

Americanizing Brexit Britain's Welfare State?

Jane Gingrich and Desmond King

University of Oxford.

Introduction.

On May 28 2018, the *New York Times* ran a cover story proclaiming “Britain is looking less like the rest of Europe and more like the United States.”ⁱ (NYT May 28, 2018). This dichotomy, between a generous European welfare state and a meagre American one is often overstated, and yet, in respect of working age adults, both the systems of welfare and labour market structures historically varied substantially between the United States and Europe. In the US, benefits for working age adults are modest, commonly restricted to families, and conditional on discharging work requirements, creating incentives to enter highly flexible and often low-paid labour markets with few protections. Historically, benefits in Europe for working age adults were extensive and often un-conditional, creating a degree of income security during periods of unemployment, with both collective bargaining and market regulations limiting labour market flexibility but also restricting low-wage labour.

The British welfare state built on both of these models from its earliest days. But since the 1980s, numerous reforms, significant and marginal, have heightened the tension between these alternative trajectories. Today, after a period of historically prolonged austerity and substantial working-age welfare reform, with the UK facing yet another renegotiation of the

social contract in a post-Brexit world, the question of whether there remains space for an alternative to the “American” model is of crucial importance.

To address this question, we argue that there has been a blurring of differences across the American and European welfare states in terms of working age benefits, as most countries have adopted aspects of work-based conditionality reforms, which attach the receipt of benefits to the active pursuit of work, and to varying extents, the underlying politics of US welfare reform, where there are large coalitions supportive of more punitive policies towards low-income adults and minorities. These trends are taking place against the backdrop of a second major shift: increasing restrictions on benefits for immigrants. This double narrowing of the welfare state, making benefits conditional for citizens and excluding those who are not citizens, seemingly sets the agenda for a more restrictive post-Brexit welfare state. The experience of the last two decades, suggests, however, that the adoption of the American model has not been wholesale; steering a middle path between punitive conditional American benefits and more traditionally generous universal benefits is on the agenda across advanced welfare states.

While the transformation of working age welfare and the labour market under the Thatcher and Major governments pushed the British welfare state more decisively towards the “American” model, developing such a middle path was at the heart of the Blair and Brown governments’ ‘Third Way’ policies. Labour policy through the 2000s aspired to combine the flexibility of American labour markets with some European-style protections for children and families and investment to foster long-run skills. The second section of the paper argues that in several respects these policies succeeded in the short-run: they helped reduce poverty and supported skill development. However, this middle path has not been politically durable. The instruments used to create income security were vulnerable to retrenchment and the emphasis on long-term supply side measures to address structural weaknesses in the labour market (low skills and regional variation) left these weaknesses partially in place.

The result was that as the pendulum swung toward austerity in public spending, the American model again became dominant both in the content of policy and the call by some critics to demarcate benefits to British citizens only (though in practice EU citizens held the same rights after three months residence). The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition and the Cameron-May Conservative governments' signature working age welfare reform, the universal credit (UC), rather than presenting an opportunity to restore abandoned elements of the Europeanization framework or to reverse the influence of US type programmes, has *accelerated* the move towards supporting a lower-wage and lower-skilled work force, without the compensatory investments that moderated these shifts under Blair and Brown.

The discussion concludes by examining whether there is space for a new European model in the UK.

Americanization or Europeanization: A blurring of models or stark choice?

Two conflicting approaches have long characterized Britain's post-war welfare state: a *Europeanization* model consistent with the sorts of social democratic (and at times Christian democratic) principles informing welfare state expansion across Scandinavia, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium amongst others since the 1950s, rooted broadly in universalism and, crucially non-conditional working-age benefits; and an *Americanization* approach, prevalent in the US and other English language states such as Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and Canada, which retains a strong element of conditionality in distributing benefits and a significant selective emphasis in welfare assistance.

In the post-war decades and into the early 1980s, the British welfare state was a comfortable member of the European social democratic trajectory when measured in terms of universal health provision, education, social services including public housing and unemployment and disability / injury insuranceⁱⁱ (Holmwood 2000). However, this surface-

view camouflaged a resilient culture of conditionality and sanctioning,ⁱⁱⁱ which was revived after 1980 first by the Conservative government under Thatcher, and then with New Labour. However, as this blurring of models occurred, the American model has become yet more punitive, moving the ‘goal posts’ to the right. The tension between the models then, remains one of the defining features of contemporary welfare politics across Europe. To understand how these tensions played out in Britain, this section describes the trajectory in the US and Europe, with the next section turning to the British experience.

From the 1980s, welfare cuts and growing conditionality became entwined with both the emerging post-industrial economic order and subsequent changes in the political coalitions around the welfare state. The decline of industrial jobs starting in the 1980s often translated into a decline in middle skilled employment. Through the 1990s, jobs grew at both the low and the high-end of the skill distribution, a pattern that is widely described in terms of polarization.^{iv} Low skilled work presented a problem for both the traditional ‘European’ model and ‘American’ model.

Traditionally extensive unemployment benefits in Continental Europe were intended to provide workers with security during periods of unemployment, in part to avoid long-run occupational downgrading. In a period of low-skilled job creation, proponents of more market liberal approaches argued that far from supporting job matching, high unemployment benefits and other social insurance benefits simply reduced labour supply, creating problems of “Eurosclerosis.” The American approach, had one answer to this changing political economy – funneling working age adults into the low-skilled workplace rather than protecting them from it. But it was an answer that largely worked with the grain of rising inequality, not combatting it.^v

Next to post-industrial economic changes, the coalition bases of welfare support shifted through this period.^{vi} New middle-class voters, including left middle-class voters, were less

invested in traditional passive benefits and often attracted to workfare reforms.^{vii} Parts of those on the left became increasingly skeptical that traditional welfare failed to cover emerging risks (e.g. lone parenthood) and had highly gendered dynamics. Moreover, these benefits did not in themselves redistribute skills, raising interest in new modes of welfare provision.

In response to these pressures, the UK adopted aspects of the American approach to welfare reform: with increasingly conditional income support measures.^{viii} Then Prime Minister Tony Blair adopted this logic, proclaiming that rights begat responsibilities.^{ix} New Labour's Britain was not alone in this shift. Even stalwart "European" systems turned to working age conditionality through the 2000s in tandem with labor market reform, for instance, through the Hartz reforms in Germany, aspects of the flex-security system in Denmark and the French RMI reform.^x The degree of sanctioning and content of the mandatory elements varies across these reforms, but the trend through the 1990s and 2000s was to make recipients of income maintenance support do something in return.

Despite seemingly blurring distinctions across models, during this period the US also moved towards more conditionality, demonstrating a deeper social logic extending beyond active efforts to push workers into work. Conditionality of welfare benefits has been a hallmark of US welfare policy from 1981, expanding under the Reagan presidency, consolidated in tough welfare reform acts passed by Congress in 1988 and 1996, and bolstered by federal rules prohibiting access to public housing for ex-felons with narcotics convictions or their families. Loic Wacquant characterizes these reforms as brutal attempts at "disciplining the poor": with the US welfare enacted by President Bill Clinton in 1996 diluting federal involvement in welfare benefits, increasing the discretionary powers of the states, and toughening up of the eligibility criteria to drive down the number of participants.^{xi}

Despite these moves and an already limited safety net for working age childless adults, the US has continued to move further down its own Americanization road. Two recent

measures stand out. First, Congress wants to impose work requirements on recipients of Medicaid (health care for the low income), granting this option to several states already, and on recipients of food stamps, imposing the existing requirement for TANF (cash-welfare) requiring adults between the ages of 18 and 58 to work part-time or enroll in 20 hours a week of workforce training to receive assistance. Second, the Department of Housing and Urban Development plans dramatically to raise the rents imposed on tenants in public housing from \$50 to \$150 a week, continuing to shift public housing management into private control and not building new units.

The US reforms are profoundly racialized. The effects of workfare conditionality are unevenly distributed by racial groups, a longstanding bias of the system but one which has intensified since the Great Recession. Thus, these measures are the culmination and consolidation of the anti-welfare state and individual responsibility ideology which has shaped social policy since the 1980s and which has enjoyed an accelerated salience under the Trump administration as it responds to its core electoral constituency of white voters, some of whom are motivated to support cuts due to racial resentment toward African Americans, other ethnic minorities, and recent immigrants.^{xii}

America's racial hierarchy is distinctive, but the US does share with the UK and other European democracies a revived intensity of debate about immigration and immigrants' demands on the welfare state.^{xiii} Unlike generous benefits for citizens, European welfare states have long been more restrictive, and internally varied, in terms of how they incorporated immigrants into the welfare state. Scapegoating immigrants as competitors for scarce low wage jobs and welfare state benefits is a historically common anxiety mobilized by right wing parties and populists and at times trades unions. For low-wage native-born workers, this anxiety is an important issue, especially many have seen weak wage growth and declining social rights. In the US low-skilled immigrants are absorbed into the long standing black-white racially

hierarchical labour market as threats to the (white) working class.^{xiv} In the UK and Europe a similar populist rhetoric against immigrants contributed to the rise of UKIP, the collapse of centrist parties in such countries as France and Italy, and has fueled new movements and parties who have won significant electoral support against the traditional conservative and social democratic parties in such states as Germany, Austria, Sweden and Denmark, as well as galvanizing illiberal parties in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In many European countries the hostile sentiment toward immigrants is overlaid by a religious antagonism (Christian Europeans versus new Muslim immigrants) and a racial hostility (dislike and prejudice toward non-white immigrants). But across these various systems common themes have emerged electorally and shaped changing party bases and formations: nativist fear of competition for jobs, especially low-wage service positions, access to public housing and preferred schools, and health care provision. The result is the rise reforms that explicitly demarcate access to benefits to citizens next to growing conditions for existing citizens: in short, more restrictions on both fronts.

This blurring of the boundaries of the European and American model raises the question of whether there is still a space for an alternative to the American model? Although the rise of conditionality, exclusion of migrants, and the political logics behind these moves – both in the post-industrial economic structure and in populist concerns about racial hierarchies – have blurred the distinction between the models, differences persist. Ethnographically the experience of welfare state provision and access to income or health support remains apart: the US is a minimal social support system while most European states continue to offer state-based support sufficient to keep most households out of poverty. Moreover, the degree to which welfare states have excluded migrants varies.^{xv} Even as nearly all countries have adopted aspects of the American model, the American model has moved in a more punitive direction, keeping the boundary of these models at the heart of European welfare politics.

The next section argues that although Blair and Brown's "Third Way" approach aimed to steer a middle path between the conditional American model and the traditional European model, the UK has become increasingly close to the US in terms of a consolidated welfare support system with tighter eligibility thresholds and conditionality and pursuit of a stricter stance towards immigrants' access to benefits under a 'hostile environment' framework. To understand why third-way policies proved vulnerable to increasing Americanization, rather than institutionalizing a durable alternative, the next section argues that we need to examine both their policy design and underlying coalition basis.

The Reshaping of Working Age Welfare from Thatcher to Blair

Welfare reform emerged prominently on the agenda under the Conservative Thatcher and Major governments. Unsurprisingly, given these governments' conservative orientation, through the 1980s and 1990s, they moved towards the American model, cutting benefits to working age adults. Figure 1 shows these shifts on two dimensions: employment protection legislation and unemployment replacement rates.^{xvi} Employment protection has always been relatively low in the UK, but unemployment insurance, by the late 1970s, was in line with many other European countries (and a number of US states, pictured here, with higher benefits). Through the Thatcher years a series of reforms began cutting benefits and moving away from a multi-tier (earnings related) unemployment benefit system to a more limited flat-rate benefit.^{xvii} Poverty and inequality rose, while benefits fell.

In response to these trends, both the Democrats in the US and the Labour party began to develop proposals that accommodated the thrust of the emerging low-wage sector, but also looked to modify employment conditions in two ways: first, to redistribute income to those in work, especially parents; second, to provide skills for future cohorts of workers, moving towards a higher skills equilibrium. This 'social investment' approach offered a seeming

middle way between the American and the traditional European model, aiming to marry the more liberal labour market structures with the greater equality of “social Europe”. Clinton, in the US, proclaimed his ambition to “end of welfare as we know it” and to “make work pay.”

In the British context, the Labour government (1997-2010) also pursued identifiable strategies for working age welfare: a dramatic expansion of more conditional in-work benefits, as well as largely non-conditional income transfers targeted at families with children, while continuing to limit unemployment benefits.

First, Labour’s policy substantially expanded the safety net for families, introducing a series of tax credits initially targeted at families with children and new spending on housing benefits broadly matching rent rises, which largely benefited families. Figure 2 shows these benefits in a comparative perspective, showing the expansion of *targeted* benefits to families.^{xviii} Hills et al find that spending on cash transfers related to children nearly doubled in real terms under Labour. Labour further introduced a (modest) minimum wage.^{xix}

Second, the flip side of Labour’s investment in families was a stricter benefits regime for childless out of work adults. Hills et al find a fall in the minimum income levels (permitted by benefits) of childless adults (both single and in couples), next to the aforementioned expansion of benefits for families for children, particularly lone-parents.^{xx}

Next to this fall in relative benefit levels, Labour introduced increasing work-based conditionality. In its first years in office Labour introduced a four element New Deal programme for anyone receiving benefits: a subsidized job in the private sector, education, a voluntary position or participate on a compulsory environmental task. Initially, this conditionality targeted those closer to the labour market, and sanctions were limited, but Labour later extended a light touch version of these policies to those further from the labour market (e.g. those with disabilities), sanctioning recipients to promote compliance with the

conditions. The result was limited conditionality in access to working-age benefits in the British welfare state.

Finally, Labour pursued a future oriented approach to reducing inequality that relied on skill acquisition. Although much of Labour's investment was targeted at children, there was some initial expansion of active labour market policies and a more general expansion of higher education and training through the 2000s.^{xxi}

The state then, played an increasing role in underwriting the income security for working adults and families through in-work benefits and housing benefits, and expanded education, but offered little direct support for working age childless out-of-work adults. This strategy yielded an important set of consequences.

By the end of Labour's time in office in 2010, child poverty had fallen and the living conditions of families improved. However, while the share of low-wage work in the UK fell slightly through the decade, it remained high and persistent (OECD 2016). Indeed, many of the income gains at the bottom of the income distribution through the 2000s came from in-work benefits and other family related support rather than wage increases.

Moreover, several structural weaknesses in the economy were increasingly exposed. Labour's focus on supply side skills investment had left the 'demand' side largely untouched. By the end of the 2000s, concern about low rates of private investment emerged (Figure 3), presaging the contemporary concern about productivity and weaker long-run demand for skilled labour. Next to these concerns, the regional cleavage in the British economy remained high. Across the UK regions there is substantial divergence in terms of gross value added per worker, a measure of varying local productivity with important implications for living standards.^{xxii}

The 'third way' for working age welfare, then, compensated adults for some of the problems in the UK's post-industrial labour market, but did not fundamentally alter them. As

a result, we argue in the next section, the political climate remained vulnerable to the dual pressures pushing conditionality and welfare restrictions for migrants in the US: middle class concerns about welfare and nativist/anti-minority backlash.

Welfare reform in the coalition government: the 2012 Bill.

The deep financial crisis and the election of a new Conservative-Liberal government in 2010 marked another turn in the UK working age benefits structure. Combined with fiscal austerity the welfare reforms in 2012 moved the UK more decisively towards the American model, which enhanced, rather than ameliorated, the structural weaknesses observable by the end of the Blair-Brown period.

The key policy of the coalition government's working age welfare strategy came in the 2012 Welfare Reform Bill. This bill altered a number of aspects of the benefit structure, including limiting housing benefits and child benefits. Its signature component was the introduction of the Universal Credit (UC), presently being rolled out and due to be in place by 2021. The UC unifies six working age schemes – housing, Income Support, ESA (disability) and JSA (unemployed), and Child benefit and CTC – into a single capped benefit.^{xxiii} Ostensibly, this new structure aims to combat a long-standing problem of low-income benefit recipients facing a high marginal tax rate (due to benefit withdrawal in the face of earned income) as well as a series of technical problems that emerged with benefits through the 2000s.^{xxiv}

While the logic of a unified benefit structure is not intrinsically related to either conditionality or cuts, it has proven to be vulnerable to both. The UC integrates conditional and non-conditional benefits in a single structure, making it an easier target for reform. Indeed, since its initial introduction, the Conservative government has tightened UC conditionality and introduced a steeper withdrawal rate than in its earliest plans, as well as switching from weekly

to monthly benefit payments and a longer waiting period. The new sanctioning regime around UC is also steep, with even working claimants liable to sanctions if they do not meet minimum income thresholds (equivalent to 35 hours at minimum wages). As a consequence, working age benefit recipients are subject to greater conditionality – as all six previous benefits are now conditional for large portions of recipients – and the scope of conditionality is more intensive, with a most serious infraction resulting in a loss of upwards of half of all benefits.^{xxv} The result is transformative if still not completely grasped by commentators. For both childless adults and those with families, sanctioning in UC is already occurring, and in some regions of the countries, sanctioning affects large portions of the population. Hood and Water at the IFS estimate large real decreases in the incomes of low-income families with children due to benefit cuts.^{xxvi}

These cuts to benefits have taken place against the same structural weaknesses in the labour market observed in earlier periods. Despite low unemployment, real incomes at the low-end have stagnated, as has productivity growth, and there is little pick up in investment (private or public). The result is the persistence of the low-wage economy and high levels of regional variation, and after close to a decade of austerity, fewer compensatory policies or investments in skills, that defined the Third Way of the 2000s.

Why did the Third Way policies prove an unstable equilibrium? First, until very recently, public opinion was largely supportive of sanctioning and limited benefits. As Tom O’Grady argues, the thrust of elite discourse on welfare policy since the mid-1990s was often negative towards welfare and welfare recipients. The public, in many ways, followed elites. The British Social Attitudes survey shows that by the 2010s, 50-60% of voters polled agreed that benefits were too high compared with 25% in early 1990s.^{xxvii} Such a pattern has historical resonance echoing the search for ‘the scrounger’ during the inter-war decades.^{xxviii} While Labour invested a great deal in lower-income families through the 2000s, this low

visibility redistribution, combined with punitive rhetoric, did not create a mobilized coalition pushing a more fundamentally supportive stance towards the welfare state.

Second, while scholars debate the relative role of economic and cultural motives in UKIP support and Brexit voting, both are likely at play. The structural economic weaknesses and vulnerability to trade shocks in parts of the country are strongly correlated with Brexit voting patterns.^{xxix} At the same time, a large number of voters had long expressed concerns about immigration and low political responsiveness from elites.^{xxx} These issues became tied up in public debate over the EU, with the tabloid press and other public voices alleging immigrant mis- or over-use of health, housing and education services. The clampdown on immigration numbers has followed from tight monthly quotas on the number of skilled workers (who must earn over £46k pa). Already the Brexit vote has reduced the movement of EU citizens to the UK and has prompted others to exit. The electoral and political effects of this targeted focus on migration include the virtual disappearance of UKIP, but not necessarily the underlying motivations to restrict benefits to foreigners.

In sum, many of the underlying “demand” side factors for more punitive policies remained in place through Labour’s time in office, meaning that when combined with the financial crisis and public desire for fiscal austerity, there were fewer vested actors in third policies able to mobilize against yet more shifts towards the American model.

A New Third Way after Brexit?

Will Brexit Britain continue to follow this Americanization trajectory? Perhaps not.

First, Public opinion may be shifting against it for a number of reasons. Figure 5 shows the fitted composite score on welfare attitudes from the British Social Attitudes Survey, where higher numbers are scaled to represent more negative attitudes towards welfare across survey respondents from 1995 to 2016. As outlined above, there has been a long-run erosion in

support, but more recently, a swing back towards more support for welfare.^{xxx} These shifts in the public combine with other forms of mobilization. First, unions have consistently criticized the UC programme for pushing more households, especially child households, into poverty. Second, the severity of sanctioning, the visibility of hardship and the potential exclusion of EU citizens may raise concerns about the well-being of recipients. Many UC recipients are building up debts in the six-week non-benefit period and food bank demand soars in the UC roll out areas, leading to widespread concern about the program.

Second, elite thinking on conditionality may also be shifting. Consider how economists engage the UK's 'productivity puzzle' – the persistently low rates of productivity growth in a post-financial crisis period – and how politicians and citizens alike try to make sense of the growing regional division expressed through the Brexit vote. In both cases, questions about sustained investment (in not just skills, but infrastructure) are entering the political agenda. While not fully operational, the UC is sparking concern over its harsh structure and sanctioning. At the same time, the Conservative government has moved towards increasing the minimum wage and discussing the possibility of greater public investment to combat low-pay.

The shape of Brexit and future governments remain uncertain. Whether conditional and punitive benefits continue to define the approach is a central question going forward.

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- ⁱ *New York Times* May 28, 2018.
- ⁱⁱ J. Holmwood 2000. "Europe and the 'Americanization' of British Social Policy." *European Societies* 2 (4): 455-82.
- ⁱⁱⁱ D. King, 1995. *Actively Seeking Work?* Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- ^{iv} M. Goos, A Manning and A Salomons. 2009. "Job polarization in Europe." *The American Economic Review* 99 (2):58–63.
- ^v A key point in D. Rueda, 2015. 'The State of the Welfare State: Unemployment, Labor Market Policy and Inequality in the Age of Workfare', *Comparative Politics*, 47(3): 296-314
- ^{vi} J. Gingrich, and S. Häusermann. 2015. "The Decline of the Working-Class Vote, the Reconfiguration of the Welfare Support Coalition and Consequences for the Welfare State", *Journal of European Social Policy* 25(1):50-75.
- ^{vii} C. Knotz "A rising workfare state? Unemployment benefit conditionality in 21 OECD countries, 1980–2012." *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy* 2018 34 (2), 91-108 and S. Watson, "Does Welfare Conditionality Reduce Democratic Participation?" *Comparative Political Studies* 2015 48: 645-86.
- ^{viii} Rueda, 2015. 'The State of the Welfare State.'
- ^{ix} D. King, 1999. *In the Name of Liberalism*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- ^x See Knotz "A rising workfare state?"
- ^{xi} L. Wacquant. 2009. *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal government of social insecurity*. Durham NC: Duke University Press.
- ^{xii} J. Sides, M. Tesler and L. Vavrek. 2017. "The 2016 US election: How Trump lost and won." *Journal of Democracy*. 28(2). 34-44.
- ^{xiii} J. Gest, 2018. *The White Working Class: What everyone needs to know*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- ^{xiv} G. Borjas, 2016. *We Wanted Workers* New York: W W Norton, and D King, 2001. *Making Americans: Immigration, Race and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy* Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- ^{xv} K. Banting and W. Kymlicka. 2017. *The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ^{xvi} The employment protection legislation data comes from the OECD EPL database, version 1, and combines the component parts for individuals, collective dismissals and temporary workers. The unemployment replacement rates data is from the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset, and estimates the percentage of "average production worker" wages replaced by after-tax unemployment insurance benefits.
- ^{xvii} J. Clasen, 2011. 'The United Kingdom: towards a single working-age benefit system', in J. Clasen and D. Clegg (eds.), *Regulating the Risk of Unemployment: National adaptations to post-industrial labour markets in Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ^{xviii} Figure 2 draws on data from the Stockholm University SPIN dataset on Child Benefits.
- ^{xix} J. Hills, P De Agostini and H Sutherland. 2016. "Benefits, pensions, tax credits and direct taxes". *Social Policy in a Cold Climate*. Eds. Tania Burchardt, John Hills, Ruth Lupton, Kitty Stewart and Polly Vizard. Polity Press.
- ^{xx} J. Hills et al 2016. "Benefits, pensions, tax credits and direct taxes".
- ^{xxi} A. McKnight, 2016. "Employment policy since the crisis". In *Social Policy in a Cold Climate*. Eds. Tania Burchardt, John Hills, Ruth Lupton, Kitty Stewart and Polly Vizard. Polity Press.
- ^{xxii} Figure 3 comes from World Bank data on Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Figure 5 draws on the Cambridge Econometrics regional database, using NUTS-3 regions.
- ^{xxiii} Council Tax Benefits are not included in UC. Instead uniform national provision was replaced with local and varied measures, which in its decentralized emphasis mirrored how Americanization of welfare increasingly operates through states, counties and municipalities.
- ^{xxiv} N. Timmins, 2016. *The Universal Credit, From Disaster to Recovery*. Institute for Government.
- ^{xxv} Recipients sign a "Claimant Commitment" which outlines the conditionality groups. There are various tiers, from those with no conditionality (e.g. the severely disabled), those required to do work focused interviews but not full search (e.g. lone parents), those required to do training and preparation but not a full search, and those subject to full conditionality.
- ^{xxvi} A. Hood and T. Waters. 2017. *Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK*. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies. And National Audit Office. 2018. *Rolling out universal credit*. June. <file:///C:/Users/King/Documents/NAO%20Rolling-out-Universal-Credit.pdf>

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- ^{xxvii} T. O’Grady, 2017. “How politicians created, rather than reacted, to negative public opinion on benefits.” LSE Blog. <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/public-opinion-towards-welfare/>
- ^{xxviii} King *Actively Seeking Work?*.
- ^{xxix} I. Colatone and P. Stanig, 2018. Global Competition and Brexit. *American Political Science Review*. 112(2): 201-218.
- ^{xxx} Matthew Goodwin and Rob Ford. 2014. *Revolt of the Right*. Routledge
- ^{xxxi} The composite score includes summary measure of welfare attitudes across across three items, scaled from 1=sympathetic to 5= poor don’t deserve, with weighted annual means,.