | 5      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 870.000      | 5    | 50      | 45   |
| 265 | Primate's World Relief & Dev F  | 1959 | j \$ e b t                 | 15     | 0      | 15     | 6000  | 0     | 6000  | 3772.000     | 0    | 75      | 25   |
| 266 | Prodeva FIC. Inc                |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 267 | Program Angola                  |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 268 | Projets Bethel                  | 1977 | j: \$ m e cs               | 0      | 0      | 0      | 10    | 1     | 9     | 20.000       | 2    | 63      | 35   |
| 269 | Pueblito Cda                    | 1974 | j: \$: k h e               | 6      | 2      | 4      | 100   | 0     | 100   |              |      |         |      |
| 270 | Rallye Tiers-Monde Estrie Sherb | 1977 | j: \$ m: b e h             | 0      | 0      | 0      | 100   | 30    | 70    | 27.000       | 80   | 10      | 10   |
| 271 | Regions Beyond Missionary Union |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 272 | Regroupement Afriquebec         |      |                            | 7      | 0      | 7      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 273 | Relief Soc Tigray Support Cmtee | 1983 | cda j: \$: ag h b f        |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 274 | Richard St. Barbe Baker Fdn     | 1984 | d                          |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 275 | Rigpe Dorje Foundation          |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 276 | Rooftops Cdn Fdn                |      | d j: cs t b                |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 277 | Rotary Clubs of Canada          |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 278 | Royal Canadian Legion           |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 279 | Royal Life Saving Soc Cda - ON  |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 280 | Rural Advancement Fd Intl       |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 281 | The Salvation Army              |      | j: \$ m x: cs h e          |        |        |        |       |       |       | 3565.000     | 3    | 27      | 70   |
| 282 | Sask'wan Agriculture            |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 283 | Sask'wan Council for Intl Coop  | 1974 | n l s: \$                  | 5      | 0      | 5      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1048.000     |      |         |      |
| 284 | Save a Family Plan/St. P's Sem  | 1965 | sp j: \$: h ag cs          | 31     | 30     | 1      | 4469  | 4354  | 115   | 2095.000     | 0    | 90      | 10   |
| 285 | Save the Children-Cda           | 1921 | j: \$ m x: h w ag b t e k  | 65     | 30     | 35     | 800   | 0     | 800   | 5114 000     | 70   | 0       | 30   |
| 286 | Save the Children Fd of BC      | 1919 | j: \$ x: h k e w t         | 5      | 0      | 5      | 15    | 0     | 15    | 1082 000     | 10   | 40      | 50   |
| 287 | Scarborough Foreign Miss Soc    | 1918 | ch j r: \$ m x: h p e t    |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 288 | Secours aux aines               | 1981 | cda & overseas j: \$       |        |        |        |       |       |       | 103 000      | 0    | 100     | 0    |
| 289 | Secours aux lepreux (Cda Inc.)  | 1961 | j: \$: h                   | 3      | 0      | 3      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 2025.000     | 0    | 88      | 12   |
| 290 | Secours tiers-monde Quebec      |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 291 | Service Monde-Aml               | 1973 | ch j: \$: h e ag k         | 6      | 0      | 6      | 1     | 0     | 1     | 75.000       | 75   | 25      | 0    |
| 292 | Seva Service Socley             | 1978 | j: \$ m x: h f ag          | 13     | 1      | 12     | 25    | 0     | 25    | 113 000      | 2    | 72      | 26   |
| 293 | Shair Intl Resource Centre      | 1970 | d                          | 0      | 0      | 0      | 35    | 0     | 35    |              |      |         |      |
| 294 | Share Agriculture Foundation    | 1976 | j: \$: ag                  | 0      | 0      | 0      | 18    | 0     | 18    | 76 000       | 0    | 50      | 50   |
| 295 | Sibley Doudation                |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 296 | SILAM Christian Mission         |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 297 | SIM Canada                      | 1893 | ch j: \$ x: h e ag         | 166    | 124    | 42     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 3861 000     | 12   | 77      | 11   |
| 298 | Sir Edmund Hillary Fdn          |      | j: \$ mx: h                |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 299 | Social Justice Ctee of Montreal | 1975 | d                          | 3      | 0      | 3      | 26    | 1     | 25    | 30 000       | 0    | 40      | 60   |
| 300 | Soc de coop pour le dev Intl    | 1985 | j: x: b                    | 13     | 11     | 2      | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 301 | Soc de dev Intl Desjardins      | 1970 | j: \$ x: b                 | 67     | 30     | 37     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 7729.000     | 0    | 0       | 100  |
| 302 | Soc quebecoise solidarite Intle | 1980 | d: f                       | 1      | 0      | 1      | 12    | 0     | 12    |              |      |         |      |
| 303 | SOPAR-Limbour                   |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 304 | SOS Canada                      |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 305 | South Africa Educational Trust  |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 306 | South Asla Partnership          | 1981 | s: ag v h e b              | 56     | 8      | 50     | 0     | 0     | 0     |              |      |         |      |
| 307 | So Pacific Peoples Fdn of Cda   | 1975 | d j: \$: cs e              | 2      | 0      | 2      | 15    | 0     | 15    | 62 000       | 0    | 33      | 67   |
| 308 | South SK Cmtee for W Dev        | 1973 | d                          | 3      | 0      | 3      | 80    | 0     | 80    | 90 000       | 12   | 15      | 73   |
| 309 | Ten Days for World Dev          | 1973 | d l                        | 4      | 0      | 4      | 1000  | 0     | 1000  | 237 000      | 0    | 50      | 50   |
| 310 | Terre des Hommes                |      |                            |        |        |        |       |       |       |              |      |         |      |
| 311 | Thlrd World REsource Centre     | 1977 | d                          | 0      | 0      | 0      | 100   | 0     | 100   | 113 000      | 3    | 22      | 75   |
| 312 | Tibetan Refugee Aid Society     | 1962 | j: \$ f e t cs             | 2      | 0      | 2      | 20    | 0     | 20    | 188.000      | 0    | 45      | 55   |



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