SUETONIUS ON THE EMPEROR:

STUDIES IN THE REPRESENTATION OF THE EMPEROR

IN THE CAESARS

by

A. F. WALLACE-HADRILL

VOL I

Thesis submitted for the degree of D.Phil.
in the Michaelmas Term 1979 (ie 1980)
Volume II

Notes to Chapters I–X 1

Bibliography 102

Abstract 109
Although no general study of Suetonius has appeared since Macé's of 1900*, it is not my purpose here to fill that gap. This study is intended as an essay in historiographical interpretation. A valuable clue to the understanding of any society lies in what it makes of its past. In the Caesars Suetonius looks back over the lives of twelve men who had played a central role in shaping the society of his day: what does he make of them? The purpose of these pages is to look at the way Suetonius portrays a series of emperors and to find what light is cast on contemporary conceptions of the Emperor and his place in society.

Such a study inevitably must be deeply indebted to the work over the last two decades by Fergus Millar. From examination of the behaviour of individual rulers over a span of four centuries, he has extrapolated a type of 'the Emperor', and in so doing, has presented a challenging reinterpretation of the emperor's role and function. A study of Suetonius' 'Emperor', is concerned with a related problem, but approaches from a somewhat different angle. Millar's emperor is what he does, or what he is expected to do. Suetonius' emperor exists only in the mind (or the writings) of one man. The portrayal of an object (or a series of objects) must be affected by a whole range of factors: the intellectual and literary tradition in which the author moves, his social status, his occupation, the quirks of his personal experience and cast of mind. There

* For bibliographical conventions see note at head of Bibliography.
can be no hope of extrapolating a 'true' picture of 'what the emperor was'; not even of establishing a universally valid picture of what the emperor was expected to be at the time of writing. Rather the aim is to come to an understanding of why Suetonius saw or represented his 'emperor' as he does.

As there are various kinds of factor that affected the author, so there are three broad divisions to my investigation, summarised as the 'literary' (Part A), the 'social' (Part B), and the 'ideological' (Part C) contexts. Under the first the biographical form of the Caesars is considered. The aim here is not to construct a literary pedigree, but to estimate the relative importance of literary tradition and of the author's conception of the emperor. Does the form dictate the way in which an emperor is portrayed, or does his understanding of what an emperor is dictate the form? Under the 'social context' the part played by the author's personal background is examined. Here my concern is above all to make sense of the viewpoint of the scholar and equestrian secretary. The final context is labelled (with some reservations) as the 'ideological'. Ideals of what an emperor should and should not be had a life of their own, especially under the guise of 'imperial virtues'. Here I attempt to set the 'virtues' and 'vices' met in Suetonius in the context of Roman and pre-Roman 'ideology'. Since there is much preliminary work to be done before the context can be understood, as I suppose it, rightly, discussion ranges far beyond Suetonius himself.

There are many questions that are not here discussed, not necessarily because they are irrelevant, but because I have nothing new to add, or simply for lack of space. Two omissions in particular may be mentioned.

First, I do not discuss the truth or otherwise of the statements Suetonius makes. His historical reliability is not at issue, and in that
sense the Caesars is treated almost as a work of fiction, somewhat after the fashion in which Paul Veyne treated Petronius. Nevertheless, it is vital to remember that the Caesars is not fiction. The author dealing with historical facts is bound to the facts; only in his judgement of what is plausible and what is important and relevant can he exercise his own imagination and reveal himself or his times.

Closely related to this is the problem of Sources. Here again I omit discussion; yet it is clear that a historical writer's judgement of the plausible and relevant must be affected by the judgements of those who had handled the same material before him. I hope that I have never lost sight of this fact. The justification for lack of explicit discussion lies in the scale and difficulty of the undertaking. Comparison of Tacitus, Cassius Dio, Plutarch and Suetonius has long since demonstrated the existence of a common historiographical tradition behind them, homogeneous to an extent hardly to be expected of a similar set of modern sources. But the features of individual authors within this tradition are notoriously hard to establish. I have therefore taken 'the tradition' for granted as an undifferentiated amalgam; and in drawing comparisons and contrasts between Suetonius and other surviving historians, I have avoided pressing specific points, where hidden 'sources' may be responsible, and concentrated on what is generally observable in the authors' approaches.

One final omission is worth comment. Debate still rages over the literary qualities of Suetonius. At one extreme he is dismissed as a 'blosser Tatsachensammler'; at the other he is hailed as an 'artist', 'un vero scrittore'. I do not here join battle; yet a point of view will emerge in the following pages, and in one respect the question is fundamental. The traditional hostility to and contempt for Suetonius may be summed up in the judgement of Benedetto Croce (Quaderni della Critica
14, 1949, 16): 'Si rimane con l'impressione che Svetonio avesse bensì accumulato notizie molteplici e di varia fonte e di varia autenticità, ma non sapesse egli stesso che cose pensare di Caligola, e perciò si desse a versare sui lettori il corno d'abbondanza di quelle notizie'.

If this is right, any study of Suetonius' views is doomed to failure, for he can have had none.

Such contempt for Suetonius seems to me unjustified;* yet one need not go to the opposite extreme in putting a high valuation on the Caesars as a 'work of art'. In doing so, Steidle and his followers seem to me to miss some of the most valuable insights of scholars like Macé, Funaioli (1947) and Paratore (1959). The approach of Suetonius is palpably that of the scholar and antiquarian; he operates with detail, minute and often petty or sordid. Drama, pathos and deep political or psychological penetration are missing. Yet this is not to condemn the author. Trivial detail is the stuff of biography, and Suetonius' strength lies precisely in its accumulation, vivid and authentic. Where the detail is thinnest, and the generalisation most impassioned and facile, in the 'tyrant' Lives, the author is at his weakest. That the profusion of detail does not issue formless from the cornucopia Steidle has shown. Whether or not it adds up to a picture of the emperor of any degree of coherence or value is the problem to which the following pages are addressed.

* For the reasons for Croce's distaste, see Piero Treves, 'Biografia e storia in Svetonio', preface to Svetonio: Vita dei Cesari (Milan 1962), 5ff. I am grateful to the author for sending me an offprint of this piece.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Over the years, my work has involved others in considerable sacrifice of time. Without seeking to incriminate, I would express my consciousness of debt to the following scholars: E. L. Bowie, Prof. J. Classen, M. H. Crawford, Prof. J. A. Crook, Prof. A. Dihle, Prof. F. Millar, O. Murray, S. R. F. Price, D. A. Russell, A. N. Sherwin-White, and D. R. Walker. I owe an especial debt to the patience of Prof. P. A. Brunt. No less is my debt to two typists. My wife gave up her summer to the first draft. Mrs Jan Chapman typed the present version; I only wish that what I have written deserved the spotless elegance of her typing.

Magdalene College, Cambridge

1 December 1979

A. F. W.-H.
PART A

THE LITERARY CONTEXT
Chapter I

The Portrayal of the Emperor

1. The rubric: weaknesses and strengths.

"Proposita vitae eius velut summa, partes singillatim neque per tempora sed per species exequar, quo distinctius demonstrari cognoscique possint." (Aug. 9)

The one feature that sets Suetonius' Caesars apart, for better or for worse, from other ancient writings is the rubric. Presentation of material κατὰ γένος was long known as an alternative to that κατὰ χρόνον. But no historian and no biographer ever pursued an arrangement by subject matter with such dedication, or shunned the chronological with such determination. Every reader of the Lives has seen this; even Suetonius' first imitators, the biographers of later emperors (though their imitation of his method was at best partial). To explain this phenomenon in terms of literary history was the raison d'être of Leo's study of ancient biography, the watershed of modern scholarship on Suetonius. The rubric has remained at the centre of Suetonian scholarship since then; this study in its turn moves from this phenomenon.

But the rubric, so long familiar, is better known for its failings than for its advantages. Many of the disadvantages are real. The historian is first frustrated by the chronological obscurity that results from the dismemberment of the customary annalistic structure. Here the complaint is against fate rather than the author. It is the chance of transmission that has deprived us of the annalistic works on which Suetonius drew; and there can be no justification for supposing that the Caesars was intended as a substitute for traditional histories, rather than as an addition to them. A standard disclaimer that could well have featured in his lost preface was that the biographer was no
historian. 4

More compelling is the argument that the rubric system is directly responsible for distortions of the material that seriously affect its historical reliability. 5 The rubric attempts to establish generalisations: it is a temptation to which Suetonius too often succumbs to speak of a single event as if it were a practice (thus we may reasonably doubt whether girls other than the daughter of Sejanus were raped by the executioner: Tib.61,5). Complicated situations are oversimplified to fit a heading, and items are divorced from their circumstances (the Great Fire, financial crisis, the persecution of the Christians, the rebuilding of the city and the Domus Aurea appear as isolated items, Ner.39; 32,1; 16,2; 16,1; 31,1-2). Possible motivations that do not fit the rubric are suppressed, and indeed alternative and incompatible variants may appear separately under separate rubrics. There are even plain errors of fact, which a chronological narrative would have avoided (Tiberius is depicted before his accession as made anxious by the conspiracies of subsequent years; 25,1). These failings and more are undesirable side-effects of the method Suetonius chose; the moral is that the historian should never treat an item from the Lives as if it came from the Annals. Yet to point out side-effects is not to show that the treatment has failed in its own purpose.

Criticism touches a more sensitive nerve in suggesting that the system prevents an adequate depiction of the complexities of a personality. 6 If human nature were static, an analytical approach on the model of Theophrastus' Characters would be ideal. But men do not always act in the same way; perhaps because circumstances change, perhaps because men themselves change, perhaps because human personality is ultimately too contradictory to rationalise. The author cannot be blamed for
innocence of post-Freudian analysis; but he can be compared with his contemporaries. The biographer's Tiberius is far cruder than that of the annalistic tradition on which he draws: dissimulation is mentioned (42,1) but never offers the key to the understanding of the man, as in Tacitus and Dio. Rubricisation is again to blame. Here criticism is just; but in part is exaggerated, and in part misdirected. Suetonius does of course allow for contradictory behaviour within his rubric-system. The good side and the bad may be separated off, as notably with the 'tyrants' Nero and Caligula; but the discussions of Augustus' private life (68-78) or Vespasian's financial dealings (16-19) offer splendid examples of how effective the rubric method could be precisely in assembling contradictory evidence and weighing it. The inadequacies of the 'tyrannical' Julio-Claudian Lives should not all be attributed to the system: prejudice and haste are perhaps more serious faults here, and we miss both the documentation of the Augustus and the impartiality of the Domitian. It is an apter criticism of the system to argue that only by chronological narrative in the style of Plutarch can personality be convincingly portrayed. But here again less than justice is done to Suetonius' aims. The presentation and interpretation of human personality as a whole is not the only task of the biographer. It suits Plutarch with his philosophical interest in Ἴθος; and suits the rhetorically trained Tacitus. But for Suetonius character is at most one aspect of a biography. He manifests none of the interest of a Buchan in the problem of why Augustus' behaviour as emperor was so different from his viciousness as a triumvir (Aug.29 & 51). If one wants to understand Augustus as a personality this is a serious loss; but if the question is only what sort of an emperor Augustus in the event made, it matters little. Suetonius, so it seems to me, is of greater value in answering the second question.
than the first.

The rubric-system, then, is open to grave objections: if one approaches Suetonius for the purposes of literary criticism, they must be made. It will probably be added, on a purely aesthetic level, that categories give a less good 'read' than narrative. Aesthetically Plutarch and Tacitus will be preferred to Suetonius, and for reliability as a 'source' Tacitus and perhaps even Dio allow greater confidence. But for the historian such value-judgements are not enough. Documentation of the ancient world is thin enough already, and no advantage lies in establishing which authors can be most readily jettisoned. The historian wants to know not only what dangers are inherent in this source, but what it can contribute that is distinctive and valuable to the understanding of the ancient world. Has Suetonius with his rubrics anything to offer?

The limitations of ancient historiography are only too familiar: the obsession with military and political narrative, the straightjacket of annalistic form and the confusion of the search for truth with an art-form, part poetry, part rhetoric. To complain of one of the rare sources free of these particular limitations on the grounds that he lacks just these features must involve an element of perversity. Here is an author whose approach is (at its best) scholarly not literary, who wants to improve on his predecessors not in style but in unearthing new facts, who has no qualms about defacing his text with quotations of documents, technical terms, foreign words, and the names of his authorities, and who has no illusions about the dignity of his genre; this much at least is acknowledged to his credit. But as these features are the product of his background as φιλόλογος, so is the devotion to rubrics. The one great advantage of the organisation per species is that it raises
different questions from those in a chronological narrative.

To take an example. The life of Julius as a narrative of the battles of one of the best generals of antiquity is little short of derisory: the Gallic wars are dismissed in one compact paragraph (25). But Suetonius knew that the general's own Commentaries rendered emulation superfluous (56,1-4); and instead he gives an analysis of Julius' generalship. He looks at his personal energy (57), his mixture of caution and daring (58), his attitude to the omens traditionally observed in warfare (59), his strategy in deciding when to engage in battle (60); his personal participation in battle, cutting a figure and setting an example (61-64); his handling of the troops, in training them for action (65), promoting confidence (66), exercising discipline (67,1) and winning their loyalty (67,2). After this, the devotion (68,1-2) and effectiveness (68,3-4) of the Caesarian army is comprehensible, as is the general's own position of (almost) unchallenged authority (69-70). In fact, Suetonius asks what sort of qualities made Caesar the outstanding general of his day; the excellence of his answers stands out in comparison with (for instance) Cicero's rhetorical and unrevealing praise of Pompey's generalship (Imp.Pomp.29-35). Any feeling that the man who turned down a military tribunate (Plin. ep.iii,8) had no understanding of the importance and art of warfare must be dissolved by these chapters. Perhaps it is relevant that the ab epistulis had some responsibility for military promotions (Stat. Silv.v,1,94ff.); but the point here is that it is the rubric system which has permitted an analysis more convincing and more available than anything that could 'emerge' from a narrative. Is this analysis of any use to us? Perhaps the problem is that a modern scholar would prefer to conduct his own analysis of the Commentarii; Suetonius' will have 'dated', like all old scholarship. But what can never 'date'
is the value of the chapters as evidence of what a Roman saw as good
generalship. Their value perhaps becomes clearer in comparison with
the analogous chapters on Augustus (20-25, esp. 24f.). This is an
analysis of the wars of a general whose conquests exceeded even those
of Caesar (21,1); but the qualities recorded are quite different: the
strict maintenance of discipline among officers and troops (24), the
avoidance of Caesarian fraternisation (25,1); the policy of enlistment
(25,2) and of military decorations (25,3); and the criteria for picking
generals (25,4). The contrast between Julius and Augustus shows vividly
Suetonius' understanding of the differences between an imperator in the
republican and the imperial sense: between the dashing and charismatic
commander in the field and the emperor in his function as commander in
chief; responsible for the peace and security of the empire, unambitious
of glory or cheap popularity, observant of the social hierarchy, and
carefully balancing the profit and the loss of each action. We need not
accept this as an analysis of Augustus' military policy. But the questions
he raises remain pertinent; and if we wish to investigate the conception
of the emperor's military role early under Hadrian after the collapse of
Trajan's eastern policy, this is a primary document. 11

As the rubric system allows Suetonius to ask what sort of a general
Julius was, without repeating all the details of his campaigns, so it
allows on a much broader scale the investigation of what sort of an
emperor each of Julius' successors was, again without reiterating the
history of their reigns. Since Millar, the attention of the imperial
historian has focused on the question of what the functions and role of
the Emperor were. The great strength of Suetonius' system is that it
lays out explicitly an answer to a very similar question in setting out
what a series of emperors did, and how they performed. We need not take
the *Caesars* as the ultimate answer on what the Emperor was; but it is a primary document for ancient conceptions of what the Emperor was. We may deny the author originality and intellectual penetration beyond the level of a library cataloguer; but the cataloguing system of a library says something about the educational structure of a university and the cataloguing system of the *Caesars* necessarily says something about what the role of the Emperor was taken to be in the early 2nd century.

That the strength of Suetonius' unusual approach lies in this direction has been observed by the two most important books on the author to appear since Macé. Steidle (1951), especially in his chapter on 'das Römische', saw how the author reflected traditional Roman conceptions of public life and of the points considered important in a public figure;\(^{12}\) della Corte (1958) was more precise, relating the whole approach to Roman society of the Hadrianic age, static not dynamic, bureaucratic not senatorial, more interested in administration than conquest, in order than in liberty.\(^{13}\) Both books were flawed: Steidle's by the excess of his zeal to show Suetonius an artist, della Corte's by a misconception of the relations between senate and the *ordo equester*.\(^{14}\) But their contribution to the understanding of the author was real.

The aim of this study is to develop these approaches. What are the headings Suetonius thinks appropriate to the life of an emperor, what are the patterns of behaviour, good and bad, he considers relevant? What factors, literary, social, personal, ideological, affected his selection? The focus of attention will be on the opportunity provided by the rubric: not the individual remark or judgement made on an emperor en passant, but on the topics that are of persistent concern, recurring in life after life.

The author who undertakes to write biography must necessarily find himself affected by literary conventions of what constitutes a life, what should be said, what omitted. Naturally the way a ruler is depicted will vary from genre to genre: the panegyrist may look for virtues, the public inscription for imposing titulature, the historian for ἡμᾶς ὑπερτόνομχοι; but only the biographer will note that Augustus' teeth were small and rotten (Aug.79,2). If the Caesars are to be examined to find what the author thought an emperor was, the first thing to beware is the part played by literary tradition and the peculiarities of the genre. How far is Suetonius' depiction of a Caesar no more than a depiction of any 'ordinary' man?

The question is made particularly acute by the theories of Leo (1901) on Suetonius' place within the genre. He divided ancient biography into two great streams: the elevated Plutarchian tradition that dealt with the lives of public figures by a fundamentally narrative technique (the 'Peripatetic'); and the unpretentious scholarly tradition, designed for the lives of literary figures, following a dry schema of rubrics (the 'Alexandrian'). The contribution, or the blunder, of Suetonius was to apply the Alexandrian schema to the lives of emperors; his rubric style was inappropriate for such public figures, but he had no option, once embarked, for he lay under the 'Zwang der Gattung'. Leo's structure has since been attacked from all sides: Stuart (1928) and Steidle (1951) argued that Roman traditions, above all the laudatio funebris, meant more to Suetonius than any Greek genre; Plutarch scholars showed that there was more to their author than narrative, rather a cross-current of 'chronologisch' and 'eidologisch'; Momigliano (1971) has stressed how little we know of the so-called 'peripatetics', and the part that the
school of Aristotle played in forming the genre; and Dihle (1954) held that the whole Gattungsfrage had been obsolete long before Steidle's attempt at demolition. Yet though Leo's structure has collapsed as an account of the literary history of the genre, many of his remarks on Suetonius retain their pertinence. He knew Alexandrian and Roman scholarship better than most subsequent writers on Suetonius; he saw absolutely correctly that Suetonius stood in the tradition of the Alexandrians and Varro, and that the Caesars are in form extremely close to the surviving parts of the de Viris Illustris, lives of literary figures treated in a dry 'rubricising' style. It still makes sense to characterise scholarly biography as 'Suetonian'; and Flach (1972) can still blame the failings of the 'Zettelkastenverfahren' on the influence of 'literary' biography.

For present purposes the question of literary history is not important per se; the argument is only affected insofar as the points Suetonius looks for in a Caesar derive from biographical traditions. If, as was suggested above, Suetonius' aim is (partly) to analyse the performance of a Caesar as a ruler, it makes no practical difference whether he adopted his analytic approach under the 'Zwang der Gattung' or adopted the Gattung to facilitate an analytical approach. The question, therefore, is not where the rubric method derived from, but which rubrics came from where. For this purpose I propose to distinguish three classes of rubric within the pattern of the Suetonian life.

There is no need here to give a full analysis of the structure of the Caesars: this has been done repeatedly for the Lives both in general and individually. It is thus possible to concentrate on some questions of principle. Scholars have found it surprisingly hard to generalise about the pattern of a Suetonian life; surprisingly so, because schematism
and repetitiveness appear to be characteristic of the author. The answer to the paradox is that it is at the level of detail that he is most repetitive: similar ideas are expressed in closely parallel language, similar items appear in similar contexts, and an almost identical pattern of rubrics recurs in each life. But in putting the rubrics together there are quite considerable variations; and it is surely in the flexibility with which the same topics are moulded to the circumstances of different lives that Suetonius shows himself (if not a 'great artist') to be far from mindlessly mechanical.

The traditional division of the Lives is into four parts, corresponding perhaps to the 'nomina res gestas vitamque obitumque' of Ausonius' summary. These are: i) ancestry, birth and career up to the acquisition of imperial power; ii) public life as emperor; iii) private life and personal details; iv) death. The majority of the Lives have all four parts in that order; but in some (iii) follows (iv) (Nero, Galba, Otho, Domitian); and in the shortest lives (ii) and (iii) tend to wither away, so that (ii) is completely missing from the Otho, and (iii) appears only in skeletal form at the end of the Otho and Vitellius (in the latter ingeniously embedded in the death narrative), and at the beginning in the Titus.

Distinction is customarily drawn between the first and last parts as 'chronological narrative' and the middle two as 'analysis by rubrics'. In a sense this is right; a sharp break can be felt between (say) the narrative of Vespasian's rise to power in the civil wars and the analysis of his reign (at 8,1) or the narrative of Nero's suicide and the description of his person (51). But great caution is needed, especially in the use of the label 'narrative' in the context of biography (this applies to Plutarch and to all other biography). 'Narrative' is properly used of
a story, the description of an action, but not of a person. A person may be involved in a continuous action, and thus be the subject of narration; but to describe his progress through life is to 'narrate' only in a special sense. The steps of the cursus honorum follow each other chronologically; and they form part of the 'story' of a man's rise to distinction. But they do not involve the narrative of a continuous action. In fact what Julius did as aedile (Jul.10) or consul (20-22) forms inevitably a series of isolated incidents in which even the chronological element is subsidiary. It is only when an incident of great importance and duration arises in a man's tenure of office (e.g. the Catilinarian conspiracy) that full-scale narrative becomes possible. The tracing of a man's ancestors is 'narrative' in no sense at all.

The distinction is an important one. It would appear that Suetonius misses the golden opportunity in the life of an emperor: given a potentially exciting story, he abandons it at the climax. But a man's life may be thought too long and disparate to form in itself a story; exciting narrative only becomes possible when the man is involved in an external action exciting in itself. Thus much of Plutarch's 'narrative' is made possible because (despite his statements of principle) he uses biography as an opportunity for general historical narrative.31 Suetonius is rigorous in denying himself this opportunity, as can best be seen in his treatment of the civil wars of 68/69 AD: in three successive lives he looks at the same historical events exclusively from the viewpoint of the participant whose life he describes.32 The story suffers, but it is truer 'biography'. Once this point has been made for the relatively 'narrative' parts of a Suetonian life, it is easier to understand what the author is doing in the parts arranged not per tempora but per species. This treatment of the public life of an
emperor flows from a determination not to confuse biography with history. The emperor is deeply involved in Roman History, but Suetonius will no more take the life of Nero as an excuse for the story of Corbulo in Armenia than he will the life of Julius for a repetition of the Gallic Wars. He proceeds per species because he maintains that the part personally played by an emperor in public life is seen more clearly (distinctius) in an approach by subject matter (Aug.9). One should hesitate before rejecting this.

In fact it is much more helpful to see the whole of a Suetonian Life as a succession of topics, some linked by chronology, some by subject matter. Though chronological linkage predominates in parts (i) and (iv) (up to accession, death), linkage by subject in the other two, both types are found in all four sections. A chronological element is often present in the 'public life' (ii), both in the arrangement of items within a rubric (Tiberius' saevitia, 57-62, is an especially clear case) and in the broad arrangement of topics, notably where there is a degeneration from good to bad (Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Domitian). The Life of Tiberius is the outstanding example of the mixture of topical with chronological; the mixture may well be deemed a failure, though it is hard to see how it could have been better done without the useful Christian convention of numerical dates. Conversely it must be emphasised that the topics of the first and last part, though broadly speaking chronological (birth to career, life to death) remain nevertheless a series of topics: paternal family, maternal family, date of birth, place of birth, portents, upbringing, entry into public life, stages of career, death of father, financial circumstances, betrothals and marriages, patrons and friends are conventional topics in the first part; circumstances of death, portents, last sayings, date of death,
place of death, length of life or reign, funeral, disposal of remains, will, family and descendants, posthumous honours and public expressions of grief or joy are all typical of the last part. Naturally some elements of this string of topics are suitable for narrative expansion: civil wars and assassinations are the occupational hazards of emperors (actual or aspiring). But equally they allow non-chronological expansion: the same scholarly collection of evidence that is met in the central sections is applied to the cognomina of Augustus (7), the birthplace of Caligula (8) or the method of assassination of Claudius (44,2-3).

Seen from this angle, the whole of a Suetonian Life is composed of 'rubrics', but two sets of topics swell to unusual importance, the subject's activities as emperor, and the personal details. The first of these may be regarded as the final step of the cursus honorum, but expanded enormously; just as the activities of a magistracy or provincial command (e.g. Julius as consul and in Gaul) may be analysed, so are the activities of the emperor. It stands to reason that the categories of analysis of a reign cannot derive from any biographical tradition, let alone that of literary figures, for as a set they should be (and are) exclusively appropriate to a Roman emperor (thus honours and magistracies, jurisdiction, legislation, campaigns, tours, administration of city and provinces, treatment of senate, equites, people, games-giving and building activities). 36

With private and personal details the matter is more complex. Suetonius again employs a succession of topics: physical appearance, health, blemishes; way of life, eating, drinking, sleeping, sex, entertainments, housing, furniture, dress; exercise and relaxation; education and literary abilities, military abilities; religion and superstitions; family, household and friends; and traits of character. 37
These, as will be seen in the next chapter, are the standard topics of ancient biography, and it becomes very difficult to determine how far Suetonius intends such private details as a critique of the emperor qua emperor. In the first two Lives he draws a clear distinction between the public and the private details (Jul.44,4; Aug.61,1); but the distinction is not that simple, because the same topics are sometimes found in a public context, sometimes in a private. The chapters on the forma, habitus, cultus, mores and studia of Julius (45-79) mix the public and private indifferently; alongside details of appearance and literary style are found the analysis of his generalship (above), avarice in office (54), moderation in administration (75), and the arrogantia towards the republic by which he merited assassination (76-79). For Augustus a neater distinction is made, between public activities and 'intieriorem ac familiarem eius vitam' (above): certain traits of character, liberalitas (41), clementia and civilitas (51-56) are firmly (and properly) identified as public, and the same traits (with their opposing vices) recur regularly in the public sections of later lives. Even so, a degree of flexibility remains: even these traits can be treated as if private (Cl.34, saevitia); and while in Aug.68-78 mores (sex, luxuries, eating and drinking etc.) are treated as private, the vices of luxuria and libido appear as aspects of public life of some (not all) other emperors (Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, Titus). Again, family is a private matter for Augustus, but becomes public for Tiberius, Caligula and Nero who persecute their relatives, and for Claudius who allows his to affect his running of the empire. Singing, dancing, fencing, racing and acting are private studia like literature for Caligula (54 & 55); but dominate the public life of Nero (20-25).

The implication is that though Suetonius distinguished in principle
a public and a private aspect of the imperial role, he drew no hard and fast distinction on which topics belonged in the private category. Another hint that he felt that the private could sometimes (not always) be of public significance lies in the relative placing of the 'personal' and 'death' sections (iii & iv). One could certainly not argue that when the death comes in the last position, the implication is that private life is of public significance: Tiberius' expiry in his bed (72-73) is unrelated to the quaint literary affectations that precede it (70-71). But when Caligula is murdered by his subjects, his mania for racing, including the alleged nomination of his horse to the consulship, has contributed directly to their exasperation (56,1). By contrast the details categorised as personal for Nero (51-56) are so minor in comparison to the mighty catalogue of his vices (20-39) that the narrative of revolt and suicide more appropriately precedes the 'private' and follows the 'public'.

For present purposes, then, the normal quadripartite division is not helpful; instead I propose to distinguish three classes of rubric according to their content, not their position. i) First the 'biographical' topics which run throughout the whole life from ancestry to death, including most of the private and personal details. These, as will be seen in the next chapter, are the commonplaces of ancient biography. ii) Next, the virtues and vices which, though falling under the biographical category of 'personal traits of character' are normally and properly treated as aspects of public life. For these I shall suggest that the literary background lies in encomium rather than ordinary biography; but that the actual choice of traits is independent. iii) Finally analysis of imperial activity according to headings drawn from public life rather than personal biography (games, buildings, wars, etc. listed above).
These are free of suspicion of distortion by any literary pedigree other of course than the historiographical one from which the majority of his information derived. The main body of this study will be concerned with the topics of the second two categories; for though the other topics are vital to the portrayal as a whole, it is these that form the heart of Suetonius' analysis of the emperor qua emperor.
Chapter II

Traditions of Portrayal

The literary pedigree of the Caesars has been much discussed since Leo. Just as his demonstration of the influence of Alexandrian scholarly biography replaced an older theory that the form of the Lives derived from Augustus' Res Gestae, so later scholars have shown that we must allow for other influences, native Roman tradition, notably the laudatio funebris (so Stuart), and the rhetorical tradition of encomium, put into practice in panegyric of emperors (Steidle). Few now would attempt to account for 'Suetonian form' in terms of any single literary tradition: rather it should be seen as the intersection of a particular type of mind with a particular type of material as well as with various genres. It is no part of the purpose of this chapter to attempt to construct a new literary pedigree. The question is of Suetonius' perception of the emperor: in what respects is it predetermined by literary tradition? He represents the life of a Caesar under various headings: which of these stem from the fact he is simply writing biography or following a certain literary pattern? Which would contemporaries have felt to be peculiarly appropriate to an emperor, which peculiarly inappropriate? The answer offered here is already implicit in the distinction drawn at the end of the last chapter between three types of topic or 'rubric', the biographical, virtues and vices, and the analysis of a reign. This chapter will look at each of these types in turn and explore them in greater detail.
1. Biographical topics.

The gravestone, the commemorative plaque, the obituary notice, even the Who's Who entry all operate on the assumption that there is a fund of essential data by which a man may be distinguished from his fellows; a bare enumeration will suffice, without any aspiration to 'narrative'. Biography differs from the gravestone in scale, but it too must convey a certain basic minimum of data. Ancient biography is little different from modern in this respect. At one extreme (especially in the short sketch) a biography may be little more than a collection of essential data: 'John-a-Nokes was born on the -th of -. Of his earliest years we find...' But the writer with aspirations to bring his subject back to life, artistically speaking, must rise above the dryness of data, and call in the techniques of the poet or the novelist; though he too is bound to convey his data, and with no less accuracy.

Suetonius adopted a dry, factual style that for many of his readers has too much of the gravestone and too little of the poet; Plutarch is palpably an artist. In style and method the Caesars are in many respects closer to the same author's Lives of poets than to Plutarch. But this should not be allowed to conceal the fact that the data Suetonius and Plutarch consider basic are very much the same. This is not simply true in the otiose sense that they contain the data any biography must contain. Plutarch has a framework of topics common with Suetonius (no matter whether in Lives of poets or emperors) which must be assumed to be the common framework of ancient biography. At the same time it is worth asking whether any topics are more specifically Roman and which suit an
emperor.

a) Life and Death.

The most basic of all biographical data are those that typically cluster round the beginning and end of a Life and that are closest to the epitaph: name, parentage, status, place of origin, date of birth, career, date of death, length of life.

Ancestry and family stand at the head of almost every Life in Plutarch and Suetonius. Two basic concerns are the family's place of origin and its status (the rank and distinction achieved by its successive members); in the de Viris Illustribus where information on family is lacking, origin and status (often in the case of grammatici servile) are still noted. Just occasionally facts about the family are used to illuminate the later conduct of the subject: Suetonius points explicitly to the failings of Nero in his forebears (1,2 'vitia... ingenita'), and by implication in other Lives, Plutarch foresees Antony's ἐλευθερωτης in his father (i,1-3, cf. iv,3-4) and stresses tyrannicide in Brutus' background (i,1-3). Names matter, particularly for Romans; the family's cognomina are recorded and explained in this context, personal ones at the appropriate stage. Plutarch's polemic against Posidonius on Marius' lack of a cognomen reflects the fact that discussion of the topic is normal (Mar.i). Suetonius' chapter on the cognomina of Augustus, 'Thurinus' onwards, is a fine example: here (as de Gramm.3; Plut. Fab. Max.i,3; Dem.iv,3-5) several names are collected, looking forward far beyond the context of infancy.

The last item of family in Suetonius is regularly a notice of the wife and children of the subject's father, often in the form 'obiit superstitibus liberis (names) ex (name of mother)'. Plutarch too can
employ this formula (Gracch. i, 3 "...τελευτῆσαι, δεκαόυο παύσας ἐκ τῆς
Κορινθίας αὐτῆ γεγονότας καταλπόντα"). Particulars of birth are richer
for Caesars than for others. Suetonius takes pains to document year,
day and place of birth (the argument at Cal. 8 is the ultimate case of
this concern); sometimes he correlates the data with other events, and
records dreams and portents that foretell the baby's distinction. These
details are almost always introduced in dry epitaphic style: 'natus est
Plutarch has only rare details of birth: no indications of place or year,
though he does specify the day, correlate it with other events, record
dreams and portents. The notice of Alexander's birth (iii, 3) has the
same documentary ring: 'ἐγεννήθη δ' ὅν 'Αλέξανδρος ζωταμένου μνῆς
'Εκατομβαλώνος...ἐκτρ...'.

The framework of the early life in both authors is strictly
chronological, punctuated by indications of age, whether precise ('annum
agens sextum decimum'. Jul. 1, 1) or approximate (infans, puer, pubescens,
adulescens, μικρός, κατζ, ἀντίκας, μετράκτων, νέος etc.). Such
indications will not normally be found within the main body of the Life.
Accession marks a sharp turning point in this respect in the Caesars;
similarly in several Plutarchian lives a clear turning-point is felt,
and sometimes marked by an indication of age.

Within this chronological framework is accommodated relevant
material, whether more or less 'narrative', or topical. Naturally the
emphasis is rather different in the lives of Greeks and of Romans. For
a Greek education is crucial: Plutarch is very forthcoming with details
of nurses (τροφή) and teachers (πατοεία), while in Suetonius such
information is rare. It is worth comparing how in the little Life of
Heracles given in Theocritus Idyll 24 (see below) much space is devoted
to the names of Heracles' teachers (105-133). From the Cyropaedia onwards, Greeks treated a man's education as a subject of particular biographical interest per se.\textsuperscript{19} By contrast the Roman is more concerned with public life: the assumption of the toga virilis marks his entry, though it may be anticipated by the delivery of a laudatio funebris;\textsuperscript{20} prima stipendia initiate him into military life (though Plutarch does note τρωταὶ στρατευταὶ for Greeks as well as Romans);\textsuperscript{21} and the steps up the cursus honorum are naturally indispensible.

If these details tend to follow a chronological progression others do not. Financial circumstances of upbringing are considered significant, and together with inherited substance; the fortune (οὐσία) of Aristides provokes Plutarch to a scholarly discussion comparable in scale and method with Suetonius (i,1-9).\textsuperscript{22} The father's death is important: Suetonius usually, and Plutarch occasionally, will specify the subject's age at this moment.\textsuperscript{23} Marriage is a topic which frequently goes outside the chronological context: the occasion of a first marriage may lead on to discussion of the marriage, divorce, and later wives.\textsuperscript{24} Amicitia is a fundamental facet of Roman life: Suetonius uses the same language to describe the acquisition of powerful friends by poets and future emperors alike. Similarly Plutarch gives details of φιλία.\textsuperscript{25}

Over the heart of the Life analysis may temporarily skip (for it is here that the difference between the two authors is radical). Of the death of a famous man there is often a story to be told, a fact reflected under the early empire in the fashion for Exitus Illustrium Virorum.\textsuperscript{26} Where there is a story, Suetonius, as Plutarch, tells it, along with dreams and portents, sometimes in rubric form, sometimes so disposed as to heighten tension in the narrative;\textsuperscript{27} with last sayings;\textsuperscript{28} and where there is doubt with scholarly recording of variant versions.\textsuperscript{29}
After the story, Suetonius will detail place and date of death, length of life and length of reign, in a little obituary summary often introduced with the word 'obiit' or 'periit'. This information may be given in the course of the narrative: so Vespasian 'inter manus sublevantium extinctus est viii Kal. Iul. annum agens aetatis etc.' (24). Where personal details are interposed after the death narrative, the obituary notice is delayed until the end of the Life. Plutarch is no different: ἀπέθανεν ἔτελεύτησε vel.sim. introduces details of place, date, age, length of rule or tenure of office. Commonly this forms an independent item, but it may be intertwined with the narrative, as for Pompey who ἐνεκαρτέρησε ταῖς πληγαῖς, ἐξῆκοντα μὲν ἐνὸς δύοντα ἐβεβωκὼς ἔτη...'.

Facts of funeral and disposal of the remains follow dryly. More interesting is the concern with public reactions of grief or joy, which for an emperor may be many and varied. Corresponding to this theme in poets' Lives is the later reputation of their writings. Public reactions may be formally expressed in posthumous honours, from public funeral to deification. Plutarch will also occasionally mention the dedication of statues and epigrams; Suetonius does not do so in the Caesars, presumably because of the embarras de richesses, but he does in literary lives.

The family and descendants are another recurrent point of interest. Sometimes a man's family shares his fate. Sometimes the descendants succeed to power: Vespasian's ambitions for his family are used to round off the life as in several cases in Plutarch. But generally Plutarch is more liberal with information on descendants than Suetonius whose subjects' families are either too well known (the Caesars) or else unimportant or non-existent (most of the literary figures).
other hand, Plutarch is very neglectful of a central feature of Roman
death, the will: Suetonius gives details for figures both literary
and public.41

Two further topics are used for rounding off a Life. Plutarch
is fond of the revenge motif, the fate of the subject's killers or
betrayers.42 The motif normally implies disapproval of those upon whom
such divine vengeance falls, and Suetonius has hardly opportunity to
employ it.43 The other topic is the historical epilogue: as at the end
of the Life of Domitian Suetonius glances forward to the Trajanic age,
so Plutarch occasionally sketches future developments.44

So far there is little to cause difficulty. The essential data
of birth and death which Suetonius documents for a Caesar are traditional
enough. There is nothing to suggest that as far as topics are concerned he
looks at details more relevant for a poet than an emperor. If there is
a contrast with Plutarch, it is that he is closer to the facts of Roman
life. But on the other hand, there is little that is specifically
imperial about these topics. The Panegyrist was expected to praise an
emperor for the nobility of his ancestry;45 in some sense high birth
was regarded as a qualification for imperial dignity, and after Commodus
'nobilissimus Caesar' became a normal mode of address.46 But there is
no sign that Suetonius regarded nobilitas as an important asset, except
insofar as it was regarded as glorious for any Roman.47 Galba makes no
better a ruler for being 'haud dubie nobilissimus' (2), and the Flavian
house for all its obscurity did credit to the state (Vesp.1,1 'rei p.
nequaquam paenitenda'). Similarly he documents the stages of public
career as they should be documented for any Roman; all that is
distinguishably imperial is that the Caesars enter on courses of action
(civil wars) or are carried on by the luck of birth or the freaks of
chance such as eventually to bring them to supreme power.

b) Appearance and character.

An epitaph may, apart from giving the essential 'biographical' data, remark on the beauty, sweetness of disposition (or whatever) of the dead man. For the biographer, some sort of discussion of personal details is almost indispensible. By their nature these details lend themselves to static description: even if the stamp of a man's character may be left to 'emerge' from the record of his actions, much on his appearance and manner cannot. Suetonius devotes an analytic section to the personal details of almost every one of his Caesars; and he does so in precisely the same fashion as he does for the Life of a poet, notably for Virgil and Horace. Plutarch too gives regular attention to these details; Leo was well aware of this, but emphasised the difference of his style, which avoids the dry analytical factuality of Suetonius, and the formal difference of positioning, at the beginning instead of the end of a Life. Whatever the explanation of these differences, the similarities are close enough to illuminate the actual choice of topics in Suetonius, and show how far the questions he asked were controlled by biographical tradition and how far they are specifically suited for the life of a Roman Emperor.

'It is usual, I know not why, when a character is given, to begin with a description of the person.' Whether or not they knew the explanation that eluded Mrs Piozzi, Suetonius and Plutarch both normally followed this practice. Both may open the description of physical appearance in dry, factual style, 'forma fuit eximia', 'μεγάλης μὲν ἡν...' 'Ἡν δὲ τὸ μὲν εὐδοκ...', though Plutarch likes if possible to interweave this item into what precedes it. What Plutarch says by
way of description is usually brief, and where possible related to the
personality of the subject: from it he moves directly on to consideration
of Ἀθος, personality in general. In Suetonius the emphasis is inverted:
the physical description is highly detailed, in the technical style of
an εἰκονικός whether used by a physiognomist or in an advertisement for
a missing slave.\(^52\) Frequently there are included details of physical
blemishes (vitia corporalia)\(^53\) and relative health and illness (valetudo).\(^54\)
But his observations on traits of character are rare in occurrence and
limited in scope. The idiosyncratic Claudius forms an exception; at some
length we learn of his bloodthirst (34), timidity (35-37), irritability
(38,1-2), stupidity (38,3) and absentmindedness (39 μετεωρώς and
άβαλεψία). Isolated details are given of the wit of Vespasian (22-23),
the conflicting self-confidence and fearfulness of Caligula (51), and the
desire for popularity of Nero (53-55). Part of the reason for this
scarcity in the Caesars is that virtues and vices are more often discussed
as aspects of the reign. But the Lives of grammarians and poets are
little more forthcoming about character, and it is surely right to see a
fundamental difference of purpose between the authors. Plutarch the
moralist is primarily interested in character; Suetonius treats 'character'
as at best one aspect of a man, and it seems fair to suggest that this
reflects in part a contrast between Greek and Roman notions of
'personality'.\(^55\) (Note the poverty of Latin words to describe character
compared to the richness of Greek, that leads Suetonius on two occasions to use
Greek words in his text.)\(^56\)

Biographical tradition, one may conclude, demanded discussion of
appearance and character; but in emphasis Plutarch and Suetonius each
went his own way. There is little sign that Suetonius' emphasis was
much affected by the fact that his subjects were emperors: the Lives of
Virgil or Horace are hardly to be distinguished from that of Augustus in this respect. Observations in both literary and imperial Lives on vitia corporalia, for instance, reflect the interests (and previous publications) of the philologist, though at the same time this may well be a specially 'Roman' interest. Physical appearance, indeed, was not negligible as an aspect of the imperial image: statues and coinage made the faces of the Caesars familiar throughout the Roman world. Further, the panegyrist might be expected to compliment a ruler on his manly form. The beauty of Titus gains him credit (3,1 cf. Aug. 79,1); perhaps more significant he had the necessary auctoritas which deserted Claudius when in motion (3,1, cf. Cl. 30). But in general it would be hard to show that the question that lies behind these physical descriptions was 'Did he have the right physique for an emperor?' and not simply 'What was he like?'

c) Life-style (δίαιτα).

In Idyll 24, Theocritus adapts the story of the infant Heracles and the snakes as told by Pindar to what ought to be recognised as 'biographical' form. So much might be hinted at by the precise indications of age in the opening words ('Ἡρακλέα δεκάμηνον ἐόντα'); it is certainly apparent in the material which Theocritus appends to the Pindaric story (103ff.). The section on the education of the young Heracles has already been mentioned (above); this is followed (135ff.) by a description of his regimen: his sleeping (135-6), eating (137-9) and dress (140). At this point our text breaks off, and a papyrus fragment reveals that the poem continued for thirty lines but gives away nothing of their content.

It should be a fair guess that details of daily regimen formed a
normal component of Greek biography from an early stage. Certainly ὁμοίωμα is a regular element in Plutarch's personal descriptions: the important elements being sexual affairs, eating and drinking, and clothing. These and sleeping habits made up ὁμοίωμα as a Greek understood it: a Socrates could show his self-control in these areas. The same topics are standard in Suetonian biography (whether of a Caesar or of Vergil or Horace): sexual affairs, cibus, vinum, somnus and vestitus (in the last case with the precision to be expected of the author of de genere vestium). But there are further topics which are not so readily paralleled in Plutarch at least in the lives of Greeks: habitatio (not only where the subject lived, but the scale of luxury of his houses), lautitiae (the luxurious trappings of a household, furniture, objets d'art, and slaves), habits of gambling, and convivia (scale and fashion of entertainment). These were aspects of private life into which the censor traditionally enquired. They are to be met in some of Plutarch's Roman lives, notably that of the elder Cato. Best of all they are paralleled in the most interesting and Roman of Nepos' Lives, that of Atticus. Nepos applies to his subject precisely the standards Suetonius applies to emperors: his housing was respectable, but he wasted no money on improvement (13,1-2); his familia of slaves was not chosen for physical attraction and was kept up economically (3-4); his furnishings achieved elegance without luxury (5); his entertainments observed social rank, were limited in cost, and decent in the forms of amusement put on (13,6-14,2); and finally he shunned luxurious gardens and country villas (14,2-3). This is enough to confirm that life-style was a traditional concern of biography, but that it is a Roman way of life that biographers of Romans are enabled to depict. It is also worth noting that on a couple of
occasions Suetonius gives a brief sketch of daily routine (ordo vitae). This too can be paralleled in Plutarch; but that the description of daily routine had become a fashionable Roman topic, is exemplified in Pliny's correspondence. That a Roman would not consider these matters too trivial for the life of an emperor will be argued below (ch.IX,4).

d) Family.

In the Life of Augustus Suetonius describes in detail in the personal section Augustus' relations with his family (61-5), friends (66) and dependants (67). In most other lives similar details belong to the chapters on public life; yet the sequence of family (from senior to junior members) friends and dependants is the same. Sporadic mentions of relationships with family and friends in Plutarch are enough to suggest that family was another traditional component of personal description. But the stamp of the Suetonian chapters is evidently Roman, reflecting the structure of the Roman household. The closest parallel in Plutarch is the discussion of the elder Cato as head of his household (xx-xxi). Here Cato is shown in turn as the good husband (xx,1-2), the good father (xx,2-8) and as the master of slaves (xxi, but Plutarch has some reservations, cf. v). Suetonius' standards are clearly traditional Roman ones. He shows Augustus taking personal care of the education of his daughters (64,3) as Cato does of his son (xx,4). Cato regards laying violent hand on wife or child as sacrilege; Suetonius recounts with predictable disapproval the violent treatment of their families by Tiberius, Gaius and Nero. Severity of discipline was proper in handling the servile household, even if Cato went too far (xxi,3); the failure of Claudius in this respect (29) contrasts with the firmness of Augustus who forgives faults against himself, but is inexorable where faults
against society are involved (67). The dedicated fides of Julius to his clientes is in accord with the oldest Roman standards (71), though for an emperor clients lose their significance. Amicitia was equally an institution to which standards of conduct attached: the facilitas of Julius (72-73) and the constantia of Augustus (66) were sadly missing in some of their descendants.

In family and friends, then, we again have a topic which might suit any biography and which perhaps was usual in ancient biography. But the complexion of Suetonius' handling of the topic derives from Roman life. In contrast to some of the other topics of the personal section (e.g. personal appearance) it was a topic which had a marked overlap with public 'history': imperial parricide, incest, palace politics and interference of the household in public life were the stuff of Annals, and Suetonius reflects this by promoting the topic to the 'public' section in several lives (above ch.I). But even there his presentation follows the arrangement normal in the private section, a hierarchic grading according to degrees of intimacy of relationship, and not the historian's chronological narration. Suetonius' approach was not an inept one for the life of an emperor: Pliny's Panegyric draws on the same categories of Roman life in order to congratulate Trajan on his domestic life, wife (83,4-8), sister (84), amici (85-87) and liberti (88,1-3).

e) Exercise and studies.

Suetonius treats the martial and the literary activities of Julius ('quae ad civilia et bellica eius studia pertineant', 44,4) as a natural pair (55-70). In other Lives military affairs take their proper place under 'public' affairs: nevertheless there still remains in a couple of
cases a chapter on physical tolerance and exercise, and sport for relaxation (even if only ball-games and fishing) in association with the chapters on studia. To literary interests Suetonius devotes enormous (one might feel disproportionate) attention, and it is notable how close in approach the chapters on Augustus' studia are to those on a poet like Virgil. The recurrent topics are oratory, with style and delivery, writings in prose and poetry, authentic or not, with details or recitations and success, knowledge of Greek, traits of handwriting and conversational style (sermo); finally other non-literary arts (e.g. singing and dancing).

Again comparison with Plutarch suggests we are on old biographical territory. In several cases he takes physical exercise and literary studies in conjunction, and because he gives his 'personal' details early in the Life (not as Suetonius towards the end) the rationale of the conjunction is much more apparent: training of body and mind are the two main components of education. Physical training is a side which Romans took seriously, to the detriment, Plutarch sometimes felt, of their intellectual training. The elements of παντόκρατος he notices are public speaking (λόγος) with details of style and delivery, the reading and writing of poetry, philosophy and history; the knowledge of Greek by Romans; and particulars of surviving writings. It may be noted that the place of singing and dancing in the Greek educational curriculum helps to explain why Suetonius treats the 'aliae artes' of Caligula in this context.

Here again Suetonius writes as a biographer; but the topics are not necessarily designed for the life of a poet but flow from the Greco-Roman education that an emperor too underwent. Indeed the preoccupations of the trained philologist are apparent; but this is not to say that they
are out of tune with the way the rest of the Roman world saw the emperor. Alföldi drew attention to the emphasis which 4th century sources lay on the need for education in an emperor; Millar has made it clear that the expectation that the emperor should share the literary interests and accomplishments of educated Greco-Roman society goes back to the very beginning. In a later chapter I shall suggest that the chapters on imperial studia may reflect on the official role of the emperor's a studiis (ch.IV). In the context of such a society it took education as well as good character to make a good ruler.

Of physical exercise there is less to be said: endurance of labour was a traditional quality in a Roman general, yet it was less urgent in a Roman emperor. Even so, hunting, the traditional and energetic sport of kings, enjoyed a revival under Trajan and Hadrian; and Pliny could take the opportunity to flatter Trajan by comparison with his predecessors and assert that an emperor is betrayed by his amusements (Pan.81-82).

f) Religion.

In a few lives, most notably that of Augustus, Suetonius says something of attitude to religio, observance of omens and cult practice. There is only the slightest hint in Plutarch that beliefs and superstitions were a normal biographical topic. It is perhaps the lack of importance of this topic that is most surprising: a modern biography might well devote a large chapter to beliefs. But in that religion consisted in no more than the observance of traditional practices without a personal commitment of 'faith' there was simply less to be said: Augustus observed what was traditional, shunned new superstition, Tiberius was carried away by astrology, Nero by frivolity. Cotta the Pontifex would surely have approved of Suetonius' presentation.
Conclusions

Comparison with Plutarch suggests that the Caesars follows a more or less traditional run of biographical topics covering life, death and personal description. Where Suetonius parts from Plutarch in choice of topics (rather than in style or format) there is no sign that he does so because following a specialised type of biography designed for literary personalities; on the contrary his tendency is to stress the traditional elements of Roman society. Certainly none of these topics have any exclusive relevance to the life of a Roman emperor; but in that an emperor was a specimen of humanity, and more particularly a Roman, the topics suit his life well enough.

But what has been left untouched is the core of an imperial life, the analysis of the man's activities as emperor. Only here does it really matter that the topics should be specifically adapted to what is characteristic of the activity of an emperor (as against other men). There is no sign that Suetonius was affected here by 'biographical' tradition, let alone that of literary figures. The next two sections will examine the types of topics he does employ, and their possible sources.

2. Virtues and Vices.

Regular topics and static elements there may be in all biographies; but with most men of action there is a story to tell, and most biographers are happy to tell the story. There can be no doubt that Suetonius' failure to tell the story is on the face of it surprising; that the ordinary biographer would have told is confirmed by Plutarch's handling
of the lives of Galba and Otho, the remnants of a series running from Augustus to Vitellius, which clearly indicate that Plutarch approached the successive reigns as historical narrative. Suetonius' analytic treatment of the reigns of his Caesars is idiosyncratic, and needs explaining. The explanation may be attempted both in terms of literary tradition and of the author's conscious purpose. Leo attempted to explain by literary tradition alone: but though both methods and topics of 'Alexandrian' scholarly biography may indeed be detected in the Caesars, it is not in the central core of analysis of the reign that they are found (how could it be?) and it is this core that requires the explanation. In the first chapter I suggested that the author had a perfectly acceptable purpose: not to reduplicate historical narrative but to examine what kind of rulers his Caesars made. Even so, to fulfil this purpose he might draw on literary traditions; and parallels may at least illuminate his purpose.

A large part of the analysis of each reign is conducted in terms of virtues and vices. These are strictly limited in scope, and each virtue is correlated with an opposing vice. Because the same kind of items are adduced again and again, it is apparent that irrespective of variations in vocabulary (e.g. cupiditas, rapacitas or avaritia) and of whether the behaviour is good or bad (e.g. saevitia or clementia), Suetonius is concerned with four main areas of behaviour: punishment (clemency v. cruelty), finances (liberality and abstinence v. rapacity), conduct (civility v. arrogance) and private indulgence (luxury and lust v. restraint). Augustus is liberal (41), clement and civil (51-56). Tiberius started civil (26-32) but eventually proved indulgent (42-45), mean (46-49) and cruel (50-62). Caligula's faults were arrogance and cruelty (22-35), shameless indulgence (36-37) and rapacity (38-42).
Nero started with a show of liberality, clemency and geniality (10), soon manifested the vices of indulgence (26-31: petulance, lust and luxury), avarice (32) and cruelty (33-37). Galba was hated for cruelty and avarice (12; 14,2-15), Vitellius for luxury, cruelty and insolence (10-11), but especially the first two (13-14). Vespasian was always civil and clement (12-15), but his handling of money was debatable (16-19). Titus was suspected before accession of incivility, cruelty, indulgence and rapacity (6-7,1) but rebutted these charges in turn by private restraint (7,2), abstinence and generosity (7,3-8,1), geniality (8,2) and clemency (8,3-9). Domitian manifested clemency and liberality (9) until these were transformed (cf. 3,2) to cruelty (10-11) and rapacity (12,1-2). Civility he lacked from the start (12,3-13).

In all these cases Suetonius treats these vices and virtues as defects or strengths of the emperor in his public role. Actions are cited in evidence to estimate the performance of each emperor in the various areas; the actions are usually 'public' ones, but sometimes 'private' (e.g. involving the family). There is almost no variation in the selection of areas considered: some emperors have idiosyncratic weaknesses or strengths (Caligula ἀξιωματικής, 29; livor and malignitas, 34-35; Nero petulantia 26; Vitellius vanitas and insolentia, 10,3; Titus benivolentia, 8,1); still, they are all sub-species or variants of the four main areas. Nor, if we turn to the chapters on 'private' life does a new set of qualities and defects emerge. Julius' traits are typically imperial: indulgence (49-53), rapacity (54); mercy and moderation (73-75) and arrogance (76-79). The debate on Augustus' indulgences is found in the private section (68-78). But cases where traits mark out the individual only underline the rarity of the phenomenon: the earthy humour of Vespasian (22-23), perhaps the enthusiasm of Caligula
(55) and the desire for popularity of Nero (53-55), and above all the traits of the queer Claudius, not only bloodthirst (34) and timidity (35-37), but irritability (38,1-2), stupidity (38,3) and absentmindedness (39).

Biography, as has been seen, is concerned with moral qualities. But Plutarchian Ἡθος differs from these virtue/vice categories in more than manner of presentation. It is not merely that Plutarch lets characteristics 'emerge' from his presentation; in fact he may on occasion gather together anecdotes which demonstrate a characteristic, as he does for the ἐκλείκεω of Pyrrhus (viii,4-5) or the inaccessibility of Demetrius (xlii). Equally important is the difference in kind between the qualities the two authors look for. Plutarch is attempting to identify the distinctive features of a personality; often indeed to identify a personality as being of one particular type (e.g. 'the ambitious man'). Suetonius weighs the relative success or failure of each emperor within defined areas of behaviour in which any emperor must move. There is an essential difference in kind even between the ἀθαυτοκρατορία of which he says Caligula was proud (29,1) and the saevitia of which this ἀθαυτοκρατορία forms part of the evidence: the first is a characteristic, the second constitutes a judgement on performance in a previously defined area. The difference in kind lies behind the difference in presentation. According to peripatetic theory, to show a man to belong to a certain type (e.g. the Φιλότιμος) one would have to narrate his every action; but to estimate a man's performance in three or four separate areas, it may well be most convenient to take each area separately.

Steidle rightly saw that in this respect the closest analogy to Suetonius is in encomium. Xenophon's Agesilaus offers the most
illuminating parallel. Xenophon wishes to show that Agesilaus was an exemplary king: he therefore examines his record in various areas, beginning with the standard virtues of εὐσέβεια (iii), δικαιοσύνη (iv) σωφροσύνη (v) ἀνδρεία (vi,1-3) and οἰκία (vi,4-8), then going on to less familiar qualities. The method is precisely the same: a quality is named, then documented: 'clementiae civilitatisque eius multa et magna documenta sunt...' (Aug.51), 'περὶ γε μὴν τῆς εἰς χρήματα δικαιοσύνης ποια ἄν τις μεῖζω τεκμήρια ἔχων τῶν...' (Ages.iv,1).

Sometimes evidence is so abundant that the citation of examples is enough: 'singillatim crudeler facta eius exequi longum est; genera velut exemplaria saevitiae enumerare sat erit' (Tib.61,2); 'ὅς γε μὴν φιλόπολις ἢν καθ' ἐν μὲν ἑκαστὸν μακρὸν ἄν εἰη γράψει...ὡς δ' ἐν βραχεῖ εἶπετ...' (Ages.vii,1).

Recent scholarship has tended to play down the distinction between the 'genres' of biography and encomium, so sharply differentiated by Leo. Steidle argued that the techniques of encomium had been absorbed into political biography long before Suetonius; Nepos abandons historical narrative for documentation of virtues in his Life of Epaminondas; and it is possible (though to me implausible) that the lost half of Nicolaus' Life of Augustus expounded his virtues. It is even uncertain how far biography and encomium were ever sharply differentiated. Isocrates' Evagoras and Xenophon's Agesilaus are vital for the early history of both genres. But the question here is not of 'Formgeschichte'. Whether or not Suetonius had predecessors, using similar techniques, perhaps on Hellenistic kings, perhaps on Roman public figures, he adopted his method deliberately and consciously. The question remains, for what purpose he used this approach. Does the parallel with encomium help to illuminate what Suetonius is doing? Did he adopt the method as no more than a
convenient method of sorting out information or was this in fact a useful way of treating the life of an emperor?

One may start by looking at the purpose of encomium in concentrating on virtues. The primary aim of encomium is to praise (just as that of its opposite Φόνος or vituperatio is to blame). It is a branch of rhetoric, the art of persuasion. Biography may, but does not necessarily, have a similar purpose; where it does (as in Tacitus' Agricola) it becomes hardest to draw a sensible distinction between it and encomium. From the first, prose encomia employed certain topics that were to become normal in any type of biography, since a convenient way to praise a man was to go through his whole life step by step; but it is not the choice of these topics so much as the use to which they are put, that can be spoken of as distinctively encomiastic. On a formal level, then, the biographer can only be said to borrow from encomium when he adopts techniques specifically designed to facilitate praise. Ancient theory on how praise is best achieved is propounded in a whole series of rhetorical handbooks, stretching from Anaximenes and Aristotle, through Cicero and Quintilian, to the Greek rhetoricians of the imperial period collected in Spengel's Rhetores Graeci. They base their prescriptions on a distinction drawn between the topics worthy of praise in a man's life: on the one hand virtues, ἄρεται, on the other hand what is not virtue, τὰ ζέει τῆς ἄρετης, divided after Anaximenes into two classes, the things of the body (corporis commoda) and things external (res externae). This distinction is, of course, taken from moral philosophy. But as it happens, 'things of the body' and 'things external', as listed in rhetorician after rhetorician, show a high degree of coincidence with the topics shown above to be typical of ancient biography: external are ancestry (γένος, genus), birth (γένεσις),
upbringing (τροφή), education (παιδεία, educatio), family, friends, possessions, fortune; physical are strength (ρώμη, vires), looks (κάλλος, dignitas) and health (ψυχες, valetudo). However, it is felt by the rhetoricians that appropriate though these 'biographical' topics are, they are not the proper material for praise: as Anaximenes (35, 3-4) frankly puts it, apart from virtues, the rest is cheating (τὰ δ' ἔξω κλέπτεται), material for congratulations not praise (οὐκ ἔχανεν ὅλλά μακαρίζειν).

According to theory, therefore, the true core of an encomium should be praise of virtues. Consequently the disposition normally recommended is to arrange the subject's achievements (πράξεως, res gestae) under the various virtues they document and not chronologically, though indeed some authors acknowledge chronological narrative as an alternative method. The rationale of preferring disposition κατὰ μέρος to the chronological (ἐφεξῆς) is set out by Aristotle (Rhet.iii, 16,1416B16ff.): insofar as argument is concerned not merely to report an action but to demonstrate something about it, its truth, quality or quantity, narrative ἐφεξῆς is inappropriate, because hard to follow; it is simpler and more comprehensible to state which actions demonstrate which qualities.

If encomium, then adopts a κατὰ μέρος disposition, it is because it regards the virtues manifested in an action as more praiseworthy than the action per se. It would indeed be surprising if biographers of public figures whose purpose was laudatory did not use this encomiastic technique: Nepos' Epaminondas is an example of what was doubtless a common enough pattern, adopted in this case because Epaminondas was regarded as a paragon of moral virtue. But what differentiates the Caesars from a work like the Epaminondas or Xenophon's Agesilaus is that Suetonius'
purpose is not to praise, or even to blame, at all costs: he is critical, apportioning praise and blame as the evidence suggests. Suetonius' per species arrangement reflects an analytical purpose ('quo distinctius demonstrari cognoscique possint', sc. partes vitae) which is shared by Aristotle's encomiast; but he differs from the encomiast in remaining impartial. Perhaps Suetonius was the first to see how the method could be so employed; but the nature of the evidence allows no final answer.

Rhetorical theory may help to illuminate the purpose behind Suetonius' method; but the question remains of whether the method was an appropriate one for the life of an emperor. The rhetorician takes it for granted from the philosopher that animi virtutes were the most important point about a man; he takes over also the philosopher's definition of which virtues matter most, courage, temperance, justice and wisdom. Addressing an audience imbued with moral philosophy, he might be expected to carry conviction. But could similar assumptions be made in dealing with an emperor? Did the Romans, or those who read Suetonius, really believe that animi virtutes were crucial in an emperor? Was not the Roman more concerned with res gestae, whether a public figure did glorious things than whether he was a 'good' man?

In answering these questions it is important to consider the actual practice of imperial panegyric. Though only a few specimens survive, speeches in praise of the reigning emperor must have been a regular feature of public life even in Suetonius' day: the gratiarum actio in the senate by a consul at least once a year; in the court speeches by ambassadors (often chosen for their rhetorical skill); speeches of welcome in the provinces; and in general speeches punctuated every occasion, birthdays, dies imperii, adventus, profectiones and countless others.
There were also the eulogies pronounced over dead emperors by their successors, as the laudatio funebris given by Tiberius on Augustus, by Nero on Claudius. If the speakers normally observed the rules of the rhetoricians, a courtier like Suetonius must have been thoroughly familiar with the sound of an emperor being praised for his animi virtutes, and nothing can have seemed more natural than to adopt the disposition for use in biography.

Yet surviving specimens give little comfort to the idea that the handbooks were obeyed. Much ingenuity has been expended in tracing the rules of Menander, easily the most explicit and interesting of the rhetoricians, behind the panegyrists. But even if there are traces, the basic fact remains that none of the surviving Panegyrici Latini, from Pliny to Ausonius, explicitly dispose their material according to the virtues of Menander's rules. The organisation of Pliny's gratiarum actio is much too subtle to be subsumed under any rhetorical schema.

Certainly Trajan is praised ceaselessly for his virtutes, and certainly there are some stretches in which evidence is piled up to illustrate specific virtues (especially 25-43 for numerous proofs of liberalitas, 52-55 for moderatio). But the speech as a whole cannot be analysed in terms of disposition by virtues, let alone the ἄρεται of Menander. Similarly the later panegyrists are anxious to show their emperors in possession of all virtues, even the philosophically approved ones (e.g. Pan.viii(vi) 4-5 on the continentia, fortitudo, iustitia and prudentia of Constantine), yet they never dispose the main body of the speech according to these. Indeed, Mamertinus is prepared to assert that these virtues are of little importance in an emperor in comparison with the pietas and felicitas of his Maximian (xi,(iii),19,2). It is true that when Ammianus borrows the technique of encomium to sing the praise of
Julian he documents the four 'canonical' virtues, in addition to others borrowed from Cicero’s panegyric of Pompey; but this is in an epilogue after historical narrative of the res gestae. Only one surviving imperial encomium, in fact, does religiously follow the school rules, that attributed to Aristides: after long and fruitless debate over the identity of the emperor involved, it can surely at last be accepted that this itself is no more than a school exercise, even possibly designed to serve as a model in the same way as Menander’s hints on the βασιλικός λόγος.

In fact, one should be extremely wary of supposing much correlation between the theory of the Rhetores Graeci and the normal practice (particularly by Latin speakers) of the imperial period. Even Cicero parts from his own prescriptions in praise of Pompey. The traditional virtues are replaced by four points requisite in a good general: ‘scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem’ (Imp. Pomp. 28). Virtues proper only form part of his argument (29-42), and even here the largest part is taken up by a list of Pompey’s campaigns (30-35).

Nor is there reason to suppose that the native Roman brand of encomium, laudatio funebris, important though it doubtless was for Roman 'biographical spirit' was any more persistent than panegyric in sticking to a disposition by virtues. Nero praised the dead Claudius (ludicrously) for his sapientia and providentia (T. Ann. 13, 3), but this need not argue a Menandrian disposition, so much as a series of exclamations after the fashion of Velleius' panegyric of Tiberius. What struck Cicero about traditional laudatio was its formlessness. It was doubtless traditional to praise virtues: the anonymous lady celebrated in our only well-preserved laudatio is praised for many, including the domestic qualities of 'pudicitiae, opsequi, comitatis, facilitatis, lanificiis
tuis [adsiduitatis]' etc. (Laud.Tur.i,30). But narration of her good turns to her husband bulks much larger, and there is nothing here of 'rubric' style.

It would be rash, on this showing, to suggest that the clear disposition met in Suetonius derives from contemporary laudatory practice. But what can be affirmed is that virtues and vices were the common currency of imperial panegyric, as of all sorts of celebration and criticism of the emperor. Behind the model encomium of the rhetorician lies the Socratic assumption that the only truly laudable aspects of a man are his ἄρετα; it is significant that Xenophon, the earliest encomiast known to base his disposition on virtues, was himself a Socratic.29

Behind Suetonius' disposition lies a similar assumption, that the praiseworthy emperor is marked by certain virtues, his opposite by corresponding vices. It makes little sense to attempt to explain this assumption in terms of any literary or rhetorical tradition; rather one must look at the whole pattern of Roman thought that attached importance to virtues and vices in the emperor. This is a matter for fuller discussion (below, Part C). But granted this assumption, and granted a habit of mind inclined to neatly disposed analysis, it may well be that Suetonius turned to encomium for a model of how to deal with the virtues of a ruler.

If so, it is perhaps even worth considering the possibility that he was influenced not so much by contemporary practice, or even by rhetorical theory, (though doubtless he was well acquainted with both) but more specifically by Xenophon's Agesilaus. In their simple, direct, unpretentious approach the authors have something in common. Moreover the idealised Agesilaus shows many points of contact with Augustus, as lovingly portrayed by Suetonius: his restraint in food and drink, sleep and sex (Ages.v,1-7; cf. Aug.76-78, but 71,1 for sexual weakness); his genial approachability
(Ages.viii,1-2; ix,1-2; cf. Aug.53,2); and perhaps most strikingly, in his domestic life, his simple house (Xenophon draws attention to the doors, viii,7, Suetonius to the porticos, 72,1), the furniture (Ages.viii, 7; cf. Aug.73), his behaviour at festivals (Ages.viii,7; cf. Aug.75), and even in the restraint of female dependants (viii,7; cf. Aug.72,3). \(^{30}\) But there is no telling how far such links are due to direct influence, how far to common ideals.

**Conclusions**

In his subordination of 'actions' to virtues and vices Suetonius shows similarities of approach to the encomiastic tradition. Questions of Formgeschichte apart, the similarities cast light on Suetonius' purpose: the approach is one suitable for weighing a man against a given set of standards and depends on the assumption that virtues and vices matter. This is not to say: (i) that the whole per species method derives from encomium, which can offer no parallel to the important non-moral categories to be considered below; (ii) that the idea that virtues and vices matter in an emperor derives from encomium, rather than from much more widespread views of the emperor; (iii) that the actual qualities Suetonius looks for are those of rhetorical theory. For these, it is argued below (Chapter VIII) we must turn to the historiographical tradition.

3. **Analysis of the reign.**

Even if Menander Rhetor believed that an emperor's activities could be wholly subsumed under his 'virtues', Suetonius had no such illusions.
The main categories under which he examines the public activities of his Caesars are not moral: they comprise the various aspects of public life itself. Certainly these are treated as 'rubrics' (species) in contrast to 'narrative' just as much as virtues and vices. But the different kind of heading leads to a different kind of treatment. If the rubric concerns a quality, every item adduced serves as evidence of the possession or lack of that quality; but if it concerns an area of activity (e.g. games-giving) the heading acts as no more than a definition of an area of relevance. The items may not serve as evidence of any generalisation at all (e.g. a factual list of games given), or they may serve as evidence of a whole variety of separate questions (Was he generous? Did he attend personally? Did he ensure public order during performances? Did he respect the traditions of the occasion? etc.).

In their treatment of evidence the two types of rubric might be contrasted as 'convergent' and 'divergent': in moral rubrics the evidence converges to demonstrate the lack or possession of a virtue, in non-moral rubrics it diverges to demonstrate a widening range of points.¹

This contrast underlies the two standard but contradictory complaints against the Caesars: that facts are gathered together mechanically for no end (i.e. in 'divergent' rubrics), and that emperors are judged by crude moral categories (i.e. according to virtues and vices). Neither charge does the author justice: the Caesars are not judged in moral terms alone, for the analysis of their administration forms a vital part of the overall picture of the kind of rulers they made; the failure to attach explicit labels of praise or blame to the administrative actions documented does not mean they are collected aimlessly, for the items recorded might be measured by a set of standards of how a good emperor would behave which Suetonius assumed in a Roman reader. Sometimes indeed
not even an implicit critical judgement is appropriate: many actions may illuminate how a ruler exercised his power without being 'good' or 'bad'. It is surely to the credit of Suetonius' method that it does not force him into inappropriate black and white judgements.

This side of the Caesars, the examination of public activity area by area, can in its nature owe nothing to encomium, theoretical or practical, in which the aim to praise is paramount. It is necessary to look at the headings themselves in order to understand what the author is doing. The same headings recur from life to life, though never in quite the same order or selection.

Analysis of the reign is built round three basic principles of division, the geographical, the social, and the functional. The first two represent hierarchies of status. The geographical spreads outwards from Rome as it descends in status: Rome, Italy, provinces, 'client' kings, foreign states. The social hierarchy also descends in status: magistrates from high to low, senate, ordo equester, populus Romanus, cives Romani, liberti, slaves. The social hierarchy is generally accommodated within the geographical, since the ordines properly belonged to Rome. Less easy to grasp, and much looser in structure is the functional principle. The emperor had various functions, formal and informal, in consequence of which he took responsibility for various aspects of the state. As pontifex maximus he was responsible for religious matters; as commander of the army (under whatever title) for military matters; above all, but most obscure, as a magistrate or 'maius aliquid et excelsius' (T. Ann.3,53) he exercised care over civil affairs. Corresponding to these three aspects, three different sets of heading recur: i) Religious affairs (res sacrae, caerimoniae etc.) ii) Wars external and internal, military expeditions and peaceful peregrinations,
and responsibility for the forces or res militaris. Magistracies represented the republican warrant for civil administration, and these are duly listed, often introduced by the word consulatus. But it was clear that the emperor's responsibilities did not derive from his honors, and it is only exceptionally that his conduct in magisterial office is discussed. As emperor he is involved in jurisdiction, legislation, maintenance of public order, and censorial control, as well as being responsible for everything within the geographical and social hierarchies (above). In addition to these three functions the emperor was possessed of enormous wealth, and this he might be expected to lavish on buildings (opera), shows (spectacula), as well as donatives and distributions of various sorts. Because of the importance of the expenditure involved, these topics are sometimes subsumed under the moral category of liberalitas; but normally a great deal more is involved than generosity and the topics are treated 'divergently'. Two final headings which might involve expenditure, but more importantly demanded powers of organisation were the corn-supply, and the general protection of the city from fire, flood and riot.

Though Suetonius' rubrics are lucid enough, the pattern sketched above is not wholly apparent to the casual reader, and particularly as it has not been examined in detail before, it is worth illustrating how it is adapted to the different requirements of individual Lives. In the Julius he glides from a summary of the civil wars (34-36) to an analysis of his period of domination (–44,3). Triumphs (37) act as a transition to rewards for veterans, donatives and other liberalities (38), then shows (39). Now he turns to bringing the state to order (40,1): religious matters first (the calendar reforms, 40), then senate (41,1–2), juries (41,2), populus (41,3), citizens and grants of citizenship (42,1). Next
regulations and legislation (42,2-3), jurisdiction and censorial measures (43). Finally his uncompleted plans are summarised, involving building, civil organisation (a legal Digest) and military effort, in Rome (44,1-2), Italy, the provinces, and foreign nations (44,3). It is remarkable how these brief chapters contain in embryo all the main headings used in later Lives, and this surely reflects the author's (correct) belief that Julius was an emperor in embryo.

By far the fullest discussion is that of Augustus' reign (in turn surely reflecting a belief that he among emperors performed his function most fully). An account of civil wars (9-19) and external wars (20-23), with some deference to the chronological sequence, is concluded by analysis of his control of the armed forces (24-25). Magistracies are listed, including the triumvirate (26-27) and a discussion of his conduct as triumvir relieves the author of the necessity of mentioning this embarrassing evidence in the subsequent discussion of the 'reign'; a paragraph on his hesitations after Actium (28,1-2) introduces analysis of the optimus status which he created (28,2-50). Overall shape is given by the geographical hierarchy, city (28,3-45), Italy (46), provinces (47) and client kingdoms (48), to which are added garrisoning and communications in the empire (49-50). In the chapters on Rome there are multiple subdivisions: building and the protection of the city (28,3-30); religious measures (31,1-4); republican heroes (31,5); the restoration of public order (32,1), and the legal system (2-3), his jurisdiction (33) and legislation (34); then the social hierarchy, senate (35-38,2), equites (38,3-40,1), populus (40,2), civitas Romana (3-5). The heading of liberality introduces donatives and the like (41) but it is emphasised that he showed more qualities than simple generosity in dealings with the annona and related questions (42). The long treatment of spectacula bears
this out (43–45). Here then, though the discussion of administration (even discounting bellal etc.) is four times the length of the comparable section for Julius, the choice of headings (but not their arrangement) is substantially the same.

For later emperors rarely more than a selection of these headings is found. Claudius 13–25 is relatively full: internal troubles (13) are split off from the one military expedition (17) by a long section on magistrates (14–16), expanded by the inclusion of jurisdiction and censorial discipline over equites under this head. The geographical hierarchy runs from urbs (18,1), through Italy (cf. 25,2) to provinces (25,3–5) and foreign kings (25,5); overlapping with the social hierarchy, magistrates (23,2), senate (24), equites (25,1), liberti (25,1–2), peregrini (25,3); with a crosscurrent in the same chapters (22–25) of a distinction of matters religious (esp. 22), civil (esp. 23) and military (esp. 24,3–25,1). These chapters are preceded by the protection of the city (18,1) and its corn-supply (18,2–19), building works (20), distributions (21,1) and shows (21,1–6). With some ingenuity these chapters on administration are made to precede the rubric on family and household (26–29), so that the credit for sound administration is balanced by the discovery that Claudius was not his own master (25,5). From the point of view of organisation of material the most remarkable feature here is the conflation of three principles of arrangement, geographical, social and functional in the core of the passage. The author is evidently master not slave of his schema.

For Vespasian a rather different arrangement is appropriate. He dealt with first things first, bringing under control a turbulent army (8,2–3), turbulent provinces and client kings (8,4). Then he could proceed to the restoration of the city (8,5), to building (9,1), reformation of
the social ordines (9,2), the courts (10) and to censorial control (11). Magistracies and triumphs form part of the evidence for his civilitas, as in several other lives, and so are missing from this section (see n.11).

The life of Tiberius is built round the theme of a gradual revelation of cruel character, and the chapters on administration are subordinated to the theme that (after a milder start) he showed himself a conscientious ruler but a tough one. The rubrics are chosen to illustrate the theme: judicial supervision (33), censorial control (34-35), religious discipline (36), maintenance of public order (37,1-3), and military policy (37,4). Discussion of his useless peregrinations (38-40) acts as a transition to the retreat to Capri and final revelation of vice (41ff.). We miss here the usual social and geographical rubrics: even so the section opens with the senate (33) and closes with the sequence Rome, Italy, provinces, regna (37,1-4).

In the Lives of Caligula, Nero and Domitian this section forms part of the evidence of good beginnings to subsequently deteriorating reigns. For Caligula the sequence is brief: various measures judicial, censorial and administrative (15,4-16,1); then magistrates, equites, populus, Italy, regna (16,2-3), closed by a last instance of courting popularity (16,4); magistracies (17,1), distributions (17,2), shows (18-20), buildings (21). The last two rubrics are both arranged internally to spread outwards from Rome through Italy to the provinces. Military affairs are delayed to the build-up to his murder (43-48). Nero 11ff. starts emphatically with shows (11-13), moves through magistracies (14) and jurisdiction (15,1) to the senate (15,2), city (16,1), and government censorial, religious and civil (16,2-17). Military policy (18) and peregrinations (19,1-2) provide a conclusion that leaves us at extreme
geographical limits (the Caspian Gates). Domitian's good or variable beginnings involve shows (4,1-4), distributions (4,4), building (5), warfare external and internal (6), innovations in matters censorial, administrative and military (7), jurisdiction and supervision of the legal system (8,1-2); supervision, administrative and censorial, over magistrates and equites (8,2-3); and over Vestal Virgins and other religious matters (8,3-5).

Of the administration of the remaining four emperors there is little to be said. Otho had no reign worth speaking of; that of Vitellius, such as it was, was in the hands of actors, charioteers and a freedman (12). Galba too was in the hands of his associates and decisions affecting various ranks of men and aspects of government were made at their whim (14,3-15). Not even Titus is found governing: a fact which perhaps adds to the impression that this favourite of fortune and darling of the people was not a flesh-and-blood emperor.30

Despite, then, very substantial variations in the way they are put together in each life, the headings under which Suetonius views a reign are remarkably constant. Once they are laid out, it is immediately apparent that there is no point in looking for literary forebears. 'Sie entstammen also nicht der Literatur oder dem Zwang einer Gattung, sondern dem Leben.' (Steidle 112f.). That is to say, Suetonius draws on the traditional compartments of public life or the hierarchies and divisions which governed the way Romans customarily perceived public life.

This reflection prompted Steidle (though he was discussing the Caesars in general) to emphasise the links with Roman laudationes, especially as preserved in elogia. From his valuable discussion it emerges that such topics as honores, victories, buildings, benefactions, games, laws passed, colonies founded must have been the traditional stuff
of any laudation of a Roman aristocrat. Yet though these confirm the 'Romanness' of Suetonius' approach, they do not touch on what is specifically imperial. Indeed an emperor was a Roman aristocrat, but he was also a great deal more, and Suetonius' analysis acknowledges the fact. In this respect Augustus' Res Gestae might be expected to offer a closer parallel, and it was long ago conjectured that Suetonius' method drew its inspiration thence. But the Res Gestae is much too traditional and 'republican' in its scope: honours, military res gestae and financial benefactions (including, of course, donatives, congiaria, games and building) are detailed fully enough and legislation is at least mentioned. But the document no more gives a full account of the real social, political and administrative achievements of the reign than it does of the nature of Augustus' power.

The annalistic tradition, of course, dealt with emperors, and there is little doubt that the vast majority of the items of information Suetonius adduces, at least for the public life of the Caesars, were drawn from the historians. But it was no business of the annalist to split the functions and activities of an emperor into types. There are, however, a couple of passages in Tacitus worth taking into consideration. At the start of the Histories (i,4-11) he surveys the situation of the empire in January 69, summarising his survey as 'qualis status urbis, quae mens exercituum, quis habitus provinciarum, quid in toto terrarum orbe validum' etc. The descent is hierarchical: 'patres...primores equitem...populi pars integra...clientes libertique...plebs sordida...' (4); then the 'miles urbanus', the crucial factor in this particular context (5). When he has finished with the city ('et hic quidem Romae') he turns to the provinces (8-11) to which Italy is ironically appended as one of the 'inermes provinciae'. Here then we see both geographical
and social hierarchies as the basis for analysis of the parts of the empire. They are applied more specifically to imperial administration in the survey of the early years of Tiberius (Ann. 4, 6): senate and magistrates; equites as publicani and as procurators ('spectatissimo cuique'); plebs and provinces; and finally the domus Caesaris, freedmen and slaves.

These parallels, such as they are, serve only to confirm that Suetonius' approach would have seemed natural to a Roman, not to suggest its source. The division of imperial activity into religious, military and civil was doubtless also self-evident to a Roman; at least, the oppositions of 'res divinae et humanae' and of 'domi militiaeque' were traditional. However, it is worth noticing that the king's functions were divided by Aristotle and at least one subsequent Greek theorist into priesthood, generalship and jurisdiction. But topics like censorial control and supervision of public order fall outside the Greek pattern.

One final tradition ought to be taken into consideration, that of antiquarian research. Antiquarianism was Suetonius' personal literary background, and it was from scholarly work that he acquired the habit of mind that enabled him to split up diverse information into headings and subheadings, whether types of clothing, different aspects of ludi, or categories of swear-words. It would be particularly interesting to know whether the Roman antiquarian, notably Varro in his Antiquitates, used anything like the Suetonian disposition in dealing with the respublica and its institutions. At least a hint is given by Valerius Maximus' arrangement of a series of anecdotes on the theme 'de Institutis antiquis' (2, i-vi). The first chapter collects edifying anecdotes of old Roman morals in the family context (esp. of uxorial fidelity). Then
he moves on to the unimpeachable standard set by the senate and magistrates (ii,1-8); the old rituals of the equester ordo, including the transvectio (ii,9); the respectful behaviour of the populus in war (iii,1). From military institutions he 'marches on' (his own metaphor) ad urbana castra, to the civil equivalent of the camp, which he sees in the theatre (iv,1); and a detailed account follows of the institution of ludi (2-7). The next chapter (v) is a ragbag: the first golden statue (1), the publication of the ius civile (2), the establishment of the venificii quaestio (3) the reason why tibicines wear masks (4), the old style of public feast (5), the worship of Febris (6); this miscellany might fairly be summarised as caerimoniae and mos civilis. The final chapter turns attention abroad to the laudable institutes of foreign peoples (vi).

The parallel is only partial, but there are certainly some relevant points. Family is distinguished from state (compare vita publica and domestica in Suetonius); Rome from abroad; the ordines from each other; the military from the civil; and games, law and religion form the main components of civil institutions. The common factor may be seen, as by Steidle, in the facts of Roman life, the structure of Roman society. But it is a fair guess that Valerius' arrangement is derivative, and if we knew more it might emerge that Suetonius' approach to the emperor was an 'antiquarian' one. But this is certainly not to say that it was inappropriate, and does not reflect the way that Romans in general perceived their emperor.

Conclusions

The Caesars are unlike any previous specimen of ancient political biography that we know. Their heroes are neither offered as participants
in exciting events, nor as moral paragons. The outlook is coolly critical, the style drily factual. In trying to explain what made possible this approach, it is vital to recall that Suetonius was by training a scholar, and the author of biographies of literary figures. But to account for his depiction of an emperor that is not enough. By no means does he limit himself to standard 'biographical' topics. The heart of his analysis of a reign owes little or nothing to biographical tradition. Aspects of administration and the virtues and vices of rule are topics that could only suit an emperor; and though certain literary traditions (encomium and possibly antiquarian research into institutions) provide illuminating analogies, they are not enough to explain why he depicted emperors in these terms. An emperor is a historical figure. Inevitably the way any author represents him is largely controlled by the way earlier historians had done the same thing. But in that the Caesars differ in form from the traditional annals, it is pointless to try to account for the work at literary level alone; the net must be cast wider, to embrace conceptions of the Emperor in general, and the author's social and personal background in particular. To these questions the following chapters are directed.
PART B

THE SOCIAL CONTEXT
Chapter III

Status and status-consciousness

Literary tradition tends to be a potent element in the make-up of any ancient writing. But it is certainly not the only one, and in order to appreciate Suetonius' presentation of the emperor, it is necessary to ask in what respects it reflects the author's own standing and background. About the biographer's life we are, at least for this purpose, remarkably well informed, and what is known is enough to raise high expectations of the interest of his viewpoint.

Controversy flourishes over Suetonius' career. It is enough here to recall what is basic and unquestioned, and it is worth emphasising (because so easily taken for granted) from what a lucky convergence of disparate sources our information derives. From his own writings the basic background emerges: his father an equestrian officer who fought in the camp of the unfortunate Otho, but then, surely, transferred his allegiance to the victorious Flavian cause; his grandfather one who moved on the periphery of Caligula's court-circle, though in what capacity or what status we do not know, nor what favour he enjoyed from this or later emperors; Tranquillus himself enjoyed at Rome under Domitian the standard rhetorical education of the upper classes of the empire, attending the lectures of a certain Princeps, gathering practical experience by attendance at the courts. From Pliny's letters we discover the fact, and several details, of the patronage of one of the great men of his day, dedicated to a renaissance of studia, letters, who saw in Suetonius one fitted for promotion by his learning, upright character and respectability; and who gave him advice on advocacy (1,18), leverage in the purchase of an estate (1,24), the chance of military promotion
which he abandoned (3,8), encouragement in his writing (5,10), perhaps a post on his staff in Bithynia, and certainly procured him from the emperor a rare and valuable legal privilege (10,94-5). Pliny never lived to see the floruit of his protégé, but where the Letters fail, three further sources supply crucial information. Misfortune has deprived us of the preface to the Caesars; but it happens that a Byzantine antiquarian who had a certain admiration for 'Tranquillus' mentions that the work was dedicated to the then praetorian prefect Septicius Clarus (Lydus de Mag.ii,6). One cannot infer from this that Septicius had replaced Pliny as his patron, for literary dedication, as of the first volume of Pliny's Letters to the same man, could be purely complimentary; but it does indicate the continuance of links between men (a 'coterie' is too much) distinguished simultaneously in public life and in letters from the reign of Trajan to that of Hadrian. To this information another admirer and imitator adds (vita Hadr.11,3): Suetonius held the office of secretary ab epistulis to Hadrian, and was relieved of his post simultaneously with Septicius. About the implications for Suetonius' views of Hadrian we can only guess; the vital fact is that this scholarly author held office under this dilettante emperor. To all this is added the lucky discovery of an honorific inscription from Hippo Regius in Africa (AE 1953, 73), the later see of St. Augustine. The important point that it demonstrates is that the office of ab epistulis followed two previous ones, those of a bibliothecis and a studiis; so that we can speak of a Palatine 'career', stretching, if the latest arguments are right, from the end of Trajan's reign to Hadrian's African tour of 128 AD. What remains unknown is Suetonius' origo. Hippo itself, or Ostia where a priesthood of Vulcan is known, are possibilities suggested by the inscription; but not the only ones, and though the author would
have approved of scholarly debate over origins, perhaps the most
interesting point to emerge from the debate is that neither his public
career nor his writings would be affected by whether he stemmed from
the centre or the outskirts of the empire. The distinguished and
the literate of the empire came from an ever-widening geographical
circle; but the centre of their universe geographically, politically
and stylistically, was Rome.

What gives all this accumulated information its interest is the
relation it bears to what is already known about Roman society of the
period: the continuity between the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian, the
importance attached to education and learning, the growth of an imperial
bureaucracy, the workings of patronage and the centrality of the emperor.
The facts of Suetonius' career are important because they place him not
only in relation to, but close to the heart of the society of his day.

How then did this background affect his views? Above all, can we detect
the perspective of the equestrian official?

Such a viewpoint is potentially of considerable interest. Our
knowledge of the early empire is dominated by sources (Tacitus, the
younger Pliny, even Cassius Dio) whose views are patently 'senatorial';
for whom the conflict between senate and emperor is the focus of interest,
who are supposed by many modern scholars to see the emperor 'from outside'
as an essentially threatening force, and to judge him too easily by his
treatment of the senate. From an imperial secretary one might hope
for a view from the 'inside'. In 1958 Francesco della Corte published
a book that aimed precisely to demonstrate the 'mentalità del ceto equestre'
in Suetonius (Syme's study of Tacitus as a consular historian was
published in the same year). He discerned in him the prophet of a new
generation, breaking clear from senatorial prejudices (and the influence
of Pliny) to write for a circle of equestrian civil servants (centering on Septicius). Yet della Corte's is a lone voice: most would echo the disappointment of Herman Peter in finding in Suetonius 'die uns bekannten Illusionen jenes senatorischen Kreises wieder'.\textsuperscript{16} Reviewers at once pointed out the fallacies of della Corte's approach.\textsuperscript{17} The annalistic tradition could not be contrasted as exclusively 'senatorial': the elder Pliny was also an eques. Paratore rejected the idea of either senatorial or equestrian perspective and revived De Sanctis' characterisation of Suetonius as 'the man of [sic] the street'.\textsuperscript{18} More recently Cizek (1977) has attempted a compromise position: Suetonius indeed represents views of the circle of Septicius, but they are not views hostile to the senate, so much as moderate and conciliatory, following the Ciceronian ideal of 'concordia ordinum'.\textsuperscript{19}

For all dissent, however, della Corte had a case.\textsuperscript{20} The contrast between the \textit{Caesars} and Tacitus' \textit{Annals} is more than one of genre. In terms of literary history, however close the two in date,\textsuperscript{21} Tacitus looks back, the last of the republican annalists, while Suetonius looks forward, the founder of a new style of historiography.\textsuperscript{22} The different forms suit different purposes. Annalistic form originally made possible the study of politics and the dynamics of a power-struggle in a society where the annual rotation of magistrates was of fundamental importance. Suetonius' static \textit{per species} biography lends itself to analysis of how over a period of years an emperor did his job. This is an approach that suits admirably the 'golden age' of Pax Augusta: indeed part of Funaioli's sharp criticism of Suetonius was that he so accurately reflected this "wüsteste Pause im Leben der Menschheit, in jener Periode allgemeiner Welterschlafung".\textsuperscript{23} Political and military 'events' have become the exception, not the way things work; the real concern is the
administration of a vast empire. Such developments as there are consist of mere refinements in the methods of sustaining this vast society in peace, order and law. 24

In the subsequent chapters this point of view will be developed further. But at the outset it is necessary to come to a clearer understanding of Suetonius' views on Roman society. The real failing of Svetonio eques Romanus is that it rests on a misconception of the place of the eques in Roman society and of the nature of the imperial service. Since 1958 understanding of these questions has moved a long way forward. The consilium principis can no longer be seen as a sort of imperial cabinet replacing the senate, nor Hadrian as a radical reformer in this field. 25 Since the work of Brunt, Badian and Nicolet on the ordo equester it has ceased to be plausible to look for conflict between senate and equestrians as social classes at least in the Republic, and the same arguments naturally extend to the Principate. 26 On a social level the great divide is not above but below the equestrian rank, between the landowner, the educated, and the army-officer on the one hand and the peasant, the illiterate, and the foot-soldier on the other. 27 It is worth looking again at the picture of society in Suetonius to show that there is to be found neither conflict between senator and equestrian (della Corte), nor reconciliation (Cizek), nor even undue influence of senatorial illusions (Peter), let alone the view of the humble 'man in the street' (Paratore), but a perspective that suits a man of rank in a firmly hierarchical society.

1. The social hierarchy

The equites Romani formed not a class in the modern sense, united either by a common socio-economic background or by occupation, nor simply
a group of a certain degree of wealth, but an ordo: a rank of dignity within a social hierarchy defined by the state, standing in a known relationship to the other ranks that formed the totality of the state. It was axiomatic to the Romans that men, even citizens, were not equal; they were, and must be in the ideal state, finely graded, into gradus dignitatis. Property qualification remained a fundamental index of respect for the Roman, and he celebrated Servius' creation of the census system as the establishment 'omnis in civitate discriminis ordinumque' (Livy i,42 as Cicero Rep.i,39f.). But fortuna alone was not enough; it must be combined with dignitas, rank conferred by the state in recognition of virtus by means of honores, and it was the task of the censor to examine the worthiness as well as the wealth of the citizens.

Suetonius is not merely particularly conscious of the role and dignity of the ordo equester, but of the social hierarchy as a whole, and of the place of each grade within it. The expression 'omnes ordines' is used several times to describe the whole of Roman society, though taking women and children into account, 'sexum aetatem ordinem omnem' offers fuller differentiation. Among the ordines two merit specific identification, the senatorial and the equestrian; together they form, as regularly under the empire, uterque ordo. There is no doubt as to which ordo has seniority: the senate is amplissimus, though on one occasion the epithet is extended to 'both' ordines. The other ordines are not worth specifying, though once in the de Grammaticis he speaks of the ordo libertinus; he seems to adhere to the Ciceronian pattern of 'senatus, equester ordo, omnes ordines.' Whether or not he would describe the populus as one of 3 ordines, as Pliny the Elder in a famous passage, is not made apparent.
Suetonius' view is marked, as Gascou (1976) puts it, by 'une conception hiérarchique de la société romaine'. The most evident sign of his acceptance of the *gradus dignitatis* is his use of them in his organisation of material. It has been shown in detail in the previous chapter how the two overlapping hierarchies, social and geographical, act as a basic principle of organisation in the chapters on the administration of the state. No matter what the literary precedents (if any), this is more than a convenient system for arranging facts. It implies the assumption by the author that the component parts of the *res publica* are precisely its ranks of dignity. Organisation and ranking of facts goes hand in hand with the assumption of organisation and ranking among humans. Moreover, apart from the chapters on administration, items are again and again arranged according to *gradus dignitatis*: the moderation of Tiberius (30-32) the liberality of Augustus (41) the malignity of Caligula (35) are shown as affecting all from high to low in turn. (Further examples will be discussed below.) It is also relevant to recall that a similar principle of ranking is applied to the discussion of family, dependants and friends (above p.28). For Suetonius hierarchy is more than a convenience: it is a habit of thought.

A further indication of this status-consciousness may be found in the frequency with which Suetonius introduces a character, particularly in an anecdote, with no more than a reference to his status. Equites R. abound. So the man who threw his pen and books at Claudius in court is introduced simply as 'equitem quidem Romanum...' (Cl.15,4). This is not to say that the author is giving undue prominence to men of his order: use of the label where appropriate is regular in Roman authors, as in inscriptions. He is no less generous in status indications for other sorts and conditions, senators, especially *viri triumphales*, *consulares*
and praetorii, laticlavii, for primipilares (upon whom alone among soldiers rank conferred permanent status), veterani, libertini and so on. What is unusual is that Suetonius so often suppresses the nomina of the characters involved. Tacitus labels as many equites R., but he never omits to give the name at the same time. He may for instance mention that many senators and equites joined Flavius Sabinus on the Capitol without naming them ('quorum nomina tradere haud promptum est'): that was because so many claimed falsely to have been there (Hist.iii,69). The contrast is doubtless due to genre: one function of Annales (except for the elder Cato) was to record the names of those who distinguished themselves, that of biography to record the life of the subject and no more. Suetonius retains the minimum relevant to his narration. But the fact that it is the status indication that remains is significant. The Claudian anecdote cited above is immediately preceded by one in which the emperor is called an old fool by a mere litigatur Graeculus. The juxtaposition of status, Graeculus and eques, is deliberate. 'Why, even an eques Romanus...' One may suspect that his status indications are rarely gratuitous. It is a vir consularis (no name) who records in his Annals an absurd detail of Tiberius' cruelty (61,6) - so let the witness be believed. When Claudius made incest between uncle and niece legal, none could be found to follow his example but a libertinus and a primipilaris, whose weddings he attended (26,3) - how rare and bizarre for the ruler to attend the officia of the humble. Particularly when a character suffers at the hands of the emperor a status indication is likely to have emotive force; this is a point to which I shall return in discussing the relations of the Caesars with the ordines. At present the only point is that Suetonius draws attention to status, and in doing so accepts the implications of the social
2. Mobility within the hierarchy.

Not only is Suetonius acutely aware of the nuances of the formal stratification of Roman society; he is alive to the constant movement of individuals up and down the ladder.

The lives of the Grammarians and Rhetors are relevant here. To give details of paternity, status and origin in a biographical sketch, however brief, was a standard part of the ancient scholarly tradition. But in the de Grammaticis the author has a theme, the rise in status of literary education and its practitioners in Rome. Grammar was once despised and practised by semigraeci (1,2), then given a boost by two equites R. (3,1), and finally so rose in popularity that even clarissimi viri put their hand to it (3,4). The story, like Cicero's Brutus, stops short at its climax: the author modestly suppresses the greatest social triumph of γραμματική, that it produced an ab epistulis. Similarly Rhetoric, once harried by the censors (25,1), gradually became honesta, through practice by a praetor, consuls, triumviral dynasts and finally emperors (25,2-6). As the Arts themselves rose, so did their exponents: Rhetoric flourished so that 'nonnulli ex infima fortuna in ordinem senatorium atque ad summos honores procceserint' (25,7). Not enough of the rhetors' Lives survive to illustrate the point precisely. But Voltacilius Pilutus was once not merely a slave, but a chained door-keeper, yet rose through manumission 'ob ingenium ac studium litterarum' to teach Pompey and storm the senatorial bastion of historiography. Epidius had been censored for calumny, Sex. Clodius was a mere Sicilian (28 and 29); while Albucius Silus, an erstwhile dignitary of Novaria, was so conscious of the status of his Italy as to exorciate a proconsul for treating it
as a province (30,6). We may add that Quintilian was awarded the ornamenta consularia, and that the last rhetor of the book, Julius Tiro, rose to the praetorship (Macé 74).

The background of the grammarians is almost universally servile, or peregrine (8 Pompilius a Syrian). The lives illustrate the power of literary studies to bring manumission and social promotion (explicitly of Staberius Eros 13, as of Voltacilius above and of Terence in the vita). They also illustrate more generally the unpredictability of life, in downs as well as ups. Antonius Gnepho (7) was born free but exposed and manumitted by his foster parent. Melissus too was exposed (21), but because his parents quarrelled, and later was claimed by his mother; but he preferred to remain slave to Maecenas, which won him manumission. Valerius Cato was no libertus, as alleged, but an orphan stripped of his capital by the chances of civil war (11). Orbilius (9) was another orphan, his parents foully murdered by enemies and his inheritance taken. He climbed through public service as an apparitor and in the army, and in early retirement took up schoolmastering in his hometown of Beneventum; thence to Rome and fame. It was a rarity for an ingenuus like Orbilius to practise γραμματική: only in desperation at his failure to secure a posting as centurion did Valerius Probus turn to scholarship (24).

This theme of status pervades the de Grammaticis, to the exclusion of themes of literary development and so to the despair of literary historians. The Caesars displays the same theme, but on a grander scale and at greater length. Suetonius is scrupulous about establishing the precise degree of dignity of an emperor's family. How many consuls and triumphators could the gens Claudia muster? (Tib.1,2). Who was the first Sulpicius to confer nobility on the family? (Galb.3,2). The scholar is undismayed by the nature of his sources, invective and
panegyric: some decried libertine origin in the Vitellii, others claimed an aboriginal Latin family that had lapsed from the patriciate; Suetonius will only put his money on what is certain, the equestrian grandfather, procurator Augusti (Vit.1,2). He has no need to spell out, as Tacitus, 'quae equestris nobilitas est' (Agr.4). The slanders of Mark Antony do not fool the researcher: the Octavii were a cadet branch of an erstwhile patrician family, of high distinction in Velitrae where they remained, 'seu fortuna seu voluntate' (Aug.2,1-2). Even a prince may slander his family: but it was vain for Caligula to accuse Livia of sporting a decurion among her progenitors, for the public records demonstrated that Aufidius Lurco held office at Rome (Cal.23,2). If the emperors from Tiberius to Galba are models of pedigree, those of A.D.69 are not. Vespasian is the most astonishing document of mobility; but again precision is everything. His father was not a primipilari or even a centurion invalided out, but a publican: the evidence is epigraphic (Vesp.1,2).

Upward mobility is most extensively documented, inevitably given the subjects of his lives. But degradation often hovers in the wings. The four sons of P. Vitellius met very different fates: all were senatorial, but while his brothers rose in varying degrees, Quintus was expelled from the ranks by Tiberius for 'unsuitability' (Vit.2,2). Servius Galba became emperor; his brother lost his capital, was forbidden by Tiberius to put in for a proconsulship, and committed suicide (Galb. 3,4).

The same concern for status and dignity leads to careful analysis of each emperor's cursus honorum before accession. Of course this was an indispensible part of the biographical tradition, particularly at Rome; but that Suetonius had a conscious interest in the fluctuations
of dignitas can be seen most clearly in cases where dignitas met rebuffs. Tiberius' early career mounts to a peak of distinction culminating at the point of his retirement to Rhodes (10,1); then declines to a nadir of degradation when he abandons Roman dress (13,1); and after return rises a second time to glory (20). Claudius' youth is a story of indignities: he is assigned a barbarian as pedagogue (2,2), underrated by Augustus, and driven by Tiberius to despair of dignitas (5). That the equester ordo twice elected him patron demonstrates not his popularity with that class, but the modest degree of public respect he enjoyed despite all humiliations (5-6,1). Caligula allowed him the consulship (7); but also subjected him to public ignominia (9,2). It is surely a merit of Suetonius' account of Caesar to see his career in its true light as an aristocrat's ruthless struggle to vindicate his dignitas, spurred on by indignation at slights (indignatio 4,1; nullo modo tolerandum existimans 17,2; iniuria instinctus 19,2; and the sayings of 29,1; 30,4 and 72).

Likewise with marriages contracted in the course of a career; the biographer is scrupulous to establish status, for it reflects on the husband. Claudius is engaged or married in turn to a descendant of Augustus, of the great Camillus, to a daughter of a triumphator, then of a consular, then of a relative (26,1-2). The latter, Barbatus, though distinguished, held no consulate: so there is here a steady decline. There is no special credit in marrying the daughter of an eques R. Only the special circumstance that Arrecinus had been praetorian prefect made him a suitable father-in-law for Titus ('patre eq. R. sed...'), and the next wife is contrasted as splendidi generis - the family was consular (4,2). As for marrying the delicata of an eques, only latterly vindicated as the freeborn daughter of a scriba
quaestorius... (Vesp. 3, see n. 44).

Much more detail could be adduced that serves not simply to titillate and amuse but to trace dignitas, rising and falling. A future emperor should hardly be pelted with turnips at Hadrumetum (Vesp. 4, 3 'non sine dignatione... nisi quod...') nor run so short of cash as to be forced to put his family in lodgings (Vit. 7, 2). Suetonius' account of Vitellius' death falls short of Tacitus' in literary art: but excels it in the excruciating catalogue of indignities (Vit. 16 f. and T. Hist. iii, 84 f.).

Suetonius' world is one in which the ladder of social standing is fixed and immobile; but the place of any individual on it is subject to violent and unpredictable change. It is right that the deity whose presence is most keenly felt is Fortuna. Twice Galba dreamed that the goddess visited him, on his coming of age, and immediately before his death: in between he kept a shrine for her at his summer place at Tusculum (4, 3 and 18, 2). Suetonius is taken for a superstitious man: he may have been, but as far as the Caesars goes his obsession limits itself to two points, the rise to supreme power, and the fall from it. Titus lectures two overambitious patricians, 'principatum fato dari' (9, 1). Was he not right? The golden dice thrown by Tiberius still glittered under the water at the fountain near Padua (14, 3). Dreams, portents, prophecies, coincidences, obiter dicta of former emperors, even the predictions of foreign gods might have something in them. But above all the horoscope was in vogue, and believed: an imperial genesis could cost a man his head (Vesp. 14 and Dom. 10, 3).

One further point should be made. There are for Suetonius only two routes to social preferment; public service, particularly in the army, and literary education. Viri illustres for him, apart from Caesars,
are literary men. Valerius Probus turned to grammar as an alternative to military service; Orbilius combined the two (above). Suetonius himself both tried his hand at rhetoric, and at least applied for a military tribunate (above). The two are not even necessarily alternatives: the elder Pliny combined *equestres militiae* with *liberalia studia* (vita Plini, Roth p.300). What seems to be absent is the role of the acquisition of wealth as a means of social promotion. Contrast the world of Petronius and Juvenal with its *captatores* and *negotiatores*. Trade is conspicuously absent from Suetonius' pages: it appears only in discredited invective (e.g. Cassius of Parma on Augustus, 4,2) or as a sign of desperation (Vespasian's descent 'ad mangonicos quaestus sustinendae dignitatis causa', 4,3 almost a contradiction in terms). Claudius' offer of civic privileges to the ship-building industry is a special case, prompted by the overriding need of the corn supply (18,2-19).

The reason for this silence is that though wealth newly won (as opposed to old landed wealth) conveyed enormous influence in Roman society, it could convey no respectability. Military service and public life (the old Roman pursuits) and culture (taken over from the Greeks not without misgivings) could do so, and Suetonius is only concerned with the spectrum of honor. He would make a poor spokesman for a commercial class.

3. The emperor and the *ordines*.

If Suetonius' view of society is such, how does it affect his judgement of a Caesar?

First, an emperor is seen to have his own place within the hierarchy, though indeed it is one of preeminence. He is entitled to
a degree of respect. Two feel themselves 'reduced to ranks' by insubordination, Claudius by the disrespect of the Ostians, Vespasian by the downright insults of Helvidius: the expression used, 'in ordinem coactus' is only appropriate to an officer or magistrate. The emperor stands at the tip of the Roman pyramid, its fastigium; but to be persuaded that this tip surpasses principes and reges and mounts into the heavens is sheer madness (Cal.22,2). It is firmly anchored to the basis of Roman society, and respect is demanded for the res publica, its officers and organs, both populus and senate (e.g. Tib.26ff., Dom. 13). The concept of excessive status, nimii honores, is clearly defined (Jul.76,1): res divinae precede and are firmly distinguished from the human plane in the Roman hierarchy. We may sympathise with Caesar when he refuses 'a primo ordine in secundum...detrudi' (29,1). But in his struggle for dignitas he did not know where to stop: when the senate approached him 'honorigentissimis...decres' he might have seen that he had achieved his aim, instead of insulting them (78,1). The ability to pitch status correctly is the virtue of civilitas, which Suetonius played a significant part in formulating (below ch.X).

Secondly, how far are emperors judged on their treatment of individual ordines? It is not always an easy thing to gauge Suetonius' opinions. He is sparing with explicit judgements; often the implications of a fact set down nakedly can only be gathered from the context. When virtutes and vitia are at issue the judgement is clear; but many of the relevant items occur in the 'administrative' sections where good and bad are mixed, and then a subjective judgement must be made on the prejudices that lie behind the item. Nevertheless, at least the previous discussion should provide a firm basis for inferring these prejudices.
To begin with, is it in fact true, as della Corte supposed, that Suetonius' judgement is more favourable towards those who enjoyed good relations with the ordo equester? It is just possible that he does give unusual prominence to items involving equites (though it is hard to know how to control this impression). But what is certainly false is that he approves of rulers who favoured this order against the senate. The decisive passage is Vespasian's resolution of a quarrel between an eques and a senator: 'though an eques should not insult a senator', he rules, 'he may properly (civile fasque) answer him back', so demonstrating that the ordines differed not in libertas but in dignitas (9,2). Vespasian takes absolutely the right view of the hierarchy and reinforces it. 58

A convenient test-case might be the life of Domitian. Gsell suggested that Suetonius took a more balanced view than the senatorial Pliny because of this emperor's reforms in the imperial service - 'quaedam ex maximis officiis inter libertinos equitesque R. communicavit' (7,2). But Pliny makes his Domitian so black because his purpose is rhetorical: Suetonius' approach is ever balanced. He sees both good and bad in Domitian (3,2). There is no sign that discrimination between senators and equestrians tips the balance in either direction. Senators and equites benefit alike from Domitian's generosity (4,5) senators alone are detailed as suffering from his cruelty (10,2-4). Where Suetonius' account of Domitian is unusual is in giving credit not for any favour shown to equestrians, but for conscientious administration. 60 Nero's proposal to exterminate the ordo senatorius and hand over power to equites and liberti is given as an example of indiscriminate savagery (37,3). Caligula's declaration of war on the senate and his support for 'equestri ordini et populo' is reported in a highly hostile context.
(49,1). Senate and equites, in fact, were not to be set at odds.

Did Suetonius approve of emperors who favoured or disfavoured any individual section of the state against another? He was certainly aware that an emperor might have different appeal to different sectors: Domitian's death was taken 'indifferenter' by the populus, 'gravissime' by the army, while the senate was beside itself with joy (23,1; equites are not specified). Similarly it was the populus that rejoiced at the death of Tiberius (75), so mean with shows (47) and so harsh on riots (37,2); there were those who missed Nero (57), so sensitive to popularitas (53); and Galba was honoured in death by the senate alone (23). Some awareness of the conflicting political interests of senate, mob and army emerges. Yet perhaps more remarkable is the extent to which he glosses over and conceals any such conflict. The notices of posthumous reactions bear little relation to the preceding narrative and are of little more than antiquarian interest.

Nero and Caligula are preeminently rulers who made deliberate appeal to the populus at the risk of antagonising upper class opinion. Suetonius supplies the necessary details (Cal.15-20; Ner.11-13 and 21-25). Tacitus recounts with distaste how the plebs sordida missed Nero (Hist. i,4); Suetonius by contrast has 'non defuerunt qui' as the exception to the public joy and speaks of the plebs running through the city pilleata (57,1). Nero had provoked 'omnium in se odium' (45,2): his war-tax had fallen on omnes ordines (44,2). Not only did he plot to poison the senate, but to let loose fire and wild beasts among the populace (43,1). His saevitia affected senators from the noblest down (36-37); but despite dropping the senate's name in his prayers 'sibi ac populo R.', he failed to spare the populace, and the Great Fire is confidently ascribed to his machinations (37,3-38, on consular evidence). In his salad days, his
liberalitas, clementia and comitas had beamed on omnes ordines, both senate and plebs (10).

Equally with Caligula. Though it was the senate on which he openly declared war (49) and the senate which celebrated liberty on his death (60), it was not only the senate he maltreated (26,2-3). Similar pride and violence were turned against 'ceteros...ordines': equites were insulted and killed in the theatre, and so was the turba, and famine was declared against the populus (26,4-5); and, (again hierarchically), he vilified the senate, harried the equester ordo and wished the populus R. had but one neck (30,2). His jealousy affected all down from the nobility, through the son of a primipilaris to the slave king of Nemi 'tam abiectae condicionis tamque extremae sortis' (34-35).

And so on.

In fact what Suetonius likes is a sort of consensus. Despite the differentiated posthumous reactions, Domitian was 'terribilis cunctis et invisus' (14,1). Galba ended up 'universis ordinibus offensis' (16,1): little wonder, for he condemned 'claros ex utroque ordine viros', was mean with civitas R. and the ius III liberorum, and refused the requests of all from the decuriae iudicum to the populus R. (14,3-15,2); and above all antagonised the milites (16).

On the other hand his true hero is Augustus. The devotion for him was shared by all (57-8): witness not only the usual senatus consulta but celebrations by the equites R. and by omnes ordines. The feeling was spontaneous and universal: those who acclaimed him pater patriae were 'universi repentino maximoque consensu', the plebs and senate alike (58,1).

Under such conditions Suetonius' ideal can hardly be the favouring or disfavouring of any one ordo against the others. What then is the imperial ideal? It is, I would argue, the acknowledgement, acceptance
and bolstering of the hierarchy itself.

The two great rulers who emerge from Suetonius' pages are Augustus and Vespasian. (Titus is an acknowledged freak.) Both saved their country from the horrors of civil war, restoring law and order; they reimposed on society a firm structure based upon Roman tradition, eliminating the old confusion. Augustus returned to the senate its pristine splendor, purging it of a 'deformi et incondita turba' and expelling indignissimi (35,1); and he reviewed the equites frequently, renewing a lapsed custom (38,3). So too Vespasian renovated the amplissimos ordines, decontaminating them from dignissimis, replenishing them from Italy and the provinces with honestissimo quoque (9,2). Augustus purged the populus too, restoring ius pristinum to elections (a return rather to days before electoral corruption than simply to the pre-triumviral republic); above all he kept the citizen blood pure and free from corruption, the threat being not racial impurity, but a flood of those undeserving of honor (40,2-4). Like Vespasian he saw the towns of Italy as a reservoir of honesti (46). His liberality extended to omnibus ordinibus (41,1). The seating of spectators at games had been lax confusion: he restored proper ordo (ordinavit), giving the first rank to senators, keeping libertini out of the orchestra, separating the military from the people (here again the milites appear as a quasi-ordo) (44,1).

I note in passing that public performances recur as a context where ordo is important, for since the lex Roscia the ranks of seats had served as a symbol for the ranks of Roman society. Caligula deliberately let the plebs into the equestrian rows to provoke trouble (26,4). Claudius extended the principle of order into the circus (21); and Domitian tightening up by stopping promiscuous seating in equite
In general Augustus showed respect for rank: not only in his famous civility, showing both deference to his senatorial peers and comitas to the plebs (53), but in his private social life. His hospitality was 'non sine magno ordinum hominumque dilectu'; no libertinus but Mena with honorary ingenuitas sat at his board, and an ex-speculator was an exception (74). 65

The distinction of libertini from ingenui is, naturally, a theme of importance. Only disaster forced Augustus to enlist manumitted slaves, and then he avoided mixing them with ingenui or even arming them in the same style (25,2). His own liberti he controlled with severity: he killed a favourite freedman who proved to have affaires with matrons (67) as Caesar had done (48). Claudius stands in contrast: though he is exemplary in stopping libertini who pose as equites R. (25,1), he cannot control his own (28). What (for Suetonius) is so scandalous about the often cited figure of 35 senators and 300 equites killed by Claudius is that his liberti were responsible (29,2).

In general two great cardinal principles emerge. The first is that confusion of the ordines is intolerable. An emperor should not allow liberti to perform magisterial functions, even dropping a flag at mock races (Ner.22,2). Liberality has its status side too: let an emperor reward citharoedoi and murmilloes, but not with the estates of viri triumphales (Ner.30,2). Conversely, the upper classes must not be degraded, for instance by being made to perform in public. An eques Romanus on an elephant is an unedifying sight (Ner.11,2). 66 It is particularly because an emperor has the power to raise men 'infimi generis ad amplissimos honores' that he must beware (Jul.72,cf. Aug.66). Indiscriminate distribution of honours helped to earn Caesar his

(8,3).
murder (76, 1 and 2).

Secondly a man's status earns him consideration, even from an emperor. This was felt particularly strongly in the judicial context, and Suetonius is liberal with status indications in enumerating those an emperor executed. A man of status merits dignified punishment: a 'vir equestris ordinis' should not be condemned to operate a bilge-pump (Tib. 51, 2). All men deserve a hearing before sentence, even a scriba quaestorius, let alone a praetura functus; they happened to have been innocent (C1. 38, 2). Galba condemned many 'ex utroque ordine' unheard (14, 2). Condemnation on trivial charges is peculiarly painful to those of exalted status (Dom. 10, 2–3, Vit. 14, 1). It was an old Roman principle that higher status carried an entitlement to preferential treatment in courts of law; and though it is doubtful whether Hadrian made the distinction official by any deliberate reform, it is in this period that the distinction becomes common in the sources between honestiores and humiliores. Caligula branded or condemned to ignominious punishment many 'honesti ordinis', an unusual and striking expression (Cal. 27, 3). Suetonius makes it clear that an emperor ought to accept the same principle.

An emperor who accepted these two principles, that the grades of the hierarchy should not be confused and that high status deserved special treatment, would be greatly limited in his freedom of action. He could neither promote his friends at will nor punish his opponents indiscriminately. The conflict of the early empire, as it emerges from Suetonius' pages, was not between classes, whether senate and equites, or between the two ordines and the plebs and army. Rather it is between the emperor and Roman 'society' as the two sources of success and prestige (or their opposites). The more that privileges and honours,
and thus standing in the hierarchy, came to be the gift of the ruler, the greater became the moral pressure on him to exercise his power according to the rules of the hierarchy, and not his own _arbitrium_. Suetonius would like us to think this ideal was that of _omnes ordines_; of course it was really those, like himself, 'honesti ordinis' who cared.

4. The official on the Principate.

There is no sign that Suetonius questioned the social preeminence of the senate or rejected 'senatorial' ideals. When Caligula fails temporarily to replace the consuls 'fuìt...per triduum sine summa potestate res p.' (26,3). This does not involve any 'illusion' that real power resided in the consuls; but it does imply acceptance of the Roman tradition that the consuls were formally the senior and indispensable magistrates. That was the 'official' view: dating by regnal years was limited to Egypt. But while no conflict of opinion can safely be posited between the equestrian Suetonius and the consular Tacitus, yet there is perhaps a detectable difference in emphasis. It is not easy (perhaps not even justified) to disengage a coherent view of the Principate as a political system from either author; even so some contrasts may be drawn.

Tacitus is no republican; yet he manifests a certain nostalgia for the days of true liberty, and a constant cynicism about human motives and the pursuit of power. The rule of one is at best a harsh necessity. Suetonius too is not without nostalgia, but it is for the antique, not for the republican (see Excursus below). In denying himself substantially the 'dynamic' element of narrative of power-struggle, he denies himself opportunities for cynicism at the expense of the emperor: the _dissimulatio_ so important in Tacitus' presentation of
Tiberius shrinks to a single sentence (42,1). Where there is narrative, that of the civil wars which brought about the transition to the principate, there is no trace of sadness at the passing of the old order. Caesar's motives are questioned (30) and the final verdict is that he abused power and merited death (so at least it was reckoned, 76,1); there is no implication that dominatio is wrong as such.

The introduction of a new order by Augustus is discussed more explicitly (28,1-2). There is nothing here of the devastating counterpoint of Tacitus' presentation of the cases for and against Augustus (Ann.1,9-10) nor of the realistic expose by Dio (liii,2-11) of the charade of the surrender of powers. The return of the res publica is a possibility which Augustus twice considers and rejects (28,1). Suetonius recognises that Augustus' personal advantage is involved in the decision (reputans...se privatum non sine periculo fore...), but the motive is self-protection, not aggrandisement, and it coincides exactly with the public interest ('et illam - sc. rem. p. - plurium arbitrio temere committi'). There is no conflict, as in Tacitus, between considerations of public welfare and of propriety of motivation; the only doubt is whether motivation or effect are more to be applauded (dubium eventu meliore an voluntate). Motivation is established by the citation of a public pronouncement (no doubts are raised over the acceptability of official pronouncements). A final comment by the author allows full and unqualified realisation of these good motives: the novus status was one that none regretted. The chapters that follow (28,3-56) demonstrate how this was achieved; and the claim that acceptance was universal is documented (57-60). Evidence for conspiracies has been removed from notice to a brief postscript to the civil wars (19) and even there more attention is given to the crazed camp-follower who made at
Augustus with a hunting knife than to Varro Murena.

Treatment of the division of provinces is also to the point (47). Augustus takes over for himself such provinces as are neither convenient nor safe for annual sortition (nec facile nec tutum). From the point of view of administration that is well and succinctly put (below p. 142); but it leaves the vital political point unsaid. As Dio put it, while the πρόφασις was to protect the safety of the state, the ἔργον was to leave any form of personal opposition unarmed (liii, 12, 3).

Pax for Tacitus was purchased at the price of libertas. Wirszubski's history of Libertas as a political idea ends with Pliny's Panegyric: principate and liberty were reconciled, leaving liberty empty of any meaningful content. 74 Suetonius merits no discussion in the book, and rightly so. The word libertas appears in his pages, but although it is naturally a word of approval, in Suetonius it is almost without trace of emotive content. 75 Doubtless it would be to Otho's credit if he killed Galba 'rei p. ac libertatis restituendae causa' (12, 2, but this is treated as an idle rumour); and it is to Tiberius' discredit that he betrayed the plans of Drusus to force Augustus to restore libertas (50, 1). But in both cases the word is hardly more than a synonym for the 'pristinum rei. p. statum', 76 without perceptible resonance. The attempts of the senate to assert liberty on Gaius' death are reported factually (Cal. 60; Cl. 10, 3). Tiberius presumably does well to induce 'speciem libertatis quandam' in the senate (30); but what is described is not so much an ideal which would stir a Thrasea as a rather surprising and exaggerated revival of antiquated senatorial functions. The intentions may be laudable, but it is not to be imagined that an emperor who left the wording of diplomatic correspondence to the senate is being offered by an ab epistulis as an ideal (ibid.). There is perhaps a touch
of pathos in the report of the young Augustus' harsh treatment of the Nursines for commemorating their dead 'pro libertate' (12); this part of the Life can be critical, and his behaviour is here shown as excessive. Even so, more poignant use can be made of the anecdote as an epitaph on the fall of the Republic.77

Twice libertas is used of freedom of speech (Aug.54; Vesp.13) but negatively, as an unpleasance to be endured by the good emperor. This author, has, as della Corte observes, little sympathy for the insolence of Helvidius (Vesp.15). Not that this involves a positive rejection of 'senatorial ideals', for a middle way lay 'inter abruptam contumaciam et deforme obsequium' (T. Ann.4,20).78 Still, it is notable that in both passages cited above libertas appears in close association with contumacia and such expressions as 'immodicas altercationes' (Aug.54). If the good emperor endures verbal abuse, that is by no means to condone the abuse itself or exalt it to an ideal. Tiberius' belief in free speech in a free state, itself doubtless an admirable and vital quality in a good emperor, only leads to tolerance of convicia (28). One may return to Vespasian's handling of the quarrel between a senator and eques (9,2): the principle on which he works is that the ranks differ 'non tam libertate...quam dignitate'. Dignity is the ideal that possesses real emotive force for Suetonius; if the republic knew a conflict between the two ideals, 'contentio libertatis dignitatisque', it is the second that appears to have won.79 Libertas in the context is no more than the taking of (unwarranted) liberties. In only one passage is idealism palpable (itself, characteristically, a citation): Augustus is acclaimed in his last days by Alexandrian sailors, 'per illum se vivere, per illum navigare, libertate atque fortunis per illum frui' (98,2). Here perhaps is the Libertas Augusta of the coinage, so hard to pin down in content,
that was eventually to merge by a strange verbal confusion with liberalitas. 80

None of this is enough to make of Suetonius an opponent of Tacitean views. Only in tone and emphasis is he different: less alive to the intrinsic disadvantages of autocracy, more attentive to its advantages, notably good administration and order (see below). In this sense Suetonius may be cast as a loyal civil servant. But the relations of the Roman upper classes of the early 2nd century are too complex to allow sharp division into camps, republican versus imperialist, senatorial versus equestrian. 81 Suetonius is a worthy successor to that earlier ab epistulis, Titinius Capito: friend of Pliny, admirer of republican heroes, promoter of studia and author of exitus illustrium virorum. 82 Being a loyal amicus principis and admirer of the novus status involved neither necessary rejection of the republican past nor of traditionalism nor of the traditional social order that culminated in the senate and its consuls.
Chapter IV

Scholar and Bureaucrat

Suetonius' strictly hierarchical view of society suits a man of rank. May we go further and detect in the Caesars a view of the emperor specifically appropriate to the bureaucrat, the imperial secretary?

So much was hinted at by della Corte. Yet there are two problems of principle to be considered before embarking on this question. The first is one of sources. Every historical writer depends on his sources, and though there is a fair amount of material, documentary and anecdotal, that Suetonius has imported from outside, it is clear that the core of his information derives from the annalistic tradition. In taking over an item there is always the possibility that an author takes over the attitudes of his sources. Without having the full annalistic tradition to compare, how can one be confident that a given view is peculiar to Suetonius and not derivative? In reply, two points may be made. First it is not necessary to suppose that Suetonius actually disagreed with his annalistic sources. An author derives his attitudes from reading as well as experience; not only the imperial secretary but even the emperor was liable to be affected in his views by literary presentations of the past. Nor is it fair to distinguish the annalistic tradition as exclusively 'senatorial' (so della Corte): the Histories of the elder Pliny were highly influential, and there is every reason to suppose that Suetonius saw eye to eye with this equestrian official. No sharp contrast should be posited between the Caesars and the previous tradition. Secondly, even if it is dangerous to base conclusions (as does della Corte) on individual items, one may still fairly comment on
general approach. It may not be possible to isolate the views of the imperial official on specific issues, but it is possible to draw attention to the kind of thing he lays emphasis on, and the kind of way he does it.

The second problem lies in the extent of our ignorance of what an imperial secretary was and how he functioned. The imperial service had been too easily taken for an earlier incarnation of a modern civil service. Recent works have tended to stress the dangers of this assumption and the limitations of our knowledge. The Consilium Principis had been too easily taken for a standing cabinet of senior department officials, created in its final form by a 'reform' of Hadrian. Crook emphasised by contrast its informality, its gradual emergence from the traditional consilium called by the republican aristocrat, the lack of evidence for 'reform'; even questioning whether an institutionalised consilium principis existed before the Constantinian consistorium. Over the nature and activities of imperial secretaries Millar has raised formidable objections. It is premature to assume a systematized bureaucracy in Hadrian's reign. Attestation of an individual in a post is not enough to prove the permanent establishment of an 'Amt' with its substructure of subordinates, regular system of promotion, and officially defined procedure for handling business. Can we assume the office of a studii to have been regularly filled between Claudius' Polybius and Suetonius? How much more formalised was Suetonius' role as ab epistulis than that envisaged by Augustus when he invited Horace to 'help in writing letters'? Above all it is dangerous to assume that the secretariat had become a systematic mechanism for protecting the emperor from the burden of his work. At least in ideal he was still expected to execute business personally. If a modern petitioner persuaded the
chauffeur to stop the royal car, he would only be politely requested to apply by the proper channels on the proper form (S. Vesp. 23, 2). Did those channels and forms even exist in Suetonius' day?  

To assimilate one institution (the imperial secretariat) to another (the English Civil Service or the German Verwaltungsdienst) is bound to mislead. On the other hand, an individual phenomenon may fruitfully be compared with the general category of which it is a specimen, and its specific features isolated. There is a recognisable category of social organisation that may be labelled 'bureaucracy' with certain characteristic features; and enough is known of the imperial officia to compare them to this type and thus from comparison to identify certain features of Suetonius' approach that may be termed 'bureaucratic'.

It might be helpful to start from Max Weber's succinct analysis of the features of bureaucracy (not one restricted to the post-industrial age). In the system he isolated the following characteristics:

1. The division of activity among posts, regularly defined, and regularly and continuously occupied.
2. A system of subordination.
3. The 'bureau' consisting both of personnel, and of documentary 'files', and of a regular location of operation.
4. Expert training for the job. It is notable what an important role is played by literary education, together with qualifying examinations and certificates.
5. Full-time employment of staff.

Of the official himself the following are typical:

7. Office is regarded as a duty, not an opportunity for selfish exploitation.
8. The official enjoys social esteem in accordance with rank held.
9. The official is appointed by a superior not elected from below.
10. Position is normally held without term, though the official may at any time give notice or be dismissed.
11. He receives a regular salary, fixed according to his rank not his achievement.
12. He is set for a career up a hierarchical structure of offices.

To these may be added:


No service need show all these features to qualify as a 'bureaucracy'. Nor need that of the empire have sprung fully-armed from the head of Hadrian, let alone Claudius. But enough is known to see that it corresponds in general, even in Suetonius' day, with the general type described. Doubt subsists over the extent to which matters had been regularised (1,2,5,6,10,12), though in each of these there was at least some degree of regularity, at least in comparison to republican administrative procedure. The difference is of degree, not kind. Other features certainly pertain (3,7,8,9,11). In the case of (4), while the degree of expert training is questionable, it is important to observe the marked degree of literary education testified in the secretariat, and notably in Suetonius himself. Finally, and most relevant, each of the features of bureaucratic outlook and method (13,14) seem to me in some degree characteristic of the Caesars.

So much, then, in preliminary justification of the search for 'bureaucratic' features in Suetonius' outlook. Extreme caution is
necessary; nevertheless, there is headway to be made. But rather than starting from any Weberian analysis, it is perhaps more prudent to look at the posts Suetonius is known to have filled, and to ask how far these are found reflected in the Caesars. For all obscurities, there is enough to show an interest in a range of questions that were of minimal importance in the annalistic tradition.

The Hippo inscription revealed Suetonius' tenure of three secretarial posts:

\[ \ldots a \] studiis a bybliothecis/ 

\[ ab e \] pistulis/ 

\[ \text{Imp. Caes. Tra} \text{i} \text{ani Hadri} \text{an[i]} \text{ Aug.}^{11} \]

What posts he held before these is not known though it is most likely that he was adlected by Trajan int[er selectos] i.e. as a iudex.\(^{12}\) At least it is worth noticing that he takes a regular interest in any reforms affecting iudices.\(^{13}\) Of possible intervening posts nothing can be said, but it seems likely that he entered the imperial service under Trajan; according to the natural reading of the stone, only the post of ab epistulis was held under Hadrian.\(^{14}\) Of a life's career in the imperial service we can hardly speak: he was probably at least in his mid 40s when first appointed.\(^{15}\) However, it now seems possible that he may have served in all for as long as fifteen years.\(^{16}\) It was formerly generally assumed that he and Septicius lost their posts at the time of Hadrian's British tour (121/2). But an inscription revealing Septicius' colleague Marcius Turbo in Dacia on 10th August 123 has made it appear that the placing of this notice in the Life of Hadrian (11,3) is unchronological; and Crook's old suggestion (1956/7) that the Hippo inscription belongs to the context of the African tour (128) becomes highly plausible. Whatever the truth,\(^{17}\) he held at least three Palatine
offices; and each in turn has left its impact on the Caesars.

1. a bibliothecis

To start with the least problematic. Public libraries in Rome were the brain-child of Caesar and were firmly established by Augustus (eclipsing the lead of Asinius Pollio) and from the first the librarian-ships were an imperial appointment. Long before the Hippo inscription came to light, Gomoll drew the inference from the frequency of references to the bibliothecae in the Caesars and other works that Suetonius was likely to have held the post. It is he who tells us that Caesar conceived the first library (Jul.44), that Augustus built two, on the Palatine and at the porticus Octaviae, and furnished them with librarians (Aug.29; de Gramm.20 Hyginus, 21 Melissus). He knew the letter Augustus wrote to his librarian Pompeius Macer forbidding him to publish the minor works left behind by Caesar (Jul.56). Tiberius added a further library (Tib.74), and ensured that the works of his favourite author Euphorion were available to the public (70). Caligula nearly had Virgil and Livy removed from the shelves (Cal.34); and finally Domitian rebuilt a burnt library and sent to Alexandria for replacement copies (Dom.20). All this information comes not from historical sources (Tacitus does not so much as mention the word bibliotheca) but from his own researches: the letter to Pomponius Macer is evidently his own discovery, and made in the library. As so often he will have drawn in the Caesars on his own previous learned works. Gomoll argued that the short historical sketch of bibliothecae in Isidore Origines vi,3 and 5 derives from a lost work of Suetonius; this could have formed part of the de viris illustribus (so Gomoll) or even, I suggest, of the de Institutione Officiorum (see ch.V).
Now the clear connection between this interest in libraries and Suetonius' scholarly pursuits raises the objection that this is no evidence of the administrator. That would be to misconceive the imperial administration. Numerous careers show that the posts of a bibliothecis, a studiis and ab epistulis were closely connected in the 2nd century AD and that they were held by men of literary talents. This may be because the job of ab epistulis required more philological expertise than we should have guessed, a background which also suited for librarianship; or it may be that a librarian acquired skills of cataloguing and filing that could also be applied to the imperial correspondence (so Gomoll). Whatever the reason, the fact is that the combination in Suetonius of scholar, librarian and imperial secretary is not quirkish but regular.

2. a studiis

The function of the a studiis is the most opaque to us, which makes it hardest to say whether experience of this office is reflected in the Caesars. Cuq suggested that this official did research for imperial decisions, pointing to an anecdote in Gellius (iii,16,12) where Hadrian pronounces on a ten month pregnancy 'requisitis veterum philosophorum et medicorum sententiis'. Macé argued that he had care of all imperial archives, and that it was in this office that Suetonius had access to the letters of Augustus and the imperial wills that form his most striking single contribution to the historical tradition. Millar has recently added the conjecture that he wrote the emperor's speeches. All or any of these may be true, but perhaps the most important direct evidence has been neglected, that of Suetonius himself. There is a danger of circularity here, since the point at issue is whether the Caesars reflects professional
experience; even so, what a former a studiis has to say about an emperor's studia ought to be primary evidence of what the job involved. A regular section of the lives is dedicated to studia liberalia. Here we see the emperor declaiming (Aug.84,1), giving speeches (Jul.55 etc.) or lectures (Aug.84,2): writing, whether private literary works (Aug.85 et passim) or letters to the senate (Jul.56,6); showing knowledge of Greek as well as Latin (Claudius congratulated the Achaeans on their communia studia, 42,1; also Aug.89,1; Tib.70,1f.). Not only does the emperor produce literature: we see him as a connoisseur, reading works (Aug.89,2; Dom.20), quoting them (Cl.42,1, cf. Vesp.23); delivering judgement on matters of style (Aug.86,2; Cal.53,2) keeping an interest in the libraries (Tib.70,2); listening to recitations and promoting the literature of the age (Aug.89,3), even sitting at dinner catching out the grammatici at their own game (Tib.70,3). There is no boundary here between official and domestic activity: Augustus sends the fruits of his leisure reading as admonitions to governors and officials (89,2), but Domitian restricts his leisure reading to official documents, the commentarii of Tiberius (20). In Suetonius' eyes the whole complex of literary activity belongs together, and it is an essential facet of the emperor - Domitian earns strong disapproval for his (alleged) neglect of studia liberalia, manifested both in his choice of bedside reading and in his use of a public speech-writer (Dom.20).

Suetonius shows emperors as integrally involved in the cultural life of their society (a theme well stressed by Millar); the a studiis could surely be called upon to help them at any point. It might be in writing (particularly of speeches); equally it might be with providing reading, whether classics with which to confound the professors, or the latest publication. In this connection it might be borne in mind that
the emperor was constantly bombarded with dedications of new works: even the best intentioned prince was short of time for reading them (Horace Epist. 2,1,1-4, but more vividly id.1,13), yet if he did not encourage authors, and with financial rewards, he was letting down the struggling arts (Tiberius' reward of 200 HS for a dialogue is only made absurd by the nature of the work, a piece of gastronomical philosophy: Tib.42,2). The a studiis might have an important role in promoting the talents of the age: it is Polybius, pinpointed in this office by Suetonius (Cl.28), to whom Seneca addressed his flatteries from exile. Martial addresses blandishments to a certain Sextus under Domitian (5,5): he identifies him as Palatine librarian, but as the man is intimate with the 'secreta ducis pectora', it has been inferred that he was also a studiis. The poet was after shelfspace in the library; a good route not only to immortality but to the pocket of the emperor.

Our inclination is to imagine an official primarily as an aide to the emperor in public life. The Gellius anecdote gives a concrete example of how the a studiis might help with research in public affairs. Another incident might illustrate private research at work. The grammarian Charisius quotes Hadrian discussing whether the word 'obiter' is good Latin.26 The emperor makes reference to Laberius and other 'ancients', then cites a letter of Augustus in which that emperor ticks Tiberius off for using 'perviam' in place of 'obiter'; and yet, Hadrian writes, Augustus was not a perfect scholar (non pereruditus) and may have been drawing on everyday usage. How did Hadrian come across this apposite passage of Augustus? From his own reading perhaps, but it can hardly be irrelevant that a recent a studiis had made a corner in the unpublished correspondence of Augustus. Whether or not Suetonius actually 'researched' this point, and in an official capacity, is of
minor importance. The incident shows us an emperor interested in grammatical quaediones, aware of the latest philological methods and discoveries, eager to prove himself more erudite than his great predecessor. To keep ahead, such an emperor needed an assistant with the qualifications of Suetonius. 27

It seems fair to conclude that the discussion of the literary interests of the Caesars is not just the product of the philologist's private obsessions; it reflects the expectation that the emperor is and should be involved in studia liberalia in public and in private; and it is therefore in some sense a reflection of Suetonius' professional acquaintance with the emperor. (The rider should be added that he is likely to have overweighed the 'private' aspect as against the 'public', because routine public work would be less revealing of character.)

That the a studiis also acted as imperial archivist as Macé supposed seems to me dubious. 28 Each officium surely kept its own records. 29 As for the private correspondence between members of the imperial house, it was of no public significance; doubtless it mouldered in the cellars of the Palatium, stashed in innumerable scrinia or sacraria (Tib.51,1; Ner.47,2 for incidents when documents unexpectedly emerged). No official need have had care of it; it could equally have been as librarian that Suetonius wondered whether the letters of Augustus ought to be given shelf-space, only to receive some such discouraging reply as the industrious Pompeius Macer had from Augustus himself (above, Jul.56,7).

3. ab epistulis

The activities of the ab epistulis, finally, are no less obscure. 30 But without prejudice to controversy we can point to several details in
the Caesars reflecting experience of this post. The sphere of operation of this officium is defined not by an area of government (as annona or vehiculatio) but by the physical form in which the business was transacted. This adds to our confusion: epistulae might be the form of military reports and orders (stressed by Statius Silvae v,1,81ff.); of queries and decisions on provincial administration, or of requests for and grants of legal privileges, rights and permissions (all as in Pliny); of dealings with embassies, of all applications for and appointments to office, the latter technically known as codicilli, to say nothing of miscellaneous communications on matters of state or, at the other extreme, to private friends. This leaves little room for technical expertise in the secretary, or for reflection of it in his writings. But the common factor throughout is the reading and writing of epistulae and codicilli and it is precisely in this area that Suetonius betrays interest and knowhow.

He is interested in the physical aspect of the imperial letter. Julius wrote to the senate not in roll form as earlier proconsuls but in memorandum form 'ad paginas et formam memorialis libelli', probably setting a precedent (29,6). Augustus put time as well as date on his letters, and sealed them, after various experiments, with the portrait used by all subsequent emperors (50). He comments on the ciphers used by both men (Jul.56,6; Aug.88), and on the handwriting and orthography of the latter (Aug.87,3-88). He knows the circumstances of handling correspondence: Julius read and replied at the games, rashly enough (Aug.45,1), Vespasian had a regular session with his secretaries before breakfast (Vesp.21), though Titus at some stage took over the officiorum cura and dictated letters in his father's name (6,1). Domitian was at work dictating an official circular (formularem...epistulam) when he
committed the gaffe of calling himself 'dominus et deus noster' (13,2). Comment is made on the epistolary titulature of other emperors too (Tib.26,2; Oth.7,1). He knows how vital it is for the ruler to keep abreast with his in-tray: Nero displays his negligence in sending no replies or instructions (rescribere...mandare...praecipere) for eight days on end during Vindex's revolt (40,4). He is startled by Tiberius' ways in answering the letters of kings: he consulted the senate not only on content but on style ('quid et qua forma', 30). That an imperial secretary distinguished matter and form might have some bearing on the question of his own role: but he seems to disapprove of Domitian forming his letters, as his speeches and edicts, 'alieno...ingenio'(20). Content merits attention, but only when it is quaint: Augustus sending his governors, magistrates and domestics improving quotations from the ancients (89,2). Glimpses of the secretariat are rare, but still there: not only Claudius' corrupt freedmen (29,1) but the a manus Thallus who had his legs broken for betraying correspondence (Aug.67,2; cf. Jul.74,1 for the title).

We also see letters of appointment, codicilli, at work, but only in cases of abuse. Tiberius gave a governorship and the urban prefecture as reward for a drinking marathon, and drew attention to the fact in the codicils (42,1); Caligula similarly gave a praetorship to a good trencherman (18,2). In the case of the young Claudius, the codicil is used to refuse the consulship requested (5); and it is codicils that open opportunities of scandalous forgery to the same man's freedmen (29,1), of which an example may be of Vespasian's legateship acquired through Narcissus ab epistulis (4,1).

Cumulatively these items surely reflect the specialist interests of the imperial secretary. This may encourage us to go on to look for
signs of secretarial mentality in the author's approach in broader terms. I shall glance at three points, the use of documentary evidence, the organisation of material, and style.

Suetonius' use of documentary evidence has long been noted in this connection, and needs no further illustration. One point, however, has not been sufficiently aired. It is not merely that his official position gave him access to important unpublished material, but that he clearly recognised in principle the value of documentary evidence. The palmary instance is his discussion of Caligula's birthplace where he concludes with a statement of principle 'sequenda est igitur...publici instrumenti auctoritas' (Cal.8,5). Likewise he uses the acta to refute Caligula's aspersions on one of his ancestors: his tenure of office was authenticated 'cum publicis monumentis certum sit' (Cal.23,2). After the Capitoline fire Vespasian restored 3,000 bronze tablets; Suetonius, habitually brief and reserved, allows himself an uncharacteristic expression of enthusiasm, 'instrumentum imperii pulcherrimum ac vetustissimum', for there were recorded senatus consulta and plebiscita on alliances, treaties and privileges from the beginning of the city (Vesp.8,5). This emphasis on the value of documents is the more remarkable for its great rarity among the historians of antiquity. But what is not at all certain is how he came to this awareness: was it through official activities, or as a philologist?

The passages cited above have the ring of an official's viewpoint. Pliny's request to Trajan for authentication of epistulae of past emperors 'in scriniis tuis' (ep.10,65,3) gives a glimpse of what must have been a vital activity of the officium epistularum, the keeping of records of correspondence. In the period when the confirmation of the beneficiæ of previous rulers had become automatic (a significant development which
Suetonius understands and attributes to Titus, 8,1), the proof of a beneficium claimed or disputed might lie in the discovery of the decisive epistulae (as in Pliny ep.10,58). Accustomed to producing letters of Augustus in such contexts, Suetonius might naturally turn to the same source for a decisive contribution to the debate on Augustus' view of Tiberius (Tib.21,4f.) or the birthplace of Caligula (Cal.8,4).

But this is not the whole story. Suetonius had been a scholar long before he was an official, and citation of documents was an integral part of scholarly method. A quaestio on the meaning or usage of an expression was resolved by quoting the authors. Hadrian, as has been seen, could exploit a letter of Augustus in this way. It is highly likely that Suetonius himself quoted the same source in philological works before ever he tackled the Caesars: in a long and valuable fragment of 'Tranquillus' preserved in Isidore on different names of waves, he quotes Augustus for the expression 'caecus fluctus'. Philologists were accustomed to searching in public records to expound institutions or etymologies: note for instance the way that Varro in explaining accensus quotes long passages from the Censorial and Consular Commentarii (L.L.vi,86ff.). In fact, what distinguishes Suetonius from the historians is not his consultation of documents (Tacitus after all may have used the senatorial Acta) but his verbatim citations. Here the letters of Augustus fall into the same class as the fragments of Greek and Latin verse scattered through his text; and they point to the methods of ancient scholarship, in sharp contrast to the canons of historiography.

When, therefore, Suetonius speaks the language of archival research (Aug.2,3 'nec quicquam ultra...repperi; Vesp.1,4 'ipse ne vestigium quidem de hoc, quamvis satis curiose inquirerem, inveni') he speaks simultaneously the language of the secretariat (Plin.ep.10,66
'nec quicquam invenitur in commentariis...') and of scholarship. There is no need to choose between the two; it only reinforces the point that philology could be a suitable training for this type of administration.

Turning to the organisation of material in the Caesars, we may suspect the same dual background. Debate still rages over the literary abilities of Suetonius. Steidle and his followers have demonstrated amply that he has no lack of ability; the lives are not a mass of detail undirected by a 'disegno organico', but firmly and intelligently organised. But they have not shown that he is a 'vero scrittore' in the sense of a great artist, drawing on the stops of human sympathy and imagination (πάθος and ἐναργεία). Suetonius is not an artist, but precisely a scholar with remarkable control over a vast amount of information. His virtue (never equalled by his imitators in biography and history) is the clear and succinct arrangement of thousands of diverse items of information under a simple but flexible system of headings - the life of Augustus in particular is a tour-de-force. This is the skill of the grammarian, trained to distinguish types of clothes, maybe, or insults, and document them with citations from literature. More specifically, perhaps, it is the skill of the librarian, drawing up Pinaces or Indices of his books, listing the authors under their different genres, cataloguing the works of individual authors under different categories. 40,000 volumes makes a small library by modern standards, but to Seneca (Tranq.9,4f.) it seemed infinitely large, a positive obstruction to studia; even the Indices were a life-time's reading (the first comprehensive Pinaces of Callimachus had run to 120 volumes). The Caesars read at times like a library catalogue: not the narrative of an event, but the brief outlines of its content filed under the appropriate category. It is a fair guess that the officium
epistularum used similar methods; but for lack of direct evidence one must stop short at this speculation.

Finally to the style of the Caesars. Here one must trespass on controversial ground. Against the modern presumption that the secretariat was responsible for the drafting of imperial correspondence, Millar has raised formidable objections. In ideal and even in practice the emperor was personally involved in the wording of communications and proclamations to an extent that now seems astonishing. But though we may now question the picture of business dealt with by the secretariat and at the last stage 'signed' by the emperor, both reason and evidence still suggest that the first role of the secretary was to 'aid in writing letters'. Already the conscientious Augustus found the burden too great: 'Ante ipse sufficiebam scribendis epistulis amicorum: nunc occupatissimus et infirmus Horatium nostrum a te cupio abducere'. It remains at least a plausible hypothesis that the secretary was in general responsible for the style if not the content of imperial letters; as Suetonius puts it, not 'quid' but 'qua forma' (Tib.30). Does the style of the Caesars have anything in common with that of imperial correspondence?

Millar has collected the evidence of the literary backgrounds of imperial secretaries; though he stresses that they included scholars as well as rhetoricians, the impression gained is that the talents required were mainly rhetorical. But this does not mean that the chancery style of the 2nd century was that of contemporary rhetoric. We happen to be best informed about 2nd century rhetoricians who became ab epistulis Graecis because of Philostratus' Lives of the Sophists, mentioning no less than five. This is of course symptomatic: the main job of the ab epistulis Graecis was to deal with embassies of Greek cities, and since sophists were so often ambassadors, he needed the
qualifications to beat them at their own game. But the hallmarks of sophistical style were brilliance and display, and Philostratus makes it clear that the style appropriate to writing imperial letters (and this he identifies as the main function of the post) was rather different. Of Celer (perhaps the tutor of Marcus) he says he was a good letter-writer but a bad declaimer (VS ii,22). He identifies Aelius Antipater as the ideal epistoleus: his merits are clarity (σαφήνεια) and dignity (γνώμης μέγεθος), as well as appropriateness and a good use of asyndeton (VS ii,24). This squares with the debate on this topic between the secretary Aspasius and his nephew Philostratus of Lemnos (VS ii,33). Although the author characterises Aspasius’s merits as appropriateness and simplicity (δοξάζως τε καὶ σῶν ἀσέλεις ἐρμηνεύειν) he was taken to task for writing too 'agonistically' and obscurely, when what was required was the authoritative pronouncement (δόξα) and clarity (σαφήνεια). Though the verdict on Aspasius may be inconsistent, the ideals are accepted by all parties to the debate.

Authority and clarity are the antithesis of sophistic practice and required a special effort of a rhetor. They might come more easily to a grammarian. Suetonius is in good company as a grammarian-secretary: the learned Claudius Balbillus 'perfectus in omni litterarum genere rarissime'; the Alexandrian Dionysius, γραμματικός and head of the Museum (Suda); Julius Vestinus, epitomator of the Glosses of the grammarian Pamphilus and author of two Selections (Eclogae) of the vocabulary of Attic orators (Suda s.v. Οὐσικύνος), as well as librarian. The interests of Vestinus are close to those of the rhetor and secretary Cornelianus, to whom Phrynicus dedicated his Selection; the dedicatee is praised for his Atticism, and argues the point whether βασίλεια is proper Attic.
Surviving imperial *epistulae* of the early empire, both Greek and Latin, are not characterised by colour and flourish. They are brief, direct, formal, dry. They set out the situation succinctly, then deliver the imperial verdict unmistakeably, where appropriate with a tone of righteous indignation. One may compare Suetonius' own judgements of emperors as stylists. In Augustus he discerns, not (what the letters he quotes might suggest) a lively, almost racy style, urbane and given to cultured Greek expressions in the Ciceronian tradition, but the avoidance of all form of affectation and the overriding desire to express himself with clarity (86,1). Similarly he characterises the letter to Macer, 'brevem admodum ac simplicem' (Jul. 56,7). Tiberius by contrast ruined his style by 'adfectatione et morositate nimia' (70,1). Claudius' failing is neglect of decorum; his inapposite remarks did no credit to a man of such learning, let alone a princeps (40,1-3). As in appearance, he undermined his own auctoritas and dignitas (30). Inappropriate joking destroys the imperial image (21,5). Suetonius' view of the proper balance between rhetoric and learning is betrayed by his judgement of Caligula: 'minimum eruditione, eloquentiae plurimum attendit' (53,1).

The ideal that emerges, of clarity and authority against a background of learning, is that of Philostratus. Can the same canons be detected in the style of the *Caesars*? The tone, dry, factual, concise, unadorned, the passion for explicitness in minutiae, the clarity, the purity of language, the preference for the technically correct over the emotive, colourful and 'artistic', and not least the impartiality that suppresses the author's own views and personality, these indeed all bear the mark of the Alexandrian scholar. Yet they were also just the features appropriate to the desiccated formality of official documents.
The modern critic shies off official documents as too barren of style for 'literary' interest. It is easy to forget that it is in itself a considerable stylistic achievement to produce this formality which suited the dignity of the ruler of the empire, above human weaknesses and passions. 'Individuality' may, by subtle analysis, be detected in these documents; but it is worlds removed from the individuality stamped on the ordinary correspondence of ordinary mortals.

One or two features are worth looking at in greater detail. One typical pattern of imperial letter is to set out briefly a complicated situation before coming to the imperial decision, in such a way that the decision flows reasonably and clearly from the circumstances. So Severus and Caracalla address the people of Tyre (ILS 423; Claudius' edict to the Anauni is comparable, ILS 206): 'Although it is the case that...nevertheless, in view of the fact that...it is our will that... Therefore let such and such...'. Similarly it is a feature of Suetonius, particularly in describing an emperor's administrative activity, to preface the record of an action or a decision with a sketch of the circumstances or arguments that lead to it. (The whole of Vesp.8-11 is constructed on this problem-and-solution principle.) So at Aug.32 he comments on the state of public disorder engendered by the civil war ('pleraque pessimi exempli' - note the tone of righteous indignation); 54 then goes on to elaborate on two aspects of the troubles, the activities of highwaymen and factions. Finally he gives the solution: 'Igitur...': police-stations were set up, chaingangs reviewed, collegia abolished. The resulting impression is one of effective and well-aimed action by the emperor. Suetonius' narrative is normally too circumstantial to carry the tone of authority requisite for imperial letters; yet it can certainly be businesslike. Asyndeton, specifically applauded by
Philostratus in Antipater (VS ii.24, above) is a constant feature of his style. Perhaps too he owes something to official technique in his knack for compressing a complicated situation into a single period, long and intricate in structure, but clear in meaning (Dom. 8.4 on the execution of the Vestal Cornelia for an elaborate example).

There may be, then, something to be said for seeing the hand of the imperial official in the dry clarity which constitutes one of Suetonius' most formidable, if least engaging, talents. In this connection an aspect of his selection of words may be significant. In contrast to Tacitus who will often avoid a word that is obvious or sordid, he shows no such scruples. This will be in part the product of the grammarian's concern for λεξις; but explicit and legally unambiguous expression is increasingly a feature of imperial communications of the mid-empire. He regards it as a curiosity that Tiberius should have been squeamish about using the Greek term monopolium (Tib. 71); he allows it in his own text without comment (id. 30). Throughout his vocabulary is chosen for propriety rather than decoration or effect; he has no qualms about specialist jargon, regarded by the ordinary Roman author with horror. A handful of such words concern aspects of official life, in which Suetonius has been seen to take an unusual interest. Especially where these are used on inscriptions and by legal writers, and little by earlier 'literary' authors, they may be taken as a sign of the 'official' at work. A list of these words is appended immediately below.

Conclusions

How far, in summary, can experience in the imperial service be seen to affect the Caesars? Throughout, the greatest difficulty, as it
seems to me, is that what may be thought to have appealed to an official would also have interested a grammarian: details of libraries, imperial literary bents, imperial writings and style, documentary evidence, even the proper vocabulary of whatever area he should discuss. In this respect the Caesars might perfectly well have been written if Suetonius had never left the grape-vines of his secluded agellus (Plin. ep.ii,24). But at all points the interests of the secretary overlap with and reinforce those of the scholar. Suetonius' work is clearly stamped with his own interests and approach: so that it is safe to examine his treatment of the emperor as administrator without the fear that what he says is solely dictated by the prejudices of his historical sources.
officium itself is a particularly interesting case: S. provides the first literary instance of the word in the sense of 'department' rather than 'job', anticipated by ILS 1921, 'Nerito Divi Claudii lib. principi offici imper ...'; from this point on 'department' is the regular use of the word in epigraphic and legal sources (esp. Vesp.14, 'quidam ex officio admissionis'; see in detail ch.V on de Institutione Officiorum).

ducenarius: Cl.24 is the first instance of the word to mark a grade of procuratorship; it becomes regular in inscriptions only from the second half of the second century AD, and is at all times rare in literary sources. This was of course the rank the author held, though the context is an expression of surprise that Claudius granted consular ornamenta even to ducenarii. Further, Aug.32,2 is our only evidence that the fourth decury of iudices were termed ducenarii.

breviarium, rationarium: at Vesp.21 describes the emperor checking the departmental minutes, 'officiorum...omnia breviariis'. Here is evidently the word used in 'the office'. The account of the empire Augustus left at his death, drawn up by his freedmen, he calls 'breviarium totius imperii' (Aug.101,4; contrast the description of the same document at Tac. Ann.1,11 'libellum...opes publicae continebantur...'). Galba proves his stinginess by rewarding a dispensator for his 'breviarium rationum' with a dish of vegetables (Galb.12,3). In a different sphere the word was used as a title for potted histories like the surviving one of Festus (on the genre, see the edition of J. W. Eadie, 1967, lOff.; S. records that Ateius Philologus wrote one such for Sallust (de Gramm. 10), though of course the title may stem from S. not Ateius (Eadie p.12).

This is one of the rare cases where contemporary comment on the emergence of a new word survives. Seneca, undertaking to write for Lucilius a potted philosophy, points out the limitations of a summary, and comments in passing on the word: 'haec quae nunc vulgo breviarium dicitur, olim cum latine loqueremur summarium vocabatur' (ep.39,1). There are various ways in which new words may appear: by the deliberate creation of an author (so possibly with S.'s civilitas as an imperial quality), or as the necessary corollary of the appearance of a new object or institution (so, I argue below with officium of imperial 'posts'); one of the commonest ways must be when a word is promoted from everyday usage, colloquial or technical ('vulgo') to accepted literary currency ('latine'). Between Seneca's expostulation and S., the only surviving occurrence is in the elder Pliny (twice: of Pompey's summary of his military achievements, vii, 98; and apologetically of what seemed to be turning into a farming manual, xviii,230). Possibly the word started its life, as the Suetonius passage may suggest, among freedmen secretaries: it is certainly appropriate that the author prepared to discuss such vulgar subject-matter should use so vulgar a word.

rationiarium imperii is used at Aug.28,1 to describe the papers handed over in the illness of 23 BC, a document very similar to the breviarium of AD 14. This is a ἄκατος λεγόμενον; but there is no reason to suppose S. invented it for himself. Rationarius of an accountant is attested in Ammianus (xv,5,36; xviii,5,1) and in a passage of the
Digest (27,1,15,5) which though translating Greek, confirms the colloquiality of the word: 'neque librarios neque calculatores quos vulgo rationarios dicimus'.

memorialis libellus probably has a similar background. S. attributes to Julius the innovation of writing to the senate 'ad formam memorialis libelli' (Jul.56,6). Books were written under this title by the jurist Sabinus (Gellius 5,6,13) and by a certain L. Ampelius, who modestly hoped to have summarised all knowledge within 62 Teubner pages (ed. Assmann 1935, v.praef.). Otherwise 'memorialis' is only known from Christian authors.

formalis: Domitian is described dictating a 'formalem...epistulam' in the name of his procurators (Dom.13,2). There is no precise parallel for this, but it has the smell of a bureaucratic term. It is certainly directly connected with a use of forma common in legal and epigraphic sources, of a model decision made by the emperor, to be applied by his subordinates in specific cases. So, just as Domitian circularises his procurators on how to act, Fronto warns Aurelius that any decision he makes will provide a forma to be followed by all provincial governors (ad M. Caes.1,6,3,p.14N = p.11 v.d.H).

consiliarius: in three places S. talks of people acting 'as' (ut or velut) consiliarii. Tiberius has his twenty leading citizens 'velut consiliarios in negotiis publicis' (55), and both he and Claudius sit in on the courts of magistrates as assessors (Cl.12,2 'ut unus e consiliariis; Tib.33 'se offerebat consiliarum'). The lexica distinguish two uses of the noun consiliarius: a vague one of 'advisor', commonly used by Cicero, and the technical one of 'legal assessor', usual in the jurists and inscriptions, for which these passages of S. offer the earliest evidence. As often, the lexicographer has been forced to an overschematic distinction. A consiliarius is one who sits on a consilium, and Crook has shown how the consilia of the empire flow from those of Cicero's days. Still, there was undoubtedly a gradual process of formalisation, seen most clearly when consiliarius emerges as the name of an imperial post, first attested under Marcus, possibly, but by no means certainly going back to Hadrian (Consilium Principis 73f.). If a line can be drawn, then, Suetonius falls on the later side of it. Looking back to the beginning of the process, he sees Tiberius' amici as similar to, but not identical with, what he understood as a consiliarius: one who attended a consilium on a regular basis as a paid expert, not informally as a friend.

praeses was, by the time of the jurist Macer, the 'nomen generale' for provincial governors, regardless of status or means of appointment (Dig.1,18,1). It only became such gradually. The term is unknown before the reign of Trajan; Tacitus was still prepared to use the archaic praetores of governors in general (Ann.15,25). Before S. 'praesides provinciarum' appears only once as a general expression (Plin. Pan.70,4); while Tacitus twice refers to praesae Syriae (Ann.6,41 and 12,45). This looks like being semi-'official' usage: Trajan writes to Pliny of his 'Moesiae praeses' (ep.x,44). S. generalises no less than 7 times about praesides, and uses the singular on two further occasions. From this point on the term is found epigraphically and in the jurists.
ordinare was by the second century the proper term for appointment to an imperial post (e.g. CIL vi,9100, 'praeposit. ordinato a divo Tito'), a usage which survives in the 'ordination' of priests. It appears to be very rare in literary sources; but S. speaks of Vespasian 'ordaining' a dispenser (Vesp.23), even of Julius 'ordaining' magistrates (Jul.76). He provides the only known evidence for ordination as a session at which promotions were made (Dom.4,2 used by Pflaum, Les Procurateurs Equestres 203f.). In connection with this verb, we may note the use of the adjective ordinarius, applied to a slave appointed to a post, with other slaves (vicarii) under him. Regular in legal sources, this is a rarity elsewhere; but a Suetonian anecdote has an 'ordinarius dispenser' (Galb.12,3).

fiscalis, confiscare; S. was aware of the vocabulary of offices other than his own. Since the fiscus only emerged as an institution over the course of a century of empire, the vocabulary connected with it was also slow in developing. Tacitus and Pliny are both happy to use fiscus, but are innocent of its derivatives. S. is the first to use fiscalis (Dom.9,3, 'fiscales calumnias'), later much favoured by the jurists. He also provides the first trace of the useful confisco, which he favours and applies in several senses. That of 'confiscate' was to prove popular with legal writers and posterity, but that of 'stash away' (Aug.101,2) failed to win a following. Tacitus in similar circumstances had been circumlocutory: 'bona...petita in fiscum' (Ann. 2,48).

instrumentum: attention has already been called to S.'s appreciation of the value of documentary evidence; in appealing to 'publici instrumenti auctoritas' (Cal.8,5) he also employs the correct terminology for a legal document, familiar to lawyers and official pronouncements (e.g. Smallwood, Documents of Nerva etc. 330,22 of AD 150). He is anticipated here only (but properly) by Quintilian (e.g. xii,8,12). He has no predecessor, however, in referring to the whole collection of documents in the Capitol as an 'instrumentum imperii' (Vesp.8,5), and in this usage he coincides with bureaucratic titulature (e.g. 'adiutor ad instrumentum commentariorum': Hirschfeld p.64).

actus rerum is not identified as a technical term by any of the lexica. Quintilian (x,6,1) and Pliny (ep.ix,25,3) both use the plural 'rerum actus' of the conduct of legal business by advocates. But S. four times uses the singular in a stilted way that suggests a technical formula. Two emperors adjust the 'legal year', adding 30 days to its length (Aug.32,2) or abolishing semesters (Cl.23,1). Odder uses are two ablatives: Claudius revises the jury-panels 'decurias rerum actu' (Cl.15,1), and Nero transferred cases 'rerum actu' from the aerarium to the forum (? 'in legal business': Ner.17). It is quite possible that S. has preserved a technical term unknown to later jurists (as he does with 'decuria ducentariorum').

urbicus: alongside the traditional adjective 'urbanus', S. uses the new formation 'urbicus', apparently with a nuance something like 'metropolitan', i.e. pertaining to the city of Rome. Twice he uses the word of magistratus (Aug.46, Dom.8,2: yet at Vit.5 and Oth.1,2 'urbanus' is used of office at Rome in contrast to provinces), twice of imperial
business in the City, 'urbicas res' (Ner.23,1), and 'annonae urbicae' (Aug.18,2); and further of City businessmen in Bithynia (Jul.49,2). What the pedigree of this word is, at least on present evidence, is not clear; certainly it is very rare outside S. There are some signs that it was a fashionable city word: Martial i,53,5 in its first attestation contrasts purple town-dress 'urbica...Tyrianthina' with the rustic 'lingonicus...bardocucullus'; and inscription from Bologna advertises bathing on a private estate 'more urbico';68 and both Urbicus and Urbica were popular names in the city.69 There are also, however, signs that the legal and bureaucratic world found this a convenient term: Ulpian refers to an 'urbicam procurationem', and a dedication of AD 137 attests an imperial Ratio urbica.70 Certainly, then, the currency of this word was fairly new when S. took to it; and the chances are that he picked it up from colloquial or administrative contexts.

Tracing the history of Latin words is always a dangerous business because of the enormous limitations of our evidence. A Suetonian 'first' may only be evidence of our ignorance. But at least it is possible to contrast the usage of surviving authors, and where several cases point in the same direction, the dangers of coincidence are diminished. The conclusion seems fair that at least to some extent Suetonius' vocabulary was influenced by his administrative experience.
Chapter V

Excursus: On the Institution of Offices

The grammarian Priscian discussing the word puer cites Suetonius 'in libro qui est de institutione officiorum' (Inst.Gramm.vi,8,4lf.). Neither the Suda in its bibliography of the author nor any other source mentions a work of a similar title, but then Suetonius' scholarly works were copious and diffuse enough for this to be the case with several titles.¹

The title by itself has been enough to stir some interest. The sources credit Hadrian with a reform of the 'officia...publica et palatina' which established them in the shape in which they were to last to Constantine and beyond (Epit.14). This is at best an oversimplification; still, it remains fair to suppose that Hadrian did take an interest in the organisation of the imperial 'bureaucracy'.² Scholars have been swift to point out the connection. Macé suggested a work possibly prompted by the emperor (on analogy with Julian's Perpetual Edict), acquainting the public with the details of organisation of the bureaucracy, della Corte a preparatory study.³ If the young cavalry officer Pliny could write a manual on Shooting from Horseback and Frontinus from the Chair of the Waterboard the definitive work on Aqueducts, we are more than ready to see Suetonius as a top civil servant under a reforming emperor coming up with a History of the Civil Service.⁴

It is of some interest for the understanding of Suetonius' viewpoint, and particularly of his perspective as an 'official' to be able to form an idea of the nature and scope of this work. But the fragments themselves are disappointing. The Priscian citation itself is peculiarly
unhelpful, consisting of a collection of passages from 'the ancients' (antiqui) to demonstrate the use of the feminine puera. He used the same piece of learning to score a point about the birthplace of Caligula (8,3) and there can be no guessing what point he was making in the de Institutione Officiorum.⁵

At first sight more promising is a fragment assigned to this work by Roth (302f.) and Reifferscheid (fr.200) from John Lydus' de Magistratibus (i,34 p.35 Wünsch); he cites Tranquillus as authority for the fact that Augustus in 'putting up the palace' (?building it or establishing the imperial household: τὴν...βασιλείαν ἀνεγείρων) introduced newly τὸ...τῶν ἐργῶν σχεδιασάν. This is a most obscure passage.⁶ Macé sees in it the cura operum publicorum similarly mentioned in the Caesars as established by Augustus (Aug.37),⁷ but it is hard to see how this can be reconciled with the context, a discussion of the praefectura urbis which Lydus connects with the decemvirs of the early republic.⁸ In any case, there is always the danger that Lydus has drawn on precisely the passage of the Augustus above.⁹

In fact from the fragments nothing emerges with certainty except that Suetonius here displayed the same philological and antiquarian interest that is known from his other works.¹⁰ But while the business of the collector of fragments is to locate the precise words and opinions of his author, what is here more interesting is to establish the scope of the work and the author's angle. Without discovering further fragments nothing can be established with any confidence (though below for a suggestion). But at least there are two avenues worth exploring. Since the scholarly works are so often reflected in the Caesars, it is worth looking there for what he has to say about this kind of thing;¹¹ and secondly one may investigate later writings possibly influenced by this
one. In doing so it is vital to guard against anachronistic assumptions about the likely appearance of a 'History of the Civil Service'.

1. 'Institutions' and 'offices' in Suetonius.

One may start from the elements of the title transmitted, institutio and officium. The meaning of institutio for Suetonius is easily established. Though the noun is not found in the Caesars, he uses the verb instituo and its derivatives at least 22 times of innovations in public life by the emperors (cf. below p.153): new customs introduced like the shortlived publication of the acta senatus by Julius (20,1), new taxes (e.g. Jul.43,1; Ner.32,2), new cults (e.g. Aug.31,4; Cal.15,2), and so on. An especially instructive parallel is offered by what the author has to say about innovations in Games. Tertullian tells us explicitly at de spectaculis 5,8 that Tranquillus recorded 'quos quern per ordinem et quibus idolis ludos instituerunt [sc. reges et ceteri]'. Thus 'Romulus Iovi Feretrio ludos instituit', Numa and, in their turn, Tullus and Ancus started others. Now it is clear that the books On Games covered many other topics, of which we can get an idea not only from directly attributed fragments, but from the exploitation of the pagan tradition in Tertullian and Isidore Origines 18,16-69; but one of the concerns of the scholar was institutio, who originated a practice, and when, and why, and doubtless what it was. The same interest, and very likely the same material, recurs in the Caesars, where he devotes chapters to the quinquennial games 'instituted' by Nero (12,3) and Domitian (4,4) - note too the Neapolitan festival 'instituted' in honour of Augustus (98,5).

By analogy one can work towards the Institution of Offices. In the Caesars he tells us explicitly: a) that Tiberius 'instituted' a new
officium (44,2, see below); b) that Augustus having reorganised the city 'instituted' magistrates for the regiones and vici (30,1); c) that the same emperor 'instituted' consilia semestria (35,3); d) that Claudius 'instituted' the titular rank called supra numerum (25,1); and to these passages where instituo occurs we may add: e) that Augustus thought up (commentus est) 'excubias nocturnas vigilesque' (30,1), and of course, f) how Augustus 'nova officia excogitavit' (37). Not necessarily all, if any, of these passages had corresponding entries in the Inst.Off. but at the very least they show the same interest in institutio in what must be broadly the same area.

One further occurrence of instituo may be significant. It was observed above that as a holder of the post of a bibliothecis Suetonius showed a marked interest in imperial libraries. A passage of Isidore normally supposed to derive from Suetonius shows precisely an interest in institution (fr.102 Reiff). It moves from a brief sketch of libraries in Greece (bibliothecam primus instituisse Pisistratus creditur), through the libraries of Hellenistic kings, to their arrival in Rome (primus...advexit Aemilius Paulus); the design of a public library by Caesar, and its eventual execution by Pollio. If we conflate Isidore with other passages in Suetonius, we may add the last step: the building of the Palatine libraries by Augustus (Aug.29,3) and the appointment of librarians (Jul.26; de Gramm.20 & 21). This coincides with the impression given by the works On Games of what discussion of 'institution' must have been like. But before positing that bibliothecae was in fact one of the headings of the Inst.Off. it will be necessary to consider the evidence for the significance of officia.
The word has its own history, moving perceptibly with developments in public life. The history of a word is extraordinarily hard to pin down with precision, both because the occurrences in surviving literature represent only a fraction of total usage, and because the boundaries between different nuances are so very fluid. Nevertheless the broad outlines can be traced in this case with some confidence.

In the republican period, as represented by comedy and the writings of Cicero, officium conveyed not concretely a 'job', but the 'role' or 'function' of a particular type of person (for Plautus a pimp, a tart, a cook may 'do', but not 'hold', officium suum); and this shades into the nuance commonest in Cicero of the 'duties' of a type of person, a man, a citizen but particularly a magistrate. When Cicero speaks of himself as having performed 'officio...consulari' (in Cat.iv,19, cf. Rab.Post.2) he means that he has done his duty, not held the 'office'. It is only (and significantly) at the very end of the period that the concrete sense of 'job' emerges, and I doubt whether Cicero ever uses the word unambiguously thus, though there are grey areas; he can use the expression 'commune officium censurae...defendere' of a censor (Prov.Cons.20), but the context makes it clear that his censor is answering the call of duty in upholding an 'officium', not merely entering in on a job.

When the concrete sense does emerge, it is not as a slide from the Ciceronian 'duties of a magistrate', and indeed I know no certain case where a republican magistracy is described as an officium. Rather it is the new non-republican special commissions that are initially so described, especially in the military sphere. (Note that the soldier not only has his duties, as do other types, but can 'remain in', 'desert', or 'return to' his officium.) It is Caesar (and in the Civil not the
Gallic War) who leads the way: 'toti tamen officio maritimo M. Bibulus praepositus cuncta administrabat' — here is a new sphere of administrative action. With empire the irregular commissions of the civil war turned into regular posts, and officia became a regular phenomenon. So Velleius Paterculus is successor to his father's officium as praefectus equitum (ii,104,3). In the period between Augustus and Trajan the scope expands: it covers the post of procurator (Sen. NQ 4A praef.1) and the whole equestrian career 'officiorumque per officia processus' (Sen. ep. 101,6, cf. Plin. ep.iii,5 on his uncle); and in the senatorial career the praefectura urbis (Sen. ep.83,14), the praefectura aerarii (Plin. Pan.91,1), the cura aquarum (Front. de aqu.1) and the supervision of the Tiber (Plin. ep.v,14,2); and in Tacitus commonly imperial (but not senatorial) governorships (e.g. Agr.25 'sextum officii annum').

That there should have been a semantic distinction between such officia and republican magistratus makes sense, for it corresponds to an ideological distinction (cf. Plin. ep.iii,1,12 obiit officia, gessit magistratus). It is not merely that these posts are new (cf. Tac. Hist. i,20 'novum officii genus' of Galba's equestrian commissioners), but that they involve in some sense subordination to a superior officer. Officium describes the relations of two parties, the obligations of one to another, whether in the role of miles, amicus, or whatever. A magistracy is primarily an honos conveyed by the people, which incidentally has duties inherent in it; an officium is a task undertaken by one for another which incidentally proved honorific.

But officium, as well as suiting the duties of a subordinate in a military and political sphere, could also apply to the relations of slave and master. Just as in Comedy pimps and tarts had their officia (duties), in the early empire a slave may be given an officium (a job).
In strict usage, perhaps, a slave performed a ministerium, and only a free agent could undertake an officium; but the servile household too had its sense of rank and dignity, and it is clear that the word officium was used. This linguistic fact is surely important for the conceptual development of imperial 'offices'. Seneca shows the freedman Polybius, just like the equestrian Lucilius, pressed by his 'adsidua laboriosi officii statione' (Cons.Pol.6,4). The epitaph of one freedman of Claudius is eloquent of the pride he took in his post:

Cl(audius) hic iaceo Diadumenus, arte poeta, olim Caesariis floridus officiis (ILS 1849).

Thus the same word could be used to describe the job assigned by the emperor to a senior consularis and to a junior palace slave.

The final development of the word corresponds to the increasing institutionalisation of the imperial administrative machinery. Under the republic officium conveys an abstract duty; from Caesar a concrete job; but from the 2nd century AD it also frequently refers to the 'department', the 'bureau' in the Weberian sense of personnel and files and location (above p. 83). The 'office' becomes the institution and machinery for which one 'officio praepositus' is responsible, then the personnel under his command, and the location where the department operates. By the end, paradoxically, the officium tends to exclude the head of department. This sense is first attested in the inscription of the first century AD (ILS 1921, 'Nerito Divi Claudii lib. principi offici imper...'). But it is only with Suetonius himself that this sense appears in a literary source, and thereafter it is common in the jurists and inscriptions. It seems fairly evident that the usage is one that has 'worked up' socially; first used among freedmen and palace staff, and only accepted as 'good Latin' when an author of equestrian
status comes to hold a freedman post. 25

The history of the word demonstrates the important fact that alongside the well-known institutional development brought about by the principate, there was a conceptual development. Just as the reign of Hadrian is the culmination of early institutional developments, with Suetonius it seems to represent a turning-point conceptually. The terms 'civil service' or 'bureaucracy' would have been meaningless to him; but he could see officia as institutions, the development of which could be recorded.

But so much said, it is not enough to assume that Suetonius wrote the history traced above. It is natural for a modern writer to suppose that an ancient should see the history of a development in roughly the same terms as he does; but in practice almost always wrong. It is therefore essential to look at the passages in the Caesars where officia are discussed to gain an idea of Suetonius' own perspective. The passages are fairly numerous and interesting enough to set out in detail.

i) creation of officia:

1) Aug. 37 'quoque plures [sc. senatores] partem administrandae rei p. caperent, nova officia excogitavit: curam operum publicorum, viarum, aquarum, alvei Tiberis, frumenti populo dividundi, praefecturam urbis, triumviratum legendi senatus et alterum recognoscendi turmas equitum, quotiensque opus esset.'
2) Tib. 42, 2 'novum denique officium instituit a voluptatibus praeposito equite R. T. Caesonio Prisco.' (cf. also no. 5 below).

ii) changes in organisation/status

3) Dom. 7, 2 'quaedam ex maximis officiis inter libertinos equitesque R. communicavit'.
4) Tit. 6, 1 'receptaque ad se prope omnium officiorum cura...praefecturam quoque praetori suscepit nunquam ad id tempus nisi ab eq. R. administra tam'.

iii) appointments

6) Tib. 63,2 he gave several consulars provinces, but kept them till he appointed their successors... 'cum interim manente officii titulo etiam delegaret plurima assidue, quae illi per legatos et adiutores suos exequenda curarent'.

7) Cl. 29,1 'suppositos aut etiam palam immutatos datorum officiorum codicillos' - sc. by liberti.

8) Ner. 32,4 'nulli delegavit officium ut non adiceret: "scis quid mihi opus sit", et "hoc agamus, ne quis quicquam habeat"' (of appointment of procurators).

9) Galb. 15,1 'existimabatur etiam senatoria et equestria officia bienni spatio determinaturus nec daturus nisi invitis et recusantibus'.

10) Oth. 7,1 'procuratores atque libertos ad eadem officia revocavit'.

11) Vesp. 16,2 'creditur etiam procuratorum rapacissimum quemque ad ampliora officia ex industria solitus promovere' (used like 'sponges').

12) Dom. 1,3 'uno die super XX officia urbana aut peregrina distribuit, "mirari se", Vespasianum dictante, "quod successorem non et sibi mitteret"'.

iv) offices at work

13) Vit. 5 'proconsulatuum Africae post haec curamque operum publicorum administravit... in provincia singularem innocentiam praestitit... at in urbano officio dona atque ornamenta templorum subripuisse' (ferebatur) etc.

14) Vesp. 14 when Vespasian was banned Nero's court and asked what to do, '... quidam ex officio admissionis simul expellens "abire Morboviam" iussaret'.

15) Vesp. 21 '... dein (after waking) perlectis epistulis officiorumque omnium breviariis...'.

16) (=4) Tit. 6,1 'receptaque ad se prope omnium officiorum cura, cum patris nomine et epistulas ipse dictaret et edicta conscriberet'.

What emerges? The frequency with which Suetonius mentions 'offices' in the technical sense is in itself worthy of comment. 27 Most often he speaks of administrative posts (note the use of administrare in 1, 4 & 13) delegated by the emperor (delegare: 6 & 8); but in three cases he has the new sense of 'department' (14, 15, 16), particularly clear in 'quidam ex officio admissionis' (14). Those who hold offices may be senators, equestrians, or liberti: and he speaks in the same breath of senatorial
and equestrian posts (9) or of equestrian and libertine (3 & 10); the appointments that the young Domitian showered may well have involved all three classes, but we are not told (12). The frank application of the term to liberti is a sign of the integration of the 'imperial service' as a whole stretching down from consulars to slaves. There is no sign that Suetonius confused officia with magistratus and honores: one point that is distinctive of an officium is that it ends not with the year but with the arrival of a successor (6, 12) and he evidently has no sympathy with Galba's proposed introduction of a time-limit (9). When provincial governorships are so labelled, it is imperial, not senatorial provinces involved (6; compare the nuancing of 13, 'in provincia, [sc. Africa proconsulari]... at in urbano officio' [sc. cura operum publicorum]).

Does this material allow us to make any inferences about the contents of the Inst. Off.? Certainly it confirms the interest of this equestrian official in his administrative world. But the balance of his interest is not quite what we might initially expect (and for this reason I have divided the items under various topics). The view we get is not of the Imperial Service as an organic whole developing from emperor to emperor (see §i & ii). In fact the only important items in this respect are Augustus' creation of senatorial officia and Domitian's extension of secretarial posts to equites (1 & 3). There is some interest in the offices at work, but this is restricted to Vespasian's reign (14-16). The predominant interest is in appointments and the light this casts on an emperor's character - rapacious (8 & 11), capricious (12), anxious (6) or out of control (7). But this only goes to show the author's ability to subordinate his material to the purpose in hand, the analysis of the lives of the Caesars not of the Development of the Empire. The balance of the Inst. Off. will hardly have been the same.
Nor does this material help us to determine just which officia Suetonius described the 'Institution' of. It does however draw attention to the width of the range of possibilities. They may be distinguished as follows.

1) The secretarial departments originally run by freedmen.
2) The equestrian posts that form the bulk of Pflaum.
3) The great equestrian prefectures, annonae, vigilum and praetorio.
4) The command of imperial provinces, both equestrian and senatorial.
5) The senatorial curae.

Perhaps the easiest assumption is that the centre of interest of the Inst.Off. was in the first of these categories; particularly as it was secretarial posts that the author himself held and since it was Hadrian who regularised the principle that the equestrians should run the departments. It would be a theme of great interest (to us as well as to Suetonius' contemporaries) to trace the gradual emergence of these posts from the context of a private household and their rise in importance and then status. The same author's de Grammaticis traces the rise in status of the art of Grammar and its practitioners (from semigraeci to clarissimi), which adds to the plausibility of his interest in the theme. In particular it is significant that he knew that Augustus offered Horace the epistolarum officium, and that he alone gives the 'official' titles of Claudius' liberti, 'ab studiis', 'ab epistulis', 'a rationibus' (Cl. 28), as of Nero's 'a libellis' Epaphroditus (Ner.49,3 and Dom.14,4); and that he is aware of the role of the Flavians in preparing for Hadrian's 'reform' (above 3). But attractive though this conjecture is, there are strong arguments for caution. The story of the secretariat is one that has its introductory chapter under the Julio-Claudians, its real development under the Flavians and its culmination under Hadrian. But this
goes against everything we know of the period which interested this antiquarian. His other works all point to his love for the antiqui, not only in the regal period and the republic, where he had been largely preempted by the great Varro, but above all in the reign of Augustus. It is unwarranted to construct a rule under which he restricted himself to the period ending with Domitian's death. The last of his rhetors is Julius Tiro, who died in AD 105. The Caesars had to stop at Domitian because members of the current dynasty could never be handled with the same frankness. Even so, what the Caesars can confirm is Suetonius' depth of learning falls off in direct proportion to the distance of the material from the reign of Augustus. If the Institution of Offices was at all like the other antiquarian works (e.g. On Games discussed above) it should start in the remote past, and move to a climax in the reign of Augustus. Of the Grammarians he records eleven are republican (5-15), six Augustan (16-21), only three from the subsequent century (22-24). It is worth recalling that the single authentic fragment of the Inst.Off. discusses an archaic piece of vocabulary. The latest authorities cited are Varro and Ovid (fr.200 Reiff. above).

At first sight this suggestion may seem paradoxical. In the history of the imperial bureaucracy Augustus forms the first and unimportant chapter. But this is only true (if at all) of the 'secretarial' bureaucracy, and it is evident from the survey of Suetonius' usage that he did not regard this as a separate category. The great senatorial curae enumerated at Aug.37 must surely have bulked large in his account. The kind of approach suitable may be seen from comparison with Frontinus' account of the water-commission, complete with citations of senatusconsulta (Aqu.ii,98ff.). The establishment of the great equestrian prefectures
belongs to this reign; even if they are not detailed in the Life, Suetonius is well aware of the circumstances that made them necessary: praetorio, Aug.32;43,1;49; vigilum, 30,1; annonae, 41.1. He knows the importance of another of Augustus' vital institutions, the cursus publicus (49,3) even if its direction did not become an equestrian post till later. The knowledge of a freak and evanescent office like Tiberius' equestrian a voluptatibus implies knowledge of the more important posts. Finally there were indeed 'secretarial' posts attributable to Augustus: Horace's officium epistolarum is surely one (cf. Aug.50 for details of the emperor's epistolae); we may add the librarianship, with the conjecture that even if Isidore's material (above) is not a fragment of this work, something approximately of the kind was there; and further note that a rationarium imperii (Aug.28,1) implies an a rationibus. It seems to me probable that such (Augustan) material formed the bulk of the work, and that though subsequent accretions (particularly under Claudius for whom he had some sympathy) were mentioned, their treatment would surprise and disappoint us.

But if this is right, what of the earlier chronological limits? The republic can hardly have produced evidence of offices, even if he knew, for instance, that the father of Pompeius Trogus had care of Caesar's letters, embassies and his ring (Justin Epit.xliii,5,1lf.). Here the crucial question is whether magistracies were discussed. The transmitted title gives no encouragement to this idea (though generally assumed by modern scholars), for Suetonius properly preserves the distinction of officia and magistratus. However, the title as transmitted might be an abbreviation (e.g. of de Institutione magistratum et officiorum) and this should be no deterrent. What makes the notion worth pursuing is the way that senatorial offices and magistracies are
linked together in the Caesars just as offices senatorial equestrian and libertine are. Vitellius moves from a senatorial governorship to an urban officium (above no. 13). That was perfectly normal, and it must have been hard by Suetonius' day to regard magistracies and offices as distinct in anything but certain technicalities of appointment and historical origin. The new officia Augustus created are seen as part of a programme to increase involvement in the administration, on the same footing as the creation of triumviral censorial boards, the revival of censors, and the increase of the number of praetors (Aug. 37). Even if Suetonius had too much respect for tradition to call a magistracy officium the two belong to the same world. Officia supplemented magistratus rather than overriding them.

It is therefore a hypothesis certainly worth consideration that the institution of magistracies found its place in the same work. To test the hypothesis, it is necessary to turn to the later tradition, which may possibly show signs of Suetonian influence.

2. The later tradition.

Of the two collections of Suetonius' works (excluding the Caesars) while that of Roth covers 64 compact Teubner pages, that of Reifferscheid runs to 360. This dramatic increase was not due to any new discovery (that came 5 years later in 1865 in the shape of a Byzantine abridgement of the περὶ βλασφημίων and περὶ καλωδίων); rather it stemmed from a different approach. Roth only printed the passages directly attributed to the author; but Reifferscheid laid out in extenso the passages from later authors that could be reasonably supposed to go back ultimately to Suetonius. Reifferscheid's procedure is now generally regarded with extreme suspicion: the hypothesis that ancient authors transcribed each
other at length has lost its appeal.

But at least there is this justification that can be offered for Reifferscheid. Scholarship is in its nature tralatician: every scholar passes on the material collected by his predecessors in order to be pillaged in turn by his successors. Each individual writer is in a sense no more than a link in the chain. Yet some writers have more impact on the tradition than others: they turn it in new directions. Given all this, it makes little sense in studying an individual scholar merely to collect his bibliography and his opinions; he only makes sense in the context of the tradition in which he stands and the impact he has on it. Turning to Suetonius, we have palpably a scholar who stands in a tradition leading from Alexandria through the magnificent Varro to the grammarians and commentators of the late empire and finally to the Christian West and the Byzantine East. The impact of Suetonius on this tradition, if not as great as Varro's, was fundamental. Just as his Caesars provided the foundation for the later tradition of imperial biography it is clear from citations alone that his scholarly works were constantly pillaged for their learning. It is not possible to measure with any accuracy the impact he did have on this tradition since we have as yet no Pfeiffer to guide us through the tradition itself - that would be a vast work. But at least in considering an individual work it is a basic step to examine works on the same topic that were under its influence. Here is the great merit of Reifferscheid's edition: not to enable us to recover hunks of the authentic Suetonius embedded among the dross of corrupt epigoni, but to catch a glimpse of the scope and purposes of works in the tradition and the impact of our author.

This procedure can be followed fairly confidently with the tradition On the Roman Calendar (Reiff. p.149-192), where Suetonius, and
before him Varro and Pliny, plausibly lie behind Macrobius, Censorinus, Isidore and others; and with that On Games (Reiff. fr.113ff.), where Tertullian and Isidore follow the steps of Varro and Suetonius. But the Institution of Offices is a much trickier affair.

The most promising direction in which to turn is towards John Lydus' de Magistratibus. But here even the intrepid Reifferscheid despaired: 'sed tamen eruere ea [sc. fragmenta] non ausim ut qui satis sciam in quantum Byzantinus ille antiquae eruditionis reliquias suis commentis miscuerit' (p.466). Well might he hesitate to identify further fragments: but the question I wish to consider is whether the way Suetonius approached his subject had an impact on the way Lydus approached his.

The Magistracies is an extraordinary work, a mixture of obscure and garbled antiquarianism and of authentic but passionate description of contemporary Byzantine administration, with no middle ground inbetween. Although Lydus proposes to treat the whole period from Aeneas to the death of Anastasius (one of 1,746 years he reckons, Mag.i,2), his whole emphasis is on two periods, that from Romulus to Augustus, and that from Constantine to his own times. The first book details the creation of each magistracy and its insignia, starting from Romulus with the kingship (i,3-13) and attempting (but failing) to go through the regal (14-29) and republican (30-51) magistracies in chronological order. The second book offers a corresponding account for the empire: it starts with the monarchy established by Julius and Augustus, and its insignia (ii,1-4), and then attempts to catalogue the new commands. It is here that his unevenness shows up most glaringly: he leaps straight from the praetorian praefecture created by Augustus and its insignia (5-22) to the post of magister sacrorum officiorum (23-26) which he emphasises is no older
than Constantine or at best Licinius (25), and then very briefly outlines half a dozen new commands (offshoots of the praetorian prefecture) instituted later than Constantine (27-30). In the third and longest book he returns to the praetorian prefecture, discussing its subordinate personnel (iii,1-38 including a long excursus on his own career in the office, 25-30) and the causes of its lamentable decline (39-end, incomplete: the ancient chapter headings, p.6-7 Wünsch, misrepresent this book).

Lydus prides himself on his learning, which won him promotion (iii,30). One should not be deceived: he had not even consulted the authorities he cites. But the unevenness of his account stems not so much from the inadequacy of his sources as from his own perspective. He writes as an ex-official of the prefect's officium, rueing the rise of the magister officiorum at his department's expense, and it is partly for polemical purposes that he stretches back to Roman antiquity. The Caesars were a revival of the kings (ii,3 p.57, 20f.W.); and the praetorian prefecture created by Augustus was a direct revival of Romulus' office of tribunus celerum (i,14; ii,6 etc.), repeated in the intervening stage as the magister equitum of the dictators (i,37). Equally the imperial guard, the excubitores, went back to Romulus (i,13, p.17,24f.), as did even the subordinate office he himself had held, that of cornicularius (iii,22).

The remote past provided the justification of his view of the present. This in itself is adequate to explain his dichotomy. There is no need to fill the gap between Augustus and Constantine, for it is the gap between the respectable past and the intolerable present, and at the same time the gap between the praefectus praetorio and the magister officiorum. We may well wonder whether behind so Byzantine a perspective
the views of Suetonius can possibly lurk.

First it must be determined whether there is any case for Lydus having used the de Institutione Officiorum at all. The first step is to consider direct citations. Here the danger is that any reference to an earlier authority may derive from an unnamed predecessor's footnotes. It is evident that the author has great respect for Tranquillus, as he does for Varro (Wünsch xliii): he shares this sense of respect with the Latin commentators and grammarians of the preceding two centuries. Tranquillus is four times cited. 1) Mag.i,12 p.18 quotes Aug.40,5 on Augustus' enforcement of the wearing of togas, though pardonably he changes the scene of the anecdote from the contio to the more familiar hippodrome. 2) Mag.ii,6 p.61 is our only evidence for the lost dedication of the Caesars to Septicius. Lydus cites it as evidence for the style of titulature praefectus praetorianorum cohortium, to show that the prefect had originally command of the troops and not merely of the court (praetorii). The style is indeed Suetonian usage (Tit.4,2; Dom.6,1) and rather unusual. Yet it is curious that he should go for this bit of information to the dedication of the Caesars, and not to an explicit discussion of the office, if such were available in the Inst.Off. 3) Mag.i,34 p.35 is the passage already discussed on Augustus' creation of the ἐργων σκυρνιάν. It might equally come from the Inst.Off. or from the life of Augustus. 4) Mag.iii,64 quotes the περὶ ἐπισήμων πορνῶν for information on Omphale, but as Apuleius is cited at the same time, it may be he who is responsible for the reference, if not a third party. To these we may add 5) Mag.i,6 on the refusal of the name dominus by 'Augustus or perhaps Tiberius' which derives ultimately from the Caesars, whether Aug.53 or Tib.27 or a confusion of both.
All these citations may be second-hand or remoter. Taken together they might reasonably suggest that Lydus knew only the *Caesars* at first hand, particularly the dedication and the *life of Augustus*. But certainly we cannot on this evidence rule out that he knew the *Inst.Off.* and it should be borne in mind that in another work, the *de mensibus*, there is a good chance that he based himself on Suetonius' work *On the Calendar*.47

Secondly we may ask whether Lydus could possibly have written as he did had he had a work of Suetonius on which to base himself. The failure to discuss any early imperial *officia* beyond the praetorian prefecture is discouraging, but can be explained in terms of his own purpose (above). Lydus does in fact seem to regard the reign of Domitian as a watershed, which would point strongly towards Suetonius. At the end of his (lacunose) section on praetors, he declares he will not take the story past Titus, protesting against innovations by Domitian and Caracalla (i,49). He returns later to Domitian's crime, typical of the *νεωτερωμος* of this tyrant, which is to have replaced the one *praefectus urbi* by twelve (ii,19 p.75). In the same place he alleges that when Fuscus was praetorian prefect he wickedly changed the insignia of the office (ii,19 p.74f.); and in a third passage Domitian and Fuscus reappear as responsible for some confused change to the post of *cornicularius* (iii,22 & 23). This is a most dismaying mixture of fact and fantasy, and even allowing for Lydus' ability to misinterpret Latin sources it is hard to believe he had a Suetonian account of the two prefectures before his eyes. Perhaps he knew the *life of Domitian*, and derived from that his knowledge of the emperor's tendency to innovate (Dom.7,1) and of Fuscus' prefecture (6,1).

But even if Lydus never read the *Inst.Off.* himself, that leaves
unaffected the hypothesis that he wrote in a tradition strongly influenced by Suetonius. Is there anything to recommend this?

One of the hardest points to settle is whether Suetonius' lost work discussed the institution of republican magistracies as well as of imperial offices. It is not that, if he did so, he is likely to have said anything new on the subject: he could have done little more than gather the opinions and disputes of republican writers like C. Sempronius Tuditanus, the author of as many as 13 books on Magistrates and Junius Congus 'Gracchanus' already filtered through Varro and Ateius Capito (cf. Gellius xiv,7 & 8), and doubtless of the Augustan scholar Fenestella, who like Gracchanus had opinions on the quaestorship (Ulpian Dig.1,13 = Lyd.Mag.i,24). If Suetonius did gather this information, probably his contribution will have been to do so methodically, discussing like Lydus each office in turn. But the really important point is the implied link between magistracies and offices. In the case of Lydus it is fundamental to his argument that the praetorian prefecture was a revival of an earlier magistracy. It matters relatively little whether S. actually enumerated the magistracies as Lydus does, compared with the question of whether he attempted this kind of historical link.

Now though this conjecture about the prefecture happens to suit Lydus' purpose very well, it is not of his own making. It can be traced back through the jurists in the first book in the Digest, whom Lydus explicitly cites (i,14), to the age of Hadrian. Although it is Aurelius Charisius whose words Lydus translates (= Dig.1,11), the doctrine is already present in the long précis of Pomponius' Enchiridion (Dig.1,2,2,19): the dictators were given magistri militum just as the kings tribuni celerum, 'quod officium fere tale erat, quale hodie praefectorum praetorio, magistratus tamen habebantur legitimi'. The jurist of course
is well aware of the distinction between a magistracy and an extraordinary prefecture (id.33), but nevertheless makes a direct comparison.

The value of Pomponius has come to be better appreciated by recent scholars. With his interest in history and antiquarianism, he is a valuable document of mid 2nd century culture; as in Gellius, legal and antiquarian learning go hand in hand. Moreover, his similarity in approach and style to Suetonius, particularly in the de Grammaticis, has been stressed. It is therefore a possibility worth considering that Pomponius derived this conjecture from Suetonius. The Encheiridion is Hadrianic in date, and if Suetonius did discuss magistracies, Pomponius will hardly have neglected the great antiquarian of the age. Of the three parts of the work, the second deals with the 'names and origins of magistrates'; and though it stops short at offices (for they are 'extra ordinem utilitatis causa') it might give an idea of, and reflect some details of Suetonius' approach.

This is pure speculation; but at least the likelihood is that Suetonius' approach to the past was on the same lines as that of later antiquarians and jurists. Even if the Inst.Off. did not discuss magistracies, it may well have sought for precedents in pre-imperial history. As Lydus links the praetorian prefect with the tribunus celerum and magister militum, so he links the praefectus urbi with the decemvirs, the leading one of whom was entitled τῆς πόλεως φύλαξ (i,34; Livy iii, 33,8 calls him praefectus iuris), and he compares the praefectura vigilum with the obscure republican magistrates, triumviri nocturni (i,50). He also links the contemporary imperial bodyguard with the excubitores allegedly established by Tiberius as a revival of an early guard of Romulus (i,12, p.17). These links are not just the product of Byzantine nostalgia; considerable antiquarian learning lies behind them (not Lydus').
Suetonius is at least a plausible candidate.

Conclusions

In trying to understand how Suetonius' views fit an imperial official, there is a real danger (to which in my view della Corte succumbed) of mistaking the nature of his historical perspective. It is too facile to imagine the official, confident in a glorious new bureaucracy, looking back with contempt, condescension or even mere curiosity on the republican past. This view of a 'progressive' Suetonius leaves no room for the antiquarian.

Indeed he shows a certain pride in the officia. He disapproves of rulers who abuse their officials to satisfy their rapacity (Nero and Vespasian) or lust (Tiberius). But this is a sense of propriety, not an arrogance that rejects the past. The official must be reconciled with the antiquarian. One solution lies in the central role played in his thought by Augustus. At the same time the most innovative and the most traditionalist of emperors, he made it possible for the adherents of a new system to look back on the republican past as their own (further below ch.VI). By his heroisation of this man Suetonius contrived to reconcile conflicting loyalties to republic and empire. This should be reflected in the de Institutione Officiorum; and it seems to me that there are enough indications that it was.

Whether or not the work also discussed republican magistracies, and whether or not Lydus or Pomponius drew on it, must remain highly uncertain. But at least one can see how their 'antiquarian' view of the past develops from Suetonius. His enormous popularity in succeeding centuries is an important fact: it is easier to understand it when we see how the philologist and antiquarian, the author of the Caesars, and the imperial official, are one.
Chapter VI

The Secretary on Imperial Administration

In the three preceding chapters I have attempted to suggest some ways in which the approach and interests of Suetonius fit in with his background, social, administrative and scholarly. There is need of great caution in recreating the perspective of an 'equestrian official'; our ignorance is considerable and the danger of seduction by modern analogies ever-present. Nevertheless it seems to me that we can with some confidence trace a distinctive viewpoint in his works: that the Caesars constitute considerably more than a mindless reshuffling of the 'facts' of the annalistic tradition.

In this light we may turn to his presentation of the emperor as administrator. Which are the aspects of the 'emperor at work' Suetonius thinks worth commenting on? Do any overall views and judgements lie behind his presentation? May they be taken to reflect the standpoint of a Hadrianic ab epistulis?

At an earlier stage (ch.II, 3) it was shown how Suetonius breaks up his account of the Caesar in his 'administration of the state' into certain recurrent headings. I shall start by considering his chapters on administration area by area, in order to find whether any clear conception of the emperor's role lies behind them (as opposed to a mere jumble of facts and curiosities); then go on to discuss certain broader themes that emerge.

1. Methods and Policies.

i) War, spectacle and building: biography versus annals.
res militaris:

(Jul. 57-70; Aug. 20-25; Tib. 37, 4, cf. 18-19; Cal. 43-48; Cl. 17; 24-25, 1; Ner. 18-19; Vesp. 8, 2-3; Dom. 6, 1; 7, 4)

In contrast to the whole ancient historiographical tradition, the Caesars allots a minimum of coverage to military affairs. This fact follows, as was suggested in the opening chapter, from a perfectly legitimate conception of the biographer's task: not to relate μάχαι μυριόσκολοι, but to analyse the personal involvement of the subject of the biography. Caesars fought battles often enough on their routes to power, but only exceptionally as emperors, and Suetonius' distribution of military narrative accurately reflects this. Yet on any account, the emperor's military role was a basic one and ought to appear in an analysis of his administration. What features does Suetonius think worthy of record?

Four main topics are found, usually under the 'military affairs' rubric, but rarely in the context of other administrative matters (Cl. 24-25, 1; Dom. 7, 4). These are military activity, discipline and decoration, organisation, and generalship (I omit civil wars and rebellions from consideration). 1) On military activity he gives little more than a bald summary of events in epigraphic style (Aug. 21, 1, cf. Jul. 25) and a record of the expeditions in which the emperor was personally involved (Aug. 20; Cal. 43f.; Cl. 17; Dom. 6, 1; negatively Tib. 37, 4; cf. Ner. 19, 2). It would be interesting to know whether any coherent view emerges of military policy in a work written after Hadrian's abandonment of Trajan's new acquisitions. The comment on Nero is certainly pertinent: not only was he without ambition to expand the empire, but he would have abandoned Britain but for respect for his parent's memory (18). 3 That might well imply criticism of 'non-expansionist'
policy: yet Augustus too is represented as without ambition for expansion of military glory (21,3). Any dichotomy between expansionism and 'defensive' policy is too crude. Augustus' wars are praiseworthy because just and necessary, not in mere pursuit of la gloire whether for empire or emperor (1.c.). Domitian's wars were partly necessary, partly sponte (i.e. unprovoked), and this corresponds to the mixture of good and bad in his reign (6,1, cf. 3,2). Claudius' conquest of Britain is represented as a slight achievement (expeditionem unam... eamque modicam, 17,1) because it was so effortlessly accomplished and motivated by little more than the desire for a full-scale triumph. The account of Caligula's German expedition is predictably hostile (43ff.); because wilfully undertaken and pointlessly, even farcically, executed. At one extreme Suetonius has no sympathy for the emperor who evades his military duties: Tiberius shirks expeditions after his accession, resorting under duress to a rather questionable variety of diplomacy (37,4), and the reference to Claudius' single expedition is dismissive ('unam omnino'). But on the other hand the emperor cannot afford to go pot-hunting. One can surely apply the apopthegm quoted from Augustus: the risk must not exceed the possible gain, for this is to go fishing with golden hooks (25,4). Hadrian's abandonment of Mesopotamia, from this perspective, should not be seen as a change of policy, but as a reassessment of the pros and cons; the advantages would not repay the military investment, and Trajan was known for a weakness for glory.

This leads to a further problem about Suetonius' views. He only discusses military undertakings in which the emperor was personally involved. It is true that Augustus' indirect achievements on the north-western frontier are recorded; this, as he makes clear, is because the
emperor planned and supervised operations without actually taking the field (20). But this very concession underlines the point that in a modern treatment, Corbulo's Armenian campaigns would be discussed as an aspect of Nero's military policy, Agricola's British ones as an aspect of Domitian's. The Law of Biographical Relevance does not exonerate the author from the duty to discuss military policy in general. Yet the crucial question here is how accurately Suetonius represents contemporary conceptions of the emperor's role. There was no 'war office': did the Romans conceive of a coherent 'military policy' for which the emperor bore responsibility, rather than ad hoc solutions to individual crises? If (but only if) we take the Caesars as the informed work of an imperial secretary, the implication is that they did not.

The only contribution to the Armenian problem, for responsibility with which he credits Nero, is a characteristically exhibitionist display (13) at inordinate public expense (30,2); perhaps the implication is that a responsible emperor would rather have undertaken a personal military expedition. (It will emerge below how often he stresses personal participation by the emperor.) He knew, of course, that an emperor made numerous specific decisions on whom to appoint and what they should do. But the task of analysing these decisions in order to establish the kind of generalisation which he likes probably never occurred to him, and was surely too vast. He can say what type of commander Augustus favoured, but only because his letters betrayed it (25,4).

ii) Discipline and decorations. Hadrian himself undertook no military expedition (SHA Hadr.21,8). Yet he toured the armed forces extensively, laying enormous emphasis on the observance of disciplina. The control of discipline emerges from Suetonius as an important imperial
preoccupation (Aug. 24-25; Cal. 44; Vesp. 8, 2-3; cf. Jul. 65-67; Tib. 19).
Severe military discipline was a traditional Roman ideal, and from the account of Augustus and Vespasian it is evident that Suetonius took the maintenance of discipline as an important imperial function. This is unaffected by the fact that Caligula abused his duties, playing at the strict general. The alternative is illustrated by Julius, in his mixture of severity (65-66) with indulgence and connivance at faults (67). Suetonius makes no explicit comment, but we note that Julius' familiar appellation of 'commilitones' (67, 2) was dropped by Augustus as too revolutionary and undignified (25, 1). The strictness of imperial discipline was counterbalanced by reward for good services through military decorations. Countless inscriptions testify to the proliferation of these decorations under the empire. Suetonius details the behaviour of two emperors in making these awards. Claudius was absurdly prolific (24, 3), Augustus generous or mean in respects that in view of later practice might seem odd (25, 3).

iii) Of changes to the organisation of the army Suetonius says little (Aug. 24; Cl. 25, 1; Vesp. 8, 3; Dom. 7, 3). Augustus brought about numerous changes, institutions and revivals, but these are not detailed. Presumably the author regarded this information as too technical even for his audience. (The reorganisation of the pay and service structure is mentioned later, 49, 2) For others only tantalising details are mentioned: Claudius' reform of the equestrian cursus, Vespasian's ruling that military runners go unbootted (this an aspect of discipline), and Domitian's anti-revolutionary limitation of the size of frontier camps and his pay-increase. Evidently the author does not mean to be exhaustive.

iv) On generalship there was little to say because these emperors so rarely led troops. The analysis of Julius' generalship is exceptional
(57-64), though there are a few corresponding comments on Tiberius before accession (18). One point is perhaps worth bringing out. Julius displayed an exceptional combination of dashing temerity and cautious preparation (58). Tiberius was all care and caution (18,1). That the latter was the right style for the imperial general is confirmed by the quotation of Augustus' views (25,4, surely extracted from his correspondence, cf. Tib.21,5). The motto is festina lente. Suetonius rightly identifies the priorities of the empire: remorseless efficiency not flair, discipline not indulgence.

Brief, then, and in some respects patchy Suetonius' account may be. But it is not necessarily inconsistent with the role an intelligent ab epistulis might attribute to the imperator. Though wars, the annalist's forte, are ignored except where the subject of the biography is directly concerned, the emperor's military function is not neglected. He is seen, in general, not as a strategist or a creator of 'policies', but as responsible for the stability of the empire, the security of the frontier and the discipline of the armed forces.

Historians there were who were prepared to clog their narratives with details of building and the dimensions of beams (T. Ann.13,31); but they were exceptional. Suetonius gives the details at some length; quite properly, as building was, together with spectacle, one of the main forms of imperial liberality. As with donatives and other types of distribution he does little more than list the facts. It is clear that building in general is to an emperor's credit, and Tiberius is explicitly criticised for his meanness in building. But the details
are not, as a rule, subsumed under the moral category of liberality, and this has important implications for the author's view of liberality (below ch. IX). Along with the names of the new buildings are sometimes given attendant circumstances (esp. Aug. 29, 1-3, the new forum built because of the pressure of legal business etc.); this underlines the fact that the purpose of the rubric is to inform, not to prove. Yet that a moral viewpoint lies behind his approach emerges from the observation that it is only public works he records. Nero's Domus Aurea is classed as an extravagance (31, 1-2), Domitian's new palace is (curiously) not even mentioned. Thus the ideological distinction between public munificence and private restraint (Plin. Pan. 51, 1-3) is preserved. Suetonius, in fact, records opera publica because they were something expected of the emperor.

spectacula:

(Jul. 39; Aug. 43-45; Tib. 47; Cal. 18-20; Cl. 21, 1-6; Ner. 11-13; Vesp. 19; Dom. 4, 1-4)

In matters of warfare Suetonius is reticent compared to historians: on games he is informative just where they are reticent. The point was seen by della Corte (100ff.): it reflects a genuine view of the principate, expressed, however ironically, by Fronto, 'imperium non minus ludicreis quam sereis probari, atque maiore damno seria, graviore invidia ludicra neglegi.' Games-giving was indeed a vital imperial activity, and unduly neglected by annalists. On the other hand, the length and detail he devotes to this topic is out of all proportion. There can be little doubt that this is due, not to an overestimation of its significance, but to his own earlier researches on the subject. He was the expert on the topic, and he knew that, unlike warfare, it was generally neglected. Though the Res Gestae provided precedent for the abbreviated summary of
spectacles given, as of victories won, he chose to give full detail. Consequently there is more stress on the facts than on their possible significance.

Above all, games-giving is a mark of liberalitas. He stresses the extent and scale of the various types of spectacle (Aug. 43, 1 etc.), and it is meanness that is demonstrated by Tiberius' failure to put on shows (47). But there are other themes that make it impossible to treat spectacula as no more than a subheading of liberalitas. One such is the introduction of new types of spectacles or new features, or the revival of forgotten ones. The emperor may score a 'first' - 'instituit et quinquennale certamen primus omnium Romae' (Ner. 12, 3, cf. Dom. 4, 4); he may be outstanding for novelty (Cal. 19, 1 'novum...atque inauditum genus spectaculi', cf. Cl. 21, 4, the 'sportula'), he may like Claudius, go in for revivals 'ex antiquitate repetita' (21, 1 cf. Dom. 4, 1). Such details were not only a traditional concern of antiquarians (Val. Max. ii, 4, 6-7 for a list of 'firsts' in this context) but were actually recorded in the acta (used extensively by the elder Pliny for his account of wild beasts in book viii), and formed the stuff of elogia.

A predominant theme is concern for the status of performers: Augustus exhibited young nobles, yet remained within the law (43, 2-4), others were less scrupulous (Jul. 39, 1-2; Cal. 18, 3; Ner. 11-12). Related is concern for the status of spectators: Augustus' reforms of seating regulations according to dignity were fundamental (44), but of other regulations in the same spirit, only those of Claudius are recorded. Augustus' care for the dignity and privileges, but at the same time the proper behaviour of professional performers is unique (45, 3-4). Another pervasive theme is the emperor's own attendance: how often he came, how keenly he participated, where he sat, what he wore, how he behaved
These themes are all relevant to a serious study of the emperor. Yet one cannot deny that Suetonius is occasionally carried away by enthusiasm for detail, *curiositas*. One paragraph collects the accidents that befell Augustus during performances, the day the chair broke and other tales (43,5; cf. Ner.12,2). Such anecdotes tend to undermine our confidence and provoked his imitators to parody or outright frivolity: does he lavish this detail on the topic because he supposes it important or because he happens to have it at his disposal? That remains the heart of the Quaestio Suetoniana. That his motivation was a great deal more than aimless *curiositas* is suggested by the way that many of the same themes recur in other contexts. Two themes in particular, already detected in the chapters on military affairs and games, emerge as of constant concern: measures affecting status, and changes to organisation and procedure.

**senatus-equites-populus, Urbs-Italia-provinciae**

It is the hierarchical sequence, social and geographical, that forms the core of the administration section, and here the themes emphasised are consistent.

**senate:**

(Jul.41,1-2; Aug.35-38,2; cf. Cal.16,2; Cl.23,3-34; Ner.15,2; Vesp.9,2)

The subject of the emperor's relations with the senate permeates the *Caesars*: it could hardly be otherwise. The chapters on *civilitas* and *clementia* above all revolve largely, but not exclusively, around this
subject. Therefore when a chapter is given exclusively to the senate, much that a modern writer would have included has been preempted by the 'virtue' chapters. Still, what remains is no miscellany.

The most important theme is imperial control of senatorial membership. This may take the form of censorial control, through wholesale purges and supplements (Jul.41,1; Aug.35,1-2; Vesp.9,2); through electoral interference (Jul.41,2); and through individual grants of the latus clavus (Cl.24,1; Ner.15,2). Closely related is the control of honours and privileges within the ordo; the award of military decorations (Cl.24,3; Ner.15,2; Aug.38,1; this last passage is notable for asserting Augustus' generosity without breathing a suspicion of the restriction of the triumph to the imperial family) and the award of magistracies and magisterial ornaments (Cl.24,1; Ner.15,2). Julius (41,1) and Augustus (37) are both recorded as increasing the number of magistracies; in the case of Augustus the clear implication is that the introduction of new officia, as the revival of the censorship and the attempt to introduce a second consular colleague, was aimed at increasing the opportunities for honour ('quoque plures partem administrandae rei p. caperent'; cf. 38,1 'nec parcior in bellica virtute honoranda' sc. than awarding magistracies). Caligula is recorded only as making magistrates inappellable, a step which presumably increased their dignity (16,2).

The second main area of interest is adjustments to senatorial procedure and administrative regulations. Augustus having restored the senate by purges to its splendor pristinus then sought to make its proceedings more dignified by legislation on the conduct of meetings (35,2-3, 'quo...et religiosius et minore molestia senatoria munera fungerentur'); to this is appended a list of minor regulations affecting
the publication of the *acta*, proconsuls, and changes in functions of magistrates (36). Similar adjustments of magisterial functions are recorded for Claudius (24,2) and Nero (15,2: the consul reads imperial letters, though this was temporary). Claudius also extends control of senatorial behaviour by taking over the grant of *conmeatus* (23,2).

**equites:**

(Jul.41,2; Aug.38,3-40,1; Cal.16,2; Cl.25,1; Vesp.9,2)

About the *equites* he is surprisingly uninformative. Overwhelmingly the most important theme is control of the membership of the *ordo* through the *recognitio* (Aug.38,3-39; Cal.16,2; Vesp.9,2; cf. Cl.16,1-3 where details are given in connection with his censorship). Throughout he makes clear his approval of a mixture of severity tempered by moderation (esp. Cal.16,2) and disapproves of Claudius' unpredictability. A couple of items relate to equestrian honours and privileges (Aug.40,1 theatre seating rights; Cl.25,1 military ranks). The only public function of the order discussed (military apart) is that of service in the courts; two items are given of changes to the panels (Jul.41,2; Cal.16,2); elsewhere these are recorded as an aspect of the administration of justice (Aug.32,3 in detail; cf. Galb.14,3).

There is a perceptible interest in the relationship of rank between senate and equestrians. Vesp.9,2 records Vespasian's classic ruling on their relative dignity; Aug.40,1 notes the emergency election of *equites* to the tribunate, leaving open return to the old *ordo*; and under the senatorial rubric Cl.24,1 records the grant of consular *ornamenta* to procurators, and this emperor's hard line on the refusal of senatorial service. Nero is noted to have given equestrians triumphal *ornamenta* for non-military services (15,2).

The gaps here are striking. Suetonius gives no hint of the rise
of the equites in the field of public administration, through which
he himself held a public post. New officia under Augustus are recorded
for senators, but not for equestrians. Claudius' grant of jurisdiction
to procurators, placed by Tacitus in context of the republican struggle
of the ordines (Ann.12,60) is not represented as a triumph for the
equestrians. It is in a different context, of Claudius' civilitas,
that he is praised for extracting this ratification from the senate
precario (12,1), a detail glossed over by Tacitus. The record of
Claudius' change to the equestrian cursus (25,1) is an exceptional item.

populus:
(Jul.41,3-42,1; Aug.40,2-5; Cal.16,2; Cl.25,1-2; cf. Tib.37,1-2)

As the previous two sections revolve around two main themes, the
control of status, and adjustments to formal procedure (the meetings
of the senate, the panels of iudices), so the same themes continue in
this section. Status-control takes the form partly of the census (Jul.
41,3; Aug.40,2) but more importantly of recruitment to the citizenship
from peregrines and slaves (Jul.42,1; Aug.40,3-4; Cl.25,1-2). The
ideal of racial purity, in a moral not an ethnic sense ('sincerum atque
ab omni colluvione...incorruptum') is stated squarely (Aug.40,3).
Julius operates through regulations on citizen-movement, Augustus is
responsible for the fundamental manumission laws, Claudius introduces
some adjustments; and at the level of beneficia, Julius enfranchised
doctors and professors, Augustus is strict about viritim grants, while
Claudius proves ruthless towards imposters.

Secondly, procedure. Apart from the method of census-taking, changed
by Julius (41,3) and Augustus (40,2), adjustments are recorded to the
public functions of the populus Romanus in receiving frumentum (Jul.41,3;
Aug.40,2) and attending the comitia (Aug.40,2; Cal.16,2). Suetonius is
careful to explain the reasons for reforms: Julius wanted to avoid riotous assembly ('ne qui novi coetus...moveri quandoque possent'), Augustus to avoid distracting the plebs from business. The ideal of public order is apparent: and it lies behind Claudius' ban on attendance of salutationes by soldiers (25,1) as of Tiberius' harsh repression of populares tumultus (37,2) for which purpose the praetorians were centralised on Rome (37,1).

urbs:
(Jul.44,1-2; Aug.28,3-30,1; Cl.18-19; Ner.16,1; Vesp.8,5-9,1; Dom.5)

Again two basic themes emerge, but because we are dealing with the fabric of the city, and not with people, they are inevitably different. It is in the Augustus, as so often, that distinctions are drawn most lucidly: he found the city ill-adorned and dangerous, left it marble and safe (28,3). The predominant theme is adornment of the city by building (Jul.44,1-2, his plans; Aug.29; Vesp.8,5-9,1; Dom.5); the secondary theme is of regulations or interventions that rendered it safe, especially from fire (Aug.30,1; Cl.18,1; Ner.16,1). It would not be over-subtle to suggest that these themes are directly parallel to those concerning persons. Adornment of Rome might be regarded as evidence of liberalitas as far as the emperor is concerned (Tib.47 for the converse); but as far as the city is concerned it is expressly represented as a matter of dignity. Rome needed to be marble, in order to be 'pro maiestate imperii ornatam' (Aug.28,3); Vespasian found it 'deformis...veteribus incendiis ac ruinis' (8,5), a state of undignified chaos directly corresponding to the chaos of the ordines. Similarly the protection of the city is achieved by organisational measures and regulations analogous to the tightening of senatorial meetings: the city is organised by vici, a fire-brigade is instituted (Aug.30,1) or a new
style of fire-proof building is thought out (Ner.16,1), though once-for-all methods are also employed (Aug.30,1, purging the Tiber, extending the road system; Cl.18,1, personal intervention during a fire).

res sacrae: 15

(Jul.40; Aug.30,2-31,4; Cl.22)

Augustus is the only ruler credited with extensive reforms in the area of religion. Here again two themes: the restoration of the gods to their proper dignity, and the imposition of order on religious practices. The theme of honour is made explicit by a transitional sentence at the end of the chapter: 'proximum a dis immortalibus honorem memoriae ducum praestitit' (31,5). The gods receive their due through the restoration of their tumbled temples and rich donations within (30,2); through the increase in number and dignitas of their priests and revival of neglected ceremonies; and new institutions of worship of the Compitales (31,3-4: no mention of ruler-cult here!). Order on the other hand is served by the purging of the Sibylline oracles, the rectification of the calendar, and various bans on youthful exuberance at festivals (31,1-2 & 4). Julius' calendar reform had laid the foundations of order in this area, putting an end to licentia (40). Claudius' revivals of atavistic rites were doubtless prompted by piety, but the reader may suspect they served no useful purpose at all (22, cf. 25,5). 16

Italy:

(Jul.44,3; Aug.46; Cal.16,3; Cl.25,2, cf. 20; cf. Tib.37)

Information here is very scrappy, but the two old themes run on. Only Augustus is credited with a coherent policy, of establishing and dignifying the country (46: compare Julius' plans 'de ornanda instruendaque urbe', 44,1). He set it up (instruxit) by founding colonies, by building works (cf. Jul.44,3; Cl.20) and by vectigalia (somewhat differently
Caligula remits an indirect tax for Italy, 16,3); and raised it in status, 'iure ac dignatione', by a new voting system; also promoting the birthrate and 'honestorum...copia'. All these moves benefit the status of Italy.

Procedural regulations are adjusted by Claudius, who restricts vehicular traffic and establishes fire-services at the two main ports (25,2). Public order is vindicated by the police-action of Tiberius against the unfortunate Pollentines (37,3) as by his general increase of police stations (37,1).

**Provinciae (& regna):**

(Jul.44,3; Aug.47-8; Tib.37,3; Cal.21; Cl.25,3-5; Ner.18-19; Vesp.8,4)

More space is devoted to the provinces than to Italy; yet in terms of relative importance, the brevity of this section is astounding. As an account of provincial administration in the first century of empire, it is hard to imagine anything less adequate. But that is not what is offered.

The twofold division is again clear in the Augustus (47). An emperor could affect the condition and status of a province, or of units within the province by grants and cancellations of privileges, *Latinitas, civitas,* and especially *libertas* (Aug.47; cf. Tib.37,3; Cl.25,3; Vesp.8,4); also by subventions and tax-remissions (Aug.47); and by building (Jul.44,3; Ner.19; cf. Cal.21: all three including the ill-fated Isthmus canal project). He might have added, as he had for Italy, by founding colonies.

The organisation of a province in formal terms was above all affected by the division between senatorial and imperial government. Augustus' division is recorded not as a device to strengthen his own political position: he took over the provinces for which the republican
system was inappropriate ('quas annuis magistratum imperiis regi nec facile nec tutum erat'). Suetonius succinctly identifies a vital truth; but he sees only one side of the position, in terms of the needs of order and peace, not of libertas.\(^\text{17}\) (Cl.25,3 records an adjustment to the division; Vesp.8,4 a change in the government of Cappadocia.) Tiberius' abolition of asylum is another procedural change in the interests of order (27,3).

Regna follow the same pattern.\(^\text{18}\) Their status is affected by whether they are retained as kingdoms (Aug.48) or reduced to provinces (Tib.37,4; Ner.18; Vesp.8,4); their running by Augustus' skilful dynastic policy (48, cf. Tib.37,4).

Finally, it is worth noting Suetonius' enthusiasm for provincial tours by the emperor in person (peregrinationes). He calculates that Augustus visited all but two provinces, and even then a visit had been planned (48). He scorns the ditherings of Tiberius (38) and makes clear the Campanian peregrination was no true one because of his unapproachability (40). He even contrives to be dismissive about Nero's travelling (19,1 'peregrinationes duas omnino suscepit'); an effect exaggerated by recording the proclamation of Greek libertas not in this context, according to the normal pattern, but as an aspect of chariot-eering (24,2). He evidently approves in principle of personal appearances by the emperor in the provinces, as at the games and on the war-front (above) and in the legal forum (below).\(^\text{19}\) But it is relevant too that he served a peregrinating ruler; and indeed the actions recorded in his 'provincial' chapters were precisely those of which such a ruler was capable, grants of privileges, status and money, and the enhancement of dignity through building. (Add of course the review of military discipline, another Suetonian topic.)
Two dominating themes have emerged from this analysis of Suetonius' hierarchy. The author's way of accumulating detail with a minimum of comment and interpretation tends to give the dismaying impression that it all serves no argument (hence his reputation as a 'blosser Tatsachensammler'). It has been necessary to go into considerable detail to show how an overwhelming proportion of this detail is in fact subordinated to distinct themes. Rather than regurgitate aimlessly items culled from his sources, Suetonius starts from a clear conception of the emperor's role, that may be summarised in the policy he attributes to Vespasian 'rem publicam stabilire primo, deinde et ornare' (8,1). The emperor's task is to create a peaceful, ordered and efficiently functioning state by regulating the operation of its component parts, and occasionally intervening against abuse; and then within that ordered structure to ensure a correct distribution of status, to make the whole as glorious as possible, and to ensure that the individual members enjoy dignity in proportion to their deserts. Such a picture, it may be objected, emerges primarily from a mere handful of lives - especially that of Augustus, but also those of Julius, Claudius and Vespasian. Yet the fact that more such items are not recorded for other rulers is itself indicative: they fell short of the ruler's proper role.

It would be possible to view many of the items in this section, revolving around grants of dignity and status, in terms of the Hellenistic ideal of εὐεργεσία: the expectation that the ruler will convey benefits (on request) upon the ruled. The actual continuity of tradition between Hellenistic king and Roman emperor has been demonstrated by Millar. Suetonius, however, has a rather different perspective. He operates in terms of the traditional Roman values of order and dignity: and the role
he assigns to the emperor as supervisor of public order and of degrees of dignity is much closer to the traditional role of the republican Censor. In the next section to be considered, this idea will be pursued further.

iii) *cura iuris et morum*

(\textit{Jul.} 42, 2-43; \textit{Aug.} 32-34; \textit{Tib.} 33-37; \textit{Cl.} 23, with 14-16; \textit{Ner.} 16, 2-17, with 15, 1; \textit{Vesp.} 10-11; \textit{Dom.} 7-8; cf. \textit{Cal.} 15,4-16,1)

Either before his chapters on the hierarchy of orders (\textit{Aug.}, \textit{Cl.}) or after them (\textit{Jul.}, \textit{Ner.}, \textit{Vesp.}) Suetonius regularly has a section on the emperor's impact on *ius* and *mores*; and in two lives this theme is of such importance as to replace completely the hierarchy section (\textit{Tib.}, \textit{Dom.}).

*ius*:

The judge and the lawgiver are familiar roles of the emperor. Of personal jurisdiction the biographer has a fair amount to say, in an area where Tacitus is not forthcoming: this stems from his interest in anything in which the ruler participated personally (see above). He testifies to the assiduity of four rulers in this department (\textit{Jul.} 43, 1 and \textit{Cl.} 14 'laboriosissime'; \textit{Aug.} 33, 1 'assidue'; 'diligentia'; \textit{Dom.} 8, 'diligenter et industrie') and documents their varying styles, the severity of Julius (43, 1), the *lenitas* of Augustus (33, 1-2), the unpredictability of Claudius (14-15), and Nero's arbitrary handling of his *consilium* (15, 1). No explicit marks of approval or disapproval are attached; but every Roman knew what to make of these items. Of the lawgiver Suetonius has surprisingly little to say, and this is surely because *leges*, like *bella*, were the stuff of history. A paragraph on Augustus' great legislative programme is summary in the extreme (34)
and contrasts with the specificness of (for instance) his account of new senatorial regulations (36). But slightly more details are given for others. Julius' solution of the debt-problem and his tightening up of the laws in general are described (42,2-3); details are given of legislation of Claudius (23,1-2; the abrogation of an amendment to the *lex Papia Poppaea*, and new laws on wards and exiles), of Nero (17, laws on forgery of wills, and the pay of advocates) and of Domitian (7,1-2, the ban on castration and the vine-edict). But the lists are incomplete; and legislation may be recorded in other contexts (e.g. *Aug*. 40,4 and *Cl*. 25,2 on the manumission of slaves).

Suetonius clearly views personal jurisdiction and legislation as being only part of a wider responsibility for *ius*. Augustus and Vespasian both undertake a clearing of the books of the courts in the aftermath of civil war (*Aug*. 32,2; *Vesp*. 10; cf. *Cal*. 15,4). But Augustus, he stresses, did not allow this to become a carte blanche for crime: he improved the legal system by an overhaul of the courts (32,2-3). Subsequent changes were brought in by Caligula (16,2), Claudius (23) and Nero (17) (cf. *Jul*. 41,2; and Galba's refusal to add a sixth panel of *iudices*, 14,3). The emperor was involved in other courts through delegation (*Aug*. 33,3; *Cl*. 23,1) and appeal (*Cl*. 14, retries cases from *privati iudices*; *Ner*. 17, reroutes appeals from *iudices* to the senate; cf. *Cal*. 16,1, making magistrates inappellable). He might also interfere more directly in the functioning of the courts: assessing and lecturing like Tiberius (33), cancelling verdicts, delivering warnings and censuring corrupt judges like Domitian (8).

Beyond care for the laws and their administration, the emperor has responsibility for the maintenance of public order. *Augustus* (32,1)
corrected 'pleraque pessimi exempli', putting down grassatores and following Julius (42,3) in his ban on all but traditional collegia. Tiberius followed the same tradition, anxious above all to protect pax from brigandage and rioting (37,1). Circus cliques and actors, of old an object of censorial disapproval, remained a constant source of disorder and a series of emperors took action to control them (Aug.45,4, under spectacula; Tib.34 & 37,2; Ner.16,2; Dom.7).

But the emperor is responsible not only for the order, but for the personal conduct of his people, whether or not, like Tiberius and Domitian he explicitly undertakes the censorial duty of correctio morum (Tib.33; Dom.8,3). There are three main areas of censorship, luxuria, libido and religion. In the control of luxury, Julius (43), Tiberius (34,1) and Nero (16,2) were particularly energetic, limiting expenditure on jewellery, furniture, and in the case of Tiberius, on games, and repeatedly controlling the sale of hot foods in public (Jul. 43,2; Tib.34,1; Ner.16,2; with Dom.7 reversing Nero's introduction of sportulae). Tiberius reinforced control by setting an example of abstinence in public; and in addition he stopped by edict two customs, public kissing, and the presentation of gifts beyond New Year's Day (34,2). Vespasian is credited with the repression of rampant luxuria: the only measure cited is a senatusconsultum against lending to minors (11). The account of Claudius' censorship is aimed at demonstrating his unpredictability, and the only sumptuary measure noted is his destruction of a silver chariot (16,4). Augustus' lex sumptuaria is only listed with his other laws (34,1).

Against libido the main crusaders were Tiberius (35) and Domitian (8,3-4), taking disciplinary action, or occasionally promoting legislation, against the prostitution of matrons, incorrect marital relations (so too
Julius, 43, 1), homosexuality and incest of Vestals; as against other types of upper-class immorality, dancing, public performance, and shady property deals. Vespasian is said to have brought libido under control with luxuria, but again the evidence is limited to a single s. c. on the marriage of free with slaves. 22 Augustus' moral and marital laws are only discussed under his other legislation (34). Claudius' attempts to censure the immoral are dismissed as bungling (16); he is also credited with the cancellation of an amendment of the lex Papia Poppaea by Tiberius (23, 1), though Tiberius is given no credit for the original amendment (= Tac. Ann. 3, 25-28).

In religion the main censorial aim is the repression of foreign superstition. Tiberius takes severe measures against Egyptians, Jews and astrologers (36); Claudius against Jews and Druids, though he promotes respectable Greek cults (25, 4-5); Nero against Christians (16, 2). Domitian is presented as a champion of religious purity (8, 4-5); curiously there is no mention of Jews or Christians in this context (but 12, 2 for the fiscus Iudaicus).

2. The ideal role.

To this point the role attributed by Suetonius to the emperor has been the object of this analysis. But what the biographer observes that rulers actually did by way of administration is not necessarily the same as what he considered they should do. How far does he give his approval to the actions he records? Two main themes have been distinguished, the control of status and adjustments to organisation. These will be examined in turn.
i) Morals and Status

The difficulties of eliciting the author's opinions in this area have already been pointed out. Except in rare cases, the actions concerned are not related to moral categories but to aspects of the state. Judgement of individual items is left to the assumptions he might expect his Roman reader to share. For all that, it is notable that none of the material above occurs in parts of the work where the tone is generally critical ('the bad halves'). The lives of Caligula and Nero separate sharply good actions and bad (see Cal.22,1; Ner.19,3): administrative actions are recorded in the 'good' part. There is a similar movement from good to bad for Tiberius and Domitian, though he characterises each in the former part as 'varium' (Tib.33; Dom.3,2). Vespasian is blameless in all respects but his handling of money (16,1); and about Augustus' government he is explicitly enthusiastic, 'fecitque ipse se compotem voti nisus omni modo, ne quern novi status paeniteret' (28,2). Over Claudius he suspends judgement.²³

There can be little doubt that he held administrative activity in the main as the proper business of the princeps. He uses this title itself as if it implied administrative duties, not all of them necessarily attractive. 'Hactenus quasi de principe, reliqua ut de monstro...' (Cal.22,1). 'Paulatim principem exeruit, praestititque etsi varium diu, commodiorem tamen saepius et ad utilitates publicas proniorem' (Tib.33). At the end of this section on his administration, Tiberius is criticised for abandoning 'rei publicae...curam' on his retreat to Capri (41). The main criticism of Claudius is that his administration was not his own, 'totum...principatum non...suo...arbietro administravit' (25,5). By implication the same criticism is made of Nero: 'multa sub eo et animadversa severe et coercita nec minus instituta' opens a chapter wholly
expressed in the passive voice; this is unique in the lives, for they are characteristically marred by repetitive use of the perfect active of traditional elogia. Nero can take no credit, in fact, for what would otherwise be creditable. Seneca and Burrus lurk, unnamed. Nero's administrative actions may perhaps appear blameless by contrast to his scandalous pursuits and vices (19,3); but the balance is wrong, too little government, too much spectacle of a dubious sort.

But within this framework of overall approval, it is necessary to draw a distinction. Among the Lives, there are two main patterns of organisation of the administrative section: those where the 'hierarchical' arrangement predominates (Jul., Aug., Cl., Vesp.) and those where it is submerged (Tib.; Dom.). Tib.33-37 is arranged as a crescendo of severity: first negative interventions against maladministrations (33); then positive correctio morum (34-36); finally, and above all (in primis) the inexorable repressal of signs of popular discontent (37). The reader is left with the impression that such severity, while strictly proper, was overzealous; and this is confirmed by the later statement that he did much that was cruel 'specie gravitatis ac morum corrigendorum' (59,1). A similar pattern is shared by Domitian (a fact in itself suspicious): a chapter on his innovations (7); then one on his strict control of courts and magistrates (8,1-2); finally his correctio morum (8,3-5). Certainly his scrupulous control of provincial governors, 'ut neque modestiores umquam neque iustiores extiterint' is admirable (8,2); but the accumulation of such items leaves the reader with an impression of severity about which he must be in two minds (hence 'varium': 3,2).

What Tiberius and Domitian achieved by correctio morum Augustus and Vespasian, the rulers who most inspire Suetonius' enthusiasm, managed by review of the membership of the orders, and by legislation. Moral
control is naturally invidious: but their severity is balanced by generosity. Augustus did much to mitigate the unpleasantness of his equestrian reviews (38,3-40,1; e.g. 'lenissimum genus admonitionis'; cf. Cal.16,2 'nec sine moderatione'); and his hated senatorial purges (35,1-2) were set off by increases in the opportunities for dignity and generosity with marks of distinction (37-38,1). Vespasian purged the disreputable, but also adlected the worthy (9,2). Neither Tiberius nor Domitian are credited in this context with advancing anybody's status. One may conclude that in Suetonius' ideal, the supervision of status requires a positive as well as a negative side, reward as well as punishment.25

The accounts of the private lives of these emperors are also relevant. It was a point repeatedly made in the ancient world that a good ruler should operate by example not command; in particular this point was applied as an argument for the abolition of imperial censorship. Pliny welcomes the realisation of this ideal in Trajan, in reaction against the perpetual censorship of Domitian: 'nam vita principis est censura eaque perpetua' (Pan.45,6); Tacitus sees the reign of Vespasian as the turning point in the transition from the rule of morals by law to that by imitation (Ann.3,55).26 Does Suetonius attempt to correlate the private lives and public administration of the subjects of his lives?

Vespasian's private life is blameless (21), Augustus' (at least in most respects) a model of propriety (71-78). Tiberius and Domitian, who alike lead campaigns for moral probity, personally have shabby moral records, even sharing a taste for particularly outré sexual deviations (Tib.42-45; Dom.22).27 The nature of Suetonius' biographical form makes it hard to demonstrate that there is here a conscious connection between
private and public standards: but at least in the case of Tiberius the charge of hypocrisy is explicit, for he spent a night and two days in carousal 'in ipsa publicorum morum correctione' (42,1). Ironically Tiberius tried to anticipate just this charge (Tac. Ann.3,54) and his panegyrist discerned in him the ideal: 'nam facere recte cives suos princeps optimus faciendo docet, cumque sit imperio maximus, exemplo maior est' (Velleius ii,126,5). But the only example of this policy Suetonius reports is damning: he served rechauffé dishes at formal dinners as an example of parsimony (34,1).

It would not be possible to argue that Suetonius only ascribes moral indiscretions to rulers who interfered in the private lives of their subjects, or that this was the only reason for reporting them in his lives. But it is important to see that there is more to this discussion of mores than rhetorical denigration, misplaced application of the rules of the genre, or sheer salaciousness. If the author saw a large part of the business of the ruler as being the supervision of the moral order of the empire, particularly through his control of status, the moral worthiness of the ruler was necessarily a relevant topic. He quotes with approval the edict of Augustus on restoring the statues of the republican heroes: 'commentum id se, ut illorum velut ad exemplar et ipse, dum viveret, et inequentium aetatum principes exigerentur a civibus' (31,5).

ii) Tradition and innovation

Hadrian has picked up something of a reputation as a reformer, though much of it has dissolved on closer inspection. Suetonius has been seen to show a constant interest in procedural innovations by past emperors. What is his relative valuation of innovation and tradition
and what stance does he think the ideal ruler should take with regard to them?

There can be no doubt that Suetonius saw the establishing of new customs and institutions as a vital part of the emperor's job. That is apparent from the frequency of the verb instituo alone. Any Caesar worth his salt 'instituted' something: Julius the publication of the acta senatus (20,1), a new way of supplementing the census list (41,3), an import tax (43,1); Augustus a whole list of military changes (24,1, not as a rubric), the vicomagistri (30,1) and Compitalia (31,4), and the senatorial consilia semestria (34,3); Claudius a whole series of matters (22, as a rubric) and specifically titular military rank (25,1); Nero some important legal innovations (the rubric of Ner.16,2, referring to 17, but see above on the voice), together with some fiscal reforms (32,2); Titus the automatic confirmation of beneficia, previously renewable 'ex instituo Tiberii', and Domitian a priestly college for Minerva (4,4). That is not to say instituo is automatically a word of approval. All depends on what is introduced, and unworthy rulers betray themselves. Tiberius institutes the office a voluptatibus (42,2), Caligula cult-honours for his family (15,2) and himself (22,3), Domitian the title of 'dominus et deus' (13,2); and Nero's fiscal reforms are certainly extortionate (above). Whether the new quinquennial festivals of Nero (12,3) and Domitian (4,4) meet with approval is unclear.

This pattern is confirmed by words of similar meaning. Constituo is almost synonymous: on the good side Julius 'constituted' calendar reforms (40,2), Augustus the aerarium militare (49,2), a transport grant for governors (36,1) and celebrations at Actium (18,2); Tiberius the praetorian camp in Rome (37,1 - a dubious manoeuvre perhaps); Claudius incentives for corn-merchants (18,2) and separate circus-stalls for
senators (21,3); Nero salaries for poor senators (10,1) as Vespasian for professors (18, cf. 8,3 below). On the other hand Caligula set up a brothel in the palace (41,1), and Vespasian had himself a succession of concubines (21).

Emperors betray themselves even more transparently in the exercise of their ingenuity (excogito, comminiscor). Augustus excogitated new offices (37) and the postal vote (46); Claudius devices to keep the corn-supply flowing (18,2); Nero a new style of building (16,1); while Tiberius designed amusement centres at Capri (43,1) and new tortures (62,2); Caligula the absurd Baiae bridge 'novum...atque inauditum genus spectaculi' (19,1; cf. 19,3 and 32,1), and exotic victims like flamingoes for his cult (22,3); and Nero a peculiarly horrendous style of orgy (29).

Comminiscor has the authority of an Augustan edict (31,5); the inventions to which Suetonius applies the world are highly characteristic for each emperor: Augustus' fire-fighting vigiles (30,1); Tiberius' sensual haunts (43,2); Caligula's new bathing style (37,1); Claudius' additions to the alphabet (41,3); Nero's matricidal boat (34,2); and Vespasian's pissoir tax (23,3).

Novare is used only once, of the long lists of Domitian's innovations (7). Auctor fuit applies to senatorial legislation promoted by the ruler (Aug.36; Tib.35,1; Vesp.11); but also Caligula's proposal to include his sisters in the sacramenta (15,3), Claudius' restoration of the temple of Venus.Erycina (25,5) and Domitian's recommendation that an aedile be impeached by a tribune (8,2).

Now the reason why imperial innovations were so important was that they tended to stick, so that over the years by a mass of minor adjustments a whole new pattern of life and law was built up. As a secretary, Suetonius should have been well aware of this point. Indeed several times
he explicitly comments on the survival of a new practice: Augustus' signet-ring was still the official seal (50). Claudius' benefits to the corn trade held good (19) and Vespasian's instruction to the military runners to go bootless had curiously stuck (8,3). He might have added that the majority of the sensible innovations listed above survived. He does not, and leaves it to the reader's own knowledge to discern that, for instance, Domitian's abolition of *sportulae* and invention of two new circus colours were unsuccessful experiments, whereas his increase of military pay remained (7,1-3).30

For that reason, the *Caesars* could never be treated as a repertory of practices current in the author's own day. In no sense is the work a history of the gradual evolution of the imperial system as a result of individual contributions. Indeed, one might well conclude that excepting a few minor adjustments by later rulers, all the important changes had been wrought by Augustus: perhaps the author thought so. But the point is that he uses a ruler's innovations to illuminate his character, not to write a history of the empire.

Consequently it is evident that he attached no value to innovation *per se*. The Romans were deeply ambivalent towards novelty. They boasted proudly if they were the first to achieve something (see above):

'\textit{eodemque primus fecei, ut de agro poplico aratoribus cederent pastores}'

(ILLS 23, Popilius Laenas).31 Suetonius too gives credit: Julius was *primus omnium* to compile and publish the *acta* (20,1), Vespasian was *primus* in his grants to professors (18), Titus in the automatic confirmation of benefits (8,1); but then on the other hand Claudius was the first to set a price on praetorian support (10,4) and Nero's introduction of Greek *quinquennalia* is questionable (12,3).32
Fundamentally the Roman was hostile to novelty, and dedicated to his mos maiorum. 'Innovate' was a word that emperors themselves applied pejoratively. That novavit is only used of Domitian should alert suspicions (above). Later tradition at least saw him as a needless innovator: κενόδοξος γὰρ ὡν...τούς νεωτερισμοὺς ἔχαρεν (Lydus Mag. ii, 19 p. 75W.). A break from mos is only as good as its reason: Julius took his census 'nece more nec loco solito', but he was avoiding riots (41,3); Augustus took sententiae in the senate 'non more atque ordine sed prout libuisset', but only to keep members on their toes in serious discussions (35,4).

Words expressive of the past and tradition tend in Suetonius to be emotive. So anything priscum or pristinum tends to be good. Tiberius preserved the pristine majesty of the senate (30), Drusus wanted to restore the 'pristinum...rei p. statum' (Cl. 1, 4); whereas Nero's fire consumed the houses of 'priscorum ducum' (38,2), and Domitian vainly restored buildings 'sine ualla pristini auctoris memoria' (5). Above all Augustus revered his past: he restored the calendar 'ad pristinam rationem' (31,2), the senate 'ad modum pristinum et splendorem' (35,1), and brought back the 'pristinum ius' of assemblies (40,2), urged the people to wear their 'habitum vestitumque pristinum' (40,5; contrast Cal. 52), and revived the lusus Troiae thinking it 'prisci decorique moris' (43,2).

Suetonius was right. One of the great achievements of Augustus was to convince the Romans that his revolution was not a rejection of the mos patrius, but a reaffirmation and extension of it. He and his successors stood at the end of a long line of duces (31,5). 'Legibus novis latis complura exempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nostro usu revocavi et ipse multarum rerum exempla imitanda posteris tradidi' (RG 8).
He made it possible for Romans of the empire to see the *mos maiorum* not as a fixed and unchanging quantity, but as subject to constant evolution. The antiquarian researches of Varro, inspired by the fear of change, became intensely relevant for the acceptance of the fact of change.

'Quis dubitet quin in aeternum urbe condita, in immensum crescente, nova imperia, sacerdotia, iura gentium hominumque instituantur?' (Livy iv, 4,1-4).

Suetonius the antiquarian belongs to the same tradition. The rubric at Cl.22 summarises the business of administration: 'quaedam circa caerimonias civilemque et militarem morem, item circa omnium ordinum statum domi forisque aut correctit aut exoleta revocavit aut etiam nova instituit'. Here we have defined the two most important objects of government, *mos* (in religion, military and civil life) and *status*; and a trio of methods, correction, revival and innovation. The emperor, that is to say, inherits an agglomerate of traditions, *mos*, and is expected to leave it behind him improved. Innovation must go hand in hand with the preservation of tradition; the idea is fundamental to Suetonius' views. Augustus' impact on military practice is summarised, 'et commutavit multa et instituit atque etiam ad antiquum morem nonnulla revocavit' (24,1). The first two actions recorded for Julius' consulship are an innovation (publishing the *acta*) and a revival: 'antiquum etiam retulit morem...' in the use of an accensus (20,1). In Augustus' whole government revival, correction and innovation go hand in hand: so under *caerimoniae* we learn in quick succession that he restored some obsolete rites, introduced corrections (no unaccompanied minors at the Secular Games after dark, among other rules), and introduced the crowning of the Compitales with garlands (31,4). The frequency both of his innovations and of his revivals has been illustrated enough; correction too is there
throughout, as when he 'spectandi confusissimum et solutisissimum morem correxit' (44,1). This pattern is too pervasive to need further illustration: it even extends to building, where restorations are recorded alongside nova opera (e.g. Vesp.8,5–9,1).

For improvement, the Roman looked back to the examples set by his ancestors. Valerius Maximus in his chapters de Institutis Antiquis (ii,1–6, discussed above ch.II,3) sees a strict contemporary relevance: 'opus est enim cognosci huiusce vitae, quam sub optimo principe felicem agimus, quae est fuerint elementa, ut eorum quoque respectus aliquid praesentibus moribus prosit (ii, praef.). Exemplum is as vital to Roman thought as mos. Suetonius sees the emperor as the guardian of exemplum: he draws old examples to the attention of his people, as Augustus circulated his officials with salubrious praecerta et exempla (89,2). He promotes good example, like the specious Caligula rewarding a faithful slavegirl 'quo...magis nullius non boni exempli fautor videretur' (16,4). He corrects whatever is pessimi exempli (Aug.32,1); and he sets new exempla himself, propagating great-grandsons (Aug.34,2).

Conclusion

If we ask what the emperor actually spent his day doing the answer will be that (war apart) he sat deciding on petitions, applications and complaints from groups and individuals throughout his realm. If we ask one of his equestrian secretaries what he ought to have been doing, the answer appears to be something like this: preserving the moral and social order of the world into which he was born, and adapting it in the face of difficulties to make it more ordered, more worthy and more Roman. An upper class answer, of course. But not one aimed at repressing the lower classes, so much as at controlling the whim of the autocrat and
his friends. That an imperial official should hold such views will cause no surprise. Centuries later the official John Lydus was to maintain a similar position: οὐ οὖν ὅτι τυράννων ἀνατρέπειν τὰ πάλαι καθεστηκότα (Mag. ii, 19).
Appendix: Providence, Imperial and Divine

Providentia Principis

The business of imperial (and indeed any ancient) government was retrospective to an extent that seems startling to modern society. Yet even if it is true that the emperor's role was 'essentially that of listening to requests, and of hearing disputes',39 contemporaries saw another essential aspect of his role in the care for the future of the state. This ideal was expressed as providentia. It was a central tenet of philosophical, notably Stoic, doctrine that the cosmos was steered by divine pronoia. By analogy the ruler fulfilled the role for his territory that the divine power did for the universe: Aristeas advises the king that he will exercise pronoia for the crowds under his control if he observes how God benefits mankind, providing health, nourishment, and all things in due season.40 Imperial providentia was widely acclaimed from the start; and Charlesworth has shown the wide range of activities in which this foresight for the security of the future was manifested: political security in the provision of successors and the prevention of conspiracies, the welfare of the empire as secured by legislation, building and organisation, especially in good communications (roads and harbours), the provision of essentials (corn and water), the promotion of agriculture and the encouragement of the birth-rate (alimenta); and in general all that involved the peace and prosperity of the empire; in which must surely be included the military security of the frontier.41

By Suetonius' day the celebration of this 'virtue' was regular. From Trajan the coinage bore a personified Providentia Augusti, and the epithet 'providentissimus' is applied to Trajan in Pliny's correspondence and in inscriptions.42 Here was a category under which much of the public activity Suetonius records could be subsumed. His conception of the emperor's administrative role (discussed above) lay close to the Stoic providentia, defined according to Cicero as the provision 'first that the universe should be in the fittest state for survival, then that it should have no deficiencies, above all that there should be in it outstanding beauty and every adornment'.43 This stands close to Suetonius' definition of Vespasian's aim 'rem publicam stabilire primo, deinde et ornare' (8,1) and to the persistent concerns that emerged from analysis of the 'administrative' section, for order and for status.

Suetonius does not make use of providentia as a category, nor does he even employ the word; though he comes close to doing so in stating that Augustus both adorned Rome and ensured its safety 'quantum provideri humana ratione potuit' (28,3). But this absence of providentia is no matter of surprise, once his purpose in employing 'virtue' categories is properly understood.

i) He is by no means concerned to analyse every public act in terms of the appropriate 'virtue' or 'vice'. That is the style of a panegyrist, whether following the schematic disposition of encomium according to ἀρχαῖα, or like Pliny passing from act to act and extracting from it whatever praise was possible. Suetonius' enumeration of public acts is by contrast deliberately disengaged and impartial, and critical judgements are generally implicit. The sections on virtue are an addition to, not a substitute for this (so above ch.II,3).
ii) The virtues and vices which he does document are aspects of character, human moral qualities such as analysed by a Theophrastus. But providentia is more a function inherent in the emperor's role than a moral quality: though other men could exercise 'foresight' in certain situations (e.g. T. Hist. ii, 19 of a general), providence was not a virtue in respect of which men were compared. Further, providentia was in its essence quasi-divine, 'tua caelestis providentia' as Valerius says to Tiberius. The biographer or historian (unlike the panegyrist) is not concerned to make god out of a man. The rider in the comment of Augustus' protection of Rome 'quantum provideri humana ratione potuit' is significant in this context. Similar motives will lie behind Tacitus' avoidance of the term except in mockery or irony. Providence belonged to the gods, not men.

Providentia Deorum

This may lead on to a brief consideration of Suetonius' views of the relationship of the emperor with the divine providence. The evidently widespread Stoic idea that the fate of the universe was directed by divine will was applied by supporters of the regime to the legitimation of the emperor. Seneca represents Nero as picked to act as viceregent of the gods, Pliny acclaims Trajan as 'a diis electus', and the coinage on the accession of Hadrian depicts the eagle of Jove passing down the sceptre to the hands of the new emperor. Where does Suetonius stand vis-à-vis this concept of the emperor if not himself a god, at least ruling by the grace of god?

The Lives contain no explicit pronouncement on this issue, and providentia deorum is no more named than providentia principis. But one aspect of the work does have direct bearing on the issue, namely the omens, portents and predictions regularly and extensively reported in each life. It is clearly inadequate to dismiss this feature (as did Macé) as the product of a quirkish personal superstitiousness of the author. For all the scepticism of Cicero's de Divinatione, divination had been reestablished within Stoic doctrine by Posidonius; and with the empire the conviction that the future could by various means be foreseen became increasingly popular. Even if traditional techniques like augury and haruspicy declined, there was an enormous upsurge in the predictive 'pseudo-sciences' reaching a peak in the 2nd century: above all in astrology (witnessed by the surviving works of Ptolemy and Vettius Valens), also in oneiromancy (Artemidorus) and physiognomology (Polemon). This is not the place to enter in on a full discussion of Suetonius and 'superstition': but at least some observations may be made on the implications of his collections of omens for the relationship of emperor and gods.

i) Though the author shows great diligence in collecting omens, portents, dreams, oracles, prophecies and predictions of all sorts, the bearing of the predictions is not on any and every event in the Caesar's life. With one exception they all point to two crucial moments: the acquisition of power, and death. This is most apparent in the long list of portents in the Life of Augustus (94-97). First are collected the signs 'quibus futura magnitudo eius et perpetua felicitas sperari animadvertique posset' (94,1). The list proceeds chronologically, starting with signs before his birth, until it reaches Actium, when it breaks off sharply (96,2). It then passes to signs of his death and divinity (97).
The same pattern holds for the other Lives, except that in no other are all signs gathered together under one rubric, but they usually precede accession and death respectively. The one exception is the augury of Domitian's success against the rebellion of Antonius (6,2); and this only reinforces the point that acquisition and loss of imperial power is what concerns the author.\(^5^3\) Nor is it only the rise and fall of individuals that is predicted, but of whole dynasties: the end of the Julian house with Nero (Galb.1), the continuity of the gens Flavia (Vesp.25) and the golden age that would follow the last Flavian (Dom.23,2). Potentially, then, this is indeed evidence of whether the gods willed that a certain man should receive power, or (by his death) relinquish it.

**ii** It is clear that at least in principle Suetonius accepted the validity of omens etc. for predicting the future. External evidence apart\(^5^4\) so much emerges from his enumerations of signs, particularly from the use of the epithet evidens, evidentissimus (thus Augustus' death portended 'evidentissimis ostentis') and from the comments on the fulfilment of predictions.\(^5^5\) It is also apparent that the conviction was widespread among emperors themselves that the future could be foreseen, even as with Tiberius, that 'cuncta fati agi' (69); astrological forecasts were taken particularly seriously, and in the case of Domitian (if Suetonius can be believed) not only was the exact hour of his death known to him in advance, but that knowledge provided his chamberlains with the opportunity to trick him and so to fulfil the predictions (14,1 & 4; 16,2).

**iii** It is no less clear that for Suetonius the most patent evidence of the future offers no justification for power. Omens certainly were used as evidence for divine sanction: Menander recommends for the Basilikos Logos that the orator relate miracles attendant on an emperor's birth.\(^5^6\) Many of the omens detailed by Suetonius, especially for Augustus and Vespasian, must have been deliberately manufactured at the time in order to carry popular opinion.\(^5^7\) But in Suetonius' presentation omens of future power can convey no divine sanction, simply because the emperors themselves may have been regrettable ones. Astrologers forecast the power of Tiberius (14,2), Otho (4,1), and Vitellius (3,2) and Vespasian's sons (25) as well as of Augustus (94,12). Prediction is morally neutral: the infelicitas of the reign of Nero (6,2) can be foreseen just as much as the felicitas of Augustus (94,1). He may have approved of the sentiment of Titus 'principatum fato dari' (9,1); but this was wholly different from divine sanction for rule. Marcus in the Meditations constantly asserts his belief that the world-order, down to the smallest detail, is ruled by divine providence: but the conclusion he draws is not that his power is sanctioned by the gods, but that he as all others must accept his station in life, however little he likes it, and live in accordance with the nature given him.\(^5^8\)
PART C

THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT
Suetonius' sympathy (if I have read him aright) goes to the emperor who performs his administrative functions properly; who accepts the hierarchy and traditions of Roman society, strengthens and enhances them; who maintains public order and public morals; and who passes on to his successor the res publica of his ancestors, purged of its faults and improved by such new institutions as promote its welfare. Such a man does not need personal talents of a kind that set him apart from the ordinary run of men. A dedication to duty is surely required; also a respect for tradition, an ability to organise efficiently and consistently (avoiding the 'mira varietas animi' of Claudius, 15,1), the toughness necessary to impose strict discipline, coupled with a mildness that overlooks human fallibility; and of course the strength of character not to fall under the whimsical influences of wives, freedmen and associates. One may also surely add that a literary education is a great advantage. But these were qualities to be found in any Roman gentleman of the better sort, and were doubtless to a lesser degree requisite for the proper performance of any subordinate administrative post. What is missing is any sign of flair and brilliance. In fact, Suetonius' emperor is, in Weber's distinction,\(^1\) not a 'charismatic' ruler, depending on the possession (at least in his subjects' eyes) of personal qualities that set him apart from all others, but 'bureaucratic', rational and efficient, the servant of his office. The justification of his power is not the acknowledgement of his special gifts, but the quality of his performance of his job.

But there is another side to Suetonius' judgement of an emperor,
and if the distinction drawn above is accepted, it stands in apparent contradiction to the ideal of the good administrator. Virtues and vices play as important a part in the depiction of emperor as does conduct of administration (above ch.II). It is evident that there is more to these virtues and vices than the biographer's concern for character; as was argued above, the interest in characterisation is exceptional (e.g. Claudius' idiosyncracies) and the virtues are treated as a series of standard criteria for measuring public conduct. It was suggested that his use of these categories could not be explained without reference to the whole pattern of thought that lays emphasis on the ruler's possession of virtues. Yet it is precisely here that a paradox appears, if one accepts the normal view that the function fulfilled by 'imperial virtues' was to promote the 'charismatic' image of the ruler.²

That Suetonius' Caesars acquire much charisma from their possession of virtues will scarcely be believed; indeed those who most blatantly aimed at 'charismatic' status are in a sense the most vicious (Caligula, Nero). But in his use of 'virtue' terms like clementia and liberalitas Suetonius stands much too close to the charismatic ideology of the empire for us to be able to dismiss the affinity. Why is it that Suetonius is so interested in virtues and vices, and what aspect of the ruler is he trying to draw attention to? Why is it that virtues feature so largely in imperial ideology, and what function do they serve? What is the relationship between Suetonius and this 'ideology', and where do the differences lie? There are no easy answers to these questions, and I shall not pretend to offer any final solutions. But some sort of discussion of the nature of imperial virtues and ideology is necessary before Suetonius can be placed within his proper context, and particularly so since some of the tenets of the received doctrine are, in my view, unsupportable. These
general issues will be considered in the present chapter, before turning to the Suetonian picture.

Modern discussion of the place of virtues in the ideology of the Roman empire moves from an old but still illuminating paper by Charlesworth (1937). His thesis was briefly this: For the mass of the population of the Empire the legal and constitutional position of their ruler was an irrelevance. What mattered was their belief that he was right for them and that they needed him. This belief centered on his possession of certain 'virtues'. Spread belief in these, and the ruler's position was secure. The vehicle for propagation of belief was the official coinage, which frequently bore on its reverses the depictions of various 'virtues' personified. The choice of the virtues so advertised depended on assumptions about what the 'ideals' of a ruler were, which ultimately flowed from Greek philosophical thought about kingship, and which became 'canonised' in the Golden Shield presented to Augustus.

This thesis was accepted with only minor reservations in the most authoritative study of the 'Herrscherideal', Wickert's Pauly article on the Princeps, and by most subsequent scholars. Yet there are certain features of his argument that should have caused hesitation.

1) He saw the propaganda of coinage as aimed at a wide social range (compared to the readership of the modern daily newspaper), essentially the humble as opposed to the educated élite ('the farmer in Gaul, the corn-shipper in Africa, the shopkeeper in Syria' p.108). Yet the virtues propagated are supposed to have been the product of Greek philosophy, the élite in its most elitist of intellectual activities. What did the 'common man' care for Socratic virtue?

2) He posited a 'canon' of imperial virtues, finalised by the Golden
Shield: *virtus*, *clementia*, *iustitia*, and *pietas*. Now though he admitted that there were others (he stressed *providentia*), 'still these four great qualities...were always thought of as present in and exercised by his [Augustus'] successors, and they were certainly cardinal virtues of a ruler' (p.114). Wickert lists some fifty and more qualities attributed to emperors over the centuries by various sources, literary, epigraphic, numismatic; nevertheless, he only discusses the 'cardinal' four. But the very notion of a 'canon' ought to have been questioned. A canon implies a fixed and generally accepted belief in a set of entities. It therefore allows no room for difference of viewpoint between different groups of people (let alone a distinction between élite and masses). Nor does it allow for difference between different periods and historical circumstances, even between different societies. Did the philosopher in Ptolemaic Alexandria, the historian in Trajanic Rome, and the panegyrist in late Roman Gaul really each see the same set of ideals in his ruler? If so, one must suspect that the ideals were so general and superficial as to be without any real value.

In view of these difficulties it is necessary to examine the evidence again. I shall look first at the arguments for a 'canon of virtues', then at the relationship between the 'virtues' met on the coinage and those in the literature of the educated élite.

1. The Canon of Virtues.

At some stage in 27 or 26 BC the senate presented the newly named Augustus with a Golden Shield, 'virtutis clementiae iustitiae pietatis erga deos patriamque caussa'. His pride in the honour is evidenced by the record in the *Res Gestae*, by the frequent representation of the shield on the coinage, and by the dissemination of copies throughout the empire,
of which that from Arles survives as a specimen. But even setting aside the assumption that Augustus designed the wording himself as a 'political platform', the canonical status of these virtues is a delusion.

The first premise on which the argument rests is that the virtues of the shield, Virtus, Clementia, Iustitia and Pietas, are identical with those of Greek philosophy. The identification is widely held to have been proved by the Polish scholar Markowski. Yet it is either gravely misleading or simply false. The facts are straightforward enough: no doubt that moral philosophers constantly spoke of four cardinal virtues, but they are not the same ones. Bravery (ἀνδρεία), Temperance (σωφροσύνη), Justice (δικαιοσύνη) and Wisdom (φρόνησις/σοφία) form the canon. The group is of course Socratic in origin. The earlier dialogues of Plato treat of five parts of ἀρετή, these four and ὀσωτης (εὐσέβεια), and this group of five appears in the classic encomium of a king, the Agesilaos of Xenophon (a Socratic). But religious observance is of limited appeal to a moral philosopher, and from the Euthyphro on Plato drops ὀσωτης, and limits the canonical number to four. The analytic Aristotle drops this restriction and extends the range (without reintroducing ὀσωτης). It is the Stoics who confirm the idea of a canon, reestablishing the Platonic four, and turning other virtues into subspecies of these. By the time of Cicero this is firmly established, and he constantly rehearses the four as an assumed fact of moral philosophy: he renders them as fortitudo (not virtus), temperantia/continentia, iustitia, and prudentia/sapientia. What canonised this group perhaps more effectively than Stoic systematisation were the rigid prescriptions of rhetoric: in rhetorical handbooks, whether Cicero and Quintilian, or the arid imperial tracts collected in Spengel's Rhetores,
the prescription is constant, that to praise a man, in particular a king, the orator must demonstrate the four virtues.  

The Golden Shield tells a different story.  

Virtus, though close to ἀνδρεία, is not used to translate it.  

Clementia is certainly not the same as σωφροσύνη, and it involves an element which the Stoics were notorious for rejecting, forgiveness.  

There are indeed passages when Cicero makes clementia a sub-category of temperantia; but in other passages it is subsumed under other virtues. Justice is canonical. But, most important discrepancy of all, there is no confusing pietas and sapientia. If one of the original five virtues was to be dropped, a philosopher would never be prevailed upon to abandon wisdom; whereas piety did indeed lapse.

It is surely clear that the most one can argue is that the Golden Shield represents a variation upon the canon. In this case we must begin by asking whether variations are in fact found? After all, it goes against the nature of a canon to admit variation. Here one comes up against a problem of method. Groups of four virtues may be mentioned often enough, but how are those which are deliberate variations on the canon to be identified? The pitfall is arbitrary selection (as when Weinstock takes a group out of the middle of a long list of virtues and identifies them as canonical). In practice, I have found that the context occasionally provides hints when a variation is intended: most clearly when four virtues are used as the basis of divisio of a passage, or when enumerated in the form 'a,b,c,d and all the other virtues'.

In a philosophical context, minor variations are possible. The first book of de officiis is based on the four virtues of the good citizen: among these magnitudo animi replaces fortitudo, but this, as Cicero explains, is because magnanimity also includes patientia, passive as well
as active bravery, and should therefore be regarded as the leading species. In a rhetorical context Cicero uses Aequitas in the place of Iustititia: this and the three others are ranged on his side against the Iniquitas and other vices of Catiline. 'Iniquity' sounds better than 'injustice', perhaps. The same variation is used in a panegyric on Julian: the orator sees in him the very form of Virtue - the candour of Equity, the blush of Temperance, the stiff-neck of Fortitude and the penetrating glance of Providence. The hearers will quickly understand that Aequitas is δικαιοσύνη, and Providentia is φρόνησις.

Another type of variation is when the context provides the reason why one of the canonical four has to be dropped and replaced. Cicero explains why the lawyer Sulpicius could not reach the consulship: he has the virtues of 'continentiae gravitatis iustitiae fidei' which qualify him for the consulship. But he lacks prowess in war; and what is the use of legal learning in the consular elections? Fortitudo and sapientia are therefore dropped (pro Mur.23). Or Pliny praises a friend as being the equal of philosophers in 'castitate pietate iustitia fortitudine'. He could hardly pretend he was their equal in sapientia, so pietas is resuscitated for the context. A panegyрист introduces an old debate, whether Virtue or Fortune won Theodosius his battles? Constancy, Patience, Prudence and Fortitude all bear witness on the emperor's side - two of them canonical virtues, two of them replacements for the less appropriate Justice and Temperance.

Finally, there are cases where there is little more than the number of four that suggests the author wishes to allude to the philosophical canon. When Cicero requested a triumph for his work in Cilicia, Cato opposed the request: instead that irritating Stoic voted him, what he least needed, a Certificate of his integrity, justice, clemency and fides
Were Cato not so philosophical, one would hardly guess there was any significance in the number of four.26

Where does this leave the Golden Shield? On balance, I am inclined to think that, as with Cato's testimonial, the number of four is indeed meant to give the appearance of the philosopher's canon. But what dictated the choice of the actual virtues mentioned? Given that only one of the quartet, Iustitia, is unquestionably 'philosophical', and given the wide range of variations shown to be possible by those who did abandon the exact canon of the Stoics, it seems misleading - or pointless - to assert that Augustus picked them because they were known to be the four virtues of the ideal ruler. In fact, the philosophical virtues were known to be partly inappropriate to a ruler. Defending the king Deiotarus, Cicero mentions his frugalitas: this is the greatest virtue, he says, modestia, or temperantia; but it is no way to praise a king. 'Brave, just, severe, grave, magnanimous, generous, beneficent, liberal - these are regal compliments (hae sunt regiae laudes); the other one is for private citizens' (Deiot.26).

Reminiscent perhaps, then, but not identical. But all this will be beside the point if the quartet of the Golden Shield in fact acquires canonical status thereafter. How are we to judge? One expects of a canon, whether of seven Sages, nine Lyric poets, or four Virtues that it should be repeated, preferably ad nauseam, or at least with a tolerable frequency.27 It is a curiosity, then, that nowhere in the literature, at least as known to me, do Virtus, Clementia, Iustitia, and Pietas occur together in a context that suggests their special status. Certainly they are among the most frequently named individual virtues in the late imperial panegyrics; but never together as a group.28 The imperial coinage is of course the direction in which Charlesworth indicated we should turn:
but only Hadrian, Pius and Marcus, of so many dozen Caesars, do actually mint types of all four virtues (see Appendix with chart). Even here there is no special association. The types issued by imperial mints varied from year to year, and none of these three emperors ever issued all four types from the same mint in the same year. It is a story of missed opportunities. Right at the start Tiberius came close to achieving the Four. But issuing a series of handsome female heads (probably Livia) he labelled them as Æstitia, Pietas and - Salus. In another emission he came up with Clementia, inscribed round a commemorative shield: but twinned it with Moderatio. Even when under Hadrian, as will be seen, the first conscious series of virtues was minted, Pietas and Virtus were omitted.

To this argument *e silentio* one may add a positive one. If the Golden Shield was regarded as an authoritative variation on the philosophical ideal of a statesman it ought to have been exploited in contexts where the ideal was drawn upon. This is where the rhetorical tradition is significant. The handbooks continued to recommend the traditional Platonic quartet for the βασιλικός λόγος. Menander, the best of them, acknowledges ἕλενθερσια (*clementia*), but treats it as a sub-division of δεκαέοις, not as an alternative to σωφροσύνη. What is recommended in theory is put into practice by the anonymous panegyric that has come down under the name of Aristides. Again in practice the late imperial Panegyrici are well aware of the theory of cardinal virtues. But despite at least three occurrences of the classical canon, and five variations on it, they never hit on the Augustan group.

In view of the pattern of the rhetorical tradition, there seems to me little point in constructing hypotheses that detect the Golden Shield virtues in obscurer corners of the sources. Horace's Roman Odes are one
old hunting ground, certain sarcophagi (for private citizens) of the Antonine period another. But without solid foundations, such hypotheses must totter. More weighty is Stefan Weinstock's attempt to trace an anticipation of the 'statesman's virtues' by Caesar. But he freely admits that the evidence for either iustitia or pietas playing a significant part in Julius' propaganda is negligible; and all in the end boils down to a pamphlet detected behind the account of Romulus in Dionysius' Roman Antiquities. Even granted the hypothesis that his source was a pamphlet and its date Caesarian, the case, as Balsdon saw, will not stand. Dionysius talks not of the qualities of the statesman, but of the qualities Romulus instilled into the Romans. These are piety, temperance, justice and nobility in war. While it is just arguable that clementia may substitute for σωφροσύνη in a canon, it seems ludicrous to imagine that a Roman reading how Romulus brought σωφροσύνη to his state by legislation controlling the lasciviousness of women would be put in mind of the clementia Caesaris.

After making so many negative points about the Golden Shield, I ought perhaps to add something positive. The context to which the Shield surely does belong is indeed a Greek one, but not a philosophical one. One has only to open Dittenberger OGIS almost at a random page to discover that it was standard practice for the Greek cities in the Hellenistic period to honour kings and other benefactors by presenting them with crowns, statues and the like, bearing honorific citations. So a city presents Attalus III of Pergamum with an agalma and eikon; they are to bear the respective citations of, "'Ο δήμος βασιλέα "Ατταλοῦ... ἀρετῆς ἑνεκεν καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον...' and 'Ο δήμος βασιλέα "Ατταλοῦ...ἀρετῆς ἑνεκεν καὶ φρονήσεως...καὶ μεγαλομερείας τῆς εἰς έαυτόν' [i.e. to the Demos]. There are many variations, but the commonest
features are the start in the form ἀρετὴς ἐνεκενν and the conclusion εὐνολας/εὐεργεσίας/εὐσεβείας τῆς εἰς ἑαυτὸν or 'both to the gods and to the city'. Romans knew this custom well, because they as governors inherited the honours (numerous examples in IGRR). In the case of Caesar, a whole rash of such honours breaks out after Pharsalus (Raubitschek collected the different versions).

The precise wording of the citation on the Golden Shield is not preserved on any version; but by conflating them the following version may be achieved: 'Senatus Populusque Romanus Imp Caesari Divi F. Augusto Cos VII dedit clipeum virtutis clementiae iustitiae pietatis erga deos patriamque caussa'. If we compare the honorific decrees of the Greek tradition, the following points are found to be paralleled.

1. The form of the honour: a golden shield was presented to Q. Cicero by his province, though a golden crown is the most commonly met form of honour.

2. The form of citation (ὁ δῆμος τὸν δεῖνα...ἐνεκεν).

3. The characteristic start ἀρετὴς ἐνεκεν = 'virtutis causa'.


5. The intervening 'iustitiae' is paralleled by δικαιοσύνης in two of the dedications to Caesar (ICRR iv,305 and IG viii,1835).

The Greek inscriptions offer no parallel, so far as I can discover, for two points: the mention of clementia, and the selection of a group of four virtues (two or three are usual). If the second point suggests that the senate was trying to superimpose the impression of a philosophical canon, the first does not. Both points, however, are paralleled in Cato's Testimonial to Cicero mentioned above.
Augustus' Golden Shield, then, is perhaps better regarded as the end of an old tradition, rather than the beginning of a new one. Virtus, Clementia, Iustitia and Pietas individually may all have been important, indeed central, 'virtues' in certain contexts under the empire; but as it seems to me, there is simply no evidence for supposing that the Shield played any authoritative role in spreading belief in them, nor that they constituted a 'canon'.

2. 'Virtues' and the coinage.

If the evidence for a 'canon of virtues', whether officially propagated or spontaneously adopted, breaks down, we must be led to question further. How far was there an official attempt to propagate belief in any sort of virtues? Especially if we assume (for the purposes of argument) that propaganda was directed at the 'masses', what sort of appeal would 'virtues' have had, and if they had any at all, what kind of virtues are stressed?

Charlesworth's case rested on the imperial coinage, as it must. Inscriptions may provide valuable supplementary evidence; but they cannot offer anything as a corpus on the scale of the coinage, regularly produced, fully preserved, and systematically catalogued by modern scholars. (Note however one important deficiency of imperial catalogues, that they take no cognisance of local coinages.) The thirties was an ideal decade for detecting imperial propaganda: not only was propaganda itself very much a live issue, but the numismatic material was for the first time properly catalogued, indexed and discussed with particular awareness of its 'ideological' content, by Mattingly in RIC and BMC; while simultaneously in Germany Paul Strack was working over the Antonine Reichsprägung with meticulous care.
Numismatic tastes are rather different these days; and though as late as 1959 Sutherland defended the notion that coin-types were both understandable and understood, most of his colleagues shifted onto pastures new and economic. The conception of coins as an organ of propaganda now meets with increasing scepticism. Too little is known of the mechanics of type selection (how far was it by the emperor, how far by his subordinate personnel?). Nevertheless, the types are there, in a variety exceptional in numismatic history, and they must in some sense reflect 'official' perceptions of the emperor. Which 'virtues', then, are advertised, and why? Can we speak of an attempt by those in authority to persuade the subjects that their ruler was the right man for the job?

Working from the basis of a crude chart of the personifications on Roman coinage (see Appendix), I wish to make three observations. The chart does not, it is important to remember, cover all the themes of imperial coinage, individual events like Aegypto Capta or Quadragesima Remissa, scenes like a Praetorian Decursio, the new harbour of Ostia or the crowning of emperor by senate. It is restricted to what is relevant to the question of virtues, the (predominantly) female personifications.

i) Personifications and virtues.

The first point is about the use of the label 'virtue'. The category we are discussing is an ancient, not a modern one (ἀρεταί, virtutes), and it is as well to be clear what was meant by it. There is no problem here, as philosophers define it often enough. As for Aristotle ἀρετή is a ἓν ψυχῆς, so for Cicero 'virtus est animi habitus' (de Inv. ii, 53) or an 'adfectio animi constans conveniensque, laudabiles efficiens eos in quibus est' (Tusc. iv, 34). Virtue is the moral quality of a man, whether innate or developed by education and practice. The trite definition of rhetoricians
is also relevant. There are three points for which a man can be praised: the things of the soul, the things of the body, and external things (like wealth and luck). Only the first, τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, constitute proper ἀρετῆς.\\n
But the usage of modern numismatists is different, and varied. Mattingly started from a passage of Cicero (de leg. ii, 28) that distinguishes virtutes from res expetendae; but having acknowledged that many personifications were of desirable states rather than virtues, he proposed to keep the term 'virtutes' for all. In a way he was right. The Tiberian series of Justitia, Pietas and Salus are so clearly linked in purpose that it makes no numismatic sense to distinguish them as different types of things, although Salvation/Safety is no ἐξ ἔως ψυχῆς. Moreover, there is a sense in which (e.g.) Salus is more than a res expetenda; one of the regular features of these personifications is the attachment of an explanatory Augusta or Augusti to the legend. The implication is that the quality, like a virtue, resides within the emperor (so is not one of τὰ ἐξ ἔως): Salus Augusti is not just the Safety of the ruler, but the Saving Power that flows from him.

Moving from this last observation, Michael Grant attempted a fresh distinction: the adjectival Augusta signified a res expetenda, a blessing, the genitive Augusti a virtue, a quality within the ruler. This was a distinct step backwards. He lists sixteen personifications qualified in the 1st century AD by Augusti. Among these are perhaps five which Cicero would have called virtues (Aequitas, Clementia, Constantia, Pietas and Virtus); others are, philosophically speaking, τὰ ἐξ ἔως - Victoria, Tutela, Libertas, Pax, Securitas, Aeternitas, Fortuna). Now doubtless these all reside within the metaphorical 'godhead' of the emperor: but what sort of theological sophistry is needed to turn Annona Augusti into a virtue?
My point, then, is this. Specialists are entitled to use whatever label they choose for these personifications. But if one is to compare coins with other sources, particularly philosophically inspired ones (i.e. in talking of the virtues of the ideal statesman) it is vital to distinguish what is a virtue and what is not. Among the forty or so personifications of the imperial coinage, only a dozen are virtues. It is also worth noting that the types which only appear once or twice are almost all virtues.

ii) Pattern of distribution.

The second point is about the pattern of distribution of personifications. Charlesworth draws inferences from the presence or absence of individual virtues in the coinage of individual rulers – one of his most widely quoted observations is that clementia was not advertised by most early emperors, which he explained by the 'despotic character' of the virtue. But this kind of observation can only hold good if the general pattern would lead one otherwise to expect clementia. If, of course, the coinage acted as a continuation of the message of the Golden Shield, one would expect Clementia. But does it?

An overall conspectus of the personifications reveals a pattern which the specialists have never, to my knowledge, made explicit. Three periods may be distinguished. In the first, the Julio-Claudian period, personifications are scarce and spasmodic. Such as do occur are not repeated from reign to reign. There is no sign of a systematic attempt to put across any message, let alone that the Shield virtues have been realised. The intermittent appearance of clementia is no surprise: pietas and the others are no less intermittent. Given the internal history of Roman coinage all this is natural enough: it took time to discover the value of these personifications as reverse types. Slogans with
personifications usually in the form of female heads, Libertas, Pietas, Felicitas and Virtus etc., had appeared under the late republic. Tiberius tentatively revived this tradition (ignored by Augustus). It is worth noting that one of the initial attractions of this type of reverse was that it provided an excuse for depicting female members of the imperial household (cf. Livia as Salus etc.). Caligula's three sisters appear with the attributes of Securitas, Fortuna and Concordia: they are among the first 'goddesses' to be depicted full-figure on imperial coins, which subsequently becomes the standard method of depicting personifications.\textsuperscript{59}

The second period stretches from the civil wars of 68/9 to Antoninus Pius. This is the heyday of the personification. Not only are the goddesses found in unprecedented number (32 as against 16 in the first period); a quite new pattern has emerged of repetition and continuation. Once one emperor has introduced a new type, it is notable when his successors do not continue it. There can be no doubt what gave the impetus to this new pattern.\textsuperscript{60} In the wars of 68/69 the contending parties, starting with Vindex, used the coinage (necessarily minted to finance their war-effort) to advertise their ideals. Appropriately enough all their personifications (except Securitas) have republican precedents. The ideals of Vindex are taken up by Galba as emperor (note that by now all the republican personifications have been revived); Galba's by his rivals, until with the Flavians this pattern of repetition settles down to become the norm. But new themes are constantly added, until with Hadrian and Pius comes the climax.

The last period, from Marcus onwards (to, say, Diocletian) is only distinguished by its dullness. The repetition of types continues, more and more meaninglessly. It is most seldom that a new type appears, and
those are variations on old themes (Perpetuitas for Aeternitas, Abundantia for Annona). It is as if the mint was rehearsing a doxology of empire established by the century that culminates with Pius. It is no coincidence that the loss of interest by numismatists in 'imperial virtues' coincides with the time the BMC moved into this latter phase.  

iii) Hadrian and Virtues.

The last observation puts together the results of the first two. Virtues proper are a relative rarity among personifications; and it is only after 68 AD that any personifications, let alone virtues, acquire regularity. Can one speak of any systematic attempt to propagate belief in the virtues of the ruler? To begin with, claims to virtue are isolated and idiosyncratic: Tiberius has his Clementia and Moderatio, Claudius his Constantia, Vitellius his Clementia. When regularity supervenes, virtues are in a small minority: Virtus from Nero on, and Pietas more and more frequently. Aequitas becomes a regular from Galba on: but there is a special reason, unconnected with the moral qualities of the ruler. Aequitas refers almost certainly to the proper operation of the mint, and the legend is interchangeable over the centuries with that of Moneta. It is only after Nerva that things begin to look up: he establishes a regular type of Justitia, Trajan one of Providentia. But Hadrian is outstanding: all his innovations are virtues (Liberalitas, Indulgentia, Patientia, Pudicitia, Tranquillitas) or quasi-virtues (Hilaritas and Disciplina). The case of Liberalitas emphasises how far this represents a new way of thinking about coin types. From the reign of Nero individual congiaria are celebrated by emissions with vivid depictions of the scene of the dole. But under Hadrian (tentatively anticipated by Trajan) the abstract notion of Liberality acquires predominance over the concrete scene. Either the goddess replaces one of the attendants, and the legend
becomes LIBERALITAS AUG, or the goddess alone represents the whole scene by a sort of pictorial shorthand. This is typical of a general shift from the specific, characteristic of Julio-Claudian reverses, to the abstract. What is most remarkable is the series issued by Hadrian in AD 128, which is responsible for most of the new 'virtues'. In this year appeared in parallel Iustitia, Clementia, Indulgentia, Patientia, Liberalitas and Tranquillitas. For the first time we have what is surely a deliberate effort to produce a gallery of virtutes. The impression is of a ruler possessed of endless virtues.

Why this sudden upsurge of interest in virtues? There can be little hesitation in identifying the context. At the turn of the century Pliny had published his Panegyric, flattering the ruler not as a god but as a man. Twenty perfectly human virtutes, moral qualities, are mentioned within three chapters alone (2-4), and at least fifteen more in the rest of the speech. One may well suppose that earlier gratiarum actiones praised earlier emperors for virtues: but it is no mere accident of transmission that ensured the survival of Pliny's. The title of 'optimus princeps', redolent of the philosophical ideal of the rule of the best man, had been applied intermittently to earlier emperors: but it is only with Trajan that it becomes 'official'. Probably already by AD 128 Suetonius' Caesars, or at least a first instalment, had appeared: biographies in which the subjects are all too human, and ruler after ruler is judged (in part) in terms of his virtutes and vitia. In offering a gallery of imperial virtues, the mint responds to the mood of the times.

'Virtues' in the philosophical sense, then, are at all times a secondary phenomenon on the coinage. They are always outnumbered by personifications that do not denote moral qualities (the only virtues to appear with any regularity are Virtus, Pietas, Liberalitas, Providentia
and Aequitas, certainly not the Augustan 'canon'). It is only with Hadrian that they become anything other than a rarity. If one can speak of influence, it is not of official propaganda on the public, but of the educated élite upon the imperial machine.

This pattern tends to be confirmed by the epigraphic evidence. It is hard to generalise about this, because there is no collection of imperial virtues in inscriptions. But it appears that on the whole emperors were not particularly given to vaunting their virtues on official documents. Where virtues do crop up with some regularity is in the 'inofficial titulature' - the complimentary epithets subjects attached to their rulers' names. Here the pattern follows that of coinage very closely, and one must either assume that people were directly influenced by the coinage, or that both coins and 'inofficial Titles' derived their impetus from the same official source. In the early period these epithets are rare: optimus is the most widely met, though under Trajan alone does it become official. Iustissimus is attested several times of Tiberius, one whose coinage Iustitia features; but not again until Pius. Only after Domitian do these epithets start to proliferate: fortissimus, providentissimus, liberalissimus and indulgentissimus from the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian, who introduce these virtues to the coinage; nobilissimus from Commodus, the originator of Nobilitas; and so on. It is only from Marcus onwards that inscriptions appear in the form 'omnes omnium ante se principum virtutes supergressus', 'omnium virtutum exsuperantissimo', 'pleno omnium virtutum principi', 'virtute...cunctos retro principes supergresso' and so on; i.e. that the emperor's possession of virtues becomes a cliche. If the aim of the coinage was to spread belief in the emperor's virtues, it was not until the 2nd century AD that it achieved its purpose.

But the distinction between personifications that represent moral qualities and the rest, though it may serve to make a point, is not an illuminating one for the understanding of the coins themselves. 'Virtues' is a confusing term because it coincides with the ancient term virtutes which has rather different connotations. But even if the label is unfortunate, the category of personifications which it describes is indeed one that hangs together. The question must be approached again of what these personifications are, how they are distinct from the qualities met in Pliny or Suetonius, and where there is overlap.

One may start by asking how a Roman would have explained the function of numismatic personification. Arnobius, at the beginning of his fourth book Against the Gentiles, attacks the pagan Romans for their needless multiplication of divinities. Pietas, Concordia, Salus, Honos, Virtus, Felicitas are made objects of cult, when they are no more than blessings we pray for; do they genuinely believe that Victoria, Pax and Aequitas live up in the heavens, or is this a façon de parler? Arnobius then puts his finger on the truth: it is a characteristic trait of Roman religion to turn abstractions into numinous powers. He opens his copy of Varro's Antiquities, evidently under the letter P, and is able to reduce this whole tendency to absurdity: Panda is the goddess who opened a way up to the Capitoline for Titus Tatius, Pellonia the one who drives off the enemy. Worse, Pertunda is the goddess of sexual penetration, and Perfica of sexual performance. Prayers may have become more sophisticated since those old days, but the mentality is the same.

Now it is clear that as a Christian polemicist Arnobius is pushing the pagan into an extreme position. If we ask whether an intelligent pagan would have believed these personifications were literally gods, on
a footing even with the Olympians, the answer is certainly that they did not. Arnobius' polemic is built on the basis of earlier pagan polemic, as for example, in Cicero, Pliny the Elder and Lucian, against the 'hypostatisations' of abstractions. However, even their polemic implies that others, more naive, believed. Another approach is to ask whether these personifications were actually the recipients of attested cult. Some enjoyed state cult in Rome (Concordia, Spes, Pietas, Pudicitia etc.) or received sacrifice from the Arval (Securitas etc.), or at least received private dedications (Aequitas). But many others, including such a virtue as Liberalitas, enjoyed no known cult. Scholars therefore distinguish these as deities only in an 'allegorical' sense: they are personified (or hypostatised) only for the purposes of numismatic picture language. But here again it is pointless to split the coins into two classes. When Liberalitas and Clementia both were represented as female figures with divine attributes, it meant nothing to the coin-user to know that one had a temple at Rome, the other not.

Numismatists therefore tend to abandon the fact that these are deities, and treat them all as abstractions. Yet there is a danger in totally secularising these deities. The obverse of the coin was occupied by the head of the reigning emperor, a position reserved until the time of Caesar for real divinities. Of course nobody supposed that this implied that the emperor was a god; even so it was one of the numerous signs that he occupied a place of ambiguity between humanity and divinity. The reverse bore an evident connection with the obverse; and in the case of personifications it was frequently (but not always) emphasised by the attachment of the label Augusti/Augusta/Augustorum. The personification was therefore in some sense in the power of, or an aspect of the emperor on the opposite side. Seen therefore from the exaggerated viewpoint of
an Arnobius, the message of the coin was roughly this: if you want peace, you will have to pray to the deity of Peace; but Peace is in the power of Augustus, so you must first pray to him.

This is of course to take the coins at face value. We need not suppose the Roman actually 'believed' so much. But the fact that the 'metaphor' the coins employed was a religious one is in itself significant. It identifies the view of the emperor as a 'charismatic' one. The subject is encouraged to attribute to his sovereign qualities that are (at face value) supernatural. The emperor owes his position not only to the possession of a legal titulature (spelled out on the obverse), but to his possession of powers and qualities. In his hands lie Peace, Concord, Felicity, Security, Safety, Trust, Good Fortune and the like; they are guaranteed by his Victory, secured through his unique possession of Virtue and the favour of the gods given to Piety. Other material benefits are under his control, the Corn-supply, even Money itself; they are made possible by his Providence, his Liberality, his Equity. Power, in fact, is at the focus of attention: the power to conquer, to save, to bring harmony and stability, and to distribute benefits. This power, beyond the reach of the ordinary human, tends to the divine. As Cicero puts it (ND ii, 61) humans turn abstractions into deities because of the power inherent in them, 'quia vis erat tanta ut sine deo regi non posset'.

The basic message of the coins, therefore, is not that the emperor has the right human qualifications to suit him for the job, but he has the necessary almost mystical powers and gifts (or that he enjoys the divine favour required) to grant his people what they needed. This was essentially at odds with the 'rational' approach that characterised the educated: only the morally best man was fitted to rule, and only virtue in the moral sense, not power or wealth or fortune elevated men above the
level of the human. One has only to enumerate some of the virtues attributed to emperors in the Panegyric or the Caesars to see that they belong to a different world of thought: *abstinencia, moderatio, continencia, humanitas, civilitas, comitas, facilitas, simplicitas, veritas, frugalitas* are enough to give the flavour of what is missing. These are above all social virtues, qualities of self-restraint. The focus is not on the possession of power, but control of it in deference to other members of society.

Again one must not make the distinction too rigid. Inevitably there is a degree of overlap. 'Rationalising' writers know the value of victory, fortune, security, concord and the rest; and the coins, particularly under Hadrian, make some attempt to advertise more human virtues (note especially Patientia). In particular the two great 'ideals' of Clementia and Liberalitas are (more or less) prominent in both coins and literature. As is also true of Libertas, they had become political 'slogans' of far too much emotive resonance to be ignored. These are themes of central importance for the understanding of the empire, and it makes sense to gather together the evidence of these 'ideals' from different sources (as do Wickert and Kloft). But that is not to say that coins and literary sources make the same use of these slogans. If emperors had followed the moral rules laid down by Cicero in the *de Officiis* for the exercise of Liberality, this source of political power would have been gravely weakened.

A second caveat is that no simple contrast can be drawn between 'élite' and 'masses'. Doubtless, as Charlesworth suggested, the coinage reached a wider social range than Seneca's *de Clementia* or Pliny's *Panegyric*. It is also fairly clear that those who stood to benefit most from the virtues of restraint stressed by literary sources were the educated upper classes. But there could be no justification for arguing that coins were
aimed exclusively at the masses. More important, the élite used precisely the same semi-religious language when occasion demanded. As Arval Brethren, leading senators offered actual sacrifice on behalf of the emperor to such abstractions as Aeternitas, Concordia, Felicitas, Fortuna, Providentia, Salus, Securitas, Spes and Victoria; as also to the Genius of the princeps. One cannot even draw a clean line between literary and epigraphic sources. There is a contrast between the image of Trajan in the Panegyric and in the Letters of the same author. When Pliny writes to the emperor he invokes his Aeternitas, and celebrates his Providentia: in the Panegyric we hear neither of Eternity nor of Providence. In fact different contexts demanded different language.

The real contrast is not between social strata (élite v. masses), nor between media (coins v. literature) but between two different aspects of the emperor that may be labelled the 'rational' and the 'charismatic'. They are two different ways of looking at the emperor that may overlap even within the same or similar contexts. Particularly in the late imperial panegyrics the two approaches are mingled, though some, especially Mamertinus' panegyric of Julian (delivered before the senate of Constantinople) imitate Pliny's in their rationality, while others stress the mystical and charismatic side.

Conclusions

Imperial ideology is much too complex a phenomenon to be reduced to any simple schema, and in drawing contrasts it has not been my intention to set one up. Much must remain obscure; and particularly until the epigraphic evidence has been properly assembled we cannot be confident of how the emperors themselves wanted to be seen.
But at least some conclusions are possible. First, that the idea of a 'canon' of imperial virtues is not only unsupported but positively misleading. There was no agreed set of ideals to which the good emperor conformed. Philosophers and rhetoricians had their set (of philosophical derivation); historians (it will be argued in the next chapter) had another; and neither coincides with the group of abstractions that came to be 'hypostatised' on the coinage, nor with Augustus' Golden Shield. The only common factor is the universal use of 'virtue' language, reflecting a common assumption that a ruler was, or should be, possessed of virtues and qualities (an assumption which goes back to the Hellenistic kingdoms). To attempt to extrapolate a single simple universally agreed pattern of the 'ideal' is to miss the most interesting insights the evidence can reveal, into the differences and tensions between the ways the emperor was seen, not only differences of political interest, but of contexts and traditions.

Secondly, it has emerged that when an author like Suetonius writes of imperial virtues and vices, he is far from making his rulers 'charismatic' ones. 'Imperial virtues' were of great contemporary interest (Hadrian's coinage confirms that much). But the way that a member of the educated élite, at least in writing a work of scholarly impartiality, uses 'virtues' is a 'rational', not a quasi-religious one. If there is charisma in the Caesars, it is charisma that has been 'rationalised'.

87
Appendix

Personifications on the official coinage

A similar tabulation will be found in F. Gnecchi, 'Le personificazione allegoriche sulle monete imperiali', Riv. It. Num. 18, 1905, 349ff. This has been constructed independently, on the basis of the Indices of Mattingly's BMC Emp. volumes, and is in several respects different. Reigns have been divided into three periods (see text). Further, personifications have been divided into different classes. These are, from a numismatic point of view, arbitrary, and serve only to make easily visible the points made in the text. The separate classes are: i) the so-called 'canon of virtues' of the Golden Shield; ii) personifications that from a philosophical point of view may reasonably be termed 'virtues'; iii) Aequitas and Moneta correlated in order to show their interdependence; iv) other personifications.

Such tabulations inevitably conceal important facts. I have not distinguished different types, the frequency of individual types within reigns, nor types which appear against an obverse bearing the head of a member of the imperial family other than the reigning emperor. Such points are not here relevant. Nor is any indication given of whether types are identified as AUG(usta/usti/ustorum) or P(opuli) R(omani) since practice varies frequently from reign to reign, and even within reigns (see below on Tranquillitas). I have however attempted to indicate one distinction. A personification strictly is the figure of a deity (usually female, but Honos and Bonus Eventus are male; Genius has been excluded); normally identifying legends are attached to these. Where they are not, there is danger of mistaken identity; these are recorded as T(type).

(E.g. It is impossible to distinguish the Type of Aequitas from that of Moneta.) Sometimes however, the legend names an abstraction, but it does not accompany a personification, but rather a scene, an altar, a shield or such like. It is vital not to confuse these (e.g. Tiberius' Clementia and Moderatio appearing on a shield are presumably the record of an honour) and they are distinguished as S(cene).

Since the object is not to show the choice of types by individual emperors but to establish overall patterns, the data for the period between Pertinax and Diocletian has been reduced to an approximate indication of frequency within the bands R = 5-15, F = 16-25, FF = 26-35, FFF = almost without exception; figures less than five are given precisely (the unit being the emperor or claimant under whom the type appears). No indication is given of personifications introduced later than Commodus; in fact these are rare (notably Abundantia from Elagabalus, Perpetuitas from Severus Alexander, Uberitas from Trajan Decius). The HUMANITAS AUG attributed to Probus (RIC v, 2, 36, cf. p.7) is highly dubious. Brief comments on selected points are given below; for full details and discussion see Mattingly in BMC i-iv; Strack, Reichsprägung i-iii (1931-1937); and when appropriate C. H. V. Sutherland, Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy 31 BC - AD 68 (1951); M. Grant, Roman Anniversary Issues (1950) and Roman Imperial Money (1953), 133-175 (on personifications). W. Koehler, Personifikation abstrakter Begriffe auf röm. Münzen, Diss. Königsberg 1910 only reaches clementia proceeding alphabetically; but note the brief posthumous contributions of this author to the Enciclopedia dell'Arte Antica (1958-66). For the Republic, M. H. Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage (1974).
i) **virtus**: Not a true type of Augustus since only under the independent moneyer Aquillius Florus, (BMC i,10) reviving a type of an ancestor (RRC no.401). It is symptomatic of the lack of desire to advertise the virtues of the Golden Shield, or indeed Virtues in general, that Virtus, though a republican theme, does not appear before Nero: (Sutherland 1951, 159). Even then the iconography makes it clear that the connotations are strictly martial.

clementia: First as the temple to Clementia Caesaris (RRC no.480,21). Then under Tiberius in the much-debated twin series with the legends CLEMENTIAE and MODERATIONI(S) respectively round imagines clipeatae. Date and occasion of this series is still not settled, but it clearly commemorates some honorific dedication, and must not be equated with 'personification'; see Sutherland, JRS 28, 1938, 129ff.; Grant, RAI 47ff.; Sutherland 1951, 193ff.; H. Gesche, Jahrb. Num. Geld 21, 1971, 37ff.; B. Levick in Essays in honour of C. E. Stevens (1975), 123ff. The type enjoys a brief flowering under the Antonines, but thereafter is exceedingly rare (Clodius Albinus), except under the rather different guise of CLEMENTIA TEMPORUM (Gallienus on).

iustitia: For full details see now Lichocka (1974). Of Vespasian's type (BMC ii,75) there is only one attestation, and that specimen disappeared under the French Revolution (Lichocka 32, n.25). It must therefore come under extreme suspicion. The iconography, seated goddess with ear of corn, has not been hitherto correctly explained: it is the astrological sign of the Virgin (Virgo Spicifera). This increases its oddity. For Trajan two types come under consideration; i) BMC iii,lxv goddess seated with branch and slanting sceptre, taken by Mattingly (following Strack i,52) as both Pax and Iustitia, by Lichocka 34ff. as Pax alone; ii) BMC iii,lxvi goddess enthroned holding sceptre with cornucopae as arms; Strack i,65f. identifies as 'Secura Annona'; Mattingly as Justitia-Astraea, the 'spirit of the Golden Age'; Lichocka 44ff. as Justitia.i.e. We can identify neither figure.

pietas: The popularity of this traditional Roman theme needs no comment. For the strong charismatic associations of this virtue see Charlesworth, 'Pietas and Victoria: the Emperor and the Citizen', JRS 33, 1943, 1ff. On imperial coinage of the 1st century AD the reference is almost exclusively dynastic: Strack i,75; ii,51f.; 169f. For further bibliography Weinstock (1971), 248 n.2.

ii) (* indicates that classification as a virtue is questionable.)

constantia: Exclusive to Claudius: M. Grant, 'Constantia Augusti', NC 1950, 23ff. exaggerates vastly in characterising the virtue as an epitome 'of the whole current trend of thought concerning monarchy'.

*disciplina: Not properly a virtue (its placing in the chart is dubious). Celebrates Hadrian's encouragement of the military cult of Disciplina (Strack ii,151ff.).

liberalitas: The clearest case of the elevation of concrete circumstance (the congiarium) to an abstraction. Trajan tentatively introduces the goddess (unnamed) on aurei (Strack i,141f.), Hadrian both introduces an identifying legend for this personification, and uses the same legend to
replace CONGIARUM P.R. The widespread epigraphic celebration of the abstract Liberalitas is well illustrated by G. Barbieri Diz. Ep. iv, 838ff., s.v.

*magnificentia*: Not a personification (MAGNIFICENTIAE AUG within laurel wreath); presumably, like Moderatio, a reflection of an honorific dedication. AD 192 only.

moderatio: Not a personification: Tiberius only. See above clementia.

providentia: The only type between Tiberius and Vitellius is an altar, PROVIDENTIA SC., evidently the Ara Providentiae Augustae dedicated under Tiberius (Eisenhut RE Supp. xiv (1974), 562f., s.v.). This is no personification, and hardly suggests the current emperor's possession of a virtue. From Vespasian on is found an interesting series of scenes referring to the accession; the goddess only appears personified under Trajan, and is labelled by Hadrian (Strack i, 45ff.; 228). For Providentia as an imperial slogan Charlesworth (1936), 107ff.

pudicitia: A coin of Plotina under Trajan depicts an ARA PUDICITIÆ SC., BMC iii, 107. Hadrian introduces the personification, BMC iii, cxxxi. Mattingly (loc. cit.) unconvincingly identifies P. as the personal holiness of the head of state religion; it is almost always a theme for the coins of females of the imperial house who are taken to embody this traditional Roman women's deity (Strack ii, 117f.). To see in the type a counterblast to rumours of Hadrian's personal erotic excesses, as does Carney (1967), 291ff., strains credulity.

*tranquillitas*: Closely akin to Hilaritas, introduced in the same reign. In neither case does it make sense to distinguish the 'virtue' from the 'res expetenda'. TRANQUILLITAS AUG might be taken as the emperor's 'philosophic peace of mind' (Mattingly iii, cxi, n. 7); but it is also the disposition in the emperor that produces the 'tranquillitas saeculi tui' (Plin. ep. x, 3A, 2, cf. Strack i, 124ff.). HILARITAS P.R. is more ostensibly a 'res expetenda' (therefore not here classed as a virtue), but it is undoubtedly conceived of as produced by the Hilaritas of the emperor (cf. Plin. Pan. 4, 6). Mattingly iii, cxxxiii aptly cites Fronto ad M. Caes. i, 9, 7 p. 20, 3f. v. d. H. 'certe hilaris es... mea securitas, hilaritas, gloria'. Tranquillitas only returns under Philip 1 (RIC iv, 63) and Tacitus (RIC v, 342). Hilaritas is commoner, also as HILARITAS AUG and HILAR TEMPOR.

iii) aequitas/moneta: For the close interrelationship of these types see Mattingly BMC iv, 1. Against the reference of numismatic Aequitas to the administration of justice (by Strack i, 154ff.) I hope to produce detailed arguments elsewhere.


felicitas: the civil war type is ill-attested (BMC i, 290n.) but I accept it as fitting the pattern of republican types (RRC no. 473, 3) later taken on by Galba.
fortuna: Under Augustus only a commemoration of the altar Fortunae Reduci by the moneyer Rustius (BMC i,1).

hilaritas: v.s. tranquillitas.

honos: Under Augustus only the moneyer Durmius BMC i,10. Later always in connection with Virtus, as in republican cult. M. Bieber, 'Honos et Virtus', AJA 49, 1945, 25ff.; Eisenhut RE Suppl. xiv, 905f. Galba, followed by Vitellius and Vespasian, pairs HONOS ET VIRTUS, as the republican RRC no. 403 (70 BC); Pius has two separate types of Honos and Virtus for Marcus perhaps as princeps iuventutis (BMC iv, lviii).

victoria: The commonest of themes, in innumerable varieties. Rightly so, since Victory is the lynch-pin of imperial doctrine: J. Gagé, 'La Théologie de la Victoire impériale', Rev. Hist. 171, 1933, lff. Already regular under the republic with the adoption of the 'Victoriatus' as normal type for gold quinarii.
Chapter VIII

Virtues and Vices: The Pattern and its Background

Once the notion has been abandoned that there was any single set of 'ideals' for the Roman emperor, philosophically formulated, officially propagated, and universally accepted, it becomes worthwhile to ask just which qualities a particular author expects of an emperor. Before considering virtues and vices in Suetonius, it is important to make clear exactly what is under discussion. It is by no means the case that by adding up the virtues that are mentioned in the Caesars we may arrive at Suetonius' 'ideal' of an emperor, or even at his set of criteria for judging an emperor. His views on Caesars as 'administrators' have been discussed without reference to moral terms. Given the propensity of all Latin authors to moralisation, his chapters on the emperor at work may seem refreshingly realistic. We might indeed wish that we had more of them, and less of vice and virtue. At all events, moralisation is not the whole story.

Secondly, it is not simply the fact that Suetonius uses various moral terms which makes vice and virtue a vital part of his picture of a Caesar. Indeed various qualities are mentioned in passing. Augustus shows gravitas and constantia in stopping abuse of the dole (42,2), various Caesars manifest diligentia, specially in jurisdiction (Aug.33,1; Dom.8,1), where industria (Dom.8,1) and aequitas (Cl.15,2) are also appropriate. Severitas is a quality evidently important for the man in authority, whether governing the people, distributing justice, or controlling his own household. It is nice to know too that Vespasian was never 'facilior aut indulgentior' than in his bath (21), a realistic touch which brings the Indulgentia of the coinage down from her pedestal.
An incidental characterisation hits off an aspect of Augustus' quality as a ruler that is never made explicit in the *Life*: he was a 'circumspectissimum et prudentissimum principem' (Tib.21,3). Even Claudius could be 'circumspectus et sagax' (15,1); but alas, on other occasions he proved 'inconsultus ac praeceps', even 'frivolus amentique similis' (ibid.).

These are mere incidentals. They add sharpness to Suetonius' picture of a Caesar, but are not basic to it. What demands discussion is his use of virtues and their correlated vices as standard categories in the estimation of an emperor. The system is simple and consistent (above ch.II,2): Caesar after Caesar is categorised according to the same criteria, clement or cruel, civil or arrogant, liberal and abstinent or avaricious; and fourthly there is the luxury and lust of private life, though here while gross indulgence is a grave fault, it is not so clear that a good ruler needs the halo of continence and chastity. These apart, a Caligula may compound his arrogance and savagery by *livor* and *malignitas* (34,1), or a Nero his self-indulgence by *petulantia* (26), but these and similar categories are only incidental variants on the standard headings.

What is most striking about all this is its thorough and systematic nature. This comes out strongly from comparison with Suetonius' successors and imitators. Aurelius Victor, the 'Epitomator', Eutropius, and above all the later imperial lives (SHA). None of them adopt a wholehearted *per species* treatment, let alone a set of standards against which successive emperors are measured. Consequently no clear picture emerges of the 'virtues' requisite in a good ruler. For those who write in the abbreviated style of an epitome (Victor, the 'Epitome', Eutropius) this is out of the question. There is little room for anecdotes and *exempla*, only for succinct characterisation by epithets and nouns; under such conditions variety is
essential and vivid characterisation demands an unique set of qualities
for each Caesar. This is not to say that Suetonian virtues and vices
are not frequently met (but civilitas is notable only in Eutropius);\(^5\)
only that no overall impression emerges of a set of criteria.\(^6\) The SHA
lack this stylistic excuse, but still the lives are uncertain and
spasmodic in their application of a rubric system. Marcus is outstanding
in virtue: he behaved civiliter (8,1), with diligentia (10,10), was
moderantissimus (12,2, as a rubric for the whole chapter), and possessed
enormous clementia (13,6), sanctitas (15,3), benignitas (16,1),
tranquillitas (16,5); showed moderatio and benignitas to the provinces
(17,1), waged war with virtus and felicitas (17,2), was magnanimus in
giving games (17,7); in fine he was a model of sanctitas, tranquillitas
and pietas (19,10) as of clementia (19,12); then, as the life trails on,
his diligentia in war (21,6) and aequitas in jurisdiction are added.
But in all this there is no trace of system, only an attempt to pile up
compliments.

The difference in practice of these authors is enough to confirm
that Suetonius' system of imperial virtues was not one he slipped into
inadvertently. Moreover, it can be shown to be a set he chose for its
special relevance to the emperor. On several occasions in the course
of the lives biographical details are given of men other than emperors
(either emperors before accession or their relatives). A quite distinct
set of virtues emerges as appropriate to the magistrate: innocentia,\(^7\)
integritas,\(^8\) industria,\(^9\) iustitia,\(^10\) even fortitudo\(^11\) are qualities that
characterise good governors and urban magistrates, but are only exceptionally
applied to emperors, and even then refer to the execution of magisterial
capacities (e.g. consular jurisdiction).\(^12\) Severitas,\(^13\) moderatio and
abstinentia are applied both to governors and emperors, but on the other
hand no governor evinces the imperial clementia, civitas or liberalitas with which the last two overlap.  

What, then, is the significance of the set of qualities Suetonius chooses to emphasise in an emperor? Why does he pick on these categories and not others? This is not the 'canon' of the Golden Shield (only clementia is common to the two sets). Nor is it the Platonic canon (only σωφροσύνη is shared, if even that). Particularly if the suggestion is right that the method of arrangement of 'virtue' rubrics owes something to the rhetorical tradition of encomium (above ch.II,2), we may ask why he rejected the group which rhetoricians prescribed. The material contained in his Lives might plausibly enough be rearranged under the classic four headings: fortitudo could be the rubric for the emperor's activity as commander of the army, iustitia for his legislation, jurisdiction, civil and criminal, as also for his control of taxation and finances, temperantia might cover both private indulgences (libido and luxuria) and the self-restraint in matters of social respect summed up as civitas; and under sapientia or even providentia could be subsumed most of the material on administrative activity, the organisation of the empire. But Suetonius was neither rhetorician nor philosopher, and the Platonic virtues are irrelevant to his system.

In explanation it must be emphasised again that Suetonius' group is not a 'Fürstenspiegel', a systematisation of all the qualities requisite in the ideal ruler. Nor is it a biographer's systematisation of the most important aspects of personality. The limitations of Suetonius' interest in what we understand by 'personality' have already been stressed (Part A). What it is that the four categories surely do have in common is that they concern the relations between the ruler and his subject. Courage and wisdom, for instance (to take two from the Platonic canon), were doubtless
thought important assets in an emperor, even by Suetonius. But both are personal qualities, manifested in the handling of circumstances, rather than of the ruled. But clemency, civility and liberality all concern crucial areas of relationship between ruler and ruled: the exercise of the power of punishment, respect for social status, and the accumulation and expenditure of imperial wealth. Luxury and lust, it may be objected, have little to do with the Roman people; the emperor's morals are his private concern. But here it will become abundantly clear, that at least for Suetonius, morals did affect the public crucially. While the peccadillos of a continent emperor like Augustus are little more than curiosities (and so dealt with as 'private') the extravagances and orgies of a Nero caused major public scandal and real financial hardship.

The importance of the Suetonian virtues and vices for the public is emphasised by the author's comments on public reactions, regularly given directly after the virtue/vice chapters. Augustus was adored by his people (57-60). The evidence follows the analysis of his administration (28-50), and more immediately, the documentation of his clemency and civility (51-56). Tiberius lived feared and fearing (63-67); that is in consequence of his vices (41-62). Caligula's frenzied behaviour provoked his murder (56,1); since 22,1 the life has been a catalogue of monstrosities, public and private. Nero was deserted by the world (40,1) because of his behaviour (20-39 catalogue vices and abuses). Galba made himself unpopular by the report of his vices even before he arrived (12-13), then earned universal hatred (16,1). Similarly the revolt against Vitellius (15,1), the adoration of Titus (1,1) and the detestation of Domitian (14,1) may all be taken as results of their public behaviour, especially of their virtues and vices. Vespasian is reported to be blamed only for his cupidity (16,1), Julius 'is thought' to have deserved death for his arrogance.
(76,1); in both cases the author hides his own judgement behind the weight of general opinion. Only for Claudius and Otho is there no clear indication of public opinion; in neither case are virtues or vices detailed as part of 'public life' - in Otho because there is no 'public life' at all, in Claudius because his vices are (exceptionally) treated as a 'private' matter.

An emperor's 'public' life is public because his people is affected. Whether he is discussing administration of the state or virtues and vices, Suetonius concentrates on the areas in which people were affected, dividing the state into its social and geographical groupings, and choosing 'virtues' for their relevance to the ruled. But here it is not enough to state the principle of selection. Suetonius' mind was not an original, though a lucid one. The problem remains of how far his analysis of the crucial virtues and vices reflects traditional conceptions. Does it reflect contemporary Roman ideas on how the emperor should behave? Does it owe anything to Hellenistic philosophy on kingship?

**Virtue and vice in contemporary thought**

The first direction in which enquiry must turn is to the other Latin authors of the Trajano-Hadrianic period. No source is more prolific in virtues than Pliny's Panegyric, and it is clear that Suetonius' picture of the emperor is not far removed from Pliny's. But the very profusion of virtues, coupled with Pliny's deliberate avoidance of the mechanical schema recommended by the schools makes comparison difficult. The Panegyric cannot be reduced to a system on the model of Suetonius without distortion. Even so, one can show that the kind of virtues and vices that concern Pliny are those that concern Suetonius (and not those of a Greek philosopher, let alone of a mint official), and that there is substantial
overlap in the areas to which prominence is given.

One thread to guide the reader through the maze, is offered by the eight contrasting pairs of virtues and vices listed programmatically in the introduction (3,4): i) humanitas v. superbia; ii) frugalitas v. luxuria; iii) clementia v. crudelitas; iv) liberalitas v. avaritia; v) benignitas v. livor; vi) continencia v. libido; vii) labor v. inertia; viii) fortitudo v. timor. All the Suetonian categories are here; clemency (iii), civility (i), liberality (iv), luxury and lust (ii & vi). The last two (vii & viii) do not concern public relations, and do not form Suetonian categories. Nevertheless it will be recalled that Suetonius is interested in an emperor's 'patientia laboris' along with his sleeping habits;\(^{22}\) and the fearfulness of the tyrant is a recurrent theme (Tib. 63-67; Cl.35-37; Dom.14,2-15,1; cf. 3,2).

The only real discrepancy is Suetonius' lack of the pair benignitas v. livor (v). Here is of course precisely the malignitas and livor of Caligula (34-35) (and perhaps the benivolentia of Titus: 8,1); in that sense the category is not missing. Yet given the importance of the theme of the promotion of merit and reward of the good in the Panegyrical (esp. 44-47)\(^{23}\) it is perhaps surprising that Suetonius does not make more of it. Agricola might have been brought forward as a specimen of Domitian's malignity.\(^{24}\) It might possibly be supposed that the theme was one too exclusively of concern to senators (cf. Pan.62); it may have been unusual to show as he does with Caligula that the blight of malignity extended from the noblest patrician, through the son of a primipilaris to the most abject of men (35). Yet the theme of the promotion of status is one that runs throughout the chapters on administration and the explanation is perhaps that he considered such items relevant to other contexts.\(^{25}\)
If the other themes of the introduction are pursued through the speech, the Suetonian virtues prove, with one exception, prominent.

i) **Civilitas** is not fully formulated as a virtue before Suetonius; but his formulation of the category is deeply indebted to the Panegyric (below ch.X). **Humanitas** and **superbia** head the list of pairs: no vice is so frequently mentioned as **superbia**, with its variant **arrogantia**, the worst of Domitian's vices.\(^{26}\) **Humanitas** recurs another half dozen times; but it is **moderatio** and **modestia** that above all characterise Trajan, and serve as the leitmotif of the piece (cf. 56,3 'quam multa dixi de moderatone, et quanta plura restant').\(^{27}\) The full range of applications of **moderatio** is considerably wider than Suetonius' category; but the theme that most concerns Pliny is Trajan's refusal to be treated as a god, his avoidance of excessive honours, his reverence to the senate and his behaviour towards his subjects as fellow humans with **facilitas**, **suavitas**, **iucunditas**, **comitas**.\(^{28}\)

ii) The evidence for **liberalitas** is endless (most of ch.25-42 is relevant). But as important as the positive is the negative side of this virtue: Trajan's benefactions are made possible not by **avaritia** but by his personal **frugalitas**. That the accounts balance is miraculous (41).\(^{29}\)

iii) Because imperial frugality plays this role in balancing the books, personal luxury is clearly a matter of public significance for Pliny. Trajan auctions palace furniture and stops building for his private benefit (50-51). **Libido** is less obviously a topic of public significance, but Pliny argues that things are different for one in the limelight (83f.).\(^{30}\)

iv) The one misfit is **clementia**. In the body of the Panegyric it is given curiously little prominence.\(^{31}\) As a judge Trajan showed **clementia**, but this is a mercy that tempers **severitas** (80,1). Given the extermination of **delatores** (35,1) and the refusal to admit **maiestas**
charges (42,1), one might have expected to hear much of the cruelty of Domitian and the mercy of Trajan. Yet the explanation perhaps lies in Pliny's own words (42,4): 'Non vis in te ea laudari, nec fortasse laudanda sint'. Domitian, as Suetonius records (11,2-3) abused the senate's patience by his 'praefatione clementiae', the representation of an atrocity as an act of mildness. Senatorial dedications to Clementia were regular at times of blood-letting.\textsuperscript{32} Paradoxically, Pliny's silence is the best testimony to the importance of the 'virtue' and to the real merit of Trajan.

To investigate other themes of the Panegyric is not here relevant (it is certainly not suggested that these are the only themes). But a couple of negative observations may be made. First that the 'philosophical' virtues as a set are of no importance. Sapientia only shows through once in the refusal of honours (55,8 but cf. 88,6); prudentia does not occur. Trajan's fortitudo is naturally enough what keeps the barbarians at bay (16,3): but the idea on which Pliny lays emphasis is that Trajan loves peace and chases no spurious triumphs. It is a great thing to be able to stand on the bank of the Danube and proceed no further; that demands moderatio as well as fortitudo (16,1-3). Here we have the ideal that Suetonius sees in Augustus, the combination 'virtutis moderationisque' (21,3), military strength tempered by firm restraint. The ideal stems from political realities, not philosophy.\textsuperscript{33} Justitia is absent from the programmatic list of the introduction. In the text there is no sign of it as a fundamental ideal of the good king. The manifestations of the quality are specific: in the presidency of the games and in the exercise of consular jurisdiction (the people's need for 'iustitiae monumenta' is an argument for the acceptance of a fourth consulship).\textsuperscript{34} We can hardly suppose philosophical influence here.
Secondly we may note that qualities attributed to the emperor are not the same as those manifested by his subjects. This is by no means so marked as in Suetonius, but its relevance will emerge later. Good men receive provinces as a reward for constantia, integritas and industria (44,7), or for sanctitas and industria (70,4), as military officers are praised for fides and industria (19,4). Despite his anxiety to detect every possible virtue in Trajan, the only one of these terms Pliny applies to him is sanctitas. The contrast indeed is a verbal one: the governor's industria involves much the same as the labor and vigilantia of the emperor (10,3), and the subject emulates the virtues of the Princeps (45,5). But even at a verbal level, some sort of a contrast is there.

The Panegyric, then, offers an ideological 'programme' which is basically consistent with Suetonius. He must have known this masterpiece of his former patron well; and it is therefore conceivable that he derived his model of imperial virtues directly from it. But while there can be little doubt that the Panegyric helped to clarify ideals by setting them out explicitly, it is doubtful that it was the ultimate source of Suetonius' assumptions. He gathered his information on the Caesars from the mass of historical literature that can be dimly perceived behind the surviving works of Tacitus and Dio; and it can be seen from the surviving historians that the virtues and vices analysed by Suetonius were already embedded in the annalistic tradition.

Tacitus, according to Syme, 'elected a bleak world for his habitation', avoiding mention of imperial virtues. Certainly there is none of the gushing profusion of Pliny, and the historian was too cynical to be influenced by the legends of the coinage. He was sceptical about the claims of imperial contestants to their own virtues: in the Histories Piso unmasks the specious virtues of Otho, Otho those of Galba; Vitellius'
virtues are more plausibly explained as vices; even if Vespasian's qualities on the whole stand the test. But this scepticism is not directed against the emperor's need for virtue, rather against the claims of individuals to have realised that need. The virtues he fails to find and the vices he excoriates, are essentially those of Suetonius.

Nothing demonstrates this so clearly as his portrait of Tiberius. One of the notable features of this man is his loving cultivation of his virtues; but dissimulatio was his favourite (4,71), the only one he kept up until his dying breath (6,50). Throughout the narrative Tacitus documents the display of 'virtues', often undermining their plausibility by cynical asides or juxtapositions. Which these 'virtues' are needs no full documentation, for the evidence was laid out by Rogers in an attempt to show that Tiberius was of outstanding virtue. The four virtues he discovered were Liberalitas, Providentia, Clementia and Moderatio. Providentia is here, as far as Tacitus is concerned, an interloper; though Tiberius does declare himself 'vestrarum rerum providum' (4,38), providentia is a word Tacitus notably avoids, and it is certainly not a virtue he implies the good emperor ought to display. The evidence for Tiberius' attachment to this 'virtue' is epigraphic (and the words cited above might well stem from the senatorial acta). But liberalitas, clementia, moderatio and related terms recur constantly in the text. Liberalitas was the virtue Tiberius retained long after he had dropped the others (1,75); firm enough too against extortion (3,18) until the second part of the reign (4,20). Clementia, frequently boasted, is perhaps never conceded in the man who brought back maestas charges. Moderatio or civilis animus (there are several synonyms) is dismissed as superbia in this stiff-necked Claudian. To these feigned virtues need only be added the libidines which emerged after the death
of Sejanus (6,51) and scarred the tortured mind of the tyrant (6,6). To look beyond the account of Tiberius would only confirm this pattern. Superbia (or arrogantia), saevitia (or crudelitas), avaritia and similar expressions are universal; so are luxuria and libidines. On the opposite side, clementia is often displayed, but perhaps never conceded; civilis is rarely used of others than Tiberius, but Vitellius too is suspect (Hist.ii,91). Liberalitas is frequent, but tends to be a front for luxuria (cf. i,30); at its side is the Sallustian and critical largitio (cf. i,17f.); bonitas is a partisan name for extravagance (i,52); parsimonia is a front for avaritia (i,37); and indulgentia, frequently used by Pliny in the Panegyric and in his petitions to Trajan, in Tacitus only appears in the Dialogus (9,5) as a compliment to Vespasian.

Indeed this is not to exhaust the tale of virtues and vices in Tacitus, any more than in Pliny or Suetonius (let alone to suggest his interest in emperors is limited to these areas). Severitas, constantia, gravitas, vigilantia are traditional Roman qualities that Caesars manifest (or fail to when they should have done so) in various contexts as in Suetonius. But there are no virtues or vices relevant to the relationship between the Princeps and his people other than these and their synonyms. The reward or the obstruction of merit is a recurrent topic; yet the words livor and malignitas, though used in the Agricola of Domitian's freedmen (41,4), are not used of emperors in the Histories or Annals, nor the corresponding virtue of benignitas. Imperial piety is mentioned: but it is piety towards predecessors and family, not 'erga deos patriamque'.

Philosophical virtues keep a low profile. Naturally enough 'ducis boni imperatoria virtus est' (Agr.39,3): even so neither fortitudo nor virtus is attributed to an emperor. (But tyrannical fear is of course
a theme. Wisdom is a virtue sadly lacking in Vitellius and Claudius: but the more than moderate prudencia of Tiberius does nothing to endear him to his people. 52 No good emperor shows either iustitia or aequitas; nor is a bad one criticised as iniquus or iniustus. 53 Provincial governors and magistrates have very distinctly their own group of qualities: iustitia, integritas, innocentia, industria and abstinentia are used with reasonable frequency in their praise. 54 A remark in the Agricola surely supplies the clue to the explanation of this phenomenon: 'integritatem atque abstinentiam in tanto viro referre iniuriam virtutum fuerit' (9,4). Agricola was a mere governor; how much more tame would such words sound in praise of the Princeps. Confirmation can be produced that these were precisely the clichés suitable in praise of a governor. Epigrams in honour of governors survive from the Greek East: καθαρότης (= integritas), ἀγνεία (sanctitas), θυσίας (cf. innocentia) and δυσκαλοσύνη (iustitia) are regular terms. 35 Δυσκαλοσύνη and καθαρευόμενη were also qualities expected of the Hellenistic royal official, and together with them naturally ἄγρυπνος (vigilantia/industria). 56 We may turn too (for lack of earlier comparable material) to the great series of inscriptions in honour of post-Diocletianic magistrates at Rome (CIL vi,1651-1796): in the fulsome vocabulary of praise among words that recur are iustitia, aequitas, integritas, industria, abstinentia, moderatio, constantia, probitas, prudentia, utilitas. 57 If, then, Suetonius and Tacitus, and to a certain extent Pliny, apply a somewhat different set of terms to the emperor and to his subordinates, this by no means implies that similar qualities were not essential in an emperor too. Corruption, abuse of justice and indolence were the common failings of a magistrate; the vices of an emperor involved, but went far beyond these.
If it is accepted that Tacitus and Suetonius correspond fairly closely in their pictures of imperial virtues and vices, we need not conclude that Suetonius borrowed directly from the consular historian. Cruelty, avarice, rapacity, pride, luxury, lust and their opposites may be assumed to have been commonplaces of the historiographical tradition. An instructive parallel is the Alexander History of Quintus Curtius (whatever the date of this document). Alexander had long served as focus for controversy about the behaviour of the ruler; and though there is no hope of sorting out original hellenistic strands derived from sources as against Roman accretions, it is clear that there is much here of sharp relevance to the contemporary Roman reader (explicitly at x,9,3-7). The degeneration of a monarch was an old Greek theme. But Romans could recognise their own problems in reading of a ruler who, originally marked by clementia, moderatio and continentia, was corrupted by his conquest of Persia, turning to superbia and lascivia (vi,6,1ff.). The adoption of Persian court style and its concomitant animi insolentia (ib.5) alienates the Macedonian nobility, and leads to conspiracies. Liberalitas to the troops only serves to buy off discontent (ib.11). Plots are formed, and are met with charges of maiestas.

The issues are crystalised in the set debate between the hot-blooded young conspirator, Hermolaus, and Alexander (viii,7-8). Hermolaus' complaint is that Alexander has converted imperium over free men into domination over slaves (7,1). His grounds are threefold: first his saevitia in killing the Macedonian nobility (7,4-6); second his lack of liberalitas, either in permitting free speech to Callisthenes or in rewarding the troops with booty (8-11); last and most grievous, his superbia in adopting Persian court style and divine cult (12-15). Alexander rebuts the charges in order: saevitia has been forced on him against his will, for clementia
depends on the behaviour of the subjects as well as the ruler (8,1-8); avaritia is a ridiculous charge when a glance at the accoutrement of the troops reveals his liberalitas (8,9); alleged superbia is refuted by moderatio to the conquered, and the Persian style vindicated on the grounds of the need to impress the subjects and the enemy (8,10-17).

The subsequent torturing and execution of Hermolaus and the innocent Callisthenes (8,20-21) puts the moral seal on the conspirator's complaints.

The set debate is the part of a history where the author is most liable to impose his own views. It seems likely enough that Curtius is reflecting the assumptions of Roman historiography in identifying cruelty, avarice and pride as the areas in which an autocrat is most likely to antagonise his subjects. Suetonius in adopting his pattern of virtues and vices was surely only schematising the judgements he found in his historical sources, though doubtless a work like the Panegyric helped him to do so. The enquiry must therefore at this point broaden. Why do early imperial historians attach such importance to these particular areas?

Hellenistic and Republican Background

It is of course quite possible that experience of imperial rule, and particularly the tensions between the upper classes and the ruler (as brought out by the Macedonian analogy of Curtius) was enough to give these areas importance. But the chances are that the Romans were also affected by literary and intellectual traditions, and it is necessary to test this hypothesis.

If any source is prima facie likely to have influenced Roman ideas on autocracy, it is the Hellenistic literature περὶ βασιλείας. Yet it proves disappointing for the present purpose, and for two reasons in particular. The first is the state of preservation of the evidence. No
authentic treatise survives in full from the Hellenistic period proper. The letter of Aristeas comes closest to fitting the bill; yet the author's purpose is to fit the Hellenistic thought to a Jewish context, and his cast of mind, 'illogical, vague, and repetitious' presents a considerable obstacle to the reconstruction of a Hellenistic 'core'. The neo- (or pseudo-) Pythagorean tracts on which Goodenough (1928) based his reconstruction of the Hellenistic ideal are notoriously difficult to date, and in content are at best eccentric. These apart we are restricted to documents from either side of the central period. Isocrates' Cyprian works and Xenophon's Agesilaos and Cyropaedia were evidently models for later writers; while the theoretical foundations were laid by Plato in the Republic and the Statesman; and at the other end of the period Dio Chrysostom in four orations On Kingship, Plutarch (ad principem ineruditum) and Philodemus' fragmentary work On the Good King in Homer are very probably faithful reflections of earlier material. But a delicate work of reconstruction is necessary, and until this is undertaken by an expert, one can have little confidence in discerning the essential features of the Hellenistic ideal.

But even if the reconstruction had been accomplished, it is not clear that it would greatly illuminate the picture found in Roman historians. Certainly it is possible to find ample parallels for individual themes: the connections between clementia and the pervasive φιλανθρωπία and ἐξελεξέα of the 'Hellenistic' tradition, and between liberalitas and εὐεργεσία, are already familiar. But such parallels are not enough to suggest that the Romans derived their ideas of what an emperor should be directly from these tracts. The question is whether the Romans could have derived their overall view from the overall view of the philosophers.
While philosophers were interested enough in the problems of the justification of autocratic power, it is open to question how far they had strong views of their own on the details of how a king should behave. The impression that comes most clearly out of the surviving documents is of a general call to virtue and to the recognition of the importance of moral philosophy. That a king should take counsel from philosophers, or better be a wise man or philosopher himself, is the message from Plato to Julian. Less blatantly proselytising is the notion that morality is essential for legitimate government. Only the morally best, ἀρετῶς ἀνήρ, is entitled to rule. Neither birth, wealth or military strength entitles a man to rule others, but ἀρετή. Hellenistic kings were worshipped as gods: philosophers do not shy from this fact, but stress that it is only in ἀρετή that a ruler can imitate God (to be, as Diotogenes put it, a θεόμονον πρᾶγμα), or be, like the Sun in heaven, a reflection of God's light or even simply secure of God's backing through ἐνδεξάμενα. It is by providing himself as a model of ἀρετή that he will in turn induce his subjects to imitate him.

But if pressed for a detailed prescription of how the king is to practise virtue, the answer of the philosopher is less clear. If attempting to be systematic, he naturally turns to the Platonic canon. In some respects it was apt enough. The importance of the problem of the relationship between autocrat and the law brought the virtue of δικαιοσύνη into great prominence. This may certainly be spoken of as one of the great Hellenistic kingly ideals, though its importance to those other than philosophers has been exaggerated. Secondly σωφροσύνη proved convenient, especially in creating a polar opposition between the ἀρετή of the true king and the Ἰδιονή, τρυφή, and πλεονεξία of the tyrant. Either the ruler ruled for the benefit of his subjects or for himself. In the latter case
he was necessarily a tyrant, and as such would be hated; would have to maintain power by violence and would have all his ηδονή (his only aim in the first place) spoilt by the torments of conscience and opposition. A Damoclean sword would rob him of his much loved sleep. Therefore true rule must start from self-rule: 'rex eris qui recte facies, qui non facies non eris'.

Platonic virtues apart, numerous specific precepts are given in the kingship tracts (notably in Isocrates To Nicocles and the 'letter of Aristeas'). But the precepts are highly traditional in character, and together add up to little more than anthologies of adages. Scholars have looked in vain for system behind the endless commonplaces of Aristeas' sages. Naturally enough some of the precepts reflect the preoccupations of the hellenistic world. A pervasive theme is that the ruler can only secure his power through the εὐνομία of his subjects; that is only possible if he rules for their benefit, exercising φιλανθρωπία and εὔεργεσία. Here the philosopher exploits the clichés of the contemporary language of flattery: εὐνομία and εὔεργεσία were the commonplaces of honorific decrees, φιλανθρωπία that of petitions. These may indeed emerge as central hellenistic 'ideals': but they are hardly of the philosopher's making.

On the one hand, then, the περί βασιλείας literature produces a string of commonplaces, many of which were indeed taken over by the Romans, but which add up to no coherent system. On the other hand, where there is system (the Platonic virtues) it is not derived from analysis of historical circumstances (Aristotle is in this respect quite exceptional). No consideration is given to the society over which the autocrat rules, its specific tensions and institutions. The ideals are nebulous and highly generalised. Indeed it was only in this way that they could remain constant.
for so many centuries and in such widely different societies and that we are at a loss to date so many of the crucial documents. 85

In consequence, in order to discover just which were the main problems a king faced, which aspects of behaviour were recommended or disapproved of, it is more fruitful to turn to historians dealing with a concrete situation. Indeed, Hellenistic historians belonged to the same moralising tradition; but they provided the empirical fieldwork for the theories of the philosophers.

Historians who dealt, like Suetonius, with successions of kings have the first claim to attention; but surviving examples are, like the late imperial epitomators, too brief to cast much light. The most important is the account of the kings of Egypt by Hecataeus of Abdera which Diodorus has been taken to reflect faithfully. 86 The ritual aretalogy by which he reports that the priests kept their kings on the road of virtue seems to be fairly characteristic of the Hellenistic ideal (i,70,6f.). The king is praised as pious to the gods and gentle (ἡμερόβατα) to men; his virtues are self-control, justice and magnanimity (ἐγκράτης, δίκαιος, μεγαλόφυος); further he is truthful (ἀφευδής) liberal with benefits and superior to desire; and in a final antithesis, he punishes less than deserts and rewards in excess of them. But the comments on individual kings in the narrative reveal rather different emphases. The demand for piety presumably derives from Hecataeus' clerical sources: Sabaco wins special credit by his abdication in horror at a dream in which he had cut up the priests (65,5-8), but otherwise εὐσέβεια is negligible. The theme of ἐγκράτεια and superiority to desires is echoed by the round condemnation of τρυφή introduced by the first king Menas. 87 But the outstanding themes are εὐεργεσία and ἐπεξείκεια. Building is the most important form of generosity for these pyramid makers, praised variously
as φιλοτιμία (46,6), μεγαλοψυχία and φιλοκαλία (51,1), μεγαλοπρέπεια (51,5). But other forms of financial benefactions are also welcomed (54,1; 64,9; 68,9) and Rhemphis is sharply criticised for his hoarding of revenues: μυροψυχία and φιλαργυρία as opposed to εὐεργεσία make a good economist, but not a king (62,5f.: the moralising is absent from Herodotus with his story of the thieving brothers, i,121f.). Mildness in punishment of the subjects (ἐπιείκεια, χρηστότης) is the other pervasive topic, contrasted with the ὁμότης of a Pharaoh who drives his subjects to death in constructing pyramids (64 Cephren). Together εὐεργεσία and ἐπιείκεια generate good will, εὔνοια, a lasting good name, and even deification. If the topics of punishment and finances are crucial, there is little sign of matters of status. When Sesoostris yokes conquered kings to his triumphal chariot, behaviour which Romans might have condemned as arrogance, this is splendid, μεγαλοπρέπειστατου (58,1-2). Yet pride does prove fatal to one king: Amasis both punishes his subjects unjustly, deprives them of their property, and treats them intolerantly, ὑπεροπτικός καὶ κατὰ τὰν ὑπερηψάως. The consequence is hatred and revolt (60,1-2). The contrast with his successor who knew how to bear good fortune in a fashion suitable to a human (ἄνθρωπισι) implies that this was the root of Amasis' failure (60,3f.).

This narrative perhaps (rather than the more philosophically formulated 'ideal') offers something in the very broadest terms analogous to the Suetonian picture. If it is right to attribute the moralising comment to Hecataeus (but it should be remembered that an epitomator may easily impose his own judgements), then the analogy dates back to the beginning of the Hellenistic period. But it would be hard to confirm this from similar accounts of dynasties. It would be interesting to have preserved in full Nymphis' account of the early tyrants of his native
Heracleia. What we have is Photius' summary of Memnon, who must have based himself on Nymphis\(^9_2\) (FGH 434 F 1-5). Little more comes across than the obsession with the relative ωμότης or πραότης of each tyrant,\(^9_3\) including the sordid satisfaction at the painful death of the cruel Satyrus (F2). A strong disapproval of τρυψί is illustrated by the description of the corpulent Dionysius (F4) coming directly from Nymphis (F10). Clearchus comes under attack for the ἄλαχονετα of his theatrical public image (F1), but this is not enough to show whether tyrannical pride was an important theme.

But though it may be frustrating not to be able to get a better picture of Hellenistic writings on kings and tyrants (Phainias of Eresos On the Sicilian Tyrants might have been relevant\(^9_4\)) it is much more illuminating to turn to the surviving 'universal' historians Polybius and Diodorus.

Polybius' views on kings and kingship have been the subject of an excellent monograph,\(^9_5\) and it is here only necessary to make such points as are germane to the argument. The ideals most frequently applied to kings by Polybius are those of μεγαλοψυχία, φιλανθρωπία and εὐεργεσία;\(^9_6\) but it is only of limited use in this context to trace these concepts and adduce the parallels from the kingship literature, for the types of behaviour covered by these (and other) words are multiple. Thus μεγαλοψυχία, a concept much favoured by the contemporary Stoa, covers a wide range of behaviour considered suitable to a great man, an avoidance of everything petty, whether vindictiveness or tight-fistedness or over-reaction to good fortune and bad.\(^9_7\) What matters are the actions Polybius recommends. One of the most important themes is that of mercy to the defeated. It is enough to turn to the reflections on the vengeful looting of Thermus by Philip V (v,9-12). The king should have imitated Antigonus
at Sparta (cf. ii,70) or Philip II in his treatment of Athens: ἐπειδῆς, φιλανθρωπία, εὐγνωμοσύνη, μετριότης, πραότης, καλοκαγαθία and μεγαλοφυχία are used in quick succession of the behaviour that won over the Athenians (10,1-4). The difference between king and tyrant lies in ruling not by φόβος but by εὐεργεσία and φιλανθρωπία (11,6); it is more regal and magnanimous to act with εὐσέβεια in overcoming anger (12,1). Philip was a ruler of great promise who degenerated, for whatever reason, to tyranny: ἰμότης becomes his worst fault as it is of many others.

Secondly, the handling of money. Meanness, φιλαργυρία, is described as the 'peg of all vice' (xxix,8,9), which ruined Perseus' chances of empire. The good will and honour of the Rhodians towards generous kings shows the folly of μικροδοσία (v,90,5f.). Extortion is tyrannical (xiii,6 Nabis). The honesty and generosity of Scipio Aemilianus in abandoning the traditional Roman parsimony is what shows his μεγαλοφυχία (xxxii,25f.). Finally, Polybius is a stern critic of self-indulgence in eating, drinking, sex and luxury. But ἡθυμία, ἁσέλγεια and ἁσωτία are usually the failings of the ineffectual kings of Egypt, and σωφροσύνη is a rare quality.

What Polybius has to say of kings is by itself only of limited relevance for the Roman picture. But to limit the enquiry to kings is to give a one-sided picture of an author who shows kings in competition with republics (particularly Rome and Carthage) and confederacies (the Achaeans and Aetolians). What really interests Polybius is not kingship, but the correct use of power. His world is one dominated by τύχη; and the real test of a man is how he takes the μεταβολαὶ τύχης (vi,2,6). He should be μεγαλόφρων in defeat and moderate in victory, and this is the mark of the μεγαλοψυχὸς. The fate of a king like Perseus teaches the Romans that it is wrong to be overbearing in success (xxxix,20);
and as Hannibal exhorts the elder Scipio not to be proud in success but to think ἀνθρωπινός (xv,7,5), so the younger Scipio comments on the humiliation of the bragging Hasdrubal who had dressed as a stage-tyrant (xxxviii,7-8) that one should do and say μηδὲν ὑπερήφανον ἀνθρωπον ὑπαίτω (id.20,2). The thought may be commonplace, but it has a very practical application. Men are antagonised by arrogance: Perseus accuses the Romans of ὑπερήφανία and βαρύτης to stir up support against them (xxix,4,9). The Hellenistic world was one in which diplomacy mattered as much as military power: conduct in ἐνεπεξετασαί and ὀμιλίαι is constantly the subject of comment. To show aptitude in ὀμιλίαι was the mark of a true king (v,39,6 Cleomenes); to render oneself ὄσενεπτευκτον was to antagonise the court and bring on conspiracy (v,34, Philopator). The way to win people over was φιλανθρωπία; reception of embassies φιλανθρωπίως are so common as to be formulaic. Scipio Africanus by his use of this device seemed more formidable to his antagonist than in battle (xi,24a,4).

Of course φιλανθρωπία in deeds spoke louder than words. The lesson Polybius reads over the looting of Thermus (above) is one intended for all powers. His comments on the Roman conquest of Spain illustrate this enough. From the start Scipio wins εὐνομία by sparing the people of New Carthage (x,17,7f.) and demonstrates his restraint by not taking a beautiful captive (19,7). The effect on the Iberians is enormous: they are used to Carthaginian rule, arrogant and despotic (36,3f.) - the Carthaginians would not even promote governors who treated their subjects πρόως καὶ φιλανθρωπίως (i,72,3). But it is a principle of successful rule to use victory to one's advantage; by the φιλανθρωπία of restoring his captive family to the chieftain Edeco Scipio achieved this (x,34f.) and won himself salutation as a king (38).
Pride, brutality and greed (Polybius criticises the Romans for the appropriation of works of art that creates bad feeling ix,10,12) are not so much the marks of the bad king as of inappropriate relations between any ruling power and the ruled. It is in this area, then, and not in that of the explicitly named regal virtues, like μεγαλοφυχία, that we begin to approximate to the Suetonian pattern of 'virtues and vices'. From Polybius it is natural to proceed to his continuator Posidonius, who picked up these ideas and wove them together to produce a theory of empire that was quite outstanding in its vivid presentation, systematic application and compelling persuasiveness. Posidonius' Histories themselves, starting from the point where Polybius left off, the sacking of Corinth and Carthage, and ending in all likelihood with the Sullan settlement, only survive in a handful of fragments. But it is generally accepted that this work was the main source of the best part of the last books of Diodorus (xxxiii-end). However, moralising comment is an area in which it would be particularly easy even for a derivative writer like Diodorus to make his own contribution, and given that very similar moralisations occur throughout the Hellenistic books (from xxi on) it is methodologically safest to start by discussing Diodorus.

The Hellenistic books of Diodorus only survive through Byzantine extracts; but one of the titles of Constantine Porphyrogenitus' excerptors was precisely de Virtutibus et Vitiis and thanks to them, ample material survives relevant to the present question. Repeatedly Diodorus preaches the lesson of the mutability of fortune: That one must be moderate in success. Fortune has an uncanny way of catching up with the arrogant and paying them back in their own coin. Energy and courage may be the way to win power; but it can only be retained through φιλανθρωπία and
Again and again the besetting sins of tyrants emerge as ὠμότης (and παρανομὰ), ὑπερφανία and πλεονεξία; they lead to hatred and revolt, as opposed to the wise ruler’s ἔπλεκχελα and φιλανθρωπία.

(All of these faults are familiar from Polybius; but ὑπερφανία is more frequent here, and πλεονεξία is promoted to a new importance as the 'metropolis of vice'.) Typical is the ὠμότης and παρανομὰ τυραννικὴ of Pseudophilip: beastly by nature, he was φονικός, κατὰ τὰς ἐντεύξεις ὑπερήφανος and full of πλεονεξία - that is, in Suetonian terms, he combined saevitia, arrogantia and avaritia.

Multiplication of instances would only demonstrate how soon a commonplace degenerates to a cliché. But behind the Diodoran picture lies a clearly formulated analysis of contemporary problems; and it is here that the hand of Posidonius is most evident. The vivid narrative of the Sicilian Slave War is explicitly intended to be paradigmatic: the same principles govern the relationship of master and slave as of political ruler and ruled, those in ὑπεροχὴ and the ταξινόμησις. The humble will accept their subjection if tempered by φιλανθρωπία; abuse of power leads to conspiracy in the household and civil war in the state. Prosperity was the root cause of the Sicilian uprising: it caused the τρυφί of the great landowners, then in turn their ὑπερφανία and ὑβρις; and in proportion to maltreatment the alienation of the slaves grew (xxxiv/v 1=26). The wealthy landowners imitated the Italians in ὑπερφανία, πλεονεξία and κακουργία (27) leaving their slaves ill-fed, ill-clothed and brutally branded, reduced to robbing travellers to sustain life (26 = 36). The spark was provided by the inhuman Damophilus who imitated the Persian court in τρυφὶ and ὑπερφανία (10 = 34); while the simplicity and φιλανθρωπία of his daughter led to her escape from the atrocities, so proving that the ὠμότης of the underdog is no more than the
product of the treatment he receives ($13=39$).

It was a tenet of Posidonius' ethical system that wealth was the precedent cause of evil by engendering arrogance and τὸφος (Sen. ep. 87, 31ff. = F170 E.K. 'insolentiam tumorem arrogantiam'). In the political sphere he is only reapplying the old proverb, τίκτει κόρος ὑβρις (D.S. xxxiv/v 2, 35); but his originality lies in the systematic way in which he applies it to contemporary problems. He identified as the strength of the old Romans their austere and frugal ways, their piety and justice (P. 59, 20f. J.) illustrated by Scaevola as governor (cf. D.S. xxxvii, 5); likewise the Lusitanian chieftain Viriathus kept together an army for eleven years, devoted, invincible and untroubled by στάσεις, through his justice in dividing spoils and rewarding the meritorious and by his frugal style and superiority to pleasures (D.S. xxxiii 21a, cf. 1). But while lowliness fosters frugal self-sufficiency and justice, superiority breeds πλεονεξία and παρανομία (id. 8). The abandonment of frugality and restraint in exchange for τρυφή was the direct cause of the Marsic war. (D.S. xxxiii, 2, 1).

Posidonius started his work with the sack of Carthage; and whether or not Scipio Nasica did actually make predictions of the effect of removing the metus Punicus, it can only be Posidonius who adapted this idea to his theory of empire and made it the turning point in historical representations of the moral decline of Rome. Sallust took over the part of the theory applicable to internal relations, that superbia and luxuria cause civil discord (as with the slaves); the second, and equally important prong of his argument concerns relations with subjects, for πλεονεξία and παρανομία will bring the empire into hatred. That the decline of empires is caused by moral degeneration in prosperity could be seen not only from the Athenian and Spartan (cf. Sall. Cat. 2, 2) and the
Etruscan empires (F.119 J.) but from the fates of many kings. Athenaeus found Posidonius such a good quarry for citations on τρυφή (F.1-27 J.) because the author was out to prove that it brought kings into hatred and contempt (cf. D.S. xxxiii,22f. on Physcon). It is kings like Arsaces VI of Parthia who by practising ἐπεξέκασα and φιλανθρωπία and resisting τρυφή and ὑπερφανία find that their empires increase thereby (id.18).

Finally the same principle that governs the relationship of master and slave, senator and plebeian, king and subject, ruling power and empire governs that of general and troops (already illustrated by Viriathus). By avoiding the indolence of other officers and treating his troops ἐκεῖσι, generously in gifts, and genially in ὀμιλίαι, Marius won the εὐνοία of his troops and their best service in battle. He won their devotion by sharing their humble life-style: to command by example not by punishment, 'hoc est utile, hoc civile imperium' (Sall. Jug.85,38).

It is, then, only when we come to the later books of Diodorus that a closely similar pattern of vices and virtues is found to that in the imperial historians. Behind Diodorus' account (whether immediately as a source, or indirectly as an inspiration) surely lies Posidonius. His concern is to produce an explanation of the relationship between the mighty and the weak (ταυρευνότης/ὑπεροχή), the ruler and the ruled. According to his model, applied to various historical circumstances, success (abundance of wealth and power) causes a moral decline: indulgence, pride, greed and cruelty replace the austerity and justice by which success was initially gained. Most of the elements of this moralising system are already present in Polybius, but it is Posidonius who elevates it to a coherent theory.

This is not a theory formulated in a philosophical vacuum, but a response to historical circumstances. In the aftermath of the Macedonian
wars the power of Rome now seemed complete; only moral pressure could now control it. Posidonius was a Greek aristocrat, yet one of the subjects and humble (ταξευνότερος). He worked out a moralising theory of history, the clear lesson of which was that if the Romans wished to preserve their power over their subjects and at the same time preserve themselves from internal dissension, they must restrain the exercise of their power. It is easy to see how, after the power of Rome passed into the hands of an autocrat, the same moral arguments could be applied by his subjects to restrain the exercise of his power. The vices of the emperor who abuses his people are naturally those of the state that abuses its empire.

The impact of Posidonius on Roman thought, and in particular on Sallust, is a matter of hot dispute. The relative impact of any single thinker, as opposed to commonplace ideas, is notoriously hard to measure. To suggest that the virtues and vices met in Suetonius ultimately derive from Posidonius would be a gross exaggeration of his influence. His ideas were surely influential because he formulated so clearly what was already largely accepted. If we turn to contemporary Latin sources, we find exactly the same 'vices' under criticism. The *Verrines* indicate that pride, cruelty, avarice and indulgence were already standard charges to bring against a corrupt governor. The Sicilians could have tolerated Verres, says Cicero, if he had only had the occasional vice, if only he had behaved humanely; what made him unbearable was the simultaneous occurrence of all possible faults, 'cum perferre non possent luxuriam, crudelitatem, avaritiam, superbiam' (II *Verr.* 2,9). From Sallust on, these vices are the commonplaces of Roman moralising historiography. One need not suppose that they were adopted because Posidonius laid emphasis on them, but simply because they were assumed by the Roman to be
the normal manifestations of abuse of power. Granted that, Posidonius' moralising histories gave welcome confirmation that these evils were indeed the cause of the fall of empires.

Conclusions

The group of moral qualities by which Suetonius judges Caesar after Caesar has little to do with philosophically formulated 'ideals' of kingship or with any official ideology. Suetonius is concerned with the relationship of the emperor and his subjects; the virtue/vice chapters cover the main areas of potential abuse of power, areas where only moralising protest (or armed insurrection) could procure redress. The choice of these areas, it is argued, is not peculiar to Suetonius, but probably is common to the tradition of imperial historiography, and goes back to republican historiography, closely linked with political invective like Cicero's Verrines.

Of supposing any significant debt to Hellenistic kingship literature one should be exceedingly wary. The Roman approach to the phenomenon of autocracy was not a theoretical one. "Phrases, professions, and doctrines obscure the truth. The Romans themselves enjoyed a robust advantage: they had long been almost immune against political speculation" (Syme, Tacitus 549). But this is not to say that the crucial areas of relationship between ruler and ruled might not be the same in some Greek societies as in Roman society. As Aristotle puts it, injustice is motivated by three things, honour, wealth and personal safety, together with the pleasure that derives from them (EN 1130b1f.). Wherever the upper classes cared for their own status, property and personal safety, they were likely to resist an autocrat who threatened their possession of these advantages in order to secure his own, and who thus put his own 'pleasure' above theirs.
In suggesting, therefore, that Suetonian 'virtues' and 'vices' go back to late republican moralisation about the problems of empire, I do not mean to exclude the possibility that there are parallels or antecedents in the Greek world. In the following chapters these areas will be examined individually in closer detail. The question is at best only in part one of 'ideals' summed up in single words (clementia, liberalitas etc.) which may or may not owe something in their formulation to Greek 'ideals' (φιλανθρωπία, ἐπιτείκεια, εὐεργεσία etc.). As important or more important is the precise pattern of behaviour involved in each. The advantage of Suetonius' Caesars, it will be argued, lies in the way that the patterns of behaviour recommended or disapproved of are set out explicitly. In broad terms the patterns may go back to the Greek world; but the characteristic features are the product of historical circumstances.
Chapter IX

Present and Absent Virtues

In the remaining two chapters the main moral categories employed by Suetonius in the Caesars will be examined in closer detail. Just what are the actions he approves or disapproves? How far is his judgement affected by ideals potent in the society of his time? To what extent did these ideals derive from the Greek world or the republican past? To whom did they matter, and why? Some of these questions, particularly relating to the ideals of clementia and liberalitas have been examined at length by earlier scholars; others have not. I have attempted to be brief where there is little to be added; where there is perhaps something new to be said, I have not hesitated to go beyond the bounds of discussion of the Caesars. Before turning, however, to the categories present in the Lives, there is one conspicuous absentee to consider.

1. Iustitia

Neither Suetonius nor Tacitus, as was seen in the last chapter, speak of the iustitia of the emperor (nor of its opposite). Doubtless many of the actions which Suetonius records with evident approval particularly in the 'administrative' chapters came within the ancients' understanding of iustitia, normally defined by philosophers as the distribution to each according to his deserts, 'suam cuique tribuens dignitatem'. Nevertheless iustitia is not a criterion Suetonius explicitly applies; nor does he ever gather together items under one category which we might reasonably gloss as 'justice'. In the case of Tacitus, Syme suggested that the absence of the word was due to the
deliberate avoidance of a contemporary political slogan. What significance, if any, should be attributed to its absence from Suetonius? Is this absence at all surprising?

If the standard view is accepted of what the 'Herrscherideal' was, then justice should be central to any depiction of an ideal ruler, and Suetonius is badly out of tune. But one of the main themes of this study is that the nature of imperial ideology has been misconceived; iustitia provides a test case. The normal procedure (followed in this instance particularly by Wickert and Lichocka) is to reconstruct an 'ideal' by piecing together evidence from a wide variety of sources: Greek philosophy and kingship literature, Latin theoretical works, panegyric, historians and other authors, as well as coins and inscriptions. What in practical terms this composite 'ideal' represents is far from clear: who formulated it, with what purpose, under what pressures and to what end? The answer (insofar as one is offered) is given in terms of 'official propaganda', the deliberate manipulation of public opinion by the authorities in order to underpin their rule. Some of the difficulties in the way of this point of view were suggested above (ch.VII). In my view the composite 'Herrscherideal' is chimerical, and obfuscates what is of the greatest potential interest to the historian: the differences and tensions between various points of view and traditions. To whom, then, did the idea of justice matter and why?

The Greek Background

Justice was undoubtedly the lynch-pin of Greek theoretical justifications of monarchy. Indeed for the Greeks δικαιοσύνη was the prime virtue of the member of the polis. The Theognidean line was proverbial: ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλημβόντος κἀγὼ ἀρετὴ ἑστὶ. Plato was rationalising the
current 'Vulgarethik' when he made justice the most important of the four cardinal virtues in his ideal State (esp. Rep. 432B ff.): ὑστατοσύνη related to the other three virtues as in the individual did the harmony of the three parts of the soul to the individual components (441C ff.). After Plato the central importance of justice in moral philosophy was never challenged.⁴

This applied no less to the ideal king than to the ideal polites.⁵ It was ταραύμια that turned the young man of the Republic into a tyrant.⁶ Here was the fundamental objection to monarchy, ὁρχῇ ἀνυπερθνος, that the autocrat was beyond control of the law: he upsets the ancestral νόμων, rapes women, and kills men untried.⁷ Well might Isocrates' Nicocles stress his justice by claiming that no citizen had suffered exile, execution or confiscation of property in his reign (Nic. 32).⁸ But apart from the need to persuade the tyrant to submit himself to the basic norms of social behaviour, the whole issue was enormously complicated by the king's fundamental role as distributor of justice. The primacy of this role is already implicit in Herodotus' explanation of the rise of the Persian monarchy.⁹ It involves the whole problem of the relation of the king to νόμος. If the ruler is above the law in the sense that he is lawgiver and fount of justice, how can he be just in the sense of subordinating himself to the law? One solution commonly met in kingship tracts is to see the king as a superior substitute for the law. Plato believed the wisdom of his Statesman to be superior to νόμος; the ruler serves as model of behaviour for his people.¹⁰ In the classic exposition of Diotogenes, the king is an embodiment of the law, ἔμφυσος νόμος. According to his incoherent argument (263, 14ff.), since ὑστατοσύνη depends on νόμος, and the king is either the embodiment of νόμος or a legitimate ruler (νόμος ἀρχων), the king is necessarily ὑστατοσύνη.
If this represented standard Hellenistic theory (though this is uncertain, and the importance of the νόμος ἐμφύσεως doctrine has been vastly exaggerated), in practice it is clear that jurisdiction was a primary function of Hellenistic kings. Schubart quotes a Ptolemaic proclamation (UP 2,113): 'the king and queen attach great importance to the distribution of justice (δικαίωσεως) to all their subjects...'. Certainly frequent petitions appeal to the Lagids for justice (τὸ δίκαιον). On the other hand, despite Schubart, it is not clear how far the subjects appealed to, or celebrated, the ruler's δικαιοσύνη as a moral quality rather than a function. The regal response to a petition was not a legal ruling, but (if successful) an act of grace, τὸ φιλανθρωπία. The quality that was most urgently required and celebrated was φιλανθρωπία. It still requires proper investigation of the documents to establish whether δικαιοσύνη was important in everyday usage.

The Roman Tradition

Whatever the truth about the documents, there is no doubt of the importance of δικαιοσύνη in Hellenistic theory. These ideas were substantially taken over by the Greek writers of the Roman empire. 'Who', as Dio of Prusa puts it, 'has greater need of δικαιοσύνη than he who is above the law?'. The Stoic emperor Marcus, writing in Greek, invokes δικαιοσύνη constantly. In the Greek tradition of encomium too justice maintained its central place. But what of the Latin tradition? Was iustitia an ideal that mattered to the Romans as δικαιοσύνη did to the Greeks? Was it an ideal expected of, or publicised by emperors?

For Cicero, iustitia was the basis of Roman society (off.i,20).
Without it there could simply be no res publica (rep.ii,70). It was the queen of virtues, 'omnium...domina et regina virtutum' (off.iii,28): the justice that guarantees suum cuique, above all property rights and status, is fundamental to the de officiis. Further, it is the distinguishing quality of the good ruler: in the Republic he envisages the safety of the citizens governed by 'unius perpetua potestate et iustitia omnique sapientia' (ii,43), and iustitia defines the good king.

But in all these passages Cicero writes as a philosopher, under the direct and openly admitted influence of Plato and Panaetius. It is important at the outset to establish what sort of roots the concept of justice had in Roman society and culture. In the introduction to the Catiline, Sallust states that the republic had grown by labor and iustitia (10,1). Pöschl observes that this is the only place in Sallust where the word iustitia is used; and this is because the concept was not 'altromisch'. Fides is the 'fundamentum...iustitiae' (Cic. off.i,23), and this, not justice, is the idea that had real resonance for Roman sentiment. Heinze, in his article on fides to which Pöschl refers, suggests that if Cicero had only based the de officiis on Roman sentiment, not Greek philosophy, 'so wäre der fides ein ragender Thronsitz zugefallen'. Iustitia was an immigrant at Rome.

To chase the 'altromisch' in periods for which we have no evidence seems a fruitless undertaking. But what can be thoroughly substantiated is that the Roman concept of iustum rested on wholly different premises from the Greek δικαιοσύνη, and that still in the first century B.C. a distinction persists between philosophical and non-philosophical usage in Latin. This is most apparent in the characteristically Roman idea of the bellum iustum. It was not in the area of morality that the Romans sought justification for wars, but in the ius fetiale, in the observation
of treaties and rules. In war as in other aspects of religion, the support of the gods was won by doing what was technically right and proper, *iustum piumque*. The cynical side of this legalistic approach is emphasised by the Caudine Forks debate in Livy (ix,8-10). But it would be wrong to suggest that the idea of *bellum iustum* was, or rather remained, exclusively legalistic. Against the Caudine Forks may be set Camillus' treatment of the treacherously surrendered schoolboys of Falerii (v,27-28,1). There was nothing in the Fetial law that ruled for such contingencies; yet Camillus refused to avail himself of treachery, and war over the Falerii by his *iustitia* (v,28,1). But though in a sense his motivation is moral, it is not so in a Greek sense. 'Sunt et belli sicut pacis iura': there are certain standards of right and proper conduct which the Roman aristocrat, frank and open, would think it beneath his dignity to transgress. The *fides* of patron and magistrate extends by analogy to warfare.

Examination of Livy's employment of *iustus/iustitia* confirms the essentially non-moral nature of the concept. His usage of the adjectival (rarely adverbial) *iustus* may be divided into three groups. i) Easily the commonest concerns military affairs; as a war (or peace) may be right and proper, so may a battle (*proelium, pugna, acies, decursus, arma*), a body of troops (*exercitus, equitatus, classis, legio*) or the various aspects of military life (*dilectus, missio, militia, stipendia, vacatio; statio, custodia, obsidio; hostis, caedes; and triumphus*). *Iustus* is here without moral connotations, merely indicating what is formally in accordance with the rules, or properly so-called. ii) The next most common group concerns motivation: the *iusta causa*, the just grounds of complaint (*querella, preces, deprecatio, miseratio*) or (frequently) of anger (*iustae irae*). Though this group is closer to the moral than the
last, the idea is basically legalistic: what a iudex would adjudge to be a right and proper case or cause of grievance and anger. It may thus issue in a iusta poena. iii) Third in frequency is the group where the sense of 'due', 'legal', 'properly so-called', is applied to non-military matters, especially civil institutions: to possession, heirs, suffragatio, the day for assembly; even to the river-bed proper (opposed to the area of flooding i,4,4) or a true mater familiae (opposed to a mistress xxxix,53,3). Within this group what is specially significant for the question of the autocrat's justice is the usage of imperium iustum. 30 Again the basic idea is strictly legalistic: only the patricians enjoy 'iustum imperium et auspiciem domi militiaeque' (x,8,9, cf. xxii, 1,5). When the Lycians complain that they are reduced to 'iustum... servitium' by Rhodes, they clearly mean a state fulfilling the legal definition of slavery, not 'just' slavery (xli,6,10).

But what is evidently a traditional Roman expression for power duly conveyed on a magistrate shades into the Greek idea of just rule. Power duly conveyed must be exercised with due respect for the standards of decency: to be cruel 'plus aequo et bono' involves 'saeva atque iniusta imperia'. 31 Kingdoms and kings are on the same footing as empires. 'Iusta ac legitimia regna' or 'rege...iusto ac legitimo' bear an obvious similarity to the βασιλεύς δικαιότατος καὶ νομιμότατος, though even here any notion of 'justice' will be an overtone by association with the Greek ideal. 32 Yet in some 180 instances of iustus in Livy, only six refer unambiguously to a person in his moral conduct: five of these are Greek kings, like Antigonus 'mitissimo et iustissimo rege' (the other a Capuan senator); so that even here the idea of 'just because duly empowered' is present. 33

It is no surprise therefore, that the nominal iustitia implying
a possibly ethical disposition is very rare (11 cases). In 7 of these the clemency of the victorious general is referred to, and the word is linked with fides, clementia, temperantia, moderatio, benignitas. Two of the remaining cases refer to Greek kings; one to the iustitia religioque of Numa the great legislator (i,18,1); and the last to the integritas and iustitia of triumvirs in making a fair but unpopular assignation of land (iv,11,7).

The evidence of Livy indicates that the Greek ideal of ethical 'justice' was at best secondary and very poorly rooted in normal Latin usage of the late 1st century. Cicero's usage in the speeches as opposed to the philosophica confirms the pattern. As in Livy, iustus is used of war and triumph; of causae (frequently), anger, complaints and punishment; and of legally defined social institutions (comitia, imperium, honos, servitus, funus). In the rare cases where the adjective is applied to persons, either they are magistrates, iudices or lawyers; or else the context is Greek, the four cardinal virtues (Muren.64), the regiae laudes of King Deiotarus (26) and Aristides himself (Sest.141). Similarly with the noun. In the philosophical writings iustitia is one of the commonest words (5 columns in Merguet's lexicon); the speeches produce only a handful of instances (15). As in Livy it is used (once) of the clemency of the victor, namely Caesar (Marcell.12), who had declared to the senate his intention of winning 'iustitia et aequitate' (Caes. BC i,32,9). As with iustus it is applied to magistrates, juries, lawyers. The remaining cases are Greek and philosophical; the virtuous Cato, the theory of evolution (Sest.91); and a passage reminiscent of Posidonius (Sex.Rosc.75: city life produces luxury, then avarice, so to audacia and all the sins, whereas country life teaches parsimonia, diligentia and iustitia).
The picture that emerges may be summarised thus. Panaetius and Posidonius found the Romans talking constantly of *iustum piumque bellum*, *iustum imperium* and the like. They (but most of all Posidonius) tried to persuade the Romans on the basis of this that *iustitia*, as *pietas*, was one of the great Roman qualities. The concept of *imperium iustum* perhaps underwent a certain degree of moralisation. Nevertheless, outside philosophical context, *iustum* and *iustitia* maintained their close connection with *ius*: the prescribed form of military, political and social institutions, and the judgement delivered by magistrate, *iudex* or conqueror.

Suetonius

Suetonius is therefore wholly in line with republican tradition. He speaks of 'iustum piumque et faventibus diis bellum' (Galb.10.4) and uses *iustus* of other military institutions; causes, punishments or hatred are just, and Claudius is quoted promising that his *ira curdens* will be 'non iustum'; finally various social institutions are 'due and proper', *libertas*, *matrimonium*, the time for resigning the *fasces*. The only people of whom *iustitia* is predicated are provincial governors.

Yet even if Suetonius is traditional in this respect (as is Tacitus), there are in Cicero and Livy the seeds from which a category of imperial justice could reasonably have developed, both the Greek-inspired 'rex iustus ac legitimus', and the notion of *iustum imperium* with its increasingly moral overtones. Again, was not the role of the emperor in jurisdiction and as a (quasi) magistrate enough to make *iustitia* a natural category?

One element in the explanation may be that the author has simply no interest in the question of legitimacy. The principate is taken for granted,
not justified or defined (above ch.III,4). The concern for the justification of power makes justice an important category for the philosopher. But as far as the historian was concerned, the scope of δικαιοσύνη was much too broad to be of practical use. Tyrannical abuse involves all Suetonius' moral categories, cruelty, arrogance, avarice and selfish indulgence; and in addition most of the administration of the state, the distribution of 'suam cuique dignitatem', let alone jurisdiction proper. It would be superfluous to invoke iustitia where clementia, civilitas, and moderatio, liberalitas and abstinentia were more specific.

Official Propaganda

Can one speak at the same time of an avoidance by Suetonius and Tacitus of the cant of 'official propaganda'? The case for iustitia playing an important part in imperial propaganda is, in my view, a very weak one. It was not used as a slogan on republican coinage and (as has been seen above) its appearances on the imperial coinage are very isolated. Only under the Antonines and Severi does the type acquire any regularity, and here it is clear that the point of reference is the emperor's now paramount role in supervising the law. The epigraphical evidence is equally thin. Though 'iustissimus princeps' is used right from the start, of Gaius Caesar and of Tiberius, the potential and actual successors of Augustus (and therefore surely in the ambiguous sense of δικαιότατος καὶ νομιμότατος), it never caught on in the 'inofficial titulature'. The Golden Shield of Augustus celebrates the iustitia and clementia of the victor (a combination met above in Livy, in Cicero's pro Marcello, as later in the Panegyrici), but it is only necessary to turn to Seneca's de Clementia to see why iustitia becomes the less important of the two. Under an absolute ruler, the appeal to mercy was
more effective than that to legal right. One further possible venue for Justititia was in the theme of the return of the Golden Age, heralded by Virgil in the fourth Eclogue. With the imperial peace, the Virgo-Astraea-Justitia would return from her place in the stars. But though imperial poets favoured this theme, Justitia never came to acquire the significance it later had for mediaeval and Renaissance princes.

On this showing, it is doubtful whether Justitia was important in the official picture of the emperor, at least in the early and middle empire. An exception should perhaps be made for one man, Tiberius. The first to introduce this theme to the coinage, the recipient of an unusual number of dedications to the 'iustissimus princeps', he had an exaggerated respect for legal form, and an obsession with jurisdiction. The only record of official Roman cult of Justitia is of a Signum Justitiae Augustae dedicated in AD 13 perhaps by Tiberius. Even in a private letter Augustus addressed him as 'dux vo μιμωτατέ'. Velleius celebrated his reign as a return of Justitia, and Valerius Maximus dedicated a chapter of his collection to Justitia, though what the anecdotes illustrate is fides, and in particular a refusal to avail oneself of treachery against the enemy; a point in which Tiberius won the admiration even of Tacitus. But even if this is right, Tiberius is exceptional.

Conclusion

The dependence of Justitia on what was legally and traditionally right (ius) was and remained much stronger than was the case with the essentially moral δικαιοσύνη. 'Justice' had little force as a political slogan either under the Republic or the Empire. When under Hadrian it became more common on the coinage, it was in the technical sense of the justice distributed by the judge, not of a moral quality. But moral
qualities are precisely what concerned Suetonius; for in these the individual rulers differed, and by appeal to morality the autocrat might be controlled. Justice was therefore not a category he employed, even though it might be recognised by the philosopher in his depiction of the good emperor.

2. *Clementia* - *Saevitia*¹

The relevant sections in Suetonius are: Jul.75 (moderatio, clementia), cf. 73-74 (lenitas etc.); Aug.51 (clementia), cf. 27,1-4; Tib.50-56 (odium adversus necessitudines), 57-62 (saevitia); Cal.27-33 (saevitia), cf. 23-26 (family friends, all ranks); Cl.34 (saevus); Ner.33-35 (family and friends); 36-38 (saevitia); cf. 10,1-2 (clementia); Galb.12,1-2 (saevitia), cf. 14,3-15; Vit.14 (saevitia), cf. 10; Vesp.14-15 (clemens); Tit.9 (lack of saevitia, cf. 6,1-7,1); Dom.10-11 (saevitia), cf. 9 (clementia).

It is a reasonable claim, and made by authors so diverse as Seneca, Themistius, and the biographers of Avidius Cassius and Aurelian, that *clementia* was the imperial virtue above all others.² Suetonius makes no exception, weighing each Caesar in the balance of *clementia* on the one side, *saevitia* on the other (see above). The only absentee is Otho, whose life is free from rubrics; and even here there is the testimony of his detestation of civil war which is very relevant to this question (10,1). Imperial clemency, and its Greek roots and antecedents, particularly *φιλανθρωπία*, have been endlessly discussed (n.l). There is no need here to gather the evidence, only to make such observations as will put Suetonius in perspective. Again the inclination to 'lump' the evidence together should be resisted. Isolation of the author's characteristics is needed, not a panegyric of *clementia*.
Hellenistic Background

"If you lose", Alcinous threatened the beggar Irus, about to engage in boxing with Odysseus, "I shall send you to the mainland to King Echetos, the bane of all men, who will slit off your ears and nostrils without pity, tear out your genitals and give them to the dogs to eat" (Od.18,85f.). Odysseus himself made a very different sort of king, mild and loved by his people: πατήρ δ’ ὃς ἦπιος ἦεν (Od.2,47 etc.). From the beginning of ancient literature (nor is there even anything distinctively ancient about this) autocratic rulers are characterised by their mildness (ἡπίος, πράος, χρηστός, μελίχως, ἕμερος, μέτρως etc.) or harshness (χάλεκος, ἀκήνης, ὠμός, μαίρονος, βίαιος and so on). Inevitably so, for the autocrat holds the power to punish, both in cases involving relations between his subjects, and to protect himself from assaults on his own power. Phalaris was already a legend in Pindar's day (Pyth.1,95f.). Violence, Bia, was the hallmark of the Greek tyrant; a bodyguard protected his power; his hostility to established interests (the aristocracy) was axiomatic, and if he followed the advice of the sage Thrasyboulus, he trimmed off the heads of his most prominent subjects like so many ears of corn. The picture drawn by Plato in the Republic of the making of a tyrant was vivid and widely influential: smiling and πράος at first, the ruler soon tastes human blood, and is transformed into a being as insatiate as the maneater (565-6). The true king, ruling by law and consent, is innocent of blood, his people's saviour not their bane.

In a sense Suetonius' cruel and clement Caesars are no more than a continuation of this old stereotype. But there is more to be said than this. Clementia as an ideal has quite specific features, the product of historical circumstances. Its roots are generally sought in the
Hellenistic 'Königsideal' already emerging in the 4th century, in the qualities of ἕλεος and ἀγαθευτησία. The first of these is repeatedly applied to their model kings by Isocrates and Xenophon. The word emerges quite suddenly to prominence in this century, after only one attestation in the 5th century (PV 11), with a wide range of applications, to gods, kings, animals, farming, laws etc. One must assume a widespread spoken usage before emergence in written sources; the evidence of the orators, though not chronologically prior, suggests that it became common as a slogan of Athenian democratic cant. Demosthenes applies ἕλεος to the Athenian citizens and assembly, especially in their legislation governing themselves and their allies (Chers.viii,33). Linked with πράος, μέτρος, ἡμιος, κοινὸς and δημοτικὸς, it is contrasted with ὑμός, βίας, φοβηρός, χαλεκός and ὀλγυαρχικός (esp. Timocr.24; 51; 191-3; 196). One aspect is the pity (ἔλεος, συγγνώμη, Aristog.i,81) that may be appealed to in a jury. But the positive side of 'Menschenliebe' is much wider than this: the generosity of liturgies or decrees that can be passed at no cost to encourage metics (Xen. Por.iii,6), the public spirited behaviour of Socrates (φιλάνθρωπος and δημοτικὸς) in not charging for tuition (Xen. Mem.i,2,60), or the spurious smiling attitude of a popular politician that escapes the lofty and dignified Chabrias (Isocr. Antid.xv,131-3).

This democratic 'bonhomie' was (in my view) transferred from the Athenians to the ideal king. Linked with πράος, εὐνοία and εὐεργέσιας to the Greeks, it would win the Macedonian royalty popular acclaim (Isocr. Phil.114-116). It is not often that authors specify how this philanthropy is to be manifested. Xenophon's Cyrus is the most explicit model: and though the quality enters into the granting to the inhabitants of a sacked city their money and life, the one long and detailed chapter on
the quality (Cyrop.viii,2,1ff.) talks only of Cyrus' benefactions to his followers, whether in care, support and sympathy (2) or generosity with hospitality (2-6), money (7-23) and medical aid (24-25). It is this aspect that becomes popularised in countless petitions and decrees from all over the Hellenistic world. Petitioners apply indifferently and formulaically for justice (τὸ δίκαιον) or for the benefit of the king's φιλανθρωπία; their goal is not legislation, but a wide range of personal benefits, fiscal rebates, amnesties, legal privileges, asylum, immunities, guarantees against arbitrary action, titles to protection of person and property and so on.

Remission of punishment does not appear to be more than a minor component of the ideal, even though later, under the influence of imperial clementia, it became predominant in the φιλανθρωπία of Themistius and Julian. It was indeed a standard topic that the king should be more mild in punishment than the offender's deserts warranted. The qualities mentioned in this connection are usually πράος, χρηστότης, rarely εὐγνωμοσύνη, and εὐεξία. Already Gorgias had praised the Athenians for their preference of τὸ πρᾶος ἐπειδήκες as against the rigours of the law (τὸ ἀγριος δίκαιον, Epitaphios 6 DK). Aristotle brilliantly rationalised ἐπειδήκες into a higher justice that adapted the inflexible generality of a law to the peculiar circumstances of an individual case (EN v,10,1137A 31ff.). His influence on kingship literature has perhaps been exaggerated. It is humane feelings, not higher justice, that Aristeas emphasises in putting the quality at the head of his recommendations to the king (188). In fact this virtue is not so common in the theoretical tracts as in the historians (examined in the last chapter). Diodorus/Hecataeus' Actisanes may be taken as a model of mildness in punishment: he gathered together the criminals of the land into a colony a Rhinocolura,
so called because he merely cut off their noses.21

Two relevant elements emerge from the Hellenistic ideals: the spirit of generous devotion to mankind that may result in acts of indulgence (φιλάνθρωπα), and the mildness in exercise of the power of punishment that gives the criminal less than his deserts. What ought to be kept quite distinct, and what is most relevant to Roman clementia is the ideal of pardoning the defeated enemy. Here is an idea alien to the traditional understanding of the rules of war, that the victor was entitled to sack, slaughter, pillage and rape. The good king was πρόστατος to his friends, but to his enemies φόβοφότατος (Xen. Ages. xi, 10). Indeed there are some hints of a different point of view. In Thucydides both Cleon and Diodotus speak out against ἐκκείκετα to the Mytileneans; but that might suggest there were less hard-boiled politicians who were in favour of it (iii,40,3; 48,1). Similarly the model Cyrus demonstrates his πρόστασις in pardoning his rebellious vassal, the Armenian king (Cyrop.iii,1,41). It would be particularly welcome to have an authentic early Hellenistic account of Alexander. In Diodorus, as later in Curtius Rufus, he wins over the foe by φιλάνθρωπα and ἐκκείκετα; and by his humane treatment of Sisigambis demonstrates the principle that those in power should show pity (ἐλεος) to the fallen, and not be carried away by success to arrogance. But unless Diodorus can be shown to be transcribing meekly a single source, one cannot have complete confidence that this is not a 'Romanised' Alexander.22

The question would require an investigation of Hellenistic historiography beyond the scope of these pages; but on the whole it appears that the attention in Polybius and Diodorus/Posidonius to the sparing treatment of the defeated is something new. Even if isolated earlier parallels can be found, the impression is that their ideal of
The policy of sparing the conquered was what the Romans termed *clementia*; and already when Cato defended the Rhodians it could be regarded as traditional (Gellius vi,3 = ORF p.62f.). Whether it really was traditional is a quibble: the important point is that it was distinctive. Unlike *φιλανθρωπία* or *ἐνεκέλευα* the word *clementia* is connected from the first with the act of pardoning (*ignoscere, parcere*). Reasonable softening of the rigour of the law, especially under mitigating circumstances, implies a wholly different process from forgiveness. The paradigm is set out in Gellius' paraphrase of Cato (though note that this is only one of the lines he takes): the defendant concedes guilt (47 'quasi deliquisse eos concedat', 52 'quasi sit erratum') but begs pardon (47 'ignosci postulat'); this is possible because the injury is a personal one to the judge, who wishes for revenge (33 'iniurias ulcisci'), but is persuaded that it is in his interest (cf. 52 'utilitatis') to pass over his rights. This is quite unlike the normal process in court of law (cf. Gellius l.c. 18); and owes its distinctive features to the fact that it centres on the behaviour of the victor on the battlefield.

By Cicero's day *clementia* was applied to a wide range of situations: to relations between citizens, to the mercy begged of a jury, and to the conduct of a provincial governor. Particularly in the last, the ideal of *clementia* (frequently mentioned in Cicero's Cilician correspondence) contains an element of paradox. *Sévéritas* was the characteristic ideal of a magistrate, 'sine qua administrari civitas non potest'.

Cicero
admits it to be a rhetorical trick to represent acts of severity as cruel, acts of weakness as clement. Nevertheless in his recommendations to his brother he urges lenitas alongside severitas (ad Q.f.i,1,21) and celebrates the clementia, mansuetudo and humanitas of his administration. On a theoretical level the solution to the paradox is that clemency is the restraint of anger in punishment, thus the elimination of a human weakness. In practice what shows up the behaviour of Verres, documented throughout the final book of the Verrines, as cruelty and not severity is the innocence of his victims, together with his utter disregard for their status and the aggravation of their sufferings. The crudelitas or saevitia of a governor is that form of unjust abuse (prompted usually by avaritia) that manifests itself in punishments and executions; his clementia little more than absence of abuse.

Yet the civil wars brought a new situation; and scholars are surely right to discern in the clementia of the victorious Caesar something effectively new to Roman politics, even if the term had long been a political catch-word. Caesar's clemency was not that of a magistrate, judge or governor. It consisted in the pardoning of political opponents; and there can be little doubt that he was deliberately and self-consciously transferring a procedure that he knew from the Gallic battlefield. Contemporaries acknowledged it. Sallust (or his imposter), explains this to the victor: all cruel empires are short-lived, and the clemency traditionally shown by our maiores to the enemy is the only guarantee of survival; Caesar must imitate them (ad Caes.i,3). The relationship between victorious Rome and its empire is the direct model for the autocrat's relationship with his subjects.

Caesar's contemporaries asked whether his clemency was a matter of natural inclination or of political calculation. Modern scholars who
continue the debate miss the point. What made those like Cicero anxious was whether the clemency would continue: natural disposition offered some sort of guarantee. But though the ancients may have been right in arguing that only a man with certain natural moral qualities was capable of carrying through the relationship of clementia, it cannot (unlike πράγματος) be accounted for in moral terms alone. The essence of Caesarian clementia is a situation and relationship: the victory of one man and his 'partes' over the tota res publica in the context of a society which knew no mechanism for party rule. Those who were crucially affected by clementia were not wrong-doers or petitioners at large (as was the case with the Hellenistic ideals) but the political classes, who, accustomed to derive their status from service to the respublica, now found that rights and honours depended upon an individual to whom as inimici they were in opposition. It is surely because there was so much more to clementia than ordinary human character that it was treated as divine, actually received cult; and perhaps too for this reason that Caesar avoiding predicating it of himself.

The best blueprints of imperial clementia are Cicero's speech pro Ligario (not so much the pro Marcello) and Ovid Tristia II, because they document the process of clementia in action. In precisely the way detected by Gellius in Cato's Rhodian oration, the defendant submissively admits guilt (error) of a personal nature in the hope that, in return for exaltation and the promise of future loyalty, his status will be restored. The work which has attracted the most modern discussion is Seneca's de Clementia. But it is essential to recognise the tendentious nature of this piece. The author combines two disparate questions, though he distinguishes them clearly enough: the emperor's handling of offences against himself, and his arbitration or jurisdiction in matters that do
not concern him personally (Clem. i, 20, 1). The whole process discussed above, the *clementia* that overlooks personal injuries in order to secure future support, ought to be irrelevant to the behaviour of the *iudex* in *cognitio*. Yet it is on this latter role that Seneca appears finally to base his ideal of *clementia*. The results of amalgamating two essentially unrelated questions are twofold. First Seneca brings the whole of imperial jurisdiction under the scope of *clementia*. The emperor can now manifest this quality in his treatment of non-political (and consequently much lower status) offenders. Secondly he can base political *clementia* on the analogy of extraordinary jurisdiction (instead of victory on the battlefield) and thus eliminate the (unStoic) element of pardon.

*Clementia* emerges from this treatise transformed. Yet there is no evidence that it had any influence, at least before the reign of Hadrian. In the numerous cases where Tacitus employs the word, he refers either to the treatment of personal 'opponents' (whether real conspirators or maestas defendants) or else to external enemies. The only occasions when *clementia* is publicly celebrated, whether on the coinage, or by dedications recorded elsewhere, concern victory in civil war, or the treatment of 'political opponents', including members of the imperial household. *Clementia* does not feature in the day-to-day imperial 'titulature' whether in the form 'clementissimus princeps' or 'tua Clementia', before the 3rd century. The reason is surely that it would only be appropriate for the beneficiaries of *clementia*; it is not a day-to-day phenomenon, nor lightly to be celebrated.

But with the reign of Hadrian, the beginning of a process of 'devaluation' of *clementia* becomes apparent. On the coinage of AD 128 it joins the virtue gallery of *Iustitia*, *Patientia* and others: the reference is almost certainly to general imperial jurisdiction, not to
a particular political offence. Later the vague Clementia Temporum is to become regular on coinage (from Gallienus); with it the epithet 'clementissimus' (from about the same period); finally the standard courtly address, tua Clementia.

Suetonius

It is perhaps in the context of this 'devaluation' that Suetonius' clementia should be seen. The heart of his discussion of clementia/ saevitia is certainly what it traditionally ought to be. The pardoning of political opponents remains vital: Julius and Augustus are models not only in granting their opponents in civil war their lives, but in allowing them to return to hold office (Jul. 75, 4; Aug. 51, 1). Attitudes to civil war in general are crucial: apart from the explicit praise of Julius' attitude, and his proclamation 'ut civibus parceretur' (75, 1-3), there is the first-hand testimony of the author's father on Otho's horror of war (10, 1) (evidently vital to his unusually favourable portrayal of this emperor) and standing in sharp contrast, Vitellius' savouring of the stench of dead Roman (10, 3). In more peaceful times, opposition manifests itself in armed rebellion, conspiracy and the more amorphous types of maiestas. Suetonius never seriously challenges the right of a ruler to defend himself against violent assault and detected conspiracy, though the ideal model for handling conspiracy is either Julius, warning the plotters off by edict (75, 5), or Titus who informs two patrician conspirators that their stars are against them (9, 1). But he is highly critical of emperors who execute the innocent or find defendants guilty on trivial grounds. Verbal opposition is certainly an insufficient ground and he approves highly of those who ignore this (here the topic of clementia overlaps with civilitas) though verbal insult
can go too far. Maiestas is regarded as a bad law, and delatores as a plague.

All this is the traditional stuff of the clementia question, and Suetonius' views are in line with those of Tacitus and all others. But he casts his net a good deal wider than this. Does he follow Seneca in including the exercise of imperial jurisdiction under the heading of clementia? Indeed he takes over, surely directly from the de clementia, Seneca's anecdote of Burrus and the signing of the death warrants, which has nothing to do with true Caesarian clementia. But this is not a matter of cognitio. Jurisdiction is a topic quite separate from clementia in the lives. It is true that Augustus wins credit in this area for lenitas (33,1): he skilfully avoids having to impose the full legal penalty for parricide, and provides a neat instance of Aristotelian ἐξείκετα at its best by finding a way to pardon those legally but not morally guilty of fraud under the lex Cornelia (33,2). But on the other hand it is no adverse reflection on Julius that he 'ius...severissime dixit' (43,1), or on Claudius that he moderated legal penalties in the direction of both duritia and lenitas insofar as this was 'ex bono et aequo' (14). In accordance with tradition, Suetonius approved of severitas in a magistrate, as in the exercise of discipline over family, troops, morals, and the plebs. But there is no sign of anecdotes specifically involving non-political jurisdiction being brought in as evidence in the clementia/saevitia sections. Augustus' exemplary handling of Aemilius Aelianus of Corduba was in the course of a cognitio, but involved precisely the issue of personal insults to himself (51,2). Among the sins of Caligula was that he inflicted humiliating, lower-class punishments on men of high rank, 'honesti ordinis'. But even if this is reminiscent of the special treatment of honestiores in non-political
jurisdiction, Suetonius makes it clear that this is not what he has in mind: some had belittled the emperor's games, others had omitted to swear by his genius (27,3).

There is, then, no explicit sign of the influence of Seneca, or of the new *Clementia* of Hadrianic coinage. And yet the scope of the section is indeed much broader than anything found in (e.g.) Tacitus. This is apparent from consideration of the social status of those affected. *Clementia* but more notably *saevitia* involves the whole social spectrum; and sometimes this point is explicitly emphasised by arranging cases in hierarchic order (esp. *Cal.26* descending from senate to *populus*, *Vit.14,1–4* from *nobiles* to *mathematici*; cf. ch. III). At one extreme the imperial family is brought under the scope of the section: the parricides and murders of their relatives by Tiberius, Caligula and Nero are all detailed immediately before and in evident connection with other cases of *saevitia*, while Vitellius' suspected matricide (14,5) and Titus' tolerance of his brother's plots (9,3) come immediately after. Indeed the imperial family might be involved in public displays of *clementia*: Tiberius allows a vote of thanks after his disposal of Agrippina (53,2). But it is not in the context of a dynastic power-struggle or of any form of political opposition that Suetonius sees these family murders. He passes directly from family to the immediate household circle of friends and dependants (*Tib.55–56; Cal.26,1; Ner.35,5*). Tiberius exiles a Greek friend for a tactless use of Doric (56); Nero his nurse's son, the prefect of Egypt, for using the imperial baths (35,5); while affecting the emperor personally, these cases were only remotely political.

At the other end of the spectrum there is much on the treatment of the humble. Naturally the senatorial class forms the focus of attention;
but unlike Tacitus, Suetonius goes out of his way to show that all orders were affected. He passes over the great cases of Augustan clementia as too well known; instead he cites the cases of two 'e plebe homines' who declared their hostility (51,1). Tacitus' account of Tiberius on Capri is missing; but he would hardly have mentioned the case of Tiberius and the lobster-fisherman, or the guardsman who lost his head for filching a peacock (60). Certainly he said nothing of Vitellius' persecution of money-lenders and astrologers (14, 2-4; contrast T. Hist. ii, 62). Though it was to the relationship between autocrat and the political classes that the ideology of clementia owed its importance and distinctive form, yet it is perhaps important to be reminded that maiestas charges affected the humblest. The games emerge as a dangerous time: to criticise the games-giver (Cal. 27, 3) or to support the opposite team too vigorously (Vit. 14, 3; Dom. 10, 1) could be a capital offence (cf. Plin. Pan. 33, 4). Unless one assumes an undercurrent of petty maiestas charges, heard by the praetor but only exceptionally reported by the historian (Tib. 58 merely selects some absurdities), it is not easy to make real sense of Tacitus' account of Tiberius, or to explain the droves of delatores summarily dealt with by Titus (8, 5) and Trajan (Plin. Pan. 34-35). Poor men had their enemies just as rich, and the maiestas charge offered a deadly handle against all.

Partly, Suetonius' wider range is motivated by the (tendentious) desire to demonstrate that a bad emperor was equally unwelcome to all his subjects. Not finding any plebeian victims documented for Nero, he confidently assigns the Great Fire to deliberate cruelty: 'sed nec populo aut moenibus patriae pepercit' (38, 1, cf. p. 71). But perhaps the most important point is that he considers clementia and saevitia essentially as a matter of character. Contemporaries debated whether Caesar's behaviour
was genuine and natural: Suetonius provides his answer by demonstrating from other contexts, that he was 'natura lenissimus' in overlooking personal injuries, before even raising the question of public clementia (73-4).

The cruelty of the inclement is documented from their earliest youth (Tib. 57,1; Cal. 11; Ner. 7,1). Evidence that the young Domitian was far from blood-thirsty (9,1) leads to elaborate explanations. There is no area in which the author more frequently speaks of the natura or ingenium, the natural disposition that lies behind the ruler's behaviour. This is why he is most lavish with information not in the great 'historical' cases but over trivia: a man's real inclinations do not necessarily emerge when he is on show in public. For this reason too saevitia goes far beyond the persecution of opponents to sheer mindless bestiality: unnecessarily aggravated punishments, like the flogging of a culprit by Caligula, protracted until the stench became too offensive (27,4), ingenuity in devising tortures (Tib. 62,2; Dom. 10,5), verbal callousness to victims (Cal. 29 & 33; Ner. 34,5 & 35,4), the mixing of punishment with pleasure and relaxation (Cal. 32; Cl. 34,2), and the open enjoyment of pain (Cl. 34,1; Vit. 14,2). Such behaviour is not motivated by the anger and desire for revenge which clementia seeks to counteract. It is the sadism of a tyrant, a Phalaris or a Verres: 'the most abominable savagery which invents new tortures, applies ingenuity to devise new instruments to vary and prolong suffering...and finally reaches the insanity of converting cruelty to enjoyment and finding pleasure in the killing of a human' (Sen. de clem.i,25,2).

Conclusions

The clementia of the ruler which the senate anxiously praised, to which they even offered sacrifice, and which Tacitus shows in operation
in the *maiestas* trials, involved a special, almost mystical, political relationship unique to the circumstances of the Roman empire. Yet the scope of Suetonius' chapters on clemency and cruelty is very much wider than this. It is possible that this is in part a reflection of a 'devaluation' of clementia in the post-Domitianic era. Delation was officially stamped out, *maiestas* charges ceased to be an issue and emperors could afford to take an oath not to execute senators. Trajan expressly asked not to be praised on this account. Yet even in such enlightened times, the best intentioned of autocrats might find that human frailty imposed a constant strain on his patience and good humour: Marcus in his *Meditations*, though avoiding the official terms for clemency, constantly imposes on himself a restraint that Cicero, Seneca or Pliny would have recognised as the clementia of a judge.

Nevertheless, the chapters in Suetonius are not about cognitiones (for him a separate issue). They concern the character of the man, down to the most trivial details, his mildness or his cruelty. This concern with personal character is of course the calling of a biographer. But the biographer was not isolated in his interest in the ruler as a person. From Plato onwards it was assumed that the degeneration so often observed in the behaviour of the autocrat should be explained at least partly in moral, not political terms; and from the start in the clementia literature it is assumed that a natural disposition towards mildness is an essential prerequisite even if arguments of political expediency will give a rational basis and further inducement. In distinguishing the merits of one Caesar from another, there was little point in discussing policies, for nearly all acknowledged the need for clementia towards their opponents. Human character is therefore the focus of attention: Suetonius' interest is not in a 'Herrscherideal', but in the use and
abuse of the power of punishment which is the common theme of all ancient depiction of autocrats whether governors like Verres or Greek tyrants like Phalaris.

3. Liberalitas - Avaritia

Relevant sections fall into two groups. i) non-moral: Jul.38-9; Aug.29 & 43; Cal.17,2-21; Cl.20-21; Ner.11-13; Vesp.8,5-9,1; Dom.4-5. ii) moralising: Jul.54; Aug.41-42; Tib.46-49; Cal.38-42; Ner.10,1 & 32; Galb.12,1 & 3; Vesp.16-19; Tit.7,3-8,1, cf.7,1; Dom.9 & 12,1-2.

The next of three great areas of public activity that Suetonius treats as a moral category is the ruler's handling of finances; though, as will emerge below, it is important to bear in mind that he does not in fact present all the relevant material in moral terms.

Liberalitas

Extended discussion of liberalitas may be spared, since the work has already been done with exemplary thoroughness in a recent monograph. Kloft has shown how under the changed circumstances of the late republic the traditional ideals of frugalitas and parsimonia were challenged and joined by the dubious newcomer liberalitas. It came to Rome if not with Greek thought, at least with Greek wealth. Hellenistic kings, and before them aristocrats like Cimon, had long realised the value of converting their riches into political support: εὐεργεσία and φιλανθρωπία expressed in financial benefactions bred εὐνομία. Caesar, among the nobles of the late republic, best exploited the political potential of what a traditionalist like Cato termed largitio; and the pattern of behaviour Caesar established was confirmed by Augustus as a fundamental feature of the principate. Only military achievements compete with financial benefactions
One of the merits of Kloft's work is to realise and exploit fully the great value of Suetonius' contribution to this question. Once leave the realms of theoretical speculation and ask how imperial liberality manifested itself, then Suetonius' 'rubric' system comes into its own. He sets out with a perspicuity met in no other source the areas in which liberalitas operated (and these Kloft draws on); public works and buildings, public entertainments in their separate forms (games, gladiatorial shows, circuses, theatrical performances, festivals, and other 'spectaculars'), distributions to the people (congiaria) and troops (donativa); public feasts; capital grants to impoverished senators; subventions in emergencies and disasters; remissions of debts and tribute; support of the arts; and private gifts to 'friends'. The only major omission here has been fully supplied by Millar; the beneficia to innumerable individuals and corporations, too multiform for categorisation, which in a sense form the continuation of hellenistic ϕιλανθρωπία. Of these too Suetonius is conscious, though he can attempt little more than a generalised depiction of the beneficiary ideal as realised in Titus.

Little of this massive detail appears, by contrast, in Tacitus. He notices what affects senators (capital grants) and the state in the old-fashioned sense (public subventions and tribute remissions); records the congiaria and donativa that pave the way to power, and the liberalitas by which Nero buys the complaisance of his amici. But the everyday run of benefactions, public works and entertainments is on the whole missing. It is therefore worth asking whether Suetonius' judgement on imperial liberality is in any way different from that of the senator. That it is, might be suggested by their divergent views of Tiberius.
Tacitus is untypically handsome in acknowledging his merits in this area ('quam virtutem diu retinuit, cum ceteras exuerat', 1,75): Suetonius cites the same cases only as exceptions from a general picture of meanness, the hard core of which is formed by the emperor's failure to build or produce spectacula. Does Suetonius attach greater value to these latter popular largitiones? A similar contrast might be detected in their portraits of Galba. Suetonius is unqualified in his disapproval for his avaritia: Tacitus has evidently some sympathy for the parsimonia of this general who refused to buy his troops, though in the end he too condemns. One may compare too the clearly expressed views of the senator Cassius Dio: his ideal is οἰκονομία βελτίστη, balancing the state budget, and though he acknowledges that certain expenditures are ἀναγκαῖα, notably donatives to the troops, and buildings and festivals in the capital (as opposed to the provinces), he is much more concerned to spare the pockets of the propertied classes who must pay for liberalities.

Yet any attempt to differentiate Suetonius from the 'senatorial' viewpoint is certainly invalid. Despite the lavish detail on building, entertainments and distributions, these are precisely the items he customarily treats separately as part of the morally neutral 'administrative' section (passages cited at head). It is a grave error to miss the implicit condemnation of Gaius' 'novum...atque inauditum genus spectaculi' (19,1) and Nero's fêting of Tiridates, related 'nonimmerito inter spectacula' (13,1) despite the fact that these come in the 'good' parts of their lives. There is no reason to suppose that he did not share Tacitus' disapproval of Nero's Graeca facilitas, and certainly none that he parted with the universal moral condemnation of public performance by members of the senatorial and equestrian orders. His
reticence need not mislead. On no occasion are the 'popular' acts of liberality included in explicit moral approval unless they go hand in hand with acts of generosity to the upper classes. Again the ideal is of the emperor who shows his good qualities to omnes ordines. It does not follow that the author speaks from the point of view of omnes ordines. He devotes more space to demonstrating that Augustus was salubris in his handling of the populus than to his generosity: he could show severitas, gravitas, constantia when popular demands became impertinent and would even have abolished free corn had not political sense forbidden (42). The same emperor's spectacula are not represented as pandering to popular demand: they provide an opportunity for the distinction of rank (44,1). But even more significant is the attention Suetonius gives to the opposite side of the coin.

Avaritia

Elementary economic sense reveals that the financial benefits of one set of men are only made possible by the losses of another. It is this reverse side that is most prominent in Suetonius (and not dealt with except cursorily by Kloft).

Confiscation of property was always the mark of a tyrant. It is justice in financial matters, as much as generosity, that Isocrates stresses. Aristotle's first recommendation to the successful tyrant is to avoid expenditure on gifts that causes grievance to those who have to work to pay for them; the ruler must appear to the good οἶκονόμος, caring for the financial welfare of the community, publishing his accounts; taxes and liturgies must only be raised (at least in appearance) on behalf of the state (1314 B 1-17). Πλαονετία was as grave a fault in the hellenistic king as μυχρολογία. It lay both in the means by which revenue
was raised (especially executions of the rich)\textsuperscript{27} and the purposes on which it was spent: even for Diogenes πλεονεκτία must be aimed at benefaction and defence, not at gratification of ἡδονή.\textsuperscript{28}

For the Romans of the republic the best opportunities for indulging avaritia lay where the money lay, in the provinces.\textsuperscript{29} To allies accustomed to the depredations of their governors, the advent of the restrained Pompey might seem like the fall of a god from the skies (Cic. Imp.Pomp.41). If there was a debate over the quality of liberalitas, the Roman had no hesitation in endorsing abstinentia. The forms avarice could take in exactions and bribes were endless (but all of them known to Verres); perhaps the most horrifying to Roman sentiment was the sale of justice. The severitas of a good judge was only possible in combination with absolute integritas (ad Q.f.i,1,20); when Cicero himself came to have experience of provincial government, he found that the consciousness of his own integrity gave him a positive sense of pleasure.\textsuperscript{30}

The emperor was in many ways analogous to a governor. Alongside his liberalitas a similar abstinentia was essential: indeed in theory to be generous at the expense of others de alieno and not de suo, was not liberalitas.\textsuperscript{31} But when we come to examine the ways in which avaritia was manifested, there is an important distinction to be drawn between emperor and governor. The provincial governor had no responsibility for the imposition of taxes and levies, whereas this is a vital part of the emperor's role. To this extent the avaritia - abstinentia of the ruler go far beyond the governor's lack or possession of integritas and innocentia, and are often closer in form to the behaviour of Greek kings and tyrants.

Just as Suetonius gives an unusually clear break-down of the forms of liberality, his itemisation of avarice reveals the sources of imperial
revenue in detail only paralleled by Pliny's *Panegyric* (certainly not met in Tacitus, though to some extent in Dio). (i) The prime source of imperial revenue was taxation. This is not to say that taxes flowed into emperor's private purse, the *fiscus*; but that just as he had responsibility for the main items of expenditure (troops, corn-supply, building etc.), equally he had the *cura* of all the *imperii reditus*. As Dio, Suetonius sees no point in distinguishing the spheres of *fiscus* and *aerarium*. The introduction of new *vectigalia* (and the revival of old ones) and the doubling of provincial tribute is the main head in the case against Vespasian's *cupiditas* (16,1). The 'vectigalia nova atque inaudita' of Caligula are listed in indignant detail; worse the fact that the emperor deliberately suppressed publication of the details of the laws (40-41). The young Nero won himself popularity by remitting *vectigalia* (10,1); quite different was the reception of the levies he imposed in the crises of rebellion (44,2). Taxes were at all times unpopular in the ancient world, one of the characteristic features of tyranny, always avoided where possible by the free state. Inevitably the *invidia* of taxation fell on the emperor, though it was accepted in principle that tax was necessary. It is highly significant for Suetonius' portrayal of Augustus that he says nothing in this context of the introduction of the *vicesima hereditatum*, the first direct property tax imposed on Roman citizens since 167 BC (except in the emergencies of civil war), and undoubtedly the source of much grievance in the last decade of his reign. Pliny was lucky to have exemptions from this tax on which to congratulate Trajan (*Pan.*37-40). Dio could not forgive Caracalla for cancelling the exemptions, raising the rate and extending the tax, with the citizenship, to the whole empire.

(ii) Collection of tax. The emperor's responsibility for taxation
extended to the means of collection. Two anecdotes in Suetonius illustrate how by his control of procurators the emperor could directly affect the burden the tax-payer bore. Nero appoints procurators with the words 'hoc agamus, ne quis quicquam habeat' (32,4), and Vespasian picks them for their rapacity, later to squeeze them like sponges (16,2). Though other sources often enough comment on procurators as agents of the private interests of the fiscus, they are too seldom documented in their public role. Yet tax-collection could lead directly to revolt.

In other ways too the emperor could make tax-collection burdensome: Domitian's harshness over the fiscus Iudaicus is documented by a first-hand anecdote (12,2).

(iii) Inheritance. The importance of private sources of revenue has been emphasised by Millar; though it should be noted that neither Suetonius nor Pliny in the Panegyric attempt to distinguish the public from the private. Inheritance was a vital feature of ancient society, and the emperor was the greatest beneficiary of this social institution. But the possibilities of abuse rapidly emerged, and Suetonius illustrates the accepted code of right and wrong behaviour in this respect. The emperor may inherit from his own friends; but ought to turn down inheritance from others. There were certain advantages in making it known that Caesar was your heir; but it was abuse to exact the property of those who had made the claim falsely. Gratitude to benefactors was normally expected in wills; impiety even made them legally void; but for the emperor to prosecute on charges of ingratitude was too much. As Pliny puts it, bad emperors give their friends gifts as bait, in order to pull out the whole fish (Pan.43,5).

(iv) Bona caduca and damnatorum. Imperial finances benefited inordinately from the operation of the criminal and marital laws (it is...
again in this context irrelevant whether *aerarium* or *fiscus* is concerned). Here we are on well documented territory, for the upper classes, particularly senators, were crucially affected. The marital laws (Iulia and Papia Poppaea) brought the state a valuable income of 'bona caduca', while the criminal laws, especially concerning *maiestas*, enriched the imperial finances through confiscation. Both sources of income, though legally valid, could be gravely abused; and in abuse the two can be hard to distinguish. Both operated by means of delation; when Suetonius joins the chorus of approval for emperors who suppressed *delatores*, he documents liberality as well as clemency. Confiscation emerges in Suetonius as one of the gravest abuses, not because it is in itself illegal, but because it leads to the condemnation and execution of (comparatively) innocent men for their money, as was true under any tyranny. Calumny was a technique practised by the corrupt governor like Verres (Cic. II Verr.2,19-119 passim); but it differed in its operation. Verres accused the innocent in order to provide an opportunity for bribery (to condemn or to acquit); the tyrant was only interested in condemnation, since this led to confiscation of property. But there was nothing wrong *per se* in *bona damnatorum* when properly acquired, not through calumny; and it is very indicative both of their scale and of the lack of liquidity in the Roman economy that the accumulation of coin from this source could be thought to cause a cash shortage, and that the good emperor lent out these monies at low interest.

(v) Collationes. It was in line with social custom for individuals and communities to make voluntary contributions to the emperor (as they did to others) either on specific occasions, e.g. *strenae* (on New Year's Day), the *aurum coronarium* (usually on accession), or as aid in emergencies (particularly after destruction by 'act of God'). Again there was a
code of right and wrong conduct for an emperor, which Suetonius illustrates: a generous emperor may (but does not have to) turn down customary collationes (Tit. 7, 3); a bad one will apply pressure in exacting both customary and unusual contributions. Caligula collected collationes to his daughter's alimony and dowry (42), Nero exacted honorific prize-money (32, 2), aid for the Great Fire (38, 2), let alone special civil war levies (44, 2). Galba was excessively scrupulous in counting the value of what he received (12, 1). But none of these Caesars equalled the demands of Caracalla that alienated Dio and his class.

(vi) Auctions. An occasional technique for raising additional revenue was the auction of palace furniture. The proceeds cannot have been very considerable; the real value of the manoeuvre, as Pliny's Panegyric suggests, was as an advertisement of the frugalitas of the emperor in contrast to the avaritia of his predecessors who had accumulated these goods (Pan. 50, 5). It was important, as Aristotle pointed out, that the ruler should seem to the public to be gathering money for purposes other than his own ἄνδρος (above). Thus, as Dio saw, the cooperation of the taxpayer can be secured (11, 29, 2f.; further below on luxuria). Suetonius, however, records only one auction (or rather series of auctions), by Caligula (38, 4–39). This emperor's potentially laudable conduct is immediately discredited by the surrounding circumstances: compulsorily inflated prices, sales to unwilling (even unconscious) buyers, commandeering transport etc.

(vii) Corruption. The sale of privileges, immunities and justice was one of the most lucrative sources of income for an unscrupulous governor. But of avaricious emperors in Suetonius only Vespasian is directly charged with such corruption (16, 2) and other relevant evidence
is hived off as evidence of wit (23,2-3). In fact such behaviour must have been exceptional: most emperors, even bad ones, were too remote and conscious of their status to indulge in the petty haggling involved, say, in the anecdote of Vespasian and the muleteer (23,2). It was among the emperor's subordinates that the real danger of corruption lay, and Suetonius documents this for both Claudius and Galba. Criticism of emperors unduly dominated by their households were for this reason real and proper. Here the relevant good quality is severitas towards the familia: Suetonius records with evident approval that Augustus broke the legs of an amanuensis who betrayed a letter for money and drowned the corrupt ministers of his son Gaius (67,2). This much at least the good emperor had in common with the good governor, gravis and constans in restraining his retinue.

(viii) Varia. Outright plundering of provincials and their temples is recorded for Julius (54); but this is on the whole the characteristic behaviour of the republican governor and commander, not of the emperor concerned with revenues; Nero is a notable exception. Business speculation appears to be an irregularity of Vespasian (16,1), though Caligula is said to have set up a palace brothel for profit (41,1). Gambling was a popular engagement with emperors but only Caligula is said to have aimed at supplementing his income thereby (41,2; cf. below).

Conclusions

In attempting to document the relative liberalitas, abstinentia, avaritia, cupiditas or rapacitas of his Caesars, Suetonius gives an unusually detailed picture of the forms of expenditure and revenue-raising that were held to be the responsibility of, and to reflect on, the emperor. It is an essential feature of his presentation that the object
of his enquiry is the man's personal character. The behaviour of the man before accession is therefore relevant, as Tiberius' meanness to his comites (46). Vespasian is damned by the testimony of the cowherd who recognises the old wolf under his new imperial sheep's clothing (16,3). Trivial anecdotes may be just as indicative of character as important public acts: Galba is said to have groaned at the sight of a lavish dinner (12,3). Caligula, the most depraved of them, behaves in the fashion of a true miser: he rolls in his heaps of gold (42). Indeed the author is well aware of the possible pressure of circumstances (Vesp.16,3; Dom.3,2); but this does not alter the fact that the question for him is ultimately one of natura.

What is so strange to modern notions is that questions of imperial fiscal policy should be handled at all in moral, not economic terms. Partly the explanation must be that Suetonius is writing biography. Yet other authors no less see the matter in moral terms: Velleius and Pliny as panegyrists, Tacitus and Dio as historians. It might be argued that moral terms were the only conceptual tools available: yet the Roman needed no abstractions to tell him that a distribution of cash won him politically valuable applause. The attraction of moral terms simply lay in their persuasive value (it was a rhetorical commonplace to praise luxury as liberality, meanness as parsimony). Since by ethical doctrine virtue excludes vice, then true liberalitas is incompatible with avaritia or rapacitas: extortion and abuse cannot be caused by liberality, but are consequent on luxury and immoral expenditure. Since liberalitas flows from character not policy, the conflicts of interest between different groups are obscured. A generous man will be so to omnes ordines; equally all suffered at the hands of an avaricious one.
Hadrian was the first emperor whose coinage celebrated LIBERALITAS AUG; simultaneously inscriptions praised him for this quality in unparalleled profusion. The contemporary biographies of Suetonius stress another side. Behind the doctrine of omnes ordines hide the anxieties of the landowning classes of the empire.

4. Luxuria - Libido

Relevant sections: 1 Jul.45,3-53; Aug.68-78; Tib.42-45; Cal.36-37; Cl.32-33; Ner.27-31; Galb.22; Vit.13, cf. 3,2; 10,2; Vesp.21; Tit.7,1-2; Dom.21-22. Only Otho lacks a comparable section, but cf. 2.

A man's private life (βίωσι), his style of living, his appetite for food, drink, sex and even sleep were among the traditional (and perfectly proper) concerns of the biographer. Suetonius stands squarely within this tradition, even in his presentation of the material topic by topic. But what did this side of an emperor's life matter to the Romans he ruled?

Hellenistic Background

In Posidonius' analysis of the Roman decline, a central role was played by τρυφή. Here was a characteristic feature of moralising Hellenistic historiography. Thanks to the inclinations of Athenaeus who dedicated a whole book (xii) to τρυφή, fulsome documentation survives. The fall of states of all varieties, tyrannies, the kingdom of the Diadochi, oligarchies and democracies was ascribed to τρυφή, and by the most authoritative Hellenistic historians, Theopompus, Ephorus, Timaeus, Duris, Phylarchus and others. According to their schema of moral decline, τρυφή led to ῥοξως and so to a fall. Thus Phylarchus described how the
Sybarites were led by their self-indulgence to arrogance and abuse of the Crotonians, until they eventually brought vengeance on their own heads. The horror of the historians for luxury, closely linked with debauchery and indolence (ἀσέλγεια, ἀσωτία, ἁθυμια) has its counterpart in the insistence on σωφροσύνη in the theoretical works on kingship: rule of others must start from rule of self.

This is not the place to discuss the reasons for this obsession with τρυφή (doubtless exaggerated by Athenaeus); but it is relevant to consider the grounds of objection to indulgence in kings. (i) One vital objection was that the idleness of the dolce vita was simply incompatible with the energy requisite in a ruler. "How may [a king] avoid turning to ἁθυμία and pleasures?" asks Aristeas' Ptolemy; "By remembering that he rules a large and populous realm and should put his mind to nothing other than the care of his people." Anecdotes stress the hard slog involved in kingship; to Antigonos Gonatas was attributed the saying that his job was no more than an ἐνδοξος δούλεια. From Homer onwards, the good king has no time for sleep, let alone for pleasure.

(ii) Secondly there is the theme that the ruler must be a model of virtue to his people. Even if the philosophical doctrine that a state necessarily forms itself on the pattern of the ἲθος of its ruler might seem excessive, there was the practical point that 'kings are quite wrong to compel others to behave decently without themselves being any more restrained than their subjects' (Isocr. Nic.38). When indulgence actually took the form of sexual abuse, there were few issues on which subjects were more sensitive and which were more likely to lead to revolution.

(iii) To these very real considerations may be added a third, more characteristically Hellenistic. There is some evidence that τρυφή was
deliberately practised by certain dynasties, particularly the Lagid, as a rational political device. To exalt it to a 'philosophie royale ptolemaique' is perhaps excessive; still, the names of Tryphon and Tryphena seem to have been official, and there can be no doubt from the records in the historians of public extravaganzas put on by the Lagids and Seleucids that they knew and exploited the political value of conspicuous expenditure. From the treatise of Heraclides Ponticus on Pleasure Athenaeus preserves a justification of regal τρυφή: tyrants and kings, like the Persians and Medes, deliberately adopt it to make themselves more μεγαλόψυχοι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς; pleasure and luxury are the mark of free men, labour that of the servile and humble. Aristoxenes Musicus pursued a similar line in the life of Archytas, adding that justice, restraint and the other virtues were only invented by law-givers to reduce members of a community to the same level (όμολογος) especially in clothing and δύναμιν. In brief, indulgence was a symbol of status; it raised the ruler above other men and gave him dignity and authority (σεμνότης). Moralists did their best at least to restrict the scope of this argument: 'Indulge in clothing and physical adornment but be tough as a king should in other aspects of behaviour', advises Isocrates (Nic.32). A third and potent ground of objection was therefore resentment against status display; but this overlaps with a broader topic and further discussion must be postponed to the chapter on civilitas (X,2).

Roman Views

The Roman campaign against luxuria and libido is too central and familiar a phenomenon to need any embroidery here. Embedded in the censorial tradition, it became a political issue at least from the
elder Cato onwards and gave rise to sumptuary legislation. If Posidonius (and his predecessors) preached the hellenistic doctrines of τρυφί to the Romans, these were only too eager to listen. That luxuria and avaritia were the two pestes that ruined empires was a leitmotif of the historiographical tradition from the elder Cato on. Moral legislation (though of a new variety) was to be a central, if rotten plank in the Augustan reformation. Nor was any topic so congenial to political invective as the immodesties and debaucheries of the opponent, a Piso, an Antony or an Octavian.

Here it is only necessary to pick out some of the factors which made self-indulgence by an emperor particularly offensive to Roman eyes. (i) The Roman needed no persuading of the disadvantages of ραξυρία. Cato boasted how he spent a harsh and industrious youth among the flints of the Sabine fields (ORF fr.128). Few words had such resonance in the vocabulary of praise as strenuus, navus, industrius and few defects were held so alien to virtus as inertia, ignavia, socordia, even otium. So far was this the case that it was almost superfluous for a Roman to make a special demand for industry in an emperor (contrast the lengths to which the Greek Dio goes in his advocacy of κόνως). Vitellius' torpor, somnus and ignavia in contrast to his boasted industria simply made him contemptible. But there is no mistaking that energy was a prime requirement in an emperor: the vigilant Trajan set the pace for future princes, to shake off their inertia, delights and sweet slumber. Even the conscientious Marcus warned himself against the temptations of the pillow. But the most vivid illustration of the pressures of office is the fact that his teacher Fronto had to write to him at length and with eloquence to urge him to take a holiday and at least catch some sleep; reminding him of the old proverb that a bow must be unstrung; and
yet only receiving the reply that affairs were δυσκαράτητα and the call to duty a res imperiosa. Suetonius' notes on imperial sleeping-habits are no idle gossip.

(ii) Luxury is by its nature an expensive business. The farmer's ideal of preserving his patrimony by parsimonia was deeply rooted in the Roman ethic, and with it the corresponding disapproval of the heir who squandered his fortune in nepotatus, parallel to, but exceeding Greek disapproval of ὀσωτία. But in the case of an emperor the disapproval was made doubly urgent by the fact that it was the pocket of the citizen which in the end had to bear the cost. Suetonius links fiscal extortion directly with overspending on private indulgence. Not merely in theory did the private frugalitas make possible the balancing of the public accounts (Plin. Pan. 41,1); on several occasions sales of palace furniture and perquisites were held to aid in financial crises. An anonymous emperor boasts that it is only his private κοσμισμός, σωφροσύνη and ἐγκράτεια that has enabled him to make a partial remission of the aurum coronarium. Luxury spending might put a real strain on the imperial budget, even if Seneca's figure of 100 million HS, the tribute of three provinces, is a gross exaggeration for the cost of a single dinner of Gaius (ad Helv. 10,4). But perhaps more significant than the actual cost is the fact that Romans like Seneca were prepared to believe that provincial revenues could be squandered in this way. Frugalitas principis served an important purpose in reassuring the tax-payer that his monies were indeed going towards useful and necessary ends (Dio lii,29,2f., above).

(iii) This question of public image is not to be underestimated. From the republic the Romans acknowledged that the prominent public figure was bathed in limelight, so that even in trivial and private affairs a standard of conduct was expected that the humble could escape; the emperor
all the more was pinioned to his pinnacle, *fastigio adfixus.* More than that, he had a moral duty to his social inferiors. The Greek topic of the ruler as a *παράδειγμα* to his subjects fitted in with censorial sentiment. Cicero included among his rules for the conduct of magistrates, 'ceteris specimen esto'; in illustration he cited Lucullus who, when defending his luxury on the grounds that two equestrian neighbours lived on a grander scale than he, meets the rebuff that unless he sets an example, the others will never learn. From the very first, the topic that the emperor must rule by example as much as command is sharpened by his possession of censorial duties (if not powers). For Ovid, Augustus' (largely moral) legislation is linked with his personal conduct:

\[ \text{legesque feret iustissimus auctor} \]
\[ \text{exemploque suo mores reget} \]  

(Met. xv, 833f.)

Later, Tacitus was to ascribe the improvement in morals perceptible from the reign of Vespasian to the behaviour of that emperor himself, over and above other factors: emulation of fashion was more effective than the fear of the law (Ann. 3, 55). Suetonius too comments sharply on the private behaviour of Tiberius during his *correctio morum*, and a similar contrast is surely intended elsewhere.

(iv) The one factor that appears to be missing from the Roman debate on *luxuria* is that which gave hellenistic τρυφή its actuality. There seems to be no suggestion in Latin sources that indulgence could raise the status or was objectionable because it did. It is not that the Romans lacked the notion of *σειμάτισι* but *dignitas* was to be acquired by public service, not by display in *εσθής* and διαλύτα. *Luxuria* was incompatible with *dignitas* to a degree never true in Greek culture. *Indulgentia* was a sign of *levitas* rather than of status. The *maiestas*
of famous men acted as a sort of censorship in itself. Thus when Roman emperors commit extravagances analogous to, if not directly inspired by, the glitter and τραυμή of Hellenistic monarchs (e.g. Caligula's extravagant engineering and Nero's Domus Aurea) these are condemned by Suetonius as acts of private indulgence, luxuria, and not as departures from civilitas into superbia.

Suetonius

This evidence for the background has been assembled to show that Suetonius' readers would not have dismissed his details on the private life as irrelevant to serious discussion of an emperor. Yet the author himself omits for the most part to make explicit moral judgement on the items he adduces. From this it has been, and still is inferred, that he wrote with no other aim than to titillate, assembling gossip for gossip's sake. But it is precisely the absence of comment that guarantees the author's sincerity. It is only by the tacit (but surely inescapable) assumption that his Roman reader would feel shock or otherwise at each item he related that his presentation could achieve its effect. The implicit moral judgements are, and must be, wholly traditional.

The glutton and drunkard (helluo, ganeo, popino, ebriosus etc.) were traditionally objects of reprobation. Julius and Augustus are noted for their restraint in food and drink, Domitian is at least free from blame; Vitellius is a glutton, encouraging the revolting practice of vomiting; and Tiberius not merely drank to excess, but distributed public office to his drinking companions. Feasts meet approval when conducted with decorum, with socially acceptable guests, limited costs, and civilised conversation and entertainment (Augustus and Titus); not when protracted from midday to midnight, in orgiastic surroundings and at excessive cost.
(Caligula, Nero, Vitellius), the last a matter traditionally controlled by sumptuary legislation. The scale of housing, furniture, clothing and the familia of slaves were matters for censorial concern: the simplicity of Augustus contrasts with the extravagance of Julius, Caligula and Nero.

Sexual mores also affected public opinion. Pederasty and adultery with the sons and wives of Roman citizens were forbidden by law, but perhaps more significant was the infamia involved in the abandonment of the old standards of pudicitia. A Roman aristocrat should not indulge in untraditional practices like fellatio; still less should he acquire a reputation for his outrageous tastes. Nobody minded a certain amount of extra-marital play, provided that it was kept within limits and involved low-status partners: Augustus' penchant for virgins is a colourful detail, but presumably not outrageous. But the attempt (by Nero) to take a relationship with a freedwoman to the point of marriage flaunted public decency and the Augustan legislation. Incest with family and Vestal Virgins was not only illegal but against religious taboo.

There were other routes to infamia. Dicing (alea) was forbidden by law, but connivance was possible when it was simply played on occasion as a game, with low stakes. Public appearance on the stage was certainly scandalous: the histrio was classed with the pimp in legislation affecting status, and the extraordinary fashion among the aristocracy for repairing their fortunes at the cost of their reputations through public performance was countered by a series of new laws.
Conclusion

Suetonius as other Romans had no hesitation in condemning imperial luxuria and libido. Partly he will have thought of the waste of time and money; partly of the need of the ruler to act as a model for his people. But in the last analysis his standpoint is based on the unquestioned assumptions of social convention. Luxury and lust offended because they ran counter to what was Roman; in the end perhaps the most disturbing thing was that a Roman emperor should not behave as was decent and proper for any Roman gentleman.
Chapter X

Civilitas

One major moral category remains to be discussed: that which deals with the pattern of behaviour ranging from civilitas (or similar expressions) to superbia or arrogantia. In Suetonius' estimation of an emperor this category is at least as important as those of clementia and liberalitas; yet in the modern literature while the latter are endlessly discussed, civilitas is almost totally neglected.¹ This is not fortuitous; the explanation lies in the nature of the sources involved. Clementia and liberalitas are terms that appear in a wide range of sources, literary, epigraphic and numismatic; they are in some sense 'official virtues', part of the self-image propagated by the imperial machine. Imperial civilitas is celebrated in no inscription,² advertised on no coin.³ The occurrence of the word and its cognates is substantially limited to the historians, together with two rather special panegyrics (those of Trajan and Julian).⁴ If the purpose of coin types and certain inscriptions is to promote the 'charismatic' image of the emperor, it is no surprise that civilitas had no appeal; for its essence lies in the self-denial of 'charisma', the voluntary condescension of the autocrat to the level of the citizen. Discussion of 'imperial virtues' has hitherto focused on the 'official'. I have tried in the preceding chapters to suggest that there is another side. To redress the balance further and to come to a better understanding of a concept that is of some interest in itself, and of some importance for Suetonius, I shall examine the evidence in considerably greater depth than the 'virtues' of the previous chapter.
1. The Imperial Ideal

i) Suetonius.

The noun *civilitas* only occurs twice in the *Caesars*. In Aug.51 it ushers in the section: 'clementiae civilitatisque eius multa et magna documenta sunt'. Of what follows the first chapter should strictly be taken as evidence of *clementia*, though here the concepts merge: Augustus pardoned political opponents and was lenient to those who expressed enmity for him. The rest (52-56) is *civilitas*. Honores are refused, temples, silver statues, and the dictatorship (52); adulation, the title of *dominus*, is repressed (53,1); ceremony is restricted in public appearances and *salutationes* (53,2); social relations with senators are courteous (53,3); he tolerates free speech (though not in excess) notably in the senate (54-55), also outside it (56,1); and finally he arrogates to himself no special privileges in his behaviour at elections, in the courts, purchasing land, forwarding his sons' careers or protecting the interests of his friends (56,1-6).

The second occurrence of the noun is Claud.35,1 in a cross-reference, 'quanquam ut diximus iactator civilitatis'. The passage in question is 12,1-2: that he is 'in semet augendo parcus atque civilis' is evidenced by refusal of *nomina* and *honores*, lack of fuss over family festivities, respect for the senate's powers ('neminem exulum...a consulibus petit') and courtesy towards its officers ('cognitionibus...nisi stantes'). What gives the lie to this *civilitas* is behaviour on social occasions: his bodyguard is in evidence at dinner-parties, sick-bed visits, and at *salutationes* (35,1-2 '...adimerentur').

In other cases the adjective rather than the noun introduces the section. Tiberius starts his reign 'civilem admodum...ac paulo minus quam privatum' (26-32). In illustration we find *honores* refused (temples,
statues, nomina, magistracies, 26), avoidance of adulation (including the title dominus: 27); patience in the face of libel, illustrated by a remark that is percivilis (28), extreme politeness on his own part (the senate addressed as dominos, 29); respect for the powers and dignity of senate (30-31,1) and its magistrates (31,2-32,1); and no less respect for lesser men (32,2).

Vespasian is 'civilis et clemens' from beginning to end (12-15). The first chapter (12) shows him civilis, humble about his origins, without appetite for honours, whether triumphs, magistracies or titles, and at his salutationes reversing the incivil innovation of Claudius. The next (13) shows him tolerant of free speech.

Two further emperors exhibit civilitas without explicit mention of the quality. Ner.10 details an initial show of liberalitas, clementia and comitas: the behaviour given in evidence of the last - salutatio without prompting, respectful address of the senate, and admission of the plebs at public performances (10,2) - recognisably belongs to this category. Augustus' comitas toward the plebs (53,2) had been part of his civil behaviour: so too we must regard the comitas of Titus at games (8,2), answering the implicit criticism of his behaviour as praetorian prefect, 'incivilius et violentius' (6,1).

The category is not only used to document possession of the quality but also the lack of it. Domitian is explicitly 'minime civilis animi' (12,3). Over-confident even before accession (12,3), he speaks of himself as giving away imperium and possessing a pulvinar; in public appearances he is happy to be flattered, yet rudely turns down a popular request (13,1); he describes himself as 'dominus et deus'; and takes excessive honours, statues, triumphal honours, magistracies, month names (13,2-3).
This attitude is described as arrogantia (Dom.13,2), and the same vice is predicated of Julius (76-79). Despite his moderatio and clementia (75,1) the last item of which is his tolerance of libel 'civili animo' (75,5), his behaviour is far from civil. The themes are close to those met above, though also traditional to the narrative leading to the Ides of March (cf. Plut. Caes.lx-lxii). Of excessive honores, magistracies, nomina, statues are put in the shade by those that go beyond humano fastigio - the apparatus of cult (76,1); he distributed honores to others without regard for constitutional form (76,2-3), including a neglect for consular comitia; made arrogant remarks (77), treated the senate and magistrates with disrespect (78); and aroused acute suspicions 'affectati... regii nominis' (79).

In the case of Caligula the same phenomenon is described as superbia: excessive titles and even kingship (22,1) are below his fastigium and he turns himself into a god with the full apparatus of cult (22,2-4). In the following chapters (23-26) his treatment of family, friends, senate and others shows simultaneous superbia and saevitia (the latter the opposite of clementia); superbia manifests itself in his shame at the ignobilitas of an ancestor (23,1), in irreverent treatment of senate and magistrates (26,2-3), and in contempt for the people at games (26,4-5).

Civilitas or its opposite thus appears as a species in nine lives, all but the three short-lived Caesars of 69 A.D. It is also found outside its species. In the two short lives of Germanicus and Drusus it is only a matter of scale that makes its occurrence less than a full-fledged category. Germanicus (Cal.3) is notable for 'benevolentiam singularem conciliandaeque hominum gratiae...studium'. This statement is expanded later: 'domi forisque civilis' he does without lictors, honours the famous dead, makes a personal show of piety over the clades Variana; and treats
his inimici with lenitas. Drusus (Claud.1-4), reputedly 'non minus gloriosi quam civilis animi' demonstrates the latter quality by a declared intention to restore the republic.

Twice further evidence of an emperor's civilitas is found outside the species. Tiberius anticipates his reign by his way of life on Rhodes, civile admodum, dispensing with lictors and exchanging officia with the locals. He is polite to the humble, and abstains from exercise of his tribunicia potestas (Tib.11,1-3). Caligula is no less incivil in his dress than in other respects: 'vestitu...neque patrio neque civili ac ne virili quidem ac denique humano semper usus est' (52).

What Suetonius means by civilis gains further light from two more passages. An anecdote about Vespasian (9,2) quotes his verdict on a quarrel between a senator and an eques: the latter should not insult senators, but 'remaledici civile fasque esse'. Secondly the life of Messala Corvinus in the de viris illustribus (Roth p.290; fr.61 Reiff.) gives his grounds for resigning the praefectura urbis as 'incivilem potestatem esse'.

It is evident that the same themes recur from life to life under the category of civilitas: the scope and emphasis of the concept may be clarified by gathering together the most important themes.

The refusal of honores is of primary importance. One who is civil avoids magistracies too powerful or too long, or delays acceptance. Of a piece with this is to abstain from exercising potestas, as Tiberius on Rhodes, and from the trappings of power. There seems no distinction in kind between magistracies and the purely honorific: titles, nomina, statues and so on. The difference between these and honours appropriate to the gods is merely one of degree; the latter include honorific months, temples, and the remaining apparatus of cult. Kingship too may be...
regarded as an honor that ought to be refused. Flattery, no less than official decrees, generates titles that should be resisted, notably that of dominus.

While refusal of honours is a negative virtue, respect for the senate is a positive one, and central to the idea of civilitas. Not only does the good ruler defer to the authority of the senate collectively and to its magistrates individually, allow free speech and control his own tongue, but he accords the respect demanded by their dignitas, greeting by name, rising to his feet, and even exchanging social civilities (officia) to the point of visiting the sick and attending funerals.

The emphasis on the senate might give rise to the assumption that civilitas is in essence a sort of republicanism, a demand on the princeps by the old establishment to behave as if the principate did not exist. Indeed, we have seen that Drusus' desire to restore the res publica is described as civilis. Yet this misses the heart of the concept. It is not, in Suetonius' representation, just the senate who object to arrogant behaviour, but omnes ordines, not only cives down to the plebs, even provincials. As remarkable as Tiberius' exchange of officia with senators is the same behaviour in Rhodes 'cum Graeculis' whom he treats 'prope ex aequo' (11,1); after an administrative blunder he is apologetic 'tenuissimo cuique et ignoto' (11,2); he is no less fair to provincials in his reign (32,2). Again, it is not just senators whom the young Nero greets memoriter, but omnes ordines (10,2). Two occasions in particular stand out at which the treatment of the plebs matters: at games - contrast Titus' willingness to grant popular requests with Domitian's abrupt command for silence - and at the ceremony of salutatio; admissio of the plebs to the latter is a sign of comitas just as is Nero's admissio of the plebs to his campestres exercitationes, and Titus' to his baths.
It is tempting to view civilitas as a specious quality, as being in some way a pretence: though his power is monarchic, the ruler must not be called rex, not even imperator; though more important than the consuls, he must put on an act of being their inferior (Tib.31,2, 'et assurgere et decedere via'). But while it may be true that some put it on as a show - so Tiberius (57,1, 'moderationis simulatione'), Claudius (35,1, 'iactator civilitatis') and surely the young Nero\textsuperscript{22} - the quality itself is real enough. The fundamental attitude may perhaps be summed up as follows.

The supremacy of the princeps stands beyond question. Yet his fastigium (cf. Jul.76,1 and Cal.22,2) has its limit: he is not a god. The natural flood of honours that fear and flattery produce may cast him as one: yet unless he resists the result is invidia (cf. Jul.78). The relationship of senator and eques in the Vespasian anecdote is comparable (Vesp.9): the senator has his dignitas and ought not be maligned, but the eques too has his and is entitled to answer back - 'civile fasque esse'. The dignitas of the princeps is beyond question; yet others too have theirs and the princeps must go out of his way (because of the very greatness of his power) to treat others with their due of dignitas, as fellow citizens (cives) even as fellow humans (cf. Tib.29 for the notion of humanitas). The senate and its members deserve most respect, in proportion to their imperium and dignitas; but it is no less important that he should treat all men with comitas, down to the very humblest, 'tenuissimo cuique et ignoto'.

Civilitas is closely linked in Suetonius with clementia, and it is necessary to take note of a term that hovers between the two, moderatio. In Tib.32,2 it is used as a synonym for civilitas: 'parem moderationem minoribus quoque...exhibuit'; but later in the life (57,1) it stands in
contrast to the saevitia evident 'etiam inter initia cum adhuc favorem hominum moderationis simulatione captaret', and consequently must also include the notion of clementia. In Jul.75 it is linked with clementia, and stands in contrast to the arrogantia that follows (76ff.). Yet it must include an element of civilitas, in that it covers Julius' tolerance of libel 'civili animo'. Elsewhere it is twice linked with abstinentia: of Otho's provincial administration (3,2), and, in the last words of the work, of the behaviour of Domitian's successors. In both of these it may be presumed to cover civilitas and clementia.23

In these chapters on the possession or lack of civilitas, Suetonius builds up a precise picture of the expected pattern of imperial behaviour. It may seem a strange mixture. In his way, he mixes what is of central importance (treatment of the senate, refusal of honours etc.) with what seems trivial (visiting the sick or bathing in public). Is this category a concoction of his own? Was civilitas an important ideal before or after him? If so, to whom? Is it an old republican ideal? Do Greek writers think in comparable terms? Were Greek rulers expected to behave in anything like the same way? Only when these questions have been answered can we begin to judge the value of Suetonius' chapters.

ii) civilis: lexical development.

One may conveniently start by examining the lexical history of the key term, though what is involved is not a word by the pattern of behaviour it describes. Between Cicero and Suetonius lie two substantial developments in the usage of the term which are of importance for the history of the concept.24 The adjective civilis is formed from the root civis with a basic meaning (and one that must have been always felt by the Roman using it) of 'pertaining to' or 'involving' or 'appropriate to' cives Romani
(thus 'civil war', 'civil law' etc.). In Suetonius civilis appears in a moral sense on a par with clemens or liberalis: one who behaves as a citizen morally should (cf. liberalis, one who behaves as a free man - liber - should). Correspondingly an abstract noun comprehends the 'virtue': civilitas. This noun is only found in one surviving author before Suetonius. Quintilian uses it to translate the Greek idea that ἐντορωμή is an aspect of πολιτική: 'rhetoricen...civilitatis particular simulacrum'. The sense is wholly different, and the context (translation of a foreign language) suggests that Quintilian is innovating linguistically. Neither Tacitus nor Pliny use the noun (though, as will be seen, they had ample opportunity) and the chances are that Suetonius has coined civilitas as the name of an imperial virtue.

Corroboration is provided by usage of the adjective. Together with his unusual noun, Quintilian speaks of his ideal orator as a 'vir civilis', translating what Plato τοντωμήν vocat'. Suetonius rather differently speaks of his ideal emperor as 'civilis'. But before him civilis is not generally applied to persons. An individual's behaviour may be civile, his speech civilis, he may act civiliter, he may display civile ingenium or civilis animus, but no author before Suetonius says absolutely of an emperor that he is, or is not, civilis. The closest approach is in the Panegyric where Plotina is called 'civilis incessu' (83,7); even this is tantamount to saying 'civili incessu', a form avoided perhaps on account of hiatus. Certainly Suetonius is the first to make regular use of the word to denote a moral characteristic. Noun and adjective change together when civilitas becomes a virtue.

Authors earlier than Suetonius expect emperors to behave 'civilly', and it will be argued that the pattern of behaviour he recommends is derived from predecessors. He is not offering civilitas as a new idea. Rather,
it is forced on him by his approach, categorising emperors under moral headings. It represents the culmination of the gradual emergence of a new ideal that goes back to the transition from republic to empire. The first, and most vital, development, is that *civilis* should come to have moral connotations at all. It is fairly clear that the usage is not republican. The earliest attestations appear to be in Sallust (or pseudo-Sallust). Caesar is advised by the author of the admonitory epistle to use his victory *civiliter* (*ad Caes.i,3,1*), i.e. as a citizen among citizens should. More strikingly in the *Jugurtha* Marius contrasts his method of command with that of the nobiles "homines superbissimi": he sets the troops an example of endurance, "hoc est utile, hoc civile imperium"; to live, as the nobiles, softly and command by punishment, "id est dominum non imperatorem esse" (*BJ* 85,35). *Civilis* here implies a standard of conduct suitable to the *imperator* who commands citizens not slaves, and as in Suetonius, is set against arrogance.

This passage might suggest an old republican ideal. One can by no means be confident that earlier annalists did not use *civilis* thus. But attestations are not forthcoming; the context of both passages above looks forward to the empire (the correct conduct of the victor and of the imperator); and the practice of Cicero is a strong indication that the moral usage is not republican. *Civilis* is frequent in his works, but not in this, moral, sense. Two passages are cited by the *TLL*. In one he is explicitly translating: he speaks of an element in human nature, 'quiddam ingenitum quasi civile atque populare quod Graeci Πολιτικον vocant'. This smacks strongly of linguistic innovation. In the second he lays down a principle which comes much more close to later usage: 'nihil tam contrarium iuri ac legibus, nihil minus civile et humanum quam in composita et constituta re publica quicquam agi per vim'. The idea that certain
standards of behaviour can be expected of a member of society is there, though the type of society is different.

Both passages belong in the context of a whole series in which Cicero speaks of the state as a societas (or communitas) civilis, existing for the mutual benefit (utilitas) of its members, and held together by the bond of law. The expression is interchangable with societas civium; to this extent the use of civilis is descriptive (a society consisting of citizens) rather than prescriptive (a society that ought to be of a certain type). But the word derives moral connotations from its context. In the Republic (i,48-9) he represents the democratic argument that the excessive wealth of one or the few leads to superbia and the subjection of the people; but the resulting monarchy or oligarchy is unstable (and therefore bad): given that law is the 'civilis societatis vinculum', what can hold together the societas civium unless the equality (par condicio) of citizens, in rights if not in property? The argument thus associates civilis with democratic legality and opposes it to superbia.

It is when a monarch is in question that we come closest to the imperial ideal. Tarquin's superbia and injustice make him a tyrant, a beast not a man (rep.ii,48); how can one be called human, 'qui sibi cum suis civibus, qui denique cum omni hominum genere nullam iuris communionem, nullam humanitatis societatem velit'? That is to say, in imperial terms, that Tarquin was neither civilis ('cum suis civibus') nor humanus ('cum omni hominum genere'). The opposite ideal is the basileús, 'bonus et sapiens et peritus utilitatis dignitatisque civilis, quasi tutor et procurator rei publicae'. Again civium might be substituted for civilis, and it is significant that Cicero does not, as Suetonius would, characterise the sovereign himself as civil; but the introduction of the word in such
a context prepares the ground for its later development.

The idea that a member of a society of citizens (and therefore, in a sense, of equals) ought to behave in a certain fashion is, paradoxically, an unrepulican one. The behaviour of the republican citizen was controlled by ius and leges. It is only when the structure of the societas civium is threatened by something alien, the uncontrollable power of the autocrat, that moral standards needed to be laid down. It will be suggested below that in practice the behaviour expected of the civil emperor was not truly 'republican'; it is suggested here that the use of the word civilis is not republican either.

iii) The Republican Background.

If civilis played no part in the political vocabulary of the republic, it will occasion little surprise. Civilitas involves a lowering of status. The republican noble, by contrast, set great store by his dignitas, even had a duty to uphold it; decorum demands that the magistrate as representative of the state should sustain his 'dignitatem et decus', while the private citizen should live 'aequo et pari cum civibus iure', without being either too submissive or self-assertive. Still, there were already factors which pulled in the opposite direction, and it is worth glancing at some of the aspects of behaviour later described as civilis, both to suggest roots and to point the contrast.

a) The refusal of honours.

As honores the Romans classed indifferently both magistracies and purely decorative honours. Under the empire the assumption is that honores of both sorts were offered unsolicited to the princeps (whether or not he in fact prompted them) and that the responsibility then lay with him to accept or refuse. Refusal is a virtue, call it civilitas, moderatio,
modestia, temperantia. The syndrome spreads down from princeps to lesser mortals: so, to Pliny's indignation, Pallas makes a show of 'moderantem...honores suos' (ep.viii,6,11). Was it conceivable in republican days to gain credit by recusatio?

Livy writes as if it was: Scipio and Fabius are credited with moderatio (see below); likewise the abdication of office is praised as modestia. But as will be seen, not only are the facts dubious, but the interpretations put upon them liable to be anachronistic. Was it not Augustus who by two magnificent gestures discovered the ploy of recusatio? The pattern of normal republican life leaves no room for refusal: honours are fought for tooth and nail, and do not fall into the lap of the unwilling. "What?" asks Cicero of Cato, "Should you beg me or should I beg you in order for you to undertake trouble and danger for my safety's sake?" Indeed by the rules of philosophy the electorate should invite the candidate; but this simply does not square with the facts of political life.

Illuminating is a passage of Cicero's invective against Piso (56ff.). Piso has claimed never to have been 'cupidus triumphi'. Indeed nobody wishes to be thought guilty of cupiditas, Cicero counters. But it consists in chasing empty glory. To turn down the 'honorem dignitatemque' of a just triumph, even if command has been pressed on one unsolicited 'aut etiam recusantem' is mean-spirited. Piso is then sarcastically depicted as a vir moderatus addressing his son-in-law Caesar a philosophical sermon against the vainglorious desire of supplications and triumphs.

Cicero dismisses Piso's pose as an Epicurean (and thus unRoman) attack on φιλοδοξία or φιλοτιμία. A decade later, now under Caesar's domination, he depicts the Epicurean wise man as repudiating 'honores...etiam ultro delatos': the acceptance of ignobilitas and humilitas that
this involves will hardly appeal to a Roman. If the refutation of Piso is also philosophically inspired, it is by doctrines more sympathetic to Roman life; the same line is attributed by Tacitus to those who decried Tiberius' moderatio.

To this extent, Cicero's dismissive attitude confirms that refusal of honours lay outside the republican spirit. Yet by implication he reveals that commands or honours might be pressed on the unwilling, and that credit might be sought by recalcitrance. Further, he betrays to what sort of man this might apply. With Piso the show is absurd; it is Caesar who has achieved enough to be moderatus about. In the Tusculans he backs the argument that glory may bring not pleasure but molestia by citing the Ephesians' jealous expulsion of their princeps Hermodorus; the maxim 'nemo de nobis unus excellat' holds of all peoples; they hate all 'exsuperantia virtutis'. It was the great marshals of the late republic who threatened the parity of the senatorial oligarchy and created the demand for moderatio.

Dio saw that Augustus had republican precedents for renouncing ὀναστεῖα to win credit. Sulla's abdication of the dictatorship, and with it the refusal of a preferred consulship, was of course genuine. More significantly, Pompey kept up a facade of being forced unwillingly into special commands; though, as Caelius pointed out, he had not the ability to bring it off convincingly.

In neither case do we find the turning down of honours which affect dignitas not power, the characteristic of imperial recusatio. Cicero himself provides a concrete instance here in his repeated refusal of divine honours in Asia and Cilicia. No dynast himself, yet his motivation is significant. Above all he wishes to avoid jealousy in Rome, and indeed wins great praise and admiration thereby. Naturally the epigraphic
records of provincial cult give no idea of whether others too used Cicero's ploy. But it might be fair to suggest that under normal circumstances Rome knew little and cared less about honours decreed for its provincial governors.

It is those to whom most is given of whom most is expected. No Roman before was so honoured as the victorious Caesar; no doubt contemporaries thought him immoderate, and Augustus' tact represented a conscious reaction. But this tends to obscure the fact that Caesar played at *recusatio*, and to an extent not attested of anyone before him. Dio, our fullest source, reiterates that in some cases (but not enough) honours voted were not accepted or not taken up. He assumes from an imperial standpoint that acceptance was automatically a matter of consideration for the honorand and that certain honours were known to be offensive; he therefore omits to specify which honours were turned down. A couple of items can be recovered. Caesar turned down a ten-year consulship and the right to appoint all magistrates and provincial governors. In the same spirit he resigned the consulship, the first man, according to Dio, voluntarily to do so. The mechanics of voting did not always present opportunity for refusal: honours after Pharsalus and Munda were voted in the victor's absence, and even when in Rome, he took care not to attend honorific votes in the senate. So he was apparently unaware of the statue of himself astride the globe inscribed 'Ἡλίας' (though Dio counts it among honours he did not turn down) and on discovery he had the inscription erased. A delegation might be necessary to inform the honorand; this was the purpose of the senatorial procession on a famous occasion, and though the dictator gave offence by lack of *reverentia*, it was then that he refused the decennial consulship. According to Plutarch, he even gave offence by the curt reprimand, his honours needed subtraction not addition.
honours, without being specifically repudiated, might never be put into effect; an important instance is the failure to use the voted senatorial and equestrian bodyguard after dismissing his military one.  

Above all his gran rifiuto, if any, was that of the nomen regium. A well-known series of incidents in which he resists growing pressure to call him rex leads up to the carefully staged recusatio of the Lupercalia; which by his entry in the Fasti Caesar represents as a formal offer of the people formally refused. The deposition of the tribunes Marullus and Caesetius appears to let down the pose of reluctance; yet according to Suetonius his charge was 'ereptam sibi gloriam recusandi'. If Cicero won admiration in Rome and escaped the resentment of his peers by disallowing his cult in Asia, Caesar could hope for no less. The man who had overthrown the state to vindicate his own dignitas had now his fill of gloria; he had never, he claimed, sought extraordinary honour and would have been content with the consulship due him. But in a society imbued with the idea that dignitas should be commensurate with achievement, it was hard to convince people that with the power of a king was not desired the status of a king.

The impact of Caesar's domination is evident in the de Officiis, even though the work depends philosophically on Panaetius and earlier thinkers. Earlier Cicero had drawn on the Aristotelian μεγαλόφυξος to confute Piso's contempt of glory. Now gloriae cupiditas is seen as the prime danger attendant on magnuminitas. Desire for principatus is the first step towards iniuria. The great should not seek commands; rather 'aut non accipienda interdum aut deponenda non nunquam'. The struggle for honours is, in Plato's simile, like sailors squabbling for the tiller. The good citizen, gravis and dignus principatu to whom the care and tutela of the state is committed should do anything but struggle for his own potentia.
b) comitas and facilitas.

The dignitas of the Roman noble demanded a certain comportment, that of gravitas and severitas.\(^74\) In this Romans were conscious of a contrast with the Greeks. Gravitas did not permit a Roman to dance; the Greeks had other conventions and Nepos is much embarrassed that his hero Epaminondas danced.\(^75\) But education brought the Romans humanitas, and they rapidly saw the advantages of an alien tradition. Humans are, Cicero argues in the Laws (i,32), remarkably similar, and all love comitas and hate the superbi. He urges Cato, that paragon of old Roman virtues, to season his gravitas and severitas with comitas and facilitas.\(^76\) The contrast between these pairs of virtues and the need to blend them is a cliché in republican writers.\(^77\) The circumstances that invited the latter pair are illuminating for civility.

**Amicitia**

Comitas wins friends. Tristitia and severitas are admirably grave, but friendship is more relaxed, more inclined 'ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque'.\(^78\) Comitas often draws near to obsequium, though it is firmly distinguished from flattery.\(^79\) Potentially therefore it is the demeaning behaviour of lesser to greater; but as such behaviour is unremarkable, in practice, at least by Cicero's time, it is almost exclusively applied to the socially superior winning support from his inferior.\(^80\) It is precisely this downwards flow that characterises civilitas. In the sphere of friendship comitas manifests itself in hospitality and social intercourse, or merely conversation.\(^81\)

**Petitio**

It is with a crowd that conciliatory behaviour comes into its own. It is hard to say how effective are 'comitas adfabilitasque sermonis' in winning hearts (off.ii,48). Cicero goes on to cite the recommendations
of Hellenistic rulers to win over the multitude and soldiery by flattering address. The Roman employed the same technique as candidate for office. An inversion of roles took place under these circumstances and the patron adopted the humiliating behaviour of a client towards the populus. Indeed the Commentariolum Petitionis urges Cicero to go beyond his natural comitas and indulge in blanditia. Two aspects are particularly relevant, salutatio and supplicatio.

Salutatio takes two forms. The morning reception was normally more a matter of duty paid by client to patron. But the candidate won credit by making himself more available, facilis; advisable to rise before dawn to gratify callers. Secondly, the candidate typically greets by name, comiter appellare, preferably without the prompting of a nomenclator, those he meets in public. It may not come up to Gate's ideals of dignitas, but usage justifies it. Both these practices are cultivated by the civil emperor.

Supplicatio, adopting the attitude of a suppliant towards the people, was the extreme form of abandonment of dignity. The noble might find it irksome to supplicate the electorate 'nimis submisse', to throw himself on his knee 'fracto animo atque humili'; but it came to a choice between gravitas and office. That emperors who stood in no doubt of election should supplicate more solemnly shows a respect for the populus all the more remarkable.

The provincial governor

The techniques he had used as a candidate, Cicero also exploited as a governor; accessibility to petitioners brought him great popularity. Here the stress is on the administration of justice and thus facilitas (though comitas is employed as a synonym). The proconsul's role, as Cicero advises his brother, corresponds to that of the praetor urbanus at Rome;
jurisdiction necessarily involves magisterial severitas, but the pill can be sugared by humanitas, by accessibility to petitioners in the first place, and then giving them freedom to speak. The result is popularity, requisite for the governor who would escape repetundae charges. Again the possibility is felt that dignity might be infringed: Cicero stresses that facilitas is an addition to severitas, not an alternative, and goes on to hold up Xenophon's Cyrus as a model, whose 'summa gravitas...cum singulari comitate coniungitur'. The tension is more apparent in the more sharply epigrammatic form of his praise of Pompey as a governor: 'ut is qui dignitate principibus excellit infimis par esse videatur'.

The same aim of popularity will lie behind the habit occasionally testified of the proconsul adopting local, especially Greek, clothing. The classic examples are Scipio Africanus and his brother Lucius; likewise Sulla the dictator in the Greek city of Naples. But republican writers never credit this as comitas, precisely because traditional sentiment was deeply shocked by it. Cicero has to defend Rabirius at length for wearing Egyptian clothes and uses it as a standing jibe against Verres. Even in the first century of empire the dress of the civil ruler is the citizen's toga; Tiberius reprimands Germanicus for going Greek in Egypt - he had only done so himself in his days of deepest humiliation (S. Tib.13,1). Yet Germanicus' dress is part of his comitas; Valerius Maximus in his chapter on the matter sees traces of virtue in this departure from tradition; and later writers positively applaud it.

Kings

What applies to a provincial governor, for whom the great Cyrus can be a model, applies the more to a king. The younger Cyrus too is described as comis and humanus: the glorious monarch, glittering in regal
purple, showed Lysander round his orchard, planted and tilled with his own hands (de sen. 59). In the *Republic* Cicero credits Tarquinius Priscus and Servius of Roman kings with *comitas*; for both it brought popularity and helped lay the road to kingship. It can be the quality of a despot: when a people has no choice but servitude, the only latitude of doubt is 'utrum comi domino an aspero serviant'._96_

For a king the alternative to *comitas* is not *dignitas* but *superbia*. _97_

Again the *magnanimus* of the *de Officiis* shows the impact made on attitudes by the domination of Caesar (1,88f.). From the familiar case of jurisdiction, where the *severitas* of the official should be tempered on a personal level by *facilitas* and *clementia*, _98_ Cicero moves to the general case of good fortune. In success one must flee *superbia*, *fastidium* and *arrogantia* above all; so Philip of Macedon though a lesser conqueror than his son, was his superior in *facilitas* and *humanitas*. The principle is right: 'quanto superiores simus, tanto nos geramus summissius'.

Two distinct strands have been examined. Refusal was foreign to Roman politics; aware of the possibility from Greek philosophy, the Roman only took it seriously under the impact of special circumstances, the rise of the great commander exciting the jealousy of his senatorial peers. The second, *comitas*, was absorbed at a much earlier stage, partly, no doubt, due to the hellenisation of society, but deriving its strength from a universal senatorial need for courting popularity. The two strands could have lead to separate imperial virtues, springing from the separate needs to placate senatorial opinion and to win favour from the larger mass of the ruled; to a certain extent, as *moderatio* and *comitas*, they did.

But what the two have in common, and what *civilitas* unites, is the idea of a (potential) sacrifice of *dignitas*. For the republican noble under
normal circumstances civilitas would have been unthinkable. Little would deter him from standing on his dignity. But the great marshal and the provincial governor have in common that the rift between them and other mortals is large enough to make condescension safe, even necessary. Civilitas may be glossed as "republican" insofar as it is to behave "as if" the republic with its égalité continued; it has republican antecedents insofar as the emperor rules the world as a proconsul his province. But there is nothing republican in a magistrate pretending to be a private citizen; and in truth there is no pretence: this is the behaviour demanded by society from an acknowledged autocrat – the higher his stature, the lower he must stoop.

iv) Development of the imperial ideal.

The ideal of civilitas applies to the behaviour of the great and powerful to his inferior, not of the ordinary citizen to his equals. It belongs primarily to empire and emperor, and its inception dates to the time when 'verso civitatis statu...omnes exuta aequalitate iussa principis aspectare' (T. Ann.1,4). It is Augustus who firmly establishes the pattern his successors attempted, or failed, to follow, primus inter pares, modest in refusal of power and honours, an autocrat who boasted the impossible feat of limited and collegiate power and played the private citizen. In numerous later accounts, quite apart from Suetonius, he is renowned for civil conduct. An early example is an anecdote from the elder Seneca: when Gaius Caesar died, Pollio broke public mourning by giving a large dinner; Augustus wrote him a letter of reproof, but 'ut erat mos illi clementissimo viro non civiliter tantum sed etiam familiariter' (Sen. Controv.iv.pr.5). Pollio is treated not as a disloyal subject but as a tactless friend. That contemporaries too celebrated Augustus as
observing what was *civile* is confirmed by Ovid. As in the Senecan anecdote, the main concern is with the suppression of personal rancour ('*odio civiliter usus*') and what Ovid is after is an act of clemency. The title 'pater patriae' is seen to sum up the ideal ('quid enim est *civilius illo*?'). But *civile* is no synonym for clemency.

The best idea of the scope of the ideal under Augustus is given by Livy. Though he writes of the republican past, and sometimes doubtless in terms borrowed from republican annalists, contemporary colours assuredly do show through. The word *civilis* is more frequent in Livy than in any other pre-Trajanic writer. Often coupled with *humanus*, it is opposed to illegal and violent conduct, to pride and tyranny. It contrasts with the *superbia* and abuse of wealth of the ruling *ordo* of Carthage and of the members of the Macedonian court, who alike subvert legality and the institutions of a free state; in the case of the Macedonians, the lack of *civilis animus* is coupled with *regius...victus vestitusque*. At Rome tribunes are the symbols of freedom, and the use of force against them by aristocrats is twice described as more *pium* than *civile*.

Particularly striking in this connection is the use of *civilis* in the first decade in association with the Appii Claudii, the more significant for the possible influence of Livy's portrayal of the *gens* on Tacitus' of Tiberius. Successive members of the family, as is notorious, are type-cast for their arrogance, as embittered enemies of the plebs; yet the historian, subtler than is sometimes allowed, weaves in indications of quite opposite tendencies. Appius the decemvir, campaigning for extension of his office, turns *popularis*, making a show of *comitas*. It is a front, and power secured, dissimulation is dropped and the hallmarks of the tyrant emerge, *superbia* and unapproachability. When Verginius arraigns him,
it is as 'legum experteram et civilis et humani foederis' (iii,57,1);
earlier a relative had begged him to turn back from his nefarious pact
(foedus) with his colleagues to the civilis societas of his birth, for
sooner or later the res publica would have its due of ius. Triumviral
pacts inevitably come to the reader's mind.

The grandson of the decemvir follows family tradition in opposing
the tribunes (iv,48,5; v,2,13); but in his speeches he seeks to turn the
tables on them. It is they who in obstructing the comitas of senate to
plebs show themselves destitute of 'quicquam...non dico civilis sed
humani' (v,3,9). That the words sound paradoxical in the mouth of an
Appius is clearer in his attack on the tribunes Licinius and Sextius
(vi,40-42). Dismissing the allegation of Claudian anti-plebian prejudice
(40,3-5), he claims to speak as an ordinary citizen, unus Quiritium.
It is the tribunes whose demand for reelection, tantamount to perpetual
office (40,7) like their actual proposals for legislation, is minime
civilis (40,15). Appius in fact would have his audience believe that he
is 'civil' and his opponents proud. The reader is invited to scepticism:
he spoke in hatred and anger (vi,40,2). These few passages bring civilis
to the centre of the discussion of the controversial family that vacillated
between superbia and comitas.

One feature decried as not 'civil' in the Appii (or by them) is the
extension of magistracy. Elsewhere tribunes state the principle clearly:
'neque magistratum continuari satis civile' (xxvii,6,4). The sentiment
is eminently Augustan. It was the Augustan declaimer Porcius Latro whose
epigram the elder Seneca records: 'nihil tam civile tam utile quam brevem
potestatem esse quae magna est'; and Suetonius reports Livy's coeval
Messala Corvinus resigning his urban prefecture as an 'incivilem potes-
tatem'. Twice more Livy uses civile in the context of honores: objection
is raised to Camillus' triumph, his chariot drawn by the white horses appropriate to a god - 'parumque id non civile modo sed humanum etiam visum' (v.23,6); while Scipio's _moderatio_ in turning down a whole list of honours wins him much praise, 'moderantissis ad civilem habitum honoribus' (xxxviii,56,12f.).

These last two items have a particular call to attention, for they echo precisely honours voted to Caesar. When Livy's Camillus, confronted by the spoils of Veii, prays in dismay to the gods to avert the _invidia_ of the _nimia fortuna_ which indeed brings ruin to Rome and himself, the author is drawing on a schema that goes back to the _Agamemnon_ of Aeschylus. But the triumph itself takes on the unmistakable colours of Caesar's return of 46 BC. Camillus is hailed as 'maximus imperatorum omnium', and the senate decree him supplications of unprecedented length. The triumph exceeds all custom; as for the white horses of the quadriga, they turn the dictator into an object of cult. The legend of the white horses may indeed already have been there for Caesar to draw on; but Livy's evaluation is beyond doubt post-Caesarian.

With Scipio's _recusatio_, we have to do with a fiction of more recent vintage. To his narration of the abortive prosecution of the two Scipios, Livy appends a variant version, consonant with a purportedly contemporary speech of Tiberius Gracchus. According to this, Africanus forcibly obstructed the tribunician arrest of his brother, preferring family loyalty to his duty as a citizen, 'magis pie quam civiliter'. Such is the complaint of Gracchus, and Livy with relish proceeds to refute him with his own words. Scipio had once displayed such _moderatio_ and _temperantia_ that he castigated the people for the offer of a perpetual consulship and dictatorship, and forbidden a series of statues. What does this show if not that he behaved civilly? The parallels with honours voted to Caesar
are too precise for any coincidence, and Mommsen divined the hand of
the anti-Caesarian pamphleteer. Though the details remain uncertain,
the forgery is patent. In fact Livy is sceptical. One may ask what
led him to give space to this dubious evidence at all.

His motive may perhaps be seen in the fascination already elicited
by the spectacle of a clash between a great marshal and the law. In the
main version of the trial the great issue is not as to his guilt, but
whether it is right to put such a benefactor of the state on trial at
all. On the one side it is a republican principle that the great man
must be subject to the law: 'neminem unum civem tantum eminere debere
ut legibus interrogari non possit; nihil tam aequandae libertatis esse
quam potentissimum quemque posse dicere causam' (50,8). The opposite
case is put most forcibly by his defender Gracchus: Scipio had risen
'deorum hominumque consensu' through his achievements and honours to such
fastigium that the trial would be a shame to the state (52,11). Scipio
himself had withdrawn from the proceedings, too magnanimous and too
distinguished to undergo the humiliation of a trial, 'summittere se in
humilitatem causam dicentium' (52,2). His enemies could see magnanimitas
as superbia (52,4), and though Livy gives the last word to Gracchus, the
impression is left of a less than perfect princeps. Hence the readiness
to grasp evidence from the unexpected quarters of an invective that the
refusal of honours proved his behaviour, after all, to be civilis.

If to turn down honours is for Livy civile, the name of the virtue
thus displayed is moderatio or modestia. It has a vivid illustration
in Fabius Maximus, who vigorously resisted the popular offer of a further
consulate, fearing the jealousy of the gods for his 'nimia fortuna' (x,
13,6). But his moderatio only made the people keener, and he was elected
'consensu civitatis victus'. So too Augustus in 27 B.C.
Moderatio is a gospel Livy preaches throughout, going beyond the scope of the present question. Restraint in the acceptance of power merges with restraint in its exercise, involving in turn restraint in the sense of clemency. It is remarkable how despite the rift between Caesar's possession of moderation in the last sense and his lack of it in the former, Livy (and other imperial authors) continue to apply the word indiscriminately to both.

Moderation was a quality to which Augustus' successor too laid especial claim. Apart from Tacitus (below) there is the contemporary evidence of a coin-type and of a loyal author. Velleius praises Tiberius for his moderatio in refusing honours: seven triumphs earned, he was content with three (ii,122,1). This was the man who preferred to be 'aequalem civem' than 'eminentem principem' (ii,124,2). Velleius does not explicitly call Tiberius civilis, but he uses the word elsewhere.

The Gracchi are criticised for using force to take what the state would have given them 'si civilem dignitatis concupissent modum' - the excess presumably consisting in the illegal renewal of tribunates (ii,7,1). Pompey showed himself civilis by a voluntary diminution of power: on return he dismissed his army at Brindisium and entered the city 'cum privato comitatu' (ii,40,3).

A very full idea of the scope of moderatio can be gained from Velleius' contemporary Valerius Maximus, who dedicates a chapter to this quality, with fifteen Roman and nine Greek examples (Val.Max. iv,1). He uses the word civilis only once, of Metellus Macedonicus' grief at the death of his rival Scipio Africanus, 'tam humana tamque civili lamentatione' (iv,1,12). Here, as often with emperors, the credit lies in subordinating a private feud to public welfare. Apart from this only the term moderatio is used; in it two basic ideas are combined, the balance between the two
differing considerably in Roman and Greek sections. One idea is the moderation of the degree of power: so the first case, Publicola, who by weakening the consulate 'invidiosum magistratus fastigium moderatione ad tolerabilem habitum deduxit'. The republic is rich with examples of the principle that too much power and too many honours are to be avoided.\textsuperscript{128} The other idea is generous treatment of inimici. The two types of moderatio are juxtaposed in the case of Scipio Africanus, who, in addition to refusing honours, gave support to his defeated enemy Hannibal.\textsuperscript{129} This second is the aspect of moderatio which verges on clementia, though it can still be described as civilis (iv,1,12 above). A subsidiary idea associates moderation with justice, in avoidance of the condemnation of a man on the evidence of only one person.\textsuperscript{130} At its weakest moderatio is a very vague notion, and the case of Metellus Numidicus (13) illustrates no more than a philosophical equanimity in the face of fortune or misfortune.

Of the Greek examples, only that of Theopompus and the ephorate (ext.8, cf. below Appendix B) illustrates the weakening of fastigium, though Antiochus is actually grateful to have his kingdom reduced (9), and the story of the seven sages is a type of refusal of honour (7). The emphasis is on moderatio/clementia: generosity to rivals (4, Thrasyboulos; 5, Stasippus; 6, Pittacus), not punishing in anger (1, Archytas; 2, Plato), patience of ill-treatment (3, Dio), and refusal to believe slander of friends (2, Plato and Xenocrates).

In all this Valerius may be passing on old anecdotes with old morals. But the interest in moderatio as a category of behaviour is his own, and reflects the emphasis laid on the quality by the emperor of the day. Between Valerius and the Trajanic period there is a gap in our evidence. There can be little doubt that the intervening annalists would
have been concerned with moderation and civil behaviour, contrasted
with the arrogance of a ruler like Gaius (below p.303). Yet it may be
that not quite all is the chance of transmission. It is an extraordinary
fact that the younger Seneca does not use the word civile in its new
sense. Indeed, he shows some interest in moderatio in a sense closely
linked to clementia;\footnote{131} and he protests against the stereotyped arrogance
of Caligula, who allowing an aged consular to kiss his shoe effectively
tramples upon the república.\footnote{132} But the ideal of the ruler who acts
as the equal of his subjects is remote from the divine viceregent of the
de clementia; and though Nero knew well enough the value of geniality
to all ranks (below p.301) it may well be that the particular combination
of elements that was thought to constitute 'civility' was not in vogue
in his reign.

A document which is frustratingly hard to place, but may be early
imperial, is the Alexander History of Quintus Curtius.\footnote{133} Imperial
colouring unmistakeably tinges his presentation of Alexander. Like
Caesar, the conqueror first showed moderation and clemency in pardoning
the vanquished. But Persian conquest turned his head, moderatio became
superbia.\footnote{134} He broke with Macedonian royal traditions, 'disciplinam...
Macedonum regum...temperatam et civilem habitum velut leviora magnitudine
sua ducens Persicae regiae par deorum potentiae fastigium aemulabatur' -
this by innovations close to Diocletian's, in χρωσκύνησις and dress (vi,
6,lf.). Conspiracy ensues, but is detected; and in a set piece Alexander,
accused among other failings of superbia, because of his adoption of Persian
customs, replied that the best evidence of his moderatio is that 'ne victis
quidem superbe impero' - a nice exploitation of the ambiguity of moderatio,
for clemency to the vanquished is used to counter incivil superbia (viii,
7,14; 8,10). Ptolemy contrasts well with Alexander: 'modico civilique cultu,
liberalis inprimis adituque facili, nihil ex fastu regiae adsumpserat' (ix,8,23).

The mixture of Hellenistic and Roman in Curtius cannot be disentangled with confidence. But in authors of the Trajanic age, the Suetonian ideal is proclaimed loud and long. It is one that pervades Pliny's Panegyricon. The theme is apparent from the beginning (2,3f.). No need to flatter Trajan as a god, 'non enim de tyranno sed de cive, non de domino sed de parente loquimur'. Trajan is citizen and father like Ovid's Augustus (Trist.iv,4,13). Citizens rejoice that he thinks of himself as 'unum ex nobis', a fellow citizen, and even a fellow human, 'nec minus hominem se quam hominibus praeesse meminit'; yet his eminence is the greater for that (2,4). This is the quintessence of civilitas, even if the noun itself is lacking. Even civilis only occurs a handful of times. Twice it is applied (paradoxically) to the acceptance of honours: the cognomen of Optimus is civile and senatorium in contrast to those given to his predecessors in their adrogantia (2,7); and he urges that to accept a fourth consulate will be civile (78,3). When the praetorian prefect retires, it is 'civile...et parenti publico convenientissimum' for Trajan to waive his potestas and allow his friend libertas (87,1). Plotina is 'modica cultu...parca comitatu...civilis incessu' (83,7). It is also applied to the handling of the annona by Trajan, 'parens noster', and before him Pompey, presumably because 'sine ullius iniuria' (29,2). These references are incidental and give little hint of the importance of the theme.

Other terms predominate. Humanitas is a word once used by Suetonius of Tiberius' civil behaviour - he almost went too far (S. Tib.29). Pliny favours the word. It is humanitas when Trajan levels himself with the candidates at the consular comitia (71,5; cf. S. Aug.56,1), and here he
states clearly the doctrine of the emperor's status: 'cui nihil ad augendum fastigium superest hic uno modo crescere potest, si se ipse summittat securus magnitudinis suae'. The least of the dangers of principate is humilitas. Humanitas is to behave as a human, and is therefore opposed to divinitas and superbia. It manifests itself in ease of admissiones, warmth of hospitality, and in greeting those who meet him.

Moderatio is yet more frequent, occasionally varied by modestia. This is deliberately introduced as a theme at the beginning and hammered out by the repetition of the terms (cf. 56,3 'quara multa dixi de moderatione, et quanto plura adhuc restant'). Almost always it refers to the repression of flattery or refusal of honours; also, through the ingenuity of the orator, to the acceptance of certain honours. Moderatio in not seeking for military gloria is part of the same thing. In addition the word occurs in the context of public appearance: on his entry into Rome he approaches the palace 'eo vultu ea moderatione' as if he were going to a private house, and it is moderatio that makes him come down to the elections.

Opposed to civile, humanitas, and moderatio are superbia and adrogantia (cf. 3,4 'non enim periculum est ne cum loquar de humanitate, exprobrari sibi superbiam credat'). These cover aspiration to divine fastigium, excess in honours (manifesting itself paradoxically, in some cases, in refusal), contemptuous treatment of the public. Also noteworthy is reverentia as a term covering the civil treatment of the senate, as in Suetonius.

Large stretches of the Panegyric thus describe what later authors would call civilitas (see particularly: 2,3-8 Trajan as a fellow human,
citizen and senator; 22-24 entry into Rome; 47-49 admissiones and hospitality; 52 avoidance of divine honours; 54-58 refusal of flattery and honours; 63-64 elections; and the treatment of Trajan as consul passim, 65-80). It is difficult to imagine the interest of Suetonius (or later authors, even perhaps futuri principes) in this aspect of the emperor without the Panegyric: yet the word civile is rare, and moderatio is the noun most used, supplemented by other words also met in Suetonius in civilitas contexts, humanitas, reverentia, and the opposites superbia and adrogantia.

The doctrines applied by Pliny to the emperor are illuminatingly adapted to a provincial governor in the letter of advice to Maximus (ep. viii,24). He has been commissioned to settle the state of free cities: 'quid ordinatione civilius?' (7). The cardinal fact is that his command is over free men not slaves, members of civitates (5). Pride and harshness have no place. There is no danger of contempt, for one endowed with the fasces can never be 'humilis et sordidus', unless he despises himself. Terror is no way of ensuring respect (6). Maximus' position was indeed analogous to that of the princeps. The principate involved the superimposition of monarchy on a society accustomed to the ideals of freedom and citizenship characteristic of the Greco-Roman world. Civilitas offered the solution to that paradoxical combination.

In Tacitus civile is comparatively frequent but for a particular and interesting reason. Only found twice in the Histories, it is applied to Vitellius (ii,91) whose civil behaviour at the consular elections recalls Augustus (S. Aug.56,1) and Trajan (Plin. Pan.63f.); this, coupled with cultivation of the plebs at theatre and circus (cf. S. Tit.8,2), in fact meets criticism because of the suspicion that it is not the case that they 'a virtutibus proficiiscerentur'. Secondly Vespasian writes to
the senate (iv,3): despite civil war 'ut princeps loquebatur, civilia de se, de re publica egregia'.

It is in the Annals that the word becomes frequent; and only in the first six books. With two exceptions it always refers, directly or indirectly to Tiberius. Always Tiberius strives to appear civilis; very rarely Tacitus seems to let him get away with it - left out of a will it is 'civiliter acceptum' (3,76). When Urguliana tries to escape a summons through her excessive influence, Tiberius acquits himself well (maiore fama) by doing no more than going to stand witness for her, 'hactenus indulgere matri civile ratus' (2,34); yet doubt arises later (4,21) for though 'in praesens Tiberius civiliter habuit' he remembered the case as grounds for resentment. In other cases doubt is always cast on prima facie instances of civil behaviour: the good effect of the refusal of honours (pater patriae, and iuratio in acta) is undone by the revival of maiestas (1,72); when Drusus is excused the first sententia in the trial of Lepida 'alii civile rebantur...quidam ad saevitiam trahebant' (3,22); and when Tiberius gets the senate to reprehend the populus for rioting in a corn-shortage, his own silence 'non civile, ut crediderat, sed in superbiam accipiebatur' (6,13). Finally the quality is denied him by direct contrast with others: Augustus thought it civil to join in the pleasures of the crowd at games (compare Vitellius above): 'alia Tiberio morum via' (1,54). Germanicus, as Suetonius too declares, had a 'civile ingenium, mira comitas': not so Tiberius, 'sermone vultu adrogantibus et obscuris' (1,33). It was noticed in the case of Drusus as well as Germanicus 'displicere regnantibus civilia filiorum ingenia' (2,82).

Relevant uses of moderatio only confirm this picture. Tiberius puts up a show of moderatio in turning down honours and privileges, yet it turns sour, adroganti moderatone (1,8); forcing moderation on
Livia, it is only through jealousy 'muliebre fastigium in deminutionem sui accipiens' (1,14); and his request to the senate for tribunicia potestas for Drusus seems to be in at least potential contrast to the 'fama moderationis parta' through his discouragement of delators: what he requests is the ultimate honour, 'summi fastigii vocabulum' (3,56).  

It has been argued by Lana that civile for Tacitus signifies behaviour in accordance with republican traditions, 'as if' the emperor were a citizen living under the old republic. Indeed this is an essential aspect of the ideal; but civility cannot fairly be glossed as "republicanism", and when Lana seeks to distinguish it sharply from comitas he gravely misrepresents. To moderate honours is indeed to preserve a certain 'imago rei publicae', and there is no doubt that respect for senatorial powers and traditions is a large part of Tiberius' style. But that Drusus as a consul designate was excused the first voice in a trial involving maestas is nothing to do with republican traditions, but with clemency (3,22; cf. 4,21 and above on Ovid). Nor is it anything to do with republicanism that the senate is left to reprehend the populus for rioting: it is to do with the relationship of the emperor and his people (6,13). The background is rioting in the theatre directed against the emperor, the manoeuvre is motivated by the desire to avoid appearing vindictive: yet the people see through the tactic and feel he is not playing the game, arrogant not civil.

It is essential for the understanding of the ideal to see that it is not limited to the relationship of emperor and senate, but also involves that with the populus Romanus. The emperor is expected 'misceri voluptatibus vulgi' (1,54), playing the candidate at elections, the spectator in the theatre, the partisan at the circus (Hist.ii,91). These were ways in which the republican noble might have won popularitas, but
his peers would hardly have approved his behaviour as traditional. We might expect a senator to dismiss this side and concede Tiberius 'civile ingenium' on the grounds of his treatment of the senate. But Tacitus denies him the disposition not only on grounds of his actual retention of power, but because of the arrogance and impenetrability of his manner (1,33). The early years were in a sense a model of good rule (4,6), but his style undermined the good effect, 'non quidem comi via sed horridus ac plerumque reformidatus' (4,7). The same man who fails to show comitas to the populus fails to show it in the senate. Arrogance of gait had always marked this stiff-necked Claudian.

In this light a feature of the portrait of Nero is relevant. Suetonius represents Nero in early years as displaying comitas, polite in saluting all ranks, modest towards the senate, and open in admitting the crowd to his exercises, declamations and recitations (10,1). Suetonius never later seeks to challenge this evidence. Pride and arrogance do not feature among his failings (cf. 26,1), and this despite the fact that arrogance had been a feature of his grandfather, who similarly put men and women of social distinction on stage (4). Tacitus conforms to this pattern. The word civile does not appear in the second half of the Annals. Nor is Tacitus' Nero criticised for arrogance, except that once, in staging his triumphant return from the murder of his mother he is called 'superbus ac publici servitii victor' (Ann.14,13). But how could one blame a man for pride whose consulships and titles were few (Ner.14) and who was so carried away by popularitas that he played the man of the people in every possible form of public entertainment (Ner.53)? Virtue lies close to the borderline of vice. Civility taken to excess results in the terrifying showmanship of Nero. Fliny claims (in the context of relations with the senate) that the emperor can never abase himself too much; no
danger is further than humilitas (71,5). Yet earlier he had been more honest (4,5): no emperor is perfect, 'reverentiam ille terrore, alius amorem humilitate captavit'. Nero's self-abasement was popular with some, disgusting to others. Tacitus or Suetonius would only applaud such behaviour if it fulfilled their definition of 'virtue': 'quae grata sane et popularia si a virtutibus proficiscerentur...indecora et vilia accipiebantur' (Hist. ii, 91 on Vitellius).

There is an element of paradox in the suggestion that an ideal so eminently 'upper-class' as civilitas also covered relations with the vulgus. But it was precisely by absorbing this relationship under a moral category that the upper classes could attempt to control it. It is not to be supposed that Nero performed in public because he desired to display civilitas; he simply wanted popularity, 'charisma'. But those like Tacitus and Suetonius who accepted a degree of geniality towards the crowd within their moral category, rather than rejecting it outright, were able to draw distinctions of approval and disapproval. The geniality of an Augustus or Titus was acceptable where Nero's was not. Similarly in absorbing the imperial disbursement of wealth under the moral category of liberalitas, they were enabled to give approval to the generosity of Augustus that (supposedly) hurt nobody's pocket and the extravagance of Nero that plunged the state into financial crisis.

v) Continuity of the Ideal.

The combination of items of behaviour and ideas which Suetonius puts together to make a category, summed up in the word civilitas, is surely not a new one: the refusal of honours, respect for the senate, affability to high and low, and, shading into clementia, the toleration of opposition at least at a verbal level. Civile plays a part in Tacitus' picture of
Tiberius as it does in Livy's of certain Appii Claudii; if only the intervening annalists survived, we would probably find the idea in them. Suetonius' analysis will be a distillation of the ideas of the sources he quarries. At the same time, however, it is surely fair to discern a marked increase in interest in this ideal under the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian. Historians writing under Vespasian, a modest ruler whose behaviour was unchanged by his new fortuna (Plin. NH praef.3) may well have paid it attention; under Domitian this is less likely. But the enormous prominence of the ideals of modesty, humanity and avoidance of pride in Pliny's Panegyric suggests a new emphasis. The Panegyric is as different from Seneca's de Clementia as was Trajan's actual style of behaviour from Nero's. Suetonius is not simply distilling his sources: he is searching them for evidence of something that seemed at the time to matter.

For later writers the importance of Suetonius will have been that the pattern of right and wrong imperial behaviour had been clearly and definitively set out. Civilitas proliferates, at least among historians. It is unnecessary here to consider all the evidence. But two themes may be stressed, the continuity of the ideal pattern, and the correlation of interest in it with the actual behaviour of the reigning emperor.

The Latin evidence clusters around the reign of Julian. There is a remarkable contrast between the histories of Aurelius Victor, published shortly before the elevation of Julian to Augustus in 361, and of Eutropius, some fifteen years later. Victor is sparing in the use of the term civilis: once of Augustus, and once to criticise the new court ceremonial of Diocletian, 'plus quam civilia tumidique et affluentis animi' (39,3). Eutropius, writing of the same emperors, describes a whole series of them as civiles or otherwise. Trajan is the prime example, with a whole
chapter devoted to his civilitas and moderatio (viii,4): he behaves as the aequalis of all at Rome and in the provinces, visiting his friends for salutatio, in sickness or on festal days, exchanging hospitality, and sitting in their carriages - behaviour that recalls Suetonius' account of Augustus. Trajan in fact behaved to privati as he himself had hoped to be treated when privatus (viii,5,1). Julian too features in Eutropius as 'civilis in cunctos' (x,16).

Between Victor and Eutropius lies the programmatic Panegyric of Mamertinus (362), praising Julian for the carefully staged salutation of the consuls that documented his civility (Pan.Lat. iii(xi),28,1, 'civilis animi satis clara documenta') and showed him only to have improved on his old moderatio since his elevation in status (27,3). There is no doubt that Julian made deliberate show of this 'virtue'. In Ammianus too the concept is recurrent. Constantius is criticised for calling himself 'Aeternitas mea' despite all his 'aemulationem civilium principum'; flattery carried him away into oblivion of his mortality (xv,1,3-4). By contrast the hero Julian, 'civilitati admodum studens, tantum sibi adrogans quantum a contemptu et insolentia distare existimabat (xxv,4,7). More clearly than in any early imperial source, civilitas is represented as a delicate balance between the ordinariness that breeds contempt, and the elevation and 'Absonderung' that is criticised as arrogance. Ammianus apologetically reflects criticisms that Julian in fact abased himself too far (xxii,7,1 'quidam ut adfectatum et vile carpebant').

But if Julian revived an old ideal, consciously harking back to Trajan and Marcus, this by no means implies that the ideal lay dormant in between. There is much of relevance in the imperial Lives. Some of the explicit attention to civilitas may reflect contemporary preoccupations - if indeed the final composition of these documents belongs to the latter
part of the century. A series of passages centre around the controversy over the pitching of imperial status. Hadrian was *civilissimus* even to the humblest; he objected to preserving the *fastigium principis* at the expense of *humanitas* (20,1). Pius diminished 'imperatorium fastigium ad summam civilitatem', despite the vested interests of the court, yet only grew in stature thereby (6,4; cf. Plin. Pan. 71,5). Above all the model of *moderatio* is Alexander Severus (20), who was affable to all, visited even humble friends when sick, listened to complaints, and was accessible to all but the corrupt. This 'nimia civilitas' brought him under criticism of his wife and mother who supposed him to be weakening his power. Here, in this most fictional of Lives, we have a literary anecdote going back to Aristotle's *Politics* (Appendix B). In short not a day passed but 'aliquid mansuetum, civile, pium fecit'; again, presumably, a literary topos designed to go one better than the benevolent Titus. 170

In all these cases, and others where the word *civilis* occurs, 171 we may be dealing with 4th century retrojections. Yet something in these Lives must derive from historical sources, and perhaps more impressive evidence for the continuity of the ideal may be found in those passages, often meaninglessly strewn around these chaotic compositions, where precisely the familiar pattern of behaviour is documented. Some examples must suffice. Hadrian is described as *civilissimus* (above, 20,1) but little evidence is adduced. Yet the evidence is there, strewn through the Life, particularly in three passages. The longest is 8,1-10: Hadrian took advice from the best senators, refused games to honour his birthday, spoke respectfully of the *res publica*, raised many to his own status of thrice consuls, attended senatorial meetings, and in general did all he could to raise the *fastigium* of the senate. Separately from this 'senatorial' section is a 'social'one (9,7-8): he attended the *officia* of magistrates, exchanged
hospitality, visited the sick including equites and liberti, and generally did all 'ad privati hominis modum'. Finally a 'popular' section (17,5-8): he bathed in public (as did Titus), and a curious anecdote is told of how he gave an impoverished bather slaves to scrape him down. He was in fact 'plebis iactantissimus amator' - a point perhaps later evidenced by his fondness for conversation with the humble (20,1-2).

Similar dispersion of evidence is found in the Life of Pius. After the statement quoted above on Pius' civilitas, we hear of his deference to the senate and hesitation over the title of pater patriae (6,5-6). Then intervenes some information concerning honours for his family, but the last item of the chapter is that he let his friends see him 'cum privatis vestibus' (6,12). In a later chapter we are told that he treated his friends as a privatus (11,1); then after some other material, that he exchanged hospitality with friends and did all 'quasi privatus' (11,4-7), and finally, 'civilitatis eius praecipuum argumentum', an anecdote is told of his endurance of wit at his expense (11,8).

Finally in the Life of Alexander Severus, in addition to the chapter on his moderatio, an earlier chapter (4,1-3) details familiar items: refusal to be called dominus, abstinence from titulature in letters (cf. S. Tib.26,2), abolition of extravagant dress, exchange of hospitality with friends, and ease of admission to salutatio. Again, at the very end of the life we hear of how in celebrating his birthday he mixed with the people 'civiliter' (60,3).

It is not worthwhile conjecturing whence such dispersed items stem, and whether there was a source which marshalled them all together. But they are surely evidence of the standard 'code of conduct' that was established after the reign of Trajan; and indicate too the impact that Suetonius had on the writing of 'history'. Such runs of items of everyday
behaviour as are found in both Eutropius and the SHA could scarcely have appeared in Tacitus, despite his interest in what was civile.

A vital missing link between Suetonius and the 4th century sources is supplied by Cassius Dio. Despite difficulties, from the conceptual point of view, caused by the fact he writes in Greek, his attitudes are clearly Roman and senatorial. Repeatedly he gathers together familiar pieces of information that document civilitas; and it is worth bearing in mind that he wrote under one emperor renowned for the quality, Alexander Severus. If any single word represents a translation of civile, it is ὑμοτεκόν; but the word had its own nuances and what matters is the pattern of behaviour described.

One of the features of Dio's annalistic technique is his inclusion of biographical sketches of each emperor taking the reigns as a whole. These cannot be reduced to neat categories on the Suetonian model; nevertheless several include chapters which document what a Latin writer would call civilitas.

Tiberius is the first and fullest. Like others Dio distinguishes an early good period of the reign, for him while Germanicus lived (lvii, 7-13,6). This summary of Tiberius' τρόπος starts with his open behaviour at his own cognitiones and those of others, emphasising his encouragement of free speech. The next two chapters (8-9) treat him as ὑμοτεκόν (so 8,3 καὶ οὕτω γε ὁλα πάντων ὑμοτεκόν ὑμοτεκόν ἦν ὡτε..., 9,1 ταύτα τε ὑμ δημοτεκῶς ὁλάκεν, καὶ ὁτί...). The list is familiar: avoidance of δεσπότης and other titles; banning the celebration of birthday oaths by his fortune, iuratio in acta and New Year's gifts (8); refusal of divine honours; and initial refusal to admit maiestas charges (9). Dio now turns to financial questions (10), and it would seem that the subject of Tiberius as
civilis - δημοτικός has been wound up. Yet the next chapter (11), opening with the description εὐπρόσωπος καὶ εὐπροσήγυρος, and shortly afterwards noting the extent of his ἐπεκίνεσις (often in Dio the equivalent of clementia) lists: his treatment of senators at the salutatio (11,1), the anecdote of the Rhodian magistrates (11,2; cf. S. Tib.32,2), respectful treatment of senators ὡς ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ in rising for consuls and in hospitality, and of senators and equites in forbidding attendance at his carriage (11,3; for the last contrast S. Cal.26,2); behaviour at festivals and games (a different slant from T. Ann.1,54) including, so ζοος and διος that he was, the freeing of a dancer at popular request (4-6; contrast S. Dom.13,1); and finally the treatment of amici ὡς καὶ ἐν ἱδωρείᾳ, exchanging officia, visiting the sick and attending funerals (11,7). Attention then shifts to his treatment of his mother (12).

Various facts strike. In 8-9 and 11 we have two perfectly clear civilitas sections. They assemble material just as Suetonius does, indeed many items coincide with Suetonius; yet the chapters are in no way lifted from Suetonius, for many items are new, some Suetonian ones are missing, and above all the arrangement is Dio's own (though common sources may possibly lie in the background). Why does he split up the two sections? Does he not in fact conceive of the two as part of the same phenomenon? Does he regard the intervening evidence of liberality as part of the same thing? Or is it sheer coincidence that he separates two aspects of what in different circumstances he might connect?

The distribution of items between his two sections is not random. The first is concerned with cases of restraint in the acceptance of honours and the use of power (maiestas cases), what in Latin would be characterised as moderatio. The second depicts easy behaviour towards his subjects, whether senators and equites, or the people, as at games, the comitas and
and *facilitas* of Latin tradition. While *civilis* applies to both, Dio here only employs *δημοτικός* of the first. One must look to other passages to find whether the distinction holds.

Claudius demonstrates his moderation (*ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ ὑμετέρας* 1x,5,4) immediately on accession: honours refused, *προσκύνησις*, acclamations and expensive statues forbidden, gladiatorial combats *pro salute* disallowed, celebrations and distinctions for the imperial family restricted (5,3-8). This and more he did *ἐπελευθέρως*, courteous to the consuls, living and dressing *δωματίως* in Naples (6,1-2). Thereafter come financial and other matters. But in the narrative of the next year, Claudius' own consulate, discussion of senatorial organisation leads to consideration of how *κοινός καὶ ἐπελευθερωμένος* he was to senators (12): he visits the sick, exchanges hospitality, and makes his household behave with respect to senators; sits and stands properly in the *curia*; passes over his *dies imperii* without fuss; and, final instance of moderation (12,5 ἐκ πάντα τὰ τυχόντα ἐμετρήσεως), does not celebrate the birth of a son, turning down the titles Augustus and Augusta. Again *civilitas* is described (though without the word *δημοτικός*) and split into two sections. But here restraint and geniality occur together in both.

By the time the history reaches Vespasian we are reduced to epitomators; but the account of his daily routine given by Xiphilinus documents a civil emperor (1xvi,10,4-11,3). *Admissio* to the palace is easy, he frequents the senate and shows it respect, exchanges hospitality with senators and close friends, and generally proves himself *κοινός καὶ ἰσοδύναμος* (11,1); he teases and is teased *δημοτικός*, is tolerant of libel, forgives old *inimicitiae* (11,2, the Phoebus anecdote, cf. S. *Vesp.*14) and writes to Vologeses without titulature.
Here is a need for caution, for Xiphilinus may misrepresent Dio's vocabulary. But δημοτικως used of tolerance of jokes is supported by its application to Tiberius' endurance of maestas (lvii,9,2). Again one may distinguish the comitas of the first items from the moderatio of the last (the division is at 11,1); but it is only a distinction of arrangement, for Xiphilinus at least refers κοίνος and ἱσοδίατος to both halves.

A brief sketch of Trajan is placed by Xiphilinus early in the reign, in the context of the first Dacian war (229,29-231,2 = lxviii,6-7). Among the characteristics are the kind that Eutropius took as civilitas: he was affable to the people (μετ' ἐπελευκέλας), joined others in hunting and at feasts; took others into his carriage, and would enter their houses without a guard (7,3).

Hadrian's τρόπος is reviewed at some length (lxix,3-7), and the last part moves in the area of civilitas, though there is no revealing terminology (6-7). He treated the δῆμος with dignity rather than flattery: he nearly repeated Domitian's blunder at the games (cf. S. Dom.13,1), and only paid attention to a female petitioner after reproof (6). Had he done better by the δῆμος he might have qualified as δημοτικός. The senate he respected, taking care not to trouble people officii causa (7,2; cf. S. Aug.53,2); he made his company with the ἀρχουσίωτος, hunted for amusement, exchanged hospitality; visited the sick and joined in the celebrations of his friends, calling at their estates; in return they sold no palace information.

What is said of Marcus in his epitaph is instructive (lxxi,35,3-5). To prove that his ἄρετη was through φύσις as much as πατερια, Dio adduces his behaviour as a youth. Despite adoption into the palace, he did not become arrogant: witness his salutationes, when he dressed ἡσυχαστικός; he
visited the sick, as well as his tutor; dressed humbly, and took his duties as sevir equitum seriously, actually descending to the forum (as the civil princeps might to the comitia).

Finally Pertinax (lxxiii,3,4). In the initial sketch we are told 'he treated us (sc. the senate) δημοτικώτατα': he was εὐπροσήγορος, listened to requests, gave his opinion ἀνθρωπίνως, entertained senators without excess or sent them cuts from the imperial table. For once, the courteous treatment of the senate is explicitly described as δημοτικόν. This provides welcome confirmation that δημοτικός is not restricted to the refusal of honours, but again we are at the mercy of Xiphilinus.

What is to be concluded about Dio and civilitas? His biographical sections are governed by no strict formula, but vary to suit each emperor. He is not operating a system of recurrent species, and has no need to use words to signpost sections, as Suetonius does with civilis. Nevertheless, he clearly has in mind a pattern of imperial behaviour, composed of items repeated from emperor to emperor, which coincides precisely with the pattern Latin authors term civilitas. If he has a tendency to distinguish two aspects, it is a distinction that echoes the Latin one of moderatio and comitas, though it is possible that this is exaggerated by the fact that approachability belongs to an old tradition of Greek kingship thought, while refusal is something particularly Roman (below X,2). He links the two aspects, notwithstanding. His terminology is flexible (so too the Latin): δημοτικός and μέτρος are favoured in the context of refusal; 178 ἐπειγής, εὐπρόσοδος/εὐπροσήγορος, κοινός, οὖσ, ὑμοιος, ὑπωμοιος and ἀνθρωπινός characterise humane behaviour towards subjects. While τὸ δημοτικὸν is not explicitly used to describe the ensemble, it comes nearest of the terms to civilitas.
2. Greek Antecedents

The imperial ideal under discussion is one closely tied to historical circumstances. It will hardly be suggested that it in any sense 'derived' from Greek political thought. Even so, it is worth looking in the pre-imperial Greek world for links. Certain anecdotes used by Romans to document civilitas (Severus Alexander and his argument with his mother, Hadrian and the female petitioner) are of Greek derivation. The position of a Greek king might well be analogous to that of an emperor, for the essential precondition of the ideal is the imposition of autocracy on a society accustomed to the standards of freedom and status that go with the institution of citizenship. In fact there are analogies, and, more than that, formulated ideals which had some influence on the Romans. Nowhere in the Greek world will the precise pattern of behaviour involved in civilitas be found; but it is illuminating to look at Greek authors both for comparisons and for contrasts that set the Roman ideal in sharper focus.

i) Pomp, ceremonial and remoteness.

The 'Hellenistic' ideal most familiar from modern accounts is that of σεμνότας; a word hard to translate as its nuances range from 'pride' to 'dignity' and 'majesty'. It is set forth clearly by the pseudo-Pythagorean Diotogenes (Stob. iv, 7, 62). For him the good king steers a mean between being too harsh and being an object of contempt (εὔκατα-φόνητος). Of three ingredients recommended, σεμνότας is designed to counteract contempt. It is a θέΰμαν πράγμα, imitating the gods, and aims to produce admiration. This involves doing nothing base, ταξελύνων, nor imitating one's lessers or ζουν, equals, but setting oneself apart from human feelings, ἄνθρωπον κάθεα, and approximating oneself to the
gods. Not indeed through pride, ὑπεραφανία, but magnanimity; by such impressive appearance, converse, comportment and adornment as to leave the audience astonished (καταπεξειλαγμένος) by such majesty (ἐξουσία). Admittedly this is to be balanced by the ἄρθροτος that wins affection; this consists in justice, mercy and being helpful and mild, ἀβαρός, to all men, particularly the weaker. Yet Diotogenes reiterates that above all θεόμυθον ἐντε πράγμα βασιλεία. An ideal further from civility is hard to imagine.

Diotogenes cannot be dated with any confidence. But his ideas fit a Hellenistic context plausibly enough. The purpose of his recommendations is to avoid contempt; for techniques of attaining majesty Greeks looked, both in theory and practice, to Persia. The most explicit model is in Xenophon's Cyropaedia. Herodotus had treated Persian regal style with little sympathy in his description of Deioces (i,95-100). After winning himself the kingship by equitable jurisdiction, he shuts himself up within the walls of Ecbatana. Unapproached and unseen, neither spitting nor smiling, he put himself beyond the criticism of his subjects by acting οὐκομός. Petitions came to him in writing, and he was harsh in jurisdiction. Herodotus had little sympathy for autocracy. But Xenophon takes pains to justify these features. Pride and inaccessibility to petitioners (σκάπνος τε καὶ σεμνός) are justified as protecting the ruler from the pressure of work (vii,5,37f.). Ceremonial style and dress (including high heels, make-up round eyes and rouge, and abstention from natural functions like spitting) is necessary to beguile the masses (viii,1,40f.). The splendour of the royal progress (ἐξελαστικός), during which the monarch is only indirectly approachable to petitioners, is a device to enhance σεμνότης and dispell contempt (viii,3,1-23).
The *Cyropaedia* was a work read with admiration, especially by Romans. Other theoretical works transfer the 'Persian' ideal to Greek soil. Heraclides Ponticus put up a case for τιμή in Persian style on the grounds that it leads to μεγαλοψυχία, greatness of spirit, whereas hard work is for the slaves and humble (ταξιανός) and cramps the spirit. Isocrates recommends to Nicocles a more subtle compromise, steering between the dangers of humiliation and excessive grandeur. The king is to be σεμνός in appearance by indulging (τυφάν) in finery of apparel, but must simultaneously be spiritually tough and urbane (άστεγος) to his subjects.

In practice the adoption of ceremonial finery is well attested from the 4th century onwards. Even setting aside Alexander, who followed foreign traditions on foreign soil, Persian practices were adopted by Isocrates' pupil, Clearchus, tyrant of Heracleia on the Pontus, and in Athens by Demetrius of Phaleron, fêted as like the sun, ἡλιόμορφος, and by his homonym Poliorcetes, hymned as a godlike and noble sight (σεμνόν) like the sun among the stars. The stunning effect (κατάξιανής) produced by Demetrius in his full regalia is vouched for by Diodorus.

ii) Polemic against ὑπερηψανία.

Undoubtedly the hellenistic age knew its 'Rois Soleils'. Yet to exalt σεμνότης and the techniques of the *Cyropaedia* to an official 'ideal' is at best grossly misleading. Pride, as Euripides' Hippolytus discovers, is not a quality that endeared in a society like that of Athens. Accounts of kings who adopted this pose are universally hostile, and the hostility is contemporary. Agamemnon brought about his own ruin by accepting the outrageous oriental honour of a purple carpet. Aeschylus surely reflects in fiction contemporary preoccupations. Pausanias the Regent, disgraced
for his 'Medizing' at Byzantium, became for later authors the prototype of pride. Duris (himself a tyrant of Samos) puts him at the head of a rogues' gallery of rulers who took to Persian finery, which proceeding through Dionysius of Syracuse and Alexander the Great, culminates in Demetrios Poliorcetes (F14). Nymphis of Heracleia, writing in the 3rd century BC attacks Pausanias for his abandonment of Spartan customs and for his τρυφή and ύπερφανία (F9). He launches similar assaults on the rulers of his own city, particularly Clearchus. Of Dionysius of Heracleia, he recounted the colourful details of his gross corpulence and of the wooden structure with which he concealed his embarrassing physique from view during the transaction of business - a type of unapproachability. The tyrants of Heracleia are alleged to have imitated Dionysius I of Syracuse. Baton of Sinope (3rd century BC) was among the critics of the Syracusan Dionysius, the originator of a style of pomp and unapproachability. Contemporary reactions to Alexander are hard to recapture; but Athenaeus preserves accounts of his regal style from Phylarchus and Ephippus, both of which express open hostility to the gulf of unapproachability thereby set between ruler and ruled.

The most cogent surviving presentation of the case is in Plutarch's Life of Demetrius. There is nothing but praise for the βασιλικῆ σεμνοτής that results from Demetrius' natural stature and beauty, which is combined with the charm of geniality in intercourse (ii,2-3). But the assumption of the title of Basileus changes his character, bringing presumption and over-bearing (δυσκοιλία and βαρύτης) in his dealings (xviii). Growing τρυφή antagonises the Athenians, and in particular a star-spangled mantel is described as a work of pride (xli,6-8). Most offensive of all, Demetrius made himself hard of access, δυσόμιλον and δυσπρόσθεν. Audience (ἐντευξίζων) was hard to gain, embassies treated high-handedly; and his attitude to his
subjects is summed up in a description of a progress (ἐξέλασις), in the course of which, despite an initial appearance of being δημοτικώτερος, he threw the petitions pressed into his hand into the nearest river. The true regal ideal is then summed up in a much-repeated anecdote of Philip and the female petitioner (xlii). The difficulty here is to establish how much of the picture of the degenerating Demetrius derives from hellenistic sources; but at least the hostile description of the star-mantle comes directly from Duris.

A growing consciousness of the ills of pride is also detectable in the philosophers. Aristotle does not seem to know ὑπερηφανία as a fault (EN 1124B17f.). Vain-glory (χαυνότης) is the failing of the small man who claims more than his share of τιμή, but to claim less than one's share is mean-spirited. The ideal is the μεγαλόφυσος, the great and good man who claims the dignity due to his moral superiority (ὑπεροχή); though he is distinguished from the ὑπερόμητος who plumes himself on mere good fortune, and his σεμνότης is reserved for his equals, for proud behaviour to the humble is vulgar.

Μεγαλόφυσία as defined as a virtue of rulers, notably in Polybius. But there is also increasing hostility to pride. In Theophrastus' Characters the ὑπερήφανος appears putting off interviews because of the pressure of business, off-hand in private arbitration, failing to greet, not attending dinner parties, and not even bathing in public or receiving visitors when he baths. Much here is analogous to the pattern of social behaviour in which a Roman emperor too was involved.

Pride rises to the subject of a whole essay by the Peripatetic Aris on of Ceos, preserved in the papyrus fragments of Philodemus. The text is particularly interesting for its illustration of philosophical points by historical anecdotes, typical in later authors. Aris...
to the success of great men who in positions of elevation (ὑπεροχή) behave in company (δυνατά) as ἔσοι and συνεσταλμένοι (contracted, as against puffed up), and set themselves against the δύναμις of fortune (fr.13 VI Wehrli). He illustrates by anecdotes of Alexander and Dionysius (paradoxically); for the disastrous effect of the opposite behaviour he points to Demetrius Poliorcetes, whose one harsh word lost him his troops to Pyrrhus. The arrogance of keeping people waiting around for audience is illustrated by an anecdote of Dion. The proud man also shuns the advice of others (fr.13 V), and if he does consult them, he is χαλεπός ὑπακούειν in his ἄνδρα and his desire to take the credit. The injustice of increasing one's own ὑπεροχή by humiliating others (ταξιλωνοῦν) is seen in Agesilaus' treatment of Lysander (fr.13 VI). Pride is not to be confused with μεγαλοψυχία, that regal virtue: one despises the gifts of chance through φυσικὴς δύνας, the other is puffed up by them to despise men. As a culmination of the section (fr.13 VII) Ariston says that pride turns to madness, μανία: such Xerxes' yoking of the Hellespont, but particularly the belief in one's own divinity, the fate of the utterly proud. Finally it is interesting to note in passing a trait of the ἀυθάδος: that he neither takes notice of friends who visit him sick, nor does the same for them (fr.14 II, 5f.); one recalls the exemplary behaviour of Cyrus and certain Roman emperors.

iii) Regal simplicity: ideal and practice.

In historians and philosophers there is sharp resistance to regal majesty acquired by Persian techniques (so they were regarded), ceremonial finery, ostentatious life-style and difficulty of access. But can one point to any ideal other than σεμνότης and μεγαλοψυχία, and is there any sign that it was put into practice?
Against Xenophon's idealised Cyrus must be set his idealised Spartan king. Agesilaus is held up as the opposite to Persian pretentiousness (ix,lf.). The Great king gave himself airs (ἐσεμυόνετο), rarely seen, hard of access, slow to transact business. Agesilaus is available, εὐχρόοδος, and promptly sends off petitioners with what they want (2). His tough regimen contrasts with easy Persian indulgence (3–4). He possessed the gift of geniality, τὸ εὐχαρι, despite his power never pompous, attentive to his friends, and cheerful (ἰλαρός) in their company. Grandeur he reserved for rebuffing the Persian king (3). In a later recapitulation, his geniality is emphasised (xi,ll): he despised the pompous but outdid the moderate in humility (τῶν μετρῶν τακευνότερος). His finery was his army, not the meanness of his own lame physique (φαυλότης).

'Meanness' and 'humility' are strong words to use in praise of a king. Humility (τακευνότης) was not acknowledged in ethics as a virtue before Christianity. Yet the Agesilaus is not eccentric. One may compare Aristotle's practical advice in the Politics on how a tyrant may avoid contempt. The malevolent tyrant (1313a35ff.), imitating Persian devices, will simply eliminate his rivals, discouraging everyone dignified or free (σεμυνός, ἐλεύθερος), for the subject with pretensions is a threat to his preeminence, ὑπεροχή (1314a4f.). The skilful tyrant (1314a31ff.) must indeed retain his dignity, but through virtue and especially military excellence, not Oriental indulgence (b18ff.). The solution to the threat of a preeminent subject is to create more of his ilk to rival him (1315a8f.). Insult is to be avoided at all costs, for honour is precious to more people than money (a14ff.). That the second method is more effective in preserving tyranny is backed up by historical examples, among them Pisistratus (1315b11ff.).
The parallel account in the *Ath.Pol.* (16) casts further light. This ruler's administration was moderate, μετριώς καὶ μᾶλλον πολιτικῶς ὃ τυραννικῶς. Especially by comparison with his sons, his reign was seen as a golden age. The most remarkable thing about him was 'τὸ δημοτικὸν εἶναι τῷ ἢθελ καὶ φιλανθρωπον'. He was such in that he governed under the laws, even submitting to trial by the Areopagus (cf. *Pol.* 1315b21ff.). He won over the upper classes by his company, ὀμολογεῖ, the lower by his benefactions.

In view of the later use of δημοτικὸν to translate *civile*, it is worth asking what its force is in this context. Usually in this essay and elsewhere in classical Greek a δημοτικὸς is a supporter of the party of the demos, a democrat. Pisistratus is explicitly cast as a champion of the demos and a demagogue. But there is perhaps another element. In the *Politics* (1308a10) oligarchs are recommended to treat each other δημοτικῶς: they should borrow the democratic ideal of τὸ ἔος and share office equally. What Pisistratus does as tyrant is not merely to cultivate the demos (he was also genial to the upper classes), but to submit to the principles of democratic equality, appearing before the courts.

Equality is certainly a principle Aristotle recommends for kings (1313a18ff.). The keynote of his advice for the preserval of kingly power is moderation, μετριότητας. Here the anecdote is told of Theopompus, who weakened the Spartan royal power by the creation of the ephorate, but replied to his wife's complaints that he had rendered it more permanent. Kings last by diminution of their power, by becoming less despotic and more egalitarian in their disposition (τοὺς ἢθελον ἔσοι μᾶλλον). In this context δημοτικὸς might be inappropriate, for Aristotle's king is no demagogue (1310b9); but the distinction is only one of nuance.
Mainstream post-Aristotelian kingship literature does not survive; but it seems to me an error to suppose that philosophers would have approved a 'neo-Pythagorean' Roi Soleil. Luxury, arrogance, inaccessibility and Persian style were surely set against simplicity, moderation, geniality and self-control. Heraclides' arguments for τρυφή are set up to be knocked down; Ariston of Ceos shows how it should be done. More typical than Diotogenes should be Aristeas, though the Jewish admixture is patent: a king may avoid ύπερηψαντία by preserving ύποτης and remembering he rules as man over men, ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρώπων, for God puts down the proud and exalts the humble.39

It makes sense that in certain circumstances, particularly in mainland Greece and Magna Graecia, the autocrat should indeed have found convenient Aristotle's advice to level himself down, rather than seeking to exaggerate the gulf between himself and his subjects. A handful of cases is perhaps enough to confirm that there were hellenistic rulers who adopted this tactic.

The recurrent problem is to find a pre-imperial account, since historians are inevitably infected by contemporary ways of looking at events. Diodorus can be relied on better than most to plagiarise, and his account of Agathocles (xix,1-9) is pertinent, based probably on Duris rather than the hostile Timaeus.40 The lowly-born Agathocles rose to power in Syracuse at the end of the 4th century B.C. by a classic Aristotelian combination of military talent and demagogy. His final stroke was a blood-bath of the upper classes. But then he changes his tune (9,lf.). He declares before the people that he is restoring pure autonomy, and, to escape the burdens of government, is returning to the status of a private citizen, ὄνομα τῶν πάσων. He changes from his military uniform into civilian clothes, as 'one of the many' (τῶν κοιλαών...ένα). It is all a bit of acting,
playing the δημοτικός, with the predictable result that he is entrusted with the absolute control of the city. Still, henceforth his style of rule is an utter change from his previous bloodthirstiness: he is well-disposed towards the masses, wins over everyone by kind words (λόγοις φιλανθρώπως); despite his power he never takes the diadem, that epitome of ceremonial finery (even when the title of βασιλεύς became the fashion he retained the laurel wreath of his priesthood); he took no bodyguard; and, unlike nearly all tyrants, made no practice of δυσεντευξία, unapproachability. If this account sounds almost a parody of the Roman recusatio, yet the behaviour is apparently an authentic Syracusan tradition. Gelon is described by Aelian as rushing naked into the agora and returning power to the state, so securing himself the monarchy as being δημοτικωτέρου ἢ κατὰ τὴν τῶν μονάρχων ἐξουσίαν.

The ideal is evident in the favourable tradition on Cleomenes III of Sparta. The paradox of this reactionary was that to achieve his aim of restoring the Sparta of tradition he turned himself into an autocrat of the Hellenistic type, overthrowing the constitutional βασιλεία. And yet, after his coup, Plutarch depicts him ruling in a style significantly different from his contemporary βασιλεύς (Cleom.xiii). These may have produced admiration (κατάχλης) in their audience by their extravagance (one thinks of Demetrius); but greater, says Plutarch, was the loathing engendered by their overbearing arrogance (ὑπεροφία and δυνος) and their harsh treatment of petitioners. Cleomenes on the other hand was a model of simplicity, ἀφέλης and εὐτελής, his unpretentious way of life in no way setting him apart from ordinary people. There was no purple and pomp, no crowd of attendants, no difficulties of transacting business through intermediaries. He met petitioners himself, gave them his time, chatted with them smiling and kindly (ἐλαφός καὶ φιλανθρώπως). So they were
enchanted and won over (κατεδήμωγωγόντο). Plutarch goes on to outline his hospitality: the fare was plain but the conversation charming. The king won the hearts of his guests by his ὄμιλια, not his expenditure. He thought truly regal behaviour (βασιλικὸς is always a word of approval) was to catch people by his Ἐπός not his purse.

For once we have a real glimpse of the source behind his picture: Athenaeus' interest in food has preserved the passage of Phylarchus from which Plutarch quarried this chapter. Here he describes the corruption of the Spartan Ὀλιγα, particularly under the kings Areus and Acrotatus who imported luxury, αὐλικὴν ἔξουσιαν ἐπλασάντες. Cleomenes, whose own life is ἀφελέστατος, reforms all, and there follows the description of his hospitality which Plutarch has closely paraphrased. What cannot be proved is that the account of Cleomenes' ἐντεύξεις came from the same source. But the essential elements are there, the contrast with Hellenistic court life, the condemnation of luxury as ύπερφάνου, and the Spartan's personal affability, αὐτὸς προσομιλᾶν at table. The passage bespeaks the same ideal as Phylarchus' distaste for Alexander's pomp (above).

The behaviour Polybius considered kingly is more available to plot, and the surviving parts of his Historiae are rich with kings. Two in particular are worth attention. His account of Philip V confirms Plutarch's picture of the reaction to diadem and purple in the world of the diadochi. The historian has very mixed feelings about this monarch. A model prince at the start, he degenerated to the worst tyrant. At one point in this checkered career, Philip tries to win himself more support among the Achaeans (x,26). Removing his diadem and purple, he posed as an equal, ἔσον τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρᾶδον τινα καὶ δημοτικὸν. It was a fraud, for the more demotic his clothing, the more monarchical became his use of power (ἔξοψια), and he abused the married women and young boys of the district.
It was in the democratic Argos that he put on this show. A second case, that of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, is something of a freak. People were, according to Polybius, bemused by his behaviour. Some took it as simplicity, ἄφελεμα, the ideal of Cleomenes, others thought he had left his senses. He would slip out of the palace, we are informed, and wander round the shops in town with a couple of friends - this the opposite of the grandiose ἐξέλαφτος. He kept company (ὀυλία) with all sorts, even members of the demos (μετὰ δημοτῶν ἀνθρώπων), and would join in the parties of the young (emperors won approval for accepting invitations). Often, like Philip, he would take off his royal robes, but it was in exchange for the toga; and wearing this, he would put himself up for some humble office like the aedileship or tribunate (δήμαρχος) and go down to the forum to canvas votes, greeting and embracing the electorate in Roman style. Once elected Antiochus would exercise jurisdiction, sitting on a curule chair in the agora, conscientiously giving judgement on private cases (Claudius did no less). After a paragraph on his liberality follows the extraordinary item that he washed in the public baths, even when they were crowded with δημοταλ. Indeed when a fellow-bather once envied him his unguents, the next day he had a whole bottle of myrrh poured over the man's head. The gesture recalls the generosity of Hadrian under similar circumstances (above p.306).

The image Antiochus was aiming at was surely that of the δημοτικός. If he caused bewilderment, it was not that the image he intended was incomprehensible or unsympathetic: he simply overdid it. Polybius dubbed him Ἐξωμανὸς: yet his final verdict was of a worthy king (xxviii,18).
How far, on this evidence, was the imperial ideal of civilitas anticipated in the Greek world, either at the theoretical level or as a pattern of behaviour?

If δημοτικός was used in the imperial period as an equivalent of civilis and was applied to very similar contexts in the pre-imperial period, this is certainly not to say that τὸ δημοτικὸν was a hellenistic regal ideal. It is little more than a word appropriate for the tactic of a ruler attempting to make himself acceptable in a democratic society. But moderation was certainly an ideal, and adjectives like κοινὸς, ὁσος, εὐροσοφός, εὐπροσήγορος, εὖχαρος and the like were as applicable in praise of a Greek king as later to a Roman emperor. The fundamental problem that Greek and Roman autocrats had in common was one of status: how to ensure the maximum of respect for themselves without offending the sensibilities of their subjects. The philosophical answer was that ὑπεροχὴ was a matter of superiority in virtue, and that it could never be bolstered by external techniques such as ceremony, let alone the humiliation of others. Such moral superiority was consonant with Aristotelian μεγαλοψυχία (but scarcely with Diogenes' σεμνότης). Such philosophical formulations surely had direct influence on the doctrines, found in Pliny the Younger and later authors, that the emperor's fastigium can never be diminished if he submits himself and treats his subjects as equals.

At a theoretical level the Greeks therefore contributed to the formulation of civilitas. But at a practical level, the pattern of behaviour welcomed in an emperor only overlapped partially with that of a Greek autocrat. In Greek sources the emphasis is on ceremonial dress and style, and on the degree of accessibility and affability at the great
occasions of contact: the conduct of business (χρηματισμός), the reception of petitioners (ἐκπέμψας), the progress (ἐξελασιας), and social occasions, ὁμιλία, whether the dinner-table or the bath. The same points of contact mattered for the Roman emperor, as Millar has shown (though it should be observed that it is from the Greek part of the empire that the bulk of his evidence comes). Augustus' comitas to petitioners is indeed part of the ideal. But ceremonial finery is barely an issue for the Romans, at least before Diocletian. Caligula's dress was shocking, neither traditional nor civil, not even manly or human (Cal.52); but dress does not feature in normal discussions of civility and arrogance. On the other hand, the social contacts (ὁμιλία) with the aristocracy loom much larger in the Roman tradition: the exchange of officia, of hospitality, of sick-bed visits and so on belong much more clearly to a Roman pattern of life, though they have their Greek analogues.

Missing (with rare exceptions) from the Greek picture are the most important elements of civilitas, springing from Roman political life: the refusal of honours, the respect for the senate and its libertas and the respect for the populus Romanus especially at elections and at what replaced them as a popular forum, the games.

In words, ideas, situations, patterns of society and of behaviour, there is overlap between Greek and Roman; but not identity.
Appendix A

Civility in Greek Imperial authors

Some further evidence may be assembled to illustrate (i) the use of ὑπαικτικός in the imperial period as an equivalent to civilis, and (ii) the continuity of the Greek ideal of regal simplicity and approachability.

i) To the passages of Cassius Dio and others where ὑπαικτικός approximates to civilis may be added the following (the list is not complete). a) Dionysius Halicarn. AR iv,10,1: Servius Tullius is μετρος καὶ ὑπαικτικός to the humble; 25,1-2 he seems ὑπαικτικός in weakening his power by surrendering civil jurisdiction; cf. 36,1-2 for his lack of pomp and pride, and behaviour ὡς ἑαυτοῦ λέγωσιν. b) Josephus AJ vii,215: Rehoboam, faced with popular disquiet, is advised to associate with the people in a friendly fashion, καὶ ὑπαικτικότερον ἢ κατὰ βασιλείας ὅγκον, on the grounds that subjects like mildness and 'τὸ λογίων' in kings. Contrast I Kings 12,1-14 (I Chron.10) where he is advised to be the servant of his people. Similarly AJ iii,212: Moses refuses all honours, behaves as a private citizen (ὑποκείμενος) in dress, and in other respects acts ὑπαικτικότερον, unwilling to appear different from the many. c) Arrian Anat.vi,4,7: Alexander seemed ὑπαικτικόν τε καὶ Φιλάτατον in attending the weddings of his companions. For Alexander cf. Polyaeus.iv,3,24 (below) and Curtius vi,6,1f. d) Appian Mithr.55: Pompey's dismissal of his army at Brundisium is ὑπαικτικόν, cf. Veil.Pat.ii,40,3 'civilis reditus'; Pompey is similarly ὑπαικτικός at BC ii,29 & 86. e) Polyaeus iv,3,24: Alexander's style of jurisdiction over Greeks was μετρόν καὶ ὑπαικτικόν; id. v,3,7, the Syracusans gave Agathocles power ὡς ἀνδρὶ ὑπαικτικό καὶ μετρῷ; cf. above on Diodorus' account. g) Aelian VH ii,20; this is the famous anecdote in which Antigonus declares kingship to be an ἐνθάδεον δουλεῖαν. The king is characterised as ὑπαικτικόν καὶ πρόον. vi,11 Gelon is given power after a show of refusal as appearing ὑπαικτικωτέρον ἢ κατὰ τὴν τῶν μονάρχων ἐξουσίαν (cf. above p.321). h) For the use of ὑπαικτικός in Plutarch's Lives see Wardman (1974), 68 and B. Bucher-Isler, Norm und Individualität in den Biographien Plutarchs (Bern 1972), 16. It has many nuances, ranging from 'plebeian', 'popular', 'democratic', 'demagogic', to something close to 'civil'. There is in Plut a frequent contrast between the plain and simple style of life and the grandiosity of the great, and in this context ὑπαικτικός is frequently applied to way of life (δύνατα), Ant.xxi,2 (of Pompey; cf. Pompei.ii,5,5 on his difficulties in adapting to ὑποκείμεναι δύναμιν); Mar.vi,2; Nic.xi,2; Lyc.xiii,4, and to receptions, salutationes and social intercourse, Crass.iii,5; Galb.xi,2; Ages.vii,3; Cat.mi.xxxv,5, Demetrxiii,4. It is also contrasted with tyranny, esp. Rom.xxxi (cf. xxvi,1); Sol.xxvii,8; Publ.xxv,5; and it is applied to the voluntary diminution of royal power, Lyc.vi,4 (the Theopompus anecdote). In the imperial lives it may conceivably be a translation of civile: cf. Oth.i.3 address to senate ὑπαικτικά καὶ φλάνθωσα διαλέξεις, cf. T. Hist.iv,3 'civilia de se...et egregia'; Oth.vi,5 of arrogance of Caecina; Galb.xv,1 executions of senators without hearing not lawful νησὶ ὑπαικτικῷς, cf. S. Tit.6,1 'incivilius et violentius' of summary executions.

Together these passages demonstrate that ὑπαικτικός, with its connotation of 'equality' became established in the imperial period as the appropriate word for the grand man who laid aside his grandeur. If
a calque had to be formed, πολιτικός might have been expected; yet, despite the application of this word to mores facillimi, it never became an equivalent of civilis, as can be seen from the collection of material in F. Schotten, Zur Bedeutungsentwicklung des Adjektivs πολιτικός, Diss. Köln 1966, esp. ch.V.

ii) Historians who used ὀμοτικός in a sense approaching civilis were surely in part influenced by Roman circumstances and preoccupations (note the themes of recusatio and living as a privatus in cases cited above). But in theoretical writings there is little sign that τὸ ὀμοτικὸν ever became an 'ideal' in the fashion of φιλανθρωπία or εὐρεφοσία. A few passages may be assembled to show the continuity of hellenistic ideas in this area.

a) Plutarch comes closest to idealising τὸ ὀμοτικὸν. In the Politica Parangelmata he contrasts the Homeric kings who puff themselves up with purple, sceptre and guards with the plain man's politician, ἀνδρικὸν ἐξωτικὸν ἐξ ἰματίου καὶ σχήματος ὀμοτικοῦ. He passes no judgement here, though his sympathies are evidently with the latter (5, 801D-E). Later in the same work (31.823A-D) he portrays his ideal. The statesman must not be haughty but approachable, εὐκροσίγορος καὶ κοσμὸς, a haven to those in need; no crowd of attendants around him at the baths or theatre, in his dress and way of life he will be ἔος καὶ ἄραξ, as if he wished to ὀμοθησεῖ καὶ συνανθρωπεῖ τοὺς πολίτες, to be, that is, civilis and humanus. Only such a man will the many consider ὀμοτικὸν (the statesman Plutarch is defining) καὶ ὀμοτικὸν καὶ ἄρχωντα; deceived initially by the glitter of a Demetrius (cf. Demetr.xlii,4 and Pyrrh.xi,4), they will soon discover his true Ἡθος.

b) Dio Chrysostom's views are considerably less egalitarian. Though he lets Diogenes laugh at Alexander's diadem, all but sprouting a tiara like a coxcomb, and urge him to go around in the poor man's tunic (or. iv,66), he defends Homer for equipping Agamemnon in purple (ii,49): the commander should not appear ταπεινῶν or similar to the many or θάλασσας but grander than them in clothing and σεμνότερον. He is indeed here trying to show the difference between the Homeric picture and τυραπή, clothing that is womanly and ποικίλη. But his symbolic ideal of Basileia opposed to Tyrannis equally supports σεμνότης (i,66ff.). These ladies are found enthroned on mountain-tops, symbolising their ῥυθμον, though Basileia's is higher (66). She is large and beautiful, dressed in white, with a gleaming sceptre. Her face is bright (φαίνοντον) and σεμνον, inspiring confidence in the good, too bright, like the sun, for the bad to behold. There is respectful hush in her presence (70-72). Tyrannis tries to mimic her (78ff.) but becomes a horrid caricature. All is bogus glitter, δίαξονεια and τρυφή, multicoloured robes, costly throne and sceptres, diadem and tiaras. She imitates Basileia's Ἡθος, but the engaging smile becomes a demeaning (ταπεινὸν) leer, the dignified (σεμνὸν) gaze a fierce scowl. To appear μεγαλοφορῶν, she does not look those who approach in the face and consequently earns their hatred.

c) Traditional thought lies beneath the ruminations of the emperor Marcus (see refs. to Brunt above ch.X,1 n.1) and Roman sensibilities are clothed in hellenistic terminology. For him Antoninus embodied the ideal: benignant in expression (i,16,11 τὸ φαίνοντον; vi,30,5 τὸ εὐθυδον τὸν προσώπου), he gave easy ear (i,16,4), practised τὸ εὐθυμολογουν and
if not to excess (i,16,19). Genuine σεμνότης (vi,30,1 cf. ii,5,1) need not end in τύφος (i,16,16). Without becoming shabby, he had no inclination to καλλωπισμός and finery (i,16,20 & 26; vi,30,9), restrained himself in diet (vi,30,11) and passions (i,16,7). Thoughtful for his friends (i,16,8 κοινονομοσυνή), neither honours nor flattery affected him (i,16,2 & 13). It was living at this court that Marcus was freed of τύφος and came to appreciate the dispensibility of guards and finery and pomp; like a private citizen he could συστάλλεν ἐαυτόν without behaving more lazily or ταυενότερον than a ruler should (i,17,5). With such an ideal a man, far from allowing himself to be deified, is not even caesarified (vi,30,1). But Marcus had no sympathy for τὸ δημοκρατικόν (i,16,15) and does not use the word δημοτικός. That agrees with Cassius Dio's representation of his style (lxix,6), though Herodian testifies to his proper treatment of petitioners (i,3,4).

d) POLLUX ASSEMBLES THE Clichés OF PRAISE AND CRITICISM OF A RULER (i,40-42): the king, among much else, is εὐπρόσωπος, εὐπρόσδοχος, εὐπρόσγνωρος, εὔνετυκτος, the tyrant ἔνεποσ, ἔνεποπόντος, δυσπρόσωπος, δυσπρόσδοχος, δυσπρόσγνωρος, δυσενέτυκτος, βαρύς, ἐπαχθής.

e) ENCOMIASTS FOLLOW MENANDER'S RECOMMENDATION TO PRAISE THE KING FOR HIS AVAILABILITY TO PETITIONERS (p.375,9f. Spengel), though not always under the heading of ὄντες σήμερον that he prescribes. The model panegyric preserved in the Aristidean Corpus (ix) branches off from ὄντες σήμερον to the non-canonical virtue of φιλανθρωπία (23-24 Keil). Large among the proofs of this is the emperor's κοινοτάτος τρόπος to those for whatever reason ἐνυχώνοντες, in his appearance, converse and lack of fuss over being reached. He does not believe that to be famed as great and admirable he must make himself σάνων and δυσφρόσδοχον, but the opposite. The orator contrasts him with the regent Pausanias who forgot himself and the ways of home (cf. above). This emperor demonstrated that one could remain the same καὶ ὑδότην καὶ βασιλέα. The theme of approachability could be pursued far in encomium (e.g. Julian or.i,45D; Themist.xv,190C etc.).

f) THE LAST WORD MAY BE LEFT WITH SYNESIUS OF CYRINE, DELIVERING HIS WITHERING ATTACK ON THE COURT CEREMONIAL TO WHICH THE YOUNG ARCADIUS SUCCEEDED (περὶ Βασ. xivff.). All this σεμνότης, this terror of becoming mortal (ἐξανθρωποθετήτε) and an everyday sight, has walled emperors up in themselves; seeing nothing, hearing nothing, reduced to physical pleasures of the basest - the life of a sea-shell. Only the pin-heads can get access to the palace. Yet empires are built not by pleasure seekers but by ἄνδρες δημοτικοὶ τε καὶ στρατιώται (xiv). Gone are the traditions of the old Romans who conquered continents: yet what has been the improvement since emperors adapted their peacock glory of purple and gold and jewelry, afraid like lizards in their holes to peep out lest they be found out ὅπο τῶν ἄνθρωπων ὄντες ἀνθρωποι; (xv) The good king must be κοινός, ἀγάδος and ἄνθρωπος. The tyrant hides to appear σὺν ἐκτιλήξει, but no false σεμνότης will help him to escape κατασφόνησις. The sun appears daily and is never despised (note the inversion of the topic of the king ἕλιομορφος); let the king do likewise and be κοινότατος. Who laughed at Xenophon's lame king? (xvii,20). At the end of eight centuries the Agesilaus, no less than the Cyropaedia, could still be held up to an emperor as a model.
Appendix B

Vagrant Anecdotes

The tale of Hadrian and the old woman petitioner, apparently illuminating for the way the emperor was seen, proves to be a familiar hellenistic anecdote (Millar, The Emperor, 3). In their nature such anecdotes, self-contained and all too loosely anchored to any narrative context, can wander far from their original home. The historian, long since suspicious of their factual content, cannot even be confident of using them as indications of attitudes (cf. R. Saller, Greece and Rome, forthcoming). An interesting group attaches to the ideal of 'civilitas', and it is possible to detect traces of the routes along which they have travelled.

Three species of ancient literature are especially given to the historical anecdote: historical biography (or biographical history) where the trivial tale may illuminate character; philosophy, where it may illustrate and corroborate a general point; and anthologies of stories and sayings, like Valerius Maximus, Plutarch's Apophthegmata, or Stobaeus' Florilegium. The directions in which anecdotes may move between the three naturally vary. The most obvious route is from history to philosophy to florilegium. Thus two anecdotes which Ariston of Ceos used to illustrate his treatise μεταφυσικός, that of Dion and Ptoleodorus of Megara, and that of Demetrius and his troops (F13 VI), which are also found in Plutarch's Lives (Dion xvii and Pyrrh.xi,9 of Demetrius) are perhaps more likely to have been taken by both Ariston and Plutarch from histories, though of course as a philosopher Plutarch might have taken them from a philosophical treatise. But Seneca's tale of the clemency of the young Nero (clem.ii,1) is surely an original contribution, which passed from philosophical exemplum to biography (S. Ner.10).

Dio's story of Hadrian and the old woman is clearly derivative. Whence? Apparently (Millar 3) the same tale is attributed to Philip II of Macedon (Plut. Apophth.Reg.179C-D, Philip 31), to Demetrius Poliorcetes (Plut. Demetr.xlii,7) and to Antipater (Stob.iii,13,48). The matter is not quite so confusing. At Demetr.xlii,7 Plutarch is contrasting the regal style of Philip, μέτρως and κοινός, with that of Demetrius, failing to be δημοτικός. The anecdote surely belongs to Philip, who learnt his lesson from the old woman, and in future gave his time to jurisdiction. Stobaeus is muddled. His characters have become Antipater and a rustic (ἀγροτικός). He quotes as his source Serenus, a philosopher according to the bibliography (= Photius 167 p.114B). The next anecdote (13,49), from the same source, is one of Philip and jurisdiction, also given by Plutarch among the sayings of this king (178F, Philip 24). 'Serenus', then, collected anecdotes in the manner of (even deriving from ?) Plutarch; and either Serenus or Stobaeus has confused the attribution. They have similarly confused the second anecdote (a litigant appeals against the inattentive Philip to the same monarch 'ἐγγοργότα') for the appellant, named by Plutarch as Machaetas, has become the προσβοτος of the first anecdote. The name Antipater might derive from a third anecdote (Plut. 179B, Philip 27) which Stobaeus does not quote.
Passing from collection to collection, anecdotes naturally become muddled. Dio (or his source) might have taken his Hadrian anecdote from such a collection. But where did Plutarch find it? A history of Philip is a possibility; but at Demetr.xlii,7 the story comes in the context of moralisation about the duties of a king, not in a history of Philip. Plutarch may have found it in a similar moralising context. The obvious possibility is a treatise περὶ βασιλείας, but kings were supposed to read all sorts of philosophy and it might equally suit a discourse on (e.g.) pride.

The movement from philosophical treatise to anthology to historical biography can be illustrated by two anecdotes of Severus Alexander in the SHA Life.

1) Alex.Sev.20,3. In corroboratior of this emperor's exceptional civilitas, the story is told of how his wife and mother reproached him for making his power weaker and more contemptible; he retorts 'sed securiorem atque diuturniorem'. The anecdote originally belongs to the moderate king Theopompus of Sparta, thought to have introduced the ephorate. In the earliest version, Aristotle Pol.v,11,1313a26ff., Theopompus retorts to his wife's complaints that he will pass on his kingship πολυχρονωτέραν. This illustrates his moderation (μετράσαντος τοτε τε ἄλλος καὶ...), for Aristotle the best method of preserving monarchical power. Valerius Maximus iv,1 ext.8 gives the same tale as an example of moderatio (the retort being 'sed diuturniorem'). Plutarch twice uses the anecdote, in the Life of Lycurgus vii,4, a roughly narrative context, (with the retort 'χρονωτέραν') and in his kingship treatise ad princ.inerud.1,779E (with the retort 'Βαυατέραν'). The Alex.Sev. version is the first to combine the notions of security and permanency so may depend on a further version. Clearly the story is a classic one for illustrating the 'duties of a king' as conceived of by Greek philosophers, and doubtless featured in περὶ βασιλείας treatises. The imperial biographer has nothing but commonplaces to demonstrate this emperor's civility, and perhaps drew on philosophical literature, either directly, or through an anthology. (Plut. Apophth.Regum and Stobaeus iv,7 περὶ βασιλείας are good examples of anthologies on the subject of kingship.)

2) Alex.Sev.20,4: 'dies denique nunquam transitit quando non aliquod mansuetum civile pium fecit, sed ita ut aerarium non everteret'. Though this is not so clearly a case of borrowing, the claim that Severus made a benefaction every day is related to the tale of Titus, that when one day passed without a benefaction ('nihil cuiquam toto die praestitisset') he lamented 'amici diem perdidi' (S. Tit.8,1→Epit.x,9; Eutrop.vii,21,3; Hier. chron.a.2095; Auson. Grat.Act.xvi,72). Titus' benevolent remark may actually have been made. If so, this princeps, unusually influenced by eastern traditions (he only just relinquished Berenice and a court of eunuchs Tit.7,2) was thinking of the saying commonly attributed to the idealised Alexander the Great: 'ἓνωμεν οὖν ἐβασιλεύσα· οὐδὲν γάρ εὗ ἐκουίνα' (Vita Marciana Aristoteles 276a; taken by Rose fr.646 as a fragment of A.'s περὶ βασιλείας). This is the form in which the saying is attributed to Titus by Greek sources, Themistius (or.vi,80a; xiii,174c; xviii,225a; cf. xv,193a) and Zonaras (11,18; not Dio, cf. Boissevain ad loc.).
O. Luschnat (Philol.109, 1965, 297ff.) has attempted to trace Alexander's saying further in the Gnomologia. Alexander is credited with confessing to three great regrets, one of them that he spent one day δόξαθετός (Gnom.Bas.12 p.145 Froben). A day 'without a testament' sounds meaningless, and Luschnat suggests that it means 'without a benefaction' and is a variant of the 'today I did not rule' story. If this is correct, light is cast on a further saying attributed to the dying Titus, reported by Suetonius (10,1) as mystifying: he said that he had committed no 'factum paenitendum' except one. Perhaps the sin was not one of commission, as his hearers assumed, but one of omission: he spent that famous day δόξαθετος. In a reign of two years, two months and twenty days, it is almost conceivable.

But in this instance the generalisation in Alex.Sev. is only approximately similar to the Alexander and Titus stories. It merely reflects the widespread notion, doubtless to be found in any treatise περί βασιλείας, that the perfect ruler does something good ('grants a boon') every day. Josephus employs the same topic in his discussion of Jehoshaphat (AJ viii,393f., καὶ τὴ ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἑώρων ποιήσας) and doubtless it was widespread among hellenistic historians.

What conclusions do the wanderings of these anecdotes permit? It is not to undermine the credentials of every anecdote (all anecdotes are automatically under suspicion). It merely casts doubt on the credentials of anecdotes about Roman emperors that reflect the Greek idealised conception of a monarch as one whose role is to grant boons, distribute justice, and moderate his own power. The popularity of anthologies of sayings and of discourses on kingship under the empire shows that the Greek ideals were still very much felt to be relevant (especially by Greeks) and might even influence the sayings and actions of a hellenising ruler like Titus (or Hadrian ?). Romans perhaps swallowed these ideas. Nevertheless, left to himself a Roman may well have felt that a princeps had more important things to do than giving justice to old ladies.
Epilogue

From the Lives of twelve successive Caesars some sort of impression emerges of how Suetonius saw an emperor. How illuminating is his picture of the emperor for our understanding of the Empire? By way of recapitulating the main themes of the preceding pages, a brief summary may be made between the images of the emperor in Suetonius, and in three other authors, two ancient and one modern.

Dio Chrysostom's orations On Kingship may be taken as a representative product of Greek political philosophy. Though addressed to Trajan, they might have been written under almost any ruler over the long centuries that lead from Alexander's successors to Byzantium. Set beside the Caesars, they are disconcertingly vague. The customary antithesis is developed between the ideal autocrat, the basileus, philanthropic, beneficent and tireless in labouring like the good shepherd for the welfare and salvation of his devoted flock; and the tyrant, selfish and indolent, harsh to his cowed subjects and indulgent of his own pleasures. The same contrast underlies the Caesars; even to some extent the tendency to polarise the good and the bad. But the whole emphasis in Suetonius lies not on the principles but on the details, on the precise acts, great and small, by which emperors antagonised the Roman people or endeared themselves to it. There is no sign that Suetonius set out to construct a Mirror of Princes, an anatomy of Good Rule or of Tyranny. The reader is (or should be) always aware that this author is a scholar and antiquarian, not a philosopher. He propounds no new insights into the nature of autocracy; he limits himself to the amassing and organisation of specific information. Many items may satisfy little more than idle curiosity; yet it is the consistency with which he adduces items of the same sort in life after life which indicates that he had a clear conception of what an emperor should and should not be.
Curiosity for the trivial is at its highest where the fervour of admiration for a good ruler is at its most palpable, in the Life of Augustus. Like all Roman, and indeed most ancient historians, Suetonius must have seen the past as offering lessons to the present, lessons perhaps more digestible than those of philosophy: 'pauci prudentia honesta ab deterioribus, utilia ab noxiis discernunt, plures aliorum eventis docentur' (T. Ann. 4, 33).

Comparison with Tacitus himself is less straightforward, for the extraordinary vigour and incisiveness of the historian's mind makes Suetonius appear by comparison flaccid and petty. Decades of Quellenforschung have put it beyond doubt that our surviving historical authorities for the early empire drew on substantially the same fund of historiographical sources; that the difference in their portraits of each emperor are almost exclusively matters of personal touch; and that the judgements or prejudices of these authors are substantially the same. To that extent, where Tacitus survives, Suetonius can offer little more than confirmation that the historian's judgement of an emperor reflects the view of the Roman educated upper classes as a whole, not of a small senatorial clique. Even so, within these limitations, a real contrast is possible, immediately manifest in the formal distinction between annals and scholarly biography. The emphasis of the two authors is diametrically opposed: in one the grand and public event predominates, the struggle for power, the movements of armies, the senatorial debate; while Suetonius offers rather the trivial and private, the ephemera of administration, the domestic, the anecdotal. Tacitus is more revealing, Suetonius more intimate. We must turn to Tacitus to understand the conflict between autocracy and liberty; yet the corollary of the observation that one man has a monopoly of power is that the intimate features of that man acquire
a disproportionate significance. Suetonius gives a more reliable picture of what being an emperor involved from day to day. In this it is surely not mere wishful thinking to detect the hand of the secretary as opposed to that of the consular.

The emperor in action from day to day forms the main focus of Fergus Millar's study of The Emperor in the Roman World, and as a final comparison Millar's emperor may be set off against Suetonius'. In a sense comparison is impossible, for the evidence of Suetonius has been very thoroughly absorbed into Millar's book. If there is a contrast, it lies between two modern interpretations of Suetonius. But perhaps, with due caution, one observation may be made. At the heart of Millar's book lies a vision of the Roman Emperor derived from a reading of Josephus (Preface xi). The vision is a Greek one, of the ruler as distributor of benefits and justice, seated impassive on his throne of judgement while individuals, organisations and communities bombard him with complaints and requests. The image is as valid for Constantine as it would be for Xenophon's idealised Cyrus. But 'the emperor' (if one may legitimately so generalise) may be seen in other lights no less authentic. This is not the vision that emerges from a reading of the Caesars, even though many glimpses of Caesars at work corroborate the picture. In order to make sense of Suetonius' image of the emperor, a rather different theme, so it seems to me, should be stressed: a theme that may be summed up as 'order and status'. Suetonius' Caesars belong in the context of a society, the res publica Romana. It is a society both structured and unified: structured by a hierarchy of rank and dignity, unified by the ideal that the structure is established for the benefit of all its members, not of any single sector. What most concerns Suetonius is the emperor's relationship with this society as a whole. He is seen as essential for
its preservation: it is the emperor who after civil war can establish a new order, based on respect for tradition, and enhance it by new institutions. He bears responsibility for its welfare; for all its parts from high to low, from senate to slave or client king, in all its aspects, military, civil, religious and moral. Measures that enhance its order and dignity are his duty, measures that bring confusion and disorder are his undoing. His virtues lie in his relationship with his subjects as a whole. His generosity, being a natural characteristic, should benefit all ranks, omnes ordines, not just the politically sensitive urban populace, and will entail no extortion. His clemency is not limited to the political relationship with senate and senators, but is manifested in mildness to all orders. Because the emperor is so vital a component of the society he rules, his private life too is a matter of public concern; he must follow the moral code of the society for which he himself bears responsibility. Finally this author, so sensitive to questions of dignity and status, lays emphasis on the virtue of civility, respect for the status of the subject at the expense of the diminution of the ruler's own dignity; a respect which is owed to all ranks high and low, though not in an egalitarian fashion, but to each in proportion to his standing.

There can be no claims to novelty in this Suetonian conception of the emperor as the guardian of the traditional social order. But perhaps the antiquarian and secretary was well placed to see what the order owed to innumerable individual acts by the great men of the past, and how it was sustained by innumerable individual acts by the great man of the present.
SUETONIUS ON THE EMPEROR:

STUDIES IN THE REPRESENTATION OF THE EMPEROR
IN THE CAESARS

by

A. F. WALLACE-HADRILL

VOL II

Thesis submitted for the degree of D.Phil.
in the Michaelmas Term 1979
Chapter I

The Portrayal of the Emperor

1. For the distinction in rhetoric, esp. Arist. Rhet. iii, 16, 1416B 16f.; see below ch. II (2). Note also in historiography the Ephoran principle of organisation κατὰ γένος recommended by Diodorus v, 1, 4 (though for difficulties in its interpretation G. L. Barber, The Historian Ephorus (1935), 17ff.)


5. The most cogent presentation of the case against rubrics is that of Flach (1972). For errors cf. D'Antò (1957) and the critique of Ailloud (1931), xxxvi f. For the habit of generalisation cf. Townend (1959), 288f.


7. This is the method of Bringmann.

8. The fall-off in quality is demonstrated by Townend (1959), esp. 289. For discussion of the causes, see below ch. V p. 117.

9. On the aims and strengths of S. see the just appraisal of Steidle by Drexler (1969), esp. 263ff. See also Funaioli (1932), 615 who, for all criticism, sees in S. 'ein immer reges Aufmerken ... auf das, was er [der Herrscher] war oder zu sein schien'.


11. See below ch. VI p. 129 for a brief discussion of S.'s views on the emperor as commander.

12. Emphasised by Drexler (above n. 9).


15. Above n.4 for the contrast between biography and history. Biographers were conscious of the triviality of some of their material, e.g. SHA Quadr.Tyr.11.4 'longum est frivola quaeque conectere, odiosum dicere, quali statura fuerit, quo corpore, quo decoro, quid biberit, quid comederit....'. Note the defensive tone of S. Jul.44.4 'non alienum erit summam exponere'; Aug.76 'nam ne haec quidem omiserim'.

16. Leo 143f.

17. The distinction of A. Weizsäcker, Untersuchungen über Plutarchs biographische Technik (Berlin 1931).

18. Esp. 66ff.

19. This is perhaps the most important review of Steidle. However it seems wrong to me to use the thumbnail sketches of the Ptolemies in P.Haun.6 as evidence of hellenistic political biography (see also Momigliano 85). A sketch in a single sentence is not the same as a full-scale Life. These sketches are now perhaps paralleled by P.Oxy.2821, a fragment of a Ptolemaic pedigree with brief identifications of the characters involved (Theoxena, Agathocles). I am grateful to Mr. P. J. Parsons for this reference. See also Italo Gallo, Frammenti Biografici da Papiri vol.i, La Biografia politica (Rome 1975).

20. Compare Plautinische Forschungen (1895), ch.I & II.

21. It is normally assumed that the de viris illustribus and most of the other scholarly works were written earlier than the Caesars, even if the de Grammaticis is possibly later (Brugnoli (1968), 33f.). This is in general probable in view of his career, cf. Millar 91; perhaps the strongest internal arguments are the numerous links between the Caesars and other works emphasised throughout by Macé. (So p.320 'On retrouve sans cesse chez le biographe des Césars la méthode, les tendances et les goûts de l'auteur des Reliquiae.') On the Suetonian authorship of the Donatus Life of Vergil see H. Naumann, Philol.108, 1974, 131ff.

22. So Momigliano (1971), 86f. Despite doubts about Leo, he still writes (100): 'Suetonius wrote biographies of Caesars which applied to the emperors methods of description and documentation more usually meant to satisfy curiosity about literary men - common mortals'. This is a fair comment of S.'s scholarly approach to imperial biography: it does not follow that he misrepresented emperors.

23. At p.287 n.45 he takes issue with Steidle on the influence of 'das Römische' rather than the scholarly biographical tradition. But this is not an 'either-or' question.

24. For analysis in general: Schmidt (1891), 22-42; Leo 2-10; Steidle passim, esp. 111-2; Mouchová (1968), 17ff. & 79ff.; Cizek (1977), 49ff. For individual lives (apart from the above) note esp. for Aug., Hanslik (1954); Luck (1964,2); Tib., Döpp (1972), Wittke (1974); Claud. and Ner., Paratore (1959), Croisille (1969/70); Ner., Bradley (1978); Calb., Oth.,
I Portrayal

Vit., Venini (1974); Tit., Luck (1964,1).

25. Luck (1964,2), for instance, tries to evade the difficulty by taking Aug. as a 'typical' specimen; Gugel (1977), 45 denies its typicality. Steidle (e.g. 127) is rightly critical of Leo's attempt to extrapolate one single typical format. Also Ailloud (1931), xxvii.

26. Demonstrated at length by Mouchová (1968), 18ff.


28. Ausonius Monosticha 1,5 (on the Caesars); so Leo 2.

29. Vit.17,2 'erat enim...' ingeniously adapts the traditional narrative (T. Hist.iii,84f.). For further details, Leo remains the most succinct presentation.

30. E.g. Leo 2 'Es wird erzählt ... dann rubricirend ...'; Mouchová ch.II 'Rubric und Erzählung'. Cizek (1977), 56ff. prefers the terminology 'chronologique-eidologique'. Gugel (1977), esp. 144ff. argues for a subtler blend of narrative and rubric.


32. Excellently brought out by the discussion of Venini (1974).

33. E.g. Steidle 68ff.

34. The criticisms of Bringmann (1971) are salutory, but exaggerated.

35. For details see ch.II(1).

36. Cf. Steidle 111f. For details, below ch.II(3).

37. Below ch.II(1).
Chapter II

1. Biographical Topics


2. Stuart (1928), 189ff.; Steidle 129ff. Further below.

3. IG ii,3,2084, quoted by Lattimore (1962), 267. The whole of Lattimore's chapter on biographical themes in epitaphs (266ff.) is of interest.


6. On this dilemma of biographers see the first chapter of Garraty, too inclined, however, to seek a compromise.

7. The Lives of poets are cited in the edition of A. Rostagni, Suetionio de Poetis e biografi minori (Turin 1944); the de grammaticis et rhetoribus from the Teubner text of G. Brugnoli (Leipzig 1963).

8. All Caesars except Tit. and Dom. (shared with Vesp.); in Plutarch all but Nic., Flam., Camill.

9. Note especially where there is dispute over these points: Plut. Brut. i,4-5; Dem.iv,1; Cic.i,1; Phoc.iv,1; as S. Aug.2,3; Vit.1-2,1; Vesp.1,4. Disputed at de Gramm.11 (Valerius Cato); 20 (Hyginus). On status in these Lives below ch.III.

10. Esp. Tib.2,1 on the mixed record of the Claudii. Note also the model government of Aug.'s father (3,2) and the financial activities of Vesp.'s ancestors (1,2).

11. Names: Plut. Publ.i,1; Cat.ma.i,2; Per.iii,2; Fab. Max.i,3; Marcell.i,1; Dem.iv,3-5; Cic.i,2-4; Mar.i; cf. Pyrrh.i,2 & Artax.i,1. Suet. Aug.7; Tib.1,2; & 3,2; Cal.9; Cl.2,1; Ner.1,1; Calb.3,1; de Gramm.3,2 (Aelius); 18 (Crassicius); cf. 6 (Aurelius Oppilius, a point of spelling); 10 (Ateius); also Verg.41. (N.B. etymologies of other nomina: Thes.iv,1; Rom.vi,2; Fab.Max.i,2; Aem.ii,1.)

12. Birth: Aug.5; Tib.5, Cal.8, Cl.2,1; Ner.6,1-2; Calb.4,1; Oth.2,1; Vit.3,2; Vesp.2,1; Tit.1; Dom.1,1. Also Verg.6-22; Hor.71; de Gramm.10 (Atelius); Plut. Num.iii,4; Per.iii,2; Cic.II,1; Alex.II,2-iii,5.
II.1 Biographical Topics

Dreams & portents: Plut. Per., Cic., Alex.; cf. Suet. Ner., Vit., Verg.8-22; (and a little later in Galb. & Tit.).

17. Accession marked by age at Cl.10,1 and Ner.8; similarly for Orbilius' arrival in Rome de Gramm.9; cf. Verg.23-27 for arrival in Rome, but no age given.
Turning points in Plut.: Num.v,1; Sull.vi,10; Pomp.vi,3; Aem.x,i; Dem. xii,i; Alex.xi,i; Demetr.v,2; Ag.iv; Philop.v,1; Flam.i,2. Also cf. Theas.xii,1 arrival in Athens marked by a precise date.

18. τροφή & παιδεία in Plut. passim; cf. S. Aug.6; Ner.6,3; Vesp.2,1; Tit.2; de Gramm.7 (Gniphos); 21 (Melissus). Details of education in S. are usually postponed to the section on studia liberalia (below).

19. Despite title and introduction (i,1,6) the Cyrop. is of course about much more than upbringing. For hellenistic works under its influence (e.g. πῶς 'Αλέξανδρος ἡκέθη D.L.6,84) see Leo 252f.

20. Steidle 111.

21. prima stipendia: Suet. Jul.2; Aug.8,1; Tib.9; Tit.4,1; πρῶται στρατευο: Plut. Cat.ma.1,6; Coriol.iii,1; Sert.iii,1; Demetr.v,2 (with age); Mar. iii,2.

22. S. Aug.6 (locus...permodicus); Ner.6,3; Dom.1,1 (tanta inopia); cf. Plut. Lys.ii,1; Sull.i,1-4; Pelop.iii,1; Crass.i,1; Sol.ii,1; Dem.iv,2.

23. Death of father: Plut. Cim.iv,4 (μετράκων); Dem.iv,2 (ἐπταύτης); Alex. x,4f. (age 20); Arat.ii,1-2 (ἐπταυτή καταλαθεμένον); without age: Lyc. ii,3; Pomp.iv,1; Cleom.iii,1; Artax.iii,1. Suet. Jul.1,1; Aug.8,1; Tib.6,4; Cl.2,1 (infans relictus); Ner.6,3; Oth.2,2 (no age); Dom.2,3 (no age); Verg.50 (iam grandis); N.B. omission at Cal.10,1. Also cf. orphans: Plut. Coriol.i,2; Sert.ii; Cat.mi.i,1; Ant.ii,1; Suet. de Gramm. 9 (Orbilius).

24. Cf. Mouchova (1968), 28ff. Marriage: Suet. Tib.7,2-3; Ner.7,2; Galb.5,1; Oth.3; Vit.6; Vesp.3; Tit.4,2; Plut. Num.iii,6-iv; Alc.viii; Sull.vi,10-12 (ἄλλα τάϋτα μὲν ὑστερον); Pomp.iv,3-5; Aem.v; Cat.mi.vii; Mar.vi,2.

25. Amicitia/φιλία: Suet. Ter.11-28; Hor.112-117; Tibull.3-5; probably fallen out of Verg. in transmission cf. Leo 12. de Gramm.10; 12; 14; 15; 16; 20; 21; 29; Cal.12,2; Galb.5,2; Oth.2,2; Vit.4. Note the use of 'insinuatus' for Cal., Oth., & Gramm.21. Plut. Arist.ii,1; Cat.ma. iii,1-4; Cim.v,4; Phoc.vi-vii,2; Ant.ii,3-4; cf. Per.vii,6. Suet. Tit.2 & Plut. Pelop.iv are the friendships of peers.

26. On this exitus literature see F. A. Marx, 'Tacitus und die Literatur der exitus illustrium virorum', Philol. 92, 1937, 83ff., notably the work of the ab epistulis Titinius Capito (Plin. ep.viii,12,4).

27. For Suetonius' treatment of omens see Mouchova (1968), 35f.; Gugel (1977), 24ff. Omens of death in Plut.: Cim.xviii,3-4; Alc.xxxix,1-2; Lys.xxix, 3-7; Sull.xxxvii,1-2 (own foreknowledge cf. Suet. Cl.); Pelop.xxxi,2;
II.1 Biographical Topics

- 6 -

Marcell.xxviii (at start) & xxix,4-5 (in middle); Dion lv; Brut.xlviii; Dem.xxix,2; Cic.xlvii,5-6; Alex.lxxii; Caes.lxii; Ant.lxxv,3-4; Pyrrh.xxxii,4-5; Mar.xlv,1; Tib. Gracch.xvii.

28. Last sayings: Suet. Jul.82; Aug.99; Ner.49,4; Galb.20,2; Oth.11; Vesp.24; Tit.10; Plut. Per.xxxviii,3-4; Pomp. lxixix; Pelop.xxxii,1; Dem.xxix; Caes.lxv,5; Phoc.xxxvi; Ant.lxxvii,4; Ag.xx,1; Philop.xx,3; Arat.iii; Galb.xxxvii,1; Oth.xxvii,2; cf. Eum.xxxviii,4.

29. Variants and dispute: Suet. Tib.73,2; Cal.58; Cl.44; Ter.80-96; Plut. Thes.xxxv,4; Rom.xxxvii,5-8; Lyc.xxxi,4; Sol.xxxii,3; Them.xxxi,5; Arist. xxi; Cim.xix,1; Nic.xxxviii,4; Alc.xxxix,5; Dem.xxx,1-4; Alex.lxxv,3-1xxxvi; Mar.xxxv,4-7; C.Gracch.xvii,3.

30. Obiit: Suet. Jul.88; Aug.100,1; Tib.73; Cl.45; Ner.57; Galb.23; Vit.18; Vesp.24; Tit.11; Dom.17,3; also Cal.1,2 (Germ.); Cl.1,3 (Drus.); Verg. 150; Hor.72-75; Tibull.10 (obiit adolescens); de Gramm.17 (Verrius Flaccus). Cal.59 takes the unusual form 'vixit annis...' cf. de Gramm. 9 (Orbilius), & 11 (Cato).

31. eieXeunoe MTA.: Plut. Rom.xxxix,7 (δεονισθαι); Lyc.xxxi,4; Them.xxxi,5; Num.xxx,4; Camill.xliii (ὢλυται...ὑπατος); Cim.xix,1; Ages.xi,2; Pomp. lxixix,4; Pelop.xxxv,5; Dem.xxx,4; Cic.xlvii,4; (Alex.lxxvi,4), Caes. lxix,1; Cat.mi.lxxiii,1; Demetr.iii,3; Ant.lxxxvi,4-5 (Ant. & Cleopatra); Mar.xlv,5; Ag.xx,3 (ἤλυτας...γεγονός...); Cleem.xxxvii,1; Arat.iii,1; Artax.xxx,5; Oth.xxviii,2. Also perhaps cf. Sol.xxxii,3 (επεβίωσε...) with Cal.59 above.

32. Funeral: Suet. Jul.84,1-4; Aug.100,2-4; Tib.75,3; Cal.59; Cl.45; Ner.50; Oth.12,2; Dom.17,3; also Cl.1,3 (Drus.); Plut. Num.xxxi,1; Publ.xxxii,2; Arist.xxxvii,2; Lucull.xliii,2; Alc.xxxix,4; Coriol.xxxix,5; Fab.Max.xxxvii,2; Lys.xxxix,1-3; Sull.xxxvii; Ages.xl,3; Pomp.xxxix,4-1; Pelop.xxxii; Marcell.xxx,2; Brut.iii,3; Timol.xxxix,1-3; Aem.xxxix,3-5; Phoc.xxxix,2; Cat.mi.xxxi; Pyrrh.xxxv,5; Philop.xxx,2-4; Arat.iii,1-3; Oth.xxviii,4.

33. Reliquiae/MTA: Suet. Aug.100,4; Cal.59; Ner.50; Galb.20; Dom.17,3; Hor.78-79; Verg.151ff.; Plut. Thes.xxxvii; Lyc.xxxi,5; Num.xxxii,2-5; Sol.xxxii,4; Publ.xxxii,3; Them.xxxii,3; Cim.xxxi,4; Lucull.xliii,3; Ages.xl,3; Pomp.lxxx; Marcell.xxx,2-3; Brut.iii,3; Timol.xxxix,4; Eum.xiv,1; Phoc.xxxvii,3-viii,1; Demetr.iii,1-3; Philop.xxxii,5; Galb.xxxviii,3; Oth.xxxvii,1.

34. Public reaction: Suet. Jul.84,5-85; Tib.75; Cal.60; Ner.57; Oth.12,2; Tit.11; Dom.23,2; cf. Cal.5-6 (Germ.); Plut. Thes.xxxv,5; Num.xxxi,1; Publ.xxxii,2-3; Camill.xliii; Lucull.xliii,2; Per.xxxix,4; Fab. Max. xxxvii,2; Coriol.xxxix,5; Lys.xxx,1; Pelop.xxxii; Timol.xxxix; Aem.xxxix,3-5; Phoc.xxxvii; Cat.mi.xxxi; Mar.xlv,5; Ag.xx; Philop.xxxi,1-4; Oth.xxxvii,3-5.

A variant is the reaction of a single man: Them.xxxi,5 (the King); Pomp.lxxx,5 (Caes.); Marcell.xxx,1-3 (Hannibal); Brut.iii,3 (Ant.); Cic.xlix,3 (Aug.); Cat.mi.xxxiii (Caes.); cf. Suet. Cl.1,5 (Aug. on Drusus).

35. Ter.105-121; Verg.192-218 (obrectatores).
II.1 Biographical Topics

36. \( \tau w t\): Suet. Jul. 85 + 88; Aug. 100, 2-3; Cl. 45; Calb. 23; Tit. 11.
   Plut. Thes. xxxv, 5-xxxvi; Rom. xxviii; Lyc. xxxi, 3; Publ. xxiii, 2-3;
   Arist. xxvii; Cim. xix, 4; Fab. Max. xxvii, 2; Coriol. xxxix, 5; Lys. xxx, 5;
   Pelop. xxxiii-iv; Timol. xxxix, 4; Dem. xxx, 5; Phoc. xxxviii, 1; Cleom. xxix, 2-3;
   C. Gracch. xviii, 2; Arat. liii, 4-5.

37. Statues & epigrams: Plut. Them. xxxii, 5 (epigr.); Sull. xxxvii (monument &
   epigr.); Marcell. xxx, 4-5 (stat. & epigr.); Dem. xxx, 5 (stat. & epigr.)
   + xxxi, 1-2; Phoc. xxxvii, 1 (statue); Philop. xxii, 5-6 (statues), Oth. xv, 1
   (monument & epigr.); Suet. Verg. 151-155 (epigr.); Tibull. 10-14 (epigr.);
   de Gramm. 9 Orbilus (statue); 17 Verrius Flaccus (stat.). But N.B. Jul. 85.

38. Fate of family: Suet. Cal. 59; Vit. 18; Plut. Dion lvii, 3-lviii; Brut. lii, 4-5;
   Ag. xx; Cleom. xxxviii; cf. Alex. lxxvii, 4; Lucull. xl, 3. But the
   mother of the Gracchi survives splendidly (C. Gracch. xix).

39. \( \delta w o h o v\): Suet. Vesp. 25; cf. Plut. Ages. xl, 3; Demetr. liii, 4; Mar. xlvi, 5-6;
   Artax. xxxv, 5; cf. Ant. lxxvii.

40. Descendants: Plut. Lyc. xxx, 4; Num. xxi, 1-3; Publ. xxiii, 3; Them. xxxii, 1-2
   + 5; Arist. xxvii; Cat. ma. xxxvii, 5; Lys. xxx, 5; Sull. xxxvii, 4; Marcell. xxx. 6;
   Aem. xxxix, 5; Phoc. xxxvii, 2; Cat. mi. lxxiii; Arat. liv; Suet. Ter. 99;
   de Gramm. 9 Orbilus.

41. Will: Suet. Jul. 83; Aug. 101; Tib. 76; Ter. 99-104; Verg. 156-166; Hor. 76 f.
   Plut. Aem. xxxix, 5 (closest to Ter. 'reliquit filiam...item hortulos...').
   For Plut.'s neglect of this topic cf. Caes. lxviii, 1.

42. Revenge: Suet. Jul. 89, cf. perhaps Cal. 2 (Germ.); Plut. Crass. xxxiii, 5;
   Pomp. lxxxv, 5-6; Pelop. xxxv; Dion lvii, 1-4; Dem. xxx, 3-4; Cic. xliv, 244;
   Caes. lxix, 2-8; Sert. xxvii; Eum. xix, 2; Phoc. xxxvii, 1; Tib. Gracch. xxi, 2-3;
   C. Gracch. xviii, 1; Philop. xxi, 1-2. (Cf. Galb. xxvii, 5, a little differently.)

43. Cf. Cic. xliv, 4 & Eum. xix, 2 τὸ δαμόκλευον. Contrast Leo p. 183 'Es ist
   sehr bezeichnend...'.

44. Historical epilogue: Suet. Vit. 18; Dom. 23, 2; cf. also Cal. 6, 2 (Germanicus);
   Plut. Lyc. xxvii, 6-xxxi, 2; Num. xxii, 6-7; Sim. xiv, 2-3; Per. xxxiri, 4-5;
   Coriol. xxxv, 6; Tib. Gracch. xxi; Oth. xviii, 3-4; in Num., Per., Coriol.
   & Oth. at end of life.


46. For the role of nobilitas in the 'Herrscherideal', see at length Wickert
   2200ff.

47. Steidle 111 rightly stresses the Roman interest in gens. But to say with
   Kloft (1970), 77 that 'hinter der breiten Erörterung über die Herkunft steht
   das Postulat der nobilitas' is misleading.

48. Lattimore (1962), 290ff. He notes, however, the rarity of physical
   description in Latin epitaphs (297); this is counterbalanced, of course,
   by the frequency of portraiture. Note ILS 1 'quoius forma virtutei
   parisuma fuit'.

49. For the role of nobilitas in the 'Herrscherideal', see at length Wickert
   2200ff.

50. Historical epilogue: Suet. Vit. 18; Dom. 23, 2; cf. also Cal. 6, 2 (Germanicus);
   Plut. Lyc. xxvii, 6-xxxi, 2; Num. xxii, 6-7; Sim. xiv, 2-3; Per. xxxiri, 4-5;
   Coriol. xxxv, 6; Tib. Gracch. xxi; Oth. xviii, 3-4; in Num., Per., Coriol.
   & Oth. at end of life.


52. For the role of nobilitas in the 'Herrscherideal', see at length Wickert
   2200ff.
II.1 Biographical Topics

49. Leo 181 for a succinct summary of the elements in Plutarch.


51. E.g. S. Aug.79.1; Verg.28f.; Hor.53f.; Plut. Demetr.i,2 (μεγέθεσε μὲν ἄν); Philop.ii (ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐλδος) etc.

52. For details Wardman (1967). According to Leo 14 there are no physical details in the de Gramm., but see 29.1 (Sex. Clodius) 'male oculatus'. For the 'iconistic' style of S.'s descriptions see the valuable article by G. Misener, 'Iconistic Portraits' C.Ph.19,1924,97ff.

53. E.g. S. Aug.80; Cl.30; Oth.12.1 (male pedatus); cf. also Hor.53ff. on his obesity; de Gramm.29.1 above.

54. Jul.45.1; Aug.81-2; Tib.68.4; Cal.50,2-3; Cl.31; Ner.51; Calb.21; Vesp.20; Dom.18; cf. Verg.29. But ὑπάτω is also a topic of Greek encomium (below) and is occasionally noted by Plut.: Cat.ma.i,3; Dem.iv,3; cf. Cic.iii,5 & iv,3.

55. So Drexler (1969), 263f. Steidle 114 suggests the Roman was more interested in 'Rangstufe' than virtues; but of course qualities like frugalitas mattered greatly in traditional thought. Rather, the Roman is not interested in types of person, but in the individual features that mark a man out from his peers, together with the individual performance against a traditional set of standards (honores and virtutes). Further below on Virtues and Vices.

56. S. Cal.29; Cl.39. The numerous terms for character in Plut. are discussed by B. Bucher-Isler, Norm und Individualität in den Biographien Plutarchs (Bern 1972) and Wardman (1974), 105-152.

57. For fragments of the de vitiis corporalibus see Roth 302, Reifferscheid fr.170-173. The links with the Caesars are well brought out by Macé 331f.

58. It is enough to recall the frequency of physical defects in cognomina as Flaccus, Naso, Strabo, Verrucosus etc.

59. E.g. T. Hist.1,7 'imperatores forma ac decorae corporis, ut est mos vulgi, comparantibus'. Plin. Pan.2,6 contrasts popular acclamations of Domitian and Trajan; 'formosum alium, hunc fortissimum personat'; yet comments on the physique, 'honor capitis et dignitas oris' and grey hair of Trajan on the grounds that they 'longe lateque principem ostentant' (4,7).

60. Men. Rhet.iii,371,15f. How the rhetorician might 'upgrade' the physical is illustrated by Pan. Lat.viii(v)19,3; vi(vii)4,4; iii(xi),5,4-5 detecting virtues in physical features.

61. The appearance of Claudius is turned to mockery by Seneca at Apocol.5. Note also the interest of Plin. NH xi,143 in the eyes of emperors from Augustus to Nero.
II.1 Biographical Topics

62. The attempts of Couissin (1953) as of E. C. Evans 'Physiognomonic in the Ancient World', T.A.Ph.S. NS.59,1969,5 to demonstrate ulterior motives of physiognomonical analysis in S.'s portraits seems to me misled; cf. Bradley (1978), 281f. Physiognomonic was a scientific discipline, and therefore unknown to the vast majority of S.'s Roman readers. Since the author himself draws no correlations, he could hardly expect his readership to. Nevertheless, he may mean to offer material for analysis.

63. Not recognised, to my knowledge, in the literature on Greek biography or by the commentators on Theocritus.

64. ποροῦ (πόσιν) in 1.142 might conceivably refer to H.'s drinking habits, χροῆ in 1.144 to physical appearance.

65. To judge by the fragments of Clearchus preserved in Athenaeus, the examination of different life-styles was an important motif in 'peripatetic biography'; cf. Momigliano (1971), 69.

66. δατά: Rom.vi,3; Num.iii,6; Sol.i,3 + iii,1; Them.v,1-2; Cat.ma.iii,1-3 + iv,3-4; Cim.iv,3-9; Per.vii,4-6; Crass.i,1-iii,1; (cf. Alc.iv-vi); Lys.ii,4-5; Sull.ii,3-4; Pomp.ii,2-6; Pelop.iii-iv,1; Alex.Iv,4; Phoc.iv,2; Cat.mi.v,3-vi,4; Demetr.ii,3; Ant.iv,2-4; Ag.iv; Gracc.ii,3-4; Philop.iv,1-3.

67. ἐπιτιὰ: SoKi,3; Cira.lv,5-9; Crass.1,1-2 (Alc.iv-vi) ; Sull.ii,3-4; Pomp.ii,2-5; Alex.iv,4; Ant.iv,3; cf. also Num.iv (Egeria). There is argument over evidence of continence for Soll., Cim., Crass. & Pomp. as at Suet. Aug.68-78.

68. τραίσεα: Cat.ma.iv,3 (...οὐν...δοῦν...); Cim.iv,3 (κολυμπητής); Pomp.ii,5-6 (food); Pelop.iii,2 (τραίσεις αὐτότητι); Cat.mi.vi,1-2 (το κλειστον); Demetr.ii,3 (κτόσον καὶ τρυφῶν); Ant.iv,2 (κώθων...φαγεῖν...); Ag.iv (δείκτα); Gracc.ii,3 (τράισεαν); cf. Lucull.xi-xli (at end of life).

69. ἐσθήσ: Cat.ma.iv,3; Pelop.iii,2; Phoc.iv,2; Cat.mi.vi,3; Ant.iv,2; Ag.iv.

70. So Xen. Mem.i,3.5ff. (cited by Steidle 54f.); also Ages.v.1-4 μέθης... σίτων...θυμω...δροσόσωϊων; also ix,3f. for contrast with Persian king.

71. libido: Jul.49-52; Aug.68-69 & 71,1 (circa libidines haesit); Cl.33,2; Gaib.22; Dom.22 cf. Vesp.21 pallacae subsumed under ordo vitae. Similarly Verg.31-35; Hor.62-4; de Gramm.23 (Remmius Paulaeon).

72. cibus: Jul.53; Aug.76; Cl.33,1; Gaib.22; Dom.21 ('Matianum malum'). Similarly Verg.31ff.

73. vinum: Jul.53; Aug.77; Cl.33,1; Dom.21 ('modicam...poticulam'). Similarly Verg.31.

74. somnus: Aug.78; Cl.33,2; Vesp.21; Dom.21.

75. vestitus: Jul.45,3; Aug.73; Cal.52; Ner.51, Oth.12,1 cf. also Dom.4.4. For the de genere vestilum see Roth 281f.; Reifferscheid fr.165-169; discussed by Macé 305f.
II.1 Biographical Topics

76. habitatio: Jul.46; Aug.72; Verg.47-49; Hor.65-66.
77. lautitiae: Jul.46-47; Aug.72-3.
78. alea: Aug.71,1-4 & 70,2; Cl.33,2; Dom.21. Further below ch.IX4luxuria-libido n.55 for a possible link with a scholarly work on games.
79. convivia: Jul.48; Aug.70 & 74-75 (including festivals); Cl.32; Dom.21. Vesp.22ff. veers off from this topic ('et super cenam comissimus') into dicacitas.
80. In general see below pp.265f.
81. Esp. Cat.ma.iii-iv; also see Crass.ii-iii; Gracch.ii,4; Cic.viii,2.
82. Compare most closely Aug.72-74, particularly the details of his convivia (74).
83. ordo vitae: Vesp.21; Dom.21; similarly Aug.78. Also Tib.11,1-3.
84. Plut. Cat.ma.iii,1-3; Cic.viii,2-4; Cat.mi.v,3-vi; Philop.iv,2. For descriptions of daily routine in Pliny see ep.iii,1 (Sapurinna); 5,8ff. (Pliny the Elder); ix,36 & 40 (self). In verse Martial iv,8; Juvenal 1,127ff.
   Note that Cic. ad Att.xiii,52 on dining with Caesar is effectively a description of the dictator's ordo vitae. On later emperors cf. Millar 209f. The earliest description of royal routine known to me is that of Amasis at Hdt. ii,173. Further D.S. i,70 on Egyptian kings; Plut. de fort. Alex. ii,6,338 D on Alexander.
85. Tib.50-56 (necessitudo, amici, convictores); Cal.23-26,1 (family, wives, friends); Cl.26-29 (wives, liberti); Ner.33-35 (family, wives, connections, friends, liberti); also Jul.71-73 (clientes, amici, inimici); and Tit.9,3 (treatment of a brother) show how treatment of family is linked to treatment of subjects. Also Verg.50-53 (parents, brothers).
86. Family in Plut. (cf. Leo 181): Lucull.i,6 (πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν...εὐνοῦσα); Cat.mi.iii,5-6 (πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν εὔνοα); Demetr.iii (ψυλλοκάτωρ); Pyrrh.ix (wives and children); cf. Cim.iv,3-7 (relations with sister); Crass.i,1; Pelop.iii,4 (γάμος & ματές); Timol.iii,3-4; Marcell.i,1 (saves brother); Sert.ii (ψυλλομέντωρ).
87. Similarly with approval on Titus’s behaviour to his brother. Refs. n.85.
89. Contrast Tib.55; Cal.26,1; Ner.35,5.
90. Note that there is no sign of distinction in S. between friends in the ordinary sense and amici principis: see esp. Tit.7,2 where he is praised for choice of friends 'quibus etiam post eum principes ut et sibi et reip. necessariis adquieverunt praecepueque sunt usi', in contrast to the eunuchs of his previous acquaintance (7,1). On the imperial amici see Millar 110ff.
II.1 Biographical Topics

91. Exercise: Jul.57; Aug.83; Tit.3,2; Dom.19.

92. Relaxation: Aug.83; Dom.19.

93. studia: Jul.55-56; Aug.84-89; Tib.70-71; Cal.53-54; Cl.40-42; Ner.52; Tit.3,2; Dom.20. Also Verg.54-139; Hor.67-70.

94. eloquentia: Jul.55,1-2; Aug.84; Tib.70,1; Cal.53; Tit.3,2; negatively Ner.52; Dom.20; cf. Verg.55-56. Style (genus eloquentiae): Jul., Tib., Cal., & Aug.86 (style as whole).

95. pronuntiatio: Jul.55,2; Aug.84,2; Cal.53,1.

96. Writings: Jul.55-3-56; Aug.85; Tib.70,2; Cl.41-42; Ner.52; Tit.3,2. Cf. Verg.59-109.

97. Unauthentic: Jul.55,3-4; cf. Hor.67-70.

98. recitatio: Aug.85; Cl.41,1-2; cf. Verg.130-139; verdicts: Jul.56,1-4; Ner.52; cf. Verg.116-129.

99. Greek: Aug.89,1; Tib.70-71; Cl.42; Tit.3,2.

100. Jul.56,6 (code); Aug.87,3-88 (handwriting, spelling, code); Tit.3,2 (ability as a forger).

101. sermo: Aug.87,1-2; Cl.40; Dom.20.

102. aliae artes: Cal.54; Ner.52; Tit.3,2; cf. Verg.54f. (medicina).

103. δοκησις σώματος/λόγου: Cat.ma.i,4-7; Fab.Max.i,4-5; Coriol.i,2-ii; Marcell.i-ii,1; Sert.ii; Mar.ii,1-2; Arat.iii,1-2; cf. Aem.ii,4.

104. So Marius and Coriolanus (above). Marcellus at least admired παιδεία.

105. παιδεία: Sol.iii,3-5 (leading to an excursus on S. and the sages iv-vii); Lucull.i,3-5; Per.viii; Fab.Max.i,4-5; Crass.iii,2-4; Alc.x,2-3; Brut.ii; Dem.v-xi; Cic.ii,3-4; Sert.ii; Phoc.v,2-3; Cat.mi.iv-v,2 (interspersed with narr.); Pyrrh.viii.2-3; Grach.ii,3; Philop.iv,3-4; Arat.iii,2. Cat.ma. is, as ever, untypical in the scattering of topics throughout the life: i,4 (λόγος), ii.3-4 (παιδεία), vii-ix (style), xxiii (hostility to παιδεία), xxv.1 (writings). Also cf. Num.iii,5; Them.ii,1.

106. λόγος: Cat.ma.i,4 + ii,4 + vii + xxv,1 and all the above except: Sol., Num., Cic., Pyrrh., Philop. Style of λόγος in all these except Crass. & Sert. Delivery (φωνή): Dem.xi,1-4, Cat.mi., Grach.ii,5 (anecdote under Αθήναι).

II.1 Biographical Topics


109. Surviving writings: Lucull.ii,5; Fab.Max.i,5; Per.viii,5; Cic.ii,3; Pyrrh.viii,2; Arat.iii,2. Compare Plut.'s use of ἀπολέοντες or similar (Pyrrh., Arat.) with reliquit in S. Jul.55,3; Cl.41,2; de Gramm.24 etc.; and Plut.'s use of ὀλοκληρώσατο (Lucull., Fab.Max., Cic.) with extat in S. Jul.56,6; Cl.41,3 etc.

110. Cf. Tit.3,2 for similar accomplishments. Pyrrh.viii,3 is contemptuous of τὰς ἄλοις γλαυφούς, flute-playing being specified. Note also Verg. 54 'studia medicinae', with Cat.ma.xxiii,3-4, contempt for medicine.

111. A. Alfoldi, A Conflict of Ideas in the Late Roman Empire (Oxford 1952), 96ff.; further Wickert 2253ff., also concentrating on the late empire.

112. Millar 83ff. on the context of educated society, and 203ff. on the premium set on education in an emperor.

113. So Aristeas 290 of the best king: ἦδος χρηστὸν καὶ παιδείας κεχωλωμηκὸς δυνατόν ἄρχειν ἔστε.

114. Cf. Plin. Pan.82,6 'nec vero per se magno opere laudaverim duritiam corporis ac lacertorum... (but if controlled by a stronger mind) tunc ego seu montibus seu mari exerceatur, et laetum opere corpus et crescentia laboribus membra mirabor'.

115. For hunting as a sport of kings cf. Xen. Ages.ix.5-6. In general J. Aymard, Essai sur les chasses romaines (Paris 1951) 159ff. For imperial recreation, the list in Fronto Fer.Als.3,45 (214,16ff.v.d.H.) is illuminating; even Pius fished.

116. religio: Aug.90-93; Tib.69; Ner.56; cf. Cal.51,1 (under confidentia and metus); Jul.59 (under res militares). Further below, ch.VI.

117. Esp. Per.vi on his avoidance of superstition; also cf. Num.iii,6 briefly mentioning his piety in the personal description (naturally this particular life has more on the theme later).

118. Cic. ND iii,5 for the declaration of faith in ancestral practice. Further Macé 60f. and briefly below on providentia deorum ch.VI Appendix.
2. Virtues and Vices

1. Cf. Venini (1974), passim for the contrast with S. Even if this is an extreme case, a similar contrast subsists between the two authors' Lives of Caesar.

2. Luck (1964,1) misses the precision with which Tit.7,2-9 answers the charges of 6-7,1. S. does not indeed mark the divisions clearly, and they should not be pressed; in particular 8,3-5 on T.'s reaction to disasters and delators is not so strictly evidence of clemency as 9,1-3; but cf. Cal.31 where the opposite attitude to natural disasters is evidence of saevitia.

3. Illustrated by Dihle (1956), ch.iv from Plutarch Cleomenes.

4. Cf. D. A. Russell, Plutarch (London 1972), 106, 'His heroes tend to be representative figures.' The methods of character-portrayal in S. and Plut. are contrasted by Wardman (1974), 144ff. He rightly contrasts moralisation in S. as based on a 'given, Roman scheme' with what in Plut. is 'theoretically explicable' (149). It is precisely this lack of theoretical basis that makes S. so valuable a vehicle of Roman views on the emperor. There is no evidence that the Romans formulated a 'political philosophy' of empire independent of Greek theory (below ch.VIII).

5. Steidle 129ff.; cf. Momigliano (1971), 87 'The Suetonian scheme is only a refinement of the systematic order of certain "encomia" of kings and generals'.

6. See Momigliano 83; for Leo's views, esp. 207ff.

7. Steidle 133ff. Against his suggestion that the part of the Βούς Καλόσαρος not preserved by the epitomators was an analysis of the reign by virtues, Nicolaus' own words seem to me to tell very strongly (FGH 90 F 126): 'to demonstrate the wisdom and virtue of this man...is a challenge to writers and orators.... But I shall narrate what happened, from which all will be able to recognise the truth'. Nicolaus is surely drawing a contrast between his narrative purpose (κατά τὸν δ' ἀργίνους), and the traditional approach of the encomiast. Cf. also F.130,58, offering a narrative of the έργα πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης of Augustus after accession. For scepticism about Steidle's analysis cf. Momigliano 86 n.21.

8. Momigliano 49ff. Also Stuart (1928), 60ff.

9. On encomium see Fraustadt (1909); Buchheit (1960); Th. Payr, RAC 5, 332ff. s.v.; J. Martin, Antike Rhetorik (1974), 177ff. I shall speak throughout of encomium, not its opposite vituperatio. Rhetoricians only notice the latter as the mirror-image of encomium; and in practice surviving invectives (e.g. Cicero In Pisonem) do not follow school rules of disposition. However, it is relevant to S. that what is said of encomium and virtues could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to vituperation and vices.

10. ?Anaximenes Rhet ad Alex. (ed. Fuhrmann, Teubner 1966), 35; Arist. Rhet. iii,12ff.; Auct. ad Her.iii,10-15; Cic. de Inv.177-8; de Or.ii,43-46 and 341-349; Part. Or. 70-82; Quint. Inst. 3,7; Theon (in Spengel Rhetores
II.2 Virtues

Graeci) ii,109-112; Hermogenes ii,11-14; Aphthonius ii,35-40; Nicolaus iii,477-482; Menander iii,368-377 (the only rhetorician to apply the encomium explicitly to the emperor). Also Ps. Dionysius Ars Rhet. vi,2.

11. Anaxim. 35,3-4 contrasts τὰ ἔξω τῆς ἀρετῆς and τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀρετῇ. The Latin handbooks from ad Her. iii,10 on make a threefold division, 'res externae', 'corporis commoda', 'res animi' vel sim., doubtless going back to hellenistic models drawing on philosophic theory (cf. already Anaxim. 14,9).


13. So Cic. Part. Or. 75 offering the additional options of chronological and reverse-chronological arrangement; Quint. 3,7,15 either chronological or 'in species virtutum'. But Greek rhetoricians speak against ἔφεξις arrangement (e.g. Theon. ii,111).

14. The text is in some doubt because of the apparently contradictory implication that narrative is sometimes appropriate (ἐν οἷς τού ἐφεξῆς): Fraustadt 83ff., Buchheit 182ff. Nevertheless, Aristotle's arguments in favour of κατὰ μέρος disposition seem clear enough; I have paraphrased. The distinction that history narrates while oratory demonstrates or proves remained traditional: e.g. Quint. Inst. 10,1,31.

15. But though Epam. 1,4 distinguishes res gestae and virtutes, the author appears to be in confusion, cf. Fraustadt 212ff. That Epaminonas' moral qualities were most important is suggested by 1,3 'exprimere imaginem consuetudinis atque vitae.' Equally the virtues seen in Atticus (veritas 15, humanitas 16, pietas 17) reflect the encomiastic, or at least apologetic, intention of the author. On this life see R. Halm, Rh.M. 109, 1964, 175ff.

16. With 'distinctius' compare Aristotle's ἀλοιπότερος, with 'demonstrari' his use of δεικνύοντα. Rather different is Nicolaus' justification of the arrangement by virtues 'ἐνα μὴ ὑπηρετὸς ὁ λόγος γλυκνατ' (481,14). The pursuit of truth as opposed to praise and blame puts S., of course, on the side of the historian. For the classic contrast between the purposes of history and encomium see Polyb. x,21,5.

17. For the philosophical 'canon' of virtues see below ch. VII.

18. For the practice of panegyric especially in the late empire see Straub (1939), 146ff.; MacCormack (1975), 154ff.


21. So Steidle 115 n.3.
II.2 Virtues

22. On imperial virtues in the Panegyrici see Born (1934); Burdeau (1964).

23. See the good discussion of Gärtner (1968).

24. Stertz (1979) seems to me wholly convincing against earlier argument, esp. C. P. Jones, JRS 62, 1972, 134ff. Julian's encomium of Constantius (or. i) is another case where Menandrian rules are followed; but even here the virtues praised are only partly those of Menander's prescription.


26. M. Durry, Éloge Funèbre d'une Matrone Romaine (Paris: Budé 1950), xiff. offers the most convenient discussion of what is known of the form of the laudatio.

27. Cf. Vell. ii, 129-130. Woodman (1977), 51ff. for the panegyrical form of this section (too defensive). Note also the verbal parallel between Velleius' preface to his panegyric, ii, 129, 1 'sed proposita quasi universa principatus Ti. Caesaris (imagine), singula recenseamus' and S. (proposita vitae eius velut summa, partes singillatim...exsequar). But Velleius does not organise his singula into distinct groups, though he does employ the tone of panegyric.


29. On this work see D. Krömer, Xenophons Agesilaos, Diss. Berlin 1971. By contrast there is no trace of virtue disposition in Isocr. Evagoras, though the virtues are attributed to Evag. (22-23); but Nicocles 31-45 is based on justice and temperance. Agathon humorously praises Eros for possession of the Socratic virtues at Plat. Symp. 196b-197b.

30. Augustus destroys his granddaughter's luxurious apartments; Agesilaus' daughter goes down to Amyclae like an ordinary citizen, if Causabon's emendation of the text ἕθη τυγάτηρ αὐτός from Plu. Ages. xix is correct.
3. Analysis of the reign

1. This point is worth emphasising, in view of the approach of Cizek (1977), 65ff., assuming that all items in the Caesars can be simply classified as favourable or unfavourable (i.e. virtue v. vice).

2. Jul.44; Aug.28,3ff.; Tib.37; Cal.18ff.; 21; Cl.18ff.; Ner.16ff.; in reverse Vesp.8,2ff.

3. Jul.41f.; Aug.35ff.; Cal.16,2-3; Cl.23,2f.; Vesp.9,2; Dom.8,2-3. For other similar 'hierarchical' runs, cf. ch.III.

4. Defined explicitly at Cl.22 'caerimonias civilemque et militarem morem'. The following references sometimes overlap since the boundaries between rubrics are by no means rigid.

5. Jul.40; Aug.30,2-31,4; Tib.36; Cl.22; Dom.8,3-5.

6. Aug.20-23; Cal.43-48; Dom.6,1.

7. Aug.9-19; Cl.13; Dom.6,2.

8. Tib.37,4; Cal.43f.; Cl.17; Dom.6,1.

9. Peregrinationes are of course not strictly military, but the context links them to expeditions: Tib.38-40; Ner.19,1-2.

10. Aug.24f.; Tib.37,4; cf. Cal.44; Cl.24,3-25; Ner.18; Vesp.8,2-3; Dom.7 ad fin.; cf. Jul.57ff.

11. Aug.26-27; Cal.17,1; Cl.14-16; Ner.14; Vesp.8,1. In other lives magistracies are evidence of arrogance or civility: Jul.76,1-2; Tib.26,2; Dom.13,3; cf. Vit.11,2. Triumphs are sometimes detailed separately from other honores: Jul.37; Aug.22.

12. So Aug.27 (triumvirate); Cl.14-15 (consulship); 16 (censorship). Cf. Jul.20 on his first consulship.

13. Jul.43; Aug.33; Cl.14-15; Ner.15,1; Dom.8,1.

14. Jul.42,3; Aug.34; Cl.23; Ner.17; Vesp.11; Dom.7.

15. Jul.42,2; Aug.32; Tib.37,1-3; Ner.16,2; Dom.7,1.

16. Jul.43; Tib.34-35; Cl.16; Vesp.11; Dom.8,2-5.

17. Aug.29-30; Cal.21; Cl.20; Vesp.8,5-9,1; Tit.7,3; Dom.5. Also Tib.47 negatively as evidence of meanness. Cf. Jul.44,1-3.

18. Jul.39; Aug.43-45; Cal.18-20; Cl.21,1-6; Ner.11-13; Vesp.19; Dom.4,1-4. Also Tib.47 as evidence of meanness.

19. Jul.38; Aug.41; Cal.17,2; Cl.21,1; Ner.10,1; Dom.4,4.
II.3 Analysis

20. See below ch. IX on liberalitas.

21. Aug. 42, 3; Cl. 18, 2-19.

22. Aug. 30, 1; Cl. 18, 1; Ner. 16, 1.


24. Steidle 112 identifies some of the topics, without showing how they hang together. Mouchová (1968), 42ff. restricts herself to ethical categories.

25. For analysis cf. Steidle 48ff., showing the social hierarchy in 41-42, but missing the geographical in 44.

26. See Hanslik (1954), but passing over this (central) aspect of the Life very cursorily.

27. Thus the order reflects the Greek hierarchy of Pindar Ol. 2, 2 'τίνα θέου τίν' ἡρωικα, τίνα δ' ἄνδρα κελαδὸς ομεν', reflected in Horace Odes 1.12.


30. Cizek (1977), 104 is of course right that the Life is exceptionally favourable; but at best it is a depiction of brilliant potential. Acts of government are indeed recorded, but all are subordinated to demonstration of virtues.

31. Esp. Steidle 114. The importance of honores is further illustrated by the new fragment of the laudatio of Agrippa (Ej 2, 366). For the themes of elogia see now M. M. Sage, 'The Elogia of the Augustan Forum and the de viris illustribus', Hist. 28, 1979, 192ff.


33. Despite complications, the following basic groupings seem clear: RG 4-14 honores; esp. 4-7 triumphs, magistracies; 8 censorial activity and legislation; 15-24 financial benefactions (15-18 congiaria, donatives, liberalities; 19-21 building; 22-23 spectacula); 25-33 military achievements. Note also the distinctions drawn in the Appendices between grants of money (app. 1), new buildings (2), repairs (3), spectacula (4). These are distinctions observed by S.

34. Compare perhaps Livy i, 42 where warfare and Numa's establishment of sacred law is contrasted with Servius' civil achievement, 'conditorem omnis in civitate discriminis ordinumque'. Note that res divinae preceded res humanae in the agenda of the Roman senate: Varro ap. Cellius xiv, 7, 9.

36. On S.'s scholarly background, see further below Part B.

37. Dahlmann, RE Suppl. vi (1935), 1230ff. and 1243ff. gathers the little that is known of Varro's Antiquitates and Vita Pop. Rom. For evidence of the use of Varro by Valerius Maximus see Helm, RE viii A (1955), 110ff.

38. This is not to say that there are no outbursts of passion, e.g. in favour of Augustus, or against the 'tyrants' Tiberius, Gaius and Nero. But in all cases good and bad are recorded alike.
Chapter III

Status and Status-consciousness

1. For full bibliography see the latest and most important discussion by Gascou (1978). Particularly note Macé 29ff.; Crook (1956-7); Syme, Tacitus 779ff.; Townend (1961,1); della Corte 9ff.; Pflaum,Carrières 219ff.; Brugnoli (1968), 11ff.; Baldwin (1975); Baurain (1976). The earliest collection of the facts of S.'s career was by the humanist Politianus: see Brugnoli (1968), 187ff.

2. Two epigraphic discoveries (AE 1953, 73; 1973, 459) have substantially affected our knowledge of S.'s career; it is salutary to be reminded how far we depend on chance. At the same time the sources of information themselves reflect Suetonius' impact: on literary life (Pliny, the SHA, Lydus) and on public life (honorific inscription).

3. Oth.10. The legion of Laetus was XIII Gemina, the disaffection of which in defeat played an essential part in its espousal of the Flavian cause (T. Hist.ii,86). Macé 33 assumes that all the officers were replaced after Bedriacum; della Corte 130 envisages the possibility that Laetus also fought for Vespasian. Either way, an old Othonian is likely to have supported Vespasian; and to judge by his son's success it should not surprise if Laetus held procuratorial office under the Flavians. In that case the anecdote of procurators used like sponges (Vesp.16,2) and the description of imperial routine (Vesp.21) might be family memories (the elder Pliny is the obvious alternative source).


5. de Gramm.4,9 for Princeps; Dom.12,2 for evidence of attendance at courts. It is of course relevant that Quintilian held the chair of rhetoric at Rome during his youth, and likely enough that he attended his lectures. See L. Dalmasso 'Un seguace di Quintiliano....' Atti Acc.Sc.Torino 41, 1905-6, 805ff.; D'Anna (1954), 87ff.; Cizek (1977), 14ff., all, in my view, overschematic and exaggerated.

6. Plin. ep.x,94,1 'probissimum, honestissimum, eruditissimum virum'.

7. It is still by no means clear whether having turned down this tribunate S. later held any military office. There is no reason to suppose this was a necessary step to a procuratorial post cf. Townend (1961,1),99 n.3. Baurain (1976), 124ff. conjectures that S. held the post of praefectus fabrum to Pliny as a substitute.

8. For the question of whether S. accompanied Pliny to Bithynia, proposed by Syme,Tacitus 779, cf. Sherwin-White on ep.x,94. This is the natural reading of the text, but there is no certainty.

9. della Corte 22 assumes that Septicius replaced Pliny as 'patron'; Cizek (1977) 181ff., speaks confidently of 'la faction de Septicius'. For the inapplicability of this picture of factions and circles see M. Griffin, JRS 66, 1976, 229f. on Cizek's general approach. There is no reason to suppose that S.'s appointment to office was directly due to Septicius: Gascou (1978), 441.
10. The attempt to detect criticisms of Hadrian in S. is taken to extremes by Carney (1968).

11. See Gascou (1978) on the full implications of *AE* 1973, 459. However, it would be rash to assume that this debate is now closed.

12. The new dating of the appointment of Septicius makes it much more likely that the Hippo inscription should be connected with Hadrian's African tour of 128, not his origin (Gascou l.c.). New documents on the Egrilii of Ostia show that the local priesthood cannot have been held by S. before 126 (F. Zevi, *Mé!. Arch. Hist.* 82, 1970, 302f., accepted by Meiggs *Roman Ostia*² (1973), 584). If he held it later, the Hippo inscription can hardly be chronological (Gascou 441 n.31).

13. Syme, *Tacitus* 780f. suggests Pisaurum on strong prosopographical grounds. One can only guess.

14. It is enough to recall the now defunct controversies on 'Spanish' and 'Africa' literary schools. On the spread of culture through the empire see Brunt *The Romanization of the Local Ruling Classes in the Roman Empire*, in *Travaux du VIè Congrès International d'Études Classiques, Madrid 1974* (1976), 161f.


18. Paratore (1959), esp. 341; 'la voix des milieux les plus roturiers de la Rome impériale'.

19. Cizek (1977), 167ff. making several good points, but carried away by the idea of 'ciceronianism'.

20. The strengths of the book are lucidly separated from its misapprehensions by Crook (1969).

21. Gascou (1978), 442 for the possibility of accepting both Syme's Hadrianic date for the publication of the *Annals* and S.'s knowledge of the *Annals* if the *Caesars* were published in c.128. Macê 206f., Townend (1967), 89f. for evidence that S. at least knew the *Annals*.

22. Above ch. I n. 2 for the influence of the 'biographical' style even on Dio.


24. Well expressed by della Corte 195f.
III Status

25. Below ch.IV.


27. Sketched vividly by R. Macmullan, Roman Social Relations (1974), 88ff. A. Stein, Der römische Ritterstand (1927), 195ff. showing the links from marriage and blood between the two upper orders and the mobility from one to the other should be warning enough against supposing any radical difference of outlook. Brunt art.cit. for the same phenomenon and its implications under the republic.


29. There is no need to enter into the controversy over the composition of the ordo equester and the significance of the title eques Romanus: see M. I. Henderson, JRS 53, 1963, 61ff. and Wiseman, Historia 19, 1970, 67ff. But there is certainly more to the eques as S. sees him than a census qualification.

30. omnes ordines: Aug.41,1 and 57,1; Cl.22; Ner.10,2 and 44,2. Tacitus does not use this expression, though of course he is well aware of the differing dignitas ordinum instituted by the maiores, Ann.13,27. For other authors see Cohen p.260 n.3.

31. Cal.4; cf. T. Ann.15,54; Vell. ii,89 etc.

32. For references see Howard-Jackson Index Suetonianus s.v. ordo: senatorial, 8 instances, equestrian 19, uterque 7. For uterque ordo Mommsen III p.460 n.1,esp. CIL ix,5420 = MW 462 displaying the workings of Domitian's consilium 'adhibitis utriusque ordinis splendidis viris', cf. Crook, Consilium Principis p.49.

33. amplissimus ordo: Cal.49,1; Oth.8,1; Vesp.2,3; - of senate and eques Vesp.9,2. The expression is quasi-official for the senate, e.g. Trajan ap. Plin. ep.x,95.

34. de Gramm.8. For other instances of the expression, together with the denial that the libertini properly constituted an ordo, Mommsen III 420 n.1.

35. For Cicero, Béranger, 'Ordres et classes d'après Cicéron', in Recherches sur les structures sociales (above n.28), 225ff. and (succinctly) Cohen p.260. For Suetonius cf. Aug.57,l'senatus consulta...equites R....omnes ordines'.
III Status


37. Gascou (1976), 269. The conclusions of this chapter were reached independently before I discovered this article, easily the sanest contribution to the debate. There is little in Gascou with which I would disagree. Where our arguments overlap will be noted below.

38. Howard-Jackson s.v. eques Romanus give 64 instances of the label. But then Gerber-Grief gives almost exactly the same number for Tacitus (s.v. eques B.b.).


40. Gascou (1976), 267 notes that words indicating senatorial status are three times more frequent than those indicating equestrian status.

41. On *primipilares* see B. Dobson in *Recherches sur les structures sociales* (above n.28), 99ff. He oddly infers from the use of *primipilares* in inscriptions that it conveyed higher status than the 'average' eques Romanus. The point is that the primus pilus, but not the centurio or optio, acquired permanent rank. Similarly, equites R. who had enjoyed specific honours called attention to them - *equo publico*, *nongenti*, *selecti*, etc., even if this was 'superba usurpatio'. Plin. *NH* xxxiii, 31.

42. On the Law of Biographical Relevance see Townend (1967), 84.

43. So he tacitly corrects, and to Claudius' detriment, Tacitus *Ann.* 12, 7 who knew only of *'Alledius Severus eques Romanus'.

44. Townend *JRS* 49, 1959, 203 draws attention to S. *Vesp.* 3 where the status (eq.R.) origin (Sabrata in Africa) and, for once, name of the former lover of Flavia Domitilla are detailed. S. is evidently emphasising the extraordinarily low status of this low born emperor's wife. There is nothing odd if S. was an eques himself, even an African: he knew his place.

45. Above ch.II,1.

46. *de Gramm.* 6, 7, 10, (11), 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23. For the great interest of these lives as a document illustrating slavery see J. Vogt, *Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of Man*, tr. Wiedemann 1974, p.125.

47. So Funaioli (1932), 608, sees here details for literary history, but no 'Gebaude'. Similarly Townend, *Proc. Class. Ass.* 69, 1972, 27. This theme might be pursued in the fragments of S.'s other works. Gellius xv, 4 (= Reifferscheid fr.210) quotes him on the Parthian triumph of Ventidius Bassus. The chapter in Gellius illustrates the moral that many 'altissimum dignitatis gradum ascendisse ignobilissimos prius homines et despicatissimos'; and goes on to describe the remarkable rise of Bassus in the style of a Suetonian biographical sketch (note the quotation of soldiers' verses, an old Suetonian trick). It is easy to imagine that the moral too derives from S., the only authority cited.

III Status


50. The theme is well brought out by Steidle 24ff.

51. splendidus does not necessarily indicate senatorial status but distinction: the family of Vespasia Polla, with equestrian father and senatorial brother, enjoyed local splendor near Nursia (Vesp.1,3); a leading Greek could be splendidus (Cl.16,2); Aug. restored its ancient splendor to the senate (35,1), but 'splendissimum quemque equestris ordinis' is also possible (Cal.15,1). In fact the term is relative. Against the notion that splendidus eques R. ever became an official appellation (Stein, Der röm. Ritterstand, 97f.) see S. Demougin, Epigraphica 37, 1975, 174f.

52. Cf. Juvenal 3,39f. ...quales ex humili magna ad fastigia rerum, extollit, quotiens voluit Fortuna iocari.

53. Further below ch.VI, Appendix on providentia.

54. Note Hunt and Edgar, Select Papyri i, no.112, the first letter home of a young recruit at Misenum, 2nd century A.D. He thanks his father δόθι με ἔκαδέυσας καλῶς καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἐλπίζω ταχὺ προκόψω (leg. προκόψω).

55. Though the loss of patrimonium is seen to bring demotion, cf. above on Galba's brother.

56. Honor and honestus are very frequent (Howard-Jackson s.v.).

57. Cl.38,1; Vesp.15; see Mommsen, Staatsr. I 139 n.3.

58. Tac. Ann.13,27, rejecting the idea that the libertas of freedmen should be made revocable: 'non frustra maiores, cum dignitatem ordinum dividerent, libertatem in communi posuisse'. Ann.2,33 'distinctos senatus et equitum census [from the rest, not from each other, according to the commentators], non quia diversi natura, sed ut locis ordinibus dignationibus antistent...'.

59. S. Gsell, Essai sur Domitien (1894), 343f. Note also S.'s failure to mark the same innovation by the wicked Vitellius (T. Hist.1,58).

60. So Gascou (1976), 270f.


63. For liberality to all ranks cf. Jul.27,1 (ex reliquo quoque ordinum genere); Vesp.17 (in omne hominum genus); Ner.10,1; Dom.4,5. Further below ch.IX,3.
III Status

64. But nothing is said of Nero's extension of their privilege to equites, T. Ann.15,32, cf. Plin. NH viii,21.

65. Discrimination was also shown by Julius, but between Romans and provincials (48).

66. Instances are multiple in Ner.11-12, as in Jul.39,1-2. S. makes no explicit comment; indeed Ner.19,3 implies that these items are above reproach. Yet there can be no doubt about Roman views on performances by the upper classes (Friedländer, Sittengeschichte I, 19ff.; particularly Juvenal 8,198ff.). Ner.4 puts S.'s own attitude beyond doubt: Nero's grandfather who produced equites and matrons on stage was 'arrogans, profusus, immitis' (the first is applicable here). The behaviour of Aug. (43,2) is at least proper, that of Tib. (35) severely correct. But S. does not record Vitellius' excellent ban on equestrian self-degradation (T. Hist. ii,62).

67. P. Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire (1970) for this whole theme.

68. See below ch.IX,2 clementia.

69. Cited in this sense by Peter l.c. (n.16), followed by Macé 84; Cizek (1977), 170.

70. Disagreements on points of historical fact (Macé 206f.; Townend (1967) 88ff., Syme, Tacitus, 781f.) do not, of course, amount to disagreements in political and social viewpoints.

71. Hist.i,1; Ann.1,9; 4,33 etc. See Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea (Cambridge 1950), 160ff.; Syme, Tacitus 547ff.

72. Cizek (1977), 180 discussing this passage takes the alternative to be 'l'intention initiale (i.e. of restoring the republic) ou son abandon'. This is ruled out by the words immediately following: 'quama voluntatem ...testatus est'. The voluntas is his good intention in retaining power.

73. Below p. 93 for S.'s respect for official documents. However Tiberius' declaration at Tib.61 is rejected, and prejudice in favour of Augustus may be more significant.

74. Wirszubski 171 'the possession of libertas became a gift rather than a right and ceasing to be a right, lost what had been its essential quality.'

75. The following discussion discounts passages where libertas is simply a legal status, opposed to slavery (Aug.40,4; Vit.10,2; Vesp.16,3) or of provincial cities (Aug.47; Tib.37,3; Cl.25,3; Ner.24,2; Vesp.8,4).

76. Cf. Tib.50,1 'restituentam libertatem' with Cl.1,4 'pristinum rei p. statum...restituturum' of Drusus. The latter confirms that S. saw the principate as a novus status (Aug.28,2).

77. Contrast Syme, Roman Revolution 212.
III Status

78. This passage is cited by Macé 85 (for 'deuxième' read 'premier'); della Corte 98f.; Cizek (1977), 178. To suggest as Cizek that Helvidius was the 'ideal vivant' of the aristocracy is to overstate; parallel accounts of him are also critical, Dio lxv, 12 (Xiph. 206, 30ff. and Exc. Val. 273); schol. Juv. 5, 36. On Tacitus' actual ideal see conveniently Wirszubski 166.

79. For dignitas versus libertas in the republic, Wirszubski 15f.

80. With Aug. 98, 2 cf. Wirszubski 170: 'Libertas now means respect for the person and property of the citizen, security and welfare; but under tutelage it hardly means independence... ' For the numismatic confusion with liberalitas A. Stylow, Libertas und Liberalitas. Untersuchungen zur innenpolitischen Propaganda der Römer, Diss. München 1972.

81. For the tight social links cf. Stein esp. 291ff. (above n.27).

82. For Titinius see Plin. ep. i, 17 and viii, 12 with Sherwin-White ad loc.; Pflaum, Carrières Equ. no. 60.
Chapter IV

Scholar and Bureaucrat

1. See the criticisms of della Corte by Townend, JRS 49, 1959, 202f.

2. A theme stressed by Millar, e.g. p.4.

3. Thus Townend l.c.; the numerous correspondences with Pliny are well brought out by Warmington (1977), cf. p.8.


6. S. Hor.23 (Rostagni) 'nos in epistulis scribendis adiuvabit'. On the significance of this passage see below ch.V.

7. For the use of this anecdote see Millar, JRS 1967, 9.


9. Cf. Brunt, JRS 65, 1975, 124ff. on the lack of specialist training for prefects of Egypt, and drawing wider conclusions for the 'imperial civil service' (141). For the applicability of points 3,7,8 and 9 see the discussion of officia in ch.V. For point 11 see below Appendix, s.v. ducenarius.

10. Millar 83ff. drawing rather different conclusions. The former role of the Oxford school of Literae Humaniores in providing training for the Civil Service is not wholly irrelevant.


13. See below Appendix on rerum actus, and ch.VI p.146 on iudices. Also Carney (1968), 18 n.67 observing interest in legal affairs.

14. Argued by Townend (1961,1), 102ff.; still accepted by Gascou (1978), 443. However the original incentive to place the start of the career under Trajan has now collapsed, i.e. the need to fit in 3 offices before 122, and the arguments will need to be reexamined more carefully. For arguments for and against combinations of these offices, and for similar careers see further Townend (1961,2) and Van't Dack (1963). But even if all 3 were held under Hadrian, there may still be earlier offices under Trajan: Townend (1961,1), 102.
15. Mace's arguments (35ff.) for a date of birth round AD 70 are generally accepted. The attempts of Baldwin (1975) to place it earlier seem to me implausible. On the other hand, there is nothing to exclude a date even 5 years later (pace C. P. Jones, Phoenix 1968, 129). The vital evidence is S. Ner.57,2, placing a false Nero 'post viginti annos' (i.e. 87-89) in his own adulescentia, i.e. after the age of puberty. Mace's assumption that an adulescens is older than an adulescentulus (45ff.) cannot be substantiated from S.'s own usage.


17. It would be rash to anticipate further debate on this topic. For present purposes the most significant point is the possibility that S.'s secretarial career was much longer than previously supposed.

18. On the post see Hirschfeld, Kaiserliche Verwaltungsbeamten, 295-306; Dzitatzko RE iii, 421ff.

19. Gomoll (1935); anticipated more tentatively by Macé 220-225.

20. Following Reifferscheid, fr.102-104. Reifferscheid's hypothesis of an appendix to the de viris illustribus is not convincing: Macé 265f.

21. See Townend (1961,2); Van't Dack (1963) for details. Millar 83ff. emphasises the literary qualifications of imperial officials. The posts of a studiis, a bibliothecis and ab epistulis were all held by Julius Vestinus (Pflaum Carrières 105); a bibl. and ab epist. by Dionysius Alexandreus (Pflaum 46) and Valerius Eudaemon (Pflaum 110); a stud., a bibl. and a libellis by Volusius Maecianus (Pflaum 141).

22. Discussed by Friedlander, Sittengeschichte i,56; Hirschfeld, Verwaltungsbeamten 332ff.; Kübler RE iv A (1932), 397f. Macé 110f. shrewdly guessed S.'s involvement with the business of this office.

23. Mace l.c.; Millar 205.

24. Above ch.II p.30 for refs. For the term studia see Aug.84,1; Cl.40,3; 42,1; Dom.20; also Tib.70,1 and Cal.54,1 'studiosissime'. Studia is used similarly in de Gramm.9,1; 20,3; 21,1; 24,1.

25. So Friedländer i,56, followed by Hirschfeld 333 n.2.

26. Charisius Inst.Gramm.ii,209 Keil; H. Bardon, Les empeureurs et les lettres latines (1940), 413f. has little to say about this unusual fragment.

27. It is too readily assumed that the post of a studiis was regularly filled between Polybius and Suetonius. Claudius, as S. amply demonstrates, was exceptional in his dedication to studia, and it may be more than coincidence that we hear of a personal assistant for him and not for his successors. In this light, it is perhaps worth considering that Hadrian is more likely to have required an equestrian a studiis than Trajan. On the other hand, information e.g. on Domitian's reading habits (20) might stem from the 'office'.

- 27 -

IV Scholar and Bureaucrat
IV Scholar and Bureaucrat

28. For a full discussion of imperial archives (commentarii) see Millar 259ff.; id. 267 against the view that the a studiis conducted active 'research' for official projects.

29. The increasing importance of retrieval of information on past imperial acts may be reflected in the emergence of an officium a memoria in the 2nd and 3rd centuries: Millar 265ff. But this does not mean that officia did not keep their own records, as is confirmed by the attestations of scriniarii, e.g. CIL x, 527 (scr. ab epistulis); vi, 8617 (scr. a libellis). Further, Preresterstein RE iv, 726ff. s.v. Commentarii. The record-keeping of Egyptian officials is comparatively well attested, but in its 'day-book' form much more simple: see U. Wilcken, Philol. 53, 1894, 80ff.

30. For the post see Hirschfeld 319ff.; Friedländer i, 56; with appendix by M. Bang iv, 35ff.; Rostovtzeff RE vi, 210ff. s.v. epistulis; on incumbents of the post Townend (1961, 2); Millar 88ff.; on the functions involved Millar 213ff. (and passim; see Index).

31. For details Hirschfeld l.c.; also Brassloff RE vi, 204ff. s.v. epistulae, with corrections by Preresterstein RE xiii, 30ff. s.v. libellus.

32. It is notable how largely some of the evidence adduced below features in Millar's survey, 213ff.

33. This may be added to the examples of appointment by codicil in Millar 305ff.

34. See Macé's long chapter 'le Secrétaire ab epistulis aux Archives impériales', 110-198.


36. Above n. 29.

37. Roth p. 305 = Reifferscheid fr. 157 from Isidore Nat. Rer. 44. P. Wessner Hermes 52, 1917, 214ff. challenges the attribution of this whole passage to S. and suggests that the citation only covers the first two sentences of the piece which coincide with a Virgil scholium (cf. Roth p. 304). Yet the citation of Augustus in itself is a strong pointer to Suetonius. I would suggest further that the citation of Augustus on fretus in Charisius i, 129 Keil stems from the same passage. Isidore explains the phrase fretum angustum but omits the authorities.

38. However Townend, Hermes 88, 1960, 8ff. who emphasises the oddity of S.'s citations in Greek, suggests Cluviius Rufus as the source.

39. See esp. Funaioli (1947); Paratore (1959); Dihle (1954).

40. See Regenbogen RE xx, 1408ff. s.v. Πολης; Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship from the beginnings (Oxford 1968), 126ff.

41. Despite Millar (below), there seems to me much sense in Sherwin-White, The Letters of Pliny, 536ff. (= JRS 52, 1962, 114ff.).
42. Millar 219-228. Also important is Wynne Williams, 'Individuality in the Imperial Constitutions', JRS 66, 1976, 67ff.

43. S. Hor. 19f. Rostagni citing Augustus. Millar 225 adduces this passage, but emphasises that we do not know how the secretary assisted. He gathers evidence showing (i) that the ab epistulis Graecis dictated letters; (ii) that the ab epistulis Latinis was supposed to dictate them in the later empire (Firmicius Maternus Math. viii, 25, 6). Especially in view of the probability that Suetonius dealt with both Greek and Latin correspondence (Townend (1961,2), 376) it seems hard to deny that he dictated Latin letters, and that his function was partly to ensure good style. On the ways a secretary could help, Cic. ad Q. fr. i, 2, 8-9 (Quintus and his secretary Statius) is illuminating. (I owe this reference to Professor Brunt.)

44. Millar 85-94, with 224. The whole of the following discussion is indebted to Millar.

45. G. W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (1969) ch. iv 'Sophists and Emperors' puts them in their context.

46. Sen. QN iv, 2, 13 - if this is the secretary: Millar 86f.

47. Phrynichus Ecl. 357 (Fischer 1973 = 356 Rutherford); and 231 (203R.).

48. On the tone of indignation see W. Williams, JRS 1976, 69 & 76; also Sherwin-White op. cit. 541ff. It should not be automatically assumed that indignation is a sign of individuality: it was one of the few human emotions that could be regarded as appropriate for an emperor.

49. Discussions of S. as a critic of style (esp. D'Anna (1954), 94ff.) pay no attention to the idea that a particular style suits the imperial persona. The Atticist-Asianist debate is beside the point.

50. Compare the remarks on the proper style for a statesman of Plutarch Praec. ger. rep. vi-viii, 802E-804B: theatricality and rhetoric are to be avoided; speech must be frank, dignified and appropriate; buffoonery is to be avoided, though ridicule may be used for reproof, but not at the wrong moment. Indeed, it may be possible to detect very subtle touches of humour in imperial constitutions: W. Williams JRS 1976, 74 on Pius. That laughter ill-befits a king is an old topic: Hdt. i, 99 (Persian king); Xen. Ages. viii, 2 & xi, 11; Livy xxxii, 34, 3 'erat dicacior natura quam regem decet' cf. Polyb. xviii, 1, 10; Philodemus x.a.B. iii, 18f. (king should not be ψυχογέλσων); Philo leg. ad Gai. 42 (against Caligula's jokes); Plut. Cleom. xiii, 4.

51. W. Williams, JRS 1976, 78f. comments on Marcus' passion for minutiae. Is this really unusual? Similarly for Marcus' linguistic purism (80ff.).

52. On S.'s style cf. Funaioli (1932), 622 'ungekunstelt, einfach, gedrungen und klar, von klassischer Eleganz'; also Steidle 125f.; della Corte 208, 'l'espressione chiara e pura, senza orpelli, senza vagheggiamenti letterari...'; also Bagge (1875), 3 'oratio enim eius tam pura et incorrupta est, ut nihil emendatius'.

IV Scholar and Bureaucrat
53. Carney (1968), 11, quotes Cyril Connolly's neat characterisation of S.'s style as 'dead-pan'.

54. Similarly Trajan to Pliny (ep. x, 97, 2): 'nam et pessimi exempli nec nostri saeculi est'.

55. For Roman sensibilities on technical terms, the excuses of Plin. NH praef. 13 are eloquent: 'plurimarum rerum aut rusticis vocabulis aut externis, immo barbaris etiam cum honoris praefatione ponendis'.

56. S.'s unusual fondness for technical terms is taken for granted by D. Slusanski, 'Suetone-critique littéraire. Problèmes de vocabulaire', Actes XII Conf. Int. Et. Class. Eirene (1972), 1975, 115ff. Bagge (1875), 55-7 lists Grecisms and neologisms. There is, however, no detailed investigation of his vocabulary. In what follows, only words with 'official' connotations are discussed.

57. For data I depend on the TLL vol. i-viii (-1977); and where this is lacking on the Oxford Latin Dictionary (OLD) fasc. i-vi (-1977) and Forcellini, Totius Latinitas Lexicon (1858-1871).

58. Hirschfeld 434. Apul. met. vii, 6 has one 'ducenaria perfunctum': the novel characteristically admits sermo cotidianus.

59. See further E. Wolfflin, 'Epitome', Archiv Lat. Lex. 12, 1902 and bibliography cited by Eadie loc. cit.

60. S.v. forma, TLL vi, 1081, 58ff.; OLD §12.

61. Mommsen, Staatsr. ii, 240. Hirschfeld 385f. argues that praeses only became general after senators ceased to hold provincial commands in the 3rd century. If so, it will only be general in S.'s day for imperial appointees. The important point, however, is that a 'general' name becomes appropriate where the emperor starts to issue 'general' instructions (cf. S. Aug. 89, 2 but using the term rectores) as envisaged by Callistratus Dig. 1, 18, 9 'generaliter quotiens princeps ad praesides provinciarum remittit negotia...'.

62. praesides provinciarum: Aug. 23, 1; Tib. 41; Cl. 17, 3; Oth. 7, 1; Vesp. 6, 4; Dom. 8, 2. praesides (without 'provinciarum'): Tib. 32, 2; sing. Jul. 35, 1 (Egypt), Dom. 6, 2 (Germania sup.). In no case however, is it made explicitly clear that proconsuls are included: 'governors' to whom an emperor writes and so on may all be legates. Tib. 32, 2 is a case of generalisation from one instance, actually the prefect of Egypt, cf. Dio lvii, 10, 5.

63. So Hirschfeld, 433 n. 1.

64. P. R. Weaver, Familia Caesaris, 200. Otherwise Sen. Ben. iii, 28, 5 calls the job given a slave 'ordinarium... officium'. Ordinarius is of course common enough in other applications (e.g. consul ordinarius).

65. confisco of goods taken: Cal. 16, 3; Dom. 12, 2; of people fined: Aug. 15; Tib. 49, 2; Cal. 41, 2; of money kept in reserve Aug. 101, 2.
66. Note that S.'s (approximate) contemporary, the epitomator Florus, is first with the noun *confiscatio* (epit.1,44).

67. Wlassak RE i,333f. s.v. rightly argued that the modern use of the phrase as a technical expression for the 'period of the legal term' is not supported by ancient usage which refers to 'conduct of legal business' generally. Taken as technical by Riccobono, Acta Divi Augusti 145.

68. CIL xi,721; cf. Forcellini s.v. In this case, however, the word has no specific reference to Rome.

69. See index to CIL vi; also Juvenal 6,71: Martial i,42,11.

70. Ulp. Dig.4,4,11,2; the same author contrasts 'vias rusticas' and 'urbicas', cf. Gell.xv,1,3 using the same contrast of real estate. (But Ner.30,2 has 'urbanis rusticisque praediis') For the *ratio urbica*, Hirschfeld 177 n.2;270.
Chapter V

Excursus: On the Institution of Offices

1. Listed by Brugnoli (1968), 166.

2. For a cautious discussion Crook, Consilium Principis, 135ff. Also Pflaum, Les Procurateurs Equ. 58ff.


4. So Peter, Geschichtliche Literatur I, 123 'eine historische Entwicklung der Hof- und Staatsamter'. Plin. ep. iii, 5, 3 for the elder Pliny (della Corte 238 n.6).

5. Della Corte 237f. imagines he was discussing the minimum age for various 'offices' and connects with it implausibly an unassigned fragment on the obscure lex (P) Laetoria forbidding 'stipulation' under the age of 25 (fr. 111 Reiff.).

6. 'intricatissimus locus' Roth p. 303.

7. Macé 301; similarly Brugnoli (1968), 169.

8. Lydus is sidetracked into a discussion of the tax called gleba, but he appears to return to the explanatory remark (τό γάρ ...) that it was only Augustus who introduced the office of praefectura urbis. If this is a right interpretation, I would read τό γάρ τῆς πόλεως σχετικῶς (vice ἔργων); cf. Mag. iii, 5 p. 91 for this usage.

9. So Roth p. 303. Reifferscheid further assigns as fr. 201 a passage of Georgius Cedrenus on an officium created by Numa; but it seems hard to saddle Suetonius with the Byzantine institutions of the erogatio (ῥόγυνωμένων) and the carat of gold (κερατίου). Macé 302 prefers to assign it to the de Regibus.

10. Stressed by Macé 300.

11. This is to assume that the de Inst. Off., along with the bulk of S.'s philological work, was composed earlier than the Caesars, cf. above Ch. I n. 21. Townend (1967), 80 inclines to a date after the composition of the Caesars; but Cal. 8, 3 can assume the ancient usage of puera without citing authorities, and the natural implication is that the de Inst. Off. passage is earlier.

12. For full references see Howard-Jackson Index s. v.; he also uses the verb in the technical sense of 'heredem instituere', e.g. Aug. 101, 2; Cal. 24, 1, of education and upbringing (Aug. 48 & 64, 2) and for practices adopted by emperors personally (Augustus made a practice of reading speeches from a text: 84, 2). Following their inconvenient practice Howard-Jackson make no distinction between different usages.

13. So the text of Castorina 1961; Roth p. 279 & Reifferscheid fr. 185 have slightly different readings.
14. The Suetonian origin of this passage is reargued by Gomoll (1935), 381ff. The strongest argument is the close similarity in wording between Isid.6,5 'post hos Caesar dedit Marco Varroni negotium quam maximae bibliothecae construendae' and S. Jul.44,2 'bibliothecas... quas maximas posset publicare [sc. destinabat], data Marco Varroni cura comparandarum ac digerendarum'. But Brugnoli (1968), 209ff. is highly sceptical of the attribution of the fragment. It is important to bear in mind the enormous dangers of supposing that Isidore ever saw a manuscript of Suetonius, despite his frequent citations; see the fundamental article of Wessner (1917), accepted authoritatively by J. Fontaine, Isidore de Séville et la Culture classique dans l'Espagne Wisgothique (Paris 1959), i,16 & 748ff. But though the hypothesis of an encyclopaedic Prata as predecessor of the Etymologiae will no longer stand (cf. Brugnoli (1968), 135ff.) it is evident that numerous items from Suetonius filtered through the tralatician late classical tradition: this is plausibly enough one of them.

15. See above ch.IV, 1.

16. A useful account of the development is given by E. Bernert, De vi atque usu vocabulis officii, Diss. Breslau 1930; the article officium in the OLD (fasc.v,1976) is lucidly arranged; not so that in TLL (vol.ix,2, fasc.iv,1974) which blurs vital distinctions. We are not here concerned with the 'services' of clientela and amicitia, including the exchange of social courtesies in high society (Kroll, Kultur der ciceronischen Zeit i, 1933, 60ff., Friedländer, Sittengeschichte i,238ff.; OLD Bl & 2) but with the officia of public life.

17. Cf. OLD §5 & 6; TLL ix,523,6ff. is peculiarly confusing here.

18. BC iii,5,4; for other passages in Caesar see Bernert and OLD §5. The closest passage in Cicero is in the Republic, referring to the duty and function of his ideal statesman: 'video iam illum...virum cui praeficiis officio ac munere' (Rep.ii,69).


20. Sen. ep.19,8 stresses the labours involved in Lucilius' equestrian career: as he undertakes risks for money, so he does toils for honor, and he wears himself away 'in ista sollicitudine procurationum et deinde urbanorum officiorum'. Compare the complaints of Pliny ep. i,10,9 'distringor officio'.

21. E.g. Columella i,8,1; Sen. Const.Sap.15,1 etc.

22. Sen. Ben.iii,18,1ff. for the distinction between officium and ministerium. That there is something 'grand' about the word officium is suggested by Petronius Sat.30 (in the context of the pretentiousness of Trimalchio's household) and Nepos Eum.1,5 (commenting that the Greeks held the officium of a scribe in respect, unlike the Romans).

23. If this is the a rationibus of ILS 1474, he died under the Flavians or later.

24. See Boak RE xvii,2045f., s.v. officium.
25. This point should not be pressed. We cannot tell how often the word was used in lost works, let alone in everyday speech. Nevertheless, the point remains that S. writes of officia as 'bureaux' where Tacitus and Pliny do not.

26. I exclude passages where officium appears in other senses; it must be borne in mind that S. uses it frequently in the sense of private social obligations and ceremonies. Tib.15,1 provides the conceptual link: 'privata modo officia obiens ac publicorum munerum expers'. Note also Aug.13,3 on the division of 'duties' by the triumvirs. Also for military duties see Jul.67,1; 69; Cl.29,2; Calb.10,5; Vesp.6,3. The quaestor's duty of reading imperial communications is described as an officium (Ner.15,2), but this is not to confuse the magistracy with an 'office'.

27. 15 x; Gerber and Greef s.v. cite half the number of passages in Tacitus with the meaning 'Amt', but a full column and more of instances in the traditional, Ciceronian, senses.


29. The distinction drawn by Hirschfeld 319 n.3 between the 'private' post offered to Horace and the 'Amt' is rightly challenged by Millar 85. In any case it is fairly clear that S. drew no distinction.

30. Macé 72f. against this 'rule' of Reifferscheid (418f.); further Funaioli (1932), 598; Brugnoli (1968), 60. It is clear however that in principle S. avoided the contemporary.

31. That contemporary events demand a different and higher tone, i.e. of panegyric is a common theme in the historiographical tradition after S.: Eutrop.x,18,3; Ammian.xxxi,16,9; SHA Heliog.35,5; Quadr.Tyr.15,10; Car.18,5; cf. Straub (1939), 153. (I owe this reference to Dr. Oswyn Murray.)

32. Townend (1959), 285ff. gathers the evidence of decline, and argues that the post-Augustan books were published after his dismissal from office. But even if this is right, there is still an absolute decline of learning and interest; if he was simply disillusioned, he would hardly bother to quote Augustan documents on Tiberius and Claudius. See Macé 361f.; Crook (1969), 63. Against the explanation of Bowersock (1969) - i.e. that the later books are earlier experiments - see Bradley (1973).

33. If so, one should question the normally preferred dating of the cura alvei Tiberis by Dio Ivii,14 to AD 15.

34. Attestations for the post of praefectus vehiculorum have crept back from the reign of Hadrian to Vespasian; it does not make sense to say the cursus only latterly became a 'véritable service official': G. Burton, JRS 67, 1977, 162.

35. It is a curiosity that the only other attestation of this post is placed by Pflaum, Procurateurs Equ. 64 under Hadrian.

36. One might add that Aug.50 on libellis raises the possibility of an appropriate secretary.
37. The inclusion of magistracies is assumed by Reiffersheid 466; Macé 299; della Corte 238; and denied or questioned by none.

38. Cf. e.g. titles transmitted of the work on clothing: Servius on Aen. 7,612 has the brief de genere vestium in place of the Suda's 'περί ὑπομάτων κυρών καὶ ἱδεῶν ἐνθημάτων καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἷς τὸς ἀμφίευσσαν' (Roth p.281f., Reiff. fr.165f.).

39. Macé 301 suggests that Jul.41 and Cl.23 on adjustments to the number and functions of magistrates also reflect the de Inst.Off.

40. See G. Wissowa, de Macrobii Saturnaliorum fontibus (Breslau 1880), 19f.; Brugnoli (1968), 154f.

41. See E. Castorina, Tertullian de Spectaculis (1961), intro.

42. Cf. proem. & 3,74. J. F. Schulze, Quaestionum Lydianarum particula prior, Diss. Greifswald 1862 for his failings, and Wünsch's introduction.


44. When Lydus cites an impressive list of sources on military matters, it stems from Vegetius (Wünsch xl). The only sources we can be confident Lydus used are those he does not name, the Digest, whence came all his citations of the jurists (see Wünsch xli) and the commentaries on Virgil and other poets which provide much of his philological learning (Schulze 20ff., Klotz RE xiii,2213f.)

45. Ensslin RE xxii, 2394 s.v. praefectus praetorio.

46. Klotz 2215.


48. Schulze 6f., Klotz 2216.

49. Cf. Macé 299.


51. Esp. Nörr 563ff. on his historical viewpoint.

52. By F. Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (1946), 169; Bretone 121; Nörr 532 & 588.

53. There has been much discussion of the possibility of Pomponius' use of Varro, but nothing is sure: Nörr 518ff.; esp. 532 pointing to unknown republican sources, but stressing the similarity in structure to S. de Grammaticis. Note the list of those who added to the number of praetors from Julius to Nerva (Dig.1,2,2,32), comparing Jul.41,1 and Aug.37 for parallel information in S.
54. The information on the triumviri nocturni derives immediately from Paulus Dig.1,15,1; but the antiquarian research must be earlier for the triumviri are poorly attested (Livy ix,46,3; Val.Max. viii,1 damn.5-6). The style of Paulus' historical sketch of the vigiles is much what one would expect of S. Note the central role played by Augustus.

55. This might conceivably derive from S. who certainly mentions the excubiores (Cl.42; Ner.8), a technical term which Tacitus avoids (Ann.12,69). Cf. Fiebiger RE vi,1577 s.v. vigiles. That Tiberius should have 'instituted' them is plausible enough, and the item might derive from a discussion of the praetorian prefecture.
Chapter VI

The Secretary on Imperial Administration

1. 'Administration' is a Suetonian category of thought: cf. Aug.46 'ad hunc modum urbe urbanisque rebus administratis, Italianam...'; Cl.25,5 'sed et haec et cetera totumque adeo ex parte magna principatum non tam suo quam ubern libertorumque arbitrio administravit'; Vit.12 'magnam imperii partem non nisi consilio et arbitrio vilissimi cuiusque...administravit; Dom.3,2 'circa administrationem...imperii aliquamdiu se variurn praestitit'. Administration overlaps with the reorganisation of the state: Jul.40,1 'conversus hinc ad ordinandum rei publicae statum'; Vesp.8,1 'rem. p. stabilire primo, deinde et ornare'; similarly the quotation of Aug.'s edict on himself as 'optimi status auctor' (28,2) serves as introduction for what follows.

2. These are linked with external wars at Aug.9-19 and Dom.6,2. Naturally the ability of the emperor to hold his own against rivals was as important as the security of the frontier.

3. So Townend (1959), 292 extending the observation of Syme, Tacitus 490; also Carney (1968), 15; contra Warmington (1977), ad loc.

4. Brunt JRS 53, 1963, 172 characterises S. here as reflecting Hadrian's 'defensive' policies; C. M. Wells, The German Policy of Augustus (1972), 9 rightly points out that S. only says Aug. was not aggressive 'quoquo modo', 'at all costs'.


6. The opening sentence 'in re militari...revocavit' has the appearance of a characteristic rubric. But nothing follows fitting the description.


8. Fronto Princ.Hist. 18, p.199 van den Hout. Della Corte wrongly, however, implies that Pliny underestimated the political significance of games-giving. Pan.33,1 shows his awareness; his own distaste (ep. ix, 6, 1) was a personal matter.

9. This needs no elaboration after Kloft (1970) and Cameron (1976).

10. περὶ τῶν παρὰ 'Ρωμαίοις θεωριῶν καὶ ἀγώνων βουλία β' (Suda), ludicra historia according to Gellius ix, 7. Roth p.278f., Reifferscheid fr.184ff.

11. Pliny NH viii,19 quotes Fenestella on the very first elephant fight (= Peter HRR, Fenestellae Annales fr.13).
12. Cf. the elogium of Q. Metellus preserved by Plin. NH vii,139, 'qui primos elephantos ex primo Punico bello duxit in triumpho'. Yet Seneca Brev.13,3ff. characterises precisely this kind of thing as 'inane studium supervacua discendi'. His verdict 'non est profutura talis scientia' is just, but must not be used to brush aside the Roman taste for such things. See Steidle 42, n.4. Further below.

13. For Roman views and laws on this issue see Friedländer, Sittengeschichte ii,19ff.

14. Cameron (1976), 157ff. shows the importance of this theme, drawing heavily on Suetonius.

15. This topic is included here because of its thematic pattern. For the 'functional' division of military, religious and civil cf. ch.II,3.

16. Religious measures recorded in other contexts (esp. expulsions of foreign superstitions) are discussed below.

17. For the lack of the political side, see above ch.III,4. The point implied by 'nec facile nec tutum' (and missed by Dio liii,12,2ff.) is surely that imperial and senatorial provinces were not only distinguished by the military factor, but in degree of civilisation: non-urbanised communities needed more professional administration than the annual sortition permitted.

18. I have omitted one theme in this analysis; interference in provincial religious affairs, an idiosyncracy of Claudius (25,4-5).

19. Note also Cl.23,2 where a detail of Claudius' personal appearance in the senate is recorded.


21. Suetonius is explicit about Tiberius' correctio morum (cf. Tib.42,1 and 59,1). Tacitus plays down this side, stressing rather his refusal to take full responsibility: Ann.2,33 'non id tempus censuerae nec, si quid in moribus labaret, defuturum corrigendi auctorem'; and the letter of refusal at 3,53-55 with the conclusion 'remissa aedilibus talis cura'. Tiberius is playing the Augustan game of recusatio; Suetonius is surely right that he did in fact take action. (Note the verbal parallel between Ann.2,33 and Tib.33 'si qua in publicis moribus... labarent, corrigenda suscepit'.) Cf. Dio lvii,13,3-4 for refusal of legislation.

22. Vesp.11. It is curious that both s.c. in this chapter were originally measures of Claudius, who is given no credit for them. The commentators Braithwaite and Mooney assume Vespasian reenacted or modified previous legislation; but perhaps Suetonius slipped. There may well have been a shortage of evidence for Vespasian's cura morum if he acted mainly by example (Tac. Ann.3,55).
23. Croisille (1969/70), 78f. well illustrates the constant fluctuation in this life between favourable and unfavourable points, echoing the varietas animi of the man himself.

24. The implication of the use of the passive was pointed out by Steidle 89, followed by Croisille (1969/70), 82; for criticism of the normal 'hoc fecit' style see Dihle (1954), 50.

25. This is the express ideal of Pliny's Panegyric esp. 44f. & 70; e.g. 'tibi beneficiis potius quam remediis ingenia nostra experiri placet', 45,4; 'nec poenis malorum sed bonorum praemiis bonos (sc. magistratus) facias'; 70,2, the latter with implied criticism of Domitian's policy. The dual role of poenae and praemia is commonplace: e.g. Tacitus Ann.3,26 depicting the golden age when neither was needed to inspire morality. In fact Velleius attributes use of both methods to Tiberius: 'honorantur recta, prava puniuntur' (ii,126,3), 'honor dignis paratissimus, poena in malos sera, sed aliqua' (id.4). Cf. Tac. Ann.4,6 'mandabatque honores, nobilitatem maiorum, claritudinem militiae, illustris domi artes spectando...'. The topic could be pursued far, e.g. Claudian Cos.Stil.II, 124f., 'sub teste benigno/vivitur; egregios invitant praemia mores'.

26. This topic and its Greek background is more fully discussed below ch.IX,4 (luxuria-libido).

27. The similarity was noted by Syme, Tacitus 422 n.7.

28. Below l.c.

29. On his administrative 'reforms', J. A. Crook, Consilium Principis 56ff., on legal ones Peter Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire, 153ff. With what follows on Suetonius' views, compare Crook's conclusion (p.65): 'To sum up, Hadrian, in conformity with the grand tradition of Roman law, did not produce a radical innovation nor establish a new organ of government. He adapted the existing institution...'

30. The failure of the circus colours is obvious to us; but we must infer the restoration of sportulae from Martial e.g. 4,26, v. Gsell, L'Empereur Domitien 86.

31. For primus in republican elogia cf. ILS 61 (Fertor Resius); 64 (Romulus); 65 (Duilius); imperial,986 (Plautus Silvanus); 309 to Hadrian 'qui primus omnium principum et solus...' (debt remission); and the Res Gestae e.g. 16,1 'qui primus et solus omnium'. The same topic is standard in Roman poetry, Lucr.1,931; Verg. Geo.3,10ff.; Hor. Odes 3,30,13 etc. The military boast doubtless has priority: for these in Suetonius, Jul. 25,2; Tib.2,1 (Claudius Caudex); Cl.1,2 (Drusus).

32. Cf. Vit.2,5; the elder Vitellius started the worship of Caligula.

33. Thus a letter of Pius to Barca published by J. M. Reynolds, JRS 68, 1978, 114, 11.82-3 ου γάρ ἀγνοεῖ[τε ὡτ] τό τά τοιούτα καλωτομ[ένων ατι]αν παρέχει ταῖς πόλεσι φιλονεκρίας. On imperial attitudes to tradition and innovation in rescripts see W. Williams, JRS 66, 1976, 77 (Pius) and 82 (Marcus): departure from traditional procedure needs special excuse.
34. But not always: 'mediocritatem pristinam' (Vesp.12) is neutral, pristine *crudelitas* (Tib.75,1) or *cupiditas* (Vesp.19,1) bad.

35. However that innovation within the parameters set by tradition was necessary and laudable was a traditional republican notion: esp. Cic. *Rep.* ii,2ff. representing the gradual accretion of institutions as the strength of the Roman constitution.

36. In fact Julius (or Suetonius) mistook the *mos antiquus*: Mommsen *Staatstr.* i,356f. Note that Varro was interested in *accensi*, *L.L.* vi,88f. and *vita pop.* R. ap. Nonius p.520 M.


38. But exempla set by Claudius are quaint: the suffect consulship for an emperor (14), confinement to Rome as a punishment (23,2), and the marriage of a niece (26,3).


40. Aristeas 190; cf. Xen. *Cyr.* viii,2,2 τὸ προνοεῖν an aspect of Cyrus' philanthropy; *Ages.* viii,5; *Isocr. ad Nic.* 6 kingship requires πλέοντος προνοίας.

41. Charlesworth (1936), 107ff.; also (1937), 117ff. For *providentia* in Tacitus see Béranger (1975), 331ff., 'La Prévoyance (Providentia) impériale et Tacite Annales 1,8'.

42. For the personification Strack *Reichsprägung* i,228 (ib.45ff. for earlier scenes); for the epithet Frei-Stolba (1969), 37, observing however that the epithet is not common between Trajan and the late empire.

43. Cic. *ND* ii,58 quoting Zeno = *SVF* i,172. Note that the definition plays on the two meanings of ὡκομος, "order" and "adornment".

44. Val. *Max.* praef.; already Cic. *rep.* vi,26 'deum te igitur scito esse, siquidem est deus...qui providit...'.

45. See Béranger (1975), 331ff. T. Ann.13,3 for mockery of Claudius' 'providentia'; 1,8 derision of the precautions of Aug.'s funeral 'provisis...heredum...opibus'; 4,38 Tiberius claims (in speech) to be 'rerum vestrarum providum'. Béranger also compares 1,46 'satis prospectum urbanæ servituti'; 13,14 'id solum diis et sibi providum' (Agrippina speaks).

46. See now J. R. Fears, *Princeps a diis electus* (1977) for a full examination of the theme.

47. Most recently discussed in Gugel (1977), 24ff.; also della Corte 53ff.; Mouchová (1968), 34ff. For further bibliography see Gugel.

VI Administration


51. The evidence from Suetonius and others is analysed according to type by T. B. Krauss, An Interpretation of the Omens, Portents and Prodigies recorded by Livy, Tacitus, and Suetonius, Diss. Philadelphia 1930.

52. These chapters are discussed by W. Déonna, 'La légende d'Octave Auguste Dieu Sauveur et maître du monde', Rev.Hist.Rel.83, 1921, 32ff.; 163ff.; 84, 1921, 77ff.

53. Omens pointing to imperial power (including success en route): Jul.8; 32; 61; Tib.14; Ner.6; Galb.4,1-3; 6,1; 8; 9,2; 10,4; Oth.4,1; 6,1; Vit.3,2; 8; 9; Vesp.5; 7; Tit.2; 5,1. Omens pointing to death and loss of power: Jul.81; Tib.74; Cal.57; Cl.46; Ner.40; 46; Galb.18; Oth.7,2; 8,3; Vit.9;18; Vesp.23,4; Tit.10,1; Dom.14,1; 15,2-16. I do not here include omens etc. which S. records not for their own predictive value, but to illustrate the attitude of the emperor: it is notable that these may indeed refer to questions other than imperial power, esp. Aug.39 (setting out on journeys etc.).

54. Plin. ep.i,18 discusses S.'s superstitious fears before a court case. Della Corte 53ff. argues from his judgements of the superstitions of the Caesars, but unconvincingly (Mouchova 37).

55. Observed long ago by F. Wagner, De omniibus etc. Diss.Jena 1888, 7. evidens: Jul.81,1; Aug.97,1; Ner.6,3; 46,1; Galb.1,1; cf. also 'haud ambiguum', Galb.8,3; 'haud dubium', Vesp.5,2; 'aliquanto manifestiora', Galb.18,2. For fulfilment of predictions ('qualis evenit' etc.): Aug. 96,1; Galb.18,1; Vit.9; Vesp.4,5; 25; Dom.23,2.


57. So Fears 171ff. with bibliography. It is not clear from this discussion whether Fears holds that Suetonius regarded omina imperii as a sign of divine sanction, or that he reflects the beliefs of others.

Chapter VII

Virtues and Ideology.


2. Kloft (1970), 181: 'Der Prinzipat ist, um mit den Begriffen Max Webers zu sprechen, zu einem beträchtlichen Teil charismatische Herrschaft...Das angestrengte Bemühen der Panegyriker, den princeps als Inkarnation aller Tugenden zu preisen, die entsprechende Propaganda auf Münzen und Inschriften, dienen diesem Zweck'.

3. Note that when Beranger (1953) discusses the 'aspect ideologique' of the principate he is concerned with something a little different from other, especially German, scholars. For him the 'ideology' is not a series of ideals for the ruler, but the way in which the subjects perceive the function of their ruler (e.g. as one who undertakes a great burden on their behalf). 'Virtues' consequently are of subsidiary importance in his presentation.


5. For attack on the ideal of coins as propaganda, see below n.49.

6. On the circumstances of the presentation of the shield see W. K. Lacey, JRS 64, 1974, 181-2, arguing that the date Cos VIII of the Arles shield may be correct. For a collection of evidence of representations of the shield, and discussion of the significance of the virtues, Tonio Hölscher, Victoria Romana (1967), 102-112. See also H. W. Benario, ANRW II,2 (1975), 80ff.


9. Traces of the ἄρετα as a canon before Plato are dubious. Gorgias Epitaphios 82B6 Diels-Kranz mentions ἄρετήν...τὸ πρόσωπον ἐκθέμενς...δύναμιν...ἐυσεβεῖς, but not in such a way as to suggest these are the main parts of virtue. For Plato's division of ἄρετη into 5 μόρια e.g. Prot.349B.

10. Xen. Ages.iii (ἐνεσέβετο), iv (ἐν ἐκθέμενον), ν (ἐν ἐκθέμενον), vi,1-3 (ἀνδρεία); vi,4-8 (σοφία). Markowski p.121 misleadingly omits mention of σοφία.

11. Rep.iv,428A τέταρα δόντα τυγχάνει. A. Dihle, Der Kanon der zwei Tugenden (Köln 1968), 15ff. describes Plato's establishment of a 'canon' on the basis of 'Vulgarethik', and the eventual elimination of δουλείας, which

12. For ἀρετήν in Aristotle EN iii-vi; cf. EE iii, Magn.Mor.i,20-34, de Virt.2,4 & 5. Markowski p.112 asserts that πρὸντις replaces wisdom as the fourth cardinal virtue; but it is only one of several non-Platonic virtues of Eth.Nic.iv, and φρόνησις is fundamental to Aristotle's scheme. For a brief list cf. Rhet.1366B1ff.

13. SVF iii,262ff. for constant repetitions of ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη (ἔγκρατεια), δικαιοσύνη, φρόνησις, already from Zeno (i,47).

14. de fin.v,67 etc.

15. For details above ch.II,2.


17. See below ch.IX, clementia.

18. For clementia as a part of temperantia see von Premerstein, Vom Werden u. Wesen des Prinzipats, 8f.; Helen North, Sophrosyne (1966), 300f. But though at Cic. de Inv.ii,164 clementia is treated thus, at de off.i,88 it is handled under magnitudo animi, and at Part.Or.78 lenitas in punishment is a sub-division of iustitia. Similarly Menander Rhetor iii, 374,28f. and Aristides ix,16-24 treat φιλανθρωπία under δικαιοσύνη.

19. pietas is absorbed under the heading of iustitia (rather than sapientia) by Plato Euthyph.12E, Cic.Part.Or.78.

20. Weinstock (1971), 228 quotes de Or.ii,343 for the combination of 'clementia iustitia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo'. The context makes it quite clear that he has not abandoned his canon of ii,45f. The principle of arbitrary selection is fundamental to Markowski's argument (see nn.9,10,12).

21. de off.i,61-92; cf. Part.Or.77. For μεγαλοψυχία as a Stoic subdivision of ἀνδρεία and Cicero's inversion see Knoche (1935), 51.

22. Cic. in Cat.ii,25; but cf. de Or.1,56; de fin.ii,83; Livy iv,6,12 for the substitution of aequitas for iustitia. For the lack of appeal of iustitia as a slogan to the Romans, below ch.IX,1.

23. Pan.Lat.iii(xi)5,4. For providentia as a subdivision of prudentia, Cic. de Inv.ii,160. Similarly CIL vi,1741,3f. celebrates Memmius Vitrarius Orfitus as distinguished 'ad exemplum veterum continentia iustitia constantia providentia omnibusque virtutibus'. Constantia represents ἀνδρεία.
24. ep.i,22,7; cf.iii,2,2 where Arrianus Maturus is praised as 'princeps... castitate, iustitia, gravitate, prudentia'. For gravitas as a variant see below.

25. Pan.Lat.ii(xii)40,3. For other variants in the Panegyrici see viii(v) 19,3 'gravitas, lenitas, verecundia, iustitia', cf. vi(vii)4,4; and ix(iv)8,2, 'continentia, modestia, vigilantia, patientia' as the desirable products of rhetorical education.

26. Cicero himself in praising Pompey, though employing the fourfold disposition of rhetoric, chooses quite different heads: scientia rei militaris, virtus, auctoritas, felicitas (Imp.Pomp.28). Three of these are echoed by Ammianus on Julian (xxxv,4,1ff.).

27. Cf. Radermacher RE x,1873ff., s.v. Kanon. But see R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship i (1968), 207 against the mistaken conception that 'canon' in this sense is an ancient term: it stems from the 18th century.

28. The closest approach is Pan.Lat.x(ii),3-4 where all 4 are mentioned. But they are not linked. The emperor is in peace a model of iustitia and virtus (3,3); his conduct of war demonstrated not only fortitudo, but clementia and pietas (4,3-4).

29. The reason lies in the great rarity of both Clementia and Iustitia as types; only Tiberius, Hadrian, Pius and Marcus have both, and none of them produce these types except in isolated emissions. Only in the series of AD 128 (below) do both occur in the same series, and here Pietas and Virtus are both missing. For details see Appendix with chart.

30. BMC i,131 & 133. For doubt whether all three represent Livia, Grant RAI 37, Sutherland (1951), 96; Lichocka (1974), 24f.

31. See Appendix.

32. For refs. above n.18.

33. Variants are cited above. The canon at xi(iii)19,2; vii(vi)3,4; iii(xi) 21,4.

34. Von Premerstein, Vom Werden und Wesen 10f. The arguments of I. S. Ryberg op.cit. (n.7) detecting the 'canon' in the Roman Odes, the Aeneid, Ovid Fasti ii,140ff. and the Ara Pacis, do not bear detailed examination.


37. Balsdon, JRS 61, 1971, 22f. The relevant part of the 'pamphlet' is Ant.Rom.ii,18ff.

38. This goes back to the honorific practice of the Athenian assembly. For a convenient summary see Larfeld, Handbuch der griechischen Epigraphik ii,836f. (for Athens); i,509ff. (for the rest of Greece).
39. OGIS i,332. For similar passages see the inscriptions cited by Schubart (1937),5.


41. This is based on the Arles copy which preserves the formalities. Cos VIII is changed to Cos VII but may in fact be correct (see Lacey JRS 1974, 181) and the missing ‘caussa’ is supplied from RG 34. No confidence can be placed in the connectives between the various virtues found in the RG version, which has abandoned the formal citation for an indirect report. (I thus implicitly reject all speculation based on these connectives from Markowski on.)

42. Macrobius Sat.ii,3,4 for Q. Cicero's honour. Unlike Augustus' shield, this was an imago clipeata (on which see the literature cited by Sutherland JRS 49, 1959, 137 n.28).

43. Note however that δικαιοσύνη is no cliche of Hellenistic royal honours: it appears always to have a specific connection with the administration of justice. L. Robert, Opera Minora Selecta (1969) i,603f. with Bull.Ep. 1958, 356.

44. Above all it should be borne in mind that the context of the shield is victory in civil war: it is normally represented on the coinage as carried by a flying Victory. So (in my view) rightly Combès (1966), 438f. This helps to explain the preeminence of these virtues in Constantinian panegyrics, that revolve constantly around victories in civil war.

45. A further argument has been employed from the celebration of the clupeus itself on the coinage: Strack i,57-61. But though the shield itself was remembered it does not follow that the virtues it celebrated also were. Telling against this hypothesis is the fact that the accompanying legend of CL(ipeus) V(itutis) is replaced under Nero by VICT(oria) AUG(usti). What was remembered was the victory not the virtues. CL V is only repeated in a direct revival of the type in the civil wars, BMC i,304f.


47. Charlesworth cites in his bibliography L. W. Doob, Propaganda. Its Psychology and Technique (1935). The author had recently travelled in Germany, and has interesting observations on the Nazi propaganda machine.


50. Cf. S. Price, CR 1979, forthcoming, citing several texts that suggest that the emperor was held responsible for coin types, especially the anonymous de rebus bellicis 3,4. Also Sutherland, JRS 1959, 52 for speculation on officials in charge of coin-types.
51. See above ch.II,2.

52. 'The Roman "Virtues"', HThR 1937, 103ff., an important statement of his position.

53. It is perhaps better to follow Wissowa, Religion und Kultus 328 in saying there is no 'Wesensunterschied' between blessings and virtues because both are seen as gifts of the gods - not as human dispositions.

54. Cf. BMC i,lxxiv & ii,xxif. on Salus.

55. Roman Imperial Money (1953), 154ff., esp. 167. The distinction of Augusti and Augusta is pressed by Strack i,49-52; yet the frequency of the ambiguous abbreviation AUG pleads against precision. Cf. K. Latte, Römische Religionsgeschichte (1960), 324 n.1.

56. I.e. Aequitas, Clementia, Constantia, Indulgentia, Justitia, Liberalitas, Munificentia, Patientia, Piaetas, Providentia, Pudicitia, Virtus. I exclude Moderatio, Magnificentia, (and Disciplina) which are never personified. On Tranquillitas cf. below Appendix. The total of 40 is the number of personifications listed by Gnechi (see Appendix).

57. I.e. Constantia, Magnificentia, Moderatio, Patientia. Equally rare is Disciplina, not a true virtue.

58. Charlesworth 113; Sutherland JRS 28, 1938, 129ff. corrected him on an omission in the numismatic evidence, but his suggestion that clementia was 'too despotic' is still quoted with approval, e.g. Wickert 2243. Yet if the virtue was not 'too despotic' for Seneca, it was hardly so for the coinage.

59. BMC i,152; Sutherland (1951), 152. Earlier is the unidentifiable personification of the series starting in AD 13, BMC i,124f., cf. Sutherland 84.


61. Note the comment of R. A. G. Carson in the introduction to BMC vi (Severus Alexander - Balbinus and Papienus 1962),29, dismissing the reverses as little more than the 'ringing of the changes on conventional and banal types'.

62. For details see Appendix.

63. J. Beaujeu, La religion romaine a l'apogée de l'empire 424 noted the frequency of Hadrian's innovations in this area.

64. The point is well made by P. G. Hamberg, Studies in Roman Imperial Art (1945), 32ff.

65. For this 'gallery' of virtues see Strack ii, 123ff.; Mattingly BMC iii,cxl. Mr. E. L. Bowie points out to me that the 'series' is a feature of Hadrianic coinage, comparing the Provinces series. This helps to explain why there was no earlier 'virtue series'; but the point remains that Hadrian showed an unusual interest in both Provinces and virtues.
VII Ideology

66. *Pan.*2,3 'nusquam ut deo, nusquam ut numini blandiamur'; etc.

67. These are: pietas, abstinentia, mansuetudo (2,6); humanitas, temperantia, facilitas (2,7); pudor (2,8); modestia, moderatio (3,2); frugalitas, clementia, liberalitas, benignitas, continencia, labor, fortitudo (3,4); severitas, hilaritas, gravitas, simplicitas (4,6). Add later vigilantia (10,3); indulgentia (21,4); bonitas (30,5); iustitia (33,2); veritas (54,5); patientia (59,3); sanctitas (63,8); fides (67,1); reverentia (69,4); comitas (71,6); aequitas (77,3); diligencia (92,2). (Only earliest occurrences given.)

68. For earlier gratiarum actiones see Durry (1938), 3ff. Pliny's Panegyric survives because it was used as a model by later panegyrists: it was evidently an outstanding performance and treated as such at the time (*Plin. ep.*iii,18).

69. For the evidence of 'optimus princeps' before Trajan see Frei-Stolba (1969), 21ff. Trajan's title only became an official cognomen in August 114 (T. Frankfort, *Latomus* 16, 1957, 333ff.).

70. For the 'inofficial titulature' up to Marcus see Frei-Stolba (1969). The earlier work of L. Berlinger, *Beiträge zur inoffiziellen Titulatur der röm. Kaiser*, Diss. Breslau 1935 is highly selective, not touching on 'virtues' in the philosophical sense.

71. Frei-Stolba rightly emphasises that attestations are usually isolated, and that it is hard to draw a line between usage in literature and inscriptions. In this respect the analogy with the coinage (which is both official and regular) is partial. But the regular pattern is that the coinage lags behind literary sources, inscriptions behind the coinage. See there for full details. Add *ILS* 400 for Commodus, with *BMC* iv,clxi.

72. The earliest attestation of such superlative virtue appears to be *Fronto de Fer.*ii,6 p.215 v.d.H. of Pius 'omnes omnium principum virtutes supergressus'. *ILS* 374 has the same phraseology of Marcus, but glorias in place of virtutes. Cf. *ILS* 400 (Commodus); 597 (Probus); 733 (Constantius).


78. Thus the distinction drawn by Christ à propos a Roman coin: 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God...' Matt.22,21 etc.
VII Ideology

79. I do not mean to imply any exclusive connection between these benefits and these qualities.

80. Cf. above n.67 for Pliny; for Suetonius ch.VIII below.


82. Nor can any real contrast be discovered between the message of the precious metals as for the élite, as against aes for the masses, pace Carney (1967), 291ff.

83. See Henzen, Acta Fratrum Arvalium (1874) Index s.v.

84. Plin. ep.x,41,1 for the invocation of Aeternitas; for providentia/providentissimus 54,1; 108,2; 61,1; 77,1. Providence in the Pan. belongs to the gods (10,4); 'provida severitate' 34,2 is a different use of the word. Providentia and aeternitas are shunned by Tacitus: see Syme Tacitus 754f.

85. So we might expect rather different language from a theologian in celebrating mass and in writing theology.

86. See Burdeau (1964), passim. I owe much to this excellent paper in formulating this distinction.

87. On the idea of the 'routinisation of charisma' see Weber, Economy and Society iii (1968), 112ff.
Chapter VIII

Virtues and Vices: the Pattern and its Background

1. Against the attempt of Carney (1967) to correlate Hadrianic coin-legends with the usage of S. (and thence to infer criticism of Hadrian) see the sensible discussion of Bradley (1976) who rightly sees the relevance of the historical tradition and Pliny's Panegyric.

2. For diligentia cf. also Jul.48 (control of household); Cl.21,2 (calculation of Secular Games); but ironically Cal.36,2 (inspection of prostitutes). For other instances of the word see Howard-Jackson Index. On imperial jurisdiction below n.12.

3. For severitas (used with evident approval) of domestic discipline; Jul.48; Aug.67,1; military discipline, Jul.65; Aug.24,1; Cal.44,1; Galb.6,3; censorial control, Aug.34,1; Cal.16,2; Dom.8,3; urban office or provincial government, Galb.7,1; Oth.1,2; control of the plebs, Aug.42,1; 45,4. The word is never used in the context of clementia (below ch.IX,2 clementia, n.63). It is notable that Augustus manifests the quality five times.

4. The word continentia is only used once in this context, Aug.72,1 'in ceteris vitae partibus continentissimum'. Otherwise Cl.32 in derision (edict on flatulence). Evidence for good morals never appears in the 'public' part of a Life in the fashion in which auxppoauvn is demonstrated in panegyrics.


6. On Victor and Eutropius see W. den Boer, Some Minor Historians (Leiden 1972). He notes that in Eutropius, 'The trinity of greed, cruelty and lust recurs again and again' (p.32). This is especially so where S. is the source.

7. Vit.5 'in provincia singularem innocentiam', cf. 2,4 'innocens et industrius'.

8. Vesp.4,3 'Africam integerrime...administravit'; cf. Claud.15,2 a show of 'aequitatem integram' in jurisdiction.

9. Aug.8,1; Vesp.4,5; Tit.4,1 all of army officers; Galb.3,3 of an orator; Vit.2,4 (Lucius Vitellius); Dom.8,1 (imperial jurisdiction).

10. Aug.3,2, Galb.7,1; cf. Dom.8,2 governors never 'modestiores...neque iustiores' than under D. It is not at all the same thing to say that Augustus never declared war 'sine iustis et necessariis causis' (21,2 cf. Jul.24,3) or that Claudius promised his anger would be 'non iniustam' (38,1). S.'s usage of iustitia is discussed fully below ch.IX,1.

11. fortitudo of governors generals: Aug.3,2; Cal.3,1; cf. Tib.21,4, Aug. call Tib. 'vir fortissime'. But S. does record that the troops regarded Otho as 'fortissimum virum, unicum imperatorem' (12,2).
12. Virtues of an emperor as judge: diligentia, Aug.33,1; Dom.8,1; cf. Cal. 36,2 ironically; industria, Dom.8,1; integritas, cf. Cl.15,2 (n.8); laboriosus, Jul.43,1, cf. Aug.84,1 of oratory; severitas, Jul.43,1; Ner. 16,2; lenitas, Aug.33,1; Cl.14; aequitas, cf. Cl.15,2.

13. severitas of governors: Calb.6,3 and 7,1. For emperors above n.3.

14. moderatio and abstinentia together of provincial government Oth.3,2; of emperors Dom.23,2 (D.'s successors).

15. Recommended by Menander Rhetor III,372,29ff. (Spengel); in practice cf. Xen. Ages.vi,1-3; Aristides ix,30-37 (but ἀνδρεία is here disparaged); cf. Ammianus xiv,4,1-10.


17. Men.Rhet. 376,2ff. recommends ωφροσύνη as a heading for topics concerning the imperial family; more broadly for the ruler's private life Aristid. ix,27; Xen. Ages.v; Isocr. Nic.iii,36-42. There is however no parallel for subsuming civilitas under this heading. Cf. Ammianus id.7 under prudencia.

18. ψυχικῆς: Men.Rhet.373,12f. and 376,13; Aristid. ix,32-34; Xen. Ag.vi,4-8 (ψυχή); cf. Isocr. Evag.65.

19. The similarity in general approach was seen by della Corte 77ff. For discussion of the ideals of the Panegyric see Durr's commentary (1938) and Trisoglio (1972), 78ff.

20. Listed above ch.VII n.67. Cf. Pan.59,5 'didicimus quidem, cui virtus aliqua contingat, omnes inesse'. For virtutes in general cf.3,2; 55,10; 72,5; 85,7.


22. Above ch.II,1 n.74 (sleep); n.114 (patientia laboris).

23. On livor and malignitas esp. 58,4-5 (hogging the consulship); for benignitas 50,7; 60,7; for the theme of obstructing or promoting the dignitas of others cf. 19,1; 44,5; 70,7; 91,2. Convenient discussion in Trisoglio (1972), 89ff. & 95ff.

24. T. Agr.39-42 for the blighting of his career by Domitian.

25. Cf. esp. Aug.38,1 'nec parcior in bellica virtute honoranda'; Cl.24,3 'triumphalia ornamenta...dedit...tam multis tamque facile ut...'; cf.24,1 on ornamenta consularia; Ner.15,2 'triumphalia ornamenta etiam...'. The implication is that emperors could be both too mean and too generous. Even so the question of the promotion of men of virtue is not one to which S. gives attention.
26. superbia/superbus of Domitian (and earlier principes): 11,4; 22,2; 48,4; 49,1; 49,6; 52,4; 63,6 (x2); 65,3; lacking in Trajan 24,3; 55,4; 59,4. adrogantia/adrogans of Domitian etc. 2,7; 22,1; lacking in Trajan 11,4; 76,7.

27. moderatio cf. below ch.X on Civilitas; Trisoglio (1972), 85.

28. reverentia senatus, 69,4 cf. 76,5; facilitas, 2,7; 47,3; 79,6; suavitas and iucunditas, 49,7; comitas, 71,6. Further below ch.X.

29. liberalitas and indulgentia, see Jacques-Ooteghem Index. Facilitas as generosity, 51,5; 86,6; benignitas in same sense 21,4; 25,3; 32,3; 39,3: avaritia 3,4; 50,5, cf. 41,3 'avidī et rapaces'.

30. For this topic below ch.IX, 4 libido-luxuria.

31. clementia, 35,1; 80,1; mansuetudo, 2,6; 38,5; crudelitas, 28,2; 49,2; saevus, 36,1; 49,1.

32. Below ch.IX, 2, clementia n.46.

33. Note however the topic that the good king is warlike but not fond of war: Arist. Pol.1313b28; Isoc. ad Nic.24-6; Dio or.i,27; Philodemus σ.α.β. col.ix,14ff. cf. Murray (1965), 169.

34. Pan.33,2, iustitia at games; cf. S. Tit.8,2 for aequitas in same circumstances; Pan.59,3 'iustissimus humanissimus patientissimus' as consul; 78,2 'iustitiae monumenta', also 77,3 'religio aequitatis' as judge in consulship. For distinction of consul and princeps, 59,5; 79,5.

35. sanctitas: 1,3; cf. 82,2; 63,8. 'Sanctissimus' appears in the unofficial titulature from Domitian on, Frei-Stolba (1969), 34ff. For constantia in Trajan cf. perhaps 85,7 'virtutes tuas...constantissime teneas'.

36. Trajan's energy and diligence are recurrent themes: 10,3; 31,1; 59,2; 77,5; 86,5; 92,2 (labor, vigilantia, cura, diligentia but not industria).

37. For the topic see Trisoglio (1972), 94ff. and below ch.IX, 4 luxuria-libido.

38. I do not in the following analysis consider Cassius Dio for two reasons, that he may have been influenced by S., and because the difference in language creates methodological problems. Even so, there can be little doubt that he would conform to the same pattern; for his interest in civilitas below ch.X; for clementia (φιλανθρωπία/ἐπιτέκχεια) see Wickert 2234ff. for numerous citations; for liberalitas Kloft (1970), passim.


40. Otho: Hist.i,30; Galb.i,37, cf.5 & 49; Vitellius i,52; ii,91; cf. iii,86; Vespasian ii,5, cf. 77; iii,13.

41. Rogers, (1943), 1ff., 'Some Imperial Virtues of Tiberius'. See also B. Levick, Tiberius the Politician, 87ff. Tacitus' portrayal of Tiberius has been analysed from this point of view by Bergen (1962), 25ff. who concludes that Tacitus and Suetonius have exactly the same set of 'virtues'.
52. Rogers (1943), 20ff. on providentia, explicitly inspired by Charlesworth (1936), who assembles the epigraphic evidence. For Tacitus' avoidance of the term, Syme Tacitus 754f. and Béranger (1975), 331ff. For the reasons for its absence above, ch.VI, Appendix.

43. For Tib.'s liberality see esp. Ann.1,75; 2,37ff.; 2,47-49; 3,18; 4,64; 6,17; 6,45 and Rogers 3ff.

44. For clementia passages cited below ch.IX,2, clementia n.44; Rogers 35ff. For moderatio/civilitas, Rogers 60ff. and below ch.X. Tacitus is restrained in his depiction of Tib.'s libidines (cf. 6,1) but has the same details as S. (the spintriae cf. S. Tib.43,1; Cal.16,1; Vit.3,2).

45. For the verbal usage see Gerber and Greef Lexicon Taciteum.

46. clementia: Hist.i,71 sets the tone ('falsae virtutes...clementiae titulus...'). Ann.2,72 allows the quality to Germanicus, but as a contrast to Tiberius.

47. E.g. Hist.i,5 & 37 for the unpopular severitas of Galba; constantia, Ann.4,38; Hist.ii,47; iii,86; gravitas, Hist.1,83; cf. Ann.2,72 (Germanicus); 15,48 (lacking in Piso as aspirant to throne); vigilantia, Hist.1i,77; Ann.3,37 ('maesta vigilantia' of Tiberius).

48. E.g. Ann.1,80 'neque enim eminentes virtutes sectabatur, et rursum vitia oderat'; 4,6 'mandabatque honores etc.', Hist.i,2 'ob virtutes certissimum exitum'; particularly note jealousy in the appointment of generals, Ann.2,26 (Germanicus); 11,19f. (Corbulo in Germany); 13,6 & 8 (Corbulo in Armenia) etc.

49. Pietas, Ann.1,9-10 (Augustus and Caesar); 13,5 (Nero and Claudius); 14,3 'ostentandae pietati' (to Agrippina); Hist.iv,52 (Titus and Vespasian).

50. Cf. Germ.14,1 'turpe principi virtute vinci'. Hist.iii,13 'Vespasiani virtute' is probably in the general sense of ἄρετη, not of ἀνδρεία.

51. E.g. Ann.6,6 on the 'tormenta pectoris' of Tiberius.

52. Hist.1i,77 contrasts the sapientia and inscitia of Vespasian and Vitellius; Ann.11,25 and 13,3 for the failings of Claudius. Tiberius shows sapientia in diplomacy Ann.2,64; prudentia 4,11, cf. 6,24 'callidum olim'.

53. For the absence cf. Syme 755. For the reasons, below ch.IX,1.

54. iustitia, Hist.i,49 (Galba in Spain); iii,75 (Sabinus); Ann.16,23 (Soranus); cf. Agr.9,3. integritas, Agr.9,4 & 7,4; Hist.i,48; ii,97; Ann.13,46. innocentia, Hist.1,45; iii,75; iii,49; Ann.1,44 (centurions); 14,51 (Faenius Rufus). industria, Agr.42,5; Hist.i,45; Ann.1,44; 16,23; cf. 3,54 'si quis ex magistratibus tantam industriam ac severitatem pollicetur'; but the quality is vainly boasted by Vitellius as emperor, Hist.1i,90. abstinentia Agr.9,4.

VIII Virtues and Vices

56. Schubart (1937), 18ff. Note esp. ἄγυρτωσια, BCG viii,1764; P.Tebt.iii,703; δικαιοσύνη, OC i,140; AP vi,9ff. etc.; καθαρεύσεις, AP vi,9ff.; OC i,329; 339,15.

57. Cf. CIL vi Index s.v. for each. E.g. 1727 'morum integritatis adque iustitiae singularis inlustris'; 1772/3 'iustitia integritate auctoritate praestanti'; 1725 'ob egregia eius administrationum merita, quae integritate censura et moderatione ita viguerunt...' etc.


59. E.g. v,3,13 'moderationem clementiamque regis'; vi,4,24; vii,6,17; 9,18; viii,14,41 etc. iv,10,23 'tantum mansuetudinis et continentiae'; cf. iv,11,16 where Alexander asserts that this is his natural disposition.

60. liberalitas: cf. iv,11,16; v,3,15; 5,24; viii,12,16ff.

61. Cf. vii,1,21 for a charge of speaking 'adversus maiestatem'.

62. Here liberalitas is apparently conflated with libertas, possibly pointing to a post-Hadrianic date. For the confusion A. Stylow, Libertas und liberalitas. Untersuchungen zur innenpolitischen Propaganda der Römer, Diss. München 1972.

63. Rostovtzeff SEHHW iii,13ff. & 159f. For general surveys see Hadot (1968); Dvornik (1966) i,241ff.; Barner (1889) is useful for collecting some of the topics of kingship literature from Plato to Synesius. Schubart (1937) is important for adding the evidence of the documents. In my following remarks I owe much to the scepticism of Oswyn Murray's unpublished Oxford dissertation πρὸ βασιλείας: Studies in the Justification of Monarchic Power in the Hellenistic World. I find little illumination in G. J. D. Aalders, Political Thought in Hellenistic Times (1975).

64. Murray (1967), 351. For text and commentary M. Hadas, Aristeas to Philocrates (1951).

65. Text and full commentary Delatte (1942), who argues for a date in the second century A.D., to the conviction of many. H. Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period (1965) reasserted a Hellenistic date, accepted e.g. recently by J. R. Fears, Princeps a diis electus (1977), 81 n.127. I hold no position on this question. For a translation see J. F. Gardner, Leadership and the Cult of Personality (1974), 65ff.


68. See Murray (1965) for the best commentary on the fragments.


71. Chrysippus according to Plut. Mor.1043BC (= SVF iii,691, cf. 690, 693) recommended that the philosopher should be either a king or advise one. Demetrius of Phaleron urged Ptolemy to read books περὶ βασιλείας: Mor.189D. The idea of the philosopher king from Plato's Republic and Statesman onwards needs no documentation. But note the homily of Musonius' ὁτι φιλοσοφήτω καὶ τοῖς βασιλείσιν, 32 Hense, preserved in Stobaeus iv,7,67, p.279ff.

72. The call to ἀρετῆ is ubiquitous from Plato on. On the theory of the rule of the best man, Plato Polit.294A-296A, Laws 874E-875D; Arist. Pol.1286a9-1288a. Note also the answer in Aristeas 288 to the question of what entitles to succession to the throne: τὸ ἀρετήν τῇ φύσει (sc. Ἁθα).

73. E.g. explicitly Diotogenes 266,2f. (refs. to Hense's Stobaeus): the king should excell in virtue, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰν πλούτον ἢ τὰν δύναμιν ἢ τὰν ὥμαν τῶν τῶν ὀθλῶν. Xen. Mem.iii,9,10 attributes similar thoughts to Socrates (cited Stob.iv,7,76).

74. Diotog. 270,10; cf. 268,3f. the king is assimilated to the gods not in pride but in ὑπαγόμενος ἀρετῆς ἀνωτέρωταν. For the theme of the imitation of God cf. Plat. Rep.613A; Xen. Cyr.vi,2,29; Musonius 283, 26ff.; Dio or. i,37; Plut. ad princ.3 (780E) etc. It is the leitmotif of Aristeas, but this is partly due to its Jewish background.

75. On the sun as model for virtue cf. Dio or.iii,73ff.; Plut. ad princ.3 (780F). The comparison of regal glory to the sun was standard, e.g. in the hymn to Demetrius, cf. Goodenough (1928), 70. This is an attempt to moralise the 'charismatic' theme.

76. The importance of εὐσεβεία is stressed from Xen. Ages.iii,2f. onwards, often opening the list of recommendations, as Dio or.i,15f.

77. Isocr. Evag.1ff. and Xen. Ages.x,2 hold up their kings as paradigms for universal imitation. But more specific than this is the theme that it is only by offering himself to the state as a model for imitation that a king can rule. Plat. Laws 711Bf.; Isocr. ad Nic.31; Nic.37f.; Xen. Cyr.viii,1, 21ff. (cf. 6,10ff.; 8,5); Diotog. 266,19-24; Plut. ad princ.780B. For the Roman continuation of the theme of rule by exemplum cf. Woodman (1975) on Velleius ii,126,5, and below ch.IX,4.
78. The Platonic canon forms the basis of Xen. Ages. iii-vi; and of the whole of Musonius 32. Isocr. Nic. 43 plays down ἀνδρεία and δεινότης (φρόνησις) as against δικαιοσύνη (31-35) and σωφροσύνη (36-42) but sees all four in Evagoras (22-24); all four in Dio iii,7 & 58-60, explicitly Socratic (32); cf. lxii,3f. In Ephphantus 66 (278, 21ff.) the regal virtues are enumerated as φρόνησις, δικαιοσύνη, ἕγκρατημα and κοινωνία; the last (sociability, care for society) is of special concern to these authors, and takes the place of courage, which is not, however, necessarily excluded (Delatte 241).

79. Below ch. IX, Iustitia for a sketch.

80. Note the absence of δικαιοσύνη from epigraphic sources, pace Schubart (1937); ch. IX, 1, n. 15.

81. Xen. Hiero vi, 2ff. etc. For a vivid illustration of the somnolent king see below on Nymphis' description of Dionysius of Heracleia who needed medical devices to arouse him (FGH 432F10).

82. Self-rule as the essential preliminary to the rule of others: e.g. Plato Rep. 580C; Xen. Ages. x, 2; Isocr. ad Nic. 29; Aristeas 211 & 221ff.; Musonius 281, 20ff.; Plut. ad princ. 2, (780B); Diotog. 266, 17f. with Delatte 256.

83. Cf. Murray (1967). The unsystematic nature of the ad Nicoclem was confessed by Isocrates Antid. 68.

84. For εὐνοία and εὐεργεσία in honorific decrees see E. Skard, Zwei religiöspolitische Begriffe. Euergetes-Concordia (Oslo 1932), 6ff., Kötting RAC vi, 848ff., s.v. Euergetes. For φιλανθρωπία in petitions Lenger (1954/5); cf. Spicq (1958), 185 'il est clair qu'aucune "philosophe" n'est responsable de la mise en valeur de cette vertu du Souverain, ni même de la prééminence sur toutes les autres qualités'. Further below ch. IX, 2 on clementia.

85. So Hadot (1968), 581. The closest approach to the 'Suetonian' set of virtues is offered by Diotogenes 62 (265, 14ff.). He stresses first avoidance of ἁδονή and πλεονεκτία in money (265, 14-266, 17); then in jurisdiction σεμενότας, which involves μεγαλοπρεπία without ἡπερασμα (267, 5-268, 14), and χρηστότας, which involves tempering δικαιοσύνη with ἐπιείκημα and εὐγνωμοσύνη (268, 15-270, 1). The first pair correspond to avoidance of luxuria and avaritia, the second to lack of superbia (below ch. X), and possession of clementia. However, it is hard to reconstruct the context to which this belongs; possibly the author was discussing σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη respectively. He also stressed the need to be φρόνιμος (266, 9) and δεινός (an object of fear) (270, 7).

86. Diodorus i, 43-68. That Hecataeus was the source was argued by Schwarz, RE v, 670, accepted by Jacoby RE vii, esp. 2758ff. (Hekataios). The case is reviewed by A. Burton, Diodorus Siculus Book I. A Commentary (1972), 3ff. with the conclusion that if Hecataeus was the sole source, he must be held responsible for a fair amount of confusion and self-contradiction. It must also be borne in mind that moralising comment, such as is here discussed, is an area where even a Diodorus might impose his own mark.
87. 45,1; cf. 63,1.

88. ἑξεύθενεα: 54,2; 55,10; 60,3 (Actisanes a model in his treatment of a colony of thieves); 64,9; 65,3 (not using death penalty). Note also 51,4, φιλάνθρωπον καὶ δίκαιον.

89. εὐφώνια: 51,4; 54,1; 64,9.

90. Fame and deification: 51,4 Egyptus had the land named after him because φιλάνθρωπος, δίκαιος and σπουδάτος; cf. 58,4 Sesostris. 43ff. for the question of εὐφροσύνα and deification.

91. Cf. 54,2 where Sesostris' conduct in ὑμελία is, along with his financial εὐφροσύνα and his ἑξεύθενεα in remitting punishments, the cause of εὐφώνια. For the importance of ὑμελία cf. below on Polybius.


93. Clearchus F1,1 ὄμορφος etc.; Satyrus 2,1 surpassing Ἵμηρος; Dionysius πράοτατος and named Χρηστότατος 4,8; Clearchus lacking ήμερότατος and χρηστότατος 5,1. But Timotheos (3) attracts almost every possible epithet for clemency: πράος, φιλανθρωπος, χρηστός, εὐγνώμων, οἰκτίρων, μέτρως, μελίχος, γλυκύς, ἠμερός. One important synonym missing from the paraphrase of Memnon is ἑξεύθενεα: but see Nymphis F10.


95. Welwei (1963), esp. 123ff. ('das Herrscherbild').

96. Welwei 134ff. & 162ff.


98. Polybius returns to the same model of Philip's treatment of Athens at ix,28,4; xviii,14,14; xxii,16,2. Welwei 25ff. for discussion.


100. E.g. vii,7 on Phalaris, contrasting Hieronymus as εὐεργετικότατος and φιλοδοξότατος; xxiv,15,2. It is a weakness of Welwei that he omits the 'Schattenseite' from his Herrscherbild.

101. xxix,8-9. Cf. xxviii,9; Welwei 155ff. Also xviii,41 in praise of Attalus' generosity.

102. Welwei 152ff.

103. Welwei 148ff. perhaps exaggerates the importance of sophrosyne and enkrateia in Polybius by adducing much comparative material from the philosophers. Sophrosyne is only rarely attributed to kings (vii,8,8 Hiero; xviii,41,8 Attalus; cf. viii,10,10) and enkrateia is restricted to Romans.
VIII Virtues and Vices

104. On Polybian Tyche see Walbank, Commentary i,16ff.

105. So Flaminius xviii,37,7; xxv,3,9 Philip only μέτρωτος in bad fortune; xxvii,8,8 Romans criticised. The thought of moderation in success and failure was doubtless an old one; but it was stressed by contemporary Greek thought, especially by Panaetius: Cic. Off.i,90; cf. Nisbet-Hubbard, Commentary on Horace Odes II, 54.


107. Cf. xxiv,1,3 where the μετρωτής of Eumenes contrasts with the ὑπερηψανία of Pharnaces. Fear is an element which holds immoderation at bay; vi,10,8 fear of the people kept the Spartan kingship from ὑπερηψανία; id.18 prosperity and freedom from fear lead to ὑπερηψανία.

108. Cf. iv,77,1ff. Philip V makes a good impression κατὰ τὴν ὑμιλίαν; xvi,21,3 Tlepolemus has the right touch with the troops; xxii,21,4 Ortagion κατὰ τὰς ἐντυχείςς εὐχαρίας. Skill in converse is also praised in non-rulers, xii,22 the eunuch Aristonicus; xxiii,5,7, Deinocrates of Messene; xi,10,3 Philopoemen. The Rhodians win favours from kings by their skilled diplomacy (ἐντυχείςς and ὑμιλίαι) ν,88,4. Further Welwei 159. Cf. above n.91 on Hecataeus.

109. ν,62,2; xv,5,13; xxi,16,2 etc. Cf. Livy's use of benigne for receptions of envoys (Concordance s.v.). For the formula in inscriptions, cf. Tromp de Ruiter, Mnem.59, 1932, 293.

110. See Jacoby's commentary FGH 87, IIC 154ff.; Reinhardt RE xxii, 630ff.

111. Collected in Jacoby FGH 87F 1-27, 29-44, 108-123; Edelstein and Kidd (1972), F51-78, 252-284. Except where the material is preserved elsewhere I shall cite direct from Diodorus. Edelstein and Kidd only give directly assigned fragments, and Jacoby's Anhang, while transcribing much of Diodorus, is selective, on no evident criteria; cf. P. A. Brunt, Athenaeum 55, 1977, 33f.

112. So Schwarz RE v, 688ff. on the sources of Diodorus.

113. The Hieronyman books (xviii-xx) have little comparable moralisation. To be confident of the extent of Diodorus' own contribution it would be necessary to compare all his material on kings, including bk i on Egypt (above) and xvi on Alexander. This is too large a task to attempt here and falls outside the scope of the argument.


115. xxi,15 the consul Atilius, cf. xxiv,12; xxvii,6 Scipio Africanus; xxx,23, speech of Aemilius; xxi,3 Cato on Rhodes; xxxiv/v,28,3 Alexander Zabinas. Cf. the citation of Demetrius of Phaleron περὶ τύχης xxi,10,1 = Polybius xxxix,21.

116. xxv,5,2 Spondius; xxxiv/v,28,2 Zabinas (ἀνέκφευγος ἡ τυμωρίας δίκης); id.30C τύχη outruns human intelligence; xxxvii,17 an anonymous tyrant. Cf. xxviii,4 ὁ θεός rewards virtue and punishes vice. The idea of a punitive τύχη is not necessarily Polybian, cf. Walbank 20 n.5.
VIII Virtues and Vices

117. xxvii, 13-17 & 18, from the two sides of the debate on Carthage of 201 BC (= Livy xxx, 43, 1f., Appian Lib. 57-64). H. Volkmann, 'Griechische Rhetorik oder römische Politik?', Hermes 82, 1954, 465ff. argues that this derives from Polybius. DS xxxii, 2 & 4 is a long reflection on the rise and fall of empires: gained by ἀνδρεῖα and σύνεσις, extended by ἐπιτίκεια and φιλανθρωπία, secured by φόβος and καταπάθειας. Presumably this justifies the sack of Corinth (4, 5), and derives from Polybius, as is suggested by the use of Philip II as a model (4, 1-3) cf. above n. 98. (So Gelzer, Philol. 86, 1931, 290f.) Note by contrast Diodorus' panegyric of Caesar's clement treatment of Corinth (id. 27, 3).

118. ύμνότης: e.g. xxi, 16, 5, cf. 17, 4 Agathocles; xxvi, 15 Hieronymus; xxxii, 17 (9a) Ps. Philip; xxiii, 4, 1f. Demetrius; 6 Ptolemy Physcon; 15 Diegylos of Thrace etc. ὑπερηφανεία: e.g. xxi, 21, 11 general maxim; xxvii, 3 Philip V; xxxii, 17 (9a) Ps. Philip; xxxiii, 15, 2 Diegylos; 18 Mithridates. πλεονεξία: xxi, 20 Demetrius. cf. 21, 4 πλ. of citizens threatens state; id. 10 innate in kings; xxi, 5, 2 Apollodorus; xxxvii, 3 Philip V; xxi, 17 (9a) Ps. Philip; xxxiii, 15, 1 Diegylos. παρανομία is regularly linked with ύμνότης τυραννική in an almost formulaic expression: e.g. xxxii, 17 (9a); xxxiii, 6 & 12 Physcon; xxxiv/v 2, 23 (slave revolt) etc. The combination is traditional (cf. Memnon FGH 434, F2, 3 ύμνος τε καὶ παρανόμως); tyrannical παρανομία derives from Plato, e.g. Rep. 572E.

119. ἐπιθέτες and φιλανθρωπία: e.g. xxvii, 18 (debate on Carthage); xxxii, 2 & 4, xxxii, 12 Philometer; 15 Attalus; 18 Mithridates; xxxvii, 10 Drusi. N.B. Diodorus' personal fondness for Pittacus' aphorism συγγυμνόν τιμωρίας ἀρετώτερα, xxi, 9 & 14, 3; xxvii, 15; xxxi, 3, 1; xxxii, 27, 3 (own comments on Caesar).

120. xxi, 1 μητρόπολις τῶν ἁγιηματῶν; but cf. Polyb. xxix, 8, 9 κάποις κακίας ὧσανε κατατετοῦν. At D.S. xxv, 1 ἁγιαῖα becomes the metropolis of vice.

121. xxxii, 17 (9a). For the importance of ἐνετεύξεσις/δύναμις cf. xxxiv/v, 22 Alexander Zabinas. The three vices are also combined by Diegylos, xxxiii, 15, 1-2.


123. D.S. xxxiv/v, 33. For the voluntary subjection of the intellectually weak to the strong cf. F8J on the Mariandyni and Heracleia. Posidonius is openly aristocratic: he finds no problem in the subjection of some humans to others, only in the way that power is exercised. On the Panaetian background to his approach see W. Capelle, Klio 1932, 86ff. with the reservations of Strasburger, JRS 55, 1965, 44f.

124. So classically F. Klingner, 'Über die Einleitung der Historien Sallusts', Hermes 63, 1928, 165ff. esp. 180f. Also F. Taeger, Tiberius Gracchus (1928), 51ff.; cf. Jacoby Komm.III, 210 (it was surely this publication of P.'s fragments in 1926 that inspired Klingner and Taeger to this simultaneous reflection). M. Gelzer, 'Nasicas Widerspruch gegen die Zerstörung Karthagos'
VIII Virtues and Vices

Philol. 86, 1931, 261ff. = Kleine Schriften II, 39ff. (followed by D. C. Earl, The Political Thought of Sallust (1961), 47) seems to me unnecessarily sceptical about the influence of Posidonius. Doubtless the idea of metus hostilis was commonplace by the 2nd century BC.; certainly it was given prominence by Polybius (n.107); and perhaps the prophecy of Nasica was genuinely transmitted by Rutilius Rufus. Nevertheless 'zwischen Polybios und Sallust klafft eine Lücke' (Jaeger 51). It was Posidonius who applied Nasica's prophecy to a moralising interpretation of Rome's subsequent history, and who by taking up where Polybius left off set the stamp on 146 BC as a turning point. After all, in 146 Nasica lost his case; after P. it becomes the orthodox interpretation of Roman history. On the other hand, it is important to remember that Romans had been affected by Greek thought long before P.: see the opening of Cato's Rhodian oration (Gellius vi,3,14) 'scio solere plerisque hominibus rebus secundis atque prolixis atque prosperis animum excellere atque superbiam atque ferociam augescere atque crescere'.


126. D.S. i.c. Earl 49 rightly distinguishes P.'s concern for relations with subjects; but note that the preface to the Catiline largely concerns imperialism (not, what is relevant, internal relations), esp. 10,6 'imperium ex iustissimo atque optumo crudele intolerandumque factum'. Sallust attributes growth of the republic to labor and iustitia (10,1); iustitia is not a concept found elsewhere in his works (Pöschl (1940), 81), but it corresponds to the δικαιοσύνη Posidonius detected in the early Romans (above).

127. D.S. xxxiv/v,38,2. The similar account in Plut. Marius vii,2f. is likely to derive from P. (von Fritz, TAPA 74, 1943, 166f. for the Posidonian cast of the whole life); P. was an eyewitness of the general's later dissipation (Mar. xlv,7 = F37J).

128. For the importance of this passage of Sallust as the first evidence of the ideal of 'civile imperium' see below ch.X. Plut. Mar. vi,2 refers to τὸ ὀρμητικὸν τῆς διαίτης, an expression used in Greek to render civile (below). Whether the phrase derives from P. it is impossible to say: what matters is that his ideas on ἰσχυρισματα are closely linked with the later ideal of civilitas.

129. Cf. also prov. cons. 11, where the publicani of Syria are said to have been ruined by the avaritia, superbia, crudelitate of the governor Gabinius; II Verr. 5,32 'huius furta, rapinas, cupiditatem, crudelitatem, superbam, scelus, audaciæ'.

130. For superbia in Sallust and Livy see Hellegouarc'h (1963), 439f.; for the common link with crudelitas, id.440 n.7. For avaritia and luxuria in Livy cf. esp. xxxiii,4,2 'avaritia et luxuria...quaes pestes omnia magna imperia everterunt'. For the combination of faults cf. xliii,7,8 'quaes...in populares suos praetor Romanus superbe, avere, crudeliter fecisset'; xxi,57,14 'adeo omne libidinis crudelitatisque et inhumanae superbiae editum in miseros exemplum est' (Hannibal sacks a city); xiii,23,5f. the Carthaginians protest against Masinissa's 'superbiam crudelitatemque et avaritiam' and claim the right to defend themselves 'iusto...bello'; xiii,21,21 'de crudelitate, avaritia, libidine regis'. See the Concordance for numerous pairings of
these vices. The last book of Valerius Maximus (ix) collects exempla of vices under the following headings: 1. de luxuria et libidine. 2. de crudelitate. 3. de ira aut odio. 4. de avaritia. 5. de superbia et impotentia etc.
Chapter IX

1. Iustitia


2. So Cic. Inv. ii, 160; similarly ad Her. iii, 10; fin. iii, 70; off. i, 15. The derivation is of course Greek; Plato Rep. 433A; Arist. EN 1131A24f.; SVF iii, 262f. (Chrysippus) and Index s.v. Schulz, Roman Legal Science 72 for its irrelevance to Roman jurisprudence.

3. Wickert 2248ff.; Lichocka 13ff.; also Weinstock 243ff.


8. Nic. 31-36 is all a demonstration of ὀικεῖος (cf. 43 for the supremacy of this virtue and συγκοινώνιος). Similarly Evag. 43 οὐδένα δόξαν. Positive justice manifests itself in the antithetical pair of honouring the good and punishing the bad; Evag. 43, ad Nic. 16; Aristeas 291 (μυσοποιηθέν and φιλαγαθός); D.S. i, 70, 6 (punishments and rewards in excess of deserts); Diotog. 269, 10ff. (εὐγάροστος and ἄθροις); Miusonius 280, 21ff. (justice consists in the due apportionment of τιμή and τιμωρία). Justice in financial affairs is emphasised in Xen. Ages. iv; Isocr. Nic. 31.

9. Hdt. i, 96ff. on the rise to power of Deioces. The justice of the king as lawgiver is emphasised in Isocr. ad Nic. 17-19. As a lawgiver he should avoid changing established laws that are good, but replace bad ones by the best possible. As a judge he must reach decisions quickly, be consistent in his judgements, and avoid favouritism. In all this the Roman would have concurred.

10. Politicus 294; cf. Arist. Pol. 1286A9f. For the ruler’s life as a model cf. above ch. VIII n. 77, though this topic should not be confused with the question of the relationship of the ruler’s will to the law.

11. Cf. Delatte 245ff. ad loc. The incoherence lies in the point that when Greeks expected their ruler to be δικαιώτατος, that meant in accordance with their society’s criteria and not the arbitrary will of the sovereign.


15. The cult title of θεός Δίκαιος cited by Schubart is only found for rulers of semi-oriental kingdoms, cf. Rostovtzeff SEHHW iii, 1524; Delatte 249. Dihle 275ff. stresses the links with the oriental 'Sun of Righteousness'. To orientalising kings who took the title of Δίκαιος should surely be added Pescennius Niger 'Iustus', the only Roman to take this name. This cult-title apart, Schubart cites no instance of a hellenistic king praised as δίκαιος or for δίκαιοσύνη. At least for papyri the lexica confirm that δικαιοσύνη is only exceptionally used before the late Roman period: P.Berl. viii, 1824, 30 (petition to Ptolemy Auletes); id. 1138, 4 (an Augustan governor of Egypt) are the only cases revealed by Preisigke, Wörterbuch and Spoglio, Lessicale Papirologico (~ 1968). L. Robert, Bull.Ep. 1958, 356 notes that δίκαιοσύνη is never an honorific 'passe-partout' like ἀριστή or εὐνοia, but always has specific reference to jurisdiction. The absence of dikaiosyne from the epigraphic evidence is noted by Claire Préaux, Le Monde Hellenistique (1978), 211ff.


17. νόμος έφυσος in Musonius 283, 24; Plut. ad princ. 3, 780C; Themistius v, 64B; xvi, 212D; xix, 227D. Though Cic. Leg. iii, 2 speaks of the magistrate as 'legem...loquentem', there is not a trace of the νόμος έφυσος doctrine in Latin sources before Justinian (Nov. 105, 2, 4) cf. Aalders 325ff.


19. E.g. x, 12. On injustice ix, 1 etc. See Brunt JRS 64, 1974, 7.

20. Cf. above ch. VIII n. 16.

21. For further material Hellegouarc'h (1963), 266.


23. Rep. i, 50; 65 etc. See V. Pöschl, Römischer Staat und griechisches Staatsdenkung bei Cicero (1936), 127ff. on justice as the basis of the state in the de republica.

24. Pöschl (1940), 81ff. For Posidonian influence in this passage of Sallust cf. above ch. VIII n. 126.

25. R. Heinze, 'Fides', Herm. 64, 1929, 164 = Vom Geist des Römentums 79ff.


27. Cf. the modifications of Combès (1966), 360ff.
28. The material is readily available in Packard's Concordance. My analysis differs from that of TLL vii,2 fasc.v (1970), 715ff. s.v. 'iustus'. This rightly distinguishes usage 'vi morali minus vigente' from 'vi morali praevalente'; but only by grouping according to the (limited) references qualified by the adjective can the slide from non-moral to moral (e.g. with imperium iustum) be brought out. The advantage of investigating individual authors (rather than the total evidence) is that it makes possible a contrast between different types of writing (philosophical and not).

29. The 'iustus triumphus' requires 'iustum imperiumque auspiciumque'. 'Iustum bellum', even a 'iustus hostis' (cf. Gell. v,6,21ff.); Mommsen Staatsr.1, 126ff. For recent discussion H. S. Versnel, Triumphus (1970), 164ff.

30. imperium iustum: vi,16,3; x,8,9; xxii,1,5; 13,11; xxv,15,17; cf. iniustum xxxiii,33,7; xlii,41,14; 'iustus imperare' xxxv,17,7. Related usages: regnum i,48,9; rex xxxii,21,25; xxxiv,32,1; xxxv,15,3; xlii,5,5; xliv,46,11; xlv,18,2; cf. i,53,1 'iustus imperare in pacem'; potestas xxviii,25,2; magistratus iii,40,10; dominatio (iniusta) iii,39,8; cf. iv,53,6 dominus; honores xxviii,42,5.

31. xlii,41,14. For the legalistic basis of the expression imperium iustum cf. vi,16,13: Rome is a 'patientissima iusti imperii civitas' and therefore will not gainsay the unpopular act of a duly appointed dictator. But a moral tinge becomes apparent when iustum is linked with mite (xxv,15,17; for kings cf. xxxii,21,25; xliv,18,2) or moderatum (xxii,13,11). For the legalistic sense see Cic. leg.iii,6 'iusta imperia sunt'; he 'moralises' this power at id.9 'duella iusta iuste gerunto, sociis parcunto, se et suos continemento...'. For the moral sense esp. Sall. Cat. 10,6 'imperium ex iustissimo atque optimo crudеле intolerandum' under (as I accept above n.24) direct Posidonian influence. For imperium iustum/iniustum, cf. Cat.19,4; 52,21; Jug.31,11; 81,1 (Romanus iniustos).

32. i,48,9; xxxiv,32,1; cf. xxv,1,3 'iusti ducis speciem' ('a real general').

33. Antigonus xxxii,21,25; his son xxxv,15,3; also xlii,5,5 'tam iusto in cives...regi'; xliv,46,11; xlvi,18,2. For the Capuan senator xxiii,3,10, surely deriving, as the other passages, from Polybius (cf. vii,1,1). Also i,53,1 iniustus...rex (Tarquinus Superbus).

34. iustitia with fides; v,27,11 & 28,1; with clementia xliv,31,1; with temperantia xxv,36,16; xxxiv,22,5 (also moderatio); with benignitas xxxv,38,6; alone xlii,30,3.

35. Epilogue on Attalus I, xxxiii,21,4: 'summa iustitia suus rexit' cf. Polyb. xviii,41,9 τὴν πρὸς πάντας τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ φίλους πίστιν (!). Also xl,10,2 Perseus' appeal to his father.

36. Merguet's Lexicon zu den Reden des Cicero s.v. arranges the article according to nouns qualified, so that references are superfluous.

37. Magistrates, Plancc.88; Plia.35 (consula); Flacc.8 (praetor); Plancc.63,64 (provincial governor); iudices, Plancc.9; 32; 43; jurisconsult, Caec.78. Pompey's supervision of a trial: Mile.2; 21.
38. Magistrates, Planc.33 (governor); Cluent.196 (noble in local municipium); iudices, Milo.105; jurisconsult, Phil.ix.10; Pompey's supervision of trial, Milo.2.


40. For luxuria/avaritia/audacia cf. D.S. xxxiv/v,2,26; for the link between justice and farming F 266 EK = 59J.

41. For eosēβενα cf. F 266 EK. For the Greek, especially Panaetian influence on Roman ideas of justice see Brunt, 'Laus Imperii', in Garnsey and Whittaker (ed.), Imperialism in the Ancient World (1978), 159ff.

42. Cf. Jul.24,3, Caesar took any excuse for war, even 'iniusti...ac periculosi'; Aug.21,1 never made war 'sine justis et necessariis causis'. iusti triumphi: Aug.38,1; Cal.48,2; Cl.17,1. militiae, Vit.15,1; miliites, Galb. 12,2; classis, Dom.4,2.

43. iustae causae: Aug.21,2 (above); 40,3; Ner.36; suppliciis, Vesp.15; odio, Tib.66; iracundia, Cl.38,1. For parallels TLL vii,2,723,33ff.

44. libertas: Aug.40,4, cf. TLL 1.c. 720,15ff.; matrimonium: Ner.28,1; Cal. 24,1 (uxor), cf. TLL 719,46ff.; tempus; Tib.4,2, cf. TLL 719,18ff. Note also statura iusta for physical stature: Tib.68,1; Ner.51; Galb.21; and 'iustam mercedem' Ner.17 for the proper payment of advocates.

45. Aug.3,2; Galb.7,1; Dom.8,2 cf. above.

46. Cf. also Welwei (1963), 174 for the lack of specific mention of δικαιοσύνη in Polybius.

47. Compare Aristotle's analysis of the goals of δυναστεία, namely περί των ἄλλων ἐκδηλωμένης δικαιοσύνης τῆς καθήκοντος (EN 1130B2f.), neatly corresponding to the main Suetonian 'virtue' categories (ch.VIII p.220). The first three perhaps may be matched by the Thucydidean motives of imperialisation (i,76): τυμή (status), δέος (personal security) and ὀφελεία (profit).


49. ILS 140, 12f. 'iam designatum ilustissimum ac simillimum parentis sui virtutibus principem' (Caius); ILS 159 'principi optumo ac iustissimo', CIL vi,93 and ILS 3783. Frei-Stolba (1969), 22f. rightly observes the Stoic overtones of the Tiberian combination, and remarks on the subsequent rarity of the epithet. Perhaps cf. the words of Augustus, S. Tib.21,4 'dux ηομισόμενος' (below).
50. Not again until Pius, ILS 341 (on present evidence) but cf. Smallwood
Documents of Gaius, Claudius and Nero 380,14 for Claudius as ὥρωμοντος.
Later ILS 7204 of Severus; id.597 Probus. Wickert 2248f. cites no other
instances in the 'titulature' before the 4th century, though doubtless
there are more to be found.

51. For the victor's iustitia cf. Pan.Lat.vi(vii)6,1; Fronto Princ.Hist.198,19,
v.d.H. The victor's justice and clemency are celebrated together on Roman
monumental art, cf. G. Rodenwaldt, 'Über den Stilwandel in der antoninischen

52. Wirzubski, Libertas 150ff. rightly emphasises the way in which Senecan
clementia drives out justification by iustitia. de clem.1,20,2 'hoc enim
ad iustitiam, non ad clementiam pertinet' makes clear the Roman legalistic
sense of iustitia, later softened at ii,7,3; cf. Adam (1970), 32, and below
on clementia.

53. For the Golden Age theme on imperial coinage, H. Mattingly, 'Virgil's
Fourth Eclogue', Journ.Warb.Court.Inst.10, 1947, 14ff. A. Alfoldi,
'Redeunt Saturnia Regna' Rev.Num.s.6 no.13, 1971, 76ff. (for republican
background). For the middle ages and Renaissance, Frances A. Yates,
Astraea (Peregrine 1977), esp. 29ff.

54. Cf. Levick Tiberius 89; Sutherland (1951), 97ff.

55. Fast.Prae. 8 Jan AD 13 (EJ p.24). (It is unclear whether this is identical
with the temple mentioned in Ov. ex Pont.iii,6,24ff.; Wissowa, Religion und
Kultus 333; Latte RE x,1339 s.v. iustitia.) Degrassi, Inscr.It.xiii,2,392f.
argues for the dedication by Tiberius, comparing ex Pont.ii,1,133f.

56. S. Tib.21,4. Note the connection with felicitas ('ita sim felix vir
fortissime et dux νομιζῶμεντε) characteristic of iustum bellum.

57. Vell.ii,126,2, 'sepultaeque ac sito obsitae iustitia aequitas industria
civitate redditae'.

58. Val.Max. vi,5 de iustitia. The frequency of anecdotes involving failure
to exploit an enemy's treachery (1,5,6,7) suggests that the incident of
AD 19 (T. Ann.2,88) influenced him directly.

Chapter IX

2. Clementia-Saevitia

1. For clementia see esp. Wickert 2234ff., with ANRW II,1,67ff.; K. Winkler, RAC iii (1957), 206ff. s.v.; Adam (1970); Weinstock (1971), 223ff.; Griffin (1976), 133ff. Material on the Greek background was originally collected by A. Elias, De notione vocis clementiae etc., Diss. Königsberg 1912.

2. Sen. de clem.i,19,1; Themist.ii,146CD; SHA Avidius 11,5; Aurel.44,1 'imperatorum dos prima'.


5. It is presumably from Plato that the picture of Caligula transformed into an animal ultimately derives (Cal.22,1 'reliqua ut de monstro narranda sunt'). Cf. also Sen. clem.i,25,1 'abieceto homine in silvestre animal transire' of excessive bloodthirst. For the theme of μεταβολή below n.81.


7. So Adam (1970), 36f. For the combination cf. Aristeas 290, isolated there as the qualities that lift the king above other mortals.


9. It is a fallacy to suppose (as do the above authors except Spicq) that because in our surviving evidence φιλανθρωπία is applied first to gods, then to kings, then to ordinary men, that this must be the direction of its development. Spicq 171 sees the importance of the Athenians. It is surely highly improbable that the Athenian taste for being called φιλάνθρωποι in the second half of the century owed anything to Isocrates or Xenophon.

10. Lorenz 20f. etc.

11. Note that in this context it may also be linked with δυσκαλοσύνη (e.g. Lept. 165). Adam (1970), 36 rightly emphasises that there is no tension between justice and philanthropy, whereas clementia is felt to be in direct conflict with iustitia.
12. Isocr. ad Nic.15 linked with φιλότολος; Evag. 43; but earlier Pan.29 of Athens. Xen. Cyr.i,2,1; 4,1; vii,5,73; viii,2,1ff.; Ages.i,22. Later Aristeas 208,265,288; Plut. ad princ.3,781A etc.; Dio iii,39;82; i,17-20 etc. Further Spicq (1958), 181ff.

13. Cyr.vii,5,73; cf. Ages.i,22 where by προάτης to prisoners and by mild rule, Ag. wins over cities by φιλανθρωπία without force of arms.


15. See esp. Guéraud, Enteuxes (1931) index s.vv. Petitions pray either τοῦ δυκαλίου τυχάνειν or τῆς παρά σοι φιλανθρωπίας vel sim. Other variants include Βοήθεως and τῶν εὐγνωμόνων. The abstract δικαιοσύνη only appears in this connection in P. Berl.viii, 1824, 30 (Ptolemy Auletes). Adam (1970), 36 is misleading in this respect.


18. Isocr. ad Nic.23; Diodorus i,70,9 (aretalogy of Egyptian kings); Aristeas 188; all explicitly recommending punishment less than deserts. Aristeas adds the Jewish idea that this will bring them to repentance; id.207 recommends special treatment for the upper classes; 253 against excessive use of the death penalty.


20. Aristeas 188. The influence of Aristotle is exaggerated by Fuhrmann and others, see Griffin (1976), 159f. The other main theoretical recommendation of this quality is Diogenes 268,15ff. where εὐγνωμοσύνη and εὐκείκεσια are urged as the companions of justice. Even here there is nothing specifically Aristotelian. Further Dio i,5; iii,41. εὐκείκεσια does not appear in papyri etc., Schubart (1937), 13f.

21. D.S. i,60,4-5, cf. above ch.VIII, p.211.

22. References to the φιλανθρωπία, ἐκείκεσια etc. of Alexander are collected by Tarn, Alexander the Great II (1948), 66. For the winning over of the enemy see D.S. xvii,24,1; 73,1; 76,1; 91,7; 104,4. For Sisigambis 37-38.

23. clementia maiorum: Gel.l.vi,3,52; Cic. fam.v,1,2 (Metellus Celer); leg.agr. 1,19; Sall. ad Caes.i,3,4; T. Ann.3,24. For debate on its role in Roman foreign policy Poschl (1940), 83ff.; E. Bux, 'Clementia Romana', Würz. Jahrb.3, 1948, 201ff.
24. So Plaut. Miles 1252 'clementi...animo ignoscet'; Trin. 827ff. (parcere);
and the definitions of Cic. de Inv. ii, 164; Sen. ep. 88, 30 'quae alieno
sanguine tamquam suo parcit'; clem. ii, 3, 1 'temperantia animi in potestate
ulciscendi' (this the first of 3 definitions). Further H. Dahlmann,
'Clementia Caesaris', Neue Jahrb. 10, 1934, 17ff.

25. Harder Hermes 69, 1934, 65f. uses Cic. fam. v, 1 to show that clementia
was part of the 'Adelsethik'; Fuhrmann (1963), 509 rightly sees that
Metellus' usage is metaphorical. Cicero uses the word in the context of
mercy to fellow-citizens at Rabir. 13; har. resp. 4, 12 (treatment of conspirators);
post red. in sen. 17 and ad Quir. 15. Caesar
was therefore not the first to apply the concept to internal relations
(contra Wickert); nevertheless in his case the direct analogy with foreign
relations is new. For appeals to the clementia of the jury: ad Her. ii, 50;
Cic. Part. Or. 11; Cluent. 105; 202; Sex. Rosc. 85; Planc. 31; cf. Tull. 50 (of
a law). Of self and subordinates in Cilicia: fam. ii, 18, 1; xiii, 55, 2;
Att. v, 16, 3; 21, 5; vi, 2, 5; vii, 2, 7.

26. off. i, 88; cf. II Verr. v, 22 'dicet rem publicam administrari sine metu ac
severitate non posse'.

27. II Verr. v, 19 ('accusatoria consuetudine'), cf. Sen. de clem. ii, 4, 4; Plin.
Pan. 80, 1 for the debate between clementia and severitas.

28. Combès (1966), 352f. for clementia in jurisdiction. Note that clementia
is missing from Imp. Pomp. 42 (humanitas, mansuetudo).

29. So off. i, 88-89, deriving explicitly from Panaetius; similarly de Inv. ii,
164. By emphasising anger as a passion, the Stoics could get round the
problem that pity, as a passion, appeared to rule out clementia.

30. For clementia in the Verrines see esp. iv, 86; v, 19; 115. In all three
cases Cic.'s protest is not against excessive severity in punishing the
guilty, but against punishment of the innocent and respectable (e.g. 115
'ex indignissima morte innocentium').

31. So Wickert (1937) still the best article on the subject, but note the

32. Esp. Att. x, 4, 8. Cicero praises C.'s natura during his life-time (fam. vi,
6, 8; 13, 2; Lig. 38; Deiot. 4), later returns to the opinion that clementia
was a pose (Phil. ii, 116, cf. Att. viii, 16, 2).

33. So Dahlmann (1934) and Treu (above n. 31).

34. No ancient author challenges the principle set out by Cic. off. i, 85 that
the statesman must act in the interest of the totum corpus rei publicae;
and that to forward sectional interest (qui...parti civium consulerunt)
is to destroy the state by discord.

35. For the near-divinity of C.'s clementia, cf. Lig. 38 'homines enim ad deos
nulla re propius accedunt quam salutem hominibus dando'; cf. Marc. 1
'clementiam...sapientiam...paene divinam'. For the cult Dio xli, 6, 3;
Crawford RRC no. 480; Weinstock 241ff. On Caesar's reticence about his own
clementia cf. Wickert (1937), 243: 'sua clementia' only occurs put in the
mouths of the enemy (BG ii,14,5; 31,4), or in the parts of the works written by his continuators. For the indignation that predication by the emperor of his own clemency aroused, cf. T. Ann.13,11; S. Dom.11,2f. The technical terms for clemency were not used by Marcus in the Meditations (below n.80).


37. The techniques of deprecation are analysed by Quint. Inst.v,13,5f., cf. vii,4,18, quoting the pro Ligario (cf. viii,5,10; ix,2,28). The same stereotype underlies the fictional pleas for clementia in Livy viii,30-35 where Q. Fabius having offended the maiestas dictatoria of Papirius eventually wins pardon (= Dio viii, fr.36); and in Seneca clem.i,9 (Cinna and Augustus = Dio lv,16ff.). NB also the (fictional) sermonising on clementia in SHA Avidius 11-13.


39. 'a duabus causis punire princeps solet, si aut se vindicat aut alium', a divisio governing i,20-23. The importance of this distinction in imperial jurisdiction is rarely noticed; but see Millar 516ff., esp. 520f.

40. So Griffin (1976), esp. 161ff., like Büchner rightly rejecting Fuhrmann's attempt to identify Senecan clementia with Aristotelian ἐκτὸς ἥματος, but following Adam in stressing the centrality of Princeps Iudex (p.151).

41. E.g. the latrones of the Burrus anecdote (ii,1,2). The extraordinary consequences of applying clementia to cases not involving the emperor personally are apparent in i,22-23 where Seneca claims that a state in which criminals are little punished will tend to become free of crime.

42. Esp.ii,7 attempts to argue away the crucial element of ignoscere. For Stoic views cf. Griffin (1976), 155ff.

43. So rightly Adam (1970), 101ff. Exception must be made for Plin. Pan.80,1 'in omnibus cognitionibus...quam non dissoluta clementia'. But even here the emperor may be involved personally (P. speaks of fiscal profit). No clementia is detected at Centumcellae (ep.vi,31). Cf. also T. Dial.41,1 'clementia cognoscentis'.

44. So Hist.i,71; 72; 75; ii,48; 63 (all civil war); Ann.12,52 (Camillus rebellion); Ann.2,42 (Archelaus); 3,24 (Aug. and Juliae); 3,22 (Lepida); 50 (Clutorius Priscus); 68 (Silanus); 4,31 (Cominius); 5,6 (victim of Sejanus); 11,3 (Asiaticus); 32 (Messalina); 13,11 (Lateranus); 14,48
IX,2 Clementia

(Antistius); 15,35 (Torquatus). Also 4,42 (inclementia to Votienus). All these are cases of outright rebellion, or maiestas. The only apparent exception is Ann.6,14 where Rubrius Fabatus is caught attempting to flee the empire: but this too must be maiestas. Given that clementia always involves a personal offence against the princeps, the insolence of Thrasea Paetus in invoking clementia publica for Antistius (14,48) is remarkable.

45. To enemy: Ann.1,57; 2,10; (cf. 57 & 73 Germanicus); 4,50; 6,30; 12,32; 37; 55; 14,23; 38; 15,12. Also 12,11 & 14 for Parthian lack of clementia.

46. On coins (before Hadrian) only Tiberius BMC i,132 (date and occasion hotly disputed, above ch.VII Appendix) and Vitellius BMC i,384 (civil war, cf. Tac. Hist.i,75). Other celebrations: T. Ann.4,74 Ara Clementiae AD 28 (due to 'pavor internus'); S. Tib.53,2 dedication to Jupiter on death of Agrippina; Dio lix,16,10 hymns and sacrifices to Gaius' θάνατος on the occasion of restoration of maiestas charge; Act.Arv.lxxxi f. Henzen, sacrifice to Clementia in AD 66. Plin. NH ii,14 for sceptical comment on the deification of Cl.

47. Pace Charlesworth (1937), 113. Cf. above ch.VII p. 177.

48. Strack Reichsprägung ii,123ff.

49. Gallienus CLEMENTIA TEMP., RIC v,1,139 etc. For clementissimus in titulature from Gallienus Diz.Ep.ii,307. Anticipated only by Caracalla, always in the form 'clementissimus et indulgentissimus' i.e. not political clemency.

50. TLL iii,1335,44ff.; Winkler RAC iii,217ff. (from Diocletian).

51. For the use of parcere in clementia contexts: Jul.75,2; Aug.27,1; Tib.62,1 & 3; Ner.37,3; 38,1; Vit.14,2; Dom.11,3. For ignoscere, Jul.75,4; also Aug.33,2 (his lenitas in jurisdiction).


53. Cl.13,2; Dom.6,2 both outside the clementia section, see below.

54. Conspiracies: Jul.75,5; Ner.36,1-2; Tit.9,1. Morally neutral are Cl.13,1; Aug.19.

55. maiestas: Aug.51; Tib.58.

56. Thus the morally neutral reporting of revolts and conspiracies (nn.53 & 54).

57. Cf. Galb.15,2 'poenas innocentium inpunitates noxiorum'; Vesp.15 'non temere quis punitus insons'; Dom.10,2 'quasi molitores rerum novarum'; at Ner.36,1 he implies that the conspiracies were N.'s invention 'quasi per iustam causam'; also Ner.35,4 'quasi molitricem novarum rerum'.

58. Lists of trivial offences Ner.37,1 ('quacumque de causa'); Dom.10,2-3 ('levissima quaecumque de causa'); Tib.58 & 61,3; also Cal.27,3 (nec omnes gravibus ex causis'); Galb.14,3 ('suspicione minima inauditos'); Vit.14,1 ('quacumque de causa').
IX, 2 Clementia

59. Verbal attacks ignored: Jul. 75, 5, cf. 73; Aug. 51, 2; Vesp. 13. But at Vesp. 15 Helvidius is thought to have gone too far ('altercationibus insolentissimis'). Shades into civilitas at Tib. 28; cf. Jul. 75, 5 'civili animo'. However, neither Tiberius (59) nor Nero (39) get credit for ignoring lampoons.

60. Tib. 58 for maiestas; for delatores, Tib. 61, 2; Ner. 10, 1; Tit. 8, 5; Dom. 9, 3 ('princeps qui delatores non castigat, irritat').

61. Ner. 10, 1; cf. Sen. clem. ii, 1, 2. That the two accounts differ in details is no argument that Suetonius has used an intermediate source, pace Bradley (1978) ad loc.

62. Contrast Sen. clem. i, 23, 1 on Claudius' excessive use of the culleus (= S. Cl. 34, 1).

63. See above ch. VIII n. 3. The word severitas is not used in the context of the chapters on clementia.

64. Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege 130, 234ff.

65. Explicit links: Tib. 56 'nihilo lenior'; Cal. 26, 2 'nihilo reverentior leniorve'; id. 4 'simili superbia violentiaque'; Ner. 36, 1 'nee minore saevitia'. Note also Tib. 62, 3, returning to family for the last item of the section.


67. Senatorial status: see esp. the lists of victims at Ner. 37, 1-2; Dom. 10, 2-4; also Cal. 26, 2-3; 28; 30, 2; Cl. 38; Galb. 14, 3 ('ex utroque ordine viros'); Vit. 14, 1 (mobiles).

68. Also Cal. 26, 5; 30, 2. Cf. Cameron (1976), 179f. on imperial partisanship.

69. For later petty maiestas charges cf. J. Straub, Heidnische Geschichts- apologetik in der christlichen Spätantike (1963), 53ff. Beware however the possibility that the charges of S. Tib. 58 are merely distorted excerpts from senatorial trials, Baumann, Impietas in Principem 79f.

70. For the topic of forgiving old (pre-imperial) enmities cf. Vesp. 14; for the opposite Cl. 38, 2. Lossau (1975), 496ff. for discussion of Jul. 73-75.

71. Dom. 3, 2 'quantum coniectare licet, super ingenii naturam... metu saevus'. For the question of whether 'super... naturam' means 'against his natural inclinations' or 'in addition to' them, see Steidle 95. It seems to me that S. deliberately chooses a non-committal expression to avoid prejudicing the issue. In contrast to Plutarch, he never enters into theoretical discussion of the psychology of tyrannical depletion. For Plutarch see Bergen (1962), 62ff. and below n. 81.

72. natura: Jul. 74; Tib. 57, 1 ('saeva et lenta natura'); 59, 1 ('magis naturae obtemperans'); Cal. 11 & 29, 1; Ner. 7, 1 ('immanitate naturae', cf. 43, 1); 26, 3 'naturae vitia' (all faults); Cl. 34 ('saevum et sanguinarium natura'); Vit. 10, 1 ('ex natura', sc. saevitia). ingenium: Cal. 27, 1; Dom. 3, 2.
The only places where the question of nature versus circumstances is discussed for areas other than clementia/saevitia are Vesp.16ff. (handling of money); Ner.26,1 (all vitia); Dom.3,2 (avarice as well as cruelty). Of course natura is relevant to all character traits (cf. Aug.77 'vini parcissimus'; Tib.44,1 libido) and even physical traits (Tib.68,3; Cal.50). The point is that tension between the demands of the imperial role and natural personal inclination becomes most acute in the area of clementia.

73. Esp. Tib.57 & 60; Cal.27-33 passim; Cl.34; Dom.10,1.

74. Cf. Sen. clem.ii,4,2 distinguishing crudelitas arising from vengeance and anger, the true opposite of clementia, from cruelty for its own sake. Similarly de ira ii,5,1-3.

75. Compare e.g. Vit.14,2 'pascere oculos' and Cic. Verr.v,65; Cal.27,4 on entertaining the parents of victims = Sen. de ira ii,33,3f. Naturally such anecdotes owe much to the rhetorical traditions of invective: e.g. Sen. Contr.ix,2,5 for the theme of execution at the dinner-table (cf. Cal.32,1). For the 'tyrant' of declamation see Berve, Tyrannis 498ff.

76. Cf. Spicq (1958), 184 on φιλανθρωπία: 'Il s'agit d'une mystique'. This applies no less to clementia, cf. above n.35 & 46 for actual cult.

77. See Baumann, Impietas 217ff.

78. A. R. Birley, 'The Oath not to put Senators to Death', CR N.S.12, 1962, 197ff.; Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege 44ff.; Bleicken, Senatsgericht und Kaisergerecht 118f.; Baumann, Impietas 214ff. It is still not clear who was the first to take this oath.

79. Plin. Pan.42,4 'non vis in te ea laudari' of the abolition of maiestas charges. P. does not speak of clementia in this context, though he does in that of cognitio (80,1).

80. For Marcus and the strain on patience, Brunt JRS 1974, 10ff. He frequently employs terms for mildness (esp. i,16,1 τὸ ἄμερον learnt from Pius) but avoids ἐνυξίζωος and φιλανθρωπία (Brunt 19ff.). For the provocations of a governor's routine Cic. ad Q.f.i,1,37f.; ad Att.v,10,3. Note that PATIENTIA and TRANQUILLITAS join CLEMENTIA in Hadrian's great coin series, Strack ii,123f.

81. On character changes in the tyrant see Dihle (1956), 79ff. The main discussions of the degeneration of a tyrant are Polybius on Philip V (esp. vii,11ff.) and Hannibal (ix,22,7-26,11); and Plutarch Aratus i,3 (on Philip); Sulla xxx,4f.; Sertorius x;xxv. Bergen (1962), 62ff. for the similarities between these and Tacitus' Tiberius. Polybius is outstanding for resisting the view that character was at fault, but even he in shifting the blame to Philip's advisors leaves the explanation on a moral plane.

82. Esp. Sen. clem.i,1,6 'naturalis tibi ista bonitas...nemo enim potest personam diu ferre, ficta cito in naturam suam recidunt': cf. Lucr. 3,288-315. Admittedly the third (lost) book of the de clementia discussed how to develop the inclination to clemency (i,3,1); but the teacher has to start with a character naturally disposed in the right direction, and convert it into rational policy (cf. ii,2,2). So Cicero sees both natura and doctrina as the prerequisites for good government (ad Q.f.i,1,6 & 22).
83. The value of Caesar's *clementia* was questioned in the civil wars following his death, not only by the triumvirs (Appian BC iv, 8) but by Cicero ad Brut. viii, 2; but was generally accepted later, though Dio lxxv, 8, 1 says that Septimius spoke in favour of *severitas* against *clementia*. 
Chapter IX

3. Liberalitas-Avaritia


2. Cf. the conclusions of Kloft 70ff. rightly stressing that for all the influence of Greek theory, the changes in Roman society are more important. Polybius xxxi, 25ff. on the younger Scipio is particularly illuminating for the changes in Roman outlook.


4. Kloft 77ff. for excellent words on the value of S. However, his analysis of the types of liberalitas at 88-128 follows in arrangement Barbieri's article. The relevant sections in S. will therefore be cited alongside Kloft. opera: cf. Kloft, 115ff. For refs. above ch.VI p.133. Since the chapters on building etc. are not usually designated as evidence of liberalitas, they do not strictly belong to discussion of 'virtues' in S.


6. congiaria/frumentationes etc.: Jul.38; Aug.41, 2-42; Cal.17,2; Cl.21,1; Ner.10,1; cf. 7,2 (in youth); Dom.4,5. Nothing recorded for Vespasian or Titus. Cf. Barbieri 840ff.; Kloft 88ff. S. says nothing of Tiberius' congiaria in illustration of liberality, only in other contexts (54,1; cf. Aug.101,2). Contrast Tacitus (Ann.1,8; 2,42; 3,29; 4,1).

7. donativa etc.: Jul.38,1 (and land assignations); Tib.48,2 (negatively); cf. Cal.46; cf. Ner.7,2 (in youth); Calb.16-17 (negatively). Though Tiberius and Galba are criticised for their failure to give donatives, it is notable that S. rarely gives positive credit to emperors who did so. Cal.46 is ironical, and the failure to discuss Augustus' donatives, land-distributions etc. is quite remarkable (but cf. 13,3; 49,2) of a piece with the treatment of the vicesima hereditatum (below). Also note that S. is critical of attempts to stop military pay (Ner.32,1) or to cut back the military establishment (Dom.12,1), yet hardly approves the increase of their stipendia (Dom.7,3 & 12,2). For the attitude cf. e.g. T. Hist. ii, 82,2 'egregie firmus adversus militarem largitionem eoque exercitu meliore'. Kloft 107ff.

8. epula: Jul.38,2; Cal.17,2 & 18,2; Cl.21,4-5; Dom.4,5. Not in Kloft.

9. Grants to senators: Aug.41,1; Tib.47 (negatively!); Ner.10,1; Vesp.17. Kloft 101ff. These are of course noticed by Tacitus and Dio (Kloft 1.c.).

10. Subventions: Tib.48 (negatively!); Vesp.17; Tit.8,3. Kloft 118ff. (with passages in Tacitus, Dio etc.).
11. remissiones: Jul.38; Tib.48,2. Kloft 120ff. For interest-free loans (Aug.41,1; Tib.48,1; Kloft 124ff.) see further below on bona damnatorum.

12. Support of the arts: Vesp.18; cf. Jul.42,1; also Tib.42,2. Kloft 127f. is not satisfactory; Millar 491ff. is now fundamental.

13. Private gifts: Tib.46 (gifts to comites before accession, negatively); Galb.12,3 (meanness to entourage); Vesp.19,1 (presents at Saturnalia etc.); Dom.9,2 ('omnes circa se largissime prosecutus'). Kloft 125ff.

14. Tit.8,1 the automatic confirmation of previous beneficia; for cancellation of previous beneficia as a sign of meanness, Tib.49,2; Cal.38,1; Galb.14,3. For new beneficia Tit. 1.c. and Dom.9,3 (subseciva granted to holders). For φιλανθρωπία see the analysis of Lenger (1954/5), 483ff. For imperial beneficia, Millar passim.


16. Tacitus records the dedications of temples (Ann.2,49 etc.), and at Ann.6,45 grudgingly admits the demand of the vulgus for munificence in building. But Ann.13,31 is contemptuous of historians too attentive to building. The showmanship of Nero is of course fully discussed.

17. Cf. Kloft 157. Tacitus devotes considerable attention to the liberalitas of Tiberius: Ann.1,75; 2,37ff.; 2,47-49; 3,18; 4,64; 6,17; 6,45. See Rogers (1943), 1ff.

18. So Kloft 151 n.323 citing Hist.i,18,3 'nocuit antiquus rigor et nimia severitas cui iam pares non sumus'. Also i,49 'pecuniae alienae non adpetens', a very real virtue not admitted by S., but valued by him elsewhere (below).

19. For Dio's ideal of οἰκουμενία, Kloft 143f. For the theme of necessary expenditure see Maecenas' recommendations 11i,28,1ff.; cf. lxv,10,3 (Vespasian); lxxi,32,3 (Marcus); lxvii,16,3 (Septimius). The protest of the propertied is voiced unmistakably against Caracalla: lxviii,9,1ff.

20. Bradley (1978), 89 on Ner.13 assumes that S. must approve because of the rubric at 19,1. But note the irony of 'ob quae imperator salutatus... tamquam nullo residuo bello'. 30,2 confirms that he regarded the Tiridates episode as a gross extravagance.

21. T. Ann.14,47 on 'Graeca facilitas' = Ner.12,3 (no comment). For attitudes to upperclass performance see Friedländer, Sittengeschichte II10, 19ff., esp. Juv. 8,183ff. S.'s only explicit comment on making the upper classes perform is at Ner.4 ('arrogans').

22. I.e. Aug.41; Ner.10,1; Vesp.17-19,1; all including grants to senators. Tit.7,3-8,1 stresses universal generosity, without specifying any upper-class benefaction.

23. Above ch.III for the ordines in S. Kloft 87f. rightly compares Dio lxix,5,1. Hadrian enriches people, senators and equites. The Hellenistic χάριμα κοινός εὐεργετής (Welwei 167) is not at all the same thing.
24. Kloft 148ff. has good remarks on avaritia as a mark of the tyrant, but does not discuss the forms it could take.

25. So the Herodotean horror-story of how Cypselus stripped the women of Corinth of their jewelry, v,92,n. Cypselus is also the paradigm for compulsory taxation of the citizens Ps. Arist. Econ.ii,2,1346A33f. (This book collects numerous anecdotes of tyrannical revenue-raising.)

26. Isocr. Nic,31-35 emphasises his avoidance of resorting to unjust expropriations to remedy an empty treasury; id.35 is vague and brief about his gifts. Xen. Ages.v for similar financial justice.

27. For a typical instance D.S. xxii,5,2, Apollodorus of Cassandria who on the proceeds of confiscations finances a pay-rise for his troops; then takes to violent exactions from the citizens at large with this military backing. He is explicitly cast as an imitator of the Sicilian tyrants. Similar cases of πανενεχτά are countless.

28. Diotog. 265,19ff.; not to be taken as an encouragement to extortion, but as discouragement of indulgence (contra Goodenough (1928), 70).


30. ad Att.v,20,6. Combès (1966), 339f. notes that integritas is the word used in correspondence with the senate (cf. also ad Att.vii,2,2 for Cato's official testimonial), continentia etc. in private letters.

31. Kloft 128f.

32. For what follows Millar 133ff. ('The Imperial Wealth: Gifts and Exactions') is basic for comparative material. He still maintains (623ff.) that taxes did not go to the fiscus, contra Brunt JRS 56, 1966, 75ff. But given that in practice the emperor 'absorbed all the revenues of the state' (625), it gives a curious impression of the imperial wealth when he omits taxation from his account.

33. So Plin. Pan.41,1. Pliny draws no distinction of kind between collationes, donativa etc. on the one hand and vectigalia on the other. 42,1 clearly implies that imperial avaritia benefited both fiscus and aerarium.

34. Dio liii,16,1; 22,3-4 dismissing the distinction as one of paper accounts. The anecdote at Aug.40,3 implying that tax immunity for a Gaul involved loss of revenue to the fiscus could be due to carelessness over terminology on S.'s part; but cf. above ch.IV Appendix for his normal scrupulousness over official terms. In any case, the point remains that the emperor granted immunities, and the financial implications affected him as much as the senate.

35. The passage leaves it unclear whether these collationes were personal gifts or "taxes"; the distinction is probably impossible. Cf. Millar JRS 1963, 39.

IX,3 Liberalitas

37. So T. Ann.13,50 (Nero's proposal to drop vectigalia); Dio iii,29. T. Hist.iv,74 for the argument for tributum.

38. Only at Aug.49,2 'aerarium militare cum vectigalis novis constituit' in a military context. For the resistance, see Dio lv,24,9ff.; lvi,28,4-6; Nicolet 248; T. Wiedemann CQ 25, 1975, 264ff.

39. Dio lxxviii,9,4-5. For similar disapproval of new taxes and tax increases lvi,16,2 (late Tiberius); lxi,28,11 (Gaius = S. Cal.40-41); lxi,5,5 (Nero); lxii,3,4 (British complaints); lxv,8,3 (Vespasian). Zonaras 12,1 = lxxii fr. sees Marcus' auction as a laudable alternative to taxation. Similarly Pan. Lat. iii(xi)10,3 'maximum tibi praebet parsimonia tua, Auguste, vectigal'.


41. E.g. Dio lxii,3 for the complaints of Boudicca; Plut. Galb.iv,1 ἀλληγορίας ἐκτρόπων for Vindex; with Brunt, Latomus 18, 1959, 550ff. Note, however, that the elder Pliny could well be S.'s source for anecdotes on procurators.

42. Above nn.32-34.

43. Millar 153ff.

44. Dom.9,2 (refusal to be heir to those who had children) contrasts with 12,2 (confiscations of inheritances); cf. Tib.49,1. For the excellent practice of Augustus, 66,4 (cf. Dio lvii,32,2; lvii,17,8). Dio shares the same ideal: lvi,16,2 (Tib.); lxi,15,6 (Gaius); lx,6,3 (Claudius); lxii,11,2 (Nero). Tacitus thought Tiberius proper: Ann.2,48. Plin. Pan.43,1-5 is the most explicit enunciation of the ideal.

45. Cal.38,2; Dom.12,2.

46. Cal.38,2; Ner.32,2. But Aug.66,4 reveals even his anxiety to be remembered 'grate pieque'. For Dio's criteria see lxi,15,2 (Gaius). Further R. S. Rogers, TAPA 78, 1947, 78ff.; J. Caudemet, Studi Arangio-Ruiz III (1953), 115ff.

47. Millar 158ff. (Bona Caduca and Bona Vacantia) and 168ff. (Condemnation and Confiscation) very fully for what follows.

48. Plin. Pan.34; 36; 42 for the involvement of delatores in both types of prosecution. S. Dom.12,1 for the exaction of 'bona vivorum ac mortuum' on (presumably false) accusation. For delatores: Ner.10,1 liberality in cutting their praemia: Dom.9,3 liberality in repressing them; it is unclear what virtue(s) Titus' presentation of delators proves (8,5). S. uses calumnia of both types of charge in revenue-raising: Tib.49,2; Cal.38,1; Ner.32,1.

49. Tib.49; Cal.38,3; Ner.32,1-3; Dom.12,1; above for Greek tyrants.

50. S. Aug.41,1 for liberality in interest-free loans of such proceeds. Tib.48,1 does not make clear what emerges from T. Ann.6,17, that Tiberius' similar loans must have been out of bona damnatorum (Tacitus suggests this was the cause of the crisis; see further C. Rodewaldt, Money in the Age of Tiberius
(1976), lff.) Dio's Maecenas makes it a standing recommendation to sell off fiscal property and loan at low interest: l ii, 28, 3. For cases in the SHA cf. Kloft 125.

51. Millar 139ff. for gifts to the emperor. For the custom of making contributions to the victims of fire damage, Juvenal 3, 212ff. (complaining that only the rich benefit); Martial 3, 52 etc.

52. But Tiberius gets no credit for restricting strenae (34, 2). Plin. Pan. 41, 1 has 'collationes remisisse' as the first item in the recapitulation of Trajan's liberalities; there is nothing about this earlier in the speech, and I would posit a lacuna celebrating the remission e.g. of the aurum coronarium earlier in the text. Collationes is evidently the proper term: Cal. 42; Ner. 38, 3; 44, 2; Tit. 7, 3. This is surely the meaning of the mysterious κολλητωνες of two Lydian inscriptions, Millar 542.

53. lxxviii, 9, 4; also lxxiii, 16, 3 for Commodus' exactions of birthday presents from senators and the curial class at a fixed rate per head. For further passages Millar 139ff.

54. Millar 148 collects the evidence for auctions by Gaius, Nerva, Marcus and Commodus. Add also Macrinus at Dio lxxix, 12, 5, a lacunose reference to imperial θηλυκα which in the context of M.'s financial difficulties, must refer to an auction. For the depiction of the ideal should surely be added Plin. Pan. 50; Trajan is praised for selling off imperial properties rather than furniture, but doubtless the latter too might be included in the 'tabula ingens rerum venalium' (50, 5).

55. The parallel accounts of Dio, lix, 14, 1-4 (= Cal. 38, 4 sale of gladiators); 21, 5-6 (Cal. 39, Gallic auction) are equally critical.

56. The second book of the Verrines details corruption throughout: esp. 19-119 for the sale of justice; 120ff. honours and priesthoods sold.

57. Cl. 29, 1 'honores exercitus impunitates supplicia'; Galb. 15, 2 'vectigalia immunes, poenas innocentium impunitates noxiorum'. Note also Jul. 54, 3 'societates ac regna pretio dedit'.

58. S. omits Augustus' connivance at the corrupt extortion of his freedman Licinus in Gaul, Dio liv, 21, 2f.

59. Cic. ad Q. f. i, 1, 18 'familiae gravis et constans disciplina'. Cic. stresses the theme in all his works on provincial government, cf. Combès (1966), 342f.

60. Ner. 32, 4; T. Ann. 15, 45; Dio lxii, 18, 5. Perhaps to be treated as a forced collatio, as by Millar 143.

61. Condemned also by Dio lix, 28, 2-9, along with other business ventures. Similarly reproaches are made against Pertinax SHA Pert. 13, 4.

62. For the words liberalitas/liberalis (as moral quality): Aug. 41, 1; Ner. 10, 1; Vesp. 17; Dom. 9, 1; claimed by emperors themselves cf. Aug. 71, 3; Cal. 46; Cl. 6, 2; liberalitas as an act of munificence: Jul. 38, 2; Tib. 46; 48, 2; Cl. 29, 1; Galb. 15, 1. abstinentia: Dom. 9, 1; 10, 1; 23, 2; Jul. 54, 1 (negatively). avaritia: Cal. 39, 2; Ner. 26, 1; Galb. 12, 1; Dom. 9, 1. rapax/rapacitas: Dom. 3, 2; Tit. 7, 1; Vesp. 16, 2. parcus (critical): Tib. 46; Galb. 14, 2.
63. Kloft 128 observes that the anecdotes of S. and the SHA are inevitable in documenting character.

64. D. R. Walker, *The Metrology of the Roman Silver Coinage III* (1978), 106ff. for a welcome attempt to relate imperial fiscal policies to moral categories, not to inappropriate economic terminology.

65. Quint. iv,2,77; put into practice T. Hist, i,30 & 37. See Kloft 149f.

66. Barbieri's collection of epigraphic data shows how widespread geographically are celebrations of Hadrian's *liberalitas*.

**ADDENDUM**

For a full discussion of this material, see now T. Reekmans, 'La politique économique et financière des autorités dans les Douze Césars de Suétone', *Historiographia Antiqua. Commentationes...in honorem W. Peremans* (Leiden 1977), 265-314. The author examines the motivations of all economic and financial actions recorded in the Lives, finding that some are accounted for in political, economic and other practical terms, some in moral terms (esp. 293ff. for virtues and vices). I would challenge few of his conclusions. However, it should be noted that the result of examining a category not of Suetonius' own definition ('economic and financial actions', often very broadly interpreted) is inevitably to demonstrate that Suetonius' ideas on the subject were neither coherent nor cogent.
Chapter IX

4. Luxuria-Libido

1. Gugel (1977), 73ff. discussing 'Erotika' divides the lives into 3 types, those that have only rubrics on sexual matters, those that have only scattered comments, and those that have both. This division seems to me unreal. There is at least a chapter in every life except that of Otho on matters involving sexual or other indulgence. Naturally items that incidentally involve sexual misbehaviour may also crop up elsewhere (esp. Cal.11; 12,2; 16,1; 22,4; 24f.; 41,1; 52; 55,1; 56,2).

2. See above ch.II,1.

3. This evidence is collected by Passerini (1934), 35ff.

4. Athen. xii,521C ff. = FGH 81F45. The causal link between τρυφή, ὑβρίς and ruin seems to have been an especially prominent theme in Clearchus' Bioi, see Athen. xii,522D-F (Tarentum), 523A (Iapygians), 524C-F (Scythians), 541C-E (Dionysius the Younger) = Wehrli fr.48, 46, 47. Indulgence leads to the fall of Darius, Athen. xii,539B = fr.50.

5. For these three in Polybius, see Welwei (1963), 153.

6. See above ch.VIII n.82.

7. Aristeas 245. Cf. esp. Polyb. v,34 on Ptolemy Philopater who becoming overconfident, rules κανυγυρικώς, becoming lazy in conduct of external affairs, and ruins his defensive policy by love-affairs and drinking. Demosthenes in the Philippics attacks Athenian ῥήματα as a product of τρυφή (e.g. iii,4-5); cf. also Plat. Leg.901E.

8. Aelian VH ii,20. This anecdote will surely not bear the weight that is put on it in order to extract a theory of kingship. For the bibliography see Wickert ANRW II,1,59f. Béranger's 'Grandeur et servitude du souverain hellénistique' is now reprinted in Principatus (1975), 35ff.

9. Iliad ii,24 οὐ χρή παινύχλου εὐδολον βουληθρόν ἄνδρα (cf. x,1ff.). Alluded to by Dio i,13. Cf. above ch.VIII n.81 and Xen. Ages.v,2. Plut. Mor.178F tells the anecdote of how a defendant appealed against the verdict of Philip II to the same monarch awake.


11. So Plato Leg.711B. Greek inspiration lies behind Cic. rep.i,47 'talis est quaeque res publica, qualis eius aut natura aut voluntas qui illam regit.'

12. Isocr. Nic.36; Arist. Pol.1311B6ff. This is a traditional trait of the tyrant (Hdt. iii,80,5 ἧδας γυναῖκας). For a classic hellenistic instance see Plutarch on the abuses of Demetrius Poliorcetes in Athens (Dem.xxiv).


14. See esp. the descriptions of the games given by Antiochus Epiphanes, Athen. v,194c ff. = Polyb. xxxi,3 and of the festival of Ptolemy Philadelphus Athen. v,196A ff.
15. Athen. xii,512A-C = fr.55 Wehrli. The other fragments of the ἡσουρής show that it was directed against ταὑρή (Wehrli 56-61) and that these arguments cannot represent the philosopher's own view.

16. Athen. xii,545B-546C = fr.50 Wehrli.


18. Full collection of material see E. Schmähling, Die Sittenaufsicht der Censoren (1938); also G. Pieri, L'Histoire du Cens jusqu'à la fin de la république romaine (1968), 99ff.

19. The sentiment is attributed to Cato by Livy xxxiii,4,2; cf. Sall. Cat.52,7 for the younger Cato (André 49). For the theme of moral decline in Roman historiography cf. G. Williams, Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry (1968), 619ff.


22. Pöschl (1940), 12ff.; Hellegouarc'h (1963), 248ff. Gellius NA xvii,13,3 for the elder Cato on 'fortis atque strenuus' as terms of praise.

23. Esp. i,21-23; iii,3; 40; 55-85 passim; cf. R. Hoistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King (1948), 195ff. for the Cynic background.

24. T. Hist.ii,90; cf. i,50 'duos omnium mortalium impudicitia ignavia luxuria deterrimos' (Otho and Vit.); ii,77; iii,86. Paradoxically the luxus of Drusus is preferable to Tiberius' behaviour: 'quam solus et nullis voluptatibus avocatus maestam vigilantiam et malas curas exerceret' (Ann. 3,37).

25. Plin. Pan.59,2; cf. 3,4; 10,3; 31,1; 77,5ff.; 86,5; 92,2.

26. Med.v,1 most vividly; further Brunt JRS 1974, 3 n.13.


28. S. Aug.78; Cal.50,3; Cl.33,2; Vesp.21; Dom.21. Note the theme of falling to sleep during business Cl.33,2; Philo leg. ad Gai.42; Plut. Mor.178F (above n.9). Indulgence is explicitly correlated with neglect of business at Tib.41; Ner.42,2. For the ideal cf. Plin. Pan.49,8 'parcus et brevis somnus'.
IX, 4 Luxuria

29. ἄφωτια was defined by Aristotle EN 1119B27ff. as the squandering of one's substance; but he thought it impossible for a tyrant because his means were limitless (1120B25ff.). In the historians it is apparently employed in a general sense for extravagance (Welwei (1963), 154 n.109). For parsimonia/frugalitas in private affairs as an imperial ideal, Kloft (1970), 143ff.; and above p. 256.

30. Cal.37 his prodigality; 38,1 'exhaustus igitur...'; Ner.30,1 imitation of Caius, 32,1 with identical consequences. Cf. Sen. ep.95,33 'in avaritiam luxuria praeceps est'. Kloft (1970), 146ff. for further material on imperial luxury and avarice.

31. See above p. 256.

32. P.Fayum 20; text and commentary by Schubart Arch.Pap.14, 1941, 44ff.; almost certainly Severus Alexander, not Julian. This is a Greek translation of a Latin edict (Schubart 55ff.).

33. This topic is applied to public figures: Cic. off.ii,44 'tamquam in clarissima luce versetur'; Sall. Cat.51,12; Plut. praec. ger. rep.iv,800Bff. = ad princ.vii,782EF; and specifically of rulers D.S. xiv,1,1 (Diodorus' own prefatory comment); Sen. clem.i,8,3ff. ('fastigio tuo adfixus'); Plin. Pan.83,1; Plut. ad princ. l.c.; Cassius Dio lli,34,2-3 (advice to ruler by Maecenas); Claudian pan.IV.cos.Hon.269ff. (Fürstenspiegel addressed to Honorius) urging self-control, 'nam lux altissima fati/occultum nihil esse sinit'. The idea is precisely paralleled in Xen. Ages.v,6, but not seemingly elsewhere (despite Vretska commenting on Sallust Catiline, II 530).

34. Cic. leg.iii,30-32; cf. rep.ii,69. Note that exemplum only came to be used in the sense of 'model' under Greek influence, H. Kornhardt, Exemplum (1936),62ff. Traditional Roman thought sought its exempla among the dead, not the living (Adam 1970, 77).

35. Vell.Pat. ii,126,4 'imperio maximus, exemplo maior', a military theme, cf. Sallust Jug.85,38 and Woodman on Velleius ad loc.

36. After Domitian and the extinction of the censorship, the theme takes the form that the 'vita principis censura est eaque perpetua'; Plin. Pan.45,6; cf. SHA Sev.Alex.41, Valer.5,4-7; Dio lli,21,3-7; Claud. pan.IV.cos.Hon. 296ff. ('componitur orbis/regis ad exemplum'). Note also Livy i,21,2 where Numa serves as a moral exemplum to the Romans. However, Dio lli, 34,4-11 is in favour of mild censorial scrutiny by the emperor.

37. Tib.42,1; further cf. above ch.VI p.151f.

38. The following brief remarks anticipate what will be argued in full below ch.X,2.

39. For gravitas and dignitas see Hellegouarc'h (1963), 281f.; 388ff. The remarks of Tacitus on the conspirator Piso are characteristic: 'sed procul gravitas morum aut voluptatum parsimonia; levitati ac magnificentiae et aliquando luxu indulgebat' (Ann.15,48).

40. So Val.Max. ii,10 pr., at the start of a chapter on maestas following that de censoria nota: 'est et illa quasi privata censura, maestas clarorum virorum'.
41. At Cal. 52, Gaius' clothing is described as 'nedum civili', but it is not recorded along with other aspects of superbia (22). Further below, X.2. For the Domus Aurea, Ner. 31, 1-2. Friedländer, Sittengeschichte II, 10 269 rightly sees that Caligula and Nero were trying to demonstrate 'den unermesslichen Abstand des Weltherrschers von seinen Untertanen', and that they were quite exceptional among early emperors in this respect.

42. The interest in erotica is defended, but insufficiently, by Gugel (1977), 73f., Bradley (1978), 153f.

43. So e.g. Funaioli (1932), 615. Rather different (but no less regrettable) is the suggestion that the author suffered from psychological sexual fixations, Carney (1968), 7ff.

44. Contrast the bogus moralising of cheap journalism, pace Paratone (1959), 341.

45. Jul.53; Aug.76-77; Dom.21; Cl.33,1; Galb.22; Vit.13; Tib.42,1. Opeit, Schimpfwörter 157ff. for helluo etc. in political invective.

46. Aug.74,5; Tit.7,2; Cal.37,1; Ner.27,2-3; Vit.13; cf. also Jul.48; Cl.32; Vesp.19,1; Dom.21. For sumptuary legislation esp. Gellius ii,24; Kübler, RE ivA, 901ff. s.v. 'Sumptus'. For Roman luxury and the moralising tradition Friedländer, Sittengeschichte II, 10 260ff. is still valuable.

47. Housing: Jul.46; Aug.72; Cal.37,2-3; Ner.31,1-2 (Friedländer 330ff.); for moralising protest see esp. Plin. NH xxxvi,110; furniture: Jul.46-7; Aug.73 (Friedländer 349ff.); clothing and personal adornment: Jul.45,3; Aug.73 (homespun clothes, the traditional ideal); Cal.52; Ner.5,1; Oth.12,1; (Friedländer 315ff.); for the traditional view, see Vespuian's remark to a scented officer, 8,3; slaves: Jul.47 (Friedländer 369ff.). For censorial action Kübler, Schmähling (1938), Friedländer passim. The absence of comment on Domitian's new palace is remarkable.

48. So Jul.49-51; Aug.68-69, rebutted 71,1; Cal.36; Ner.28,1; Galb.22; Vit.3,2. On sex-laws see Mommsen, Strafrecht 682ff. For Augustus' new adultery laws, Riccobono, Acta Divi Augusti 112ff. For sexual abuse in political invective Opeit, Schimpfwörter 154ff.

49. On infamia as a legal technical term Pfaff, RE ix,1537ff. But the Roman should avoid public scandal in general: so Claudius in censoring a notorious adulterer 'Quare enim ego scio, quam amicam habeas?', Cl.16,1. S. repeatedly uses the term infamia in connection with sexual scandal: Jul.52,3; Aug.68; 71,1; Tib.44,1. Also Cl.5 (gambling); Vesp.19,1 (cupiditas); Jul.79,2 ('affectati...regii nominis'); Tib.67,2 and Ner.39,3 (general). Nero's 'contemptus infamiae' (i.e.) is clearly regrettable.

50. For pudicitia as a Roman tradition see Kroll, Die Kultur der ciceronischen Zeit II,38f. It was long the object of cult at Rome (Radke, RE xiii, 1942f.), though for women. Under Trajan the coinage of Plotina celebrates the erection of an Ara Pudicitiae (BMC iii,107) and from Hadrian on the personification of the deity is common especially on coins of female members of the imperial house (Strack, Reichsprägung ii,117f.). Suetonius uses pudicitia/impudicitia frequently in this context of passive homosexuality of Caesars: Jul.49,1; 52,3; Aug.68; Cal.36,1; Ner.39. He also records legislation by
Augustus de pudicitia, which to judge by his usage must refer to homosexuality or stuprum (cf. Riccobono 124), contra Mommsen, Straaf.704.


52. The classic instance of Roman tolerance is the anecdote of Cato and the young visitor to the fornix, Hor. Serr.i,2,32f. Aug.'s earlier adulterium is conceded (69,1), and the item of the virgines is certainly not beyond reproach (71,1). Still less are Domitian's unconventional habits, though involving meretrices (22). But Vespasian's pallacae are hardly a blot (21).

53. Ner.28,1. Riccobono 169 for the lex de maritandis ordinibus.


55. For laws and practice cf. Griffin, JRS 1976, 94f. For aleator in invective, Opelt 159. Augustus is excused (71). Not so Cal.41,2 (leading to extortion); Ner.30,3; Cl.5 ('aleae infamiam'); 33,2; cf. Vit.5. It is surely also relevant that S. may have covered this topic in his scholarly work on Roman games (Roth 276f., Reifferscheid 322ff. for his discussion of Greek gambling). This will explain the extended quotations from Aug.'s correspondence (71) and the knowledge of Claudius' work on gambling (33,2).

56. Ner.20-24 on singing, acting and performing is all relevant. Pimps and actors (or their daughters) are classed together, e.g. in the Augustan adultery legislation (Riccobono 115; excepted from the ban on killing adulterers caught in flagranti) and marital legislation (Riccobono 170, not to marry senators). For the practice of upper class performance an legislation against it see Friedländer, Sittengeschichte II,19ff.; esp. T. Hist.ii,62 and Juv. 8,198f. for moralising comment. Cicero abuses Clodius as 'non solum spectator, sed actor et acroama', Sest.116; for mimus as a term of abuse, Opelt, Schimpfwörter 159.
Chapter X

1. Civilitas: The Imperial Ideal

1. The neglect is noted by Cameron (1976), 175ff., itself the most important
discussion of one aspect of the ideal. Scivoletto (1970) discusses the
ideal in Eutropius giving a brief account of its earlier history. Lana
(1972) examines Tacitus and Suetonius; for my disagreement with his
position see below. For other brief allusions see Alfoldi (1934), 25ff.;
Béranger (1953), 151ff.; Griffin (1976), 127; P. A. Brunt, JRS 64, 1974,
10 n.57 and PBSR 43, 1975, 24 (on Marcus Aurelius). I owe gratitude to
Professor Brunt for letting me see an unpublished paper on civilitas;
also to Professor Cameron for sending me proofs of his Circus Factions
(1976) in advance of publication.

2. Only in CIL vi,1722 to Flavius Honoratianus (PLRE p.438, 4th century)
'custodi iuris ac legum, parenti totius humanitatis, amico civilitatis et
iustitiae'. For the (exceptional) 4th century attribution of the virtue
to the aristocracy, cf. Ammianus xxviii,4,17.

3. For the exceptional celebration of Tiberius' Moderatio, cf. above ch.VII
Appendix. For the interpretation of the bare head of an emperor on the
coins as a gesture of civilitas (a very different matter from its explicit
celebration) see Mattingly, BMC iii,xxii; Sutherland (1951), 156; M. Grant,
Roman Imperial Money (1954), 258 (I doubt this orthodoxy).

4. It is very rare in poetry: for Ovid below; also Juv. 5,112 'poscimus ut
cenes civiliter' of an arrogant patron. For the absence from Seneca see
below. Apart from histories it is also occasionally found in the novel
(Apul. Met.ix,39; x,6) and in declamation (Calp. decl.6; ps-Quint. decl.2,67;
Sen. contr.vii,8,7; cf. iv pr.5).

existimationem suam civili animo tulit'; also Tib.28; Vesp.13-14. Cl.35-37
sets his timidity and suspicion of attack against his boasts of civilitas.

6. Lana (1972), 477 limits the evidence of Aug.'s civility to Aug.51. This
reflects a failure to appreciate the nature of the section in Suetonius
(those on Tiberius and Vespasian are similarly curtailed, and the chapters
on the arrogance of Caesar and Gaius are omitted) and vitiates his analysis
of the concept in S.

7. For the structure of the Titus, cf. above ch.II,2, n.2.

8. Jul.77 'eoque arrogantiae progressus'; 79,1 'multoque arrogantius factum'.

9. Cf. Cal.26,4 'simili superbia violentiaque'; 34,1 'nec minore livore ac
malignitate quam superbia saevitiaque'.

10. With Germ.'s attitude to clari viri contrast the livor and malignitas of
his son (Cal.34). But the virtue involved here is more properly
benevolentia or benignitas, on which v.s. ch.VIII p.198.
11. For further occurrences in S. of civilis in this sense (not e.g. as in: bellum civile), cf. Aug.17,1 where Antony's will proves degeneration 'a civili more', and de Gramm.10,7 'civilique et proprio sermone' (= pure Latinitas).

12. Magistracies: too powerful, Jul.76,1, Aug.52 for dictatura; too long, Jul.76,1, Tib.26,2, Dom.13,3 (continued consulates); delay in acceptance, Vesp.12 (trib.pot.); Tib. on Rhodes 11,3; no lictors, Tib.11,1; Cal.3,2.

13. honores (refused, accepted or deferred): praenomen Imperatoris, Jul.76,1; Tib.26; Cl.12,1; cognomen patris patriae, Jul.76,1; Tib.26; Vesp.12; other cognomina, Cal.22,1; Dom.13,3 & Tib.26 (Augustus!); statuae (significance varies with metal and placing), Jul.76,1; Aug.52; Tib.26; Cal.22,2; Dom.13,2; honorific months, Jul.76,1; Tib.26; Dom.13,3; templae etc., Jul.76,1; Aug.52; Tib.26; Cal.22; cf. Dom.13,1 'pulvinar suum'. NB also celebrations, Tib.26 (natalia); Cl.12,1 (sponsalia).

14. regnum: Jul.79; Cal.22,1; cf. Dom.12,3 ουκ ἄγαθον τολμοκορανίη.

15. adulatio (dominus): Aug.53,1; Tib.27; Dom.13,1.

16. Authority of senate and magistrates, Tib.30-32; Cl.12,1-2; libertas allowed, Aug.56; polite address, Tib.29; Ner.10,2 ('cum meruero').

17. memoriter salutare, Aug.53,3; Ner.10,2; rising to feet, Jul.78; Tib.31,2; cf. Jul.78 and Cl.12,2 for making a trib. pl. stand; cf. Cal.26,2. officia exchanged, Aug.53,3; Tib.32,1; contrast Cl.35,1.

18. Cl.1,4; contrast Jul.77 'nil hab esse rem publicam'.

19. Games: Cal.24,4; Tit.8,2; Dom.13,1; cf. Cameron (1976), 162ff. for further instances.

20. salutatio: Aug.53,2; Ner.10,2; cf. Cl.35 and Vesp.12, scrutatio of salutatores and its abolition.

21. comitas: Aug.53,2; Ner.10,1 & 2; Tit.8,2.

22. S.'s language (10,1) suggests his scepticism: 'ut...indolem ostenderet' (picking up 9, 'pietatis ostentatione') '...imperaturum se professus... ne comitatis quidem exhibendae...'.

23. moderatio is also used in other contexts, not strictly relevant: Aug.21,3 of his restraint in war, Cal.16,2 of his recognitio equitum.


25. So Tib.26 'civilem admodum...egit'; Cl.12,1, 'parcus atque civilis'; Vesp.12 'civilis et clemens'.

27. i, pr.10 & 10,15; cf. xi,1,35; 2,7; xii,2,21.

28. The distinction is drawn by the TLL (iii,1,1217,79ff.) but S.'s originality obscured. Of earlier passages cited, Plin. NH xviii,320 is in error (civilis agrees with modus, not paterfamilias); and Ovid Trist.iv,4,13, is highly dubious - 'ille pater patriae - quid enim est civilius illo? - ' (of Augustus) notably uses a neuter form and may be construed as 'what is more civil than that (sc. title)?' For Plin. Pan.83,7 see below.

29. Note esp. the use of civile qualifying an infinitive, TLL iii,1217,60ff.

30. sermo civilis: Livy vi,40,15; cf. S. Tib.28; de gramm.10.

31. civiliter, TLL s.v.

32. civilis animus: Livy xlv,32,5; T. Ann.1,72; S. Jul.75; Cl.1,4; Dom.12,3; civile ingenium, T. Ann.1,33; 2,82; cf. Cic. fin.v,66 'quiddam ingenitum quasi civile'. The last use comes closest to making civile a virtue, note esp. T. Ann.1,33 'civile ingenium, mola comitas'. It makes possible the step to 'vir civilis' and 'civilitas', but is not equivalent to it.

33. 'quam modica cultu, quam parca comitatu, quam civilis incessu' - the balance of the tricolon also demands the form. Compare Quint.i,8,59 'civili...ingressu'.

34. The TLL rightly distinguishes the usages 'qui ad cives pertinet' and 'qui bonum civem decet'. Lana (1972), 468f. protests at the failure to mark the change in usage 'after the establishment of the principate'. Lana's comment is broadly true, but overlooks Sallust BJ 85,35.

35. fin.v,66. πολιτικός is translated civilem (with apology) earlier at fin. iv,5. For the link with popularis, cf. leg.iii,14 where political philosophy is 'ad...usum populem atque civilem'.

36. leg.iii,42. In the context of violent assemblies Cic. is presumably thinking of seditious tribunes. The behaviour of tribunes is the opposite of civile in Livy v,3,9 and vi,40,15 (Appius' speeches) and Vell. ii,7,1 (Gracchi). For the coupling with humanum, cf. de or. i,33 'humanum cultum civilemque', but in the sense of 'civilised' as opposed to 'fera agrestique vita'.

37. de or.ii,68, cf.i,33; rep.i,49; fin.iii,66; ND ii,78; leg.i,62.

38. fin.iii,66; cf. de or.ii,68; rep.ii,51.

39. rep.i,49 'cum lex sit civilis societatis vinculum'.

40. rep.i,49, cf. leg.ii,16.

41. The TLL (iii,1,1215,34ff.) classes these passages under I 'qui ad cives pertinet' rather than II 'qui bonum civem decet'.

42. rep.ii,51. The language is close to fin.iii,64: the 'vir bonus et sapiens et legibus pares et civilis officii non ignarus' acts for the 'communem utilitatem', not his own.
43. Note its absence from Hellegouarc'h (1963).

44. Cic. de off.i,124. Civilitas of course demands that the emperor behave precisely as a privatus; but paradoxically so, as in real terms he is nothing of the sort. For dignitas see Hellegouarc'h (1963), 388-415.

45. Livy ix,34,15 of C. Maenius in resigning the dictatorship, hardly to be expected of Appius Claudius 'a familia imperiosissima'.

46. Similarly with Valerius Maximus' instances of moderatio (below). This is not to rule out the possibility that Scipio Africanus did in fact anticipate this virtue. His refusal of kingship in Spain is lauded by Polybius (x,40,5f.), and Panaetius cites a saying of his to illustrate moderatio (de off.i,90).

47. Béranger (1953), 137ff. and Mus. Helv.5, 1948, 179ff. on the gesture of 27 B.C. The model refusal of divine honours (Charlesworth, PBSR 15, 1939, 1-10) is plausibly pinned down to an occasion in 30/29 B.C. by Habicht, Le Culte des Souverains (Fond. Hardt xix, 1972), 55ff. For statues as divine honours see K. Scott, TAPA 62, 1931, 101ff.


49. pro Mur.76f., cf. 74 'usus, vita, mores, civitas ipsa respuit'. Cato according to Plut. Cat.Min.xlix, 2f. lost the consulship by just the attitude Cicero alleges. For Stoic doubts about cupiditas honoris cf. Parad.40.

50. Cf. de Lacy, TAPA 72 (1941), 53f. and Nisbet ad loc. For Epicurean attacks on gloriae cupiditas, cf. Lucr. iii,59 'honorum caeca cupidio', Cic. de fin. i,59f. In political life to be cupidus laudis was the norm (de orat.1,14 etc.) and cupidus gloriae or consulatus can be used without a slur (e.g. Flacc.75, Mil.42). Indeed the accusation of cupiditas imperii or honoris was a weapon in the courts (Rhet.ad Her.ii,29 & 34, cf. iv,29; Part.Or.112; pro Sull.73 & 91); but it drew its strength from the implications of bribery. Thus when Cic. makes ignominia the penalty for honoris cupiditas (de leg. iii,46) he is legislating against ambitus. Cic. admits freely his 'de triumpho...cupiditas' (ad Att.vii,2,6).

51. Tusc.Disp.v,103-105, cf. 29 where ignobilitas and humilitas keep company with amissio suorum, exsilium, servitus etc.

52. in Pis.57, cf. Aristotle EN 1123b9f. on the μυκρόψυχος. T. Ann. 4,38 'ut degeneris animi interpretabantur...contemni virtutes' cf. in Pis.57 'angusti animi atque demissi...contennere'.

53. Tusc.Disp. v, 105. Aristotle Pol.v,1308b10f. points out that oligarchies hate the preeminence of any individual. It is exsuperantia of virtue like the iustitia of Aristides, not just of power that Cic. mentions. In Roman terms, glory was the proper reward of achievement (Nisbet 1.c.).

55. Appian BC i,103f. Note too his elaborate avoidance of demanding directly the dictatorship, 98f.

56. Dio xxxvi,24,5f. on this characteristic in general and the lex Gabinia in particular; xxxvii,21,3ff. in contrast to Caesar; on the lex Manilia Plut. Pomp.xxx,6-8 (he groans at the burden); cura annonae, Cic. ad Att. iv,1,7 ('claims to desire more moderate of proposed powers, his familiares think otherwise'); dictatorship, Cic. ad Q.fr.iii,8,4 'se negat velle'; Appian ii,73 λόγω μὲν ἐξουσιασμοῦν; Dio xl,46,1 οὐκ ἐξέδετο. Comment on his dissimulatio, Cic. ad fam.viii,1,3 (Caelius); ad Att. iv,9,1; vi,1,11.

57. ad Q.fr.i,1,26 joint honours of a temple with his brother; ad Att. v,21,7 all 'honores...nisi verborum', cf. vi,2,9 'nos in caelum decretis suis sustulerunt' (the Salaminians).

58. ad Q.fr. I.e. 'Romae quidem non mediocri cum admiratione laudatur...ut animo aequiore ferreント ii quibus nec debetur nec liceret'. There were other reasons. Religion presented no obstacle, cf. ND iii,46 'virtutibus hominum isti honores habeantur, non immortalitatis' and ii,62 with Pease ad loc. The financial side is important: cult was expensive and acceptance, though within the repetundae laws (ad Q.fr. I.e.) could cause molestia to the provincials, and might thus provoke prosecution (ad Att. v,21,7, cf. Flacc. 55ff. on the effect of Flaccus' seizure of monies voted for his father's cult).

59. For a list of cults Bowersock, Augustus and the Greek World App.2; for Pompey's honours Crawford JRS 66, 1976, 216.

60. Cf. Planc.63f. for the casual reception of Cic. returning from Sicily laden with 'honores...inauditi'.

61. Cic. ad Att. xiii,28,3f. draws the parallel between Caesar and Alexander whom the name of rex turned from modestia to become 'superbum, crudelam, immoderatum'. Yet if we press the parallel, Caesar at the time of writing still showed modestia as he certainly did clementia.

62. Dio xlii,19,3-4 stating his policy of not enumerating honours not confirmed; xliii,14,7 τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παρῆκατο; 46,1 most accepted εἰ καὶ τὰ μᾶλλον τῶν αὐτῶν παρῆκατο; xliiv,7,2 πλὴν γὰρ ὄλλην τινῶν πάντα αὐτὰ ἐξέδετο.

63. 10 year cos. Appian BC ii,107. Dio xliii,45,1 narrates as if accepted (though cf. 46,1 above), S. Jul. 76,1 'recepit continuum consulatum'. The same goes presumably of the 5 year cos. of xliii,20,3. Appointment of magistrates voted xliii,20,4 & xliii,14,5, turned down xliii,47,1, or half so 51,3. He chose the magistrates in practice as Dio says; if he accepted actual rights, they were probably of legally binding commendatio, cf. Levick, Hist. 16, 1967, 209f.

64. Dio xliii,46,2-3.


67. Cf. Dio xliii,46,1 & xlv,4,1 for the possibility of a time-lag between the voting and confirmation by the honorand. The bodyguard: Dio xlv,6,1 & 7,4 (τῆ...λόγος προσέμενος).

68. Stressed recently by E. Rawson, JRS 65, 1975, 149. Caesar could not (pace Rawson) tie his hands by formal refusal: he could always be 'consensu victus' (Béranger 1953, 154f.).

69. Dio xlv,9,2 has Caesar rebuking men for the address of king before the incidents of the crowning of the rostra statue and the return from the Feriae Latinae; Appian ii,107 reports the threatening refusal of a plan to call him rex.

70. Cic. Phil.ii,87 'populi iussu regnum detulisse, Caesarem uti noluisse'. Populi iussu should technically refer to the decision of the populus in assembly. Romans believed that their reges had ruled iussu populi (Cic. Rep.ii,25; 31; 35). Servius was at first exceptional, 'non iussu sed voluntate atque concessu civium', but later legitimised himself 'iussusque regnare...legem...tulit' (ibid. 37f.). By giving the events of the Lupercalia formal status, Caesar makes the refusal formal.

71. S. Jul.79,1. If he complained of infringed dignitas (Vell.Pat.ii,68,5 cf. Nic.Dam. F.130,69 επι τῇ ἐκείνου ἀτυχίᾳ) it was not in being deprived of the title of king. Refusal is a delicate and personal business; though the tribunes claimed to be supporting him, their use of magisterial powers in this context was tactless and provocative, their issue of an edict (Dio xlv,10,2) insulting to Caesar.

72. For Caesar's dignitas see Strasburger, Caesar im Urteil seiner Zeitgenossen (1968), n.64. By his own representation Caesar (BC i,32,1) denied to the senate that he 'extraordinarium honorem adpetisse'. Note that 'eo fuisset contentum' is the formula of imperial refusal. Cic. Marc.25 'satis diu vel naturae vixi vel gloriae'; cf. S. Jul.86,2, putting his valuation of respublica and dignitas the other way round from the mots of Jul.77.

73. Cic. de off.i,61-69; cf. 26 & 43 Caesar cited explicitly for cupiditas leading to iniuria. Of course regni cupiditas had always been an evil (Pacuv. fr.174-5 Warmington) and Caesar himself alleges it as a suspect motive of Gallic chieftains (BC i,2 & 9). How far attitudes have hardened is evident from a frag. of Varro's de vita pop. Rom. (iv,9 = Non. p.499,26 M, written certainly after 49 B.C.): 'tanta porro invasit cupiditas honorum plerisque ut vel caelum ruere, dummodo magistratum adipiscantur, exoptent'.

74. See Hellegouarc'h (1963), 279-290.

75. Cic. de off.iii,93 (gravitas): one might dance to save one's country, not to win a fortune. Nepos pr.1 & Epam.xv,1.


77. Cf. TLL iii,s.v. comitas, 1791,6ff. & 32ff.

78. Cic. de am.66, cf. de fin.ii,80 'comis in amicis tuendis' (Epicurus); Lucilius 664.
Cic. de am. 89, cf. Caecil. com. 108 'obsequens...comis', Cic. ad Att. vi, 6, 1 'obsequio et comitate adulescentis' (towards women); Laud. Tur. i, 30 'domestica bona...opsequi, comitatis, facilitatis'.

So Heuer (1941), 33ff. Note the anecdote of Scipio behaving civiliter to Lucilius, schol. Hor. serm. ii, 1, 72.

For hospitality cf. Plaut. Miles 676, Cic. Deiot. 19. Ennius Ann. 236 'mensam sermonesque suus...comiter impertit' may have to be abandoned, Skutsch, CQ 13, 1963, 96ff. The exchange of officia was important in the amicitia of the republic, but is not specifically designated as comitas: it is more a matter of duty. But when the emperor continues the habit, it is condescension, and marked as civilitas.

Hellegouarc'h 211-5. For the untypical behaviour of the petitor note Caecilius (I. c.) 'modo fit...comis...dum id quod petit potitur'.


Comm. Pet. 16 recommends facilitas, id. 49 'de nocte domus compleatur', cf. 50; ad Att. vi, 2, 5 (below n. 88).

Comm. Pet. 50; Mur. 76ff. against Cato's claims for dignitas.

See below. In this context note also Cic. Phil. xiii, 4 on the unlikelihood that the brothers Antony 'salutabunt benigne, comiter appellabunt unumque nostrum in the senatce.'

pro Planc. 12 & 49ff. For a remarkable illustration of supplicatio apparently by the emperor Tiberius, ILS 6044, with Levick, Tiberius the Politician, 119ff.

ad Att. vi, 2, 5 'aditus ad me minime provinciales; nihil per cubicularium; ante lucem inambulabam domi ut olim candidatus. Grata haec et magna'. cf. v, 21, 5.

ad Q. fr. i, 1, 21ff., cf. 32 'facilem in rebus cognoscendis, in hominibus audiendis admittendisque'. The same pair in de Imp. Pomp. 41: 'facilem aditus...liberae querimoniae'; these are the Greek εὐπρόσοδος and εὐπροσήγορος. For facilis of the urban praetor cf. Mur. 41. Further Heuer (1941), 45ff.

Well stressed by Combès (1966), 350ff.; cf. ad Q. fr. 1. c. 22 'grata Romae'; ad Att. 1. c. 'grata haec'; Imp. Pomp. 1. c. 'omnes nunc in eis locis Cn. Pompeium sicut...de caelo delapsum intuentur'; Mur. 1. c. popularity of praetorship helps him to consulship.

ad Q. fr. 1. c. Cicero does not mention the danger for a governor attendant upon comitas of contemptus, recognised by Plin. ep. viii, 24, 6 and Dig. i, 18, 19 (Combès 1. c.); but it was familiar from Greek theory (e.g. Xen. Cyr. viii, 3, 1) and Cic. may be taken to presuppose it. As the Digest passage, he recognises the danger of nimia familiaritas with provincials ad Q. fr. 1. c. 15ff.
92. Imp. Pomp. 1.c. The same thought in Nepos Att. 3, 1 'communis infimis, par principibus'. Nepos uses comunitas (var. lect. comitas) as an equivalent of facilitas at Milt. 8, 4 'nemo tam humilis esset cui non ad eum aditus pateret'. For comunitas in this sense see TLL iii, 1980 s.v. III.


95. Cf. Dio lx, 6, 2 (Claudius at Naples); cf. SHA Ant. Pius 6, 12; Val. Max. iii, 7 pp. 'virtutis aliquid sibi in consuetudine novanda licentiae suraentis indiciae'.

96. de rep. ii, 35 & 38; ib. i, 50.


98. Clearly facilitas applies to the handling of the case, clementia to the passing of sentence. On the provocations to judicial irritability, more eloquent than his advice to his brother (Q. fr. i, 1, 37ff.) are his own difficulties, e.g. ad Att. v, 10, 3; 15, 1.

99. So Lana (1972), 468.

100. civilis describes the proper behaviour of civis to civis. But it is very rarely applied to one who is not a magistrate or in some position of superiority to other cives: e.g. Plin. NH xiv, 56 (of rate of interest), cf. xviii, 320; Quint. iii, 8, 59 etc. (of an orator); Celsus Dig. 8, 1, 9 (of proper use of right of way): cf. Donat. ad Ter. Eun. 768 and Adelph. 454.


102. T. Ann. 1, 54; Vict. de Caes. i, 4; Epit. i, 20; Eutr. vii, 8, 4; Jord. Rom. 255; cf. SHA Claud. 2, 3 'Augusti moderatio'.

103. Ov. Trist. iii, 8, 41 'odio civiliter usus'; cf. Met. xii, 58 of Neptune: also Trist. i, 9, 25 'nec solet irasci (neque enim moderatior ullus)' of Augustus.


105. R. Ogilvie, Commentary passim (cf. 5ff.) fairly argues that much in L. that has apparently contemporary colouring may stem from sources, particularly of the Sullan period.

106. R. Syme, 'Livy and Augustus' HSCP 64, 1959, 27ff.

107. civilis et humanus: Livy iii, 57, 1; v, 3, 9; 23, 6; cf. Val. Max. iv, 1, 12; Quint. iii, 8, 59 'civili et humano ingressu'; S. Cal. 52 'neque civili...ac denique humano'; also Cic. leg. iii, 42 quoted above.
108. Livy's usage thus echoes the principle enunciated in Cic. _leg._ iii, 42 (above). For the contrast of civility and violence cf. S. _Tit._ 6, 1; Apul. _Met._ ix, 39; Ulp. _Dig._ 25, 5, 1, 2; Ammian. xviii, 1, 44; schol. Cic. _Bob_ ad _pro Sest._ _praef._ "supergressus civilera modum rogationera suam... armis optinuerit"; Donat. _ad Ter._ Eun. 768 'violento civiliter resisti solet'.

109. xxxiii, 46, 3 (Carthaginian ordo), cf. _id._ 3 'prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam essent nec _magistratus_'; xlv, 32, 5 'nulli civilis animus, neque legum neque libertatis aequae _pate_ _s_'. (Macedonian court).

110. vii, 5, 2; xxxviii, 56, 9.

111. Mommsen, _Römische Forschungen_ I, 285ff. is the classic, suggesting as source of the portrait Licinius Macer; Haffter (1956), 135ff. offers evidence to predate the tradition of Claudian superbia; Ogilvie, Commentary (refs. at p. 15) suggests Valerius Antias. Further Levick, _Tiberius_ 228 n. 4.

112. iii, 35, 3–6; 36, 1–2; the dropping of the mask to reveal true character is the old schema taken over by Tacitus for Tiberius.

113. iii, 40, 3 (assigned by the _TLL_ to a different meaning of civilis); cf. iv, 4, 10 where Canuleius objects to the ban on intermarriage of plebeian and patrician as a 'lex superbissima' that would split in two their 'societatem _civilem_'.

114. Ogilvie (454 & 464 on iii, 36, 9) is properly cautious about seeing a reference to the first triumvirate in this _foedus_; Livy's source may have had a Sullan pact in mind. But it is most unlikely, if my argument above holds, that civilis was used by L.'s source; L.'s own colouring may be tainted by the triumvirate, if his source's was not. In fact the second triumvirate provides a better model for demands of resignation and the restoral of _res publica_, cf. Millar, _JRS_ 63, 1973, 65.

115. vi, 40, 5, cf. _id._ 10 'ex _media_ _contione_ unum _civem_'. For this use of _unus_ in the language of _civilitas_ cf. below n. 135.

116. Sen. _Contr._ vii, 8; Suetonius Roth p. 290 (= Jerome). For the urban prefecture as a _continua potestas_ cf. T. _Ann._ 6, 10.

117. The question is discussed very fully by Weinstock (1971), 36 (Scipio) and 71ff. (Camillus). See there for further bibliography.

118. v, 21, 14; cf. Ogilvie _ad loc._

119. For Caesar's triumph, Drumann-Groebe, _Gesch._ 2 iii, 548ff. I do not, with Ogilvie, detect the influence of Octavian's triumph of 29 B.C.

120. Mommsen, _Rom.Forsch._ II, 502ff. observing that Scipio was criticised for obstructing a tribune but apparently praised for refusal of honours, dated the pamphlet to 49, after the use of _vis_ against the tribune Metellus, but before the acceptance of honours. Meyer, _Caesars Monarchie_ 531ff. reasonably preferred 44, after the offer of these honours; and C. continued to have trouble with tribunes to the last. If my suggestion above is right,
that C. in fact caused offence to some by his refusal of honours, perhaps the pamphlet was criticising C. (as it does Scipio) for high-handed refusal. Within a generation, this attitude had become incomprehensible to Livy.

121. moderatio: xxtviii,56,11 (Scipio); x,13,8 (Fabius); modestia is missed in Appius Claudius Censor in a catalogue of the superbia of the family (ix,34,15).

122. For the role of moderatio and consensus in the imperial refusal see Béranger (1953), 154f. Livy frequently makes the point that refusal enhances, not diminishes, gloria: ii,47,11 (Fabius refuses a triumph); iii,21,7 (Cincinnatus); iv,57,6 (Servilius Ahala); vi,39,5 (refusal as a deliberate electoral device, cf. T. Ann.1,3 'specie recusantis flagrantissime cupiverat') etc. For the use of contentus in this context cf. xxviii,40,1 with xliv,18 (Scipio and the African command); and xxix, 29,11 (the Numidian Mazaetullus) 'regio tamen nomine abstinuit contentusque nomine modico tutoris...'

123. Cf. Ogilvie 526f.; Hellegouarc'h (1963), 263f.

124. Cf. viii,33,13 'quantam interesse inter moderationem antiquorum (sc. dictorum) et novam superbia crudelitatemque' in the context of the great clemency debate between Papirius and Fabius. For clemency cf. iv,51,3; xxtviv,22,5; moderatio in the use of power: iii,33,9 (the moderatio of the first decemvirate, in contrast with the superbia of the second, cf. 39,4); iii,41,6; v,18,1; xxi,13,11; xxtxiv,7,15.

125. On the numismatic celebration of Moderatio under Tiberius see above ch.VII Appendix. Since we do not know the occasion of the dedication, we cannot know what kind of moderation is involved; but the pairing with Clementia suggests that it was the restraint of vengeance rather than the refusal of honour.


127. Cf. S.'s critical report on Vitellius' entry to Rome (Vit.11,1) and for the importance of this topic in general Alföldi, (1935), 6f. with nn.

128. Val.Max. iv,1,1 (Publicola); 3, Censorius, repeated censorship; 4, Cincinnatus repeated consulate; 5, Fab.Max. too many consulates in family; 6 Scipio Africanus refusal of divine honours, cos.perp., & dict.; 9 Claudius Nero does without own triumph; 14 Cato (mi) refuses election as praet. extra ordinem; 2 Camillus' cunctatio in accepting command; cf. 10 the younger Africanus' more modest prayer for Rome. No imperial examples! For iv,1,1 'fastigium...deduxit', cf. SHA Pius vi,4 (below).

129. iv,1,6 Scipio; similarly 8 Ti. Cracchus; 12 Metellus Macedonicus; 15 Bibulus; cf. 7 Marcellus allows provincial complaints.

130. iv,1,10 the younger Africanus as censor; 11 Q Scaevola; cf. Amm. xviii, 1,3 where Julian's refusal to condemn a man on the unsupported word of his accuser is civile.
131. Sen. ad Polyb. 13, 2. Claudius shows clem. and mod. in exiling him; de ira ii, 23, zf. of Alexander, 'quo rario...moderatio in regibus hoc laudanda magis est'; de clem. i, 11, 1 Augustus 'moderatus et clemens'; cf. i, 2, 2.

132. de Ben. ii, 12. The subsequent chapter is a tirade against superbia, including a description of the ideal 'descenditque in aequum et detraxit muneri suo pompam' (13, 2). This is philosophical orthodoxy, cf. below ch. X, 2. On Gaius as a model of vice in Seneca see Griffin (1976), 213f.

133. See above ch. VIII p. 205.

134. v, 3, 15; vi, 6, 1f. etc. The comparison of Caesar to Alexander goes back to Cic. ad Att. xiii, 28, 3 'ipse illum Aristotelis discipulum summo ingenio summa modestia postquam rex appellatus sit superbum cruelem immoderatum fuisse'. For views of Alexander, Stoic and Roman, see J. R. Fears, Philol. 118, 1974, 113ff. with refs. to earlier discussion; contra Brunt, Athenaeum N.S. 55, 1977, 39.

135. For the phrase 'unus ex nobis' in this context, cf. the 'unus Quiritium' of Appius (Livy vi, 40, 6, and above n. 115); also T. Ann. 12, 5 where Claudius poses as giving in to popular demand as 'unum se civium et consensui imparem'. Trajan is again 'unus ex nobis' at 63, 2. Nos might be taken as the senate (undoubtedly at the centre of Pliny's thought): but technically this is wrong (cf. 2, 7, where civile and senatorium are distinct). The passage at 2, 4 follows a string of first person plurals (dicamus, praedicamus, orationibus nostris, blandiamur; 2, 2-3) which refer to how the emperor should be praised not only by a consul 'sed omnibus civibus civium...'. Only then does he particularise: 'populus Romanus' (2, 6), and 'nos ipsi', the senate (2, 7).

136. For the word see also ep. viii, 24, 7 discussed below.

137. humanitas; Pan. 2, 7; 3, 4; 4, 6; 24, 2; 47, 3; 49, 5; 71, 4; cf. 59, 3 'humanissimus'.

138. 71, 5 cf. 4, 6 'nihil maiestate humanitate detrahirur'.

139. 2, 7 'divinitatem' v. 'humanitatem temperantium facilitatem'; 3, 4 hum. v. superbia; cf. 59, 3 'diceris...humanissimus...liceat experiri an aliquid superbiae...'.

140. moderatio; 3, 2; 9, 1; 17, 4; 23, 6; 39, 4; 54, 5; 56, 3; 63, 8; 78, 2; 84, 5 (Plotina); moderatus: 4, 3; 10, 3; 57, 5. modestia: (linked with moderatio) 3, 2; 10, 3; (alone) 21, 1; 58, 2+5; 73, 3; 79, 4. Cf. also ep. vi, 31, 11 (Centumcellae). For the theme, cf. Trisoglio (1972), 85ff.

141. Flattery avoided: 3, 2. Cf. 4, 3 (of gratiarum actiones); 54, 5; 73, 3 (acclamaciones). Honours refused; 21, 1; 56, 3; 58, 2; 79, 4. Cf. 9, 1 (content to be a colleague of Nerva). Acceptance of honours: cf. 4, 3 (allows panegyric); 56, 3; 58, 5; 78, 2 (urging to accept 4th cos.).

142. Military moderatio 16, 1-3; 17, 4; cf. S. Aug. 21, 3; above ch. VIII, n. 33.
143. For refs. see above ch.VIII n.26.

144. Divinity: 52,4 'superbissimos vultus' of golden statue; cf. 11,4. Honours: 2,7; 22,1; 55,4; 59,3. Contempt for public: 24,3; 63,6; 65,3.

145. reverentia: Pan.52,6; 69,3+4; 76,5, cf. S. Cal.26,2 'nihil reverentior... erga senatum'.

146. Ann.1,8 Aug.'s will 'non ultra civilem modum'; Ann.1,12,4 Asinius marrying Vipsania does 'plus quam civilia'.

147. Compare the discussion in Bergen (1962), 26f.

148. Cf. the same contrast in Licinius Mucianus '...comitate adrogantia, malis bonisque artibus mixtis' Hist.i,10,2.

149. For a full discussion of Tib.'s moderatio see Rogers (1943), 60ff.

150. For the request of honours for children in civilitas contexts cf. S. Aug. 56,2, SHA Pius xi,6; also Ann.4,17.

151. Lana (1972), 469ff.

152. For 'republicanism' see Lana 468 'il comportamento tipico...di tutti i cittadini dell' antica repubblica'. Civilitas does of course involve 'republicanism', but in the sense of behaviour as a citizen in a republic (city-state). The 'Roman Republic' often provides a model for that behaviour, but certainly not always.

153. Lana 473 for the distinction between civile and comitas. Obviously the words have different nuances (T. Ann.1,54 against 1,76) but they describe the same behaviour. To be fully civile it is necessary also to be comis. Above n.6 for Lana's misrepresentation of Suetonius.

154. Cf. Ann.3,60 'imaginem antiquitatis'.

155. This aspect is excellently brought out by Cameron (1976), 175ff. But since he only discusses emperor and people, and cites many cases not explicitly designated by the sources as examples of civility, there is some danger of overemphasis. The 'popular touch' is only one component of a complex pattern.

156. So Ann.1,7; 2,36; 3,60; 4,9.

157. Note his conduct at senatorial trials: 2,29; 3,15; 3,22; 3,67; 4,31. For public attention to his expression, cf. 3,3 'omnium oculis vultu eorum scrutantibus'.

158. Ann.1,10 = S. Tib.68,3.

159. Note also the conjecture that the early portraiture of his coins is intended as a sign of civilitas, Sutherland (1953), 156 and above n.3.

160. Cf. Griffin (1976), 127f. for the suggestion that civilitas was part of the ideal role created by Seneca.
161. Note the interest of Josephus in behaviour that is δημοτικόν (below Appendix A).

162. Elsewhere very rarely: esp. Apul. Met.ix,39 & x,6; and Tertullian Apol. ii,14 casting the empire as a 'civilitis non tyrannica dominatio'.

163. Fully discussed by Scivoletto (1970), 18ff., reaching the same conclusion on the impact of Julian. For the ideal in Claudian and beyond see also Straub (1939), 189f.; A. Cameron, Claudian (1970), 382f.

164. Eutr.vii,8,4 (Aug.); 13,4 (Claud.); 21,2 (Titus); viii,1,1 (Nerva); 2 & 4 (Traj.); 10 (Verus); ix,12 (Quint.); 27 (Herculius); x,13 (Constantius); 16 (Julian).


166. Cf. Plin. Pan.21,4 'ut reversus imperator qui privatus exieras, agnoscis agnosceris'.

167. For details see the edition of Gutzwiller (1942).

168. Discussed by D. C. Earl, The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome (1967), 111 suggesting that civilitis conveys 'civilized'. This is only true in that 'civilization' is the behaviour characteristic of a city-state.

169. It is not clear to me whether Constantius did profess civility. The description of his entry into Rome (Ammian. xvi,10,lf.) discussed by Straub (1939), 175ff. is confusing, mixing Persian pomp with cultivation of the people. But cf. Julian or.i,450D.

170. See Appendix B.


172. S. Tit.8,2 for public bathing. The anecdote has an eccentric parallel in the behaviour of Antiochus Epiphanes, Polyb. xxvi,12 (below).


174. Cameron (1976), 177 holds that there is no Greek equivalent of civile. Scivoletto (1970), n.28 (p.27-29) looks at Dio's usage, noting that of various terms used, δημοτικός comes closest to a translation.

175. Questa (1957), 37ff. on 'biographical' elements in Dio is a useful starting point; also Millar, Cassius Dio 60ff. For linguistic usage, the index by W. Narwijn in vol.V of Boissevain's edition (Berlin 1931) is invaluable.

176. See Vrind, De Cassii Dionis Vocabulis (1923), 4f.; esp. 6 noting Xiphilinus' substitution of δημοτικός for δημοκρατικός in one case.

177. On this anecdote see below Appendix B.
178. The ideal of refusal is preached by Maecenas at lii,35,1-6. δημοτικός is not used in this context; but at xxxvii,23,1f. Pompey is praised for preventing the vote of honours rather than making a great show of refusal, on the grounds that this is genuinely τὸ δημοτικὸν δυνατό καὶ δύναμιν καὶ ἐργαν.
Chapter X

2. Greek Antecedents

1. Cameron (1976), 177f. denies the presence of the ideal in the Greek world, noting especially the lack of importance of *spectacula*.

2. Cf. above ch. VIII n. 65. Taken as orthodoxy e.g. by Welwei (1963), 160f.

3. Taeger, Charisma, i, 398 puts him as late as the 3rd century A.D. There is indeed something to be said, in view of the argument below, for dating him later than Aurelian. But there is nothing to rule out a hellenistic date. Delatte (1942), ad loc. compares Philo de praem. 97 and Callicratidas ap. Stob. iv, 28, 17, p. 684f.

4. In general see Breitenbach, RE ix, A 1569ff. s.v. Xenophon, esp. 1709f.


6. Cf. the accounts of the Persian Royal Progress in Hdt. vii, 40; Curtius iii, 3, 8f.


8. Athen. xii, 512A = fr. 55 Wehrli. The work was a dialogue (Diog. Laert. v, 88) so these are not necessarily the philosopher's views.

9. ad Nic. ii, 34. ἀνευτος is translated 'zivil' by Heuss, Ant. Ab. 4, 1954, 73. For ἀπελάτος see Lammermann, Von der attischen Urbanität, Diss. Göttingen 1935.

10. In general see Alföldi (1934), 1ff. For Clearchus' rouge, costumes and tragic boots see Memnon FGH 434 Fl, 1; Justin xvi, 5, 7f.; Plut. fort. Alex. ii, 5, 338B; Diod. xv, 81, 5; Suda s.v. Berve, Die Tyrannis 315f.

11. For D. Phalareus (rouge, blond hair, and the nick-names Λαμπάτω and Χαρποβαλέφαρον i.e. 'bright-eyes') see Duris FGH 76 F 10; Diog. Laert. v, 76; Athen. xiii, 593F; Suda s.v. Aelian ix, 9 confuses Phalareus with Poliorcetes.


13. Diod. xix, 81, 4; xx, 92, 3. (= Hieronymus ?). For the term καταπληκτός, cf. Diotog. l.c. καταπληκτός; noted by Tarn, PBA 19, 1933, 152 n. 33.

14. Eur. Hippol. 94f. τις δ' οὔ σεμνός ἀκρεννός βροτόν; ἐν δ' εὐχροσοφόρουσίν ἐστι τις χάρις. See Barrett ad loc. for the role of σεμνότατης in the play.

15. Aesch. Ag. 917f. For the Persian use of carpets see Athen. xii, 514c (Heraclides of Cumae), and Fraenkel ad loc.

16. For Pausanias' Medising style of rule, Thuc. i, 130 (contrast Hdt. v, 32); Nymphis FGH 432 P 9; Duris Fl 4 (these two both cited by Athen. xii, 535Ef.); Diod. xi, 44, 5f.; Ps.-Arist. ix, 25; Plut. Arist. xxiii, 1.
17. Preserved in Memnon FGH 434Flf. (Jacoby III B, 267f.).

18. Nymphis F10 (= Athen. xii,549A); also with moralising comment, Aelian VH ix,13.

19. So Memnon F.4,5; Diod.xv,81,5; doubted by Berve, Tyrannis, 321. On Dionysius' style of rule see K. F. Stroheker, Dionysios I (1958), 159f.

20. For criticisms of D. see Baton FGH 268F4; Duris F.14; Theopompus FGH 115 F187 (= Athen. x,436 AB); Diod. xiv,44,8. Compare Livy xxiv,5,4 on the unapproachability and pride of Hieronymus, going back to Baton's monograph.

21. Athen. xii,537D-540A. Phylarchus' account of Alexander's χρηματισμός is paralleled by Aelian VH ix,3 and Polyen. iv,3,24, the latter attempting to represent him as μετρητόν καὶ δημοτικόν. Ephippus discusses the εξέλασις and social occasions. For the ἐντευξις, εξέλασις and χρηματισμός of Alex., cf. Plut. Alex.xiv,2f.


23. At Pyrrh.xi,9 the troops leave Demetrius for the δημοτικός Pyrrhus = Ariston of Ceos F.13 vi Wehrli (below).

24. See Appendix B.

25. Duris F.14. The relevant section in Diodorus is not preserved, but note xxi,21,11, an unplaced sententia, that one who enters a free city should leave behind his ύπερηψαύτα and tyrant's clothing and obey the local laws. This might fit Demetrius and Athens.

26. In general Knoche (1935); for Polybius Welwei (1963), 143.

27. He instructs the interviewee to meet him on his after-dinner stroll, behaviour criticised by Phylarchus in Clitus the White (Athen. xii,539c).

28. Contrast Plato's picture of the new ruler courting popularity, Resp.viii, 566D, 'he greets everyone he meets'.

29. Wehrli (vi,31f.) Ariston fr.13-14; Jensen, Philodemus πέρι χαλκῶν (Teubner 1911) for Ph.'s text.


31. = Plut. Dion xvii; Val.Max. iv,1 ext.3. Dion forced to wait for an audience consoles himself with the thought that he himself had done no better in Syracuse. For D.'s pride, cf. Plut. Dion viii,lf.; x,4; lii,4. Also Mor.70A quoting criticisms by Plato and Speusippus of Dion.

32. Xen. Cyr.viii,2,24f. For Philodemus' own views on pride see col.viii,26ff. on approachability and being ζωος; viii,8f. on bolstering of ύπερσχη by σωμάτης; ix,6f. on ὅμοια.

34. The thought τῶν μετρίων ταξευόμενος (Ag. xi,11) is similar to Arist. EN 1124818f. πρὸς ὑπὸ τοὺς μέσους μέτρου (on the magnanimous man), though there the language is more moderate. The Cyropaedia is not irreconcilable with the Agesilaus; it represents an attempt to moralise a different style of kingship, stressing the element of geniality.

35. At Pol.1312bl7 μέσος and καταφρόνησες are the two main causes for attack on tyrannies. It is also a failure of kings that many are εὐκαταφρόνητοι 1313al2.

36. Ath.Pol.13,4 & 14,1 δημοτικότατος; 20,3 δημαγωγός; 28,2 προστάτης τοῦ δήμου. Note also Isocr. Evag.46; the king must be a mixture of constitutions, including being δημοτικός...ἐν τῇ τοῦ πλήθους θεραπείᾳ.

37. So too Plato Laws iii,691cf. on μετρότης as the vital factor in Sparta's survival.

38. Cf. Appendix B.

39. So Aristaeas 263; similarly for the preservation of ζωτικός and the avoidance of pride 191; 211; 257; 269. Cf. Murray (1967), 356f.

40. Polyb. xii,5; cf. Berve, Tyrannis 445f.

41. Polyenaus v,3,7 relates the same story as a stratagem: A. is entrusted with power, ἥς ἄνδρι δημοτικῷ καὶ μετρίῳ.

42. xx,54,1, cf. Aelian VH xi,4 adding that the motive was to conceal his baldness. It is obscure whether this is an anticipation or a reflection of Caesar (S. Jul.45,2).

43. The parallel between Augustus and Agathocles was seen by Ed. Meyer, Gött. Gel.Anz.1888,858f. The authenticity of pre-imperial refusals is defended by H.-W. Ritter, Diadem und Königsherrschaf t (1965), see Index s.v. recusatio.

44. Aelian VH vi,11,cf. Diod. xi,26,6.

45. Phylarchus FGH 81F44 (= Athen. iv,141F). For the source question, cf. Beloch Gr.Gesch. iv,2,7f.; Lenschau RE xi (Kleomenes), 710.

46. Note also Phylarchus' criticisms of Antiochus (F6) and Ptolemy II (F40).

47. See Welwei (1963), 38ff.

48. Polyb. xxvi,1 = Athen. v,193Df. & x,439Af., with Diod. xxix,32.

49. Antiochus spent his youth as a hostage in Rome, whence he doubtless brought back these ideas, cf. E. Rawson, JRS 65, 1975, 156.

50. Despite Alfoldi (1935), arguing throughout that court ceremonial goes back long before Diocletian. This is to some extent true; but Caligula and Domitian are exceptions, and there is little sign that the issue was felt to be a burning one.
Note on Bibliographical Conventions:

This bibliography is designed for use in conjunction with the text. Items here included are normally referred to in the text by author's name and date of publication, thus: Adam (1970). Where more than one publication in any year is cited, it is distinguished numerically, thus: Luck (1964,1). Certain basic works are referred to by author's name alone; these are gathered together along with details of some basic texts of Suetonius (Basic Works and Texts).

Works cited in the text for specific points, and not of general relevance to the argument, are not included in this bibliography, and full details are given as they occur. Standard historical works and reference books are not here included, and are cited according to standard abbreviations. Abbreviations of journals, collections etc. follow usual conventions.

Basic Works and Texts


de vita Caesarum  M.IHM, C.S.T. De vita Caesarum libri VIII (ed. maior Leipzig 1907; ed. minor Teubner 1908). Citations of the Caesars follow the numeration of this text, not of the Bude edition of Ailloud.

Leo  F. LEO, Die griechisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer literarischen Form (Leipzig 1901).

Macé  A. MACÉ, Essai sur Suetone (Paris 1900).


Roth

C. L. ROTH, C.S.T. Quae supersunt omnia (Leipzig 1858)
Cited by page number.

Steidle

W. STEIDLE, Sueton und die Antike Biographie (Zetemata 1: Munich 1951; repr. 1963).

Wickert


General

T. ADAM, Clementia Principis (Kieler Hist.Stud.xi; Stuttgart, 1970)


G. D'ANNA, Le Idee Letterarie di Suetonio (Florence 1954)


P. BAGGE, De elocutione C. Suetonii Tranquilli (Upsala 1875)


G. BARNER, Comparantur inter se Graeci de regentium hominum virtutibus auctores, Diss. Marburg 1889


J. BÉRANGER, Recherches sur l'aspect idéologique du principat (Basel 1953)

———, Principatus. Etudes de notions et d'histoire politique dans l'Antiquité gréco-romaine (Geneva 1975)

K. BERGEN, Charakterbilder bei Tacitus und Plutarch, Diss. Köln 1962

H. BERVE, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen I-II (Munich 1967)


———, Suetonius' Life of Nero: an Historical Commentary (Coll. Latomus 157: Brussels 1978)


G. BRUGNOLI, Studi Suetoniani (Lecce 1968)

P. A. BRUNT, 'Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations', JRS 64, 1974, 1ff.

V. BUCHHEIT, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles (Munich 1960)


A. CAMERON, Circus Factions; Blues and Green at Rome and Byzantium (Oxford 1976)


———, 'Pietas and Victoria: the Emperor and the Citizen', JRS 33, 1943, 1ff.

E. CIZEK, Structures et idéologie dans 'Les Vies des Douze Césars' de Suétone (Bucharest-Paris 1977)


———, CR N.S.19, 1969, 62f. reviewing della Corte


L. DELATTE, Les Traités de la Royauté d'Ecphante, Diotogène et Sthéniadas (Liège-Paris 1942)


S. DÖPP, 'Zum Aufbau der Tiberiusvita Suetons', Hermes 100, 1972, 444ff.


M. DURRY, Pline le Jeune. Panégyrique de Trajan (Coll.ét.anc.Budé; Paris 1938)

F. DVORNIK, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy; Origins and Background 2 vols. (Dumbarton Oaks Studies, 9; Washington 1966)


———, 'I Cesari de Suetonio', in Studi di letteratura antica II,2 (Bologna 1947), 147ff.[=Racc.scritti in onore di F. Ramorino, Milan 1927, 1ff.]


M. GRIFFIN, Seneca: a Philosopher in Politics (Oxford 1976)

H. GUGEL, Studien zur biographischen Technik Suetons (Wiener Studien Beiheft 7; Vienna 1977)

P. HADOT, 'Fürstenspiegel', RAC viii (1972), 555ff.


J. HELLECOUARC'H, Le Vocabulaire Latin des Relations et des Partis Politiques sous la République (Paris 1963) [2nd ed. 1968; citations are from the 1st ed.]

K. H. HEUER, Comitas-facilitas-liberalitas; Studien zur gesellschaftlichen Kultur der ciceronischen Zeit, Diss. Münster 1941.


U. KNOCHE, Magnitudo Animi (Philol.Suppl. 27,3, 1935)


R. LATTIMORE, Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs (Urbana 1962)


B. LEVICK, Tiberius the Politician (London 1976)

B. LICHOCKA, Justitia sur les monnaies imperiales romaines (Warsaw 1974)

M. LOSSAU, 'Suetons Clementia Caesaris', Hermes 103, 1975, 496ff.


H. MARKOWSKI, 'De quattuor virtutibus Augusti in clipeo aureo ei dato
inscriptis', Eos 37, 1936, 109ff.


A. MOMIGLIANO, The Development of Greek Biography (Cambridge Mass. 1971)

B. MOUCHOVÁ, Studie zu Kaiserbiographien Suetons (Acta Univ. Carolinae;
Phil. et Hist. Mongr. xxii; Prague 1968)

O. MURRAY, 'Philodemus on the Good King according to Homer', JRS 55, 1965,
161ff.


———, κεφάλαιον 6: Studies in the Justification of Monarchic Power

E. PARATORE, 'Claude et Néron chez Suetone', Revista di cultura classica
e medioevale 1, 1959, 326ff.

Class. N.S. 11, 1934, 35ff.

V. PÖSCHL, Grundwerte römischer Staatsgesinnung in den Geschichtswerken
des Sallust (Berlin 1940)

C. QUESTA, 'Tecnica biografica e tecnica annalistica nel 11. liii-lxiii
di Cassio Dione', Studi Urbinati 31, 1957, 37ff.

R. S. ROGERS, Studies in the reign of Tiberius (Baltimore 1943)

E. SCHMÄLING, Die Sittenaufsicht der Censoren. Ein Beitrag zur Sitten-
geschichte der röm. Republik (Stuttgart 1938)

W. SCHMIDT, De Romanorum inprimis Suetonii arte biographica, Diss.
Marburg 1891

W. SCHUBART, 'Das hellenistische Königsideal nach Inschriften und Papyri',
Archiv für Papyrosforschung 12, 1937, 1ff.

N. SCIVOLETTO, 'La Civilitas del IV secolo e il significato del Breviarum

C. SPICQ, 'La Philanthropie hellénistique, vertu divine et royale', Studia
Theologica 12, 1958, 169ff.


P. L. STRACK, Untersuchungen zur römischen Reichsprägung des zweiten
Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: vol. i, 1931; ii, 1933; iii, 1937)

J. A. STRAUB, Vom Herrscherideal in der Spätantike (Stuttgart 1939)
D. R. STUART, Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography (Berkeley 1928)

C. H. V. SUTHERLAND, Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy 31 B.C. - A.D.68 (London 1951)


———, 'Suetonius and his Influence', in Latin Biography, ed. T. A. Dorey (London 1967)

F. TRISOGLIO, La Personalità de Plinio il Giovane nei suoi rapporti con la politica, la società e la letteratura (Mem.Acc.Sc.Torino Cl.Sc.Mor. ser.4, n.25; Turin 1972)


———, Plutarch's Lives (London 1974)

B. H. WARMINGTON, Suetonius Nero. Text, with introduction and notes (Bristol 1977)

S. WEINSTOCK, Divus Julius (Oxford 1971)

K. WELWEI, Könige und Königtum im Urteil des Polybios, Diss. Köln 1963

P. WESSNER, 'Isidor und Sueton', Hermes 52, 1917, 201ff.


W. WITTKE, Das Tiberiusbild und seine Periodisierung in der Tiberiusvita Suetons, Diss. Freiburg i. Br.1974

ABSTRACT

A. F. Wallace-Hadrill, St. John's College, Oxford
Submitted for D.Phil., Michaelmas Term 1979

A study of Suetonius' Lives of the Caesars as a gallery of portraits of Roman emperors. The object is to make sense of Suetonius' methods of depicting emperors as emperors and to ask what light is cast on contemporary perceptions of the role of the Emperor. In order to set the Caesars in context, the work is approached from three different angles, the literary, the social and the ideological.

The first part looks at the literary background of the Lives. The question here is of how far the rubric method and the actual choice of rubrics can be accounted for in terms of literary tradition as opposed to the author's understanding of what was significant about an emperor.

The second part considers the impact of the author's position in society on his presentation. An attempt is made to discover the viewpoint of one who was simultaneously an equestrian official and an antiquarian scholar. His view of society is related to his views of the emperor's place in society and his functions as an administrator.

The last part examines the relationship between his representation of the emperor and the ideals desiderated in or attributed to autocratic rulers. Discussion centres on the use of virtues and vices as categories of estimation and on their relationship to official and theoretical 'ideologies'. Since it is argued that Suetonius shares the views of other Roman sources, discussion of individual virtues and vices ranges far beyond the Caesars.