THE ROLE OF PSYCHODYNAMICS IN LINGUISTICS:
APPLYING THE TRADITION OF MELANIE KLEIN TO THE
ANALYSIS OF CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION

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Linguistics has developed elaborate accounts of the social aspects of language use - 'how to do things with words' - but the emotional-dynamic aspects have hitherto received less attention. Such discussions of emotive or affective meaning as there have been have tended to concentrate on the linguistic resources that are coded into the language system, rather than the dynamics of emotional interaction enacted through language use.

The clinical discipline of Kleinian psychoanalysis, by contrast, has made emotional dynamics its central concern. Furthermore the main tool of the psychoanalyst’s trade is the verbal interpretation of the patient’s material, much of which is itself verbal. These factors have led to the development in Kleinian psychodynamic theory of a particularly rich vocabulary for understanding emotional-dynamic interaction, and specifically those aspects which are verbally enacted.

The goal of this thesis is to outline a linguistic theory of emotional dynamics based on insights derived from Kleinian psychoanalysis. It aims to extrapolate from a clinical context Kleinian ideas that can be integrated with those of the school of linguistic thought that has emphasised the dynamic aspects of locally-managed discourse meaning.
ABSTRACT

There has been an increasingly influential school of thought in linguistics which is concerned with discourse meaning, that is the meaning of situated utterances, rather than of the meaning of decontextualised words or sentences which are coded into the language system. Proponents of this view hold that discourse meaning cannot be completely determined without taking into account factors in the local context of utterance. For the most part, however, these contextual factors have been restricted to speakers' and hearers' locally germane cognitions about both physical and social relations that exist between entities in the external world. However there has also been a long tradition in linguistics whose object of study has been affective meaning as opposed to purely cognitive meaning. The study of affective meaning in linguistics, however has tended to be confined to the consideration of conventionalised linguistic resources that speakers and hearers may deploy in their verbal interactions. In other words affective meaning has tended to be studied as one aspect of meaning that is coded into the language system.

It is the contention of this thesis that emotional aspects of speakers' and hearers' states of mind (and also their cognitions about these aspects) are a necessary and integral part of the local context of an utterance, and are thus part and parcel of a complete account of the discourse meaning of that utterance. Empirical studies of affective meaning have often sensitively described such emotional-dynamic aspects of discourse meaning, but typically only in order to support findings about linguistically coded affective meaning. This thesis builds upon both the tradition which studies context-dependent discourse meaning (but which has tended to neglect emotional and affective factors) and also on the tradition which studies
affective aspects of meaning which are coded into the language system (but which has tended to neglect locally managed contextual dynamics). The thesis places emotional-dynamic aspects of context at the centre of the linguistic stage and formulates a theoretical framework, based on an extrapolation of Kleinian psychodynamics from a clinical setting to the setting of everyday conversation, within which these aspects can be encompassed.

Chapter One, 'Linguistics and the Analysis of Conversation', briefly sketches the linguistic background to work on the analysis of conversation, identifying the notion of membership categorisation as a pivotal concept. The work of Labov and Fanshel is singled out for particular discussion because of its desirably explicit nature.

Chapter Two, 'An Application of Labov and Fanshel's Discourse Rules', is the application of the most explicit part of Labov and Fanshel's 'comprehensive discourse analysis', namely their discourse rules presented in Chapter One. It serves as a first pass over the conversational data collected for the purposes of the thesis, which will be further discussed, from a psychodynamic point of view, in Chapter Six.

Chapter Three, 'Affective Meaning and Emotional Dynamics', provides some methodological preliminaries for incorporating consideration of psychodynamic processes, as approached through Kleinian psychoanalysis into the study of conversation. In particular, it explicates the notion of 'membership categorisation' and the essential links between the external and internal worlds.

Chapter Four, 'The Role of Language in Kleinian Psychodynamics', looks in detail at some of the main ideas from Kleinian psychoanalysis, and explicates the development of Kleinian ideas about language and symbols generally. It shows how these ideas may be extrapolated from a clinical setting to conversational interaction more generally.
Chapter Five, 'Beyond Labov and Fanshel', shows how Labov and Fanshel's commentary on the therapeutic conversation that forms the data for their study, can usefully be supplemented by a Kleinian examination.

Chapter Six, 'A Sample Kleinian Discourse Commentary', presents an illustrative Kleinian commentary on the same family material which was discussed from a Labovian point of view in Chapter Two.

Chapter Seven, 'Emotional Dynamics and Lexical Leakage', discusses the accomplishment of emotional dynamics at a particular linguistic level, the lexical, and shows how a Kleinian account may illuminate such phenomena. The phenomenon of lexical leakage provides a basis for the interpretations in Chapter Six of 'what is going on' in the conversation at a (sometimes unconscious) emotionally-dynamic level.

Chapter Eight, 'Conclusion', draws together the threads of the preceding argument and suggests avenues for further research, particularly on the relatively neglected notion of discourse 'topic'.
For my Mother and Sarah
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"Human speech in its earlier phases was no doubt primarily emotive; that is the case with children's speech. The cognitive element was present from the beginning, and in some styles at least, it now plays the most important part. But nevertheless there is some sort of emotive element in all speech; if a thing were quite indifferent to me I would not say it . . ."

Gustaf Stern (1931, p. 54)

"Feelings are at the heart of the matter. The authenticity with which we are able to entertain our emotions sets a limit to the sincerity with which we can express them, either by saying or showing. This extends to the whole range of our experiences and communications from the passionate 'I love you' to the trivial 'Rather cold today', from the embrace to the handshake, from awe at thunder to irritation that the tap is dripping."

Donald Meltzer (1986, p. 81)
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is concerned with the role of emotional dynamics in conversation, and it will attempt to build a bridge between linguistics, in particular discourse analysis, and Kleinian psychoanalysis. It is proposed that the incorporation of insights and theoretical apparatus from the latter subject may further facilitate the conceptual development of the former along a path which linguists have already been fruitfully following. A precedent, in this trend in linguistics, for importation from other disciplines is exemplified in Levinson (1983) and Labov and Fanshel (1977). In these studies insights from a branch of sociology, ethnomethodology, were incorporated into linguistics. Ethnomethodologists take as their object of study only what is demonstrably of relevance to speakers in the accomplishment of everyday conversation, and thus focus precisely on the interactive, dialogical nature of language and the context-dependency of linguistic understanding which are of increasing interest to the linguist. From the linguistics side, the bridge which the present study is building rests on the work of Labov in taking as its starting point the interactive nature of meaning. The context of an utterance is both a reason and a resource for the production of meaning in that utterance. For linguists, perhaps the most important aspects of the context of an utterance are the surrounding utterances, made by the same and other speakers. The minimal task of a conversation is to produce, in interactants, a commitment to the belief that a shared understanding has been achieved. The surrounding utterances are seen as a resource as well as a reason for this task. In
order to understand the joint production of shared meaning it is important for the linguist to establish, for each interactant, in real time, which aspects of meaning provided by convention, *la langue*, interactants are bringing to that particular conversation and which aspects are locally created. The production of shared meaning can be seen to be accomplished through negotiation. Labov in particular has shown that meaning creation in the production of *parole* requires more than the conventions embodied in *la langue*. There are a complex set of sociological factors concerning, for example, role, status and obligation which are part of the relationship between particular speakers which are also used as resources, and reasons, for the accomplishment of the conversational task, the commitment to the belief that shared understanding has been achieved. A perceptive account of these sociological aspects of meaning making is Labov and Fanshel (1977), where the roles, statuses and obligations within the patient's family are discussed in the context of a linguistic analysis of a psychotherapy session. The bridge building from the Kleinian side involves a re-reading of Kleinian texts for the purpose of incorporating into linguistics the insight they contain about verbal interaction. Developing out of the Freudian tradition, Kleinian theory has foregrounded the mental dynamics which, I shall argue, are to be seen as necessary and integral constraints on everyday verbalisation. The call to view discourse from the perspective of 'Kleinian linguistics' (i.e. to expand the boundary of linguistics to include emotional dynamics) potentially upsets as many applecarts as did the call to view speakers as 'doing things with words' when such an idea was first introduced into the subject.

Both speech act theory and the study of emotional dynamics belong in the linguistic niche of pragmatics. In the past pragmatics has been regarded as something of a linguistic 'dustbin' where phenomena not explicable in terms of traditional semantics have been deposited. Recently,
however, pragmatics has started to be viewed as a rich and structured part of mainstream linguistics (cf. Levinson, 1983; and Leech, 1983).

Pragmatics has always had room for emotional dynamics - indeed the notion of a speech act and of presupposition would seem to be categories which would require some account of emotional dynamics in any thorough explication of them. For example, one account of the difference in what is conveyed by the following two utterances:

(1) Aunt Jemima passed on.

and

(2) Aunt Jemima kicked the bucket.

is in terms of pragmatics. On this account their truth-functional meaning is said to be identical whereas the presuppositions conveyed are very different. These presuppositions are emotional in nature; the former sentence presupposes a reverent feeling on the part of the speaker towards Aunt Jemina's death whereas the latter sentence presupposes an irreverent feeling. These presuppositions rely on the emotional penumbra of some lexical items being coded into the language along with their more traditionally semantic meaning in terms of denotation. A presuppositional account is required in order to account for why the following utterance:

(3) Aunt Jemima has not 'kicked the bucket', she has passed away.

is not regarded as a self-contradiction by native speakers. Other examples of emotional loading being coded into the language are, for example, swear words and modes of address. The way the same person is addressed may vary, not only according to the relative social roles which addresser and addressee occupy, but also according to the addresser's feelings towards the addressee; the same person may be referred to as 'Mr. Vice-Chancellor', 'Mr. Smith', 'John', 'pal', 'mate' or 'you bastard'.

The emotional loadings coded into the language system have been subject to linguistic analysis from various perspectives (cf. Leach, 1966 and
Fillmore, 1971; for a general survey, see Bolinger, 1980). The concern in the present study is, however, with the interactive aspects of emotional dynamics. Such an account would be needed to give a complete account of utterance (3) above. This account would go beyond an explication of the emotional loadings of the lexical items used, which are coded into the language, and would seek also to explicate the use of these emotionally loaded lexical items for interactionally dynamic 'improvisation' (which would require more context and co-text than this invented fragment contains). It is likely that most native speakers would feel that an account of emotional dynamics would be a necessary part of descriptive linguistics, in the way that such an account forms part of the gloss on dialogue in some genres of literary material. However, the academic linguist would require a more systematic account of emotional dynamics and also of its relationship to linguistic patterning. Pragmatics has traditionally given rich, structured and explicit accounts of social interaction precisely because of its importation of ideas from sociology as discussed above. However, the same level of sophistication has not been achieved in accounts of emotional interaction.

Pragmatics, as I have already pointed out, has the room for emotional dynamics: the question arises as to why this room contains so little furniture. I would suggest that this is because the discipline which takes emotional dynamics most seriously as its object of study, namely psychodynamic theory, has been confined to clinical work and has not been incorporated into the more general academic arena where it would be available for use by linguists. A central aim of the following chapters is precisely to make psychodynamic theory, in particular Kleinian, available to the linguist, for the purpose of importing a systematically elaborated account of emotional dynamics into the pragmatic study of discourse.
There are two notable exceptions, where psychodynamics has taken a 'linguistic turn': the work of Lacan (1977, Chapter 3, pp. 30-113 and Chapter 5, pp. 146-178) in France and that of Habermas (1970a, 1970b and 1976) in Germany. Lacan's work, however, is not in line with the aims of this thesis for at least two reasons. First, its approach to language is based on Saussure's notion of la langue. This leaves little room for the minutiae of language use, which would require the incorporation of parole phenomena (in Saussurean terms), as in the work of Labov. Second, Lacan, in his critique of what Freud called 'metapsychology', implies that the existence of the metapsychological structures, which are used in psychodynamic theory to account for emotional phenomena, is an illusion based on a misconstrual of language. What is being advocated in this thesis, however, is just the sort of realist theory of emotions that metapsychology can provide.

From the linguistic side the work of Habermas is much more in line with the spirit of this thesis than that of Lacan. Habermas' work has its origins in speech act theory and pragmatics and as such is concerned with 'language in action'. However from the psychodynamic side there is not the development of the extended metapsychology used by Kleinians (which is outlined in the body of this thesis) for a realist theory of emotions. This is partly a function of geography (Klein and her followers have been most influential in Britain and South America). However, a more important reason is that Habermas is concerned to account for large scale political and social processes, and he treats micro-interaction as a component in terms of which these large scale phenomena are to be explained. In this thesis I attempt to go one stage further back in the explanatory regress and treat micro-interactive emotional dynamics as phenomena in their own right, themselves requiring an explanatory account.
Since the framework of Kleinian psychoanalysis will be alien territory to many linguists, the general approach can perhaps be best introduced by a concrete example of the sort of discourse phenomenon it enables us to provide an account for. The example in question is an aspect of lexical choice called by Spence (1980) 'lexical leakage'. This type of phenomenon is well attested in the experimental cognitive psychology literature, for example Clark and Teasdale (1985) which reports laboratory studies on the affects of mood on lexical recall. The study by Spence, however, takes on a more particular significance within the context of a Kleinian framework as it is a 'naturalistic' study of conversational interaction.

Spence discovered among patients being screened for cervical cancer who had been diagnosed but had not yet been informed of the outcome, that those who had a positive diagnosis were significantly more likely to use the word 'death' in metaphorical and proverbial, 'non-literal', ways, than were patients who had a negative diagnosis. Furthermore the interviewers, who were also unaware of the patients' diagnoses (in a classical 'double blind' experiment), responded to the positively diagnosed patients' increased use of the word 'death' with a decrease in their own use of the word 'cancer'. This study illustrates the interactive rather than just the 'expressive' use of these words. Unlike the notion of a 'Freudian slip', lexical leakage does not describe some locally irrelevant intrusion of unconscious anxiety into the flow of discourse, but rather describes the externalisation of an internal state of mind into the actual words chosen which are part and parcel of the discourse itself.

From a Kleinian point of view, lexical leakage is indicative of the penumbra of meaning which a word may have for a speaker in a given discourse context. More importantly, however, lexical leakage is construed as a communicative act, in that it calls for a response, even though the ways of responding (and not responding) may be varied, subtle and indirect.
The externalisation of a mental state can be a source of information about the psychopathology of an individual; this is, of course, of interest to the psychoanalyst for professional reasons. For the present purposes, however, the important point is that the 'meaning' of lexical leakage cannot in Kleinian theory be strictly separated from the context of the discourse in which it occurs. Furthermore, the notions of shared meaning and negotiated meaning, which can be used to provide a discourse analytic account of lexical leakage, are extended in the context of Kleinian theory to incorporate mental states and mental interaction and not just interaction in terms of social roles.

Kleinian writers have developed an elaborate vocabulary for talking about lexical leakage and related phenomena which will be expounded in the course of the thesis. Lexical leakage is an example of the sorts of discourse phenomenon which Kleinian theory can provide a compelling explanation for, whose relevance to linguistics is fairly immediately apparent and whose identification is independent of Kleinian theory. It is, however, only the tip of the iceberg. Other phenomena, perhaps more central to the Kleinian theory, are more subtle. In particular some discourse phenomena which are less obvious if viewed from a theory neutral point of view will be identifiable from within Kleinian theory.

Discourse phenomena at other levels than the lexical may be illuminated by a Kleinian account. At the phonological level, discourse phenomena such as intonation and allophonic accommodation between speakers and, at the syntactic level, discourse phenomena such as the degree of indirectness of speech acts, as studied by Labov and Fanshel, would seem to require, for a complete account, some explication of emotional-dynamics such as is provided by Kleinian psychodynamics. By and large, however, this thesis will concentrate on the lexical level of linguistic patterning.
The argument in the thesis moves from the general to the specific. In the first three chapters I attempt to make room for emotional dynamics within linguistics by tracing a line of thinking developing from the work of Harvey Sacks and articulated most explicitly by William Labov. In Chapters Four and Five I then turn to the Kleinian tradition, expounding the linguistic ideas of Melanie Klein and her followers and attempting to extrapolate them from a clinical setting in ways that can make them apply to conversational interaction more generally. The Kleinian approach is given concrete exemplification in Chapter Six in the form of a sample commentary on a transcription of a family discussion. The final two chapters then focus on the phenomenon of lexical leakage and the ways in which lexical resources are used by speakers and hearers to negotiate topic for emotional-dynamic reasons.

Since the thesis aims to bridge between disciplines, readers are likely to find certain chapters of greater or lesser interest depending on their own discipline background. For those with a background in psychology or psychoanalysis, the central chapter devoted to the development of Kleinian theory (Chapter Four) is designed to be detailed enough to stand as a self-contained study. The background material and critical analysis which this entails will, of course, be of less interest in its own right to readers with more strictly linguistic concerns, but it is nevertheless hoped that the Kleinian trichotomy of discourse functions which is extrapolated (i.e. projective identification versus external world communication versus intrusive identification) is of sufficient import in linguistic terms to warrant the necessary excursion into psychoanalytic territory. Readers in this second category - and those concerned to locate the key-stone in the bridge being built - are invited to focus rather on the culminating chapter devoted to lexical leakage (Chapter Seven), in which Kleinian ideas, together with other central notions relating to 'negotiated meaning' which
have been developed in earlier chapters, are applied and evaluated in the analysis of a concrete discourse phenomenon.
Chapter One

LINGUISTICS AND THE ANALYSIS OF CONVERSATION

This chapter briefly sketches the linguistic background to work on the analysis of conversation, before proceeding to a more detailed exposition of two current models which are based on contrasting but complementary approaches. One of these, Conversation Analysis (CA), develops out of work on the sociology of language, and as such it stresses above all the interactional nature of dialogue. Discourse Analysis (DA), which stems more directly from linguistic theory, attempts to account for the structures of dialogue in terms of a set of formal rules which it endeavours to state as explicitly as possible.

One of the concepts of Conversation Analysis which will be highlighted in the discussion is that of 'membership categorisation'; that is, the interactive processes whereby participants in a discourse negotiate shared categories of meaning (processes which, of course, involve significant failures as well as successes). It will be seen that negotiational processes of the sort central to the CA model can be 'translated' in terms of the rules and routines employed in the framework of DA, and thus made more accessible to the linguist.

As a general critique of both models, it will be posited that neither of them go far enough in accounting for the internal and emotional (as distinct from the external and social) aspects of negotiated meaning. The focal concept of membership categorisation, however, offers the keys to ways in which models of discourse may be thus extended and enriched. The Kleinian model of discourse to be developed in subsequent chapters can, from this perspective, be seen as an exploration of membership categorisation in the speakers' internal worlds.
Structural Linguistics: from sentence to discourse

The founding father of modern linguistics is generally considered to be Saussure. His contention is that language is made up of signs, and that these signs gain their meaning by existing in a system of contrasts with each other. He considered that there are two types of contrast, syntagmatic and associative (often called paradigmatic, following Hjelmslev (1953)). In the sentence 'The cat sat on the mat', the words 'the', 'cat', 'sat', 'on', 'the' and 'mat' stand in syntagmatic contrast to each other. The notion of syntagmatic contrast describes how grammatical categories relate to each other in terms of sequential order. Paradigmatic contrast is the relationship of substitution and is essentially the relationship that obtains between words within the same grammatical category. For example, in the sentence 'The cat sat on the mat', the word 'dog' stands in paradigmatic relation to the word 'cat' and could be substituted for it to produce a sentence which would still be as meaningful, although not identical in meaning with the original sentence.

The business of linguistics, according to Saussure, is to explicate in a given language the ways in which signs may stand in paradigmatic and syntagmatic contrast to each other. What gives any system its structure are thus the combinatorial constraints on its constituent items. Saussure's approach is sometimes called a slot/filler method, and modern linguistics is largely concerned with the structural relations which can be stated in terms of such combinatorial constraints.

There are three central branches to modern structural linguistics - namely, phonology, morphology and syntax. Phonology is the study of structural relations between speech sounds; morphology is the study of the structural relations between linguistic entities which are the smallest unit
of form and meaning; and syntax is the study of the structural relations between the linguistic elements that go to make up a sentence. The development of this work is discussed in Hymes and Fought (1981).

Phonology, morphology and syntax are applications of the slot/filler concept of structural analysis to increasingly large linguistic units. A further step in this progression was the application of these methods to stretches of speech longer than the sentence, i.e. that is the study of constraints on the combinations of sentences in discourse. This was pioneered by Zellig Harris (1952a, 1952b). Harris set up equivalence classes of sentences that could be intersubstitutable at all points in the occurring combinations of sentences in a given corpus of text. These equivalence classes are, of course, paradigmatic sets.

The extension of the Saussaurean method to the larger units of discourse led to fundamental changes in linguistics.

(1) Harris developed the notion of transformations (variants of a sentence which have the same distributional pattern) which led to a fundamental rethinking of syntax. Chomsky (1957, p.6) acknowledges Harris' research in discourse analysis as a development in the study of transformations. (This development, though revolutionary, is however not the subject of this thesis.)

(2) The constraints in the units of discourse led to a change in the conception of meaning. The notion of meaning had to be extended from that of something residing in langue, to something that resided in dialogue, and was indeed the product of interaction between the participants. If somebody asks where the station is in a city, then one of the crucial tasks is to first establish the participant's shared knowledge. Any study which neglects to account for this task will portray the discourse as incoherent when native speakers' intuitions show patently that it is not.
For reasons related to those described in Labov above it became increasingly obvious that the Saussurean imperative that the study of linguistics consisted solely of the study of la langue was no longer tenable. Linguists became increasingly interested in parole phenomena.

**Conversational Analysis**

The investigation of linguistic structure, what Saussure called la langue, has seemed to be moving towards the study of what Saussure called parole, that is to say, of speech and conversation, under the pressure of the problems of context and of interaction. The sociology of language and conversation analysis, in particular, have taken context and interaction very seriously. Early studies in CA took telephone calls as data, so as to eliminate the problem of unrecorded non-verbal interaction, which is seen to be an essential part of the context needed for an adequate understanding of the verbal interaction (Schegloff, 1979). More recent work has been undertaken using video-tape recording (Goodwin, 1981). The value of CA is that it takes into account the interactive nature of language in a detailed way.

CA grew out of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1974), originally a branch of sociology, but is now considered to be part of linguistics (Levinson, 1983). A tenet of this school is that the central problem for sociology is what was called by Sacks (1972, 1974) membership categorisation. This is the notion that speakers categorise the world in everyday conversation and that these categories are constantly being reworked and renegotiated. CA thus provides an account of the dynamics of meaning creation. One aspect of membership categorisation that has been studied is the way in which the macro-social world is categorised (Sacks, 1979), whereas other aspects have been intra-linguistic. For example, in order for people to engage in a conversation adequately and without
hitches they need to be able to categorise the end of a 'turn to talk' of the person with whom they are conversing (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974). In other words, they have to classify what the above authors have called 'turn transition relevancy points'. Similarly, if we are using a word in a conversation, precisely what is meant by that word itself is one of the issues at stake in that conversation. In most cases, this is unproblematic, and although the process of negotiation about word meanings continues, it is taken for granted. However, there are many discussions that are of the form of 'it depends what you mean by X', which is where the negotiation of meaning becomes interactively crucial for the participants and, is therefore, made explicit in the talk. It may be asked what membership categorisation has to do with meaning. The answer lies in the distinction that has been drawn between the intention of a concept, described by the word, and its extension.

The extension of a concept is the set of all those entities in the world that the concept may be said to apply to. The intention of the concept is its meaning, that is, the set of factors that all the members of the extension of a concept have in common that are used by members of a society to classify those entities as having the concept applicable to them. The meaning of a concept is bound to the entities to which it is applicable, and this relation is accomplished in conversation. It is noteworthy that, according to this view, there is still the notion of the meaning of sentences similar to that from truth-conditional semantics. Meaning consists of relations between objects in the world, and the words in sentences refer to those relations and objects. However, the referents of the words are much more difficult to distinguish. This is because relations between the world and the meaning of words are not static and independent of social actors. On the contrary, they are constantly being created and recreated in conversation. What was initially identified in
sociology as membership categorisation can be seen to be the basis of a
central concern of linguists, namely meaning. CA can be seen to put the
interactive element back into Discourse Analysis and semantics. The
problems of interaction and context seem to have dire consequences for a
static account of truth-conditional semantics, which pragmatics sets about
to remedy.

Exposition of some CA concepts

Conversation Analysis is an attempt to investigate how members use
their social resources to accomplish the act of conversation. Of the
various conversational phenomena with which it has been concerned, the
ones that will be discussed here are: (1) turn taking; (2) adjacency pairs;
(3) openings and closings of conversations; and (4) preference structure. In
the discussion here of CA, although interaction is being taken seriously, the
problem of context is backgrounded. However, as Jefferson (1974) points
out, CA looks at context as it is relevant to, and made manifest in, the
interaction. In CA, context is examined as a resource used by interactants
and manifested in their language, whereas in sociolinguistics (and its related
branch of study, social psychology of language), extra-linguistic factors are
only brought in and investigated to see how they correlate with linguistic
ones.

The CA account of turn taking

The rules for turn taking and adjacency pairs which are used here
are those of Levinson (1983, p.298) as they provide probably the most
succinct account.

Levinson writes:

"Operating on the turn units are following rules (slightly
simplified from Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1978) where C
is current speaker, N is next speaker and TRP [transition
relevance place] is the recognisable end of a turn -
constructional unit:
Rule 1 - applies initially at the first TRP of any turn:
(a) If C selects N in current turn, then C must stop speaking, and N must speak next, transition occurring at the first TRP after N-selection

(b) if C does not select N, then any (other) party may self-select, first speaker gaining rights to the next turn

(c) if C has not selected N, and no other party self-selects under option (b), then C may (but need not) continue (i.e. claim rights to a further turn -constructional unit.

Rule 2 - applies to all subsequent TRPs.
When Rule 1(c) has been applied by C, then at the next TRP Rules 1 (a) - (c) apply, and recursively at the next TRP, until speaker change is effected.

It may be argued that such strict rules do not do justice to the complexity of conversational turn taking and that the rules have not been properly evaluated statistically. However, they are intended as a provisional working gloss on how members are able to recognise, categorise the opportunities for obtaining, retaining or relinquishing a turn at talk given that they can jointly categorise segments of utterances as TRPs. What is left unaccounted for is the problem for speakers of how they actually categorise places in the stream of talk as TRPs. It must be stated that the notion of corrections, or accuracy, of membership categorisation has to be replaced by a notion that might be best glossed as the usefulness of a particular categorisation in a particular conversational context. This would be decided as a result of implicit negotiations in the conversation itself. The ways that such negotiations are carried out will be discussed below in the section on preference structure, which shows how, for example, agreement and disagreement are decided by speakers. The turn taking rules themselves may be seen to be accounts of particular preferred sorts of sequence, which may be suspended if the speaker wants to perform a social act, for example, disagreeing by interrupting.

The CA account of adjacency pairs

Adjacency pairs are pairs of turns which often occur together and are linked structurally so that the combinatorial possibility is virtually
reduced to the production of the second turn after the first is produced. For example, if one speaker says 'Hello, how are you?', the person to whom he or she is addressing this turn is virtually restricted to the production of the turn 'Fine, thank you, how are you?' or a set of variants that are reasonably obviously equivalent to this. Variants stating the recipient's ill-health, for example, are of course possible, but dispreferred. This will be discussed below. Levinson writes (p.303):

"Adjacency pairs are sequences of two utterances that are (i) adjacent, (ii) produced by different speakers (iii) ordered as a first part and a second part (iv) typed, so that a particular first part requires a particular second (or range of second parts) - e.g. offers require acceptance or rejections, greetings require greetings, and so on. And there is a rule governing those of adjacency pairs, namely: (19) Having produced a first part of some pair, current speaker must stop speaking, and next speaker must produce at that point a second part to the same pair."

The notion of adjacency is not a fixed requirement. For example, there are what are called insertion sequences, which are found when one adjacency pair is sandwiched between the first and second pair of another adjacency pair. Levinson (p. 304) quotes the following illustration: "A. May I have a bottle of Mich ?" B: "Are you twenty-one? A"No" B: "No".

The CA account of openings and closing

In CA, telephone conversations have been the most commonly studied phenomena (Schegloff, 1972; Schegloff, 1979; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973), because all that passes between the interactants can be recorded and available to the analyst. It has been argued that telephone conversations are relatively exotic conversational settings; however as Levinson (1983, p.309) points out, they do share many features in common with 'chatty' social activities, which Atkinson (1983) has argued are in fact the centre of human interaction. The study of conversational openings shows that the first few turns at talk are recurrently concerned with recognition of the other party and establishing whether or not parties have recognised each other. After identity recognition has been established, the reason for the
call and the slot for the first substantive topic of discourse follow. Closings are usually effected by the use of a pre-closing sequence whereby one party offers the other the chance to close the conversation. If the offer is accepted the speakers then move to a closing sequence.

The CA account of preference structure

One of the central notions within CA is preference structure, which is connected to the linguistic notion of markedness (Levinson, 1983, p.307). A dispreferred utterance is one which is structurally marked in conversation, either by an 'account' by a discourse participant of why the dispreferred turn has been uttered, or by another marker which in itself could call for an account. The notion of accountability is crucial in preference structure and for CA in general. One example is that of an invitation. Generally, if an invitation is accepted then it is sufficient simply to say yes, with the accompanying social niceties. However, a refusal of an invitation is almost invariably accompanied by an account of why the recipient of the invitation cannot accept it. An account is basically an attempt to change the current way the social actors jointly having the conversation are 'membership-categorising' the world. In other words, it is an attempt to change social actors' systems of meanings and thus their view of the world, even if only in minor respects.

CA functions on two levels. First, as an attempt to investigate how native speakers use their social resources to accomplish the act of conversation. In this way it is an attempt to look at conversation as an example of membership categorisation to see how social actors conspire together to produce meaningful conversation by using their structural resources in speaking. The question here is how they categorise say, a dispreferred turn. At the second level, conversation is seen as the locus of how the world is reordered into different categories. In this way, CA is looking at how meaning is 'accomplished', that is, how meaning is created.
and recreated from conversation as it unfolds. Essentially, the use of a dispreferred turn is the signal of a hitch in the jointly produced world such that it needs to be renegotiated. A turn is meaningful according to how dispreferred it is.

Perhaps the most important case of preference is the preference for agreement. In most cases, after an assessment, except a self assessment, the preferred turn by the next speaker is that of agreement. Thus the world continues to be categorised in the same way. If the next speaker disagrees, this calls for an account on the part of this speaker, or equivalently, a justification for the disagreement. Thus, what the participants in the conversation are negotiating or reconstructing, is their shared reality. The dispreferred disagreement is precisely about membership categorisation, that is, disagreeing is negotiating about meaning. In this way preference structures give a conversation momentum and allow for the creation of meaning by providing the medium through which the negotiation and renegotiation of the extension of categories is accomplished.

CA provides an account of the interactive nature of meaning creation, which, to some extent, extends the account of interaction proposed by pragmatics. Every time social actors speak they are re-creating meaning jointly. These recreated meanings become part of their own membership categorisations of the world and, therefore, affect their next interaction. In conversation, people are renegotiating membership categorisation and, therefore, renegotiating their joint perceptions of relationships that obtain between objects in the world.

For CA practitioners conversational meaning is created by the structure of the utterances used in the context of the external social world, and not by the thoughts, intentions, and feelings of the speakers. The present study aims to investigate how such thoughts and feelings contribute to conversational meaning. CA provides a valuable basis for a more
comprehensive theory of conversation by capturing the interactional framework of language in a way which emotional theorists can build upon.

**Discourse Analysis (Labov)**

Whereas CA was rooted in sociology, DA, to which we now turn, has its origins in American structural linguistics, although it has developed into a rather different enterprise from that pioneered by Zellig Harris (cf. section 1 above).

DA, as represented in particular by the 'rule governed' approach of Labov and Fanshel (1977), may be said to be a development of generative linguistics (although Labov has elsewhere expressed misgivings about commitment to the generative enterprise, cf. Labov, 1972a passim). The aim of generative syntax, the original model for generative linguistics, is to write a rule system that would generate all and only the well formed sentences of a language. Levinson observes that the basic, though often implicit, methodology for DA is (i) the isolation of a set of basic categories or units of discourse; (ii) the formulation of a set of concatenation rules stated over these categories, delimiting well formed sequences of categories (coherent discourses) from ill-formed sequences (incoherent discourses). It should be noted that Labov and Fanshel's rules are not concerned with concatenation, but are rather 'constitutive' in Searle's (1969) sense of providing a definition of what constitutes a particular verbal action. For approaches which concentrate more explicitly on concatenation rules, the reader is referred to van Dijk (1972), for example.

DA posits a hierarchically ordered series of actions underlying observable utterances as a way of operationalising the speech act theory of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). It has been found that, whereas sequencing may be relatively unproblematic in monological texts such as those discussed by Z. Harris (1952a, 1952b), the sequencing is more
problematic in dialogue. Labov and Fanshel (1977) found that in dialogue, sequencing did not take place at the level of the utterance but at the level of underlying action. A parallel here is the introduction of transformational rules in generative grammar with the intention of relating the coherence of deep structure to the superficial disorder of surface structure (Chomsky 1957, 1965). Likewise, DA is seeking to find out the underlying interactive coherence in what we say. The work of Labov and Fanshel (1977) is an attempt to understand a psychoanalytically oriented therapy session in this way; and indeed the linguistically motivated enterprise of understanding what is behind what we say may be compared with the psychoanalytical one.

The conceptual underpinning of DA can be highlighted by a comparison with that underlying CA. CA, coming as it does out of a tradition in the sociology of language, is not concerned with how events, which are meaningful at the speech act level, cohere. Instead, it is concerned with how interaction is accomplished. The problems of coherence and meaning are only important insofar as they are demonstrably problems for the participants rather than, as with DA, the constructions of the analyst. CA is concerned with conversational regularities. It is, at least, more atheoretical or more cautious about theorising than DA and thus it avoids the hierarchical layers of meaning of DA.

In CA, the meaning of an utterance is displayed in the conversation itself by how the utterance is heard to be meaningful by the hearer. The vehicle of meaning for CA is the next speaker's response, and meaning making is only of concern to the extent that it is an issue for the participants in the conversation, and observably so. The aim of CA is to understand how conversational interactants use the 'data' available to respond in the way they do, in particular co-operatively. This contrasts with DA which considers meaning to be produced by sets of rules relating
language to social norms. The rules are a way of describing the conversation for the theorist, and the theorist is agnostic as to whether they are actually used by the participants. In CA, any rules formulated would be attempts to capture structural preferences which are regulative in Searle's (1969) sense of the co-operative nature of conversation, and, as such, are a resource for the speakers.

Levinson (1983, p.307) argues that the notion of preference, which is central to CA, provides a set of formulations which are ranked in order of preference for filling particular slots in certain structurally defined sequences. Other formulations may be in 'free variation', to use a term from structural linguistics, in that there may be a number of possible unmarked formulations that may fill a particular slot in a sequence. This leaves the possibilities open for choice in the case of formulations in free variation unconstrained by the sequential social norms that are required by the cohesive, co-operative nature of conversation. Also built into the notion of preference is the possibility of, at least relative, violation of these social norms, for, as the formulations are rank ordered in preference, none of these are excluded, but some are dispreferred. In fact, one of the ways in which preferred formulations are structurally marked is that participants selecting those formulations may be called to account for a particular choice of formulation which violates the social norms later on in the sequence. These dispreferred formulations are the carriers of meaning. Their presence suggests that one of the things participants are doing, in using this flexibility in conversational norms, is displaying personality or manifesting emotions. If a particular display of feeling or personality is one of the things interactants are doing at the level of underlying action which is the remit of DA, but at an emotional rather than a social level, then what is needed is a theory which would provide an adequate language to describe emotional interaction.
For the purposes of this thesis CA and Labov and Fanshel's DA may be seen to have essential elements which are intertransferable. Preference structure is a pivotal mechanism in CA's account of meaning negotiation. Requests, which are discussed in detail later in this chapter, can be seen to have the same pivotal role for Labov and Fanshel. A dispreferred turn on the part of the speaker may be seen to be a request for a change in the hearer of joint membership categories, where membership categorisation is seen to be the central process in terms of which negotiated meaning is accomplished. This relationship between preference structure and requests, with respect to negotiated meaning, is what provides the intertransferability of CA and DA.
One of the more detailed and comprehensive studies in the framework of Discourse Analysis is that of Labov and Fanshel (1977). This study is of immediate relevance to my central claim about the importance of emotion in the structuring of dialogue (and of the importance of speakers' 'internal worlds' as an integral part of discourse context) since it constitutes the application of techniques from linguistic analyses to conversational interchange of a session in a psychotherapy, the very point of which, both implicitly and explicitly, is the understanding of emotional dynamics.

My aim in presenting and applying the body of rules which Labov and Fanshel develop is to demonstrate the explicitness and formality which they have shown it possible to achieve within their analytic framework, a feature which contrasts sharply with the deliberate avoidance of linguistic precision within the framework of CA. Precision of the same degree, I would argue, should likewise be the ideal goal of a Kleinian model of discourse, although, of course the sort of precision that is possible in the description of internal emotional dynamics is a different kind from that which is possible in the statement of external sociolinguistic rules.

Labov and Fanshel list nine stages in what they call 'Comprehensive Discourse Analysis' (1977: 354-359), and a brief comment on each of these in turn will provide a more concrete picture of their approach before the body of rules themselves is presented in more abstract form below.

1) The recording

In Labov and Fanshel's (1977) study this consisted of an audio tape recording of the first fifteen minutes of a psychotherapy session. The session deals with the family dynamics of a patient with anorexia nervosa, both in terms of social roles and emotional relationships.
2) Paralinguistic cues

These are an important part of the material analysed by Labov and Fanshel (1977). In their study they have separated their description of these cues from the text. Labov and Fanshel use two types of acoustic displays in their study: a) a variable-persistence oscilloscope to display the overall amplitude of the speech over longest utterance stretches and b) a real-time spectrum analyser to show the rise and fall of the voice. The use of these devices mitigate the lack of intersubjective agreement on the coding of intonation contours.

3) Fields of Discourse

These are speech styles, appropriate to different contexts, used by the speakers in any one conversation. Labov and Fanshel's fields of discourse are appropriate to the therapeutic session, they are not an objectively determined part of their analysis but are "persuasive and interpretive devices" (Labov and Fanshel, 1977).

4) Editing - preparing the text

Labov and Fanshel's transcription was prepared as a lexical representation of the conversation. The segmental information captured by phonetic transcription is not particularly relevant in this context for the purposes of understanding the interaction between these particular interlocutors (p.42). Labov and Fanshel emphasise that editing is an open-ended process, where the possibility of correction and re-correction is always open on further listenings.

5) Expansion

Labov and Fanshel again emphasise the open-ended nature of this process, however they described their attempt at some systematisation (p. 356)

"First, we methodically examine all pronouns and pro-forms such as thing, do so, and so on, and attempt to give them explicit form. We attempt to complete all referentials, including indexical references to time and place. Secondly, we
introduce material from other sections of the text, searching for all parallel and repeated utterances that allow us to complete ellipses and supply other missing material."

They also supply semantic information conveyed in the paralinguistic cues discussed above in 4.

6) Propositions

Labov and Fanshel (1977, p.356) write

"More abstract than the expanded text are the propositions, those general statements which are said to recur implicitly or explicitly in many parts of the session. These propositions provide the firm skeleton for the surface that confronts us."

They point out that some of the propositions are supported by the text, but some are never stated explicitly by interlocutors but rely for their support upon parallel studies of the relevant literature.

7) Rules of discourse

Labov and Fanshel (1977, p.357) write

"The rules of discourse provide explicit connections between forms at various levels of abstraction, providing a model of how speakers might go about producing and interpreting these hierarchical structures of speech actions."

These rules will be presented in detail below.

8) Interaction

Labov and Fanshel (1977, pp. 357-358) write

"The core of the cross sectional analysis is a statement of interaction, which combines the underlying propositions with chain sequences of speech actions. These chains of actions, connected by thereby are the central theoretical construct of the analysis. The fundamental distinction between what is said and what is done is a common concern of all students of speech acts. We have attempted to give specific form to this general distinction and to marshall all of the evidence at our disposal to support these chains of speech actions. Since the interactional statements are necessarily the most abstract, the evidence is always indirect, but these statements provide an account of what speakers are doing in verbal interaction and so approach the description of the meaning of the speech."

The interactional speech events described by Labov and Fanshel (1977, p.60) were originally based on Bales' (1950) Interactional Process Analysis. They were adapted in order to allow for the same utterance performing more
than one action, and also to allow for the view of Labov and Fanshel (1977) that language is hierarchically structured on a dimension of increasing abstraction from utterance to underlying meaning. They used the discourse rules to provide a qualitative analysis using these categories, whereas Bales was concerned with quantitative coding. With reference to other material in this thesis, it should be noted that meaning is conceived by Labov and Fanshel (1977) in terms of action. This type of interactional statement will be illustrated in Chapter Two below.

9) Sequences

The analysis in terms of speech actions in this approach is motivated, in part at least, by the fact that sequential coherence occurs at the abstract level of action and interaction rather than at the surface level of what is actually uttered - the surface syntax. Thus "much of the sequencing follows automatically from the nature of the speech actions involved. Challenges are followed by defenses or admissions; requests are followed by compliance, put-offs or refusals." (Labov and Fanshel, 1977, p.358). Sequencing at a micro level is implicit in the rules of discourse (for example in Rule 2 which is stated below) and the interactional statements and diagrams they generate. They have not formalised sequences over larger sections of their text, but acknowledge that this would be a next step. 1) to 8) above provide what Labov and Fanshel (1977) call a cross-sectional analysis, that is they provide cross-sectional accounts of this. Sequencing provides an account of the way these cross-sections are linked as the text unfolds.

Labov and Fanshel (1977, p.67) consider three modes of indirectness in conversation which need to be made explicit in Comprehensive Discourse Analysis, using the nine analytic stages already outlined. "The relation of text and [paralinguistic] cues is the mode of expression, the way in which propositions are embedded in the expansion is the mode of argument, and
the way in which "what is said" is related to "what is done" is the mode of interaction."

Labov and Fanshel's discourse rules will be presented here and exemplified in the next chapter. In Chapter Five, Labov and Fanshel's commentary will be expanded using the framework of Kleinian psychodynamics, so as to encompass the emotional dynamics involved in the conversation.

I REQUESTS

Rule 1) (Labov and Fanshel, 1977, p.78)

RULE OF REQUESTS

If A addresses to B an imperative specifying an action X at time T, and B believes that A believes that

1a X should be done (for a purpose Y) [need for action]
   b B would not do X in the absence of the request [need for the request]

2 B has the ability to do X (with an instrument Z)

3 B has the obligation to do X or is willing to do it

4 A has the right to tell B to do X,

then A is heard as making a valid request for action.

Rule 2 (p.82)

RULE FOR INDIRECT REQUESTS

If A makes to B a Request for Information or an assertion to B about

a. the existential status of an action X to be performed by B.
b. the consequences of performing an action X.
c. the time T, that an action X might be performed by B.
d. any of the preconditions for a valid request for X as given in the Rule of Requests.
and all other preconditions are in effect, then A is heard as making a valid request of B for the action X.

Rule 3 (p.86)

**RULE FOR PUTTING OFF REQUESTS**

If A has made a valid request for the action X of B and B addresses to A

a. a positive assertion or request for information about the existential status of X.

b. a request for information or negative assertion about the time T₁.

c. a request for information or negative assertion about one of the four preconditions.

then B is heard as refusing the request until the information is supplied or the negative assertion is contradicted.

N.B. Labov and Fanshel (1977, p. 87) write

"Refusals based on needs and abilities are generally mitigating while refusals based on rights and obligations are extremely aggravating."

Rule 4 (p.88)

**RULE OF RELAYED REQUESTS**

If A requests B to make a request of C, and B asserts that C is not likely to comply with the request, then B is heard as putting off the original request from A.

Rule 5 (p.89)

**RULE OF REQUEST FOR INFORMATION**

If A addresses to B an imperative requesting information I, or an interrogative focusing on I, and B does not believe that A believes that

a. A has I

b. B does not have I

the A is heard as making a valid request for information.

N.B. (Labov and Fanshel, 1977, p.90)
"This rule excludes two special cases: where A plainly knows the answer and does not need the information, and where he knows that B does not have the information, and so could not get it from him. Both of these situations occur in a variety of forms, which can be termed variously "rhetorical questions", "test questions", [as a teacher might ask a pupil], "baiting questions", and so on...

N.B.2 (Labov and Fanshel, 1977, p.91)

"When A hears B making his request for information, he automatically searches for a proposition of the form: A person needs the information I in order to respond to the request for action X."

Rule 6 (p.91)

RULE OF EMBEDDED REQUESTS
If A makes a request for action or information of B, and B responds with a request for information, then B is heard as asserting that he needs this information in order to respond to A's request.

Rule 7 (p.92)

SUB-RULE OF REDUNDANT RESPONSES
(Sub-rule to rule for putting off requests Rule 3)
If A makes a request for action of B, and B responds with a request for information which A and B know that B does not need, then B is heard as provisionally refusing the request. This is stronger than a put-off.

Rule 8 (p.93)

RULE FOR REINSTATING REQUESTS
If B has responded to a request for action from A by making a request for information, and A gives that information, then A is heard as making the original request for action again.

II CHALLENGES

DEFINITION (p.97)
A challenge is a speech act that asserts or implies a state of affairs that, if true, would weaken a person's claim to be competent in the role associated with a valued status.
Rule 9 (p.94)

RULE OF DELAYED REQUESTS
If A makes a request for B to perform an action X in role R, based on needs, abilities, obligations, and rights which have been valid for some time, then A is heard as challenging B's competence in role R.

Rule 10 (p.95)

RULE OF REPEATED REQUESTS
If A makes a request for action X of B in role R, and A repeats the request before B has responded, than A is heard as emphatically challenging B's performance in role R.

Rule 11 (p.96)

RULE OF OVERDUE OBLIGATION
If A asserts that B has not performed obligations in a role R, then A is heard as challenging B's competence in R.

Rule 12 (p.97)

RULE FOR CHALLENGING PROPOSITIONS
If A asserts a proposition that is supported by A's status, and B questions the proposition, then B is heard as challenging the competence of A in that status.

III. COHERENCE

Rule 13 (p.99)

RULE OF IMPLICIT RESPONSES
If A makes a request of B of the form Q (S₁), and B responds with a statement S₂, and there exists no rule of ellipsis that would expand S₂ to include S₁, then B is heard as asserting that there exists a proposition, known to both A and B of the form, If S₂, then E (S₁)

N.B. Q is question form
E is an 'existential' of the form likely, usually, probably, certainly, and so on.

**DEFINITION** (p. 100)

The classification of statements according to the shared knowledge involved:

- **A - events:** Known to A, but not to B
- **B - events:** Known to B, but not to A
- **AB - events:** Known to both A and B
- **O - events:** Known to everyone present
- **D - events:** Known to be disputable

**Rule 14** (p. 100)

**RULE OF CONFIRMATION**

If A makes a statement about B - events, then it is heard as a request for confirmation.

**Rule 15** (p. 228)

**RULE OF REINTERPRETATION**

If A makes a statement to B, and B requests confirmation of some element which was not in focus in that statement, then B is heard as asserting that the element should have been in focus.

**Rule 16** (p. 101)

**RULE OF MINIMAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

If A asserts an A event then he normally only requires an acknowledgement of a minimal kind.

**N.B.** (p. 101)

Such assertions by A of A events are often used to introduce a narrative, B simply must show that he or she is prepared to pay attention during an extended turn at talk.

**Rule 17** (p. 101)

**RULE OF REMARKS**

If A makes an assertion about an AB-event or an O-event, then these are
heard by B as remarks, putting minimal constraint on the sort of response allowable.

Rule 18 (p.101)

RULE OF DISPUTABLE ASSERTIONS

If A makes an assertion about a D-event then it is heard as a request for B to give an evaluation of that assertion.

Rule 19 (p. 102)

RULE FOR SOCRATIC QUESTIONS

If A directs to B a yes-no interrogative about a D-event, then it is heard as a request for information about B's position on this event, which will form the basis for further discussion.

N.B. (p.102)

As the listener answers each question, the possible arguments that he or she can use to disagree with the ultimate point are eliminated: the number of AB-events grows as the number of D-events diminishes.

Rule 20 (p.103)

RULE OF SOCRATIC SPECIFICATION

If A makes a request for information of B, and B refuses to answer on the ground that he does not have the ability, and A makes another request for information which is more specific, then A is heard as asserting that the specific information implied by this request is part of the answer, thereby disallowing further refusals on the same account.

Rule 21 (p. 103)

RULE FOR ADMITTING PROPOSITIONS

If A responds to a request for information from B by giving that information, without specifically mentioning the presuppositions or implications of the request, then B admits those presuppositions and implications.
**Rule 22 (p.104)**

**RULE FOR NEGATIVE STATEMENTS**

If A makes an assertion that X has not occurred then it is presupposed that someone expects (for some reason) that X would occur.

**IV NARRATIVES**

**DEFINITION (p.105)**

A narrative is one of the means of representing past experience by a sequence of ordered sentences that present the temporal sequence of those events by that order. (See rule of narrative sequencing, rule 25).

These are seen to play a tightly integrated role in the conversation functioning as equivalent to single speech acts. Labov and Fanshel, (1977, pp.105-110) analyse a narrative as consisting of the following elements in the following order:

a) **Abstract**

   a statement of the general proposition which the narrative will exemplify. It often uses pre-forms, the referents of which will only be clarified in the ensuing narrative. This can give the listener sufficient notice that a narrative is about to begin. This is sometimes missing and the narrative goes immediately to the orientation. (see rule of forward reference, rule 23)

b) **Orientation**

   Initiation of the narrative, using a reference to a prior time to place it. The orientating statement is not reportable in itself. (see rule of narrative orientation, rule 24)
c) Narrative sequencing

the narrative itself, where the order of the narrative is isomorphic to the order of the events being described. (see rule of narrative sequencing, rule 25)

d) Evaluative point

the point of the narrative - often the event which instantiates the general proposition stated in the abstract or a general proposition being discussed by the previous speaker - for example, see the Rule of Narrative Response, rule 27. In general, it is the locus of the speech act which the narrative is performing. This is the reportable part of the story which is accountable if it is missing. A variety of devices are used to signal to the listener that the event or events being described are the central and important part of the narrative. For example,

1) the use of intensifying modifiers,

2) complex syntactic devices that bring together several events,

3) the use of negatives and models to refer to other events which did not occur but might have occurred,

4) delaying the forward movement of the narrative at a certain point by the use of many non-narrative clauses which hold the listener suspended at that point in time.

e) Coda

that which tells the listener that the story is over. For example
1) bringing the listener back to the present time (in contrast to the orientation)
2) making observations that are timeless in character.
3) stating that the narrative has finished.

Labov and Fanshel (1977, p.109) write "If we understood that a narrative plays a role in a discourse similar to that of a single speech action, then it is expected that the listener will respond to that action appropriately. Our most general characterisation of the place of narrative in discourse is that it is given as an instance of a general proposition. It is not required that the listener agree to the proposition or even disagree. He must however indicate to the narrator that he has understood how this narrative is to be interpreted, that it is intended as evidence for a specific proposition. This can be done by agreeing or disagreeing with the proposition, or by employing many other types of less specific acknowledgement." This is often, then, an instance of the rule of disputable assertions.

A narrative as described above is accomplished by using the following rules of discourse.
Rule 23 (p. 106)

RULE OF FORWARD REFERENCE
If A states a general proposition about particular events using unspecified pro-forms, then B will interpret any next reference to a past event as the subject of that general proposition. Thus A's statement will be heard as the abstract of the narrative.

Rule 24 (p. 106)

RULE OF NARRATIVE ORIENTATION
If A makes a reference to an event that occurred prior to the time of speaking, which cannot be interpreted by any rule of discourse as a complete speech action in itself, then B will hear this reference as the orientation to a narrative to follow.

Rule 25 (p. 107)

RULE OF NARRATIVE SEQUENCING
In a narrative, if A refers to an event with a sentence S, that has a nonstative main verb in the simple past or present tense (that is, verbs referring to the actual occurrence of actions that might be separated in time from other actions), and then refers to another event with a sentence $S_2$ of the same structure, then B will hear A as asserting that the event referred to by $S_1$ took place before the event referred to be $S_2$.

Rule 26 (p. 284 footnote)

RULE OF JUXTAPOSITION
If A states that event X was followed immediately by event Y, then B will hear A as asserting that X was a cause of Y.

N.B. It is, of course, possible to describe a coincidence: that is that the juxtaposition of X and Y was accidental, however this appears to be the "marked" case, which needs special mention.
Rule 27 (p.109)

RULE OF NARRATIVE RESPONSE

If A makes a request for information to B, and B immediately begins a narrative then B is heard as asserting that the evaluative point of the narrative will supply the information requested.

V SEQUENCING

Rule 28 (p. 110,111)

THE RULE OF SEQUENCING FOR REQUESTS

If A makes a request, then B must acknowledge this in one of four ways.

a) by giving the response requested, that is performing the action or giving the information.

b) by putting off the request.

c) by refusing the request with an accounting.

d) by refusing the request without an accounting.

In response to B’s response, A can do the following

a) If B has complied with the request, A can acknowledge this, with thanks, a next possible action is a minimisation by B.

b) If B puts off the request, A can reinstate it, redirect it to others, or retreat (withdraw). He or she can at the same time mitigate or aggravate the request.

c) If B refuses the request with an accounting, A can renew the request (see Rule for Reinstating Requests, Rule 8 above) or can accept the refusal.

d) If B refuses the request, without an accounting, A can accept the refusal but, in that case, may also respond with a huff.

N.B. Labov and Fanshel (1977, p.111 and P.88) point out that an accounted refusal and a put-off are not distinguished easily.

Labov and Fanshel (1977, p.110,111) write
"The rules of production and interpretation that we have been discussing . . . are quite complex; the sequencing rules are relatively simple . . .

In our discussion of assertions and challenges, it appeared that many of these speech acts can be further analyzed as requests of various kinds, and the rules for requests. In this chapter as a whole, the rules for interpretation and production have absorbed much of the complexity that has appeared elsewhere in discussions of sequencing."

Critique of the work of Labov and Fanshel (1977)

Although the work of Labov and Fanshel (1977) is an excellent empirical starting point for the type of linguistics advocated in this work, it falls short of a detailed theoretical explication of emotional interaction. They produce a highly perceptive account of dialogue which is, by virtue of its setting, highly charged emotionally. However, the very fact of the emotional nature of the material being discussed, particularly as it is embedded in a psychotherapeutic interview where emotional material is central, would suggest that they might benefit from a more structured approach to emotion. However, their discourse rules - referring as they do to roles, rights, statuses and obligations, and their propositions - are largely sociological. The only emotional propositions are of the form "X feels emotion Y", or, for example: "The patient should gain insight into his or her emotions", "X interprets the emotions of others" and "One should express ones needs and emotions to others." Whereas the sociological notions form a coherent account of what is happening at that level, both in terms of family interaction and speaker-hearer interaction, the emotional account remains theoretically inexplicit.

One of their explicit aims is to find out what has 'gone on' in these particular sessions. They are however, limited in the way they do this. They write;

"In the course of daily life, these deep emotions are usually masked by a variety of social and psychological mechanisms and are not always recognized by the actors involved. However, their effects can be seen by the continued disturbance of
family relationships and the neurotic behaviour that interferes with the life goals of family members.

The session begins with the presentation of material from everyday life. In trying to understand this material, the therapist elicits a larger body of information about complex family networks. In the course of the discussion, the therapist brings to bear her informal sociological expertise to present commonly accepted norms and suggest the obvious resolution of certain family problems. Throughout this discussion, she gives many indications that she is also thinking about questions involving the feelings that family members have towards each other; ... she finally engages in a direct discussion of those feelings. She presents an opposition between what people are saying and what they are feeling, and she indicates plainly that she believes that feelings are more fundamental. ... The overall shape of the therapeutic conversation is dictated by the theory that insight is to be gained by moving from a discussion of superficial matters (social interaction) to fundamental causes (feelings). (p.329).

I would argue nevertheless that their claim to have explained "What has happened in this session" (the title of their Chapter Ten) and to have answered the question "What is the therapist trying to do?" (p.329) is by no means completely fulfilled. For example they have not given an account in terms of the feelings which they themselves acknowledge that the therapist correctly identifies as fundamental to these questions. Like the therapist, the present author proposes that a theory of emotions must accompany a theory of social roles if one is to understand "What is happening in the session"; and this is not only in therapeutic discourse, but in any conversation, or at least in any potentially intimate one, such as a family conversation. (For a discussion of the notion of intimacy from a Kleinian point of view the reader is referred to Chapter Four.)

In considering emotional displays as a source of insight for the therapist Labov and Fanshel (1977) write:

"The therapist must then discover what psychological defences are operating at this point, and what emotional problems lie beneath the failure to achieve the stated goals. In order to solve the puzzle presented by such contradictions, the therapist must search for evidence of the actual psychodynamics that produce them. The episode [of the sessions being studied] are not undifferentiated in this respect: In each one, there are one or two points where intense
emotion is displayed - emotion that is frequently masked or denied, but that is, nonetheless, in evidence. These are concentrated at the quotations from family interaction, which we have frequently identified as centers for the most complex kind of speech acts." (p.338)

Although the therapist searches for evidence of the actual psychodynamic occurring in the session, Labov and Fanshel (1977) do not offer an explicit account of how these psychodynamics work. They write:

"The therapist has been exposed to the psychoanalytic tradition through many formal and informal educational channels. She and her colleagues were participants in that tradition and were well versed in such modern developments as ego psychology." (P.329).

However, whereas they devote a whole chapter to the explication of the sociolinguistic rules which the therapist and patient use implicitly, and which may be seen as part of what they refer to as the therapists' "informal sociological expertise" (p. 329), they make little attempt to make explicit the maxim of ego psychology, the psychological part of her expertise (as set out for example in Hartmann, 1964 and Laughlin, 1970). As the therapist's thinking about feelings will be formed by her experiences in the ego psychological tradition, and formulated in terms of that tradition, the omission of an account of this tradition shows the limitations of Labov and Fanshel's (1977) approach. They imply that the social propositions underlying their sample conversation are more complex than the emotional ones. They write:

"On the other hand, we find a rather restricted series of emotions in the underlying centre of the therapeutic session we are studying:

E₁ Rhoda feels frustration
E₂ Rhoda feels guilt
E₃ Rhoda feels anger
E₄ Rhoda feels loneliness

Not all underlying emotions are negative. People have many ways of showing such profound emotions as love, pity, admiration, and gratitude. In some therapeutic sessions, the patient seems unable to express positive emotions. However
they are not a central problem for this therapy: the ultimate focus is on anger, frustration, guilt, and loneliness. The therapist is trying to deal with the psychopathology that underlies Rhoda's self-destructive behavior, and it is not likely that she will find it in positive emotions that bind people together." (p.334).

Without a discussion of the findings of ego psychology, it is not clear why, for example, the complex interaction between the many manifestations of love and hate might not be central to the therapeutic interaction. At first sight, the question of why some patients appear unable to express positive emotions would seem to be important.

Labov and Fanshel (1977) give a sociolinguistically rich account of the psychodynamic concept of resistance. However, they do not show adequately why it is psychodynamically important. They write (p. 334):

"We have seen many examples of the phenomenon that therapists call resistance. If the patient could express simply and clearly what she felt and could give a perfectly accurate view of her relations with others, the therapist's problem would be simple. Then no psychopathology would be involved. The most difficult problem for the therapist is, therefore, to see through the many forms of masking and mitigating behaviour that prevent the patient from seeing her own problem clearly and explaining it to others."

However, without a psychodynamic account of resistance, it is difficult to believe its stated centrality. In particular a psychodynamic account of resistance is needed to understand the assertion that if the patient could express herself simply and clearly to others there would be no psychopathology involved.

Labov and Fanshel (1977) write (p.13):

"The theoretical perspective developed by psychiatrists and psychoanalysts forms a systematic alternative to the analysis that we will present in the chapters to follow. As we have already noted, we have learned a great deal from the observations of the therapist herself during playback; these often represent specific applications of the theoretical perspective that we find in a number of texts. The psychotherapeutic literature is rich in its discussion of the issues, strategies, and theoretical applications of the events perceived in the therapeutic interview by the analysts. But the terms, units, and elements perceived are often the product of considerable analysis, and the questions raised are internal to the particular theory."
They point out (p. 14) that in the traditional approach of the psychotherapeutic literature most case studies present only brief narrative accounts in the third person. They continue (pp. 15-16):

"In our approach, we draw the interpretation more directly from the immediately surrounding text, but we also find it necessary to consult material presented in widely scattered parts of the therapeutic series. Yet the problem of correct interpretation is the same in both cases: we recognise the therapist's ability to draw deep interpretations from the entire configuration, though we take a more analytic approach that isolates the particular utterances and signals ... As a whole, the psychotherapeutic literature can be described as taking the text for granted. It is possible that the techniques which we provide here, stemming from a closer examination of the text, will be useful to those working within the psychotherapeutic tradition as a further resource and as a way of validating their intuitions. However, we also recognise that the careful study of texts may always be a secondary approach for those who must make spontaneous decisions in the clinical encounter."

What the present author is suggesting is that the linguistic approach of Labov and Fanshel (1977) should not be seen as a systematic alternative to the psychiatric and psychoanalytic perspective, but should rather be supplemented by it to form an integrated dynamic linguistics. Just as Labov and Fanshel suggest that their linguistic techniques may be of use to the psychotherapist, so the present author is suggesting that the psychotherapeutic techniques may be of use to the linguist. They write (p.16):

"It should be recognised that both theoretical interpretations and the close observation of behaviour find their basis in the model of case narrative description characteristic of Freud's work. Freud's concern for the minutiae of everyday behaviour was richly developed in the interview itself, and some of the principles of discourse analysis set forth below - particularly its determinism - reflect a way in which Freud's thinking contributes to close examination of everyday behaviour."

Conclusion

The focal concept which underlies the presentation of both CA and DA in this chapter is that of membership categorisation. Sacks developed
...this notion in the atmosphere of post-Saussurean semantics and pragmatics which emphasised the negotiated nature of meaning.

We have seen that the concept of membership categorisation is central to earlier work in the framework of CA but became less so in later work by Sacks' successors. It can be argued however that although it has received increasingly less explicit attention as CA has moved towards a more formal statement of discourse processes, those formal statements can be read precisely as an operationalisation of the concept. In other words the concept of membership categorisation underpins the conceptual apparatus which has been elaborated; the rule schema developed on the basis of Sacks' approach can be seen as a more detailed articulation and operationalisation of this central concept. The concept has not been lost but has been absorbed and subsumed in and by later developments.

A superficial understanding of membership categorisation is that the term applies primarily or indeed exclusively to the content of dialogue, i.e. the way speakers use language referentially to categorise the external world. However it cannot be over-emphasised that membership categorisation applies not just to 'what is said' but also to the very categories involved in the local management of discourse and other interactional aspects of dialogue. The notion of the turn-to-talk (and associated concepts such as turn transition relevancy points) involves membership categorisation just as much as does topic selection (or rather negotiation).

This last point can be restated in Hallidayan terms (Halliday, 1978), drawing on his distinction between the 'ideational', 'interpersonal' and 'textual' function of language. Membership categorisation might on an unsophisticated reading appear to apply perhaps exclusively to the ideational function, whereas of course it applies par excellence to the textual and interpersonal ones and in some senses perhaps more indirectly to the
ideational function. Indeed the invocation of Halliday's functional taxonomy suggests the next logical step of extending the notion of membership categorisation to the 'affective' function of language in as far as this touches on one aspect of emotional dynamics.

Just as membership categorisation is implicit in the more formal rules of later CA work, so also it can be seen as a notion which more generally underpins discourse rules developed independently in the Labovian framework. These likewise can be seen as an elaboration of the machinery involved in membership categorisation of various functional sorts.

What I have been suggesting in this chapter therefore is one particular perspective of recent developments in the analysis of discourse which might be schematically represented as follows:

```
Negotiated meaning
   ↓
Membership Categorisation
   ↓
Conversation Analysis
  (Preference Structure)
   ↓
Discourse Analysis
  (Request Structure)
```

Since CA and DA have in their more elaborated forms grown into rather different sorts of animal, their shared pedigree might not at first seem obvious. It is worth noting however that Labov and Fanshel make a full and explicit acknowledgement of their indebtedness, both in general approach and details of analysis, to the ideas of Harvey Sacks (Labov and Fanshel, 1977, p. x). Furthermore although the two sets of conceptual apparatus are no longer isomorphic they exhibit a formal congruence in so far as the central notions of preference structure in the one case and request structure in the other are pivotal to the machinery whereby
membership categorisation is accomplished. It is this congruence that allows for the 'inter-transferability' of CA and DA.

In the subsequent chapters of this thesis what I aim to do is develop a model of Kleinian discourse analysis which would share a common parentage with CA and DA, and indebtedness in particular to Harvey Sacks. It should be borne in mind that his notion of membership categorisation underpins the whole enterprise of re-reading the work of Kleinian psychoanalysis in linguistic terms, even though this in places may be more implicit than explicit where it is subsumed by other terminology.

Where the model of Kleinian discourse analysis will differ from CA and DA is in its attempt to incorporate both internal as well as external dynamics as integral aspects of membership categorisation. The Kleinian account of internal dynamics will undoubtedly appear to be a strange animal to the mainstream linguist. Its conceptual apparatus is not straightforwardly isomorphic with related approaches such as CA and DA not least because any account of internal dynamics will clearly be operating at a different level from accounts which concentrate on external social interaction. I hope the reader will nevertheless be persuaded that the model to be proposed is formally congruent with the cognate approaches to which the notion of membership categorisation is likewise pivotal. As such it adds a further layer, both supplementary and complimentary to the notion of negotiated meaning in discourse.
Chapter Two

AN APPLICATION OF LABOV AND FANSHEL'S DISCOURSE RULES

The discourse rules set out in the previous chapter were based by Labov and Fanshel on the analysis of a therapeutic interview - a setting where emotional dynamic tensions are of course of a quite special sort. Since the present thesis is concerned with the emotional dynamic aspects of conversation more generally, it was thought appropriate to make a specifically non-clinical case study for exemplification and analysis. For these purposes, therefore, a recording and transcription of a family discussion was prepared, the text of which (with notes on subjects and setting) is reproduced as Appendices A and C.

A Kleinian commentary on this text will be given later in the thesis (Chapter Six). In order to highlight the emotional dynamic aspects of that commentary, the same text will be used in the present chapter for the concrete exemplification of Labov and Fanshel's rules. What this first pass over the data will aim to show is that an analysis of discourse in terms of roles, rights and obligations - i.e. in terms of external social interactions- partly reveals what is 'really going on' at the internal and emotional dynamic level, but that it does so only in an unsystematic fashion. The subsequent Kleinian analysis, it will be argued, can extend and compliment the initial Labovian one.

Since the presentation of the analysis in this chapter follows the sequence of rules as set out in the previous one, so as to facilitate cross-reference, some introductory notes on the case study may be helpful to orientate the reader. The subjects of the study were a young family (a married couple and their two sons, aged 3 months and 3 years 5 months) who were invited to converse on a range of 'domestic/family' topics.
From the point of view of this chapter, the second topic discussed by the family - 'The way to treat other people in the family' - is of particular interest (cf. Appendix C, p.8 line 28 to p.18 line 26). Underlying the external world dynamics described by Labov and Fanshel's discourse rules, exemplification of which form the majority of this chapter, are the social constructs of role, status and obligation. The whole balance of these constructs for the family is in question in this part of the conversation (see for example the discussion below of Rule 9, the Rule of Delayed Requests). This part of the discussion centres on what each partner in the marriage has not done, so Rule 22 - the Rule of Negative Statements-operates ubiquitously. Following this rule, negative statements focus the participants on unfulfilled expectations. This Rule is used (see the discussion of this Rule below) to attempt renegotiation of speakers' expectations that are attendant on role obligations - that is membership categorisation of the external world.

An example of the internal world dynamics that can be seen to be at work in this conversation is the linguistic enactment of the family members' feelings towards the author and the task set them. These feelings are manifested linguistically at the level of topic choice, speech act choice, and lexical and phrasal choice. Linguistic aspects of the internal world dynamics contained in the conversation will be further discussed in Chapter Six.

Before proceeding to exemplify each of Labov and Fanshel's discourse rules in turn, a sample will be given of the general format of their Comprehensive Discourse Analysis (cf. chapter 1 above), illustrating a brief 'cross-section' of what a sequential commentary would look like. This consists of the following components: (a) the transcribed text, (b) a note on any paralinguistic cues that are deemed relevant, (c) an 'expansion', providing a gloss on the discourse meaning, (d) a note on what discourse
rules are involved in the interaction, and (e) a set of implicit 'propositions' which are at stake.

**Text**

John: But that was a matter of choice wasn't it. (p 13 line 26)

**Paralinguistic Cues**

Basically flat affect, but has a hasty dismissive quality about it.

**Expansion**

John: But would you not agree that the fact that you gave up your career to look after the children was a matter of your choice (proposition 4, below), a personal preference of having children over pursuing a career, rather than, as you claim, evidence for your having sacrificed something for your children, which is being used as evidence for your claim (1) that you love your children, and your claim (2) that you are not an unnatural mother?

**Interaction**

John questions whether Jenny gave up her career because of her implied proposition that a good mother would give up her career as it would be best for her children to be with them (5), which is supported by her status as a mother, thereby either challenging Jenny's status as a mother (by the rule for challenging propositions, rule 12); or else if he is assenting to the proposition, he is challenging this notion that she is a good mother (2), for she would have given up her career for other reasons. He also thereby asserts (through the rule of reinterpretation, rule 15) that this element should be in focus in the discussion.
Propositions

(1) Jenny loves her children
(2) Jenny is an unnatural mother.
(3) It is better that the children see us row than that we hide it.
(4) Jenny gave up her career as a matter of choice.
(5) A good mother would give up a career because she would know it would be best for her children.

Examples of the use of rules proposed by Labov and Fanshel (1977)

I REQUESTS

This section should be read in conjunction with the exposition of Labov and Fanshel's rules in the previous chapter.

Rule 1 Rule of Requests

As Labov and Fanshel (1977, p. 82) point out "In our therapeutic session, and in many other conversations that we have reviewed, direct requests are in the minority. Demands of face-to-face social interaction require that mitigating devices be used between adults, or when a child is making a request of an adult". So it is not surprising that most of the direct requests are from Jenny or John to Dave, that is adult to child. However, Jenny says to her husband

"So you'd better tell me what they are." (p.1 line 3 and 4)

She is referring to the films on television over Christmas. The grammatical construction falls into Labov and Fanshel's (1977) definition of an imperative. Also the preconditions for the rule of request stated in the previous chapter are satisfied. With respect to condition 1a, Jenny would feel the need for action on John's part, telling her about the films, probably as material for the opening of the discussion. With respect to precondition 1b she would feel the need for a request in order to make sure John tells her what they are. Again perhaps because of her anxiety
about what to talk about, she appears to be trying to shift a long turn to John. She seems to sense that John's question (p.1 line 1, 2) is not a request for information (see rule 5 in the previous chapter) and it appears that she believes that he does have the information he seems to be asking for. So with respect to precondition 2, she would believe that John has the ability to tell her. With respect to preconditions 3 and 4 it is clear that she believes John is willing to tell her what the films are and has the right to. All the preconditions are valid and so this is an example of the use of the rule for requests.

A more usual example is (p 2 line 9) when Jenny says to Dave, as a mother to her child,

'no don't touch that darling'.

She is referring here to a piece of the recording equipment. Again, this is in the imperative. Jenny would believe that it should be done either for Dave's safety or the safety of the equipment. She would know that, as a child, he would be unlikely to refrain from touching the equipment in the absence of a request. She would certainly know he has the ability not to touch the equipment. Dave would feel that he had an obligation to do what his mother says, as he is a child for whom she is responsible, and he would similarly believe that she has the right to tell him to do it. Thus all the preconditions are valid and provide a further example of Rule 1.

Rule 2 Rule for Indirect Requests
This rule comes into play when John asks the author

'Do you want us to move on now to the next thing?' (p.8 line 26).

He is requesting the author's permission to move on to the next topic. He makes a request for information about both the author's willingness to give this permission and the time referent of the action now. With respect to the preconditions for valid requests he believes in the need for action
because they are both bored, and have nothing more to say on the topic, as Jenny says in line 27

'I think we have really exhausted that one.'

He apparently feels the need for the request despite the fact that the author had left it up to them when to change topic and believes the author has the ability to answer. He also believes that it is the author's right to tell them when to change topics, although the author's intention was that the subjects should change the topics of their own free will. Thus all the preconditions for a valid request are in effect and so this is an example of the use of Rule 2.

Rule 3  Rule for Putting Off Requests

As was mentioned in the exemplification of Rule 1 discussed above, John's initial comment (p.1 lines 1, 2)

'Have you had a chance yet to see what er films there are on television over Christmas'

is heard not as an example of a request for information - rule 5 - but another example of rule 2, the rule for indirect requests. He makes a request for information about the ability of Jenny to have seen what films there are and also to the time referent of the action ('yet'). He seems to think Jenny should organise the family's television viewing for the sake of their enjoyment over the Christmas holidays. This is illustrated in the rest of the discussion. Similarly, the later discussion shows that the assumptions in the family are that John has the right to ask Jenny to organise the family's television viewing, and Jenny has the obligation to do so. Thus, the preconditions of a request for her to do the television planning for the family over Christmas are in effect so John is heard by Jenny as validly putting an indirect request for her to do this. Jenny puts off this request as an example of rule 3 by saying that
'No I haven’t cos I haven’t even looked at them’ (p.1 line 3).

This is a negative assertion about her ability to plan the viewing and, therefore, is a mitigated put-off of his indirect request. Jenny directly answers the question which functions as John’s indirect request. This is an example of the fact that "the mechanisms for putting off and refusing requests are closely parallel to those for making requests indirectly" (Labov and Fanshel, 1977, p. 86). John’s utterance probably has the further function of setting up the conversation so that he can talk about the films that are on television over Christmas, which he subsequently goes on to do (p.1 lines 5-9). Jenny’s awareness of this is shown by her assumption that he can tell her what they are. As such, it may be a backing question (Labov and Fanshel, 1977, p.90). However, John’s utterance seems to function mainly as an indirect request for her to do the Christmas planning soon. Evidence for this is the indignation in Jenny’s voice. This would then be consistent with rule 9, the rule of delayed requests, which would imply that she thinks John to be suggesting that she is not competent at her role in the family. John’s use of the word ‘yet’ is a marker of the request being delayed.

Rule 4  Rule of Delayed Requests

There is no very clear example of the use of this rule in this tape. However, the nearest is when John asks

'Is it too late for that now’ (p.4 line 16)

referring to booking for the Christmas pantomime.

'No, I don’t think so, it depends, it depends, it depends what day we want to go and whether there’s any seats available.’

John is effectively asking her to make a request for seats from the theatre. He is therefore making a delayed request. Jenny is heard as putting the delayed request off to the extent that she is saying that on
certain days the theatre will not comply in providing certain seats.

**Rule 5  Rule of Request for Information**

This is a more ubiquitous rule than the previous one as this is not a discussion where actual actions are planned, at least on the part of the adults.

An example is (p.4 line 9) when John asks

'Are there any good sort of kids' films that he can go that are his age'

and Jenny replies (p.4 lines 10 and 11)

'Well I'm hoping there's going to be a Walt Disney film of some kind. I think that'd probably be the best for him'.

John utters an interrogative focussing on a piece of information which he clearly seems not to have and believes that Jenny has. This is an example of the use of rule 5.

**Rule 6  Rule of Embedded Requests**

When discussing a Chaplin film about a man who murders his wife, Dave asks why he does this, and John then replies

'because he doesn't like her' (p 1. lines 24, 25, 26).

Dave then says

'What does she do to him?' (p.1 line 27).

John responds

'Well what does he do to her you mean?'

As this is a request for information from Dave, followed by a request for information from John, this will be heard by Dave, according to the rule of embedded requests, as requesting information needed to respond to Dave's request for information. So Dave should respond by searching for a proposition to the effect that his father would need to know the answer to
this question in order to answer his, Dave's question. The fact that Dave does not respond in this way suggests to the author that there is a misunderstanding between them because Dave cannot find such a proposition. Dave probably means his question to remain as it stands, probably as a reformulation of his previously unsatisfactorily answered question as to why the man in the film killed his wife. If Dave had given a negative answer to his father's question, he would have been accountable to provide a third formulation of his question which would probably have been beyond the cognitive capacity of a child of his age. The fact that Dave does not reply is taken by John to be an affirmative rather than, as the author suggests, an indication by Dave that John has misunderstood him. John therefore goes on to answer a question which Dave has not asked.

**Rule 7  Sub-rule of Redundant Responses**

This rule is a sub-rule quite specific to the conversation being considered in Labov and Fanshel (1977) and does not occur in this conversation. However, the instance which comes nearest to the phenomenon described by this rule is p.8, line 11.

John seems to be getting bored at the end of a topic Jenny says (p.8 lines 7, 8)

'I think, I mean I just think that with films on television over Christmas, they're just too long for most families'.

John replies with the effect of not having been listening (p.8 line 9)

'Sorry?'.

So Jenny responds with

'They're too long for most families' (p.8 line 10).

The paralinguistic cues shows that she is irritable. John then says (p.8, line 11)
'What are?, Films'
to which Jenny replies, again with paralinguistic cues displaying irritability

'Films' (p.8 line 12)
which echoes John's answer to his own question in p. 8, line 11. John responds to his own question with information that both he and Jenny know that he does not need. If Jenny's turn in p. 8, line 7 and 8 is construed as a request for attention, which any turn may be minimally seen as being, then this is an instance of the sub-rule of redundant responses. Thus John in p. 8, line 11, is heard as provisionally refusing her request for attention - that is, not listening to her. That she construes his response in this way is illustrated by her irritability in the paralinguistic cues which continue in p.10 line 13ff.

Rule 8  Rule for Reinstating Requests
In p.17 lines 12 and 13, John and Jenny use the unmarked imperative form of the rule of requests to ask Dave to leave the microphone alone. Dave then asks

'What's that for, What does it do?' (p 17, line 15)
Apart from displaying natural inquisitiveness for a child of his age, and perhaps also displaying a desire to be part of the conversation, he may also be heard to be questioning a precondition of the request, namely that it should be done, the need for action. This is heard as a 'put off', following rule 3. Dave may be heard as questioning why the microphone is so important and/or delicate that his parents will not let him touch it. They supply an answer to his question in p.17, line 10 and also p. 17, line 21. They do not explicitly reinstate the request as the original request is automatically heard, following the rule for reinstating requests, as being reinstated. However, to reinforce the request they instead seem to be trying to work on another precondition, namely Dave's willingness to
comply with the request, by trying to interest him in the video recording equipment (p.19 lines 18, 20, 21) to distract him from what they seem to perceive as the more delicate microphones.

It is of note here that, although there should be little doubt of his obligation to obey his parents, throughout the recording they have not followed through the disciplinary comments they have made to Dave and thus allow him to continue to be disobedient. It seems that they are attempting to compensate for the precondition of obligation for a valid request, which they have allowed to become weakened by reinforcing the precondition of willingness. Dave then looks at the screen as they suggest, although he started leaving the microphones alone when the request was reinstated by John and Jenny through answering his question.

II CHALLENGES

Rule 9 Rule of Delayed Requests

As commented on in the discussion of the use of rule 3, the utterance in p.1, line 1 and 2 is an instance of the rule of delayed requests. John is assuming that there is the need for action, as it is good to get the Christmas holiday entertainment planned in advance. John's implication that Jenny has not looked up the films on the television 'yet' suggests that he feels that there is a need for him to make a request to Jenny to that effect. The rights and obligations that make this heard as a request become obvious in a later part of the conversation. The current assumption in the family is that Jenny takes domestic responsibility, although this is an assumption that she wishes to challenge. John's use of the word 'yet' in p.1 line 1 suggest that he feels that the preconditions for the request have been valid. So p.1 lines 1 and 2 is an instance of the rule of delayed requests. John is thus heard as challenging Jenny's competence in her role in the household.' She shows that she hears John's utterance in this way
by the irritable way she answers John (p. 1 lines 3, 4). This is also a put-off as commented in the discussion of rule 3 above, and may also be seen as an example of the converse of rule 21, in which Jenny explicitly displays a rejection of the assumption of her obligation which is implicit in John's request. A later example of this rejected assumption is to be found for example on p. 18, lines 18-23.

Rule 10 Rule of Repeated Requests
In the sequence (p. 3, line 18; p.4, line 2), John is questioning Jenny about recording the American Football on a long play video cassette. John makes a request for information on p.3, lines 24 and 25,

'And have you er er noticed any difference in the work that you've recorded on that,'

Jenny replies

'I think slightly slightly less good quality but it doesn't really make that much difference' (p. 3. lines 26, 27).

John responds

'Good quality in what sense'.

This is effectively (p.3, line 28) heard as a repetition of John's request (p.3, lines 24 and 25). Jenny's competence in her role of being in charge of the entertainment and her position in the family can thus be heard as being emphatically challenged by the rule of repeated requests. After the minimal responses in p.3, lines 21 and 23 Jenny suggests her resentment at being obliged to look after her husband's hobbies in which she is not interested. (Further evidence for this is p.8, lines 1 - 4.) She gives a response which is phrased vaguely in p.3, line 26 to his initial request and she adds very little more in p.3, line 29 and p.4, line 2 in response to his repeated request questioning her domestic role. Her vague answers function to question John's assumptions about her obligations in her domestic role.
For further discussion of Jenny's challenge of assumptions about her household role, the reader is referred to the section on rule 9 in this chapter.

Rule 11 Rules of Overdue Obligation

The discussion that John and Jenny are asked to have on 'The way to treat other people in the family' is concerned basically with descriptions of negotiations and renegotiations of the obligations of family roles. This discussion, therefore, is concerned with what are perceived to be overdue obligations, where an assertion that a person has not performed role obligations is heard as a challenge to their competence in that role. For example in p.12, lines 12 and 13, Jenny says

'I notice you haven't volunteered to give him [Kevin] a bath yet, but later you'll probably be prepared to give him a bath'.

A little later (p. 12 line 20) she says

'So I mean that's how you perceive your role.'

The overdue obligation of not giving Kevin a bath is being used to challenge John's perceptions of the obligations attached to his role of a father and as such to challenge his competence in this role. Jenny's long 'speech' (p.12 line 7 to p.13 line 3) is also concerned with this role obligation. Similarly, John challenges Jenny's role in an earlier part of the conversation, although he mitigates this challenge by saying that it is an emotional reaction, presumably in opposition to a rational one (p.11, line 4), and that it can be seen as foolish and idiotic (p.11, line 18). However, the challenge to Jenny's competence is made explicit when he says (p.10, lines 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29)

'I think it's odd, it seems odd to me that you would want to be without the kids, that seems really weird to me that you should think and if of course you should not want to be with the kids all
the time [another mitigator]. But it really sometimes I get really angry and feel that you're sort of really incompetent as a mother because you don't want to be with them every single moment of the day.'

Jenny orients to this (p.11 lines 5-7) when she says

'Yes I know you imply that I'm a terrible mother because I actually want you know and I feel guilty if I have I go and have a bath or something.'

Rule 12 Rule for Challenging Propositions

An example of the rule for challenging propositions is where Jenny asserts a proposition that is supported by her status as a mother and John questions the proposition, thus being heard as challenging the competence of Jenny in that status. This occurs in p.13, line 24. In defence of her competence in her role as a mother Jenny says

'it does irritate me enormously that you then imply that somehow I'm an unnatural mother and that I don't love my children. When I have in fact sort of given up a career to look after them, 'cos I think that'd be the best thing for them, and hmm.'

John then responds (p.15, line 25)

'But that was a matter of choice, wasn't it.'

Jenny's proposition, based on her status as a mother, is that a good mother should give up her career because it is best for her children for her to be with them. John does not challenge this directly, but challenges her claim that this was the reason she gave up her career. He is thus either challenging this proposition, in which case he is using the rule for challenging propositions, or he is agreeing with it and challenging Jenny's claim to be a good mother and this falls under the scope of the proposition. Either way, John is challenging Jenny's competence as a
mother, which is precisely the status she is trying to defend in this passage.

III COHERENCE

Rule 13     Rule of Implicit Responses

This rule is exemplified when John makes the request

'Are there any good sort of kids' films that he can go that are his age.'

Jenny responds with a statement (p.4, line 9)

'Well I I'm hoping that there's going to be a sort of Walt Disney film of some kind.' (p.4, lines 10,11)

There exists no rule of ellipsis that would expand the propositions 'There are some good kids films on at the cinema that are appropriate for Dave's age' and 'I hope that there are Walt Disney type films on at the cinema', which are the propositions underlying the question and answer. Thus, by the use of the rule of implicit propositions, Jenny is heard as asserting the proposition known to both of them of the form 'If, as I hope, there are Walt Disney films on at the cinema, then there will be films on that are appropriate for Dave's age.' In other words 'Walt Disney films are appropriate for Dave's age', a proposition very likely to be known to both of them. Jenny in fact undoes some of the implicitness by saying

'I think that'd probably be the best for him'. (p. 4, line 11)

This is possibly John simply needing something to say. However, it is probably more likely a way of hinting that John would not know that Walt Disney films are appropriate for a child of Dave's age. Jenny would know that John would know that Disney films are appropriate for a child of Dave's age but the comment could be a subtle challenge of John's role as a competent father who understands his children. This debate is made more explicit in other parts of the tape - for example, p.16, lines 2 - 6.
Rule 14  **Rule of Confirmation**

An example of this is where Jenny makes a comment about John's life and background and how it affects his behaviour. This is a precondition for the rule of confirmation. She says (p.11, lines 11-13)

'So that's something but, I mean that's something stemming from your mother and the way your mother expected the people to treat her, and the way she treats people in her family.'

Following the rule of confirmation, Jenny is heard by John as making a request for confirmation which he gives in p.11 line 13

'Yeah, Yeah'.

Rule 15  **Rule of Reinterpretation**

This rule is exemplified where John says

'But that was a matter of choice wasn't it?' (p.13, line 26)

(See discussion of use of rule 13). John is requesting confirmation of the element of choice in Jenny's giving up her career, which was not explicitly in focus in her preceding comments. He thus re-focusses the discussion onto an implicit assumption made by Jenny in her earlier claim in p.13, line 22, 23, 24, 25.

Rule 16  **Rule of Minimal Acknowledgement**

One of the idiosyncrasies about this conversation, which gives it an air of the participants being in 'separate worlds', 'talking in two parallel monologues' (p.19, lines 9 and 10), is that they do not minimally acknowledge each other. An example of John making a "John statement" which Jenny conspicuously ignores (see also p.16 line 18) is when he says

'But that's think, out of choice too, because I just don't like going out' (p. 16, line 13).
In this conversation they display a lack of interest in each other, and tend to ignore each other. So the rule of minimal acknowledgement is broken as the above example shows.

Rule 17 Rule of Remarks
An example of an assertion about an event known to both of them which is heard simply as a remark, putting minimal constraint on the sort of response allowable, is where Jenny says

'Well, I think we did start talking about Dave, about the effect, you know of our rows on Dave.' (p. 19, lines 22 and 23)

Rule 18 Rule of Disputable Assertions
An example of the rule of disputable assertions is where Jenny is making an assertion about the fact that she gave up her career to be with her children because she thought, as a good mother, it would be the best for them. This has been explicitly disputed by John (see discussion of use of rules 12 and 15 in p.13, line 26 and also in p. 14, lines 23 and 24). Jenny says

'Yes, but this no, it is I mean I could have made the choice to have a child minder or something but I decided it would be best for my children not to'. (p.14, lines 5, 6, 7)

Through the rule of disputable assertions, John hears this as a request for an evaluation and says (p.14 line 8)

'No, that's fine'.

Rule 19 Rule for Socratic Questions
As part of the same argument, as commented on in the discussion of the use of rule 18, John directs a yes-no interrogative about Jenny's position on the disputable event that Jenny gave up her career to be with
her children because she thought it would be the best for them. This forms the basis for further discussion and to attempt to eliminate Jenny’s possible counter arguments. John says (p.14 line 13)

'You don’t regret your career much though do you?'

Rule 20  Rule of Socratic Specification

There is not a strict application of the rule of socratic specification in this conversation, but the nearest mechanism to this appears to be the debate about whether Jenny gave up her career for the sake of her children. John makes what is, among other things, a request for information about why Jenny gave up her career. He asks p. 13, line 26,

'But that was a matter of choice, wasn’t it'.

As is suggested by some of the above discussion, this could be seen to have an underlying question.

'But didn’t you give up your career for reasons other than you believing that it would be best for your children.’

The discussion from p.13, line 27 to p.14, line 12 can be seen to be an attempt by Jenny to avoid answering this underlying question. So, on page 14, line 13, John makes another request for information which is more specific when he asks

'You don’t regret your career much though do you?'

This is more specific in that he seems to be suggesting that she was not really concerned about her career and this was the reason she gave it up, rather than because she believed it would be best for her children, as she is claiming. Thus, John is heard, through a mechanism similar to the rule of socratic specification, as asserting that the specific information implied by this request is part of the answer, thereby disallowing Jenny further refusals on the same account. She then answers the question with seeming honesty by saying on p.14, lines 15, 16, 17,
'I wish that you could combine the two but you can't so I've chosen the one I wanted to do most I suppose but yes, I mean I would would like to have a career'.

She effectively answers John's underlying question in the affirmative that she chose her course of action because it was the one she wanted to do, rather than, as she had claimed earlier, because she felt it would be best for her children. Her use of 'I suppose' suggests that she is, at least to some extent, conceding John's point.

Rule 21 Rule for Admitting Presuppositions

In the same part of the conversation, discussed in the commentary on the use of the previous rule 20, Jenny responds to John's request for information

'You don't regret your career much though do you?' (p. 14, line 13)

by giving the information given in p.14, lines 15-17. Although she does not specifically mention the presupposition that she did not give up her career because she felt it would be best for her children, by the rule for admitting presuppositions, she is actually admitting it. Again this is evidenced by the 'I suppose', displaying that the admission is grudging. It is interesting that 'I suppose' is related to 'I presuppose.' As her defeated proposition was offered as evidence for the propositions that she was not an unnatural mother and that she did love her children, then she is also implicitly admitting that her case for these presuppositions is weaker.

Rule 22 Rule for Negative Statements

An example of the rule for negative statements, where Jenny makes an assertion that something failed to occur which she expected would occur (because of her unrealistic beliefs about John), comes when she discusses the time when she was pregnant with Dave.
'I know, when, when I was expecting Dave the thing that you know really upset me most was how I'd expected you to be and what I'd expected you to want and what I'd expected you to say, you know I'd wanted you to sort of feel the baby move, and all that, and you were sort of going ohh no, and that really was the thing that most deeply upset me of anything, because I'd expected something so different. And I think we're both er probably more realistic now about each other and about what we expect.' (p.21, lines 20 - 27)

This is an example of the rule where the tense used is the past perfect, rather than the perfect. Jenny is reporting events that had not occurred in the past, and expectations that she had but has no longer. In this example, the negative expectations are made explicit.

An example where the expectations are not made explicit is when Jenny says

'In that you I mean you're prepared to give hmm Dave a bath because and presumably when Kevin's a bit bigger. I notice you haven't volunteered to give him a bath yet.' (p.12, lines 10-12)

This assertion, that John has not yet volunteered to give his younger child a bath, shows, by the rule for negative statements, that Jenny expects that he would. This expectation is based on the obligations of John's role as a father. In the past Jenny anticipated that John would fulfil these obligations but at the time of the conversation she seems rather to be implying that he should be fulfilling them. The rule for negative statements is used to convey expectations about what role obligations should be. This rule is used as a method of negotiating role obligations (cf. membership recategorisation of the external world).
IV NARRATIVES

The main narrative in the conversation is John's story about the two women on the bus (p.10, line 8 to p.12, line 6). Narratives do not always have abstracts and this is one which does not; thus rule 23, the rule of forward reference does not apply in this case. The orientation, however, is supplied by rule 24, the rule of narrative orientation.

Rule 23 Rule of Forward Reference

An example of the use of the rule of forward reference is where John introduces a short narrative type sequence about their experiences as marriage guidance clients (p.19). They begin by discussing how, in the second topic set them, they only talked about themselves, and how they mistreated each other. John then moves on from talking about this particular conversation. He states a general proposition about particular events using unspecified pro-forms. He says

'That's all we ever talk about' (p.19, line 8).

'That's' and 'ever' are the pro-forms. The next reference to a past event is thus heard as the subject of that general proposition, following the rule of forward reference. This next reference is when John follows immediately with 'its like when we went to the marriage guidance' (p.19, lines 8 and 9). John's general proposition (p.19, line 8) is thus heard as the abstract of the narrative. By the rule of narrative orientation, John's reference to a part event is heard as the orientation to the narrative to follow. He then moves straight to the evaluation which is a statement of the event, which instantiates the general proposition stated in the abstract. He says

'I think at first is sort of . . . just blew her mind that we just entered into two parallel monologues about how we were pissed off with each other.' (p.19, lines 9, 10, 12)
This comment is an instantiation of the general proposition that all they ever talk about is themselves and how they mistreat each other which was stated in the abstract. This whole sequence is of a very simplified narrative type, one which moves straight from the orientation to the evaluation.

Rule 24  Rule of Narrative Orientation

John makes a reference to an event that occurred prior to the time of speaking, 'the other day' (p. 9, line 6), which cannot be interpreted by any rule of discourse as a complete speech action in itself. Thus through the rule of narrative orientation, Jenny hears this reference as the orientation to the narrative to follow. John says

'Tell you something that on the bus the other day there were two women behind me' (p.10, lines 8 and 9).

Rule 25  Rule of Narrative Sequencing

An example of this rule which tells us how the narrative sequences as part of the narrative work, is when the reported discussion is heard as being reported in the order in which it actually occurred. Although the grammatical form of the verbs is not exactly as defined in the rule, the verbs do refer to the actual occurrence of actions that might be separated in time from other actions. John said p.10, lines 13 - 15, 17 - 21

'One of the women said something that er the bus was late you remember the night the bus was late? And she was worried about what her husband's reaction would be to er to her being late, and er she was saying "Well he goes down the pub every Saturday" or whenever, "And three evenings a week" or whatever and "he goes out to darts and wouldn't begrudge him that but he begrudges me "er" the fact that I might go out and he shouldn't do".'
Also sometime later in John's narrative he reports another piece of the same discussion which would be heard as following the previously reported discussion - p.11, lines 23 - 25

'as she said, the woman was saying hmm hmm it doesn't mean you don't love your kids just you want to spend some time to yourself.'

Rule 26 Rule of Juxtaposition

This rule is exemplified in John's statement

'They were having a conversation in the seat behind and I was listening in to what they were saying.' (p.10, lines 12 and 13)

By the rule of juxtaposition he will be heard as saying that the fact the two women were having the conversation in the seat behind him was a cause of his listening in to them. John introduces the evaluative point as the reportable part of the narrative, through the device of delaying the forward movement of the narrative by holding the listener suspended in real time. (A narrative is obviously mapped in a very contracted way onto the real events). He does this by quoting reported speech (p.10, lines 18 - 21).

The evaluative point is where John reports that he sometimes feels the same as the husband of the woman on the bus,

'I felt I do that sometimes'. (p.10, line 22)

The point of the story is to provide an example of Jenny's general proposition (p.9, lines 26 to p.10, line 7) that they do not understand each other and that is why they had the row they are discussing, and in particular that they rowed because she does not understand how tired he may be at work. He is confessing in p.10, line 22 that 'emotionally' (see p.11, line 4) he does not understand Jenny in the same way the husband of the woman on the bus does not understand his wife.

The coda tells Jenny that the story is over. John brings the listener back to the present time using a prolonged comment on a concrete situation
in his own marriage, which expands on the evaluative point of his narrative. He largely uses the present continuous tense both to bring us back to the present and to stress the 'timeless' nature of the situation. This is the longest piece in the present tense since the beginning of the narrative, and the most concrete scene from their own marriage. He says

'but I could see myself in her husband's role. If I'm with two kids and you'd gone shopping and they're getting, you know, they're getting cheesed off, and I'm getting more cheesed off, and then I reckon I'd be thinking that very same thing.' (p.12, lines 3, 4, 5, 6)

Jenny does not do the listener's evaluation after the end of the coda. She simply responds to the coda itself by saying

'But I mean it's, it's, why are they going to get cheesed off if they're with their father rather than their mother.' (p.12, lines 7, 8)

She interprets the narrative as an instance of a particular proposition and thus provides the listener's evaluation in the middle of it when she construes John's attitudes as emanating from his mother's actions (p.11, lines 11 - 13) and then says

'So that's that we've got to really, I suppose ultimately make a break from.' (p.11, lines 15, 16)

This is one of the less specific types of acknowledgement discussed by Labov and Fanshel (1977, p.109) and presented in the previous chapter of this thesis.

Rule 27    Rule of Narrative Response
The nearest approximation to the use of the rule of narrative responses is concerned with John's story of the two women on the bus (p.10, line 8, to p.12, line 6). It does not begin with an abstract in which John states the general proposition which he is going to instantiate in the evaluative point
of the narrative. Nor does Jenny make a request for information from John such that John is heard as asserting that the evaluative point of the narrative will supply the information requested, as in the case of use of the rule of narrative response. However, a mechanism very similar to the latter is used. The speech act to which the narrative is a response, or more precisely the speech act located at the narrative's evaluative point, is where Jenny is making a disputable assertion (p.9, lines 26 to p.10, line 7) that the reason they had the particular row they were discussing was because they do not understand each others' way of life. By the rule of disputable assertions, rule 18, Jenny is heard as making a request for John to give an evaluation of this assertion. He agrees with this assertion in p. 10, line 22, in the evaluative point of the narrative, by displaying his emotional identification with the husband of the woman on the bus, and thus showing that he does not understand Jenny. In the coda when he expands on the evaluative point, making explicit its timeless nature and instantiating it with a description of a recurrent event in their marriage, phrased in the present continuous, John again responds to Jenny's disputable assertion by saying how he gets 'cheesed off' because he is left alone with the children. He seems to be implying that they may row because he gets angry and tired. Jenny does not understand this, as she says in p. 10, lines 3 - 7. Thus, he has agreed and generalised with both parts of Jenny's disputable assertion: that he does not understand her, and she does not understand him. He has generalised because he is suggesting not just that these are the causes of the particular row they had in this conversation, but why they may row generally.

The evaluative point of the narrative is a response to Jenny's disputable assertion. Thus the mechanism is a version of the rule of narrative response.
V SEQUENCING

Rule 28 The Rule for Sequencing for Requests

In this conversation, it seems appropriate to apply this rule at a more abstract, global level than the other rules.

a) An example of compliance with a request is p.19, line 29. John says to Dave 'Dave can you put Bob's coat back please darling ... thank you.' John makes a request of Dave, he complies with it, and John acknowledges this with thanks. The next possible action could be a minimisation on Dave's part, but this would be unlikely for a child.

b) An example of a request of Jenny's that dominates this discussion, particularly the second topic, is that John should spend more time with the children when he comes home from work (e.g. p. 15, lines 13 - 29, p.16a, lines 1,2, p.16, lines 1 - 10). John clearly puts off the request by use of the rule for putting off requests, rule 3, making a negative assertion about his willingness to do this as he needs to be alone when he comes home from work. Jenny reinstates it regularly; this conversation is probably an instance of a repetition of this request as they seem to know, if not understand, each other's point of view (p. 15, lines 28, 29; p. 16a, lines 1, 2; p.16, lines 2,3). (Thus following the rule of repeated requests, rule 10, she emphatically challenges John's performance in his role as a husband and father.) Also the request was probably redirected to others in their time as marriage guidance clients. There is no direct evidence for this, but Jenny comments that one thing they have learnt from being marriage guidance clients is that they can say what makes them angry with each other (p. 20, lines 2 - 12), and this seems to be what is making them angry now. It is possible that this is an issue that was discussed in marriage guidance sessions. Jenny also retreats from this request (for example, p.14, line 29 to p.15, line 5). She says that
she is basically happy with her life and that only momentarily when she is under a lot of pressure does she feel dissatisfied with her lot. This can also act as a mitigator. However, the way she expresses her dissatisfaction is very aggravated. She says (p. 15, lines 4, 5) 'I'm I might decide the grass would be greener on the other side.' She seems to oscillate between aggravation and mitigation.

c) As Labov and Fanshel (1977, p. 88 and 111) point out, an accounted refusal and a put off are not distinguished easily. John's refusal of the request put by Jenny with an accounting seems to be the present state of the marriage. John's negative assertion about his willingness puts-off the request following rule 3, and also functions as an account for a refusal. Jenny renews the request, as noted above, and also at other times accepts the refusal, which corresponds to a retreat discussed in b) above on putting-off requests.

d) Insofar as the request has been repeated, as is suggested above (see rule 10, the rule of repeated requests), John's role as a husband and father is emphatically challenged. This raises the possibility that he will refuse the request without an accounting, and probably therefore refuse it permanently. In not giving Jenny an account, he leaves her no opportunity to reinstate the request (cf rule 8, rule for reinstating requests) by her stating that the conditions mentioned in the accounting no longer prevail. If the request is not responded to once the account is nullified, and so ceases to function as an account, then what initially functioned as the account now starts to function as an 'empty' mitigator to an unaccounted refusal. Again, p.14, line 29 to p. 15, line 5 are instances here. For most of the time Jenny accepts John's refusal but there are times when she threatens to
respond with a huff (p. 15, line 4, 5) 'I might decide the grass would be greener on the other side.'

It is worth noting that Labov and Fanshel’s (1977) rules were designed for, and derived partly inductively from a different conversation from the one studied in this chapter, which differs also in type in that Labov and Fanshel used a therapeutic conversation. The rules therefore have not been applied exactly but similar underlying mechanisms have been sought.

The rules have been applied at different levels of abstraction, for example the global and abstract nature of the previous section, and also the same utterances have been used as instances of different rules. This is consistent with Labov and Fanshel’s (1977) non-deterministic, hierarchical model.

**Conclusion**

The material contained in this chapter illustrates how concepts and categories from Labov and Fanshel’s discourse analysis can be applied to the author’s own case study. It can be seen that their approach provides a rich emotional-social vocabulary in terms of which the internal and external world dynamics, and the relationship between them, which are manifested in the conversation recorded may be discussed. In particular the discourse rules provide a paradigm model for constitutive rules which describe the dynamics of meaning negotiation between speakers and their hearers. The discourse rules, which are grounded in sociology, focus on the external world dynamics of roles, status and obligation, leaving the way open for a similarly detailed account of internal world dynamics. I will suggest that a Kleinian perspective on discourse can provide just such an account which, although not formulated in terms of rules, provides constitutive definitions, grounded in psychodynamic theory, of some internal
world dynamics which manifest themselves in discourse. This will be illustrated in chapter Six, which will consist of a 'second pass' over the same conversation as is considered in this chapter, considered from the viewpoint of Kleinian psychodynamics.
AFFECTIVE MEANING AND EMOTIONAL DYNAMICS

The previous chapters have sought a foundation for a linguistic model of emotional dynamics in a Sacksian-Labovian school of thought which focusses precisely on the dynamic nature of meaning in discourse (although, it was argued it also focusses on the social aspect of verbal interaction at the expense of the emotional one). The idea of 'membership categorisation' was highlighted as a pivotal notion in the account of how speech participants arrive at (or 'create') shared meanings.

In the next and following chapters we shall examine a psychodynamic perspective on emotional dynamics, with the aim of extending and complementing the Sacksian-Labovian one. Before doing so, however, we shall in this chapter briefly contrast the present approach to emotional dynamics with previous treatments of affective meaning in language. Reflection on the strategies for verbal abuse, as a concrete example, will provide a fulcrum for distinguishing between static and dynamic approaches to affective meaning, and will serve also as an initial introduction to the idea of 'intrusive identification' in Kleinian theory. The second part of the chapter will be devoted to further discussion and elaboration of the idea of membership categorisation as a dynamic process of meaning creation.

Static and dynamic approaches to affective meaning

Picking up any standard textbook on linguistic semantics one may expect to find some discussion (typically scattered rather than focussed) of how elements of affective meaning are coded into the language system, for example (Lyons, 1977, a and b, pp. 108, 175, 677, 727; Leech, 1974, pp. 18-20, 26, 47 50-55; Ullman, 1962, passim). They are coded in subtle ways
into modal systems, for example, and in more obvious ways into terms set aside for verbal abuse (to which we shall return). At the lexical level, it is a pervasive characteristic of language for sets of near synonyms, e.g. thin/slim/skinny, to have (approximately) the same denotation and to differ substantially in their affective connotations. These affective elements of meaning can be said to be part of the language system insofar as they show some consistency across speakers, as indicated by techniques such as the 'semantic differential' tests developed by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957). (The latter tests have of course been rightly discredited as purporting to be a general 'measurement of meaning', but nevertheless retain their value if reconstrued as a measure of one particular aspect of meaning, namely the affective element.)

Affective meaning may thus be expressed most straightforwardly in speech by using the affective resources which are in-built in the language system. But the crucial point for our present purposes is that this is not the only way. For instance, one can hurl a verbal brick by using a ready-made 'term of abuse'; but equally well (and often more effectively) one can press into service as a verbal brick some word or phrase which is not inherently a 'term of abuse' from the standpoint of the language system. To be effective of course the verbal brick (tailor-made for the context rather than off-the-peg) must be identifiable as such by both speaker and hearer. The process of membership categorisation - in this case the process whereby the contextually-defined category of 'verbal brick' is arrived at - thus provides an alternative means by which affective meaning can be expressed.

The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that the study of affective meaning cannot be restricted to the 'static' components residing in the language system but must also embrace the 'dynamic' processes whereby the resources for emotional interaction are created by the very interaction
The theory of emotional dynamics which is being developed here is concerned primarily and centrally with the dynamic aspects of affective meaning. It aims to go beyond a static account and to do so in a direction which can be sign-posted by a juxtaposition of two very different discussions of the linguistic categories and rules for verbal abuse. (Relevant studies could equally well have been selected from the wealth of recent literature on the linguistic categories and rules for the expression of politeness (for a survey of which, see Goody, 1978); the topic of verbal abuse allows reference to a Labov article which further elaborates the sorts of discourse rules presented in chapters one and two above.)

The first study 'Anthropological aspects of language: animal categories and verbal abuse' (Leach, 1966) is an illustration of the static approach to affective meaning, an attempt to give a principled explanation of why certain animal names, and not others, are available as ready-made linguistic resources for verbal abuse between humans. The details of the argument need not concern us here, but involve the overlap between animal categories, which Leach relates to the anthropological notion of taboo. Judged on its own terms, the article is a sophisticated study which is valuable both for its descriptive and its explanatory insights. For our present purposes, however, the point is simply that it does not attempt to provide any account of the use of the terms under discussion (nor indeed does the author aim or purport to do so).

The second study, 'Rules for ritual insults' (Labov, 1972b) complements the previous one in explicitly setting out to investigate the pragmatic rules for the delivery of ritual insults in the context of a given speech community. In other words, it approaches verbal insult as a speech act category rather than a category of the language system. Labov's study aims to show that the behaviour involved in verbal abuse is subject to
contextual constraints which may be explicitly stated in the form of the sorts of discourse rules which should be familiar from earlier in this thesis.

The point to note here is that Labov is concerned with the performance rules which constrain expression of insults which are in some sense 'coded' into the language. The study is thus pragmatic and interactive; but it is not 'dynamic' in the sense outlined above. It is not concerned (or only indirectly concerned) with the ways the categories of verbal abuse are themselves created in and through the activity of abusive behaviour. These latter processes are, however, precisely the concern of the theory of emotional dynamics being developed here.

The Kleinian theory of psychodynamics, to be outlined in the following chapter, contains within its taxonomy of speech functions the category of 'intrusive identification' - a notion that might be glossed informally as 'verbal brick-throwing' in the sense being discussed here. This function of speech can, as we shall see, be reconstructed in terms of membership categorisation, and can be seen as subsuming within a broader dynamic category the sort of rule-governed 'anti-communicative' behaviour discussed by Labov.

**Internal and external world dynamics**

The approach to language which views it primarily as action was pioneered by the speech act theorists Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). Austin was concerned with the problems raised for propositionally based truth-conditional semantics by such utterances as questions, commands, promises, vows, requests, and the like. He called such utterances performatives, as they were utterances which performed actions in the social world. Searle (1969) was concerned with the propositional and performative aspects of all utterances. He proposed that every utterance has three aspects: locutionary force, the propositional aspect; illocutionary
force, the performative aspect; and perlocutionary force, the contingent effect of the utterance.

How then does emotional dynamics relate to this three-way taxonomy? It might at first seem that affective responses to language would be classified as perlocutionary effects - effects that are epiphenomenal to the locutions and illocutions which are centrally involved in the notion of a speech act. Note that for Searle, and for other speech act theorists, the performative aspects of language are described in terms of social roles, rights, and obligations, i.e., in terms of relations in the external rather than the internal world. What I am proposing however is that emotional dynamics is not to be relegated to the 'dustbin' category of perlocutionary effects, but is to be seen as the internal world counterpart to the external world dynamics captured by speech act analysis. In the case of speech acts such as 'insulting', discussed above, it is of course clear without any strenuous reflection that not just external social relations but also internal emotional dynamics are involved. The illocutionary act of insulting someone in itself constitutes an emotional-dynamic act, and can equally legitimately be analysed as one or the other depending on one's theoretical perspective. One and the same speech act may thus have both an internal and an external world dimension.

In the case of other speech acts, such as Searle's paradigm example of promising, the emotional dynamic dimension may not be so immediately obvious. However, closer inspection of Searle's explicit set of rules for the speech act of promising (Searle, 1972) reveals that although the 'essential condition' may be stated in terms of external world relations, emotional dynamic elements of wanting, desiring and so on are indeed built into the statement of the felicity conditions. My hypothesis will therefore be that emotional dynamics is not simply a feature of a restricted subset of speech acts (including insulting and the like), but that the distinction between
internal and external world dynamics applies to speech acts across the board. Speech act theory, because of the orientation imposed by the view of language as action (with the additional implicit assumption that all action is social action), has been led to foreground external world factors and to background emotional dynamic ones. The complementary approach being adopted here is one which reverses the emphasis and views the social aspect of language from the perspective of the underlying emotional dynamics.

The question of what the nature of the action is that constitutes the performative aspect of speech can be rearticulated in terms of the view of language proposed by Saussure. R. Harris (1983) writes, in his Translator's Introduction to Saussure's Course:

"The revolution Saussure ushered in has rightly been described as 'Copernican'. For instead of men's words being seen as peripheral to men's understanding of reality, men's understanding of reality came to be seen as revolving about their social use of verbal signs. In the Course de linguistique generale we see this new approach clearly articulated for the first time. Words are not vocal labels which have come to be attached to things and qualities already given in advance by nature, or to ideas already grasped independently by the human mind. On the contrary, languages, themselves collective products of social interaction, supply the essential conceptual frameworks for men's analysis of reality and, simultaneously, the verbal equipment for their description of it. The concepts we use are the creations of the language we speak."

(p.ix)

As a language is not a static entity but, like other sets of patterns of human behaviour, is constantly being changed in the course of speech, then it follows that what is being changed in the course of speech is understanding of reality. Jacobson and Margolin (1979) write, "As organisms interact continuously with their environment, their behaviours are constantly being affected by the presence or absence of rewarding and punishing stimuli." This is not quite the same view as Saussure's, who was not primarily concerned with the constant changes in the social actors' view of reality as they talk to one another. However, if Saussure's view is
taken together with the views of the later Wittgenstein (1958), who emphasised looking at the use of language rather than assuming fixed meaning, then this would lead to the view, taken in this thesis, that the actions performed by the performative aspects of an utterance are not just forms of external world social action, but also act upon and alter the social actor's view of the world. This is what Sacks (1972) set out to investigate. He was concerned to show how social actors used meanings to construct and reconstruct their social reality through the negotiation, in conversation, of membership categorisation.

A similar argument to this is made by John Wisdom (1953) in the paper 'Philosophy, Metaphysics and Psychoanalysis', where he discusses and illustrates the nature of philosophical debate. He shows that, although very little is actually resolved, as one is led through a dialogue of holders of the various philosophical positions, meaning is enriched in having experienced these positions. To be capable of genuine conviction in the value of these positions and to be able to tolerate paradox rather than summary dismissal or 'castration' through assimilation to a different position, is to enrich and recreate meanings. Wisdom talks about discussion as having the effect of regrouping concepts. This is in essence the same idea as that being referred to as membership categorisation. He writes:

"With every name we apply we compare one thing with another, with many others" (p.274)

Hanna Segal makes the point for the internal world of emotions in the same way that Wisdom makes the point for the external world. In Segal and Miller (1983) she talks of the child's very early experiences of the mother as either good and nurturing or very bad and annihilating, as 'binocular vision', which eventually leads to a more meaningful experience of the mother. This world is re-experienced throughout life. In conversation adults have these experiences repeatedly in intimate discussion, most obviously in marital rows, where one experiences very strongly the split
between the good and the bad parts of one's partner. Wisdom suggests that
the difference between positions should not be 'castrated', that is,
difference should not be denied, but neither should it be taken as
threatening. This idea is related to the idea of the 'depressive position' in
Kleinian psychoanalysis which will be referred to later.

The view being proposed is that discourse meaning is not fixed, but
is the product of internal and external membership categorisation happening
all the time as people speak to each other. It is important to note,
however, that meaning creation, in the sense of membership categorisation,
is not only accomplished linguistically, since human beings have many
meaning creating resources at their disposal.

In order to understand why meaning is being created and to have a
fuller understanding of what sort of meaning is being created in
conversation, it is desirable to have an understanding of the experience of
participation in the interaction. One can only ever respond in an
interaction and never actually maintain the position of an outside observer.
Thus, the effort of the conversation analyst to understand meaning creation
going on in a piece of conversation is similar to the process that the
speakers are undergoing themselves. In this way, the analyst is inevitably
emotionally involved in the active process of meaning creation. It may be
that this process is distorted by participants having insufficient shared
knowledge or by emotions which motivate the speakers towards
self-deception, rather than understanding. However, it is important to
note that this lack of objectivity in itself is a hindrance only in so far as
it is a hindrance for the speakers under scrutiny in making sense of what
each other says. The participants' meanings are not merely coloured but
created by their emotional responses and their deployment outwards into a
relationship. For example, psychoanalysts are well aware that they are
partners in a meaning creating dyad, and this is the way that they will

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understand their patients rather than by mere objective observation. In scientific methodology, a similar problem arises in relation to the role of the observer. The observers and their act of observation alter the unobserved state of affairs. In conversation, the analyst, in studying meaning, is likewise acting and interacting in the world. Analysts create and re-create meaning themselves, which involves responding with their own emotions to the emotions of the speakers being observed. Thus the linguistics being advocated would not just be a body of knowledge, but would provide skills in listening and understanding to conversation akin to the ethnographers skill in understanding the events they see around them as participant observers.

It must be emphasised that what is being proposed here is not that the negotiation of meaning between speakers is an attempt to find once and for all an absolute reality which is merely distorted by emotions. Rather, negotiation of meaning is an attempt by speakers to create a joint reality, and this is enacted through the preference structure discussed above.

The process of social actors creating a joint reality may, in fact, break down, and the reasons and consequences of this are of interest. Two of the reasons that they may break down are ignorance and bias; it may be said that ignorance is a problem in the speaker's relationship with the external world, and bias is a problem in his or her relationship with the internal world. Similarly, what can go wrong can have consequences in the external world.

Those social actions which take place linguistically are about creation and recreation of meaning, and are regulative states of affairs in the internal or external world. If one thinks, for example, of the conversation that occurs in a day in the life of a married couple, they are concerned with the task of getting the children fed, budgeting and so on, i.e., tasks in the external world. Of course both sets of tasks are related
and mutually supporting, and generally if one goes wrong so does the other. However, the consequences of the failure either of the relationship in the internal world or with the relationship with the external world can be potentially disastrous, and quite literally questions of life and death. Work to regulate the external world through co-operation might be called social work, and it is likely that a social worker would be needed if it broke down. Work in the internal world might be called psychic work, for a psychiatrist or psychotherapist might be called in if it fails. It would be tempting to think of these tasks being accomplished in different types of conversation, but, on the contrary, they are aspects, to a greater or lesser extent, of all conversation. This is part of the reason for their mutual supportiveness.

The relevance of Kleinian psychodynamics

In Chapter Four, in the discussion of the work of Meltzer (1983, 1986) it will be shown that there is a strong case for the proposition that internal world dynamics are centred around emotion. From the Kleinian perspective, the internal world of the adult is in direct continuity with an infantile pre-verbal mentality. Well before the infant has speech and the cognitive apparatus by which it might categorise emotions and appraise the external world, indeed before it appears to have the concept of a whole person at all, the infant is in the grip of extraordinarily powerful emotions, albeit as yet be primitively differentiated. It will be suggested that this is connected to basic bodily sensations, for example eating and excreting, which are so essential to the welfare and survival of the infant. Other bodily sensations which are important in the context of emotional development are touch, smell, and so on. If, as suggested, this infantile experience lies at the centre of the inner world, it would follow that emotional life is at the centre of that inner world.
There is a case, therefore, for investigating emotions in order to understand inner world meaning creation, and consequently that an account of emotion is necessary for a complete theory of language. There is, however, little account taken of it in orthodox linguistics. Semantics, syntax, morphology, phonology and phonetics might not be expected to incorporate a theory of emotions (although Scherer (1979) and others have investigated non-linguistic vocal indicators of emotion). The place where one would expect to find an account of emotion in linguistics would be in the investigation of conversations. However, the CA tradition grew out of a branch of sociology, where its practitioners were concerned to investigate only what is displayably a resource of the interactants - largely in the field of sociolinguistic management such as turn-taking. They also had a skeptical concern about going beyond what is actually uttered. For these reasons, practitioners are wary of the 'depth' approach that Labov and Fanshel use. Thus their theoretical framework has left them with no explicit concern for emotional dynamics. However, Labov and Fanshel, as representatives of DA, do consider emotions. This results from their theoretical aims - a depth approach, with the aim of understanding what underlies the conversation. This consideration of emotions also comes from their material, from a dynamic psychotherapeutic interview, where the aim of the therapy is to help the patient express emotions. However, as was demonstrated in Chapter Five, even in terms of their treatment, the approach to emotions is ad hoc and not embedded in a theoretical structure. Linguistics can be seen to be incomplete, and thus inadequate, in at least this respect, namely the lack of a coherent process theory of emotions.

Until recently, work in psychology has been concerned mainly with the expression of emotions rather than the content and relationship of emotions, and has concentrated on either facial or postural communication (Ekman et al, 1980) or non-verbal vocal communication (Scherer, 1979).
The present project is concerned with lexical choice, as determined by the underlying emotional interaction, and is not centrally concerned with surface emotional expression per se nor with kinesic or paralinguistic cues. Psychologists such as Panksepp (1982) have considered the psychobiological roots of emotion, which are again, as discussed above, not the province of this particular thesis. Others, for example Averill (1980), have discussed the social construction of emotions, and this perhaps properly belongs with sociology, which again is not the main province of the present study. Recently, however, there has been a growing interest in experimental psychology in the relationship of emotion and cognition, reviewed by Blaney (1986). This is an area where truly mental theories of emotion are being developed and will hopefully be applicable soon to naturally occurring conversations. This is a very new area and, as yet, the results of this work are not conclusive, and there seems to be considerable theoretical clarification to be done.

Much fruitful work on information encoding, storage and retrieval is being done in relation to the emotions. The notion of a schema (Beck, 1967; Schank and Abelson, 1977; Trower, 1982, 1983) as a content related framework of such information control strategies would appear to be particularly useful in this context. The problem with this notion is that it is not clear how it could be applied to provide a coherent picture of lexical choice over the whole course of a particular conversation. It seems likely that this is a temporary limitation, but, again, more work will have to be done on an experimental paradigm relating this notion to everyday conversation, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is desirable that the notion of a schema and the Kleinian notion of phantasy, to be discussed in the next chapter, should eventually be brought into fruitful interaction. Such recent developments in experimental psychology would hold great promise for the further development of the present author's enterprise.
With the exception of the non-lexical work on emotional expression discussed above, psychologists of emotion seem to have ignored language. In particular, they have ignored emotional considerations in lexical choice, in conversation. While it is not necessary that the emotional theory eventually chosen to supplement linguistic theory would have had to have considered language already, it would be a helpful pointer to how the two theories might be integrated.

In considering psychiatry and psychotherapy, it may be concluded that psychotherapy would most obviously lend itself to the present enterprise. Psychotherapy is generally regarded as that subspecialty of psychiatry which is distinguished by its central emphasis on treatment by verbal interaction rather than by organic methods such as drugs, surgery and the like. Just as neurobiology was considered peripheral to the present project, organic psychiatry would be peripheral for the same reasons. To the extent that psychotherapy is concerned with emotions, and offers a theoretical account thereof, it would seem that psychotherapy, with its concentration on verbal treatment, would be of use to the linguist seeking a theory of emotional interaction which is relatively easily integrable with linguistic theory.

In psychotherapeutic practice, the same problems are treated in different ways. This is reflected in the differences in the underlying theories, which vary on many dimensions. The dimensions of interest here are, first, the extent to which they are concerned with language and secondly, the extent to which internal dynamics, and in particular, emotional dynamics, are considered. Of the various psychotherapeutic theories, the psychodynamic ones discussed in the next chapter fare best according to these two dimensions. They are explicitly concerned with the mental processes revealed in verbal interaction between patient and therapist, and in particular, as in Labov and Fanshel's work, they are
concerned with how underlying emotions are revealed in verbal interaction. Some therapies, for example behaviour therapy, are not concerned explicitly with mental processes, and of those that are, some deal more explicitly with cognitive rather than emotional processes. Behaviour therapy, for example, also uses some methods other than verbal interaction. On the whole, psychodynamic therapies have explicit theories of emotions and how they are revealed in purely conversational interaction.

It may seem surprising to suggest that ordinary social actors also function as each other's psychotherapists, but this view has a precedent in social psychiatry. Sullivan, who used the term 'psychiatry' in a sense closer to the way 'psychotherapy' is being used here (1955b, pp. 13-20), emphasised the psychiatrist's role as participant observer much as the conversation analyst is treated here as a participant observer, and he believed psychiatry to be the operationalisation of human relations. Linguistic work, therefore, can be thought to have at least three aspects. Social work, which regulates the external world, psychic work, which regulates the internal world, and, self-regulatory work, where language contains self-regulating mechanisms. This last aspect is best highlighted in studies of the turn taking system, for example, by Sacks, Scheglof and Jefferson (1974). The importance of these actions cannot be stressed enough. The failure to manage adequately the internal or external worlds, will, in either case, result in chaos, and that chaos may be destructive or self-destructive. As language has an important role in these management tasks, its self management is a necessary condition for them. It has long been the case that linguists, or those who use methods derived from linguistics (Labov and Fanshel, 1977; Scheflen, 1973) have looked at psychotherapy, but the proposal here is to invert the problem, and use theories and practices from psychotherapy to illuminate everyday conversation.
The management of these worlds, it is argued, is done in part by creating and re-creating systems of meaning for each other linguistically, from moment-to-moment. These systems have a relative stability, but entropic considerations would imply that work has to be done to keep them stable. Certainly, work has to be done to alter them. By looking at psychotherapy, we may see how systems of meaning have come to have painful and bad consequences, and how they maintain themselves, and also what may be done to render them better and maintain them in that situation.

The nature of the distinction between management of the internal world and management of the external world is related to the subject/object distinction in psychotherapy. Rollo May, a psychotherapist in the existentialist tradition, writes (1967):

"The same is true in our day-to-day living [as in psychotherapy]. If I try to act as 'pure subject', free and untrammeled by the finite requirements of traffic lights and the engineering principles of how fast my car can negotiate the curve, I of course come to grief -and generally, not so nobly or theatrically as Icarus. If on the other hand, I set out to deal with myself as 'pure object', fully determined and manipulatable, I become driven, dried up, affectless, and unrelated to my experiences. And then, my body generally jolts me into remembering that I am not a mechanical object by bringing me down with a case of flu or a heart attack. Curiously enough, both these alternatives - being 'purely free' and 'purely determined' - amount to the same kind of playing god, in the respect that we arrogantly refuse to accept the dilemma which is our fate and our great potentiality as humans" (p. 9)

May also related the subject/object distinction to the uncertainty principle - the problem of the observer discussed above. He recalls a personal discussion he had with Werner Heisenberg, the originator of the uncertainty principle:

"Our classical inherited view of nature as an object 'out there' is an illusion, that the subject is always part of the formula, that the man viewing nature must be figured in, the experimenter into his experiments, or the artist into the scene he paints. This subject-object polarity, he indicated, was what he [Heisenberg] and Niels Bohr call the 'principle of complementarity'" (p. 10)
Although language is only one of the methods of internal world management, it is an important one. Wisdom (1953, p.248) gives the example of a woman trying on a hat at which point her friend says to her 'My dear, the Taj Mahal' and she then puts the hat down. Before the utterance she fancied the hat as suiting her, but after the utterance, she sees the hat as ostentatious and too magnificent by half, in the fleeting moment of an utterance she has looked at the hat in a totally different way, and possibly part of her world view has been altered, albeit a small part. Psychoanalysts point to the function of integrating the personality through understanding, using purely verbal interpretation. Sigmund Freud wrote perspicaciously on the power of words (1916, p. 17):

"Nothing takes place in a psycho-analytic treatment but an interchange of words between the patient and the analyst. The patient talks, tells of his past experiences, and present impressions, complains, confesses to his wishes and his emotional impulses. The doctor listens, tries to direct the patient's processes of thought, exhorts, forces his attention in certain directions, gives him explanations and observes the reactions of understanding or rejection, which he in this way provokes in him. The uninstructed relatives of our patients, who are only impressed by visible and tangible things - preferably by actions of the sort that are to be witnessed at the cinema - never fail to express their doubts whether 'anything can be done about the illness by mere talking.' That, of course is both a short sighted and an inconsistent line of thought. These are the same people who are so certain that patients are 'simply imagining' their symptoms. Words were originally magic and to this day words have retained much of their magical power. By words one person can make another blissfully happy or drive him to despair, by words the teacher conveys his knowledge to his pupils, by words the orator carries his audience with him and determines their judgements and decisions. Words provoke affects and are in general the means of mutual influence among men. Thus we shall not depreciate the use of words in psychotherapy and we shall be pleased if we can listen to the words that pass between the analyst and his patient."

In the following chapters a way will be explored in which the psychic significance of words can be explicated.
Chapter Four

THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN KLEINIAN PSYCHODYNAMICS

In this chapter I shall look in detail at some of the main ideas from Kleinian psychoanalysis, one of the dynamic schools of psychotherapy which see verbal interaction as central to the psychotherapist's ability to effect therapeutic change. After an exposition of fundamental ideas of Melanie Klein herself I shall extrapolate from the literature of those who have followed those aspects of her work which have to do with the nature of symbols and language use and their relation to emotional and internal world processes. These notions (and in particular those of projective identification and splitting) will form the basis for a Kleinian approach to be further developed and exemplified in subsequent chapters.

The Kleinian development in psychoanalysis has an integrated theory of language, cognition and emotion, and has concentrated on the internal world of the mind where emotions are generated. The view particularly of Segal (1975, 1981) and Bion (1962) following Klein, highlights how, ontogenetically, these three aspects of the human condition are part of a unitary process of development and how they continue to function into adulthood. Emotions cannot simply be reduced to sociolinguistic devices; what is required is a 'metapsychological' theory in Freud's sense. Meltzer (1978, Volume III, pp. 52-53) writes:

"It seems reasonable to suggest that this [Bion's extension of Mrs Klein's work] is the first cogent statement of a theory of emotions in the history of psychoanalysis. It places emotion at the very centre of mental growth through learning from experience . . ."

The reason that the Kleinians have been explicitly concerned with language is because of their interest in applying psychoanalysis to
psychosis, with its disorders of language. A good example of this is provided by the work of Bion (1955). Klein's work with children, who, being less repressed than adults, gave her insight into the infantile aspects of the mind, gave her followers, notably Bion, insight into the schizophrenic part of the mind. As the infantile stages are considered to be the fixation point for schizophrenia in the destruction of verbal thought, Bion and others needed an account of effective verbal thought and its development before it was possible to understand its pathology.

The Kleinian Development of Psychoanalysis

Klein's work developed over many years. She was primarily an analyst of children (her adult patients were mainly in training analysis), and she developed a technique of interpreting child's play, which she saw as being akin to the free associations and reports of dreams by adult patients. She was influenced initially by Ferenczi and Abraham, and, in particular by Abraham's approach to the psycho-sexual stages, which was more fine-grained than that of Freud. She was particularly concerned with the early and late oral stages, for her work with children led her to believe in the fundamental importance of the rich emotional life which characterised earliest infantile experiences. She believed that no analysis was complete until these deepest layers of the personality had been analysed. Later she influenced and was influenced by such analysts as Fairbairn (cf. 1952), who was an adult analyst, interested in the schizoid mechanisms of the oral phase, and Winnicott (cf. 1958), a paediatrician and psycho-analyst, who was interested in the analysis of children and mother-child interaction. Another clinician who used her work was the psycho-analytical psychotherapist Guntrip (cf. 1961), who developed Fairbairn's work. Over a long working life, Klein's ideas developed from classical psychoanalysis into a theory supplementary to Freudian
psychoanalysis, which she summarised herself (Klein, 1959). Her work is summarised most definitively by Segal (1975). The Kleinian position has been developed by analysts such as Bion (1970) and by Meltzer, who has given an excellent account (Meltzer, 1978). It is a tradition in psychoanalysis which is still practiced and being developed, mainly in this country and in South America.

Fairbairn, Winnicott, Guntrip and Balint became known as the 'British object relations school' (Sutherland, 1980), because of their concern with the development of the earliest relationships with the love object, the mother or primary carer, and various pleasure-giving aspects of them, into adult relationships. Where Klein differed from the other theorists was her emphasis on instinct, following Freud (although she by no means neglected environmental factors). The other theorists were in favour of abandoning a theory of instincts, preferring to look at environmental determinants alone.

**The Notion of Phantasy and Position**

The two central concepts of the Kleinian account of development are those of phantasy and of positions. The notion of phantasy is an attempt to clarify the Freudian concept of the unconscious. It consists of action in the internal world. This world contains our earliest infantile experiences, which are built upon by our later experiences. The internal world is real in the Platonic sense and each person lives and acts in his or her internal world and in the external world simultaneously. The contents of the internal world have a real meaning, in that the individual unconsciously phantasises his or her body to contain objects that are whole objects, in other words, people, initially parents, or part objects, represented, for example, by breasts or penises. The structure of the internal world is the phantasized structure of the inside of the
individual's body. When we are awake, however, our attention is focussed on the external world because we have to act consciously in this world. It is equally necessary that we act in the internal world, and, during rapid eye movement sleep, our dream-life provides an opportunity for this, according to Kleinian theory. There are basically three actions that can be performed in and on the internal world, and all the Freudian mental mechanisms can be explained in terms of combinations of these. First, splitting, that is, rendering the self and others into parts, either in terms of all good and all bad, or into different bodily parts or their corresponding functions, and so on. Secondly, projective identification, or projection which is based on phantasies of excreting - that is, locating parts of the central ego in internal representatives of important life figures, initially parental. This leads to the experience of omnipotent control of these figures. Projective identification is usually combined with a high degree of splitting. Thirdly, introjective identification or introjection, based on phantasies of feeding, is the process of incorporating the important figures into the self.

The other central concept is that of position. This is the Kleinian reformulation of the Freudian notion of the stage. Klein's notion of position emphasised oscillation between the positions in different relationships and situations at various points in life, and over different periods of time. She also wished to emphasise that she was talking about a developmental process rather than a psychiatric illness - she was not implying that babies are mentally ill. There are two positions, namely the paranoid-schizoid position, characterised by a high degree of projective identification and splitting and thus part object relations, corresponding to the early oral stage, and the depressive position, characterised by introjective identification and categorisation and thus whole object relations, corresponding to the late oral stage. The primary
feeling associated with the paranoid-schizoid position is persecutory anxiety with the expectation of punishment and vengeance. The primary feeling associated with the depressive position is depressive anxiety, that is fear of the loss of the object. Klein believed that anal, urethral and genital aspects of the mind were present from the outset, and located the origins of the Oedipus complex at a much earlier stage than Freud (Klein, 1932). The Oedipus complex is initially experienced in terms of relationship between breast and nipple, and only later is the depressive position experienced in terms of the relationship between the mother and the father (as whole objects). This projection is then deployed outwards into our relationships with others. The attainment of mental health is the attainment of the depressive position, through action in the internal world: in lay language, the painful business of allowing oneself to love unselfishly. Everybody experiences the progression from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position with the parental couple. But the depressive position is never completely obtained, as there is always the possibility of regression. Bion saw this opposition between the two positions as a dynamic part of the mind. Meltzer describes these oscillations over different periods in the psycho-analytical process (1967).

The Kleinian idea of psychoanalysis is that the analyst is a 'blank screen', who, at least in theory, does not include aspects of her external life in the analytical relationship. The analytical setting is given a dream like quality, on a couch in a quiet room, with the analyst out of sight. Thus, the external world constraints on the patient are lifted, and he or she is free to focus his or her internal world around the analyst in what is called the transference. The analyst becomes a parental figure involved directly in the patient's internal drama. This concentration in the Kleinian development on the here and now makes it an important feature for the conversation-analyst interested in using the approach.
Similarly, although the paranoid-schizoid/depressive position oscillation can occur over a long time, even a lifetime, it can operate over shorter periods of time in everyday conversation. An important part of the depressive position is the guilt for the damage done to the loved object in the paranoid-schizoid position, owing to the splitting and projective identification of that position, which will lead to reparation, an attempt to make good this damage. An important part of the paranoid-schizoid position is the aggressive, frustrated rage felt towards the loved one for not providing for one's immediate desires. Thus a marital row, and the subsequent making up, may be seen as an example in everyday conversation of the progression from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive position. An example of this sort of conversation is transcribed in Appendix B, and discussed from a Kleinian perspective in Chapter Six.

At the threshold of the depressive position, if the depressive guilt is intolerable, manic defences against the guilt are deployed. They are characterised by control, triumph and contempt (Segal, 1975), which are organised around projective identification and splitting. The aim of these defences is the denigration of the object so that it is not experienced as worthy of reparation, and so that the need for depressive guilt is obviated. Sometimes, manic defence masquerades as reparation. This manic reparation is characterised not by the work entailed in experiencing depressive guilt and the consequent true reparation, but by the false 'repair' brought about omnipotently and magically using projective identification. In true reparation, the work of reparation will take the form of creativity as a way of subliminating guilt over an irreparably damaged object.
The Depressive Position and the Parental Object

The depressive position is so called because a crucial feature of it is the capacity of the individual to bear depressive pain and not to regress to the persecutory or manic defences of the paranoid-schizoid position. In her very first use of the term Klein (1935) writes (p. 271):

"Another important reason why the paranoiac cannot maintain his whole object relation is that while the persecution-anxieties and the anxiety for himself are still so strongly in operation he cannot endure the initial burden of anxieties for a loved object, and, besides, the feelings of guilt and remorse which accompany this depressive position. Moreover, in this position he can make far less use of projection, for fear of expelling his good objects and so losing them, and, on the other hand, for fear of injuring good internal objects by expelling what is bad from within himself.

Thus we see that the sufferings connected with the depressive position thrust him back to the paranoiac [later called paranoid-schizoid] position."

Although this paper was concerned with the depressive position in connection with manic-depressive psychosis, in a later paper (Klein, 1940) Klein makes the connection between the infantile depressive position and normal mourning. Thus she brings it nearer to the present day conception of mental reason, which may be defined as the subjects' ability to mourn the object damaged in phantasy in the paranoid-schizoid position, and subsequently their ability to bear the attendant depressive guilt for damage, experienced as having been inflicted on the object. In the previous quotation, Klein described the regression to persecutory defences and, in the following quotation from the later paper (Klein, 1940) describing the use of manic defences, she writes (pp. 348-349):

"The second set of feelings which go to make up the depressive position I formerly described without suggesting a term for them. I now propose to use for these feelings of sorrow and concern for the loved objects, the fears of losing them and the longing to regain them, a simple word derived from everyday language - namely the 'pining' for the loved object . . .

When the depressive position arises, the ego is forced (in addition to earlier defenses) to develop methods of defence
which are essentially directed against the 'pining' for the loved object. These are fundamental to the whole ego-organization. I formerly termed some of these methods manic defences, . . . because of their relationship to the manic-depressive illness."

In a famous paper Klein, (1946) has separated out fully the depressive position from the paranoid-schizoid position. She writes (p.14):

"With the introjection of the complete object in about the second quarter of the first year marked steps in integration are made. This implies important changes in relation to objects. The loved and hated aspects of the mother are no longer felt to be so widely separated, and the result is an increased fear of loss, states akin to mourning and a strong feeling of guilt, because the aggressive impulses are felt to be directed against the loved object. The depressive position has come to the fore. The very experience of depressive feelings in turn has the effect of further integrating the ego, because it makes for an increased understanding of psychic reality and better perception of the external world, as well as for a greater synthesis between inner and external situations."

Another quotation from Klein on the depressive position is of interest.

Klein (1952b) writes, p.93 and note

"The infant's capacity to enter into the depressive position and to establish the complete object within himself implies that he is not as strongly ruled by destructive impulses and persecutory anxiety as at an earlier stage. Increasing integration brings about changes in the nature of his anxiety, for when love and hatred become more synthesised in relation to the object this gives rise, as we have seen, to great mental pain - to depressive feelings and guilt. Hatred becomes to some extent mitigated by love, whereas feelings of love are to some extent affected by hatred, the result being that the infant's emotions towards his objects change in quality. At the same time the progress in integration and in object-relations enables the ego to develop more effective ways of dealing with the destructive impulses and the anxiety to which they give rise."

An important point from this quotation is Klein's stress on the great mental pain of the depressive position. This must be borne if the depressive position is to be consolidated, and the regression to the more primitive defensive forms of thought is to be avoided.

Various forms of internal object will now be considered in the stages of the infant's life. A pre-conception of the parental object, is innate, and good and bad objects arise from the action of splitting in
the paranoid-schizoid position. The strength of the good object gives the
ego the ability to enter and work through the depressive position to the
introjection of a good whole object. Of this primal object Klein (1952b,
footnote) writes:

"My psycho-analytic work has led me to conclude that the
new-born infant unconsciously feels that an object of unique
goodness exists, from which a maximal gratification could be
obtained, and that this object is the mother's breast. I
furthermore believe that this unconscious knowledge implies
that the relation to the mother's breast and a feeling of
possessing the breast develop even in children who are not
being breast-fed."

Klein (1957) goes on to write p.180:

"I have repeatedly put forward the hypothesis that the
primal good object, the mother's breast, forms the core of
the ego and vitally contributes to its growth, and have often
described how the infant feels that he concretely
internalizes the breast and the milk it gives. Also there is
in his mind some indefinite connection between the breast
and other parts, and aspects of the mother."

As this last sentence indicates, in the paranoid-schizoid position the
internal world is peopled with part objects which are sometimes
represented by psychically significant parts of the mother's, and also the
father's, anatomy, in particular erotogenic zones, or the functions they
perform in phantasy. Internal objects are related to the central ego,
which in turn takes on the structure of the objects to which it is
related.

The following long quotation from Klein (1957) describes the
relationship of splitting processes to the parental object (pp. 191-192):

"To return to the splitting process, which I take to be a
precondition for the young infant's relative stability; during
the first few months he predominantly keeps the good object
apart from the bad one and thus, in a fundamental way
preserves it - which also means that the security of the ego
is enhanced. At the same time, this primal division only
succeeds if there is an adequate capacity for love and a
relatively strong ego. My hypothesis is, therefore, that the
capacity for love gives impetus both to integrating
tendencies and to a successful primal splitting between the
loved and hated object. This sounds paradoxical. But since,
as I said, integration is based on a strongly rooted good
object that forms the core of the ego, a certain amount of
splitting is essential for integration; for it preserves the good object and later on enables the ego to synthesise the two aspects of it. Excessive envy, an expression of destructive impulses, interferes with the primal split between the good and bad breast, and the building up of a good object cannot sufficiently be achieved. Thus the basis is not laid for a fully developed and integrated adult personality; for the later differentiation between good and bad is disturbed in various connections. In so far as this disturbance of development is due to excessive envy, it derives from the prevalence, in the earliest stages, of paranoid-schizoid mechanisms which, according to my hypothesis, form the basis of schizophrenia.

In the exploration of early splitting processes, it is essential to differentiate between a good object and an idealized one, though this distinction cannot be drawn sharply. A very deep split between the two aspects of the object indicates that it is not the good and bad object that are being kept apart but an idealized and an extremely bad one. So deep and sharp a division reveals that destructive impulses, envy, and persecutory anxiety are very strong and that idealization serves mainly as a defence against these emotions.

If the good object is deeply rooted, the split is fundamentally of a different nature and allows the all-important process of ego integration and object synthesis to operate. Thus a mitigation of hatred by love can come about in some measure and the depressive position can be worked through. As a result, the identification with a good and whole object is the more securely established; and this also lends strength to the ego and enables it to preserve its identity as well as a feeling of possessing goodness of its own. It becomes less liable to identify indiscriminately with a variety of objects, a process that is characteristic of a weak ego. Furthermore, full identification with a good object goes with a feeling of the self possessing goodness of its own. When things go wrong, excessive projective identification, by which split-off parts of the self are projected into the object, leads to a strong confusion between the self and the object, which also comes to stand for the self. Bound up with this is a weakening of the ego and a grave disturbance in object relations.

In the paranoid-schizoid position, therefore, the primal maternal object becomes split into good and bad, or in excessive cases idealized and very bad, devouring. It also becomes associated with other part objects and their associated functions. As the infant's capacity to tolerate depressive pain and its cognitive capacity develop, the good and bad objects are allowed to be brought closer together and appreciated as part of the same object. The infant also begins to appreciate its mother.
and father as whole people, rather than just functions sometimes that are relevant to it at a particular point and which are under some circumstances represented by anatomical part-objects. As a result of this, the infant starts to have a conception of the relationship between mother and father. It is part of whole object relations to understand that the mother must have relationships other than with the self, and this is the beginning of the Oedipus complex.

Another account of this material and the relevance of splitting to what the present author (following Sacks, 1972) calls membership categorisation is to be found in Money-Kyrle's (1978) paper 'Cognitive Development' on pp. 419-420. Among others, Segal (1981) in her paper 'Notes on Symbol Formation' and Meltzer (1967) have stressed the continuity of adult thought with these earlier forms of mental activity. The personality contains parts at different levels of maturity. Meltzer (1967) calls this 'horizontal splitting' to distinguish it from the splitting into good and bad part objects discussed in the above quotation from Klein which he calls 'vertical splitting'.

**Constitutional envy**

One of the main reasons for the continued occupation of the paranoid-schizoid position is envy, discussed by Klein (1957) in an attempt to understand why some patients in analysis did not recover. She distinguished envy from jealousy, which is essentially a three-party relationship, in which one party is jealous of the second party because of its possession of the third party. Jealousy involves love and protection of the good object and hatred of an attack upon the third party with the aim of getting the good object away from this third party which is experienced as possessing it. On the other hand, envy is a two-party relationship, the first party envies the second party for its attributes, in
particular its goodness and power to help and nurture the first party. Envy leads to a destructive attack on good objects. The method of attack is projective identification, where the bad parts of the individual are intruded into the good object, which is then experienced as becoming vengeful and bad. As one of the preconditions for an analytic cure is the introjection of the analyst as a good whole object, envious attacks limit the possibility of an analytic cure. The mitigating factor to envy is gratitude. There is constitutional variation in the potential for envy, but how it operates depends on experience. For example a mother in the external world who is neglectful of the infant may arouse envy for the good things that she contains which are withheld from the infant. So there is environmental variation in the provocation to envy.

The psychopathology of the paranoid-schizoid position

Destructive attacks on objects in the paranoid-schizoid position by projective identification and splitting lead them to be experienced as bad and vengeful, as the bad parts of the subject are located in the object. In turn, this increases the need for further attack. In the best case, this vicious circle is reversed by reparation in the depressive position. However, if envy and greed are too great, a psychotic catastrophe may occur, leading to what may be termed a schizophrenic breakdown. This has been described by Bion (1967). Splitting of the subject’s ego so that it can be intruded into the object by projective identification is so great that the ego is experienced as being exploded into the object in minute fragments, the object itself being exploded and shattered into fragments. The distinction between external world and internal world is destroyed. The subject feels him or herself to be imprisoned in a world of minute and highly menacing particles of object encapsulated by ego or vice-versa. Bion called these particles 'bizarre objects'.
Symbolism

The Kleinian theory of symbolism was developed by Segal (1981) in her paper 'Notes on Symbol Formation' (pp. 49-65), drawing upon ideas of Freud (1900), Jones (1916) and Klein (1930). In the paranoid-schizoid position the leading mechanism is projective identification. This leads to a confusion between internal and external worlds, and a confusion between objects in the external world. The symbolic relation of 'standing for' cannot be experienced, and symbol and symbolized are felt to be identical. Segal distinguished this from symbolism proper, calling it symbolic equation. In particular, words are not felt to be filled with meaning by the internal world, but are confused with pieces of the external world. This leads to very destructive verbal action where words are not used as vehicles of communication, but as persecutory weapons that people hurl at one another. Words are experienced as material objects. A severe example of this is schizophrenic language, but a more everyday example is the marital row. With the lessening of projective identification in the depressive position, symbolism proper can occur.

Transference

Spillius (1983) points out that for Kleinians this is their most definite notion. It is meant as a clinical concept, where the analyst is seen as a parental figure by the patient, who re-enacts with the analyst the emotional relationship of the patient with his parent. However, as Meltzer (1983, p.46) points out, all relationships have a certain transference quality about them, and marital therapists, for example, Dicks (1967), have seen these phenomena in the intimate relationships of married couples. Although transference processes are ubiquitous, they are 'gathered' and made use of in the psychoanalytical setting (Meltzer, 1967). The analyst comes to symbolize figures in the child's internal
world, often the child's internal parent figures. These have been built up
dynamically around the initial parental internal object through the
introjection of the relationship with external relationships, and, in
different parts of the personality, by the different external objects that
have been in receipt of the parental tranferences. Thus, the analyst is in
receipt of many different symbolic attributes coming from the many
different layers of the personality developed by horizontal splitting
(Meltzer, 1967), and established as the individual develops to maturity.
Sometimes, the analyst may symbolically represent figures that in turn
stand for others, and so on, down through chains of symbolism to the
deepest layers of the personality. Equally, the analyst is felt to contain
many different symbols, when the patient is talking or thinking about the
analyst. The relationship between container and contained can often be
seen to be reciprocal, as may the relation of symbol and symbolized. So,
although the patient may be apparently talking or thinking about
something which has apparently nothing to do with the analyst, he or she
is often also talking about the analyst and the analytical setting.

The concentration on the here-and-now transference is a hallmark
of Kleinian psycho-analysis. The analyst and analytical setting may
symbolize many other internal and external settings. To some extent
this notion may be extended (Meltzer, 1983, p.46) to everyday life.
People, objects and settings will resonate to a greater or lesser degree
with parts of the personality, in terms of the extent to which they stand
in symbolic relation to other external or internal objects. It is suggested
that when people are talking about something, they are also in some
degree talking about the setting in which the actual conversation takes
place. The conversation, like the dream, is a container for the material
being talked or thought about, but equally, as in the analytical setting,
what is being talked about contains and symbolizes the setting in which
the conversation occurs. This will not happen as strongly as in the analytical setting, particularly with Kleinian psychoanalysis, with its strict adherence to the constancy of the setting over the lengthy period of the analysis. But the here-and-now aspects of any conversation will resonate with aspects of the internal world, which will in turn affect what is being talked about, and how it is being talked about. For example, an anxious setting will lead to an anxious conversation. To some extent, the elements being talked about will be dream elements or symbols for the situation in which they are being talked about.

Second Skin

Bick (1968) investigated the experience of the skin for the infant in early object-relations. She was concerned with the very early introjection of a containing object in order that the internal space may be set up where, through the process of introjective identification at a later stage, internal objects may be set up. This object, experienced as passively holding the parts of the personality together is experienced as concretely as a skin functioning as a boundary. Failure in the adequate development of this primal skin function may lead to the development of a substitute for this skin container formation. Instead of the containing function of the personality being set up through dependence on an introjected object, the infant uses parts of their own mental apparatus to perform this containing function, leading to an inappropriate sense of independence, a pseudo-independence. This type of containing formation in which the body functions as a shell, Bick calls 'second skin'. Cornwell (1983) extended and summarised this concept. She writes p.25:

"Mrs. Bick described a primitive state of mind in which there is no sense of an internal space, so the holding together of the parts of the personality occurs externally by means of a fragile psychic skin, equated with the physical skin. The baby in this state of mind, feels himself to be in constant danger of spilling out through a breach in his skin."
Such a spilling out is experienced as a liquefaction and loss of the self, a pouring out into space, into nothingness. This state of mind, which in the young baby is present prior to the use of projective and introjective mechanisms, is reverted to, at a later age, under conditions of stress. It is almost invariably experienced to a greater degree in a mother following the birth of her first baby."

This aspect of the personality is characterised by passive unintegration, rather than active disintegration through defensive splitting in the paranoid-schizoid position.

Transformation in Hallucinosis

The concept of transformation in hallucinosis which is being used in this study is a reworking of Bion's (1965) notion by Meltzer (1986) (pp.105-115). In states of geographical confusion, that is, confusions concerned with the location of psychic entities, usually associated with projective identification, parts of the self are located in the parental object. In particular, the functions of sensory perception could be located in the internal object and thus its external representative in the outside world. However, this does not involve a falsification of the data of perception of the external world or an incapacity to think about them. In transformation in hallucinosis, a particularly intrusive and destructive form of projective identification leads to a falsification of the data of perception of the external world as well as the incapacity to think about them and to form opinions. It involves a failure to realise that the subjects themselves are infusing meaning into external objects, and this gives rise to delusions of certainty. This is linguistically marked by the absence of such phrases as 'it seemed,' 'she appeared to be,' 'I saw it as,' and so on. This phenomenon occurs as an occasional aberration in everyday life, but mainly as an aspect of psychotic experience.
Bion's theory of groups

Bion's theory of groups is presented because conversational interaction is essentially a group activity. One would therefore expect group phenomena to be manifested conversationally. This model of group dynamics was developed by Bion (1961). Initially, it was based on his experience running an army rehabilitation unit, and then setting up the groups at the Tavistock Clinic. He established a general theory of group behaviour which he later integrated with Kleinian psychoanalytic principles. This is developed further by Bion (1970), particularly in a chapter called 'The mystic and the group'. He came to see the group as not just an interpsychic phenomenon, but as an intrapsychic phenomenon, the members of the group being characters in the internal world drama that Meltzer (1983) was later to call the Generative Theatre of Meaning. This theory of groups is essential to the understanding of the Kleinian development. Bion (1961, p.8) writes:

"I am impressed, as a practising psycho-analyst, by the fact that the psycho-analytic approach, through the individual, and the approach these papers describe, through the group, are dealing with different facets of the same phenomena. The two methods provide the practitioner with a rudimentary binocular vision. The observations tend to fall into two categories, whose affinity is shown by phenomena which, when examined by one method, centre on the Oedipal situation, related to the pairing group, and, when examined by the other, centre on the sphinx, related to problems of knowledge and scientific method.

My present work . . . convinces me of the central importance of the Kleinian theories of projective identification and the interplay between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions.

Without the aid of these two sets of theories I doubt the possibility of any advance in the study of group phenomena."

It should be noted from the above quotation that Bion distinguishes between the two approaches, the group approach and psychoanalysis.

Bion distinguishes two types of group, the work group, which, if it is given sufficient means carries out its task effectively and efficiently,
and the more regressive basic assumption group, where primitive forces, in the form of unstated basic assumptions, interfere with and oppose the group functioning as a work group. This is not to say that each group is exclusively either a work group or a basic assumption group. Every group, from moment-to-moment, would be operating with varying degrees of characteristics of both groups. Bion relates the characteristics of the work group to those attributed by Freud (1911) to the ego. Bion divides the Basic Assumption groups into three sorts, corresponding to three basic assumptions. These are:-

a) **The Dependent Assumption**

This is the assumption that the purpose of the group is to be sustained by a leader whom it creates and on whom it is totally dependent. The group is dependent on the leader for protection, and for material and spiritual nourishment (Bion, 1967, p.147). He describes how he was treated as a group deity in such a group. This is based on idealisation as described by Klein, where all the nourishing parts of the group are split off and pushed into the 'leader' through the mechanism of projective identification. This opens the way for the deity, if experienced as failing, to be experienced as a devil or idol, thus causing the group to rebel against the perceived leader; this has been called a counter-dependency assumption.

b) **The Pairing Assumption**

This is the assumption that two members of the group are going to give birth to a Messiah. Parental parts of the group are projected into the particular couple in the optimistic hope that they will give birth to the sort of leader that is manifested in the dependency group; it is essential therefore for this type of group function to be sustained, that the hope is never fulfilled and the leader remains unborn. The couple are allowed and encouraged by the group to act out various
manifestations of the primal scene of parental intercourse, through overt or covert sexualised activity, in the hope that this will result in their giving birth to the as yet unborn Messiah.

c) The Fight-Flight Assumption

This is the assumption that the purpose of the group is to fight something or run away from it. A member of the group is accepted as a leader to the extent that the group experiences his or her demands as affording opportunity for flight or aggression (Bion, 1961, p.152). This basic assumption is related to the paranoid-schizoid position of attack on psychic reality or a manic defence or denial of it. Bion (1961, p.153):

"In the fight-flight group the analyst finds that attempts to illuminate what is taking place are obstructed by the ease with which emotional support is obtained for such proposals as express either hatred of all psychological difficulty or alternatively the means by which it can be evaded.

It should be emphasised that Bion is not trying to provide a taxonomy of groups. He feels that the work-group function is present with one, but only one, basic assumption. He believes that the other inactive basic assumptions are present but in a psycho-somatic domain. This idea has been developed further by Meltzer (1986). Also of interest for this work, is the way that he points out the possibility of the moment-to-moment change in the mentality of the group (Bion, 1961, p.154).

This is far from a comprehensive treatment of Kleinian theory, but it will suffice to introduce the basic orientation of the school. In the following section the main Kleinian concepts will be elaborated, and at the same time developed for the purpose of application to conversational linguistics.
Kleinian Approaches to Communication

The work of Klein applied to language

The central notion in the Kleinian theory of language is that of projective identification. Although it was left to later writers, namely Bion, Segal, and Meltzer, to build an explicit theory of verbal communication on Klein's notion of projective identification, ideas relating to communication can be found in her work which implicitly suggests a theory of communication. Isaacson (manuscript) has developed these ideas and applied them to philosophy, including philosophy of language. Klein introduced the term 'projective identification' in 1946 where she completed her theory of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. By that point in her work, concentration on the importance of aggression had been superseded by concentration on the interaction of love and hate. The notion of projective identification, the intrusion into the object, initially the maternal object, of a part of the self, however, is used in earlier works, although never given this name. It is in these early works that the communicative aspect of projective identification is highlighted.

Klein connected two motives for projective identification, the epistemophilic instinct or the desire for knowledge on the one hand, and sadistic attack on the other. In these two notions can be seen two important aspects of verbal communication of which projective identification will later be seen to be a fundamental mechanism. The mother is for the child, initially, representative of its external world, so that the epistemophilic instinct can be seen to underlie that aspect of communication which desires to take in, and understand, the external world, and the sadistic attack to underlie that aspect of communication which desires to act on the world. The two are connected, and an example of this is the experimental method in science where an
understanding of, and action upon, the world are inseparable. However, Klein's concentration on the epistemophilic instinct declined in her later work, while her concentration on sadism and aggression moved on to the interaction between love and hate.

It may be seen that, if her account of this interaction is combined with her earlier account of intrusion into the mother, there is a mechanism which accounts for motivated action on the world, both benign and malignant. Thus, projective identification, insofar as it underlies spoken language, provides an account of the motivation for speech acts, classically the linguistic actions performed on the external world. In discussing the epistemophilic instinct, Klein's account can be seen to suggest that projective identification can also constitute modification of the internal world. This point was made more explicit in the work of Bion (1965, p. 36), and is developed in this thesis. It is also important to note that spoken language acts on the speaker's internal world, as well as the internal world of the hearer using projective identification. Since Klein set out these views in a passage making direct reference to verbal communication (Klein, 1932, pp. 173-185) this is worth quoting in full:

"It is well known what close ties there are between the instinct for knowledge and sadism. Freud writes (1913, p.241) 'we often gain an impression that the instinct for knowledge can actually take the place of sadism in the mechanism of obsessional neurosis.' From what I have been able to observe, the connection between the two is formed in a very early stage of ego-development, during the phase at which sadism is at its height. At this time, the child's instinct for knowledge is activated by its awakening Oedipus conflict and, to begin with, is put into the service of its oral-sadistic trends. My experience has shown me that the first object of this instinct for knowledge is the interior of the mother's body, which the child first of all regards as an object of oral gratification and then as the scene where intercourse between its parents takes place, and where in its phantasy the father's penis and the children are situated. At the same time as it wants to force its way into its mother's body in order to take possession of the contents and to destroy them, it wants to know what is going on and what things look like in there. In this way, its wish to know what there is in the interior of her body is equated in many ways with its wish to force a way inside her, and the one..."
desire reinforces and stands for the other. Thus the instinct for knowledge becomes linked at its source with sadism when it is at its height, which makes it easier to understand why the bond should be so close, and why the instinct for knowledge should arouse feelings of guilt in the individual.

We see the small child overwhelmed by a crowd of questions and problems which its intellect is as yet utterly unfit to deal with. The typical reproach, which it makes against its mother principally, is that she does not answer these questions, and no more satisfies its desire to know than she has satisfied its oral desires. This reproach plays an important part both in the development of the child's character and in its instinct for knowledge. How far back such an accusation goes, can be seen from another reproach which the child habitually makes in close association with it, viz. that it could not understand what grown up people were saying or the words that they used: and this second complaint must refer to a time before it was able to speak. Moreover, the child attaches an extraordinary amount of affect to these two reproaches, whether they appear singly or in combination, and at these moments it is likely to talk in its analysis in such a way as not to be understood... and will at the same time reproduce reactions of rage. It cannot put the questions it wants to ask into words, and would not be able to understand any answer that was given in words. But, in part at least, these questions have never been conscious at all. The disappointment to which the first stirrings of the instinct for knowledge originating in the earliest stages of ego development are doomed, is, I think, the deepest source of severe disturbance in that instinct in general. [M.K.'s footnote: - In addition the hatred felt for people who speak another language and the difficulty experienced in learning a foreign language seem to me to be derived from these earliest disturbances of the desire for knowledge.]

We have seen that sadistic impulses against its mother’s body activate the child’s instinct for knowledge in the first place, but the anxiety which soon follows as a reaction to such impulses gives a further very important impetus to the increase and intensification of that instinct. The urge the child feels to find out what happens inside its mother’s body and its own, is reinforced by its fear of the dangers which it supposes the former to contain, and also by its fear of the dangerous introjected objects and occurrences within itself. Knowledge is now a means of mastering anxiety; this leads to an impetus to acquire knowledge which becomes an important factor both in the development of its instinct for knowledge and in its inhibition. For, as in the case of the development of the libido, so too in that of the development of the instinct to know, anxiety acts both as a promoting and an inhibiting factor. We have had occasion in earlier pages to discuss some examples of severe disturbances of the instinct for knowledge. In these cases, the child’s terror of knowing anything about the fearful destruction it had done to its mother’s body in phantasy and the consequent counter-attacks and perils, it was exposed to,
etc., was so tremendous that it set up a radical disturbance of its instinct for knowledge as a whole. The child's original excessively strong and unsatisfied desire to get information about the nature, size, and number of its father's penises, excrements and children inside its mother had turned into a compulsion to measure, add up and count things and so on."

This quotation summarises some of the important findings relating to these matters in two important papers, Klein (1930, 1931). Klein's theory of symbol formation (1930, pp. 220-221) was that in order to form symbols the child needs to experience anxiety, both from feelings of threat from inside and also from retaliatory feelings of threat from inhabitants of the outside world. This anxiety causes the child to substitute a symbol for the object of the anxiety, for example, a penis, a vagina, or a breast. In turn, this becomes an object of anxiety which impels the child to create a further symbol and so on. Thus the child goes on to make classes of symbols equivalent to the earliest objects of anxiety. This is a form of splitting which is arguably the basis for what Sacks (1972) called membership categorisation, discussed in Chapters One to Three. Klein thought that the ability to tolerate a modicum of anxiety was the basis of the child's ability to obtain knowledge, and its instinct to do so. If the child were unable to tolerate enough anxiety for it to use the defence of sublimating, that is, transferring its anxiety onto symbols, then it would operate a more primitive form of defence of expulsion into the outside world. Here the contents of the infant's and the mother's body are felt to be so dangerous that they are pushed out of its mind completely.

This adds a third aspect to the developing notion of projective identification outlined in the above quotation, the first being the instinct for knowledge, the second being sadism, and the third being expulsion. At this early stage of her writing, Klein feels that the function of projective identification is essentially sadistic, an idea that was to be modified in her later work. However, there is an opposition discussed by
Klein (1930) which is germinal to the notion of projective identification, namely that the explosive function is essentially violent and destructive but the knowledge-seeking function is benign. This opposition foreshadows the following later theories of communication in the Kleinian tradition. Bion (1967, p. 110-119) in 'A Theory of Thinking' describes the difference between realistic projective identification, which is the origin of communication initially between mother and infant, and excessive projective identification, which is destructive of it. Bion emphasised also the two-way nature of this communication, by discussing the mother's capacity to contain empathetically her infant's projections. This led Meltzer et al. (1982) to propose a distinction between two different sorts of projective identification, one of which he suggests renaming 'intrusive identification'. This reformulation was felt to be necessary in order to emphasise the qualitative nature of the distinction rather than the quantitative nature that is implied by Bion's terminology. On the one hand there is the communicative and knowledge-based function of an appropriate amount of projective identification and on the other hand there is the destructive, expulsive and inhibitory function of excessive projective identification now termed by Meltzer et al. (1982) intrusive identification.

The original definition of projective identification (Klein, 1946) is essentially a development of the ideas in the above long quotation, for although the emphasis on knowledge and, arguably, communication is not explicitly there, it shows a shift in her work (O'Shaughnessy, 1975, p. 429) from the study of sadism in isolation, to the study of love and hate in interaction, following her acceptance of Freud's theory of the life and death instincts as a fundamental principle. This definition however, sets the stage for the extension by Bion of the notion of projective
identification into that of a mode of communication. Klein's definition reads (1946, pp.8-9)

"Also the attacks on the mother's breast develop into attacks of a similar nature on her body, which comes to be felt as if it were an extension of the breast, even before the mother is conceived of as a complete person. The phantasised onslaughts on the mother follow two main lines: one is the predominantly oral impulse to suck dry, bite up, scoop out and rob the mother's body of its good contents . . . The other line of attack derives from the anal and urethral impulses and implies expelling dangerous substances (excrements) out of the self and into the mother. Together with these harmful excrements, expelled in hatred, split off parts of the ego are also projected onto the mother or, as I would rather call it, into the mother. These excrements and bad parts of the self are meant not only to injure but also to control and to take possession of the object. In so far as the mother comes to contain the bad parts of the self, she is not felt to be a separate individual but is also felt to be the bad self.

Much of the hatred against parts of the self is now directed towards the mother. This leads to a particular form of identification which establishes the prototype of an aggressive object relation. I suggest for these processes the term 'projective identification'. When projection is mainly derived from the infant's impulse to harm or to control the mother, he feels her to be a persecutor. In psychotic disorders this identification of an object with the hated parts of the self contributes to the intensity of the hatred directed against other people. As far as the ego is concerned the excessive splitting off and expelling into the outer world of parts of itself considerably weaken it. For the aggressive component of feelings and of the personality is intimately bound up in the mind with power, potency, strength, knowledge, and many other qualities.

It is, however, not only the bad parts of the self which are expelled and projected, but also the good parts of the self. Excrements then have the significance of gifts; and parts of the ego which, together with excrements are expelled and projected into the other person represent the good, i.e., the loving parts of the self. The identification based on this type of projection again vitally influences object relations. The projection of good feelings and good parts of the self into the mother is essential for the infant's ability to develop good object-relations and to integrate his ego. However, if this projective process is carried out excessively, good parts of the personality are felt to be lost, and in this way, the mother becomes the ego-ideal; this process too results in weakening and impoverishing the ego. Very soon, such processes extend to other people, and the result may be an over strong-dependence on these external representatives of one's own good parts. Another consequence is a fear that the capacity to love has been lost.
because the love object is felt to be loved predominantly as a representative of the self. The processes of splitting off parts of the self and projecting them into objects are thus of vital importance for normal development as well as for abnormal object-relations."

Klein set up the definition of projective identification as an essentially primitive and regressive mechanism. It is counterpart to Freud’s notion of identification as a developmental one which sets up a benign superego. Freud’s notion was based on introjection and later Kleinians coined the phrase 'introjective identification' to refer to the Freudian notion in order to make its distinction from projective identification more explicit. Klein’s notion of projective identification reflects her view of the malevolent early superego, attacked and contaminated with the bad bits of the ego.

The work of Bion on language and schizophrenia

Bion (1955) deals with the same sort of psychotic communication that he found in dysfunctional groups, but this time in sick adults. There is evidence that psychotic mechanisms are the norm in groups even though they are abnormal for individuals (Menzies, 1970). This psychotic communication is based on an attack on verbal thought by projective identification. Here is shown a basic shift of emphasis from Klein to Bion. Whereas Klein was more concerned with the actual objects that inhabit the internal and external worlds, Bion is more concerned with the functions that these objects perform or are phantasised to perform (Meltzer, 1981). Thus, it is appropriate for him to talk about an attack on the function of verbal thought. The object which performs this function will be clarified below in the discussion of Bion’s theory of thinking. Bion (1955, p. 225) claims that language is used by sufferers of schizophrenia in three ways, namely, as a mode of action, as a method of communication, and as a mode of thought. He concentrates on language
as a mode of action, and this is particularly pertinent to the present thesis. Although this process of using language as action is considered pathological by Bion, using a modified speech-act analysis we can subsume the more functional aspects of language under a concept of language as action. Language as communication could be described as action on the external world, and language as a mode of thought could be described as action on the internal world.

Bion (1955, p.226-227) considers language used by the sufferers of schizophrenia, particularly in the psychoanalytical setting, as deploying language as action in the service of splitting and projective identification in three ways. First, he describes language in the service of projective identification where the patient uses words as things or split off parts of themselves which are experienced as being forced into the body of the analyst. Secondly, he describes language as a mode of action for splitting the patient's object, which is often used when the analyst becomes representative of internal persecutors in the transference, but is used at other times as well. The patient will put the analyst in a situation where he or she would ostensibly have to make contradictory interpretations, in other words, the analyst is put in a 'double-bind'. The third mode of language as action is where the patient uses his or her language to split the analyst's own speech and thus attacks the analyst's ability to help the patient to form symbols and develop verbal thought.

In this paper (1955), Bion puts in a passage where he spells out his linguistic orientation (which is similar to the view of language taken in the present thesis), and allies himself with writers who believe that traditional semantics is inadequate to do full justice to the complexity of language, in this case exemplified by psychotic language. Some of his comments are reminiscent of Goffman (1959) - the sociologist who studied linguistic interaction. Bion (op.cit.) writes:
"Before I consider the schizophrenic's difficulties with language as a mode of thought, I want to turn for a moment to a discussion of semantics. I think that our difficulties as analysts are made to appear greater than they are by an inadequate theory of semantics, and in particular the use of the Augustinian theory as if it were valid for the whole field. Wittgenstein has deprecated this view and seems to me to put forward a theory which is both more comprehensive and more realistic. In ordinary speech, the meaning of any given word, and still more the meaning of the sum total of what a man says, depends upon the synthesis of a complex variety of elements; sounds have to be combined to form words, and words, sentences. Culture and personality of the person to whom the remark is addressed is also rapidly assessed and integrated with other elements in the speaker's mind. The appropriate intonation and pronunciation must be employed, and so on. As I shall show later, reasonably correct colloquial speech can be so treated by the listener that its meaning is destroyed. Reciprocally, the speaker can be so incapable of synthesis or show such aberration in his modes of integration that a deal of work has to be done to appreciate what has happened to the verbal communication, let alone to grasp the meaning."

(p.226-227)

Bion points out that an inhibition of the phantasy life leads to the inhibition of the formation of symbols necessary for the development of verbal thought. Thus he agrees with the conclusions of Klein in Klein (1930) and Klein (1931). However, he restates this view in terms of her later theory of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. He writes:

"The severe splitting in the schizophrenic makes it difficult for him to achieve the use of symbols and subsequently of substantives and verbs. It is necessary to demonstrate these difficulties to him as they arise; ... The capacity to form symbols is dependent on:

(i) the ability to grasp whole objects,

(ii) the abandonment of the paranoid-schizoid position with its attendant splitting, and

(iii) the bringing together of splits and the ushering in of the depressive position.

He goes on to point out that the capacity for verbal thought is resisted by the patient as with the attendant development into the depressive position, as both increase the patient's awareness of his or her internal world and the terrifying nature of it.
The case material Bion then quotes is very useful to the conversation analyst, as it illustrates the moment-by-moment, turn-by-turn, oscillation between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. Bion points out that the whole of a patient’s ‘breakdown’ and psychic life can be experienced in a small piece of conversation. Bion’s view here can be seen to be an extension of the views of Klein described above, particularly those on symbol formation.

As it is the contention of this thesis that all language is action on the speaker’s or hearer’s internal world, or on the external world (for example, asking someone to open a window), how then is it possible to differentiate pathological forms of linguistic action such as those described by Bion from other forms of linguistic action? The answer lies in the notion of symbol formation. If the capacity for symbol formation is impaired, either in frank psychosis, in group phenomena or in psychotic moments in everyday life such as the marital row, then words are empty of meaning and used merely as projectiles. So the criterion for damaged communication would be if the effect of the utterance is different from the real meaning of words. For example, a confession of marital infidelity may be what it seems to be, a genuine conveying, in repentance, of a truthful message, or it may be a vicious attack on the spouse concealed by the pretence of atonement. This is an example of the first two modes of Bion’s description of language as action, namely, in the service of projective identification and splitting. The guilty spouse’s bad feelings are forced into the partner whose angry behaviour may then actually mitigate feelings of guilt. The wronged partner is also the victim of splitting, for either he or she is glad the partner confessed, no matter how disingenuously, or he or she is not. If the spouse is not glad of the confession, then his or her partner is being encouraged in the deception of not confessing. Similarly, if he or she is glad of it, the
partner experiences a double bind, in a similar way to the experience of the analyst described by Bion. This is not strictly an example of an attack on verbal thought, although what is portrayed is one linguistic act deliberately being confused with another.

**Bion's theory of thinking**

Bion extended the notion of projective identification by looking at the consequences of the relationship between that which is projected, and that into which it is projected, the relationship between container and contained. He started with an account of the mother-child relationship, and an account of the origin of thought, and thus the failure of thought that is psychosis.

Bion in 'A theory of thinking' (1967) argues that projective identification is the origin of communication. Through projective identification the infant induces in the mother the anxieties it feels, for example, a fear of dying. The mother, as Money-Kyrle (1978) suggests in his description of Bion's theory of thinking (pp.430-433), could respond in one of three ways: a) she could fail to become aware of the baby's panic; b) she could become panic stricken herself; or c) she could respond with the feeling that the baby is unnecessarily terrified in a perfectly safe situation. This last case is what Bion calls maternal reverie. In this case the mother's sympathetic lack of anxiety will communicate itself back to the infant in a form that it is more able to deal with. The mother thus performs the thinking for the baby that it cannot yet perform for itself. The capacity for thinking is what Bion called alpha-function and the thoughts which are the product of this he called alpha-elements. To the extent that the mother's reverie fails and she responds in ways a) and b) above, the baby will then have returned to it, not thoughts, but elements of nameless dread, stripped of such meaning.
as they have, that Bion called beta-elements. As it is still at the stage of part-object relations, the infant, in phantasy, projects these anxieties into the mother's breast. If all goes well then after their sojourn in the breast, the infant will take them back into itself in a detoxified form because they have been thought about by its mother. If this interchange is productive, in time the infant will take in from its mother the capacity to think for itself, phantasised as an internal containing 'breast-mother'. Then the child can perform its own alpha-function.

Failure in the mother's capacity for maternal reverie is not the only reason why this process may be disturbed. The infant may feel, because of its own greed or envy, that the mother has not dealt with its feelings. In this case, its projections will have more of the quality of malicious action of attacking the 'breast's capacity for thought'. Whether the failure of alpha-function is due to incapacity for reverie on the mother's part or constitutional envy (Klein, 1957) on the child's, it will experience the return of beta-elements. If the mother is experienced as going to pieces, then the infant experiences the psychotic catastrophe where the breast and the ego are exploded into meaningless but highly threatening bizarre objects.

The aim of a psychoanalysis is the re-experiencing of these processes, initially experienced at the breast with the mother, in the transference with the analyst. This projective identification as a primal mode of communication, and not just as a vicious attack, must persist into adult life. When the analysis is working well the patient arouses a feeling in the analyst, the analyst's counter-transference, which the analyst turns into verbal thoughts which are then returned to the patient in a detoxified form as interpretations. The aim of the analysis is that the patient should take inside himself or herself this way of thinking and learn to perform self-analysis. Meltzer (1983) leads us to the belief that
transference phenomena, the return of infantile experiences in adult life, are not just the prerogative of the analytical setting. However, the purpose of the analytical setting is to focus or 'gather' the transference (Meltzer, 1967).

Meltzer (1983) writes (p. 46):

"The creative process of dreaming generates the meaning that can then be deployed to life and relationships in the outside world [and interpsychically, the present author would argue, in some conversation]. This means, in a sense, that all of our external relationships have a certain transference quality, that they derive meaning from what exists in our internal world. Sometimes they derive an adult meaning so that through our identification with our internal objects the adult part of our personality is able to meet other people on an adult level through communal phantasy, a kind of congruence of internal objects. It is this congruence of internal objects that brings people together and it is living in different worlds that drives them apart so that they cannot communicate with one another."

This leads to the conclusion that projective identification in both its malevolent and non-malevolent forms occur in everyday life. One obvious way in which this happens is when partners come home from work and unburden the day's problems on each other. Often what seems frightening or depressing can be detoxified by talking to an attentive and sympathetic, loving, partner. Equally, if the partner is unable to understand, either by not being empathetic with their partner's feelings, or by becoming upset for themself rather than the partner, then this process does not work. Similarly, if the partner on the receiving end has his or her needs greedily ignored this process will fail. This is homologous to Money-Kyrle's (1978) account of a mother's communication with her child described above. A marriage can be seen to be a special kind of group. If the marriage is functioning at a psychotic level and partners feel that any real communication is dangerous and that their words are being used for vicious projective identification and splitting as discussed in the previous section, there may be the feeling that talking may cause the psychotic- catastrophic destruction of the self and the
partner (or the marriage). There also may be a 'psychotic transference' where the couple, because of their inhibition of symbol formation, experience themselves as a combined figure. They are felt to be one person, rather than two people who stand in a symbolic relation to objects in each others internal world as would be the case in the normal (or neurotic) transference.

Meltzer et al. (1982) emphasise the difference between the destructive use of projective identification as action, and the developmental aspect of projective identification as communication as described in Bion (1967). They are also concerned to stress the qualitative rather than quantitative differences between the two ideas. Meltzer et al, point out (1982, p. 186) that there is a "basis for a new approach to understanding the non-lexical aspects of verbal communication in particular and non-verbal communication in general". They go on (pp 201 - 202) to suggest the following re-definitions.

"Projective identification - the unconscious phantasy implementing the non-lexical aspects of language and behaviour, aimed at communication rather than action (Bion).

Intrusive identification - the unconscious omnipotent phantasy, mechanism of defense (Melanie Klein)

Claustrum - the inside of the object penetrated by intrusive identification.

Container - the inside of the object receptive of projective identifications."

In this terminology projective identification belongs to the depressive position, and intrusive identification to the paranoid-schizoid position.

One of the tasks of the Kleinian linguist is to investigate the underlying psychological states of speakers at a particular moment in a conversation. To the extent that this underlying state corresponds to the paranoid-schizoid position, language will be used for the purpose of intrusive identification, to the extent that it corresponds to the depressive position language will be used for the purpose of projective
identification. Projective identification emerges as an explicitly linguistic concept. As is suggested here, this point was in Klein's work implicitly, even before she coined the term. The moment-by-moment oscillation between these two forms of talk was pointed out by Bion (1955, p.236).

One point to be stressed, at the core of this thesis, is that all language is action, and not just language as described by Bion (1955) as such, and reflected in the redefinition of projective identification by Meltzer et al (1982) which is quoted above. I am proposing that the appropriate distinction in this context is not between language used for action and language used for communication, as communication is one form of action. The appropriate distinction to be drawn is between, on the one hand, vicious destructive action, both on the external world and interlocutors' internal worlds, performed in verbal interaction using what Meltzer et al. call intrusive identification (the sort of destructive talk described by Bion (1955)), and, on the other hand, the linguistic action of a benign sort, which Bion would describe as language used for the purposes of communication. The latter form of language is still action, but of a benign sort, and is effected both by what Meltzer calls projective identification and by the lexical aspects of language. The paradigm for this would be in a psychoanalytical treatment at a stage where the patient is not attacking the analyst. The patient would communicate by projective identification, verbal or otherwise, a feeling to the analyst, this would certainly be an action on the analyst and his or her internal world as it would induce him or her to feel the patient's anxiety in the counter-transference (Segal, 1981, pp.81-87). After a sojourn in the analyst, acting as container, the feeling would be returned to the patient in lexical form as an interpretation. This again has a strong aspect of action, for the analyst is not merely trying to communicate intellectually a proposition to the patient, but to help the
patient to accept it in an emotional way that will aid their psychic integration. This point was made by Freud. Thus patient and analyst would be trying to act upon each other, although using different means - the patient mainly by projective identification, the analyst through the lexical aspects of speech. In psychotic parts of an analysis, such as described by Bion (1955), the patient would mainly use intrusive identification. In the more complicated transferences in everyday life, all parties would use both projective identification and lexical aspects of communication. They would also, in more dangerous circumstances, use intrusive identification.

As Meltzer et al (1982) point out, whereas Klein was concerned with 'cognitive', that is, anthropomorphic parts of the personality being projected, Bion was concerned with particular mental functions being projected. Also particular functions can act as containers as well as themselves being contained by other parts of the personality. Containers need not just be physical objects in the transference. This development by Bion of Klein's ideas allowed for the development of the notion of language or words as containers. The role of words in verbal thought will now be illustrated by Bion's comments on stammering and Segal's work on symbol formation.

Bion (1970, pp.94-96) describes the function of words as a container. He considers three possible outcomes when someone wishes to communicate annoyance. The person may express themselves 'perfectly', (p.96) "one could then imagine that his emotions had served to develop his ability for well-chosen speech and that his capacity for speech had helped his emotional development". In this case, container and contained are well matched and functioning effectively. Secondly the person may remain coherent, but, in doing so, fail to express their emotion (p. 95): "this could correspond to an overwhelming of the content by the
container: his speech would in this case be so restrained that it could not express his feelings." The third possibility is that the person may become incoherent and stammer; this situation is where the content overwhelms and explodes the container. This produces, on a small scale, the effect of a psychotic catastrophe. The last possibility underlines the fact that Kleinian theory, with its emphasis on moment-to-moment interaction, refers to psychotic moments in an otherwise 'normal' interaction, as is justified by Bion (1970, pp 42-43).

Bion's discussion of stammering is analogous to the marital dialogues discussed above. First, real communication may take place using the couple's capacity to act as a container. Secondly, using Meltzer et al's (1982) term, the couple may function as a 'claustrum' - for the partnership can be too rigid, for any real emotional communication to take place. Their words are experienced as empty and inappropriate as much of the emotional meaning is squeezed out of them. Thirdly, the containing function of the couple may be exploded by the power of the feeling it is called upon to contain. In particular the couple's ability to use words as containers may be temporarily destroyed. Words are then used as projectiles, almost as physical 'blunt instruments' of attack, rather than of containers of meaning. In this third case their communication 'explodes' into a 'psychotic' row. The first sort of situation would belong to the depressive position, the second and third to the paranoid-schizoid position.

The work of Segal on symbol formation

In this section, a more detailed version of Segal's (1981) views on symbol formation will be presented, together with her application of these views to verbal thought. Her views, based on the work of Bion on the containing function of words, will also be presented. These views will be
shown to be relevant to the model of language and linguistics being presented in this thesis.

In her paper 'Notes on symbol formation' (1981, pp.49-65), Segal distinguishes two forms of symbolic relation; symbols proper, which are characteristic of depressive position thinking and symbolic equations, which are characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position. Symbols proper are felt by the subject to represent what they symbolise, but in symbolic equations symbols are felt actually to be what they stand in for. She writes that symbol formation is a reflection of the subject's ego and its object relations, which is similar to Bion's views on verbal thought (1955, p.222) as a function of object relations. She explains that the process of formation of symbolic equations is due to the operation of projective identification or what Meltzer et al (1982) have perhaps more accurately labelled intrusive identification. Segal (1981) writes (p.53):

"A leading defense mechanism in this phase [the paranoid-schizoid position] is projective identification, the subject in phantasy projects large parts of himself into the object, and the object becomes identified with parts of the self it is felt to contain. Similarly, internal objects are projected outside and identified with parts of the external world which come to represent them. These first projections and identifications are the beginnings of the process of symbol formation.

The early symbols, however, are not felt by the ego to be symbols or substitutes but to be the original object itself. They are so different from symbols formed later that I think they deserve a name of their own . . . symbolic equation . . . . Parts of the ego and internal objects are projected into an object and identified with it. The differentiation between the self and the object is obscured. Then, since a part of the ego is confused with the object, the symbol - which is a creation and a function of the ego - becomes, in turn, confused with the object which is symbolized."

For Segal, the development of symbol formation proper is characteristic of the depressive position, where the distinction between the self and the object, in this case the symbol, is less blurred as intrusive identification lessens. Thus, the ability to form symbols is seen
to be very much part of healthy development in the active ego’s task to move from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position.

Segal (1981, p.56) writes that depressive position symbols, “created internally, can then be reprojected into the external world, endowing it with symbolic meaning”. (This is perhaps one way of describing the transference.) Here again is the suggestion that projection is not wholly a malevolent aspect of the paranoid-schizoid position, but is a necessary part of healthy functioning in the depressive position. The point is that the internal symbols are not equated with parts of the ego by intrusive identification but are related to it by appropriate projective identification. Segal writes of communication (p. 57):

"Symbol formation governs the capacity to communicate, since all communication is made by means of symbols. When schizoid disturbances in object relations occur, the capacity to communicate is similarly disturbed: first because the differentiation between the subject and the object is blurred. Second, because the means of communication are lacking since symbols are felt in a concrete fashion and are therefore unavailable for purposes of communication. One of the ever-recurring difficulties in the analysis of psychotic patients is this difficulty of communication. Words, for instance, whether the analyst's or the patient's, are felt to be objects or actions, and cannot be easily used for purposes of communication."

A modification to Segal's terminology will be made here, as was done with Bion’s, in line with the contention of this thesis that all language is action. For example, communication in a good marriage is communication in Segal’s sense, but it is also action, acting on both the speaker’s and the hearer’s internal worlds, altering and enriching their symbolic capacity, in the direction of mutual understanding. This may be effected by explicit lexical communication, or by projective identification in the sense used by Meltzer et al (1982). Details boring to the outsider, such as details of each partner’s day, may be interesting and important to the couple, serving the same function as fairy tales as discussed by Segal in this paper. Similarly, disagreements between partners may be
discussed, their resolution bringing enriched mutual understanding. However, at psychotic moments in a marital row, things may operate as in Segal's sense of action as vicious attacks on the other person's internal world. Due to the functioning of symbolic equation in the paranoid-schizoid position (which will be regressed to at times by all of us, not just psychotics, and which is characteristic of marital rows), words will be experienced as things. They will be used as projectiles to hurl at, and into, the partner, and the actual function of communication and all understanding of meaning will be suspended both in the service of hurting in retaliation for hurt and in manipulating the partner. In both cases, language is action, but in the depressive position it is action enriching the internal world, and in the paranoid-schizoid position it is destructive action.

It should be stressed again that the paranoid-schizoid position will be regressed to at times by everybody, not just psychotics. It is this position which is characteristic of marital rows. Klein coined the word 'position' partly to underline the fact that this primitive level of functioning could be regressed to in 'normal' circumstances such as rows. Segal (1981) makes the point (pp.57-58) that symbols are not only needed in external world communication, but also in healthy internal world communication, in other words, communication with oneself. This does not mean being aware of the actual phantasy content of the internal world, as would be revealed in an analysis, but with symbolic expressions of these phantasies. In contrast to this healthy mental make up, in schizoid states there are parts of the self which are split off and do not communicate with others parts. Segal goes on to say that the capacity to communicate with oneself symbolically is the basis of verbal thinking, that is, the capacity to communicate with oneself using words. This is
because words themselves are symbols. She does, however, point out that not all internal communication is verbal.

Just as the internal world gives meaning to the external world (Segal, 1981, p.56, and Meltzer, 1983, p.46, both quoted above), so the external world provides symbols to represent the phantasy contents of the internal world, as for example, in dreams, or artistic creation. This internal communication, which develops into verbal thought, is initially accomplished between ego and internal object by appropriate projective identification. This projective identification as a primitive form of internal communication lays the foundations for verbal thought. This process is then deployed into the outside world of objects and words, endowing them with meaning.

Segal goes on to describe how the maturing ego of the depressive position has to integrate earlier parts, the paranoid-schizoid part of the personality. If this is done symbolically it will mitigate psychotic action or 'acting out' which would be characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position. As such, the paranoid-schizoid position is not left behind in the healthy personality, but rather represented symbolically in the depressive position. The personality is thus built up dynamically, throughout life, as oscillations between the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position take place. This is what Meltzer (1967, p.103) refers to as 'horizontal splitting'. Segal (1981, p.58-59) mentions the fairy-tale "with the witch and the fairy godmother, Prince Charming, the ogre, etc." as an integrated artistic creation which symbolizes paranoid-schizoid position phantasies. Segal (1981) then goes on to describe a patient who, when she is thinking in an integrated way characteristic of the depressive position, writes fairy tales, but when psychotic acts out her phantasies.

There is a suggestion by Meltzer (1983, p 52) that the verbal report of a therapist in supervision was identical to, or analogous to,
dreaming. In the Kleinian tradition children’s play, dreaming, and some sorts of verbal activity are the manifestation of phantasy. The paranoid-schizoid part of the self would be contained in such phantasy, rather than being acted out if the subject were operating in the depressive position. So the symbolic communication underlying verbal thought would be done intrapsychically, at least in part by dreams, and interpsychically, at least in part by verbal communication. The untrained hearer probably would not notice the connections and symbols being used at a conscious level but would, in the best case, respond with empathy. There would be analogous kinds of communication in children’s play. Both intrapsychically and interpsychically, this communication would be effected by realistic projective identification. It is not the same as conscious verbal thought or conscious expression of thoughts and feelings, but it is also not the sort of vicious attack characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position, renamed intrusive identification. Rather, it is the inducement in the other person of one’s own feelings with a view to empathic detoxification of these feelings by the other. It thus requires a recognition of the separateness of the other from the self, implying symbolic thinking proper. This communication by projective identification is an early communication which precedes the later development of lexical communication (Bion, 1967, p.118).

Segal points to the fairy tale as a sort of verbal communication whose function is to communicate and contain the paranoid-schizoid parts of the self rather than its resorting to acting out. Although the medium is verbal, the important aspect of the communication, the present author argues, is that of projective identification, that is the arousal of an empathy in the hearer for the contained psychotic parts of the speaker, as well as for corresponding phantasies that are being expressed symbolically. Without that empathy, the verbal interchange would tend to
disintegrate the speaker. Another case of this sort of communication, as discussed above, is that of the anecdote of the day's work discussed by couples in the evening. Although boring to outsiders, it is an exciting and relieving part of the day to the couple, who are immersed in shared phantasies. The anecdote would function something like a shared dream. This point is made also by Meltzer (1983, p.46) quoted above. Just as "dream life can be viewed as a place to which we can go in our sleep, when we can turn our attention fully to this internal world" (Meltzer, 1983, p.46), so our loved ones can be viewed as people to whom we can go, and turn our attention to each other's internal worlds, through sharing our phantasies with them symbolically.

The anecdote is often like a fairy-tale in that it includes monsters and gods. The speaker has not, however, treated his interlocutor as if he or she were a monster or a god, and neither will the hearer act on this supposition. It is the empathetic understanding of the hearer that he or she must function as a safe but flexible container that mitigates the need for that intensive action that would be characteristic of paranoid-schizoid functioning. Such would be the functioning of a good 'depressive position marriage'. The Kleinian linguist would be concerned to distinguish the mode of verbal activity in the paranoid-schizoid position which is using symbolic equations from the verbal mode in the depressive position which is using symbols proper. In the former case the linguist would elucidate how paranoid-schizoid mechanisms were being enacted in language. In the latter case the linguist would look for symbolic representations in phantasy of paranoid-schizoid mechanisms, such as attacking, and also of depressive mechanisms, such as mourning. This is the same task as that discussed above of distinguishing intrusive identification as manifested in conversation from realistic projective identification as manifested in conversation. Intrusive identification
underlies symbolic equation in the paranoid-schizoid position. Projective identification underlies the relation of symbolisation in the depressive position, and it is a precondition for lexical communication.

In the postscripts to Segal (1981, pp.49-65) she explicitly uses Bion's concept of container and contained (p 60): "the particular relationship between the projected part and the object projected into". She describes a patient who responds to Segal's interpretations and her own words with physical sensations or symptoms, as an example of the patient experiencing words as concrete things. Segal's patient acts on her phantasies by stealing Segal's words as physical objects which she takes inside herself as hypochondriacal symptoms. Another form of such action is the patient talking vaguely and philosophically, in phantasy emptying Segal and their joint communication of meaning. The patient's words also were used as bizarre objects, as described by Bion (1967).

Segal writes (p. 62):

"In these modes of functioning, one can see a disturbance between the container and the contained. When she was overly concrete, the projected part was totally identified with the container. When her communication was empty of meaning, the container and the contained had a relation of mutually emptying one another. When she was fragmented and produced "bizarre objects" type of associations, her projections had split the container into fragments.

Segal summarises her conclusions about words as containers (p.63):

"Verbalization can be looked at from the angle of the relation between the container and the contained. Unlike the unconscious forms of symbolism [projective identification in Meltzer et al.'s sense], speech has to be learned. Though the baby begins by producing sounds, those sounds have to be taken up by the environment to be converted into speech, and words or phrases have to be learned from the environment. The infant has had an experience and the mother provides the word or phrase which binds this experience. It contains, encompasses and expresses the meaning. It provides a container for it. The infant can then internalize this word or phrase containing the meaning."
The integration of these ideas with Bion's theory of thinking suggests that, throughout life, words are filled with meaning by an introjected, internal, speaking mother, or parental couple and this view is accepted by the present author.

Segal (1981, p.63) then goes on to describe how this process can break down using an example of her patient's difficulties in accepting her attempt to provide a verbal container for the patient in the transference.

"My patient had the greatest difficulty in experiencing any interpretation, any phrase of mine as containing and giving expression to her meaning. Strange things happened to my interpretations. They could become a pain in her belly or sexual excitement. They could be learnt by heart and applied to others. They were frequently fed back to me as her own product but usually a bit distorted, often deprived of emotional meaning, sometimes completely reversed."

Segal is explaining the ontogenesis of speech as homologous to the earlier ontogenesis of thinking as described by Bion (1967). The mother acts as a container; Bion discusses the mother using her mind to contain the child's proto-thoughts and Segal discusses the mother providing containing words for the child's experiences. In both instances, the child takes back what it had initially projected and eventually takes into itself the ability to think and speak for itself. In the case of the development of thought, the infant is learning to use its innate pre-conceptions creatively, so that they can then be used for interpsychic or intrapsychic communication by realistic projective identification. In the development of language, the infant is learning to use sound creatively to produce speech, which can similarly be used for interpsychic and intrapsychic communication.

This account of the development of language is backed up by Bruner (1975). Similarly, Boston (1975) reviews the literature on the strong level of co-ordination between mothers and infants in the proto-communicative stage which suggests that they are working together to achieve communication in the way described by Segal. Grinberg et al, (1975, p. 28) describe, in common with Segal (1981, p.62), the way the
psychotic person strips words of meaning. Bion also endorses Segal's view in a paper published in two separate forms (Bion, 1967, pp.43-64 and Bion, 1967, pp.86-92); he emphasises, however, the violence with which verbal thought is attacked.

The relationship between projective identification and introjective identification

Klein's original definition of projective identification (Klein, 1946) may be seen to be a counterpart to Freud's notion of identification. A moral superego is taken into the self at the resolution of the Oedipus complex by identification with the father (Freud, 1923, p.54). Freud's notion of identification has been adapted by Kleinian writers and termed introjective identification. In the depressive position this is a benign form of incorporation, where an independent whole object, or parental couple, is taken into the self in the depressive position. However, it is malignant if it occurs in the paranoid-schizoid position where part objects are taken into the self.

For example, Meltzer writes of adult relations (1973, pp. 67-68):

"The foundation in the unconscious, of the sexual life of the mature person is the highly complicated sexual relation of the internal parents, with whom he is capable of rich introjective identification in both masculine and feminine roles. A well-integrated bisexuality makes possible a doubly intense intimacy with the sexual partner by both introjection as well as a modulated projective identification which finds its place in the partners' mentality without controlling or dominating. It is akin to the normal use of projective identification as a primal mode of communication, as described by Bion (1963), and differs greatly, therefore, from the violent splitting and projective identification of the infantile bisexuality which is so prevalent in puberty and adolescence, epitomised in 'the crush'.

In this quote, we find that modulated projective identification and introjective identification seem similar, and are opposed to the violent splitting and projective identification which Meltzer et al. (1982) termed intrusive identification. Projective and introjective identification are the
ways different parts of the ego, in this case masculine and feminine, communicate with each other. This intrapsychic object relation is then deployed outwards into relations with other people, in this case sexual partners.

In well modulated projective identification between mother and infant, the child has to project in a reasonably satisfactory way and the mother has to be a receptive container; the child has to speak and the mother hear. But, just as the infant has to arouse a feeling in its receptive mother of its anxiety, so the mother has also to induce a particular feeling in the child, in the best case that of calm (alpha-elements). The mother has to 'speak' to the child and the child has to 'hear'. This can be extrapolated from adult relationships. In modulated projective identification there is mutuality of communication, each person being receptive to the other, each being both container and contained for the other, each 'speaking' and 'hearing', projecting and introjecting. The present author argues that the notion of projective identification, as redefined by Meltzer et al (1982), is an inseparable counterpart to introjective identification and vice versa (there is nothing to hear if no one speaks). They are aspects of a depressive position whole object relationship involves a strong and flexible relationship between container and contained. The vicious part-object or bizarre object or non-communicative object relation described by Bion (1967) characteristic of schizophrenia and of psychotic language is best described as intrusive identification with a claustrum (Meltzer et al, 1982). This is again a two way process, the expulsion described by Bion characterised by distorted speaking, and the reversal of this expulsion by a distorted hearing of the analyst's words. Intrusive identification to a lesser degree, is also characteristic of the 'non-psychotic' paranoid-schizoid
position, as again can be witnessed by the distorted communication in the marital row.

Money-Kyrle (1961, p.73) makes a point related to the one being argued here when he writes of projection and introjection:

"It is worth noting here that these two processes are probably not to be thought of as the converse of each other. Thus the converse of 'introjection' would seem to be not projection, but a sense of a part of the self being pulled out, or robbed by an external agency, while the converse of 'projection' is the sense of someone else forcibly projecting himself into one's own ego.

The term "projection in reverse" was introduced by Bion, 'Development of Schizophrenic Thought', 1956, Int. J. Psycho-Anal. [Reprinted in Bion (1967) pp. 36-42] I think we can usefully speak of both projection and introjection in this way, as something which we not only do, but also have done to us."

The view being proposed here is that projection and introjection are opposites, but in a slightly different sense to the one which Money-Kyrle is proposing; that is, projection is something that subjects do, whereas introjection is the subjects' response to the projective actions of others. However a more fruitful dimension along which to draw a distinction is between the pathological, and the communicative aspects of both projection and introjection, as is done in Meltzer et al (1982).

Meltzer's theory of linguistics

In his paper 'A theory of thinking' (Bion, 1967, pp.110-119) Bion has proposed that realistic projective identification is the origin of communication. He has also proposed, in his paper 'On Arrogance' (Bion, 1967, pp.86-92) that in psychotic states projective identification, as a primitive communicative link with the analyst, is attacked, thus denying the patient a precondition for more developed forms of communication. Realistic projective identification is not only benign but also necessary. For the infant, it is necessary to communicate with the mother through projective identification, in order that bad feelings may be modified into
thoughts by a sojourn in her psyche, phantasised by the infant as her breast, so that the infant can later develop the capacity for verbal thought. Similarly, the psychotic patient who is struggling with infantile modes of functioning must, in the transference, allow him or herself to communicate with the analyst by projective identification so that bad feelings may be modified by a sojourn in the analyst’s psyche, in order that healthy verbal thought may later be allowed to develop. These considerations paved the way for the development of Meltzer’s theory of linguistics, which will be presented and modified in the light of speech act theory, among others, as have other ideas already discussed in this section.

In his paper ‘Mutism in infantile autism, schizophrenia and manic-depressive states: the correlation of clinical psycho-pathology and linguistics’ (Meltzer et al, 1975, pp.192-206), Meltzer develops his theory of linguistics from Bion’s conception of the employment of projective identification as the primal mode for communicating states of mind. He is also influenced by Langer’s (1951) development of the notion that ‘lalling’ (babbling or experimental playing with sounds) constitutes a forerunner of the child’s development of language. Langer believed that lalling is instinctual.

Meltzer discusses five factors which are necessary for the healthy development of language. Disturbances of one or more of them, which can sometimes work together, are the factors, according to Meltzer, which cause speech disorders (or what he calls ‘mutism’) in mental illness. The five functions are as follows (Meltzer et al, 1975, pp. 193-194):

a) "It is necessary for mental functioning to be sufficiently ordered for the formation of dream thoughts suitable for communication by some means, and not merely requiring evacuation."

Thus the patient who failed in this would be resorting to intrusive identification rather than projective identification. Realistic projective
identification would not be possible as a means of communication. It would be attacked as described by Bion in 'On Arrogance'. Dream thoughts are similar to Segal's symbols and Bion's alpha-elements.

b) "There must be an apparatus for transforming dream thought into language; this apparatus consists of internalized speaking objects from whom and in identification with whom (whether by a process of narcissistic or introjective identification) the musical deep grammar for representing states of mind can be learned."

Bion (1967, p.41) comments that the compressed nature of psychotic speech was more appropriate to music than verbal communication. Meltzer goes further and sees this 'musical' aspect as a developmental precondition for verbal thought. This is in line with Bion's move towards seeing projective identification not as a psychotic mechanism per se but as a primitive precondition for verbal communication (Bion, 1967, p.92). Segal (1981, pp.57-58) makes a similar point to Meltzer.

c) "In the early years, when the lalling impulse is still strong, the child must build up a vocabulary for describing the outside world so that he may develop a virtuosity in superimposing this surface, lexical language upon the deeper, musical, language; and so be able to communicate about the outside world.

d) These internal transformations, inner speech, must find an object in the outside world which has sufficient psychic reality and adequate differentiation from the self, to require the vocalization of this inner process in order for communication to take place."

Here Meltzer comments on the importance for development and, in particular, linguistic development, of the separation of the self from the outside world stressed by Segal (1981, pp.49-65) in 'Notes on Symbol Formation'.

e) "The desire for communication with other human beings must be sufficient to sustain the continuing process of dream thought formation."

In this section, Meltzer is stressing the importance for intrapsychic object relations of interpsychic object relations. It is the contention of
the present author that an important part, but by no means the whole, of
the latter is accomplished in conversational interaction. Both Segal
(1981) and Meltzer et al (1975, p.192) point out that an important part of
intrapsychic object relations are in the inner mental activity of
verbalisation. Meltzer distills his model, discussed above, into a

"In the chapter on mutism [discussed above] I suggested a
two-tiered structure of language, one operating from the
depths of the unconscious for the purpose of transmitting
states of mind through the operation of projective
identification, while the other, more conscious, superimposes
words upon this deep music for the purpose of communicating
information about the outside world. Ecological studies
suggest that both of these operate in animals, mainly the
former in mammals and the latter in insects. Man has fused
the two and even, in his religious history, attempted to find
words for his states of mind. This theological prelude to
literature may have blossomed but it is clear that only a few
gifted individuals have ever mastered its subtle techniques."

Meltzer (1983, p.97) argues the case for a psychoanalytical view of
linguistics and questions the assumption made by some linguists that the
primary function of language is to communicate information. He
criticises the attendant speaker-as-encoder, hearer-as-decoder model of
language postulated by Jacobson and Halle, whom he cites. This criticism
relates to the two linguistic fallacies discussed by R. Harris (1981),
namely the 'telementation fallacy', that the purpose of language is to get
a message from inside of the speaker's head to the inside of the hearer's
head, and the 'fixed code fallacy', which is precisely the Jacobson-Halle
position. Meltzer (1983, pp.97-98) writes that this position "seems to pay
no heed whatsoever to the meaning of speaker-listener as two instances
in the life history of two organisms." Meltzer uses Bion's (1970,
pp.106-107) conception of words as containers of meaning to explain how,
in terms of the concrete reality of the internal world of phantasy,
meaning is created (Meltzer, 1983, pp.101-102).

"Thus we may recognize the primal combined object, breast
and nipple, as truly the source of knowledge, since thinking
is an unconscious mental activity whose scene is the baby-breast relationship; that is, internal teaching means that the breast knows everything, in a categorical sense. It is omniscient, contains all knowledge - not of course in terms of external reality but as a category of meaning in psychic reality. The words, given as empty containers by external objects, are filled with meaning by the internal breast. But this is a life-time process by which experiences may be assimilated to fill with meaning the verbal categories in ever-expanding levels of abstraction. The filling of old words with new meaning need never destroy or even overwhelm or obscure their old meaning, so marvellously contextual in actual language usage is the selection of the particular aspect of a word's multitudinous contents."

This view of meaning creation as accomplished by communicating in the internal world mirrors Sack's view of conversation (1972) as creating meaning in the external world by membership categorisation, which is discussed in Chapters One and Three of this thesis. Sack's notion is similar to that of constant conjunction discussed by Bion (1967, pp.118-119). Meltzer (1983, p.106) distinguishes between

"the use of language as a mode of operation of projective identification - that is, for the communication of states of mind - while words are used for the transmission of information from mind to mind. The former involves a degree of regression to narcissism in that object-self boundaries are in some measure surrendered or obscured for the moment."

Meltzer's views need reformulating, however, in terms of speech act theory. First external world linguistic communication does not have to be accomplished by verbal means only; intonation, for example, can be important in making sentences less ambiguous. Secondly, it would be inaccurate to say that external world linguistic communication transmits information from mind to mind; rather it performs complex speech actions on the subjects' knowledge representations of the external world. Both these points are illustrated in Labov and Fanshel's (1977) speech act analysis of a conversation. Thirdly, language as a mode of operation of projective identification in the communication of states of mind would also involve action, but this time on the internal world. It would not, however, be the sort of action that is destructive of mental states and
communication, the link between minds described by Meltzer et al (1982) as intrusive identification. Fourthly, words would also be involved in the communication of states of mind by projective identification, lexical choice being an important way of inducing emotional states of mind in other people. In summary, both parts of Meltzer's important distinction involve action. External world communication need not be solely lexical, while internal world communication need not be solely non-lexical.

One task facing the Kleinian conversation analyst is to distinguish, in any given conversation, external world communication, communication by projective identification, and the destruction of communication by intrusive identification using language, as described by Bion (1955). Another task is to hypothesise about the content of the unconscious phantasy which underlies our speech at all times. Meltzer (1983, p.110) points out that "language in its truest meaning is a process that emerges from unconscious phantasy". The following lengthy quotation from Meltzer (1983) explains his complicated view on grammar and language (pp.108-109):

"I suggest that language is primarily a function of unconscious phantasy which employs projective identification as its mode of communication. The substance of its communications are states-of-mind. Its means of communication are fundamentally primitive, namely song and dance. As its motive is the communication of states-of-mind, its information content relates primarily to psychic reality, and thus to the realm of experience relevant to art, religion, courting and combat. The subtlety of its content as regards range and intensity of emotion, complexity, levels of abstraction and logical operations, is such as can only be approximated verbally by the poet. Its history must, of course, have antedated verbal language by innumerable millennia and have reached the present level of development at a time in prehistory when communication of information about external reality was still limited to pointing. This same sequence is repeated in childhood development where the elaborate communication between mother and child, consisting of sound and gesture approximating to song and dance, stands in marked contrast to the difficulty of pointing-and-naming in regard to the facts of external reality."
We are thus suggesting a two-step theory of language development: a first step consisting of the realization by the child of its instinctual capacity for inner language, for the internal and external "public-ation" (Bion) of states-of-mind; and a second step consisting of the adaptation of this language to the description of external reality by means of verbalization, meaning the delineation of morphemes within the "strings" (Chomsky) of phonemes."

Meltzer (1983, p.110) goes on to emphasise that language is one, but only one "of the many possible symbolic forms by which cognition may objectify itself through and in the action of the mind" - a central contention of this thesis.

Meltzer (1983, p.112) summarises his linguistic theory in the following way:

"We seem therefore to have elaborated a two-tier theory of speech; that it consists of a system of vocalization as the publishable symbolic form of one current of unconscious phantasy, and therefore of thought; and that this vocalization lends itself as verbalization to a notational system for the communication of information about the outside world. Accordingly we think that grammar is also two-tiered. Depth (unconscious) grammar includes the phonemic-morphemic elements of vocalization in all its musical (including the postural and mimed aspects related to dance and dramatization) as well as the logical operations of syntax which are implied in the juxtapositions contained in the unconscious phantasy sequence. Surface grammar contains all those modifications of vocalization which the communication of information about the external world requires in order to minimize the many possible forms of ambiguity - and therefore confusion.

Colloquial speech is poorly equipped for this latter task and is notoriously "agrammatical" in the sense of a surface grammar. But correspondingly, speech which is grammatically correct in this surface sense is notoriously poor for the communication of states of mind. Dare we suggest that the technical skill of the poet resides exactly here, in the bringing together of depth and surface grammars."

Thus the song-and-dance aspect of language is expressed through projective identification for the communication of states of mind arousing the co-interlocutor empathically to feel one's own feelings, as a mother does in reverie.

Meltzer emphasises the fact that phantasy is a process that goes on continuously, awake and asleep, giving meaning to our internal and
external interactions. He points out (1983, pp.88-89) that this was a natural progression when analysts moved from the reconstructive-retrospective method of psychoanalysis to the more immediate study of the transference as a continuous process. Evidence for the continuous nature of phantasy (Meltzer, 1983, p.148) is the continuity between dreams on the same and successive nights. These views of phantasy follow on from Isaacs (1948) and from Klein. However, for Meltzer, phantasy is the basis of the song-and-dance level where the deep grammar of communication takes place through projective identification.

The implication of Kleinian ideas for linguistics

Whereas Segal believes that words are important for internal reality, Meltzer sees them as mainly for the communication of external reality while the more primitive or musical aspect of language is about the communication of internal phantasy. However, although language is only one of the symbolic forms through which ideas are communicated, it is certainly one of great interest, as demonstrated by the way in which, for example, the psychoanalytical method has it as its largest component. Liberman (1966) [translated from the Spanish for me by Giovanni Carnibella], a psycho-analyst influenced by Klein, talks of "the latent content of verbal associations". Meltzer (1983, p.46) says that all our external relationships have a transference quality, and this must be even more true of intimate relationships where one of the important things that people do in a relationship is converse. As such one would expect the shared phantasy that Meltzer talks of to be expressed in the symbolic form of conversation. He uses the verbal description of a case by one of his supervisees as an example of dream-like material (Meltzer,
Returning to Klein, O'Shaughnessy (1975) writes of her technique (p.420):

"Also characteristic is her own unhesitating acceptance of speech, play, action and dreams as equally, often interchangeably, expressive of the unconscious, and the detail and abundance of her reports of the child's talk and play." (My emphasis)

Thus speech is one way in which the internal world of emotion is displayed and worked on. Few would deny that communication is a vital part of our intimate relationships, but linguists have left out the most vital area in understanding the intimate part of our relationships, namely our emotions. All our external relationships have a certain transference quality and derive meaning from the emotional relationships of our internal world, although obviously some relationships are more intimate than others. Meltzer (1983, p.46) writes:

"Our passions are the meaning of our intimate relations, and our other relationships at the contractual and casual levels contribute nothing to our growth and development. It is only in our intimate relationships, where our passions are engaged, that we can experience the conflict of emotional meaning which nourishes the growth of the mind."

Linguists tend to represent communication as operating largely or even exclusively through social cognition, what Meltzer would call the contractual and casual levels. For example, the work of Grice (1975, 1978) on pragmatic implications in language, which has been influential in linguistics, concentrates on what Meltzer calls the contractual level. Even in linguistic analyses of overtly intimate conversation, such as that between husbands and wives, emotion tends to have been ignored. An example of this is Kreckel (1981). Equally, it seems perverse for psycho-analysts interested in emotion to ignore the tool of their trade, namely, spoken language.

In her paper 'Growing points in psycho-analysis inspired by the work of Melanie Klein', Martha Harris (1982) writes (pp. 165-166):
"These [reviews of Mrs Klein's achievement] show how Melanie Klein's work brought psycho-analysis out of a preoccupation with pathology and pathological clinical entities into what one might think of [as] a new and more profoundly based study of developmental psychology and of human relationships."

It is suggested that one direction in which this theory should grow is towards the investigation of the expression of phantasy and the emotions in everyday conversation. For, as Meltzer, Isaacs and others have pointed out, unconscious phantasy is going on all the time, even as we speak.

Meltzer writes (1983, p.67):

"One of the implications of this is that dreams are experiments; that the dreams patients bring to analysis are sometimes successful and sometimes unsuccessful - but not in the sense in which Freud meant this, for he considered that a successful dream kept the dreamer asleep and that an unsuccessful one woke him. I would suggest that the use of these terms in the sense that a successful dream solves the problem and an unsuccessful one does not."

Dreams, therefore, are attempts to solve problems of the internal world of phantasy. When subjects are awake they need to concentrate on the problems of the external world, thus leaving the internal world of phantasy largely unconscious. The problems of the internal world, however, need attending to as well. The time when consciousness as the organ of attention does not have to concentrate on the external world, is when the subject is asleep, thus freeing him or her in the dream-process to concentrate on solving the problems of the internal world. These problems need not be catastrophic - although they may be; often they will be concerned with day-to-day management. Problems of varying degrees will be occurring all the time in unconscious phantasy; they may be solved during the course of the working day or they may have to wait for a period of close attention in dreams. Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis have shown us that complex external problems, such as the management of turn-taking in conversation, are occurring all
the time. However, while they are often solved immediately in the normal course of events, time must sometimes be set aside to deal with them. People often need more concentrated problem-solving, such as metalinguistic speech, to clear up misunderstanding, as for example in industrial negotiations, and the sort of problem-solving taught by behavioural marital therapists (Jacobson and Margolin, 1979). It is proposed here that it is fruitful to look at three types or aspects of conversation; the verbal aspects of external world communication, internal world communication by projective identification, and anti-communication by intrusive identification; the last of these three being produced by Bion's 'negative grid' for the production of lies which is discussed and elaborated on by Meltzer (1986). How, though, is anti-communication, as opposed to communication, to be characterised? It seems that - as extrapolated from Meltzer on dreams - conversational internal world communication is successful insofar as it provides a solution of problems in the world of shared phantasy. Meg Harris Williams (1985, p.33), another Kleinian, writes:

"Probably Wilfred Bion's major contributions to psychoanalytic theory have been in the area of thinking about thinking. He describes the operation of a mysterious process which he terms 'alpha-function' upon primitive emotions, to create a foundation for 'dream-thoughts' eventually resulting in creative communication". [my emphasis]

The deployment of dream thoughts into the outside world of conversation is one sort of creative communication. This would be the aspect of conversation which operates at what Meltzer calls the intimate level of relationships. External world communication would be successful insofar as it provided a solution to external world problems; this is communication at the contractual level of relationships (Meltzer, 1983, p.46).

The congruence of internal objects in intimate relationships leads to a communal phantasy, a shared internal drama. This is expressed
symbolically in many ways, an important aspect of which is tactile or sexual. However, the intimate level of conversation is also an area where this phenomenon occurs. For example, external world objects referred to in an anecdote can symbolize internal objects. Conversation can thus function as a shared dream-life, but for it to function in a healthy way the phantasy component must be distinguished from external world reality.

Turning to intrusive identification as an attack on communication: this is not just failed communication in the sense of not having solved internal world problems, it is the use of utterances as objects (cf. Segal's definition of symbolic-equations discussed above) to distort communication, sabotaging the solution of problems with lies. This happens in marital rows where even the literal truth, for example the 'confession' of an affair can be used to attack communication in a deceitful and destructive way. Jokes are also often used in this way. Meltzer (1983, p.87) described the contrasting process at the intra-psychic level that it is being claimed happens in the inter-psychic level of shared phantasy.

Meltzer (1986) explores the workings of intrusive identification with respect to certain concepts of Bion's: the negative grid, transformations in hallucinosis, reversal of alpha-function, and minus K. These concepts refer to various forms of interaction which are characterised by an attack on communication, knowledge of the truth and thought, and which represent internal and thus external object relationships in the paranoid-schizoid position. They are related to symbolic equation, where words and symbols are experienced as persecutory material and hinder verbal thought and communication. The basis of all these phenomena is intrusive identification in the paranoid-schizoid position.
Meltzer's process theory of emotion

Meltzer (1986) develops a theory of emotional dynamics which the Kleinian linguist could apply to everyday conversation. In a personal communication (April, 1985), he says that he thought the ideas were applicable to intimate conversation and goes on to explain that by intimate he means when the subjects are treating each other as individuals rather than as members of a group. Meltzer (1986, p.46) demonstrates that emotions are at the root of our intimate relationships. Thus, Kleinian psychology is an excellent one for the purpose of this study. What is claimed, however, is that all conversation has intimate and thus emotional aspects to it, just as all conversation has contractual and casual aspects to it. It is the strength and importance of each of these aspects which varies in each particular piece of conversation. As Meltzer (1986) writes (p.10):

"It is useful to be able to demonstrate that the Bionic "level", or the possibility of viewing psycho-analytical transactions from the Bionic vertex, is there in every consulting room. Indeed why limit it thus? It is present in every personal interaction." (My emphasis)

Thus it is maintained that although the Kleinian linguist would always have something to say about any piece of conversation, he or she would have much more to say about some than about others. Some quotations from Meltzer (1986) will amplify this position. He writes (p.26):

"An emotional experience is an encounter with the beauty and mystery of the world which arouses conflict between L, H and K [points of view on the world motivated respectively by, love, hate and knowledge], and minus L, H and K [an attack on these views of the world]. While the immediate meaning is experienced as emotion, maybe as diverse as the objects of immediate arousal, its significance is always ultimately concerned with intimate human relationships.

I have slipped in some new words, 'significance' and 'intimate', which must be justified. It has already been fairly clearly indicated that I am taking 'meaning' to imply a complexity of perceptual experience that is beyond the scope of explanation by causal modes and must be explored by imagination using symbolization as its first move; that having departed from the finite world of causality 'meaning' sets sail
on the infinite sea of the universe of discourse where nothing can be proved, nothing is correct or incorrect. The only parameter of differentiation must be highly individual: either it interests you or it does not. 'Yes, that point of view is interesting but this one I find more so!' It is a realm where belief is capitulation, 'so far and no further', on this sea of discourse and exploration; where the claim of being 'right' betrays the slip into minus K."

What Meltzer says can be read as an affirmation of the constant and creative assignment of meaning to words in the course of conversations. Meltzer also implies that there is always a possibility of extending and revising one's sense of meaning. For example, the more relevant context one knows about an utterance the more one will understand the meaning of it. This is not a skeptical position - that one can never know what an utterance means; quite the contrary, one can and does, but knowledge of meaning, like all knowledge, is provisional and the complacency of certainty is a denial of truth. Meltzer (1986, pp.26-27) continues:

"Talking of 'meaning' thus with emotion as its primary manifestation, 'significance' must be seen as its elaboration within the general picture of the world that imagination builds. Whenever an emotion gives birth to a new 'idea', a "catastrophic change" heralded by "catastrophic anxiety" (in Bion's language) is set in train, for the whole cognitive picture-of-the-world (Money-Kyrle) must be re-ordered to take the new idea into account. This gives some lead for understanding what factors set alpha-function into reverse [related to the Negative grid and discussed above], namely that a new idea's incipiency is suspected from the first whiff of catastrophic anxiety.

The term 'intimate' human relationships, on the other hand, is the realm I wish to reserve for the emotional experiences that set thought in motion. For convenience I might contrast them with areas that are so casual as to involve no emotion, or so contractual as to preclude spontaneous response. . . .

I have already briefly described the exterior armouring of social character acquired mindlessly by primitive modes of identification, training, mimicry, conditioning, etc. All intelligent animals train their young; some, like the timber wolf, very extensively. It is still necessary to survival, but stands in competition with the processes of emotional experience and learning from them through thought from which the picture-of-the-world is constructed by imagination."
This brief description will be quoted (Meltzer, 1986, p.23):

"Extending Freud's revelation of how little man knows himself Bion brings home to us how much of our lives is lived mindlessly, that is outside the area in which emotional experiences are accepted, observed and thought about through symbolization of the meaning of the emotions aroused [as in dreams intrapsychically and conversation interpsychically through shared phantasy discussed above]. Of course one could rightly say that survival would be impossible if we did not respond with mindless automatic obedience to cultural requirements. We would simply be killing ourselves and one another inadvertently all the time. And in fact people who are mindlessly, automatically disobedient do just that."

Behaviour therapists, concerned with the external world, are attempting to change that behaviour when it becomes problematic. In the above quotations, Meltzer is describing the function of emotions and the forms of thought and behaviour which deny them. This process theory of emotions is a necessary part of Kleinian linguistics, which would be used to explore the emotional dynamics present in conversational interaction. As shown in the previous section, the central mechanism of emotional communication is realistic projective identification.

Meltzer spells out very clearly, in the following quotation, how group behaviour, paradoxically intrapsychically as well as interpsychically, excludes creative thought of intimate relationships and is thus intractable to the psychoanalytic method, and so presumably to Kleinian linguistics. Meltzer (1986, pp.38-39) writes:

"But in this schema, this "imaginative conjecture" of his, the mentality of these primitive parts of the self differ very much from those processes which psycho-analysis has been designed to study. Just as the functioning in the BA group sweeps away the most important attributes of individual mentality, such as observation, thought, judgement, these primitive parts of the personality do their thinking with the body and obey laws that are closer to neurophysiology than to psychology. Correspondingly the members of the BA Group obey the dictates of the dominant basic assumption. Thought in its creative aspect, using all the varied apparatus which Bion attempted to describe through the Grid, container-contained, Ps <---> D, and transformations, finds no place in the mentality of the BA member who needs only the equipment characteristic of the computer to design the actions for which the Basic Assumption has programmed him.
Consequently it is a world characterised by degrees or quantities of excitation rather than the infinite variety of emotional nuances. It is a world of rules and measurements rather than of principles and qualities. Learning is instilled by reward and punishment and virtue is obedience. The great terror is expulsion from the group and the great reward is a place in the establishment of authority, perhaps eventually the top post. This top post of 'leader' stands in contrast to the ultimate development in the thinking mind of a 'mystic' part of the personality, as described by Bion in Attention and Interpretation.

Meltzer (1986, p.81) summarises the important relationship between emotions and language:

"Feelings are at the heart of the matter. The authenticity with which we are able to entertain our emotions sets a limit to the sincerity with which we can express them, either by saying or showing. This extends to the whole range of our experiences and communications from the passionate 'I love you' to the trivial 'Rather cold today', from the embrace to the handshake, from awe at thunder to irritation that the tap is dripping."

The dramaturgical model in Kleinian linguistics

Meltzer (1983, p.38) describes the internal world as a place where the relationships of the inhabitants of this place generate the meaning that is deployed outwards into the external world. Goffman (1959) uses an explicitly dramaturgical model of the external world and the meaning creation processes going on within it. Meltzer's suggestion that the relationships going on within the drama of the internal world are deployed outwards, giving meaning to the drama of the external world, allows the Kleinian linguist to look at the relationship between internal world meaning and external world meaning. Splitting, an operation in phantasy, is the basis of membership categorisation, the process by which external reality is parsed and given meaning. The central human experience is the emotional experience of the internal world. Meltzer (1983, p.29) writes:

"If we return for a moment to the question of language and other symbolic forms by which human beings attempt to communicate their experiences of the world to one another, we will find ourselves taking the view that all of these
modes of communication are to be understood as ways of talking 'about' the central emotional experience. We will be assuming that attention is deployed either towards or away from these experiences and that attention is the tiller by which we steer the organ of consciousness about in the seeming world of psychic qualities."

Thus we are talking about emotional experiences even when consciousness, whose special province is attention, is directed towards the external world. Meltzer (1983, pp.25-26) makes the point ontogenetically that language development is a function of emotional relationships. This view is also supported by Isaacs (1948), who argues that thinking in the external world is supported by unconscious phantasy.

Meltzer expands on his idea of the internal world of unconscious phantasy as a metaphorically dramatic one, which the present author claims to be the underlying process behind Goffman's (1959) metaphorical drama of the external world. Meltzer (1983) writes (p.92):

"The distinction between the dream process and the observation of this process raises the problem which we have metaphorically described as the 'theatre for the generating of meaning,' and it may be useful to follow this image in defining the varying roles of different parts of the personality vis-a-vis any particular dream as well as the geographical locality of the dream action.

... We could arrange a table of organization of our theatre, a hierarchy of participation: critic, audience, producer, director, character parts, ingenue, male lead, female lead. Perhaps in the Brechtian spirit we could add "the Gods", descending occasionally to evaluate the progress of these mortal children."

The notion of 'narrative continuity' of dreams (Meltzer, 1983, pp.148-155), leads on to the contention that dreams are a symbolic form of ongoing unconscious phantasy, dreaming being the state where consciousness, is deployed inwards. Thus it is suggested that unconscious phantasy is a generative theatre of meaning which gives meaning to our everyday lives, and that dreams because of our access to them help us to manage and solve daily problems which occur in this underlying
unconscious phantasy. Isaacs (1948, p.112) writes: "... unconscious phantasies exert a continuous influence throughout life."

In this much earlier paper, Isaacs includes material suggestive of Meltzer's later formulations. She writes (Isaacs, 1948, pp.105-106):

"The visual externally referred elements in phantasy become relatively de-emotionalized, de-sexualized, independent, in consciousness, of bodily ties. They become 'images' in the narrower sense, representations 'in the mind' (but not, consciously, incorporations in the body) of external objects recognized to be such. It is 'realized' that the objects are outside the mind, but their images are 'in the mind.'

Such images however, draw their power to affect the mind by being 'in it' i.e their influence upon feelings, behaviour, character and personality upon the mind as a whole, from their repressed unconscious somatic associates in the unconscious world of desire and emotions which form the link with the id and which do mean, in unconscious phantasy, that the objects to which they refer are believed to be inside the body, to be incorporated."

Meltzer (1986, pp.175-186) develops his notion of 'the generative theatre of meaning' in a way which is of interest to the Kleinian linguist. He also makes a comment, of interest to the conversation analyst, that suggests that Bion's work would be useful in studying the nature of the meaningless verbal attack of intrusive identification that occurs in marital rows. Alpha-function has as its underlying mechanism projective identification, whereas intrusive identification underlies beta-elements. Meltzer (1986, p.175) writes:

"The theory of alpha-function and beta-elements has already proved itself fruitful for clinical observation in the area of communication of meaningful messages versus communication-like missiles of meaningless stuff."

Returning to 'the generative theatre of meaning' Meltzer gives a developmental account of this, after discussing some observation material in which, in a 'lalling' way, the child moved from private language to conventional language, Meltzer (1986, p. 179) writes:

"The 'private' period of speech in this child suggested ... that lalling constituted play with sounds in the mouth treating the sounds as objects of imaginative manipulation..."
as an extension, the small child's tendency to put objects in the mouth...

His play in his mouth with sounds seemed to parallel his play with objects, not merely as commentary on that play but as an alternative theatre of phantasy manipulation. The conceptual formulation which might be drawn - and this is the heart of this paper - would be as follows: lalling is seen to be the vocal aspect of a more general phase in cognitive development in which the physical space of the oral cavity is utilised as a theatre of phantasy and play, a mid-point between external play and internal thought (dream-thought or phantasy). The placing of fingers and objects in the mouth is accompanied by the awareness of teeth, tongue, jaws, salivation and vocal capacity. In this theatre of phantasy the sounds can be manipulated as concrete objects devoid of fixed or determined meaning but rather deriving [sic] their meaning from the immediate juxtaposition with other sounds and buccal objects. When the child moves on to accept the conventional meaning of words in the discourse that he achieves through various forms of identification, this buccal theatre is moved outside the body because manual dexterity improves and play becomes less frustrating. But the tendency to employ the buccal theatre continues in the form of play with words based on homonymity, splitting and recombination of syllables, spoonerisms, puns, alliteration, ambiguity - in short all the devices of poetic diction."

This idea is similar to that of Winnicott's (1958) notion of transitional space, but with the emphasis on the mouth being included. Previous work that corroborates this comes from Isaacs and Bion. Isaacs (1948, p.109) writes:

"It is a familiar fact that all early learning is based upon the oral impulses. The first seeking and mouthing and grasping of the breast is gradually shifted on to other objects, the hand and eye only slowly attaining independence of the mouth, as instruments of exploration and of knowing the outer world."

Bion (1962, pp.90-91) also writes of K, the vortex of knowledge:

"Although K is essentially a function of two objects it can be considered as a function of one.

The earliest and most primitive manifestation of K occurs in the relationship between mother and infant. As a part object relationship it may be stated as a relationship between mouth and breast. In abstract terms it is between contained and container...

In K, L and H [knowledge, love and hate] being factors and therefore subordinate, [contained] is projected into [container] and abstraction, of a type that I shall use the term commensal to describe, follows. By commensal I mean
contained and container are dependent on each other for mutual benefit and without harm to either. In terms of a model the mother derives benefit and achieves mental growth from the experience: the infant likewise abstracts benefit and achieves growth.

The activity that I have here described as shared by two individuals becomes introjected by the infant so that the [contained - container] apparatus becomes installed in the infant as part of the apparatus of alpha-functions. A model is provided by the idea of the infant who explores an object by putting it into his mouth. What talking was originally done by the mother, possibly a rudimentary designatory function is replaced by the infant's own baby talk.

(Bion used symbols in the text where I have used, in brackets, the words 'container' and 'contained')

In the above quotation from Meltzer (1986, p.179) he talks about the buccal theatre for the generation of meaning moving outside the body, as Isaacs implies, and to the transitional phenomena of play described by Winnicott. But in addition to moving outside the body, the buccal theatre is also moving inside the internal world as the basis for an adult generative theatre of meaning, as described by Meltzer. It is this internal space which gives meaning to both the transitional phenomena of play, analysed as functioning like dream thoughts by Kleinian child analysts, and, subsequently, adult social behaviour as described by Goffman. The dramaturgical structure of external social reality and its homomorphism with the internal world is evidence for the suggestion that the social world in general has its intimate aspects, given meaning by the internal world and this is certainly true for intimate relationships. Bion's description of the alpha-function emphasises that it is introjected by the infant and installed in it. Thus, if the buccal theatre, as described by Meltzer, corresponds with alpha-function, its most important development will be a movement in phantasy into the infant's body, rather than a movement outwards, in reality. This is clearly implied by Meltzer. Meltzer (1986, p. 181) writes:
"The present paper can be seen to straddle the concepts of two- and three-dimensionality and to attempt to fill in some of the 'emptiness' of the concept of alpha-function by defining a developmental space that is neither internal nor external in its implications, the 'Buccal Theatre for Generating Meaning' tracing its implications both for speech development and for character."

Meltzer (1986, pp.185-186) writes:

"I have framed a definitive hypothesis of a 'Buccal Theatre for the Generating of Meaning' as an early stage of internalisation and thought, and therefore of both internal discourse and external communication. In doing so I have perhaps added a certain definition and complexity to ideas put forward some years ago by Hanna Segal about a "third area" and by Donald Winnicott about the nature of "transitional objects". . . . But the most important implication for understanding child development probably lies in the implication that the evolution from the song-and-dance level of deep grammatical discourse of babbling and babbling, to the lexical level of social communication, is dependent on the move forward from a Buccal Theatre to a Dream Theatre for the generating of meaning. This means that the differentiation of external and internal worlds is essential for understanding that if you want your thoughts to be communicated, you must vocalise them, a hard lesson for many to learn".

A deep grammar for the communication of states of mind by projective identification is overlaid by a surface lexical grammar for the purpose of communicating about external reality.

**Kleinian Linguistics: Conclusion**

To conclude this section on Kleinian linguistics, Klein's early notion of epistemophilic instinct will be re-examined. It was claimed that later ideas, particularly those of projective identification as the basis for communication, were present in this notion. However, she conceived of this idea when concentrating on infantile sadism and dropped it when she became more interested in the interplay between love and hate. Meltzer reworks the notion of epistemophilic instinct particularly at the point of this interplay, distinguishing projective identification as a form of knowledge seeking and intrusive identification as an attack on it. Meltzer (1986, p.182) writes:
"The view that differentiates active and passive attention, 'penetration of' from 'envelopment by' the object, also draws a sharp line between intrusive curiosity and thirst for knowledge. It rectifies a serious error in Melanie Klein's earlier work, drawn largely from experiences with psychotic children and only partly corrected in the Narrative of a Child Analysis, in which she took the view that the 'epistemophilic instinct' was driven by sadism towards the contents of the mother's body. That intrusive curiosity which seeks the faults and defects of the object, stands in marked contrast to the awe and wonder at the beauty of the world which seeks to know and be known by the object. This distinction, which seems so often to separate science from art, holds more correctly for the difference between pornography and art on the one hand, and between Promethean and inspired science on the other.

Thus, the reworked notion of epistemophilic instinct in terms of both the projective identification of thoughts between mother and infant and the intrusive identification which would attack this link, can, through the notion of transference, give meaning to the difference between what Meltzer (1986, p. 175) calls the communication of meaningful messages and communication-like missiles of meaningless stuff.

Meltzer (1986, p. 206-207) writes:

"Similarly Melanie Klein's loyalty to Freud's formulation of the duality of instinct caused her simply to by-pass the problem and explain away the evident ambivalence implicit in the epistemophilic instinct on the basis of frustration. This attitude is a bit surprising, considering that she knew very well that a certain optimal level of mental pain (frustration, persecution, envy etc.) is necessary since development is driven by tolerable conflict.

... The problem area that the key of symbol formation was called into play to open, was the enigma of the inside and the outside of the aesthetic object. Its power to evoke emotionally was only equalled by its ability to generate anxiety, doubt, distrust. While the sensual qualities of the aesthetic object could be apprehended with some degree of confidence, its internal qualities, being infra- or supra-sensual, carried no such comfort. Here observation needed to be coupled with thought and judgement, and judgement depended greatly for its firmness on experience. For it was in the matching or disparity of this outside and inside of the object of awe and wonder that its value for good and evil must surely reside. But the baby's experience is almost nil. How is it to exercise such judgement? It cannot; it can only wait to see what will happen next."
The adult speaker may, in a sense be, in the same position as the baby. No matter how much we may have learnt from experience, from the inside of the aesthetic objects, from the people with whom we are intimate, we must allow their meaning to come as a surprise. And, as Meltzer (1986, p.186) says, people must vocalise their thoughts in order to be understood, for meaning to be clarified. The lesson to be learnt here is that of the provisionality of knowledge in relation to meaning, although with the coda that, potentially at least, the more experience one has of the person one is speaking to, the more one is capable of understanding the meaning of their speech. Frustration about the absence of such understanding provokes the operation of intrusive identification.

Here is a final quotation from Meltzer, again on the epistemophilic instinct (p. 205):

"Melanie Klein's idea had been that interest in the inside of the mother, and thereby the epistemophilic instinct in general, had its origins in the intense emotionality of the mother-baby relationship..."

But somehow Melanie Klein's formulation of the factors operating to set the epistemophilic instinct in motion did not seem to be satisfactory. Her failure to differentiate between intrusive curiosity and thirst for knowledge as factor's in the little child's interest in the inside of the mother's body, weakened the conceptual fabric."

This criticism, however, refers to Klein's early work. What she and her followers, including Meltzer, have done is to give us the framework for understanding emotion as an operative factor in the human mind, indeed as what is probably the central factor. Moreover, emotionality has its roots in communication. Initially, the communication is between mother and baby, using the mechanism of projective identification. Later, it is between the central ego and the introjected whole internal object, using the same mechanism. With this as a basis, adult communication develops using both projective identification for communication between internal worlds and for what Meltzer calls lexical
communication for structuring the external world. For reasons that are discussed above, what Meltzer calls 'lexical communication', the present author would suggest, is better termed simply external world communication. This has been the province of classical linguistics. Thus, for the linguist, communication by projective identification would put emotionality at the centre of linguistic activity, with an inability to tolerate these emotions sabotaging it by intrusive identification. The aesthetic, creative experience is not solely the province of the artist; it happens between mother and child, and, at the intimate level, between speakers and hearers. In fact, we could never have understood each other, according to this account, without this aesthetic experience. Linguists have concentrated on external world communication in such a way as to exclude emotion as an important factor. Kleinians have shown us the way forward to correct this imbalance.
Chapter Five

BEYOND LABOV AND FANSHEL

In Chapter One, two approaches to the study of meaning creation in naturally occurring dialogue were considered, namely CA, with its central notion of preference structure, and Labov and Fanshel's (1977) DA, with their central notion of the request. The link between them was explicated in terms of the concept of membership categorisation.

Labov and Fanshel's (1977) 'Comprehensive Discourse Analysis' is an important and comprehensive integration of classical linguistics, incorporating insights from phonetics, dialectology and so on, together with a complex account of sociolinguistic interaction captured in their discourse rules. However, linguistic and conversational-pragmatic constraints greatly underdetermine particular locutions. This is where the present author would suggest that a psychodynamic theory is needed. The Kleinian notion of phantasy is particularly central here, as it is seen to be what gives symbolic activity such as conversation, its real meaning for speaker-hearer.

This chapter will present a critique, from a Kleinian perspective, of the commentary on a therapeutic interview in Labov and Fanshel (1977). Their discussion of the conversational material will be considered in the order in which they present it, and a Kleinian expansion will be given where it is necessary for the understanding of the underlying emotional dynamics. The discussion will cover the whole of Labov and Fanshel's text, divided into episodes following their own subheadings.

Episode 1 (Labov and Fanshel, Chapters Four and Five)

In this episode Rhoda, a patient suffering from anorexia nervosa, tries to display to her therapist that she has understood the basic
suggestion of the therapy, that one should display one's needs and emotions to relevant others, by reporting an episode in which she indirectly asked her mother to come home because she needs her. Labov and Fanshel's notion of request, or indeed the CA notion of membership categorisation, may provide a sociolinguistic mechanism for negotiating meaning change, but they fail adequately to account for the meanings created in the conversation. For example, on pp. 137-138 they discuss the interaction:-

1.3[a]R "But _ she lef Sunday, and she's still not home.
1.3[b]Th. "O-oh"
1.3[c]R "And ... I'm gettin' a little nuts a' ready".

They write of locution 1.3 [c]

"Armed with this sympathy [the therapists reinforcement in 1.3[b]], Rhoda now gives further external evaluation to emphasise first how difficult the situation is for her: And ... I'm getting a little nuts a'ready. She uses family language to express an important proposition from the standpoint of the therapy. Patients are encouraged to be in touch with their emotions and be aware of what they are feeling. Rhoda here expresses the proposition that she feels the emotion of frustration and confusion, which we will symbolize as (E1). She expresses this in family style, with at least three features that differentiate this style from the more neutral narrative in EV [Everyday style]. First there is the -in variant, contrasting with the -ing of 1.2[c]; second the expression, a little nuts, and third, the use of the postponed adverb already. This use of already is an element of Yiddish-influenced syntax in New York City speech, a direct translation of Yiddish shven, with the meaning of intensification."

This passage illustrates the detailed use of stylistics, syntax, morphology and dialectology in Labov and Fanshel's analysis of this locution. Phonetic analysis, particularly of intonation, is also used. An example of this is in their analysis of 1.3[c] (p.137). They also use syntax morphology and semantics (for example, p.148). Their interactional analysis uses a mechanism related to rule 27, the rule of narrative responses (p.109). The therapist in 1.3[b] is, in her reinforce, seen to be giving strong sympathetic support, leading Rhoda to give further evaluation of narrative by giving information on her emotional state, in family style.
From a psychotherapeutic point of view, this passage does not explicate the importance of the proposition that Rhoda should be in touch with her emotions and does not justify the centrality of emotional life in mental health. The Kleinian account of psychodynamics emphasises this centrality and the notion of the psychopathology of splitting could explicate the importance of being in touch with one's emotions.

More importantly, however, from a linguistic point of view they are not explicit about how they arrive at the proposition that they claim Rhoda is expressing, namely that she feels the emotion of frustration and confusion. The argument that she is providing a narrative evaluation by giving information on her emotional state can be explicated by the use of their arguments on narrative (pp. 104-110). However, their expansion of the actual words she uses does not seem to be adequately justified. While their expansion of her words is not incompatible with their interpretation, they offer no compelling external reason to believe it, although it is conceivable that this could have been provided by the therapist's comments on the interaction in the 'playback'. If they had a psychodynamic theory they might have plausibly been able to endow the words with their underlying emotional meaning. A Kleinian account might suggest an apparent continuity in Rhoda's mind between her present emotional state and that of actual madness, psychotic collapse. The Kleinian view of the role of the therapist might suggest that what they gloss as the therapist's strong sympathetic support in 1.3[b] is the therapist's acting as a container in phantasy for Rhoda's mad parts. Although without psychoanalytical knowledge, this account would remain hypothetical, the present author suggests that the explicit possession of a psychodynamic theory renders this account of the meaning of Rhoda's words more plausible than that of Labov and Fanshel (1977).
Of 1.4 and 1.5 of the transcript (p.143) they make the following comments

"The argument Rhoda is summarising seems to be only between herself and her mother, but we cannot forget that she is also defending herself before the therapist. If the goal of therapy is for Rhoda to establish her independence, Rhoda must demonstrate here that she is indeed an independent person."

A particular phantasy that may be present here is one that Kleinians believe to be crucial to the psycho-analytical process, that of the transference. This notion is congruent with and adds more meaning to Labov and Fanshel's account of this material. The implication is that Rhoda's therapist would have an emotional symbolic link with her external mother, in that they are both, to some extent, external representatives of her internal mother.

Another possibility is that Rhoda in deploying a manic defence to deny dependence on a good internal mother. This possibility is further suggested by 1.5[d] (p.143):

"R: But it seems that - I have jist - a little too much t'o do". Labov and Fanshel (1977) plausibly comment on this remark of Rhoda's (pp 143, 145):

"Rhoda asserts that her fatigue is not caused by any deep problem, but it is simply that external circumstances have given her more work than she can perform. In contrasting the present problem with the ones that occurred previously, Rhoda does not blame her mother: an impersonal situation is responsible for the role strain that she feels. Our interactional statement here registers the absence of interaction with her mother, since it is clear that she is not explicitly blaming her mother for this situation."

It is possible that this is a denial, in the transference of the value of the therapist, for as Labov and Fanshel (1977, p.54) state, "The fourth major theme of therapy is that a patient should 'be in touch with his emotions'."

Labov and Fanshel's discussion of the relation of 1.1.[a] (p.124) and 2.2[b] (pp.182-184) points to Rhoda's contradictory feelings towards her therapist. Similarly, by locating the source of her problem in external circumstances, she is distancing herself from her mother, this possibly being a
manifestation of a manic denial of dependence on her. Thus, the notion of
the transference, in terms of both her therapist and her mother,
representing her internal mother on whom she may be denying her
dependence, provides a link with what she may be implicitly saying about
her mother and her therapist.

In 1.7[a] Rhoda 'role plays' the way in which she would ask her
mother to come home

R: "Which would be that if I kept letting her stay there and didn't
say, 'Look - ih - I mean y' been there long enough,' I'd just
get tired and I - I'm not doing my school work right."

A question that may be asked is why did she choose this particular
formulation. As Labov and Fanshel (1977) write (p.149):

"it contrasts sharply with her actual report in that it is more
aggressive - much further along the aggravation side of the
aggravation-mitigation polarity."

They go on to say (p.151)

"In Rhoda's role-playing of 1.7, she takes a relatively strong
position in regard to her mother, reversing the normal situation
in which a mother would tell her daughter, 'You've been there
long enough.'"

The reason for this particular formulation is possibly to be found in the
phantasy of projective identification or, more likely, intrusive identification.
Rhoda seems to be, in phantasy, locating herself within her mother and
speaking through her mouth.

In 1.10 Rhoda tells of her response to her mother's sarcastic response
to Rhoda's request to come home (p.168)

"1.10 R: An-nd I said, 'Well, things are getting just a little too
much! [laugh] This is - i's jis' getting too hard, and . . . I.'

As in 1.5 which is discussed above Rhoda locates the problem in impersonal
terms rather than in terms of the intimate parts of the relationship
between her and her mother, again perhaps denying her dependence, in
phantasy, on an internal mother, as well as being unresponsive to the
attacking quality of her external mother. Labov and Fanshel write from their linguistic standpoint (p.168):

"This is quite different from the fluent interaction of 1.8, 1.9 and 1.11 to follow. The many indicators of tension resemble those we have seen in the interview style of 1.1: hesitation, glottalization, and silence. In addition, there is nervous laughter. Figure 21 displays these disturbances in timing, giving us an overall view of the defensive posture adopted by Rhoda. Her lexical choice also shows a great deal of indirection. Instead of saying, 'I have too much to do' she uses the vague pronouns things and it. These impersonal terms shift the focus away from herself. In addition, she uses such mitigating forms as just and a little too much."

It is possible to add to this orthodox linguistic account of Rhoda's use of language a postulate concerning a phantasy of hers about language. In her interaction with her therapist, words may be acting as a container, for example in 1.3[c] which is discussed above, where her words and her therapist may be able to contain the mad parts of herself. In contrast, in 1.10 in her conversation with her mother, the words she uses have a meaningless quality, her words and her mother possibly being experienced as a claustrum squeezing out meaning. The phrases 'too much' and 'too hard' possibly reflect the claustrophobia in this phantasy as well as in the external world situation that she seems to be trying, with very limited success, to describe to her mother. Labov and Fanshel in their account of this response (of Rhoda's) (pp. 168-170), concentrate on its interactive nature rather than on what may perhaps be the underlying meaning. An integrated account would consider both aspects, although sometimes they may contradict each other.

Episode 2 (Labov and Fanshel, Chapter Six)

In this episode, Rhoda reports how she challenges her Aunt to help with the housework. The notion of the transference is implicit in Labov and Fanshel's commentary on the caution of the therapist in making direct suggestions. The therapist says (p. 187): 2.2[f] Th: "Now what about Aunt
Editha, she doesn't help you in the house?” Labov and Fanshel comment on this (p.190):

“This reference to the involvement of Aunt Editha must inevitably be seen as a request for action, and the therapist is careful to mitigate this suggestion as much as possible. As always, she is aware of the fact that Rhoda’s response to direct suggestions may be disastrous.”

This point refers back to an earlier comment (p. 12):

“There is always the danger that any suggestion from the therapist about how the patient might direct herself in coping with her daily problems will create echoes for her of the treatment she has received from family members who manipulate her through cajoling, carping and derogation.”

This seems to suggest the notion of transference. However, such a suggestion would still miss an important aspect of this notion, namely that the therapist's actions do not merely resonate with the actions of external family members but also with internal actions. It is this aspect which accounts for instances where the therapist is treated as a parental figure even when she does not resemble external parental figures. This explains the contrast between Rhoda's response to her therapist as a container and her response to her mother as a claustrum. Labov and Fanshel’s account, in that it neglects phantasy, misses these possible links.

In their discussion of Rhoda's response 2.3 (p.190-191), Labov and Fanshel write (p.190):

"In 2.3 Rhoda uses many modes of expression characteristic of her family style. There are prosodic cues, which we group as an expression of tension: hesitation, self, interruption, whine. The message conveyed is that she is so choked with emotion at the unreasonableness of Editha's behaviour that she cannot begin to describe it accurately.

Our interpretation of the message conveyed by these signals of tension may appear to be subjective, our own intuitive reactions to the prosodic cues. However, our interpretation is not based on this isolated instance. At many points throughout this episode, and throughout this session, we find similar cues: choking, hesitation, glottalization, and whine. Rhoda regularly uses these signals to indicate helpless anger: she finds herself unable to cope with the behaviour of others that injures her and seems to her unreasonable.”
They might have felt more confident about their subjective responses, after all perhaps the most important data for the therapist, had they used Bion's observations on words as containers. He found, as discussed in Chapter Four, that in some cases the emotions expressed by patients were so strong that they could not be contained by the patient's words, which 'exploded' into a stammer. A similar process seems to be at work here with Rhoda.

In 2.3 (pp.190-191) Rhoda angrily describes why it would be fruitless to ask Aunt Editha to help around the house. They write in sociolinguistic-interactional terms (p.192).

"Rhoda is doing two things at great length, using many more words than are necessary. Rhoda attacks Editha's competence; in technical terms, she challenges her status as an adult and defends her own. Since Editha is not one of the parties to the immediate situation, we must interpret this attack in relation to what the therapist and Rhoda have been doing. It seems evident that Rhoda is responding to the unstated request for action in the therapist's question about Aunt Editha. She is building up a case to show how hopeless it would be to make such a direct suggestion. The overkill in her mode of argument is then to be understood as a reaction to this suggestion that she might have done something else to carry out the basic suggestion in therapy."

Here the notion of the transference may be useful, for Rhoda seems to be reacting with anger and exasperation to the therapist in the same way as she does to Aunt Editha. The suggestion is that the therapist and Aunt Editha are external representatives of the same internal object, probably maternal. Segal's notion of symbolic equation might be appropriate here, in that Rhoda might to a certain extent be confusing her therapist with Aunt Editha, and hearing her therapist's immovability on the basic suggestion of therapy as the same as Aunt Editha's immovability in 2.3 [c]. In a less disturbed transference the therapist may be a symbol proper of Editha.

"R: Now she could sit there an' the dust could be that thick and doesn't bother her" (p.190).
Further linguistic evidence that Aunt Editha and her mother and also probably her therapist represent the same figure in the transference is given in the following passage (p.199-200):

"We can also support the interpretation of Oh [to indicate surprise and heavy implication] by the parallels between Editha's challenge [2.7] and Rhoda's mother's challenge in 1.9. It was pointed out there that Rhoda is quite sensitive to the Oh, and when she retells Episode 1 she says the next time she will respond, "What do you mean, 'Oh'?""

In discussing her angry interchange with Aunt Editha which culminated in Aunt Editha giving her a 'funny look'. Rhoda says (p.202):

2.9d [b]: And I mean I didn' mean to, I didn't yell and scream.
2.9d [c]: All I did to her was that "That looks clean to you?"

They wrote (p.203):

"According to Rhoda, there was no basis in the interaction for the funny look that Editha gave her; in other words she denies entirely the highest level of interaction . . . , and shows Editha's behaviour as completely unreasonable."

However, Rhoda's words are used as forms of intrusive identification like yelling and screaming; evidence that she herself, at some level, accepts this is that she says in 2.9 [c] "all I did to her" rather than "all I said to her". This is action rather than communication (in the sense of intrusive action discussed in Chapter Four and not in the more general sense of speech acts).

Despite the undoubted fact that Editha is behaving in a way dissimilar to the therapist in the external world, there is evidence that both Editha and the therapist have the same meaning for her in the transference. She is challenging Editha as an adult and also challenging her therapist's therapeutic suggestion. It is possible that she is saying that her therapist is not a reasonable person to talk to in the same way that Editha is not. She claims in 2.9 [c] that Editha responded unreasonably to what was talk rather than action (although there is the claim made above that
this is not strictly what she believes). Her therapist in 2.4 [a] and 2.4 [b] links their talking in the therapeutic sessions with talking to Editha. Labov and Fanshel (1977) write (p.204):

"According to Rhoda, Editha's hurt look shows that . . . she is not a reasonable person that can be talked to; Editha's failure to respond to Rhoda's rejection of her accounting shows . . . that she is not competent to evaluate such situations and therefore not an appropriate person to deal with. Both of these messages challenge the validity of the therapist's suggestion that Rhoda ask Editha for help."

The lack of the psychodynamic notion of transference prevents them from making explicit the hypothesised connection between the therapist and Editha in Rhoda's mind. Although the therapist does not belong to a school which emphasises the transference as much as the Kleinian school, it will undoubtedly occur as a phenomenon in the therapy.

Labov and Fanshel write (p.207):

"Repression of emotion is a central problem for the therapeutic session as a whole. As we will see, the therapist believes that her main task is to overcome Rhoda's tendency to deny the underlying significance of her behaviour and to recognise her own emotions. When the therapist takes note of the anger that is passing back and forth in family life, she also notes the way in which this anger is concealed. We have observed above that the patient develops in the therapeutic session a style of reporting that is pseudo-rational, as if she could examine her own behaviour without feeling any emotions; but in her accounts of everyday life, the full range of emotion becomes evident in the quotations from family style. Part of the therapist's difficulty is that the very machinery used by normal, competent interactants can be used to obscure a person's own view of his behaviour. If a person cannot use indirection and mitigation, he is incompetent, but if he cannot recognise the emotions behind this behaviour, he is disabled in another way. Resistance to therapy may take the form of a refusal to read these emotions."

The notion of transference may be used to illuminate the account of resistance given above. It is not surprising that strong emotions are most manifest when Rhoda is talking in what Labov and Fanshel (p. 36) call 'family style'. It is here that the language is intimate rather than necessarily casual or contractual, an opposition made by Meltzer and discussed in Chapter Four. However, the therapeutic conversation is also
an instance of intimate dialogue, no matter how Rhoda may resist it. The point made by considering the notion of transference is that the therapist may represent the same internal family figures as her external family member. By resisting the efforts of the therapist, she is behaving in the same way towards her as she herself is to her mother and Editha. Resistance may also be a form of attack on the therapist congruent with her attacks on her mother and Editha, although accomplished differently according to differences in the external world figures. These attacks arguably have similar effects, rendering their recipients incompetent and childlike. The Kleinian notion of envy may be appropriate here. The present author would suggest that the therapist, Rhoda's mother, and Editha all represent an internal mother. Labov and Fanshel write (p.207):

"What the therapist sees is that Rhoda has again failed to get help from other members of the family. She did not get help from her mother and her aunt. The mechanism is not quite the same in the two cases; the end result is the same. It is an open question whether this mode of family interaction is a symptom or a cause of the family's difficulties, but the overall pattern is quite clear."

What this account leaves out, which a Kleinian would include, is the role of the therapist in this family interaction. In resisting the efforts of the therapist, she is failing to get help from her just as she does with members of her family, as was discussed above. Owing to external, social and contractual world considerations, the mechanism is not the same. A Kleinian account would probably locate these interaction patterns as symptoms, with the underlying dynamics of the internal world - possibly an envious attack on an internal mother figure - as the cause of the difficulties. The therapist points out (p.109) that Rhoda behaves towards Editha as her mother behaves towards her, to treat her as a helpless child. However, as has been discussed, it seems to be that Rhoda is also infantilising her mother and the therapist.
In this episode Rhoda reports a discussion with her aunt about her aunt not preparing dinner when Rhoda is at college late. The transference is implicitly recognised by Labov and Fanshel when they discuss 3.1, where the therapist role-models the ways in which Rhoda could behave co-operatively with Editha to solve mutual problems. They write (p.216):

"Although it may seem helpful and co-operative to model behavior in such detail, it can also be heard as "talking down" to or even being maternal towards Rhoda at this point."

Here they are recognising that the therapist can stand for other figures or, more accurately from a Kleinian point of view, stand for the same internal figures that the other external figures stand for. They recognise the congruence of the therapist's co-operativeness to the suggested co-operativeness of Editha; they also recognise that the therapist may be playing a maternal role for Editha. The present author believes that the Kleinian account of the internal world, and the hypothesised envious attack on Rhoda's internal mother, may give added meaning to Labov and Fanshel's account of Rhoda's response to her therapist's suggestions in 3.1. It is suggested that she is responding emotionally to the maternal aspect of her therapist. Labov and Fanshel write (p.217):

"Our interactional statement recognises that Rhoda responds to the therapist by giving the information requested in 3.1. It does not indicate a more important fact - that she has not yet responded to the therapist's indirect request for action; but the emotion that is signalled by her vehemence and confusion shows us that she does recognise the presence of this request."

The presence of the 'vehemence and confusion' is not just to be accounted for in such interactional terms. It is also to be considered in the more directly emotional terms connected with the maternal transference discussed above. They implicitly recognise this perhaps in their comment on p.216:

"the frustration and bewilderment that Rhoda shows in her response seems to show that she is reacting to this challenge. She is being encouraged and chided at the same time."
Encouraging and chiding are very maternal things to do.

In their discussion of 3.3, where the emotion of loneliness is the issue, they do use a psychodynamic concept, illustrating how useful a more psychodynamic approach might be if applied generously. They write (pp.218-219):

"Rhoda's narrative revolves, then, around propositions concerning an emotion - loneliness. The argument she is presenting concerns who actually feels that emotion [herself or Editha] . . . In therapeutic terminology, Rhoda is saying that Editha tried to project her own feelings of loneliness onto Rhoda. Without presenting any details or arguments, Rhoda tries to enlist the therapist's support at the outset, by assuming that she would share this interpretation."

What the present author is suggesting is that the direction of projection is from Rhoda towards her therapist. She seems to be trying to project her thoughts into her therapist's mind without speaking them. It is suggested that this may be an omnipotent manic defence, with Rhoda having the feeling that she can omnipotently control her therapist's mind. The confusion over who feels the loneliness may reflect the confusion over whose mind is whose, and if Rhoda can control her therapist's mind and the minds of others in the world, then she will be lonely, both in therapy and in the world in general. The Kleinian notion of projective (or what has been renamed - see Chapter Four - intrusive) identification lends added meaning to the relationship between projection and confusion of ego boundaries. For the notion is that of projecting the mind, or part of the mind, into another person. The therapist recognises this confusion, calling the family 'symbiotic' (p.223), pointing out that they feel they know each others' feelings. She says in a 'playback' commentary on this session (p.223):

"... you see they are so symbiotic in the family, they are constantly saying when she tells me, 'my mother and my sister thinks this or feels this', I say, 'What did they say?' . . . 'Did she say it? ... 'Is this what you think?' . . . 'Making the differentiation ..."
(cf. Meltzer's work on the notion of transformation in hallucinosis, Meltzer, 1986), they write (p.223):

"The therapist feels that Rhoda is not always clear about what she has said and what others have said. In the light of this kind of confusion, she is very reluctant to allow Rhoda to impose her interpretation upon reports of what others have said. The first step, in her view, is for Rhoda to be clear on what actually was said."

A lot of the therapist's work in Episode 3 is trying to help Rhoda to sort out phantasy from external reality.

Labov and Fanshel discuss Rhoda's use of narrative. In Chapters Four and Six, the use of narrative in Kleinian terms was discussed as a form of shared dream life. Just as a dream is an event to solve problems in the internal world of the individual, the anecdote can be seen to be solving shared internal world problems. The therapist seems to be concerned that Rhoda's anecdotes are 'effective' in solving these problems.

Labov and Fanshel (1977) write (p.226):

"However, Rhoda has hardly begun her first narrative event in 3.3 before she interrupts herself with a long series of evaluative remarks referring to the entire narrative. The last of these, 3.6 [b], is the interpretation that is challenged by the therapist in 3.7.

Rhoda's response to this challenge is to begin the narrative with an event which is not clearly located in regard to anything that she has said so far: a remark of Editha's. As the therapist repeatedly presses for clarification, Rhoda develops a whole series of narrative events that consist of interchanges between her and Editha. This account is plainly in response to the therapist's intervention, and is naturally suspect because it is a defense against the therapist's challenge. Rhoda finally satisfies the therapist by transforming her interpretation into a literal report of what Editha had said.

We have seen before that Rhoda's basic mode of argumentation is to use narratives to answer requests for information, suggestions and challenges. Here one can observe again that Rhoda uses narratives to argue abstract issues. This particular narrative must be seen as strongly determined by its use as a response to the therapist's challenge to Rhoda's competence as an interpreter. Whereas we have given arguments to support the narrative of Episode 1 as a reasonable account of what happened in Rhoda's family, this narrative might be looked at as a less reliable account because it is a response to the therapist's challenge."
The social interpersonal dynamics may be deepened if we consider the underlying emotional issues by seeing these narratives as shared 'dreams'. The problem they seem to be addressed to is sorting out what Meltzer (1967) calls 'geographical confusions' about blurred ego boundaries.

Labov and Fanshel (1977) write (p.226):

"The mechanism that the therapist uses to accomplish the reorientation of roles is of some interest to discourse analysis. Rhoda's narrative report in 3.9 [a] shows Editha using a very impersonal expression in which the local topic of 'not wanting to eat alone' is transformed for the first time, into the emotional predicate of 'feeling lonesome'. This is done in a very impersonal way, which does not attribute the emotion of loneliness to any one person: It gets sorta lonesome . . . Rhoda does not comment on this statement but prepares to go on with the factual account which we expand as 3.9 [b]: 'Like if I were to eat out in a restaurant'. This sentence must be reconstructed from 3.14 since the therapist intervenes with the request for confirmation in 3.9 [c]: She didn't say 'for you'."

There seems to be confusion in Rhoda's mind about who is feeling the emotion. The pronoun 'it' could be seen as a symbolic equation in Segal's sense, where the word 'it' is concretely felt to be containing the emotion that has been pushed into it using intrusive identification. Rhoda's impersonal account of eating out, may show that she does not want to stay 'at home' with her emotions. The therapist seems to be trying to sort out some of these confusions in 3.9 [c]. With respect to this they write (p.228):

"In this case, Rhoda's report of Editha's statement did not mention any person as feeling lonesome. It is obvious that Editha did not say, 'It gets lonesome for you,' (meaning Rhoda); when the therapist requests confirmation of this, she performs an act of interpretation."

The above Kleinian discussion of the confusions involved deepens the account of the emotional dynamics that the therapist is trying to disentangle.

The confusions about who feels what emotion seems to be connected to the mutually retaliatory nature of the paranoid schizoid position, which seems to be characteristic of this family's interaction. Instead of a request
for help resulting in help being given, it is experienced as making that attacker vulnerable to attack. This is not quite captured in the Labov and Fanshel's sociological account. They write:

"Members mask their emotional needs by indirect appeals. It is Editha who has appealed for help, and Rhoda, who, hears the request, recognizes what is being asked for. She then exacts a heavy price in return for help: Editha must admit that she is the one who feels lonesome. The confession of dependency lowers Editha's status; Rhoda now will show herself as independent and Editha as helpless."

Why should a declaration of loneliness by Editha make Rhoda independent and Editha helpless? This could be accounted for by the extremes of idealisation and splitting found in paranoid-schizoid position emotional interaction.

The transference is implicitly hinted at by Labov and Fanshel. They write (p.230-231):

"The final act in this series of interventions is the therapist's pointed comment on 3.11 [b]

3.11 [b] Th: Oh, so she told you

Our contextual expansion of the therapist's Oh draws its significance from the entire series of interventions: 'So that is what I expected, and different what you told me before.' The understanding that now emerges between patient and therapist resolves more than cognitive confusion: 3.11 [b] removes the conflict between therapist and patient in the proper allocation of their roles, and re-establishes the original solidarity of the two actors looking at the situation from the same point of view.

The reader may be struck with a parallel of the interaction between therapist and patient in the interview situation and the interaction between Rhoda and her aunt in the narrative. Just as it is important for Rhoda to make it plain who is asking who for help, so it is important for the therapist to make it plain what kind of statements Rhoda can introduce as given for the therapeutic work. Yet, while Editha has suffered a decline in her standing as an adult member of the household, Rhoda is in a more favorable position. It is now accepted that she has uncovered her aunt's subterfuge, and 'smoked her out'."

These suggestions are deepened if one asks why there should be a parallel between Rhoda's interaction with Editha and with her therapist, and the suggestion made from a Kleinian point of view is that the therapist and
Editha represent the same internal maternal figure for Rhoda in the transference. She seems to have been trying to 'be the therapist' and 'be the adult', infantilising both her therapist and Editha with respect to their different external world roles. This would be a manic defence, possibly inspired by Rhoda's envious fear of asking for help, both from Editha and her therapist. Further evidence of this infantilisation of Editha, made more explicit with respect to Rhoda's suggested phantasy of toppling her internal mother, represented by Editha herself, and possibly becoming her mother's mother in phantasy, is suggested by the following passage (p.232-233).

"An even stronger reference to Editha's dependent position is the heavy implication of would you like that. The heavy, even stress pattern of this intonation contour is shown in Figure 31. It can be identified impressionistically as the intonation that is used in placating a child who is asking for something unreasonable. Just as Rhoda's mother uses the intonation contour Oh Why-y? (Figure 4), so Rhoda challenges the adult status of Editha through the implication that Editha is behaving like a child. A speaker uses this intonation contour to agree with a request and yet make it plain that he is conceding to the other person's desires only because he is more mature."

The Kleinian account of phantasy gives reality to the 'impressionistic' remarks of Labov and Fanshel, and also adds further commentary. Labov and Fanshel make a point that implicitly suggests a maternal transference (p.233, footnote).

"The parallel between her response to Editha and her mother's response to her is quite striking."

**Episode 4 (Labov and Fanshel, Chapter Eight)**

In this episode Rhoda changes the subject back to that of her mother, and describes the events which led to her being away from home. The dynamics of the paranoid-schizoid position and the continuity of psychotic, neurotic and normal thought which are made explicit in the Kleinian account of psychodynamics are exemplified by the interactions discussed by Labov and Fanshel. However, without a psychodynamic theory, these dynamics cannot be spelled out. The phantasy of the retaliatory
parent, who will not take any challenge without fearful vengeance, is implicitly shown in the following quotation, discussing 4.2 [a] (p.251):

"This is an oblique, almost suppressed reference to the more powerful members of her family: they. These are her mother and her married sister who is living in household 2; they are members who have taken a superior position in criticizing her for being underweight, for not eating, and for not being able to take care of herself in general. Our expansion completes Rhoda's thought, drawing on information in other parts of the session. The important fact is that Rhoda censors herself, and does not pursue her challenge to whatever idea they have.

The reference to a generalized they indicates that the speaker feels the weight of forces aligned against her, powerful enough that it is best not to attack them directly. In extreme cases, such references indicate an unreal kind of paranoia; in the more ordinary cases like this, it expresses the polarity of the family and the power relationships which lie behind many of the dynamic developments in anorexia."

The suggestion of the present author is that a defence against these feelings is a denial of dependence on a good internal mother. It seems that she is terrified to admit dependence as this will open her up to emotional contact with an attacking internal figure. She appears to be denying the possibility of communicating internally by projective identification, a precondition to external communication. Perhaps that is why the patterns of emotional communication in the family are so bad. Equally, an assertion of independence could be seen as a challenge. The external members of her family appear to collude with this hypothesised phantasy. The following quotation shows how the hypothesised phantasy seems to work in relation to external figures.

"There is a class of people who are opposed to Rhoda's viewpoint, who deny that she is an adult, who deny that she can get along without her mother . . . The most pressing fact is that they must be made to understand that Rhoda is not being dependent on her mother by asking her to come home. Rhoda's hesitation and self-censorship indicate that she has not been able to formulate explicitly the kind of contradiction in which she finds herself, her demonstration of independence can still be interpreted as a sign of dependence."

Her parents and her sister seem to be acting as a claustrum for her feelings, rather than as a container. This may be connected to her
stammering in 4.2 which could be explicable in terms of Bion’s comments on stammering when the emotions are felt to be too powerful for words to act as a container for them. Labov and Fanshel write of 4.2 (pp. 252-253):

"Rhoda stammers, chokes, interrupts herself, and then bursts forth with extra heavy stress on the first available verb. She is dealing again with her central concern: to prove that she is independent, an adult, and free to make her own decisions. It's also clear that she feels powerful pressure from her mother and sister to establish the opposite."

A Kleinian account could connect aspects of what Labov and Fanshel call Rhoda’s basic position. They write (p.253):

"This restatement sums up Rhoda’s basic position, which the therapist must deal with: first, a blanket assertion of her adult status, and, secondly the transference of any blame away from family members to purely external, neutral circumstances. Rhoda suppresses direct criticism of her family and returns to the vague language of her everyday style, in which ‘it’ or ‘things’ is responsible for her problems rather than ‘they’.

What is being suggested is that internal communication by projective identification is being denied, in that Rhoda can manage completely on her own as an adult without the help of a good internal parent figure. This would require the blame to be moved from family members who would be representatives of internal figures, with whom connection is being denied, to external circumstances. The denial of communication with a good internal parent would lead to symbolic equation; hence the words have this concrete quality. They have the same function as the external circumstances in that they are confused with that part of the self projected into them, on which they have a concrete causal effect. This is a very different situation from that of a communicating family. It seems that Rhoda’s mother colludes with this way of interacting which is characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position. Labov and Fanshel write (p.271):

"We see that the basic mode of argument in the family transforms qualitative judgements into categorical statements. The mother’s position is that ‘I can’t leave Rhoda alone for a minute’. In the face of these categorical statements, it is hard for Rhoda to make the quantitative point that a day or two is nothing, but that three or four days is too much."
This is idealisation-and-splitting, characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position.

**Episode 5 (Labov and Fanshel, Chapter Nine)**

In this episode the therapist tries to help Rhoda understand some of the dynamics underlying her situation. In Labov and Fanshel's discussion of Episode Five they write (p. 279):

"Episode 5 moves into a sphere that is properly psychological, rather than sociological; the therapist will deal with emotions and responses to emotions, rather than with rights, duties, and obligations. The informally assumed knowledge of social relations will now give way to a fairly explicit understanding of the therapist's competence in dealing with unexpressed emotions. Furthermore, the discussion will show a new kind of complexity in that the therapist will make comparisons between past and future actions of a number of the parties concerned. The complexity of Episodes 1-4 lay in the network of personal obligations and events connecting the people concerned; now we will be dealing with internal actions and reactions and the consequences of these actions upon inner states."

It seems likely that here an account of internal world actions and reactions, as expressed in linguistic interaction, will be needed that is as detailed an account of the manifestations of linguistic interaction in external world sociological matters of rights, duties and obligations as Labov and Fanshel's rules of discourse are. For example, they say (p.279):

"Therapists themselves frequently describe their aims as 'trying to put people in touch with their feelings'."

This notion is explicitly discussed by Segal (1981, pp.57-58) in terms of the psychodynamics of internal world communication. Labov and Fanshel find need to use psychodynamic constructs; for example, they write (p.280):

"In Rhoda's case, the therapist is particularly anxious to avoid reinforcing a 'harsh superego', which is the product of her past relationship with her mother."

If they had had a psychodynamic theory, they would have been able to use the phrases 'trying to put people in touch with their feelings' and 'harsh superego' without putting them in 'scare ' quotation marks; their meaning would be an integral part of the account. Similarly, the Kleinian
development of the notion of transference would add meaning to the notion of 'reinforcing' in the above quotation, for insofar as transference was occurring, Rhoda's therapist and her mother would represent the same internal figure. A Kleinian account, the present author argues, is of more interest to the conversation-analyst than is the ego psychological model used by the therapist, because it is more concerned with the emotional dynamics present in the immediate conversational data (the main concern of the conversation analyst) than in past relationships with parents.

It would seem that, broadly, the whole force of episode 5 is that the therapist is trying to make Rhoda understand a parallel between her mother and her sister's emotional reactions to her, and her reactions to them. Both reactions, the therapist seems to feel, are based on anger. In 5.17[b], there is a suggestion from the therapist that Rhoda is 'reading in' emotions behind what they are actually saying. The phantasy of intrusive identification is related to what would be called in ego psychology, the mechanism of projection. This is perhaps the motif of episode 5. The phantasy seems to be that Rhoda is pushing her anger into her mother and her sister in order to deny it in herself. In terms of external world behaviour, she might be arousing the feelings of anger in her mother and sister, so that their reactions are consonant with the internal figure they represent. It is, of course, a matter of delicate balance whether the shared phantasies involved will be, on the one hand, that of projective identification into a container for the purposes of communication and understanding of emotions, as in maternal reverie, or on the other the destructive defense of intrusive identification into a claustrum for the purpose of denial of emotions. It appears that the interaction in this family consists mainly of the latter, where anger is, in the therapist's words, 'passing back and forth' (5.27 [c]) in a mutually retaliatory way characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position, to which the phantasy of
intrusive identification belongs. The anger seems to be passing back and forth in a covert and concrete way. They seem unable to accept and think about their own and other family members' emotions, as they would if they were using the phantasy of realistic projective identification for communication. This is suggested by Labov and Fanshel (1977) who write (p.283):

"In bringing out this parallel [between Rhoda's reaction to her family and her family's reaction to her], the therapist is operating on a tacit principle that it is always easier for a person to see unreasonable and aggressive behaviour on the part of others towards himself than to see the same pattern when he is the actor. The therapist wants to take advantage of the family's action towards Rhoda to help her recognize the nature of how own actions towards them. Rhoda refuses to see the point. Throughout the first four episodes, Rhoda has presented herself as a reasonable, matter-of-fact person, ignoring the overemotional reactions that she displays towards her sister and Editha, but she has not yet learned how to use this rationalizing style in talking about her emotions."

It appears that the therapist is trying to induce Rhoda to use her, the therapist, as a container, to accept and think about her anger, but does not as yet seem to have been successful.

As Rhoda's psychopathology is anorexia nervosa, one might expect that oral phantasies connected with the mouth and eating might be at the forefront of her material. This is possibly reflected in the way she uses words, which is related to Bion's notion that stammering occurs when emotions are too powerful to be contained by words. There may also be a pathological regression to Meltzer's notion of the 'buccal theatre' discussed in Chapter Four. Rhoda certainly does not use the devices of poetic diction to enrich meaning and communication, but she is perhaps using some defensive counterpart to obfuscate it (in the same way as intrusive identification is the defensive counterpart of projective identification). Labov and Fanshel write of 5.8 (p.292):

"The extraordinary number of self-interruptions are signals of considerable internal tension. Rhoda breaks off her references to two events that actually occurred, and sums up her situation
by a general statement about what her mother is bound to say if she ever confessed... that she felt tired.

In this indirect argument, Rhoda shows two ways of not saying what she means. First she interrupts herself, then she makes an oblique reference to the answer she will get without stating it explicitly."

The force with which Rhoda denies emotions and the actions consequent upon them is displayed in the almost certainly duplicitous 5.10, where she claims that her low weight is nothing to do with her not eating, that she ate for days with no effect on her weight. Labov and Fanshel (1977) write (p.295):

"Rhoda has not proved anything about her own desires and personal control on eating; the claim that she cannot help being thin means that some mysterious external circumstances are responsible. She has refuted the challenge to her claim to be an adult. She is not anxious to take advantage of the prerogatives of a sick person. Rhoda is far more concerned with avoiding the penalties of being sick and losing her claim to decide her own future."

Labov and Fanshel, like Rhoda, externalise the problem: Rhoda explains it in terms of mysterious external circumstances; Labov and Fanshel in terms of external role obligations. It is the contention of the present author that a psychodynamic explanation could supplement the sociological one. Rhoda, perhaps, has her feelings towards eating in a part of herself that is so split off that it is projected out of herself into mysterious external structures. These feelings are so dangerous to think about that, not only does she not allow them to remain within herself, her mind, but she cannot bring herself to mention them or give them any structure at all. They are not mentioned in 5.10 but must be inferred from her account. This splitting can be related to hypothesised attacks both on links with the therapist by realistic projective identification and on links between different parts of her material to which the therapist is trying to draw her attention, in order to give her insight into the situation. Labov and Fanshel point out that anorexia nervosa is characterised by argument through intrusive action, verbal or otherwise, rather than understanding a mode of relating that is
apparently characteristic of this family. The apparent resistance to her therapist's attempts to give her insight by linking material, and also to the basic suggestion of the therapy, that she should express her needs and emotions to relevant others, possibly reflect an attack on her link with her therapist through projective identification. From a Kleinian perspective, all these attacks on links - between members of the family, between Rhoda and the therapist and between parts of her material - could be seen as reflections of the internal split, of which they are external representations. She cannot communicate using realistic projective identification with split-off parts of herself and the external others that represent them. This account supplements that of Labov and Fanshel (1977), making more links and giving a psychodynamic account. They write (pp.295-297):

"This discussion of the central theme of therapy shows less indirection than anything we have seen before. The modes of expression, argument, and interaction are all quite direct, and we can see that this issue has been debated quite often in Rhoda's family. We also see a mode of argument that goes beyond verbal interaction - where disagreements are translated into actions. This is, in fact, the nature of Rhoda's neurosis. In anorexia the patient argues by reacting with her own body, converting her anger into actions that injure her family, but also, unfortunately, injuring herself. When Rhoda denies that she is doing this, she is also arguing against the therapist's analogy of 5.1. Whereas the therapist would like to show her that there is some reciprocity involved, Rhoda would destroy half of the comparison. She argues that her family is unreasonable to her, but that there is nothing unreasonable in the way she has behaved. As long as Rhoda makes this claim, it is impossible for the therapist to use the agreement that they have achieved in discussing the justification of Episode 1 - Rhoda's appeal for help - to achieve insight into Rhoda's own behaviour."

Rhoda seems to be pushing her own unreasonableness into her mother and sister and also into the therapist in the transference. She is thus experiencing her own as well as her mother's and sister's unreasonableness in their behaviour. This way of interacting is characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position.

In their discussion of 5.12, Labov and Fanshel make a direct allusion
to Rhoda's stammering, which can be given further meaning by Bion's account, which was mentioned above. They write (p.298):

"Rhoda continues the defence she began in 5.10, but it is not surprising to discover that she show a great deal more hesitation than she did before. The discussion of her lack of confidence is now reflected overtly in her verbal style. Even more significant than the multiple stammering is the suppression of reference to her responsibility."

It can be seen that an internal matter, her lack of self-confidence, is actually deployed outwards into her verbal style. The suppression of her reference to her responsibility for her weight loss could be seen psychodynamically as an outward manifestation of the degree of splitting from the central part of her personality, the part of herself that contains her feelings about eating and her weight. Again, this is manifested by the way her words 'explode' in 5.14[d] in response to her therapist's suggestion in 5.13 [b] that her inability to perform school and household duties have anything to do with her low weight. Labov and Fanshel (1977) write (p.302-304):

"This violent response [5.14 [d]] is the converse of the repressed [What] and illustrates dramatically the strain Rhoda feels in discussing this question. Our expansion and interactional statements follow quite regularly from the discourse rules already given. Rhoda's repressed question, 5.14[a], is a request for information embedded within the larger request for a position of 5.13 [the relationship between Rhoda's role difficulties and her low weight], and once the therapist provides this information, the request is automatically reinstated..."

As the therapist moves closer to her aim, the discussion of emotion, Rhoda denies what the therapist is saying using the same intonation as she used in her denial of the therapist's suggestion in the preceding quotation. She then launches into an attack on her family. When she stops 'attacking' the therapist's interpretations, Rhoda immediately turns her attention to attacking her family. Both these vehement denials of what the therapist is saying could be seen as an attack on the therapist in the transference. The present author suggests that both the therapist and
Rhoda's family are felt by Rhoda to represent, probably as claustrums, that split-off part of herself that contains her feelings about her weight. It seems that Rhoda might feel that the therapist and her family are the mysterious external circumstances. These are the hypothesised underlying dynamics behind what Labov and Fanshel (1977) write on pp. 305-306.

"Rhoda's response to the Socratic questioning of the therapist is to contradict immediately the therapist's presupposition that she has not been consistent in her position

5.16[a] Oh, I'm staying with it.

She uses the same falsetto squeal we heard in 5.14, but then, surprisingly enough, she turns in the direction the therapist is looking for: a discussion of underlying feelings (5.16[b] and 5.16[c]). . . .

On the surface, this discussion continues as a criticism of her family. Rhoda begins with the same kind of rapid condensation that we have seen before when she showed us how she had responded aggressively to her aunt (2.6 - 2.8). As Rhoda then recovers from this shock of the mention of her weight, she continues with an increasingly fluent denunciation of her family. She employs one of the resources of family language: a superimposed intonation that adds a meaning quite different from the literal interpretation of her words. 5.16[c] shows a series of alternating heavy stresses, producing a rhythmic, 'sing-song' pattern, which we interpret as ridicule directed at the speech being quoted . . . Rhoda does not mean to imply that this is the intonation pattern that her sister uses."

In 5.17[b], the therapist's interpretation is that what concerns Rhoda is not what her family are saying as much as the feeling that she is reading in behind what they are saying. She is pointing to a phenomenon that could be described psychodynamically in terms of symbolic equation, discussed in Chapter Four. The therapist seems to be suggesting that Rhoda is unable to distinguish what is said from the underlying internal states that they symbolise. Equally, she is suggesting that it is not her family's emotions that she is experiencing but her own. The basis for symbolic equation is intrusive identification. The present author's hypothesis is that Rhoda's phantasy is that her emotions are pushed into her family by intrusive identification, thereby attacking the possibility of internal world
communication by projective identification, a precondition for external world communication. This phantasy is deployed outwards in terms of her external family's not having meaningful words of their own to communicate with, but instead uttering words that have Rhoda's internal state pushed into them. This is, for the present author, an interesting example of intrusive identification as the basis for symbolic equation. The therapist also seems in 5.17[b] to be reflecting a 'paranoid' they in another context uttered by Rhoda in 5.16[b]. Of this Labov and Fanshel (1977) write (p.306):

"As we expand 5.16, we must deal with the pronoun they; this seems to refer to Rhoda's mother and sister. Yet Rhoda's ridicule is directed only at her sister, rather than at her mother, and the mocking intonation is superimposed on a statement attributed to her sister."

This highlights the blurring of ego boundaries in this paranoid-schizoid position mode of interaction.

In writing of the therapist's comment Labov and Fanshel highlight two lexical aspects. First, they highlight her use of the word 'really', to establish two levels of reality: internal world of phantasy and external world, symbolised and symbol, which would be seen as the therapist directing herself at what a Kleinian would call the symbolic equation part of the interaction. Secondly, her use of the words 'reading in' imply that it is Rhoda's feelings that are at issue rather than her family's. This could be seen as the therapist addressing herself to the issue of intrusive identification. They write (pp. 308-309):

"There are two lexical features of interview style in 5.17 that strengthen the thrust of the therapist's interpretation. Really establishes two levels of reality: what we observe on the surface, and what really lies below it. The expression reading in indicates that Rhoda attributes an emotion to her family on the basis of their observed behaviour, with a strong implication that this is a misperception, at least in part, and may reflect Rhoda's own emotional state more than the reality.

The interpretation the therapist offers in 5.17[b] is set up in the form of a statement as complex as the analogy of 5.1: 'What causes you to do X is not so much that M does Y as that M does Z.' However, the interpretation the therapist offers is more complex even than this. She wants to point out
that the source of emotion in Rhoda is not so much what in fact 'they' are feeling, but what Rhoda feels they are feeling. The therapist establishes three levels of phenomena:

1. What Rhoda's mother and sister are saying;
2. What Rhoda's mother and sister are feeling;
3. What Rhoda feels her mother and sister are feeling.

These distinctions point towards one of the goals of the therapeutic session. We have seen that the therapist is first given an account of the everyday life, in a style stripped of emotional evaluation and interpretation. To this are added overt justifications in terms of general social norms and then the more personal interpretations of the patient's relations with others. Now the therapist introduces the view that Rhoda's behavior is motivated by underlying emotions.

In Kleinian terms, though not necessarily in the terms used by the therapist, the therapist would be giving the events of everyday life emotional meaning for Rhoda by putting her in touch with her phantasy life. Rhoda shows great resistance to this throughout the episode with long silences and unco-operative contradictions. Labov and Fanshel (1977) say (p.311):

"she sees no reason to discuss any emotions that lie behind her family's statements."

The present author suggests that this is because the internal parent figure has had Rhoda's emotions intruded into it, and then been radically split-off from the rest of her personality and become located concretely in her family, her therapist and the words that pass between them. This means that phantasy is confused with external reality, and Rhoda is denied true access to her family and her therapist, although her family may be colluding with her. The threat that words - her words, her family's and her therapist's - pose to her is hypothesised as re-establishing the denied link with the split-off part of her personality. This may account for the various forms of verbal behaviour in the family and the therapeutic setting, including the silences which Rhoda uses as a form of resistance in Episode Five. Her resistance to the work of the therapist is thus explained in terms of the psychodynamics of splitting and intrusive identification. Her
verbal resistances are reflected in the following passage from Labov and Fanshel (1977) (p.315):

"In the midst of the therapist's addition, Rhoda introduces a soft No, repeating her disagreement in a muted form. Throughout the exchanges of 5.21, Rhoda shows extreme reservation. Her volume remains low, her words are condensed and difficult to follow, and another long silence is heard. Nevertheless, the therapist finally extracts an admission from her

5.21  
[b] R: Oh, I guess I w's angry, but  
[c] Th: Ye-es  
[d] R: ........ (Yeh)

The paralinguistic cues in Rhoda's responses are quite informative. The Oh does not have the high contour of surprise we have seen earlier, but the more level intonation expressing the concession of a point without full agreement; in this respect it matches the final but. Furthermore, it is surprising to find Rhoda using the expression I guess in connection with her own emotions in the therapeutic session. The I guess is a reluctant concession to a person who is considered to be an expert in the interpretation of emotions."

Evidence of a parental transference between Rhoda and the therapist is shown in Labov and Fanshel's footnote to p.316:

"In these and similar reinforcements, the therapist seems to be adopting an adult-to-child relationship to Rhoda, which is probably not deliberate but is called forth by Rhoda's immature style. Though the therapist recognizes that Rhoda wants to be treated like an adult, and wishes to treat her like one, Rhoda keeps giving the cues that prompt responses of this kind."

The present author suggests that Rhoda's adult self will be impoverished and infantalised by the splitting of an important part of herself, the adult part which contains her emotions, which is then intruded into the therapist in the transference. This hypothesis could supplement the more superficial account that Labov and Fanshel give.

Labov and Fanshel in discussing the therapist's interpretation of 5.22 write (p.317):

"The heaviest [stress] of all is on angry, which is accompanied with a harsh voice qualifier which seems to symbolize the emotion she is talking about."

To the extent that the therapist has been trained to have contact with her own unconscious, one may oppose the insightful and probably deliberate use
of the word angry as a symbol, with a symbolic equation where the word anger is hurled angrily at Rhoda as a concrete projectile.

The intended move in therapy towards seeing emotions as causes is displayed in the following quotation. However, it does suggest the need for a structured theory of emotion such as the Kleinian one.

"Though the therapist has led Rhoda up to the point of seeing a causal explanation in terms of emotional factors, Rhoda's hesitant agreement of 5.21 does not satisfy her. She feels that Rhoda herself must recognize the emotional basis for her responses to her family. Our contextual expansion cannot show all of the implications that might be drawn, but we can complete the argument by comparing this with the original discussion of . . . the emotional strain Rhoda described in episodes 1 and 4. Until now, this strain has been discussed as the result of objective social factors - the fact that Rhoda has had too much to do. In the therapist's eyes, this subjective reaction on Rhoda's part is due not only to her own inability to fulfill her obligations; it is also the product of the emotional burden created by interchanges of anger.

We have therefore departed considerably from socially oriented logic used in the first two episodes, based upon the principles of distributive justice that are involved in role obligations. The therapist has now redefined Rhoda's problem in terms of the anger that she feels."

In a footnote on this page to 'interchanges of anger', Labov and Fanshel write:

"It is not clear whether the strain is attributed primarily to Rhoda's emotions or to her perceptions of her families emotions, or to the complex of both."

It is the present author's view that, due to intrusive identification, there is no clear distinction in Rhoda's mind and, in the family interaction in the external world, between Rhoda's emotions and her perceptions of her family's emotions. If this view is correct, it would be less accurate to say 'interchanges of anger' as this implies communication, than to say 'confusion about anger'. 'Interchanges' could imply recognition and communication about anger on that part of Rhoda and her family, which one can infer is not the case from Rhoda's resistance and hesitation in this episode, and also from what is known about her family interaction. There seems not to be sufficient ego distinction to allow interchanges. Instead,
Rhoda and her family seem to be locked through long established intrusive identification into an immovable confusion of present, but denied anger.

Some of this confusion is displayed in Labov and Fanshel's expansion of 5.22 (p.318):

"Since you admit that ... you feel anger, we now have to explain that feeling: it is because you feel ... your family is angry with you because they think that you have deliberately made yourself underweight ... and are violating the principle that you should take care of yourself."

The present author would suggest that the causal arrows do not necessarily go as this expansion suggests from her family's anger to Rhoda's anger. As an alternative, it is proposed that there is a cyclical and reciprocal angering characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position.

That her words are attacked using intrusive identification and filled with and exploded by emotions they cannot contain is the suggested phantasy behind the verbal resistance in 5.23[a] described as follows by Labov and Fanshel (p.318):

"There is none of the agreement that she gave to the social and psychological propositions of episodes 1-4; here she responds first with silence, then with hesitation, and finally with outright denial, repeated over and over again. This dramatic explosion of resistance to the therapist's ideas is accompanied by a wealth of paralinguistic cues, all of which show severe emotional agitation. We often find that our contextual expansion must be much longer than the actual statement, but here we have the reverse, as Rhoda says the same thing over and over again."

In the very next section 5.23[b] (p.318), Rhoda says that she gets annoyed hearing her family telling her over and over again that she is underweight. Apart from the use of the mitigated 'annoy' rather than 'anger', which Labov and Fanshel point out (pp.318-319), the other point of interest is that she criticises her family for doing something that she has done, that is to repeat utterances over and over again. Again this points to a confusion about who is feeling annoyed or angry with whom about what. It is manifested directly in the transference. The suggestion is that Rhoda is trying, in phantasy, to project her annoyance at being repeatedly told about
Concerning the mitigation of Rhoda's anger, Labov and Fanshel write (pp. 319-320):

"At this point, the therapist has succeeded in bring Rhoda's refusal to admit anger into the open, and we have a direct view of the devices she uses to deny her anger. It seems clear that mitigated forms of emotion are acceptable in Rhoda's framework. We can seen an analogy between Rhoda's emotional behavior and the range of behavior that is considered appropriate in carrying out role obligations. Not to feel any emotion would be wrong, since her family did something that was clearly wrong in her eyes, but to feel anger is also wrong. The appropriate range of emotional display reactions to other family members is to be 'annoyed' or 'bothered'. This verbal mitigation is an important element in masking for Rhoda her own feelings of hostility towards her family. We can infer that she has undergone a long history of conditioning to repress anger and convert it into other forms of expression."

They explain Rhoda's inability to express anger in terms of 'conditioning', a behaviourist term, and 'repression', a Freudian term. In Kleinian terms, the underlying phantasy would be the most important factor. The real emotion of anger seems to have been experienced as too dangerous. This could be because of the hypothesised ego confusion. If she expresses anger then she is attacking herself, represented in the external world by the attacking mother and sister into which the angry parts of herself have been projected. There is also always the fear of a psychotic catastrophe where, if the intrusiveness is too great, the ego and its object explode completely into bizarre objects. Rhoda seems to have to judge her acceptable level of anger mechanistically, as she would judge the appropriateness of behaviour in particular role performances. She does not seem to be able to be in touch with her emotions in the sense discussed by Segal (1981) in 'Notes on Symbol Formation'. She seems not to be able to communicate with good internal objects by projective identification, which would allow her to respond intuitively. This seems to be prevented by her confused internal world characterised by intrusive identification. Dealing with her emotions..."
in the same way as dealing with external circumstances is another way of distancing herself from her true emotions, which seems to be the aim of her defensive organisation. The therapist's analogy (5.19) between Rhoda's family's feelings about her being underweight and her anger about their nagging at her is denied. Labov and Fanshel write of this (p.320):

"The underlying proposition here [5.24[a]] is that Rhoda's family is not reasonable. In explaining her emotion, Rhoda argues that the situation is not a symmetrical one. In this argument, she sees her family as unreasonable and herself as reasonable. Therefore the therapist's elaborately constructed parallel of 5.19 cannot stand; our互动al statement shows that Rhoda rejects the notion that her family behaves to her as she behaves towards them."

This shows the use by Rhoda of the concept that the emotions a person should feel are defined by social norms. She seems to reject any suggestion that both parties may be reasonable, as this would open up the channel for real communication that she seems to fear. Also, in the transference she seems to be denying that her therapist's interpretation is reasonable and this mitigates what appears to be frightening emotional contact with her. The present author is proposing that she is denying real emotional contact with the parts of herself which are split off and externalised into her therapist and family, using intrusive identification. In 5.24[d] (p.321), she goes as far as to deny implicitly the basic suggestion of therapy that one should express ones needs and emotions to relevant others.

From a Kleinian perspective in 5.25 (p.322), the therapist could be seen as acting as a container for Rhoda's confusion. The therapist tries to help Rhoda to think about feelings and sort out her confusion about who is feeling what emotion and why, thereby putting her back in touch with her own emotions. They write (p.322):

"Rhoda begins a new anecdote, presumably to support the charge that her family is unreasonable, but the therapist will not permit her to turn back to the events of the everyday world again. Instead, she insists upon a direct confrontation with the question of who is feeling what emotion."
Through the technique of socratic questioning (see Chapter One), the therapist gets Rhoda to admit implicitly her family's emotions, thereby helping her to separate them out from her own and helping to put her in touch with her own emotions.

Labov and Fanshel (p.323) write:

"Therefore if Rhoda should answer 5.25[d], she will be also admitting that the reason that the family keeps repeating their charge that ... she does not eat is the emotion that they feel rather than their perception of the real situation."

It seems that the therapist is trying to suggest to Rhoda that emotions are real and do not have to be restricted by a mechanistic view that only the emotions that are judged reasonable are allowed to be felt. Again, she seems to be acting as a container for Rhoda's emotions through the equivalent of 'maternal reverie' in the transference, allowing her to think about and experience them.

The concept of projective identification, as the direct induction of feelings of one person in another, a development of the way the child acts with the mother, might help explain the 'came out' of 5.26. Labov and Fanshel (p.324) write:

"In this answer of Rhoda's, we return to the fundamental issue of her claim to adult status and her family's denial of it. It is possible to see first how serious an issue this is and how much emotion revolves around it. Rhoda finally says, in characteristic family language, that her family is angry with her: They came out and told me. The expression came out implies that they had already conveyed the message in many indirect ways before they said it in so many words."

Rather than being realistic projective identification, this is actually probably more like a manifestation of the phantasy of intrusive identification, where the family members confuse their very strong emotions with each others'. This does not allow family members to communicate directly. The present author would argue that the phantasy is of one family member's very strong emotions concretely located in the mind of another family member. This perhaps contributes to the possibility of the
fear of a total breakdown into psychotic catastrophe, meaning that the containment of emotions, such as it is, may break down completely. This may be one of the reasons why Rhoda seems unable to allow herself to be angry. Labov and Fanshel write (p.325):

"The moral dimension is dominant in almost all the family arguments that we have seen reflected in the therapeutic session: each person seems to be struggling to define himself as a good person in the sense that he fulfills the obligations that society puts upon him. In the other interviews examined in the Playback series, we find reports that family members have accused the patient of selfishness, and neglecting his basic responsibilities, just as Rhoda is accused of malingering. These charges produce violent emotions in all parties concerned, and the therapist is aware that the anger Rhoda must experience from her family interaction is quite intense. She is also aware how difficult it is for Rhoda to express these emotions even when she perceives them."

Rhoda seems not to be in touch with her emotions in the sense discussed by Segal (1981) in 'Notes on Symbol Formation'. She hypothesises that what this means is the reduction of splitting and the ability of one part of the self to communicate with another. The medium for this internal communication is realistic projective identification. It is the present author's hypothesis that there seems to be, for Rhoda, inadequate introjective identification with good internal parents capable of containing her emotions in a real sense, in the same way as a good external mother might act as a container for her baby's emotions. It is with these parental containers of emotion that the central ego could be in touch, using realistic projective identification. This does not seem to be the case for Rhoda, whose internal world seems to be the more confused one of intrusive identification.

The therapist's comment 5.27[c] (p.326),

"Th: So there's a lot of anger passing back and forth."

is interpreted by the present author in terms of the phantasy of concrete non-verbal projectiles being hurled backwards and forwards, instead of direct communication, which can be expressed and thought about. Also the
picture seems to be more static and immovable than the verb *passing* suggests. The anger already seems to have been located by one person in another. On p.326, Labov and Fanshel write of 5.27[c]:

"The cost of this direct statement from the therapist cannot be avoided. Instead of the stream of speech Rhoda has produced in other episodes, we again note a repression of speech. Rhoda has nothing further to say at this point. She is willing to admit the therapist's assertions, but the fact that she does not add anything to the discussion shows that her acceptance is very limited. We might anticipate a further exploration of these emotions now that this one insight has been achieved, but Rhoda's further responses indicate that she is not ready for such an advance. On the contrary, she retreats into the minimal responses that indicate that she will not produce any further evidence for the therapist and her to explore together."

Rhoda's lack of acceptance of anger can be seen as an inability to communicate either verbally, or as a precondition for this, by realistic projective identification with her mother and family, internal and external, and also in the transference with the therapist. It is hypothesised that she cannot respond to the anger contained in her internal parent figure and she cannot respond to her family's anger, and also, in the transference, she cannot accept her therapist's interpretation of this. She cannot respond to the basic suggestion of the therapy that one should express one's needs and emotions to relevant others. This puts her out of touch with herself, her family and her therapist.

It could be objected that the particular application of the notions of transference and the therapist as a container, that the present author has used, are specific to Kleinian psychoanalysis and not to the ego psychological orientation of the therapist discussed by Labov and Fanshel. However, these concepts could be seen as descriptive of the psychotherapeutic process, as well as a prescription to attend to these particular phenomena, when practicing Kleinian psychotherapy in particular. The Kleinian account could be seen as providing an interpretation of the phantasies underlying psychodynamic therapy, irrespective of whether such
phantasies are made explicit and used as tools in the therapy, as is the case in Kleinian psychoanalysis. In this sense, the heuristic usefulness of Kleinian categories is advocated by the present author quite independently of the particular practical applications of a given therapy. Our preceding discussion of material supplied by Labov and Fanshel has been intended to show how the Kleinian account may be used to extend the interpretation range and overcome the limitations of their chosen analytical framework.

The claims being made by the present author are twofold. First, that a psychodynamic conversation, or for that matter any intimate conversation, needs a psychodynamic theory, in order that emotions are understood in terms of a theoretical structure and are less ad hoc than in Labov and Fanshel’s account. Second, that the Kleinian theory, with its elaborated account of the transference, and of the deep infantile parts of the personality provides a more encompassing structure than the ego psychology of the therapist. Its explicit concern with language discussed in Chapter Four make it particularly amenable for adoption by the conversational linguist.
Chapter Six

A SAMPLE KLEINIAN DISCOURSE COMMENTARY

This chapter presents a Kleinian commentary on a family discussion - a 'second pass' over the case study used in Chapter Two to exemplify Labov and Fanshel's discourse rules. In this case, the commentary will follow the transcript (cf. Appendix C) sequentially.

In looking at the conversation, three aspects of utterances will be considered: a) the communication of information about external reality; b) communication of states of mind by projective identification; and c) attacks on communication by intrusive identification. This chapter will concentrate on aspects included in b) and c). In the case of communication by projective identification, the impact of such communication is largely unconscious; its aim is not so much to inform but to induce an empathetic state of mind in the listener or reader. It is a repetition in a transference situation of that described by Bion's theory of the development of thinking, where the pre-verbal infant induces, by projective identification, a state of mind in the mother which she can return to the baby as an element that can be used for thinking. It should be noted that language is one of the many symbolic forms available for such communication. Non-verbal communication such as bodily gestures and tone of voice are another important aspect of communication by projective identification. For the conversation analyst to ignore projective identification would be to ignore a vital part of what is happening when people talk to each other. This intimate aspect of conversation is effectively a shared dream and, as such, will be idiosyncratic and difficult. It is difficult for the participants in a conversation and also for the conversation analyst to think verbally about what are essentially pre-verbal phantasies, or 'memories in feeling' as
Klein (1957, p.180) called them. This is true even for type a) communication of external reality, as Kreckel's (1981) notion of a 'homodynamic code' in a family shows. Thus, the comments being made on this conversation should be afforded the status of hypotheses, and not clinical interpretations. The distinction between b) and c) is very fine and varies in degree from moment to moment, as described by Bion (1955). It is possible, however, that all three elements are present at all times in all utterances. More explicitly, the distinction between b) and c) is between benign induction of a state of mind by the speaker in the hearer for the production of empathetic understanding in the case of b) and an attack by intrusive identification on communication for the purpose of causing pain and confusion in the case of c). Hypothesised instances of other concepts discussed in the previous chapter that are found in the conversational text will also be presented in this chapter.

It will be remembered that the conversation between John and Jenny was both filmed and taped and the transcript is based on these records. The participants were informed that they could choose which topics they wished to discuss, although in practise they required guidance on this point from the author (see Appendix A). The conversation opened with a discussion of films.

Phase 1 Discussion of Chaplin films (p.1, line 6 - p.2, line 21)

The first film star discussed by the family was Chaplin, the clown, perhaps reflecting their anxieties about being seen as clowns in the film. In the author's recollection, it was largely Jenny's agreement to be filmed on the day just before Christmas, when they were both anxious to get away on their long journey to their home town. The description of the film in which the man kills his wife (p.1, line 11 - p.2, line 7) may express John's anger at Jenny for agreeing to be filmed, and may induce a fear of dying.
in Jenny, while John verbalises his murderous phantasies. It is largely an example of an attack on communication by intrusive identification, but also has aspects of communication by projective identification, for he is asking Jenny to contain his murderous desires in their shared dream life. To a large extent, she does so by providing minimal listening responses, therefore enabling John to think through his phantasy, separating it from reality. If she had shown more than the minimal level of anxiety she does which could be heard as a nervous laugh (p.1, line 13), then perhaps the utterance would have been more effective as the intrusive identification, which was 'meant' by John, than as the communication by projective identification into which it seemed she turned it. As such, she could be seen to be detoxifying John's verbal missiles and turning them into shared dream-elements, in other words alpha-elements; to this extent she is performing an alpha-function (Bion, 1967, p.117).

Dave then joins the conversation, after an injudicious tease by the author, who at that point was very anxious. Dave seemed to be angry at being called a baby, a feeling which was probably heightened by envy of the attention which Jenny is paying to his baby brother, who is being dandled on her lap. After the author had referred to him as a baby - a piece of intrusive identification on the part of the author - Dave protests to his parents 'he said baby to me' (p.1, line 20). Dave is here being involved in the family drama, and seems to be used, as is often the case in this conversation, as a container for his parents' anxieties. When Dave asks his father 'Why does he kill his wife?' (p.1, line 25), John's reply (p.1, line 26) seems to reflect a paranoid-schizoid position omnipotence phantasy that John can kill his wife simply by not liking her. It does not constitute a reason for killing her, which was being asked for in Dave's question.

Dave's next question (p.1, line 27) seems to be asking what is it that she does to him that would warrant him wanting to kill her. John then
reverses his son's question (p.1, line 18) thus giving himself the chance to explain the gory details of the murder. It seems that Jenny again defuses this potentially explosive situation, by using alpha-function. There seems to be the fear that if a strong container is not around, the family will fragment, as in a psychotic catastrophe (Bion, 1967). Jenny's response (p.2, line 3), accepting the projective identification part of the communication, seems to be reassuring Dave that, in reality, John is not being very kind to her, and is trying to make her anxious, rather than actually making a murderous attack on her. She shows that it is a piece of phantasy that can be contained. The response, 'that's not very kind is it', seems an inappropriate reaction to the horrific actions of the murderer in the film, but it is a perfectly appropriate response to detoxify her husband's projectiles for herself, for her husband and Dave. She seems to be responding as she might do to a very angry baby, whom she understands because it has aroused anxiety in her by a mixture of projective identification and intrusive identification, and says to herself and the baby, 'it's alright darling', thus restoring calm. Jenny appears to be acting as a container and using her maternal reverie. She thus elicits an apologetic agreement from her husband.

She then tries to change the subject to another film (p.2, line 5), but is interrupted by her husband, who continues to talk about the same film (p.2, line 6, 7). However, this time it might be inferred from Jenny's response (p.2, line 10) that before Dave's interruption he was about to refer to it as the first or the only talkie. Knowing that the author is analysing conversation, they may be overcoming their anxiety about making a talking picture for the author in their shared phantasy. Later, in the conversation (p.17, line 21), Jenny expresses her conscious awareness of the linguistic nature of the exercise.
The contents of p. 2, lines 8, 9 seem to be a manifestation of intrusive identification by Dave and possibly they have two purposes: first, the attack on the recording equipment, perhaps resulting from the anxiety of being filmed, both on his own part and that projected into him by the rest of the family; secondly, in collusion with his mother, he seems to be counter-attacking the intrusive identification part of his father's account of the wife-murdering film. This seems to be successful, as Jenny is then allowed to change the subject to another Chaplin film 'The Great Dictator' (p.2, line 10), where her question again is about whether it is a talkie. There appears to be a transference aspect to this part of the conversation, 'the great dictator' being a character in the shared internal drama of this couple. The parental origins of this image clearly cannot be ascertained from this conversation, but, in the present, there seem to be at least two great dictators. John appears to be acting as the great dictator of the family (Meltzer, personal communication). He looks slightly like Chaplin, and his rigidity on camera might reflect anxiety about being toppled as the great dictator by the process of filming turning him into a clown, just as Chaplin ridiculed Hitler in the film by playing him as a clown. The other more immediate great dictator seems to be the author, who has forced them into playing the clown by making a 'talkie' for him (Piers Linley, personal communication). The family phantasy of the great dictator appears to have been projected into the author in retaliation for his intrusiveness into their intimate internal world. Thus, some of the phantasies being manifested in this talk are perhaps those of the paranoid-schizoid position.

Just as John's lack of knowledge does not deter him from pronouncing on whether 'The Great Dictator' is a talkie (p.2, lines 11,12) or not, it also does not stop him immediately contradicting Jenny's guess at the name of the film containing a particular image that she appears to be thinking of (p.2, lines 16,17). John's comment that the film she is thinking
of is 'Hard Times' perhaps reflects what a 'hard time' he is having with films, and being filmed. With this simple task of trying to think of a film, embedded within the bigger task of talking about film, the couple seem to be functioning as a Basic Assumption group (Bion, 1961), where the Basic Assumption is dependency, the group being dependent on John as the great dictator. John is perhaps having 'hard times' on this film, trying not to be toppled from his position by his wife and his son, who have ganged up on him to change the subject from 'Monsieur Verdin'. He may be anxious also about the movie-making author turning him from great dictator into clown. He retaliates to what he seems to be experiencing as intrusive identifications, with an attack on Jenny's guess at the film (p.2, line 17), even though he himself admits that he does not know very much about Chaplin films (p.2, lines 11,12). He responds immediately, and initially without equivocation, to Jenny's 'City Lights' with his 'Hard Times'.

The contents of p.3, lines 12-15 suggest that all the responsibility lies with Jenny, who gets interrogated about whether she is fulfilling her duty. Later, there is a suggestion of fear of what women might get up to on their Christmas shopping sprees (p.10, line 10) (Donald Meltzer, personal communication). John seems to be reacting against Jenny going out seeing the 'City Lights' by making sure she has 'Hard Times' organising the family Christmas at home.

The image that Jenny uses in this discussion seems to be for her a feminine one, that of a flower seller, a blind girl. After he concedes that the film is 'City Lights', Jenny interrupts with a comment about how good it is. He interrupts (p.2, line 20) by making a comment, which is perhaps a manifestation of intrusive identification, that this film contains a boxing scene. There seems to be no communicative function to this comment in terms of carrying out the task of the discussion going on. It seems like an attack on Jenny, as in a boxing match, and upon her communication. She
responds disinterestedly (p.2, line 21). Her communication appears to be attacked and, for the moment, destroyed. At this point in the discussion, the sexual division of labour seems particularly harsh. It seems that Jenny denies her masculine parts, reducing herself from the capable, thinking mother that she was earlier, to the blind flower seller, presumably weak and penniless. John appears to resort to the 'macho' boxing scene. Each partner seems to be pushing the parts of themselves which might, in our society, belong to the other sex, onto the other partner, leaving them as the potentially destructive gender caricatures.

**Phase 2 Discussion of other films (P.2, line 22 - P.4, line 3)**

The next instant the tone seems to change to a mode of conversing more characteristic of the depressive position. John seems to want to make some reparation to the emptied Jenny by changing the subject away from Chaplin films to 'The Big Sleep' (p.2, lines 21,22), although again this is a violent film. The author believes that both parties know that 'The Big Sleep' means death, and that it is a reference to murder by the novelist Raymond Chandler. However, this theme seems to be picked up more co-operatively by Jenny and they seem to relax and enjoy each other's company. It is a possibility that the big sleep might be a reference to their sharing a bed after their long journey home, which is being delayed by this filming. The promise of sleeping may be unconsciously offered as a reparative gesture to Jenny. Certainly, she responds very quickly (p.2, line 24). They then converse in a more close and loving way, sharing agreed eulogies about the film (p.2, lines 24-29). However, the positive comment by Jenny (p.2, line 27) is changed by John to a more negative one (p.2, line 28). He seems to have lost touch with this reparative sequence, for Jenny, who throughout uses baby Kevin to defend herself both verbally and non-verbally against John by using him as an intrusive distraction from the
conversation, then says to Kevin 'are you going to talk now too' (p.2, line 29). This may reflect a conscious preoccupation with talkies. This seems to be effective in attacking and destroying this depressive position sequence which John was starting to abandon, and which Jenny then destroys completely.

John tries to resume the conversation, but is interrupted by Kevin crying (p.3, lines 3,4). Possibly he is being upset at being used as a shield, or as his mother's second skin (Bick, 1968; Cornwell, 1983). Another way of putting it is that Jenny might be projecting her vulnerable baby bits into Kevin, a suitable but vulnerable receptacle for them, to protect them from John. Kevin's crying, which seems to be used to shut up his father, is preceded by his mother's comment on p.3, line 3. In this sequence, she recognises that Kevin's interruption is disruptive of the task of 'talkies'; presumably she was hoping he would not cry for the whole filming. However, despite this, her comment 'Kevin's going to cry now' (p.3, line 3) seems to not only have the force of a prediction but also an imperative. Also, it acts in itself as an interruption of John. Jenny seems to be attempting to protect the vulnerable parts of herself from the possibility of verbal projectiles from John, and attacking his communication by inducing Kevin into a collusive intrusive identification. In this situation, she does not seem to have an adequate capacity for maternal reverie with baby Kevin.

This seems to be picked up on by John, because he refers to the first of 'The Raiders' films being shown on television (p.3, line 5). In this he may be displaying the unconscious phantasy of being attacked by his wife and baby son - almost as being raided. However, this seems to be a more sublimated response, as opposed to the verbal intrusion of the earlier sequence. This brings them back into a shared dream life, where their communication problems can be thought about unconsciously, and where
they can communicate by projective identification and about external reality. P.3, line 7-11 is a short co-operative sequence where they discuss the advantages of having a video recorder to see films. In this sequence, they are clearly commenting about external reality. However, they also seem to be communicating, by projective identification, that they are in a less anxious state of mind about being videoed.

This sequence gives way to one discussed above in connection with 'Hard Times', where John interrogates Jenny about her apparent domestic responsibility to record all the videos (p.3, lines 12-15). Jenny seems to become irritated by this, answering John curtly, particularly in p.3, line 19. There is a question of whether the long-play video will be of good quality (p.3, line 24 - p.4, line 2), possibly reflecting the unconscious phantasy on John's part that the shorter the video he makes for the author, the better quality it will be, as if he were offering the author a better quality video if he shortened John's difficult task. He also asks Jenny if she had recorded the American football yet (p.3, line 22), in which, as it transpires later, Jenny is not interested (p.8, line 2). This is perhaps a further aspect of John's exaggerated and stereotypic 'macho' style. It is also a possible reference to using words as projectiles, like footballs, that is as symbolic equations rather than symbols (Segal, 1981, pp. 49-65), and also to the 'talkie' being about getting kicked around. Jenny's minimal and awkward answers seem to reflect this experience as well (p. 3, lines 19,21,23). Her words seem to have an abstract and 'stripped-of meaning' quality that is characteristic of this conversation (p. 3, lines 26,27,29, p.4, line 2), and which is also characteristic of symbolic- equation. The contents of p.3, lines 24, 25 display that it seems to be Jenny's responsibility, part of her 'work', to use John's own word, to record for John things to which she is emotionally opposed. This domestic 'hard labour' could be related to John's determination that she should have 'hard times' rather than see the 'city
lights’ (cf. p.2, line 17). This interchange between John and Jenny seems to foreshadow Jenny’s rebellion over sports programmes later (p. 7, line 14 - P.8, lines 2-4). The contents of p.3, lines 26 27, as well as having confusing information content (as reflected in John’s response at p.3, line 28), seem to be denying that quality is important. This resonates with Jenny’s feelings about the quality of John’s taste in watching the American football. Probably, her refusal to give anything away has something of the force of ‘if its all my responsibility, then I’ll do it my way’. This prompts John to respond with what appears to be an intrusive question in p.3, line 28. The reply (p.3, line 29) refers not only to the quality of the video but also to the nature of her answers to John’s questions. A filled pause by John (p.4, line 1) appears to be trying to milk more out of Jenny, but all he gets is the slightly fuzzy ’more than anything else’ (p.4, line 2). This sequence has the quality of a dependency basic assumption group. It seems that Jenny is being manipulated by John into being the group leader (Bion, 1961, p.149). He seems to be intrusively pushing all the responsible parts of himself into her. In turn she seems to be manipulating him as being greedy and idle, and trying to suck the already empty breast dry of meaning. By stripping her words of meanings she could be encouraging John to suck at the internal meaning giving breast (Segal, 1981, pp.49-65), which at least at this moment in their shared phantasy he seems to have intrusively pushed into her.

Phase 3 Discussion of Dave’s trip to the cinema  (P.4, line 3 - P.7, line 5)

The conversation then moves on to being more co-operative and the participants seem to be functioning more as a ‘work group’ than a ‘dependency basic assumption group’ (Bion, 1961). The reference to watching films together as a family (p.4, line 3) seems to reflect their lessening anxiety about being videoed. There follows an apparently good
family discussion in p.4, lines 4-24, though the responsibility again seems to rest with Jenny. There may be some suggestion that the show that they are putting on for the author is a pantomime, with its stereotyped figures, devoid of individuality.

Jenny's account to Dave of what it is like to go to the cinema (p.5, lines 14-21) could take out the essential mystery which would be the basis of his enjoyment of a new experience (Isabel Menzies Lyth, personal communication). In fact her account mirrors strongly the account of what their friend's child found surprising and 'couldn't quite get his head round' (p.4 line 25 - p.5, line 1). This seems to be a form of intrusive identification functioning as manic reparation, where Jenny appears to be trying to put the thought into Dave's head magically instead of allowing him to digest and experience it for himself. There appears to be a confusion of identities between Jenny and Dave, and an assumption that new experiences may be frightening to him, and that to allow him to experience them emotionally might be 'catastrophic' (Meltzer, 1986, pp.26-27). This could be because she is operating at a level of manic omnipotence, of controlling the world and holding it together as the all-responsible mother holding the family together. To that extent, a new emotional experience, a surprise, out of her omnipotent control, could threaten catastrophically her world and her family. This feeling seems to be projected into Dave. Moreover, the refusal to allow him to learn from experience and to grow may prevent him giving his mother any surprises by changing, thus allowing her to experience him as he is at present - that is, essentially manageable.

The contents of p.5, line 22 testify that Dave seems to have been 'switched off' by what his mother was telling him, because this question has already been answered (p.5, lines, 10,11). The stress in p.5, line 22 is on 'I'. This suggests that Dave was not thinking that he might have to
wait until he is older (as he might have taken from what his mother said (p.5, line 13)) or even doubting whether 'thinking about' could be taken too seriously. The stress on 'I' suggests that he does not realise what his mother's previous description had to do with him. In a sense, it seems that he is right, because his mother's comments appear to be more concerned with her own anxieties than with the reality of her son's emotional experience.

John interrupts Jenny (p.5, line 26) possibly to bring the conversation back to the perceived task of the adults having a discussion (cf. p.17, line 21). However, at another level, he appears to be splitting himself off from Jenny and the parts of himself located in her in shared phantasy. It is noticeable how far they are sitting apart, and this may reflect a phantasy they have, which seems to manifest itself a lot in the later parts of the conversation, that if they get too close they will cease to be independent people. They appear to have to attack links between them (Bion, 1967, p.83-109). Instead of these representing the creative interaction between whole independent people that characterises the depressive position, these links seem to represent channels where each will be swamped by projectiles from the other's personality. In his interruption in p.5, line 6, John reformulates Jenny's 'Daddy and Mummy' comment (p.5, line 25) to one about his own past, which he then follows with a question to Jenny about hers (p.5, line 29). This could be a manifestation of this phantasy (that if they get too close they will cease to be independent people) and the attendant feeling of the necessity for splitting which it arouses. This atmosphere of nostalgia continues until Dave interrupts with the comment in p.6, lines 3,4 which seems out of context. This confusion could reflect the shared phantasy that Dave acts as a container for his parents' marriage. He appears to act in the role of 'marriage guidance counsellor' to this couple, who have been to marriage guidance, as is revealed in p.18,
lines 8,9. So Dave seems to be experiencing their parental transference towards him, in turn feeling that his parents, his grandparents' children, should be parents to their parents, that is the grandparents. 'Parents' is an unusual word for a child to use. It is adult and rather 'technical' (Isabel Menzies Lyth, personal communication). It would seem more appropriate to say 'Mummy and Daddy'. However the proposed shared phantasy is not of two independent individuals relating to each other, but of parents as an abstract entity. It is suggested here that this results from the feeling manifested earlier that, if the parents relate to each other, their personalities will become swamped. It also may reflect Dave's experience in phantasy that the parts of his mother and the parts of his father have got merged together into a combined parent figure (Segal, 1975, pp.107-108), creating a feared internal object. Dave seems to be experiencing the intrusive projection of his parents' combined parent figure into him, hence his reference to his grandparents. The fact that they are referred to separately is due possibly to Dave's not knowing the word 'grandparents'. Or, it may be that, in his role as container, he is trying to perform alpha-function and disentangle his parents from each other by thought. The latter seems unlikely, for his interruption seems to have a quality of intrusive identification, probably in reaction to the insecurity he appears to feel at the apparent lack of his parents' real relationship at this moment, and the anger he seems to be feeling at their intrusion into him.

At this point, John and Jenny appear to move nearer to a depressive position reaction and to work together to clear up Dave's misunderstanding. However, they keep up the use of the seemingly inappropriate word 'parents'. They also seem unconcerned to check on Dave's understanding. Jenny finishes the explanation with a minimal 'D'you see' (p.6, line 11) and, without letting him answer, moves quickly on to commenting that they should really be talking about films rather than parents. It is likely
that this is partly because of the external constraints of the task they were given but also probably because it's getting 'too close to home'. This seems to reflect something of Jenny's failure to perform alpha-function and think for Dave in the previous few minutes of the film. This is possibly reflected in his comment in p.6, line 13, showing that he has not really digested what was told to him twice earlier (p.5, lines 10, 11 and p.5, lines 23, 24). He seems not to trust that his parents mean what they say. His parents' words appear to have the quality of beta-elements. They are meaningless words that have not been thought about. There was evidence of this in Jenny's apparently thoughtless speech about what it was like to go to the cinema (p. 5, lines 13-21). Jenny, probably consciously realising the inappropriateness of his question, starts off by saying 'You want to....' (p.6, line 14) and seems about to say something like 'go to the cinema over Christmas'. However, possibly realising that this question has been answered in the external world she reformulates it as 'Yes it will be a Christmas treat' (p.6, line 14). In p.6, lines 15-17, John seems to be trying to project into his son his boredom at making a video. The opposition in the external world communication between boredom and the video seems to be belied by their juxtaposition when John is clearly bored and engaged in making a video. The suggestion is not that John does not mean what he says in terms of external world communication, but that he means something different at the level of communication of internal world reality by projective identification. They then move into a sequence (p.6, lines 19-25) where they seem to be reassuring each other that they (John and Jenny) really will not get bored over Christmas, backing up the suggestion that it was John's boredom that was being discussed at that level of communication rather than Dave's. This is probably related to the feeling that, if they do not keep themselves busy, they will have to indulge in the intimate communication which they appear to find so threatening to their
own personalities. They seem frightened that projective identification will turn into intrusive identification. The reference by John to blockbusters (p.6, line 27) again manifests his stereotyped masculinity.

**Phase 4 Discussion of Sport on T.V.** (P.7, line 6 - P.8, line 5)

Stereotypical male and female roles seem to be assumed by John and Jenny in this section, John being concerned with market share and Jenny taking a more humanistic attitude (Donald Meltzer, personal communication).

Jenny, in p.7, line 14, seems to be wishing she had an alternative to John, who appears to be the great dictator of the family, and who does not give her any alternative to watching sport on television. She also seems to want an alternative to what she could be feeling about what the great dictator author might be doing - that 'I' (P.7, lines 15, 16), forcing them into their competitive sport-like argument. This argument has the feel of them mind-reading 'ITV', so that Jenny seems to be projecting her femininity into ITV and looking at their programming with these parts of herself 'through the eyes' of ITV, John seems to be projecting his masculine bits into ITV and looking at their programming 'through their eyes' with those parts of himself. In the end, John submits (p.8, line 5) when Jenny, from a very personal point of view, at last shows that both views are possible (p.8, line 2-4). However, she appears to have the omnipotent phantasy that ITV programming is all done for her benefit, as evidenced by the personal, first person, nature of the argument. It is as if she has pushed part of herself into ITV as controller, the great dictator.

**Phase 5 Discussion of films on television over Christmas and of Dave running round in circles** (P.8, line 6 - P.8 line 27)

The boredom of this discussion seems to come very much into evidence, with p.8, lines 7,8 presumably meaning, in external world
communication, that the children get bored. But at the level of communication of states of mind through projective identification, perhaps she is projecting, as John did in p. 6, lines 15-17, her own boredom with the long film they are making, into Dave. John displays his boredom with a piece of inattention (p.8, lines 9,11), which appears to force Jenny into a boring explanation of what she means (p.8, lines 13-16). There seems to be a collusion that the boredom of the situation should be located inside Jenny.

What follows (p.8, lines 17-27) could be described as a minor explosion (Meltzer, personal communication). The family appears to have to contain a psychotic catastrophe. Dave starts running in circles around the sofa on which they are sitting (p.8, line 17), functioning perhaps as both the explosion and the container. However, rather than acting as a container, he may be acting as a claustrum (Meltzer et al, 1982). As such, he is tightly holding his parents together in an attempt to protect them from his explosion, but is in fact squeezing them so tightly that they stop their conversation. Perhaps he is parodying the claustrophobic 'filming' that is going on where his mother's words have had the meaning so squeezed out of them that they are no longer of any interest to his father.

Dave's running round in circles seems to have many layers of meaning. Perhaps he is representing the fact that the argument is going round in vicious circles (Meltzer, personal communication), or perhaps he is representing how John is running circles round Jenny. He effectively terminates this boring conversation on films.

In p.8, line 21 John appears to be distancing himself from the situation, as if 'Daddy' were a person other than himself. This again seems to be an attack on linking. 'Daddy' and 'I' have to be separate people because Daddy has to relate to Mummy and their children and thus might loose his 'I'-ness, his identity. Using the model of an internal drama
generating meaning, different characters have at different times "the organ of consciousness whose function is the perception of psychic qualities" (Meltzer, 1983, p.93). This seems to move in John's internal drama from the central ego to a split off 'Daddy' part of himself, perhaps intrusively identified with his own internal father.

John and Jenny's injunctions to Dave to sit down (p.8, lines 18-24) are not followed through by, for example, physically restraining him (Isabel Menzies Lyth, personal communication). This may be an example of the meaningless quality of their words, 'just words'. The hypothesis suggested here is that they have had the meaning squeezed out of them by a claustrophobia, which possibly could be in part their marriage, and in part the filming situation that the author has put them in. P.8, line 27 also seems to show an awareness that the internal breast that fills their words with meaning has been exhausted, squeezed dry. It also seems to sum up the part-object relationship that seems to have manifested itself throughout the previous conversation, with John appearing not to allow Jenny freedom to be herself, but apparently being the great dictator omnipotently controlling her. She seems to be experienced simply as a figure to organise entertainment and fend off boredom over Christmas. Her individuality and sexuality seems to be denied by John who appears to be treating her as a part-object, the breast at which he greedily sucks.

The utterance in p. 8, line 28 could be a manifestation of attacking communication by intrusive identification, because paradoxically, by saying this, he has effectively started the next topic. His words seem simply to attack his wife by putting her in the hot seat. Jenny responds in kind by uttering a snide statement of mock gratitude (p.8 line 29). This concludes the first of the three topics of conversation which the couple were set.
**Conclusion**

What is of interest in this chapter is how emotional dynamics underlie a conversation which is on the surface not concerned with emotions at all, a discussion of films. This conversation could be seen as a shared dream where problems contained in shared phantasy about family dynamics are attempted to be solved. As with dreams, very often the elements in the conversation are not obviously related to the internal figures which they symbolise. An extension of the clinical notion of transference might be appropriate here. The internal world dynamics engendered by the particular setting in which something is discussed affects what is being discussed. For example, the claustrophobic setting in which this family found themselves in being videoed could be seen to manifest itself in the hypothesised unconscious emotional reactions to films, videos and the author displayed in the conversation and discussed above. Of course, this notion of transference is rather different to the more specific notion of a focussed transference in the psychoanalytical setting which Kleinian analysts use as one of the main tools of their trade.
Chapter Seven

EMOTIONAL DYNAMICS AND LEXICAL LEAKAGE

In the Kleinian commentary presented in the previous chapter we have seen how emotional-dynamics is manifested in everyday conversation in a variety of ways, ranging from negotiation of turn-to-talk down to selection of topic. What in Kleinian terms is articulated in terms of action and interaction in the internal world of speech participants can, in linguistic terms, be re-articulated as processes of membership categorisation of various sorts operating in and through discourse at various levels. In the present chapter, a phenomenon involving membership categorisation at one particular linguistic level - namely that of lexical choice - is singled out for more detailed analysis.

It will be argued that 'lexical leakage', which has been investigated from a Freudian perspective by Spence (1968, 1970, 1980; Spence et al., 1978), can be accounted for with greater explanatory adequacy within the sort of Kleinian framework developed in the thesis so far. Furthermore, the explication of the phenomenon within this framework calls into question certain current assumptions in linguistics concerning the notion of discourse topic. On the basis of the analysis, a distinction between local and global discourse topic will be posited - together with a notion of a multiple 'agenda' of topics, which function as constraints both on the interpretation and production of discourse.

The term 'topic' is used in a variety of different senses in recent discourse analysis (for a general survey cf. Brown and Yule, 1983, Chapter Three). The position I shall be adopting is in accord with the principle which Brown and Yule themselves insist upon, namely 'that it is speakers
and writers who have topics, not texts' (op.cit. p.68). Nevertheless I hope it will emerge from this chapter that a close textual analysis of the phenomenon of lexical leakage (and a re-analysis of the more familiar phenomenon of the 'Freudian slip') can shed interesting new light on ways that lexical resources can be used to accomplish the negotiation of topics by discourse participants. It is speakers who have topics, however it is in texts that topics are manifested.

**The concept of lexical leakage**

The following is a discourse segment from an interview with a patient:

"Interviewer: You got pretty irritated with her?

Patient: Well...yes,...ah...not to the extent where you would become violent or anything like that, but as I said I was pretty stiff. I thought things should be done in a certain way...well that's the way they should be done. Since I didn't think...I thought it was base for a woman to smoke, or take a drink, or any thing like that, and...ah...I was just as set in that as though I was 90, and there was no bending..."you either don't smoke or you are a bad woman." And so...ah...time, as I said, wasn't taking care of that because...ah...now at a time when I should - if I was going to be set in my ways - I should be set in that way of thinking, now I don't feel that way."

(From Alexander, French and Pollock (1968), quoted in part by Spence (1970). Some of the underlinings are Spence's and some my own).

What do the above underlined words refer to? On the one hand the words have a literal meaning which is coded into the language ('*langue* meaning'). However if the words are seen in their discourse context, as a response to the question asked by the interviewer, it is clear that the words are being used not literally but metaphorically. This tension might be characterised as an opposition between 'langue meaning' and 'discourse meaning'. One can note a 'gestalt switch': for the average listener when the words are heard in isolation it is the literal meaning which is heard,
yet when the words are heard in their discourse context it is the metaphorical meanings which are heard.

The primacy in this case of the metaphorical meaning of words over their literal meaning is paralleled in discourse pragmatics by the resolution of tension between the verbal and the paralinguistic features of an utterance. Lyons (1972 p.62) points out that where there is a contradiction between the overt form of the verbal part of an utterance and the associated prosodic or paralinguistic features, it is the latter which determine the illocutionary force of the utterance.

If however a further aspect of discourse context is taken into account, namely that the speaker is an arthritis sufferer and that he was discussing his illness in an earlier part of the interview, then the picture becomes even more complicated. Given this broader context the listener can (in Spence's (1970) terms) 'hear through' the metaphorical meaning to the literal meaning. In this case the metaphorical meaning refers to the speaker's feelings towards his wife, but one can hear through to the literal meaning which refers to the symptoms of the speaker's arthritis. In an important sense (to be defined below) both things are being talked about.

In another study Spence (1980) discusses discourse between a trained clinical interviewer and women being screened for cervical cancer. He reported patterns of use of the words 'death' and 'cancer' as used by patient and interviewer. He found that if the patient uses the word 'death' one or more times the interviewer tends not to use the word 'cancer' and vice versa. Spence points out that the interviewer was detecting the word 'death' and revising his own utterance as a result, despite the fact that the word was frequently disguised in metaphors. Examples of such metaphors are:-

I was scared to death.

He worried himself to death.
I almost froze to death.

In these cases the interviewer was (possibly unconsciously) listening through the metaphor to the literal meaning. In this study Spence also found that the interviewer never used the word 'cancer' unless the patient used it first. However, not only did the use of the word 'cancer' by the interviewer come after its use by the patient, but the amount of delay was significantly longer in positively diagnosed patients than in negatively diagnosed patients (even though neither patient nor interviewer knew the outcome of the tests). Spence found that in interviews with both positively and negatively diagnosed patients the word 'death' was almost never used by the interviewer. He also found that, of the patients who were diagnosed positive, significantly more of them used the word 'death' than negatively diagnosed patients and that they did so with significantly greater frequency. Spence points out that positively diagnosed patients use the word 'death' about five times as often as negatively diagnosed patients, who use the word with almost exactly the same frequency as the spoken English norms published by Howes (1966).

Spence's findings illustrate that in discourse participants orient to the literal as well as the metaphorical meanings of the words they use. When the possibility of serious illness is seen as part of the discourse then the literal meaning becomes reinstated as part of the discourse meaning along with the metaphorical. His work also stresses the highly interactive, negotiated, and emotionally dynamic nature of word use in this context. Spence was concerned with the expressive use of the words, and its disguise. He labelled as 'lexical leakage' the disguise in metaphor, of words in the speech of the patients, which were expressive of their illnesses. In coining this term Spence was following Ekman, Friesen and Ellsworth (1972) and Ekman and Friesen (1973) who used the word 'leakage' to describe the
phenomenon where warded-off affects seem to influence facial expression.

**Lexical leakage and lexical choice**

The phenomenon identified by Spence as 'lexical leakage' takes on a different significance (and, as we shall see below, calls for a different interpretation in Kleinian terms) if it is subjected to a more fine-grained linguistic analysis.

What is involved in lexical leakage is the presence of not one but two levels or layers of discourse meaning, which Spence (1968, p.352) (following Freud's terminology) refers to as 'manifest' and 'latent'. Thus in the first example discussed above, the manifest level of reference is to the subject of the patient's wife, while the 'latent' level of reference is to the subject of his arthritis. Given the potential ambiguity of the lexical items selected by the speaker, the listener may 'hear through' one level to another. The terms 'latent' and 'manifest', however, require further explanation.

In linguistic terms the appropriate reading of a potentially ambiguous item in discourse can be analysed as being determined by the discourse content, a part of which involves the notion of 'topic' (cf. Brown and Yule, 1983, Chapter 3; Labov and Fanshel, 1977, p.38; Stubbs, 1983). Conversely, discourse topic crucially depends upon the meaning of the specific lexical items that are uttered in the discourse, in that these items refer to elements of the topic under discussion. The prevailing assumption in linguistic studies of topic, which are concerned for example with disambiguation is that there is only one discourse topic at any one time. However in examples such as those under discussion, the systematic ambiguity of the lexical items used means that we are faced with cases where more than one discourse topic is 'on the agenda'.

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The distinction which Spence draws between 'latent' and 'manifest' meaning can be reinterpreted, in this light, in terms of a distinction between the local topic (the one that is being attended to at the moment of speaking) and other topics on a more general level which can be termed global. In terms of the hierarchy of discourse levels posited by the Birmingham school, global corresponds with the overall discourse unit while local refers to the level of 'transaction' unit - (cf. Coulthard 1977, and Stubbs 1983). The assumption I am making here is that conversation, in general, involves an agenda of multiple topics. Within a given transaction unit in discourse, participants agree on one specific local discourse topic, selected (by a negotiational process of membership categorisation) from the set of topics on the global 'topic agenda'. Lexical leakage is thus to be seen, ex hypothesi, as a special case where not one but two topics are being talked about (directly or indirectly) within a single transactional unit.

It should be stressed that according to this account of lexical leakage the latent topic is not simply left off the participants' shared agenda. Spence's account suggests that participants are motivated to attempt to remove the latent topic from the shared agenda. The account being proposed here is that the latent meaning is located outside the local agenda in order that the topic at hand can be efficiently and consciously attended to. However, the latent topic is still a necessary and integral part of the global agenda. Indeed although topics on the global agenda that are not on the local agenda are not attended to, and thus in a sense 'backgrounded', in terms of the overall structure of the discourse they are, by definition, superordinate. Although global agenda topics are locally unattended to, Spence's results on the lawfulness of his subjects' lexical choice show that these topics are still oriented to by the speakers in the text of their conversations. A global topic is one that is returned to even when it is locally unattended to. (Of course there is always the option of speakers
explicitly returning to a global topic explicitly as a local agenda topic if necessary. A parallel may be drawn here with the use of metalinguistic speech. The textual function of speech, although oriented to by speakers, as shown in CA, is unattended to until it becomes necessary to invoke metalinguistic speech to attend to it directly.)

Lexical choice (and indeed intra-paradigm choice of formulations at other linguistic levels) provides the vehicle for speakers to orient to global topics that are locally unattended to - a topic from the global agenda 'leaks through' into the text of a conversation whose locally attended to topic is something else. In that the study of the phenomenon of lexical leakage is the study of speakers' global agenda, its concern is with what is 'really' going on in the conversation. A parallel can be drawn with Labov and Fanshel (1977), whose study is discussed elsewhere in this thesis, and who also have the aim of discerning what is really going on in conversation.

This linguistic background allows one to pinpoint where a Kleinian account of lexical leakage would diverge from the Spencian account. The agenda of topics, both global and local, is one aspect of the discourse which involves negotiation between participants - it is accomplished using the process of membership categorisation. The Kleinian account would look at this process of membership categorisation, its particular contribution being an account of internal world membership categorisation to complement more orthodox accounts of membership categorisation of the external world.

In lexical leakage the latent meaning is not 'temporarily off the agenda' or 'disguised' (to use Spence's term). The Kleinian would argue that latent and manifest discourse topics are both on the agenda (although of course they have a different status). Furthermore latent and manifest meaning interact, as can be seen from a reconsideration of the example of the discourse fragment taken from an interview with an arthritis patient.
The speaker is not just referring covertly to his arthritis in the course of talking about his feelings towards his wife. The two levels of meaning are linked both in the internal world of the patient and in the shared internal world of the patient and the interviewer; and this linking occurs in both directions. The arthritic 'leakage' is a vehicle for the patient's expression and externalisation of feelings about his wife, just as talk about his wife provides the resources for repeated metaphorical reference to arthritis. The emotional dynamics of the link between the local and global topic require them, at that moment in the dialogue, to be on the agenda simultaneously, and it is this that determines the systematic ambiguity of the particular lexical items used.

**A Kleinian account of lexical leakage.**

Spence talks about lexical leakage in terms of the need to disguise the painful feelings expressed in the literal meaning of the words used. But this account fails to provide any principled explanation of why the speaker should have used the potentially ambiguous formulations in the first place. A Kleinian perspective would provide a different and communicative rationale for lexical leakage in terms of its functionality for the speaker.

In the case of the cancer patients it seems that an active issue for both interviewer and patient was whether the patient was to be categorised as terminally ill. Both interlocutors were ignorant of the actual diagnosis and so the categorisation can be seen to be happening at the level of internal world phantasy rather than external world reality. (Even though in Spence's findings phantasy and reality seem to be congruent). From a Kleinian point of view internal world membership categorisation is an important aspect of what is happening in these dialogues in that the speakers are trying to negotiate, interactively, solutions to problems occurring in shared phantasy. The Kleinian account would tend not to
emphasise that the literal meanings of the words were disguised, but rather that they were unattended to because, in this context, they belong to dream-life. The referents of the words would be of significance from the point of view of external world membership categorisation in, for example, interviews where patients are being informed of the outcome of their tests. In this situation death might be discussed explicitly and the word 'death' used in an unambiguously literal sense.

From a Kleinian perspective, in the situations discussed by Spence, the emotions expressed by the literal meanings of the words used are experienced by the speakers (and, in the case of the cancer patients, their interlocutors) as actually contained in these words. The speakers' use of these words is conceived by the Kleinian as being for the purpose of externalising the painful feelings contained in the words in an attempt by the speakers to rid themselves of these feelings. The Kleinian approach thus provides an account of speakers' motivation for the use of these words in the first place. This explanation of lexical leakage contrasts with that of Spence where the literal meanings of the words are conceived of as disguised. But there would appear to be no motive for the arthritis patient quoted above to disguise his symptoms, since he was discussing his disease openly earlier in the interview. From the Kleinian point of view, however, the internal world link between his symptoms and the rigidity of his attitude towards his ex-wife, the latter being the overt topic of the discourse fragment quoted, provides the opportunity for him to 'leak' the painful feelings in his mind which are unattended to at that point in the interview. Spence's account also suggests that the cancer patients would omit the relevant words completely rather than using them in a covert form. Although from the point of view of the patient the aim is to split off and get rid of the painful feelings contained in these words, from an interactive point of view of the adaptive functioning of the human organism
in its environment, the patient is 'looking for' a listener to act as a container for these feelings and thus return them to the patient in a form that the patient could tolerate and use as a basis for thought. This is the phenomenon of communication by projective identification.

Although the interviewer seems to be interactively sensitive to these projections he does not seem to accept and contain them. Rather he seems to avoid and deny them. Spence suggests that the words used are being experienced as equated to the disease itself and that the interviewer's lack of use of the word 'cancer' is denying presence of the disease. He seems to be attempting a sort of 'magical treatment'. In Kleinian terms this would be symbolic equation characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position.

Spence's account of the phenomenon he identified as lexical leakage focuses on the need to disguise the painful feelings expressed by the literal meaning of the words used. However a Kleinian account provides a communicative rationale, in terms of a functional account of human psychic needs, for why these particular words were used at all.

**Lexical leakage as an everyday phenomenon**

The previous examples, referred to by Spence, have drawn on pathological situations where major physical illnesses and their emotional consequences have been a determining factor. However it should be stressed that lexical leakage is a special case of a more general everyday phenomenon. Membership categorisation of the external world and of the internal world are simultaneously and routinely a problem for participants, and topics from both domains will therefore be on the agenda at any one point in a conversation. Also limits on the capacity of short term memory will mean that the global topic will not be attended to by participants, although it will be oriented to in the discourse for the purposes of interaction. This orientation will thus have to be accomplished by
processes such as lexical leakage (or some other form of leakage such as intonational or facial).

An everyday example of lexical leakage can be found in the commentary in the previous chapter. It will be recalled that the family having the conversation had agreed to be videoed as a personal favour, knowing that the recording was for a thesis on discourse analysis. This had delayed their drive home to a distant town on a dark night just before Christmas. Page two, lines 10, 11, and 12 of the transcript are as follows:-

'Jenny: Isn't the Great Dictator a talkie?
John: No, I don't think there's any talking in the Great Dictator, I mean I don't know much about Chaplin films.'

The local topic is that of films, and whether a particular film, 'The Great Dictator', contains any talking. The global topic is their feelings of annoyance with me at being detained for the purpose of studying their talking (cf Jenny's comment in page 17, line 21 of the transcript: -

'Mummy and Daddy are talking for Uncle Bob' [The author]).

One can again see the duality of topic in this discourse fragment. It is precisely the associative link between the global and local topic that provides the opportunity for the lexical leakage. The global topic provides the particular question about the particular film, and the local topic affords them the opportunity and resources to externalise their feelings about the 'film' they are themselves in, both to each other and to me. Both topics are being talked about. Again the leakage relies on the ambiguous referents of the words they use. In terms of the local topic the words 'the great dictator' refer to the Chaplin film of that name and the word 'talkie' to the general category of talking pictures. In terms of the global topic the words 'the great dictator' refer to me and the word talkie to the particular video that they are at that moment engaged in making for the purposes of my studying their talk. The leakage is perhaps more difficult
to establish in this case because it is less patterned than Spence’s data. However, in the previous chapter it will be seen how in other cases their particular choices of films from within the paradigm of films that they might discuss are also a manifestation of leakage.

**Lexical leakage and the Freudian slip**

It is important to distinguish the notion of lexical leakage from that of the Freudian slip, which is another everyday emotional-dynamic aspect of language use that is (initially at least) unattended to by the speaker. Freud (1901) defined slips of the tongue as part of a more general class of motivated mistakes - parapraxes. He defines parapraxes (Freud, 1916, p.44) as arising

"... from the concurrent action - or perhaps rather, the mutually opposing action - of two different intentions."

He goes on to say (p.61):

"We have said that parapraxes are the product of mutual interference between two different intentions, of which one may be called the disturbed intention and the other the disturbing one."

He then defines slips of the tongue as follows (p.65):

"[The disturbing intention]... is forced back. The speaker decides not to put it into words, and after that the slip of the tongue occurs: after that, that is to say, the purpose which has been forced back is put into words against the speaker’s will, either by altering the expression of the intention which he has permitted, or by mingling with it, or by actually taking its place. This, then, is is the mechanism of a slip of the tongue."

He concludes (p.66):

"... the suppression of the speaker’s intention to say something is the indispensable condition for the occurrence of a slip of the tongue."

(The emphases in the preceding quotations are Freud’s.)

From a psychodynamic point of view lexical leakage and the Freudian slip would not initially seem to be clearly distinct phenomena; linguistically, however, they are distinct. A Freudian slip is some locally irrelevant
intrusion into the flow of discourse - an intrusion from the global topic agenda which fragments the discourse concerning the local topic. The discourse at the level of the local topic provides semantic, syntactic and phonological constraints on (or filters for) the Freudian slip. Despite this linguistic 'meshing' with the co-text, the slip is nonetheless a disruption of the discourse flow. Although the slip is initially linguistically unattended to by speakers (by definition, or it would not be a slip), it is routinely brought to their attention as accountable, or, more precisely, corrigible, by their audience or, occasionally, by speakers themselves after they have made the slip (cf. Freud, 1916, p.68:- "... we often fail to hear our own slips, though never other people's"). By contrast, lexical leakage is non-disruptive precisely because speakers make use of the local topic flow as a resource for referring to global topic items without actually intruding into that flow. (For example, this can be accomplished by using the literal meanings of words to refer to global topic items, where these literal meanings are backgrounded because of the metaphorical use of the words in the immediate discourse context of the local topic. This is the strategy used in Spence's data discussed in the previous sections.)

In characterising the phenomenon to which he is referring Freud (1901, p.59) gives an example used by an earlier author, the philologist Meringer. Meringer describes how the President of the Lower House of the Austrian Parliament opened the sitting with the words:-

"Gentlemen: I take notice that a full quorum of members is present and herewith declare the session closed!"

(Original emphasis).

His attention was only drawn to his slip by the general merriment and he corrected his mistake. Although he did not initially attend to the mistake himself the President was corrected by his audience - his audience oriented to him as having introduced an accountable disruption into his discourse flow. It should also be noted that this sort of slip, unlike lexical leakage,
does not use ambiguity to accomplish duality of topic. It is precisely
because the Freudian slip does not use ambiguity, or some other such
strategy, that makes the slip a disruption to the discourse flow and renders
it corrigible. Lexical leakage involves the same words referring to two
different topics simultaneously and therefore can be said to involve a true
duality of topic. A Freudian slip, however, does not interact with lexical
choice at the level of the local topic, and is thus best analysed as a
momentary shift of topic, or topic interference, that is the intrusion of a
fragment of discourse belonging to a topic from the global topic agenda,
into the local topic discourse flow. In the above example the local topic is
the opening of the Parliament and the item from the global topic agenda
that intrudes into the local topic is the closing of the Parliament.

Hockett (1973, p.94), who enjoins linguists to look further at
Freudian slips, gives two reasons why they have been relatively ignored:-
1) The concentration by linguists on langue rather than parole.
2) The emphasis by linguists on what he calls 'smooth speech' rather
   than blunders.

Chomsky, he claims, perpetuates the situation where phenomena such as the
Freudian slip are ignored by linguists. Chomsky (1965, pp. 3 and 4)
consigns processing errors such as slips of the tongue to the category of
performance, as opposed to competence, and as such defines them as not
part of the proper study of grammar. Linguists such as Hockett have taken
issue with Chomsky's position on this issue, as they see real-time
processing as part of the grammarian's data. Chomsky's use of the
competence / performance distinction is parallel to that of Saussure's
langue / parole distinction in as far as they are both invoked to avoid the
need to account for aspects of language use such as the Freudian slip.
Linguists have been critical of this general position not least because of
the need to explain the unambiguously linguistic phonological, semantic and
syntactic filters by which smooth speech constrains phenomena such as verbal slips.

By contrast to the Freudian slip, however, the phenomenon of lexical leakage occurs in what Hockett calls smooth speech and hence does not fall into the category of performance error. The study of lexical leakage can thus be seen as part of the study of speakers' linguistic competence, and should be included as part of the micro-semantic component of linguistics. The more restricted definitions of the proper subject matter of linguistics, as proposed by Saussure and Chomsky, would exclude consideration of the Freudian slip. However, even by these restricted definitions, lexical leakage remains centrally a part of the data of linguistics.

From a psychodynamic point of view there might, at first sight, seem to be little difference between lexical leakage and the Freudian slip. The Freudian would account for both phenomena in terms of the linguistic manifestation of emotions which the speaker attempts to disguise or suppress (cf. the last of the above quotations from Freud) and the Kleinian would account for both phenomena in terms of linguistically accomplished internal world communication. The Freudian account of the slip of the tongue has a similar weakness to that of lexical leakage, that is it does not explain why the suppressed intention returns as a slip instead of remaining suppressed. As with lexical leakage a Kleinian explanation can provide a more satisfactory account in this regard. There is one dimension which the Kleinian account would emphasise more than the Freudian in differentiating between lexical leakage and the Freudian slip. This dimension is intrusiveness: the Freudian slip is an intrusive phenomenon in a way that lexical leakage is not. (Freud and his followers did not theoretically develop the notion of intrusiveness as did Kleinians, for example in the development of their notion of intrusive identification as discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis.) It will be evident that this dimension of the
degree of intrusiveness correlates directly with the dimension along which the two phenomena differ linguistically, as discussed above. However whereas the linguistic distinction was drawn behaviourally, in terms of observable hearer orientation, the Kleinian distinction is in terms of the intrusiveness of the underlying emotions expressed by the slip. In other words the Kleinian account would provide an explanation for the linguistic intrusiveness of the Freudian slip in terms of the intrusiveness of the underlying emotions and, conversely, would take the linguistic intrusiveness of the Freudian slip as providing the evidence for the intrusiveness of the underlying emotions. In the case of lexical leakage, the emotions expressed by the leakage from the global topic agenda remain contained within the local discourse topic; in the case of the Freudian slip, these emotions are intrusive enough to fragment the flow of discourse about the local topic.

This Kleinian account of the Freudian slip may be compared with Bion’s clinical discussion of stammering outlined in Chapter Four of this thesis. Central to this approach is the notion of coherent language as a container for thought. The Kleinian would account for the Freudian slip in terms of an attack on the speaker’s linguistic container by the part of the self responsible for the linguistically intrusive emotions, using the mechanism of intrusive identification. Since discourse provides the medium through which locally negotiated thinking is given structure, any disruption to the flow of discourse will serve as a disruption to the structure of the thought contained within that discourse. Thus in the case of the Freudian slip underlying emotions are seen to interfere intrusively with the process of conscious verbal thought, whereas in lexical leakage this process remains intact. Kleinians have been more concerned than Freudians in investigating intrusive emotions, in that these emotions provide the basis for an account of the motivation for the disruption of verbal thought. This emphasis has been because Kleinians have traditionally been more concerned in
accounting for the psychogenesis of psychosis than have Freudians, and as a result they have also developed further the study of such everyday phenomena as slips of the tongue, what Freud called 'the psychopathology of everyday life'.

I wish to state a caveat at this point. Although there is compelling evidence that some lexical ambiguities and some slips of the tongue are in the service of internal world communication, it is important to stress that by no means all ambiguities and slips serve such a purpose. Not all potentially ambiguous words leak and, contrary to what Freud thought, not all slips are 'Freudian'. I would therefore propose three criteria by which the linguist may differentiate instances of lexical leakage and Freudian slips from other types of 'performance factors' (Chomsky, 1965, pp. 3 and 4) which are not immediately relevant to the present discussion:-

(i) They interact with their discourse context (either local or global) in ways which are semantically identifiable;
(ii) They are oriented to by the hearer;
(iii) They occur (at least in the case of lexical leakage) with some degree of systematicity in the local discourse context.

The first two criteria group together the two phenomena on semantic and pragmatic grounds respectively; the third criterion serves to distinguish lexical leakage from the Freudian slip in terms of discourse distribution.

Motley (1980) and Ellis (1980) have been concerned with investigating the validity of Freud's theory of slips of the tongue. Motley writes (p.133):

"Freud claimed that verbal slips are instigated by the global cognitive (and affective) state of the speaker, and that linguistic factors do not influence the outcome of the errors. Subsequent research has ignored the Freudian notion of influence by global cognitive states, while focussing on the linguistic factors that influence verbal slips. The present study, while based upon the recognition that linguistic factors most certainly influence verbal slip outcomes, is designed to pursue the possibility that the influences outlined by Freud may operate as well."
What Freud calls the 'disturbing intention' in the previously cited quotations is glossed by Motley as the 'global cognitive and affective state of the speaker'. This rearticulation is in line with the approach of this chapter that the outcome of the slip and of lexical leakage is influenced by what has been termed 'the global topic agenda'; this is itself a manifestation of the global cognitive and affective state of the speaker. Another similarity of this chapter to Motley's approach is that it has also assumed that local linguistic factors influence the outcome of lexical leakage, a related phenomenon to the Freudian slip, while its purpose has been to explore the influence of global factors. Motley provides a gloss of Freud's explanation of verbal slips in terms of the semantic manifestation of global cognitive variables as follows (p.133):

"Freud explained verbal slips as a manifestation of a speaker's cognitive state. The claim was that verbal slips are semantically related to a cognitive state, or set, which is determined by personality and situational influences, and which may be independent of the cognitions associated with the speaker's intended utterance. To put it another way, Freud's view was that semantic influences (e.g., cognitive set) that are independent of a speaker's intended utterance can create a distorted utterance such that the mutilated outcome (i.e., verbal slip) more closely resembles the meaning of the (semantic) interference than the meaning of the originally intended verbal output."

It should be noted that Motley is including affective or emotional factors in what he describes as 'cognitive set'. Motley goes on to describe his experimental study of the influences proposed by Freud. He concludes (p.145):

"Freud's . . . insight is one for which this study lends strong support: Semantic influences that are independent of a speaker's intended utterance can influence verbal slips to be closer in meaning to those semantic influences than to the originally intended utterance."

Thus the global semantic influence 'pulls' the stream of utterance away from the local topic. It is precisely this that makes the linguistic output a
slip rather than lexical leakage which uses systematic ambiguity to achieve a duality in the discourse semantics.

Motley's conclusion is that for some slips but by no means all, as was claimed by Freud, Freud's account is valid. The Kleinian approach supplements this causal account of the Freudian slip with a motivational one. It would seek to explain why some global elements 'break through' into the linguistic text as a disruption while others do not; in other words it attempts to give an account for the reasons why some global agenda items are differentially more intrusive than others.

Ellis (1980), in the same volume, also makes the case that not all slips of the tongue are the result of competing intentions as had been Freud's claim. He further argues that almost all of the slips of the tongue found by Freud do not differ on formal or structural grounds from those studied by psycholinguists and that they can be explained more parsimoniously in terms of the information-processing model of speech production that is being evolved by psycholinguists. He suggests that slips which appear to be 'Freudian' in origin appear to be so merely by chance - there would be a finite non-zero probability that the information processing architecture, which does not assume a Freudian disturbing intention, would randomly produce some slips which appear to be Freudian. Ellis, however, concedes the practical difficulties with operationalising and thus testing this statistical hypothesis.

The present author would agree that not all slips of the tongue are psychodynamic in origin. However I would take issue with Ellis' claim that the information-processing model is sufficient; it does not provide an account of why, given exactly the same psycholinguistic preconditions, sometimes a slip occurs and sometimes it does not. This is not to say that a strictly psychodynamic explanation would necessarily be required in order to provide such an explanation. Nevertheless, global features of the
speaker at the time of utterance (for example the speaker's alertness) would need to be considered over and above purely psycholinguistic factors. However, global cognitive and affective features of the more strictly 'Freudian' sort, such as those which were experimentally manipulated by Motley (1980) in the study mentioned above, would also need to be considered. In particular the psychodynamic characteristics of items other than the local discourse topic which are, consciously or unconsciously, on the speaker's mind at the time of utterance (items on the global topic agenda) are likely to be determinants of whether or not a slip occurs given the appropriate psycholinguistic preconditions. One important dimension of a global topic agenda item that will determine whether or not it causes a slip is its intrusiveness, and this is precisely the dimension that is of importance to the Kleinian in this context.

A Kleinian assessment of the intrusiveness of a global agenda item, in the case of a slip, if this assessment were to be made independently of the item having been the topic of a slip, would probably have to rely on what Freud, in this context, called 'circumstantial evidence'. In turn it would be this circumstantial evidence which would allow the linguist to determine whether a slip was in fact properly 'Freudian'.

Lexical leakage is, by definition, not an intrusive 'explosion' into the local discourse in the way that a Freudian slip is; this allows the leakage to be more pervasive and thus more patterned in the local discourse without rendering that discourse incoherent in the way that pervasiveness of the Freudian slip would. So the phenomenon of lexical leakage is routinely more patterned than the phenomenon of the Freudian slip. Thus, in the case of lexical leakage, data on psychodynamic characteristics, like intrusiveness, of a global topic agenda item would be more likely to be found in the linguistic text itself. It is for this reason (together with the fact, discussed above, that lexical leakage is more clearly a langue
phenomenon than the Freudian slip), that lexical leakage, rather than the Freudian slip, serves to illustrate the meshing between Kleinian psychodynamics and linguistic analysis.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that Spence's account of lexical leakage is inadequate. I hope to have shown that an alternative Kleinian account, by placing the phenomenon firmly in a communicative context, can give a more adequate understanding of its emotional-dynamic significance.

The application of a Kleinian framework to one specific discourse phenomenon has, furthermore, helped articulate a number of assumptions which apply to the linguistic analysis of discourse more generally. In particular, it calls for a more complex treatment of the notion of discourse topic than is usually assumed, including a distinction between local and global discourse topics, and the notion of a multiple agenda of topics, the ranking of which is established by negotiational processes of membership categorisation. Lexical leakage occurs when not one (as more typically) but two topics are on the immediate agenda, and are thus both operative at the micro-level at which lexical choice is constrained.

The assumption that discourse topic is unitary (rather than potentially multiple) is not frequently made explicit, but is implicit in discussion of the problem of disambiguation in the context of generative grammar (cf. Katz and Fodor, 1963; Aitchison, 1983, Chapter 10). For sentences in isolation, the assumption may indeed be quite appropriate. In discourse terms, however, it needs to be called into question. Although lexical leakage is, in certain respects, a 'special case', the implication of this Kleinian account is that in conversation more generally, the immediate discourse topic is typically surrounded by a penumbra of other topics, which can be shown to be 'on the agenda' by an analysis which takes equal account of
both the local and the global context. The Kleinian perspective thus
indicates ways in which the purely linguistic analysis of discourse may be
enhanced; and, conversely, close linguistic analysis can reveal some of the
micro-mechanisms of language whereby emotional-dynamic interaction is
effectuated.
Chapter Eight

CONCLUSION

Austin made the suggestion that we see language in terms of its users doing things with words, the implications of which are discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. This suggestion laid the foundation for those branches of linguistics, for example discourse analysis and sociolinguistics, both of which are exemplified in the work of Labov, which see language as a form of social interaction. In this thesis I have tried to argue that it is not just social interaction which we do with words, but also emotional interaction.

Furthermore emotional dynamics are not just part of the context of the discourse, but constitute a determining factor of the very fabric of the discourse itself, in the same way that social factors such as race, class, sex and so on have been shown to be by sociolinguistic studies. The definition of the membership of these social and emotional categories is one of the things which, in Austin's sense, is 'done' with words. Emotional dynamics are not just a determinant of verbal interaction but also a product of verbal interaction. Thus emotional dynamics are seen to be centrally within the domain of discourse analysis.

It should be noted that accepting the centrality of emotional dynamics to discourse processes is independent of the acceptance of Kleinian psychodynamic theory (although I myself consider Kleinian theory to be the best available framework for construing emotional interaction). Having once gained an emotional-dynamic perspective on language by using a Kleinian ladder, one can (to use a Wittgensteinian image) then kick the ladder away.
This final chapter will attempt to pull together various threads of the thesis. I shall first rearticulate my general theoretical position on the necessity of incorporating emotional dynamics into the tradition of speech act theory and Labovian linguistics, in order to supplement its already elaborate account of social dynamics. I shall then argue, with specific reference to lexical leakage and the notion of discourse topic, that this theoretical position has concrete implications for the descriptive apparatus of discourse analysis.

**What do speech acts act upon?**

In Chapters One and Two of this thesis I looked at a tradition which sees language as action in the social world. In order to establish the need to supplement this social account with an emotional dimension I shall examine the question: What do speech acts act upon?

Language acts upon various things, for example, people's social relationships and attitudes. Of particular interest here is the way that language acts upon speakers' and hearers' emotions. The view of emotions envisaged is that they are subjects' conscious experience of their internal worlds, of which they are largely unconscious in their waking life. Subjects stand in relationship to their internal worlds in a way which is analogous to their relationship to the external world, but they are not, in general, immediately aware of it; subjects' main contact with their internal worlds is through dream-life. People need to spend a certain amount of concentration on both the external and internal worlds; however, in waking, consciousness needs to be directed outwards towards the external world. Problems occur in subjects' internal worlds which need attention - these occur all the time, whether the subject is awake or asleep, but in waking life they require slightly less immediate attention than the problems of the external world and can wait for the safety of sleep and dream-life for
attention. Some internal world states, however, manifest themselves in 'real time', when the subject is awake, and are experienced consciously as emotions. Emotions are the primary waking conscious representations of the internal world and, as such, are the manifestations of the internal world which are most immediately available for being acted on linguistically, for example by jokes or verbal soothing. (In a psychoanalysis, patients' dream-elements, which symbolise their internal world objects, are identified and made conscious and are thus rendered available for purposeful verbal action on the part of the analyst.)

The approach to language taken here is critical of the view which takes language as a mirror of reality; that is the view that takes speaking as an attempt to transfer a picture that the speaker has of the world, in his or her mind, into the mind of the hearer. (This view manifests itself with respect to topic in, for example, the work of van Dijk (1977) which will be discussed later in this chapter.) A metaphor for this model of language is the exchange of photographs. For the dynamic approach to language as action being proposed here it is necessary to modify the view that interlocutors' pictures of the world are all that their speech acts act upon. In the present account 'pictures' are replaced by the richer notion of interlocutors' 'knowledge representations' as the objects of their speech acts. In this context, knowledge is defined, not as encyclopaedic, but as that conscious or unconscious knowledge which is used by interlocutors to shape those transactions in the world that are relevant to the particular speech acts in question. Examples of such knowledge might be knowledge of how to walk, of social obligations, and of the various internal world phenomena. 'Language as action' is a richer model of language and language use than classical picture theory. Language is seen as something that happens between, and acts upon, people and their knowledge representations. Its content is not exhausted by, though it naturally
includes, the communication of subjective pictures of the world between speaker and hearer. These pictures, however, are not static representations and are, at least in part, a product of the verbal interaction itself. According to this view the pictures of the world which speakers communicate about are negotiated in the conversation itself through the process of membership categorisation.

The dynamic model of linguistic interaction being proposed here is that there are three aspects to conversation, which are in operation when we speak to each other. They are all three always present but to different degrees at various points. They are:-

a) Communication involving the external world. (This, to the neglect of the other two aspects, has traditionally tended to be the province of linguistics.)

b) Internal world communication; this involves the communication of states of mind by projective identification.

c) 'Anti-communication'; this is where an utterance is used as a means of attack, by intrusive identification.

In communication by projective identification language is used by the speaker to bring about an empathetic response on the part of the hearer such that the speakers' state of mind is induced in the hearer. On the other hand, the essence of anti-communication is the attempted destruction, by the speaker, of thought or the potential for thought in both him or herself and his or her hearer. Examples of this mode of linguistic action are when conventional labels, such as jargon, which have long since had the meaning squeezed out of them, are used to 'blind with science', leaving the speaker complacent and the hearer confused; the speaker has rid him or herself of his or her confusion and forced it into the speaker. Another example of this form of language use is an angry comment, made in a quarrel, where the speaker rids him or herself of the feeling of anger by
forcing it into the hearer. The speaker, however, does not bear all the
responsibility for whether an utterance functions as projective identification
or as intrusive identification; they are essentially interactive concepts, and
as such must be understood in terms of both speaker and hearer. It should
be noted that verbal interaction is only one of the ways by which
projective identification and intrusive identification are accomplished, but
their operation through verbal interaction is what concerns the present
work.

There is a delicate balance between projective identification and
intrusive identification. In the former case, one person is momentarily
inducing his or her own state of mind in the other person, in order to help
both of them to think about it and thus to understand it better. In the
latter case, one person is pushing or forcing his or her state of mind into
the other person, in order that he or she may deny it in him or herself
and destroy the possibility of thought about it in the other person. The
recipient of intrusive identification will not experience empathy with the
speaker, but will rather feel overwhelmed by a state of mind which is
unamenable to thought. The destruction (or attempted destruction), in the
hearer, of the capacity to think about the speaker's denied state of mind is
in furtherance of the speaker's denial, the function being, at least in part,
to prevent the hearer from returning the denied state of mind back to the
original speaker (by direct confrontation or otherwise). It is easy for
communication by projective identification to slip into intrusive
identification. Envy of the other person being able to help one to think is
often a reason for the use of intrusive identification rather than
communication by projective identification.

External world communication acts on knowledge representations of
the external, physical and social world using mechanisms traditionally
studied by linguists such as Labov and Fanshel (1977). The most explicit
aspect of Labov and Fanshel's investigation is focussed on what Meltzer calls the contractual level of language - that is the social level of rights and obligations. This contractual element in linguistic interaction is important both for the negotiation of meaning (cf. Grice, 1975, 1978) and the negotiation of the conversational text itself (cf. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974). However in the sort of conversation where emotional dynamics are an important factor, such as in the medical settings described in Spence's work on lexical leakage, (and arguably in all conversations), the creation of meaning cannot be interpreted solely in terms of contractual or other types of linguistic usage which pertain to the external world. A theory of emotional dynamics is required to give a full account of meaning creation (as I attempted to demonstrate in Chapter Seven by discussing the phenomenon of lexical leakage). However such a theory is, on the whole, not deployed by linguists (including Labov and Fanshel, even though they are investigating a highly emotionally charged piece of psychotherapeutic discourse). The central argument of this account has been that existing approaches to linguistic analysis, which focus on such elements as contractual 'bargaining' in language, have important limitations, not least when dealing with linguistic interaction that occurs in emotionally charged circumstances such as those described by Spence. It seems plausible to suggest that it is precisely in such areas that the limited validity of analytical approaches which concentrate on meaning creation in the external world is greatest. However it is hoped that the discussion and interpretation of empirical material in Chapter Six has demonstrated the need to go beyond this type of analysis, even in relatively everyday settings with everyday topics under discussion.

Each person has a set of beliefs or, more accurately, knowledge representations, about their obligations, their rights, their relationships (both along the dimension of intimacy and along the dimension of power or
status) and so on. The mind contains mental representations of what is outside the mind, the external world, and mental representations of what is inside the mind, the internal world. These representations may be conscious or unconscious. The knowledge representations of what is inside the mind are known, by Kleinians, as phantasies - a phantasy is a mental representation of an internal world scenario. More precisely, a phantasy is a representation in the mind of something in the mind which is viewed as if it were in the body. The knowledge representations of the external world and the knowledge representations of the internal world are related to each other, and each gives meaning to the other. The external world provides the symbols, dream-symbols, with which to think about the internal world, and in turn the internal world invests the external world with meaning and affect.

However, confusion between the two is a source of psychopathology. An example of interaction between the internal and external worlds is the following:- Human beings have internal 'parents', representations of their parents which are experienced as being inside the body and which are the central figures of the internal world. These internal objects will be based initially on early feelings and experiences, especially those connected with feeding, but are constantly being manifested and reworked in everyday life, throughout the individual's lifespan, with external world figures that relate symbolically to the internal world. (The physical sensations associated with emotions may in part be due to the persistence into adult life of infantile sensations such as hunger which form the earliest experiences of internal objects.) Transactions with external parents will be a powerful force for internal reworking as they will probably be the most powerful symbols for the internal parents. In a mentally healthy and adult state external parents will not be symbolically equated with internal parents or viewed solely as symbols for internal parents; they will be allowed freedom from the self.
The degree of independence of external parents will be a function of how independent the internal parents are from the self. It should be noted that figures other than external parents can symbolically represent internal parents - there is no simple correspondence between internal and external objects. The psychoanalyst, for example, may symbolically represent an internal parent, or indeed any other internal figure, in the transference. (To some extent the development of good internal parents is innate. An individual with good primal internal objects, despite a non-conducive and impoverished environment with respect to external parents, will nevertheless deploy whatever positive elements there are in the environment for the development of good internal parents. On the other hand an individual with more destructive tendencies will not be able to use for the development of good internal parents even perhaps the most favourable environmental conditions.)

The present author opposes the idea that language is simply information transfer. Rather, language is seen as involving action upon two very complicated representations of the world, internal and external, psychological and sociological, which are inter-related in the way that has been described. Therefore the answer to the question 'What do speech acts act upon?' might be as follows:- First, speech acts act on people. They do not act directly on the external world like physical actions, but they may act directly on the internal world. Speech acts can act indirectly on the external world, for example, if someone makes the request for action 'Please can I have a glass of water?' which is complied with by the addressee picking up the glass of water and passing it to the speaker. However, a prerequisite for the action on the external world is for the speaker to change and refocus the hearer's knowledge representations of her relationship with the speaker at the time the request is made, in particular his or her needs, rights and obligations with respect to the
speaker and the action requested by the speaker. This process of change and refocusing is explicated in Labov and Fanshel's discourse rules which are presented and illustrated in Chapters One and Two of this thesis.

Speech acts, therefore, act upon people, and on their knowledge representations both of the external world and of the internal world, and also, perhaps, on their internal worlds directly. To the extent that the depressive position, the zenith of mental health, is achieved, these two parts of the personality will be integrated, that is they will interact with each other in an enriching way without the two domains of representation being confused. They will be two halves of a healthy, whole personality.

The notion of membership categorisation provides an account of how speakers use language (and other interactional resources) to organise cognitively their conceptions of the physical and social world. This is membership categorisation of the external world. The notion of membership categorisation can be extended from cognitive sociology (the term used by Cicourel (1973) in this context) into dynamic psychology by applying it to speakers' use of interactional resources to manage their emotional organisation of the world, that is, what they feel about things in the world. According to the Kleinian account, speakers' feelings about something will depend on how it is associated with objects in their internal worlds and how these objects are classified. This organisation of associations between objects in the internal and external worlds and of the classifications of objects in the internal world is known in dynamic psychology by the term 'object relations'. We may then view the local management of object relations using interactional resources, in particular language, as internal world membership categorisation. Just as the operation of speech acts on representations of objects in the external world (and therefore their associations with representations of objects in the internal world) results in the accomplishment of external world membership categorisation, so the
operation of speech acts on representations of objects in the internal world (and therefore their associations with representations of objects in the external world) results in the accomplishment of internal world membership categorisation. It should be noted that as the internal world and the external world are intimately related, as was noted in the previous discussion, external world membership categorisation will result in some internal world membership categorisation and internal world membership categorisation will result in some external world membership categorisation.

This section has presented an account of speech act theory from a Kleinian point of view, which has pointed to the 'internal world' as the locus of emotional interaction, and explored the relationship between action on the internal world, on the one hand, and action on the external world, on the other. It has explicated how the Kleinian category of the internal world is related to the more theory-neutral notion of emotional dynamics, and similarly how the category of the external world is related to the notion of socially accomplished cognitive classification. It provides background for the notion that the verbal negotiation of emotional dynamics can be construed as membership categorisation of the internal world in much the same way as verbal negotiation of cognitive categories of the physical and social (as exemplified in a very explicit fashion by Labov and Fanshel's rules of discourse) can be construed as membership categorisation of the external world.

**Discourse topic and emotional dynamics**

In the previous section I argued, in Kleinian terms, for the centrality of emotional dynamics in verbal interaction. In this section I shall draw together some of the implications for the discourse analyst.

If one is to ask 'what is really going on' in a chunk of discourse, as was the approach of Labov and Fanshel (1977), one needs to bear in mind
not just the social dimension but also the emotional-dynamic dimension (for the theoretical reasons given in the previous section). More specifically, one needs to bear this dimension in mind when defining notions such as 'topic', or what the chunk of discourse is about. Lexical leakage is a phenomenon where there is more to 'what is really going on' (or to 'what the discourse is about') than meets the eye. A Kleinian reorientation in discourse analysis thus leads to a re-examination of some of its key concepts, and the notion of topic in particular.

Brown and Yule (1983, pp. 69 and 70) define topic as follows:

"In order to divide up a lengthy recording of conversational data into chunks which can be investigated in detail, the analyst is often forced to depend on intuitive notions about where one part of a conversation ends and another begins. There are, of course, points where one speaker stops and another starts speaking, but every speaker-change does not necessarily terminate a particular coherent fragment of conversation. Which point of speaker-change, among the many, could be treated as the end of one chunk of the conversation? This type of decision is typically made by appealing to an intuitive notion of topic. The conversationalists stop talking about 'money' and move onto 'sex'. A chunk of conversational discourse, then, can be treated as a unit of some kind because it is on a particular 'topic'. The notion of 'topic' is clearly an intuitively satisfactory way of describing the unifying principle which makes one stretch of discourse 'about' something and the next stretch 'about' something else, for it is appealed to very frequently in the discourse analysis literature."

(Original emphasis.)

Brown and Yule (p. 68) also insist on the principle that "it is speakers and writers who have topics, not texts", and they suggest that "formal attempts to define topics are doomed to failure". In the light of material presented in the preceding chapters in this thesis, some aspects of Brown and Yule's account of topic will have to be modified. The important insights they have are that the topic of a chunk of discourse is what that chunk is 'about' and also that it is a property of interlocutors, and from this it would follow that a motivational account of topic is required. They also stress (p. 90) that topic is negotiated by interlocutors. However, their assumption that topic change only occurs at speaker change points, together
with the related assumption that a chunk of discourse has one and only one
topic, is challenged in the present work.

Topic is a category oriented to and accomplished by speakers as a
way of organising their discourse into chunks for various purposes to do
with coherence, for example pronominal reference. The topic of a piece of
discourse and the points of topic change are negotiated by interlocutors and
as such accomplished by membership categorisation. Topic negotiation is
therefore a textual, micro-linguistic aspect of membership categorisation,
which is analogous to the negotiation of speaker turn (Sacks, Schegloff and
Jefferson, 1974).

The interactive nature of discourse topic makes those accounts of it
which are couched simply in terms of the propositions underlying the piece
of discourse, problematic, and many attempts to give a formal definition of
topic fall into this category. An example of this approach is in the
textlinguistics of van Dijk (1977), an extension to the discourse-semantic
level of the notion that the meaning or content of a sentence resides solely
in its underlying propositional or information content. Discourse analysts
who view their subject as a branch of pragmatics, for example Labov and
Fanshel (1977), have taken issue with approaches of this sort. Brown and
Yule (1983, p.1) refer to the information transfer aspect of language as
'transactional' and the speech act aspect as 'interactional'. (A related
distinction, discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, is made by Meltzer in
the Kleinian tradition). The solely transactional notion of topic exemplified
in van Dijk's textlinguistics is inadequate since, as Brown and Yule point
out, speakers and writers have topics, not texts.

One of the reasons for the neglect of interactional and dynamic
aspects of topic is the proposal by Chomsky (1965), criticised by Hockett
(1973) in his paper on the linguistic importance of slips of the tongue
discussed in Chapter Seven, that the study of competence should be the
primary aim or orientation of syntactic theory, rather than the study of performance. This proposal, which has (explicitly or implicitly) been generalised to other areas of linguistic study as well as syntax, relegates human agency and motivation from being a central part of the explanatory apparatus needed to account for linguistic data, to being part of the explanatory apparatus of the more peripheral study of performance. What is being proposed here, following Hockett and others, is that such a theory of 'performance' should be seen not as peripheral, but as necessary and integral to the explanation of linguistic data, particularly with respect to topic. The linguistic investigation of lexical leakage presented in Chapter Seven illustrates how human agency and motivation is part of the explanatory apparatus needed to account for the linguistic data on topic.

One reason why the specifically emotional aspects of the dynamics of topic negotiation have been neglected is the dominant model of language simply as a function of 'cognition', one of whose manifestations is the purely propositional account of linguistic content exemplified in van Dijk's (1977) approach to topic, referred to above. Examples of the 'cognitive' account of language are the notions of mental representations (Kempson, 1988) and mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1981). These theories account for thinking about objects in the external world. Clearly I do not have my girlfriend in my mind when I am thinking about her, I have a representation of her in my mind; it is such representations which form the basis of the cognitivist account of thought. However, emotional interaction can also be, in a sense, 'direct', in that it does not necessarily have to be mediated through knowledge representations and cognition. The application of Kleinian theory to speech act theory (presented in the previous section), with its notion of the internal world, containing internal objects, as the locus of emotions, provides a way of construing 'direct' emotional interaction in terms of the interaction of internal objects, and also of
construing knowledge representations of emotions in terms of knowledge representations of internal objects.

Returning to topic, what is required then is a dynamic, person-based and dialogical notion of topic, and the account which would seem most appropriate is in a strain of thinking about discourse deriving from Sacks and Labov. However, their notion of social context needs to be extended to encompass emotional dynamics and internal world interaction.

In the present work language is seen as action and interaction, and discourse meaning is seen as negotiated, that is, as a product of membership categorisation in both the external and the internal worlds. Topic is seen as accomplished by speakers in an analogous way. Membership categorisation of the internal and the external worlds is the process by which topic and topic change are negotiated. It is through this process that interlocutors decide what to talk about and when to talk about it, that is the content and coherence of their discourse.

A 'competence' account or a purely cognitive, knowledge-based, account, of linguistic categories such as topic, precisely rules out the sort of motivational account that I have suggested is implicitly required by Brown and Yule's interactive notion of topic. Furthermore the discussion of lexical leakage and Freudian slips in Chapter Seven of this thesis demonstrates the need for such a motivational account, such as the one provided by Kleinian psychodynamics. What is required is a performance-based account of how speakers accomplish aspects of topicality which also captures the emotional-dynamic and motivational aspects of this accomplishment.

There are however two points of divergence which I have with Brown and Yule. A consideration of lexical leakage (where lexical resources are used by speakers to accomplish duotopicality at a particular point in their discourse) challenges their notion of monotopicality at all points in
discourse, and a consideration of Freudian slips challenges their notion that topic change only occurs at speaker change points (although the latter assumption seems unwarranted even when examined against some of Brown and Yule's own data). Consideration of these phenomena calls into question assumptions made in current linguistic analyses, and leads to specific proposals about the framework for talking about continuity, content and coherence in discourse which applies not just to emotional dynamics, but to discourse more generally. For example, the interaction between topic and lexical choice is central to 'collocational' (lexical semantic) accounts of discourse coherence and lies at the heart of any discussion of disambiguation. These collocational accounts will have to be elaborated further so as to explain not only how speakers and hearers use the interaction between lexical choice and topic to accomplish disambiguation, but also how they use this interaction for the accomplishment of systematic, motivated ambiguity; for example the systematic lexical ambiguity which allows for the duotopicality in lexical leakage. Furthermore, as the discourse analyst has to encompass the possibility of 'polytopicality' at any particular point in discourse, the possibility is opened for the discourse-analytic understanding of examples of manipulative language use with 'hidden topic agendas'. For example advertising slogans or different styles of news-reporting may be seen from this point of view, with the 'speakers' seeking to use lexical devices to 'orient' the audience in particular ways.

The specific proposal for discourse analysis that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that the currently available descriptive vocabulary in the area of TOPIC can be usefully enriched in the following way. The LOCAL topic of a discourse fragment is to be analysed in the context of a GLOBAL TOPIC AGENDA, the constituents of which are negotiated by the discourse participants by a process of MEMBERSHIP CATEGORISATION.
This framework allows (contrary to implicit current assumptions) for the possibility that a discourse fragment may be DUO-TOPICAL, as exemplified by the phenomenon of LEXICAL LEAKAGE, where there is both a foregrounded LOCAL topic and also a backgrounded GLOBAL topic that 'leaks through' into the locally-managed discourse semantics.

It might further be posited - as a hypothesis to guide further research - that the duo-topicality involved in lexical leakage is a limiting case of a more general discourse principle, which can be stated as follows:-
The linguistic formulations used by speakers to converse about a local discourse topic are motivated, in ways that crucially involve emotional dynamics, by the penumbra of other topics on the jointly negotiated global topic agenda of the discourse participants.
Since the concluding chapters of this thesis have gradually narrowed their focus so as to examine one particular level of language in detail, the broader scope of the linguistic discourse analysis I am proposing can be conveniently reaffirmed by means of a literary illustration. Literary representations of dialogue include not just the locutionary (propositional), but also illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of the particular speech acts accomplished in the discourse. In particular, they typically include the emotional-dynamic aspects of the speech acts, including accounts of these emotional-dynamics accomplished using linguistic devices at levels other than the lexical. Although fictional, literary representations of dialogue are likely to capture a level of native speaker intuition that would be part of the concern of a linguist studying real conversation. However, academic linguists would need a vocabulary, such as the Kleinian one, with which to structure and substantiate their account.

As an example of the way that discourse can be represented thus in a multi-layered fashion, consider the following not untypical snippet from a modern novel by A.N. Wilson, *The Healing Art* (1980, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.32). The conversation is between George and Dorothy ['Dol'] as they leave hospital after Dorothy has been x-rayed for suspected cancer:-

'Keep you waiting, though, don't they?' she sniffed, trying to look on the bright side.

'That's my Dol.' And he regretted the reassuring tone at once for fear that it would set her off again. 'Yes', he added hastily, 'still I dare say as they're short-staffed at weekends.' He delivered the judgement as from some professional standpoint. Dorothy took it up respectfully and said, 'Short-staffed, that would be it. Though you hear that they all work very long hours in hospital.'

The representation of dialogue consists of much more than just the bare utterances contained within the quotation marks. The additional
commentary, indicating to the reader 'what is really going on' (in the sense of Labov and Fanshel) includes:-

(1) Intonational / voice quality aspects (eg. 'sniffed', 'reassuring tone').
(2) Emotional-dynamic strategies (eg. 'trying to look on the bright side', 'fear that it would set her off again', 'as from some professional standpoint', 'took it up respectfully'.
(3) Sequencing markers (eg. 'he added hastily').

Of particular interest, in this context, is the interaction of linguistic devices (in this case not at the lexical level but at the intonational and discourse sequencing levels) and the emotional-dynamics accomplished by these devices, an account of which, in turn, provides an explanatory account of why these particular linguistic devices were used ('...he regretted the reassuring tone at once for fear that it would set her off again. "Yes", he added hastily...').

Discourse analysis should treat texts as involving not just social interaction but also emotional interaction between speakers. The literary snippet gives an informal idea 'in a nutshell' of what the scope of such an enriched commentary would be, including the emotional-dynamic interaction and also a motivational account of the dialogue. In this thesis I have attempted to develop a vocabulary for capturing these aspects of discourse within a linguistic framework.
This thesis is a memorial to Mr. Denman Whatley who died in Oxford just after 12 noon on 6th September 1986. He was much loved and is greatly missed.
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THE EMPIRICAL STUDY: INTRODUCTION AND METHOD

In mid December 1984, two couples were asked to participate in a study. This study required them to have a conversation which was both video and audio tape recorded. It was always the intention to analyse only one of the conversations, but both were recorded as a precaution against the possibility that, for any reason, one of the recordings could not be used. In fact, quality of recording turned out to be the selection criterion.

The couple, whose conversation was used in the study, had been married since 1979 and had two sons. The youngest son was aged approximately 3 months, the other 3 years 5 months. They were friends of the author and agreed to participate in the study whilst on a social visit. They knew something of the author's work but not enough to cause concern about this over-affecting their conversation during the recording. They were asked to attend the Social Psychology Laboratory in the Department of Experimental Psychology, Oxford. This is an austere room designed for human experimental social psychology, containing a couch, three chairs and a white board.

The couple brought their two sons and whilst the couple was seated side by side on the long couch, facing a video camera on a tripod with a visible monitor, the baby was held by his mother and the older child played in the room. To ensure high quality, a stereo audio tape recording was made (in addition to the recording made from the microphone attached to the video camera) using microphones on stands placed by both of them.
Prior to entering the room, the couple were asked to talk during the recording about the topics that were listed on the whiteboard. When in the room the author read the topics, of which there were three, to the couple and ensured that they felt comfortable with them. These topics were listed as follows:-

1) Films or books or eating out or theatre (They chose to discuss films)
2) The way to treat other people in the family.
3) Discussion - what they thought of their discussion, the objectives of the exercise and so on.

They were told they could change the topics when they wanted to, but in fact asked the author's "permission", during the recording, to change topic. The author was present most of the time and another person helping out as a technician, who was not known to the family, was present some of the time. The total recording time was approximately 32 minutes.

Although the couple seemed not to be completely at ease, they were not unrelaxed; the mother had breastfed the baby in the room, prior to the recording commencing, in the presence of both the author and technician.

The couple gave their consent for unrestricted use and playing of the recording.

An orthographic transcript was prepared by the author using both the audio and video recordings, with names and personal details changed. Punctuation and "stage directions" were used to describe kinesic and paralinguistic context, but the emphasis was on the verbal interaction.
Appendix B

JENNY'S LETTER PLUS EXPLANATORY NOTE

Address

6th September, 1986

Dear Bob,

Here, as promised is the letter confirming that John and I have no objection to people having access to the material in your thesis relating to us. We understand that all names will be changed. At this present moment we do not wish to look at this material ourselves - although this may change in the future.

With all our best wishes

Jenny and John

N.B. This is a typed version of a hand-written letter with the names changed and address removed.
N.B. It was decided that the transcript should remain relatively free of post hoc punctuation marks so as to avoid adding artificial pointers to one reading rather than another.
TOPIC 1: FILMS

1 John Have you had a chance yet to see what er what films there are on television over Christmas?

Jenny (stilted) No I haven't 'cos I haven't even looked at them, so you'd better tell me what they are.

5 John Well, they seemed to have. I haven't looked too closely but on BBC I haven't seen the ITV ones but on BBC they seemed to be having er a series of Chaplin films. You know how in the past they've done these seasons. They did that Bogart one and they did that Christmas with Cagney (laugh) it seemed a really unlikely thing to do, but this this

Jenny (laughing) not very suitable.

John time its Christmas with Chaplin. I don't think they've got the one when Monsieur Verdin, the one where the guy kills his wife.

Jenny laugh Oh.

John Did you see that one?

15 Jenny No, I haven't seen that one.

John Well that's the one where the guy, as I remember it, I think it its the first. I think its either the first or the only talking film he ever made so er and I don't think he says anything at all. I It's a long time since I've seen it, but I don't think he says anything at all.

Dave He said baby to me?

John Did he? I'm telling Mummy about a film that we're going to see over Christmas.

Dave What is it called?

John It's called Monsieur Verdin 'n it's about a man who kills his wife.

20 Dave Why does he kill his wife?

John (to Dave) 'Cos he doesn't like her

Dave What does she do to him?

John Well what does he do to her you mean

John He takes her out on a boat as I remember. And he puts a rock around
he ties around a piece of rope around (her) and put a rock on the end and he throws her into the water.

Jenny That's not very kind is it?
John No

Jenny I haven't seen, I haven't seen
John (to Jenny) And it's I think it is the its either first, or the only Chaplin film

Dave ....? He likes

Jenny (to Dave) No, don't touch that darling

Jenny Isn't the Great Dictator a talkie?

John No, I don't think there's any talking in the Great Dictator, I mean I don't know much about Chaplin films.

Jenny (Interrupting) The only one I I have can remember seeing is the one where where its the flower seller hm hm the blind girl.

John Oh yes.

Jenny And he goes home. City City Lights?

John Hard Times (hm) it might be. No that's right City Lights. City Lights when ...

Jenny It's very very good.

John (Interrupting) There's a boxing scene in there as well.

Jenny Is there? I don't know.

John I'll tell you what they are showing and that's this next week they're showing the Big Sleep.

Jenny (quickly) Oh well that'll be good ...

John 'Cos even though you've seen sort of it ten or fifteen times it's still really good.

Jenny (Interrupting) You still don't know what's going to happen. (Laughing)

John No, that's right, you still lose track of the plot half way through.

Jenny (to Kevin) Are you going to talk now too?
John: Um yes no. I haven't had haven't had an opportunity to look at anything til ...

Jenny: Kevin's going to cry now. Which isn't really a good time to start.

Kevin: (Cry)

John: They've got on ITV they've definitely got the first of the Raiders films.

Jenny: Oh yes, that'll be good. I shall enjoy watching that again.

John: We had that on tape.

Jenny: Yeah, yeah I mean that's one advantage of having the video really isn't it? To be able to see films

John: (agreeing) Yeah.

Jenny: 'Cos not being able to go out and watch them.

John: Have you decided what you're going to do on that yet? Are you going to set of preset a whole series up of things on all the different channels or are you just going to take it one by ... sort of write down the schedule and then do them as they come up.

Jenny: I think probably (interrupting) take it one by one because it depends how much tape we've got for films.

John: Have we done anything yet on that long play thing yet?

Jenny: Yes, (I have).

John: Have you played anything back?

Jenny: Yes.

John: Is the American football taped on that long play?

Jenny: Yes.

John: And er er have you noticed any difference in the work that you've recorded on that?

Jenny: I think slightly, slightly less good quality but it doesn't really make that much difference.

John: Good quality in what sense?

Jenny: It's just slightly hmm fuzzy.
Jenny: More than anything else, I think for us it's probably the best way to see films now rather than going to the cinema although I'd like to take Dave to the cinema for Christmas.

John: Yeah.

Jenny: I think that'd be a good idea. I think he actually might be able to sit through.

John: Are there any good sort of kids' films that he can go that are his age?

Jenny: Well I'm hoping there's going to be a sort Walt Disney film of some kind. I think that'd probably be the best for him.

John: In X-town?

Jenny: In X-town, yes.

John: Have you done anything about taking him to the pantomime?

Jenny: No, not yet no.

John: Is it too late for that now?

Jenny: No, I don't think so, it depends, it depends what day we want to go and whether there's any seats available.

John: It's Goldilocks and the three bears isn't it?

Jenny: Yes. Yes.

**PAUSE**

Jenny: Well we see what they've got on at the cinema ...

Jenny: Yes

John: ... if they've got a Walt Disney film.

Jenny: 'Cos Anne was saying, it's quite interesting. Anne was saying when she took Trevor they forgot to tell him it was going to be dark in the cinema, and so he couldn't quite get his head round the fact that it was dark, and all the lights went out and people were sort of sitting, and he'd say "Ooh look, there's a big television (John, Hmm) 'cos it was the
first time he'd actually been.

What did they take him to see?

I think something like a Hundred and One Dalmations or something like that, one one of the cartoony ...

Hmm.

... type. Walt Disney, which I think would probably be the best for him to start with er I think he'll probably he might actually sit and watch a cartoon.

Cartoons?

Yes. We were thinking of taking (to Dave) you to see a cartoon at Christmas at the cinema.

Oh.

(to Dave) That's where when you're older you'll be able see see films. You don't just see them on the video you can go and see them in the cinema and you go in, you pay the lady for your ticket and then you go you go in, and it's all dark and you and you sit and you watch on a great big screen. A screen is much bigger than that one there, see there's one (points) there and its much, much, much bigger than that, and then there's an interval when you can go and buy ice creams or drinks and things and its all, its an exciting atmosphere to go in to the cinema like that.

Can can I go to the cinema?

Yes, yes we'll probably take you during the during the Christmas holidays.

'Cos Daddy and Mummy used to enjoy going to

When I was small I always used to go to Saturday morning pictures. Did you used to go to Saturday morning pictures?
Jenny Hmm, yes, yes.
John It was really good, you used to get about five films for a tanner.
Dave (to John and Jenny) (interrupting) You, you, you are Grandma and Grandad's parents?

Jenny No they're
Jenny and John (together) They're our parents.
John We're your parents
Jenny We're your parents and Grandma and Grandad and Nana and Grandad are our parents

Jenny (to Dave) (briefly) D'you see? We're supposed to be talking about films we're not really supposed to be talking about parents.
Dave I I want a film for my Christmas treat.
Jenny (to Dave) You want to ... ??? Yes it will be a Christmas treat.
John (to Jenny) (overlapping) Yes, we'll probably ... what we could do ... another thing we could do ... maybe if it gets a bit dull for him over Christmas is hire a video for him.

Jenny Yeah, Yeah.
John Although I suppose there'll be plenty of things to do.

Jenny (overlapping) I think there'll probably be plenty of things that we can actually make do with over Christmas.

John I saw a trailer for that that Placido Domingo Pause hmm programme that documentary. It looked really good, a year in the life of of of Placido Domingo (under his breath) should be quite good value

Jenny Yes, that will be good.
John but I don't think that certainly not on BBC they don't seem to have gone out of their way to get any real blockbusters this year.

Jenny No.
John There's nothing, there's nothing major that is really exciting. I think
Jenny I wonder where it's sort of changing
John they've given up.
Jenny Yes.
John given that side of things up to ITV now.
Jenny Yes.
John I'll tell you what I was, what I did see in the paper, is that ITV are
giving up er er Saturday afternoon sport.
Jenny Really?
John What they're doing is they're having racing only which they're switching
to Channel Four.
Jenny Hmm.
John And they're going to do something else ( ) with the Saturday
afternoons on the main and ITV channel.
Jenny They're actually giving you an alternative to sport.
John But it'll be interesting what alternative ITV I mean I I could imagine
what BBC might do with the time but I would've thought that ITV will
want to get the same market, more of the same market, the sort of
people (Jenny hmm, yeah) who watch sport in an afternoon. Presumably
mostly men.
Jenny Well, I don't know, don't don't you think they're just trying, they're just
accepting that BBC have got the monopoly of of that of that side of
things and that they really ought to be providing an alternative?
John No. Can't see. What I mean, all they're concerned about is market
share, presumably, and not creating an alternative.
Jenny Well yes, well I know ... (quite aggressively)
John (interrupting) for the advertisers who
Jenny Well aren't they, by giving it up, aren't they saying that you know we
really you there's there's two sports programmes. We might just as well
admit defeat on that and try and aim for hmm a different, a different
audience, an audience who aren't turning on to watch sport, because if I'm on my own, I'm not going to turn the sport on am I? I mean, I might turn the alternative programme but but I'm not going to turn the sport on.

John

No, I suppose that's true.

PAUSE

Jenny

I think, I mean I just think that with films on television over Christmas, they're just they're just too long for most families.

John

Sorry?

Jenny

They're too long for most families.

John

What are? Films?

Jenny

Films

Jenny

For most people, to sit and watch for the whole of a Christmas night for example, especially when your children are probably staying up later and so on, so I think perhaps that's why they've given up and also people are going to be playing videos anyway for films.

DAVE RUNNING ROUND IN CIRCLES

John

Dave can you sit down for a minute

Jenny

Dave, yes ...

John

'cos I'm cos I'm getting a bit giddy.

Daddy's getting a bit giddy

(Jenny laughs)

Jenny

(to Dave) You're going to fall over. And will you be careful of the wires please.

Dave

I'm sorry.

John

(to me) Do you want us to move on now on to the next thing?

Jenny

Hmm yes, I think we really exhausted that one. Hm. Hm.

TOPIC 2: THE WAY TO TREAT OTHER PEOPLE IN THE FAMILY

John

(to Jenny) You start this time.

Jenny

(smiling) I can start this time can I? That's very kind of you, right, so
wha wa wha what's the subject? (looking at board) The way to treat other
people in the family, well I think that's probably something that's
particularly having children is particularly apposite for us 'cos the way
we behave to each other affects not only ourselves but our children as
well.

John  When we, it's funny when the other day when when we had that row and
I over-reacted that Dave, Dave's response was so immediate and so,
sort of violent, and that I mean, I suppose that's what you'd expect but
its not until you experience it that

Jenny  Well you see I think ...

John  (over the interruption) it he was really hurt wasn't he that

Jenny  Oh yeah, yes.

John  He was almost in a state of panic.

Jenny  Hmm. Yes.

John  Hmm.

Jenny  But I think it's better that he does see us row in public. I much prefer
the fact that he does see us row and then sees us make up because with
my parents, they used to go into another room and row. It was much
more frightening - all you could hear was sort of muffled voices and the
occasional thud, which (laugh) as a child you just didn't know what that
was. I mean obviously it was just perhaps somebody throwing something
'cos having adult rows yourself you know that that sort of thing goes on,
but I prefer the fact Dave sees us row although it may be disturbing to
him. I mean it obviously was disturbing to him in the way that he
reacted. He saw us making up, he saw that it was OK afterwards and
that we did love each other really, but I I mean I think you over-reacted
over-reacted

and I because we basically don't understand each other's way
of life, I mean I think perhaps you understand more about mine than I do
about yours because you have actually been at home on week days when

9
I'm on my own normally with the children whereas, when you go to the office although I've been into the office building and seen you it's actually meaningless to me and I don't really understand either the pressures that you're under or, you know, how tired you may be. You don't understand how tired I may be but I don't understand how tired (John agrees) how tired you may be and I think that's why we actually both over-reacted on that occasion.

John Tell you some one thing that on the bus the other day there were two women behind me, and they'd obviously gone out on a Christmas shopping (pause) day in Y-Town from X-Town or from I don't know if they'd come from X-Town or from Z-Town - I can't remember if they got off at X-Town and they were having a conversation in the seat behind and I was listening in to what they were saying and one of the women said something that the bus was late. You remember that night the bus when was late?

Jenny Yeah and ...(inaudible)

John and she was worried about what her husband's reaction would be to her being late, and she was saying "Well he goes down the pub every Saturday" or whenever, "And three evenings a week" or whatever and "he goes out to darts and I wouldn't begrudge him that but he begrudges me" or "the fact that I might go out and he shouldn't do", and I felt that I do that sometimes. I think it's odd. It's odd. It seems odd to me that you would want to be without the kids, (Jenny mmm) that seems really weird to me

Jenny Hmm

John that you should think and if of course you should not want to be with the kids all the time. (Jenny yes) But it really sometimes I get really angry and feel that you're sort of really incompetent as a mother because you don't want to be with them every single minute of the day
and then when I'm with them for ten minutes I get pissed off.

Jenny (laughs)

John And and yet I think that sometimes I do think sometimes emotionally I think that you should somehow be totally

5 Jenny Yes. I know you imply that I am a terrible mother because I actually want you know and I feel guilty if I have if I go and have a bath or something. (John yeah) I really feel guilty because I've left you with the kids, and yet you wouldn't think twice about doing something like that.

10 John No.

Jenny So that's something but I mean that's something stemming from your mother and the way that your mother expected the people to treat her and the way that she treats people in her family.

John Yeah. Yeah.

15 Jenny So that's that we've got to really, I suppose ultimately make a break from

John But I mean when, when this woman was saying this it seemed she her husband seemed a real idiot to me. He seemed an absolute fool and yet that's exactly how I feel sometimes er if you if you want to have some time to yourself as it were. I feel that it's odd that you would want to spend almost sort of, it seems almost unnatural sometimes to me that that you should want to spend (Jenny Hmm) and yet it's so perfectly it is natural and I mean, as she said, the woman was saying hmm hmmm it doesn't mean you don't love your kids just you want to spend some time to yourself. Just because you're married and you've got children (Jenny Hmm) doesn't mean, doesn't mean that you that you want to be or that indeed you should be a

20 Jenny (interrupting) it's like that

John a a slave to to to them, but I, the thing that that struck me is that the
logic was all on her side and she was absolutely right and I can imagine, 
I can understand exactly what she was saying, and agreed with what she 
was saying but I could imagine myself in her husband's role. If I'm with 
two kids and you'd gone shopping and they're getting, you know, they're 
getting cheesed off and I'm getting more cheesed off, and then I reckon 
I'd be thinking that very same thing.

Jenny But I mean, it's, it's, why are they going to cheesed off if they're 
with their father rather than their mother? I mean it isn't that 
something to do with the expectations that you have of how of what you 
should do with your children? In that you I mean you're prepared to 
give hmm, Dave a bath because and presumably when Kevin's a bit 
bigger. I notice you haven't volunteered to give him a bath yet, but 
later you'll probably be prepared to give him a bath, and I was talking 
to a girl opposite and her husband absolutely refused to give their first 
child a bath. He wouldn't give it, and she (John Hmm) still now PAUSE 
rushes round at nights when she is going out in the evening to her keep 
fit class she must give them a bath before she goes. He does the 
washing up. He's accepted that as a part of his function in the family, 
but he won't accept that giving the children a bath is part of that 
function. So I mean that's how how you perceive your role. I mean I 
know that if I go out like if I go out on Saturday morning shopping I 
know when I come back the house will still be in a mess that Dave will 
not, he might be dressed, not necessarily, but you know there are only 
certain things that you will decide are your particular task and anything 
else is is mine, and is left to me even though I've gone out shopping and 
then later on you'll sort of say "Well you went out on your own" as 
though it's some big favour for me to go and rush round the shops so I 
think again, that's that's parts of what you perceive to be your role 
within the family and I mean anything you do for the children you're
doing me some big favour. You know I mean you say I've I've done this for you and I've done that for you whereas in fact you're just, you should just be doing it because that's part of your

Dave What's a fire engine man who drives a fire engine?

Jenny He's called a fire man. **PAUSE** OK, you're a big fire man, are you?

Dave He's a fire man.

Jenny OK

Jenny It just seems to me but I you know, but on the other hand I can't see how you feel I mean I know something of the sort of background of your family background and how that will disrupt things but I don't really know hmm about your work life 'cos your work life is completely separate from our home life and whereas you can come home from work and that's recreation, I'm never away from what is effectively my place of work, so when you begrudge me sort of my half an hour away from the kids that just my idea you know that's my holiday, that's my relaxing time because you know it's almost impossible to relax with two children around you and plus which I need time to think and be myself as well and just be me as an individual as opposed to me with two appendages who I've got to get in and out of shops and things and I you know ninety-nine percent of the time I don't resent them at all but just one percent of the time I'd like to have a bit of time free to myself and yes, it does it irritates me enormously that you then imply that somehow I'm an unnatural mother and that I don't love my children. When I have in fact sort of given up a career to look after them, 'cos I think that'd be the best thing for them and hmm.

John But that that was a matter of choice, wasn't it?

Jenny (angrily) yes it was a matter of choice, but I mean its it was

John There was no need for you to give up your career if you didn't want to.

Jenny No I mean I I made a choice, a selection, so did you. I mean if you
hadn't wanted children we wouldn't have had children would we.

John
No, well, but I'm saying the the fact that you stay at home is not absolutely necessary, I mean admittedly now it would be difficult but you did make the choice.

Jenny
Yes, but this no, it is I mean I could have made the choice to have a child minder or something but I decided it was be best (John Hmm) for my children not to

John
(quietly) No that's fine.

Jenny
But that doesn't mean I haven't sacrificed something, 'cos I have.

John
You made, Yeah, but you made you made a sacrifice of choice.

Jenny
I have I have chose. I have chose the best out of two. Best way I think for myself and our children but I I also feel

John
You don't regret your career much though do you? You don't regret

Jenny
I wish that you could combine the the two but you can't so I've I've chosen the one I wanted to do most I suppose but yes, I mean I would would like to have a career. I'm hoping eventually that I will have one. I mean obviously that depends but that's something that you (aggressively) don't understand the the feeling of not having one, you are a person in your own right, I mean I wasn't even allowed to sign the Granada TV rental things or whatever they were you know 'cos you're i like some kind of non person, you know, because I don't earn money, hmm, I'm er I'm a non-person and that's something you don't understand. You don't understand things in terms of status because you have status yourself. You can't understand what it feels like to be treated as through you have none.

John
(quietly) hmm.

Jenny
And that's you know that that is something I've given up status. I've given up a profession so hmm, you know. I'm happy with my life. I like
my life but you know there, there are times and you know all the washing needs doing and both the kids are screaming and er you're just about to come in and I haven't even started cooking the supper when I'm you know, I'm I might decide the grass would be greener on the other side even if that's only momentary.

John  The other side being where?

Jenny  The other side being, I suppose, a career without children, I don't I don't know about being married or not married. I don't think er that actually hmm affects your life in er, in er practical terms in in the same way as having children or young children does.

Jenny (to Kevin) Yes, you're talking too are you, you going to tell us all about it, yes?

John  The resentment, one of the things I resent if that's the right word, is I quite like d'you know that you understand that I often or sometimes want to be completely alone, hmm, that I feel that I'm more hemmed in than you are, that and you say you've had the kids all day, that's true. I feel somehow more hemmed in then you by the fact that I've got to work all day and people there and then come home and there's people there, I hmm sometime feel that I'd like to sort of just get away for a period of time.

Jenny (to Dave) Dave please don't do that you're going to fall. Now could you get down (to John) Yes, no but then you don't understand my needs. I think you've got to accept that while you've got young children you're not going to be alone are you? Because I mean because you resent the fact that I might want to go off for an hour and I resent the fact that you want to go off and that's hmm I suppose something we might come to some agreement about but not

John  But you find it difficult because you feel that as I understand I think you find it difficult because you think well he's been away from them
all day and after fifteen minutes suddenly, (Jenny, yeah) he's pissed off with them.
Jenny: Yeah, well that's right.

John: Well that's not, I don't think that's right, because they're just an additional hmm

Jenny: they're not though, are they? They're your children and you should be, you should be trying to find something rewarding out of them, not just thinking "Oh God, it's more, just more people to cope with", yeah, you know, yes you can be alone after they've gone to bed or whatever, you can do whatever you like, I mean you do do whatever you like basically, I mean, if you if you're going to go out for the evening, you go out for the evening.

John: Yeah, but that's very rare.

Jenny: Admittedly very rarely, but I mean

John: But that's think, out of choice too, because I just don't like going out. It's not a question of going out or doing things or being anywhere. It's nothing as specific as that its just (Pause) being on one's own or or the choice I think the one thing that if if if anything that I feel that children, the most negative thing of having kids has to me, has been (Jenny ignoring him, playing with Kevin) the fact that you can't choose when you want to be alone. (Jenny, No).

Jenny: Oh, No, that's absolutely true but then you can't ...

John: Like at the time when they're both awake. Either you if you're going to be alone hmm if I'm going to be alone then that's going to put the burden on you if you're going to be alone that's going to put the burden on me. If we're both going to be alone then the kids are going to pi? you know pi... The kids are going to fall into the fire or things like that and ...

Jenny: No, I just I just think that you you see you (Pause) To me you have an autonomous life and when you come home, I expect you to want to be with the children. I know you say you're in the office and you're with
people but you're not effectively you're you're with colleagues. But it's not emotionally demanding of you most of the time whereas being with children all day, particularly perhaps if we haven't gone out, it's extremely emotionally draining and I expect you, first of all, to want to be with them because because you like them and you want to be with them and secondly to support me, because I've had them since, I don't know, half past seven or whatever time in the morning, and hmm to me that's that's part of your, that is one of your duties, and you know, part of your role as a father is to support me. And to give me a break, I mean I hmm I know it's that's what I was saying, I say I find it difficult to comprehend.

John (to Dave) Dave, leave the microphone alone darling.
Jenny (to Dave) Leave it alone because you're going to your going to make it ...

Dave What's that for? What does it do?
John (and Jenny, together) It's
Jenny It's picking up the sounds that Mummy and Daddy are making.
John (to Dave) If you look at the television over there, then you can see us.
Jenny You'll be able to see us, go and have a look.

John Go and see. Kevin as well
Jenny Mummy and Daddy are talking for Uncle Bob.
Jenny (to Kevin) And you're talking too, aren't you
Jenny (to John) But you see it's
Kevin (Coughs)
Jenny (to John) But I mean I think I think that you know all this comes back to for me, basically, to the fact that you expect me to be sort of like your mother, and I'm not, and there was a sort of article in the paper yesterday, it was Brian Robson, "Me and my Mum", or something, and he was saying you know, if if she's not looking after our children,
she's cooking and dusting and how much she loves her housework, and all this, and this seems to me to be a sort of archetypal hmm, I don't know, working class image of what of of the function of a woman, whereas you would be bored stiff if I was like that, but you want me to be like that in one sense, because you want to come back to order, and and to be able to you know, eat your food and do whatever you want, and be alone if you want, but on the other hand you'd be bored stiff if I was like that, so you know, I'm in a no win situation, in that in in that particular aspect. (PAUSE) because I always feel that whatever you do for the children, you regard it as a very big favour to me, you're relieving me of of my of what is essentially my duty. (John, Mmm) But I don't actually know whether you think I'm supposed to have any time off for good behaviour. You know, hmm, being our children are small, and really need attention, virtually twenty four hours a day.

John    Hmm

Jenny    Seven days a week. I mean you at least have holidays from work (PAUSE) and I don't, and so I do get really very angry when you begrudge me and I also get very angry when things are perhaps disorganized and you want them to be organized, and it's just you know, part of you know, one of those days but but to you, you want always to come back to this image of the home that's ordered and er you know, the children are in bed and supper's on the table and your slippers and pipe are by the fire (they both laugh) and I mean, life isn't like that.

John    No

Jenny    (to Kevin) Hello

Dave    Hello (then something inaudible)

**TOPIC 3: DISCUSSION**

John    (to Bob) Shall we move on to the er discussion?

Jenny    (to Kevin and Dave) Oh, Oh, Oh, Oh.

John    We ended up talking about ourselves rather than about others.
Jenny: Yes, I don't think well (laughs).
John: We didn't really talk about how we treated kids (Jenny laughs) just about how we mis, how we mistreat each other.
Jenny: I think that was just an occupational hazard (laughs).
John: How the I has been mistreated by the you.
Jenny: How we've suffered (laughs) Yes but I think that's almost all w ... You know yeah.
John: That's all we ever talk about ... it's like when we went to the Marriage Guidance. I think at first it sort of ... just blew her mind that we just ... entered into two parallel monologues.
Jenny: (laughs)
John: About how we were pissed off with each other.
Jenny: But I do think I think that we've to a certain extent, we have worked that through to a large extent. I mean we both know what each other feels, and I mean we do we have a lot of backsliding, but I mean, I think that that yes, we I mean we're both very self obsessed people. So I mean, that's almost inevitable, and and we perceive, mothers, fathers, children, is how they affect our lives.
John: Not how we affect theirs.
Jenny: Yes

PAUSE

Jenny: Well, I think we did start talking about Dave, about the effect that you know, of our rows on Dave.
John: Hmm

Jenny: Which (pause) you know, as I said, I I feel that hmm you know, I know people where a their anger and hmm hmm resentment of each other is repressed and that seems to me to be to be having a much more unhealthy effect upon their children.
John: (to Dave) Dave can you put Bob's coat back please darling ... thank you.
John (to Jenny) Sorry, I didn't ...

Jenny I'm saying that I know people where anger and at each other is being repressed and that seems to me to be having a much more unhealthy effect on their children, than than our, than our more open expressions of it. I mean that's basically what we were doing when we went to Marriage Guidance, was sort of squashing all our feelings and I think that's actually what came out of going was the the, I mean yes we were talking, we were still talking on parallel lines but we were able to say to each other, "I'm angry with you" for this, this and this reasons whereas before, I (just) I just felt generally angry with everything and everybody whereas now, I think, on the whole I know what it is that makes me angry and I can say it to you.

John Suffering from non-specific anger.

Jenny Yes (laughs) I wa

I was, just everything you did or said made me angry

(laughs)

So, whereas now I know what it is that makes me angry about you and I can say it, and you can say it to me.

John It's changed - into tertiary anger now.

Jenny Yes (they both laugh)

Jenny But I mean that that seems to me to be much more healthy, and and I mean in that I don't believe that we should be showing our children that, that we're always happy and that life is always wonderful.

John Oh no, Oh no.

Jenny I think it's better to say, yes, we're angry with each other but, you know, we'll say we're sorry later, and you know we'll, we'll be friends again.

John Yeah

Jenny It's much better. But yes, you're quite right we did end up as usual
talking about ourselves but then, in terms of a nuclear family, I would have said that our relationship is central to how our children think and feel.

Jenny (to Kevin) Oh dear, what's the matter, what's that on your face.

John So, yeah, I mean

Jenny I mean ...

John I think that's true.

Jenny if we're basically happy, and even if we're sort of angry with each other at times, I think it's made we've made a much more stable home than it was before when we were just not speaking to each other and not saying anything to each other. We were still just as self obsessed but we were, we weren't actually communicating with each other at all, I mean I could, apart from saying, "what d'you want for dinner tonight," and "it's time to get up," we were going through sort of whole periods where we actually didn't speak to each other (John: Yes) about our feelings or I mean at least we can actually sort of scream and shout at each other but we say what we feel and I think we're both of us beginning to understand a little bit more about hmm the difficulties of each others role, and what we expect of the other person. I think that's even more important, because I know when, when I was expecting Dave the thing that you know really upset me most was how I'd expected you to be and what I'd expected you to want and what I'd expected you to say, you know I'd wanted you to sort of feel the baby move, and all that, and you were sort of going ohh no, and that really was the thing that most deeply upset me of anything, because I'd expected something so different. And I think we're both er probably more realistic now about each other and about what we expect (PAUSE) hmm, and I mean, I think we're working at it which I think is perhaps the main thing. I mean we still moan at each other, but I think things are sort of more
1 worked out than they were and I, as far as I'm concerned to me if our
relationship our roles are not necessarily satisfactory but on that way
that affects how I perceive (PAUSE) not only how I perceive our
children and our parents and whatever but I think how they perceive us.

5 John Hmm. I dunno. It's hard to say. Maybe 'cos Dave is

Jenny What is Dave doing?

John I suppose Dave, you can't really ask Dave whether he thinks we're
happy, I suppose it's what what he does should tell us, but I don't I can
never judge.

10 Jenny I don't think he has any concept of what it would be for us to be happy
or unhappy.

John No.

Jenny We just are and we he exists you know we exist.

John That's like what Jim says about his wife, you know, although she's a
dingbat

Jenny (laughs)

John Erm, the kids know no different.

Jenny No, so they don't mind do they?

John So the fact she (walks) goes off and erm when she gets pissed off she
goes and locks herself in a room, so's not to (Jenny: hurt them) hurt the
kids.

John That's what they expect a mother to do

Jenny Yes

John Who's cheesed off with them.

20 Jenny Yeah

John Is to go in a room and lock herself in, and so

Jenny Well I mean I would

John So perhaps they're not being affected by her.

Jenny Well, I mean, I would I would say it's far better for a family to be
together isn't it, than as long as she long as I mean it is a bit difficult in that situation 'cos they're so young, the children are so young but I mean the alternatives are far less desirable than ...

John Yeah

5 Jenny than what is actually happening it's just very worrying for Jim.

John Hmm

Jenny Really, because there he has he has had to take over an almost entirely supportive role, he's not allowed to be irresponsible or (PAUSE) slobbish or whatever at all because he's got to you know, sort of totally take over responsibility for both parents though I mean, I think that's something that that hmm I do feel very strongly is that I'm I'm supposed to be the responsible one and you're you, you know if there's any thing decision that needs making then I'm supposed to make it and all the rest of it and I suppose just sometimes, I'd like it to you know, I suppose I want to be a little girl again, you know, but then again I suppose I'd resent it if you did, so you're in a no win situation too. But that yes, I think I think that's basically played that one out really.

John (to Bob) Shall we leave it at that Bob?

Jenny (to Bob) Is that, is that OK? is that enough (PAUSE) Will that be any use? (laugh)