THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN THE NON-WESTERN WORLD

DPHIL THESIS

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In loving Memory of my Father

Abstract

This thesis investigates the involvement of non-state actors (NSAs) in foreign policy decision-making processes in the non-Western world in order to find answers to why, how, and under what conditions such entities become engaged in foreign policy-making and influence state behaviour. Based largely on primary sources, it offers an exclusive and original data set, organised around a set of hypotheses and according to an organically developed conceptual framework. This allows for an unprecedented insight into the modus operandi of different non-state actors and contributes to an analytical diversification away from a prevailing Western-centrism in the scholarly literature.

The thesis demonstrates that non-state actors, assuming a variety of different operational roles, are able to become informally but nonetheless meaningfully involved. Thus, by adopting a networked analysis of international relations, the dissertation is able to shed analytical light on a grey area, existing alongside the formal, state-driven initiatives. This ultimately reveals a hybrid form of foreign policy at work, blurring the boundaries between the actions of states and non-state actors.

Hence, whilst informality in foreign policy might raise questions of legitimacy, the thesis suggests that hybridity should be acknowledged and perhaps welcomed – especially when it proves to be more efficient than more formal and supposedly legitimate forms of diplomacy. The thesis offers a conceptualisation of informal networks and adopts a methodology able to illustrate their inner functioning. It concludes that coordinated policies of state and non-state actors, capable of recognising and utilising the formal and informal networks they are embedded in, are already prevalent in distinct regional settings, determining the international rules of the game.

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Abbreviations

BENGO	Bent NGO
BINGO	Business Interest NGO
BONGO	Business Organised NGO
BRINGO	Brief Case NGO
CHONGO	City Hall NGO
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMENGO	Come and Go NGO
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DINGO	Donor International NGO
DONGO	Donor Organised NGO
ENGO	Environmental Nongovernmental Organisation
FINGO	Financially Interested NGO
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
GANGO	Gap-Filling NGO
GC	Governing Council
GOC	Georgian Orthodox Church
GoG	Government of Georgia
GONGO	Government-Organised NGO
GoP	Government of Pakistan
GRINGO	Government Run or Inspired Run NGO
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
IGC	Iraqi Governing Council
IGCC	Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
IIG	Iraqi Interim Government
IPO	Indigenous Peoples Organisation
IR	International Relations
LGMA	Local Government and Municipal Authorities
MANGO	Mafia-Affiliated NGO
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MNF	Multinational Force
MONGO	Mafia-Organised NGO
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontiers

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNGO	Northern NGO
NSA	Non-State Actor
PANGO	Party-Affiliated NGO
PAT	Principal-Agent Theory
PAJCCI	Pakistan Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
PM	Prime Minister
PONGO	Parliamentary Organised NGO
PT	Process-Tracing
RINGO	Research and Independent NGO
RONGO	Retired Officials NGO
SMT	Social Movement Theory
SNGO	Southern NGO
TAL	Transitional Administrative Law
TAN	Transnational Advocacy Networks
TUNGO	Trade Union NGO
UK	United Kingdom
USG	United States Government
US	United States
YOUNGO	Youth NGO

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Thesis Outline

Disraeli once famously remarked that 'the world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes'[1] and Ryan Gingeras, in his outline of the origin of the Ottoman Empire's *derin devlet* (Turkish for: 'deep state'), observed the existence of 'a kind of shadow or parallel system of government in which unofficial or publicly unacknowledged individuals play important roles in defining and implementing state policy'[2]. Similarly, the reality of world politics today is complex and multi-faceted and its arena is populated by precisely such unofficial or publicly unacknowledged individuals, although they take the form and shape of a variety of actors, operating in a variety of networks and according to different rationales and logics. States, contrary to the expectations of some, have not become obsolete but still constitute an integral and important part of international relations – and indeed of the very same networks, which constitute the rivulets of global affairs. To be sure, those IR theorists who, in their analysis, solely focus on the relationship between states and great powers and treat all other actors, such as International Organisations (IOs), the European Union (EU), businesses, and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs) corporations, and business associationsas more or less irrelevant subcontractors have been heavily criticised[3]. After all, it appears that, in order to be successful in their conduct today, states have to take the networked environment they are embedded in into account and either work together with NSAs or find ways to efficiently employ them on their behalf – be that formally and openly or informally and clandestinely.

The author's MPhil thesis, titled 'The Role of Non-State Actors in Foreign Policy'[4], has already sought to assess the role and influence of Western NSAs operating in Pakistan, making it apparent that such actors, often serving as the

[1] Disraeli, *Coningsby*.
[2] Gingeras, "Last Rites For A 'Pure Bandit'."
[3] Abbott, et al., "The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State"; Avant et al., "Who Governs the Globe?"; Lake, "Rightful Rules: Authority, Order, and the Foundations of Global Governance."
[4] Markert, "The Role Of Non-State Actors In Foreign Policy."

extended arm of the West towards the Global South, have taken up responsibility in areas, which had previously been an exclusive domain of the state – sometimes even exceeding the influence of state representatives themselves. States still command the military force despite an impressive privatization of the military sector, but their command of the financial and ethical agendas is often less impressive as compared with some non-state actors. Consider, for instance, the MNCs control of financial resources and the NGOs ability to shape the normative discourse.

Each of these actors can work with states (and each other) in the pursuit of global objectives or, 'more narrowly', traditional, state-led foreign policy. In the words of Marchetti: 'it has become evident that non-state actors are able to influence global politics in an autonomous way'[5]. What has consequently emerged, is what Avant et al. have referred to as 'the new power politics', which is centered on 'maintaining, developing, and shaping relationships as well as working through these relationships to affect governance outcomes'[6] – foreign policy, whose essence and conduct still relies on states, has not been exempted from these developments. After all, 'while government-to-government relationships are still very important, it is clear that a player who does not take into account the different components of civil society is bound to fail, or at least to have a harder time pursuing its goals'[7]. Hence, 'much of what we see in security governance is puzzling to traditional analyses. We see more and different governance than realists expect and different routes to governance than liberals anticipate'[8].

Against this backdrop, this thesis now seeks to analyse why, how, and under what conditions different types of NSAs can get successfully engaged in foreign policy decision-making processes in the non-Western world and influence state behaviour. By investigating these questions, the thesis with its set of empirical data allows for an unprecedented and extensive insight into the *modus operandi* of different NSAs. Indeed, throughout this thesis, it will be shown that NSAs, in different operational roles, are fully capable of becoming informally, yet meaningfully, involved. Indeed, viewed through a networked analysis of

[5] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 8.
[6] Avant et al., "Introduction", p. 3.
[7] Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 4.
[8] Avant et al., "Introduction", p. 16.

contemporary international relations, it shall highlight and investigate a grey area of foreign policy, existing parallel to formal, state-driven initiatives. Building on the insights of these studies and network theory's foundational logic, this thesis outlines a conceptual framework for the study of foreign policy that goes beyond states alone. This ultimately reveals a hybrid form of foreign policy at work in contemporary foreign policy, which blurs the boundaries between state and non-state entities and their respective abilities and responsibilities. Indeed, 'the partnership between national governments and non-state actors is the core of hybrid or public diplomacy'[9]. Thus, following a network-logic, rather than conceptualising power and influence as assets that foreign policy actors own, the dissertation treats power in today's foreign policy as emerging from, and depending on, relationships –reliant on the quality and form of ties that links states and NSAs. Furthermore, this dissertation hopes to clarify that, rather than rejecting such arrangements and inferring certain normative conclusions from them, hybrid foreign policy should be welcomed – especially when it proves to be more efficient than more formal forms of diplomacy. Indeed, it is especially through this conceptualisation of informal networks and their inner workings, advanced by this thesis as a result of the employed methods and the rich empirical data, that it is able to make a contribution to IR as a discipline. Against this background, it will become clear that it will be those entities, state or non-state, capable of recognising and utilising the formal and informal networks they are embedded in, which will prevail and master the rules of the game of 21st century foreign policy – even though these 'rules are not necessarily formal'[10].

Precisely what these rules are, who makes them, on what basis, and how the different foreign policy actors accordingly operate under (or against) them is distilled by the analysis of a unique set of data, formed around a set of hypotheses and in accordance with a specifically designed conceptual framework. Its main strength thus lies in obtaining, assessing and presenting rare, high-quality empirical data derived from elite interviews with very specific individuals involved in certain decision-making processes. Indeed, throughout the DPhil fieldwork activities, carried out in Georgia, the UK, the US, and Pakistan, significant efforts have been

[9] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 140.
[10] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 4.

made to interview representatives from all actors involved in the examined case studies so as to corroborate accounts, distil biases and ultimately present a balanced overall picture of events. Of course, following these interactions, particular emphasis has been placed on triangulating the information with other additional secondary sources, such as diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks and documents from the US National Security Archive.

Yet, whilst unique interview data, corroborated with strong secondary sources, certainly represents one of the unique selling point of this dissertation, it also represents some of its shortcomings. After all, throughout my research, I have realised that critical and unique information is only revealed in personal meetings, which create an atmosphere of trust and comfort for the interviewee. In this context, the focus and, one might add, nature of my research on parallel channels of state foreign policies in and towards countries in the non-Western world also highlighted the critical importance of approaching potential interviewees in a certain manner. Indeed, it seems indispensable to have a local 'sponsor' whose good offices would not just establish contact with the potential interviewee but who would also be able to vouch for the researcher's trustworthiness and integrity. On multiple occasions, it would be even more beneficial for this 'sponsor' to be present during the interview to enhance the 'trust factor'. Although I faced no difficulties in this regard in Pakistan other chapters have proven to be more difficult – and thus all the more telling. Indeed, this was particularly true in the cases of Iraq and Russia – not least because of the clandestine yet nonetheless significant role that intelligence agencies have played in the relevant case studies and contexts. Whilst the necessary introductions were made in the case of Iraq, COVID travel restrictions barred me from travelling and I was told in no uncertain terms that the nature of my questions would 'not in a million years' be answered over the phone. In the case of Russia, I did not possess any trusted contacts that could facilitate my primary research and despite over a dozen 'formal' attempts (e.g. E-Mails, filing of Official Information Requests), not a single interview with 'the Russian side' of the Georgia conflict could be secured. Thus, whilst established and trusted contacts in the UK, US, Georgia, and Pakistan helped enormously with obtaining a set of unique empirical material through an array of personal interviews, the lack of such relationships in Russia and the inability to realise personal meetings in Iraq has naturally led to a certain asymmetry in the interview coverage.

Yet, whilst this might, at first glance, be regarded as a deficiency of this thesis, these very same shortcomings could also be seen as interesting research findings in and of themselves. After all, viewed from this angle, it might no longer appear so surprising to find that, in the face of such obstacles, traditional Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) scholars still overwhelmingly focus on state actors[11]. Similarly, the existence of such challenging research conditions in these countries and others in the Global South has certainly also made it more difficult to increase the volume of IR research focused on the non-Western world[12]. Therefore, his thesis represents, inevitably, one might add, an imperfect and unfinished endeavour, which will have to be continued judiciously henceforward. At the same time, it does not just represent a unique analysis of the way foreign policy is conducted today but also an original contribution to a much-needed diversification away from a prevailing Western-centrism in the scholarly literature[13].

1.2 Theoretical Perspectives

Having said this, however, there is much to distil, synthesise, and incorporate from existing bodies of scholarly literature. Indeed, as already alluded to earlier, recent decades have observed the emergence and development of transnational actors, which have been identified as an important explanatory variable by a series of authors in the study of International Relations[14]. This development has been recognised as an attempt to shift away from an overwhelming focus on states as the primary unit of analysis in IR theory. Indeed, it is pointedly argued that 'states are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that world'[15]. Against this background, it is thus imperative to sketch out the theoretical literature that this

[11] Baumann et al., "Foreign Policy Analysis, Globalisation And Non-State Actors"; Hellmann, "Fatal Attraction? German Foreign Policy and IR/Foreign Policy Theory".
[12] Acharya, "Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten years on"; Wemheuer-Vogelaar, "The IR of the beholder: examining global IR using the 2014 TRIP Survey"
[13] Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 20.
[14] Higgott, et al., *Non-State Actors And Authority In The Global System*; Keohane et al., *Transnational Relations And World Politics*; Risse-Kappen, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*.
[15] Finnemore, *National Interests In International Society*, p. 2.

thesis seeks to draw on in order to clarify how these bodies of theoretical literature inform your own development of theory and highlight their added value.

Foreign Policy Analysis

Having said this, our first academic instinct would be to draw on and speak to the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature. After all, considering that 'FPA presents a more contingent view of the relationship between domestic and international politics'[16] and thus 'FPA and neoclassical realism represent separate but related research agendas'[17]. Crucially, as Chong highlights, 'foreign policy is becoming functionally and descriptively rivalled in a globalizing context (…) once the theoretically exclusive prerogative of the nation-state, [it] is violated daily by new developments in non-state actorness'[18]. Indeed, given its criticism of IR's state-centrism, one should expect FPA to be most suited for foreign policy decision-making involving NSAs. Yet, a review of the existing literature shows that most of FPA remains still mostly focused on state actors, while more or less neglecting NSAs[19]. A notable exception is Rosenau's analysis of the emerging post-Cold War era, in which 'functions of governance (…) are now being performed by activities that do not originate with governments'[20]. Nonetheless, he does not address the specific aim of this thesis, that is to develop the conceptual mechanisms involved in NSA activity in FP and an elaboration of the conditions under which and the reasons for why they have an impact on state policy. To be sure, recent FPA research has examined a wide range of actors affecting FP decision-making. Empirical studies have analysed the influence of different bureaucracies, cabinets, security councils, politburos, heads of state[21], ministries and agencies[22], legislative bodies[23], coalition parties[24], advisors[25], small group dynamics[26], and individuals[27].

[16] Kaarbo, "A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective On The Domestic Politics Turn In IR Theory".
[17] Taliaferro, "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy".
[18] Chong, "The Post-International Challenge To Foreign Policy ". p. 783.
[19] Baumann et al., "Foreign Policy Analysis, Globalisation And Non-State Actors".
[20] Rosenau, "Governance, Order, And Change In World Politics".
[21] Hill, *The Changing Politics Of Foreign Policy*.
[22] Allison, *Essence Of Decision*.
[23] Howell et al., "Presidents, Congress, And The Use Of Force".
[24] Kaarbo et al., "Taking It To The Extreme".
[25] Redd, "The Influence Of Advisers And Decision Strategies On Foreign Policy Choices ".
[26] Garrison, "Small Group Effects On Foreign Policy Decision Making".
[27] Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy ".

One might conclude from this that although FPA's theoretical and conceptual toolkit could provide a broad applicability, scholars have mainly concentrated on decision-making processes within national governments. Another notable exception is 'European foreign policy', which analyses the interplay between the EU, its institutions and its member states and which shall be reviewed in more details below[28]. Conceptually noteworthy in this regard is what has been referred to as '*downloading',* that is, the adoption of EU directives into national foreign policy, and '*uploading'*, that is, the reverse procedure, when the EU adopts a particular national policy[29]. This, of course, does also bear a certain resemblance with Putnam's 'two-level games', which occurs when a state is influenced by and thus has to balance both an internal as well as an external pressure on its policy formation process[30] - an analytical inspiration for this thesis which shall be addressed in more detail below. What is more, as mentioned above, whilst there might be a growing number of studies examining decision-making in European and Middle Eastern countries, the bulk of the research still focuses on the US[31] - a noteworthy gap, which this thesis, by casting its glance at the Global South, seeks to fill. To be sure, FPA has not completely ignored NSAs. Overall, most of the articles featuring NSAs examine the media[32], private business[33], interest groups[34], or international organisations[35]. Yet, whilst most non-state actorness is confined to the lobbying particular governments[36], there are several approaches that go beyond national boundaries. Particularly interesting for this thesis is, for example, Lee's examination of the growing influence of private business on the foreign policy of the UK[37].

[28] Smith, "European Foreign Policy".
[29] Oates, "The Role Of The United States In The European Union's Decision-Making On Security Policy, 2001-2005"; Torreblanca, "Ideas, preferences and institutions"; Bull et al., Europeanisation and Italian policy for the Mezzogiorno.
[30] Putnam, *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.*
[31] Baumann et al., "Foreign Policy Analysis, Globalisation And Non-State Actors".
[32] Brunk, "Curing The Somalia Syndrome"; Rubenzer, "Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes And U.S. Foreign Policy Influence".
[33] Thies et al., "Crawfish Tails".
[34] Alons, "Predicting A State's Foreign Policy"; Vanderbush, "Exiles And The Marketing Of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba And Iraq".
[35] Hellmann et al., "De-Europeanization By Default?"; Haftel, "Indonesian Foreign Policy And The Formation Of ASEAN".
[36] Mearsheimer et al., *The Israel Lobby And U.S. Foreign Policy*.
[37] Lee, "The Growing Influence Of Business In U.K. Diplomacy"; EU Institute for Security Studies, *The Role Of Non-State Actors In EU Policies Towards The Israeli- Palestinian Conflict*.

Two-level Games, Transnational advocacy networks (TAN) and Social Movement Theory (SMT)

Having sought out a variety of intellectual allies in the epistemological and ontological shift that this thesis seeks to contribute to, one must look to yet another body of literature for analytical inspiration. Indeed, what promises to offer a more enriching framework of analysis and refreshingly less 'Westphalian view' on the more and more complex picture of contemporary world politics, are the works of scholars of transnational advocacy networks (TAN) and social movement theory (SMT). What is more, it appears that the entities that are being considered by these two branches tend to overlap with those domestic factors whose analysis is demanded by the literatures hitherto assessed. In their analysis, they have drawn substantially from constructivist paradigms and focused their analysis on the relationships and interactions between states, international organisations and transnational actors, in which the latter seek to influence the former two in pursuit of certain normative goals[38]. Arguably, considerable inspiration for this literature has been inspired by Putnam's 1998 article in which he paid close analytical attention to national leaders' responsibility to address both domestic and international audiences – the two-level game[39]. The examination of such two-level games has, of course, also inspired other theorists, such as Moravcsik, whose liberal intergovernmentalism was tested and assessed in *Double-edged Diplomacy* for its potential symbiosis with Putnam's work. Although they might not be firmly rooted in the transnationalism literature, it is to their great credit that they have opened up the 'black boxes of the state' and highlighted the influence exerted by non-state, domestic elements in the formulation and implementation of state policy at the international level. What is more, the interaction between governments and the domestic arena in the two-level game might also fit into the up/downloading procedure. However, although Putnam and Moravcsik have widened the scope of analysis, Evans criticises their inherent 'COG [chiefs of government]-centered view'[40] and Knopf points out that 'the two-level game approach does not encourage

[38] Della Porta et al., *Social Movements In A Globalizing World*; Khagram et al., *Restructuring World Politics*; McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives On Social Movements;* Smith, *Globalization And Resistance*.
[39] Evans et al., *Double-Edged Diplomacy*.
[40] Evans et al., *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, p. 401.

exploration of the possibilities for strategic action by domestic players' and that does equally not envision that such 'transboundary forms of interaction (…) may give domestic actors strategic options of their own'[41]. Indeed, it appears that although two-level games and liberal intergovernmentalist approaches concede to non-state elements the ability to influence or persuade state actors to behave in a certain manner in international affairs, they do not envision them to play any role beyond this, say, as implementing partner of state foreign policy or being in the driving seat themselves. Seemingly building on this critique of two-level games, Risse-Kappen argues that in the context of transnational actor activities and their respective influence on policy formation, one can in fact observe a 'three-level game'[42] in policy formation.

Indeed, the literature has been growing and covered a variety of different issue areas and political actors. Generally speaking, such network actors and social movements are seen to insert new ideas, norms and discourses into policy deliberations and express 'collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity'[43], such as states or international organisations. By doing so, they are said to contribute to a change in perception of the interest, behaviour, identity and preferences of societal and state actors. Naturally, as Keck et al. point out, 'many of the characteristic strategies, tactics and patterns of influence [found in the analysis of TANs] resemble those outlined in the literature on social movements (…) organisations and individuals within advocacy networks are political entrepreneurs, mobilise resources like information and membership, and show a sophisticated awareness of the political opportunity structures within which they operate'[44].

Some parts of the literature have focused their analytical attention on particular issues such as the campaign to put an end to the system of apartheid[45], the peace movement more general[46], human rights and democracy[47], the

[41] Knopf, "Beyond Two-Level Games."
[42] Risse-Kappen, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*, p. 299-300.
[42] Finnemore, *National Interests In International Society*
[43] Katzenstein, *The Culture Of National Security*, p. 5
[44] Keck et al., "Transnational Advocacy Networks In International And Regional Politics", p. 91; Tarrow, *Power In Movement*.
[45] Klotz, "Transnational Activism And Global Transformations".
[46] Rochon, *Mobilizing For Peace*.
[47] Risse-Kappen et al., *The Power Of Human Rights*.

environment[48], immigrants[49] and indigenous rights[50]. Other studies have looked more extensively at the influence of TANs on international institutions such as the ICC[51], the UN System[52], or the World Bank[53]. A different branch of scholars has focused on international treaties, granting resources to NSAs[54], in which advocacy networks and movements played a decisive role[55], or against which they fostered opposition[56]. On the whole, it is because of the underlying ontological and epistemological underpinnings of these scholarly works to move away – though not completely – from what could be referred to as a 'Westphalian reductionism' in the analysis of world politics[57] and their specific focus on the interaction between NSAs and states that this thesis naturally speaks to and indeed draws from SMT and TAN literature.

What is more, the literature provides this paper with useful conceptual constructs and typologies of actors. Chief among them is what has been referred to as 'norm entrepreneur'[58] or 'issue entrepreneur'[59], that is, a specific type of NSA that possesses sufficient organisational power to mobilise its resources in order to influence the emergence and evolution of norms and their impact on states. Indeed, the relevance of such an actor becomes particularly apparent in the models offered by SMT and TAN literature. Keck and Sikkink's 'boomerang pattern', for example, shows how domestic actors can bypass obstructed channels of communication within their state and 'search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside'[60]. Similarly, della Porta et al.'s model also seeks to single out three different types of international interactions between state and non-state entities and to demonstrate the interdependence of national interactions between social movements in each country and governmental interactions at a supranational

[48] Young, *Global Governance*.
[49] Soysal, *Limits Of Citizenship*.
[50] Brysk, *From Tribal Village To Global Village*.
[51] Struett, *The Politics Of Constructing The International Criminal Court*.
[52] Clark et al., "The Sovereign Limits Of Global Civil Society"; Clark, "NGOs and their Influence on International Society"; O'Brien, *Contesting Global Governance*; Stiles, *Global Institutions And Local Empowerment*; Weiss et al., *NGOs, The UN, And Global Governance*.
[53] Clark et al., *Demanding Accountability*; Fox, *The Struggle For Accountability.*
[54] Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*.
[55] Price, *The Chemical Weapons Taboo*; Price, "Reversing The Gun Sights".
[56] Ayres, *Defying Conventional Wisdom.*
[57] Della Porta et al., *Social Movements.*
[58] Finnemore et al., "International Norm Dynamics And Political Change".
[59] Keck et al., "Transnational Advocacy Networks In International And Regional Politics", p. 200.
[60] Keck et al., *Activists Beyond Borders*, p. 12-13.

level[61]. Additionally, as great attention has been directed at the communication of certain normative ideas that seek to shape actors' preferences, the mechanisms of 'persuasion' and 'framing' are also very useful and indeed central conceptual products of both literatures. In the words of Finnemore, 'normative claims become powerful and prevail by being persuasive'. Persuasion is consequently defined as 'the process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective' or rather as an attempt to 'change the utility functions of other players to reflect some new normative commitment'[62]. In other words, the aforementioned norm entrepreneurs persuade governments to adopt certain normative ideas as 'set standards for the appropriate behaviour of states'[63]. Such entrepreneurs are consequently able to 'mobilise and coerce decision-makers to change state policy'[64]. Identifying a three-stage 'life cycle' for the persuasion process itself, Finnemore et al. elaborate a mechanism of NSA-state interaction in which Actor A seeks to persuade states B, C, and D to change previously held preferences. Highlighting the importance of mutual agreement and consent around a certain normative assumption, persuasive messages - after the ensuing diffusion process, in which states B, C, and D eventually help to convince others - eventually become institutionalised.

Hence, successful 'norm entrepreneurs' are actors that are 'able to "*frame*" normative ideas in such a way that they resonate with relevant audiences. Framing, in fact, is (…) a central element of successful persuasion'[65]. Highlighting the mutually constitutive character of both mechanisms, Barnett refers to framing as a persuasive instrument employed to 'fix meanings, organise experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to on-going problems'[66]. The aforementioned study of Price, for example, makes it clear that the movement to ban landmines was able to frame the issue in terms of the 'indiscriminate nature of their effects', thereby putting it on par with the campaign against WMDs[67]. Payne, moreover, points out that 'framing labour

[61] Della Porta et al., *Social Movements,* p. 5.
[62] Finnemore et al., "International Norm Dynamics And Political Change"; Klotz, "Transnational Activism And Global Transformations".
[63] Finnemore et al., "International Norm Dynamics And Political Change", p. 893.
[64] Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, And National Identity In Contemporary Europe".
[65] Payne, "Persuasion, Frames And Norm Construction".
[66] Barnett, "Bringing In The New World Order".
[67] Price, "Reversing The Gun Sights".

standards as basic human rights [has been] a subjectively appealing notion and activists have employed it successfully in the past to achieve their goals'[68].

The interactions illustrated in these models, with pressure stemming from an NSA to get State A to change its policy towards State B, very much informs and influences the conceptual model elaborated in this thesis. Nonetheless, it needs to be highlighted that norm-building through the mechanism of persuasion appears to be more coercive and confrontational than persuasive. Similarly, framing-based analysis is also based on a confrontational view of state-NSA interactions. Moreover, whilst offering us useful insights into the conditions under which norms can effectively resonate with a target audience, it appears to pay less analytical attention to the communicative process and thus 'does not reveal causality in norm-building processes'[69].

Indeed, SMT particularly conceptualises the relationship between state and non-state actors along confrontational and unidirectional lines with the NSAs autonomously, that is, independent of state intervention, seeking to circumvent, influence or even actively work against the state by initiating campaigns to try to change state actors' normative behaviour, perception and consequent policies through different types of interaction. Hägel neatly summarises this criticism when he observes that state-transnational actor interaction models in SMT and TAN literature do 'usually not foresee the reverse relationship – state actors influencing transnational actors in order to further their own interests'[70]. To be sure, Keck et al. do recognise the possibility of a 'revolving door' through which 'parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments'[71] would become actors within non-state organisations just as much as della Porta et al. do 'external support (…) from foreign governments'[72]. However, as they do not incorporate these insights into their overall models or suggested mechanisms, they do not appear to foresee the possibility of NSAs "doing the states' bidding", and hence operating as its 'subcontractors'. As Tarrow points out: 'Since states can build upon common objectives and use their resources to influence transnational actors, the latter's autonomy can only be a hypothesis that demands careful examination'[73].

[68] Payne, "Persuasion, Frames And Norm Construction".
[69] Payne, "Persuasion, Frames And Norm Construction".
[70] Hägel, "States And Transnational Actors".
[71] Keck et al., *Activists Beyond Borders*, p. 9.
[72] Della Porta et al., *Social Movements*, p. 11.
[73] Tarrow, "Transnational Politics".

Highlighting that transnational actors are in some cases not as autonomous from the state, as the literature seems to suggest, Hägel's case study in Jewish Diaspora Politics during the Cold War is particularly illuminating. Demonstrating how Israel, via its secret office 'Nativ', significantly influenced the Jewish diaspora and other transnational actors in the mobilization for Soviet Jewish emigration during the Cold War, he concludes that 'whenever transnational actors' goals overlap with states' foreign policy objectives, opportunities for collaboration arise (…) But while their objectives are usually ultimate goals for NGOs, they are sometimes only instrumental goals for states, or at least states can attach other interests to them, like installing regional security and stability, opening up export markets, or mobilizing resistance against an unwelcome foreign regime'[74]. From this it also becomes clear that SMT and TAN literature have placed their examination of NSAs within the context of 'value-laden debates over human rights, the environment, women, infant health, and indigenous peoples, where large numbers of different situated individuals have become acquainted over a considerable period and developed similar world views'[75]. This understandable focus on norms promotion on part of transnational actors on the whole positions them in a framework that conceptualises the relationship between state and NSAs along confrontational lines. Even Hägel's examination of the way the Jewish diaspora has been used by states to pursue certain objectives and his consequent introduction of the category of 'state- influenced NGOs' (SINGOs) into the study of transnational relations still very much keeps norms promotion at the core of the analysis. In this context, it is important to highlight that, as indicated earlier, another consequence of the fixation on normative campaigns and issues is that when it comes to the question of under what conditions NSAs might be successful in their activities, attention is mostly focused on the features of the 'issues around which transnational advocacy networks have organised most effectively'[76]. Or, to draw on Payne, 'why one set of knowledge claims "wins" and why others are left behind'[77]. Such an issue-centric analysis, however, leaves out an examination of the conditions under which NSAs are successfully operating in other countries – on behalf of states or autonomously – or

[74] Hägel, "States And Transnational Actors", p. 485.
[75] Keck et al., *Activists Beyond Borders*, p. 9.
[76] Keck et al., "Transnational Advocacy Networks In International And Regional Politics", p. 93, 98-99; Stone, "Causal Stories And The Formation Of Policy Agendas"; Carpenter, "Setting The Advocacy Agenda".
[77] Payne, "Persuasion, Frames And Norm Construction".

an analysis of whether the conditions between the relevant interacting states matter for the success or failure of NSA activities. Nonetheless, Hägel's contribution in particular remains vital and informative for the overall aim of this thesis. After all, he invites future researchers to 'differentiate how and to what extent state influence happens, particularly with regard to the distinct uses of covert operations and open collaboration (…) Considering the creativity states have shown in influencing domestic actors, subsequent research will certainly expand the variety of mechanisms at work vis-a-vis transnational actors[78].

This paper very much accepts this invitation to go further down this alley of analysis and indeed seeks to present a distilled conceptual mechanism of State-NSA interaction, in which the latter merely reduces its activities to norms-promotion but becomes a constituent part of the foreign policy-making process itself – in an interactive climate of cooperation rather than confrontation with the state actor. In developing and examining this mechanism, it also aims to incorporate a typology of NSAs operating as entrepreneurs, working in relative autonomy from the state, and as subcontractors, acting in dependence on and under supervision from state actors. What is more, it attempts to go beyond a focus on conditions under which specific normative issues can be advanced by the NSA to become official state policy. Rather, it will highlight the conditions necessary for an NSA to successfully operate – autonomously or under state supervision - in the very country it operates and to consequently become a constituent part of foreign policy-making towards this very state. This move away from norms as the central playground for NSAs, of course, also allows one to investigate the possibility that they might be involved in less 'benevolent' activities as recent events in Ukraine have indicated. Moreover, one might also add that much of the work on transnational actors in world politics 'takes the nature of these agents for granted, leaving unanswered questions about differences between types of NSAs and relationships between them'[79]. The case studies addressed in this dissertation take up this challenge and go beyond it by seeking to reveal whether the difference in the type of actor does make a difference.

[78] Hägel, "States And Transnational Actors", p. 487.
[79] Klotz, "Transnational Activism And Global Transformations".

Principal-Agent Theory

To be sure, it has become clear that SMT and TAN literature overwhelmingly focus on a mostly confrontational relationship between autonomously operating norm entrepreneurs and states that largely neglect the possibility of NSAs willingly pursue a certain *raison d'etat* – as an extended arm of the state so to speak. Yet, the literature on PAT might offer one a way out and provide us with the necessary analytical toolkit to conceptualise the aforementioned relationship and perhaps contribute to a further osmosis between PA and the previous reviewed literature of SMT and TAN.

PAT had its genesis in the field of economics but quickly shifted into the realms of political science, particularly to explain regulatory politics between the US Congress and regulatory agencies [80]. Ross defines an agency relationship as a situation when 'one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems'[81]. Overall, the literature suggests numerous reasons for why principals decide to delegate tasks to agents. Perhaps the most preeminent among them is the desire to enhance credibility[82], minimize transaction costs and to improve the political decision-making process[83], and deflect blame for unpopular or controversial decision[84]. On the whole, PA studies are based on two premises: Firstly, the delegating principal has to assume that agents often have different preferences and might 'behave opportunistically, pursuing their own interests'[85], making the former reluctant to delegate. Secondly, drawing on Weber's classical observation of a rather common relationship in which authority is located on one side and informational advantage on the other[86], PA's other premise is that the agent, for a variety of reasons, possesses an informational advantage over the principal[87]. The majority of PA literature is thus concerned with outlining

[80] McCubbins et al., "Congressional Oversight Overlooked"; Epstein et al., *Delegating Powers*.
[81] Ross, "The Economic Theory of Agency", p. 134.
[82] Thatcher et al., "Theory And Practice Of Delegation To Non-Majoritarian Institutions".
[83] Keohane, *After Hegemony*; Moravcsik, "Preferences And Power In The European Community"; Hawkins, *Delegation And Agency In International Organizations*.
[84] Fiorina, "Legislative Choice Of Regulatory Forms"; Tallberg, "Delegation To Supranational Institutions".
[85] Kiewiet et al., *The Logic Of Delegation*, p. 5.
[86] Weber, *Essays In Sociology*, p. 232.
[87] Miller, "The Political Evolution Of Principal-Agent Models".

mechanisms to contain potential externalities that could arise out of agent discretion and information asymmetries. Such externalities are referred to as 'agency losses', which occur in the form of 'shirking', that is, 'the ability of an agency or other executive actors to enact outcomes different from the policies preferred by those who originally delegated power'[88], or in the form of 'slippage', that is, 'when the structure of delegation itself provides perverse incentives for the agent to behave in ways inimical to the preferences of the principals'[89]. A principal can, of course, draw on several instruments to reduce such 'agency losses'. As Dür et al. explain, 'tools are available prior to delegation (selection of agent, screening and definition of mandate), throughout the policy process (monitoring and reporting requirements), and at the end of a policy cycle (sanctioning, non-acceptance of negotiated agreements and termination of mandates)'[90]. To be sure, some scholars have identified instances when 'it is not the principal's interest to minimize such difference' and take appropriate measures against 'agency losses'[91]. Nonetheless, because the vast majority of PAT is primarily focused on mechanisms of delegation and control, the inherent assumption appears to be that agents, for different reasons, will necessarily possess different and diverging interests. As Damro points out, 'without different interests, it is quite difficult to identify any instances of agent behaviour as exclusively agent shirking or slipping. Rather, if principal and agent interests are the same, the agent's behaviour simply reflects the faithful execution of the principal's desires'[92]. Yet, because of the focus on controlling the agents' preferences, one might argue that PAT neglects the possibility of the agent precisely just 'faithfully executing the principal's desires', particularly when it comes to specific policy areas such as covert operations.

Moreover, going back to the second assumption inherent in PAT, it appears that for PAT literature the condition under which NSAs or agents can engage successfully in policy-making is identified as informational advantage[93]. Whilst this is certainly true, one of the contributions of this thesis lies in highlighting that it is the lack of accountability that NSAs enjoy in the country they operate in that

[88] Epstein et al., "Administrative Procedures, Information, And Agency Discretion", p. 699.
[89] Pollack, "Delegation, Agency, And Agenda Setting In The European Community", p. 108.
[90] Dür, "Principals, Agents, And The European Union's Foreign Economic Policies".
[91] Majone, "Two Logics Of Delegation".
[92] Damro, "EU Delegation And Agency In International Trade Negotiations".
[93] Pollack, "Delegation, Agency, And Agenda Setting In The European Community", p. 130; Dür, "Principals, Agents, And The European Union's Foreign Economic Policies".

incentivises states to delegate tasks to NSAs. Perhaps, part of the reason for why accountability has not yet moved to the forefront of PAT analysis is that most of its studies focus on the Western World, which possesses a very rigid and advanced regulatory system to supervise and monitor non-state activities. As one shifts the geographical focus away from the West, however, it will become clear that NSAs might be engaged in far less benign activities than norms production and enjoy specific advantages vis-a-vis over state actors due to their lack of accountability and oversight in the country they operate in. In this context, one might also add Thompson's legitimate criticism of a certain 'agent-centrism' in the PA literature. He draws our attention to the possibility that 'just as agents can undermine their principals' interests, principals can undermine agents who are faithfully pursuing agreed-to goals'[94]. Indeed, the literature 'almost invariably assume[s] that it is the agent that is opportunistic, even to the point of cheating, rather than the principal'[95], whilst there is only a limited analytical engagement with the notion of the principal cheating. Again, the aforementioned environment in a country such as Pakistan might only provide greater incentive for such 'pathological delegation' on part of the principal. In the language of PA theory, this would thus constitute a total and complete agency loss and a reversal of the original constellation of the agent carrying out work on behalf of the principal.

Generally speaking, however, as it offers various conceptual mechanisms that highlight how the principal can ensure that the agent does not move away from its delegated assignment, PAT must overall be seen as a complementary analytical toolkit for this thesis, especially when it comes to understanding of NSAs acting as subcontractors in a condition of dependence on and indeed under supervision by state actors. In this context, there indeed appears to be potential for a symbiosis between TAN+SMT and PAT, as both conceptualise a different NSA-state relationship, literature so as to paint a comprehensive and nuanced picture of the various roles of NSAs in foreign policy-making and their respective interaction with the state.

Veto Players

[94] Thompson, "Principal Problems".
[95] Perrow, "Economic Theories Of Organization", p. 14.

Furthermore, when it comes to the distillation of the various ways and forms in which NSAs can operate in foreign policy, traditional actor typologies used, for example, in fields such as comparative public policy, have not yet found their way into the analysis. In this context, Oppermann draws attention to the underappreciation of the role of 'veto player approaches' in FPA, which 'has not been systemically explored'. Yet, whilst he rightfully points to a gap in the literature and reminds us that 'the overwhelming majority of empirical applications of veto player arguments has focused on established parliamentary democracies of the Global North while relatively little attention has been put on non-democratic regimes or on developing countries of the Global South', he himself very much sticks to a state-centred analysis of veto players: 'given the extent of executive control over foreign policy making (…) veto player analyses of foreign policy should pay particular attention to veto points and veto players inside governments'[96]. Indeed, his sole focus on the role of state actors as veto players appears to be the guiding principle in the few other analyses that seek to theorise the role played by veto players in foreign policy: Mansfield et al. have used veto player arguments to explain the propensity of states to join preferential trade arrangements[97]. Along similar lines, Wang et al. have shown that larger numbers of veto players reduce the volume of foreign aid a country provides[98]. Another example of a veto player analysis in foreign policy is Choi et al.'s study on the ability of developing democratic countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)[99]. Stoiber et al. have compared and contrasted the veto player constellations of the then 15 EU member states in ratifying European treaties[100] whilst Finke et al. have employed veto player perspectives to provide an in-depth analysis of the workings of the European Convention and the bargaining and ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty[101]. Patrick Howell, moreover, has sought to analyse EU attempts at coordinating a common European response to the 2008 financial crisis[102]. Overall then, it appears that, despite the state-centrism of these studies,

[96] Oppermann et al., "Veto Player Approaches In Foreign Policy Analysis".
[97] Mansfield et al., "Vetoing co-operation".
[98] Wang et al., "Veto players and foreign aid provision".
[99] Choi et al., "Reexamining the effect of democratic institutions on inflows of foreign direct investment in developing countries".
[100] Stoiber et al., "Der Vergleich von Ratifikationsstrukturen der EU".
[101] Finke, "Reforming the European Union."
[102] Howell, "Coordination in a crisis".

veto player approaches in conjunction with a focus on the role of NSAs appear to have great potential in reinvigorating analysis, especially when it comes to making a contribution to the growing research agenda about the foreign policy of different types of authoritarian regimes[103] and foreign policy fiascos[104].

Yet, as only a few of these works appear to take into consideration that a non-state entity might be capable of operating as some sort of veto player vis-à-vis states, this thesis seeks to advance a perhaps as of yet unexplored and underappreciated research agenda. What is more, most of these studies rest on the hypotheses developed by classical veto player theory, namely, that the further a policy initiative is from the preferences or agenda of a given veto player, the higher the likelihood of his intervention. Acknowledging this, one might still wonder whether it might not be worth going further than this aforementioned rational-choice approach to veto player involvement and analyse *under what conditions* non-state veto players are able to exercise their power and in what manner such a veto power might be employed. For example, one might ameliorate the traditional concept of a veto player to the effect that the conditions that enable an actor to exercise his veto beyond merely stopping a procedure. Indeed, one might envision that such an actor would seek to use its resources to take over or directly *hijack* a policy process and continue to conduct it on its own and as its own. Finally, one might also highlight that, similar to for some of the key assumptions of this DPhil thesis, veto player literature assumes that the inclusion of multiple veto players might result in the diffusion of accountability – a hypothesis that has been identified as one pathway in the direction of more extreme government coalition foreign policy[105] but has not yet been linked to the potential lack of accountability that NSAs enjoy in their operations.

In the light of all of the above, one might wonder what these various roles are that NSAs can assume and whether they are subjects or objects of foreign policy? What is more, with direct reference to the above, another question that might be raised is whether this thesis speaks more to the TANs (Transnational Advocacy Networks) or to the PAT (Principal-Agent Theory) debate? The short

[103] Weeks, "Strongmen and straw men".
[104] Janis, *Groupthink.*
[105] Kaarbo et al., *Taking It To The Extreme.*

answer to this would be: both. The long answer requires further elaboration.

On the whole, there is an immense variety of acronyms in the existing literature, which describe potential roles that NSAs, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), can assume. These different roles, which have occasionally been referred to as 'suspicious newcomers'[106], can range, as Cumming outlines, from QUANGOs (quasi-governmental organisations) and GONGOs (government-organised NGOs), to PONGOs (parliamentary organised NGOs or, sometimes, personal NGOs), FINGOs (financially interested NGOs), GANGOs (gap-filling NGOs), BRINGOs (brief case NGOs), DONGOs (donor organised NGOs), DINGOs (donor international NGOs), BONGOs (business organised NGOs), BINGOs (business interest NGOs), BENGOs (bent, in the sense of crooked NGOs), CHONGOs (city hall NGOs), GRINGOs (government run or inspired run NGOs), PANGOs (party-affiliated NGOs), RONGOs (retired officials NGOs), COMENGOs (come and go, or here today and gone tomorrow NGOs) as well as MANGOs or MONGOs (Mafia-affiliated or Mafia organised NGOs)'[107]. The United Nations Framework for Climate Change also adds indigenous peoples organizations (IPOs), local government and municipal authorities (LGMAs), research and independent NGOs (RINGOs), trade union NGOs (TUNGOs), women and gender (WGC), and youth NGOs (YOUNGOs) to the list[108]. What is more, one recent book introduces ENGOs (environmental nongovernmental organisations), which have spread in numbers in countries such as China[109], to the list. Another distinction made in the literature is between 'Northern NGOs' (NNGOs) and 'Southern NGOs' (SNGOs)[110]. Regarding the latter it seems unsurprising, as Marchetti highlights, that 'almost ¾ of the NGOs are northern. In fact, in the CSOs the traditional governmental imbalance between north and south is even more accentuated'[111]. This, one might legitimately argue, is all the more reason for this thesis to focus analytical attention on the activities of NSAs in the Global South –

[106] Dichter, "Globalization And Its Effects On Ngos: Efflorescence Or A Blurring Of Roles And Relevance?."
[107] Cumming, "Gongos". A similar list can be found in: Vakil, "Confronting The Classification Problem: Toward A Taxonomy Of NGOs", p. 2060; Götz, "Reframing NGOs: The Identity Of An International Relations Non-Starter", p. 232.
[108] United Nations, "Admitted Ngos."
[109] McBeath et al., Comparative Environmental Politics, pp. 60-62.
[110] Lewis, "Nongovernmental Organizations, Definition and History."
[111] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 147; note: this, it seems, makes it even more imperative to focus attention on NSA activities in the non-Western world.

whether they are humanitarian-minded NGOs, traditional civil society actors (e.g. trade unions, churches), or other entities that are not part of the official government structure.

In the light of the outlined list of possible roles that NSAs can assume, it appears that most of them really fall into two broad categories, namely, those who exist in autonomy from states, as most NSAs in the TAN literature hope to achieve or maintain, or those who find themselves in a dependence on states, as most agents in the PAT literature. Autonomy and dependence – it is between these two poles that NSAs oscillate vis-à-vis states. GONGOs and QUANGOs are by definition reliant on state facilitation, resources, and even personnel, with government funding possibly constituting 'the central defining characteristic of being a QUANGO'[112]. As List writes: 'particularly the great powers will almost certainly have geopolitical interests which they will advance by a variety of means. One of these may be the GONGO which might well be established ostensibly to advance ideas and practices such as democracy promotion which are not, on the surface, politically contentious but, in fact, mask other economic and foreign policy objectives'[113]. Naim, for instance, cites the National Endowment for Democracy as the most well-known example of a GONGO[114]. Marchetti summarises this broadly dichotomous taxonomy when he outlines that, in the case of CSOs, there are, on the whole, 'two types of actors [that] can enter into very different kinds of relations. At one extreme, CSOs can be created by governments (so-called GONGOs), or by IOs (so called IONGOs). At the other extreme, CSOs may end up posing a threat to public institutions and enter into a violent relationship with them'[115]. This again highlights that NSAs can act as independent actors, choosing whether to cooperate with states in what might be referred to as 'hybrid policymaking' or even against the interests of states as rivals – be that in the form of spoilers or even veto players of state-driven foreign policy initiatives[116]. This appears to be very much in line with the assumptions underpinning network theory, another crucial body of literature, which is going to be assessed below. After all, 'network theory places relationships among actors and the properties of these relationships at the center of

[112] Cumming, "Quangos".
[113] List et al. , *International Encyclopedia Of Civil Society*.
[114] Naím, "Democracy's Dangerous Impostors."
[115] Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities."
[116] Chong, "The Post-International Challenge To Foreign Policy ". p. 784.

studying political processes (...) [such] a network perspective places a premium on relational understandings of power; power that derives from and is exercised through actual or potential relationships rather than residing only in a node'[117] - and this relationship is, in the case of foreign policy-making, determined by how dependent on or autonomous from the state an NSA is. Given that the nature of its relationship with the state determines whether an NSA can act with autonomy from or in a state of dependence on governments, it can thus be stated that this thesis does not just speak to only one branch of literature (TAN, PAT, Veto-Players). Rather, it seeks to synthesise them in order to provide a comprehensive framework, which helps to account for the immense complexity of foreign policy-making today.

Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM)

To be able to account for their influence on NSAs or how they, as NSAs themselves, seek to become part of, take over or otherwise influence the political decision-making process, we can draw analytical inspiration from the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM)[118]. Put differently: traditional paradigms of IR have usually described states as a 'black boxes'[119]. This, however, does not include the complex interaction of states' constituent parts and the bargaining between different institutions out of which the eventual of conduct of foreign policy emerges**.** To be sure, this is of particular relevance in the developing world where democratically-elected, 'civilian' governments do not necessarily possess supreme authority over the decision-making process, which they have to either share with or completely hand over to a 'deep state' whose configuration varies from state to state but mostly has at its core the military establishment and intelligence services. So as to accurately acknowledge and capture these dynamics the BPM is very useful indeed as it brings to light the organisational structure within states and the impact that different state institutions can have on a decision-making process[120]. Moreover, it also allows us to realise and understand the mechanism and indeed motivation behind the employment of NSAs by some state institutions, which might have an interest in pursuing a rival policy vis-à-vis another government agency, to have its

[117] Avant et al., "Introduction", p. 9.
[118] Allison, *Essence Of Decision*.
[119] Frankel, *Realism*, p. 194.
[120] Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 19;* Kegley et al., *World Politics, p. 69*.

policy proposal prevail[121]. This can be the result of more overt 'pulling and hauling' between these actors or unfold secretly[122]. In the context of the countries selected for this dissertation and them possessing almost parallel structures of governance, this might be particularly relevant for the study of how NSAs might be used by actors in one governance structure to avoid having to bargain with the other. Hence, this thesis shall follow into the footsteps of scholars such as Fearon[123] and Mansfield[124], and Schultz[125] who have sought to demonstrate how different structures in the organisation of states compel them to certain policies or convey useful information in varying levels. Indeed, the instrumentalisation of NSAs for different political objectives of different and competing actors is an analytical field that this thesis seeks to explore more generally.

State Capturing

Furthermore, given that this DPhil seeks to concern itself with the non-Western realm of the global polity, interchangeably referred to as 'the South', the 'developing' or 'Third World', it is also imperative to draw on literature that paints a different and rather different, non-Westphalian picture of 'the state' outside Europe and the US. This phenomenon has already been alluded to in the review of the literature on neoclassical realism. In this regard, the thesis seeks to draw further analytical enrichment from the literature on 'state capturing' and the different natures of political entities states as advanced by a fringe branch of the post-conflict reconstruction. The foundation of these works can be identified Weber's idea of the patrimonial form of governance through neo-patrimonial regimes and the associated patron-client relationship[126]. In such a neo-patrimonial system the individual national leader controls the political and economic life of the country, and the personal clientistic relationships with the leader playing a crucial role in amassing personal wealth or in the rise and decline of members of the political elite. The insight advanced by this literature holds valuable lessons for the geographical focus upon that this thesis intends to rest upon. Indeed, understanding the socio-

[121] Tagma et al., "Bureaucrats, Ayatollahs, and Persian Politics".
[122] Rosati et al., *The Politics Of US Foreign Policy, p. 288*.
[123] Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences And The Escalation Of International Disputes".
[124] Mansfield, et al., "Why Democracies Cooperate More".
[125] Schultz, *Democracy And Coercive Diplomacy*.
[126] Jackson, "States and Quasi-states"; Migdal, "Strong States, Weak States".

political context of state-building activities in many developing countries requires a recognition and an understanding of neo-patrimonialism. For example, several authors argue that it is misguided to assume that state weakness causes a power vacuum in fragile states. Often, where state apparatus appears weak, power is actually vested in extremely strong informal networks, such as the tribal structures in Pakistan. Reno calls these 'shadow states' and highlights that what are often classed as symptoms of state weakness are actually often deliberate strategies of rulers to enlarge their personal economic power base[127]. This perspective highlights that there are often major disincentives that prevent rulers in developing countries from supporting state-building initiatives. Translating this into the context of this thesis, it is thus important to, firstly, recognise the fundamentally different nature of the political entities this DPhil seeks to investigate and to, secondly, realise the different and greater analytical enrichment that a focus on non-state actor activities in such circumstances might allow one to reach.

Networks and Informality

Finally, it seems imperative to also incorporate network theory into the theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis. Enjoying particular prevalence in the fields of communication studies[128], financial networks theory[129], and geography[130], networks have also been gaining momentum in IR recently. This is, of course, not to assert that IR theory has neglected the potential that network theory offers. Various engagement between the two have taken place over the years. In the late 1960s and early 1970s scholars from Savage et al.[131], to Brams[132], and Skjelsbaek[133] analysed structures in the international system arising out of network ties in IGOs, trade ties, and diplomatic exchanges. In order to sketch out the 'multiplexity of connections between nation-states', Christopherson, for example, mapped out the frequency of diplomatic visits between states and draws comparisons with the

[127] Reno, *Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa*.
[128] Castells, *The Rise Of The Network Society*.
[129] Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, "Systemic Risk And Stability In Financial Networks."; Bougheas and Kirman, *Complex Financial Networks And Systemic Risk*.
[130] Hess and Yeung, "Whither Global Production Networks In Economic Geography? Past, Present, And Future."; Sui et al., "Networks in Geography".
[131] Savage et al., "A Statistical Model Of The Gross Analysis Of Transaction Flows."
[132] Brams, "Transaction Flows In The International System."
[133] Skjelsbæk, "Peace And The Structure Of The International Organization Network."

volume and consequent structure of trade between states[134]. This first wave was followed by disciples of world-systems and dependency theories, drawing on network theory to analyse global inequalities by assessing four different types of international networks in the realms of trade, diplomatic relations, treaty memberships, and the military. Overall, however, Hafner-Burton et al. conclude that 'the discipline of international relations has not, until recently, treated networks as structures that can constrain and enable individual agents and influence international outcomes. Research has focused on networks' effects on their environments, for example, the effects of transnational activist networks on international agreements, rather than the effects of network structures on actors and outcomes within those networks[135] (…) assessments of power in international relations could be transformed by network analysis, which proposes new bases for international influence independent of the capabilities of individual states'[136]. Yet, this alleged gap now seems to be closing with scholars, such as Slaughter, advancing the proposition that IR and network analysis have potentially significant overlaps, which need to be explored further.

Indeed, in this context, it is indispensable to include the lessons one can draw from Slaughter's *The Chessboard and the Web*, which possesses a much stronger overlapping with the themes and focus of this thesis. Overall, she reaffirms her fundamental observation that 'whatever the future brings, we need the ability and the tools to operate effectively in a very different world, where states still exist and exercise power, but side by side with corporate, civic, and criminal actors enmeshed in a web of networks'[137]. Importantly, her work pays considerable attention to NSAs and the informal ways through which they become involved in foreign policy: 'when we combine the chessboard and the web perspectives, we can see states as unitary actors competing and cooperating with other states and also as sites of many different networks spreading beyond their border but incorporating their citizens, corporations, civic, and criminal organizations (...) for scholars studying networks as actors in global governance, the central question is whether

[134] Christopherson, "Structural Analysis Of Transaction Systems."
[135] See also: Kahler, "Collective Action and Clandestine Networks"; Kahler, "Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance".
[136] Hafner-Burton, "Network Analysis For International Relations".
[137] Slaughter, *The Chessboard And The Web*.

and when networked international organizations, regimes, or informal initiatives are more effective at solving international problems or achieving members' objectives than traditional international organizations'[138]. The ability to become informally involved, partly due to its ability to operate with less accountability, does indeed appear to be one of the key advantages an NSAs possesses and lies at the core of what this DPhil seeks to provide empirical evidence for. Her outline of a broader framework that allows for the incorporation of NSAs of various types, creates a theoretical space, in which this thesis could position itself and whose further elaboration and development it hopes to contribute to. In this regard, Slaughter's work does present a very solid foundation for such an endeavour by avoiding the extremes of Hardt and Negri's *Empire* on the one hand and the 'Westphalian trap' on the other. Indeed, the following excerpt might perhaps serve as one of the credos for what this dissertation hopes to demonstrate: '[states] should become docks for all kinds of networks, those composed of government ministers and those composed of mixed government, civic, and corporate actors (...) in this order, states must be waves and particles at the same time. They must continue to be the principal actors in the global system for addressing many circumstances: interstate war, weapons proliferation, state-sponsored terrorism and other criminal networks, ethnic and religious conflict, boundary disputes, and the many other issues of foreign and commercial diplomacy. But they must also be the places where web actors reside, reaching across boundaries as they engage in commercial, civic, political, and criminal justice pursuits that reverberate in global affairs just as much as state actions do'[139].

Crucially, one of Slaughter's earlier works, although focusing primarily on 'executive trans-governmental networks', that is, institutionalised relationships between amongst government agencies and their respective members and representatives in different countries, nonetheless advances an important concept, namely, that of informality. The usefulness of the notion of Informality is becoming most apparent when Slaughter observes that 'a key identifying feature of current government networks is that they are necessarily informal (...) they operate in the political equivalent of the informal economy, alongside formal international

[138] Slaughter, *The Chessboard And The Web*.
[139] Slaughter, *The Chessboard And The Web*.

institutions (...) In practical terms, what this informality means is, crucially, that individual government institutions cannot be subjected to specific obligations or duties under international law (...) the entire world of trans-governmental relations remains largely hidden from the formal rules and foundational principles of traditional international law (...) the interesting question is how these formal unitary state relations coexist and / or conflict with relations among parts of states in the informal sector'[140]. This might, of course, be true for the main entities of her book, namely, trans-governmental networks – but can also be applied to NSAs and their ability to operate with less accountability compared to state actors. After all, NSAs are also active in the 'political equivalent of the informal economy' and whilst some of them are 'subject to specific obligations or duties' vis-à-vis their home government, they often remain largely hidden from the 'formal rules' in the country they operate or are being sent to operate in. Indeed, the very question of how these formal unitary state relations coexist and/or conflict with the informal sector have been at the core of the author's MPhil thesis on Western NSAs in Pakistan, which could conduct their business largely without oversight and proper monitoring. It might thus be reasonable to claim that some states are able to wield what might be referred to as 'informal state power' through NSAs and are thus able to circumvent 'formal' inter-state channels. Having said this, it must be underlined that Slaughter, with reference to trans-governmental networks, seems to reject the notion that lack of accountability might be beneficial or that informality can be instrumentalized and utilised[141]. However, in line with the findings of the author's MPhil thesis, we can fully expect that it is precisely the ability to work in the shadows that offers some states an edge over others or enables them to circumvent the formal rules, which normally determine its interaction with another government. Making the relationships between state and NSA 'more visible' might thus be counterproductive.

It cannot be emphasised enough that this very notion of informality, already featuring prominently in the State Capturing literature and Slaughter's writing but

[140] Slaughter, *A New World Order*.
[141] Slaughter, *A New World Order*.

also to be found outside of Political Science[142], could indeed constitute one of the most important building blocks for the theoretical and conceptual foundation of this thesis. It is thus necessary to further dwell on it and examine the other works, which are of significant value for this thesis. However, before doing so, it is important to point out that the concept and study of informality is not without its controversies. Indeed, it is at the centre of a normative debate, already alluded to in Slaughter's engagement with the question of whether the lack of accountability, characterising informal arrangements, ought to be regarded as ethically tenable. Conrad, for example, distinguishes 'informal (…) [as] three in one: it is rather crooked in developing countries (corruption, cronyism), it is useful in institutions of international governance (flexibility, efficiency), or it is dubious as part of Western political activity'[143]. Merkel et al. also appear to share this rather critical view, especially when it comes to informal arrangements outside the democratic West, warning that whilst informal arrangements can be complementary in liberal democracies, they can undermine or displace legitimate formal institutions in so-called 'defective democracies'[144]. The basic tenet of these authors thus seems to be that 'any normative assessment [of informality] will have to engage with the question of democracy because democratic standards are per se under threat when formal institutions are bypassed or hollowed out in the process of public policy-making'[145]. Viewed through these prisms, we can clearly see the possibility of informal arrangements in foreign policy assuming a pathological dimension, running counter to liberal democratic standards. And yet, taking the literature on State Capturing into consideration, one wonders whether, following this logic, might not lead us to consider the way foreign policy is being conducted outside the democratic West as illegitimate and therefore 'bad'? Is the lack of formality and transparency not one of the key advantages of the involvement of nonstate actors in foreign policy? After all, whilst we must certainly acknowledge that informality can be 'pathological' or 'bad', viewed from a Western-centred point of view, we must wonder whether such rigid normative assessments ought not to be made more

[142] Jaffe et al., "The Myth Of Formality In The Global North"; McFarlane, "Rethinking Informality"; Picker, "Sovereignty Beyond The State"; Swyngedouw, "Governance Innovation And The Citizen."
[143] Conrad, "Informal Politics", p. 256.
[144] Merkel and Croissant, "Consolidated Or Defective Democracy?", p. 19.
[145] Christiansen, "Introduction".

flexible so as to comprehensively and neutrally account for foreign policy conduct outside the democratic West where different conditions prevail.

As part of this call for greater normative flexibility in studying informal arrangements, it is also useful to point out that informal arrangements *are already part of formal institutions*, even in the democratic West, and constitute a modus operandi, not necessarily exclusive of formal procedures. After all, several studies inform us that the EU's institutional development can only be sufficiently understood 'against the background of the existing mix of formal rules and informal governance'[146]. Similarly, Shapovalova underscores the 'need to pay greater attention to informal governance in the areas of intergovernmental policy-making in the EU and other international institutions because it has greater potential to explain how the policies in these organisations are made and how international cooperation advances than just looking at formal structures and institutions'[147]. In other words, this demonstrates that informal governance is already a reality and very much part of day-to-day practice of international affairs – and one complementing formal governance[148]. In the context of this thesis, it thus follows that 'we should be cautious not to dismiss informal governance as undemocratic, non-transparent or as favouring the rule of the few over the many. Such tendencies certainly do exist, but on the other hand there seem to be specific advantages and qualities of informal governance which we need to understand better before arriving at a conclusion. One should also not employ a romanticised image of traditional interstate law. As informal governance arrangements, formal international law and the international organisations based on it has often lacked in terms of transparency and accountability and has privileged certain states or groups of actors over others'[149].

Having acknowledged the various positions in this debate and having allied ourselves with those scholars demanding that certain rigid normative assessments ought to be made more flexible so as to comprehensively and neutrally account for foreign policy conduct, especially outside the democratic West, we can now turn to examining a work, which further problematises this 'gap between the way things

[146] Kleine, *Informal Governance In The European Union,* p. 158.
[147] Shapovalova, "The power of informality", p. 342.
[148] Achen "Evaluating political decision-making models", p. 295.
[149] Conzelmann, "Informal Governance In International Relations."

are formally declared to be and the way in which things get done in practice'[150]. To be sure, although Ledeneva writes on domestic rather than international politics, her work seem to be most inspiring for this dissertation. After all, as we already learned above, states and non-state entities do not always go 'by the book' but in practice develop or rely on less conventional approaches. What is facilitating this modus operandi, both in Russia's *sistema* and foreign policy, is the fact that it is 'based on [their] non-transparency: networks of insiders are tied together by following an unwritten code (...) the foundations of belonging to networks of power are hidden behind formal appointments and are non-transparent (…) just as occupying a formal position is not the same as having real power, the existing legal framework is different from the mastery of the rules of the game[151]'. This, of course, is applicable to the Russian society as well as to the "international society" of global politics. In other words, there might be formal institutions and entities (e.g. states and IOs), which (we expect to) operate according to a codified legal code and established diplomatic procedures but which might in reality pursue very different strategies according to the *de facto* 'rules of the game'.

It should also be added that such networks are, according to Ledeneva, characterised by their 'diffuse nature' so that they may 'penetrate formal and informal hierarchies [to] ensure that both types of hierarchies have no fixed boundaries'[152]. This could be interpreted to mean that the line between the formal hierarchy between and within states is blurred – an observation, which could have significant implications for this thesis. As the empirical chapters on Pakistan and Georgian in particular can be expected to demonstrate: those entities which are not even incorporated in the formal hierarchy of states might often be more effective in achieving their goals than those who are formally part of the state. Similarly, one might also envision there to be a stronger connection between an informal network in State A and a formal hierarchy in State B. In such a scenario, the former might be more skilled at interacting with the latter rather than with its own government. Furthermore, what might start with a formal procedure could at some point be infused with informal hierarchies, which could be uniquely suitable to further aid

[150] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*, p. 3.
[151] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*, p. 14.
[152] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*, p. 22.

the process or even constitute an indispensable factor that must be included in order for the policy to be successful at all.

The other notions, which Ledeneva advances in her work, closely linked to the above, are 'ambivalence of constraints' and 'flexibility of rules', depending on whether an actor seeks to operate through the formal or the informal system of governance[153]. These are, of course, related to questions about accountability and plausible deniability, which have already been running like a red thread through the author's MPhil thesis on the operation of Western NSAs in Pakistan. After all, it might be an NSA's superior ability to operate with less accountability than a state actor, making it uniquely qualified either to be hired on behalf of a state, or initiate policies a state might be unable to pursue or unwilling to be seen involved in.

Having said this, it must be stressed that Ledeneva's analysis is based on a certain normative orientation at its core. Even though she makes it clear that 'it would be a mistake (...) to associate *sistema* with a failed state'[154], she still very much hopes to make suggestions that will lead to change. For her, 'power networks tend to create effective yet illegitimate shortcuts that undermine the efficiency and legitimacy of formal institutional channels'. What is more, 'the formal sites of the state workings lose their relevance because of the 'network' character of the state that emerges through the personal contact between state officials in various branches of public administration and/or between them and their counterparts in politics and business, law enforcement, the judiciary and the legislative system'[155]. Hence, 'even if personalised channels of power networks might be effective in the short term and on a selective basis, their long-term effect is to create a gap between the real and the formal centres of power, ultimately undermining both the strength of institutions and their manageability'[156]. However, whilst this might sadly be true in the case of Russia, the effects of networks and the parallel system of governance that their analysis reveals might nonetheless be soberly incorporated into the context of the thesis. After all, what might be detrimental in terms of Russia's development towards a Weberian legal-rational authority, nonetheless describes the way foreign policy operates today. In other words, whilst these 'rules of the game' characterise the system of governance in Russia, they can also be found in the global

[153]Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*, p. 249.
[154] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*, p. 249.
[155] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*, p. 17.
[156] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*, p. 23.

environment different entities, including states, find themselves in – not necessarily to their disadvantage. Indeed, these 'rules of the game' do not necessarily mean that formal institutions (states, IOs) are weakened – it could mean that some are weakened whilst others are strengthened, namely those who are able to successfully play by or rather exploit the rules for their own advantages. At the same time, states do not always have to come out 'on top' in this game. After all, there might be some non-state entities, which possess a superior ability to exploit these rules and gain advantages vis- à-vis states. As Ledeneva herself writes: 'in societies where formal institutions do not work to their full potential and where people rely on informal ways of getting things done, the leadership is bound to rely on the use of informal instruments as well. Leaders can only be leaders once they master and control informal networks. The manageability of informal networks is often achieved with informal means and instruments'[157]. Through the prism of my thesis, this very passage could very well be translated as follows:

> *In any complex and multifaceted environment where formal institutions, such as states and IOs, are not able to work to their full potential and in the formal way they might officially be expected to act, all concerned actors are bound to sometimes rely on the use of informal instruments. Leaders, that is, those entities, states and NSAs alike, which are successful in navigating this system, can only be leaders once they master and control informal networks. The manageability of informal networks is often achieved with informal means and instruments.*

At the same time, as it will be demonstrated in the case of Pakistan, there might be some states, which might possess formal state institutions at first sight but, upon closer inspection, show themselves to be ruled by a network of very different actors and entities, whose composition and modus operandi do not correspond well to the picture of a state we have in the West. In this case, any successful interaction with states possessing such features requires a distinctly different, that is, informal approach and modus operandi compared to, say, the more institutionalised, codified conduct of foreign policy between France and Germany. In short, entities, which

[157] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*,p. 242.

hope to be successful in global affairs today, have to realise and utilise the symbiotic nature of formal procedures and informal ways of circumventing them in the 'international *sistema'*.

Chapter 2: Theory

2.1 Research Question(s) and Hypotheses

Taking the relevant literature and understanding of foreign policy underlying this thesis into consideration, we must proceed to state the research questions this thesis shall ask, namely, *why, how and under which conditions do non-state actors become involved in foreign policy-making?* Accordingly guided, the dissertation attempts to systematically develop a theoretical argument and subsequent conceptualisation that brings to light the strategically relevant actor- and country-oriented features for this influence so as to understand whether, and if so, why some NSAs might potentially be more qualified than state actors - or other NSAs - to pursue a certain foreign policy; how, through what mechanisms and under what conditions are they able to insert themselves and exert influence in the decision-making processes of states towards each other? Which of these mechanisms and circumstances favour which actors in different countries and contexts and, referring back to the author's MPhil thesis, how do Western and non-Western actors differ in their *modus operandi* and qualifying features? By systemically identifying such factors, conceptualising different NSA types, comparing them with each other and exploring the reasons for their respectively different ways of involvement, the thesis seeks to develop a theoretical argument and analytical framework that highlights aspects to understand why, how and under what conditions they form associations with states and/or each other, determine their preferences and ultimately make decisions in foreign policy today.

Yet, how does this play out in what Waltz once referred to as the 'complex and ugly reality'[158] of foreign policy and what hypotheses can we accordingly distil and test? As already sketched out, state institutions around the planet have observed the rise of NSAs on the world stage over recent decades differently and the record

[158] Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy."

of their respective interaction has been mixed. Yet, whilst a multitude of Western NGOs and advocacy groups such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch have been operating as the heirs apparent to the missionaries and doctors during the previous age of empires, the non-Western world also possesses a variety of different NSAs which have made their impact felt both in the so-called 'Global South' and 'North'; and indeed, governments in both realms have utilised and – at the same time – been subjected to their influence.

In the case of post-9/11 Pakistan, for example, NATO troops in Afghanistan have witnessed how the country's powerful security apparatus has cunningly employed insurgent groups to spoil the efforts made by Indian, Western, and Afghan foreign policies to shape the geopolitics of the region in their favour. In marked contrast to such bellicose utilisation of NSAs by a state, non-state elements on both sides of the Durand line covertly and cautiously initiated a peace initiative between Afghanistan and Pakistan at a time of heightened tensions between the two countries, to which tribal leaders but, crucially, no representatives of the concerned states had initially been invited to. The same covert pattern can be seen in the way the first direct peace negotiations between the Taliban and the US were brought about, namely through a Saudi business lawyer, who served as a middleman between the Kingdom and the Taliban representatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan and eventually approached a trusted friend of Richard Holbrooke on the American side.

Moreover, bearing in mind Durkheim's conceptualisation of the state not as a coherent, unified actor á la Weber, but as a conflicting agglomeration of different clashing interests and various power centres within it, it is important to remind ourselves that a country such as Pakistan, as many other countries in the 'Global South', is distinguished by the existence of a so-called 'deep state', comprised – at its core – of the armed forces and intelligence agencies. Confronted with such an obstacle to policy formulations and implementations, one should thus not be surprised to hear about the enlistment of businessmen, former officials and other non-state envoys by the Pakistani civilian government to circumvent such domestic veto players and test the waters regarding the possibility of peace talks with its Indian neighbour – a policy realm nominally under the responsibility of the Pakistan Army. Such delegation of accountability by governments to NSAs is, however, not always a feature of NSA-state interaction that is welcomed by governments –

especially not by those outside the Occident. Indeed, as already alluded to on multiple occasions, recent geopolitical events and the controversies surrounding them have shown that relations between governments and NSAs can prove to be far more difficult and indeed dangerous. In the Middle East, the Syrian administration has been denounced for not permitting Western NGOs such as *Medecins Sans Frontiers* (MSF) to work in government-held territory and only reluctantly agreed to cooperate with UN agencies. In Russia and Egypt governing elites have been criticised for their legislative and judicial 'crackdown' on NSAs, which were regarded as 'the extended arm of the West' and thus as threats to national security. At the same time, the US has been accused of having infiltrated various humanitarian-minded NGOs in Ukraine but also in Pakistan where it allegedly instrumentalised Save the Children, to obtain bin Laden's DNA through a vaccination campaign[159].

Moreover, going back to the so-called 'deep state' acting as a *de facto*, although not *de jure*, domestic veto player, one might legitimately wonder whether NSAs could potentially also fulfil a similar function. In the Russia of the 1990s under President Yeltsin, for example, the natural resources, a major tool of its foreign policy, were largely under the control of his 'family' of oligarchs, whilst the Saudi Royal family and government is said to be restricted in the conduct and orientation of its relationship with the outside world by the existence of a powerful religious establishment. Pakistan and Afghanistan, again, are, in some parts of the country, dominated by landlords and tribal chiefs who wield considerable influence and can often not be by-passed in the government's decision-making process. Of course, apart from resting on economic, religious or traditional authority, the warlords of Afghanistan are similarly known to possess sufficient firepower to eliminate not just people but also proposals about their country's conduct on the world stage.

Against the background of what we have witnessed around the globe and particularly in the non-Western world, one can thus formulate the following three hypotheses to find answers to the question of why, how and under what conditions NSAs engage in foreign policy-making and influence state behaviour:

[159] Yusufzai, "Bin Laden Blowback? Pakistan Expels Save The Children."

H1: Non-state actors engage successfully in foreign policy-making if they do have direct access to state authorities in the country they operate in.

H2: Non-state actors will come to fill a vacuum in foreign policy-making when bilateral cooperation is difficult among given countries.

H3: Non-state actors engage successfully in foreign policy-making because they are less accountable in the state they operate in.

Despite the nature of many states outside the West, that is, Western Europe and North America, with its multiple power centres and authorities, this thesis expects that NSAs operating in these countries – either independently or on behalf of a government – do still require a comprehensive and direct relationship with government authorities in the concerned countries to be able to operate smoothly and consequently become successfully engaged in foreign policy. The Syrian and Russian examples illustrate that if an NSA is not on good terms with the government it will find it harder if not impossible to successfully engage in foreign policy-making. Of course, this begs the question whether this is an indispensable condition or whether contact with anti-governmental authorities should be seen as being of equal importance, that is, whether it depends on the type of elite an NSA needs to interact with. From the network and regulatory theories assessed above we have learned that whilst the state remains an important anchor of the international system, governments do not necessarily have to come out on top or be the main drivers of policy initiatives. Indeed, the case of the rather private, that is, tribal, initiative to initiate peace talks between Afghani and Pakistani societal stakeholders indicates that official government participation might in some instances not be necessary or even counterproductive and an approach based on informality, a tribal *sistema*, is to be preferred. Nonetheless, it is safe to intuitively assert that without governmental contacts an NSA does not and indeed cannot enter the picture – it is an essential pre-condition for any successful foreign policy engagement.

Having said this, NSAs *do* have a chance to enter the picture when the conventional foreign policy channels between two countries do not function properly and the relationship has become difficult for whatever reason. This could be due to an on-going international dispute as in the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan or because of a particular domestic issue, such as the type of regime in power. Whatever the reasons might be, it constrains the scope of state foreign policy

and will open a window or space of opportunity for NSAs. If the two governments cannot work with each other, particular tasks or policies can then be delegated to NSAs, *which do have direct access to government authorities in the other country*, to pursue them instead. After all, as Conzelmann underline, such 'informal governance arrangements are used to test completely new ways of dealing with specific problems for which the classical instruments of interstate law have proven to be too inflexible and cumbersome'[160]. Managing these challenges through the involvements of NSAs thus constitutes 'a deliberate choice of state actors to prefer informal over formal instruments because of perceived specific advantages of these instruments'[161]

Of course, intrinsically linked to these points, such delegation to NSAs and their engagement in foreign policy-making more generally is ultimately only possible because they are less accountable than state actors. By offering plausible deniability, they help governments to address accountability problems both at home and abroad. Diplomats and state representatives in general are very much constrained in their scope and range of actions, as they have to answer to both their own as well as their host government. NSAs, on the other hand, will not have to answer to their host government and sometimes perhaps not even to their own. Indeed, precisely because NSAs are less accountable to their state of origin as well as to their host state, NSAs can be expected to effectively circumvent traditional or rather conventional channels as well as domestic veto players and pursue policies, which neither the NSA nor the concerned state institution would otherwise be able to carry out. As Gel'man points out, informal arrangements can be seen as 'a useful method to bypass imperfect old and/or new formal [state] institutions'[162]. Indeed, Marchetti makes a similar observation when he observes that 'what remains highly controversial is the fact that almost by definition bypass local governments and enter into conflict with sovereign nationality. Public diplomacy in fact in place of little consideration of the local government that are seen as inefficient, corrupt or simply as an enemy. In order to provide services locally and to promote a political project what (essentially) Western governments increasingly put into practice (but also recognize within certain limits as politically legitimate) is a kind of local action

[160] Conzelmann, "Informal Governance In International Relations."
[161] Abbott et al., "Hard And Soft Law In International Governance", pp. 43-50.
[162] Gel'man, "The Unrule Of Law In The Making."

that goes well beyond the classic Westphalian model in intergovernmental diplomacy'[163]. What is more, as the assessment of Ledeneva's and Slaughter's writings on informality shows, this does necessarily have to be a pathological feature of networks. After all, formal institutions can arguably also be pathological in their effect. Furthermore, the ability to 'operate in the shadows' (and thus perhaps enjoying asymmetrical access to information or people vis-a-vis diplomats) could be identified as the crucial advantage, the 'added value', that NSAs possess in foreign policy-making. The employment of 'ordinary' businessmen and other non-state envoys, who might not be 'detected' by the armed forces nominally in charge of India policy, by the civilian GoP as a tool might be seen as one potential case study confirming this hypothesis.

Having outlined these hypotheses, it is, of course, important to highlight that there is a potentially vast number of alternative hypotheses that might be tested in this thesis to ascertain why, how and under what conditions NSAs engage in foreign policy-making and influence state behaviour. Naturally, our first instinct would be to assume that states and NSAs enter into a relationship for primarily functional reasons.

Marchetti, for example, although focusing his analysis on civil society organisations (CSOs), pointedly highlights that 'alternative explanatory perspective have been formulated to explain why hybrid corporation and partnerships emerge at the international level. The traditional interpretation of hybrid partnership centred on functionalism. According to this perspective, hybrid partnerships are interpreted as a response to systemic needs which are not met either by the state or by the market alone. They are, in fact, responses to both state and market failure'[164]. In short, 'this kind of hybrid partnership was considered the functional response to the shortcomings of intergovernmental politics'[165]. However, the increase in outsourcing or subcontracting certain functional tasks to third parties, which are not part of the government structure but appear to possess better functional expertise, has been well documented over recent years. These activities have ranged from efforts to organise Iraqi election by the USAID-funded International Foundation for

[163] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 141.
[164] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 135.
[165] Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities."

Election Systems (IFES)[166] to the employment of private military forces by states[167]. In other words, space for NSAs to step in opens up when a *functional vacuum* emerges, which only they are supposedly able to fill. Whilst this is certainly true, functional reasons for state-NSA relationships to emerge are intuitive, logical, and well-documented. The author's MPhil thesis[168], for example, has outlined how Western NSAs, such as the International Republican Institute, the Adenauer Foundation, and the private development contractor Adam Smith International work with their respective home governments due to their, 'professional know-how based on specific technical/local/social/political expertise'[169]. Such 'enhanced effectiveness [is] based on the assumption that CSOs are considered better equipped than other actors to reach outlying communities, to promote participation, to innovate and to operate at low cost

Aside from the intuitive nature of this possible hypotheses, however, it might also be argued that a mere 'functional perspective' also suffers from a certain Western-centrism. As Marchetti highlights, 'almost ¾ of the NGOs are northern. In fact, in the CSOs the traditional governmental imbalance between north and south is even more accentuated'. To be sure, a vast majority of these northern NGOs do, *prima facie,* have a (developmental) function to fulfil vis-à-vis their Western home government and the countries to operate in. This seems intuitive. However, since this thesis seeks to geographically focus on the non-Western world, it appears imperative to think beyond mere financial or expertise-related functionalism. After all, as Marchetti emphasises, 'in some cases, CSO are not only seen simply as duplicators of northern power, but also as multipliers, as tools through which northern government pursue their foreign policy goals (…) by taking advantage of civil society resources, public institutions would be able to make a deep impact on societies, skipping the classic intergovernmental checks and balances' [170]. Indeed, viewed from this perspective, the 'possibility of outsourcing tasks at low cost without losing control of the deliverables'[171] might instead be regarded not in

[166] Embassy Baghdad, "Iraq Partners Forum Discusses Election Preparations And UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)."
[167] McFate, *Mercenaries And War: Understanding Private Armies Today*.
[168] Markert, "The Role Of Non-State Actors In Foreign Policy."
[169] Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 18.
[170] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 147-148.
[171] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 137.

rational, financial terms but rather as lower *political* costs, offering states plausible deniability and thus less accountability for their actions. Given the fact that NSAs often serve as 'multipliers of northern power' in the non-Western world, it is imperative to test whether (H3) NSAs engage successfully in foreign policy-making because they are less accountable in the state they operate in.

In a similar vein, another alternative hypothesis to test as to why, how and under what conditions a state-NSA relationship to emerge is the matter of public support. Indeed, one can envision a situation in which a particular foreign policy initiative does not have the necessary public support so that it becomes difficult for an official state actor to carry it out. Subcontracting the task to an NSA thus grants the concerned government officials less accountability and diminishes the impact that public opinion might have on their ability to conduct a certain foreign policy. This is, however, also covered by H3.

Besides, one can also envision that NSAs become involved in foreign policy-making when there is a presence of a coalition with other actors or a certain transnational network. After all, in matters of civil society multi-stakeholder partnerships and networks are increasingly appreciated as tools to offer solutions to complex global challenges[172]. As Marchetti puts it: 'the interaction between public institutions and civil societies in inter- national affairs occurs both multilaterally (usually in the form of multi- stakeholder partnerships) and bilaterally (i.e. government-to-CSOs). Multilaterally, the hybrid interaction among actors of different kinds has played a constant role in international policy-making, not only in setting agendas but also in deciding, implementing, monitoring and evaluating policy'[173]. Yet, whilst the presence of such multilateral coalitions and networks is indeed a most relevant hypothesis to test how, why, and under what conditions NSAs become involved in foreign policy making, this thesis confines itself to the bilateral model, that is, state-to-NSA, as opposed to a multilateral one. However, this can and should be addressed in future research projects.

Furthermore, one could test the hypotheses that NSAs become involved in foreign policy-making because of their ability to provide 'additional strength to overcome internal bureaucratic barriers'[174]. Yet, whilst this certainly represents a

[172] Gleckman, *Multistakeholder Governance And Democracy*.
[173] Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 4.
[174] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 137.

very reasonable alternative hypothesis (and is indeed touched upon in the Iraq chapter of this thesis), this thesis seeks to go further and highlight that NSAs cannot just overcome internal bureaucratic barriers in their home government but especially in the country they operate in. Indeed, it is this possibility that H1 seeks to test.

In addition to this, one might also explore whether 'bipartisanship' or 'public opinion' play a role in the foreign policy-making process between states and NSAs in the non-Western world. Yet, it seems that the question of support from both ruling and opposition parties and support for a certain foreign policy agenda from a democratic electorate is more applicable to the parliamentary systems of the West. The same might be said of the question of 'ideological resonance'. After all, one might envision that a Republican administration in the United States would be more likely to work with the International Republican rather than the National Democratic Institute. To be sure, it must be underlined again that the above certainly represents a list of valid conditions and reasons, which would help us understand how, why, and under what conditions NSAs can become engaged in foreign policy-making and influence state behaviour. However, as already outlined above, the very deliberate focus of this thesis on the non-Western world with its peculiar political constellations should justify the prioritisation of the three selected hypotheses.

2.2 Data Gathering and Analysis

Against this background, this thesis shall use a qualitative methodology with a strong reliance on elite interviews and process-tracing. The examination of the chosen case studies, as well as the outlined conceptual framework, is conditioned on in-depth knowledge, which suggests a qualitative approach to the research. Indeed, the main strength of the research be conducted for this thesis is derived from its fieldwork activities, consisting of semi-structured elite interviews – structured and unstructured - in all the home countries and countries of operation of the examined NSAs. Through this fieldwork the main data of the thesis shall be obtained. Given defines 'semi-structured interviews' as 'a qualitative data collection strategy in which the researcher asks informants a series of predetermined but open-ended questions'. Thus, she points out, 'the researcher has

more control over the topics of the interview than in unstructured interviews, but in contrast to structured interviews or questionnaires that use closed questions, there is no fixed range of responses to each question'. To be sure, 'the topics of the interview guide are based on the research question and the tentative conceptual model of the phenomenon that underlies the research'. Accordingly, 'because of the degree of structure in this interview format, the resulting text is a collaboration of investigator and informant', which results in 'the development of rich, relevant data rests on the interviewer's ability to understand, interpret, and respond to the verbal and nonverbal information provided by the informant'[175].

Of course, the employment of interviews as a method of research also possesses other advantages. Richardson et al., for example, underline, interviews are very suitable indeed to ascertain attitudes, beliefs, motives, and values of the interviewee[176]. What is more, Gordon underlines that face-to-face conversations provide the researcher with the opportunity to observe the truthfulness and validity of the interviewees' statements by observing non-verbal indicators – a feature, which, as he maintains, might be particularly useful when discussing sensitive issues, as in this thesis[177]. Additionally, as Bailey, outlines, face to face interviews, in contrast to simple questionnaires, also ensure that the interviewee is unable to receive assistance from others when formulating his response[178].

Concretely, these interviews will also serve to pursue the following objectives: Firstly, they are necessary to acquire information on actors and processes that are likely not documented elsewhere. After all, as Auel points out in the case of informal foreign policy, 'informal influence takes place behind closed doors, which makes it generally more difficult to assess its "success rate"'[179]. Secondly, they help to enquire deeper into the interaction between the different foreign policy actors and their inner workings. This also helps us to better capture the dynamics of informality, which are happening alongside states and NSAs – the, as Rodgers puts it, 'shadow side dynamics of an organisation relating to those below-the-surface aspects of organisational life'[180]. Put differently, 'researching

[175] Given, "Semi-Structured Interview."
[176] Richardson, *Interviewing*.
[177] Gordon, *Interviewing: Strategy, Techniques and Tactics.*
[178] Bailey, *Methods of Social Research.*
[179] Auel, "Democratic Accountability And National Parliaments: Redefining The Impact Of Parliamentary Scrutiny In EU Affairs", p. 264.
[180] Rodgers, *Informal Coalitions*, p. 40.

informal governance is an attempt at studying the invisible or at least the opaque, and as a result, methods have to be fine-tuned to deal with the particular challenges in this regard'[181]. Thirdly, elite interviews are of crucial importance to conceptualise the processes of the 'downloading/uploading' causal mechanisms outlined in the conceptual framework. On the whole, it must be underlined here it is only through interviews and access to political elites that one can identify why, how and what strategies have been pursued by whom and to what end. After all, the involvement of NSAs in foreign policy is expected to be successful because of their ability to operate with less accountability than state actors. Discrete, informal and sometimes even clandestine activities are at work in this nexus. Interestingly, Ledeneva, given the nature of her research into Russia's *sistema*, seems to have faced similar challenges since 'the hidden nature of the workings of *sistema* leaves no trace or record, making it difficult for researchers to substantiate their findings (...) because the workings of power networks of *sistema* are hidden behind facades of official hierarchy, one has to rely on the willingness and ability of insiders to articulate the networks' capacity of circumventing the formal rules and/or enforcing the unwritten rules (...) to approach a subject on such a scale, abstraction and secrecy, one has to be patient. Information is sensitive and tacit for its carriers (...) imaginative methods are required for gathering stories, and time for assembling, cross-checking and interpreting. My primary sources are a few precious in-depth interviews with respondents who work in and with the administration'[182]. Echoing her sentiments, Ferguson, in his study of networks, points out that 'professional historians, by contrast, have until very recently tended to ignore, or at least to downplay, the role of networks. Even today, the majority of academic historians tend to study the kinds of institution that create and preserve archives, as if those that do not leave an orderly paper trail simply do not count. Again, my research and my experience have taught me to beware the tyranny of the archives. Often the biggest changes in history are the achievements of thinly documented, informally organized groups of people'[183]. Christiansen et al. further underline this in the context of researching into the informal arrangements that form important underlying currents of international affairs, observing that 'as long as empirical

[181] Christiansen, "Introduction."
[182] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*
[183] Ferguson, *The Square and the Tower*.

research is directed primarily at issues for which empirical data are more readily available – such as the performance of formal institutions – rather than addressing important questions on which data may as yet be non-existent (as is often the case with respect to informal governance), then it will be hard to make progress in this regard. Empirical research on informal governance is often not only about gathering data, but actually about what kind of data is to be collected. The ultimate test is then about gaining access to information about developments that are undocumented and generally lacking in transparency and in which actors tend to have an interest in it remaining so'[184]. Ultimately, this methodology is indispensable to shed light on the 'grey area'[185], the 'shadows of hierarchy'[186] of foreign policy.

Against this background, it shall now briefly sketch out how precisely such research is being conducted. Having specified the theoretical framework, an initial list of relevant interview partners will be compiled and a guideline designed in order to acquire concrete answers. Immediately following each interview, the field notes will be typed and added to the case file. If recorded, the audiotapes will be transcribed by the researcher and then analysed for themes or issues[187]. As May emphasises: 'given the dynamic nature of interviewing and the subtle problems of topic control and data interpretation, the procedures used to log data must be given considerable attention'[188]. Thus, as While argues, 'audio taping is frequently the method of choice, as it provides a detailed insight into the performance of both the respondent and the interviewer. Further, access to the nuances of the interactions between respondent and interviewer (e.g. intonations, pauses) help validate the accuracy and completeness of the information collected. Audio taping also reduces the potential for interviewer error by, for example, recording data incorrectly or cheating by logging an answer to a question that was not asked'[189]. After all, in order to understand the causality of the chosen case studies, one requires a detailed account that offers sufficient evidence from which one can derive conclusions. It is from conceptualising and understanding the process of decision-making, the

[184] Christiansen, "Introduction."
[185] Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad."
[186] Peters and Pierre, "Governance Approaches", p. 93.
[187] Creswell, *Research Design*.
[188] May, "Interview Techniques In Qualitative Research: Concerns And Challenges."
[189] While, "Collecting Data Using A Semi-Structured Interview: A Discussion Paper", p. 332.

reasons and motivations behind it, and the mechanisms through which political influence was employed that we can understand whether an NSA was involved.

Of course, because of the analytical focus on socio-economic and political elites, there might be a challenge to get access to the relevant sources. As Beach et al. advise: 'accessibility concerns are also important. If we do not speak Spanish, it might be difficult to interview civil servants in Costa Rica, meaning we probably would not select it as a case unless we have no alternative. Similarly, studying elite decision making is easier when archives are declassified, other things equal. Given that tracing mechanisms is very data-demanding, selecting typical cases that are expected to be data-rich is a wise strategy'[190]. Whilst the strategy of selecting typical case is going to be outlined in greater detail in the case selections strategy part of this chapter, it is necessary to highlight in this context that the matter of accessibility has indeed been of importance when selecting interview partners for this thesis. As this thesis focuses on countries of the non-Western world and potentially sensitive political matters (e.g. diplomatic conflicts and military hostilities), it is crucial to develop an 'access strategy' when starting one's fieldwork activities. Indeed, one can expect a high level of reluctance on the part of many of the actors involved to share politically sensitive information or to voice one-sided opinions. The issue of sensitivity is of particular importance in Pakistan and the neighbouring countries as well as Russia where NSAs are increasingly viewed with suspicion – and Western researchers even more so. Thus, it is crucial to develop a network of trusted stakeholders in these respective countries, who would make the relevant introductions, thereby lending their reputation and credibility to the researcher. Hence, rather than approaching potential interviewees as an 'external' (e.g. via E-Mail), the researcher would come across as a trusted friend or colleague of the personages who facilitate the introduction. This 'trust factor' cannot be underestimated when it comes to researching sensitive topics, or any topics for that matter, in the non-Western world and any academic ignoring these matters would do so at his or her own risk[191]. In this regard, the method of semi-structured interviews also possesses some inherent benefits. As Treece et al. point out, in contrast to structured, standardised interviews, semi-structures ones

[190] Beach et al., "Case Selection Techniques In Process-Tracing And The Implications Of Taking The Study Of Causal Mechanisms Seriously", p. 22.
[191] BBC News, "Matthew Hedges: Durham Student Charged With UAE Spying"; BBC News, "Giulio Regeni: Egypt 'Suspends' Investigation Into Cambridge Student's Murder."

allow the researcher to change the words but not the meaning of questions. This, of course, must go hand in hand with the acknowledgement that not every word has the same meaning to every respondent and not every respondent uses the same vocabulary[192]. For example, the term 'non-state actor' carries very negative connotations in Pakistan where it is mostly associated with armed militant groups and foreign intelligence services. This led the author to change his use of terms and refer to NSAs as 'entities that are not part of the official government structure' in his interviews. Hence, as Denzin highlights, validity and reliability do not depend on the repeated use of the same terminology but rather upon equivalence meaning[193]. Given that the interviews conducted for this thesis are focused on sensitive matters in non-Western countries, the researcher frequently had to rely on anonymisation. In fact, many research guidelines do recommend disguising the personal identities of research participants as a default position[194] whilst others recommend respecting the wishes of participants either for anonymity or to 'receive recognition'[195]. To be sure, there are very practical challenges when it comes to concealing the identities of interviewees[196]. For example, anyone familiar to a particular topic will most likely be able to recognise and identify participants and places[197] – a challenge that Tolich refers to as 'internal confidentiality'[198]. Yet, these difficulties are no excuse not to anonymise interview partners who do not wish to be named for a variety of personal and security reasons[199]. Hence, this thesis makes use of the perhaps most common technique of asking the participant under which pseudonym they would like to be cited[200]. This results in some sources quoted as, for example, 'Former Senior US diplomat closely involved in working with the Iraqis and CPA during the period of transition from CPA to the INA'. This, however, it must be underlined, must also be understood against the backdrop of the geographical and contextual orientation of this thesis. Yet, the unique empirical

[192] Treece et al., *Elements Of Research In Nursing*.
[193] Denzin, *The Research Art In Sociology: A Theoretical Introduction To Sociological Methods*.
[194] British Sociological Association (BSA), "Statement Of Ethical Practice"; ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council), "Framework for research ethics".
[195] Canadian Sociological Association (CSA), "Statement of professional ethics"
[196] van den Hoonaard, "Is Anonymity An Artifact In Ethnographic Research?."
[197] Nespor, "Anonymity and place in qualitative inquiry"; Scheper-Hughes, "Ire in Ireland";
[198] Tolich, "Internal confidentiality: when confidentiality assurances fail relational informants"; Walford, "Research ethical guidelines and anonymity".
[199] Kelly, "In defence of anonymity: rejoining the criticism"; Corden et al., "Exploring 'quality': Research participants' perspectives on verbatim quotations".
[200] Clark, "Anonymising Research Data"; Moore, "The politics and ethics of naming: questioning anonymisation in (archival) research", p. 332.

data derived from these perhaps under-appreciated regions of the world does outweigh any compromises that had to be made regarding the identification of sources.

Having said this, the combination of semi-structured elite interviews and process tracing also proves to be particularly useful as 'through direct and focused questioning' they will help to 'reconstruct political episodes on the basis of the respondents' testimonies'[201]. Naturally, there are several areas where possible bias or obfuscation on part of the interviewees could potentially arise. For example, given the involvement of NSAs, state actors could show a natural tendency to exaggerate their own role so as to claim ownership of the successful shift in foreign policy and play down or obfuscate the role played by the NSA[202]. In other words, 'many officials will "recall" events in a way that puts the best gloss on their own role or that supports causes they have come to promote'[203]. Apart from adhering to the highest of confidentiality, it will thus be crucial to judiciously and carefully prepare for each interview and triangulate the information with other interviews or documents where possible[204].

Moreover, this thesis will rely on contractual and intergovernmental agreements, policy papers, intelligence reports, as well as American diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks as well as the National Security Archives of the US and Britain. Indeed, the importance that Wikileaks has had for this thesis cannot be understated. As Beach et al. advise with reference to the causal mechanism, which shall be outlined and eventually traced in this thesis: 'we do recommend thinking about whether: one has access to empirical material or not when selecting typical cases, and the chosen case is one where the mechanism might actually have left empirical fingerprints that can be observed. In some cases, the mechanism might leave very distinct and unique traces that enable strong within-case inferences to be made, whereas in others the data-generating processes might leave few traces. For example, bureaucratic politic mechanisms might leave few traces in a highly oral context, whereas in a context where extensive written records are kept, it might be

[201] Tansey, "Process Tracing And Elite Interviewing", p. 766-767.
[202] Tansey, "Process Tracing And Elite Interviewing", p. 766-767.
[203] Kramer et al., "Remembering The Cuban Missile Crisis", p. 213.
[204] Davies, "Spies As Informants".

easier to study'[205]. In this context, Wikileaks has been providing precisely the type of 'empirical fingerprints' and 'extensive written records' that would have otherwise been most difficult to obtain – even in the National Security Archives.

2.3 The Type of Process-Tracing employed by this Thesis

Apart from in-depth contextual knowledge derived from these sources, which allows one to make valid claims about the cases in the first place, process-tracing can be identified as the central instrument of analysis. Generally speaking, process tracing is based on its objective to trace causal mechanisms[206]. It thus constitutes a deductive research tool, aiding analysts to initially state a theoretical model and subsequently verify each constituent part of it[207]. In other words, as Checkel puts it, process tracing must be regarded as an effort to 'trace the process in a very specific, theoretically informed way. The researcher looks for a series of theoretically predicted intermediate steps'[208]. The method can thus help to 'identify paths to an outcome, point out variables that were left out in the initial comparison of cases, check for spuriousness, and permit causal inference on the basis of a few or even a single case'[209]. Process-tracing will thus help to single out the complex forms of chronologically ordered causal interactions between the actors in foreign policy and help to perform two central tasks: Firstly, it allows to single out key junctures and moments within the case, and then consequently break down every case into a continuum of different steps, which makes each of them easier to examine[210]. Secondly, using process-tracing also gives us the opportunity to 'open up' each step to identify the existing causal mechanisms. Indeed, causal mechanisms are at the very heart of the method of process-tracing. According to Bennett, they may be defined as 'processes through which agents with causal capacities operate in specific contexts to transfer energy, information or matter to other entities'[211].

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[205] Beach et al., "Case Selection Techniques In Process-Tracing And The Implications Of Taking The Study Of Causal Mechanisms Seriously", p. 22.
[206] Bennett, ''Process-tracing: A Bayesian Perspective"; Bennett, "The Mother of All 'Isms': Organizing Political Science around Causal Mechanisms"; George et al., *Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.*
[207] Gerring, *Case Study Research*, pp. 172-185.
[208] Checkel, "Tracing Causal Mechanisms", p. 363.
[209] George et al., *Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences*.
[210] Bennett, ''Process-tracing: A Bayesian Perspective";
[211] Bennett, "The Mother of All 'Isms': Organizing Political Science around Causal Mechanisms", p. 207.

Given its emphasis on causal mechanisms, it should be underlined that the literature on process-tracing has recently come under criticism, notably from Beach et al. who point out that the majority of 'existing work on process-tracing treats it as a singular method'[212]. Considering the fact that this thesis has to be explicit as to whether it considers itself a theory-testing or theory-building exercise, it is necessary to further engage with this critique. For Beach et al. there exists 'a clear bifurcation overall between theory-centric and case-centric process-tracing, reflecting a choice between building/testing (relatively) parsimonious causal mechanisms that can be generalized across a bounded context of cases and focusing on explaining particular outcomes through the pragmatic use of mechanismic explanations to account for the important aspects of the case'[213].

In 'theory-testing process tracing', the researcher hypothesises a causal mechanism to be present in a range of cases: 'the researcher selects a single case where both X and Y are present, and the context allows the mechanism to operate. Here the goal is to evaluate whether evidence shows that the hypothesized causal mechanism linking X and Y was present and that it functioned as theorized'[214]. 'Theory-building process tracing', in turn, seeks to create a theory about a causal mechanism between X and Y in a population of cases. As they observe: 'the core difference between theory-testing and -building process-tracing involves theory before fact versus fact before theory. In theory-building process-tracing, empirical material is used to build a hypothesized theory, inferring first that what is found reflects the observable implications of an underlying causal mechanism'[215]. On the whole, causal mechanisms in such 'theory-centric studies' are employed so as to be ultimately generalised across cases in whose context they are expected to function[216].

Finally, there is the case-centric 'explaining-outcome process-tracing', which is used in situations 'where we want to explain a particularly puzzling historical outcome. Here the ambition is not the theory-centric one of building or testing a generalizable theorized mechanism; instead, the aim is to craft a sufficient explanation of the outcome. Instead of studying mechanisms that cause war (Y),

[212] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 9.
[213] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 11.
[214] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 11;
[215] Beach and Pedersen, "What Is Process Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants Of Process Tracing Methods And Their Uses And Limitations", p. 16.
[216] Falleti et al., "Context And Causal Mechanisms In Political Analysis."

the analysis would focus on explaining a particular outcome such as World War I'[217].

Overall, the three types share the objective of studying causal mechanisms 'whereby causal forces are transmitted through a series of interlocking parts of a mechanism to produce an outcome'[218]. To be sure, this thesis certainly harbours sympathies for the philosophical underpinnings of the case-centric 'outcome-process-tracing' – especially for its assumption that 'the social world is very complex, multifactored, and extremely context-specific (…) a complexity [which] makes the ambition of producing knowledge that can be generalized across many cases difficult'. It also views favourably explaining-outcome process tracing's urging to use theories 'in a much more pragmatic fashion, that is, as heuristic instruments that have analytical utility in providing the best possible explanation of a given phenomenon'[219]. However, the dissertation shirks back from the perhaps all-too grandiose ambition of explaining-outcome process-tracing to analyse 'particularly interesting outcomes, both because of their substantive and theoretical importance (e.g., the end of the Cold War, the start of World War II) because we are unable to account for the particular outcome with existing theories'[220]. Put differently, 'cases are chosen in explaining-outcome designs not on the basis of research design strategies but instead because the cases are substantively important (e.g., the French Revolution)'[221]. Surely, the context of the case studies to be examined for this thesis, namely, the Iraq and Georgian Wars and the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan are important historical and foreign policy events. Yet, the focus of the paper lies in analysing only particular aspects of these events, namely the relationship between the involved governments and particular NSAs within the larger strategic foreign policy aspects. Additionally, it also does not share the objective to be 'more interested in explaining the outcome of a particular case than a generalizing ambition to make theoretical claims beyond the

[217] Beach et al., "Case Selection Techniques In Process-Tracing And The Implications Of Taking The Study Of Causal Mechanisms Seriously."
[218] Beach and Pedersen, "Observing Causal Mechanism with Process - Tracing Methods - The Benefits of using a 'mechanism' understanding of causality."
[219] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 13.
[220] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 161.
[221] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 145.

single case'[222]. On the contrary, the thesis rests on the assumption that even initially perhaps all too different case studies, involving a variety of NSAs and governments operating in the non-Western world, might nonetheless be plausibly compared to distil how, why and under what conditions such relationships are possible and therefore have an impact on foreign policy.

In the light of the aforementioned criteria, this thesis shall thus adopt a theory-testing process tracing, the 'theory before fact', approach, where 'we know both X and Y and we either have existing conjectures about a plausible mechanism or are able to use logical reasoning to formulate a causal mechanism from existing theorization'[223]. In the case of this dissertation, Y is the impact on a certain foreign policy between the concerned countries, whilst X differs, depending on whether state- or non-state actors are the driving forces behind a particular initiative. This shall be elaborated on in more detail in the subsequent parts of this chapter. Having said this, the first act in a theory-testing exercise is 'to conceptualise a causal mechanism between X and Y based on existing theorisation along with making explicit the context within which it functions'. Once mechanism and context are conceptualised, the researcher 'collects empirical evidence that can be used to make causal inferences, updating our confidence in whether the hypothesised mechanism was present in the case and whether the mechanism functioned as predicted or only some parts of the mechanism were present'[224]. Naturally, this empirical analysis 'proceeds stepwise, testing whether evidence indicates that each part of the mechanism was present'[225]. Put differently, 'what is being traced is not a series of empirical events or narratives but instead the underlying theorized causal mechanism itself, by observing whether the expected case-specific implications of its existence are present in a case'[226].

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[222] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 24.
[223] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 14.
[224] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 14; Note: The manner in which and the sources from which this very empirical evidence was being collected has been outlined in the previous part of the chapter.
[225] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 14
[226] Beach et al., "What Is Process Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants Of Process Tracing Methods And Their Uses And Limitations", p. 14.

2.4 The Usage of Causal Mechanisms in Theory-testing Process-Tracing, as employed by this Thesis and the Key Concepts underlying them

Given the relevance that causal mechanisms have in theory-testing exercises, it is imperative to further elaborate on them.

As Beach et al. highlight: 'in mechanism-centered designs, mechanisms are traced to gain better understanding of the causal relationship between X and Y within a bounded population'. This results in what they refer to as 'mechanistic evidence that sheds light on causal processes'. In this, 'the theorized mechanisms are front and center in our analysis, with the analytical focus on assessing how the causal arrow(s) in-between X and Y actually works in particular cases'[227]. Importantly, in theory-centric process-tracing, we are seeking to generalise the systemic parts of the mechanisms beyond the single case that is presently studied onto a wider population of cases, 'assuming that the context that allows them to operate is present'[228]. Indeed, for mechanisms of this type to operate smoothly, such contextual conditions are indispensable present[229]. According to Falleti et al., they might be defined as 'relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, spatial, or institutional) in which a set of initial conditions leads (…) to an outcome of a defined scope and meaning via a specified causal mechanism or set of causal mechanisms'[230].

Before elaborating more on these contextual conditions and key concepts, it is necessary to briefly outline how causal mechanisms are drafted. In general, as Beach et al. advise, 'a good starting point for conceptualizing a plausible causal mechanism for a given theorized causal relationship is to start with a thorough reading of the existing theorization on the phenomenon'[231]. In this regard, we can, of course, draw on the extensive literature review, outlined in the previous chapter of this thesis. Having done so, 'the next step is to game through the different steps of a hypothesized mechanism, filling in the dots between X and One way to start is to draw a mind map of plausible links between X (or a set of Xs) and Y, using boxes

[227] Beach et al., "Case Selection Techniques In Process-Tracing And The Implications Of Taking The Study Of Causal Mechanisms Seriously", p. 4.
[228] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 34.
[229] Falleti et al., "Context And Causal Mechanisms In Political Analysis"; Goertz et al., "The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research", p. 660-661.
[230] Falleti et al., "Context And Causal Mechanisms In Political Analysis", p. 1152.
[231] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 58.

to illustrate each part of the mechanism (…) In particular, we must focus on conceptualizing the entities and their activities'[232].

When it comes this conceptualising of relevant theoretical notions, entities and their activities, this thesis has identified Moravcsik's conceptualisation of how non-state supranational actors, such as the EU Commission, can influence national governments in EU negotiations[233] to be particularly enriching. Especially for the purpose of elaborating the key concepts underlying the causal mechanisms, Moravcsik's work represents a most helpful starting point. After all, the distillation of how a non-state body can become meaningfully involved is in itself an acknowledgement that foreign policy initiatives do not necessarily have to be authored by state actors. What is more, similar to explaining-outcome process tracing, Moravcsik also seems to be using theories 'in a much more pragmatic fashion, that is, as heuristic instruments that have analytical utility in providing the best possible explanation of a given phenomenon' and draws from a variety of literatures. Indeed, not limiting himself to weaving in theoretical material that is solely focused on the phenomenon he seeks to investigate but also utilising a wider literature, ranging from general bargaining theory, to IR, and American and comparative politics. After all, as Beach et al. highlight, in order to 'develop a causal mechanism, we need to reconceptualize the causal theory into a mechanism composed of a set of parts (entities engaging in activities) [i.e. states and NSAs and their respective activities] to study the dynamic transmission of causal forces through the mechanism to produce the outcome (…) Here, we reconceptualize the theory as a mechanism'[234]. Regarding the latter, we can draw on the analytical stimuli entailed in the literature review from the previous section.

Having said this, it should also be underlined that aside from the imperative to cast one's net widely when it comes to the utilisation of different theories and concepts for the drafting of one's causal mechanism, Moravcsik's mechanism also offers other assumptions and indeed concepts that are of value for this thesis. In his case, X represents the activities of the supranational actor, namely, the EU Commission, which exerts influence over negotiation outcomes (Y). Interestingly, the component parts of the causal mechanism start from the assumption that national governments

[232] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 58.
[233] Moravcsik, "A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation. International Organization", p. 275.
[234] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 110.

find themselves in a situation in which they are unwilling or unable to act – in this case they are unable to 'access and process critical information and ideas'. This constitutes the context, that is 'the relevant aspects of a setting where the initial conditions contribute to produce an outcome of a defined scope and meaning through the operation of a causal mechanism'[235]. In the case of this thesis, as shall be seen, the foreign policy setting in which the causal mechanisms link state actors and NSAs is one in which the concerned governments are unwilling or unable to pursue a certain policy towards each other. This could be due to a prior worsening of the relationship or because the policy in question is particularly sensitive and the relevant state actors do not want to be associated with it. In all three cases chosen for this thesis, the prevalent contextual conditions for the mechanisms to apply are diplomatic crises, two of them arising out of a recent or on-going state of war between the state actors involved. What is more, both Moravcsik and this dissertation seek to bring to light ways and situations, which allow non-state organisations or entities to seize political space and carve out a role for themselves, or, one dares to add, depending on the nature of the relationship they possess with a government, have a role carved out for them. For Moravcsik, it is the EU Commission's 'privileged access' to certain information and ideas, which allows it to become meaningfully engaged. Because of that, it can operate in a capacity similar to that of the norm entrepreneur from the SMT and TAN literatures and therefore 'most effectively initiate, mediate and mobilise' between the concerned state actors. Yet, whilst this thesis considers access to information critical and shall adopt it as part of its mechanism, it is the ability of NSAs to operate with less accountability than state actors, which assumes the central role informational asymmetry has in Moravcsik's mechanism. As already mentioned and underlined again by Adcock et al., it is imperative to translate abstract theoretical concepts into what they refer to as 'systematised concepts'[236]. Put differently, whilst the central concept of 'informational asymmetry' for Moravcsik is derived from bargaining theory[237], one of the most relevant concepts of this thesis, namely that NSAs are able to operate with less accountability compared to and vis-à-vis state actors is in turn informed by the literatures on informality and networks. What is more, whilst

[235] Falleti et al., "Context And Causal Mechanisms In Political Analysis", p. 1152.
[236] Adcock, Robert. 2007. ''Who's Afraid of Determinism? The Ambivalence of Macro- historical Inquiry".
[237] Muthoo, *Bargaining Theory With Applications*.

access to information is also featured in this dissertation's causal mechanism, particular emphasis is placed on linkages to and with authorities in the concerned countries, a consideration arising out of the lessons that can be drawn from the literature on state capturing. Crucially, all of the aforementioned, together with the question of whether NSAs find themselves being supervised by state entities, must be seen in light of the fact that this thesis very deliberately seeks to focus on the non-Western world.

As already highlighted in the preceding sections of this thesis, this must be understood in the light of 'societies where formal institutions do not work to their full potential and where people rely on informal ways of getting things done', conditions, which, in their extreme form, might appear reminiscent of Reno's shadow states[238]. Put differently, there might be some states, which, like Pakistan, might possess formal state institutions at first sight but, upon closer inspection, show themselves to be ruled by a network of very different actors and entities, whose composition and modus operandi do not correspond well to the picture of the state we have in the West. In this case, any successful interaction with states possessing such features requires a distinctly different, that is, informal approach and modus operandi compared to, say, the more institutionalised, codified conduct of foreign policy between the French and German governments France. Access to particular authorities, both state and non-state, is thus just as important as possessing certain information. Of course, before illustrating them as component parts of the employed causal mechanisms, it is necessary to first provide definitions of the key theoretical concepts.

Foreign Policy

Naturally, we would first have to outline the understanding of foreign policy that this thesis rests upon. This, in turn, requires us to draw on and situate ourselves in the existing literature. Generally speaking, as Smith highlights, it is 'important to remember that all perspectives on the subject of international relations contain statements about foreign policy (…) theories of foreign policy are therefore intrinsic to theories of international relations, even for those who deny the centrality of the state as an actor in international society'[239]. Such observations notwithstanding,

[238] Reno, *Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa*.
[239] Smith, "Theories Of Foreign Policy".

however, Hermann points out that foreign policy represents a 'neglected concept', which, in and of itself, 'has been one of the most serious obstacles to providing more adequate and comprehensive explanations of foreign policy'. This, he maintains, is largely due to the fact that 'most people dealing with the subject have felt confident that they knew what foreign policy was'[240]. As one would expect, the scholarly debate revolves around the role of the state and the extent of its involvement.

On the one hand, as Frankel argues, 'foreign policy consists of decisions and actions, which involves to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others'[241]. Padelford et al. reinforce the sole agency of states in foreign policy when they define it as 'totality of [a state's] dealings with the external environment. Foreign Policy is the overall result of the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into specific courses of action in order to achieve its objectives and preserve its interests'[242]. Rodee joins this chorus when he asserts that 'foreign policy involves the formulation and implementation of a group of principles which shape the behaviour pattern of a state while negotiating with (contacting) other states to protect or further its vital interests[243]'and in Gibson's assessment, 'foreign policy is (…) conducting the business of government with rest of the world'[244].

On the other hand, as Maurer et al. point out, 'states have never been the sole actors in diplomacy. Historically, the practice of diplomacy preceded the establishment of modern states'[245]. Joining this assessment, Hill also cautions against this apparent state-centrism and conceptualises foreign policy as 'the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations'[246]. Similarly, Northedge describes foreign policy as the usage of political influence in order to induce other states to employ their law-making power in a way preferred by the state concerned. Hence, he elaborates, it

[240] Hermann, "Changing Course".
[241] Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy*.
[242] Padelford et al., The Dynamics Of International Politics; Kinsella et al., *World Politics*.
[243] Rodee, *Introduction To Political Science.*
[244] Gibson, *The Road To Foreign Policy*.
[245] Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad."
[246] Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy.*

must be seen as an interaction between forces originating outside the country's borders and those working within them[247]. Although still very much based on the assumption that foreign policy is solely the business of the state, alluding to 'forces in and outside the country's border' does open up the possibility of incorporating the influence of other entities. Carlsnaes, for example, highlights that state-driven foreign policy does not necessarily have to be focus on their counterparts on the other side but can also be directed towards NSAs. He thus refers to it as 'those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors — both governmental and non-governmental — which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territory'[248]. Even more daring, Gerner points to the possibility that foreign policy might not be the exclusive prerogative of states as it represents 'the intentions, statements, and actions of an actor, often, but not always, a state-directed, towards the external world and the response of other actors to these intentions, statements and actions'[249]. Viewed from this perspective, NSAs can also 'do foreign policy'. Examining the complex nexus of European external relations, Maurer et al. thus raise the imperative that it is crucial to shed light on the 'grey area' in which other actors are involved in particular foreign policy processes and practices[250]. Neack joins this charge and thus purposefully uses 'a broad definition of foreign policy that includes both statements and behaviour or actions' as the study of foreign policy 'needs to consider more than what states declare to be their goals and how they attempt to achieve them. The study of foreign policy needs to consider how certain goals arise and why certain behaviours result. Thus, we will have to explore the factors that cause a state to declare and embark on a certain foreign policy course. Our emphasis will be on understanding these factors and the processes by which policy (as both statements and behaviours) is made'[251]. Drawing attention to such 'factors' and 'actors' in Maurer's 'grey area' that influence state conduct in behaviour does indeed allow us to open an avenue of inquiry in which the role and involvement of NSAs can be accounted for. After all,

[247] Northedge, *The Foreign Policies Of The Powers*.
[248] Carlsnaes, "Foreign Policy".
[249] Gerner, "The Evolution Of The Study Of Foreign Policy."
[250] Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad."
[251] Neack, *The New Foreign Policy*.

as Maurer emphasises, 'there has always been a trend in diplomacy towards 'networked diplomacy', in which the connectivity and the capacity to orchestrate the network matter, rather than the available set of material resources'[252].

In light of the above, this thesis certainly views Gerner's and Neack's observations as well as the imperative, brought forward by Maurer, to establish 'more inclusive definitions of diplomacy, to account for actors beyond states' as part of a 'trend towards a more networked diplomacy'[253] with sympathy. Indeed, if foreign policy was an activity only states are entitled to conduct, the very legitimacy of entire bodies of scholarly literature, such as 'EU foreign policy', a topic, which has given birth to a variety of journals, articles, books, think tanks, and research grants, would have to be called into question. After all, the European Union might resemble all sorts of different entities – but certainly not a state.

Yet, in the interest of conceptual clarity, it is crucial not to blur the lines between foreign policy and what might be referred to as global politics, which, in its extreme form, is described in Hardt and Negri's *Empire*. Put differently, in the words of Waltz: 'International Politics is not Foreign Policy'[254]. This is especially true since the latter suggests an ultimate reference to the state: 'foreign policies are governmental products. A theory has to take the performance of governments as its object of explanation in order to be called a theory of foreign policy'[255]. International or global politics, on the other hand, is often-times referred to as 'politics beyond the state'[256] as it "does not stress the primacy of intergovernmental relations and transactions"[257].

This, however, does not dismiss the possibility that NSAs are able to enter this picture in the form of tools, partners, influencers, or even spoilers of states' foreign policy behaviour. In Maurer's words, states *do* know how to work with the NSAs who operate in the 'grey area'. What is more, whilst states must be an integral part and reference point of foreign policy initiatives, they do not necessarily have to be their authors. Indeed, some NSAs might have the ability to persuade state actors to

[252] Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad."
[253] Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad."
[254] Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy."
[255] Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy."
[256] Wapner, "Politics Beyond The State Environmental Activism And World Civic Policics."
[257] Evans et al., *The Penguin Dictionary Of International Relations*, p. 578; see also: Paul, "Globalization and Politics", p. x.

partner with them in achieving a certain objective. Thus, one can argue that as states become part of the respective endeavour, a particular initiative becomes foreign policy. In other words: NSAs can be both objects and subjects of foreign policy-making. As Neack argued above: 'we will have to explore the factors that cause a state to declare and embark on a certain foreign policy course. Our emphasis will be on understanding these factors and the processes by which policy (as both statements and behaviours) is made'[258]. Thus, given this 'trend towards a more networked diplomacy'[259], which, nonetheless still requires states to be an integral part of the diplomatic procedure, this thesis shall define foreign policy as:

> *actions which are pursued by or with the participation of state representatives towards objectives, conditions and authorities — both governmental and non-governmental — which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territory and the response of other actors to these actions.*

To be sure, the assumptions, which are, both explicitly and implicitly, underlying this definition of foreign policy require further elaboration. On the whole, it is important to emphasise that this understanding of foreign policy deliberately seeks to avoid extremes – with the fluid, border- and stateless globalisation paradigm on the one and a rigid, state centred realist approach on the other side of the spectrum. Both these positions seem to be, each in their own way, caricatures of the contemporary world. As Slaughter so aptly pointed out above, '[states] should become docks for all kinds of networks, those composed of government ministers and those composed of mixed government, civic, and corporate actors (...) in this order, states must be waves and particles at the same time'[260].

In a similar fashion, the proposed definition does not argue that the state is obsolete but that there is something more than just the state at play, which is shaping reality on behalf of or with the participation of states. Here, the term 'participation' is deliberately meant to be neutral because the relationship with the involved state representatives on either side of the territory concerned does not necessarily have to be a harmonious one. Indeed, the role of governments today is more complicated

[258] Neack, *The New Foreign Policy*.
[259] Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad."
[260] Slaughter, *The Chessboard.*

than assumed by most realist literature. After all, other actors are being employed on behalf of national governments to carry out tasks, which have traditionally been associated with the state – and sometimes such actors are able to persuade state actors to pursue initiatives together with them. We can thus legitimately claim to observe a certain 'hybridity' in the conduct of foreign policy, entailing a 'linking and blurring [of] the boundaries'[261] within which state foreign policy actors operate. However, bearing Waltz's warning in mind that international politics is not foreign policy, it is important in this context not to go too far and exclude states from our definition of foreign policy altogether. Foreign policy initiatives do not necessarily have to be the brainchild of governments but in order for these endeavours to be classified as foreign policy, the state has to be an integral part of them. After all, one can realistically envision NSAs, such as His Highness the Aga Khan, the GOC or Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, to formulate objectives and subsequently persuade or even compel government representatives to become part of these initiatives. And even in situations when state actors are the authors, their initiatives could either be enhanced or facilitated, spoiled, or even vetoed by elements outside the formal government organisational structure – depending on the type of relationship the respective entities entertain with states. As stated above, NSAs can enter this picture in the form of tools, partners, influencers, or even spoilers of states' foreign policy behaviour.

Indeed, it must be underlined again that this thesis cautious against concluding that a post-Westphalian era should be proclaimed – especially if this describes a state-less world or a world in which states only play minor roles and merely constitute recipients of larger trends, which are said to be beyond their control. Proclamations of this sort have been made before – and yet: the state is still here. At the same time, there are those foreign policy specialists who focus on the relationship between states and great powers and tend to regard other actors, such as IOs, the EU, businesses, and NGOs, as more or less irrelevant subcontractors. This has, of course, been heavily criticised and a sophisticated analysis has developed which encompasses other, different actors – not just firms and NGOs but also the EU, regions, and city states. To account for these phenomena whilst not losing sight of the relevance of the state in international affairs, network theory

[261] Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad."

again offers a promising and suitable toolkit. As already mentioned above, networks are defined as 'sets of relations that form structures, which in turn may constrain and enable agents' and offer them the possibility 'to increase their power by enhancing and exploiting their network positions, and the fungibility of network power'[262].

A significant part of network theory, as incorporated hitherto into IR theory, focuses on the membership of states in certain international institutions and alliances, such as NATO and the EU – Katzenstein's analysis of Germany's networked position is perhaps one of the most prominent examples in this regard[263]. Indeed, far from declaring the state to be obsolete, network theory literature points to a multitude of factors that states, in their respective decision-making processes in the contemporary era, have to take into consideration. Böhmelt, for examples, points to the importance of 'indirect links, as established for example through the network of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) connect the disputing dyad to multiple other actors, and may thereby create connections between belligerents even if direct links are either absent or torn apart'[264]. Yet, it is not just IOs, such as the EU, which help states 'to increase their power by enhancing and exploiting their network positions' but also their ability to connect, maintain, enhance, and ultimately employ or, should the entity be more autonomous, work with a certain network of NSAs. Revealingly in this regard, Beckfield, observing a 'steadily decreasing inequality of [Intergovernmental Organisations] ties over time among states', points out that 'inequality in international NGO ties is as high as the level of world income inequality because rich, core, Western states and societies have grown more dominant in the NGO field'[265]. The impressive ability of Western states to involve NSAs in their foreign policies towards the global south has become very apparent indeed in the author's MPhil thesis, which portrayed the West's skilful employment of and indeed collaboration with a range of NSAs in Pakistan. Besides the NSAs ability to implement some projects more efficiently than their home governments, their main advantage vis-à-vis state actors turned out to be that they were able to operate with less accountability, thereby offering plausible deniability. As mentioned earlier, it has also become apparent that states like Russia, Egypt,

[262] Hafner-Burton et al., "Network Analysis For International Relations."
[263] Katzenstein, *Tamed Power.*
[264] Böhmelt, "International Mediation And Social Networks."
[265] Beckfield, "Inequality in the World Polity".

Syria and Pakistan had, until recently, no regulatory framework to monitor NSA activities in their own country. Hence, one of the implications of adding a 'networked perspective' to the study of IR and definition of foreign policy is certainly that in order for states to be successful in the contemporary world, governments will have to take the environment in which they find themselves in into consideration – and this very environment consists of a habitat in which a multitude of NSAs reside. To be sure, such insights also seem to reflect the underlying philosophy of those authors writing on informality, who point out that 'informal institutional arrangements are an essential aspect in the functioning even of formal social institutions. They have to be systematically included in any policy research that strives for *realistic results* [emphasis added]. Just as it would be a mistake to neglect formal institutions and to dissolve their specificity by reducing organisational processes to chains of social interaction, so underestimating the impact of informal institutional arrangements would yield unrealistic results. In fact, both institutional types may complement, support, impede, disable or paralyse each other (…) the interpenetration of both spheres presupposes further empirical research and conceptual modelling and generalisation to account for a complexity, the analysis of which still needs additional and complex instruments'[266].

Against this background, it is also important to briefly elaborate on the notion of 'authorities', mentioned in the definition. Indeed, this thesis and its definition of what constitutes foreign policy places particular emphasis on access to certain authorities in the countries that the involved state and NSAs are either based in and/or operate in. Landemore refers to authority as '*the power held by a political entity to require action and claim obedience to its rules*' – a definition, which this thesis shall adopt. Importantly, however, it also has to be outlined that 'this power can be either de facto or de jure (normative). De facto political authority is the actual ability of a political entity to rule and be obeyed. De jure or normative political authority is the moral power, or right, of a political entity to claim obedience to its laws and orders'[267]. Accordingly, 'de jure authority always requires some degree of de facto authority [and] a de facto authority will always claim to

[266] Brie et al., "Formal Institutions And Informal Institutional Arrangements", p. 37.
[267] Landemore, "Political Authority".

have de jure authority'[268]. Considering its focus on the non-Western world, this distinction is of some importance to this thesis. As already alluded to in the earlier review of the literatures on informality, networks, and state capturing, understanding the socio-political context of state-building activities in many developing countries requires a recognition that actual, de facto power and influence is often found in authority structures and entities that are not formally part of the de jure, state-centred authorities. Where the state apparatus appears weak, power is de facto vested in extremely strong informal networks, such as the tribal systems in Pakistan. What is more, harkening back to the earlier discussion about the deep state, recognising that authorities can sometimes wield de facto but not de jure power is also helpful. Both NSAs and state actors engaged in foreign policy-making in the non-Western world will often have to interact with authorities that are not formally part of the state structure but whose involvement is still indispensable for the success of an initiative.

And so, this thesis, building on an array of solid and mutually enhancing theoretical assumptions, seeks to analytically 'dig in' and observe what is taking place on the ground. As the analysis this thesis seeks to conduct hopes to provide a rich set of empirical data, it is imperative that its underlying and deliberately broad definition is able to account for the complex reality of foreign policy in the 21st century.

Non-State Actors

We shall now turn to defining another key concept at the centre of this thesis, namely, NSAs. The scholarly debates about globalisation, beginning with Keohane and Nye's interdependence literature[269], and its impact has certainly brought NSAs as causally significant entities in international affairs back to the forefront. Especially the 1990s raised questions about state authorities vis-à-vis multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international organisations (IOs). Today, one can confidently assert that the majority of scholars do not doubt the impact that NSAs have in world politics[270]. As Waltz himself

[268] Landemore, "Political Authority".
[269] Keohane et al., *Power And Interdependence*.
[270] Risse, *Transnational Actors And World Politics*, p. 262.

writes, 'states are not and never have been the only international actors (…) The importance of nonstate actors and the extent of transnational activities are obvious'[271]. Indeed, some scholars have even pointed out that in light of the activities of the Hanseatic League and the East India Companies prior to the Peace of Westphalia, states, not NSAs, should be regarded as 'the new kids on the block' in international relations[272]. Besides questions as to whether the state ought to be seen as an old-fashioned model, a walking corpse[273], or rather as a still relevant entity[274], these debates have provided us with a rich and diverse array of empirical and theoretical studies, which have drawn attention to a variety of different governance arrangements.

The specifics of this decades-old debate shall, however, only marginally concern us here. How this thesis shall view NSAs shall be based on the definition provided by the Max Planck Encyclopaedias of International Law:

> *'The term non-State actors is a superordinate concept that encompasses all those actors in international relations that are not State[s]. It comprises individuals as well as entities, the latter spanning a large range of organizations and institutions on the global, regional, sub-regional as well as the local levels'*[275].

Interestingly, the Encyclopaedia furthermore adds that 'these entities cannot be identified by common sociological features as they include, inter alia, international organizations, corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade associations, transnational corporations, terrorist groups, and transnational criminal organizations'[276]. Yet, whether these entities represent NGOs or MNCs and how, why and under what conditions they are respectively linked with states through formal or informal relationships or networks is to be analysed in each individual case.

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[271] Waltz, *Theory Of International Politics*, pp. 93-94.
[272] Osiander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, And The Westphalian Myth."
[273] Ohmae, *The End Of The Nation State*; Strange, *The Retreat Of The State*.
[274] Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century*
[275] Wagner, "Non-State Actors."
[276] Wagner, "Non-State Actors."

The State/State Actors

Having defined NSAs, we shall now turn our attention to their counterparts on the world stage: states. Indeed, as Stirk puts it so aptly: 'understanding the state [is] the precondition for a nuanced appreciation of the predicaments and potentialities of international relations (…) it [is] a precondition of the art of foreign policy-making'[277]. Fully embracing this assertion, especially in view of the earlier-stated definition of foreign policy, it must, however, be acknowledged that a full review of the literature on the state in the discipline of IR[278] would go beyond the scope of this DPhil. This thesis shall thus draw on both the Restatement and the Montevideo Convention of 1933 and define a state as

> *'an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities'*[279].

Having defined the state, it is necessary that we briefly discuss a related concept, which is far less clear but of significant relevance to this thesis, especially in the Pakistan-focused case study, namely, that of the 'deep state' or 'state within the state'. Going back to Ledeneva's work, cited in the previous section, it is interesting to note that she refers to her *sistema* as a dual state, a 'bifurcated system' and suggests that even the informal part of the system has its own custodians: 'according to a well-informed respondent, the monitoring function of *smotryashchie* (the watchers) is central for informal governance and should not be associated with some stereotypical *siloviki* planted everywhere to watch over businesses or projects'[280]. Seen in this light, *sistema* should not be regarded as an anarchical system without hierarchy and it might equally be a mistake to treat the realm of non-state activities in a similar fashion. Viewed through this prism, we can fully expect the intelligence services to be heavily involved in NSA-based foreign policy, playing the roles of *smotryashchie*. These depictions, certainly, contain

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[277] Schuett et al., *The Concept Of The State In International Relations - Philosophy, Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism*.
[278] Lake, *Hierarchy In International Relations*.
[279] Tse-shyang Chen, "The Meaning Of "States" In The Membership Provisions Of The United Nations Charter."
[280] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*

within themselves familiar notions that both popular cultural and scholarship have about the deep state. Yet, one must bear in mind that the topic itself is clouded in and perhaps even tainted by a certain 'conspiratorial sensationalism' – a tendency only further strengthened over the course of public discourse over the last four years in the US[281].

However, this should not discourage further serious research into a matter, which has already been discussed by a variety of scholars and might contribute to the understanding of informal or hybrid foreign policy. Indeed, the idea of a state within a state, a power behind the throne, which could disregard and supersede the existing legal and constitutional frameworks and intervene in the body politic whenever it deemed such exceptional actions to be necessary, is an old one[282]. Particularly illuminating in this regard is Ernst Fraenkel, who, dynamising the idea of a state of emergency, proposes the concept of the 'dual state'. This 'dual state' is divided into the 'prerogative' and 'normative'. In the former, 'there is no objective and therefore also no subjective right, no legal protection and no competences provided with legal guarantees. In this political sector the norms are lacking and the action is dominant'. In short, decisions are no longer made according to legal standards, but exclusively politically 'according to the state of affairs'. Its counterpart, the 'Normative State', is defined as an 'an administrative body endowed with elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal order as expressed in statutes, decisions of the courts, and activities of the administrative agencies'. It constituted the sector in which laws, court decisions and administrative acts were still valid but in constant conflict with the authorities of the state and that wider 'governmental system which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal guarantees', which falls under the auspices of the 'Prerogative State'[283].What is more, these two spheres would co-exist simultaneously as the term 'dual state' itself implies and only certain personages or organisatons are able to step in when exceptional circumstances arise and indeed also have the privilege to determine what might constitute the very circumstances allowing for this. Hence, Fraenkel's conceptualisation of the 'Prerogative State' comes very close indeed to what one might envision to be a 'deep state'.

[281] Wittes, "Blaming The Deep State."
[282] Schmitt, *Political Theology*.
[283] Fraenkel, *The Dual State*.

The concept of the 'dual state' was subsequently adopted by Hans Morgenthau, who, presumably against the backdrop of the U.S. National Security Act of 1947, observed the establishment and spread of a similarly complex dialectical structure inside the US, underlining that 'it is characteristic of the dual state that in it, as a matter of law, the power of making decisions remains with the authorities charged by law with making them while, as a matter of fact, by virtue of their power over life and death the agents of the secret police – coordinated to, but independent from, the official makers of decisions – at the very least exert an effective veto over the decisions. Once the secret police has established itself firmly in an agency of the government, it will have less and less need for intervening drastically in day by day operations; for its omnipresence and ruptured omnipotence would generally be sufficient for the constituted authorities to avoid any action which might displease the secret police'[284].

Thus, we can record that parallel structures and the existence of a state within a state, showing itself from time to time in moments of crisis or whenever its members deem it to be appropriate, appear as an undeniable reality in a variety of serious scholarly investigations into the matter – although it seems that the utility of this concept is limited by a lack of clarity. There are, however, important common denominators, which, in turn, seem to be very much aligned with the aforementioned literatures on networks and informality. Helmke et al., for example, point to 'socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels'[285]. This high degree of autonomy is further stressed by Gill who underlines that the wider security apparatus is more disaggregated and not limited to just the armed forces. His 'independent security state' is distinguished by a 'lack of external controls (...) its goals will be determined by officials within the agency and may not coincide with those of the political elite'[286]. Put differently, members of the deep state do not necessarily trust their own government to pursue the national interest, as they define it. In the light of the above, this thesis shall thus base its analysis of deep state structures on the following conceptualisation, as proposed by O'Neil: 'the deep state is a set of coercive institutions, actors and relationships beyond those

[284] Morgenthau, "The Corruption Of Patriotism", p. 400.
[285] Helmke et al., *Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics*, p. 8.
[286] Gill, *Policing Politics,* p. 61.

formally charged with defense, intelligence and policing. Driven politically by a logic of tutelage and exercising a high degree of autonomy, the deep state justifies itself through the need to defend the nation against purported existential threats'[287].

Against this background, one might, of course, wonder whether the deep state is part of the state or a non-state actor. In short: the deep state can be comprised of both state and non-state elements. Although mostly associated with permanent coercive institutions of the state, such as the intelligence services and the military, the concept of the deep state can also include non-state elements. The (in)famous 1996 Susurluk scandal in Turkey, for example, drastically highlighted that organised crime and far-right movements, such as the grey wolves, can very much be part of a *derin devlet*[288]. What is more, in countries like Pakistan, some families and informal tribal networks precede the creation of the state and are thus part of an informal government structure that governs behind the scenes. Based on this, they can also very much work alongside the traditional deep-state institutions, such as the armed forces.

Having said this, the inclusion of the concept of the deep state in this theoretical framework does not seek further theoretical refinement of the concept as such but rather hopes to contribute additional and certainly unique empirical data to better comprehend the *modus operandi* and rationales behind the state within a state. Furthermore, this suggests that informal actions - whether initiated by a formal government agency, an NSA, members of a deep state, or a combination of all these entities - do not necessarily have to be autocratic or illegitimate but rather constitute the way 'things are done' – sometimes even more effectively than formal practices and without such actions necessarily being driven by a nefarious intent. After all, as the chapter on PAJCCI in particular shall demonstrate, the involvement of a 'deep state' in the foreign policy of a country like Pakistan is normal - even though it might rightfully be viewed with scepticism in our hemisphere where the rule of law and democratic procedures are the expected norm. Of course, the Pakistani deep state, over the course of the country's history, has, quite literally collected more than just a few skeletons in its cupboard. As

[287] O'Neil, "The Deep State."
[288] Park, "Turkey's Deep State."

Christiansen would put it, an ethically problematic, 'sinister picture' seems to emerge in which 'the presence of formal Democratic procedures – elections, political parties, Parliament – becomes a façade behind which very different, informal arrangements are hidden which actually determine the allocation of political power'[289]. However, the chosen case study will demonstrate that its members can also become involved in more benign endeavours, such as in the improvement of diplomatic relations with neighbouring Afghanistan. In a way, one could even assert that this thesis' focus on the non-Western world underlines the need to call into question rigid normative notions, already discussed earlier, implying a dichotomy between formal (legitimate) and informal (illegitimate) diplomacy.

Accountability

Another key concept, which the literature on informality and networks has brought to the forefront and which constitutes an integral part of the causal mechanisms that shall be traced, is accountability. Bovens et al. fittingly describe accountability as '*an institutional relation or arrangement in which an agent can be held to account by another agent or institution'*. Put differently, an actor has to be accountable vis-à-vis someone or something else. In the context of public accountability, Bovens et al. stress that 'it is crucial that the actor is obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct, by providing various sorts of information about the performance of tasks, about outcomes, or about procedures'. What is more, there also needs to be the possibility that the principal, 'the forum', in their case, can 'interrogate the actor and to question the adequacy of the explanation or the legitimacy of the conduct'. Finally, and as a result of this, the principal may 'pass judgement on the conduct of the actor' and either reward or impose sanctions on him or her[290]. Conversely, an agent operates with less accountability if he or she does not have to answer for her actions by another entity.

Accountability is thus closely linked with supervision and monitoring by another, superior entity, as it is the case in the principal-agent theory literature. This elaboration on the concept of accountability bears implications for the mechanisms

[289] Christiansen, "Introduction."
[290] Gailmard, "Accountability And Principal-Agent Theory."

employed by this thesis. After all, state actors may have foreign policy objective with which they do not want to be associated with. This could, for example, be due to the fact that it might not be popular with the population in either the target or the home country. In order to still pursue this very goal, however, they might decide to employ an NSA, which does not find itself under the same degree of public or legal scrutiny, to implement the policy on their behalf. This might endow the said state actors with plausible deniability, to deny knowledge of or responsibility for any damnable actions committed by the NSA, whilst at the same time enabling them to hold the employed NSA accountable. What is more, if two governments cannot work with each other, particular tasks or policies can then be delegated to NSAs, which do have direct access to the authorities in the other country, to pursue them instead. As Gel'man points out, such informal arrangements can be seen as 'a useful method to bypass imperfect old and/or new formal [state] institutions'.

Importantly, given that many developing nations are only now beginning to develop proper monitoring regimes for foreign entities operating in their territories, such NSAs are thus able to work with less accountability vis-à-vis the governments of the target country – but would still find themselves supervised by the state they are being employed by. To be sure, the fact that state actors are able to supervise the activities of NSAs they have employed on their behalf implies that the latter find themselves in a state of dependency on the former. Alternatively, in the case of non-state entities, which are not in a condition of (legal, financial etc.) dependency vis-à-vis a government, NSAs do not have to answer for their actions and might be able to operate with less accountability in all states they operate in. In a nutshell, the more dependent an NSA is on a state actor, the more it can be held to account by the latter – and vice versa. At the same time, one can envision a situation in which an NSA is only accountable to state actors in one country but not in another.

Resources and Information

Finally, this thesis may define resources as 'a stock or supply of money, materials, staff, and other assets that can be drawn on by a person or organisation in order to function effectively'[291]. Technically a part of the former, information may additionally be defined as 'facts or details about someone or something'.

[291] Lexico, "Resource English Definition And Meaning."

2.6 The Conceptual Framework and the Employed Causal Mechanisms

Having outlined the key theoretical concepts underlying, which shall be incorporated in the theory-testing causal mechanisms, we shall now proceed to outline them in greater detail. As already mentioned above, causal mechanisms in theory-testing process-tracing employ a 'theory before fact', approach, where 'we know both X and Y and we either have existing conjectures about a plausible mechanism or are able to use logical reasoning to formulate a causal mechanism from existing theorization'. In the case of this dissertation, Y is the impact on a certain foreign policy between the concerned countries, whilst X differs, depending on whether state- or non-state actors are the driving forces behind a particular initiative. In conjunction with the theoretical concepts, elaborated above, the hypotheses, the distilled approaches within IR do, of course, also constitute an inspiration for the causal mechanisms and the distilled approaches within the discipline of IR.

Referring back to Slaughter's writings, for example, it should be underlined here that it is imperative 'to understand how different actors — whether states or individuals — are connected to other actors, how different patterns of connections form different types of networks, and how the position of specific actors within a network, together with the quantity and quality of their ties to other actors, determines power, influence, and the fragility of nodes within a network and of the network as a whole'[292]. To be sure, 'web actors, typically called nonstate actors (…) are well recognized as drivers of state action, even if scholars disagree on precisely what the transmission belts are between what these actors want and what states actually do'[293]. Similarly, as Beach et al. highlight in their elaborations of causal mechanisms as transmission belts: 'we need to reconceptualize the causal theory into a mechanism composed of a set of parts (entities engaging in activities) [i.e. states and NSAs and their respective activities] to study the dynamic transmission of causal forces through the mechanism to produce the outcome (…) Here, we reconceptualize the theory as a mechanism'[294]. In the words of Bennett, such causal

[292] Slaughter, *The Chessboard and the Web.*
[293] Slaughter, *The Chessboard and the Web.*
[294] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 110.

mechanisms constitute 'processes through which agents with causal capacities operate in specific contexts to transfer energy, information or matter to other entities'[295]. In the pursuance of establishing what these transmission belts between the relevant actors are, Slaughter urges scholars to derive the necessary analytical inspiration from 'a far richer trove of scholarship on networks in multiple disciplines, from biology to physics to industrial organization'[296]. This would, amongst others, also include literature on Actor Network Theory (ANT).

In the face of this, one might legitimately wonder about the intricacies and constituent steps of these very connections and transmission belts. In this regard, Latour's 'associology' might prove to be of significant value for the attempt of this thesis to distil and outline the causal mechanisms that underlie state-NSA interaction today. According to Latour, comprehending *why* particular arrangements have materialised can only be understood by showing *how* they have come into existence. Building on this imperative, a variety of ANT scholars, have underlined that this very process-based perspective should not regard associations between actants[297] as a given, or *fait accompli.* Rather, its focus ought to be on the genesis of associations and its subsequent transformation'[298]. Simply put, ANT begins its assessment with the genesis of an actor-network and its gradual development. This, of course, bears similarities with other assumptions underlying network theory, which conceptualises power as 'emerging from, and depending on, relationships' and thus 'places a premium on relational understandings of power; power that derives from and is exercised through actual or potential relationships rather than residing only in a node'[299].

Against this background, one might then wonder what form and shape the association between state and NSA can assume and in what conditions the actants or actors concerned might be at this genesis of their cooperation? As shall be seen, these considerations carry significant implications and inspirations for the conceptual framework this thesis hopes to build its analysis upon. It is therefore

[295] Bennett, "The Mother of All 'Isms': Organizing Political Science around Causal Mechanisms", 207.
[296] Slaugther, *The Chessboard and the Web.*
[297] Note: the term 'actant' is used in network theory. According to the Oxford Research Encyclopedia, 'actants are the full range of potential agents in the network'. The term 'actant' and 'agent' may thus be used interchangeable in this thesis.
[298] Stark et al., *Actor Network Theory and After*; Mol, "Actor-network theory".
[299] Avant et al., "Introduction", p. 9.

maintained that at the outset of any association, before the actants or actors are linked together, an NSA finds itself in either a condition of 'Autonomy' or 'Dependence', which are, as shown in Figure 1, in turn, distinguished by three different factors: Finances, Agenda, and Supervision. 'Finances' refers to how the NSA receives funding for its operations. If, for example, a development contractor receives 100 per cent of its revenues from specific tasks issued by the state government in the form of a contract, dependent on turn on performance in the field, it finds itself clearly in a state of dependence on the state. On the other hand, an organisation such as the Aga Khan Foundation receives an annual amount from donations regardless of its performance; it is thus able to operate under a condition of autonomy from the state. This is linked to the question whether the NSA possesses any *a priori* Agenda. A development contractor, given that it is financially dependent on the state, will certainly follow the maxim of 'He who pays the piper calls the tune' and passively adopt the Government's agenda as its own. It possesses no *a priori* agenda, rather the state agenda and its own are congruent. The Aga Khan Foundation, on the other hand, strengthened by greater financial independence, has a pro-active political and even ideological 'mission' regardless of the current state foreign policy and without governmental interference. Lastly, another important factor to consider is Supervision. A dependent NSA will be more subject to supervision by the state from which it receives directives. This could be in the form of regular reporting to a state official or a periodic check of performance regarding its activities and achievements.

	Finances	Agenda	Supervision
Dependence	The inflow of income depends on performance and is accordingly received from the state	State agenda equals NSA agenda; NSA would not be active otherwise	NSA is supervised by state
Autonomy	The inflow of income does not depend on any performance and is received regardless	NSA pursues a pro-active agenda regardless of state policies	NSA activities are not supervised by the state

Figure 1: Conditions of NSA Foreign Policy Involvement

Out of the above-cited conditions of autonomy and dependence, NSAs find themselves in, we can distil two different types of roles they can assume, depending

on the situation at the genesis of their association with other actants, such as states. On the one hand, as we learn from Allen, actors exercising power frequently rely on 'mobilising intermediaries' in order to 'register their presence through quieter, less brash forms of power than domination and overt control', or what he refers to as 'mediated power'[300]. For example, in the interest of obtaining plausible deniability for its policies, a state might employ an NSA instead of pursuing the objective itself. The NSA would thus find itself in a condition of Dependence vis-à-vis the state and constitute a *Subcontractor* – similar to the 'agent' in PAT. Murphy further elaborates on the matter of inequality between associated actants when he writes that 'actor networks are (…) shaped by power asymmetries [and] an agent successfully translates his or her power into desired actions and outcomes through (…) enrolling or ordering heterogeneous materials in his or her network'[301]. Similarly stressing the importance of asymmetry, Marchetti highlights that hybrid partnerships (…) depend on the concrete interests of more powerful private actors and public institutions. In this case it would not only be a matter of governance deficit but also of the interests of the potential actors (…) based on the idea that, through partnerships, the actors involved may acquire additional means and tackle problems (…). This perspective considers partnerships as the by-product of power positions, but also as power-enhancing instruments'[302] – and a Subcontractor can represent precisely such a power-enhancing instrument to states on the international stage. Of course, power asymmetries do not always mean that states find themselves in charge in a given network. Rather, as already alluded to in the Aga Khan example above, we might also envision the prime actor, seeking to use networked power, to be an NSA. Bearing in mind the concept of 'norm entrepreneur' in the SMT and TAN literatures, such an NSA – pursuing its own agenda and operating independently of and under no supervision by a state – shall be referred to as playing the role of an *'Entrepreneur'*. Marchetti captures the logic underlying these conditions accurately when he writes that 'the internal dynamics of a global network are determined by the strategic decisions of national social and political actors to enter, stay in or leave a network. Underpinning these decisions are a number of reasons which can be interpreted according to a model of acquisition of

[300] Latour, *Science in Action,* pp. 223-228.
[301] Murphy, "Building trust in economic space".
[302] Marchetti, Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 16.

shares of 'ownership' in the network: the investment of political capital and resources by each participant is negotiated with the network coordinator and other key members, in order to obtain political gains both at the international and national level (…) this results in differing degrees of participation for each member, and thus in asymmetrical roles in the network'[303]. This logic might apply to transnational networks as well to foreign policy-making. Hence, an Entrepreneur possesses a greater share of 'ownership' in its relationship with the state, thus making it less asymmetric as that of a Subcontractor, whose 'capital' is mostly granted by the state. What is more, since an NSA's 'relational position shapes her power, it is also something she can take action to shape strategically'[304]. As a consequence, both Entrepreneurs and Subcontractors appear and operate 'in a variety of different forms'[305].

In this thesis, they are expected to assume the roles of Hijackers, Facilitators, and Spoilers. Indeed, networked NSAs, whether they operate under the condition of dependence or autonomy, can associate themselves with others in a manner that a specific foreign policy process or objective is aided and assisted. Here we can draw on Krasner's work on international economic regimes, in which states are assumed to play a variety of different roles[306]. Krasner describes some as 'makers' of such regimes, designing policies that would be adopted by other states, and others as 'breakers', opposing such regimes and seeking to undermine or destroy them without having the influence themselves to create or offer alternative ones.

Translated into the conceptual framework used for this thesis, NSAs acting as 'Subcontractors' or 'Entrepreneurs' of a state can operate as 'Facilitators' (resembling Krasner's 'makers') which are seeking to aid and advance a foreign policy among the concerned states. One might also be reminded Brewer's study, emphasising the significance of brokerage roles undertaken by certain nodes within security networks. These actors are strategically placed to bridge 'structural holes' and serve as 'conduits of exchange' in 'otherwise fragmented security networks'[307]. Facilitators do indeed serve this very purpose of 'conduits of exchange' between two states who cannot pursue certain policies towards each other or whose

[303] Marchetti, Global Strategic Engagement, p. 129.
[304] Avant et al., "Introduction", p. 2.
[305] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 132-133.
[306] Krasner, "Structural Causes And Regime Consequences."
[307] Brewer, "Controlling Crime Through Networks".

relationship might be severely fragmented. As the second hypothesis puts it: '*non-state actors will come to fill a vacuum in foreign policy-making when bilateral cooperation is difficult among given countries'*. A Facilitator, as Pentillä would put it, is thus 'the key to make sure that the existence of semi-formal and informal groups facilitates rather than hampers the work of formal institutions'[308]. Or, to draw on Marchetti: 'while it is clear that CSOs cannot aim at substituting the traditional channels of political representation, it is also recognized that they often play a key role, among others, in 'broadcasting' needs and aspirations that struggle to be included in the political agenda'[309] – a task typical for a facilitator.

Additionally, NSAs might assume the operational forms of 'Spoiler', similar to Krasner's 'breakers'. In such a case, the NSA would, either on its own or directed by a state, actively pursue a strategy of undermining another actor or country – either targeting a particular policy or even the sovereignty of the state itself. Additionally, as Krasner observes, there might be situations in which such actors, whilst not powerful enough to offer alternatives, will nonetheless attempt to throw the decision-making process into disarray.



Figure 2: Non-State Actor Typology

Lastly, NSAs can assume the operational form of 'hijackers', allowing it to take over the decision-making process. This is a scenario familiar to scholars of ANT. As Latour points out, one must not assume intermediaries to be faithful delegates as they are able to 'transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry'[310]. According to Latour, this turns intermediaries into what he refers to as 'mediators', entities which might still be actants but not in the same manner and form they were originally intended to be. Indeed, they might even turn against those they are meant to originally serve as delegates[311]. Such sentiments appear to be echoed by Brewer, who observes a similar possibility, which might

[308]Penttilä, "Multilateralism Light", p. 39.
[309] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 146.
[310] Latour, *Reassembling the Social*, p. 39.
[311] Featherstone, "Spatial Relations And The Materialities Of Political Conflict."

further bolster the theoretical foundation of this typology, writing that 'private actors have considerable influence over controlling flows within security networks— particularly in terms of 'build[ing] bridges between disconnected parts of the market and organisations where it is valuable to do so' (...) such capabilities [however] introduce a conundrum where private actors can, through their control over certain network assets, effectively usurp government and the public interest and potentially seize control of the authorisation and delivery of security within a range of settings'[312]. This understanding of how the relevant NSAs behave when they possess such 'considerable influence over controlling flows' and are able to 'usurp government and the public interest' might also be merged with a theory already strongly incorporated into IR, namely Principal-Agency Theory (PAT). As already mentioned earlier, PAT has largely focused on so-called agency losses, specifically on the issue of cheating on by the agent. However, one might also envisage a situation, in which the agent does not use cheating but essentially takes over or *hijacks* the agenda of the principal. This would constitute a reversal of the traditional principal agent relationship, as the former would now be dependent on the latter. This could be due to informational asymmetry, the amassing of sufficient resources by the agent, enabling it to take control of the concerned policy, or clever manoeuvring by the agent, portraying itself, rather than the principal, which would normally be in charge, as the only legitimate face of the entire entity to interact with. Of course, the idea of hijacking goes way beyond any discussion of agency losses, which are set to be only relative in their scope, as ultimate control would still rest with the principals. In the case of hijacking, however, the agent would have gathered sufficient information or resources so it would be able to take over from the nominal principal or it could have always had the potential ability to hijack the principal agenda, deciding at a certain point in the decision-making process to step in and take control. In the latter case, the NSA might possess a veto power[313] over the decision-making process, which it might decide to activate at a certain point and hijack a government's agenda. In a like manner, one might also envision a situation in which a government is weakened (e.g. through the loss of popular support) or simply unable to act (e.g. because it is diplomatically isolated), thus willingly or unwillingly opening up space for an NSA to step in or seize. This NSA, having held

[312] Brewer, "Controlling Crime Through Networks".
[313] Tsebelis, *Veto players.*

a contrarian agenda or view vis-à-vis the government would then be able to use its activated or new-found power to hijack the country's foreign policy agenda and turn it around according to the NSA's preferences. The reasons behind the initiation of a hijacking process could be that the NSA - either at the outset or during the foreign policy decision-making process - reaches the conclusion that its own agenda and approach is to be regarded as superior vis-a-vis the state actor(s) involved. It might thus strategise to take over the foreign policy for the greater good of its constituency, country, or cause. The weakness of the state actor should be regarded as a necessary prerequisite for the hijacking to be successful. This could be due to a lack of support from a particular constituency, loss over the flow of information, a rapid decrease of resources available to it, or an engulfing isolation that shackles the traditional tools of foreign policy at hand. One could safely assume here that a strong state actor would naturally seek to fight any attempt by an NSA to take the mantle of power.

In the typology model outlined above, two types of NSAs were identified (Entrepreneur and Subcontractor) and three types of role (Hijacker, Spoiler, Facilitator). Against this background, one might, of course, wonder whether there are any more possibilities and why this thesis chose these particular ones. Indeed, harkening back to the writings on informality, we can detect similar roles and dynamics to be at play. Helmke et al., for example, propose a 'fourfold typology of informal institutions, distinguishing between those that are complementary, accommodating, competing and substitutive, depending on the relationship with formal institutions'[314]. Similarly, Lewis divides the possible roles that NGOs can be divided into (1) implementers, whose role, contracted by governments, 'is concerned with the mobilization of resources to provide goods and services to people who need them', (2) catalysts, whose role 'can be defined as an NGO's ability to inspire, facilitate or contribute to improved thinking and action to promote social transformation (…) and attempts to influence wider policy processes through innovation, and policy entrepreneurship', and finally (3) partners, whose role 'reflects the growing trend for NGOs to work with government, donors and the private sector on joint activities, such as providing specific inputs within a broader

[314] Helmke et al., "*Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics", p. 1.*

multiagency program or project, or undertaking socially responsible business initiatives'[315]. With reference to the taxonomy of NSAs, the interaction between NSAs and states can, on the whole be divided up into two broad categories. Namely, NSAs that operate in *autonomy from* or *dependence on* states. What is more, from our definition of foreign policy we acknowledge that states have to be an integral part of the process for it to be called 'foreign policy'. Hence, NSAs that are reliant on state support will be subcontracted by the state. On the other hand, NSAs who can command over their own resources and enjoy relative independence from the state can, similarly to the norm entrepreneur, envision and act upon their own agendas, co-opting states in the process to make it a fully-fletched foreign policy initiative. Having identified these two broad categories of NSAs, the two types of NSAs seem to be able to account for both.

Regarding the three types of roles, one can certainly think of a great variety of alternative possibilities, such as 'cheaters', 'rivals', or 'partners'. Generally speaking, this thesis selected hijacker, spoiler, and facilitator in order to illustrate dynamics, distilled in the 'Theoretical Perspectives' section and beyond. As Marchetti observes, there exists a 'cooperative dimension of the international policy process' although 'many studies concerning the relationship between international organizations (IOs) and CSOs have tended to see the process as one of rivalry and dispute in the form of contentious politics'[316]. The 'Theoretical Perspectives' section also revealed that the SMT and TAN literatures, with the exception of Hägel[317], have regarded the interaction between states and NSAs as unfolding along confrontational lines. An engagement with the PAT literature and the works concerned with NSAs operation as SINGOs has, however, revealed that NSAs can be instrumentalised by states as well. What is more, a 'merged reading' of PAT and scholarly literature on Veto Players has revealed the possibility of NSAs operating as veto players, who might be able to 'take over' a state foreign policy, and spoilers, which can throw a foreign policy process into disarray. In a way then, alternative roles, such as 'cheaters' and 'rivals' can be subsumed under 'hijackers' and 'spoilers'. To be sure, there is a very strong element of 'cheating' in the activities

[315] Lewis, "Nongovernmental Organizations, Definition and History".
[316] Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 5
[317] Hägel, "States And Transnational Actors".

of a 'hijacker'. More than that, a successful hijacking of a foreign policy might turn an NSA into a very serious rival, as illustrated in the Georgia chapter. Thus, developing the concept of a 'hijacker' also fulfils another purpose, namely to demonstrate that 'non-state actors are able to influence global politics in an autonomous way'[318]. In fact, as in the case of the Georgian Orthodox Church, they can be so autonomous from the state that they are able to take over an entire foreign policy initiative.

On the more cooperative side, both 'catalysts' and 'partners' seem to have the same purpose as 'facilitators', namely to support a state in successfully implementing a particular foreign policy. The same would, broadly speaking, apply to Helmke's substitutive, accommodating, and complementary institutions[319]. Of course, one could – and in a larger study should – devise operational roles for NSAs, which are very clearly demarcated in their scope and defined in their purpose (i.e. differentiating cheating from hijacking, or rivals from hijackers). However, this study has sought to account for the dynamics captured through its reading and interpretation of the existing literature. To be sure, 'these research boundaries do not have an absolute value – that is, they are determined by practicality and feasibility. A thoroughgoing research into hybrid partnerships in global governance should ideally include them, but this was not possible here'[320]

Having established this, we might wonder how the actants in the network, states and NSAs, establish and transform their respective association. As mentioned above, comprehending *why* particular arrangements have materialised can only be understood by outlining *how* they have come into existence. Linked to this is a notion central to ANT, namely, the procedure of incorporating heterogenous actants into an actor-network. In the course of this, their respective agendas and objectives become aligned, 'creating convergences and homologies by relating things that were previously different'[321] – a process known in ANT as 'translation'. In a similar manner, we can envision a process in which heterogenous states and NSAs, entities that were 'previously different', are becoming aligned to pursue a certain foreign

[318] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 8.
[319] Helmke et al., "*Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics", p. 1.*
[320] Marchetti, Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 5.
[321] Callon, "Struggles and negotiations to define what is problematic and what is not", p. 211.

policy goal. Subsequently, according to Callon, 'translation' advances in four constituent steps: 'problematisation' identifies and defines an issue or a challenge and the set of compatible actants related to it. What follows is 'interessement', namely, a particular series of actions through which the prime actant enlists other actants to adopt specific roles in the actor-network and determines their respective identities within it. 'Enrolment' is proposed as the result of the two previous steps, describing the successful calibration and alignment of actants' interests and agendas in the created actor-network. Finally, during 'mobilisation' one actant becomes able to communicate or act on behalf of the other concerned actants, pushing them to act towards the collective objective[322]. Reflecting on this, the process of 'translation', it seems, enables or rather creates agency: it makes initiatives and joint action possible through a careful and considerate alignment of different interests and agendas, which are then subsequently carried out by a selected actor or group of actors.

Having outlined this, the concept of 'translation' and indeed its four constituent steps also very much inspire the causal mechanisms through which both Subcontractors and Entrepreneurs become involved in foreign policy-making. Outlining the two central mechanisms underlying this thesis is particularly important given the fact that 'in the three political science journals with the highest impact factor, in the period from 2005 to 2010, fewer than 10 percent of articles even mentioned mechanisms in their theorization of causal propositions'[323]. Taking into consideration the two respective roles that NSAs assume, the procedure of 'translation' itself must be subdivided into two distinct, customised processes. Here, we shall draw on the Europeanisation literature and its concepts of 'downloading', referring to the adoption of EU directives into national policy, and 'uploading', as the reverse process[324]. Hence, 'Entrepreneurial NSAs', which operate under conditions of autonomy from the state, are able to *'upload'* – through any of the given operational forms – their own agenda to the state level, thereby making the state to adopt it as its own agenda. Vice versa, NSAs functioning as Subcontractors work under conditions of dependence on the state and *'download'* the state's agenda, thereby making it its own. In the same context, the literature on regulatory

[322] Callon, "Struggles and negotiations to define what is problematic and what is not", p. 211.
[323] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 57.
[324] Torreblanca, "Ideas, preferences and institutions*"*; Bull et al., *Europeanisation and Italian policy for the Mezzogiorno*.

theory again provides an additional inspirational impetus with its metaphor of 'steering' and 'rowing' to describe a state's regulation offers. Using these nautical images, 'the state strategically "steers" or directs regulatory efforts while non-state actors take on the state's traditional task of "rowing" by creating and operating various regulatory arrangements'[325]. This relationship between 'enforcer and enforcee' seems to bear similarities with my notion of downloading. The underlying reasons for the development of this state-NSA relationship, both in regulatory matters and foreign policy, also appears to be related as 'one of the principal reasons that non-state actors may form transnational regulatory arrangements is because states are perceived to be incapable of or are unwilling to provide transnational governance on certain issues (...) working outside more traditional legal processes can enable non-state actors to address problems that states are unwilling to or incapable of addressing alone, at least in ways that non-state actors may prefer'[326]. To be sure, regulatory initiatives are not unidirectionally emanating from states. On the contrary, as the authors underline 'not all states have equal capacity to influence, stimulate or control regulatory efforts by non-state actors, particularly mega-corporate actors'[327]. The influence of such powerful NSAs on states would thus resemble the concept of uploading.

However, whilst treating this as additional and important conceptual contributions, this thesis shall continue to be based on 'downloading' and 'uploading' to describe state-NSA interactions (see: Figure 2). Having said this, it must still be elaborated precisely how each process takes place and it is in this regard that the insights from and indeed the constituent steps of ANT's 'translation' offer sufficient substance and analytical orientation.

In doing so, we can now turn our attention to how 'downloading' takes place. As shown in the first two steps in Figure 3, we are faced with a scenario in which 'State Actors in concerned states unwilling or unable to pursue a certain Foreign Policy towards each other'. This could be due to a diplomatic crisis, a military conflict between both states, or a particular policy area with which one of the concerned states does not want to be officially associated with. Therefore, state

[325] Tusikov, "Transnational Non-State Regulatory Regimes", p. 342.
[326] Tusikov, "Transnational Non-State Regulatory Regimes", p. 339.
[327] Tusikov, "Transnational Non-State Regulatory Regimes", p. 339.

actors in the concerned states identify a foreign policy objective they would like to pursue despite or perhaps precisely because of the situation they are in vis-à-vis the other country. Referring back to ANT's 'translation', this, of course, very much resembles the constituent step of 'problematisation', in which a challenge or issue and the relevant compatible actants related to them are being identified. Certainly, the process of selecting the compatible NSA, which might be recruited to achieve a successful completion of the said objective, already leads into Step III, in which the identified non-state entity is granted access to authorities, and resources in at least one of the concerned states. This, of course, is very much aligned with the subsequent step in the 'translation' procedure, namely 'interessement'– the particular series of actions through which the prime actant (in this case the state) enlists other actants to adopt specific roles in the actor network and determines their



Figure 3: Causal Mechanism of Downloading

respective identities within it. In other words, by granting them previously lacking access to contacts and resources the enlistment of the NSA in the foreign policy decision-making process of the state has begun. The identity of the NSA, as a Subcontractor of the state, is being made clear through the one-sided, state-led enhancement of the NSA's abilities and assets. This is neatly going over into Step IV when the state demonstrates its ability to supervise the selected NSA activities in the concerned area. The imposition of a state-led supervision mechanism onto a non-state entity is also, referring back to ' interessement', part of the creation of the actants identity – in this case as that of a Subcontractor. It does, however, also fall under 'enrolment', namely, the successful calibration and alignment of actants' interests and agendas in the created actor-network. In this case, the calibration of the interests and agendas of the concerned actants, state and NSA, essentially means

the adoption of the agenda of the former by the latter. Finally, to a significant extent because the NSA is able to operate with less accountability in the concerned area (Step V), the final steps in the mechanism are very much akin to 'mobilisation', that is, when one relevant actant is able to communicate or act on behalf of the other concerned actants. In other words, when the subcontractual NSA begins to implement the previously identified policy objective towards at least one of the concerned state actors and we are ultimately able to observe a successful downloading of the state actors' agenda in the other concerned state through NSA activity (Steps VI+VII).

Having outlined the procedure of 'downloading', we can now begin to sketch out the reverse process of 'uploading'. As illustrated in Figure 4, the causal energy being transmitted through uploading is Political Influence, exerted by the NSA on the involved state actor(s) with the goal of 'persuading' the latter to accept



Figure 4: Causal Mechanism of Uploading

its agenda. 'NSA Activity' thus describes the activities of a given NSA solely on the basis of its own agenda and without any state interference. Again, we are faced with a situation similar to that entailed in 'problematisation' as the concerned states are, due to a variety of reasons (e.g. a diplomatic crisis, a sensitive policy area, a post or pre conflict situation) unable or unwilling to pursue a certain foreign policy towards each other. In contrast to 'downloading', the relevant NSA operates in a condition of autonomy and is able to independently step into the apparent void between the two countries. The NSA itself thus identifies and defines an issue or a challenge and considers itself to be the compatible actant able and willing to intervene (Step I+II). In contrast to a Subcontractor, however, the NSA already possesses access to resources, institutions, elites and information in one of the states and does not require the facilitation of state actors. This type of 'interesssment'

entails an NSA enlisting itself in its particular role. It is able to determine its own identity within the wider network because of its independence from the state and its good will (Step III). What follows is the alignment of all involved interests and agendas in the concerned network due to the insertion of the NSA and its ability to operate with less accountability. Having successfully manoeuvred itself into or rather having carefully initiated the foreign policy process and having carefully calibrated the interests of all actors concerned, the final stage of 'mobilisation' begins. In it, the NSA is able to effectively implement its previously conceived agenda between the concerned states and by becoming the prime actant able to communicate on behalf of all others, we can observe a consequential impact of NSA activity and a successful completion of the process of uploading.

To be sure, whilst up- and downloading are the causal mechanisms specifically developed and selected for this thesis, there are other, alternative mechanisms through which states and NSAs can interact in foreign policy-making. Especially, since this thesis seeks to incorporate the insights and assumptions of network theory into its conceptual framework, it is crucial to place 'relationships among actors and the properties of these relationships at the center of studying political processes [and to] focus on variation in the position of actors, the distribution of ties, and the quality of ties to better understand' foreign policy today. Viewed through this prism, the causal mechanisms linking states and NSAs, including the distribution and quality of ties connecting them, can assume diverse forms, which might be different from those subsumed under up- and downloading.

After all, 'nonstate actors are present in all phases of the international policy process [including] agenda setting, policy decision, implementation, monitoring, [and] policy evaluation'[328]. With indifference or even rivalry constituting further concrete possibilities, Abbott et al. also point to causal mechanisms centred on setting and managing agendas, implementing policy, monitoring, enforcing, adjudicating outcomes[329]. Additionally, in the field of transnational civil society engagement, 'at least five mechanisms can be singled out'. These involve 'consultation with CSOs (…) subcontracting of specific functions (…) founding,

[328] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 132-133.
[329] Abbott et al., "The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State."

financing, aggregating, or simply sponsoring of newly created CSOs (…) hybrid partnerships (…) [and] the formal inclusion of NGOs into the decision-making process of the United Nations'[330]. Similarly, Marchetti highlights creation, co-optation, lobbying, partnership and cooperation, indifference, one-way dissemination, consultation, dialogue, contention, and threat as being in the 'range of relationships between public institutions and CSOs'[331].

Out of the above, 'setting and managing agendas, dialogue, implementing or enforcing policy, monitoring, enforcing, adjudicating outcomes, cooperation, consultation, policy evaluation, and co-optation' could certainly be seen as being integral parts of what Marchetti refers to as the '*cooperative* dimension of the international policy process'[332]. To be sure, it would be worth drafting and investigating causal mechanisms that would tailor the causal mechanism linking states and NSAs to these very specific types of interaction. However, both uploading and downloading as causal mechanisms are deliberately broad in their focus so as to allow all of these cooperative activities to be subsumed under them. This also aids the attempt to demonstrate how wide-ranging NSA involvement in different types of foreign policy-making can be. Subcontracting', in turn, is the very essence of what the causal mechanism of downloading is based upon – and, should an NSA find itself in a position of dependence on a state, so is the 'founding, financing, aggregating, or simply sponsoring of newly created NSAs', resulting in the very hybrid partnerships between states and NSAs that this thesis seeks to analyse.

Having said this, one might very well imagine 'rivalry', 'contention', and 'threat' to constitute another possibility of a causal mechanism linking state and NSAs in foreign policy today. This is particularly true 'given that many studies concerning the relationship between international organizations (IOs) and CSOs have tended to see the process as one of rivalry and dispute in the form of contentious politics'[333]. Indirectly, this thesis has already shed light on this

[330] Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement*, p. 137.
[331] Marchetti, Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 12.
[332] Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 5.
[333] Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 5; Note: As pointed out earlier, the same tendency can be observed in the SMT and TAN literatures.

possibility by conceptualising NSAs as 'spoilers' and 'hijackers', which could go against the agenda of their host and foreign governments. This is particularly true for NSAs operating as hijackers for they are able to openly operate as rivals to states. Another view on 'rivalry-based causal mechanisms' would be to regard them as being potentially able to capture the dynamics of multiple NSAs competing to influence the foreign policies of governments. The competition between the Iraqi National Accord and the Iraqi National Congress to influence US foreign policy towards Iraq, for example, might represent an example of such an inter-NSA rivalry. In order to comprehensively capture this type of 'rivalry', however, a causal mechanism would have to drafted, which could account for a multilateral model of engagement between multiple actors – some of them being aligned, others competing with each other. After all, the interaction between governments and NSAs 'occurs both multilaterally (usually in the form of multi-stakeholder partnerships) and bilaterally (i.e. government-to-CSO[/NSA])'[334]. To be sure, aside from the Bureaucratic Politics Model, the conceptual toolkit of network theory will certainly prove to be most helpful in this regard. Witte et al., for example, point to the development of 'innovative implementation mechanisms' in global public policy networks[335]. Ultimately, however, one has to realise the advantages and disadvantages of in-depth, small-n studies and their limited external validity[336]. Focusing on one, bilateral model of state-NSA interaction has proven to be more revelatory in putting forth innovative arguments and thereby adding value to the literature than a wide study, outlining all possible constellations. The implications, derived from both the theoretical and empirical chapters, do, however, indicate the need for and perhaps even constitute the foundation for further scientific explorations with a comparable *and compatible* research agenda. This will have to include accounting for multilateral models of interactions, including causal mechanisms based on 'rivalry' between the concerned actors. Put differently, whilst it is certainly imperative to move from a bilateral model of state-NSA interaction towards a multilateral one 'these research boundaries do not have an absolute value – that is, they are determined by practicality and feasibility. A thoroughgoing

[334] Marchetti, Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 4.
[335] Witte et al., "Beyond Multilateralism: Global Public Policy Networks", p. 183.
[336] Mahoney et al., "The Logic Of Historical Explanation In The Social Sciences."

research into hybrid partnerships in global governance should ideally include [such types of constellations], but this was not possible here'[337].

Finally, there is 'indifference', which could constitute yet another alternative mechanism to illustrate an NSA-state interaction. Indifference might be interpreted as states or NSAs not being interested in interacting in a particular foreign policy initiative. However, the selection of cases for this thesis has been carefully contemplated as to whether there is a genuine interest on behalf of states or NSAs in becoming involved in joint foreign policy decision-making processes. Put differently, the goal was not to demonstrate which actors might have been indifferent but rather who got involved, in what capacity and through what kind of causal mechanism.

2.7 Case Selection Strategy for Theory-Testing Process-Tracing as employed by this Thesis

Having clarified the causal mechanisms, the conceptual framework and the key theoretical concepts, we must now proceed to outlining a case selection strategy, which is in methodological alignment with the underlying assumption of the theory-testing process tracing employed by this thesis. As Beach et al. point out 'the need for the analyst to be explicit about the case selection strategy, detailing the reasoning behind the selection of specific cases. Given that the perfect case for a particular research purpose usually does not exist'[338]. (beach et al book). As a first step, 'selecting appropriate cases requires some form of prior cross-case knowledge of the population of the given theoretical relationship (…) therefore, before we select cases we have to produce a mapping of the population in terms of what cases are members of the set of X, Y, and the theorised contextual conditions that enable the relationship to occur and that plausibly result in the same mechanism linking Y and Y within the population'[339]. As already mentioned above, the contextual conditions that have to be present are the existence of a vacuum between two states (e.g. due to a diplomatic crisis, the controversial nature of the policy matter at hand,

[337] Marchetti, Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 5;
[338] Beach et al., *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations And Guidelines*, p. 145.
[339] Beach et al., "Case Selection Techniques In Process-Tracing And The Implications Of Taking The Study Of Causal Mechanisms Seriously."

a state of war). These conditions would thus, in our expectation, open up space for NSAs to become involved. To be sure, as outlined in the conceptual framework, in what shape or form and capacity they do become involved, depends on the conditions they themselves find themselves in vis-a-vis the states they are dealing with, that is, whether they can operate in a condition of dependence or autonomy in relation to those states. A prior 'mapping' thus requires us to survey recent cases where the relations between states have soured. A survey of current or prior state of hostilities or even war or cases where the relations between two states have historically been problematic thus has to be conducted. In this regard, the 21st century offers a trove of potential case studies. This thesis, however, chooses to focus on three major theatres of conflict in the developing world, namely, the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and the problematic border disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan whose sour relations have, due to the 2001 NATO-led war, only become worse. Given the assumption that NSAs have become increasingly part of the way that states conduct foreign policy, we can fully expect that such entities played important roles in the events prior to or following these major conflicts. Thus, as Beach et al. underline, 'when our research goal is to make strong within-case inferences about whether X is linked with Y, and/or shedding light on how X is linked with Y, we trace mechanisms only in cases where they can in theory be present'. Based on this, they argue, 'typical cases are the only type of case where it makes sense to test whether a hypothesized causal mechanism was present or build a theory about the mechanism linking X and Y'[340]. The category of typical cases, they outline, 'can be used to either test or build theories of causal mechanisms linking X and Y (…) when we are testing whether there is mechanistic evidence suggesting that a mechanism actually exists between X and Y, we deduce a theory from the existing literature and then test whether there is evidence that a hypothesized causal mechanism is actually present in a given typical case'[341]. Having found inspiration in Moravcsik's theorised mechanism on the role played by supranational entities in EU politics and having infused the same with concepts from other relevant literatures, this thesis has to select typical cases,

[340] Beach et al., "Selecting Appropriate Cases When Tracing Causal Mechanisms."
[341] Beach et al., "What Is Process Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants Of Process Tracing Methods And Their Uses And Limitations".

which enable us to test whether there is the evidence for the outlined causal mechanisms.

Yet, one might wonder whether to choose most or least likely typical cases[342]. However, Beach et al., whose writings on process-tracing and case selection strategies forms the basis for this thesis, warn that 'the most serious problem with most/least-likely logic is that it conflates theoretical (ontological) and empirical (epistemological) likelihood. The use of the term likelihood in relation to causation requires a probabilistic ontological understanding of causation'. Causation, according to Gerring, might in this context be understood as 'a cause raises the probability of an event occurring'. Against this background, Beach et al. point out that 'causal relationships are more likely in more conducive circumstances (more contextual conditions present) and less likely in less conducive (contextual conditions mostly absent). However, this type of ontological probabilism is not compatible with case-based designs. In case-based research, we want to produce explanations that can account for what happened in particular cases instead of just producing theoretical odds for whether something might occur'[343]. They therefore 'recommend the use of the term typical case without any qualifications about likelihood, referring to cases where the theorized causal relationship is possible because both X, Y, and the requisite contextual conditions for it to occur are present'[344]. Having established that typical cases are the preferred choice for a thesis which employs causal mechanisms centred on theory-testing process-tracing, we may now turn to the case selection.

Borg et al. define research based on case study analysis as 'the in-depth study of instances of a phenomenon in its natural context and from the perspective of the participants involved in the phenomenon[345]'. The examined case studies for this thesis shall be based on the perspectives of the NSAs, their respective home governments, other concerned nations as well as the relevant governmental authorities in the countries they are operating in, that is, Pakistan, Georgia, and Iraq. Such a case study approach will enable one to investigate and understand NSAs' activities as a social, interactive process in its specific political and organisational

[342] Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science".
[343] Beach et al., "Selecting Appropriate Cases When Tracing Causal Mechanisms", p. 21.
[344] Beach et al., "Selecting Appropriate Cases When Tracing Causal Mechanisms", p. 22.
[345] Borg et al., *Educational Research.*

environment. Hence, one will be able to develop an understanding of NSA behaviour within the wider context of other actors operating in- and outside the organisational structure of the NSA itself. Various in-depth cases of NSA behaviour in these countries have been chosen as examples to explain why and under what conditions NSAs become engaged in foreign policy-making and influence state behaviour. As already mentioned, the theoretical and conceptual frameworks outlined above shall be applied to case studies from three countries, namely, Georgia, Iraq, and Pakistan.

Naturally, a detailed discussion and evaluation of individual cases might justifiably be seen as premature at this stage. Yet, it is important to briefly shed some light on the nexus of non-state activities within these particular nations from which this DPhil seeks to subsequently draw the relevant analytical data. Moreover, one might also highlight the respective commonalities of the three realms, which have inspired the author to select the aforementioned countries.

Chief among them is the already mentioned contextual condition that all of the concerned states find themselves in a diplomatic crisis of one sort or another with each other. Russia and Georgia had just fought a war, so had the US and Iraq, and Afghanistan and Pakistan have also traditionally seen each other as hostile. In that sense, they all represent

Furthermore, all three countries are regarded as illiberal or even (semi-) authoritarian[346]. Georgia, after decades of Soviet rule, has only recently been trying to transform itself into a country based on the Western model, despite a largely conservative society. Even President Saakashvili, himself born into a family of KGB officers[347] and once the liberal hero of the Rose Revolution for a pro-Western Georgia, seemed to have reverted back to the old ways of ruling through authoritarian means[348]. MacFarlane further reinforces this impression when he observes that ‘ironically, despite Saakashvili’s democratic credentials, as time passed his approach to rebuilding the state increasingly came to resemble that of his authoritarian Russian counterpart (…) Over time, media freedom was substantially curbed and civil society organisations met with increasing restriction

[346] Cato Institute, "Human Freedom Index."
[347] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze
[348] Dolidze, "Georgia's Path To Authoritarianism."; Fuller, "Georgian Leader’s Popularity Has Dramatically Fallen."

on their activities. State interference in electoral processes was increasingly obvious. The human rights situation deteriorated, and there was a rise in the number of politically motivated assaults and killings. In November 2007, mass opposition demonstrations were forcibly suppressed by the police, with significant numbers of injuries'. What is more, 'the government systematically used state resources against its opponents and non- compliant broadcast and print media'[349].

Furthermore, Pakistan, for decades a close US ally, and, since the events of September 11, 2011, a key member of the Western alliance in its War on Terror, has been severely criticised for her alleged anti-Western 'double game' in Afghanistan and undermining of American state- and peacebuilding efforts[350]. What is more, having been ruled, either overtly or covertly, by the military and security establishment since its founding, democratic governance has been the exception rather than the rule. Even during times of nominal civilian rule, the military is said to still reserve ultimate decision-making power[351]. Indeed, it appears that all three countries are characterised by similarly strong security apparatuses, which have evaded civilian control and are being regarded as a 'state within a state'[352]. Their governance structures in general do also not follow the Weberian legal-rational system with its meritocracy and rule of law. Rather, one can arguably observe that governance structures in Georgia, Iraq, and Pakistan are characterised by a certain patrimonialism in which not qualification but close ties to the governing elite grants wealth and status[353].

Naturally, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, once most aptly described as 'a concentration camp above ground and a mass grave below'[354], does not perform any better according to these parameters.

What is more, in contrast to most of Western Europe the three countries are very religious indeed, with Georgia and Iraq experiencing a resurgence after decades of communist and secular Baathist rule respectively although the latter has experienced a severe split between the Shiite and Sunni branches of Islam, which

[349] MacFarlane, *Two Years Of The Dream*.
[350] Chalmers, "Analysis: Pakistan's Double-Game."
[351] International Crisis Group, "Pakistan."
[352] Reiner, "Pakistan's ISI."; Staff et al., *Iran, Iraq And The Arab Gulf States*, pp. 83-94; Interview Mamuka Giorgadze;
[353] Banuazizi et al., The State, Religion, And Ethnic Politics, p. 261; Kupatadze, "Accounting For Diverging Paths In Most Similar Cases.";
[354] Foreign Policy, "The War Over The Iraq War."; see also: Makiya, *Republic Of Fear*.

seems to have only widened after the 2003 invasion[355]. Pakistan, of course, has traditionally being considered the 'Muslim Zion' with Islam playing a very strong role in the country's politics and society, not just since the days of Zia ul-Haq[356]. Another aspect of this is that all countries concerned possess religious and arguably politically disenfranchised minorities[357].

Additionally, all concerned countries do not just have separatist regions, that is, the Kurds in Iraq, Baluchistan in Pakistan, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia[358], but also find themselves in 'troubled neighbourhoods', with contested borders and armed conflicts making their impact felt. This, of course, might be intimately related to the fact that all chosen realms enjoy geopolitically strategic locations on the chessboard of great power rivalry. Georgia, the Caucasian bridge between East and West, matters to the US and EU 'because of its importance as a transit route for energy goods from the Caspian Sea region' whilst being regarded as 'destructive' by Russia for her South Caucasus Policy and her goal to monopolise regional hydrocarbon routes and prevent a further deepening of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration[359]. Iraq, a key state in the Middle East, itself once described by the US State Department as 'the most stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history'[360], is of similar geopolitical importance – particularly if one takes into consideration that it might very well be the largest oil-rich country in the world[361]. Finally, Pakistan's strategic location, which has historically been associated with its close proximity to the Middle Eastern Oil fields, its border with China, India, Iran and Afghanistan, has been prominent on the minds of geo-strategists at least since the West 'used' her in its fight against the USSR in Afghanistan. The events of 9/11 have further reinforced Pakistan's prominence on the grand chessboard for the US and her allies and China's recent decision to invest up to 70bn USD, with CPEC being a key component in its One Belt One Road Strategy, does indeed constitute another

[355] Lipka, "Iraq's Unique Place In The Sunni-Shia Divide."
[356] Devji, *Muslim Zion*; Köllner, "Patriotism, Orthodox Religion And Education."; Smock, "The Role Of Religion In Iraqi Politics."
[357] Fuchs et al., "Religious Minorities In Pakistan."; De Los Fayos, *Minorities In The South Caucasus*; Lalani, *Still Targeted*.
[358] Harpviken, *Troubled Regions And Failing States*; Akbar, "In Balochistan, Dying Hopes For Peace"; Visser, "The Territorial Aspect Of Sectarianism In Iraq."
[359] Lynch, *Why Georgia Matters*.
[360] Kolko, *The Politics Of War*.
[361] Slav, "Iraq's Oil Reserves May Be Much Higher Than Thought."

testimony to this. To be sure, playing vital roles in the grand game of geopolitics does have consequences. It does thus only appear natural that the great powers seek to dominate, control, or manipulate the politics of these respective countries in their favour by all means available to them – be that through outright military interventions, diplomatic manoeuvres, economic incentives and associations or the clandestine operations of their powerful intelligence services. Arguably, all countries concerned have had the experience of being absorbed in vastly more powerful imperial structures superimposed on them.

Certainly, to some extent correlated with these aspects are anti-American[362] and, in Georgia's case, anti-Russian[363], sentiments, and the political instability that characterises all the countries chosen for this thesis. It might also be highlighted that distrust of civilian governments, on the whole, appears to be very high[364], whilst certain institutions, such as the Church in Georgia[365] and the armed forces in Pakistan and Iraq[366] enjoy very high levels of public support and confidence.
The overall picture reveals itself then as a unique meshing of a multitude of different conditions and factors, which stand in sharp contrast to the order of things in the West and which make the judicious analysis of NSA activities all the more fascinating. Having thus briefly made the comparison between the three countries from which this DPhil seeks to draw its empirical data from, we might now sketch out the potential case studies that are assessed in the thesis.

Some of the chosen case studies are deliberately drawn from the post 9/11 period, which might entail several advantages for our analytical objectives. Firstly, the War on Terror has accelerated and intensified the process of privatisation and outsourcing of tasks – in the realm of security and beyond – to non-state entities that had previously been under the monopoly of the state. Moreover, one has also been able to witness the emergence of an interdependent nexus of development,

[362] Lynch, "The Persistence Of Arab Anti-Americanism."; Burson-Marsteller, *Inside The Hearts And Minds Of Arab Youth*.; Afzal, "On Pakistani Anti-Americanism."
[363] Lapidus, "Between Assertiveness And Insecurity."
[364] Kennedy, "Iraqis' State Of Mind 16 Years After US Invasion."; Yosuf et al., "Examining Citizen's Confidence In Institutions Of Pakistan"; Kakhishvili et al., "Democratization And Europeanization In Georgia"
[365] NDI Georgia, *Public Attitudes In Georgia.*
[366] Ray, "Pakistanis Still Rate Military Tops Among National Institutions."

democratisation, and security, which would become the central focus of most Western security- and foreign policies and doctrines. Within this nexus, NSAs – be that private security contractors, NGOs or political institutes engaged in democracy promotion – have started playing an ever growing and increasingly more important role. Nowhere except perhaps in neighbouring Afghanistan or Iraq would this nexus and the role of NSAs therein become more apparent than in Pakistan, which, after 2006 and the resurgence of the Pakistani Taliban in the north of the country, became a magnet and habitat for both violent and non-violent NSAs as a frontline state in the West's War on Terror.

Initially, the thesis shall turn to examining a case study concerning a non-Western NSA, namely, the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PAJCCI), which operates as an Entrepreneurial Facilitator, according to the Conceptual Framework. Seeking to play a low-key role in actively trying to improve the sour bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the organisation does require access to government elites in multiple countries in- and outside the region. Aware that it operates in an area of foreign policy that is of utmost importance to matters of national security for the Pakistani security establishment, the chamber very purposefully and pre-emptively subjugates itself under its watchful eyes. The resulting type of accountability, or lack thereof for that matter, the chamber enjoys must be understood in the sense that it is not accountable to the same constituency (be that foreign government or the electorate) as the concerned state actors. It can risk losing face should its efforts fail and thus offers 'plausible deniability' to the relevant state actors involved, should the overall strategy to improve relations fail. Partly out of its own commercial interest, partly used as a platform for the Pakistani *derin devlet*, the chamber is ultimately able to seize a vacuum that had opened up and was indeed widening between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed, she did not merely stop her activities after an official bilateral dialogue had been re-established but managed to keep herself locked into the future decision-making process by becoming an integral part of the newly established framework between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The next case study focuses its analytical attention on the unique role played by the GOC during and after the 2008 war with Russia. Envisioned by an NSA operating under the condition of autonomy, a policy is being initiated, its operation aided by the lack of accountability in the country it operates in. However, in contrast

to a facilitator, this policy is not 'offered' to the home government. Rather, due to its access to resources in both Russia and Georgia, the GOC 's operations after the August 2008 war appear to resemble more a case of 'hijacking' as she is able to take control over the process from the nominal principal, the GoG, and pursue a parallel strategy, running counter to the principal's agenda. In line with this, the GOC does not require access to government elites in Georgia to pursue its objectives. Rather, she is able to tap into a pre-existing channel of communication with the Russian church and state and use the same in the pursuance of her agenda. Her superior ability to operate under less or no accountability gives the GOC an edge over the Georgian state to engage in negotiations with Russia. In fact, such state actors were regarded as *personae non grata* by the Kremlin. This lack of governmental control or supervision the GOC enjoys in the pursuance of her self-defined historical mission is to be found in the legal framework she operates in and also stems from the enormous popularity and support she possesses among the Georgian population. Indeed, precisely because NSAs are able to operate with less accountability, the GOC is able to effectively circumvent traditional or rather conventional foreign policy channels and pursue policies, which neither the NSA nor the state would otherwise be able to carry out. What is more, the GOC steps into or rather *seizes* a vacuum that opened because the relations between Georgia and Russia had been completely broken off. She is able to seize the opportunity and occupy political space that had been left vacant for her own, self-defined project and agenda. Thus, she 'uploads' her objectives to the level of official Georgian foreign policy, in effect becoming *the* premier arbiter of Georgian foreign policy.

The final case study examined in this thesis, analyses the relationship between an exiled Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), and the USG and the CIA. Envisioned by State A (US), a foreign policy towards State B (Iraq), namely removal and replacement of the latter's government, is being designed. Subsequently, the US identifies certain areas of the policy, which it is unwilling or unable to pursue (any longer) herself in an official capacity, resulting in 'outsourcing' this to an NSA, namely the INA – this occurs during the 1990s when the USG does not want to be officially associated with the bombing campaigns and coup attempts carried out by the INA as well as after the end of the official occupation of Iraq in 2004 when the INA's head, Iyad Allawi, is asked to represent a supposedly sovereign Iraq as PM, albeit be it under subtle American

custodianship. At the same time, these two distinct periods of US-INA relations also represent evolving and indeed changing operational roles the organisation would assume. Initially, the INA would, supported by the CIA, pursue a strategy of undermining another country, namely Iraq, by targeting its government and thus its sovereignty. When the Bush Jr. administration subsequently comes into office and supporting coups through the INA gives way to outright invasion, the organisation transforms itself into a 'facilitator', seeking to aid and advance the seriously pursued removal and replacement strategy of the USG as a whole but particularly the aligned agenda of one particular state actor, the CIA. This can be observed throughout the pre-war conferences when both CIA and INA actively and indeed successfully seek to undermine the proclamation of a provisional government. The peak of facilitating American objectives in Iraq is, of course, reached when Allawi is selected PM and is aiding the US-led creation of the new political structure of Iraq – including the establishment of its intelligence service.

Having said this, it might also be important to note that this dissertation does not write about the role of the media despite its importance in contemporary foreign policy. After all, governments often receive their information from CNN rather than from their intelligence agencies. Nonetheless, whilst there is considerable work on the influence of the media on international relations, this paper does consider it as belonging to a different category altogether. Moreover, the fact that some of these actors will be distinct from each other in purpose or mission as well as organisational and incentive structure, might, of course, invite the criticism that such a variety or rather mixture risks to distort coherence. In this paper, however, a multiple case study was deliberately developed in order to provide a detailed description of NSA engagement in foreign policy. Yin underscores that multiple case studies enhance the analytical outcome by replicating the patterns thereby increasing the validation of the findings[367]. Ultimately, in this thesis, each case study will serve to confirm or falsify the conclusions and hypotheses derived from the others. As will be seen, the examination of each case and the consequent findings will paint a more complicated picture as presented in the aforementioned

[367] Yin, Case Study Research.

hypotheses. Some expectations will certainly be confirmed, whilst perhaps only to a qualified extent, whilst others will not be.

On the whole, however, the case studies selected for this thesis and outlined above all represent typical cases on NSAs becoming involved when the contextual conditions between the concerned states allow for that engagement, that is, when the relevant governments are unable or unwilling to pursue a certain foreign policy initiative themselves (e.g. due to a diplomatic crisis, the controversial nature of the policy matter). In such scenarios of varying degree of conflict, these typical cases can be used to test causal mechanisms linking states and NSAs 'and then test whether there is evidence that a hypothesized causal mechanism is actually present in a given typical case'[368]. Yet, there is an argument to be made about the Georgia case in fact representing a deviant case, defined as 'those cases that, on the surface, appear to be exception to the rule that is emerging from the analysis'[369]. In other words, 'the deviant-case method selects that case(s) which, by reference to some general understanding of a topic (either a specific theory or common sense), demonstrates a surprising value. It is thus the contrary of the typical case'[370]. It thus allows for the development of a richer, more in-depth understanding of a phenomenon and to lend credibility to one's research account'[371]. Indeed, given the widespread assumption, perhaps originating out of a dominant realist paradigm in IR, that states have to necessarily be the originators of foreign policy and NSAs are condemned to play a subordinate role, a case where an NSAs is willing and able to be on-par with a government, such as in Georgia, might indeed represent a deviant case – an exception to the rule of how we perceive foreign policy conduct. By including and analysing a case in which an NSA, such as the GOC, can hijack the foreign policy of its own government and pursue its own agenda vis-à-vis an officially hostile foreign power, it might be possible to identify 'causal processes (…) within the deviant case [which] will illustrate some causal factor that is applicable to other (more or less deviant) cases. This means that a deviant-case study usually culminates in a general proposition, one that may be applied to other

[368] Beach et al., "What Is Process Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants Of Process Tracing Methods And Their Uses And Limitations".
[369] Cohen et al., "Qualitative Research Guidelines Project."
[370] Seawright et al., "Case Selection Techniques In Case Study Research"; Gerring, "Case Selection For Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative And Quantitative Techniques", p. 665
[371] Cohen et al., "Qualitative Research Guidelines Project."

cases in the population. Once this general proposition has been introduced into the overall model, the expectation is that the chosen case will no longer be an outlier. Indeed, the hope is that it will now be *typical* (…) This feature of the deviant-case study should help to resolve questions about its representativeness (…) it may still be plausible to assert (based on general knowledge of the phenomenon) that the chosen case is representative of a broader population'[372]. The strategy of including a case in which an NSA can operate with significant autonomy from state actors was already included in the author's MPhil thesis. In conjunction with the GOC case in this thesis, it should ultimately become clear that NSAs do not have to be reduced to being subordinate to states. It also demonstrates that one does not necessarily have to make a choice of talking *either* to the TAN literature *or* the PAT literature – the latter generally assuming that states delegate foreign policy initiatives to NSAs but remain firmly in charge as principals and the former literature granting more autonomy to non-state movements and actors. Both models, NSAs as subjects *and* objects of foreign policy, are possible in the 21st century – even though states have to be an integral part of any initiative that deserves the name 'foreign policy'. Both models can co-exist just like the private East India Company and the state could co-exist in the British Empire. Including a deviant case, such as the activities of the GOC in Georgia and Russia, thus has the goal of demonstrating that in reality it represents a typical case of foreign policy today.

Having said this, we must address another important issue: given that this thesis seeks to analyse a variety of different and sometimes at first sight rather distinct non-state actors in this thesis, this short summary of the methodological and analytical approach requires further, more detailed elaboration so as to avoid giving the impression that the dissertation is 'comparing apples and oranges' and shed light on the philosophy it is based upon. Indeed, it should be made clear that the paper seeks to examine categories of different actors, which are nonetheless grouped in a plausible way. This is conducted in conjunction with an assessment of not just whether these NSAs can have a causally significant impact but also whether, and if so, why and under what conditions different actors might perform better than other

[372] Gerring, "Case Selection For Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative And Quantitative Techniques".

in different or the very same countries albeit in different circumstances and contexts.

In this context, it is interesting to point out that the scholarly works based on or speaking to network theory do not seem to be too concerned about the different natures, shapes or forms that of NSAs active in global affairs assume. Slaughter, for example, critically underscores that 'in universities and at the State Department, the web world's participants are called "non-state actors", which as Clay Shirky has pointed out is like calling a car a "horseless carriage". Looking backward, we know what they are not. But looking forward, we have no affirmative vocabulary for what they are. In the web world, they are foreign policy actors, full stop. They have the same identities they do in the domestic realm, as individuals, businesses, charities, civic organizations, criminal syndicates, universities, and all the other actors we recognize in our national space. In the web world, they are all, like government officials and agencies, equally capable of creating networks and operating as nodes within those networks'. Rather than organising our analysis according to certain standards of comparability then, 'it is more relevant to understand how different actors — whether states or individuals — are connected to other actors, how different patterns of connections form different types of networks, and how the position of specific actors within a network, together with the quantity and quality of their ties to other actors, determines power, influence, and the fragility of nodes within a network and of the network as a whole'[373]. Indeed, as Avant et al. point out, a networked perspective is most helpful in this context 'since it is agnostic with respect to what entities constitute the nodes in a network, network analysis allows for a multiplicity of actor configurations ranging from states to IGOs, companies, NGOs, and even individuals to be seen as power wielders (…) Multinational corporations have greater access to money, states to military force, NGOs to principles, but each of these can be important for generating changes in others' behavior'[374]. In a similar fashion, scholars of regulatory theory underline that the active nodes 'may comprise individuals, groups (or parts of groups), organisations (or parts of organisations) or states (or parts thereof); they may be large or small, tightly or loosely connected and inclusive or exclusive; they may engage in similar activities or they may be specialised. Nodes can function separately or jointly as

[373] Slaughter, *The Chessboard and the Web*.
[374] Avant et al., "Introduction", p. 9-10.

sponsors of governmental actions and/or as providers who supply governmental services such as security'[375]. Marchetti also underscores that, for example, the term civil society organisation 'is widely used and commonly refers to different types of organization including community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social movements, labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, media operators, academia, diaspora groups, lobby and consultancy groups, think tanks and research centres, experts, professional associations, and foundations (…) the current institutional frame is composed of different factors, including state entities, international organisations, and transnational players of different kinds (…) every governance covers an ample spectrum of actors'[376]. Indeed, such a 'hybrid interaction among actors of different kinds has played a constant role in international policy-making (…) these actors may be external, such as lobbyists, but may also be consultants, experts, partners, protestors, even rebels'[377]. Scholars in the field of informality also join this chorus, highlighting that it might not be feasible to pursue 'the application of a single conceptual frame to the different contributions. An attempt to impose a single frame to the diversity of contributions would not only be impractical, but crucially it would have run counter to our aim of demonstrating in this volume the variety and the range of research that has been undertaken in the area of informal governance'[378] – a sentiment this thesis harbours sympathy for as it seeks to highlight the variety and range of how NSAs and states can informally interact. What is more, there is great potential, also in diversifying a Western-centric research agenda, in accepting 'the challenge of moving from single-country, single-system, or single-sector studies to an overarching agenda that would facilitate comparison across different policy domains or that encompasses different political cultures, still remains'[379]. Overall then, these authors seem to suggest that one should place less priority on the differences between the actors involved and instead devote one's analytical attention to understanding and outlining their *modus operandi* and the environment they find themselves in.

[375] Holley et al., "A Nodal Perspective Of Governance", p. 168.
[376] Marchetti, Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 1-2, 6;
[377] Marchetti, Marchetti, "International Policy Partnerships With Civil Society: Risks And Opportunities", p. 4.
[378] Christiansen, "Introduction."
[379] Christiansen, "Introduction."

What is more, as outlined above, this thesis is employing a case study approach to the study of NSA activity in foreign policy. There has been severe criticism of case study research within the scholarly community, viewing it as mere anecdotal knowledge and story-telling[380]. Lijphart, for example, in his hierarchy of methods puts it at the very bottom, with controlled experiments at the very top, followed by randomised experiments, statistics and comparative methods[381]. This articulated scepticism pertaining to case study-based analytical investigation is premised on a particular understanding of the central purpose of science and scientific investigation in general, namely, to establish generalisations. As Lijphart comments (691), '*the scientific status of the case method is somewhat ambiguous because science is a generalizing activity. A single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalization*[382]. If at all, then, case studies are to be seen as *a research strategy based on the in-depth investigation of one, or a small number, of phenomena in order to: (i) explore the configuration of each case, and (ii) elucidate features of a larger class of (similar) phenomena, (iii) by developing and evaluating theoretical explanations*[383].

This, once again, emphasises the imperative to generalise the findings so that the conclusions might be deemed scientifically enriching. And yet, there has been resistance against the idea of treating case studies as merely representing the last resort of serious scholarly enquiry, highlighting that it follows a different logic and purpose compared to other scientific methods[384]. This focus tends to deliberately downplay the emphasis on the necessity to establish generalisation as the central purpose of scientific activity, bringing the importance of *description* in and of itself to the forefront of the debate. Introducing the idea of what one might refer to as 'thick description', case study research, it is argued, ought to offer the reader a rich and detailed account of the complexity under investigation, aiming to not assess phenomena with reference to an established general law but providing a thorough description and comprehension of a particular case.

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[380] Campbell, "Degrees of freedom and the case study." Eysenck, *Case Studies in Behaviour Therapy*.
[381] Lijphart, "Comparative politics and the comparative method".
[382] Lijphart, p. 691.
[383] Della Porta et al., *Approaches And Methodologies In The Social Sciences*, p. 226.
[384] Collier et al., *Rethinking Social Inquiry*

Departing from the duty to view science as a generalising epistemic practice, this paper shall thus define a case study as *'the thick analysis of social phenomena as they occurred in circumscribed contexts. It is thus a situated analysis, rich in detail and directed to represent faithfully the complexity of the object of interest. As such, it constitutes a reservoir of local knowledge that becomes evidentially useful when understanding and intervening in the social world in order to fix it, change it, and improve it. One way in which case studies can perform this evidential role is by formulating causal hypotheses in a rigorous and conscientious way'*[385]. The knowledge thereby produced does not originate from the identification of identified empirical rules with a strong external validity but rather from the distillation and analysis of causal processes and mechanisms[386]. Thus, it is in this analytical space that the thesis seeks to situate itself in – not seeking to present the reader with a typology of all-too similar NSAs (e.g. only religious actors, or only businessmen/former politicians in the concerned countries) in the pursuance of thereby achieving the much-desired generalisation. As generalisability is sought after in the interest of establishing a strong external validity, one might heretically point out that it might not be '*a problem of representativeness but rather one of inference (...) The challenge of external validity actually consists in identifying the circumstances under which the results of a study can be generalized to other cases. We need to refine the criterion further to distinguish what qualifies as a comparable case study and what does not. Furthermore, one needs to specify what makes a case study comparable and what detracts from it (...) The study then needs to inform us about the aspects that matter to the causal relation in the studied case such that we can proceed to the comparison with the target and eventually to the inference (...) knowledge of the relevant causal factors is what enables the inference'*[387].

Hence, by harnessing its analytical energies towards the identification and confirmation of the conditions for NSA involvement – in conjunction with the hypotheses and causal mechanisms established for this dissertation in the case studies – the similarity of the examined actors shall not be treated as a priority. As

[385] Ruzzene, "Using Case Studies In The Social Sciences.", p. 16.
[386] Coleman, "Social Theory, social research, and a theory of action"; Creager et al., *Science Without Laws;* Flyvbjerg, "Five misunderstanding about case study research"; Forrester, "If *p*, then what?"; Geertz, "Thick description"; Morgan, *Counterfactuals and Causal Inference*; Stinchcombe, "The conditions of fruitfulness of theorizing about mechanisms in the social sciences"; Vennesson,"Case studies and process tracing".
[387] Geertz, "Thick description"; Morgan, *Counterfactuals and Causal Inference.*

already mentioned, though these different actors will be grouped in a plausible way, the dissertation shall seek to highlight of not just whether these NSAs can have a causally significant impact but also whether, and if so, why and under what conditions different actors might perform better than other in different or the very same countries albeit in different circumstances and contexts: '*When the design, conduct, analysis, and reporting of a multi-site case study are sound, the findings may be more compelling than those from a sound study where the sample is one cohort or a single phenomenon. A multi-site case study is a potentially useful means of capturing the complexity of a phenomenon while revealing rich understandings about the context in which it is based'*[388].

Of course, the instruments employed for the analysis of such findings or evidence in case study-based research are, as pointed out earlier, process tracing and comparison. Used in conjunction, together with a thorough causal mechanism and a distillation of the conditions under which the same is triggered, this array or spectrum of methods refines, enriches and complements the respective causal relationship that the researcher is seeking to highlight. What is more, it will also allow this particular dissertation to depart from the perhaps narrow desire to only compare all-too similar types of actors, such as *only* religious actors, but rather broaden the spectrum onto different actors, focusing its analytical attention more towards the circumstances under which and the reasons for why they can have an impact in different or the same countries contexts. Once again, it should be underlined that although there will be categories of different actors, they shall nonetheless be grouped in a plausible way to allow for the necessary inferences.

Finally, it might also be worth pointing out that this 'reservoir of knowledge', which lies at the basis of the definition of a case study employed by this dissertation, also speaks to one of the main strengths of the thesis, namely, to provide a unique and rich set of empirical data gathered around a set of plausible hypotheses, which might be treated as 'usable knowledge'. George and Bennett have criticised the grand theories of IR as being based upon generalisations broad in scope and probabilistic in form, making it thus difficult for policy makers to implement them. In order to be applied practically, they argue, the discipline ought

[388] Mills, "Multi-Site Case Study."

to create ‘usable knowledge’, based on hypotheses that may be narrower in their scope but clearly define the circumstances under which these admittedly narrow generalisations remain valid. Treating case study-based academic inquiry as an appropriate and sufficiently strong enough tool to create such knowledge and ultimately bridge the gap between scholarly work and the imperative of policy makers to evaluate the adequacy of the conditions their strategies might rest upon[389]. This orientation towards a high degree of potential practical relevance as opposed to the pursuance of approving or advancing grand theories might thus, humbly, also be identified as one of the *leitmotifs* of this thesis. Given the geographical focus of the thesis on the so-called Third World and the existing conditions that governments and non-state organisations might be confronted with and can learn from, this could be a particularly relevant aspect to take into consideration in this context.

[389] George, “Bridging the gap between theory and practice”; George, “Knowledge for statecraft”; George, “The two cultures of academia and policy making”.

Chapter 3: Empirical Chapters

3.1 The Georgian Orthodox Church, Russia and Post-Conflict Trust-building

Background

On the night of 7 to 8 August 2008, a sustained Georgian artillery attack rained down on the town of Tskhinvali, a city in the separatist region of South Ossetia, provoking Russian military intervention and a breaking of the ice of yet another frozen conflict. Indeed, these shells were ultimately regarded as the opening salvo in 'Europe's first war of the 21st century'[390]. As the fog of war receded and a ceasefire agreement was signed on August 12th, the relationship between the two main warring parties were on a knifes edge. This was perhaps most vividly summarised by then Russian PM Vladimir Putin who, in the presence of Nicolas Sarkozy, threatened to hang the Georgian President Saakashvili by his private parts[391]. The Georgian leadership responded in kind and so a war of both words and deeds ensued – causing perhaps irreparable damage to the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Thus, with the earthly powers at odds, it fell to the authorities of the spiritual realm, namely, the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC), to remind both sides of the biblical imperative of 'peace on earth, goodwill toward men'[392]. As all conventional state-to-state relations had broken down, it became the responsibility of the church to maintain, broaden and indeed put to use a centuries-old line of communication, a religious version of the famous 'red telephone', so as to have at least one working, high-level channel with the Russian Federation and pour oil on troubled waters.

Embedding the chapter in the wider scholarly debate

Yet, before analysing how, why and under which conditions the GOC was able to insert herself in this very foreign policy decision-making process, it is necessary to briefly outline which existing scholarly works this chapter speaks to and builds upon. Putting things into perspective in this regard, MacFarlane observes that 'the

[390] Emerson, "Post-Mortem On Europe's First War Of The 21St Century."
[391] The Telegraph, "Vladimir Putin Threatened To Hang Georgia Leader 'By The Balls'."
[392] Biblehub, "Luke 2:14."

bulk of the commentary on that conflict has focused on establishing what happened, who was responsible, and what the implications of the conflict for Georgia, Russia, the South Caucasus, the wider European system, NATO and the US might be'. Asserting that 'there has been little effort to relate the conflict to wider concepts and debates in political science and international relations', he urges scholars to address questions of whether 'theory [can] help us to understand the conflict and its implications?' and whether 'in turn, (…) thick analysis of the conflict [can] help us build towards broader generalisations on state-building, regional conflict and security?'[393]. It is this very calling, which the chapter regards as one of its driving *leitmotif*s. Indeed, besides embedding it in the distinct conceptual framework organically developed in and for this dissertation, there is a variety of 'wider concepts and debates' that this chapter draws on and ultimately seeks to contribute to theoretically, conceptually, substantially, and geographically.

Given the fact that the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 'provides a striking example of the relationship between state responses to weakness and failure, on the one hand, and regional insecurity, on the other'[394], a potentially natural ally, as already highlighted by MacFarlane, is the literature around 'post-conflict state-building'. State-building, according to Caplan, 'refers to efforts to reconstruct, or in some cases to establish for the first time, effective and autonomous structures of governance in a state or territory where no such capacity exists or where it has been seriously eroded'[395]. Of course, as this definition already implies, most literature on state-building is focused on the aftermath of civil wars and/or humanitarian interventions to end them, rather than inter-state wars, which have 'become a rare event'[396]. The August war, however, *does* constitute one of these 'rare events' and whilst the literature concentrates its analytical attention mainly on civil wars, there are important parts of 'post-conflict state-building' that inform and inspire the forthcoming assessment of the GOC's role. According to the OECD, for example, the factor of 'legitimacy', which an organisation engaged in state-building efforts might be endowed with, 'plays a complex additional role in shaping expectations

[393] MacFarlane, "State-Building And Regional Insecurity In The Post-Soviet Space."
[394] MacFarlane, "State-Building And Regional Insecurity In The Post-Soviet Space."
[395] Caplan, *International Governance Of War-Torn Territories*, p. 3.
[396] Szayna et al., What Are the Trends in Armed Conflicts, and What Do They Mean for U.S. Defense Policy?.

and facilitating political process[es] (…) [it] has various domestic forms and sources, which are not always mutually reinforcing: embedded or residual legitimacy, deriving from prior state-formation or other historical dynamics'. To be sure, the post-conflict state-building debate frames the question of legitimacy mostly in the context of external, that is, international, actors and how those entities are struggling to obtain legitimacy in the country they operate in[397]. Nonetheless, the importance of 'embedded legitimacy' is not to be underestimated and indeed serves as an inspiration when it comes to the assessment of the post-conflict activities pursued by the GOC. It will be demonstrated that it is the very residual legitimacy and reputation the church enjoys amongst the Georgian population that represents the main reason for why she is able to act in such an effective, sustainable and autonomous manner. What is more, it is also worth highlighting that the legitimacy debate in the state-building literature tend to, revolve around states or organisations which are largely dominated by states. The GOC, however, is a non-state entity with different instruments available to her. Generally speaking, it might be thought-provoking in and of itself that it was the GOC, which was able to carve out political space for herself during and immediately after the conflict, and not the state, which traditionally tends to dominate military and security matters during and after inter-state wars.

It has thus been briefly indicated how the present chapter can still benefit from the post-conflict state-building debate, despite its focus on an altogether different type of war. Closer to the focus of this chapter are the concepts entailed in a closely related debate, namely that on *peacebuilding*, which, according to Caplan, refers to the 'range of activities by governmental and non-governmental actors to preserve and strengthen the peace following a cessation of major hostilities with the aim of establishing a self-sustaining peace'[398]. Of course, as it is the case with state-building, the scholarly works concerned with peacebuilding tend to focus on 'the array of third-party interventions'[399] and '*international* efforts to support countries emerging from conflict' [emphasis added]. Hence, although considerable emphasis is placed on the imperative to have peacebuilding strategies 'tailored to the specific

[397] Caplan, "From Collapsing States To Neo-Trusteeship."
[398] Caplan, *Measuring Peace*.
[399] MacFarlane, "State-Building And Regional Insecurity In The Post-Soviet Space."

needs of the country concerned (…) [and] national ownership'[400], the overarching question, since the Cartigny WSP meeting in 1994, has remained: 'How can external actors, working collectively, best assist countries emerging from violent conflict and war?'[401]. Apart from this inherent 'third-party bias', the solutions produced by this paradigm have raised other, significant criticism. After all, as Caplan points out, 'there is a tendency among peacebuilding organizations, to varying degrees, to rely on pre-conceived models or templates that are often either maladapted or plainly ill-suited to local conditions'[402]. As will be observed over the course of the chapter, the very same tendency is acted upon in the Georgian context, with the international community focusing its political energies mainly on 'the usual medicine' of Geneva talks and Swiss Embassy interest sections. Meaningfully approaching the GOC, with her impressive 'embedded legitimacy' in Georgia, or incorporating her into a comprehensive post-conflict peacebuilding strategy seems not to have been on the agenda of the traditional peacebuilding organisations. This, naturally, raises questions about the alternatives to traditional official negotiations. What comes to mind here is, of course, the rather informal Track II diplomacy, 'a specific kind of informal diplomacy, in which non-officials engage in dialogue, with the aim of resolving conflict and building confidence[403]'. With Diamond and McDonald highlighting that religion must be regarded as a separate track in and of itself[404], the Track II debate serves as an important scholarly aid to divert analytical attention away from traditional, state-centred and formal modes of peace-building. However, it suffers from the same 'external actors bias' and, apart from the allegation that Track II rarely leads to tangible outcomes[405], is 'confined' to a particular institutional setting. For example, among the most prominent Track II processes in the Middle East are those organised by UCLA and the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)[406]. Reychler herself admits that although the 'findings contribute to a better understanding of successful and failed peacemaking efforts (…) most of the research is still

[400] United Nations, *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation*.
[401] IPI, *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited*.
[402] Caplan, *Measuring Peace*.
[403] Reychler, "Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding".
[404] Diamond et al., *Multi-Track Diplomacy*.
[405] Kraft, "The Autonomy Dilemma Of Track Two Diplomacy In Southeast Asia."; Rüland, "The Contribution of Track Two Dialogue Towards Crisis Prevention".
[406] Kaye, *Talking To The Enemy*, p. 36.

conceived from the perspective of strong and rich countries and has not been reviewed by colleagues from weak and poor states'[407]. Criticism of an apparent Western-centrism in Track II more generally is also observable in Augsburger's work: 'so called primitive societies often have conflict solutions that are more effective in bonding adversaries and blending goals than those groups who designate themselves as advanced, developed, or possessing far more data on human relations'[408]. Although Georgia can certainly not be referred to as a 'primitive society', the role that the GOC played in the aftermath of the war must be regarded as a unique and country-specific and thus non-Western conflict solution mechanism, which might enrich the existing body of knowledge contained in the peacebuilding literature.

Against this background, it has become clear that there is a significant and substantive body of scholarly literature that this chapter draws upon and is inspired by. However, these existing analytical platforms can, at the same time, not be regarded as an altogether suitable theoretical and conceptual habitat. Indeed, the brief assessments of the works on state- and peacebuilding as well as Track II diplomacy have revealed that there might be an opening for an avenue of inquiry, related to post-conflict peacebuilding and perhaps international relations in general, which ought to receive greater attention. In this regard, it was perhaps the seminal work *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, written by Douglas Johnston, a veteran of conflict resolution and peace studies himself, which initiated religion 'returning from exile'[409] in IR theory. The book 'launched a dialogue in Washington on the costs of overlooking religion's critical role in international affairs'[410] and alternative modes for post-conflict peacebuilding. Yet, despite 'the challenge of September 11 to secularism in international relations', yet another call to start a comprehensive incorporation of religion into the discipline, 'the interest in the subject of religion and IR is increasing very slowly'[411]. This notwithstanding, one can be somehow optimistic as the number of books on religion and international affairs has grown from about one book per annum in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s

[407] Reychler, "Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding".
[408] Augsburger, *Conflict Mediation across Cultures*.
[409] Petito et al., *Religion in International Relations.*
[410] Barton et al., *Mixed Blessings.*
[411] Kubalkova, "A 'Turn To Religion' In International Relations?."

to six books since 2002[412]. What is more, efforts to embed religion into existing IR theories and promising suggestions for further research have been made[413]. However, although Barton underscores that 'any international relations theory, which accounts for the impact of religion must in some way recognize the existence and influence of religious actors', most literature still tends to view religious NSAs through the established prism of classic mobilisation-, social movement-, and transnational activism theories – with religious fundamentalism 'arguably the most widely discussed transnational religious phenomenon'[414]. Interestingly for this chapter, Barton, citing the Vatican's activity in communist Poland, also points out that 'religious groups can challenge the state's power by providing an alternative to existing governments'[415]. In the words of Johnston, 'religion is an intractable force that can be unresponsive to all the instrumentalities of state power, let along the instrumentalities of foreign policy'[416].The call to analyse not just the involvement of religious NSAs in international affairs, the type and nature of their relationship with state actors (at home and abroad), and the impact this in turn has on its foreign policy role is indeed one that this chapter seeks to follow and provide ample empirical evidence for. In this context, one cannot help but to acknowledge that although 'the interplay between religion and politics/diplomacy can be subtle and complex', an analysis of the same can certainly contribute to an ever-closer dialogue between it and existing reservoirs of knowledge in the realm of peace- and state-building. With the goal of assessing how 'religion properly managed (…) may play an even more important positive role in diplomacy and conflict resolution', this chapter hopes to be a voice in this very exchange of concepts and ideas[417]. To be sure, a debate on these matters has already taken place. However, it appears that the necessary intellectual osmosis between the academy and the policy-making world has yet to follow up. In 2007, for example, Madeleine Albright urged the foreign policy apparatus to pay greater attention to religion[418]. Almost ten years later, her successor, John Kerry, reinforced this imperative when he asserted that 'the more we understand religion and the better able we are as a result to be able to

[412] Hassner, "Religion and International Affairs".
[413] Sandal et al., *Religion In International Relations Theory*.
[414] Barton et al., *Mixed Blessings.*
[415] Barton et al., *Mixed Blessings.*
[416] Johnston, "The Missing Dimension."
[417] Stempel, "Faith And Diplomacy In The International System."
[418] Albright, *The Mighty and the Almighty.*

engage religious actors, the more effective our diplomacy will be in advancing the interests and values of our people'[419]. In those ten years, several reports with policy recommendations have been published. For example, the 2007 CSIS report 'Mixed Blessings', which assessed USG's engagement with religion in conflict or post-conflict environment, concluded that current frameworks viewed religion as 'narrow', approaching faiths as 'problematic or monolithic forces, overemphasizing a terrorism-focused analysis of Islam and sometimes marginalizing religion as a peripheral humanitarian or cultural issue'. Highlighting the lack of a mutually enriching relationship between scholarship and decision-makers, the document also states: 'a survey of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy reveals that the government as a whole is not proceeding strategically on this issue. Lack of strategic thinking has left American practitioners without a clear set of policy objectives or tactical guidelines for dealing with emerging religious realities'[420]. On the one hand, then, there is a clear acknowledgement that there are available 'religious means of redressing grievances can help achieve post-conflict healing'[421]. On the other hand, as the 2015 Anglo-American 'Toward Religion-attentive Foreign Policy' report puts it, religion is still 'treated as a discretionary variable rather than an important factor in almost any external engagement' of both the State Department and the FCO[422] - although the former seems to have made greater strides in that direction than its British counterpart[423]. Indeed, it is alleged that 'the FCO, and perhaps the UK Government more broadly, still suffers from a condition of "religion blindness"'. Hence, the report calls for 'the urgent need for the FCO to develop a 'religion-attentive' diplomacy', which engages religious actors and develops an understanding of 'the various international models of religion-state relationship and the way this influences public policy'. The paper acknowledges that 'there are still many gaps in our knowledge about the role of religion in international affairs' and makes it very clear that 'scholars have much to contribute to filling this knowledge gap'[424]. Nigel Baker, Former UK Ambassador to the Holy See, neatly sums the dilemma up when he asserts that 'we still seem to tie ourselves up in knots on issues relating to religion and foreign policy (…) In the modern world, 'doing God' –

[419] *Kerry, "Remarks At Rice University's Baker Institute For Public Policy."*
[420] Barton et al., *Mixed Blessings.*
[421] Smock et al., *Religious Contributions to Peacemaking*.
[422] Birdsall, et al., "Toward Religion-attentive Foreign Policy."
[423] Birdsall, et al., "The State Department's Great Leap Faithward."
[424] Birdsall, et al., "The State Department's Great Leap Faithward."

sensitively, sensibly, without exaggeration – should be an integral element in our foreign policy work and training'[425].

Against this background, one can thus observe that 'the biggest impediment to this auspicious outcome is lack of knowledge and correct information by all major social groups about religious linkages'[426]. This 'lack of knowledge' does indeed seem to signify a greater gap – not necessarily inside the scholarly community of IR but between the academy and policy-makers. Caplan draws attention to this inconvenient truth when he states that 'from Avey and Desch we know that senior national security policymakers find little of practical value in much social science research. There is no reason to expect that the pattern is very different for the sub-field of International Relations that conflict studies represents'[427]. Similarly, George and Bennett have criticised the grand theories of IR on the whole as being based upon generalisations broad in scope and probabilistic in form, making it thus difficult for policy makers to implement them. This, naturally, begs the question of how a chapter such as this one would best seek to enter into the aforementioned debate between the scholarly fields whilst avoiding the impeding pattern diagnosed by Caplan and others. In the pursuance of the same, it seems that case study-based academic inquiry, as implemented this chapter, might be the appropriate to enter into this dialogue and create such knowledge, which could ultimately bridge the gap to policy-makers to evaluate the conditions their political strategies might rest upon[428]. MacFarlane's call to perform 'a thick analysis of the conflict' thus fits in neatly with this approach. Indeed, it constitutes an imperative further reinforced by Caplan who underlines that 'the advantage to case studies is that they provide thick description of the nuts and bolts of successful peacebuilding. They allow a researcher to take into consideration all conceivably relevant factors without having to worry about lack of comparability with other cases because s/he is not necessarily seeking to derive a theory or explanation about all peacebuilding but, rather, an account of peacebuilding in one case'[429].

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[425] Baker, "Religion And Diplomacy."
[426] Baker, "Religion And Diplomacy."
[427] Caplan, *Measuring Peace*; see also: Avey et al., "What Do Policymakers Want From Us?", cited in: Caplan, *Measuring Peace*.
[428] George, "Bridging the gap between theory and practice."; George, "Knowledge for statecraft."; George, "The two cultures of academia and policy making."
[429] Caplan, "Studying Conflict And Practicing Peacebuilding."

Summa summarum, the main goal of this chapter is thus to further contribute to the overall focus of the thesis itself: highlighting the conceptual mechanisms involved and further distilling the concrete reasons for and conditions under which NSAs, such as the GOC, engage in foreign policy and consequently shape and alter state conduct in it. Besides this, however, this particular chapter accepts MacFarlane's urging to assess how the August 2008 war might relate 'to wider concepts and debates in political sciences and international relations'[430]. It hopes to achieve this by advancing the scholarly debate about peacebuilding and the role of religion within it – whilst drawing on important lessons and insights from related fields such as post-conflict state-building. Finally, it aspires to provide a unique and rich set of empirical data gathered around a set of plausible hypotheses, which might be treated by policy-makers and peacebuilders as 'usable knowledge'.

The Georgian Orthodox Church

Having provided a brief background and the position of the chapter in the wider scholarly debate, it is now necessary to briefly establish whether, according to the typology and conditions outlined in the Conceptual Framework, it operates as an entrepreneur or subcontractor in its relationship to its home government, Georgia. Hence, going back to Figure 4, one must examine the GOC's (1) Agenda, (2) Supervision, (3) Funding arrangements.

Agenda

Founded by St. Andrew, the 'First-Called', and St. Nino, the baptiser of all Georgians, the Georgian Church constitutes an integral, independent part of global Orthodoxy. Having lost her autocephalous status during the time of Russian imperial rule and struggling to survive during the age of socialism, she was recognised as an independent entity again in 1990. Ever since that time, she has been the most trusted institution in Georgia with 95% of all citizens having a favourable view on her[431]. Truly, she is seen as the country's dominant and most

[430] MacFarlane, "State-Building And Regional Insecurity In The Post-Soviet Space."
[431] BBC News, "Georgia's Mighty Orthodox Church."

influential religious institution[432]. Presently, the church runs four universities, five seminars of theology, 25 schools, eight social institutions, 18 charitable funds, and 16 cultural centres[433]. This, together with its public reputation, forms the backbone of the special role it plays in the country as a whole. Indeed, it is an active participant in drafting school curricula and making its views heard and seen through its own television channel, radio show and newspaper[434]. Further strengthening her position within Georgia, is the fact that the country itself is among the most religious countries in the world[435]. In the words of a representative of the GoG:

> *'the church is not a separate entity. It is part of the society, the nation. They are the nation in the case of Georgia'*[436].

Or, as a trusted friend of the Catholicos himself puts it:

> *'historically our church has been the cultural and ideological ruler of our country. Our society was created by the Georgian church and the church has always been the director of life in Georgia'*[437].

This is also reflected in the fact that it is not just the institution of the church that enjoys such popularity but also its head, the Catholicos Patriarch Ilia II of Georgia who received a staggering 96% approval rating[438]. This is summed up by Kachkachishvili when he points out that the GOC's political neutrality is a myth as its influence comes from public opinion (…) it uses the trust of the people as a source of strength. And every government and politician use the Georgian Orthodox Church as a source of legitimacy'[439]. One of the starkest examples of just how influential the Church and the Patriarch have been in the body politic was when, amidst the birth pains of a newly independent Georgia in 1993, expressed through the destruction of state institutions, corruption, high crime rates, economic poverty and total social insecurity, the then-President Shevardnadze called for a state of emergency, a suspension of Parliament and threatened to step down from office. It fell to the Catholicos-Patriarch to fill the social-political vacuum and underwrite Shevardnadze's reign: 'The whole of Georgia is nervous. So, as the spiritual father

[432] Funke, "The Georgian Orthodox Church And Its Involvement In National Politics."
[433] Minesashvili, "The Georgian Orthodox Church As A Civil Actor."
[434] Minesashvili, "The Georgian Orthodox Church As A Civil Actor."
[435] Smith, "The World's Most (And Least) Religious Countries."
[436] Interview Sofia Gegechkori.
[437] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze.
[438] NDI Georgia, *Public Attitudes In Georgia*.
[439] BBC News, "Georgia's Mighty Orthodox Church."

of Georgia and personally your spiritual father, I have the right to give benediction to you to announce that you are the head of Georgia'[440]. Considering Carl Schmitt's famous assertion that 'sovereign is he who decides on the exception'[441], this example particularly illustrates the power and influence the GOC wields in Georgia. What is more, it shows how very distinct this power is from anything found in the secularised West. After all, one might find it hard to recollect or even imagine a similar situation, in which the leader of the state religious body, through the sheer power of organically grown and firmly established authority, is able to solve a severe political crisis through such an act of anointing.

Equipped with these instruments and strong backing by the population, the GOC and the Patriarch appear to act as what is often referred to as the Church Militant, which struggles against 'the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places'[442]. The said rulers are regularly identified in Western culture and in its own government's pursuance of economic, military and ideological integration with the Euro-Atlantic alliance at home and abroad. Especially the desire to fulfil the conditions of the EU's human rights and social standards has become a bone of contention between the earthly and spiritual rulers of Georgia:

> *'If you ask Georgian church attendees 'what is the West?' They will answer that the West is LGBT. They will say that the West tries to corrupt Georgia. Because the West struggles with the Orthodox Church, they believe'*[443].

Indeed, the embrace of Western liberalism has even led to clashes between the institutions in which the GOC not just actively intervened in the political process but also came out of it victorious. Among numerous examples in this regard, the anti-discrimination bill, which would guarantee the fundamental rights of sexual minorities, serves as a representative one in this context. From severe rhetorical attacks, stating that it might be better to not have visa liberalisation with the EU 'rather than to make such inclinations like homosexuality a legal norm', to anti-gay riots led by Orthodox priests themselves[444], the GOC has sought to intervene

[440] Catholicos - Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II, "Black Spot For Soviet Leaders."
[441] Schmitt, *Politische Theologie*.
[442] Biblehub, "Ephesians 6:12."
[443] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze.
[444] Flintoff, "Anti-Gay Riot In Tblisi Tests Balance Between Church, State."; Clayton, "Rising Church Asserts Itself In Georgia After Orthodox Christian Protesters Attack Gay-Rights Activists."

directly in the legislative process itself and heavily influenced the wording of the new law. Indeed, whilst the legislation was eventually passed, it lacked any enforcement mechanisms and was therefore rendered ineffective[445]. Even proposals made by the Patriarch to fully restore Georgia's constitutional monarchy of the Bagrationi family has been welcomed across the political spectrum in Georgia, prompting the US Embassy to comment that 'the Georgian Orthodox Church and the Patriarch are well-respected and extremely influential in Georgia. Any idea the Patriarch puts forward must be seriously considered by any politician'[446]. Or, as another US Diplomatic Cable, accurately titled 'Georgia: Impossible to govern without God and Bible', puts it: 'some such as former PM Gurgenidze see the Georgian church as an unstoppable force and anti-western (…) If the people are forced to choose (…) they will choose the church over the government'[447]. As already mentioned, this split between the elected governments and the GOC becomes particularly apparent in the realm of foreign policy in which the former has vigorously pursued a pro-Western course whilst the latter has opposed it, seeking to obtain a position of neutrality or even maintaining a pro-Russian stance[448]. The divergence widened and has become more apparent over the years. When the Government of Georgia purposefully joined the political, economic and security institutions of the West, joining the Council of Europe in 1999, the WTO in 2000 and filing an application to join NATO in 2002[449], the Patriarch and his Church headed down a different path altogether. Indeed, the GOC reversed its traditional anti-Russian nationalism and developed a new discourse, highlighting the transcendental Orthodox brotherhood with the 'Third Rome' and bitterly opposing the West. Patriarch Illia II himself warned that liberalism would 'totally destroy the country' as 'the West is the world where everything is permitted and violence dominates. It is materially rich but spiritually poor' and would therefore

[445] Funke, "The Georgian Orthodox Church And Its Involvement In National Politics."

[446] Embassy Tbilisi, "Patriarchs's Proposal For Restoration Of Georgia's Constitutional Monarchy Receives Respectful Response."
[447] Embassy Tbilisi. "Georgia: Impossible to govern without God and Bible ".
[448] Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, "Easter Epistle."
[449] Kakachia, "Georgia's Euro-Atlantic Aspirations."

be 'unacceptable for Georgians to accept'[450]. These calls for distancing Georgia from the earthly powers of the West towards Russia also had its impact on the spiritual representatives of the Occident when, in 1997, the GOC abandoned the ecumenical movement and left the World Council of Churches and European Churches[451]. Subsequently, in 2003, President Saakashvili, the 'darling of the West'[452], rose to power and pursued the government's integration into the West with an even greater fervour, the ideological and political rift between the state and the GOC started to widen – this rift revealed itself in the numerous confrontations already mentioned but came to a head during and after the war with Russia in 2008. Whilst the intricate details of this shall be examined later in the chapter, it is nonetheless important to briefly highlight a few examples for the historically grown pro-Russian stance of the GOC. The GOC's sympathy towards the former imperial overlord seem to be widely acknowledged. The American Embassy, for example, remarks that 'allegations of the Patriarch's strong ties to Russia are manifest due to his place of birth, Russia-based theological education, and strong contact with the Russian Patriarchy'[453]. Assertions that 'the love between Georgia and Russian will be eternal'[454] have been repeatedly issued by the GOC – both before and after the conflict of 2008. In February of 2008, for example, when Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov made it a point to first meet the Patriarch before President Saakashvili or members of the opposition, the head of Georgia's Church underlined that 'we continue to speak the same language. We have a good command of Russian, so Russian-language texts are easily accessible for us (…) our rituals (…) are mostly Russian (…) so sympathy toward Russia is predominantly determined by the fact that we have shared the same cultural space for two centuries'[455]. Besides other praising comments about Soviet leader Jozef Stalin as 'an outstanding person (…) [who] realized the world importance of Russia'[456], the GOC, even before the war in 2008, has been able to use its organic connection with Russia to calm bilateral disputes: when, in early 2007, Russian spies were arrested

[450] The Catholicos, "Christmas Epistle Of 1994-1995."
[451] Zolotov, "Georgian Orthodox Church To Leave WCC And CEC."
[452] House of Commons, Georgia After The 2008 War.
[453] Embassy Tbilisi. "Georgia: Impossible to govern without God and Bible ".
[454] Tabula, "Ilia II: Putin Will Do Everything For Us To Remain Friends."
[455] Asatiani, "Church Shows The Way Toward Moscow."
[456] Netgazeti. "Ilia II: I Love Russia Very Much, Stalin Was A Believer."

in Tbilisi and the Russian Federation threated to impose economic sanctions, including a ban on the crucial air traffic between the two countries, the GOC diplomatic initiatives succeeded in avoiding such a measure, and Ilia demonstratively travelled out on one of the first Moscow-bound flights to meet with Russian Patriarch, Aleksy II. In a nutshell, the description of the Russian Orthodox Church as 'a government within a government, a political entity as much as a theological one'[457] in a US diplomatic cable might thus justifiably also be fitting for its Georgian counterpart – although, compared to the ROC, the GOC possesses much greater independence vis-à-vis the state[458]. Having outlined this, one might ultimately, in accordance with the conditions of NSA Involvement (Figure 4) conclude that the GOC pursed a pro-active, agenda regardless of state policy.

Supervision

Analysing how a religious institution, such as the GOC, might be supervised requires us to investigate the role of the church in Georgian society – and this arguably even harkens back to the very essence of Western Civilisation and Christendom, perhaps most clearly articulated by Christ himself when he demanded to 'render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's'[459]. Indeed, following this maxim, Western Europe has undergone the process of dividing *Imperium* and Sacerdotium, what Winkler has referred to as *Selbstsäkularisierung*[460] (self-secularisation) – yet, the boundaries of church and state and the ability of the latter to enforce that separation and also watch over church activities encroaching on state responsibilities in both foreign and domestic affairs, appears to be more difficult and complex in Georgia.

Prima facie, the Constitution assures that 'the church is independent from the State' and grants 'full freedom of religion and confession' and yet, it continues to assert that 'the state recognises the special role of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the history of Georgia'[461]. Indeed, with the position of the GOC regarded to be

[457] Embassy Moscow, "Hilarion On The ROC's Role In Russia's Development."
[458] Interview Mariam Tsatsanashvili.
[459] *The New English Bible*. Mk. 12:17
[460] Winkler, *Geschichte Des Westens*.
[461] Government of Georgia, *The Constitution Of Georgia*.

of such importance, an additional Constitutional Agreement regulates the relationship between the state and church of Georgia. In it, the GOC is recognised as 'a historically originated public legal person – a full legal public person recognized by the State that exercise its activities according to the Ecclesiastical (Canon) Law, the Constitution of Georgia, the present Agreement, and Georgian legislation'. This concordat, active since 2002, includes articles giving the patriarch immunity, granting the GOC the exclusive right to staff the military chaplaincy, exempting GOC clergymen from military service, and giving the GOC a unique consultative role in government: 'The agreement grants the Georgian Church *a substantial advisory role in government*, particularly in the educational sphere' [emphasis added][462]. At the same time, the state grants the church financial support in recognition of and as compensation for 'material and moral damage to Church during loosing state independence in XIX-XX centuries'[463]. In the light of this role of the church within Georgia, as defined by the Constitution and the Concordat, Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, Ilia II, himself observes that in the case of Georgia, 'relations between the State and the Church require a different approach at the contemporary stage, which is predetermined by domestic political organization of the country, as well as considering the international situation. Therefore, a constitutional agreement has been considered as the most acceptable form of relations between the State and the Church'[464]. Importantly, it also crucial to bear in mind that 'this Agreement is not a document granting rights by the State as the superior organization to an inferior organization. It represents an agreement of *two equal legal entities* on distribution of responsibility before citizens of their own country. Thus, *changes can be made to it only upon approval by the supreme legislative authority of both countries* – the Parliament of Georgia and the Holy Synod. Bilateral signatures are also required for a change, i.e. both the State, and the Church should support the change. Thus, wilful act of the government towards the church will be legally avoided' [emphasis added]. The fact that legal scholars in Georgia are referring to the GOC as a *country* in and of itself is indeed very telling and a crucial insight to bear in mind for our assessment of what type of actor

[462] The Government of Georgia, *Constitutional Agreement Between State Of Georgia And Georgian Apostolic Autocephaly Orthodox Church*.
[463] The Government of Georgia, *Constitutional Agreement Between State Of Georgia And Georgian Apostolic Autocephaly Orthodox Church*.
[464] Khetsuriani, "State and Church."

she represents. Elaborating on this, Boumis observes that 'according to this system, two institutions – state and church are identified as mutually equivalent. Neither the state governs or supervises the church, nor the church applies the practice of governance or supervision towards the church. Limits of power of both institutions are established by an agreement concluded between them (Concordat)[465]. This is being confirmed by a German diplomat who re-iterates that:

> *'the Georgian church has formalised its relationship with the Georgian state in the concordat [and] both sides agreed not to interfere in each other's affairs'*[466].

In the light of this rather uncommon resolution of its legal regulation and oversight (or rather the lack thereof), one can safely conclude that the GOC is not supervised by another entity, such as the Georgian state. Indeed, when looked at in conjunction with the earlier mentioned activities of the GOC going against the interest of the government, it becomes even clearer that no formal mechanism is in place to supervise the GOC's activities abroad and at home. These activities, it might be said with reference to Figure 4, are not supervised by the state.

Funding

Referring back to the persecution and expropriation the GOC had to face during the communist rule, the GoG commits itself to 'compensate, at least in part, the Georgian Church for its financial and asset losses incurred during that period'. What is more, the agreement also states that *'the Church financing sources include: voluntary contributions, corporate income, investments, grants, donations, and other income received in accordance with applicable law'*[467]. In addition, the special status of the GOC grants her tax benefits for the salaries of its members or property owned by the church – a privilege other religious institutions cannot obtain.

Overall, it appears that the major sources of income of the GOC are private donations and funding received from the Georgian state. According to

[465] Khetsuriani, "State and Church."
[466] Interview Sofia Gegechkori; Interview Mariam Tsatsanashvili.
[467] The Government of Georgia, *Constitutional Agreement Between State Of Georgia And Georgian Apostolic Autocephaly Orthodox Church*.

Transparency International, for example, between 2002 and 2013, for example, the government has allocated up to 200.000.000 GEL (around 75m USD) to the church[468]. Interestingly for the context of this case study, the funding of the GOC by the Georgian state increased almost threefold annually since the start of the war[469]. Additionally, in 2009, the GOC received 15m USD together with luxury sports vehicles for the GOC's ten archbishops, funded directly from the Presidential Reserve Fund[470]. The sources of this funding come from different institutions of government – ranging from money allocated for particular activities presidential and government decree or the Presidential Reserve Fund[471].

Referring back to the section of Supervision, it might also be important to highlight that although the GOC appears to receive the vast majority of its funding directly from the state, this does not necessarily mean that the GoG also calls the tune. Naturally, the Patriarchate assures that the Ministry of Finance strictly monitors the state funding. The Patriarchate's spokesperson Father Sharashenidze, for example, points out that 'those funds are taken in good faith. The church […] will accept whatever it is offered as a sign of respect for the role it has played in holding the country together throughout Georgia's turbulent history'[472]. Yet, despite such assurances, a ministry spokesperson admitted that 'the law did not allow the ministry to exercise such control'. Echoing such claims, the Parliamentary Budget and Finance Committee Deputy Chairperson, Chakhvadze, 'the Georgian church is excluded from that because we give a subsidy and the church itself decides how to use the money'[473].

One might thus confidently conclude that although the GOC is mainly financed by the Georgian state, it is not accountable to the same or is required to

[468] Transparency International. "An Overview Of Public Financing Provided To The Georgian Patriarchate."
[469] Transparency International. "An Overview Of Public Financing Provided To The Georgian Patriarchate."
[470] Goodrich, "Church-State Separation becomes an issue amid Government financial support for Georgian Orthodox Church."
[471] Netgazeti, "The President's Relationship With The Church."
[472] Goodrich, "Church-State Separation becomes an issue amid Government financial support for Georgian Orthodox Church."
[473] Goodrich, "Church-State Separation becomes an issue amid Government financial support for Georgian Orthodox Church."

present any official reports of its expenditures or financed activities for that matter[474]. Indeed, whilst normally state funding would indicate a clear dependence of an actor, suggesting the role of Subcontractor in the typology developed for this thesis. The fact that so little oversight in financial matters can be enforced by the government, demonstrates that the picture is indeed not as clear-cut as it might appear at first sight. Indeed, the flow of income does not depend on any performance and is received regardless – this is especially true as the GOC within Georgian society appears almost 'untouchable' and any state attempt to make its funding conditional would be detrimental to its own standing.

Overall then, when judged against the conditions outlined in the Conceptual Framework, one can identify the GOC as an *Entrepreneur*, which finds itself in a very autonomous position both in domestic as well as foreign policy. Having done this, one can now process-trace the conceptual mechanism of 'uploading', as outlined in the Conceptual Framework, through which such a type of NSA interacts with both its home government and the other concerned countries it operates in. By doing so, it shall also become clear which 'Operational Role' the GOC assumes.

Step I: Concerned State Actors unwilling or unable to pursue a certain Foreign Policy towards each other

Having identified the GOC's role although not yet its operation role, we must now proceed to Step I of the Uploading Mechanism (see. Figure 5) to realise just how broken the relationship was between Georgia and Russia. By examining this, it will become clear that the concerned states were indeed both unwilling and, due to the preceding war, ever-more heated rhetoric, and continued violent clashes, indeed unable to pursue reconciliatory policies towards each other.

Surely, PM Putin's desire to hang the Georgian President by his private parts might already be a rather graphic representation of just how sour relations had become. Nonetheless, it is important to provide further evidence for this perception. Indeed, the long-standing antagonism that the Russian PM had felt towards

[474] EMC, "Legislative Assessment Of Financing Practice Of Four Religious Organizations."

Sakaashvilli[475] reached a new low. Truly, the relationship 'was extremely poor'[476], and it seems that the Government of the Russian Federation saw the Georgian President as illegitimate and unacceptable as a partner for post-conflict negotiations and future relations. Whilst the fighting was still on-going, the Georgian Foreign Minister Tkeshelashvili reported on August 10th that 'all subsequent Georgian attempts to offer disengagement with the Russians have been met with silence, including a request for an appropriate Russian leader to speak to Saakashvili'[477]. In the eyes of the American embassy in Tiblisi, this tactic employed by the Russian, can only have the 'final goal' of 'forc[ing] the departure of Saakashvili'[478]. Further aiding this assumption, the US Secretary of State at the time, Condoleeza Rice, recalls a conversation she had with her Russian counterpart: 'Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, told me there were three conditions for ending the war. First, the Georgians should sign a "no-use-of-force pledge" in the breakaway regions. Second, the Georgian forces had to return to their barracks. These were acceptable to the Government of Georgia and its allies. However, the third condition, which he said was "just between us," shocked me. "Misha Saakashvili has to go."'[479]. Subsequently, President Dmitry Medvedev, on August 11th, also threw down his gauntlet and accused Georgia of the worst crime any government could commit in international relations: 'the ferocity in which the actions of the Georgian side were carried out cannot be called anything else but genocide, because they acquired a mass character and were directed against individuals, the civilian population, peacekeepers who carried out their functions of maintaining peace'[480]. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili retaliated and alleged that Georgia's former imperial overlord is carrying out a 'pre-planned, cold-blooded murder of a country'[481]. The Russian desire to remove Saakashvili from office was also visible at the UN where the Russian representative, accused of seeking to carry out 'regime change' in Georgia, replied that 'some democratic leaders are an obstacle to peace'. When pressed again by his American counterpart whether 'the goal [is] to change the leadership of Georgia', merely answered that he had already given his

[475] Levy, "The Georgian And Putin: A Hate Story."
[476] MacFarlane, "State-Building And Regional Insecurity In The Post-Soviet Space".
[477] Embassy Tbilisi. "Working With France To Advance A Solution To The Conflict In Georgia."
[478] Embassy Tbilisi. "Working With France To Advance A Solution To The Conflict In Georgia."
[479] Rice, "Russia Invaded Georgia 10 Years Ago. Don't Say America Didn't Respond".
[480] BBC News, "Georgia Conflict: Key Statements."
[481] BBC News, "Georgia Conflict: Key Statements."

response[482]. In short, those comments 'to the effect that Russia would not negotiate with President Saakashvili suggest that one objective of Russia's military action was to secure Saakashvili's removal'[483].

Behind the stage, on which this fierce battle of words was played out in front of an international audience, the wheels of diplomacy were turning. Various state actors sought to work towards the mending of the severed relationship. Apart from the Armenian President's futile attempt to meet his Georgian counterpart[484] it was primarily President Sarkozy of France who caught the greatest attention and, through a Kissingerian shuttle diplomacy between Tbilisi and Moscow, eventually secured a peace deal. Praised as a 'momentous moment'[485] by Sarkozy and regarded as a step to 'restore peace and [and] an attempt through dialogue to find a long-term solution'[486], this six-point plan, it was agreed, would be the beginning of international talks to define the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Yet, despite the optimistic rhetoric emanating from the Elysee Palace, proclaiming that 'if all conflicts could embark on resolutions such as this, we would all be in a better position'[487], early hopes that this ceasefire would translate into a process of calm rapprochement and rhetorical disarmament would be shuttered. On the contrary, the spiral of rhetorical escalation spun even faster: On the very day the military ceasefire was officially signed, the Russian Foreign Minister continued to assert that the Russian government had stopped to regard the GoG, and particularly President Saakashvili as legitimate: 'Russia's approaches toward the negotiation process will undergo substantial change, because we have no trust in the present Georgian leadership anymore (…) A ceasefire as a term presupposes that there are two partners who are ready to move to mutually respectful relations. I think that this is hardly possible to do with the present Georgian leadership'[488]. At the same time, the said leadership referred to the country Mr. Lavrov represents on the international stage as a 'barbaric aggressor'. The Saakashvili administration also

[482] Embassy Tbilisi. "Tough Day For Russia In Security Council."
[483] MacFarlane, "State-Building And Regional Insecurity In The Post-Soviet Space".
[484] Embassy Yerevan, "Armenian Frustration Grows Over Perceived Georgian Snubs."
[485] Day, "Georgia Crisis: Nicolas Sarkozy Hails Breakthrough In Talks With Russia."
[486] Office of the President of Russia, "Press Statement Following Negotiations With French President Nicolas Sarkozy."
[487] Day, "Georgia Crisis: Nicolas Sarkozy Hails Breakthrough In Talks With Russia."
[488] Lavrov, "Transcript Of Remarks And Response To Media Questions By Russian Minister Of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov At Joint Press Conference."

echoed the earlier Russian accusation by blaming her in turn for acts of *Völkermord*[489] and announced that it would withdraw from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) [490], in a final 'good-bye to the Soviet Union'[491]. Russia returned the favour and again the ugly word of genocide was used as a political projectile in this war of words between the two sides: 'The Georgian leadership gave the orders that led to acts to genocide and developed into war crimes, and ethnic cleansings and this cannot remain unanswered'[492]. By now, not a day would go by without the inflationary use of the term that, like perhaps no other, stirs up emotions in the West and conjures up the demons of the past. Sakaashvili, on the other hand, continued to place the Russian Federation in the tradition of evil empires when, on August 13th, he burst out on CNN, exclaiming: 'You know what? Germany told the world they were attacked by Poland in 1939. The Soviet Union was attacked by Finland in 1939. Soviet Union was attacked by Afghanistan in 1979!'. Discounting the feverish efforts by France's President Sarkozy to forge a lasting peace deal, he alleged that 'the Russians never meant any ceasefire. This is a kind of ceasefire that I don't know they had with Afghanistan in 1979 or that Germany had with Poland in 1939. There is no ceasefire. They are moving!'. It might thus not come as a surprise that a day later, on August 14th, Foreign Minister Lavrov repeated the Russian demands for the resignation of Saakashvili as he could not be treated as 'a responsible partner in talks, since all that which this man has been saying in the last few days absolutely does not correspond to facts. And the political assessment he makes based on lies is simply outrage'. Pressed on the issue of 'with whom to talk in Georgia then, if Georgia remains a party in the negotiations, if the president of Georgia is now not a negotiator for you?', Lavrov remarked that 'Occasionally this question has no answer (…) The wounds he has inflicted are very deep. They will take very long healing'. Surely, to the horror of the Georgian military and political leadership, the Russian Foreign Minister, in characteristic dryness, remarked that 'one can forget about any talk about Georgia's territorial integrity'[493].

[489] BBC News, "Georgia Conflict: Key Statements."
[490] Reuters, "Georgia To Pull Out Of CIS: Saakashvili."
[491] Embassy Tbilisi, "Georgia: SITREP 9: Russian Troops Remain In Georgia."
[492] Lavrov, "Transcript Of Remarks And Response To Media Questions By Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of The Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, Moscow, August 13, 2008."
[493] Lavrov, "Transcript Of Interview Of Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of The Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov With Editor-In-Chief Of Ekho Moskvy".

Of course, one might add here, that it is precisely on such occasions that the entity to talk to will be not a government or state actor but an NSA, such as the GOC. However, before assessing this, one might further highlight the dire state of the relationship between the two Orthodox nations. Of course, the accusation of genocide suggests various historical parallels and so President Saakashvili, in the presence of the US Secretary of State, certainly hit a nerve when, on August 15th, he again compared Russia's action to those of her former nemesis, the Third Reich, vis-a-vis the Sudetenland: 'These are 21st century barbarians. You know, everything that is nice and new makes them sick. You are dealing with the people who despise everything human, everything nice, everything modern, everything European, everything civilized. That's what they are after (…) Because we know exactly the truth and we know that we are dealing with people who tried their best to mislead the world, to cheat, to lie, to deceive, and to repeat this over and over again and maybe also in other places (…) This is anniversary of Prague. Russians, are historically, it looks like, doing bad things in August when everybody else – everybody – civilized decision-makers go for vacations (…) How many more things can these barbarians do, these cold-blooded killers do for the world not to blame the victims? Can you say that, you know, the victim of rape is to be blamed for the rape because she wore a short skirt? Or the victim of, you know, killing be blamed for the killing because he provoked the killer with, you know, some strange look in his eyes? That's exactly what some of the people were trying to do now toward Georgia for the last several days'[494]. The Georgian President, perhaps very keenly aware of how the uprising in Prague ended for the receiver of the USSR's tank diplomacy, was not quite as sure as he made it appear that his refusal to interact with 'the 21st century barbarians' was the right path for his republic. After all, in his speech to the Georgian nation on August 18th he cautiously expressed his willingness, conditioned on a Russian withdrawal, to engage in talks with the Russian leadership[495]. Yet, the Russian side would have no dealings with what it regarded as a 'criminal regime'[496]. On August 26th, the Kremlin put the last nail into the coffin of the Georgian-Russian relationship by officially recognising the independence of the two separatist regions of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as

[494] US Department of State, "Remarks With Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili."
[495] Saakashvili, "Saakashvili's Televised Address."
[496] Lavrov, "Transcript Of Remarks And Response To Media Questions By Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of The Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov."

sovereign states, prompting the GoG to officially cut all diplomatic relations[497]. In other words, all official state-to-state relations had, at this point, come crushing down. President Saakashvili responded with outrage and, in his statement, charged that 'if intervention in Kosovo was about stopping ethnic cleansing, today's decision by the Russian Federation is about rewarding and legalizing ethnic cleansing (…) It means that today, annexation and ethnic cleansing have once again become tools of international relations (…) Today, it is clear around the world that Russia is acting as an aggressor state'[498]. As one would expect, Russia responded in kind with President Medvedev remoulding the old Nixonian madman theory into a political accusation as 'only a madman could have taken such a gamble. Did he [Saakashvili] believe Russia would stand idly by as he launched an all-out assault on the sleeping city of Tskhinvali, murdering hundreds of peaceful civilians, most of them Russian citizens?'[499]. Saakashvili in the President's view, 'no longer exists in our eyes. He is a political corpse'[500]. Foreign Minister Lavrov further developed the narrative of Georgia acting as an extended arm of the West. After all, 'instead of choosing their national interests, and the interests of the Georgian people, the US and its allies choose the Saakashvili regime, this will be a mistake of truly historic proportions. For a start it would be right to impose an embargo on weapons to this regime, until different authorities turn Georgia into a normal state'[501]. Finally, the last round of this rhetorical broadside from Russia was launched by PM Putin himself claiming that the Georgian leader was 'politically dead, likely insane, and irrelevant to Russia's decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia'[502]. Having said this, one can safely assume that the state-to-state relations between Georgia and Russia were characterised by an ever-growing animosity – describing the other as 'ethnic cleansers'[503] became the new norm, and violent clashes between the armed forces were a regular occurrence[504]. The relationship between the respective leaders, made worse by the recognition of Georgia's break-away regions as

[497] "BBC News. "Georgia Breaks Ties With Russia."
[498] Saakashvili, "Saakashvili's Statement On Russia' Action."
[499] BBC News, "Georgia Conflict: Key Statements."
[500] BBC News, "Saakashvili A 'Political Corpse'."
[501] The Irish Times, "Russia Says Backing Georgia Would Be 'Mistake'."
[502] Embassy Tbilisi, "New Sarkozy-Medvedev Agreement: Questions Remain."
[503] Saakashvili, "Speech By H.E. Mr. Mikheil Saakashvili."
[504] CNN, "Georgia Police Officer Slain Near Russian Checkpoint"; Harding, "Car Bomb Kills Russian Troops In South Ossetia."; Reuters, "Russia Blames Georgia For S.Ossetia Blast."; The Citizen, "Seven Russian Troops Die In Ossetia Car Bomb Attack: Officials."

independent states, was irrevocably thrown into the abyss when Russia fermented the situation by announcing, in late November 2008, that construction of military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia would now commence[505].

With the relationship between the two countries and between the two political leaderships in such shambles, all eyes turned to the Geneva International Discussions (GID), the 'key mechanism for advancing resolution of the 2008 conflict and reversing the effects of war by enhancing security and stability and promoting respect for human rights through practical, confidence-building measures in the conflict-affected areas'[506], envisioned by President Sarkozy and the six-point ceasefire agreement. It was hoped that with the EU taking 'the lead in starting a process of international discussions in Geneva (…) this forum can provide a space to address the more urgent issues, such as security'[507]. After all, it was believed that the participating states (Russia, Georgia, the US) and the international, state-dominated institutions (the EU, the UN, and the OSCE) 'possess the expertise needed to help tackle the challenges inherent in the process and look forward to continued fruitful cooperation among these organizations'[508]. In fact, so much optimism was invested into the Geneva discussions that the idea of any rival forum, floated through the diplomatic arena, was rejected so it might 'distract from the Geneva process'[509]. Indeed, given this rhetoric one could get the idea that the second 'hour of Europe' was, after the failure in Yugoslavia, finally at hand. The appointment of […] the EU's Special Representative[510] and his bellicose insistence that 'the battle is just beginning'[511], seemed to signal the much-awaited realisation and practical application of the debate around the civilian or normative power of the EU. Here at last, it would be proven to that even

[505] Russia Today, "Russia To Spend $US 400 Million On Military Bases In Abkhazia And South Ossetia."
[506] Baer, "On Geneva International Discussions On The Conflict In Georgia | USOSCE."
[507] Embassy Paris, "More From EU Special Rep For Georgia And French MFA On Next Diplomatic Steps."
[508] Baer, "On Geneva International Discussions On The Conflict In Georgia | USOSCE."
[509] US Embassy to the United Nations in New York, "Georgia/Russia: Russia Offers UNOMIG Extension For ARRIA."
[510] Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action (2008/760/CFSP) of 25 September 2008 appointing the European Union Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia", p. 16.
[511] Embassy Paris, "More From EU Special Rep For Georgia And French MFA On Next Diplomatic Steps."

the inhabitants of Venus can be peacemakers. What is more, the indispensable uniqueness of the GID was made clear from the outset as it was regarded as 'the only forum in which all parties to the conflict were represented and argued that this gave the process a unique role in resolving outstanding security and humanitarian issues'[512]. As a Georgian diplomat describes it:

> '*The major instrument of state-to-state relations, state to state communication, there is what is called the conflict resolution between Georgia and Russia and restoration of the unity of the Georgian territorial integrity. The major mechanism of communication for this are the talks in Geneva, the Geneva process. Both the Georgian and Russian governments have their own special representative there who meet from time to time, get together and discuss the major issues'*[513].

Much pride was taken in the fact that Geneva 'was the first time since the tragic events of August that the parties had met directly (…) [and] moved from procedural discussions to practical matters that affect people on the ground'[514]. This was the cause for much hope[515] as 'steady progress' was allegedly continually made[516]. However, as the Georgian Special Representative for Russia, appointed by a new government four years later, highlights, the GID were not *direct* talks between the two governments. Rather, they had to be regarded as talks taking place under '*international administration*'[517]. What is more, amidst a continuation of rather aggressive rhetoric, the diplomats participating in the GID would over the next few months and years find themselves in a 'dead end'[518]. As one American diplomatic cable acknowledged, 'the Russians [are] playing a more openly unhelpful role (…) the tone of conversation became more negative and personal (…) the process is in jeopardy'. Even the EU's Special Representative complained that the participants should 'not allow

[512] Embassy Brussels, "FSC-PC June 17: Geneva Talks On Georgia; OSCE UNSCR 1540 Strategy."
[513] Interview Sofia Gegechkori.
[514] OSCE Secretariat, "OSCE Chairman Welcomes Important Step Forward In Georgia Discussions In Geneva"
[515] OSCE Secretariat, "OSCE Chairman Satisfied With Geneva Process."
[516] OSCE Secretariat, "OSCE Chairmanship Welcomes Steady Progress At Geneva Discussions On Georgia."
[517] Deutsche Welle, "Abaschidse: "Der Ball Ist Auf Russischer Seite".
[518] Deutsche Welle, "Abaschidse: "Der Ball Ist Auf Russischer Seite".

themselves to become "quiet managers of the status quo"'[519]. With Georgia regularly accused of being an 'American client'[520], Saakashvilli blaming the Russians for showing 'no interest whatsoever at this stage in any diplomatic process'[521], and the US stating that 'the Russians playing a more openly unhelpful role'[522], the chaos appeared to be complete. Hence, an 'impasse' in the GID became 'more and more apparent in Geneva', where Georgia sees Russia as a party to the conflict and an existential threat'[523]. As one Georgian diplomat put it: '*So far there have been very little tangible results. They disagree a lot and walk out a lot. Everything happens. Anything that you could possibly imagine happens in a negotiation happens (...) within this formal line of communication, the GID, it is a stalemate. Basically, nothing is moving. We are still in the same place*. At the same time, the diplomat also acknowledges Georgian shortcomings as the Saakashvili administration refused to rhetorically disarm even though:

> '*the US, our strategic partner, had asked Georgia to cool down the rhetoric and work with a cold mind to get the real results*'[524].

Against this backdrop, one should perhaps not be surprised about a sense of irony and pity that the American delegation felt towards the EU's Representative who 'worked hard to find areas of agreement, at times stretching to exaggerate the productivity of the sessions'. In the end, it was concluded that 'if we continue to see no progress on what should be simple issues, we will have to reconsider the usefulness of Geneva[525] and 'think carefully about where real progress is actually possible, and what we will need to do either within or outside Geneva to enable that progress'. Hence, the official, state-led peace initiative in Geneva might perhaps be best summarised by the title of this very US diplomatic cable: 'Geneva Discussions on Georgia: Some Positive Talk, Little To Show'[526]. In the words of a Georgian diplomat:

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[519] Embassy Bern, "Geneva Discussions On Georgia: Round IX."
[520] Embassy Bern, "Geneva Discussions On Georgia Round VIII."
[521] BBC NEWS, " Georgia-Russia Talks Move Fails."
[522] BBC NEWS, " Georgia-Russia Talks Move Fails."
[523] Embassy Bern, "Geneva Discussions On Georgia: Round IX."
[524] Interview Sofia Gegechkori.
[525] Embassy Tbilisi, "Georgia: Scenesetter For Special Representative Holbrooke's Visit."
[526] Embassy Bern, "Geneva Discussions On Georgia: Some Positive Talk, Little To Show."

> '*The Russians still think of us, and of the region in general, in these 19th century terms of zero-sum game and "our neighbourhood", the backyard. And they will not let the backyard go anywhere because of the strategic, geopolitical importance that Georgia and this region carries. So, you will see it is a deadlock (...) the Russians have been very aggressive. Instead of being open they have actually closed themselves in. You know who rules Russia. Putin is a former KGB officer and, as they say, there never are former KGB officers. He will do anything within his power to consolidate his power, the regime, to be even more aggressive because that is the only way for them to act*'[527].

Another state-led angle from which reconciliation efforts were pursued since early 2009 was a traditional tool of diplomacy: the opening of interest sections in the Swiss Embassies in both countries[528]. However, as a member of the Russian foreign ministry put it, this was considered 'the maximum of what we can do at the moment to protect the people's interests'. In Moscow, the Georgian interest section 'enjoyed regular contact with the MFA, but in practice did not have access to Duma members or other branches of government'[529] with 'the bulk of his section's work consisted of responding to other agencies' inquiries about Georgian nationals apprehended in Russia on suspicion of crime, rather than liaising with the interest section'[530]. To make matters worse, the US embassy in Moscow had to report that 'Swiss diplomats readily conced[ed] to us that they lacked the breadth of contacts and long professional associations enjoyed by Georgian diplomats with their MFA counterparts'[531]. In short, as former DFM Kalandadze put it, the Swiss interest sections have been '*of no consequence*'[532].

Summa summarum, the bitter diplomatic cocktail that was brewing at the time thus had a multitude of unhelpful ingredients: personal animositiy, if not outright hatred, between the Russian and Georgian leaderships, broken-off diplomatic relations, an unwillingness on the

[527] Interview Sofia Gegechkori.
[528] Tass, "Georgia's Opposition Calls For Direct Dialogue With Russia."
[529] Embassy Moscow, "Georgian Representation In Moscow."
[530] Embassy Moscow, "MFA On Possibility Of Regime Change In Georgia."
[531] Embassy Moscow, "Georgian Representation In Moscow."
[532] Interview Nino Kalandadze.

part of Russia to regard President Saakashvilli and his government as legitimate, a stalled, state-actor-led reconciliation initiative in and through Switzerland, a well-meaning, yet ultimately unimportant interest section in the Swiss embassies, continued skirmishes, and no high-level contact between both governments.

We may thus confidently confirm Step I in the Uploading Mechanism, namely, that all concerned states – including states and state-dominated institutions beyond Russia and Georgia – were unable and, in the case of the two former belligerents, indeed unwilling to pursue a policy of reconciliation towards each other.

Step II: NSA identified Foreign Policy Objective

In the previous section it has become obvious that any 'effort to rebuild a constructive relationship between these states will be protracted and difficult, and prospects for a renewal of conflict (advertent or inadvertent) remain reasonably strong'[533]. Against this background, one might legitimately wonder what objective the GOC set herself, that is, with what agenda it sought to intervene in the political process. In this regard, it is important to once again remind oneself of the historical mission that the church perceives herself to have the duty to pursue. As one senior church leader puts it:

> '*the church has always been dedicated to this nation, her statehood, her people and to her safety. The Church never intervenes in day-to-day party politics but when the subject is to uphold our country and our statehood, the Church has a duty to act. The war was detrimental for our people, our country, and we always support our people (...) we try to help our state and our country, our people'*[534].

Out of this higher calling, the GOC derived two concrete goals – one religious and one political. Regarding the former, it was clear that:

[533] MacFarlane, "State-Building And Regional Insecurity In The Post-Soviet Space".
[534] Interview Giorgi Tviadadze.

> '*one of our main objectives was that the Church of Georgia should have access to Abkhazia and the Region of Tskhinvali, the so-called South Ossetia (…) The only institution to allow clergymen to conduct services there is the Georgian Orthodox Church. This was a very vital issue to our Church: to nourish the Christians who live in these regions. This is our obligation. The Church is striving to take care of our spiritual sons and daughters living there (…) The Church uses every influence in a positive way to persuade Russia to open doors for us in order for us to conduct our services'.*

On the more mundane, political front, on the other hand, it was clearly recognised by the GOC leadership that whilst all diplomatic relations were broken, '*the church still had a foundation, a basis, on which we can build'*. In keeping with her aforementioned historical mission, she thus sought to be:

> '*a bridge to the benefit of our country and our people (…) The Church would use all possible means to work for the benefit of our country and our people (…) The Church always tries to unite Georgia and to use all means, peaceful mechanisms in order to achieve the objective of our country, which is the restoration of the territorial integrity (…) The Church of Georgia, along with the government, is making efforts towards the restoration of the territorial integrity and towards whatever is vital for our country as a whole*'[535].

Keeping in mind the enormous popularity ranking of the Catholicos, it does not come as a surprise in this context that the Patriarch himself should play a very significant role in this regard. With *Sacerdotium* seemingly trumping *Imperium*, the head of the GOC:

> '*truly always acts as the spiritual leader of our country (…) The Patriarch can speak on behalf of our country and our people and our Church has done everything possible to pursue the national interest (…) The Patriarch's most important objective was to help his nation, his country*'[536].

Reading such statements, one might be musing what the high priests of realism might have thought about a church leader, rather than a statesman (a prince in the more traditional sense), defining what the national interest ought to be. One might find a glance at what Machiavelli had to say about the subject of ecclesiastical

[535] Interview Giorgi Tviadadze.
[536] Interview Giorgi Tviadadze.

principalities illuminating in this context. In an observation, which has often interpreted to be of an ironic nature, he remarks that there are realms, which are being upheld by the venerable ordinances of Religion, which are all of such a nature and efficacy that they secure the authority of their Princes in whatever way they may act or live. These Princes alone have territories which they do not defend, and subjects whom they do not govern'[537]. With regards to the agenda the GOC set herself then, we can establish that whilst it was important to keep canonical jurisdiction over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, she also sought to play the role of a bridge vis-à-vis Russia with the ultimate, long-term objective of bringing about the *status quo ante*, that is, the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity. Early on in the conflict, it was recognised by the senior church leadership that the special Orthodox bond the GOC enjoys with Russia and her church:

> '*gives us ground to speak with the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia in order to somehow persuade him that this is extremely important for our Church and our country'*.

In short, the GOC began dialling the religious 'red telephone' and on August 8th, together with her counterpart, declared 'their common peace-making position and readiness to cooperate in this field'[538]. This would set the stage for a whole range of activities and initiatives pursued by the GOC. Initially, the Patriarch led a delegation of GOC representatives towards the Russian lines to rescue dead and wounded Georgians from the battlefield and reach out to the Russian military leadership. As a trusted friend of the Catholicos and former MoP describes it:

> *'they entered into the villages, the Patriarch just entered into the conflict zone, he intruded into the Russian lines. It was a very well-known fact here that the Patriarch entered the conflict zone when it was still raging and took the dead bodies of fallen soldiers with him. The Georgian government considered this move to be quite dangerous and they told the troops to stop the Patriarch but he went ahead anyways. He was guarded by Russian soldiers. He was a real warrior. He ignored his own government and entered into the conflict zone. Sure, the Patriarch tends to be a very loyal man but when it comes to matters of principle, the national interest, he*

[537] Scott, *The Routledge Guides To The Great Books*, p. 121.
[538] Heneghan, "Does Mccain See Real Faith Factor In Russia-Georgia Conflict?."; Interfax, "Ilia II Urges Tbilisi And Tskhinvali To Peaceful Settlement."

becomes very radical. He is very strict when it concerns the national interest. This is the historical mission of our church. In critical situations, the leaders of our church always act in this way. This is also why he has such trust among the people. In critical situations the majority of the population always supports the church[539].

This account further corroborated by a Georgian diplomat, who underlines that:

'*even during the war the church went into the territories, guarded by Russian soldiers. They actually helped civilians to get out of the conflict zones. In those days the Russians were shooting people but did not touch the clergymen'*[540].

As an American Embassy cable confirms, the Patriarch was able to do so by tapping into the GOC's very high-level linkages to Russia and her church: 'Ilia II travelled to Gori through Russian occupation lines to retrieve dead soldiers' remains, after appealing to Aleksey II, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, to mediate his access'[541]. It also emerged that the ROC did not just facilitate this trip but was also instrumental in conveying 'letters of appeal from Patriarch Ilia of Georgia to the Russian president, Dmitri A. Medvedev, and PM Vladimir V. Putin'[542]. In light of the fact that the Patriarch refused the 'order' of the GoG to abort his mission and could not be stopped by the Georgian military, one might already draw one's preliminary conclusions about the question as to how accountable the GOC truly is for its actions. Yet, as this shall be answered in greater detail below, it suffices to recognise that this initial push behind the Russian lines was followed by several more such trips undertaken by the Catholicos[543] during which the Patriarch was guarded by Russian soldiers. However, whilst it is noteworthy that the GOC was the only Georgian institution capable and able to carry out such operations, against the will of her own government, these excursions were merely the beginnings of wider diplomatic operations. These operations would erect and gradually further strengthen the bridge that the GOC sought to build between the two countries.

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[539] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze.
[540] Interview Sofia Gegechkori.
[541] Embassy Tbilisi. "Georgia: Impossible to govern without God and Bible ".
[542] Kishkovsky, "Conflict Tests Ties Between The Georgian And Russian Orthodox Churches."
[543] ICC, "Humanitarian Consequences Of The Armed Conflict In The South Caucasus."; Interfax, "Georgian Patriarch Visits Gori To See The City Wasn't Demolished."; Interfax, "Georgian Catholicos-Patriarch Visited Gori."; Civil Georgia, "Church Intervenes To Bring Soldiers' Bodies Back."

As described *en detail* in the previous part, the diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia were eventually abolished entirely after the end of the hostilities. In parallel to other state-led initiatives, the GOC took it upon herself to independently step into the political process. At a time when the senior government ranks of both countries still exchanged rhetorical broadsides, 'a delegation of the Georgian Orthodox Church met in Moscow (…) [on November 7, 2008] with the Russian deputy foreign minister, Grigory Karasin, in the first official contacts between the countries since war broke out in the breakaway region of South Ossetia in August'[544]. In this context, it must be noted here that this delegation visit took place at a time when in October 2008 the ROC made the canonical decision to not take the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia under her own jurisdiction. On the contrary, the Moscow Patriarchate announced that they would remain to be under the auspices of the GOC[545]. As Giorgadze remarks:

> '*it is still the jurisdiction of the Georgian church. Sure, the church cannot achieve all she wants there but Russia and the Russian church admits that it is the canonical territory of the Georgian Orthodox Church. The Church is trying to use this channel and the opportunities that arise from it*[546]'.

The former Georgian ambassador to Russia, Zurab Abashidze, who was working as an academic in Tiblisi when the Patriarch of Georgia asked him to be part of the church delegation to Moscow, highlighted the unique and important nature of the visit:

> *'the Orthodox churches had become the main channel of communications between the countries (...), this is the only thread, the only channel, that connected the two countries and the two peoples, such church ties (...) in August or September 2008 diplomatic relations were disrupted, closed down. The only channel of communication which remained was between two churches. The Russian church still recognises the canonical territorial integrity of Georgia. Formally it allowed these contacts to maintain (...) It*

[544] Kishkovsky, "Georgian Church Envoys Meet With Russian Official."
[545] Kishkovsky, "Conflict Tests Ties Between The Georgian And Russian Orthodox Churches."; Interfax Religion, "Moscow Patriarchate Shall Not Encourage The Separation Of The Abkhaz Diocese From Georgian Church."; Civil Georgia, "Russian Orthodox Church 'Respects' Georgian Church Authority Over Abkhazia, S.Ossetia."
[546] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze.

was a very tense period, of course. Even more than nowadays'[547].

What is more, a senior church leader, Metropolitan Gerasim, added what became more and more obvious, namely, that 'the churches were essential to fill a diplomatic vacuum'[548]. This assessment of the two members of the delegation can also be corroborated by a member of the Georgian Embassy in Washington D.C. who points out that what came into existence was:

> '*a parallel stream of communication between the Russian and the Georgian churches. So, when the communication on the state level ended with the direct invasion by Russia and the diplomatic channels ceased to exist, the only channel left to exchange information and to try to deal with some issues was the church channel. This is why the Patriarchate got involved into the bigger politics following the 2008 war*'[549].

Against this background, we can observe that the building of the bridge had started not even two months after the end of the hostilities. The manner in which this bridge would be effectively used by the GOC until the time when both states would find a less heated and aggressive conduct towards each other, shall be examined in greater detail at a later stage of this chapter. Indeed, before moving to part V and VI of the causal mechanism, we must now first investigate the next step in the causal mechanism.

Step III: NSA granted access to resources, authorities, and information in at least one of the concerned states

Having defined the agenda of the GOC, we must now proceed to the next step of the 'Uploading' mechanism and examine whether the GOC enjoys access to resources, institutions, elites and information independently in or through at least one of the concerned states. The aforementioned examination of what role the GOC plays on the basis of its Finances, Agenda, Supervision, and Members has already demonstrated that she enjoys considerable access to all of the above in her home country, Georgia. She does not just have access to generous funding by the state and private donors but also, due to her prestige, respect and authority, possesses

[547] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze.
[548] Kishkovsky, "Conflict Tests Ties Between The Georgian And Russian Orthodox Churches."
[549] Interview Sofia Gegechkori.

considerable access to institutions and elites in Georgia. What is more, the funding from the state does not come with attached strings so the church can independently choose where and how to spend it. It has also become apparent that perhaps her most formidable resource is the reputation and support she enjoys among the wider Georgian public and within the body politic. Indeed, whilst reminding ourselves of such notions mentioned throughout the chapter once again confirms the validity of the claim that Georgia is 'impossible to govern without God and Bible', as proclaimed by an American Embassy cable cited earlier, the analysis of this particular step of the causal mechanism would be insufficient without taking into consideration the rather difficult relationship that the GOC had with the government of President Saakashvili. Referring specifically to the diplomatic initiatives pursued by the GOC vis-à-vis Russia, a Georgian diplomat points out that the church was:

> *'able to do so because the trust in the government was just as low as it could get after the war. People were united in the purpose to not let the Russians in but they were not fond of the government. Since 2008 people have begun to understand that certain things were not done correctly. Look at the situation: the popularity of the government had been declining since 2007*[550]*. We had massive demonstrations there. Some of them were not ending peacefully. Crack down of these demonstrations. And then the war with Russia started, which nobody expected. So, when the war broke out the nation against consolidated behind the government because the enemy was in our country. But that was not because Saakashvili's popularity. But the church became critical of the government, so I would not be surprised if the Patriarch decided to explore a peace-channel to help his country without prior consultation with the government (...) The thing is that when the diplomacy does not work then the Church is usually engaged. Mostly, still with a certain degree of coordination with the government to try to balance out. To do something. But also: when there is a void created by the mistrust of the government, that void could be filled by the church. The Georgian Patriarch is not just a spiritual leader, he is also a statesman in a certain way'*. Having said this, she echoes remarks made earlier about the GOC *de facto* although perhaps not *de jure* representing the nation of Georgia: '*When*

[550] Fuller, "Fuller: Georgian Leader's Popularity Has Dramatically Fallen."

we are talking about the decreasing popularity of the parties or the government, the church becomes the nation. When Saakashvili lost the trust of the nation, the church gained even more trust. We should not separate the church as a sort of different galaxy from the nation. It is part of the nation'[551].

With the GOC, even by state actors themselves referred to as 'becoming the nation' and the Catholicos described as 'a statesman' – titles, which the Westphalian system jealously reserves for state actors – it should thus not come as a surprise that, as Giorgadze puts it:

'the Saakashvili government has viewed the church as a competitor, a rival. They are afraid of the church because it is the place where you can raise independent people (…) Apart from very rare exceptions, which concern the national interest, the church has never tried to oppose the government. Because the church is an institution that is responsible and unfortunately the Georgian governments have not felt such responsibility'[552].

Yet, this antagonism had already existed before the start of the August 2008 war. In 2007, Former Georgian Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili claimed that Saakashvili regards the GOC 'as his "competitor" overshadowing his glory' and 'accused Saakashvili of attempting to collect compromising information on church leaders in order to undermine their authority'[553]. What is more, the fact that a little later that year, the Patriarch had called for the abolition of the office of President to be replaced with a constitutional monarchy also surely did not add to a sense of harmony between the administration and the GOC[554]. Indeed, as the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Saakashvili government admits, '*formally everything seemed okay but it surely was not the best of relationship'* – an observation, which Zurab Abashidze, a member of the GOC-led delegations to Moscow, could confirm[555]. Nino Kalandadze furthermore reminds us that the state generously finances the church, which, however:'

[551] Interview Sofia Gegechkori; Note: This insight seems to reflect Slaughter and her writing on Network, pointing out that *'the central question is whether and when networked international organizations, regimes, or informal initiatives are more effective at solving international problems or achieving members' objectives than traditional international organizations'.*
[552] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze.
[553] Embassy Tbilisi, "Okruashvili Throws Down The Gauntlet."
[554] Embassy Tbilisi, "Patriarch's Proposal For Restoration Of Constitutional Monarchy Receives Respectful Response."
[555] Interview Zurab Abashidze.

has not led to our [the government's] influence being increased. It has been in the church's interest to maintain the influence it has had since 2004 and which has been shaken up by the rose revolution of 2004'[556].

Here, it must be noted that the delicate issues of church funding and the GOC's relationship with the Saakashvili government are particularly interwoven in an anecdote already mentioned in the *Finances* section of this chapter:

'You mentioned the SUVs earlier that Saakashvili gave to the church[557]*. Why do you think these things were advertised on TV? Why this was so popularised? This was the period when Saakashvili and Illia II were in very bad relations with each other. During this period, Saakashvili decided to present these gifts to not the church as an institution as such but personally, to individual Archbishops. But some Archbishops rejected these gifts. It resulted in a very serious conflict between the church and the government. It is still controversial. From the second day of the present, Saakashvili's TV begun to label the church priests as corrupt and wondered why they would accept such gifts. They never asked the question why the President of such a poor country decided to give such luxurious presents, violated the law. He is the President and he has no right to give such presents. But people had quite a negative attitude towards these bishops because they took such luxurious presents. Ten of them could not say in public no but gave these cars to children charities. They did not even drive these cars because they were afraid that there was some sort of bugging device installed. But still as of today there is talk that the church received such presents'*[558]. In conclusion, Giorgadze perhaps best summarises the essence of this uneasy relationship when he points out that '*Saakashvili started to compromise the church. It was done and on purpose so that people should perceive the church as evil. With one hand they tried to pet the church, with the other hand they tried to struggle with the church'*[559].

Having established the contentious nature of the relationship between the GOC and her home government, another question that arises against this backdrop is whether, and if so, why, the GOC also possesses access within Russia, which it is able to use

[556] Interview Nino Kalandadze.
[557] *Referred to as 'luxury sports vehicles' in the Finance section above.*
[558] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze.
[559] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze.

for her political initiatives. At an earlier point of this chapter, it has become clear that the GOC's linkages to Russia are indeed so strong that, by utilising them, she is able to enter a conflict zone unharmed and negotiate with the Russian general in charge. What is more, the delegation visit to Moscow in November of 2008 (and all subsequent trips) demonstrate very clearly that this access is not just limited to the religious and military establishment of the Russian Federation but includes the senior Kremlin leadership. Put simply, in the timeframe this chapter seeks to investigate (and indeed beyond that), the Catholicos Patriarch has been the only Georgian 'statesman' to have met both Putin and Medvedev on a regular basis. Naturally, one might wonder about the reasons behind the ability to organise and carry out such high-profile delegations. The answer to this question seems to be twofold. On the one hand, as a senior church leader underscores, the GOC, and even more so the Patriarch himself:

> '*has international recognition. President Putin knows this very well. The Patriarch is a very well-respected person. He matters'*[560].

What is more, as an American embassy cable summarises it, 'the Patriarch's strong ties to Russia are manifest due to his place of birth, Russia-based theological education, and strong contact with the Russian Patriarchy'[561]. The fact that the leader of the GOC is held in high esteem in Russia is furthermore confirmed by Giorgadze who points out that:

> *'Our Catholicos has a great reputation among people –in Russia, within the Russian leadership, the wider Orthodox world. It is the respect from the Russian side to the Georgian church (...) They have lived with the ideology of being the Third Rome. Putin is trying his best to emphasise that he is in very good relations with the Georgian Patriarch, church and people. The patriarch has used this attitude at the right moment to build a bridge to Russia. He has freed prisoners, lifted air traffic ban, brought back the bodies of fallen soldiers and civilians'*[562].

Hence, as Saba, the Ruling Bishop of Georgian Diocese in North America, concludes, it is:

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[560] Interview Giorgi Tviadadze.
[561] Embassy Tbilisi. "Georgia: Impossible to govern without God and Bible ".
[562] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze.

'*not surprising that Patriarch went to Russia because he does have all these connections*'[563].

However, there might be a less overt channel of communication. An American Wikileaks cable, for example, cautiously cites claims that the GOC has been 'infiltrated by Russian agents'[564]. Does this appear to suggest that the Russian state and the GOC might, in the famous words of Dick Cheney, 'work through sort of the dark side, if you will (…) spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world'[565]?. To be sure, 'as a lot of what needs to be done here [is] done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to (…) intelligence agencies'[566], it is admittedly difficult for any researcher to provide the much sough-after 'smoking gun' to prove that this connection exists. Nonetheless, it is worth dwelling on this point a little more. Indeed, when asked about precisely why the GOC enjoys such close contacts with Russia and is able to carry out delegation visits, Saba answers with three letters, which had been the cause for considerable tremor in the era of the Cold War: '*KGB'*. His Grace continues by pointing out that such linkages go back to earlier decades of Soviet imperial rule when there were close connections between the churches in and outside of Russia and the Russian state since the time of Stalin. For the churches it was clear that: '*without cooperating with the KGB nothing was possible*'[567]. This impression is being reinforced by Giorgadze who admits:

> '*yes, these old links carry on. They exist. The tragedy is that the Georgian government never adopted a similar law, as you did it in the GDR, and published all the archives to see who was working for KGB and who was not. We asked Saakashvili in parliament to do that but he refused. But yes, the KGB put people in the church*'[568].

Of course, as one might expect, given the sour relations between the Saakashvili government and the church, DFM Kalandadze echoes such accusations of the GOC having ties to the sword and shield of the Russian state:

> *'Georgian society is very religious and thankful to the Patriarch. Yet, when it comes to Russia, one gets the impression that the Georgian Orthodox*

[563] Interview Intskirveli Saba.
[564] Embassy Tbilisi. "Georgia: Impossible to govern without God and Bible ".
[565] Washington Post, "Vice President Cheney On NBC's 'Meet The Press'".
[566] Washington Post, "Vice President Cheney On NBC's 'Meet The Press'".
[567] Interview Interview Intskirveli Saba.
[568] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze.

Church is indeed heavily infiltrated. By now this is no longer a secret. All the communists who fought against the church all of a sudden became very pious (…) in the entire post-soviet space where the churches play a significant role, the churches were an instrument of KGB back then and are of the FSB today (…) if we really decided to do something, it would probably be revealed that 50% have these connections (…) this truly is a problem when on a state level there are no diplomatic relations and a parallel policy is being pursued (…) this is a very influential instrument because in essence it is the FSB, which fights against Georgia and which possesses very well connected structures here and especially in the church, which is extremely powerful in our country (…) the FSB has had more than enough time to further strengthen and solidify its network here'.

Reminding one of the literature on weak state structures outside the Westphalian world of the occident, she furthermore concludes that '*for you in the West this danger is minimised because your state is very strong'*[569].

The picture which thus arises out of the examination of Step V is truly a fascinating one. It has throughout the thesis become clear that the GOC possesses extensive access to resources, elites, and institutions (being a *primus inter pares* institution herself) in her own country of Georgia. However, her own home government, led by President Saakashvili, appears to be deeply sceptical, if not outright antagonistic, towards the GOC – an attitude fuelled by a sense of rivalry and fear. At the same time, the GOC also enjoys overtly and seemingly covertly links to relevant institutions and information in Russia. Given the fact that the GOC proactively utilised this fascinating constellation in the pursuance of her own parallel agenda, unhindered by her own home government, makes one wonder already whether she might not perhaps best be described as a 'hijacker', as per the Conceptual Framework. Before being able to pass judgement on this, however, we must proceed to examine the remaining steps of the causal mechanism.

[569] Interview Nino Kalandadze; Note: this insight seems to reflect Ledeneva's writing on the custodians of the informal governance system whose *'monitoring function of smotryashchie (the watchers) is central for informal governance and should not be associated with some stereotypical siloviki planted everywhere to watch over businesses or projects'*. In this case, a foreign government seemed to have 'planted' its watchers in an institution operation in the realm of informal foreign policy, the GOC.

Step IV: NSA is able to operate with less accountability in at least one of the concerned states

In order to assess whether the GOC is able to operate with less accountability, it is useful to investigate this factor from a legalistic and a practical, 'on the ground'-perspective. For the former we must return to the one defining contractual agreement, which regulates the relationship between the church and the state in Georgia: the concordat. Concretely, in this context, one should raise the question whether the GOC is accountable to the government from a legal-theoretical standpoint. According to Mariam Tsatsanashvili, the main architect of this constitutional agreement under President Shevardnadze, one has to realise that the church is only accountable to the people of Georgia and not the government:

> *'there is a lot of support for the church from the people. This was one of the main reasons for why we had to make the agreement. This strength was even felt at a time when religion was prohibited under the Soviet Union. But then the government felt strong, strong enough, to deal with the church. The government supervised who will be Patriarch, who will be a Bishop. When this period ended, we decided to disentangle these two entities, the church and the government. The government should not interfere in the affairs of the church. Out of 235 parliamentarians 223 supported the concordat because the Georgian people supported it. The strength of the church comes from the support of the people. There is no accountability for the church in its activities vis-à-vis the government, its strength is organic from the people. It is them that the church has to answer to'*[570].

Indeed, the appearance of a certain power imbalance between *Sacerdotium* and *Regnum* in favour of the GOC is further reinforced by a senior member of the clergy, who underlines the superior position of the church vis-à-vis the secular authorities of the country by pointing out that:

> *'the following needs to be made clear: Of course, the church is separated from the state with the constitutional agreement. We are independent of the state and the state is independent of the church (…) But the government…they are also children of the church. This is very important.*

[570] Interview Mariam Tsatsanashvili.

They are in the bosom of the church. But whenever it comes to the national interest, we have only one obligation: to be loyal to God and to our statehood. And when we are speaking about these commitments, we have an obligation to nourish and to care for our statehood. I should mention here that with truth and with honesty that since the 4th century, when we were established, the church has always been devoted to this task before God and before our statehood. There have been periods when there were no secular authorities in this country and the church was the only institution who would unite the whole nation, protect our statehood, Georgian identity, language and culture.

Giorgadze, Georgian dissident in the USSR, Member of the Georgian Parliament and trusted friend of the Catholicos himself, reinforces the impression that the GOC is not bound by government legislation or supervision when he underlines that:

'he [the Patriarch] always supported us, the people. His strength comes from this, the people. But the Georgian church has always been the right director of the situation. They always acted in the name of the people. Whenever there is a critical situation in the country, the Church steps in and tries to support the national interest. But of course, the church does not try to govern day-to-day affairs. Generally, it helps solve to principal national issues. But this does of course not mean that the church might not have been loyal to the government. It always took the strategy of the government into consideration but when it came to national issues – beyond mere political issues – it always sought to support the people, the nation. This, of course, is the case when a big neighbour, such as Russia, invades us. Perhaps our Patriarch is not as strict with Russia but he always makes sure to uphold the interest of the nation'.

With reference to the previous step of the causal mechanism, it again becomes clear that truly the greatest resource the GOC can access is the trust extended to her by the people of Georgia – residual legitimacy, as the post-conflict state-building literature would refer to it. What is more, as the church seems to be only accountable to God and country, the main architect of the concordat, furthermore underlines another point which is of great interest for this nexus. According to Mariam Tsatsanashvili, at the time of the drafting of the concordat:

'Russia was looking at us with open eyes to see what course we would take after independence. The Russian state took another way. They had laws about religious organisations but there were so many regulations that we can really question the independence of the church in Russia. The church in Russia is more regulated, supervised by the state all religious organisations in Russia are. The Georgian church enjoys independence, the Russian church does not. The Russian Orthodox Church is not as independent from the government as the Georgian Orthodox Church. It is a fact. It is written in the law in Russia.

Having made this comparison and having underlined that the Georgian state was forced to go another route because of the irresistible power and influence of the church in Georgia, she acknowledges that:

'*we are a small country and there was a grave danger that could impact our state if the government did not cooperate with the church'*[571].

Having thus highlighted that legally the church does not owe any accountability to the Government of Georgia, we must now also briefly investigate how this lack of legal accountability plays out in GOC activities in the mundane world. In this regard, it has already been mentioned that the Patriarch took it upon himself to drive into the conflict zone – ignoring orders by the GoG to abort the mission. This insight has already indicated that the lack of accountability the GOC enjoys legally is neatly translated or rather applied into the theatre of operations in the political realm. Her main operations then in the context of this thesis, the delegation visits to Russia, were perceived and displayed by the church as being in the higher national interest of Georgia – which the GOC seems to be at liberty to define herself. Whilst the Georgian diplomat in Washington D.C. could not shed light on the question whether these GOC-led delegations were ordered by President Saakashvili, she nonetheless makes it very clear why the Catholicos is able to carry out such missions independently of the GoG:

'could the GOC have done this independently of the Saakashvilli government? I am not sure about this particular trip but first of all you have to realise that the number one trusted institution is the Patriarch, the highest

[571] Interview Mariam Tsatsanashvili.

approval goes to the Patriarch. To himself personally. The church is the most trusted institution of Georgia. I do not know how separate the decision was made with the government at the time. However, I would say that the Patriarch could have made this decision by himself. Yet, I still think he would have informed the government. These sort of things are decided behind 12 doors. But this does not exclude the fact that the Patriarch could have done it himself'[572].

Given the sense of rivalry and deep-rooted antagonism against the GOC, it should not come as a surprise that President Saakashvili, after the second delegation visit in December 2008, sought to evoke the impression that he 'welcomed the efforts of the Church of Georgia to build channels of communication with Moscow as 'a public diplomacy mission' and claimed that 'he had met the Patriarch before the latter's departure to Moscow to attend the funeral of the Patriarch of Russia and discussed with His Holiness a message to be conveyed to the Russian President'[573]. At first sight these statements appear to suggest that the GOC was merely doing the bidding of the GoG. However, upon closer inspection – behind the proverbial '12 doors' mentioned above – this impression of the state's dominance over the church falls apart. The supremacy of *imperium* over *sacerdotium* in the realm of foreign policy is indeed strongly rejected by a senior member of the clergy:

'the Church always does everything which is within her power. The Church does not need to be told that we should behave like this. The Patriarch himself is completely devoted to God and to his nation. So, the Patriarch does not have to be told by anyone that he should do this or that for our people. The Patriarch did everything possible. His authority is great. Not just within Georgia but within the entire Orthodox church. The Patriarch is always dedicated to our country and our people and did everything possible to help'[574].

Hence, it appears that the delegations visits to Russia, perhaps *the* most crucial and high-level linkage between the two countries during the last years of Saakashvili's government, were conducted independently by the GOC – without the government able to hold the church accountable for an initiative of which it seems not to have

[572] Interview Sofia Gegechkori.
[573] Civil Georgia, "Saakashvili Hails Church's 'Diplomatic Mission'."
[574] Interview Giorgi Tviadadze.

been too fond of. This is confirmed by Zurab Abashidze, who himself took part in the delegation visits:

> '*this was the only channel of communication and contact with the Russian side and they [the church] had all these contacts themselves (...) It was the church's initiative to go there'*[575].

The impression that no accountability for the GOC's activities were in place is further reinforced by the fact that the Georgian Foreign Ministry itself (Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze, to be more precise) was unable to evaluate the delegation visits speaks volumes in this regard[576]. As she herself admits:

> '*Saakashvili does not have the power to tell the Patriarch to go to Moscow. These delegations were the initiative by the church and Saakashvili could not do anything about it nor could he object it'.*

Having thereby clearly established that the church could neither be ordered to act on behalf of the secular authorities of Georgia nor be held accountable for its actions, she warns of the unchecked parallel foreign policy that the GOC pursues, which has to be treated with:

> '*utmost caution as the population of Georgia is still very religious indeed and a majority is under the influence of the church. This means that the Georgian population can be manipulated. This is a sentiment which can be instrumentalised. Because of this we did not welcome that this [the delegation visits] took place without consulting us, without approval by the state (...) The church can have her influence felt for or against the state when a particular government is not to her liking*[577]*'.*

Against this background, it can be established that the GOC can legally and practically operate without any accountability. Indeed, the only accountability she sets for herself seems to be a proverbial one, namely, towards God and the nation of Georgia. Together with her access to resources, institutions and information in

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[575] Interview Zurab Abashidze; Note: the above seems to reflect Ledeneva's writings on the 'ambivalence of constraints' and 'flexibility of rules' within *sistema*. Whilst the GoG sought to impose rules on how the Church ought to behave towards Russia, the GOC enjoyed an ambivalence of constraints and could bypass any rules she was asked to adhere to.

[576] Interpressnews, "Georgian Foreign Ministry Cannot Evaluate The Visit Of Catholicos-Patriarch In Moscow."

[577] Interview Nino Kalandadze; Note: Going back Slaughter's writings on networks, this might constitute an interesting example of 'how these formal unitary state relations conflict with relations among parts of states in the informal sector'.

both her own country as well as in Russia this makes the GOC a formidable and qualified NSA in foreign policy. Again, it should be highlighted that the GOC is able to conduct her operations even though her own government – although unable to intervene – appears to be outright hostile towards her activities, which are perceived as running counter to the national interest as defined by the secular authorities of Georgia. Keeping this fascinating constellation of factors in mind, we must now finally turn towards examining how the GOC is able to most effectively implement its agenda and policies in and between the concerned states and influence their foreign policies respectively.

Step V: NSA able to most effectively implement its agenda in and between the concerned state actors + Step VI: Successful influence on the Foreign Policy of the concerned state actors towards each other through NSA activity.

So far, we have examined all preceding steps of the causal mechanism and, by briefly analysing the November 2008 delegation visit to Moscow, already obtained a glimpse into the manner and mechanism through which the GOC sought to fulfil her foreign policy agenda of being a bridge between two countries, whose diplomatic relationship was utterly shattered by the 2008 war. However, how precisely this very bridge was built, further solidified, to what end and with what effect is a matter, which still requires more elaboration. We have already learned that the delegation visits had become 'the only thread, the only channel, that connects the two countries'[578]. At the same time, no other official and direct state-to-state contact was established and the multilateral format in Geneva 'essentially dead'[579]. What is more, the rhetoric between the Russian and Georgian political establishment remained tense and high-pitched and seemed to make a rapprochement under the administration of President Saakashvili very unlikely indeed. The GOC, meanwhile, in pursuance of her historical mission organised delegation visits so as to assure that some direct channel of communication would be opened and groundwork for a gradual improvement of the bilateral relations paved.

[578] Kishkovsky, "Georgian Church Envoys Meet With Russian Official".
[579] Interview Nino Kalandadze.

Another crucial delegation visit, led by the Catholicos himself, took place in December of 2008 in the wake of the funeral of Patriarch Alexey II of Russia[580]. It is important to examine this particular trip and its subsequent events in more detail as it reveals much about the influence and status of the GOC and the relationship between GOC and the Saakashvili government. Indeed, seemingly utilising the GOC's authority and reputation, a meeting, described by the Patriarch as 'historic'[581] as well as 'useful and friendly'[582] was arranged between Illia II and Russian President Medvedev on December 9th, 2008. Having thereby demonstrated that the leader of the GOC was the only Georgian able to meet the senior Russian leadership, he urged that 'our [the Georgian] leadership should use this visit to further improve relations and continue in the same direction, which will hopefully bring good results'[583]. The 'quite positive and good agreements' that the Russian President and the Georgian Patriarch had reached would require 'careful and diplomatic follow-up'[584]. At the time, one would even hear 'unconfirmed reports, rumours in other words, that the Patriarch brought back from Russia a settlement option', which was, however, 'absolutely unacceptable for the current administration'[585]. Indeed, this very administration, unable to act on its own, eagerly awaited the return of its church leader. Upon his return to Tbilisi, the Patriarch was visited by Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze, the actor that traditional state-centrism would normally regard as being responsible for the sort of mission the GOC undertook. Showing that the GOC had become the sole and most powerful voice of the nation of Georgia vis-à-vis the Russian Federation, Vashadze had to admit that the GOC 'is very authoritative'[586] in Russia and proclaimed that 'the Patriarch had interesting meetings, among them that with the Russian President. This means that dialogue between Russia and Georgia has been renewed'[587]. Joining the chorus of praise, Zurab Abashidze, former ambassador to

[580] Geotimes, "Ilia II Plans To Meet With Russian Authorities."
[581] The Messenger, "Versions Of The Visit."
[582] Radio Free Europe, "Overview Of The Week's Events."
[583] Radio Free Europe, "Overview Of The Week's Events."
[584] RadioFreeEurope, "Who Has An Interest In Discrediting Georgia's Patriarch?."; Civil Georgia, "Head Of Georgian Church Again Speaks Of 'Positive Agreements' With Medvedev."
[585] The Messenger, "Versions Of The Visit."
[586] Civil Georgia, "Saakashvili Hails Church's 'Diplomatic Mission'.";
[587] The Messenger, "Versions Of The Visit."

Russia and member of the delegation, underlined that the GOC again 'played a positive role' in building a dialogue between the two countries[588].

Yet, apart from opening up political space for a resumption of dialogue between state actors in both countries, the influence of the Patriarch manifested itself in the fact that the Russian military withdrew from the village of Perevi, just outside the recently occupied territories – an achievement rightfully perceived as being the result of the 'efforts of the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia'[589]. However, in contrast to his apparently enthusiastic foreign minister, President Saakashvili seemed not to be willing to concede that the GOC had acted independently and was *de facto* the only Georgian actor to undertake such a diplomatic operation. Whilst welcoming the 'efforts of the church to build channels of communication with Moscow as a "public diplomacy mission"', he vehemently underlined that the Patriarch talked to Medvedev at his direction and claimed that 'before the Patriarch's departure they had met and agreed what message he was to convey to the Russian President'. Making it clear that he had dictated the message the Catholicos presented to the Russian side, he asserted that he was 'grateful that he conveyed all our thoughts, word for word, to the country which carried out the occupation of a significant part of our territory and continues doing so'[590]. Of course, we have already learned that this constituted a failed attempt to assert the supremacy of the state vis-à-vis the GOC. After all:

> *'the Church does not need to be told that we should behave like this. The Patriarch himself is completely devoted to God and to his nation*[591]*'*

and, as the President's DFM herself admitted:

> '*Saakashvili does not have the power to tell the Patriarch to go to Moscow. These delegations were the initiative by the church and Saakashvili could not do anything about it nor could he object it'*[592].

This view was subsequently further strengthened by the Russian side, which made it very clear indeed that Moscow would only regard the Catholicos and the GOC as a legitimate counterpart for negotiations with Georgia. As Giorgadze describes it:

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[588] Civil Georgia, "Head Of Georgian Church On Russo-Georgian Ties."
[589] Ambebi, "Perevi - The Subject Of Political Bargaining."
[590] Civil Georgia, "Saakashvili Hails Church's 'Diplomatic Mission'."; Radio Free Europe, "Overview Of The Week's Events.".
[591] Interview Giorgi Tviadadze.
[592] Interview Nino Kalandadze.

> '*when the Patriarch visited Moscow, President Saakashvili claimed that it was him who sent the Patriarch there. You know what was the result of this when he said this? The Russian troops who had left already came back [into Perevi] in protest. Putin declared whilst he respected the Catholicos, it would not be acceptable if the Patriarch merely acted on behalf of Saakashvili. In that case, he said, he would return Russian troops in protest of Saakashvili*'[593].

That the Patriarch had asked the Russian President for a withdrawal of his troops from the village and the Russian follow-up, as an explicit gesture of goodwill towards the GOC, is also confirmed by Zurab Abashidze, who was present at the time, and a senior church leader[594]. Their account can be further corroborated by reports, which make it clear that 'about half an hour after Saakashvili's speech, when the first Russian tank in Perevi returned. The Russians are very angry and they said that the Commander was given the order to return to Perevi after Saakashvili's speech (…) Putin had personally called the General and ordered him to return the troops back to the village. It [was] said that the withdrawal of the Russian troops Medvedev ordered was the merit of the Patriarch of Georgia'[595]. The perception that the Russian military had withdrawn as a result of the negotiations conducted by the Catholicos and returned because of an apparent envy of a state actor is further solidified by Nino Burjanadze, the former parliamentary chairperson who 'blamed President Saakashvili's, "irresponsible statement" for Russia's decision to retake Perevi and alleged that the President had "undermined the positive results achieved by Ilia II (…) who visited Moscow last week"'[596]. Similarly, Georgian newspapers observed that whilst 'the Georgian Patriarchy was credited with the four-hour de-occupation of the village, (…) the return of the Russian military was presented as a "response to the president's thoughtless

[593] Interview Mamuka Giorgadze; This insight reflects Ledeneva's writings on controlling and utilising informal networks – although in this case, the GoG seemed to be incapable of doing so and therefore did not prove itself to be a 'leader' in the 'international *sistema*. After all, ''*in societies [or situations, such as diplomatic crises, one might add] where formal institutions do not work to their full potential and where people rely on informal ways of getting things done, the leadership is bound to rely on the use of informal instruments as well. Leaders can only be leaders once they master and control informal networks. The manageability of informal networks is often achieved with informal means and instruments'.*

[594] Interview Zurab Abashidze; Girogi Tviadadze.

[595] Presa, "The Russians Leave Perevi Only In Words."

[596] Civil.Ge, "Perevi Developments Ahead Of Geneva Talks."

statement"'[597], as 'Moscow presumed the dialogue was with Saakashvili' with the Catholicos acting as his messenger[598].

Against this background, the Perevi case demonstrates that the GOC can, through the mechanism of delegation visits, successfully negotiate and deliver results in the mundane world - although it was ultimately to no avail due to President's Saakashvili's rhetorical intervention. However, the most important insight one can derive from this particular case is that the GOC continued to keep the proverbial foot in the door in Georgia's relations with Russia. Amidst international discussion groups and state-led forums in Geneva, which would ultimately end in a stalemate, she, as the only Georgian actor, activated and kept open a channel of communication with the senior Russian leadership. Simply put, from the Georgian side the GOC, an NSA, had become *the* foreign policy actor that would interact with Russia. This is of particular importance as the Kremlin itself would categorically refuse to directly talk to Saakashvili and his government. As one might expect, these conditions made the role of the GOC in the realm of foreign policy indispensable. Furthermore, slightly foregoing the analytical conclusion of this chapter, Perevi also demonstrates that a government, which has been shown its own limits, might nonetheless seek to take back control. The statements made by President Saakashvili, implying that the Patriarch was allegedly doing the government's bidding as well as his continued rhetorical salvos towards Russia might well be understood as a calculated attempt to spoil a foreign policy agenda pursued by an 'entrepreneurial hijacker', who was perceived as a rival. Hence, it must be regarded as a foreign policy achievement in and of itself given the high level of tensions, which manifested themselves in numerous instances when a resumption of hostilities seemed imminent[599].

Truly, this very constellation – the GOC conducting the only direct talks with the Russian Federation, whilst her own government becoming more and more antagonistic and ever more heated in its rhetoric towards Russia, the international talks delivering no progress, and the threat of renewed war hanging over the

[597] Central Asia & The Caucasus, "Central Eurasia 2008 Analytical Annual."; Democrats, "Nino Burjanadze Responds To The Opposition's Accusations."
[598] The Messenger, "Versions Of The Visit."
[599] Russia Today, "RT: Ossetian War"; Radio Free Europe, "Frictions Fuel Fears Of New Conflict."; Kupunia, "The Messenger - Foreign Ministry Condemns Russia's 'Deliberate Attempts' To Escalate The Situation."

Caucasian mountains – would become the new status quo until the end of the Saakashvili government. Indeed, the Russian side was very clear: although it sought to have 'direct contact with Georgia "without middlemen"', it was underlined that 'for both PM Putin and President Medvedev (…) there would be no direct contacts with Saakashvili'. Instead, the Georgian Charge d'Affaires in Russia, Givi Shugarov, stressed that until Saakashvili had been removed – by force or through elections – the Kremlin was 'focused on promoting rapprochement through the Russian Orthodox Church'[600]. The impression that the Russian state preferred to deal with a Georgian NSA rather than the Saakashvili government is further reinforced by other members of the country's foreign policy establishment. Dmitry Shtodin, for example, highlights that his government 'abided by Medvedev's categorical refusal to talk to Saakashvili or the GOG'. He points to 'the Russian Orthodox Church's decision not to recognize the South Ossetian Orthodox Church, but instead maintain its recognition of the Georgian Orthodox Church's authority over the South Ossetian faithful, as another example of this policy'[601]. Indeed, this focus on the GOC and the appreciation of this direct, albeit non-state-based, channel of communication was visible even higher up in the ranks of the Russian political leadership. President Medvedev, for example, pointed out that 'he personally will refrain from any contacts with Saakashvili, as he believes the latter "has committed crimes both against his own people and against the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia"'[602]. On a different occasion, the Russian President repeated this direction of Russian foreign policy, underlining that it is Saakashvili who bears full responsibility for the war[603] and direct ties would only be restored after his resignation: 'I don't see any chances [for improvement] during the incumbent Georgian president's rule, because I am convinced that he did a bad thing, or, to put it in legal terms, he committed a crime'[604]. Russian Minister Lavrov, on the other hand, emphasised that 'we allot a special role to relations between the Russian and Georgian Orthodox Churches. Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II has

[600]Embassy Moscow, "Georgian Representation In Moscow."
[601] Embassy Moscow, "MFA On Possibility Of Regime Change In Georgia."
[602] Radio Free Europe, "Who Has An Interest In Discrediting Georgia's Patriarch?."
[603] Civil Georgia, "Medvedev: Saakashvili Should Be Held Responsible For War."
[604] Alto, "Russia, Georgia To Repair Ties After Saakashvili Quits — Medvedev."

repeatedly spoken in favour of us having normal relations, including when he visited Moscow. There was a delegation of the Georgian Orthodox Church in Moscow recently (…) This is a very big factor which underscores the spiritual, cultural and humanitarian unity of our peoples. I am certain that this factor will ultimately prevail'[605]. Indeed, it was again underscored by the Foreign Minister that 'we do not avoid contacts with the Georgian side, such contacts have been maintained. You know that during the Orthodox Christmas season charter flights took place. That was a request by the Georgian side. We felt that it would be correct. Moreover, we are ready to open regular air communication, and the relevant services of the two countries may well discuss it'[606]. On this point, we learn from an American Embassy cable that these 'contacts', which enabled the resumption of flights between the two countries, suspended after the war, were in fact the Patriarch and the GOC. Indeed, the breakthrough 'was reached with mediation by the Georgian Patriarch to temporarily resume charter flights for the 2009 New Year/Orthodox Christmas period'. Seemingly with a sense of astonishment, the US diplomats state that 'the information on the possible realization of charter flights between Georgia and Russia became known to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia from the statements made by the Russian Foreign Ministry', which, of course, had negotiated with the GOC instead of the 'normal' counterpart on the state level[607]. Apart from the fact that tourism, thereby re-enabled, plays a very significant factor in Georgia's economy in general[608], it is surely remarkable to observe that an NSA would be able and capable to negotiate inter-state bilateral agreements without prior consultations with its own government. Whilst this is surely not of the same magnitude as achieving the retreat of the Russian military from Perevi, it nonetheless appears that the GOC has taken over the bilateral dialogue with the Russian Federation – in parallel to and seemingly against the preferences of the GoG. It is thus altogether fitting and appropriate to agree with those American diplomats who observed that the GOC 'appears to have made some progress in opening a semi-official back channel. The trip highlights the critical role the GOC plays in Georgian politics and foreign relations'[609].

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[605] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Russian Minister Of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov's Interview With Television Channel Vesti".
[606] Lavrov, "Russian Minister Of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Interview To RIA Novosti".
[607] Embassy Tbilisi, "Georgia: Charter Flights To Russia Set To Resume January 8."
[608] Bhutia, "Measuring The Impact Of Russia's Tourism Embargo On Georgia."
[609] Embassy Tbilisi, "Georgia: Patriarch Discusses Church Delegation To Moscow."

Yet, as already mentioned, the GoG seems to have become a mere passive bystander, which sought to unsuccessfully take back control over the process by undermining GOC initiatives. Indeed, the relationship between state and church further deteriorated in the years following the war[610]. In addition to the pre-existing animosities between *Imperium* and *Sacerdotium,* already highlighted throughout this chapter, the GOC's ever-growing influence in the homeland and the outside world led to, as one US cable puts it, more and more 'Georgian Government officials (…) privately expressing frustration over the expansive role the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) plays in society'. As a consequence, the document observes that 'the long-hidden conflict between the GOC and GOG may be beginning to play out publicly in subtle ways (…) [although] this power struggle between the GOG and the GOC is cloaked; however, in subtle innuendoes and privately confessed aggravations by GOG officials'. Further underlining the impression that the events of 2008 have enormously strengthened the church, 'First Deputy Minister of Justice Tina Burjaliani told us that she could not understand the rise of the GOC's influence (…) Burjaliani said that "just four to five years ago, after the Rose Revolution, Patriarch Ilia II and the GOC did not wield nearly as much power as they do now"'[611]. This very rift between the secular and the religious also becomes apparent in the Patriarch's public criticism of the government for failing to avoid the August 2008 war. Seemingly blaming Saakashvili personally, the Catholicos, perhaps the more 'astute diplomat'[612], pointed out that 'when a vessel is on the sea, its leader, a captain should know where reefs are in order to avoid them (…) the tragic events in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali shouldn't have happened. We could have avoided them'[613]. These comments were widely interpreted to 'mark the first time in recent Georgian history when the Orthodox Church and the government find themselves at odds[614]'. As member of the Georgian foreign service put it perhaps rather undiplomatically: '*If you as a government fail then you are creating a void and somebody else will fill that void of leadership. This*

[610] Interview Nino Kalandadze.
[611] Embassy Tbilisi, "Georgia: Church And State, Maintaining A Delicate Balance."
[612] Embassy Tbilisi. "Georgia: Impossible to govern without God and Bible ".
[613] Interfax Religion, "Ilia II Believes It Was Possible To Avoid August Crisis 2208 In Caucasus."
[614] Radio Free Europe, "Georgian Patriarch Criticizes Saakashvili For War."

is most likely what happened when the church decided to engage with the Russian side'[615].

Having said this, it speaks to the enormous prowess of the GOC to, despite the circumstances, be able to successfully continue its initiative. To be sure, territorial integrity, the ultimate objective of Russo-Georgian interaction, can *de jure* only be signed into law on a state-to-state level. However, it has been the declared goal of the GOC to operate as a bridge and run a parallel foreign policy stream with the 'desire to serve a positive role in normalizing and stabilizing relations with Russia'[616] and to serve her historic mission so as to steer 'rudderless Georgians towards stiller waters'[617]. Yet, stiller waters were clearly not in sight under the Saakashvili administration, which continued to escalate its rhetoric towards Russia. The election of the Georgia Dream Coalition under Bidsina Ivanishvili in 2012 was thus perhaps the 'miracle in Georgia-Russia Ties' that the Patriarch had hoped for:

> *With the change of the government in Georgia, a pragmatic attitude towards Russia set in (…) the new government toned down the temper and has chosen a more pragmatic attitude towards Russia. But there is no direct clash verbally as we had it previously. The temperature has gone down. This is an important thing because for many years the US, our strategic partner, had asked Georgia to cool down the rhetoric and work with a cold mind to get the real results*[618].

The Russian Federation seemed to be equally pleased with the outcome. As Vladimir Putin's spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov put it: 'We are definitely looking forward for a fresh, new non-hostile, sober leadership in Georgia (…) if they have more political wisdom under a new leadership, then lots and lots of new roads can be opened for the country'[619]. One of the very notable roads that being opened was,

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[615] Interview Sofia Gegechkori; Note: this furthermore shows, to speak with Slaughter, that *'states must also be the places where web actors reside, reaching across boundaries as they engage in commercial, civic, political, and criminal justice pursuits that reverberate in global affairs just as much as state actions do*'. In this case, however, it seems that Russia was more adapt at doing so compared to its Georgian counterpart. In Slaughter's own terminology, Russia proved to be capable of being 'wave and particle at the same time'.
[616] Embassy Tbilisi, "Tbilisi: Patriarch's Take On Moscow Meetings, Abkhasia, Alexei II."
[617] Embassy Tbilisi, "Tbilisi: Patriarch's Take On Moscow Meetings, Abkhasia, Alexei II."
[618] Interview Sofia Gegechkori.
[619] Harding et al., "Georgia's President Saakashvili Concedes Election Defeat."

in November 2012, the establishment of 'an office of the PM's special envoy for relations with Russia and [the appointment] of diplomat Zurab Abashidze, Georgia's former ambassador to Russia in 2000-2004, to that post'. Apart from claims that the GOC allegedly sought to influence the Georgian voters to help the new government to be elected[620], which might be difficult to verify, it should not come as a surprise at this point that a key member of the church delegations was appointed to be the first direct contact with Russia since the August 2008 war. Indeed, the Karasin-Abashidze format 'resumed direct dialogue between the two countries officials suspended after the 2008 developments'[621]. It constituted the 'only official direct dialogue between the two countries'[622]. MacFarlane seems to underscore the importance of this development when he points out that 'the new government showed considerable focus in its relations with Russia. The vituperative rhetoric towards the country ceased when Georgian Dream came to power. In November 2012 the government appointed a special representative, Zurab Abashidze, to initiate a dialogue with Russia (…) He reported directly to the PM, emphasizing the centrality of the task'[623]. The establishment of this direct state-to-state channel in 2012 took place amidst much frustration with the other existing mechanisms:

> '*We expected much more from Geneva. Our illusions…we invested huge energy into this format but there was a huge disappointment*'.

Compared with the hot-tempered relations with Russia under President Saakashvili, this direct communication must be interpreted as a crucial sign of normalisation. In the words of Zurab Abashidze himself:

> '*The tensions in 2012 were still very high. The idea was to reduce these tensions which would not allow us to stabilise internally, would not allow any investors to come. This was a necessity. Having such high tensions with Russia creates huge problems for the country politically and economically (…) Yes, of course it was a sign of normalisation. It was an initiative by Tbilisi. The idea was to establish a new channel of communication and to reduce the temperature of the confrontation, the possibility of new violence.*

[620] Goshadze, "The Rise Of The Christian-Orthodox Church In Post-Soviet Georgia."; Harding et al., "Georgia's President Saakashvili Concedes Election Defeat."
[621] Tass, "Moscow Hails Georgian PM's Intention To Normalize Relations With Russia."
[622] RT Deutsch, "Russia's DFM: Moscow Interested in Improving Relations with Georgia".
[623] MacFarlane, *Two Years Of The Dream*.

There was very high tension. To step-by-step normalise the relations. We had the first meeting end of December and we decided to have our own agenda and not to repeat the same agenda and mistakes of Geneva. Mainly focus on trade, the economy. There was no transport communication with Russia, there was no export going to Russia, which for us is very important. The idea was to settle as much as possible'[624].

Indeed, business and trade had become one of the main victims of the war, which hurt the Georgian economy significantly as it depended on Russia 'for around 18 percent of its total exports' – with wine accounting for 'almost 90 percent of these sectors' exports'[625]. Hence, it must indeed be regarded as 'a broader shift in bilateral relations' when Moscow, in January of 2013 announced that such products may return to the Russian market shortly[626] and a Georgian economic delegation travelled to Moscow in February of 2009 to 'discuss restoring trade between the two countries' so as to 'normalise economic ties between Russia and Georgia'[627]. All in all, in the words of MacFarlane, 'the elections of 2012 replaced a government that was a major opponent of Russia with one committed to reducing tension in the relationship and to exploring improvement in areas of mutual benefit. Pragmatism replaced brinksmanship (…) The new government knew what it wanted in relation to Russia and had a clear sense of what compromises it could accept in order to get there. It put an effective process in place to reduce diplomatic tensions and restore trade without political concessions on the occupied territories'[628].

In the light of these developments, it might thus in conclusion be said that that Zurab Abashidze, the first direct state-to-state contact, and the Georgian business delegation both walked across the very bridge to Russia that the GOC had sought to erect and kept fortified after the August 2008 war[629]. Georgia now had 'a new government that is open for talks', as the Catholicos Patriarch, 'the only official in

[624] Interview Zurab Abashidze.
[625] Stratfor, "Georgia And Russia Work To Improve Economic Ties."
[626] Hvino News, "Eight Georgian Experts To Negotiate Wine."
[627] Stratfor, "Georgia And Russia Work To Improve Economic Ties."
[628] MacFarlane, *Two Years Of The Dream*.
[629] Note: It is worth bearing in mind that, according to Ledeneva, informal governance is characterised by its 'diffuse nature' so that it may '*penetrate formal and informal hierarchies [to] ensure that both types of hierarchies have no fixed boundaries'*. The fact that Abashidze, a member of a prior informal, non-state initiative, would now hold an official government-appointed post demonstrates that the line between both realms and hierarchies, the formal and the informal, is indeed blurred.

Georgia who has kept his ties with Russia', himself put it[630]. Indeed, it was the leader of the GOC who personally passed on greetings from the new leader of Georgia, Bidsina Ivanishvili, to Vladimir Putin and assured him that all necessary and possible steps shall be undertaken to build up relations again[631]. Pointing at the previous Georgian administration and its President, he Patriarch asserted after this meeting that '[Putin is a] very wise man [who] will do everything to ensure Russia and Georgia remain brothers, and the love between the countries will be eternal (...) in the past Russia and Georgia were like brothers, but apparently someone envied this, and artificially created hostility between us'[632]. Another thinly veiled criticism of former President Saakashvili came when, during the same trip, the Patriarch blamed the outbreak of the August 2008 war on 'separate individuals'[633] and asserted that 'what happened is neither Russia's fault nor Georgia's It was the fault of some individuals'[634]. Almost as if to confirm this view but to primarily acknowledge the role the Patriarch had played since 2008, he was awarded with the IFUOCN prize 'For Special Services in Strengthening Fraternal Ties between Orthodox Nations and Churches'[635]. A tribute repeated by Vladimir Putin who on the occasion of Ilia II's 80th birthday and his 35-year anniversary as Patriarch, stressed how much 'we appreciate your warm attitude towards Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church. Your personal efforts, and calls for peace, love, creation, harmony and unity largely contributed to the preservation of centuries-old ties of friendship and understanding between our peoples in a complex stage of history'[636]. Having outlined this, it has become clear that the GOC was able to most effectively implement its agenda and policies in and between concerned states and was therefore successful in influencing the foreign policies of both Georgia and Russia towards each other. In the words of the Catholicos himself, it has become clear that 'it is true that we are not politicians and we do not need to take serious steps in this

[630] RT International, "Patriarch Of Georgia: Our Church And People Never Cut Ties With Russia."
[631] Civil Georgia, "Georgian Patriarch Met With Putin In Moscow."
[632] Kakachia, "Is Georgia's Orthodox Church An Obstacle To European Values?."
[633] Mendiashvili, "The Law Of Russian-Georgian Eternity."; Education and Orthodoxy, "We Have Always Been And Will Remain Brothers."
[634] Tabula, "Ilia II: Putin Will Do Everything For Us To Remain Friends."
[635] The Russian Orthodox Church, "Primates Of Russian And Georgian Orthodox Churches Meet With Russian President Vladimir Putin."
[636] The President of Russia, "Catholicos-Patriarch Of All Georgia Iliah II."

area, but with the help of God, it is more or less possible to influence the processes'[637] – of foreign policy decision-making, one might add.

Conclusion

The *katechon* (κατέχον) is a biblical term found in second letter to the Thessalonians (2:6-7)[638] and might roughly be translated as 'he who holds it together'. It thus represents a force that protects and keeps together alive a world that is facing chaos and danger. To be sure, whilst scholars ranging from Carl Schmitt to Paolo Virno have tried to conceptualise the *katechon*, one is tempted to conclude that in this case study it was the GOC, in the service to its own country, which manifested Georgia's *katechon* – holding the country together during and after the war with a vastly superior Russia.

Indeed, one can observe a fully completed process of 'uploading'. Envisioned by an NSA operating under the condition of autonomy, a policy is being initiated, its operation aided by the lack of accountability in the country it operates in. However, in contrast to a facilitator, this policy is not 'offered' to the home government. Rather, due to its access to resources in both Russia and Georgia, the GOC's operations after the August 2008 war appear to resemble more a case of 'hijacking' as she was able to take control over the process from the nominal principal, the GoG, and pursue a parallel strategy, running counter to the principal's agenda. At the same time, it must again be born in mind that the GOC could surely not have restored the territorial integrity of Georgia all by herself. Although she might have repeatedly asked the Russian leadership for it, her role was to ensure stability at a time when tensions between the Georgian and Russian governments would not calm down. The bridge she erected was to be used and maintained until a new government, with a more pragmatic attitude, would come to power in Georgia. Against this background, one is indeed reminded of General Durrani's observation that:

> *'there are those who have always been there (...) who keep the relationship in some sort of shape and make sure it does not go beyond a certain point*

[637] Patriarchate Of Georgia, "Speech Of The Catholicos-Patriarch Of All Georgia To The Russian Patriarch Kirill."
[638] Bible Gateway, "2 Thessalonians 2:6-7."

(...) they are not going to be able to turn around the entire relationship but they will have identified key people to approach when things are on the way towards betterment'[639].

A manifestation of these 'key people' can be found in the appointment of Zurab Abashidze, a regular member of the GOC delegation, who was personally approached to come on board by the Patriarch, as Georgia's Special Representative for Russia under the new government in 2012. Having made this clear, it must, of course, also be noted that the GOC's successful uploading of its 'bridge building' towards Russia until the end of the antagonistic Saakashvili government also bears implications for the initial hypotheses.

Regarding H1, for example, it has become clear that the GOC did not require access to government elites in Georgia to pursue its objectives. Rather, she was able to tap into a pre-existing channel of communication with the Russian church and state and use the same in the pursuance of her agenda. H1 might thus be seen as partially falsified by this case study as the GOC could engage successfully in foreign policy-making *although* it did not need to have direct access to government elites in Georgia. Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that she could have ensured this access easily. She did, however, require access to government and church elites in Russia to ensure that her bridge-building activities could be maintained. Hence, a mixed picture emerges, which might be seen as necessary and conducive for an NSA operating as a hijacker. Simply put, the GOC as a hijacker is able and capable of pursuing a foreign policy that is running counter to its rather impotent home government's wishes and is even further aided in this endeavour by utilising strong contacts to government elites in another country, namely Russia.

Having said this, it is also important to underscore that her superior ability to operate under less or no accountability has given the GOC an edge over the Georgian state representatives' ability to engage in negotiations with Russia. In fact, such state actors were regarded as *personae non grata* by the Kremlin. This lack of governmental control or supervision the GOC enjoys in the pursuance of her self-defined historical mission can be found in the legal framework she operates in, as

[639] Interview Muhammad Asad Durrani.

enshrined in the concordat, and also stems from the enormous popularity and support she possesses among the Georgian population. Indeed, precisely because NSAs are less accountable to their state of origin, the GOC was able to effectively circumvent traditional or rather conventional channels and pursue policies, which neither the NSA nor the state would otherwise be able to carry out. That the GoG seems to have been uninformed about the delegation visits and would sometimes only hear about the results from the media, its inability to stop the Patriarch from entering the war zone or traveling to Moscow to negotiate on behalf of Georgia, and its failed attempts to spoil the GOC's activities by subtly seeking to compromise its integrity, all reinforce the notion that NSAs *engage successfully in foreign policy-making because they are less accountable in the state they operate in* (H3).

Related to this is, of course, the fact that the GOC stepped into or rather *seized* a vacuum that opened because the relations between Georgia and Russia had been completely broken off. She was able to seize the opportunity and occupy political space that had been left vacant for her own, self-defined project and agenda. Thus, she was able to 'upload' her objectives to the level of official Georgian foreign policy, in effect becoming *the* premier arbiter of Georgian foreign policy. One can thus confirm H2, as the GOC was able to fill a vacuum in foreign policy-making at time when bilateral cooperation was difficult among given countries.

Chapter 4: Commerce, Chambers and Custodians: Pakistan's *Derin Devlet* and AfPak Trade

Background

Disciples of Liberal Internationalist Theory have proclaimed that the promotion of the mutually reinforcing duality of democracy and trade must be regarded as the most effective instrument for the establishment of lasting Kantian peace between nations. Western policy-makers, since the days of the British Raj, have seemingly sought to introduce this school of thought in the mundane world on both sides of the Durand line through the application of overwhelming imperial might. And yet, despite the passing of the mantle from Britain to the US and the emergence of Pakistan, as the legal heir to the line Sir Mortimer drew in 1893, her landlocked neighbour, Afghanistan, has up until today not officially recognised the common border[640]. Indeed, despite Western pressure, neither side seems to have been enlightened enough to turn swords to ploughshares. Hence, the porous border continued to constitute a blind spot in the empire's realm, in which America's will would be denied. Indeed, the return of English-speaking battalions to the country after the *attentat* of 9/11, only deepened the already existing friction between Pakistan and Afghanistan. With political tensions still high, no high-level meetings taking place, economic relations between the two failing to achieve the desired heights, trade falling into the abyss of illicit activity, the imposition of severe regulatory duties on Afghan goods by the GoP, and a border closed to trade, the situation appeared grim. Amidst this turmoil, it was not an external but a 'native', Pakistani body, the Pakistan Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PAJCCI), which started working towards the removal of such impediments to a more pragmatic trade and political relationship. Yet, as shall be made clear, there is more to PAJCCI's efforts than just the benign activities of commerce directed at improving a bilateral trade relationship. Looming chaos naturally calls upon those custodians of order, which might not hold government office but nonetheless define the boundaries and direction of state policy. The initiatives pursued by PAJCCI, as will be seen, appear reminiscent of what William Pitt once described in 1770 as this 'long train of these practices [which] has at length unwillingly convinced me that

[640] Zahler, "No Change In Stance On Durand Line: Faizi".

there is something behind the throne, greater than the throne itself'[641]. Before seeking to lift this veil, however, we must briefly outline which existing scholarly works this chapter speaks to and builds upon.

Embedding the chapter in the wider scholarly debate

Naturally, given the subject of this chapter, a chamber of commerce, the first instinct would be to turn our analytical attention to literatures concerning commercial and economic diplomacy. To be sure, both types of diplomacy are 'irrevocably intertwined'[642] and must therefore be regarded as 'distinct [but] obviously closely related'[643]. Economic diplomacy itself is defined as an activity seeking to 'secure the nation's interests and to serve economic interests through diplomatic means'[644] or simply as 'the use of international political tools to obtain economic objectives'[645]. Rana echoes this when he describes it as a 'process through which countries tackle the outside world, to maximize their national gain in all the fields of activity, including trade, investment and other forms of economically beneficial exchanges, where they enjoy comparative advantage'[646]. This would include 'all aspects of business support and promotion (trade, investment, tourism, science, and technology, protection of intellectual Property)'[647]. Other authors especially on the role of the state institutions in this very process and 'the work of diplomatic missions in support of the home country´s business and finance sectors (…) including the promotion of inward and outward investment, as well as trade'[648]. Rana, for example, stipulates that 60% of the work of the French and German ambassadors concerns economic promotional efforts[649]. Of course, these state representatives and their governments might, beyond promoting its businesses abroad, might also be interested in 'nation branding'[650],

[641] Almon, *Anecdotes Of The Life Of The Right Hon. William Pitt, Earl Of Chatham*.
[642] Potter, "Branding Canada", p. 55.
[643] Berridge, *The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary Of Diplomacy*, p. 128.
[644] Muller, "South Africa´s economic diplomacy", p. 1.
[645] Coolsaet, "Trade and Diplomacy", p. 61.
[646] Rana, "Economic Diplomacy: The Experience Of Developing Countries", p. 1.
[647] Naray, What a good commercial diplomat has to know and be capable of, p. 8.
[648] Ozdem, *Government Agencies in Commercial Diplomacy,* p. 8.
[649] Ozdem, *Government Agencies in Commercial Diplomacy,* p. 8.
[650] Potter, "Branding Canada", p. 55.; Yang et al., "Country reputation in Multidimensions."

the 'relative attractiveness of a country in the minds of foreign publics'[651], thereby presumably increasing their soft power.

On the whole, however, it appears that there is a certain 'economic reductionism' permeating throughout the literature. Most initiatives pursued through economic or commercial diplomacy are seemingly reduced to questions whether they can contribute to promote business include creating jobs and increasing tax revenue and foreign direct investment and economic growth[652], thereby ensuring country competitiveness[653] - as opposed to the utilisation of commercial or economic diplomacy to tackle specific foreign policy goals or problems. The role of embassies in this nexus, for example, appears to be limited to investigations into how they gather intelligence and information in their host country, which, in turn, can aid their country's businesses[654]. Indeed, the dense enmeshment of concrete foreign policy imperatives and economic diplomacy is perhaps best encapsulated in the scholarly works on how specific initiatives (free-trade- and preferential-trade- agreements, treaties that tackle non-tariff obstacles, transportation agreements, and investment protection and facilitation accords) accordingly depend on the strength of the relationship that the concerned countries enjoy amongst each other[655]. But even in the analytical work assessing conflict handling, 'commercial diplomats' appear to be reduced to serving the interests of businesses as opposed to wider geopolitical agendas in the pursuance of which commercial diplomacy might be but a pretext[656]. This might, however, miss an important element of what firms and business associations can contribute. We know, for example, that prior to the 2003 invasion, the Iraqi government sought to use, albeit be it to no avail, a trusted Lebanese-American businessman, Imad Hage, with important contacts in Washington, to establish a channel of communication[657]. In a similar fashion, it was a US-educated, Omani businessman who played an

[651] Yang et al, "Country reputation in Multidimensions.", p. 422.
[652] Kotabe, "State government promotion of manufacturing Exports"; Van Bergeijk, "Economic Diplomacy, the level of development and trade"; Wilkinson, "Trade promotion and SME export performance."
[653] Lee, "The old and the new significance of political economy in diplomacy."
[654] Kostecki*, Commercial diplomacy and international business.*
[655] Rana, Rana, "Economic Diplomacy: The Experience Of Developing Countries"; Sherman, "Trade Disputes and Non-state actors."
[656] Kostecki and Naray, "Commercial Diplomacy".
[657] Risen, *State Of War*.

instrumental role in facilitating the initial Iran nuclear talks[658]. It is the analysis of how concrete foreign policies and geopolitical objectives can be pursued under the 'pretense', or alongside with commercial diplomacy, to which this chapter hopes to contribute to.

The Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Indeed, it is first and foremost necessary to briefly establish whether, according to the typology and conditions outlined in the Conceptual Framework, it operates as an Entrepreneur or Subcontractor in its relationship to its home government, Pakistan. Hence, going back to Figure 4, one must examine the GOC's (1) Agenda, (2) Supervision, (3) Funding and (4) Membership arrangements.

Agenda

Founded in 2012 'on a private initiative in order to bring the business communities of the two countries closer together', PAJCCI's wider objective is 'peace and prosperity through [the] promotion of bilateral trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan'. This goal it seeks to achieve through 'entering into any arrangement with governments of Pakistan/Afghanistan' and maintaining 'close liaison' with 'other chambers of commerce in Pakistan and its counterparts, the corresponding foreign authorities, industrial associations, enterprises and business persons of various branches (…) diplomatic missions and NGOs to exchange trade related information, to introduce PAJCCI activities'[659]. The maintenance and expansion of these connections in the state- and non-state sector, in turn, are achieved by actively seeking to combine the economic imperative of 'reviving economic ties and discouraging illegal trade' with the political need to 'facilitate peace prospects and to curb extremism and terrorism'. Indeed, given the historic tensions between the two countries, the chamber stresses the political aspect of its activities in particular and portrays itself as 'a catalyst to easing out any pressures induced by [the] Political or Legal framework in the respective countries in the most appropriate

[658] Solomon, "Secret Dealings With Iran Led To Nuclear Talks."

manner possible‘ and to accordingly ‘strategise on the macro-level to facilitate the respective Governments to revive [the] bi-lateral political relationship as well, in the greater interest of both the countries[660]’. After all, as PAJCCI’s Executive Director underlines, ‘you can change a lot of things but you cannot change your neighbour’[661]. Hence, PAJCCI ‘will serve to ensure [a] win-win situation for all stakeholders and will serve as a body to enhance trade relations between two brotherly nations without succumbing to any unrelated political or cultural influence’. In the words of Faiza:

> ‘*what our chamber can do is to become a spokesperson. It can become a channel. Arbitration. Mediation (…) What do you do when two brothers fight? (…) They should talk directly to each other. You see, but what happens instead is that one brother goes to the father and the other one to the mother. Afghanistan and Pakistan take their issues to other forums and badmouth about each other there or they complain to other countries, such as the US and India, about the other but they do not talk directly to each other*’.

The chamber, however, intervenes in a way that:

> ‘*we get the actual agenda of the government neutralised in a manner that it becomes a mere economic issue to build the right kind of relationship. It depoliticises. One of the issues we have had with Afghanistan is that economic policy is very much politicised. Every time there is a problem in terms of security, it has an immense impact on our economy’*.

Yet, even though its approach might deliberately be designed and presented as apolitical, the chamber’s agenda is inherently political – necessarily, one might add, given its sole focus on Pakistan and Afghanistan. With its stated and sole aim to do everything in its power to improve the economic relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it thus represents a partially visible hand of politics and trade diplomacy with which a strong and mutually dependent bond of friendship is gradually woven between two difficult neighbours. Going back to Figure 4, then, it might be said that PAJCCI pursues a pro-active agenda regardless of state policies. Indeed, given the fact that its activities started when there was a standstill between

[660] PAJCCI, "Vision & Objectives."
[661] Interview Faiza

the two countries at various levels, it can even be said that it initially went against the prevalent policy of its home government at the time.

Supervision

PAJCCI, as a domestic non-state entity, is 'duly recognized and licensed by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as well as Islamic Republic of Pakistan' and was incorporated in Pakistan on November 18, 2011 as a company limited by guarantee under Section 42 of the repealed Companies Ordinance, 1984 (now the Companies Act 2017)'[662]. Interestingly, the very fact that PAJCCI chose to be registered under Section 42, again underlines its keen desire 'to be on the proper side of things'. According to a senior source from within the Pakistan Center for Philanthropy[663], Section 42 organisations in Pakistan:

> '*tend to be more organised. There are certain requirements. You have to submit your accounts, you have to be an active taxpayer, there is a requirement in terms of audit. And they [the intelligence agencies] will enforce it. And this is because of the pressure the organisation is feeling. They [the organisations] want to be better safe than sorry. When you say that you are section 42 then it would be perceived by people that a lot of requirements have already been fulfilled. So, section 42 does not just have a legal but also a perception element to it*'[664].

The vital importance of perception, especially for a Pakistani organisation, is also underscored by Faiza who points out that whilst:

> *'we are a licensed body. We register with the government of Pakistan and there are certain laws that apply to us (…) There is also a certain decorum that we have to follow'*[665].

To be sure, although:

> *'it would have been easier to register an organisation, obtain funds for an organisation, and build an organisation before 2015'*[666],

[662] PAJCCI, *Financial Statements For The Year Ended June 30, 2018*.
[663] The institution tasked by the GoP to register domestic and foreign non-state organisations operation inside Pakistan.
[664] Interview Ahmad Nadeem.
[665] Interview Faiza.
[666] Interview Ahmad Nadeem; Note: As elaborated in the author's MPhil thesis, up until 2015 there was no effective regulatory framework in place to register and monitor non-state organisations

as it was most probably the case for PAJCCI, the organisation made sure to always adhere to the law and expected behaviour towards both the state and the state within the state:

> *'every year we have to send the Director General of Trade Organisation at the Ministry of Commerce a report on our progress and how our funding has arrived. This report is published online. We have to publish these audit reports online by law. We really have to make sure that things are transparent in nature given our focus on Afghanistan, which is matter of national security. We also need to have at least 300 members. Otherwise our licence is cancelled. They can also ask for any additional records that they want to see. The activities are not monitored but we report to them voluntarily'.*

Again, it seems that the self-awareness of the very unique, yet potentially controversial, focus of PAJCCI on trade across the Durand line, seems to have led the organisation to voluntarily impose an extra layer of supervision onto itself so as to ensure smooth and effective operations:

> '*especially since we work in the border area there will always be a question about the integrity (…) from the very inception we have always believed that we do everything with documents because we were working with a country about which there are too many security concerns'.*

Indeed, as already alluded to, the chamber appears to have another, perhaps unofficial, yet almost all-seeing, supervisor, whose approval is essential to obtain – certainly for any domestic organisation operation in Pakistan:

> *'there is a difference with the West where you have democratic peace and liberalism and all the rest…yes, the military does play a role in your part of the world but not the same way it does in the developing world. Over here you have "the powers that be" and Afghanistan is a matter of national security. Remember: in order to rule Pakistan, you need the three As: Allah, the Army and America. We are mostly concerned with the first two although the US also works with us. The military is dominating Afghan policy. As a chamber dealing with this country, we have to be extra vigilant towards them (…) So until and unless our true representatives, that is the elected*

operation in Pakistan. The years since this legislation have witnessed the beginning of this registration process.

representatives, start speaking out clearly in terms of foreign policy we will have the boots, we will have the establishment. It cannot be any other way. When the official government fails to act even in benign areas such as trade, then organisations like us, interested in solving this issue, will have to deal with the boots, the only institution that can do it'[667].

That this anxious desire to please and comply with the security apparatus appears to be a sober approach is an impression that is reinforced by a senior source from the highest level of Pakistan's intelligence services, which points out that there is

'*an extra layer of due diligence and supervision on Pakistani actors (...) the Western NGOs were much more freely operating. They have their assets abroad. The Pakistani businessman has his assets here. So, it is not just the laws. A business man from a third world country maybe bending the rules but he cannot break them (...) For him to take the risk especially in countries like Pakistan...if his business enterprise does not have the consent of the security establishment his businesses will suffer*'[668].

Against the background of this very direct assertion, it becomes clear that for the chamber and its members, it is of existential importance to make sure that their activities would be aligned to the interest of the state and not even in the slightest giving the appearance of running counter to the *raison d'etat*.

Funding

The chamber takes pride in its independence from state actors, which, at first glance, is also represented in its funding structure. Indeed, a glance at the audit reports, which PAJCCI is required to publish annually, reveals that membership donations and fees, profits from the chamber's own investments and services constitute a significant and regular flow on financial income. Since the founding of the chamber, the amount varies from 600,000 to 1.700,000 PKR per year. As PAJCCI's Executive Director highlights:

[667] Interview Faiza;
[668] Interview Senior Government Bureaucrat; Note: these two notions do not just reflect the insights gained form Ledeneva's writings on the co-existence and enmeshment of formal and informal hierarchies but also indicates the existence of a monitoring function enacted through *smotryashchie* (the watchers), central for the sort of informal governance at play in this context.

'our funding comes mainly from membership donors, there is no government funding. You cannot influence them if you take money from them!'[669].

Yet, apart from this regular flow of income which guarantees a proper functioning of the chamber, a closer examination of the audit reports from 2012 to 2018 clearly shows that other, non-state organisations regularly contribute large sums of money –often exceeding the amount brought forward by the chamber members:

In 2018, for example, the organisation 'Saferworld' donated 12.975,557 PKR with the aim of 'creating a more enabling environment for the development, delivery and expansion of regional economic and connectivity initiatives between Pakistan and its neighbouring countries (with particular attention to Afghanistan)'[670]. Indeed, the political character of the donation is clearly stressed in Saferworld's financial records as the organisation takes pride in having 'played a critical role in sustaining dialogue at times of crisis and creating space for policy developments which could over time reduce tensions and establish the potential for greater regional collaboration, connectivity and peace'[671]. Saferworld itself is 'a London-based international NGO working to prevent and reduce violent conflict and promote cooperative approaches to security'[672]. According to its own records, it relies heavily on state funding with 76% of is income coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Britain's DFID, and the US Department of State as the largest donors[673].Similarly, from 2015 until 2017, the chamber 'has extended the existing collaboration with "The Asia Foundation" (…) for achieving the shared objectives of the "Enhancing Trade and Regional Cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan'[674]. The respective sums from The Asia Foundation revolve around 5.000,000 PKR[675]. In the case of this donor organisation, the linkages to Western state power might be found in former Vice-President Cheney's 'dark side (…) in

[669] Interview Senior Government Bureaucrat.
[670] PAJCCI, Financial Statements For the Year ended June 30, 2018
[671] Saferworld, *Report And Accounts For The Year Ended 31 March 2018*.
[672] Embassy Astana, "Kazakhstan: EXBS Advisor's Reporting Cable."; see also: Saferworld, "Who We Are".
[673] Saferworld, "Funding And Finance - 2013 To 2018 ".
[674] PAJCCI, "Newsletters & Annual Reports."
[675] PAJCCI, "Newsletters & Annual Reports."

the shadows in the intelligence world'[676]. Indeed, 'the Committee for Free Asia, according to former C.I.A. officials, was founded as the Eastern counterpart of the Free Europe Committee. It later changed its name to the Asia Foundation. It still exists, though its ties to the C.I.A. were severed a decade ago'[677]. In a CIA memorandum, it is revealed that the foundation has served as 'a Central Intelligence Agency proprietary (…) to undertake cultural and educational activities on behalf of the USG in ways not open to official US agencies. (…) TAF has accomplished its assigned mission with increasing effectiveness and has, in the process, become a widely-known institution, in Asia and the US. However, the memorandum also urged that 'in the long run (…) its viability as an instrument of US foreign policy in Asia can be assured by relieving it of its total dependence upon covert funding support from this Agency. In the belief that TAF contributes substantially to US national interests in Asia and can continue to contribute if its viability is sustained, CIA requests the Committee's study and attention to possible alternative means of supporting it'[678]. It might thus not be altogether be surprising to read about the decision of the US political leadership to bring the foundation into the daylight and have its funding arranged through the State Department as 'the Foundation was definitely in the national interest and should be protected and nurtured'[679]. Today, the majority of its funding is derived from the US State Department, which is then channelled through TAF to PAJCCI. Finally, the chamber has been receiving considerable funding from another US-based non-state entity, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE): 12.184,263 PKR (2013), 17.196,695 PKR (2014), 10.101,308 PKR (2015), and 2.707.889 PKR in 2016[680]. The Centre's origin dates back to the Reagan Presidency and the founding of the National Endowment for Democracy, of which it is stated as one of the four core institution. Still being indirectly funded through the USG, CIPE's work is 'every bit as vital today as it was back then'[681].

[676] Washington Post, "Vice President Cheney On NBC's 'Meet The Press'."
[677] Crewdson, "Worldwide Propaganda Network Built By The C.I.A.."
[678] Office of the Historian, *Memorandum From The CIA To The 303 Committee*.
[679] US State Department, "Johnson Administration, Foreign Relations 1964-1968."
[680] PAJCCI, "Newsletters & Annual Reports."
[681] CIPE, "Who We Are."

Overall, we can observe, that PAJCCI is financially able to operate independently due to a regular flow of income from its members. However, it must also be born in mind that the chamber appears to rely heavily on external funding from foreign non-state organisations, strongly affiliated and intertwined with their respective home governments, the US and Britain. This, of course, begs the question to what extent Anglo-American funding for the organisations has an impact beyond merely assuring its proper functioning as well as how and why this funding was given to the organisation in the first place. Whilst an answer shall be provided over the course of this chapter, it is, for now, sufficient to recognise the fact that PAJCCI is able to stand on its own feet financially.

Thus, when judged against the conditions outlined in the Conceptual Framework, one can identify PAJCCI as an autonomous *Entrepreneur*. Its pro-active agenda to view Afghanistan through the eyes of commerce is distinguished from the GoP's inherent tendency to adopt a perspective of national security. To be sure, the very founding of the chamber was predicated on the more and more souring relations between the two neighbours. PAJCCI's desire to build upon commercial channels so as to work towards a softening of the bilateral relationship in the political realm was a foreign policy position initially not shared by the GoP at the time.

Regarding its supervision, one might conclude that although there is no externally imposed monitoring system in place to check individual activities of PAJCCI on a regular basis, as, say, DFID does it with its subcontractors, the chamber nonetheless seeks to voluntarily put itself under the very 'extra layer of due diligence', the senior member of the intelligence service referred to. The imperative to be on good terms with the powers that be in a third world country, such as Pakistan, is all the more vital given its sole focus on Afghanistan – a country very high on the priority list of the security establishment. Hence, although there are certain boundaries of which PAJCCI ought to be aware of, no strict monitoring system is in place to infringe on the chamber's autonomy of action on a 'day-to-day' basis.

Finally, although it does receive considerable amounts of money from

foreign organisations, it is nonetheless able to stand on its own feet financially through the generation of a regular income generated by its membership fee[682].

Hence, one can now process-trace the conceptual mechanism of 'uploading', as outlined in the Conceptual Framework, through which such a type of NSA interacts with both its home government and the other concerned countries it operates in. By doing so, it shall also become clear which 'Operational Role' the chamber assumes.

Step I: Concerned States unwilling or unable to pursue a certain foreign policy *toward each other*

Before elaborating on the particular temporal and foreign policy context in which the initiative of PAJCCI relevant to this chapter must be understood, it is imperative to briefly outline the historical theses and antitheses that have characterised the political dialectic between the two neighbours. To begin with, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan's accession to the UN after its independence because of Kabul's claim on the Pashtun territories located on the other side of the Durand Line. The Pashtuns to whom the imperial overlords had only given the option of either joining India or Pakistan, have regarded the border as a hindrance towards the path to their own nation[683]. Pakistan, on the other hand, saw itself as the heir to the border drawn by Her Majesty's Viceroys and made sure that these particular areas would become part of its KPK province. This, according to those who have held responsibility in Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment, 'became an irritant, which has continued until today' and triggered a shadowy cycle of violent interventions in each other's domestic affairs to resolve the issue: '*they interfered, Pakistan responded. Pakistan interfered, they responded. This has continued until today'*[684]. Hence, with a border disputed by so many sides, the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been rocky from the outset and the focus generally seems to have been more on warfare rather than welfare.

[682] Note: The outlined financial, political and regulatory environment (both in- and outside of Pakistan) PAJCCI is embedded in seems to reflect the '*expansive, yet multifaceted' process of 'interweaving state authorities and non-state actors into an increasingly complex and differentiated patchwork'*, observed by the aforementioned authors from Regulatory Theory.
[683] Bajoria, "Afghanistan's Troubled Border."
[684] Interview Brigadier Ishaq.

Fast-forwarding a few years, one can observe how Afghanistan became more and more a battlefield of national security hawks rather than a potential market for the doves of commerce. After all, it was General Zia ul-Haq's and Zbigniew Brzeziński's strategy during the 1970s, to 'keep the water boil at the right temperature'[685] in Afghanistan by gradually undermining the Kabul Government with the help of the same tribal warriors, whose forefathers had already fought Churchill[686]. One might add that when the USSR ultimately walked into the 'bear trap'[687], was defeated, and forced to retreat, Pakistan's all-powerful military intelligence service, the ISI sought to achieve the Pakistani military's supreme doctrinal objective of 'strategic depth'[688] in Afghanistan by training and aiding the Taliban, which would eventually take over the country's government – only to be swept away by yet another imperial power, the US. Henceforward, Britain's 'civilising mission' became 'Pax Americana' and yet another English-speaking empire, still spurred by the righteous spirit of the unipolar moment, seemed to be fighting for the validity of the democratic peace thesis along the Durand Line. Pakistan, however, formally an ally of the US, continued to support insurgent elements so as to prevent an Afghanistan dominated by her nemesis, India. Indeed, the alleged support that Pakistan Army and ISI have extended to the Taliban has been a key factor behind Afghanistan's growing hostility. With insurgent attacks having caused up to 80% of civilian casualties over recent years, Afghan leaders and a significant part of the Afghan population have regularly and with increasing anger pointed their fingers at Pakistan[689]. Ever since the days of President Karzai, the Afghan government has accused its Pakistani counterpart to have 'pursued a double game toward Afghanistan and using terrorism as a means'[690]. Karzai even suggested to 'cut the hand that is feeding the militants' and send troops into Pakistan, claiming: 'this is the duty of Afghanistan: to rescue the Pashtuns in Pakistan from this cruelty and terror'[691]. His successor, President Ghani, also did not mince words, suggesting that Pakistan has instigated an 'undeclared war of

[685] Swami, "Pakistan And Osama Bin Laden."
[686] Churchill, *The Story Of The Malakand Field Force*.
[687] Yousaf et al., *Afghanistan The Bear Trap*.
[688] Khan, "The Strategic Depth Concept."
[689] King, "Protests Break Out At Afghanistan Peace Negotiator's Funeral."; Gall, "Afghan Suicide Bombings, Tied To Taliban, Point To Pakistan."
[690] Partlow, "Karzai Accuses Pakistan Of Supporting Terrorists."
[691] Gall, "Karzai Threatens To Send Soldiers Into Pakistan."

aggression' against his nation[692], making it clear that 'the biggest challenge for Afghanistan is not the Taliban or al-Qaeda but the state-to-state relations with Pakistan'[693]. What is more, the very outspoken head of Afghanistan's military intelligence, Amrullah Saleh, has been just as critical of Pakistan's policy towards his own country, alleging that the ISI must be seen as 'part of a landscape of destruction in this country' whilst 'the West talks about all these proxies but not the master of the proxies which is the Pakistan army'[694]. Hence, he urges the US to 'show the muscle of a superpower to Pakistan' as although she is 'already bombing Pakistan' this is not done 'at a scale we all desire'[695]. Saleh's successor also maintained that attacks in his country are 'drawn up by the Haqqani network with direct coordination and cooperation from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence'.

Members of the very same ISI itself freely admit that:

> '*the war of the intelligence agencies has also intensified. ISI is active in Afghanistan and the NDS over here. It has to be this way. It is a reality. It exists everywhere but the Afghans blame us. The Afghan government has looked more and more negatively at Pakistan*'[696].

The head of another Pakistani intelligence agency furthermore observes that

> '*some of the elites here in the Punjab are surprised why the Afghans are not extremely grateful to us for what we did. But I am coming from that province and I understand what we did to them, to their country, their social and political life and what we are still doing. So, if the Afghans don't like us, it does not surprise me'*[697].

With similarly surprising honesty, although perhaps not as much remorse, former Director General of the ISI, Muhammad Asad Durrani perhaps describes Pakistan's *Spiel* best when he points out: '*if you can't ride two horses at the same time, you have no right to enter the circus'*[698]. The official reaction from the Pakistani government has, of course, been less frank and more defensive, rejecting Afghan allegations as 'unhelpful towards efforts for peace'. Indeed, the GoP regularly points at the collusion between Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies and their

[692] Kay et al., "Ghani Says Afghanistan Hit By 'Undeclared War' From Pakistan."
[693] Kay et al., "Ghani Says Afghanistan Hit By 'Undeclared War' From Pakistan."
[694] Burch, "Afghan Ex-Intel Chief Opposed Karzai Peace Plan."; BBC, "Hardtalk, Amrullah Saleh".

[696] Interview Brigadier
[697] Interview Senior Member ISI.
[698] Interview Mohammad Asad Durrani.

alleged efforts to stir up insurgent movements in Baluchistan[699] and across the country[700]. As a senior member of the Pakistani intelligence community puts it:

> '*India is involved there with anti-Pakistan intelligence activities. They have engaged us and are still engaging us on two fronts. What they are conducting is a third country operation, from Afghanistan through the open border to Pakistan. 2600 kilometres with hardly any checks. The Indians have used the Afghans to engage us. Through Afghanistan, they have supported the Baluch nationalists, they have given money to Afghans to channel this to insurgents (...) India is a very big factor in the mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan*'[701].

Summarising the dilemma, particularly of the India factor, PAJCCI's Faiza underlines that:

> 'p*eople at the highest level in Pakistan believe that Afghanistan is a pawn of India. Whenever there is a call to sit down for a meeting from the Pakistani side, the Afghans want to include India. If there is a bilateral connection, you cannot force another country to make it trilateral. And so, the Pakistani government said: "if you continue asking us to bring in India into the conversation, then we are not going to have any conversation at all. If you want a conversation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, you are more than welcome. You come to us, we come to you. No problem". Why is this happening? If you ask me, because India is expanding its defence budget into Afghanistan. It is a developing country itself but it is spending a lot in Afghanistan. If I know that I cannot go to war with a country, I will make sure to devastate it economically. And so, what India is doing is a very good way of achieving this. They have invested into Chabahar port in Iran which has taken a lot of transit from us*'[702].

Indeed, whilst it would be much cheaper for Afghanistan, as a landlocked country, to access the global commons via Pakistan, more and more trade in the years prior to 2018 had been diverted from Pakistan towards Chabahar port in Iran – a development facilitated by the nemesis India[703].

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[699] Ramachandran, "Now It's War Against India In Afghanistan."
[700] The Times of India, "India Rejects Pak Charge On Quetta Blast."; Asian News International, "India, Afghanistan 'Deliberately' Trying To Destabilise Balochistan, Musharraf Told US."
[701] Interview Brigadier.
[702] Interview Faiza.
[703] Al Jazeera, "Indian, Iran And Afghanistan Sign Trade Corridor Deal."

Hence, that border, partially perceived as illegitimate, would continue to witness the crossing not of produces, peacefully manufactured by both nations, but mostly of unlawful combatants and illicit goods[704]. Faced with this, the American leadership, seemingly convinced that economics was destined to triumph over archaic grievances, identified trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan as a key to bring peace and stability to the region and put an end to the former's double game. After all, CIA Director Hayden had warned that that the situation on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border 'presents a clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and to the West in general, and to the US in particular'[705]. At times, as an American embassy cable put it, the situation had become 'so tense and the political context so complicated that a little heat can produce fire', which is why 'positive Afghan-Pak relations are essential to long-term stability in Afghanistan and to U.S. strategic objectives in the struggle against terrorism'[706]. Hence, the 1965 APTTA (Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement) was renegotiated and eventually signed by both countries in October 2010. Under the proud eyes of Secretary of State Clinton the broad, sunlit uplands of democratic peace and trade were outlined in their characteristically technical language, promising 'freedom of transit' as well as 'elimination of customs duties'[707].

Given that the whole righteous might of the American people had now presumably thrown behind such an initiative, one might legitimately wonder whether APTTA was able to cut the Gordian knot of both ancestral and contemporary animosities. Indeed, having demonstrated that the relationship has been largely defined by respective national security rather than commercial interests, it should not come as a surprise that this nexus has had a rather negative impact on trade between the two countries. According to the 2017 country report on Afghanistan issued by the Pakistani Ministry of Commerce, 'during the last five years, the trade volume between Pakistan and Afghanistan has declined from $2.3 billion to $1.4 billion'. Highlighting the importance of the Chabahar agreement in reducing Pakistan's market share from 33% in 2012 to 21% in 2017, it grimly concludes that 'due to the consistent decline in trade volume since 2012, the

[704] UNODC, *Examining The Dimensions, Scale And Dynamics Of The Illegal Economy.*
[705] Associated Press, "CIA: Pakistan Border's Clear and Present Danger."
[706] Embassy Kabul, "Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Firing Incident."
[707] U.S. Department of Commerce, "Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement."

bilateral trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan is diminishing'[708]. Other studies and statistics point to the fact that the overall trade volume had tumbled from 2.7bn USD to a mere 500m USD in only 18 months prior to the FY17[709]. What is more, Pakistan's exports to Afghanistan, amounting to 1.43bn USD in FY16, dropped to 1.27bn USD in FY17[710]. Ultimately, this sharp deterioration might be best portrayed in its entirety by the fact that the numbers of containers passing into Afghanistan had been reduced to 7,000, from the previously 70,000, with almost 80% of Afghanistan's cargo traffic shifting towards Chahabar in Iran[711]. Worse yet, in 2017 the government of Pakistan had decided to impose an additional regulatory duty on Afghan exports[712] and, in a further blow to bilateral relations, close 'the border between the two states for an indefinite period'[713]. The latter move led outraged Afghan officials to remark that 'continuous unreasonable closure of legal Pak-Afghan trade and transit routes cannot have any other explanation except to be aimed at hurting the common Afghan people'[714] and former President Karzai to once again underline that Pakistan possesses 'no legal authority to dictate terms on the Durand Line'[715]. Against this backdrop, Zahidullah Shinwari, President of the Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI), accurately pointed out that 'strained relations between Islamabad and Kabul are to be blamed for the 80% drop in the volume of bilateral trade'[716]. Furthermore, Faiza neatly sums up the dilemma both countries found themselves in when she points out that:

> '*we have economic imperatives but our trade is stuck. Our trucks are standing there for months. This has been one of the major problems our two countries had faced'*[717]. Similarly, PM Abbasi puts the record straight when he asserts that '*the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship is defined by the security situation, trade will have a backseat due to its limited impact'*[718].

Of course, in this already very dire situation, it is also important to bear in mind that, as a UN study once put it, Pakistan's 'relations with its neighbors,

[708] Ministry of Commerce, *Country Report On Afghanistan*.
[709] Pakistan Today, "Pak-Afghan Trade Tumbles From $2.7Bn To $1.2Bn In 18 Months."
[710] Iqbal, "Pakistan Loses 50Pc Market Share In Kabul."
[711] EurAsian Times, "Afghanistan's Trade Shifts From Karachi To Indian Funded Chabahar Port."
[712] FBR Pakistan, "Federal Board Of Revenue Government Of Pakistan."
[713] Siddiqui, "Afghanistan Will Never Recognise The Durand Line: Hamid Karzai."
[714] Shakil, "Steep Fall In Pakistan-Afghanistan Bilateral Trade."
[715] Siddiqui, "Afghanistan Will Never Recognise The Durand Line: Hamid Karzai".
[716] The Express Tribune, "'Bilateral Trade Between Pakistan, Afghanistan Has Dropped By $2B'."
[717] Interview Faiza
[718] Interview Abbasi

particularly Afghanistan, are complicated by cross-border criminality, which in turn creates a thriving regional illegal economy orchestrated by complex informal and formal organized criminal networks'[719]. As pointed out by PM Abbasi, this has always been a key feature along the border:

> '*Pakistan Afghanistan relations have since 1979 at least been defined by the security situation – Russian invasion, Taliban and post-9/11, commerce was never a major issue. Trade has been dominated by the Pakistan Afghanistan transit trade, which has been the conduit of massive smuggling of consumer goods, successive governments on both sides have ignored this situation. The smuggling has beneficiaries on both sides of the border who branched out into arms smuggling and the drug running'*[720].

Indeed, smuggling is the flower that blossoms under such conditions and even more so when these very conditions worsen even further. As Faiza describes it:

> '*at one point in time it was 2,5bn dollars in trade, legal trade, but also 2,5bn dollars in illegal, parallel trade (…) and it had gotten worse over the years with 1bn from legal trade moving into the parallel trade sector now standing at 3,5bn illegal vis a vis 1,5bn in legal trade (…) Whenever there would be problem politically, the level of parallel trade would rise*'.

In a perhaps rare moment of political sobriety, she thus acknowledges that '*you can change a lot of things but you cannot change your neighbour*'[721]. The detrimental surge in smuggling did, of course, not go unnoticed by Pakistani intelligence officers who were very well aware of the fact that as:

> '*the border has been kept closed by Pakistan regularly. At some point for over 2 years, the mistrust was getting more and more and more and there was more and more smuggled across the border. Smuggled items were coming at a cheaper price. This is a big area that damaged the relationship'*[722].

Once again Faiza encapsulates the greater vicious cycle at work here when she remarks that:

> *'see, even if I do not like a country, I should still trade with it. Whether I like it or not. But this is not the case. Emotions trump economics. In economics 2+2 might be 4 but in politics it is never 4. It can be anything but 4. That's how we*

[719] UNODC, *Examining The Dimensions, Scale And Dynamics Of The Illegal Economy.*
[720] Interview Abbasi.
[721] Interview Faiza.
[722] Interview Brigadier.

trade. That's how we think. And this is how we design our economic policy. This is not only restricted to the border area. The economic and military elite are emotionally attuned to the economic understanding of the situation. If China and India would get the chance, they would wipe off each other but they are not doing it. They are trading heavily with each other. They understand that economics plays an important role. We don't understand this'[723].

Faced with such an agglomeration of problems – ranging from a closed border, the imposition of regulatory duties, a diversion of trade towards Iran, on-going border skirmishes, mutual accusations of interference in each other's internal affairs, the India factor – we can clearly establish that both countries were unwilling and indeed unable to pursue a softer foreign policy towards each other. Or, to put it in the words of yet another senior member of PAJCCI: '*At this time when there was a breakdown of communication between the two countries'*[724]. Having said this, we must now turn to identifying what imperatives PAJCCI drew out of the situation it was confronted with.

Step II: NSA identifies Foreign Policy Objective

Considering the aforementioned environment in which the bilateral relationship found itself in, it is thus no exaggeration to speak of a crisis between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indeed, the businessmen, involved in Pak-Afghan trade, seemed to have been very well aware that a turning point had been reached and decided to harness their respective energies in the organisational structure of a chamber, dedicated to this bilateral relationship. To be sure, given the fact that PAJCCI has based itself to the *sole* objective of restoring the political and economic relationship, the outline provided under section 'Agenda' above already provides us with a very good overview of the chamber's foreign policy objective. However, having obtained a better understanding of the historic and immediate circumstances surrounding the genesis of the chamber, it is worth re-emphasising and broadening the points already made. Faiza encapsulates these goals in the following way:

'*when the Afghanistan-Pakistan chamber was constituted, it was at a time when the economic concerns between Afghanistan and Pakistan were not*

[723] Interview Faiza.
[724] Interview Faiysal AliKhan.

settled out well (…) For years there had been no meetings going on transit between the countries at all. There was a gridlock (…) we needed a different configuration and different approach. A true B-to-B relationship. That there is a dire need to have a more direct relationship and so they came up with the idea of having a joint chamber, they proposed it to the Ministry of Commerce and ultimately the chamber came into existence'.

Since neither government was on talking terms with the other, the aim was that:

'*rather than having a Pakistani minister go or an Afghani minister come, we would be a mid-placed organisation. Our concerns can be communicated to each other without consulting any ministry. So, business to business can sit together and sort out the concerns that they have (…) We have very limited but clear focus. Make sure that Afghanistan works with us!'*[725].

The said chairman, Zubair Motiwala, very much echoes this view when he underscores that:

'things had been deteriorating on a day to day basis. There were the allegations and counter-allegations. And the biggest allegation was that all the disturbances in Afghanistan were driven by Pakistan, that they came out of Pakistan'.

Hence, besides acknowledging the 'border closures as 'a major problem', PAJCCI's leadership also paid considerable attention to the aforementioned regulatory duty that the GoP had imposed on Afghan exports:

'*This duty was also imposed on their exports into Pakistan. Now what is their main export to us? Dry fruits, fruits and some very essential and common items amounting up to 500-600m USD. They opposed it and our chamber got involved. The border was also closed for 53 days and we met everybody, the* PM*, the National Security Advisor, everybody in Pakistan. And we got the government of Pakistan to promise that they will compensate for the losses at the Afghan border and we asked the PM to visit Afghanistan. At that time there was no high-level meeting going on. We were trying to bring them on the same page'*[726].

Naturally, this begs the question:

[725] Interview Faiza.
[726] Interview Zubair Motiwala.

> '*how this chamber has sought to 'play its role in these most difficult conditions when the government to government meetings were not happening? The higher ups did not want to meet because of emotions and egos and a lot of other issues arounds security etc. So, what do we do? We engage! At the economic, political and social level through subtle interventions*'[727].

On the strategic level then we can define PAJCCI's objectives as an endeavour to bring back the bilateral relationship into some sort of shape. This was coupled with an acknowledgement of just how difficult it is to navigate through the stormy waters of national security policy surrounding the focus of this very initiative – ranging from the desire to remove the regulatory duty, to re-establish official G-to-G talks, and prevent anymore border closures. In short, PAJCCI intended to '*become a spokesperson. It can become a channel and engage in arbitration and mediation'* between the respective governments[728].

Step III: NSA enjoys access to resources, authorities, and information in at least one of the concerned states

Having set itself this objective, one might wonder which resources, institutions, elites and information PAJCCI might enjoy independently or through at least one of the concerned states to help the chamber achieve it. As shall be demonstrated, this question requires considerable elaboration and indeed constitutes a key factor in comprehending the analytical depth of the case study itself – and, by extension, the deeper meaning behind PAJCCI's initiative towards Afghanistan.

To understand this, we must, first of all, harken back to the genesis of PAJCCI itself. As outlined in the 'Finance Section' above, the chamber has been the recipient of generous financial aid from diverse Anglo-American organisations – most of them in turn funded by their respective governments with whom they are to varying degree associated. Additionally, we must also remember that the time of PAJCCI's creation was characterised by the twilight of non-existence and non-

[727] Interview Faiza.
[728] Interview Faiza.

enforcement of laws regulating non-state activities in Pakistan[729]. As outlined earlier in this thesis, the GoP had no oversight over the activities of both foreign and domestic NSAs. In the words of one of the regulators:

> '*it would have been easier to register an organisation, obtain funds for an organisation, and build an organisation before 2015* [before the GoP introduced and started to enforce a new legal framework for NSA activities in the country]'[730].

And truly, this seems to have been a conducive environment for although the idea of creating a chamber was conceived in Pakistan, its obstetricians could be found in Great Britain and the US. As one would expect, whilst PAJCCI representatives would accept such external linkages by acknowledging that the talks they held were 'encouraged and supported by external actors such USA and Britain', and that in their attempts to hold 'focus discussion and bring in key people here' the chamber was working with and was financed by the British High Commission', they would nonetheless seek to play down the role of outsiders[731]. However, a closer investigation reveals that the Pakistani businessmen who were intent on setting up PAJCCI lacked the expertise to bring the proper organisational structure of a chamber into existence and, through one of their Directors, who possessed an extensive and long-established relationship with the British Government[732], sought advice and guidance from the British High Commission. Yet, the diplomats of HMG, very appreciative of the idea, decided to outsource this task to yet another NSA, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), one of the four core institution of NED, which truly appears to be a key hub in the realm of NSA activities worldwide. What is more, the British willingness to support the endeavour seems to follow a strategy, as set out in a 2008 Wikileaks cable, which states that 'HMG is also looking at ways to deepen and institutionalize the dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan such that it could "survive political shocks and individual personalities"'[733]. After being approached, HMG, as outlined by the respective point person at CIPE, viewed the organisational build-up of PAJCCI as some sort of:

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[730] Interview Ahmad Nadeem.
[731] Interview Faiza.
[732] Interview Faiysal AliKhan.
[733] Embassy London, "Pakistan: UK On Fata Integration, Af-Pak Relations, EU Trade, And Zardari."

'*project funded by the UK, with CIPE as the implementer (…) The UK wanted a trusted intermediary. They basically hired us to do three things – first, to be grant managers, so there was oversight of the UK money flowing to the two constituent entities; second, to be technical assistance providers, to help them launch PAJCCI, train staff, work with the board on the governance structure, etc.; third, to be project managers – to help them plan events, activities, conferences, etc., and make sure all of that happened on schedule and according to plan […] It was a three-year project under which we gave them less and less money each year, until our engagement ended (…) I'd heard they kept supporting PAJCCI but the second time [they] had the funds flow through the Asia Foundation*'[734].

This, of course, corroborates the funding flow outlined in the aforementioned 'Finance Section', which shows CIPE funding lasting from 2013 until 2016 and TAF taking over henceforth. Following the 'expected decorum' vis-à-vis the intelligence agencies in Pakistan, the chamber made sure to report that 'the British government offered to assist in the formation of the joint chamber and its capacity building. For the due process and execution of project objectives effectively British High Commission (BHC) engaged Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) (…) as a technical partner and facilitator in the process'[735].

Interestingly, CIPE's engagement had to end as the organisation fell victim to the newly introduced NGO legislation introduced by the GoP in late 2015. According to the relevant regulator concerned with CIPE's case, this was mainly due to the opaque manner in which it sought to set up PAJCCI:

'*CIPE was asked to close offices (…) we could not find any report found on their chamber building or any other activities'.*

This fact is acknowledged by Faiza, although she would not explicitly name CIPE:

'*recent NGO laws have also affected us and one of our partners who was the mediating body between the British High Commission and us*[736]'.

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[734] Interview Member CIPE.

[735] PAJCCI, *Draft Annual Report 2014*; CIPE, *Dividends Of Peace And Governance*.; This notion seems to reflect the insights gained in the aforementioned writings on Network Theory. Particularly, Slaughter's urging that states 'should become docks for all kinds of networks, those composed of government ministers and those composed of mixed government, civic, and corporate actors (...) in this order, states must be waves and particles at the same time' – a call seemingly heeded by HMG in this instance.

[736] Interview Faiza; Note: this is reflected in the research findings of the author's MPhil thesis and Marchetti's observation that when 'public diplomacy is viewed suspiciously and interpreted as an

Whilst the question to what extent this has impacted the accountability of PAJCCI and the NSAs supporting the chamber vis-à-vis the Pakistani state must be answered in the subsequent section of the case study, we can surely establish that PAJCCI enjoys considerable access to resources, institutions, elites and information both independently (through its membership fees) and through the governments of the US and Britain.

Naturally, given the trade that the founders of the chambers had been involved in, there would also already be pre-existing linkages with the business community in Afghanistan[737]. By reaching out to the commercial sector in Afghanistan, PAJCCI sought to:

> '*meet business people here, meet businesspeople there, take every problem, smaller and bigger ones, and ask them what they think are the solutions, submit them to us and we make sure that it is raised with the government*'.

Initially, PAJCCI thus catered overwhelmingly to their counterparts in the business community, with whom they managed to build up trust:

> '*So, we had a situation when the government of Afghanistan and the government of Pakistan did not talk. B to B did talk*[738]*'*.

These commercial linkages would ultimately be elevated to the highest governmental level, as PAJCCI's chairman, Zubair Motiwala, proudly underlines:

> *'President Ghani came here and we had a very long meeting with him. He knows me by name*[739]*'*.

Indeed, as a press release from early 2015 confirms, the chamber 'met President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in Kabul to discuss matters of mutual interests, besides explore ways and means of how to enhance the existing trade and investment ties between the two countries[740]'.

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attempt to impose foreign influence on national affairs which instead the principle of sovereignty should reign (…) this kind of radicalization happens, (…) the context becomes securitise, [and] the space for manoeuvre for any CSO or becomes narrow'.

[737] Interview Motiwala, Faiza.
[738] Interview Faiza.
[739] Interview Motiwala.
[740] PAJCCI, *PAJCCI Delegation Visits Kabul*.

Finally, in this realm 'where every man is a soldier'[741], Zubair Motiwala, chairman of PAJCCI, correctly recognises the importance of the tribal areas for PAJCCI:

> '*The tribal belt is on both sides. But this tribal belt is actually one. It is centuries old, including the trade between the tribes. We want to formalise it by giving them confidence and incentives that this trade can be done through regular means as well. With 2,800 miles of borders you cannot dictate it to them, you cannot do it with the boots'*[742].

Faiza further elaborates on the crucial linkages that the chamber enjoys within this very tribal belt:

> '*Another important thing are tribal connections. Our directors have these. We talk to them. We get things sorted. There is a certain sentiment in tribal relations that one needs to be aware of. So, we take help from them, bring in the elderly for mediation. You need to have mediation according to the country you work in. the British government does not have these connections, the American government does not have these connections, not even the Pakistani government might have these connections. We fill the gap and this was one of the needs to have this chamber in the first place. In 2012 they trusted no one from our side. So, when we first went we took people with extensive tribal connections along. They might have distrust towards the Pakistani government and military but someone with organically grown links on both sides of the border is someone they would listen to. Now they trust us. This is not stated on the website but is a lot of the work we do. Confidence building in the tribal areas'*[743].

Indeed, in the words of an American Embassy cable, the tribal areas constitute a realm 'where residents are instinctively suspicious of government programs – more so when such programs bear the U.S. government's imprint'[744]. Another cable cites Hamid Karzai as saying that 'tradition and political service [are| the keys to tribal influence. "You can't buy it; no amount of money or guns will earn you that influence. You earn it by being part of the tribe and serving the community"'[745].

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[741] Churchill, *The Story Of The Malakand Field Force*.
[742] Interview Motiwala; Note: Again, the discrete involvement of Ledeneva's *smotryashchie* come to mind in this context. Even informal governance is not without its watchers.
[743] Interview Faiza.
[744] Embassy Islamabad, "Fata Plan Implementation Update."
[745] Embassy Kabul, "NSA Hadley Hears President Karzai's Views On The Cross-Border Jirgas."

Having said this, Faiysal AliKhan, one of the directors Faiza referred to who enabled and facilitated the chamber's connection with the tribes, also underscores their crucial importance:

> '*When you are talking about these tribal relationships or kinship relationships or relationships between communities and all this kind of thing – this is why you have individuals who come because it is all about having this shared history, trust, relationships, which the state has been unable to have in the same way. So, the state itself does not have the credibility or the know-how or understands the history to be able to play that role. It is all based on us. This is how the whole system functions'*[746].

Indeed, having demonstrated that PAJCCI does enjoy crucial links with the tribal areas, it is also important to highlight that in the chamber's operations, including establishing tribal connections, certain key individuals, such as Faiysal AliKhan, seem to be playing key roles in successfully advancing such initiatives. The analysis of the actions that such men of consequence, with old and established authorities and reputation, undertake within PAJCCI or outside it, is a matter that will be of enormous analytical relevance over the course of the chapter as a whole. Before doing so, however, we must turn our analytical focus towards investigating whether PAJCCI is able to operate with less accountability in at least one of the concerned states.

Step IV: NSA is able to operate with less accountability in at least one of the concerned states

It has already been outlined how the legal and regulatory environment prior to the introduction of the so-called 'NGO laws' in October 2015 has been conducive to the creation of the chamber, in the sense that it was easier to obtain external support from the US and Britain – both financially and in terms of technical assistance – without having to fear greater scrutiny and monitoring from the relevant state actors

[746] Interview Faiysal AliKhan; The insights gained from the above reminds us of the insights gained from Network Theory underlining that '*a key identifying feature of current government networks is that they are necessarily informal (...) they operate in the political equivalent of the informal economy, alongside formal international institutions [such as tribal authorities]*' and thus potentially providing an answer to the interesting question is how these formal unitary state relations coexist and / or conflict with relations among parts of states in the informal sector'; and Regulatory Theory's imperative to study today's '*multifarious web of regulatory, contractual, voluntary and informal arrangements*'.

in Pakistan. Naturally, this raises the question how this might have contributed to PAJCCI being able to operate with less accountability in at least one of the concerned states and, crucially, what sort of accountability it does or does not enjoy. In the author's MPhil thesis, we have been able to observe how the lack of accountability and monitoring by the authorities has either been actively exploited or tacitly and knowingly accepted. Hence, one wonders: has PAJCCI sought to emulate these practices to aid its operations? It has already been outlined in the 'Supervision Section' how, in addition to the normal legal requirements, the chamber has followed the appropriate 'decorum' a Pakistani organisation concerned with Afghanistan is expected to and made sure to regularly inform the security apparatus of the country about its activities. To be sure, given the aforementioned environment that NSAs found themselves in, such a forthcoming behaviour was surely not necessary. Yet, seemingly knowing that PAJCCI's involvement in a matter of the highest national security, the chamber sought to nonetheless impose an extra layer of supervision onto itself so as to ensure smooth operations in the future. In this regard, it must also be acknowledged that the chamber did not seek to hide the involvement of foreign funding as it was published in their annual reports and indeed sent to the relevant state institutions in order to avoid giving the impression of being involved in undesirable activities. As a telling contrast to this stands the fate of the chamber's American implementing partner, CIPE, which, as we learned earlier, did not follow the same 'decorum', kept its activities undisclosed and eventually fell victim to the tougher measures introduced. Interestingly, coming under scrutiny after the new regulatory framework was brought into existence, CIPE sought to continue its role by flying members of PAJCCI out of Pakistan's jurisdiction to Dubai to proceed with its technical assistance programme there. This, however, sealed its fate and CIPE was eventually forced to leave the country[747]. The 'wind of change' that was blowing from October 2015 onwards, particularly for organisations concerned with national security issues, is encapsulated by the former head of a Pakistani intelligence service, who is able to directly comment on the 'CIPE-PAJCCI Dubai venture':

> *They cannot operate these areas [Afghanistan]. Even if they hold their meetings in Dubai. They will have a flight there, they have to sign agreement*

[747] Interview Member CIPE.

in Dubai or do business with their counterparts. Without going through the proper clearances, the Pakistani intelligence agencies would know. When they would come back from Dubai, we would ask them "where have you been?". So, without that clearance, they are not able to do that sort of thing'[748].

Of course, the fact that CIPE was forced out of the country does not necessarily mean that the introduction of new NSA regulations brought about an entirely new and more rigorous system. Indeed, the fact that TAF was able to step in and continue the external funding for PAJCCI's activities demonstrates that an NSA is able to withstand the implementation of new or already existing laws due to the fact that they were '*so strong in their lobbying efforts*[749]*'* towards the Pakistani state. This clearly highlights the discrepancy in the introduction of new regulatory laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement. What is more, we can also observe that PAJCCI's efforts and objectives seems to have been looked upon benignly and were not considered as going against the national interest of the state[750]. In other words, the chamber seems to have undergone 'the proper clearance'.

We can thus see that the accountability question in the case of PAJCCI is not so much of a legal nature. The chamber is being supervised and monitored. It purposefully and pre-emptively subjugates itself under the watchful eyes of the security agencies. Indeed, it seems that its accountability is of a different type, namely, it was able to facilitate a re-engagement between the two estranged governments at a time when bilateral relations were difficult. The two governments were not on talking terms and an organisation outside the public eye was able to step in and seize the necessary political space to improve the situation. The 'subtle interventions', referred to earlier, endow PAJCCI with precisely the sort of lack of accountability that make its endeavours so uniquely qualified. The chamber's chairman hints at this when he underscores that:

[748] Interview Senior Member ISI; Note: This insight again reflects the stipulations made by Ledeneva about the existence of 'the watchers' in the governance of the informal sector.
[749] Interview Ahmad Nadeem.
[750] Note: This insight reflects the lessons from Regulatory Theory whose authors observe a 'multifarious web of regulatory, contractual, voluntary and informal arrangements' between state and non-state authorities.

'*ministers have their own set of rules, they own policies to implement. We have no policy to implement (…) Our policy is completely flexible'*[751].

Yet, at the risk of already venturing into the final steps of the causal mechanism, it is worth citing Faiysal AliKhan, another senior member of the chamber, who most eloquently sums up the unique qualification that PAJCCI is able to bring to the table, due to its lack of accountability and the manner of its conduct vis-à-vis state actors:

> *'At this time when there was a breakdown of communication between the two countries (…) first we had to talk to the government in Kabul, the Chief Executive office, which is Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, and the President and their intelligence and our intelligence and our foreign ministry and everybody else in order for everyone to agree that this is what we need to do and how we do it and what will be the different working groups. So, the idea was to try and dissect the issues – otherwise everything gets derailed when you get caught up in the sticking points, in the particular issues because they spill over into all others. So, they had to be separated and led by people of consequence (...) So, what we decided was that in order for this to happen. Let's say if I have five to six key actors which I need to interact with their specific counterparts here I can't do that without attracting attention to it unless there is some smokescreen. The way you create the smokescreen is that we set up a project, got funding from the British government and have sixteen participants on each side. There are regular meetings going on that everybody is aware of and they are coming to talk about larger issues but all this is just a fluff. But this allows me to justify the frequency of visits of some of these key people who are coming as part of the group. And then whilst they are here we take them around and have all the real meetings. For example, the military to military meeting was kept on an operational and tactical level between General Karimi who was their head of the military (…) he needed to be connected here with our director general of military operations in order for them to work through things like*

[751] Interview Motiwala; This insight again reflects the stipulations made by Ledeneva about informal networks being 'based on [their] non-transparency: networks of insiders are tied together by following an unwritten code (...) the foundations of belonging to networks of power are hidden behind formal appointments and are non-transparent'.

communication, various small border issues which have not so much to do with political issues (…) The economic piece we did through The Asia Foundation. Now the funding, be it by the British or the Asia foundation – that is one aspect of things. But the strategic aspect of things is what happens on a state to state level. Which is where the Afghan ambassador here and the Pakistani ambassador there were involved in selecting some of the participants on the list who would come to visit. This had to be there because otherwise you cannot do these things. People will start getting suspicious as to why this is happening[752]*. So, all of this was done, all of these different layers each of them had various role to play in the larger picture. The original concept was to have working groups established between the two (…) I did not put them all together because I did not want them to get muddled up. Again, initially none of these things were directly connected. We were the thread connecting them all'*[753].

This clearly, albeit lengthily, establishes that PAJCCI is indeed able to operate with less accountability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan whose state actors were unwilling and unable to officially reach out to each other at a time when bilateral relations had reached a low point. Instead, they were very purposefully relying on an NSA, offering plausible deniability and a low-key channel of communication, to help facilitate an eventual re-engagement. In other words, the lack accountability of the chamber must be viewed and defined not in any legal context or in its ability to utilise the non-existent regulatory framework at the time of its creation. Rather, the type of accountability, or lack thereof for that matter, must be understood in the sense that the chamber was not accountable to the same constituency (its own electorate, the government of the other country concerned) as the State actors would have been and could therefore also risk losing face should its efforts fail.

Having said this, we must now turn to the final steps of the causal mechanism to further investigate how PAJCCI sought to achieve this.

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[752] Note: this insight seems to reflect Slaughter's writing on networks, warning that states 'must continue to be the principal actors in the global system'. Harkening back to the eternal lesson of Realism, it also demonstrates that states are a force to be reckoned with – even in the world of transnationalist activity. At the same time, we also learn that a lack of accountability in informal governance, as stipulated by Ledeneva, does not necessarily have to be pathological but, on the contrary, can offer sufficient plausible deniability in the pursuance of goals, which might not be achievable through formal channels.

[753] Interview Faiysal AliKhan.

Step V: NSA able to most effectively implement its agenda and policies in and between the concerned states + Step VI: Successful influence on the Foreign Policy of the concerned states towards each other through NSA activity

Having already alluded to the manner in which PAJCCI has sought to implement its agenda in and between the concerned states, the following shall seek to further elaborate on this and ultimately outline how the chamber successfully influenced the foreign policy of the concerned states. As stated by Faiysal AliKhan, the chamber sought to adopt the role of an intermediary that would facilitate visits to the respective countries whilst ensuring that the governments and intelligence agencies of both sides were kept informed. It was also made sure that these visits would, on the surface, merely discuss minor and non-controversial issues, the 'smokescreen', which would then provide the necessary cover to negotiate on more substantial bilateral matters and build up the trust that had been lost over the previous years. As Faiza describes it:

> '*overall what we have been doing during these 2,5 years of no one speaking on the G to G side, the chamber had been pursuing a lot of activities. Focus discussion, bringing in key people here and there*'.

Indeed, the activities of PAJCCI were stepped up towards the end of 2015 and gathered momentum in early 2017 as the trade- and political relationship was deteriorating. It was at that time when the chamber:

> '*reached out to mid-tier government officials in Afghanistan and invited them to meet us. So, a mid-tier government delegation visited us in Pakistan. One of the issues we discussed were regulatory duties. And so, we nourished the rhetoric with them, we facilitated them, we organised their meetings with the Ministry of Commerce. It was the deputy Minister of Commerce from the Afghan side. We told them that if you really want to sort out this issue, you need to come here and we will help you with our government*[754].

In keeping with the 'decorum' PAJCCI has sought to follow, all these activities are indeed well documented – in writing and through photographs – and published. Against the backdrop of the border closure and the imposition of regulatory duties

[754] Interview Faiza.

in 2017, PAJCCI activities significantly increased from October 2017 to June 2018 – in terms of the amount, density and the level of access to policy-makers. Beginning in October 2017, the chamber followed up on the previous delegation mentioned above by raising 'issues being faced by the business community in Pakistan-Afghanistan transit' in Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Maritime. In November and December, Faiza convened meetings across the border in Kabul with the relevant business representatives. Her colleagues in Pakistan, held a meeting with officials from Pakistan's National Logistics Cell to discuss how it might be able to 'play its role in Afghan Transit Trade Logistics for the improvement of Pak-Afghan trade'. In January of 2018, the chamber called on both the Pakistani finance minister and Afghanistan's ambassador 'to deliberate matter of utmost concerns', underscoring in particular the '*issue of regulatory duties imposed'*[755]. According to Faiysal AliKhan, the objective of the meeting was to establish a task force that would seek to:

> '*expedite if the Afghan finance minister and the Pakistan finance minister are meeting on a 21 points agenda, that task force would then be able to work through four or five of some of the points that had already been agreed on so that next time they meet there would only be 16 points and so on and so forth*[756]*'.*

Naturally, PAJCCI also sought to apprise the powers that be of its activities and made sure to officially convene with the military commanders of the Frontier Corps 'to discuss problems of traders at Chaman border'. Eventually, the strategy of gathering strategic momentum by initiating 'regular meetings (…) that everybody is aware of', as outlined by Faiyal AliKhan, reached the highest level of the Pakistani state: the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Bajwa. Having, in October 2017, during his first visit to Afghanistan, already 'discussed bilateral relations, trade and transit'[757] with President Ghani, it was subsequently agreed in February 2018 to establish 'five joint working groups, focusing on ensuring a comprehensive engagement for countering terrorism, intelligence sharing, military, economy, trade and transit interaction, refugee repatriation and connectivity[758]'. As one would expect, the COAS's suggestion to re-ignite the

[755] PAJCCI, *Progress Report October 2017 - June 2018*.
[756] Interview Faiysal AliKhan.
[757] GEO TV, "COAS Meets Afghan President, Discusses Regional Security."
[758] SUCH TV, "Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa In Kabul For High-Level Military Meeting."

bilateral dialogue by, in the words of Faiysal AliKhan, trying to '*dissect the issues (…) and led by people of consequence*,' in the form of working committees only added to the feverishly prepared meetings which PAJCCI organised or co-chaired. In late February, for example, a meeting was held with the British High Commissioner 'to deliberate upon Af-Pak economic issues and to sought support in convening halted table-talks across the border'[759]. Although his own organisation, FIDA, which co-hosted the event would eventually be removed from the resolution[760], Faiysal AliKhan organised a 'Cross Border Stakeholder' Engagement and Advocay Meeting' around the same time in Islamabad, which would include PAJCCI, Saferworld and the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), 'officials from Afghan Embassy and Ministry of Foreign affairs, representatives from the British High Commission and USAID'[761]. The final communique would 'urge governments on both the sides to segregate business and trade ties from political and security tensions, and suggest that Pak-Afghan trade, both bilateral and transit, needs rejuvenation and appropriate confidence building measures may be instilled for removing deep-rooted mistrust in Pak-Afghan relationship[762]'. Commenting on this surge of PAJCCI's activities, Faiza states:

> '*In February, the COAS visited Afghanistan, he met Ghani, they discussed the trade. And the chief said that all working groups should meet every two months to discuss all issues because sometimes we discuss security but forget economics and vice versa (…) The months before April then, we were really going back to back, focus group discussion with our governments, opening them up to what Afghanistan had to say, it was the breaking of the ice. We went to the Ministry of Commerce here in Pakistan and in Afghanistan (..) what we did was to sketch out common ground so they could talk. We made sure to have meetings in March and April to make sure that there is some platform'*[763].

In one such meeting in March, the Deputy Head of Mission of the Afghan Embassy to Pakistan very much acknowledged the instrumental role played by the chamber and 'showed his gratitude for the productive effort of PAJCCI and said that this can

[759] PAJCCI, *Progress Report October 2017 - June 2018*.
[760] Note: The author is in possession of the original documents, as provided to him by Faiysal AliKhan himself.
[761] PAJCCI, *Progress Report October 2017 - June 2018*.
[762] PAJCCI, *Progress Report October 2017 - June 2018*.
[763] Interview Faiza.

be helpful for the betterment of relations on both the sides (…) [and] enhance the business, commerce and trade of both countries by de-politicization'[764].

Yet, beyond the rhetorical, there would be a more formal recognition of the role that PAJCCI played between the two countries when the PM of Pakistan eventually seized the momentum that had been building up since the Chief's visit and the on-going, yet low-key bilateral activities in his own country and visited President Ghani in Kabul in early April 2018. Heralded as a breakthrough in relations, both leaders agreed 'that the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS) [first proposed by the COAS] would provide a useful framework for broad based and structured engagement on all issues of mutual interest and decided to operationalise the five working groups'[765]. Indeed, PM Abbasi did not just recognise that 'PAJCCI, particularly from within tribal areas, and the Afghan government had raised the issue [of regulatory duties on Afghan exports] both formally and informally'[766] but also 'announced waiver of additional regulatory duty on Afghan export to Pakistan to help lift the Afghan economy'. In another gesture of goodwill, he proclaimed a 'gift of 40 thousand tons wheat for the Afghan people[767]', for, in his own words:

> '*Afghanistan cannot survive without wheat or flour from Pakistan as it is a basic part of the diet and imports from other countries is of double and triple cost to the consumer*'[768].

Claiming the fruits of its labour, PAJCCI proudly claimed that 'the recent visits of the Honorable PM of Pakistan and Honorable COAS to Afghanistan have rekindled the momentum and broken the ice. It is expected that soon Government to Government meetings will be held (…) During both visits, assurance of segregating economics from politics and security tensions has been extended across the border and it was agreed that border closures would be avoided[769]. According to Faiza:

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[764] Business Recorder, "Pakistan And Afghanistan: PAJCCI For Initiating Dialogue For Peace."
[765] Tolo News, "Ghani, Abbasi Agree To 7 Key Principles For Action Plan.";
Hashim, "Pakistan PM Abbasi Set To Visit Afghanistan To 'Reduce Mistrust'."
[766] Interview Abbasi.
[767] Afghan Studies Center, "PM Shahid Khaqan Visit To Kabul On 6 April 2018."
[768] Interview Abbasi.
[769] PAJCCI, *Progress Report October 2017 - June 2018*.

> ‘the PM *went in April and after the negotiations we did for this regulatory duty, Abbasi announced waiving off this duty in April which was implemented in July. We kept our promises’*[770].

Indeed, following the April by PM Abbasi, a high-level Afghan delegation, the first of its kind in years, including ministers and deputy ministers of agriculture, international trade, commerce, foreign affairs, customs, and finance, visited Islamabad in May to continue the recently re-established bilateral dialogue[771]. According to Faiza:

> ‘*the May delegation was a delegation after 2,5 years from Afghanistan that visited Pakistan. It was a major, major achievement’*[772].

Besides the waiver of the regulatory duty, which had been so high on the chamber’s agenda, the other significant development might be its official inclusion in the working committee whose establishment the COAS and the respective Presidents had agreed upon. On May 28th, 2019, the Pakistani Ministry of Commerce issued an on official notification in which it nominated PAJCCI ‘to represent the private sector’ in the APAPPS meetings as the chamber ‘is actively involved in working on bilateral and transit trade matters’[773]. Being included in the joint economic commission of the APAPPS framework, the official state-to-state channel, seeking to provide ’a comprehensive and structured mechanism to enhance engagement between counterpart institutions of the two countries’, must be regarded as a major success of the chamber. Indeed, to be present at its first meeting in June 2018 in Kabul[774], was:

> ‘*a huge achievement (..) We were the only business to business representative that took part in this meeting. The only chamber. Not even federation. All the rest was government, military to military, intelligence to intelligence’*[775].

This bilateral framework and the workings of the respective committees constitute a major bilateral channel until today – even after a new government came to power

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[770] Interview Faiza.
[771] PAJCCI, *Progress Report October 2017 - June 2018*.
[772] Interview Faiza.
[773] Ministry of Commerce and Textiles, *Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan For Peace And Solidarity*.
[774] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Joint Statement Inaugural Session Of The APAPPS Working Groups*.
[775] Interview Faiza.

in Pakistan, state actors from both sides still 'convene meetings of the Joint Economic Commission and bilateral transit trade coordination authority[776]' and make sure to 'take the necessary steps (…) so the main north-western Torkham crossing with Afghanistan could be kept open 24 hours'[777] in order to 'solidify economic and trade relations'. What is more, the 'waived off regulatory duties on fresh fruit imports from Afghanistan, [led] to a 29% increase in Afghan exports to Pakistan' and an overall 'recorded increase of 118% in 2018'[778]. Proudly summarising these substantial achievements of his chamber, Zubair Motiwala highlights that:

> 'for *the last 1,5 years the border closures have not happened. Previously, prior to 2018 before Abbasi's visit, they used to close down the border all the time (...) The chamber has been playing a very instrumental role in actually bringing the two states nearer and we have managed to have the border closures to not take place anymore. We have managed to bring down the duties on certain items from Afghanistan'*[779].

Against this background, one can indeed argue that PAJCCI successfully '[eased] out any pressures induced by Political or Legal framework in the respective countries in the most appropriate manner possible[780]'

Having outlined how the chamber successfully uploaded a foreign policy agenda to the state level, one could, of course, leave it at this and once again draw one's conclusions about the qualified insertion of NSA activities into the realm of state activities. Yet, there is a final, very peculiar, and perhaps, in the thesis as a whole, unique aspect to or rather cause for PAJCCI's success. As demonstrated, the level of contact that PAJCCI would enjoy in Pakistan, as part of its pursuance of better relations, eventually reached the highest level of the military and civilian governments of the country – as Faiysal AliKhan, with reference to the visiting head of the Afghan military, underscored earlier. Having gone through the details of the intermediary role that the chamber played, one might legitimately wonder how such a young organisation came by such power and influence in such a short

[776] Hindustan Times, "Have Not Agreed To Open Afghan Trade Route To India, Pakistan Clarifies."
[777] Gul, "Possible US Troop Exit Prompts Pakistan To Accelerate Afghan Border Fencing."
[778] Daily Times, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Bilateral Trade Crosses $2 Billion Mark In Year 2017-2018."
[779] Interview Motiwala.
[780] PAJCCI, *Progress Report October 2017 - June 2018*.

period of time? Certainly, it has been established that the chamber enjoyed access to important resources, information, and elites in the concerned countries. Yet, how was PAJCCI catapulted to the position of eminence it came to play and why would this particular organisation come to play the role it played and no other? One might indeed wonder whether the chamber's success and its initiatives are an example for the 'long train of these practices' which once convinced William Pitt 'that there is something behind the throne, greater than the throne itself[781]'. Indeed, throughout this case study we have been able to observe how PAJCCI's activities have been intertwined with the intelligence agencies of the country, whose 'green light' the chamber has always sought to obtain and whom PAJCCI has always sought to keep informed. Yet, there is a difference between obtaining tacit approval by the powers that be and to be knowingly or unknowingly directed, steered or even manipulated by them. It is widely accepted that most countries but especially the third world possess 'a kind of shadow or parallel system of government in which unofficial or publicly unacknowledged individuals play important roles in defining and implementing state policy'[782]. General Durrani, former head of Pakistan's ISI and hence someone who would be most qualified to comment on the matter, freely confesses to the existence of such a structure:

> '*there are those who have always been there (…) who keep the relationship in some sort of shape and make sure it does not go beyond a certain point (…) they are not going to be able to turn around the entire relationship but they will have identified key people to approach when things are on the way towards betterment*'[783].

The head of another Pakistani intelligence agency echoes this assessment when he proclaims that:

> '*Pakistan has taken U-turns with the Afghans since forever (…) whoever comes into power in Kabul…Pakistan will find it difficult to have a relationship with. This is why it is even more important to have certain personages who might not be fighters. Who might be low key people that can be of help*'[784].

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[781] Almon, *Anecdotes Of The Life Of The Right Hon. William Pitt, Earl Of Chatham*.
[782] Gingeras, "Last Rites For A 'Pure Bandit'."
[783] Interview Durrani; This statement again highlights the validity of Ledeneva's thesis about the existence of the 'smotryashchie (the watchers), [who are] central for informal governance.
[784] Interview Senior Government Bureaucrat.

One of these personages appears to be Faiysal AliKhan who, as we have learned, has been instrumental in organising and facilitating a whole range of PAJCCI's activities. Being a member of the chamber, having an old and established relationship in the tribal areas and a family, which has been heading a variety of major internationally operating companies in Pakistan itself, he, at the same time, seems to be an 'external member' of PAJCCI – one, who has inserted himself and those around him for the single and temporary purpose of bringing about betterment in the bilateral relationship. Since it is rare to find primary evidence about the existence of a member of *derin devlet*, it is worth citing his 'confession without repent' about his role and responsibility in full: *'*

> *So, PAJCCI traditionally, I initially kept away from Motiwala and all the leadership because the work that we were doing was more discrete. Motiwala and all these people, their role has traditionally been to represent logistics companies and all the transport companies who are going back and forth who are trying to make or save money by tariffs. Taking things there and then bringing them back and selling them here. All this kind of nonsense. They have never been really representing business on a larger scale. And all of these things* [stepped up PAJCCI activities] *were happening with the Presidencies, the Afghan ambassador, funding from the British and Asia Foundation, and everybody being in the loop. But these are all just pieces of the pie. They are not directing them. These issues are being conceived elsewhere and they have their own cycle and things that they need to show. They can deliberate on them, take pictures etc. they get to do that. We get to do it without making the government spend the money or losing faith because they are not directly involved. And things like that* (…) *So, the way this is all done…I personally am not always directly seen to be involved, or directing or curating any of these things. It is always done through various organisations and institutions. So, the chambers themselves and the people in the chambers would not be doing anything strategically, or trying to play some strategic role. Neither would any of these mechanisms. These are merely vehicles to achieve objectives. And these vehicles depend on who is in these vehicles. So, if I am using these chambers with support of both*

the governments or with the support from Mr Rangoonwala[785] then on the documented, codified and institutional side we are not shown, only that the chambers did this or that. But in reality, we are doing all of these things through these chambers. But if we are disengaged and not doing it as individuals with that support from the governments then the chambers don't have that as an objective nor will they be doing it'.

Asked about in what capacity he and others were acting then, Faiysal AliKhan replied 'as agents of the state'. When challenged that he and ICC President Tariq Rangoonwala are no member of the state or the official state structure, the very essence of a parallel, partly non-state-based, government comes to light in his answer. As Faiysal AliKhan underscores:

'*That's the whole point! If people of consequence who have greater interests whether because they see the current people as rentiers keeping the seat warm for when they come, like tenants in my house which I currently don't occupy myself, or whether it is because of your own personal or family networks that you act on behalf of the state (...) The role the chambers had to play was to offer a platform to those who uphold the integrity of the federation, even though they were not part of the government, in the interest of the state[786]. It is because of years and years of people and individuals being embedded within the structure and system so that all of these mechanisms, whether they are chambers or committees or whatever they are, they are skilled at the ability to utilise it, sometimes better than people who are in government but are short-sighted and may lack that exposure because they are generalists who come for a specific period of time and move on (...) they would have no idea about the intricacies of all this. Because they are not part of an institutional memory. We are custodians of the institutional memory of state secrets and statecraft because of a history of being involved, acting on behalf of the state and you can say, in Pakistan's case, given the fact that the country is only 74 years old and these families and their organisations, companies or institutional identities*

[785] Note: The head of an old and established Pakistan business family and director of the Pakistan Chapter of the International Chamber of Commerce.

[786] Note: This insight seems to reflect Slaughter's earlier urging that states '[states] should become docks for all kinds of networks'; It is also reminiscent of Harsh's notion that "informal governance refers to as means of decision-making that is uncodified, non-institutional, and where social relationships and webs of influence play crucial roles".

predate all that, they have been playing those roles anyways. And there are many of examples like this that you can give (…) Meaning you can say that in our country it is very much part of our history[787] *(…) a lot of the deal making is being done through personal networks and capacities just like you have the power of the state*[788].

Against this background, one wonders whether the chamber 'merely' served as a platform:

'*to those who uphold the integrity of the federation, even though they were not part of the government, in the interest of the state'* or, as a vehicle for those who '*keep the relationship in some sort of shape and make sure it does not go beyond a certain point'*[789].

Yet, does this in any way diminish the role of PAJCCI and its achievements? After all, the idea of dissecting the bilateral issues and establish specific working groups originated with Faiysal AliKhan and so did the organisation of various relevant meetings and funding. This notwithstanding, the chamber's accomplishments are real and recorded for posterity. Its activities and initiatives have had a real and lasting impact for which it has been acknowledged and rewarded. It has played a causally significant role in the bilateral relationship. The fact that it has perhaps rather unknowingly served as a platform for other powers, the powers that be, with overarching, yet in this case conveniently aligned, interests merely shows that there are varying degrees of depth in which non-state activities take place. In the greater scheme of things, it demonstrates that the dominion of foreign policy in a way very much resembles an onion as it reveals itself as a multi-layered, interwoven, multivariate and holistic system, whose very core can constitute a symbiotic

[787] Note: This might be interpreted to be a unique empirical insight into the workings and self-perception of a state within a state, whose members, going back to Helmke et al., are tied together by 'socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels'. It also appears to confirm Gill's observation that the 'independent security state', which goes beyond the armed forces, is distinguished by a 'lack of external controls...its goals will be determined by officials within the agency and may not coincide with those of the political elite'. Truly, members of the deep state do not necessarily trust their own government to pursue the national interest, as they define it.

[788] Interview Faiysal AliKhan; Note: The description of his activities in Pakistan seem to validate Ledeneva's assertion about mastering informal governance: 'in societies where formal institutions do not work to their full potential and where people rely on informal ways of getting things done, the leadership is bound to rely on the use of informal instruments as well. Leaders can only be leaders once they master and control informal networks. The manageability of informal networks is often achieved with informal means and instruments'.

[789] Interview General Durrani.

interplay between state and nonstate agency[790]. At this core, we can often times find those 'custodians of order', hybrids, as it were, who possess both state and non-state linkages and are able to define the boundaries and direction of state policy but nonetheless seek to portray its activities as being carried out and implemented by others.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can thus observe a fully completed process of 'uploading'. Envisioned by an NSA operating under an autonomous condition, a policy of re-engagement and trust build-up is being initiated. This process is further aided by a lack of accountability the NSA enjoys in the countries it operates in as it is able to conduct its mission outside of the public eye. In keeping with the features and characteristics of a 'Facilitator', as outlined in the 'Conceptual Framework', it seeks to offer its agenda to the home government and further aids it throughout the decision-making process. Having said this, it must also be highlighted that the 'trust-building' activities that PAJCCI has undertaken between two very difficult neighbours also bears implications for the initial hypotheses.

Regarding H1, for example, it has become apparent that PAJCCI did indeed require access to government elites in multiple countries in- and outside the region – ranging from Pakistan and Afghanistan to the former and present imperial power, the US and Britain. Especially the links to the latter two, although initiated from within Pakistan, have ensured that sufficient funding and expertise was provided to create an effective organisation. Furthermore, what started as a business-to-business relationship developed into high-level and comprehensive access to the highest political offices in both countries. Since PAJCCI operated as an intermediary, approved and looked upon benignly by the concerned state actors in its activities, it was indispensable for it to have direct access to government elites in the countries it operated in so as to engage successfully in foreign policy-making. H1 can thus be confirmed. In this context, however, it must also be born in mind that what

[790] Or, as Drewer might have put it, a mixture of formal discrete networks whose various 'shared models emerging throughout this process are expansive, yet multifaceted, interweaving state authorities and non-state actors into an increasingly complex and differentiated patchwork of security provision' – and based on a 'multifarious web of regulatory, contractual, voluntary and informal arrangements'.

distinguishes this particular chapter is the remarkable insight into the working of the parallel, or deep, state, which, in this case, is comprised of old families, with domestic and international linkages going back to the times before there was a Pakistan, and members of the intelligence service. In the introduction to the thesis, Historian Ryan Gingeras observed of the existence of 'a kind of shadow or parallel system of government in which unofficial or publicly unacknowledged individuals play important roles in defining and implementing state policy'. It is this phenomena that an examination of the chamber's activities was able to bring to the light of day. What, at first sight, appears to be an initiative, driven by businessmen, revealed, at closer inspection, the workings of very particular individuals, who see themselves as 'custodians of the integrity of the Federation'. Having held organically grown authority since before independence, these individuals, who do not hold government office, have admittedly utilised the chamber as a cloak under which they might disguise their efforts of bringing about better relations between two very difficult neighbours who had not been on talking terms with each other. It seems to have been mainly these individuals who, through their involvement, granted this comprehensive access to the chamber.

Having established this, we can turn to the question whether a lack of accountability has helped the chamber to engage successfully in foreign policy (H3). We have observed that this crucial accountability question in the case of PAJCCI is not so much understood to be of a legal nature. The chamber is being supervised and monitored. It very purposefully and pre-emptively subjugates itself under the watchful eyes of the security agencies and registered itself under the most acceptable law and kept a public record of its activities. In this way, PAJCCI could have been very easily held accountable for any of its actions. Rather, it seems that PAJCCI's accountability is of a different type, namely, it was able to facilitate a re-engagement between the two estranged governments at a time when bilateral relations were difficult, the two governments were not on talking terms, and an organisation outside of the public eye was able to step in and seize the necessary political space to improve the situation. The unique qualification it was able to offer to all state actors involved, and those in the deep state, one might add, might perhaps be best described as a 'plausible deniability' as no state actors could have been held accountable for reaching out to the other side of the Durand line at a time of

mounting tensions. The type of accountability, or lack thereof for that matter, the chamber finds itself under must, in this case, be understood in the sense that she is not accountable to the same constituency (be that foreign government or the electorate) as the concerned State actors. It can risk losing face should its efforts fail and thus offers 'plausible deniability' to the states involved, should the overall strategy to improve relations fail. H3 can thus be confirmed.

Against this background, we can certainly establish that PAJCCI represents one of those NSAs which will come to fill a vacuum in foreign policy-making when bilateral cooperation is difficult among given countries (H1). Partly out of its own commercial interest, partly used as a platform for the Pakistani *derin devlet*, the chamber was able, or made able, to seize a vacuum that had opened up and was indeed widening between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The chamber was able to seize the opportunity and occupy political space – a conduct eventually looked upon benevolently and approvingly by the political and deep-state establishment in Pakistan. By positioning itself, or purposefully and strategically *being* positioned, she was able to 'upload' her agenda to the level of official Pakistani foreign policy. More than that, however, she did not merely stop her activities after an official bilateral dialogue had been re-established but managed to keep herself locked into the future decision-making process by becoming an integral part of the newly established framework between Afghanistan and Pakistan. H2 can thus be confirmed.

Chapter 5: Removing and Replacing Saddam Hussein: The United States and the Iraqi National Accord

Background

In the year 1990, September 11 signalled the arrival of a 'unique and extraordinary moment'[791]. With 'Operation Desert Shield' demonstrating the impressive extent of American air superiority, President H. W. Bush, in front of a US flag and framed by two *fasces*, underlining his nation's claim to the full inheritance of the *Imperium Romanum*, proclaimed before a Joint Session of the Congress: 'the crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times (…) a new world order can emerge: a new era (…) today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known'[792]. Truly, in the struggle against Iraq and his leader Saddam Hussein, this 'Hitler revisited'[793], the battle cry of the declared *novus ordo seclorum* coming out of the august chambers of the New Rome at the Potomac might well have been in keeping with Roman fashion: *ceterum censeo Mesopotamiam esse delendam!*

After all, 'in the hierarchy of states, nations did not always know their place'[794] in this new era and one of those states refusing to fall into line appeared to have been the Iraq of Saddam Hussein, whose continued rule, even after the launch of Operation Desert Storm, presented a standing defiance to the US throughout the 1990s. Indeed, the earlier decision by President Bush to allow Saddam Hussein to remain in power soon came 'under review'[795]. As the leader of the West himself acknowledged, the war was fought to 'restore the status quo' when Saddam constituted 'a pillar of the gulf balance of power' and 'his iron fist simultaneously held Iraq together (…) and prevented Iranian Islamic fundamentalists from sweeping over the eastern Arab world'. It was thus hoped in Washington that 'sanctions would force Mr Hussein's generals to bring him down', which would, in the eyes of the US leadership, result in 'the best of all worlds: an iron-fisted Iraqi

[791] Bush, "Address Before A Joint Session Of The Congress On The Persian Gulf Crisis And The Federal Budget Deficit."
[792] Bush, "Address Before A Joint Session Of The Congress On The Persian Gulf Crisis And The Federal Budget Deficit."
[793] PBS Frontline, "The Mind Of Hussein."
[794] Anderson, *American Foreign Policy And Its Thinkers.*
[795] Friedman, "The World; A Rising Sense That Iraq's Hussein Must Go."

junta without Saddam Hussein'[796]. In other words, the US President, the *praefectus praetorio,* seem to have realised that he had become a victim of his own dictum, namely that 'our problem is with Saddam Hussein alone[797]' and that the rebellious province of Iraq needed a new proconsul – one that would restore the favourable *status quo ante bellum*. Of course, direct rule has rarely been the preferred *modus operandi* of any power. The role model of almost all Western imperial powers, Rome, for example, embraced the concept of the *rex sociusque et amicus*, king and ally and friend. Formally recognised by the Senate, 'these were rulers under the patronage of the Roman state'[798]. And if it was not Rome, it might have been Britain's Lord Curzon whom the architects of the New World Order had in mind when they began to sketch out scenarios on how one might best achieve the establishment of the aforementioned 'iron-fisted junta without Saddam Hussein': '[We need an] Arab facade ruled and administered under British guidance and controlled by a native Mohammedan and, as far as possible, by an Arab staff (….) There should be no actual incorporation of the conquered territory in the dominions of the conqueror, but the absorption may be veiled by such constitutional fictions as a protectorate, a sphere of influence, a buffer state and so on'[799]. And so, there was indeed a growing number of different personages and Iraqi exile organisations, sworn enemies of the Saddam Hussein regime, flocking to the Imperial Courts in Washington and London – some of them all-too obviously hoping to become the public face of the façade, others quietly forging lasting alliances, biding their time and waiting for their moment to seize when the empire would inevitably 'act again, creating other new realities'[800]. One of these organisations was the Iraqi National Accord (INA), led by Dr Ayad Allawi, would become part of this new reality in Iraq, created by the second Bush administration in 2003.

It is against this background that this chapter shall thus set out how why and under what conditions this relatively little known Iraqi exile organisation would come to play an integral part in American foreign policy over more than a decade

[796] Friedman, "The World; A Rising Sense That Iraq's Hussein Must Go."
[797] PBS Frontline, "The Mind Of Hussein."
[798] Braund, "Client Kings."
[799] Lord Curzon (and Eastern Committee). 24 April 1918. and Curzon memorandum, 12 December 1917, cited by William Stivers. *Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-*American World Order, 1918-1930 (Ithaca, 1982). pp. 28, 34.
[800] Suskind, "Faith, Certainty And The Presidency Of George W. Bush."

and, following Operation Iraqi Freedom, was subsequently able to seize its place in the hot sun of Mesopotamia.

Embedding the chapter in the wider scholarly debate

Yet, before analysing how, why and under which conditions the INA was able to insert herself in this very foreign policy decision-making process, it is necessary to briefly outline which existing scholarly works this chapter speaks to and builds upon.

As Adamson et al. underline, whilst earlier scholarly work treated diaspora communities as specific ethnic groups *within* a particular state, recent years have witnessed a shift of analytical attention to the linkages of such groups *with* government institutions and the cultivation of political and economic bonds of nationals abroad with their home states[801]. Reversely, attempts by the state of origin to utilise their emigrants and establish platforms to further institutionalise such linkages has also received considerable attention[802]. What is more, Lyons et al. have shown that the goals and objectives of such communities do not necessarily revolve around the same set of principled values as most of the TAN groups focus on but are often driven by narrow and partisan objectives, which might even come into conflict with the 'lofty cosmopolitanism' generally driving advocacy groups[803]. Adding to this, Brinkerhoff and others have demonstrated that diasporas are very heterogenous in terms of the variety of their identity, their agenda[804] and their involvement with the homeland[805].

Surely, Koinova's classification of the existing literature on diasporas in global affairs is particularly helpful in obtaining an overview in this regard. Her

[801] Brand, *Citizens Abroad;* Østergaard-Nielsen, *Transnational Politics;* Østergaard-Nielsen,"Turkey and the 'Euro Turks'; Senay, "Trans-Kemalism"; Adamson and Demetriou, "Remapping the Boundaries of 'State' and 'National Identity'; Délano, *Mexico and Its Diaspora in the US;* Délano, "The Diffusion of Diaspora Engagement Policies"; Iskander, *Creative State*.
[802] Gamlen, A. 2006. *Diaspora Engagement Policies*; Iskander, *Creative State*; Kapur, *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy;* Naujoks, *Migration, Citizenship, and Development;* Varadarajan, *The Domestic Abroad,* pp. 109–110.
[803] Lyons, 2010. "Think Locally, Act Globally.", p. 126.
[804] Brinkerhoff, *Digital Diasporas,* p. 35.
[805] Sheffer, Gabriel. 2014. "The Effects of Diasporas' Nature, Types, and Goals on Hostland Foreign Policies", p. 33.

first category regards such communities as independent actors in international relations[806]. In the second, diasporas are analysed in the context of being influenced by their original home states[807], and the third classification portrays them as 'acting as both depending on the location of the main mobilising agents'[808]. On the whole, this underscores the growing attention that diaspora groups receive in the contemporary scholarly debate. Yet, as Marinova points out in her seminal work, the existing literature seems to examine the role of diasporas through a unidirectional prism, which might be perhaps best captured in Waterbury's assertion that diasporas assume importance whenever their home state wants them to[809]. However, as Marinova rightfully asserts, this should not just be applied to the state of origin but also to 'the state of reception, which utilises select diaspora communities for advancing its foreign policy objectives'[810]. After all, she observes – very much in line with what this thesis as a whole seeks to achieve – 'it is important to incorporate that role of the state into understanding the utilization of select diaspora organizations, which is a transnational process in terms of both its practice and its implications. Unlike these scholars (…) I contribute to understanding the significance of the role of the states in utilizing and engaging diasporas toward mutually beneficial foreign policy goals, not from the standpoint of the significance of the state in the regulation of immigration, which has been their focus'[811]. To be sure, with reference to the Literature Review Chapter, Hägel's criticism of the SMT and TAN literature, which does not 'foresee the reverse relationship – state actors influencing transnational actors in order to further their own interests'[812], does come to mind in this context. In the diaspora literature itself, however, as Marinova maintains, this inversed relationship of states using diasporas for their own foreign policy agenda seems to have received rather limited attention: 'nonetheless, a systematic discussion of participation of ethnic groups, in close relationship to the host-state leadership, in which the host state approaches the

[806] Shain,"The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution."
[807] Haegel, and Peretz. 2005. "States and Transnational Actors."; Ragazzi, "Governing Diasporas."
[808] Koinova, "Why Do Conflict-Generated Diasporas Pursue Sovereignty-based Claims Through State-based or Transnational Channels?"; Koinova, "Can Conflict Generated Diasporas Be Moderate Actors During Episodes of Contested Sovereignty."
[809] Waterbury, "From Irredentism to Diaspora Politics."; Waterbury, *Between State and Nation: Diaspora Politics and Kin-State Nationalism in Hungary.*
[810] Marinova, *Ask What You Can Do For Your (New) Country*.
[811] Marinova, *Ask What You Can Do For Your (New) Country*.
[812] Hagel, "States And Transnational Actors: Who's Influencing Whom?".

ethnic groups and seeks their assistance, has not been presented (…) among the works on ethnic/diasporic groups and foreign policy, none offers a broad theoretical understanding of when, under what circumstances, and for what reasons host-state governments use diasporas'[813]. If at all, there has been a debate about whether the involvement of such groupings ought to be considered beneficial[814] for the national interest or detrimental[815]. Another exception might be Auten and Shain, who, despite not developing particular case studies, show how diaspora communities engage in political activity directed against the home-state government and are being used by their new home state to carry out paramilitary and propaganda operations as well as intelligence collection activities[816].

Having thus briefly sketched out the diaspora literature and its inherent assumptions, Marinova's '*Ask What You Can Do For Your (New) Country: How Host States Use Diasporas'* must be treated as a key analytical ally and indeed a solid foundation onto which this thesis as a whole might be built upon and thus contributes to. One of her chapters even investigates the efforts of the perhaps most well-known Iraqi exile organisation, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), to 'actively support and promote the impending Iraq war to the US public'[817]. As she points out, 'the case of the Bush administration and the INC is indicative of how host-state leadership can use a diaspora organisation in order to rally support for, and increase the perception of legitimacy for, regime change in the exiles' homeland'. Something she rightfully considers to be a 'textbook example of host-government use of diaspora members'. Here it must be underlined, however, that her Iraq-centred case study is focused primarily analysing the INC's role in 'promoting, or, in other words, "selling" the 2003 pre-emptive war on Iraq'. Hence, although she does briefly touch upon the INC's relationship with other Iraqi exile group, the narration of the organisation's activities is mostly 'inward'-looking, that is, it revolves around the utilisation of the INC, and its ability to provide intelligence to

[813] Marinova, *Ask What You Can Do For Your (New) Country*.
[814] Hollinger, *Postethnic America Beyond Multiculturalism;* Bard, *The Water's Edge and Beyond;* Glastris, et al., "Multicultural Foreign Policy in Washington."
[815] Miller, *The Unmaking of Americans;* Smith, *Foreign Attachments;* Schlesinger, "Hyphenating Foreign Policy."; Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests"; Huntington, "The Hispanic Challenge."; Mearsheimer et al., *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*.
[816] Auten, Brian J. 2006. "Political Diasporas and Exiles as Instruments of Statecraft."
[817] Marinova, *Ask What You Can Do For Your (New) Country*, p. 174.

the US government, as part of a larger public relations campaigned aimed at persuading the American (and partly foreign) public to support the war. Whilst these considerations play an important role in this chapter, it is not the INA's incorporation into 'inward-looking' public relations matters but the 'outward-looking' instrumentalisation of the INA into the actual process of US-led nation-building efforts prior to and indeed following the invasion of Iraq. It will become clear that the Allawi and the INA constitute an integral part of the US foreign policy implementation process, which would have a lasting impact on Iraq itself many years after.

Another crucial insight Marinova's work offers is her observation that diaspora organisations are heterogenous in organisational structure and outlook. In the case of Iraq, she points out that different Iraqi exile organisations would be supported by the governments of different countries. However, what still requires further elaboration and analytical attention is the possibility that different groups supported by the same country might in turn have different institutional patrons *within that same government*. Although she briefly mentions that the INC was the favourite of the Pentagon whilst the INA received most of its resources and facilitation from CIA and to a lesser extent the State Department (which had previously supported but then shunned the INC) this nonetheless presents a gap, which this chapter seeks to further investigate.

On the whole, it is rather baffling to see that there is a considerable number of books, and some scholarly articles[818], narrating the role played by Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress (INC) in the lead-up to the war. This appears to be the case because of the very public exposure of Mr Chalabi and his undeniable charisma, which have certainly made him and his organisation known to a larger audience. Roston's 'The Man who pushed America to War'[819] and Bonin's 'Arrows of the Night'[820] are particularly noteworthy works in this regard. A variety of television interviews and documentaries[821] have further reinforced the impression

[818] Gunter, "The Iraqi Opposition And The Failure Of U.S. Intelligence."
[819] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War*.
[820] Bonin, *Arrows Of The Night*.
[821] Al Jazeera, "Profile: Ahmed Chalabi."; PBS Frontline, "Truth, War And Consequences."; Smith, "America, Iraq And The Legacy Of Ahmad Chalabi."

that the INC seems to be perceived as the only Iraqi opposition group deserving of popular and academic attention. This is, of course, surprising given the fact that it was after all the INA's founder, Ayad Allawi, who would assume responsibility as the first post-Saddam Iraqi PM whilst the role of Chalabi and his organisation was, despite a later comeback, greatly diminished. Although this concentration on the INC makes it considerably more difficult to obtain secondary sources on INA-related activities, this chapter seeks to fill this important gap and thus, as it were, set the historical record straight.

Finally, it is crucial to highlight that, as a senior member of both the organisation itself and the Allawi family put it: 'the INA is a one-man army'[822]. In this regard, the INA bears a certain similarity with its chief rival, the INC. It's head, Ahmed Chalabi, 'the man who pushed America to war'[823], has been the subject of ample literary and media attention and due to his flamboyant charisma, which he skilfully employed to achieve his desired goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Although there were other opposition groups collaborating with the US and UK (and other governments, such as the Iranian, for that matter), one might legitimately assert that the INA and INC were the most prominent ones: 'Americans who supported Chalabi often saw him as a counterpoint to Allawi, who was portrayed to them as a dark, brooding force. (Most, once they met Allawi, found him likable and warm. Ironically, he had been trained in the same school of hospitality and charm as Chalabi)'[824]. Yet, it is surprising that, apart from a few newspaper articles, the INA has received nowhere near as much attention as its chief rival. Hence, it seems that both organisations were led by Weberian-style charismatic authorities has methodological, theoretical and very practical implications for this chapter and consequently for the thesis has a whole – particularly regarding the importance of conducting high-level, elite interviews.

The Iraqi National Accord (INA)

[822] Interview Senior Member INA.
[823] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War*.
[824] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War*.

Having outlined the scholarly foundations of this chapter, which inspire and drive this chapter, it is now necessary to briefly establish whether, according to the typology and conditions outlined in the Conceptual Framework, the INA operates as an entrepreneur or subcontractor in its relationship to its home government, the US. Hence, going back to Figure 4, one must examine the GOC's (1) Agenda, (2) Funding, and (3) Supervision arrangements.

Agenda

In a nutshell, the INA is an opposition group, founded in 1991, with American, British, Saudi, and Jordanian support, by Iyad Allawi and Salih Omar Ali al-Tikriti, both former members of the Baath Party and former supporters of Saddam Hussein[825]. Its agenda might perhaps be best captured by the battle cry of Lucius Junius Brutus, leader of the noblemen who overthrew the Roman monarch in 509 BC, founder of the Roman Republic and its first consul: *sic semper tyrannis!* Indeed, the INA makes it very clear in its charter that the organisation was established in 1990 in order to 'achieve a democratic pluralistic regime that respects human rights and lives peacefully with its citizens, neighbours and the whole world'. Yet, most important was the *'removal of Saddam's regime'* [emphasis added]. This goal is repeatedly underscored. After all, it is claimed, the INA is 'supported by Iraqis inside and outside Iraq, some of those fugitives, united by a common goal, that is *the removal of Saddam's regime'* [emphasis added]. Already implying that their preferred manner of achieving this would be an 'organic Tyrannicide' from inside Iraq in the form of a coup, they underline that they 'hope to achieve this by encouraging and working with opposition elements (both military and civilian) within Iraq in their efforts to bring about change'[826]. The primacy attributed to the role of the Iraqi military in overcoming Hussein's rule and the INA's emphasis on security is particularly important to underline here as it will prove to be of particular relevance over the course of this chapter. Indeed, the INA and its leader, Iyad Allawi, would remain committed to the 'Putsch option' as a preferred outcome throughout their engagement with the US prior to Operation

[825] Congressional Research Service, *Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance And Security*.
[826] Iraqi National Accord, "Iraqi National Accord."

Iraqi Freedom. The importance attributed to the armed forces of Iraq might of course be explained by the very composition of the organisation itself. As Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Douglas Feith outlines: 'the CIA favored Iyad Allawi and his Iraqi National Accord (INA), the group formed by former Sunni, Baathist military officers who had fallen out with Saddam. The INA said it favored democracy for Iraq, but its leaders, supported by Sunni-controlled Arab governments, wanted the country's Sunni-controlled military to continue to play a key political role in Iraq [that is, after the overthrow of the Saddam-led government]'. Having already hinted at the fact that different institutions of the US government worked with different opposition groups, he makes the Pentagon's antagonism towards the INA even clearer when he muses how these objectives 'squared with the INA's proclaimed support for democracy'[827]. In short, we can thus observe that the INA primary objective is to remove Saddam Hussein from power, preferably by instigating a *Putsch* and, one would assume, take on the mantle of government itself.

Funding and Supervision

The detection and assessment of funding and supervision mechanisms prevalent in the relationship between the West and the INA is a complex endeavour. What is more, the collaboration, especially between the US and the INA, has evolved over time – with varying degrees of intensification and arguably peaking with the appointment of Allawi as the first post-Saddam PM of Iraq. This requires us to equip this section of the chapter with a comprehensive chronological narration of this evolvement so as to understand the interdependence of supervision and funding arrangements at work.

Having already observed the strong causal correlations between funding and supervision in the previous chapters, this very nexus appears to be even more intermeshed in the realm in which intelligence services and organisations, such as the INA, operate. As it is the case with covert funding, an analysis whether, how, and to what extent INA activities were monitored by state actors in the West, is, due to the nature of the organisation, difficult to carry out. As a secret Congressional Report, published by Wikileaks, acknowledges: 'covert action has been a

[827] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 240.

significant component of US foreign policy since the post-World War II world'. The Church committee itself famously warned of the existence and possible expansion of a 'parallel but invisible system in which covert operations are routine'[828]. It follows from this that 'the management of covert actions presents significant challenges to any government but, especially to a democratic government that operates on the basis of openness and public accountability' – and, in keeping with Ledeneva's earlier observation, to any researcher who seeks to shed light on this nexus. However, as 'presidents and administrations have made excessive (…) use of covert action (…) [which] have become a routine program with a bureaucratic momentum of its own'[829], a certain trail of evidence has inevitably been left. After all, 'for many years covert actions were undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) without congressional approval notification, but since the mid-1970s the executive branch has been required to provide increasingly detailed information to congressional intelligence committees on planned and ongoing covert actions'[830].

Against this background, it might be apparent that, in contrast to 'normal' Subcontractors with linkages to Western state actors, entities, such as the INA, which collaborate with intelligence agencies will most likely not possess an official contractual agreement, specifically outlining objectives and terms and conditions of the cooperation. After all, as official US government documents point out: 'inherently, covert actions must be planned and undertaken in secret. Funding arrangements – the normal focus of accountability in the U.S. Government – must also be made secretly'[831]. However, it might nonetheless be argued that certain supervision mechanisms of varying intensity and degree have been in place throughout the collaboration between the US and the INA, which, despite periods of standstill, subsequently only grew in strength as the exchange intensified.

In the light of this, we shall depart from the arrangements in the preceding chapters and merge the funding and supervision assessment into one section.

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[828] US Senate, *Final Report Of The Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities*.
[829] US Senate, *Final Report Of The Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities*.
[830] US Congress, *Covert Action: An Effective Instrument Of U.S. Foreign Policy?*.
[831] US Congress, *Covert Action: An Effective Instrument Of U.S. Foreign Policy?*.

As indicated above, there have been different funding and supervision mechanisms in place throughout the history of the INA, beginning in the London of the 1970s when there was not yet an INA but only the 'one-man army', Iyad Allawi, at the time a Baath party member and supporter of Saddam Hussein, who 'exercised a key function for Iraqi Intelligence as head of the Iraqi Student Union in Europe'[832]. By 1978, Allawi, 'who never lost his taste for the world of intelligence' had 'entered into a relationship with the British security services'[833]. Miraculously surviving a subsequent assassination attempt by Iraq's Mukhabarat, 'Alawi lived to (…) pursue his connections with British intelligence and similar organisations'[834]. Finally, when the thunders of Operation Desert Storm blew away the old world order and loudly trumpeted the dawn of the 'unipolar moment', he 'scented the interest of Saudi intelligence'[835], which seems to have realised 'the urgent need of good bridges with Iraqi opponent'. What followed was a decision that would have historic implications in the years to come. At a dinner in November 1990 in Saudi Arabia, hosted by Major General Al-Otaibi and attended by the head of Saudi Military Intelligence, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, a decision was made: 'it was precisely on that evening that the Saudi promise that Salah [Salah Omar Ali al-Tikriti, Iyad Allawi's Sunni Arab partner] and Iyad kept waiting impatiently for was fulfilled. Lua Al-Otaibi advanced towards Salah and extended a closed envelope. And so, it was Saudi patronage and funding that birthed the INA, although members of Allawi's own family would remark that it was M16 which was working with the Saudis to create the INA[836]. There appears to be agreement, however, that the INA, after receiving the initial seed funding, 'earned the patronage of the CIA'[837] and was continually 'capitalising on his links to M16 which he [Allawi] had cultivated'[838]. As a senior member of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service freely admits: 'there were extensive links throughout the 1990s'[839]. Indeed, the linkages that the INA had built across and beyond the region,

[832] Cockburn, *Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession*.
[833] Cockburn, *Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession*.
[834] Cockburn, *Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession*.
[835] Cockburn, *Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession*.
[836] Interview Senior Member INA.
[837] Costel, *Surging Out Of Iraq?*, p. 58.
[838] Ismael et al., *Iraq In The Twenty-First Century*.
[839] Interview Senior Member of the Special Intelligence Service, M16.

helped to portray the organisation as an instrument 'which offered itself to several sympathetic foreign agencies as a vehicle for overthrowing Saddam'[840]. Indeed, 'financial support flowed in from Britain, Jordan, [and] Saudi Arabia'[841]. Soon, the mother of all intelligence agencies, the CIA itself, 'was drawn into opposition politics' and the INA became a 'serious contender for US attention'[842] – 'handed to the Americans on a silver platter by the M16'[843]. Indeed, 'as the CIA was drafting its plans, the British encouraged the Agency to contact an experienced Iraqi exile named Ayad Alawi, who headed a network of current and former Iraqi military officers and Ba'ath Party operatives known as *wifaq'*[844]. The organisation thus 'had built-in access to the US government but through the CIA, which invariably coloured its orientation and prospects'[845]. Before we proceed with examining the nature and implications of the INA-CIA relationship in the years to come, it is worth highlighting that these early years already demonstrate that the organisation seemed to have been dependent on external state funding. On the other hand, there is very little evidence that can shed light on the extent of the supervision that the Saudi intelligence service had in place for the INA. The fact that Allawi was being presented to the Agency could both be interpreted as being a sign of independence, with the organisation proactively seeking a new patron, or as a sign of dependence, with the INA merely being 'passed on', as it were.

However, in the evolving US-INA collaboration, the asymmetry of the relationship between the two in matters of funding and supervision would come to the surface. As a first sign of a certain conditionality that would be attached with CIA patronage, the agency demanded that Allawi distance himself from the INA's co-founder al-Tikriti, who 'was said to have supervised public hangings in Baghdad'. Due to this, the 'CIA would not work with Dr Allawi until he severed his relationship with Mr. Tikriti, which he did in 1992'[846]. In fact, Tikriti was 'viewed as unsavory'[847]. This, one might argue, already demonstrates that the US

[840] Harding, "Iyad Allawi — From CIA Agent To Iraqi PM."
[841] Brinkley, "Man In The News; A Guide For Hard Times -- Iyad Alawi." Wezuiop
[842] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*
[843] Interview Senior member INA.
[844] Ignatius, "The CIA And The Coup That Wasn't."
[845] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq,* p 52.
[846] Brinkley, "The Reach Of War."
[847] Brinkley, "The Reach Of War."

was able to set the tone. Yet, on the whole the nature of the interaction between the two appears to have been a cordial one. After all, 'the INA's theory of regime change coincided with – or reflected – the CIA's own biases for clandestine work with existing power elites inside Saddam's Iraq. It was based on controlling the process by co-opting potential dissidents within the regime's power structures, buttressed by tribal and Ba'ath Party elements, and working through military and intelligence officers who had been 'turned'. And so, having 'moved from the orbit of MI6 to the CIA', with which he 'developed close links'[848], the INA persuaded its new patrons that it was in a position to organise a military coup in Baghdad. According to several intelligence officials, 'the agency's broad goal immediately after the Persian Gulf war in 1991 was to recruit opposition leaders who had senior contacts inside Iraq (…) Iyad had contact with people the agency thought would be useful to us in the future (…) he seemed to have ties to respected Sunni figures that no one else had'[849].

Furthermore, the INA's creation and its expressed preference for a *Putsch* option coincided with the refusal, as bewildering it may have been to many in the US administration, of the 'Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside'[850]. As a consequence, President George H. W. Bush signed what, in the language of the *lingua imperii Americani*, is known a 'lethal finding', which instructed the CIA to covertly create conditions that would lead to a change of regime in Iraq[851]. And so, with a stroke of the pen, the INA had bestowed upon it a CIA code name: 'PANTHER' whilst its leader became 'PANTHER ONE'[852]. With 'press accounts indicat[ing] that about $15 - $20 million were allocated to efforts to cultivate ties to Iraqi military and security officials in the hopes of fomenting a coup'[853], the INA became 'a great favourite of the agency'[854]. Indeed, other sources seem to confirm these figures and highlight that 'the CIA ran its largest covert operation since the Afghan war in Iraq, pouring tens of millions of dollars annually into the (…)

[848] Harding, "Iyad Allawi — From CIA Agent To Iraqi PM."
[849] Brinkley, "The Reach Of War."
[850] Bush, "War in the Gulf."
[851] Hoagl, "How CIA's Secret War On Saddam Collapsed."; Weiner, "Opponents Find That Ousting Hussein Is Easier Said Than Done."
[852] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War*.
[853] Tyler, "Plan On Iraq Coup Told To Congress.";
see also: Wright, "America's Iraq Policy".
[854] Tyler, "Plan On Iraq Coup Told To Congress."

INA'[855] and other exile organisations, such as the Iraqi National Congress (INC). What is more, the US Congress more than doubled the budget (to about 40 million USD for FY1993) for covert support to the opposition[856].

Yet, with the new role and the new patron also came new terms and conditions that are of particular relevance to questions concerning the supervision and funding arrangements. This, it should be emphasised, must also be seen in the context of the falling from grace of Allawi's chief rival: Ahmed Chalabi and his INC, the CIA's previous 'implementing partner', who refused to play by the Agency's rules and even dared to double-cross her[857]. According to Berger, who would later become national security advisor in the Clinton administration, the INA was 'highly regarded by those involved in Iraqi operations (…) 'unlike Chalabi, he [Allawi] was someone who was trusted by the regional governments. He was less flamboyant, less promotional[858]. Indeed, the adoption of the INA as the CIA's new partner had the stated aim to 'decrease the proportion of Chalabi's role in what we were doing by finding others to work with'[859]. In short, 'the CIA had ditched Chalabi's INC in favor of Allawi's Iraqi National Accord (INA). Chalabi and his followers resented Allawi's role in diverting the covert funding stream of the CIA that had kept Chalabi's operations alive'[860]. This stream of funding, according to members of the CIA who were interviewed for this thesis, kept flowing up until 2004 and Allawi's eventual appointment as PM[861]. We can thus firmly establish that the INA's reliance on external state funding continued. Whether and in what form this funding arrangement was formalised cannot be fully and clearly ascertained here.

What can be done, however, is to analyse the arrangements that the CIA had in place in its interaction with the INC and consequently draw conclusions about the INA. In terms of funding, for example, 'the problem was that the INC did not actually exist as an incorporated entity anywhere back then [when the collaboration

[855] Wright, "America's Iraq Policy".
[856] Sciolino, "Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi."
[857] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War*; Bonin, *Arrows Of The Night*.
[858] Brinkley, "The Reach of War."
[859] Brinkley, "The Reach of War."
[860] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War.*
[861] Interview Member CIA; see also: Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War.*

with the CIA, which initiated the contact, began], or ever (…) The CIA needed a way to get Chalabi his $4 million per year. And so, according to various sources, Chalabi's IBC Communications was founded in January 1992 as a for-profit company (…) But IBC Communications was far more than this; it was, sources say, the legal front through which the Central Intelligence Agency poured money into Chalabi's operations. (…) IBC was basically laundering the CIA's funding of the Iraqi National Congress, concealing the agency's involvement. IBC was for all intents and purposes the front company[862]. In the light of this account, one might derive the conclusion that the model pursued with the INC might have been the preferred approach to funding the implementing partners of the CIA's wider strategic objectives in Iraq. Hence, one could safely assume that a similar structure and *modus operandi* was in place for this other London-based Iraqi exile organisation, which is at the centre of this chapter. If so, this would once again demonstrate that the INA was dependent on external, state-funding.

Yet, the question remains how such a funding arrangement was linked to potential supervision mechanism that might have been in place. In this regard, it is again helpful to examine the INC-CIA cooperation and draw insightful lessons about its lesser-known rival, the INA. In the case of the transfer of CIA funds to the corporate entity, solely owned by Ahmed Chalabi, 'people familiar with the CIA's files say that money would be wired to an account. Chalabi's bank would send confirmation that the payment was received. In this way, the CIA could satisfy its accounting requirements, and Chalabi would not have put anything to paper'[863]. From this we can observe that even CIA money comes with accounting strings attached. After all, it was the alleged embezzlement of these funds that constituted a major factor in the falling out between the agency (and later the State Department) and the INC: 'difficulties arose early in the CIA-Chalabi relationship (…) such groups tend to be less than careful stewards of the largesse bestowed upon them, leaving government organizations (in this case the CIA's Iraq Operations Group) with concerns about how the US money is being spent'[864]. On top of the INC's lax attitude towards the CIA's accounting standards, the worsening relationship between the two was exacerbated by the fact that, according to a senior member at

[862] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War.*
[863] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War.*
[864] Clark, *American Covert Operations*.

the State Department', 'the CIA was about to lose control of Chalabi (…) instead of him being dependent on the CIA, the CIA became dependent on him (…) Although Chalabi became an agent of influence for the CIA, he never entirely worked in their service. "Agent" is a technical term for the CIA, and it usually requires a polygraph. A real CIA agent is someone the CIA completely controls, and with Ahmad Chalabi that never happened, as the agency began to realize much too late'[865]. Indeed, it was precisely because Chalabi and his INC were not playing by the CIA supervision rulebook that the cooperation was eventually terminated. Although not able to precisely measure the parameters of this supervisory framework, one could nonetheless conclude from this that the INA *did* in fact abide by CIA expectations and rules. Otherwise, the agency would have surely also abandoned its cooperation, as it had with Chalabi's INC. Instead, the collaboration that was forged would last for many years to come. After all, it was the head of the CIA himself who would later fondly talk about 'all the trust and goodwill that the CIA had built up over the years with him [Allawi] and the INA'[866]. To be sure, the same George Tenet also asserted that 'Iyad Allawi was and remains far too independent to be anyone's puppet'. However, as we have learned above, 'a real CIA agent is someone the CIA completely controls'[867]. This cannot be said about Iyad Allawi and his INA. At the same time, the brief examination of the CIA-INC collaboration above has revealed that the agency seeks to avoid becoming too dependent on its implementing partner. Hence, there must have been a somewhat advantageous balance for the agency in its relationship with the INA. After all, it is said that it takes two to tango and whilst the CIA was surely the partner leading it, she could not have danced at all without Allawi's INA. Ali Allawi delineates the overall balance of dependence and autonomy perhaps most accurately when he observes that 'in spite of *its dependence on material and organisational support from the CIA and MI6*, the organisation continued to play a major role in the affairs of the opposition, mainly because of the undoubted political skills and credibility, as well as widespread contacts, of its leader, Ayad Allawi' [emphasis added][868]. Driven, or perhaps even pressured, by a Presidential directive to implement

[865] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War.*
[866] Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, p. 442.
[867] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War.*
[868] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*

America's regime change objectives in Iraq whilst being essentially 'deaf in Iraq'[869], that is, without meaningful U.S. sufficient intelligence resources inside the country[870], and having been double-crossed by an all too autonomous Iraqi exile group, the CIA, surely, was happy to have a more agreeable partner. Although the organisation itself would be fundamentally reliant on CIA support, she would fulfil her end of the bargain by providing the agency with both contacts and information from inside Iraq and offering itself as an instrument to use in US clandestine foreign policy.

Indeed, the aforementioned reliance on US support only increased when both organisations began preparations to launch a coup against Saddam Hussein as it was the agency, which provided resources to the INA and helped her to create and further refine the required organisational structure. This, it is asserted by members of the CIA who were involved at the time, only increased the reliance on American support[871]. After all, in planning a coup of that magnitude and political importance for the US administration and security establishment, not much was left to chance or solely in the hands of the Iraqi exiles[872]. As a first step, the CIA supervised an INA-led 'bombing and sabotage campaign, [which constituted] a test more than anything else, to demonstrate capability. Another former intelligence officer who was involved in Iraqi affairs recalled that the bombings "were an option we considered and used." Dr. Allawi's group was used, he added, "because Chalabi never had any sort of internal organization that could carry it out," adding, "We would never have asked him to carry out sabotage'[873]. This is corroborated by other accounts, which furthermore indicate the extent of CIA supervision of INA clandestine activities as members of the organisation feared that 'the Americans will cut off financial aid to us'[874] should they be unable to assure the continuation of its bombing and sabotage raids inside Iraq. Yet, despite the fact that the 1996 coup turned out to be an 'unmitigated disaster'[875], there are lessons to be learned in

[869] Bonin, *Arrows Of The Night*.
[870] Brinkley, "The Reach of War."
[871] Interview Member Central Intelligence Agency.
[872] Interview Member Central Intelligence Agency
[873] Brinkley, "The Reach of War."
[874] Cockburn, "CIA `Backed Iraqi Bombers'."
[875] Cockburn, "CIA `Backed Iraqi Bombers'."; Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War*; see also: Risen, "C.I.A. Plan For Covert Iraq Action Was Reportedly Turned Down."

the context of the section of this chapter. After all, we have clearly been able to see that there were funding and supervision mechanisms in place, which were not just clearly working in favour of the state actor CIA but also seemingly constituted a lasting *modus operandi*.

To be sure, the examined data on funding and supervision of the INA might already be sufficient to draw satisfactory conclusions in this section that would allow us to categorise the organisation according to the conceptual framework of this thesis. However, in order to portray an accurate and comprehensive of the wider US-INA collaboration, we must analyse the subsequent, additional supervision/funding layer the INA found itself under when the Clinton administration came to power in Washington D.C.

With the new administration, it appears, the gravity of the 'unipolar moment' had fully sunk into the minds of the US foreign policy establishment, which began to proclaim a new policy toward Iraq, one that openly embraced the goal of ousting Saddam Hussein. As part of a 'deliberate, sustained' effort to overthrow the Iraqi leader, administration leaders promised to commit resources to a 'practical and effective' effort to build up potential opponents[876], appoint a special U.S. envoy to work with the Iraqi opposition, and step-up covert U.S. support for Iraqi opposition activities[877]. Having failed to topple Saddam Hussein through economic sanctions and clandestine coup attempts, the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) became the foundation of this new approach. Unique in post-war history, its passing made the overthrow of a foreign government the object of public law. As Colin Powell's Chief of Staff remarks:

> '*during the Cold War, the US Congress would never have risked such arrogant action as legislating the overthrow of another state's ruling regime. The "Duma" (and Politburo) would have reciprocated'*[878].

Yet, the constraints of the bilateral had been substituted by the imperial temptations of the unilateral. As a consequence, the Iraqi exile opposition, including the INA, rose to new prominence. After a meeting with Chalabi, Allawi and

[876] Lippmann, "Two Options For Iraq In U.S. Policy."; Diamond, "U.S. Focus On Ousting Saddam."
[877] Sieff, "New U.S. Game Plan To Oust Saddam Described."; Crossette et al., "Even U.S. Sees Iraq Opposition As Faint Hope."
[878] Interview Lawrence B. Wilkerson.

others, Vice President Gore appeared to suggest that the Administration would strongly pursue an opposition-based overthrow strategy (…) [and] reaffirmed the Administration's "strong commitment to the objective of removing Saddam Hussain from power'"[879]. This commitment was repeatedly underlined by President Clinton asserting in various statements that 'the best way to end that threat [emanating from Iraq] once and for all is with a new Iraqi government'[880]. In the light of this, it should not come as a surprise that President Clinton extended the 'lethal finding', allowing for covert operations against Saddam's regime, which his predecessor had initiated[881].

Of course, this new quality of facilitation by the US raises the question what practical implications these new measures had for the supervision and funding of the INA. As a token to its prominent role in US foreign policy towards Iraq, the INA was explicitly named in a 1999 'Presidential Memorandum on Assistance to Iraqi Democratic Opposition Organisations' as an organisation 'that satisfies the criteria set forth in section 5(c) of the [Iraq Liberation] Act' and is thus 'eligible to receive assistance'[882]. Generally speaking, as the covert CIA support seemed to have continued, there now was an additional, overt layer placed upon the organisation and whilst this translated into access to more funding, it also meant additional scrutiny. As a first step in this regard, the State Department, tasked by the President to disperse the overt funding among the members of the Iraqi opposition, pressured the INA to place itself under the umbrella of a new corporate entity through which the said resources would flow: the Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF), set up the law firm Shea and Gardner: 'its papers say that the subsidiary was established "at the request of the U.S. Department of State to serve as a vehicle for the department to channel assistance to the Iraqi National Congress." (…) One result of the incorporation was that not only Chalabi's friends but also his rivals in the Iraqi opposition were installed on the foundation's board at the insistence of the State Department. It

[879] US Congress, *Iraq's Opposition Movements*.
[880] Albright, *Madam Secretary,* pp. 283-87; Brattebo, *The No-Fly Zones And Low Intensity Conflict With Iraq*, pp. 224-30; Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, pp. 9-10.
[881] Bonin, *Arrows Of The Night*.
[882] Clinton, *Memorandum On Assistance To Iraqi Democratic Opposition Organizations*.

included Ayad Allawi (…) In total, the INCSF would collect a total of $33 million from the U.S. State Department'[883]. Yet, did this mean that he who pays the piper calls the tune? As part of the funding to the INA, through the INCSF entity, now became overt and public, several audits were conducted by both British and American accounting firms and even by the US Office of Inspector General (OIG). The common denominator uniting all of them appears to be that the INCSF had 'significant non-compliance and accounting issues' and 'needed to strengthen certain internal controls' so as to 'ensure that Federal funds were properly accounted for and spent for the intended purposes of the agreements'[884]. These 'inconsistencies'[885] appear to suggest that even though there might have been public funds that were given out to the 'united' opposition under the banner of the INCSF, this did not necessarily translate into a rigorous supervision of the recipients in terms of how and to what end the US taxpayer money was spent. Interestingly, however, the calling for an OIG report by the State Department seems to have been rooted in the growing hostility by State and CIA towards the most prominent member of the INCSF board, Ahmed Chalabi's INC. Indeed, with the incoming George W. Bush. administration, the State Department, steward of the ILA-related funding, deliberately dissected the opposition and 'with $5 million in seed money, State Department officials began showing more support what came to be known as the group of four, a coalition of the Iraqi National Accord, the two Kurdish political movements, and the Shiite opposition. The Iraqi National Congress was noticeably absent from the group for membership'[886]. We can thus identify an additional stream of funding that the INA received from the US government. How this particular funding mechanism was monitored or supervised is, however, unclear.

This notwithstanding, the extensive outline of the INA's evolving funding and supervision arrangements have presented us with a complex picture. Nonetheless, one can discern a strong trend within the relationship the INA entertains with state actors in the US, which, when judged against the conditions outlined in the Conceptual Framework, allows us to identify the organisation as a

[883] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America to War.*
[884] Office of Inspector General, *Follow Up Review Of Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation*.
[885] Office of Inspector General, *Follow Up Review Of Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation*.
[886] Kryzanek, *Comparative Politics.*

Subcontractor. Although the organisation might have been lax in its accounting of US tax-payer money it received, the INA seems to have nonetheless satisfied the expectations of both the CIA and the State Department. In other words, the tune played by the piper might have had its dissonances but it was still pleasing to the ears of those who paid him. This becomes particularly obvious in comparison to the difficult relationship both US state institutions have had with the INC, which, in contrast to the INA, seems to have been rather too autonomous in the conduct of its activities and compliance. The CIA terminated its relationship with the INC because it 'lost control over it' and the State Department equally did not approve. This becomes particularly clear in the latter's strategy to form an extra 'Group of Four', which would exclude the INC but grant the INA an additional stream of funding. This, of course, is not to argue that the INA was merely a willing executioner with no agenda or autonomy of its own. Its agenda overlapped conveniently with that of the US Indeed, it enjoyed its own connections inside Iraq, which its American partners relied upon. Overall, however, the INA was sufficiently dependent and 'obedient' vis-à-vis US state actors that those very institutions happily strengthened maintained their support and facilitation of Iyad Allawi. What is more, the INA leadership seems to have grasped that it could not carry out its agenda without strong American backing and therefore willingly submitted to the written and unwritten rules that form the basis of a collaboration with an intelligence agency.

In light of this assessment, one can now process-trace the conceptual mechanism of 'downloading', as outlined in the Conceptual Framework, through which such a type of NSA interacts with both its home government and the other concerned countries it operates in. By doing so, it shall also become clear which 'Operational Role' the GOC assumes.

Step I: State Actors in concerned states unwilling or unable to pursue a certain Foreign Policy towards each other

Throughout the previous sections, it has become apparent that the relationship between the US and Iraq could hardly have been worse. As we have seen above, since the early 1990s it became the undeclared and later the declared objective of the US government to remove Saddam from power. The objective could not have

been articulated clearer in the ILA: 'it should be the policy of the US to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime'[887]. Another feature of this tormented relationship was the imposed sanctions-regime, which failed to foster the conditions for an organic removal of Saddam's government or a change in its behaviour[888] and the ramped-up support for the opposition. Militarily, Iraq policy during the Clinton years was characterised by a series of punitive military expeditions: in June 1993 the US Navy launched a cruise missile attack on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in reprisal for the attempted assassination of former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait[889]. In September 1996, when Iraqi forces moved into Irbil, US ships and aircraft launched cruise missiles at air defence targets in southern Iraq to prepare for coalition patrols in the expanded no-fly zone[890]. This was followed in 1998 by four days of air strikes carried out by British and American fighter jets under Operation Desert Fox[891]. In sum, it was made clear in word and deed that the US was prepared to 'use effective force of necessary to secure its goals' of removing Saddam Hussein from power[892]. In the light of this and the account of bilateral relations sketched out in the previous sections of the chapter, one should thus not be surprised that Iraq and the US had not entertained official relations for 11 years when the Bush Jr. administration assumed office in 2001. After all, one of the involved governments actively worked towards removing its counterpart from power. Truly, one might conclude, 'the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must'[893]. Hence, the unwillingness of the strong to engage with the weak had become a permanent condition both countries found themselves in – and one that was not altered by either the inauguration of the George W. Bush administration. Saddam Hussein continued to be a *persona non grata* with whom normal relations would not be an option for the US – only the *ultima ratio regum* seems to have been considered an appropriate instrument of US foreign policy. In other words, in order to restore

[887] US Congress, *Iraq Liberation Act Of 1998*.
[888] Khadduri, "U.N. Sanctions On Iraq: 10 Years Later."
[889] Cockburn, "Saddam 'Sent Hit Team To Kill Bush In Kuwait'."
[890] Mitchell, "U.S. Launches Further Strike Against Iraq After Clinton Vows He Will Extract 'Price'."
[891] US Department of Defense, "Operation Desert Fox."
[892] Schweid, "Berger: U.S. Will Work With Saddam Hussein's Foes."
[893] Thucydides, "The Melian Dialogue."

'normal' bilateral relations between the two Saddam's government would have to be removed.

Step II: State Actors in concerned states identify Foreign Policy Objective

Of course, one could have expected this poisonous relationship to change with a new administration assuming office in January 2001. Yet, history appears to teach us that a change of tenants in 1600 Pennsylvania Ave does not mean a change in the underlying principles of US foreign policy – but perhaps only the employment of adjusted means. After all, when the 1947 National Security Act was passed and the days of the Old American Republic came to an end, the new 'institutional complex developed the permanent ideology of national security presiding over the American empire to this day'[894]. From then on, as Perry Anderson succinctly puts it, 'commonality of outlook and continuity of objectives set the administration of empire apart from rule of the homeland'[895] – although certain, previously unexpressed sentiments were now proclaimed openly. The New York Times Magazine perhaps best captured the essence of the *Zeitgeist*, now proudly proclaimed: 'American empire (Get used to it)![896]'.

In what way the empire had set out to act in the case of its unruly province of Mesopotamia was articulated right from the outset. In other words, 'getting Hussein was now the administration focus'[897], as Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O'Neill, recounted the Bush administration's first principals committee meeting on January 30, 2001. Indeed, during the very same meeting, ten days after the inauguration, the President tasked the Pentagon to develop military options for Iraq and CIA to enhance their covert operations in the country[898]. This trend continued in a February 1, 2001 principal meeting at which Wolfowitz, the Pentagon's Number 2, unsuccessfully requested that the Iraqi Opposition be given US arms[899] and also converted the first deputies meeting in April, which was supposed to deal with the threat of terrorism and Osama bin Laden, into a debate on Iraq[900]. Following this

[894] Anderson, *American Foreign Policy And Its Thinkers*, p. 37.
[895] Anderson, *American Foreign Policy And Its Thinkers*, p. 1.
[896] Ignatieff, "The American Empire; The Burden."
[897] Suskind, *The Price Of Loyalty*, p. 72.
[898] Clarke, *Against All Enemies*, p. 264; Suskind, *The Price Of Loyalty*, pp. 70-75.
[899] Suskind, *The Price Of Loyalty*, pp. 82-86, 96.
[900] Clarke, *Against All Enemies*, pp. 231-232.

trajectory, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld maintained in July 2001 that 'if Saddam's regime were ousted, we would have a much-improved position in the region and elsewhere'[901]. Those ever-louder calls to arms against Iraq by those signatories of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) who had lamented that their proposed 'process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor'[902] were at last accentuated by 'the images of fire and ashes and bent steel'[903]. When this new Pearl Harbour came thundering down out of the innocent looking blue sky on that fateful Tuesday morning of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration appears to have realised that it might present an opportunity to bring to an end the standing defiance that Iraq and its government represented. Accordingly, as National Security Adviser Rice told the British ambassador to the US the very same day, 'we are just looking to see whether there could possibly be a connection with Saddam Hussein'[904]. Following the same trajectory later that day at 2:40 PM, Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, noted 'best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at the same time – not only UBL [Usama bin Laden]' and adequately expressed the wounded empire's ire when he instructed his staff to 'go massive – sweep it all up. Things related and not'[905]. Later in the day, during a second crisis meeting, he reinforced this notion and urged the President 'you know, we've got to do Iraq - there just aren't enough targets in Afghanistan'[906]. He was reassured by the President that 'we will get this guy but at a time and place of our choosing'[907]. This focus on Saddam's Iraq remained at the centre of the administration's considerations the following day. The Commander in Chief himself urged his staff: 'I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything. See if Saddam did this. See if he's linked in any way...Look into Iraq, Saddam'[908]. In line with earlier notions, President Bush, on September 17, 2001, ordered that an invasion of Iraq be prepared, including a plan to bring her

[901] U.S. Department of Defense, "Memo from Donald Rumsfeld to Condoleezza Rice, "Iraq," July 27, 2001"; also: Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 203.
[902] The Project for the New American Century, *Rebuilding America's Defenses*.
[903] Bush, "President George W. Bush - Washington National Cathedral."
[904] Sparrow, "Christopher Meyer At Iraq War Inquiry – Live."
[905] Roberts, "Plans For Iraq Attack Began On 9/11."; US Department of Defense, *Office Of The Under Secretary For Policy Notes From Stephen Cambone [Rumsfeld's Comments], September 11, 2001.*
[906] Murphy et al., "Farewell To All That".
[907] Trainor et al., *Cobra II*, p. 17.
[908] Clarke, *Against All Enemies*, p. 32.

oil fields under American control[909]. Only four days later, Bush again tasked Rumsfeld to begin updating these very plans but keep it secret[910]. On September 29, the Secretary of Defence dutifully asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop military options with two strategic goals: finding weapons of mass destruction and regime change, requiring no more than one to two months and a total of 250,000 US troops[911]. These signals were not missed by the members of the CIA Iraq Operations Group. One of its leading members, John Maguire, jubilantly told an Iraqi covert operations collaborator, presumably Iyad Allawi, given that his INA had been the agency's favourite implementing partner just such clandestine enterprises: 'it's showtime!'[912]. It was becoming increasingly clear that the US government saw 'Afghanistan [as] just the beginning'[913]. The *attentat* of 9/11, one might say, presented a *casus belli* for wider strategic objectives the New Rome at the Potomac had entertained for years: the Pentagon was instructed to develop concrete plans to 'take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran'[914]. To be sure, whether conspiracy, providence, or coincidence might have guided the thinking of US grand strategists towards the Middle East a little more than a decade later will continue to stir the minds of many. What can be observed with growing and reasonable certainty, however, is that, as Iyad Allawi's patrons at the Iraq Operations Group eventually told their colleagues in Rome in April 2002, 'Iraq had been on the Bush agenda from the beginning (…) "They said this was on Bush's agenda when he got elected, and that 9/11 only delayed it (…) they implied that 9/11 was a distraction from Iraq, and that it would start with kinetic energy – meaning bombs. Meaning war'[915]. Indeed, throughout 2002 the drums of war began their ominous thunder, starting with the January State of the Union Address in which President Bush famously referred to Iraq as being a member of an unholy alliance, dubbed the 'Axis of Evil' that 'threaten the peace of the world'[916]. David Frum, one of the President's speechwriters with intimate knowledge of the

[909] Kessler, "U.S. Decision On Iraq Has Puzzling Past; Opponents Of War Wonder When, How Policy Was Set."; Trainor, *Cobra II*, p. 17.
[910] Woodward, *Plan of Attack,* pp. 1-5, 30, 35.
[911] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 218
[912] Isikoff et al., *Hubris*, pp. 6-9, 154.
[913] Duelfer, *Hide And Seek*, p. 195.
[914] Clark, "Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid: "I Think About It Every Day"."
[915] Risen, *State Of War*, p. 77; see also Woodward, *Plan Of Attack*, pp. 68-69, 71
[916] Bush, "Text Of President Bush's 2002 State Of The Union Address."

intentions behind the speech, referred of this address to the American people and the world when he observed: 'if the US overthrew Saddam Hussein next, it could create a reliable American ally in the potential superpower of the Arab world (....) An American-led overthrow of Saddam Hussein [replaced] with a new government more closely aligned with the US —would put America more wholly in charge of the region than any power since the Ottomans, or maybe the Romans' [917]. This, it might be argued, once again highlights the essential objectives the USG had vis-à-vis Iraq: *removal* of a defiant regime and *replacement* thereof with a more agreeable, US-aligned government. Following the speech, on February 16, Bush signed a top-secret National Security Council directive calling for regime change in Iraq and instructing the CIA to assist the military in removing Saddam Hussein through support for opposition groups, sabotage and a disinformation campaign. The initiative was endowed with approximately 180-200m USD and four days later, the CIA entered northern Iraq[918]. Having asserted in April that 'the policy of my government is that he [Saddam Hussein] goes', Bush, on the fateful day of August 29, 2002 finally greenlighted an Iraq war plan[919]. Interestingly in the context of the thesis, the Iraqi government at the time also sought to use, albeit be it to no avail, a non-state actor in the form of a trusted Lebanese-American businessman, Imad Hage, who, in turn, possessed important contacts in Washington. Iraqi intelligence asked Hage to convey a message to the USG 'that Iraq had no WMD, and to prove it the regime was willing to let the Americans in to look for themselves'[920]. He contacted Richard Perle about the matter, who conveyed the message to the CIA, and was told 'that the only message they [the CIA] had for the Iraqis was that "we will see them in Baghdad"'[921]. Amidst the bellicose rhetoric, Britain's Defence and Overseas Secretariat soberly concluded what was at stake in 2003: 'the US administration has lost faith in containment and is now considering regime change' (…) [and] the only certain means to remove Saddam and his elite is to invade and impose a new government'[922]. Truly, the decision of the USG to remove and replace the Saddam regime could no longer be altered. Indeed, in the light of the above it has become apparent that at least since the inauguration of President Bush in early

[917] Frum, *The Right Man*, pp. 196, 224, 233.
[918] Woodward, *Plan Of Attack*, pp. 108-109.
[919] Scarborough, *Sabotage*, p. 45.

[921] Risen, *State Of War*, p. 77
[922]Cabinet Office. Defense and Overseas Secretariat, *Iraq: Options Paper*.

2001, removal and replacement of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq became an official goal of US foreign policy.

Having established the validity of this foreign policy objective, it is certainly useful to briefly outline the very state actor's view on the matter under whose patronage the INA had operated for many years, namely that of the CIA. To be sure, it has already become apparent that the Agency and its Iraq Operations Group came to accept the decision of the Bush administration to remove and replace Saddam Hussein. However, before the *attentat* of 9/11, the CIA still hoped to persuade the administration that a coup, externally engineered or otherwise, should still be considered as a preferred option[923]. After, the attacks, however, America's premier intelligence agency eventually endorsed the decision to invade. For example, when the new Associate Deputy Director of Operations was first shown the plans on August 1, 2002, by a representative of the Iraq Operations Group, he was told that 'it's a done deal (…) The decision's already been made (…) the planning's completed, everything's in place'[924]. What is more, George Tenet himself, after leaving office, observed that 'those involved in assembling support for the U.S. military had the sense from early in the Bush administration that war was inevitable'[925]. Other CIA members echoed this assessment, observing that 'it was quite apparent from—certainly from, I would say, early 2002—if not that, mid-2002—that we were going to war, that the decision had been made'[926] Faced with the prospect of an American invasion of Iraq, which would surely succeed in removing Saddam, the Agency would naturally seek to shape the implementation of the decision to go to war and, crucially, influence the post-war period, particularly the question who or what should replace Saddam. As Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy at the time, observes rather scornfully: 'John McLaughlin and his CIA colleagues often stressed the value of stability. They argued that if Saddam were to be ousted, he should be replaced by another Baathist military strongman – someone who would preserve Sunni authoritarian predominance in Iraq (…) Stability and continuity were themes identified with Iyad Allawi and his Iraqi National Accord (composed largely of Baathists, including

[923] Feith, *War And Decision*.
[924] Kiriakou and Ruby, *The Reluctant Spy*, p. 148.
[925] Tenet, *At The Center Of The Storm*, p.309.
[926] Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, And The War In Iraq."

senior military figures), for whom CIA officials had particular admiration. Unlike Chalabi, Allawi tended to extol order rather than democracy. He argued that the Sunni-dominated Baathist military was the key to keeping Iraq under control after Saddam's overthrow'[927]. Noteworthy for this chapter, Feith, as a member of the Pentagon, again underlines that the INA is 'favored by the CIA' and the State Department whilst Ahmed Chalabi's INC 'alienated CIA and State Department in the 1990s'[928].

Having established that even before but especially after the attacks of 9/11, the USG developed ever-more aggressive policies and rhetoric towards Iraq with the general goal of removing and replacing the Saddam regime, we must now turn our attention back to the role that the INA played in the pursuance of this objective. After all, as Douglas Feith himself admits, 'through most of 2002, in fact, the Iraq matter that was most hotly disputed within the US government was not *whether* Saddam Hussein should be overthrown but what (if anything) should be done to lay the groundwork for a new Iraqi government'[929]. To be sure, the INA's overall position would be significantly elevated now that regime change was on the agenda of the world's superpower.

Step III: NSA granted access to resources, authorities, and information in at least one of the concerned states

With the USG, as a whole, determined to remove and replace Saddam Hussein, both covert and overt channels of assistance granted to the Iraqi opposition could reasonably be expected to grow and expand. In this context, the overarching rationale for the facilitation of the INA and others was, according to Douglas Feith, given by Wolfowitz himself who 'spoke often of the importance of helping foreigners promote freedom in their own countries against anti-democratic and anti-US regimes (…) US national security could benefit from such help (…) those regimes were widely hated by their own citizens, a vulnerability we might be able

[927] Feith, *War And Decision*, pp. 200-201.
[928] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 241.
[929] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 239.

to exploit[930] (…) supporting local, antiregime forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere could also strengthen our diplomacy with problem regimes (such as Syria, Libya, and Sudan), causing them to reconsider their policies on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. These regimes might become more accommodating if they feared we would otherwise actively support their domestic opposition. Supporting local opposition forces could possibly be a more effective way to pressure the regimes than diplomacy alone – whether those opponents were in exile (like many in the Iraqi opposition) or based in the country (like the Iraqi Kurds, or Afghanistan's Northern Alliance forces)'[931].

Yet, what form and shape could USG facilitation take? It has already been outlined earlier that the INA had, for more than a decade, been granted access to elites, institutions and resources in various states. In all the concerned countries, the INA succeeded at building crucial linkages with the respective intelligence agencies. Through these relationships, the organisation received material and organisational support as well as access to personages of consequence in matters of foreign and security policy. What is more, we have also learned that covert CIA backing remained in place after President Clinton had launched an official stream of funding post ILA. The partnership with the Agency had proven to be sustainable. Besides the assistance received through covert channels, the Bush administration officially 'cleared the way for $4 million to be given to Iraqi opposition groups'[932] as part of the ILA provisions and 'issued an order permitting Iraqi opposition groups to begin limited moves inside Iraq using US government funding'[933]. This notwithstanding, what seems to have changed with the new administration is the frequency and level of access that Iraqi opposition groups, including the INA, were given to important state actors in the US. As part of the aforementioned deliberations about how to best 'lay the groundwork for a new Iraqi government'[934], the INA became a key player within this wider endeavour. On April 9, 2002, for example, Allawi informed his fellow exile Hamid al-Bayati of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) 'about his recent meetings in Washington

[930]Note: This insight again reflects the writing of Slaughter, who urges that *'[states] should become docks for all kinds of* networks'.
[931] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 258.
[932] NZ Herald, "Bush Funds Iraqi Opposition."
[933] Kettle, "Bush Funds Iraqi Opposition."
[934] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 239.

with officials from the State Department, National Security Council, and other departments; he sensed seriousness about toppling Saddam and regime change (…) Allawi had [also] met with Ben Miller, Deputy National Security Advisor in charge of presenting security summaries to the president; Stephen Hadley of the National Security Council; and James Cunningham, who worked for CIA Director George Tenet to coordinate the process of change in Iraq (…) Allawi was told that President Bush had decided to change the leadership in Baghdad'[935]. In early June, the INA, together with other members of the Group of Four, visited Washington and met 'many officials from the State and Defense Departments and the National Security Council, including Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith[936]. The regular crossing of the Atlantic, this vast Anglo-American maritime dominion, would not stop there but only accelerate further. In late June 2002, Allawi would again conduct a political pilgrimage to the US 'because of the dramatic escalation of events regarding Iraq [and] meet with the National Security Advisor, along with others, including General Wayne Downing, Head of Special Operations during the 1990–1991 Gulf War'[937].

As these meetings demonstrate the granting of significantly improved elite access to the INA, one must not fail to highlight a crucial feature, which has run through the history of the organisation and the Iraqi exile opposition in general, like a read thread: the rivalry between the INA and the INC and their respective patrons in the USG. What had begun in the 1990s now threatened to escalate – only with higher stakes. The unfolding struggle between the two organisations 'was partly driven by personal rivalries between the two leaders for US support, but mostly because they appealed to different factions in the US government, each of which had fundamentally differing perspectives on the way that the Iraqi regime ought to be handled'[938]. After all, 'the core strategic question was how long, if at all, the US should directly govern Iraq'. Whilst the Pentagon, at this point in time, 'strongly favored a short occupation followed by a handoff to its favored exile leaders, most notably Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress'[939], 'it became increasingly

[935] al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*
[936] al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*
[937] al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*
[938] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*
[939] RAND Corporation, *Occupying Iraq A History Of The Coalition Provisional Authority*.

clear that Richard Armitage and others at the State Department were concerned about the possibility that the Iraqi National Congress would play the leading role, which could make individuals such as Ahmad Chalabi look good (…) State and CIA endorsed a strategy of liberating Iraq, but opposed every element of it at the tactical and operational levels'[940]. The latter pursuit, in apparent collaboration with the INA, would come to play an interesting role later in the discussions about the proclamation of a transitional government and, accordingly, the handing back of sovereignty to Iraq. The impression that the Bureaucratic Politics Model was in full swing in the turf battles fought between the different USG agencies over Iraq policy, is furthermore reinforced by other sources. In the early June visit to Washington DC, SCIRI's al-Bayati observed that 'the State Department and the National Security Council were against the INC and Chalabi, and they asked us to criticize him'[941] and Zalmay Khalilzad underlined that 'the Pentagon, backed by the Vice President's Office, proposed various plans to empower the Iraqi opposition. Among the opposition leaders, the Pentagon and Vice President's Office, were closest to Chalabi. The State Department and CIA were more sceptical of the Iraqi opposition (…) State and CIA were particularly hostile to Chalabi'[942]. Subsequently, as already outlined in the examination of the INA's funding arrangements, the State Department and the CIA 'had encouraged the formation of the group of four, as an entity distinct form the INCSF and in a March 26, 2002 paper it praised the INA for favouring "pluralistic democratic government" and for "good working relationships" with Saudi Arabia and others, and "good relations with a variety of Shi'a clerics and tribalists"'[943]. Indeed, 'the INA grew in stature, in tandem with the raised CIA profile within the administration. The CIA had proved itself in the Afghan war by mobilising and directing the Northern Alliance in their successful campaign against the Taliban, with minimal US casualties and cost. It became a 'key player in planning for the subversion and overthrow of the Baghdad regime'[944] – and thus, by extension, its implementing partner, the INA. Importantly, the INA received additional help from old allies across the Atlantic as 'the British also had a hand in mobilising the opposition, and their efforts mirrored those in the USA

[940] Feith, *War And Decision*.
[941] al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*
[942] Khalilzad, *The Envoy*.
[943] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 243.; see also: Toensing, "U.S. Support For The Iraqi Opposition."
[944] Feith, *War And Decision*.

(…) M16 stuck close to the CIA and had early settled on the INA as its most suitable opposition partner'[945].

Having said this, there were some initiatives that all USG agencies would be able to agree on. On July 25, 2002, the INA and other Iraqi exile opposition figures 'received a letter from Ryan Crocker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, inviting them to attend a meeting at the State Department on August 9, 2002, co-hosted by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith'[946]. Both Feith and Grossmann used the meeting to 'urge the Iraqis to work with us to convene a political conference (…) such a conference might lay the foundation for post-Saddam political reconstruction and could demonstrate the existence of a responsible alternative to the Saddam Hussein regime'. Further demonstrating the importance the USG attached to this symposium, the Iraqi oppositionists met with Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers, and had a video conference with Vice President Dick Cheney'[947]. The subsequent press release once again reiterates the 'remove and replace' objective that the USG had set itself: 'the US and the Iraqi opposition share a vision for a better future for the Iraqi people at the departure of Saddam Hussein and his regime (…) the US will continue to work with those who seek political change in Iraq and with the international community to make progress towards this common goal'[948].

However, it would be insufficient for our analysis to merely portray the INA in this section as a passive recipient of information, resources and access to important elites in the US. To be sure, the INA clearly had the role of a junior partner. This notwithstanding, the INA was also able to grant both the US and the UK access to crucial information, personages and resources in two crucial instances in the lead-up to the war: the first area, in which the INA would help its patron to pave the way to war was in establishing a line of communication to important figures of the Saddam regime inside Iraq: 'when the Bush administration began

[945] al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*
[946] al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*
[947] al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*; Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War*.
[948] US Department of State, *Meeting Of Iraqi Leaders*.

making plans to invade Iraq in 2002, the C.I.A. came to Dr. Alawi again. His organization's mission this time was to make contact with senior military commanders in the Iraqi Army and urge them not to fight'. Iyad Allawi himself asserts that his group 'negotiated successfully with a significant number of officers, including officers in the Sunni Triangle (…) during the war, no bullets were fired there in defense of Saddam'[949]. According to other reports, these joint CIA-INA activities also included efforts to persuade 'Iraqi officers to surrender or defect (…) the anticipated defectors included a top Iraqi Defense Ministry official and a top Republican Guard commander'[950]. The other field of cooperation with Western intelligence agencies has received far greater public attention, namely, the provision and instrumentalisation of false intelligence about Iraq's alleged WMD programme, which was listed as a major reason to invade by the USG. Admittedly, there has been a vast amount of publications in academia, journalism and popular culture about the misuse of incorrect or manufactured information by the Bush administration. Yet, in the context of how the Iraqi opposition contributed to this public relations campaign, the focus lies overwhelmingly on Ahmed Chalabi and his INC – 'the man who pushed America to war'. However, the INA also played a role that almost seems to have been expected of her by her patrons but which she was all too willing to fulfil. Indeed, out of the cacophony of accusations levelled at Saddam's Iraq by the West to justify the invasion, two in particular, originating from the so-called 'September Dossier', a document published by the British government on 24 September 2002[951], have stood out: President Bush's famous 16 words that 'the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa' and the assertion that Saddam's 'military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them'[952]. The allegation formed the foundation of the intelligence document issued by HMG and the 45-minute claim, was also taken up by President Bush and Ari Fleischer, his press aide at the time, to justify the war on Iraq[953]. To be sure, after the war, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), in its Duelfer Report, would find that all allegations within the September Dossier turned out to be

[949] Brinkley, "Man In The News; A Guide For Hard Times -- Iyad Alawi."
[950] Ignatius, "The CIA And The Coup That Wasn't."
[951] HM Government. *Iraq's Weapons Of Mass Destruction*.
[952] Blair, "Full Text Of Tony Blair's Foreword To The Dossier On Iraq."
[953] Lewis, "False Pretenses."

false[954]. The significance for this chapter, however, was revealed in the subsequent Hutton Inquiry by Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6, who stated that the information 'did come from an established and reliable source equating a senior Iraqi military officer who was certainly in a position to know'[955]. This single source would turn out to be Lt Col al-Dabbagh, who, together with his brother-in-law, General Muhie, 'helped to smuggle the intelligence out of Iraq to the Wimbledon headquarters of the Iraqi National Accord (INA)'. Further investigations have shown that Dr Allawi confirmed that he personally made sure al-Dabbagh's reports were received by British and American intelligence 'sometime in the spring and summer of 2002'[956]: "Yes, we passed this information on to the British and Americans (…) it was part of a constant stream of intelligence we passed on to both intelligence agencies. And I still believe it is true. You must remember the dedicated efforts that were undertaken by Saddam and his institutions to hide and conceal [WMD] was gigantic'[957]. What is more, the fact that Allawi and his organisation provided his patrons with the location of Saddam Hussein's bunker[958], which was bombed during the opening hours of the conflict, once again demonstrates that 'both SIS and America's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had relied heavily on Iraqi exile groups for intelligence on what was going on inside Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Of those the most reliable were generally held to be the Kurds and the INA. Information provided by the Kurds was limited because, as their region was under the protection of the international no-fly zone, they had little if any direct contact with Saddam's regime. The INA, on the other hand, was highly regarded at both the SIS's London headquarters in Vauxhall and the CIA in Langley, Virginia, and in the 1990s had been involved in a failed CIA attempt to overthrow Saddam. The INA's intelligence depended on a number of serving and retired Iraqi military officers and Ba'athists prepared to risk their lives to rid the country of Saddam'[959].

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[954] CIA, *DCI Special Advisor Report On Iraq's WMD*.
[955] Lord Hutton, *Report Of The Inquiry Into The Circumstances Surrounding The Death Of Dr David Kelly C.M.G. By Lord Hutton*, p. 112
[956] Coughlin, "Revealed: The Iraqi Colonel Who Told MI6 That Saddam Could Launch WMD Within 45 Minutes."
[957] Coughlin, "Revealed: The Iraqi Colonel Who Told MI6 That Saddam Could Launch WMD Within 45 Minutes."
[958] Coughlin, "Revealed: The Iraqi Colonel Who Told MI6 That Saddam Could Launch WMD Within 45 Minutes."
[959] Coughlin, "Revealed: The Iraqi Colonel Who Told MI6 That Saddam Could Launch WMD Within 45 Minutes."; Leigh et al., "Iraqi Who Gave MI6 45-Minute Claim Says It Was Untrue."

In light of the above, it has again become clear that the INA was indeed granted access to resources, elites and information in both the US and the UK. At the same time, our analysis has equally revealed that she was able to reciprocate and provide her patrons, CIA and M16, with access to important personages and information, which played a crucial role in the overall foreign policy objective, namely, to justify the removal and replacement of Iraq's defiant leader. These interactions also indicate the existence of a supervision mechanism. We must thus turn to the next step of the causal chain and examine this matter more closely.

Step IV: NSA activities supervised by State Actors in at least one of the concerned states

Earlier in the chapter, it has become clear that Western intelligence agencies, first and foremost the CIA, closely monitored the INA's activities. Yet, what form and shape did the supervision by parts of the USG take in the pre-war planning? In the previous section, we have learned that a key component of the post-Saddam Iraq strategy was the organisation and funding of a series of Iraqi opposition conferences. As Feith, together with Grossmann one of the co-authors of the idea, puts it: 'organising the London conference was a joint project of the Iraqi externals on the Bush administration. The idea was to devise a broadly supported political transition for your rock that would mesh with the US plan for regime change'[960]. To be sure, the accounts of some Iraqi exile organisations underscore that 'U.S. officials said they were willing to organize and finance a conference for the Iraqi opposition. We said we preferred that the Iraqi opposition organize and finance the conference themselves. Accepting U.S. aid would give our enemy the pretext to attack and discredit the conference'[961]. Such publicly proclaimed steadfastness and incorruptibility notwithstanding, however, the reality appears to have been rather different. As Glass notes, there was a 'desk outside the conference room where delegates complete US State Department sheets for reimbursement of their travel and hotel expenses' and Iraqi exiles were assured that they would 'receive [their]| cheque within a month'[962]. Other accounts point out that the exiled Iraqi opposition

[960] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 379.
[961] al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship To Democracy*.
[962] Glass, *The Northern Front*, p. 75.

had gathered *under U.S. care* in London [emphasis added]'[963], thereby reinforcing the notion that it was in fact the USG which set the stage. Another significant development in this regard was the appointment of Zalmay Khalilzad as 'Special Presidential Envoy to the Free Iraqis' prior to the conference on December 2, 2002. Khalilzad was tasked to 'work with the Iraqi opposition to prepare for a post-Saddam Iraq' and thus 'concluded that the president had decided to invade Iraq'[964]. To be sure, the position of Special Envoy to the Iraqi Opposition was not new. During his administration, President Clinton had appointed Francis Ricciardone to 'quickly [assert] his authority and [embark] on wide-ranging consultations with opposition leaders'[965]. This time, however, the US administration had decided to opt for direct invasion of Iraq to change its leadership. Nonetheless, then and now, the very fact that the President appointed an Ambassador to the Iraqi exiles demonstrates that an institutionalised oversight of the same was desired by the USG. Indeed, Khalilzad's own thinking about opposition elements as part and parcel of US foreign policy very much reflected the nature and purpose of his mission and the importance and relevance that this chapter and thesis hopes to contribute to the involvement of NSAs in foreign policy-making: 'the US will need to cultivate democratic counter-elites in a more systematic way (…) I was convinced that the Iraqi opposition could be a strategic asset for the US. Besides the moral authority that they brought to the issue, these leaders were knowledgeable and had access to important networks within the country (…) While coming from varying backgrounds and different power bases, they advocated a free, peaceful Iraq aligned with the US[966]. Yet, this grand mission notwithstanding, the inter-agency infighting had not disappeared and became even more apparent throughout the London conference. As an Iraqi exile attending the event observed: 'the

[963] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War*.
[964] Khalilzad, *The Envoy.*
[965] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*
[966] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*; Khalilzad furthermore calls for '*the creation of an American version of the Soviet Union's Lumumba University, which trained a cadre of Soviet-backed parties and officials of client states in the developing world. Our version would train individuals from developing countries in the work of promoting democracy and making institutions deliver after a democratic transition—skills that are not and, in all likelihood, never will be taught in U.S. universities*'. In conjunction with Feith's earlier stated thoughts about this matter, this insight seems to reflect the stipulations made by Slaughter who envisions a similar model in her writing on Networks ('*What if we could help create those networks with much more understanding of how to structure and support them in ways that would maximize their resilience, capacity for action, ability to scale? (…) we could actively seed them and help them grow. Not by stirring up opposition or funnelling cash under the table to insurgent groups, as intelligence agencies around the world have long done. But rather as a set of foreign policy tools aimed at advancing* interests').

Pentagon backs Chalabi, the State Department the Kurds, and the CIA the Iraqi National Accord of Iyad Allawi'[967]. In fact, Khalilzad himself acknowledges 'interagency squabbles' and Ali Allawi points to the main bone of contention: the questions of whether the Iraqis and/or the Americans should proclaim a provisional government. Yet, Khalilzad's instructions prior to the conference were clear: 'the US does not support the creation of a national assembly or a provision government at this point'. Instead, there should merely be an 'advisory committee that emerges from the conference'[968]. Interestingly, this seems to have already been a foregone conclusion as some opposition groups had, prior to the start of the event, 'agreed to a press statement that the conference should result in formation of a coordinating committee and issuance of a vision statement'[969]. Yet, 'some groups, such as Chalabi's INC, wanted a provisional government to be established before any military action took place'[970]. Other sources echo these assertions as 'Chalabi and his "proxies," as some people refer to his followers in the exile community, lobbied endlessly for a "provisional" or "transitional" government they would run, ready to deploy behind the U.S. tanks'[971]. Or, as an advisor to the State Department at the time, puts it: 'he [Chalabi] wanted to make sure that the U.S. government put him in a position to dominate the transition and take power in Baghdad'[972]. Of course, conspiracy or coincidence, the actors opposed to the declaration of a provisional government also happen to be the main supporters of Iyad Allawi's organisation. It should thus not come as a surprise that 'the INA and its supporters were silent on this issue but worked against the idea of a provisional government (…) the CIA and its supporters insisted that a military insurrection or a palace coup were the most likely routes for overthrowing the regime'[973]. This view can be corroborated by Khalilzad's own account of the conference as 'Ayad Allawi (…) continued to feel that a coup was the most promising approach to regime change in Iraq. He shared reports about restlessness in the Iraqi military and asked me to signal to the military, in my public statements, that they should side with the people of Iraq rather than

[967] Glass, *The Northern Front*.
[968] US Department of State, *Background And Talking Points For Khalilzad Meetings With Iraqi Oppositionists*.
[969] US Embassy London, *Iraq Opposition: Presidential Envoy Khalilzad's Works To Resolve Conference Sticking Points*.
[970] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*
[971] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War*.
[972] Phillips, *Losing Iraq*, p. 76.
[973] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*

with Saddam'. However, the Presidential Envoy ultimately dismissed this plea merely 'took his advice'[974]. In this context, it ought to be again underscored that whilst it was surely an important objective of the CIA and aligned state actors to prevent the declaration of a provisional government, it is equally important to point out that 'provisional government' also meant 'Ahmed Chalabi' – and neither could be allowed to play a meaningful role in US foreign policy for post-war Iraq.

At the December 2002 London Conference, one can indeed discern a specific supervision mechanism in place for the INA, seemingly working hand-in-glove with the CIA to prevent the declaration of a provisional government with Ahmed Chalabi as a leading figure. Beyond this, we can also detect a more general supervision mechanism in place for the conference and the attending opposition groups as a whole. Indeed, besides the fact that the US funded the event, the exiles have to 'take their disputes to Khalilzad on the fourteenth floor, where Tom Warwick decides who will and will not be admitted to the proconsular presence'[975]. What is more, the Iraqi opposition is told in no uncertain terms to 'work out an agreement they *must submit to Khalilzad*' [emphasis added]. ´Even more adamantly, Khalilzad underlined that unless 'opposition groups demonstrated unity, I observed, the US might pursue options that [they] would find unpalatable'[976]. Indeed, should they be unable to do so, as Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Bill Luti reportedly told the gathered Iraqis, 'we are going ahead. This is your last chance. If you come up with a united committee, you will be part of a future government. If not, we'll do it on our own'[977]. It could thus not have been clearer that the USG was more than able to influence and supervise the activities of the Iraqi opposition at the conference and determine the outcome of the event according to its preferences. At this point, it did become 'necessary to come up with a committee of sorts that would place a mantle of legitimacy on the opposition and meet one of the conditions for possible participation in a post-Saddam administration. Finally, a sixty-five-person committee was selected by the leaders of the main political groups (…) But a serious discussion of a number of vital issues had been avoided'[978] – deliberately so, one might add given the USG's earlier stated

[974] Khalizad, *The Envoy.*
[975] Khalizad, *The Envoy*, p. 79
[976] Khalizad, *The Envoy.*
[977] Glass, *The Northern Front*, p. 80.
[978] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*

preference for an 'advisory committee'. Against this background, it does truly appear to be the case that the conference itself 'was a public relations exercise, designed to show wide Iraqi support for the US policy of escalation with Saddam and to bless any military action that might be taken against the regime. This was the plan of the 'realists' in the administration, who needed an Iraqi cover for the evolving plan to attack Saddam'. The US delegation had wanted to establish 'a small opposition leadership group with which it could discuss and coordinate the pending action against Saddam, but it was left purposefully vague as to whether such a coordinating group would have any serious influence on the direction of events'[979]. The outcome of the event was thus very much in line with what Grossman and other 'realists' had wanted in the first place for 'in order to attend participants would have to agree beforehand to certain basic principles (…) the objective of the conference would be to have a joint political statement of the opposition's vision for a future Iraq'[980]. Unsurprisingly, the final proclamation was thus of a general character and, crucially, did not proclaim the establishment of a provisional government. However, 'the Iraqis affirmed that they opposed any form of foreign occupation after Saddam'[981]. Here the opposition, as a whole, seems to have been determined to draw a line in the very sand they would soon be treading on in their ancestral homeland.

This twofold pattern would continue throughout the pre-invasion period and the subsequent conferences organised by the USG: on the one hand, the INA would serve as the extended arm of its patron and its agenda, spoiling attempts by its main antagonists to become predominant and/or declare a provisional government. On the other hand, there seems to have been a more general supervision of the attending Iraqi exile groups, personified by the Presidential Envoy, aiming to prevent them from becoming an independent force and declare themselves to be a government in exile. Indeed, Khalizad's mission again entailed the prevention of an exile-led provisional government[982]. With a follow-up conference planned in Salahuddin, Northern Iraq, a Wikileaks cable authored by the Presidential Envoy, makes the

[979] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*
[980]US Department of State, *U/S Grossman Meeting With The "Group Of Four".*
[981] Khalilzad, Zalmay. *The Envoy.*
[982] US Department of State, *Background And Talking Points For Khalilzad Meetings With Iraqi Oppositionists*; see also: Bonin, *Arrows Of The Night*, p. 216

need to properly monitor the Iraqi opposition's activities apparent: 'we need a senior diplomatic presence in northern Iraq as soon as possible, to be the eyes and ears of Washington in the area, and to liaise closely with the Iraqi oppositionists in the north to ensure that they do not undertake any actions unhelpful to U.S. goals'[983].

At this next conference, Khalilzad 'couldn't dispel the notion that the USA was not wholly committed to a sovereign government of Iraqis. Ahmad Chalabi demanded sovereignty – Iraqi sovereignty over Iraqi soil (…) the USA, however, was adamant that there would be no provisional government declared from Salahuddin – and had prepared for the arrest of the proponents of such a government'[984]. Khalilzad told the gathered opposition with finality that 'the U.S. government in general and the President in particular rejects the idea of setting up an Iraqi interim government at this time'[985]. And so, the line in the sand, drawn in London, was gone with the desert winds of Salahuddin. This, of course, pales in comparison to the earlier threat of having all those arrested who would dare to declare a provisional government. In the context of this thesis, such a decision by parts of the opposition would go against the conditions set by the USG, making it very apparent that a supervision mechanism for the opposition as a whole was in place and would, if required, be drastically enforced. Finally, it ought to be highlighted again that the pre-invasion conferences, organised by the USG should not be regarded as mere footnotes in grander US strategies. After all, 'President Bush was asking for updates about our group every half hour'[986].

Whether coincidence, providence, or conspiracy – but certainly in line with the spirit of empire that had engulfed the White House – President Bush declared the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19: the same day that General Sir Frederick Stanley in 1917 conquered Baghdad and declared to George V.'s new subjects that Britain's armies also 'do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators'[987]. As the armed forces of the US and Britain rolled into Iraq aided by allied air strikes, the exiled opposition would be

[983] Embassy Ankara, "TFIZ01: Khalilzad Discussions in Northern Iraq."
[984] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*
[985] al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*
[986] Khalizad, *The Envoy.*
[987] World War I Documents Archive, "The Proclamation Of Baghdad."

summoned again in Baghdad. In the preceding weeks, the US administration had briefly flirted with the idea of establishing an Iraqi Interim Administration (IIA) after a short-lived military occupation was potentially in sight, developed by Feith's office[988]. This concept was 'designed to share governmental power in Iraq through a formal agreement between Iraqi leaders and the US-led military coalition'[989]. Khalilzad and General Garner, initially put in charge of the post-war set up of Iraq, were to discuss this with the exiles, namely, those 'with whom we are familiar and who have already endorsed principles that the USG supports'[990], at conferences in Nasiriyah, on April 15, and Baghdad, on April 28. Indicating that even though a power-sharing agreement was potentially in sight, the elected leadership council of exiles 'agreed that they would not try to form their own interim government but work with the process we had set up'[991] – demonstrating again that US supervision was firmly in place. Revealingly in this regard, General Garner, when asked about the selection process of the additional, non-exiled participants at the Baghdad conference confirmed that he and his team 'depended on Western intelligence and friendly regional countries' databases, in addition to advice from some expatriate Iraqis'[992]. This, truly, would be indicative of what was to come.

Yet, whilst Garner and Khalilzad were certainly stern defenders of US interests and would not allow the opposition to cross red lines, they at least seemed to give the exiles the impression that they were somewhat interested in consulting and co-opting them in their plans. When President Bush decided on a change of guard and appointed Paul Bremer as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which would oversee an extended rather than short-lived US military occupation of Iraq, any benign pretence would be cast aside: supposed cooperation became occupation – and supervision almost total. Declared on May 8, 2003, the CPA would be the vehicle for the UK and the US to 'exercise powers of government temporarily'[993].

In any case, before venturing to Iraq, Bremer asked Khalilzad, who had been called back to Washington, to return to Baghdad so as to 'hand over [his] Iraqis to

[988] Feith, *War And Decision*; see also: RAND, *Occupying Iraq A History Of The Coalition Provisional Authority*.
[989] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 403.
[990] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 411.
[991] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 437.
[992] al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*
[993] CPA, "The Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1."

him'[994]. What followed, led the former Presidential Envoy to the Free Iraqis to conclude that 'the new policy was for Bremer to run Iraq indefinitely until the Iraqis were "ready" for self-government'[995]. Judging what 'ready' meant and who might be deemed to be equipped to assume the sceptre of state power in Iraq was for Bremer and the USG to decide. Indeed, until this process would be completed, 'Bremer told the Iraqis, he held the executive, legislative, and judicial authorities of the country'[996]. At the same time, the head of America's military occupation was still keen to have the convened Iraqis 'public face'[997] of his occupation. Hence, he 'appointed a "Group of Seven" Iraqi leaders made up of the returned exiles: Chalabi, Pachachi, Allawi, the Islamist parties, as well as the Kurds. Then Bremer expanded that group to a twenty-five-member "Governing Council." (…) The Governing Council was a government in the same sense as a student council at a high school: it had structure with no authority. Chalabi and twenty-four other Iraqis were forced into a role of humiliating irrelevance'[998]. To become a member, Bremer made it clear that 'members would have to endorse our broad vision for Iraq as captured in the Nasiriyah declaration of principles'[999]. In fact, Bremer himself acknowledged that the CPA 'wanted more control over creating the interim government than the [Council] wanted us to have'[1000]. As Khalilzad recalls, 'the Iraqi leaders could advise him, but he would not be obliged to take their advice'[1001]. And Bremer acted accordingly: all Iraqi members of the Governing Council were selected by the CPA, the new Iraqi ministries were bound to execute CPA orders and no formal mechanism existed for the Council to veto any CPA proposals. The CPA, on the other hand, granted itself veto power over any Council initiatives[1002]. Summing up this highly asymmetrical relationship a constitutional advisor to the CPA maintains that 'the Governing Council governed no one. Its "decisions" were more in the nature of recommendations (…) the GC had little or no say in the

[994] Khalizad, *The Envoy.*
[995] Khalizad, *The Envoy.*
[996] Khalizad, *The Envoy.*
[997] CPA, *Meeting With Iraqi Political Leaders*.
[998] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War*.
[999] CPA, *Meeting With Iraqi Political Leaders*.
[1000] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 44.
[1001] Khalizad, *The Envoy.*
[1002] Otterman, "Iraq: Iraq's Governing Council."; Chandrasekaran, "Iraq Occupation Faces New Challenge."; Oppel et al., "After The War: Politics."; Walt, "Iraq Schools Trying To Close Book On Baathist Regime."; Wong, "The Struggle For Iraq."

ministries' day-to-day operations'[1003]. Another colleague of his reinforces this notion when he observes that the Council was merely 'given some ability to advise the American viceroy': 'the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was neither fish nor fowl: it was not really a governing council, as Bremer made it clear that he would continue to exercise supreme power, including the power to veto any IGC decisions'[1004].

In the light of the above, it has become clear that NSA activities were indeed supervised by State Actors in the US. Following the attacks of 9/11 and the new impetus for removing and replacing the Iraqi regime, the USG had sought to incorporate Iraqi opposition groups into their foreign policy decision-making process. More concretely, different USG agencies attempted to facilitate the group they were most closely aligned with and sought to accordingly spoil the efforts of rival institutions and 'their exiles'. Whilst the Pentagon seemed to support Ahmad Chalabi's group, the State Department and, to a greater extent, CIA actively sought to undermine the INC and extended more than just a helping hand to the INA. Considering the tried and tested relationship that the Agency and his group had developed since the 1990s, it was not surprising to realise that throughout the conferences, which played an integral part in American post-war planning, the INA appeared to be the enforcing hand of CIA's objectives – most prominently in working against the idea of declaring a provisional government. In fact, the INA still hoped for the encouragement of a military coup in Iraq by the US and appeared to favour a long-term US occupation and troop presence. The various conferences themselves showed that it was the USG, which paid the piper and thus called the tune. They served to monitor the activities of the opposition as a whole – although, in the case of the INA, this seems not to have been necessary given its agreeability to US goals and conduct. In this sense, there were thus two layers of state supervision that the INA found itself working under: an individual CIA-related supervision and the overarching USG monitoring system for all the opposition organisations. This latter supervision system became considerably stricter and more encompassing with the advent of the CPA when the members of the Governing Council realised that the USG would leave them virtually without any powers of

[1003] Feldman, *What We Owe Iraq*, p. 110.
[1004] Diamond, "Lessons From Iraq.", pp. 9, 10-11.

their own. Yet, even in the face of this, the INA was content to oblige and adhere to 'the rules of the game'.

Having established the existence of strong supervision mechanisms in place, we must now turn to the next step of the causal chain and analyse whether the INA is able to operate with less accountability in at least one of the concerned states.

Step V: NSA is able to operate with less accountability in at least one of the concerned states

Any attempt to assess whether the INA is able to operate with less accountability must begin with the acknowledgement of the motivations for states to collaborate with organisations like the INA in the first place. Fortunately, the rationales for such clandestine activities have been established in writing. In the Executive Order, signed on December 4, 1981 by U.S. President Reagan, for example, it is pointed out that 'special activities mean activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the USG is not apparent or acknowledged publicly'[1005]. The 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act very much echoes this and, in its statutory definition of covert actions, points out that such activities have the stated goal to 'influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the USG will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly'[1006]. After all, 'if the US were to deny itself the covert action option, it would be forced to rely more heavily on other military, diplomatic, and economic instruments of power. Some opportunities would have to be foregone and some temptations foreclosed'[1007]. Having said this, it has, throughout this chapter, become apparent that the very purpose of the CIA-INA relationship in the 1990s was based on the USG's intent to avoid accountability and visibility in the pursuance of its objective of toppling Saddam Hussein. Despite the fact that the coup option was brushed aside by the incoming George W. Bush administration and invasion became the preferred mechanism to remove and replace Saddam Hussein and his regime, we must bear these considerations in mind

[1005] Department of Defense, *Executive Order 12333*.
[1006] US Congress, *Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991*.
[1007] Congressional Research Service, *Covert Action*.

in the following assessment of the INA's ability to operate with less accountability in one of the concerned states.

Having imposed a rigorous military occupation with an almost all-encompassing supervision mechanism for the Iraqi Governing Council, the CPA and USG leadership, although entertaining the idea of a prolonged military rule, slowly began its planning for the time after the end of *formal* occupation: 'as time went on, and with it the failure to find any weapons of mass destruction or former regime operational links to international terrorists, democratization became an ever more dominant rationale for the American presence (…) Doing so required answering a series of intensely difficult policy questions: Who would rule Iraq? How would these rulers be chosen? Under what restraints would they exercise their power?'[1008]. Hence, during the summer, Paul Bremer's team began to develop a plan for the transition to democracy and supposed Iraqi sovereignty – a plan that would go through a multitude of reviews and adjustments. In addition to the pressing questions and the perceived need to deliver on the mission and the US election in 2004 already looming on the horizon, the country also suffered ever-stronger spasms of violence, caused by a growing insurgency against the American presence in Mesopotamia[1009]. Faced with this, Feith at the Pentagon, perhaps still hoping that Ahmed Chalabi might be the ultimate beneficiary of such an initiative, argued in the summer of 2003 that 'it would be helpful to (…) put an Iraqi face on the governance tasks'[1010]. It was imperative, he maintained, to find 'one way to involve Iraqis *while maintaining Coalition control'* [emphasis added][1011]. Bremer, in turn, repeatedly tried to point out to the Pentagon that one of the core problems of handing back sovereignty to Iraq immediately would be that 'there would be no guarantee the Iraqi government would want US troops to remain welcome for any necessary period of time'[1012]. The desire to keep a significant troop presence in Iraq and to prevent an Islamist takeover of the country are indeed two crucial points to bear in mind for the assessment of American foreign policy going forward. And truly, Ahmed Chalabi and his INC appeared as rather minor problems compared to

[1008] RAND, Corporation. *Occupying Iraq A History Of The Coalition Provisional Authority*, p. 265.

[1010] Feith, *War And Decision*.
[1011] US Department of Defense. Under Secretary for Policy, *Forming The Iraqi Interim Administration*.
[1012] CPA, *Path To Sovereignty*.

what was brewing all over the country. After the assassination of UN envoy de Mello in August, Rice observed that 'the situation would spiral downward after that terrible August attack. Coalition forces couldn't get a handle on the insurgency, which was gaining strength almost daily (…) Iraqis were becoming more insistent about retaking control of their country. We started to hear the word "occupiers" with greater frequency'[1013]. Similarly, General Kicklighter, who would subsequently lead the Pentagon's Iraq Transition Team, observes that:

> *'it had become clear at that time that we did not want the role of occupier. This is why we decided to return sovereignty at an earlier stage than originally planned'*[1014].

Seemingly bewildered, but certainly on a lighter note, even staunch US allies, like Egyptian President Mubarak wondered aloud: 'I know you want to bring democracy to the Middle East (…) but why did you start with the Iraqis? They are the worst!'[1015]. Hence, in order to establish control over the escalating security situation, US and coalition forces sprang into action, launching one military campaign after the other – all to no avail. The insurgency only intensified and 'by the fall of 2003, the original American project for Iraq was clearly faltering. Violent resistance was rising (…) the President and his advisors concluded that it was important to end the occupation as soon as possible'[1016]. Indeed, the ever-growing acts of violence and resistance against the American occupation, together with the 'democratisation imperative', became a key reason for ending the CPA earlier than initially planned and to have an Iraqi nominally in government (although perhaps not in power). This was made clear to Bremer when he 'travelled to Washington in late October [and] all the senior administration officials he met with conveyed to him their impatience with an extended timeline. Various reasons were given, but the main concern was the rising tide of violent resistance to the occupation'[1017]. When he was still Presidential Envoy, Khalilzad had outlined that 'the US (…) could improve the odds of a good outcome by avoiding a Western occupation, which, I feared, might create a scapegoat and a common enemy for Iraqis'. Instead, he had argued, 'we needed an Iraqi in charge—a Karzai—someone to whom the

[1013] Rice, *No Higher Honour*, pp. 240-41.
[1014] Interview Claude M. Kicklighter.
[1015] Cited in: Rice, *No Higher Honour*, pp. 240-41.
[1016] RAND, *Occupying Iraq A History Of The Coalition Provisional Authority*, xxxvi.
[1017] RAND, *Occupying Iraq A History Of The Coalition Provisional Authority*, p. 272.

Iraqis could go with their problems. We would be there behind the scenes, helping to get things done, but without the burden of running the Iraqi government'[1018]. Now, that the occupation had become a prolonged reality, it was realised that one would have to indeed divert accountability from the CPA, an occupying power, to an Iraqi-led government, at least accountable in name to the Iraqi people. Soon after this shift in strategy, senior members of the CPA realised that 'it is a political imperative to end the occupation by mid-2004'[1019]. A memo thus tellingly advised to be 'operating stealthily behind the scenes' in the drafting of the constitutional setup of an interim administration as 'this process would provide our maximum opportunity to exercise leverage over future constitutional outcomes in Iraq'[1020]. Furthermore, the memo urged to influence this very procedure in a manner that would, after having the interim constitution approved and obtaining a UNSCR resolution, 'endorse the political process and hail the approval of the interim constitution for Iraq'. What is more, 'special provision could be made to authorise the use of force in the case of armed conflict or any threat to the territorial integrity of Iraq'[1021]. Interestingly, Bahr al-Oloum, member of the GC, appeared to echo these recommendations when he urged the US Ambassador to Kuwait to change policy 'so as to give the impression that Iraqis are ruling themselves, with the Coalition providing strong but discreet support from "behind the curtains"'[1022]. And indeed, behind those very curtains there was considerable movement.

Significantly reducing the role of the Pentagon in determining post-occupation Iraq and hoping to 'bridge the divide between the CPA and Washington', Condoleeza Rice, with President Bush's approval, established the Iraq Stabilization Group (ISG), headed by Robert Blackwill'[1023], who began his work shortly thereafter. As a prominent member of the GC describes the first meeting with the new American envoy: 'President Bush wanted Blackwill to come to talk behind the scenes to the Governing Council'[1024]. Following this display of

[1018] Khalizad, *The Envoy.*
[1019] O'Sullivan and Martinez to Bremer, "Overview of Changing Timeline Proposals", cited in: RAND Corporation. *Occupying Iraq A History Of The Coalition Provisional Authority*.
[1020] Coalition Provisional Authority, *Part II Of Constitutional Strategy*.
[1021] Coalition Provisional Authority, *Part II Of Constitutional Strategy*.
[1022] Embassy Kuwait City, "Sayed Bahr Al-Oloum Tells Ambassador Iraqis Must Be Out Front, Coalition „Behind The Curtains"."
[1023] Rice, *No Higher Honour*, p. 242.
[1024] Al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*

bureaucratic politics and the insertion of a new American envoy into the policy-planning process, 'Bremer effectively worked under guidance from the White House'[1025]. By the end of the year, Bremer and the GC agreed to announce an expedited timetable, entailing the drafting of an interim constitution, which would become known as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), and the appointment of an interim administration, which would take over governance of Iraq from the CPA by June 30, 2004. As one of the architects of the document describes it: 'the first priority in the new plan would be to draft an interim constitution, although it would be called a "fundamental law." This document would lay down the structure and principles of the transitional government that would rule Iraq until a permanent constitution was written and a government elected under its rules'[1026]. National elections, it was proclaimed, would be held by the end of 2005[1027]. Douglas Feith at the Pentagon had to bitterly acknowledge that Bremer 'had aligned himself with the views prevailing at State and the CIA'[1028]. Indeed, Bremer had succeeded in 'finally driv[ing] a stake through that concept [of handing back sovereignty to Iraqis immediately]'[1029].

It was necessary to outline the background *en detail* so as to fully comprehend the relevance of the following process to the ability of the examined NSA to operate with less accountability. The chartered course made it clear that 'the most important task would be to replace the Iraqi Governing Council with an interim government'[1030] and within this, 'the most difficult challenge was the selection of the interim PM, the most powerful leader in the new government'[1031]. To be sure, selections rather than elections of political leaders have almost assumed the status of world cultural heritage in most countries of the Middle East but in this particular case, the USG, traditionally the sole kingmaker, thought it to be imperative to obtain the cloak of legitimacy from the UN. Thus, Brahimi became the special UN envoy to help select the members of the interim government. However, according to a senior CPA advisor, it soon became clear that this was not

[1025] Rand, *Occupying Iraq A History Of The Coalition Provisional Authority*, p. xvii.
[1026] Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, p. 16.
[1027] Rand, *Occupying Iraq A History Of The Coalition Provisional Authority*, p. xxxv
[1028] *Occupying Iraq A History Of The Coalition Provisional Authority*, p. 496.
[1029] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 168.
[1030] Rice, *No Higher Honour*, p. 269.
[1031] Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, p. 257.

to be a partnership of equals. When Brahimi arrived in Baghdad to begin his consultations 'the behind-the-scenes involvement of the strong-willed Blackwill'[1032], who was tasked to 'shadow Brahimi, as a way to get information and assert American interest'[1033]. One participant closely involved in the ensuing deliberations thus observed that 'Washington wanted a clean outcome and to have control of the process. So, we ended up with a process that was not transparent, choosing the interim government through backroom negotiations with the main players on the GC[1034]. To be sure, there were also other forces at work in this very initiative who were clandestinely seeking to influence the process and its outcome – forces that were all too familiar to and indeed even friendly towards the INA. After all, whilst Brahimi and Blackwill held meeting after meeting with the relevant Iraqi personages, 'behind the scenes the intelligence agencies were preparing master lists of their own candidates for senior positions in the Interim Government'[1035]. Making the intent of the USG even more apparent, Blackwill himself, brushing aside Brahimi's continued reference to a neutral, technocratic government for Iraq, 'strongly indicated that the USA would not allow the transfer of power to a government that would not try to control the political process during the interim period: the USA, at least, would favour a government of politicians that would be susceptible to its influences'[1036]. The members of the GC, sitting across the table from 'the two kingmakers'[1037], some of them still pushing for elections for the Iraqi government, clearly understood that Bremer's references to 'the bad security situation, the lack of electoral law, a census, or legislation for establishing political parties in Iraq (…) were only excuses and pretexts: Bremer did not want to hold elections because he wanted to appoint the government he liked'[1038]. Making his refusal to grant full sovereignty to Iraq very clear, 'Bremer also spoke 'explicitly about the need for checks on the powers of the interim government'[1039]. Echoing this, Blackwill 'went on to outline principles: There must be consistency between the present Governing Council and the transitional government; the U.S.

[1032] Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, p. 257.
[1033] Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, p. 248.
[1034] Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, p. 253.
[1035] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*
[1036] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*
[1037] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*
[1038] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq.*
[1039] Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, p. 251.

did not want the Governing Council to be completely different from the interim government (…) Maintaining consistency was necessary in order to deal with the major challenges facing the new government; now was not the time to put in place a new formation'[1040]. In this context, 'consistency' might very well be interpreted as the intention of the US not to relinquish the supervision mechanism she had superimposed on the Iraqi groups from the outset. The goal, it seems, was to divert accountability from the CPA, an occupying power of the USG, to an Iraqi-led government at least nominally accountable to the Iraqi people. At the same time, however, the new interim Iraqi government would still have to be accountable to, even dependent on, the US. Further reinforcing this impression, Bush administration officials confessed in late April 2004 that the interim government would only be receiving 'limited sovereignty'. As Powell asserted: 'it's sovereignty [that the Iraqis will get], but part of that sovereignty they are going to allow us to exercise on their behalf and with their permission. It is not as if we are seizing anything away from them. It is with the understanding that they need our help, and for us to provide that help we have to be able to operate freely, which in some ways infringes on what some would call full sovereignty'[1041]. However, since 'it quickly became apparent that such constraints would not fare well in Iraq or in the international community, (…) the administration dropped the word 'limited'[1042]. Such cosmetic rhetorical changes notwithstanding, the trajectory seemed to have remained the same. Yet, referring back to Powell's statement, one might wonder which Iraqi would be willing to 'allow [the USG] to exercise [sovereignty] on [his] behalf and with [his permission]'?[1043]. Yet, this question, namely the choice of PM, the most important appointment for the interim government to be made, appeared to have already been made at the time of his statement.

Against this background, it should, of course, not come as a surprise that as the process of planning for the interim began, 'we saw that many of the key players were in fact the same figures who had participated in the December 2002 political conference in London'[1044]. To be sure, several considerations played a role in the

[1040] Al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*
[1041] Radio Free Europe, "Iraq: Powell Acknowledges Limited Sovereignty For New Government."
[1042] Diamond, *Squandered Victory,* p. 256.
[1043] Radio Free Europe, "Iraq: Powell Acknowledges Limited Sovereignty For New Government."
[1044] Feith, *War And Decision*, p. 497.

decision-making process that would lead to Iyad Allawi's eventual appointment – and the hope that the candidate would be agreeable to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani, a religious NSA with significant influence in Iraq's Shia majority, certainly ranks very high[1045]. Yet, the most important qualifications for the post of PM were pointed out by President Bush himself, who, on May 19, made it clear to Bremer and Blackwill that 'whoever it is, I want to be sure that he won't start playing to the gallery by attacking the Coalition right after taking office (…) We've got to be certain the new PM won't ask us to leave the day after sovereignty'[1046]. In response to the President's remarks, Paul Bremer reminded the assembled members of the NSC that it was because of 'how deeply unpopular the Coalition had become under the incessant barrage of Arab propaganda and mounting security concerns' that the USG had decided to 'end the *formal* occupation [emphasis added]' and nominally put Iraqis in charge of their own country - namely, in the hope that this 'would help bring greater acceptance of the need for Coalition troops'[1047]. Bush agreed and after emphasising that he would 'be a lot more comfortable knowing that the man has courage and wasn't weak', Bremer proposed Allawi as the most suitable candidate for the office of PM, whose 'toughness' he had 'always respected' and who 'didn't let go' of a policy 'he'd committed himself to'[1048]. '"Okay," the president said. "Look, we just have to remind people that only one year has passed since Liberation. The transition to democracy will take time, and we have to be patient—all of us, the Coalition and the Iraqis. That's why I'm concerned about getting some solid statements of support of the Coalition from the new Iraqi government"'[1049]. Indeed, Bremer seems to have been very well aware of what else qualified Allawi for the position. Besides a display of 'most tough-minded practicality'[1050], he had 'worked closely with Western and Arab intelligence organizations'[1051] – qualities that would be of dire need in the worsening security situation the country found itself in and that would be in line with Washington's desire who would look favourable on US objectives. Pointing in particular at the growing insurgency, Bremer underlines that

[1045] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*; Interview Senior US Diplomat in Iraq
[1046] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq.*
[1047] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq.*
[1048] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq.*
[1049] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 153.
[1050] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 44.
[1051] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq.*

‘Washington agreed with our assessment that a sovereign Iraqi government would have to take tough necessary decisions to address these two important unresolved issues (…) and also that Alawi would be the Iraqi politician most likely able to handle those two difficult issues. Which analysis proved to be correct’[1052]. Blackwill also ‘pushed hard to make Ayad Allawi, a tough, secular Shiite with close ties to the Central Intelligence Agency, the interim PM of Iraq (…) America’s man in Baghdad’[1053]. Aware of such manoeuvres, other members of the GC were convinced that ‘Ambassador Bremer and the Americans favored Dr. Ayad Allawi as the first PM for Iraq right from the beginning’[1054]. This suspicion appears to be confirmed by Bremer himself who acknowledges that ‘for some months I had felt that Ayad Allawi was probably the best choice for PM. Bob and I both felt that Allawi was tougher than any of his colleagues. And a newly sovereign Iraq would need a tough leader. But I didn’t want to spoil Allawi’s chances by pushing his candidacy. I hoped Brahimi would eventually see the logic of this choice, though Blackwill and I agreed that he would probably choke at the prospect of appointing a man known to have had connections with the CIA[1055]. Furthermore, ‘the increased tensions in Fallujah and Najaf worked in favour of Ayad Allawi’s candidature. A security-minded person was seen as an essential requirement for vigorously prosecuting the war against the insurgents (…) A PM who, above all else, could understand the imperative of establishing security and who might be called upon to authorise the use of large-scale force, would be a critical element in the difficult transition period. Ayad Allawi fitted the profile in nearly every respect. The natural choice of the security-minded establishment in both London and Washington’[1056]. Echoing such notions, a senior advisor to the CPA points out that the seemingly Hobbesian state of nature that began to engulf Iraq only ‘left Allawi—who was Blackwill’s favored candidate from the beginning (…) and the Bush administration itself was enthusiastic in its support. After all, Allawi had spent years on the U.S. payroll and could be trusted (to a degree that few other Iraqi leaders could) not to go against America’s most vital interests’[1057].

[1052] Senior Member Coalition Provisional Authority.
[1053] Bumiler, "Backing An Iraqi Leader Again, This Time For A Fee."
[1054] Al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*
[1055] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 338.
[1056] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*.
[1057] Diamond, *Squandered Victory*.

And so, on May 28, presumably also because of 'all the trust and goodwill that the CIA had built up over the years with him and the INA'[1058], the GC 'was informed that Allawi was the choice for PM of the interim government, and they unanimously endorsed it (…) the decision was made by Blackwill and Bremer and reluctantly accepted by Brahimi'[1059]. America's will would not be denied in this case. The UN's role, in contrast, had become that of a spectator whose nominal involvement and ultimate blessing was nonetheless desired to endow the process with the glow of legitimacy and the multilateralism that was so dreaded in the era of the second Bush Presidency. Thus, to the dismay of his nemesis, Ahmed Chalabi, 'Allawi was now ascendant in the new "sovereign" Iraq [and] he was even still collecting CIA funding, sources say'[1060]. Yet, Blackwill, Bremer and Anglo-American intelligence agencies also had their impact felt in the appointment of the Interim Iraqi President and ministers of the cabinet as 'the final form of the Interim Government Cabinet was very little different to the one it was to replace. There were, however, important differences as to the personalities selected for ministerial appointments. First, the proportion of Islamists was reduced from that of the Governing Council Cabinet, in a deliberate attempt to limit their influence. Second, the intelligence agencies had directly selected a number of ministers who were connected to them in one way or another (…) Ayad Allawi was given a list of two or three choices of ministers for each ministry, and was allowed to veto only those whom he felt he could not accept. He was not allowed to propose candidates himself. Given that he had only a limited first-hand knowledge of most of the names that were being proposed, he could only intervene in the few instances where he found a particular ministerial candidate objectionable'[1061]. Revealingly, 'the two key security ministries of Defence and Interior were awarded to people who were intimately connected with the efforts by the CPA and the intelligence agencies to exercise control over Iraq's provinces'. What is more:

> *'every ministry had a group of American advisers. So, at the beginning it was a government propped up by a lot of American support'*[1062].

[1058] Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, p. 442.
[1059] Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, p. 259.; see also: Borger, "British-Educated Surgeon Is New Iraqi PM."
[1060] Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America To War*.
[1061] Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*.
[1062] Interview Senior Member US Embassy Baghdad.

In other words, it became clear that 'the USA was only prepared to cede power to a friendly government that would dominate the transition period and control the pace of change'[1063].

These developments, it should be noted, were, justifiably, interpreted as 'evidence that the CIA had trumped the Pentagon in the administration's internal struggle'[1064]. What is more, given the security situation in the country, Allawi, 'as an unflinching advocate of a strong Iraqi security service and a strong government (…) may be what Jordan's King Abdullah meant when he said recently that Iraq needed a "strong man" to guide it in the coming months'[1065]. Though perhaps a popular choice with the leader of the country's Hashemite neighbour, once upon a time intrinsically linked with Iraq through a tribal bloodline, the American Embassy in Amman soberly noted that in the Arab press 'the immediate reaction after the handover remained sceptical, with some commentary describing the transfer as "another act in a play" and the new Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) as "nothing but the tails of the crusaders." One op-ed characterized the transfer of sovereignty as nothing more than a "protocol exchange of papers between Bremer and Allawi."'[1066]. These new realities created left some members of the GC, who were, due to their Iranian ties and Islamist credentials, excluded from the interim administration, concerned: 'we needed to try to understand the real U.S. intentions; when they spoke of "the end of the occupation," we needed to understand what that meant'[1067]. Was this, in other words, the long-sought after 'best of all worlds: an iron-fisted Iraqi junta without Saddam Hussein'? [1068].

Indeed, it is in the face of all of the above that we must evaluate the ability of the INA and its leader, Iyad Allawi, to operate with less accountability compared to other, namely, state actors. Naturally, in the case of the early phase of the

[1063] Interview Senior Member US Embassy Baghdad.
[1064] Curtius, "Some Find Ties To CIA, Baath Party Worrisome."
[1065] Curtius, "Some Find Ties To CIA, Baath Party Worrisome."
[1066] Embassy Amman, "King Abdullah Welcomes IIG."; Note: All of the above is reminiscent of Ledeneva's writing about the 'diffuse nature' of networks, which can 'penetrate formal and informal hierarchies [to] ensure that both types of hierarchies have no fixed boundaries'. What is more, 'networks of insiders are tied together by following an unwritten code (...) the foundations of belonging to networks of power are hidden behind formal appointments and are non-transparent (…) just as occupying a formal position is not the same as having real power, the existing legal framework is different from the mastery of the rules of the game' – and the real masters in this regard were clearly those state actors, accustomed to informal governance and operations.
[1067] Al-Bayati, *From Dictatorship to Democracy.*
[1068] Friedman, "The World; A Rising Sense That Iraq's Hussein Must Go."

collaboration between the US, represented by the CIA, and the INA the answer is straightforward. At a time when the USG was unwilling to commit significant military resources to the removal and replacement of Saddam Hussein, a clandestine alliance with an Iraqi exile organisation provided the Bush Senior and Clinton administrations with plausible deniability in the pursuance of their foreign policy goals. This seems to be particularly true for the CIA-supervised bombing campaign the INA conducted inside Iraq – the means through which the destabilisation and ultimate regime change in Iraq was to be achieved. After all, it was an Iraqi organisation behind these attacks. Any official cooperation with and therefore approval by the USG could be denied and accountability for any such acts avoided. After all, 'if the US were to deny itself the covert action option, it would be forced to rely more heavily on other military, diplomatic, and economic instruments of power. Some opportunities would have to be foregone and some temptations foreclosed'[1069]. Thus, in order not to rely merely on such 'traditional' means of foreign policy and not to allow herself to forego the temptation of pursuing the removal of Saddam Hussein, the CIA decided to facilitate an organisation able to operate with less accountability relative to the employment of official US state actors.

Once there was a change of guard in the White House and outright invasion was worked towards and implemented under the Bush Jr administration, the question of the INA's accountability vis-à-vis the USG in Iraq became more complex – although the underlying rationale for the ongoing collaboration remained virtually the same. It has been outlined that the political pressure to create a democratic Iraq and end the CPA grew exponentially throughout 2003. Such deliberations surrounding the need to avoid being seen as officially and directly governing a country are, of course, not new to English-speaking empires in the Middle East. Indeed, the need to therefore delegate or grant nominal powers of governance to 'native' personages was already identified by Lord Curzon almost 100 years earlier when it became apparent that '[we need an] Arab facade ruled and administered under British guidance and controlled by a native Mohammedan and, as far as possible, by an Arab staff (….) There should be no actual incorporation of

[1069] Congressional Research Service, *Covert Action: An Effective Instrument Of U. S. Foreign Policy?*.

the conquered territory in the dominions of the conqueror, but the absorption may be veiled by such constitutional fictions as a protectorate, a sphere of influence, a buffer state and so on'[1070]. Khalilzad's urging that the US 'needed an Iraqi in charge—a Karzai—someone to whom the Iraqis could go with their problems [whilst] we would be there behind the scenes, helping to get things done, but without the burden of running the Iraqi government'[1071] – might thus be seen as merely a modern adaptation of a principle that is as old as imperialism itself. Scholars of the way Rome ruled her *imperium*, it might be added, point to 'the term "client kings" [which] is conventionally used (…) to denote a range of monarchs and quasi-monarchs of non-Roman peoples who enjoyed a relationship with Rome that was essentially harmonious but unequal. These were rulers under the patronage of the Roman state, but the less abrasive language of friendship was the norm. In fact, there is very little ancient authority for the term "client king": the Roman state called such kings *rex sociusque et amicus,* "king and ally and friend"'[1072]. The reasons for the appointment of INA's Iyad Allawi, who had faithfully worked with the USG for years and could therefore be relied upon, as PM of Iraq might thus also fall into the long lines of 'client kings' and 'Arab facades'. Its simple goal was to divert accountability away from the CPA, an occupying power of the USG, to an Iraqi-led government, at least nominally accountable to the Iraqi people. Compared to an outright military occupation by the US, Allawi, officially in charge of and responsible for the affairs of the Republic of Iraq, would therefore be able to operate with less accountability. At the same time, however, the new PM, the most powerful member of the new government, would still be accountable to, indeed even dependent on, the USG. Interestingly, the anointing of Allawi as PM is an example of an NSA deliberately being transformed into a, however independent, state actor. Seen from this perspective, as a state actor the INA's biggest advantage was not its lack of accountability but precisely the opposite. Whilst nominal power would, as we shall see, continue to reside in the hands of the US and the American troops, there now was an Arab facade in place, who would be regarded as being accountable for whatever might befall in Iraq. In short, less accountable *compared*

[1070] Lord Curzon (and Eastern Committee). 24 April 1918. and Curzon memorandum, 12 December 1917, cited by William Stivers. *Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-*American World Order, 1918-1930 (Ithaca, 1982). pp. 28, 34.
[1071] Khalizad, *The Envoy.*
[1072] Braund, "Client Kings."

to the CPA, Allawi and the INA were purposefully turned into nominal state actors, which would carry more supposed accountability vis-à-vis the international community and the Iraqi public. At the same time, however, it must be noted that the fundamental, underlying structure of USG-INA collaboration would now seemingly be applied to US-Iraqi relations as a whole. After all, the principle of this symbiotic relationship had the objective to 'influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the USG will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly'[1073].

Having said this, 'among the tasks that remained in the final weeks of occupation rule, one of the most important was to secure a UN resolution blessing the transitional steps and interim arrangements and giving some legal basis for the continued presence of American and other international forces'[1074] – and it is in the configuration of the transitional steps and interim arrangements that the USG-INA collaboration would prove to have a long-lasting impact on the future of Iraq itself. After all, as an old Arab proverb says: 'nothing is longer than the interim'.

Step VI: NSA implements previously identified policy objective towards at least one of the concerned state actors + Step VII: Successful downloading of State Actors' agenda in concerned State through NSA activity

This very interim had now begun, Saddam Hussein removed and a *rex sociusque et amicus* of long standing in the *Imperium Americanum* appointed. In other words, the removal of the *ancien regime* was completed and the process of laying the foundation for what would replace it was gathering. To be sure, American exceptionalism has also had its impact on the minds of her foreign policy and military establishment. As General Kicklighter, Director of the Department of Defense's Iraq Transition Team, highlights that 'we did not want them to become puppets but build a nation that would prosper'. 'But', he cautions:

> *'they should be pro-freedom, that they have a nation that is a contributor to a safer world, whatever their leanings. My personal opinion is that the most important thing was that they restore security and stability and build a*

[1073] US Congress, *Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991*.
[1074] Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, 264.

nation that can be united and prosperous and not be a threat to the region. We have never had designs on taking over a nation for an extended period of time. We want to restore nations and let them have their own freedom'[1075].

Of course, as Ferguson fittingly reminds us, 'it is possible to occupy a country for decades, while consistently denying that you have any intention of doing so. This is known as hypocrisy, and it is something to which liberal empires must sometimes resort'[1076]. One part of the '*mission de l'hypocrisie'*, namely, the process of personnel decisions for the new Iraq, had been completed – with the discreet help of Anglo-American intelligence agencies. One of the members from the senior ranks of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service freely confesses in this regard that 'once the decision for an interim government was made, these old links [with Allawi] became relevant again'. Asked whether the argument for an 'Arab façade' might still have been relevant and indeed applicable to the situation in Iraqi in 2004, the same interviewee confirmed that what Curzon had described presented 'the classical dilemma' for 'in the current world they [the US] cannot colonise the place, they need local allies'[1077]. These local allies had now been found. The task that remained was the carefully calibrated moulding of the structures and institutions upon which the new Iraq would be built. In this context, it will become clear that in the pursuance of this, the involvement of Allawi, who, as newly appointed PM, had become the beneficiary of 'all the trust and goodwill that the CIA had built up over the years with him and the INA'[1078], would prove to be crucial and indeed foresighted. To be sure, at this point the INA, this one-man army, had, at least in name, become a state actor, albeit be it one with, quite literally, trimmed wings. As a senior member of the US embassy in Baghdad recalls:

'when I got there and Mr Allawi wanted to fly somewhere, he had to borrow an aeroplane from us. This was designed to help him. We had a C130 aircraft and a crew, and we had the plane painted with Iraqi insignia and all of that and we gave that to Mr Allawi for him to use so he could at least travel around the country and would not have to come begging to the American embassy for an airplane'[1079].

[1075] Interview Claude M. Kicklighter.
[1076] Ferguson, *Colossus*.
[1077] Senior Member of The Secret Intelligence Service, M16.
[1078] Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm.*
[1079] Interview Senior Member US Embassy Baghdad.

Leaving such revealing anecdotes about inherent power asymmetries aside, this chapter will continue to track its collaboration with the US into the time period of nominal sovereignty for an analysis of this might reveal whether there might not be elements of continuity still in place that have characterised the previous years of US-INA cooperation.

Having said this, in order to fully comprehend the importance of this role that Allawi played during the interim administration, we must first go back in time to December 2003 when he and another member of the INA, Nouri Badran, returned from the imperial periphery back to the metropolis in order to co-author, together with the CIA, Iraq's *derin devlet*, the state within the new state, as it were. This act, it must be underlined, should not be underestimated. After all, as one CIA operative pointed out in this regard: 'intelligence services are the heart and soul of a new country'[1080]. Given the fact that Allawi has had a long and trusted relationship with the Agency, it should not be surprising that he and his patrons were present at the creation of the heart and soul: 'the new service will be trained, financed and equipped largely by the CIA with help from Jordan'. Paul Bremer himself corroborates this account and furthermore acknowledges the importance of these activities for the new Iraq: 'since abolishing the Baathist Defense Ministry and the Mukhabarat intelligence service the previous May, we had labored to lay the foundation for responsible institutions to replace them (…) worked for months with Ayad Allawi, chairman of the GC's Security Committee, to delineate the powers and the responsibilities of the new Defense Ministry, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS), and the Ministerial Committee for National Security'[1081]. It was thus initially decided that the state within the new state 'will be headed by Iraqi Interior Minister Nouri Badran, a secular Shiite and activist in the Jordan-based Iraqi National Accord'. As yet another testimony to the repeatedly mentioned 'trust and goodwill', 'Badran and Allawi, leader of the INA, are spending much of this week at CIA headquarters in Langley to work out the details of the new program. Both men have worked closely with the CIA over the past decade'. To be sure, besides the ability to significantly influence the domestic and foreign affairs of Iraq through its US-aligned intelligence service, the immediate rationale for its creation

[1080] Duthel, *Worldwide Secret Service And Intelligence Agencies.*
[1081] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 318.

was obvious: ‘establishing the service is just one of several steps the CIA is taking to deal with an increasingly worrisome Iraqi resistance’[1082]. And thus, in March 2004 Bremer, through CPA Order Number 69[1083], officially announced the creation of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, which, it was decided, would now be led by Mohammed al-Shehwani, another member of the INA and trusted ally of Iyad Allawi. The organisation would be financed by ‘funds set aside within the Iraq appropriation approved by Congress. These funds, totalling 3bn USD over three years, are said to be destined for covert CIA operations within Iraq’[1084].

This insight into the depths of continued INA-CIA collaboration months prior to the official handover of sovereignty does bear several revealing conclusions. First of all, it demonstrates that American supervision of INA activities, a defining feature since the outset of the relationship, very much remained in place and, it appears, was also willingly accepted and embraced by Iyad Allawi. The very fact that the CIA would only work with Allawi to create perhaps the ultimate, institutionalised supervision mechanism for any country, its intelligence agency, again speaks to the ‘trust and goodwill’ that both sides of the asymmetrical partnership felt towards each other. Indeed, it seems that it was precisely due to this tried and tested interaction over the years that only Allawi and other members the INA were deemed to be eligible to implant the ‘heart and soul’ into the political organism of the new Iraq. What is more, one might even go as far as to argue that by installing an Iraqi *derin devlet* through the good offices of the INA, the US sought to replicate or rather project the influence it had possessed over Allawi’s organisation on Iraq as a whole. Thus, having successfully carried out the removal, this episode demonstrates how important Allawi and the INA continued to be in the process of replacing Saddam Hussein’s regime.

However, the creation of Iraq’s intelligence service, which began months prior to the official return of sovereignty, would not be the only contribution Allawi, together with the USG, was able to make in the ‘Saddam replacement process’. In fact, the same senior member of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service, diagnosing the existence of the ‘Curzon dilemma’ in Iraq, accurately observes that:

[1082] Wright, "Iraq Spy Service Planned By U.S. To Stem Attacks."
[1083] CPA, *Coalition Provisional Authority Number 69*.
[1084] Wright, "Iraq Spy Service Planned By U.S. To Stem Attacks."

'in 2004, there was a strong element of dependence on the Western militaries (…) authority and strength in Iraq was clearly embodied in the outside powers'[1085] *– and Iyad Allawi, in his capacity as PM, would play his part to ensure that, despite the official end of US military rule, would continue to be the case. Indeed, in the previous sections we have learned that President Bush himself, outlining the qualifications the new Iraqi PM ought to have, wanted 'we've got to be certain the new PM won't ask us to leave the day after sovereignty'*[1086].

Echoing the President's concerns, Paul Bremer had also warned that 'there would be no guarantee the Iraqi government would want US troops to remain welcome for any necessary period of time'[1087]. Given these considerations, it appears only natural that, in drafting the interim constitution, the TAL, the USG, prior to the official handover of sovereignty in June 2004, vehemently sought to establish the lowest bar possible to enable the interim government of Iraq to reach a status-of-forces agreement covering future U.S. military activity and presence in Iraq[1088]. And, as the official transfer of sovereignty approached on June 30th, the US and the appointed future interim administration officials reached agreement about the 'terms of that [US military] presence in the unusual form of parallel letters, one from U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, and one from Iraqi PM Ayad Allawi, to the President of the UN Security Council (…) appended to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, issued on June 8, 2004'[1089]. The resolution itself endorsed the Iraqi interim administration and, regarding the status of Coalition troops, explicitly stated that 'that the multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq'. The case for this was further strengthened by Allawi's letter, which officially invited the Coalition troops to remain in Iraq 'until we are able to provide security for ourselves', requesting that 'the Security Council review the mandate of the MNF at the request of the Transitional Government of Iraq, or twelve months from the date

[1085] Interview Senior Member of The Secret Intelligence Service, M16.
[1086] Bremer, *My Year in Iraq.*
[1087] Coalition Provisional Authority, *Path To Sovereignty*.
[1088] Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, pp. 158-60.
[1089] US Congressional Research Service, *Operation Iraqi Freedom; some scholars, such as Le Mon, have argued that this invitation, issued by Allawi, ought to be treated as formally invalid given the fact that it is dated 7 June when Allawi had not been officially become PM (Le Mon, "Legality of a Request by the Interim Government for the Continued Presence of the US Military Forces").*

on which such a resolution is adopted'[1090]. Of course, as Carcano maintains, 'there is no real guarantee (…) that the Security Council will be in a position to withdraw the Multinational Force if requested (…) the US, for instance, might prefer to veto it rather than leaving Iraq to an unfriendly government'[1091]. Additionally, as Carcano points out, 'Resolution 1546 makes clear that while the Iraqi security forces are under the command of the Interim Government, the Multinational Force is not. The Multinational Force is only requested to act in co-ordination and in consultation with the Interim Government and is not accountable to the Interim Government'[1092]. Indeed, Iraq's fledgling forces would come under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence, but operationally would be part of the command structure of the MNF. Effective military power remained with the MNF – hence, with the US – and the occupation would continue under another guise'[1093]. Noting the provision of article 42 of the Hague Regulations that a territory ought to be considered occupied when 'it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army', in conjunction with the fact that the Iraqi interim administration's existence very much rested on the MNF's presence[1094], Dorman concludes in this context that the Multinational Force, under US command, must be regarded as an occupation force[1095]. Echoing this assessment, an American embassy cable from the UAE observes, any [such] peacekeeping force would fall under the command of the U.S. military and, as such, would be seen as an extension of the U.S. occupation'. After all, the Embassy's assessment continues 'on 17 July, Iraq PM Iyad Allawi clearly stated, "the multinational forces are under the command of the United Nations and since the US has the largest force, then it is natural that they are under its command"'[1096]. As a matter of fact, the relationship between the MNF and the Iraqi government would be strictly one of 'coordination, not command'[1097]. A senior member of the new US Embassy in Baghdad can only confirm this:

[1090] United Nations, "Security Council Endorses Formation Of Sovereign Interim Government In Iraq."
[1091] Carcano, "End Of The Occupation In 2004?."
[1092] Carcano, "End Of The Occupation In 2004?."
[1093] Allawi
[1094] See also: Chesterman, "Occupation As Liberation."
[1095] Colassis, "International Humanitarian Law in the Iraqi Conflict".
[1096] Embassy Abu Dhabi, *UAE Paper On Deployment Of GCC Forces To Iraq*.
[1097] US Congress, *Operation Iraqi Freedom*.

'when I got there was only one battalion of the Iraqi army and there was nothing done in the previous year. I don't think any state can survive unless it has a reasonable and well-trained security force (...) There was very close coordination because at that time the Iraqis were not able to operate independently anyway. So whatever security issue would have to be addressed, it was carried out by our forces (...) whenever there was fighting, we did it'. The embassy, he concluded, thus became 'more like an Embassy plus, plus, plus'[1098].

The building of these structures go beyond the mere single act of safeguarding a permanent US troop presence. Instead, one must take a closer look at the legalistic structure the new post-Saddam Iraq would be based. As one of the main drafters of the TAL, the interim constitution, wonders: 'how much power would the interim government have? And what would become of Bremer's decrees? They now had the force of law. If the interim government could not adopt any laws, then it could not amend or remove Bremer's decrees—a dramatic diminution of its authority. And if it could not exercise some power over the foreign forces on its soil, how could it be said to possess sovereignty?[1099]'. Indeed, 'Bremer's decrees' did not lose their effect but rather were transitioned into the new legal codex of the country 'to ensure that the Iraqi Interim Government and all subsequent Iraqi governments inherit full responsibility for these laws, regulations, orders, memoranda, instructions and directives so that their implementation after the transfer of full governing authority may reflect the expectations of the Iraqi people, as determined by a fully empowered and sovereign Iraqi Government'[1100]. Furthermore, the TAL, Iraq's interim constitution, explicitly state that 'the laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law'[1101]. In other words, all previously issued CPA legislations would remain in place *unless the new Iraqi government decided to opt out of them*. Naturally, Iyad Allawi's interim administration took no such step, thereby ensuring the continuation of occupation laws in the now supposedly sovereign Iraq. In order to obtain this independence of

[1098] Interview Senior Member US Embassy Baghdad.
[1099] Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, p. 259.
[1100] CPA, *Coalition Provisional Authority Order 100*.
[1101] CPA, *Iraq: Law Of 2004 Of Administration For The State Of Iraq For The Transitional Period.*

Western troops from any Iraqi jurisdiction, Secretary Powell, in his letter to the Security Council stressed that 'the MNF must continue to function under a framework that affords the force and its personnel the status that they need to accomplish their mission, and in which the contributing states have responsibility for exercising jurisdiction over their personnel and which will ensure arrangements for, and use of assets by, the MNF. *The existing framework governing these matters is sufficient for these purposes*'[1102] [emphasis added]. This very 'existing framework' can be found in CPA Order 17[1103]. Issued by the CPA very early on, it granted coalition forces and all foreign personnel in the CPA immunity from Iraqi courts[1104]. Just a few days before the end of the CPA on June 27, the regulation was revised and accordingly updated, stating that the Multinational Force 'shall respect the Iraqis law' but 'shall be immune from Iraqi legal process' and 'shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their sending states'[1105]. Section 20 of the revised Order 17 furthermore outlines that the order 'shall remain in force for the duration of the mandate authorising the MNF under UN Security Council Resolutions 1511 and 1546 and any relevant subsequent resolution and shall not terminate until the departure of the final element of the MNF from Iraq, unless rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law'[1106]. Hence, Order 17 'survived the transfer of authority to the Iraqi Interim Government, which took no action to amend or rescind it. Iraq's permanent constitution was adopted in 2005. Article 130 of the permanent constitution continues the validity of existing laws, presumably including CPA Orders that were not rescinded by the Transitional Government'[1107]. In fact, Order 17 seems to have only come to an end when the US and Iraq entered into a substituting status of forces agreement in 2008. To be sure, such strategies are not novel. After all, as Fox observes accurately, the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention were very much 'aware that past occupiers had effectively manufactured local consent for their actions (…) "a variety of ingenious devices by which occupants avoided the observance of the rules of international law." In its commentary, the ICRC criticized World War II occupying powers for

[1102] United Nations, *Resolution 1546 (2004)*.
[1103] Carcano, "End Of The Occupation In 2004?."; US Congress, *U.S.-Iraq Withdrawal/Status Of Forces Agreement*.
[1104] CPA, *Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17*.
[1105] Wright, "US Immunity In Iraq Will Go Beyond June 30."
[1106] CPA, *Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17*.
[1107] US Congress, *Operation Iraqi Freedom*.; see also: Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, p. 273.

creating pliant local governments to help implement their political agendas (…) Of course, the Occupying Power usually tried to give some colour of legality and independence to the new organizations, which were formed in the majority of cases with the cooperation of certain elements among the population of the occupied country, but it was obvious that they were in fact always subservient to the will of the Occupying Power (…) Agreements with local authorities, whether new or pre-existing, "represent a more subtle means by which the Occupying Power may try to free itself from the obligations incumbent on it under occupation law"'. Bearing particular relevance for the continued immunity of MNF members, 'there is, warned the ICRC, "a particularly great danger of the Occupying Power forcing the Power whose territory is occupied to conclude agreements prejudicial to protected persons"'[1108]. It is thus not surprising that a former member of the Governing Council, complained that 'they have established a system to meddle in our affairs (…) Iraqis should decide many of these issues'[1109].

With these critical steps taken, several of the expectations the USG had for the new Iraqi PM were certainly fulfilled. Allawi would not 'start playing to the gallery by attacking the Coalition right after taking office'. On the contrary, it might be argued with some justification that the US, by selecting someone who, over the years had built up 'trust and goodwill', sought to ensure that her vital interests would be looked after and the conditions necessary for it cemented in Iraq's political structure. It was at these critical junctures when a new Iraqi interim administration had to be selected and, subsequently, certain key decisions, indispensable for continued American influence over Iraq's body politic, had to be made that the ultimate usefulness of the US-INA relationship became apparent.

Conclusion

Overall, one can observe a fully completed process of 'downloading' on part of an NSA. Envisioned by State A (US), a foreign policy towards State B (Iraq), namely removal and replacement of the latter's government, is being designed.

[1108] Fox, "The Occupation Of Iraq."
[1109] Chandrasekaran, "U.S. Edicts Curb Power Of Iraq's Leadership."

Subsequently, the US identifies certain areas of the policy, which it is unwilling or unable to pursue (any longer) herself in an official capacity, resulting in 'outsourcing' this to an NSA, namely the INA, for implementation on its behalf – this occurs during the 1990s when the USG did not want to be officially associated with the bombing campaigns and coup attempts carried out by the INA as well as after the end of the official occupation of Iraq when Iyad Allawi was asked to represent a supposedly sovereign Iraq, albeit be it under subtle American custodianship. At the same time, these two distinct periods of US-INA relations also represent evolving and indeed changing operational roles the organisation would assume. Initially, Allawi et al. would, supported by the CIA, pursue a strategy of undermining another country, namely Iraq, by targeting its government and thus its sovereignty. After the Bush Jr. administration came into office and supporting coups through the INA gave way to outright invasion, the INA, arguably, would transform itself into a 'facilitator', seeking to aid and advance the seriously pursued removal and replacement strategy of the USG as a whole but particularly the aligned agenda of one particular state actor, the CIA. We were able to observe this throughout the pre-war conferences when both CIA and INA actively and indeed successfully sought to undermine the proclamation of a provisional government. The peak of facilitating American objectives in Iraq was, of course, reached when Allawi had been selected PM and aided the US-led creation of the new political structure of Iraq – including the establishment of its intelligence service.

Naturally, INA's 'downloading' also bears implications for the initial hypotheses. Regarding H1, for example, it has throughout this chapter, become apparent that it was indispensable for Allawi and the INA to possess direct access to government leads in all the countries they operated in. In fact, if it had not been for the linkage to and indeed facilitation from State actors, from Saudi Arabia, to Jordan, Britain, and finally the US, the organisation might not have come into existence in the first place or would have been forced to stand on very weak legs indeed. Indeed, Allawi, like all the other Iraqi exile organisations, would not have been able to achieve his objective of liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein's role. To be sure, the INA possessed relationships to Government elites inside Iraq, independent of her Western and Arab supporters. After all, this constituted one of

the key advantages that she was able to bring to the table in the relationship with the CIA. These contacts notwithstanding, however, access to government elites in the Western and Arab worlds represented the *conditio sine non qua* for her ability to operate at all. This realisation, it seems, might have also been behind her apparent willingness to be supervised by the CIA. Before therefore confirming H1, however, one must add another important qualifier, namely, that the INA possessed better and more trusted access to some government elites in the US (CIA and, to a lesser extent the State Department), whilst lacking this linkage to other state actors (the Pentagon). H1 can thus be confirmed.

In light of the analysis put forward over the course of the chapter, it has, in the case of H2, been revealed that the INA did indeed manage to fill a foreign policy vacuum. This vacuum, after all, was created after the end of Desert Storm when the USG refused to entertain any other policy towards Iraq other than supporting coups and imposing sanctions - with the explicit goal of, if not removing, at least containing the regime of Saddam Hussein. Yet, there would be no normal relations with Iraq until this latter objective would have been achieved. The existence of severe hostilities and the looming threat of war only widened this very vacuum and the INA, with the support of her patrons, came to regard it as a fruitful habitat in which she could play her role, embedded in the wider strategic objective of US foreign policy and her particular state patron, the CIA. This vacuum was subsequently filled jointly by Allawi and the US – after regime change had successfully been implemented, the continued presence of US troops and their immunity from Iraq's judicial system ensured, the creation of the country's new intelligence organisation implemented under American supervision, and the transition of CPA laws and regulations into the legal foundation of the new Iraq safeguarded. H2 might thus be confirmed as well.

The hypothesis that non-state actors engage successfully in foreign policy-making because they are less accountable in the state they operate in might also be confirmed. Although the nature of the INA changed over time, transitioning from an NSA to a nominal state actor, the type of accountability, namely, plausible deniability for the actions of others, remained. After the end of Desert Storm, when the USG was unwilling to commit significant military resources to the removal and

replacement of Saddam Hussein, a clandestine alliance with an Iraqi exile organisation provided the Bush Senior and Clinton administrations with plausible deniability in the pursuance of their foreign policy goals of removing Saddam's regime. This seems to be particularly true for the CIA-supervised bombing campaign the INA conducted inside Iraq. Later, as already extensively outlined above, when Allawi had been appointed PM, it was hoped to solve the 'Curzon dilemma'. At the time when the formal occupation had become a prolonged, deeply unpopular reality, it was realised that one would have to indeed divert accountability from the CPA, an occupying power of the USG, to an Iraqi-led government, at least accountable in name and *de jure* to the Iraqi people. However, PM Allawi and his carefully selected interim administration would still be accountable to, even dependent on, the USG. Interestingly, the anointing of Allawi as PM is an example of an NSA deliberately being transformed into a state actor operating under the condition of dependence. Seen from this perspective, as a state actor the INA's biggest advantage was not its lack of accountability but precisely the opposite. Whilst nominal power would continue to reside in the hands of the US, there now was an Arab facade in place, who would be regarded as being accountable for whatever might befall in Iraq. In short, less accountable *compared to the CPA*, Allawi and the INA were purposefully turned into nominal state actors, which would, in comparison, carry *more* supposed accountability vis-à-vis the international community and the Iraqi public.

All of the above has demonstrated the impact that America's partnership with the INA has had on Iraq. Confronted in 2010 with the charge that he was being referred to as 'Saddam Lite', supposedly a 'compliment in a country where strong leadership is often prized above all else', Allawi, 'flashing the wolfish grin that has led some to liken him to an Iraqi Tony Soprano', does confirm that 'I have been called that (…) But I believe in democracy, and I only went after the outlaws. The main function of government is to ensure the rule of law, and if you don't have that, you can forget any stability or progress'[1110]. As a testimony of how lasting American support for Iraqi exile groups, such as the INA, has been, it would, in February 2020, fall to Iyad's cousin, Mohammed Allawi, as newly appointed PM,

[1110] Freeman, "Why Ayad Allawi Is Iraq's Greatest Political Survivor."

to look after this very rule of law that his uncle had helped the US to introduce in Iraq at the dawn of this century.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

This thesis investigated the involvement of non-state actors (NSAs) in foreign policy decision-making processes in the Western and non-Western world in order to find answers to questions of why, how, and under what conditions such actors become engaged in foreign policy-making and influence state behaviour. Based on primary empirical evidence, gathered through extensive field research, it has offered an exclusive and original set of data, obtained mainly by interviews with high-profile decision-makers and key representatives of both state and non-state actors in all the chosen countries. The dissertation's empirical material was organised around three hypotheses and according to an organically developed conceptual framework, which allowed for an unprecedented insight into the *modus operandi* of different NSAs. In pursuance of this, this study has also sought to contribute to a necessary analytical diversification away from a certain prevailing Western-centrism in the scholarly literature on foreign policy. Taking into account the respective conclusions each chapter has been able to draw from the empirical data, it is worth to once again reflect on these inferences holistically and in conjunction with the presented hypotheses. Having done so, we can then proceed to discuss their wider implications.

Overall, we can observe a mixed outcome compared to what we initially expected. Some hypotheses could be confirmed, others unexpectedly falsified. The assertion that NSAs engage successfully in foreign-policy making if they possess direct access to government elites in the country they operate in (H1), could, in the case of PAJCCI (Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry), be confirmed. Nonetheless, one might raise the question of precisely what type of government elite an NSA has to have access to. As highlighted in the case of the Western subcontractor CIPE (Center for International Private Enterprise), temporarily working with PAJCCI, if an organisation does not have access to or does not enjoy the trust of the security establishment, in a country such as Pakistan - especially after the so-called NGO legislations were passed in 2015 - it will find

it very difficult indeed if not impossible to operate in such countries. In this context, it would certainly be interesting, as part of a future study, to compare and contrast the ability of NSAs to operate in countries like Pakistan before and after the introduced NGO legislations. What is more, it should also be highlighted that it was not just access to formal government elites per se but rather the informal and implicit contact with members of the Pakistani deep state, who were not formally part of the government structure but aided and facilitated PAJCCI's conduct in foreign policy. In this light, it appears imperative to deepen serious scholarship into the deep state concept - particularly through the tools that qualitative research offers. In this context, it is also worth reminding ourselves, as Ledeneva points out, that the line between formal and informal positions of power and hierarchies is blurred[1111]. What is more, it seems imperative for policy-makers to acknowledge that 'in societies where formal institutions do not work to their full potential and where people rely on informal ways of getting things done, the leadership is bound to rely on the use of informal instruments as well'[1112]. Indeed, such empirical insights demonstrate the value, which studies concerning networks and informality can bring to bear in an analysis of temporary foreign policy.

In the case of the INA (Iraqi National Accord), the case appears to be more straightforward. Without her government patrons, from the Government of Saudi Arabia at the hour of her creation, to the British and American governments, the INA would surely have had no basis for existence, let alone the necessary resources to conduct its operations. Due to this dependence, the cooperation followed the motto of 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'. However, viewed through the Bureaucratic Politics Model lens, the case study has revealed that those very government elites are not necessarily monolithic. Indeed, we were able to observe how two very similar NSAs, the INA and the INC (Iraqi National Congress), and the respective groups government of elites they were aligned with, found themselves in a fierce competition. In fact, the concerned government agencies, with CIA and the State Department on one side of the isle and the Pentagon on the other, were determined to promote and facilitate their favourite or rather chosen NSA in the overall foreign policy decision-making process.

[1111] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*
[1112] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*

Finally, the GOC (Georgian Orthodox Church) appeared to present the exception from the rule that an NSA requires contact to government elites in order to become successfully involved in foreign policy-making. Indeed, whilst both PAJCCI and the INA very much depended on access to state actors, the Church did not require access to the Government of Georgia. Although possessing it, she made it a point not to seek access to such actors in her own country, thereby demonstrating her autonomy and influence as an NSA. Instead, she was able to tap into a pre-existing channel of communication with the Russian church and state and use the same in the pursuance of her own agenda. H1 might thus be seen as partially falsified by this case study as the GOC could engage successfully in foreign policy-making *although* it did not need to have direct access to government elites in Georgia. Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that she could have ensured this access easily. She did, however, require access to government and church elites in Russia to ensure that her bridge-building activities could be maintained.

Having said this, the initial expectation that NSAs *will come to fill a vacuum in foreign policy-making when bilateral cooperation is difficult among given countries* (H2), can, in all three case studies be confirmed. Indeed, this appears to be a crucial condition for NSA involvement in foreign policy and demonstrates that whenever there are areas or issues in which the state is unable or unwilling to act, operational space opens up for NSAs to seize. The role played by PACCI has demonstrated this vividly. Of course, it always depends on the roles, conditions and operational forms, which the involved NSAs assume, to assess what sort of influence and impact they can have on the bilateral relations. The GOC, an autonomous Entrepreneur, assumed the role of a hijacker and seized the existing vacuum to pursue policies, contrary to the preferences of her own government. In the case of US-Iraqi relations, the USG (United States Government) had no interest in mending ties with Saddam Hussein's Iraq but rather sought to fill the existing vacuum between the two countries with a more agreeable Iraqi government. In order to achieve this, the INA was accordingly supported. The employment of NSAs by governments when their bilateral relations are difficult does thus not necessarily mean that the intentions behind it are benign and intended to 'avert

conflict or at least converting it into a measure of cooperation[1113]', as Slaughter seems to hope. One might thus conclude that it ultimately depends on reasons for why relations have become difficult, or the type of conflict between the involved states, whether there can be a vacuum for NSAs to seize and accordingly in what form. What is more, another apparent implication is that governments in contemporary foreign policy are in some instances not interested in tapping into the traditional bilateral channels in the first place but prefer to circumvent those in favour of a foreign policy approach that would have NSAs involved alongside these channels.

Finally, it seems that the hypothesis asserting that *non-state actors engage successfully in foreign policy-making because they are less accountable in the state they operate in* (H3) constitutes a key factor in all three examined case studies – each with their own distinct manifestation of this perhaps indispensable by-product of NSA activity. The common denominator of the INA and PAJCCI might perhaps be best referred to as plausible deniability – offered to those willing and able to employ NSAs in their foreign policy decision-making processes. A revealing comparison in this regard is PAJCCI vis-à-vis the GOC. Both NSAs are Entrepreneurs but the Chamber appeared very well aware that her nominal autonomy (independent resources, a loose regulatory and monitoring framework at the time of her creation, and her own agenda) and the actions she accordingly took made her nonetheless accountable to the intelligence services of Pakistan. Indeed, the lack of accountability she enjoyed vis-à-vis other constituencies must be understood as 'plausible deniability' – a feature, which made her 'enlistment' by Pakistan's *derin devlet* in its Afghan policy all the more attractive. In the Georgian case, on the other hand, lack of both political and legal accountability the GOC enjoyed vis-à-vis its own home government appeared to be the key reason for her autonomy and ability to hijack the foreign policy process. The Church felt responsible to 'God and the nation' only and would not be held accountable for her actions by any earthly power. Interestingly, both Russia and Afghanistan clearly represented essential national security problems and yet the GOC was clearly able to operate more freely and was less accountable vis-à-vis the powers that be in her

[1113] Slaugther, *The Chessboard and the Web.*

own countries. One might therefore assert that there are NSAs and then there are NSAs. On the whole, however, we can, as expected, confidently confirm that NSAs engage successfully in foreign policy-making because they are less accountable in the state they operate in.

Naturally, all of the above naturally raises questions about the implications of these findings for our understanding of foreign policy, IR as a discipline, and potential future avenues of research. Overall, it seems, as it does so often in the study of IR, that the elephant in the room is the state and its role, shape, and conduct in global affairs. In this regard, the dissertation does indeed offer mixed results and paints a complex picture, displaying the immense complexity of contemporary foreign policy and the environment decision-makers, state or non-state, are embedded in. This very complexity is being more and more recognised – by scholars and policy-makers alike. After all, as Jan Zielonka remarked at his Farewell Conference on February 17th, 2020: 'I have never said that the state is obsolete, but I have always said that there is more than just the state'. Indeed, to reduce our analysis of international affairs and foreign policy merely to what states or trans-governmental networks 'do' is, as Ferguson accurately points out, 'to overlook its profound transformation by the proliferation of informal networks in the past forty years'[1114] – a growth, which has only accelerated since the dawn of the 21st century. It should be underlined here that in the thought- and writing process of this thesis, which began with an MPhil thesis on Western NSAs operating in Pakistan, I discovered the literature on networks and informality at a very late stage. Yet, it soon dawned on me that I might have written on networks and informal governance all along – without realising it. After all, as Maurer emphasises, 'there has always been a trend in diplomacy towards 'networked diplomacy', in which the connectivity and the capacity to orchestrate the network matter, rather than the available set of material resources'[1115]. Yet, what are the conclusions we draw from these insights? For Ferguson, the dialectical relationship between (informal) networks and states resembles an antagonistic one. A struggle between 'Pentarchy' vs 'Cyberia'. For him, 'whether or not these five great powers [the P5] can make common cause once again [against agents of networks], as their predecessors did in

[1114] Ferguson, *The Square and the Tower*, p. 395.
[1115] Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad."

the nineteenth century, is the great geopolitical question of our time'[1116]. However, in the light of the findings of this thesis, one wonders whether states do necessarily have to come out on top or do necessarily have an interest in asserting their supremacy over the realm of informal networks – the natural habitat of NSAs? Does this dialectic have to be antagonistic? Can the syntheses arising out of their co-existence not take different forms and shapes? After all, the literature on medievalism and empires[1117] teaches us that the constellations we are witnessing on the global stage, and have been able to observe in this thesis, have always been there – although they might be dwarfed by the sheer multiplicity of actors and the degree of complexity of today's world. Against this backdrop, it does indeed appear that IR and foreign policy scholars will be faced with the question of how 'formal unitary state relations coexist and/or conflict with relations among parts of states in the informal sector'[1118]. The realm of NSA activities in global affairs, the political equivalent of a vast informal economy, it seems, can only be neglected at our own analytical peril.

What then are the lessons we can draw regarding the study, understanding, and conceptualisation of contemporary foreign policy? On the whole, it seems that the role of states and their governments on the global stage is indeed more complicated than sometimes depicted by a significant part of realist literature. As this dissertation has shown, a great variety of other actors is being enlisted and instrumentalised by states – and in some instances, such actors are even able to turn the table and have state actors work on their behalf. Put differently, foreign policy initiatives do not necessarily have to be initiated by government representatives. And even when state actors are the authors, their initiatives could either be enhanced or facilitated, spoiled, or even vetoed by elements outside the formal government organisational structure – depending on the type of relationship the respective NSAs entertain with states. Some of these NSAs do not resemble state actors in the slightest and do not operate along the same logic as states – sometimes precisely because they do not recognise an all too rigid assumption about domestic and foreign and operate in different spaces, with different decision-making structures

[1116] Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad.", p. 423.
[1117] Zielonka, *Europe As Empire*; Zielonka, "Empires and the Modern International System."
[1118] Slaughter, *A New World Order*.

and rationales altogether. In this light, the notion of 'hybridity' appears to rank most prominently in the guiding imperatives for our analysis of foreign policy today. Undertaking such 'linking and blurring [of] the boundaries'[1119] between state and non-state naturally opens up a vast 'grey area'[1120] within which traditional and non-traditional foreign policy actors are involved in a variety of foreign policy processes and practices. In other words, the study of foreign policy necessitates broadening the scope of analysis in order to open up an avenue of inquiry in which the role and involvement of NSAs *and* states can be accounted for. As we have learned, for example in the case of religious NSAs, this is not a mere theoretical consideration. After all, the 2015 Anglo-American 'Toward Religion-attentive Foreign Policy' report calls for 'the urgent need for the FCO to develop a 'religion-attentive' diplomacy', which engages religious actors and develops an understanding of 'the various international models of religion-state relationship and the way this influences public policy', emphasising that 'scholars have much to contribute to filling this knowledge gap'[1121]. Once again, it should be highlighted that one of the implications of adding a broad, 'networked perspective' to the analysis of foreign policy is certainly that in order for states to be successful in the contemporary world, governments will have to take the environment in which they find themselves in into consideration – and this very 'grey area' represents a habitat in which a multitude of NSAs reside.

In the light of the conclusions drawn from the empirical chapters, one can once justifiably assert that this thesis' embrace of 'hybridity', with its 'linking and blurring [of] the boundaries'[1122], in conjunction with its focus on the non-Western world underlines the need to call into question rigid notions entailing a dichotomy between formal (legitimate) and informal (illegitimate) diplomacy. To be sure, informal arrangements can be problematic in the international as well as in the domestic political realm, especially if they deliberately serve to undermine the rule of law or democratic procedures. At the same time, the empirical chapters, analysing hybrid foreign policy in the non-Western world, have shed analytical light on the 'grey area' where hybrid diplomacy is the norm. This allows us to treat

[1119] Maurer et al., Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad."
[1120] Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad."
[1121] Birdsall, et al., "The State Department's Great Leap Faithward."
[1122] Maurer et al., "European Cooperation Abroad.",

informal arrangements, even the 'machinations' of a state within a state, as 'normal' and indispensable in certain countries – and even beneficial in attaining the desired objective, which in and of themselves do not have to be nefarious in their intent. Perhaps it was this very geographic focus which has allowed us to conclude that informal actions - whether initiated by a formal government agency, an NSA, members of a deep state, or a combination of all these entities - do not necessarily have to be autocratic, pathological or illegitimate but rather constitute the way 'things are done' – sometimes even more effectively than formal, seemingly more legitimate, state-driven practices. In other words, these insights suggest that 'hybridity' should be welcomed rather than viewed or evaluated through a rigid normative prism. After all, networked diplomacy and informality can sometimes be more efficient than more formal and therefore supposedly legitimate forms of diplomacy. State actors, who acknowledge this reality, would do well not to shirk away from engaging in hybrid diplomacy, even if this does not allow them to go through the 'proper channels'.

Having said this and the benefits of a more 'networked' foreign policy analysis notwithstanding, some eternal truths of Realism, including the Thucydides rule, do, of course, remain: just as there are more powerful states and less powerful ones, there are more influential and less influential NSAs. It appears, for example, that some states possess powerful intelligence service, accustomed to navigating and operating through the NSA nexus and therefore able to assume the 'monitoring function of *smotryashchie* (the watchers) [which are so] central for informal governance'[1123], whilst others do not. One of the core lessons to draw from this thesis is thus, it seems, that it will be those states and those NSAs, which are capable of recognising and indeed utilising and 'exploiting' the complex environment they are embedded in, which will, to draw once again on Ledeneva, achieve 'the mastery of the rules of the game'. Such actors will be the 'leaders' in conducting foreign policy in this century – but 'leaders can only be leaders once they master and control informal [and, one might add, formal] networks [simultaneously]'[1124].

[1123] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*
[1124] Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise?*

Of course, some states seem to have already grasped these imperatives and appear determined to align their strategies accordingly. As the US National Intelligence Council's 2016 Global Trends Report outlines: 'managing global issues will become harder as actors multiply—to include NGOs, corporations, and empowered individuals—resulting in more ad hoc, fewer encompassing efforts (…) The most powerful actors of the future will be states, groups, and individuals who can leverage material capabilities, relationships, and information in a more rapid, integrated, and adaptive mode than in generations past (...) The most powerful entities will induce states—as well as corporations, social or religious movements, and some individuals—to create webs of cooperation across issues, while exhibiting depth and balance across their material, relational, and informational capabilities. Sustaining outcomes will require a constant tending to relationships'[1125]. As an ever-more complex and rapidly changing world is entering into an era of heightening US-Sino rivalries across the globe, it will be fascinating and indeed imperative to analyse who is going to be able to assess, harness, combine, and ultimately utilise the potential of state *and* non-state actor capacities in their foreign policy decision-making processes.

[1125] US National Intelligence Council, *Paradox Of Progress*.

Bibliography

List of Interviews conducted by the author

Name, Position, Location, Date

Abashidze, Zurab Special Representative of the Prime Minister of Georgia for Relations with the Russian Federation, Tbilisi, June 24th, 2019.

Abbasi, **Javed** Senator of the Senate of Pakistan, Chairman Committee Law and Justice. Islamabad, September 9th, 2016.

Abbasi, **Shahid Khaqan** Former Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad, September 1st, 2019.

Aftab, **Junaid** Senior Program Officer International Republican Institute Pakistan. Islamabad, September 26th, 2016.

Ahmed, Ishaq Brigadier Pakistan Army (Retd.), Islamabad, August 23rd, 2019.

AliKhan, **Faiysal** Member PAJCCI, CEO PESCO (Pvt) Ltd., Member ICC Pakistan National Committee, Islamabad, September 1st, 2019.

Alvi, **Itrat** Ministry of Finance Pakistan, Economic Affairs Division. Islamabad, September 21st 2016.

Badat, Babar Chairman Pakistan National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce (PNC-ICC), President International Federation of Global Logistics Associations (FIATA), Chairman, Transhold Pvt Limited, Islamabad, August 29th, 2019.

Chaudhry, Tanvir Khan, Senator of the Senate of Pakistan. Committee on Interior and Narcotics Control. Islamabad, September 9th, 2016.

Chaudhry, **Danyal** Advisor to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Islamabad/Rawalpindi, August 31st, 2016.

Durrani, **Mohammad Asad** 3-Star Rank General in the Pakistan Army (Rtd.), Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Director General Military Intelligence (MI), Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Germany and Saudi Arabia. Islamabad, January 16th, 2019.

Faiza Executive Director Pakistan Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PAJCCI), January 20th, 2019.

Faulkner, **Jon** Director Adam Smith International Pakistan. Islamabad, September 21st, 2016.

Former Government Official, Islamabad, August 31st, 2019.

Former Senior US diplomat closely involved in working with the Iraqis and CPA during the period of transition from CPA to the INA, Germany, August 10th, 2020.

Gegechkori, Sofia Public Affairs Officer, Embassy of Georgia in the United States of America, Washington D.C., May 9th, 2019.

Gill, **Shaheryar** Senior Litigation Counsel, American Centre for Law and Justice. Virginia Beach, VA, June 23rd, 2016.

Gillani, **Yousaf Raza** Former Prime Minister of Pakistan. Islamabad, September 22nd, 2016.

Giorgadze, Mamuka Member of Parliament, Liberty Party, Soviet Dissident, Tbilisi, June 19th, 2019.

Gul, Imtiaz Chairman, Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Islamabad. Islamabad, January 16th, 2019.

Hammeed, **Maiza** Member of the National Assembly (PML-N) and Senior Vice President of the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N). Islamabad, 29th September, 2016.

Herbertson, **Judith** Deputy Head of Department For International Development Pakistan. Islamabad, 28th September, 2016.

Hashmi, **Nehal** Senator of the Senate of Pakistan, Oversight Committee and Parliamentary Affairs Committee. September 9th, 2016.

Jaffar, **Chaudhry Muhammad Omar** Member Provincial Assembly of the Province of the Punjab, Rahimyar Khan. Islamabad, September 14th, 2016.

Javed, **Momsin** Senior Assistant Program Officer International Republican Institute (IRI) Pakistan. Islamabad, September 26th, 2016.

Kalandadze, Nino Deputy Foreign Minister of Georgia, Administration of President Saakashvili, Tbilisi, Georgia, June 24th, 2019.

Kamal, **Mohsin** Attorney-at Law with the Senate of Pakistan. Islamabad, September, 29th 2016.

Kicklighter, Claude M. Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of State for Stabilization and Security Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Director of the Department of Defense's Iraq Transition Team, Commander of the United States Army Western Command (United States Army Pacific), Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning, Department of Veterans Affairs, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs. Washington D.C., October 25th, 2019.

Kleinschmidt, **Kilian** Senior Emergency Coordinator, UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Islamabad (2006-07); Assistant Representative (Durable Solutions), UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

Islamabad (2010); Deputy to the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for Assistance to Pakistan, UN Department For Political Affairs, Pakistan (2010); Senior Advisor and Acting Deputy Representative, UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Islamabad (2011-2011). Innsbruck, July 26th, 2016.

Knop, **Almut** First Secretary Development, Head of Cooperation German Embassy Islamabad. Islamabad, September 1st, 2016.

Knowles, Andrea, Country Director International Republican Institute Pakistan. Islamabad, September 26th, 2016.

Malik, **Asif Yasin** Major General, Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Director Joint Intelligence and Information Operations, Commander 11 Corps. Islamabad, September 16th, 2016.

Malik, **Musadik** Spokesperson of the Prime Minister. Islamabad, September 30th, 2016.

Member Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Washington DC, April 9th, 2020.

Member CIPE, Center for International Private Enterprise, Director of Development and Partnerships. Washington D.C., May 13th, 2019.

Mikeladze, Malkhaz Director Department of Relations with Neighbouring Countries and Regions**,** Tbilisi, June 25th, 2019.

Motiwala, **Zubair** Chairman PAJCCI, Pakistan, August 30th, 2019.

Nadeem, Ahmad Manager Communication and Outreach Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy, Islamabad, August 16th, 2019.

Plattner, Marc National Endowment for Democracy, Former Director of Program, Advisor on Economic and Social Affairs at the United States Mission to the United Nations**,** Washington D.C., May 14th, 2019.

Rangoonwala, Tariq Chairman International Chamber of Commerce Pakistan**,** Chairman of the ZVMG Rangoonwala Trust and the Rangoonwala Group of Companies**,** Islamabad, August 28th, 2019.

Raisani, Nawab Muhammad Aslam four times elected Member of the Provincial Assembly of the Province of Baluchistan and Chief Minister of Balochistan from April 2008 until January 2013. Islamabad, September 20th, 2016.

Raja, **Falak** Financial Analyst Leader for Performance Evaluation of International NGOs Working in Pakistan. Islamabad, August 31st, 2016.

Saba, **Intskirveli** The Ruling Bishop of Georgian Diocese in North America, Philadelphia, May 19th, 2019.

Sadiq, Ayaz Speaker of the National Assembly of Pakistan. Berlin, July 4th, 2016.

Sadiq, **Nuzhat** Senator of the Senate of Pakistan, Chairman Foreign Relations Committee. Islamabad, September 9th, 2016. September 9th, 2016.

Senior Member INA, London, February 18th, 2020.

Senior Member Coalition Provisional Authority, United States of America, September 13th, 2019.

Senior Member The Secret Intelligence Service, M16, London, March 5th, 2020.

Senior Member US Embassy Baghdad, Germany, April 3rd, 2020.

Senior Member Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), August 31st, 2019.

Shah, **Muzzaffar Hussain** Senator of the Senate of Pakistan, Former Chief Minister Sindh. Islamabad, September 9th, 2016.

Shahi, **Mir Kabeer Ahmed Muhammad** Senator of the Senate of Pakistan, Senate Chairman, Senate Committee Devolution Process. Islamabad, September 9th, 2016.

Soomro, Muhammad Mian Current Minister of Privatisation, Former President of Pakistan, Former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Former Chairman of the Senate of Pakistan, Former Governor of Sindh Province, Former President of the National Bank of Pakistan, Former General Manager and Chief Executive Officer of International Bank of Yemen. Rawalpindi, January 20th, 2019.

Source in the Ministry of Interior. Islamabad, September 20th, 2016.

Tirmizi, **Syed Salahuddin** Senator of the Senate of Pakistan, Lt. General, Chairman Pakistan-Germany Friendship Group. Islamabad, September 9th, 2016.

Tsatsanashvili, Mariam Parliamentary Secretary to President Eduard Shevardnadze, Tbilisi, June 14th, 2019.

Tviadadze, Giorgi Rector Tbilisi Theological Academy and Seminary, Tbilisi, June 25th, 2019.

US Official, Embassy of the United States of America Islamabad. Islamabad, September 22nd, 2016.

Wilkerson, **Lawrence B.** Secretary of State Colin Powell's Chief of Staff, Associate Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, Special Assistant to General Powell when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington D.C., October 23rd, 2019.

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