The Protestant Cause: Religious Alliance with the European Calvinist Communities as a Political Issue in England, 1585-1630

Abstract

It has long been accepted that protestant ideological aspirations played an important role in the foreign policy of England in the period from the Henrican Reformation to the Civil War; but little attempt has been made systematically to analyse the effects of this role. Most discussions of the question have been characterised by a lack of sympathy for protestant aspirations, and have concentrated upon anti-catholicism, relegating the Protestant Cause to the rank of provincial bigotry.

This study has been undertaken with the contrary assumption - that the Protestant Cause should be seen not merely as a response to catholic threats, but as a positive force which posed the central problem to English foreign policy in this period. Not only did England have the central role to play in the creation of working religious alliances with continental protestant states; but the defence of religion was the leading motive for English intervention on the continent beyond the coastal periphery. The years between Leicester's expedition to the Netherlands in 1585 and England's withdrawal from the Thirty Years War in 1630 mark the period in which the issue had the greatest political effect, for with Leicester's expedition the English monarchy came the closest to undertaking the leadership of the Cause, which it rejected finally upon withdrawal from the Thirty War.

The approach employed in this study, specifically the a priori assumption that these ideological aspirations in foreign policy, termed here "political puritanism", should be taken seriously, is open to a serious methodological objection. It does not seek deeper political

and social motivation beyond straightforward acceptance of the ideology. In part this was a deliberate reaction to standard accounts which have seen the Protestant Cause as little more than an excuse for plundering the Spanish Main. On the other hand it was also felt that by examining the ideological reaction to the events of 1585-1630 in this manner its full effects could be appreciated. The results of this investigation I feel have justified this assumption, particularly the relevation of certain aspects of the advocacy of political puritanism by the aristocracy and the gentry, worthy of greater attention. The most important is the lack of awareness of the political ramifications of their demands. Support for revolution and rebellions abroad could be urged while revolutionary intent was sincerely denied. In this respect Elizabeth James and Charles, but particularly James, had a far greater sensitivity to the revolutionary potentialities of these aspirations. This may help to explain the often puzzling confusion of the governing classes in the 1620s and 1640s.

The approach taken here to the subject sheds new light, therefore, not only on the workings of English diplomacy but also on the nature of the English Reformation and English Calvinism. The ideological basis for Calvinist international politics was provided by the Calvinist conception of the unity of the Reformed Church and the struggle between the Reformed Church and the Papal Antichrist. Both were central elements in Calvinist thought. Although the struggle with Antichrist was a vague concept it inspired the demand both for the overthrow of the Papacy and for the protection of other branches of the Church.

English Calvinism shared this conception of the Reformed Church and saw the Church of England as an integral member of this Church. Its demand for greater conformity with the Church abroad created a reaction in the Church establishment, which can be termed "anglican", and which

progressively isolated itself from the Church abroad and culminated in Archbishop Laud's attempt to sever relations entirely. This is a previously unexplored area in which anglican and puritan attitudes can be clearly distinguished. The attempt by anglicanism to establish a via media between the Reformed and Rome and its growing repudiation of the doctrine of the Papal Antichrist can thus be seen as developments of major political significance. This conception of puritanism also leads to serious questioning of recent efforts to see puritanism as a nationalist movement. In so far as nationalist motives were employed they were employed by anglicans, puritanism remained faithful to the idea of a universal Reformed Church. A puritan conception of a special relationship between God and England does not emerge until the direct political application of covenant theology in the late 1620s.

Having established this definition of the puritan conception of the European situation, this study attempts to explore the domestic and external repercussions of the puritan demand that English foreign policy be based upon it. Only relations with the three politically significant continental Calvinist communities, the United Provinces, the Palatinate, and the Huguenots, are examined. The reasons for the exclusion of the Lutherans and the Scots prior to 1603 are given in the preface. Only through an examination of relations with the three communities collectively can the political difficulties of converting ideological aspirations into a working alliance be appreciated. Furthermore the manner in which relations with a particular community were influenced by the demand for general unity can also be analysed. One result of this analysis is a new interpretation of the role of the house of Nassau, led by Maurice of Nassau and the Duke of Bouillon, in providing the leadership of continental Calvinism from the 1590s to 1620.

A major cause of the failure to create the desired religious alliance was the internal struggle within both England and the continental communities with secularist conceptions of politics, or realpolitik. This struggle was epitomized by the struggle between England and France for the leadership of the anti-Hapsburg states, which England sought through religious, France through political, alliance. Anglo-Dutch political relations were dominated by the countervaling forces of an ideological stimulus toward alliance, and a commercial one toward hostility. Commercial rivalry with England was translated by the Dutch into political friendship with France. This situation made the Huguenots the insoluable dilemma of English diplomacy. Strong support for the Huguenots antagonized the French monarchy, which could offer substantial military and political assistance in an anti-Hapsburg alliance. Yet such a political alliance involved the compromise of religious aspirations, without which there was no ground for substantial political and military activity on the continent.

In dealing with these questions a narrative has seemed preferable to an analytical approach. In many areas the absence of previous research has necessitated the establishment of a basic narrative. Secondly, I have wished to explore in detail the interrelationships between English domestic political developments and events on the continent. Finally, there is the basic problem of any study of an ideology: assessing the ability of its advocates to apply it to the reality around them, and its ability to explain new developments. Thus although the basic preconceptions and attitudes held about France, for example, do not change, the circumstances of their intended implementation do. Furthermore, it is important to analyse the effects of the conflicting demands on English diplomacy at particular points in time. The dimensions of the Huguenot problem, for example, can only be adequately understood if account is made of its effects on Anglo-Dutch relations.

Similar considerations influenced the use of the narrative in the examination of the domestic aspects of the problem. The ideals of political puritanism remained constant, as did the rejection by the monarchy of its goals. In the absence of royal leadership, political puritanism turned to the court aristocracy. The model for this form of political leadership was the national puritan alliance led by the earl of Leicester; and his expedition to the Netherlands in 1585-7 was the natural expression of this alliance. Considerable attention has been paid, therefore, both to Leicester's conception of the enterprise and to the reasons for its failure.


The revival of Leicester's "party" became the principal ambition of political puritanism in the following years. Consideration is given to its influence on the career of the earl of Essex; and the candidacy of Sir Henry Neville for the secretaryship in 1611-1613 is studied in some detail as one aspect of an attempt, inspired by Neville, to revive such a party around the Viscount Rochester. On the other hand, less significance is given to the puritan alliances of the duke of Buckingham in 1624-1626. In contrast to the general trend of recent scholarship, the earl of Pembroke's leadership of political puritanism in the Parliaments of 1624 and 1626 is considered more important than the temporary alliance of Buckingham and the Riches.

Thus it was only in the absence of strong aristocratic leadership from 1603-1610 and after 1626 that the leadership of political puritanism was taken by the House of Commons. At the end of the 1620s both the domestic and foreign aspects of the question came to a head. The collapse of the Reformed alliance after the English monarchy rejected the Protestant Cause and the final demise of the aristocratic leadership of political puritanism were closely interrelated. On the aftermath a new balance of political forces in England and a new role for England in Europe would have to be sought.

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The Protestant Cause: Religious Alliance with the West European Calvinist Communities as a Political Issue in England, 1585-1630

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Preface

The role of religion in the formulation of English foreign policy in the period 1560-1640 has been long accepted but little explored. Standard accounts have concentrated on anti-catholicism and hostility to Spain. This study is concerned with the positive aspect of this issue: the influence of the belief that foreign policy should be governed by England's obligations as an integral part of the Reformed Church, specifically the obligation to assist the other parts of the Church. The inspiration for this was primarily the Calvinist conception of the Church and the parameters of the debate were defined by the nature of the reception of Calvinism into the Church of England. This is discussed in Chapter 1.

Although the definition of the relationship to the Reformed remain constant throughout the period 1560-1640, the chronological limits of the study have been established by the political context. The expedition of the earl of Leicester to the Netherlands in 1585-1587 was the first major military effort to assist the Reformed on the Continent; the withdrawal from the Thirty Years War in 1629-1630 marked the final rejection by the monarchy of any obligation to aid the Reformed. The belief in the unity of the Reformed Church was responsible for the decision to examine relations with the three major communities, the United Provinces, the Huguenots, and the Rhenish Palatinate, rather than with only one of them. Only by examining relations with all three can the problems engendered by the demands of unity be usefully evaluated.

The study is not solely concerned with diplomatic relations with the three communities but also with the domestic debate over the general

issue. As it is one of its theses that the conflict over this issue was a cause of the collapse of the relations between crown and Parliament in the late 1620s, it has been necessary to define the political position, aspirations, and the tactics of the advocates of this conception of foreign policy. It is hoped that this may serve as a contribution towards the definition of "puritanism" as a political phenomenon.

The wide scope of the study has necessitated that the areas covered be severely restricted. Anti-catholicism and hostility to Spain per se have not been discussed. Nor have relations with the East European Calvinists, the Swiss and minor German Calvinist communities, or with the German and Scandinavian Lutherans been included. Scotland and Ireland have been discussed only peripherally, as considerations of domestic policy were of more importance in those areas. Only political relations with the three communities have been studied: other important areas, commercial relations, the refugee communities in England, charitable collections, and intellectual contacts, have had to be excluded.

The absence of useful studies of late Elizabethan and Jacobean foreign policy and the almost complete lack of attention previously paid to this issue heretofore has necessitated a detailed examination of political events. For this reason a narrative rather than a thematic approach has been employed. Extensive citation and quotation of primary sources has been necessary. Other aspects of English politics in this period, e.g. the nature of the Spanish Faction, have been discussed, although the conclusions must, in the absence of further study, remain hypothetical. There has also been an attempt to evaluate the politics of the other Calvinist communities but the centre of interest has remained the English conception of the situation. Archival mater is primarily

English although printed collections and transcriptions in England of continental archives have been employed. Preference has also been given, in most cases, to contemporary English translations of major continental theological works over the originals.

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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are employed in the footnotes:

Bodl.	Bodleian Library
PRO	Public Record Office
S.P.	State Papers
B.M.	British Museum
Addit. MSS.	Additional Manuscripts
Berks. R.O.	Berkshire Record Office
Lambeth	Lambeth Palace Library
Longleat	Manuscripts of the Marquess of Bath at Longleat House
Hist. MSS. Comm.	Historical Manuscripts Commission
Camb. Univ.	Cambridge University Library

Unless otherwise noted, works cited were published in London.

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL PURITANISM AND THE UNITY OF THE REFORMED CHURCH

I.

In Calvinist thought the unity of the Reformed Church is defined both by the Word which links the Church to God and unites it within the world and through time; and by the struggle between the Church and Anti-christ. The Church itself is divided into the universal, invisible Church of the elect which is with God and the visible Church in the world, the essential elements of which are the administration of the sacrements according to the Word and preaching of the Word. A "Church" exists wherever these are found and "les Eglises, qui sont distribuées par chacune ville et village, sont tellment comprises qu'une chacune a le tiltre et authorité d'Eglise."[1] Yet, as McNeill notes, despite the absolute break made between the invisible and visible Church, Calvin tended to see the visible Church as similar to the invisible and sharing in the same catholicity and communion of the Saints.[2] As a result "Church" and "Churches" were used interchangeably to describe the visible Church. Thus Beza could say, "a true definition of a true Church, either particularly, or universally considered, is that, by which it is said to be a congregation, that it confesseth the True Jesus Christ." The Huguenot divine Bertrand de Loque made a similar equation, "All the particular Churches then, which consent in true doctrine, ought to be holden and esteemed for one only Church, seeing the Church is but one."[4]

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1. Calvin, Institution de la religion Chrestienne, Book iv, Chapt.1,7,9, (French edition of 1560, ed. Bennoit, Paris, iv, 18-24).
2. J.T.McNeill, Unitive Protestantism (1964), 44, 68-69.
3. A discourse of the true & visible markes of the Catholique Church (1582), Sig. (C3v).
4. A Treatise of the Church (1581), 11-12. See also Philippe de Mornay's A Notable Treatise of the Church (1570), Sig. Biiii.

The clearest explanation of the relationship between the visible "Church" and the particular "Churches" was the suitably fluid analogy of an ocean, the Church, having within it various seas, bays, and gulfs, the particular churches, each having a different name. Although I have not found a use of this in Calvin's works, it is used by Mornay, William Perkins, and even Richard Hooker. The beauty of the analogy lies in the two different ways in which it can be used. To Mornay it is the basic unity of the ocean which is paramount:

> And yet notwithstanding we know there is but one ocean, and not many, whereof by these names we make many distinctions seeing it is but one body and uniforme, from which the union cannot be severed, but only distinguished; as we ought also to acknowledge in the Church.[1]

Hooker is able to use it to support his conception of the Church of England:

> So the Catholic Church is in like sort divided into a number of distinct societies ... unto every of which the name of a Church is given with addition betokening severality, as the Church of Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, England ... (which) must be endowed with correspondent general properties belonging unto them as they are public Christian societies.[2]

Perkins maintains a careful neutrality.[3]

The Church is never, however, merely the sum of the particular churches, it is never bound to specific places, but depends solely on the succession of doctrine.[4] Hence particular churches can be added and subtracted without effect upon the whole. The resulting conception of the Church is both supple and able to encompass a number of polities, from the English national church to that of the congregational-independents. The Genevan and French churches under the influence of Beza were

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1. Mornay, ibid., Sig. Biiii - v
2. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, iii, 1, 14, Works (ed. Keble, Oxford, 1836), i, 196-97.
3. A Golden Chaine, Works (1612-13), i, 303
4. Ibid. 309.

were to adopt a rigid position on the "synodical polity and consistorial discipline", but this was in response to specific political circumstances.[1] A similar position on a single discipline was also to be taken by English separatists.[2] To Calvin, however, discipline was a secondary consideration; the essential unity came from doctrine.[3]

The method for obtaining functional unity was not, therefore, political or institutional, but spiritual, through the establishment of the unity of doctrine. All the major "national" confessions, the Second Helvetic, the French, and the Belgic, stressed the universality of doctrine and the Church.[4] Although the drive towards a single confession came to a halt in the aftermath of the Frankfurt Conference of September 1577, the production of the Harmony of the Confessions, sponsored by Beza, laid the groundwork for further efforts.[5] This emphasis on the need for unity of doctrine was further exemplified by the Synod of Dort, the lack of interest in conciliar reconciliation with the Papacy, and the manner in which approaches were made to the Lutherans. Although the last were to fail through Lutheran political and doctrinal intransigence, the need to incorporate them within the Reformed Church was always recognised.[6]

This idealist conception of the Church could not of itself, however,

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1. R.M.Kingdon, Geneva and the Consolidation of the French Protestant Movement, 1564-1572 (Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 128, 148.
2. H.Jacob, Reasons ... proving the necessitie of reforming our Churches in England (Middleburgh, 1604), 4-7.
3. F. Wendell, Calvin: The Origin and Development of his Religious Thought (1963), 300-1, 510.
4. McNeill, Unitive Protestantism, 80-81, 215.
5. Harmony (Eng. ed., Cambridge, 1586), Sig. (¶¶ vi). Gualter to Arch. Grindal, 8 Mar. 1580, J. Strype, Annals of the Reformation (Oxford, 1824), ii, 679-80.
6. McNeill, op. cit., 180. See also the interesting comment on the Lutherans in Sir Edwin Sandys, The Relation of the State of Religion (1605), Sig. (Q4-v).

account for the relationship between the Reformed Church, the Papacy, and the Primitive Church. The explanation of this, the central historical problem of the Reformation, was provided by the historical role of the Papal Antichrist. Despite recent appreciation that this concept plays a larger role in protestant thought than as a mere excuse for vituperative propaganda, one major misconception remains which has hindered an understanding of its true significance. This is the view that the belief in the Papal Antichrist was ipso facto millenarian and an hysterical response to the weakening political position of the Reformed in the early seventeenth century.[1] The relationship between the Papal Antichrist and millenarianism is far more complex than heretofore thought.

Millenarianism, the belief in the thousand year reign of Christ on earth after the defeat of Satan, prior to a final battle with the forces of evil and the Last Judgement, was based primarily on Revelation xx. It had been pronounced unorthodox by the Church in 431 after its repudiation by Augustine.[2] Antichrist, "the deceiver" (2 John 7) was the "man of sin (who) as God sitteth in the temple" of 2 Thessalonians ii, 3-9. He had only been identified with the second beast of Revelation, certain elements of the prophecy of Daniel, and then with the Pope by medieval millenarians, notably Joachim of Fiore.[3] The distinction between the two is vital, however, because both Luther and Calvin, convinced anti-millenarians, arrived at a belief in the Papal Antichrist through Thessalonians and the orthodox elements of Daniel, and not through Revelation.

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1. This can be found in C.Hill, Antichrist in Seventeenth Century England (Oxford, 1971), 20.
2. P. Toon, ed., Puritans, The Millennium and the Future of Israel: Puritan Eschatology 1600 to 1660 (Cambridge, 1970), 14-15
3. M. Reeves, The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 1969), 107-8.

Their use of the Antichrist was historical and political rather than prophetical.[1] Antichrist was the deceiver who "exalteth himself above all that is God ... so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God" until "there come a falling away ... and that man of sin be revealed". He was only sustained by the "mystery of iniquity " and after his revelation the Lord would destroy the wicked.[2] This provided a precise analysis of the relationship of the Papacy to the Church. Using Daniel and Thessalonians, who, he stated "ont predit que l'Antechrist seroit assis au temple de Dieu ... Puisq'il est dit que le siège d'Antechrist sera au temple, par cela il est signifié que sa regne sera tel qu'il n'abolira point le nom de Christ ne de son eglise", Calvin was able to show that the papal institutions had never been part of the Church but imposed upon it. As the ruins of the temple (the Church) had survived, there were still some surviving remnants of the Church to be restored.[3] In 1521 Luther had made the same discovery and, reaching the important conclusion that the Antichrist was not an individual pope but the succession of the Papacy, determined that the reign of Antichrist had begun with Gregory the Great.[4]

Another early reformer who appreciated the significance of Antichrist was Knox. It was his first sermon, at St. Andrews in 1547, explaining the significance of the Papal Antichrist, which inspired the comment "others

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1. It was gratifying to find my research on this point confirmed by K.R. Firth, approaching it from the opposite direction: "no apocalyptic conclusions could be drawn from the identification of Antichrist with the Pope." The Apocalyptic Tradition in Early Protestant Historiography in England and Scotland, 1530-1655 (Oxford Univ. D.Phil. Thesis, 1971), p. 36.
2. 2 Thessalonians ii, 3-9.
3. Institution, IV, ii, 11; vii, 25, Bennoit, iv, 52-3, 146. See also de Loque, op. cit., 102-3, 113.
4. J.M.Headley, Luther's View of Church History (Yale U.P., 1963), 195-7, 201.

[pp. 6 and 7 reversed in binding]

first draft of Chapter xvi, section 8 of the Second Helvetic Confession of 1562.[1] The reason for the inclusion at such a late stage is probably due to the growing sense of direct confrontation with the Papacy and also to the counterattacks of Bellarmine and the Jesuits on the protestant interpretation of the Antichrist at the turn of the century. The latter was the cause of the great outpouring of controversial literature on the Papal Antichrist in the period 1590-1620, most of which was intended as a refutation of Bellarmine. It was to this debate that James I made his celebrated contribution.[2]

There was a third contributory factor to the controversy, which has often been overlooked. In 1600, the pastor of Nîmes, Jeremie Ferrier was arrested and summoned before the Parlement de Toulouse on a charge of lese - majesté for teaching the doctrine of the Papal Antichrist at the académie of Nîmes. When he claimed the liberty of the Edict of Nantes, which safeguarded Huguenot beliefs, it was refused on the ground that the Papal Antichrist did not appear in the French Confession. Ferrier's case was taken up by the Huguenot Synod of Gap in October 1603, where a number of divines, led by Mornay, pressed for a declaration that the Pope was the Antichrist to be included in Article 31 of the Confession. They argued that this had always been a fundamental belief and it was necessary to include such a declaration to protect others. The Synod accepted this and when Henry IV, anxious to prove his orthodoxy, forbade them to include the statement, Mornay appealed to the other Churches for their support. He received a lukewarm letter of support from James I; but his agent to the German universities was forbidden by the crown to return to France.

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1. P. Schaff, ed., The Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches (New York, 1877), 224, 481, 540, 657-8.
2. See below, pp. 155-58.

sawed the branches of the papistry; but he strikes at the root to destroy the whole."[1]

The Papal Antichrist therefore provided the key to the history of the Church in the period between the Primitive Church and the Reformation. All Roman institutions and practices were usurpations; yet in the ruins of the temple the Church had survived, for in every age a few individuals had practiced true religion. In this manner the perpetual visibility of the Church through succession of doctrine had been maintained. It is not difficult to see how central this view of the history of the Church was to Calvin's conception of the Church. The succession of doctrine was the answer to apostolic succession; this succession was "neither tied to any certain place, nor unto the multitude".[2] The study of both the reign of Antichrist and the visibility of the True Church was a major stimulus to the great works of protestant history.[3] The title of Richard Bernard's 1623 treatise, Look beyond Luther or an answer to that question, so often and insultingly proposed by our adversaries, asking us: "Where this our Religion was before Luther's time", is self-explanatory.

It is true that the identification of the Antichrist with the Papacy only appears in confessional statements at a late stage; first in the Second Scottish Confession of 1580, and then in the Irish Articles of 1615 (Article 80), and the articles of the Westminster Assembly of 1645 (Chapter xxv, part ii). The identification does not appear in any of the major continental confessions, although Bullinger did include it in the

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1. Knox, History of the Reformation in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1950), i, 84-86. See also J. Ridley, John Knox (Oxford, 1968), 56.
2. Beza, op. cit., Sigs. A, D2, (G4v). One can quote almost every major Calvinist theologian on this point.
3. On this see Firth, op. cit. It is noteworthy how this forms the background of even a quasi-religious history, when the central subject matter is secular. See, for example, W.Bradford, History of Plymouth Plantation (New York, 1908), 24, or L.Hutchinson, Memoirs of Colonel Hutchinson (1885), i, 8-9

Although the next synod, that of La Rochelle in 1607, was also prohibited from entering the declaration in the Confession, the issue stimulated a new round of controversy, to which Mornay's own Mystere d'Iniquite was a contribution.[1]

The historical research of the Reformation, in discovering a connection between the Reformed and the medieval heretics, brought about a revival of interest in the medieval millenarians, particularly Joachim of Fiore. Although the ultimate apocalyptic tendencies were not stressed, the role of the Papal Antichrist was extended from the realm of history to that of the present and the future. This new "orthodoxy" was established by Bullinger in his A Hundred Sermons upon the Apocalypse in which he overrode Luther's suspicions about the Revelation. Claiming the authority of Joachim, he claimed that the Papal Antichrist would last until the second coming, although he refused to attempt a prediction, leaving it to the will of God.[2] Orthodox Calvinism held this position steadfastly for the remainder of the period under discussion, despite the increased use of the terminology of the Revelation.[3] The later specifically apocalyptic studies associated with Napier, Brightman, Alsted, and Mede were a definitely novel development.[4]

The orthodox interpretation of Antichrist, that he was engaged in a

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1. Philippe de Mornay, Memoires et Correspondence (Paris, 1824), ii, 41-2. J. Quick, Synodicon in Gallia Reformata (1692), i, 22, 274-5, 316. H. Ouvré, Aubery du Maurier, Ministre de France a la Haye (Paris, 1853), 102-3. Mornay to La Fontaine, 16/26 Mar.1604, Corres., ix, 542-44. Sir G.Carew to Sir Thomas Edmondes, 29 Mar. 1607, B.M. Stow MS. 169, ff. 1-2
2. (English ed., 1561), Sig. Biii-v, pp. 385, 451, 593.
3. Reeves, op. cit., 489. See also R. Edwards to Sir Francis Walsingham, 10 Aug. 1586, Cal. S.P. For., xxi, pt. ii, 123-6; G.Downame, A Treatise concerning Antichrist (1603), 17; T.Taylor, Christ's Victorie over the Dragon (1633), 789-90; J.Hall, The Revelation Unrevealed, Works,(Oxford, 1863), viii, 295-7.
4. See Firth, op. cit., esp. 282-3.

struggle with the True Church which would end in his defeat and the second coming, did however provide the context for the political activities of the Church.

> Touching your request to be informed of the present state of foreign parts, as we here understand them to be in general, it shall not be amiss for you to remember that we of this age are fallen into those perilous latter times, which are forewarned us in scripture, wherein the enemy rageth the more extremely ... the chief instrument he useth is the Antichrist as a motive to all other princes he keepeth yet in bondage ... and particularly ... on every side they combine themselves together for the subduing of the Church of God ...[1]

To Englishmen, the Armada experience in particular was proof that a struggle on a scale heretofore unknown was upon them.[2]

The struggle between the Church and Antichrist was thus a parallel, on another plane, of the struggle between Christ and the Devil for the soul of the individual. Although for both the Church and the elect victory was assured, the struggle would/be severe and it was only through maintenance of true religion both personally and in the Church that it could be obtained. The ultimate sanctions for action remained spiritual.[3] Furthermore action was only to be pursued through traditional channels. In his desire to maintain the social order against the attack of the Anabaptists, Calvin was unwilling to consider novelties.[4] Instead he relied upon magistrates being animated by the Word in the performance of their duties to the commonwealth in the same manner/that other Christians were to perform their vocations. Even the celebrated right of resistance was an

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1. N.Faunt (a clerk of Walsingham's) to A.Bacon, 22 Feb.1583, T. Birch, Memoirs of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth (1754), i,28. See also W. Perkins, A Cloud of Faithful Witnesses, Works, iii,161; G.Gifford, Sermons upon the Whole Book of Revelation (Ded.to Essex,1599), Sigs. A2v-A3, A4.
2. R. Sparke to the earl of Huntingdon, July 1588, C.Cross, Puritan Earl; The Life of Henry Hastings, Third Earl of Huntingdon, 1536-1595 (1966),218.
3. A.Esmein, "La Theorie de L'intervention internationale chez quelques publicistes francais du xvi , siecle," Nouvelle Revue Historique de Droit, (xxiv (1900), 562.
4. M.Walzer, The ~~Army~~ Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics (Harvard U.P., 1965), 28, 40-41.

attempt to preserve the social order from the danger an ungodly magistrate could cause; its notoriety came only with attempts to employ it.[1] That such a godly commonwealth could be maintained was proved by the history of Israel in the Old Testament, the model of the godly state.[2]

The "revolutionary" aspects of Calvinism were therefore accidental rather than the result of conscious political experimentation. As long as the magistrate was godly, Calvinism could function equally well within the autocracy of the Palatinate, the semi-autocracy of Maurice of Nassau, the aristocratic constitutionalism of the English gentry or the French theorists of the 1570's, and the bourgeois republicanism of Geneva. As its ultimate sanctions were always spiritual it could either override class or national distinctions or reinforce them. It could provide the basis for a nationalist resistance and at the same time an international exile culture. International activity could function on both a class basis, the Mornay-Sidney relationship or the activities of the house of Nassau, or, in the case of assistance to the Dutch or French Rebellions, cut across class lines, with the aristocracy of one country assisting the petite bourgeoisie of another. As a result there was always a tension within Calvinist aristocratic leadership between their traditional class and political consciousness and the tendencies of their religious obligations. Owing [redacted] to the failure of Calvinism to provide a novel system of social and political relationships, there is always a point at which popular leaders, from William of Orange to Cromwell, turn against their followers. The

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1. Ibid., 59.
2. The role of Israel as the model for a godly commonwealth is found in Perkins, A Cloude of Faithful Witnesses, Works, iii, 97; and W. Gouge, The Churches Conquest over the Sword, in God's Three Arrows (1631), 177.

radicals of one period, the classic example is Mornay, became the conformists of the next.[1]

The sanctions for international political activity were therefore the same as those which inspired the magistrate to fulfill his duty to create a godly commonwealth - a zeal for the glory of God and the maintenance of the Gospel.[2] As the brethren abroad were one body with those at home, the danger to one part of the body, that favorite analogy, would affect the whole. On the spiritual level, love of the brethren, as expressed through charity, was a display of spiritual life and the love of God.[3] Prayer for the brethren was necessary; but "let us not love in word, neither in tongue; but in deed and truth".[4] Failure to respond to this could bring upon a community the curse of Meroz, a warning which resounded through so many sermons in this period:

> Curse ye Meroz, said the Angel of the Lord, curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof; because they came not to the help of the Lord against the Mighty.[5]

God had promised to preserve his Church against the ungodly and those who failed to assist his Church were surely among the unregenerate.[6]

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1. Walzer, p.187, argues that such a social organization was created in England in the seventeenth century, but this was the result of events rather than theory.
2. See M.Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York, 1958), 108, 115; W. Fulke, A Sermon at Hampton Court, 12 November 1570 (1571), Sig.H; Ibid., Praelections upon the Revelation of St. John (1573), Sig. *iiii; J.Knewstub, Lectures on Exodus xx (1578), 68-70; Perkins, A Treatise on Vocations, Works, iii, 752-54.
3. On the relationships within "the body", see Perkins, Exposition on Nehemiah, Works, iii, 235; R.Sibbes, Josiah's Reformation, Works (ed. Grosart, Edinburgh, 1862-64),vi,66; S.Buggs, David's Straits (1622), 57, 88. On the role of charity to the brethren see 1 John.iii, 3-7; The Second Admonition to Parliament (1572), in The Puritan Manifestos (ed. Frere and Douglas,1954),124,147; J.Stubbes, The Gaping Gulf (1579), 20, 86; J.Davenport, A Royal Edict for Military Exercises (1629), 16-17.
4. 1 John. iii. 18.
5. Judges. v. 23.
6. The major elements of this obligation are drawn from two important works of the 1620's discussed in more detail below: T.Gataker, A Sparke toward the Kindling of Sorrow for Sion (1621) and J.Preston, The New Life, in Sermons Preached before his Majesty (1630)

The struggle with Antichrist provided the context for this mutual assistance. Owing to the unwillingness to probe into the secrets of God and the lack of interest in making precise apocalyptic predictions, this struggle remained a markedly fluid concept and could be used to explain practically any political situation. The struggle could be depicted in optimistic terms, claiming that the end of Antichrist was near, or in pessimistic, warning that the struggle could be more violent and that no particular church could be guaranteed survival.[1] In the treatise Life Eternal, first published in 1630, John Preston urged the godly not to be disillusioned by the loss of a particular church as the Lord would restore his Church in time.[2] In the sermon The New Life of November 1626, he warned that the disappearance of a particular church would be final.[3] The war could be depicted in offensive terms, propagating the Gospel and bringing about the fall of Rome, or in defensive, protecting the Church from the assaults of Antichrist. Deliverance could come through human agents or the miraculous intervention of God.[4]

II.

The establishment of the Church of England by national political authority before its "reformation" made it the anomaly in the Reformed Church.[5] The Church had been defined in relation to its constitutional position within the kingdom and in relation to Rome by a system of ecclesiastical polity in which the main element was the autonomous national particular church subordinate to the sovereign. The revival of this polity at the accession of Elizabeth was to inhibit the absorption of the

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1. For the optimistic view see R.Bernard, The Bible-Battells (1629), 20-21; W.Gouge, God's Three Arrows, (1631), 332-3; R.Sibbes, The Churches Visitation, (1633), Works, i, 378. For the pessimistic, T.Taylor, Christ's Victorie over the Dragon, (1633), 298, 754.
2. 87-89, 109-10, 170, 201-2.
3. Sermons before his Majesty, 51.
4. For miraculous deliverance, see Preston, New Life, 51-52; for human, Taylor, op. cit., 270-71.
5. McNeil, op. cit., 128.

English Church into the greater Reformed Church. Furthermore the Queen soon established herself as the dominant influence in the Church. Motivated primarily by political considerations, the desire to remain on good terms with the Catholic states and to maintain the traditional social order, she threw her weight decisively behind the retention of the monarchial episcopate and the traditional liturgical practices.[1] Throughout the 1560's the Church continued to maintain the traditional Henrician outlook and its main doctrinal statement, Jewel's Apology, was concerned primarily in establishing autonomy in relation to Rome rather than defining a relationship to the Reformed.[2]

Archbishop Parker himself was of considerable influence in the establishment of a national eschatology, based on Eusebius and generally associated with John Foxe, in which the history of the Church culminates in a godly ruler. Mrs. Firth has recently shown that Foxe himself later rejected this in favour of the orthodox Calvinist eschatology, thereby removing one of the main supports of the argument, made by Haller, that the national church was a major belief of English Calvinists.[3] Confusion has also been caused by the use of the model of Israel by Calvinist theologians which has produced the "elect nation" theory. Israel provided the model for the internal functioning of any godly commonwealth; in the wider

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1. See the important work of W.P.Haugaard, Elizabeth and the English Reformation: The Struggle for a Stable Settlement of Religion (Cambridge,1968), 42, 181, 195-6, 198. J.H.Blunt, The Reformation of the Church of England (1882), ii, 585-86. G.Yule, "Continental Patterns and the Reformation in England and Scotland", Scottish Journal of Theology, xxii (1969), 315-16.
2. Jewel, An Apology for the Church of England, Works (Parker Soc., 1848), iii, 30, 74; The Defence of the Apology, ibid., iv, 40, 751. H.F. Woodhouse, The Doctrine of the Church in Anglican Theology, 1547-1603 (London, 1954), 113, 121.
3. Firth, op. cit., 110-12, 123-4, 151-52. Mrs. Firth bases her conclusions on the study of Foxe's Eicasmi of 1586; his position at this time can also be seen in his introduction to James Pilkington's Exposition on Nehemiah of 1585 (Works of Pilkington, Parker Soc., iii, 278-79).

sense of "God's People" it was used to describe the whole Church.[1] The idea of the national church was always an anglican one and it is revealing that Parker was very interested in the view, included in the Acts and Monuments, that Joseph of Arimathea established an episcopal church in England before Augustine, making the reformation a purely national one.[2]

There was, however, an alternative tradition in the Church which first clearly emerged in the reign of Edward VI when Cranmer began to realign the Church towards the continental churches and away from its Henrician independence, through his attempt to hold a major Reformed doctrinal council in England and the establishment of the "strangers churches" as experiments in presbyterian polity.[3] The events of the Marian exile reinforced this tendency.[4]

The relationship of the Church of England to the Reformed Church was defined principally by the internal dispute over discipline and the presbyterian polity. The presbyterians argued that by retaining episcopacy the Church of England was not in harmony with the rest of the "best reformed churches".[5] The impact of this was blunted, however, by the fact that during the primacy of Edmund Grindal from 1576 to 1583, as a result of the international situation and Grindal's attitude towards the Church, the Church of England entered into close relations with the churches on the

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1. See Preston, The New Life, 51.
2. McNeil, op. cit., 213-4. R.C.Strong, "The Popular Celebration of the Accession Day of Queen Elizabeth I", Journal of the Warburg-Courtauld Institute. xxi, (1958), 102-3. W.Haller's Foxe's Book of Martyrs and the Elect Nation (1963), 65.
3. McNeill, op. cit., 229-39, 250; also T.Cranmer, Works (Parker Soc., 1846), ii, 420-34 passim. F.A.Norwood, "The Strangers 'Model Churches' in Sixteenth Century England", Reformation Studies: Essays in Honor of R.H.Bainton (ed. Littell, Richmond, Va., 1962), passim.
4. See the interesting comment in Haller, op. cit., 77.
5. The First Admonition to Parliament (1571) and The Second Admonition (1572), Puritan Manifestos, 19, 95-96. "The Millenary Petition" (1603), B.M.Sloane MS. 271, ff. 20-1.

continent. Although the legal and constitutional position of the episcopacy was maintained, there was a certain defensiveness in Grindal's attitude to it and a willingness to compromise with the practice of the other churches.[1] The curious anomalies of the Elizabethan settlement originate from this period. Although the Strangers Churches had been reintroduced in 1559, Grindal was a particular patron of theirs; in 1576-77 the Channel Islands were permitted a presbyterian policy; in 1578 the English Church at Antwerp was granted the same privilege.[2] Perhaps his most significant action, and in retrospect one of his most controversial, was to license a Scots divine, John Morison, on the basis of his presbyterian ordination without demanding episcopal re-ordination.[3]

It was under his successor Whitgift that the first major effort was made to define the relationship between the Church of England and the Reformed Church on the issue of episcopacy. Whitgift himself, orthodox in doctrine, on predestination, and on the Papal Antichrist, held the Queen's view on the political importance of episcopacy. The position of the Reformed Church was irrelevant. He had already expounded this view bluntly in the Admonition controversy; the head of a particular church was the head of the state in which it lay and the internal practice of one particular church was of no concern to the others.[4]

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1. See P. Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement (1967), 165-7,188; also the eulogy of Grindal in J. Nichols, The Plea of the Innocent (1602), 9.
2. On the Strangers' Churches see P.Collinson, "The Elizabethan Puritans and the Foreign Reformed Churches in London", Proceedings of the Hugenot Society of London, xx (1965), 532-33, 537; F.de Schickler, Les Eglises de Refuge en Angleterre, (Paris, 1892), 230, 414-15. Significantly the only other primate esteemed similarly by the Strangers Churches was Abbot. On the Channel Islands see A.F.S. Pearson, Thomas Cartwright and Elizabethan Puritanism, 1535-1603 (Cambridge, 1925), 157-59. On the Antwerp Church see below, p. 31
3. E. Denny, The English Church and the Ministry of the Reformed Churches (1900), 62-63. N.Sykes, Old Priest and New Presbyter (Cambridge, 1956), 96.
4. Whitgift, Defence of the Answer to the Admonition, Works (Parker Soc., 1851-53), iii, 178, 369, Also Thos.Norton to Whitgift and Answer, Oct. 1572, ibid., i, 57-65

The fifth of his Articles of 1583, which demanded proof of ordination, was to bring the issue to a head. In 1584 Walter Travers was preferred to the mastership of the Temple but his appointment was refused by Whitgift on the ground that his presbyterian ordination was not legally valid.[1] Travers protested that:

> the communion of the Saints (which every Christian man professeth to believe) is such that the acts which are done in any True Church of Christ's, according to his word, are held as lawfull being done in one Church, as in another.

The Statute of 1571 accepted Roman ordinations, surely it must accept Reformed. Grindal had accepted his and other men's presbyterian ordinations. Whitgift answered that the Statute did not permit presbyterian ordination, that the case of William Whittingham, Dean of Durham, who had received presbyterian ordination at Geneva during the Marian Exile, was irrelevant as he did not have the cure of souls, the other cases were illegal, and Travers himself deserved no dispensation as he had deliberately sought presbyterian rather than episcopal ordinance. He concluded by reaffirming his general principle that the internal discipline of one particular church was of no concern to the others.[2]

This definition of the relationship with the Reformed Church, which we may term 'the Whitgiftian', was to remain that of the Jacobean and early Caroline Church. Although Reformed practice was irrelevant to England, the Church of England, as Whitgift himself believed, was firmly among the Reformed Churches and recognised as such.[3] The position of the Lutherans

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1. For the circumstances of Travers' ordination see below, p. 31. It is not clear whether Whitgift's primary purpose was to establish the principle or to keep Travers out of an important preaching post.
2. See Whitgift, Works, i, 478-79, 480-81, iii, 115-17, 182-85 Hooker Works, 552-53. Denny, op. cit., 28-29, 67-68. Compare Huntingdon's defence of Whittingham's ordination when that was questioned, Strype, Annals, ii, 174.
3. Whitgift to Beza, Feb. 1694, Works, ii, 169-72. Statement of Bishops, 1593, art. 6, Strype, Annals, iv, 240-41.

was often cited to prove that there was no such thing as unity of discipline among the Reformed.[1] It was in response to this that the puritans constantly used the phrase "best Reformed Churches", considering the Lutherans as backward as the Church of England and no model.

A modified Whitgiftianism was employed by those puritans who remained within the church in their debates with separatists. Both Cartwright and Perkins justified the Church of England as a True Church through its maintenance of true doctrine and, although it was not an absolute proof, the fact that all the Reformed Churches "give the right hand of societie ... to assemblies which are in England."[2] Although the major documents of Reformed unity, the Harmony of the Confessions and the "Geneva Book", were to have a long life with them, the separatists refused to accept this argument on the grounds that, as Browne said, "I will not enter into that question, whether the churches have power to sit in mens consciences."[3]

The consequences of Whitgiftian autonomism were soon revealed by the debate in the Temple between Richard Hooker and Travers in 1586. Employing, as seen above, the Calvinist analogy for the relationship between the invisible church and the particular churches, Hooker claimed all particular churches were autonomous and equal, including the Church of Rome. Although Calvin and Perkins accepted that there were probably small groups

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1. See the Whitgiftian defences of English ecclesiastical polity; T.Cooper Admonition to the People of England (1589) 72-74, 81-84; J.Bridges, Defense of the Government Established in the Church of England (1587),
2. T.Cartwright, Letter to Robert Browne, Cartwrightiana (ed.Peel and Carlson,London,1951), 52.Perkins, A Golden Chaine, Exposition on Nehemiah, The Combat between Christ and the Devil, Works, i, 307, iii, 265,iii, 388-89. See also I.Breward,"Williams Parkins and the Ideal of the Ministry in the Elizabethan Church", The Reformed Theological Review, xxiv (1965),79.
3. On the Harmony, see Bradford, Hist.of Plymouth Plantation, 202. On the "Geneva Book", see below pp. 32, 68?.R.Browne, An Answere to Mr.Cartwright, The Writings of Robert Harrison and Robert Browne (ed.Peel and Carlson, London, 1953), 453.

maintaining true religion within the Church of Rome, to claim that the Church of Rome as a whole was a True Church was a major attack on the whole Calvinist conception of the Church and its history.[1] The breach was made absolute by Bancroft's Paul's Cross sermon of 9 February 1589 which claimed that the episcopacy had been established iure divino. This was an attack on the Calvinist conception of the church which struck at its root, that the mark of a True Church was doctrine and not apostolic succession.[2] Bancroft also attacked apocalyptic history, challenging the Calvinist interpretation of the role of the Church in history. As Bancroft and his followers were mainly concerned with internal presbyterianism, the ultimate consequence of iure divino episcopacy, the "unchurching" of the presbyterian churches was not advocated; but the position of the Church of England had been shifted from full membership in the Reformed to a "via media" between the Reformed and Rome.[3] Bancroft received the support of Whitgift and both of them engaged in intrigues in Scotland to encourage James VI to restore episcopacy there.[4]

There was no immediate counter to the position of Whitgift and Bancroft and, unfortunately, we lack comment on the subject from the two most interesting late Elizabethan theological students. Sir Edwin Sandys never

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1. See Calvin, Institution, iv, ii, 11 (Pannoit, iv, 52-3); Perkins, A Golden Chaine, Expo.on Nehemiah, Works, i,304, iii,294, 328-9. For the Hooker-Travers debate see; S.J.Knox, Walter Travers (1962), 76-78; Travers' supplication against Hooker,Strype, Annals, iii,pt.i, 633-34; PRO S.P. 12/188/5; A Christian Letter ... unto Mr.R.Hooker (1599), 17; F.L.Baumer "England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom", Amer.Hist.Rev.,1 (1944), 4.
2. Previous "anglican" apologists,Jewell for example,had taken the Reformed position on the role of succession of doctrine,see W.M.Southgate, John Jewel and the Problem of Doctrinal Authority (Harvard U.P.,1962),194-7.
3. Sermon at Paul's Cross (1589),esp.7. J.M.Krumm, "Continental Protestantism and Elizabethan Anglicanism (1570-1595)", Reformation Studies,142-3. See also the Bancroftian treatise, T.Bilson, The Perpetual Government of Christ's Church (Oxford,1842), 333,341. Sykes, Old Priest, 63-65.
4. See Whitgift to Beza, Feb.1594, Works, ii, 170-71. G.Donaldson,"The Attitude of Whitgift and Bancroft to the Scottish Church", Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 4th Ser., xxiv (1942), passim.

finished his Relation of the State of Religion and the section on the Reformed is missing. His analysis of the struggle with the Papal Antichrist, which he believed in, shows an awareness of the need for the Reformed to unite in a more effective manner than heretofore to counter the unified forces of Rome.[1] William Perkins' marked disinclination to take a public stand on politically controversial subjects inhibited him from dealing with the problem.[2] Although he held the orthodox Reformed position on the structure of the Church, aside from his answer to the separatists, his works include no real discussion of the problem of the relationship of the Church of England to the Reformed.[3]

The Whitgiftian and Bancroftian conceptions of the Church were to coexist in the Jacobean and Caroline Church and even advanced Bancroftians, like Laud, would use the Whitgiftian position, which was essentially legal and constitutional, in their public statements.[4] The majority of Bancroftians were careful not to push their arguments to the point of unchurching the Reformed and in 1610 Bancroft cautiously admitted that a presbyterian polity was lawful in those countries where episcopacy could not be established.[5] This doctrine of "presbyterianism by historical necessity" was to be used as the principal explanation of the relationship between the Church of England and the Reformed Church by those members of the Jacobean and Caroline hierarchy who continued to hold the Whitgiftian position of

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1. Relation, Sigs. (S2v)-(S3v), T2-v, p. 3.
2. R.A.Sisson, "William Perkins, Apologist for the Elizabethan Church", Modern Language Review, lxvii (1952), 498, 500-1.
3. See above passim, also Perkins, His Problem of the Forged Catholicism, Works, ii, 598-99.
4. Laud, History of the Troubles and Trials of, Works (Oxford, 1857) iii, 386.
5. Woodhouse, Doctrine of the Church, 100-101. See also T.Rogers, The Catholic Doctrine of the Church of England (Parker Soc., 1854), preface, 6; R. Field, Of the Church (1606-10), iii, 76.)

uniformity in doctrine with the Reformed but autonomy of the national polity.[1] This group comprised the majority of the "Calvinist" bishops: George and Robert Abbot, James Montague, George Carleton, John Davenant, Joseph Hall, Thomas Morton, and the two pillars of the Irish Church, James Ussher and William Bedell. From their number was to come the core of the English delegation to the Synod of Dort and the position they took there was orthodox Whitgiftianism.[2] This position enabled them to refute Barneveldt's charge that the Counter-Remonstrants were the same as English puritans; "puritanism" was an issue of domestic non-conformity on matters of discipline, the Counter-Remonstrants were maintaining the doctrine of the Church.[3] Those still alive in the 1630's, Carleton, Morton, Davenant, Hall, Ussher, and Bedell, were to be the main episcopal supporters of the activities of John Dury.[4]

The involved logic behind their position did cause them considerable soul-searching and although they all held the basic Reformed position of the relationship between the universal Church and the particular churches, albeit with more emphasis on the national church, and believed in the Papal Antichrist, there was some difference of opinion on other issues.[5]

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1. Sykes, Old Priest, 69-82, 112; _____, The Church of England and the Non-Episcopal Churches in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (1948), 18.
2. Sykes, Church of England and Non-Episc. Churches, 23.
3. Sir D. Carleton to Sir R.Winwood, 18 Feb.1617, Letters to and from Sir Dudley Carleton ... 1616-20 (Hardwicke ed., 1775), 98-101 (Hereafter Carleton Letters).
4. Dury, Good Councils for the Peace of the Reformed Churches (1641); J.Davenant, Exhortation to Brotherly Communion betwixt the Protestant Churches (1641), passim.
5. R.Abbot, The True Antient Roman Catholic (1611), 43. Geo. Carleton, Directions to Knowe the True Church (1615), 1-2, 4, 50, 85; ___, Jurisdiction, Regall, Episcopall, Papall (1610), Sig.A2v, p.194. (G.Abbot), A Treatise of the Perpetual Visibility and the Succession of the True Church in All Ages (1624). J.Ussher, A Sermon Preached before his Majesty, 20 June 1624, Works, (ed.Elington and Dodd, Dublin, 1847-1864), ii, 481. 490, 495-6. W. Bedell, The Copies of Certain Letters between James Wadsworth and William Bedell (1624), 45-6, 79-81.

The question whether the Church of Rome, excluding the papal institutions, could be considered a True Church troubled both Bedell and Hall.[1] Hall and Carleton believed in a hierarchial polity and dabbled in iure divino episcopacy.[2] Ussher, on the other hand, whose relative freedom in the Irish Church enabled him to introduce the exceedingly Calvinist Articles of 1615, was prepared to accept presbyterianism.[3]

The extreme Bancroftianism of the Laudians, although they were careful to avoid absolutely unchurching the Reformed, led in practice to a complete severance of all ties between the English Church and the Reformed and to a denial of the historical conception of the Reformed Church. By the time of the royalist exile in the 1650s the majority of Laudians had reached the point of severance; only Cosin was prepared to associate with the Huguenots.[4] An early instance of this was Laud's clash with Abbot during his B.D. examination when he denied the perpetual visibility of the Church through succession of doctrine and insisted on the episcopal succession.[5] Another was the attack on Paraeus in 1622.[6] The position of the Laudians was considerably assisted by the growth of Arminianism on the continent as well as in England which produced a number of foreign protestant divines, Saravia was an early example, who accepted the Laudian position and provided further proof that the Calvinist position was not the only one held by the continental

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1. W.Bedell to S.Ward, 17 Feb. 1619 (?), Bodl.Tanner MS. 74, f.164. J.Hall to Sir John Eliot, 6 Feb. 1629, The Letterbook of Sir John Eliot, 1625-1632 (ed. Grosart, 1882), 40-3.
2. J.Hall, The Peacemaker, Works, vi, 610-11. Carleton, Bishop Carleton's Testimonie concerning the Presbyterian Discipline in the Low Countries (1642), passim.
3. On the Irish Articles see J. Collier, An Ecclesiastical History of Great Britain (1852), vii, 384-5. J.Ussher, Vindication, Works, i, cliii-iv.
4. R.S.Bosker, The Making of the Reformation Settlement: The Influence of the Laudians, 1649-1662, 83-84.
5. See the comments of Heylyn, Cyprianus Anglicus (1668), 53; and Prynne, A Breviate of the Life of William Laud (1644), 2.
6. See below, p.329.

churches.[1]

The issue became clarified during the battle over Richard Montagu in the Parliament of 1625 and the York House Conference. In his defence of Arminianism, Montagu claimed that Calvinism was a foreign importation which threatened social and political order in England. The Pope was not Anti-christ, the Church of Rome was a True Church and always had been, and doctrinal conferences such as the Synods of Dort and Gap were of no relevance to England.[2] The attack on Montague, both in Parliament and at York House, on the ground that he was advocating the separation of England from the Reformed Church, was answered by his essentially Whitgiftian defence that neither the Lambeth Articles, the Irish Articles, nor the articles of the Synod of Dort had been legally established in England. The suggestion that the Dort articles be legally introduced was rejected by Buckingham.[3] A further attempt to attack Montague's repudiation of the doctrine of the Papal Antichrist on the ground that it was a dishonour to James, who had proved the opposite, was foiled by Montague's acute observation that James's arguments had been political rather than religious.[4]

Given this atmosphere, Laud's efforts to purify the Church of England in the 1630s and rationalize the Elizabethan anomalies could only be seen, in the words of the twelfth charge against him at his trial, as an endeavour

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1. W.Barlow, The Summe and Substance of the Conference (at Hampton Court) (1604), 37-8, Sir D. Carleton to Walter Balcanquall, 23 Jan. 1626, PRO S.P. 16/19/32.
2. R.Montague, Appello Caesarem: or a Just Appeal from Two Unjust Informers (1625) 44, 69-71, 106, 137-38, 141-43, 158.
3. Debates in the House of Commons in 1625, ed. S.R.Gardiner (Camden Soc., new ser., vi, 1873), 71, 183. Letter of Laud, Neile, and Buckeridge to Buckingham, 7 Aug. 1625, Cabala sive scrinia sacra (1691),105-6. J. Cosin, The Sum and Substance of the Conference at York House ... Feb.1626, Works (Oxford, 1843-55), iii, 38, 80-81. Selden reminded the Commons of this problem in Feb. 1629, W. Notestein and F. Relf, eds., The Commons Debates for 1629 (Minneapolis, 1921), 119-20.
4. Cosin, Conference, 80-81; 1625 Debates, 49; see also below, pp. 156, 380.

to "cause division and discord betwixt the Church of England and the other reformed Churches".[1] In contrast to the increasingly nationalist stance of the hierarchy, its enemies had always taken a strongly internationalist position:

> Touching the word forreyne, though indeed the things desired by us are in all churches of other countreys fully reformed in doctrine with ours, yet these churches being all the same household of faith that we are, they are not aptly called forreyne ... All Churches and all members of the Church, in what country so ever they be, are not to be accounted forreyners one to another, because they are all citizens of heaven, and we all make one family or body.[2]

The acceptance of Arminianism by the hierarchy and its lack of concern for the state of the Church abroad was paralleled by the growth of covenant theology among puritan divines which saw the danger to the Church abroad as a sign that the covenant had been broken and the attitudes of the hierarchy as the cause for that breach.[3] Pym's speech, introducing the charges against Laud in 1645, in which he claimed that "unity with God's True Church everywhere is not only the beauty but the strength of religion", was heavily influenced by this view.[4] Thus, although the evidence of Laud's "malice" towards the Reformed Church, his rejection of the doctrine of the Papal Antichrist, the purge of the chaplaincies abroad in 1633, his opposition to the Palatine collection of 1634, and the attack on the liberties of the foreign congregations in 1634-35, may have been flimsy, its basis was the widespread belief that "to think well of the Reformed Religion is enough to make the Archbishop one's enemy."[5]

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1. W. Prynne, Canterburies Doome (1646), 27.
2. W.Bradshaw, A Myld and Iust Defence of Certaine Arguments (1606), 5.
3. See P.Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (New York, 1939), 476; also below, pp. 408-9.
4. Prynne, Canterburies Doome, 30.
5. Ibid. 389-99, 539-42. On the chaplaincies, see below, Appendix III. The comment comes from the earl of Northumberland to the earl of Leicester, 19 Dec. 1639, A.Collins, ed., Letters ... of State (1746) ii, 163 (hereafter Sidney Papers).

The rival conceptions of the nature of the Church of England provide a useful approach to the definition of the terms "anglican" and "puritan". If one defines as puritan the view that the Church of England should be an integral part of the Reformed Church, one has an ideological issue which transcends the complex questions of doctrine and conformity, links the "puritan episcopate", laymen, conformist divines, and separatists, and remains essentially constant throughout the period 1560-1640. This was an issue which was recognised as such by contemporaries; "a constant consideration of the state of God's Church abroad", or mourning "like Nehemiah" over disasters to the Church were conventions of puritan piety.[1]

The advocacy of assistance to the Church abroad, rather than rapproachment with the catholic powers or realpolitik, as the goal for English policy, I have termed "political puritanism". Although this refers primarily to a conception of foreign policy, it also reflects a certain interest in domestic reform. The specific positions taken on domestic reform, however, were heavily influenced by other considerations which are not relevant here. The position of political puritanism within the English political system was fundamentally defined by the fact that neither Elizabeth, James, nor Charles had any real sympathy for its goals. In contrast to the position in other Calvinist states, effective leadership could not come directly from the monarchy. The problem, therefore, was the manner by which political puritanism could obtain sufficient influence over the political structure to exert pressure on the crown.

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1. See the comments on Cartwright, Taylor, Gouge, Gataker in S.Clarke, A General Martyrologie ... and the Lives of Thirty-two English Divines (1677), 21, 126, 244-5, 257; On Samuel Crook, ibid., A Collection of the Lives of Ten Eminent Divines (1662), 45. Life of Robert Bolton, Works (1631-1641), i,24. Life of Joseph Mede, Works, (1664), i,xxix. Thos. Froysell, The Beloved Disciple (funeral sermon of Sir Robert Harley, (1656), Letters of Lady Brilliana Harley (Camden Soc.,lviii,1845), xxxviii.

Practically at the outset, by the mid 1570s, success was obtained in the traditional manner by means of a clientage network allied to Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, who was able to combine both an intimate relationship to the Queen and the leadership of the coalition which espoused political puritanism.[1] This coalition had two major sources of power. One was the interlocked group of great families centred about the Dudleys, which can be traced back to Northumberland's efforts to add stability to his faction; the other was the circle of government officials created by Sir Francis Walsingham.[2] The Leicester-Walsingham alliance was formed in the early 1570s and was symbolized by the marriage of Sir Philip Sidney to Frances Walsingham in 1583. By the end of the 1570s, however, the connections of clientage emanating from the two sources had become very much interrelated and the party should be considered as a whole.

The power of the coalition is best illustrated by the most famous statement of its defeated enemies - Leicester's Commonwealth.[3] Amid the attacks on Leicester is found an often overlooked description of the way Leicester "controlled" the country. The Lord President of the North was his brother-in-law Huntingdon, "his dearest in friendship". Wales was controlled by his brother-in-law Sir Henry Sidney (Lord President, 1580-86, followed by Pembroke, Sidney's son-in-law, 1586-1601) to say nothing of his own power. There is e v i d e n c e that Sidney's appointment was

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1. See the interesting remarks of Lionel Sharpe, a chaplain of Essex's, on the ability of Leicester and Essex to combine these roles. His suggestion that the system be revived is a revealing comment on its importance. Sharpe to Visc.Dorchester, 8 May 1629, PRO S.P.16/142/45.
2. For the Dudley connection see Table I.
3. The ex-supporters of the Anjou marriage later associated with Mary, Queen of Scots, see Leo Hicks, "The Growth of a Myth: Fr. Robert Parsons S.J. and Leicester's Commonwealth", Studies, xlvi (1957), 95, 101.

was more Leicester's desire than the Queen's.[1] Bedford (died 1585) was Lord-Lieutenant of the West. There was a spate of Leicesterian Lord Deputies of Ireland in the 1580's; Arthur, Lord Grey de Wilton (1580-82), Sir Henry Wallop (along with the Archbishop of Dublin, 1582-84), and Sir John Perrot (1584-88). The Governor of the Isle of Wight (until his death in 1583) was Sir Edward Horsey; of Jersey, Sir Amyas Paulet; and of Guernsey, Sir Thomas Leighton. Warwick was Master of the Ordnance, Sir William Pelham the Lieutenant, and Sir Owen Hopton, Leicester's "servant", Governor of the Tower. Sneering reference was also made to Leicester's contacts in the City of London such as Recorder Fleetwood.[2]

A number of these men had been associates of Leicester's from the time of the expedition to Le Havre (Newhaven) in 1562-63. This expedition was a crucial event in a number of ways. Not only was it the only attempt at open assistance to the continental protestants before 1585, but, as MacCaffrey and Collinson have shown, it was the first example of puritan-military alliance under Leicester's leadership.[3] Although Leicester was the moving spirit, the actual expedition was commanded by Warwick, with Henry Sidney, Leighton, Horsey, Pelham, and Henry Killegrew playing important roles. Killegrew, who had been an exile with the Huguenots during Mary's reign, was another link with Northumberland. He has been described as a Dudley retainer.[4] Other puritan figures involved included Cuthbert Vaughan and Sir Adrian Poynings and the divines William Whittingham and Christopher Goodman.[5] A Huguenot divine, Jean Veron, who had dedicated his Treating

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1. R.Whyte to Robt. Sidney, 12 Sept.1599, Sidney Papers, ii, 121-3.
2. History of Queen Elizabeth ("Leycester's Commonwealth"), (ed.F.J. Burgoyne (1904), 76-79.
3. W.T. MaCaffrey, Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime (Princeton, 1969), 126-7. P.Collinson, Letters of Thomas Wood, Puritan, 1566-1577 (Bull. Inst. Hist. Res. Special Sup. v, 1960), ix.
4. A.C.Miller, Sir Henry Killegrew (Leicester, 1963), 11, 20-1.
5. MacCaffrey, 130-1. Collinson, ibid.

of Freewill to Robert Dudley in 1561, was also present in the garrison.[1] Another, and perhaps more significant, figure associated with the Newhaven expedition was the first true puritan politician, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton. Like Killegrew the possessor of wide contacts in Huguenot circles, Throckmorton was the first major political figure to state publicly that religion had made a decisive change in the relationship between England and the continent.[2] The Newhaven expedition was in a sense the result of his alliance with Dudley which was to last until his death in 1571.[3]

The refusal of the Queen to contemplate another pro-protestant intervention after the failure of the Newhaven Voyage and his personal difficulties over the Queen's marriage and the succession go a long way to explain Leicester's erratic political behaviour in the late 1560s and early 70s. Throckmorton's course was similar. Leicester's alliance with the puritan divines is usually attributed to political expediency and dated from the early 1570s. It should not, however, be overlooked that puritan patronage was undertaken by all the members of his immediate family and could be traced back to his father.

Indeed on the local level one can see these connections operating in the 1560s. Both he and his brother Ambrose had great estates in Warwickshire (Ambrose was High Steward of Warwick borough and later Lord-lieutenant of the county). In the middle 1560's Leicester, along with Warwick, Huntingdon, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton and his brother Clement, Sir Thomas

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1. Collinson, ibid. E. Rosenberg, Leicester: Patron of Letters (New York, 1955), 203.
2. S. Haynes & W. Murdin, Collection of State Papers. (1740-59), i, 471-2 (hereafter Burghley Papers).
3. MacCaffrey, 126-7. See the comments of Leicester and Walsingham on his death; Leicester to Walsingham, 14 Feb. 1571: Walsingham to Leicester 5 Mar. 1571; Dudley Digges, The Compleat Ambassador (1655), 47-8.

Lucy, Sir Richard Knightley, and Sir Ambrose Cave, was a Governor of the Corporation of the Preachers of the Gospel of Warwickshire, which was also to supply divines to Leicestershire (seat of Huntingdon) and Northamptonshire (seat of Knightley).[1] In 1571 Leicester founded the hospital in Warwick which was later to provide a refuge for Cartwright. The Dudley connection with Lucy, the Throckmortons, and other important warwickshire gentry, e.g. Sir Fulke Greville the elder, was to dominate county politics.[2]

Another area of important Leicesterian connections was East Anglia. Although Leicester did not rank as one of the great landowners of the region, he had inherited lands there through Amy Robsart and had lived there during the 1550 s. He had also formed a close friendship with Roger, 2nd Baron North (of Kirtling, Suffolk), although the beginnings of this relationship are still mysterious.[3] North is a shadowy figure and has been seen as an eminence grise behind Leicester. Leicester's Commonwealth claimed that he persuaded Leicester to espouse the puritans "by way of policy".[4] North was High Steward of Cambridge and in 1588 Lord-lieutenant of Cambridgeshire. He was also a leader of the Suffolk puritan gentry.[5]

Another important Suffolk figure was Sir Robert Jermyn of Rushbrook who controlled ten livings.[6] A leading figure in the county (Knight of

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1. Charter of Incorporation c.1567. PRO SP 12/44/147a.
2. The Black Book of Warwick, ed. T.Kemp (Warwick, 1890), 308.
3. North was a witness at the marriage with Lettice Knollys in 1578. The closeness of the relationship can also be seen in North to Leic, 5 Sept. (?1584), Longleat, Dudley MSS., ii, f.304 The Bodleian North MSS. unfortunately contain nothing of interest.
4. Burgoyne, 21.
5. Collinson, Elizabethan Puritan Movement 220, 337.
6. Collinson, op. cit., 337.

the Shire 1584, 1586), he had been knighted in the progress of 1578, possibly through Leicester's influence. In 1582 he and two other Suffolk J.P.s were involved in a major battle with the bishop of Norwich over their support of puritan divines.[1] Despite the support of North and other gentlemen they were suspended from the commission of the peace until Leicester obtained their restoration in 1586.[2] Jermyn was a friend of William Davison and Sir Drew Drury.[3] Drury (who was Paulet's deputy as governor of Mary, Queen of Scots) was the son of Sir William Drury who was also connected with Leicester. He was a friend of Davison, Sir John Perrot, Essex, and Willoughby d'Eresby.[4] Leicester's Commonwealth refers to Leicester's "endless persecution" of Drury but there is no other indication of this.[5] At his house in Rougham, Suffolk, he protected the divine Oliver Pig.[6]

These gentlemen were among the chief protectors of the Suffolk classical movement.[7] Jermyn was very close to the Dedham classis which in 1587 appealed to him and Lord Rich to apply to the Council on behalf of the deprived ministers.[8] One of the issues in the clash between Jermyn and the bishop of Norwich was Jermyn's deferring the choice of ministers at Bury St.Edmunds to "Mr. Knewstub" rather than the bishop.[9] John Knewstub, rector of Cockfield

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1. Jermyn to Walsingham, Feb. 1582, Answers of bishop of Norwich, ibid., B.M.Egerton MS., 1693, ff. 87-89.
2. Leic. to Wal. 15 Feb. 1586 Cal. S.P. For. (Eliz), xx, 379
3. Jermyn to Wal., ibid.
4. N.H.Nicolas, Life of William Davison (1823), 179. J. Perrot to D.Drury, 20 April 1585, Bodl. Perrot MS., 1, f. 232-3. Essex to Davison, ?April 1589, Bodl. Tanner MS. 79, f. 46. D.Drury to Willoughby, 24 Jan. 1586, Hist. MSS. Com. Ancaster Mss., 17-19
5. Burgoyne, ill.
6. Jermyn to Wal. ibid. This was an issue in the clash with the bishop of Norwich.
7. Collinson, op. cit., 218-20.
8. The Minute Book of Dedham Classis, ed. R.G. Usher (Camden Soc., 3rd. Ser., viii, 1905), 61.
9. BM Egerton MS. 1693 f. 89.

was the great leader of Suffolk puritanism. Although there is no direct evidence to connect Leicester and Knewstub before 1585, of Knewstub's three major published works (all curiously between 1577 and 1579) one was dedicated to Warwick, another to Warwick's wife (both in return for support), and the last to "those gentlemen in Suffolk whom the true worshipping of God hath made more worshipfull."[1]

A further illustration of the East Anglican connection is provided by John Stubbes scaeva of Buxton, Norfolk, author of the Gaping Gulf. Although there is no proof of Leicester's or Walsingham's involvement in the book's production, in 1585 Leicester conferred upon him the stewardship of Great Yarmouth, where Leicester had been High Steward since 1572.[2] By 1586 Stubbes was secretary to Willoughby d'Eresby to whom he was distantly related. His sister married Cartwright, he was a friend to divines such as Knewstub, and Jermyn was a trustee of a use he drew up for his wife.[3] Willoughby d'Eresby himself, although there is no direct connection with Leicester before 1585, was definitely within the puritan aristocratic constellation. The son of Katherine, duchess of Suffolk, he had been born in exile in Germany. His friendship with Drew Drury lasted until his death when Drury, along with Lord Rich and Lord Zouch, was appointed guardian to his son.[4]

Leicester's close relationship with Walsingham was in existence by at least 1570-71 and replaced the earlier one with Throckmorton. Once Walsingham had become Principal Secretary in December 1571 there was a

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1. Dedications to Confutation of the Family of Love (1579), An Answeare (1579), Lectures on Exodus XX (1578.)
2. Rosenberg, 311. Stubbes was M.P. for Great Yarmouth in 1588.
3. John Stubbe's Gaping Gulf, ed. L. E. Berry (Washington D.C., 1968), 203-4.
4. G. Bertie, Five Generations of a Loyal House (1845), 439.

marked increase in "puritan" participation in government, particularly in diplomacy.[1] Yet even here the lines of patronage are blurred. William Davison is usually considered a Walsingham protégé, yet ~~the~~ he began his career as secretary to Killegrew in the 1560 s. Killegrew, although his rise was no doubt assisted by his marriage to Burghley's sister-in-law, was always a stauch Leicesterian.[2] Davison was distantly related to Leicester who always addressed him as "cousin Davison". A fascinating glimpse into the workings of this network can be found in the Killegrew-Davison correspondence of 1577-80.[3]

Davison, whose secretary for some years was the later separatist William Brewster, was a central figure, during his embassy to the Netherlands in 1578, in one of the more interesting efforts of political puritanism at this point - the establishment of the Merchant Adventures congregation at Antwerp as a presbyterian church on the model of the other foreign congregations, such as the French, in the Netherlands. He and the later diplomatic agent George Gilpin became elders in the church. This was capped by his and Killegrew's work with the London Conference to obtain the chaplaincy for Walter Travers. He must, therefore, have supported Travers's deliberate seeking of presbyterian ordination in May 1578 from the influential Huguenot divine Pierre l'Oysleur de Villiers.[4] Even Walsingham had his doubts but he and Davison supported Travers in his refusal to use the Book of Common Prayer and probably his introduction of

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1. This was first noted by Conyers Read, see Collinson, Eliza. Pur. Move., 166.
2. Miller, Killegrew, 184.
3. Only part of this correspondence survived and is mostly Killegrew to Davison; it is found in Cal. S.P. For., xi, and xii, and Cal. S.P. Dom. Addit., 1565-79, 519-49 passim, 1580-1625, 25-6.
4. There is evidence that Travers was followed in receiving presbyterian ordination from l'Oysleur de Villiers by Robert Wright, chaplain to Lord Rich and tutor to Essex. See Strong,"Eliza.Accession",100; J.Strype, Life of Whitgift (Oxford, 1822), i,477; Life of John Aylmer (1701), 83.

the old "Geneva Book" (the "Book" of the "Bill and Book" of 1584), The Book of the form of Common Prayer according to the Use of the Reformed Churches, which was to have such a long life in the English community in the United Provinces.[1] When Travers retired in 1580 he was succeeded by Cartwright.

Leicester's precise role in these relationships is made difficult to determine by the loss of the great part of his correspondence, particularly letters to him. The Dudley MSS. at Longleat have great gaps in them, particularly in the period 1582-87, and it is thought that many of his papers were destroyed in the siege of Kenilworth during the Civil War. We have one letter from Sir Francis Hastings, which also mentions Sir Richard Knightley as close to Leicester, but there must have been others.[2] Similarly only one of his secretaries, Jean Hotman, has left any papers. The loss of those of the mysterious Arthur Atye, his chief secretary in the 1580s, is particularly unfortunate.

Leicester's interest in soldiers was not unrelated to the general direction of his patronage. Sir William Pelham, regarded for many years as the leading professional and Lieutenant of the Ordnance under Warwick, had been associated with Leicester since the 1560s.[3] His family were among the leaders of Sussex puritanism and he was a good friend of William

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1. B.M.Addit. MS., 6394, ff. 103, 104-5, 106-7. P. Collinson, "John Field and Elizabethan Puritanism", Elizabethan Society and Government (1961), 140; Knox, Travers, 43, 47-48; C.Read, Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth. (Oxford, 1925), ii, 264-5. For the Geneva Book, see Collinson, Eliz. Pur. Move., 286-7, and below pp.68,445. This congregation later moved to Middleburgh and in 1620/21 to Delft, A.C.Carter 'The Ministry to the English Churches in the Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century,' Bull. Inst. Hist. Res. xxxiii (1960), 166 .
2. F. Hastings to Leic. 10 Oct. 1578. Longleat, Dudley MSS, ii, 191.
3. Sir Roger Williams, The Actions in the Low Countries, (1618), 86. Williams may have been somewhat snide here as he blamed Pelham for the loss of Sluys in 1587.

Davison.[1] A similar figure was Sir John Perrot, a leading Pembrokeshire landowner and an ally of Leicester's in Welsh politics in the 1570s.[2] He was Lord Deputy of Ireland 1584-88 and he and Leicester were working together in the creation of a university in Dublin.[3] Raleigh was briefly a client of Leicester's and his breach with Leicester (by 1586) may have been caused by a quarrel with Perrot.[4] It was Leicester who assisted John Norris to begin his military career - a source of bitterness to both of them later.

Perhaps the most interesting of Leicester's "military" clientage was the mathematician and military theoretician, Thomas Digges. His Straticticos (1579) was dedicated to Leicester and he was M.P. for Southampton in the Leicester interest in 1584. Leicester was godfather to his son Dudley in 1583. Digges also drew up the Bond of Association, which was sent out over Leicester's signature.[5] He was later the author of two published justifications of Leicester's activities in the Netherlands, the Briefe Report (1587) on the 1586 campaign and the Briefe and True Report (1590) on that of 1587. The second was a posthumous defence of Leicester, the first may have been part of a public relations campaign.[6]

Even in his protection of puritan divines, Leicester was not acting

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1. R.P.Manning, Religion and Society in Elizabethan Sussex (Leicester, 1969), 264. Pelham to Davison, (Aug.1585), PRO S.P. 84/63/361.
2. J.E.Neale, The Elizabethan House of Commons (1963) 245-6. Perrot to Leic., 31 Oct. 1578, L.Howard, A Collection of Letters (1753), i, 313-4.
3. Perrott to Leic., ?Sept. 1585.Bodl. Perrot MSS., i, ff. 136v-38.
4. W.M.Wallace, Sir Walter Raleigh (Princeton, 1959), 49-50. Compare Raleigh to Leic. 25 Aug. 1581, E.Edwards, Life of Raleigh (1868), i, 17-18, with Raleigh to Leic. 29 Mar. 1586, Leicester Correspondence, ed. J.Bruce (Camden Soc., xxvii 1844) 193-4
5. Leic. to Lord Chandos, 4 Oct. 1584. (17th century copy of a circular letter) Bodl.Clarendon MSS, i, ff. 13-14.
6. Briefe Report, Sig. (E2). Both pamphlets are anonymous but Digges identifies himself as the author of Stratioticos in the Briefe and True Report, p. 11.

as a"lone wolf" but as a member of a well established system of patronage. The key figure here was his elder brother Warwick, whose relations with men such as Thomas Wood or John Field were older and much closer. Field had been under Warwick's protection since the early 1560s.[1] Warwick's defence of Leicester to Wood, "that God which hath made him an instrument for his church heretofore will continue or rather increase his zeall to that end", suggests that Warwick was the more reliable.[2] Appeals were made to both men together.[3] Field dedicated the Caveat to Parsons Howlett (1581) and his translation of Mornay's Treatise of the Church (1579) to Leicester, and his translation of Olevian's Exposition of the Symbols of the Apostles (1581) to Warwick, "my singular patrone". Dudley Fenner dedicated his Book of Religion (early 1580's) to both men, whose protection was "a most safe comfort and sanctuary."[4]

They often combined with their brother-in-law Huntingdon.[5] An example of this is provided by the career of Matthew Hutton, an associate of Grindal's and a moderate episcopalian (he accepted Whittingham's presbyterian ordination). His early career was very much under the aegis of Leicester and Huntingdon and he was Huntingdon's candidate as Archbishop of York in 1594.[6] Toby Matthew's soliciting for the deanery of Durham provides another example, while the obtaining of the rectory of Guisley,

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1. Collinson, "John Field", 129.
2. Warwick to T. Wood, 16 Aug. 1576, Collinson, Letters of Wood, 11-12
3. Wood to Warwick and Leicester, n.d., ibid., 22-3.
4. B.M.Harleian MS. 6879. The introduction is by Cartwright.
5. See Giles Wiggington to Walsingham, Feb. 1587, The Second Part of a Register, ed. A.E.Peel (Cambridge, 1915), ii, 238-45.
6. Hutton was to support Essex in 1599-1600 and the puritans in 1604. See Correspondence of Matthew Hutton, ed. N. Surtees (Surtees Soc., xvii, 1843), xix, 56, 71. Burghley to Robert Cecil, 5 Oct. 1594, F. Peck, Desiderata Curiosa (1779), i, 167. R. R. Reid, The King's Council of the North (1921), 227.

Yorkshire, for Robert More, in early 1580s, involved a great number of noble patrons including Warwick, Huntingdon, Bedford and his daughter the countess of Cumberland, Oxford, Walsingham, and Willoughby d'Eresby, who paid most of the fee for the rectory and later gave it to More.[1]

Although the strong position of puritanism in the 1570s and 1580s owed a great deal to the organizational ability of John Field and the London Conference, neither that nor the classical movement could have survived for very long without the protection provided by Leicester, Walsingham, and their allies. The failure of Essex to achieve a similar position and to extend a similar protection was to doom this form of organisation. On a wider plane, the position of the Leicesterian coalition at court was to provide the goal for the activities of political puritanism for the next forty years. The effort to create an ersatz Leicester, in the person of Somerset or Buckingham, was until the latter half of the 1620s to be the major political manouevre of the party. Only after the failure of Buckingham in 1625 and Pembroke in 1626 to provide adequate leadership did political puritanism turn, faut de mieux, to the House of Commons and the "country" and repudiate the court.

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1. T. Matthews to Sir Thos. Heneage, 7 Sept. 1581, N. H. Nicholas, Memoirs of Sir Christopher Hatton (1847), 191-2. Will of R.More, R.A. Marchant, The Puritans and the Church Courts in the Diocese of York, 1560-1642 (1960), 212-14.

2. Leicester's Expedition to the Netherlands:

The Conception of the Enterprise

A foreign policy based primarily on religious considerations was a novelty of the Reformation. Within the medieval corpus christianum, with few exceptions, relations between political bodies had been governed by political rather than religious considerations. In the first half of the sixteenth century English policy, despite the effects of the Henrican schism with Rome and the fears of the hegemony of Charles V, had been based almost completely on the traditional hostility to France and alliance with the Burgundian Netherlands and with Spain. This policy was also held by Elizabeth, whose views remained fixed on conservative lines. The Queen never wholeheartedly accepted the political repercussions of the Reformation; while she was prepared, for propaganda purposes, to act as "nursing-mother" to the churches, her position was always somewhat apart and her political assistance to the churches always the result of political calculations.

With the exceptions of the Scottish expedition of 1559-60, which could be justified on political as well as religious grounds, and the Newhaven Voyage of 1562, the failure of which was partially due to the Queen's attempt to derive political advantage from a nominally religious enterprise, the aims and conduct of Elizabeth's policy remained traditional during the first decade and a half of the reign. The major change in direction came in the early 1570s, the result of developments in the international situation, not the least of which was the Papal Bull which marked the failure of Elizabeth's efforts to avoid a clash with Rome, and the rise of Leicester and Walsingham to an influence equal to that of Burghley's. The new view of politics which saw the religious struggle as the dominant element in international affairs, expressed first by Throckmorton in 1568

of the Palatinate to be sent to Orange's support if Don Juan repudiate
the Pacification, had been negotiated by Philip Sidney in his embassy
Casimir

and then in the correspondence between Leicester and Walsingham in 1571, found perhaps its most sweeping expression in John Stubbes' Gaping Gulf:

> They suffer themselves to be abused which believe the Frenchmen when they say that England is unfurnished of friends, neither in perfect league nor good opinion nor near alliance with any prince in Christendom. Our alliances are better than his and more assured,... we have the Lord's right hand on our side and all the hearts and hands of those of our religion.[1]

The late 1570s saw not only the consolidation of political puritanism in England but also the establishment of the Calvinist parties in France (the Peace of Monsieur, 1576) and in the Netherlands (the Pacification of Ghent, 1576). The latter was particularly important as her support for the Pacification was Elizabeth's first public commitment to the protection of a continental protestant movement since the early 1560s. The position of William of Orange under the Pacification in turn produced the first Leicesterian-inspired project for a general protestant military alliance. The essential elements of the project, an English expeditionary force under Leicester supported by a second army under John Casimir and Orange in the summer of 1577.[2] The disinclination of Elizabeth and the catholic-dominated States-General to push matters to a conclusion prevented the project from coming into effect. Twice during the winter of 1577-78 Leicester nearly obtained his expedition but was foiled at the last moment by the second thoughts of Elizabeth or the States. In the end Elizabeth decided to send English volunteers and use Casimir solely as a subsidized mercenary, a compromise liked by no one.

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1. Stubbes, Gaping Gulf, 86. Throckmorton to Burghley, 18 Sept. 1568, Burghley Papers, i, 471-72. For the Walsingham letters, see Collinson, Letters of Thomas Wood, xxv.

2. Sidney, "Relation of the State of the Prince of Orange" (May), Casimir to Sidney, 24 Aug. 1577; J.M.B.C. Kervijn de Lettenhove, Relations Politiques des Pays-Bas et de l'Angleterre sous le Regne de Phillippe II (Brussels, 1882-92), ix, 309-14, 479.

Leicester's plans received the full support of his followers. Sir Amyas Paulet regretted his absence in France; "I think myself unhappie that I am not in England at this time to offer unto your L ordshi p my Symple service in this voiage..."[1] Killegrew commented that Leicester was "minded to do God and his prince a notable service. I am a forespoken soldier of his and shall think my life well spent."[2] In default of Leicester, the dispatch of the volunteers was a subject of godly attention. The case of one young East Anglian gentleman, William Woodhouse, is a good example. John Stubbes recommended him to Davison, using Walter Travers (associated with Davison and Killegrew congregation in the establishment of the Merchant Adventurers in Antwerp) as a reference as well as "this band of Christian love which is between the faithful." A similar recommendation came from Killegrew, who in turn had been approached by Sir Drew Drury, "a godly gentleman who will not forget any favour you will show him."[3] Leicester himself recommended the commander of the volunteers, John Norris.[4]

The situation was transformed in the Spring of 1578 by the Duke of Anjou's offer of assistance to the States-General. This alternative "compromise" solution was accepted by Elizabeth and became the basis for the "courtship", a tactic which would both enable her to use Anjou and to prevent him from taking personal and independent control of the Low Countries. Anjou was also accepted by Orange, not only as a source of immediate military assistance but also as a means of keeping the allegiance of the catholics in the States-General rather than having to rely on the Flemish radicals. Although he did not trust Anjou personally, he was

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1. Paulet to Leic. 24 Jan. 1578, Bodl. Addit. MS. C. 82,ff. 5v-6v.

2. Killegrew to Davison, 15 Oct. 1577, Cal S.P. Dom., Add., 1565-1579, 519.

3. Stubbes to Davison, 30 Apr. 1578, Berry, 106-7. Killegrew to Davison, 8 May, 1578, Cal.S.P.For, xii, 670-1.

4. Leic. to WD, 26 May 1578, Kervijn de Lettenhove, x, 453-4.

relying on the marriage with Elizabeth both to bring the Queen into the alliance and to keep Anjou under control. The growing number of Hugenots in his entourage, Mornay, Languet, and the divine Pierre L'Oysleur de Villiers; the search for a "politique solution" to the Netherlands situation; and his personal dislike of the radicals of Flanders and Brabant all caused a major shift of Orange to the right against protestant radicalism and towards political support from France.[1]

As a result Orange broke not only with the radicals but also with his "ally" Casimir, whom the States had never liked. In turn Casimir and the radicals came together in a protestant alliance on 10 October 1578.[2] This development came as a shock to the English. Killegrew had felt, "In my judgement I think it most fit that the Prince of Orange should join with Gantoys though not in open shew, for their course makes more for his strength and his surety, and for the advancement of the Gospel..."[3] Walsingham regarded the affair as the result of the "lewde advice" of Casimir's agent Pierre Beuttrich who had been involved in similar activities among anti-Navarre Huguenots.[4] Leicester was genuinely perplexed by this breach, particularly by Orange's position, as "all his actions" had shown that he "chiefly sought the advauncement of the glorye of God & furtherance of his gospell."[5] He asked Daniel Rogers to attempt a reconciliation between Orange and Casimir but it was unsuccessful.[6]

The problem of Casimir was resolved by the ending of the English subsidy at the end of 1578. Although he was publicly fêted by Leicester on his

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1. On Mornay's activities see G.L. Hunt and J.T. McNeill eds., Calvinism and the Political Order (Philadelphia, 1956), art. "Mornay", p.57.

2. On these developments see the important work of T. Wittman, Les Gueux dans les Bonnes Villes de Flandre (1578-1584), (Budapest, 1969), esp. 215-66 passim.

3. Killegrew to Davison, 1 Nov. 1578, Cal S.P. For., xii, 225-6.

4. Wal. to Davison, 12 Nov. 1578, Kervijn de Lettenhove, xi, 128-9.

5. Leic. to Davison, 12 Dec. 1578, B.M. Harleian Ms. 285,ff. 65-6.

6. Leic. to Davison, 31 Dec. 1578, ibid., ff. 73-4.

visit to England in January and February 1579, Elizabeth had decided firmly to employ the Anjou solution and Casimir retired to the Palatinate. Davison was withdrawn from the Netherlands in May 1579 and not replaced. In August Orange regained control of Ghent and the radicals fled to the Palatinate. The "Anjou courtship", which began in earnest in January 1579, dominated English politics for the next two years and, by placing Leicester and his party on the defensive, prevented any fresh initiatives.

Whatever the investing of Anjou with the sovereignty of the Netherlands was to achieve, any hopes for a solution were to be quickly destroyed by the "French fury", his attempted catholic coup in Antwerp in January 1583. By this time Orange had become deeply committed to a "French solution", symbolized by his fourth marriage, in May 1581, to Louise de Coligny, daughter of the Admiral. This identification with France caused a split in his supporters, many of whom, especially in Flanders, preferred, in defense of traditional liberties, to return to the sovereignty of Philip II.[1]

The collapse of Anjou, on the other hand, proved to some, notably Mornay, that the politique solution was bankrupt and that the only course was a protestant alliance. The conversion of the Archbishop of Cologne, Gebhard Truchess, in 1582 held out a promise of reviving German interest. However, when these suggestions were made by Navarre's agent Jacques de Ségur, sieur de Pardillan, to Elizabeth in July 1583 she showed no interest and continued her support for Anjou.[2]

The split in the Orange movement enabled Parma to recapture, by the end of 1584, the great Flemish cities and to invest Antwerp. The death of Anjou in May 1584 and the assassination of Orange in July completed

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1. Wittman, p. 346, 382.

2. Ibid., 358-9. 358-9. Mornay, "Discours a M. de Valsingham pour Induire la Roine...a Embrasser l'Union du Roi de Navarre et des Princes Protestant D'Allemagne", Memoires et Correspondence, ii, 235-41. L. Anquez, Henri IV et L'Allemagne (Paris, 1887), 8-9.

the collapse of Orangeism and three factions emerged in Dutch politics. The Orange rump, led by his widow, Villiers, and to a certain degree by Ste. Aldegonde and encouraged by the French agent La Roche des Pruneaux, remained faithful to the French connection - even after Henry III's decision not to accept the sovereignty.[1] A vague group, necessarily anonymous, regarded reconciliation with Philip II as inevitable. In the surrender of Antwerp, Ste. Aldegonde was to show himself to a certain degree a member of this group.[2] The third group, predominantly the oligarchs of Holland and Zealand led by Paul Buys, were determined to achieve at least provincial independence, but were prepared to accept English sovereignty if it would provide them protection from Philip II.[3] In this they were supported by the radicals.

Elizabeth would have preferred Henry III to continue political support for the Netherlands.[4] An initial appeal of the Dutch for English support in August 1584 was refused and joint assistance with France proposed.[5] This in turn was refused by the French. By the end of 1584 a rapid deterioration of the situation in France had begun. The new position of the King of Navarre in the succession created by the death of Anjou led in December to the alliance of the house of Guise and the proto-leaguer organizations and in January 1585 to their alliance with Philip II. This pressure caused Henry III to refuse the sovereignty of the Netherlands on 17/27 February. This was followed in March by the Declaration of Peronne publicly announcing the Holy League. In June Henry signed the Treaty of Nemours with Guise and on 15 July published the Edict of St. Maur proscribing the religion pretendue reformee.

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1. Kervijn de Lettenhove, Les Huguenots et Les Gueux (Bruges, 1883-85), vi, 380.

2. Wittman, 386-88.

3. R.C. Strong and J.A. Van Dorsten, Leicester's Triumph (Leyden, 1964), 18-19.

4. Instructions for Sir Philip Sidney, 8 July 1584, B.M. Cotton MS. Galba E vi, ff. 252-4. This was an abortive mission to Henry III.

5. Wal. to Sir Ralph Sadler, 2 September 1584, The State Papers ... of Sir Ralph Sadler, ed. A. Clifford (Edinburgh, 1809), ii, 307-10.

From the autumn of 1584 it was understood that sooner or later initiatives would have to be taken in the Netherlands and Davison was sent there in November.[1] The simultaneous crisis in France made the situation more delicate. In the early part of 1585 Sir Arthur Champernoun had been sent to promise support to Navarre if attacked and Thomas Bodley to Germany to investigate the possibilities of German assistance.

As part of the general plan James VI of Scotland was to be neutralized and in July 1585 this was accomplished at the price of a pension of £4000 p.a.. James's attitude was in large part the result of the closeness of the current Scots favorite, Patrick, Master of Gray, to Leicester and Sidney.[3] Yet Elizabeth was careful not to combine this into a general protestant league. James was not pressed into supporting her foreign policy. Navarre was supported as a counterweight to Guise, not as a protestant champion. Thus although Ségur had been in England since May, it was only after the passing of the Edict of St. Maur that Elizabeth offered Navarre a subsidy of 50,000 écus (about 15,000) to raise a German army.[4]

Her reasons may have been in part financial. There was, however, a major political decision involved - a compromise solution was still to be sought in the Netherlands. Parma and Philip II were to be persuaded to maintain the "Burgundian liberties" and some degree of religious toleration by the threat of English military intervention. This was the background to the provisions of the Treaty of Nonsuch and her refusal of the sovereignty. Her army was to be engaged in a holding action not a liberation of the south. The famous budget of £126,180 10s p.a. was, as Walsingham described it, for the "ordinary garrison", not to provide for

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1. C. Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth (New York, 1960), 307-310.

2. Read, Walsingham, iii, 94-5.

3. Master of Gray to Archibald Douglas, 8 July 1585, E. Lodge, Illustrations of British History (1838), ii, 264-68.

4. Anquez, 11-12.

major military operations.[1]

This was also the reason why, in violation of the treaty itself, Sir John Smith was sent to Parma in August 1585 to inform him secretly of its contents and to suggest a compromise peace.[2] The printed Declaration of the Causes moving the Queen... to give aid to the ... people ... in the Low Countries of 1 October 1585 hinted directly at this type of solution. After declaring that Philip II's proclaimed defence of the catholic faith was only a pretence for political tyranny, it went on to state that Elizabeth's reason for assisting the States General was to prevent them from becoming so oppressed that they would attempt total independence.[3] It is interesting that Walsingham was not happy with the Declaration and wished the Dutch to be consulted: "it may be that there is somewhat contained therein that haply may more prejudice the cause than yield benefit in point of justification."[4]

The intervention in the Netherlands was thus not to be an inspiration for a protestant coalition.[5] Whatever assistance that could be obtained from Germany was to be used for Navarre not for the Netherlands. Willoughby's embassy to the King of Denmark in the Autumn of 1585 was solely to obtain assistance for Navarre.[6]

Despite this very careful manoeuvering, Elizabeth was unable to avoid one commitment. Her policy depended on the ability of the United Provinces

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1. A. Douglas to Master of Gray, 21 Sept. 1586, Hist. MSS Comm. Salisbury MSS, xiii, 307-9.

2. G.F. De Jong, "The Earl of Leicester's Administration in the Netherlands 1585-86" (Univ. of Wisconsin Ph.D. thesis 1956, BM microfilm), 65-7, quoting Cal. S.P. For., xix, 671-3.

3. Declaration (1585), 6, 9.

4. Wal. to Burghley, 12 Oct. 1585, quoted in C. Read, "William Cecil and Elizabethan Public Relations", Elizabethan Society and Government, 42.

5. This was noted for example by La Fontaine, see La Fontaine to Ségur, 27 Aug./6 Sept. 1585, quoted in F.H. Egerton, Life of Thomas Egerton (Paris, 1828), 433.

6. Considerations concerning negotiations of Germany and Denmark, early Nov. 1585, Cal. S.P. For. xx, 134-6.

to stave off a collapse in order that a compromise could be reached. The surrender of Antwerp by the previously resolute Ste. Aldegonde was dramatic evidence that such a collapse was not impossible. Therefore, although she refused the sovereignty, she was forced to provide the Dutch with a man of prestige, "vous assister de son advis et conseil au gouvernement, comme vous en avez requise".[1] Furthermore, despite the fact that it was desired that he should act "in like manner as other governor-generals or as the Prince of Orange", and that he strongly opposed the whole course of her policy, there was only one man who could be sent.[2]

To political puritanism the basic element in the situation was the duty of the churches to assist their brethren:

> for the common Citties of God there ought to be a common defence. But the churches of all cuntries are the common Citties of God, therefore for them there ought to be common deffence.[3]

Similarly "A very honorable union to bothe the countreyes of Englande and the lowe Countryes" found that the union tended greatly to the Queen's honour "and greater honor Her Majestie cannot doe unto God, than to ayde his holly ones, to give a freer passage to his woorde, whereby the number of his sayntes may be increased."[4] A slightly later memorandum placed religious duty squarely against political motives for a peace;

> we should not suffer our brethren most cruelly to be murthered for the profession of Christ's true religion, and sit still untill the churches of those countrys be utterly wasted and ruinated.[5]

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1. QE to States General 3/13 Sept. 1585, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, ed. H. Brugmans (Utrecht, 1931), i. 2-3. See also F.G. Ostenhoff, "The Earl of Leicester's Governorship of the Netherlands, 1585-1587" (Univ. of London, Ph.D. Thesis, 1967), 54.

2. Christopher Rolls to Davison, 22 Nov./2 Dec. 1585, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 175.

3. "Reasons for Her Majestie to aid the Low Countries", 1585, B.M. Harleian MS. 285,f. 125. Harley 285 is predominantly Davison papers, this may be a product of his staff.

4. B.M. Harleian MS. 6353, f. 35v.

5. "Resolution of some doubts...to move simple people to embrace conditions of peace offered by the Spaniards", c.1586, B.M. Harleian MS. 7188,f. 161.

Willoughby d'Eresby argued that "it agreed with God's word to use ordinary means and not to wait for miraculous deliverance" so that afflicted brethren might "haply find charity in some one corner of the world."[4]

The political ramifications of this position were not only the acceptance of the sovereignty of the United Provinces but also the rallying of a protestant coalition about the intervention. What this would involve was predicted by William Herle. If the Queen would raise the siege of Antwerp she would inspire the rebellion of "the citties all-ready capitulated" and then "effectually assisted by the King of Denmark, the prynces of Germany (who never favoured the French, nor the Prynce of Orenge Course) will back her Majestie & join to restore Truxes to the Sea of Collyn ...."[2] He was especially insistent that the German backwardness was due to their distrust of the French and that action by the Queen would "awaken all Germanie out of sleep to backe and assiste the cause."[3]

In the first flush of enthusiasm after Leicester's appointment, Palavicino revealed the hopes for the expedition.

> Nous i aurons des forces assés, pour la defensive de celes provinces, que nous prenons à defendre, et aussi pour vous secourir, un jour, en France, car, j'estime que ainsi que nos ennemis se joignent ensemble tous pour nour faire du mal, que aussi la necessité nous apprendra à nous joindre pour nostre defense et conservation: ce n'est point une chose esloignée de nostre possibilité, que nous assistons de nostre levée avec une partie de vostre (i.e. German) infanterie, et que vostre chemin, pour passer en France, soit plustost par le Pais-bas, que par la Lorraine.... nous ministront des moyens assés pour maintenir les extraordinaires despenses de la guerre; ce que nous donne courage de ... la suivre jusques à la fin."[4]

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1. In an interview with the Danish Chancellor Kaas. Relation of Willoughby, Dec. 1585, Cal.S.P. For., xx, 255-7.
2. Heale to Burghley, 17 June 1585, PRO. S.P. 12/180/68-71.
3. "Memorial to Queen Elizabeth", PRO. S.P. 84/63/262v. This is dated July 1585, but is probably earlier.
4. To Ségur, 7/17 Oct. 1585, quoted in Egerton, Life, 433.

Leicester was, from the beginning, the leading advocate of this policy and his position was public knowledge. Thomas Stocker in the dedication of his translation of the History of the Troubles ... of the Low Countries (1583) cast Leicester in the role of Moses as protector of the Church both at home, "the aidying of all those godly ministers", and abroad. The original of this history was a justification for the rebellion produced by the Dutch Church with which Leicester may have been involved.[1] Christopher Fetherstone's dedication of his translation of the Brutish Thunderbolt of Sixtus V (1586) informed Leicester (and the reader) that:

> your Honor hath great cause to magnifie the Lord... in that He hath vouchsafed you this honor, to stand in arms ... in so just and holie a quarrell; as is the maintenance of his sacred religion, and the delivering the helpless out of the hands of the oppressor.[2]

The posthumous justification "Dead Man's Right", stated "how he succored and relieved distressed members of the Church, I leave to those that have made proofe, who ought in dutie to make relation thereof."[3]

Leicester's willingness to be involved in the Queen's assistance to the United Provinces had been understood from the beginning of the negotiations. His offer to command any troops sent had been one of the proposals Walsingham had made to the Dutch agent Jacques Ortell during the interview in March 1585 when Walsingham first suggested that the Dutch appeal to the Queen.[4] From this point Leicester and Walsingham took the lead in advocating a major commitment to the United Provinces and in finding ways around Elizabeth's refusal of the sovereignty.[5] He later claimed

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1. History, Sig. Aiiv - iiiv. Rosenberg, 104-7 passim.

2. Brutish Thunderbolt, Sig. A3-(A5v).

3. Probably by Nicholas Breton. Forward to The Phoenix Nest (1593) ed. H.E. Rollins (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 7.

4. Strong and Van Dorsten, 20-1.

5. Leic. to Davison, 24 April 1585, B.M. Harleian MS., 285, f.127. This involved him in a bitter battle with Burghley, see Read, Burghley, 314-22 passim.

responsibility for the recall of Norris from Ireland in May secretly to prepare a relief for Antwerp.[1]

The most difficult part of the negotiations which produced the the establishing of
Treaty of Nonsuch was / the political relationship between Elizabeth and the United Provinces. The compromise solution, a person of "respect and quality" to assist in their government as well as command her army was tailored to Leicester. Dutch opinion was fairly consistent behind his nomination, with perhaps some prompting from his partisans. The ubiquitous Digges, in the United Provinces in the early Summer to examine the military situation, reported that Ortell was actively encouraging the States General to ask for Leicester. He himself was preparing some suggestions for "that army that I hope to see led under your honorable Conduyte".[2] The Zealander Jacques Rossel informed him that "no one could be more pleasing to them (the people), nor respected and obeyed, than your Excellency."[3] A perhaps more important testimony to his suitability, from Orangeist circles, can be found in the "Raisons pourquoi le Retour de ... Leicester est desirable" of March 1587.[4]

The long delay in the ratification of the treaty by the States-General - it was not implemented until October - gave Elizabeth time to hesitate over her commitment. The initiative was taken by Walsingham. On August 27 he informed Davison that "I will move her Majesty to take order both for my lord of Leicester and Sir Ph. Sidney" and asked him to hasten the Queen's decision "by writing thither as soon as you are over that her Majesty must needs send thither with speed lest otherwise there be an accord made before she be aware."[5] Walsingham appears to have been

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1. Wal. to Norris, 12 May 1585, Bodl. St. Amand, 8, f.5. Leicester's claim is in the "Declaration of such Causes as have moved...Leicester to think himself not well dealt with" (1587), B.M. Addit.MS. 48116, f.77. (hereafter Declaration of Leicester).
2. Digges to Leic, 23 June 1585, B.M. Harleian MS. 6993, f.91.
3. Rossel to Leic, 26 Aug./5 Sept. 1585, Cal.S.P. For., xix, 680-1.
4. Archives...de la Maison de Orange-Nassau, ed. G. van Prinsterer (Hague, 1841-1915), 2nd, Ser., i, 42-4, esp. ##4, ##6.
5. Wal. to Davison, 27 Aug. 1585, Cal.S.P.For., xix, 682.

successful. On the 28th Leicester received word from him and from Burghley "that her Majesty is now in good inclination to help the Low Countries, and you both think that her Majesty will employ me" and that she wished to know "whether I doe remayn in the same mind Antwerp being lost which I dyd before to be imployed in that service."[1]

Leicester's long answer to Walsingham is worthy of extensive quotation. The cause was of both the Queen and God; of God:

> touchinge religyon which, in my opinion ys a sufficient cause for all trew affected Chrystians to adventure their lyves for.... Therefore Mr. Sect. for my nowne dysposytion hit ys not the loss of Antwerp ... that can alter my opinion, or discourage me but that I persuade myself... that if God did move hir majesties hart to take the cause in dede princelyke in hir hands, but God hath geven hir meanes I know not only to preserve the rest .... If hir majesty wold take the cause to hart as yt ys worthie ... than I doe protest to you, I never was more willing in all my lyffe to be imployed in this service then nowe.... The cause ys as yt ys .... there can be no summa totalis in this case in my opinion sett down before hand. Hit must be a full and resolute determynation that she wyll use all the ways and meanes that God hath geven her to be imployed in this matter. (This lack of resolution has demoralized many) who wold have runne to this servyce at the beginning ... for they wyll not beleave that hir majesty wyll so deall in yt as they maye hope ... of such comfort as ys fitt for men that must goe hazard their lyves. ... Such as I have imparted your letters unto here of the hyghest and best sort doe gyve no creditt to yt and therefore hir Mat. must openly and comfortably deall in this matter .... For myself if hit please hir Mat. to gyve me knowledge resolutely of hir pleasure in such sort as I may boldly and dyrectly procede both in warning my friends & servants & providing for myself hir mat. shall than well perceave whether I have good wyll and readyness to serve hir or no.[2]

His answer to Burghley was shorter and blunter:

> My only wish is not only for myself but for the whole, as well those that shall go to serve, as they that remain, that if Her Majesty be not persuaded and fully resolved that the cause is of other importance than as it were to make a show and become only a scarecrow it were better never to enter into it .... Every man doth see the necessity thereof as well as her counsellors.[3]

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1. Leic. to Burghley, 28 Aug. 1585, Hist. MSS.Comm., Salisbury MSS. iii, 108.

2. Leic. to Wal. 28 Aug., PRO S.P. 12/181/222-3. See also Osterhoff, op.cit., 104.

3. Leic. to Burghley, 28 Aug., ibid.

He also carefully asked that Sir Thomas Cecil be among his company. His point about discouragement is illustrated by Sir William Pelham's remark to Davison that the negotiations were going badly through dishonest dealing on both sides, "there myght be some good done, if the cause were well carryed, thoughe hir majestie lay oute never a penny".[1]

Leicester's request does not appear to have received a definite answer; rather, doubt was expressed that he would bring over too many men with him:

> In very troth yf I shuld sooe I wold cary the best I can of every degre & yf I thought she would myslyke yt I wold rather tarry at home than do as I perceave wold best lyke her .... I pray God except hir mat. be resolute to helpe the States & willing that I carry whom I wyll that she appoint another.[2]

This response of Leicester's may have caused the Queen to look briefly for another candidate. Arthur, Lord Grey was under discussion; "I would to God the ability of his purse were answerable to his sufficiency otherwise."[3]

One of the persons the Queen disliked may have been Philip Sidney who had been under discussion as governor of Flushing for some time.[4] This was the occasion for his attempt with Greville to join Drake.[5] There was a dispute over the governorship with Sir Thomas Cecil, who was offered a charge of horse or Sluys or Ostend instead; "I will never agree for Flushing to any but to my nephew".[6] It was not until the middle of the month that Sidney was appointed.[7] The main reason for this was the Queen's

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1. Pelham to Davison, n.d. (Aug. 1585), PRO S.P. 84/63/361.
2. Leic. to Wal., (1 Sept.), ibid. 12/182/1.
3. Wal. to Davison, 5 Sept. 1585, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 8.
4. Davison to Wal., 4 Sept. 1585, ibid., 6. Also Wal. to Davison, 27 Aug., Cal. S.P. For., xix, 682.
5. R. Howell, Sir Philip Sidney: The Shepherd Knight (1968), 232-6.
6. Leic. to Burghley, ? Sept. 1585, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 53.
7. Norris to Wal., 22 Sept. 1585, ibid., 33-4.

decision, out of fear that the States would make peace with Parma immediately, to order Davison to take Flushing under his command.[1] Davison in turn suggested that if Sidney, "whom they greatly recommend", were governor "the town will without any difficulty be delivered into her hands."[2]

By taking control of the Cautionary Towns, the Queen was also forced to fulfill her side of the treaty by formally granting the States the 6,000 troops and "ung seigneur de qualité non seulement pour prendre la charge de nos dicts forces, mais aussi pour vous assister de son advis et conseil au gouvernment, comme vous en avez requise."[3] From both sides of the North Sea came increased requests for the speedy dispatch of Leicester, some of it perhaps orchestrated from England.[4] The question remained unresolved, however, through much of September. There was rather an emotional scene on the night of the 20th; "She makes the cause only the doubtfullness of her own self ... her fear that she shall not lyve and wold not have me from her."[5]

It was only on the 24th that she gave her formal consent and Leicester was able to begin his preparations.

> I shall not fayle to use all the possible meanes I can devyse for my expedicyon being sorry that this was not one month sooner knowen. (His only request was to be) supplied with all things mete both for her governor & the better accomplishing of hir service ther which I hartyly pray that yow would seke with the rest of my Lords to further.... For yf I shall desire anything in respect of my nowne partycular anyway they refuse me.[6] (sic)

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1. Eliz. to Davison, 3 Sept., B.M. Harleian MS., 36, f. 264.

2. To Wal., 5 Sept., Cal. S.P. For., xx, 6.

3. Eliz. to States-General, 3/13 Sept., Brugmans, i, 2-3.

4. Wal. to Davison, 12 Sept.; N. Erington to Wal.; 12 Sept.; Norris to Wal. 22 Sept.; Davison to Leic., 24 Sept.; Cal. S.P. For., xx, 21, 22-3, 33-4, 37-8.

5. Leic. to Wal., 21 Sept. PRO S.P. 12/182/41. See also Wal. to Davison, 12 Sept., Cal. S.P. For., xx, 21.

6. Leic. to Wal., ?24 Sept., PRO S.P. 12/182/67. See also Ortell to Leic., 21 (should be 27) Sept., B.M. Cotton MS. Galba C viii, ff. 205-6.

On the 26th the Queen, for unknown reasons, suddenly ordered Leicester to halt his activities. He was furious, having just sent off "above ii c letters" to servants and friends asking them to prepare to embark on the 18th-20th October. The States wished him to depart in a fortnight.[1] Although the cause of this delay was quickly resolved, the fundamental problem of the Queen's desire to limit her commitments, "letting me from such able persons as I shall desyre", and Leicester's wish for as thorough an expedition as possible remained.[2]

Early in October the formal request of the States-General for Leicester and Sidney, now superfluous, was received.[3] At the same time two more definite steps were taken. The Declaration of Causes was prepared for printing on the 1st.[4] On the 2nd the letter patent "De Capitaneo Generali, ad Serviendum in Belgio" was drawn up. Described as "Lieutenant and Captayne Generall of all suche forces as ... serve in the Lowe Countries", Leicester was given permission to levy five hundred of his tenants and servants and the Queen's protection was given to all "as shall be imployed in this our service ... and have our saide cousines warraunt."[5]

Leicester planned his departure for the beginning of November.[6] At the end of October, however, the Queen again began to have second thoughts; "We fynd the charges dayly to increase beyond hir Majestie's good allowance, specially by the coming of my L. of Leicester with a

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1. Wal. to Leic., 26 Sept; Leic. to Wal., 27 Sept. (two letters); Leycester Correspondence, 4-5, 5-7, 7-8.

2. Leic. to Wal., n.d. (late Sept.), ibid., 10-11.

3. States to QE, 25 Sept./5 Oct., Brugmans, i, 4-5.

4. It did not appear until later in the month, see Read, "William Cecil and Elizabethan Public Relations", ibid., 41-2.

5. This was enrolled in the Patent Roll of 27 Eliz. which is missing. The only copy is in T. Rymer, Foedera.... (1727-35), xv, 799.

6. Palavicino to Segur, 7/17 October, Egerton, 433. Leic. to Davison, 25 Oct., Cal. S.P. For. xx, 118.

great company of gentilmen of vallew..."[1] Another example of the Queen's attitude at this point can be seen in a letter to Norris; ostensibly in praise of a successful action, it ended "so would we have liked best, you had remembered our particular direction, given unto you to stand upon a defensive warr....For that our meaning in the present action is (as we have publicly notified unto the world) to defend."[2] Walsingham was worried about the effect on the States-General that "her Majestie dothe delyver unto dyvers persones the great dyslike she hathe of her owne resolution taken in this cause of the lowe contryes". He argued that it would be a mistake to go back on her promises now. If she wanted a compromise peace, it would be better to go forward; her commitment itself would serve as a bargaining counter.[3] He later informed Davison:

> I cannot deny but some practices have been used to draw her Majesty to mislike of the present action and of such as advised her to enter into the same; but the matter is now salved, and I hope free from like practices.[4]

However this problem was resolved, it was hoped the expedition would be under way on the 16th. Sidney received his commission as governor on the 9th and departed as soon as he could, "ayant esté arresté par S.M. plus longtemps qu'il ne pensait", arriving in Flushing on the 18th/28th.[5] His dispatch had been particularly urged by Davison, who felt that once the governors were installed Leicester could take his time.[6]

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1. Burghley to WD, 24 Oct., B.M. Lansdowne MS. 102, F.232.
2. Eliz. to Norris, 31 Oct., Bodl. MS St Amand 8, f. 1.
3. Wal. to Burghley, 26 Oct., PRO S.P. 12/183/56.
4. Wal. to Davison, 6 Nov., Cal. S.P. For. xx, 146.
5. Leic. to States, 9/19 Nov., Brugmans, i. 20.
6. Davison to Leic., 20 Oct., B.M. Addit. MS. 48127, f. 95.

Although Leicester hoped to be away before the end of November, "I am sorry that I tarry thus, but the fault is not mine", his commission was not signed until the 27th.[1] His official letters of recommendation were sent on the 30th.[2] It was not until the 4th of December that he left London, arriving at Flushing on the 10th.

The most mysterious element in Leicester's appointment is the nature of the discussions over his future role in the Netherlands. The failure to discuss this adequately in most accounts has been due, in part, to the paucity of documents on the subject among the State Papers and the older collections in the British Museum. Although many may have disappeared with the bulk of Leicester's correspondence, a certain number were collected by Robert Beale and are now found among his papers.[3] There also exists a contemporary index of memoranda entitled "Dispatch of the Earl of Leicester, 1585" which lists twenty-five items under the section "November-December 1585" (of which only ten appear to be of relevance) and a number of the titles match those of memoranda in the Beale Papers.[4] Although there are still serious lacunae and although much of importance was dealt with in unrecorded conversation, some useful analysis is possible.

The major problem is one of chronology as most of the memoranda are undated. The earliest appears to be "An aunswer to the Earle of Leycester's Requestes" which from internal evidence must date from the first discussion of Leicester's appointment in August or early September.[5] The statement "If her Majesty shall have Flushinge Sir Philip Sidney is to tak chardg thereof" would appear to date it before 3/13 September when

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1. Leic. to Davison, 18 Nov., Cal. S.P. For. xx, 171, Leic. to Earl of Shrewsbury, 15 Nov., Longleat, Talbot MS. 1, f. 202. For the date of Leicester's commission see below, p. 53 .
2. Eliz. to States, 30 Nov./10 Dec., Brugmans, i, 21.
3. B.M. Addit. MSS. 48000-48196, also known as the Calthorpe or Yelverton MSS.
4. B.M. Cotton MS. Titus B vi, f. 72v.
5. B.M. Addit. MS. 48129, no foliation. In Burghley's hand.

the Queen ordered Davison to take control of the town. The most important part of this document is the definition of Leicester's non-military authority:

> to exercise such authorite in those countryes over all others than hir Majesties subjects, as the Generall Stats shall gyve unto hym, executyng the same in ther names and not in hir Mats. name.

There is a gap after this until the end of October when Leicester's commission was drawn up. The commission itself is a mysterious document and has only received attention from Tenison.[1] The sole copy exists in Rymer's Foedera as the Patent Roll for 27 Elizabeth has disappeared.[2] The date is matter of controversy. It was enrolled on the Patent Roll of 27 Elizabeth which ended on 16 November 1585 and was dated 22 October.[3] However, Sir Christopher Blount later claimed, in a dispute with the Queen over debts incurred by Leicester, that it was not signed until 27 November.[4] As Elizabeth reversed herself soon after 22 October and Leicester did not really get under way until the end of November, this fits into the general chronology of the expedition.

The earlier letter patent (2 October) had named him Captain General; this new one, "De Comissione Speciale pro Capitaneo praedicto", established the limits of his military authority. In two important respects it was phrased very widely. First his power of making war:

> ducendi & duci faciendi, & cum dictis Inimicis quibuscumque modis Bellum gerendi, & omnia alia faciendi & exequendi promeliori servitio nostro in eisdem, prout eidem sanam Discretionem suam, melius videbitur.[5]

This appears to have been a matter of some debate for in a draught of the commission, "as he sees fit" was added in the margin by Burghley.[6] The

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1. Elizabethan England (Royal Leamington Spa, 1933-50), vi, 19-22.
2. Foedera, xv, 799-801.
3. Ibid., 799.
4. Longleat, Dudley MS. iii, f. 92.
5. Foedera, xv, 800.
6. Draught of a Commission for the Earl of Leicester. B.M. Addit. MS. 48129, no foliation.

other wide power was that:

> causabit solvi & expendi tot denariorum summas de Thesauro nostro pro solutione & sustentatione Exercitus & Copiarum Hominum nostrorum praedictorum, prout eidem Comiti, juxta sanam Discretionem suam, melius videbitur expedire.[1]

Although this commission dealt only with his military authority, the wide scope of his powers outlined here contrasts sharply with the description of his powers in his "Instructions".[2] These are dated December 1585 and were no doubt drawn up in the period between the signing of his commission and his d eparture. The difference between the two suggests that during November Elizabeth had definitely decided to restrict his role.

The "Instructions" made a vital change in his military powers. Instead of his being able to wage war at discretion;

> we do requyre you that you rather bend your cawse to make a defensive than offensive warre, and that you seeke by all the meanes you maie to avoide the hazard of a battail.[3]

Special attention was paid to his political powers. Here the Queen walked a narrow path; although she would not accept formal responsibility for the United Provinces, she was determined to control their political activities. Leicester was described as being sent to "governe them".[4] He was given a very specific list of duties to carry out. The "Instructions" ordered him to have the States-General appoint an executive council and to prohibit trade with Spain.[5] A "Memorial" endorsed "private" contained orders to remove quietly those involved in the surrender of Antwerp, collect a group of local agents, create a chamber of finances, and to "drawe the governors of the townes and provinces to be at his L. devotion.".[6]

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1. Foedera, xv, 800-1.
2. Leycester Correspondence, 12-15.
3. A Drawghte of Instructions entitled A minute of Instructions for the Earle of Leicester, Nov. 1585. B.M. Addit. MS. 48084, f. 42-53.
4. Ibid., f. 50.
5. Ibid., ff. 46-v, 49. Leycester Correspondence, 13-14.
6. A Memorial for the E. of Leicester., B.M. Addit. MS. 48129, no foliation. No date, probably 27 November - 4 December, 1585.

The sanction for his actions was the threat that if the States-General was uncooperative the Queen might be tempted to abandon them.

> We hope that as they offered themselves first to our obedience, and secondlie to our generalle protection by yealdinge to be governed absolutelie by such as we would send to be our lieutenante, so though we doe not for the presente time take so much upon us as to command them in such absolute sorte yett except you, beinge our lieutenante, shall find them bent to use the advice of us, by the mediation of you our lieutenant for some better strengthening (of their affairs Elizabeth might be tempted to abandon them).[1]

This threat would be difficult to carry out. The final "Instructions" was even vaguer:

> unless they should shew themselves forward to use the advice of Her Majesty to be delivered unto them by her lieutenant, ... Her Majesty would think her favours unworthelye bestowed upon them.[2]

It is not surprising that Leicester considered that his authority was nowhere sufficient to achieve these aims, let alone anything else. Whatever the "Aunswer" had meant by his acceptance of authority from the States-General, this must have been rescinded later. A memorandum "Certain points to be resolved touching the Earl of Leicester's Instructions" posed the question:

> whether he shall excercise any further authority of the inhabitants of the United Provinces than is contained in the treaty; or whether he shall not accept of so much authority as they shall be disposed to yield unto him, whereby he may be the better able to establish some good order of government amongst them.[3]

Unfortunately the answer has not survived. It could not have been favourable as on the eve of his departure Leicester sent Walsingham a letter for the Queen:

> if you think it needful. I have not stood upon any particular matter in it, but the cause is such, as truly I had as lief be dead as be in the case I shall be in if this restraint hold for taking the oath there, or some more authority than I see her Majesty would I should (have). I trust you will all hold hard for this, or else banish me England withal .... I perceave by your message your peace with Spain will go fast on, but this is not the way.[4]

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1. B.M. Addit. MS. 48084, f. 51.
2. Leycester Correspondence, 15.
3. Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., iii, 386. It is dated 1588, but this is obviously wrong. It is probably 27 November-4 December 1585.
4. Leic. to Wal. 3 Dec. 1585, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 192.

The conflict between Elizabeth and Leicester over the nature and purpose of the expedition was reflected in many of its aspects. The fact that Elizabeth had the final decision in matters of controversy has obscured the degree to which it was primarily a puritan enterprise. That it was so was in large part due to Leicester.

Support for the expedition was widespread in puritan circles, much of it spontaneous. The first dispatch of troops in the summer of 1585 was, despite the official desire to keep it semi-secret, accompanied in East Anglia by the public exhortation of magistrates and divines:

> The soldiers readie & forward, & thanks be to God well instructed from the mouth of the preacher in these cownties even at their departure, how to use this calling & profession of a soldier in true dutye to God & to their Soveraigne. I wisshe the same wer done in all places where soldiours be levied.... The Cawse without controversie is good.[1]

A number of puritan laymen voiced similar sentiments: Warwick, "You warr never so honoured and loved in your lyff amongst all good people as you ar att this daye"; Sir John Perrott, "A great part of our generall good dependeth on your happie success"; Sir Henry Wallop "The greate good which ... may come unto the common cause of Godde's truth, to the relief of those oppressed people"; John Stubbes, "These warrs are holy, God hath much honoured you for the time you have served in them", "The quarrel is holy and just"; Sir Drew Drury, "I think there never was a more necessary enterprise."[2]

From the divines very little has survived. No sermons were printed; only the semi-official and anonymous A Most Necessary Prayer for the Earle of Leicester which did, nonetheless, ask that "the fruite

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1. R. Jermyn to Davison, 25 Aug. 1585, Bodl. Tanner MS. 78, f. 73.

2. War. to Leic., 6 Mar. 1586, Leycester Corres., 150-1; Perrott to Leic., 20 Feb. 1586, T. Wright, Queen Elizabeth and Her Times (1838), ii, 289-90; Stubbes to Willoughby, 6 June, 21 April, 1586; Drury to Will. 3 Mar. 1586; Hist. MSS. Comm. Ancaster MSS., 32-3, 21, 19-20.

of the English Church, be meate unto others, and the lease thereof, medicinable unto thy afflicted and scattered people."[1] There are some other fragments. Giles Wigginton informed Mildmay that in 1586:

> I used to pray ... that God would blesse all hir Majesties faithfull councellors, and namely my L. the Earle of Leicester in his expedition and warfare for the Church and the Gospell.[2]

A more interesting document is Oliver Pig's "Part of a letter sent to a Christian knighte ... in the service ... in the Low Countries 1585". It has a curious history as it exists only in a manuscript volume prepared by Pig for Sir Francis Drake's inspiration on the Portugal Voyage of 1589.[3] The rest of the volume consists of two "meditations" on the Armada which were printed in 1589.[4] The letter is not complete, nor is the "knight" identified (I would assume Jermyn or Willoughby), and that which survives is primarily a moral exhortation. Although;

> the cause which you have in hande, I nothing doubt is the Lords, as well in respects of releeving his present pore distressed churches, as allso in preventing the ruine of owers here (and) there is great cause, why in this behalfe, you should much comfort yourselves,

it is necessary to be pure in the sight of God lest "we have not just cause to feare, that he will not go into the fielde."[5]

Leicester himself held this view of the expedition. After communion on St. Stephen's Day (26 December), soon after his arrival in the Netherlands, he publicly offered all "who were not whole-hearted in the service to freely depart."[6] His handbook of martial law,

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1. (1585), 5.

2. Wigginton to Mildmay, Feb. 1587, Sec. Part of a Reg., ii, 245.

3. Camb. Univ. MS. Dd. ii, 76.

4. Meditations concerning praiers to Almighty God, for the Safety of England ... (1589). Pig wanted to give a copy of this to Drake but it was not ready yet; the "Letter" he added himself. Camb. Univ. MS. Dd. ii. 76, f. 2-3.

5. MS. Dd. ii. 76, ff. 21-25.

6. Sir John Conway to Wal. 27 Dec. 1585, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 243-4.

the Lawes and Ordinances, announced in its third article:"no good event of any action can be expected wherein God is not first and principally honored and served." The penalty for a first offence of blasphemy was a 5s. fine "to the releefe of the poor".[1] The very existence of this handbook, the first published code of English martial law, may itself be a reflection of the purpose of the expedition. It is not irrelevant that it was used without amendment by Willoughby and Essex.[2]

The expedition involved him in a huge personal financial commitment; he later claimed that he spent over £35,000 in 1586 alone.[3] At the end of September 1585, after he had assurance of his appointment, he approached a number of Italian merchants in London through Palavicino for a loan of £25,000. Palavicino reported that they could not raise so much and that he should try the mayor and aldermen of London.[4] He was eventually able to raise £17,500 from them as a mortgage on the manor of Denbigh which was transferred to the Queen as surety on 2 December.[5] He was indeed "for many curtesies much beholding unto you".[6] Stone suggests that he raised the rest of the £25,000 from the sale of £9,000 of property and obtained a further £13,000 loan from the Queen.[7] The London loan was only for a year and in the event he was unable to repay it and the limit was finally extended until January 1588.[8] It is doubtful

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1. n.d. (1586?), 2. The final draft of this was probably another Thomas Digges production.

2. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (Oxford, 1968), 161-3.

3. Leic. to J. Hotman, 21 Jan. 1587, R. Broesma and G.B. Huet, "Brieven uit de Paperien van Jean Hotman", Bijdragen en Mededeelingen Historisch Genootschap, xxxiv (1) (1913), 143-4.

4. Palavicino to Wal. 10 Oct., 12 Oct., 1585, PRO S.P. 12/183/27, 38.

5. Statement of loan (to Leic.), end. by Burghley 8 May 1587, Bodl. Tanner MS. 78, F. 144.

6. Leic. to Mayor and Aldermen, 3 Feb. 1586, B.M. Harleian MS. 6993, f. 127.

7. L. Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (Oxford 1965), 456. "The Anatomy of the Elizabethan Aristocracy", Econ. Hist. Rev., xviii (1948), 18.

8. Bodl. Tanner MS. 78. 78, f. 144.

that very much was repaid by the time of his death.

Leicester also made several efforts to broaden the base of moral and financial support for the expedition at home. He was particularly interested in bringing up the issue before Parliament. The Parliament of 1584 had been prorogued in March 1585 until May and it was hoped that the Low Countries would be discussed then.[1] However, Elizabeth prorogued it again until October and then successively through 1586, greatly to Leicester's disappointment.[2]

> Now that Her Majesty is sought and sued to call a Parliament, and offers infinitly made of her good subjects to assist and help her, and with as good thanks to take their offer as to refuse it, I am sorry to heare and see it.[3]

His expectation of Parliament's position on the issue, "I nothing doubt but they wilbe founde moste agreable and willinge", was probably the very reason for Elizabeth's refusal to summon it.[4] It was only the discovery of the "Babington Plot" and the resultant trial of Mary, Queen of Scots which forced her hand.

There were hints of more radical proposals. In the summer of 1585 one of his agents, Alexander Neville, wrote to Whitgift in Leicester's name that he:

> wonders not a little, that in this long tyme of consultation about the Low Countrey causes, your L. and your Brethren (but especially your Lordship), have not declared your mynde unto hir Majesty the rather to stirre her highnesse to the enterprysing of so honourable an action .... Therefore he most earnestly adviseth your Lordships hiest in degree in the churche, to yeeld unto the church and commonwealth that duty, which nowe in perill and danger .... at your G. handes principally they seem to challenge .... His Lordship is fully persuaded your Grace can do nothing at this tyme to God more acceptable.[5]

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1. Wal. to J. Norris, 12 May 1585, Bodl. St. Amand MS. 8, f.5.

2. Read, Burghley, 319.

3. Leic. to Wal., 16 Apr. 1586, Leycester Corres., 224-9.

4. Leic. to Burghley, 29 Sept. 1586, B.M. Harleian MS. 6994, f. 37.

5. Neville to Whitgift, 19 July 1585, B.M. Lansdowne MS. 45, f. 98. Neville entered Leicester's service in 1582, see Neville to Leic., 23 July 1582, Longleat, Dudley MS ii, f. 224. He later edited the Cambridge eulogy for Sidney, Academiae Cantabrigensis Lachrymae (1587).

Whitgift refused to involve himself, partially because it was "a matter of counsell and of state", but also because:

> some of calling have openlie gyven it out that these wars must be mayntayned by the dissolution of cathedral churches, which God forbid.[1]

There is no further direct evidence of Whitgift's charge but the scheme later developed for the bishops to raise £25,000 among their clergy for the provision of horse for the Low Countries may be a pale reflection of this.[2] The circular letter sent to the bishops on this subject echoes Leicester's insistence that the defense of religion in the Low Countries should be a matter of special concern to the clergy.[3]

This may not have been purely a trap to catch Whitgift; Leicester appears to have canvassed all the bishops for their opinion on the question of whether a prince could assist the subjects of another from being forced to commit idolatry. The answer of the bishop of Salisbury, John Piers, has survived. As the Church was universal, one part should assist the other providing it was for the glory of God and not for secular ambition. Whitgift appears to have drawn up a private memorandum on the subject which offers a revealing insight into his political attitudes. The unity of the Church was purely spiritual, hence the question was solely a political one. Although protestant princes should ally against the Pope and Spain, the head of one political body should not assist the "feet" of another as that would upset the political order and invert the order of nature.[4]

Another facet of this policy was Leicester's effort to strengthen his position on the council. In the summer of 1585 he could count on the support of five councillors: Walsingham, Warwick, Bedford (died 28 July 1585),

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1. Whitgift's answer to Burghley, B.M. MS. Lansdowne 45, f. 98v.

2. For details see Cruickshank, 30.

3. Eliz. to Chaderton, B. of Chester, 23 Jan. 1586, Peck, Desiderata, i, 160-1.

4. Questions to Salisbury; Whitgift's Memorandum; Strype, Whitgift, iii, 165-70, i. 439-40.

Sir Henry Sidney, and his father-in-law Sir Francis Knollys. A sixth, Sir Amyas Paulet, was, as the governor of Mary, Queen of Scots, rarely in London and both Sidney (died May 1586) and Warwick were infirm. Lord Chancellor Bromley, although probably a Leicester nominee and of puritan sympathy, was also a political conservative and like Mildmay would adhere to Burghley's position. There were four strong conservatives: Shrewsbury, Derby, Hunsdon, and Sir James Crofts. Two others, Hatton and Howard of Effingham, were if anything anti-puritan yet supporters of anti-Spanish policies. There is some mystery in the relationship between Leicester and Hatton; although previously rivals, they were known as personal friends. Hatton was publicly anti-puritan and the sincerity of his anti-Spanish position is open to doubt.

Leicester's departure was seen as a serious loss for puritan influence and "will make a great alteration in court as som think".[1] The change came quickly. On 2 February 1586 Whitgift, Cobham, and Buckhurst were appointed to the council, a move widely seen as an effort by Burghley to bolster his position.[2] Thomas Morgan, Mary, Queen of Scots' agent in Paris, saw this as a defeat for Leicester who had earlier attempted to have men favourable to him installed: Pembroke, Huntingdon, Arthur, Lord Grey, and Henry Grey, earl of Kent.[3] Although poor, Kent was a trustee of Sidney Sussex College, and the puritan candidate to succeed Huntingdon as Lord President of the North in 1594.[4]

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1. R. Manners to e. of Rutland, 2 Dec. 1585, Hist. MSS. Comm., Rutland MSS., i, 184.

2. Manners to Rut., 19 Feb. 1586, ibid., 190. Thos. Morgan to Mary, 21/31 Mar. 1586, Murdin, 481-503. L'Aubespine to Mary, 24 Feb./6 Mar., Cal. S.P. Scotland, viii, 247-9. See also Wilkes to Burghley, 17 Feb. 1587, Brugmans, ii, 109-13.

3. Morgan to Mary, 21/31 Mar. 1586, ibid.

4. See below page 108.

4. Since my writing this, however, one has come to light - it was to John Wynn of Gwydir, Caernarvonshire on 26 September. See National Library of Wales, Calendar of the Wynn Papers, no. 93.

In the composition of the expeditionary force the conflict between Elizabeth and Leicester can be seen clearly. There is little question that Leicester desired to deploy the largest number of partisans possible. In most cases these partisans were important figures in political puritanism or "representatives" of them. Their agreement with Leicester's goals and policies in the United Provinces is striking.

The Queen's forces in the Netherlands consisted of the garrisons of the cautionary towns (1400 foot) and an army of 5000 foot and 1000 horse. The foot were almost completely conscripts and most of them had gone over with Norris in August. The degree of choice Leicester had over the appointment of their officers is unknown. Most of them were professionals or semi-professionals and it is doubtful if many conceived of the venture in other than professional terms. There were, however, exceptions such as Thomas Wilford, a relative of Digges. Leicester sent both of them over beforehand to make an examination of the military situation.[1] Another was William Browne who went over as lieutenant of Robert Sidney's company. In 1588 he married a Frenchwoman in Flushing and remained there as Sidney's lieutenant-governor until his death in 1611. His correspondence shows him to have been a model godly officer who confessed "to love this nation more than any but our King's natural subjects." He may, however, have been a family retainer.[2]

Of Leicester's personal recruiting only two pieces of evidence have survived: the commission to levy five hundred tenants and his own account of letters sent to two hundred friends.[3] Unfortunately I have been unable to find any of those letters.[4] They were received

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1. Wilford to Wal. 15 Dec. 1585, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 215.

2. Browne to Wal. 6 Oct. 1585, ibid., 67. Browne to Wal., 28 Jan. 1588. Ibid., xxi (iv), 37. Browne to Lord Cecil, Hist. MSS. Comm. Salis bury MSS, 23 Aug. 1604, , xvi, 269.

3. See above, p.50 .

by the middle of October. On 7 October Palavicino related that he had been offered the command of "une compagnie de ceant lances etrangéres".[1] Willoughby D'Eresby received word in Denmark towards the end of October and joined Leicester in the Low Countries as soon as his embassy was over.[2]

In several known cases, Palavicino and Fulke Greville for example, Leicester did not obtain his and their desire. There was a major battle over two others, Sir William Pelham and Arthur, Lord Grey. Both were men of considerable military experience and in his shortage of experienced senior officers and lack of a second-in-command Leicester attached great importance to their presence.[3] Although they were apparently accepted in November, both were heavily in debt to the Queen and she refused to let them depart with their debts outstanding. In Pelham's case it was also claimed that the Queen did not wish, in the absence of Sidney and the infirmity of Warwick, further to deprive the Ordnance Office of its officers.[4] Leicester appealed for them throughout the spring of 1586:

> If she had all Pelham's and Lord Grey's lands and goods they would not be so profitable to her coffers as their services here would be beneficial to her.[5]

It was only after his breach with Norris that the Queen relented.[6] Pelham, appointed Lord Marshal, finally arrived in the United Provinces in July.

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1. Palavicino to Ségur, 7/17 Oct. 1585, Egerton, Life, 433.

2. Willoughby to Segur, 24 Oct. 1585, ibid.. To Leic. 25 Oct. Cal. S.P. For., xx, 120.

3. Leic. to Burghley, 27 Dec. 1585, ibid., 242.

4. Burgh. to Leic., 21 July 1586, Leic. Corres., 355.

5. Leic. to Burgh. 27 Dec., ibid.

6. Wal. to Leic. 11 Apr. 1586, Leic. Corres., 222.

Leicester was able to place a number of allies in senior military positions: Sidney, governor of Flushing, Essex, General of the Horse, Digges, Muster-Master. On the other hand the appointment of Sir Thomas Cecil as governor of the Brill was a political compromise with Burghley. Norris was Colonel-General of the Foot. Whatever his former relationship to Leicester, his appointment was the result of his professional standing and he does not appear to have shared Leicester's conception of the expedition. He opposed the acceptance of the governor-generalship.[1] The famous quarrel between the two originated over this and was always a battle over authority; Leicester never questioned Norris's competence.[2] In the disputes with Norris, Walsingham supported Leicester's position:

> The partyes that doe chiefly possesse the coronell are but bad instruments,.... I would to God that with his courage and valewe he carryed the mynde and reputation of a relygyous soldyer. The chefe experyence and nuryture that he hath receyved in the warres hath been in thos countryes where neyther dyscypline mylytarye nor relygyon carryed any sway.[3]

He saw Norris as a member of the anti-Leicester plot that he alternately suspected and exonerated Burghley of directing:

> The ground of the seyd coronels carying of himself towardes your lordship grew by practice from hence. The nourishinge of factyon at home and abroade is thought here the best course of pollecye.

Leicester, who became disenchanted with Sir Thomas Cecil, suspected that he and Norris were in collusion.[4] Norris was definitely corresponding closely with Burghley.[5]

The final breach came with the appointment of Pelham and there was a

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1. Norris to Burghley, 18 July 1586, Cal. S.P. For., xxi(ii), 92-3.

2. See Reply of Leic. to Reply of Norris to Interrogatories (1587), B.M. Addit. MS. 48127, ff. 10-12.

3. Wal. to Leic. 28 Mar., 1586, 11 Apr. 1586, 23 May 1586, Leic. Corres., 190-2. 222-4, 278-9.

4. Wal. to Leic. 28 Mar. 1586, ibid.

5. Norris to Burghley, 18 July 1586, ibid.

general split of the officers into factions.[1] Out of this was to come the notorious anti-Norris petition which was to give Stanley and Yorke their freedom from Norris's control. It was also signed by Sir William Russell, Sir Roger Williams, and Thomas Morgan.[2] The bitterness between Norris and the Leicesterians continued long after Leicester's death. In 1591, when Norris was recruiting in the Netherlands for his campaign in Brittany, a number of officers refused to serve with him.[3] During Sir William Russell's Lord-Deputyship in Ireland in 1594-97 his hostility to Norris virtually paralyzed operations.

A similar situation existed with regard to Leicester's civilian staff. Under the treaty of Nonsuch there were to be two English members of the Dutch Council of State. In the earliest discussion the candidates were to be Davison and Dr. Bartholemew Clerk, a civil lawyer.[5] It was soon evident, however, that Davison would have to return to England on personal business after Leicester's arrival and in November he was replaced with Henry Killegrew:

> He doth of verie neere affection towardes your Lordship serve theare at this time, which otherwise no reward could procure him.[6]

Leicester was to rely on him closely while he regarded Clerk as imposed upon him.[7]

When Davison finally returned to England it was to persuade the Queen to accept the governor-generalship. He and Leicester expected

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1. Leic. to Wal. 30 July 1586, ibid.
2. Petition to Leic., n.d. (1586), B.M. Egerton MS. 1694, f. 51.
3. Read, Burghley, 473-4.
4. "Aunswer" to Leic. Sept. 1585. B.M. Addit. MS. 48129, n.f.
5. Wal. to Davison, 6 Nov. 1585. Cal. S.P. For., xx, 146.
6. Burghley to Leic. 6 Mar. 1585, Leic. Corres., 158.
7. Leic. to Wal. 22 Jan., 29 July, 1586, Leic. Corres., 75-6, 375.

that he would soon afterwards return to the Netherlands as an advisor.[1] The disastrous result of the mission and the breach between them forestalled this. Needing further aides with Low Countries experience, Leicester appealed for Daniel Rogers and "my old servant Bodyly".[2] Thomas Wilkes was sent instead: first in the late summer to negotiate a financial agreement between Leicester and the States-General and then in September as a permanent representative on the Council of State.[3] As Wilkes was later to claim to Burghley that "at the first I declared to you that if I dealt faithfully with Her Majesty in these services it would be my undoing", it is interesting that he told Leicester that it was only for him that he returned to the Netherlands "in respect of the doubt conceived here that the action ... will never be prosecuted from here with any good purpose".[3] At this stage Leicester thought highly of him.[4]

The core of Leicester's following was to be found in his personal retinue and the gentlemen who volunteered to serve with him and whose retinues formed the greater part of the horse. A manuscript at Longleat gives his immediate retinue as ninety-nine with another 101 gentlemen and their servants in his company in December.[5] Included in the retinue were two secretaries and two chaplains. The secretaries were Arthur Atye (although he is also listed as an independent gentleman) and Jean Hotman, sieur de Villiers, son of Francois Hotman, who had been in Leicester's service since 1582. There may, however, have been others, including Philip Hart, who had been recommended by the London Conference.

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1. Davison to Leic., 20 Oct. 1585, B.M. Addit. MS. 48127, f. 95.
   Leic. to Wal. 22 Jan. 1586, Leic. Corres., 69-70.

2. Leic. to Wal. 1 Feb., 27 June, 7 Aug. 1586, ibid., 83, 326-7, 383.

3. Wilkes to Leic. 28 Sept. 1586. B.M. Egerton MS. 1694, f. 45.
   Wilkes to Burgh. 24 Jan. 1587, Brugmans, ii, 64-5.

4. Leic. to Wal. 7 Aug. 1586, Leic. Corres., 383.

5. Dudley MS.iii, f. 63.

Leicester's choice of chaplains provides a revealing insight into his conception of the expedition. One was John Knewstub who preached at Utrecht at the St. George's Day triumph in 1586 but shortly afterwards returned to England.[1] Another was Humphrey Fenn who had been appointed with the concurrence of the London Conference and remained with Leicester throughout 1586.[2] There is also strong evidence that Cartwright was present in Leicester's company and acting as his major advisor on religious matters, particularly with regard to the synod. As Cartwright had been in the Netherlands in 1580-81 he was an obvious choice, although there was good reason to keep his presence quiet.[3] On the calling of the synod in July 1586 Leicester attempted to obtain the services of Dr. William James, dean of Christ Church, and Dr. John Still, archdeacon of Sudbury, who was sympathetic to the Suffolk puritans. There is evidence that James did attend the synod.[4] The presence of other divines is not well reported. The George Gifford who attended Sidney at his death may have been George Gifford, deprived rector of Maldon and leader, under the protection of the Riches, of Essex puritanism.[5] A Mr. Fountain was also present, a friend of John Stubbes and Knewstub, who had been proposed as Willoughby's chaplain at Bergen-op-Zoom.[6] The "Mr. Allyn" who preached before Leicester on 4 September 1586 was probably Walter Allen, rector of Rushbrook and protegé of Sir Robert Jermyn.[7]

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1. Alex. Southaicke to Wal., 27 Oct. 1585, PRO S.P. 12/183/189. R. Holinshed, Chronicles (1587), iii, 1433. J. Stubbes to Willoughby, 14 May 1586, Hist. MSS. Comm., Ancaster MSS., 25-6.
2. Collinson, Eliza. Pur. Move., 343. S. Clarke, The Marrow of Ecclesiastical History (1675), II, ii, 36. B.M. Addit. MS. 48014, f. 161. R. Bancroft, Daungerous Positions and Practices (1593), 122-23; Survey of the Pretended Holy Discipline (1593), 304, 386.
3. S. Goffe to Sir Wm. Boswell, 12/22 Feb. 1633; D. Carleton (the younger) to Boswell, 25 Apr. 1637; B.M. Addit. MS 6394, ff. 80, 250-1. Pearson, Cartwright, 232-33.
4. Leic. to Eliz., 26 June 1586, Cal. S.P. For., xxi(ii), 51-4. Collinson, op.cit., 338. De Jong, 169.
5. Collinson, ibid., 265-6, 321.
6. Stubbes to Willoughby, 14 May, 6 June 1586, Hist. MSS. Comm., Ancaster MSS., 25-6, 31-33.
7. Stubbes to Willoughby, 14 May, ibid., Collinson, op.cit., 219. B.M. Addit. MS. 48014, f. 161.

This religious orientation was to have a far-reaching effect. The army, both at this point and for the next forty years, was to form the largest single element in the English community in the United Provinces and the dominant influence in the English Church there. Although the army was expected to use the Book of Common Prayer and English liturgical practice, the liberty of the English Church under the constitution of the United Provinces enabled use of the Prayer Book to be evaded and Leicester appears to have lent his assistance to the evasion. There is good evidence that Sidney established a presbyterian discipline in the garrison chapel in Flushing with the officers as elders.[1] According to later reports it was Leicester, on the advice of Cartwright, who introduced the "Geneva Book" to the army.[2]

Apart from Leicester, there were only four other nobles in the expedition. This is not surprising as most of the young nobles were hereditary and few of them were Leicesterians. The only other earl was his step-son, Essex (aged 19). The three barons were Willoughby (30), Henry Touchet, 11th Lord Audley (36), and Lord North (55). North was also an anomaly in that he was the only one to be a figure of power and wealth. Audley was a shadowy figure, his lands were in Somerset but he was probably poor (he only brought a retinue of four) and appears to have been looking for a military career. Both Willoughby and Essex (who spent between £1000 and £4000 on the expedition) had serious financial problems, having inherited heavily mortgaged estates. Both were warned about overspending on the expedition.[3] Although it may be

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1. T. Potts to R. Sidney, Visc. Lisle, 8 May 1607, Hist. MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., iii, 372-74.

2. S. Goffe to Boswell, 26 Feb. 1633, B.M. Addit. MS. 6394, f. 86. There were three "army" editions, 1586, 1587, 1602. The cum privilegio on the titlepage is considered to be Leicester's. See also Collinson, op.cit., 308-9. For the history of the army after 1603 see Appendix III.

3. Stubbs to Willoughby, 14 May, ibid. F. Knollys to Essex, 14 Nov. 1585, F. Devereux, Lives of the Devereux (1853), i, 178-9. Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, 456.

possible to see a financial motive in their military activities, the fact that such activities would involve a heavy capital outlay, for uncertain return, should perhaps be seen as a financial disincentive.

The participation of such nobles created / the problem of [redacted] providing them with suitable offices. Essex was in a special position and the easiest to provide for. Audley was to raise and command English volunteers in the States pay and during the winter of 1586-7 to command at Utrecht.[1] Willoughby, who was also in need of a remunerative office, was given the governorship of Bergen-op-Zoom by Sidney in March 1586.[2] North, however, caused greater problems. An old friend and ally, he had come over "without charge" and Leicester had nothing to offer him.[3] Leicester was worried that this would cause resentment and there is evidence that North was making his dissatisfaction known in England.[4] Leicester was warned about his letters of complaint.[5] He was, however, a member of Leicester's inner circle of advisers and Leicester tried to give him either Clerk's or Sir Thomas Cecil's offices. In this he was unsuccessful and the Queen replied that if any governor was to be replaced it would be Sidney.[6] By the summer North was given the important governorship of Utrecht.

The most useful list of the individual volunteers is the muster-list

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1. PRO S.P. 12/190/34. Muster List of Nov. 1586, B.M. Egerton MS., 1694, f. 54-5.

2. Will. to Burgh., 13 Apr. 1586, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 545-6.

3. Leic. to Wal., 22 Jan. 1586, Leic. Corres., 75-6.

4. Ibid. North to Burgh., 28 Jan. 1586, Cal. S.P. For. xx, 327-9.

5. Thos. Duddley to Leic. 11 Feb.; Thos. Vavasour to Leic., 31 Mar. 1586; Leic. Corres., 111-4, 194-6.

6. Leic. to Wal. 22 Jan.; Wal. to Leic. 28 Mar. 1586; Leic. Corres., 75-6, 190-2.

of the horse assembled at the Hague on 10 January 1586.[1] The fact that the horse was mustered according to retinue permits an analysis of individual contributions. It is not, however, complete as the total is only 744 and several important figures, e.g., Sidney, Thomas Cecil, John Norris, and John Conway are missing. Those present were, on the other hand, the majority of those who came over with Leicester in December.

The retinues were, in fact, quite small; out of 219 listed only eight were ten or above. Exactly how many were in the immediate retinues of Leicester and Essex is not clear. Essex was listed with fifty and Leicester with "40 more". However a good number of Leicester's immediate followers were listed as individual gentlemen: Arthur Atye (4), Christopher Blount (6) his Master of Horse, Captain Selby (12) "Capt. of the Earles band of lances", Michael Harcourt (10) "Provost-Marshal of the Erl. Household", and Sir Henry Goodyer (10) "Captain of the Earls gard and pensioners".[2]

The largest retinues outside those of the generals were those of (25), to which should be added the seven of William Jermyn, Sir Robert Jermyn, and Lord North (22). Sir Robert Jermyn soon returned to England with a commission to raise volunteers and Leicester's praise: "He hathe come hither as well appointed as any that hathe come over ... he is greatly to be esteemed."[3] Leicester also recommended that Jermyn and his associates Sir John Higham and Mr. Affeld be reinstated on the Suffolk commission of the peace.[4] A commission for raising 300 volunteers in East Anglia was issued by the Council on 8 April but the results of this are not known. Jermyn did not return to the Low Countries and sat with Sir John Higham as M.P. for Suffolk in the Parliament of 1586, where

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1. S.P. 84/6/22-24v, printed in Tenison, vi, 45-47.
2. Offices from Burghley's "List of gentlemen ... with ... Leic." n.d. (1586), PRO S.P. 15/29/107. Bracketed numbers are size of retinues.
3. Leic. to Wal. 14 Feb. 1586, Leic. Corres., 114-5. North to Burghley, 28 Jan. 1586, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 327-9.
4. Leic. to Wal. 15 Feb. 1586, ibid., 379.

Higham defended the Bill and Book M.P.s.[1]

A major contribution was made by the Warwickshire gentry. There were three major families represented on the muster list: Sir George Digby (10), Sir John Harington (4), and two Traceys (2). A fourth important Warwickshire figure, Sir John Conway, was governor of Ostend. Both Digby and Sir John Tracey (died 1591) were later commissioned to raise volunteers in the county.[2] Harington was Sidney's cousin and was M.P. for Warwickshire with Fulke Greville in 1586. Conway had married Elena, daughter of Sir Fulke Greville the elder. His son Edward was to marry Sir John Tracey's daughter Dorothy and his daughter Mary, Tracey's son William. Tracey's other daughter, Mary, was to marry Sir Horace Vere in 1607.[3]

An important figure in the expedition was Sir William Russell (6), Bedford's eldest surviving son and a product of "that most excellent divine" Lawrence Humphrey's Magdalen. There is an interesting account of Russell's life in his funeral sermon where he is presented as the model godly soldier and gentleman, studious in religion and his profession, charitable, and a good commonwealth's man.[4] After Sidney's death he became governor of Flushing on Sidney's previous recommendation and at the request of the city.[5] This appointment was praised by Ste. Aldegonde.[6]

It was from the second generation of the great puritan families, such as Russell, that the strongest representation came. The Sidney s were represented by Sir Philip, Robert (6), and Michael Dormer (10), son of Henry Sidney's sister Mary and Sir William Dormer. Sir Francis Knollys

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1. J.E. Neale. Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 1584-1601 (New York, 1957), 158.
2. PRO. S.P. 12/190/34. Acts of the Privy Council, 1586-7, 79-80.
3. C.R. Markham, The Fighting Veres (1888), 380.
4. W. Walker, A Sermon ... at the funerals of ... William Lord Russell (London, 1614), 45-8. Walker's description of Lawrence Humphrey is the one quoted.
5. Burghers of Flushing to Davison, 4/14 Nov. 1586, Cal. S.P. For., xxi(ii), 217-8.
6. To Wal. 17/27 Feb. 1587, ibid., 266-7.

was represented by his son Sir William (9) and his son-in-law Sir Philip Butler (8). There were also two grandsons, Essex, and Sir Thomas Leighton's son Thomas (2). Although Sir John Perrott was unable to obtain his relief from Ireland, his brother Sir Thomas (married to Essex's sister Dorothy) brought five men.[1] The Countess of Warwick later sent a company of volunteers under her kinsman Maurice Dennys.[2] There were also present Lord Chancellor Bromley's son Francis (2), Simon Killegrew (4), Bernard Grenville (2), and Sir Richard Dyer (4).

Another contingent was provided by Leicester's court allies, such as Sir John Fortescue's son Francis (3). Sir Thomas Shirley and his son Thomas provided a large retinue (20 in all). Shirley was also commissioned to raise volunteers and then returned to the Netherlands to a disastrous career as treasurer. A court figure who did not appear on the muster-list was Hatton's client Henry Unton.[3]

Leicester was anxious to increase his forces by the enlistment of volunteers in the States' pay and, as has been seen above, a number of important men were commissioned to raise them. The success of their efforts was adversely affected by reports of the terrible conditions in the Low Countries, Leicester's financial difficulties, and little interest from the Queen. In the end some 5000 were raised.[4] Leicester also tried to raise volunteers from among the French refugees in England.[5] In his search for men he also tried recruiting in Ireland where Perrott had offered troops from the garrison since September 1585.[6] The same

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1. Perrott to Leic. Sept. 1585, Bodl. Perrott MS. 1, ff. 136v-8.
2. Thos. Shirley to Leic. 21 Mar. 1586, Leic. Corres., 180-3. Acts P.C., 1586-87, 106-7.
3. He does appear in the Spanish list, Cal. S.P. Span., iii, 553-6. The list is dated December 1585.
4. Burghley's Memorandum on Volunteers, 15 June 1586, PRO S.P. 12/190/34-5. There were already some 1-2000 in the Netherlands on Leicester's arrival.
5. Sidney to Wal. 25 July; Leic. to Wal. 27 July; Cal. S.P. For., xxi(ii), 102, 104.
6. Perrott to Council 10 Sept. 1585, Bodl. Perrott MS. 1, f. 131-2.

problems existed there, however, and in the end only 1000 were raised, half of them Leinster kern, much to Perrott's disgust.[1]

The Irish were raised by Sir William Stanley and his later activities raises the question of catholic participation in the expedition. Stanley and Yorke were professionals and if their backgrounds were dubious, so were those of a number of other professionals. Mary's agent Thomas Morgan claimed there was a pocket of catholics in the army who would "do a good service".[2] He did not mention Stanley or Yorke, but rather Christopher Blount, Leicester's Master of Horse. Blount, who married Lettice Knollys after Leicester's death and was executed with Essex, was a secret catholic yet hardly of pro-Spanish orientation.

Other references are equivocal. Sir John Conway did not think that Leicester's company were "worthy of him", but whether that was because he doubted their religious sentiments or just young courtiers in general is not clear.[3] Warwick's warning, "Take hede whome you trust, for that you have some fallss boyes about you", may refer to Morgan's intercepted letters or may mean those who sent back unwise accounts of his activities to the court.[4] Mendoza, on the other hand, felt the position for English Catholics at home was easier "since most of the strongest heretics are now in Zealand".[5]

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1. Perrott to Norris, 10 July, 1586, Bodl. St. Amand MS., 8, f. 10.

2. Morgan to Mary, n.d. (Dec. 1585 - Jan. 1586); 15/25 Jan. 1586, Murdin, 448-9, 478.

3. Conway to Wal., 27 Dec. 1585, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 243-4.

4. War. to Leic. 6 Mar. 1586, Leic. Corres., 150-1. The interception theory is Tenison's, vi, 58.

5. Mendoza to Philip II, 1/11 May 1586, Cal. S.P. Span., iii, 576.

3. Leicester's Expedition to the Netherlands: The Failure of the Enterprise

The execution of Leicester's policy in the United Provinces was a two-staged process; the establishment of a firm base in the Netherlands and then alliance with the other protestant powers, with the second stage necessarily contingent on the first. His efforts to establish this base were as influenced by the political situation in England as that in the United Provinces.

When Leicester left England he was still worried that Elizabeth would "fall into myslyke of this cause" and withdraw her support for the Netherlands in favour of the CONTINUING negotiations with Parma.[1] His temporal difficulties brought out in him, as they later did in Sidney, an almost mystical conception of the enterprise: "If the Queen fail, yet must I trust in the Lord ... God is my comfort and on him I cast all: there is no strength in this world beside."[2] He was also worried by Burghley's attitude and appealed to him not to abandon him and "the cause comytted now to my delinge chiefly".[3] Burghley's attitude to the expedition is still difficult to disentangle.[4] Although he publicly supported Leicester, he was committed to the negotiations and definitely gave a friendly ear to those with whom Leicester disagreed. Walsingham was never sure whether he was working against Leicester or not.[5]

The first priority of business was the creation of a stable functioning government which would prevent a further collapse. Even Elizabeth agreed

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1. Leic. to Burgh., 5 Dec. 1585, B.M. Harleian MS. 6993, f. 120
2. Leic. to Wal. 5 & 7 Dec. 1585, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 197, 201-2
3. Leic. to Burgh., ibid
4. Read was to change his view of Burghley from his working actively against Leicester ("Walsingham and Burghley in Queen Elizabeth's Privy Council", (Eng. Hist. Rev. xxviii (1913), 56-8) to supporting him. (Burghley, 327). See also Osterhoff, 45
5. See above, p. 64

with this. The compromising surrender of Antwerp by Ste. Aldegonde was the conclusive proof to the English that total collapse was imminent. Only Leicester's presence and the revitalizing of the government would prevent this and his arrival was considered to be in the nick of time.[1]

Before his departure Walsingham had ordered George Gilpin "to confer with some of the best affected patriots about some plot to be presented to him, as well for the removing of the great abuses reigning there as also for the establishing of some well settled government."[2] However, the measures he would take would be very much conditioned by his position in relation to the leading elements in Dutch politics. The Orangeist rump, led by the dowager Princess of Orange and L'Oysleur de Villiers, was very much a French party and viewed Leicester's coming with less than enthusiasm. This was later virtually admitted in the Orangeist Advis to Leicester of May 1587.[3] Ste. Aldegonde was no longer available as an intermediary.

In October 1585 an accord, arranged by Davison, had been reached in which Leicester agreed to protect the family and its rights out of "the love I bare to the noble man that is gone."[4] In November, however, Maurice of Nassau was hurriedly and secretly invested as Stadtholder of Holland and Zealand, a move by the French party to take advantage of the lull before Leicester's arrival and leave some room open to maneouvre against English control.[5] Although efforts were made to play it down, the English were alarmed and it was now all the more necessary for Leicester to establish

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1. Sidney to Leic., 18 Nov., B.M. Cotton MS, Galba C viii, f. 191-2. Wal to Leic. ?Dec. 1585, Leic. Corres., 34-7.
2. Wal. to Gilpin 19 Nov., Cal. S.P. For.xxx, 173.
3. Archives ... Orange-Nassau, ii(i), 47-63, esp. P. 56.
4. Louise de Coligny to Leic., 14/24 Oct; to Hotman, 1/11 Nov., 1585; P. Marchegay, Correspondence de Louise de Coligny (Paris, 1887), 22-3. Leic. to Davison 25 Oct., Cal. S.P. For. xx, 188. Davison to Leic. 20 Oct., B.M. Addit. MS 48127, f. 95
5. Strong and Van Dorsten, 33-4. For the role of Barneveldt in this, see Osterhoff, 98.

his authority firmly.[1] Quite soon after his arrival the tension broke into open hositility, Leicester calling Villiers "a most vyle trayterous knave", never to be healed.[2]

The Holland oligarchy, led by Paul Buys, was fully in support of Leicester as the best means of assuring English protection. They were among the strongest advocates of his acceptance of the governor-generalship. They were not, however, interested in English protection in itself but as a means of maintaining provincial independence.

The political reasons for Leicester's decision to accept the governor-generalship in January were, therefore, two: it was the most expeditious way of establishing the necessary authority, especially in regard to the position of the house of Orange, and, by forcing her hand on this matter, a means to counter-act Elizabeth's interest in the negotiations with Parma.[3] The theory that the tactics were planned beforehand, although interesting, appears, however, to read too much into the evidence.[4] Leicester claimed at the time that although Elizabeth publicly refused to allow him to accept the governor-generalship:

> Yet, afterwards in speaking with her, I founde her very well content I should receive anythinge from their hands whatsoever, so it would not proceade from herselfe, but of themselves.[5]

Certainly her reaction was unexpected. The Queen blamed Sidney and Davison for having persuaded Leicester to accept, "for which it appears we owe our thankes to some with your Lordship".[6] Leicester in turn was given to believe that Davison had not fully defended him at court. This appears to have been the result of Heneage's intervention and may represent an

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1. Sidney to Leic. 22 Nov., B.M. Cotton MS. Galba C viii, f. 191-2. Christ. Rolls to Leic. 22 Nov.; Leic. to Davison 18 Nov., 1585; Cal. S.P. For., xx, 171, 175.
2. Leic. to Wal., 22 Jan. 1586., Leic. Corres., 73
3. Instructions for Mr. Davison, Feb. 1585.; Leic. to Wal., 7 Feb. 1586; Ibid., 80-82, 92-5.
4. Strong and Van Dorsten, 50-60 passim. See also Ostenhoff, 104.
5. Leic. to Wal., 8 Feb. 1585, B.M. Harleian MS. 285, f. 190.
6. Davison to Leic., 17 Feb. 1586, Leic. Corres., 118

effort to shield Leicester by blaming his "evil councillors".[1] Sidney, in attempting a reconciliation between Leicester and Davison, remained intransigent:

> I will for no cause deny ... that ever I was of opinion he should accept it without delay, because of the necessity, without sending to her Majestie because of not forcing her in a manner to be furder engaged than she wold, which had been a piece of undutiful dutifulness.[2]

To Walsingham he rose to mystic, and politically revealing, heights:

> If her Majestie wear the fountain I would fear ... that we shold wax dry. But she is but a means whom God useth and I know not whether I am deceaved but I am faithfully persuaded that if she shold withdraw herself other springes would rise to help this action. For methinks I see the greate work indeed in hand against the abusers of the world.[3]

Elizabeth had perhaps good ground to regard Sidney and the position he held in the Netherlands with some concern.[4]

Elizabeth's reaction to Leicester's acceptance, the compromise, and her second thoughts are well known. However, the effects on Leicester are worthy of attention. It was now plain that Elizabeth was in earnest about the peace negotiations and Leicester was warned "you are only used for an instrument".[5] Edward Dyer advised him not engage Parma in battle as Parma's superiority was such that Leicester ran a good chance of defeat and "if your Lordship be overthrown, not only you but the cause, the country, and all hope of repair hereafter is gone also ... her Majesty will be utterly discouraged."[6] Walsingham was already regretting Leicester's absence and

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1. Heneage arrived on 3 March 1586, it was only in his letters on 9 and 10 March that Leicester began blaming Davison. See Ibid., 162-71 passim.
2. Sidney to Davison, 14 Apr., B.M. Harleian MS. 285, f. 237.
3. Sidney to Wal., 24 Mar., B.M. Harleian MS. 287, f. 1-2.
4. Ibid. Wal. to Leic. 28 Mar., 11 July, Leic. Corres. 190-2, 343
5. T. Vavasour to Leic. 31 Mar., ibid., 194-6
6. Dyer to Leic. 22 May 1586, B.M. Cotton MS. Galba C ix, f. 245.

his inability to control the negotiations, "yf it passe to other hands, yt wyll not be so carefully dealt in".[1]

Parma had already disseminated propaganda reports about the negotiations in an effort to split the Dutch and the English, and the Queen's refusal appeared to confirm them.[2] If that was the case then the States-General had no further use for the English. Exacerbated by clashes over religious and financial issues, by the early summer relations between Leicester and the States-General were distinctly hostile. There were reports that Buys was negotiating with the King of Denmark to accept the sovereignty of Holland and Zeland and insinuating that it was a sovereign and not a general that the United Provinces needed and if Elizabeth did not want the sovereignty then the States-General must look elsewhere.[3]

As Leicester's relations with the States-General cooled, he grew closer to the Calvinist radicals, which in turn further exacerbated his position with the oligarchy. On the one hand this stemmed from his original conception of the expedition. In the "Advice" of the Dutch commissioners to him in September 1585 he had been asked:

> To have in singular commendation the churches and the reformed evangelyke religion ... to advaunce, confirme, and to cause the same to encrease so muche as ys possyble, not admittinge or sufferinge anye of contrarye or papystical religion to anye offices or chardge of importance.[4]

His acceptance of this role can be found in his justification of the synod to the Queen:

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1. Wal. to Leic., 21 Apr. 1586, Leic. Corres., 232
2. Leic. to Wal., 7 Feb. 1586, Ibid., 93
3. Matters concerning Paul Buys, 27 June (1586), PRO S.P. 84/63/350. Possibly minutes for a missing letter of Leicester's.
4. Leic. Corres., 15-19.

> It was a matter principally expected at my hands, upon the common hope all men had of your Majesty, being a chief article from you that you would send a man of true religion to be in this place; and the first thing they made suit for to your Majesty was that the true religion, as it was professed in England, also might be preserved here.[1]

On the other hand it also developed from the collapse of his relations with both Orangeism and the oligarchy. In this way Leicester unconciously walked into the political and social conflict which dominated Dutch politics from the clash between Orange and the Flemish radicals in 1577-78 into the seventeenth century. Although Orange had been the original antagonist of the radicals, by 1585 the oligarchy had taken his place as exponents of the policies of religious toleration and maintenance of the position of the traditional magistrate class. When Maurice of Nassau broke with Barneveldt in 1611-12 and allied the army and nobility with the radicals the classic alignment of forces was created.[2] In this respect Leicester can be seen as a proto-Maurice. He suffered, however, under three crucial disadvantages: lack of control over his own policy (i.e. the Queen's ultimate control), lack of a native power base such as the prestige of the house of Orange, and the basic difficulties involved in being a foreigner. Yet the essential similarity between the two was admitted by Barneveldt when he claimed in his Apology that Maurice was attempting to establish a "Leicesterian tyranny".[3]

One of the more mysterious questions concerning the expedition is whether Leicester had been in contact with the radicals before his arrival in 1585. It is doutful that this would have come from Sidney's well-known

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1. Leic. to Elizabeth 26 June 1586, Cal. S.P. For., xxxi (ii), 51-4.
2. Wittman, 394.
3. Dudley Carleton to Sir Thomas Lake, 14 Apr. 1618, Carleton letters 263-5. Carleton's view of Leicester is interesting.

contacts in the Netherlands as these were primarily with aristocratic and academic Orangeism.[1] One piece of evidence is tantalizing. In the summer of 1578 the court was in progress in East Anglia. On 19 August, after Leicester had failed for the third time to persuade Elizabeth to send him to the Netherlands, the Court was addressed by the minister of the Dutch Church in Norwich.[2] Leicester was deeply moved: "My thinkes I hear every daye the voyce of that people, and little good I imagine they say, but crye out uppon such neighbors".[3] The divine was Hermann Modet, who was minister at the church from 1576 to October 1578. In view of the theories that Leicester was closely involved with the Dutch Church at Norwich at this time in other respects, it would be tempting to see him in close relations with Modet as well, but there is no substantive evidence.[4]

It was not pure coincidence, though, that Leicester was to find his closest Dutch advisors from among religious refugees from the South, men deeply disliked in Holland.[5] By February 1586 he was in contact with Modet.[6] From an early stage he was to take a paternal interest in the activities of the radicals at Utrecht, led by Modet and Gerard Provinck (Deventer), and supported them in their clash with a magistracy attempting to maintain an Orangeist toleration.[7] Leicester's analysis is revealing:

> Those at Utrycht begynne excedingly to encrease in relygyon, who were lately the worst of all these provinces ... The mynysters begynn to be bolder and they have prospered accordingly, but only the meaner sort, and God be thanked they be many, and the work of God doth appeare in them ... I am persuaded, within vj months, you shuld heare that these provinces wylbe equall with any countrey for religion.[8]

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1. See J.A. Van Dorsten, Poets, Patrons, and Professors (Leyden, 1962).
2. J. Nichols, Progresses ... of Queen Elizabeth (1823), ii, 151-4.
3. Leic. to Davison, 18 Aug.; to Wal., 29 Aug. 1578; Kervijn de Lettenhove, x, 741, 772-3.
4. Rosenberg, 104-7 passim.
5. De Jong, 106-7, gives brief biographies.
6. Modet to Leic. 17/27 Feb. 1586, Broesma, 38-40.
7. Strong and Van Dorsten, 67-8.
8. Leic. to Wal. 27 Feb. 1586, Leic. Corres., 139-41.

The protection of religion was to be one of the major policies of Leicester's government.[1] The decisive act was the sponsorship of the synod which convened at the Hague in June. Although it was assembled at the request of the Dutch divines, Leicester was glad to oblige.[2] The twenty-four members included representatives from the Walloon and Flemish Churches as well as those of the independent provinces. Leicester at first wished Maurice to act as his deputy but he "excused ... the charge" and Leicester directed it himself.[3]

The synod caused a major breach between Leicester and the States-General; partly because Leicester had summoned the synod and ratified its acts on his own authority, but also because the form of church policy devised was greatly disliked.[4] The States, already alarmed by his relationship to the religious radicals, saw the synod in the most sinister light, which genuinely surprised Leicester.[5] Particularly adamant about it was Buys, who, Leicester claimed, was circulating rumours "That I was a puritan ... and that her Majestie was gladd to be ridd of me, and to send me hither".[6] This was the final clash between them and on 9/19 July Buys was arrested at Utrecht by Lord North.

Word of these controversies had reached England and in June Leicester defended his policies in a revealing letter to the Queen. His support of the radicals at the expense of the catholics and neutrals was due to their political reliability: "The Prince of Parma hath continual intelligence with them (catholics) ... not so in other places ... where the papists be

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1. See, for example, Council of State to Willoughby, 14/24 May, 1586, Ancaster MSS., 24,on conditions in Bergen-op-Zoom.
2. Order of the Synod Holden in Holland, Bodl. Tanner MS 78, F. 155-6. G. Brandt, History of the Reformation ... in the Low Countries (1720-22), i, 405-7.
3. Bodl. Tanner MS 78, ff. 155v-6.
4. Brandt, ibid. D. de Burchgrave to Davison, 20/30 June 1586, Cal. S.P. For., xxi (ii), 42-4.
5. Declaration of Leicester, B.M. Addit. MS. 48116, ff. 68v-9.
6. Leic. to Wal. 10 June, 18 June 1585, Leic. Corres. 303, 311. See also Osterhoff, 196-97

banished". The only alternative was large English garrisons in the suspect towns which he could not afford. As it was it was lucky he had come when he did, "as otherwise there had been at least ten or twelve great towns delivered up to the Prince." The synod itself was merely part of the policy he had been expected to pursue and was necessitated by the great number of sects and debilitating religious controversy.[1]

The failure to establish a firm base in the Netherlands with the Queen's support paralyzed any efforts to develop the intervention into a protestant grand alliance. The frustration of the Leicesterians can be seen in Fulke Greville's remark in the unpublished Shrewsbury manuscript of the Life of Sidney: "The Earle his unkle by misprison of this under-taken sovereignty not onely disgraced in person but in him all hope of future designs in those parts like to be totally buried".[2]

From its inception, Leicester and Walsingham had been closely watching the effect of the expedition on the Germans. Just before he left, Leicester informed Walsingham:

> I have received from My Lord Willoughby as wise a letter as I have read a great while and not unfit for her Majesty's sight. I pray God open her eyes to the wonderful means God offers her. If she lose these opportunities who can look for other but dishonour and destruction.[3]

Walsingham replied:

> As your Lordship heareth out of Germanie ... so do we here the like out of Italie, and I thincke that, if they might stand assured that Her Majesty would thoroughlie prosecute the cause,

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1. Leic. to Eliz. 26 June 1586, Cal S.P. For., xxi (ii), 51-4.
2. Quoted in J. Rees, Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke 1554-1628 (1971), 76.
3. Leic. to Wal., 7 Dec. 1585, Cal. S.P. For. xx, 201-2

> they might be drawne ... to kyndell some fyre there ... If the princes of Germanie could be drawne to congratulate your Lordship's repaire into those parts ... it will be greatly countenance the cause.[1]

Leicester as usual was sanguine. "Hyr Majestyes dealinge here" will cause the Germans "not only to send a messenger to the French king, but to lett him know, that they will come to the ayd of the king of Navare"; more had been done "in these causes" in the twenty days since his arrival than in the last ten years.[2]

At the same time Elizabeth was prepared to proceed further in her subsidizing of any army for Navarre by sending Palavicino to establish an account of 50,000 écus at Frankfort.[3] Although the same man, John Casimir, now Regent of the Palatinate, was the center of both her and Leicester's attention, their projects were moving on completely different levels. Elizabeth's intention was solely to keep Navarre "in being" and it was only the fear that he might join with Guise that caused her in the summer of 1586 to double her offer.[4]

Leicester and Casimir, who had been in correspondence since 1578, held different ideas. Soon after his arrival Leicester gave Casimir a somewhat optimistic description of his position in the United Provinces and asked for his assistance in "deliverant ces pais de la longue oppression qu'ils ont soufferte jusqu'icy."[5] An agent was sent to Heidelberg and although no record has remained of his negotiations, Casimir did offer

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1. Wal. to Leic. ?Dec. 1585 (draft), Leic. Corres., 35.
2. Leic. to Wal. 31 Dec. 1585, Ibid., 48, See also Sir D. Drury to Willoughby, 24 Jan. 1586, Hist. MSS. Comm., Ancaster MSS., 17 - 19 A. Lobertius to Wal. 14 Jan. 1586, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 297
3. Instructions for Palavicino, Feb. 1586, B.M. Cotton MS. Galba B xi, f. 362-5.
4. Burghley, "Considerations to be had in the cause of the King of Navarre", 20 July 1586, B.M. Lansdowne MS. 50, f., 9.Burgh. to Leic., 21 July 1586, Leic. Corres. 361.
5. Leic. to Casimir 18 Jan. 1586, F. von Bezold, Briefe des Pfalzgrafen Johann Casimir (Munich, 1882-1903), ii, 336-7, 343.

Leicester whatever assistance he would consider necessary.[1] The subject of the negotiation was probably the use of the army being raised in Germany for Navarre in alliance with Leicester's forces to defeat Parma and liberate the southern Netherlands. This can be deduced from letters of Casimir and Ségur to England asking for sufficient support for the army; "chiefly to those (affairs) of the Low Countries, such an army might be of great service".[2] It was also hoped that with such support an alliance of German princes could be formed: "The first to feel the benefit of this union shall be (if I can do it) the Elector Truchess and those poor countries of Holland and Zealand, of which your Queen has taken the protection."[3]

The Queen's policy and its effect on Leicester's position put a quick end to this. In June Ségur asked Leicester to use his influence with the Queen to increase her support, "si nous l'eussions receu à temps nous serions desja pres de nostre déliverance et les Pays Bas seroient en meilleur estat qu'ils ne sont".[4] Leicester's answer revealed the impasse. Although he had written to the Queen, his own situation was so confused:

> qu'il ne m'a encores esté possible de prendre une certaine resolution: mesme sur ce que j'avais et ay encores intention de traicter avec Monsieur le duc Casimir, et avec vous; ce qui est, moyennant quelque bonne somme d'argent, faire servir vostre armée a deux effects, et si possible est, faire passer par nos quartiers, suyvant les moyens qui vous en seroient proposez, j'attendray l'evenement de vostre negociation, pour me resoudre en cest affaire.[5]

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1. Casimir to Leic., 26 Feb./8 Mar. 1586, P. J. Blok, Correspondence inedite de ... Leicester, Francois, et de Jean Hotman (Archives du Musee Teyler, 2nd Ser., xii (ii), 1911), 124-5.
2. Casimir to Eliz. 16/26 May, 1586, Cal. S.P. for., xx, 675-6.
3. Ségur to Wal., beg. Apr. 1586, Ibid., 512.
4. Ségur to Leic., 17/27 June 1586, Blok. 131-3.
5. Leic. to Segur, 25 July 1586, Egerton, Life, 448.

As a result, although Leicester and Casimir remained in close contact and Leicester's agent John Junius, sieur de Crabbendaye, was sent to Heidelberg in January 1587, their understanding played no further part in the raising of German assistance for Navarre. The German army itself was slowly assembled in the spring of 1587 but without any real purpose. Navarre was unwilling to use it against Henry III. He was also unwilling to engage the forces of the crown himself and it was only the pressure of the semi-leaguer Joyeuse wh[illegible] forced him into battle. Casimir resigned the command of the German army to his agent the Prussian Calvinist Fabian von Dohna and it lumbered to its disastrous defeat at the hands of Guise. Elizabeth became highly suspicious of both Navarre and the Germans and turned to a policy of playing Henry III off against Guise.[1] Through 1588 English policy toward France was dominated wholly by the course of events.

Leicester was also engaged in a highly complex project to involve James VI of Scotland in the protestant league. There were in fact three elements to his plan: the involvement of James in the Low Countries, the use of Scotland as a further source of troops, and the effort to persuade James to sacrifice his mother in return for the support of political puritanism for his claims in the English succession. Although a certain amount of the correspondence on the subject has survived, there is only a fraction of that between the principals, Leicester and the Master of Gray.

Since the end of 1584, Gray had used his position as James's current favorite to reach a political entente with Leicester. In 1585, possibly at Leicester's prompting, he had offered to join the expedition with a force

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1. The Queen's attitude was noticed by the Huguenots, see Mornay to Wal., 3/13 July 1588, Bodl. Addit. MS. D.109 (Fortescue 1), f.10.

of Scots.[1] To Walsingham and Leicester this was a means of publicly committing James to the expedition: "the King's selfe muste be imbarked in this action (which is a thing of no small moment) for that yt cane not be done withowte the kingeis consent and allowance".[2] James's participation "cannot but greatly further and grace the cause".[3] Leicester was also insistent that Gray lead the Scots himself; he did not want more Scots mercenaries of the type that were already in the Netherlands.[4] In March 1586 Gray, fully accepting these political ramifications, had agreed to approach James.[5]

In this case, as in others, these ambitious plans were brought to a halt by the Queen's reaction to Leicester's acceptance of the governor-generalship. Throughout the summer of 1586 she alternately agreed to and then cancelled plans to provide financial support for troops raised by Gray. At the end of September, after Gray had in fact already dispatched some men to Leicester, she called a definite halt to the operation.[6] To some observers this action caused as much damage to the English position in Scotland as did the trial of Mary; "The captains and soldiers who were preparing to go to Flanders ... had employed much of their means in this hope".[7]

On 12 May 1586 Leicester wrote to Gray:

> I desyre greatlie to speak wit yow, if it may be possible for the service of his Majestie, being of great importance, or wit some werry trustie and discreit gentleman that yowe sall commend

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1. Gray to Wal., 13 Dec. 1585, Cal. S.P. Scot., viii, 171. He is mentioned in the "Spanish list" with 600 Scots, Cal. S.P. Span., iii, 553-6.
2. Thos. Randolph to Leic., 7 Feb. 1586, Letters and Papers Relating to Patrick Master of Gray (Bannatyne Club, 1835), 63-4.
3. Wal. to Leic., 11 Apr. 1586, Leic. Corres., 222-4.
4. Leic. to Wal., 11 July 1586, Ibid. 346-7
5. Gray to Burghley, 2 Mar. 1586, Gray Papers, 70-1. To Wal., 2 Mar., Cal. S.P. Scot., viii, 242.
6. Wal. to Gray., 14 Sept. 1586, Gray Papers, 108-9. A. Douglas to Gray 21 Sept., Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., xiii, 307-9.
7. Courcelles to Brulart, 20/30 Nov. 1586, Cal. S.P. Scot., ix, 175.

> to me: quair upon I assure myself thair will follow greit occasione to sett yow on work here, and perhappis your master, but ye must use great expeditione the occasione is but newly offered.[1]

The subject of this proposed meeting has not been revealed; but it probably refers to one or the other of Leicester's further projects, James's acceptance of the sovereignty of the United Provinces and the waiving of the Huntingdon claim in return for concessions over Mary. The only clear reference to the first of these is in a later letter of Gray to Archibald Douglas, denying that he had been involved in an intrigue over the succession:

> My Lord of Leicester has sent at divers tymes an offer of the propriete of the Low Contreys to the Kingis Majestie, and now of late, and craves an answer. It is a thing, if the King miht have it by the Queens advise thair, not to be refusit; bot except he obtain hir good vill, and not only her good vill, bot she prays him to take it, that he will not accept it.[2]

As the middle of May saw Elizabeth in great doubt about the "Heneage compromise", this would be the moment when Leicester might have considered looking for another "protector" for the Netherlands.

The offer to waive the Huntingdon claim had probably been in existence for some time but was given a fresh importance by the discovery of the Babington Plot. Leicester knew of this by 9 July and appears to have made some kind of offer to James soon after.[3] James accepted

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1. A copy in Scots sent to Walsingham by Gray, Cal. S.P. Scot., viii 374-5.
2. Gray to Douglas 10 Nov. 1586, Gray Papers, 114-6. A further illustration of Leicester's activities with the Scots is provided by Sir Thomas Fairfax's claim that Leicester was forced to withdraw the offer of a command of horse as Fairfax was too publicly identified as a partisan of James. List of services of Sir T. Fairfax to James (1625), G. W. Jackson , ed., The Fairfax Correspondence (1848), 12-13.
3. Read, Burghley, 344

Leicester's offer but refused to agree to Mary's execution.[1] The affair came to a head after Mary's trial. James sent Gray to intercede for her but this was assumed by the English to be merely pro forma.[2] Soon after his return to England, Leicester had a conversation with Archibald Douglas in which he offered, if James would accept the execution, and remain constant in religion, to assist in his succession and have Huntingdon, "if it would not offend the Queen", publicly renounce his claim in favour of James.[3] A further meeting was arranged, but before it could be held, a strong protest from James, in Gray's hand, reached Elizabeth and required all Leicester's influence to dampen its effect.[4] Although Gray's actions in this are still mysterious, perhaps his experiences during the summer had cooled his pro-English sentiments, Leicester regarded it as a betrayal of confidence and broke with him. He now dealt with James with warnings which James knew well enough to heed.[5]

The ambiguous results of his military activities in 1586 and the state of his relations with the States-General placed Leicester in a difficult position at the end of the year. It has usually been considered that his official recall in November to attend Parliament was mainly to save his face. He did, however, have two pressing reasons to return to England when he did. The first was the fact that his debt to the Londoners was due to be repaid in December. The other was the result of the trial of the Queen of Scots and the desire of the council to have him present to use his influence with the Queen to ensure that the sentence would be

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1. James VI, "Instructions for Douglas", 14 Aug. 1586, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., xiii, 305. Gray to Leic., 8 Sept. 1586, Blok, 143-4.
2. Gray to Leic., 4 Oct. 1586, ibid., 153-5
3. Douglas to James, 8 Dec. 1586, R.S. Rait and A.I. Cameron, King James's Secret (London 1927), 79-82.
4. Ibid., 64-5
5. Leic. to James, 31 Dec. 1586, The Warrender Papers, ed. Cameron (Scot. Hist. Soc., 3rd Ser., xvii-xix), i, 253

carried out. As Burghley said when sending him permission to return, "I fear more slackness in her Majesty than will stand either with her surety or with owers." Although Leicester was supposed to await the arrival of Lord Grey, who was ordered to take command in his absence, Burghley also warned him that Grey "will shunn it, I am sure, as much as he may".[1] It is not surprising that Leicester did not wait for him. He arrived in England on 24 November and immediately entered into discussions with the Queen on the subject of the Queen of Scots.[2]

The trial had also caused Elizabeth to summon Parliament. Although its first session (29 October - 2 December) was devoted entirely to the Queen of Scots, the second (15 February - 23 March 1587) was the scene of one of the more interesting Elizabeth parliamentary conflicts. Not only did it see the debate over the "Bill and Book", but also the most radical foreign policy debate of the reign. The course of the debates has been well chronicled by Neale but there are two points worthy of note.[3] The radicalism of the Parliament was to a certain degree spurious as in the wake of the Davison débacle the council was in an almost Jacobean disarray and represented in the Commons only by Hatton, Mildmay and Knollys. Secondly the motives for the calling of the second session are not at all clear and the council did not have its usual closely worked-out program. Thus, although the puritans were able to seize the initiative at the beginning of the session, once the Queen had decided on her policy, "order" was quickly restored.

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1. Burgh. to Leic., 4 Nov. 1586, B.M. Cotton MS Galba C x, f.40
2. Wal. to Wilkes, 3 Dec 1586, Brugmans, i, 294-6
3. Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 1584-1601, 166-83 passim. An examination of his principal sources, B. M. Harleian MS 7188, ff. 90-3 and 6845, ff. 30-9 reveals no omissions.

Neale has suggested that the foreign policy debate was "inspired" by Leicester.[1] He had been campaigning for a Parliament for two years and the policy advocated by Job Throckmorton and others, financial support in return for the Queen's acceptance of the sovereignty of the United Provinces, was his own. This demonstration by the Commons would have been useful in his current "war of nerves" with the Queen.

On the other hand, Leicester's absence in the Low Countries would have prevented any real attempt at a well-managed exploitation of his parliamentary patronage. The election of Job Throckmorton himself suggests the lack of such a campaign. His famous "crashing" of Warwick borough would have been unnecessary as Leicester could have easily provided him with a seat elsewhere. Warwick, as High Steward of the borough, had made the usual compromise with the town and had nominated Thomas Dudley since 1572. Not only would he have been unlikely to have encouraged Throckmorton in breaking the "rules of the game", but he was not even notified beforehand.[2] The fact that Throckmorton was assisted in the Warwick election by Sir Fulke Greville the elder, Sir John Harrington, and Thomas Cartwright, all associated with Leicester, is a further suggestion that the election represents the absence of leadership from the top.[3] It is not impossible, of course, that Throckmorton and Leicester or agents of his were in communication in the interval between the sessions. On the other hand the course of the debate does not exactly display the hand of a master parliamentary tactician. The Commons went careering from issue to issue and there was no attempt to exploit their initiative seriously.

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1. Neale, ibid., 169
2. The Black Book of Warwick, ed. T. Kemp (Warwick, 1890), 390
3. Their participation is mentioned in Neale, Elizabethan House of Commons, 241-2.

A final piece of evidence is suitably ambiguous. This is the "Buzenval letter" which definitely displays some Leicesterian connection.[1] If the Commons debate was to be employed as a display this was one of the ways its influence could best be felt. Yet, although it describes the Commons' offer, it makes no connection with Leicester. On the other hand this may have been deliberate, as Leicester could have wanted his role in the matter carefully hidden.

Part of the difficulty in tracing Leicester's activities in the Parliament lies in the shadowy knowledge we have of his activities in general in the months following his return. This also applies to discussions over the future of his governor-generalship. His basic position appears to have been a desire to return quickly to prepare a spring campaign and at the same time a refusal to accept a repetition of 1586; "I will not endure suche another yeares service with so many crosses and wants, and so little assistance."[2] The contradiction in this position was to be resolved by a war of nerves with Elizabeth to force her, and through her the States-General, into making the concessions he considered necessary.

His bargaining power was considerably weakened by a serious deterioration in his position in the United Provinces in his absence. When he returned to England he took with him most of the English leadership, leaving Wilkes in charge of civil affairs and Norris in command of the army. Soon afterwards the very different conception Wilkes held of the situation in the Netherlands made itself felt. Regarding the maintenance of the political status quo within the United Provinces as the aim of English policy, he took the part of the Utrecht magistracy against the radicals.

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1. On the Buzenval letter, see below pp. 94-96.
2. Leic. to Burgh., 29 Sept., 1586, B.M. Harleian MS. 6994, f. 37. Leic. to Maurice of Nassau, 4 Feb. 1587, Archives Orange-Nassau, ii(i), 37.

The issue, interestingly enough, was the appropriation of church wealth:

> Although for myself I think church livings were most fitly to be converted to the defence of the public cause, yet the manner of the doing thereof accompanied with so great danger ... will hazard the loss of the town and consequently of the whole province.

He was particularly angered when William Herle, "I know not by what authority and direction", wrote to encourage the radicals in the Queen's name. Wilke's prime target was Herman Modet "the Prince of Orange could never brook this same Modet", and he regretted that "My Lord North, Mr. Killegrew, and (Thomas) Webbe have greatly supported him in his humours at Utrecht, and it is not to be doubted but they will do the like at home". It is interesting that Wilkes admitted that he had received his anti-Modet information from Villiers and the conservative theologian Saravia.[1] In December he arranged with the governor to have Modet kidnapped and remóved from Utrecht.[2] Shortly afterwards Modet went to England to see Leicester.

Wilkes's earlier reports of the state of Leicester's government were another source of controversy between the three. Leicester accused him in particular of submitting a false account of his finances.[3] During the disputes over the finances in the winter of 1586-7. Leicester believed that Wilkes was supplying Burghley with material with which to attack him.[4] As Wilkes was Burghley's man, these suspicions may not have been groundless.[5] Wilkes in turn saw himself as the target of a plot directed by Leicester or his agents.[6]

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1. Wilkes to Wal., 24 Dec. 1586, Cal. S.P. For., xxi(ii), 283-4. See also Osterhoff 220.
2. Wilkes to J. Hotman, 13 Dec. 1586, Broersma, 91-2
3. Declaration of Leic., B.M. Addit. MS. 48116, F. 52v
4. Ibid., f. 62v, Wilkes to Leic., 13 Dec. 1586, Brugmans, i, 322-6. Read, Burghley, 332-3.
5. Wilkes to Burghley, 24 Jan., 17 Feb. 1587, Brugmans, ii, 64-5, 109-13
6. Wilkes to Burghley, 17 Feb., ibid; To Wal., 17 Feb. 1587; ibid., 113-5

Leicester's position suffered its most serious reverse with the defection of Stanley and Yorke and the loss of Deventer and the sconce of Zutphen. In response to the petition of his officers against Norris, he had given them freedom from Norris's interference in their garrisons.[1] Although he could claim with some justice that he should not be held directly responsible for the actions of Stanley and Yorke, this was of little use against the loss of confidence caused among the Dutch and the protection the incident gave for the States-General to move against the English and Leicester's Dutch allies.[2] Norris regarded the defections as proof he had been right all along although he received no support from Walsingham nor, immediately, from Wilkes.[3] The Queen also supported Leicester.[4]

The repercussions of the defections also had an important effect on Leicester's position in England. Despite earlier appeals to return, he had previously refused to leave without first obtaining important improvements in his position.[5] When Hotman wrote directly to the Queen, Leicester told him sharply not to appeal above his head.[6] In early February a Dutch commission arrived in England to ask Elizabeth to increase her assistance. When she refused, Leicester proffered his resignation.[7] Soon afterwards, however, came news of the defections and with it a strong attack on Leicester from the States-General. With this the basis of his position as the indispensible man for the Netherlands was swept away. Instead of being able to force concessions from Elizabeth with the help of the Dutch, he now needed Elizabeth's help to

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1. B.M. Egerton MS. 1694, f. 51. Declaration of Leicester, B.M. Addit. MS. 48116, f. 61v-62.
2. Leic. to States, 9 Sept. 1587, B.M. Addit. MS. 48014, f. 584.
3. Wilkes to Wal. 17 Feb., ibid. Wal. to Wilkes, 23 Feb., Brugmans, ii, 132-3
4. Eliz. to Norris, 3 Mar. 1587, Bodl. St. Amand MS. 8, f. 2.
5. Audley to Leic., 21 Jan. 1587, B.M. Cotton MS. Galba C xi, f. 10.
6. Hotman to Eliz. 5/15 Feb. 1587, ibid., f. 238. Leic. to Hotman, 22 Feb. 1587, Broesma, 170-1.
7. J. Woolley to Leic., 9 Feb. 1587., B.M. Cotton MS. Galba C xi., f. 218 Wal. to Wilkes, 10 Feb., Brugmans, ii, 104-5

force concessions from the States-General. The result was the decision to send Buckhurst, on Leicester's recommendation, to the Netherlands to negotiate these concessions.[1]

Buckhurst was dispatched on 12 or 13 March and arrived in Flushing on the 24th. Just before he left an important analysis of the background to his embassy was made in a letter from Paul de Choart, sieur de Buzenvall, ambassador of Navarre in England to an unidentified correspondent in the United Provinces.[2] Buzenvall first emphasized that Leicester was the strongest supporter of the United Provinces in England and that the recent commissioners could testify to that. He then went on to describe Parliament's offer of a benevolence which would provide £20,000 for the campaign and had moved Elizabeth to send Leicester back immediately. At that point she received the letter from the States-General attacking him and had halted his departure and sent Buckhurst instead to find out what was going on. Buzenvall concluded that Elizabeth and Leicester would not withdraw their favours "aux églises que Dieu a receuilli pardela" because of the actions of a few ingrates.

On the same day Leicester sent a letter to Jean Hotman giving him instructions on the subject of the embassy.[3] Buckhurst was to examine the state of the United Provinces and "to deall touching my particular effectually with them". Hotman was to provide him with information and:

> procure such able, wyse men to repair to him soe as be true patriotts inded, and that ye warn My Lord of such as ye know to be dyssemblers and hollow persons.

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1. Declaration of Leicester, B.M. Addit. MS. 48116, f. 76v.
2. Buzenvall to ?, 10/20 Mar. 1587 (extracts), ibid., 48014, f. 460-1
3. Leic. to Hotman, 10 Mar. 1587, Broesma, 171-3.

If Buckhurst's negotiations were successful he would come over immediately, "and I have given order to Rychard Browne my servant to leye on provisions of all things for me." There was praise for Buckhurst and the demand:

> I look to have myne honour repayred ... but I hear that (the States' actions) have been furthered by some of our owne nation ther ... I shall see them shortly and yt is not the yll wylling of 10 or 12 can discourage me to doe servyce for the church of God and so afflicted a people, whome I love and wyll love without regard of others yll dealings wit me.

He ended by requesting Hotman to have Deventer, "an honest wyse man", see Buckhurst as soon as possible.

Leicester's hopes of Buckhurst were to be sadly disappointed. Partly this was owing to Buckhurst's religious coldness and his sharing of Wilkes's distrust of the radicals. It was also due to his conception of the purpose of the embassy: to re-establish a working relationship with the States-General and at the same time persuade them to accept Elizabeth's peace negotiations. As there was a widespread suspicion of Elizabeth's activities in the United Provinces, he regarded his prime responsibility as the restoration of the confidence of the States-General and proving to them that the Queen would not abandon them.[1] Thus he and Wilkes, with whom he worked closely, supported the Dutch request for a £50,000 loan.[2] Leicester regarded Buckhurst as having conceded everthing he was supposed to negotiate.[3] His own policy was to force the States-General into accepting his return on his own terms and if necessary to rally the radicals against

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1. "Interrogatories delivered to Buckhurst", n.d. (1587), B.M. Addit. MS. 48127, f. 3v.
2. Wal. to Wilkes, 2 May 1587; Eliz to Buck., 3 May; Cal. S.P. For. xxi(iii), 47-8, 48-50.
3. Declaration of Leicester, B.M. Addit. MS. 48116, n.f., bet. ff. 59-60

them. He refused to recognize that the peace negotiations were Elizabeth's aim because he also realized that the dominant elements in the United Provinces would not accept them.

An early clash developed over the Buzenvall letter. Buckhurst discovered that it was being widely circulated in Leicesterian circles and felt it necessary to repudiate it and publicly support the States-General. Although he later denied any knowledge of it, Leicester found its contents unobjectionable: "I would faine know what danger was in such a letter"; it was only written "throughe zeale to this cause".[1] The letter may not have been a piece of Leicesterian propaganda, yet the similarity between it and his letter to Hotman, especially the distinction between the "people" of the United Provinces and the few ingrates, suggests at least a connection with Leicesterian circles in England.

Buckhurst also took a personal position with Leicester's enemies and against his friends. Leicester later claimed that he was prejudiced against "the ministers, consisteries, puritanes or protestants".[2] He was furious when he found Buckhurst taking Norris's part and conferring with Buys and other members of the States-General.[3] There was a clash over Philip, Count Hohenlohe, the alcoholic son-in-law of Orange who was an officer in the States' service. Although Leicester had cultivated good relations with him in 1586, a breach had occured over the winter and Hohenlohe was claiming publicly that Leicester was attempting to assassinate him. Leicester, with Elizabeth's support, wanted him arrested but Buckhurst and Wilkes advised strongly against it, further increasing Leicester's belief that they were in league against him.[4]

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1. Interrogatories to Buck ... and Leicester's Answer, B.M. Addit. MS. 48127, f. 3v.
2. Declaration of Leicester, B.M. Addit. MS. 48116, f. 69v.
3. Leic. to Buck., 30 April 1587, Cal. SP. For., xxi(iii), 37-40.
4. Ibid. Wilkes to Wal., 29 April. Brugmans, ii, 230-4.

With the negotiations of Buckhurst working so against his interest and with none of his grievances rectified, Leicester was aghast to find the Queen intent on sending him back to the Netherlands. She would make no new arrangements for paying the troops, nor could she be persuaded to help him with his own expenses.[1] His mortgaged lands had not been redeemed and the loan had to be extended for another year.[2] He was equally unsuccessful in persuading Elizabeth to halt the peace negotiations or to strengthen his authority in the Netherlands.[3] Throughout April, on his own and through Walsingham, he appealed to her to discharge him from his commission if she would not make any concessions.[4] For a while she toyed with the idea of replacing him with Norris. There is some indication that Leicester was not happy about resigning:

> There is nothing sticks in my stomach but the good will in the poor afflicted people; for whom I take God to record I would be content to loose any limb I have to do them good.[5]

By the middle of May Buckhurst and Wilkes had become so deeply involved with the anti-Leicesterians that they reversed their earlier request for him to return and urged that some other governor be sent.[6] The decision was, however, precipitated by the crisis of the investment of Sluys and by the end of the month Elizabeth had returned to her original intention of sending Leicester "with those forces she thinketh fyt".[7] During the next few weeks a hasty compromise was put together. Leicester was given power to override the States-General but he was also to bring

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1. Read Burghley, 393.
2. Bodl. Tanner MS. 78, f.144.
3. Wal. to Leic., 10 April, B.M. Cotton MS. Galba C xi, f. 292.
4. Leic. to Wal. 11, 16, 18 April, B.M. Harleian MS. 287, ff. 22, 24; Cal. S.P. For., xxi(iii), 20-1
5. Leic. to Wal. 16 Apr., Cal. S.P. For., xxi(iii), 20-1.
6. Wilkes to Wal. 13 May, 15 May, Cabala 32-4, Cal. S.P. For., xxi(iii), 64.
7. Wal. to Burgh., 23 May, 26 May, B.M. Harleian MS. 6994, ff. 68, 70.

them to agree to accept the negotiations.[1] He received a £6,000 loan from the Queen which involved the pawning of his farms of sweet wines and of fines and alienations.[2] A covert arrangement was made with Walsingham to increase his auxiliary troops.[3]

Leicester left England on 25 June and arrived in Flushing on the next day. In the meantime a further clash with Buckhurst had occured. On 10 June Leicester requested his agent Junius to inform "les bonnes villes" of his impending return and the Queen's intention to support them.[4] Junius was to repudiate Buckhurst's statement that the Queen was seeking peace with Spain - his own return with his army and Drake's voyage to Cadiz was proof of this. He was also to inform "ceux qui ont charge sur le peuple" that Leicester was going to resume full authority with the support of the Queen and in general to reassure "les bons". Buckhurst immediately identified "ceux qui ont charge sur le peuple" with "the ministers of the churche and captaines of the burgers of every town" and the letter as a call for insurrection. His response was to have Junius arrested. He gave four other reasons for his reactions to the letter: that it would antagonize the States-General beyond return, that it revealed more of the Queen's view on the negotiations than he thought wise, that it officially admitted the sanction given to Drake, that it was not consonant with the Queen's policy as he had been given to understand it.[5] Leicester claimed that Buckhurst had deliberately distorted the letter and had persuaded the States-General to do the same, a result of his association with Leicester's enemies.[6]

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1. Cal. S.P. For. xxi(iii), 120-3
2. Leic. to Burgh. 15 June, Hist. MSS. Comm. Salisbury MSS, iii, 265
3. J. E. Neale, "Queen Elizabeth and the Netherlands, 1586-7", Eng. Hist. Rev., xiv (1930), 390-1
4. B.M. Cotton MS. Galba D ii, f. 25 (endorsed by Burghley, "whereunto the States war offendid"); This may not have been the only anti-Buckhurst manoeuvre, see Wilkes to Wal., 3 June, Cabala, ii, 41-2.
5. Buckhurst to Eliz., 28 June, B.M. Cotton MS. Galba C xi, f. 60-2.
6. Interrogatories to Buck., B.M. Addit. MS. 48127, f. 4-v,9.

When Leicester arrived, Buckhurst, Wilkes and Norris left for England, none of them coming to see him first. This, it appears, was done on Buckhurst's authority as he was afraid Leicester would try to arrest them.[1] According to Camden, he also had hopes of having Leicester brought to trial in England for his policies.[2] To Leicester this was the concluding demonstration of their "malice" towards him. On their return to England they were arrested, partly on Leicester's request, partly on Elizabeth's own dislike of their concessions to the Dutch.[3] There was some attempt to investigate the dispute, but no real conclusion was reached. Although none of them received further employment while Leicester lived, Buckhurst at least appears to have been reconciled with him.[4] A curious role in the affair was played by Walsingham. Both Leicester and Wilkes sent their complaints against each other through him and he appears to have protected Wilkes against Leicester.[5] Read has suggested a personal breach between Walsingham and Leicester over Sidney's debts, yet he was apparently sincere in his efforts to help Leicester to return to the Netherlands.[6] It is not impossible, though, that Walsingham had decided to avoid a painful repetition of 1586 by keeping himself carefully in the background.

Leicester brought with him a more united staff than in 1586. His civilian councillors were Killegrew and Robert Beale, with whom he was extremely pleased.[7] Pelham replaced Norris in command of the foot and Willoughby Essex in Command of the horse. Lord North also returned, much to the dislike of the States-General who detested his closeness to the radicals and feared he would be given another important post.[8] Lord Grey

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1. Wilkes to Leic., 28 June, Blok, 165-6.
2. Read, Burghley, 395.
3. Wal. to Leic., 14 July, Brugmans, ii, 412.
4. Buck. to Leic., 26 Aug. 1588, Longleat, Dudley MS. iii, f. 259.
5. Needham to Wal. 25 July 1587, B.M. Harleian MS. 287, f. 37.
6. Read, Burghley, 333-4
7. Leic. to Burghley, 11 Sept; to Wal., 16 Sept; Brugmans, iii, 118, 131.
8. Gilpin to Wal., 22 Aug., Cal. S.P. For., xxi(iii), 267.

was expected but again his debts prevented his departure.[1]

The basic reason for Leicester's return was to raise the siege of Sluys and this he failed to do. Whatever the reasons, and to a large degree the Dutch were responsible, this put an end to any immediate hopes of mastering the States-General.[2] During the summer there were various pro-Leicesterian insurrections in the United Provinces, none of which were strong enough to have much effect and only served further to alarm the States. In Utrecht Modet was arrested by the Stadtholder for attempting to depose him and bring in Lord North.[3] In England the loss of Sluys provided ammunition for Leicester's enemies and Raleigh in particular saw it as another reason to oppose land operations and concentrate on the sea. Leicester was defended by Essex who thereby compounded his personal quarrel with Raleigh.[4]

The surrender of Sluys (26 July) increased Elizabeth's desire to come to terms with Parma. On 9 August she informed Leicester that she was going to negotiate and ordered him to invite the States-General to send representatives to join her commissioners.[5] The decision was completely hers; even Burghley appreciated the damage it would do to Leicester's position.[6] Leicester warned her of the danger negotiating would do to "the cause you took here in hand viz. the church of God and preservation of so many thousand of people" and tried to stall, but she was insistent that he deliver her message to the States-General.[7] He had a further

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1. Grey to Eliz., 11 June, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., iii 263-4.
2. R.B. Wernham, Before the Armada (New York, 1966), 388-9. The Leicesterian side is to be found in North, Willoughby, Pelham, Russell to Council., 12 Aug. 1587, Cal. S.P. For., xxi(iii), 234: (T. Digges), Briefe and True Report (1590), 1-10. See also Osterhoff 334.
3. Brandt, i, 413.
4. Read, Burghley, 394
5. Ibid., 399
6. Ibid., 394-98
7. Leic. to Eliz., 15 Oct., Cal. S.P. For., xxi(iii), 373-4.

difficulty explaining the decision to his Dutch followers and in doing so contributed to the idea that the Queen would continue to protect the Dutch churches.[1]

His own position was now impossible and several of his followers, North, Pelham and Atye, advised him to resign on the spot.[2] He refused, however, to leave the situation in chaos and was prepared to wait for a successor. He suggested that completely new personnel be brought in and one of two policies be adopted, either a continuation of some form of the present regime (he suggested Howard of Effingham as his replacement) or purely an auxiliary army under a professional from Ireland, Sir Richard Bingham.[3] Having decided to resign there were, however, two pressing reasons to return to England quickly; Walsingham's desire for him to be at court to control the peace negotiations and the need to redeem his debts, as his mortgages would be forfeit by the New Year.[4]

Despite his advice the Queen came to neither a quick nor a clear decision.[5] His own recall did not come until the middle of November and he did not leave until 7 December. Instead of an uncompromised figure being sent from England, the command of the English forces was given to Willoughby, a committed Leicesterian. Willoughby himself appealed against his commission for this reason and suggested that Norris or Lord Grey be given the command.[6] Other posts of authority were given to Leicesterians. Killegrew remained as Willoughby's civil advisor and the most outspoken Leicesterian, Sir William Russell, was still governor of Flushing.

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1. Killegrew and Beale to Council, 11 Sept., ibid., 307-8
2. Gilpin to Wal., 22 Aug. 1587, Cal. S.P. For., xxi(iii), 267-8
3. Leic. to Burghley, 11 Sept., Brugmans, iii, 117-18.
4. Ibid., Leic to Eliz., 29 Sept., Cal. S.P. For., xxi(iii), 341-3. Bodl. Tanner MS. 78, f. 144.
5. Wal. to Leic., 12 Nov., B.M. Cotton MS. Galba D ii, f. 192.
6. Bertie, Five Generations, 142-4

Willoughby's own friends, Thomas Wilford, Sir William Drury, and John Stubbes (who became his Comptroller of Checks in the summer of 1588), had Leicesterian allegiances.[1] Willoughby's situation was made more difficult by the fact that although he and Killegrew held the two English seats on the Council of State, he had no civil power. Leicester's civil authority had been given to Maurice of Nassau.

Elizabeth's indecision regarding the English paralleled her indecision towards the Dutch Leicesterians. After Leicester's resignation was made public (March 1588) the States-General and Maurice of Nassau moved quickly to re-establish their authority. Elizabeth continued to give a vague moral support to the Dutch Leicesterians but Willoughby was given neither the power nor the authority to protect them.[2] As a result they were abandoned to their fate and the English leadership, emotionally comitted to them, involved in ugly confrontations with the States-General. Russell regarded their abandoning as Leicester's "worst fault".[3] There is, however, some evidence that Leicester wished to help them but was prevented by Elizabeth.[4]

The "abandoning" of the Dutch Leicesterians hastened the retirement of the English Leicesterians. The first to go was Killegrew who left, with Leicester's help, in the autumn of 1588.[5] Russell also wished to retire at the same time and eventually did so in the beginning of 1589.[6] Willoughby left in March 1589. Killegrew was replaced in November 1588

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1. Will. to Burgh., 21 Aug. 1588, Cal. S.P. For., xxii, 150.
2. Wernham, Before the Armada, 394
3. Russell to Wal., 8 Nov. 1588, B.M. Harleian MS. 287, ff. 112-3.
4. T. Heneage to Leic., 29 Aug. 1588, Longleat, Dudley MS. 2, f. 271.
5. Killegrew to Leic., 16 Aug. 1588, ibid., f. 251.
6. Russell to Leic., 25 Aug. 1588, ibid., f. 257. Wal. to J. Woolley, 21 Apr. 1589, Cal. S.P. For., xxiii, 225.

with Thomas Bodley, Willoughby in the summer of 1589 by Sir Francis Vere (with the lower rank of Sergeant-Major General) and Russell by Sir Robert Sidney. Although Sidney was appointed on Walsingham's recommendation in August 1589, he did not arrive in Flushing until May 1590. Wernham has noted that the retirement of these Leicesterians marked a "revolution" in English policy toward the Netherlands.[1] For the remainder of the reign the English leadership was composed of junior figures and in the case of Bodley and Vere, careerists and professionals. Yet despite the "political" manner in which Elizabeth, the Cecils, and James would view relations with the United Provinces, the Leicesterian conception of the relationship would survive both in political puritanism as a whole and, more specifically, in the army.

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1. Cal. S.P. For., xxiii, v.

4. The Earl of Essex and the Fate of the Huguenots

I.

The failure of political puritanism in the Netherlands was, to a certain extent, obscured by the drama of the Armada, a victory which had a major effect upon the Englishman's view of the struggle in which he was engaged. The defensive nature of the victory was for the Queen an ideological triumph; the battle was fought and won on her terms. It also gave a boost to the English nationalism which the Anglican conception of the church was to find so useful an ally.

Its immediate effect on political puritanism was, however, of a somewhat different nature.

It was first and foremost the most dramatic proof since the Marian regime of the threat to religion in England.[1] Its providential and defensive nature was, however, only proof that God was supporting the English; the final defeat of Anti-christ was still far off and a long and difficult struggle lay ahead.[2] This sign of God's support should, nevertheless, provide inspiration for the protection of the brethren abroad. One of the tracts produced by the crisis was the translation of Part IV of the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, with its very definite stress on the duty to aid the oppressed:

> And therefore if the Germaine Princes do defend the church of Christ in Germanie, or the Prince of England in England, & do not ayde the churches also in other countries, but do suffer them to be oppressed and desolate, they may be thought to have forsaken the Church.3

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1. Burghley, Memorandum, 25 Feb. 1588, B.M. Cotton MS. Vespasian C viii, f. 12. R. Rogers, Diary, 13 Aug. 1588, Two Puritan Diaries, ed. M.M. Knappen 1933, 80.

2. Rogers, Diary, 26 Oct. 1588, ibid., 81. E. Bunny, The Coronation of David (1588, ded. Huntingdon). A.Marten, An Ex Hortation (1588), A2v.

3. An Apologie for Christian Soldiers (1588), A4v.

Anthony Marten saw as reasons for England to develop a powerful military machine not only self-defence, but "if need so require to offend some of them (catholics) also for the better safety of our Christian brethren dispersed abroad in the world".[1]

The inspiration derived from the Armada victory can be found in two puritan tracts presented to Drake and Norris at the departure of the Portugal Voyage of 1589. One was Oliver Pig's compilation of his "Letter to a Christian Knight" of 1585 and his two "Meditations" on the Armada.[2] They were to give Drake "instructions how to proceed in such causes".[3] The "Meditations" contain the reflection that although the church in England was preserved by the Armada victory,

> Other churches, as those of France and of the Lowe Countries...have many deadly enemies, so necessarily there is required an employing of our and their forces, against such common adversaries.4

Drake received Pig's blessing as God's "executioner of his vengence upon the enemies of His Church".[5]

The other tract is the report of an anonymous group of London divines to Drake and Norris on the question, submitted by a "well wisher" of theirs, [redacted] whether they should attempt the restoration of the Portugese pretender, Don Antonio, during the voyage.[6] The discussion is dated November 1588 and the results are to be kept secret.[7]

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1. An Exhortation, C2.
2. See above, p. 57
3. Camb. Univ. MS. Dd ii 76, f. 2v.
4. Meditations (printed edition), A5v-A6, also 28-29.
5. Camb. Univ. MS. Dd ii 76, f. 2.
6. Camb. Univ. MS. Hh vi 10.
7. Ibid., f. 58v.

This looks very much like an activity of the London Conference; this and Pig's work may be the survivors of a fairly large campaign of exhortation.

The fascinating feature about this disputation is its thoroughness, its almost over-meticulous discussion of the nature of the godly war. The initial question, whether a popish prince (Antonio) should be assisted to his throne, received the predictable answer, only as a matter of policy to weaken the king of Spain.[1] This question was then reversed and the problem of whether a protestant ruler should subdue all papists discussed. The conclusion was that although it was "very worthy to deliver the poor brethren", in which no secular advantage was to be taken, scripture did not command it. Godly rulers, it is "proved out of Revelation", are commanded instead directly to attack the Pope. There was then a long discussion of the stages of Antichrist to show that the stage when Rome should fall had been reached.[2] England was designed to lead this attack as the first absolute kingdom to leave Babylon.[3] Should a protestant alliance be formed first? Interestingly enough no - because all protestants would rally to the campaign once it had begun.[4] The present voyage would, however, be blessed if Don Antonio would maintain the Gospel after his restoration and if Drake and Norris would plan a second expedition against Rome immediately on their return.[5] The desire that this expedition, the counter attack to the Armada, should be aimed directly at Antichrist in Rome was also held by George Peele.[6]

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1. Ibid., ff., 5v, 16.
2. ff. 19-19v.
3. f. 35v.
4. ff. 48v-9.
5. ff. 57-8.
6. "Farewell...to the...Generals of Our English Forces", Works, ed., A.H. Bullen (1888), ii, 238-9.

The other interesting facet of the disputation is its desire to integrate the expedition, and all future expeditions, into a general religious strategy. They would have preferred that God had been sought first.[1] It was a fault in the bishops that they had not held a general conference of divines to do so as would have been the case in Israel.[2] The seeking should examine whether the sins of England had been sufficiently reformed to assure that God would favour them in the great work and was a vital necessity for the next expedition if it was to be aimed at Rome.[3] They themselves could not request it; they "would be called Puritans for meddling". Drake and Norris were to request it "as from yourselves", in which case the present discussion could serve as a guide to the agenda of the greater conference.[4]

The ability of political puritanism to achieve its goals received at the same time a critical setback in the death of Leicester on 4 September 1588.[5] He was to be followed in 1590 by Warwick and Walsingham and in 1595 by Huntingdon. By the middle 1590's the crucial aristocratic core of the movement had disappeared and the significance of their loss was recognized by contemporaries:

> The deathe of your noble uncle, the Erle of Huntingdon, Doctor Whittaker in Cambridge, and Sir Roger Williams here, all three worthie men in their callings, and hardlie like to be seconded againe portend some scourge uppon us. The Lord give us grace to amend our lives.6

There remained a small group of widows, particularly Anne, countess

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1. Camb. Univ. MS. Hh vi 10, f. 56.
2. Ibid., ff. 10-12, 56v.
3. f. 58v.
4. ff. 56v, 58v-59.
5. The importance of his death is well discussed by Collinson, Elizabeth Puritan Movement, 387.
6. Robt. Beale to Sir Robt. Sidney, 21 Dec. 1595, Sidney Papers, i, 396.

of Warwick, in the crucial position at court, who tried to continue the old patronage: helping Wentworth during his imprisonment in 1597 or recommending Edmund Snape to the city of Exeter in 1599.[1] Their political power, however, in such cases as their advocacy of the earl of Kent as Huntingdon's successor as Lord President of the North, was nil.[2] None of the great aristocratic leaders of the movement left a suitable heir. Warwick and Huntingdon were childless, as was Leicester after the death of Denbigh in 1584. Bedford's heir had been killed in 1585 and his grandson, the 3rd earl, was an unprepossessing minor. The leading figure of the second generation, Philip Sidney, was also dead. His younger brother Robert was in fact Leicester's and Warwick's nearest heir in blood but, as he was to complain to Essex, he was unable to obtain any advantage from his position.[3] He and his family were, however, to be constantly reminded of their 'inheritance'.[4]

The man cast in the role of Leicester's political successor was his stepson Essex. Leicester had introduced him to the court and, after the death of Sidney, had groomed him to take his place, transferring to him his mastership of the Horse in December 1587.[5] After Leicester's death some of his followers, such as Lord North, made their peace with Burghley:

> The untimely death of...that noble Erle...is a great loss to the whole land and cannot be but generally and greatly lamented of the good and best sorte. In his life he advanced the glory of God....Now I am resolved to honor you above all the world....6

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1. Collinson, 443-4, is rather disparaging about them.

2. Elizabeth, dow. Lady Russell to Robt. Cecil, 27 Jan. 1596, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., vi, 31.

3. Sidney to Essex, 12 Mar. 1597, ibid., vii, 108-9.

4. Eliz. to Sidney, 11 Jan. 1594, PRO, S.P. 78/33/21. See also G. Gilpin to Sidney, 7 Mar, 1590. Sidney Papers, i, 395-6.

5. Sir Henry Wotton, "Some observations...of...Essex and...Buckingham", Somers Tracts, iv, 154.

6. North to Burghley, 9 Sept. 1588, Wright, ii, 393-4.

On the other hand Sir Francis Hastings wrote to encourage Essex. After accurately predicting the great loss to the "churche of God" that Leicester's death would prove, he went on to urge Essex to:

> employe your whole forces both in honour and credite to advaunce (God's) truth and be a comforte to his people professing the same. Now is the time come wherein you should put this in practice, in that He hathe taken from us that honorable worthy gentleman, whom He used many times as a notable instrument.

Essex was not only to succeed him but "overgoe him in his care in this behalfe". He was also warned to be careful of whom he advanced as Leicester had been betrayed by a number of those he had befriended.[1] Another man who thought in these terms was James VI. During 1588, possibly inspired by the Armada, he had decided that his best interests lay in a protestant alliance with England and had therefore accepted Leicester's previous offers of support. At the time of Leicester's death Sir Robert Sidney was on an embassy to Scotland and James was planning to enter into a close correspondence with Leicester through him. News of his death was a jolt to these plans and James looked for a successor. Through Sidney he entered into correspondence with Essex.[2]

Essex's efforts to live up to these expectations were, however, subject to great hinderances. In part the problem was the paucity of his own resources. By the time of the Portugal Voyage he estimated his personal indebtedness to be in the region of £22 or 23,000. He was unable to succeed to any of Leicester's positions of

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1. Hastings to Essex, 9 Sept. 1588, The Letters of Sir Francis Hastings, 1574-1609, ed. M.C. Cross (Somerset Record Soc., lxix, 1969), 38-41.

2. R. A. Douglas to Douglas, 16 Sept. 1588, Hist. MSS, Comm., Salisbury MSS., ii, 359. Robt. Bowes to Wal., 12 Sept. 1588, Cal. Border Papers, i, 333-4.

patronage. Whitgift prevented him from obtaining the chancellorship of Oxford and he did not become a privy councillor until 1593.[1] Nor was the all important relationship to the Queen a similar one. Where there had been a basis of genuine affection in the relationship between Leicester and Elizabeth, in Essex's case there was an air of artificiality and of studied exploitation for the political opportunities it would offer. Essex's position was also dominated by the larger political context which was very different from that in which Leicester operated. In the aftermath of the Armada it was no longer a question of advocating military action to achieve certain objects. A undeclared war existed with Spain and the issue was now what the war was about and how it should be fought. From this was to emerge the great debate over strategy, naval warfare or land operations on the continent, which would dominate the 1590s. On the surface the issues were purely military, yet the choice of military strategy was decisively influenced by political objectives.

Although none of the advocates of the naval war, except at their most sanguine, considered that Spain could be completely defeated by naval operations, they did argue that sufficient pressure could be applied for a settlement to be made. As a settlement was still Elizabeth's and the Cecils' desire, the naval argument had great weight with them. It also offered favorable financial terms: "private enterprise" would relieve the crown of a good part of the expense and the spoils would both recover the initial expenditure and possible yield a profit. Land warfare, on the other hand, was both highly expensive and wasteful and would offer no chance of profit.

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1. Thos. Birch, Memoirs of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, i, 74-5.

Land operations, furthermore, were directed at certain objectives, almost entirely related to the defence of protestant communities, which were by their nature political. To the Queen's conception of the war the need to protect these communities was a liability, to those who advocated land operations it was the primary motive for the war.

Politically, therefore, the essence of the debate was the nature of the war: was it religious or secular. The "admirals" Raleigh, or Howard of Effingham (together with the Queen and the Cecils), with the possible exception of Drake, saw the war as primarily secular. The "generals", Essex, Willoughby, Robert Sidney, with the exceptions of Norris and perhaps Francis Vere, saw it as religious. To Leicester, despite his interest in maritime activity, naval warfare had been subsidiary to the primary objective of sustaining the United Provinces. The debate itself, when it first clearly emerged in the planning of the Portugal Voyage, was the ultimate cause for the retirement of the Leicesterians from the Netherlands. To Willoughby, the decision to use troops from the army in the Netherlands marked the end of the Leicesterian program. He was afraid of a collapse in the United Provinces and he did not like "new adventures".[1] He advocated instead a full-scale discussion of the problem with (significantly) Russell, Killegrew, Wilford, and himself as participants, and resigned when his objections were over-ridden.[2] The objections were not, however, forgotten. The Copie of a Discourse of Sir Anthony Wingfield, ostensibly an account of the voyage, was in fact an attempt to justify it and answer the criticisms of the "generals".[3]

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1. Memorandum to Burghley, ?12 Jan. 1589, Cal. S.P. For., xxiii, 53-4.
2. Will. to Burgh., 19 April 1589, B.M. Harleian MS. 6994, f. 170-1.
3. (1589), 57.

Although he admitted to a certain partiality for military affairs, Essex saw the war very much in religious terms.[1] His political situation, however, forced him to use other means than direct advocacy. His lack of power at the highest level made it impossible for him to influence policy to the degree to which Leicester had. To obtain this power he had only one method - military victory. As he put it himself:

> The greatness of Her Majesties favour must grow out of the greatness of her servants merits & I saw no way of merit lye so open to me as by service in her wars.2

His first effort in this direction was made in the Portugal Voyage. Although in the event he had to join the expedition secretly, he appears to have been involved with it from its inception and claimed to have appointed many of the officers.[3] Gelly Meyrick estimated that Essex spent £7,000 on the expedition.[4] At his departure he left a well-known letter to Heneage which has greatly contributed to the opinion that Essex was motivated primarily by economic necessity.[5] This, however, was intended for the Queen and the court and probably over-states the case for her benefit. A letter to William Davison at the same time gives a different impression. His departure was not precipitate, but "many months ago it was resolved". It was a testing of whether God would see him prosper or not and this prosperity would be political not purely financial.[6]

Although the expedition did provide him with a stronger public image, George Peele described him as sucessor to Sidney, politically it was anything but a success, and it took him some time to work his way back into favour.[7] It also revealed the great weakness of his

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1. Essex, An Apology... (1603), Sig. C2, D-F2.
2. Ibid., Sig. B.
3. Ibid.
4. Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, 456.
5. Essex to Heneage, (?Mar/Apr. 1589), Murdin, 634-5.
6. Essex to Davison, ? Apr. 1589, Bodl. Tanner MS 79, f.46.
7. Peele, "Eclogue to Essex" (1589), Bullen, ii, 273. J.B. Black, Elizabeth and Henry IV (Oxford, 1914), 40-1.

position, his fundamental dependence on military victory and conversely the great dangers presented by defeat. Another weakness, which was to be revealed in time, and about which Francis Bacon warned him, was the Queen's deep dislike of military men.[1] The same problems were also in evidence during Essex's participation in the siege of Rouen of 1591-2.

His experience during the siege, did, however, cause him to change his tactics. As Leicester had found, absence from court brought with it a loss of influence over policy. Convinced that he had been let down by Burghley, Essex decided on a massive effort to secure his position at home.[2] This involved a challenge to the Cecilian monopoly of court and government patronage both with regard to obtaining office for his supporters and wooing theirs away.[3] Here Essex met with an almost total defeat. Wotton claimed that Essex was able to obtain only a single appointment, that of Thomas Smythe as Clerk of the Council and Clerk of Parliament.[4] This exaggerates but only slightly. By dint of great effort he was able to obtain offices for himself, the mastership of the Ordnance in April 1597 and the earl marshalcy in January 1598, but hardly anything for his followers. The battle for patronage developed into a personal conflict with Robert Cecil who was able to obtain the very offices Essex sought while he was out of the country.

There were important ramifications to Essex's inability to break the Cecilian monopoly. He was never able, for example, to exploit

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1. Bacon to Essex, 4 Oct. 1596, The Life and Letters of Francis Bacon, ed. J. Spedding. (1861-74), ii, 40-5.

2. See e.g., Sir Henry Unton to Cecil, 10 Jan. 1592, Correspondence of Sir Henry Unton, 1591-1592, ed. J. Stephenson (Roxburghe Club, 1847), 263-4.

3. Ibid., for Essex's attempt to attract Unton.

4. Wotton, Observations, 162. Wotton's analysis of the reasons why is still valid.

his "popularity" through Parliament. Parliamentary management in the 1590s remained very tightly under Cecilian control. As his battle with the Cecils grew bitterer, Essex's efforts to build up his party became less and less gentle; there were numerous cases of "poaching" and growing resentment among those who already held office.[1] As a result Robert Cecil was able to forge a wide alliance of leading court figures united almost wholly by opposition to Essex. Out of this was to emerge the coalition, Buckhurst, Worcester, and Thomas and Henry Howard, with which he was to run the country in the early years of the next reign. Essex was thus trapped in a vicious circle. To obtain political influence he needed a military victory; to provide his military activities with sufficient support he needed political power. Each military defeat he suffered made his chances of political power so much the less. He was forced to seek control of all military activity and he could afford no rivals. This of course only hastened the worsening of his relations with his potential enemies. The spiral of defeat and frustration was a leading cause of his rebellion.

It is in the light of this situation that the "Essex party" should be examined. Although it has been considered a collection of "outs" this definition over-simplifies the problem, particularly with regard to the former Leicesterians. To a large degree their position as "outs" was a consequence and not a cause of their relationship with Essex. This can be clearly seen in the careers of the surviving Leicesterian leaders: Willoughby, Sir William Russell, and Sir Robert Sidney. Although Willoughby may have clashed with Essex at the time of his expedition to France in 1589, by the time of the siege of Rouen he was firmly in Essex's camp. His financial position forced

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1. See, e.g., Beale to Burghley, 24 April 1595. Original Letters, ed. H. Ellis (1824-46), 3rd ser., iv, 112-27; Buckhurst to R. Cecil, 27 May 1596; Pembroke to R. Cecil, 26 June 1598; Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., vi, 197; viii, 233.

him to live abroad from 1593 to 1596 although even in this position he was sending Essex suggestions for a closer alliance with the Germans.[1] For several years before 1596 Willoughby had been seeking the governorship of Berwick and for the next few years Essex attempted to obtain it for him.[2] He was finally successful in 1598 when Cecil was absent in France.[3] They were in close communication over the Irish expedition and Willoughby, who was "enchanted with your sweet harmony of discords", added his voice to the chorus urging Essex to make sure of his position at home: "bestride us down, firm one foot there but rest the other here, that, when you step to us again, it may be without slipping".[4] Willoughby was the transmitter of Essex's correspondence with James VI.[5] After the rebellion he made his peace with Cecil, somewhat uncharitably emphasizing his previous clashes with Essex, and died several months later.[6]

Russell appears to have retired for reasons of health after his resignation of Flushing.[7] In 1591, however, he reminded Essex of his desire to serve him.[8] In May 1594 he was appointed Lord Deputy of Ireland with Essex's support.[9] He retired in 1597 and refused a second appointment in 1598.[10] Henry Cuffe later testified that he was Essex's candidate to succeed Raleigh as Captain of the Guard if the rebellion had been successful.[11]

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1. See below p. 134
2. Will. to Essex, 12 Sept. 1596, Hist. MSS. Comm., Ancaster MSS., 332. Also correspondence, 1596-98, ibid., 335-7.
3. Essex to Cecil, 1 Mar. 1598, PRO S.P. 78/41/199-v.
4. Essex to Will., 4 Jan. 1598; Will. to Essex, 26 Jan; Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., ix, 9-11, 34-5.
5. Correspondence of James VI...with Robert Cecil, ed. J. Bruce (Camden Soc., lxxviii, 1861), 89-90.
6. Bertie, 406-7.
7. He was probably the anonymous correspondent ofBurghley, 22 Feb, 1589, refusing a commission in the Portugal Voyage, PRO S.P. 12/222/87.
8. Russell to Essex, 10 Dec. 1591, Hist. MSS Comm., Salisbury MSS,iv,162.
9. Essex to Unton, Mar/Apr. 1594, Ibid., 499. The office is not mentioned, but must be the Lord Deputyship, see also F. Bacon to Essex, n.d. (early 1598), Cabala, 20-1.
10. R. Whyte to R. Sidney, 18 Mar. 1598, Sidney Papers, ii, 96.
11. H. Cuffe, Examination, 2 Mar. 1601, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1601-3, 1-2.

Sidney had probably been an ally of Essex's from the time of Leicester's death. In 1595 he stated, "I have of long given myself unto you", and during his French embassy of 1593-4 he was also working for Essex. Party loyalty played a large role in Sidney's position:

> For though I were in no way tied unto you for your own particular favours, as long as you have these ends you nowe have, you cannot separate me from from following your course.[1]

In 1596 and 1597 Essex made two major efforts to obtain important positions in England for Sidney: to succeed Lord Hunsdon as Lord Chamberlain and to succeed Lord Cobham as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports.[2] The Cecils may always have regarded Sidney with suspicion but after 1597 he awas regarded with complete coldness for being:

> For many years most inward and great, in all secrecies, and factiously great with the Earl of Essex...you are not to be trusted.3

Further confirmation came with his failure to succeed his brother-in-law Pembroke as Lord President of Wales in 1601.[4]

The symbol of Essex's allegiance to the Leicesterians and political puritanism was provided by his marriage to Walsingham's daughter and Sidney's widow, a marriage which would bring with it no increase in power or wealth. His efforts to secure the restoration of William Davison to the secretaryship provide further evidence. He had been an advocate of this since 1587 and hoped that it would be one of the fruits of the success of the Portugal Voyage. He even attempted to

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1. Sidney to Essex, 6 Nov. 1595, 8 Feb. 1594, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., v, 440-2; PRO S.P. 78/33/84.

2. See correspondence 1596-7, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1595-7, 181; Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., vii, 108-9, 115, 133-4; Sidney Papers, i, 115, ii, 17-18.

3. R. Whyte to Sidney, 12 Sept. 1599, Sidney Papers, ii, 121-3. Sidney to Essex, 29 Jan. 1598, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., viii, 29-30.

4. P. Williams, The Conncil in the Marches of Wales (Cardiff 1958), 298-9.

gain the support of James VI for Davison, "beloved of the best and most religious of this land".[1] He tried again after Walsingham's death and it was only by the middle 1590's that he accepted the fact that the case was hopeless.[2]

Essex's efforts to expand his party after the siege of Rouen were frustrated by inability to dispense patronage. In 1592, after Hatton's death, he was able to attract his former client Unton but the result was Unton's remaining in the wilderness.[3] His efforts on behalf of Francis Bacon are well known. In 1595 he attempted to cultivate Thomas Bodley and, somewhat against Bodley's wishes, made him, in Davison's place, his candidate for the secretaryship. After Cecil became secretary in 1596 Bodley considered that his association with Essex had destroyed any further hopes for political advancement and retired to build his library.[4] Essex was still thinking of him as a secretary in 1601.[5] A similar attempt to "suborn" Thomas Edmondes failed to shake his allegiance to Cecil.[6] The appearance of important figures in political puritanism during the next reign, Ralph Winwood, Henry Neville, or John Packer, among his following is, however, of some significance.

His political situation was more important in his relationship to the puritan divines than Collinson has allowed for.[7] He was never in

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1. Essex to James VI, 18 Apr. 1589, Bodl. Tanner MS. 79, f. 89.
2. Essex to Davison (1590), Cabala, i, 215.
3. Essex to Unton, 24 Oct. 1595, Mar/Apr. 1594, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS, 68-9, 499.
4. Birch, Memoirs, i, 206, ii, 62. Bodley, Life (Oxford, 1913),12-13.
5. H. Cuffe, Examination, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1601-03. 1-2.
6. Birch, Memoirs, i, 250. Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS. viii, 391.
7. Elizabethan Pur. Move., 444-47.

the position to influence church policy or provide protection in the Leicesterian manner. Furthermore Whitgift himself was too useful an ally against the Cecils not to cultivate. Essex may well have had quite radical personal views. In 1593, during his imprisonment, John Penry had suggested to Essex that he take up the "good old cause" of abolition of the episcopacy and expropriation of church wealth for the use of the commonwealth.[1] It is usually considered that this had no effect but there is a curious passage in the Apology which suggests that Essex may have been thinking along the same lines:

> Did the godly kings and religious people...in the Old Testament, to maintaine the warres against the enemies of God, sell the ornaments of the Temple and things consacrated to holy uses? And shall we that have as holy a warre, spare those things that we have dedicated to our idle and sensual pleasures?2

The reference to the "ornaments of the Temple" may have been a rhetorical one yet it had obvious implications.

Any attempt to describe Essex as the leader of an essentially puritan party must take into account his recusant following. To a large degree, though, this was a mutual alliance against the Cecilian establishment and it was only towards the end that the recusant wing of his following came into prominence. By that time Essex was far more concerned about his personal position at court than anything else. His great friend Southampton may have had an impeccable recusant background but his personal religious position was and still remains a highly mysterious one. Politically he held the same views as Essex.

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1. J. Penry, Notebook (Camden Soc., 3rd Ser., lxvii, 1944). 91.

2. Apology, Sig. F2.

II.

To political puritanism, the 1590s were dominated by the situation in France and debates over the policy to be followed provided a repetition of the debates over the Netherlands in the 1570s and 1580s with Essex playing the role of Leicester. His failure was as substantial as Leicester's and it had two major results: the total decline of political puritanism at court, and the eclipse of the religious link in the relations between England, the United Provinces, and the Huguenots. Both the Dutch and the Huguenots were, by the end of the reign, abandoned to their own devices while the English attempted to wind up the increasingly meaningless war with Spain.

Elizabeth's policy towards France was essentially negative - to prevent a pro-Spanish party from gaining control of the state. In the aftermath of the Armada this goal was apparently secured by the treaty between Henry III and Navarre of 24 March/3 April 1589. Burghley saw it as a "work of God for our good" and rejoiced with his friend Shrewsbury:

> My Lord, the state of the world is marvelously changed, when we true Englishmen have cause to wish success to a French king and a king of Scots.1

There was even the agreeable opportunity of appealing to the Germans for assistance to Henry III in the cause of monarchical solidarity.[2] This euphoria, and indeed the whole policy, was shattered by the assassination of Henry III in August. A memorandum, probably Walsingham's, accurately analysed both the effects of the event and the necessary response.[3] Although Navarre immediately claimed the crown as Henry IV, he lost the support of a large segment of the catholic royalists who either joined the League or lapsed into neutrality. His military and political position was grave.

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1. Burghley to Shrewsbury, 27 May, 16 June 1589, Lodge, Illustrations ii, 372-3, 377.
2. Instructions for Palavicino (cancelled) 1589, B.M. Cotton MS, Galba E vi, f. 456.
3. Memorial of things to be done, (Aug. 1589), ibid., f. 461.

Although they had been in existence since the beginning of the decade, Navarre's accession also brought into prominence the divisions in the Huguenot leadership. There had always been a group, led by Sully, who had seen themselves as his servants first and Huguenots second. Another faction was formed by otherwise independent figures who saw the best chance for the survival of the Religion in France in Navarre's accession and whatever compromises would be necessary. Its most prominent spokesman, Mornay , had formulated this policy in 1583.[1] There was also, however, a third group who saw in Navarre's very closeness to the throne the danger that he would compromise the existence of the party to maintain his right to the succession. Their policies had varied from the advocacy of closer relations with the Church abroad to plotting, at the Assembly of Montauban in 1581, the creation of a Huguenot republic in southestern France under the protection of Casimir. Until his death in February 1588 their leader had been Henry, prince of Conde, the head of the cadet branch of the house of Bourbon. At the time of his death Sir Edward Stafford had advised Burghley and Walsingham that, as Navarre's reliability was questionable, the best course would be to support this group and particularly Henry de La Tour d'Auvergne, vicômte de Turenne, whom he saw as its new leader.[2]

As Turenne would become the leading figure in Anglo-Huguenot relations, if not in protestant politics in general, until his death in 1623, his background is worth some discussion.[3] He was Sully's bitterest enemy and his reputation has never recovered from the

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1. R. Patry, Philippe du Plessis-Mornay (Paris, 1933), 62.

2. Stafford to Burghley 1 Mar.; to Wal., 17 Mar. 1588; Cal. S.P. For., xxi(i), 530-1, 542-6.

3. Modern studies of his career are lacking. The only complete biography is J. Marsollier, Histoire de Henry...duc de Bouillon (Paris, 1719). Other useful sources are H. Ouvre, Aubery du Maurier, (Maurier was once his secretary) and A. Laugel, "Le Duc de Bouillon d'apres les documents inedites" Revue des Deux Mondes, xviii (18 76), xix (1877).

character assassination he received in the Oeconomies Royales.[1] The orphan heir of an important family of the noblesse dépee in the Perigord, he was raised at the court by his grandfather the Constable Montmorency and spent his youth in politique circles. At some point in 1576-77 he converted to the Religion and, despite his captivity by Parma from 1582 to 1585, quickly became one of the Huguenot leadership.[2] By that time he was already noted by Walsingham as "earnestly devoted to Her Majesty".[3] It was only after Condé's death, however, that he began to openly challenge the Mornayist position.[4]

Immediately after the assassination, Henry IV sent a new agent to England, Jean de La Fin, sieur de Beauvoir le Nocle, a former Condé partisan. Beauvoir soon formed extremely close relationships with Willoughby and Essex and John Stubbes regarded him and Robert de Macon, sieur de La Fontaine, minister of the French Church in London, as "the most honourable and most honest French in England".[5] Part of Beauvoir's mission was to obtain immediate military assistance for Henry who had retired to the northern coast. In September it was decided to send 4000 foot and, although Essex appears to have wanted it for himself, Willoughby was given the command.[6] With him went John Stubbes as Muster-Master, Sir Thomas Wilford, and Sir William Drury.[7]

At the last moment, Henry's military position suddenly changed for the better and the expedition could have been called off. Willoughby

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1. Marbault, Mornay's secretary, warned of this in his Remarques sur les Mémoires...de...Sully, Nouvelle Collection des Memoires, ed. Michaud and Poujolat (Paris, 1854), xvii, 3.
2. He gave an interesting account of his conversion to Christopher von Dohna in 1609. E. Spanheim, Vie de Christophe...de Dohna, (Geneva,1639), 78-9.
3. Wal. to Hatton, 10 Aug. 1581, Nicolas, Hatton, 186-7.
4. Ouvré, 28.
5. Stubbes to ? (M. Hicks), n.d. B.M. Lansdowne MS.43, f.51-2. Also Beauvoir to Willoughby, Correspondence, Hist. MSS. Comm., Ancaster MSS., 307-12.
6. Bertie, 406-7.
7. "Journal" of Willoughby's March, B.M. Cotton MS. Galba E vi, f.413.

however, decided on his own initiative to go ahead. There is a good possibility that he was in a highly exalted state of mind as he was a great consulter of almanacs and there remains in his papers a prophecy of great events for 1589.[1] The mood was shared by Stubbes who, after all the horrors of the expedition, could still write:

> The King's cause is God's cause....There are few that do not swallow up these incommodities, thinking it an honor to have been in this jorny.2

The expedition lasted for four months and it was a grim lesson in engaging in Henry's IV's campaigns as three-quarters of the men never returned, most of them dying of disease and privitation. One of those was Stubbes who died on 15 January 1590 just before re-embarkation.[3] Willoughby returned worn out physically and financially but was ready to go back.[4]

The other goal of Beauvoir's negotiations was the revival of the plan to obtain German assistance, about which there was general agreement.[5] Towards the end of 1589 Elizabeth's favorite financial negotiator, Palavicino, was sent to Germany with an agent of Henry IV's. The French wished to extend this into a political alliance but Elizabeth refused.[6] The embassy coincided with a growing uneasiness among the German princes over Spanish military activity in the Rhineland and therefore met with some success. The "Torgau Alliance" under the leadership of Christian I, Elector of Saxony and Casimir was created to provide the support for Henry. With memories of 1587 still strong, however, they required that Henry provide a responsible French grandee to lead the Germans into France.[7]

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1. Hist. MSS. Comm., Ancaster MSS., 240-211, 332. See also Cruickshank, Eliza. Army, 244-45.
2. Stubbes to (Hicks), (Jan.) 1590. B.M. Lansdowne MS. 43, f. 51-2.
3. B.M. Cotton MS. Galba E vi, f. 417v.
4. Will. to Henry, 4 Feb., 29 May, 1590, Egerton, Life, 318, 351.
5. Wal. to Casimir, 2 Aug. 1589, Von Bezold, iii, 211-2.
6. Beauvoir and de Fresne to Wal., n.d. (late 1589), B.M. Cotton MS. Galba E vi, f. 458.
7. Anquez, Henri IV et l'Allemagne, 31.

The necessity for this assistance was increased by the full-scale Spanish intervention on behalf of the League in the summer of 1590. The most alarming aspect of this was the arrival of Parma with his Low Countries army in August to raise the siege of Paris. In October came the occupation of Brittany. The diversion of Spanish interest did, however, imply an improvement in the security of the United Provinces and Elizabeth was now considerably more amenable to providing Henry with military assistance.[1] Henry himself was regarded at this point very highly in England. A newsheet of 1590 portrayed him as God's champion and in his Paul's Cross sermon of 15 February Roger Hacket publicly urged that no effort be spared to aid him.[2]

On his return from Germany Palavicino had a discussion with Henry on the subject of the leader of the German expedition. Although there is no evidence that Palavicino was acting on instructions from London, the choice was Turenne and this marked his first entrance into international politics.[3] He was sent first to England (October 1590) and then to the United Provinces (February 1591) where he was successful both with Elizabeth and with the States-General, who lent Henry 30,000 écus. The Princess of Orange gave him considerable assistance.[4] He was equally successful in Germany and by August 1591 had an army of 16,000 under Christian of Anhalt-Bernberg ready to be conducted to France. The other facet of this negotiation was Turenne's success in establishing personal contact with the protestant leadership. During

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1. R.B. Wernham, "The Mission of Sir Thomas Wilkes to the United Provinces in 1590", Studies Presented to Sir Hilary Jenkinson (1957), 455.

2. Newes from Rome... (1590), Sig. B4-4v. R. Hacket, A Sermon Needful for These Times (1591), Sig. C4-4v.

3. Marsollier, ii, 15-17.

4. Correspondence de Louise de Coligny, 59-85 passim.

the summer Beauvoir had analysed the position of the major English politicians and his comments on Essex were revealing:

> Quant a M. le Comte d'Essex, il fait ce qu'il peut; mais n'estant que du conseil privée, et non celuy d'estat, il ne peut pas beaucoup.1

Willoughby, the other leading French partisan, was also without influence.[2] Turenne was still instructed to contact them. Willoughby was incapacitated but Turenne and Essex did meet and began the political and personal friendship which would play such a large role in Anglo-French relations for the rest of the decade.

In the first half of 1591 there emerged, therefore, the appearance of a functioning protestant coalition. The final step came when Elizabeth agreed to send English troops to France: 3000 in the spring under Norris to Brittany and in June (Treaty of Greenwich, 25 June 1591) 4000 to Normandy to cooperate with Henry IV in the siege of Rouen. There is some indication that the Normandy plan was the brainchild of Essex and Turenne.[3] Essex very much wanted the command of this expedition and he was supported by the French, Beauvoir overstepping his instructions to ask for him directly.4 Elizabeth was not happy with the arrangement and agreed only with reservations.

During the spring Essex was growing rapidly back into favour. Although he was still unsuccessful in his efforts for the restoration of Davison, his accession to Leicester's "credit and dignity" was seen as imminent.[5] His closeness to the puritan divines was also

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1. Beauvoir to Henry, 28 May/7 June 1590, Egerton, Life, 349-51.

2. Will. to Henry, 29 May, 25 Nov. 1590, ibid., 318. Hist. MSS. Comm., Ancaster MSS., 310.

3. Bertie, 214-5.

4. Henry to Eliz. 3/13 June 1590, Lettres Missives de Henri IV, ed. J. Berger de Xixery (Paris, 1843-76), iii, 399-400.

5. Cal. S.P. Dom., Addit., 1580-1625, 319.

noted; he, together with Burghley, the Countess of Warwick, and Davison, was looked to to protect the ministers currently under attack by Whitgift.[1] In any real sense, though, he was still powerless, for, as Thomas Lake warned Sir Robert Sidney:

> Old Saturn (Burghley) is still...yet predominant here... whatsoever hope you have of any other, believe it not.2

An end to his powerlessness was to be one of the results of success in the expedition:

> The earl is impatient with the slow progress he must needs have during the life and greatness of the Chancellor and Treasurer....There are great expectations from him, and if he returns with honour from his voyage, he is like to be a great man in the state; both soldiers and puritans wholly rely upon him.

On the other hand he was under some pressure from the more cautious of his following not to take the chance of the expedition and "seek a domestical greatness like to his father-in-law", leaving the command to another.[3] Premonitions of failure were not lacking, both Sir Thomas Wilkes and Sir Thomas Shirley avoided being appointed councillors to him on the expediture. through lack of confidence in the "so many young and untrained commanders".[4]

Lawrence Stone has described the campaign, not inaccurately, as having within it the "inevitable rhythm of a Greek tragedy".[5] The overall impression is one of waste and incompetence; Elizabeth was more than justified in recalling Essex in January 1592. Yet the campaign also marks the last appearance of the civilian wing of the old Leicesterian party. Essex took with him as advisers Sir Henry Unton, Sir Roger Williams, Sir Henry Killegrew, and Sir Thomas Leighton. Not

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1. Minutes by Phelippes, 22 Mar., 19 July 1591, PRO S.P. 12/238/82,12/239/93.
2. 1 Oct. 1591, Sidney Papers, i, 231-2.
3. Minutes by Phelippes, 1, 19 July 1591, PRO S.P. 12/239/70, 93.
4. Wilkes to Sidney, 11 July 1591, Sidney Papers, i, 326-7.
5. An Elizabethan: Sir Horatio Palavicino (Oxford, 1956), 174.

surprisingly they accepted his plan of campaign.[1] Willoughby was also trying to join him by leaving England secretly but was unsuccessful.[2]

The effects of the expedition on Essex's political position have already been discussed. Its effect on Anglo-French relations was equally important. The disaster put an effective end to any further hopes of large-scale military assistance to Henry and revived old doubts as to his motives.[3] On the French side there was increased pressure on the King to cease relying on the new non-existent "foreign aid" and come to a political solution with his catholic subjects, a solution which would involve his conversion. Elizabeth's refusal to interest herself in France beyond the northern coast, however wise strategically, could not but arouse French suspicions. As a result, from 1592 there was a certain distance in official Anglo-French relations while those with the Huguenots became closer.

The key figure in the new Anglo-Huguenot relationship was Turenne. He had not been present during most of the siege of Rouen for in October 1591 he married Charlotte de La Marck, duchess of Bouillon, a step which was to have important consequences for his international position. The view that this was a reward for his successful embassy is, however, incorrect. The duchy of Bouillon, which comprised the city of Sedan and some surrounding territory, was a sovereign ex-imperial principality which had been under the protection of the French crown since 1521. The de La Marck dukes had been early converts to Calvinism and Sedan had become the leading sanctuary for the northern Huguenots. The last duke had been a leader in the German expedition of 1587 and had died in Geneva in 1588 leaving his sister as heir under the protection of Navarre. The importance of Sedan militarily, it bordered both the

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1. Eliz. to Killegrew and Leighton, 2 Sept. 1591, Unton Corres., 55-6.
2. Will. to Essex, 30 July 1591, Hist. MSS, Comm., Salisbury MSS, iv, 131.
3. Burghley to Bouillon, 3 Oct. 1592, PRO S.P. 78/29/189-90.

southern Netherlands and Lorraine, and politically necessitated that it be held in reliable hands. Turenne was considered to be of sufficient rank to marry the duchess and in 1588 both Navarre and Mornay urged him to do so. There may also have been an ulterior motive: by taking up residence at Sedan he would no longer have his previous influence in southern France.[1] He originally refused and his acceptance of the marriage to the duchess in 1591 may have been the result of a new awareness of the possibilities it gave for an international role.

Essex for one recognized Bouillon's potentialities:

> He will sway this state more than any subject whatsoever in alliances...and especially with them of the Religion....He will be glad to have dependence on Her Majesty....He is worth the embracing.2

This may not have been completely objective as Essex was already a great friend of Bouillon's: "I pray you preserve me in the favour of the Duke of Bouillon and tell him I am divorced from my greatest contentment, and that I am absent from him".[3] There was some appreciation in England of the worries of the Huguenots about Henry IV and Unton had been instructed to work closely with them.[4] In February 1592, on the basis of these instructions, Unton asked Henry in Elizabeth's name to advance "those of the Religion" and particularly Bouillon to the rank of marshal which the King agreed to do. Unton also advised Elizabeth to take the infant Prince of Condé under her protection: "he is the only expectation of them of the Relligion".[5] In April he and Sir Thomas Wilkes, who had just been sent over, had a conference with Bouillon to discuss the main issues in Anglo-Huguenot

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1. Patry, 137. Ouvré, 30.
2. Essex to Burghley, 23 Oct. 1591, Devereux, Lives, i, 250-3.
3. Essex to Unton, 5 Mar., 9 Mar. 1592, Unton Corres., 364-5, 372-3.
4. Instructions, 28 July 1591, Unton Corres., 1-4.
5. Unton to Eliz. 28 Feb. 1592, Unton Corres., 351-3.

policy. The main item was the fate of Condé; he was to be immediately christened in the Religion, publicly proclaimed as Henry's heir, and placed under Bouillon's tutorship. All of these were to insure the safety of the Huguenots in the event of the King's death and to take place under Elizabeth's aegis. There were also a number of minor items, including the appointing of Huguenots as governors of Dieppe and other channel ports.

Bouillon wished to maintain a close correspondence.[2] When Unton was withdrawn in June 1592 leaving his secretary Thomas Edmondes as agent Bouillon was anxious that another ambassador with full powers be sent quickly.[3] In London this correspondence was maintained through Beauvoir Le Nocle and that extremely interesting figure Robert le Macon, sieur de La Fontaine, the minister of the French Church. The founder of the church at Orleans, he had narrowly escaped to England after St. Bartholemews and had remained as minister in London ever since.[4] A close friend of Mornay's, he was not only the leading French divine in England but am important figure in the network leading from Geneva. He also worked very closely with Walsingham and was a semi-official French translator for government declarations.[5] From 1589 he had been an agent of Henry IV's and after Mornay's embassy in 1591 he was made a confidential link between Elizabeth and Henry.[6] After the retirement of Beauvoir le Nocle in 1595 he was more or less French ambassador until 1598. He appears also to have combined this official role with a number of unofficial ones. In 1591 he was working closely

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1. "Speeches of Bouillon", 6 Apr. 1592. PRO S.P. 78/27/297-v, 372.
2. Bouillon to Wilkes, 14/24 May, 9/19 June 1592, ibid., 78/28/44, 155.
3. Bouillon to Eliz, 8/18 June, B.M. Cotton MS. Caligula E vii, f. 352v.
4. Schickler, Les Eglises de Refuge, i, 229.
5. La Fontaine to Wal. 27 Sept. 1585, Cal. S.P. For., xx, 46. Also ibid., xix, 691.
6. Schickler, i, 259-260.

with Bouillon and by 1593 he was an intermediary between him and Essex.[1] After Henry's conversion he became the general Huguenot agent in London.[2] At the same time he was also acting as an agent in French affairs for Essex.[3]

In the autumn of 1592, when it was becoming obvious that the King's conversion was more than a possibility, Bouillon wrote to Burghley asking what the English would do to prevent it. In his answer Burghley lamented the fact that the Huguenots were no longer growing but that it was necessary to wait for God to work his will. He conceded that it might be necessary to offer the catholics toleration - a not particularly relevant concession as catholicism was the official religion in France and the Edict of 1585 banning exercise of Calvinism was still in force. The Queen was still angry about the failure of the Rouen expedition and it was doubtful if English military assistance would be increased beyond the limited numbers already in France.[4] Nothing further appears to have been done until the following spring when the conversion was all but complete. By then enquiries were coming in again from Bouillon and others about English support.[5] Essex and Bouillon were in communication at this point but little has survived of their correspondence.[6] Bouillon himself gave Burghley the first word that the conversion was about to take place and requested that English and Dutch assistance be provided to the Huguenots.[7]

Elizabeth was publicly furious at the conversion and protested

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1. Louise de Coligny to Turenne, 4/14 Apr. 1591, Corres. Louise de Coligny, 85. Essex to Bouillon, 5 April. ?1593, PRO S.P. 78/36/193.
2. Bouillon to Essex, 7/17, 15/25 Aug. 1593, Hist. MSS. Comm. Salisbury MSS, xiii, 537, 539.
3. P.P. Laffleur de Kermingant, La Mission de Jean de Thumery (Paris, 1886), i, 509.
4. Burghley to Bouillon, 3 Oct. 1592, PRO S.P. 78/29/189-90.
5. Thomas. Edmundes to Burghley, 6 May 1593, Edmondes Papers, ed. G.G. Butler (Roxburghe Club, 1913), 70-73.
6. Essex to Bouillon, 5 Apr. ?1593, ibid., 78/36/193.
7. Bouïllon to Burghley, 27 Apr./7 May 1593; To Beauvoir 9/19 May; PRO S.P. 78/30/308-10, 78/31/63-5.

to Henry strongly. She also informed Bouillon that she "washed her hands" of the King and warned him that if he had been one of the supporters of the conversion he was lucky not to be an Englishman. She also promised if "God will be pleased to putt you in the right way...I shall be the same as you did leave me".[1] On the other hand the political necessity of the conversion was probably accepted; the real worry was the nature of the agreement with the Papacy and the motives for the military truce which accompanied the conversion. In September a Huguenot deputation led by Bouillon, Mornay, and the King's sister Katherine approached Henry to request liberties for the profession of the Religion, guarantees for their offices, and protection from a catholic inspired repression. At the same time they appealed to Elizabeth to send an ambassador to support these demands in her name. La Fontaine was to plead their cause in England and Bouillon wrote again to Burghley asking for his advice.[2]

In October the Queen informed them that Sir Robert Sidney ~~weld~~ would. be sent.[3] His instructions were to remind Henry of the assistance the Religion had given him, the difficulties under which they suffered, the efforts the Queen had made in his behalf, and then in her name ask him to grant their requests. He was also to show these instructions secretly to Bouillon and the other leaders of the delegation beforehand and obtain their advice and amendment.[4] Just before his departure, Elizabeth gave him verbal instructions to tell Henry that he "hath often tasted of the good of such her succors" and knew well enough why she was

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1. Eliz., to Bouillon, n.d. (?Aug. 1593), PRO S.P. 78/36/191.

2. Edmondes to Burghley, 4 Oct. 1593, Edmondes Corres., 100-2.
   Bouillon to Burghley, n.d. (?Oct. 1593), Bulletin de la Societe de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Francais, x (1861), 116-7.

3. R. Cecil to Edmondes, 4 Oct. 1593, B.M. Stowe MS, 166, f.78.

   Eliz. to Bouillon, n.d. (?Oct-Nov. 1593), PRO S.P. 78/36/190, assuring him "of me in your owne particular".

4. Instructions for Sidney, 26 Oct. 1593, PRO S.P. 78/32/258-61.

taking such a step. If necessary she would assist the Huguenots directly. Sidney was in favour of this and felt it would do a great deal to encourage the Huguenots but wished written confirmation before taking up such a position with Henry.[1]

In the meantime Henry had countered with the proposition that if he was to continue in his present course he would need substantial military assistance from Elizabeth. He was prepared to grant both the Religion and any auxiliary troops safe places of retreat.[2] Sidney did not leave the court until November and was kept back at Dover by storms in the Channel throughout December so that he did not reach France until early January 1594. By that time the conference had disbanded and Henry had not extended the truce. The very fact of Elizabeth's intervention, and his fear that she would demand substantial concessions to the Hugeunots in return for any military assistance, had moved the King to come to terms with the delegates. They had been granted the Edict of Toleration of 1577 and promises of political concessions.[3] Although the original purpose of his mission was no longer applicable, Sidney was ordered to examine the situation and make Elizabeth's concern for the Religion known to the King.[4] The delegates were still worried about the sincere enforcing of the edict and, emphasizing the dependence of their position on the King's honouring his promises, asked Sidney to negotiate these. Henry in turn re-emphasized that in return he would need support from Elizabeth. On the other hand Sidney did not feel that the Huguenots were in any

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1. Sidney to Burghley, 24 Dec. 1593, PRO S.P. 78/32/382-3.

2. Edmondes to Burghley, 1 Nov. 1593, Edmondes Corres., 111-4.

3. Sidney to Burghley, 25 Jan. 1594, PRO S.P. 78/33/64-5.

4. Sidney to Burghley, 27 Dec. 1593, PRO S.P. 78/32/384. Also Burghley's Memorandum on Sidney's mission, Jan. 1594, ibid., 78/32/416-7.

immediate danger and returned to England at the end of February.[1] He did not meet Bouillon who had left the court by the time he arrived but he received great assistance from La Fontaine who happened to be in France at the time.[2]

The absence of necessity was always welcome and during 1594 English military activity was confined to Brittany. By the end of the year, however, Bouillon's position had undergone two major changes. In May Charlotte de La Marck died in childbirth and after a legal battle Bouillon held the duchy in his own right. In February 1595 he married again and his new wife, Orange's daughter Elizabeth of Nassau, brought with her "membership" in the family which would provide the core of continental political Calvinism during the next few decades.[3] The end of the year saw the King's declaration of war against Spain (6/16 January 1595), for which Bouillon had been the leading advocate. His motives are hard to disentangle; Sully, who is not to be trusted on the subject, claimed that Henry was suspicious of them.[4] Although there may well have been an element of self-interest, there were also valid political factors; the need to commit France to an anti-Spanish and therefore protestant orientation and surety for the Huguenots as a vital element in the King's army. There was an unsuccessful attempt to involve Elizabeth directly in the French war and the hope that success would encourage her. Bouillon definitely staked his reputation with the King on the war's success, particularly a joint invasion of Luxemburg with the Dutch which he planned and commanded.[5] After a few

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1. Sidney to Burghley, 26 Jan. 1594, ibid.
2. Sidney to Essex, 8 Feb.; to Burghley 20 Feb. 1594; PRO S.P. 78/33/84, 103-4.
3. See Table II.
4. Oeconomies Royales, ed. Buisseret and Barbiche (Société de l'Histoire de France, 1970), i, 492 ff. Only the first volume (1572-94) of this edition has yet appeared.
5. Edmondes to Essex 13 Nov. 1594; Sancy to Essex, 13/23 Nov.; Hist. MSS. Comm. Salisbury MSS., v, 20-1. Edmondes to Burghley, 30 Nov. 1594, Edmondes Corres., 194-7.

successes if failed and he appealed to Essex for military aid from England.[1] In the summer he was transferred to the campaign in Picardy and this turned into a major disaster, endangering most of northeastern France.[2]

By the end of the year, therefore, the situation in France was serious. There was already tension between the Huguenots and the King which had manifested itself in the Assembles of St. Foy in 1594 and Saumur in February 1595. This was increased by Henry's removal at the end of 1595 of the prince of Condé to Paris to be raised as a catholic in accord with his agreement with the Pope. The next Assembly, at Loudon in April 1596, was openly hostile and he dissolved it.[3] Henry also had grave doubts about the war policy and Bouillon's role in it.[4] Both he and Bouillon increased their appeals to Essex to persuade Elizabeth to agree to a close alliance. There was an important difference in their approach for Bouillon was now asking for the alliance not as an end in itself but as a means to prevent the consequences to the Huguenots of Henry's coming to terms with Spain.[5] Bouillon was also asking on his own behalf for a loan to fortify Sedan.[6] He was joined by a second Huguenot leader, Claude de La Tremouille, duc de Thouars, a cousin of Bouillon's and a former Condéite.[7] La Tremouille had fallen heavily in debt through his support of Navarre, and, bitterly resenting the conversion, was now to ally himself closely to Bouillon.[8]

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1. Bouillon to Essex, 14/24 Jan.; 20 Feb/5 Mar.; n.d. (?Jan). 1595; Hist. MSS. Comm. Salisbury MSS., xiii, 525-6, 528-9, 518-9.
2. Bouillon to Essex, 12/22 July; 7/17 Aug. 1595; Hist. MSS. Comm. Salisbury MSS., xiii, 537, 539.
3. R. Mousnier, L'Assassinat de Henri IV (Paris, 1964), 124-6. Ouvré, 45.
4. A. Perez to Essex, 25 Nov./5 Dec. 1595, Birch, Memoirs, i,341.
5. Henry to Essex, 25 Sept./5 Oct. 1595, Lettres Missives, iv, 422-4. Bouillon to Essex, 7/17 Aug., ibid.
6. Bouillon to Burghley, 15/25 Oct. 1595, B.M. Cotton MS. Galba E ix(ii), f. 43. To La Fontaine, 15/25 Oct.; La Fontaine to Eliz. late 1595; Hist. MSS. Comm. Salisbury MSS, xiii, 542-4, v.536.
7. La Tremouille to Essex, 28 Dec./7 Jan., ?Mar/Apr. 1598, ibid.,vi,6,131.
8. Laugel, i,213.

Essex was, of course, strongly in favour of assisting Henry and was already using his far from negligible intelligence service to intrigue for the alliance.[1] It was also the view of his party:

> For, questionless, the good of the state of England, and generally all of them that profess religion is by all meanes to keepe the King of France in affection.2

Willoughby sent him a plan to rally the Germans to the assistance of France.[3] On the other hand, with the outbreak of Tyrone's rebellion in Ireland and the assembling of a new armada the Queen and the Cecils were disinclined to provide major assistance to Henry. Furthermore such an alliance would have to involve the Dutch, a step the Queen disliked intensely. The news of the armada had also inspired in naval circles the idea of a naval raid on the Spanish coast, a plan which received the Queen's acceptance in December. Essex had been involved in the idea from the beginning, although he did not see it as excluding aid to France.[4]

The Queen was determined to do the minimum necessary in France and in November she decided to send an ambassador to examine the situation. The choice fell on Unton but he refused at first, probably with Essex's support, as he did not feel Henry was to be offered enough. After being "warned on his allegiance and let understand that princes will not be capitulated (sic) by their servantes", he finally agreed.[5] When he left in late December he carried secret instructions from Essex to persuade the King to state publicly that hewas being abandoned by

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1. G. Alleyn to ?, Nov. 1595, Birch, Memoirs, i, 345.

2. Sidney to Essex, 6 Nov. 1595, Murdin, 698, R. Beale to Sidney, 25 Sept., 21 Dec. 1595, Sidney Papers, i, 349-50, 396.

3. Will to Essex, 20 Nov. 1595, Birch, Memoirs, i, 322.

4. Essex to Bouillon, 17/27 Sept. 1595, PRO S.P. 78/36/192. Apology, Sig.Bv

5. Lake to Sidney, 22 Nov. 1595, Hist. MSS. Comm. De L'Isle and Dudley MSS, ii, 188-9.

Elizabeth and was thereby forced to make peace with Spain. This was to be relayed to her in an effort to force her hand.[1]

Although Unton was to die of disease by the end of February, his negotiations with Henry were successful and the King was prepared to offer whatever concessions were necessary to the Huguenots in return for the Triple Alliance.[2] The Huguenot leadership itself preferred this solution as such a protestant coalition would provide them with sufficient political protection.[3] La Fontaine appealed in their name to the Council.[4] On the other hand, if Henry did make peace with Spain, Bouillon stated "they would stand upon their strengthe" and rely on assistance from England and other protestant powers.[5] To emphasize the point Bouillon and La Tremouille retired with their contingents from the army to prepare for the Assembly of Loudon. Henry was in turn becoming particularly suspicious of Bouillon's closeness to Essex and refused Essex permission to place his kinsman Robert Vernon with him.[6]

In March Henry's bargaining position was radically weakened by the investment of Calais. Unable to relieve it himself, he was forced to appeal for immediate military assistance from England and for this he needed the services of the pro-English Huguenots. The first choice was Beauvoir le Nocle, who was infirm, and Sancy was dispatched instead.[7] He left on 8/18 April and was followed by Bouillon on the

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1. Instructions, 23 Dec. 1595, Lambeth MS. 652 (Bacon vi), f. 264-5. See also Birch, Memoirs, i, 374-5.
2. Unton to Essex, (?Jan. 1596); Villeroy to La Fontaine, 27 Jan./6 Feb. 1596; Birch, Memoirs, i, 396, 398-9.
3. Unton to Burghley, Jan. 1596, Murdin, 705. La Tremouille to Essex, 28 Dec./7 Jan., ibid. Laffleur de Kermingant, i, 30-31.
4. Jan. 1596, Lambeth MS. 654 (Bacon viii), f.234.
5. Unton to Burghley, Jan. 1596, Murdin, 705.
6. A. Perez to Essex, rec. 6 Feb. 1596, PRO S.P. 78/37/53. Unton to Essex, 4 Feb., Hist. MSS. Comm. Salisbury MSS, vi. 46.
7. Beauvoir to Essex, n.d. (Mar./Apr. 1596), ibid., 42.

15/25th. The siege also prevented Essex from integrating the Cadiz voyage into a common policy for the alliance, as Sir Francis Vere, for one, had urged him to.[1] The French wanted Elizabeth to use the Cadiz army for the relief of Calais.[2] Elizabeth refused, although Essex was ready and waiting, unless the city was returned to the English.[3] This raised the terms beyond anything Henry could accept and Essex was unable to dissuade the Queen.

Bouillon was dispatched in the hope that his well-known influence with Essex and Elizabeth would be able to reverse the Queen's decision. On the day he landed at Dover, however, Calais fell. On the same day, 16/26 April, he met Essex and attempted to persuade him not to proceed further with the Cadiz voyage as it was hazardous and its failure would endanger his position while his enemies would make use of his absence.[5] The same point had already been made by Vere.[6] Instead Essex should help him in his negotiation and use his influence for the assistance of Henry. Essex's reaction is still unclear. The French account claims that he agreed with Bouillon but that his enemies prevented him from giving up the voyage. More probably Essex could not go back; not only had he made a large personal investment in the voyage, but if he did not take the command, someone else, Raleigh or Effingham, would. He was also well aware that it was very doubtful that

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1. Vere to Essex, 9 Mar. 1596, ibid., 90-1.

2. Laffleur de Kermingant, i, 42.

3. Essex, Instructions, 13 Apr. 1596, PRO S.P. 12/252/24.

4. Beauvoir to Essex, ibid., Essex to R. Cecil, 14 Apr., Cal. S.P. Dom., 1595-7, 204. A. Bacon to La Fontaine, (Apr. 1596), Birch, Memoirs, i, 459.

5. Discours de la Negociation de M. de Bouillon et M. de Sancy en Angleterre, 1596, par M. DuVair (Secretary to the Embassy), B.M. Kings MS 120, f. 39v-40.

6. Vere to Sidney, 8 Feb. 1596, Howard, Collection of Letters, i, 387-90.

Elizabeth would back a substantial expedition to France.

Bouillon's negotiation was only a qualified success. It took second place to the preparations for the Cadiz Voyage and was dominated by the Cecils who wished to escape with the minimum commitment.[1] On 14 May the Treaty of Greenwich was signed providing for a defensive-offensive alliance between England, France and the Dutch, and, more to the point, 4000 English for Henry. In a secret treaty on the 16th however, these were cut back to 2000 who did, in fact, remain with the King until the Treaty of Vervins. Bouillon was bitterly disappointed with the result. He was also disappointed by the total lack of support from Essex who refused to leave his preparations to assist him. Although he denied that he had tried to prevent the expedition, he did not hide his dislike of it and left Essex with the warning that that not only would it endanger the chances of a favourable situation in France but it would also endanger his position at home. He claimed that it was being circulated that there was "nulle aparanse qu'aucun aie aprouvé vostre dessyn mes seullement vostre fantansie" by those on both sides of the Channel who wished to destroy their partnership.[2]

To Essex, however, the voyage was to provide him with the military success necessary to achieve dominance at court and he tried to reassure Bouillon that "he was about to do more for his friends than they could hope for".[3] One element of this was his unsuccessful plan to convert

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1. B.M. Kings MS 120, f. 41v. Read, Burghley, 517-8.

2. Reynolds to Essex, 6 May, 10 May, Birch, Memoirs, i, 477; Lambeth MS. 657 (Bacon ix), f. 109-11. Bouillon to Essex, 20/30 May, Hist. MSS. Comm. Salisbury MSS., xiii, 573-4.

3. Essex to Reynolds, 10 May 1596. Birch, Memoirs, ii, 6-7.

Cadiz into a permanent base. The other was his attempt to exploit the victory. On his return from Cadiz, Essex drew up a "True Relation" of the action and Henry Cuffe was sent ahead to deliver it to his chief secretary, Edward Reynolds. Reynolds was to prepare it for immediate printing and provide copies for La Fontaine and Bodley to distribute in France and the United Provinces. He was also to approach Whitgift to license a public thanksgiving for the victory. The second stage of the operation was for Reynolds to confer with La Fontaine and the agent of the States, Noel de Caron, sieur de Schoonewalde, and to inform them that Essex was returning from Cadiz with a strong army, suggesting that they both appeal to the Queen for it to "be kept together, till we may treat of conditions for the siege of Calais, or some such like service". He was also to ask the City of London, through the agency of Essex's client Dr. Giles Fletcher, Secretary to the Corporation, to make a similar appeal.[1] When Cuffe landed he brought with him further verbal instructions. It was of utmost importance that the "True Relation" be not connected with Essex and therefore Fulke Greville was to be asked to let it go out over his initials. If not, then, "you may put R.B., which some no doubt will interpret to be Beale". La Fontaine was to translate it into French and cause it to be widely distributed in France.[2] It was known that Bouillon would soon return to England for the ratification of the Treaty of Greenwich and this was considered to be the best time to seek permission for Essex to go to France.[3]

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1. Essex to Reynolds, 1,28 July 1596, ibid., ii, 45, 77.

2. H. Cuffe to Reynolds, 30 July, ibid., ii, 81-2.

3. A Bacon to Lady Bacon, 11 Aug. 1596, ibid., ii, 102. Reynolds to Essex 10 Aug., Lambeth MS. 657 (Bacon xi), f. 106.

The existence of the "True Relation" was, however, revealed to the Queen and the council who immediately prohibited its printing. Reynolds tried to have it printed secretly but was unsuccessful, although he did manage to circulate manuscript copies both at home and abroad. The victory thanksgiving was limited to London.[1] Essex's other hope collapsed with the anger of the Queen over the lack of profit from the booty and the bitter quarrel over responsibility for the failure to capture the Indies fleet. The negotiations over the ratification with both Bouillon and the Dutch were in the hands of the Cecils and Essex was given no opportunity to make the alliance anything more than a formal exercise.[2] He and Bouillon did discuss some future plans but Bouillon was the first to agree that "la dispossission de vostre court vous doit principallement conduyre".[3]

The weaknesses of Essex's position were now being clearly revealed. During the voyage Robert Cecil had received the secretaryship, the prize he had fought for for so long. Essex may have received some recompense in September with the appointment to the council of Lord North and Sir William Knollys both of which he claimed to have obtained.[4] On the other hand both of these were members of the older generation and North, at least, was also close to Burghley. Even his military position was no longer unchallenged and his rivals also claimed the credit for the Cadiz voyage. It was not perhaps coincidence that it was at this point that Francis Bacon sent him his acute analysis of his position with the advice to cease being publicly associated with military adventures

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1. Reynolds to Essex, 9 Aug. 1596, Birch, Memoirs, ii, 95-6.

2. R. Whyte to Sidney, 30 Sept. 1596, Sidney Papers, ii, 4-5.

3. Bouillon to Essex, 31 Dec./10 Jan. 1596/7, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., xiii, 590.

4. Essex to A. Perez, 14 Sept.; A. Bacon to A. Hawkyns, 4 Sept., Birch, Memoirs, ii, 121, 141.

and "popularity". The "True Relation" scheme may have confirmed to the Queen the impression that Essex was "a man of nature, not to be ruled".[1]

In 1597 the Triple Alliance was put to the test and exposed as the stop-gap it was. With its collapse Henry IV had no alternative but to come to terms with Spain. One again the crisis was precipitated by a military setback in France, the suprise in March 1597 of Amiens, the King's base of operations.[2] Henry was already suspicious of English motives and the coldness toward the Triple Alliance. There were rumours in France that the English preferred to see Calais in Spanish hands in order that a settlement could be made and they could regain it in return for the surrender of the Cautionary Towns.[3] Henry accused Sir Anthony Mildmay, the ambassador over the winter of 1596-97 of supporting such a "Burgundian solution" and intriguing with the Huguenots at the same time.[4] There was also disenchantment with Essex, a suspicion that he had promised far more than he could ever produce and that the real power in England remained with the Cecils.[5]

At the same time the King's relations with the Huguenots had also reached a crisis point. The dispersal of the Assembly of Loudon had demonstrated the breach between them and the year was to see it worsen. Henry was particularly worried that they would appeal successfully to England for assistance.[6] He was also growing dis/enchanted with Bouillon

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1. F. Bacon to Essex, 4 Oct. 1596, Life and Letters, ii, 40-45.
2. Sir A. Mildmay to Essex, 6 Mar. 1597, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS, vii, 99.
3. Reynolds to Essex, 10 Aug. 1596, Birch, Memoirs, 98-100. Marsollier, ii, 135.
4. Henry to Essex, 26 Jan./5 Feb. 1597, Lettres Missives, iv, 686-8.
5. Naunton to Essex, 28 Nov. 1597, Birch, An Historical View of the Negotiations of...Sir Thomas Edmondes (1749), 61-4.
6. Henry to La Fontaine, 24 June/4 July 1596 Lettres Missives, iv, 614-8. To Essex, 26 Jan./5 Feb. 1597, ibid., 686-8.

and wary of his closeness with the protestant states. The decision to use him as the negotiator of the Triple Alliance had been an admission of weakness, an admission that it was only Bouillon's special relationship to the foreign protestants which would provide success. In the context of the worsening relations with Huguenots this aspect of the Triple Alliance had dangerous potentialities.[1]

To all parties concerned with the future of the alliance it was vital that it produce concrete results in the form of a triple attack on the Spanish Netherlands and particularly the recapture of Calais. Bouillon and Essex had agreed on this by the end of 1596.[2] To Henry IV it was essential if he was to avoid defeat during the summer of 1597 and withstand the importunings of his catholic councillors to make peace.[3] The Dutch willingly accepted the plan.[4] So did those of Essex's followers closest to them, Vere and Sidney. As Vere wrote:

> No action can be of more advantage to the common cause. I do most humbly desire your honour to stick firmly to it, for that I know there is no other but yourself that can bring it to pass.5

Essex was not, however, in the position to "bring it to pass". The winter had seen a major clash between him and Cecil and the restoration of Raleigh to the court. In the spring the three made a political truce out of which emerged the plans for the "Islands Voyage".[6] The voyage was supported with enthusiasm by Raleigh and Cecil. Essex

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1. Sidney to Essex, 10 Jan. 1597; G. Gilpin to Essex, 13 Jan; Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., vii, 19,27.
2. Bouillon to Essex, 31 Dec./10 Jan. 1596/7, ibid., xiii, 590.
3. Sidney to Essex, 19 Apr. 1597, ibid., vii, 164.
4. Vere to Essex, 5 June 1597, ibid., vii, 236-7.
5. Vere to Essex, 1 Jan, 24 Apr. 1597, ibid., vii, 1-2, 236-7.
6. R. Whyte to Sidney, 4 March, 19 April 1597, Sidney Papers, ii,24-5,41-3.

was to claim that the idea was not originally his and that he only took charge later on.[1] His motives for doing so are not exactly clear. He knew well enough what the French thought of naval expeditions. The Dutch thought that an attack on Ferrol should take second place to an attack on Cadiz. Vere sent him clearly expressed military arguments against the voyage and for the land campaign.[2] Probably he was swayed by the offer of another chance of a great victory which would only go to his rivals if he refused. The French thought it was a trap laid by Cecil to create another naval disaster.[3] This was perhaps exaggerated but Cecil may have intended it to lure him away from a land campaign. Essex's closeness to the French was already looked on with suspicion.[4] It is also interesting that Essex's final plans were not known to his allies until the very end. At the beginning of June, although they knew the voyage was under consideration, Bouillon, Vere, and Sidney still thought Essex was intending to proceed with the siege of Calais.[5] He received his instructions on 15 June and, having been kept back by storms, finally put to sea in August. The outcome of the Islands Voyage and its effect on his career are well known.

Essex's decision to proceed with the Islands Voyage had important consequences in France. In May the Huguenot Assembly was held at Saumur and Henry IV demanded assistance for his summer campaign. They refused it until he fulfill their requests. To emphasize their position Bouillon and La Tremouille were ordered in the name of the Assembly to

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1. L.A. Prevost-Paradol, Elizabeth et Henri IV, 1595-1598 (Paris, 1863),172.
2. Apology, Sig. B2v-B3. Vere to Essex, 24 Apr. 5 June 1597, ibid.
3. Prevost-Paradol, 143. See also Wallace, Raleigh, 142-4.
4. La Fontaine to Essex, Jan. 1597, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS, viii,51.
5. Vere to Essex, 5 June; Sidney to Essex, 6 June; ibid., 236-7, 243-4. Bouillon to Essex, 1/11 June, ibid., xiv, 15.

retire their troops from the army and on 5/15 June, the whole Assembly retired behind the Loire to Châtelleraut.[1] On his way to Châtellerault Bouillon wrote a revealing letter to Essex. The assembly was to:

> prendre ung derniere resolution en nos affaires et j'espere fere et avancer le que je vous ay autre foys dict. Souvenes vous en je vous supplie et tous les propos que nous avons eus ensemble....L'utillitié, quy en reussira, ne peult estre que grande a tous les deux estats, et peult servir d'ung grand apuy a nous de la Réligion.2

This strongly suggests that Essex knew what the Assembly would do and that the plan for the assault on Calais was to be an element in the war of nerves with Henry IV. As a leader of the Assembly Bouillon could have planned the steps in advance.

Having taken these bold steps in June, the Assembly came to a surprisingly quick temporary agreement with Henry on 15/25 July.[3] By then it would have been known that Essex was going ahead with the Islands Voyage and that therefore the King would make peace with Spain. This threw the Huguenots back on their second line of defence and they began preparing their citadels.[4] Embassies were to be sent to England and the United Provinces. At the same time (11/21 July) Bouillon began the negotiations for the marriage of his wife's sister Charlotte-Brabantine of Nassau to La Tremouille, acting as an independent sovereign and in the name of the Religion. Although the King finally

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1. Mousnier, 126. G. Serr, Henri de Rohan, son Role dans le Parti Protestant. (Aix-en-Provence, 1946), 34.

2. Bouillon to Essex, 1/11 June 1597, ibid.

3. Mousnier, 126-7.

4. G. Carew, to R. Cecil, 13 Sept. 1597, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., vii, 384.

accepted it, the negotiation was a deliberate provocation and was taken as such.[1] In the middle of August the Assembly dispatched the sieur de Chaligny to Elizabeth. His requests were essentially defensive.[2] Their situation was such that the Huguenots had been forced to form leagues of defence to obtain their just demands. They were afraid, however, that the concessions were merely a foil until peace with Spain had been reached and war could be declared upon them. There fore they appealed to Elizabeth to be their protector during the making of the peace and to support them if any steps were taken to their prejudice. If there were any verbal requests, no record has remained. The Queen's answer was very non-committal, "nous nous sommes accordées a ce qui en estoit de raison et propre a l'estat des affaires".[3] Bouillon saw this attitude as the result of Essex's absence and hoped for more success after his return.[4]

Although his recapture of Amiens in September improved his position sufficiently to refuse further concessions, Henry could not afford to disavow the agreement with the Assembly. Furthermore, having decided to seek a peace it was necessary to pacify the Huguenots to prevent a revolt. When Herault de Maisse was sent to England in November to inform Elizabeth of the peace, he was ordered to avoid the issue of English assistance to the Huguenots. If

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1. Laugel, ii, 913. Corres. de Louise de Coligny, xl-xli.

2. There are two English copies of his instructions: PRO S.P. 78/40/195-v (torn in half), and B.M. Cotton MS. Caligula E ix(ii), f. 145-6.

3. Eliz. to Bouillon, 17 Sept. 1597, PRO S.P. 78/40/162.

4. Bouillon to Essex, 18/28 Nov. 1597, Hist. MSS. Comm. Salisbury MSS., xiv, 26.

pressed, he was to stress the great concessions the King had made to conciliate them.[1]

In answer to the mission of de Maisse, Elizabeth sent Cecil, Sir Thomas Wilkes, and Sir John Herbert to France in the early months of 1598 to examine the situation. It was immediately clear that Henry was in earnest about a peace but assurance was obtained on the more important point that it would not involve an alliance with Spain. Aside from an intention to investigate possibilities of using them to create trouble if the King "runne into pacts with Spaine", little attention was to be paid to the Huguenots.[2] A Cecilian memorandum, "Some things to be observed in the Negotiations", considered that in order to prevent the peace, the Huguenots "make greater show of discontentment than there is cause".[3] On the other hand, the arrival of the English embassy appears to have persuaded Henry that it was time to render the Huguenots powerless by granting them their requests in a more formal manner - the Edict of Nantes, 3/13 April. Such was the conclusion of the ambassadors and La Tremouille; "il a pleu à Sa Majesté (Elizabeth) s'emploier pour leur faire obtenir ung Edict".[4] Some indication of the concern the possibilities of an Anglo-Huguenot entente caused the King can be found in the account of a conference Sully claimed he had with him at the time of the Edict.[5]

The Treaty of Vervins (22 April/2 May) followed almost immediately. The French withdrawal, combined with the arrival in May of a Dutch

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1. Prevost-Paradol, 56-7.
2. RC to Essex, 14 Feb. 1598, PRO S.P. 78/41/135-6.
3. 9 Jan. 1598, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., viii, 7-9.
4. Dispatch of Cecil and Herbert, 23 Mar., ibid., 90-9. La Tremouille to RC, 29 Mar./8 Apr. 1598, PRO S.P. 78/41/363.
5. Oeconomies Royales, Michaud and Poujulat edition, xvi, 273ff.

embassy, caused some re-examination of English policy. This is most famous for the row in which Burghley called Essex a "man of blood". The positions taken were the old ones. The Cecils argued for a peace based on the Burgundian solution with religious guarantees for the Dutch.[1] Their caution was fortified by the situation in Ireland and a dislike of Dutch commercial prosperity.[2] Essex wanted a continuing full-scale war in defence of religion: "Now is no time to make peace with the chiefs enemies of our religion, when a conspiracy is in hand against all the professors of it".[3] In taking this position he had the support of Bouillon and the Dutch.[4] His arguments were unsuccessful and the Dutch received only the most limited terms.[5]

The Irish situation came to play an increasingly important role in the Cecilian policy until it rivalled the Netherlands in importance.[6] At the same time it was gradually appreciated that the United Provinces could and would fight on alone.[7] Cecil was also interested in withdrawing England from the forefront of European politics at first to safeguard the succession and after that as general policy. Peace with Spain, excluding the Dutch who could always be helped secretly, would, therefore, be sought once Ireland was pacified.[8] This was accomplished by Mountjoy

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1. Considerations on a Treaty of Peace, May 1598, Strype, Annals, iv, 451-64. Considerations touching the Peace, Aug. 1598, B.M. Lansdowne MS. 160, ff. 89-92.
2. J. Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 20 May 1598, Letters of John Chamberlain, ed. N.E. McClure (Philadelphia, 1939), i, 38-9.
3. Apology, Sig. F2.
4. Bouillon to Essex, 14/25 April, n.d. (May), 1598, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., xiv, 57-8, 59. J.L. Motley, History of the United Netherlands, (1875), iii, 450.
5. Motley, iii, 463.
6. See e.g., Cecil to Whitgift and LCJ Popham, 21 Aug. 1601, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS, xi, 353-4.
7. See T. Bodley to "Privy Councilor", 8 May 1598, B.M. Lansdowne MS. 814, f.44
8. See the important Council discussion of 24 May 1602, Journal of Sir Roger Wilbraham (Camden Soc. 3rd Ser., iv, 1902), 49-50.

in the early months of 1603.

Essex had little interest in Ireland:

> Into Ireland I go....I am tied to mine own reputation to use no tergiversation. And as it were indecorum to slip collar now, so were it minime tutum, for Ireland would be lost, and though it perished by destiny, yet I should be accused for it, because I saw the fire burn, was called to quench it, yet gave no help.1

At least two men who considered themselves his friends, Bouillon and Hutton, Archbishop of York, saw Ireland as a waste of resources which should be used elsewhere and thought Elizabeth should make a compromise peace with Tyrone.[2] Although these judgements were made after his expedition, similar sentiments may have played an important role in Essex's conduct in 1599. Whatever plans he may have had, however, collapsed with him.

The eclipse of Essex after 1599 probably accounted for the total lack of interest in England in the most interesting development in political Calvinism in the last years of the century. In 1598 the Spanish, freed by the treaty with France, invaded the Rhineland in an effort to outflank the United Provinces. This in turn stimulated a revival of interest in a defensive alliance among the Calvinist princes.[3] The leading role was taken by the Elector Palatine Frederick IV whose marriage with Louise-Julianna of Nassau had brought him into the main-stream of Calvinist politics. The inspiration for the league came from the most outstanding of the Calvinist free-lances who dominated Palatine politics, the former commander of the German expedition of 1591, Christian of Anhalt. The German princes whose representatives convened at

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1. Essex to Willoughby, 4 Jan. 1599, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., ix, 9-11,
2. H. Neville to Cecil, 22 Oct. 1599, Memorials...of Sir Ralph Winwood, ed. E. Sawyer (1725), i, 122-4. Hutton to Cecil, 20 May 1600, Corres., 153-5.
3. Anquez, Henri IV et L'Allemagne, 70-72.

Frankfort in December 1598 were all Calvinists and were later to form the core of the Evangelical Union. The necessity for a powerful German protestant alliance with close contact with the other protestant states was agreed upon.[1] None of the Lutheran princes were interested, however, nor were Elizabeth or Henry VI. Close relations were formed with the Dutch and a joint campaign against the Spanish were successful. The Palatinate provided loans for the United Provinces and in 1604 reached an agreement to prevent Cleves-Jülich from falling into Spanish hands.[2] The support given to Bouillon in 1603 provided further evidence of the Palatine revival.

There was also a lessening of English interest in the Huguenots due, in part, to the Edict. This view of the Edict as the final solution to the problem of the Huguenots was to have a serious effect on the future of the party. Although they regarded the Edict as a "pis aller" this was not the view of Henry IV.[3] The all-important secret agreements were subject to steady attrition. As they dealt particularly with civil liberties, the effect was to encourage the conversion of Huguenot office holders at court and in local government outside their own towns. In time this was to reduce the party to two fundamentally incompatible elements, the great towns of the southwest dominated by their bourgeoisie and local gentry and the feudal clientage of the great magnates. Henry was also concerned to isolate the Huguenots from foreign, particularly

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1. Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des Dreissig Jahrigen Krieges (Munich, 1870-1909), i, 130-1, 153.

2. Anquez, 76. C-P. Clasen, The Palatinate in European History, 1555-1618 (Oxford, 1966), 22.

3. Patry, 372.

English, contacts. In 1599 the Sorbonne and the Parlement of Paris objected to the participation of foreign divines in Huguenot synods and to the right of the Huguenots to send representatives abroad and the King agreed with them.[1] Henry also changed his policy toward his ambassadors to England. From the appointment of Boissise, an ex-leaguer, in October 1598 there were no more Huguenot ambassadors. La Fontaine's role as intermediary with Elizabeth also lapsed.[2]

While he still had the power Essex was ready to assist the Huguenots and he may have been behind the appointment at the end of 1598 of Sir Henry Neville to replace Thomas Edmondes as ambassador to France.[3] A Berkshire gentleman, Neville had been connected with the Sidneys as a young man. He married Henry Killegrew's daughter and was a Cadiz knight. As he was both a friend of Essex's and "near allied" to Cecil, the ultimate responsibility for his appointment is not clear.[4] On the other hand he took with him as secretary his later close friend Ralph Winwood who was definitely an Essex appointee.[5] Neville's other secretaries were Dudley Carleton and John Packer, who had previously been an agent of Essex's in France.[6] The French regarded both Neville

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1. Oeconomies Royales, Michaud and Poujolat, xvi, 308-10. Marbault, Remarques, ibid., xvii, 49.

2. Laffleur de Kermingant, i, 294-5, 509.

3. "Instructions for M.D.H. (?)", 2 Sept. 1598, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., viii, 326-7.

4. Examination of Neville, Mar. 1601, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1601-1603, 5-8.

5. Chamberlain to Carleton, 17 Jan. 1599, PRO S.P. 12/270/16.

6. Packer to E. Reynolds, 3 Sept. 1598; Neville to Cecil, 26 Feb. 1601; Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS, viii, 329, xi, 88.

and Winwood as "preoccupé" with the subject of the Huguenots[1] Before he left Neville specifically asked for instructions on his dealings with the Huguenots; whether he should "educate them by promises to look to the Queen for support and inspiration".[2] His formal instructions, however, ordered him to encourage them to accept the Edict and not to clash with Henry IV over "things indifferent". He was to intercede for them if traduced or in their just demands but not otherwise.[3] Although no major issues arose during his embassy, he did work closely with them.[4] From May to July 1600 he was a member of the delegation at Boulougne and then returned to England. He was to return to France in the spring of 1601 but was arrested for complicity in Essex's rebellion (he was Essex's nominee for secretary if the coup succeeded) and spent the rest of the reign in the Tower. Winwood remained as agent after he left for Boulogne and did not return to England until the spring of 1603 when he was appointed agent to the United Provinces.[5] In the spring of 1602 Sir Thomas Parry took over the embassy.

Although the French ambassador described him as "ce qui cherit plus la France", the execution of Essex did not have any effect on immediate relations.[6] He had not been engaged in politics since his return from Ireland and Bouillon later claimed that he had not corresponded with him since that time. Yet the eclipse of Essex may not have been

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1. Laffleur de Kermingant, i, 509.
2. Points wherein I desire to understand Her Majesties pleasure, n.d. Hist. MSS. Comm., VIIIth Report (Baybrooke MSS), 283.
3. Jan. 1599, PRO S.P. 78/43/37v-38.
4. Neville to Cecil, 22 Oct., 20 Dec. 1599, Winwood Memorials, i, 122-4, 136-7.
5. Carleton to Chamberlain, 10 Feb. 1603, PRO S.P. 78/48/47-9.
6. Boissise to Rohan, 22 Feb/4 Mar. 1601 (Winwood's copy). Winwood Memorials, i, 296-99.

without effect on the general atmosphere. In May 1602 Bouillon complained to Winwood that he was no longer esteemed by Elizabeth. Winwood agreed that there had been attempts to break up the close relations between the English and the Huguenots and, to that end, rumours of Bouillon's complicity in Essex's rebellion had been circulated by Henry and Rosny.[1]

The tension between Bouillon and the King and his arch-enemy Rosny erupted at the end of 1602 in a crisis which might well have had greater consequences. The general bad relations between the King and the French nobility resulted in the autumn in the arrest and execution of Marshal Biron on charges of having plotted with the Spaniards to depose Henry. During the investigations a minor agent in the affair claimed that Bouillon had been informed of the plan in 1600.[2] Bouillon later denied this and the extent of his involvement has never been resolved. On 8/18 November he was summoned to the court to answer the charges. Whatever Henry's intentions, Bouillon appears to have seen this as an attempt to eliminate him one way or another. Instead he presented himself at the court at Castres established under the Edict to deal with cases involving the Huguenots. Winwood noted that this would put the Edict to the test.[3] Henry immediately claimed that the court had no jurisdiction in cases of lese-majesté and forbade it to take cognizance of the plea. Whether Bouillon's appeal was genuine or not is still unresolved but after it was refused

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1. Winwood to Cecil, 15 May 1602, Winwood Memorials, i, 410-12.
2. Marbault, Remarques, 60, 82. Anquez, 97-98.
3. Winwood to Cecil, 2 Dec. 1602, Winwood Memorials, i, 448-50.

he made his way [redacted] to Geneva where he was warmly received. Later he went to the Palatine court where he claimed that he had left France to avoid causing a crisis between Henry and the Religion.[1]

Whether this claim was justified is also questionable. The Huguenots divided fairly evenly into two groups, those, e.g. La Trémouille, who passionately believed in his innocence ~~La Tremouille~~, and those like Mornay who regarded him with some uneasiness and saw the whole affair as a private matter which could only damage the position of the Religion.[2] On the other hand, Winwood, who believed in his innocence from the beginning, thought that his popularity was such, that if he had decided to challenge Henry in France, "yt wold have been wished, perhaps too late, that a bridge had been made him of silver to pass over". There were fears that this presaged a general attack on the Religion which were not assuaged by Henry's accusing a Huguenot delegation of treason when it came to request leniency. La Fontaine considered that this reaction had "mis le corps de la Religion par deça en fort mauvais predicament". The delegation appealed to Winwood for the Queen to protect them if a persecution began. Winwood himself became highly unpopular at the French court, Henry VI claimed "il abonde en malice", for having written to England that a second St. Bartholomew's might result.[3]

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1. Bouillon to Henry, 23 Dec./2 Jan. 1602/3 (copy), Bodl. Addit. MS. D. 109 (Fortescue (Packer)1), f. 146.

2. Patry, 408.

3. Winwood to Cecil, 26 Nov, 18 Dec. 1602, 2 Jan. 1603, Winwood Memorials, i, 446-7, 456-8, 454-5, Henry to Beaumont, 29 Dec./8 Jan. 1602/3, Lettres Missives, vi, 9-12.

The King was concerned with the effect the affair would have in the protestant states, particularly in England, and he began reviving the old rumours that Bouillon had been involved in Essex's conspiracy.[1] He asked Elizabeth for her advice, having pointedly made this claim but received the prompt answer that the charges against Bouillon were absurd and that he was being treated unfairly. Winwood was also instructed to inform the Huguenots discreetly that the Queen believed Bouillon to be innocent.[2] Bouillon's strongest supporter in France, La Tremouille, definitely saw the issue as one of defence of the Religion and attempted to have Sir Thomas Parry and the Dutch agent, François Aerssens, undertake Bouillon's defence in this cause.[3] He also held conversations with Winwood about the possibility of reviving a protestant alliance which would force Henry IV to re-enter the war against Spain. Otherwise he saw the Huguenots eliminated one by one as was the case with Bouillon.[4] Before any further steps could be taken, however, Elizabeth died.

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1. Henry to Beaumont, 14/24 Dec. 1602, 29 Dec./2 Jan. 1602/3, Lettres Missives, v, 723-8, vi, 9-12.

2. Winwood to Cecil, ? Dec. 1602, Winwood Memorials, i, 450-52.

3. Memoire justificatif ou exposé de sa conduite dans l'affarie de duc de Bouillon par François d'Aerssen, 6/16 Mar. 1603, G.G. Vreede, Lettres et Negotiations de MM. de Buzenval et d'Aerssens (Leyden, 1846),406.

4. La Tremouille to Cecil, 31 Jan./10 Feb. 1603, PRO S.P. 78/48/52-v.

5, James I, Salisbury, and the failure of real politik, 1603-1610.

In his candidacy for the English throne James VI of Scotland had pursued a careful policy of appearing all things to all men. To political puritanism he had long been the focus of considerable attention and he had the reputation of being king of a country "foremost among the Protestant Churches". This was reinforced by the circumstances of his accession when, dispelling the threat of the Infanta, he ensured the "continuance of our Church government and doctrine".[1] He gave hope, not only of "further reformation in our Church" but, in the eyes of Anthony Nixon, of completing Elizabeth's work and presiding over the fall of Antichrist.[2] The triumph of the king of Scotland revived an old theme in the ~~teleography~~ mythology of the apocalypse - the Joachimite prophecy of the Lion of the North who would destroy Babylon.[3]

The King's own conception of his role in protestant politics is not easy to delineate despite his writings and obiter dicta. Yet there is an element of coherence which provides the link between his reflections and his actions. This was his conception of political order: hierarchy within civil society and the independence under God of temporal rulers. He disliked presbyterianism for its "popularity" and "contempt of the civil magistrate" and saw the monarchical episcopate and the ecclesiastical hierarchy as necessary for "order sake" to prevent the "anarchie or paritie of the puritans".[4]

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1. Miles Mosse, Scotland's Welcome (1603), 64-65. John Lane, An Elegie upon the death of Elizabeth (1603), Sig. B2v-B3v. John Manningham, Diary 1602-3 (Camden Soc., xcix, 1868), 24 March 1603, 147-48.

2. Manningham, Diary, 3 April 1603, 158; Andrew Willet, Ecclesia Triumphans (Cambridge, 1603), 91-2, 105-6, 110-11, 117-18. Anthony Nixon, Eliza's Memorial, King James his Arrival, and Rome's Downfall (1603), Sig. (D4v)-(D4).

3. J. Maxwell, Admirable and Notable Prophecies (1615), 138-139. See also Reeves, Influence of Prophecy, 499-500. Broderie to Puysieux, 26 Apr./6 May 1609, A.L. LeFevre de La Broderie, Ambassades de M. de La Broderie (Paris, 1750), iv, 318-21.

4. C.H. McIlwain, ed., The Political Works of James I (Harvard U.P., 1918), xc-xci; Basilikon Doron. 7; Premonition, 126; Speech to Judges, 20 June 1616, 564.

This was accompanied by a morbid fear of republicanism; James was easily persuaded, as Gondomar quickly discovered, that he was beset by crypto-republicans and was always amenable to appeals to monarchical solidarity. Monarchical solidarity was a prominent element in James's thought and he took extremely seriously:

> that duty which God and nature doth bind him to beare to the maintenance of the sovereignty of all absolute rulers.[1]

He saw himself as acting on behalf of all temporal rulers and, perhaps more significantly, expected them to act reciprocally. This expectation underlay his negotiations with Spain and his belief that a mutually satisfactory relationship could be established with Philip III. Another example of the manner in which this informed his policy is the dedication to Rudolph II of the Premonition to all Most Mighty Monarches, Kings, Free Princes, and States of Christendom, his most outspoken attack on the Papacy, and the presentation of copies of the work to all the catholic monarchs. He sincerely believed that the papal pretentions were a threat not only to him but to all monarchs and that when alerted they would all respond to their true self-interest.[2]

Although it was historical accident that the anti-monarchical activities which inspired his most widely expressed anger, the Gunpowder Plot and Bellarmine's response to what James regarded as the eminently reasonable Oath of Allegiance, were committed by catholics, James irremediably confused his own case by employing in his anti-papal attacks the Calvinist ideological weapon of the Papal Antichrist. In a crucial passage in the Premonition he clearly shows that his motives were political:

> Thus hath the Cardinal's shameless wresting of these two places of Scripture; Pasce oves meas, and Tibi dabo claves, for prooving of the Pope's supreme temporal authority over Princes, animated mee to proove the Pope to be the Antichrist ...; so to pay him in his owne money againe.

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1. Sir Ralph Winwood to Sir Thomas Edmondes, 1 Apr. 1616, B.M. Stowe MS. 176, f.9.

2. James to Henry IV, 15/25 May 1609, S.R. Gardiner ed., The Fortescue Papers (Camden Soc. New Ser., i, 1871), 3-6. Cal. S.P. Ven., xi, 282-3.

> And this opinion no Pope can ever make me recant; except they first renounce any further meddling with Princes in any thing belonging to their Temporall Jurisdiction.[1]

Yet it appeared in a context which suggested the opposite. James was the author of two previous disquisitions on the Papal Antichrist, the Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle St. John and A Fruitfull Meditation ... of the 20th Chapter of the Revelation; but both were written at the time of the Armada, when James like so many others believed that "this our last time" was upon him.[2] Further significance was given by emphasis he laid upon his title defensor fidei, although Bellarmine at least pointed out that it was a papal title.[3]

These gave the impression to many that James was ready to take up the leadership of the Reformed. There are at least two instances of English ambassadors quoting James's own works as authorization for protestant politics, Sir Henry Wotton in 1609 urging support for the Evangelical Union and Sir Francis Nethersole on the eve of the White Mountain, who noted that Fredrick's supporters believed that:

> God will always deliver his true Church out of danger; and are not a little confirmed therein by the divine exposition of his Majestie upon the 20th Chapter of the Revelation, which they take for a prophecy of these time now at hand.[4]

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1. Premonition, McIlwain, Works, 149-50 also 129, 144. Cal. S.P. Ven., xi, 263-4.
   At two points during the Spanish marriage negotiations James admitted that his motives were political and that his identification was purely a retaliation for papal enroachments on temporal jurisdiction. (Gondomar to Philip III, 6/16 Feb. 1621, C.H. Carter, The Secret Diplomacy of the Hansburgs, 1598-1625 (New York, 1964), 243-44. James to Buckingham and Charles, 25 Mar. 1623, Bodl. Tanner MS. 73, f.297). During the York House Conference Richard Montague used the passage quoted above as his evidence that James's identification was not religious. See Cosin, Sum and Substance of the Conference, Works, iii, 80-81.

2. Meditation, James Montague, ed., The Works of the Most High and Mighty Prince James (1616), 73.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., x, 113. J. Brodrick, Robert Bellarmine, 1542-1621 (1928), ii, 157.

4. Nethersole to Sir Robert Naunton, 15 Sept. 1620, PRO S.P. 81/18/83-7. For Wotton see below, p. 167

Mornay, who supervised the distribution of La Fontaine's French translation, greeted the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance as a demonstration of James's leadership.[1] On the other hand Giovanni Diodati, the leader of Genevan orthodoxy, saw through James and was disappointed by the Apologie's

> lasche et tiéde assertion de la vérité de la doctrine ... La grande et unique force qu'il fait sur l'usurpation du temporal ... (qui) me font doubter que nous n'aurions ni grand honneur ni profit de ceste oeuvre.[2]

James had no intention of leading a protestant political movement which might threaten monarchical government. Furthermore, in terms of pure theology he was markedly liberal. In the Basilikon Doron he remarked à propos of the controversy over presbyterianism in Scotland, "I doe equally love and honour the learned and grave men of either of these opinions".[3] So long as they posed no political threat he was prepared to tolerate both catholics and presbyterians and his own choice of theological companions ranged from Andrews to Abbot and Hall. He had a Hookerian view of the corpus christianum and conceived of this tolerance in European terms.[4] Regarding certain catholics as the instigators of religious conflict, he was not prepared to be an instigator himself. His clearest statement on the issue can be found in his response to Mornay's dedication to him of the Mystère d'Iniquité in 1611 with the exhortation to lead a political and military offensive against Rome.

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1. Mornay to La Fontaine, 28 Apr./8 May 1608, Ecclesiae Londino-Batavae Archivum, ed. J.H. Hessels (Cambridge, 1889), ii, 936-38. Ibid., 26 Jan./5 Feb. 1609, Mornay, Corres., x, 278-80. Mornay had previously doubted the sincerity of James's belief in the Papal Antichrist, see Mornay to J. Hotman, 16/26 Mar. 1604, Blok, Corres. Leic. & Hotman, 271-2.

2. To Mornay, 22 Sept/2 Oct. 1608, Corres. Mornay, x, 249-50.

3. Basilikon Doron, McIlwain, Works, 7.

4. Baumer, "England ... and Common Corps", 31.

> Nous ne pouvons trouver aulcung assés suffisant garant, ni dans la Saincte Escriture, ni en la doctrine ou exemple de l'Eglise primitive ... qui nous puissent justement animer á faire ung guerre offensive pour matiére de la Religion contre aulcung autre prince ou potentat ou ecclesiastique ou seculaire.

His own role, significantly, was to:

> dessiller les yeulx de tous les autres monarches et princes, pour accomplir la prophetie des dix roys en l'Apocalypse.[1]

James's disinclination to take up the political leadership of the Reformed was revealed at the beginning of his reign. At the time of his accession two Palatine envoys, Count Solms and Vollrad von Plessen, were in France pleading the cause of the duke of Bouillon. They were sent on to James to present formal greetings on his accession and to persuade him to continue Elizabeth's support of Bouillon. There is evidence that they also had instructions to discuss with him the creation of a strong German Evangelical Union under his leadership. Very little has survived of this negotiation, but James's formal response was studiedly vague.[2] The Germans were followed by Rosny, the purpose of whose embassy was both to explore James's intentions and to persuade him away from dangerous areas. Henry IV was worried by two possibilities: that James was interested in a peace with Spain or that:

> il y a quelquesuns en Angleterre qui au nom de Messieurs de Bouillon, La Tremouille, du Plessis et autres, fasent les menées pour disposer le Roy d'Angleterre á se dire protecteur des Huguenots de la France, et nommer le comte Palatin pour son lieutenant, comme l'on m'en a donné advis.[3]

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1. James to Mornay, 7 Oct. 1611, Mornay Corres., x, 310-11. Also Edmondes to earl of Salisbury, 11 July 1611, B.M. Stowe MS. 172, f.124v.

2. Plessen to Sir Thomas Parry, 7/17 May 1603, B.M. Cotton MS. Caligula E x, f. 209. Cal. S. P. Ven., x, 143. James to Fredrick IV, 8 June 1603, PRO S.P. 81/9/6. Ouvré, Du Maurier, 88-89. Anquez, Henri IV et l'Allemagne, 104.

3. Henry IV to Rosny, 2/13 June 1603, Lettres Missives, vi, 107. The source for this letter is the Oeconomies Royales; it may not be completely reliable.

Although Rosny was not successful in his attempt to keep James hostile to Spain, he did obtain reassurance that James was not interested in Bouillon whom he considered a fugitive from the justice of his king.[1] Several months later, Stephen LeSieur, agent with the German princes, was recalled in disgrace for having urged the Germans to support Bouillon and for declaring that James would do the same.[2] The loss of English support was to cause Bouillon to submit to Henry IV in 1606.[3] In the aftermath of the Palatine embassy of 1603, Brederode, the Dutch agent at Heidelberg, observed that James would not of his own accord become the leader of a protestant alliance, although he hoped that force of circumstance would eventually have its effect.[4]

James's conception of the state of political order was not the only influence on foreign policy during the initial years of the reign. Equally important was Salisbury's continuation of the themes of Cecilian realpolitik: suspicion of France and desire for a political understanding with Spain. Although Salisbury was not as susceptible as his father to religious arguments he did regard the protestant states and communities as potentially useful allies. The first fruit of the James-Salisbury partnership was the treaty with Spain of 1604 in which, it should be noted, all the conditions which Salisbury had laid down in 1602 were fulfilled: the succession was safe, Ireland was safe, the first approaches came from Spain, and the English were permitted to continue military assistance to the United Provinces.[5] Salisbury's aim in the treaty was to withdraw the English government from the position of financial and political vulnerability into which the war had forced it. A final condition was also necessary - the war, and successful Dutch resistance, should continue indefinitely.

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1. Rosny to Henry IV, 14/24 June 1603, Oeconomies Royales, Michaud and Poujolat, xvi, 459. Bouillon to Winwood, 26 Aug./5 Sept. 1603, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i. 43.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven., x, p.131.

3. Anquez, Henry IV et l'Allemagne, 108-10.

4. Archives Orange-Nassau, II, ii, 210-14.

5. See above, p. 146.

Salisbury had no illusions about an alliance with Spain; the treaty was purely a political expedient, the viability of which depended on the prior engagement of Spain in the Dutch war.[1] This tendency towards "isolationism" was further reinforced by Salisbury's intense suspicion of the policies of Henry IV, which, reciprocated by the French, inhibited an Anglo-French alliance.[2] At the heart of this lay the religious issue. If the English were to undertake the leadership of an anti-Spanish alliance it would of necessity be a confessional alliance. This was the greatest fear of Henry IV as it would encourage the Huguenots, whose position was widely understood as being dependent on outside support, and generally revive confessional politics.[3] The aims of French policy, therefore, were to embroil the English independently with Spain, while encouraging the other protestant states, the Dutch and the Germans, to become political clients and to dissuade them from confessional organization.

The effect of these tensions can be seen in the response to the crisis over the Venetian interdict in 1606-7. To James it was an excellent example of the need to defend the rights of temporal princes:

> I hear he (Philip III) blames me for having declared for the Republic, but what better reasons are there why the King of Spain should declare in favour of the Pope? As I have frequently said this is no question of faith or religion, but of that independence which God has granted to Princes, and which every sovereign is bound to defend with all his might.[4]

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1. See his remarks to Sir Charles Cornwallis, 24 Oct. 1605, Winwood Memorials, ii, 147-49.

2. This is the theme of M. Lee, James I and Henri IV (Univ. of Illinois, 1970), esp. page 69. Lee concentrates unimaginatively on political issues, however, and ignores the religious, particularly the role of the Huguenots. See also A.J. Loomie, "Sir Robert Cecil and the Spanish Embassy", Bull. Inst. Hist. Res., xlii (1969), 43.

3. On the position of the Huguenots see the Observations ... upon the State of the XVII Provinces ... in 1609 attributed to Sir Thomas Overbury, in Overbury, Miscellaneous Works (1856), 247-8.

4. Cal. S.P. Ven., x, 469.

To Salisbury, however, it was a French plot to embroil England with Spain and he threw his weight decisively against intervention.[1] For his part Henry IV intensely disliked the Reformed interest in Venice and was prepared to use any means to put an end to it.[2]

The political significance of the Venetian crisis did not lie solely in these manoeuvres; in the effort to evangelize Venice it also represented a revival of protestant politics. Although this was based on a misinterpretation of the situation in Venice, both among the population at large and within Sarpi's circle, it was an international operation involving Mornay, Giovanni Diodati, the leading Genevan divine and author of the Italian translation of the Bible employed in the evangelizing efforts, Anhalt's agent Christoph von Dohna, and the English ambassador in Venice Sir Henry Wotton and his chaplain William Bedell, one of the earliest graduates of Emmanuel, and friend of Joseph Hall, Samuel Ward, and John Knewstub.[3] The leading role was played by Wotton, the result of his own enthusiasm for the project, the importance of the English embassy as a base within Venice, and the expectation that James would prove the patron of the whole operation. Although James had made his position on Venice perfectly clear, the Venetian crisis provided one of the earliest examples of the Reformed inability to see James's position for what it was. In Bedell's words:

> The world hath taken knowledge of his (James) profession, to stand for the liberty of princes encroached upon by the Pope ... To goe a little further, it were an opinion against his honour to think that he doth not affect the reformation of the Church of God, the ruine of Babel.[4]

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1. Ibid., 471-4, 474-5.

2. W.G. Bouwsma, Venice and the Defence of Republican Liberty (Berkeley, 1968), 405-6, 505-6. Mousnier, L'Assassinat de Henri IV, 164-5.

3. See Diodati to Mornay, 12/22 Apr. 1605, Mornay, Corres., x, 180-4. W. Bedell to A. Newton (tutor to the Prince of Wales), 1 Jan. 1609, Two Biographies of William Bedell, ed. E.S. Shuckburgh (Cambridge, 1902), 139-51 passim.

4. To Newton, 1 Jan. 1608, Shuckburgh, 235. It might be noted that Newton encouraged Bedell in the name of both the King and the Prince; Newton to Bedell, 16 May 1608, Some Original Letters of Bishop Bedell, ed. E. Hudson, (Dublin, 1742), 38-40.

The confusion over James's position affected both Wotton's efforts to persuade the Venetians to engage in an active anti-Hapsburg and anti-Papal policy and the whole scheme for the conversion.[1] Wotton's plan envisaged the encouragement of an anti-Papal posture, the large-scale introduction of protestant literature, using the embassy (he also wished to encourage the establishment of embassies by other protestant states) and the houses of protestant merchants for proselytising, and finally the establishment of a congregation.[2] In this he was supported by Sarpi, who, in 1609, sent James his own ideas which included James making himself the effective leader of a protestant alliance which would establish seminaries for Italian missionaries in Switzerland.[3] Although little interest was shown by James, Wotton was prepared to take some initial steps himself. In the summer of 1608 Christoph von Dohna, whose mission was specifically to advocate increased Anglo-German contact through common action in Venice, arrived in Venice accompanied by Diodati whom Wotton wished to examine the situation.[4] Diodati, who was working closely with Mornay on the problem, was not optimistic about the possibilities, due to the lack of interest among the Venetian aristocracy, and considered that intermediate steps depended on serious English involvement.[5]

These plans were compromised in 1609; first by Henry IV's interception of a letter from Diodati to the French divine Samuel Durand which the KING relayed to the Venetian Senate and then by James's attempt to present the Venetians with a copy of the Premonition. Their refusal caused Wotton to resign.

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1. See audiences of Wotton of 6/16 May, 22 Sept./2 Oct. 1606, and 20/30 Jan. 1607, Cal. S.P. Ven., x, 348-9, 406-8, 473.

2. Bedell to Newton, 1 Jan. 1609, ibid., Wotton to James, 14/24 April 1608, L.P. Smith, The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton (Oxford, 1907), i. 421-5. E. de Budé, La Vie de Jean Diodati (Geneva, 1869), 66-67.

3. Smith, i, 93-94.

4. Anhalt to Dohna, 16/26 July 1608, Briefe und Akten, ii, 38-39.

5. Bedell to Newton, 1 Jan. 1609, ibid. Report of Diodati, 1608, Budé, 66-67.

Although his successor, Dudley Carleton, was sympathetic, these events and the lack of interest shown by James were fatal.[1] Yet despite this failure the whole affair revived the informal comtacts among English agents and the leadership of the continental Reformed, which, in the absence of clear leadership from the King, would decisively influence the course of policy.

Salisbury's ability to conduct his independent realpolitik was crippled first by the Agregation and then by the Truce between the United Provinces and Spain in 1607-9. The ending of the war removed the basis of his entire policy and his initial response was to take more active measures to enable Dutch resistance to continue.[2] This, however, was vetoed by James.[3] The English reaction to the Truce was further influenced by the activism of Henry IV, whose offer of a triple alliance was regarded with suspicion by Winwood as well as Salisbury.[4] The ultimate English offer, the bilateral treaty guaranteeing the Truce, was widely and correctly interpreted as a sign of weakness and political puritanism viewed the tame acceptance of the Truce with possible greater alarm than the treaty of 1604. Sir William Browne, Lieutenant-governor of Flushing, wrote to Sir Robert Sidney, now Viscount Lisle:

> What I think or do not think is not material, but I fear that the safest course for our good is not to urge much this truce unless we will imagine to win the Spaniards, whom in my judgements we shall never so far engage by any kindness but they will take their advantages against us when the time serves. I pray we may be allwayes armed against the inconstant humours of France and the revenging settled hatred of Spayne and that in all things aim at the glory of God and the good of his Church.[5]

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1. For Henry IV's actions see p.161. Mornay to La Fontaine 16 Jun./6 July 1609, Archivium Ecclesiae Londino-Batavorum, ii, 941-43. I. Wake to Diodati, n.d. (1611), quoted Bude, 253-5.

2. Broderie to Puysieux, 22 Mar./1 Apr., 22 Apr./2 May, 1607, Ambassades, ii, 131-41, 199-201.

3. James to Salisbury, 1 Dec. 1607, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., xix, 351-3.

4. Winwood to Salisbury, 14 Jan. 1607, ibid., 7-8. Salisbury to Winwood, 8 May 1607, Winwood Memorials, ii, 309-10. Lee, 94-100 passim, 115, contains a good discussion of the mechanics of the Truce.

5. 17 Oct. 1608, Hist. MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., iv, 58-59.

Sir Henry Neville observed that the weakness did not lie in English opinion:

> For my part I profess I hold their (the Dutch) interest and ours so nearly conjoined ... and would as willingly contribute even beyond all proportion to my means, and cooperate with my voice and endeavour in Parliament to enable the King to yield them a real assistance as I would for the reduction or pacifying of Ireland. And sure I am that the general affection of the subjects of England is great unto the conservation of these Provinces; and that they would sooner be drawn to yield him a contribution to that end, then for any other that can be proposed; yet I am out of hope that he will make use of their affections that way ... I wish the States would once more send to sollict our aid and that before the Parliament sit ...[1]

The importance of support for the Dutch to the Protestant Cause was emphasized by Winwood's agent John More:

> For the Religion being thereby reinforced the Protestants of France taking heart unto them, the King (Henry IV) would be no less afraid and jealous of them than heretofore he hath been of the contrary faction ... But this discourse is but wide, his Majesty is a lover of Peace, and having conceived I know not what opinion of the States, is miserably poore, having not wherewithall now to maintain his ordinary expenses, much less feed a warre ...[2]

The consequences of the Truce of Antwerp (19/29 March 1609) became immediately apparent in the crisis over the Cleves-Julich succession later in the same year. Although James himself favoured the candidate supported by the German Evangelical Union, the Elector of Brandenburg, whom he regarded as having the better claim at law, his initial response to requests for assistance in the spring of 1609 was to offer himself as a mediator.[3]

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1. Neville to Winwood, 21 June 1608, Winwood Memorials, ii, 411-12; 12 May, ibid., ii 398-9. Neville to Sir Thomas Edmondes, 7 July 1607, B.M. Stowe MSS. 169, f.76.

2. To Winwood, 25 June 1608, Winwood Memorials, ii, 412-13.

3. V. Kybal, "Henri IV et Jacues Ier pendant l'Affaire de Cleves et Juliers en 1609 et 1610", Mélanges d'Histoire offerts a M. Charles Bémont (Paris 1913), 582-4.

His freedom to do so was, however, limited by two factors beyond his control: the establishment of the Evangelical Union among the German Calvinist princes and the response of the French to the Union. Through his lack of interest in the Germans, which he had inherited from Elizabeth, and in protestant political alliances in general, James had left the initiative in this direction to Anhalt and the Palatine leadership who worked for such an alliance both within the Empire and abroad through the Nassau connection. Owing to the delicate political position of Maurice of Nassau, the most important member of the family outside Germany was now the duke of Bouillon. An old friend of Anhalt's from the 1590s; the Elector Frederick IV had protected him during his quarrel with Henry IV, giving him the custody of the young Frederick V as a symbol of his confidence.[1]

Anhalt saw the involvement of the English in this alliance as vital. When his agent Christoph von Dohna was dispatched to Venice in the summer of 1608 just after the formation of the Union, the important element in his mission was to discover from Wotton the best ways of establishing closer relations with England and what Salisbury's attitude to the Germans was.[2] His conversations with Wotton produced, to his surprise, the suggestion from Wotton that the Elector's eldest daughter be married to the Prince of Wales to prevent a catholic queen.

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1. Anquez, Henri IV et l'Allemagne, 105. On Bouillon's attitude towards the family see, for example, Louise de Coligny to Mme. de La Tremouille, 8/18 Mar, 1616, Corres. de Louise de Coligny 298-99.

2. Anhalt to Dohna, 16/26 July 1608, Briefe und Akten, ii, 38-39.

Wotton further argued that both James and Salisbury would be favourable to such a marriage, promising to raise the issue with them himself, and suggested that Maurice of Nassau, "ch'e amato del ré", be employed as the negotiator, "dicendo esser mosso per il bene della patria e religione commune".[1] In this conversation, the first real discussion of a "Palatine marriage", Wotton appears to have been acting without authorization, nor was there any effort from the English to follow it up. But the Palatines took it seriously. On his return from Venice in the autumn, Dohna was sent to Sedan to confer with Bouillon and Wotton's proposals were laid before him. "Als einem Liebhaber der wahren Religion, verwandten des Churfursten von der Pfalz und einem guten Deutschen", Bouillon was asked for his own opinion of the marriage, what the French reaction would be, and whether he would assist in the negotiations. His answer was direct: "Die Heirathsache ist eifrig zu betreiben ohne Rücksicht auf die Kosten".[2] From this point we may see an English marriage as one of the leading goals of Palatine policy.

Such a relationship between the Germans and England was what the French feared most and it was at the time of the founding of the Evangelical Union in May 1608 that the first serious rift appeared in the Franco-Palatine understanding. Although eager to encourage anti-Hapsburg political activity, Henry IV regarded a confessional alliance with great suspicion, for, with the activities in Venice, it suggested a European-wide revival of religious politics.[3] Faced with this attitude, the founders of the Union were the more confirmed in their desire to seek a religious alliance with James.

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1. Dohna's notes on conversation of 14/24 Aug. 1608. ibid., 88-89.

2. Anhalt's "Entwurf für (Dohna's) Vortragen mit ... Bouillon, 14/24 Sept. 1608"; Dohna's "Aufzeichnung uber Bouillon's Erklarung" (late 1608); ibid., 101, 103.

3. Anquez, Henri IV et l'Allemagne, 122. See also Sarpi's appreciation of the position of Henry IV in his letter to Dohna of 25 July/4 Aug. 1608, Sarpi, Lettere ai Protestanti, ed. M.D. Busnelli, (Bari, 1931), ii, 124-5.

At the second meeting of the Union at Rotenberg in August 1608 they decided to maintain "gute Correspondenz" with Henry IV but not to invite him to join the Union. James and Christian IV of Denmark were to be approached. Not having to make any immediate commitment, James gave a favourable reception to the envoys of the Union, which the French noted with some alarm.[1]

Anhalt, at least, saw in this tension between England and France an opportunity for playing one off against the other and obtaining increased support from both.[2] This had some effect for Henry IV's response to the Cleves crisis was to use it an a means of regaining the initiative and by a vigorous anti-Hapsburg policy and support for the Princes Pretendent to re-establish his control over the Evangelical Union. At the Union meeting which was finally held at Halle at the beginning of January 1610 he offered the German princes full military support, while at the same time offering James an alliance for joint action in Germany. Although this alliance would bring in the Dutch, it would be an alliance dominated by France.[3]

The initiative of the French placed James in a difficult position. In his decision to mediate in the dispute, he had already resisted considerable pressure to make a confessional alliance with the Union. Wotton had even quoted the King's book in offering his advice:

> I may also (if his Majesty shall find it expedient to proceed so far) upon this occasion sound how the said Princes stand disposed to a defensive combination or unity both among themselves and with others under the title and form (which seemeth the most sensible and aggregative and is excellently urged by his Majesty in page 130 of his last book) of procuring and maintaining a temporal security of their persons and estates against the enroaching Babylonian monarch.[4]

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1. Protocoll, Rothenberger Unionstages, Briefe und Akten, ii, 55-56. Anquez, Henri IV et l'Allemagne, 128. Broderie to Villeroy, 20/30 Oct. 1608, Ambassades, iv, 51-55.

2. Entwurf für Donna, 14/24 Sept. 1608, Briefe und Akten, ii, 99-100.

3. Instructions for Broderie, 18/28 Dec. 1609, Ambassades, v 12-16. Winwood to Edmondes, 20 Oct. 1609, B.M. Stowe MS. 171, ff. 177-78.

4. A few humble remembrances about the proposition of my employment to some German Princes on my return, June (?) 1609, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS xxi, 75-77.

The strongest advocate of direct action was Sir Ralph Winwood, agent with the Union as well as ambassador in the United Provinces, who considered "yt is a pittye so faire an occasion with one blowe to be able to beate downe the Pope and House of Austria should be let slipp".[1] To Winwood's dismay James vetoed in October any involvement in alliances over the Cleves question, either with the Union or with the French.

> Concerning the General Union, we assure ourselves you will judge it very incompatible with the Profession and Condition of the French King; and therefore there is no cause for his Majesty to give you any further instructions at this time than you have.[2]

The French move upset all these calculations, however, for although James could refuse the French alliance, he could not afford to lose all influence in Germany by letting Henry dominate the campaign in support of the Princes Pretendent. At the end of January 1610, an expedient was found, a contribution of 4000 foot to the army of the Union, which would allow James to commit only the minimum, while retaining considerable influence, an expedient which infuriated the French.[3] The offer was implemented very slowly as James had not given up hope that the situation might resolve itself peacefully.

Further developments at the Halle conference upset even this arrangement. The original decision of the Union was to accept the French alliance but not to include any foreign powers formally within the Union. An embassy was to be sent to James after the reaction to the French offer was known to discuss future policy over Cleves.[5]

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1. To Edmondes, 20 Oct. 1609, ibid.

2. Council to Winwood, 4 Oct. 1609, Winwood Memorials, iii, 75-7. See also Winwood to Salisbury, 25 Sept, 20 Oct. 1609, ibid., 70-72, 81-82.

3. Salisbury to Winwood, 8 Feb. 1610, ibid. 112-15. Henry IV to Broderie, 17/27 Feb., Ambassades, v, 89-96.

4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xi, 470-72.

5. Schwabisch-Halle Abschied, 3/13 Feb. 1610, Briefe und Akten, iii 97-99.

In February, however, came the news of his rejection of the French alliance and his offer of a separate agreement, while at the same time the negotiation of the league between France and the Union came to a halt over Henry's insistance that the treaty include an agreement by the Union not to support the Huguenots.[1] Refusing to compromise the purpose of the Union, at the end of the conference a secret meeting of the leading princes decided that if negotiations with France broke down, "man sich mit Engellant desto naeher verbinde", and Anhalt and the duke of Württemberg were commissioned to decide "wie weit in diesen wichtigen punckten sicherlich gegangen werden konne".[2] They in turn resolved that the embassy was now to persuade James "to declare himselfe, yf not the heade, yet a member of that partye".[3]

At the end of March Henry IV offered James another alliance, this time between England and France only and with no committment to German policy. This was accepted and the negotiations proceeded quickly, being almost completed at the time of Henry IV's death.[4] Here again a major and unresolved article of contention was the attempt to include an agreement not to support the Huguenots.[5] Although this treaty posed no threat to James's desired independent position, the arrival of the German embassy in April did. The offer of the leadership of the Union, accompanied by rumours of some form of Anglo-Palatine marriage, became widely known as did James's dislike of the position in which he was placed.[6] Although Edmondes felt "we shall at length consent thereto", a decision had not been reached by the time of Henry IV's assassination.[7]

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1. Broderie to Henry IV, 22 Mar/1 Apr. 1610, Ambassades, v. 160-173.

2. Instructions for embassy to England, 8/18 March 1610, Briefe und Akten, iii, 148.

3. Winwood to Edmondes, 6 Apr. 1610, B.M. Stow MS. 171, f. 191. See also Cal. S.P. Ven., xi 469. Briefe und Akten, iii, 227.

4. Lee, James I and Henri IV, 158.

5. Broderie to Henry IV, 22 Mar./1 Apr., 2/12 May, Ambassades, v, 160-73, 236.

6. Broderie to Villeroy, 10/20 Apr., 21 Apr./1 May, 27 Apr./7 May, 2/13 May, Ambassades, v, 187, 193, 221-9, 234. Cal. S.P. Ven., xi, 479-80.

7. Edmondes to Trumbull, 2 May, Hist. MSS. Comm. Downshire MSS., ii, 284-6. Buwinckhausen to Württemberg, 18/28 Apr., Briefe und Akten, iii, 224-25.

Although the foreign policy of 1603-1610 was the product of the partnership of James and Salisbury, it was also the result of the exclusion from influence of spokesmen for political puritanism. The structure of court politics until 1610 was very quickly established after the accession and was to consist of three rather rigid factions; Salisbury's own following, the Howards, and the Scots. Because of the influence this court situation was to have on the development of political puritanism in this period, it is worth some comment.

At the accession Salisbury emerged with a following which consisted of conservative politiques, e.g. Buckhurst, Worcester, and later Bancroft, and "moderate puritans", e.g. Sir Walter Cope and Sir George More. The important "territorial" officers, the Lord President of the North, Lord Sheffield, the Lord President of Wales, Lord Zouch, and the Lord President of Munster, Sir George Carew, were his clients. Yet although this was in essence still the old "Cecilian party" of his father, its immediate stimulus had been hostility to Essex and after 1601 it began to display signs of fragmentation. Immediately after James's accession Cecil was able to get rid of his more unreliable allies: Raleigh, Grey, and Cobham, and shortly afterwards Northumberland. Furthermore, although Cecil was able to drop men quickly, he appears to have been unable to attract support so that by 1610, with many of his original allies, like Buckhurst, dead, his following consisted almost solely of the bureaucracy, typified by careerists like Dudley Carleton and the Calverts.

The Howards can in a sense be considered the first defectors from Salisbury's party which they had joined under Henry Howard's leadership when he abandoned Essex. At the accession, however, their prior claim to James's affection, as the old party of Mary, Queen of Scots, provided them with an entrée into positions which approached equality with Salisbury's.[1]

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., x, 55.

In the absence of an adequate study of either Salisbury or Northampton, their relationship cannot be clearly defined, although there appears to have been a growing tension after 1608.[1] Nor is Howard influence on the overall conduct of foreign policy in this period particularly evident, despite their efforts to increase contact with Spain and the fact that Northampton's client Sir Charles Cornwallis was the ambassador there for most of the period.

Although there has been some attempt recently to see Jacobean foreign policy as a clash between the pro-Spanish faction led by the Howards and a "French faction" led by the Scots, the political influence of the Scottish courtiers can be easily exaggerated. Despite the great numbers of Scots who followed James on his way south in 1603, only four, (excluding Carr) Lenox, Hamilton (after 1618), Hay and the mysterious Fenton, played any major role in politics and there is no evidence of them acting as a discrete group to the exclusion of English allies. There is, however, some evidence that anti-Scots feeling was deliberately incited by Northampton as a political tactic - he definitely exploited it in 1614.[2]

The triumph of these factions completed the collapse of political puritanism at court which had begun in the early 1590s. In a process very similar to that which occured in the late 1620s it broke down into its constituent elements and retired to "the country". Here as in the late 1620s and 1630s it was to reform in novel ways.[3]

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1. Broderie to Puysieux, 21 Apr./1 May 1607, 27 Apr./7 May, 22 June/2 July, 1608, Ambassades, ii, 82-92, 243-9, 340-7.

2. This is the theory of C.H. Carter, in "Gondomar: Ambassador to James I", Historical Journal, vii (1964), 193. For Northampton see "A Compendious Discourse of Passages between the Earles of Essex, Somerset ...", B.M. Harleian MS. 6029, f. 4v-5.

3. The institution which remained most constant to the aspirations of political puritanism in this period was the army in the United Provinces whose peculiar status afforded it considerable independence. The effects of this are discussed in Appendix II.

In the immediate aftermath of the accession, however, the divines, deprived of the protection of allies at court met a crushing defeat in the deprivations and suspensions for non-conformity under the canons of 1604. Equally important was the failure of their immediate supporters, the authors of the county petitions, most prominently of Northamptonshire but also from the other Midland counties, men of the position of Sir Frances Hastings, Sir Valentine and Sir Richard Knightley, and Sir Edward Montague.[1] A similar attempt by Archbishop Hutton to moderate the government's policy met with an equal lack of success.[2]

The position of Essex's former followers was, initially, somewhat different. James felt he owed a debt to Essex and one of his first acts after the accession was to release Southampton and Sir Henry Neville, the remaining Essex partisans still imprisoned. It was noted that of his first four creations, Cecil, Robert Sidney, William Knollys, and Edward Cotton, the last three had strong Essex connections.[3] Immediately afterwards came the fall of Essex's bitterest enemies, Raleigh, Grey, and Cobham. This atmosphere also produced a curious literary revival of Essex's reputation in which the most interesting figure was one Robert Pricket whose work contains the essence of the radical political puritan position: an apocalyptic view of the state of the Church, and crypto-presbyterianism.

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1. These gentlemen were to continue to espouse the cause of the deprived of 1604 during the greater part of the reign, see for example W. Notestein, The House of Commons, 1604-1610 (Yale U.P. 1971), 289-90.

2. Hutton to Cranbourne (Cecil), 18 Dec. 1604, Winwood Memorials, ii, 40-1. Cranbourne to Hutton, Feb. 1605, Lodge, Illustrations, iii, 125-30. It is interesting to note that Cecil particularly disliked the fact that copies of this correspondence had been circulated; Cranbourne to Sheffield, 20 Feb. 1605, Hist. MSS. Comm. Salisbury MSS., xvii, 61-2.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., x, 41.

Pricket greeted the accession with perhaps the most outspoken pamphlet urging James to undertake the leadership of the Church.[1] His anti-Catholic position was not well received but he returned to the attack later in 1603 with his Souldiers Resolution.[2] Here he continued his request for James to reform the Church in England and assist:

> Those your Majestics faithfull friends and true believing Protestants, (marginal note: "The State of Holland") ...The justice of their cause ...is and hath beene by the hand of God approved.[3]

James had an important eschatological role to play; the seventh trumpet had been sounded "already fiftie five years past" and James's actions as champion of the Church would immediately preceed the second coming.[4] In 1606 he produced a further apocalyptic tract, Times Anatomie, in which he returned to the demand for ecclesiastical reform at home: attacking the deprivations for non-conformity, hinting that the status of bishops should be less than it was, and that kings should be corrected when they "doe amisse".

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1. A Souldiers Wish unto his Sovereigne Lord King James (1603, esp. Sig. (C2v).

2. See also Pricket's declaration, 19 Apr. 1603, PRO S.P. 14/1 53-4.

3. Souldier's Resolution, 19.

4. Ibid., 3-3v.

he also made great play with the prophecies of the "lyon of the north".[1]

In 1604 he took perhaps his boldest step with the tract Honors Fame in Triumph Riding, dedicated to Southampton, Devonshire and Lord Knollys, the first major apologetic for Essex. It was, of course, very cautious and the only enemies of Essex openly attacked were Raleigh, Grey and Cobham, yet even so he was brought before the Council for seeking to "extenuate an offence".[2] Pricket's work was only one of a number of pro-Essex publications, including the broadside "A lamentable ditty upon the Earl of Essex his deathe".[3] On a higher level George Carleton published his Heroici Characters in 1603; it was dedicated to Neville and contained a poem on Sidney's death and a long poetical description of the Cadiz Voyage, part of an incomplete epic, the "Devoraxeidos". More significant politically was the publication of Essex's Apology, probably aimed at the treaty with Spain, as it concludes in heavy type, "Remember how Bernardino Mendoza spent his time while he was in England".[4] In 1605, John Ford in his elegy for Devonshire, Fames Memorial, could refer to Essex as,

> Renowned Devereux, whose awkward fate,
> Was misconceited by foul envies hate.[5]

Politically, however, the Essex revival was an ephemeral phenomenon as Salisbury, the Howards, and James feared and distrusted the leading Essex survivors.

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1. Times Anatomie, Sig. A2-3v, (C4)-(4v), D. (D2v).
2. See ibid., Sig. I12-2v.
3. Bodl. Wood 401.
4. Apology, Sig. (F3v).
5. Sig. C3.

Some of them, Edward, Lord Wotton and William, Lord Knollys, married into and joined the Howards, as Fulke Greville was to do in 1613, having been kept at a distance by Salisbury during his lifetime.[1] In these circumstances, some of the elderly simply retired, as did Sir William Russell, created Lord Russell of Thornhaugh at the accession. Significantly, his major intervention in politics in this period was his defence against the bishops, in the House of Lords on 3 May 1610, together with Lords Say and Sele, Zouche, and Sheffield, of Sir Edward Montague's bill on pluralities.[2] It was not coincidental, though, that it was his son Francis who on becoming 4th earl of Bedford in 1627 after the heirless death of the 3rd earl, revived the role of the house of Russell in puritan politics.

Yet there remained a certain cohesion in the party which is illustrated by the careers of the four most interesting members, Southampton, Robert Sidney, after 1606 Viscount Lisle, Sir Henry Neville, and Sir Ralph Winwood. The military experience of both Southampton and Lisle gave them a certain importance: Lisle being kept as governor of Flushing until the surrender of the Cautionary Towns in 1616 and Southampton appointed governor of the Isle of Wight. The accession saw Southampton's definite conversion from recusancy, although to what would be difficult to define. Yet James always held him in a curious regard mixed with fear and the suspicion of Salisbury kept him in position of semi-retirement.[3]

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1. On Greville see Rees, Fulke Greville, 34-5.

2. The Proceedings of the Parliament of 1610, ed. E.R. Forster (Yale U.P., 1966), i, 226-33 passim.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., x, 42.

Lisle was appointed Chamberlain to the Queen, which involved him in considerable trivial administration and kept him out of major politics.[1] His political stance was not popular at court, where he was known as one of t e few who would not accept Spanish money, and there was at least one attempt made to disgrace him, probably masterminded by Northampton.[2]

Another aspect of Lisle's position was his relationship to his nephews, the 3rd earl of Pembroke and the earl of Montgomery. This was to take on importance after Salisbury's death when Pembroke, who had previously been little more than a courtier, was cast as the leader of a revived puritan court party. There are a number of references to the closeness between Lisle and Pembroke. In July 1607 Broderie noted that Lisle had attempted to use the influence of Pembroke and Montgomery with the King to topple Salisbury, with whom he was always on bad terms.[3] Rowland Wyte, Lisle's "man of business", was also a client of Pembroke's and lived in Pembroke's London house.[4] In the Parliament of 1614, Lisle's son sat for Pembroke's pocket borough of Wilton.[5] Perhaps the most revealing reference was Northampton's deathbed letter to Somerset in which he called both Pembroke and Lisle his worst enemies and begged that none of his offices be given to them.[6] The Leicesterian tradition descended from Lisle to Pembroke. In 1612, a history of the Dutch wars, The Triumphs of Nassau, was dedicated to Pembroke and Montgomery,

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1. Lisle to William Trumbull, 17 Sept. 1614, Berks R.O., Trumbull MSS., Alphabetical, xxix, art. 75.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven., x, 271, 276. Lisle to Salisbury, 24 Aug. 1605, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., xvii, 390-92.

3. Broderie to Puysieux, 4/14 July 1607, Ambassades, ii, 323-4.

4. J. Nichols, The Progresses of James I, (1828), i, 494.

5. T.L. Moir, The Addled Parliament of 1614 (Oxford, 1958), 49.

6. Chamberlain to Carleton, 30 June 1614, Letters, i, 540-3.

"because many of these actions (were) performed by your noble uncles, whose honours you inherit" ...[1] Pembroke also absorbed the Russell influence, both as a close friend and ally to the countess of Bedford, and through holding the 3rd earl's proxy in the Parliaments of 1621 to 1626.

Sir Henry Neville was perhaps the most politically sophisticated of the former Essex partisans. Also cut off from office by Salisbury, his main area of activity was the House of Commons where he sat as M.P. for Berkshire from 1584-1614, with the sole exception of the Parliament of 1601 when he was in the Tower. Unfortunately only a few fragments of his correspondence in this period have survived; but what does, especially that with his good friend Sir Ralph Winwood, contains some of the most outspoken comments on parliamentary affairs of the period.[2] In 1604 he was a member of the committee which drafted the Apology.[3] In 1606 he introduced a bill to prevent recruiting for the army of the Archduke, which was later altered out of recognition by the government in the House of Lords. He found Salisbury's attitude in this deeply discouraging.

> "This parliament hath done me no good, where not only speeches and actions, but countenances and conversations with men disliked hath been observed".[4]

In 1608 he suggested to Winwood that a Dutch embassy to request assistance to continue the war be co-ordinated with an expected session of Parliament so that the issue could be raised there.[5] Perhaps his most revealing actions came in the Parliament of 1610. A strong advocate of the acceptance by the crown of the great contract and concessions on impositions, he was one of the thirty M.P.s summoned by James to a private conference on 16 November.

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1. Epistle Dedicatory, (iii).
2. The Baybrooke MSS., now PRO 30/50.
3. Notestein, House of Commons, 131.
4. To Winwood, 4 June 1606, Winwood Memorials, ii, 216-17.
5. See above, p. 164

When asked point-blank whether the Parliament was obliged to pay the debts of the crown, he replied, "when your Majesty's expense groweth by the commonwealth we are bound to maintain it, otherwise not".[1]

The career of Sir Ralph Winwood as agent and then ambassador in the United Provinces from 1603 to 1613 is, at first sight, one of the anomalies of early Jacobean politics. His maintenance of the ideals of political puritanism and his continued association with such men as Neville and Bodley, whose step-daughter he married in 1603, were not conducive to advancement in the new regime. Yet Salisbury appears to have had a shrewd awareness of his psychological fitness as agent with the Dutch and his ability and dedication were to win him a leading role in diplomacy.[2] Furthermore, his position was not unique.

With the exceptions of Cornwallis in Spain and Sir Henry Wotton, who had a prior personal connection with James, the leading diplomatists of this period were Salisbury's proteges: Sir Thomas Parry and then Sir George Carew in France, from 1602 to 1609, and Sir Thomas Edmondes in the Archucal Netherlands (1604-1609).[3] Of these, Edmondes was the senior figure and, as he himself was acutely aware, the most experienced. Although his dominant political characteristic, as he was to display under Salisbury whom he had served throughout his career and later under Buckingham, was to gravitate to the strongest influence, he was committed to the Protestant Cause.[4] One of his secretaries, Jean Beaulieu, was the brother of a Huguenot divine and Mornay considered him a good friend.[5]

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1. Wotestein, 421-3.

2. Robert Naunton to Winwood, 15 Sept. 1612, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 112-14.

3. For Wotton see Smith, Wotton, i, 45.

4. In 1610 Broderie described him as Salisbury's "serviteur et creature", Broderie to Villeroy, 29 Nov./9 Dec. 1610, Ambassades, v, 507.

5. Maisseaux to Villeroy, 7/17 Dec. 1611, PRO 31/3/43, f. 192v. Mornay to La Fontaine, 26 Jun./6 July 1609, Ecclesiae Londino-Batavae Archivum, ii, 941-43. To Asselineau, 28 May/7 Jun. 1609, Carres., xi, 221.

Although there was a considerable rivalry between him and Winwood, by the end of the decade he had also established close connections with Neville and his circle.[1] His secretary and successor in Brussels, William Trumbull, was a pronounced puritan and his long tenure, from 1609 to 1625, in a post where his sympathies hampered his usefulness, was another curiosity of Jacobean politics. A partial explanation is the fact that one of his main duties was to relay correspondence with the duke of Bouillon at Sedan, with whom he was in close personal contact.[2]

A potential revival of political puritanism could therefore count on the support of a number of men who, although at this point on the periphery of Jacobean politics, were strategically placed to rally about a new court leader. The political orientation of the diplomatists, Winwood, Edmondes (who was transferred to France in 1610), and Trumbull, was to be of considerable importance in the years 1610-1612. To a certain degree communication with the "country" elements of puritanism could be maintained through the agency of Parliament, although the atmosphere in the Parliament of 1604-1610 and the absence of a suitable issue of foreign policy about which to galvanize opinion inhibited the possibilities of reconstructing the party on a parliamentary basis.[3] Another agency of communication was provided by the Virginia Company which, although it has been considered the fashionable investment of the period, exhibits characteristics similar to those associated with the colonizing ventures of the late 1620s and 1630s.

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1. Edmondes to Neville, n.d. (1608), PRO 30/50/3, f.9.

2. Hist. MSS, Comm., Downshire MSS., iii, 413-4, 416.

3. See T.K. Rabb, "Sir Edwin Sandys and the Parliament of 1604", Amer. Hist. Rev., lxix (1964), 648.

An examination of the non-mercantile membership reveals some very interesting political configurations.[1] The most striking is the almost total lack of investment by men of recusant or pro-Spanish orientation. Of the Howards only the two more independent members of the clan, Arundel and Theophilus, Lord Howard de Walden, showed any interest (both joined in 1609 and both became directors at some point) as did Lord Knollys in 1612. Of the men later associated with policies of rapprochement with Spain there were only two investors, Sir John Digby and George Calvert, both of whom joined in 1609 and neither of whom became directors.

The membership was, therefore, overwhelmingly protestant and provided what can almost be described as a roster of the exponents of political puritanism. Of the original membership of 1606 (eight, all of whom became directors), three were members of the puritan wing of Salisbury's following, Sir Walter Cope, Sir George More, and Sir Henry Montague. Two others, Sir Thomas Gates and Sir Ferdinando Gorges, were former Essex men. Of the additions of 1607 (sixteen, all of whom became either directors or governors), one, Sir George Carew, was a member of Salisbury's following, while eight were either prominent Essex survivors, parliamentarians, or protestant advocates: Sir Henry Neville, his brother-in-law Sir Robert Killegrew, Sir Thomas Smythe, Sir Oliver Cromwell, Sir Edwin Sandys, Sir Maurice Berkeley, Sir Thomas Roe, and Sir Thomas Challoner (later Chamberlain to the Prince of Wales).

The major enlargement of the membership came in 1609 after the granting of the Royal Charter. For the first time there was a substantial participation by the nobility.

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1. I have compiled the membership from the table of investment in T.K. Rabb, Enterprise and Empire: Merchant and Gentry Investment in the Expansion of England, 1575-1630 (Harvard U.P., 1967).

The fourteen peers who later became directors included, apart from Arundel and Howard de Walden: Southampton, Pembroke, Montgomery, Lisle, the 4th earl of Dorset, Lord Chandos, Lord de la Warr, and three members of Salisbury's puritan following, John, Lord Stanhope, Thomas, Lord Burghley, and Edward, Lord Zouch. Zouch, who was a close friend of the elder Harington (whose sister he married), had originally been a protege of Burghley's and in 1601 had received the Lord Presidency of Wales with Cecil's support. In 1610 he was one of the four lords to defend Sir Edward Montague's bill.[1] Two other peers present a more curious case. Both William Parker, Lord Mounteagle, and Edmund, Lord Sheffield had recusant backgrounds but both had since become extremely close to Southampton. Mounteagle had been amongst those fined for complicity in Essex's rebellion.[2] The one bishop who also played a similar role in the company was, significantly, James Montague.

Of the commoners who joined in 1609 and later became directors, four were prominent parliamentarians, Sir Dudley Digges, Christopher Brooke, Sir John Tolles, and Sir Samuel Sandys, while two others were members of Salisbury's following, Sir Robert Drury and Henry Carey. A more significant group were the leading officers of the English troops in the United Provinces. These, to whom Sutton and Lisle should be added, included Sir Horace Vere, Sir Edward Conway, Sir Edward Cecil, Sir Edward Harwood, and Sir John Ogle.[3]

Among the later members, 1610-1613, those who became directors included the younger Harington (1610), Sir Ralph Winwood (1611), the 2nd earl of Warwick (1612), Sir Edward Sackville (1612) and Sir Robert Phelips (1613).

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1. Foster, Proceedings of 1610, i, 226.

2. For Sheffield's rather unique career, see Appendix I. It may be noted that this list contains all the nobles prominent in opposing the Union of 1607, Southampton, Pembroke, Arundel, Mounteagle, and Burghley. See Broderie to Puysieux, 22 Apr./2 May 1607. Ambassades, ii, 199-201.

3. For Gates see B.M. Addit. MS. 17677E, f. 21.

Among those who did not become directors were a large group of parliamentarians, Sir Francis Barrington (1610), Sir Francis Goodwin (1610), Sir John Bourchier (1610), Sir William Fleetwood (1610), John Hoskyns (1610), Sir Valentine Knightley (1612), and Thomas Wentworth (1612). There were also an important group of peers, Dudley, 3rd Lord North, Henry Rich (later earl of Holland), and 3rd earl of Bedford, and Robert, Lord Spencer, (all 1612), and other figures, Archbishop Abbot (1612), Sir Henry Wotton (1612), and Sir David Murray, Groom of the Stole to the Prince of Wales (1610). Finally we should also note the presence of a significant group of great ladies, Margaret (Russell), dowager countess of Cumberland, Mary (Sidney), dowager countess of Pembroke, and Lucy (Harington) countess of Bedford (all 1612).

Although the presence of individuals in such a large group should not presuppose close political alignment and although we should hesitate before ascribing to the Virginia Company the political significance of the Providence Island Company, the inclusion of almost every prominent advocate of political puritanism is not fortuitous. Gondomar considered the similar Bermuda Company a plot by Pembroke, Southampton, Montgomery, and Howard de Walden to provoke a war with Spain.[1] At the bare minimum the Virginia Company provided a medium for the association of the survivors of the Leicesterian and Essex parties with the younger men who would become the spokesmen for political puritanism in the 1620s.

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1. Carmiento to Philip III, 7/17 Mar. 1614. Correspondencia Official de ... Gondomar, ed. A. Ballerstros Beretta (Madrid, 1936-45), iv, 17.

6. The Great Reversal in Foreign Policy, 1610-1612

The assassination of Henry IV removed the final prop on which Salisbury's policy had rested - the guarantee of Franco-Hapsburg enmity - and with it the hopes for an easy neutrality. Thus reactions to the event were mixed: relief at being freed from Henry IV's dangerous belligerency but alarm at the measures the situations would necessitate. For the next few years, until James was given the opportunity to commit himself to a rapprochement with Spain and the hope of neutrality it offered, foreign policy was to respond strongly to external stimuli. The result was a temporary revival of confessional politics and an alliance with the activist elements in continental Calvinism.

The immediate effect of the assassination was to add further weight to the arguments of the advocates of alliance with the Evangelical Union: "how we shall resolve in England God knows, but I think it was never more needfull to make a league of those of the Religion".[1] Although James bowed to this pressure and agreed in principle to such an alliance, he was careful to limit it to the Cleves crisis and to:

> defer the particularities thereof to another assembly, and to dismiss the ambassadors with this general assurance of his good disposition and affection to it.2

Winwood was given the power to negotiate with the Princes in July, but the death of the Elector Frederick IV on 29 August/8 September enabled

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1. Browne to Trumbull, 8 May 1610, Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., ii, 290. Also Winwood to Salisbury, 8 May, Bull. of the New York Public Library, vi (1902), 479-80.

2. Council to Winwood, 18 May 1610, Winwood Memories, iii, 165-67. Levinus Munck to Winwood, 19 May, B.M. Stowe MS. 171, f. 199.

James to procrastinate further.

Although the Union immediately sent a reassurance of their willingness to make the treaty and empowered Anhalt to meet with Winwood, James decided to await the settlement of the Palatine succession and the outcome of the dispute over the regency.[1] He also took the opportunity to make the terms narrower; he would not join the union himself but would make an alliance as an equal partner, while the treaty was only to have effect in the dispute over Cleves.[2] In November Anhalt himself went to England to seek James's support. As he later reported to the Union conference at Rotenberg in July 1611, he found James "anfangs wenig Lust gezeigt hat wegen eines Bundnisses zu verhandeln" and seeking every excuse for delay. A compromise was at length made by the Buwinckhausen, the agent of the Union, and Salisbury in which James promised to send an envoy to the next Union conference to sign the treaty there.[3]

The situation in France now became the major area of concern. The proclamation of the regency of Marie de Medicis on the aftermath of the assassination had been the work of the ex-leaguer councillors of Henry IV, Villeroy, Sillery, and Jeannin, with the assistance of Épernon, and was of dubious constitutionality. In an effort to placate the grandees and princes of the blood, a number of the "outs" of the previous reign, particularly Bouillon and Condé, were brought on to the conseil d'état. Policy, however, was now to be made by the conseil de la petite escritoire,

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1. Salisbury to Winwood, 23 July, Winwood Memorials, iii, 196-98. Frederick IV to James, 3/13 Aug.; Union to James, 2/12 Sept.; Winwood to Salisbury, 20 Sept.; PRO S.P. 81/10/117-8, 151, 184-8. Salisbury to Edmondes, ?Sept., B.M. Stowe MS. 171, f. 337-8. Lake to Salisbury, 18 Oct., Cal. S.P. Dom., 1603-10, 638. Gutachten der Heidleberger Tagsatzung, 9/19-14/24 Sept., Briefe und Akten, iii, 454.
2. Council to Winwood, 28 Sept., Winwood Memorials, iii, 222-3.
3. Protocoll des Uniontages von Rothenberg, 29 July/8 Aug. 1611, Briefe und Akten, ix, 706. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 75-6, 94-5.

consisting of the aforementioned [redacted] ministers, the Concinis, the Nuncio, the Spanish ambassador, and père Coton, and under such influences began an initially cautious but steady reversal of the policies of Henry IV.[1]

English policy towards France now had two goals. The first was the continuation of the policies of Henry IV, particularly with regard to the siege of Jülich, and to that end Edmondes was finally sent over as permanent ambassador in May with instructions to conclude the treaty under negotiation at Henry's death. Although this was soon signed, 19/29 August, the French lack of interest in Germany was obvious to all observers.[2] The other was to prevent the regency coming under the influence of men hostile to England. To achieve these goals [redacted] there were two potential English agents: the Huguenots and James's cousin the duke of Guise, now estranged from the court. The potentialities of such an alliance, which was to be James's hoped-for solution during the next few years, were alarming to Villeroy and cheering to Dudley Carleton:

> One thing I am glad to observe in those divisions (in France), that the Guise and the Religion can shake hands uppon faction...(it) will be a barr to any in that state hereafter to make religion a pretence for further quarrell.3

This new interest in French internal politics caused in turn a revival of the old relationship with Bouillon who had just re-entered court politics. Although it has been considered that Bouillon was

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1. G. Serr, Henri de Rohan, 42-44.

2. Winwood to Edmondes, 19 May 1610; Salisbury to Edmondes, 15 Aug.; Edmondes to Salisbury, 2 Nov.; B.M. StoweMS 171, ff. 195-8, 320, 348v.

3. Carleton to Edmondes, 13 July 1610, ibid., f. 190-92. Broderie to Villeroy, 30 Nov./9 Dec. 1610, Ambassades, v, 509.

motivated solely by self-interest, as evidenced by his preparedness to act as the agent of the court in the destruction of his arch-enemy Sully, we can also see a serious concern with the maintenance of the pro-protestant orientation of French policy and a solid opposition to the policies of Villeroy.[1] Unsuccessful in obtaining the command of the army against Jülich, in October Bouillon obtained permission to conduct his pupil Frederick V to Heidelberg and to take part in the family conference there.[2] By the beginning of 1611 he was advocate of Reformed unity and adviser to the Dutch and German agents at the French court, warning them of the current policies of the crown and urging an alliance between the English, the Dutch and the Germans.[3]

The renewed relationship with the English had two roots: they had always regarded Bouillon rather than Sully, with whom their relations had always been cold, as the leading Huguenot spokesman, and at this juncture both James and Bouillon were interested in the same policy, the alliance of the anti-court catholics with the Huguenots.[4] The rapproachement was rapid and an important role was played by Edmondes who had a "very long and intrinsical acquaintance" with Bouillon which had begun during his residence in France in the 1590s. By the beginning of 1611 Noel de Caron noted that Bouillon was the source of James's information about the state of affairs in France.[5] In turn James paid Bouillon the almost unparalleled compliment of releasing one of his political prisoners, the Scots presbyterian leader Andrew Melville,

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1. Broderie to Villeroy, 27 Sept./7 Oct.; Villeroy to Broderie, 27 Oct./6 Nov. 1610; Ambassades, v, 433, 455. B. Zeller, La Minorité de Louis XIII (Paris, 1892-99), i, 66-67.
2. Edmondes to Winwood, 14 June 1610, Winwood Memorials, iii, 182-4. Instructions a M. de Bouillon allant...a Heidleberg...Oct. 1610., B.M. Kings MS. 117, f. 99-108 passim.
3. Aerssens to Barneveldt, 31 Jan./9 Feb. 1611; Aerssens to Buwinckhausen, 3/13 Feb.; Briefe und Akten, ix, 112-3, 128-9.
4. Broderie to Villeroy, 9/19 July 1610; 27 Oct./6 Nov.; Ambassades, v, 352-3, 350.
5. Caron to Barneveldt, 27 Feb./9 Mar. 1611, B.M. Addit. MS. 17677H, f.29. Edmondes to Prince Henry, 22 Feb. 1612, B.M. StoweMS. 172, f.184-5. Bouillon to Winwood, 25 Feb./7 Mar. 1605, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 52.

imprisoned in the Tower since 1608. In August 1610 Bouillon had asked for Melville's release so that he could join the faculty of the Academy at Sedan. James agreed, freeing Melville in early 1611, despite the fact that the Queen-Regent bitterly protested against the release of so dangerous an individual and that he himself had refused earlier requests from the Huguenots.[1] The political significance of this "gift" was noted by Edmondes:

> The Duke doth very well deserve that his Majestie should gratifie him in that request, not onely for the particular affection which he beareth to his Majestie and the state: but also for that he is the beste instrument that maketh head against the ill councils of this place; and continues still tobe very well respected by the Queene for his greate sufficiency.2

This alliance with Bouillon had major repercussions upon English policy towards the Huguenots, the first example of which was to be seen in the Huguenot Assembly of Saumur in the summer of 1611. The right to hold a political assembly had been granted in October 1610 as part of the Queen-Regent's attempts to pacify all the factions in France. Having made this concession, however, she was frightened of its possible effects and at the same time wished it to be out of the way before the announcement of the double marriages with Spain, secretly negotiated during the spring of 1611.[3] She was therefore amenable to a compromise suggested by Bouillon that:

> if those of the Religion may enjoy the benefit of the edict entirely wherein hitherto they have been excluded in many of the principal points, he will employ all his endeavours to

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1. Queen to Broderie, 8/18 Dec. 1610; Puysieux to Broderie, 8/18 Dec.; Broderie to Queen, 27 Dec./6 Jan. 1610/11.; Ambassades, v, 513-15, 517, 531-33. Cal. S.P. Dom., 1611-1618, 23.
2. Edmondes to Salisbury, 11 Feb. 1611, PRO S.P. 78/57/51-3. See also Bouillon to James, 16/26 Jan. 1611, ibid., 78/57/9. Edmondes to Salisbury, 5 Jan. 1611, B.M. Stowe MS. 171, ff. 350-51.
3. Zeller, i, 276.

containe them within those bounds of contentment.[1]

The course of the Assembly, however, destroyed any hope of a successful conclusion. A major factor was Sully's attempt to use the Assembly to obtain his reinstatement in office, which brought him into direct collision with Bouillon, their personal antagonism embittering their political differences. Whatever merit Bouillon's position may have had was lost by the charge, instigated by Sully and his followers, that he had been bought by the court.[2] As a result Bouillon lost the leadership of the militant wing of the Huguenots, which he had held for so long, to Sully's son-in-law the duke of Rohan, who had taken the lead in attacking him.[3] At the same time Bouillon was cheated by the Queen, who failed to honour their agreement by not rectifying the grievances of the Assembly[4] This in turn led Bouillon to embark on an alliance with Condé in the autumn of 1611. This effort, in which he even made attempts to have Condé reconvert to the Religion, has been seen, probably correctly, as an attempt to revive the old Huguenot-politique alliance of the late 1570s with Condé playing the role of Alençon.[5]

The English reaction to the Assembly was influenced completely by the alliance with Bouillon. The Queen-Regent was worried that the English might have agents at Saumur encouraging the militants; but this was not the case and when speeches were made suggesting appeals to James if the

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1. Edmondes to Salisbruy, 26 Feb. 1611. B.M. Stowe MSS. 171, f. 362. Bouillon's motivation has been the source of considerable controversy. Rohan claimed that he stage-managed the whole thing, Rohan, Mémoires (Amsterdam, 1646), 495. A more sympathetic analysis is found in Laugel, "Le Duc de Bouillon d'aprés les Documents Inedites", i, 163. There can be no doubt, though, that one of Bouillon's motives was to strengthen his position at court.
2. Marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil, Memoires (Collection Michaud et Poujoulat, 2eme Ser., v, 1854), 47. Patry, Mornay, 488-89. Anquez, Histoire des Assemblées Politiques des Reformés de France (1573-1622) (Paris,1859)229.
3. Serr, Henri de Rohan, 77. See also account by Agrippa d'Aubigny, in "Histoire de Ma Vie", Oeuvres Complètes (Paris, 1873-92), i, 85.
4. Anquez, Assemblées Politiques, 239-43. Bouillon to Edmondes, 14/24 June 1611, PRO S.P. 78/58/164-65.
5. Fontenay-Mareuil, 71. Rohan, 493.

grievances were not rectified, Edmondes publicly informed the Assembly that such speeches were "indiscreet" and unacceptable. Although his "neutrality" was threatened by the dedication to him at this point of Mornay's Mystère d'Iniquité, James expressed complete confidence in Bouillon and Mornay, who was uneasily attempting to hold a middle ground between Bouillon and Sully, and no sympathy for Sully.[1] Both James and Edmondes knew of Bouillon's compromise and favored it; James being particularly in agreement with the conception of the political position of the Huguenots it embodied:

> The said body justifying themselves by their moderation, they will not be aggressors against the state but upon violence first offered to them, their united party may be held of obvious recommendationto be called to the assistance of the state...& so to interest themselves more and more in the favour and good opinion of the state; whereas otherwise by their contentious humours and exhorbitant demands they should both renew the old hatred and persecution against them....2

James's support for Bouillon was, however, to have an unexpected consequence. Bouillon's cultivation of the house of Bourbon, Condé, Soissons, and Conti, was to wreck any hope of an alliance between the Huguenots and the Guise, on the rocks of the bitter Bourbon-Guise feud.[3]

Bouillon's influence on English policy was not limited to French affairs but was to have a major effect upon the marriages of James's children and the role these were to have on the revival of Reformed unity. Although Willson is incorrect in stating that James's diplomacy in the

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1. Spifame de Buisseaux to Queen, 14/24 June, PRO 31/3/42, f. 44-45; Edmondes to Salisbury, 15, 25 June, PRO S.P. 78/58/13-15, 21-3; 11, 24 July, B.M. Stowe MS. 172, ff. 99-101, 124-25. On the Mystère see p.157 above.

2. Edmondes to Salisbury, 26 Feb., 24 July, 1611, B.M. Stowe MS. 171, f. 362, 172, f. 99v. By the autumn of 1611, however, anti-Bouillon reports had reached England, see Buisseaux to Villeroy, 3/13 Nov. 1611, PRO 31/3/43, f. 159v.

3. Zeller, Minorité de Louis XIII, i, 302-3.

years 1611-1612 "centred" about the marriages, they now became a serious consideration as both the elder children were of age and offers had already been made for Elizabeth. Elizabeth was a particular concern as she could not be married to a catholic, for the religion of her heirs would create problems with the succession, and the list of suitable protestants was a small one. The French were suspicious about a marriage with Maurice of Nassau but James appears to have favoured from the start the young Elector Frederick V, who was of the right age, rank, and, after September 1610, a prince in his own right.[1] No formal suggestions had, however, been extended by the English and the decision to seek the marriage was taken by the Palatines, along the lines of their previous interest, at the family gathering at Heidelberg in October 1610 at which Bouillon and Maurice were present. Bouillon was given the charge "to knowe his Majesties resolution therein". Although both Bouillon and Anhalt were already committed to the marriage, it is not clear who proposed it. Anhalt himself was not present, but he and Bouillon were in communication, and it was probably decided between them that Bouillon, as a relative, was a more suitable negotiator, for Anhalt did not bring up the question in his embassy to England in November.

Soon after his return from Heidelberg Bouillon approached Edmondes who referred the matter to Salisbury.[2] The rambling reply from James

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1. D.H. Willson, King James VI & I (New York) 1967), 280. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 30-32, 56-7, 73-5. Broderie to Villeroy, 27 Sept./7 Oct. 1610, Ambassades, v, 431-5.

2. Broderie to Villeroy, 27 Sept./7 Oct., 16/26 Oct., 7/17 Nov. 1610, ibid., v, 433, 450-51, 474-75. Bouillon to Edmondes 16/26 Oct., B.M. StoweMS. 171, f. 343. Edmondes to Salisbury, 19 Jan. 1611, to the Council, 26 Feb., PRO S.P. 78/57/17, 64-67.

contained the assurance that "as the Duke is now become an instrument therein, whose appearance therein doth authorize the motion", Frederick "should need not doubt but he shall be well heard, if she be well sought".[1] On receipt of this Bouillon promised to inform the Palatine council and gave Edmondes a memorial by them on Frederick's position.[2] There followed a long delay caused by the need of the Palatines to call together the Elector's tutors, Maurice, Anhalt, and John of Nassau, for their formal approval, and the relaying of messages via Bouillon whose absence at Saumur made the process more complicated, and it was not until September 1611 that the formal commitment was made.[3] During the spring of 1611 Bouillon also suggested a marriage between Prince Henry and a French princess, a project which was to be one of his greatest ambitions over the next few years. This was to be a "protestant" French marriage which would enable James and Henry as well as Bouillon himself, to extend their influence in France. Although James, deeply involved in his hopes for a Spanish marriage, gave only a non-committal response, the possibility haunted Villeroy.[4]

If the aftermath of the assassination of Henry IV caused James to return hesistatingly and unwillingly to a form of confessional politics,

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1. Council to Edmondes, 7 Feb., PRO S.P. 78/57/ 43-44.
2. Edmondes to Salisbury, 26 Feb., PRO S.P. 78/57/64-7. The memorial is S.P. 81/11/30.
3. Edmondes to Salisbury, 24 Apr., 27 May, 25 June, 19 Sept., PRO S.P. 78/57/149-51, 183-4, 58/21-22, 24, 164-5. Edmondes to Salisbury, 22 Aug., B.M. Stowe MS. 172, ff. 169-70. Edmondes to Trumbull, 28 Sept., Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., ii, 150-52. Electress Palatine to Bouillon n.d. (Mar.-April. 1611), PRO S.P. 81/10/295.
4. Edmondes to Salisbury, 19 Jan. 1611; Council to Edmondes, 7 Feb.; PRO S.P. 78/57/17, 44. Villeroy to Broderie, 2/12 July, 27 Oct./6 Nov. 1610, Ambassades, v, 328-30, 450.

Digby's discovery in June 1611 of the double marriages between France and Spain forced him to engage in a full-scale revival of religious alliances. To both James and Salisbury the marriages suggested the revival of a catholic league, and the total collapse of their previous policy.[1] Although Gondomar was later to claim that Salisbury was responsible for the English response to the marriages, James, whose reaction may have been in part chagrin at being outmanouevred by the French on the marriages, was deeply shocked.[2] Among Englishmen generally, relief at being spared a Spanish match was mixed with alarm, in the words of the French ambassador, "plus grand que je ne vous represente" at the possibilities of a revived League, "which combination is judged of dangerous consequence for the United Provinces and those of the Religion in France".[3] For the next two years this fear was to dominate European politics. On 21/31 March 1612 the Venetian Senate ordered their ambassadors to investigate the League's existence.[4] On the previous day, their ambassador had discussed the subject with James and reported him as saying that "he knew quite well that such a league was directed against him or some of his friends". Sir John Throckmorton was sure its purpose was to "root out the true profession of God's Gospel", while Winwood compared the Queen-Regent's journey to Bayonne in February 1612 with the notorious conference of 1565.[5]

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1. Digby to Edmondes, 28 June 1611, B.M. Stowe MS, 172, f. 106. Salisbury to Edmondes, 5, 20 Sept., PRO S.P. 78/58/145-6, 175-6.
2. Sarmiento to Philip III, 5/15 Oct., 6/16 Nov. 1613. Corres., iii, 109-11, 156-8. Buisseaux to Villeroy, 10/20 Nov. 1611, PRO 31/3/43, f.169-70.
3. Buisseaux to Villeroy, 19/29 Nov. 1611, PRO 31/3/43, f. 173v-174. Dudley Carleton to Digby, 15 Oct. 1611; Edmondes to Digby, 18 Oct.; Digby to Edmondes, 9 Dec.; Hist. MSS. Comm. Xth Report: Eglington etc. (Digby) MSS., 538, 539, 546-7.
4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 321.
5. Ibid., 319-21. Throckmorton to Lisle, 24 Mar. 1612, Hist. MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., v, 38-39. Winwood to Dathenus, 24 Feb./5 Mar. 1612, Briefe und Akten, x, 376-77.

The effects of the new situation are strikingly illustrated in the correspondence over the Palatine marriage; previously James had been prepared to let the negotiations drag on, now Salisbury became immediately impatient with the delays.[1] By the end of September, however, Bouillon had finally received the formal resolution to undertake the marriage.[2] When he suggested, to hasten the negotiations, that he and Edmondes settle the conditions together before a public embassy was sent to England, Salisbury was infuriated, "A strange wynd that after all this tyme spent to treat of marriage in France. There is a little too much lead in their coyne". James, however, insisted that Bouillon be continued as the intermediary.[3] In return for this and the public declining of a Savoyard offer, Salisbury demanded that the Palatines send a public embassy to England as soon as possible, as "things seem to be so carried as that they must depend upon the D. of Bouillon's laysure from his private affaires". This was agreed to and the Electress Palatine nominated Bouillon as the Palatine envoy.[4]

The Franco-Spanish marriages had an equally strong effect upon the negotiations with the Evangelical Union. The Union conference finally held at Rotenberg from 23 July/2 August to 23 August/ 2 September had failed to inform Winwood of their meeting beforehand but on 22 August/ 1 September wrote to James, Salisbury, and Winwood requesting that James fulfill his promise of the previous November and that Winwood be commissioned to meet their agents as soon as possible.[5] James received their letter

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1. Fenton to Salisbury, 27 Aug. 1611, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1611-1618, 71. Salisbury to Edmondes, 3 Oct., PRO S.P. 78/58/190/5.

2. Bouillon to Edmondes, 27 Sept./7 Oct.; Edmondes to Salisbury, 5 Oct.; ibid., 78/58/198-201, 304.

3. Edmondes to Salisbury, 8 Nov.; 5 Dec.; Salisbury to Edmondes, 20 Nov.; ibid., 78/58/223/6, 239-43, 257-8. H. May to Salisbury, 18 Nov.; PRO S.P. 14/67/35.

4. Edmondes to Salisbury, 21 Dec., 9 Jan. 1612; Salisbury to Edmondes, 26 Dec., PRO S.P. 78/58/276-8, 282-5, 59/9-10.

5. Protocoll des Unionstages von Rothenberg, 29 July/8 Aug., 17/27 Aug.; Dritte Nebenabschied des Uniontages, 19/29 Aug., Briefe und Akten, ix, 705, 728, 775-6. Union to James, to Winwood, 22 Aug./1 Sept.; Buwinckhausen to Salisbury, 5/15 Sept.; PRO S.P. 81/11/131-4, 151-2,159. Winwood to Salisbury, 21 Sept., PRO S.P. 84/68/30.

on 27 September and it was noted that "his Majesty is showing greater warmth than usual". On 11 October he replied that he was prepared to go through with the treaty and that Winwood was commissioned to do so at a place and time convenient to the Union.[1] At the end of the year Buwinckhausen and Schonberg were designated to meet Winwood at Wesel at the end of January.[2] Winwood, deeply involved in the controversy over Vorstius, could not leave the Hague until the end of the session of the States-General and the meeting was postponed until the end of March.[3] On 28 March/7 April the treaty, whose terms had been established for so long, was quickly signed.[4]

Although the treaty concerned only the relations between James and the Union, ever since he had agreed to it there had been speculation that this would be only the beginning of a major protestant alliance.[5] Edmondes saw this as vital if the situation in France was not to deteriorate:

> if they shall finde that his Majestie will show himself sensible of their proceedings, and for that purpose shall unite himself strictly with his other allies, his very countenance will suffice (in regard they know him to be the primum mobile of the protestant partye) to keepe matters from growing here to any extremities.

He reported French alarm at reports that Prince Henry was going to the United Provinces and Maurice of Nassau to England.[6] The same view

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1. James tp Union, 11/21 Oct., Briefe und Akten, x, 52-3. Cal. S.P. Ven. xii, 228-30. Salisbury to Winwood, 15 Oct., PRO S.P. 84/68/101-4.
2. Deux-Ponts to James, 10/20 Dec., PRO S.P. 81/11/191-2. Instructions for Buwinckhausen and Shonberg, 1/11 Jan. 1612, Briefe und Akten, x, 225-27.
3. Winwood to Salisbury, 4 Jan. 1612, PRO S.P. 84/68/209-13. To Dathenus, 24 Feb. Briefe und Akten, x, 376-77.
4. B.M. Addit. MS. 17677H, f. 110-11. Schönberg and Buwinckhausen to Union, 28 Mar./7 Apr., Briefe und Akten, x, 430-31 Winwood to Salisbury, 7 Apr., PRO S.P. 84/68/263-4.
5. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 231-2, 284-5.
6. Edmondes to Salisbury, 22 Feb. 1612, B.M. Stow MS. 172, f. 182. See also Mornay's reaction: to Sarpi, 16/26 Mar. 1612, Sarpi, Lettere, ii, 235-6; to Asselineau, 15/25 May, Corres., xi, 436-7.

was held by Sir Edward Conway:

> At length we ratify the treaty with the princes of the Religion....I should be more glad to hear, that his majesty did give countenance and encouragement to the Protestants in France.1

The obvious candidate for membership in such an alliance was the United Provinces; Salisbury had advocated such a step in 1611 and Winwood was insistent on it with the Germans.[2] This in turn was a major factor in the reorientation of Anglo-Dutch relations over the winter of 1611-1612. The immediate cause of this was the controversy over Vorstius, which, as Shriver has recently shown, did not at first represent an intervention by James into Dutch affairs.[3] James's original intentions were quite moderate and were concerned mainly with the clearing of his name from accusations of heterodoxy in the wake of the oath of allegiance controversy. But the issue was forced by Winwood who stressed the religious link between the United Provinces and England, and, as James and Salisbury informed him, exceeded his instructions by allying with the Counter-Remonstrants. It is interesting that Lisle, always a partisan of the Dutch, also thought that Winwood had gone too far.[4] The other element in the crisis was the attitude of Barneveldt who regarded James's position in the religious debate, which he was attempting to control, as intervention *per se*.[5] This dispute occurred at a time when Barneveldt's pro-French political orientation was already suspect and the two, as can be seen in Winwood's view of Barneveldt, became linked together.[6] This conjuncture

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1. Conway to Adam Newton, 19 Mar. 1612, T. Birch, *The Life of Henry, Prince of Wales* (1760), 504-8.
2. Salisbury to Winwood, 15 Oct. 1611, PRO S.P. 84/68/181-4. Winwood to Dathenus, 24 Feb. 1612, *Briefe und Akten*, x, 376-77.
3. F. Shriver, "Orthodoxy and Diplomacy, James I and the Vorstius Affair", *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, lxxxv (1970), 449-474 *passim*.
4. Salisbury to Winwood, 29 Dec. 1611; J. More to Winwood, 1 Jan. 1612; *Winwood Memorials*, iii, 316-18, 319-20.
5. Barneveldt to Caron, 7/17 Nov. 1611; 2/12 Jan., 18/28 Jan. 1612; J.L. Motley, *The Life and Death of John of Barneveld* (1874), i, 269, 270, 284.
6. Winwood to Rochester, 7 Apr. 1612, *ibid.*, ii, 459-50.

inspired the "black legend" of Arminianism, that it was a catholic fifth column, to which Barneveldt himself was to be a victim. In 1617 he was described by George, Lord Carew as "a greate upholder of the arminians and, as men suppose, a papist; he is a great favourer of the French king's cause agaynst the Princes".[1] In its full flowering the legend took the following form:

> Barneveldt was a principal agent, who by assistance of Hoogenberts of Leyden, Grotius of Rotterdam, and Leidenburgh secretary of Utrecht, with others their assistancs, drew on the design, which was to suppress the Protestant Reformed Religion, and establish the tenents of Arminius being fomented by the Kings of France and Spain, as the immediate way to introduce popery.2

James himself was later to call Barneveldt "un mauvais homme, espagnol d'estat et arminien de relligione".[3]

The decisive step was taken in February 1612 when James decided that Barneveldt had become "du tout aliené" through his religious position and attachment to the Queen of France and ordered Winwood secretly to contact Maurice of Nassau whom he considered had remained true to "la bonne cause et a moy en particuliere". Winwood was to discuss with Maurice the "danger qui peut resulter à toute nostre réligion et les professeurs d'icelle par ces dits mariages" and to offer him a Garter as a public symbol of James's esteem.[4] The offer of a Garter had originally been an idea of Prince Henry's. Henry had attempted to offer it to Maurice in early 1611 and Conway, who had been Henry's agent in the affair, had urged the revival of the offer in early 1612 as a means of maintaining the religious connection with the United Provinces. This may have been James's immediate inspiration.[5]

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1. Carew to Sir Thomas Roe, 18 Jan. 1618, Letters from George Lord Carew to Sir Thomas Roe, 1615-1617, ed. J. Maclean (Camden Soc., lxxvi, 1860), 89.
2. A. Wilson, The History of Great Britain, being the Life and Reign of King James the First (1653), 119.
3. V.-L. Tapie, La Politique Etrangère de la France et le debut de la Guerre de Treate Ans (1618-1621), (Paris, 1934), 358.
4. James to Winwood, 18 Feb. 1612, Winwood Memorials, iii, 339.
5. Conway to Henry, 2 June 1611; to A. Newton, 28? Jan. 1612; B.M. Harleian MS 7002, ff. 105-6, 170-71.

Winwood met Maurice at Arnhem on 31 March 1612 on his return from Wesel. They discussed the "general league complotted for the subversion of religion" and Winwood asked in James's name for Maurice's views. Maurice agreed that the league was being formed, "which he instanced in the alliances between France and Spain", and urged that James make himself head and protector of a general alliance of the Union, the United Provinces, Denmark, Sweden, and the protestant cantons of Switzerland. He further suggested that this alliance be prepared to come to the assistance of the Huguenots. At this point the conversation turned to the subject of Barneveldt, Winwood asking:

> what possibility that the protestants of France could expect favour from these provinces when the same man (Barneveldt) is known to depend solely on the devotion of France.

Maurice agreed that something would have to be done about Barneveldt and made broad suggestions to the effect that "some good resolution may be taken...under the protection of your Majesty's safeguard". Winwood then revealed James's offer of a Garter which Maurice agreed to accept if the States-General agreed.[1]

Winwood wished to make this the beginning of a full-scale intervention into Dutch politics and requested permission to announce the offer publicly to the States-General:

> to oblige to your service the well affected people, who well know that there is no surety for themselves...but under your Majesty's favour....

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1. Winwood to James, 7 Apr. 1612, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., xxi, 354-6. To Rochester, 7 Apr., Motley, Barneveldt, ii, 459-60.

and to override any opposition.[1] This he obtained and on 25 April made the announcement to the States-General, the significance of the move being immediately noticed by the French.[2] Yet although Maurice's formal installation took place by the end of the year, the pressure for intervention weakened substantially when Barneveldt bowed to <u>force majeure</u> and agreed to the dismissal of Vorstius. This period, 1612-1613, was to see the high-point of James's relations with the United Provinces; it was to see them ally with the Union under his sponsorship and it also saw his schemes for the amalgamation of the two East India Companies and the resolution of various trade disputes.[3] He was even prepared, in another demonstration of his basic theological position, to concede to Barneveldt's request that the civil power have the final control of religious affairs and readily accepted Grotius's defence of this position in 1613. It was only with some effort that Winwood and Abbot were able to make him realize what this would mean in the Dutch situation and from this point he harboured a deep suspicion of Barneveldt.[4]

The commercial disputes with the United Provinces during this period are a reflection, not a cause, of the political relationship.[5] While those elements in both countries who saw the confessional tie as paramount, the Orangeist party and political puritanism, were prepared to compromise on trade questions, those elements who did not, the Holland oligarchy and the Spanish faction together with certain members of the merchant community and East India Company in England, were prepared for a

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1. Winwood to James, 7 Apr. <u>ibid</u>.
2. Villeroy to Buisseaux, 2/12 May 1612; Puysieux to Buisseaux, 10/20 May; PRO 31/3/44, ff. 147, 193.
3. G.N. Clark, and W.J.M. Van Eysinga, <u>Colonial Conferences between England and the Netherlands, in 1613 and 1615</u>, (Bibliotheca Visseriana, xv, no. 32, 1940), i, 48.
4. <u>Ibid</u>., 80.
5. <u>Ibid</u>., ii, 142-3.

major rupture over commercial issues. In the commercial conference of 1613 it was the Dutch who were uneager to compromise; in that of February 1615, the Dutch, militant in the aftermath of the second Cleves crisis, were ready for an offensive alliance against Spain, while James now pro-Spanish, refused.[1]

Perhaps the most important effect of the dispute over Vorstius was, however, its symbolic role as an example of James's defence of the faith. Preaching at Paul's Cross on the tenth anniversary of the accession (24 March 1613), Joseph Hall considered that James's stand against Vorstius, his refusal of toleration, and his alliance with the Union made "all Christian churches in their prayers and acclamations, style him, in a double right, defender of the faith, more by desert than inheritance".[2] An even greater symbol was now to be provided by the Palatine marriage, which could not but be considered as part of the alliance with the Union.

Although Bouillon had initially requested secrecy, the news of the marriage and his role in it became public very quickly and was greeted by Reformed opinion as a great boost to the cause.[3] In September 1611 Bouillon, for reasons of his own, revealed his participation to the Queen-Regent and the conjunction of this with the Conference of Rotenberg's request to James linked it to the Union:

> Mais je n'ay pas sceu jusques a ceste heure, que ceste recherche (of marriage) ait estée deliberée et resolue en l'Assemblee de Rothenberg, en ce cas ce seroit un mariage pour fait destat, ceste resolution ayant esté prise à la suite de l'estroite confirmation de l'union des Princes Protestants.4

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1. Ibid., i, 114, 117-18, 152.
2. Strype, Annals, iv, 505. See also Symonds D'Ewes's view, The Autobiography and Correspondence of Sir Symonds D'Ewes, ed. J.C. Halliwell (1845), i, 264-65.
3. Edmondes to Council, 26 Feb. 1611, PRO S.P. 78/57/64-7. Beaulieu to Trumbull, 21 Feb. 1611, Hist. MSS. Comm. Downshire MSS., iii, 25. Caron to States-General, 11 Mar. 1611, B.M. Addit. MS. 17677H, ff. 29v-30. Throckmorton to Lisle, 3 Apr. 1611, Hist. MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., iv, 261-62. Mornay to Asselineau, 28 May/7 June 1611, Corres., xi, 220-23. Catherine de Parthenay to duchess de La Tremouille, 27 May/6 June 1611, H. Imbert, Lettres de Catherine de Parthenay...1609-1624 (Niot, 1874), 60-2.

At the time of the treaty of Wesel, Winwood saw the marriage as the seal of the alliance and thought it wished "with a fervency of affection by all good patriots".[1] In England the marriage took on a particular significance as a protection against the Savoyard proposals, which Conway for one, felt would "slake France, the Low Countries, and the Protestants in Germany".[2] Even Raleigh, who never let religious considerations interfere with politics, saw the Palatine marriage as more useful than that with Savoy.[3] Although James constantly reiterated that when a firm Palatine offer was made the Savoyard offer would be dropped, the fact that it offered financial advantages was a cause for worry. Further alarm was caused by the fact that the Spanish ambassador and the Spanish Faction exploited it as a means of preventing the Palatine match. These worries continued through the spring of 1612 and the knowledge that the Palatine marriage would actually go forward was to Sir John Throckmorton "a great boon to the common cause of religion" and to Conway a sign that James was ready to:

> hold in heart and comfort those of the religion in France, keep in devotion those of the churches of Germany, and keep his interest in these provinces.5

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1. Winwood to Digby, 13 Apr. 1612, Hist. MSS. Comm., Xth Report, 574-5. Winwood to Edmondes, 17 Mar. 1612, B.M. Stowe MS. 172, ff. 210-11. Schönberg to Administrator of Palatinate, 16/26 Feb. 1612, Briefe und Akten, x. 360.

2. Conway to Newton, 7 Apr. 1611, Birch, Henry, 479-82.

3. Considerations on Match with Savoy, Raleigh, Works (Oxford, 1829), viii, 223-36, esp. 336. See also Minute on Matches, n.d. (late 1611), PRO S.P. 14/67/83.

4. Levinus Munck to Trumbull, 20 Nov. 1611, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Misc., iii, bet. arts. 171 and 172. Beaulieu to Trumbull, 21 Feb. 1611, Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iii, 25. Salisbury to Edmondes, 20 26 Dec. 1611, PRO S.P. 78/58/239-43, 282-5.

5. Digby to Edmondes, 10 Apr. 1612, B.M. Stow MS. 172, f.234. Throckmorton to Trumbull, 28 Apr., Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., ii, 285-6. Conway to Newton, 19 Mar., 8 Apr., 16 May, Birch, Henry, 504-8, 508-10, 510-14.

The marriage negotiations themselves were, however, overshadowed by events in France. In the beginning of March 1612 the Palatine council appointed the count of Hanau and Vollrad von Plessen its agents in the marriage together with Bouillon and they were ordered to meet him in England.[1] At the same time the English council gave Bouillon final assurance that, although the formalities would have to be followed, the Elector need fear no rivals.[2] But Bouillon's participation in this embassy was to be subject to other considerations. The protestant reaction, both external and internal, to the news of the Franco-Spanish marriages had seriously alarmed the Queen-Regent. In order that the reaction of the princes of the blood could be gauged, on 16/26 January 1612 a séance plénière of the conseil détat was formally informed of the state of the marriage negotiations. Only Condé refused outright to consent but Bouillon, Soissons, and Lesdiguieres expressed strong reservations. This response was a disappointment to Edmondes who now considered the princes too wedded to self-interest to be relied upon. He also reported that after the séance they had promised him that they would not sign the contract.[3]

At the same time the Queen announced that embassies would be sent to the leading protestant states to reassure them about the

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1. Deux-Ponts to James, 5/15 Mar.; Electress Palatine to James, 11/21 Mar.; PRO S.P. 81/11/213, 219. Edmondes to Salisbury 13 Mar., B.M. Stowe MS., 172, f. 204-5.

2. Council to Bouillon, 5 Mar., PRO S.P. 78/59/70.

3. Edmondes to Salisbury, 22 Feb., B.M. Stow MS. 172, ff. 180-82. F.T. Perrens, Les Marriages Espagnols sous la Regne de Henri IV et la Regence de Marie de Medicis (Paris, 1869), 372-3.

marriages.[1] At the end of January M. de Reffuge was dispatched to the United Provinces to persuade Barneveldt and the States-General to remain faithful to the French connection and not to respond to possible Huguenot appeals. He also made great play with the fact that James himself had sought a Spanish marriage.[2] Similar embassies were to be sent to Germany under Count Schomberg and to England under Bouillon. This last attracted immediate attention; for, in Edmondes' words:

> as it is generally conceived that his Majestie will show himself somewhat sensible of so strict a union by these cross marriages with Spaine so it is by many found strange, that the Duke of Bouillon will undertake this voyage into England to be used as an instrument to give a plausible collour to those proceedings....3

Bouillon, however, publicly refused the original offer in January and it was only in the middle of February that he finally accepted, his acceptance being conditional on being "authorized to carie some real satisfaction to his Majestie and not to be made a messanger onely of verball profession."[4]

The nature of these "concessions" has been the subject of some controversy. The ostensible purpose of his embassy was to reassure James that the marriages posed no threat to Anglo-French relations. To mollify the King he was empowered to settle various old and minor disputes such as the French debt and the Scots Guard.[5] The major "concession" to Bouillon was probably the power to negotiate the marriage

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1. Zeller, Minorité de Louis XIII, i, 330-3.

2. Lorkin to A. Newton, 6 Jan. 1612, B.M. Harleian MS. 7002, f. 160. C. von Dohna to Anhalt, 5/15 Feb., Briefe und Akten, x, 310.

3. Edmondes to Salisbury, 22 Feb., B.M. StoweMS. 172, f. 180v.

4. Edmondes to Salisbury, 7 Feb., PRO. S.P. 78/59/46-48. See also Beaulieu to Trumbull, 30 Jan., Winwood Memorials, iii, 332-3. "Forboist" to Newton, 7/17 Feb., B.M. Harleian MS. 7015, f. 246-47. Buisseaux to Puysieux, 20 Feb./1 Mar., PRO 31/3/43, f.68.

5. Instructions à M. de Bouillon, n.d. 1612, B.M. Kings MS. 117, f. 256-85, passim.

of the Prince of Wales to the Princess Christine, about which approaches had already been made to Edmondes.[1] Although the Queen's purpose was to provide a balance to the Spanish match, the project, as has been seen above, had a different significance to Bouillon and the advantage this concession offered him was probably the reason for his acceptance of the embassy.[2] Edmondes was aware of Bouillon's purpose:

> though his Majesty may think itt fitt to stand at the first upon some terms of reservedness towarde the Duke of Bouillon, yet nothwithstanding I most humbly beseech your Lordship to be a favourable meanes thathe may receive such good usage as his worth, & the ancient good affection, which he hath born to our state, doth desire....3

In a private letter to the Prince of Wales, he was more explicit:

> For howsoever his Commission is to seek to excuse the concluding of the marriages with Spaine, & to give assurance, that the same shall innovate nothing in the former good affection of this state towards his Majestie, yet notwithstanding his care will be withall either to procure that his Majestie may receive some good fruits of these professions, or els sincerely to discharge his conscience towards his Majestie in advising what meanes were best to be used to meete with any indirect proceedings, wherein the using of timely caution at this present will be able to prevent great future inconveniences to our state. But I most humbly beseech your Highness, that the knowledge of this his secret intente may be kept private to your Highness self....4

Another important factor in the embassy was Bouillon's position among the Huguenots, for the militant faction regarded his agreement to undertake it as the final proof of his surrender to the

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1. Seconde Instruction, ?April 1612, ibid., ff. 284-85. Compare copy of Instructions in PRO 31/3/44, ff. 209-220. See also Edmondes to Salisbury, 25 Jan., PRO S.P. 78/59/26-9.

2. "Forboist" to Newton, 22 Feb./3 Mar., B.M. Harleian MS 7015, ff. 251-2. Beaulieu to Trumbull, 13 Feb. Winwood Memorials iii, 335-6.

3. Edmondes to Salisbury, 22 Feb., B.M. StoweMS, 172, f. 18-181v.

4. Edmondes to Henry, 22 Feb., ibid., 172, ff.184-5.

court.[1] There was a bitter personal antagonism between him and Rohan and he was the subject of further suspicion through his sheltering at Sedan of the proto-Arminian divine Daniel Tilenus who was at the moment engaged in public theological dispute with the spokesman for the orthodox party, Pierre du Moulin.[2] There is some evidence that he was worried by effect that reports of the course of the Assembly of Saumur was having on his reputation and that he saw the embassy as a means of restoring his position with the English.[3] It was probably as a demonstration of his power as a Huguenot leader that his train included a great number of young Huguenot gentlemen, led by M. de Châtillon and his nephew the young duc de La Tremouille.[4]

The negotiations over the Palatine marriage were thus of only secondary importance, for it was to the advantage of the Queen to make minor concessions to protestant opinion. An official encouragement of the match was, therefore, included in his instructions and the agent in Germany, Ancel, ordered to give a similar encouragement there. It was with official approval that Bouillon was able to make arrangements to meet the Palatine envoys in England to "assist them in that negotiation, and withall consult with them about other important busynes."[5]

Bouillon had originally intended to depart on 5/15 March but at the end of February his departure was suddenly postponed until the beginning of April, much to the irritation of James who was eagerly awaiting his

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 292.
2. Edmondes to Salisbury, 6 Mar., B.M. StoweMS. 172, ff. 197-8. Duchess de Bouillon to duchess de la Tremouille, 24 Feb./5 Mar., P. Marchegay, Lettres de Elizabeth, duchesse de Bouillon (Paris, 1877). 94-96. Throckmorton to Lisle, 24 Mar., Hist.MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., v, 38-39.
3. Rohan, Mémoires (Collection Michaud et Poujoulat, xix, Paris., 1854), 500. Paul Phelipeaux, sieur de Ponchartrain, Mémoires (ibid.), 318. 196. Edmondes to Salisbury, 14 Feb., PRO S.P. 78/59/50-52. Beaulieu to Trumbull, 21 Feb., Winwood Memorials, iii, 340-42.

advice on the situation in France. The delay was caused by the Queen's concern at the growing hostility of the princes of the blood to the Spanish marriage.[1] In the meantime Hanau and Plessen had arrived in England but being instructed to rely on Bouillon's "judgement and direction" had to await his arrival. This was further delayed beyond the beginning of April and it was not until the 14/24th that he left Paris arriving in England only on 26 April.[2]

The cause for the second delay was the crisis between the crown and the Huguenots which erupted over the governorship of St. Jean d'Angely, the first attempt by Rohan to lead the militant wing in a direct confrontation with the Queen.[3] Although Rohan was later to develop his conception of the position of the Huguenots into a theory of a "third force", holding the balance between the crown and the princes, this was not yet a reality.[4] Condé and his faction had given signs of their dissatisfaction with the court but had not yet broken away completely, while Bouillon was still being used as a conciliator and intermediary with the grandees.[5] The great fear of the crown was, however, as Bouillon himself was planning, that the condéistes would make a common cause with the Huguenots and it was this that caused the crisis over St. Jean d'Angely.[6] Although Rohan was the governor, the city had traditional condéiste sympathies and the crown feared that Condé, in concert with Rohan, would

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1. Edmondes to Salisbury, 29 Feb., PRO S.P. 78/59/62-63. "Forboist" to Newton, 29 Feb., B.M. Harleian MS.7015, ff. 253-54. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 319-21. Buisseaux to Puysieux, 1/11 Mar., PRO 31/3/44/83-4, ff. 89-91.
2. Winwood to Trumbull, 13 April, Winwood Memorials, iii, 357. Buisseaux to Puysieux, 14/24 Apr.; Puysieux to Buisseaux, 16/26 Apr.; PRO 31/3/44, ff. 205v-206, 208.
3. Villeroy to Buisseaux, 3/13 Apr., PRO 31/3/44, f. 94.
4. On the "Third Force", see J.A. Clarke, Huguenot Warrior, The Life and Times of Henri de Rohan, 1579-1638. (The Hague, 1966). 38-39. Pertinent comments on Rohan's political beliefs are made by F. Meinecke in Machiavellianism, (1958), esp. 188.
5. Edmondes to Salisbury, 13 Mar., B.M. Stowe MS, 172, ff. 204-5.
6. Villeroy to Buisseaux, 3/13 Apr., PRO 31/3/44. F.94.

re-establish himself there.[1]

Rohan's activities caused immediate suspicion that he was receiving English support. James was known to dislike the Queen's handling of the dispute and Edmondes reported that the Treaty of Wesel was regarded as having "a relation to the succoring of those of the Religion here in their neede." Although Salisbury scribbled irritably in the margin of his dispatch, "There is no such thing in the treaty", this was of course the desire of many Englishmen, including Edmondes himself.[2] Yet while Rohan was probably the inspirer of the anti-Bouillon reports which reached England, there is no evidence that he was in communication with either James or Henry and James was to complain in July that since "the beginning of these Jarres of his with the Queen", he had not heard from Rohan at all.[3] In his Mémoires Rohan claimed to have sent an agent in Bouillon's train; this is doubtful as in June he did send one M. de Valdan whose instructions implied that there had been no earlier communication.[4]

The embassy of Bouillon in England, which lasted until 19 May, was, for the duke, a great personal success. Both Noel de Caron and Foscarini,

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1. Serr, Rohan, 79-80. Bouillon's lack of sympathy for Rohan in this affair was to further embitter their antagonism.

2. Villeroy to Buisseaux, 3/13 Apr.; Buisseaux to Villeroy, 21 Apr./1 May; PRO 31/3/44, ff. 97, 123v-24. Edmondes to Salisbury, 17 Apr., PRO S.P. 78/59/95-7. See also p. 194-5 above.

3. Villeroy to Buisseaux, 9/19 Apr., PRO 31/3/44, f. 103. Marsollier, Bouillon, ii, 370ff. James to Edmondes, 3 July, B.M. Stowe MS. 173, ff. 1-2.

4. Rohan, Mémoires (Michaud et Poujoulat), 500. Rohan to James, 9/19, June, PRO S.P. 78/59/162. To Henry, 9/19 June, B.M. Harleian MS. 7008, f. 188.

the Venetian ambassador, were struck by the great rapport he established with James.[1] He also achieved a close relationship with Henry and Rochester. Pembroke, to whom Edmondes had recommended him, found him:

> sincerely affected to the Good of Religion in generall, and in particular to his Majesty's honor and service,

and was glad to enter into the "inward correspondency" that Edmondes had suggested.[2] Bouillon himself was gratified by his reception.[3] The only surviving discordant voice was, significantly, that of Sir Thomas Lake, who thought him "a crafty man and he hath more his own ends then matter of religion."[4] Salisbury, who was dying at the time, has left no comments on the embassy.

The negotiation of the Palatine marriage was easily concluded in the first conferences.[5] So too were the contents of his "official" commission, but with less success. Although Bouillon was able to demonstrate in minor areas that French policy had not changed, on the substantive issue of whether the French would join in an alliance with the Evangelical Union, he could only proffer his own opinion that they would have to do so to prevent its becoming a purely confessional alliance, and promise to use his influence in that direction.[6] Nor was James convinced, if indeed Bouillon sincerely tried to convince him, that the marriages with Spain

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1. Caron to States-General, 5 May, B.M. Addit. MS. 17677H. f. 138. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 364-6

2. Caron to States-General, 20 May, ibid., f. 139. Buisseaux to Puysieux, 22 Dec./1 Jan., 1612-13, PRO 31/3/46, fl. Pembroke to Edmondes, 27 Apr., B.M. Stowe MS. 172., f. 253.

3. Bouillon to Edmondes, 8/18 May, B.M. Stowe MS. 172, f. 278.

4. Lake to Edmondes, 29 May, ibid., f. 282.

5. Plessis du Bellay to duchess de La Tremouille, 2/12 May, E. Charavay, "Le Marechal de Bouillon à la Cour d'Angterre", Revue des Documents Historiques, i (1873-4), 54-55.

6. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 364-66. Bouillon to Caron, 9/19 May, B.M. Addit. MS. 17677H, ff. 143v-44. Lake to Trumbull, 9 July, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alphabetical xxvii, art. 7015, ff. 288-89.

had no ulterior purpose, and he regarded the Queen's protestations with continued suspicion.[1]

The important aspect of the embassy was the understanding reached between Bouillon and James over joint action in France. Although the Queen had intended the marriage of Prince Henry to a French princess as a balance for the Spanish match, Bouillon urged it on James as a means to build up an English party in France and even gave assurances that an English offer of marriage would be a means to rally opposition to and prevent the Spanish marriages.[2] At the same time he also brought James into contact with Condé and Soissons and James promised them support in their attempts to maintain their influence at court.[3] Equally important was James's new interest in the position of the Huguenots. Bouillon was somewhat surprised by James's concern over the affair of St. Jean d'Angely but agreed to act as a means for the reconciliation of the factions. From this point James, through Edmondes, was to take the lead in bringing together Bouillon and Rohan, an initiative greatly desired by many Huguenots. This was probably the reason for the dispatch of M. de Valdan to England.[4]

On 19 May James also presented Bouillon with a declaration in which, although he refused to condone "illegal action" by the Huguenots, he:

> did very strongly state his intention to protect them if the edicts were broken that the world might see that they were being persecuted for the cause of their religion...for naturall reason teacheth every man to foresee what his owne case will be next, when his neighbors bee first dealt with in the same quarrell.[5]

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 369-71.
2. Caron to States-General, 20 May, B.M. Addit MS. 17677H. f. 139v. Henry to James, 29 July, Ellis, Original Letters, Ser. 2. iii, 226-28.
3. James to Conde and Soissons, 12 May, Bodleian MS. Addit. D, 109. f. 199.
4. Edmondes to Salisbury, 13 May, B.M. Stowe MS. 172, ff. 273-4. "Forboist" to Newton, 1/11 May, B.M. Harleian MS. 7015, f. 276. James to Edmondes, n.d.(mid-June), PRO S.P. 78/59/156-7.
5. There are two copies of this declaration, PRO S.P. 78/59/156-7. and Egerton Papers, ed J.P. Collier (Camden Soc., xii, 1840), 450-2. In his Mémoires (Michaud et Poujoulat, 500) Rohan incorrectly claimed responsibility for this declaration.

This "understanding" with Bouillon was to cause, in James's policy towards France, an interventionism unparalleled in the reign. This shift in policy was accompanied, and to a certain extent influenced, by the change in government after the death of Salisbury. Although Edmondes was ordered to send his ordinary reports to Sir. Thomas Lake, he and Bouillon were now to correspond directly and secretly with James through Rochester, who, with the advice of Overbury whom James permitted to assist Rochester in his correspondence, now handled all important matters and the French marriage in particular.[1]

The aftermath of the embassy dispelled any lingering illusions about the policy of the Queen-Regent, for, despite Bouillon's continued assurances, Edmondes found no interest at all in an alliance with the Evangelical Union.[2] In his conference with Bouillon, Edmondes also discovered that although Bouillon still wished the English offer to be used as a rallying point for the princes of the blood to challenge the Spanish marriage, he was less confident of success than he had been in England.[3] Nor had his embassy dispelled the suspicions of the Huguenots and Bouillon blamed Rohan for the failure to improve their relations, claiming that Rohan's activities only antagonized the Queen and would provoke counter-measures. James was also inclinded to blame Rohan but wished that Bouillon would "prefer the glory of God and the weall of the state of religione to his owne passiones" and continued to urge a reconciliation.[4] This pressure

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1. Edmondes to Rochester. 20 June, B.M. Stowe MS. 172, f. 304. Buisseaux to Villeroy, 13/23 June, PRO 31/345, f. 21. For Overbury see testimony of Somerset at his trial in 1616. State Trials, ed. Cobbett and Howell (1816), ii, 964, 981, 993. The significance of this change in government is discussed in the following chapter.
2. Edmondes to James, 20 June, B.M. Stowe 172, ff. 309-14. Edmondes to Winwood, 22 June, Winwood Memorials, iii, 373-75. A. Pauli to Administrator to Palatinate, 4/13 July, Briefe und Akten, x, 576-78.
3. Edmondes to James, 20 June (private letter), B.M. Stowe MS. 172 ff. 315-18. A Copy was also sent to Henry, possibly at Bouillon's request; Edmondes to Henry, 20 June, ibid., 306. Bouillon to Henry, 20/30 June, B.M. Harleian MS. 7008, f. 190.
4. James to Edmondes, 3 July, B.M. Stowe MS. 173, ff. 1-2.

was paralleled by a movement for reconciliation within the party led by the duchess de La Tremouille. At the Synod of Privas at the end of July Bouillon and Lesdiguieres proposed a formal reconciliation with both the body of the Religion and with their personal enemies at Saumur.[1] The Synod in turn sent a delegation, consisting of the divines Pierre du Moulin and Samuel Durand and Mornay's friend Groslot de Lisle, to invite Rohan, Sully, and Mornay to subscribe, which they did at the end of August under the benevolent aegis of James and Edmondes.[2] James also attempted to resolve the theological debate between Moulin and Tilenus which had contributed to the political clash but with less success and in the end demanded that both be silenced.[3]

The primary cause for this interest in the political unity of the Huguenots was James's concern over the Spanish marriages.[4] In the middle of July Edmondes expressed his doubts that the princes of the blood would ever act to break the marriage contract and warned James that although the marriage with the Princess Christine could be easily obtained, "if your Majestie doe only ayme at the breaking of the alliance with Spain by this proposition, there may be great danger of failing therein."[5]

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1. Bouillon to Rochester, 20/30 July, PRO S.P. 78/59/204-6. To James, 13 Aug., B.M. Stowe MS. 173, ff. 58-59.

2. Rohan to Edmondes, 20/30 July; Edmondes to Rohan, 22 Aug.; to Mornay, 22 Aug.; B.M. Stowe MS. 173, ff. 26. 75, 76. Articles of Reconciliation (copy), PRO S.P. 78/60/16. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 416. Serr, Rohan, 112-113.

3. Abbot to James, 10 Aug., Cal. S.P. Dom., 1611-1618, 142. James to Edmondes, 16 Aug., B.M. Stowe173, ff. 64-65. Cal.S.P. Ven., xii, 400.

4. James to Edmondes, 27 Aug., B.M. Stowe MS 173, ff. 79-81.

5. James to Edmondes, 3 July, PRO S.P. 78/59/183-4. Edmondes to James, 21 July, B.M. Stowe173, ff. 7-11.

This caused suspicions in England that they had been tricked by Bouillon. Henry felt that as the marriage had been only considered on Bouillon's promise that it would break the Spanish match it should now be dropped and asked Edmondes if he thought Bouillon was playing them false.[1] Edmondes agreed that Bouillon had exaggerated the possibilities of breaking the Spanish match, but felt that he had done more than anyone else for James and Henry, although "I cannot excuse him, but that he hath in other considerations, his particular imperfections; which I would he had not."[2] Edmondes' pessimism about the reliability of the princes, received confirmation on the next day (15/25 August) when they all signed the marriage contract at the Louvre. Immediately afterwards he went to see Bouillon, "to be satisfied touching the reason thereof," and was offered various excuses and a promise that Bouillon, Lesdiguieres, Condé, and Soissons had taken a firm resolution to oppose "those practices". Bouillon admitted that the princes were "weak agents" but he advised that the best use of them possible should be made. He own intention was for a cabal to remove Villeroy, whom he claimed was the inspirer of the marriage alliance, and to take control of the court without causing further disturbance. For this they hoped to have the assistance of Concini, Épernon, and Guise. Edmondes thought the scheme, which would hopefully produce a favourable situation in France, worthwhile for the "happiness of the common cause of religion" and obtained for James a

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1. Henry to James, 29 July, Ellis Original Letters, Ser. 2, iii, 226-28. A copy of this somehow reached Edmondes, Stowe172, f. 134. Henry to Edmondes, 31 July, B.M. Stowe173, f. 34-5. To Bouillon, 31 July, B.M. Harleian MS. 7008, f. 202.

2. Edmondes to Henry, 14 Aug., B.M. Stowe173, ff. 62-63.

a written promise from Bouillon to go through with it.[1]

James received his letter on 24 August, St. Bartholemew's Day, and Rochester later informed Edmondes that "I have not seen the King so bent, nor so violently sett upon the successe of any act as of this."[2] James's own reply began with a rambling disquisition on St. Bartholemew's Day and his fears of a repetition of the massacre. Although he also considered the princes "weak instruments", he felt every effort should be made to prevent the marriages which would make the King of Spain "absolute governor of France during the King's minoritie". He was glad to see Bouillon committed to firm action and wanted him kept to it. Edmondes was to use indirect means to obtain the participation of the duke of Guise.

> The success that we expect is, that by means of the Princes of the Blood, with the assistance of Bouillon, Lesdiguieres, and all the body of the Religione if need be, together with the House of Guise if they can be wonne, that pernicious statesman (Villeroy) may be first removed and then this alliance and popish cabal betwixt France and Spain to be quyte broken of. (sic) A work which will be acceptable to God, will procure the preservation of his Church, and the true peace, securities and quyetness of that kingdom. 3

On 10 September Henry wrote to Edmondes on the same subject. Thanking him for confirming "my so strong settled opinion of the Duke of Bouillon's plane and sincere dealing with us", he expressed his reservations that the princes would be able successfully to accomplish their coup or that if they did they would be able to maintain themselves afterwards. Yet he was also confident that if another civil war was caused it would enable England, by alliance with one of the parties, to control French politics. He wished Edmondes to "cherish them in that humour .... Though you may not

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1. Edmondes to James, 17 Aug., B.M. Stowe MS. 173, ff. 75-76.
2. Rochester to Edmondes, 27 Aug., ibid., ff. 77-78.
3. James to Edmondes, 27 Aug., ibid., ff. 79-81.
4. Ibid.

doe (it) as ane ambassador: Yett you may do it as a pryvate man...."[1]

Edmondes was gratified by James's reponse:

> I find thereby, with what lively affections your Majestic doth embrace the case of the publique wherein I will be bould to say & I protest without flaterie that I find a greate difference betweene the directions of the present time which flowe immediately from your Majestie's self & those of former times, which I received from the second hand.

Bouillon and Soissons had been encouraged by James's support and he himself was doing what he could to further the coup.[2] Yet having taken this step, James appears to have had second thoughts and on 24 September Rochester wrote to Edmondes that Bouillon must be kept to the "great disseigne". Questioning Edmondes' credulity where Bouillon was concerned, he warned him to place no further trust in Bouillon until his promises were confirmed as his schemes had miscarried before and there was always a possibility that he could be bought off.[3] Although Edmondes was encouraged by the strong stand Bouillon had taken in the conseil on the German situation, he was disappointed when Bouillon announced his departure for Sedan at the end of September, for, as Soissons had also left the court, everything was now in abeyance until their return.[4] He also had to inform Henry that the hopes of breaking the Spanish marriages, which depended completely upon the plot, were now more questionable.[5] This setback confirmed James in his doubts and he in turn informed Edmondes that he had gone too far in the marriage and that he saw "small hope of success lykely to follow upon their intendit plott." Hence

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1. B.M. Stowe MS. 173, f. 113-v.

2. Edmondes to James, 14 Sept., B.M. Stowe MS. 173, ff. 123-4.

3. Rochester to Edmondes, 24 Sept., ibid., f. 129.

4. Edmondes to James, 29 Sept., (Bouillon) to Rochester, 22 Sept./2 Oct., ibid., ff. 132-6, 140.

5. Edmondes to Henry, 29 Sept., ibid., f. 138-v.

although he did not mean by this to reflect on Edmondes' handling of the affair, he was tempted to take a second look at the whole business.[1]

James's hesitations were also influenced by the domestic debate over Henry's marriage caused by Wotton's return from Savoy in July with the offer of one of the duke's daughters. This possibility caused alarm among those who, like Conway, wished Henry to marry a princess of the Religion "which will so bind and assure all protestants of Christendom to his Majestic and his Highness."[2] The Savoy match was also opposed by Sarpi, who considered it worthless as James would never use it as a means to introduce the Reformed religion into Italy, and Raleigh, who considered a French marriage more useful, although not immediately necessary.[3] At the beginning of October, after some argument, Henry himself decided for the protestant-oriented French match, which included some hope of converting his bride, as it would offer "greater contentment to the general body of protestants abroad".[4] The possibility of Henry's marrying a catholic also alarmed Maurice of Nassau and Anhalt and there appears to have been a concerted effort by Frederick V and Frederick-Henry of Nassau, acting on their instructions, at the time of the Elector's journey to England to persuade Henry to marry Frederick V's sister. This Henry, disillusioned by the failure of Bouillon's coup, agreed to just before his death.[5]

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1. James to Edmondes, 4 Oct., B.M. Stowe MS. 173, ff. 142-43. More to Trumbull, 5 Oct., Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iii, 377.

2. Conway to Newton, 15 May, Birch, Henry, 510-14.

3. Sarpi to Groslot de Lisle, 12/22 May, Lettere, i, 230-32. Raleigh, Advice on Marriage of Henry, Works, viii. 237-52.

4. Henry to James, 5 Oct , B.M. Harleian MS. 6986, f. 180.

5. Instrucktion fur Anhalt zu dessen Verrichtung in Unionssachen in Ansbach, 30 Aug./9 Sept., Briefe und Akten, x, 637. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 453-4. Tarantaise to duke of Savoy, 28 Mar./7 Apr. 1624, quoted in H.G.R. Reade, Sidelights on the Thirty Years War, (1924), ii, 339.

Although Edmondes was quick to respond to Rochester's insinuations about his gullibility and to reiterate his belief that the coup would produce "infynitt much good to the generall affaires of Christendom" and that Bouillon was doing all he could, his hopes were belied by the course of events.[1] On 7 October he reported that the Queen had prohibited any further Huguenot assemblies, which he considered to be a definite plan to pre-empt the coup by provoking the Huguenots which would force Bouillon either to join the Huguenots and lose his catholic allies or to remain neutral and revive the hostility with Rohan.[2] A final end to his hopes came with the death of Soissons from smallpox on 21/31 October. Soissons had been Bouillon's closest ally and his demise caused Bouillon to retire into a cautious neutrality and to suspend the coup indefinitely. He also refused to support the Huguenot demand for the restoration of their assemblies and this reopened the breach with Rohan.[3] Bouillon's retirement caused the final disillusionment of James, who, having heard reports of military preparations against the Huguenots, which Edmondes claimed were exaggerated, had been eager to revive the coup.[4] James's disillusion was compounded by the death of Henry who had always been an advocate of strong action in France. Although Edmondes was ordered on the aftermath of Henry's death to keep the opportunity for action open by continuing the negotiations for a French marriage in Charles's name, James [redacted] now [redacted] lost his interest in intervention in France.[5]

During the summer of 1612 the intervention in France had been paralleled by other initiatives in confessional politics, notably in the

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1. Edmondes to Rochester, 7 Oct., B.M. Stowe MS. 173, f. 150-v.
2. Edmondes to James, 7 Oct., PRO S.P. 78/60/152-4.
3. Edmondes to James, 22 Oct.; to Rochester, 18 Nov.; to James, 7 Dec., B.M. Stowe MS. 173, ff. 170-v, 220-21, 235-37. Buisseaux to Puysieux, 22 Dec./1 Jan. 1612/13, PRO 31/3/46, f. 1.
4. Rochester to Edmondes, (before 6) Nov.; D. Hume to Edmondes, 6 Nov.; Edmondes to Rochester, 18 Nov., B.M. Stowe 173, ff. 186, 190, 220-21.
5. Rochester to Edmondes, 7 Nov., B.M. Stowe MS. 173, f. 205.

enlarging of the Evangelical Union. After the alliance with the United Provinces, a prime area of concern would be an alliance with the Scandinavian kingdoms and the ending of the war between Denmark and Sweden.[1] Although James took steps to mediate this dispute in the summer, negotiations on their alliance with the union was delayed until discussions could be held with the Germans during the marriage of Frederick and Elizabeth.[2] The Elector's arrival was also preceeded by what appeared to be new Spanish and Imperial countermoves "upon Cleve, the Low Countries, or England itself" and Winwood was ordered to keep a close watch on the situation.[3] Schönberg, the Palatine agent, wrote to Henry that a revival of hostilities would provide him with an opportunity to lead a naval expedition "sur les côtes de Flandre, Espagne, & West Indes", while Bouillon was attempting to keep French policy favorable. Sir Charles Montague saw such a war as a means to unite the protestants and:

> have less intermingling between Protestants and Papists, and so sever the sheep from the goats, which God grant if it be his will. 4

Yet although Frederick V's journey to England was to be the climatic event in the revival of protestant politics, it was over-shadowed by a serious deterioration of the political situation in England. The major setback was the death of Henry, on whom the Germans had placed great expectations.[5] Equally important was the loss of Rochester's support. Although Winwood had advised them "in playne and direct terms, entirely to repose themselves for the conduct and carriage of their business, upon

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1. See Conway to Newton, 3 Mar. 1612, B.M. Harleian MS. 7002, f. 184.
2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 402-3.
3. Rochester to Winwood, 19 July, PRO S.P. 84/68/293-4.
4. Schönberg to Henry, 19/29 Aug., B.M. Harleian MS. 7008, f. 209. (Bouillon) to Rochester, 22 Sept./2 Oct.; Edmondes to James, 29 Sept.; B.M. Stowe MS. 173, ff. 132-6, 140. Sir Charles to Sir Edward Montague. 6 Feb. 1613, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 240-41.
5. Frederick to Henry, 21 Sept./1 Oct., B.M. Lansdowne MS. 1237, f. 38.

the counsaile of my Lord (Rochester)", Rochester was coming increasingly under the influence of Northampton, who was doing all he could to disrupt the marriage. Although Abbot gave Frederick considerable and long-remembered support, this was not enough to counteract the prevailing tendencies at the court.[1]

The political significance of the journey and the marriage was confined, therefore, to the conclusion of the negotiations over the enlarging of the Evangelical Union and the role that Frederick was henceforth to play in the aspirations of political puritanism. For the Palatines his journey was itself a symbol of their decision to expand the Union into a general alliance of protestant powers and while Frederick was in England Anhalt managed to persuade the non-princely members of the Union, who were worried about the effect this step would have on their consitututional position within the Empire, to accept the idea.[2] The Germans wished James, as the leading protestant sovereign, to undertake the leadership of this expansion and to use his influence to bring in the Scandinavian kingdoms, the United Provinces, and, possibly, France.[3] James was still strongly committed to the idea of the Union and wished the alliance to be made with the United Provinces as soon as possible. He requested that he, Bouillon, and the States-General be kept informed of the proceedings of the Union conferences and later sent Sir Stephen le Sieur to mediate between them and the Emperor at the next Imperial Diet.[4]

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1. Winwood to Overbury, 24 Oct., PRO S.P. 84/68/303-4. Buisseaux to Puysieux, 22 Dec./1 Jan., 1613/13, PRO 31/3/46, f. 1. Chamberlain to Carleton, 29 Apr. 1613, Letters, i, 441-46.

2. Memorial of Administrator of Palatinate, 18/28 Feb. 1613; Conference of Anhalt with City Representatives, 22 Mar./1 Apr.; Briefe und Akten, xi, 118, 301-4.

3. Instructions for Frederick, 27 Aug./6 Sept. 1612; Anbringen der kurpfalzischen rate, 19 Feb. /1Mar. 1613; ibid., x, 630-32. xi, 149-50.

4. Administrator of Palatinate to Anhalt, 13/23 Jan. 1613, Briefe und Akten, xi, 40-41. E.A. Bellar, "The Negotiations of Sir Stephen le Sieur, 1584-1613", Eng. Hist. Rev., xi (1925), 27-32.

The entry of the United Provinces into an alliance with the Union was quickly accomplished. The main barrier had been the previous unwillingness of the Union to become involved in a Spanish-Dutch war on the conclusion of the Truce and the Dutch eventually compromised by agreeing to a five year alliance with the Union. The actual terms had been worked out on the Elector's journey through the United Provinces on his way to England. Although there was a French effort to dissuade the States-General, James placed his and Winwood's assistance at the disposal of the Palatines and the treaty was signed by the Elector on his return to Germany in late May 1613.[1] In February Bouillon informed James that an embassy from the Catholic League was in France to invite the Queen to join. This provoked a counter-embassy of Buwinckhausen and Plessen in concert with Edmondes and Bouillon; but both were unsuccessful and the French remained neutral.[2] This, however, was the high point of James's interest in the Union. Although he successfully undertook the mediation of the Scandinavian wars in 1613, of which he was very proud, he made no real attempt to obtain an alliance with the Union.[3] He showed some interest in the entry of the Swiss evangelical cantons but made no effort to counteract French influence against their joining.[4] At the height of his alarm over the situation in Cleves, France, and Italy in 1615 he attempted to persuade the Venetians to ally with the Union but without success.[5]

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1. Instructions for Frederick, 20/30 Mar. 1613; Union to James, 22 Mar./1 Apr.; Briefe und Akten, xi, 296-8. 299-300. Winwood to James, 27 Apr., PRO S.P. 84/69/50-3. Edmondes to James, 24 Mar., 9 Apr., 24 Apr., B.M. StoweMS. 173, ff. 304-5v; 174, ff. 9-11, 24-27. Frederick to Union, 26 May/5 June, Briefe und Akten, xi, 438-40.

2. Edmondes to James, 20 Feb., 24 Mar., 9 Apr., James to Edmondes, 22 Feb., B.M. StoweMS. 173, ff. 283-4, 281, 304-7, 174, ff. 9-11.

3. Union to James, 22 Mar./1 Apr. 1613, Briefe und Akten, xi, 299-300.

4. John Dickinson to Salisbury, 29 Mar. 1612, PRO S.P. 81/11/229. James to Edmondes, 13 Oct. 1613, B.M. StoweMS. 174, f. 178.

5. Carleton to Edmondes, 29 Aug. 1615, B.M. StoweMS. 175, f. 341. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 380-81, 385-7.

Within England, the Palatine marriage, "the contentment of all well-affected people" had two important long-term effects.[1] The first was the role of the marriage in the succession. With the death of Henry and the minority of Charles, the security of the protestant succession now rested with the Elector and his wife. This which was to have serious consequences for future Anglo-Palatine relations.[2] The birth of their eldest son in 1614 was to inspire Henry Peacham to his Prince Henry Revived. The only bill passed by the Parliament of 1614 was that naturalizing the Elector and his descendants and making them eligible for the succession.[3]

The second effect of the marriage was the hope it offered for the general protestant coalition which would herald the fall of Rome.[4] Attention was now to focus increasingly on Imperial affairs. During the clash in Prague in 1611 Abraham Williams, Winwood's secretary, had noted that:

> Many divining opinions doe conclude that the overthrowe of Antichrist (which by all prophesies and revelations must within fewe yeares come to passe) will first spring from that roote. 5.

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1. Chamberlain to Winwood, 23 Feb. 1613, Letters, i, 427-29. Cal.S.P. Ven., xii, 511-3. See also A. Nixon, Great Britaines Generall Ioyes (1613), ded., Sig. A4-v; A. Willet, A. Treatise of Solomon's Marriage (1612), Sig. 4-v; G. Webbe, The Bride Royall (1613), 78-79.

2. See D'Ewes's comments, Autobiography, i, 53-54.

3. Moir, Addled Parliament, 81, 90.

4. See the poems of John Prideaux, Rector of Exeter, and John Glanville in the Oxford University celebration of the marriage, Epithalamia sive Lusus Palatini (Oxford 1613), Sigs. B2v, C4v. R. Bolton, Some Generall Directions for a Comfortable Walking with God (1625), 15-16.

5. A. Williams to Trumbull, 28 Mar. 1611, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha., xlvii, art. 7.

The death of Rudolf II aroused expectation that action by the German princes would lead to the dethroning "of that whore who hath but too long occupied that seat of Babylon".[1] The marriage brought with it increased contact with Palatine Calvinism.[2] Translations of Palatine religious works were also made. In 1614 Cromwell's schoolmaster Thomas Beard translated two tracts of John Rolte, A Full Declaration of the Faith and Ceremonies Professed in the ... Palatinate and A Faithfull Admonition of the Paltsgraves Churches to all Protestant Churches in Dutchland, as a demonstration "that we are not alone in the profession of our faith, nor do separate ourselves from other reformed churches."[3] William Walker, the Russell family divine, was asked by "my ever honoured friend Sir Stephen le Sieur" to translate Heinrich Alting's A Votive Oration for the Auspicial Government of ... Frederick V, which he dedicated to Francis, 2nd Lord Russell of Thornhaugh.[4]

During Frederick's visit there was certainly some discussion of the possibility of Frederick being elected to the Bohemian throne although James refused to involve himself.[5] The expectation that Frederick would in time become Emperor was, as can be seen in the literature celebrating the wedding, fairly widespread in England.

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1. Sir John Throckmorton to Trumbull, 28 Jan, 1612, Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iii, 227-28. Throckmorton to Lisle, 30 Mar, 1612, Hist. MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., v, 40. See also Sarpi to Groslot de Lisle, 4/14 Feb. 1612, Lettere, i, 215.

2. M.A. Shaaber, Some Forerunners of the Newspaper in England, 1476-1622.(Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1929), 181.

3. Full Declaration Sig. (Bv).

4. (1615), Sig. (A3v). Walker was also the author of the funeral sermon of William, Lord Russell, see p.71 above.

5. James admitted this to the Council in September 1620, see Sir Julius Caesars's notes of Council meeting, 29 September, 1620, B.M. Addit. MS. 34324, f. 119. See also Reade, Sidelights, i, 243.

> Of Queen and Empress: now my thoughts doe whisper
> These titles one day shall thy virtues grace. 1

The fact that both Frederick and Elizabeth were born in August permitted great play to be made with conceits about Caesar Augustus.[2] Although there may have been a considerable element of flattery in such addresses, they were a demonstration that whatever ambitions Frederick may have had in that direction would not come as a surprise in England.[3]

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1. George Wither, Prince Henries Obsequies or Mournfull Elegies upon his Death (1612), Sig. B3.

2. Poem of John Richards, Oxford Epithalamia, Sig. (L2v). James Maxwell, A Monument of Remembrance (1613), Sig. (F4v).

3. Poems of Thomas Williams, Samuel Smith, Theophilus Gule, Oxford Epithalamia, Sig. (D4), (F4v), G2v), Henry Peacham, The Period of Mourning (1613), Sig. G3; Prince Henry Revived (1614), Sig. (B4), (D2v), Thomas Haywood, A Marriage Triumph (1613), dedication. Walker/Alting, A Votive Oration, dedication, Sig. (A4v), Similar expectations circulated abroad, see Cal. S.P. Ven., xii xiii, 172-73.

Frances Yate's study The Rosicrucian Enlightenment (1972) appeared just as this thesis was being typed; I have not had time to examine her interesting theories about the intellectual elements in the Anglo-Palatine alliance in any detail. See also p. 455 below.

7. The Revival of a Puritan Party at the Court.

The revival of confessional politics in the years 1610-1612 coincided with the collapse of the political system by which Salisbury had dominated the court since the accession. The turning point was the Parliament of 1610; not only through the failure of the Great Contract, but also because it was the first clear example of the refusal of Jacobean government to take into account popular concern for the defence of religion abroad or to exploit it in the interests of the monarchy.

At the time of the opening of the Parliament the decision to send troops to the assistance of the Evangelical Union in the siege of Julich had been taken. Yet, although this was the first time such an "initiative" had coincided with a Jacobean Parliament, Salisbury made little effort, as would have been done in an Elizabethan Parliament, to use the issue to boost the government's prestige. In his opening speeches he made only the most passing mention of the Cleves crisis; although Robert Naunton, for one, saw "aid to protestants abroad" as a cause for supply.[1] No further mention of foreign affairs was made by government spokesmen until the assassination of Henry IV, when Salisbury made an effort to persuade the Commons to forego the immediate discussion of grievances with the remarkable appeal:

> Looking on you, as I do and as my Lords do, as upon men of extraordinary quality, I shall speak of things worthy of you. I shall not only tell you of necessity (as former parliaments were wont to do ...), we deal not with you economically, we talk not of matter of corn or grain but as with statesmen and wish you to bend your cogitations to view how foreign states stand, and how their affairs have relation to the state of this kingdom, which being considered you will easily see how twas no effected (sic) eloquence or fine art that was used, when notice was taken in this place of the deplorable murder of that glorious and magnanimous French king, he, as I told you, was the monarch that did counterpoint the balance of Christendom.[2]

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1. Speeches of 14, 24 Feb., Foster, Proceedings of 1610, i, 12-14, ii, 19, n.33. Naunton to John Coke, 28 Feb. 1610, Hist. MSS. Comm., Cowper MSS., i, 68.

2. Speech to Committee of the Commons, 14 June, Foster, ii, 136-37.

This appeal, however, came too late in the day for certain members of the Commons, who had already come to their own conclusions:

> Mr. (Thomas) Wentworth sayd that they were in error that used the argument of the deathe of the Frenche kinge to drawe money from the subjects, for ... we all knowe that the king of France died not from lack of money ... he had submitted his soul to Rome; and hence (Wentworth) wisht that our king would be more carefull to banish Prelatry, to punish the Jesuits and priests, and to cherish his subjects; for without these things supply nor support are to no purpose.[1]

This interchange is particularly interesting in the light of the expectation in several quarters that if thegovernment had been prepared to request the support of the Commons for the defence of religion openly they would have met with an eager response.[2]

On 4 June, 1610, Henry Frederick was invested Prince of Wales and his brief political career began. If the failure of the Parliament of 1610 marked the collapse of the "Elizabethan" system of government, Henry's death, by eliminating the possibility of a sovereign who could take personal leadership of political puritanism, was a further step on the road toward a direct clash between political puritanism and the monarchy. Despite the short span of his career, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Henry was contemplating and moving towards such a political position.

The expectation that Henry would be a major protestant leader was not only the product of hagiographers after his death, but was held throughout his life. Lionel Sharp, one of his chaplains, drew up a conceit for his twelfth birthday (1606) of twelve hopes, of which the last was:

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1. 14 June, S.R. Gardiner, Parliamentary Debates in 1610 (Camden Soc., lxxxi, 1862), 57.

2. See Broderie to Puysieux, 10/20 April, Ambassades, v, 186-92. Winwood to Edmondes, 30 Mar. 1610, B.M. StoweMS. 171, ff. 186-87.

> That we may helpe to fulfill the prophecy of Christ upon Antichrist, as the kings majesty hath truly expounded itt ... untill the coming of Christ which cannot be afarr off.[1]

Occasionally, as with the prophecy "Henry the 8 pulled down abbeys and cells, But Henry the 9 will pull down bishops and bells", this could be an embarrassment: "For these, not fools bolts, but knaves bolts, shoot at a shrewd target ..."[2] After the investiture the expectations increased. Mornay saw Henry as destined to cause the destruction of Rome and the fall of Antichrist. A similar view was held by Daniel Price in his Defence of Truth and the French Herald of 1611 urged him to continue the attack on Rome halted by Henry IV's assassination.[3]

Henry's puritan friendships, with the Harington's for example, and his patronage of evangelical divines, Lewis Baylie, Joseph Hall, and the racketeering Sharpe, are well known.[4] How dominant this orientation was among the officers of his household has not, perhaps, been so well appreciated. His Chamberlain, Sir Thomas Challoner (1561-1615), and Cofferer, Sir David Foulis, a Scot settled in Yorkshire, were members of the alum mine patent with Lord Sheffield and Sir John Bourchier, and the latter three, with Challoner's son, were to be prominent in opposition to Charles I in the 1630's.[5] The Comptroller was the notoriously independent Sir John Holles. The Groom of the Stole, Sir David Murray, was regarded by James as a dangerous puritan.[6]

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1. Sharpe to Henry (1606), B.M. Harleian MS. 7008, f. 233. Birch, Henry, 146-8, 158-9.

2. Sir John Harington to Sir Thomas Challoner, 6 Sept. 1607, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., xix, 242-3.

3. Mornay to Asselineau, 27 June/7 July 1611, Corres., xi, 220-23. Mornay to Henry (presenting a copy of the Mystére d'Iniquité), July 1611, B.M. Harleian MS. 7015, f. 192. Price, Defenceof Truth, (1610), Sig. *2v. The French Herald summoning all true Christian Princes to a generall Crusade (1611), Sig. A2, p. 42.

4. The best account of the household is in C. Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution (Oxford, 1965), 213-17.

5. J.T. Cliffe, The Yorkshire Gentry, from the Reformation to the Civil War (1969), 90-91, 302-3.

6. A. Thompson, "John Holles", Journ. Mod. Hist., viii (1936), 155.

Holles, Murray, and Challoner were important members of the Virginia Company, and their interest was shared by the Prince.[1] Henry's secretary and former tutor Adam Newton was deeply interested in the conversion of Venice and a translator of Sarpi.[2] The only striking exception among the senior officers of the household was the exception which proves the rule. His Treasurer was Sir Charles Cornwallis, descendant of a family of Howard retainers, client of Northampton's, former ambassador in Spain and regarded as "no puritan". Henry's original intention had been to appoint Sir George More, but James intervened to give the office to Cornwallis in order to have an agent in the household who was sympathetic to the Spanish marriage negotiations of 1611.[3]

Henry's relations with the other factions in Jacobean politics are not, however, completely clear. Before 1610 Broderie was reporting tensions with Salisbury but it is questionable how important these were.[4] After the investiture there is evidence that Henry, who was admitted to the Privy Council in October 1611, was attempting to take up an independent political position, his most interesting effort being that of having ambassadors abroad provide him with private reports of foreign affairs.[5] The first example was probably the promise of private and secret information that he obtained from Edmondes on his departure for France in 1610.[6] Yet although he was prepared to correspond periodically with the Prince on matters concerning him, Edmondes

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1. See above p.180-2 and Birch, Henry, 90-91.

2. See above p.161, and du Budé, Diodati, 180.

3. Goodman, Court of James I, 363. Winwood Memorials, iii, 48. More to Henry, 1 Mar. 1611; Cornwallis to Henry, ? Feb., 1611; B.M. Harleian MS. 7008, ff. 21, 28. More and Holles were potential agents with the House of Commons.

4. Broderie to Puysieux, 21/31 Oct. 1606, 26 May/5 June, 1608, Ambassades, i, 398-403, iii, 297-303.

5. J. Thorys to Trumbull, 8 Oct. 1611, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Misc. iii, art. 146.

6. A. Newton to Edmondes, 2 Sept. 1610, B.M. Stowe MS. 171, f. 329.

was unwilling to endanger his own relations with Salisbury by breaking the latter's monopoly of foreign reports. Henry was unhappy with this but accepted Edmondes' scruples. In the spring of 1612, as Salisbury's death approached, he renewed his pressure and was successful.[1] At the same time similar requests were made of other ambassadors and Digby, Carleton, and Trumbull hastened to comply.[2] Although no correspondence with Winwood has survived, there was a substantial group of Henricans in the United Provinces, notably Sir Edward Harwood and Sir Edward Conway, who provided information.[3]

These efforts reflected his deep interest in foreign affairs, particularly in the situation in France. Although this was partly the product of his traditional interests as heir to the Scottish throne, and some of it, his "communication" with Henry IV, has been exaggerated, it was still strong enough for Newton, on the failure of his approaches to Edmondes in the autumn of 1611, to make elaborate arrangements with the minister Thomas Lorkin to hire an "intelligencer" to provide Henry with French news,"as any my Lord Treasurer shall have himself", without Salisbury's knowledge. This agent, named "Forboist", functioned throughout 1612; it is not impossible that he was one of Edmondes' secretaries as the phrasing of his reports is strikingly similar to that of Edmondes' dispatches.[4]

The political effect of this interest is not easy to discover as Henry had the important and compromising parts of his correspondence destroyed just

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1. Edmondes to Henry, 29 Aug. 1611; Sir Thomas Somerset to Edmondes, 8 Nov. 1611; Newton to Edmondes, 17 May 1612, B.M. StoweMS. 172, ff. 174v, 176-7, 276. Edmondes to Newton, 13 Mar. 1612, B.M. Harleian MS. 7002, f. 182.

2. Digby to Newton, 2 July 1612; Carleton to Henry, 26 June 1612; Trumbull to Henry, 28 Aug. 1612; B.M. Harleian MS. 7002, ff. 207, 217, 219-20.

3. Conway's correspondence with Henry through Newton from March 1611 to October 1612 is printed in Birch, Henry, 497-520. On Harwood, see Appendix II.

4. Lorkin to Newton, 20 Nov., 12 Dec. 1611, 10 Feb. 1612, B.M. Harleian MS. 7002, ff. 152, 160, 174. The "Forboist" letters are found in B.M. Harleian MS. 7015.

before his death.[1] From 1610 he was in communication with Rohan and Villeroy was concerned about the extent of his contacts with other French factions.[2] He also displayed a strong desire for closer relationships with Maurice of Nassau and the Palatine leadership.[3] The first clear example of his intervention in major political decisions is provided by the embassy of Bouillon. According to Edmondes, who termed Bouillon "a wise oracle with whom your Highness may safely consult":

> One of the principal motives, which made him (Bouillon) undertake that journey, was for the earnest desire which he hath to make himself knowne to your highnesse ... being the person on whom the eyes & hopes of the Reformed Churches are fixed .... He hath praied me ... that he may have some private conversation with your highnesse.[4]

Whether Bouillon was sincere or not, from this point the Prince was to be deeply engaged in the intervention in France in the summer of 1612, constantly pressing for action. He regarded Bouillon highly and there are suggestions that he saw himself, together with Maurice of Nassau and Frederick V, as the leader of a grand protestant political coalition. His opposition to the Savoy marriage is an indication that he was prepared to clash with his father on these issues.[5]

His position in the domestic political struggles is less clear. Although he appears to have joined the opposition to Northampton in the autumn of 1612,

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 452-4.

2. Rohan to Henry, 24 Sept./4 Oct. 1610, B.M.Harleian MS. 7007, f. 412. Villeroy to Broderie, 2/12 July 1610, Ambassades, v, 328-29.

3. Anhalt to Henry, 16/26 Dec. 1610, B.M. Harleian MS. 7007, f. 429. For his relations with Maurice see p. 186 above and J. Harrison, The Messiah Already Come (Amsterdam, 1619), Sig. 1¶ 4.

4. Edmondes to Henry, 22 Feb. 1612, B.M. Stowe MS. 172, ff. 184-85.

5. For Henry's activities in 1612 see above pp. 207-15 passim.

there is no indication of the degree to which he was prepared to take this.[1] Nor do we have any real evidence of his role in the secretaryship contest. Both Wotton and Edmondes attempted to win his support but he himself admitted that his influence was not great.[2] Although he is considered to have hated Rochester, he was close to Winwood and Neville.[3] Perhaps the best comment on his role in the events of 1612 came from Sir John Holles, who considered Henry responsible for the fact that:

> one half year had shewed the right way, that we (were) once again the nation among all nations, a terror to God's enemies and ours, the triumph of the Church at home, and a sure haven to the distressed church abroad.[4]

The experience of 1612 made D'Ewes confident that if Henry had lived, "the Church of God had not suffered such shipwrack abroad as it hath done" in the 1620's.[5] The hopes placed in the Prince made the loss caused by his death the greater:

> many men hope(d) and believe(d), that God had reserved and destined him as a chosen Instrument to be the Standard-bearer of his quarrell in these miserable times, to work the restoration of his church and the destruction of the Romish Idolatry. But the Lord's ways are not our ways, and his judgements far above ours.[6]

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1. Abbot, Memorials on the Essex Divorce, State Trials, ii, 821. D'Ewes, Autobiography, i, 46-49.

2. Chamberlain to Carleton, 17 June 1612, Letters, i, 356-61. Bouillon to Henry, 20/30 June, 31 July, B.M. Harleian MS. 7008, ff. 190, 202. Edmondes to Henry, 18 Aug., B.M. StoweMS. 173, f. 66.

3. On Henry as reformer of the court see Sir John Holles to Lord Grey, 27 Feb, 1613; Grey to Holles, 29 Feb; Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS., ix, 8-11, 40-44.

4. Holles to Sir Robert Mansell, 14 Nov. 1613, Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS., ix, 35-6. Chamberlain to Carleton, 29 May, 1612, PRO S.P. 14/69/57.

5. Autobiography, i, 46-49.

6. J. Beaulieu to Trumbull, 12 Nov. 1612, Winwood Memorials, iii, 410-11.

The conflict with the Jacobean establishment which Henry was approaching is also illustrated by the unparalleled attacks on Northampton, whose clash with Henry and Abbot over the marriages had already attracted attention, occasioned by his death. The lead was taken by Henry's chaplain Lewis Baylie in his sermon of 17 November and Baylie's escape from punishment was applauded by many, from the earl of Dorset down.[1] The theme was even taken up in Wither's Henries Obsequies where his ghost advises Charles to:

> Shut from thy counsells such as have profest
> The worship of that antichristian beast.[2]

Although Northampton was able to counter-attack successfully in the libel action against Sir Richard Cox, the moral victory remained with his enemies, particularly in the widespread suspicion that he had poisoned Henry.[3]

Henry's activities were, however, of an importance secondary to the effects of the gradual erosion of Salisbury's influence with the King and control over the politics of the court in the aftermath of the Parliament of 1610, This has usually been seen as the period of Howard dominance, yet it also saw a partially successful attempt to rebuild the old puritan coalition at court. To a certain degree Salisbury himself may have aided this; for as he reverted to a form of limited confessional politics on the failure of his "realist" foreign policy, so he sought puritan allies in his deteriorating domestic position. The leading figure here was Pembroke, whose admission to the Council in October 1611 he sponsored.[4] This was to make

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1. Dorset to Edmondes, 23 Nov. 1612, B.M. StoweMS. 173, f. 224. Chamberlain to Carleton, 19 Nov., 17 Dec., Letters, i, 390-3, 395-8.
2. Sig. E2. Henries Obsequies was dedicated to Lisle.
3. "Northampton's Case", State Trials, ii, 862. Chamberlain to Carleton, 26 Nov., 17 Dec. 1612, 13 May 1613, Letters, i, 393-5,395-8, 451-55. It is not impossible that Cornwallis's Discourse on Henry's death (Somers Tracts, ii) was written to exonerate Northampton by showing that Henry died of natural causes. The murder of Overbury gave added credence to the view of Northampton as a poisoner.
4. J. Thorys to Trumbull, 8 Oct. 1611; S. Calvert to Trumbull, 27 Feb. 1612; Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Misc., iii, art. 146, Alphabetical xiv, art 40. On the other hand Holles was later to claim that Pembroke's admission to the Council was due to Rochester, Holles to Sir George Holles, 18 July 1615, B.M. Addit. MS. 32464, f. 85.

Pembroke rather than Southampton the most influential figure in the revival of the old Essex party.[1] Northampton was later to claim that Pembroke, Hay, and Sir Walter Cope were the only men to regret Salisbury's death.[2]

Another important political change was caused by the death of Salisbury's old friend and ally Archbishop Bancroft in September 1610.[3] His successor, George Abbot, was to play a role in political puritanism similar to that of Grindal, particularly as his relations with the majority of the influential bishops, with the exceptions of King and Montague, were cold and his principal friends and allies were puritan laymen like Pembroke, Ellesmere, Coke, Winwood, or Trumbull. He also had connections with important parliamentary figures like his former pupil Sir Dudley Digges.[4] He first emerged as a major exponent of puritan politics during the Vorstius controversy and then took a strong position in the council supporting Henry's decision not to marry a catholic and clashing openly with Northampton.[5] By the beginning of 1613 he joined with the main puritan faction in supporting Winwood's candidacy for the secretaryship.[6]

The most important effect of political puritanism, the attempt to rebuild the old court coalition about James's favorite Carr, sprang from disillusion with Salisbury after the Parliament of 1610. The central element was Sir

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1. For Southampton's reaction see Chamberlain to Carleton, 29 May 1612, PRO S.P. 14/69/57.

2. Northampton to Rochester, 26 May 1612, PRO S.P. 14/69/56.

3. Broderie to Villeroy, 7/17 Nov. 1610, Ambassades, v, 472-81. The reasons for Abbot's appointment remain mysterious.

4. Archbishop Abbot, His Narrative, Oct. 1627, J. Rushworth, Historical Collections (1659), i, 451.

5. Abbot, Memorials on Essex Divorce, 2 Oct. 1613, State Trials, ii, 821. Naunton to Winwood, 17 Nov. 1612, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 118-19. Chamberlain to Carleton, 26 Nov. 1612, Letters, i, 393-5. Gondomar to Philip III, 27 Aug./6 Sept. 1613, Corres., iii, 59.

6. Chamberlain to Winwood, 9 Jan. 1613, Letters, i, 402-6.

Henry Neville's scheme to restore a working relationship between crown and Parliament by a compromise by which the King would grant the major grievances of the Commons beforehand and give the leadership in Parliament to men the Commons could trust. These in turn would guarantee majorities for the King.[1] This was later to be known as the scheme for "undertaking", part of the notoriety of which was caused by James himself, yet its importance should not be overlooked. Underlying it was Neville's often-expressed fear that disputes between crown and Commons would paralyze the state and the scheme contained the political innovation that the leadership of the House of Commons should become the ministers of the crown.[2] As much of the correspondence, particularly Neville's, relating to the scheme has disappeared, it is difficult to tell how much support he received from members of the opposition in the Commons in 1610, but his allies included Sir Maurice Berkeley and Sir Robert Phelips.[3]

In the light of Carr's reaction to the Parliament of 1610, approaching him with such a scheme would appear to have been doomed to failure. Yet his position, so similar to that of Buckingham in 1621, was primarily that of an inexperienced young courtier and a Scot, alarmed at the tenor of the Parliament.[4] His political career was just beginning, he did not become Viscount Rochester until March 1611 or enter the Privy Council until 23 April 1612, and it was not impossible that, with experienced guidance, he could be brought round to undertaking the leadership of a faction of the House. Carr

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1. The proposals in PRO S.P. 14/74/44 are usually attributed to Neville.

2. See C. Roberts, The Growth of Responsible Government in Stuart England (Cambridge, 1966), 18-20.

3. Berkeley to Phelips, 12 Nov. 1612, quoted in E. Farnham, "The Somerset Election of 1614", Eng. Hist. Rev. xlvi (1931), 580.

4. On Carr and the Parliament of 1610 see Willson, King James, 267. Broderie to Villeroy, 30 Nov./9 Dec. 1610, Ambassades, v, 510.

himself may well have been interested in projects for outflanking Salisbury. The crucial role in persuading him was played by Sir Thomas Overbury through whom Neville worked.

The first direct news of Neville's scheme appears in a letter to Winwood from his London agent John More of 29 October 1611, which deserves to be quoted at length:

> Being the other day with Mr. Levinus (Munck) talking of divers occurents, he fell suddenly from other matter to this speech: "I wonder from whence shall grow so much discourse of Sir H. Nevill to be a Sect. of State or at the least a councillor". I answered him (and that truly) that for me I never heard of any such discourse, neither did I see much reason to believe it, ... (Neville) did not (like Sir Dudley Carleton) speak in Parliament for the kings demands, but ranged himself with those patriots that were accounted a contrary faction to the courtiers; which I think he would not have done, if he had aspired to any court employment. He (Munck) said that, all that notwithstanding, he doth seek for some advancement, and that through Sir Thomas Overbury, by means of the Viscount Rochester, who of late (said he) hath brought to pass many great and secret matters, there being still (but especially were before Sir Thomas Overbury his disgrace with the Queen) more suitors following him than my Lord Treasurer. I marvelled much at Sir Thomas Overbury's greatness and especially his report of Sir Hen: Neville; and indeed I think it may be some speech cast out rather to his hinderance than advancement. The plot (he said) was, that Sir H. Neville should undertake to deal with the Lower House, and then (so as my Lord Treasurer would not intermeddle) there was no doubt but that better effects would come of the next sessions (which is like to be in February next) than did come of the former.[1]

The role of Munck, one of Salisbury's personal secretaries, in this conversation suggests that his approach to More was aimed at discovering how widespread this scheme was and whether Winwood, as Neville's friend, was involved. Despite More's ignorance, Winwood was, either by this time or soon after, in contact with Rochester and offering his services.[2]

The events of the next six months are not clear. Overbury's clash

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1. Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 101-2. Plans for the expected session of Parliament in early 1612 received a wide circulation, see Buisseaux to Puysieux, 10/20 Nov. 1611, PRO 31/3/43, f. 162v-63.

2. Winwood to Rochester, (late 1611), Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 103-4.

with the Queen and exile to France from December 1611 until the death of Salisbury no doubt inhibited the growth of the Neville-Rochester alliance. On the other hand the infirmity of Salisbury in the spring of 1612 not only brought Rochester into the forefront of politics but also raised the question of the succession to the Lord Treasurer. Although it was not until his death that the distribution of the bulk of his offices became an issue, by April there was expectation of the appointment of a new Secretary of State, and Neville, presumably through Rochester, was considered a leading candidate.[1] By this time Winwood was taking his relationship with Rochester seriously and probably working closely with Neville, although it was not until Salisbury's death, which released all previous bonds of clientage and presented a chance for a major re-distribution of power, that the importance of this alliance was revealed.[2] The true nature of the Winwood-Rochester-Neville relationship in this period and later is obscured by the fact that, although a good deal of Winwood's correspondence has survived in the Buccleuch and Queensbury Manuscripts his more compromising papers were destroyed by John More after his death.[3]

The competition for the secretaryship attracted a great number of candidates from the middle level figures at the court from Cornwallis through Sir Thomas Lake, Fulke Greville, Bacon, Wotton, Edmondes, to Neville and Winwood. Lake was not only supported by the Howards, but had an immediate advantage in

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1. J. Thorys to Trumbull, 2 Apr. 1612, Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iii, 266-67. Chamberlain to Carleton, 29 Apr., Letters, i, 344-47.

2. Winwood to Rochester, 6 May 1612, PRO S.P. 84/68/280. The reason for his sending of the report of his conference with Maurice of Nassau (7 Apr., Motley, Barneveldt, ii, 459-60) to Rochester was probably Salisbury's illness, but the tone of the report suggests a closer relationship.

3. More to Trumbull, 7 Nov. 1617, Berks R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xxxii, art 82.

being left with the signet by Salisbury and being kept on by James to handle the routine duties of a secretary.[1] Aside from Lake, Neville, and Winwood, however, only two of the other candidates, Wotton and Edmondes, were of any importance, and the reasons for this are noteworthy as they reveal that competition was not so much a scramble for place, but a reflection of the simultaneous debate over policy. Wotton's hopes rested on the interest in the Savoy marriage, which had been whetted by his own over-optimistic claims. Once it was rejected in August his candidacy was no longer important.[2]

Edmondes' expectations had two bases. The first was his seniority as a diplomatist. He placed considerable hope on the support of Pembroke, with whom he had been corresponding since 1611, and he was shocked when Pembroke supported Neville and Winwood.[3] The other basis was the interest in the French marriage, and the support of its advocates, e.g. Bouillon and Lenox, but his candidacy declined with the decline in interest in the marriage.[4] At the time of the revolt of the princes in France in 1614 Bouillon attempted once again to persuade James to appoint Edmondes a secretary but he had over-estimated James's interest in French affairs.[5]

Although there were rumours that an entirely new system of secretaries

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1. Chamberlain to Carleton, 29 Apr. 1612, Letters, i, 344-47. Edmondes to Rochester, 20 June; to Lake, 20 June; B.M. Stowe MS. 172, f. 304; PRO S.P. 78/59/107.

2. Chamberlain to Carleton, 29 May, PRO S.P. 14/69/57; 17 June, Letters, i, 356-61.

3. Edmondes to Henry, 18 Aug. 1612; to (Pembroke), 24 Apr. 1613; B.M. Stowe MS. 173, f. 66, 174, f. 28. See also Stowe MS. 173, ff. 108, 253, for the relationship between Edmondes and Pembroke.

4. Bouillon to James, 14/24 Dec. 1612, B.M. Stowe 173, f. 254-5. Bouillon to Henry, 20/30 June, 1612, B.M. Harleian MS. 7008, f. 190, Lenox to Edmondes, 9 Aug. 1613, B.M. Stowe MS. 174, f. 150. Lisle to Trumbull, 26 Nov. 1613, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha.xxix, art. 69. Winwood to Carleton, 24 Oct. 1613, PRO S.P. 84/69/112-13.

5. Bouillon to James, 14/24 Jan. 1614, PRO S.P. 78/62/11-12. See also Sir John Holles to Sir John Digby, 17 Feb. 1614, B.M. Addit. MS. 32464, ff. 74v-75.

might be established, it was expected that the old system of two would be maintained. It was further rumoured that Rochester had agreed to limit his claim to one of the offices so that the candidates would be Neville, for domestic business, and Lake for foreign. Whether or not such a compromise was possible, Neville's candidacy was posed a challenge not only to the Howards but also to the entire structure of politics since the accession, for with him he brought the core of the old Essex connection and the parliamentary opposition. At their head were Southampton and his ally Sheffield now making their first real entrance as supporters of political puritanism.[1] It was rumoured that they would be made councillors and Southampton was said to be hoping for the Lord Treasurer's staff.[2] Whatever Rochester may have felt about being the ostensible leader of such a group, this display was the last thing to appeal to James and it was a setback for Neville from which he never really recovered:

> it is saide too much solliciting hath hindered him; and the flocking of parliament men about him, and theyre meetings and consultings with the earle of Southampton and the Lord Sheffield at the Lord Rochester's chamber (as is informed to the king, but whether truly or no is a question) hathe done him no goode, for the king sayes he will not have a secretary imposed upon him by Parliament.[3]

James demanded a public recantation of their previous position as the minimum condition for his favour. As Suffolk later related:

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1. They were to continue with Pembroke in support of Winwood in 1614, Moir, Addled Parliament, 74.

2. J. Packer to Trumbull, 12 June, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Misc. iv. art. 8. Chamberlain to Carleton, 29 May, PRO S.P. 14/69/57. Dorset to Edmondes, 22 June 1612; Edmondes to (Pembroke), 24 Apr. 1613; B.M. StoweMS. 172, f. 319, 174, f. 28. It was probably at this point that Southampton was fobbed off with the pension of £2000 p.a. which was to inhibit his future political activity. See Sir John to Sir George Holles, 18 July 1615, B.M. Addit. MS. 32464, f. 85.

3. Chamberlain to Carleton, 17 June 1612, Letters, i, 356-61.

> his Majestie hath often protested in many of our hearings that he (Neville) and the rest should amend the faults they made last parliament before he would set markes of favour upon them.[1]

As a demonstration of the true structure of power at the court soon afterwards the Treasury was placed into commission with Northampton as first lord.[2] Yet Neville, probably through Overbury who had just returned to his old position as Rochester's eminence grise, was able to keep his hold on Rochester, at least for the meantime. This is the real connection between the domestic politics and the foreign policy of 1612; for at the same time as he was associating with Neville, Rochester was also taking part in the intervention in France. Although positive evidence of Rochester's influence is slight, we do have examples of serious "coaching" by Overbury, Neville and Winwood. Similarly once Rochester came under the influence of Northampton during the winter of 1612-13, James's interest in protestant politics declined.

In July Winwood made a sudden journey to England. Although he claimed that he had been summoned by James, no record of this has survived. His ostensible reason was to report that the Dutch were preparing to force the Sound in alliance with the Swedes in the war against Denmark which James was attempting to mediate. This caused speculation that he was to be made secretary.[3]

Yet James's hesitancies were not resolved and after some weeks Winwood returned to the United Provinces with a promise of permanent recall in the autumn.[4] Yet the journey was not without some significance. James was

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1. Suffolk to Somerset, bet. 6-12 Feb. 1614, B.M. Cotton MS. Titus, F iv, f. 340-41.

2. Chamberlain to Carleton, 29 May, PRO S.P. 14/69/57. Fenton to Mar, 22 June, 14 July, Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS., ii, 41, 42.

3. Chamberlain to Carleton, 2 July, PRO S.P. 14/74/1. More to Trumbull, 2 July; Williams to Trumbull, 1 Aug.; Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iii, 323, 342. Winwood to Trumbull, 7 July, Berks. R.O. MS. Alpha. xlvii, art. 54. Sir Robert Anstruther to Prince Henry, 8 Nov. 1612, PRO S.P. 75/5/55.

4. Throckmorton to Trumbull, 15 July, Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iii, 330. Chamberlain to Carleton, 25 July, PRO S.P. 14/74/8.

impressed by him and he was entrusted with the general supervision of Netherlands and German affairs.[1] The journey also saw the full emergence of the project for sharing the secretaryship between Neville (home) and Winwood (foreign).[2] They had several conferences with Overbury and Rochester and Winwood had at least one interview with Prince Henry.[3] Their joint-candidacy was now to become the hope of political puritanism; Lisle gave his support and Winwood offered his potential services to Trumbull and Carleton.[4] As Abraham Williams expressed it, "God send us an honest man who will set aside all private ends for the common good of the Churche".[5] Even Edmondes, despite his rivalry with Winwood, believed that he and Neville would be the best candidates.[6]

Although Overbury was the main link between Neville and Rochester, another indication of their relationship is provided by the appointment of John Packer to be a secretary of Rochester's, which occurred between July and December 1612.[7] After serving in the Neville embassy to France in 1599,

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1. Rochester to Winwood, 19 July, 1612, PRO S.P. 84/68/293-4.

2. More to Trumbull, 18 July; Beaulieu to Trumbull, 29 July; Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iii, 335, 340-41. Chamberlain to Carleton, 25 July, PRO S.P. 14/70/8. Edmondes to (Pembroke), 24 Apr. 1613, B.M. Stow MS. 174, f. 28. Further proof that Neville and Winwood were working in concert, not in rivalry, is provided by Winwood's making Neville godfather to one of his children in October, Neville to Winwood, 22 Oct., Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 115-16.

3. Neville to Winwood, 12 July; Sir John Holles to Winwood, 22 Feb. 1613; Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 109, 127.

4. Lisle to Winwood, 13 Aug. 1612, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 110. See also Hotman to Winwood, 3 June 1613, ibid., 133-34. Winwood to Trumbull, 1 Aug., Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iii, 343. Chamberlain to Carleton, 2 July 1612, PRO SP. 14/70/1.

5. Williams to Trumbull, 1 Aug., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Misc. iv, art. 79.

6. Beaulieu to Trumbull, 17 July, Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iii, 333.

7. Edmondes to Lake, 7 Dec. 1612, PRO S.P. 78/60/240.

Packer had become a French Secretary and his knowledge of French affairs may have been one of the reasons for his appointment at this time. On the other hand he was a close friend of Neville, Winwood, Edmondes, and Trumbull and in Neville's company in July 1612.[1] Unfortunately neither of the collections of Packer's surviving papers, the Fortescue MSS. in the Bodleian and the Packer MSS. in the Berkshire Record Office, contain any material from this period of his service to Rochester.[2] While it does not appear that he was admitted to Rochester's confidence, surviving evidence is not a true guide as Packer was always exceedingly discreet.[3]

The conjunction of Neville and Winwood created considerable opposition; "Much kicking there is against you and me severally, but more against the coupling of us both together". Neville remained confident that his parliamentary proposals would at length find favour with James and that once a decision was taken to call a Parliament he would be appointed.[4] He expected this decision to be taken at a Council meeting at the end of September but it was postponed until the conclusion of Elizabeth's marriage. Winwood was ordered to remain in the United Provinces to await the coming of the Elector and it was suspected that his opponents were seeking to prevent his return by creating fresh projects for him to accomplish in the United Provinces.[5]

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1. Packer to Trumbull, 22 July 1612, Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iii, 337. This letter suggests that he was not yet in Rochester's service.

2. The draft of the letter from James to Condé and Soissons of 12 May 1612 in the Fortescue MSS. (Bodleian Addit. MS. D 109, f. 199) is probably a product of his French secretaryship.

3. See, for example, Packer to Winwood, 27 Apr. 1613, Winwood Memorials, iii, 447-48.

4. Neville to Winwood, 6 Sept. 1612, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 111-12. It was in this period that Neville was negotiating with the parliamentary leaders, see Berkeley to Phelips, 12 Nov. quoted on p. 231 above.

5. Lisle to Winwood, 13 Sept; Naunton to Winwood, 15 Sept; Neville to Winwood, 22 Oct; Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 112, 112-4, 115-6. More to Trumbull, 25 Sept., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xxxii, art. 39.

By this time, however, the alliance itself was crumbling. Although the underlying causes, Rochester's frivolity and his affair with Frances Howard, were not immediately apparent, there was a growing disenchantment with Overbury. While committed to keeping Rochester allied to the puritan party and sympathetic to the party's goals, his ability to act as the key-stone of the alliance was increasingly open to doubt.[1] This first became evident in Rochester's quarrel with Pembroke in July which was attributed to Overbury, an important error as Pembroke was now playing an increasingly important role in politics and had himself protected Overbury in 1611.[2] Another issue was Lake's commission in October to handle the informing of ambassadors which, as Winwood hastened to inform Overbury, went a long way towards the substantive performing of the secretary's office.[3] He also informed Neville, who tried to impress upon Overbury that:

> Lake's purpose is to engage the king as much as he may, and intrude himself as far as he can into the execution of that place, that his friends may claim he hath wrong done him if he be excluded in the end,

and that it was therefore vital to obtain an immediate favorable decision from the King. Neville himself was disappointed in Overbury, on account of both the King's suspicions of Overbury and Overbury's:

> unadvised courses, having not only refused to take any help in the work under pretence of not sharing obligations, but irritated all men of place by his extreme neglect of them.[4]

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1. See Overbury to Trumbull, 15 Sept., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Misc. iv, art. 90. Overbury to Winwood, 9 Oct., Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 114. Winwood to Overbury, 24 Oct., PRO.S.P. 84/68/303-4. These letters contain the best evidence of the "coaching" of Rochester in protestant politics by Winwood and Neville through the medium of Overbury.
2. G. Calvert to Edmondes, 1 Aug. 1612, B.M. StoweMS. 173, f. 38-9. Rochester to Northampton, 8 Oct. 1612, B.M. Harleian MS. 354, f. 43.
3. Winwood to Overbury, 24 Oct., PRO S.P. 84/68/303-4.
4. Neville to Winwood, 22 Oct., n.d.(between 22 Oct. and 6 Nov., misdated April. 1613), Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 115-6, 131-2.

At the beginning of November Neville managed to reconcile Pembroke and Rochester, Pembroke promising to "join henceforth closely with my Lord (Rochester) in all things he shall undertake for religion and the state." From this point Pembroke placed his support solidly behind the Neville-Winwood candidacy, dropping his support for Edmondes. In turn Neville urged Winwood to cultivate his friendship.[1] On the other hand, Neville's own position with the King was suffering both through his identification with Overbury and the political threat that the alliance represented.

> There is exception taken to him that he cannot be content to come in himself, but must bring in his man Sir R.W. and his champion the earle of Southampton, and whosoever he thinckes good. Yt may be indeed the great favorites embracing too muche at once will marre all.....[2]

According to Viscount Fenton, Neville's party now consisted of Pembroke, Southampton, "some of the most discontented nobill men of the younger sort, and all the parliamentary mutineers."[3] James Whitelocke, who considered Neville "my true and worthy friend" and "the most sufficient man for understanding state business that was in this kingdom" claimed he was "an actor with greater men" in the resistance of Sir Robert Mansell to Northampton's commission for reforming the navy. He regarded his own imprisonment for the part he played in this as an attempt by Northampton to implicate Neville.[4] Through his absence Winwood was able to escape the opprobrium of such associations. Rochester continued to encourage his aspirations

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1. Neville to Winwood (22nd Oct.-6 Nov.); Naunton to Winwood, 17 Nov; Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 131-2, 118-9. Dorset to Edmondes, 23 Nov; Edmondes to (Pembroke), 24 Apr. 1613; B.M. Stowe MS. 173, f. 224, 174, f.28.

2. Chamberlain to Carleton, 4 Nov., Letters, i, 387.

3. Fenton to Mar, 20 May 1613, Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS, ii, 51-2. James's alarm may have made him more amenable to Howard pressure, see Chamberlain to Carleton, 7 Jan. 1613, Letters, i, 401-2; Fenton to Mar, ? July 1613, ibid., 52.

4. J. Whitelocke, Liber Famelicus (Camden Soc., lxx, 1858), viii, 35-7, 46-47.

and he was also receiving support from Abbot and Ellesmere. According to Chamberlain, even James favoured his candidacy.

By the beginning of 1613 the situation had reached an impasse, with Neville checked by the suspicion of James and the pressure of the Howards and Winwood kept in the United Provinces to await the return of the Elector Palatine and his bride.[2] It was at this point that the imprisonment of Overbury and the Essex divorce brought the whole scheme crashing to the ground. Although it is impossible to tell whether Rochester had been consciously dissembling over the past few months, this turn of events placed Neville's relationship with him under a double jeopardy. Not only was Neville closely associated with Overbury but both he and his principal allies, Pembroke and Southampton, were the supporters of Essex in the divorce.[3] The initial response of Neville and Pembroke was to attempt to restore Overbury; it was the general view of his supporters, from Southampton down, that Overbury was Neville's main liability. Once something was done about Overbury all would be well, for "truly it is more than time that an able man were in that place".[4] It is not impossible that Abbot's intervention and the attempt to send Overbury abroad were part of an effort to minimize the political effects of his fall. Abbot was already close to Neville and Southampton, so close that he was accused of being influenced by them in the Essex divorce.[5] The revelation of the role of Rochester in

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1. Rochester to Winwood, 7 Dec. 1612; Ellesmere to Winwood, 7 Dec; Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 119. Chamberlain to Carleton, 7 Jan. 1613; to Winwood, 9 Jan; Letters, i, 401-402.

2. More to Winwood, (Jan. 1613), 6 Feb. 1613, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 123-4, 124-5. Winwood to Carleton, 13 Feb., PRO S.P. 84/69/132-3.

3. Fenton to Mar, 20 May 1613, Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS., ii, 51-52. Abbot, Memorials on Essex Divorce, State Trials, ii, 808, 818, 822. Gondomar to Philip III, 15/25 Jan. 1614, Corres. 111, 228.

4. Packer to Winwood, 22 Apr. 1613; Southampton to Winwood, 6 Aug; Winwood Memorials, iii, 447-8, 475. Winwood to Carleton, 22 May, PRO S.P. 84/69/68-70. Lisle to Winwood, 10 July, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 138. Sir George Goring to Edmondes, 13 June 1613, B.M. Stowe MS. 174, f. 91.

5. Abbot, Memorials; Testimony of Sir Dudley Digges, Trial of Weston, 1616; State Trials, ii, 808, 1818, 919-20.

the divorce during the hearings in the summer came as a great shock:

> which I never have suspected but that great folkes will have theyre ends without respect of friends or followers.[1]

For Neville this was the handwriting on the wall, although he does not appear to have accepted it until after Overbury's death when Rochester offered him Overbury's reversion of the treasurership of the Chamber as a "consolation".[2]

The discovery that "Venus hath overcome Mercury and will knit two sides in one" and that it was no longer the time for "sincere and worthy causes" was also of ominous import for Winwood. He was warned "to be reserved therefore in your proceedings" and not to expect anything.[3] Yet his position was not as bad as Neville's; his absence from the court had protected him from attacks and he was not personally involved with Overbury or the divorce to the same degree. Rochester had no immediate reason to withdraw his support.[4] The death of his step-father-in-law Bodley at the beginning of 1613 gave Winwood the excuse to return in August 1613.[5] Although James was still uninterested in appointing a Secretary, and Winwood was preparing to return to the United Provinces at the beginning of 1614, Rochester continued his promise "according to your merit abroad, to see you settled in some good place at home". Winwood in turn pledged his loyalty and was observed playing the uncharacteristic role of courtier at the wedding of Rochester (now

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1. Chamberlain to Winwood and to Carleton, 10 June, Letters, i, 455-7, 457-60.

2. Neville to Edmondes, 16 July, B.M. StoweMS. 174, f. 116. Chamberlain to Carleton, 14 Oct., Letters, i, 477-80.

3. Thomas Bull to Winwood, 20 July; Naunton to Winwood, 21 July; Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 139-40.

4. Rochester to Winwood, 20 June, ibid., 135.

5. Winwood to Carleton, 13 Feb., 1 Aug., PRO S.P. 84/69/97-8, 132-33.

earl of Somerset) and Frances Howard.[1]

By this time the initiative had passed to the Howards, who, with the gaining of Somerset, the assistance of Sarmiento, and their own position with the King, were reaching the peak of their political power. Around them were grouped the former agents of Spain, later to play important roles in the Spanish marriage negotiations, Lake, George Calvert, Walter Aston, Francis Cottington, and Cornwallis.[2] The course of politics now depended on the strategy the Howards would take with regard to the two leading political issues, the French marriage and the financial situation of the crown. For some time Northampton had been conducting a defensive campaign against the French marriage through his support of the Savoyard offer and he was assisted by the revived association of the French marriage with the Scots, the result of Lenox's involvement in the negotiations during the summer of 1613. He now began a carefully modulated programme of attacking the marriage as a Scottish project and whipping up anti-Scots sentiment. He was later able to transfer this to his anti-parliamentary campaign, successfully intimidating James.[3] To these efforts Sarmiento, determined to prevent the French marriage, gave great encouragement, including the possibility of a Spanish match. It was at this point that Digby entered the "Spanish Faction"; Sarmiento considered him, as a favorer of such a marriage, the best medium for passing suggestions about the marriage to the English.[4] The other recruit to this

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1. Winwood to Carleton, 20 Aug., 24 Oct., PRO S.P. 84/69/100, 112-3. Chamberlain to Carleton, 14 Oct., Letters, i, 477-80. Winwood to Trumbull, 14 Oct., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha., xlvii, art 75. Rochester to Winwood (later 1613); Winwood to Rochester (late 1613); Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 148.

2. Sarmiento to Philip III, 25 Sept./5 Oct. 1613, Corres., iii, 86, 104.

3. Lenox to Edmondes, 9 Aug. 1613, B.M. StoweMS. 174, f. 150. Sarmiento to Philip III, 15/25 Jan. 1614; to Lerma, 7/17 Mar; to Philip, 29 Apr./9 May; Corres., iii, 210-15, iv, 35, 41-2, 45-7.

4. Sarmiento to Philip, 15/25 Jan; to Lerma, 5/15 Feb; to Philip and Lerma, 29 Apr./9 May/; ibid., iii, 210-15, 295, iv, 44, 110-12.

campaign was Somerset, who, at Northampton's instigation, had broken publicly with the other Scots, Lenox, Hay, and Fenton, as well as with Neville in the autumn of 1613.[1]

It was not, however, the battle over the French marriage so much as the need to summon a Parliament to rescue the crown from its financial position which resolved the question of the secretaryship. Without this stimulus there was no need for the Howards to seek the appointment of new officers of state. Although the puritan party had been urging a Parliament for some time, it had been prevented by Howard opposition and, as Winwood wrote, "what reliefe will be founde by a parliament rebus sic stantibus, I cannot but doubt."[2] At the beginning of 1614, however, the Howards took what was to be their most audacious step, the acceptance and then deliberate sabotage of a parliament, the purpose of which was to destroy not only the relations between the King and the Commons, but also between the court and parliamentary wings of the puritan party. The evidence for this plot is to be found primarily in three letters to Somerset in the beginning of February, two from Northampton and one from Suffolk.[3]

Pembroke had continued to espouse the Neville parliamentary proposals and the candidature of either Neville or Winwood through the winter of 1613, while Somerset continued to encourage Winwood in his expectation of office, probably as a potentially useful instrument. At the end of January 1614 Suffolk, at the instigation of Somerset, approached Pembroke with an offer both to revive the Neville proposals and to replace Winwood with Neville as the leading candidate for the secretaryship. Pembroke and Winwood appear to have taken this at face value and accepted that, in Winwood's words,

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1. Sarmiento to Philip, 27 Aug./6 Sept. 1613; 14/24 Nov; 15/25 Jan. 1614; 7/17 Mar; ibid., ii, 59, 197-9, 210, iv, 33.

2. Winwood to Carleton, 24 Oct. 1613, PRO S.P. 84/69/112-3.

3. They originate from the Somerset correspondence which fell into Sir Robert Cotton's hands after his fall.

"it proceeded from his (Suffolk's) better understanding of Sir H.N., his worth and ability to do his Majesty service."[1] At a council meeting in the second week of February, to Pembroke's astonishment, Northampton took the lead in advocating the calling of a Parliament, but disavowing any "pragmatical inventions".[2] Both he and Suffolk had, however, as Suffolk cheerfully commented, been "playing the knave" and had no intention of either supporting Neville seriously or really attempting to achieve some prior arrangement with Parliament, but rather to implicate as many of the puritan party in "undertaking" as they could.[3]

To Pembroke's disquiet, the council now proceeded to prepare for a Parliament without any serious consideration of compromises to be reached, yet with the maximum publicity for "undertaking". This was increased when James, panicking at reports of the hostility to courtiers seeking election, ordered the council to employ their electoral influence on behalf of the crown.[4] At the same time Somerset was carefully posing as an ally of the puritans. It was through Lisle that Somerset intervened in the Somersetship election.[5] He pursued the same policy with Winwood. The standard account of Winwood's final promotion to the secretaryship, as reported by Sarmiento for example, is that he was chosen at Somerset's promoting over the opposition of the Howards as it was necessary to have a puritan spokesman to deal with the Commons.[6]

In this context,

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1. Suffolk to (Somerset), (bet. 6-12 Feb.), B.M. Cotton MS. Titus F iv, ff. 340-41. Winwood to (Somerset), (approximately the same day), Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 148-49. The attribution of such guile to Somerset is not fanciful as he has shown previous examples of it during the Parliament of 1610, the Overbury murder and probably with Neville. The continued association of Winwood and Neville is illustrated by the fact that Winwood spent the Christmas of 1613 with Neville, Whitelocke, Lib. Fam., 32.
2. Northampton to (Somerset), (c.11 Feb.), B.M. Cotton MS. Titus F iv, ff. 329-30 (two letters). On the date of the Council meeting see Moir, Addled Parliament, 28-29.
3. Suffolk to Somerset (6-12 Feb.), ibid. See also Sir Thomas Roe to Trumbull, 7 Mar., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Misc. v, art. 43.
4. Suffolk to Somerset (6-12 Feb.), ibid., Lake to Northampton, 19 Feb., B.M. Cotton MS. Titus F iv, f. 342. Chamberlain to Carelton, 3 Mar., Letters, i, 514-17.
5. Lisle to Sir Edward Phelips, 28 Mar., Farnham, "Somerset Election", 588. See also Lisle to Trumbull, 28 Apr., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha

however, such a dispute does not make sense, for the Howards would have every reason to involve Winwood or Neville in the Parliament in order to compromise them. A mock dispute, which would allow them to claim something for Lake in return, is more probable.[1]

Winwood's appointment was only made on 29 March and as late as the 21st he was still publicly preparing to return to the United Provinces.[2] The incongruity of his appointment was emphasized by Sir Thomas Leedes when he "marvailed that two such eminent persons as Sir Hen. Neville and Sir Thos. Edmondes are left unpreferred."[3] Chamberlain was dubious about Somerset's intentions:

> all my drift is that he (Winwood) should not be confident nor resolve beyond reason or experience of others, that have run upon the same rocke.[4]

Further clarification of the impermanence of Winwood's appointment was provided by the refusal to grant him the seals or to allow him to handle foreign correspondence. When Edmondes returned to France in the summer, Winwood was not to receive any of his correspondence and Edmondes only sent him copies of his open dispatches secretly out of personal friendship and

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(from p. 245)
xxix, art. 71. Throckmorton to Trumbull, 1 Apr., Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iv, 363.

6. Sarmiento to Lerma, 7/17 Mar; to Philip III, 29 Apr./9 May; Corres., iv, 36, 106-7.

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1. See Edmondes to Trumbull, 25 Feb., 18 Mar., 22 Apr., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha., xxiv, arts. 110, 111, 115.

2. Winwood to Huygens, 21 Mar., B.M. Egerton MS. 1169, f. 10.

3. Leedes to Trumbull, 16 Apr., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xxix, art. 12.

4. Chamberlain to Carleton, 3 Mar., Letters, i, 514-17.

political loyalty. It was not until October that Winwood began to receive foreign correspondence.[1]

The course of the Parliament of 1614 demonstrated the acuteness of Howard tactics. Their ceaseless campaign of provocation and manipulation of anti-Scots sentiment, which culminated in the suborning of Hoskyns, already known for his anti-Scots speeches in the Parliament of 1610, had the desired effect on James.[2] They were nearly successful in destroying Winwood's credibility as well, one result of which was to create the impression that Winwood was lacking in the qualities necessary to be a successful leader of the Commons. His opening speech was the first in a Jacobean Parliament seriously to request parliamentary support for "the maintenance of God's true religion" abroad and his emphasis on the good of the commonwealth was probably sincere.[3] Nor was he given the power to make the necessary compromises with the Commons on their grievances. His efforts to form a joint front on church reform were swamped by the reaction of the clergy.[4] His frustration comes out in his letters to friends like Carleton and Trumbull where his basic sympathy for the Commons' grievances over impositions, his anger over the activities of Neile, and his suspicions of provocation are clearly evident.[5]

The result of the political battles of 1612-1614 was, therefore, to

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1. Edmondes to Trumbull, 22 Apr., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xxiv, art. 115. Edmondes to Winwood, 11 Sept., 21 Oct., B.M. Stowe MS. 175, f. 37; PRO S.P. 78/62/184.

2. Sarmiento to Philip III, 29 Apr./9 May, Corres., iv, 45-7. Moir, Addled Parliament, 118, 126-30. Roberts, Growth Res. Gov., 167.

3. Speech of 12 Apr., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha., xlvii, art. 82.

4. Moir, 109-110.

5. Winwood to Trumbull, 16 June, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xlvii, art 87. To Carleton, 16 June, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1611-1618, 237.

create two mutually antagonistic factions on the Council, one committed to rapprochement with Spain and the other to political puritanism, whose struggles for supremacy were to form the underlying framework of politics for the remainder of the reign. Although the Howards appeared to hold the superior position on the aftermath of the Parliament of 1614, the nature of their victory had the effect of increasing the hostility of their enemies. The involvement of Lionel Sharpe and Cornwallis, both known agents of Northampton's, with Hoskyns made his role in inciting anti-Scots hysteria obvious to all.[1] Abbot saw the connection between the dissolution and the rapprochement with Spain.[2] The apparent Howard monopoly of office was illusory. The death of Northampton had removed their master strategist, "they who were the greatest instruments of mischief are now gon; whether to God or no, he only knowes", and Suffolk and Somerset were concerned only to exploit Somerset's position with James and their role in the negotiations with Spain for immediate personal gain.[3]

By the summer of 1615 hostility to the Howards had created what Sir John Holles, who made the mistake of joining Somerset at this point, called "the faction". The core of the faction consisted of the leaders of the puritan coalition, Pembroke, Winwood, and Southampton, whose political opposition, according to the prejudiced Holles, had been provoked by personal affronts, Pembroke through his failure to be appointed Master of the Horse, Southampton his appointment as a councillor, and Winwood the refusal to give

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1. Cornwallis to James, 22 June, PRO S.P. 14/77/42. Chamberlain to Carleton, 30 June, Letters, i, 540-3. Sarmiento to Lerma, 6/16 Aug., Corres., iv, 254-55.

2. Abbot to Trumbull, 31 Aug., Hist. MSS.,Comm., Downshire MSS., iv, 511-5. Northampton's activities also received attention in Scott's Vox Populi, Somers Tracts, ii, 515.

3. Lisle to Trumbull, 14 Aug., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xxix, art. 74. See also Throckmorton to Trumbull, 12 June, Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iv, 425. Edmondes to Winwood, 21 Oct., PRO S.P. 78/62/184.

him the seals. They were joined by three other leading figures whose opposition was based solely on personal grievances against Suffolk and Somerset; Arundel, over Suffolk's defrauding him of his inheritance; Lake, through the sale to Greville of the chancellorship of the exchequer which had been promised to him; and Viscount Fenton, because the Howard-sponsored Cockayne project deprived him of his own monopoly in the cloth trade.[1] Whether or not the famous conference at Baynard's Castle in August 1614 actually took place, they were also the sponsors of Villiers. In the autumn of 1615, beginning with the investigation of the murder of Overbury, Winwood initiated the attack which was to unseat Somerset.

The victory, however, revealed the weakness of "the faction". While the puritan core wished to institute major changes of policy, summon a Parliament, and reform the finances, their allies were satisfied with the fall of Somerset. Early in 1616 it was noted that Fenton and Lake had broken with Pembroke and that Lake was reconciled with the Howards.[3] Arundel, whose quarrel was with Suffolk, remained an ally of Pembroke's until Suffolk's fall in 1619 when he became head of the Howard clan and a leading member of the Spanish faction. His hostility to Suffolk was the cause of his joining Pembroke in support of Raleigh in 1617. The redistribution of offices after Somerset's fall further reinforced the division on the Council. Although Pembroke became Lord Chamberlain and Winwood received the signets, there were no new councillors of their orientation. Furthermore, in January 1616 Worcester became Lord Privy Seal and Lake a Secretary.

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1. Sir John to Sir George Holles, 18 July 1615; to Somerset, 31 July; B.M. Addit. MS. 32464, ff. 85, 87-v. Lenox to Edmondes, 3 Oct. 1614, B.M. Stow MS. 175, f. 74-5. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 244-46.

2. Sir John Holles to Lord Norris, 29 May 1615, B.M. Addit. MS. 32464, f. 81. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 99-101.

3. John Woodford to Edmondes, 29 Mar. 1616, B.M. Stowe MS. 176, f. 5v.

The antagonism between the factions was hardened by the decision to negotiate for a Spanish marriage in March 1617. Although the negotiations increased the importance of its supporters, its opponents were irreconcilible and Winwood, Abbot, Edmondes, and Hay had to be excluded from the discussions in the council.[1] In his "Considerations upon the Marriage with Spain", Winwood outlined the puritan case: "unless the Lord build the house, the builders labour in vaine", the incompatibility of such a marriage with England's position among the protestant states, and the impossibility of reliance upon Spain.[2] The hostility between Abbot and Winwood on the one hand, and Lake and Digby, although now in Spain, on the other, continued throughout 1617.[3] James was forced, even more than before, to govern with what were in effect two separate administrations, one to deal with the rapprochement with Spain, the other with relations with the protestant states. The political dangers inherent in this were noted by Bacon, who, both during the discussion on summoning a Parliament in 1615 and again during the Spanish marriage negotiations in 1617, warned James against making major decisions without the unanimous support of his Council, as the disaffected would form the focal point for any opposition.[4]

The decision to seek a Spanish marriage also saw the emergence of a new element in the Spanish faction, together with the Howards and the catholic sympathisers, a party which in part represented a continuation of the realpolitik of Salisbury. Its leading spokesman was Bacon, although his position was

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 483-5, 509-11.

2. B.M. Lansdowne MS. 253, ff. 179-91.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 509-11. Abbot to Trumbull, 19 Dec. 1617, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. i, art. 30. Sir Edward Harwood to Carleton, 20 Dec. 1617, PRO S.P. 14/94/69.

4. Letter of Sept. 1615, letter of 19 Apr. 1617, Spedding, v, 176-191, vi, 170-72.

probably shared by Digby, whose commitment to Spain and catholicism remains mysterious.[1] The orientation of this group was conservative, anti-Dutch and anti-French and, in Bacon's case, it included a strong dose of theoretical absolutism. In his "Remembrance Additional to the Instructions of Sir John Digby" of 23 March 1617, Bacon gave as one of the advantages of Anglo-Spanish understanding a strengthening of monarchies against a "creeping disposition to make popular estates and leagues to the disadvantage of monarchies".[2] This group also hoped that an alliance with Spain would bring with it commercial advantages which would enable England to undercut the Dutch.[3]

Although it has become accepted to see the period from 1615 to 1620 as dominated by the rise of Villiers, Master of the Horse in January 1616, earl of Buckingham and member of the council by March 1617, the political effects of this can be exaggerated. Buckingham became master of patronage but there are no clear indications that he played a major role in political decisions and his patronage was motivated primarily by personal and family interest. He may have taken some interest in French affairs in 1616 and may have been responsible for the appointment of Hay; otherwise he appears to have followed James's lead entirely and did not take up an independent political position until 1620-21.[4] He soon, however, outgrew his original relationship with his sponsors. Winwood had originally intended to surround him with suitable men and had John Packer transferred from Somerset's service

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1. Winwood considered Digby to be "totally Spanish" but he was biased. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 509-11.

2. Spedding, vi, 157-59.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 207-8.

4. See Condé to Villiers, 1/11, 11/21, Mar. 1616, Bodl. Addit. MS. D. 109, ff. 263, 265.

"to attende the new Master of the Horse".[1] But although he supported the release of Raleigh, Buckingham's relations with the leaders of the puritan party were cool.[2] A more interesting "patron" was Winwood. In 1616 Edmondes, "of our party" and a useful ally, was appointed Comptroller of the Household and a member of the council and took up residence in England. Buckingham does not appear to have been involved in this appointment which was probably the work of Winwood and Pembroke.[3] Winwood also had the support of Carleton, Wotton, and Trumbull, whom he and Edmondes protected against an attempt by Buckingham to remove him in early 1617, which placed them both on Buckingham's black-list.[4] Another important figure in this group was Abbot, close friend to Winwood and open correspondent to Trumbull.[5] Winwood's connections extended widely, a collection of his friends dining with him in late 1616 included Raleigh, Sir Henry Saville, Sir Maurice Berkeley, and Sir Edward Seymour.[6]

It was probably Winwood's death which enabled Buckingham to take a commanding role in politics. The appointment of the new secretary was his first attempt at control of a major office of state. The choice of the puritan party was Sir Dudley Carleton, who, through the agency of Sir Horace

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1. John Woodford to Edmondes, 6 Mar. 1616, B.M. StoweMS. 175, f. 357.

2. Thomas Carew to Carleton, 11 Sept. 1616, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1611-1618, 393. Wallace, Raleigh, 256.

3. Pembroke to Edmondes, 24 Mar. 1616; Edmondes to Villiers, (Sept. 1616); B.M. Stow MS. 175, f. 380, 176, f. 29. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 509-11.

4. Abbot to Trumbull, 10 May 1617, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. i, art. 27. Sir Edward Cecil to Carleton, 31 Oct. 1617, Dalton, Cecil, i, 252. Sir Henry Wotton to Buckingham (late 1617), Bodl. Addit. MS. D. 109., f. 319.

5. Chamberlain to Carleton, 31 Oct. 1617, Letters, ii, 108-12.

6. Chamberlain to Carleton, 14 Nov. 1616, ibid., 34-37.

Vere, Sir Benjamin Rudyerd, Sir Henry Saville, and Sir Nathaniel Brent, had obtained the support of Pembroke, Abbot, Arundel, and even the Electress Palatine. Buckingham, however, chose his kinsman Sir Robert Naunton.[1] He also took over Winwood's secret correspondence and his secretary John More.[2] With this demonstration of his power, many middle-level figures, e.g. Sir Edward Cecil, began to attach themselves to him.[3]

Buckingham's patronage network, as it developed, was to transcend and incorporate elements of both major factions. Through his mother and later through his wife's family he had important contacts with catholic circles. Other members of his following were strong advocates of political puritanism. John Packer was a notable patron to puritan divines.[4] Naunton, however mediocre a secretary he may have been, was sincerely committed to political puritanism, married to a daughter of Dorothy Devereux and Sir Thomas Perrot, and member of a circle consisting of Greville, his cousin Sir Edward Conway, and John Coke.[5] This connection was probably responsible for Greville's recommendation of Francis Nethersole to Doncaster as [redacted] secretary.[6] Conway, whose daughter Brilliana was to marry the impeccably puritan gentleman Sir Robert Harley, was always amenable to the influence of his sister-in-law Lady Vere. In October 1624 he was prepared to use his and Buckingham's

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1. Carleton to Chamberlain, 8 Nov. 1617, The Court and Times of James I, ii, 51-52.

2. Bodl. Addit. MS. D. 109, f. 319. Gondomar to Archduke Albert, 5/15 Dec. 1617, Corres., i, 150-51.

3. Abbot to Trumbull, 3 Nov. 1617, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha., i, art. 29. Wotton to Buckingham (late 1617), Bodl. Addit. MS. D. 109, f. 319. Sir N. Brent to Carleton, 2 Jan. 1618, PRO S.P. 14/95/3.

4. J. Burgess to Lady Vere, 2 Jun. 1618, B.M. Addit. MS. 4275, f. 62. Bishop of Chester to Packer, 31 July 1622, Fortescue Papers, 180-81.

5. See Hist. MSS. Comm., Cowper MSS., 24-62 passim.

6. Nethersole to Trumbull, 4 Oct. 1624, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. art. 5.

influence to obtain the appointment of her protégé John Davenport to the living of St. Stephen, Coleman Street.[1] The promotion of James Ussher to the archbishopric of Armagh was also obtained this way.[2]

Having a foot in both camps, Buckingham was able, when his policies and desires so demanded, to obtain support from either with considerable ease. The Greville connection was not without importance in Buckingham's association with the anti-Howard financial reforms campaign and the interest in naval affairs which inspired him to obtain the admiralty from Nottingham in 1619.[3] An element in this was his sponsorship of Southampton's appointment to the council and probably the offer of the command of the fleet to be sent against the Algerine pirates.[4] Yet Buckingham could not at this stage break the power of the Spanish faction or weaken it's importance to James. Digby was able to revive James's never too-disguised fears of Southampton's militarism and block his appointment to the command of the fleet.[5] Buckingham was behind the attack on Lake at the beginning of 1619 but was unable to replace him with his own candidate, suspected to be John Packer. James chose Sir George Calvert, long associated with the Spanish faction.[6]

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1. The correspondence relating to Davenport's appointment is found in PRO S.P. 14/173/42, 43, 47, 51, 64, 174/14; S.P. 16/13/15.

2. Ussher to Lady Vere, n.d. (1624), B.M. Addit. MS. 4274, f. 32. See also J.F. Maclear, "Puritan Relations with Buckingham", Huntingdon Lib. Quarterly, xxi (1958), 119-21.

3. Gondomar to Philip III, 5/15 July 1618, Corres., ii, 38-39.

4. Southampton to Carleton, 30 Apr. 1619; Sir Ed. Conway to Carleton, 5 May 1619; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1619-1623, 41, 43.

5. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 298-300.

6. Sir T. Wynn to Carleton, 14 Feb. 1619, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1619-23, 14.
Sir E. Harwood to Carleton, 16 Feb. 1619, PRO S.P. 14/105/112.
Samuel Calvert to Trumbull, 23 Dec. 1618, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha., xiv, art. 61. Cal. S.P. Ven., xv, 434-35.

8. James I and the Leadership of the Protestant Cause, 1614-1620.

With the concluding of the Palatine marriage and the sponsoring of the treaty between the United Provinces and the Evangelical Union in early 1613 the great reversal of Jacobean foreign policy had been accomplished. Not only had James assumed the formal leadership of the Reformed, but both his own actions and those of his agents appeared to the leaders of the militant wing of continental calvinism to indicate that further English support could be expected. He also appeared to fulfil the aspirations of political puritanism and had himself set a standard against which his own actions would be judged. This leadership would, however, be tested in a series of crises, beginning with the revolt of the princes in France in 1614 and culminating in the struggle for Bohemia in 1619-20, and be found lacking. Its failure would have the major consequence of driving his erstwhile allies to desperate and novel measures in an attempt to force him into action.

The reasons behind this failure of leadership were many, the financial weakness of the crown, the influence of the Howards and the Spanish faction, James's increasing debility, yet underlying them all was James's sincere and constant refusal to undertake religious politics, particularly when they involved war or rebellion. In this respect his actions in 1612 were illusory; although his alarm at the "catholic league" caused him to take the lead in the formation of a widespread confessional alliance, he had no intention of accepting its consequences. His desire to avoid these consequences was to make him the more receptive to the hopes offered to him by the Spanish faction of a solution to both his foreign and domestic problems by means of a Spanish marriage.

The Howard victory in the domestic political struggles of 1612 and the winter of 1612-13, was considerably assisted by the fact that the major issue of foreign policy outstanding in mid-1613 was the French marriage, the sole rationale of which was its role in Bouillon's scheme for James's intervention

in French politics. By the summer of 1613, however, Bouillon had lost his former influence and had retired to plot with Condé, while the Queen-Regent was using the marriage as a tactic to keep James out of more dangerous areas. The purposelessness of the marriage was compounded by the involvement of the duke of Lenox in the negotiations during the summer of 1613, thereby reviving the association of a "French policy" with the Scots.[1] This provided Northampton with a useful weapon (in the shape of anti-Scots prejudice) against the French marriage.[2] James's activities in 1612 and the reorientation of English policy about the two Bouillon-inspired matches had also caused considerable alarm in Spain and resulted in the dispatch of Sarmiento with instructions to use every means to break off the Anglo-French marriage and revive James's previous interest in a Spanish alliance.[3] The conjunction of Sarmiento and the Spanish faction was now to provide the combination of influence and the political skill necessary to exploit James's dislike of the consequences of the alliances of 1612.

In the beginning of 1614 the crisis between the Queen-Regent and the princes in France finally erupted and Condé, Longueville, Nevers, and Maine, instigated by Bouillon, left the court in a protest against the predominance of the ministers of state and the catholic party led by Épernon and Guise.[4] Bouillon asked for James's support, specifically the continuation of the marriage between Charles and the Princess Christine, "l'authorisation des interventions de vostre Majesté", and his assistance in obtaining the support of the Huguenots. At the same time he gave Edmondes secret information about

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1. Rochester to Edmondes, 1 May 1613; James to Edmondes, 9 June; B.M. Stowe MS. 174, ff. 37-8, 84-88.

2. Lenox to Edmondes, 9 Aug. 1613; Edmondes to Rochester, 14 Nov. 1613; ibid., ff. 150, 186. Sarmiento to Philip III, 26 Sept., 5 Oct. 1613; 15/25 Jan. 1614, Corres. iii, 101-8, 210-17. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 22-3, 59-60.

3. Digby to Edmondes, 20 June, 1612, B.M. Stowe MS. 172, ff. 307-8. Cal. S.P. Ven., xii, 501.

4. Zeller, Minorité de Louis XIII, ii, 140, 169-70. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, For Bouillon's role as instigator, see Perrens, Marriages Espagnols, 490-6. Laugel (Bouillon, ii, 164) argues that it was primarily a demonstration of strength and that a quick treaty was intended.

the intentions of the plotters to deliver to James personally and persuaded him to make an unauthorised journey to England in late January.[1] In February Edmondes drew up a memorandum, "Considerations touching upon the Discontentments of the Prince of Condé", incorporating Bouillon's proposals, which is worth some examination.[2]

The problem was the same as that of 1612, the pro-catholic and pro-Spanish policies of the Regent and the threat to the Huguenots posed by the Spanish marriages. Hence a coalition "of sundrie of the principall men of the state" had been created "to hinder the celebration of the marriages with Spain" and possibly challenge the regency itself.

> The benefitt which the Duke of B. proiecteth will grow thereby are these, that in seeking to putt off the marriages with Spain, there is hope of breaking the same. Secondlie, in nourishing a faction and dyvision amongst the Catholicks, and in procuring the best part of them in the hatred of Spayne to depend on your Majestie; and thirdlie in extinguishing by this meanes the factions amongst those of the religion.

Such a change would mean a favorable French foreign policy. The Princes had also agreed to maintain the liberties of the Huguenots, particularly with regard to the discrimination against them in office-holding. Bouillon considered it vital to have Huguenot support and claimed to have the agreement of Rohan and Sully. He wanted James to obtain Dutch assistance.[3]

Edmondes saw James as having three alternatives, non-intervention, direct support, or "some middle course which might in some sort give comfort to that partye and yett not discontent the state". The presentation of these alternatives was the first time that the reality of the role of the Huguenots

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1. Bouillon to James, 14/24 Jan. 1614; Edmondes to James, 20 Jan. (my own deciphering); PRO S.P. 78/62/11-12, 13-14.

2. B.M. StoweMS. 174, ff. 234-39.

3. Bouillon to Edmondes, 29 Jan./8 Feb.,PRO S.P. 78/62/17.

in English policy in the period since the Edict of Nantes seems to have faced by James and his ministers. The central issue was a perhaps insoluble dilemma; whether to seek a political alliance with the French crown, for a common policy in Germany for example, which would involve the sacrifice of the Huguenots, or to stand solidly behind the Huguenots and their allies, risking the antagonism of the French crown and a civil war in France. Another aspect of this dilemma can be seen in the reaction to the policies of Henry IV. The third "compromise" alternative was self-defeating, lack of foreign support would make French factions more prone to seek private treaties with the crown, while any form of intervention, even "mediation" would only antagonize the crown. In this course of policy lay the seeds of the tragedy of later Anglo-Huguenot relations.

The basis for Edmondes' advocacy of the third alternative was that "it is not to be wished that there should be a recourse to vyolent remedies, but in extreme necessity", hence James should propose himself as mediator between the princes and the crown, advising them and interceding for them. He was to use his influence with Rohan to guarantee his support and Edmondes himself had obtained a promise from Guise not to interfere just before his departure.[1] If, however, a major conflict arose with the possibility of Spanish intervention, "I suppose your Majestie will judge it to be no good cause to remayne les bras croissés." Edmondes himself felt that the whole affair "will be accomodated rather by treatie than otherwyse", and that the coalition with the assistance of Rohan and Guise would be strong enough to force the Queen to agree to a settlement in which James would have a major voice. At the minimum this course of action would procure "the reconciling of those of the religion which will be of no small benefit". James followed Edmondes' advice almost to the letter. On 10 February Edmondes informed Bouillon that James insisted "qu'on ne vienne point à des remedies violans" but would request Rohan and

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1. Ibid.

the body of the Huguenots to agree to "une bonne unyon sur la consideration des occasions presentes" and prevent Guise from intervening. He would use his influence with the Queen to obtain a favourable settlement and desired to be kept informed of all developments. As for the marriage, he was waiting for the Council to give their advice.[1]

The rebellion was very short-lived. The princes had intended to assemble on 5/15 February at Mezieres, where Nevers was governor, but Nevers was initially refused admission by the lieutenant du roi. This halted the momentum of the revolt and on the quick assembly of the royal army the princes accepted the mediation of de Thou. In March they agreed to a conference at Soissons which in May became the treaty of St. Menehould.[2] The Queen agreed to summon the états-généraux and to defer the marriage until the King's majority.[3] The English role in this was minimal, for although James had not intended to intervene in any significant manner, English diplomacy did not even achieve what it did attempt. The effort to persuade Guise to neutrality was, as Edmondes later admitted, a total failure.[4] Nor was any greater success achieved with the Huguenots. Although James did write to Rohan as promised, his letter was extremely cautious and Rohan was not moved to commit himself to the princes.[5] There was a formal reconciliation with Bouillon, his agent Hautefontaine was sent to the camp of the princes, and

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1. Edmondes to Bouillon, 10 Feb., B.M. StoweMS. 174, ff. 244-45. Edmondes to Trumbull, 12 Feb., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xxiv, art. 109. Trumbull was the medium for the important correspondence with Bouillon during this and the following years.

2. Bouillon to Edmondes, 29 Jan./8 Feb., ibid., 12/22 Feb.; B.M. StoweMS. 174, ff. 263-64.

3. A copy of the treaty is B.M. StoweMS. 174, f. 332; see also David Hume to James, 3/13 Apr., ibid., ff. 306-9.

4. Edmondes to Somerset, 13 Feb., PRO S.P. 78/62/24. Guise to Edmondes, 18/28 Feb., B.M. StoweMS. 174, f. 279.

5. B.M. StoweMS. 174, f. 232 is probably a draft of this. Although it is catalogued to Bouillon, the contents point to Rohan.

individuals like Agrippa d'Aubigné joined Condé, but nothing further.[1] There was, however, a curious, and in its way fateful, side-effect of the rebellion on Huguenot politics. For several years the divine Pierre du Moulin had been the advocate of a large general Calvinist synod which would, under the sponsorship of James, settle the various theological controversies. He had been inspired to this by James's actions in 1612 and formally proposed it to the Synod of Tonneins in May 1614, where it was well received. Bouillon, hoping to win the Synod to the support of Condé, agreed to a compromise over Tilenus. In March 1615 Moulin brought his propositions to England but James, determined to avoid confessional politics, showed only nominal interest and made no attempt to support the plan.[2] This was the last effort by the Huguenots to take the leadership in international Calvanist organization.

James's position also inhibited any support for the princes from the other protestant states, particularly the United Provinces.[3] François Aerssens, the Dutch ambassador in Paris, advocated assistance to the princes, but was dismissed by Barneveldt at the request of the Queen-Regent. Aerssens, who attributed this to Barneveldt's religious position, now became, with the assistance of sympathetic Englishmen like Trumbull, Maurice's agent with Bouillon and Condé.[4] The failure of James to take any initiative in this rebellion and later in the second Cleves crisis had a dual effect on Dutch politics: it forced Barneveldt to depend even further on his alliance with

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1. Rohan to James, 3/13 May, 10/20 July, Bodleian Addit. MS. D. 109., ff. 209, 244. Serr, Rohan, 134.

2. Moulin to James, 19 Feb./1 Mar. 1613, PRO S.P. 78/61/66-69. Quick, Synodicon, i, 418, 447-48. Brandt, Hist. Reformation, ii, 153-57. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 384-5. I am most grateful to Dr. W.B. Patterson for letting me read his unpublished article on the Synod of Tonneins.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 89.

4. Aerssens to Trumbull, 25 Mar./4 Apr. 1614, Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iv, 347. Aerssens to Winwood, 10/20 Apr., PRO S.P. 84/69/150.

the French crown while his reliance on this alliance and his refusal to engage independently in religious politics made the breach between him and Maurice of Nassau irreparable.

The English reaction to the rebellion also revealed the division on the council which was to be a permanent feature of all future foreign policy debates. Although James was deeply concerned by the rebellion and was observed to be following events closely, the Howards opposed any form of involvement in France.[1] Suffolk attempted to have Edmondes disciplined for returning without leave, which James refused, and then spread rumours that Edmondes was a bribed agent of Bouillon.[2] Edmondes, who had not been in England since 1610, was amazed at the strength of the Spanish party.[3] James left the question of the marriage to the council, where Northampton was given further opportunity to pursue his campaign of linking the marriage with the Scots.[4] When Edmondes was sent back to France in July 1614, he was given instructions to continue negotiating for the marriage but only as a means of maintaining some influence in French politics.[5]

James's refusal to support the Princes openly and his failure to provide any form of leadership deeply irritated Bouillon:

> My own conjecture is that there is some general conspiracy of the papists against all those of the religion wherever they may be. I do not think that they pay enough attention to this in England in the present state of affairs. I could say and write more about this but letters receive no reply.[6]

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 96-7.

2. Sarmiento to Philip III, 5/15 Mar., 7/17 Mar., Corres., iii, 307-310.

3. Edmondes to Trumbull, 12 Feb., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xxiv, art 109. Sarmiento to Lerma, 7/17 Mar., Corres., iv, 32-38.

4. Sarmiento to Lerma, 7/17 Mar; to Philip III, 29 Apr./9 May; Corres., iv, 35, 41-2.

5. Instructions, drafts of 17 July, 20 July, PRO. S.P. 78/62/71, B.M. Stowe MS. 175, ff. 1-3. See also Zeller, Minorité de Louis XIII, iii, 46-47.

6. Bouillon to Trumbull, 11/21 July 1614, Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iv, 455-56.

Yet, although Edmondes' instructions contained nothing about future relations with the princes, there is some indication that James had received an agent of Condé's in England and that a new understanding had been reached.[1] According to the Venetians, Bouillon had assured James that the *états-généraux* would cause the collapse of the Spanish marriages and enable Charles to marry the eldest French princess.[2] The *états* were, however, a trap, for, although Condé did not realize it until it was too late, the membership was to be predominantly royalist. James himself, curiously enough, had sufficient experience of such assemblies to inform Condé, "that the deputies are to be chosen by the ministers who ... will be able to convenience the former government to the disadvantage of those that oppose it."[3] Edmondes had to report that Condé was in no position to resist this and that, in the débacle which followed the conclusion of the *états*, the reconciliation between Rohan and Bouillon had once more broken down.[4]

The rebellion in France was followed closely in the summer of 1614 by the second Cleves crisis, the first test of James's leadership of the Reformed alliance of 1612-13. In many respects it was to be a preview of the crisis of 1619-1620 and all the contradictions of James's policy were to receive their first public exposure. The most portentous was the connection between parliamentary support and the pursuit of protestant politics which had been understood by Winwood in his unsuccessful efforts in the Parliament of 1614 and even by Barneveldt:

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1. This comes from Sarmiento (to Lerma, 18/28 July, *Corres.*, iv, 230-31). but although there is no reference in English sources, Condé was sending agents abroad in the summer of 1614, see *Cal. S.P. Ven.*, xiii, 188-89.
2. *Ibid.*, 248-9.
3. Somerset to Edmondes, 27 Sept., B.M. StoweMS. 175, ff. 58-9.
4. Edmondes to James, 28 Oct., *ibid.*, ff. 89-91.

> If the King ... will take this matter earnestly ... I cannot doubt that Parliament would co-operate ... and this occasion should be made use of to redress the whole state of affairs.[1]

James refused to reconsider his decision and the resultant paralysis was pathetically illustrated by Abbot's efforts to raise money by the sale of church plate.[2] James's original intention of joint mediation with the French revealed a striking lack of understanding of the effects of his previous French policies. More important was his determination to reach an understanding with Spain. Although all observers, and James himself in 1612, had expected that Spinola would intervene militarily in the next crisis in the Empire, James was now prepared to accept Sarmiento's hints to the contrary and to undertake to persuade the Dutch as well.[3] The shock of the loss of Wesel caused him to muster the militia and threaten to rally the Evangelical Union but as soon as suggestions were made about a compromise James became the eager mediator of the treaty of Xanten. By accepting this he was placing his leadership of the Union, who were preparing for war against what they considered a Spanish effort to cripple their growth, at stake.[4]

The resolution of the crisis depended on the success of the treaty of Xanten, the restoration of Wesel in return for the Dutch evacuation of Jülich. The fundamental issue was the strategic position of the duchies; Spinola was prepared to remain at Wesel where he could both threaten the

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1. Barneveldt to Caron, 3/13 July, 11/21 Nov., Motley, Barneveldt, ii, 15-16.

2. Winwood to Barneveldt, 19/29 Aug., ibid., 12-13. Abbot to Trumbull, 14 July 1614, Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS., iv, 453-8.

3. By 1615 there was a realization of the connection between the internal situation in France and French policy in the Cleves crisis, see Edmondes' Remonstrances (1615), Sig. (A4v) ff. See also Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 185-6, 189-90.

4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 211-12, 219-20, 349-50, 375-6.

eastern United Provinces and inhibit the communications between the Dutch and the Palatinate, while the minimum Dutch demand was free movement through the duchies. At first James accepted their position and was prepared to support them but on Spanish offers of a compromise returned to his efforts to find one.[1] The position of the Spaniards in England was now at its strongest and the Howards used all their influence to persuade James to mediate rather than support the Dutch.[2] His relations with the Dutch were further embittered by the failure of the colonial conference in February 1615 and the Cockayne project.[3] To a certain degree James's actions in this dispute were motivated by his hopes for a Spanish marriage, the first proposals for which came from Spain in the spring of 1615.[4] The revival of the offer in the early months of 1616 caused him to renew his pressure on the Dutch to accept his compromise.[5] He was not, however, prepared to give the Dutch and the Germans the guarantees they demanded and the negotiations dragged on into 1617 achieving nothing but the exacerbation of Anglo-Dutch relations.[6] Even Carleton, now ambassador in the United Provinces, was prepared to admit publicly that James's efforts were pointless.[7]

In the summer of 1615 the resolution of the Cleves crisis became entangled

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1. Ibid., 295-7, 301-2.

2. Ibid., 375-6, 512-13. See also George, Lord Carew to Sir Thomas Roe, 18 Apr. 1615, Carew, Letters, 5.

3. Clark, Colonial Conferences, i, 97, 114, 117-18. Winwood had opposed the Cockayne Project on these grounds. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 99-101. The role of the Howards in inciting commercial clashes with the Dutch deserves further study; see also "Compendious Discourse (on) ... Essex and Somerset", B.M. Harleian MS. 6029, ff. 4v-5, 24.

4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 338. Willson, James, 366-67.

5. Instructions for Carleton, 6 Jan. 1616, Carleton Letters, 3-8.

6. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 205-7, 398.

7. Ibid., 375-6.

in the new revolt of the princes in France. James's actions in this crisis provided further confirmation of his decision not to undertake the political leadership of the Huguenots - although he still hoped for a favourable situation in France and was furious, for example, at Condé's hesitation to support the Parlement de Paris.[1] The failure of Condé's hopes for the <u>états-généraux</u> and the Regent's determination to proceed with the Spanish marriages made the question of armed resistance impossible to evade. Both the princes and the Huguenots looked to James for leadership and Moulin's journey to England in March 1615 with his plan for the synod was also an embassy from the Religion to signify their readiness to undertake his commands.[2] James, however, ordered them to render all obedience to the King so long as the Edict was maintained.[3] In June James made his last effort to dissuade the Queen from the marriages. Edmondes delivered a public Remonstrance in June, which was later printed in England, in which James predicted dire consequences from the union with Spain.[4] At the same time Edmondes attempted to obtain a decision on the marriage, only to find that the Regent had been playing for time and had no intention of concluding the match.[5]

By this time the decision to go through with the Spanish marriages had been made. In mid-August the French court finally departed for the Spanish frontier escorted by an army commanded by Guise, the final symbol of the failure of this element of James's French policy, and Bouillon, Condé, and their followers left the court to rally resistance. James had by this time

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1. Edmondes to Winwood, 22 Mar. 1615; Winwood to Edmondes, 1 Apr; B.M. Stowe MS. 175, ff. 278-80, 290-91.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 384-5. See also life of Moulin in <u>Novelty of Popery</u> (1662), xl.

3. James to Bouillon, 16 Apr. 1615, PRO S.P. 78/63/42.

4. <u>Remonstrances Made by the Kings Majesties Ambassadour unto the French King ....</u> (1615), Sig. (A4v).

5. Zeller, <u>Minorité de Louis XIII</u>, iii, 129.

been in receipt of further requests from the Huguenots for his advice. In mid-July Giovanni-Francesco Biondi was dispatched to Bouillon and Condé and from them to the Huguenot assembly at Grenoble. Biondi was a Venetian patrician who had converted while secretary to the Venetian embassy in Paris in 1605. He had become a servant of James's and was knighted in 1623. Although a close friend of Theodore Turquet de Mayerne and Diodati, he was also an informant to the Venetians on English policy and an agent of the duke of Savoy.[1] In mid-August a second agent, Marin de Boislorée, was sent to the conference at La Rochelle, the headquarters of the rohanistes and the militants. A Huguenot domiciled in England since 1612, Boislorée was a triple agent: he was used by James as an agent for minor missions in France and later made a Gentleman of the Privy Chamber; he functioned periodically as an agent for the Huguenots in England; and from 1613 he was a pensioner of the French crown and probably acted as a spy for the French ambassador in London.[2] The use of such questionable agents for so delicate a situation was a true reflection of the confusion of James's French policy.

James's dilemma was noted by the Venetians:

> the effectuation of the marriages is distasteful to him in the highest degree .... on the other hand he wishes to see France united ... and as he is naturally inclined to peace he cannot make up his mind .... From my own experience I find that the king speaks much more clearly to the Princes of France than he does to those of the religion, with whom he is considered more reserved, possibly because they are a more complex body.[3]

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1. On Biondi see: Budé, Diodati, 255; Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 542-3, xiv, 509-11, xvii, 276; Gabaleone to Buckingham, 13/23 Apr. 1619, Berks. R.O. Packer MS., f. 139.

2. On Boislorée see: Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 549-50; Buisseaux to Villeroy, 2/12 Jan. 1613; Tillieres to Puiseaux, 12/22 Feb., 4/13 Jun. 1620, PRO 31/3/46, f. 9-v, 31/3/53, ff. 73-6, 119v; Herbert to Naunton, 12 Oct. 1620; Naunton to Herbert, 12 Jan. 1621; Calvert to Herbert, 18 Mar., 1622; PRO 30/53/3, f. 134, /4, f. 10, /5, f. 69. Boislorée to James, 25 Feb. 1621, PRO S.P. 78/69/67. Effiat to Louis XIII, 14/24 Feb. 1625, Documents Illustrating the Impeachment of Buckingham in 1626, ed. S.R. Gardiner (Camden Soc., New Ser., xiii, 1889), 150-51.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 545-50.

He no longer treated the concluding of the marriage as cause for intervention but only the "incorporation" of France and Spain and unconstitutional actions by the French crown and offered instead to mediate for the princes.[1] With the Huguenots he was even more careful. Biondi was to make contact with Bouillon first and then with his advice go on to the Assembly at Grenoble. On 3/13 September he addressed the Assembly in James's name, making two points, that violent methods should not be employed, and that they could only rely on James's support if the Edict were violated, the constitution of France threatened, and France joined to Spain.[2] The same message was taken by Boislorée to La Rochelle and later to the meeting between the Huguenots and the princes.[3] He may not have been successful in obtaining their confidence as they appear to have regarded him with suspicion. In September Condé sent an emissary, the marquis de Bonnivet, to England to solicit arms and military support from James but without success.[4] Bouillon also tried to convince James that the Queen, who had already been receiving some Spanish military assistance, could only be countered by joint action of the protestant states, but also unsuccessfully.[5] James's refusal to act probably prevented a full-scale civil war as Spinola was expected to come to the aid of Regent if she was seriously threatened, while the Dutch and the Palatinate would have assisted the princes

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1. James to Condé, 6 Aug., PRO S.P. 78/63/266-67. Winwood to Edmondes, 5 Sept., B.M. StoweMS. 175, ff. 347-50.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven, xiii, 542-3. Biondi to (Winwood), 30 Aug./9 Sept., PRO S.P. 78/63/318-20. There is a copy of his address in the PRO (S.P. 78/64/63-4) and another in M. Bouchitté, Negotiations, Pièces, et Lettres Relatives à la Conference de Loudon (Collection des Documents Inedites sur l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1862), 78-79.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiii, 545-50. Villiers to Edmondes (early Aug.), Birch, Negotiations of Edmondes, 406-9. Instructions for Boislorée (early Aug.), PRO S.P. 78/60/283.

4. Boislorée to Winwood, Oct. 1615, PRO S.P. 78/64/182. James to Condé, 7 Sept. 1615; Des Maretz to Du Maurier, 6/16 Oct; PRO S.P. 78/64/11, 136. See also Bouchitté, Loudon, 163, n.1.

5. Bouillon to (Winwood), 23 Sept./3 Oct. 1615, PRO S.P. 78/ 64/41.

if James had taken the lead.[1] He would only provide for the protection of Sedan against a surprise by Spinola.[2]

In the absence of support the resistance failed. Despite a strong military effort by Bouillon, Condé was unable to prevent the Regent's progress to the frontier and her return.[3] Without James's encouragement the Huguenot response was lukewarm and only a small group under Rohan joined Condé.[4] Among informed Englishmen the course of events caused some restiveness. Edmondes hinted strongly that James might do more to assist the princes and he was angered by reports that the French and Spanish ambassadors in England were attempting to discredit him with James as a fosterer of malcontents and that the printing of his Remonstrance had been interfered with, although Winwood assured him it was not so.[5] Writing privately to Lisle, Sir John Throckmorton could be more outspoken:

> I beleave the busynes will not be soe easily composed as his Majesty our Master maketh account it will, as I knowe he hath sent over certaine articles unto the Queen Regent by which he offereth to be an arbitrator to reconsile all these discontentments betweene her and the Princes. Unto your Lordship, my Lord, this: some of his brave predessors woulde have made other uses of these advantages.[6]

After the failure to prevent the marriages, Condé decided to seek peace,

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 8-10.

2. Ibid., xiii, 542-3. Winwood to Trumbull, 3 Jan. 1616, Berks. R.O. TRumbull MS. Alpha. xlvii, art. 100.

3. Laugel, Bouillon, ii, 165.

4. Treaty of Lanlay, 20/30 Nov. 1615, copy in Bodl. Tanner MS, 74, ff. 57-58. Perrens, Marriages Espagnols, 539.

5. Edmondes to James, 25 Aug. 1615, PRO S.P. 78/63/293-97; John Woodford to Edmondes, 3 Sept. 1615; Winwood to Edmondes, 5 Sept; B.M. Stowe MS. 175, ff. 345-6, 347-50.

6. 16 Aug. 1615, Hist. MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., v, 306-7.

to the dismay of his Huguenot allies who were prepared to continue their resistance.[1] He wished, however, that James would be a guarantor of this treaty and requested that Edmondes be present at the negotiations. An agent, M. de Courtenay, was sent to England to sollicite James personally and appeals were also made through Pembroke and Villiers. James was glad to be offered an opportunity to mediate and Condé was assured of his support.[2] Edmondes' role in the treaty was, however, more complicated. Although he and the duke of Nevers were the agents of the agreement by Condé in December 1615 which established the conference at Loudon, the Regent adamantly refused Condé's request that Edmondes be a formal party to the treaty.[3] He was allowed at length to be present and he was an important influence in both the acceptance of the treaty by the princes and later by the Huguenots, who initially had refused their agreement. In early April 1616 Edmondes and Sully were sent to La Rochelle to persuade and bully them into acceptance. This was only accomplished by emphasizing James's support for the treaty and his guarantee for its implementation.[4]

The treaty of Loudon was anything but a success. The Regent had no intention of restoring the princes of the blood to political power and James himself doubted that she would.[5] She also deeply resented the intervention of Edmondes in the treaty and was determined that the English would never play a similar role again.[6] Finally Rohan and his followers considered

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1. Anquez, Assemblées Politiques, 276-8.

2. Edmondes to Winwood, 22 Dec. 1615, PRO S.P. 78/64/223-6. Winwood to Trumbull, 3 Jan. 1616, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. ALpha, xlvii, art. 100. Pembroke to Edmondes, 24 Mar. 1616, B.M. StoweMS. 175, f. 380. Condé to Villiers, 1/11, 11/21, Mar. 1616, Bodl. Addit. MS. D. 109., ff.263, 265.

3. Edmondes to Winwood, 22 Dec. 1615, ibid., Bouchitté, Loudon, 269-73. Ponchartrain, Mémoires, 442-3.

4. Bouchitté, Loudon, 573-4. Ponchartrain, 436. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 183-85. The treaty of Loudon was finally signed on 23 April/3 May 1616.

5. Winwood to Edmondes, 1 Apr. 1616, B.M. Stow MS. 176, f. 9-10.

6. Ponchartrain, 442-43.

themselves betrayed by the princes and forced into the peace. From this point Rohan began to take his "third force" theories seriously and henceforth took an independent position, refusing further support for Condé.[1] Yet whatever his doubts about the treaty, and influenced by the optimism of Edmondes who as late as May considered that its results were favourable, James now expected Condé to be the dominant influence at the French court and decided that close relations with France were possible and the French marriage worthwhile.[2] The revival of the marriage negotiations was assigned to Edmondes and to James, Lord Hay who was sent to join him in the summer of 1616. The choice of Hay may have been due to his "French" orientation but may also reflect the influence of Villiers, his great crony.

On his arrival in France in July, however, Hay found both the Princes out of power and the Queen unwilling to consider the marriage. The negotiations proceeded no further.[3] A more important aspect to his embassy was his relationship to Condé and Bouillon who were now actively plotting the overthrow of Concini and possibly the Regent herself. According to French accounts not only was Hay's embassy to provide a cover for their activities but Hay himself was a participant and encouraged them in James's name.[4] There is, however, no evidence of this in English sources. His instructions presupposed that the Princes were still in power while his dispatches, especially those on the arrest of Condé, gave no indication that he was aware of what was going on.[5]

The arrest of Condé on 21/31 August 1616 was intended by the Regent,

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1. Anquez, Assemblées Politiques, 278.

2. Winwood to Edmondes and Hay, 19 Aug. 1616; James to Sir Daniel Dunne, 3 June 1616; PRO S.P. 78/65/226, 66/38-39. Edmondes to (Winwood), May 1616, B.M. StoweMS. 176, ff. 20-21.

3. Hay and Edmondes to Winwood, 31 July; Winwood to Edmondes and Hay, 19 Aug; PRO S.P. 78/66/20-33, 38-39.

4. Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, 105-6. Zeller, Minorité de Louis XIII, iii, 304. Serr, Rohan, 187.

5. Instructions for Hay, B.M. Egerton MS. 2592, ff. 17-18. Hay and Edmondes to Winwood, 21 Aug., PRO S.P. 78/66/47-9.

with the acquiesance of Rohan, as an answer to the plotting of the princes, but most of his confederates, including Bouillon, remained at liberty. James was disturbed by the news but Edmondes urged strongly that unless he was prepared to intervene effectively he should abstain. James agreed and Edmondes, who had recently been appointed Comptroller of the Household, was permitted to return to England with Hay.[1] The situation in France suggested, however, that a new and more serious rebellion would take place and the puritan faction in England, with the added support of Edmondes, now pressed James to take decisive action. Sir Dudley Carleton was given permission to assist in the provision of arms for La Rochelle from the United Provinces and contact was reestablished with Bouillon, Winwood wishing him to be informed that "I am both his servant and a servant to the common cause."[2]

At the beginning of February 1617 the Baron du Tour was sent by the Regent to England to persuade James not to intervene but in the meantime Bouillon had come out in open revolt and had made overtures to the Huguenots with some success and was attempting to gain both Dutch and English support.[3] James promised him to protect Sedan and sent Edmondes back to France to attempt a final appeal to Louis XIII. If this failed he was ready to take the step urged by the puritan faction of "uniting the Princes of France, the United States, and the protestant princes of Germany in a league of which he shall be the head". He [redacted] wrote to Frederick V to ask for his support in such an eventuality.[4] Yet James, who at this time was deeply engaged in the

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1. Edmondes to Winwood, 9 Oct. 1616; Winwood to Edmondes, 24 Oct; B.M. Stowe MS. 176, ff. 34-5, 45-6. The French were suspicious that Edmondes was returning to urge James to stronger action, see Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 383-4.

2. Carleton to Edmondes, 6 Dec. 1616, B.M. Stowe MS. 176, ff. 71-72. Winwood to Carleton, 31 Dec. 1616, Carleton Letters, 82-83. Winwood to Trumbull, 31 Dec. 1616, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xlvii, art. 131. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 400-1, 401-2.

3. Discourse on French affairs (probably by Edmondes), March 1617, PRO S.P. 78/67/45-50. Bouillon to Carleton, 11/21 Mar. 1617, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 184. Zeller, Minorite de Louis XIII, iv, 162.

4. James to Bouillon, 25 Jan. 1617; James to Elector Palatine, 6 Mar; PRO S.P. 78/67/59, 81/15/26. Sir John Throckmorton to Carleton, 12 Feb. 1617, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1611-18, 434.

revival of the Spanish marriage negotiations, was extremely uneasy at these steps. The failure of the revolt to make headway caused him to lose patience quickly: "His Majesty said that he perceived the Monsieurs continued their accustomed fiddling and giddy fashion, but said no more!"[1] When the news came of the assassination of Concini and the assumption of power by Louis XIII, James was overjoyed and ordered Edmondes to thank the assassin for his "good service", which would enable him to evade any further commitments in France.[2]

The collapse of James's French policy in 1616-1617 was accompanied by other indications of his lack of interest in taking the leadership of the Reformed. The surrender of the Cautionary Towns in the beginning of 1616, although for financial reasons, was widely interpreted as a collapse of English influence in the United Provinces and as a sign of Spanish influence in England.[3] More serious was the decision to open formal negotiations for a Spanish marriage in March 1617. James's interest in this marriage was already causing concern among the Dutch and the Germans and rumours were deliberately fostered by the French in an effort to damage Anglo-Dutch relations. In February 1617 Carleton wrote to Winwood in some alarm asking for reassurance and stressing the serious effect the rumours were having. Winwood could only relate what he had been told, that James would ensure that the match would not cause "either prejudice to the religion we now profess, (or) weakness in any sort to the alliances his Majestie holdeth."[4]

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1. Buckingham to Winwood, 3 Apr. 1617, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 192. John Woodford to Edmondes, 12 Mar. 1617, B.M. Stow MS. 176, ff. 74-77.

2. Buckingham to Edmondes, 27 Apr. 1617, Ibid., ff. 89-90.

3. Throckmorton to Lisle, 31 Jan., 6 Feb. 1616, Hist. MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., v, 391-2, 395-7. Edmondes to Winwood, ? May 1616, B.M. Stow MS. 176, ff. 20-21.

4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 207-8. Carleton to Winwood, 6 Feb. 1617; Winwood to Carleton, 1 Mar; Carleton Letters, 94-7, 105-7.

As Winwood and the other opponents of the marriage were now to be excluded from the negotiations, such assurances would no longer be an accurate reflection of James's policies.

The course of English policy in the years 1614 to 1617 was a source of great disillusion to those who had greeted the initiatives of 1612. As Sir John Throckmorton wrote from Flushing on 26 September 1615:

> My heare (sic) standeth upright upon my ... heade ... to heare what is spoken of our dear and dread soveraigne, and howe theye speake of him, and of his tytle as defender of the faythe they make a very jest of it, the carriage of the business of Wesell, and nowe of France, hathe utterly everye where and with all nations cryed him downe. Bothe his owne honour and that antient glorye of our nation is lost. Our days are become the verye dayes of sorrow and mourning, and their is noe man left that will stand upp before His Majesty to speake freely and loyally of these things.[1]

Barneveldt was at a loss to understand how James could fail to honour his commitments in the crisis over Cleves:

> His majesty is first king of the religion, he bears the title Defender of the Faith. His religion, his only daughter, his son-in-law, are all especially interested besides his own dignity, besides the common weale.[2]

James's reaction to the rebellions in France further diminished his prestige in the United Provinces:

> Our deare Master for his irresolution or raythe r, as these people (of Zealand) terme it, his resolution not to assist the Churche of God nor the professors thereof is cryed downe bothe heare and in France by those, as I saye, of the Religion, and I assure your Lordship that he hathe utterly lost the affection of these people in Zealande.[3]

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1. To Lisle, Hist. MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., v, 319-20.

2. To Caron, n.d.(late 1614), 21 Nov. 1614, Motley, Barneveldt, ii, 15-16, 17-18.

3. Throckmorton to Lisle, 12 Oct. 1615, Hist. MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., v, 324-5.

His own writings were now used in catholic anti-Huguenot propaganda in France.[1]

The disillusion with James's leadership caused the puritan faction to look for methods to provoke war with the Hapsburgs and force James into action.[2] Winwood, for one, appears to have tried to set such schemes in motion; the most famous example being the release of Raleigh and the second Guiana Voyage. At the same time he was trying to cajole the Venetians and the Savoyards into attacking Spain in the Milanese and possibly the Dutch into an attempt to regain Wesel.[3] After the initiation of the marriage negotiations such provocations became even more necessary but the possibilities were diminished by Winwood's death in October 1617.[4] The Dutch, reported Carleton, had not lamented the death of an Englishman to such a degree since the death of Essex.[5]

The other effect of James's inaction was to surrender the initiative to other protestant states. This was particularly true in Germany where the impending death of the Emperor Matthias and the probability of the election of Ferdinand of Styria was causing serious alarm in the Palatinate. In 1616 Schönberg had been sent to England to enlist the support of James in preventing Ferdinand's election as King of the Romans but without success.[6] In July 1617 Frederick V went to Sedan to confer with Bouillon about the scheme for supporting the candidature of the duke of Bavaria in the next imperial election and Frederick asked for Edmondes and an agent from the United Provinces to be present. Edmondes' role in this conference is unclear; although he was under general orders to be of assistance to Frederick, he

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1. G. Ascoli, La Grande Bretagne devant l'Opinion Française au xvii^e Siècle (Paris, 1930), i, 24-25.
2. Throckmorton to Lisle, 19 Jan. 1616, Hist. MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., v, 385-6. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 354-5.
3. Cal. S.P. Ven, xiv, 385-87. Winwood to Carleton, 31 Dec. 1616, Carleton Letters, 82-83.
4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xv, 339-41.
5. Carleton to Chamberlain, 8 Nov. 1617, Birch, Court of James, ii, 51-52.
6. Cal. S.P. Ven., xiv, 207-8.

appears to have gone to Sedan without authority. His correspondence with England over this meeting has not survived and all we know is that he did join in the discussion of the Bavarian candidacy and agreed to act as Frederick's agent in investigating the French reaction to the idea.[1] James's reaction was swift; Edmondes was recalled and censured and Albertus Morton sent to Frederick to advise him not to interfere with the election. This information comes from Gondomar which suggests that James's repudiation of Edmondes was another example of his influence over the King at this time.[2]

A final opportunity for James to reassert his authority over the Reformed Church before the Bohemian crisis was provided by the Synod of Dort, the real significance of which lay more in what it was not, the great theological-political conference of the Reformed, than what it was. For this the responsibility lies with James whose sponsorship as "Defender of the Faith" of such an assembly had been desired for some years. Yet despite his earlier interest in Dutch religious affairs and his anti-Remonstrant and anti-Barneveldt position since the end of 1613, he personally played a minimal role in the events leading up to the Synod. Sir Dudley Carleton's instructions on the commencement of his embassy in 1616 ordered him to assist "the true professors of the Gospel" and to "let fall, how hateful the maintenance of these erroneous opinions is to the majesty of God, how displeasing unto us ....", but little else.[3] As the crisis developed in 1616 and 1617, however, this commission became of some importance as Carleton, with the support of Winwood, took up Winwood's old position of alliance with Maurice and the Counter-

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1. Ibid., xv, 2. Edmondes to Winwood, 22 July 1617; Frederick to Edmondes, ? July 1617; B.M. Stowe MS. 176, ff. 118, 119-20.

2. Gondomar to Philip III, 24 July/3 Aug., 19/29 Aug. 1617; to Archduke Albert, 5/15 Dec. 1617; Corres., i, 89, 95, 150-51. Consulta by Gondomar, 4/14 Jan. 1619, S.R. Gardiner, ed., Letters and Documents Illustrating the Relations between England and Germany at the Commencement of the Thirty Years War (1618-20) (Camden Soc., xc, dcviii, 1865, 1868), i, 27-31.

3. Instructions, 6 Jan. 1616, Carleton Letters, 7.

Remonstrants. Given James's predilection for the Counter-Remonstrants, Carleton was thus given fairly free rein; "you are sur les lieus, and therefore are best able to advise what is to be done for the honor of his Majesty and the maintenance of religion".[1] When the debate developed over the calling of a synod, both Carleton and James came out in favour of the Counter-Remonstrant proposal for a national synod with representatives of the other churches present.[2]

From this point Carleton became fully engaged in the debates in the States-General, welcomed by Maurice and resented by the Remonstrants, who perhaps exaggerated his role in their propaganda against "foreign interference".[3] Yet despite the fact that he supported the Elector Palatine's dispatch of divines to help "pacify" the Dutch church and despite the desire of Carleton and Sir Edward Harwood that he would "continue his countenance to the cause" and make his weight felt, James took no initiative in the establishment of the Synod. The English delegates were summoned by invitation from the States-General and given no particular importance as the representatives of the Defender of the Faith. There was some debate on the subject in England, as Lake showed himself very much against the idea, while Abbot and, in his leisurely way, Pembroke, were after the death of Winwood, its chief supporters.[4] The actual choice of the English delegates, Joseph Hall, George Davenant, George Carleton, Samuel Ward, and Thomas Goad, one of Abbot's Chaplains, was, it appears, left to Abbot which would explain why they came from the Calvinist

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1. Winwood to Carleton, 16 Feb., 1617, also Carleton to Winwood, 14 Jan. 1617, Ibid., 101-2, 86-90.

2. Carleton to Winwood, 18 Feb. 1617; James to States-General, 20 Mar. 1617; ibid., 98-101, 122-23.

3. Maurice to James, 2/12 Dec. 1617, B.M. Lansdowne MS. 1237, f. 42, Blok, History of the Netherlands, iii, 445-46.

4. James to Carleton, 12 July 1617; Winwood to Carleton, 26 July; Carleton Letters, 155. Sir Edward Harwood to Carleton, 20 Dec. 1617, PRO S.P. 14/94/69. Pembroke to Samuel Ward, 17 Jan. 1619, Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, f. 182.

party in the hierarchy. Their instructions were quite moderate; although they were to support the Counter-Remonstrant position, they were to take no initiative.[1]

These instructions specifically excluded any further proposals for unity or any political schemes which might well have met with a positive response. Bouillon was very interested in the Synod and was said to be looking for some political result. Pierre du Moulin wanted James to sponsor his plan for the reconciliation with the Lutherans at the Synod but James was not interested and Maurice did not wish to complicate the proceedings by introducing them himself.[2] Instead the Synod pointed to the growing weakness in the political position of the Reformed. The refusal of Louis XIII to permit the French delegation to attend, whether from disapproval of the execution of Barneveldt or the desire to break the foreign ties of the Huguenots, was an ominous demonstration of their growing isolation and by implication the inability of the Church to protect its constituent parts.

Equally importantly the Synod produced no common policy towards the revolt of the Bohemians; the initial reactions to the Bohemian crisis were, instead, to be dominated by the precedent of the Cleves crisis of 1614. Spanish policy was aimed at protecting the Emperor and preventing James from taking up the leadership of the Evangelical Union. Gondomar, in offering James the opportunity to negotiate, was hoping to repeat his success of 1614.[3] James

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1. Abbot to Ward, 10 Aug. 1618, Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, f. 124. Cal. S.P. Ven., 250-52. Instructions to the Delegates are in Collier, Ecclesiastical History, vii, 409-10.

2. Langerac to Barneveldt, 9/19 May 1618, Motley, Barneveldt, ii, 218-19. Catherine de Parthenay to duchess de La Tremouille, ? Nov. 1618, Lettres de Catherine de Parthenay, 108. Moulin to Carleton, 28 Nov./ 8 Dec. 1618; Carleton to Naunton, 16 Dec. 1618; Carelton Letters, 318-19, 325-26. S. Ward to Ussher, 26 May 1619, Ussher, Works, xv, 144-45.

3. Consulta by Gondomar, 4/14 Jan. 1619, Letters and Documents 1618-20, i, 27-31. S.R. Gardiner, History of England ... 1603-1642 (1905), iii, 283-84. Cal. S.P. Ven., xv, 343-45.

was also influenced by the Cleves precedent for, although he was more than ready to mediate, he also wished to prevent any weakening of the position of the Bohemian protestants.[1] To other Englishmen, the Cleves precedent proved that no Spanish offer to mediate could be trusted. Archbishop Abbot wrote to Trumbull that he could not forget Wesel and Aix-la-Chapelle.[2] Furthermore, the events in Bohemia offered exciting possibilities, even to the fastidious Wotton:

> The actions in Bohemia give us leave to be wanton, about which although modus non placet, I mean the throwing of councillors out of windows, and other circumstances of popular sollevation, yet considering upon what just causes, and pernicious discoveries it began, I am sorry the remedies were so violent that were so necessary.[3]

In England the initial debate over the crisis was caused by the embassy of Christoph von Dohna from Frederick at the end of 1618 to obtain the renewal of the treaty with the Union and to probe James's views on the Bohemian situation. Although James refused to condone any "illegal" actions in Bohemia, or make the issue one of religion, he did agree to the renewal of the treaty, thereby creating the belief in the puritan faction that he would in time come to the assistance of the Bohemians.[4] Dohna was given the impression by these men, who at the same time were urging the Dutch to put pressure on James, that if decisive steps were taken James could be brought round. It was this impression that Weiss has considered to be central to the Palatine belief that James was fundamentally committed to

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1. Buckingham to Philip III, 30 Sept. 1618, Letters and Documents 1618-20, i, 13. Cal. S.P. Ven., xv, 358-60. E. McCabe, "English Foreign Policy in 1619 and Lord Doncaster's Embassy to the Princes of Germany", Mitteilungen des Institutes fur Oesterreichishe Geshichtsforschung, lviii, (1950), 460-61.

2. Abbot to Trumbull, 27 Mar. 1619, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha., i, art.38.

3. Wotton to Carleton, 1 Oct. 1618, Smith, Wotton, ii, 157-59.

4. McCabe, op. cit., 468-69. Wynn to Carleton, 14 Feb. 1619, Court and Times of James, ii, 135-37. Cal. S.P. Ven., xv, 443-45.

the defence of religion and that his warnings need not be taken seriously.[1] This embassy also saw the emergence of what was to be one of the major issues of the next few years: James's attempt to regard the Bohemian affair as a purely Imperial problem and his refusal to accept the position that the crisis was one of religion in which the major enemy was Spain, financing the various catholic parties and, through Spinola's army, threatening the Palatinate. The goal of Palatine diplomacy and that of their English allies was not necessarily full-scale support from James in Germany, but the diversion, either by diplomacy or force, of Spanish resources away from Germany.[2]

James's response to the embassy of Dohna was the embassy of Hay, now Viscount Doncaster. As in the case of Sir Henry Wotton's embassy to the United Provinces in 1614, events moved far too swiftly for the original instructions to have any relevance, a problem which was compounded by Doncaster's fecklessness, and the fact that the embassy, announced in February 1619, did not leave until May. With this embassy James abdicated the leadership of the Reformed, refusing to act before Doncaster reported. This abdication gave other leaders, including Frederick V, their opportunity. Maurice of Nassau was ready for a war; the States-General less so but prepared to join with the English to assist the Bohemians. They received the tart response from James that "the embroiling of Germany in a warre would do them but little good."[3] Bouillon also felt that a major conflict was imminent and although he was more cautious than Frederick, preferring him to become

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1. Commissioners to States-General, 23 Jan./2 Feb. 1619, Letters and Documents 1618-1620, i, 38. Frederick to James, 1/11 Mar. 1619, Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, f. 252. J.G. Weiss, "Die Vorgeschichte des Böhmischen Abenteures Freidrichs V von der Pfalz", Zeitschrift fur die Geschichte des Oberrheins (New Ser., liii, 1939-40), 424-25. Also E. Weiss, Die Unterstützung Freidrichs V von der Pfalz durch Jacob I und Karl I von England im Dreissigjahrigen Kreig (Stuttgart, 1966), 18-19.

2. Frederick to James, 1/11, 2/12 Mar., Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, ff. 250, 252.

3. Carleton to Calvert, 18 May, Calvert to Carleton, 29 May, 1619, Letters and Documents 1618-1620, i, 92-3, 97-8. Weiss, "Vorgeschichte", 391.

protector rather than King of Bohemia, he attempted to win James's support with a "cunning and a fine disquisition".[1]

During the course of his embassy, Doncaster became increasingly pro-Palatine and this position was shared by most English agents abroad including another client of Buckingham's, the new ambassador to France, Sir Edward Herbert. Like all English ambassadors, Herbert had standing instructions to assist Frederick and this now took the form of recruiting in France for him, although James put an end to it after Frederick accepted the Bohemian throne.[2] A similar role was played by Isaac Wake in Savoy, who assisted in the transfer of Mansfeldt's army from the Savoyard to the Bohemian service.[3] Frederick's election was greeted by Trumbull as removing:

> all appearance of reconciliation with the house of Austria. Were he seconded with the power and assistance of his Majestie; I should have no doubt that in a shorte time all cause of feare would be taken away from those of the reformed Religion.[4]

Herbert saw it in similar terms:

> God forbid he should refuse yt, being the apparent way His providence hath opened to the ruine of the Papacie. I hope, therefore, his Majestie will assist in this great work.[5]

The news of the election was brought to England at the end of August 1619 by Doncaster's secretary Francis Nethersole, who was accompanied by

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1. Bouillon to Doncaster, 25 May/4 June 1619; Naunton to Doncaster, 10 June; Doncaster to Bouillon (mid-June); B.M. Egerton MS. 2592, ff. 85, 94, 132v. Weiss, "Vorgeschichte", 472-3. Spanheim, Vie de Dohna, 210-11. Bouillon also advised Achatius von Dohna during his embassy in England in 1620 but this correspondence has not survived. See A. von Dohna to Trumbull, 15 June 1620, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha, xxiv, art. 11.

2. B.M. Addit. MS. 7082, ff. 17, 19, 24-27. Naunton to Carleton, 10 Dec. 1619, PRO S.P. 84/93/192. Herbert to James, 31 Dec. 1619, PRO 30/53/2 f.7v.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 58.

4. Trumbull to Doncaster, 28 Aug. 1619, B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, f. 10.

5. Herbert to Naunton, 9 Sept. 1619, Gardiner, Letters and Documents, ii, 12-13.

Christoph von Dohna from Frederick to ask for James's advice on acceptance. With him Dohna brought letters from Elizabeth for Buckingham and probably Abbot, as well as others of her friends, asking them to "use your best meanes in persuading his Majestie to show himself, now in his helping of the Prince here, a true loving father to us."[1] Only the letter to Buckingham has survived but Abbot's letter to Naunton of 12 September refers to correspondence with both the Elector and the Electress. Weiss has considered Goodman's anecdote of the letter from Abbot, telling them to accept the throne whatever James's reaction as he would have to support them, which Elizabeth displayed during her exile, to be a reference to an answer to their letters and a major influence on Frederick's decision.[2] The importance attached to Buckingham's support was probably the result of Doncaster's frequent promises during the summer and autumn. Also not without influence at this point was the support of Naunton who promised Doncaster all assistance and who shared the apocalytic view of the situation:

> I hope God will assist his owne cause and inspire his Majestie with a kingly zeale to make his Church that is now militant to become triumphant .... When we have watched and planted, we must submit & committ the increase to be given by Him.[3]

Further evidence that Frederick was relying more on popular support in England than a definite commitment by James is provided by his letter to Bouillon of 14/24 September:

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1. Elizabeth to Buckingham, 12 Aug. 1619, Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, f. 219.

2. Abbot to Naunton, 12 Sept., Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, ff. 221-2. G. Goodman, Memoirs of the Court of James I (1839), 239-40. Weiss, "Beitrage zur Beurteilung des Kurfürsten Friedrich V von der Pfalz", Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins, New Ser. xlvi (1932) 40, 46-7.

3. Naunton to Doncaster, 2, 3 Sept. 1619, B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, ff. 13, 15.

> Je me promets aussi toute assistance du Roy d'Angleterre mon beau-pere, duquel je n'ay encore nulle response sur le sujet de cette nouvelle, dont je lui ay donne part. Mais tous les seigneurs & le peuple de ce pais-là me temoignent beaucoup de joy & d'affection.[1]

James's response was to summon the Council to meet in his absence under the chairmanship of Buckingham to discuss Dohna's propositions and offer advice for his own decision. This meeting was held at Whitehall on 10 September.[2] By 11 September, however, word reached England that Frederick had accepted and a more serious discussion was necessary.[3] James summoned another meeting for Sunday 12 September in his presence at Wanstead. As is well known he prevented any discussion by stating directly that he would not support the Elector at this point but then went on to say ambiguously that he would have to study the question further and that the onset of winter made an immediate decision unnecessary.[4] Although, as Willson has pointed out, the former leading members of the Spanish faction, Gondomar and the Howards, were no longer present, the new members were still able to exert considerable pressure, particularly as they told James what he himself wanted to hear.[5] Their main arguments, which were to remain the leading arguments

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1. H. de Bethune, Ambassade Extraordinaire de Messieurs les Duc de Angouleme, Comte de Bethune ... en l'Annee MDCXX (Paris, 1667), 95-6.

2. Naunton, Speech to Council, 10 Sept., PRO S.P. 81/16/283-4. Sir Julius Caesar, Notes of Council Meeting, 10 Sept., B.M. Addit. MS. 34324, f. 107. Naunton to Doncaster, 2 Sept., B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, f. 15.

3. The news which reached England on 11 Sept. (see Chamberlain to Carleton, 11 Sept., Letters, ii, 262-64.) must have been little more than a rumour as the final decision was not taken in Heidelberg until the 8/18 September.

4. The best accounts of this meeting are found in two extracts, dated 16 and 19 September, of newsletters sent to Trumbull which he sent on to Doncaster, B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, ff. 45, 46-7. They are also found in Birch, Court and Times of James (ii, 188-90, 191-2), erroneously addressed to Doncaster. See also Trumbull to Doncaster, 2 Oct., B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, ff. 58-60. Other useful accounts are those of the Savoyard ambassador, Gabaleone (in Reade, Sidelights, i, 244), and the Venetian, see Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 18-19.

5. Willson, James, 410-11.

of the anti-interventionist position over the next few years, were two: that James's goal should be mediation and therefore he should completely disassociate himself from Frederick lest he appear biased, and that the dispute was purely a German one, involving infractions of the Imperial constitution, and hence it should not be seen as a war of religion. The fact that James himself had already accepted these arguments contributed greatly to the influence of the Spanish faction.[1]

In taking this stand James was assisted by a blunder of Frederick's. Although his motivation in accepting the Bohemian election was predominantly religious, as he informed Bouillon, James, and other protestant leaders, "mon seul but est de servir Dieu & son église", he also wished to obtain French support by dampening the religious issue.[2] Specifically he wanted James and Bouillon to persuade Louis XIII that the Bohemian revolt was not motivated by religion.[3] James reacted strongly against this suggestion of "hypocrisy". This became one of his leading grievances against Frederick during 1619 and 1620 and gave him a justification for his refusal to support the Bohemian cause.[4]

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 248-50. Buckingham to Gondomar, (mid 1620), Rushworth, Collections, i, 16.

2. Frederick to Bouillon, 14/24 Sept.,1619, Bethune, Ambassades, 95-96
Frederick to Buckingham, 12/22 Sept., Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, f. 223.
Frederick to States-General, 15/25 Oct., Carleton Letters, 420-21.

3. Bouillon to Louis XIII, 22 Dec. 1619/1 Jan. 1620, Bethune, Ambassades, 97-100. See also Frederick to Sir E. Herbert, 14/24 Sept. 1619, Hist. MSS. Comm., Westmoreland &c. (Powis) MSS., 384.

4. James to Frederick, ? Oct. 1619, Letters and Documents, 1618-1620, ii, 62-64. Sir J. Caesar, notes of council meeting 29 Sept. 1620, B.M. Addit. MS. 34234, f. 119. His Majesties Declaration touching his proeedings in the Late Parliament (1621/22), 27-29.

The reaction of political puritanism to Frederick's acceptance received perhaps its fullest expression in the celebrated letter that Abbot sent to Naunton on 12 September:

> my humble advice [for the Council meeting] is, that there should be no going back, but a countenancing of it against all the world ... I am satisfied in my conscience that the cause is just ... And when God hath set up the Prince, that is chosen to be a work of honour through all Christendom, to propagate his Gospel, and to protect the oppressed; I dare not for my part give advice, but follow where God leads.
>
> And methinks I do in this, and in that of Hungary, foresee the work of God, that by piece and piece, the Kings of the Earth that gave their power unto the Beast (all the word of God must be fulfilled) shall now tear the Whore, and make her desolate, as St. John in his Revelation hath foretold. I pray you therefore with all the spirits you have, to put life into this business; and let a return be made into Germany with speed, and with comfort, and let it be really prosecuted, that it may appear to the world, that we are awake when God in this sort calleth us. Our striking will comfort the Bohemians, will honour the Palsgrave, will strengthen the Union, will bring on the States of the Low Countries, will stir-up the King of Denmark, and will move his two uncles the Prince of Orange and the Duke of Bouillon, together with Tremouille (a rich prince in France) to cast in their shares; and Hungary I hope (being in that same cause) will run the same fortune. For the means to support the war, I hope providebit Deus: the Parliament is the old and honourable way, but how assured at this time I know not; yet I will hope the best. Certainly if countenance be given to the action many brave spirits will voluntarily go ... all the money that may be spared is to be turned that way .... If I were with you this should be my language, which I pray you humbly to convey to the King.[1]

This conception of the Bohemian adventure was to predominate in England during the 1620's, despite official efforts to check it. As one correspondent of Samuel Ward's stated:

> the matter to me seemes more to concerne the church of God then any we or most living have seene, so that I cannot be weary of writing nor you weary of hearing the same things.[2]

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1. Abbot to Naunton, 12 Sept., Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, ff. 221-2.

2. Richard Pernham to Ward, 16 Nov. 1619, ibid., f. 235, See also Sir Oliver St. John to Trumbull, 22 Mar. 1620, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Misc. xi, art. 64. Sir Henry Mainwaring to Lord Zouch, 19 June, 1620, PRO S.P. 14/115/92. Earl of Hertford to James, 2 Nov. 1620, Bod. Addit. MS. D. 119., f. 338. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 91-4.

Even the far from sanguine Chamberlain, who could comment at the first news of Frederick's acceptance, "the world thinks ytt was a plot of the Prince of Orange and the Duke of Bouillon to drawe in our king, nolens volens," still felt that as "the chance is throwne in Bohemia" England was committed to the support of Frederick.[1]

Having decided against intervention, James was left dependent on his efforts to mediate. Doncaster's embassy was now useless as Ferdinand was implacable and Doncaster completely committed to Frederick.[2] The return of Doncaster and his party, all strong Bohemian supporters, on 1 January 1620 now laid James open to the charge that Doncaster had been secretly instructed to incite Frederick to accept the Bohemian offer. As a result James cracked down even harder on public expression of pro-Palatine sympathies, "for to be zealous in the cause of Bohemia or only to be thought to be so, is now fault enough in their opinion which governe all." To escape from the pressure of Frederick's supporters, James now closeted himself with sympathetic members of the Spanish faction and, after his arrival in March 1620, with Gondomar.[3]

The composition of the Bohemian party is worth some examination. By the time of the arrival, in late January 1620, of the permanent ambassador from the new King of Bohemia, Christoph won Dohna's brother Achatius, a fairly organized body was already in existence, in communication with Elizabeth and Frederick, and ready to work with him.[4] Its core consisted of the leading members of the puritan party on the Council, Pembroke, "nothing makes him soe sad or merry as the success of theyre affaires", his friend the marquis of Hamilton, and Abbot, as well as Edmondes, Lisle (now earl of Leicester),

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1. Chamberlain to Carleton, 11 Sept., 13 Nov. 1619,, Letters, ii, 262-4, 271-3.

2. Doncaster to Buckingham, 21 Sept. 1619, Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, ff. 225-26.

3. Nethersole to Carleton, 8 Jan. 1620, 18 Jan; Caron to States-General, 14/24 Jan. 1620; Letters and Documents, 1618-1620, ii, 132-4, 145-6, 138-42. Chamberlain to Carleton, 2 Jan. 1620, Letters, ii, 283-85. B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, f. 79. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 109-11, 158-59.

4. See Abbot to Trumbull, 18 Oct. 1620, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha., i, art. 43.

Naunton, and Thomas and Sir David Murray of Prince Charles's household.[1] Elizabeth had her personal friends, e.g. the countess of Bedford and Sir Thomas Roe.[2] Sir Henry Wotton was suspected of correspondence with Frederick. A more mysterious role was played by Southampton and his faction, Sheffield, Lord Cavendish, the Danvers, Sir Edwin Sandys, and Southampton was considered to be the leader of the activist element in the Bohemian party.[3]

An important, if under-appreciated, member of the party both during 1620, when he was "one whom they (the Spanish faction) esteem to be wholly Dutch", and over the next few years, was Doncaster.[4] His personal position at court and his closeness to Buckingham made him particularly useful to Achatius von Dohna and later to the exiled Bohemian court.[5] He also tried to protect those whose pro-Bohemian sympathies endangered their position with James: his former secretary, Francis Nethersole, agent with Elizabeth from August 1620, Naunton, whom he defended after his arrest in January 1621, Carleton, Trumbull, and Wake. He corresponded with them in notably outspoken terms.[6] His secretary through most of the 1620's, John Woodford, was a close friend to Nethersole and Sir Dudley Digges and until his death in 1625 acted as a medium for Nethersole to send criticisms of policy to Doncaster. In 1620 Doncaster

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1. Sir Benjamin Rudyerd to Nethersole, 27 Sept. 1620, PRO S.P. 81/18/155. Plessen to A. von Dohna, 19/29 Jan. 1620, B.M. Harleian MS. 1583, ff. 221-22. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 170-72.
2. Elizabeth to countess of Bedford, 3/12 March, 1620, Hist. MSS. Comm. Supplementary Report on Hamilton MSS., 9. Sir Thomas Roe to Elizabeth, 7 June; Elizabeth to Roe, 19 June; PRO S.P. 81/17/59, 62.
3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 196-197.
4. Doncaster to Carleton, 2 July 1620, PRO S.P. 14/116/41.
5. John, Count of Nassau to Doncaster, 22 May/1 June 1620; Dohna to Doncaster, 18 Nov. 1620; Nethersole to Doncaster, 10 Jan. 1622; B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, ff. 148-9, 272, 2595, f. 19. Nethersole to Woodford, 14 Mar. 1621; Dohna to Nethersole, 21/31 May 1621; PRO S.P. 81/20/263-4, 21/27v.
6. Wake to Doncaster, 7 Apr. 1620, B.M. Egerton 2593, f. 176, Doncaster to Carleton, 9 Nov. 1620, PRO S.P. 84/98/28-9. Doncaster to Trumbull, 17 Oct., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xxiv, art. 59. Chamberlain to Carleton, 3 Feb. 1621, Letters, ii, 337-40.
7. Digges to Sir E. Conway, 7 Jun. 1623, PRO S.P. 14/146/26. Nethersole to Carlisle, 11 Sept. 1625, PRO S.P. 81/33/188.

was prepared to move in more independent circles, allying with Southampton and his friends, Sheffield, Cavendish, and Sandys, in their opposition to James in the battles in the Virginia Company.[1]

Another interesting member of the Bohemian party was Winwood's former secretary Abraham Williams who by November 1619 was the permanent agent of the King and Queen of Bohemia in London. He was to hold this position for the next two decades and his house in Westminster was to be the residence for all Frederick's other envoys.[2] How he obtained this post is not clear, although it may have owed something to Doncaster, with whom Williams was in close communication during 1619-1620.[3] He also functioned as deputy to Burlamachi for the transfer of the allowance provided for Elizabeth during her exile and after Burlamachi's bankruptcy in 1633 became principal agent in his place.[4] Although Williams' non-financial activities remain exceedingly mysterious, he was obviously well-connected and was knighted by Charles in 1625.[5] In 1620 he became one of the holders of the notorious patent for licensing beggars but the scheme was never put into operation. Summoned before the Commons in 1621 he willingly surrendered it and was defended by Sir Thomas Roe.[6]

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1. A. Brown, English Politics and Early Virginia History (Boston, 1901), 31-32.

2. Sir T. Willson to R. Willis, ? Dec. 1619, Hist. MSS. Comm., [illegible], IVth Report, Appendix, De la Warr MSS., 284. Burlamachi to Trumbull, 4 Feb. 1620, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xi, art. 156.

3. See B.M. Egerton MS. 2592, ff. 78-79.

4. Account of Williams, Apr. 1623, PRO S.P. 81/28/236-37. Account of Williams, 1633-1638, PRO, Exchequer, Audit Office, Declared Accounts, A.O. 1/5/5.

5. His brother was a captain in Mansfeldt's expedition of 1624-25, PRO S.P. 81/33/223. See also Williams to Carleton, 1 Dec. 1621, 25 Oct. 1622, PRO S.P. 84/104/9, 14/133/58.

6. On the patent see The Commons Debates for 1621, ed. W. Notestein, et al. (Yale U.P., 1935), iv, 108, vi, 271, vii, 418-19, 506-7. Elizabeth to Roe, 21/31 Aug. 1621, PRO S.P. 81/21/216.

Despite the influence of Doncaster and of his other puritan followers, particularly Naunton, Packer, and even Thomas Alured, whose letter urging Buckingham to lead an anti-Spanish party had the misfortune of appearing after Buckingham's reconciliation with Gondomar, Buckingham remained uncommitted.[1] Elizabeth and Frederick placed considerable hope in his assistance over the winter of 1619-20, but he showed little interest in taking up the public leadership of their supporters. In August 1620 Nethersole claimed that Buckingham had rendered them considerable assistance.[2]

James's reaction to the Bohemian crisis also had important repercussions on the positions taken by the other Calvinist parties, to whose concerted action, as Abbot and Pembroke reiterated, his leadership was vital.[3] In the United Provinces, preparing for the expiry of the Truce in 1621, Maurice had been concerned to remove any hindrances, created during Barneveldt's ascendancy, to a full Anglo-Dutch alliance and had already taken steps to end the colonial disputes. The view that the time was propitious for such an alliance which would be central to any general coalition of Calvinist states was also held by Carleton.[4] With his assistance Maurice attempted to interest Buckingham in a diversionary attack in Flanders, to prevent Spinola intervening in Germany, and an alliance to support Frederick. This had previously been suggested in general terms by the Palatines and in the next few years would be major element in the "protestant strategy". James, however, reiterated his refusal to engage in a war of religion.[5]

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1. Naunton to Nethersole, 28 Oct. 1620, PRO S.P. 81/19/123. Frederick to Packer, 29 Mar./8Apr. 1620, Bodl. Addit. MS. D. 111, f. 11. Dohna to Packer, 27 May, PRO S.P. 81/17/47. For Alured see PRO S.P. 14/115/67, 116/42.

2. Elizabeth to Buckingham, 12 Aug; Frederick to Buckingham, 12/22 Sept; Doncaster to Buckingham, 27 Sept. 1619; Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, ff. 219, 223, 225-6. B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, f. 46. Nethersole to Buckingham, 11 Aug. 1620, PRO S.P. 81/17/221-23.

3. Tillieres to Puisieux, 25 Jan./4 Feb. 1620, PRO 31/3/69, ff. 53, 72.

4. Clark, Colonial Conferences, i, 128-29,132. Carleton to Doncaster, 1 Aug. 1620, B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, f. 177. Carleton to Naunton, 2 Oct. 1620, Carleton Letters, 497-99.

5. Carleton to Doncaster, 20 Sept. 1619, B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, f, 52-3.

In France the situation was considerably more serious. James, who had not shown any interest in French politics since the assassination of Concini, was hoping for French support in his mediation of the Bohemian crisis but the French court, under strong dévot influence, was markedly anti-protestant. At best they would be neutrals and Bouillon's appeal to Louis XIII to support Frederick and continue traditional anti-Hapsburg policy met with no response.[1] There remained the Huguenots, from among whom, although James prohibited his recruiting, Herbert was confident a strong pro-Bohemian party could be rallied, either to come to Frederick's assistance or to prevent French support for the Emperor. This confidence was also strong among the puritan party in England; Abbot mentioned the subject in his letter to Naunton and the French ambassador was alarmed by discussions in this vein between Abbot, Wotton, and Edmondes.[2] In March 1620 Pembroke commented to Herbert on "your new disturbances there, for that we hope they will keepe you from assisting the Emperor."[3] Pro-Bohemian sentiments were, in fact, quite strong among the Huguenots. Rohan exhorted James to support Frederick and take up the leadership of a general alliance, promising his assistance.[4] In June 1620 Herbert persuaded Pierre du Moulin to appeal in the name of the French church to James to/take under the defence of the faith. James, intent on obtaining French support for his own policy and on demonstrating his lack of interest in the religious aspects of the crisis, had

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(f.n.5. cont. from previous page)
Carleton to Chamberlain, 22 Oct; to Buckingham, 5 Dec. 1619; Naunton to Carleton, 10 Dec. 1619, PRO S.P. 84/92/175, 93/143-144, 192.

1. Herbert to Naunton, 9 Sept. 1619, Letters and Documents, ii, 12-13. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 58. Bouillon to Louis XIII, 22 Dec./1 Jan. 1619, Bethune, Ambassades, 97-100, Reade, Sidelights, i, 228-29.

2. Herbert to Naunton, 25 Oct. 1619, Letters and Documents, 1618-1620, 83-85. Abbot to Naunton, 12 Sept. 1619, ibid. Tapié, Politique Etrangére, 420.

3. Pembroke to Herbert, 28 Mar. 1620, PRO 30/53/10, f. 66.

4. Rohan to James, 20/30 Apr. 1620, PRO S.P. 78/68/292.

Buckingham give the letter to the French ambassador. Louis XIII tried to arrest Moulin, forcing him to flee to Sedan, another demonstration of the growing political isolation of the Huguenots.[1] Yet even these tactics did not succeed in obtaining the desired support from Louis XIII, who had decided that a victory for Frederick was a victory for the Huguenots. Not only were French efforts at mediation half-hearted but Louis also decided to use the Bohemian war as a cover for the campaign to re-establish catholicism in Béarn.[2] All James could do was make his displeasure known.[3]

As a further demonstration of his neutrality James also attempted to curb expressions of support for Frederick in England. The first was his veto of Abbot's proposal to celebrate Frederick's accession officially in London.[4] This was followed by a prohibition of publicly praying for Frederick and Elizabeth as King and Queen of Bohemia and Joseph Hall, followed soon afterwards by Lewis Baylie, was the first of a long line of divines who were censured for so doing.[5] What James could not control, however, was Bohemian propaganda printed in the United Provinces for an English audience, the same method used for the distribution of non-conformist theological works. Probably the first original work, other than printings of official statements, was the Short Relation of the Departure of the Most High and Mighty Prince Frederick by the Reverend John Harrison, who had been present at the departure

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1. Naunton to Herbert, 16 Mar. 1620, PRO 30/53/2 f. 10. Moulin to James, 20/30 June 1620 (copy), Archives Orange-Nassau, II, ii, 571-3. Schickler, Eglises de Refuge, i, 384-85. Life of Moulin, Novelty of Popery, xxxx3.

2. Tillieres to Puysieux, 20/30 Apr. 1620, PRO 31/3/53. f. 105-8.

3. Minute by Calvert, 23 Aug. 1620, Bodl. Clarendon MS. 3, f. 57.

4. Abbot to Naunton, 12 Sept. 1619, Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, ff. 221-2, Letters and Documents, 1618-1620, ii, 22-23.

5. Hall to Carleton, 22 Sept. 1619, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1619-23, Nethersole to Carleton, 8 Jan. 1620, Letters and Documents, 1618-1620, ii, 132-4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 62

from Heidelberg. This was followed by a reprinting of his earlier tract, The Messiah Already Come, rededicated to Frederick.[1]

Harrison, who described himself as a former servant of Prince Henry's, brought together the two most important elements in the English conception of Frederick. The first was the apocalyptic expectation that Frederick's actions would be the first blow in the fall of Babylon and Harrison's description of the departure stressed the solemn and devout bearing of "Deborah and Barak", the Electress and Elector. The Messiah Already Come advanced the conversion of the Jews, "the very period of all prophesies", which Harrison now hoped Frederick would accomplish.[2] This apocalyptic theme was also taken up in The Cleare Demonstration that Ferdinand is by his own Demerits Fallen from the Kingdom of Bohemia.[3] The other element was the role of Frederick and Elizabeth in English politics; the Electress was "Queen Elizabeth revived", the young Henry Frederick was "Prince Henry revived".[4] This identification which, as has been seen above, had been made since the marriage now became a more serious business as it was noted that Frederick was considerably more popular than the sickly Charles. It provided the Spanish faction with one of their more useful propaganda weapons: the claim that the Palatines and their English allies were aiming at the succession and even the overthrow of James.[5] Gondomar considered that James was particularly worried that a serious reverse to Frederick's hopes in Germany would cause him and his wife to retire to England with their children

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1. Dort 1619 and Amsterdam 1619.

2. Relation, Sig. Aii-v. Messiah, Dedication.

3. Dort, n.d. (1619-20), Sig. (D2v) -D3.

4. Relation, Sig. (Aiiv). Messiah, Dedication. See also Sir Arthur Gorges to Trumbull, 24 Jan. 1620, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Misc. xi, art. 17.

5. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 91-4.

"and form a party with the Calvinists of his own particular sect".[1] The Archduke's spy in London, William Sterrell, reported in the summer of 1620 that there was a considerable fear in England that a negotiated peace between Frederick and Ferdinand would, as was the case in 1622, involve the raising of Frederick's heir as a catholic, "& so the Gospell might chaunce to be in danger if God should take away our prince without issue."[2]

In 1620 the scale of Bohemian propaganda was substantially increased by the efforts of Achatius von Dohna who considered that the circulation of anti-Bohemian propaganda in London made a full-scale effort necessary: "were also Zeit, dass man dagegen die Iustification dess Bohaimischen wesens publicerte, und andere notwendere Replicas, &c."[3] He and Abraham Williams had a number of tracts printed in Middleburgh for distribution in England, including his own oration to James on the Bohemian constitution.[4] Among this production was the Declaration of the Causes for which, wee Frederick ... have accepted of the Crowne of Bohemia, edited by John Harrison.[5] A more complex question is the role of Dohna and the Bohemians in the production of works written by Englishmen for a popular audience. An early example was The Popes Complaint ... against the Good Success of the Bohemians which was both well-informed and employed the technique of dramatic dialogue later brilliantly exploited

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1. Gondomar to Governor of Milan, 6/16 July 1620, ibid., 436-7.

2. Sterrell to della Faille, 24 Aug. 1620, quoted in Carter, Secret Diplomacy of the Hapsburgs, 158-9. Carter's claim that Sterrell was a disinterested "intelligencer" ignores the fact that he had been a member of Thomas Phelips' ring in the 1590s, see Cal. S.P. Dom., 1591-94, ix.

3. Dohna to Anhalt, 28 May/7 June 1620, Furstliche Anhaltische Gehaime Canzley (n.p., 1621), 302.

4. A. Williams to Trumbull, 17 Apr. 1620, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xlvi, art 118. Carleton to Trumbull, 2 May, ibid., xvi, art. 44.

5. Middleburgh, 1620, 17-18, 21-22. Shaaber (Forerunners of the English Newspaper, 84), considers that Harrison's earlier efforts were also part of this campaign.

by Thomas Scott.[1] Also significant in this context was the reprinting of Babilon is Fallen, an apocalyptical tract of 1597, with its original dedication to Essex.[2]

The initial reaction of the Bohemian party to James's refusal to recognize Frederick was to continue in their expectation that his commitment was unavoidable. This was best expressed by Pembroke, in a message intended to be relayed abroad:

> Some open speeches of his Majestie may give greater discouragement than he himself intends they should. It is true that I believe the King will be unwilling to engage in a warr, if by any means, with his honour, he may avoid it; and yet I am confident, when the necessity of the cause of religion, his sonne's preservation, and his owne honour calls upon him, that he will perform whatsoever belongs to the defender of the fayth .... I am afrayd the Baron Dohna is gone hence with little satisfaction .... This I can only say, that the body of the council stands well affected, and I make no question that it will prevayle against those particular opinions, which are nourished too much with Spanish milk.[3]

By the beginning of 1620, although there was still hope that "there is deep pollicie in it", the party began to realize that whatever reasons lay behind his decision, dislike of religious war, the Spanish marriage, or fear of Parliament, James could not be directly pressured into supporting Frederick.[4] With this came experiments in more indirect tactics. Doncaster and Edmondes began making enquiries about a revival of the French marriage in an effort to

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1. N.p., n.d. (1620). See also the appendix on Thomas Scott.

2. This was a domestic production. The journey of John Taylor the Water Poet to see the new King and Queen is a good example of popular interest, particularly as Taylor was no radical. He found it prudent, however, to publish his "Englishman's Love to Bohemia" at Dort and Taylor his Travels to Bohemia at a later date.

3. Pembroke to Carleton, 24 Sept. 1619, PRO S.P. 14/110/81.

4. Nethersole to Carleton, 8 Jan. 1620, Letters and Documents, 1618-1620, ii, 283-85. Sir Oliver St. John to Trumbull, 22 Mar., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Misc. xi, art. 64. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 135-8, 152-4.

create an alternative to the Spanish match.[1]

The opportunity for the employment of these tactics was provided by the arrival of Achatius von Dohna as Frederick's permanent ambassador at the end of January 1620. His formal introduction to James at the beginning of February was a public demonstration of the strength of the Bohemian party; he was advised and assisted by Abbot, Pembroke, and Henry Wotton, and escorted into James's presence by Buckingham and Doncaster.[2] Buckingham's involvement gave Naunton grounds for hope that he would take up the leadership of the Palatine party.[3] Permission was sought for Dohna to raise a loan and levy recruits for Frederick. At the end of February, Sir Andrew Gray, a Scots officer in Frederick's service, was allowed to raise 2000 men in England and Scotland.[4] This was considered to have created a precedent for further requests and it was hoped that these activities would cause such an expression of public opinion that James would have to give more direct support.[5]

James himself, according to Charles at his prompting, negotiated with the King of Denmark for a loan of 200,000 rix dollars (c.£47,000) for the defence of the Palatinate which was transferred to Frederick's agents in Hamburgh in August 1620. The disaster in Bohemia during the winter caused James to order Sir Robert Anstruther to obtain a further loan from Christian IV and in March 1621 Anstruther received another 100,000 rix dollars. This provided £20,000 for Elizabeth's immediate necessities and paid off the first

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1. Tillieres to Puysieux, 25 Jan./4 Feb., 12/22 Feb., PRO 31/3/53, ff. 69-72, 73-76.

2. Tillieres to Puysieux, 12/22 Feb., ibid. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 175-7.

3. Naunton to Buckingham, 3 Feb., Fortescue Papers, 119. See also Nethersole to Buckingham, 11 Aug., PRO S.P. 81/13/222.

4. Gray received considerable assistance from Pembroke, Doncaster, Hamilton, and Lenox. Statement of Gray, 5/15 Apr., PRO S.P. 81/17/31.

5. Caron to States-General, 14/24., Letters and Documents, 1618-1620, ii, 138-42. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 135-8, 152-54, 199-200, 205-7.

installment of the previous loan. James was left, however, with a debt of 300,000 rix dollars at an annual interest of 18,000 rix dollars - none of which was paid during his reign.[1]

The attempt to raise a loan for Frederick in England was a more controversial matter. Although the commercial slump of 1619-21 has been considered responsible for the poor response, the immediate causes were political. Dohna and his allies wanted a full commitment from James and a Parliament and only in default of this were other forms of financial assistance contemplated. Despite offers from individuals like Southampton and the earl of Dorset, Dohna and Buwinckhausen, the agent for the Evangelical Union, preferred a formal loan from organized bodies like the City of London to individual charity. Their request to the City, first for £50,000 and later raised to £100,000 appears to have been carefully planned as at the same time Abbot offered to match it by subscriptions from the clergy.[2] The Lord Mayor, however, wished James to give his formal permission first. When James refused, the request was referred to the Common Council.[3]

The hesitation of the City was influenced by several considerations, related to the financial state of the crown. Their basic desire was to avoid a continuation of government by forced loan and to force James to return to Parliamentary subsidies. The Bohemian loan was particularly suspect as it might set a precedent for further financing of foreign policy by loan. There was some hope that a refusal of the loan would force James to make a formal declaration which would necessitate a Parliament. There were also suggestions that a parliamentary grant for Frederick be disbursed by special treasurers to prevent James from interfering, a forerunner of the

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1. See PRO S.P. 75/5/215, 261-2. Charles to Christian IV, 21 Mar. 1620, 46th Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records, Appendix II, Danish Archives, 20.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 219-20.

3. Ibid., xvi, 205-7, 219-20.

proposals of 1624. Furthermore, the Spanish faction, now reinforced by Gondomar, was attempting to disrupt the loan. Rumours were spread that James would confiscate the loan, a suspicion to which his refusal to give formal authorization gave credence, or that he might use the prerogative to force assistance for Frederick.[1] As a result the City took the easy way out. Initially they intended to await the response of the rest of the country but then compromised by having every alderman solicite the citizens of his ward for a voluntary contribution.[2] Although this protected the City from committing itself corporately to a precedent for such loans, it ensured that the sum raised would be a small one.[3] The total subscribed by the City came to between £12,000 and £13,000 of which only £2,000 was in Dohna's hands by May.[4]

The collection of the clergy met with a similar fate. The guiding spirit was Abbot who claimed that the clergy would match the subscription of the City with each bishop giving £100 and he himself a large contribution.[5] James, however, was suspicious of his enthusiasm and two reliable bishops, Richard Neile and Lancelot Andrews, were attached to the commission supervising the collection. Restrictions were placed on the methods to be used. Requests were to be made individually and "as quietly as possible." "The Clergy are not to give the Prince and Princess any other titles but to follow their sovereign; neither are they to preach the war as one of

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1. Ibid., xvi, 152-3, 175-7, 210-12, 219-20, 229-30. Thomas Murray to Sir E. Herbert, 23 Mar. 1620, Hist. MSS. Comm., Powis MSS., 383. Nethersole to Carleton, 21 Mar., PRO S.P. 14/113/33. Gondomar to Philip III, 21/31 Mar., Corres., ii, 285.

2. Chamberlain to Carleton, 20 Mar., Letters, ii, 295-97.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 234-6, 238-40.

4. Ibid., 248-50. A. Williams to Trumbull, 3 May; Abbot to Trumbull, 22 July; Berks. R.O. Trumbull MSS. Alpha. xlvi, art. 119, i, art. 42. See also Tillieres to Puysieux, 20/30 Apr., PRO 31/3/53, ff. 205-7. PRO S.P. 15/42/27.

5. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 205-7. Nethersole to Carleton, 21 Mar., PRO S.P. 14/113/33.

religion."[1] Hence the response was a weak one.[2]

When it became apparent that neither the City nor the clergy were going to produce a sufficient sum, Dohna was forced to solicit among the country at large.[3] According to Nethersole, Buckingham wished to take the lead with a contribution of £10,000 but James would not permit him to. This led to what was noted as their first major clash and Buckingham, unsure of his position, decided that his relationship to James outweighed his devotion to Bohemia.[4] Other offers were made by the more dedicated supporters of the King and Queen of Bohemia. Southampton was said to have offered £40,000 for the command of an auxiliary army. The 3rd earl of Dorset gave £1 000 down and a promise of the same for each of the first five years of the war, regretting that he could not give more. The earl of Warwick subscribed £500, Robert, Lord Spencer £100, and among the other contributors were the earls of Kent and Salisbury and Lord Cavendish.[5] This collection was also hindered because "they cannot agree de modo, because the king will not declare himself." By May Williams claimed he had only received £5,000 from these sources.[6]

The method finally chosen for the general collection was the solicitation of individual counties through the Lords lieutenant, the deputy lieutenants and the J.P.s. The "form letter" of the request was an inhibited document; although Dohna could refer to his master as the King of Bohemia, he could not describe the political circumstances of the loan but only state "the

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1. Ibid., 229-30. Abbot, Andrews, and Neile to bishop of Peterborough, 21 Mar., PRO S.P. 14/113/34. Gondomar to Philip III, 21/31 Mar., Corres., ii, 285.

2. Chamberlain to Carleton, 1 Apr., Letters, ii, 297-300, Also returns in PRO S.P. 14/115/4, 16-19, 37, 78.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 234-6. Williams to Trumbull, 3 May, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xlvi, art. 119.

4. Nethersole to Buckingham, 11 Aug., PRO S.P. 81/17/222.

5. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 135-38, 239-30. Chamberlain to Carleton, 1 Apr., Letters, ii, 297-300. Nethersole to Carleton, 21 Mar., PRO S.P. 14/113/33. Dorset to Herbert, 6 May, PRO 30/53/2, f. 179. Also PRO S.P. 14/117/75, 105, 106, 110, 118, 128, 118/31.

6. A. Williams to Trumbull, 1 Apr., 3 May, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha, xlvi, arts. 116, 119.

reasons are apparent" and rely on loyalty to Elizabeth.[1] The weakness of this method was that it left the collection dependent upon the political sympathies of the regional and local magistrates. A newsletter of October gave this as the reason for the poor response in several areas and there is some proof of it.[2] The collection was begun in Essex and Middlesex in the hope that the nearness to London and the religious sentiments of these counties would make them good examples to the rest. Warwick, the lord lieutenant of Essex, was able to raise some £4,000.[3] A similar course was taken by the earl of Huntingdon who personally met with all the inhabitants of the borough of Leicester worth over 40s. p.a. to obtain their contributions.[4] Lord Zouch wrote to the burgesses of the Cinque Ports: "I do advise you as a friend, I doe persuade you as a colleague, and I admonish you as your governor to express your loves...." He further required that a list of all who refused to be sent to him. As a result, Sandwich, which was not a wealthy town, produced £153.11s.[5]

An example of a county where the magistrates were not zealous is provided by Norfolk where the earl of Arundel, now a member of the Spanish faction, was lord lieutenant. Although Dohna had written to him in April, it was not until July that his letter was forwarded to the deputy lieutenants. Arundel supposed "you to be all readie purposed in it," and that there was no need for him to make any further promptings:

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1. See letters to Sussex, 26 May, B.M. Harleian MS. 703, f. 176; to Norfolk, 15 Apr., Bodl. Tanner MS. 243, f. 16; to Northamptonshire, 31 May, PRO S.P. 81/17/52.

2. Berks. R.O. Trumbull, MS. Misc. xi, art. 143.

3. Williams to Trumbull, 3 May, ibid., Alpha. xlvi, art. 119. Warwick to Dohna, n.d. (summer 1620), PRO S.P. 81/19/305.

4. Records of the Borough of Leicester, ed. H. Stocks (Cambridge, 1923), iv, 192.

5. PRO S.P. 14/116/97, 117/7.

> My earnest desire is that you carefullie and in a quiet manner and with the least trouble that may be, give intimacion to your neigbors as well of this motion ..., but so as you press no man otherwise than as his own disposition & your example shall leade him.[1]

An interest/ing contrast to the course of the collection in Norfolk is provided by the vigorous activity of Sir Robert Harley in Herefordshire.[2] Sir George More was able to raise £1,126.11s.8d. in Surrey, giving an extra £40 himself.[3]

As the money came in slowly from the different parts of the country, it is difficult to tell how much was finally obtained. Abbot, who was always an optimist, was hoping for £200,000 by the end of the year, but by 8 October Dohna had received a total of some £30,000. As a number of the county contributions were still outstanding, the total may have come to about £50,000.[4] Throughout the summer it had been dogged by the tension in the country. Sir Thomas Roe informed the Queen of Bohemia that the reasons for the small sum were "the wary declaration of his Majestie and that none of our own nation were called to this service."[5] There were constant rumours that James would confiscate the loan, and after his declaration for the defence of the Palatinate he did in fact consider appropriating Dohna's funds.[6] Nor did it pay to be too enthusiastic. Sir Simon Weston, deputy lieutenant for Staffordshire, who made a strongly anti-Spanish speech

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1. Bodl. Tanner MS. 243, ff. 16, 17.

2. Compare ibid., ff. 17v-20, and Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS., iii, 11-13.

3. Hist. MSS. Comm., VIIth Report, Molyneux MSS., 674.

4. Abbot to Trumbull, 22 July, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. i, art. 42. Account of Dohna, 8 Oct., Lambeth MS. 666, art. 51. Naunton estimated the total as £40,000. Naunton to Sir E. Herbert, 14 Nov., PRO 30/53/3, f. 158.

5. 7 June, PRO S.P. 81/17/59.

6. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 340-341, 457-60. C. Bridenbaugh, Vexed and Troubled Englishmen, 1590-1642 (Oxford, 1968), 265.

in support of the loan at Stafford Shire Hall on 27 June was summoned before the Privy Council.[1]

Closely related to the loan was the question of English military assistance to Frederick. The idea of dispatching volunteers had existed since the news of his election but it was not until the embassy of Dohna and James's permission for Gray to recruit, that any real steps were taken. Although James insisted that he was only allowing recruiting as a courtesy and refused to be formally associated, the obtaining of his permission was also part of more ambitious plans. Like the loan the levy was organized by Dohna in conjunction with Doncaster, Southampton, and Buckingham. From an early stage it was decided that the loan should be used for the payment of the levies which would make it more palatable to the country, create less opportunity for James to appropriate it, and, by establishing so formal an organization, place increased pressure on James to commit himself.[2]

In giving permission, however, James did not initially commit himself to the size of the levy he would permit, whether conscription could be used, and who would be allowed to have the command. The command was the key issue as it would set the tone for the whole operation. The leading candidate was Southampton who had the support of the King and Queen of Bohemia, was prepared to invest a substantial amount from his own resources, and could attract a large following. He also had the support of Buckingham with whom an agreement had been made that if Southampton did not take the command it would go to his client Sir Edward Cecil.[3] Even before the choice of a commander had been finally made, Southampton had begun to gather about him

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1. Examination of Weston, 29 July, PRO S.P. 14/116/52-v. Weston was an uncle of Sir Richard Weston and M.P. for Lichfield in 1624, see R.E. Ruigh, The Parliament of 1624: Politics and Foreign Policy (Harvard U.P., 1971), 318-19.

2. Nethersole to Carleton, 21 Mar., PRO S.P. 14/113/33. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 205-7, 219-20.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 135-8, 219-20, 229-30. Nethersole to Buckingham, 11 Aug., PRO S.P. 81/17/223v. Also involved in this were Southampton's friends the Danvers; Henry, Lord Danvers claimed to have been offered command of the expedition if Southampton refused. Danvers to Carleton, 27 Apr. 1621, PRO S.P. 84/100/203.

a group of young noblemen, the 3rd earl of Essex, the 18th earl of Oxford, Viscount Lisle, Dorset's brother Sir Edward Sackville, and the sons of John Holles, Lord Houghton, and Robert, Lord Spencer, which gave the proposed expedition the colour of an Essex revival.[1] James was fully aware of this and the Spanish faction succeeded in awakening his suspicions of Southampton with insinuations of his "popularity" and republicanism and of the dangers, both internal and external, of letting him loose with an army. Dohna attempted to deploy all his influence to obtain the appointment, including Buckingham, and even appealed to Digby. At the end of May James decided against Southampton on the grounds that by allowing a privy councillor to serve Frederick he was committing himself too far.[2] He also placed strict limitations on the levy itself; it was not to go above 4,000 volunteers, it was only to be used for the defence of the Palatinate, and it was not to be publicly associated with the Bohemian loan, which Sir Thomas Roe considered to be a major hindrance to both.[3]

The choice of the new commander had serious repercussions. The candidate of the King and Queen of Bohemia was Sir Horace Vere, James raised no objections, and in mid-June Vere was given warrants to raise his troops.[4] This, however, broke the agreement with Buckingham that Cecil would be the second choice. The King and Queen of Bohemia had a personal dislike of Cecil, while the Vereite faction in the army in the United Provinces was strongly Bohemian. Both Doncaster and Charles supported the Bohemian request and Buckingham had the unusual experience of having his powers of patronage successfully

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 273-6. Roe to Elizabeth, 7 June, PRO S.P. 81/17/59. Also S.P. 14/117/110, 118/28.

2. Earl of Kellie to the earl of Mar, 29 May, Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS., ii, 100. Williams to Trumbull, 26 May, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xlvi, art. 120. Dohna to Packer, 27 May, PRO S.P. 81/17/47.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven, xvi, 273-6. Roe to Elizabeth, 7 June, ibid.

4. Vere to Carleton, 14 June, PRO S.P. 84/95/247.

challenged. He reacted by dropping all assistance to the Bohemians and joining in Gondomar's intrigues.[1]

Although Vere had a commission to raise 4,000 men, the money in Dohna's possession was not sufficient to maintain them, and it was decided to raise one regiment of 2,000 immediately and the other 2,000 when money was ready. Vere tried to make a virtue out of necessity by forming the regiment as a cadre for a future larger force by mixing the young nobles with experienced officers and accepting gentlemen into the ranks.[2] In this he was not entirely successful. Although he obtained the service of such personal followers as Sergeant-Major John Boroughs and John Burgess, the blocking of Southampton and interference in the appointments by Charles and Buckingham was resented and at least Viscount Lisle and Sir Edward Sackville resigned. Furthermore, insinuations by the Spanish faction and James's refusal to give the levy public support had a serious effect on recruiting. By the beginning of August, however, Vere had brought 2,200 men to the United Provinces where they were trained, armed, and then escorted by the Dutch to the Palatinate.[3] Hopes of expanding this force with the other 2,000 were diminished by the slow progress of the Bohemian loan. By mid-August, after dispatching both Gray's and Vere's men, Dohna was running a deficit of £8,000 which by October was still at £6,000.[4] He had difficulty even in supplying Vere with funds

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1. Nethersole was given the task of making Buckingham's displeasure known to the King and Queen of Bohemia and his report to Buckingham (PRO S.P. 81/17/221-24) is the best account of this dispute and of Buckingham's relations with the Bohemian party in 1620. See also Tillieres to Puisieux, 26 May/5 June, PRO 31/3/53, ff. 114-17. Naunton to Carleton (16) July; Cecil to Carleton, 17 July; Sir E. Harwood to Nethersole, 1 Aug; PRO S.P. 84/96/30, 32, 70. Nethersole to Doncaster, 10/20 May 1622, PRO S.P. 81/24/154. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 430-2, 614-15. Note Cotton's reference to this dispute in his "Dangers wherein the Kingdom now Standeth" of 1628, B.M. Harleian MS. 6356, f. 200-v.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven, xvi, 291-2, 295-98. Dohna to Trumbull, 15 June, Berks. R.O. Trumbull, Alpha., xxiv, art. 11.

3. Vere to Carleton, 14 June; Carleton to Chamberlain, 8 Aug; Burgess to Carleton, 19 Aug; PRO S.P. 84/95/247, 96/88-89, 128. Chamberlain to Carleton, 28 June, Letters, ii, 307-9. Carleton to Trumbull, 7 July, 5 Aug., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xvi, arts. 53, 59. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 306-8, 340-41, 368.

4. Harwood to Nethersole, 1 Aug., PRO S.P. 84/96/70. Williams to Trumbull, 18 Aug., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xlvi, art. 122. Lambeth MS. 666, f. 51.

so that by the end of October Vere was angrily demanding pay for his men.[1]

The other goal of Dohna's embassy, the prevention of an attack on the Palatinate, was even more difficult to achieve. Although such a manoeuvre was widely expected, James, who had himself seen the danger in 1619, refused to accept its possible effects on his policy. Dohna made great efforts to employ the influence of Doncaster and even/to persuade James to take action Buckingham but without success.[2] After Spinola's mobilization in mid-June, James's response was to send Sir Henry Wotton to the Emperor in early July and then Sir Edward Conway and Sir Richard Weston to the Archduke Albert later in the month in a further effort to mediate. Although Wotton was initially optimistic, the Conway mission was regarded as abortive before it began.[3] The only result of James's mediation was the Truce of Ulm between the Evangelical Union and the Catholic League which paralyzed the Union.

The more important question now was what James would do once Spinola struck. The governor of the Palatinate suggested that he had three alternatives, sending Englishmen to the Palatinate, financing the Germans, or a diversionary attack on Flanders. The last, he stressed, was his preference as well as that of the Union which sent James a similar request.[4] James refused to respond. To resist the pressure of the Palatine party, he had taken refuge with Gondomar and those sympathetic to "mediation", Calvert, Arundel, and Digby (now the core of the Spanish faction), while members of the Bohemian party were excluded from his councils. In such an atmosphere, and assisted by a clash with the Dutch in the East Indies, Gondomar was able

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1. Vere to Naunton, 26 Oct., PRO S.P. 81/19/127-28.

2. Plessen to Dohna, 19 Jan. 1620, B.M. Harleian MS. 1583, ff. 221-22. Dohna to Packer, 27 May, PRO S.P. 81/17/31. John, Count of Nassau to Doncaster, 22 May/1 June; Trumbull to Doncaster, 2 Oct. 1619; B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, ff. 58-60, 148-49.

3. Trumbull to Doncaster, 12 June, 6 July, B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, ff. 154, 160. Chamberlain to Carleton, 8 July, Letters, ii, 310-12. Walter Balcanquall to Carleton, 27 July; Carleton to Chamberlain, 8 Aug; PRO S.P. 84/96/61, 88.

4. Duke of Deux-Ponts to James, 7/17 Aug; 28 Aug./7 Sept; B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, ff. 179-82, 194-5, 204-5.

to attempt his most audacious stroke. Playing on James's anti-republicanism and dislike of the Dutch, he proposed a league for the defence of monarchy, the aim of which was English assistance in an attack on the Dutch employing the fleet fitting-out against the pirates. Buckingham, estranged from the Bohemian party after the appointment of Vere, was quite interested in the idea.[1] The importance of the fleet had been noted by both sides. In August the Dutch, in concert with the Evangelical Union, urged James through Carleton to use it in the diversion in Flanders against Spinola.[2] This James refused as inconsistent with his relationship with Spain, and this refusal prohibited the use of such a strategy in the near future.[3]

Spinola's invasion of the Palatinate in early September was thus not entirely unwelcome. As Doncaster's secretary John Woodford wrote:

> we were the less sorry ..., because it will be a means to open our eyes that we may be no longer blinded with the amusements of our enemies.[4]

James's hand was forced and on 26 September at a Council meeting he announced that he would defend the Palatinate, although not Bohemia, ordered the Council to consider the means, and had his statement circulated abroad. Led by Naunton the Council considered that the best means would be a Parliament and there was also an agreement that England should support any necessary diversion of Spinola.[5] By the next Council meeting, 30 September or 1 October, James's resolution had declined and although, as Rudyerd noted, he was still considering a Parliament, "there will be great practices to hinder (it)",

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1. Doncaster to Carleton, 21 July, PRO S.P. 14/116/41. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 248-50, 291-2, 371-3, 439-41.

2. Carleton to Buckingham, 20 July; Carleton to Naunton, 9 Aug; PRO S.P. 84/96/14-15, 96. Extract of the latter by Calvert for James, Bodl. Clarendon MS. 3, f. 55. Carleton to Thomas Murray, 26 July, Lambeth MS. 666, art. 5.

3. Naunton to Carleton, 27 Aug., PRO S.P. 84/96/160.

4. Woodford to Trumbull, 13 Sept., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xlix, art. 12.

5. Buckingham to Herbert, 29 Sept., Hist. MSS. Comm., Eglington & c. (Drummond Moray) MSS., 104-5. Sir Benjamin Rudyerd to Nethersole, 27 Sept., PRO S.P. 81/18/155. Notes of Sir Julius Caesar, 29 Sept., B.M. Addit. MS. 34234, f. 119. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 428-30, xvii, 63.

specifically suggestions to raise money by the prerogative. Furthermore, he had become convinced that the winter made immediate moves unnecessary and left room for further diplomacy.[1] Conway and Weston were ordered to remain in Germany and informed by Digby, the contents of whose letter were soon known both in Germany and in England, that "his Majestys declaration is only conditional if betwixt this time and the Spring a peace cannot be procured by their Lordships' mediation."[2]

On the question of a Parliament there was an initial compromise; James attempted to raise a partial benevolence by means of a loan from councillors and crown officers, while giving Naunton and Bacon the task of preparing a parliamentary strategy. On 25 October this loan was extended to the nobility, including bishops and deans, with the possibility of a further extension to the gentry at large.[3] Although there was an attempt to excuse this as a temporary necessity, when combined with the delay in summoning Parliament, it had a serious effect on public confidence. With this came renewed discussion of long-standing grievances, particularly impositions and monopolies, made worse by Buckingham.[4] The position of the crown with regard to the Parliament was not an easy one; it would be difficult to obtain substantial support without compromising the prerogative.[5] Bacon realized this and wanted James to capitalize on public feelings by taking the lead of pro-Palatine sentiment and making the war the central issue of the Parliament.[6]

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1. Naunton to Nethersole, 2 Oct.; Rudyerd to Nethersole, 2 Oct; PRO S.P. 81/19/4, 17. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 432-33.

2. Nethersole to Woodford, 4 Dec; PRO S.P. 81/19/252.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 439-41. PRO S.P. 14/117/2, 5. Acts of the Privy Council, 1619-1621, 291-3.

4. Chamberlain to Carleton, 14 Oct., 28 Oct., 9 Nov., Letters, ii, 321-22, 322-24, 327-29. Carleton to Nethersole, 20 Oct., 22 Oct., PRO. S.P. 84/97/163, 165-7. Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Misc. xi, art. 143.

5. Woodford to Trumbull, 17 Oct., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xlix, art. 13.

6. Bacon to Buckingham, 18 Oct., Life and Letters, vii, 123-4.

This, however, was too great a commitment for James and when the proclamation for the Parliament, which he wrote himself, was finally issued on 6 November, the Palatinate was mentioned only in muted tones.[1]

The Parliament also had an important effect on the position of Buckingham. At the time of the invasion of the Palatinate he was still on bad terms with Dohna and he was further alienated when Dohna, in turn, relied more upon Southampton, Doncaster, Pembroke, Lenox, and Hamilton.[2] After the decision to support the Palatinate, James attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Buckingham and Dohna and Elizabeth was advised by Naunton and Nethersole to keep him mollified. This reconciliation was, however, only superficial and Buckingham, courted by the Spanish faction, showed no interest in becoming the leader of a new Bohemian party. Hence he saw the Parliament in purely personal terms: as the man most associated with monopolies, his prestige and patronage were threatened by public opinion and he faced the opening of the session as an ally of Gondomar's.[3]

Although James's decisions gave rise to the hope that he would, in Doncaster's words, "play the latter part of the game better than he hath played the former", his refusal to make a complete break with Spain and his continued interest in negotiations belied it. Both in England and among the Dutch and Germans attention was focused on the steps he would take in mobilization and "la diversion si souvent sollicité". Even after the White Mountain Frederick pressed for the diversionary attack on Flanders rather than reinforcement for the Palatinate which would both be expensive and further increase the destruction in the country.[4] The desired English contribution was best described

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1. Rudyerd to Nethersole, 8 Nov., Cal. S.P. Dom., 1619-1623, 190, Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 478-80.

2. Dohna to Doncaster, 5 Sept., B.M. Egerton MS. 2593, ff. 200-2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 415-17. Also B.M. Addit. MS. 17677K, f. 70-v.

3. Elizabeth to Buckingham, 16 Sept., Bodl. Addit. MS. D.111, f. 61. Naunton to Nethersole, 2 Oct., PRO S.P. 81/19/14. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 428-30, 430-32, 489-91.

4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 441-3, 478-80. Doncaster to Trumbull, 17 Oct., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xxiv, f. 59. Union to Dohna (?), 20/30 Oct. (copy given to Doncaster); Frederick to Dohna, 12/22 Nov; Deux Ponts to James, 17/27 Oct; B.M. Egerton MS., 2593, ff. 258, 262-3, 268-69. Chamberlain to Carleton, 7 Oct., Letters, ii, 319-21. Carleton to Naunton,

by rumours which reached the United Provinces in October that an army of 10,000 men under Southampton was to be sent to the United Provinces by Christmas to be trained and prepared for a spring campaign and that the fleet was being outfitted.[1] James's interest in continuing negotiations, which Nethersole noted was "myrrh to the King of Bohemia", was accompanied by an equally striking lack of interest in coordinating any overall strategy with the Dutch and the Germans. In December Nethersole warned that unless some interest was shown in the Union, it would collapse in the following year and make a separate peace with the Emperor.[2]

Having summoned the Parliament, two further events forced James to go through with it. The first was the failure of the benevolence among the nobility; hardly anybody outside the immediate circle of councillors and courtiers subscribed anything, most of them pleading poverty, but a significant number indicating that they would prefer to contribute to the war effort through a Parliament.[3] The other was the news of the White Mountain and the loss of Bohemia which reached England at the end of November.[4] Despite the efforts of establishment spokesmen like Donne to play down the setback, the news caused great popular ferment. Further significance was given to the defeat by the simultaneous campaign of Louis XIII in Béarn: "the reformed religion hath received two great blowes at the foote of the two great mountains, the Alpes and the Pyrenees",[5] The prospect for the next year was a general assault on the Reformed on all fronts.[6]

(f.n.4 from previous page)
8 Nov., Carleton Letters, 505.

1. Carleton to Nethersole, 20 Oct., PRO. S.P. 84/97/165-6.
2. Nethersole to Naunton, 4 Dec., PRO. S.P. 81/19/238-39.
3. See returns in PRO S.P. 14/117 and 118. By January 1621 subscriptions amounted to only £32,361 13. 4d., PRO S.P. 14/119/14.
4. Carleton to Naunton, 21 Nov., Carleton Letters, 505. Cal. S.P.Ven., xvi, 495-7.
5. Donne, Sermon on Matthew xviii. 7., Complete Sermons, ed. Potter and Simpson (Univ. of California Press, 1953-62), iii, 178-79. Carleton to Trumbull, 6 Nov; Herbert to Trumbull, 6 Nov; Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xvi, art. 44, xxvi, art. 167. D'Ewes, Autobiography, i, 153-4.
6. Nethersole to Naunton, 4 Dec., PRO S.P. 81/19/239.

The catastrophe did, however, suggest that it was not the cause that was at fault but, as Sir Henry Wotton commented, "some human affections in the business".[1] What these were was explained by the most famous tract produced by the crisis, Thomas Scott's Vox Populi, which appeared in late November.[2] The effect of Vox Populi was to throw James and the government immediately on to the defensive. In mid-December, alarmed not only for Gondomar's safety but also for the course of the parliamentary elections which Scott had warned would be tampered with by popish "great men", James directed the bishop of London to order his clergy not to meddle with matters of state in their sermons.[3] On 24 December appeared the famous proclamation "Against Excess of Lavish Speech on Matters of State" which not only made the possibilities for incrimination exceedingly wide but also threatened exemplary punishment to the first offenders.[4]

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1. Wotton to Bacon, 19 Dec., Smith, Wotton, ii, 204-7.

2. The most famous account of the reception of Vox Populi is that of D'Ewes, Auto., i, 158-59. See also Appendix III.

3. Vox Populi, Somers Tracts, ii, 515. Chamberlain to Carleton, 22 Dec., Letters, ii, 330-32.

4. PRO S.P. 14/187/207. See also D'Ewes account of the reception of the proclamation, Auto., i, 161-62.

9. The King's War or Parliament's War: 1621-1624.

The attitude James took towards the Parliament of 1621 was but one aspect of the general policy he continued to pursue until the collapse of the Spanish Match in 1624 - the resolution of the German situation within the context of his rapprochement with Spain. If a general peace could not be obtained by this means then the position of Frederick was to be treated as a purely German political problem. The question of religious conflict was to be avoided at all costs. This policy was already established by the time of the opening of the Parliament.

On the aftermath of the collapse in Bohemia steps were taken to stabilize the situation in the Palatinate. Anstruther was ordered to obtain a further loan from Denmark while Sir Albertus Morton was dispatched to the Evangelical Union with the £30,000 obtained from the benevolence of the nobility as a contribution for the defence of the Palatinate. James refused, however, to consider the diversion in Flanders repeatedly urged by both Maurice of Nassau and the Union.[1] A Dutch embassy which arrived in February 1621 to announce the end of the truce with Spain and to suggest a joint campaign in Flanders and a joint naval expedition to the West Indies met with a cold reception.[2] The anti-Dutch attitudes which Gondomar had incited in 1620 remained a marked feature of James's policies throughout the remainder of his life.[3]

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1. James to Union, 20 Jan. 1621, PRO S.P. 81/20/66. Carleton to Nethersole, 29 Jan. 1621, PRO S.P. 84/99/105-6. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 508-10, 521-22.

2. J. Mede to Sir M. Stuteville, 10 Feb. 1621, B.M. Harleian MS. 309, ff. 13-14. Carleton to Calvert, 26 Feb. PRO S.P. 84/99/205-7. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 569-71. Carter, Secret Diplomacy of the Hapsburgs, 250-51.

3. Chamberlain to Carleton, 27 Feb., Letters, ii, 346-8. Carleton to Chamberlain,, 20 Mar., PRO S.P. 84/100/71. Thomas Gataker to James Ussher, 29 Sept. 1621, Ussher, Works, xv, 164-5.

On January 13 after considerable pressure from Naunton a council of war, comprising the majority of senior officers, was established.[1] Little was expected of it; Gondomar saw it purely as a sop to quieten the Bohemian party, as it was prohibited from discussing questions of strategy but limited to the preparation of a report on the size and cost of an army to be sent to the defence of the Palatinate. The report, which was presented on 13 February, suggested an army of 25,000 foot and 5,000 horse at the prohibitive cost of £258,370 to raise and equip it and £76,064 a month to maintain it - over £900,000 p.a. This condemned James's strategy from the outset and the council of war was known to privately prefer the diversion. An anonymous analysis of the strategical situation, attributed to Bacon, came to the same conclusion and advised that if James wished to avoid the political problems raised by the diversion the best solution would be to send an auxiliary army to join the Dutch - the 1624 solution.[2]

The political goals of James's strategy were revealed by the embassy of Sir Edward Villiers to Frederick in December 1620 to persuade him to surrender his pretensions in Bohemia in exchange for a negotiated settlement in the Palatinate. Although Frederick maintained that he was bound by the will of God to defend the Bohemians, it was clear that James and, at this point, Buckingham were committed to obtaining this solution whether he would accept it or not.[3] To this end Digby proposed to go to the Archduke to arrange a truce in the Palatinate.[4]

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1. Naunton to Carleton, 2 Jan., PRO S.P. 84/99/4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 516-18.

2. Carter, Secret Diplomacy of the Hapsburgs, 235. PRO S.P. 14/119/21, 93. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 562-3. Bacon, Life and Letters, vii, 162-64.

3. Buckingham to Elizabeth, (Dec. 1620), Bodl. Addit. MS. D. 111, f. 94. Elizabeth to Buckingham, 25 Jan. 1621, B.M. Harleian MS. 6987, f. 3. Frederick to James, 21/31 Jan., ibid., 1583, f. 219. Nethersole to Woodford, 14/23 Mar., PRO S.P. 81/20/263-4.

4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 563. Sir T. Edmondes to Bouillon, 4/14 Apr., B.M. Stow MS. 176, ff. 179-82.

A further element in James's policy was provided by the situation in France. The revival of a vigorous French monarchy, as demonstrated by the campaign in Béarn, revived the old political dilemmas of the reign of Henry IV.[1] The dévot faction, led now by the favorite Luynes, saw the German war as the opportunity to crush the Huguenots without foreign interference. On the other hand the Hapsburg victories caused considerable alarm while the Anglo-Spanish rapprochement suggested a political alliance aimed at France. A settlement in Germany would enable James to assist the Huguenots. French policy was aimed therefore both at breaking the Spanish Match and at preventing English aid to the Huguenots. When Buckingham played into Richelieu's hands in 1624-1625 this was successfully accomplished.

In December 1620 Luynes' brother, the Marshal de Cadenet, was dispatched to James to make a first attempt at a resolution of the situation, offering the marriage of Henrietta Maria to Charles and a vague promise of political support in Germany in return for a repudiation of the Huguenots. Although James refused both the match and the repudiation, the weakness of his government implied that his intervention need not be feared.[2]

The frustration caused by James's refusal to take any decisive action caused Dohna to present a remonstrance to him on 8 February accusing him of encouraging Frederick to go to Bohemia and then abandoning him.[3] Dohna received assistance from Abbot and Naunton and this gave Gondomar the opportunity to make a major attack on the Bohemian party. Dohna was effectively dismissed; he left in April and James told Frederick not to send another ambassador. Abbot and Naunton were again excluded from James's inner councils and Naunton was also accused of entering into discussions of a French

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1. See above, pp.160, 166-69.

2. Herbert to Naunton, 19 Nov., 8 Dec. 1620, PRO 30/53/3, ff. 164-7, 187-88. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 510-12, 546-8. B.M. Egerton 2593, f. 282.

3. PRO S.P. 81/20/354-5.

match with members of Cadenet's train, arrested, and suspended from office.[1] Gondomar's success in this attack, combined with the proclamation on freedom of speech, cast a pall over the opening of Parliament.

James approached the Parliament with some circumspection - parliamentary support would be a useful weapon in obtaining diplomatic concessions yet the session must not get out of hand. His opening speech, 30 January, promised that the match with Spain would cause no change of religion in England. While he disclaimed any responsibility for Bohemia, he needed a supply to obtain peace in the Palatinate. His precise needs were expounded by Sir George Calvert in the Commons on 5 February - an immediate supply of £300,000 for an army to defend the Palatinate. Although he claimed this was based on the estimates of the Council of War, it was a deliberate falsification of the real figure of £900,000 which would have caused immediate querying of the cost and investigations of an alternative.[2]

The attitude of the Commons was reflected in their questioning of James's sincerity. On 3 February Sir James Perrot, son of Leicester's client Sir John Perrot, asked how the government could defend Frederick when it was controlled by papists and whether the proclamation on freedom of speech precluded discussion of the prerogative, state matters, and the defence of religion. The House requested an answer to this before proceeding to debate the supply.[3] In the meantime Sir John Jephson, a follower of Southampton's,

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1. Dohna to James, 4 Feb. 1621, PRO S.P. 81/20/156. Chamberlain to Carleton, 20 Jan., 3 Feb., Letters, ii, 335-37, 339-40. Edmondes to Bouillon, 24 Jan., B.M. Stow 176, f. 175-6. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 60-61. See also Canon to States-General, 11 Jan. 1621, B.M. Addit. MS. 17677K, 93-94.

2. Notestein, Commons Debates, i, 9-11, ii, 19.

3. Ibid., ii, 19-24. The same position on the political role of the recusants was taken by Abbot, Saye andSele, and Spencer in the Lords on 16 February. Notes on the Debates of the House of Lords, 1621-1625, 1628, ed. F.H. Relf (Camden Soc., 3rd. Ser., xlii, 1929), 6-7. Perrot had strong connections to Pembroke and to the "Bedford House set", the countess of Bedford, Hamilton, and Lord Belfast. See PRO S.P. 14/167/6, 16/56/38. It might be noted that Pembroke's client, Sir Benjamin Rudyerd, who married a cousin of the countess of Bedford, might also be included in this "set". Belfast married the countess of Bedford's sister.

raised the question of Gondomar's license to export ordnance, which, he claimed, would go directly to Spinola.[1] Another interesting exchange was caused by the choice of the preacher at the communion on 18 February. The House rejected the nomination of John Williams; Williams claimed this was instigated by Sir Francis Barrington, and chose James Ussher who was advised by Sir Thomas Roe. His sermon made a strong appeal for assistance to the brethren.[2]

After a satisfactory reply on freedom of speech had been received the Commons debated the supply on 15 February. Although there was an early agreement that an immediate supply was necessary to provide assistance to the Palatinate over the summer, the sense of immediacy was lost by Calvert's declaration that James intended to negotiate first and by his criticism of Sir Robert Phelip's suggestion that consultations of strategy be held with the Lords. The House offered two subsidies and, on the suggestion of Sandys who declared that it would in no way provide for purpose proposed and advocated a diversion, made it a demonstration of resolve rather than an answer to the requests of the government. Further supply would be forthcoming when more concrete proposals were made.[3]

Having made this gesture the Commons turned to grievances and the attack on monopolies occupied their attention for the remainder of the session. The resulting attack on Buckingham revealed a considerable group of lords, Southampton, Spencer, Sheffield, Oxford, Warwick, Dorset, Huntingdon, Houghton, Saye and Sele, and the bishop of Bangor, disillusioned with the government and working closely with the Commons. Pembroke and Abbot attempted without

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1. Notestein, ii, 69-72.

2. Williams to Buckingham, 7 Nov. 1622. Berks. R.O. Packer MSS., f. 116. Roe to Ussher, 17 Feb. 1621, Ussher, Works, xvi, 375. Ussher, Sermons before the House of Commons, 18 Feb., ibid., i, esp. 423-5.

3. Notestein, ii, 84-91, iv, 56-8, v, 464. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 569-71, 589-90.

success to create a moderate position.[1] Two further incidents are of interest. On 26 April Sir John Jephson, possibly with the prompting of Southampton, requested the House to consider the state of Ireland and this was eagerly taken up by Coke and Phelips. Concern over Irish security was a natural corollary to a continental war. The effects of Tyrone's rebellion on Elizabeth's strategy in the 1590s were well understood and there had been numerous hints from the Spaniards that if another war broke out they could cripple England by inciting another rebellion.[2] The other was the demonstration in "Ffloyd's case" of the determination to react to anti-Bohemian speeches in the same manner pro-Bohemian activities had been punished.[3]

By the end of May the growing demands for action on recusants and for the removal of Buckingham convinced James that Parliament was now a liability and further supply would necessitate further concessions. Parliament was to be adjourned on 4 June. The Commons, led by Phelips and Sandys, were now alarmed by the little they had been able to accomplish for the defence of religion and on the 4th June Sir James Perrot moved a declaration that the Commons would support any military action James would take for the defence of "the true professors of the same Christian religion professed by the Church of England in foreign parts." Sir Williams Derrick, M.P. for Leicester Borough, considered this important enough to send a copy immediately to his constituents, emphasising that failure to assist the Church would not be caused by lack of support from the Commons.[4]

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1. Relf, Lords Debates, 10-11, 22-23. Notes of the Debates in the House of Lords ... 1621, ed. S.R. Gardiner (Camden Soc., ciii, 1870), 54-61, 129-36. Chamberlain to Carleton, 27 Feb., Letters, ii, 346-8. Sir D. Digges and M. Abbot to Carleton, 15 Feb., PRO S.P. 84/99/158.

2. Notestein, iii, 90-91, iv, 101. The argument of R. Zaller (The Parliament of 1621. A Study of Constitutional Conflict (Berkeley, 1971), 214) that Coke's concern with Ireland represents "isolationism" is nonsensical.

3. Zaller, op. cit., 112-15.

4. Notestein, ii, 305. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 51. Stocks, Leicester Records, iv, 195. Edmondes to Bouillon, ? June, B.M. Stow MS. 176, ff. 188-89.

Immediately after the adjournement came the arrest in July of Southampton, Sandys, Oxford, and Selden on a series of charges ranging from criticism of the Spanish policy in the case of Oxford to collusion in Parliament and plotting with the King and Queen of Bohemia in the case of Southampton and Sandys.[1] Lewis Bayley was examined and threatened with degradation.[2] Although they were all released as a gesture of conciliation, both Southampton and Sandys were forced to withdraw from Parliament and a further proclamation on lavish speech issued on 26 July.[3] These cases have usually been considered as parliamentary problems but they also reflect, along with the dismissal of Dohna, the campaign of the government to control the Bohemian party in England.

On the aftermath of the disgrace of Naunton, the leadership of this party had been undertaken by the group associated with the countess of Bedford; [redacted] Pembroke, Hamilton, Southampton, and Sir Thomas Roe, [redacted] Doncaster occupied a somewhat independent position. They had some hope that the Queen of Bohemia might arrive in England and influence the Parliament.[4] To prevent this James forbade her to enter the country and his investigations of Southampton and Sandys demonstrated his suspicions of their contacts.[5]

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1. Charges against Oxford, B.M. Harleian MS. 6799, f. 330; PRO S.P. 14/122 21; T. Tyrwhitt, Proceedings and Debates in the House of Commons in 1620 and 1621 (Oxford, 1766), ii, append. Charges against Southampton, Notestein, vii, 615-17; Tyrwhitt, op. cit., ii, appen. Charges against Sandys, Tyrwhitt, ii, appen.

2. B.M. Harleian MS. 389, ff. 102, 108-9. Bayley's career is worth examination. The attempt to impeach him in the Parliament of 1626 was probably also a government effort as the charges were preferred by Sir Eubule Thelwall, a master in chancery. Bodl. Tanner MS. 72, f. 93.

3. Rymer, Foedera, xvii, 314.

4. Sir B. Rudyerd to Nethersole, 13 Apr., PRO S.P. 14/120/133. Nethersole to Carleton, 2 May, S.P. 84/101/9-14. Elizabeth to Roe, 21 May, 31 Aug., S.P. 81/21/30, 216. Also extract of letter from Dohna, 1 May, S.P. 81/21/1.

5. James to Carleton, 25 Jan., 1 Mar., PRO S.P. 84/99/97, 100/97. James's suspicions that Southampton and Sandys were engaged in a scheme to transfer subsidies directly to the King of Bohemia may havebeen provoked by attempts, raised in the Commons in both sessions in 1621 by Perrot, to revive the voluntary collection of 1620. See examination of Southampton

Only in July did he allow the countess of Bedford, together with Abraham Williams, to visit her at the Hague but under considerable restrictions which the countess found also hampered her activities on Elizabeth's behalf in England.[1] The dispatch of Roe to Constantinople, under Buckingham's sponsorship, later in the year may have been a form of banishment.[2]

The establishment of the Bohemian court at the Hague was to have the effect of bringing into the Bohemian party the preachers in the United Provinces.[3] Forbes, Paget, Wing, and Hassall all preached before the court.[4] The Vereite faction in the army and the official English community in the United Provinces also became closely connected with the court. Both Carleton and Nethersole were to suffer from serious conflicts of loyalty in the next few years.[5]

In the autumn of 1621 John Preston visited the Queen of Bohemia and having accepted an offer to become chaplain to Charles had to refuse an offer of hers.[6] Preston's involvement with the Bohemian court reflects the engagement of another important element in the Bohemian party - the influential preachers of London, particularly William Gouge, rector of St. Anne's,

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1. (F/n. 5 from previous page)
and Sandys, Tyrwhitt, ii, appen.; B.M. Harleian MS. 389, f.105; Woodford to Nethersole (April) 1621, PRO S.P. 81/20/335. Frederick to Roe, 8/18 May, PRO S.P. 81/21/11-v; Notestein, iii, 96-7, 404-5; Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 133.

1. Countess of Bedford to Lady Cornwallis, 12 July (1621, misdated 1616), The Private Letters of Jane, Lady Cornwallis (London, 1842), 41-3.
Countess of Bedford to Carleton, 4 May 1622, PRO S.P. 14/130/15.
Carleton to Calvert, 24 Aug. 1621, PRO S.P. 84/102/118.

2. Roe to Buckingham, 4/14 Dec. 1621, B.M. Harleian MS. 1580, f. 378.

3. See Appendix III.

4. Carleton to Chamberlain, 7 July 1621; Forbes to Carleton, 16 Feb. 1624, PRO S.P. 84/101/245-v, 122/158. J. Wing, The Saints Advantage (Flushing, 1623).

5. Nethersole to Carleton, 16 Nov. 1622; D. Carleton the younger to Carleton, 3 May 1623; PRO S.P. 84/110/65-66, 112/103-6. Chamberlain to Carleton, 16 Nov. 1622, Letters, ii, 463-65.

6. Preston to Carleton, 8 Jan. 1622, PRO S.P. 84/105/39.

Blackfriars, Richard Sibbes, lecturer of Grey's Inn, Thomas Gataker, minister of Rotherhithe, and Thomas Taylor, of St. Mary's Aldermanbury. All Cambridge educated and close friends they occupied a vital central position working closely with both the Calvinist wing of the hierarchy, Davenant, Bedell, and Ussher, and with radicals like Davenport who had close friends among the army chaplains. Similarly they brought together a number of patronage groups: the Veres (Sibbes dedicated his most famous work Bruised Reed and Smoking Flax to them); the Rich group, particularly Sir Nathaniel, and other East Anglican figures, e.g. Sir Nathaniel Barnardiston; important lawyers, Sir Henry Yelverton and the Crew brothers; and the Russells, the countess of Bedford had some connections with Preston and Davenport, while the 4th earl of Bedford was to have a close association with them, particularly through John Pym.[1] Sir Robert Harley was a cousin of Gataker's and a correspondent of Gouge and Taylor; the minister at Brampton Bryan from 1612 to 1633 was Thomas Pierson, another Cambridge puritan and an editor of Perkins.[2]

Despite the censorship, under which Gouge was imprisoned for his part in the publication of Sir Henry Finch's The World's Great Restauration and Sibbes practiced great caution, 1621 saw the printing of Thomas Gataker's great sermon A Sparke toward the Kindling of Sorrow for Sion.[3] Gataker's arguments are worth extensive quotation as they provide the core of the demand for the defence of the Church. Having posed the question, "Whether the sinnes of our nation also be in part the cause of those disasters befallen our brethren in foraine parts?", he proceeds:

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1. For these connections see Ussher's correspondence, Works, xv, xvi, correspondence of Samuel Ward, Bodl. Tanner MSS. 72-73; correspondence of Lady Vere, B.M. Addit. MS. 4274; Z. Catlin, "Dr. Sibbes his Life", Cambridge Antiquarian Society, Communications, i (1859); Letters of John Davenport, ed. I.M. Calder (Yale U.P., 1937), esp. 19, 23, 27-29, 29-32.

2. Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS., iii, 13, 15, 23, 25.

3. For Sibbes see R. Tenison to S. Ward, 26 May, 1621, Bodl. Tanner 73, f. 29.

> It is a fearful thing for men not to be affected with God's hand upon others, especially upon their brethren; ... So not to be possessed with griefe and thought, when God's children are in danger and distress ... argueth a great want of Christian charity; and brotherly love; a want of bowels of tender pitie and compassion .... It argueth a want of spirituall life ... sincere love of the brethren and a fellow-feeling in their miseries is a sure argument of life .... It argueth a want of love to Christ, when we have no commiseration of the members of Christ, being in want or misery .... It argueth a want of love to God's cause, a want of zeale of God's glory, then which nothing should be more deare unto us .... And what a fearfull estate are they in, to whom it is all one, whether God's church sinke or swim.
>
> The main use hereof, is to admonish us everyone, laying to heart that which the Prophet here speaketh, to cast our eyes into foreign parts abroad, and consider what cause God hath given us to be even sicke again with sorrow .... Can we heare daily reports of our brethren in foreign parts, either assaulted, or distressed, or surprised by Popish forces, and a main breach made into the state of those that are by bounds, civill and sacred, so nearly knit to us, and yet esteem all as nothing, ... Neither let any man say; What is their affliction to us? What are those parts to these? What is France or Germany to England? For what was Jerusalem to Antioch ....
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> But what then is to be done?... We should take some time ... to consider seriously of the troubles and calamities of our distressed brethren abroad .... Let us make their case our owne .... We should humble ourselves in the sight of God, and repent us of our sinnes .... We should strive by prayer to God for them .... We should show our compassion towards them, by being forward, according to our ability, to helpe and releeve them. Let us love, saith the Apostle, not in word and tongue; but in deed and truth .... Imitate those worthy well-willing Macedonians, of whom the Apostle beareth witnesse, and it remaineth upon record to their everlasting renowne, that to their power, yea beyond their power, they shewed themselves willing, and pressed the Apostles instantly to accept of their free-gift for the reliefe of the Saints ... Otherwise ... The Curse of Meroz may light upon us ....[1]

Gataker was a master of allusion. The Spiritual Watch of 1622 on moral defence against the subtlety of the adversary had obvious overtones of defence against Spanish influence. The Ioy of the Iust .... A Discourse tending to the Comfort of the Deiected and Afflicted of early 1623 on the

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1. A Sparke .... A Meditation on Amos 6:6.(1621), delivered in 1620 to Sergeant's Inn and dedicated to Sir Ranulf Crew, pp. 25-39 passim.

Christian's solace in affliction, dedicated to Vere and his wife on Vere's return from the Palatinate, could not but refer to Vere's defeat at Mannheim as well as other afflictions of the cause of religion.[1]

James pursued his search for a settlement in Germany with the same ruthlessness towards his allies which he employed against domestic opponents. Although Digby managed to arrange a truce in the Palatinate in Brussels, Morton's effort to keep the Evangelical Union in line failed. When James refused to give the Union full-scale support, it accepted the Imperial command to disband. James's refusal also inhibited Christian IV from executing his proposals for assisting the Union.[2] The only alternative was to send Digby to Vienna to obtain a continuation of the truce and eventually a settlement based on the restitution of the Palatinate in return for the surrender of pretensions to Bohemia.[3] Frederick had already refused this compromise and was attempting to rally the armies of the Union and of Mansfeldt for the defence of the Palatinate. For this he needed the financial assistance James had formerly promised him. The promise had only been a vague one and now it was refused on the ground that it might jeopardize Digby's negotiation.[4] James threatened to abandon Frederick entirely if he crossed his plans.[5] Digby, however, having discovered that Ferdinand was already committed to the transfer of the Palatinate to Maximilian of Bavaria, decided that the Palatinate would have to be defended. He himself helped to reassemble

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1. Ioy of the Iust (1623), Sig. (A3v), p.60.

2. Union remonstrance to James, Feb. 1621, PRO S.P. 81/20/217-8. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvi, 614-5. Anstruther to Calvert, 10 Mar., 31 Mar., PRO S.P. 75/5/235-7, 243-4.

3. Edmondes to Carleton, 12 June, PRO S.P. 14/121/96. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 36-7, 49. Chamberlain to Carleton, 9 June, Letters, ii, 382-3.

4. Nethersole to Carleton, 23 Apr., 1 May, 2 May, PRO S.P. 84/100/221, 101/5, 9-14. Dohna to Nethersole, 21/31 May, ibid. 81/21/26-28. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 42-3.

5. Nethersole to Calvert, 1 Sept., 9 Oct., 26 Nov., PRO S.P. 81/22/1, 107-8, 195. Calvert to Carleton, 29 Oct., ibid. 84/103/149.

Frederick's army and with Dutch assistance Mansfeldt was able to relieve Frankenthal. Under the influence of his report, James had no alternative but to recall Parliament for 20 November to obtain the supply to maintain this army. It was made clear to Frederick that any assistance would be contingent upon his acceptance of James's overall direction of policy.[1]

The same policy was pursued in the crisis in France. Assured that James could not intervene, in the spring of 1621 Louis XIII began his campaign to reduce the Huguenot sanctuaries below the Loire. Although James originally hoped that the Huguenots would offer no provocation and not cause a major conflict, once the siege of St. Jean d'Angely had commenced he had no alternative to a declaration that he would protect the Huguenots if an attempt was made to exterminate them. There was pressure on him from the Scots, particularly Hamilton and Holdernesse, to take strong action.[2] The conjuncture of the danger to religion both in France and Germany had a considerable effect in England, especially after French refugees began arriving in May. Sandys and Phelips in the Commons, Samuel Buggs at Paul's Cross, and even John Chamberlain saw a full-scale assault on religion in progress.[3]

Appeals for aid came from Bouillon, Rohan, Moulin, and, in July, in the form of a delegation from the Assembly of La Rochelle to request 4000 soldiers, 30 pieces of ordnance, and naval protection for Rochelle itself. There was hope that the matter would be brought before Parliament, Edmondes

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1. Carleton to Calvert, 12 Oct.; James to Frederick, 12 Nov.; PRO S.P. 84/103/61-v, 81/22/240-41. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 161-2, 167. Calvert to Carleton, 3 Dec., PRO S.P. 84/104/23.

2. Edmondes to Bouillon, 4 Apr., B.M. Stow MS. 176, f. 180. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 52-54, 65. Herbert to Calvert, 17 May, PRO 30/53/3/174-v.

3. Notestein, iii, 345-6, 348-50, S. Buggs, David's Straits. A Sermon Preached at Paul's Cross, 8 July 1621 (1622), 57. Chamberlain to Carleton, 9 June., Letters, ii, 382-3.

prepared a speech to that effect, and the Commons Declaration of 4 June carefully did not limit the offer of support solely to the Palatinate.[1] James assured the delegation he would ensure Rochelle's survival but claimed inability to provide immediate naval and military assistance. Instead Doncaster was to be sent to Louis for a last attempt at negotiation on the basis of the disbanding of the Assembly in exchange for a peace and the delegation was to await the results of his embassy.[2] Underlying this embassy was James's old hope that if a suitable settlement could be arranged, Louis XIII would support his policy in the Palatinate.[3]

The possibilities for negotiation had already disappeared. Sir Edward Herbert, when delivering James's request for moderation towards the Huguenots and his declaration, had clashed with Luynes and had left the court. When Doncaster refused to disavow Herbert's action, he was ignored.[4] The utility of the embassy, which he himself doubted from the beginning, was made more questionable when he fell seriously ill in September and October.[5] In the interim James refused to take any further steps although in September he permitted the delegation from La Rochelle to make a voluntary collection and promised a naval patrol in the Channel to keep open the approaches to Rochelle.[6] In the absence of assistance from England and the United Provinces the Huguenots were saved only by the military failure of the crown. After the

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1. Rohan to James, 12/22 May, PRO S.P. 78/69/102. Bouillon to Edmondes, 2/12 June; Moulin to Edmondes, 6/16 June; Edmondes to Bouillon, ? June; B.M. Stowe MS. 176, ff. 185-6, 187, 188-89. Petition of delegation, 9/19 July, ibid., f. 191-2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 81-2. In his speech (Notestein, vii, 610-11) intended for 30 May, Edmondes asserted that this declaration was only a reissuing of the declaration of 1612. See above, p. 208.

2. Buckingham to Luynes, 18 July, Berks. R.O. Packer MS., f. 324. Buckingham to Doncaster, 21 July, B.M. Egerton MS. 2594, f.55. During this period the delegation engaged in some propagandizing, distributing tracts printed in Rochelle in English. See A Declaration set forth by the Protestants in France (Rochelle, 1621), esp. 24.

3. Doncaster to ?, n.d. (Sept.), B.M. Egerton MS 2594, f. 207.

4. Herbert to Calvert, 15 June, 8 July, PRO 30/53/4, ff. 204-7, 215-17. Herbert to James, 31 July, PRO S.P. 78/69/148-49. Doncaster to James, 1 Aug., B.M. Egerton MS. 2594, f. 58. Carleton to Herbert, 10 July, PRO 30/53/4, ff.218-9.

5. Doncaster to James, 13 Nov., B.M. Egerton MS. 2594, ff. 169-70.

6. Calvert to Doncaster, 11 Aug., 18 Sept., 22 Sept., B.M. Egerton MS 2594, ff. 67-8, 105-6, 117-18. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 137.

raising of the siege of Montauban Doncaster noted an interest in James's proposed settlement but when James announced that he would undertake the defence of the Palatinate the attitude hardened again on the assumption that the English could not fight two wars at once.[1] Convinced that mediation was impossible, Doncaster was preparing to leave in early December when Luynes, the inspiror of the anti-Huguenot policy, suddenly died. Louis, who, Doncaster believed, was tired of the war, then allowed him to negotiate with La Rochelle.[2]

Although the news that Parliament was to be recalled to provide assistance for the Palatinate, the relief of Frankenthal, and the surprising "conversion" of Digby gave cause for optimism, the after effects of the previous session and the fact that the "adverse party" was even more in control clouded the opening of the session. The purge of the Bohemian party in the spring had been followed by the replacement of Bacon by John Williams and the eclipse of Abbot after the hunting accident in July. In October Mandeville was made Lord President and replaced by Cranfield as Lord Treasurer, Cranfield's friend Sir Richard Weston replaced Greville as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Thomas Murray, Charles's secretary, was dismissed for his part in the presenting of a tract against Spanish marriage and replaced by Digby's former secretary Sir Francis Cottington. These men were to form the core of the Spanish faction of the 1620s and their promotion was considered to be a preparation for the Spanish match. There were even rumours that Digby was to replace Pembroke as Lord Chamberlain and that Buckingham's client Sir John Suckling was to be given the vacant secretaryship.[3] The only effort made to

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1. Doncaster to James, 13 Nov., B.M. Egerton MS. 2594, ff. 169-70. To Calvert, 6 Dec., PRO S.P. 78/69/315-v.

2. Doncaster to Calvert, 19 Dec., B.M. Egerton MS. 2594, ff. 144-7. Ibid., 19 Dec., PRO S.P. 78/69/344-47. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 178-79.

3. Sir T. Knyvett to Lady Knyvett, 9 Oct., The Knyvett Letters (1620-1644), ed. B. Schofield (1949), 55-6. Rudyerd to Nethersole, 11 Oct., 2 Nov., PRO S.P. 14/123/27, 81/22/152. Countess of Bedford to Carleton, 5 Nov., ibid., 84/103/213-4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 161-2, 172.

conciliate the Parliament was the appointment of Oxford to command the Channel fleet although the appointment of John Preston to be chaplain to Charles at this time may not have been related to this.[1]

James's ultimate policies were unchanged. He was still determined not to jeopardize the Spanish match and considered that as the war was primarily between Frederick and the Emperor it was in Spain's best interest to co-operate with England. An important influence on this position was Digby, who believed the Spanish match the best available and the fear it would jeopardize relations with protestant allies a "vulgar prejudice".[2] This policy was unveiled to Parliament by Williams, Digby, and Cranfield when, in a significant departure from previous practice, they addressed a conference of Lords and Commons on 21 November. Williams declared the purpose of the session: to provide the immediate supply promised in the Declaration of 4 June in a session lasting until Christmas with grievances to wait for another session to begin on 8 February. Digby then gave an account of diplomatic developments since the loss of Bohemia and of the present position. The central element was the statement that "For the state of the warre, the question is only betweene the Emperor and the Palsgrave; all the rest are but of the by". The duty of the Commons was to provide sufficient funds to keep the army of Vere and Mansfeldt in being over the winter and to decide how many men should be sent as reinforcement. This would be cheaper than providing a new army, he gave the correct cost of £900,000, and offered the hope of reviving the

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1. Preston had preached before James with success in the Autumn and Sir Ralph Freeman with the support of John Packer suggested to Buckingham that Preston would be a useful contact with the puritans. Although this did not bear immediate fruit, Preston was discreet enough to survive the next two years. During this time he worked closely with the Bedford House group, particularly Hamilton and Chichester. His growing importance to Buckingham in 1623 may well have been due to the influence of Conway. T. Ball, The Life of the Renowned Doctor Preston (Oxford, 1885), 65-69, 77, 88-89, 93-4, 97. Preston to Carleton, 8 Jan. 1622, PRO S.P. 84/105/38. Also PRO S.P. 14/148/84, 110-11.

2. James to Frederick, 12 Nov., PRO S.P. 81/22/240-41. Doncaster to Calvert, 6 Dec., ibid., 78/69/313-7. J. Beaulieu to Woodford, 14 Nov., B.M. Egerton MS. 2594, ff. 175-6. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 180-2.

Evangelical Union. Cranfield concluded by stating that James had disbursed £312,370 on foreign affairs, most of it on embassies, and had only received £210,700. It was the Commons' duty to make up this deficit as well.[1]

The reaction of the Commons was to question the government's sincerity once again. Mr. Alford, seconded by Perrot, claimed that the proclamation on freedom of speech made the invitation to discuss the Palatinate a trap and that they were prevented from discussing anything else. On Calvert's denial the case of Sandys was raised and it was only after considerable debate that the House accepted Calvert's assurance that he had not been punished for parliamentary matters. The debate on the supply began on 26 November with a speech by Sir Dudley Digges who declared that the war was one of religion with Philip IV and James as the leaders and that after maintaining Mansfeldt it was necessary to plan the diversion. Although Rudyerd attempted to moderate the demand for a war of religion, the point was seconded by Perrot, Sir Miles Fleetwood, and put most forcibly by Phelips with the striking analogy of Spain as the great wheel and Germany as a little wheel. Phelips also declared that as there was going to be a second session the discussion of strategy could be delayed and immediate attention paid to grievances. Despite Calvert's opposition, this carried the day together with the demand for a naval war, raised by Digges and Sir Edward Giles on Elizabethan precedent.[2]

The debate continued on the 27th with a significant change of tactics on both sides. John Wilde opened the day with another demand for a general war against the house of Austria but was countered by Edmondes who stated that James wished to see how the King of Spain would now act in the Palatinate before proceeding further and that the Declaration bound the Commons to provide

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1. Notestein, iii, 421-4, iv, 426-8, vi, 414-18. Tyrwhitt, ii, 186-9.

2. Notestein, iii, 445-58, iv, 435-41, v, 195-99. Tyrwhitt, ii, 206-17. The Journal of the House of Commons (1803), i, 644-7. (hereafter Commons Journals).

a supply to stabilize the immediate position in the Palatinate. He was answered by Pym, seconded by Mr. Neale and Sir Nathaniel Grosvenor, who argued that the country was too poor to afford such an expensive war in Germany without a chance to finance it through naval operations. Pym also proposed the eventually successful compromise that a full supply be withheld until the declaration of such a war although in the meantime a free gift be granted which would fund Mansfeldt without committing the Commons to supplying him alone. Legislation should be considered in this session. Sir Thomas Wentworth tried to blunt the point of the compromise by combining the assistance to the Palatinate with a session by Christmas without including the later discussion on the larger war.[1] But Pym's proposal, supported by Coke and Phelips, carried the day. Further elaboration was provided by Perrot, who urged the establishment of a military committee to provide expert advice for this larger discussion, and by Sir Nathaniel Rich, who denied that the Declaration was limited to the Palatinate but included all protestants and wished James to make a protestant alliance which would be confirmed by act of Parliament. A committee which would discuss both religion and the supply was established for the 28th.[2]

After the establishment of a subcommittee under Pym to consider the position of recusants, particularly those about the king, the debate in the committee of the 28th was opened by Sir John Jephson with a request for the strengthening of the Anglo-Dutch alliance. Rich renewed the request for a military committee. Calvert reminded the House that this committee was

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1. Wentworth's position on foreign policy was very close to that held by his friend Sir George Calvert; he supported the government in this Parliament. His "opposition" was the result of his dislike of Buckingham and his position in debates on Buckingham's foreign policies in later Parliaments was the nearest thing to "isolationism" found in the 1620s. The speech of Sir George Chaworth in 1624 shows this was the standard position of the Spanish faction in opposition.

2. Commons Journals, i, 647-49. Tyrwhitt, ii, 206-26. Notestein, iii, 454-73, iv, 441-6, v, 214-20. Speech of Edmondes, PRO S.P. 14/123/128.

concerned only with the supply and the Palatinate. Phelips accepted this compromise, proposed a single subsidy for Mansfeldt, suggested a further discussion on the war in the second session with legislation occupying the remainder of the present one. The committee and then the House accepted this, voting a single subsidy to be collected in February with recusants paying double, on the principle that they had avoided the voluntary collections, and petitioning for a second session to discuss the war.[1]

The fate of this compromise was decisively affected by the most mysterious episode of the session. On 29 November Sir George Goring, on the instructions of Buckingham, proposed that as James had requested the King of Spain to cease assisting the Emperor, the Commons petition him to declare war on Spain if Philip IV refused. The source of this proposal caused considerable surprise but it was eventually accepted by Phelips who proposed a debate on the matter on the next day.[2] Buckingham's motives in sponsoring this have received considerable analysis, but his motives may not have been as rash as previously considered.[3] The intimates of the King expected that Philip IV would assist James against Ferdinand. Hence there was little danger in the petition which would continue the threat of a parliamentary war as a diplomatic lever while pacifying the Commons by apparently conceding to their demand for a war with Spain in the near future. After acceptance it could be ignored.

If this was the expectation, the scheme failed grievously for it inspired the Commons, in the debate on the Petition and Remonstrance on 1 December, to drop any pretence of compromise over the nature of the war. The

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1. Commons Journals, i, 649-50. Tyrwhitt, ii, 241-5. Notestein, ii, 461-7, v, 221-4, vi, 206-9, 326-31.

2. Goring to Buckingham, 29 Nov., Notestein, vii, 620-21.

3. See the discussion in Zaller, Parliament of 1621, 152-53.

Remonstrance established that the issue was the danger of catholicism at home and abroad and requested an open war, a protestant alliance, a war by diversion, and also that Charles marry a princess of the Religion. In return for this they would provide a subsidy for the Palatinate and requested a session before Christmas including legislation. Although the demand for a second session was not made explicit, it was implied by the request for a full-scale war which would require further supply. The most audacious element in the Remonstrance was the discussion of the marriage which caused some uneasiness.[1]

A copy of the Remonstrance was sent to James and Charles urged that Parliament should be prevented from discussing his marriage, and the session by Christmas should be offered as a compromise. The councillors returned on 3 December with the warning that the statement on the marriage was an infringement of the prerogative. There was an attempt, sponsored by Wentworth, to split the petition, separating the request for a session from the Remonstrance on religion, but the House was intransigent and only agreed to add a rider disclaiming any intention of infringing the prerogative.[2] On 4 December a letter arrived from James prohibiting as infringements of the prerogative any discussion of the marriage or any attacks on "that king, or any other our friends and confederates." He concluded with a warning to leave the case of Sandys alone, warning that although he had not punished Sandys for parliamentary activity he would do so in future if necessary.

The Commons was shocked at this response and on the 5th decided to prepare another petition explaining the first. Basing themselves on the requests of Digby and Williams to consider the Palatinate, they claimed they were only giving their opinion, not dictating policy. The petition closed with a request for liberty of speech, threatened by the last letter, and on

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1. Petition and Remonstrance, Rushworth, Collections, i, 40-43. Tyrwhitt, ii, 261-7. Notestein, v, 228.

2. Commons Journals, i, 655-57. Tyrwhitt, ii, 269-78. Notestein, ii, 487-99, v, 229-32, vi, 220-24. Charles to Buckingham, (c. 1 Dec.), B.M. Harleian MS. 6987, f. 205-6.

the 9th both petitions were sent to the king. James's answer was received on the 14th. It denied that the invitation to discuss the Palatinate was an invitation to discuss war with Spain and announced that discussion of the marriage was totally out of bounds. The Commons reacted in turn with the Declaration on Liberties and Freedom of Speech, defending their constitutional right to discuss such matters, which was entered in the Journal on 18 December. Their refusal to continue with business in the meantime caused James to demand first a session and then at their request an adjournment on 19 December to 8 February.[1]

The clash with Parliament drove James closer to Gondomar and news of further progress in the match caused him to dissolve it on the 30th over the objections of Pembroke and Hamilton. Later in the spring Digby went to Spain to conclude the negotiations over the match. Although he claimed he was only acting as an "honest broker", a later libel by a member of his train savagely pilloried his Spanish affections.[2] A long expected Dutch embassy led by François Aerssens, the leading advocate of religious alliance, which arrived on the aftermath of the Parliament found James completely uninterested in a joint policy. Inspired by Gondomar, another trade dispute broke out. The experience of this embassy was to cause a revival of Dutch interest in a political alliance with France.[3]

The ramifications of James's policy received further illustration by the reaction to the sermon of John Knight in Oxford in April on the right of subordinate magistrates to resist tyranny in defence of religion based on David Paraeus' commentary on Romans xiii. The punishment of Knight was not

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1. Rushworth, op. cit., i, 43-44, 44-46, 47-49.

2. Chamberlain to Carleton, 4 Jan. 1622, Letters, ii, 418-20. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 279-81. "Letter of Francis Phelips", c.1623, B.M. Harleian MS. 3638, ff. 93-98.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 211-12, 326. Doncaster to James, 14 Apr. 1622, PRO S.P. 78/70/81-2. Pembroke to Carleton, 10 Jan. 1622, ibid., 84/105/43.

unexpected but the burning of the work of a leading Reformed theologian caused considerable alarm - not the least in the United Provinces where it tended to confirm doubts held about James. Although the University did not ban all the works of Paraeus, young scholars were advised to pay more attention to English theologians than "other late authors, who live in churches and states, which are not so settled as it hath pleased God that these are."[1] An important element in this episode was the role of William Laud.[2] According to Heylyn the University sent the report of the case to him as the only Oxford bishop at court. This sounds suspicious as Abbot was both an ex-vice-chancellor and Laud's superior. It is not impossible that deliberate advantage was taken of the incident by Laud and other Oxford anti-Calvinists to further the isolation of England from Calvinist influence.[3]

Yet James was still committed to the stabilization of the situation in the Palatinate. As it was considered impolitic to raise troops in England, Arthur Chichester, Lord Belfast, was sent to do so in Germany and to supervise the assembly of an army out of the contingents of Mansfeldt and Vere. Money was to be provided by a benevolence replacing the supply lost through the dissolution.[4] In April Weston was sent to the Infanta in Brussels to arrange another truce in the Palatinate. The main effect of this was to inhibit Frederick who had gone to the Palatinate to join Mansfeldt. Although a small victory was won against Tilly at Wiesloch in April, he was immediately commanded by James to await the result of Weston's negotiations and to prevent

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1. Sentence of Bishops, c.22 May 1622, PRO S.P. 14/130/106. Brandt, Hist. of the Reformation in the Netherlands, iv, 406.

2. It may not be coincidental that Laud was now growing close to Buckingham; he became his chaplain on 15 June, Diary, Works, iii, 139.

3. See G.W. Whiting, "Paraeus, the Stuarts, Laud and Milton", Studies in Philology, 1 (1953), esp. 219-22. Whiting (224) also considers that this episode was to inspire Parliament to retaliate in kind upon Sibthorpe, Montague, and Mainwaring. There is, however, no direct evidence of this.

4. The fate of the benevolence and the opposition of Saye and Sele and M.P.S, e.g. Sir Jerome Horsey and Sir Peter Heyman, are well known.

Mansfeldt from going on the offensive. James also used his influence to prevent Frederick from obtaining assistance from Denmark and Nethersole, who accompanied Frederick, was criticized for not keeping him under better control.[1] Although originally persuaded by Bouillon to ignore the armistice, Frederick unhappily accepted James's request. His ability to oppose him was finally crippled in June when Tilly, who declared he would not accept any armistice, defeated the armies of Christian of Brunswick and The Margrave of Baden. Frederick first retired to Sedan but Bouillon, who now became nervous about his own position, persuaded him to return to the Hague.[2]

Frederick had now lost all influence over the course of events and was reduced to the role of a spectator. Bouillon tried to recruit Mansfeldt into the service of the Huguenots but in August Mansfeldt accepted a Dutch offer and marched to the relief of Bergen-op-Zoom.[3] The total collapse of the Palatinate, the storming of Heidelberg in September and the evacuation under mysterious circumstances of Mannheim by Vere in October, soon followed.[4]

A similar situation developed in France. In January Doncaster, with the permission of Louis XIII, sent his secretary John Woodford to La Rochelle and obtained a submission which would form the basis of a settlement whose terms would be guaranteed by James. In February he returned to England to prevent a repetition of the arguments over English participation in the Treaty of Loudon and to obtain fresh instructions.[5] In his absence the talks broke down

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1. James to Frederick, 22 Apr., PRO S.P. 81/24/42. Nethersole to Calvert, 19 Apr., 11 June, Belfast to Calvert, 10 June, ibid., 81/23/224, 25/97-9, 93. See also Ibid. 75/5/269,271. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 318-20, 333. Also Nethersole to Calvert, 2 June, PRO S.P. 84/108/6.
2. Trumbull to Edmondes, 6 July, B.M. StoweMS. 176, f. 232. Bouillon to James, 7/17 July, PRO S.P. 81/26/30. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 380-1.
3. Frederick to Elizabeth, 4/14 Aug., PRO S.P. 81/26/179-80.
4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 533-34.
5. Doncaster to Calvert, 17 Jan., Woodford to Nethersole, 7/17 Feb., Soubise to James, 7/17 Feb., PRO S.P. 78/70/12-15, 39-40, 43. S. Durant to P. Ferry, 30 Jan./9 Feb., J. Pannier, L'Eglise Reformée de Paris sous Louis XIII: De 1621 à 1629 (Paris, 1932, pièces justicatives, 86-89.

and Louis, inspired by Condé and by the dissolution of the Parliament, returned to his campaign.[1] Doncaster returned to France in April and James was now more desperate for a settlement. The situation was made worse by the defeat of the Huguenot fleet at the Isle of Rhé in April which encouraged Louis to renew the siege of Montauban. In June the Duke of Soubise, Rohan's brother and the defeated commander of the Huguenot fleet, arrived in England to appeal for arms and men and in July he was followed by another delegation from Rochelle. Most unwelcome guests, they were told to await the outcome of Doncaster's negotiation.[2] This negotiation never got off the ground as Doncaster found that the Huguenots felt that James was prepared to concede too much for a settlement and that Louis ignored him. Doncaster, who finally returned in August, considered from the beginning that the embassy was a waste of time and recommended that James provide at the minimum sufficient assistance to insure the survival of Rochelle.[3] James now made this contingent on the success of the Spanish match and to his relief Soubise left England in September.[4]

The disasters of the summer and autumn of 1622 gave an added impetus to the political developments of the previous year. In August the collapse in the Palatinate inspired three anti-Spanish sermons at Paul's Cross which in turn provoked James to issue instructions to the bishops for tighter control of preaching. In September establishment divines, led by John Donne, were

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1. Woodford to Nethersole, 7 Mar., PRO S.P. 78/70/59.

2. Calvert to Doncaster, 8 June, B.M. Egerton MS. 2595, ff. 147. Montmartin to Buckingham, June-July; Remonstrance of Rochelle, 4/14 July; Berks. R.O. Packer MSS., ff. 144, 367-70.

3. Doncaster to Calvert, 14 Apr., 4 May, 26 June, PRO S.P. 78/70/81-82, 103-7, 162-3. Doncaster to Calvert, 19 May; to James, 19 May; to Charles, 19 May; B.M. Egerton MS. 2595, ff. 99, 103, 105. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 279-81, 327-8, 370, 388-9.

4. Ibid., xvii, 380-1, 392-3.

assigned to Paul's Cross in a not very successful demonstration of correct preaching.[1] The growing dislike of the government for puritan divines in England was paralleled by a growing decline of the importance of the confessional alliance abroad. This was to become the dominant political trend of the 1620s as the tergiversations of English policy were to drive continental Calvinists to seek more effective support elsewhere.

After the collapse in the Palatinate and the sacrifice of Frederick, the Dutch leadership, even Maurice of Nassau and François Aerssens who had previously been the strongest advocates of the confessional alliance, began to look closely at reviving the political alliance with France.[2] Similar developments occurred in France. On the failure of foreign assistance, both from James and from the scheme to obtain the services of Mansfeldt, the aristocratic leadership of the Huguenots through the efforts of Rohan obtained a compromise peace with the crown at Montpellier in October. The price paid was not only the surrender of the political power of the assemblies and the surrender of their fortresses, but also the effective isolation of the Huguenots from the remainder of the Calvinist world.[3] The synod of Dort was banned by royal command and Scots divines, e.g. Gilbert Primerose, who had been a minister in Guienne since the 1590s, expelled.[4] One of the main reasons for the crown to end the campaign short of total victory was the alarm caused by the apparent surrender of theEnglish in Germany and the progress of the Anglo-Spanish entente. The voyage to Spain was suspected of being a prelude to a war against France in which the Huguenots would be manipulated

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1. Instructions on Preachers, Cabala, 103-4. B.M. Harleian MS. 389, f. 228v. Chamberlain to Carleton, 28 Sept., Letters, ii, 450-53. Donne, Sermons, iii, esp. 337, 344. Also R. Willan, Conspiracie against Kings, Heaven's Scorn. (1622).

2. Carleton to Buckingham (draft-unsent), 3 Aug., PRO 84/107/192-5. Aerssens to Lord Cromwell, 17/27 Aug., Hist. MSS. Comm., VIIIth Report, Part II (Manchester MSS.), 29.

3. Pannier, op.cit., 48-51, pieces justicatives, 5-7. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 502-3, 508. Rohan to James, 15/25 Dec., PRO S.P. 78/70/287.

4. Louis XIII to Synod of Charenton, 15/25 Sept. 1623, Quick, Synodicon ii, 103, also pp.95-97. Relation of G. Primerose, 14 Oct. 1626, PRO S.P. 16/37/75. Primerose had often been used by James as an agent with the Huguenots. The official reason for his expulsion was that he would be used as an agent to cause a Huguenot rebellion in the event of an Anglo-Spanish war against France.

by the English. In response steps were taken, the engaging of Mansfeldt and increased assistance to the Dutch, to prepare for such a war.[1]

Although James was now adamant in his determination to resolve the situation through the Spanish marriage, a certain uneasiness is observable on the part of Buckingham.[2] In the early summer he had sponsored the appointment of Viscount Grandison and Sir Edward Conway, both military men and in Conway's case puritan, to the council: "such a choice of uncorrupted persons has not been seen for three years."[3] When Nethersole was sent to England in September after the fall of Heidelberg he found Buckingham and Charles, under the influence of Doncaster (now earl of Carlisle), Holdernesse, and even Cranfield ready to press James to force the issue with Spain and summon a Parliament. A demonstration of Buckingham's good intentions was his sponsorship of Conway, "he doth advise much and often with him", as secretary.[4] James on the advice of Digby (now earl of Bristol) and Cottington refused to contemplate a change of policy.[5] In an effort to hurry the match along Buckingham proposed his going to Spain himself in the autumn and then dispatched Endymion Porter in October. It was Porter's optimistic report of the possibilities for the match and a settlement in the Palatinate which caused him finally to undertake the voyage in February 1623.[6] There is evidence to suggest that already at this stage he was suspicious of Bristol and wished to force the issue one way or another.[7] It is revealing that his patronage at this point was in a puritan direction, the most significant example of which was the appointment of Conway

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1. Herbert to James, 25 Jan. 1623, PRO S.P. 78/71/10-11. Ibid., 22 Mar., to Charles 8 May; PRO 30/53/5, ff. 79, 122. Carlisle to Buckingham, 13 May, B.M. Harleian MS. 1580, f. 191.
2. Instructions to Digby, 4 Oct. 1622, Bodl. Clarendon MS. 3, f.152. Note by Packer of letter of Buckingham to Frederick, 3 Sept., Berks. R.O. Packer MSS., f. 61v.
3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 370-1.
4. Nethersole to Carleton, 28 Sept.: to elizabeth, 3 Oct.; PRO S.P. 84/109/106-8, 81/27/97-8.
5. Nethersole to Carleton, 18, 24 Oct., PRO 81/27/124-7, 84/109/211-12.
6. Belfast to Carleton, 10 Jan. 1623, PRO S.P. 84/111/7.
7. This is what Preston thought, Ball, Life of Preston, 102-3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 2.

as secretary on 16 January. Buckingham was also extending his protection to Vere over the evacuation of Mannheim, Saye and Sele, imprisoned for resistance to the benevolence, Oxford, imprisoned for criticism of James in April 1622, and Naunton.[1] Although this may have been an effort to allay opposition to the match, it may also have been the preparation of a party in the event of a breach with Spain.

The opposition to the voyage is also revealing. The fear for Charles's safety has been exaggerated; only an accident in France or exposure to catholic prostyletizing were real worries. James and most people realized that it was in the interest of Spain to prevent anything happening to Charles which would make the Queen of Bohemia heir to the throne.[2] The most vocal opposition came not from the puritan faction but from the Scots and the Spanish faction. The Scots, particularly Hamilton, Lenox, and Holdernesse, saw this as a threat to the possibility of a French match. Even Carlisle found his loyalty to Buckingham and dislike of Spain difficult to reconcile.[3] The Spanish Faction, Arundel, Calvert, Worcester, Weston, and probably Middlesex and Williams, allied to Bristol, feared that Buckingham's make or break approach would ruin everything. By contrast the reaction of Pembroke and Abbot, whose position was well-established, was quite mild. This may have been due to their inability to offer alternatives which had not already been rejected, or possibly to the confidence generated by Conway, now Buckingham's major spokesman in England.[4]

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1. Vere to Conway, 16 Feb. 1623; Saye to Buckingham, 3 Feb.; PRO S.P. 81/23/54, 14/138/5. Conway to Buckingham, 12 Apr., B.M. Harleian MS. 1580, f. 293-4.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 6.

3. Carlisle to Herbert, ? Mar., PRO 30/53/10, f. 169. Cal. S.P. Ven., xvii, 582, 585.

4. Buckingham to Conway, 24 Mar., B.M. Harleian MS. 6987, f. 39. Conway to Buckingham, 2 Apr., Bodl. Tanner MS 73, ff. 307-8. J.J. von Rusdorff to Frederick, 11/21 Apr., Memoires et Negotiations Secretes de M. de Rusdorff, ed. E. Cuhn (Leipzig, 1789), i, 9-13. Rusdorff had arrived in England in early 1623 as Frederick's new ambassador.

By the summer Buckingham had decided to break with Spain and the next few months saw his successful struggle with Bristol for influence over Charles. In July the need for the council to take the oath on toleration gave an opportunity for resistance led by Abbot, with the support of Pembroke, Lenox, Hamilton, and, significantly, Carlisle and Conway, who were aware of Buckingham's new orientation.[1] The new policy now brought upon Buckingham the hostility of the Spanish faction, particularly Arundel, and Bristol's friends who saw him as the destroyer of the negotiations they had so carefully nurtured for so long.[2] On his return his problem was not only to wean James away from Spain but to do it in such a way as to destroy the influence of the Spanish faction. For this he would need allies and his first approach was to the Bohemians.

During the voyage James's efforts to bludgeon Frederick into accepting a settlement contingent on the Spanish match reached a culmination. Frankenthal, the remaining fortress in the Palatinate, was placed under the protection of the Infanta and another truce arranged. Frederick regarded this a betrayal of the Dutch, who would be left the sole target of the Spanish armies, and it was only after the defeat of Christian of Brunswick, who commanded the last army under Frederick's flag, in August that he agreed.[3] Both his resistance and surrender was influenced by advice from England. On the first news of the voyage the Queen of Bohemia had intended to go to England, possibly as a demonstration of her position in the succession, but was dissauded by Pembroke and the countess of Bedford.[4] In July, worried by James's demands for acceptance of the truce and rumours of concessions made by Buckingham,

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1. James to Buckingham and Charles, 21 July, Miscellaneous State Papers, ed. Philip Yorke, earl of Hardwicke (1778), i, 428. Kellie to Mar, 21 July, Hist, MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS, ii, 175. Ruigh, Parliament of 1624, 141, n.75. See also Carlisle to Buckingham, 10 Aug., B.M. Harleian MS. 1581, ff. 332-3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 105-6.
2. Lord Rochford to Buckingham, n.d. (Aug-Sept.), B.M. Harleian MS. 1581, f.379.
3. See correspondence on this, PRO S.P. 81/28/228, 340, 29/14, 61, 84-5, 120. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 105-6.
4. Countess of Bedford to Carleton, 28 Mar., 24 Apr., PRO S.P. 14/140/57, 143/63. Pembroke to Carleton, (Mar.-Apr., misdated Sept.), ibid., 14/152/89.

Elizabeth sent Nethersole to Madrid. Buckingham's response, brought to her by Sir George Goring in August, was to urge her not to break with James over the truce but to rely on his support in future.[1] This rapprochement was the first open sign of the new orientation.

Buckingham's initial strategy for weaning James from Spain had two major elements. The first was the wrecking of the settlement with Spain by the demand for assurance on the restitution of the Palatinate before delivery of the proxy. James's request to Frederick to accept the marriage of his son to the Emperor's daughter met a similar fate, as Frederick, bolstered by Buckingham's support, refused to consider this before the restitution was accomplished.[2] This deprived James of the initiative and brought him to the acceptance of a Parliament in late December. The initiative, now in Buckingham's hands, was to be maintained by the second element: the involvement of James in an immediate anti-Spanish alliance.

A major role in this was to be played by the Bohemians and their closest English associates. At the end of August Elizabeth, after a public banquet with Oxford and Warwick, nominated Buckingham and Lenox as godfathers to her newly born son. Goring was sent to the Hague in November to act as proxy and, in consort with Elizabeth, Carleton, and Nethersole (whom he had earlier advised to Buckingham to patronize), to cultivate Maurice of Nassau and persuade him to offer England a new alliance. Maurice, however, demanded a demonstration of James's resolution first. At the same time Conway made similar approaches through Rusdorff.[3] Nethersole, encouraged by the atmosphere, sent a "religious and wise" discourse on the restitution of the Palatinate to Carlisle

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1. Nethersole to Conway, (Aug.), PRO S.P. 81/29/118. Buckingham to Elizabeth, (July), B.M. Harleian MS. 6987, f. 151. Goring to Buckingham, 15 Aug., ibid., 1580, f. 436-7.

2. See correspondence, PRO S.P. 81/29/218-19, 234, 275-6, 311-13. Bodl. Tanner MS. 73, f. 361. Ruigh, op.cit., 24-25.

3. B.M. Harleian MS. 389, f. 354. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 120. Buckingham to Elizabeth, (? Nov.); D. Carleton to Carleton, 1 Nov.; Buckingham to Carleton, 20 Nov.; Carleton to Buckingham, 18 Dec.; PRO S.P. 81/29/356-57, 14/154/2, 84/115/46, 84/115/151-2. Carleton to Buckingham, 9 Dec., B.M. Harleian MS. 1580, ff. 249-51.

and John Woodford, who promised to distribute it secretly "so you may be secure of Alured's case".[1]

Goring's dispatch was accompanied by the preparation of Anstruther to go to Denmark and Sir Isaac Wake to Savoy. These embassies, however, were suspended until a more definite resolution was made; in Anstruther's case it may have been a personal refusal to proceed without something definite as he had prejudiced his personal standing with Christian IV over James's policy in 1621.[2] A similar interest was shown in an alliance with France. A faction in France, led by the duke of Chevreuse and his celebrated duchess who were already in contact with Carlisle, saw this as the opportunity of breaking the Spanish match and offered a French match.[3] Carlisle was joined by Bacon in pressing this policy on Buckingham and in December it was openly reported that Henry Rich, Viscount Kensington was to be sent to France privately to test their sincerity.[4]

The Dutch demand that the initiative in any alliance come from England was a disappointment to Buckingham and Conway who replied that firm offers were necessary for James to present to Parliament (in reality for them to present to James) and redoubled their efforts through Carleton, Noel de Caron, Rusdorff, and Elizabeth.[5] These eventually bore fruit in the embassy of François Aerssens and Albertus Joachimi in February. Carleton emphasized, however, that they would have to be offered concrete proposals: suggesting the establishment of a West Indian Company to join with the Dutch company and

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1. Nethersole to Carlisle, 1/11 Dec. B.M. Egerton MS. 2595, f.204. Carlisle to Nethersole, 8 Nov., Woodford to Nethersole, 8 Nov., PRO S.P. 14/154/16, 81/29/259.

2. Anstruther to Conway, (Jan.) 1624, PRO S.P. 75/5/297. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 193-5. Kellie to Mar, 14 Jan. 1624, Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS., ii, 187-8.

3. Herbert to James, 31 Oct., PRO 30/53/5, ff. 230-31. Herbert to Trumbull, 10 Sept., Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xxvi, art. 200. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 124. See also R. de Bellegarde to Buckingham, 30 Dec./9 Jan. 1623/24, Bodl. Addit. MS. D. 111, f. 434.

4. Bacon, Life and Letters, vii, 442-44. Rusdorff to Frederick, 18/28 Dec., Rusdorff, Negotiations, i, 156-7. Kellie to Mar, 18 Dec., Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS., ii, 185.

5. Conway to Maurice, Conway to Carleton, Buckingham to Carleton, 9 Jan. 1624, PRO S.P. 84/116/11-12, 17-19, 20.

alliance with the Algerine pirates in a naval war against Spain.[1]

The failure to obtain a "grand alliance" with which to dominate both James and the Parliament was, however, a major setback. James gave public expression of his unwillingness to engage in a war and it was vital to avoid frightening him by a difficult parliamentary session.[2] The decision of the junto of twelve councillors to proceed to a parliament had been a close one, with five members, Arundel, Weston, Calvert, Williams, and Middlesex, opposing: either out of commitment to the Spanish alliance or because they believed it was the King's desire. Several of them were in communication with Bristol and it was important to isolate them.[3] It was therefore necessary for Buckingham to broaden his base of support and come to terms with potential enemies in the Parliament.

Of the junto he could only count on support of Conway and Carlisle. The nature of his relations with the other four members, Hamilton, Lenox, Pembroke and Belfast, was dramatically revealed by a vote on 4 January when they abstained on a resolution to reject a new Spanish offer which James was known to favour. Pembroke, the leader, gave as his reasons his wish to have Buckingham questioned more closely on the Spanish negotiations and his desire to have the Spanish treaties dissolved in Parliament rather than beforehand.[4] A vital compromise had to be made with Pembroke on these grounds; the basis of the new foreign policy was to be made by the Parliament not outside it. From different perspectives, Williams, Carlisle, and Southampton all expressed alarm at the lack of a solid policy for the crown to offer Parliament - but the crown had no policy, it was in Pembroke's hands.[5]

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1. Carleton to Conway, 15 Jan., PRO S.P. 84/116/41. Carleton to Buckingham, 24 Jan., B.M. Harleian MS. 1580, ff. 258-60. Elizabeth to Conway, 16 Feb., PRO S.P. 81/30/41.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 190-92, 196-7

3. Ibid., xviii, 130-1, 167-70.

4. Ibid., xviii, 216. Rusdorff to Frederick, 22 Jan./1 Feb., Negotiations, i, 190. Ruigh, op.cit., 39-42., is not too clear of Pembroke's activities.

5. Williams to Buckingham, 2 Feb., Cabala, 273-74. Carlisle to James, 14 Feb., B.M. Harleian MS 1580, ff. 193-6. Southampton to Roe, 24 Dec., PRO S.P. 14/155/77. Part of the compromise was the abstention by Pembroke from questioning Buckingham on the Spanish negotiations.

Buckingham's parliamentary patronage therefore comprised two basic elements: a reconciliation with Oxford, Saye, and the Riches and the understanding with Pembroke. The reconciliation with the Riches has been attributed to Preston, although there is only one direct piece of evidence to connect him to the government at this point, Conway's support for his preferment to the Trinity lecture at Cambridge, in May 1624.[1] Warwick's brother Kensington probably also made a contribution and it is interesting that Warwick continued to be a supporter of the French marriage in December 1624.[2]

The understanding with Pembroke assured not only the commitment of Pembroke's own following but also the Sandys-Southampton faction. It was Pembroke who first openly opposed the scheme to send Sandys, Coke, and possibly Phelips to Ireland, although it needed Charles's influence finally to quash the scheme.[3] Further evidence that Buckingham could not have negotiated directly with Sandys and Southampton is provided by the support of the government in January 1624 for the Riches in the disputes over the Virginia Company in which Sandys was deposed and the Company dissolved.[4] The bitterness of this dispute, in which Sandys accused Warwick of using Virginia as a base for piracy and Sir Nathaniel Rich thought Sandys was trying to establish a Brownist republic there, continued through the Parliament.[5] Although Phelips was later consulted by Buckingham on the question of Bristol and Sandys's attack on Middlesex was allowed to develop into an impeachment, it is difficult to see them as associates of Buckingham in the same manner as the Riches.

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1. PRO S.P. 14/214/120. Also Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 167-70. Ruigh, 76.
2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 419-20.
3. Ibid., 217. It is interesting that while Buckingham held six proxies in the Lords, Pembroke held five, and Oxford, Essex, Southampton, and Saye, one each. The Journal of the House of Lords (1846), iii, 205.
4. Ruigh, 318-19. W.F. Craven, The Dissolution of the Virginia Company (New York, 1932), 120-21. W.R. Scott, The Constitution of English, Scottish, and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1920 (Cambridge, 1910-12), ii, 289-90.
5. Hist. MSS. Comm., Manchester MSS., 35-6, 45.

The nature of Buckingham's compromise was revealed early in the Parliament. James's opening speech on 19 February was decidedly cautious; although he asked Parliament for its advice, he carefully denied any commitment to a war and gave no lead on the policy to be followed. The vital steps were taken when the relation of Charles and Buckingham of the negotiations in Spain was discussed in the two Houses. Although Charles appears to have hoped the Lords would come to an earlier decision to influence the Commons, he was prevented by Pembroke who proposed successfully that although the Lords should clear Buckingham from any illegal action in Spain, they should not resolve the issue before a conference with the Commons. He was supported by Hamilton, Southampton, Sheffield, and Spencer, overriding both Abbot and Saye who wished a resolution made first. Buckingham significantly abstained from the debate.[1] The debate in the Commons on 1 March was opened by Pembroke's friend and client Sir Benjamin Rudyerd, not by a councillor. Rudyerd urged not only the rejection of both treaties but the establishment of the war as one for defence of religion. The rejection should be made quickly by James, "For until it be done, his friends will hold him in continual jealousie," and followed by a confessional alliance. Parliament was not to make an open offer of assistance but to finance four "propositions": security for Ireland, preparation of the navy, repair of forts in England, and assistance to the United Provinces. If James was to embark on a war it was to be waged by diversion, he did not state whether by attack in Flanders or naval expedition, and not by a campaign in the Palatinate which had already been seen to have failed.[2]

The significant aspect of Rudyerd's speech was the manner in which he set both the tone of the day's debate and, in that his four propositions were those ultimately accepted, the tone of the session. He was followed by Phelips, Sir Francis Seymour, and most of the other leading members of the

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1. Notes of the Debates in the House of Lords ... 1624 and 1626, ed. S.R. Gardiner (Camden Soc., New Ser., xxiv, 1879), 2-3, 9-11.

2. B.M. Harleian MS. 6799, ff. 182-3. The demand for a diversion had already been made by Sheffield in the Lords.

House but they could add nothing to his arguments and the debate ended with the formation of a committee to prepare for the conference with the Lords.[1] Rudyerd's speech should be seen as the other element in the compromise between Buckingham and Pembroke. It proposed the funding of military necessities, vital for a successful war, but, in that it did not bind the Parliament to support questionable adventures, forced the crown to return for fresh subsidies if an offensive war was to be waged.

In their four reasons why the treaties should be broken the Commons established that the danger was one to religion in which the Palatinate was only one example, reversing the government's policy of regarding the Palatinate as an isolated issue.[2] The conference with the Lords decided on an immediate breaking of the treaties and a public declaration of intent before proceeding further. Buckingham was now faced with the problem of gaining James's acceptance which he attempted to ease by requesting, through Southampton, an open offer of assistance. In exchange he was prepared to persuade James to allow expenditure to be overseen by a committee of the Commons.[3] Pembroke and Saye suggested that it be referred to the Commons, where, although Sandys and Phelips supported it as necessary to the success of the petition, it was rejected.

A similar compromise, that the cause of religion be left out of the grounds for war with Spain, was successful, despite the unhappiness it caused Sir Robert Harley and Edward, Lord Montague. It was strongly hinted that James was insistent upon this and Abbot claimed that it was included in the general proposition anyway.[4] The acceptance was based on the belief that once James was separated from Spain a general war was inevitable. As the bishop of

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1. For Rudyerd's impact see D. Carleton to Carleton, 5 Mar., PRO S.P. 14/160/33. Also Ruigh, 181-83 although he interprets Rudyerd's speech differently.

2. D'Ewes Journal, B.M. Harleian MS. 159, f. 72v.

3. Ruigh, 193. Notes of Buckingham for speech by James, c.5 Mar., B.M. Harleian MS. 6987, f. 202.

4. Ruigh, 195. Diary of Lord Montague, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., iii, 232.

Chichester wrote:

> For when armes are up on all sides, it is not the recovery of the Palatinate will give full satisfaction ... for these warres will turn from the quarrell between the Emperor and the Palsgrave, to be the quarrell for religion, these things are in the hands of God, to guide as he will, our partes must be to prepare ourselves.[1]

In his response, James made his poverty, which Middlesex and Weston were to explain, the basis for his unwillingness to proceed to war, although he indicated he would be willing to accept a committee to oversee disbursement. Middlesex attempted to extend this to cover the king's debts but was over-ruled by Charles in the Lords. The reaction to this revealed a certain split in Pembroke's alliances. While Rudyerd, supported by another client, Sir Robert Mansell, urged supply for the four propositions only, a council of war, and a gesture towards James's debts, Southampton, Sandys, and Phelips were prepared to offer a general support, although not, as Buckingham would have preferred, a specific figure.[2] This was carried and the petition and the offer presented to James by a deputation led by Abbot on 14 March.

Here again he outflanked them by demanding five subsidies and ten fifteenths for immediate military expenses and one subsidy and two fifteenths p.a. for his debts before he would consider breaking with Spain. This nearly caused the collapse of the whole elaborate edifice which Buckingham had been constructing. By great effort he and Charles managed to reduce this on 17 March to an immediate grant of six subsidies and twelve fifteenths and a promise of further supply if necessary, in return for another session at Michaelmas and one in the following spring.[3]

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1. G. Carleton to Carleton, ? May, PRO S.P. 14/164/11. One of the steps Bishop Carleton wished taken in preparation for the war was the legal establishment of the articles of the Synod of Dort.

2. Lords Debates, 23-27. B.M. Harleian MS. 159, ff. 80-82v. Ruigh, 204-9.

3. Ruigh, 212-16. Buckingham to James, c. 15 Mar., B.M. Harleian MS. 6987, f. 200.

The debate on this request in the Commons on March 19-20 was widely regarded as crucial. The King's demands, estimated by Sir Edward Coke at £900,000, were forbidding, particularly as there was no security that James would honour a promise to proceed to a war. Those who had been most prominent in urging an open offer, Sandys, Digges, and Phelips, were regarded with suspicion.[1] Rudyerd opened with a subtle compromise which again dominated the debate: the commons should grant the king's request which would be useful for propaganda and enable him to raise loans on the security but it should be paid in widely spaced increments, the first of which should be devoted to the four propositions. Despite some effort by privy councillors to justify the king's sincerity, this distinction between the two parts of the supply was generally accepted and carried over to the next day's debate.[2]

This debate revealed the full subtlety of the proposal. Sandys opened and divided the question into general and specific supply; concerning himself only with the specific, he urged the consideration of Rudyerd's propositions as the necessities for the present year. Although Sir Robert Killegrew tried to begin a discussion of the general, the House decided to follow Sandys. Coke, supported by Phelips, suggested a grant of £300,000 (three subsidies and three fifteenths) for the four propositions with a review at Michaelmas. This was carried. When Sir John Saville queried that the purpose of the war was not yet decided, Coke replied that this was to be paid by parliamentary treasurers for the four propositions only and that the Commons was not committed to supply a specific war as yet. The resolution embodying the offer stipulated that it was to be paid after the dissolution of the treaties, to be disbursed for the four propositions through parliamentary treasurers (assistance to the Dutch included "and other your majesties friends and allies"), and concluded with a promise that the Commons would provide more once a war was declared.[3]

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1. Chamberlain to Carleton, 20 Mar., Letters, ii, 547-51.
2. B.M. Harleian MS. 159, ff. 87v-92. Diary of Sir Walter Earle, B.M. Addit. MS. 18597, f. 93v. Compare Ruigh, 216-26 for a different interpretation.
3. B.M. Harleian MS.159, ff. 92v-95v. The resolution is in Rushworth, i, 135-36.

A draft of the resolution was taken by Buckingham to James who again quibbled at the war for defence of religion. The Commons was amenable to its exclusion on the realization that this implied James would accept.[1] His acceptance was anything but enthusiastic and he carefully emphasized that control of strategy remained in the prerogative and that he intended a political war for the Palatinate rather than a religious war against Spain. As he was hoping to gain catholic allies, the question of religion must remain muted. Despite the implications of this statement, the Commons had obtained the dissolution of the treaties. If James was sincere about a war they had provided him with sufficient funds for preparations; if not, the subsidy was as protected as it could be.[2]

This compromise did, however, leave Buckingham in a dangerous position. He had achieved all he could with Parliament and he was faced with more delicate problems, making James honour his agreement publicly to declare the treaties broken, resolving the domestic grievances of the Commons, and repelling the counterattacks of his enemies, the Spanish embassy and the Spanish faction. As the subsidy bill would not be passed until the end of the session, the Commons still needed placating. James took considerable prodding to make the declaration and the Commons petition on recusants threatened to reverse the whole process. James re-emphasized that he would not engage in a war of religion and was worried that the Commons would make the petition a sine qua non for the subsidy and was prepared to halt the breaking of the treaties in retaliation.[3] Considerable manoeuvring was necessary to avert this. James was finally persuaded to accept the petition on recusants and a display of diplomatic activity was employed to assuage the fears of the Commons. Yet by the end

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1. Nethersole to Carleton, 25 Mar., PRO S.P. 14/161/36, also 14/161/19.

2. Ibid., 20, 25 Mar., PRO S.P. 81/30/88-90, 14/161/36. Also Sir E. Conway the younger to Carleton, 23 Mar., PRO S.P. 14/161/30.

3. Ruigh, 236-8. James to Conway, 3 Apr., Rushworth, i, 140-41. James to Conway, (dated 4 Apr. by Ruigh), PRO S.P. 14/162/30.

of April the suspicion that James was still not in earnest continued to plague the situation.[1]

The drafting of the subsidy bill on 14 May reflected this continuing tension. While the preamble declared the treaties broken and limited expenditure to the four propositions, Conway recommended in the king's name that the recovery of the Palatinate be included and aid to the Dutch limited to that purpose. This was rejected but it provided further proof that James could not be trusted. The efforts by the lawyers to assemble precedents for the powers of the treasurers and the legal responsibility of the council of war, on whose advice disbursements were to be made, to Parliament did not carry conviction. The eight London aldermen appointed treasurers were markedly unhappy about their position.[2]

The conclusion of the Parliament therefore left Buckingham little better off than he was at its outset. The course of the Parliament had, if anything, made it somewhat worse. His manoeuvrings had only just concealed the fact that an impasse had been reached between political puritanism and the crown on the nature of foreign policy. Any remaining hope that James would take up the cause of religion, originally inspired by his activities in 1611-13, was now extinguished. Furthermore, while in the discrediting of the Spanish embassy, the imprisonment of Bristol, and the impeachment of Middlesex, he had gained an initial victory over the Spanish faction, there was no stability in his victory. Until James's death he was to be haunted by the fear that he might lose his influence over James who would return to the Spanish faction, particularly during the winter of 1624-25 when Gondomar was expected to return. It was vital that James be not frightened by the demands for confessional foreign policy, while at the same time Buckingham would have to satisfy the desires of political puritanism if his alliance with that party was to continue. These two basic problems were to provide the matrix for the foreign policy of 1624-25.

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1. R. Knightley to Buckingham, (dated 29 April by Ruigh), Bodl. Addit. MS. D 111, f. 443. D. Carleton to Carleton, 19 Apr., PRO S.P. 14/163/16. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 291-2.

2. See Ruigh, 251-56. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 302, 342.

IO. Buckingham and the Grand Alliance, I624-I626.

If the contradictions in his domestic position provided the main stimulus for Buckingham's foreign policy in I624-I625, their effect was compounded by his delusions of grandeur which inspired him to believe he could transcend and surmount both them and the political situation on the continent. His method was that of a grand alliance against the Hapsburgs, which he had already tried to create at the end of I623, to which the key was a political alliance with France. This, however, was to cause him to fall into a greater contradiction than those he thought to avoid. The central element in all previous English anti-Hapsburg policies had been defence of religion. A political alliance surrendered the initiative to France, which could deploy far greater resources, and would be dominated by French political considerations, one of the most important of which was the weakening of international Calvinism. In his efforts to gain the French alliance Buckingham was forced to make repeated concessions on religious issues. This not only caused his repudiation by political puritanism in England in I626, but also completed the disintergration of the Calvinist alliance and caused, as will be seen, the other members to revert to being political clients of France. This was perhaps the crucial event in the Thirty Years War: the conversion of the opposition to the Hapsburgs from international Calvinism to the political alliances manipulated by the French monarchy. This, in turn, provided the basis for the belief that the English monarchy had consciously abandoned the Church on the continent.

The immediate causes which impelled Buckingham to the French alliance were two: the need to marry Charles off quickly to prevent any revival of the Spanish match and the need to engage James quickly in a massive political alliance and a war. France was the only country which could provide a solution to both which James would accept. These imperatives were to lead him directly to the two most controversial aspects of his foreign policy: the French match and the expedition of Mansfeldt.

At the beginning of I624 there was sufficient indication from France that, as the French too had an interest in breaking the Spanish match, a French marriage would raise no problems. Although there were some question about an alliance, doubts were brushed aside by Kensington who reported that the French attitude was such that an alliance would soon follow the match. On the basis of his over-optimistic reports, he and Carlisle were commissioned in the spring to treat for both.[I] This was fairly widely reported and caused disquiet among those who now expected a protestant match.[2] Nethersole was already investigating through Carleton, Maurice of Nassau, and the Bohemians the possibility of a protestant bride.[3] There is evidence that both Preston and Conway protested to Buckingham but he answered that the only match James would accept was a French one and if it failed he would revert to a Spanish match.[4]

I. Herbert to James, I9 Jan.; Kensington to Conway, 4 Mar.; to Buckingham, 4 Mar, 9 Mar.; Conway to Kensington, 3I Mar.; PRO S.P. 78/72/9-I0,48,50,52, 83-84. Kensington to Buckingham, 26 Feb.; to Charles; 9 Mar, B.M. Harleian MS. I58I, ff. 26-7, 24.

2. Sir E. Cecil to Herbert, I9 Feb, PRO 30/53/6, ff. 24v-25. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, I84.

3. Nethersole to Carleton, 3I Mar., 6 May, PRO S.P. I4/I6I/6I,I64/45.

4. Ball, Life of Preston, I09. For Conway, see J. Goll, Die Französische Heirat: Frankreich and England, I624 und I625 (Prague, I876), 46-7.

There was considerable curiosity in the Commons about the match but this was temporarily assuaged by the acceptance of the petition on recusants and a declaration by Charles a future marriage would cause no change in the state of religion.[I] Despite the muted tones of the discussion this was the first sign of the impermanence of Buckingham's alliance with political puritanism.

The alliance was still the greater problem. Herbert, who was replaced as ambassador by Kensington and Carlisle, warned that the French were primarily interested in breaking the Spanish match with the marriage and that in a war between England and the house of Austria "they would render themselves arbiters and in the meantime settle their affairs at home to the sure detriment of these of the Religion". James should receive proof of their assistance in a war before making an alliance.[2] At this point Mansfeldt appeared in England. Although he had a popular reputation as Frederick's general, he had been repudiated by the Bohemians, and no one with any knowledge of the German situation had any confidence in him. In part the public reception directed by Buckingham was propaganda for the Parliament but Mansfeldt also had two new over-riding attractions. His offer to raise an army for the Palatinate for only £40,000 was immensely appealing to James. Moreover, despite the fact he had been expelled from France, his schemes for joint action with France and vague promises of French interest would provide the functional basis for the alliance with France.[3]

I. Ruigh, 24I-44. Kellie to Mar, 5 Apr, Hist. MSS. Comm, Mar and Kellie MSS. ii, I97.

2. Herbert to James, I3 Apr; to Buckingham 20 Apr; PRO 30/53/6, ff. 72-3v, /IO, f.1. Carlisle appears to have shared this scepticism, Conway to James, c. Mar., PRO S.P. 78/72/89-90.

3. D. Carleton to Carleton, I9 Apr., PRO S.P. I4/I63/I6. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 280-I, 293-6, 303.

He was sent back to France with an advance of £20,000, provided from the subsidy. This was the first indication that the government would not accept the spirit of the four propositions and it may have been the cause of the uneasiness about the system felt at the end of the session.I

Any chance that the "parliamentary war" would provide an alternative was crippled by James's treatment of the Dutch embassy which arrived in February. Although Aerssens came prepared to make the most comprehensive alliance, it was not until April that serious negotiations were begun, probably as a gesture for the Parliament of James's sincerity. By that time it was too late to prepare anything for I624.[2] The Dutch were further antagonized by the reception given to Mansfeldt, which appeared as another evasion by James of a sincere anti-Spanish alliance.[3] The agreement reached at the end of May was only for a defensive alliance in which 4000 English in James's pay were to be added to the Dutch army. To gain popularity and the support of the military wing of political puritanism Charles and Buckingham gave the command to Oxford, Essex, Willoughby, and Southampton, who did not want to go.[4] Discussion of a joint naval campaign with the Dutch, in which Buckingham, who would gain personally as Lord Admiral, and Conway were interested, was innibited by James.[5]

I. Rusdorff to Frederick, 26 Apr, 6 May, Négotiations, i, 289. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 332-3. Conway to Coventry, 3I May, PRO S.P. I4/I65/67.

2. Nethersole to Carleton, 3I Mar; D. Carleton to Carleton, II Apr; PRO S.P. 84/II7/30-3I, I4/I6I/6I.

3. D.Carleton to Carleton, I9 Apr., PRO S.P. I4/I63/I6. Rusdorff to Frederick, 24 Apr/4 May, Negotiations, i, 287-88. Cal.S.P. Ven xviii.

4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 323-5, 332-3, 343.

5. Nethersole to Carleton, 3I Mar; D. Carleton to Carleton, II Apr; Memo randum of Conway, n.d. (spring I624); PRO S.P. I4/I6I/6I, 84/II7/30-3I, I4/I57/64.

Another scheme of Buckingham's, the capture of Cadiz by a naval expedition, was checked both by James and the state of the fleet and had to be postponed until the next year.[I] Both Conway and Pembroke had advocated careful military preparations in concert with the Dutch but this too was ignored. The council of war, established on I4 April, was intended to countersign the expenditure of the subsidy not to plan strategy. The fact that the majority of its members, Conway, Cecil, Ogle, Grandison, Brooke, Button, and Carew, were clients of Buckingham's, only Mansell and Belfast had equally strong ties with Pembroke, ensured that it would interprete the subsidy bill widely enough to incorporate any of Buckingham's schemes.[2]

Immediately afterwards the Dutch signed a treaty with France at Compiègne renewing the French subsidy and demonstrating the unsatisfactory nature of the treaty with England. Despite the preference of Maurice and Aerssens for the religious alliance with England, the Dutch were forced back to the political alliance with France.[3] After the Amboyna affair, the news of which reached Europe at the same time, became a source of Anglo-Dutch antagonism, the French alliance would, as it had done previously, provide a prop for anti-English sentiment. The disappointment over English policy was also shared by the Bohemians, who, now that they had served their purpose,

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I. Nethersole to Carleton, I8 Apr; D. Carleton to Carleton, I3 May; PRO S.P. I4/I63/3, I64/72. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 3I5-6.

2. Conway, Memorandum, ibid. Also PRO S.P. I4/I62/55, I68/30, 55. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 343.

3. This treaty involved the loan of Dutch ships to France, ostensibly for an attack on Genoa, an indication that Dutch accepted the condition of French assistance, the abandoning of the Huguenots. See Goll, op, cit., 66.

were ignored by Buckingham.[I] Standard accounts have seen these treaties as creating a "Triple Alliance" of England, France, and the United Provinces, but this "alliance" was illusory.[2] The grand alliance existed solely as a figment of Buckingham's imagination. The reality was the abandoning of a confessional alliance system by the English in pursuit of a grand alliance which it was impossible to realize.

The reason for James's rejection of the "parliamentary war" was revealed during the summer; he would not contemplate a war until an alliance with France had been made.[3] The French negotiations now became the centre of all English efforts and with this the initiative was surrendered and the process of concession began. Although James demanded that the alliance be made first and with it the agreement over Mansfeldt, the French, particularly after Richelieu became the dominant figure on the council, were not prepared to engage in an open war against the Hapsburgs and insisted on the marriage coming first.[4] The negotiations dragged on throughout the summer and in August Charles and Carlisle were prepared to abandon them.[5] Yet the "agreement" over Mansfeldt had become too important to be abandoned. In June Anstruther had been sent to Denmark and Sir James Spens to Sweden to invite Christian IV and Gustavus Adolphus to join in a grand alliance.[6] Christian demanded

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I. Elizabeth to Conway, I9 Apr; Carleton to Nethersole, 7 Apr; PRO S.P. 8I/30/I47, 84/II7/22-4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 303.

2. See, e.g. C.V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (I938), I95, Blok, Hist of the People of the Netherlands, iv, I2-I3.

3. Nethersole to Carleton, 7 Jun, 25 Jun, 3 Jul, PRO S.P. I4/I67/28, I68/40, I69/I4.

4. PRO S.P. 78/72/2I4-20, 266-67, 27I-72.

5. Carlisle to Buckingham, 6 Aug; Charles to Carlisle, I3 Aug; ibid., 78/73, I-3, 40.

6. Instructions for Anstruther, June I624; for Spens, 6 June; PRO S.P. 75/5/3I2-I5, 95/2/86-8.

a diversion in Flanders as a precondition to his engagement and he was offered Mansfeldt's expedition. Although he first regarded the use of the "odius and suspect" Mansfeldt as a jest, Anstruther persuaded him to accept the Anglo-French agreement as a basis for his intervention.[I]

In September, therefore, the English compromised. The marriage would be negotiated first and recusants would be given the same liberties offered in the Spanish treaty in exchange for a promise to assist with Mansfeldt. By early October the marriage treaty was settled and the English claimed the public support for Mansfeldt promised earlier. Louis XIII would offer only a verbal understanding to pay half Mansfeldt's expenses for six months.[2] Charles and Buckingham were now, however, trapped. Mansfeldt had become too important to their plans to be abandoned and the marriage, as James, with Gondomar on the way, threatened to return to Spain, vital. At the beginning of November they were forced to sign the marriage treaty and proceed with Mansfeldt with only the hope that the course of events would force the French into a closer alliance.[3]

The immediate purposes of Mansfeldt's expedition could not, however, withstand close scrutiny. Because of its political importance his army had to be sent abroad as soon as possible, even in the dead of winter. His orders, not to attack any Spanish territory but march directly on the Palatinate, were absurd but

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I. Anstruther to Carleton, 24 Oct., PRO S.P. 84/I20/I69; to Edmondes, I Aug., B.M. Stow MS. I76, f. 258. Cal.S.P. Ven xviii, 434-6.

2. Carlisle to Conway, 9 Oct,; Conway to Carlisle and Holland, c.I8 Oct, Charles to Carlisle, I9 Oct,; PRO S.P. 78/73/229, 248, 250.

3. Carlisle to Buckingham, I2 Nov., ibid 78/73/299-300. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 466-67, 478-9, 528-29, 537-39.

the real purpose of the expedition was to involve the French by operating from French territory. Buckingham was out-manoeuvred again when Louis XIII refused Mansfeldt permission to land in France and requested that he be sent to the United Provinces to assist in the relief of Breda. Although Buckingham toyed with the idea of forcing a landing in France, he had no alternative but to accept. Mansfeldt landed in the United Provinces in January but James refused permission to take part in the relief of Breda or any other operations against Spain.[I]

Doubt had been expressed about Mansfeldt's expedition for some time. Nethersole noted that it was the very kind of expedition Parliament had refused to subsidize.[2] Conway had displayed little confidence in Mansfeldt and had regarded him purely as an instrument to bring in the French. He was more interested in the creation of an army from the English troops in the United Provinces to provide the diversion for Christian IV in Flanders, which he hoped would gain the support of the Dutch and the Bohemians and be acceptable to Parliament.[3] Yet Conway was also mesmerized by the "grand alliance" particularly as it appeared to have the effect of bringing James into the war.[4] Mansfeldt's expedition also marked the end of

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I. Conway to Carlisle, 23 Dec, B.M. Egerton MS. 2596, f. 75. Charles to Buckingham, 24 Dec., B.M. Harleian MS. 6987, f. 203. Holland and Carlisle to Conway, 29 Dec., Buckingham to Charles 23 Jan I625; PRO S.P. 78/73/373, 74/39-4I.

2. Nethersole to Woodford, 27 Nov, Carleton to Sir E.Conway the younger, 2 Nov, PRO S.P. 8I/3I/I73, 84/I2I/33-34. Chamberlain to Carleton, 4 Dec, Letters, ii, 588-9I.

3. Carleton to Conway the younger, ibid., Rusdorff to Frederick, 4/I4 Sept., Négotiations,i, 358-63. Cal.S.P. Ven., xix, 49-50.

4. Conway to Lord Brooke, 23 Nov., PRO S.P. I4/I75/33.

any hopes for a parliamentary war; not only had the subsidies been expended for the expedition but the use of conscription had converted a blunder into a crime. The distress of the conscripts caught the sympathy of even the upper classes and Buckingham himself doubted whether Parliament would accept the expedition.[I]

Despite appeals from Frederick, the Dutch, and Mansfeldt's own officers, James refused to reverse his decision on the siege of Breda and the army rotted.[2] Although Charles quickly ended the prohibition after James's death, in view of the weakness of the army and the grave state of Breda this came too late to be of any use. Yet although Mansfeldt was down to only 2000 men his utility was not at end.

At the beginning of I625 the Scandinavian kings had presented their proposals: Christian offered, if the English would provide 6000 foot and I000 horse and a diversion, to create an army of 30,000 from Denmark and the Saxon Circle; Gustavus an army of 40,000 with England, Sweden, and Germany each contributing a third. The English reaction was to snap up the Danish offer immediately. Although the ostensible reasons for the rejection of Gustavus's offer were its greater expense and the demand for the neutrality of Denmark, the real reason was Gustavus's position on the French. Both kings distrusted the French but Gustavus demanded a religious alliance and the exclusion of the French from full membership while Christian was prepared to work with them in a political alliance.[3]

I. Buckingham to Mansfeldt, I2 Jan. I625, PRO S.P. I4/I8I/50.

2. Shortly before his death there appears to have been a decision by Mansfeldt's English officers, at the request of Frederick to disobey their orders. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 623.

3. Memorial for Spens, early I625, PRO S.P. 95/2/I04-6. Anstruther's abstract, early I625; Anstruther to Carleton, I3 Jan I625; Abstract of Conway, Feb; Conway to Anstruther, 20 Feb; ibid 75/6/4-7, I9-20, 30, 75/5/349-52. Also 75/6/53. Rusdorff to Frederick, I8/28 Jan., Négotiations, i, 423-26, 449-56, 459-65.

The rejection of the Swedish offer was, however, a delicate matter; it was hoped Gustavus might be persuaded to support Christian and feared he would take rejection as a personal rebuff. A public decision was to be delayed until a conference of the alliance, hopefully with the attendance of the French, could be held at the Hague on 20 April I625. Although the conference was disguised as a strategic consultation, this was its real purpose. In the meantime, Christian, who displayed little interest in the conference, which would only detract from his leadership of the armies of the alliance, was encouraged to begin his campaign immediately. Spens was dispatched to Gustavus to persuade him to await the conference; if he refused Spens was to encourage him to continue his war in Poland which would prevent the Poles aiding the Emperor. The failure to obtain French agreement caused the indefinite postponement of the conference and Gustavus, on the prompting of Spens and on reports from agents abroad, including Rusdorff, that his proposals had been rejected in England, returned in June to his Polish war.[I]

The English desire for the Danes to begin their campaign immediately forced them to provide their contribution, the diversion and the contingent for Christian's army, with a similar speed. "If we fail him again he will not put it to the hazard of being deceived any more."[2] The only instrument ready for a diversion, much to Christian's disgust, was Mansfeldt, who was to be recruited up to strength and sent into Germany. As the government had no more money

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I. Draft to Anstruther, 9 Feb,; J. Avery to Carleton, 23 Mar.; PRO S.P. 75/6/I7-I8, 38-39. Instructions for Spens, I5 Mar.; Spens to Conway, 25 May; to Carleton, I4 Jun, ibid.95/2/II8-I9, I22, I26-7.

2. J. Avery to Carleton, 23 Feb., ibid., 75/6/25-6.

to pay him, Carleton had to use his influence with the Dutch to obtain a loan of £60,000 for three months pay.[I] Nor could the contingent be provided in time and in April I625 Charles offered a subsidy of £30,000 a month until it was ready. When Anstruther was dispatched to Christian in May to sign the treaty of alliance he brought with him £46,000, raised in anticipation of the French dowry, the only funds Christian was ever to receive from England.[2]

The accession of Charles had brought with it a new enthusiasm but no real change of strategy. In early April a commission on foreign affairs, consisting of Buckingham, Pembroke, Conway, Brooke, and Lord Treasurer Ley, was established to provide a general consideration of policy but no record of its function has survived.[3] In the absence of any careful planning and in the general mismanagement of affairs, Carletom regarded the new enthusiasm sceptically.[4] He was particularly worried by the state of relations with the United Provinces. Throughout the tergiversations of James's policy stability had been given to Anglo-Dutch relations by the efforts of Maurice of Nassau and Aerssens. It was Maurice, with the assistance of Carleton, who, in the midst of the intransigence of both the East India Companies, was prepared to seek a settlement involving compensation for the English over Amboyna.[5] Yet the serious military

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I. Conway to Carleton, I2 Apr, 26 Apr; Carleton to Conway, 3 May; PRO S.P. 84/I26/I73, 260,I27/7-8. See also 84/I28/I00.

2. PRO S.P. 75/6/58-59, 72-4, 77, 9I, 95.

3. Commission, 9 Apr, PRO S.P. I6/I/39. Rusdorff to Frederick, II/2I Apr., Négotiations, i, 538-44.

4. Carleton to Sir J. Spens, 7 Apr, PRO S.P. 84/I26/I52.

5. Clark, Colonial Conferences, ii, I40-I. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 455. Carleton to (Conway?), c. 24 Mar., PRO S.P. 84/I26/79.

position of the Dutch, culminating in the fall of Breda in May I625, and the lack of effective English support had introduced a caution into Dutch policies to which Maurice himself had subscribed.

Maurice's death, soon after James's, was a serious loss, for, as Carleton immediately warned, his successor, his half-brother Frederick Henry, was much influenced by his mother towards France and Arminianism.[I] An equally serious loss was the death in late I624 of Sir Noel de Caron; his successor as ambassador in England, Albertus Joachimi, had Arminian leanings and by the beginning of I626 had lost all confidence in the English government.[2] These changes in the Dutch government were accompanied by increased English demands. The Amboyna dispute and the loan for Mansfeldt was followed by the need to pay the four new regiments of I624. These were to have been paid by the parliamentary subsidy but were now abandoned and the Dutch demanded that the English respect their obligations.[3]

The ability of the English to respond was limited by the effects of the French marriage on the political situation in England. Not only did Buckingham have the Spanish faction to consider but doubt about the conduct of the French negotiations and the employment of Mansfeldt was widely held. Nethersole wrote: "I never liked nor looked for good of our friendship with Spain and I looke for lesse of our emnity, as it is managed."[4] A major element in this was the cooling of the relationship between Buckingham and Pembroke. By the

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I. Carleton to Conway, I4 Apr I625, PRO S.P. 84/I26/I92-3.

2. D. Carleton to Carleton, 28 Mar I626, PRO S.P. 84/I3I/II3-I5.

3. Carleton to Conway, 30 Apr., 3 Aug I625, ibid 84/I26/297-8, I28/II2-3.

4. Nethersole to Trumbull, I Jan I625, Berks. R.O. Trumbull M.S. Alpha. xxxiii, art. I40. Also Woodford to Nethersole, I2 Nov I624, PRO S.P. 78/73/303.

end of the Parliament of I624 Pembroke had given several indications of his disagreement with Buckingham's activities, most notably in his and Hamilton's initial refusal to support the imprisonment of Bristol.[I] In the early summer of I624 Pembroke was expected to become Lord Treasurer and Rudyerd Master of the Wards but these appointments were never made.[2] In August came the mysterious episode of Pembroke's support for A Game of Chess with Rudyerd prominent in the audience.[3] In October there was an effort to mend the breach by Sir George Goring and Montgomery, always the major link between Pembroke and Buckingham, through the marriage of Montgomery's son to Buckingham's daughter. Goring claimed the anti-Buckingham influence came from the "ill councils of Bedford House", which suggests the old triumvirate of Pembroke, Hamilton, and the countess of Bedford, with the Queen of Bohemia possibly in the background.[4] Pembroke's room to maneouvre was, however, limited; he understood the difficulty of engaging James in a war other than on the King's own terms and the importance of the French alliance in that context. Hence he was prepared to acceed to the demand that the war be "styled rather a particular war for the kingdome of Bohemia(!), then a warr for religion, though I know in the consequence they can not be severed".[5] Buckingham was careful nonetheless to keep him and Hamilton off the commission for the French marriage.[6]

I. Ruigh, 3I4-I5. Rusdorff to Frederick, II/2I May I624, Négotiations, 304-6. Lords Debates I624 and I626, I54, I74-76, I78.

2. Nethersole to Carleton, 3 Jul, I4 Aug, PRO S.P. I4/I69/4, I7I/49.

3. Chamberlain to Carleton, 3I Aug, Letters, ii, 576-78.

4. Goring to Buckingham, 3 Oct, 4 Oct, B.M. Harleian MS. I580, ff. 445, 447.

5. Pembroke to Carleton, 9 Dec I624, PRO S.P. I4/I76/34. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 452-53.

6. Pembroke to Carleton, 5 Dec I624, PRO S.P. 84/I2I/I73. Kellie to Mar, I5 Dec I624, Hist. MSS. Comm, Mar and Kellie MSS., ii, 2I6.

The dislike of the French policy both by the Spanish faction and political puritanism had a major effect on Buckingham's political position which manifested itself in two ways. The first was his decision to rely on the support of a few trusted intimates rather than broaden his alliances. Cranfield's offices were given to Ley, a nullity, and Naunton, while he himself purchased Zouch's wardenship of the Cinque Ports with its important possibilities for parliamentary patronage. Denbigh, Fielding, and Anglesey were expected to be given posts in the household, Kensington made earl of Holland and Carlisle a K.G. [1] The only other leading figures noted in his company were Warwick, and Montgomery, who was made a councillor in December I624.[2] Another important indication of this tendency was the bestowing of the secretaryship resigned by Calvert in January I625 on Sir Albertus Morton rather than Carleton, regarded as too independent and too close to the Queen of Bohemia.[3]

This drive towards "monopoly" of power, the dominant aspect of the remainder of his career was assisted by the accession of Charles which enabled him to remove the majority of the Spanish faction, Calvert, Lord Wotton, and Bristol, Cranfield, and Suffolk (all nominally councillors), from the council, deprive Bristol of his vice-chamberlaincy and Cottington of his place in Charles's household.

I. Nethersole to Carleton, I4 Aug, PRO S.P. I4/I7I/49. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 552-53.

2. Hist, MSS. Comm., Various Collections, VIII, 26. See also B.M. Addit MS. I7677k, f. 406.

3. J. Packer to Carleton, 9 Mar, (I625?), PRO S.P. I4/I85/35. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 566-9.

The council was now almost solidly Buckinghamite.[1] Equally important were the fortuitous deaths of Southampton and Oxford in the United Provinces and Hamilton and Belfast, removing a number of the important figures in political puritanism. This left Pembroke "the only honest harted man imployed that I know now left to God and his cuntrie."[2]

The second effect of the French alliance was the threat it posed to future relations with Parliament through the rejection of the parliamentary war. In October the Michaelmas session had to be prorogued until February when the marriage would be made and the war in progress - this Buckingham hoped would check any "exhorbitant or ungentle motions".[3] His confidence in the success of this manoeuvre was not widely shared and the alarm was increased by the manner in the financial demands of the grand alliance conflicted with conditions of the subsidy bill.[4] By the end of the year the subsidy had been expended; £62,000 being disbursed for Mansfeldt. The treasurers made some resistance to this but were forced by Conway and the council of war.[5] It was probably at this point that Buckingham toyed with/the idea of appropriating the Sutton legacy and entertained Preston's scheme for the dissolution of cathedral chapters.[6]

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 12-13.

2. Countess of Bedford to Lady Cornwallis, 23 Mar., 12 Apr 1625, Letters of Lady Cornwallis, 118-20, 125-31. The loss of these four men, together with the French match, the loss of Breda, and the situation in Germany, was one of Samuel Ward's "Motyves for Fasting and Publick Humiliation" of 9 June 1625. Knappen, Two Puritan Diaries, 122.

3. Buckingham to the earl of Nithsdale, n.d.(Oct 1624?), B.M. Harleian MS 7000, f. 179.

4. Kellie to Mar, 15 Dec 1624, Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS ii, 216. D. Carleton to Carleton, 4 Dec, PRO S.P. 14/176/16. See also Sir T. Wentworth to Calvert, 12 Oct, Letters and Dispatches of the Earl of Strafford, ed. W. Knowles (1739), i, 24.

5. Sir W. Beecher to Conway, 18 Nov; Council of War to Conway 20 Nov; Conway to Council of War, 19 Nov; PRO S.P. 14/174/87, 175/9, 214/169.

6. J. Hacket, Scrinia Reserata (1693), 203-4. See also Ruigh, 237-8.

By the beginning of I625 the French negotiations and the grand alliance had developed such a momentum that Buckingham was to be led into an even more difficult position. The precipitant now was the rebellion of the duke of Soubise, motivated not only by private discontents but also from the fear in certain Huguenot circles that an Anglo-French alliance would work to their disadvantage. This rebellion revealed the fundamental contradiction of the alliance; that its price would be the abandoning of the Huguenots by the English. Although, as Soubise grew in strength, Carlisle suggested that the rebellion might be exploited to obtain better terms for the alliance, the initial English reaction was to protect the alliance at all costs. James offered Louis any assistance he might want.[I] The French requested, as they also did from the Dutch, the loan of warships, the lack of which had been the principal weakness of their previous efforts. The jeopardy in which the alliance was placed overrode Buckingham's irration over Mansfeldt and in February eight ships, including one of the Royal Navy, were made ready.[2] As he was preparing to go to France to settle the marriage and the alliance it is not impossible that the offer was intended as a bargaining counter for these negotiations.[3] This situation did, however, cause a further prorogation of Parliament until the end of April.

I. Carlisle to Conway, ? Jan I625, B.M. Egerton MS. 2596, f. 90-I. Carlisle and Holland to Conway, 4 Jan, 25 Jan., PRO S.P. 78/74/3-4, 27-9, Effiat to Louis XIII, II/2I Jan., Documents Relative to the Impeachment of Buckingham, I39-40. A strong pro-Huguenot line was, however, taken by Conway. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 56I-3.

2. Documents Relative to the Impeachment, I40-47 passim.

3. See PRO S.P. 78/80/280-8I.

The use of the ships as a bargaining point was, however, countered by the French demand for a re-negotiation of the marriage terms in mid-February. The new terms included much wider provisions for recusants in England probably in order to create a catholic party in England to balance the Huguenots. Richelieu reasoned that Buckingham was so committed to the French alliance that he could not refuse and both Goring and Carlisle warned him to stand firm as the concessions would destroy his domestic position.[I] Buckingham had by now placed all his hope in the personal embassy to France in which he would settle "the business of the Palatinate and the affaires of Germany, and of the Religion". "I propose to come with such store of materials and propositions as shall make them willing to hearken to me".[2] Fresh impetus to this was provided by the accession of Charles who was determined to obtain a strict alliance with France.[3] Carlisle warned that caution should be used and no alliance expected, advocating assistance to the Huguenots if necessary, but Buckingham, to save his embassy and the alliance, surrendered both the marriage terms and the loan of the ships (8 May).[4]

The famous journey to France to bring Henrietta Maria to England and Buckingham's involvement in the intrigues surrounding the French royal family have been celebrated in fact and fiction. More important was his total inability to obtain anything further for the alliance except a verbal agreement to provide support for

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I. Carlisle to Buckingham, II Feb., B.M. Egerton MS. 2596, ff. II4-I6. Carlisle and Holland to Conway, I4 Feb; Goring to Buckingham, 23 Feb; PRO S.P. 78/74/58-59, 60-6I.

2. Carlisle to Buckingham, I4 Mar, PRO S.P. 78/74/II7-22. Buckingham to Carlisle, I5 Mar, B.M. Egerton MS. 2596, f. I36.

3. Kellie to Mar, 7 Apr, Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS., ii, 227.

4. Carlisle to Buckingham, 2I Apr., PRO S.P. 78/74/I92-3.

Mansfeldt for another six months. To Pembroke, who hinted that Conway felt the same way, this confirmed his doubts about the whole French policy: "I must confess for mine owne part I never expected that France would come further".[I] Yet Buckingham could not reverse his course at this point and he continued to hope for a second personal embassy for the remainder of the year. As result there occurred the curious comedy of the attempt to withdraw the ships without appearing to. They were finally released in August on a premature report that a settlement had been reached with the Huguenots.[2] When it was realized the war was continuing, it was impossible to recall them. An interesting aspect of this affair was the involvement of Pembroke in giving Pennington his orders. Pembroke later testified that he had known nothing about the original negotiations over the ships.[3] He may have been brought in as someone Pennington would trust or possibly to provide a witness that Buckingham had tried to prevent the transfer of the ships.[4]

Although Buckingham intended to proceed as before, the failure of the French alliance caused a serious setback to his strategic planning.[5] For prestige and financial reasons the naval side of the

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I. Pembroke to Buckingham, 3I May, B.M. Harleian MS. I58I, f. 368. See also Rusdorff to Frederick, 24 May/3 Jun, Negotiations, i, 578-80. Cal.S.P. Ven., xix, 6I-63.

2. Conway to Lorkin, 8 Aug, PRO S.P. 78/75/288.

3. See Bodl. Tanner MS. 72, f. 66.

4. Both Conway and Sir John Coke were worried about the domestic repercussions of the loan of the ships. Conway to Buckingham, 6 Jul, Coke to Conway, II Jul, PRO S.P. I4/2I4/22I, I6/4/40. Coke also denied knowledge of the original contract. Lord Brooke to Coke, I2 Oct, Coke to Brooke, 5 Nov, Hist, MSS. Comm., Cowper MSS i, 2I7, 223.

5. Part of Buckingham's difficulty in developing an alternative policy was caused by Richelieu's tactic of deliberately creating confusion about his intentions. M.G. Schuybergson, "Ein Neue Beitrage zur Geschichte der Letzten Huguenoten Kriege, I62I-I629", Historische Vierteljahrschrift, N.F. i (I90I), 360.

war now occupied an increasingly important position in his plans; although seriously hindered by lack of funds a fleet was prepared in the summer of I625. Yet its purpose had not yet been decided. There were two main alternatives, a duplication of Essex's voyage to Cadiz in I596 or an attack on Flanders which would provide the diversion for Christian IV. The attack on Flanders was one of propositions Buckingham had wanted to raise on the embassy in France and arrangements were made to bring in the Dutch after it had agreed upon. The French, however, refused to contribute and the decision was postponed until the Dutch were consulted.[I]

A long series of discussions was held with Aerssens and Joachimi from July to September and these revealed the degree to which Dutch policy had shifted during the year. The English wished to strengthen the alliance with Denmark and the Germans and put into action the attack on Flanders. The Dutch, who had already given an indication of their new policy in the loan of ships against the Huguenots and a promise to give no assistance to them, refused to consider Flanders without French participation. They desired primarily a revival of the defensive alliance of I624 and in September a compromise was reached on a joint expedition to Cadiz. To Carleton this was proof of the growing strength of the revived Arminianism.[2]

The confusion of its foreign policy determined the government's response to the opening of Parliament in June I625. Despite the

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I. Pembroke to Buckingham, 3I May, B.M. Harleian MS. I58I, f. 368. D. Carleton to Carleton, II Jun, PRO S.P. 84/I27/I44-45.

2. Instructions for Sir A. Morton, I4 Jun; Morton and Carleton to Conway, 4 Jul; Conway to Morton and Carleton, I5 Jul; Carleton to Pembroke, I7 Aug; to Nethersole, 20 Aug; PRO S.P. 84/I27/2I9-20, I28/I4-I5, 5I-53, I57-8, I80-82. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, I03-5, I22-4, I65-6.

need for funds, neither the opening speeches of Charlesmor Lord Keeper Williams gave any indication of the policy to be followed, except for an insistence upon the "engagement" of I624 binding the Commons to honour any of the military expenses of the crown.[I] Nor did Rudyerd, whose speech, on 22 June, according to Sir John Eliot, was expected to offer suggestions from Pembroke, give a positive lead.[2] In the absence of any leadership and the desire to the Commons for a speedy adjournment to avoid the plague, there was no discussion of important business during the first week, except for a petition on recusants which was seen as a veiled attack on the French match.[3] On the 25th there was an exchange which revealed an interesting split between the old leadership of political puritanism and those who would form the later leadership. Sir Nathaniel Rich moved a bill to restore silenced ministers but was answered by Rudyerd, seconded by Abbot's followers Sir Robert Hatton, his steward, and Digges, that it was unnecessary as "moderate bishops will do it of themselves."[4]

There appears to have been considerable outside discussion of the use of the subsidy of I624 for Mansfeldt and of the state of the fleet.[5] The fruits of these were made public on the 30th when Sir Francis Seymour suddenly proposed that a subsidy and a fifteenth

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I. Rushworth, i, I7I-72.

2. Eliot, An Apology for Socrates and Negotium Posterorum (I88I), i, 69. (hereafter Negotium Posterorum) the only person to make an appeal for a defence of the Church was Preston in his fast sermon of 2 July. See Preston, The Saint's Qualifications (I633, sermon appended), 269, 283-4, 292-94.

3. Carleton to Chamberlain, 25 Jun., Letters, ii, 624-26.

4. Debates in the House of Commons, I625, ed. Gardiner, 28.

5. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 96-7, I06-8, III.

be offered in exchange for the petition on recusants. These was increased to two subsidies to be offered as a gift. Phelips seconded by Sandys then moved that the engagement of I624 was not binding as neither a war nor an enemy had been declared. An account should be made of the expenditure of the subsidy of I624 and strong hints were made that it was considered misused.[I] Another revelation of these discussions occurred on 5 July, after the end of the sessions due to the plague was announced, when it was decided to investigate the accounts of the treasurers of the subsidy and Sir Walter Earle, seconded by Phelips, moved that as Tunnage and Poundage had been originally intended for the defence of the Narrow Seas, the granting of it be made contingent upon a correct naval policy.[2]

On 8 July Buckingham made the unexpected decision, according to Eliot against his and Sir Humphrey May's advice, to request an increase of supply. The reasons for this have caused some discussion but the best interpretation seems to be alarm at the growing criticism which made him want to justify his policy and obtain a firmer commitment to finance his engagements.[3] This was revealed to the Commons on the 8th by Sir John Coke in his first appearance as a government spokesman.[4] After describing the expediture of the subsidy of I624, including the £62,000 for Mansfeldt, he went on the describe the "grand alliance" and its cost:£I03,000 for the fleet,

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I. Negotium Posterorum, i, 77-78, Commons Debates I625, 3I-33.

2. Commons Debates, I625, 42-43.

3. Negotium Posterorum, i, II0-I4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, I4I-3. See also H. Hulme, The Life of Sir John Eliot (I957), 80-83.

4. In view of Eliot's intense hatred of Sir John Coke, now considered one of his main stimuli in this period, his view that this speech was met with great scorn may be regarded with some scepticism. J.N.Ball, "Sir John Eliot at the Oxford Parliament, I625", Bull. Inst of Hist, Res., xxviii (I955), I26-7.

£40,000 already disbursed for Denmark, and £20,000 a month for Denmark and Mansfeldt. He laid considerable stress on the role of Mansfeldt as the key to the alliance, reflecting the defensiveness of the government in that issue. That Mansfeldt had played this role in Buckingham's policy was, in fact, true; whether it was expedient that he continue or whether the alliance did in fact exist was another question. Coke concluded by stating there was no need for an immediate grant but consideration must be given in the next session or the money would have to be found in a "new way". On II July Charles adjourned the session to I August at Oxford.[I]

The interval provided the time for consideration of the consequences of Coke's speech, the domestic consequences of the French marriage, and the news of the loan of the ships and the session began with fresh criticism of the French marriage and a demand for an account of the expenditure of the subsidy of I624.[2] On 3 August both Houses were addressed by Charles, Conway, and Coke, who presented two quite contradictory propositions: on the one hand a request for a supply of £30,000 - £40,000 for the fleet as a quid pro quo for the petition on recusants, on the other a justification of the grand alliance as created by James at the request of the Parliament of I624. This argument, which absolved Charles of responsibility for anything, was to be a constant theme of the crown for the remainder of the I620s. If Eliot is to be trusted as a witness these speeches reinforced the impression in the Commons

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I. Negotium Posterorum, II7-I8, I23. Commons Debates, I625, 56-9.

2. Kellie to Mar, II, I2 July, Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS., ii, 229-30, 30-I. D. Carleton to Carleton, II July, PRO S.P. 84/I27/I44-45. Rusdorff to Frederick, 20/30 July, Negotiations, i, 595-97. Commons Debates, I625, 68-69. Negotium Posterorum, ii, II-I2.

that as far as the grand alliance was concerned "the conclusion (was) not judged answerable to the premises".[I]

The belief that the crown's case was riddled with flaws, either through malice or incompetence, dominated the debate on 5 August on these addresses. Sir Simon Weston opened by noting that as no enemy had been declared a supply was not obligatory. He was followed by Sir Francis Seymour who in a more sweeping attack claimed that the subsidy of I624 had been misused, queried the French alliance on the ground that English ships were employed in a civil war there, and demanded a reformation of council. The same case was also made by Phelips who demanded to know why the Parliament had been summoned, why the desires of the Parliament of I624, marriage to a protestant, defence of neighbors against Spain, and protection of religion at home, had not been fulfilled, and requested good council before entering a war. He queried the whole conception of the grand alliance, asked for proof of French and Danish participation, and posed the leading question - had the match with France in fact produced an alliance. He concluded by refusing to believe that Charles was unable to find the £40,000 claimed to be necessary for the fleet. His point was taken up by Sir Edward Coke who re-emphasized that there was no engagement until a war was declared and that both the Admiralty and the Ordnance Office were incompetent. Goring and Sir Richard Weston replied that the Commons should petition the king to declare an enemy and that Buckingham should be allowed to defend himself against their criticism.[2]

I. Commons Debates, I625, 73-76. Negotium Posterorum, ii, 2I-22.

2. Commons Debates, I625, 77-89. Negotium Posterorum, ii, 23-49. Commons Journals, i, 8I0-II.

The debate on the 6th began with further attacks on the consequences of the French match and, by Eliot, on the administration of the Navy. His attack on the commissioners of the Navy may have been less a defence of Buckingham than an attack on his enemy Coke, who responded by sheltering behind Buckingham. The high point of the debate was Sir Nathaniel Rich's five demands, which were supported by Phelips: an end to protection of papists, declaration of an enemy, need for grave councillors, economies in the king's estate, and an end to impositions. This may have been less the major compromise that has been suggested than a summing up of the basic position of the majority of the Commons.[I] It did, however, lay down a framework for the response that Buckingham could have made in his major defence on 8 August. This, however, was completely unsatisfactory. Its tone was set by the rather flippant answer to the demand for a declaration of war that if a supply was granted the Commons could name their enemy. This gave the lie to the government's claim that the Parliament had engaged them in a war in I624 and provided the ground for the later position of the Commons that as there had been no previous war and that the Parliament had been dissolved before the declaration was made in the autumn of I625, they were not liable for breaking the peace.[2] The grand alliance was defended and £40,000 was demanded for the fleet,

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I. Commons Debates, I625, 89-9I. Negotium Posterorum, ii, 49. Commons Journals, i, 8II. The compromise theory has received most recent expression in C. Thompson, "The Origins of the Parliamentary Middle Group, I625-I629", Trans. Royal. Hist, Soc. 5th Ser. xxii (I972), 76-77. Its importance is dependent upon importance given to the existence of a puritan "Middle Group" based about the Riches, for whose self conscious political activity there is still no positive proof. As the Riches did not abandon Buckingham for at least another six months, Buckingham's rejection of their proposals could not have been a major blow.

2. Advice to the Commons, I628, Bodl. Tanner MS. 72, ff. 320v-2I.

although no purpose for it was given and its setting out so late in the year explained as a necessary demonstration of resolve. Finally he refused to state why the ships had been loaned to France although he promised they would not be used against the Huguenots.[1]

The failure of this defence became apparent when it was debated on the IOth. Attention was focussed on the Navy and Phelips, after renewing his demand for good council, suggested that Sir Robert Mansell be allowed to give the truth about the council of war's preparation of the fleet. He was followed by Seymour, Denzil Holles, John Glanville, and Sir Edward Coke, who continued the attack on maladministration in the Navy demanding that the council of war justify its expenditure of the subsidy, part of which was assigned to the preparation of the fleet. Mansell, speaking as a member of the council of war, claimed that discussion of the objective of the fleet had been prevented by Coke and Conway. This was obviously prepared in advance and it is not impossible that Pembroke was behind it.[2] On the IIth the Commons began the preparation of a Remonstrance in which the failings of the admiralty were a major issue. Both Mansell and Seymour, who directly attacked Buckingham, took a prominent part in this debate. This attack provoked the dissolution on the I2th but not before an attempt was made by the government to disprove Mansell and defend Buckingham's reputation. Claiming that Mansell was motivated by private distastes, Sir Robert Heath suggested that Brooke and Grandison be allowed to

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I. Negotium Posterorum, ii, 55-74.

2. Commons Debates, I625, I05-I6, I59-6I. Negotium Posterorum, ii, 79-93. Commons Journals, i, 8I3-I4. For the role of Pembroke see below, pp. 381-85.

testify on the council's deliberations. Mansell indicated that he was ready for a full-scale investigation and promised other revelations but debate was ended by the disolution and there was only time for the Commons to present their Remonstrance and offer to supply "all just designs" in a parliamentary way.[1]

The failure of the Parliament thus coincided with the collapse of the initial formulation of the grand alliance: the French alliance was non-existent, the Dutch were growing cold, and in August the accident to the King of Denmark caused him to withdraw from Germany, possibly permanently. This, however, made Buckingham only keener to revive his personal reputation and somehow to restore his relationship with Parliament and his political position in Europe. A new formulation of the grand alliance was therefore created in which the centre of the league was to be transferred from the Anglo-French alliance to one of England, the United Provinces, and Denmark. The basis of this was the Anglo-Dutch agreement of early September and the old idea of a general meeting at the Hague was revived. It was now to be held in November and the Danes and Swedes invited. In the meantime Manseldt's force was transferred to Denmark to provide immediate assistance to Christian IV. Although Christian was sceptical about the conference he accepted it after he was informed that Buckingham would be present.[2] A second part of the new strategy was the decision to send the fleet to Cadiz, despite the

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1. Commons Debates, 1625, 122-27, 147-8, 162-3. Negotium Posterorum, ii, 97-106. Commons Journals, i, 815.

2. Rusdorff to Charles, I/II Aug., PRO S.P. 81/33/151-52. Anstruther to Conway, II Sep; Conway to Anstruther, 12 Sept; Conway to Christian, 22 Sept; Anstruther to Conway, 15 Now; ibid 75/6/157, 161, 171, 195-6. Carleton to Conway, 5 Sept; to Nethersole, 20 Aug; to Conway, 27 Sept; ibid., 84/129/II-14, 128/180-82, 129/103-7.

fact that neither the season nor its equipment gave any real hope of success and, as Rusdorff urged, it might be better employed in assisting Christian. The justifications were the need for Buckingham to gain prestige and money from a quick victory and the willingness of Dutch to co-operate.[I] The voyage would also answer the Commons' demand for a declaration of war against Spain.

The Hague negotiations were a good deal more complicated than often considered. The original intention was for Buckingham to make a northern alliance and then go to France to obtain at least some agreement from Louis XIII to co-operate with their efforts. At the same time, however, he was to attempt to release Charles from many of his financial commitments without causing Christian IV to abandon the war. He was given the crown jewels to pawn to provide an immediate subsidy. Together with the general agreement he also wanted to prepare an attack on Flanders with the Dutch and persuade the Swedes to join the alliance on his terms.[2]

Buckingham's difficulties were apparent from the moment of his arrival at the Hague on 9 November. Carleton had warned that although Frederick Henry would remain faithful to the English alliance it was imperative that Charles's credit be restored by repaying the loan to Mansfeldt. The Dutch refused to provide any further assistance to Denmark and left the question of the attack on Flanders up to the English - promising support if requested.

I. Rusdorff, Memoire of 3I Aug/IO Sept; Négotiations, i, 609-I7. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, I65-7.

2. Instructions for Buckingham, I7 Oct., B.M. Harleian MS I584, ff. 26-8, 29-30, 3I-8. Charles to Buckingham, ? Oct., ibid 6988, f. 5. Memorial on the embassy, ? Oct., PRO S.P. 84/I29/ 2I6.

Charles eventually gave up the idea in March I626.[I] They did agree to send Aerssens to France to join the English in persuading the French to join the alliance.[2] The negotiations with Denmark were left to the English. Although Buckingham was toying with the novel expedient of requesting the Danes to contribute to the naval war in exchange for the subsidy, he still had to deal with the arrears of £I50,000 on the subsidy of I625 and the debts that James had incurred. He did, however, manage a not unsatisfactory compromise: the monthly subsidy of £30,000 was continued, but the addition of subsidy for Mansfeldt was now discontinued and it was to cease as soon as an English contingent was sent to Denmark or a meaningful diversion begun. Christian agreed to await the Parliament for the arrears while the money from the jewels was to pay the subsidy in the interim.[3]

Buckingham and Conway later claimed that the Dutch had assured them they would be able to raise £300,000 from the jewels. This was denied by the Dutch who stated they had only promised to act as surety for whatever loan the English could raise on the private market in Amsterdam. As is well known only £68,000 was raised on the jewels - the reason, however, was not the intrinsic worth of the jewels but the political climate in the United Provinces. The Arminian revival, particularly in the cities of Holland, was

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1. Coke to Carleton and Holland, 27 Feb I626, PRO S.P. 78/77/308-9.

2. Carleton to Conway, I3, 25 Oct; Buckingham, Holland, and Carleton to Conway, I4 Nov; Conway to Carleton, 2I Nov; Buckingham to Frederick-Henry, ? Dec; PRO S.P. 84/I29/I5I-4, 20I, I30/33-35, 62-3, II0.

3. PRO S.P. 84/I30/35v-36. Memorial of Danish Account, I8 Nov., Treaty of 9 Dec; Buckingham to Christian, I5 Dec; Anstruthar to Conway, 7 Jan I626; (Conway) to Anstruther, 22 Feb; PRO S.P. 75/6/I99-200, 2I6, 2I8-I9, 7/5-6, 8, 38-39.

flourishing in the disillusion with England while Frederick Henry pursued a middle course.[I] At the end of I625 Nethersole drew up an interesting, if prolix, memorandum on the subject.[2] The support given by England to Maurice of Nassau in the first Remonstrant crisis had made England the leading enemy of the deposed Remonstrant magistrates and it was in England's interest to keep them out of power. This situation had been endangered by the change of government under Frederick Henry. As the restored Remonstrants would follow Barneveldt's French policy it was necessary for Charles to force Frederick Henry to maintain Maurice's position. French efforts to obtain a favourable situation and to break to he? link with England were increasing and there was a danger that the French could always outbid England in offering assistance whatever the real policy of France was. He concluded with a warning that the Synod of Dort could be reversed - it had been procured by a political alliance between Maurice and the Counter-Remonstrants and an alliance between Frederick Henry and the Remonstrants could undo it.

One of the most important of Nethersole's revelations was that the Dutch leader most courted by the French was Aerssens - a bitter enemy since I6I4 and the leading advocate of the English alliance.[3] They were successful in December I625 during his embassy in France. In exchange for a promise to pay the arrears of their subsidy the French obtained a promise to prevent any further assistance from

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I. Carleton to Conway, 3 Dec., 8 Jan I626; Charles to Joachimi, 8 Feb.; Carleton the younger to Carleton, 9 Feb; PRO S.P. 84/I30/68, I3I/6-8, 43, 48.

2. PRO S.P. 84/I30/I75-79 passim. One copy was probably sent to Carlisle (see Nethersole to (Carlisle), I May I626, ibid., 8I/34/62-3). Another was sent to Pembroke (see Rudyerd to Nethersole, 3 Feb., 22 Apr., ibid I6/20/23, 25/46), who agreed that Charles must take action against the Arminians.

3. Ibid., I76-v.

the United Provinces to the Huguenots.[I] They also achieved, in April I626 in the interim after Carleton's resignation as resident in December I625, the depriving of the English ambassador of his right to sit in the Council of State. According to Aerssens the French demanded a seat themselves, but the younger Carleton, who had been left as agent, suspected Aerssens had put them up to it. The removal of the English, through a loophole in the treaty of I624, was a compromise. Despite the loss of prestige, there was no remedy and in an effort to salvage the position Carleton, who might be able to claim the seat as a personal right, was to be returned.

The"defection" of Aerssens was both a cause and a reflection of the growing disillusion with the English alliance. The failure to repay both the loan for Mansfeldt and a second one for the four English regiments of I624 (the "new English") caused both the loss of English credit and the inability of the States-General to negotiate further loans for the English. The pawning of the jewels was thus a private negotiation between the English and the Arminian merchants of Amsterdam. The repeated failure to pay the new English, whose contract expired in September I626, caused the Dutch to fear the regiments would be left on their hands. The Dutch also took a firmer attitude towards the standard English practice of borrowing officers from the Dutch service whenever necessary for their own expeditions. Underlying all these developments was the growing feeling among the Dutch that they were bearing the greater burden of the war and that the English were merely exploiting them.[2]

I. H. de Vic to Conway, 26 Jan I626, PRO S.P. 78/77/70. Also ibid., 84/I3I/2I4-I8.

2. On these developments see the correspondence of Carleton the younger with Carleton, March-May I626, PRO S.P. 84/I3I/70-3, II3-5, I28-9, I60-62, I78-8I, I83-84, I85-6, 202-3. Also ibid., 84/I3I/I56.

The failure of the loan on the jewels and the dissolution of the Parliament of I626 marked the collapse of the effort to finance the grand alliance. By May I626 £240,000 was owed to Christian IV (as well as the debt of James) and when a Danish agent was sent to Charles he was informed that Charles would have to suspend his subsidy and the Danes must look to France for assistance.[I] The military failure of the alliance followed soon after with the defeat of Mansfeldt at Dessau Bridge in April and of Christian at Lutter in August. To keep it from collapsing totally and Christian from seeking a peace the new English under Sir Charles Morgan were transferred to Denmark in November. It is indicative of the state of the alliance that this was supported by the Dutch on the grounds that it would enable them to escape any further liability for their pay.[2]

Simultaneously with the collapse of the "northern alliance" the came/full failure of the French policy. In September I625 the Huguenot revolt was halted by the defeat of Soubise at the Isle of Rhé by the reinforced royal fleet. It was also reported that the Huguenots would seek Spanish assistance if abandoned by their co-religionists. Buckingham and Conway were becoming increasingly aware of the failure of the French policy and of the necessity to obtain the return of the ships and a peace for the Huguenots.[3]

I. Ibid., 75/7/95-97, I00, I56. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 450-5I.

2. Ibid., 8I/34/205-6, 84/I66-68. On Morgan's expedition, see E.A. Bellar, "The Military Expedition of Sir Charles Morgan to Germany, I627-I629", Eng. Hist. Rev., xliii (I928).

3. Conway to T. Lorkin, I9 Sept; H.Augier to Conway, I Oct; H. de Vic to Conway, 7 Dec; PRO S.P. 78/75/368-69, 76/8, I83-4. Schuybergson, "Letzte Huguenoten Kriege", 36I.

Buckingham again staked everything on another personal embassy, after the Hague conference, which would enable him to resolve the whole French situation.[1] His original instructions were to press the French to join the alliance but not to risk a second public refusal, obtain a peace for the Huguenots with the guarantee of English assistance if the treaty was broken, and demand the immediate return of the ships.[2]

In the event Louis XIII refused to accept him and at the end of December Carleton and Holland were sent instead. Their instructions gave second place to the alliance and emphasized the need either to make a settlement for the Huguenots or make arrangements for English assistance.[3] The French were prepared to promise only underhand assistance to the alliance while they insisted on terms for a peace that had already been rejected by the Huguenots.[4] In the meantime Buckingham and Conway had become passionate advocates of military assistance to Rochelle and on 21 January Conway ordered the ambassadors to withdraw if no immediate answer was given on the ships and to inform the Huguenots that Charles was preparing a naval force to recapture the islands of Rhé and Oleron.[5] Carleton, however, had been impressed both by the military weakness of the

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 221-3. Kellie to Mar, 11 Nov., Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS., ii, 236-38. Rusdorff to Frederick, 1/11 Oct., Negotiations, i, 635.

2. Oct. 17, B.M. Harleian MS. 1584, 54v-56v.

3. Ibid., ff. 63-67, 69-72.

4. Carleton to Charles, 13 Jan. 1626; (Holland) to Buckingham, 14 Jan; Carleton and Holland to Conway, 23 Jan; PRO S.P. 78/77/33, B.M. Harleian MS. 1581, f. 45-6, S.P. 78/77/55-8.

5. PRO S.P. 78/77/47, 48-49. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 298-303. Rusdorff to Frederick, 17/27 Mar., Negotiations, i, 683.

Huguenots and by the realization that effective assistance would involve a war between England and France, "which this of all others is no time to undertake". Furthermore he had been informed that assistance from England would not be ready for six weeks and had been told by Rohan that he could not hold out in Languedoc long enough and that a peace would have to be made.[1] On 27 January the ambassadors reported that the Huguenots had submitted (Peace of Fontainebleau, 26 January/5 February) on the assurance that Charles would guarantee the treaty.[2] On 29 January Conway, on receipt of an earlier dispatch, informed them that the terms were too high, told them not to advise their acceptance, and ordered them to return to England immediately.[3] Great embarrassment on both sides was caused by this failure in communications. In England rumours grew that this was a secret plot by Buckingham to surrender Rochelle at any price in order to secure the return of the ships. Carleton offered to try and undo the peace but in the end Charles accepted that he had done the best in the situation.[4] Despite any attempt to put the best face on the treaty there was little to show for a major defeat for the Huguenots - assistance in Germany was still only promised and there were delays in the return of the ships. Furthermore the treaty was not honoured. The major issue of

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1. Considerations touching the Peace, c. Mar., PRO S.P. 78/78/167-8.

2. Ibid., 78/77/85-87.

3. Ibid., 78/77/100.

4. Carleton to Charles, 5 Feb.; Conway to Holland and Carleton, 2 Feb.; Conway to Holland and Carleton, 7 Feb.; Coke to Carleton and Holland, 11 Feb.; PRO S.P. 78/77/171, 178-9, 211.

controversy had been Fort Louis, the citadel which enabled the king to dominate La Rochelle. The Huguenots had demanded its demolition as a sine qua non for a peace and a compromise had been arranged by Carleton in which the king promised verbally to evacuate it when expedient. By March he showed little sign of doing so and, admitting defeat, Charles ordered the ambassadors to return.[I]

Despite the almost total failure of his policy in the months following the Parliament of I625, financial reasons forced Buckingham to go ahead with the next session which had been planned in September to coincide with the return of the "victorious" fleet from Cadiz. His political situation was now, however, even more difficult for the contradictions in both his foreign domestic policies which he had hoped to transcend were now nakedly revealed. In many cases they were linked. Although Preston felt Buckingham had been forced into lending the ships, "from that time (he) doubted of the sainthood of the Duke".[2] The peace of Fontainebleau was seen purely as a manoeuvre to impress the Parliament.[3] The failure and mismanagement of the Cadiz Voyage alienated not only Sir John Eliot but, after Wimbledon was exonerated, a number of men of established military reputation, particularly Essex, Sir Edward Harwood, and Sir John Boroughs, and previous followers of Buckingham, Lord Cromwell, Lord Dela Warr, and Lord Valentia.[4] Only a few stauch independents, e.g. Sir Francis Barrington, resisted the forced loan for the fleet,

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I. Holland and Carleton to Coke, I Mar.; Information from Rochelle, 3/I3 Mar.; Coke to Holland and Carleton, I6, I7 Mar.; PRO S.P. 78/78/I-2, 30-34, I30, I39-40.

2. Ball, Life of Preston, I09, II4-5.

3. Rudyerd to Nethersole, 3 Feb I626, PRO S.P. I6/20/23. Cal.S.P. Ven., xix, 332-35.

4. Dalton, Life of Wimbledon, ii, I5I-2. B.M. Harleian MS 390, f. 23v. Nethersole to Carlisle, I9 Nov I626, B.M. Egerton MS 2597, f. 25. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 42.

but it caused others, e.g. Lord Montagu of Boughton, considerable soul-searching.[I]

Two particular aspects of this alienation were of greater importance. The first was the failure of Buckingham's efforts to balance both protection of recusants and Arminians and cultivation of certain puritan factions. This began with his protection of Richard Montague during the Parliament of I625. In November came the minor clash between Richard Knightley and Sir William Spencer and Lord Vaux during the disarming of recusants in Northamptonshire. Soon afterwards Knightley was pricked for sheriff which he claimed was a punishment despite his previous loyal service to Buckingham.[2] The climax was the famous conference at York House on II and I7 February I626, summoned by Buckingham at the request of Warwick and Saye to examine the orthodoxy of Montague. Its deeper purpose was probably to investigate Buckingham's own position on Montague. Although Preston was the main opponent of Montague, the burden of the attack was undertaken by Thomas Morton, bishop of Coventry and Litchfield, which suggests some collusion by Abbot.[3] The audience is also of interest: on the IIth it included Buckingham, Carlisle, Sir John Coke, Pembroke, Saye, Warwick, and Lincoln; on the I7th Bridgewater, Dorset, Mandeville, and Sheffield (now earl of Mulgrave) also attended. The main effect of the conference was to prove that Buckingham was not prepared to support the anti-Arminian party and

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I. PRO S.P. I6/II/73. Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 265.

2. Conway to Buckingham, 30 Nov I625, B.M. Harleian MS. I580, f. 34I-3.

3. Ball, Preston, II9. Cosin, Summe of Conference, Works, ii, 20-2I. Laud, Diary, Works, iii, I82.

he refused Coke's suggestion that the articles of the Synod of Dort be legally established. Cosin noted that both Pembroke and Carlisle took a moderate position towards Montague.[I] Yet although Preston, who wrote into the country on the subject, Warwick, Saye, and Lincoln were now considered disenchanted with Buckingham, the effects of this were not apparent until the after math of the Parliament of I626.[2]

The main political danger to Buckingham came, however, from the direction he had feared since I624, an alliance of the Spanish faction and the older leadership of political puritanism. The first clear signs of this emerged at the end of the Parliament of I625 when Williams and Arundel and Abbot and Pembroke opposed the dissolution. There is evidence that he feared their alliance, which had a common platform in the repudiation of the French policy, throughout the winter.[3] There are grounds for considering Pembroke the leading figure in this alliance and the instigator of the impeachment of I626 and perhaps the inspirer of Mansell in I625. The striking aspect of the impeachment of I626 is its orchestration. Whether or not Eliot was "impulsive" in beginning his attack on IO February, as soon as the questioning of the council of war bogged down, the issue was taken up by Turner's charges; when the impeachment itself ran into difficulties, Bristol's accusations took over. Pembroke was deeply connected with each stage and the only man to co-ordinate them. Although some degree of involvement has always been established, the ramifications have not been explored.

I. Cosin, ibid., 38.

2. Ball, Preston, I42. Maclear, Puritan Relations with Buckingham, I42. I. Morgan, Prince Charles' Puritan Chaplain (I957), I64-66.

3. Kellie to Mar, I5 Aug., II Nov., Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS., ii, 232-3, 236-8. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, I46-7.

The starting point is the famous letter from Sir James Bagg to Buckingham which has usually been considered from the aspect of the understanding between Pembroke and Sir John Eliot.[I] More significant, however, was Bagg's report that Pembroke was not using his usual agents, Sir William Herbert and Sir Benjamin Rudyerd, but packing Cornish boroughs with naval officers: Sir Francis Steward, Sir Clipsby Crew, and most significantly (Pembroke did not want this publicly known) Sir Robert Mansell.[2] A second element in Bagg's report was the sponsoring of Dr. Samuel Turner and Sir James Fullerton. This reflects another important element in Pembroke's following, his inheritance of Southampton's party. Turner was not as obscure as heretofore thought; he had connections with the Wriothesleys at least before I623 and he was also an informant of Carle ton's. In I624 he had been appointed physician to the four new regiments in the United Provinces and had attended Southampton in his final illness.[3] Fullerton had been a client of Southampton's friend Lord Cavendish. Further examples of this "inheritance" are provided by Southampton's friend Sheffield (now earl of Mulgrave) who gave his proxy to Pembroke in I625 and the

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I. PRO S.P. I6/523/77, it should be dated c. IO Mar. Consideration is given to this letter by D H Willson in The Privy Councillors in the House of Commons, I604-I629 (Minneapolis, I940) I83-88, but he fails to note the significance of the naval officers.

2. This is the main evidence to suggest that Pembroke had at least protected Mansell from the consequences of his actions in I625. Rudyerd's minor role may have been deliberate policy or Rudyerd's personal dislike of the impeachment. He had supported the purging of Coke and Phelips and nearly did not sit. Rudyerd to Nethersole, 23 Nov, I625, 8 Feb, I626, PRO S.P. I6/IO/I6,16/ 20/23. He did support the later stages of the impeachment.

3. Turner to Carleton, 4 Sept, I623; to Conway, late I625; PRO S.P. 84/II4/78, I30/204, also 84/I3I/53. Hill, Intellectual Origins, 60. See also B.M. Addit MS I7677/K, ff. 399-400.

5th earl of Huntingdon who gave his proxy to Southampton in I624 and to Pembroke in I625 and I626.[I] An interesting question is posed by Sir Edwin Sandys. In January there was still a question whether he would receive Buckingham's support for the shire election in Kent. He lost and sat for Penryn, possibly with Pembroke's support.[2]

The further ramifications of the alliance were illustrated by the roles of Sir Dudley Digges and Sir Walter Earle. Digges, Bagg considered, "wholly my Lord of Canterbury's" - which he had been for most of his career. Digges had already decided that a policy of reform and examination of past disasters was necessary.[3] It was noted that Abbot was prepared to suspend action on Montague until the result of the impeachment was known and that Digges and Maurice Abbot were probably behind the East India Company charges.[4] Sir Walter Earle was "not soe great with any as the Lord Sea", an early indication of the effects of York House. It is not impossible that Pym was also a member of this alliance through the Russell connection - Pembroke held Bedford's proxy in this session and the conference with Coryton on Mansell was held at Bedford House.

Pembroke was also the connection between the Commons impeachment and Bristol's accusations. From I624 he had been noted for his moderation toward Bristol and Preston believed that Bristol and Williams planned Bristol's charges and then invited Pembroke

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I. Lords Journals, iii, 205, 43I, 49I.

2. Sir J. Hippsley to Buckingham, 8 Jan. I626, PRO S.P. I6/I8/28. Sandys had sat for Penryn in I625.

3. Digges to Charles, ? Jan I626, ibid., I6/I9/I07.

4. J. Meddus to J. Mede, 22 May I626, The Court and Times of Charles I, ed. R.F. Williams (I848), i, I05.

to join with them in the attack on Buckingham.[1] This connection helps to explain the basic nature of the effort. In origin it was little more than a sophisticated version of the coup which brought down Somerset - a cabal of enemies with no further common policy. The novelty was the role of Parliament. It also explained the public role of Pembroke and Abbot in the Parliament; while the Commons were attacking Buckingham, they were cautiously advocating the war policy and the need for a subsidy, a demonstration that they would be more successful than Buckingham in obtaining the support of Parliament.

Buckingham was well aware of the growing hostility; in September I625 Henry, Lord Cromwell had warned him that "they say the best Lords of the Councell knew nothing of Count Mansfeldt's journey, or this fleete" which "discontents even the best sort" and that it was felt he was advised by only one "grave man" - Conway.[2] His reaction was the old one of drawing closer to his intimates, particularly Carlisle and Holland, and purging unreliable men. In September the secretaryship vacated by the death of Morton was given to Sir John Coke, in October Williams was dismissed and replaced by Sir Thomas Coventry, while Sir Robert Heath was made solicitor-general.[3] The prevention of Sir Edward Coke, Phelips, Seymour, and Wentworth from sitting in the next session was part of this effort. The one major new client was Carleton, whom he brought back from the United Provinces as an advisor on foreign policy.[4]

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1. Ball, Life of Preston, II6-I7.

2. Cromwell to Buckingham, 8 Sept. PRO S.P. I6/6/30.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, I97. Kellie to Mar, 5 Oct, Hist, MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS., ii, 234.

4. Carlisle to Carleton, late Oct I625, PRO S.P. 84/I30/28.

As was the norm in Caroline Parliaments, the opening speeches of Charles and Lord Keeper Coventry to the Parliament in February I626 gave little indication of the policy to be followed.[I] On the IOth, however, Eliot requested the establishment of a grand committee for grievances to deal with the state of the king's estate and an account of the subsidies of I624.[2] He was also reported as offering an "estate for the king's wars" in exchange for the investigation - which agree with the general tenor of the impeachment.[3] The investigation of the subsidy was henceforward the key to this stage of the impeachment. Simultaneously the charges of the officers against Wimbledon were being heard at court; as Rudyerd hinted, "out of which it may be more questions will growe".[4] This indicates the importance of the association of Eliot and Pembroke - it was for these investigations that Pembroke had brought in his naval officers, particularly Mansell. He may also have been hoping to use the testimony of Essex and Harwood against Wimbledon; but Charles prohibited an investigation of the Cadiz Voyage. A further boost for the investigation of the subsidy came on 2I February when Philip Burlamachi requested payment of arrears for the four new regiments and the House established a committee to examine the accounts.[5]

I. B.M. Harleian MS. I6I, ff. 7I-72.

2. Hulme, Eliot, I05-7. These were the two areas suggested by Digges in his letter to Charles (S.P. I6/I9/I07) as requiring investigation.

3. B.M. Harleian MS. 390, f. I5.

4. Rudyerd to Nethersole, 3 Feb., PRO S.P. I6/20/23.

5. Commons Journals, i, 822.

Eliot may have been impulsive in pursuing the case of the St Peter of Havre de Grace which developed into an attack on Buckingham for provoking the French seizure of English shipping. The House was not prepared to accept his unique justification for the French.[1] It is significant that one of his witnesses was Sir Francis Steward, who, as commander of one of the Channel Squadrons, was also an expert witness on the defence of the narrow seas, another major grievance.[2] On 28 February the committee of the whole ordered the council of war to testify on 3 March and a committee of Sandys, Digges, Selden, Eliot, Nathaniel Rich, Pym, William Coryton, and Sir John Strangeways established to draw up the questions.[3] With the exception of Mansell and possible Vere, who had been in the United Provinces during the preparations of Mansfeldt and was discharged on 9 March, the council was solidly Buckinghamite and, in the infirmity of Conway and Brooke, led by Grandison. The investigation, however, was to provide the stage for further revelations from Mansell and on I March, after it had been decided that he would be considered a member of the council not the House during the investigation, he stated that he regarded himself as under the orders of the House not of the king during the session.[4]

On the 3rd, when Grandison was asked the first question, whether the advice of the Commons had been followed in the disbursal of the subsidy, he asked to be given further time to answer and the council were given until the 7th.[5] In the meantime the government

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I. Ibid., 823. Hulme, op. cit., IIO.

2. Commons Journals, i, 827.

3. Commons Journals. i, 826.

4. Ibid.,. 829.

5. Ibid., 832. Roberts, Growth of Responsible Government, 55.

had decided that the council was not responsible to the Commons for its advice, against which Selden later protested, and therefore they were ordered in the king's name not to testify. After this answer was given on the 7th they were ordered to report once more on the 9th to answer singly.[1] The question was now whether Mansell would take this opportunity but Conway was able to intimidate him sufficiently with the king's supreme displeasure that on the 9th he weakly admitted that although he was duty bound to answer the Commons he could not do so without the King's permission. A further effort was made to obtain answers on the IIth after which the Commons admitted defeat.

By this time the government decided to go ahead with its demands for a supply on the grounds that Charles was only fulfilling commitments made by James and that no mistakes should be admitted, - even on Mansfeldt. On the 6th Coke made a request for three subsidies and three fifteenths purely for the war.[2] On the next day a debate on defence was held in the Lords, led by Abbot and Pembroke. Pembroke took a moderate position on Mansfeldt: while he had not been a success, he had been necessary to encourage the King of Denmark. It was decided to propose to the Commons that a supply be provided for Mansfeldt and Denmark and provision made for the preparation of the fleet.[3]

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1. Commons Journals, i, 833-35. Conway to Buckingham, 8 Mar., PRO S.P. I6/523/53. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 356-8.

2. Notes of Coke, 6 Mar., PRO S.P. I6/523/50. Commons Debates, I625, I64-78. Rusdorff to Frederick, I3/23 Feb, Negotiations, i, 676-8.

3. Lords Debates, I624 and I626, I2I-24. B.M. Harleian MS. 390, f. 23v.

At this juncture the second stage of the impeachment was reached. On II March the Commons promised a supply after grievances were answered and Turner made his five charges against Buckingham, having first been introduced by Digges.[I] Whether or not Pembroke directly inspired these charges, two points should be noted: first, that aside from the Cadiz Voyage and loss of control of the narrow seas these issues had not been previously raised, and secondly, that they all concerned Buckingham in his personal capacity, and did not touch on the king or matters of policy. It is not impossible that witnesses had already been prepared.[2] After several days debate on the legality of Turner's charges, the House added four more, including loan of the ships to France and misuse of the subsidy of I624. On 22 March subcommittees were re-established to investigate the subsidy. These ten causes of two evils in the kingdom - diminution of strength abroad and loss of trade - were reported to the House of 25 March. In the meantime Digges and Nathaniel Rich, seconded by Pym and Rudyerd, proposed conducting the war at sea through a joint stock company - effectively removing it from Admiralty control.[3] On the 27th Eliot made a direct attack on Buckingham.[4]

I. J.N. Ball, "The Impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham in I626", Melanges Antonio Marongiu: Studies Presented to the International Commission for the History of Representative Institutions XXXIV (Brussels, I968), 39.

2. B.M. Harleian MS. I6I, f. 59.

3. Commons Journals, i, 835, 840. Thompson, "Middle Group", 80.

4. Hulme, Eliot, II7-20.

Charles responded by denying the right to attack his servants which caused Eliot to move a remonstrance. On the other hand Buckingham wished to defend himself against the growing attacks and on the 30th he, Conway, and Pembroke held a conference with the Commons to allow him to answer the ten causes. Buckingham claimed that the Cadiz Voyage was undertaken with the full agreement of the council. Conway defended the use of Mansfeldt on the substantially accurate ground that James needed him as a demonstration of sincerity and to bring in the French. The subsidy of 1624 had been employed as there was no other source of funds. Buckingham then dealt with the loan of the ships; the original decision had been James's and he called upon Pembroke to testify that he had kept Pennington from departing before the news of a peace. This Pembroke did although he insisted he knew nothing about the original arrangement.[1] By taking this course Buckingham reopened the possibilities for a questioning of policy. The countess of Bedford noted, possibly on information from Pembroke, that the Commons "have had some hope given them, which is understood by them as a good signe of the kings relenting ...."[2] Charles had desired to dissolve the Parliament at this stage but Buckingham had persuaded him to permit an impeachment which he expected to contest successfully.[3] The remaining period before the Easter recess was occupied by consideration of the remonstrance, in which

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1. Bodl. Tanner MS. 72, ff. 81-86. B.M. Harleian MS. 161, ff. 181-87. Lords Debates, 1624 and 1626, 131.

2. To Lady Cornwallis, 31 Mar., Letters of Lady Cornwallis, 145-7.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 380-81.

Eliot, encouraged by Buckingham's response, claimed the right to examine officers of state and discuss matters of policy "out of common sorrow ... to those who professe our religion".[I]

Charles promised an answer to the remonstrance when Parliament reassembled on I3 April but then postponed his reply and requested an immediate supply. This may have been intended to avoid terminating the Parliament on constitutional issues and losing the supply, but it gave an indirect approval to the attack.[2] Although it was not until the 2Ist that a committee was established under Digges to draw up the charges, events in interim contributed to the growing attack. On the I7th Pym reported the findings of the committee for religion on Montague and the dangers of Arminianism.[3] On the I8th Carleton gave an account of the French negotiations, probably to demonstrate the government's sincerity in its dealings with the Huguenots. It was an honest account but, as Eliot pointed out immediately, not one to create confidence in the government. Carleton admitted that the ships were still to be returned, that the peace for the Huguenots was not ideal, and that there was only a vague promise of French assistance in Germany. Eliot remarked sardonically that at the Oxford Parliament Buckingham had assured the Commons that the French alliance was a success.[4] On the 24th the Grand Committee reported to the House eight charges against Buckingham, excluding three of the original ten, including the

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I. Bodl. Tanner MS. 72, f. 88.

2. B.M. Harleian MS. 6799, f. 27I. Ball, "Impeachment", 4I.

3. PRO S.P. I6/25/IO.

4. Commons Journals, i, 845, 846-7. Hulme, Eliot, I26.

misemployment of the subsidy of I624 as there was not sufficient evidence to link the council of war's decision to him, and adding the extortion of money from the East India Company.[I] On the 25th a debate on the subsidy was held and at the suggestion of Digges and Rudyerd a further subsidy added to those already requested. Further charges, including that of poisoning James, inspired by the recent appearance of George Eglisham's Forerunner of Revenge, and the St Peter case, were added soon after.[2] On the 28th Charles permitted them to go through with their "inquiry" so long as the subsidy was prepared and the charges were given a final reading. Speakers and two assistants were assigned to each charge, including Eliot, Digges, Earle, Strangeways, Nathaniel Rich, and Pym, and the subsidy linked to the success of the impeachment.[3]

There was a delay as Charles attempted to obtain the subsidy first during which the third stage of the attack, the accusations of Bristol, was begun. The Lords had already indicated considerable antagonism to Buckingham over the matter of the proxies and the imprisonment of Arundel. The release of Arundel, in which Pembroke played a discreet role, was seen as major development in the construction of a successful anti-Buckingham coalition.[4] The accusations of Bristol now set the stage for a joint attack in both Lords and Commons - although the attempt by Bristol to join the two was

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I. Ibid., 840, 849, Hulme, I28-29.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 409, 4I6. Commons Journals, i, 849.

3. Commons Journals, i, 854, Hulme, Eliot, I29-3I.

4. Countess of Bedford to Lady Cornwallis, 3I Mar, Cornwallis Letters, I45-47. Sir J. Skeffington to the Earl of Huntingdon, I7 May, The Hastings Journal of the Parliament of I62I, ed. Lady de Villiers (Camden Soc., 3rd. Ser., lxxxiii, I953), 4I-43.

resisted by the Lords on procedural grounds. It did, however, give Eliot the opportunity to request that Buckingham be dismissed from office and imprisoned during the trial.[I] A final impetus to the attack was a forged letter from Christian IV attacking Buckingham which inspired some members to believe that "all foreign princes concurr in a desire of seeing his subversion".[2]

The long battle over Bristol's rights gives some idea of the balance of factions in the Lords. Carlisle, Conway, Dorset, and to a lesser degree Montgomery were Buckingham's main defenders. The supporters of Bristol were primarily Essex, North, Clare, Mulgrave, Saye and to a lesser degree Warwick, Devonshire, Russell of Thornhaugh and Montague. Pembroke took a middle position and it was here that his strategy broke down. Although his tactic of encouraging attacks from all quarters to demonstrate to Charles that the country would be ungovernable unless Buckingham was dismissed implied that he should provide an alternative by not being too directly associated with the attacks, it was also necessary to rally the Lords sufficiently to overcome their basic conservatism and dislike of opposing the crown, now firmly behind Buckingham. This Pembroke failed to do.[3] Without sufficient support in the Lords the impeachment collapsed. The oratory of Digges and Eliot on the 8th and IOth of May merely secured their own imprisonment and the

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I. Hulme, Eliot, I32, I33-34.

2. Skeffington to Huntingdon, I7 May, ibid., A copy of the "letter" is PRO S.P. 75/7/64.

3. Lords Debates, I624 and I626, I5I-78 passim. Bristol was relying on Pembroke as a witness, ibid., I54, I74-6, I78.

impetus of the attack on Buckingham was lost in efforts over the rest of the month by the Commons to secure their release. Bristol's attack also lost its impetus and by the end of May Charles was able to seal his triumph by appointing Buckingham Chancellor of Cambridge. Although this roused the Commons to prepare another declaration attacking Buckingham, Charles had won the significant battle over the impeachment and he dissolved the Parliament, as Ball has argued, having lost patience over the failure to obtain a supply.[I]

I. Ball, "Impeachment", 46-48. See also Rudyerd to Nethersole, 2 June, PRO S.P. I6/29/9.

11. The Curse of Meroz, 1626-1630.

Buckingham's reaction to the Parliament of 1626 was once again to [illegible] strengthen his personal following at court. The earls of Bridgewater, Dorset, and Salisbury were admitted to the council, Carlisle and Holland to the bedchamber, and Grandison and Carleton made barons. After the dismissal of the Queen's household in August 1626, he intended to convert it into another stronghold of his followers. Although the appointments were not formally made until 1628, Dorset was made her chamberlain, Goring, vice chamberlain, and Carlisle's brother-in-law, Lord Percy, her master of horse, while the ladies of her bedchamber included the duchess and countess of Buckingham and the countesses of Denbigh and Carlisle.[1]

The novel aspect of this regrouping and an event of major political importance was, however, the reconciliation with Pembroke in August on the basis of the old scheme of the marriage of Montgomery's son to Buckingham's daughter and their inheritance of both Pembroke's and Montgomery's estates. In exchange Pembroke was made Lord Steward and Montgomery Lord Chamberlain. Although this reconciliation was obviously a reaction to the failure of the Parliament, Pembroke's reasons, whether due to a sense of futility about Buckingham's removal, or a dislike of the increasingly open conflict with the King on the issue, are still unclear. Yet it implied a rejection of his more radical following, William Coryton lost his vice-wardenship of the Stanneries in September, and a resignation of the leadership of political puritanism.[2] This resignation, which deprived political puritanism of its last remaining advocate at court, completed the defeat of the Parliament.

The existence of an influential faction at court had been one of the important elements of political puritanism since, excluding the years 1603-

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1. Rudyerd to Nethersole, 3 Aug., PRO S.P. 16/33/30. Cal. S.P. Ven., 439-41, 500, 510-511, 519-20, 546-7.

2. See Hulme, Eliot, 157, n.2.

1611, the days of Leicester and Walsingham. From 1626 until the 1640s this element was again to be lacking. As under the régime of Salisbury, political puritanism returned to the country to regroup, a process which was hastened by another result of the Parliament, the forced loan of 1626-27. The loan, with the order to ministers to exhort obedience, the threat of imprisonment and conscription for resisters, the use of martial law, and rumours that the regiments in the United Provinces were to be recalled to quell resistance, was a direct challenge to the previous attempts by Parliament to influence the making of policy by refusing finance. There were two interesting political aspects to the refusal: the new leadership it produced and the regional aspects of the resistance.

The old leadership of political puritanism, particularly Pembroke, offered no support and it is significant that neither Rudyerd nor Pym did either. The little that was offered by the shrunken court party caused it to lose its remaining influence. In November 1626 Lord Chief Justice Sir Ranolph Crew was dismissed for refusing to accept the legality of the loan. Abbot's refusal to license Sibthorpe's Apostolic Obediance in the spring of 1627 finally sealed his fate - he had already been in disgrace for his actions in the Parliament of 1626.[1] He had only agreed to sign the original command to the preachers through the need to defend religion abroad.[2] Both the earl of Manchester and Lord Coventry were unhappy with aspects of the scheme.[3] On the other hand resistance was led by the Riches and Fiennes. Warwick rose to a particular prominence and attracted to him Eliot, who remained close to him through the remainder of his public career, and other former clients of Pembroke's like William Coryton and Sir Francis Steward.

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 33-34, 305.

2. Abbot to bishops, 26 Sept. 1626, D. Wilkins, Concilia Magna Britanniae et Hiberniae (1731), iv, 472-3.

3. Court and Times of Charles I, i, 207-8, 240-41.

In April 1627, already beginning to steal the limelight as a naval commander, he went to sea swearing not to return until another Parliament was called.[1]

The strength or willingness of the Riches was not, however, sufficient to make the resistance a national one, and it remained firmly tied to regional power structures and the political position of the local nobility and gentry. It was strongest in counties like Essex where the power of the Riches and other local magistrates, e.g. Sir Harbottle Grimstone and Sir Francis Barrington, called the "father" of the movement, was able to encourage the resistance in depth.[2] A similar situation occurred in Lincolnshire where the earl of Lincoln supported the refusal of almost all the commissioners for the loan and the corporation of Boston.[3] In other counties there was a considerable battle for influence: Northamptonshire where the resistance was led by Sir Richard Knightley and Sir Augustine Nicholls (patron of the divine Robert Bolton), Cornwall by Eliot and Coryton, and Gloucester by Sir Maurice Berkeley.[4] In Dorset, however, Sir Walter Earle stood almost alone. Although the resisters included most of the prominent parliamentarians, Digges and Sir Nathaniel Barnardiston as well as the above, there were exceptions, Rudyerd, and Pym, and even Sir Nathaniel Rich, about whom William Bedell commented in May 1627, "be well advised what you write (to him) & think it might come to the Duke's hands".[5] A total of some sixteen peers supported the resistance, including Warwick, Essex, Saye, Clare, Lincoln, Kent, Huntingdon, Bolingbroke (St. John of Bletsoe), and Philip,

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1. Sir James Bagg to Buckingham, 20 April 1627, PRO S.P. 16/60/75. Anon. Diary, 11 April 1627, ibid., 16/60/10. See also Eliot Letter-book, 32.

2. PRO S.P. 16/39/25. Anon. Diary, 13 Apr. 1627, ibid., 16/60/10.

3. Ibid., 16/56/39. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 126, 154.

4. PRO S.P. 16/68/76, 49/8, 68/70, 68/25, Cal. SP. Dom., 1627-28, 59, 61, 66.

5. Bedell to S. Ward, 18 May 1627, Bodl. Tanner MS. 72, f. 198.

Lord Stanhope, many of whom lost offices for their efforts, but they were not strong enough to make the resistance national in scope.[1] One "community" may, however, have been of more influence - the scheme for bringing over the army in the United Provinces to enforce collection collapsed not only for lack of money but also through doubt of the army's political attitude and its reliability in the situation.[2]

A further effect of the loan was the total alienation it produced between the government and the puritan divines. The support of Arminians and catholics was a prominent feature of the loan and it was noted that Buckingham had decided to rely on their support and to cease cultivation of puritans.[3] When Abbot was suspended, Laud and Neile entered the council.[4] This growing change in the religious position in England alarmed the Calvinist wing of the church from Bishop Davenant down.[5] In response, the puritan clergy, led by the London group of ministers, turned to novel expedients to maintain the orthodox orientation of the church. The earliest of these was the Feoffees for Impropriations, the leading clerical members of which, after April 1626, were Gouge, Sibbes, and Davenport. It has been claimed that Preston created the Feoffees as a response to the failure of York House, but the evidence is not conclusive. Although the first recorded meeting of the society was on 15 February 1626, it had been in existence since 1625. Furthermore the only contemporary to consider Preston the inspirer of the Feoffees was Heylyn, who had a vested interest in puritan conspiracies.[6] Another argument against

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1. Rudyerd to Nethersole, 1 Dec. 1626, PRO S.P. 16/41/3. Court and Times of Charles, i, 240-41.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 306.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 426, xx, 8-10, 78, 106, 154. Thompson, "Middle Group", 82.

4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 218.

5. Davenant to S. Ward, 10 Oct. 1625, Bodl. Tanner MS. 72, f. 55.

6. See Morgan, Prince Charles' Puritan Chaplain, 182-83. I.M. Calder, Activities of the Puritan Faction of the Church of England, 1625-1633, (1957), xii. E.W. Kirby, "The Lay Feoffees. A Study in Militant Puritanism", Journ. Mod. Hist. xiv (1942), 4.

Preston's inspiration is the fact that, although he could not have been unaware of its existence, and was a close friend of its clerical members, none of his lay acquaintances took an active part in the scheme. The only politically prominent supporters of the scheme were Sir Edward Harwood, whose brother George was a Feofee, Sir Robert Harley, who remained a supporter of the government as long as his father-in-law Conway was in office, and two lawyers, Christopher Sherland and, after his death in 1632, Sir Thomas Crew.[1]

In March 1627, Gouge, Sibbes, Davenport, and Thomas Taylor sponsored a charitable collection for refugee Palatine divines, for which they were summoned before Star Chamber for pre-empting the official collection. The four had been engaged in similar activities before and this was probably arranged with the Bohemian court, possibly through Lady Vere, for the Queen of Bohemia appears to have known of its existence. Their claim, "we know a sure and safe way of getting this to those whose hands it is intended", was an implied criticism of the government's collection. Despite official impediments, by November 1627 Davenport claimed to have dispatched £600 to the United Provinces.[2]

To encourage support for the loan and the government's foreign policy, a number of belligerent sermons appeared in 1626.[3] Yet those of the London group, formerly such strong advocates of defence of the Church and protection of the Godly, focussed on the defeats suffered of the past years and the state of the nation. Preston warned that the Lord was not bound to work through the obvious means of a military victory.[4] Thomas Gataker, in The

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1. See Calder, op. cit., xii, 32, 147, 85.

2. See Circular letter of 2 Mar. 1627, PRO S.P. 16/56/15. H. Briggs to S. Ward, 27 Nov. 1627; T. Gataker to S. Ward, 21 Apr. 1625; Bodl. Tanner MS. 72, ff. 22, 28. Davenport to Lady Vere, 30 Jun. 1628, Calder, Davenport Letters, 29-32. Elizabeth to Nethersole, 16/26 July 1628, PRO S.P. 81/35/59. Alexander Leighton was also involved in this, see An Appeal to the Parliament: or Sion's Plea against Prelacy (n.p. 1628), 261.

3. T. Barnes, Vox Belli or an Alarum to War (1626), see 13-15. W. Hampton, A Proclamation of Warre from the Lord of Hosts (delivered at Paul's Cross, 23 July 1626, pub. 1627).

Anniversary Memoriall of England's delivery from the Spanish Invasion, took up the theme that although the saints were in league with God and the city of God could not be overthrown: "It is God's Church in generall, not this or that Church in particular, that is sure thus constantly to continue". There was no promise that the Church of England would continue.[1] Gouge, in The Whole Armour of God, emphasized the assaults of Antichrist and the Devil and urged preparation for the "evil day" when the general assault upon the Godly might be expected, especially through the boldness of ministers and "an equall and impartial preaching of the word ... without respect of persons."[2]

The hostility of Buckingham towards domestic political puritanism was paralleled by major changes in his foreign policy, which served to increase the alienation of political puritanism. The growing tension with France brought with it a lessening of interest in the war with Spain and on the aftermath of the Parliament there was sharp revival of contacts with Spain. Although an important element in this new policy was the use of unofficial and private agents, Rubens, Balthazar Gerbier, and the Abbé de Scaglia, Bristol's accusations had reawakened suspicions of Buckingham's previous contacts with Spain and his actions were carefully scrutinized. In September 1626 Nethersole communicated the alarm of the Bohemians at the rapprochement to Carlisle and the rumours increased during the winter.[3] In January Conway and Carleton, and later Pembroke, had to admit that Buckingham was undertaking negotiations with Spain through Rubens but claimed these were not taken seriously. These claims were belied by the reappearance of Cottington and

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4. The Saints Daily Exercise (1629), 58-59. Considered to be a comment on the defeat at Lutter, see C. Hill, "The Political Sermons of John Preston", Puritanism and Revolution (New York, 1964), 265-66.

1. (1626), esp. 10, 17, 22.

2. Works, (1627), ii, 38-9, 51, 251.

3. 11 Sept. 1626, PRO S.P. 81/34/113-16. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 577, 586, xx, 53.

Calvert at court.[1]

The news of these negotiations combined with controversies with France and the previous disasters completed the alienation of the other Reformed members of the alliance from Buckingham. Although the situation in the United Provinces had stabilized, the independent mood of the Dutch was bolstered by the news. From this point commercial disputes, particularly that over Amboyna, dominated Anglo-Dutch relations.[2] Similar dissatisfaction with Buckingham was expressed by the Kings of Denmark and Sweden.[3] Equally important was the breach with the Bohemians. Buckingham had always feared their influence and this was reinforced by a marked growth of expressions of hope in the Bohemian succession at the end of 1627.[4] Although publicly Elizabeth expressed confidence in Buckingham, the hostility between them grew and Buckingham refused her request for the employment of Sir Thomas Roe, returning from Constantinople, as ambassador at the Hague.[5]

A major source of this tension was the attitude taken to Buckingham by Frederick's agents Rusdorff, Camerarius, and Dohna who had long been restive about the manner in which they were exploited by English diplomacy and were now convinced that Frederick's best interests lay in French support. Rusdorff and Camerarius had freely criticized Buckingham and were regarded as prejudicing the Scandinavian kings against him. In January 1627 Buckingham demanded and obtained Rusdorff's recall on the grounds that he was a French pensioner, had meddled in English politics, and had instigated the King of Denmark to attack him. Rusdorff admitted that he and Buckingham had clashed

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 100, 147, 151-3, 160. In 1628 Cottington sat for Saltash under the sponsorship of Buckingham, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1628-29, 24.

2. Nethersole to Carlisle, 11 Sept., ibid. D. Carleton to Carleton, 23 Oct., 12 Dec., PRO S.P. 84/132/115-6, 192-3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 529, xx, 141-2.

3. Anstruther to Charles, 2 Nov. 1626; Spens to Buckingham, 20 Dec. 1627; PRO S.P. 75/7/228, 95/2/201.

4. Rudyerd to Nethersole, 6 Nov. 1626, PRO S.P. 16/39/35. Court and Times of Charles, i, 189-90.

5. Elizabeth to Buckingham, 24 Apr. 1626, PRO S.P. 81/34/46. Cal.S.P. Ven., xx, 35. See also Elizabeth to Buckingham, 3 Jun; to Carleton, 20 July; B.M. Harleian MS. 6988, ff. 21, 29. D. Carleton to Carleton, 28 Dec. 1626; 13 Jan. 1627, PRO S.P. 84/132/227, 133/28-29.

but claimed that Buckingham was estranging Charles from foreign rulers, creating dissension between Charles and his subjects, sponsoring papists, and treating with Spain. Although Pembroke, Abbot, "selon (sa) confiance accoutumé", and Conway regretted the action, this ended any Palatine representation in England.[1]

Relations with France, on the aftermath of the embassy of Carleton and Holland, were, however, the mainspring of all other policies. During 1626-1627 the tension that had existed since 1621 finally exploded and, despite the irrational aspects of Buckingham's actions, the issue was a real one: whether England or France would dominate the anti-Hapsburg alliance. Thus throughout the crisis Buckingham's policy was always ultimately one of alliance with France, but it would have to be an alliance on English terms, and this implied the overthrow of the leading influence in French policy, Richelieu, and the total change of French policy towards the war. To achieve this Buckingham had two principal weapons, the personal embassy in which he would persuade Louis XIII to change his course, or a combination of military pressure and intrigue with various anti-Richelieu factions.[2] His hopes for a personal embassy were finally destroyed in December 1626 when the negotiations over Henrietta Maria's household and the compromise he had arranged with Bassompierre were repudiated and, en route, he was forbidden to enter France. He now became totally fixated by the desire to crush Richelieu.

Buckingham's second alternative, intrigue with anti-Richelieu factions, was, in one sense, a revival of the policy of 1611-1614 but with a vital difference. In 1611-1614 encouragement of Condé had been seen as a means

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1. See Rusdorff to Frederick, 18/28 Jan. 1627, Négotiations, i, 802-11 passim. D. Carleton to Carleton, 3 Feb., 12 Mar. 1627; Carleton to Conway, 29 Jun. 1627; Camerarius to Carleton, 11/21 Jan. 1628; PRO S.P. 84/133/52-3, 84-v, 134/237, 136/13-14. Also S.P. 75/7/69v, and Conway to D. Carleton, 27 Jan. 1627, ibid., 84/133/27. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 101.

2. The goals of policy in 1626 can be seen in the Instructions for Carleton in July, PRO S.P. 78/79/147-8, 149-51; and the instructions for Buckingham's two abortive embassies, in July, ibid.,78/79/177-78, and December, ibid., 78/80/240-43. See also Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 20-22.

for the protection of the Huguenots, now military pressure via the Huguenots was to be a means to support an anti-Richelieu faction. Personal factors were also involved here, for the instigator of anti-Richelieu intrigues was Buckingham's and Holland's friend the duchess of Chevreuse. Her first effort, the conspiracy of Chalais in the spring of 1626, was a failure but Richelieu was fully aware of the relation between her activities and the goals of English policy.[1] A second conspiracy was to be set in motion (this was the purpose of the mission of Wat Montague) by the landing on Rhé in 1627 but it collapsed as soon as Buckingham's military failure was known.[2]

Although the Huguenots had long been seen as the means for exerting military pressure on the French crown, the situation was complicated by the peace of Fontainebleau. On the one hand the guarantee by Charles of its terms made their implementation an important issue in the controversies of 1626. On the other the peace had seriously weakened the military position of the Huguenots and it was only a matter of time before Richelieu eradicated their position entirely. A major step was the establishment of the French Admiralty board in the summer of 1626 which would enable the crown to maintain naval superiority over the Huguenots and obviate the dependence on English and Dutch naval assistance. The danger was clearly seen in England and the issue of control of the Narrow Seas was merely a front for the intention to keep open sea communications with Rochelle. A further spiral in the "escal ation" was caused by the report of the committee, Buckingham, Carlisle, Ley, and Conway, which studied the question and recommended striking first before the Admiralty scheme became a reality.[3]

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1. Carleton to Buckingham, 21 Aug. 1626, PRO S.P. 78/79/269-70, also ibid., 78/79/299-v. On the duchess of Chevreuse see M. Prawdin, Marie de Rohan, Duchesse de Chevreuse (1971), 37-41. Reade, Sidelights, iii, 51-2.

2. Prawdin, op. cit., 46-49.

3. See their report, Aug. 1626, PRO S.P. 78/79/299-v. Carleton to Buckingham, 13 Aug., ibid.,78/79/238-39.

A further result of the peace of Fontainebleau was revealed by a discussion between Sir John Coke and Gilbert Primerose in May 1626. Primerose reported that a peace party was now in control of Rochelle and that any effort by England to encourage them to result the crown would probably be unsuccessful. He suggested that the leader of the party of resistance be Soubise who was not included in the peace of Fontainebleau and whose loyalty was unquestioned.[1] Soubise could offer his fleet, the support of his brother Rohan, who indicated his willingness to act with the English to force full implementation of the peace terms, and his mother the old duchess of Rohan whose influence in Rochelle was of great importance in a later stage of the operation. This advice was accepted with the result that although English assistance was officially on behalf of Rochelle it functioned through Soubise and Rohan, not the city.[2]

The new policy towards the Huguenots was expounded in a long and detailed "Considerations on France" of October 1627. It began with the observation that a war with both France and Spain simultaneously needed serious justification. This was provided by the desire of the French crown to crush the Huguenots, their secret understandings with Spain, their attempt to engineer a catholic revival in England through the marriage treaty, the seizure of English shipping, and the attempt to woo the Dutch away from the English alliance. Immediate action was necessary to exploit their internal dissensions. The war with Spain was to be limited to a naval war and all available resources devoted to France. The role of the defence of religion was thus essentially secondary; the goal of the operation was the restoration of a favourable alliance with France in which an equitable solution

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1. Coke to Conway, 18 May 1626, PRO S.P. 78/79/33-34.

2. Soubise to Buckingham, 9/19 July 1626; Rohan to Charles, 8/18 Nov; Memorandum of Soubise, ? Dec; PRO S.P. 78/79/142, 78/80/143-44, 254. Cal. S.P. Ven., xix, 559-60, xx, 4-6.

for the Huguenots would be found. As seizure of shipping would be answered by reprisals, so infringements of the peace would provoke assistance to Rochelle and the recovery of Rhé.

The details were even more revealing. The key agent was to be Soubise who was to obtain from Rochelle a request for English assistance to recapture Rhé, and agreements to admit the English to the city and to join them with their own forces. A similar request was to be made by Rohan and the rest of the Huguenots. There followed details of the troops needed, some of whom were to be obtained from Denmark under one pretext or another, and assembling of shipping, in which speed and accuracy were paramount. The essence of the project was the way in which a request from the Huguenots was to be manufactured when necessary, rather than as a genuine appeal for aid, for an expedition which was to undertaken as soon as opportunity presented itself.[1]

This opportunity was provided by the seizure of French goods to finance the expedition which in turn provoked the French into retaliating. Despite Buckingham's confidence of his ability to exploit the situation in France, there was little chance of secrecy, and, with his intentions so obvious, the French were fully prepared and Rhé garrisoned with crack troops. The vital element was now the degree of support among the Huguenots. In April the plan for the use of Soubise was put into operation but there was considerable doubt as to the willingness of the Huguenots to accept it.[2] This received further confirmation in May shortly before the departure of the expedition when intercepted dispatches of the French agent in London revealed his intrigues with a follower of Soubise, M. de Savignac, and the old double agent Boislorée to betray the plans of the expedition.[3] Success therefore depended upon a

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1. PRO S.P. 78/80/70-73.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 127-29, 175, 184, 216-17. Memorial of Soubise, ? Apr., PRO S.P. 78/81/119.

3. Boislorée admitted at this point having held a pension from the French crown since the reign of Henry IV. See the intercepted dispatches PRO S.P. 78/81/130-33, 136-37, and interrogations of Savignac and Boislorée (12 June), ibid., 78/81/151-3, 159-60, Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 226, 256.

quick victory and the convincing of the Huguenots of English sincerity in undertaking the defence of religion.

The purposes of the expedition, as expressed in Buckingham's Instructions of 19 June, remained political - particularly as far as Charles was concerned. The instructions emphasized that Buckingham's primary function was to control the Channel and he was only to send troops to Rochelle if requested. If the offer was refused then Charles had honoured his obligations under the peace of Fontainbleau and owed no further assistance to the Huguenots. Buckingham was then to attempt to free the English ships held at Bordeaux and to cruise off the Spanish coast destroying Spanish maritime commerce.[1] This political interpretation was also emphasized by Charles in his Manifesto which limited his interest in the Huguenots to the engagement of his personal honour at the peace of Fontainbleau.[2] A similar justification was given by Sir Isaac Wake to the Duke of Savoy.[3]

Buckingham, however, realized that the exploitation of the cause of religion was vital to the success of the expedition both in England and in France. It was as defender of the cause of religion that he would restore his prestige in England and at the next Parliament. He may well have received some inspiration for this from Preston's sermon A New Life delivered to the court in November 1626 which suggested that Buckingham's future lay with his assistance to the Church: if he succeeded God would bring about a reconciliation with his enemies, if he failed "then thou and thy house shall fail."[4] To achieve this Buckingham instituted a major propaganda campaign to accompany

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1. B.M. Harleian MS. 1584, ff. 148-51.

2. PRO S.P. 78/81/182.

3. Wake to Conway, 17 Aug. 1627, B.M. Addit. MS. 34311, ff. 110v-13.

4. A New Life, Sermons preached Before his Majesty, 51-52, See also Hill, Preston Sermons, 252-53.

the expedition.[1] His exploitation of the religious issue was successful enough to obtain the support of Pembroke as well as of admirers like Holland and Conway. Only Carlisle and Carleton expressed doubts about a war with France.[2]

Buckingham also knew that his strongest supporters at Rochelle would be the preachers and the ideologically committed.[3] His initial approaches to the city government revealed considerable hesitation and it was only by strenuous activity by Soubise and his mother that Sir William Beecher was allowed to address the magistrates. His speech justified the previous rejection of requests by Rochelle by claiming that Charles had not been previously personally engaged as he was after the peace of Fontainbleau. Now "the countrie of God is our true and common country". The magistrates requested time to consult the other churches in France.[4] Being advised by Soubise that they should'bee fully perswaded (he was) sent only in their behalf & the rest of the churches," Buckingham drew up a Manifestation which stated that Charles dispatched the expedition only for the churches "for the surety and liberty whereof he stood answerable". Written on 21 July off Rhé this was sent to Rochelle to be printed and distributed by the duchess of Rohan.[5] After he received a copy, Charles immediately informed Buckingham he had reversed the order of political and religious motives:

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1. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 321-2, See also A Continued Journal of the Proceedings of ... Buckingham ... in the Isle of Rhé (1627). Immediately prior to his assassination Buckingham appointed Herbert of Cherbury as historian of the expedition. Herbert, The Expedition to the Isle of Rhé (1860), xxix.

2. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 60-61, 110-11, 127-28, 152-3.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 279-81, 374, 376-77.

4. Soubise to Buckingham, 12/22 July; Coke to Conway, 21 July; Speech of Beecher and Response; PRO S.P. 16/71/74, 16/71/68, 78/82/60-61, 66. Herbert, Expedition to Rhé, 26-28.

5. Buckingham to Conway, 28 July; to duchess of Rohan, 28 July; PRO S.P. 16/72/37, 78/82/79. A Manifestation or Remonstrance of the Duke of Buckingham (1627, London and Rochelle), 1-5, 8.

> I would wishe you to alter one point in it, which is, that whereas ye seeme to make the Cause of Religion, the onlie reason that made me take armes; I would onlie have you declare it the chiefe cause, you having no need to name anie other. So that ye may leave those of the Religion to think what they will: but I think itt much inconvenient in a manifest to be tyed onlie to that cause.[1]

Buckingham was also aware that Huguenot support depended on his achievement of a rapid success on Rhé.[2] Although Rohan was ready to act, it was not until September that he was able to raise troops and obtain the commitment of the Assembly of Bas-Languedoc.[3] This was to encourage Rochelle to declare itself in October but by then Buckingham had been defeated and was evacuating Rhé.[4] The responsibility for the defeat lay entirely on his shoulders - particularly the lack of professional officers and the disorganization of the army. His clash with the one leading professional accompanying him, Sir John Boroughs, was widely reported, particularly the fact that Boroughs had warned him not to be pinned down on Rhé and had been overruled.[5]

The failure of his expedition and the abandoning of the Huguenots to a final struggle was the conclusive stroke in the alienation of political puritanism at home and protestant allies abroad. Once the disaster was known even pro-Huguenots like Pembroke and Conway wished to revive negotiations with France.[6] Although the initial view was that it was Buckingham's incompetence and egotism which had caused the disaster to the Huguenots, it soon developed into the "black legend" of Buckingham: that he had deliberately contrived their destruction. Although this was to find its full flowering

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1. Charles to Buckingham, 13 Aug., B.M. Harleian MS. 6988, ff. 33-34. By this time the Manifestation had already gone to press

2. Buckingham to Conway, 28 July, PRO S.P. 16/72/31.

3. Rohan to Soubise, 29 July/8 Aug; Declaration of Assembly of Bas-Languedoc, 31 Aug/6 Sept; ibid, 78/82/24, 105-6.

4. Rochelle to Charles, 7/17 Nov., ibid., 78/82/179. Cal. S.P.Ven., xx, 530-31.

5. H. de Vic to Conway, 27 July, PRO S.P. 16/72/18. W. Fleetwood "Review of the Unhappie Behaviour of the Duke of Buckingham at the Isle of Rhé", (early 1628), B.M. Sloane MS. 363, f. 60v.

6. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 433-34.

in later histories like Prynne's Hidden Works of Darkness, it was already in existence by the beginning of 1628. Conclusive proof was given to the puritan view that the policy of the government had been to deliberately betray the churches abroad, which, in Prynne's words, was "one principall cause why God (by way of retaliation) hath permitted the Papists in Ireland and England to shed so much Protestant blood ...."[1] This view was given a theological basis by Preston's application of covenant theology to the disaster at Rochelle, its first direct application to the immediate political circumstances of the Church, in the sermon A Sensible Demonstration of the Deity delivered in November 1627 just before the disaster was known. The failure of efforts to relieve the Church in its distress point to a deep anger of God caused by a major breach of the covenant. Immediate regeneration was necessary if England was to escape divine wrath, for when God strikes the churches he strikes them all in greater or lesser degree depending on their understanding of the causes and their efforts to avert his wrath.[2] The aftermath of Rochelle saw an immediate growth of fasts and humiliations. John White of Dorchester's Articles and Covenants for his parishioners, emphasized the "Lord's indignation upon our neighbor churches" and the need for greater memory of "our brethen afflicted" in prayer.[3] In December 1627 a private fast was held in London at which Hugh Peter preached for God's enlightenment of the King at the behest of Warwick and

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1. W. Prynne, Hidden Works of Darkness Brought to Public Light (1645), 55-56. See also Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 420, 485. Fleetwood, op. cit., (probably written for the Parliament of 1628), B.M. Sloan MS. 363, ff. 56-71, esp. 67v-71. J. Rous, Diary, 1625-1642 (Camden Soc., lxvi, 1856), for 27 Nov. 1627, p. 13. H. Burton, A Narration of the Life of Mr. Henry Burton (1643), 6. PRO S.P. 84/137/217.

2. Preston, A Sensible Demonstration of the Diety, Sermons Before His Majesty, 83-88 passim. Interestingly Preston does not state whether the covenant was made just with England or with the whole Church. See also Hill, Preston Sermans, 255.

3. (before 1628), B.M. Addit. MS. 6394, f. 152. Also Edward, Lord Montague to the earl of Manchester, 2 Dec. 1627, Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS., i, 267.

Sir Robert Harley.[1]

The "war" between England and France was intensely disliked by England's allies as it involved both the loss of English assistance and the difficulty of remaining neutral in the quarrel. The failure to assist Christian IV to any greater degree than Morgan's contingent doomed him to defeat and Tilly's offensive in the autumn of 1627 was seen as a response to Buckingham's engagement at Rhé. The continued low priority of the crisis in North Germany in 1628 abandoned Christian to fend for himself and the invasion of Jutland led to his capitulation in May 1629.[2] The lack of sufficient English participation contributed to Gustavus Adolphus's caution about engaging himself at this point.[3] Perhaps the most critical effect of the "war" was, however, on relations with the Dutch, who through their close ties with both powers were the most directly affected by their hostility. Both sides attempted to obtain their support and from the beginning of 1627 their firm intention was to remain neutral. The growing importance of French assistance and doubts about the direction of English policy overrode the influence of religion. As in the earlier loan of the ships, the growing Arminianism of Frederick-Henry, Joachimi, and Aerssens, produced a revival of Barneveldt's policy towards the Huguenots.[4] A growth of Arminianism went hand in hand with a hardening of attitude towards England. In April 1627 Captain Henry Hexham, Thomas Scott's friend, obeying

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1. Bishop of London to Buckingham, 12 Dec. PRO S.P. 16/525/48. Peter had held one of Warwick's livings since 1623 and he was suspended for this sermon. He had assisted the Feofees for Impropriations in 1627. See R.E. Stearns, Strenuous Puritan: Hugh Peter, 1598-1660 (Univ. of Illinois, 1954), 41-43. Another later radical associated with Warwick at this point was Henry Bastwick, a letter to Samuel Ward of 6 December was written from Warwick House, Bodl. Tanner MS. 72, f. 237.

2. D. Carleton to Carleton, 19 May 1627; Carleton to Pembroke, 25 July; PRO S.P. 84/133, 146-49, 134/49. Christian to Buckingham, 28 Feb. 1628, B.M. Harleian MS. 6988, ff. 64. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 352-3, 373,

3. Spens to Coke, 4 Oct. 1627, PRO S.P. 95/2/175-6.

4. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 159, 170.

the Placart of February 1620 in assisting the magistrates of Schoenhaven to disperse an Arminian assembly with his troops, received a rebuke from the Prince of Orange and orders to cease involving himself further in internal affairs. The younger Carleton felt that the Arminians were encouraged by reports of the growth of Arminianism in England and its encouragement by Charles. In the early summer the French offered a new alliance and a subsidy of 1,000,000 florins p.a.[1]

To counter all these developments Carleton, who was both the most respected Englishman in the United Provinces and now a loyal follower of Buckingham, was sent back to the Hague in May 1627.[2] Not only was he to oppose French influence and Arminianism but also to obtain Dutch support for the relief of Rochelle and generally restore English credit- an impossible task. To accomplish this all he had was a garter for Frederick-Henry, an Irish barony for Aerssens, and bribes for several other Dutch politicians. On the other hand the English debts could not be repaid and only some of the interest on the loan for Mansfeldt provided. He was to accomplish a similar restoration of credit with the Bohemians, dissuading them from appealing to France with a promise of payment for some of their debts.[3]

Carleton later admitted that this was the most difficult embassy he had undertaken.[4] The States-General offered to negotiate a reconciliation between England and France but refused to budge from their neutrality despite increasingly bellicose statements from Charles that he would make them "alter that measure". Carleton's only hope was a quick success by Buckingham and once the

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1. D. Carleton to Conway, 13 Jan. 1627, 25 Jan., 14 May, PRO S.P. 84/133/24, 33-34, 132-5. Hexham's account of Schoenhaven, ibid., 84/133/108-11. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 338.

2. See ibid., xx, 151-3.

3. Secret Instructions and Memorials for Carleton, PRO S.P. 84/133/162-68, 198-99, 205. Carleton to Pembroke, 25 July, ibid., 84/134/49.

4. To Carlisle, 13 May 1628, ibid., 84/137/124-5.

defeat of Rhé was known his mission was doomed.[1] He found that his personal reputation had markedly diminished and admitted to being unable to achieve any part of his assignment: the restoration of the seat on the Council of State, countering the growth of Arminianism and French influence, or satisfaction for Amboyna. Attempts to prevent Dutch trade with France and construction of warships for the French navy caused only resentment. A blundering attempt by the Royal Navy to seize these ships caused him to write resignedly, "God send us well out of it, we have too many things to dispute with this state at once and too many enemies to hazard the loss of their friendship."[2] On the news of the landing on Rhé all English officers holding Dutch commissions accompanying Buckingham were dismissed, a demonstration that the army was no longer a source of trained soldiers for England. Carleton noted, however, that the course of Dutch policy was towards independence rather than clientage to France, as demonstrated by the campaign of Frederick-Henry against Groll in the late summer of 1627.[3]

He had intended to remain in the United Provinces until French influence was successfully countered but by the spring of 1628 he admitted defeat and returned in May. The crisis in Denmark offered an opportunity for reviving the alliance but the Dutch refused to act unless the English took the lead, which was impossible. This doomed Morgan's garrison at Stade and he surrendered in April 1628. Carleton's efforts received a final setback at the time of his departure when Carlisle paid an impromptu visit to Brussels on his way to Lorraine,

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1. Carleton to Conway, 27 June; to Weston, 12 July; to Carlisle, 28 July; PRO S.P. 84/133/231, 134/28, 80. Conway to Carleton, 14 July, ibid., 84/134/34.

2. To E. Nicholas, 6 Oct. 1627, PRO S.P. 84/135/33-34.

3. Carleton to Conway, 6 Aug; 18 Aug; to Coke, 18 Sept; to Buckingham, 15 Mar. 1628; S.P. 84/134/164-5, 309-10, 136/196. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 350-1, 353, 383, 506-7.

giving fresh life to suspicions of Anglo-Spanish reconciliations.[1]

On the aftermath of Rhé Charles and Buckingham were faced with both a crisis in Denmark and a civil war in France. Despite promises by Buckingham that consideration would be given to Germany there was no doubt about the order of priorities.[2] Through his seedy collection of agents, he was attempting to create an anti-Richelieu alliance including Lorraine and Savoy. In April 1628 Carlisle was sent to encourage this activity, the last of his great fool's errands, ~~whose~~ the real purpose of which was to get him out of the country on the aftermath of a quarrel with Buckingham.[3] The decision to continue military operations necessitated a Parliament for although the forced loan had brought in a considerable sum, politically it could not be repeated.

The Parliament of 1628 exhibited a number of curious aspects. The first was the unresolved question of who wished to summon it, as Charles appears to have been unwilling while Buckingham was later reported to be concerned by the possibility that Charles and Parliament might come to an agreement to exclude him.[4] Another was the secondary role played by the Lords. Although a number of the Lords, led by the resisters to the loan of 1627, Warwick, Saye, Lincoln, Essex, Bolingbroke, Clare, and including Mulgrave, Devonshire, and the 4th earl of Bedford as well as members of the Spanish faction like Arundel and Bristol, supported the petition and a number of members of the Commons, Rich, Pym, and Digges, wished to cooperate with the Lords none of them were strong enough to lead a major effort. The absence of someone in the position of Pembroke, Rudyerd acted in the government interest in this session, was notable, and the initiative was now in the hands of Wentworth and the increas-

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1. Conway to Carleton, 2 Feb. 1628; Coke to Conway, 15 Feb; Carleton to Conway, 8 Mar; Memoir of States Ambassadors, 15 Mar; Instructions for Carleton and Carlisle, 14 Apr; D. Carleton to Carleton, 29 June, 10 July; PRO S.P. 84/136/37, 49-50, 71, 160-63, 198, 241-42, 137/33, 43, 204-5, 222. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 548-9, xxi, 61.
2. Buckingham to Carleton, 21 Nov., 1627, PRO S.P. 84/135/139.
3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xx, 343, 520, 558-59, 614-15.
4. Ibid., 558. Nethersole to Elizabeth, 14 Apr. 1628, PRO S.P. 16/101/4-5.

ingly radical Eliot, Coke and Selden.[1]

The importance of the situation on the continent to the Parliament is well illustrated by Sir Robert Cotton's widely distributed "Dangers wherein the Kingdom Standeth and the Remedies". This is dated 10th March and was probably a contribution to the discussions held by the leadership of the Commons before the beginning of the session. Cotton was never an exponent of political puritanism and his analysis saw the house of Austria exploiting catholicism in order to obtain its political goal of the "fifth monarchy". But the use of the term shows how far he had come to the religious analysis of the situation. After showing how England had been almost stripped of allies and even relations with the United Provinces endangered by "our own domestic factions", he proceeds to demonstrate how failures in foreign policy were linked to lack of council and to the activities of Buckingham. His protection of recusants, the ending of the marriage with Spain on grounds of religion and then the reversal in the French match, undertaking the Cadiz Voyage, "against the advice of Parliament", and other fruitless expeditions, "a plot to weaken ourselves deliberately", and the abandoning of the war with Spain, "that the Parliament petitioned and gave supply to support" for one with France had created serious doubts as to his leadership. This doubt had provoked the refusal to provide a parliamentary supply and had been increased by attempts at arbitrary government.

A similar analysis had been given in an anonymous advice "to the House of Commons" which demanded an investigatiom of Buckingham's activities and the understanding that the people's "true griefe is not that matter of givinge but to see the evil ymployment of it when it is given."[2] Yet Cotton came to a more interesting conclusion: the fears of the people would cause a popular revolution under "a glorious pretence of religion and the publique safety". Hence the attack on Buckingham must be prevented and everything done to

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1. Thompson, "Middle Group", 83-85. Court and Times of Charles, i, 347.

2. Bodl. Tanner MS. 72, ff. 317-324.

convert him to the reform of grievance and support of Parliament.[1] This was part of the basis for the decision to forego the attack on Buckingham in return for concessions on grievances.[2]

Another aspect of the importance of the continental situation was provided by the motion on 20 March for a fast and humiliation for the state of the Church abroad by Strode, Perrot, and Phelips. Three preachers were nominated, Sir Edward Giles suggested Sibbes and Mr. Waller, John Burgess; in the end Burgess, Jeremiah Dyke, a Rich protégé, and Walter Balcanquall, now dean of Rochester, were chosen.[3] Only Dyke's sermon was printed and in this he also struck the new note that the catastrophe abroad was a warning for reformation at home which the Parliament must institute for the sake of the Church both at home and abroad.[4]

The prohibition of attacks on Buckingham prevented any serious discussion of foreign policy over the greater part of the session. Despite requests from Charles, supported by Rudyerd, for an immediate supply, on 22 March the Commons established the priority of the discussion of grievances. This debate included an interesting contribution by Digges. Protesting at the growth of arbitrary government, he contrasted the liberties of the Dutch and their beneficial effects on Dutch society and military ability. With the possible exception of Scott's Belgicke Pismire, this was one of the earliest public statements by an exponent of political puritanism supporting Dutch republicanism. Previous descriptions had seen all the virtues of the United Provinces

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1. See printed (anon.) edition (1628), esp. pp. 5, 9, 13-15, 17-18, 20-21. Also MS ed., B.M. Harleian MS. 6356, ff. 198-202.

2. Hulme, Eliot, 184-85.

3. See Maclear, Puritan Influence 275. Diary of Sir William Borlase, B.M. Stow MS., 366, f. 6. Maclear thought the Burgess mentioned was Cornelius but Borlase, f. 50v, makes it clear that John "the elder" Burgess was intended.

4. I. Dyke, A Sermon Preached at the Public Fast Before the Commons House of Parliament April 5th 1628 (1629), 23, 36-37, 38-44.

in Orangeism and republicanism as the gateway to Arminianism and anarchy.[1]

On 20 March Sir John Coke had introduced fourteen specific needs for supply. The first eight were ships for the Narrow Seas, Rochelle, and the Baltic, a land army probably for Rochelle, 6000 men for Denmark, and various other military preparations which were unexceptional if expensive. What was to end the truce over investigation of past disasters was the demand to pay the arrears of the ordnance office, the treasurer of the navy, and other branches of military administration. As Sir Edward Coke and Phelips stated immediately, reasons for these must be given and when Secretary Coke promised to produce them, the Commons returned to grievances.[2] Supply was not debated until 2 April and the debate began with the refusal to pay arrears without an investigation. The Commons also showed a greater willingness to provide a supply for Denmark, urged by Digges and Rich, than for Secretary Coke's request for an army obviously intended for Rochelle. Coke was instantly opposed by Eliot on the grounds that past expeditions had failed. Instead of attacking Buckingham, however, Eliot advocated the waging of a defensive rather than an offensive war. This gave the lead to Wentworth, always ready to oppose the war, who successfully urged a return to grievances and a postponing of debate until 4 April. Hulme makes the valid point that the paralysis of the previous leadership by the prohibition of attacks on Buckingham was largely responsible for the dominance of Wentworth, whose interests were purely domestic. The only member to support the governments requests whole-heartedly on religious grounds was John Packer making his only appearance as an M.P.[3]

The debate on the 4th was practically a repetition of that of the 2nd. Coryton and Perrot wished an examination of the proposition in detail and

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1. Borlase, f.12. See also Hulme, Eliot, 187-93.

2. Borlase, ff. 15-20. Also B.M. Harleian MS. 6799, f. 285.

3. Borlase, ff. 25-39. B.M. Harleian MS. 1601, ff. 14v-15. Hulme, Eliot, 196-98. Cal. S.P. Ven, xxi, 59-60.

Alderman Clitheroe urged support of Denmark - but discussion of the propositions could only lead to attacks on Buckingham into which the House was unwilling to venture. Once again Wentworth suggested a solution: the deferring of debate on the propositions but the offering a supply of five subsidies to create an atmosphere conducive to concessions on grievances.[1] Charles appeared pleased but the inclusion by Secretary Coke of Buckingham in the official thanks drew the immediate retort from Eliot that they were dealing with the king and no one else. On the 11th it was resolved to pay the subsidies within one year and that no further resolutions concerning supply were to be entertained before agreement on the propositions for liberty of the subject had been reached.[2]

Throughout April and May the debate was dominated by the question of liberty of the subject and the subsidy bill suspended until its conclusion. Charles's answer to the Petition of Right on 2 June carefully avoided a legal affirmative and an outright negative caused a fear that the subsidy bill might slide through before satisfaction had been obtained. Responding to the belief that the agreement on rectification of grievance had not been honoured Eliot moved on the 3rd a postponement of an answer to the king's speech and began a full-scale review of the failures of foreign policy, toleration "in effect" in England, and the want of council responsible for the disasters. He attacked the war with France as irresponsible and suggested that Spanish influence was at work, claiming that the serious situation in Denmark was a result of the war with France. He concluded by moving a remonstrance on the grounds that without reform at home further activity abroad was doomed to disaster.[3] Despite the objections of Sir Thomas Jermyn, Sir William Beecher, and Sir Robert

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1. Borlase, ff. 43-50.

2. Ibid., ff. 53-v, 73-v. Hulme, Eliot, 108-9, Nethersole to Elizabeth, 14 Apr., PRO S.P. 16/101/6-10.

3. Speech of Eliot, B.M. Harleian MS. 37, ff. 314-316v.

Killegrew, the Commons, led by Coryton, Phelips, Wentworth, Strode, and Sir Henry Martin, agreed to link the Remonstrance with the subsidy.[1]

On the 5th Charles responded by refusing to change his original answer to the Petition of Right and prohibiting the Commons from laying aspersions on the state or its ministers. Rich and Pym urged joining with the Lords to defend their liberties but Wansford moved proceeding with the Remonstrance. Sir Edward Coke brought the issue to a head by naming Buckingham as the "grievance of grievances". He was followed by Coryton, Kirton, and Sherland who blamed Buckingham for the disasters and the growth of papists, and Sir Richard Knightley and Sir William Fleetwood who blamed him for the general danger to religion. Beecher attempted to show how Buckingham had acted in defence of religion at Rochelle but was ignored. Selden proposed a petition to Charles to drop Buckingham as an interposer between king and parliament and was supported by Hampden. The debate ended with a discussion of whether there was sufficient evidence of Buckingham's guilt.[2]

The king's message on the 6th contained a tactful withdrawal of any threat to liberties of speech and Rudyerd and Alford moved that he be asked for a clearer answer on the Petition of Right, avoiding any further discussion of Buckingham. Phelips urged that Remonstrance be continued which was carried with the support of Pym and Sir Robert Harley, although the cause was not to be specified. Attention focused on recusants and Arminians, Pym naming the countess of Buckingham; Digges brought up the state of Ireland and Sir Robert Mansell the failure to guard the coasts. This debate continued on the 7th when the Lords requested that the Commons join with them in requesting a clear answer on the Petition of Right.[3] Charles had decided to make the necessary compromise: to grant the Petition of Right and obtain the subsidy rather than dissolve the session on the question of Buckingham. This was announced on the 9th and the Commons agreed to complete the subsidy bill before proceeding

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1. Borlase, ff. 212v-214.

2. Ibid., ff. 218-220v. Hulme, Eliot, 250-52. Cal. S.P. Ven., xxi, 126-27.

3. Borlase, ff. 222-225v. Hulme, Eliot, 252-5.

to the Remonstrance. Debate on the Remonstrance was renewed on the 11th and Coryton moved that Buckingham as well as his mother be named as a danger to religion. The issue now turned on whether Buckingham was to be nominated the chief cause of the dangers to the kingdom with Sir Humphrey May and Rudyerd warning that if he was Charles would not accept the Remonstrance. A vote was held and the inclusion of Buckingham passed by 235 to 145.[1] In a later reading of the Remonstrance Laud and Neile were named as leaders of the Arminians.[2]

The Remonstrance was presented to Charles on the 17th but control over it was lost by the passing of the subsidy bill. On 26 June the Parliament was prorogued until October, the subsidy bill accepted, and the Remonstrance ignored. The passing of the Petition of Right and the supply gave a false note to the Parliament. Charles regarded the Petition as extorted while the Commons had failed in their attempt to curtain Buckingham's activities and had granted the largest supply of the war years without control over its expenditure or an investigation of past misuse of funds.[3]

The aftermath of the Parliament gave further support to the worst suspicions. In July came another change of council personnel: Weston became Lord Treasurer, Suffolk, Warden of the Cinque Ports, Dorset, Goring, and Jermyn were finally appointed to the Queen's household, and Carleton made Viscount Dorchester. There were even rumours that Pembroke was to be retired with a dukedom, Montgomery to be made Lord Steward and Holland Lord Chamberlain. A major reconciliation of Buckingham with the Spanish faction, now consisting of Weston, Cottington, Suffolk, Bristol and Arundel, was suspected.[4] The

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1. Borlase, ff. 230-240v. Hulme, 256-59. Conway to Carleton, 10 June, PRO S.P. 84/137/188.

2. Borlase, f. 248v.

3. Cal. S.P. Ven., xxi, 168.

4. Hist. MSS. Comm., Cowper MSS., i, 358-59. Ibid., Skrine MSS., (Salvietti Reports to Grand Duke of Tuscany, 1625-28), 158. Cal. S.P. Ven., xxi, 169, 213.

subsidies were employed in a new voyage to Rochelle while the negotiations with Spain were persued with renewed vigour. In July the Queen of Bohemia was informed that Charles was prepared to accept the new Spanish offer, which in the context of the Mantuan war would exert pressure on France to come to terms with England, and Endymion Porter was once again sent to Spain.[1]

Despite the fact that Charles was held to be less keen than Buckingham on the negotiations with Spain, the assassination of Buckingham caused little change in the situation. Porter brought better terms from Spain and it was understood that the response of the Parliament, prorogued until January 1629, would determine whether Charles would continue some form of military activity or seek peace with both France and Spain.[2] On the aftermath of the assassination the remainder of the pro-war group, Pembroke, Goring, and Nethersole, and the few remaining Scots, hoped to bring Carlisle back to court to act as a new chief favourite with the support of the Queen and engineer a reconciliation with Parliament.[3] This, however, was a forlorn hope as the real power was now held by Weston, who was known to favour a complete withdrawal from the war, was suspect in religion, and the political ally of Arundel, his former patron, Cottington, a personal friend, and Bristol. Although Bristol was still unpalatable to Charles, in November Cottington was made a councillor and Calvert's friend Wentworth made a viscount and Lord President of the North. In December the retirement of Conway caused a competition for the secretaryship between Cottington and Dorchester. Dorchester's appointment, partially as the result of his experience, partially to please the Queen of Bohemia,

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1. Carleton to D. Carleton, ? July; Sir Robt. Ayton to Carlisle, 18 July, PRO S.P. 84/137/255-56, 16/110/31. Hist. MSS. Comm., Skrine MSS., 155-56. Cal. S.P. Ven., xxi, 183, 188.

2. Hist. MSS. Comm., Skrine MSS., 167, 172. Cal. S.P. Ven., xxi, 358.

3. Pembroke to Carlisle, 31 Aug., 28 Sept; Nethersole to Carlisle, 24 Aug; Lord Percy to Carlisle, 3 Sept; Goring to Carlisle, 16 Sept; Dorset to Carlisle, 25 Nov; Ayton to Carlisle, 19 Dec; PRO S.P. 16/529/9, 19, 16/114/7, 16/529/15, 17, 40, 58.

was also window-dressing for the parliament, as was favour shown to Abbot, Sir Ranolph Crew, Essex, Saye, and Lincoln. The reality, as Benjamin Valentine wrote to Eliot, was "the Spaniards fakesion growes strong."[1]

The military situation in the last half of 1628 saw the final collapse of the protestant alliance. In the summer of 1628, despairing of effective English assistance, Rohan had turned to Spain for financial support. After the fall of Rochelle in October he was totally abandoned by England.[2] Christian IV was understood to be only awaiting the result of the next Parliament before capitulating. With the Dutch the break was more dramatic. In August Piet Hein achieved the ideal of so many English strategists by capturing the Plate Fleet and treasure worth over £1,200,000. This gave the Dutch financial independence and provided the basis for the successful campaigns of the Prince of Orange over the next few years. There was bitterness in the United Provinces that England would continue to seek peace at a point when there was now a chance for real success.[3]

The same events, particularly the fall of Rochelle, completed the alienation of political puritanism and provided the evidence for belief that England had failed the churches abroad. In June 1628 Sir John King wrote to Archbishop Ussher, "It is to be wished now that his Majesty had never meddled with them (Rochelle); for in the beginning they were well provided to have made their own peace."[4] There was a further growth of expressions of hope in the Palatine

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1. Percy to Carlisle, 3 Sept; Ayton to Carlisle, 19 Dec; ibid., PRO S.P. 84/137/186-7. Cal. S.P. Ven., xxi, 189, 223, 394, 416, 459. Valentine to Eliot, 4 Nov. 1628, Eliot, Letterbook, 23-5.

2. Weiss, Unterstützung Friedrichs V, 99. Clarke, Huguenot Warrior, 174-75. D. Carleton to Conway, 20 Aug. 1628, PRO S.P. 84/137/279-82.

3. Court and Times of Charles, i, 433-5. Cal. S.P. Ven., xxi, 415, 448, Stearne, Hugh Peter, 61.

4. 30 June 1628, Ussher, Works, xv, 412-14. See also S. D'Ewes, "Great Britaine's Strength and Weaknesses", B.M. Harleian MS. 339, ff. 102-6, esp. 102-3. Examinations of John Vicars, minister of St. Mary's Stamford, Oct. 1629, PRO S.P. 16/119/52.

succession, although this was curbed somewhat by the death of the young Prince Henry in January 1629 and the pregnancy of Henrietta Maria.[1] Arminianism was increasingly seen as the cause for God's abandoning of the church in England. Leighton's famous Sion's Plea Against the Prelacy, "printed in the year & month wherein Rochelle was lost" saw bishops as having caused divisions between England and the other Reformed churches:

> (They) keep God's kingdom out of the country for which the hand of God is upon the kingdom.... Let us touch upon the last (of the results of this), namely the black pining death of the famished Rochellers ...(which) proclaimeth to the world the vanity, if not the falsehood of our help.[2]

The most interesting commentary on these developments is The Spy Discovering the Danger of Arminian Heresy and Spanish Treacherie written in August 1628 by John Rhodes, probably in the United Provinces. Written as a direct response to the failure of the Grand Remonstrance, its main themes were the confusion sown in England by Arminianism and the continuation by Buckingham of Gondomar's efforts to betray England's plans and divert her energies. The war with France was a plot by Spain to cause the abandoning of Denmark and the army used at Rhé should have been sent to Holstein under Morgan, Essex, Vere, or Warwick. Now there was a lack of good leadership in England: formerly Parliament used to make policy, Scott warned of Spanish dangers, and, most significantly:

> Then zealous in God's Cause, and ours wert thou
> Earle Pembroke, but the case is altered now.[3]

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1. J. Rous, Diary, June 1628, p. 19. PRO S.P. 84/134/242, 273. Cal. S.P. Ven., xxi, 518.

2. Leighton's, Sion's Plea, epistle to the reader, 260-62, 269-70. A comparison between this work and Leighton's earlier optimistic Looking-Glasse of the Holy War (1624), n.p.) shows the distance political puritanism had travelled in the years 1624-1629. See also W. Prynne, Anti-Arminianisme: The Church of England's Antithesis to New Arminianisme (1629), Sig. (C4).

3. The Spy, Sigs. *2, Av, B4-C, (D4v), E-v, E3-v, (F3v), also MS. copy PRO S.P. 16/113/66. The place of printing on the title page is Strasburgh, but Carleton knew enough to hunt Rhodes in the United Provinces. Carleton to D. Carleton, 20 Apr. 1629, PRO S.P. 84/139/98-99.

In this atmosphere the collapse of the Parliament of 1629 was a foregone conclusion. Domestic issues dominated the debates because both sides now demanded a favourable situation at home before considering the situation abroad. On 24 January Charles demanded tunnage and poundage on the ground, as Sir John Coke explained on the 26th, that it was necessary to enable him to send a fleet to the Baltic. Eliot retorted that there was no proof of this and requested an investigation. On the same day (the 26th) Arminianism and recusancy were raised as causes for the recent disasters. Phelips and then Rich moved a fast to avert the wrath of God from the churches, as was most recently seen in the death of the King of Bohemia's son.[1] The demand by the Commons for a major attack on Arminianism and an end to their patronage by the court, to which even Rudyerd and Harley joined, occupied a considerable part of the session until it appeared to lead to a direct attack upon the king. On 17 February the investigation was dropped. In the background were constant reminders of the increasingly pro-Spanish policy of the crown. These as much as tunnage and poundage were ingredients in the famous scene of 2 March when Eliot included not only Arminianism but also an attack on Weston for continuing Buckingham's policies in his declaration.[2]

After the dissolution few expected to see another Parliament and this was understood to involve the withdrawal from the war. As was expected, soon after hearing the news the King of Denmark signed the treaty of Lübeck. In May Sir Thomas Edmondes was brought from retirement to negotiate a treaty with France at Suza. In March Sir Henry Vane had been sent to the United Provinces to inform the Dutch and the Bohemians that Charles was prepared to make peace with both France and Spain although this did not mean he would abandon either of them. The Dutch attempted to persuade Charles to continue the war with

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1. Notestein, Parliament of 1629, 12-21, 108-9. Nethersole to Elizabeth, 24 Jan. 1628, PRO S.P. 16/133/4.

2. Notestein, op. cit., 23-28, 115-18, 121-35, 138-40, 240-41. Hulme, Eliot, 284-7. Nethersole to Elizabeth, ? 31 Jan., PRO S.P. 16/133/24. Cal. S. P. Ven., xxi, 537.

Spain, particularly as Frederick-Henry was able to go on the offensive and besiege Bois-le-Duc that summer, but without success.[1]

The making of both treaties would involve a substantial surrender of the goals of previous English policy and only Charles, Weston, Cottington, and Arundel, on the grounds of curtailing expenditure, if nothing else, supported both.[2] The peace with France included the abandoning of the Huguenots, who, as the Spanish subsidy never materialized, still relied on the English. Their capitulation, the peace of Alais, followed a month after the treaty of Suza.[3] A small group, Carlisle, Dorchester, Coke, and possibly Holland, continued to advocate the war with Spain. They were able to delay the actual treaty for some time, it was not signed until December 1630, but hostilities were ended in 1629. Dorchester and Sir Thomas Roe were able to set in motion Roe's embassy to the United Provinces and Gustavus Adolphus in 1629 to keep the northern war alive.[4] Yet, although Roe was able to contribute considerably to the intervention of Gustavus in Germany, Charles and Weston refused to engage themselves financially and English involvement in the whole episode was minimal. Charles limited his foreign policy solely to intriguing to obtain the restitution of the Palatinate as painlessly as possible.

Charles's refusal to intervene in Europe was paralleled by Laud's efforts to sever the connections between England and the greater Reformed Church. By the late 1620s political puritanism too had realized that its primary enemy

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1. Instructions for Vane, Feb. 1629; Conference of Vane with Frederick-Henry, 20 Mar., 12 May; PRO S.P. 84/139/60-62, 70-72, 135-6. Frederick to Dorchester, 8 Oct; Dorchester to Elizabeth, 24 Oct; ibid., 81/35/245-46, 256. Cal. S.P. Ven., xxi, 590-92, xxii, 76-77.

2. Vane to Carlisle, 28 Mar; PRO S.P. 84/139/70-72.

3. Assembly of French Church to Charles, spring 1629, B.M. Harleian MS. 7023, ff. 95-98.

4. Dorchester to D. Carleton, 26 Jan. 1629, PRO S.P. 84/139/27-28. Letters Relating to the Mission of Sir Thomas Roe ... 1629-1630, ed. S.R. Gardiner (Camden Soc., Misc. vii, 1875), 1-2, 6-8.

was at home. The refusal of the crown to wage the war advocated had caused both military disaster and the alienation of Reformed allies. God had shown his wrath and without a national reformation the survival of the Church both in England and elsewhere was questionable.[1] It would survive somewhere, in the United Provinces, under Gustavus Adolphus, or in America, but the curse of Meroz had fallen upon England.[2]

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1. T. Taylor, Christ's Victory over the Dragon (1633), 132, 278, 754, 777. R. Sibbes, The Churches Visitation (1633), Works, i, 378. J. Davenport, A Royall Edict (1629), 17.

2. For the Dutch see, H. Peter, Digitus Dei (Rotterdam, 1631), esp. (B2). On the effect of Gustavus Adolphus see, e.g. J.N. Langton, "John Workman, Puritan Lecturer in Gloucester", Trans. Bristol and Gloucester Arch. Soc.. lxvi (1945), 219-32. For emigration, e.g. examination of Charles Chauncy, Apr. 1630, PRO S.P. 16/164/40, art. 10.

12. Conclusion.

The withdrawal from the Thirty Years War marks the end both of an era in England's relations with the Continent and of a particular relationship between the crown and the political forces we have termed political puritanism. During the next two decades, as a result of both the personal rule and the Civil War, England was to take no part in European politics. At the beginning of the 1650s certain circles about Cromwell attempted to revive the Protestant Cause but the European situation had changed. In the United Provinces the new family ties between the house of Nassau and the house of Stuart had broken the old relationship between Orangeism and political puritanism. The attempt by the Commonwealth to seek a republican alliance with the Holland oligarchy collapsed in the commercial disputes which led to the First Dutch War. The weakness of the Huguenots and the utility of the alliance with Mazarin inhibited intervention in France. Only the war with Spain and the attempt to create a Northern Alliance resulted from Cromwell's interest in the Protestant Cause.

Cromwell's difficulties can be traced to the developments of 1585-1630. While the drift towards secular politics was not necessarily inevitable, it was a definite trend on the aftermath of the disaster to the Protestant Cause in the early 1620s. The functioning of a Reformed ideological alliance was dependent on the mutual support of the activists in the constituent countries. Without this the impetus to unity was lost and secularist factions rose to power. This tension was stimulated by the rivalry between France and England for the leadership of the forces opposing the Hapsburgs: England as the leader of an ideological alliance, France of a political alliance. In this sense the failure of the Protestant Cause in the early 1620s was the direct result of the failure of English leadership.

Of the three communities which form the subject of this study, only the Palatinate in its periods of activism attempted to follow an ideological

policy independently and its fate was a grim warning. In the United Provinces, only in the period 1618-1625 under the political supremacy of Maurice of Nassau were the advocates of ideological alliance victorious over the Francophil oligarchy. Yet their hopes were based on an expectation of active English support and when it was not forthcoming there was a reversion, in 1623-25, to the French alliance. In the period from the mid-1590s to 1613 the family alliances of the house of Nassau appeared to provide the basis for an ideological alliance but it too depended upon English support.

The position of France was, therefore, the key to the general situation and to Reformed, particularly English, diplomacy it presented an insoluble problem. At the bottom lay the inability to find a resolution of the conflict between the Huguenots and the French monarchy. It is an error to see the Edict of Nantes as providing one, for it was purely a compromise forced upon the crown by political circumstances and one which it had no intention of honouring. Being only a minority in the state, the Huguenot position could only be maintained through foreign support, a task made more difficult by the fact that the Huguenots themselves were unable to resolve whether to entrust themselves to such support and establish a semi-republic or accept whatever assimilation into the state the crown would offer.

The most efficacious means of aiding the Huguenots was through an ideological alliance between England, the United Provinces, and the Palatinate. Such an alliance, however, incurred the determined opposition of the French crown, which saw its primary task as the curtailing of religious conflict and the prevention of civil war in France. The leading method of the French for resolving the problem was the policy advocated first by Coligny and the politiques, and celebrated as the policy of Henry IV, of unification of the country in a political struggle against the Hapsburgs. By doing so, and by outbidding the English for the support of the Dutch and the Germans, the ideological struggle could be converted into a political one, and the domestic consequences of an external religious alliance averted.

The response of Henry IV to the Reformed activities in the crisis caused by the Venetian interdict is a good illustration of the effects of this policy. The price to be paid for French political support by the Reformed states was the abstention from ideological alliances and the abandonment of the Huguenots.

The experience of the regency of Marie de Medicis provided further evidence of the necessity for this policy but it took the acuteness of Richelieu to advocate it from an impeccably catholic position. His task was both easier and more difficult than Henry IV's. French policy had been effective in the United Provinces until the overthrow of Barneveldt in 1618. It had been less effective in Germany when on the outset of Henry IV's mobilization at the beginning of 1610, the Evangelical Union had rejected his demands for the repudiation of the Huguenots and had turned towards England to maintain the religious basis of their alliance. By the time Richelieu came to power, however, in 1623-1624 the Germans had been crushed and the Dutch had been disheartened by James's rapprochement with Spain and Richelieu was able to reestablish French influence without great difficulty. The most serious threat to his policy was, on the other hand, the decision by the Parliament of 1624 to engage in a full-scale war against the Hapsburgs on a religious basis. Had this been successful a new Reformed alliance might have been created and English influence restored. As has been seen, however, Buckingham's commitment to a French alliance and marriage surrendered the initiative and allowed Richelieu to hamstring the English leadership. At the same time, 1625-1629, Richelieu was able to obtain both a final victory over the Huguenots and political leadership over the anti-Hapsburg alliance.

It has become standard to see the period 1629-1631 as the decisive point in the change in the opposition to the Hapsburgs from a primarily religious alliance to a political one manipulated by France. It might be more accurate to see it in the years 1624-25 when Buckingham surrendered to Richelieu the opportunity for England to revive a religious alliance.

Given the fact that France could deploy greater resources, English

diplomacy was unable to discover a successful counter to this policy. Only political puritanism was prepared to accept the possible consequence of open assistance to the Huguenots - the alliance of the French monarchy with the Hapsburgs. James I was both opposed to a revival of religious war and too entranced with the idea of receiving the political assistance of the French monarchy. His handling of the situation in France in 1611-1617 threw away the final chance to create a workable pro-Huguenot policy. The argument, current today, that the best means of avoiding the Thirty Years War would have been an alliance between England and a France employing the policy of Henry IV, also overlooks the basic problem that policies of both countries were radically different. While Henry IV sought a political anti-Hapsburg alliance to control both the Huguenots and the protestant states, the only justification for English intervention on the continent was the defence of religion. In this respect the Cecilian realpolitik, shared by Elizabeth, with its distrust of France was a rational response to the situation. But it provided no solution to a crisis in which continental Calvinism looked to England for leadership, as in 1585, 1610, or the early 1620s. A grudging response from England merely encouraged the growth of French influence. Only through strong English support was the Protestant Cause to have any political efficacy.

If these considerations, combined with scepticism about the ability of a Reformed alliance successfully to challenge the Hapsburgs, create doubt as to the ability of political puritanism to achieve its aspirations, its failure can be exaggerated. Furthermore, as it was never actually put to the test, the question of the ultimate capabilities must remain an open one. Only Leicester's expedition to the Netherlands approached being a practical experiment in political puritanism and its failure was as much the result of the Queen's tactics as faults of Leicester or mis-interpretations of the situation in the Netherlands. These aspirations were certainly no more "irrational" than Elizabeth's and Cecil's "Burgundian solution", James's

rapprochement with Spain, or Buckingham's grand alliance.

Given the fact that a religious alliance was never whole-heartedly undertaken by the English government in this period, the other important aspect of the issue was its role in English politics. In the first chapter of this study it was suggested that the interpretations of relationships of the English church to the greater Reformed Church provide an accurate reflection of the "anglican" and "puritan" influences in the Church of England. We have also suggested that the identification of the puritan conception of the Church of England as "nationalist" is erroneous and that the term is better applied to the anglican position. Only with the political application of covenant theology by John Preston in the late 1620s do we find a special relationship between God and England playing an important role in puritan theology but this is still vague at the end of the period. Furthermore this relationship concerned the failure of England to uphold the covenant rather than a particular bounty of God.

Considerable attention has been paid to the methods of political expression employed by political puritanism. Of essential importance here is the absence of personal commitment to the Cause on the part of the monarchs of the period. In Elizabeth's case this was partially obscured by her godly councillors and by the circumstances which forced her into war with Spain. In James's case, his activities in the dispute with Bellarmine, the Venetian interdict, the dispute over Vorstius, and the Palatine marriage gave the appearance of fulfilling the expectations of political puritanism and it was only after 1613 that his true position was clearly revealed. A residual over-estimation of his devotion to the Cause was still of major influence in the Bohemian crisis. Charles's initial years were dominated by the activities of Buckingham but the revelation of his personal conception of the political situation in Europe contributed to the general disillusionment of political puritanism in the years after 1626. This failure of the monarchy to provide adequate leadership is the key to the politics of the period since

political puritanism, as can be seen in the idolization of Prince Henry and the Palatine succession, was not inherently anti-monarchical.

In the absence of direct inspiration from the crown, political puritanism turned to the struggle for influence at court. Here the model was established by the ability of the earl of Leicester to combine the position of royal favourite and protector of the party in the country. The earl of Essex attempted to play a similar role but was unable to do so. After his failure political puritanism adopted a "country" position as it was to do again after 1628. The importance of court leadership is revealed once again, however, by the attempt by Sir Henry Neville to recreate it through Rochester in 1611-1613. Despite Neville's failure, after 1613 a puritan faction led by Archbishop Abbot and the earl of Pembroke was established at court. Pembroke's position was similar to that of Leicester and Essex, as was that of Abbot to Grindal, with the major difference that he did not attempt to exploit it actively but rather inherited it through his family and through the absence of a challenger. Only in 1624 and 1626 did he play an active role, motivated by suspicion of Buckingham, but this ended in his reconciliation with Buckingham in the summer of 1626.

This study has seen Pembroke, as organizer of the "compromise of 1624" and the impeachment of 1626, playing a larger role than has been attributed to him by recent scholarship. In doing so we have ascribed less importance to the direct alliance of Buckingham with political puritanism in this period. Although evidence exists for some form of understanding with the Riches, both its nature and the nature of the Rich "group" remain unclear. On the aftermath of Pembroke's surrender of the leadership of political puritanism, we can see another, and ultimately final, return to the "country" as none of the younger aristocratic leaders were strong enough to rebuild the old structure.

This suggests a reappraisal of the role of Parliament in these activities. There is ground for seeing a causal relationship in the coincidence

of the absence of aristocratic leadership in 1603-1610 and after 1626, and the adoption of "country" attitudes by the Commons in those years. In 1621-1626, when aristocratic leadership is more in evidence, the Commons was dominated by groups and factions directly connected to that leadership.

Furthermore, a less negative attitude has been adopted to the conceptions of foreign policy advocated by the Commons in the 1620s. Instead of seeing them as the products of provincial ignorance and bigotry, we have attempted to show how the debates on foreign policy, dominated by the political allies of the aristocratic leadership, Rudyerd, Digges, Sandys, Eliot, Perrot, and so on, expounded the basic conceptions of European politics held by political puritanism. Considerable attention has been paid to the demand by the Commons for a diversionary attack in Flanders as the response of England to the crisis in the Palatinate. We have shown how this was also the desire of England's allies. Less importance has been given to the request for naval warfare, a more complicated issue than heretofore acknowledged. The role of a naval war in depriving Spain of its wealth and in financing English expeditions to the continent was a standard strategic concept of the period. This was the view held by Leicester and Essex as well as by the parliamentarians of the 1620s. Not only was it an adjunct to the continental war, but rather than unlimited piracy, major expeditions in concert with the Dutch were the method desired.

Finally we have attempted to show how the grand alliance policy of Buckingham was not created in response to the requests of the Parliament of 1624 but rather as a solution to Buckingham's relationship with James and was in many vital ways contrary to the desires of Parliament. The old argument that the Parliament refused to finance the war it had demanded is therefore open to serious question. Rather we would suggest that the struggles between King and Parliament in 1624-1626 should be seen as a debate between fundamentally conflicting conceptions of the nature of the war in which England was embarked. This was the same debate in which Leicester

and Essex were engaged, but now the conflict between the crown and political puritanism was revealed.

The conflict between the crown and Parliament and the withdrawal from the Protestant Cause were thus intimately linked and mark the failure of the attempt to create a godly commonwealth under the monarchy. A new relationship between these forces would have to be found.

APPENDIX I: Edmund, 3rd Baron Sheffield, and 1st Earl of Mulgrave (1564?-1646)

My attention was first drawn to the career of the earl of Mulgrave by Francis Yates's identification of him as the young man in Leicester's company who represented England in the pageantry of the Joyeuse Entrée of the duke of Anjou at Antwerp in 1582.[1] He was the one peer who appeared to have been both a member of Leicester's following and a supporter of the Parliament in the Civil War. Although research has shown this connection to be superficial Mulgrave's career does illustrate one very interesting phenomenon - the emergence of Southampton's faction as an important element in political puritanism.

Mulgrave was the son of John, 2nd Lord Sheffield and Douglas Howard. After his father's death and during the period his mother was Leicester's mistress he was Leicester's ward. In this capacity he accompanied him to Antwerp in 1582. By the mid-1580s, however, he had left Leicester and had become a follower of his uncle Howard of Effingham, under whom he served against the Armada.[2] He also returned to the influence of his mother and her new husband Sir Edward Stafford, bitter enemies of Leicester and of strong recusant sympathies. His wife, a daughter of Sir Robert Tyrwhit whom he married in the mid 1580s, was also a recusant.[3] During the 1590s he was a strong Cecilian supporter and a most persistant seeker for office. His attempt to succeed Huntingdon as Lord President of the North in 1596 failed as the Queen disliked his recusant connections.[4] In 1598 he was offered the governorship of the Brill but refused it as he was in a state

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1. F.A. Yates, The Valois Tapestries (London, 1959), 96-99.

2. R.W. Kenney, Elizabeth's Admiral: The Political Career of Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham, 1536-1624 (London, 1970), 143.

3. PRO S.P. 12/165/28.

4. Sheffield to R. Cecil, 12 Dec. 1595, PRO S.P. 12/260/9. Cal. S.P. Dom. Addenda, 1580-1625, 365-6.

of religious melancholy and it was rumoured he had turned catholic.[1] In the new reign he attained his desire and under the sponsorship of Cecil was appointed Lord President of the North in July 1603.

Through most of his career Sheffield's dominant characteristic was his penury which inspired his demand for office and his seeking of pensions after he obtained it.[2] This has been considered one of the reasons for his lack of success as Lord President.[3] It would suggest that his drift into opposition under James was financial in origin and that he could be characterized as a malcontent. Equally important, however, was the fact that he emerged from his "melancholy" of 1598 as a marked puritan in religion. This may owe something to his connection to William Crashaw, one of the editors of Perkins, who dedicated two of Perkins's works to him.[4] In 1608 Crashaw also dedicated his translation of Beza's life of Galerio Caracicoli to Sheffield and his wife and the choice of this history of an illustrious convert from catholicism may have been related to Sheffield's own "conversion".[5] In 1609 Sheffield paid a visit to Mornay at Saumur who considered that "il se porte fort bien".[6] He was one of the four supporters of Sir Edward Montague's bill against pluralities in the House of Lords in 1610 - together

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1. Sheffield to Robert Cecil, July 1598, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., viii, 277-8. Carleton to Chamberlain, 7 Aug. 1598, PRO S.P. 12/268/18.

2. James to Cranbourne, n.d. (1604?), Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS. xvi, 395-8. Cal. S.P. Dom., 1625-26, 70. PRO S.P. 16/521/32.

3. R.R. Reid, The King's Council in the North (London, 1921), 372-88. Reid also considers Sheffield to have been incompetent.

4. The Treatise of Christian Equity (1603) and the Commentarie on Hebrews (1607). A Cloud of Faithful Witnesses (1608), was dedicated to his children. Other puritan divines who dedicated works to Sheffield included Henoch Clapham and Richard Bernard.

5. Newes from Italy of a Second Moses (1608).

6. Mornay to La Fontaine, 26 June./6 July 1609, Ecclesiae Londino-Batavae Archivum, ii, 941-43.

with Zouch, Saye and Sele, and Russell - declaring that "I desire to hear (it), for howsoever it may be ill to the clergy, or to ourselves that be lords, I wish both neglected in respect to the law of God."[1] His tenure as Lord President was marked by strong measures against recusants and after a major effort in 1615-17 he was dismissed by James at the end of 1618 at the request of Gondomar and replaced by the recusant Lord Scroope.[2]

Sheffield's religious position was not unconnected to his family and political alliances. His lands lay in Lincolnshire and eastern Yorkshire and his family were closely connected to the Holleses - Denzil Holles the elder had married his aunt and made him a supervisor of his will.[3] In the late 1590s Sheffield developed close contacts with Willoughby d'Eresby and his eldest son married Willoughby's daughter.[4] Another close ally was Sir Thomas Fairfax of Denton who was his Vice-President - Sheffield's daughter Mary was to marry his son Ferdinando and he was to be godfather to their son Thomas.[5] In 1607 Sheffield was one of the original patentees for the alum mines and his partners included two members of Prince Henry's household, Sir Thomas Challoner and Sir David Foulis, and Sir John Bourchier. Bourchier, later a regicide, married Sheffield's daughter Elizabeth.[6]

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Sheffield's new religious attitudes was his benign attitude towards separatists. In 1604-6 he was in close contact with, and probably protecting, the Se-Baptist John Smith.[7] It was

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1. Foster, Parliament of 1610, i, 233.

2. Reid, Council of the North, 387-88. Gondomar to Philip III, 22 Aug./1 Sept. 1618, Corres., ii, 80-81. Sheffield to James, 1 Nov. 1603, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., xv, 278-79.

3. G. Holles, Memorials of the Holles Family, 1453-1656 (Camden Soc., 3rd. Ser., iv, 1937), 66.

4. See Sir J. Holles to Sheffield, 16 Jan. 1598, Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS., ix, 58-9.

5. See Johnson, Fairfax Corres., xxiii.

6. Cliffe, The Yorkshire Gentry, 90-91.

7. Marchant, Puritans and the Church Courts in the Diocese of York, 150.

probably a reflection of this interest that it was Sheffield's share of the New England Company's territory (Cape Anne) which was granted to the "Pilgrim" settlement in the patent of January 1624.[1] This interest of Sheffield's may not have been unconnected to his close association with the political faction most notorious for its tolerance of separatists - Southampton, Sir Edwin Sandys and their friends. Exactly when Sheffield became a friend of Southampton's and the nature of theirpersonal relationship is not clear. It was probably in existence by 1609 when Sheffield joined the Virginia Company and definitely by 1612 when Sheffield was noted as Southampton's most prominent ally.

After his dismissal from the lord presidency of the North, Sheffield appears to have been offered a post in the fleet which Southampton was to command, probably as part of the price of his surrender of his office. When the expedition was cancelled, Sheffield was notably embittered. In mid-1619 he was under suspicion for publishing illegal books with Lewis Baylie.[2] In 1621 Sheffield was Southampton's most prominent ally in the House of Lords and, upholding a similar position, he was to be one of the more active members of that body for the rest of the decade. His promotion to the earldom of Mulgrave in February 1626 was probably an effort to buy off some of his financial demands against the crown, particularly those relating to the alum mines, and was without political significance.

Sheffield's later career is not relevant here and his activities are probably worth a fuller study. This stage of his career does, however, illustrate certain interesting developments. The first is the swing of certain recusant elements under the leadership of Southampton to an alliance with political puritanism. Southampton may have been motivated primarily by the

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1. Bradford, Hist. of Plymouth Plantation, 169.

2. Sir T. Wynn to Carleton, 14 Feb. 1619, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1619-1623, 14. T. Lorkin to Sir T. Puckering, 16 Feb. 1619, Goodman, Court and Times of James, ii, 177. Bacon to Buckingham, 31 July 1619, Life and Letters, vii, 39.

legacy of Essex but Sheffield, who had not been a partisan of Essex, was probably inspired by a form of "conversion". He may well have been a major link between Southampton and "country" puritanism - the support of Lewis Baylie for Southampton in 1621 may have been due to Sheffield's influence. Secondly it also suggests that the alliance with political puritanism may have had more of a religious basis than heretofore thought. Finally it provides further evidence for the serious interest Southampton and his faction had in the separatists.

APPENDIX II: Political Puritanism in the Army in the United Provinces, and the Classis of Divines, 1604-1635.

The army left in the pay of the States-General of the United Provinces by the treaty with Spain in 1604 was a considerable body. Before the surrender of the Cautionary Towns in 1616 it consisted of three regiments of foot, commanded by Sir Francis, until his death in 1609 when he was succeeded by his brother Sir Horace, Vere, Sir Edward Cecil, and Sir John Ogle, and some horse, 5,500 men in all. After 1616 the garrisons of the Cautionary Towns were added to form a fourth regiment under the younger Robert Sidney, Viscount Lisle and a second contingent to Vere's regiment. In 1621 the total strength was four regiments of seventy-five companies, 9,520 men, combined with two Scots regiments to make a total strength of 13,100.[1] This structure remained stable throughout the period with only a few major changes in command: Ogle resigned his regiment to Sir Charles Morgan in 1622 for political reasons, Lisle resigned his to Sir Edward Harwood in 1623, and Cecil his to Sir Philip Pakenham in 1627.[2] The overall command was held by the Veres and their regiment was twice the size of the others. Throughout the period, therefore, Sir Horace Vere was the dominant figure.

One result of the position of the Veres was the permanent feud it caused with Sir Edward Cecil, who regarded them as blocking his advancement and whom they regarded as owing his position to Salisbury's influence.[3] Although the feud may have been personal in origin, it had important political consequences

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1. Lists of strength; (1616), Bodl. Tanner MS. 74, f. 58v; (1621) PRO S.P. 84/104/189-90.

2. For Ogle's resignation see the appendix on Thomas Scott.

3. G. Holles, Memorials of the Holles Family, 79. Sir D. Carleton to Vere, 18 July 1621, PRO S.P. 84/101/163-v. Charles to Buckingham, 1 Dec. 1621, B.M. Harleian MS. 6987, f. 205-6. For Cecil see C. Dalton, Life and Times of Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon, 1572-1638 (1885), esp. i, 28-29.

for both Cecil and Ogle, in an effort to by-pass Horace Vere, became adherents of Buckingham's. Furthermore it reflected a political/religious division within the army, between those like Vere and the Sidneys who were puritan in religion and advocates of political puritanism, and those whose conception of their role was primarily professional. In the case of Vere and the Sidneys political orientation was buttressed by personal relationships, Vere through his close personal friendship with Maurice of Nassau, who regarded him as his most reliable subordinate and the English as his most politically reliable troops, and the Sidneys by the Leicesterian inheritance.[1]

About Horace Vere and the Sidneys were grouped similarly minded officers - a process assisted by the fact that Vere and the elder Lisle were also the governors of the Cautionary Towns. The officers of Vere's regiment included, aside from various cousins, Sir Edward Conway, Vere's brother-in-law and lieutenant-governor of the Brill, Sir George Holles, brother of the 1st earl of Clare, Sir Thomas Gates and Sir Thomas Dale, both followers of Prince Henry and important figures in the Virginia Company, and Captain Henry Hexham, friend of Thomas Scott and patron of radical preachers.[2] The following of the Sidneys included the two lieutenant-governors of Flushing, Sir William Browne and Sir John Throckmorton (a relation of Pembroke's), Sir Henry Herbert (another relation of Pembroke's), Sir Ferdinando Knightley, and the younger Sir Edward Conway.[3] Ogle's successor, Sir Charles Morgan, who married Ste. Aldegonde's daughter, was also a close associate of Pembroke's and a friend of Sir Benjamin Rudyerd.[4]

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1. P.J. Blok, History of the People of the Netherlands (New York, 1900), iii, 431. Cal. S.P. Ven., xviii, 523. See also the letter of the younger Lisle to Buckingham, 3 May, 1622, Bodl. Tanner MS. 73, ff. 144-45.

2. For Hexham, see B.M. Addit. MS. 6394, f. 161.

3. For Browne see above, p. 62 . For Throckmorton see Pembroke to Carleton, 21 Sept. 1623, PRO S.P. 84/114/124. I have been unable to discover whether he was one of the Warwickshire Throckmortons.

4. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion (Oxford, 1888), i, 73. W. Rudyerd to Sir Francis Nethersole, 31 Dec. 1624, PRO S.P. 81/31/222.

The most interesting senior officer of the army aside from Vere was Sir Edward Harwood, about whose activities far too little has survived. Originally a protégé of Horace Vere and Prince Henry, and bitter antagonist of Sir Edward Cecil, his first command was that of a company in Vere's regiment.[1] In 1621 he became lieutenant-colonel and in 1623 colonel of Lisle's regiment a post which he held until his death at the siege of Maestricht in 1631. One of his closer subordinates was another protégé of Vere's - Philip Skippon. During this period Harwood was close both to the court of the King and Queen of Bohemia and to Southampton, Pembroke and the countess of Bedford.[2] After 1626, possibly as a reaction to the Cadiz Voyage, in which he was a bitter critic of Cecil, his activities became more radical. His brother George, a member of the Haberdasher's Company, was one of the original Feofees for Impropriations and Harwood was one of the earlier contributors.[3] He now gravitated to the younger puritan peers, Essex and Warwick, and became a member of their pet project, the Providence Island Company. It is not irrelevant, perhaps, that it was to Harwood that Sir John Eliot, in the Tower, sent his son to receive military training.[4] Immediately before his death Harwood was patronizing Hugh Peter, an association which probably began when Peter was working for the Feofees for Impropriations.

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1. See in general Hugh Peter's, "Relation of the Life and Death of Sir Edward Harwood", in The Advice of ... Sir Edward Harwood (1642). Also Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS., Misc. iii, art. 65; and Sir D. Carleton to Sir E. Herbert, 10 Oct. 1620, PRO 30/53/3. f. 133v. Harwood's lieutenant was Sir Thomas Roe's brother. Harwood was known as a friend of Thomas Roe's and of the 2nd Lord Harington, see R. Stock, The Churches Lamentation for the Loss of the Godly (Harington's Funeral Sermon, 1614), 11-12, 79, 88.
2. Pembroke to Sir E. Herbert, 30 Sept. 1623, PRO 30/53/10, f. 205. Countess of Bedford to Carleton, 13 May 1622, PRO S.P. 14/130/167. Harwood to Nethersole, 3 Apr. 1628, PRO S.P. 81/35/14.
3. See above, p.398. It is interesting that George Harwood's contribution to the Advice of Harwood was a panegyric on the Feofees, see Sigs. E_3 - (E_4).
4. On Providence Island see A.P. Newton, Colonizing Activities of the English Puritans (Yale U.P., 1914), 60. Eliot, Letterbook, 160-61, 165.

One of the important consequences of the army's orientation was its continuance of the Leicesterian tradition of protection of radical divines. A boost to this was given by the deprivations for non-conformity of 1604-5 which drove a number of ministers to seek employment in the United Provinces. According to the Dudley Carleton the younger a blind eye was turned towards their employment by the army because the low salaries of the army chaplaincies made it difficult to attract men seeking a more orthodox career.[1] A leading role in the patronizing of these divines was played by Vere and his wife, who was one of the great puritan patronesses of this period.[2] From 1605 to 1611 Vere's chaplain was John Burgess, who until his deprivation had been preacher at Ipswich under Jermyn patronage.[3] Burgess returned to England in 1611 and in 1616 a number of prominent patrons, the countess of Bedford, Winwood, the Veres, Sir Theodore Mayerne, and Bishop Montague, obtained for him a license to preach.[4] In 1620, through "hopes I had to honour God and further the service and succours of this distressed church and people in the Palatinate thereby ... and my indebted duty to the noble general", Burgess became Vere's chaplain in the Palatinate.[5] In 1611 his successor was his son-in-law William Ames who also, through the help of Winwood, became chaplain to the embassy church at the Hague.[6] Ames was too controversial, however, and was forced

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1. D. Carleton to Sir William Boswell, 25 Apr. 1637, B.M. Addit. MS., 6394, f. 250-1.

2. See the very interesting series of letters to her in B.M. Addit. MS. 4275.

3. He was a follower of Essex, see Burgess to Essex, 16 June 1600, Hist. MSS. Comm., Salisbury MSS., x, 185.

4. Chamberlain to Carleton, 3 Mar. 1617, Letters, 514-7. See also letters of Burgess to Lady Vere, B.M. Addit. MS. 4275, ff. 60-67.

5. Burgess to his children, Jan. 1621, Bodl. Rawlinson MS. B 151, f. 98-9.

6. Burgess's family connections were interesting; his sister married John White of Dorchester and another daughter Cornelius Burgess, F. Rose-Troup, John White, The Patriarch of Dorchester (New York, 1930), 20.

to resign in 1619, becoming a professor at Franeker, not without some opposition from England, in 1622.[1] His successor, John Hassall, also combined his chaplaincy to Vere with the chaplaincy at the Hague in the years 1621-1626. Hassall, who later became dean of Norwich, was, however, licensed in England and had very respectable connections.[2] Vere's chaplain from 1626 to 1630 was Obadiah Sedgewick who went on to a more famous career in association with the earl of Warwick. Vere's final regimental chaplain, the notorious Stephen Goffe, probably owed his post to Lady Vere's friendship with the then ambassador at the Hague, Sir William Boswell.[3] This was not the immediate limit to Vere patronage, for at the same time Lady Vere was associated with a number of equally radical preachers including Samuel Balmford, John Davenport, and Hugh Peter.[4]

As a Cautionary Town Flushing was more under the direct control of the crown and Robert Dury and John Forbes were prevented from preaching there in 1608. The chaplain to the garrison, however, was another of the deprived of 1605, Thomas Potts. Enjoying the support of the officers, he requested Lisle in 1607 to recruit all future chaplains from among the deprived and to restore the presbyterian system in the congregation established by Philip Sidney.[5] Potts was later preacher at Amsterdam until his death in 1630.

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1. Abbot to Winwood, 18 July 1612, Winwood Memorials, ii, 346-7. Sir D. Carleton to Chamberlain, 18 July 1617, The Court and Times of James I, ed. R.F. Williams (1848), ii, 22-3. Ames to Lady Vere (1618?(, B.M. Addit. MS. 4275, f. 8. Ames to Carleton, 30 Apr. 1622, PRO S.P. 84/106/135.

2. Hassell to Carleton,10/20 Nov. 1624; Carleton to Conway, 8 Oct. 1625, PRO S.P. 84/121/85, 129/143.

3 On her friendship to Boswell, see Lady Vere to Boswell, 11 May 1629 PRO S.P. 84/139/131.

4 D. Carleton to Boswell, 25 Apr. 1637, B.M. Addit. MS. 6394, ff. 250-1.

5 Sir W. Browne to Lisle, 12 Jun. 1605; Throckmorton to Lisle, 3 Aug. 1611, Hist. MSS. Comm., De Lisle and Dudley MSS., iii, 173, iv, 281. Potts to Lisle, 8 May 1607, ibid., iii, 372-74. A somewhat anecdotal account of the divines and the English community in the United Provinces can be found in J.W. Stoye, English Travellors Abroad, 1604-1647. The Influence on English Society and Politics (New York, 1968), pp. 239-75 passim.

The most important consequence of this harbouring of divines by the army was the famous synod or classis.[1] The first effort by the English divines to create an independent organization had been made in 1612-1613 with the support of Winwood but had been prevented by the Arminians.[2] In 1621, in the more favourable climate in the United Provinces, a majority of the divines led by John Forbes, now preacher to the Merchant Adventurers at Delft, and John Hassall, approached both the Dutch and James through Carleton, who supported the project, for permission to establish an independent synod. The States-General permitted this on the grounds that other foreign congregations, whose legal position the English shared, had been previously granted such a classical organization. James wished to appoint a moderator over them but on their protests relented, requesting them to exercise only disciplinary powers, suppress illegal printing, and control the appointment of ministers.[3] Stearns has regarded the establishment of the synod itself as an expression of "congregationalism" but this is an exaggeration.[4] The explicitly congregational aspects of the synod's activities do not appear until the end of the decade. Yet it should be noted how conducive the position of the divines in the United Provinces (as indeed was also the case in Massachusetts) was to the formulation of the theory by which "non-separating" congregationalism escaped the difficulties of earlier separatism. Elizabethan separatism had declared that the Church of England was not a True Church and had paid the

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1. The standard account is R.P. Stearns, Congregationalism in the Dutch Netherlands: The Rise and Fall of the English Congregational Classis, 1621-1635 (Chicago, 1940). This relies far too heavily on the investigations of Goffe which distort the early history of the classis and does not use documents in the State Papers.

2. Carleton to James, 30 Apr. 1624, PRO S.P. 84/117/133-4.

3. Carleton to Chamberlain, 7 July 1621; to Calvert, 19 July; Petition of Ministers to James (autumn); PRO S.P. 84/101/245-v, 281-82, 104/178-81. Boswell to Sir J. Coke, 8 Mar. 1633, B.M. Addit. 6394, ff. 111v-12.

4. Stearns, op. cit., 14.

consequences. The position of "non-separating" congregationalism - that the Church of England was a True Church but it had no authority over the practice of individual congregations - was easier to maintain, as the synod did constantly, if one was theoretically still within the Church of England yet protected from episcopal authority.

In 1622 the first classis was held under the presidency of John Forbes and included the regimental chaplains of three of the English regiments, Vere's (Hassall), Lisle's and Cecil's, and the Scots, and thirteen ministers of town and garrison churches, including Thomas Scott, the pamphleteer, of Gorcum and John Wing of Flushing.[1] The classis declared that both the English and the Dutch Church were True Churches and then proceeded to establish, on the model of the French Church, a system of elders, including officers in garrisons, for the congregations.[2] The two preachers at Amsterdam, John Paget and Potts, refused to join the classis, preferring to remain part of the synod of South Holland.[3] They petitioned the synod to ban the classis as they considered its views heterodox and its independence a threat to the understanding between the English and Dutch Churches. The classis replied with a protestation that they were only trying to follow the order of the foreign churches in the United Provinces without severing communion with the English Church. Forbes, Scott, and Samuel Batchelor tried to persuade Potts and Paget to withdraw their objections but without success.[4]

A second classis in April 1623, in which Forbes, Scott, Hassall, Wing, Batchelor, and Thomas Barkley were prominent, continued its steady progress

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1. Wing succeeded Hassall as minister of the church at the Hague from 1627 to 1630.

2. Acts of Classis, 20 Apr. 1622, PRO S.P. 84/106/84.

3. There is some doubt about Potts' original intentions. He was listed as a member of the classis but did not sign its protestations.

4. Scruples against Classis, Apr. 1622; Protestation of Classis, 20 Apr.; PRO S.P. 84/106/139, 141. See also Stearns, op. cit., 14-16, 114-115.

towards establishment of presbyterian discipline, ordered the Dutch liturgy to be used, and required subscription to the articles of the Synod of Dort.[1] The liturgy was now to become a major issue. According to Goffe, who investigated the question deeply, the English liturgy had been used under Sir Francis Vere and was always used by Sir Edward Cecil's chaplains. Burgess, Ames, Scott, Hassall, and Batchelor used various modifications of it and most of the others modifications of the Dutch. Yet circulating in the background was the Leicesterian edition of the "Geneva Book" which the semi-Brownist Hugh Goodyere, the preacher of Leyden, was known to use. When Hugh Peter went to the United Provinces he was also suspected of using it although Goffe also claimed that he, like Forbes, preferred to use no liturgy at all.[2]

After this meeting, however, complaints began to reach James from various army officers and others and at the beginning of 1624 he ordered them either to use the English liturgy and discipline and accept a moderator or to disband. Carleton, who was still in favour of the classis as a disciplinary body, delivered this message to them at their meeting in April 1624 and rather than accept a moderator they adjourned.[3] An interesting comment on the classis came from George Carleton, bishop of Chichester, who felt that Sir Dudley Carleton had done a "good service" in helping the synod, and considered that a classical assembly in a country without bishops was "without exception". Only if it was established in England in direct opposition to episcopacy would there be "just occasion of reproach."[4]

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1. PRO S. P. 84/112/3-4.

2. B.M. Addit. MS. 6394, ff. 80, 161, 250-51.

3. James to Carleton, 28 Jan. 1624; Carleton to James, 8 Mar; 30 Apr; Statement of Ministers. Apr; PRO S.P. 84/116/28, 199, 117/133-34, 121/235-6. Forbes to Conway, 9 Mar; D. Carleton to Carleton, 13 May; PRO S.P. 14/164/72, 185/35.

4. G. Carleton to Sir D. Carleton, ? May 1624, PRO S.P. 14/164/11. The "Whitgiftian" position is noteworthy.

In 1626, probably as a result of Carleton's absence, Scott and Barkley, attempted to obtain the support of the army officers in reviving the classis. They received the support of Vere and Harwood and a meeting was held at Utrecht in June.[1] The revived classis was a markedly more radical body. In January 1628 Carleton informed Laud, now the dominant figure in the church in England, that certain ministers were introducing a new liturgy consisting of a mixture of the English and Dutch liturgies. This was in fact the "Geneva Book". It had been used in services attended by the King and Queen of Bohemia and the ministers, he did not specify whom, were going to have it established by the classis. Furthermore they were ordainingministers. This worried Carleton. Although he accepted that the chaplaincies would fall to non-conformists through their low stipends, he did not want the classis to become "a nursery to non-conformists".[2]

Laud took this very seriously indeed - it "will merely concerne the Church of England if it be not prevented".[3] He obtained an order from Charles that they were not to engage in a new liturgy or any other novelties, ordain ministers, or engage in doctrinal debates on pain of abolition of the classis. They were to continue in their disciplinary function and suppress books attacking the church or state of England. This order was presented by Carleton to the classis at Rotterdam in May 1628.[4] The response of the classis claimed that these charges were the result of "sinister proceedings"; the "novel" liturgy was that established by Leicester at Flushing and the Brill; ordination was a vital function of the classis; and their activities were those practiced by churches occupying a similar position in the United Provinces.[5] The classis

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1. PRO S.P. 84/131/220-v.

2. Carleton to Laud,14 January 1628, PRO S.P. 16/90/84.

3. Laud to Conway, 20 Feb. 1628, ibid., 93/95.

4. Conway to Carleton,10 Mar., PRO S.P. 84/136/170-71. See also Stearns, 95-96.

5. Stearns, 97-104.

was then ordered to dissolve but again the absence of an active English ambassador after the summer of 1628 made control of the ministers difficult. Forbes also appealed to Charles that they were in fact introducing no novelties and by the end of 1629 the king appeared to relent.[1]

The final battle occurred in 1631-32. By this time several of the more prominent ministers, Forbes and the recent emigré, John Hooker, had become full-blown Amesian independents. Their disputes with more orthodox divines at Amsterdam and Delft came to Laud's attention at the end of 1632 and provided the excuse to discipline the army chaplains.[2] Laud was not hampered by fears of damaging Anglo-Dutch relations and demanded that all ministers employed by the army use the English liturgy and discipline. The agents for the purge were Sir William Boswell and his friend Stephen Goffe. Cecil's regiment (now Pakenham's) had always used the English liturgy and Sir Henry Herbert, Harwood's successor, was amenable to the changes.[3] The resistance came from Sir George Holles, lieutenant -colonel of Vere's (Vere appears to have abstained) and Sir Charles Morgan and his chaplain Samuel Batchelor. Under pressure from England Morgan was forced to dismiss Batchelor and accept the prayer-book. By 1635 the chaplains had been disciplined and the radicals either gone underground or, like Peter, Hooker, and Davenport, left for New England.[4]

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1. Ibid., 27, 104-5. Also PRO S.P. 84/137/108v.

2. PRO S.P. 16/224/57. The purge is described in great detail by Stearns.

3. Boswell to Sir J. Coke, 8 Mar. 1633, B.M. Addit. MS. 6394, ff. 109-12.

4. B.M. Addit. MS. 6394, ff. 77, 109-110. Stearns, 49, 72.

APPENDIX III: The Career of Thomas Scott and Bohemian Propaganda

Thomas Scott was perhaps the most famous of the pamphleteers of the 1620s both for the success of his technique and the size of his production.[1] Yet the standard of scholarship on the subject has remained low and a number of interesting aspects of his career have gone uninvestigated.[2]

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1. The basis for the Scott corpus is The Workes of the Most Famous and Reverend Divine Mr. Thomas Scott (Utrecht, 1624), comprising twenty-six pamphlets, which had previously appeared separately:
   Vox Populi (1620)
   A Relation of some Speciall Points Concerning the State of Holland (1621)
   A Speech of Sir Edward Cecil in Parliament 1621 (1622)
   The Belgick Pismire (1622)
   News from Parnassus (1622)
   A Short View of the Reigne of Henry the Third (1622)
   The Proiector (1623)
   High-Waies of God and the King (1623)
   A Tongue-Combat (1623)
   Digitus Dei (1623)
   An Experimental Discovery of Spanish Practices (1623)
   The Second Part of Vox Populi (1624)
   Symmachia or a True-Loves Knot (1624)
   The Spaniards Perpetual Designes (1624)
   Aphorisms of State (1624)
   Certaine Reasons and Arguments of Policie (1624)
   A Briefe Information of the Affaires of the Palatinate (1624)
   The Belgick Soldier (1624)
   Boanerges (1624)
   Robert Earle of Essex his Ghost (1624)
   The Second Part of Spanish Practices (1624)
   Vox Coeli (1624)
   Votivae Angliae (1624)
   England's Ioy for the Suppressing the Papists (1624)
   Vox Regis (1624)
   Vox Dei (1624)
   As will be seen, at least eight of these were not original. Other works by or attributed to Scott will be discussed below.

2. L.B. Wright, "Propaganda against James I's 'Appeasement' of Spain", Huntingdon Lib. Quart. vi (1943) merely recapitulates all previous errors made about Scott.

A basic problem has been caused by the existence of two Thomas Scotts: Thomas Scott the pamphleteer (1580? - July 1626), B.D. Peterhouse 1620 (incorporated from St. Andrews) and rector of of St. Saviour's Norwich in 1620[1], and Thomas Scott (? - 1638), B.D. Trinity Cant. 1611, rector of St. Clement's Ipswich 1612-1614, suspended and reinstated 1614-1638. Scott of Ipswich was also chaplain to Pembroke and dedicated the Assize sermon Vox Dei to him in 1623 which has often been attributed to Scott of Norwich.[2] From this confusion have spread two errors about Scott the pamphleteer: that he was a client of Pembroke's, of which there is no other proof, and that he returned to England in 1622-1623.

The confusion over the two Scotts is also of relevance to the question of the authorship of two earlier works: the sermon Christ's Politician and Solomon's Puritan of 1616 by Thomas Scott B.D. and chaplain to the king and the pamphlet Philomythie or Philomythologie of 1616 by Thomas Scott, Gent. It is doubtful that they were the same person and unless a third Scott is to be hypothesized it would be logical to assign the sermon to Scott of Ipswich and the pamphlet to Scott of Norwich who was not yet a B.D.[3] At the time of Scott of Norwich's escape to the United Provinces in January 1621 Thomas Locke informed Sir Dudley Carleton that he was the author of a "book of birds in my

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1. The association with St. Andrews is interesting as Scott was always an advocate of the concept of Britain - he may have been a Scot or an Englishman who resided there for some time.

2. The confusion between the two Scotts is made in the British Museum catalogue and the Short Title Catalogue. The Bodleian annotated Short Title Catalogue, however, makes some distinction. The distinction is clearly made in J. Venn, Alumni Cantabrigensis, art. Scott, Thomas.

3. In The Proiector, an Assize sermon of 1620 which he published in 1623, Scott referred to his previous sin and redemption which may infer a decision to enter the ministry in the period 1616-1620. The Proiector, "to the reader".

lord of Somerset's time", a description which would fit the Philomythie.[1] It is a curious work but there are several themes in it which are used in Scott's later work. It was obviously a political libel with references to the Essex divorce, a defence of Salisbury and an attack on Northampton.[2] More idiosyncratic are the defence of the Union with Scotland, if based on common maintenance of true religion, and the description of "church-papists", also taken up in The Interpreter: "They magnifie the Infanta, the Archduke, and Spinola; but vilifie his Excellence and the States".[3] There are a number of verse dedications to Norfolk gentry, Hevinghams, Sir Harmond Le Strange, Sir Thomas Southwell, and Sir Henry Bedingfield, as well as the earl of Essex and Sir Robert Rich (later 2nd earl of Warwick).

The most fascinating and elusive aspect of Scott's activities in the 1620s is that of his sponsorship, as the size of his production and his freedom from pursuit makes it doubtful that he was acting alone. It is not impossible that the Vox Populi itself may have been connected with Achatius von Dohna's propaganda activities for it was printed abroad and appeared at a perfect time for Dohna's purposes. Although Calvert was in pursuit of him immediately and his identity was soon revealed, Scott was able to make an easy escape to the United Provinces and to establish himself there without difficulty.[4] In August 1621 Colonel Sir John Ogle informed Buckingham of his residence at Alkmaar where "Scot is buysye about another booke & hath (as I hear) good and stronge encouragements

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1. Locke to Carleton, 2 Feb. 1621, PRO S.P. 14/119/60.

2. Philomythie, 1-4, 29-35, 107.

3. Ibid., 102-3, 51.

4. Chamberlain to Carleton, 3 Feb. 1621, Letters, ii, 337-40. B.M. Harleian MS., 389, f. 14-15. Calvert to Buckingham, 28 Nov., 4 Dec., 1620, Fortescue Papers, 143-4, 144-5.

from England, there being order given in Amsterdam that he want for no money." An immediate response came from Calvert, apparently requesting Ogle to apprehend him, but Ogle replied in November that it was impossible. Although Scott was now with a detachment of Vere's regiment at Rees, and had published a second work as well as a Dutch translation of Vox Populi, he was so popular that Ogle as a servant of the States-General dare not touch him.[1] Ogle was apparently worried about having involved himself even this far and wrote again to Calvert later in November to inform him that Scott was now "appoynted by the officer of that regiment under whom he shelters hymself to holde his winter residence at Gertruydenbergh" and that if Scott was to be captured it had better be done by Carleton. Ogle then wondered whether, as war with Spain was approaching, Scott was only "callinge a spade a spade".

By the end of the year, Ogle's involvement in the "pursuit" of Scott had become known and at the end of January 1622 he sent an even more concerned letter to Calvert, feeling that his action over Scott had been "an ill-advised interposition" and that when combined with his desire to resign from his regiment might make him appear to "stand otherwise affected". He was worried that Scott "may inwardly be lyked of, though outwardly discountenanced for a tyme", that Carleton would take his intervention as an insult, and that Maurice of Nassau and the States-General, as well as many Englishmen, would regard him as an enemy for attacking Scott "that shewd hymself to work so worthily against theyr arch-enemy the Spaniard, which impression (I doubt) hath taken so deepe roote as I shall hardly be ever capable to continue their service in confidence on theyr part." He wished Buckingham to protect him and

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1. Ogle to Buckingham, 6 Aug.; to Calvert, 3 Nov.; PRO S.P. 84/102/14, 81/22/156-v.

and insure that he would be able to sell his regiment without prejudice.[1] Although many aspects of this episode remain mysterious, Ogle continued to consider "that serpent at Utrecht" responsible for his resignation and his loss of prestige among the Dutch and the Bohemians.[2]

This was the last time Scott was pursued and he settled down to a public career as an army chaplain, playing a prominent role in the classis. In that of 1622 he represented the garrison of Gorcum and soon after was the choice of the garrison and English inhabitants of Utrecht for the first minister of the church which they, with the help of Carleton, obtained the permission of the States-General to establish in May 1622. On 20 May he was inducted by John Forbes, Thomas Barkley, Andrew Hunter, and Walter Whetstone and remained there, representing Utrecht in all the later classes, until his death in 1626.[3]

A most interesting aspect of this pursuit was the absence of any participation by Carleton and indeed Carleton never mentions Scott in any of his official dispatches throughout 1620-1626. This was not due to any elusiveness of Scott, who was a public figure, nor any oversight of Carleton's, who through spies and agents kept a close watch on English printing in the United Provinces.[4] Carleton was, however, limited in his powers by the situation for, although he obtained a placart from the States-General forbidding the printing of books attacking foreign governments early in 1621, it was difficult to obtain the cooperation of the Dutch authorities in suppressing activities favorable to their cause.[5]

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1. Ogle to Calvert, 31 Jan. 1622; 20 Nov. 1621; Buckingham to Carleton, 13 May 1622; PRO S.P. 81/22/184, 23/32-33, 84/106/202.

2. Ogle to Conway, 18, 30 June, 22 Sept. 1625, PRO S.P. 16/3/83, 103, 6/86.

3. See PRO S.P. 84/121/235-6. Carleton to States of Utrecht, 10 Apr. 1622, B.M. Addit. MS. 6394, f. 20. Also Stearns, Congregationalism, 87-89.

4. See e.g. PRO S.P. 84/117/157, 118/24, 70, 120/99, 138.

5. See ibid., 84/99/20-21, 52-v.

He himself did not act without direct instructions from England on the ground that "the marring of one in that kinde proves only the making of another."[1] Yet Scott was a unique case and although Carleton thought him a "very knave" for appearing to mock James in the Vox Populi he did lend him personal assistance in late 1622.[2] This was the curious episode in November and December when Carleton's agent in London, Thomas Locke, gave, apparently on Carleton's instructions, assistance to Scott's brother in interceeding for Scott with the bishop of Norwich and Archbishop Abbot. The cause is not specified and all we know is that both bishops promised Scott he would not be proceeded against unless they were forced to by higher powers. It could be assumed, however, that this does not refer to his pamphleteering, in which the bishop of Norwich would have no authority one way or the other, but rather to permission to take up the semi-official post at Utrecht while legally a minister who had absconded from his cure without leave.[3]

Carleton's forebearance is perhaps best explained by looking at Scott's pamphleteering activities and the patronage it suggests. This will also show why Scott is one of the most interesting advocates of the ideals of political puritanism. His only new work of 1621, mentioned by Ogle, was A Relation of some Speciall Points Concerning the State of Holland; or the Provident Councillors Companion, a defence of the resumption of the war with Spain by the United Provinces and the need for England to assist them.[4] This was probably sponsored by Dutch propaganda.

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1. Carleton to Conway, 5 Jan. 1624, ibid., 84/116/5-6.

2. Carleton to Trumbull, 28 Dec. 1620, Berks. R.O. Trumbull MS. Alpha. xvi, art. 76.

3. Locke to Carleton, 20 Nov., 25 Dec. 1622, PRO S.P. 14/134/20, 75.

4. Hague, 1621.

During the winter of 1621-1622 Scott's position stabilized and his major propaganda effort began. It was probably at this point that he began working for the King and Queen of Bohemia, if he had not been in 1620, for there is some evidence that the propaganda campaign begun by Dohna in 1620 was continued.[1] John Burgess produced in April 1621 a description of Vere's expedition, Certaine Letters declaring in part the passage of affairs in the Palatinate, and he may have been behind a similar work, A Relation of the Passages of our English Companies. In December 1621 Burgess was given a gift of £100 by Elizabeth.[2] Such a connection would explain, in Scott's case, both Carleton's forebearance and the financial backing for his large production. It would be in the interest of all parties concerned to keep the relationship secret. Bohemian rather than Dutch sponsorship would explain the staunchly independent position Scott held on Anglo-Dutch relations. It would also explain a certain hesitation about criticism of internal English politics.

Four pamphlets were produced in 1622 of which only one, The Belgicke Pismire, was original. Another tract urging stronger Anglo-Dutch union, it was probably inspired by the failure of the Dutch embassy of the spring of 1622 and reached England in early 1623. It expresses one of Scott's most interesting themes, the necessity for true Anglo-Dutch unity and proposes Dutch society as a model for England. Yet Scott does not hesitate to criticize the United Provinces, which suggests that it was not Dutch

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1. He was known to them by September 1622, see PRO S.P. 84/109/10.

2. For the gift, see ibid., 84/104/58 (enclosure), 60, 86. Certaine Letters (printed in Amsterdam) contained numerous appeals for further English assistance, Sigs. A4, (A4v)-B2v, B3-(B4V). A Relation of Passages was apparently pr$nted in London.

propaganda.[1] The other tracts were A Short View of the ... Reigne of Henry III, written by Cotton and widely circulated in manuscript, Newes from Parnassus, a translation of Traiano Boccalini's Ragguagli di Parnaso which was probably printed in the summer of 1622, and, at the end of the year, A Speech of Sir Edward Cecil in Parliament, urging a war for defence of religion.[2] This had been written by "one Turner about him (Cecil)", possibly Samuel Turner, and also circulated widely in manuscript before Scott printed it, but it was not delivered in the Commons.[3] This production of non-original works clearly suggests that Scott was acting as publisher of anti-Spanish propaganda for someone else. It would also suggest why The Interpreter, generally attributed to him, was never publicly acknowledged. Its criticisms of English society were too controversal, particularly the description of "A Protestant":

> A Protestant is one that shakes the head
> And pities that the Palsgrave was mislead
> To meddle with Bohemia, and insense
> The Spanish wrath, gainst which there is no sense.[4]

In 1623 Scott's production, excluding Vox Dei which definitely appeared after January 1623-4, totalled five tracts. Two if these were

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1. B.M. Harleian MS. 389, f. 281. Belgicke Pismire, Sig. a.a.-v, pp. 88, 99. See also Walzer, Revolution of the Saints, 210.

2. Newes from Parnassus, (93)-(95). The recent discussion by Frances Yates of the significance of the Ragguagli di Parnaso, originally the work of a member of Sarpi's circle, to the Rosicrucian manifestos is of some interest here. See The Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 133-37; She does not, however, mention Scott's translation. Although it is doubtful, in the absence of further evidence, that Scott, if he was personally responsible for the translation, saw more in this than an anti-Hapsburg polemic, as it was the kind of tract cirdulating in Bohemian circles, its publication strengthens the argument that Scott was functioning as a Bohemian propagandist.

3. Chamberlain to Carleton, 16 Nov., 21 Dec. 1622, Letters, ii, 463-65, 469. Carleton to Chamberlain, 3 Dec., PRO S.P. 84/110/139. Notestein, 1621 Debates, ii, 89, n. 24. MS. copies can be found in B.M. Harleian MS. 389, ff. 70-71, MS. 6799, and PRO S.P. 14/119/71, 72. Also circulating at this time was a "Speech" of Sir Edward Sackville, purporting to have been delivered in 1621 although the context shows it was written later. See Carleton to Chamberlain, 3 Dec., ibid., Bacon, Life and Letters, vii, 460, B.M. Harleian MS. 7021, ff. 181-87.

4. The Interpreter (n.p. 1622), 7, see also 8-10. It reached England at

Assize sermons delivered in Norfolk in 1620, one of which, The High-Waies of God and the King, contained a warning to prepare for parliamentary elections, to vote for the most religious men, and to avoid the electioneering of great patrons.[1] Two others were primarily pro-Dutch and anti-Spanish tracts: An Experimental Discovery of Spanish Practices, warning of Spanish treachery to James and urging unity with the United Provinces, and A Tongue-Combat, a defence of the English army in the United Provinces and Anglo-Dutch unity. It contained a dedicatory preface by Captain Henry Hexham of Vere's regiment to his Sergeant-Major Sir George Holles, both of whom were probably friends of Scott's.[2] The other work of 1623, Digitus Dei, contained Scott's most eloquent advocacy of Reformed unity. He denied that the destruction of Antichrist would come at the hands of temporal princes but only through "the unity of the Reformed churches within themselves". Two particular problems needed to be dealt with: whether certain points of doctrine need be considered vital and whether different forms of church government threaten unity, but he did not specify whether by imposition of dogma or compromise. His major concern was the need for unity between England, Scotland, the Huguenots, the Palatinate, and the United Provinces before the war commenced and he hoped that James "whose wisedome hath bene pleased to run a contrarie course" would contribute to this.[3]

Including the tract Vox Dei, Scott produced fifteen pamphlets as well as the complete works in 1624. These fall into several fairly specific catagories. The earliest, Vox Dei, was written immediately after the

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relation of Buckingham to the Parliament and predicts the appearance the beginning of 1623, B.M. Harleian MS. 389, f. 314.

1. High-Waies, 86-88. The other sermon was The Proiector.

2. Experimental Discovery, 47-48. Tongue-Combat, 69-70, 87-88, 104.

3. Digitus Dei, 33-37.

of the Vox Regis, which appeared immediately after the Parliament. The two were a pair and contain frontispieces unusually elaborate for Scott's works. The most remarkable theme in the Vox Dei is the apotheosis of Buckingham, "a long time held to be the child of fortune only" but now "an oak or cedar for the upholding of Church and State". Doubt of his religion had been caused by the orientation of his wife and mother, but the voyage to Spain had justified him. The frontispiece contains a pyramid of Ramsey "for the King" quelling the Gowrie plot, Buckingham "for King and Kingdome", curbing "faction (the Spanish Faction?) and bribery", and Charles at the apex, "for the King, Kingdome, and the Church", overthrowing the Pope. It contains a justification of Scott's own conduct in defending the church and demands that Parliament declare war on Spain in alliance with the United Provinces.[1] The Vox Regis begins with an admission of his authorship of the Vox Populi and Vox Dei and defends his activities as similar to those of a good commonwealth's man in Parliament. It was primarily a description and apotheosis of the Parliament as a model of unity. This was symbolized in the frontispiece which showed Charles reuniting Frederick and Elizabeth to James, the clergy offering their prayers, the Lords offering their swords, and the Commons their hearts and their money.[2]

In the spring of 1624 appeared A Briefe Information of the Affaires of the Palatinate, which defended Frederick's actions including the acceptance of the Bohemian throne, and Certain Reasons and Arguments of Policie, which described how James had been exploited by the Spaniards and gave proof why England should end the treaties with Spain. In March

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1. Vox Dei, Sig. xx-v, pp. 19, 58-59, 61, 71.

2. Vox Regis, 1-3, 7, 49-69.

Carleton had informed Nethersole and Conway that Rusdorff was receiving some discourses "a childe of the King of Bohemia's Chancerie" already printed in the United Provinces with a request that permission be granted for them to be printed in England. It is probable that these were the works to which Carleton was referring, although there is no record of whether permission was in fact granted for printing in England.[1]

The Majority of the tracts were aimed at encouraging the Parliament to break with Spain and celebrating its decisions. Two were definitely not original, one, The Spaniard's Perpetual Designes, was a French tract urging the revival of the policies of Henry IV, and the other, Aphorismes of State, a German tract urging the German princes to rally against catholic activities within the Empire.[2] A Second Part of Spanish Practices was a list of Spanish atrocities and a history of the Dutch rebellion justifying the war, probably Dutch in origin. Robert Earle of Essex his Ghost was a compilation from Essex's Apologie urging an anti-Spanish and pro-Dutch policy and making one interesting reference to Southampton as a witness to Essex's aspirations.[3] The Belgicke Soldier urged the necessity of the war against Antichrist and demonstrated how England and the Church abroad had not prospered during the peace.[4]

The most revealing of Scott's own position was the Second Part of Vox Populi, written towards the end of the Parliament, as it mentions both the petition against recusants and the visit of Mansfeldt. Another of the

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1. Carleton to Nethersole, 5 Mar.; to Conway, 8 Mar.; PRO S.P. 84/116/193, 198.

2. Perpetual Designes, Sig. xx3-v. Aphorismes, Sig. B3.

3. Essex Ghost, 4-5.

4. Belgicke Soldier, 5, 27-30.

satirical dialogues against "that same Fox Populi Count Gondomar", the general theme is the danger in which Spain is placed by the actions of the Parliament. The only novel element is the emphasis placed on Spanish intrigues among great men, possibly a request for the purging of the remainder of the Spanish Faction.[1] Most interesting, however, is the dedication to Maurice of Nassau and Frederick and Elizabeth, in which he refers to the Bohemians' "respect ... towards me" and his "sometime dependence on your Excellency (Maurice)", the only public indication of his relationship to them.[2]

Three more of the tracts are more specific. The least interesting is England's Joy, for Suppressing the Papists celebrating the petition against recusants. Boanerges: or the Humble Supplication of the Ministers of Scotland to the High Court of Parliament in England broke a previous abstention from criticizing internal matters by attacking the established church and its wealth and structure, particularly cathedral chapters, as crypto-papist. It demanded toleration for those who wished to follow continental practice and ceremonies, and included interesting praise for Archbishop Abbot.[3] Symmachia: or a True-Loves Knot was perhaps the most eloquent of his defences of Anglo-Dutch unity. Written in the late summer of 1624, it was a response to the danger caused by the Amboyna affair. The grand alliance for defence of religion should not be imperiled by those who "love mammon more than Christ". After admitting that the Dutch had been made less friendly by previous English policy, he urged that as the States had promised an investigation it be allowed to proceed before further steps were taken. Speaking as one who "suffered for their sake (the Dutch) from mine own nation" he suggested a number of compromises to be made by both sides.[4]

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1. Pp. 15-16, 55-56.
2. Sig. Av.
3. Boanerges, 8, 25.
4. Symmachia, 1-2, 15-16, 19, 24-28, 29.

The remaining two tracts, Vox Coeli and Votivae Angliae, both published during the spring of 1624, fall into a unique catagory. In July John Reynolds, tutor to Basil, Viscount Fielding, was brought from France and imprisoned for writing them. James claimed he had obtained £1000 from their sale and demanded it as a fine. Reynolds was to remain in prison for two years and admitted to being the author of both works.[1] Vox Coeli, a dramatic dialogue between Elizabeth, Henry VIII, and other monarchs urging James to war against Spain, was in fact written in 1621 as it mentions Bacon as Lord Chancellor and Luynes as still living. In the dedication to the Parliament of 1624 the author refers to having given a copy of Votivae Angliae to James on New Years Eve 1623. Votivae Angliae, which also mentions that it was written in London and a copy presented to James, was a letter urging the king to take up arms for the Palatinate. It was not printed until Parliament had asked for the treaties to be broken.[2] There are several other points which show Scott not to have been the author: it admits that the acceptance of the Bohemian crown was illegal, which Scott never did, and the author of both tracts is given the initials SNRI, unique for Scott's works.[3] A surviving letter of Reynolds shows him to have been a supporter of the French match.[4] It was probably because he had been given a copy that James was able to identify Reynolds as the author when the printed edition appeared. The connection between Reynolds and Scott is, however, still unclear.

After this massive affort, Scott mysteriously ceased operations and nothing further appeared from him until 1626. His decision may have been

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1. Locke to Carleton, 11 July 1624; Nethersole to Carleton, 14 Aug.; Abbot to Conway, 5 Nov.; PRO S.P. 14/169/41, 171/49, 174/20. Petition of Reynolds, c. Oct. 1626, ibid., 16/44/28.

2. Vox Coeli, Sig. A4-v, pp. 26, 34. Votivae Angliae, Sig. *iii, Bv.

3. Votivae Angliae, Sig. Av.

4. Reynolds to the earl of Denbigh, 29 May 1624, Hist. MSS. Comm., IVth Report, Appendix (Denbigh MSS.), 261. It is an interesting coincidence that Reynolds's pupil, later the 2nd earl of Denbigh, was the only member of the Villiers clan to support Parliament in the Civil War.

influenced by the Reynolds affair, or the reaction to A Game at Chess, which made James issue yet another proclamation against illegal printing.[1] On the other hand the publication of the Complete Works in the latter half of 1624 has an air of finality about it and it is probable that with the Parliament and Buckingham's engagement in the war he and his sponsors considered his job was done. Scott continued, however, to be prominent in circles about the Bohemians in the Hague in 1625.[2]

In the spring of 1626 Scott was once again prominent in the revival of the classis. According to Joseph Mede he was about to be appointed chaplain to Elizabeth in succession to John Hassall. On 18 June he was assassinated by John Lambert, a soldier of the garrison of Utrecht. There are two conflicting accounts of this. The official account, published in 1628, claimed Lambert was mad and believed Scott had hindered his promotion with the Queen of Bohemia, another illustration of his position at the Bohemian court. On the aftermath of the assassination, however, Mede heard a report that Lambert was hired to assassinate Scott to prevent the publication of a tract on the Cadiz Voyage. As he was a soldier in Wimbledon's regiment and both Wimbledon and Buckingham would wish to dampen criticism of the voyage this is not impossible.[3] Scott had either published, or it was published posthumously, Sir Walter Raleigh's Ghost which was in fact a tract on the voyage. Yet is contains not the slightest criticism of the expedition but is merely another anti-Gondomar comedy. It could almost be considered pro-Buckingham and supports the government contention that the voyage did prevent a Spanish invasion of England.[4]

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1. See PRO S.P. 14/170.35.

2. B.M. Harleian MS. 389, ff. 423, 451.

3. J. Mede to Sir M. Stuteville, 7 July 1626, Court and Times of Charles, i, 123. A Briefe Relation of the Murther of Mr. Thomas Scott (1628), 2, 6.

4. Raleigh's Ghost (Utrecht, 1626), Sig. (A2v). This was not the only dramatic dialogue entitled Sir Walter Raleigh's Ghost. Another, sub-

Despite his fame Scott was not the only producer of pre-Bohemian propaganda in the United Provinces and, despite his advocacy of the Reformed alliance, not necessarily the most radical. Tom-Tell-Truth, written in the autumn of 1621 for the second session of the Parliament, which urged James to take up the defence of religion both in Germany and France and ally with the Dutch in the diversion in Flanders, was far more critical of the domestic situation in England.[1] This is a further indication that Scott, whose personal views were probably quite radical, was held in check by more conservative sponsors. The Bohemians would want criticism of foreign policy and attacks on Spain but not attacks on the political order in England. Interesting confirmation of this is provided by Calvert's The Answere to Tom-Tell-Troth.[2] This treatise was a counter to the puritan pamphleteers and a most revealing exposition of the views of the Spanish faction. Calvert argues that peace with Spain is more valuable than the Dutch alliance, that the acceptance of the Bohemian crown was illegal, and that Charles should not support Frederick's restitution.[3] As he had done while secretary, Calvert takes the puritan pamphlets seriously. He thought they were all coming from a central source in the United Provinces but considered works like Vox Populi and Votivae Angliae "peddler's stuff".[4] Tom-Tell-Troth and the now vanished Practice of Princes were another matter as their criticisms of the internal order in England were an incitement to revolution. Calvert claimed that this was the influence of Dutch republicanism but he also saw a Bohemian succession as bringing with it a puritan revolution and the overthrow of episcopacy.[5]

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titled Vox Spiritus, involving the appearance of Raleigh's ghost to Gondomar and a group of Jesuits, appeared in manuscript in late 1621. A contemporary commonplacebook gives the author as a Mr. Gainsford. See Bodl. Rawlinson MS. B. 151, f. 54.

1. It circulated widely in manuscript and was printed in 1622. See MS copy in B.M. Harleian MS. 1220, ff. 69, 72v.

2. This was printed in 1643 but was probably written about 1628 when Calvert again appeared at court or possibly just after 1630. The major internal indication of the date is a reference to the pregnancy of the Queen which occured both in 1628 and 1630. There is also an MS. copy bound with one of Tom-Tell-Troth, PRO S.P. 14/126.

3. (1643 edition), 6-7, 24-25, 30. 4. Ibid., 1. 5. Ibid., 4-6, 23.

Table I: The Dudley Connection

Table II: The House of Nassau

William of Nassau, Prince of Orange (1533-1583)

(1)

Anne of Egmont
(d. 1558)

Philip-William,
count Buren,
Prince of Orange
(d. 1618)

(2)

Anne of Saxony

Maurice,
Prince of
Orange and
Statholder
(d. 1625)

Marie
(d. 1616
m.
Philip, count
Hohenlohe-Neverstein

Emilie
(d. 1605)
m.
Emmanuel, Prince
of Portugal

(3)
1575

Charlotte of Bourbon-Montpensier
(d. 1582)

Emilie-Antwerpina
m. (1616)
Frederick-Casimir,
duke of Landsberg

Catherine-Belge
m. (1596)
Philip-Louis,
count of Hanau

Elizabeth
m. (1595)
Henri, duke
of Bouillon

Louisa-Julianna
m. (1593)
Frederick V,
Elector Palatine
(1574-1610)

Charlotte-Brabantina
m. (1598)
Claude, duke de La
Tremouille (d. 1605)

Flanderina
(converted)
Abbess of
St. Croix de
Poitiers

(4)
1583

Louise de Coligny
(1555-1620)

Frederick-Henry
Prince of Orange and
Statholder
(1625-1647)

Frederick V,
Elector Palatine
(1596-1632)
m. (1613)
Elizabeth,
Princess Royal
(1596-1661)

Louisa-Julianna
m. (1612)
John, duke of
Deux-Ponts
(brother of
Landsberg)

Charlotte
m. (1615)
George William
Elector of
Brandenburg.

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