

How do minority presidents manage multi-party coalitions? Identifying and analysing the payoffs to coalition parties in presidential systems

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Interview and survey data can be viewed at <http://reshare.ukdataservice.ac.uk/852003/>
On-line Appendix: 'English Wording of the Questionnaire Items Used in This Study'

Abstract

The preponderance of minority presidents in modern democracies has concentrated the attention of researchers on the multi-party coalitions that presidents form to govern in legislative assemblies. This analysis of “coalitional presidentialism” has focused almost exclusively on presidential systems in Latin America, and Brazil in particular. It has understood multi-party presidential coalitions as cabinet-level constructs, which bind the support of parties in legislatures through portfolio payoffs. In this paper, we explore this analysis in a non-Latin American context: post-Soviet Ukraine. Using original quantitative and qualitative data, we find that portfolio payoffs are an important tool for managing Ukrainian coalitions. But, we also find that minority presidents have relied systematically on the support of legislative parties outside of the cabinet, and have used different payoffs to manage their support. Given that this complexity also exists in other new democracies, we argue that there is a need to distinguish between cabinet-level and floor-level coalitions in minority presidential systems.

Authoritarian breakdowns in the late Twentieth Century gave birth to new political systems that combined directly elected presidents with multi-party systems. As a result, the odds that presidents would fail to command single-party legislative majorities increased. This raised fears eloquently identified by Juan Linz (1990) and Scott Mainwaring (1993) that minority presidentialism would be prone to institutional conflict and breakdown.

As we now know, this danger has been largely avoided. Like minority prime ministers in parliamentary systems, minority presidents have mitigated the problem of institutional conflict by building multi-party coalitions. Although minority presidents (unlike minority prime ministers in parliamentary systems) do not face the threat of losing votes of confidence, they still deploy coalitional strategies. Between 1974 and 2013, 52 per cent of minority presidents governing in political systems that met minimum democratic standards formed cabinets from more than one party (Chaisty and Power, 2016).

With coalitional rule today the modal form of governance in minority presidential systems, the focus of research has turned to *how* presidents manage their coalitions to ensure legislative support (Chaisty, Cheeseman, Power, 2014; Chaisty, Cheeseman, Power, Forthcoming). This work, which has been concerned with Latin American (mainly Brazilian) presidential systems, has largely focused on the ways in which minority presidents share cabinet portfolios with their coalition allies in return for legislative support. Analysis of Brazilian presidentialism has found strong evidence to suggest that cabinet portfolio payoffs strengthen legislative support for minority presidents (Amorim, 2002; Pereira, Power and Renno, 2005).

However, these theories of coalitional governance have not been tested outside of Latin America. Cross-regional research on presidential systems has found little evidence to suggest that multi-party cabinets raise the level of legislative voting unity among their party contingents (Carey 2009, pp. 161-162), but this analysis is not concerned with questions of

coalition management. There has also been little consideration of the relative importance of cabinet strategies compared to other strategies of coalition management.

In this article, we explore how minority presidents manage their multi-party coalitions to achieve legislative support in another region: the former Soviet Union. We focus on Ukraine, which is an ideal case in many respects. First, with few exceptions, it has been governed by multi-party cabinet coalitions since 1996 (Chaisty and Chernykh, 2015), and it offers rich macro-level data. In these ways, Ukraine provides a more appropriate point of comparison with Latin America cases than other post-Soviet states, or even cases of coalitional presidentialism that exist in Africa. Second, Ukraine is a difficult case with which to test *institutional* hypotheses. Extant analyses of Ukrainian politics have questioned the applicability of notions of coalitional behaviour, and have suggested that coalitional solutions to the problems of limited legislative support are difficult to operate in the Ukrainian context. Therefore, we contend that any findings for effective coalition management strategies (specifically cabinet portfolio payoffs) in Ukrainian politics will significantly strengthen theories of coalition management. Third, the coalitions that deliver legislative support for Ukrainian presidents contain parties that do not have cabinet representation, and are not motivated by strong programmatic goals. Thus, Ukrainian presidential coalitions provide an opportunity to explore the non-cabinet strategies that presidents use to manage the support of coalition parties. This highlights the need to distinguish broader floor coalitions from cabinet coalitions, and hence emphasises the multivariate nature of coalition management. This distinction between cabinet and non-cabinet coalition parties travels to other cases of Third Wave minority presidentialism, where programmatic party development is equally limited (Chaisty, Cheeseman, Power, Forthcoming).

In the following sections we provide an overview of the relevant literature on coalition management in presidential systems, and then turn to an analysis of the cabinet

portfolio payoff hypothesis in the Ukrainian context. Our analysis, which replicates the empirical research of Latin American scholars, finds strong evidence for this theory, even controlling for ideological and electoral factors. However, in the course of this analysis, we also discover that Ukrainian presidents have relied systematically on the support of parties from outside of their cabinets. In accounting for the behaviour of such non-cabinet coalition parties, we argue it is necessary to examine the other strategies that Ukrainian presidents use to maintain their support in the legislature. In this analysis, we use qualitative data on the motivation of non-cabinet parties to join presidential coalitions in order to infer the strategies that presidents deploy.

Coalitional Presidentialism

Coalitional presidentialism is an institutional strategic response by minority presidents to the challenge of securing legislative support in multiparty assemblies. The coalitions that presidents form are not situational or ad hoc; they are durable and stable alliances that endure for N units of time or legislative sessions.

In analysing the strategies that presidents deploy to augment their alliances, extant research has largely focused on the ways in which minority presidents distribute cabinet portfolios to their coalition allies (Amorim Neto 2006; Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010; Alemán and Tsebelis, 2011). Although most presidents have the unilateral power to determine the composition of their executives, there are well known “perils” associated with the separation of powers, which force presidents to concede executive authority. The probability that the democratic legitimacy claimed by both presidents and assemblies will lead to deadlock and governmental crisis is one of the main perils facing minority presidents (Linz 1994; Mainwaring 1993). The formation of multi-party cabinet coalitions is one way in which presidents have largely avoided this outcome (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Cheibub 2007).

The benefits that minority presidents gain from distributing cabinet authority are well-documented in the research on coalitional presidentialism in Latin America. Minority presidents who share cabinet appointments with their coalition allies are found to enjoy higher levels of legislative support (Amorim Neto 2002; Zucco 2009; Raile, Pereira, Power, and 2011). They increase the likelihood that their legislative proposals will become law (Saiegh 2011). They expedite the enactment of their decisions (Hiroi and Renno 2014). They strengthen their “legislative shield” against impeachment or removal (Pérez-Liñán 2007); and they augment the durability and effectiveness of governments (Martínez-Gallardo 2012). It should therefore come as no surprise that cross-regional surveys of MPs find portfolio payoffs to be the most widely used strategy of coalition management by minority presidents across a broad range of regional contexts (Chaisty, Cheeseman, Power, Forthcoming).

Minority presidents deploy this portfolio strategy in a variety of ways. First, they can manipulate the size of their cabinets to manage coalition support. The likelihood that presidents will form minimum winning cabinet coalitions will depend on the reliability of the legislative support of their party allies, which is contingent upon factors like levels of party fragmentation, ideological division and the electoral cycle (Altman, 2000; Power, 2010; Meireles, 2016). The institutional capacity of minority presidents to bypass assemblies also affects the presidential calculus surrounding cabinet size. Factors like the magnitude of the president’s agenda-setting powers – e.g. decree and veto powers (Amorim Neto 2006; Martinez-Gallardo 2012) - and the institutional constraints that presidents operate within, such as bicameralism and qualified majority rules (Alemán and Tsebelis, 2011; Meireles, 2016), are known to affect cabinet size.

Second, minority presidents can bolster their coalition support by mixing the appointment of partisan and technocratic ministers (Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán, 2015). In the

event that presidents form cabinets on a predominantly technocratic basis, their management of coalitions is more likely to be reliant on non-cabinet strategies. Third, minority presidents can raise levels of satisfaction within their coalitions by distributing posts on a proportionally fair basis. A major insight generated by the literature on Brazilian coalitional presidentialism (which we explore below in the context of post-Soviet Ukraine) is that presidents are able to solidify their legislative support by making their cabinets more proportionally representative of the parties that make up their legislative coalitions (Amorim Neto 2002; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011). Amorim Neto termed the fairness of portfolio allocation “coalescence”: the allocation of portfolios to parties in proportion to their seats in the assembly.

In making these strategic calculations, presidents have to consider the costs involved. Extant research has understood these costs first in terms of policy: presidents can lose control over their ministries (so-called “agency loss”), which can have consequences for policy continuity and effectiveness (Martinez-Gallardo 2012; Martinez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). The formation of cabinets also generates political costs. The task of satisfying all coalition partners is not easy, and can cause intra-coalitional tensions. Furthermore, the behind-the-scenes deal making that is part-and-parcel of coalition formation obscures channels of responsibility, and can have consequences for legitimacy. These costs mean that minority presidents do not automatically seek the benefits that multi-party cabinets offer. Hence, a surprisingly high percentage of minority presidents (48 per cent) have governed with single or no party governments in political systems that met minimum democratic standards over the period 1974 to 2013 (Chaisty and Power, 2016).

Yet, the decision of minority presidents to govern with single or no-party governments does not mean that they abandon legislative coalitions altogether. As we discuss below in the context of Ukraine, it is possible for presidents to govern with both

single-party governments and multi-party legislative coalitions at the same time. This situation occurred during the early years of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich (2010-2012). Under these conditions, presidents are required to use alternative non-cabinet strategies of coalition management.

Following Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power (2014), we maintain that non-cabinet management strategies cluster into four main categories. They include the legislative and partisan powers that presidents use to dominate their coalitions, and budgetary and informal strategies (the so-called exchange of favours) used by presidents to incentivise the support of coalition members. In our analysis below, we infer the extra-cabinet strategies that presidents deploy in Ukraine from the benefits that MPs associate with coalition membership. Hence, we are largely concerned with the budgetary and informal strategies that presidents deploy, rather than the more punitive legislative and partisan strategies.

Like cabinet tools, the deployment by presidents of budgetary tools - targeted discretionary spending to coalition members (often referred to as “pork”) - and the informal exchange of favours - such as access to electoral resources, favourable treatment of allies’ business interests and the conferral of lucrative positions outside of the cabinet - are contingent upon their relative costs, which can be both political and economic. The use of budgetary side-payments to augment coalition support can be time-consuming, financially expensive in unfavourable economic circumstances, and politically controversial when non-transparent off-budgetary sources of funding are used. Similarly, the exchange of favours can be financially costly and is politically damaging when illegal activity is exposed. Presidents have to consider these costs when managing the noncabinet members of their coalitions, and their choice of strategy will be affected by a variety of systemic, coalitional, and conjunctural factors: the level of transparency and the strength of the rule of law, political institutions that raise particularism such as personal-vote electoral systems, the size of

coalitions and their level of fragmentation, and conjunctural factors like the state of the economy and the proximity of elections, which add a time-variant dimension to coalition management (Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power, forthcoming). All of these factors affect the deployment of non-cabinet coalition management strategies.

Therefore, the strategic decisions that minority presidents make around the formation of coalitions require them to consider the costs and benefits of managing coalitions, and many contextual factors intervene to shape how minority presidents deploy this strategy. In the following section, we introduce the Ukrainian case and describe its strategic context before exploring the hypothesis that cabinet “coalescence” (the fairness of cabinet payoffs) affects the degree of legislative support for Ukrainian presidents. We then go on to explain why this strategy has not been sufficient to account for the support of all parties that support Ukrainian presidents on the floor of the assembly. This analysis highlights the importance of understanding the alternative strategies of coalition management that presidents deploy.

Portfolio allocation and Cabinet Coalition Discipline in Ukraine

Our analysis focuses on three periods of presidential rule in Ukraine since 2000: Leonid Kuchma’s second presidential term (1999-2004); Viktor Yushchenko’s presidential term before premier-presidential arrangements were temporarily introduced (2005); and the first two years of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich (2010-12), up to mid-term assembly elections in October 2012. In contrast to the “pure” presidential systems of Latin America, Ukraine had a semi-presidential political system during these years. However, this did not diminish the president’s formateur role. Drawing on the typology developed by Shugart and Carey (1992), Ukraine operated as a “president-parliamentary” system. This constitutional arrangement gave the president substantial control over the formation of the executive (Whitmore 2004: 38). According to one leading specialist of Ukrainian politics: “using

Linz's definition of a presidential system as one in which the president possesses "full control over the composition of the cabinet," we can safely define Ukraine from 1996 to 2006 as a presidential system" (D'Anieri 2007: 136). The exceptions are the periods when Ukraine operated as a premier-presidential system: from 2006 to 2010, and since 2014. Under these arrangements, prime ministers also had the power to be coalition formateurs. Hence, we exclude the years of premier-presidentialism from our analysis.

Throughout our periods of analysis (2000-2005 and 2010-2012) all Ukrainian presidents lacked single party majorities. The reasons for this are well known to comparative political scientists: the type of electoral system and the number of political parties (Shugart and Carey 1992; Jones 1995). Up to 2006, the Ukrainian assembly, the Verkhovna Rada, was elected by a mixed electoral system – consisting of MPs elected from first-past-the-post and party list systems in equal proportion; this changed to a closed-list system of proportional representation in a single nation-wide electoral district for the 2006 and 2007 legislative elections.¹

The mixed electoral rules that existed prior to 2006 combined with relatively low levels of incumbency to incentivise the personal vote and particularistic behaviour.² They also produced fragmented assemblies, with high levels of coalitional necessity. This is illustrated by Table 1, which calculates an Index of Coalitional Necessity for each episode of coalitional presidentialism from the effective number of parties and the percentage of seats held by the president's own party.³ As can be seen, coalitions were especially necessary during the Kuchma presidency, when a non-party president had to work with a large number of fragmented parties. This resulted in cabinets formed on a multi-party basis.

TABLE 1

In 2000, President Kuchma signed a coalition agreement with his legislative supporters, which included the offer of cabinet portfolios in return for their support

(Whitmore 2004: 101), and further deals were reached after legislative elections in 2002, which included posts within the government for Kuchma's party allies (Razumkov Centre 2003, p. 11). The formation of the government in 2002 illustrated the intense bargaining that could occur between coalition parties and the executive over their preferred portfolios. In negotiations over the formation of this cabinet, the Regions of Ukraine party succeeded in achieving its main objectives: the post of prime minister and the post of deputy prime minister with responsibility for fuel and energy. Likewise, the Entrepreneurs and Labour party succeeded in securing a deputy prime ministerial position and control of the economics ministry; and the Agrarian Party fulfilled its wish list with deputy prime ministerial and ministerial appointments that gave the party control over agricultural policy. In 2005, another minority president, Viktor Yushchenko, approved a power-sharing accord, which distributed cabinet portfolios to his coalition allies – this included giving the most prized post of prime minister to Yuliya Tymoshenko, the head of his main coalition ally, the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (Radio Liberty 2005). Finally, in 2010, President Yanukovich traded the three ministries of Ecology and Natural Resources, Transport, and Social Policy and Labour in return for the support of the Lytvyn Bloc.⁴ This concession was part of the "Stability and Reform" coalition formed between Yanukovich's Party of Regions, the Lytvyn Bloc and the Communist Party of Ukraine in the Verkhovna Rada in March 2010. The parties that received cabinet portfolios for each episode of coalitional presidentialism covered in our analysis are summarised in Table 2.

- TABLE 2 -

Nonetheless, the extant literature on Ukrainian politics has suggested that *cabinet-level* coalitions have had little impact on legislative support for presidents; they have been little more than an "imitation" according to one analysis (Razumkov 2003: 14). Despite the

benefits that parties have gained from cabinet membership, scholars have argued that there are few institutional incentives for parties to ally with presidents on the floor of the assembly (Whitmore 2004; D’Anieri 2007), and that legislative behaviour has been defined by “rapacious individualism” (Way 2005). The apparent disconnect that these authors highlight between cabinet membership and support on the floor speaks to the danger that Amorim Neto (2002) identified of making inferences about coalitional governance from what *appear* to be multi-party cabinets in presidential systems. In other words, cabinets may contain party representatives, but this does not mean that they act according to a coalitional logic.

This scepticism is understandable. Much of the extant research on Ukrainian legislative politics has focused on the years of Leonid Kuchma’s presidency, when parties were weakly developed and Ukrainian cabinets contained large numbers of technocratic ministers (Protsyk 2003, p. 1079). Yet, as Ukrainian politics evolved over the 2000s, cabinets became more partisan.

As Figure 1 illustrates, the number of parties represented in Ukrainian cabinets increased during the 2000s, with the exception of the government of Viktor Yanukovich. Also, the proportion of non-partisan ministers in the Ukrainian cabinet fell sharply: from an average of 80 per cent of all cabinet members in the late 1990s, to less than 20 per cent during the presidencies of Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovich. Moreover, data on the coalescence of Ukrainian cabinets suggests that cabinets have become more proportionally representative over time (Chaisty and Chernykh, 2015, pp. 16-17); and analysis of voting in the Verkhovna Rada shows that parties with close ties to the president have been able to maintain higher levels of discipline on the floor (Thames 2005). All of this is suggestive of evidence that cabinet payoffs are integral to coalition management.

- FIGURE 1 –

Method, Data and Analysis

To explore the hypothesis that cabinet portfolio payoffs to coalition allies raise the level of legislative support for Ukrainian presidents, we analysed the voting of cabinet parties on bills initiated by the executive branch (president or government) between 2000-2005 and 2010-2012.⁵ This period covered three Ukrainian presidents and four different parliaments.

Following Amorim Neto (2002) and Carey (2000), we analysed only those votes deemed to be “critical.” The “criticalness” of votes was measured in terms of both deputy participation and contestation: when (a) at least 60 per cent of legislators voted and (b) at least 20 per cent of legislators dissented from the dominant position taken on the floor. This produced a total of 543 votes over 18 sessions of the Verkhovna Rada.

Our dependent variable - *coalition discipline* - is defined as the degree of cabinet coalition unity on voting decisions. It is measured as the percentage of legislators belonging to cabinet parties who voted in favour of bills introduced by the executive branch. In addition to those legislators who voted against president-backed initiatives, we also coded legislators as having voted “no” if they were absent or abstained; in practice, such deputies have a greater impact on levels of unity than those legislators who simply vote “no”, and are thus an important indicator of non-cooperative behaviour.⁶ On average, legislators who belonged to parties with cabinet portfolios supported Ukrainian executives almost 80 per cent of the time for the votes that we selected for analysis.

In order to test the portfolio payoff hypothesis, our chief explanatory variable is the level of *cabinet coalescence*. As we explained earlier, coalescence is a measure used by Amorim Neto (2002) to determine the proportionality of cabinets. By calculating the ratio of cabinet portfolios to legislative seats for those parties that make up the cabinet coalition, coalescence seeks to capture the level of fairness in the distribution of cabinet posts among coalition members. Fairness, it is hypothesised, produces higher rates of cabinet coalition

discipline by engendering greater satisfaction among cabinet coalition parties (Amorim Neto 2002; Raile, Pereira and Power 2011).

We calculate coalescence using the formula developed by Amorim Neto (2002):

$$CABINET = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (|S_i - M_i|)$$

where M_i is the percentage of ministerial portfolios allocated to party i , and S_i is the percentage of legislative seats that party i holds within the cabinet coalition.

To generate coalescence for each cabinet in Ukraine, we first calculated the absolute value of the difference between the percentage of ministries held by each cabinet party and the percentage of legislative seats held by each cabinet party. We produced the coalescence score for each cabinet by summing up the absolute values for all parties in the given cabinet, dividing these by 2 and then subtracting them from 1. The scores range from 0 (no correspondence between ministerial payoffs and legislative seats) to 1 (perfect correspondence between ministerial payoff and legislative seats).⁷ As Table 3 shows, there is substantial variation in cabinet coalescence in Ukraine: it ranges from 0.19 under Leonid Kuchma to 0.87 under Viktor Yanukovych. This level of variation is consistent with findings from the analysis of other presidential systems. As Amorim Neto and Samuels (2010) argued, in separation of powers systems, executives have stronger incentives to distribute portfolios non-proportionally. Thus, presidential cabinets are more likely to include ministers who have no legislative party contingents: non-partisan ministers and representatives of parties that have no seats in the assembly (Amorim Neto 2006; Schleiter 2013).

- TABLE 3 -

Following Amorim Neto (2002), we also included two extra variables that controlled for electoral cycle and the ideological diversity of the cabinet coalition at the time of the roll call. Unlike Brazil, presidential and assembly elections are not concurrent in Ukraine. However, given that our time-series included just one presidential election, we chose to

model assembly elections only. To capture the effect of the electoral cycle, we included a variable that measured the time (in days) to the next assembly election from the date that the vote took place. We estimated the ideological diversity of the cabinet coalition by measuring the ideological distance between the most leftist and rightist parties within each cabinet at the time of each vote. In the extant Ukrainian scholarship there is no equivalent of the ideological scores of parties that are available for Brazilian parties (Power and Zucco 2009). Instead, we used the Manifesto Project Database (MPD) to calculate the ideological positions of political parties on the left-right scale,⁸ and produced a score for each cabinet by subtracting the most extreme left-right party scores from each other.⁹

The results are summarised in Table 4.¹⁰ As you can see, cabinet coalescence has a positive and statistically significant effect on cabinet coalition discipline in Ukraine. Put in substantive terms, an increase in cabinet coalescence by 10 per cent increases cabinet coalition discipline by 2.4 per cent. This relationship suggests support for the hypothesis that presidents who compose their cabinets more proportionally can expect a higher degree of satisfaction from allied parties and thus higher levels of voting discipline on the assembly floor. Therefore, in terms of this result, the dynamics of coalitional presidentialism in Ukraine are similar to those that we find in Latin America.

This result was robust to the effects of ideology and the electoral cycle, which were both significant, albeit to a lesser extent than cabinet coalescence. First, ideologically diverse cabinet coalitions produced lower levels of cabinet coalition discipline. In other words, parties located further away from each other on the ideological spectrum had higher probability of disagreement, which in turn resulted in lower cabinet coalition discipline overall. This ideological diversity was greatest in the fragmented cabinet coalitions that presidents Kuchma and Yushchenko formed at the start of their terms.

The fact that coalescence remains significant after controlling for the effects of ideology is consistent with other research on coalitional presidentialism in Latin America. Work on Uruguay, for example, has found a close association between cabinet membership of political parties and pro-government behaviour on the floor, which authors argue cannot be explained away by ideology (Zucco, 2013). Indeed, cabinet coalition affiliation can be so strong, it has been argued, that this strategic incentive for legislative voting has replaced more conventional determinants such as party and ideology (Zucco 2009; Zucco and Lauderdale 2011).

The voting unity of cabinet coalitions also declined as parliamentary elections approached. The positive sign on the coefficient indicates that as the time to parliamentary elections fell so did the level of cabinet coalition discipline. This appears to indicate that parties seek to distance themselves from presidents during legislative elections in Ukraine. Examples from Leonid Kuchma's second term substantiate this finding (Chaisty and Chernykh 2015, p.17).

Further robustness tests reinforced the strong relationship between cabinet coalescence and voting discipline. First, to replicate the statistical analysis of Amorim Neto (2002), we used ordinary least squares regression to estimate the model. This analysis did not change the significance of the findings for coalescence (Table 5, Model 1). Second, to correct for the fact that the data panels were unevenly spaced (i.e. the dates of votes were not sequential) we also ran a generalised estimating equations model (Table 5, Model 2). Again, our main results remained the same.

- TABLE 5 -

We also considered whether the relationship between cabinet coalescence and voting discipline held at the level of individual parties. We selected for analysis only those parties that experienced substantive change (either up or down) in the number of cabinet portfolios allocated to them during their membership of the president's coalition: the People's Democratic Party (PDP), the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU), and the Party of Regions.¹¹ All three parties spent significant time in the cabinet, too.¹² In our time-series (2000-2005; 2010-2012), the PDP and SDPU participated in all cabinets appointed by Leonid Kuchma between 2000 and 2004; the Party of Regions held ministerial portfolios between 2001 and 2004, and then returned to the cabinet again when its leader Viktor Yanukovich won the presidency in 2010.

We calculated support as the percentage of party deputies voting in favour of each executive-initiated bill. Similar to our calculations of cabinet discipline, abstentions and absence were counted as non-cooperative behaviour. And the party's cabinet payoff was measured as the percentage of ministerial portfolios allocated to the party divided by the percentage of legislative seats held by that party within the cabinet coalition (Amorim Neto 2002). Given that the focus of analysis was party-level discipline rather than coalition-level discipline at the cabinet level, aggregate ideology scores for individual parties were not an appropriate measure for ideological dispersion at the party level. Moreover, as President Kuchma did not have an official party, we were unable to calculate the ideological distance between these parties and the presidential party. However, given that all three parties were in the cabinet for most of Leonid Kuchma's second term (including the run up to the 2004 presidential elections), we included the time to presidential election variable. Consequently, the party-level model contained the cabinet payoff variable and the time to elections variables only. The exception was the SDPU, which saw its cabinet portfolio payoffs increase as the

elections approached - as this presented the problem of multicollinearity, the model we used for the SDPU was a simple bivariate analysis.

As in Table 4, we utilized ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors to evaluate the effect of portfolio payoffs on individual party support for executive-initiated bills (see Table 6). The results support the findings of the cabinet-level analysis. The relationship between portfolio payoffs and discipline is positive and statistically significant for all three parties. In substantive terms, an increase in cabinet payoffs by 10 per cent increased the discipline in PDP by 1.8 per cent, in the Party of Regions (PR) by 2.9 per cent, and in SDPU by 3.5 per cent.

- TABLE 6 -

Therefore, we find a consistently strong relationship between the degree of fairness in the allocation of cabinet portfolios to parties, and the voting unity of their members towards executive bills on the floor of the assembly. Alternative statistical specifications of this model do not affect these results; nor do variables that might be used to develop alternative explanations. For example, the provenance of the bill (in terms of its authorship) does not appear to affect the level of cabinet coalition discipline. Although the nature of the dual executive in Ukraine's semi-presidential system means that both the president and the government can initiate legislation, we found no evidence to suggest that presidential bills commanded higher levels of cabinet coalition discipline than bills initiated by the government, or vice-versa.¹³ Therefore, the strong relationship between levels of cabinet coalescence and voting unity that is found in Brazil appears to be equally robust in the Ukrainian case.

Managing parties outside of the cabinet

Our analysis so far has concentrated on the cabinet-level incentives that minority presidents in Ukraine use to attract the support of parties. However, Ukrainian presidents also rely on the support of parties that do not receive portfolio payoffs. While this is not unique to Ukraine (Kellam 2015), the Ukrainian case offers rich variety in the motivation of parties outside of the cabinet that offer legislative support to the president. It therefore provides a useful basis for identifying the alternative strategies used by presidents to maintain their support on the floor of the legislature.

Identifying the non-cabinet parties that make up presidential floor coalitions is less straightforward than simply identifying those parties that take cabinet portfolios. To do this we use two indicators of coalition membership 1) official declarations of support for the president, and 2) systematic support for the president, as identified independently by experts and/or practitioners. The number of non-cabinet coalition parties are significant in the Ukrainian case. As Figure 2 illustrates, the inclusion of non-cabinet parties almost doubles the number of parties supporting the president. Whereas on average four parties formed cabinet coalitions between 1996 and 2012, the average composition of floor coalitions (the addition of both cabinet and non-cabinet coalition parties) was seven parties over the same period. The inclusion of non-cabinet parties was crucial in giving each president minimum winning majorities or near majorities. For example, President Kuchma's floor coalition in 2000-02 on average comprised around 51 per cent of the seats in the assembly, compared to just 23 per cent of the seats occupied by parties that comprised his cabinet coalition (see Table 2). In fact, no president enjoyed a cabinet coalition that on average commanded a majority of legislative seats (see Table 2), and the addition of non-cabinet parties produced minimum winning coalitions at best (see Table 7 below for the percentage of seats held by non-cabinet coalition parties).

- FIGURE 2 –

This broader definition of coalitions also addresses a number of empirical problems with cabinet-centred definitions in the Ukrainian case. In practice, Ukrainian cabinets have contained ministers who belonged to parties that were officially in opposition to the president, and so could not be considered to be part of their legislative support base. The Communist Party of Ukraine, for example, was represented in Ukrainian cabinets across two terms of President Kuchma's presidency (1998-2002), despite being part of the legislative opposition at this time.¹⁴ Ukrainian cabinets have also contained ministers from parties that have no representation in the assembly. This was the case with ministers belonging to the Agrarian Party of Ukraine that were appointed to cabinet positions between 1999 and 2002. Furthermore, one party leader, Viktor Baloha (United Centre), served in Viktor Yanukovich's cabinet (2010-12), even though his party refused to join the president's floor coalition because it contained the Communist Party. Examples like these account for the variation in the coalescence of Ukrainian cabinets.

The names of the non-cabinet parties that comprised floor coalitions during our period of analysis are listed in Table 7. They include some parties that shunned cabinet membership for electoral reasons, and others that supported presidents in return for particularistic benefits rather than cabinet portfolios – budgetary pork, business perks, and so on.

- TABLE 7 –

The extra-cabinet motivations of such parties are well illustrated by the floor coalition formed by President Yanukovich in 2010. Known as the "Stability and Reform Coalition", this floor coalition comprised the president's party (the Party of Regions), the Communist Party and the Lytvyn Bloc. However, only members of Yanukovich's Party of Regions were

consistently chosen for government posts. The Communist Party did not seek cabinet representation for electoral reasons – it continued to claim it was not part of the government and thus maintained it could not be held accountable for the government’s decisions – and the Lytvyn Bloc ceased to have representation in the government after the first year of Yanukovych’s presidency. Also, when a new deputy grouping, “Reforms for the Future”, joined Yanukovych’s floor coalition in 2011, it was not rewarded with cabinet posts.

Interestingly, the voting unity of non-cabinet coalition parties is, according to our data, in step with that of cabinet parties. As you can see in Figure 3, average levels of voting unity increased in line with cabinet parties over the three presidential terms, and even exceeded those of the one party, the Party of Regions, that comprised most cabinets during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych.¹⁵ So how do we account for the support of such parties?

- FIGURE 3 -

Method, Data and results

To explore the motivation of non-cabinet, coalition parties – and thus to account for the mixed strategies of coalition management that presidents deploy - we analysed the attitudes of legislators who were members of President Viktor Yanukovych’s floor coalition. An interview sample and a battery of structured and semi-structured questions were designed to explore whether the perceived benefits of coalition membership differed significantly between members of coalition parties that were and were not part of the cabinet.¹⁶

Between February and May 2012, interviews were conducted with 50 legislators, of whom around 60 per cent were members of the coalition. The distribution of coalition parties within this sample reflected the proportional share of deputies within the floor coalition at the time: almost 70 per cent of the legislators interviewed were members of the president’s party, the Party of Regions, which had cabinet membership; the rest were members of coalition

parties that had no cabinet membership (see Table 8). In the following analysis, we mainly report the findings of our interviews with the 29 MPs who were members of the coalition.

- TABLE 8 -

The make-up of the non-cabinet parties that formed President Yanukovich's floor coalition provided interesting leverage on the question of motivation. These parties included a mixture of programmatic, charismatic and particularistic party types (Kitschelt 2000). First, the Communist Party of Ukraine, a party that had by post-Soviet Ukrainian standards a long electoral history, and was by far the most programmatic of all Ukrainian parties. Second, the Lytvyn Bloc, which was an alliance of two parties that centred on its authoritative leader Volodymyr Lytvyn, a powerful political insider from the time of President Leonid Kuchma. Third, Reforms for the Future, a parliamentary grouping formed from deputies who defected to the coalition from opposition parties following rule changes that permitted party switching¹⁷ - this group comprised deputies with particularistic business interests.

The diverse nature of this group of parties produced different non-cabinet motivations for joining President Yanukovich's coalition. For the Communist Party, which had an electorate that largely rejected the ideological direction of post-Soviet Ukrainian politics, there were political costs associated with representation in the government. Hence, the party sought appointments outside of the cabinet, in particular control over the leadership of the country's lucrative Customs Service. One of the non-Communist coalition members that we interviewed described the Communist Party's relationship with the coalition as a "double game":

"[I]n the Customs [Service] they [the Communists] have access to large resources, which are given to members of the coalition only. As the elections approach, they move away more and more from the position of the president, especially concerning issues where they can play the

populist card..... [B]ut I cannot say that they are completely out of the coalition - they are playing a double game.”

In contrast, the main prize of the Lytvyn Bloc was the influential post of legislative speaker for its dominating leader Volodymyr Lytvyn. Through the speakership, Lytvyn was able to play a pivotal role in crafting majorities on the floor, and this brought legislative benefits to Lytvyn and his party. According to one opposition MP, membership of the coalition “saved for [Lytvyn] the position of the head of the parliament”, which another coalition member also suggested had budgetary payoffs that benefitted Lytvyn’s personal electoral plans:

“According to experts’ data, nearly 100 million or 180 million from the budget was sent to the district where Volodymyr Mykhaylovich [Lytvyn] will probably run as a majoritarian candidate in the elections.”

For the parliamentary party Reforms for the Future, the payoffs were allegedly venal. Referred to disparagingly as a party of “tushky” (roadkill) – legislators who effectively sold their votes to the presidential administration in return for business perks or even financial payments - legislators commented on the particularistic nature of the tools deployed by the president to maintain their support. As one opposition legislator explained:

“He [Yanukovych] started appointing people from the Communists Party and the Lytvyn Bloc to different positions, and the Party of Regions of course came to power and formed a government. They worked differently with the *tushky*, using political bribery: financial means.”

This emphasis on extra-cabinet benefits was also evident in the aggregate results from both semi-structured and structured survey questions. As can be seen in Figure 4, when coalition members were asked open questions about the strategies that the president used to form the coalition (see on-line Appendix Q2), non-cabinet coalition party members were significantly more likely to identify extra-cabinet strategies: patronage, budget payoffs and informal favours.¹⁸ These particularistic demands existed in spite of the adoption of proportional electoral rules for the Rada in 2007, which were aimed at strengthening party programmes.

- FIGURE 4 –

A similar pattern can be seen in the responses to a structured question, which asked legislators to choose the first and second most important reasons why a political party would choose to join a presidential coalition from a list of options (see on-line Appendix Q1a). As Figure 5 shows, members of the only cabinet party, the Party of Regions, were significantly more likely to identify policy influence and cabinet positions than the members of non-cabinet parties within the floor coalition. In contrast, members of non-cabinet parties were more likely to mention budget influence and especially the informal exchange of favours than members of cabinet parties: over one-third of non-cabinet party members identified the exchange of favours as either the first or second reason why parties joined the coalition compared to less than 10 per cent of cabinet party members.

- FIGURE 5 -

These findings about the relative importance of particularistic considerations for non-cabinet coalition parties were reinforced by specific questions about the coalitional importance of the president's budget tools. Non-cabinet coalition party members were 50 percent more likely than cabinet party coalition members to identify maintaining "the support

of those economic interests that support the coalition” (see on-line Appendix 2 Q1b) as the main management function of the president’s budgetary influence (75 per cent to 22 per cent).

While Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency was unusual in that only one party (the Party of Regions) had cabinet representation for long periods, we have no reason to believe that non-cabinet coalition parties were treated any differently during earlier episodes of coalitional presidentialism. Research by Sarah Whitmore (2004) on the Kuchma presidency uncovers similar tools of coalition management. Our semi-structured interviews also find ample evidence to suggest that previous presidents deployed mixed strategies. Reflecting on the Kuchma era, for example, one member of President Kuchma’s coalition revealed a variety of coalition management strategies:

“..first - it's political and business... The second level is purchase; there are different tools for purchasing [MPs]: tools such as [support for] legislative initiatives, budget payments, and, at the time of Leonid Kuchma, there was a unique tool – [access to] state shares... If this did not work then came blackmail.”

Thus, we conclude that the motivation to support the president differed between coalition parties that were members of the cabinet and those that were not. Presidents appear to manage the support of non-cabinet coalition parties through the deployment of a much broader range of tools. This finding highlights the need to consider the entire “toolbox” of resources that presidents can utilise to maintain their coalitional support (Chaisty, Cheeseman, Power, 2014).

Conclusion

In modern political systems, presidents are increasingly reliant on multi-party coalitions. This phenomenon of “coalitional presidentialism” is well-known to Latin American scholars, and extant research has started to identify the strategies that presidents use to manage their coalitions. Most attention of Latin American specialists has been devoted to the strategies or coalition tools that presidents deploy at the cabinet level. This research has addressed an array of issues, including the effect that the fairness of portfolio distribution has on the voting discipline of coalition party contingents.

In this article we have considered the managerial strategies of coalitional presidentialism in another region of the world: the former Soviet Union. By concentrating on the effects of coalition management strategies on voting behaviour in the Verkhovna Rada, we reach two main conclusions. First, cabinet coalition management – the way in which portfolios are dispersed between different coalition parties (the degree of fairness) – is significantly correlated with the level of coalition unity on floor votes. Replicating quantitative analysis developed in the context of Brazilian politics, we find evidence for this effect at both the cabinet and party levels. Second, we contend that levels of coalition unity are also shaped by extra-cabinet coalition management strategies. The existence in Ukraine of floor coalitions that contain many more parties than those just represented within cabinets provides insights into the other tools or strategies that presidents deploy to maintain coalition unity. Our qualitative analysis of the coalitional payoffs for non-cabinet parties finds that deputies from such parties place far greater emphasis on patronage, pork and informal tools of coalition management.

Therefore, on the one hand, the Ukraine case validates extant analysis on the effects of cabinet management on legislative behaviour. This suggests that coalitional presidentialism is not simply a Latin American phenomenon, and provides good reasons to expect similar dynamics in other regions of the world. Given the increasing preponderance

of minority presidents in new democracies, this presents the opportunity to compare a diverse range of presidential cases across other parts of Europe, Africa and Asia.

However, on the other hand, the Ukrainian case also highlights the multivariate nature of the strategies that presidents deploy to maintain their legislative support. This inference from our study of coalitional presidentialism in Ukraine adds a new dimension to the extant literature, which has mainly focused on the tools deployed by presidents at the cabinet level. By distinguishing between cabinet and floor coalitions, it is possible to identify parties that are motivated to join presidential coalitions by reasons other than cabinet portfolios. It is therefore not surprising that we find that members of non-cabinet coalition parties in Ukraine are likely to value other coalitional payoffs more highly.

The Ukrainian case is not unique in this respect. This survey research was conducted as part of a broader comparative project on coalitional presidentialism, which found strong evidence to suggest that legislators in Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet Union understand the coalition management strategies of presidents in multivariate terms.¹⁹ In response to a question asking legislators to select the first and second most important reasons why a political party would choose to join a presidential coalition (see on-line Appendix Q1a), 47 per cent chose “to secure cabinet positions for the party.” But, 37 per cent of MPs also selected the option “to secure favourable treatment (by the executive) for party members and interests represented by the party”, and others chose the options legislative posts (24 per cent), policy influence (42 per cent), budget influence (21 per cent), and electoral support (28 per cent).

As far as Ukraine is concerned, the fragmented nature of party politics in that country guarantees that coalitions are likely to remain a feature of politics as long as electoral competition persists. It is therefore crucially important to understand *how* presidents share power. This has consequences for the nature of decision-making and the quality of

democracy more generally. Our interviews found, for instance, that legislators believed that coalitions enhanced public policy (68 per cent), and the overwhelming majority believed that they increased the decisiveness of policy-making (96 per cent) (see on-line Appendix Q1c). Moreover, legislators believed that coalitions had played a stabilising role during Ukraine's turbulent transition from communism. Eighty per cent of those legislators that we surveyed (both coalition and opposition) believed that coalitional governance encouraged political stability (see on-line Appendix Q1c). Of course, these interviews were conducted before the overthrow of President Yanukovych in February 2014. Nonetheless, despite the extraordinary pressures that this event and subsequent crises have placed on the Ukrainian political system, the ability of the new president Petro Poroshenko to manage his coalition has been one of the few elements of stability in an otherwise weak state.

At the same time, the collapse of presidential power in February 2014 also highlighted the democratic weaknesses of coalitional presidentialism. The deployment by President Yanukovych of extra-cabinet powers, in particular informal powers and budgetary pork undermined the legitimacy of presidential rule. In our survey, legislators acknowledged that coalitions were more likely to lead to a style of politics based on the exchange of favours (58 per cent) (see on-line Appendix Q1c). This feature of presidential coalition management is difficult to dislodge in Ukraine. In a country with few programmatic parties that are primarily motivated by policy concessions and cabinet portfolios, presidents are inevitably drawn to working with parties that seek particularistic benefits. This has big legitimacy costs for presidents in Ukraine. Thus, an understanding of the ways in which presidents share power also sheds light on bigger problems affecting governance in countries like Ukraine that are governed by minority presidents.

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Table 1: Coalitional necessity in Ukraine: 1999-2010

President (Year of presidential or parliamentary election)	Effective Number of Parties	Seat Share of Presidential Party (%)	Index of Coalitional Necessity	Presidential Party
Kuchma (1999)	9.44	0	94.40	No party
Kuchma (2002)	8.58	0	85.80	No party
Yushchenko (2005)	9.46	22.40	73.41	Our Ukraine
Yanukovich (2010)	3.39	38.00	21.01	Party of Regions

Table 2. Presidential coalitional allies with cabinet representation, 2000-2012

President	Start date of coalition	Cabinet Parties	Average percentage of seats in the parliament (standard deviation)
Kuchma 1999-2004	13 January 2000	People's Democratic Party, Social Democratic Party (United), Ukrainian People's Movement (Rukh) (until April 2001), Fatherland (until February 2001), Green Party of Ukraine (from June 2001), Regions of Ukraine (June 2001)	23 (3.69)
Kuchma 1999-2004	29 May 2002	United Ukraine ²⁰ , Social Democratic Party (United), Entrepreneurs-Labour Ukraine, People's Democratic Party, Regions of Ukraine, Agrarian Party	41 (7.25)
Yushchenko 2005-2010	24 January 2005	Our Ukraine, Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (until September 2005), Socialist Party, Entrepreneurs and Industrialists (April-September 2005), Ukrainian People's Party (October 2005), Ukrainian People's Movement (October 2005)	30 (6.18)
Yanukovich 2010-2012	16 March 2010	Party of Regions, Lytvyn Bloc (until December 2010)	42 (.98)

Figure 1. The number of parties in Ukrainian cabinets, 1996-2012




Table 3. Summary statistics for all variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Cabinet discipline	543	0.77	0.14	0.23	1
Cabinet coalescence	543	0.43	0.16	0.19	0.87
Time to parliamentary elections (in days)	543	572.30	374.87	12	1361
Ideology	543	13.46	5.54	0.00	18.66

Tables 4. The determinants of support for executive bills by cabinet coalition parties

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>
Cabinet Coalescence	.24*** (.05)
Time to Parliamentary Election	.0002*** (.00002)
Ideology	-.006*** (.001)
R ²	.53
Wald χ^2	148.22
Prob > χ^2	.00
N	543

***p<.01

Table presents coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5. Robustness checks

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>
Cabinet Coalescence	.23*** (.03)	.28*** (.05)
Time to Parliamentary Election	.0002*** (.00001)	.0002*** (.00002)
Ideology	-.006*** (.001)	-.005*** (.001)
Adj R ²	.30	
Wald χ^2		83.64
Prob > χ^2		.00
N	543	543

***p<0.01

Table presents coefficients with standard errors in parentheses

Model 1: ordinary least squares regression

Model 2: generalised estimating equations model

Table 6. The determinants of support for executive bills by individual cabinet parties

Independent Variables	PDP	PR	SDPU
Cabinet Payoff	.18** (.08)	.29*** (.06)	.35*** (.12)
Time to Presidential Election	.0001** (.00006)	-.00004 (.00003)	-
Time to Parliamentary Election	.00001*** (.00004)	.0002*** (.00004)	-
R ²	.19	.21	.18
Wald χ^2	26.29	53.28	8.25
Prob > χ^2	.00	.00	.00
N	420	302	420

***p <.01, **p<.05

Table presents coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses

Figure 2: The number of Ukrainian parties in cabinet and floor coalitions, 1996-2011




Table 7. Non-cabinet allies in presidential floor coalitions, 2000-2012

President	Start date of coalition	Non-Cabinet parties	Average percentage of seats in the parliament (standard deviation)
Kuchma 1999-2004	13 January 2000	Green Party of Ukraine, Reforms and Order Party (until April 2001), Rebirth of Regions, Working Ukraine, Regions of Ukraine (March 2001), Solidarity (March 2000), Yabluko (September 2000), Unity (November 2001)	28 (2.81)
Kuchma 1999-2004	29 May 2002	People's Power, Democratic Initiatives, European Choice, People's Choice (September 2002)	13 (2.37)
Yushchenko 2005-2010	24 January 2005	Ukrainian People's Party (April 2005), Centre Group, United Ukraine Group (until September 2005), Democratic Ukraine (February 2005)	11 (5.95)
Yanukovich 2010-2012	16 March 2010	Communist Party of Ukraine, Lytvyn Bloc (December 2010), Reforms for the Future (February 2011)	12 (3.78)

Table 8. Sample of legislators from cabinet and non-cabinet coalition parties

Party membership	Number	%
<i>Cabinet party</i>		
Party of Regions	20	69
<i>Non-cabinet party</i>		
Lytvyn Bloc	3	10
Communist Party	2	7
Reforms for the Future	2	7
Not affiliated	2	7
Total	29	100

Figure 3. Average voting unity of non-cabinet and cabinet coalition parties




Figure 4. Percentage of non-cabinet and cabinet coalition party members who identified the importance of extra-cabinet benefits (patronage, budget resources and informal favours) in the formation of coalitions





Figure 5. Percentage of non-cabinet and cabinet coalition party members who selected as the first or second most important reason why a political party might choose to join a presidential coalition



Notes

¹ MPs who served during the Victor Yanukovich presidency (2010-2012) were elected under this electoral system in 2007.

² The mixed system had a high personal vote score: 10 on a scale from 1 to 13. This is based on the analysis of Carey and Shugart (1995) and recoded and updated by Johnson and Wallack (2010).

³ The index multiplies the Laakso-Taagepera effective number of (parliamentary) parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) by the complement of the percentage of seats held by the president's own party, and then divides by 10 for ease of interpretation (see Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power, 2014, p. 78).

⁴ This parliamentary party was renamed the People's Party in November 2010.

⁵ We are grateful to William T. Bianco and Regina Smyth for sharing roll call data for 2000-05. Data for the 2010-2012 period was obtained from the website of the Verkhovna Rada: <http://rada.gov.ua/>

⁶ We are not aware of the informal institution of "pairing" in the Verkhovna Rada. This practice occurs when MPs from opposing parties agree to abstain from voting, thereby cancelling out the effect of their non-vote. In practice, absence from the chamber did not prevent Ukrainian MPs from voting. Before 2012, it was common for absent MPs to give their voting cards to colleagues who would vote on their behalf. Therefore, if MPs did not vote because of absence we believe it is appropriate to interpret this action as non-cooperative behaviour. We thanks Sarah Whitmore for this observation.

⁷ One shortcoming of the index is that it treats each ministerial portfolio as equal in importance. However, data on the value of ministerial portfolios in Ukraine is not currently available.

⁸ In many cases MPD provides information only for electoral blocs or alliances. In these cases, we give each political party in the alliance the same score. For these data, see <https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu>

⁹ We assume that the distance between each contiguous position is the same.

¹⁰ Since our data is time-series, we utilize ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors (PSCE) to address potential problems of autocorrelation and serial correlation (Beck and Katz 1995, 2004).

¹¹ This excludes parties like Our Ukraine whose portfolio allocation changed because of party reorganisation. During Viktor Yushchenko's presidency, Our Ukraine lost cabinet seats when it broke up into several pro-presidential parties. These parties retained the cabinet portfolios they had previously held with Our Ukraine.

¹² We exclude the Entrepreneurs and Labour Party, which served in the Ukrainian cabinet for less than two years (2002-2004).

¹³ The results are available on request from the authors.

¹⁴ Thus, we exclude the Communist Party from our analysis of Kuchma's cabinet coalitions (see Table 2).

¹⁵ Our voting data only include periods when the Party of Regions had representation in the cabinet. This does not mean that other parties did not feature in Yanukovych's cabinets. The Lytvyn Bloc was represented in the cabinet between March and November 2010.

¹⁶ See on-line Appendix for the text of the questions. The authors wish to thank Petro Burkovsky and Olexiy Haran for their advice and assistance in conducting these interviews.

¹⁷ See <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/update-ukraine-passes-law-easing-coalition-buildin-61275.html> accessed 11 November, 2015.

¹⁸ We created the coding categories from open-ended responses to semi-structured questions. The coding categories covered legislative; partisan; cabinet; other appointments; budget; ideological/vision for the country; business perks and security; personal bribes, perks and security, blackmail; electoral resources; media resources; popularity; exchange of favours (general); institutional change.

¹⁹ In addition to Ukraine, 300 national legislators were interviewed in 8 other countries: Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Benin, Kenya, Malawi, Armenia and Russia. The Coalitional Presidential Project is directed by Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman and Timothy J. Power at the University of Oxford. For more information on the project see http://users.ox.ac.uk/~spet0783/CPP_website/About_CPP.html

²⁰ In July 2002, United Ukraine was broken up into several factions including United Ukraine, Entrepreneurs-Labour Ukraine, Regions of Ukraine, People's Power, People's Democratic Party, Agrarian Party, Democratic Initiatives, European Choice, People's Choice (September 2002). Hence we use these party names when appropriate.

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