

A Chronotope of Containment Development: Europe's Migrant Crisis and Africa's Reterritorialization

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Abstract: Europe has taken unprecedented levels of peacetime defensive actions against the perceived demands by African migrants for “absolute hospitality”. In collaboration with politicians across the Mediterranean, European political leaders are authoring a chronotope that removes Africa and Africans from global time. This discursive vision rests on an epistemological reorientation coding all Africans as potential migrants capable of threatening European and African sovereignty and security. This conceptual realignment has seeded a defensive assemblage of coercive controls, sociologies of knowledge, and a campaign to generate sedentary African subjects. Ultimately it is engendering “containment development” aimed at geographically localising Africans’ desires and imaginations. In an era of planetary entanglement and exchange, this discursively and materially excludes Africans from what it means to be fully human.

Résumé: Suite à la « crise des réfugiés » en 2015–2016, l’Union Européenne et des membres de l’élite politique africaine ont collectivement entrepris une série d’interventions qui a eu pour effet de reterritorialiser l’Afrique, et plus encore, de détacher le continent et son peuple du temps global. La redéfinition de cet espace-temps repose sur une série de contrôles coercitifs et sur des processus de subjectivisations. Ces derniers, incluant assistance militaire, renforcement des frontières et de nouvelles sociologies du savoir, mettent enfin en évidence des processus, des lieux et des gens rendus invisibles par les bureaucraties, effacés du regard global. L’analyse révèle l’émergence d’une nouvelle ère de « développement de confinement », conçu pour contrôler les mouvements et normaliser le sédentarisme en localisant géographiquement les désirs et trajectoires des africains. Avec cette nouvelle catégorie, le succès du développement est défini en tant que déconnexion: les africains restent géographiquement à l’écart des processus globaux de circulation humaine, et l’action se cantonne au développement économique localisé et au développement personnel.

Keywords: migration, externalisation, reterritorialisation, temporalities, Africa

One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era. By day it pursues its enemies. It is cunning and ruthless, it sends its bloodhounds everywhere. By night it feeds on images of disaster: the sack of cities, the rape of populations, pyramids of bones, acres of desolation. (J.M. Coetzee 1980, *Waiting for the Barbarians*)

Introduction

In 2015 a moral panic engulfed Europe and its cultural corollaries in the United States and elsewhere. Long uneasy with transformations engendered by human mobility from beyond the largely Christian west, European politics was riven with fear of a migrant swarm from Africa and the Middle East. European leaders responded with unprecedented levels of peacetime defensive action against perceived demands for “absolute hospitality” (Derrida 2005) from undesired strangers. Hungary closed its eastern border because, in its president’s words, “People want us Europeans to be masters of the situation, and defend our border” (Kounalakis 2015). A multi-billion Euro deal with Turkey to arrest eastern flows soon followed. In subsequent months, fears of the “African migrant” spawned a recalibration of Europe’s material and discursive relationship with its southern neighbour. Collaboration among political leaders across the Mediterranean has generated a chronotope of “containment development” intended to alienate Africans from global time.

The redefinition of space–time stems from an epistemological reorientation coding all Africans as potentially migratory threats to European and African state sovereignty (see Andersson 2016). The conceptual realignment is spawning a defensive assemblage of coercive controls, sociologies of knowledge, and education initiatives designed to normalise sedentarism by geographically localising Africans’ desires and imaginations. Under this emerging spatio-temporal epistemology, development success is disconnection in which Africans are removed from global imaginations and developmental time. Although sedentarisation strategies are not novel (see Bakewell 2008), gone now is the chronotope of modernity, entanglement, and hypermobility. While past chronotopes ~~were~~ reinforced patterns of paternalistic difference, they nonetheless placed Africans within global, potentially convergent developmental trajectories. No longer is Africa emerging or co-developing through the exchange of money, ideas, and people. Their displacement from even a remedial position within a global telos reflects both a reterritorialisation and retemporalisation of the African development narrative.

If, as Bauman (2011) and Arendt (1968) suggest, movement is intrinsic to contemporary global membership and political freedoms, Africans are being excluded from global post-modernity. The practices that embody this chronotope may ultimately produce outcomes serving no one but smugglers, African autocrats, and European bureaucrats. Yet even if the material actions fail to match those imagined by the chronotope’s authors, this narrative exclusion of Africans is significant. It represents not so much a reinscription of racially inflected imperial logics, but a new mode of governance—led by European and African political elites—that categorically denudes Africans’ freedom and humanity.

Reading the Chronotope

This article explores the reconfiguration of African space–time through Bakhtin’s (2008:250) concept of the chronotope and Foucault’s reflections on “pastoral power”. The chronotope is an epistemological and narrative reflection of an

author's perspectives on the relationship between space and time. Shaped by authors' material and political environments, it draws attention to the ideological and moral content of space, recognising that "specific times and places placed conditions on who could act, how such actions would be normatively structured, and how they would be normatively perceived by others" (Blommaert 2017:95–96). It is both a conceptual apparatus in its own right and a heuristic for reading the forces at work in the culture system that created it (Holquist 2008:56). In this case, it reflects Europe's understanding of threat and the racially infused logics informing their response and African leaders' desire for sustained, territorial power. Although Bakhtin argues that multiple chronotopes exist simultaneously, they can become dominant by displacing other modes of reflecting people's geographic and temporal positions. The chronotope discussed here is not yet hegemonic, but the rapid naturalisation of exclusion and sedentarisation in public and political discourse bespeaks its ascendance. As it gains traction, it provides the discursive, epistemological, and ethical foundations for future engagements in which Africans remain the perpetual "other".

In melding Bakhtin's chronotope to contemporary political temporalities, I draw on two aspects of Foucault's (1983) work on pastoral governance. The first relates to the temporal underpinnings of political authority. Here power is legitimised by its ability to gradually improve a defined population (e.g. the citizenry, the flock) through its institutions: schools; museums; science; the clinic; prisons. This makes them healthier, smarter, stronger, more productive. Sustaining systems demands temporal and often spatial subjectification: from inculcating the sense of a collective project in ways necessitating adherence to collective norms and institutions. The second is authorities' reliance on extensive knowledge about individuals and their potential defections. The role of scientific observation is in part to identify ideal behaviours and correct those deemed threatening to collective advancement. As Pandian (2008:92) notes, this system relies,

on a radical difference in kind between pastors and the populations in their care. Flocks are made up of beings that would scatter, starve, suffer, die or simply lose their way without the careful attention of someone else with better judgement.

The colonial encounter was premised on a discourse of paternalistic pastoralism (see Hugo 1879). The new chronotope reflects a fearful contempt of poor Africans shared by collaborative leaders in Europe and Africa.

The arguments presented here stem from critically reading secondary materials and engagements in policy deliberations related to African migration within South Africa, Southern Africa, and at the continental level. I draw on a dynamic, emergent archive impossible to consider in its entirety. Apart from its novelty, the records of many relevant policy and political deliberations remain *in camera* leaving participants' motivations, debates, and narratives obscured. My conclusions are consequently indefinite. Nonetheless, signals are sufficiently strong to recognise components of an emerging chronotope and the practices it generates. In charting these broad directions, the article leans towards conceptual generalisations over nuance and parsing. Nowhere is this more evident than in discussing "Europe", a complex geographic and political body often riven by internal

conflict. I refer largely to the European Union and its policies towards countries and political bodies within the African continent. Of course, African states and regional bodies also vary immensely in size, institutional configurations, and leadership. In the interest of identifying and describing trends, I overlook many of these variations. However, it is in the deviations in which uncertainty rests and from which alternative chronotopes may emerge.

Containment Development

The European chronotope breaks from contemporary development thinking emphasising space–time compression and the circulation of empowered individuals. Rather, it presents Africans as misguided wards dazzled by false promises of better lives far from home. In this vision, successful development is underscored by a concept of *“aiutiamoli a casa loro”* (“let’s help at home”) (Curzi 2016). Such sedentarisation strategies are not novel (see Bakewell 2008), but the containment imperative has now become a dominant trope around which continental relations are being redefined. Take, for example, the “Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration (COM [2016] 385)” (7 June 2016). The immediate goals—or the stated goals anyway—of the partnerships/compacts are to save lives in the Mediterranean Sea. Underlying this is the explicit aim of increasing returns to countries of origin and transit, and enabling migrants and refugees to stay close to home so they can avoid undertaking dangerous journeys all together.

To realise “containment development”, three containment strategies are at work. The first takes the form of direct conditionalities being placed on African countries by European donors. As described in more detail in subsequent sections, bi-lateral assistance programmes are being made increasingly contingent on at least a performance of control by African states. This includes compliance with the border control and population strategies outlined below. The second is a redefinition of “successful” development. While many of the specific aid programmes will remain relatively unchanged—assistance for health, infrastructure, education—the metrics used to assess their success will not. Across Africa, development aid is increasingly framed as addressing the root causes of migration. Under the “new migration partnership framework” (Mogherini 2016) assistance is aimed broadly to combat all sources of mobility. Over the long term, it calls for the European Union to heighten efforts to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, and to provide capacity building to the host communities and relevant institutions. Although by no means unique, this is perhaps most bluntly evident in Denmark’s commitment of around 14 million dollars to contraception programmes to help, in the words of Denmark’s Minister for Development Co-operation, Ulla Tornaes, “limit the migration pressure on Europe” (BBC News 2017). Such statements import to the 21st century, longstanding apprehension over Africans’ animal-like sexuality and fertility which need controlling for their own betterment.

Europe previously supported the African Union’s campaigns for safe and easy migration across Africa (see “Agenda 2063”; African Union Commission 2015).

Once framed as a critical means of overcoming spatial inequality and promoting economic development, within the chronotope of containment development, such movements read as self-defeating delusion. As Knoll and de Weijer observe, the “developmental imperative has been largely subsumed with the containment narrative ... The tools used—which now span all external action tools ... include negative conditionality” (Knoll and de Weijer 2016:18–19). That is, developmental progress has become “containment”.

Coercive Externalisation and Reterritorialisation

The chronotope and its associated practices have emerged dialogically between existing rhetoric and epistemic framing and actual events, with one interacting with and reshaping the other. It is neither possible nor necessary for this article to fully detail these interactions. Others provide more detailed timelines than are required here (see Brachet 2016; Knoll and de Weijer 2016; Perrin 2012). Yet a few facts are worth rehearsing: In 2015 alone the European Union had 1,015,078 arrivals by sea (asylum seekers and others), up from about 220,000 the year before (there were only about 75,000 in the first half of 2014) (UNHCR 2016:6).¹ The European statistical agency (Eurostat) reported that in 2015 the EU received over 1.2 million new asylum applications, a rise of over 100% from the previous year. Germany, Hungary, Sweden, and Austria received almost two-thirds of those (Eurostat 2016). Another 3771 people were reported dead or missing in the waters separating Europe from Asia and Africa (UNHCR 2015), turning the Mediterranean into what Pope Francis termed a “vast cemetery” (Biles 2014). That several European Union governments refused to fund the Italian-run rescue option “Operation Mare Nostrum” (later replaced by Frontex’s “Operation Triton”) reflects the conscious decision to create this macabre, heterotopic boundary—a utopia outside of Europe that opens the possibility of preserving European cultural and territorial sovereignty (cf. Agamben 2005).

Denying support for rescue operations was but the first of many muscular policy responses by domestic European authorities and by Europe writ large. These included a range of heightened patrols and militarised restrictions placed along both sea and land. Even as German chancellor Angela Merkel promised to accept a million refugees (an openness rejected by many of her political peers and later scaled back), Germany supported interventions limiting the spontaneous movements of people into the Union. While individuals and philanthropic groups rescue some people—as indeed did the Greek and Italian coast guards—the modalities were clearly about protecting the sovereign right to exclude.

Heightened controls along Europe’s geographic borders are important, but less radically transformative than how the chronotope predicates extending containment measures beyond its immediate borders. These include the “Turkey Deal”. Announced on 12 November 2015, the EU offered Turkey somewhere around €3 billion over two years to “manage” more than two million refugees (largely from Syria) who had sought refuge in Turkey in exchange for Turkey’s acquiescence in restricting migration through Turkey towards the European Union (Kanter 2015). This ultimately became a €3 billion fund in February 2016. A similar strategy

informed the outcome of a summit between European and African leaders held in Valletta, Malta on 11–12 November 2016. Echoing the Turkey deal, the Valetta Summit resulted in a European “Trust Fund for Africa” supported by at least €1.8 billion. Despite the “African” moniker, these funds are to be distributed almost exclusively among countries feeding the central Mediterranean route. This includes some in the Sahel (Libya, Mali and Niger) and others in the Horn (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan). Southern Africa, which collectively hosts millions of refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR 2015); in little danger of reaching Europe, is effectively absent from these agreements.

These actions are embedded within an elaborated legitimising discourse that justified past “partnerships” with North African and later with Sahelian states. Casas-Cortes et al. (2015) trace this back to the early 1990s when migrant “raids” on Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands raised the spectre of uncontrolled African migration to Europe. As Brachet (2016:276) notes, in the minds of European politicians and technocrats, “the southern migration frontier of the EU has been progressively externalised, from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Sahara”. These strategies stem from a chronotope in which future stability and development—of both Europe and Africa—demand containment. It not only justifies border externalisation (Mountz and Hiemstra 2014) but necessitates efforts to reshape the territorial politics and ambitions of almost all Africans.

Webber (2016) reports on the European desire to find “coherence between migration and development policy. To realise this vision, the European Union launched an initial trust fund that later became part of €8 billion dedicated to supporting migration (and migration conditional aid) in Africa over the next five years (Reuters 2016). As of June 2016, the European Commission had allocated approximately €63 billion in grants and loans, with European development bank aimed at “African development” oriented towards preventing or arresting migration within and out of the continent. Of these various funds, Niger will receive at least €100 million, Ethiopia is paid €97 million, and Mali €91.5 million (Toaldo and Barana 2016). These are substantial sums that can transform countries like Niger with an annual GDP of €6.3 billion or even somewhat wealthier countries. Perhaps most remarkable is engagements with Libya, a country without a *de facto* government. It has a €200 million annual deal with Europe (Reuters 2017). It is unclear how current funds will be used or by whom.

If finding a strong central authority in Libya was challenging, European negotiators found no such obstacle in signing a €112 million deal with the indicted war criminal Omar Al Bashir, Sudan’s long-sitting president (Nielson 2016; Webber 2016). Almost all of this money is in the form of military aid to enhance border controls. It is uncertain where this assistance will end, but according to a European humanitarian agency (ECHO) representative based in Nairobi,² there are further bi-lateral agreements with five countries in the works which would provide further and more directed assistance. The fine points of these arrangements continue to be worked out while the details of these and other negotiations remain shrouded from public scrutiny. European military and “development” assistance to Africa is not new—in 2011, the European Commission spent €11.3 billion globally (Debaisieux 2012). While about half of that was granted to Africa, it is now

dedicating almost that much to a sub-section of the African continent to address questions of militarised border management.

Yet the most significant implications of these efforts to enclose stem from the extension of European borderlands into Africa and the imbrication of these policies with African states' domestic political practices. This includes new investments—building on old—in places like Agadez that effectively bisect Niger into north and south, putting a heavily militarised border across spaces that were previously permeable and largely unregulated (Diallo 2017). Similar strategies are being tried in Mali and elsewhere. Although the consequences of military funding to governments with well-established records of ethnic and political persecution will be varied, they will also likely include further micro-bordering and controls on political opponents and ethnic minorities. This is most likely in Sudan and Eritrea where tens of millions of Euros of military aid will support leaders with established histories of violence against citizens from “uncooperative” areas and ethnic groups. Eritrea is going further in requiring an exit visa for anyone trying to leave the country. This empowering of unaccountable autocrats and their territorial terrors may, ironically, result in greater displacement and mobility desires in the long term. More immediately, it further fragments African populations and territories.


While Africa's borders are notoriously permeable, often unmarked, and often fail to create categorical social divisions based on nationality, they do serve as sites for control, rent seeking (Chalfin 2010; Coplan 2001; Herbst 2000). A renewed focus on enforced and enacted national boundaries not only enhances the importance of national membership, but disrupts the cross-border identities and processes which remain the norm in many parts of the continent (Coplan 2001; Rodgers 2009). Given the economic precarity of many countries' national economies, people are increasingly forging diasporic or mobile socialities oriented towards “multiple elsewhere” (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004). Whether founded on singular migrations, oscillations across spaces, or through participation in global associations such as Pentecostal churches or other “communities of convenience”, national boundaries are no longer—if they ever were—the containers of many personal socio-economies (Landau and Freemantle 2016). While heightened border controls will by no means eliminate the circulation of information, ideas, or trade, they will at least partially force the renationalising of patterns of material exchange and movement. If nothing else, crossing borders will become more dangerous, more expensive, and potentially less desirable. As noted earlier, the reinforcement of borders and bi-lateral arrangements with Europe also undermines AU efforts to promote integration and ease movement within the continent.

Some within the European Union and African state administrations may believe technocratic promises of fully fettered movement. Yet most undoubtedly recognise the impossibility of controlling the thousands upon thousands of kilometres of borders separating African countries (to say nothing of the varied sub-national borders within). As Kotef (2015:22) highlights, many border controls—in her case those between Israel and the Palestinian territories—are designed to fail in ways that reinforce the chronotope and the necessity for pastoral interventions. They not only symbolically separate space and code populations, but they produce transgressors. By creating a restriction, they create illegality and “illegal migrants”.

The presence of these illegals signifies the ever present threat and legitimises further restrictions (cf. Kotef 2015:17).

These bilateral bordering partnerships between the EU and African states help renationalise African territory by undermining continental campaigns to liberalise movement within and between countries. Moreover, they stigmatise African migration in ways that naturalise national boundaries as economic, political, and social containers. In doing so, they pathologise all Africans as potential movers and enable Europe to use those who do move—particularly those escaping Africa’s continental container—as justification for further closure (Kotef 2015). Even those who make it to Europe with stamps in their visas will be colour coded within the chronotope.

Counting and Categorisation

The dual effort to pathologise and remedy ould be African migrants has led Europe to invest heavily in new sociologies of knowledge designed to identify real and potential defectors from the containment development. In part, this enables the savage sorting of “deserving” refugees and the highly skilled from ordinary, superfluous migrants (cf. Sassen 2010). The latter can then be legitimately detained and excised. Yet these are strategies practiced primarily at the interface of European and African territory, while the most fervent focus is on tracking actual and potential movements within the continent. Among these are initiatives to assess African demographic trends that hark back to modern demography’s history as a handmaiden for population control, a realignment from data gathering geared more exclusively towards poverty alleviation or improved health care. Such investments reflect a significant shift in regulatory practice. For lack of resources and interest, African states have often done little to systematically collect data on their own populations. Information on domestic, let alone, international migrants is less reliable if it is even available. While data on asylum seekers and refugees are often more robust due to United Nations’ interventions, these often overlook the majority of displaced people who live outside of camps or receive no formal humanitarian assistance (UNHCR 2015, 2016). Such invisibility brings risks for migrants and others desperate for assistance; it also allows the kind of autonomy that comes from living beyond formal systems of regulation and control (Kihato and Landau 2016).

The European Union has responded to these paucities by supporting African states to improve their statistical collection and population registries (Toaldo and Barana 2016). The numbers they generate are central to the pastoral project. Casas-Cortes et al. (2015) speak explicitly about ongoing efforts to “Map the Routes” as a way of improving management and redirection. In this regard, the I-MAP project by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) was developed. “Its main impulse is to provide information and strategic support to the externalisation process ... It was designed as an explicit response to the complexity and variability of migrant flows, and the consequent need to manage “risk” in new ways (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015:907). In the first instance this involves creating a “one stop shop” that will collect and collate information

on all arrests and returns from Europe. This counting and categorising of people is not utterly novel, but represents a significant strengthening of longstanding assistance to border agencies and statistical agencies which has seen the introduction of bio-metric systems at border posts, investments in training border officials, and increased effort to at once externalise their borders to African soil while reinforcing divisions among states and between regions.

The collection of this information will also allow particular actors—those manning the one-stop shop—to see African populations in ways far more holistically than domestic governments: a form of imperialist knowledge production. In summarising these new policies, BBC News (2016) reports that the “EU package will include provision of border surveillance equipment, police training and other technical support to stop migrants heading North”.

It is also worth noting how these categorisations reinforce notions that the only foreigners worth entering Europe or moving are the highly skilled (which are not even considered here) or those who are inherently needy and worthy of pity. For a European population perceptibly threatened by often intangible forces beyond their borders, the character of the needy foreigner manifests their fears. And as the gateways to refugee status have narrowed, the rest confront heightening walls behind which they can be treated as chancers, frauds, and existential threats to citizens’ physical, economic, and moral security. Again, this does not represent a rhetorical rupture from past political and popular speech (Malkki 1995). Yet the application of these categories through widely and often unaccountably empowered immigration departments and aid agencies reflects a remarkable enhancement of categorisation capacity. By allowing these agencies to ration rights based on their reading of histories, Europe seeks to legitimise particular experiences and in so doing effectively pathologises almost every African citizen. Given that almost everyone within Africa has reason to consider moving—to escape violence, poverty, persecution, career advancement, or adventure—the continent’s citizenry has again been rhetorically and almost universally shaped as a threatening other. Africa is being re-inscribed as a land of problematic and potentially invasive people, diseases, and processes. Long ago Du Bois (1968) spoke about the colour-line as the defining marker of difference and politics. Here colour, nationality and origin blended in the demonised African, a kind of Schmittian othering against an external threat.

Crafting the Sedentary Subject

In a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the deputy head of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, proposed, “... to use a mix of positive and negative incentives to reward those third countries willing to cooperate effectively with us and to ensure that there are consequences for those who do not” (cited in Reuters 2016).³ The coercive containments outlined above discipline migrants’ bodies, but do little to naturalise sedentarism for those already imbricated within global imaginaries. To these ends, Europe and its African allies shift to subjectification and stigmatisation by expanding existing initiatives across the continent. For many years, the European Union has funded public awareness

campaigns in Senegal aimed at discouraging potential migrants from taking to the seas. Along with exaggerating the dangers of a water crossing, such initiatives play on patriotism and familial guilt: migration means abandoning one's family and country. To die trying for a better life is an utter betrayal and an indication of an almost clinical narcissism. Writing about more recent information campaigns managed by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) underway in Niger, Brachet (2016) similarly describes IOM's awareness campaigns as an effort to present information "in a way that cannot be rejected by the target population but forcibly makes them adhere to it", so as to "bring about a change in the target population's conduct" (IOM 2010, cited in Brachet 2016). The continued conflation of smuggling with human trafficking, terrorism, and other forms of criminality only further marks those who move (see OpenDemocracy 2016). Supported by further stigmatisation that comes from effectively imprisoning migrants and punishing those who forcibly returned from other countries (Human Rights Watch 2009), these campaigns are designed to quash even the imagination of moving; to naturalise sedentarism through self-identification with space and global disconnection.

The Containment Chronotope and the Remaking of African Space-Time

Africa's place in European chronotopes reflects uncomfortable strains of racially inflected erasure, distancing, and pastoral embrace. Hegel (1956) famously argued that Africa was not a "historical continent" because it showed no development; no progress. Mbembe (2001) critically echoes this historiographical dismissal in noting the frequency with which African societies and politics are presented as fixed, unchanging, out of the chronological circuits and spirals that shape life elsewhere: Africa remains the quintessential Other (Evans 1996:33). In Mbembe's account, Europeans have often treated Africa (and Africans) as being moved by instinct and customs, shamans and spirits that were always there. Progress, for Mbembe's Europeans, is corrosive, and self-destructive. Yet this is potentially an incomplete reading of Europe's encounter with the African other.

Marking the end of slavery in 1879, the famously progressive Victor Hugo counters these isolationist dismissals with an interventionist chronotope more closely aligned with the form of European imperialism that would follow. Without disputing Africa's absent or intransigent history, he instead insists on liberating its people from geographic and temporal sedentarism:

Africa imposes on the universal such a suppression of movement and circulation that it limits universal life, and the march of human progress can no longer accept that a fifth of the globe remains paralyzed ... To make old Africa fit for civilization, that is the problem. Europe will resolve it. Go, peoples, take this land! Who owns it? No one! Take this land that is God's land. God gives land to men. God offers Africa to Europe. Take it! Pour your surplus in Africa and, at the same time, solve your social problems.

Such conceptions of a common future shaped by differentiated modes of inclusion in common political projects are inherent in Mehta's (1999) critiques of the

liberal (i.e. European) colonial project. In liberal colonialism's imperial logic, full membership in a global community of equals was dependent on particular forms of reason. The inability of Africans and other colonial subjects to think, act, and engage with these logics internally legitimised Europe's strategies of paternalistic, exploitative inclusion. While discriminatory, they nevertheless established a form of global space time. As Mehta (1999:94) argues, progress became "like having a stalled car towed by one that is more powerful and can therefore carry the burden up an ascendant gradient". Such incorporation makes equity unlikely, but nonetheless generates a potentially shared and common future. The French colonial *évolué* is perhaps the most explicit illustration of this logic under which inferior natives could be moulded into something like equals. The universalism of imperialism and colonialism which sought to bring Africa (and Africans) into global time and processes albeit as secondary followers.

Modernisation theory in its multiple forms similarly reinscribed common scripts for progress within increasingly planetary modes of production and meaning (Brenner and Schmid 2012). There is not the space to present a thorough genealogy of European developmental discourse vis à vis Africa, but over the previous decades European—and global—development assistance towards Africa has been one of incorporation into global time. Underlying Rostowian modernisation theory, the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, or the good governance and civil society fascination of the late 1990s and early 2000s, was a sense that universal rules applied to Africa. The interventions being applied may have been misguided or founded on fundamental readings of European and American historical development, but they nonetheless offered (but did not deliver) on a promise of catching up or moving up. More recent emphases on enhancing continental and extra-continental trade beyond raw materials reflects the continuation of a generalised ethos that while Africa was distinct, it remained part of global time.

Decades of overt imperialism, colonialism, neo-imperialism, along with international development discourses and practices, have created entangled modes of engagement and subjectification. Although privilege remains stratified across space and race, the Bretton woods institutions, the United Nations, and other global development and human rights campaigns reflect a globally integrated—if not always benevolent—pastoral project. The ability to move within these realms has always been varied according to wealth, want, and coercion, but people were nonetheless discursively constituted as individual humans with at least potential access to the universal rights of movement. The World Bank's remittance euphoria of the noughties is the quintessential example of this globalist, pro-mobility position (Ratha and Shaw 2007).

The emergence of containment development is shifting the relationships global time has with Africans and their territory. Actions instigated by the European refugee "crisis" radically expand and deepen an assemblage of containment practices. Attempting to create populations disconnected from global circulations and imaginations, collaborations between European and African elites aim to generate a sedentarist African political imagination. Within this, hierarchies of privilege and autonomy become more extenuated and exclusive the closer one is born to the European border (Brachet 2016:287; Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Current efforts

at categorisation, stigmatisation, and emplacement reflect a break from the imagined if elusive future shared across the Mediterranean. Instead, African subjects are not only excluded from European territory, but from contemporary logics of mobility and global desire.

In concluding her speech at the Valetta summit between the African and European Unions, then African Union chair, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, indicated that: "Our fate is closely interlinked. We believe that migration, and legal migration, can be an enabling factor for strong partnership" (Louw-Vaudran 2015). Yet the processes described above are enacting a chronotope of containment that positions Africans beyond global time and space. While most people engage with planetary processes from a position of voluntary sedentarism, the impossibility of moving—or the possibility of mobility with stigma—reflects a break; a sedentarist subjectification (Arendt 1968:9; Spruyt 1996; Torpey 2000; Vigneswaran and Quirk 2015). This is, in Kotef's words, a "*different mode of being*" (2015:15, emphasis added).

The closer one is born to the European border, the more extreme such subjectification will be with these modes of belonging—attached to them are measures of rights, political representation, possibilities of global engagement and imagination—representing a spatial continuum stretching north to south.⁴ Those within European nominated risk zones will encounter the most martially coercive and ideationally concerted interventions aimed at generating containment subjectification. Those further south will be affected less overtly by external interventions, freer to move and imagine in ways only slightly altered by the containment apparatus largely paralleling the equator. But here too the normalisation of bordering and the denigrations of universalism, Pan-Africanism, and rights talk are having important effects. This is already evident in proposed policies of closure from South Africa as it mimics Europe's plans to externalise and exclude (see Republic of South Africa 2017; see also Department of Home Affairs 2017). Across West Africa, the principles of free movement are likely to be rapidly undermined by aid dependency.

The containment chronotope significantly differs from the Agambian zones of exception described in much of the literature on externalisation and off-shoring (Moran et al. 2017; Mountz et al. 2013). Across Africa, people are not being reduced to bare life—outside of all law and subject to the naked power of a coercive state. Rather, they are being emplaced in a distinctive pastoral project premised on normalising the exchange of material resources while prohibiting human mobility.⁵ Within the chronotope people will remain economic and political citizens, even if their local political communities are exploitative and impoverished. It is the possibility of being fully human in the world that is denied to them.

Those whose imaginations and bodies will not remain sedentary may be exposed to brutal physical violence and discursive denigration. Within this logic, the more defecting Africans continue to seek Mediterranean crossings, the greater the remedial interventions may be. Fassin (2007) speaks about how the logic of humanitarianism is the new modality of governance and bio-politics. In his assessment, humanitarianism becomes a metric through which to organise people and

space. Already humanitarian language counter intuitively justifies eroding sovereignty and rights in the name of saving lives. Indeed, Brachet persuasively demonstrates humanitarian language allows the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to “redefine their field of intervention as an area beyond the law, potentially dangerous for migrants, where they needed to be helped; referring to the notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’, interventions were thus *a priori* justified, whatever they might be” (Agier and David 2011; Brachet 2016). Many of the tools Fassin and Brachet described are found in current Euro-African efforts, especially the fixation with statistical tools and tracking mechanism. So too is this echoed in interventions designed to halt migrants for their own good. It similarly resonates with a generalised rationing of life; that some people deserve special care while others are violable by their own governments’ persecution or prevailing poverty. Humanitarian politics also resonates in “producing public representations of the human beings to be defended” (Fassin 2007:501).

The important distinction here is that the population to be defended is not the poor African refugee, but rather all Europeans and all Africans. Europeans must create an African heterotopia so that their vision of a prosperous (white) future may be realised. Africans must be protected from themselves and their narcissistic, deviant desires to abandon community and country. The logic of interventions and political construction is a defensive and particularistic one in which only through containment can Africans be protected. This chronotope reflects the fearful time in which it was authored. Through the massive investments behind it, it is helping to create an imagined future which locates Africans beyond an entangled future. Africans who manage to move are ever more likely to be trapped in the liminality of refugee camps and detention centres as they await their eventual return. For the majority of Africans, they will remain caught in distanced space-time in which the impossibility of moving can only heighten precarity and vulnerability to persecution.

In modern politics—all the more so in deterritorialising late-modern capitalism—one’s ability to move has become a hallmark of citizenship. Arendt (1968:9) argues that “being able to depart for where we will is the prototypical gesture of being free, as limitation of freedom of movement has from time immemorial been the precondition for enslavement”. It is for her central to being a complete, political being. Although one might debate her definition of freedom and the specific forms of movements she describes, like many others she points to the central role of human mobility—and its regulation—as fundamental modern political orders (see Spruyt 1996; Torpey 2000; Vigneswaran and Quirk 2015). Exclusion from mobility means being less than modern. As Kotef observes, “regimes of movement are integral to the *formation of different modes of being*” (2015, emphasis added). In an era of planetary urbanisation and broader global entanglements (Brenner and Schmid 2012), fixing people in space produces a kind of defracted geography that excludes people from what is required to be fully human. The stated aim is to promote the rights of people to development at home, but this reflects a substantial denuding of rights and humanity.

The chronotope also brings with it significant distortions in knowledge production and visibility. Naturalising borders and rhetorically and geographically

distancing Africa erases the inherently transnational processes behind patterns of exploitation and displacements. Defining African development as self-contained and disconnected shrouds past and present processes of unequal incorporation and exploitation. This is not only the colonial histories which created the often unworkable borders (Davidson 1992), but the continued involvement of international (often European or partially European) companies in farming, mining, education, engineering, and other activities resulting in deprivation and displacement (Krug 2016). These processes are likely to continue within the containment chronotope, but in ways that deny responsibility through logics of disconnection. Moreover, the generation of social research across the continent is likely to follow the logics of containment. With few resources to fund its own research agenda, universities and non-government organisations will collect information largely on those people and processes of interests to donors and their domestic political partners. Whereas European funded research on migration may once have sought to demonstrate its costs and benefits for Africans and others, it will now largely be dedicated to demonstrating risks or opportunities for sedentarising interventions. Without a sound alternative base of knowledge and analysis, the European gaze will come to frame many Africans' self-understanding.

Although the evidence for a hegemonic chronotope of containment development is strong, the outcome has yet to be determined. As a mix of discursive, epistemic, ethics, and practices, chronotopes are dialogically subject to challenge and negotiation. Casas-Cortés et al. (2015) rightfully note that migrants exercise various forms of autonomy and agency that undermine and ultimately reshape—often in unpredictable ways—the mechanisms designed to halt or manage them. From one perspective, these movements read as resistance to state and imperial hegemony. Under increasingly constrained conditions their movements will be curtailed but there are few doubts they will exercise forms of “nomadic resistance” (Deleuze and Guattari 2010). Similarly, we may well see the emergence of a counter narrative of entanglement seeking to maintain or restore Africa's place in global space-time.⁶ Some of these will undoubtedly echo colonial or neo-colonial pastoral sentiments implicitly informed by racially inflected paternalism. Diasporic literature and politics may, however, create alternative idioms of connection across the African continent and the Mediterranean. While these may create powerful counter narratives that help reinscribe Africa into global circulations of ideas, people, and material (i.e. global time), we must not be too sanguine. The emerging dominance of the containment chronotope likely means such resistance only legitimises greater forms of external and internal imperial interventions.

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Endnotes

¹ While these numbers are remarkable, the UNHCR (2016:18) notes that during this same period, the “developing world” hosted 86% of the world’s refugees compared with 70% 20 years ago. The least developed countries according to United Nations categorisations provided asylum to 26% of the global total. Sub-Saharan African continues to host the largest number of refugees with 4.4 million. The Asia-Pacific region had 3.8 million (a slight decline from the previous year) while the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) hosted 2.7 million. Within the Middle East the proportion of certain national populations that comprise refugees is notably high: 18.3% of Lebanon’s population is now refugees; and 8.7% of Jordan’s. The Americas (North, South, and Central) hosted only 746,800 (UNHCR 2016:14). By the end of 2015, the 30 countries with the largest numbers of refugees per GDP (PPP) per capita were all in developing regions with the exception of Russia, which squeaked in at 30th place (UNHCR 2016:18). The Democratic Republic of Congo, a country at war with itself and its neighbours since the mid-1990s, tops the table. Ethiopia and Pakistan are next.

² ECHO, “European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations”, was previously responsible for managing the regional body’s humanitarian assistance. The new arrangements being negotiated threaten to exclude ECHO and direct aid through other channels (5 March 2017).

³ This builds remarkably on an extended history of containment oriented development (see also Bakewell 2008).

⁴ Brachet (2016:287) observes as similar yet less continental trend confirming observations made earlier by Ferguson and Gupta (2002).

⁵ For a discussion of the state as pastoral project, see Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982).

⁶ See the “Joint NGO statement ahead of the European Council of 28–29 June 2016: NGOs strongly condemn new EU policies to contain migration”.

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