

**Diplomatic Counsel and the Shaping of
Anglo-Scottish Relations (1558-69): the
British Perspectives of Nicholas
Throckmorton and Thomas Randolph.**

Victoria Smith
Worcester College Oxford

Doctor of Philosophy in History

Short Abstract

This thesis combines debates on the nature of politics and counsel in Elizabeth's first reign with strands of the 'new diplomatic history'. These distinct fields of study intersect on a theme at the heart of this thesis: the importance of socio-political networks at home and abroad to the formation and sustenance of political careers, and individuals' access to channels of counsel that enabled them to exert political influence.

This is a thesis with two clear but intimately related approaches: the first three chapters explore the nature and practices of diplomatic counsel from the perspectives of Nicholas Throckmorton and Thomas Randolph. They examine how well Randolph and Throckmorton's education and experience fitted that of the ideal ambassador outlined in the prescriptive literature, and how their level of socio-political integration into the early Elizabethan regime affected the political influence they were able to exert, the avenues of counselling open to them, and the strategies of counsel they could employ. The final seven chapters then consider how these factors affected their ability to perform their diplomatic roles within the wider framework of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy. It highlights the relationships between diplomats abroad and councillors at the English court, the limits of diplomatic agency, and how diplomats used their privileged access to intelligence and foreign potentates to construct counsel that forwarded their preferred policies.

Focusing on Anglo-Scottish relations from the perspective of the diplomats on the ground rather than Elizabeth and her ministers, this thesis provides fresh insight into the key issues underpinning English policy toward Scotland in the 1560s: the assumption of a British Protestant ideological approach to Anglo-Scottish relations amongst members of the English and Scottish regimes; the contentious issue of Mary, Queen of Scots' place in the English succession; the Darnley marriage; and English responses to Mary's deposition in 1567.

Long Abstract

This thesis reintegrates the political culture of diplomacy with debates on political networks, governance and counsel that lie at the heart of scholarship on the Elizabethan government. Responding to calls from John Guy and Patrick Collinson for a 'socially derived' approach to Tudor politics, historians have turned their attention to the impact of interpersonal relationships, political language and ideologies on the Elizabethan political arena. Examining the informal, socio-political mechanisms of Elizabethan politics has led to a broader conceptualisation of Elizabethan counsel, policy-making and the agents thereof. Simon Adams and Christopher Haigh recognised that Elizabeth preferred to debate key political issues informally with a select group of trusted privy councillors with whom she had personal friendships. For Haigh, this politically influential group also included non-councillors, like Robert Dudley and Thomas Heneage prior to their elevation to the Council. Natalie Mears built upon this to redefine politics within the Elizabethan regime as dynamic and amorphous, centred on the overlapping socio-political networks of the Queen and her leading councillors. She identified a broad base of non-conciliar advisers (those counsellors without an official Privy Council position), including government officials, courtiers and ambassadors previously thought to have been 'denied any major role in power-broking or decision-making'.

Our knowledge of the regularity and extent to which Elizabeth sought and received counsel from non-conciliar counsellors remains limited. Mears labelled them 'ad-hoc' advisers and argued that Elizabeth primarily relied upon the informal counsel of her favourite privy councillors. This thesis will redress this perception by examining the individual factors that determined the extent and consistency with which these advisers were able to wield political influence. Building on the hints in Mears's study that absence from court was not equivalent to political exclusion as previously thought, this thesis will demonstrate that residence abroad

with access to foreign monarchs and their ministers' provided diplomats with both authority to support their counsel and unique opportunities to influence the nature of the diplomatic relationship and their government's policies. Mears's political model drew attention not only to the Queen's collaboration with her advisers but to the collegial, collaborative discussions of policy that occurred between counsellors – a practice already hinted at by Stephen Alford. Emphasising the personal nature of politics, this thesis examines how the relationships and interaction of these two diplomats with their colleagues and the Queen defined their political careers and shaped the formation and implementation of Anglo-Scottish policy during the first crucial decade of Elizabeth's reign. Moreover, it will expand our understanding of the breadth of political collaboration within the regime, and the impact of ideology, in particular that of the *vir civilis*, in conditioning a counsellor's perception of their political role and consequently their political action.

This is a thesis with two clear but intimately related approaches. The first three chapters examine how well the education and experience of two diplomats and extra-conciliar advisers – Nicholas Throckmorton and Thomas Randolph – fitted that of the ideal ambassador, outlined in the works of Jean Hotman, Alberico Gentili et al., their level of integration into the early Elizabethan regime and how this impacted upon the degree of political influence they were able to exert, the avenues of counselling open to them, and the strategies of counsel they were able to employ. The final seven chapters then consider how these factors affected their ability to perform their diplomatic roles within the wider framework of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy. They highlight the relationships between diplomats abroad and councillors at the English court, the limits of diplomatic agency, and how diplomats used their privileged access to intelligence and foreign potentates to construct counsel that forwarded their preferred policies. They also re-examine the two key issues underpinning English policy towards Scotland in the 1560s from the perspective of the diplomats on the ground, rather than the Queen and her leading advisers

at the English court: the assumption of British approaches to Anglo-Scottish relations amongst members of the English and Scottish regimes and, intrinsically connected to this, the contentious issue of Mary, Queen of Scotland's place in the English succession.

This study provides a new lens through which to examine the counselling and policy-making practices of the early Elizabethan polity. Studies of the Elizabethan regime from the perspective of non-conciliar advisers rather than key figures, like Cecil, are rare – Mark Tavinier's thesis on Robert Beale is one notable exception. Yet, these counsellors can offer important insight into the informal, amorphous and intrinsically personal model of politics outlined by Mears. How did their personal relationships – with Elizabeth and her key advisers – impact on their ability to wield political influence as counsellors? How did they enable or impede their involvement in the processes of policy formation and implementation? And what role did relationships with their other colleagues – Mears's 'horizontal' relationships – play in determining their ability to exert political influence? Finally, were these genuine or affected relationships (a facet of what Stephen Greenblatt has called self-fashioning), or a mixture of the two? These questions are at the heart of this thesis.

The relationship between their integration into the informal, collegial and collaborative system of policy-making and counsel and the strategies of counsel they employed will also be considered. I ask how did Throckmorton and Randolph's personal relationships shape their counsel? And, beyond the notion of 'bouncing' into action, what rhetorical strategies and persuasive techniques did diplomatic counsellors use to persuade the Queen and their colleagues of the validity of their advice? Examining these questions helps uncover the reasons behind non-conciliar advisers' varied levels of political engagement. It undermines the homogeneous model of the 'ad-hoc' political influence held by non-conciliar advisers and emphasises the dynamic, individual and consistent nature of the political roles they played. By

more fully exploring the breadth of political collaboration within the regime, this thesis contributes to a more holistic approach to the internal workings of the early Elizabethan government. It emphasises the impact of political culture in conditioning a non-conciliar adviser's perception of their political role and consequently their political action: how did ambassadors' preconceived opinions, ideological commitments and personal experiences impact their perception of, and actions in, their diplomatic role(s)? Moreover, my study of Randolph and Throckmorton's political agency further elucidates Elizabeth's political role and how it was perceived by her political elite.

The activities of Throckmorton and Randolph offer a unique lens through which to explore the development of the British perspective in the 1560s beyond the narrow focus of Stephen Alford's work on William Cecil or Jane Dawson's work on Archibald Campbell, Earl of Argyll. By considering the British approach to Anglo-Scottish relations of Throckmorton, Randolph and their English and Scottish colleagues, this thesis substantially broadens our understanding of how endemic the assumption of British ideas and the development of British policies were within both regimes. This thesis analyses the heady concoction of factors that, from an English perspective, made the idea of a united Britain so attractive in the 1560s: English national security within Europe and the British Isles (strongly influenced by the principles of reason of state); the English succession crisis; and the defence of the Protestant religion. Throckmorton and Randolph demonstrate that for most Elizabethans, Alford's Cecil aside, British ideas and policies were not static entities nor were they developed in isolation, rather they were one component of a constantly evolving response to events in Europe, in particular France, and the British Isles. By analysing how Throckmorton and Randolph's British perspectives evolved in response to events such as Mary's brief Catholic revival in 1565-6, the Conference of Bayonne (1565) and the Duke of Alva's atrocities in the

Netherlands, this thesis highlights that, post-1565, perceptions of Anglo-Scottish relations were increasingly underpinned by the concept that English Protestantism was under siege.

This thesis demonstrates that there was not one British perspective but several, as different individuals prioritised different British issues creating a multiplicity of opinion and policy advice. Broadly speaking there were two competing British policies: one based on a dynastic union between the two monarchies and the other on a political settlement. Alford explored the latter from Cecil's perspective, but the former has received limited attention. Throughout the decade, Throckmorton was a persistent supporter of a combined dynastic union (in all its various forms) and political settlement. Like Cecil, at the heart of Throckmorton's British perspective were provisions for securing the English succession; unlike Cecil, when Mary returned to Scotland a *femme sole* in 1561, Throckmorton was willing to support her conditionally as Elizabeth's heir. Throckmorton shared many of Cecil's concerns about Mary – concluding, like the secretary, in 1569 that Mary was 'the instrument' by which the Catholic powers would destroy Elizabeth and Protestant England – but he favoured a solution that incorporated, rather than excluded, the Scottish Queen. In trying to find an answer to the English succession problem Throckmorton, like Cecil, grappled with the nature of monarchical authority. He suggested in 1560 that Mary's subjects depose her to make a better alliance with England and throughout the decade proposed that Mary's accession to the English throne be dependent upon her agreement to a set of conditions. Throckmorton's British perspective was driven by the principle of reason of state and his unswerving belief that England and Elizabeth's security lay in sealing off the British Isles from European interventions. Throckmorton's approach was at its heart unashamedly Anglocentric: he admitted that he would have sought an alliance with a Catholic Scotland in 1559-60 to secure Elizabeth's borders. On the other hand, Randolph's approach to Anglo-Scottish relations was conditioned by his pan-Protestant, cosmopolitan outlook. Experience of living within multinational Protestant communities and a

commitment to encouraging Protestant co-operation across national boundaries underpinned Randolph's early approach to, and support for, the Scottish Congregation and, later, his perspective on Mary as Queen of Scotland and prospective heir to England.

Dawson, Alford and others have emphasised the emergence of an Anglo-Scottish Protestant culture founded on amity between the two countries in 1559-60. An amity driven by a proliferation of the rhetoric of one island Protestantism, what Dawson has called the Island bastion – the British Isles, or at least the British mainland, geographically demarcated to protect Protestantism by its division from Catholic Europe by the sea. Such an image became ingrained in notions of English national identity: Shakespeare's 'scepter'd isle' from Richard II, for example. However, this thesis demonstrates that throughout Elizabeth's first decade the British relationship was a complex, tenuous one. Beneath the language of love, amity and common religion bubbled competing national priorities and residual traces of the engrained mistrust that had defined the relationship between England and Scotland for centuries. The tenets of new diplomatic history with its emphasis on cultural exchange are important in helping this thesis to expose the interlinked social, political and cultural exchanges between members of the English and Scottish regimes. Randolph, effectively a 'British' ambassador (responsible for handling both Anglo-Scottish relations and Anglo-Scottish-Irish relations), was at the forefront of this interchange for six years when resident at the Scottish court where he formed strong personal relationships with members of Mary's regime and court that affected his perception of English policy towards Scotland.

Both Throckmorton and Randolph's British perspectives were shaped by diplomatic encounters in a way that those of their counterparts in London were not. Randolph was actively involved in 'British' affairs and often operated as an intermediary between the English government in Ireland and Scottish nobles, such as the Earl of Argyll. They encouraged

intellectual exchanges and used them to forward their diplomatic aims. Throckmorton and Randolph collaborated to facilitate the transmission of Protestant texts, such as Theodore Beza's *Orations*, into Scotland and attempted to use them to persuade Mary of the veracity of the Protestant religion. Studying Randolph and Throckmorton's political roles will broaden our understanding of Elizabethans engagement with British ideas and policies, and by building upon the informal, extra-conciliar, collegial model of politics propagated by Mears broaden current understanding of Elizabethan political culture and the nature of Elizabethan political engagement in the first decade of the reign.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for funding my doctoral research and enabling the completion of this thesis. My supervisors, Tracey Sowerby and Susan Doran, have provided expert guidance and support. They have read and commented upon many drafts of this thesis, provided reassurance and encouragement, and have been incredibly understanding and supportive when I have had to pause my doctoral studies. I am grateful for the support of my partner and children, who I know are looking forward to seeing a little more of me. My parents have gone above and beyond to provide encouragement and generous support, stepping in without question to entertain my three children while I work.

This thesis is for my grandad, who inspired my love of history, and my gran, whose indomitable spirit was always an inspiration to me.

Contents

Abbreviations	1
Introduction	5
I. Elizabethan Counsel	6
II. Diplomatic History and Elizabethan Diplomacy	19
III. Anglo-Scottish Relations and the British Perspective	23
IV. Why Throckmorton and Randolph?	28
V. Structure	30
1. Throckmorton and Randolph's Education, Political Experience and Socio-Political Networks at Elizabeth's Accession	31
I. Education	32
i. Randolph	35
ii. Throckmorton	38
II. Political Experience at the Courts of Henry VIII and Edward VI	41
III. Mary's Reign	46
IV. Socio-Political Networks	49
i. English Connections	49
ii. Scottish Connections	54
2. Diplomatic Counsel: Politics, Networks and Political Influence	57
I. The Queen	59
II. Cecil and Leicester	70
3. Ideological Foundations and Rhetorical Strategies in Diplomatic Counsel	86
I. Foundation of Counsel: the Vir Civilis	87
II. Strategies of Counsel	91
i. History and Memory as Exemplar	91
ii. Sententiae	98
4. Throckmorton and Randolph's British Perspectives, 1559-60	105
I. Anglo-Scottish Amity, 1559-60	107
II. Throckmorton's Perspective on the British Isles and Europe	111
III. Randolph's Perspective	125
5. English Intervention in Scotland, 1559-60	135
I. Throckmorton's Influence on the Direction of Anglo-Scottish Relations	136
II. Randolph's Role in Anglo-Scottish Relations (September 1559-July 1560)	148
III. Cultivating the Anglo-Scottish Alliance after the Treaty of Edinburgh	160

6. A Tentative Amity?: Throckmorton and Randolph's Influence in Promoting the Anglo-Scottish Alliance, 1561-4	169
I. Throckmorton and Randolph's Relationship with Mary, her Court and Councillors	171
i. Mary	172
ii. Throckmorton and Randolph's Response to Mary	181
iii. Marian Councillors	183
iv. Mary's Ladies and Female Agency	187
II. Throckmorton and Randolph as Anglo-Scottish Intermediaries	190
i. French Wars of Religion	190
ii. Mary's Catholicism	195
7. The English Succession and Mary's Remarriage	203
I. Succession	203
II. The Leicester Marriage Proposal	212
III. The Darnley Marriage	220
8. 'a Divorce in Amitye': Randolph's Approach to the Breakdown of Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565	232
I. Religion and Resistance to Monarchical Authority	234
II. Randolph's Actions in 1565	242
III. Randolph's Removal from Scotland	249
9. Throckmorton's Embassy to Scotland in 1567: Manipulating the Boundaries of Diplomatic Action and Counsel	260
I. Throckmorton's Exploitation of his Diplomatic Position	262
II. Throckmorton's Manipulative Counsel	267
III. Anglo-French Rivalry and the Importance of James in the English Approach to Scotland in 1567	273
10. Counsel and the 'Court Plot' of 1569	281
I. Motivations for the Marriage	282
II. Throckmorton's Role	286
Conclusion	295
Appendix	305
Bibliography	306

Abbreviations

Add.	British Library, Additional MS.
Advocates	National Library of Scotland, Advocates MS.
Caligula	British Library, Cotton MS, Caligula.
Camden, <i>Elizabeth</i>	W. Camden, <i>History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth</i> (London, 1688).
CP	Cecil Papers, Hatfield House, Marquis of Salisbury.
<i>CPR EVI</i>	<i>Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Edward VI</i> (London, 1926).
<i>CPR P&M</i>	<i>Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Philip and Mary</i> (London, 1937-9).
<i>CSPS</i>	M. Hume (ed.), <i>Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs Preserved Principally in the Archive of Simancas</i> (London, 1892).
<i>EEP</i>	S. Alford, <i>The Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the British Succession Crisis, 1558-1569</i> (Cambridge, 2002).
Egerton	British Library, Egerton MS.
<i>EHR</i>	<i>The English Historical Review.</i>

Forbes, <i>Transactions</i>	P. Forbes (ed.), <i>A full view of the public transactions in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, I</i> (London, 1740).
Foxe, <i>A&M</i>	J. Foxe, <i>Actes and Monuments</i> , https://www.dhi.ac.uk/foxe/ [accessed 13/12/23].
Frescoln, 'Randolph'	K. Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: An Elizabethan in Scotland' (PhD, West Virginia University, 1971).
Galba	British Library, Cotton MS, Galba.
Harley	British Library, Harleian MS.
Hartley, <i>Parliaments</i>	T. Hartley (ed.), <i>Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I, 1558- 1581, I</i> (Leicester, 1981).
HJ	<i>The Historical Journal</i> .
IHR	<i>International History Review</i> .
JBS	<i>The Journal of British Studies</i> .
JEMH	<i>Journal of Early Modern History</i> .
JEMS	<i>Journal of Early Modern Studies</i> .
Julius	British Library, Cotton MS, Julius.
Kellar, <i>Scotland</i>	C. Kellar, <i>Scotland, England, and the Reformation, 1534-61</i> (Oxford, 2003).
Labanoff	A. Labanoff (ed.), <i>Lettres, instructions et mémoires; publ. et accompagnés d'un résumé chronologique par le prince A. Labanoff</i> , 7 vols (London, 1844).

Lansdowne	British Library, Lansdowne MS.
Loughlin, 'Maitland'	M. Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington c.1526-1573' (PhD, University of Edinburgh, 1991).
MacCaffrey, <i>Shaping</i>	W. MacCaffrey, <i>The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, 1558-1572</i> (Chichester, 1968).
Melville, <i>Memoirs</i>	T. Thomson (ed.), <i>Memoirs of his own life by Sir James Melville of Halhill. M.D.XLIX.-M.D.XCIII</i> (Edinburgh, 1827).
NLS	National Library of Scotland.
Parker MS	Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, Parker MS.
Pepys	<i>Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Pepys Manuscripts Preserved at Magdalene College, Cambridge, 70</i> (Hereford, 1911).
PL	Cambridge, Magdalene College, Pepys Library MS.
<i>Queenship</i>	N. Mears, <i>Queenship and Political Discourse in the Elizabethan Realms</i> (Cambridge, 2005).
<i>Relations Politique</i>	A. Teulet (ed.), <i>Relations Politiques de la France et de L'Espagne avec L'Ecosse</i> (Paris, 1862).
SCJ	<i>The Sixteenth Century Journal.</i>

SP

The National Archives, State Papers.

Stowe

British Library, Stowe MS.

ZL

J. Hunter and H. Robinson (eds.), *The Zurich Letters* (Cambridge, 1845).

Introduction

In October 1560, William Cecil wrote to Nicholas Throckmorton, English ambassador to France, despairing that Elizabeth desired to marry Robert Dudley (future Earl of Leicester)¹, and asking Throckmorton to ‘wryte to hyr majestie to move the same for order to be takyne yn the better dyspatche off hyr affayrs’.² This alone suggests the political influence Cecil ascribed to his diplomatic colleague; but Throckmorton’s response proves the point. First, he attempted to orchestrate opposition to the match more broadly, writing to his cousins on Elizabeth’s Privy Council to persuade them not to support the marriage, and encouraging his fellow ambassador in Spain, Thomas Chamberlain, to write to remind the Queen of the wider significance of her marriage.³ Second, he sent his servant Robert Jones to England with a private verbal message for the Queen that Mary, Queen of Scotland and France – and Elizabeth’s rival for the English throne – had publicly sneered at Elizabeth’s wish to marry the keeper of her horses. Elizabeth was furious, Throckmorton was disgraced, but the message had the desired effect: Elizabeth’s ardour was temporarily dampened. She took a knife to a proposal for Leicester’s elevation to the peerage and by December Leicester was in ‘more feare than hope’.⁴

This incident highlights the key theme of this thesis: diplomatic counsel. It suggests that absence from court was not the inhibitor for political engagement it has often been seen to be.⁵ Rather, it emphasises diplomatic agency and demonstrates that ambassadors who had important socio-political connections and access to foreign intelligence had the power and ability to

¹ Hereafter referred to as Leicester (created 1564).

² SP70/19, fo. 130r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 28 October 1560.

³ SP70/20, fo. 40r, Throckmorton to Northampton and Pembroke, 17 November 1560; SP70/19, fo. 132r-v, Throckmorton to Chamberlain, 29 October 1560; SP70/21, fo. 31r, Chamberlain to Elizabeth, 7 December 1560.

⁴ SP70/21, fo. 117r, Cecil to Throckmorton, 30 December 1560.

⁵ For instance, C. Haigh, *Elizabeth I* (Abingdon, 2013), p. 92.

influence policy at home. Diplomats clearly participated in the collegial and collaborative processes of counselling and shaping policy within the regime.

This thesis contributes to two areas of historiographical development: debates on the nature of politics and counsel in Elizabeth's early reign and the newly revitalised diplomatic history. Within these distinct fields of study there is a key area of overlap that lies at the heart of this thesis: the importance of socio-political networks to the formation and sustenance of political careers, in other words the relationship between diplomats' networks at home and abroad and their access to channels of counsel that enabled them to exert political influence at the English court. It seeks to understand how these factors played out in Throckmorton and Thomas Randolph's Anglo-Scottish diplomacy and to shed new light on key episodes of Anglo-Scottish relations during the 1560s, by examining relations between the two countries through the eyes of the men on the ground, who were intimately acquainted with Mary and her leading councillors.

I. Elizabethan Counsel

In the first decade of Elizabeth's reign 'counsel' was a term that was used interchangeably for the deliberative process of giving advice and the Privy Council as an institution.⁶ Thus, the word 'counsellor' had an equally broad application. It was used to refer to the monarch's privy councillors, but it could also be applied to other individuals who offered 'counsel' to the monarch. Thomas Elyot had considered the *amici principis*, generally the nobility, to be the monarch's natural counsellors, while John Hooker termed Members of Parliament 'counsellors' as they were called to give advice. Some ambassadors, who were not also privy councillors, were designated a 'counsellor' to enhance their diplomatic credentials; and, as

⁶ J. Guy, 'The Rhetoric of Counsel in Tudor England', in D. Hoak (ed.), *Tudor Political Culture* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 293.

Helen Graham-Matheson has shown, the term could even be modified to ‘Counseilleresses’ and applied to Ladies of the Privy Chamber.⁷ The broad remit of the term reflects the multiplicity of counselling forms within Elizabethan England. For alongside counsel given in the formal institutions of Privy Council and Parliament, and the more informal setting of the court, lay unofficial, and unsolicited, counsel offered through a variety of mediums including plays, sermons at court, and published pamphlets.⁸ In line with modern commentators this thesis takes ‘councillor’ to denote a member of the Privy Council and ‘counsellor’ to mean non-conciliar adviser.

The concept of counsel within historiographical debate has focused on two elements: the structure of counsel and the discourse of counsel. The former provoked a long-running debate that hinged on whether the Privy Council or the court was the main forum for advice-giving in Tudor England.⁹ The latter centred on the political ideologies, political language and linguistic nuances behind counsellors’ conceptualisation of their duty within the Elizabethan regime and the English commonwealth.¹⁰ A desire to marry structure and discourse lay behind John Guy’s call, decades ago, for a new approach to Tudor politics that focused on ‘the interrelationships

⁷ F. Conrad, ‘The Problem of Counsel Reconsidered: The Case of Sir Thomas Elyot’, in T. Mayer and P. Fidler (eds.), *Political Thought and the Tudor Commonwealth* (London, 1992), pp 77-110; *Holinshed’s Chronicles*, http://www.english.ox.ac.uk/Holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_0541 [accessed 18/02/15]; H. Graham-Matheson, ‘Petticoats and Politics: Elisabeth Parr and Female Agency at the Early Elizabethan Court’, in N. Akkerman and B. Houben (eds.), *The Politics of Female Households: Ladies-in-Waiting Across Early Modern Europe* (Boston, 2014), p. 33.

⁸ P. McCullough, *Sermons at Court: Politics and Religion in Elizabethan and Jacobean Preaching* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 51-99; N. Mears, ‘Counsel, Public Debate, and Queenship John Stubbs’s ‘The Discoverie of a Gaping Gulf’, 1579’, *HJ*, 44 (2001), 629-650; P. Kewes, ‘“Jerusalem thou dydst promyse to buylde up”: Kingship, Counsel and Early Elizabethan Drama’, in J. Rose (ed.), *The Politics of Counsel in England and Scotland, 1286-1707* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 171-192; P. Kewes, ‘“Plesures in lernyng” and the Politics of Counsel in Early Elizabethan England: Royal Visits to Cambridge and Oxford’, *English Literary Renaissance*, 46 (2016), 333-75.

⁹ G. R. Elton, *The Tudor Revolution in Government* (Cambridge, 1953); D. Starkey, ‘Court and Government’, in C. Coleman and D. Starkey (eds.), *Revolution Reassessed: Revisions in the History of Tudor Government and Administration* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 29–58; G. R. Elton, ‘Tudor Government’, and David Starkey, ‘A Reply: Tudor Government: the Facts?’, *HJ*, 31 (1988), 425–34 and 921–31.

¹⁰ Hoak (ed.), *Political Culture*; P. Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays* (London, 1994), pp. 31-58; J. McDiarmid (ed.), *The Monarchical Republic of Early Modern England: Essays in Response to Patrick Collinson* (Aldershot, 2007); S. Alford ‘From Estate to State, Subject to Citizen? Some Later Tudor Vocabularies’, *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 15 (2002), 86-88.

of, and interactions between, people, institutions, and ideas'.¹¹ Similar sentiments were voiced shortly afterwards by Patrick Collinson, who pleaded for a 'new political history' centred on the social and ideological dimensions to Tudor politics.¹² For the 1560s, the importance of these ideas have been flagged in Norman Jones and Stephen Alford's works on Cecil and the shared ideological assumptions that bound together many members of the early Elizabethan regime which derived from their shared experiences at Cambridge and during Edward VI's reign.¹³ Within this thesis, the relationship between the structure and discourse of politics is crucial for understanding the ability of diplomats to wield political influence and act as counsellors to Elizabeth and her principal advisers.

Diplomats as counsellors has not been a topic of consideration for scholars of Elizabethan government, who have typically seen absence from court as an inhibitor to political influence. Counsel is usually portrayed as taking place primarily within the confines of the Council or the court (although there remains contention about which was pre-eminent), with those individuals absent from court considered to be 'politically crippled' and unable to influence political affairs.¹⁴ Diplomatic roles however were often part of an individual's broader engagement in government with some diplomats, like Francis Walsingham or Thomas Smith, going on to become privy councillors.¹⁵ While Throckmorton and Randolph never made it to the Council table, they were able to wield varying degrees of political influence and act as advisers to Elizabeth and her councillors. To understand the nature of their political engagement we need

¹¹ J. Guy, 'Introduction', in J. Guy (ed.), *The Tudor Monarchy* (London, 1997), pp. 1-8.

¹² Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays*, pp. 11, 14-27.

¹³ N. Jones, *Governing by Virtue: Lord Burghley and the Management of Elizabethan England* (Oxford, 2015), pp. 2-3; N. Jones, 'The Cambridge Connection and the Shaping of the Elizabethan State', in J. McDiarmid and S. Wabuda (eds.), *The Cambridge Connection in Tudor England* (Leiden, 2021), pp. 252-265; *EEP*, pp. 9-28; S. Alford, *Kingship and Politics in the Reign of Edward VI* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 175-207; A. McLaren, *Political Culture in the Reign of Elizabeth I: Queen and Commonwealth, 1558-1585* (Cambridge, 2000).

¹⁴ Haigh, *Elizabeth*, p. 92.

¹⁵ E. Williamson, *Elizabethan Diplomacy and Epistolary Culture* (London, 2021), pp. 7, 19-20.

to look more broadly at extra-conciliar counselling practices within the regime and the interpersonal socio-political relationships that underpinned them.

David Starkey first explored the politics of intimacy and the ability it offered to provide advice in his work on Henry VIII's Privy Chamber, whose members' personal access to the king enabled them to exert political influence.¹⁶ This was evidently more complicated under a female monarch (albeit the Ladies of the Privy Chamber have been shown to have exercised some influence through this means) as male access was necessarily more limited but the principles of access and personal connection nevertheless remained invaluable to exerting political influence. However, considerations of extra-conciliar counselling (counsel that takes place outside the Council) are limited. Mary Tudor is noted to have sought the advice of non-councillors.¹⁷ For Elizabeth's reign the notion of extra-conciliar counselling has taken a backseat. Its consideration has, primarily, been court-centric and focused on Elizabeth's favourites – many of whom were either already councillors or would eventually make it to the Council table. Moreover, it has often been posited as antithetical to the advisory role of the Council and focused on undermining this rather than enhancing our understanding of the informal, collaborative nature of policy debate and counsel.

Mears used the notion of extra-conciliar advisers to forward a vision of Elizabethan politics that was court based and Queen-centric, arguing that debates on policy happened outside the confines of the Council chamber and was generally the remit of 'probouleutic' groups of councillors selected by the Queen.¹⁸ Conversely, Crankshaw suggested that these 'probouleutic' groups represented privy councillors taking an active advisory role, as he

¹⁶ D. Starkey, 'Representation through Intimacy', in Guy (ed.), *Tudor Monarchy*, pp. 187-224; Starkey, 'Court and Government'; D. Starkey, 'Intimacy and Innovation: The Rise of the Privy Chamber, 1485-1547', in D. Starkey (ed.), *The English Court: from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War* (New York, 1987), pp. 71-118.

¹⁷ N. Mears, 'The Council', in S. Doran and N. Jones (eds.), *The Elizabethan World* (Abingdon, 2011), pp. 66-7.

¹⁸ Mears, 'Council', pp. 59-75; *Queenship*, pp. 12-144.

considered them to be akin to Council committees and thus a contingent of the Council.¹⁹ On the other hand, Simon Adams and Christopher Haigh argued that the personal nature of counselling and policy-making limited the Council's power as an advisory body, for 'policy was made by the Queen in consultation with her intimates': an 'inner ring' of privy councillors, like Cecil, Leicester and Walsingham, with whom she had developed a personal friendship.²⁰ Guy acknowledged the political significance of informal policy discussions between monarchs and their councillors and courtiers over official conciliar debates.²¹ More recently, Susan Doran argued that Elizabeth sought advice from non-councillors in order to broaden her base of advice and understand particular issues by taking counsel from men with expertise in the area; however, she notes that most of those individuals giving advice became councillors soon after.²²

Identification of Elizabeth taking counsel from her councillors in informal, court-based sessions has encouraged a broader understanding of Elizabethan counselling practices, policy-making and the agents thereof. Some historians observed that Elizabeth practised an informal, consultative model of counsel not only with her favourite privy councillors, but also with her closest friends. Haigh pointed to the obvious, though atypical, influence of Leicester and how Elizabeth sought the advice of Thomas Heneage, Treasurer of the Chamber, before either was elevated to the Privy Council.²³ Crankshaw further showed the multiple extra-conciliar channels through which counsel could be informally solicited and delivered.²⁴ Moving the

¹⁹ D. Crankshaw, 'The Tudor Privy Council, c. 1540-1603', *State Papers Online*, <https://www.gale.com/intl/essays/david-j-crankshaw-tudor-privy-council-c-1540%E2%80%931603> [accessed 02/04/15].

²⁰ S. Adams, 'Faction, Clientage and Party: English politics, 1550 -1603', in S. Adams (ed.), *Leicester and the Court*, (Manchester, 2002), p. 18; S. Adams, 'Eliza Enthroned? The Court and its Politics', in C. Haigh (ed.), *The Reign of Elizabeth I* (Basingstoke, 1984), p. 63; Haigh, *Elizabeth*, pp. 101-2.

²¹ Guy, 'Introduction'.

²² S. Doran 'Elizabeth I and Counsel', in Rose (ed.), *Politics of Counsel*, p. 166.

²³ Haigh, *Elizabeth*, pp. 85-97; Adams, 'Eliza Enthroned?', pp. 63-65; *Queenship*, pp. 39-40, 48; S. Doran, *Elizabeth I & Her Circle* (Oxford, 2015), p. 151 also highlights the significance of these relationships.

²⁴ Crankshaw, 'Council'.

notion of extra-conciliar counselling away from select groups of privy councillors or favourites to focus on advisers who never had conciliar positions has been more deeply explored by Mears, whose picture of a dynamic and amorphous Elizabethan political system remains the most comprehensive assessment of informal counselling practices to date.

That Mears' work is now nearly twenty years old suggests the need to explore more deeply the role played by informal, non-conciliar advisers (like Throckmorton and Randolph) in counselling and policy debate within the regime. Mears argued that the informal, consultative model of counsel that Haigh recognised Elizabeth used with her favoured privy councillors and courtiers was part of a more widespread phenomenon that included non-conciliar advisers and centred not upon an individual's official position but their personal relationship with the Queen.²⁵ Mears's non-conciliar advisers included a broader base of government officials and courtiers previously thought to have been 'denied any major role in power-broking or decision-making', for example the Ladies of the Privy Chamber and ambassadors absent abroad.²⁶ While the former have received considerable attention in recent years, most notably in Graham-Matheson's work, the influence of ambassadors remains largely unexplored.²⁷ Mears's inclusion of ambassadors was important as it presented a move away from the notion that political influence was confined to the court and 'those not at Court were politically crippled'.²⁸ Similarly, Alford briefly pointed to the political influence of individuals, including diplomats who operated outside the confines of the court and he hinted at their involvement in the collaborative and collegial style of policy debate and counselling that he identified within the

²⁵ *Queenship*, p. 259.

²⁶ W. MacCaffrey, *Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572-1588* (New Jersey, 1981), pp. 425-6; *Queenship*, pp. 40-66.

²⁷ Graham-Matheson, 'Petticoats and Politics'; H. Graham-Matheson, "All wemen in thar degree shuld to thar men subiectit be": The controversial court career of Elisabeth Parr, marchioness of Northampton, c. 1547-1565", (PhD, UCL, 2013); N. Mears, 'Politics in the Elizabethan Privy Chamber: Lady Mary Sidney and Kat Ashley', in J. Daybell (ed.), *Women and Politics in Early Modern England, 1450-1700* (Aldershot, 2004), pp. 67-82; P. Wright, 'A Change in Direction: The Ramifications of a Female Household, 1558-1603', in Starkey (ed.), *English Court*, pp. 147-72.

²⁸ Haigh, *Elizabeth*, p. 92.

early Elizabethan regime.²⁹ Mears's extra-conciliar advisers were a testament to the personal, social nature of politics. Elizabeth sought their advice both collectively and individually alongside that of her favoured privy councillors because of their personal relationships to her and/or her leading councillors.³⁰

This emphasis on a more wide-ranging model of political influence, counselling and policy-making that derived from an individual's personal relationship with the monarch – reflected in contemporaries' humanistically-inflected theories of counsel, such as Elyot's *amici principis* or *consilium amicorum* – is an important step forward.³¹ Nevertheless, there is much work still to be done on informal, extra-conciliar, counselling practices and the role of non-conciliar advisers. Studies that examine the role played by non-conciliar advisers within the Elizabethan political system remain few and far between. Existing studies tend to focus on individuals who would later be elevated to the Privy Council, such as Rivkah Zim on Thomas Sackville or Doran on several key figures around Elizabeth.³² Non-conciliar advisers have received considerably less attention: in recent years only Mark Taviner's study of Robert Beale has supplemented much older biographic narrative studies, such as Amos Miller's biography of Henry Killigrew.³³ Yet, these individuals are crucially important if we are to fully understand the internal workings of the Elizabethan regime. This dearth of studies on non-conciliar advisers reflects a broader problem within early Elizabethan studies: there is little on the political engagement of key players, including many of Elizabeth's councillors and even the Earl of Leicester. Indeed, the regime still tends to be viewed through Cecil's lens, whose mammoth archive has lent itself to a wealth of studies. This thesis offers a new perspective by

²⁹ *EEP*, pp. 30-1, 52-3, 98-99.

³⁰ *Queenship*, pp. 40-66.

³¹ Conrad, 'Counsel Reconsidered', pp. 78-81; *Queenship*, p. 84.

³² R. Zim, 'Religion and the Politic Counsellor: Thomas Sackville, 1536-1608', *EHR*, 122 (2007), 892-917; Doran, 'Counsel', p. 166; Doran, *Circle*.

³³ M. Taviner, 'Robert Beale and the Elizabethan Polity' (PhD, St Andrews, 2000); A. Miller, *Sir Henry Killigrew: Elizabethan Soldier and Diplomat* (Leicester, 1963).

considering Throckmorton and Randolph's political roles; but, if we are to truly understand the inner workings of the early Elizabethan regime, we need to go much further.

Whilst Mears and Alford have briefly hinted at diplomats' involvement in the collaborative processes of policy debating and counselling, there are no in-depth studies. This thesis fills a gap and negates the notion that counsellors had to be present at court by demonstrating Throckmorton and Randolph's ability to counsel effectively from abroad. Their form of counsel furthers the move away from an adversarial model of politics with counsellors pitted against one another or the Queen and extends our understanding of the collaborative nature of these working relationships. This thesis not only emphasises the import of such counsellors but explores from whence their influence derived, highlighting the importance of political intimacy, socio-political connections, and shared ideological and experiential backgrounds.

Mears's focus on Elizabeth clouds our ability to understand how the informal processes of counsel worked alongside the more institutional model of Council – how privy councillors and their non-conciliar colleagues collaborated on policies. An in-depth investigation is needed to see how pervasive the collegial methods of policy debate and counsel were within the early Elizabethan regime, how they worked, who participated and how successful they were. Moving beyond looking merely at counselling the Queen this thesis considers the political influence non-conciliar advisers could attain through their relationships with her principal privy councillors and offers insights into the largely unexplored collaborative nature of policy debate and counselling between councillors and non-councillors. Counsel was not something reserved for the Queen. Her councillors and counsellors also took advice from those around them, their friends, colleagues, and other government officials. By highlighting how the men that made up the Elizabethan regime connected with one another – their shared backgrounds, experiences (or lack thereof) – and how this affected their position and influence, this thesis leads to our

greater understanding of who could counsel effectively and their strategies of persuasion. This is why a comparative study is essential: it is only through comparison that we can understand the variety of political experiences, and the different reasons for an individual's ability to wield political influence and act in an advisory capacity. This comparative study of Throckmorton, an ambassador, and Randolph, an agent and later an ambassador, enables a consideration of the impact of different diplomatic standings on political influence within the regime.

Taking as its focus two diplomats this study provides a new lens through which to examine the role of such non-conciliar advisers within the Elizabethan regime. It engages with some of the important questions about the socio-political nature of Elizabethan politics raised by Mears's work. Could, for example, diplomatic non-conciliar advisers, with in-depth experiences of a particular diplomatic relationship, be more influential in some circumstances than a privy councillor?³⁴ How did their personal relationships – with Elizabeth and her key advisers – enable or impede their ability to counsel and engage in the processes of policy formulation and implementation? Beyond the notion of 'bouncing' into action, what rhetorical strategies and persuasive techniques did counsellors use to persuade the Queen and one another of the validity of their advice? Were these genuine or affected relationships (a facet of what Stephen Greenblatt has called self-fashioning), or a mixture of the two?³⁵ Finally, this thesis explores the regularity and extent to which Elizabeth and her councillors sought and received extra-conciliar counsel: were they really 'ad-hoc' advisers, as Mears labels them, and, if so, why?³⁶ Examining these questions will help uncover the reasons behind non-conciliar advisers' varied levels of political engagement. It emphasises the individual nature of the political roles non-conciliar advisers played. Equally, it more fully explores the breadth of political collaboration within the regime, and the impact of ideology, particularly the *vir civilis*, in conditioning extra-

³⁴ Mears notes that Randolph's advice overruled that of Walsingham in 1581, *Queenship*, p. 43.

³⁵ S. Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago, 2005).

³⁶ *Queenship*, p. 40.

conciliar advisers' perceptions of their political role and consequently their political action. Finally, studying what shaped these two diplomats' political agency through the lens of their extant papers can also help elucidate Elizabeth's political role and how it was perceived by her counsellors.

The extent of Elizabeth's political authority has been a contentious issue. Questions about how Elizabethans perceived their Queen's authority have combined with analyses of how contemporaries' assumptions and beliefs about their political role vis-à-vis that of the Queen impacted upon their political behaviour.³⁷ Collinson's monarchical republic and the idea that Elizabeth's councillors adopted quasi-republican political outlooks has proved popular but is not uncontested.³⁸ The basis of Collinson's claim – Cecil's plan to settle the succession via conciliar examinations of the claims in the event Elizabeth died without naming an heir – has been portrayed as both revolutionary and following historical precedents for monarchical election.³⁹ Doran and Kewes have rightly argued that Cecil's plan was an emergency measure that derived from fear at the possibility of being left without the unifying presence of a legitimate monarchical figurehead rather than a desire to appropriate or limit monarchical authority.⁴⁰ Even Collinson himself later recognised that Cecil took this approach because 'the integrity, security and very being of the state required an uncontested monarch'.⁴¹ The later chapters of this thesis engage with these themes, helping to contextualise Cecil's plan by

³⁷ Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays*, pp. 1-58; McLaren, *Political Culture*; P. Collinson, 'Servants and Citizens: Robert Beale and other Elizabethans', *Historical Research*, 29 (2006).

³⁸ J. McDiarmid (ed.), *Monarchical Republic; EEP*; McLaren, *Political Culture*; M. Peltonen, *Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570–1640* (Cambridge, 1995); *Queenship*, pp. 1-144; S. Doran and P. Kewes, 'Introduction', in S. Doran and P. Kewes (eds.), *Doubtful and Dangerous: The Question of Succession in Late Elizabethan England* (Manchester, 2014), p. 14; Jones, *Governing*, pp. 11-26; P. Lake, 'The "Political Thought" of the "Monarchical Republic of Elizabeth I"', *Discovered and Anatomised*, *JBS*, 54/2 (2015), 257-287.

³⁹ Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays*, pp. 31-58; *EEP*, pp. 111-115; S. Alford, 'A Politics of Emergency in the Reign of Elizabeth I', in G. Burgess and M. Festenstein (eds.), *English Radicalism, 1550–1850* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 26-8; S. Doran and P. Kewes, 'The earlier Elizabethan Succession Question Revisited', in Doran and Kewes (ed.), *Doubtful and Dangerous*, p. 25.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ P. Collinson, *This England: Essays on the English Nation and Commonwealth in the Sixteenth Century* (Manchester, 2011), p. 67.

examining the approaches of Throckmorton and Randolph to both the succession question and the right to limit monarchical authority to protect the Protestant state, whether in England or Scotland.

The notion that the Queen and her councillors ‘subscribed to discordant political philosophies’ has led to a redefinition of the adversarial model of early Elizabethan politics.⁴² Rather than focusing on factional conflicts between councillors, many historians have emphasised a homogenous social, political and cultural outlook amongst Elizabeth’s early councillors that resulted in a model of politics where councillors united in a struggle over policy with the Queen.⁴³ In this model, Elizabeth’s early reign was marked by political conflict between a vacillating, imperially-minded Queen and her male councillors who, perceiving themselves to be *vir civilis* and key policy-makers within the ‘mixed monarchy’, sought to restrict her political autonomy and ‘bounce’ her into carrying out their preferred policies.⁴⁴ The key areas of contention related to the declaration of a successor and the fate of Mary, Queen of Scots, that Elizabeth believed fell under *arcana imperii* but her advisors viewed as critical to the security of the English commonwealth and thus matters on which they were duty bound to give counsel. Such ideological tensions were underpinned by the inherent tension between the concepts of counsel and command, and the competition between the two for relevance and authority that Joanne Paul has recently explored.⁴⁵

⁴² J. Guy, ‘The 1590s: the Second Reign of Elizabeth I?’, in J. Guy (ed.), *The Reign of Elizabeth I, Court and Culture in the Last Decade* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 13.

⁴³ Adams, ‘Eliza Enthroned?’, p. 24.

⁴⁴ See for example, *EEP*; McLaren, *Political Culture*, pp. 84-113; J. Guy, ‘Tudor Monarchy and its Critiques’, in Guy (ed.), *Tudor Monarchy*, pp. 93-100; for the effect of the issues of gender and female rule on this see A. McLaren, ‘The Quest for a King: Gender, Marriage and Succession in Elizabethan England’, *JBS*, 41 (2002); M. Thomas Crane, ‘“Video et Taceo”: Elizabeth I and the Rhetoric of Counsel’, *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900*, 28 (1988), 1-15; M. Hill Cole, *The Portable Queen: Elizabeth I and the Politics of Ceremony* (Massachusetts, 1999), pp. 36-40.

⁴⁵ J. Paul, *Counsel and Command in Early Modern English Thought* (Cambridge, 2020).

The extent of these tensions and their impact on the everyday operation of counselling and policy negotiation within the regime requires further analysis. Doran argued that Elizabeth's expressed opinions about counsel did not differ fundamentally from those of her privy councillors, suggesting instead that disagreements, when they occurred, tended to focus on councillors' personal interpretation of the Queen's application of these principles to a particular political circumstance.⁴⁶ Furthermore, Peter Lake has demonstrated that Elizabeth's counsellors' adherence to principles of 'mixed monarchy' was not wholesale and its opponents articulated increasingly 'imperial' models of monarchical government as the reign progressed.⁴⁷ Indeed, an adversarial model of politics requires an unprecedented degree of political unity amongst Elizabethan counsellors that is difficult to uncover. Doran has observed that political divisions in the Council either forced the Queen to choose a side or, more commonly, led to delays in deciding upon policy; she has moreover shown that counsellors were divided amongst themselves on whether the succession should be settled, and that those who agreed in principle could not agree on particulars.⁴⁸ Even Adams and Alford have acknowledged that counsellors frequently disagreed over the direction and implementation of policy.⁴⁹

In recent years, this adversarial approach to Elizabethan politics has been criticised for ruling the Queen out of active governance and belittling her political authority. Alford claimed that Elizabeth was held at a remove from the process of policy negotiation altogether as Cecil took upon himself 'the authority of England' and 'effectively bypassed' the Queen.⁵⁰ Conversely, Mears dedicated half a book to illustrating Elizabeth's centrality to the processes of policy-

⁴⁶ Doran, 'Counsel', pp. 153, 165-6, 169-170.

⁴⁷ P. Lake, "'The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I' (and the Fall of Archbishop Grindal) Revisited', in McDiarmid (ed.), *Monarchical Republic*, pp. 129-48.

⁴⁸ Doran, 'Counsel', p. 165; S. Doran, 'Queen Elizabeth I: Monarchical Leadership in Action', in P. Kaufman, *Leadership and Elizabethan Culture* (New York, 2013), p. 8.

⁴⁹ Adams, 'Faction', p. 18; S. Adams, 'Favourites and Factions at the Elizabethan Court', in Adams (ed.), *Leicester and the Court*, p. 59; *EEP*, p. 29.

⁵⁰ *EEP*, p. 57.

making, arguing that while councillors might find the Queen's unwillingness to accept their advice frustrating, they adopted a deferential approach to counselling (accepting that Elizabeth was not bound to follow their advice).⁵¹ Yet, when considered, the concept of councillors trying to 'bounce' Elizabeth into action actually demonstrates their acceptance of Elizabeth's ultimate authority to make political decisions. This conclusion is reflected in Doran's argument that councillors' attempts to control the intelligence and advice Elizabeth received was a product of the fact that the Queen ultimately decided upon policy.⁵² Doran portrays an amenable working relationship between Elizabeth and her advisers, arguing that frustrations tended to be voiced by individual councillors when Elizabeth would not take their advice rather than the Council as a whole.⁵³ Similarly, Rayne Allinson has depicted Cecil and Elizabeth sharing a congenial, collaborative relationship.⁵⁴ Other historians, rather than contending the issue, have simply chosen to take Elizabeth's political involvement as indisputable.⁵⁵

Elizabeth's active role and the ways in which individuals responded with persuasive counsel to influence policy is a key facet of this thesis. It also supports the idea that while tensions existed within the regime, they were more complex than a static framework of councillors versus the Queen, or each other, can convey; for such points of tension were ever-changing in response to shifting political circumstances. As a result, this thesis emphasises both the primacy of congenial everyday working relations between the Queen and her advisers, and the frequent division of opinion amongst councillors, who were just as susceptible as the Queen to attempts to 'bounce' them into favouring a course of action by their colleagues in the Council, court and on embassy abroad.

⁵¹ *Queenship*, pp. 1-44, esp. 93-4.

⁵² Doran, 'Queen Elizabeth', p. 8.

⁵³ Doran, 'Counsel', pp. 165-6.

⁵⁴ R. Allinson, *A Monarchy of Letters: Royal Correspondence and English Diplomacy in the Reign of Elizabeth I* (New York, 2012), p. 51.

⁵⁵ D. Trim, 'Seeking a Protestant Alliance and Liberty of Conscience on the Continent, 1558-85', in G. Richardson and S. Doran (eds.), *Tudor England and its Neighbours* (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 139-177.

II. Diplomatic History and Elizabethan Diplomacy

There has been a marked shift in the approach to diplomatic history in the past fifteen years, with a stronger focus on multidisciplinary approaches, the cultures and practices of diplomacy and the agency of diplomatic actors.⁵⁶ Of particular importance to this thesis is the socio-political practice of diplomacy: the role of personal networks in diplomacy, information gathering and the transmission of intelligence, and diplomatic epistolary practices. Tracey Sowerby argued that diplomatic service was ‘both a political and a social activity’; others, such as Catherine Fletcher, have underscored the point by highlighting the importance of political patronage and client networks to the establishment of successful diplomatic careers.⁵⁷

By integrating aspects of the socio-political culture of diplomacy – the skills and experience required of diplomats, their political agency and the impact of political networks on diplomatic practice – with debates on Elizabethan politics and counsel, this thesis provides a more holistic view of Throckmorton and Randolph’s diplomatic experiences and early modern diplomatic practices. Chapters one and two develop our understanding of how a diplomat’s socio-political networks at home and abroad shaped his political career, and how such relationships could shape the way in which he gathered and transmitted intelligence and engaged in the formulation of policy. Chapter three demonstrates the impact of these relationships on the composition and transmission of diplomatic letters. Broader interest in letter-writing has impacted upon diplomatic studies with historians drawing attention to the rhetoric, construction, circulation,

⁵⁶ For developments in the field see T. Sowerby, ‘Early Modern Diplomatic History’, *History Compass*, 14 (2016), 441-456.

⁵⁷ T. Sowerby, *Renaissance and Reform in Tudor England: The Careers of Sir Richard Morison, c.1513-1556* (Oxford, 2010), p. 190; J. DeSilva and C. Fletcher, ‘Italian Ambassadorial Networks in Early Modern Europe’, *JEMH*, 14/6 (2010), 505-12; J. DeSilva, ‘Official and Unofficial Diplomacy between Rome and Bologna’, *JEMH*, 14/6 (2010), 535-557; D. Carrió-Invernizzi, ‘A New Diplomatic History and the Networks of Spanish Diplomacy in the Baroque Era’, *IHR*, 36/4 (2014), 603-618.

and intended audience of diplomatic letters.⁵⁸ Gabriella Mazzon's consideration of Thomas Bodley's letters and Susan Fitzmaurice's broader consideration of Elizabethan diplomatic letter-writing simply analyse the basic structure of diplomatic letters, whereas this thesis considers Throckmorton and Randolph's use of rhetorical tropes and argumentative strategies.⁵⁹ Likewise, Williamson's work on diplomatic letter-writing focuses primarily on the afterlife of diplomatic correspondence rather than the counselling strategies employed in the letters themselves.⁶⁰ Yet, as chapter three discusses, letters were an ambassador's chief means of political persuasion when dealing with their colleagues and the Queen. Their letters stood in place of their absent selves and were the diplomat's primary mode of counsel; as a result, they give insight into their strategies of counsel that may also have been employed in verbal counsel which, as Jacqueline Rose noted, is 'frequently irrecoverable'.⁶¹

This thesis will also engage with the stereotype of the perfect ambassador. Like Castiglione for courtiers or Elyot for governors, literary guides for diplomats underscored the political and cultural expectations of what qualities and education the ideal ambassador should possess.⁶² Chapter one of this thesis will consider how well Randolph and Throckmorton (two men with very different backgrounds, education and temperaments), fitted the ideal mould.

The newly revitalised diplomatic history has focused primarily on European diplomacy. In contrast, this thesis focuses on the comparatively underexplored topic of Anglo-Scottish

⁵⁸ P. Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge, 2002); Williamson, *Elizabethan Diplomacy*; C. Bajetta, G. Coatalen and J. Gibson (eds.), *Elizabeth I's Foreign Correspondence: Letters, Rhetoric and Politics* (New York, 2014).

⁵⁹ G. Mazzon, 'The Pragmatics of Sir Thomas Bodley's Diplomatic Correspondence', *JEMS*, 3 (2014), 117-131; S. Fitzmaurice, 'Diplomatic Business: Information, Power, and Persuasion in Late Modern English Diplomatic Correspondence', in M. Dossena and S. Fitzmaurice (eds.), *Business and Official Correspondence: Historical Investigations* (Bern, 2006), pp. 77-106.

⁶⁰ Williamson, *Elizabethan Diplomacy*.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-9; Rose, 'Political Counsel', p. 10.

⁶² B. Castiglione, *The Courtyer of Count Baldessar Castilio* trans. T. Hoby (London, 1561); T. Elyot, *The Boke Named the Governour* (London, 1537); D. Frigo, 'Prudence and Experience: Ambassadors and Political Culture in Early Modern Italy', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 38 (2008), 15-34.

diplomacy. As a result, it will clarify whether the diplomatic experience at the Scottish court was unique, as Matthew Anderson claimed.⁶³ Many of the tenets of the ‘new diplomatic history’, now common in European studies, have not been integrated into the study of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy. There has been limited interest in the political culture of Elizabethan diplomacy or the issues central to this thesis. Broad studies on the nature and structure of Elizabethan diplomacy, in particular Jeffrey Platt’s article and Gary Bell’s corpus of works, predate the revitalisation of diplomatic history. Thus, Bell and Platt were interested in the ‘foreign office’ and diplomatic corps, but paid insufficient attention to how integrated their subjects were in the regime.⁶⁴ Sowerby has considered the importance of Elizabethan diplomatic networks in light of the role played by ambassadors in disseminating news and information, and as part of broader work on the significance of the ‘Cambridge Connection’ in Elizabethan England.⁶⁵ This presents important groundwork for this thesis’s narrower focus on diplomats’ political patronage networks in court, Council and at their host courts in enabling their diplomatic agency and political influence.

Part of the problem in understanding an ambassador’s political influence and his ability to proffer counsel lies in the fact that diplomatic letters are often used to elucidate broad analyses of Elizabethan foreign policy with little thought to the opinion of the author. The influence of ambassadors on events, although crucial, has often been underestimated either because of a belief that councillors manipulated diplomatic letters in order to influence the Queen or in

⁶³ M. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919* (Abingdon, 1993), pp. 27-8.

⁶⁴ J. Platt, ‘The Elizabethan “Foreign Office”’, *The Historian*, 56 (1994), 725-740; G. Bell, ‘The Men and Their Rewards in Elizabethan Diplomatic Service’ (PhD, University of California, 1974); G. Bell, ‘Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution’, in M. Thorpe and A. Slavin (eds.), *Politics, Religion and Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Honour of De Lamar Jensen* (Kirkville, 1994), pp. 267-88; G. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives, 1509-1688* (London, 1990).

⁶⁵ T. Sowerby, ‘Elizabethan Diplomatic Networks and the Spread of News’, in J. Raymond and N. Moxham (eds.), *News Networks in Early Modern Europe* (2016), pp. 305-327; T. Sowerby ‘The Cambridge Connection and the Early Elizabethan Diplomatic Corps’, in McDiarmid and Wabuda (eds.), *Cambridge Connection*, pp. 266-90.

favour of a high political narrative centring on the decisions of Elizabeth and Cecil.⁶⁶ In contrast, this thesis builds upon Mattingly's belief that ambassadors shaped policy formation and Bell's contention that we must know the diplomats 'before we can understand either the course of foreign relations or the implementation of policy'.⁶⁷ However, recognition of the extent to which ambassadors engaged in counselling and formulating policies within the Elizabethan regime remains marginal. Bell argued that diplomats were consulted only on niche areas of foreign policy where their special expertise was deemed useful, for example Randolph's opinion on Anglo-Scottish relations.⁶⁸ These ex-diplomat, foreign policy experts became Mears's 'ad-hoc' advisers; their limited advisory capacity has been recognised by many other commentators.⁶⁹ In contrast, as Randolph and Throckmorton's experiences amply demonstrate some ambassadors offered broadly focused political advice, both on embassy and at their return home, and conceptualised English foreign policy in a wide geopolitical context.

At the heart of the issue is the fact that foreign policy advice could not be given in isolation: individual foreign policies were contingent upon overlapping domestic, British and European concerns. Ambassadors, like their conciliar colleagues, could not advise on Anglo-Scottish affairs, for example, without considering the broader foreign and domestic picture. This connectivity is what underpins Alford's brief depiction of ambassadors abroad and councillors at home collaborating on the formation and implementation of policies.⁷⁰ Both Alford and David Potter have allowed ambassadors a more central role in collaborating with their colleagues at home to formulate policies and proffer counsel than has hitherto been suggested. Potter argued that the vacuum of monarchical authority in Edward VI's reign led ambassadors,

⁶⁶ Guy, 'Tudor Monarchy', pp. 93-100; Haigh, *Elizabeth*, p. 75; D. Potter, 'Mid-Tudor Foreign Policy and Diplomacy: 1547-63', in Richardson and Doran (eds.), *Tudor England*, p. 119; *EEP*; P. Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England, 1544-1604* (Basingstoke, 2003); R. Wernham, *The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1558-1603* (London, 1980).

⁶⁷ G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), pp. 109-110, 198-208, 255-268; Bell, *The Men*, p. vii.

⁶⁸ Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy', pp. 267-88.

⁶⁹ *Queenship*, p. 42.

⁷⁰ *EEP*, p. 52.

such as William Paget, to proffer advice on foreign policy more overtly and frankly than they had done previously. The extent to which this assessment can be extended to Elizabeth's reign is unclear and potentially problematic as Paget's frankness may have partly been because he was advising an ex-colleague, now Lord Protector; Randolph and Throckmorton, on the other hand, were advising a monarch.⁷¹

III. Anglo-Scottish Relations and the British Perspective

In focusing on Anglo-Scottish relations from the perspective of the diplomats on the ground this thesis provides fresh insight into the key issues underpinning English policy toward Scotland in the 1560s: a British Protestant ideological approach to Anglo-Scottish relations amongst members of the English and Scottish regimes and, intrinsically connected to this, the contentious issue of Mary, Queen of Scotland's place in the English succession.

During the mid-Tudor period, Anglo-Scottish relations were formulated by contemporaries who tied together notions of geographical unity, a common Protestant religion and a hoped-for dynastic union or political alliance between the two realms. The works of Clare Kellar, Jane Dawson, Mark Loughlin and Alford have demonstrated the capacity of English and Scottish statesmen to think within a British idiom and to pursue British policies. Kellar has shown how the English and Scottish reformations interacted with one another, especially English attempts from the 1530s to inculcate Protestantism in Scotland via diplomacy and the interchange of men and ideas, during the Marian exile.⁷² Dawson demonstrated that the amity was driven by the concept of one island Protestantism protected by the sea from Catholic Europe.⁷³ The roots of this language of religious amity are found in the propaganda accompanying Somerset's

⁷¹ Potter, 'Foreign Policy', pp. 112-113.

⁷² Kellar, *Scotland*.

⁷³ J. Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish Protestant Culture and Integration in Sixteenth-century Britain', in S. Barber and S. Ellis (eds.), *Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State* (New York, 1995), pp. 87-114.

campaigns in Scotland in the 1540s and had a profound impact on the outlook and approach of the participants in those campaigns, in particular Cecil, to Anglo-British relations in the 1560s.⁷⁴

What the existing scholarship does not adequately address, however, is just how tentative and marred with mistrust the Anglo-Scottish relationship remained at the start of Elizabeth's reign. This is addressed in chapters four and five of this thesis, which show that beneath the language of love, amity and common religion bubbled competing national priorities, an English superiority complex and residual traces of the engrained mistrust that had defined the Anglo-Scottish relationship for centuries. Focusing on Randolph and Throckmorton underlines the difficulties in navigating this tentative relationship in 1559-60 and throughout the following decade. These diplomats had to manage the weight of the two countries' historic relationship, differing cultural practices and, despite claims to a common religion, religious prejudices.

In those studies that do not focus on Mary and Elizabeth, Anglo-Scottish relations during the 1560s has primarily been viewed through the eyes of Cecil or William Maitland of Lethington (and to a lesser extent James Stuart, Earl of Moray⁷⁵).⁷⁶ Loughlin's Lethington and Alford's Cecil, taken as two halves of the whole, provide insights into the Scottish and English regimes' perspectives on Anglo-Scottish amity, British policies, and the impact of the English succession crisis. Both Alford and Loughlin highlighted the peaks and troughs of Anglo-Scottish relations following Mary's return to Scotland in August 1561. Lethington and Cecil's subsequent strained relationship has often been used to illustrate broader tensions within the Anglo-Scottish relationship from 1561, when (as the Scots attempted to reconcile their loyalty

⁷⁴ Ibid.; J. Dawson, 'William Cecil and the British Dimension of early Elizabethan foreign policy', *History*, 74 (1989), 196-216; *EEP*, pp. 43-52.

⁷⁵ Hereafter Moray (created 1562).

⁷⁶ M. Lee, *James Stewart, Earl of Moray* (New York, 1953); R. Stedall, *Mary, Queen of Scots' Secretary* (Barnsley, 2021); Loughlin, 'Maitland'; *EEP*.

to Mary and their commitment to England) the alliance shifted from one based primarily on shared religious values to one focused on the English succession question and the personal relationship between Mary and Elizabeth.⁷⁷ Lethington sought to secure the Anglo-Scottish alliance through policies that were not necessarily favourable to English or, as Lethington acknowledged, Cecil's way of thinking, such as his attempts to secure Mary's succession to Elizabeth's throne.⁷⁸ Ultimately, Lethington's pursuit of a Spanish marriage for Mary demonstrated the conflict of interests between British policies and national, or dynastic, priorities.

Both Loughlin and Alford argued that British policy was created holistically, with foreign and domestic policies directly impinging on one another.⁷⁹ For both Lethington and Cecil, events in France, Spain and the Low Countries were important factors in shaping the Anglo-British relationship. Alford's Cecil, concerned by the threat of an increasingly hostile Catholic Europe, looked to the internal cohesion of the British Isles to provide for England's security.⁸⁰ Equally, Elizabeth Bonner's work on Henry II of France's British policies in the 1550s and Potter's analysis of French and Scottish attempts to forge alliances with the Irish against England underscore the interconnectedness of European and British developments.⁸¹ By focusing on the views of men on the front line, in Scotland (Randolph) and France (Throckmorton), this thesis allows us to see how events developed gradually and not just through pivotal moments in Anglo-Scottish relations. It also showcases the confluence of domestic, Irish and continental influences on the formulation of English Anglo-Scottish policies in the 1560s. Chapter four

⁷⁷ Loughlin, 'Maitland', pp. 113-132; *EEP*, pp. 86-9; R. Allinson, 'Parables and Dark Sentences: The Correspondence of Sir William Cecil and William Maitland (1559-1573)', in P. Dover (ed.), *Secretaries and Statecraft in the Early Modern World* (Edinburgh, 2016), pp. 90-114; J. Guy, 'My Heart is My Own', *The Life of Mary Queen of Scots* (St Ives, 2004), pp. 128-131.

⁷⁸ Loughlin, 'Maitland', pp. 129-130.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 35; *EEP*, pp. 43-4.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ E. Bonner, 'The Politique of Henri II: De Facto French Rule in Scotland, 1550-1554', *Journal of the Sydney Society for Scottish History*, 7 (1998); D. Potter, 'French Intrigue in Ireland during the Reign of Henri II, 1547-1559', *IHR*, 5/2 (1983), 159-180.

shows that how contemporaries envisaged the relationship between Britain and Europe is key to understanding the different ways in which they formulated and expressed British policies. Chapter five demonstrates how English intervention in Scotland in 1559-60 was a response to European stimuli. And chapter six shows how England's intervention in France in 1562 impacted heavily upon Elizabeth's relationship with Scotland.

From this thesis we can see that the assumption of British ideas and development of British policies were endemic within both regimes. It highlights the key issues that made the idea of united Britain so attractive to Elizabethan counsellors in the 1560s: English national security within Europe and the British Isles; the English succession crisis; and the defence of the Protestant religion. It also demonstrates the centrality of Randolph and Throckmorton, as diplomats, to Anglo-Scottish political, religious, and cultural interchange; working with their Scottish and English colleagues to build a shared British perspective by assisting in the formulation, negotiation and implementation of Anglo-British policies. Through an analysis of their roles (and the relevant sources) we can glean a better understanding of key moments in Anglo-Scottish relations, such as the machinations behind Henry Stuart, Lord Darnley's trip to Scotland and subsequent marriage to Mary in 1565.

Despite making some important points about the collaborative nature of policy-making Alford largely overlooked the interventions of Cecil's colleagues and assigned key individuals, such as Elizabeth and Leicester, peripheral roles. In doing so, he underestimated the collaborative processes that lay behind the development of Elizabethan foreign policy. Thus, we are left with the unanswered question of how widespread the articulation of British ideas and policies were within the early Elizabethan regime – did all, or even most, men think like Cecil? Moreover, Anglo-Scottish policy comes across as the domain of Cecil alone; but what role did other individuals play in its formation and execution? Concentrating on Throckmorton and

Randolph's involvement in negotiating Anglo-Scottish relations provides insights into the early Elizabethan regime's collaborative and collegial model of working, the formation of foreign policy and the importance of diplomatic agency therein.

England's domestic succession crisis was the hinge upon which Anglo-British relations hung precariously. This was, as Alford and, more recently, Doran and Paulina Kewes have asserted, a British succession crisis; but one with a British-European dimension due to Mary, Queen of Scots' commitment to Catholicism and strong links to France.⁸² Elizabethan politicians' varying perceptions of the succession crisis, as with Anglo-British affairs, were affected by personalities and events in Europe. Alford observed two competing British policies: one, centred on the succession, based on a dynastic union between the two monarchies and the other, favoured by Cecil, on a political settlement.⁸³ Doran and Kewes highlighted the interplay between Anglo-Scottish relations and the succession question, suggesting that Elizabeth's unwillingness to name an heir in response to the petition of the 1566 Parliament derived from the potential effect on her recent *entente cordiale* with Mary. Importantly, they also drew attention to the fact that in the 1560s individuals' political sympathies did not always match their religious inclinations: Protestants could, and did, support Catholic Mary.⁸⁴ This thesis explores for the first time the reasoning behind Protestants, like Throckmorton, supporting Mary's succession claim; and the way in which they sought to ameliorate their concerns about her religion.

The hinges of foreign policy, and the minds of the men that made it, turned on the perceived insecurity of Elizabeth's position, the lack of a clear successor in the event of her untimely death, and the machinations of Mary Stuart. By examining the perspective of little studied

⁸² *EEP*, pp. 43-70; Doran and Kewes, 'Introduction'; Doran and Kewes, 'Succession'; see also McLaren, 'Quest for a King'.

⁸³ *EEP*, pp. 182-206.

⁸⁴ Doran and Kewes, 'Succession', pp. 26, 30.

individuals within the regime a fuller picture of the varying impact of the succession issue on Elizabethan political perspectives emerges. Chapter seven demonstrates that pressure to settle the succession had been mounting ever since Mary requested her acknowledgement following her return to Scotland in 1561. It also explores Throckmorton's view that the succession should be settled through imposing a series of conditions on Mary that protected both Elizabeth in her lifetime and the Protestant state in perpetuity. Moreover, as neither had a static position (unlike Cecil) and modified their opinions in accordance with new political circumstances, their views also reveal the range of potential dynastic and political settlements to Anglo-British relations and the succession crisis, an understudied aspect of early Elizabethan politics.⁸⁵

IV. Why Throckmorton and Randolph?

Although Throckmorton and Randolph were both involved in Anglo-Scottish affairs in the first decade of Elizabeth's reign, they were very different characters with varied backgrounds and socio-political connections. Thus, this thesis offers two different lenses through which to explore the relationship between educational background, political experience, socio-political position, their integration into the regime, and their ability to attain political influence, to counsel and the impact of that counsel.

Both men were considered influential in their day and in near-contemporary historiography. Thomas Fuller labelled Throckmorton an 'able *Minister of State*' and Randolph a 'grand Statesman & Ambassador'.⁸⁶ Edmund Bohun, writing at the end of the seventeenth century, considered Throckmorton to be 'Industrious, Wise, and an Active Statesman'.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, in recent times neither man has received much attention. They were not included in the many

⁸⁵ Exceptions are *EEP*, pp. 182-206; McLaren, 'Quest for a King', 272-76.

⁸⁶ T. Fuller, *The History of the Worthies of England* (London, 1662), pp. 63, 123.

⁸⁷ E. Bohun, *The Character of Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1693), p. 98.

biographies of ambassadors that appeared in the mid-twentieth century.⁸⁸ Most modern work on Throckmorton relates to his advice to Elizabeth at her accession, his trial for treason after Wyatt's rebellion, his Anglo-French embassy, his perceived ideological stance as a hot gospeller (which this thesis will dispute) or his alleged affection and support for Mary, Queen of Scots.⁸⁹ Only a handful of works address Throckmorton's diplomatic career or role as a counsellor. Sebastian Walsh briefly pointed to Throckmorton's political influence; and Kenneth Kisner's MA thesis also argued that Throckmorton had a role as an adviser to Elizabeth.⁹⁰ Neither explored the topic in great depth. Kisner only briefly considered Throckmorton's Anglo-French diplomacy and his advice to Elizabeth prior to her accession but did not address the nature and impact of his counsel. These are key concerns of this thesis. Throckmorton's Scottish endeavours have also received comparatively little attention aside from brief allusions to his collaboration with Cecil on the subject in 1559-60.⁹¹ Randolph has been the subject of two theses (one MA, one PhD) which examined his career in the light of high-political narratives, rather than considering his diplomatic agency and political influence as this thesis does.⁹² Randolph also played a significant role in Bell's study of English diplomatic representatives and he provided the model for Bell and Platt's portrayal of ambassadors as regional experts.⁹³ Alford briefly alluded to Throckmorton and Randolph's

⁸⁸ For example, Miller, *Henry Killigrew*; H. Drummond, *Our Man in Scotland: Sir Ralph Sadleir, 1507-1587* (London, 1969); Throckmorton was featured in A. Rowse, *Raleigh and the Throckmortons* (London, 1962), pp. 1-54.

⁸⁹ N. Sutherland, *Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-1589* (London, 1984); J. Neale, 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton's Advice to Queen Elizabeth on Her Accession to the Throne', *EHR*, 65 (1950), 91-98; A. Patterson, *The Trial of Nicholas Throckmorton* (Toronto, 1998); Guy, *My Heart*, pp. 116, 202; Rowse, *Raleigh*, pp. 42-54.

⁹⁰ S. Walsh, 'Most Trust and Beloved: Sir Nicholas Throckmorton', *History Today*, 55/9 (2005), 39-45; K. Kisner, 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton: A Diplomatic Adviser to Queen Elizabeth', (MA, Utah State University, 2003).

⁹¹ MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, p. 75; Rowse, *Raleigh*, p. 28; Potter, 'Foreign Policy', pp. 117-8.

⁹² Frescoln, 'Randolph'; D. Welch, 'Thomas Randolph: English Agent in Scotland, 1559-1566' (MA, Wake Forest University, North Carolina, 1980).

⁹³ Bell, *Handlist*, p. 15; Platt, 'Diplomatic Service', 104.

significance in Anglo-Scottish relations during the 1560s.⁹⁴ Both diplomats are therefore ripe for study in an Anglo-Scottish context.

V. Structure

This thesis has two clear but intimately related sections. The first three chapters are thematic and consider the foundations that affected an individual's ability to attain political influence and fulfil their diplomatic roles and counsel effectively. The final seven chapters are arranged chronologically and consider how these factors affected Throckmorton and Randolph's roles within the wider framework of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy. They pay particular attention to how the diplomats exerted agency and used their privileged access to intelligence from abroad and their personal engagement with foreign rulers, like Mary, Queen of Scots, to construct counsel that forwarded their preferred policies.

⁹⁴ *EEP*, p. 45.

Chapter 1

Throckmorton and Randolph's Education, Political Experience and Socio-Political Networks at Elizabeth's Accession

Jean Hotman described the ideal ambassador as a man that did not exist, for he would have to be 'a Theologian, Astrologer, Dialectician, excellent orator, knowledgeable as Aristotle and wise as Solomon'. Moreover, the ambassador should match this education with practical political experience, having been 'employed in some other charge or affairs of state'.⁹⁵ Commentaries on the perfect ambassador, like Hotman's, became increasingly popular during the later sixteenth century.⁹⁶ Such works drew similar conclusions on the key characteristics, educational skills and political experience of the ideal ambassador; and these often overlapped with the ideal skill-set for counsellors and courtiers.⁹⁷ Such convergence is to be expected as men in the sixteenth century did not train for a diplomatic role per se but a political role in general thus the perfect ambassador, like the ideal counsellor, was a man who was both well-educated and in possession of practical political experience.

In practice an ambassador's ability to fulfil his diplomatic role and exercise political influence successfully, as with all political roles, depended upon whether he was part of the socio-political fabric of the regime: whether he had sufficient connections to enable and sustain his political agency. Elizabethan politics was at its essence a social exercise, dependent on interpersonal relationships and underpinned by a common political language, education and shared ideologies.⁹⁸ Alford emphasised the familial and cultural connections that tied together

⁹⁵ J. Hotman, *L'Ambassadeur* (Paris, 1603), p. 12.

⁹⁶ L. Bély, 'La polémique autour de *L'Ambassadeur* de Jean Hotman: culture et diplomatie au temps de la paix de Lyon', *Cahiers d'histoire*, 46/2 (2001), 327-54; Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 181-191; T. Sowerby, 'Francis Thynne's Perfect Ambassador and the Construction of Diplomatic Thought in Elizabethan England', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 82/4 (2019), 539-557.

⁹⁷ Elyot, *Governour*; Hoby (ed.), *Courtyer*.

⁹⁸ Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays*, pp. 11, 14-27; Guy, 'Introduction', pp. 1-8; *Queenship*, pp. 33-72; *EEP*, pp. 24-5; S. Adams, 'Eliza Enthroned?', p. 69; Jones, 'Cambridge Connection'; Sowerby, 'Diplomatic Corps'.

Edward VI's regime and suggested that the same was true for Elizabeth's first decade, when many Edwardians were put back into the offices they vacated five years earlier.⁹⁹ Moreover, Adams, Mears and Haigh have all argued that Elizabeth primarily chose to be advised by those councillors to whom she was personally closest.¹⁰⁰ More broadly, work on female agency at Elizabeth's court emphasises the political significance of a wide-ranging social network.¹⁰¹ Thus achieving an effective and successful political career was heavily reliant on an individual's inclusion in the regime's socio-political network.

This chapter considers how well-suited Throckmorton and Randolph were to take on a diplomatic role at Elizabeth's accession. First it examines how their early education and experience of politics and statecraft measured up to the ideals upheld in diplomatic tracts. Second it considers how well-placed they were socially to be politically effective in the early Elizabethan regime.

I. Education

Through the lens of their humanistic education, politically active Elizabethans perceived themselves to be fulfilling the classical role of the public man, the *vir civilis*: they believed they had a duty to offer honest counsel for the good of the Queen and the commonwealth.¹⁰² Educational training had an intended practical application for, as Elyot observed, 'The ende of al doctrine & study, is good Counsayle'.¹⁰³ This active learning underpinned how Elizabethans approached practical politics: they read to equip themselves with skills and knowledge that they could use to assess the political situations they encountered.¹⁰⁴ Peter Mack observed that

⁹⁹ Alford, *Kingship*, pp. 195-200.

¹⁰⁰ Adams, 'Eliza Enthroned?', pp. 63-65; *Queenship*, pp. 39-40, 48; Haigh, *Elizabeth*, pp. 84-5.

¹⁰¹ Mears, 'Privy Chamber'; Graham-Matheson, 'Elisabeth Parr'; G. Allen, *The Cooke Sisters: Education, Piety and Politics in Early Modern England* (Manchester, 2013).

¹⁰² Peltonen, *Classical Humanism*, pp. 18-118.

¹⁰³ Elyot, *Governour*, p. 237v.

¹⁰⁴ L. Jardine and A. Grafton, "'Studied for Action": How Gabriel Harvey Read His Livy', *Past & Present*, 129 (1990), 30-78.

rhetorical and dialectical techniques taught in grammar schools were employed in crafting political and religious arguments in letters and orations.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, Alford has shown how Cecil used the rhetorical techniques he learnt at Cambridge to formulate arguments and assess political options *in utramque partem*.¹⁰⁶ This was the educational training expected of ambassadors.

Foremost amongst the ideal ambassador's education was 'oratorical training': finesse in the arts of dialectic and rhetoric.¹⁰⁷ Rhetoric was essential for those who had 'to reason in counsaile, or speke in a greatte audyence' as ambassadors were wont to do.¹⁰⁸ Rhetorical skill was a critical tool in an ambassador's repertoire: by employing the ornaments of rhetoric, the 'artificial instruments' of eloquence, an ambassador was able to construct persuasive arguments to deploy both in his letters home and in his orations at the courts of foreign rulers.¹⁰⁹ Next, 'a wide knowledge of history' was considered crucial to diplomatic, and broader political, success.¹¹⁰ For early modern governors history was a political guide: its examples a medium for interpreting the political present.¹¹¹ Historical study was thus seen as fundamental to political success: Elyot placed it 'above al other studies' for 'histories be interlaced with leasynges', and believed it an essential for men to acquire wisdom and execute affairs of state.¹¹² Hotman argued that a knowledge of history was 'more necessary than any other study' for it increased the ambassador's 'wisedome and judgement in the affairs of his charge'.¹¹³

¹⁰⁵ Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, pp. 176-214.

¹⁰⁶ *EEP*, p. 18.

¹⁰⁷ A. Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, II, ed. G. Laing (Oxford, 1924), p. 147.

¹⁰⁸ Elyot, *Governour*, p. 34v.

¹⁰⁹ Q. Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 27.

¹¹⁰ Gentili, *Legationibus*, p. 152.

¹¹¹ S. Lucas, *A Mirror for Magistrates and the Politics of the English Reformation* (Massachusetts, 2009); P. Kewes (ed.), *The Uses of History in Early Modern England* (California, 2006); Jardine and Grafton, "Studied for action", pp. 30-78; T. Hampton, *Writing from History: The Rhetoric of Exemplarity in Renaissance Literature* (New York, 1990); D. Woolf, *Reading History in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 2000).

¹¹² Elyot, *Governour*, pp. 36r, 228v.

¹¹³ Hotman, *L'Ambassadeur*, pp. 12, 15.

Gentili went even further, asserting that historical study could provide a substitute for practical diplomatic experience.¹¹⁴

While the influence of humanistic educational training has received significant attention, the importance of practical political experience as preparation for assuming a public role has received less interest. Diplomatic tracts prized direct experience of statecraft, treaty negotiations and the languages and cultures of foreign countries, for such experience equipped men with the necessary skills to undertake diplomatic assignments. Ambassadors were expected to have ‘long experience of the affairs of the world’, and in particular ‘long training in public business’ through employment ‘in some other charge or affairs of state’.¹¹⁵ Throckmorton’s views on practical experience as an important factor commending men for diplomatic service chime with those of the authors of the diplomatic handbooks. He argued that an ambassador should be experienced ‘in negotiation of matters’: he recommended Francis Peyto as an emissary to the Cardinal of Ferrara on the grounds that he ‘is well experimentid in the negotiation of princes affayres’.¹¹⁶ Equally important for ambassadors, who spent much of their time abroad, was ‘experience in foreign travel’ and knowledge of languages which both helped their diplomatic oratory and, as Hotman observed, allowed them to ‘know more perfectly the history and the affairs of state’ of their host country.¹¹⁷ Throckmorton’s belief that knowledge of foreign languages was essential lay behind his recommendation of Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford, as special ambassador to France because he spoke Italian, which had become popularised at the French court thanks to Catherine de Medici.¹¹⁸ Throckmorton’s opinion that ambassadors should be experienced courtiers and thus able to play the role

¹¹⁴ Gentili, *Legationibus*, p. 152; Sowerby, ‘Perfect Ambassadors’, 553.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 170; Hotman, *L’Ambassadeur*, pp. 12, 18.

¹¹⁶ SP12/17, fo. 95v, Windebank to Cecil, 28 June 1561; SP70/33, fo. 64r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 28 December 1561.

¹¹⁷ Gentili, *Legationibus*, p. 170; Hotman, *L’Ambassadeur*, p. 16; Frigo, ‘Prudence’, 15.

¹¹⁸ SP70/22, fos. 44v-45r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 10 January 1561.

skilfully at a foreign court was widely shared.¹¹⁹ Guiccardini, believed that the ‘gifts’ of a courtier – dancing, singing and ‘knowing how to ride’ – conferred such ‘honour and reputation’ upon an ambassador that anyone without them ‘lacks something important’.¹²⁰

i. Randolph

Randolph’s classical, humanist education provided him with the requisite educational skills to take on a diplomatic role.¹²¹ At King’s School, Canterbury, Randolph learnt both Latin and Greek. In the lower school he would have read Aesop’s fables, which Elyot argued ‘included moche morall and polytyke wysedome’.¹²² Randolph would then have studied Cicero and the *ars rhetorica* in order to attain ‘eloquence excellent and perfect’.¹²³ His classical school training provided a firm foundation in oratory and rhetoric that was essential to his study of law at Christ Church, Oxford, where he received his BCL in the late 1540s.¹²⁴ In April 1548 Randolph was licensed as a public notary and the following year he was acting as Christ Church’s chapter clerk.¹²⁵ In November 1549 Randolph became Principal of Broadgate Hall, the legal institution attached to Christ Church.¹²⁶ Legal training, like Randolph’s, was considered beneficial for those seeking a role in government with many Elizabethan privy councillors being experienced therein.¹²⁷ Elyot argued it enabled prospective governors to become ‘menne of so excellent wysedome’ that ‘more noble counsaylours’ could not be

¹¹⁹ SP12/17, fo. 95v; Gentili, *Legationibus*, p. 135.

¹²⁰ F. Guiccardini, *Maxims and Reflections (Ricordi)*, eds. M. Domandi and N. Rubinstein (Pennsylvania, 1992), p. 86.

¹²¹ C. Woodruff and H. Cape, *Schola Regia Cantuariensis: A History of Canterbury School* (London, 1908), pp. 48-9, 62-3.

¹²² T. Hinde, *Imps of Promise: History of Kings School, Canterbury* (London, 1991), p. 12; Elyot, *Governour*, pp. 27v-28r; I. Green, *Humanism and Protestantism in Early Modern English Education* (Surrey, 2009), pp. 162-72.

¹²³ Hinde, *Imps*, p. 12; Elyot, *Governour*, p. 34v.

¹²⁴ For the importance of grammar school rhetorical training see M. Peltonen, *Rhetoric, Politics and Popularity in Pre-Revolutionary England* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 11-98.

¹²⁵ D. Chambers, *Faculty Office Registers, 1534-1549: a Calendar of the First Two Registers of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Faculty Office* (Oxford, 1966), p. 309; Christ Church College, Oxford, Chapter Book 1547-1619, fos. 1r-22r.

¹²⁶ OUA, Reg. Cancell. GG (Hyp/A/5), fo. 38r.

¹²⁷ For example, Smith or Cecil as demonstrated in Jones, *Governing*, pp. 56-60.

found.¹²⁸ Randolph's legal background also made him an attractive candidate as an ambassador. Gentili argued that ambassadors ought to have 'some knowledge of civil law' and Smith, in his inaugural lecture at Cambridge, suggested that law students were well-suited to diplomatic tasks.¹²⁹

Legal study was so prized because law students were formally trained in the rhetorical arts of persuasion and dissuasion through declamations, case-putting and disputations.¹³⁰ Randolph, as a BCL, would have been expected to dispute upon a legal question three times a year and declaim twice. Disputations, where students had to argue for or against a particular question, helped students hone their skill in dialectic – the art of formulating arguments and reasoning persuasively via dialogue – and provided a strategic template for tackling diplomatic negotiations.¹³¹ Declamations, whereby a student argued *pro* or *contra* a question of law, provided a template for analysing political problems *in utramque partem* as demonstrated by Cecil.¹³² Moreover, this approach provided a secure foundation for a politically experienced ambassador to argue for or against a particular policy or course of action, as Throckmorton demonstrated in January 1561 when he simultaneously presented arguments in favour of religious alliances to Catherine de Medici and against them to the Duchess of Ferrara.¹³³ This deliberative form of rhetoric, the *genus deliberativum*, forwarded by Quintilian and Cicero, was thus central to political counsel.¹³⁴

¹²⁸ Elyot, *Governour*, p. 56r.

¹²⁹ Gentili, *Legationibus*, p. 200; J. Barton, 'The Faculty of Law', in J. McConica (ed.), *The Collegiate University* (Oxford, 1986), p. 271.

¹³⁰ Barton, 'Faculty of Law', pp. 270-3.

¹³¹ Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, pp. 58-9, 73-4.

¹³² Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, p. 30; R. Rainold, *A Booke Called the Foundacion of Rhetorike* (London, 1563), fo. Lixr; *EEP*, p. 18.

¹³³ SP70/22, fo. 39r-v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 10 January 1561; SP70/23, fos. 140v-141r, Bedford and Throckmorton to Council, 26 February 1561.

¹³⁴ Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, pp. 43-4; The rhetorical works of Quintilian and Cicero formed the central texts on the Oxford syllabus for rhetoric, C. Mallet, *A History of the University of Oxford* (London, 1924), II, pp. 84-5.

Another key component of the Oxford syllabus, applauded for its ability to instruct ‘meene in vertue and polytyke governance’, was moral philosophy centred on the works of Aristotle.¹³⁵ Randolph annotated his notes in Christ Church’s chapter book with Aristotelian adages and the phrase *supra omnia vincit veritas*.¹³⁶ He adopted as his motto ‘*virtus pro divitiis*’ (virtue before riches) and used the phrase as a sign off when writing to his friends.¹³⁷ These were not passive statements: virtue, truth and the prioritisation of public duty over private gain would be central to Randolph’s conceptualisation of his diplomatic role. His later dispatches equated truth with fidelity and, in accordance with his motto, repeatedly proclaimed that he preferred ‘to leave behynde me the name of a trewe servante than to possesse greate wealth’ or ‘to be master of the worlde’.¹³⁸ *Fides*, faithfulness, was a key virtue for an ambassador for, as Gentili observed, ‘the prince has entrusted himself wholly to his [ambassador’s] fidelity’.¹³⁹ Randolph was demonstrably exploring ideas of *fides* in the context of friendship at Oxford.¹⁴⁰ He appended a collection of *sententiae* with a series of notes on the nature of virtue and friendship.¹⁴¹ Using Cicero’s *de Amicitia* as a basis, Randolph collected his memoranda under the heading ‘*virtus conservat et conciliat amicitias*’.¹⁴² Virtue was paramount: Randolph, quoting Cicero, noted that ‘*virtute convenientia rerum est, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia*’.¹⁴³

Randolph’s preoccupation with humanist-classical concepts of virtue, truth, fidelity and friendship demonstrates his desire to emulate the humanist ideology of the *vir civilis* and the *vita activa*. His approach was shared by his colleagues within the Elizabethan regime, who

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 84-85; Elyot, *Governour*, p. 50r.

¹³⁶ truth conquers over all things, Chapter Book, fos. 19v, 20v, 21r.

¹³⁷ SP70/1, fo. 49r, Randolph to Throckmorton, 6 December 1558.

¹³⁸ SP52/12, fo. 65v, Randolph to Cecil, 26 May 1566; Lansdowne 8, fo. 93v, Randolph to Cecil, 1565.

¹³⁹ Gentili, *Legationibus*, p. 162.

¹⁴⁰ G. Galhardo, *Primera parte de las sentencias que hasta nuestros tiempos, para edificacion de buenos costumbres, estan por diuersos autores escriptas, en este tratado summariamente referidas, en su propio estilo* (1554), unmarked final folio in All Souls, Oxford, nn.2.15; Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, p. 77.

¹⁴¹ Galhardo, *Primera parte*, unmarked final folio.

¹⁴² Virtue brings together and preserves friendship; *ibid.*

¹⁴³ In virtue is found all harmony, stability and steadfastness; *ibid.*

used humanist-classical principles to interpret their political roles and guide their political actions.¹⁴⁴ For instance, the application of moral maxims, or *sententiae*, for living a politically virtuous life was widely encouraged amongst Tudor councillors in the mid-sixteenth century.¹⁴⁵ Ideologically then Randolph was a good fit with his colleagues within the regime. Moreover, his classical and legal education (akin to that of Cecil at Cambridge), with its emphasis on dialectical and rhetorical training, provided a firm foundation for him to develop skill in political persuasion as he became more diplomatically and politically experienced.

ii. Throckmorton

There is little contemporary evidence of Throckmorton's education. However, much can be inferred from an analysis of his letters, the remnants of his book collection at Magdalen College, Oxford, and the oratorical and dialectical skill he displayed when put on trial for treason following the failure of Wyatt's Rebellion (1554). Throckmorton's school education ended early, but in Queen Katherine Parr's household he would have been instructed by 'well learned and godly persons' in a daily regimen of prayer, scriptural study and theological training, while the household's evangelical afternoon sermons would have exposed him to the art of rhetorical persuasion.¹⁴⁶ By the end of Henry VIII's reign, Throckmorton possessed two of the key traits attributed to the ideal ambassador: he was 'somewhat lerned & languaged', having both French and Italian.¹⁴⁷

Throckmorton's education was primarily practical and political. However, he also engaged with the tenets of humanist learning. Historical works dominate what survives of his library.

¹⁴⁴ *EEP*, pp. 23-4.

¹⁴⁵ P. Collinson, 'Sir Nicholas Bacon and the Elizabethan *Via Media*', *HJ* (1980), 260; Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, pp. 145-7.

¹⁴⁶ M. Franklin-Harkrider, *Women, Reform and Community in Early Modern England: Katherine Willoughby, Duchess of Suffolk and Lincolnshire's Godly Aristocracy, 1519-1580* (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 49-52; Foxe, *A&M*, 1576 edition, VIII, p. 1236, <https://www.dhi.ac.uk/foxe/> [accessed 13/12/23].

¹⁴⁷ SP46/162, fo. 52v, King's Servants, 1547; Add. 35831, fo. 273r, Busso to Throckmorton, 18 October 1567.

Throckmorton possessed several French volumes on the history of England and Brittany, Aquitaine, Normandy and Anjou.¹⁴⁸ Some of these books were in Throckmorton's study in France, like Alain Bouchart's *Les croniques annalles des pays dangleterre et Bretagne*, which he probably referred to when advising Elizabeth on Henry VII's policy towards Brittany.¹⁴⁹ Throckmorton took his histories abroad with him because he used them most often as reference works: one of his favourite books, Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*, was certainly in his study in April 1560 when he referred Cecil to a passage which he had 'light[ed] upon [in] the Oration of Cato'.¹⁵⁰ Throckmorton's reference works were predominantly Roman and composed of the key authors studied in the grammar school syllabus: Caesar and Livy for history; the poetry of Virgil, Ovid, Lucan and Horace, and the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.¹⁵¹ Sallust and Caesar were highly praised by Elyot for their ability to enable men to be 'present and hereth the counsailes...the conducte and policies of wyse and experte capitaynes'.¹⁵² Throckmorton was also a fan of the Athenian historian Thucydides, whom, alongside Livy, Roger Ascham recommended as beneficial 'to all kind of learning, and namely for eloquence' – a key diplomatic trait.¹⁵³ Throckmorton's usage of Aristotle and Plato suggests that he also had the grounding in moral philosophy that Gentili considered fundamental for interpreting history in the light of contemporary events.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ Throckmorton's book collection in Magdalen College, Oxford comprises A. Bouchart, *Les croniques annalles des pays dangleterre et Bretagne* (Paris, 1531); J. Bouchet, *Les annales d'Aquitaine* (Poitiers, 1557); J. Nagerel, *Histoire de Normendie* (Rouen, 1558); J. Bourdigne, *Hystoire agregatiue des annalles et cronicques Daniou* (Angers, 1529). See also SP70/39, fo. 65r, Hawes to Throckmorton, 15 July 1562.

¹⁴⁹ SP70/11, fo. 62v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 20 February 1560.

¹⁵⁰ SP70/13, fo. 81v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 12 April 1560.

¹⁵¹ F. Cox-Jensen, *Reading the Roman Republic in Early Modern England* (Leiden, 2012), p. 27; Jardine and Grafton, "Studied for action", p. 54; SP70/38, fo. 93r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 9 June 1562; SP70/14, fo. 105r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 22 May 1560; SP70/17, fo. 55v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 9 August 1560; SP70/26, fo. 8v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 1 May 1561; SP70/26, fo. 28r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 4 May 1561; SP70/26, fo. 79v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 16 May 1561; SP70/25, fo. 77v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 20 April 1561.

¹⁵² Elyot, *Governour*, p. 37v.

¹⁵³ R. Ascham, *The Schoolmaster*, ed. H. Morley (London, 1900), p. 152

¹⁵⁴ Gentili, *De Legationibus*, pp. 152, 157.

Throckmorton believed that his interpretive use of history endowed him with ‘skyll’ in ‘conjecture[ing] sequeles’.¹⁵⁵ He was known for his ability to read a situation and the actors within it. In the wake of Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset’s second arrest, Richard Morison praised Throckmorton as a ‘Machiavelist’ because he ‘sawe deper in to the duke of Somersettes nature, Then I dyd, and gest ryghtlier of hys doinges’. Throckmorton ‘wayed what men offended ar wont to worke’ and ‘dyd thynk, it best, to mistrust the rest’.¹⁵⁶ Throckmorton’s political foresight and his ability to decipher the nature of men would stand him in great stead during his diplomatic engagements in Elizabeth’s reign.

Throckmorton showcased his dialectical, rhetorical, and oratorical skills during his trial in April 1554 for treasonable involvement in Wyatt’s Rebellion. During the trial Throckmorton displayed a deep understanding of the artifices of rhetoric.¹⁵⁷ Appreciating the ‘power [that] orators have’, he argued that his judges, who ‘ought to consider equity’, would, when presenting the evidence against him, employ rhetorical devices – ‘inferring, conjecturing, [and] deducing of arguments’ – in order to ‘seduce the minds of the simple and unlearned jury’ ‘to think and judge those that be things indifferent, or at the worst but oversights, to be great treasons’.¹⁵⁸ Annabel Patterson and Narasingha Sil have analysed Throckmorton’s oratorical *tour de force*, his rhetorical skill and the strategies he employed to argue his innocence.¹⁵⁹ They highlight how Throckmorton exploited the recent repeal of the Henrician treason laws to argue that his indictment was not treason as the law now stood; and turned the tables on his judges.¹⁶⁰ Accused of speaking against Mary Tudor’s marriage to Philip of Spain, Throckmorton argued that ‘I did learn the reasons of my misliking of you...in the parliament house. There I did see

¹⁵⁵ SP70/19, fo. 130r-v

¹⁵⁶ SP68/9, fo. 111r, Morison to Throckmorton, 18 November 1551.

¹⁵⁷ A. Patterson (ed.), *The Trial of Nicholas Throckmorton* (Toronto, 1998), p. 29.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-3.

¹⁵⁹ Patterson (ed.), *Trial*; N. Sil, “‘My Bitter Comedie’: The Treason Trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton and the Rule of Law in Tudor England”, in C. Ocker et al. (eds.), *Politics and Reformations: Communities, Politics, Nations, and Empires* (Leiden, 2007), pp. 381-405.

¹⁶⁰ Sil, ‘Treason Trial’, pp. 384-5, 397; Patterson (ed.), *Trial*, pp. 52, 61-2, 66, 70, 72.

the whole consent of the realm against it; and I, a hearer, but no speaker'.¹⁶¹ If he was to be tried on the grounds of speaking against the Spaniards coming to England 'then the whole parliament house...did procure treason' – his judges included.¹⁶² Patterson also observed that Throckmorton employed persuasive rhetoric and biblical allusions in a calculated appeal to his jury's reformed inclinations, for instance using a Protestant providential narrative to cast himself as a victim of tyranny.¹⁶³ Throckmorton's skilful defence of himself and rhetorical manipulation of his audience (both judges and jurors) demonstrated that he had the key oratorical skills requisite for an ambassador. The infamy of his trial meant that by Elizabeth's accession Throckmorton's oratorical ability and wisdom were well-known.¹⁶⁴

II. Political Experience at the Courts of Henry VIII and Edward VI

Randolph was immersed in academic life at Oxford. Throckmorton, in contrast, honed the skills of an experienced courtier and gained the practical political experience that authors of diplomatic tracts held in high regard.

Throckmorton's political career and rise to prominence at court derived primarily from his kinship with the Parr family who secured him positions at Henry VIII's court – he was half-cousin to Katherine Parr, Queen consort of England (after 12 July 1543), William Parr, Marquis of Northampton and Anne, Countess of Pembroke.¹⁶⁵ By 1532 Throckmorton was a page in the quasi-royal household of Henry VIII's bastard son, Henry Fitzroy, Duke of Richmond; by 1543 he was a member of Northampton's household; and two years later he was serving as a

¹⁶¹ Patterson (ed.), *Trial*, pp. 37-8.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 73; A. Patterson, "'For Words Only': From Treason Trial to Liberal Legend in Early Modern England", *Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities*, 5/2 (1993), 407.

¹⁶³ Patterson (ed.), *Trial*, pp. 49-50, 52, 78, 80. For the reformed inclinations of Throckmorton's jury see S. Brigden, *London and the Reformation* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 552-4.

¹⁶⁴ A. Townsend (ed.), *The Writings of John Bradford* (Cambridge, 1848), pp. 405-6; Foxe, *A&M*, 1570 Edition, X, p. 1677; Patterson, "'For Words Only'", pp. 400 n.23, 413.

¹⁶⁵ Appendix; Alford, *Kingship*, p. 153.

sewer to Queen Katherine.¹⁶⁶ Katherine's influence enabled Throckmorton to gain a seat in the House of Commons, standing as MP for Maldon (1545) and Devizes (1547).¹⁶⁷ He further benefited from Northampton and his brother-in-law's, William Herbert, centrality to the Duke of Northumberland's government. In December 1549 Throckmorton was appointed under-treasurer of mint II in the Tower; following Northampton's appointment as Lord Great Chamberlain, Throckmorton became a Gentleman of Edward VI's Privy Chamber in 1550; and when Herbert was created Earl of Pembroke in 1551, Throckmorton received a knighthood as part of the ceremony.¹⁶⁸

Importantly, Throckmorton attained first-hand experience of diplomacy, foreign policy and military strategy with regards to Anglo-Scottish relations through his involvement in the expansionist 'British' policies pursued by Henry VIII and Somerset during the 1540s. In the autumn of 1543, following Scotland's rejection of the marriage between Edward and Mary agreed in the Treaty of Greenwich (July 1543), Throckmorton had his first diplomatic mission when, as Northampton's deputy on the Anglo-Scottish border, he was sent to secure an end to warfare there.¹⁶⁹ The experience was a steep learning curve in the art of negotiation for Throckmorton, who 'fownde moche les conformytie then my expectacion was' in the 'assured' Lords, and consequently found himself tackling their intransigence with raids and other aggressive means.¹⁷⁰ Four years later Throckmorton took part in Somerset's invasion of

¹⁶⁶ B. Murphy, *Bastard Prince: Henry VIII's Lost Son* (Sutton, 2001), pp. 192-3; Add. 32652, fo. 238r, Throckmorton to Parr, 24 October 1543; J. Nichols (ed.), *Liber Quotidianus Contrarotulatoris Garderobae* (London, 1787), p. 167; E. Powell (ed.), *The Travels and Life of Sir Thomas Hoby* (London, 1902), p. 74.

¹⁶⁷ S. Thorpe, 'Nicholas Throckmorton', in S. Bindoff (ed.), *The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1509-1558* (1982) [<https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1509-1558/member/throckmorton-nicholas-151516-71>]; Katherine was principal landowner in Maldon and Devizes formed part of her jointure.

¹⁶⁸ Froude called them a triumvirate, J. Froude, *The Reign of Edward VI* (London, 1912), p. 215; Throckmorton was in charge of mint II from December 1549-midsummer 1552, C. Challis, *The Tudor Coinage* (Manchester, 1978), pp. 103-4; *CPR EVI*, V, p. 9; D. Hoak, 'The King's Privy Chamber, 1547-1553', in D. Guth and J. McKenna (eds.), *Tudor Rule and Revolution: Essays from G.R. Elton from his American Friends* (Cambridge, 1982), p. 101.

¹⁶⁹ Northampton was Warden of the Western Marches, Add. 32652, fos. 234r-238v, 249, 265r, Throckmorton to Parr, 23-26 October 1543; M. Merriman, *The Rough Wooings: Mary Queen of Scots, 1542-1551* (Edinburgh, 2021), pp. 110-111, 189-223.

¹⁷⁰ Add. 32652, fos. 234r-238r.

Scotland and carried the news of the English victory at the battle of Pinkie to Edward VI.¹⁷¹ Throckmorton's involvement in these campaigns influenced his later thinking on military strategy in Scotland, such as his repeated stress in 1560 on the importance of a strong naval contingent for a successful military campaign in Scotland.¹⁷² These experiences offered Throckmorton insight into Anglo-Scottish border relations, military affairs and diplomatic strategy, and enabled him to begin honing essential negotiation skills. By the end of Henry VIII's reign Throckmorton was noted to have enough 'experyens...to serve in the most part of thinges'.¹⁷³

Throckmorton's extant letters reveal that his views on the importance of strong monarchical authority, how it could be achieved, and what constituted sound political strategy were shaped by his perception of Henry's kingship and his experiences in Henry's martial expeditions. Throckmorton commanded 100 light horsemen at the capture of Boulogne in 1544.¹⁷⁴ Henry VIII's subsequent conclusion of a favourable peace with the French despite his ally the Emperor, Charles V, abandoning him had a lasting impact on Throckmorton: fearful that Elizabeth might concede to an unfavourable peace with France during the summer of 1560, he reminded his Queen that she was in a much better position than 'your majesties father [who] beinge lefte alone after a chargeable warre constraynyd the Frenche to make peace without the restitution of Bulloyn'.¹⁷⁵ Throckmorton viewed Henry as the example of an astute monarch taking action to advance England's position within Europe and the British Isles and he urged Elizabeth to follow in the footsteps of this 'prince of rare courage wisdom and foresight'.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ *CPR EVI*, IV, pp. 104-5.

¹⁷² Merriman, *Rough Wooings*, pp. 372-96; Forbes, *Transactions*, pp. 416-7.

¹⁷³ SP46/162, fo. 52v.

¹⁷⁴ Add. 5,753, fos. 133r-135r.

¹⁷⁵ SP70/15, fo. 77v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 24 June 1560.

¹⁷⁶ SP70/11, fo. 62v. See also SP70/35, fo. 42r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 16 February 1562; SP70/7, fo. 80r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 24 September 1559.

Before being appointed as an ambassador to France by Elizabeth I, Throckmorton already had a role in two embassies to France (1532-3 and 1551), where he was exposed to diplomatic practice and gained first-hand experience of the French language, country and court.¹⁷⁷ In 1551 Throckmorton got his first taste of active diplomacy at a foreign court when he was sent in his capacity as a Gentleman of Edward VI's Privy Chamber on Northampton's embassy to France.¹⁷⁸ This mission, like Throckmorton's later embassies, centred on the respective roles of England, France and Mary, Queen of Scots in 'British' politics. In particular, Northampton was tasked with trying to save England face by first demanding that Mary be delivered to England to marry Edward to fulfil the Treaty of Greenwich, and failing that, to negotiate for a marriage with the French King's daughter, Elizabeth.¹⁷⁹ The two months Throckmorton spent travelling through France and being entertained by the French court laid the foundations for his own stint as resident ambassador there, as he met many of the personalities with whom he would negotiate in the 1560s.¹⁸⁰

Serving in Edward's Privy Chamber developed Throckmorton's sense of how diplomacy worked, the importance of an ambassador's contacts at court, and the influence derived from access to the monarch. He was an intermediary for English ambassadors' suits from abroad, such as Richard Morison's request for a leather licence.¹⁸¹ Moreover, Throckmorton's experience in Edward's Privy Chamber exposed him to extra-conciliar forms of counselling, the mechanisms of counsel and the value of personal access to the monarch that were to prove formative for the advisory role he attempted to craft for himself at Elizabeth's accession. Edward trusted Throckmorton, choosing him to act as an intermediary between himself and

¹⁷⁷ Murphy, *Bastard Prince*, pp. 129-39; Throckmorton was a member of Richmond's household by 15 June 1532, Richmond's Wardrobe, Longleat Misc. MS Box no. 5, Vol. 17, 1531, fos. 17v-18r.

¹⁷⁸ SP68/9A, fo. 343, Northampton to Mason, 8 June 1551; PC 2/4, fo. 288r.

¹⁷⁹ SP68/9A, fos. 354-360, Instructions from Edward VI to Northampton, 20 May 1551.

¹⁸⁰ Bonner, 'Henry II', 61-4; Hoak, 'Privy Chamber', p. 98.

¹⁸¹ SP68/7 fos. 6r-7r, Morison to Throckmorton, 5 May 1551.

William Thomas, a clerk of the Privy Council, whom Edward asked to secretly advise him on a variety of affairs of state, including the reform of the coinage.¹⁸² As under-treasurer of mint II, Throckmorton would have been another source of ready information on the state of the coinage, and it is not inconceivable that Edward sought advice from him on the subject.¹⁸³ This would be consonant with John Strype's suggestion that Edward 'much profited' from 'wise and learned conversation' with the gentlemen of his Privy Chamber and Alford's argument that Edward took counsel on his device for the succession from the men within the Privy Chamber.¹⁸⁴

In June 1553, alongside his colleagues in Edward's Privy Chamber and his close kin, Northampton and Pembroke, Throckmorton signed the letters patent limiting the succession of the crown to Lady Jane Grey.¹⁸⁵ The succession crisis of 1553 provides crucial insight into Throckmorton's political thinking and his strong sense of self-preservation that has important implications for understanding his behaviour in relation to the English succession in the 1560s. When Edward died, Throckmorton left his wife waiting on Jane in the Tower and went to Northampton to proclaim the new queen.¹⁸⁶ But Throckmorton had already put an insurance policy in motion to ensure his survival if Mary, not Jane, was successfully enthroned. He had been secretly advising Mary on the progression of her brother's illness and, when the king died, he and his brothers notified Mary.¹⁸⁷ This enabled Throckmorton to perform a *volte-face* when he was 'drivene for safetye of his lyfe' from proclaiming Jane at Northampton. As his friends were imprisoned in the Tower or placed under house arrest, he joined his cousin Thomas

¹⁸² J. Nichols (ed.), *Literary Remains of King Edward the Sixth* (London, 1857), pp. 75-6; E. Adair, 'William Thomas: A Forgotten Clerk of the Privy Council', in R. Seton-Watson (ed.), *Tudor Studies* (New York, 1970), pp. 141-142; A. Pollnitz, *Princely Education in Early Modern Britain* (Cambridge, 2015), p. 189.

¹⁸³ Challis, *Tudor Coinage*, pp. 103-4.

¹⁸⁴ J. Strype, *Ecclesiastical Memorials*, II, pt. I (Oxford, 1822), p. 387; Alford, *Kingship*, p. 172.

¹⁸⁵ J. Nichols (ed.), *The Chronicle of Queen Jane and of Two Years of Queen Mary* (London, 1850), p. 100.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 12; 'Autobiography of Edward Underhill', in J. Nichols (ed.), *Narratives of the days of the Reformation* (London, 1859), pp. 152-3.

¹⁸⁷ Patterson, *Trial*, p. 85; D. Macculloch, 'The *Vita Mariae Angliae Reginae* of Robert Wingfield of Brantham', *Camden Fourth Series*, 29 (1984), p. 251.

Tresham in guarding Mary's entrance into London.¹⁸⁸ In September, Mary rewarded him with the keepership of Brigstock Park.¹⁸⁹ When languishing in exile abroad in 1556, Throckmorton invoked his political expediency in 1553 to demonstrate his loyalty and persuade Mary to allow him to return to England, for 'when none obeyed your highness, but those that would [I] did you such service as others hated me for, and your majestie did graciously accept'.¹⁹⁰

III. Mary's Reign

At the beginning of Mary's reign Throckmorton and Randolph were in very different positions. Throckmorton was a courtier; Randolph was a member of a cosmopolitan group of reformers at Christ Church. Neither left England with the first wave of exiles. Throckmorton fled England only in 1555 after he was implicated in the Dudley Plot. Randolph, on the other hand, left England for religious reasons during 1554, albeit he had obtained leave to study abroad before Mary's accession.¹⁹¹ Yet, their experiences of exile on the continent during the 1550s brought them similar socio-political experiences and the opportunity to engage in low level diplomacy.

As with the succession crisis of 1553, Throckmorton responded pragmatically to the religious turmoil instigated by Mary's accession. Known for his 'marked detestation of papistrie', Throckmorton 'stood for true religion' in Mary's first Parliament but he chose not to follow many of his former Edwardian colleagues into exile at that point.¹⁹² Instead he helped exiles, like John Jewel, escape England and attempted to effect change from within by dabbling in political conspiracy.¹⁹³ In February 1554, he was indicted for his treasonable involvement in

¹⁸⁸ Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁸⁹ *CPR P&M*, I, p. 206.

¹⁹⁰ Stowe 280, 106r, Throckmorton to Mary (n.d.).

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, fos. 104r-106v; Chapter Book, p. 89.

¹⁹² SP70/30, fo. 84r, Medeley to Throckmorton, 23 September 1561; Bindoff (ed.), *History of Parliament*, Appendix XI: 'They which stood for the true religion' October 1553, <https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1509-1558/survey/appendix-xi-they-which-stood-true-religion-october-1553>.

¹⁹³ J. Ayre (ed.), *The Works of John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury* (Cambridge, 1850), p. 589.

Wyatt's Rebellion alongside many of his Edwardian colleagues and in 1555 he fled to France following the discovery of the Dudley Plot.¹⁹⁴ Evidence of Throckmorton's involvement in the latter is sketchy but that he was dabbling in treasonable activity is indicated by the precaution he took in October 1555 to sign his lands over to his wife in case he had to go into exile.¹⁹⁵

Randolph's experiences prior to leaving England were somewhat different. At Christ Church, he was part of the Protestant community centred around the continental reformer Peter Martyr. The more extreme Protestants Christopher Goodman and William Whittingham, who would later help compile the Geneva Bible, were also part of this circle. However, Randolph was closest to Jewel and Martyr, witnessing the latter's admission to Christ Church in 1548 and attending private sermons in Martyr's lodgings alongside Jewel.¹⁹⁶ Randolph's experiences as part of Martyr's embattled Protestant enclave within conservative Oxford undoubtedly helped to cultivate his sense that Protestantism was under threat from the hostile forces of Catholicism. Martyr faced strenuous opposition to his reformed beliefs. He was targeted by Catholic malcontents and even had to flee Oxford when the conservative commons revolted in 1549.¹⁹⁷ The 1553 succession crisis and Mary's accession had an immediate impact on Randolph's community at Christ Church. Jewel and Martyr, who both had strong links to Thomas Cranmer and the Edwardian regime, were immediately deprived of their positions with Martyr leaving England for the continent.¹⁹⁸ Randolph did not immediately follow.¹⁹⁹ Although he resigned as Principal of Broadgates Hall in October, following the passage of the First Act of Appeal, he lived 'miserably enough' at Broadgates with Jewel until at least the end of January 1554.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁴ D. Loades, *Two Tudor Conspiracies* (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 15, 16, 19; B. Harrison, *The Tower of London Prisoner Book* (Leeds, 2004), pp. 184, 190.

¹⁹⁵ PROB 11/54, fo. 64r, Throckmorton's will.

¹⁹⁶ Chapter book, fo. 18v; T. Harding, *A Reiondre*, (Antwerp, 1566), sig. CCC 3.

¹⁹⁷ J. Loach, 'Reformation Controversies', in T. Aston (ed.), *The History of the University of Oxford*, III, (Oxford, 1984–2000) pp. 369-70.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 375; D. MacCulloch, *Thomas Cranmer: A Life* (Yale, 1996), pp. 416, 501.

¹⁹⁹ Chapter Book, p. 89.

²⁰⁰ Ayre (ed.), *John Jewel*, IV, pp. 1191-2.

Randolph arrived at the University of Paris in self-enforced exile in early 1554. Over the next few years he intermittently travelled to Zurich, Frankfurt, Strasburg and Basel, where his old friends, like Martyr and Jewel resided, and took an excursion to Italy in 1556 with his friend, Edward Frensham.²⁰¹ In 1555 he was joined by Throckmorton, who he later recalled studied ‘phisicke’ at Paris.²⁰² During this time Randolph and Throckmorton formed a friendship and became part of an Anglo-Scottish community of Protestants. Alongside other members of this group, they acted as informers for the English ambassador in France, Nicholas Wotton, reporting on the activities of English political dissidents and French plans to invade the Pale of Calais.²⁰³ Throckmorton secured Wotton’s favourable reports of his ‘good affection to the Quenes Majestie’ and his willingness ‘not to meddle with these other Rebelles doinges’.²⁰⁴ This likely helped Throckmorton’s attempts to secure a pardon and return to England, which he had pursued through the intervention of influential courtiers, like his cousin Francis Englefield, and by directly appealing to Queen Mary.²⁰⁵ Throckmorton’s letter to Mary displayed all his rhetorical skills, capitalising on any asset that could be used to further his argument. He reminded the Queen of his loyalty in 1553 and that he had ‘so behaved myself’ when tasked with delivering Edward’s letters berating Mary for hearing the mass that she had even thanked him.²⁰⁶ He recalled that his father, George Throckmorton, had spoken out against Henry’s marriage to Anne Boleyn and suffered ‘greate troble’ for his support of ‘the goode quene your mother, & your highnes owne cause’; and his mother, he argued, ‘was & is your dailie beedewoman’.²⁰⁷ Having secured a pardon, Throckmorton returned to England in May

²⁰¹ SP69/10, fo. 82r, Wotton to Mary, 27 April 1557; Harley 416, fos. 126r, 128r, Randolph to Frensham, 1556; SP70/1, fos. 48r-49r.

²⁰² Advocates 1.2.2, fo. 42r, Randolph to Throckmorton, 7 February 1566.

²⁰³ SP69/10, fo. 82r-v; SP69/10, fo. 61r, Wotton’s Notes, April 1557.

²⁰⁴ SP69/9, fo. 25r-v, Wotton to Council, 13 July 1556; SP69/9, fo. 84r, Wotton to Council, 8 October 1556.

²⁰⁵ SP69/9, fo. 25r; Stowe 280, fos. 104r-106v.

²⁰⁶ Foxe, *A&M*, 1563 edition, IV, p. 863, IX, p. 1358; Stowe 280, fo. 106r.

²⁰⁷ Stowe 280, fo. 106r; P. Marshall, ‘Crisis of Allegiance: George Throckmorton and Henry Tudor’, in P. Marshall and G. Scott (eds.) *Catholic Gentry in English Society: The Throckmortons of Coughton from Reformation to Emancipation* (New York, 2016), pp. 31-67.

1557. There he placed national interest over his religious inclinations, joining Mary's army leaving for St Quentin under the leadership of his kinsman, Pembroke.²⁰⁸ Randolph ultimately did the same, returning home when England went to war against France in 1557. The following year, he had his first official experience of intelligence-gathering when he returned to the continent as an intelligencer for the Marian government reporting on the activities of the German Princes.²⁰⁹

IV. **Socio-Political Networks**

i. **English Connections**

Although not a member of Winthrop Hudson's Cambridge Connection, Throckmorton was well-connected to those men who were; he was entrenched in the Edwardian regime and was part of the socio-political circle that translated into the early Elizabethan regime.²¹⁰ Throckmorton's place in this socio-political network was essential to his political inclusion at Elizabeth's accession and his prospects throughout the 1560s. For instance, during the development of the second Prayer Book in 1551, Throckmorton engaged in a debate on the Sacrament in Cecil's chamber alongside Francis Russell, the future Earl of Bedford, and Francis Knollys, all of whom would be appointed to Elizabeth's Privy Council in 1558.²¹¹ Alford considered the membership of these debates to be 'expressions of friendship' as well as ideology.²¹² Throckmorton's close working relationship with Cecil during the early years of Elizabeth's reign had its roots in the bond they established prior to 1558. This earlier relationship was so strong that Cecil passed the task of drafting Jane's proclamation as queen

²⁰⁸ SP69/10, fo. 102r, Wotton to Bourne and Boxall, 6 May 1557; M. Rodriguez-Salgado and S. Adams (eds.), 'The Count of Feria's Dispatch to Philip II of 14 November 1558', *Camden Fourth Series*, 29: *Camden Miscellany XXVIII* (1984), p. 332.

²⁰⁹ SP69/13, fo. 14v, Gresham to Boxall, 6 June 1558; SP70/1, fo. 10r-v, Randolph to Clinton, 18 November 1558; SP70/1, fos. 48r-49r.

²¹⁰ See Alford, *Kingship*, pp. 195-200; Sowerby 'Diplomatic Corps', p. 268.

²¹¹ Parker Library MS 102, p. 253.

²¹² *EEP*, p. 25.

onto Throckmorton ‘whose conscience’ he noted ‘was troubled therewith’.²¹³ Likewise, Throckmorton shared a long friendship with Bedford, with whom he was noted to be especially close and ‘went everywhere with’ during Philip II’s military campaign of 1557.²¹⁴ During the 1560s the relationship was mutually beneficial: they regularly shared information when absent from court and Bedford sued for Throckmorton to be discharged from his French embassy.²¹⁵ Such were Throckmorton’s connections at the heart of the Elizabethan regime that when he wished to be recalled from his embassy in France he was able to secure the support of several of Elizabeth’s Privy Councillors, including Northampton, Pembroke and Wotton.²¹⁶ Throckmorton also knew another of Elizabeth’s future councillors, Edward Fiennes de Clinton, Lord Admiral, with whom he supervised Randolph and Killigrew’s mission to Germany in 1558.²¹⁷

Throckmorton found the connections he had made in Edward’s Privy Chamber politically useful during Elizabeth’s reign. He was then acquainted with Leicester with whom he established a close working relationship during the 1560s.²¹⁸ Henry Sidney, Throckmorton’s ‘old fellow’, would become Elizabeth’s President of the Council of Wales and Lord Deputy of Ireland, and was one of those that Throckmorton worked through to petition for his return from embassy in France; and Henry Neville kept Throckmorton apprised of news from the English court during his embassy to France.²¹⁹

²¹³ P. Tytler, *England under the Reigns of Edward VI and Mary* (London, 1839), II, pp. 192-3.

²¹⁴ Rodriguez-Salgado and Adams (eds.), ‘Feria’s Dispatch’, p. 332; by 1567 their friendship spanned 20 years, SP59/14, fo. 54r, Bedford to Throckmorton, 23 August 1567.

²¹⁵ For instance, SP70/24, fo. 42r-v, Bedford to Throckmorton, 16 March 1561.

²¹⁶ SP70/30, fo. 108v, Somers to Throckmorton, 26 September 1561; Add. 35830, fo. 230r, Wotton to Throckmorton, 25 December 1561; SP70/34, fo. 108r, Throckmorton to Wotton, January 1562.

²¹⁷ SP70/1, fo. 10r; SP70/1, fos. 48r-49r.

²¹⁸ Hoak, ‘Privy Chamber’, p. 98; Nichols (ed.), *Literary Remains*, p. 359.

²¹⁹ SP70/38, fo. 67r-v, Sidney to Throckmorton, 8 June 1562; SP70/27, fo. 65r, Neville to Throckmorton, 28 June 1561.

By Elizabeth's accession, Throckmorton also had connections to several of the women in her Privy Chamber through whom he hoped to learn 'her majesties disposicion'.²²⁰ Dorothy, Lady Stafford proved a particularly useful informant both during Throckmorton's embassies and when at court.²²¹ Throckmorton also worked through his wife, Anne, who claimed a bond of kinship with Elizabeth through her maternal great-grandmother and had become acquainted with her when they were both members of Katharine Parr's household.²²² Elizabeth treated Anne favourably, including her amongst her ladies at her coronation and standing godmother to two of her children.²²³ Whilst it is not clear if Anne was a lady of the Privy Chamber, as Charlotte Merton suggests, Elizabeth often commanded that Anne attend court and provided lodgings for her to do so, and Anne certainly had ample access to the Queen and her ladies.²²⁴ Anne used this access and her friendships with two of Elizabeth's ladies – Elizabeth, Marchioness of Northampton and Lady Stafford – to petition the Queen.²²⁵ Anne's political utility was extensive. She cultivated both hers and Throckmorton's connections at court, using them to protect and advance his interests, gaining him grants of land and petitioning for his revocation. She kept him apprised of domestic and foreign news circulating at court, she acted as conduit for Throckmorton's friends who wished to contact him and proved to be useful in his engagement with Mary, Queen of Scots and her court.²²⁶ In 1561, Anne was instrumental

²²⁰ Add. 48149, fo. 8r; Graham-Matheson, 'Elisabeth Parr', pp. 68-70, 195-197.

²²¹ PL 2502, p. 522, Throckmorton to Leicester, 19 February 1566.

²²² Appendix; Anne was probably the Lady Carew, maid of honour that Dakota Hamilton struggled to identify in D. Hamilton, 'The Household of Queen Katharine Parr' (DPhil, Oxford, 1992), p. 114.

²²³ LC 2/4/3, fo. 54r, Elizabeth's Coronation Roll; E351/541, fo. 56v, Household Accounts; J. Lawson (ed.), *The Elizabethan New Years Gift Exchanges, 1559-1603* (Oxford, 2013), p. 102.

²²⁴ C. Merton, 'Women who served Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth: Ladies, Gentlewomen and Maids of the Privy Chamber, 1553-1603' (PhD, Cambridge, 1992), p. 269; SP70/41, fo. 177v, Anne Throckmorton to Throckmorton, 20 September 1562.

²²⁵ SP70/39, fo. 21r, Anne Throckmorton to Throckmorton, 10 July 1562; Graham-Matheson, 'Elisabeth Parr', pp. 68-70, 195-197.

²²⁶ SP15/9/2, fo. 43r, Sackville to Anne Throckmorton, 11 July 1560; SP70/19, fo. 46r, Killigrew to Throckmorton, 10 October 1560; SP70/51, fo. 107r, Anne Throckmorton to Throckmorton, 24 February 1563; G. Allen, 'The Rise of the Ambassadors: English Ambassadorial Wives and Early Modern Diplomatic Culture', *HJ*, 62/3 (2018), 617-638; SP70/24, fo. 42r; SP70/30, fo. 99v, Heneage to Throckmorton 16&24 September 1561; SP70/19, fo. 57r, Killigrew to Throckmorton, 15 October 1560; Add. 35831, fo. 28r, Cecil to Throckmorton, 24 March 1562; SP70/36, fo. 36r, Honnyng to Challoner, 14 April 1562.

in facilitating a reconciliation between Throckmorton and Leicester after Throckmorton had opposed Leicester's marriage suit. She signed a letter drafted by her husband, as if it were her own, which asked for Leicester's assistance in securing Throckmorton's return to England and when she returned to England, she cemented the newfound friendship by asking Leicester to be the godfather of her new son.²²⁷ Anne's actions are a testament to the importance of female agency in establishing and maintaining her family's political relationships.

Crucially, Throckmorton knew Elizabeth herself. He had access to her when they both resided in Katherine Parr's household and when Elizabeth visited King Edward at court. There is little evidence of the nature of their early association. However, in 1560 Elizabeth reportedly 'greatly commended' Throckmorton's 'service and fidelite not without good remembraunce of thinges past before she was Quene'.²²⁸ When the Spanish ambassador visited Elizabeth three days before her accession, he reported that Throckmorton was in high favour and rated his influence akin to that of Elizabeth's future councillors, Bedford, Clinton, and Leicester.²²⁹

That Throckmorton was in frequent contact with Elizabeth and a regular visitor at Hatfield during 1558 is suggested in his paper on government formation and policy he sent to the prospective Queen.²³⁰ Throckmorton has been labelled presumptuous for sending Elizabeth this advice. Yet, he introduced it by stating that 'I doubt not of your gracious acceptacion (wherof I have experience)'.²³¹ This suggests that Throckmorton had a pre-existing advisory relationship with Elizabeth and that historically she had accepted some of his advice.

²²⁷ Add. 35830, fo. 195r, Anne Throckmorton to Leicester, 30 August 1561; SP70/38, fo. 208r, Leicester to Throckmorton, 25 June 1562.

²²⁸ SP70/21, fo. 61v, Jones to Throckmorton, 10 December 1560.

²²⁹ Rodriguez-Salgado and Adams (eds.), 'Feria's Dispatch', p. 332.

²³⁰ Parker Library, MS 543, fo. 33v.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, fo. 31v; Neale, 'Throckmorton's Advice', 92.

While Throckmorton was entrenched in the socio-political network at the heart of the early Elizabethan regime, Randolph was a relative outsider. He did not possess powerful kinship connections and had no access to the court to establish his own contacts there. Through the marriage of his brother, Edward, to Sybil Croft, Randolph was connected to the future Elizabethan privy councillor, James Croft, who worked alongside Randolph on Anglo-Scottish affairs in 1559-60.²³² Randolph's cousin, Elizabeth Sandys, was one of Elizabeth's ladies-in-waiting during the early 1550s and after her accession, but there is no evidence that her position in the Privy Chamber was beneficial to Randolph.²³³ During his time at King's School and in Paris, Randolph developed a relationship with Wotton to whom Randolph 'attribute[d] what somever is in me, ether for hope ever to serve the Quenes majestie, or to be counted worthie the name of ^an^ honeste man'.²³⁴ Nevertheless, at Elizabeth's accession, Randolph's friendship network was primarily composed of cosmopolitan Protestant divines.

The Marian exile brought Throckmorton and Randolph into each other's orbit in a way that would be crucially important for Randolph at Elizabeth's accession. Meeting in Paris in 1555, they were part of a friendship group that included Killigrew, another political exile, and Wotton's secretary John Somers.²³⁵ Once they returned from the continent these relationships persisted. Randolph was reliant on Throckmorton at this time, as suggested by his letter to Throckmorton asserting that he and the other exiles resident at Strasbourg were willing to return to England 'or otherwyse to do as you shall advice us' following Elizabeth's accession.²³⁶ Throckmorton attempted to use his influence to advance Randolph, Killigrew and Somers's careers. Throckmorton's advice suggested Randolph and Somers as possible clerks

²³² Welch, 'Thomas Randolph', p. 161.

²³³ SP52/7, fo. 94r, Randolph to Killigrew, December 1562; R. Chavasse, 'Humanism in Exile: Celio Secondo Curione's Learned Women and Friends and Exempla for Elizabeth I', *Parergon* (1996), 174.

²³⁴ Woodruff and Cape, *Schola Regia Cantuariensis*, pp. 48-9, 62; SP52/4, fo. 11r, Randolph to Cecil, 7 June 1560.

²³⁵ Parker Library, MS 543, fo. 34r.

²³⁶ SP70/1, fo. 49r.

of the Council.²³⁷ When these roles did not materialise Throckmorton employed them both in his French embassy alongside Killigrew.²³⁸ Throckmorton played a part in Randolph becoming Elizabeth's agent in Scotland and ensuring he received adequate financial remuneration for the role.²³⁹ Randolph acknowledged that he would 'alwayes [be] your Lordships Detter'.²⁴⁰ In 1562 he emphasised the utility of his 'longe' relationship with Throckmorton and their frequent exchange of letters to his diplomatic position.²⁴¹

iii. Scottish Connections

The connections Throckmorton and Randolph made on the continent during Mary's reign helped to lay the foundations for their involvement in Anglo-Scottish relations following Elizabeth's accession. They were part of an Anglo-Scottish community that included the diarist and future Scottish ambassador, James Melville, and William Kirkcaldy, Lord of Grange.²⁴² This 'fraternitie in religion' that superseded national boundaries provides an important dimension for understanding Randolph's self-identification with the religious plight of the Lords of the Congregation in 1559-60 and his approach to Anglo-Scottish relations in the early 1560s. Moreover, his friendships with Kirkcaldy and Arran, who became key figures amongst the Congregation, and several other 'Scottyshe men' exiled in France were key to establishing his position as Elizabeth's agent in Scotland.²⁴³ The relationships appear to have been less fundamental to Throckmorton's thought process and his conduct of diplomacy; however, there is evidence that he and Melville used one another as informants during the 1560s.²⁴⁴

²³⁷ Parker Library, MS 543, fo. 34r.

²³⁸ SP70/13, fo. 77r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 12 April 1560; SP70/5, fo. 57v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 21 June 1559.

²³⁹ Ibid.; SP52/10, fo. 100r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 21 May 1565.

²⁴⁰ Add. 35831, fo. 19v, Randolph to Throckmorton, 4 March 1562.

²⁴¹ SP52/7, fo. 32r, Randolph to Throckmorton, 7 April 1562.

²⁴² Melville, *Memoirs*, pp. 230-1, 245.

²⁴³ SP52/7, fo. 36r, Randolph to Cecil, 25 April 1562; SP52/6, fo. 164r, Randolph to Cecil, 27 October 1561.

²⁴⁴ Melville, *Memoirs*, pp. 115, 123.

Conclusion

Throckmorton and Randolph's differing educational backgrounds, levels of political experience, and the extent and composition of their socio-political networks help to explain their differing levels of political influence, their approach to counsel and their perspectives on Anglo-Scottish relations at Elizabeth's accession.

Throckmorton fitted the stereotypical image of an ambassador, as laid down in treatises on the perfect qualities of a diplomat. He was well-versed in histories and languages, and his able command of rhetoric in high-pressure situations was well-known. He also had extensive practical political experience as a courtier, member of embassies and an intelligencer, and he had led negotiations on the Anglo-Scottish border. During the twenty years prior to Elizabeth's accession Throckmorton had shared political experiences with many of those who were to be her councillors. He was well-acquainted with the Queen and had kin and friends in her Privy Council and her Privy Chamber. He was integrated into the early Elizabethan regime, and this was crucial to establishing his position. Throckmorton's relationships with the Queen and Cecil were critically important. He was at Hatfield with Elizabeth when the messenger arrived to proclaim her Queen and, the following day, he was dispatched to London with a commission from Elizabeth to stay the ports. At the same time, Throckmorton was working with Cecil on the Queen's entry into London.²⁴⁵ Although he did not initially receive a position of prominence within the regime, Throckmorton was politically engaged. In December, the Spanish ambassador reported that Throckmorton was present at a Council meeting and he evidently worked closely with Cecil.²⁴⁶ He was involved in devising and implementing diplomatic missions: in late 1558, acting on the Queen's behalf, Throckmorton recalled his old

²⁴⁵ SP12/1, fo. 7r.

²⁴⁶ *CSPS*, I, pp. 17, 34; SP12/2, fo. 89r, Stafford to Cecil, 12 February 1559; SP12/1, fo. 107r, John Throckmorton to Cecil, 29 December 1558.

friend Killigrew from Germany and secured his swift return to the Princes of Germany with a secret request for a common league of religion, a policy that Throckmorton had forwarded in his advice.²⁴⁷ Through the influence of Bedford, Throckmorton was returned to the 1559 Parliament as MP for Lyme Regis.²⁴⁸ Throckmorton was well-placed to take on a political role and, building upon his prior advice to the Queen, to counsel effectively.

Educationally, Randolph also had the skills deemed requisite for an ambassador. His legal training even put him on par with some of Elizabeth's key advisers, like Cecil. However, he lacked political and diplomatic experience, complaining to Cecil in 1561 that 'I never have byne in place to lerne'.²⁴⁹ This, alongside Randolph's lack of integration into the early Elizabethan regime, deeply affected his early conduct of diplomacy and hampered his ability to make the transition from intelligencer to diplomatic adviser. These differences between Randolph and Throckmorton's political experience and socio-political network form the basis for exploring their differing approaches to counsel and ability to influence political decisions in the next chapter. Similarly, their differing experiences of the 1540s and 1550s – Throckmorton's involvement with Henrician and Edwardian foreign policies and Randolph's inclusion in Martyr's circle of Protestant divines at Oxford – provides an important foundation for exploring their different perspectives on Anglo-Scottish relations.

²⁴⁷ Lansdowne 106, fo. 132r; D. Gehring, *Anglo-German Relations and the Protestant Cause: Elizabethan Foreign Policy and Pan-Protestantism* (Abingdon, 2016), pp. 28-30; Parker Library, MS 543, fo. 33r.

²⁴⁸ 'Lyme Regis', Thorpe (ed.), *History of Parliament*, <http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1558-1603/constituencies/lyme-regis> [accessed 18/05/20].

²⁴⁹ SP52/6, fo. 164v.

Chapter 2

Diplomatic Counsel: Politics, Networks and Political Influence

A diplomat's ability to exercise political influence when resident abroad and at his return home depended upon the 'estimation' he was held in at the English court and the personal relationships he had formed within the regime.²⁵⁰ The intimate connection between private friendship and public 'estimation', or perceived political acumen, is clearly elucidated in the accolades written by Walsingham and Thomas Sackville, Lord Buckhurst on the death of Throckmorton (1571): both men lamented the 'prywat los' of 'soe deere a frind' and spoke of 'the genrall los' to their Queen and Country of such an able adviser, who, Walsingham added, 'for Counsell in peace and for Conduct in war...hath left of like sufficiency noe successor that I knowe'.²⁵¹

Elizabethan politics and, by extension, diplomacy were at their very essence social activities: the bonds of friendship, kinship and allegiance formed a complex web that underpinned political society, binding together the Queen, her key advisers and other members of the regime.²⁵² Political engagement was not determined solely by institutional position but by informal, personal connections. Achieving an effective and successful political career was heavily reliant on an individual's personal relationship with the Queen and his colleagues. Mears, Adams and Haigh have all argued that Elizabeth primarily chose to be advised informally by 'her intimates', those privy councillors and non-conciliar advisors with whom she had a close personal relationship; a process that culminated in the rise to power of her

²⁵⁰ F. Thynne, *The Perfect Ambassadour treating of the antiquitie, priveledges, and behaviour of men belonging to that function* (London, 1652), fos. 18v-19r.

²⁵¹ Harley 260, fo. 28r, Walsingham to Leicester, 5 March 1570; SP70/116, fo. 100r, Buckhurst to Cecil, 21 February 1571.

²⁵² See for instance *Queenship*, pp. 33-72; Alford, *Kingship*, pp. 195-200; Doran, *Circle*; Jones, *Governing*, pp. 44-74; Sowerby, 'Diplomatic Corps'.

closest relatives and trusted friends of long-standing, most notably Leicester.²⁵³ This practice conformed to the model of the classical *amici principis* or the *consilium amicorum* elucidated in the works of writers such as Elyot.²⁵⁴ Many of the tenets of true friendship – trust, respect, offering and receiving honest advice, and a shared political outlook – defined in Cicero’s influential *de amicitia*, were also the faculties of a good counsellor.²⁵⁵ These Ciceronian precepts of friendship provided the foundation for strong political relationships and bound together the participants in any private, informal political discussion.

If friendship was key to the membership of Elizabeth’s advisory network this was also the case for her chief advisors, who practised a similarly informal, collegial style of advice-taking and policy discussion with their trusted associates. Leicester and Cecil worked informally with their colleagues to discuss, formulate, and implement policies. Alford has highlighted Cecil’s collaborative work with Thomas Parry on Anglo-Scottish policy in mid-1559, and in December 1559, as the Council debated English intervention in Scotland, Cecil privately discussed the issue with Parry, Sackville, and Ambrose Cave.²⁵⁶ Likewise in the winter of 1564-5 Leicester attempted to orchestrate Anglo-Scottish policy with the help of his friends Throckmorton and Killigrew.²⁵⁷ The informal, collegial nature of early Elizabethan politics is epitomised by the working relationship between Leicester and Cecil themselves. Once characterised as factional, it is now recognised to have been more congenial and collaborative. Adams has shown that despite taking different stances on key political issues they ‘agreed over the broader aims of a

²⁵³ Adams, ‘Eliza Enthroned?’, pp. 63-65; Adams, ‘Faction’, p. 18; *Queenship*, pp. 39-40, 48; Haigh, *Elizabeth*, pp. 85-97.

²⁵⁴ Conrad, ‘Counsel Reconsidered’, pp. 76-8.

²⁵⁵ Cicero, *de amicitia*,

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/Laelius_de_Amicitia/text*.html [accessed 16/09/15].

²⁵⁶ *EEP*, pp. 56-7; SP52/1, fo. 318r, French Designs on Scotland, 28 December 1559.

²⁵⁷ Egerton 1818, fo. 29r, Killigrew to Lethington, 18 December 1564; NLS, MS 3657, fo. 8r, Throckmorton to Lethington, 18 January 1565; S. Adams, ‘The Release of Lord Darnley and the Failure of the Amity’, *Innes Review*, 38 (1987), 142.

Protestant policy' and frequently worked together; and Alford believed their relationship to be one of 'tolerant and earnest co-operation' and 'at best, perhaps, friendship'.²⁵⁸

Elizabeth, Cecil, and Leicester represent three interconnected channels of counsel. The membership of all three of their networks could overlap or work in isolation. Thus, some members of Cecil and Leicester's networks, like Throckmorton, also acted as informal advisors to the Queen.²⁵⁹ These men tended to exert the most political influence, as they were able to offer counsel both directly to Elizabeth and indirectly through political discussions with Cecil and/or Leicester. A direct channel of counsel to the Queen enabled Elizabethans to forward their advice irrespective of whether Cecil or Leicester approved of it and, for ambassadors, removed the potential for either man to misrepresent the contents of their letters.²⁶⁰ As Mears has shown, the capacity to influence the Queen directly could have profound consequences, for example in 1581 Elizabeth chose to take the advice of an ambassador over her principal secretary when deciding upon her policy towards Scotland.²⁶¹ Individuals who were unable to advise the Queen directly were generally less politically influential as they were solely reliant upon the mediation of Cecil and/or Leicester. This chapter examines the impact of Throckmorton and Randolph's relationships with the three main channels of political authority within the regime during the 1560s, Elizabeth, Cecil and Leicester, on their political engagement and their influence as counsellors in the formation and implementation of policies both during and after their embassies.

I. The Queen

²⁵⁸ Adams, 'Faction', pp. 18-19; *EEP*, p. 30.

²⁵⁹ *Queenship*, pp. 33-72.

²⁶⁰ S. Alford, 'Some Elizabethan Spies in the Office of Sir Francis Walsingham', in R. Adams and R. Cox (eds.), *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture* (Basingstoke, 2011), p. 59.

²⁶¹ *Queenship*, p. 43.

The view of Elizabeth as a Queen removed from the process of policy negotiation, with her political autonomy restrained by her councillors' commitment to the ideology of 'mixed monarchy', is no longer accepted.²⁶² In line with a less confrontational view of Elizabethan politics, Elizabeth is now often depicted as a Queen in control of her government, actively seeking counsel and presiding over informal meetings of counsellors on key political issues.²⁶³ Allinson depicted a politically active monarch, whose personal letters to foreign rulers and instructions to diplomats shaped England's foreign policy.²⁶⁴ These views are furthered by evidence from the state papers and other diplomatic collections that underscore Elizabeth's active political role during the 1560s. A holograph letter 'scribed' in haste to Throckmorton at the height of the Newhaven debacle in July 1563 reveals Elizabeth actively directing foreign policy. Acting on 'new advertisement[s that] make new determination[s]' she personally revoked Throckmorton's second set of instructions and ordered him to revert back to his initial instructions to negotiate the town's surrender on the grounds that 'we thinke it more than time that the matter wer taken up with all possible spede'. Ending on a personal plea that reminded Throckmorton 'how muche it toucheth our honor...and my particular comfort', the letter underscores the intimate connection between Elizabeth's prestige as a monarch and English policy.²⁶⁵ This was not an isolated incident. Elizabeth readily involved herself in foreign policies accorded high political importance. In 1563 she personally amended diplomatic instructions offering the examination of Mary, Queen of Scots' title to the English throne in exchange for Mary choosing a husband consonant with English interests, and instructions relating to the Anglo-French peace negotiations.²⁶⁶ In 1567, during the crisis in Anglo-Scottish

²⁶² Adams, 'Eliza Enthroned?', p. 24; *EEP*; McLaren, *Political Culture*, pp. 36-43, 75-7, 101, 141-3.

²⁶³ *Queenship*, pp. 12-103; Doran, 'Counsel', pp. 151-70.

²⁶⁴ Allinson, *Monarchy of Letters*.

²⁶⁵ Christies, sale 7590, lot 79, <http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/books-manuscripts/elizabeth-i-queen-of-england-and-5080773-details.aspx?from=searchresults&intObjectID=5080773&sid=c2342a75-10cd-4f90-a9e7-fbf03ebc148> [accessed 02/11/14].

²⁶⁶ SP52/8, fos. 100r-104r, Instructions for Randolph, 20 August 1563; SP70/65, fo. 87r, Instructions to Throckmorton and Smith, 26 November 1563.

relations provoked by Mary's rapid downfall, Elizabeth took the lead in directing English policy toward Scotland. In May she privately gathered intelligence and advice from ex-ambassadors with experience in Anglo-Scottish affairs; Elizabeth kept close tabs on 'every days Journey' in her ambassador's progress towards Edinburgh; and, in Cecil's absence, she personally responded to the ambassador's letters, directing instructions to him at all times of the day and night.²⁶⁷ Moreover, Elizabeth actively controlled knowledge of foreign intelligence: Leicester complained that Elizabeth would make 'no other creature...prevye' to Throckmorton's latest dispatch from Scotland.²⁶⁸ Such secrecy was accepted. In *De Republica Anglorum*, Smith considered it a monarchical prerogative to keep 'letters sent unto him secret as he will'.²⁶⁹ In 1567, at Elizabeth's behest, her counsellors attempted to negotiate Mary's release and restoration as Queen of Scotland, a policy with which most of them wholeheartedly disagreed. This exemplifies the fact that, as Mears has shown, counsellors deferred to Elizabeth's ultimate decision on policy, in line with Cecil's view that 'our partes is to counsell, and after to obey the commandor'.²⁷⁰

English diplomats acknowledged Elizabeth's fundamental political role; most sent her regular letters containing the latest foreign intelligence alongside their missives to Cecil and the Privy Council. Ambassadors, by virtue of their diplomatic letters, had the unique opportunity of being able to wield political influence through a private, privileged direct channel of communication with their monarch. In this regard, Throckmorton and Randolph's diplomatic practice lay at opposite ends of the spectrum. An extreme version of his colleagues, Throckmorton prioritised his direct channel of counsel to the Queen, sending most of his intelligence and advice straight

²⁶⁷ V. Smith, "'For Ye, Young Men, Show a Womanish Soul, Yon Maiden A Man's': Perspectives on Female Monarchy in Elizabeth's First Decade", in J. Daybell and S. Norrhem (eds.), *Gender and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe* (London, 2016), p. 148.

²⁶⁸ SP59/13, fo. 272r, Leicester to Throckmorton, 23 July 1567.

²⁶⁹ T. Smith, *De Republica Anglorum: A Discourse on the Commonwealth of England*, ed. L. Alston (Cambridge, 1906), p. 59.

²⁷⁰ *Queenship*, pp. 93-4; Add. 33593, fo. 129r-v, Cecil to Sadler, 14 January 1570.

to her in letter or verbal form and jealously guarding its privacy. In one letter he asked the Queen to preserve the privacy of his 'lyberall speche'; in another he remitted his intelligence until he was able 'to speake wythe youe' in person; and on one occasion he complained that intelligence he had sent her privately was publicly known.²⁷¹ Throckmorton repeatedly referred Cecil to his letters to Elizabeth for intelligence, yet the secretary exhibited frustration with the ambassador's desire to broach 'mater[s] of such weight' directly with the Queen.²⁷² In contrast, Randolph's rare letters to Elizabeth referred her to his regular, voluminous letters to Cecil, upon whose mediation he relied.

This difference in practice is underscored by their disparate reactions to what they believed to be Elizabeth's misuse of their intelligence. Throckmorton confronted the Queen directly, explaining that her actions damaged his credit with his informant, the Spanish ambassador to France, 'for he hathe allredy layde to my charge that the french know from England what he hath said to me'.²⁷³ In contrast Randolph nervously broached the subject with Cecil presenting the complaint not as his own, but as that of his informants in Scotland, who found that their 'intellegences...are returned backe unto their Queen...from the Queen majesties owne mouthe'. The Scots wanted Elizabeth to 'be dealte with here in', but Randolph referred the matter to Cecil's 'wysedome', whose close personal relationship with the Queen meant that he 'knowth better how suche a matter cane be borne, then anye other dothe'.²⁷⁴ Born of their different levels of acquaintance with Elizabeth, Throckmorton's direct engagement with the Queen and Randolph's reliance upon the mediation of her closest advisers impacted upon their conduct of diplomacy, their political engagement and their ability to exert political influence.

²⁷¹ SP70/25, fo. 120v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 29 April 1561; SP70/7, fo. 80r; Add. 35830, fos. 66v-67r, Jones to Throckmorton, 30 November 1560.

²⁷² Add. 35830, fo. 68r.

²⁷³ SP70/12, fo. 125r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 29 March 1560.

²⁷⁴ CP 155, fo. 34v, Randolph to Cecil, 17 June 1566.

Throckmorton had already established an advisory relationship with the Queen prior to her accession, offering her counsel on the formation of her government and the initial policies it should follow. Elizabeth only appointed some of the men Throckmorton suggested for positions within the regime; however, his policy advice, in particular his cautious approach to religious upheaval was in line with that pursued in the opening months of the reign. He suggested Elizabeth order ‘Salutations’ to be sent to ‘my allies’ with the Pope and the Emperor heading the list; ambassadors to the Pope, the Emperor and the King of Spain also appear on a memoranda from the day of Elizabeth’s accession.²⁷⁵ Elizabeth was also to send ambassadors to the Protestant princes ‘with secrett instruccions syned with your owne hand’.²⁷⁶ In late 1558, Throckmorton, acting on the Queen’s behalf, orchestrated this policy, recalling Killigrew from Germany and securing his swift return to the Princes of Germany with a secret request for a common league of religion.²⁷⁷

Throckmorton was almost certainly at Hatfield when the messenger arrived to proclaim Elizabeth Queen of England. The following day he was dispatched to London, trusted with the crucial commission from the Queen to secure the capital, stay the ports and organise taking control of the recently deceased Cardinal Pole’s property.²⁷⁸ From London, Throckmorton wrote to inform the Queen of his progress, asking her to order ‘a stey & searche’ on the Essex sea coast and to send her warrant to the Tower. This letter, far from being ‘an anti-climax’ written by a disinterested man, as John Neale suggests, demonstrates that Throckmorton was working hard to continue in an advisory role in the immediate aftermath of Elizabeth’s

²⁷⁵ Parker Library, MS 543, fo. 32r; SP12/1, fo. 3r, Memorandum, 17 November 1558.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, fo. 33r.

²⁷⁷ Lansdowne 106, fo. 132r, Killigrew, n.d.; Gehring, *Anglo-German Relations*, pp. 28-9.

²⁷⁸ SP12/1, fo. 7r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 18 November 1558.

accession.²⁷⁹ Using his former political experience to bolster his credentials as an advisor,

Throckmorton requested that Elizabeth:

stay your resolution for dyspocynge the offycis off the costome howse for a tyme, and yn lyke maner the office off settmaster yn the mynt wheareyn bycawse I had chearge yn Kynge Edwards tyme yt may be that I can enforme your majestie of some necessarie poyntes.²⁸⁰

His advice and experience were taken into consideration, and he was assigned to commissions to ‘consyder the state of the Mynte’ and to ‘consyder the state of the customes’; commissions he had suggested Elizabeth set up in his initial advice.²⁸¹

The presumption of Throckmorton’s advice has perplexed historians, but it is a fitting precursor to his consistent attempts to offer Elizabeth political guidance during her reign. The instructive detail of Throckmorton’s advice stemmed from his initial concerns about Elizabeth’s political inexperience. In 1561, when discussing the Anglo-Spanish friendship, Throckmorton complained that ‘*Dulcis inexpertis cultura potentis amici, Expertus metuit*’. Elizabeth was ‘inexpertis’ attempting to befriend the powerful Philip II. In contrast Cecil – to whom he was writing – and Throckmorton were ‘expertus’ in foreseeing the political dangers of such a friendship. Attempting to offset the ‘young’ Queen’s inexperience, Throckmorton initially cast himself in the role of a political tutor, encapsulating his advice within an explanatory framework.

In February 1560, Throckmorton attempted to persuade Elizabeth to sanction military intervention in Scotland by explaining the manifold benefits of expelling the French forces and their regent, Mary of Guise: this would enable Elizabeth to establish an Anglo-Scottish alliance, ensuring Scotland would ‘sit still’ next time England engaged France and it would secure her

²⁷⁹ Neale, ‘Throckmorton’s Advice’, 92.

²⁸⁰ SP12/1, fo. 7r.

²⁸¹ SP12/1, fos. 126r, 127r, Committees, 1558; Challis, *Tudor Coinage*, p. 119; Parker Library, MS 543, fo. 33r.

position more broadly within the archipelago by removing the capacity for ‘French practises with Ireland’. Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Edinburgh in July 1560, Throckmorton advised Elizabeth:

to reamember that theyre ys no tyme so fytt & apte for a prynce to aske subsydy off hir people as when the pryncis entrepryse & the chargis theroff ys freshe yn theyre memories...For the multytude off subgettes be always better inclynyd to aide the prynce yn prosperity then yn adversytie.²⁸²

This was, in effect, a political lesson; one that Elizabeth chose to ignore. Throckmorton viewed the Queen as having an active, and central, role in policy decisions within the regime. Thus, the instructive style of his advice was aimed at facilitating Elizabeth’s learning the political management of foreign affairs, and particularly the conduct of war. Hence, following the successful completion of English intervention in Scotland, Throckmorton told the Queen that she ought ‘now [to be] so well experimentyd in the politicke managinge of your weightye affaires’.²⁸³ The events of 1559-60 were not only a proving ground for Elizabeth’s political acumen, but for justifying Throckmorton’s value as a political adviser. As he wrote: ‘the sequele hath succedeyd as prosperuslie as I sayd yt wold...and synce my conjectures hath endyd with truthe and no danger:...I can say somewhat to conserve your majestie & your realme yn reputation securitie and pease’.²⁸⁴

Throckmorton’s explanatory model of counsel might be seen as an attempt to mitigate the effect of a female ruler. However, his primary concern was the political impact of Elizabeth’s youth and contingent inexperience. This is further suggested by Throckmorton’s use of the same tutorial approach to counsel the young Leicester when he began to involve himself in

²⁸² Smith, ‘Female Monarchy’, pp. 145-6.

²⁸³ SP70/16, fo. 47v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 19 July 1560.

²⁸⁴ SP70/17, fo. 40r.

Anglo-French policy in 1562. Throckmorton advised Leicester that any preparations to intervene in the war between the Huguenots and the French government ought:

to be done with as smal shewe as may be. [For] Some tyme occasions be offered that a greater dede must be ment then is shewed: Of this nature is the affairs in this tyme. Another tyme a greater shewe then meaning is necessary, after which maner the King of S[pain] and other papistical princes do procede here now.²⁸⁵

Throckmorton's forwardness with Elizabeth, particularly his advice against the Leicester marriage, has often roused comment. Most dramatically Mark Nicholls condemned him as 'suicidally outspoken'.²⁸⁶ Yet, while it might seem out of line to modern commentators and was deemed dangerous by some of his colleagues, Throckmorton was adhering to the tenets of a good counsellor – unflattering honesty – and aspiring to fulfil the classical model of a *vir civilis* – selflessly acting for the good of his country – deemed desirable in contemporary political culture. This is borne out by Throckmorton's admission that 'I had rather hasard to offend in the manner then to conceyle the matter: specially knowing your gracious acceptacion'.²⁸⁷ In offering Elizabeth advice at all stages of his career, Throckmorton was trading on the Queen's favour towards him, first observed by the Spanish ambassador, de Feria, three days before her accession.²⁸⁸ The pre-existing nature of Throckmorton's advisory relationship with Elizabeth continued to carry weight with the Queen long after her accession, enabling Throckmorton to offer vociferous, sometimes unpalatable, advice without suffering lasting disgrace or hampering his long-term counselling role. Even when Throckmorton criticised her relationship with Leicester and she admitted her dislike of some of Throckmorton's 'proceedinges', Elizabeth continued 'in talke' to 'greately' commend his 'service and fidelite' with 'good remembraunce of thinges past before she was Quene'.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁵ SP70/37, fo. 56r, Throckmorton to Leicester, 8 May 1562.

²⁸⁶ M. Nicholls, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1529-1603* (Oxford, 1999), p. 192.

²⁸⁷ SP70/25, fo. 120r.

²⁸⁸ Rodríguez-Salgado and Adams (eds.), 'Feria's Dispatch', p. 332.

²⁸⁹ SP70/21, fo. 61v.

Elizabeth actively furthered Throckmorton's advisory role. In July 1565 and in January 1567 the Spanish ambassador observed Elizabeth conferring with Throckmorton at length, and, in May 1567, she called him to court to seek his advice about the deteriorating situation in Scotland.²⁹⁰ Throckmorton was kept close to Elizabeth's presence, giving him opportunities to advise the Queen: during his brief visit to England in November 1559, Elizabeth made him a Gentleman of the Privy Chamber; returning from France in June 1564, Throckmorton was 'In grett favore' and appointed Chamberlain of the Exchequer and Chief Butler of England, a position that necessitated frequent involvement with the Queen and her household; and in 1568 he only missed out on the role of Vice-Chamberlain due to his persistent ill-health.²⁹¹

Such was Throckmorton's easy access to the Queen that Leicester employed him as an intermediary when absent from court rather than his own brother who was a privy councillor.²⁹² In 1567, Throckmorton informed Leicester how he had given the Earl's letters to the Queen, at 'what tyme no person was presente (by the Quens order)'. With customary boldness Throckmorton 'demaundyd...whether she wold wryte to your Lordship'. Elizabeth was satisfied that Leicester's letter admitted his fault, and at this point, desirous to have his demand fulfilled, Throckmorton engaged in a bout of witty repartee, suggesting that there was also enough in the letter 'to accuse your Majestie also, wheareoff sayd she: off extreme rygor sayd I. Then she smylyd'.²⁹³ This informal, familiar relationship that Throckmorton had crafted with Elizabeth enabled him to take full advantage of the political influence an ambassador could wield when on embassy, and in ensuring his continued role as a royal advisor after his return to the English court.

²⁹⁰ *CSPS*, I, pp. 452, 609; NLS, MS 3657, fo. 32v.

²⁹¹ SP70/9, fos. 139v-140r, Elizabeth to Francis II, 31 December 1559; SP70/74, fo. 59r, Clough to Challoner, 11 September 1564; F. Bacon, *Scrinia Ceciliana* (London, 1663), pp. 129, 131; SP12/47, fo. 106r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 2 September 1568.

²⁹² PL 2502, p. 733.

²⁹³ SP12/42, fo. 141r, Throckmorton to Leicester, 9 May 1567.

The opposite is true of Randolph: he was not an experienced courtier used to communicating with monarchs, nor did he possess a prior connection to the Queen. This dictated his initial approach. He rarely wrote to Elizabeth during his first abode in Scotland (1559-63), being ‘ignorant all togyther’ how to go about it having ‘never [been] accostomed to wryte unto suche personages’.²⁹⁴ Randolph had originally been appointed Cecil’s secret agent in Scotland, and, even after his official appointment as Elizabeth’s agent to the Congregation in December 1560 and to Mary in August 1561, Cecil remained his primary contact. Randolph relied on the secretary’s mediation to ‘be a great supplie unto my wante’ when he finally ‘presumed’ to write his first letter to the Queen in early 1561.²⁹⁵ He repeatedly referred Elizabeth to Cecil and modestly justified this conduct by explaining that of Cecil’s ‘good rehersall I do better assure my selfe then of my owne schill in puttinge the same in writinge’.²⁹⁶ Even when Mary asked him to write to Elizabeth Randolph wrote to Cecil instead rather than ‘trouble her majestie with my lettres’.²⁹⁷ In this early period, Randolph simply saw his role as ‘trewlye to reporte of thynges as I doe here and fynde, levinge unto your majesties wysedome the judgements therof’: he did not attempt to shape his intelligence to forward a particular policy or seek to advise Elizabeth directly.²⁹⁸

Randolph first spent time in Elizabeth’s presence during his extended stays at the English court in 1563 and 1564.²⁹⁹ This provoked a marked change in his conduct towards both Elizabeth and her chief advisers. Although Cecil remained his main correspondent, Randolph’s letters of intelligence to the Queen became more frequent: there are five extant letters for the first four

²⁹⁴ SP52/6, fo. 37r, Randolph to Cecil, 6 February 1561.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ SP52/9, fo. 51v, Randolph to Elizabeth, 30 March 1564.

²⁹⁷ SP52/6, fo. 171r, Randolph to Cecil, 15 November 1561.

²⁹⁸ Caligula B/X, fo. 159r, Randolph to Elizabeth, 6 September 1561.

²⁹⁹ SP52/8, fo. 79r, Elizabeth to Randolph, 5 June 1563; SP52/9, fo. 82r, Randolph to Leicester, 5 June 1564.

years of his embassy compared with the four he wrote in the first three months of 1564.³⁰⁰ Randolph even began sending Elizabeth private letters on matters (like Throckmorton), explaining ‘Some thinges ther are that bycause thaie do cheifelie concerne your Majestie I thoughte I woulde write them to no man els’.³⁰¹ On this occasion, Randolph was relaying Mary’s suspicion that Elizabeth had only suggested she marry Leicester to make him more acceptable to Elizabeth’s people so Elizabeth could marry him herself.

From January 1564 there were also significant changes in the construction and style of Randolph’s letters to the Queen. He started heading his letters with a phrase – ‘May it please your Majestie’ – separated from the main text; this was a common Scottish practice and Randolph, who had access to Lethington’s letters, probably adopted the construction from the secretary’s letters to Mary.³⁰² Randolph also began writing to Elizabeth in his best italic hand, although he continued to write in secretary to Cecil and his other contacts. It was a sign of respect; but, by emphasising his learning and suitability for his position, it also added weight to the advice he now began to tender to Elizabeth.³⁰³

There was also a stark tonal change in Randolph’s letters; he now exhibited overt ‘boldenes’ in offering his ‘opinion’.³⁰⁴ His initial deference now became a strategic ploy, as it was for many of his colleagues. Writing in late 1564 that the Scots hoped that Darnley and his mother would come to Scotland he added: ‘I dare not tayke upon me to gyve myne advise wher I knowe wisdome so farre passeth myne. But alwaies I am of the sam opinion that I was of her

³⁰⁰ Caligula B/X, fos. 158r-159r; SP52/6, fo. 153r-v, Randolph to Elizabeth, 8 October 1561; SP52/7, fos. 33r-34v, Randolph to Elizabeth, 9 April 1562; SP52/7, fo. 43r-v, Randolph to Elizabeth, 26 May 1562; SP52/9, fos. 7r-8r, Randolph to Elizabeth, 21 January 1564; SP52/9, fo. 39r-v, Randolph to Elizabeth, 8 March 1564; SP52/9, fos. 46r-48r, Randolph to Elizabeth, 12 March 1564; SP52/9, fos. 51r-52v.

³⁰¹ Julius F/VI, fo. 93r, Randolph to Elizabeth, 7 November 1564.

³⁰² SP52/9, fo. 39r; Add. 32091, fo. 193r, Lethington to Mary, 10 June 1562; Add. 32091, fo. 195r, Lethington to Mary, 9 March 1563.

³⁰³ On the significance of different hands see J. Daybell, *The Material Letter in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke, 2012), pp. 86-95.

³⁰⁴ SP52/9, fo. 8r.

howsbandes or rather worce'. He added the reminder 'that yf she Clame her the Erldum of Anguise ther wilbe agappe upon to disprove a greater title that she pretendethe unto nerer your Majestie selfe'.³⁰⁵ In the aftermath of the Darnley marriage, Randolph attempted to persuade Elizabeth of Mary's ill-will towards her: 'your Majestie seethe howe her promes is keapte, and by this your Majestie may measure the reste of her doynge, and unfaynedlie I do beleve that your Majestie shall finde mo fayer wordes then good meaninge'.³⁰⁶

Elizabeth's reaction to Randolph's advice is unknown. His acquaintance with the Queen and newfound desire to advise her did not translate into political influence when he returned to court in late 1566. He was appointed Master of the Posts, a position of trust but not one that allowed close contact with Elizabeth.³⁰⁷ Bell was right to use Randolph's example to support his theory that diplomats were ad-hoc, regional advisers, as Elizabeth consulted Randolph only once after his embassy had finished in the 1560s, and then alongside other diplomats in relation to the deteriorating situation in Scotland in May 1567, before sending him on embassy to Russia in 1568.³⁰⁸

II. Cecil and Leicester

Randolph's inability to foster a strong advisory relationship with Elizabeth left him reliant on Cecil and Leicester to further his political involvement and exercise a modicum of political influence. Randolph's relationships with them, like that with Elizabeth, were visibly developing throughout the decade and this had a profound effect on his conduct of diplomacy, which is reflected in his increasing willingness, and ability, to proffer advice to them.

³⁰⁵ Julius F/VI, fo. 94r.

³⁰⁶ SP52/10, fo. 143r, Randolph to Elizabeth, 16 July 1565.

³⁰⁷ SP12/46, fo. 51r, Elizabeth to Randolph, 4 February 1568.

³⁰⁸ Bell, 'Elizabeth Diplomacy', pp. 267-288; NLS, MS 3657, fo. 32r-v, Randolph to Leicester, 10 May 1567.

Initially, Cecil was Randolph's primary contact at the English court. This was a client-patron relationship not a personal friendship, and as a result Cecil neither confided in Randolph nor actively engaged him in policy discussion. Randolph's lack of political experience and personal confidence at the start of his mission left him heavily reliant on Cecil's guidance. Returning to Scotland in December 1559, Randolph composed a list of questions on how to conduct himself that Cecil duly answered. Two years later, he was still asking Cecil for 'privat instruction, when so ever anye unwonted matter or cawse unknowne sholde come in question'.³⁰⁹

After becoming better acquainted with Cecil during periods of respite at the English court in 1563 and 1564 Randolph's initial deference dissipated. Where once he wrote that Cecil could 'tayke better judgemente then I cane gyve advice', Randolph now filled his letters with forceful counsel.³¹⁰ By 1565, as the Scottish Lords looked to England for support in their rebellion against Mary, Randolph wrote to Cecil '[to ad]vise you to stonde harde to your Centre', imploring him to use his 'substanciall and beste advise' to persuade the Queen to favour the Lords.³¹¹ Randolph confronted Cecil head on, asking 'yf you thynke yt inoughe to have this Queens owne frendeshipe, I aske you fyrste howe you wilbe farther assured of yt then maye mayke for her owne proffyt, and howe myche yt wyll stonde you in steade seinge that she is not hable to governe her owne'?³¹² Whilst Randolph's advice was fuelled by the broader issues at stake and his perception of his duty as a *vir civilis*, its assertive and, at times, confrontational tone stemmed from his better acquaintance with the letters' recipient: he was no longer afraid to offend. This change in Randolph's diplomatic conduct is even more marked in an examination of his interaction with Leicester.

³⁰⁹ SP52/1, fo. 298r-v, Randolph's Memorial, 12 December 1559; SP52/6, fo. 165r.

³¹⁰ SP52/7, fo. 45r, Randolph to Cecil, 26 May 1562.

³¹¹ Caligula B/IX/1, fo. 241v, Randolph to Cecil, 10 February 1566; SP52/11, fo. 100r, Randolph to Cecil, 22 September 1565.

³¹² SP52/11, fo. 231v, Randolph to Cecil, 25 December 1565.

Randolph was drawn into Leicester's circle during a sojourn at the English court in 1564, evidenced by the Earl using Randolph to deliver a private message to the Spanish ambassador.³¹³ There is no evidence that Randolph corresponded regularly with Leicester before he returned to Scotland at the end of 1564. Since 1563 Randolph had been negotiating for a marriage between Leicester and Mary, one the Earl did not openly favour, but it was only as the negotiations began to break down in late 1564, following months of personal interaction with the Earl at the English court, that Randolph tackled the issue with Leicester. Randolph believed he faced the destruction of his mission and consequently the failure of Anglo-Scottish amity, and Leicester's lackadaisical attitude was not helping. In early 1565, Randolph wrote to berate 'your Lordship grate negligens, to woe a Q withowte...one signefication of your owne good wyll'; and challenged Leicester 'Ys yt inoughe for me allwayes to saye that yt is no smale honour for thys Queen to have suche a princesse as my Sovweain to be a suter your Lordship is righte happie yf so easlye you maye come by her'. Randolph was 'sorrise to have waded so farre' and repeatedly argued that in offering this advice, knowing Leicester would not take it well, 'My mynd is not to offende but in all detfull service duelye to serve your Lordship duringe my lyf'.³¹⁴ Thus he posited his advice as not only beneficial to England but also to Leicester, arguing that apart from marrying Elizabeth a marriage to Mary was 'the great[est] honour that you cane be called unto'.³¹⁵

These letters represent the beginning of a mutually beneficial, regular correspondence in which Randolph kept Leicester apprised of Scottish intelligence, and Leicester advised Randolph on how to conduct his proceedings based on the reception of his intelligence and advice at the English court. At the beginning of 1566, following Randolph's dispatch of several 'sharpe and egre' reports about Mary's manner of rule, Leicester sent him a 'warninge' letter, containing

³¹³ *CSPS*, I, p. 386.

³¹⁴ NLS, MS 3657, fo. 11v, Randolph to Leicester, 6 February 1565.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, fo. 11r.

‘counsell...[on] howe I sholde governe my self in thies dayngereys and suspicieus tyme[s]’. It was Cecil who disapproved of Randolph’s reports: ‘he to whom[e] I am fayne to dresse my self and directe my intellige[nce]’, and ‘by expresse commandement...forced to wryte’.³¹⁶ That a new mistrust had penetrated their correspondence is evident in Randolph’s complaint to Cecil ‘that I shall here after rather be frendlye warned of what so ever your honour shall judge amysse ^in me^, then hastelye be condemned upon what so ever accusation’.³¹⁷ These letters mark a turning point in Randolph’s relationships with Cecil and Leicester. Where once he had prioritised his letters to the former now he preferred the latter: in one letter to Leicester he spoke of things ‘I thynke better to keape secrete then wryte to master Secretarie I speake not of [them] but nowe to your Lord’.³¹⁸ This secrecy came to dominate Randolph’s letters to Leicester, with whom he shared all his Scottish intelligence, and is underscored by Randolph’s request that ‘your Lord wyll tayke no knowledge of anye such lettres by me excepte you have byne made previe to them by hym’.³¹⁹

Leicester’s supportive attitude encouraged Randolph to rely on the Earl’s ‘favorable reporte’ to ‘supporte my wantes’ when writing to the Queen, as he had initially done with Cecil.³²⁰ It also increased Randolph’s confidence to reproach the Earl. Diametrically opposed to Mary succeeding to the English throne, Randolph wrote to Leicester in early 1566 ‘that yf ever your Lord gyve your consent that ether she or her howsbonde succed to our Soverain that ther in you shall do agaynste god and your Countrie and bringe in as greate a plague unto our Nation as cane come owte of hell’.³²¹ Nonetheless, Randolph continued to work closely with Leicester following his return from Scotland. In May 1567, when the Earl was absent from court,

³¹⁶ NLS, MS 3657, fos. 24r-25r, Randolph to Leicester, 14 February 1565.

³¹⁷ CP 155, fo. 35r.

³¹⁸ NLS, MS 3657, fo. 25r.

³¹⁹ SP52/11, fo. 145v, Randolph to Leicester, 18 October 1565.

³²⁰ SP52/9, fo. 163r, Randolph to Leicester 7 November 1564.

³²¹ NLS, MS 3657, fo. 25v.

Randolph wrote from ‘your Lords lodgyng’ to keep him informed of court news, including his interview with the Queen about Anglo-Scottish affairs.³²² The following year, when Randolph was on embassy to Russia, Leicester reciprocated, writing to ‘My Randolphe’ the latest foreign intelligence from France, Flanders and Scotland, as well as news from the English court. This demonstrates the political utility of such an ‘assured Freend’, as Leicester signed himself, to a diplomat absent from court.³²³

Randolph’s relationships with Cecil and Leicester were more akin to traditional patronage associations between a subordinate and his superiors. They lacked the mutual confidence, trust and support inherent in friendship, for Cecil and Leicester did not confide in Randolph, seek his advice, or enter into political collaboration with him, nor did he attempt to offer them support in their personal or political endeavours. Rather, as Randolph’s familiarity with them increased he offered unsolicited advice that, unlike Throckmorton’s advice, did not lead to continued collegial policy debate. The personal friendship that facilitated political collaboration, engagement, and influence – the missing element in Randolph’s associations with Cecil and Leicester – was in abundance in Throckmorton’s relationships with them.

Throckmorton’s political influence and the informal advisory role he assumed with Elizabeth worked in tandem with, and was furthered by, his personal relationships with Cecil and Leicester. Direct access enabled Throckmorton to engage with them collectively as a political unit and take a peripheral role in their combined political dealings. A letter from 1565 hints at the camaraderie behind Throckmorton’s collegial working relationship with Elizabeth, Cecil and Leicester, as he wished that they had all seen a letter from Mary to Lethington ‘wherof I gat a sight: [for] you would leave said ther ^had^ neyther wanted eloquence, dispyte, anger,

³²² NLS, MS 3657, fo. 32v.

³²³ Lansdowne 11, fo. 91r-v, Leicester to Randolph, 1 May 1569.

love, nor passyon'.³²⁴ Cecil and Leicester's political involvement was total, Throckmorton allegedly acknowledged that 'nathing culd be done without them': Elizabeth's *modus operandi* was to hear their advice even if she did not take it.³²⁵ To Throckmorton, both collectively and individually, they represented another channel through which to proffer counsel. He admittedly wrote 'what I thynke' to Cecil with the intention that the secretary would 'pyke owte goode matter' from his advice and further it.³²⁶ Both Leicester and Cecil took the opportunity to 'further' Throckmorton's 'advyses...as tyme and occasione servyth'; in one letter, Cecil informed Throckmorton that 'the counsell which yow put me in remembrance of...I did so allow, as I have not spared, but propounded, usyng my owne...[to] funder it'.³²⁷ In 1565 Leicester and Cecil presented Throckmorton's advice on how to proceed in Anglo-Scottish affairs to the Privy Council and, persuaded of its value, the Council recommended implementing many of Throckmorton's recommendations.³²⁸ Two years later, in the wake of Mary's forced abdication, Throckmorton worked through Leicester to persuade the Queen to desist in involving herself in Scotland as well as writing to Elizabeth directly.³²⁹

Following Throckmorton's return to court in mid-1564 his personal camaraderie with Cecil and Leicester ensured ample opportunity to influence the direction of policy-making. In early 1565, Throckmorton and his cousin, Roger Strange, discussed the potential for a marriage between Elizabeth and Archduke Charles with Cecil and Leicester; later that year, the Spanish ambassador reported that Throckmorton, Leicester and Cecil were responsible for sending another ambassador to re-open the negotiations.³³⁰ As will be seen, Throckmorton worked

³²⁴ SP52/10, fo. 87r, Throckmorton to Leicester and Cecil, 11 May 1565.

³²⁵ Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 116.

³²⁶ SP70/31, fo. 29v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 9 October 1561.

³²⁷ SP70/50, fo. 46v, Leicester to Throckmorton, 3 February 1564; SP70/36, fo. 117r, Cecil to Throckmorton, 24 April 1562.

³²⁸ SP52/10, fo. 101r-v, Throckmorton to Leicester and Cecil, May 1565; SP52/10, fos. 117r-124v, Council Conference, 4 June 1565.

³²⁹ Caligula C/III, fo. 569r, Throckmorton to Leicester, 15 August 1567.

³³⁰ CP 155, fos. 7r-8r, Breyner to Strange, 1 April 1565; *CSPS*, I, p. 461.

closely with them both on Anglo-Scottish policy: in 1565, he was involved in private, informal meetings with Leicester, Cecil and Lethington, when the latter came to London.³³¹ The same was true of Anglo-French policy: in 1568, Throckmorton was engaged in a spot of domestic diplomacy charged with counselling the Huguenot refugee Odet de Coligny, Cardinal of Châtillon on behalf of Cecil, Leicester and Pembroke.³³²

Leicester and Cecil were crucial to Throckmorton's ability to exercise political influence as an ambassador and when resident at the English court. Throckmorton's effective, collegial political collaboration with them and his ability to offer them frank advice stemmed from the mutual respect, trust and shared political outlook found in friendship, as outlined in Cicero's contemporarily influential *de amicitia*. From the beginning of the reign Throckmorton's personal friendship with Cecil flourished; his friendship with Leicester was slower to form and did so in response to Leicester's growing authority at the English court and his increased involvement in policy-making, particularly in relation to France (from 1562 onwards).

Cicero posited that 'the whole essence of friendship' was 'complete agreement in policy, in pursuits, and in opinions'; without this foundation friendship could not exist.³³³ This lay at the heart of Cecil and Throckmorton's collaborative partnership between 1559 and 1561. They shared a vision of England's place within Britain and Europe, as Throckmorton termed it 'we sail in on shippe and plye to on coste': this vision aimed to secure Elizabeth's position on the English throne, Protestantism in England, and an Anglo-Scottish alliance to secure Elizabeth's hegemony within the British Isles against hostile European forces.³³⁴ This shared political perspective combined with Throckmorton's prior relationships with Cecil and the Queen was

³³¹ Ibid., p. 429.

³³² SP15/14, fo. 69r, Leicester to Throckmorton, 3 October 1568; SP70/103, fos. 31r-33r, Throckmorton to Pembroke, Leicester and Cecil, 5 October 1568.

³³³ Cicero, *amicitia*, p. 125.

³³⁴ SP70/18, fo. 26r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 8 September 1560.

almost certainly the reason why Throckmorton was appointed ambassador to France in May 1559: Cecil later claimed that he knew ‘not the lyke choise’ for the embassy.³³⁵ It was also the reason that when, following his eclipse at court in the summer of 1560, Cecil considered resigning his position as principal secretary it was on the proviso that Throckmorton would replace him: he could be trusted to forward the same policies that Cecil supported.³³⁶

Throckmorton and Cecil’s letters, written during 1559-61, offer a glimpse into the importance of friendship to the informal and collaborative nature of Elizabethan policy-making that is often inaccessible when both parties are at court.³³⁷ By intertwining ‘counsel in private business’ with discussion of ‘polycie & polytyques’, the letters underscore the fact that a strong personal friendship underpinned, and defined, their political relationship.³³⁸ For instance, Cecil sought and followed Throckmorton’s ‘advise’ to educate his son, Thomas, in France under Throckmorton’s watchful eye; a sign of the esteem in which he held Throckmorton, Cecil added that ‘If I shold covett any perfection in hym I wold have hym to be lyke yow’.³³⁹ Throckmorton also appealed personally to Cecil: believing he was near death in early 1561 he begged Cecil to ‘bestowe the profe of your good will [towards me] upon my wif my children and my servantes’.³⁴⁰

Written in their own hands to preserve privacy and containing unusual sign-offs that suggest the strength of their friendship, such as Cecil’s ‘yours assuredly forever’; the letters stand out in the diplomatic corpus.³⁴¹ They contain Throckmorton and Cecil’s confidential debates on policy, such as measures to prevent a Leicester marriage, and the political opinions they openly

³³⁵ SP70/8, fo. 9v, Cecil to Throckmorton, 1 October 1559.

³³⁶ Stowe 147, fo. 180v.

³³⁷ SP70/17, fo. 101r, Cecil to Throckmorton, 27 August 1560.

³³⁸ Cicero, *amicitia*, p. 209; SP70/26, fo. 79v.

³³⁹ SP70/26, fo. 62r-v, Cecil to Throckmorton, 8 May 1561.

³⁴⁰ SP70/22, fo. 133r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 24 January 1561.

³⁴¹ SP70/8, fo. 9v; Compare with Cecil’s sign off to Challoner, SP70/6, fo. 100r, Cecil to Challoner, 16 August 1559.

shared with one another.³⁴² This confidential, politically collaborative relationship between an Elizabethan diplomat and the principal secretary was unusual, although there are parallels in Cecil's behaviour toward Smith and Thomas Challoner with whom he also shared long friendships.³⁴³ Throckmorton's political collaboration with Cecil was underpinned by the strength of their personal friendship: their mutual respect, support, and trust in one another. Cecil considered the exchange of letters to be 'from frend to frend' rather than ambassador to principal secretary, or vice versa: this was the equality in friendship that Cicero advocated.³⁴⁴ Friendship and love were inseparable (Cicero argued that *amicitia* derived from *amor*): Throckmorton felt able to be 'bold as occacion may serve' with Cecil 'Bycause I do love & honor you [and therefore] I wyll not spare to utter my folie (well ment) by wey off Dyscourse'.³⁴⁵ The importance of their friendship is further emphasised through a comparison with Throckmorton's letters to William Petre, stand-in secretary during Cecil's absence in Scotland in the summer of 1560, with whom Throckmorton was not close. Throckmorton did not share his opinions with Petre, nor did he seek to advise him; the letters were merely intelligence reports.³⁴⁶

When Cecil returned home from Scotland in July 1560 and found himself playing second fiddle to Leicester, he confided his despair in Throckmorton, complaining that his 'Counsell' was 'no good' and that despite his success 'for hir honor' in Scotland he had 'no consideration made to me'. The risk Cecil took in putting his frustration with Elizabeth into writing is reflected in the language of his letter and his concern to ensure that it did not fall into the wrong hands: he wanted to confide further but 'dare not wryte that I might speke' and begged Throckmorton to

³⁴² SP70/19, fos. 130r-131r.

³⁴³ See Sowerby, 'Diplomatic Corps'.

³⁴⁴ SP70/17, fo. 101r.

³⁴⁵ Cicero, *amicitia*, p. 139; SP70/19, fo. 35v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 10 October 1560; SP70/33, fo. 16r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 10 December 1561.

³⁴⁶ SP70/15, fo. 113r, Throckmorton to Petre, 30 June 1560.

‘ether retorne my letter or kepe it save for me for letters may be misinterpreted’.³⁴⁷ Throckmorton’s response reflected the Aristotelian concept that a friend was another self: he reassured Cecil that ‘your lettres they be as saffe yn my hand as yn your owne...[for] I am as jelowes off your safetie and well doynge as your selffe’.³⁴⁸ Yet, Throckmorton also acknowledged the danger of letter-writing: ‘Yf I were with youe I durst and wolde tell youe what I thinke...[for] I had rather adventure to speake folishelye then to wrytte’.³⁴⁹ After all, no matter the trust between friends, ‘messengars, maye be reportors to whom they list’ and letters ‘comming into adverse handes may be sinistely interprete[d]’: this was a persistent barrier to their ability to fully disclose their advice to one another.³⁵⁰ Nevertheless, Cecil confided in Throckmorton his despair at the Queen’s desire to marry Leicester, asking for Throckmorton to advise Elizabeth.³⁵¹ Throckmorton’s frank response demonstrates that his personal friendship with Cecil and his commitment to the principles of the *vir civilis* proved a potent combination. Following Cicero, Throckmorton rebuked his friend freely: ‘do not so forgett your selffe as to thynke you do inowghe bycause you do not funder the matter’ and reminded Cecil of his duty to offer honest advice as ‘hyr sworne cownceler’.³⁵²

Contrary to Nicola Sutherland’s depiction of a one-sided relationship in which Cecil supported Throckmorton, the two men supported one another both politically and personally in the early years of the reign.³⁵³ In early 1560, as Cecil considered resigning his involvement in English policy toward Scotland, Throckmorton sought to inspire him to continue by advocating him to take on the mantle of the Greek hero Pericles and drive forward English intervention in Scotland against the reservations of the Privy Council and the Queen.³⁵⁴ At the same time, he

³⁴⁷ SP70/17, fos. 101v-102r.

³⁴⁸ SP70/19, fo. 131r.

³⁴⁹ SP70/18, fo. 24r.

³⁵⁰ SP70/22, fo. 57v, Cecil to Throckmorton, 15 January 1561.

³⁵¹ SP70/19, fo. 130r.

³⁵² Cicero, *amicitia*, p. 197; SP70/21, fo. 140r.

³⁵³ Sutherland, *Princes*, p. 83.

³⁵⁴ *EEP*, pp. 69-70; Forbes, *Transactions*, p. 376.

gave further support to Cecil by sending letters filled with persuasive counsel to Elizabeth and her Council.³⁵⁵ Three months later, in need of Throckmorton's help as English action in Scotland floundered, Cecil was busy 'devising how to revoke yow now uppon pretence of your sicknes'.³⁵⁶ The following year, as Throckmorton persistently voiced his opposition to the Leicester match gaining him the enmity of Leicester and the irritation of the Queen, Cecil felt compelled to 'advise yow not to medle with the matters of this court otherwise than ye maye be well advised from hence'.³⁵⁷ Cecil wanted to protect Throckmorton because 'I have professed, and doe avowe earnest frendshipp to yow', for 'I will never have my frend aventure so farr as my self'.³⁵⁸

In mid-1561 Throckmorton and Cecil's political unison began to disintegrate. Cicero posits that friendship is incompatible with political differences, but it was more complex for Throckmorton and Cecil. They agreed on the overriding aims of a Protestant English foreign policy and, as Alford has noted, on the potential threats to English Protestantism and national security; but, like Leicester, Throckmorton disagreed with Cecil on key issues within this overarching policy, including Mary's position in the English succession and her fate in 1568-9.³⁵⁹ This produced occasional moments of mistrust. In early 1566, Cecil openly disapproved of Throckmorton's support for 'innovations in State affairs', and in 1568, Throckmorton, evidently suspicious of Cecil's mistrust in him, read into Cecil's

Spechys off honeste Dealyng, (wherunto you oblygs yourselffe) and frendly dealyng, (from the wyche I may dyverte you) that some Conceate or Intellygence com to you, whereby you may hold me suspectyd...I requier you for thys and the reste to com, to put the Matter to a Triall. Otherwyse, always you shall have Whysperers, and I shall be by you condemnyd.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁵ SP70/11, fos. 5r-7v, Throckmorton to Council, 4 February 1560; SP70/11, fos. 61r-65v.

³⁵⁶ SP70/14, fo. 27v, Cecil to Throckmorton, 4 May 1560.

³⁵⁷ SP70/22, fo. 57r-v.

³⁵⁸ Add. 35830, fo. 159r, Cecil to Throckmorton, 14 July 1561.

³⁵⁹ Cicero, *amicitia*, p. 187; *EEP*, pp. 174, 179, 199.

³⁶⁰ *CSPS*, I, pp. 554-5; CP 155, fo. 117v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 18 September 1568.

Despite these brief lapses of trust that fed William Camden's outmoded depiction of Throckmorton as Cecil's factional enemy, their friendship and concurrent political relationship persisted.³⁶¹ Following Throckmorton's return to court in 1564 written evidence for their continued friendship is naturally sparser as they were now able to commune in person. Yet tantalising glimmers of Cecil's role in facilitating Throckmorton's political involvement remain, for instance in the evidence for the tripartite working relationship between Cecil, Leicester and Throckmorton.

Despite arguments to the contrary, it is likely that Cecil supported promoting Throckmorton to the Privy Council in 1565: writing to Smith, Cecil noted that 'Great meanes is made for Sir Nicholas Throckmorton to be one of the privie counsel, and so I wish you both'.³⁶² During 1567 and 1568 they corresponded about English foreign policy with France and Scotland as they had done in 1559-60, with Throckmorton openly backing Cecil's analysis of English foreign relations.³⁶³ In 1567, as Elizabeth's determination to support Mary threatened the continuity of Anglo-Scottish amity, a frustrated Cecil confided in Throckmorton his sorrow at the loss of several years' negotiation in Scotland.³⁶⁴ The following year, Throckmorton wrote that it was Cecil's 'gentylnes [that] dothe occacion me to taulke liberally with you off the matters off State'.³⁶⁵ At the same time, Cecil listed Throckmorton as a candidate for the Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster, adding that 'her Majesty can make no ill choice of any of these'.³⁶⁶ He also supported Throckmorton's candidacy for the influential household position of Vice-Chamberlain.³⁶⁷ Cecil continued to care for Throckmorton as a friend, who wrote in September

³⁶¹ Camden, *Elizabeth*, pp. 122, 152.

³⁶² *CSPS*, I, p. 377; N. Sil, *Tudor Placemen and Statesmen* (London, 2001), p. 391; Lansdowne 102, fo. 111r, Cecil to Smith, 3 June 1565.

³⁶³ CP 155, fos. 117r-118r; *EEP*, pp. 179, 185-6, 199.

³⁶⁴ SP59/14, fo. 48r-v, Cecil to Throckmorton, 20 August 1567.

³⁶⁵ SP12/47, fo. 107r.

³⁶⁶ Bacon, *Scrinia Ceciliana*, p. 129.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

1568 to thank the secretary for his attentiveness during a period of ill health.³⁶⁸ Differences of political opinion occurred but they did not sever their personal friendship: Throckmorton, imprisoned for his support of the Norfolk-Mary marriage that Cecil opposed, could still rely upon the secretary's intercession to secure his release.³⁶⁹

Nevertheless, from 1562 onwards, Throckmorton gravitated towards Leicester, whose political outlook more closely aligned with his own. This was particularly the case in relation to Mary, the English succession and Anglo-Scottish policy. Both men supported Mary's claim to be Elizabeth's heir and, in 1569, they worked together to help orchestrate Norfolk's marriage to Mary.³⁷⁰ Yet, as with Cecil, Throckmorton and Leicester also had significant differences of opinion. Throckmorton persistently opposed Leicester's desire to marry the Queen. In 1560 Throckmorton's opposition to the match had incited Leicester's wrath and provoked a breach in cordial relations between the two men, but in 1562, as Leicester became a key figure in English operations in France, a rapprochement occurred.³⁷¹ The reconciliation was sealed by a bond of spiritual kinship with Leicester godfathering Throckmorton's son, Nicholas, in 1562.³⁷² Nevertheless, Throckmorton continued to oppose Leicester's desire to marry Elizabeth and even attempted to persuade the Earl to marry Mary.³⁷³ In 1565 Throckmorton favoured Elizabeth's marriage with the Archduke Charles and unsuccessfully tried to persuade a reluctant Leicester into supporting it too.³⁷⁴

The relationship Throckmorton crafted with Leicester was different to that he enjoyed with Cecil. It was aimed at securing Throckmorton's political influence; he knew that with

³⁶⁸ SP12/47, fos. 106r-107r.

³⁶⁹ For Cecil's opposition see *EEP*, pp. 179, 185-6, 199; CP 156, fo. 16r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 25 February 1570.

³⁷⁰ Adams, 'Darnley', 142; MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 307-9.

³⁷¹ Prior cordial relations are demonstrated in SP70/19, fo. 43r-v, Throckmorton to Leicester, 10 October 1560; SP70/37, fo. 100r, Throckmorton to Leicester, 18 May 1562.

³⁷² SP70/38, fo. 208r-v.

³⁷³ PL 2502, p. 395, Throckmorton to Leicester, 21 May 1565.

³⁷⁴ *CSPS*, I, p. 472.

Leicester's increasing political engagement he needed the Earl's support to remain politically relevant. This is why Throckmorton waited to instigate a rapprochement with Leicester until 1562, when the Earl became increasingly involved in French affairs. The political utility of the relationship is immediately apparent with Throckmorton capitalising on the newfound friendship to offer Leicester political guidance on Anglo-French and Anglo-European affairs.³⁷⁵ Throckmorton's advice made an impression on his 'loving friend' Leicester, who praised his 'doings in publyke affayres' to the Queen and affirmed her belief that 'in you [there is] great rarenes & dylygens in sarvyce'.³⁷⁶ This laid the foundations for the close working relationship they developed on Throckmorton's return to England in 1564.

Leicester's respect for Throckmorton's political acumen combined with their shared political outlook and the mutual trust of friendship secured Throckmorton's position as a close advisor and confidant of the Earl, who relied upon his counsel both personally and politically. In 1567, absenting himself from court as a result of Elizabeth's disfavour, Leicester confided his troubled mind in 'his veary frende', 'sir Nyc': 'what must I think of all that forpassed favor which in such spetyall or rather unspeakable sort remayned toward me...that fondacione I fynd so altered and the case so changed, as I dare skarce now think that I ave bin bold before to say and wryte'.³⁷⁷ In this uncertain situation, Leicester trusted Throckmorton to act as an intermediary between himself and the Queen, relying on Throckmorton's own good relationship with Elizabeth to persuade her of the good intent in his letters and encourage her to look favourably on his behaviour.³⁷⁸ This is hardly surprising as Throckmorton was known for being 'carefull and devot to his Lordship', and Leicester also left Throckmorton in charge of transacting his business at court and keeping him abreast of political affairs in his absence.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁵ See above, p. 66.

³⁷⁶ SP70/37, fo. 54r; SP70/38, fo. 67r.

³⁷⁷ SP15/13, fo. 150r, Leicester to Throckmorton, 4 May 1567.

³⁷⁸ Ibid., fos. 150r-151r.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.; Lansdowne 102, fo. 121v, Cecil to Smith, 16 October 1565; PL 2502, pp. 521-2.

From 1565, Leicester furthered Throckmorton's political engagement by employing him as his unofficial secretary in Anglo-Scottish affairs: Throckmorton received, read and advised upon letters from Randolph in Edinburgh and Bedford at Berwick.³⁸⁰ Leicester also offered Throckmorton important political information, support and advice when on embassy, sending him frequent updates about how the Queen was taking his reports during Throckmorton's 1567 mission. He also sought to protect Throckmorton, advising him against 'give[ing] any advyce ^here^ that may sound any thing against that Queen [for] I know [you] shall do nought but hinder yourself', and telling Throckmorton to come away if Mary's deposition was intended 'for you know how easely some wyll sett fourth your furtheraunce'.³⁸¹

Throckmorton's relationship with Leicester was intimately connected to his perceived political authority: it was reported that Leicester was 'ruled by Throgmorton' and commentators continue to assert that Throckmorton was Leicester's 'political brain'.³⁸² Throckmorton's influence with Leicester was such that he was often called upon to intercede with the Earl for patronage and favour, even by Leicester's brother-in-law, Sidney.³⁸³

Conclusion

Throckmorton and Randolph's personal relationships, or lack thereof, suggest that friendship had the potential to enable or impede the political influence and involvement of ambassadors and other non-conciliar advisers. These relationships could offer ambassadors the political credibility, access, and authority to capitalise and build upon the natural influence accorded them by their diplomatic position. Throckmorton's dynamic political engagement with

³⁸⁰ For instance, *Ibid.*; PL 2502, pp. 725-6, Throckmorton to Leicester, 30 April 1567.

³⁸¹ SP59/13, fo. 272r.

³⁸² *CSPS*, I, p. 438; Lansdowne 102, fo. 121v; S. Adams, 'The Dudley Clientele, 1553-63' in Adams (ed.), *Leicester and the Court*, p. 152.

³⁸³ SP59/11, fo. 133r, Bedford to Throckmorton, 27 March 1566; SP59/11, fo. 45r, Drury to Throckmorton, 22 January 1566; SP63/17, fo. 43r, Sidney to Throckmorton, 17 April 1566.

Elizabeth, and more especially Leicester and Cecil, stands testament to the informal nature of Elizabethan politics. Throckmorton's friendships with Leicester and Cecil combined with his strong personal relationship with the Queen allowed him to exert political influence, advising them individually and collectively and engaging with them in informal policy discussions. Throckmorton's political influence was acknowledged by his colleagues, men like Henry Norris, English ambassador to France in the late 1560s, who used him as a conduit through which to offer counsel on Anglo-French policy in 1567; and by foreign observers, like the Anglophile Lords of Scotland, who, in 1565, asked him to use his influence to persuade the English government to support their fight against Mary.³⁸⁴ Randolph, on the other hand, with little connection to the Queen and barely more than patronage relationships with Cecil and Leicester, found his political influence severely restricted: his rare advice to the Queen and his confrontational approach to counselling Cecil and Leicester did not result in political action. The change in Randolph's diplomatic conduct following his residence at the English court underscores the fact that the level of personal acquaintanceship with the letter's recipient determined their formulation and content, and consequently the diplomat's political engagement and willingness to proffer counsel. Randolph spent the first decade of Elizabeth's reign establishing politically essential personal connections and attempting to craft an unsolicited advisory role for himself: these were the essential first steps towards becoming the diplomat that Mears depicts offering influential foreign policy advice in the 1580s.³⁸⁵

³⁸⁴ SP70/90, fo. 76r-v, Norris to Throckmorton, 19 May 1567; SP52/10, fo. 146r, Châtellerault, Argyll and Moray to Throckmorton, 18 July 1565.

³⁸⁵ *Queenship*, p. 43.

Chapter 3

Ideological Foundations and Rhetorical Strategies in Diplomatic Counsel

This chapter examines Throckmorton and Randolph's perspective on counsel and the strategies they employed to maximise the political influence of their advice. The ideological foundations of counsel, particularly individuals' conceptualisation of their duty to counsel, and the rhetorical strategies behind it have received attention as part of broad studies focusing on politics, counsel and the impact of political thought on political action during the Tudor period.³⁸⁶ Potter's argument that mid-sixteenth-century ambassadors were beginning to view themselves as counsellors stands testimony to the impact of the humanist-classical ideology of the *vir civilis* on men in public office during this period.³⁸⁷ Yet the impact of ideology and rhetorical strategies on Elizabethan diplomatic counsel remains largely unexplored. Diplomatic letters, written in lieu of communing in person, offer an opportunity to analyse counselling strategies that may also have been employed in constructing spoken counsel.³⁸⁸ For, unlike their colleagues at home, diplomats resident abroad were reliant upon letters to advise the Queen and their colleagues in England. Thus, ambassadors were acutely aware of the importance of carefully 'framyng' a letter to appeal to its recipient, for instance, when writing to the child King of France, Catherine de Medici and the King of Navarre, who was 'notyd yn

³⁸⁶ For example, Guy, 'Rhetoric of Counsel', pp. 292-310; *EEP*; McLaren, *Political Culture*; Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, pp. 176-214; M. Peltonen, *Rhetoric, Politics and Popularity in Pre-Revolutionary England* (Cambridge, 2013); Rose (ed.), *Politics of Counsel*.

³⁸⁷ Potter, 'Foreign Policy', pp. 112-3.

³⁸⁸ To date, the few studies of diplomats' letters have focused on issues such as materiality. See E. Williamson, '[Y]ou have written sometimes more largelie to some private friends, then almost to her Majesties self': secrecy and sociability in sixteenth-century ambassadorial correspondence', *Lives and Letters*, 4/1 (2012).

affections womanyshe', Throckmorton recommended Cecil lace his letters with 'intysements' for 'suche natures...do pleasure & be drawn with swete words'.³⁸⁹

This chapter examines first how Throckmorton and Randolph conceptualised counsel and how this influenced the way in which they perceived their political role and consequently how they counselled. Second it considers the broad range of rhetorical strategies they employed, including the use of historical examples, sententiae, reported speech and false deference. This analysis of rhetorical strategies also lays particular emphasis upon the importance of personalisation. Building on the conclusions of chapter two – that personal relationships enabled political influence – this chapter examines the importance of personal contact with and knowledge of the recipients of their counsel in improving the efficacy of general rhetorical strategies.

I. Foundation of Counsel: the *Vir Civilis*

Although Randolph and Throckmorton approached counselling differently the impetus behind their counsel, and their political actions, was the same. Both men conceptualised their political role within the humanist-classical framework of the *vita activa*, ascribing to the ideological tenets of a *vir civilis* they believed that they had a duty to proffer good, honest counsel for the benefit of the Queen and the Protestant English commonwealth.³⁹⁰ The rhetoric of the *vir civilis* and the responsibilities of public duty abound in Randolph and Throckmorton's explication of their counsel and actions in both their official and personal letters. Their sense of duty to their country is the key to understanding both Throckmorton's vociferous counsel and the key issues upon which Randolph chose to offer overt counsel.

³⁸⁹ SP70/38, fo. 241v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 29 June 1562.

³⁹⁰ For the *vir civilis* see Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, pp. 66-86; Peltonen, *Classical Humanism*, pp. 18-118; Guy, 'Rhetoric of Counsel'.

Randolph made the connection between ideology and action blatant. In early 1566, adapting Cicero's well-known adage 'not for us alone are we born; our country, our friends, have a share in us', Randolph posited that his increasingly negative accounts of Mary represented a fulfilment of his duty 'to my Sovereign and Countrie, to which I am borne, which I will serve with boddie and lyf trewlye and carles what becommethe of me'.³⁹¹ He had proved this point in the autumn of the previous year, when he refused the Queen's offer of a recall – despite being shot at – on the grounds that he felt he could serve his country more effectively by staying in Scotland.³⁹² When Randolph proffered overt counsel on contentious issues, such as his persistent advice in 1565 that it was in England's best interests to support the exiled Protestant lords of Scotland over their Catholic Queen, he invoked the rhetoric of a *vir civilis*: 'I am no other wyse petitioner nor suter for them then as ^{^I^} do beleve that the issue shalbe to her majesties honour, weale and proffyt of her graces Countrie'.³⁹³ When counselling others, Randolph sought to impress upon them their duty to act in the best interests of their country. In 1565 he argued that Leicester should remember 'what proffyt and commoditie shall insue unto your Countrie' if the Earl were to marry Mary, Queen of Scots.³⁹⁴ For Randolph, such statements were part-rhetoric, part-truth; he aspired to be a *vir civilis*, acting and counselling selflessly for the benefit of his country, but he also used this ideal as a rhetorical device to proffer unpopular counsel and persuade his colleagues to action or inaction.

Throckmorton went further than Randolph. In late 1560, when faced with the prospect of Leicester marrying the Queen, Throckmorton positioned his opposition to the match as fulfilling the ideal of the self-sacrificing, public duty bound *vir civilis* and sought to berate his

³⁹¹ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1:22,

<https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Cic.+Off.+1.22&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048> [accessed 02/08/16]; SP52/12, fo. 130v.

³⁹² SP52/11, fo. 136v, Randolph to Cecil, 13 October 1565; SP59/10, fo. 65v, Bedford to Cecil, 29 September 1565.

³⁹³ SP52/11, fo. 89v, Randolph to Cecil, 19&20 September 1565.

³⁹⁴ NLS, MS 3657, fos. 11r.

friends on Elizabeth's Privy Council for their perceived inability to adhere to the same standards. Throckmorton drew Cecil's attention to a passage from Thucydides that adroitly summed up the ambassador's position on the destructive nature of the proposed match and the importance of placing public duty over private gain: 'national greatness is more for the advantage of private citizens, than any individual well-being coupled with public humiliation. [For] A man may be personally ever so well off, and yet if his country be ruined he must be ruined with it'.³⁹⁵ Throckmorton undoubtedly included this passage from Thucydides because it lent authority to the position he had taken in other letters to Cecil at this time, in which he asserted that, although he esteemed Leicester personally, 'I shall not be transportyd for no body pleasure nor for any partyculer respecte or commoditye to make me say or prosecute any other thyng or porpose, then shall be for the suertie & honor off the quens majestie & hyr realme' which 'doth and shall duryng my lyffe take more place yn me then any frendshypp'.³⁹⁶

The notion that public duty trumped personal friendship was key. Throckmorton expected his colleagues on the Privy Council to put aside their private affections when offering advice on public matters. This was unsensational: it was a common refrain that the advice of 'a good counsaylour' be impartial and devoid of all respects of 'friendshyppe, displeasure, or pitie'.³⁹⁷ What was different was the way in which Throckmorton sought to hold his colleagues to account. He knew many of Elizabeth's councillors were also Leicester's personal friends and thus stood to profit personally if Leicester were to marry the Queen. Throckmorton rebuked his cousins Pembroke and Northampton, alongside two other conciliar colleagues, for neglecting their duty as the Queen's councillors, writing that 'I say to you as I owght, to move

³⁹⁵ SP70/19, fo. 130v; English translation from Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0200%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D60> [accessed 01/05/16].

³⁹⁶ SP70/19, fo. 35v; SP70/19, fo. 130r.

³⁹⁷ Elyot, *Governour*, p. 238.

you to do as you shuld'.³⁹⁸ He even berated Cecil 'not [to] so forgett your selffe as to thynke you do inowghe bycause you do not furder the matter', emphasising the secretary's responsibility as Elizabeth's 'sworne cownceler'.³⁹⁹ Throckmorton's approach caused offence amongst his colleagues, who retaliated by portraying him as the bad counsellor offering advice driven by 'passyonate affection [rather] then sincere & orderly dutie' that stemmed 'rather of yll wyll, then well meaning to the state'.⁴⁰⁰ Throckmorton was left to defend himself, reminding his colleagues that he had supported Leicester's advancement 'When the termes were suche as was betwyxte the soverayne & the subgett'.⁴⁰¹ Throckmorton was undeterred in his belief that Elizabeth's councillors were inclined to bend with the prevailing wind rather than stand strong for the good of their country, complaining that even those who 'be so wyse as to myslyke yt, be to tymerus to shew yt: So as hyr majesties affection dothe fynd rather wynd & sayle to sett yt forward then any advyse to quenche yt'.⁴⁰² In other words, they would not advise the Queen against the Leicester match because she did not wish to hear it and they feared the consequences of offending her; this was not the paradigm of good counsel.

Throckmorton's belief that he had a responsibility, as a public servant, to offer honest counsel was brought to the fore in 1561 when it clashed with instructions from his conciliar colleagues to advise the Queen only on matters that directly pertained to his embassy. Left 'perplexed with myne nowne sylence', Throckmorton identified himself with Demosthenes, whose 'speche was stoppid. He by angina: and I as yt were by commandment'.⁴⁰³ Throckmorton's mental torment at his increasingly isolated position is underscored by the way he signed a letter to Cecil 'exulmentisa domusque'.⁴⁰⁴ Yet, despite Throckmorton's disfavour and his increasing sense of

³⁹⁸ SP70/20, fo. 40r; Add. 35830, fo. 68r.

³⁹⁹ SP70/21, fo. 140r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 31 December 1560.

⁴⁰⁰ SP70/23, fo. 158v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 26 February 1561; SP70/22, fo. 55v, Killigrew to Throckmorton, 13 January 1561.

⁴⁰¹ SP70/23, fo. 158v.

⁴⁰² SP70/21, fo. 140v.

⁴⁰³ SP70/26, fo. 128v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 25 May 1561.

⁴⁰⁴ An exile from both his home and reason; SP70/24, fo. 78v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 31 March 1561.

isolation, he felt compelled to continue offering advice on matters that he deemed critical to the security of Elizabeth and the English commonwealth. In April 1561, fearful of Spanish practices to further a Leicester marriage in exchange for concessions to Catholicism in England and with a papal nuncio requesting entrance to the country, Throckmorton directly contravened the instructions of his colleagues, writing a frank and forceful letter of advice to the Queen. Its purpose was to outline the critical role Elizabeth's Protestantism served for the security of her queenship: 'if your Majestie were no otherwyse sturried with religion then *Numa Pompilius* or *Sertorius* was you wold not nor may not altre your religion that youe professe for your safetie and policies sake only'. Throckmorton concluded by positioning himself as an honest counsellor in an attempt to offset the potential for causing offence: 'Lett it not offend your Majestie that I with reverence tell you treuthe'.⁴⁰⁵ And, in case Elizabeth's councillors were once more unaware of their official responsibilities, Throckmorton reminded Cecil that it was up to 'you and others of her faithfull Counselors to geve her sound and faithfull counsell'.⁴⁰⁶ The urge to fulfil his public duty was too intense for Throckmorton to resist, as he explained to Cecil 'I ^can not^ conteyne my selffe yn my lymytes as I vowed...The occacions be suche as I can not kepe promyse with my selffe'.⁴⁰⁷

II. Strategies of Counsel

i. History and Memory as Exemplar

The ability to invoke historical examples, emotive memories and shared experiences was crucial in proffering rhetorically forceful counsel. While Peltonen has shown that Elizabethans were taught from a young age to use examples to strengthen their arguments, both in speeches and letter-writing, there has been little consideration of how this strategy was more effective if

⁴⁰⁵ SP70/25, fo. 118v.

⁴⁰⁶ SP70/25, fo. 89r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 23 April 1561.

⁴⁰⁷ SP70/25, fo. 6r, Throckmorton to Cecil, April 1561.

the writer had personal knowledge of the recipient of his counsel.⁴⁰⁸ This personal knowledge enabled him to draw on examples to best effect, for he knew which nerves to hit, which memories and experiences to tap into, and which philosophers and historical figures to employ. Throckmorton and, to a lesser extent, Randolph were able to use their personal relationships with the recipients of their advice – their knowledge of an individual’s aspirations, dislikes, and experiences – to frame their counsel to effectively motivate the addressee.

This is particularly evident in Throckmorton’s handling of English dithering over sending military aid to Scotland in February 1560. The ambassador strategically shaped his advice to appeal to the known sensibilities of the Queen and the Privy Council by employing examples he judged would best convince them of the merits of intervention. Throckmorton’s early advice to Elizabeth was often a variation on the theme of her ability to achieve a feat that surpassed her predecessors and secured her immortal fame. In so doing, Throckmorton drew on his remembrance ‘that I have herd your majestie say, you were yn grett longynge to do some acte yn your tyme that shuld make your fame to spred abrode yn your lyffe tyme and after occacion memoriall for ever’.⁴⁰⁹ Thus, in February 1560 Throckmorton posited that military intervention in Scotland offered the Queen the opportunity to achieve a glorious legacy. He paralleled Elizabeth’s opportunity to ‘wynne...estimation’ in the eyes of Europe by forcibly removing the French from Scotland with the fame Philip II won after his victory over the French at the Battle of St Quentin in 1557. Moreover, Throckmorton argued that by establishing an Anglo-Scottish alliance Elizabeth would triumph where her father and brother had failed and be able to secure her authority throughout her dominions in a way they never could.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁸ Peltonen, *Rhetoric*, pp. 43, 51-2, 80-1.

⁴⁰⁹ SP70/17, fo. 40v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 9 August 1560.

⁴¹⁰ SP70/11, fo. 63r.

Writing to the council, Throckmorton took a different approach to persuade them not to let French entreaties for peace lead to vacillation over intervention in Scotland. He drew on their shared experience of the French penchant for using diplomacy to win time until they were able to mount a strong campaign: it is 'so well knowen to your Lordships' that 'we have bought full deere' the 'disguising and fawnings' of the French, 'and therfor shuld beware therein'. Throckmorton used the loss of Boulogne (1550), following the town's capture by Henry VIII (1544), to illustrate the point.⁴¹¹ It was an example calculated to touch a raw nerve with many of Elizabeth's councillors, who, like Throckmorton, had been personally involved in the capture and loss of Boulogne. For instance, Clinton had been Lord Deputy of Boulogne during the French attack of 1549 and had supervised the English withdrawal after the town was ceded to France the following year. The loss of Boulogne was an emotive issue amongst England's political elite: Andy Boyle has shown how Arundel, Earl Marshal at the time, fell from power and languished in prison for a year because he refused to accept the surrender of Boulogne to the French.⁴¹²

Throckmorton played on this emotiveness to highlight the untrustworthiness of the current French government by associating the Guise, who now held the reins of power, with the deceitful actions of the French in attacking Boulogne. It was, he argued, 'these rulers heere then ministers and of counsel', who had encouraged the French King 'contrary to his promes and oth' to attack Boulogne, when 'king Edward...[had] his realme in an uprore and commotion and in danger of his person'. Throckmorton implored the Council to consider that at Boulogne the French King 'sticked not then to stayne his honour and false his promeses to compas his purpose' and 'be perswadid that the fayre flatering and swete languaige of this kings ministers...do serve for nothing elles'. The situational reversal was apparent: the French had

⁴¹¹ SP70/11, fo. 5r.

⁴¹² A. Boyle, 'Hans Eworth's Portrait of the Earl of Arundel and the Politics of 1549-50', *EHR*, 117 (2002), 40.

assaulted Boulogne in 1549 when the English government was occupied with internal discord; now the Guisan government was in a 'commotion', rocked by plots such as the Conspiracy of Amboise, and unable to reinforce Scotland. This was the opportunity to avenge the seizure of Boulogne and the more recent loss of Calais (1558), and 'recover to our Country that honour which of late yeres hath fallen from us' by repeated military losses.⁴¹³ Throckmorton's attempt to play on councillors' emotive, personal experiences with the French provoked a strong response from the Council, who declared that 'experience hath taught us to deale in suche thynges of importance with all the suerty that we can'.⁴¹⁴ Throckmorton's use of the loss of Boulogne was a tried and trusted strategy to argue against peace with France. When arguing against the peace negotiations at Cateau-Cambresis the year before, Wotton then ambassador to France used the example of Bolougne to strike a nerve with 'summe of the counsell, that remember it well'.⁴¹⁵

This tactic of personalised counsel was not just reserved for the recipients of Throckmorton's letters but was also a strategy he frequently employed when offering advice in person during his embassies. In the summer of 1561, as Mary Queen of Scots prepared to embark for Scotland, Throckmorton sought to impress upon Mary that her success as a ruler depended upon her toleration of Scottish Protestantism by highlighting the example of her mother, who 'kept that Realme in quietnesse, till she beganne to constrayne mens consciences'.⁴¹⁶ Mary must build on her mother's success and learn from her mistakes. This advice was predicated on Throckmorton's knowledge of Mary's love and respect for her mother: he had seen first-

⁴¹³ SP70/11, fo. 6v.

⁴¹⁴ SP70/12, fo. 38r, Council to Throckmorton, 7 March 1560.

⁴¹⁵ Galba C/I, fos. 6r-7r, Wotton to Cecil, 9 January 1559.

⁴¹⁶ SP70/27, fo. 47r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 23 June 1561.

hand Mary's grief at her mother's death the previous year and knew that she planned to bury her a few weeks after he tendered his advice.⁴¹⁷

There are fewer instances where Randolph clearly personalised his advice to make it resonate more effectively with its recipient. This is in line with his comparative lack of personal relationships within the regime during the early years of Elizabeth's reign. On one occasion, when writing to Throckmorton in early 1566, Randolph drew on their shared experience of the 'myseries' of Mary Tudor's reign to persuade his friend against supporting Mary, Queen of Scots' claim to the English throne: he was appalled that Throckmorton might 'fynde other in this Queen and her howsbonde but that which you have experiemented and felte in the laste of her name that rayned in Engl[and]'.⁴¹⁸

Alongside this personalised, experiential technique of persuasion lay a broader, more general use of historical and near contemporary examples to substantiate an individual's counsel. Randolph and Throckmorton were part of a political culture in which historical justification was a critical tool of ambassadors and councillors; past events and experiences could be used to assess, shape, and add force to political arguments. Chapter One demonstrated the didactic value placed upon historical works during the sixteenth century.⁴¹⁹ Historical examples were viewed as political guides: they presented a framework through which to interpret contemporary politics. Beale, in his guide for a councillor, explained that 'By the readinge of histories you may observe the examples of times past, judging of their successe'.⁴²⁰ Thomas Norton argued that 'a reader of hystories...layeth up the store of wisdom for him selfe, and counsell for other' as through this means he may 'discerneth and judgeth rightly of things

⁴¹⁷ SP70/15, fo. 107r, Throckmorton to Council, 30 June 1560; SP70/28, fo. 38r, Throckmorton to Council, 13 July 1561.

⁴¹⁸ Advocates 1.2.2, fo. 40r, Randolph to Throckmorton, 10 February 1566.

⁴¹⁹ Ch. 1, pp. 33-4.

⁴²⁰ Beale's counsellor thesis in appendix of C. Read, *Mr Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth*, I (Oxford, 1925), pp. 423-443.

present, and forseeth wisely of thinges to come'.⁴²¹ Thus Throckmorton was repeating a common assumption when, in 1560, he counselled Cecil to consider that 'Things done before ower tyme, do tell us what may happine yn ower tyme'.⁴²² History and memory collided to form a common cultural language that was crucial in shaping individuals' perception of the political world in which they lived. Historical examples dominate Throckmorton's diplomatic letters, less so Randolph's, illustrating the political and rhetorical utility of recent memory and more distant history in assessing the implications of foreign policies and to press a particular course of action.

The dispatches of these two diplomats demonstrate their active application of history to politics, as desired by their contemporaries: by finding historical parallels for contemporary events they were able to 'se ynto the world', 'conjecture sequeles' and reinforce their political arguments.⁴²³ When discussing the marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots, Randolph highlighted the historical danger of a Queen Regnant marrying a foreigner, 'whear her people mighte have mislykinge as that of Queen Marie with Spayne or shoulde be occasion of ennimitie as that of her selfe with france'.⁴²⁴ In 1560, Throckmorton tried to discourage Cecil from supporting the marriage proposal of the King of Sweden by writing 'to tell you what I dyd lately rede yn the hystorie off Svecia'. His subsequent recitation of a history of rebellion and unstable monarchy was designed to lead Cecil to the conclusion that the 'matche may brynge warr perill and expensis'.⁴²⁵ When, in 1560, the war in Scotland was continually hampered by Elizabeth's desire to treat for peace a frustrated Throckmorton referred Cecil to a section of the Oration of Marcus Porcius Cato 'in respect of our case at this present...wherin there is somewhat to be considered'. The passage was an exhortation against Rome's hesitant dealing with the rebels

⁴²¹ T. Norton, *Orations, of Arsanes agaynst Philip the trecherous kyng of Macedone* (London, 1560), sig. 3r.

⁴²² SP70/19, fo. 108v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 22 October 1560.

⁴²³ SP70/20, fo. 40r; SP70/19, fo. 130v.

⁴²⁴ Julius F/VI, fo. 93r.

⁴²⁵ SP70/19, fo. 108r-v.

that had joined Catiline's army, or, in contemporary terms, the English hesitancy to make good their war against the French in Scotland. It was a particularly appropriate parallel because Cato identified the key problem to be Rome's reliance on 'womanish entreaties' (*suppliciiis muliebribus*) and the solution to be 'action, and good counsel' (*agundo, bene consulundo*); in other words, it was a veiled attack on Elizabeth's policy.⁴²⁶ Similarly, in 1562 Throckmorton informed Elizabeth that 'the greatest difficultie' in the negotiations for peace between the Huguenots and Catholics in France was 'the same that was betwixt Pompey and Caesar'. He argued that if the two sides 'agree not nowe, The same issue is lyke to ensue that followed betwixt the sayd twoo remain Captaines'.⁴²⁷

Sometimes little more was needed than to reiterate the political lessons encapsulated within histories. In 1560, Throckmorton reminded Cecil 'that it is on of the chieffe instructions that phillip de Comynes saith in his historie to a prince that wyll well manage his state to send two ambassadours for one'.⁴²⁸ When Throckmorton advised Cecil to encourage Elizabeth's financial liberality, 'for...nothing can so moche hinder the Q[ueens] Majestie as to be hard', he underscored the point with the example of 'Cyrus [who] with all his povertie was more esteemed and better beloved of his people, and others then Crosus with all his riches keping them to him self'.⁴²⁹ Similarly, during proposals for an interview between the two Queens in 1562, Randolph and his English colleagues were mindful of an abortive meeting between Henry VIII and James IV in 1541.⁴³⁰ Randolph went so far as to warn Mary, who was not then born, 'that ther are yet some of them alyve, and of that mynde that then theie were whoe wolde travayle

⁴²⁶ SP70/13, fo. 81v; J. Ramsey (ed.), *Sallust's Bellum Catilinae* (Oxford, 2007), p. 49.

⁴²⁷ SP70/38, fo. 82r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 9 June 1562; SP70/38, fo. 93r.

⁴²⁸ SP70/14, fo. 104v.

⁴²⁹ SP70/12, fo. 17r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 2 May 1560.

⁴³⁰ SP52/6, fo. 124v, Elizabeth to Mary, 16 August 1561.

with her grace as at that tyme theie dyd with hym to staye and alter her mynde from anye suche purpose'.⁴³¹

Historical examples were a common rhetorical device in political and cultural dialogue; and they were also used to provide models for action. In 1560, Throckmorton suggested that Arran usurp the throne of Scotland by doing 'as Edward IV did, when he landed at Ravenspurg: (he pretended to the duchy of York; and having that, he wold not leave, till he had the diademe'.⁴³² At the same time, Throckmorton interpreted the plan to send Ninian Cockburn into Leith to spy on the French in the light of Virgil's *The Aenid*: Ninian was equated with Sinon, the man who deceived the Trojans into taking the wooden horse into Troy. Throckmorton warned Cecil that 'ther is grete conning required to play Simons parte'. Throckmorton suggested that they should 'constrayne' the French in Leith 'to kepe within' by using the same tactics against anyone fleeing the town as the Marquis de Marignan used against Monluc at the siege of Sienna (1555).⁴³³

History was not absolute: it was open to interpretation. The malleability of historical examples – their adaptability to support arguments both for and against a particular stance – was an asset when individuals used them to justify their counsel or political position. For instance, Throckmorton used Henry VII's proclivity for peace as both an asset – when arguing that England should only indirectly 'norysshe other folks yn debate' – and a catastrophe – when persuading the Queen that not intervening in Scotland would be as militarily disastrous as Henry's loss of the Anglo-Breton alliance through his unwillingness to go to Brittany's aid.⁴³⁴

ii. Sententiae

⁴³¹ Caligula B/X, fo. 202r, Randolph to Cecil, 7 December 1561.

⁴³² Forbes, *Transactions*, p. 435.

⁴³³ SP70/14, fo. 105r.

⁴³⁴ SP70/38, fo. 202v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 24 June 1562; SP70/11, fo. 62v.

As with historical examples, the inclusion of classical or biblical *sententiae* was a way for diplomats and their colleagues to add force to their counsel. As *sententiae* were accorded a high value in Elizabethan political society as models for moral behaviour and political action they proved influential as a rhetorical tool of political and moral counsel.⁴³⁵ Such maxims could be used both in support of a piece of policy advice or stand in place of the author's own counsel. In 1561, Throckmorton supported Cecil's recent punishment of a group of 'masse mongers' on the grounds that 'accordyng to the oppinion off Plato & aristotle theyre ys always more perill to the state by the faulte off dysobeyng, then by error yn commandyng'.⁴³⁶ The same year, as Cecil sought to diminish Spanish influence at the English court, Throckmorton could only offer him advice through the mediation of Cecil's favourite rhetorician, Cicero, 'who sayd to lentulus...*Si cecidisset ut volumus et optamus, omnes te et sapienter et fortiter: Sin aliquid esset offensum eosdem illos et cupide et temere fecusse dictorus. Quare quid allequi possis non tam facile est mihi quam tibi cui in conspectu anglia est ^id^ iudicare*'.⁴³⁷ Throckmorton had altered the passage to fit the context of his writing, exchanging 'Aegyptus' for 'Anglia' and altering the tense so that the advice came from him singularly.

This was Throckmorton's usual practice: when an apt example or maxim did not exactly fit the situation, he altered it accordingly. Thus, when discussing the danger posed by Mary, Queen of Scots making a marriage alliance with Spain, Throckmorton rendered 'ne forte veniant Romani' (John 11) as 'ne forte veniant Hispani'.⁴³⁸ By drawing the reader's attention to the beginning of the quotation Throckmorton could also silently indicate the dangerous outcome posed in the latter half of the sentence: that the Romans or, in this case, the Spanish would

⁴³⁵ Collinson, 'Nicholas Bacon', 260; Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, pp. 145-7.

⁴³⁶ Add. 35830, fo. 107v, Jones to Throckmorton, 8 May 1561; SP70/26, fo. 79v.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., If it turns out as we wish and desire, everybody will say that you acted wisely and courageously; if any hitch occurs, those same men will say that you acted ambitiously and rashly. Wherefore what you really can do it is not so easy for me to judge as for you, who have England within sight; Cicero, *Letters to his friends*, CXIII, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0022%3Atext%3DF%3Abook%3D1%3Aletter%3D7> [accessed 10/07/16].

⁴³⁸ Lest the Spanish will come, SP70/25, fo. 6r.

destroy the nation.⁴³⁹ Similarly, Throckmorton strengthened his advice for a policy that offered amenable Scottish lords English pensions by dropping the ‘navium’ from Horace’s ‘munera navium saevos illaqueant duces’.⁴⁴⁰

Although Randolph used sententiae less frequently in his counsel than Throckmorton, he employed them in a similar fashion. In 1562 Randolph attempted to reassure a nervous Lethington to continue his pursuit of an Anglo-Scottish alliance with a line from Terrence’s *Heauton Timorumenos*: ‘*Fortuna iuvat et non fit sine periculo facimus magnum et memorabile*’.⁴⁴¹ Similarly, Randolph reassured Cecil that whether Mary’s amiable approach towards Elizabeth and England was genuine or not would soon become apparent for ‘*nihil simulatum diuturnum*’.⁴⁴²

Randolph and Throckmorton’s use of sententiae was part of a broader, established cultural phenomenon. So extensive was the use of sententiae in rhetorical counsel that on occasion one maxim could be answered with another. In 1561 Lethington complained to Throckmorton about the lack of English pensions for Scots, employing a phrase from Chaucer he argued that ‘*withe empty handes men showld no haukes lure*’.⁴⁴³ Throckmorton responded by encouraging Lethington to have patience for ‘*quod differtur non aufertur. Tout vient à point à qui peult attendre*’.⁴⁴⁴ Sententiae were frequently employed to convey warnings on sensitive subjects. In

⁴³⁹ John 11:47-48.

⁴⁴⁰ Gifts would ensnare the savage leaders of ships, Horace, *Odes*, III.16, DOI: 10.4159/DLCL.horace-odes.2004 [accessed 01/05/20].

⁴⁴¹ No great and memorable deed is ever accomplished without danger, Terence, *Heauton Timorumenos*, Act II, Sc. III, <https://www.thelatinlibrary.com/ter.heauton.html> [accessed 13/12/23]; SP52/7, fo. 10v, Randolph to Cecil, 15 January 1562.

⁴⁴² Simulation is not long lasting; SP52/7, fo. 15r, Randolph to Cecil, 30 January 1562.

⁴⁴³ G. Chaucer, ‘Wife of Bath’s Prologue’, *Canterbury Tales*, <http://www.librarius.com/canttran/wifetale/wifetale401-436.htm> [accessed 13/12/23].

⁴⁴⁴ All is not lost that is delayed. Everything comes to him who can wait, SP70/28, fo. 36r, Throckmorton to Lethington, 30 June 1561.

late 1560, Throckmorton urged caution in Cecil's dealings with the French with the message 'you have not forgotten thys verse *Fistula dulci canet volucrm dum decipit auceps*'.⁴⁴⁵

iii. Reported Speech and False Deference

When a diplomat's own counsel fell on deaf ears, they could seek to reinforce it by placing it into the mouths of anonymous 'wise men' or other named individuals. In so doing they sought to make unsavoury advice both more potent and less incendiary to the diplomat. This exploitation of the conventional wisdom that monarchs should listen to the counsel of wise men was a rhetorical strategy advocated by Machiavelli that both Throckmorton and Randolph employed in their diplomatic counsel.⁴⁴⁶ Addressing the Queen in April 1560, Throckmorton wrote of 'the Jugement of all wise men on this side to direct your majesties doinges in such sorte to [the]...preventing of the french pretensid malice against your majestie'.⁴⁴⁷ In early 1565 Randolph supported his attempt to persuade Leicester to marry Mary with the argument that 'What proffyt and commoditie shall insue unto your Countrie, the wysest and best experimented have all reddie geven their judgemente that ther cane be no greater'.⁴⁴⁸ Equally, they made good use of reported speech to address particular political issues.⁴⁴⁹ In late 1560 as Throckmorton advised Elizabeth against the Leicester marriage, he reported how Mary sneered at the suggestion that the English Queen would marry the keeper of her horses.⁴⁵⁰ This was a calculated move: Throckmorton knew the offence that the insult to Elizabeth's majesty by her immediate rival for the English throne would cause and hoped it would help persuade the

⁴⁴⁵ The pipe sings sweetly as the Fowler deceives the bird, SP70/18, fo. 4v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 3 September 1560.

⁴⁴⁶ N. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. H. Mansfield (Chicago, 1998), pp. 13, 57, 94; G. Berridge *et al* (eds.), *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (Basingstoke, 2001), p. 19.

⁴⁴⁷ SP70/13, fo. 30r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 6 April 1560.

⁴⁴⁸ NLS, MS 3657, fo. 11r.

⁴⁴⁹ For the complexities of reported speech in diplomacy see F. de Vivo, 'Archives of Speech: Recording Diplomatic Negotiation in Late Medieval and Early Modern Italy', *European History Quarterly*, 46/3 (2016), 519-44.

⁴⁵⁰ Add. 35830, fo. 66r.

Queen not to marry Leicester. Throckmorton made a similar deliberate use of Mary's reported speech the following year when it was rumoured abroad that Elizabeth might consider a return to Catholicism in return for Spanish support in marrying Leicester. This time Mary and her uncle, Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine, were said to have 'made their advantage of the crosse and candles in your chappell: sainge youe were not yet resolved of what religion youe wold be'. This mockery emphasised the issue as a talking point at the French court and the importance of Elizabeth remaining the Protestant figurehead vis-à-vis her Catholic cousin. This was precisely the point Throckmorton attempted to drive home in his own counsel in the same letter.⁴⁵¹

The natural extension of an approach to counselling that played on the rivalry between Elizabeth and Mary was to implicitly use Mary's behaviour to reproach Elizabeth's without confronting the issue directly. Jenny Wormald commented upon how Throckmorton took this approach during the winter of 1560 when he considered Elizabeth to be rashly forsaking good counsel in pursuit of a marriage to Leicester.⁴⁵² Indeed, he silently contrasted his own Queen's behaviour with that of her rival, reporting that the newly widowed Mary 'more esteemith the contynuacion of her honnour, and to mary one that maye uphold her to be greate: then she passithe to serve and please her fansye'.⁴⁵³ Throckmorton was genuinely impressed with the way in which Mary conducted herself but his good reports of Mary's 'wisdome ^and queenly modesty' were also an implicit criticism of Elizabeth's lack thereof. Mary, Throckmorton observed, 'thinketh her self not to wise, but is content to be rulid by good counsell...which is a great vertue in a prince or princesse'.⁴⁵⁴ In the winter of 1560, Throckmorton portrayed Mary

⁴⁵¹ SP70/25, fos. 118v-120r.

⁴⁵² J. Wormald, *Mary, Queen of Scots, A Study in Failure* (Edinburgh, 2017), p. 106.

⁴⁵³ SP70/21, fo. 27v, Throckmorton to Council, 6 December 1560.

⁴⁵⁴ SP70/21, fo. 134v, Throckmorton to Council, 31 December 1560.

as the model of how a Queen should behave; Elizabeth's behaviour, by implication, did not fit the mould.

When all else failed, Throckmorton, Randolph and their colleagues employed deferential language; a tactical device that helped them to defuse difficult advice that had the potential to be disagreeable to the recipient. Exaggerated deference offered a model for counsellors to offer inflammatory advice without rebuke, for they simply deferred to the supposed greater authority of the recipient to decide upon the worth of a piece of advice. In 1559, Throckmorton used deferential language to both preface and conclude his provocative advice that Elizabeth should forgive and support John Knox, whose attack on female rule had caused offence:

(in my poor opinion, saving your highnes grave judgement) considering, what knokes is hable to do in Scotland...it shuld stand your majestie in stede [if] his former faultes were forgotten, and that no meanes be used to annoy him for the same...likeas I doubt not your majestie can consider better than I.⁴⁵⁵

Randolph too used false deference as a strategic ploy to exert his political opinions and offer advice. In late 1564, when advising Elizabeth of the potential danger of a marriage between Mary and Darnley, Randolph prefaced his opinion with deference to the Queen's wisdom and knowledge:

Howe farre theie are from their purpose your majestie beste knowne and I assured will consyder the unfetnes of the mache for greater causes then I cane thynke of which the leaste will not be the losse of manie a godlie mans harte...yf your majestie gyve your consente to matche her fourthe with such one as ether by dissentione at home, or lacke of knowledge of god and his worde may persecute those that profese the same.⁴⁵⁶

In these instances, Randolph and Throckmorton's use of deferential language, as with other rhetorical strategies of counsel, was merely a means by which they could fulfil their obligations

⁴⁵⁵ SP70/5, fo. 24r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 13 June 1559.

⁴⁵⁶ Julius F/VI, fo. 94r.

as *vir civilis*, enabling them to proffer their advice and forward their political opinions without incurring the wrath of the Queen and her councillors.

Conclusion

This chapter has broadened our understanding of how examples were used within counsel by highlighting less well-known strategies, such as how individuals chose examples based on their personal knowledge of the recipient or how they could adapt examples to better fit the argument they were putting forth. Building on Filippo de Vivo's work on reported speech in diplomatic reports, this chapter has shown that the use of reported speech could be an important asset in furthering an ambassador's counsel, and thus diplomats could be selective in which sections of speech they chose to report so as to support their purpose.⁴⁵⁷ Moreover, it has demonstrated that the ideology of the *vir civilis* was fundamental to how Throckmorton and Randolph interpreted and carried out their roles as diplomatic advisors. It has also shown that individual advisors could use the principles of the *vir civilis* to hold one another to account. Yet, the values of the *vir civilis* – the duty to offer honest, unflattering counsel – were also a rhetorical device that could be used to proffer unpopular counsel and persuade individuals to action or inaction.

Chapter one demonstrated that ambassadors were expected to be good rhetoricians – both orally and in writing – able to effectively embellish their dispatches with ‘the coullores off Rhetorique’ to make their arguments more forceful and appealing to their audience.⁴⁵⁸ This chapter has established that diplomats had to be masters of timely rhetoric. For a diplomat knowing what words to use and when depended on a variety of factors: their access to up-to-date intelligence on the political mood of the Queen and Council at home; and, as this chapter has shown, their ability to connect personally with the recipient of their counsel in order to

⁴⁵⁷ De Vivo, ‘Archives’, 519-44.

⁴⁵⁸ SP52/9, fo. 48r, Lethington to Randolph, 10 March 1564.

effectively choose rhetorical strategies that best suited the individual and the nature of the advice being proffered. Some of these strategies, in particular the use of historical examples and philosophical sententiae, were as much mediums through which Throckmorton and Randolph could interpret and predict events as they were tools of rhetoric. Thus, when navigating the rocky path of Anglo-Scottish relations Throckmorton and Randolph had an arsenal of interpretative tools and rhetorical devices – personalisation, historical examples, sententiae, reported speech and false deference – they could employ to forward their political advice to the Queen and her councillors. How they did so and to what end was fundamentally shaped by their British perspectives.

Chapter 4

Throckmorton and Randolph's British perspectives, 1559-60

In 1559-60, the British perspectives espoused by Englishmen were primarily conceived as a means to combat England's increasingly isolated position within Europe and provide security for Elizabeth's fledgling Protestant regime. In April 1559 the loss of Calais was confirmed, leaving England without a foothold on the continent and 'the French King bestyding the Realm, having on foot in Callais and the other in Scotland'.⁴⁵⁹ From Scotland, the French could potentially infiltrate Ireland and destabilise English rule there.⁴⁶⁰ The French threat was substantial: Mary, Queen of Scots and, from July 1559, Queen of France appropriated the English royal arms and title; and her Guise relatives, who controlled the French government,

⁴⁵⁹ SP12/1, fo. 152r, *The Distresses of the Commonwealth* by Armigal Waad, 1558.

⁴⁶⁰ Potter, 'French Intrigue', 159-180.

were keen to publish Mary's claim to be Queen of England.⁴⁶¹ Concurrently, the rebellion of the Protestant Lords of the Congregation in Scotland appeared to offer an opportunity to secure England's position by removing French influence from the British Isles and establishing Protestantism north of the border. Alford has shown how Cecil capitalised on the situation in Scotland to affect his British policies; Scotland was central to Cecil's British perspective and his conceptualisation of how England fitted into European politics in the 1560s. In 1560 Cecil masterminded a political alliance with the Scots. Founded on commonality of religion, the alliance aimed to remove the French from Scotland and use the links between the Irish lords in Ulster and the Scots in Kintyre and Galloway, such as Archibald Campbell, Earl of Argyll, to secure English government in Ireland.⁴⁶² Similarly, Dawson has shown that Argyll's offer to help the English in Ulster was part of a broader British strategy designed to attain English support for the Congregation's reformation in Scotland.⁴⁶³ These men were able to pursue British policies in 1559-60 because their national goals – English domestic security and Reformation in Scotland – were compatible and mutually beneficial. Their British strategies were complemented by a broader drive for an Anglo-Scottish alliance. Loughlin, for instance, has demonstrated that, prior to Mary's return to Scotland in 1561, Lethington worked closely with Cecil to secure 'the union off these two nations'.⁴⁶⁴ While several Scots shared in Cecil's British aspirations, it is less clear how deep these British ideas ran within the Elizabethan regime or how uniformly they were expressed. This chapter points to the diversity of British opinions within the Elizabethan regime in several ways: first, by highlighting the continued widespread mistrust of the Scots from many Elizabethans who remembered the failed attempts

⁴⁶¹ É. Durot, 'Le Crépuscule de l'Auld Alliance: la Légitimité du Pouvoir en Question Entre Écosse, France et Angleterre (1558-1561)', *Histoire, Économie & Société*, 1 (2007), 12-6, 19; Bonner, 'Henry II', 37-8; S. Carroll, *Martyrs and Murderers: The Guise Family and the Making of Europe* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 51-2, 83, 98-99; S. Thiry, 'In Open Shew to the World': Mary Stuart's Armorial Claim to the English Throne and Anglo-French Relations (1559-1561)', *EHR*, 132 (2017), 1405-39.

⁴⁶² *EEP*, p. 75; Dawson, 'Cecil', 200-3.

⁴⁶³ J. Dawson, *The Politics of Religion in the Age of Mary, Queen of Scots: The Earl of Argyll and the Struggle for Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 9.

⁴⁶⁴ Loughlin, 'Maitland'; SP52/10, fo. 13r, Lethington to Cecil, 1 February 1565.

at unity in the 1540s; and second, by exploring Throckmorton and Randolph's variant British perspectives and the ideological priorities that lay behind them.

A complicating factor in individuals' approach to British policy at this time is the increasingly prevalent notion of an international Catholic conspiracy to exterminate Protestantism, encouraged by the end of hostilities between France and Spain in 1559.⁴⁶⁵ Throckmorton and Randolph's approaches to foreign policy have been considered through this prism. Malcolm Thorpe's survey of English anti-Catholicism portrayed Throckmorton as a 'hot gospeller' whilst dismissing Randolph as a religious moderate.⁴⁶⁶ Thorpe's analysis is misleading, and his labels need some serious adjustment. This chapter shows how Throckmorton's depiction as a hot gospeller belies his political pragmatism which firmly subordinated the drive for Protestant unity and supporting co-religionists abroad to the needs of English national security. Conversely, it also highlights the importance of religious fundamentalism in Randolph's political thought and diplomatic conduct. Katherine Frescoln flagged Randolph's prioritisation of religion in his approach to Anglo-Scottish relations in 1565, but she did not explore this further.⁴⁶⁷ Yet, as shall be seen, Randolph's commitment to securing Protestantism in Scotland was the foundation of his approach to Anglo-Scottish relations in general.

First, this chapter considers Throckmorton's approach to Anglo-Scottish amity vis-à-vis his colleagues and in relation to the historical backdrop of the failed attempts to forge an alliance between England and Scotland in the 1540s. It then explores Throckmorton's perspective that centred on securing Elizabeth's position both in the British Isles and Europe. Finally, it

⁴⁶⁵ M. Thorpe, 'Catholic Conspiracy in Early Elizabethan Foreign Policy', *SCJ*, 15/4 (1984); Kellar, *Scotland*, pp. 184-219; *EEP*, pp. 43-70; Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish', pp. 87-114.

⁴⁶⁶ Thorpe, 'Catholic Conspiracy', 431-2.

⁴⁶⁷ Frescoln, 'Randolph', p. 206.

examines Randolph's conceptualisation of the relationship in light of his pan-Protestant outlook.

I. Anglo-Scottish Amity, 1559-60

Dawson, Alford and others have shown that the Anglo-Scottish alliance in 1559-60 was couched in a language of amity and built upon concepts of shared religion, geography, language and culture that stretched back to the 1540s. The amity was driven by a renewed commitment to the concept of one island Protestantism current in 1540s propaganda and amongst the Anglo-Scottish exile community during the 1550s, and now redeployed in the changed circumstances of 1559-60.⁴⁶⁸ In August 1559 Cecil argued that England and Scotland were 'one Ile devided from the rest of the world'.⁴⁶⁹ The Scots also invoked this idea in December 1560 when they proposed a marriage between Elizabeth and Arran to 'establishe a certayen monarchie be it selfe in the ocean devidit from the rest of the world'.⁴⁷⁰ The prospect of a politically and religiously secure island bastion is what made an Anglo-Scottish alliance so attractive to both the English and the Scots in 1559-60.

Despite many commentators stressing the importance of an Anglo-Scottish 'amity' in 1559-60, the relationship was more problematic than has been appreciated. Memories of the failed Henrician and Edwardian attempts at perpetual amity loomed large and there remained residual traces of the latent mistrust and cultural stigmas that had defined England's relationship with her northern neighbour for centuries. During the Privy Council debate on Scottish intervention in December 1559, Nicholas Bacon rehearsed Henry VIII and Edward VI's failures.⁴⁷¹ In September 1559, when Ralph Sadler was finally given the greenlight to supply the

⁴⁶⁸ Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish', pp. 87-114; *EEP*, pp. 43-70; Kellar, *Scotland*, pp. 98-112, 170-219.

⁴⁶⁹ Lansdowne 4, fo. 26r, Memoranda as to Scotland, 31 August 1559.

⁴⁷⁰ SP52/5, fo. 50r, Motion of the Scottish Ambassadors, before 7 December 1560.

⁴⁷¹ Harley 398, fos. 19r-20r, Bacon's Speech to the Council, December 1559.

Congregation with financial aid, he could not resist putting them ‘in remembrance how liberall the king her majesties father had benn afore tyme to the Nobilitie of Scotland...and how litle they considered it’.⁴⁷² The Congregation also drew on their experience of dealing with the English in the 1540s, marvelling that Elizabeth had not answered them given that Henry ‘disdained not lovingly to write to men fewar in number, and far inferior in authoritie’.⁴⁷³ The Treaty of Berwick (February 1560), usually considered to be a highpoint of the amity, reveals the tentative, mistrustful nature of the Anglo-Scottish relationship, since it included clauses designed to fortify English influence in Scotland and sever the links between the Scottish Lords and France. The Scots were required to hand over several high value hostages, kin of the leading Lords, as sureties for their loyalty during the time of Mary’s marriage to Francis II. This in theory would prevent the Scottish Lords returning to the ‘auld’ alliance with France and thereby stop the French regaining a foothold in Scotland while the Marian threat to Elizabeth persisted.⁴⁷⁴ The Scots demanded the conditions for their hostages be certified under Elizabeth’s great seal, a clear sign that they were nervous and distrustful, despite their protestations to the contrary.⁴⁷⁵ Alongside this evidence of continued mistrust persisted a sense of English cultural superiority. In July 1560, while negotiating the Treaty of Edinburgh, Cecil complained of ‘the fury of the vulgar scottes’ and in his own notes he justified English intervention in Scotland with arguments about England’s imperial jurisdiction over the Scottish realm that would have been anathema to his Scottish friends.⁴⁷⁶

The promotion of Anglo-Scottish amity underpinned by shared religion and the idealism of one island Protestantism was a means to airbrush the difficult history the two countries shared and the tentative nature of the alliance. The language of amity was carefully contrived to appeal to

⁴⁷² Add. 33591, fo. 93r, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 8 September 1559.

⁴⁷³ SP52/1, fo. 188r, Knox to Cecil, 15 August 1559.

⁴⁷⁴ SP52/2, fos. 63v-64r, Articles of Berwick, 27 February 1560.

⁴⁷⁵ SP52/2, fo. 68r, Norfolk to Council, 29 February 1560.

⁴⁷⁶ SP59/2, fo. 261r, Cecil to Throckmorton, 9 July 1560; *EEP*, p. 59.

Scottish sensibilities and assuage any concerns the Congregation might have about English intentions. The Scots set the tone, persistently drawing attention to notions of amity and unity between England and Scotland. Lethington reminded Cecil that during the 1540s ‘feare of co[n]quest made us to hate zow and love theym: the cais changed quhen we see theym planely attempt co[n]quest and zow schaw us friendship’.⁴⁷⁷ They used this language, alongside references to the 1540s ideal of one island Protestantism, to associate the English with their cause and win their support. Englishmen, like Cecil, strategically reflected this language back at the Scots in the hope of affecting an alliance between the two nations. Within the Elizabethan regime Throckmorton was one of the forerunners in fostering this language of amity, referring to the Congregation as Elizabeth’s ‘frendes’ from the summer of 1559. Randolph was even more partisan, using the term ‘we’ in his letters to suggest his identification with the Congregation’s aims.⁴⁷⁸

Like many of his colleagues, Throckmorton had experienced the 1540s drive for union and was attuned to the sense of providentialism and fulfilment the new partnership provided for these long-held ambitions.⁴⁷⁹ However, Throckmorton was also attuned to the need for sensitivity and care in fostering the relationship. He understood that to realise the Anglo-Scottish alliance (and all their British strategizing incumbent on it) the English needed to win the Scots’ trust and that the fragile relationship could be easily damaged by English insensitivity. After the Treaty of Berwick, Throckmorton counselled Cecil to be careful when taking hostages from the Scots for it was crucial that the Scots ‘have no cause to thinke we do mistrust them but as that which passeth betwene us may seeme to proceede of love’.⁴⁸⁰ The key word here is ‘seeme’. It was all about cultivating the right image. Throckmorton’s approach was

⁴⁷⁷ Caligula B/IX/1, fo. 102v, Lethington to Cecil, 20 January 1560.

⁴⁷⁸ SP70/5, fo. 177r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 27 July 1559; Add. 33591, fo. 165r, Randolph to Sadler, 30 September 1559.

⁴⁷⁹ SP70/11, fo. 63r.

⁴⁸⁰ SP70/12, fo. 44r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 7/8 March 1560.

dichotomous: he simultaneously argued that ‘for our own assurance’ the Scots must be brought to ‘love and feare us’.⁴⁸¹ Fear, a subtle form of subjugation, remained an important element of the relationship. Love would encourage the Scots to ally with England but fear, derived from a dependency on English support for the Congregation’s fledgling government, would enable the English to keep them in line. Control and influence, not love and amity, were the key features of Throckmorton’s British perspective but this was not reflected in the language or actions he used towards his ‘frendes’, the Scots.⁴⁸²

Throckmorton’s cautious treatment of the Scots was reflected in the behaviour of many of his colleagues. Cecil, for instance, was careful to avoid any sense of English superiority in his draft of the Treaty of Berwick despite using such arguments in his own private notes; and Norfolk argued for the importance of not allowing the English to fortify in Scotland for ‘the scottes might thereby...feare our conquest’ to the end that ‘we might the rather cause our freendes to becom our utter enemies’.⁴⁸³ Clearly, Anglo-Scottish amity should not be taken at face value. For many it was a strategic language designed to rehabilitate and secure the relationship between the two kingdoms.

II. Throckmorton’s Perspective on the British Isles and Europe

Far from being a warmongering, hot gospeller, in the early years of Elizabeth’s reign, Throckmorton’s religious zeal was tempered by the practicalities of ensuring the political security of Elizabeth and her regime. In his thinking, the drive for Protestant unity was subordinate to the needs of English domestic stability and external security. Throckmorton’s British perspective is best understood if it is first situated within the wider framework of his political viewpoint at the start of the reign. The cautious advice he proffered to Elizabeth prior

⁴⁸¹ SP70/12, fo. 78r, Throckmorton to Council, 15 March 1560.

⁴⁸² SP70/5, fo. 177r.

⁴⁸³ *EEP*, pp. 43-70; SP52/2, fo. 21v, Norfolk and Sadler to Cecil, 24 January 1560.

to her accession set the tone. The political insecurity of Elizabeth and her Protestant regime lay at the heart of his advice: it was designed to secure Elizabeth's 'honor saftie and happie government...through a discrete beginning'.⁴⁸⁴ This entailed a double-dealing strategy of openly dissembling with the remnants of Mary's Catholic regime and the Catholic European powers, while taking secret moves to strengthen Elizabeth's relationship with international Protestant powers. Similarly, at home, Elizabeth was advised to dissemble with her Council and order that 'ther bee no inovacions no tumultes or breach of orders in theis general wordes', in other words without reference to religion; while, secretly, laying the foundations for the eventual restoration of Protestantism by Parliament. No-one was to 'wholy understand what you meane'.⁴⁸⁵ Machiavellian dissimulation was key to how Throckmorton conceptualised balancing a Protestant regime with the establishment and security of Elizabeth's position; and his use of religion could be cold and calculating.⁴⁸⁶

In 1559 Throckmorton reminded Elizabeth that 'religion...ys nowe a great peace of your policie'; but *piece* is the important word here, it was one part of the whole.⁴⁸⁷ Throckmorton viewed the religious aspect of politics as a tool to serve the interests of English security and not as a means primarily of forwarding Protestantism. Here again Throckmorton expressed Machiavellian political principles such as advocating the use of religion to perform sleight of hand and devious policies designed to bolster England's uncertain position and keep France and other potential European aggressors occupied at home. In 1561, Throckmorton advised Elizabeth not to intervene in the religious disturbances in France but, instead, to 'carie the protestantes abrode yn your ryght hand with a syncere meynyng and the papystes abrode yn

⁴⁸⁴ Parker Library, MS 543, fo. 31v.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., fos. 32r-v, 35v.

⁴⁸⁶ Throckmorton owned and annotated Machiavelli: Magdalen College, Oxford, N. Machiavelli, *Le Prince* (Paris, 1553), shelf mark Q.6.14. For Machiavellian counsel see Paul, *Counsel and Command*, pp. 71-96.

⁴⁸⁷ SP70/6, fo. 116v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 25 August 1559.

your lefte hand' thereby 'bryng[ing] no danger to your owne contre'.⁴⁸⁸ The following year, his advice to 'countenance' the Huguenots had little to do with his religious inclinations, rather Throckmorton believed it was in England's best interests to keep the French occupied with internal dissension for 'it shall be ower saffetie that nether parte overthrow eche other'.⁴⁸⁹ Similarly, when it came to supporting the Congregation in Scotland, Throckmorton was driven not by his commitment to the 'common cause' of religion but his belief that an alliance with Scotland was imperative for English national security, for if the Scots 'were all Papistes...we for the state of our Realme shoulde [still] take our Comodite by them'.⁴⁹⁰ Throckmorton's political perspective at this time is in line with the definition of a Machiavellian given in the *Treatise of Treasons* (1571), 'where Religion is put behind in the second & last place: wher the ciuil Policie ... is preferred before it'.⁴⁹¹ It is essential to understand that, in the early 1560s, Throckmorton used religion as a tool to help secure England's position and not purely as a means of forwarding the Protestant cause if we are to appreciate Throckmorton's political perspective in general and his priorities in Scotland in particular. His behaviour – and his prioritisation of English national security above all else – supports Paul's assertion that reason of state vocabularies of counsel were evident early in the reign of Elizabeth, with counsel being aimed primarily at the preservation of the state.⁴⁹²

Throckmorton's conceptualisation of the European political arena was likewise dominated by his concern for national security at the start of Elizabeth's reign. In 1568, Throckmorton noted a step-change from when 'yn tymes paste..our potent neyghbors dyd for ambicion & superioritie contend' to 'now...[when] the generall deseigne ys to extermynate all nations

⁴⁸⁸ SP70/33, fo. 17r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 10 December 1561.

⁴⁸⁹ SP70/34, fo. 89r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 24 January 1562.

⁴⁹⁰ Bodleian, Perrot MS 3, fo. 10v.

⁴⁹¹ Anonymous, *A Treatise of Treasons against Queen Elizabeth, and the Crowne of England* (Leuven, 1572), p. 5.

⁴⁹² J. Paul and V. Schutte, 'The Tudor Monarchy of Counsel and the Growth of Reason of State', in E. Woodacre *et al* (eds.), *The Routledge History of Monarchy* (London, 2019), pp. 655-667.

dyssentyng with them yn relygion'.⁴⁹³ In 1559-60, Throckmorton saw himself as operating in the former world, where Elizabeth's hegemony was threatened by the dynastic ambitions of the Guises, and he could envisage a treaty whereby the Emperor and Philip II of Spain acted as guarantors for French good behaviour towards England.⁴⁹⁴ Throckmorton's strategizing continued to follow the traditional model of European politics. In 1560 he suggested that Elizabeth infer that she had a marriage proposal from France to keep Philip II 'afrayde for feare of an alliance with france to doo any thing against your majestie'.⁴⁹⁵ At this point Throckmorton could simultaneously argue for and against the benefits of an alliance forged on religious commonality.⁴⁹⁶ He appreciated that for many the relationship between religious and national identity was complex and that the former was not necessarily predominant. In 1562, he argued that regardless of the Protestant sympathies of the new French ambassador, Paul de Foix, he would 'exercise his wytt to thadvantage of his [Catholic] souverayne'.⁴⁹⁷ Throckmorton's perspective aligns with Potter's observation that at this time individuals were often faced with conflicting national, dynastic and religious priorities when considering foreign policies.⁴⁹⁸ Nevertheless, this does not mean that in 1559 Throckmorton could not imagine a Catholic League of France and Spain against England; indeed he believed that Philip II was a 'hallowe frend...& so maie he do more harm than an open enemy', but it did not dominate his world view.⁴⁹⁹ In fact, whereas Cecil saw a potential Catholic conspiracy as a reason for England to aid the Protestants in Scotland, during the summer of 1559 Throckmorton was concerned that such an intervention might be the catalyst for France and Spain to form a new alliance against the Protestants in England and Scotland.⁵⁰⁰ Thus a conspiratorial perception of

⁴⁹³ CP 155, fo. 117r-v.

⁴⁹⁴ SP70/12, fo. 56r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 9 March 1560.

⁴⁹⁵ SP70/12, fo. 114r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 27 March 1560.

⁴⁹⁶ SP70/22, fo. 39r; SP70/23, fo. 140v, Bedford and Throckmorton to Council, 26 February 1561.

⁴⁹⁷ SP70/34, fo. 95r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 26 January 1562.

⁴⁹⁸ Potter, 'Foreign Policy', p. 127.

⁴⁹⁹ SP70/5, fo. 177v.

⁵⁰⁰ Forbes, *Transactions*, p. 181; *EEP*, pp. 61-3.

international relations did not determine his political thinking in 1559-60. It was not until later in the decade that Throckmorton began to echo Cecil by viewing the international situation through the lens of a Catholic conspiracy against England.

Throckmorton's analysis of the international situation in 1559-60 balanced support for Protestantism in Scotland against what was best for English security. Like Cecil and other councillors, he acknowledged that a Protestant Scotland would be beneficial for England, but he measured his sympathy for the Congregation against the security of Elizabeth's realms.⁵⁰¹ As such, Throckmorton's eventual support for English intervention to remove the French from Scotland was a response to the threat to English security presented by Mary's usurpation of the English Queen's arms and title and the machinations of her Guise relatives in France. From his position at the French court, Throckmorton experienced the French threat first hand and, as a result, he viewed England as 'besieged' on two sides with the French encamped in Scotland, brandishing Mary's claims to be Queen of England, and England's south coast lying toward France.⁵⁰² There was only one way to provide for England's security: 'the Frenche must [^]be[^] utterly expellyd owt of Scotland', 'where they make the fundacion of their doings' to '~~deprive~~ your Majestie and to make your realme subject unto them', and 'they must be kept owt that they retorne no more thither for in that consystythe our safety'.⁵⁰³ The Congregation's rebellion offered the Elizabethan regime an unprecedented opportunity to remove the French from Scotland and bolster Elizabeth's position. Throckmorton focused on using the situation in Scotland for 'the benefite of our countrie' as he bluntly told the Council in June 1560 what Elizabeth 'doth in Scotland is not for the Scottes sake nor by way to ayde them...it is to provide for hir awne suretie...and hir Realme'.⁵⁰⁴ Throckmorton's attitude hinged on several

⁵⁰¹ SP70/5, fo. 154r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 19 July 1559; SP70/5, fo. 177r; *EEP*, pp. 52-70.

⁵⁰² SP70/19, fo. 31r, Throckmorton to Council, 10 October 1560.

⁵⁰³ SP70/11, fos. 61v-62r; SP70/15, fo. 22r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 7 June 1560.

⁵⁰⁴ SP70/12, fo. 116r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 27 May 1560; SP70/15, fo. 82r, Throckmorton to Council, 24 June 1560.

interlocking concerns: the protection of Elizabeth's position in England and Ireland from domestic and foreign interventions; Mary, Queen of Scots' claim to be Queen of England; and the relationship between the constituent parts of the British Isles and the powerful Catholic kingdoms of Europe, in particular France and Spain. He argued that a stable, long-lasting alliance between England and Scotland was the 'onely meane' to counter these threats: it was 'the beaste and strongest bullwarke that ever was made for the suretie of your realme' and, as such, 'a thing most necessary for the furtherance of all your affaires and t'establishe a quyet and settled state in your majesties Realme'.⁵⁰⁵

The importance Throckmorton ascribed to creating a permanent alliance between the two countries in 1559-60 led him to advocate two avant-garde policies: Mary's deposition as Queen of Scotland and a marriage between Elizabeth and Arran. Mary was the obvious stumbling block to securing a long-term Anglo-Scottish alliance. If she continued as Queen of both Scotland and France how likely were the French to remain uninvolved in Scotland? The Council were also concerned that French military presence in Scotland during Mary's lifetime augured invasion of England.⁵⁰⁶ These concerns were exacerbated in May 1560 by Throckmorton's intelligence that the previous French King, Henry II, had agreed that Francis 'shuld have the gouvernance of that realme' if Mary died without issue. The news reinforced pre-existing concerns that 'the realme of Scotland [would be] annexid to the crowne of France' in perpetuity.⁵⁰⁷ This was the antithesis of Throckmorton's British perspective as it left the French on both England's northern and southern borders and Ireland open to French intrigues. Throckmorton's immediate response was to argue that Mary – the embodiment of the French threat – be deposed as Queen of Scotland in favour of Arran:

⁵⁰⁵ SP70/19, fo. 31r; SP70/15, fo. 78r; SP70/24, fo. 70v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 31 March 1561.

⁵⁰⁶ SP70/12, fo. 39v, Council to Throckmorton, 7 March 1560.

⁵⁰⁷ Forbes, *Transactions*, p. 434.

there is no way for the surety of the Quene and our realme, if youe have expelled the French and have them in your marcy...[but to provide,] that the French do not reenter ther againe by no means. The way to perfait this assuredly is, that the Erle of Arraine do as Edward the IV did, when he landed at Ravenspurg: (he pretended to the duchy of York; and having that, he wold not leave, till he had the diademe) for then of necessitie th'Erle of Arran must depend upon the devotion of England, to maintein and defend himself...there is no such way for them [the Congregation] to have any savety or surety, oneles thei make the Earl of Arran King; and as it is their surety, so it is also ours.⁵⁰⁸

Throckmorton was unashamedly Anglocentric: he justified Mary's deposition in terms of what was politically expedient – removing Elizabeth's dynastic rival and her French troops from Scotland – for 'the surety of the Quene and our realme'. More importantly, the passage highlights Throckmorton's belief that the best way to secure English influence in Scotland and thereby the realisation of his British policies was to ensure that Scotland was made to 'depend upon' England. By leaving the Scottish government significantly weakened and dependent on England's goodwill, Throckmorton's proposal bolstered Elizabeth's authority, enabling her to dominate the politics of the British Isles. The perception that long-term English security lay in maintaining English influence in Scotland is key to understanding both Throckmorton and the Elizabethan regime's approach to Scotland throughout the 1560s.

Throckmorton was not alone in supporting Mary's deposition at this early stage. One year earlier, Cecil had countenanced deposing Mary in favour of the 'nex heyres to the Croune' – technically Arran's father, the Duke of Châtellerauld.⁵⁰⁹ Crucially, both men argued that the Scots themselves should remove Mary. Throckmorton expected Arran to seize the throne for himself; whereas Cecil was more radical, committing the transfer of power to the three estates of Scotland, proposing limiting the powers of the heir and using providence to justify Mary's deposition. Yet, Cecil also allowed for the possibility of reaching an accommodation with Mary, whereby Arran and his father would govern Scotland, but Mary would remain as

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 435-6.

⁵⁰⁹ Lansdowne 4, fos. 26r, 27r-v.

Queen.⁵¹⁰ For Throckmorton, however, only removing Mary would eradicate French control in Scotland and strengthen Anglo-Scottish relations. Throckmorton and Cecil are the only known advocates of Mary's deposition within the British Isles at this time. The Congregation would only contemplate this course of action if 'extream necessitie compell us tharto'.⁵¹¹ Alford has called Cecil's willingness to countenance Mary's deposition from the security of London a 'bold move', but it was even more dangerous for Throckmorton, who was explicitly advising this course of action from the French court at a time when he knew his letters were being intercepted.⁵¹²

While Throckmorton and Cecil's perception of the situation and conceptualisation of an Anglo-Scottish alliance as the foundation for a broader British strategy were closely aligned, the differences between Throckmorton's model of usurpation and Cecil's political justification for deposing Mary highlights their broader differences concerning the best method of securing a perpetual Anglo-Scottish alliance. In contrast to Cecil's political alliance based on commonality of religion, Throckmorton believed that a dynastic settlement was the key to establishing a permanent alliance. In December 1560, he mused that if 'one of these two Quenes of the Ile of Bryttaine were transformed ^into^ the shape of a man, to make so happie a marriage, as therby ther might be an unitie of the holl Ile, and their appendances'. For Throckmorton a dynastic union was the bedrock of any perpetual 'unitie'; it represented not only future political stability for mainland 'Bryttaine' but also for its 'appendances', particularly Ireland. Throckmorton supported his position by pointing to historical precedent: 'who so ever is conversant in storyes shall well perceave estates hathe by no on thing growen so greate, and lastyd in their greatnes, as by mariages, whiche have unytid contreyes that do

⁵¹⁰ *EEP*, pp. 62-3.

⁵¹¹ SP52/1, fo. 119v, Congregation to Cecil, 19 July 1559.

⁵¹² *EEP*, p. 63; Forbes, *Transactions*, p. 417.

confyne together'.⁵¹³ Throckmorton's view that this was 'a thing of long tyme sought for by England and never offered till now by scotland' stemmed from his involvement in policies related to dynastic union with Scotland in the 1540s and early 1550s.⁵¹⁴

Throckmorton's proposal to depose Mary and replace her with Arran came from his desire for a dynastic union. This is why, unlike Cecil, Throckmorton chose to divert the natural order of succession, from Châtellerauld to his son. On the same day that Throckmorton proposed deposing Mary to Cecil, he sent Elizabeth intelligence that the new French ambassador had instructions to offer 'the Realme of Scotland to be annexid to England so as your Majestie do mary with therle of Arrayne, in which case they will cause the French Quene to renounce hir tytyle to Scotland for ever'.⁵¹⁵ As improbable as this proposal appears, it served to remind the Queen of the possible benefits of a marriage with Arran, and further persuade Cecil, who read both letters, of the possible advantages of Arran seizing the Scottish throne. Throckmorton had supported the match for some time. While coordinating Arran's flight to Scotland the previous summer, he had discussed the potential match with Scots in France, at least one of whom also saw it as 'the meane to unite England & Scotland together'.⁵¹⁶ Throckmorton also encouraged the Queen to give Arran 'as good hope as any other' and added weight to this recommendation by reporting that the King of Navarre 'sayethe your marriage ys the makynge and marrynge of all'.⁵¹⁷ However, his enthusiastic support for the match earned him a rebuke from Elizabeth, who was perplexed that Arran seemed to think there was a proposal and who 'much mislyke[d], that any such occasion shuld be gyven by any maner [of] message done to hym'.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹³ Harley 6990, fo. 5r, Throckmorton to Leicester, December 1560.

⁵¹⁴ SP70/11, fo. 63r.

⁵¹⁵ SP70/14, fo. 31r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 4 May 1560.

⁵¹⁶ SP70/5, fo. 65r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 28 June 1559.

⁵¹⁷ SP70/6, fos. 115v-116r.

⁵¹⁸ SP70/5, fo. 152v, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 19 July 1559.

Perhaps taking their cue from the Queen, there was little support for an Arran marriage within the Elizabethan regime more broadly, and Cecil never appeared to favour Arran as a suitor.⁵¹⁹ In contrast the match was popular amongst the Scots who formally offered Arran to Elizabeth in December 1560 as ‘the only meane...to mak the frendshipp constant and indissoluble’.⁵²⁰ Like Throckmorton, the Scots were attuned to the indefinite nature of a political alliance, believing that it would not endure without a foundation that went beyond ‘parchement or paper’.⁵²¹ So, in seeking an Anglo-Scottish relationship founded in more than political alliance or abstract expressions of religious affiliation, Throckmorton was more closely aligned with the Scots than his own colleagues.

The Arran marriage was the cornerstone of Throckmorton’s defensive vision of Britain in 1559-60. In theory it offered England security within the British Isles and the opportunity to strengthen Elizabeth’s authority in the recalcitrant north of Ireland as Arran ‘being ours...all the Countrey on this syde the Ryvers of Clyde and fyrthe shall be at the Queens majesties devocion’ leaving Elizabeth able to ‘better order her relme of Ireland’.⁵²² Again, Throckmorton was in line with the Scots, who enticingly proposed that through the match ‘Ireland myght be reformed, and brought to perfection of Obedience’, enabling Elizabeth to ‘establish a certain Monarchy be it selfe in the Ocean divided from the rest of the world’.⁵²³ As the Scottish delegation arrived in London with the formal proposal Throckmorton was busy stressing how the Queen and Council

must be as carefull for the well orderynge off scotland at thys present, as the same & they be for [the] well governyne off ierlond or walls. And upon all eventes that

⁵¹⁹ Kellar, *Scotland*, pp. 197-201; S. Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony: the Courtships of Elizabeth I* (London, 1996), pp. 36-7.

⁵²⁰ SP52/5, fo. 49r.

⁵²¹ SP52/5, fo. 17r, Randolph to Cecil, 25 August 1560.

⁵²² SP70/21, fo. 5r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 1 December 1560.

⁵²³ SP52/5, fo. 50r.

matters may be so managid as Englund may make theyre surety and commodity of scotland.⁵²⁴

This position was the product of Throckmorton's increasing concern about the longevity of the newfound Anglo-Scottish alliance. Unlike his English colleagues, he had given up hope of the French ratifying the Treaty of Edinburgh, believing that they were merely biding their time and were already preparing another naval expedition to Scotland.⁵²⁵ Moreover, he had heard that the Scottish delegation at the English court had made it known that 'if their alliance be not more established...they shall be constraynid to save their neckes and to wynne the french favour againe'.⁵²⁶ This environment encouraged Throckmorton to impress upon the Council 'that meanes may be founde to make the same [alliance] long to contynewe': the marriage of Elizabeth and Arran.⁵²⁷

Throckmorton also sought to discredit other potential matches at this time. As has been seen, he emphasised the destructiveness of a marriage to Leicester. Equally, he dismissed the suit of Eric of Sweden.⁵²⁸ Throckmorton encouraged Thomas Chamberlain, resident ambassador at the Spanish court, to write to the Queen extolling a marriage whereby

greate benefit prosperitie suertie and quietnes...by your issue maie redownde not onelie to your self your Realmes and subjectes presentlie, and in tyme to come, but also unto your ancyent freyndes and neyghbours.⁵²⁹

Throckmorton's commitment to a dynastic solution for Anglo-Scottish relations resurfaces throughout the 1560s albeit under different guises. After Mary's return to Scotland in 1561 the Anglo-Scottish relationship was complicated by her claim to the English throne, and Throckmorton drew on this new dimension to Anglo-Scottish relations supporting, at various

⁵²⁴ SP70/20, fo. 65v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 29 November 1560.

⁵²⁵ SP70/18, fo. 78r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 18 September 1560.

⁵²⁶ Add. 35830, fo. 68v, Jones to Throckmorton, 30 November 1560.

⁵²⁷ SP70/19, fos. 30v-31v.

⁵²⁸ Ch. 3, p. 96.

⁵²⁹ SP70/21, fo. 31r.

times, a conditional settlement in Mary's person and an English marriage for the Scottish Queen.

Although Throckmorton's British perspective did not employ English imperial arguments or claims of overlordship like Cecil, his sense of England as the pre-eminent partner and the importance of securing English influence in Scotland were similar. Throckmorton knew there was no need for positing imperial ambitions if the Congregation were made reliant upon English support for their survival, as suggested by his comment that Arran 'must needes be Englishe'.⁵³⁰ Thus, in 1559-60, Throckmorton's British perspective centred on the importance of making Scotland dependent on English support in order to ensure English influence and a subtle form of control in the northern country. The situation was to be 'managid' to 'the benefite of our countrie'.⁵³¹

Throckmorton's British strategy rested on the fact that as a composite unit the British Isles were a defensible bastion. This was, in effect, the adaptation of the 1540s vision of one island Protestantism to suit the immediate necessity of English national security. If the Anglo-Scottish alliance was secure, then England's defensive border with her continental foes would be pushed back to the sea. In April 1560 Throckmorton reminded Elizabeth that England's 'greatest defence...is the sea whiche being the wall of your Realme is cheefely to be gardyd'.⁵³² He was echoing 1540s propaganda, like Somerset's *Epistle* which described a united England and Scotland as 'havyng the sea for a wall'.⁵³³ If England's defensive border were pushed back to the sea then the strain of defence would fall on the navy alone. Hence Throckmorton's persistent argument that the Elizabethan government should prioritise investment in the navy. He reminded the Queen and Cecil that the best way to prevent the French from landing in

⁵³⁰ SP70/21, fo. 5r.

⁵³¹ SP70/20, fo. 65v; SP70/12, fo. 116r.

⁵³² SP70/13, fo. 229r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 28 April 1560.

⁵³³ E. Seymour, *An Epistle or Exhortacion, to Vnitie [and] Peace* (London, 1548), sig. Ci.

England and provide for Elizabeth's own security was 'to contynewe your navie strong and...to devise meanis how the same may be maintayned and increasyd'.⁵³⁴ He also asked Cecil to find means by which to 'Anymate and chearyshe' men to serve in the navy and suggested granting immunities and privileges to those willing to undertake the service, for 'how necessarie suche men be for our realme'.⁵³⁵ Equally Throckmorton exhibited concern regarding the diversity of ships available and the strategic deployment of such naval forces. In September 1560, Throckmorton forwarded a defensive naval plan to Cecil, reflecting not only the immediate threat from France but also a long-term consideration of where England's broader defensive vulnerabilities lay, for example more isolated outcrops like the Isle of Wight – which Throckmorton had seen subjected to French attack in 1545 – and England's western coast towards Ireland.⁵³⁶ Like Throckmorton, Cecil understood the vital defensive role played by the English navy: in 1571, he argued that the navy was 'the wall of England' and losing ships 'wer to be compared to a town beseged wher the walls shuld fall flatt downe to gyve entry to the ennemy'.⁵³⁷ While not commonplace in the early 1560s, Throckmorton's focus on the defensive importance of the sea border to England's security was reflected in later works such as John Dee's *Perfect Arte of Navigation* (1577) and Richard Hackluyt's *Principal Navigations* (1589).⁵³⁸

An Anglo-Scottish alliance was the cornerstone of Throckmorton's broader British strategy. Beyond the immediate needs of national security, Throckmorton saw an alliance as a means to counteract political instability in Ireland and better establish Elizabeth's authority there. In early 1561 he advised Elizabeth that 'to gyve good ordre for the matters of Ireland...there is no

⁵³⁴ SP70/13, fo. 229r; Forbes, *Transactions*, p. 416.

⁵³⁵ Ibid.; SP70/33, fo. 30r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 13 December 1561.

⁵³⁶ SP70/18, fo. 24r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 8 September 1560.

⁵³⁷ SP70/119, fo. 110v, Considerations for a league with France, 22 August 1571.

⁵³⁸ R. Hackluyt, *The Principall Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation* (1589), sig. 3r; J. Dee, *General and Rare Memorials Pertayning to the Perfect Arte of Navigation* (London, 1577), sig. iij v, pp. 3-4.

waye so readye, nor meanes so meete' as by 'entretayninge a good amytie with...Scotland'.⁵³⁹ Like many of his peers, Throckmorton worried about the insecurity of English rule in Ireland and feared that it presented a fertile ground for seditious foreign interventions against Elizabeth's government.⁵⁴⁰ Throckmorton believed that the opportunities afforded Elizabeth in Ireland by an Anglo-Scottish alliance were two-fold. In February 1560 he advised that it would quash 'French practises with Irland' thereby enabling her 'to order some pollicy and to reduce the people and countrey to more service and profit'.⁵⁴¹ This could be achieved by employing Argyll's political influence and kinship connections to forward English authority in the particularly recalcitrant north of Ireland.⁵⁴² The influx of Scots into Munster and Ulster that had proved difficult to counter and had plagued England's Irish policy in recent years could now be turned to English advantage. Throckmorton's approach was in line with that favoured by Elizabeth and Cecil. The Treaty of Berwick required Argyll to 'employe his force and good will...to reduce the northe partes of Irelande to the perfect obedience of Englande', and as soon as English troops entered Scotland in the spring, Argyll was requested to provide immediate assistance in Ireland.⁵⁴³

Both Throckmorton and Cecil agreed that reforming Ireland was the only way to ensure England's long-term authority there. When discussing the subject in early 1561, Throckmorton argued that the 'reformacion' had to be based on the destruction of the native Irish and their customs and, to achieve this, he advocated a programme that amounted to no less than ethnic cleansing so 'that ther shuld not be one Inhabitant lefte of the old evill seed'. To cement English authority they had to break the bonds between the Gaelic Lords and their dependents by

⁵³⁹ SP70/24, fo. 70v.

⁵⁴⁰ W. Palmer, *The Problem of Ireland in Tudor Foreign Policy, 1485-1603* (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 81-2.

⁵⁴¹ SP70/11, fo. 63r.

⁵⁴² SP70/25, fo. 76v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 20 April 1561.

⁵⁴³ SP52/2, fo. 63v; Advocates 33.1.1, fo. 4, Cecil's Articles for Ireland, 2 April 1560.

abolishing ‘choshery, coyne, and lyverye, their bryans lawes⁵⁴⁴, and many other savaige and monsterous absurdities emongest them’ and, most importantly of all, replacing the native Irish in the ‘portes and coastes with good people’.⁵⁴⁵ Many of Throckmorton’s suggestions, such as the abolition of coyne and livery or the use of plantations, had been attempted before and would be taken up again by Sidney in the mid-1560s.⁵⁴⁶ Like Smith who wrote a decade later, Throckmorton modelled his Irish ‘reformacion’ on both contemporary and ancient colonial models, observing how ‘the Romains...retayne[d] countreis in their obedience’ and how Spain ‘kept the realme of Naples, and...their newe Indies’.⁵⁴⁷

Throckmorton’s Irish policy further highlights his misgivings about the permanence of an Anglo-Scottish alliance. Throckmorton was particularly concerned with replacing the native Irish in the ports and coasts ‘that lyeth towardes scotlande’, adding that the Scots should not be allowed to ‘perceyve wheraboutes you go’.⁵⁴⁸ This signalled the second purpose of his ‘reformacion’: it was also a defensive measure against future Scottish, or other foreign, interventions there. In Throckmorton’s mind, using Argyll’s influence to subdue the north of Ireland was not akin to accepting Scottish influence in Ireland, rather it was a means to subjugate Ulster and ultimately provision it with loyal Englishmen in preparation for an eventual break with Scotland.⁵⁴⁹ Throckmorton’s plan – to displace the native Irish – was designed in part to break the bonds between the Irish and the Scots that had been a source of security concern for the English government for several years. In essence, Throckmorton’s plan was simply an extension of the concerted campaign to remove the Scots from Ireland that

⁵⁴⁴ Brehon laws.

⁵⁴⁵ SP70/25 fo. 76v.

⁵⁴⁶ Palmer, *Problem of Ireland*, pp. 42, 89; C. Brady, *The Chief Governors: The Rise and Fall of Reform Government in Tudor Ireland, 1536-1588* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 94.

⁵⁴⁷ SP70/25, fo. 76v; J. Montano, *The Roots of English Colonialism in Ireland* (Cambridge, 2011), p. 37.

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁹ Contra Dawson, *Politics of Religion*, p. 2.

Sussex had undertaken in the two years prior to Elizabeth's accession, and which would reassert itself under Sidney in the mid-1560s.⁵⁵⁰

III. Randolph's perspective

During the 1560s, Randolph did not express an explicit British perspective in the way that Throckmorton and Cecil did. In fact, it is difficult to consider Randolph's approach to Anglo-Scottish relations as truly British as he did not factor Ireland into his conceptualisation of the relationship, despite working actively as an intermediary between the English regime and Argyll on Irish affairs.⁵⁵¹ Instead, Randolph's perspective on Anglo-Scottish amity derived primarily from a desire to aid co-religionists and further Protestantism within the British Isles and Europe. A pan-Protestant, cosmopolitan outlook, in which individuals aimed to both serve their regimes and work towards Protestant cooperation across national boundaries, underpinned Randolph's approach to Anglo-Scottish relations.⁵⁵² Unlike Throckmorton and Cecil, Randolph had had no personal involvement in Anglo-Scottish relations during the 1540s and was thus unencumbered by the weight of this past experience.

Randolph's belief that Protestantism was under threat from the hostile forces of Catholicism was inculcated early through his experience of the embattled position of Martyr's Protestant enclave within conservative Oxford during the late 1540s, and his self-enforced exile on the continent from 1554-1558.⁵⁵³ Living in Anglo-Scottish exile communities abroad instilled in him a sense of religious affiliation with the Scots that underpinned his perception of the relationship between the two countries and his diplomatic role in Scotland. As Kellar has

⁵⁵⁰ Brady, *Chief Governors*, pp. 96-7, 118.

⁵⁵¹ SP52/5, fo. 12r, Argyll to Cecil, 20 August 1560; SP52/5, fo. 36ir, Argyll to Randolph, 20 September 1560.

⁵⁵² For an example of pan-Protestantism and diplomacy see D. Riches, *Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture: Brandenburg-Swedish Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (2013), p. 10.

⁵⁵³ Loach, 'Reformation Controversies', pp. 369-70; Harley 416, fo. 126r; SP70/1, fos. 48r-49r, Randolph to Throckmorton, 6 December 1558.

shown, the exile communities Randolph lived in were Anglo-Scottish in composition and it was religion, not nationality, that defined and united them.⁵⁵⁴ In this environment Randolph was exposed to a renewed British Protestant vision that had its roots in the 1540s. The exiles created a Protestant providential narrative that emphasised the failure of England and Scotland to unite in reformation during the 1540s and exposed a shared destiny for the two countries. In 1558, Anthony Gilby encapsulated the Protestant dream for 'Britaine' fostered by exile communities on the continent writing that 'Christ should grow so strong by joynynge that Ile together in perfect religion, whome God hath so many waies coupled and strengthened by his worke in nature'. This vision had implications for Protestantism across Europe as Gilby declared that 'Britaine' should be a 'safe sanctuarie' for all 'Ghospellers'.⁵⁵⁵ The message was clear: England and Scotland united offered the opportunity to form a Protestant bastion against the Catholic powers of Europe. The idea of England and Scotland united in reformation formed a central tenet of Randolph's approach to Anglo-Scottish relations. In early 1560, he lauded 'the fruite that maye insue bothe unto the Realme of Englande and Scotlande, yf his wylbe that theie shall nowe be united in perfett faythe and Amitie'.⁵⁵⁶

Randolph was well aware of the weight of providential expectations and the broader implications of Anglo-Scottish relations in 1559-60 for Protestantism in Europe. He regularly updated Jewel and Martyr – who were interested in the British Isles as a bulwark against Catholicism – on the situation in Scotland, particularly the progress of Arran, with whom Randolph visited Martyr in Zurich during the summer of 1559.⁵⁵⁷ Randolph, Martyr and Jewel viewed a dynastic union between Arran and Elizabeth as a means to an Anglo-Scottish religious

⁵⁵⁴ Kellar, *Scotland*, pp. 157, 167.

⁵⁵⁵ A. Gilby, *An Admonition to England and Scotland* in J. Knox, *The appellation of John Knox* (Geneva, 1558), pp. 61, 65; Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish', pp. 103-5.

⁵⁵⁶ SP52/2, fo. 43v, Randolph to Sadler and Croft, 10 February 1560.

⁵⁵⁷ J. Durkan, 'James, Third Earl of Arran: The Hidden Years', *Scottish Historical Review*, 65 (1986), 164; ZL, I, pp. 56-7, 59, 68, 79, 82.

accord. The desirability of the match lay in its potential to unite ‘the chief upholders of godes religion’ within the British Isles, as the Scottish exile Alexander Whitelaw noted.⁵⁵⁸ In June 1560, Jewel wrote to Martyr that it was of ‘the utmost consequence that the English and Scots should be united, not only in a political, but also in a religious alliance. Should this take place, as I hope and desire, it will be all well respecting Crito [Arran] and Glycerium [Elizabeth]’. Underlining the collaboration, he added that Randolph ‘hopes that things will turn out as we wish’.⁵⁵⁹

The prospect of a Protestant British Isles united these men at Elizabeth’s accession. This inculcated a sense of spiritual kinship that is key to understanding Randolph’s perspective on Anglo-Scottish relations, his engagement with the Congregation in 1559-60 and his diplomacy in Scotland throughout the 1560s. As John Aylmer observed ‘it is religion and likenes of maners, that ioigne men together...wher there is one faith, one baptisime, and one Christ: ther is narrower fraternitie then, if they came out of one wombe’.⁵⁶⁰ This sentiment was the basis for the Anglo-Scottish ‘fraternitie in religion’ of which Randolph became a part while on the continent in the 1550s. Through their shared plight of ‘banissement in France for religion’, this ‘fraternitie’ bound together Randolph and Scots, such as Melville and Kirkcaldy.⁵⁶¹ It was these religiously motivated friendships, particularly that with Kirkcaldy, that had a profound impact on the way in which Randolph perceived Anglo-Scottish relations in 1559-60. The ‘fraternite in religion, sa weall groundit amang us in France’ fostered a sense of a brotherhood of religion that superseded national boundaries; an ideological position that persisted into the 1560s, when these men habitually signed their letters to one another ‘your brother’.⁵⁶²

⁵⁵⁸ SP70/5, fo. 65r.

⁵⁵⁹ ZL, I, p. 82.

⁵⁶⁰ J. Aylmer, *An Harborewe for Faithfull and Trewe Subjectes* (London, 1559), sig. L4v.

⁵⁶¹ Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 245.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 245; SP70/16, fo. 32v, Melville to Killigrew, 12 July 1560; SP52/9, fo. 109v, Kirkcaldy to Randolph, 19 September 1564; SP52/18, fo. 8r, Randolph to Kirkcaldy, 1 May 1570.

Randolph viewed Anglo-Scottish relations in 1559-60 through the lens of a broader fight for Protestant survival against the forces of Catholicism – one that extended beyond the shore of ‘Britaine’. This perspective was shared by his fellow exiles and formed a central tenet of the Congregation’s initial appeal to England for aid against the French in 1559; and Randolph’s ‘brother william’ was one of those leading the charge, appealing to Cecil to use his influence to secure English support in ‘this commun cause of Chryste’.⁵⁶³ Kirkcaldy spoke of his long-held desire ‘that the harttes of the Inhabitanes of this yle myght be united in perpetuall amitie’.⁵⁶⁴ Using the language of religious ‘fraternitie’, he argued that ‘an league made in the name of god hathe an other foundation & assurance then factions made be man for wardly comoditie’ and that the Scots ‘seek to be one with you in Religion and freyndship’.⁵⁶⁵ For Kirkcaldy this friendship was entirely dependent on religious concord: Scotland would do nothing ‘to the hurt of england so long as it doethe menteyne the gossell of chryst’.⁵⁶⁶ Like Martyr, Jewel and Randolph, Kirkcaldy mulled the possibility of a dynastic union to solidify the religious alliance, advising Cecil of the benefit to ‘boyth the Realmes that the mariage of the quene majestie be not hastye’.⁵⁶⁷

Randolph’s close association with Kirkcaldy, the extension of his own ‘fraternitie in religion’ into the Congregation’s ranks, and his experience of a broad Protestant communion on the continent in France encouraged him to identify with the Congregation’s ‘godlie cawse’.⁵⁶⁸ Randolph admitted to Throckmorton that ‘I tawlke with you all wayes as a Scotte’.⁵⁶⁹ This partisan attitude had serious implications: he referred to the Congregation’s levies as ‘our men’ long before English troops arrived in Scotland and he included himself amongst the

⁵⁶³ SP52/1, fo. 117r, Kirkcaldy to Cecil, 17 June 1559.

⁵⁶⁴ SP52/1, fo. 76r, Kirkcaldy to Cecil, 23 June 1559.

⁵⁶⁵ SP52/1, fos. 117r, 76r.

⁵⁶⁶ SP52/1, fo. 92r, Kirkcaldy to Percy, 1 July 1559.

⁵⁶⁷ SP52/1, fo. 76r.

⁵⁶⁸ SP52/3, fo. 96r, Randolph to Cecil, 22 April 1560.

⁵⁶⁹ Add. 35830, fo. 81r, Randolph to Throckmorton, 28 April 1561.

Congregation's ranks, employing the plural 'we' in his letters.⁵⁷⁰ Randolph's incorporative linguistic approach contrasted sharply with that of his English colleagues. Sadler and Croft, dealing with the Congregation from Berwick, attempted to disassociate England by employing phrases such as 'their comen action' and 'your comen cause', which implied it was common only amongst the Scots.⁵⁷¹

Randolph's use of the Congregation's language of 'our cawse' derived from the fact that he perceived the Scottish situation in much broader terms. The Congregation's arguments, elucidated by his 'brother' Kirkcaldy, were powerful for Randolph: the notion of the Scots 'be[ing] one with you [England] in Religion and freyndship' was a direct reflection of his own experiences. It was religious unity, a desire to aid co-religionists and secure the ascension of Protestantism in Scotland that drove Randolph's views on Anglo-Scottish relations: the Congregation's cause was 'so Godly a purpose' that he could not resist its allure, such was his desire for 'an Amytie betwne these two Realme that god maye be glorifiede'.⁵⁷² For Randolph, as for his brothers amongst the Congregation, the cause was not particular to Scotland or the Lords but for all Protestants. Importantly, Randolph's exile experience of Anglo-Scottish religious partnership allowed him to comfortably conceive of a partnership without conformity of discipline.⁵⁷³ The initial drive of the Congregation, prior to taking on a more nationalistic stance, was primarily religious in tone. They saw their fight against the 'papistes' as a 'battell against the devill, [and] against idolatorie' and 'to thrust the advauncement of christ jesus'.⁵⁷⁴ Randolph embraced this religious framework. Whereas his English colleagues spoke of the

⁵⁷⁰ SP52/1, fo. 264r, Randolph to Sadler and Croft, 11 November 1559; Add. 33591, fo. 165r.

⁵⁷¹ SP52/1, fo. 240r, Sadler and Croft to Randolph, 5 November 1559; SP52/1, fo. 304r, Sadler and Croft to Arran and Moray, 6 December 1559.

⁵⁷² SP52/3, fo. 43r, Randolph to Sadler, 11 April 1560; Caligula B/X, fo. 44r, Randolph to Cecil, 9 August 1561.

⁵⁷³ Harley MS 416, fo. 126r.

⁵⁷⁴ SP52/1, fo. 76r; SP52/1, fo. 121r. Congregation to Elizabeth, 19 July 1559.

French or the Queen Dowager, Randolph viewed it as a fight between the godly Congregation and the ‘papistes’.⁵⁷⁵

Randolph’s pan-Protestant perspective had at its heart a providential view of Elizabeth and England’s role as championing and defending Protestantism throughout Europe. In 1562, as England stood poised to intervene in favour of the Huguenots, Randolph reminded Cecil that ‘seinge god hathe made her an Instrumente to replant his trewe worde agayne in her owne Realme’ and that she had been ‘a comfort and a supporte unto those of thys nation [Scotland] that were in miserie and in affliction for Chrystes cawse’, ‘all godlye men’ hoped that Elizabeth would ‘not see them destitute of her aide that are in the lyke daynger that ^these before were^ & nowe god, by her, hathe delivered’.⁵⁷⁶

Randolph saw aiding the Scots in 1559-60 and working for an Anglo-Scottish religious amity thereafter as part of a broader schema for aiding co-religionists abroad. In the same letter, Randolph supported deferring the proposed interview between the English and Scottish Queens in order to support the Huguenots in France with the Aristotelian adage ‘Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato [sed] magis amica veritas’.⁵⁷⁷ Here, Randolph was arguing that the ‘truth’ of Protestantism should be preferred above furthering a friendship with Mary, a Catholic monarch, via the interview. The notion that aiding co-religionists took priority over Anglo-Scottish amity sits uncomfortably with Randolph’s diplomatic duties in Scotland. In this opinion he was clearly influenced by his Scottish Protestant milieu, with Randolph reporting to Cecil that Moray agreed that the interview was best deferred in favour of aiding the Huguenots.⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁵ SP52/3, fo. 67v, Randolph to Killigrew, 15 April 1560; Add. 33591, fo. 165r.

⁵⁷⁶ SP52/7, fo. 57r, Randolph to Cecil, 17 June 1562.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid., Socrates is my friend, Plato is my friend but truth is more my friend.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid.

Randolph viewed his mission to Scotland through the lens of establishing a bastion for co-religionists across Europe by supporting Protestantism in Scotland and securing an Anglo-Scottish alliance that had commonality of religion at its core. This was particularly evident during the crises of 1565, when Randolph despaired that he was witnessing not only the collapse of Anglo-Scottish amity but also the demise of Protestantism in Scotland. He wrote of his sorrow that the lost opportunity to unite the realms would lead ‘to the greate hurte and hynderance of Chrystes trewe religion and undoyng of a greate number of honeste and godlye men within thys Reaulme’.⁵⁷⁹

Randolph had been absorbed into the Congregation’s cause in 1559-60 and had continued to work closely with its leaders, including Moray and Lethington, thereafter, believing that they shared the goal of a reformed Scotland and a religious amity with England. Randolph trusted them implicitly because he viewed these Scots not as ministers of a foreign monarch but as co-religionists and fellow collaborators in the goal of establishing a Protestant, Anglo-Scottish alliance. His proclivity to view the situation through the lens of religious identity was at times problematic and hindered his ability to perform his diplomatic duties effectively, most notably following Mary’s return to Scotland in 1561 as Randolph’s Scottish colleagues had to balance their commitment to religious reform and an Anglo-Scottish alliance with loyalty to the political aims of their Queen.⁵⁸⁰ While Randolph’s colleagues in England were acutely aware of such tensions, Cecil, for instance, injected a new wariness into his correspondence with Lethington – such caution was not evident in Randolph’s approach.⁵⁸¹ He could not conceive that for some Scottish Protestants loyalty to their Catholic Queen might supersede their religious aims. Thus, when Lethington, who had previously extolled religious conformity as ‘the straytest knot of amitye [that] can be devised’, began negotiating a Spanish marriage for

⁵⁷⁹ SP52/10, fo. 102r-v, Randolph to Leicester, 21 May 1565.

⁵⁸⁰ See for instance Loughlin, ‘Maitland’, pp. 92-9.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 127-30.

Mary, Randolph was oblivious to it.⁵⁸² Fearful that Randolph ‘maye be bygiled’, Cecil warned him ‘to see well unto my protestantes’ but Randolph assured him ‘ther is no feare of anie harme from hence’.⁵⁸³ Randolph’s religious convictions and faith in his Scottish Protestant friends clearly clouded his political judgement. For instance, in the winter of 1561 Randolph failed to notice the French ambassador, de Foix’s, suspicious dealings at Mary’s court because he naively believed that as a suspected Protestant who ‘had indured for Chrystes sake’, de Foix would not work against his co-religionists.⁵⁸⁴ In many ways, Randolph was blinkered by his religious approach to politics. He lacked both the sense of balance between religious commitment and political reality that Cecil exhibited and Throckmorton’s willingness to subordinate religious concerns in pursuit of national interest.

Conclusion

Experiential differences between Throckmorton and Randolph helped to shape their variant perspectives on the nature of the Anglo-Scottish relationship. This suggests that personal experience, social contacts, and diplomatic encounters impacted considerably on an individual’s political ideology, perception of Anglo-Scottish relations and conceptualisation of a British perspective. Randolph and Throckmorton considered Anglo-Scottish relations through the lens of fundamentally different political perspectives. Throckmorton thought in terms of national politics while Randolph was primarily concerned with the international struggle to ensure the survival and pre-eminence of Protestantism in Europe. Throckmorton’s British perspective was driven by his unswerving belief that England and Elizabeth’s security lay in sealing off the British Isles from European interventions. His approach was at its heart unashamedly Anglocentric, driven by the political necessities of English national security. For

⁵⁸² Dawson, ‘Anglo-Scottish’, p. 101.

⁵⁸³ SP52/8, fo. 74r, Randolph to Cecil, 3 June 1563.

⁵⁸⁴ Caligula B/X, fo. 202v.

Randolph, on the other hand, religious concerns dominated. His vision of 'Britaine' was focused primarily on the mainland (England and Scotland) and was founded on his desire to aid co-religionists more broadly. His militant Protestantism determined both his support for the Congregation and his perspective on Mary as Queen of Scotland. Both men took inspiration from the concept of England and Scotland forming an island bastion made popular in the 1540s: Throckmorton used it as a defensive strategy whereas Randolph aspired to create a Protestant haven. These different perspectives were compatible as the ultimate aim – an Anglo-Scottish alliance and united British Isles – was the same.

This analysis of Throckmorton and Randolph's variant perspectives on Anglo-Scottish relations broadens our understanding of the individualistic nature of political perspective. It suggests not only that British perspectives were widespread within the early Elizabethan regime but that they were also more disparate than has previously been suggested. Even individuals who appeared ideologically aligned, like Throckmorton and Cecil, could differ significantly in their preferred British policies. During the 1560s there emerged two clear British strategies: one based on a political alliance between England and Scotland spearheaded by Cecil and analysed in depth by Alford; and the other based on a dynastic union. The latter, embraced by Throckmorton in various guises, will be more fully explored in the later chapters of this thesis. It is important to note that British perspectives were not static entities rather they took into account the gradual shift of the political landscape as the following chapters of this thesis demonstrate.

Chapter 5

English Intervention in Scotland, 1559-60

Chapter four has already shown that older scholarly ideas depict Anglo-Scottish relations between 1559 and 1560 as the fruition of ideas of Anglo-Scottish unity that had been voiced since the 1540s and had proliferated in Protestant communities exiled on the continent during the 1550s. These shared ideological assumptions about the Protestant destiny of the British Isles are seen to have formed the basis for an Anglo-Scottish alliance adumbrated by the Treaty

of Berwick.⁵⁸⁵ However, as Alford has demonstrated, locating the Anglo-Scottish situation within the broader framework of European affairs is crucial to understanding properly the motivations for the alliance between the English and the Congregation in 1559-60. Thus, he suggests that while ideology played a part, for Cecil and for England, this alliance was primarily a reaction to the belief that the French were planning to use Mary, Queen of Scots' claim to the English throne to build a platform in Scotland from which to launch an invasion of England.⁵⁸⁶ Similarly, Steven Thiry has argued that it was the threat presented to Elizabeth and England by Mary's assumption of the English monarch's arms and titles that encouraged the English to intervene in Scotland on the Congregation's behalf.⁵⁸⁷

This chapter demonstrates Throckmorton's decisive influence on Anglo-Scottish policy at this time, arguing that England's policy toward Scotland was entirely reactive to events in France. It also considers Randolph's intermediary role in Anglo-Scottish affairs, emphasising the difficulties of unofficial diplomacy and further reinforcing the argument that Anglo-Scottish relations in this period were far less amiable than usually portrayed. Rather, the alliance appears tentative and punctuated by mistrust and suspicion on both sides. Finally, this chapter examines how Throckmorton and Randolph worked for amiable relations between England and Scotland following the Treaty of Edinburgh. It highlights their integral role in the collaborative network of English and Scottish ministers that favoured an Anglo-Scottish alliance and explores the important collegial relationships that Randolph established with Moray and Lethington, which would prove essential throughout the 1560s.

I. Throckmorton's Influence on the Direction of Anglo-Scottish relations

⁵⁸⁵ Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish', pp. 87-114; *EEP*, pp. 43-70; Kellar, *Scotland*.

⁵⁸⁶ *EEP*, p. 63.

⁵⁸⁷ Thiry, "Open Shew".

Throckmorton's role in instigating England's decision to intervene in favour of the Congregation in Scotland during November 1559 has largely been overlooked. Instead, the decision is usually viewed as the result of Cecil's hard-won Council debate at the end of December.⁵⁸⁸ Because Throckmorton worked closely with Cecil at this time scholars have often portrayed him as the secretary's instrument, who was used 'to speed the Scottish enterprise'.⁵⁸⁹ However, as the previous chapter has shown, Throckmorton had a distinctive position on the importance of Scotland to English security and a strong commitment to an interventionist Scottish policy. Moreover, Cecil and Throckmorton enjoyed a collegial relationship based on their then similar (but not identical) British priorities and shared conviction that supporting the Congregation would result in the removal of the French threat.⁵⁹⁰ In fact, Cecil and Throckmorton were not alone. They worked with a broader group – including Throckmorton's cousins, Northampton and Pembroke, and his long-standing friend, Bedford – which supported first covert aid and later active intervention in Scotland.⁵⁹¹

The connection between Mary's claim to be Queen of England, events in France and English policy toward Scotland underpinned Throckmorton's diplomatic role. As English ambassador to both the King of France and the Queen of Scotland, Throckmorton was in a pivotal position, being well-placed to comment upon, and provide informed assessments of, the threat from France and Scotland. The Anglo-Scottish dimension to his embassy was immediately apparent to Throckmorton. Unofficially, he was working with Cecil to confirm intelligence that Mary and her husband, the future Francis II, were using the English royal arms and title, and to assess the level of this French threat to Elizabeth's throne by watching Mary's Guise relatives, for 'if

⁵⁸⁸ It is mentioned briefly in Sutherland, *Princes*, pp. 79-80; *EEP*, pp. 64-70; MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 74-9.

⁵⁸⁹ W. Hudson, *The Cambridge Connection and the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559* (Durham, 1980), p. 31; Rowse, *Raleigh*, p. 28; Potter, 'Foreign Policy', pp. 117-8.

⁵⁹⁰ Ch. 4, pp. 115-25; their collaborative partnership at this time is also highlighted in Sutherland, *Princes*, pp. 76-92.

⁵⁹¹ SP52/1, fo. 145v, Council to the Congregation, 27 July 1559 (not sent); Add. 33592, fo. 80r, Elizabeth and Councillors to Sadler and Croft, 12 November 1559.

any harme be ment it is to be lerned thence'.⁵⁹² This situation was made more acute on Francis's accession to the French throne in July. Elizabeth waited anxiously to see whether the new King would usurp the English royal arms and title, and if Navarre would wrest the reins of government from Mary's uncles Francis, Duke of Guise and Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine. This would have moderated the Guises's dynastic pretensions and taken away their platform for an interventionist policy in Scotland thereby decreasing the immediacy of the threat to Elizabeth. Significantly, this period of uncertainty in Anglo-French relations provoked the English to consider intervention against the French in Scotland. In August Cecil wove Throckmorton's intelligence on Francis's use of the English arms as Dauphin and the possibility of his being proclaimed King of England into his list of reasons to support the Scots against the French.⁵⁹³ Meanwhile, the Congregation, understanding the precarious nature of English support for their position, worried 'that this alteration in fraunce' might result in Elizabeth deciding against supporting them.⁵⁹⁴

During the summer of 1559, Throckmorton worked in unison with Cecil to strengthen the Congregation's position with an eye to the possibility that England might need to use them against the French. Like his colleagues in England, Throckmorton knew that Elizabeth would not 'knyt amitie with a confused multitude'.⁵⁹⁵ He encouraged the Congregation to adapt their propaganda to prioritise removing the French and securing the liberty of the Scottish commonwealth in order to win over those Scots who were not inclined to support their religious message and advised Cecil to win the support of those Scots who were willing to oppose the

⁵⁹² SP70/4, fo. 76r, Cecil to Throckmorton, 14 May 1559; SP70/5 fos. 31v-32r, Council to Throckmorton, 13 June 1559; Thiry, "Open Shew", 1419.

⁵⁹³ Caligula B/X, fo. 34v, A short discussion of the weighty matters of Scotland, August 1559; SP70/5, fo. 76v, Throckmorton to Council, 1 July 1559; Potter, 'Foreign Policy', p. 118.

⁵⁹⁴ SP52/1, fo. 187r.

⁵⁹⁵ SP70/5, fo. 177r; SP52/1, fo. 130r, Croft to Cecil, 22 July 1559; *EEP*, p. 58.

French, like the Catholic Master of Maxwell.⁵⁹⁶ Reorienting the Congregation's message brought them in line with the anti-French reasoning behind English intervention in Scotland. Moreover, in what has been called England's 'earliest and most vital' contribution to securing the Congregation's position, Throckmorton masterminded Arran's escape from France and return to Scotland.⁵⁹⁷ Arran became one of the Congregation's leaders and his arrival in Scotland secured the defection of his father, the Duke of Châtellerauld (heir presumptive to the Scottish throne), to the Congregation.

By September it was clear to Throckmorton that it was essential to English security that England support the Congregation against the French. From his vantage point at the French court he witnessed a convergence of events that convinced him that the French presented an immediate threat to England: Navarre failed to seize control of the French government; Francis II assumed the title of King of England and Ireland on a great seal sent into Scotland; René, Marquis D'Elbeuf, another of Mary's Guise uncles, was named as King's Lieutenant-General in Scotland, England and Ireland; and intelligence confirmed he was preparing a considerable number of reinforcements for Scotland.⁵⁹⁸ Stuart Carroll has shown that these reinforcements were aimed simply at securing Scotland since the Guise did not have the resources to launch an attack on England at this juncture; however, he also notes that they were keen to publicise their dynastic ambition to see Mary as Queen of England by publicly displaying the usurped English royal arms.⁵⁹⁹ It was this behaviour that led Throckmorton to fear for the worst. He was not the only resident at the French court to construe the Guises behaviour as threatening England: the Spanish ambassador to France warned Throckmorton of the danger that 'either

⁵⁹⁶ A. Ryrie, *The Origins of the Scottish Reformation* (Manchester, 2006), pp. 171-2; SP70/7, fo. 30r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 3 September 1559; SP70/8, fo. 32r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 9 October 1559; SP70/8, fo. 88r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 25 October 1559.

⁵⁹⁷ Ryrie, *Origins*, p. 169; Durkan, 'Arran', 163-4.

⁵⁹⁸ SP70/7, fo. 40v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 10 September 1559; SP70/7, fo. 60r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 19 September 1559; Carroll, *Martyrs*, p. 107; Durot, 'Le Crépuscule', 23; *Relations Politique*, I, p. 402; Thiry, "Open Shew", 1425.

⁵⁹⁹ Carroll, *Martyrs*, pp. 106-7.

we should be made a piemont and be devided or else a mylane and so constrained'.⁶⁰⁰ Such suspicions were only confirmed by Throckmorton's experiences at the French court, where he was 'dayly troubled' with the Guises' desire 'to prosecute the frenche Quenes title to England', and witnessed D'Elbeuf's threat that he could overcome England's northern border defences at Berwick and Carlisle in six days.⁶⁰¹ This needling led Throckmorton to believe that D'Elbeuf's reinforcements were in fact a platform for launching a two front attack on England, via the Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and Scotland.⁶⁰² As a result, during the winter of 1559-60, Throckmorton pressed the case that England needed to raise its defences and became convinced that it was now critical to intervene in Scotland.

Throckmorton feared that his English colleagues were not taking his warnings seriously, cautioning Cecil that 'it may be to late, when the enemy is at the dore, to put any thing in execucion'.⁶⁰³ Fearful that being absent from court disabled his political effectiveness, Throckmorton bombarded Elizabeth with a series of urgent requests for permission to return to England and confer with her in-person. However, he underestimated the impact of his advice. His warnings were already being actioned. The Earl of Arundel was ordered to keep his 'hole force' of the County of Sussex in readiness throughout the winter 'to com to the defense of our said towne [of Portsmouth] & Ile [of Wight] in case of nede'.⁶⁰⁴ Moreover, the seriousness with which the English perceived the situation and the importance they accorded Throckmorton's first-hand intelligence and advice at this critical juncture is underscored by the immediate grant of his request to return and his appointment as a gentleman of the Queen's Privy Chamber, providing him with access to advise Elizabeth when at court.⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰⁰ SP70/7, fo. 76r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 23 September 1559.

⁶⁰¹ Forbes, *Transactions*, p. 238; SP70/7, fo. 80r; SP70/8, fo. 88v.

⁶⁰² SP70/7, fo. 76r.

⁶⁰³ Forbes, *Transactions*, p. 238.

⁶⁰⁴ SP12/7, fo. 17r, Elizabeth to Arundel, 15 October 1559.

⁶⁰⁵ Wright, 'Change in Direction', pp. 155-6; SP70/9, fo. 139r.

Throckmorton's arrival at the English court on 7 November provoked a step-change in English policy toward Scotland.⁶⁰⁶ Previously the Elizabethan regime lacked resolution in their support for the Congregation. On 3 November Cecil, who would soon be a leading proponent of intervention, ruled out the possibility of England entering into a 'warr' in Scotland.⁶⁰⁷ Yet only nine days later, he performed a U turn, informing his colleagues at Berwick that war was inevitable and that the Scots 'shall shortly here of more ayde than hitherto hath bene mentioned'.⁶⁰⁸ What had occurred during those nine days to result in such a *volte-face*? Throckmorton returned to court and, the following day, Sadler and Croft reported a rumour that the Congregation had lost Edinburgh and were on the retreat.⁶⁰⁹ This convergence of events made for a compelling case. Throckmorton was arguing that the French intended nothing less than the invasion of England 'to prosecute the French Queens right heere'.⁶¹⁰ Meanwhile, the only immediate obstacle to French invasion, the Congregation, seemed on the brink of defeat and about to face the arrival of D'Elbeuf's reinforcements. This galvanised the English regime into action.

Five days after Throckmorton's return, on 12 November, the Queen and a select group of her councillors wrote to inform Sadler and Croft at Berwick that Elizabeth had decided to 'protracte the matter of Scotlande' against the French. The reason given was 'that the frenche have a full determination to breake peace with this Realme, as soone as they may recover theyr purpose in Scotland'.⁶¹¹ Conyers Read argued that this letter represented 'little more than a restatement of the position already taken'.⁶¹² This is untrue. For a start, this was the first time Elizabeth put her name to a letter concerning the Congregation's plight and, in so doing, she broke the vener

⁶⁰⁶ *Relations Politique*, I, p. 377.

⁶⁰⁷ Add. 33592, fo. 1v, Cecil to Sadler and Croft, 3 November 1559.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., fo. 78r, Cecil to Sadler and Croft, 12 November 1559.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid., fo. 37r-v, Croft and Sadler to Cecil, 8 November 1559.

⁶¹⁰ SP70/8, fo. 29r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 7 October 1559; SP70/8, fos. 88v-89r.

⁶¹¹ Add. 33592, fo. 80r.

⁶¹² C. Read, *Mr Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1955), p. 158.

of plausible deniability she had previously been so careful to maintain. Before this point, Cecil had conducted all correspondence in reference to the Congregation with ambiguous allusions to his colleagues and the Queen, while Elizabeth had written amicable letters to Mary of Guise.⁶¹³ There was also a significant change of tone. The letter was designed with English military intervention in Scotland in mind: it encouraged the Congregation to send an envoy to solicit Elizabeth for aid directly and prescribed a format for their appeal, which Lethington adopted verbatim when he arrived at the English court in December.⁶¹⁴ The appeal aimed to justify to the outside world English intervention in favour of the Congregation by highlighting the threat of invasion to ‘the crowne & kingdoms of England & Ireland’. This argument was supported by reciting a series of French offences against England that had been studiously reported by Throckmorton: the focus was Mary’s usurpation of Elizabeth’s arms and titles, and the ‘Ambitiouse desyres’ of the Guise whereby ‘it [is] manifest what the scope and determinacion of the french is agenist the Crowne of England’.⁶¹⁵ Considering that the Congregation’s flight from Edinburgh was as yet unconfirmed, the timing of the letter and the fact that its primary focus was retaliation for French aggression toward England suggest that it was Throckmorton’s return from France that finally managed to convince the Queen of the need to intervene in Scotland. He later recalled how Elizabeth and her councillors had asked for his advice on how ‘to prevent the French meaning towards your Majestie and your realme’.⁶¹⁶

Within two days of sending the letter north, Elizabeth was ‘in preparation of a Navye to the seas’ and preparing to levy ‘men of war...in the northe’.⁶¹⁷ She improved defences at Berwick

⁶¹³ References to the Queen and Council were carefully edited out of letters see Add. 33591, fo. 31r, Croft to Knox, 20 August 1559; or they were alluded to in an ambiguous manner as in SP52/1 fos. 98r, Parry and Cecil to Percy, 4 July 1559 and SP52/1, fo. 99r, Cecil to Percy, 4 July 1559; SP52/1, fo. 114r, Elizabeth to Mary of Guise, 13 July 1559; Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, p. 58.

⁶¹⁴ Add. 33592, fos. 80v-82r; Caligula B/X, fo. 198r, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 25 November 1559.

⁶¹⁵ Add. 33592, fo. 81v.

⁶¹⁶ SP70/11, fo. 61r.

⁶¹⁷ Add. 33592, fos. 86r-87r, Council to Sadler and Croft, 14 November 1559.

and readied her navy to blockade French ships just as Throckmorton had been advising her to do.⁶¹⁸ Two weeks before the official Council debate on the issue of intervention, Cecil wrote to Sadler that the military commanders Norfolk and Lord Grey would be at Newcastle and Berwick respectively by the end of the month for ‘the matter is too weighty to be trifled and so we all now at the last doo judge’.⁶¹⁹ These actions suggest that rather than providing a template for action by council, the council debate that took place at the end of December was merely a rubber stamp to events that had been provoked by an ambassador and set in motion by Elizabeth and a select group of councillors a month earlier.⁶²⁰

Throckmorton’s influence is substantiated by foreign observers. One described how Throckmorton’s objective was ‘to urge forward the fitting out of the fleet’; and, another that Throckmorton had returned to England to put Berwick in readiness against a French attack.⁶²¹ In London the French Ambassador considered Throckmorton’s arrival to be a prognostic to war between England and France, while the Spanish Ambassador reported that it had ‘resulted after much altercation in the Queen and Council deciding to give overt help to the Scots in casting out the French’.⁶²² Meanwhile, in the Low Countries, Margaret of Parma’s chief adviser, Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, Bishop of Arras, questioned whether ‘Throckmorton’s persuasions [were] worth such an adventure’ as to break peace with France.⁶²³

Au fait with the situation in France, Throckmorton was in a key position to impress the need for intervention in Scotland upon the Queen and remaining doubters within the Council.⁶²⁴

⁶¹⁸ Forbes, *Transactions*, pp. 165, 236; Caligula B/X, fo. 65v, Elizabeth to Winter, 16 December 1559; SP70/8, fos. 88v-89r; SP70/6, fo. 83v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 15 August 1559; T. Glasgow, ‘The Navy in the First Elizabethan Undeclared War, 1559-1560’, *The Mariner’s Mirror*, 54 (1968), 26.

⁶¹⁹ Add. 33592, fo. 176r, Cecil to Sadler, 13 December 1559.

⁶²⁰ *EEP*, p. 69.

⁶²¹ *CSPS*, I, p. 114; J. Rigg (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Relating to English Affairs, Preserved Principally at Rome* (London, 1916), I, pp. 47-8.

⁶²² *Relations Politique*, I, p. 376; *CSPS*, I, p. 115.

⁶²³ SP70/9, fos. 44v, 45r, Challoner to Cecil, 6 December 1559.

⁶²⁴ On conciliar division see MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 77-9; *EEP*, p. 66.

Throckmorton lost no opportunity to vocalise the French threat and the conclusions drawn up by the Council at the end of December relied heavily upon his assertions about Mary's usurpation of Elizabeth's style and arms and the conveying of French troops to Scotland, which the councillors agreed signified the French King's 'ambitiose and most injuriose intent'. Throckmorton's reports had convinced many of the councillors that the French 'will not...long forbear to make war with us'.⁶²⁵ Moreover, during his time in England, Throckmorton actively engaged in Anglo-Scottish relations and even hosted a meeting with the Congregation's envoy, Lethington.⁶²⁶

English intervention in Scotland rested on the assessment of the risk the French posed to England. The destruction and dispersal of the French fleet heading to Scotland at the end of December brought about another abrupt policy change. Elizabeth immediately turned down the Council's proposal to intervene. Her councillors again fell into 'some contrarietee in opinion'; and Norfolk, who was now stationed with troops at Berwick, was told to 'forbear...for one or ij monethes' while Elizabeth had further 'conference' with the French.⁶²⁷ By Throckmorton's return to France, at the end of January 1560, Norfolk was waiting at Berwick and Admiral Winter had a fleet stationed in the Firth of Forth: England had raised its defences and was poised to intervene in Scotland but the impetus for immediate action had evaporated.

In the early months of 1560, as religious tensions rose and the Guise regime in France faced a failed coup, Throckmorton repeatedly recommended that Elizabeth and her councillors should take advantage of the weakness of the French and push forward in Scotland.⁶²⁸ In this he was aligned with Cecil.⁶²⁹ Throckmorton, however, was concerned that Elizabeth's other

⁶²⁵ *Relations Politique*, I, p. 391; SP12/7, fos. 185r-186r, Council to Elizabeth, 27 December 1559.

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

⁶²⁷ CP 152, fo. 91v, Elizabeth to Norfolk, 29 December 1559; Add. 33592, fo. 225r, Cecil to Sadler, 30 December 1559.

⁶²⁸ Sutherland, *Princes*, p. 83; for example, SP70/11, fos. 61r-65v and Forbes, *Transactions*, pp. 369-74.

⁶²⁹ *EEP*, p. 67; Add. 33592, fo. 281r, Cecil to Sadler, 18 February 1560.

councillors were far too eager to come to terms with the French. Despite agreeing to ally with the Congregation in the Treaty of Berwick and eventually sending an army into Scotland, his English colleagues continued to engage with the Guises. Throckmorton argued throughout that the Guises were only calling for peace to win time until they could refocus their attention on Scotland.⁶³⁰ At the beginning of April, he uncovered the proof: an intercepted letter from the Cardinal of Lorraine to Mary of Guise demonstrated that the Guises' entreaties for peace sought only to win time 'as I have often written [the letter]...hath playne discovered them'.⁶³¹ Throckmorton drew Cecil's attention to the letter, which 'serveth well to perswade suche as wold drawe back and that doo believe that the Frenche meane and will performe their promysses'.⁶³²

Nevertheless, the Queen and her Council were closing in on a non-military solution negotiated by treaty and, at the end of May, Cecil and Wotton were sent north to handle the negotiations. At this juncture, Throckmorton feared that the eagerness of some of his colleagues to make peace would result in them securing a 'patchyd pease or prosequete[ing] a preposterous end' as had happened at Cateau-Cambrésis.⁶³³ So, when in April, Wotton, fearful that France and Spain might unite against England, advocated that England accept an unfavourable peace treaty, Throckmorton tried to encourage his colleagues to stand firm and 'make a good ende. For in that is all'.⁶³⁴ This new treaty, if well made, was an opportunity to provide long-term 'suretye for Englande' and make reparation for the unfavourable peace negotiated at Cateau-Cambrésis.⁶³⁵

⁶³⁰ SP70/12, fo. 56v.

⁶³¹ SP70/13, fo. 32v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 6 April 1560.

⁶³² *Ibid.*, fo. 33r.

⁶³³ Add. 32091, fo. 180r, Throckmorton to Leicester, 22 May 1560; SP70/14, fo. 104r.

⁶³⁴ SP52/3, fo. 79r, Wotton to Cecil, April 1560; See also MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 82-3 and *EEP*, pp. 77-8; SP70/14, fo. 104r.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*, fo. 104r.

In this moment Throckmorton's intelligence and advice were crucial. Cecil, busy negotiating at Edinburgh, ensured Throckmorton's letters were forwarded onto him by his secretary in London.⁶³⁶ From the continent, Throckmorton was better placed than his English colleagues to assess the relative strength of the French and Spanish positions, the relationship between the two countries and its impact on the English negotiators room for manoeuvre at Edinburgh. In early June 1560, Throckmorton immediately informed Cecil, Petre, the Privy Council, and the Queen of the crippling defeat that the Turks had inflicted on the Spanish at Djerba.⁶³⁷ Throckmorton reassured his anxious colleagues that neither France nor Spain now had the capacity to unite against England and, moreover, the defeat had sown division between the French and the Spanish, reporting that the Spanish ambassador at the French court imputed Philip's loss to the 'frenche treason', while 'the frenche laughyd' at Philip's misfortune.⁶³⁸ Throckmorton noted that the Spanish at the French court were 'cleane alteryd in countenance and in all theyr sayinges' regarding English intervention in Scotland after Djerba and were now less hostile.⁶³⁹ Throckmorton wove together the Spanish defeat at Djerba, the instability of the Guisan government in France and the increased tension between the French and Spanish to demonstrate England's superior bargaining position in Edinburgh. With England seeming more secure, Throckmorton advised Cecil to 'yeld to no thing but to have your demandes performed...I meane the utter expulsion of the Frenche owt of Scotland and reparacion of the injuries don to England'.⁶⁴⁰

Throckmorton's ability to locate the Anglo-Scottish situation within the developing crises within Europe added weight to his advice. The news of the Spanish defeat at Djerba, coinciding

⁶³⁶ CP 152, fo. 168r, Cecil to Petre, 4 June 1560.

⁶³⁷ SP70/15, fo. 23v; SP70/15, fos. 19r-20r, Throckmorton to Council, 7 June 1560; CP 2, fo. 51r, Council to Cecil and Wotton, 14 June 1560; CP 152, fo. 171r, Throckmorton to Petre, 7 June 1560.

⁶³⁸ SP70/15, fo. 20r; SP70/15, fos. 23r-24r.

⁶³⁹ SP70/15, fos. 19r-20r.

⁶⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, fo. 20v; SP70/15, fo. 23v.

with the death of the Queen Regent in Scotland (11 June 1560), provoked an explosion of enthusiasm from the English court. Bacon wrote to Cecil that ‘yf I were in your place & sawe cause to geve credytt to the advertysementes of the myserye of Fraunce of the hard happ happenyd to kyng phylp...then wold I agre to no end but to sooche as for thys present shuld delyver Skotland...from the Frenche’.⁶⁴¹ But no-one was more enthusiastic than the Queen herself. On her orders Throckmorton’s verbal report on the European situation was written into a memorandum and sent to Cecil in Scotland.⁶⁴² The language of the document actively associates Elizabeth with militant ideas that are thought to have been expressed by only her most forward ministers: ‘we are constrained by necessity to take the sworde in our hande, to take away the best & readiest meanes, which our adversaries can have to annoy us’ for ‘we are most sure, when we are most stronge, and our streingth shall increase by expulsiinge the french out of Scotland, against whome wee see that nothings can serve but a stronge hande’.⁶⁴³ Throckmorton had attempted to impress such sentiments on Elizabeth two months earlier, when he advised that ‘your majestie having the swerd in your handes is hable to constrayn them’.⁶⁴⁴ Significantly, this memorandum, reinforced by a further letter from Throckmorton at the end of June, marked the beginning of the Queen’s change in attitude towards the peace talks at Edinburgh. Previously desperate to treat for peace, Elizabeth began to question the sense of making peace if the French did not agree to all her demands. The memorandum, sent to Scotland on 14 June, stated that: ‘In no wise it is necessary to come to surceaunce for no commodite can come to us by it...the surest way is to goe on, whereby reason wilbe hadd at there hands’.⁶⁴⁵ On 27 June, Elizabeth received letters from Throckmorton emphasising her

⁶⁴¹ SP52/4, fo. 25r, Bacon to Cecil, 17 June 1560.

⁶⁴² Bodleian, Perrot MS 3, fos. 8r-12r, ‘Intelligencis and [a]dvices from our Ambassadour in france 7 Junii 1560’; Sent to Cecil by Privy Council, CP 2, fo. 51r; The original is: A paper containing much intelligence concerning France, Scotland, Caligula E/V, fos. 147r-151v.

⁶⁴³ Bodleian, Perrot MS 3, fo. 11r.

⁶⁴⁴ SP70/13, fo. 30r.

⁶⁴⁵ Bodleian, Perrot MS 3, fo. 11r.

advantage now both France and Spain ‘doo begyn to speake you fayer’, and informing her that the French would agree to all her demands.⁶⁴⁶ Six days later, Elizabeth, being ‘verie credible informid’ that the French ‘wolde not denye us almost any honorable Recompence we wolde require’, ordered Cecil and Wotton to demand 500,000 crowns and the restoration of Calais as ‘a Recompence of the great and dishonorable Injuries, that the sayd Frenche King and Queene have offered unto us by using our Armes and Tytles’; if the French refused they were to end negotiations.⁶⁴⁷

There was a fundamental difference of interpretation at this point. Albeit in March Throckmorton had mentioned to Elizabeth that she could ‘have your towne of Calles agayne yf you will stand to it’, his June memoranda made no mention of retaking Calais. Instead, Throckmorton’s primary aim was to secure the Anglo-Scottish ‘league’ and prohibit Mary and Francis from using Elizabeth’s arms and title.⁶⁴⁸ Only once this was achieved, thereby securing Elizabeth’s position within the British Isles, did Throckmorton hint at any intervention on the French mainland. Even then there is no mention of Calais, but of simply securing Elizabeth’s position by building on Throckmorton’s own attempts to ‘animate the people’ of Normandy and Brittany ‘against the howse of Gwyse’ thereby keeping the Guises occupied with internal discord and unable to intervene in the British Isles.⁶⁴⁹ However, not only did Elizabeth ask for the return of Calais, putting the treaty at risk, but she also sent to Cecil a messenger instructed to float the possibility of a war on the French mainland, in particular to invade Normandy and Brittany.⁶⁵⁰ This was undoubtedly Elizabeth’s response to an offer, brought by Throckmorton’s servant Robert Jones, from several French towns in Normandy and Brittany that ‘rather then

⁶⁴⁶ Arrival of Throckmorton’s letters noted by Petre in SP52/4, fo. 58r, Petre to Cecil, 28 June 1560; SP70/15, fos. 77v-78r.

⁶⁴⁷ CP 153, fo. 25r, Elizabeth to Cecil and Wotton, 3 July 1560.

⁶⁴⁸ SP70/12, fo. 125r; SP70/15, fo. 78r.

⁶⁴⁹ SP70/13, fo. 33v.

⁶⁵⁰ SP52/4, fo. 167v, Cecil to Elizabeth, 9 July 1560.

become subject to them that presently rule in fraunce, [they would] submit themselves to our Subjection'.⁶⁵¹ For Elizabeth it must have seemed like a propitious convergence of events for securing Calais's return, with Philip out of the way, the French unable to react and several towns in the vicinity offering her their allegiance. In the event, Elizabeth's letter arrived too late to impact the formation of the treaty, or so Cecil told the Queen.⁶⁵² Yet, Elizabeth's 'madcap scheme', as Neale called it, was not as outlandish as he suggested.⁶⁵³ It was the Queen's response to foreign intelligence and diplomatic counsel, and it was testament to Throckmorton's success in persuading Elizabeth of the strength of her position within Europe. Elizabeth spoke very highly of Throckmorton's 'good servyse' during the summer and, in early July, rewarded him with a grant of lands; no-one else was so quick to receive rewards for their efforts in Scotland.⁶⁵⁴

II. Randolph's Role in Anglo-Scottish Relations (September 1559-July 1560)

Unlike Throckmorton, Randolph's influence with his superiors and ability to shape the direction of policy was very limited in 1559-60. The significance of his role lay in his ability to establish connections within the Congregation, assess their capabilities and provide the English with first-hand intelligence of the situation on the ground, and smooth the innate tensions between the English and their new Scottish allies. This experience and the relationships that Randolph established in Scotland during this time laid the groundwork for his diplomatic career.

Having secretly escorted Arran across Europe, Randolph arrived in Scotland in September 1559 at the Earl's behest.⁶⁵⁵ As an unaccredited English agent resident amongst the

⁶⁵¹ Bodleian, Perrot MS 3, fo. 8v; MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 85-6.

⁶⁵² SP52/4, fo. 167r.

⁶⁵³ J. Neale, *Queen Elizabeth I* (Chicago, 2014), p. 98.

⁶⁵⁴ SP15/9/2, fo. 43r; SP70/17, fo. 101v; MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 93-4.

⁶⁵⁵ SP52/1, fo. 212r, Arran to Sadler, 21 September 1559.

Congregation, Randolph became the physical bridge between the English government and the Scottish Lords. However, there was a stark contrast between how the Elizabethan regime and the Congregation perceived Randolph's role. For the Congregation, Randolph was emblematic of English support for their cause; he represented a direct connection to Elizabeth's key advisers, such as Cecil, and English policy. Thus, they accorded him more authority than his position afforded him. Trusted by Arran and known to some of the other Lords, such as Kirkcaldy, Randolph was taken into the Congregation's confidence. He was present at their meetings, privy to their deliberations, had access to their private correspondence and occasionally acted in the capacity of clerk, writing the Congregation's letters to the English government and conveying them alongside his own to his superiors at Berwick.⁶⁵⁶ The Congregation's treatment of Randolph was designed to demonstrate their desire 'to joyne with her Majestie in amitie' and 'to do nothing with out [the] advis of the Queen of England [and] hir Councill' in order to secure English support.⁶⁵⁷ That Randolph was placed under considerable pressure by the Congregation to advise them on matters of policy and that, unaccustomed to operating in an advisory capacity, he felt ill-equipped to do so is best illustrated by a series of questions that Randolph laid before Cecil in December 1559. For instance, what should the Lords do if they could not remain in the field past thirteen or seventeen days? Should the Congregation make an attempt on Inchkeith before the English army arrived? and 'What answer shalbe geven to knox for preachynge in the borders'? Finally, he noted that some members of the Congregation, like Kirkcaldy and Henry Balnaves, also wanted his advice on what counsel to give their colleagues 'in some cases wherein I may not my self travaile'. Faced with requests for advice but no authority to give it, Randolph asked

⁶⁵⁶ For example, Add. 33591, fo. 232r, Congregation to Sadler and Croft, 24 October 1559 and SP52/3, fo. 100r, Randolph to Norfolk, 22 April 1560.

⁶⁵⁷ SP52/1, fo. 226r; Caligula B/X, fo. 50r, Knox to Croft, 25 October 1559.

Cecil to define the boundaries of his role clearly: if ‘I shall remayne ther, to what effecte, and therunto I desyerethe full instructions’.⁶⁵⁸

In contrast, Elizabeth and her councillors perceived Randolph’s role to be reportative rather than advisory. He was expected to provide reliable intelligence from which his superiors could make decisions. His presence at the Congregation’s consultations and his engagement with the Lords enabled him to offer assessments of the characters of the Congregation’s leading trio, Arran, Argyll, and Moray. Although he admired them, he was also concerned that they were ‘rather to forward then anye thyng to slowe’ and might ‘venture their persons to farre’.⁶⁵⁹

Randolph’s value also lay in his ability to evaluate the strength of the Congregation’s support amongst the Scottish nobility and uncover any divisions of opinion that existed from within the Congregation’s ranks. For instance, he noted that while Châtellerauld hoped to attract the powerful northern Earl of Huntly’s support ‘the rest trust him but a littell’.⁶⁶⁰ The Earl of Morton was under suspicion as he had broken his promise to join with the Congregation; and they mistrusted Lord Ruthven because he was a ‘greate freende’ to Huntly and Morton.⁶⁶¹ The position of individual nobles in Scotland vis-à-vis the Congregation was critically important to the English government’s assessment of the level of support that the Lords would be able to mobilise against the French. As Throckmorton argued that the Congregation was all that stood between England and a French invasion, Randolph’s evaluation of the Congregation’s ability to withstand the French was crucial. In November 1559, after their retreat from Edinburgh, the Congregation instructed Randolph to let the English ‘undrestand, that there is no cause for menn to be discouraged’.⁶⁶² However, observing the situation first-hand, he concluded that

⁶⁵⁸ SP52/1, fo. 298r.

⁶⁵⁹ SP52/3, fo. 67v; SP52/1, fo. 236r, Randolph to Sadler, 29 October 1559; SP52/2, fo. 3v, Randolph to Croft, 12 January 1560.

⁶⁶⁰ A. Clifford (ed.), *The State Papers and Letters of Sir Ralph Sadler* (Edinburgh, 1809), I, p. 537.

⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.*; SP52/1, fo. 264r.

⁶⁶² Clifford (ed.), *State Papers*, p. 537.

while the Congregation had ‘greate good wyll to farther their cawse’, the goals set for them by England far exceeded both their ‘knowledge and habilyte’.⁶⁶³ Randolph’s gloomy assessment undercut the Congregation’s reassurances and confirmed the opinion of his superiors that without English aid the Congregation were incapable of success against the French. While Randolph’s reports of the situation proved valuable in the last months of 1559, the arrival of the English army in the Spring of 1560 meant that Randolph’s importance momentarily diminished as the leaders of the Scottish expedition – Norfolk, Sadler, Croft and Grey – engaged with the Congregation, forwarded intelligence and directed policy.

Nevertheless, throughout this period Randolph had another crucial role: smoothing the innate tensions within the fragile Anglo-Scottish relationship. Observing the Congregation’s ‘cowlde procedinges...against the Frenche’, some of Elizabeth’s councillors expressed concern that the Congregation’s request for aid might be an elaborate ruse and that if the English aided the Scots they would join forces with the French against them.⁶⁶⁴ As late as January 1560, Norfolk was still reassuring his doubtful colleagues that ‘considering the enmitie and dailie hostilitie betwene the Frenche, and the protestantes...I cannot judge that they wolde make any suche trayne to betrappe us’.⁶⁶⁵ These tensions were exacerbated by divisive French interventions that were designed to play upon Scottish anxieties and undermine the burgeoning Anglo-Scottish alliance. Cecil observed how the ‘french seke all the wayes they can to putt a jealousy in the scottess of us’.⁶⁶⁶ When the English changed the date their troops would enter Scotland, Balnaves was concerned that the Scots would ‘cast materis in dowt’, particularly as Mary of Guise spread a rumour that Elizabeth was ‘fully agreeiet with the frenche king’.⁶⁶⁷ Witnessing these practices first-hand, Randolph worried that Guise’s ‘crafte and suttelty may ether

⁶⁶³ SP52/1, fo. 236r.

⁶⁶⁴ SP52/1, fo. 151r, Cecil to Croft, 29 July 1559; Add. 33592, fo. 2r; SP52/2, fo. 21r.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁶ Caligula B/X, fo. 106r, Cecil to Elizabeth, 21 June 1560.

⁶⁶⁷ SP52/2, fo. 85r, Balnaves to Sadler, 17 March 1560.

prevente or fraye so godly and honeste determynd a purpose as is nowe in hande'.⁶⁶⁸ Nevertheless, he was at pains to assure his English colleagues that 'I fynde not in anie of them [the Congregation] anie kynde of alteration what practyses what meanes somever be made unto them'.⁶⁶⁹ The French also attempted to undermine the religious aspect of the alliance. The captured French agent La Marque attempted to sow the seeds of religious dissension by highlighting differences in religious practice between the English and the Congregation, pretending to find it strange 'that in these churches he fyndethe nether Autour nor Image, candle nor surplice, as he saide he sawe, in the Quenes Chapell of Englande'.⁶⁷⁰

Operating in this atmosphere laden with mutual mistrust and suspicion, Randolph had to be the embodiment of the professed love and amity between England and Scotland. He worked alongside the Scots to alleviate English suspicions of the Congregation and, vice versa, he encouraged the Scottish lords to trust the English. Aware of how points of variance could easily generate mistrust and damage the would-be alliance, Randolph spent the spring of 1560 dealing with several areas of tension: Scottish mistrust at the delayed arrival of English troops; mistrust over English peace negotiations; and the Anti-Scots stance of some of the English army leaders, who accused the Scots of not bringing the number of troops they had promised, fabricated reports that the army lacked men and money, and approached the task in hand in a lacklustre manner.

Once the English fleet had arrived in the Firth of Forth in January 1560, the Scots anticipated that an English army would follow. The delayed arrival of English troops increasingly brought into question whether Elizabeth's support would actually materialise (Arran warned in January that it 'putt all the commons and soundrie barons in dispaire of your ayde') and encouraged the

⁶⁶⁸ SP52/3, fo. 17r, Randolph to Cecil, 6 April 1560.

⁶⁶⁹ SP52/2, fo. 94r, Randolph to Norfolk, 25 March 1560.

⁶⁷⁰ SP52/2, fo. 12r, Randolph to Sadler and Croft, 21 January 1560.

neutral Scottish Lords to hold back from committing to the Congregation thereby robbing them of much needed support.⁶⁷¹ Randolph reported the Scots' suspicions and made it clear that his reassurances to the Scots were crucial at this critical juncture: 'I have travayled that waye with my penne to the comforte what I cane, and daylie labor here with my tonge untill my brayns do ake'.⁶⁷² Borrowing a phrase from Lucan, Randolph warned his superiors that '*semper nocet differre paratis*'.⁶⁷³ Frustrated that his attempts to allay Scottish mistrust were hampered by the lackadaisical nature of his English colleagues, Randolph accused his superiors of 'worke[ing] negligentlyer in this cawse then the importance thereof requerethe'.⁶⁷⁴

The Congregation's anxiety about English intentions was worsened by Elizabeth's willingness to respond positively to French entreaties for peace while delaying the ratification of the Treaty of Berwick and pushing back the date of the English army's arrival in Scotland. Suspicions continued when the English army arrived at the end of March because of the English desire to broker a treaty with the French. The Scots considered this a *volte face*: Lethington accused the English in disbelief of 'bak going' and argued that had he known 'that you shold dryve us to a doutfull apoyntement...I wold wishe that hir majestie had not so far proceded'.⁶⁷⁵ Randolph shared in Lethington's consternation, venting his disbelief and frustration to Sadler 'that so godly a purpose sholde nowe quayle when we thought yt most rypeste' and lamenting 'that I am not hable to satisfie mens expectation, or to contynnue them in credyt yf this matter be not earnestly applied, wher I am desyerus, seinge them so well dysposed'.⁶⁷⁶ Randolph also laid bare his torment to Killigrew: the 'malencolie...and passions that before trobled my wyttes which were so nere spent that for thre dayes contynually I lysted for nothyng so mucche as for

⁶⁷¹ SP52/2, fo. 211r, Arran and Moray to Croft and Sadler, 19 January 1560.

⁶⁷² SP52/2, fo. 13v.

⁶⁷³ It is ever injurious to postpone when you are in readiness; *Ibid.*, fo. 14v.

⁶⁷⁴ SP52/2, fo. 55v, Randolph to Sadler and Croft, 23 February 1560.

⁶⁷⁵ SP52/3, fo. 69v, Lethington to Cecil, 17 April 1560; SP52/3, fo. 34r, Lethington to Cecil, 10 April 1560.

⁶⁷⁶ SP52/3, fo. 43r.

to die'.⁶⁷⁷ However, Randolph tried to paint the situation in a better light to Cecil and smooth the relationship between the Congregation and the English by playing down the negative effect on Anglo-Scottish relations of the negotiations: 'though some thyngs have passed contrarie to the desyer and opinion of some...yet cane I assure your honour that therein ther is nether tyme loste, or the cawse hyndered'.⁶⁷⁸

By April divisions within the English camp were apparent. Randolph and Norfolk, neither of whom had experienced the turbulence of Anglo-Scottish relations during the 1540s, supported the Congregation in arguing that England should continue the fight against the French.⁶⁷⁹ Lethington (acting as the Congregation's mouthpiece), Randolph, Killigrew and Norfolk all advanced the basic contention that a negotiated peace would be disadvantageous for both England and Scotland in the long-term.⁶⁸⁰ Norfolk argued that if the English did not help the Congregation expel the French then 'left as praye to their enemye' the Congregation would be forced to join with the French and become 'enemyes unto us'.⁶⁸¹ He concluded that 'it is cheaper to fynisse this warre nowe begoon, then hereafter to begyn a newe'.⁶⁸² Norfolk's opinion was undoubtedly reinforced by the reports Randolph sent to him, arguing that if

all men to the uttermoste of their powre wolde determen rather tadventure their lyves in the Dyches of Lyethe, then to contrive longe tyme in vayne tawlke...yt were easie inoughe in fewe dayes to mayke suche a waye to the perpetual unitynge in indyssoluble bande of Amitie thes two nations, as nether the Frenche, or whoe somever is demed moste, to tayke parte with hym sholde ever be hable to sett foote in thys lande.⁶⁸³

The notion of keeping the French out of the British Isles in the long run was crucial. Killigrew, escorting Jean de Monluc, Bishop of Valence to Scotland for the peace talks, noted that Valence

⁶⁷⁷ SP52/3, fo. 67r.

⁶⁷⁸ SP52/3, fo. 35r, Randolph to Cecil, 10 April 1560.

⁶⁷⁹ SP52/3, fo. 53r, Norfolk to Cecil, 12 April 1560.

⁶⁸⁰ SP52/3, fo. 33v.

⁶⁸¹ SP52/3, fo. 39r, Norfolk to Council, 10 April 1560.

⁶⁸² SP52/3, fo. 53r.

⁶⁸³ SP52/3, fo. 91r, Randolph to Norfolk, 19 April 1560.

was concerned that France could not currently prevent Elizabeth ‘not only dryve[ing] the french owt of scotland perforce but also use[ing] the scottis afterward at her plesure’.⁶⁸⁴ Thus Killigrew concluded that ‘god forbead yt shold end by apointment for then shold the Quyne lose all her charges she hathe bin at besides the dishonor and danger of her state’.⁶⁸⁵

While these men called for military action, Grey and Croft, sent forth to command the army, sought to negotiate a peaceful solution and, without Elizabeth’s ‘direct forbidding of the treatie’, Norfolk found himself unable to get them to ‘leave treating’.⁶⁸⁶ Moreover, in pursuing this approach they disparaged the Anglo-Scottish alliance and undermined the Congregation’s position by positing the Scots as untrustworthy and therefore unworthy of English aid. Grey complained that ‘the scottes [were] so obstinate’ and Croft questioned whether the Scots would desert the English if French reinforcements arrived and asked to be relieved by English troops because ‘there is no trust to be geven to the help of the Skottes on that behalf’.⁶⁸⁷ They were so openly antagonistic that the Congregation complained that the English ‘begyn to cast many doutes’ about their ability to pursue military action and in their desire to ‘altere the formar Resolution have...burdened us with the insufficiency off our nombres’.⁶⁸⁸ Those men the Congregation did field were alleged by Admiral Winter to ‘have no order among them’.⁶⁸⁹ The impact of this behaviour was far-reaching. Wotton, who would shortly be sent to Edinburgh to negotiate for peace, assessed the situation in Scotland on the basis of these accusations, arguing that ‘the weaknesse or untowardnesse of the Scottes’ and their unwillingness ‘to assist the queen with such forces as they have promysedde’ provided the English with justification to withdraw if they wished to do so.⁶⁹⁰ Moreover, he concluded that if England pursued military

⁶⁸⁴ SP52/3, fo. 55r, Killigrew to Cecil, 12 April 1560.

⁶⁸⁵ SP52/3, fo. 60v, Killigrew to Cecil, 14 April 1560.

⁶⁸⁶ SP52/3, fo. 108r, Norfolk to Cecil, 26 April 1560.

⁶⁸⁷ SP52/3, fo. 41r, Grey to Norfolk, 9 April 1560; SP52/3, fo. 110r, Croft to Norfolk, 24 April 1560; SP52/3, fo. 185r, Grey and Croft to Norfolk, 7 May 1560; SP52/3, fo. 193r, Killinghale’s Instructions, 7 May 1560.

⁶⁸⁸ SP52/3, fo. 62r, Lethington to Killigrew, 10 April 1560; SP52/3, fo. 69r.

⁶⁸⁹ SP52/2, fo. 25r, Winter to Norfolk, 25 January 1560.

⁶⁹⁰ SP52/3, fo. 79r-v.

action in Scotland then it would be largely a solo venture for the Scots ‘shew theym selves now, so litle able, or so litle willing to do yn a maner eny thing, for the defence of theym selves’.⁶⁹¹

This ingrained distrust of the Congregation permeated the environment in which Randolph operated. He supported the Scots and portrayed them in a positive light to counter the negative reports emanating from the English camp, arguing that he ‘never sawe men better wyllinge, nor more earnestly dysposed’.⁶⁹² Randolph extolled the Congregation’s loyalty to England, reassuring Cecil that the ‘zeale of the reste of the lordes in this godlie Action...sholde be open unto you yf you had the daylie conference with them that I have in these cases’.⁶⁹³ When Châtellerault’s loyalty was impugned, Randolph lent his credit to ‘my self testifie...[that] as longe as his sonne lyveth at the leaste, nothyng is to be dowted of his constancie in this cawse’.⁶⁹⁴ Moreover, he attempted to foster Anglo-Scottish amity by painting the Scots as ‘so desyerus tadjoyne them selves in thys cawse...with suche hartie confederance as thoughe never discord or variance had ever byne betwexte these two Realmes’.⁶⁹⁵ His depiction of the Congregation’s loyalty to England chimed with that of Killigrew, who informed Cecil that ‘I never shaw people from the beast to the worste better content to plesse and obey us and our prosidinges’ and presented the English and Scots as ‘campe[ing] together, not lyke too but one nation, as fryndly as brothers’ without any discord.⁶⁹⁶ Randolph and Killigrew’s assessments supported assertions by the Congregation that ‘no scottisheman hath shawen any brynd off hostilite’.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹¹ Ibid., fo. 78v.

⁶⁹² SP52/3, fo. 41r; SP52/3, fo. 100r.

⁶⁹³ SP52/3, fo. 17v.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid., fo. 18r.

⁶⁹⁶ SP52/3, fo. 83r, Killigrew to Cecil, 20 April 1560; Forbes, *Transactions*, p. 503; SP52/4, fo. 40r, Randolph to Killigrew, 21-22 June 1560.

⁶⁹⁷ SP52/3, fo. 69r.

Randolph also highlighted the untrustworthiness of the reports emanating from the camp by refuting Grey and Croft's complaints that the English lacked money and supplies.⁶⁹⁸ He urged Norfolk, at the behest of the Congregation, not to judge the Scots by the 'reporte[s]...made unto you of their insufficiencie, or not performance of their promasses' until they can speak 'to their purgation'.⁶⁹⁹ In making this request, and in countering his colleagues' accusations more broadly, Randolph played on the six months he had spent with them which 'sholde mayke me better hable to judge of their maners then those of les tyme'. Leveraging his position amongst the Congregation, Randolph countered the accusation that the Scots had not performed 'their promas...for the numbere of men' with the observation that none who had sworn to the cause had revolted. He believed that if Norfolk could hear 'how mucche theie are hable to saye for them selves' regarding their numbers he would 'fynde [it] resonable inoughe'.⁷⁰⁰ Randolph's reports, supplemented by those of Killigrew and Lethington, appear to have encouraged Norfolk to re-examine the veracity of Grey and Croft's accounts with important consequences. Whereas Norfolk had initially accepted the reports from the camp, he now refuted them. Complaints that the Scots had not brought the promised number of troops were tested by the Congregation's insistence that a roster be taken twice a day to prove that they did. Leaving Norfolk to conclude that reports of the insufficiency of the Scottish troops were 'not trewe'.⁷⁰¹ This led to Norfolk's increasing antagonism towards Grey and Croft. He reminded Croft that Elizabeth 'will in no case deale with treatie, except it be with the Scottes hole consentes', ordering him to 'hasten your busines', and accusing him of discouraging the soldiers by his behaviour.⁷⁰²

⁶⁹⁸ SP52/3, fo. 68r.

⁶⁹⁹ SP52/3, fo. 100r.

⁷⁰⁰ SP52/3, fo. 127v, Randolph to Norfolk, 28 April 1560.

⁷⁰¹ SP52/3, fo. 108r.

⁷⁰² SP52/3, fo. 110v, Norfolk to Croft, 24 April 1560.

Randolph's reports were influential in shaping his superiors' perception of the Anglo-Scottish situation. Norfolk in particular paid keen attention to Randolph's analysis of his engagement with Valence, who was sent by France to help negotiate a peace. Randolph argued that Valence 'beareth an other face then he sheweth' for, when talking with him, 'his nature appeared in one worde or two...sayenge the tyme wolde come that these forces betstowed here in the defens of a rebelleus people, myght do better in shorte tyme at home to defende our selves'.⁷⁰³ Norfolk drew Cecil's attention to Randolph's account of 'the dissembling bisshoppes venimous woordes' as a thing 'chieflye to be considered'; for they supported the idea that French entreaties for peace were a temporising strategy that, as Throckmorton and others repeatedly warned, would be overturned as soon as the French were able to field an army.⁷⁰⁴ This argument was underscored by another section of Randolph's letter that Norfolk also pointed out to Cecil: Randolph's report that the custodian of Edinburgh castle had warned Moray 'that he sholde beware what ende he looke with the Frenche and sholde rather dowte the daynger to come then that that was present'.⁷⁰⁵

Randolph saw his role as fostering a good working relationship between the English and the Congregation and giving practical meaning to the language of amity. Living amongst the Congregation – and even sharing a bed with some of the Lords during the siege of Castle Semple – Randolph was arguably closer to them than his English superiors.⁷⁰⁶ However, he was deeply aware that his consistent support for the Congregation left him open to accusations of partisanship given his reports were at variance with those emanating from his superiors in the English army camp. Thus, he repeatedly caveated his favourable reports of the Congregation with phrases asking to be 'excused...that I sholde either seme to affectionedly to

⁷⁰³ SP52/3, fo. 100v.

⁷⁰⁴ SP52/3, fo. 98r, Norfolk to Cecil, 28 April 1560; Frescoln, 'Randolph', pp. 51-2.

⁷⁰⁵ SP52/3, fo. 96r-v.

⁷⁰⁶ SP52/5, fo. 40v, Randolph to Lethington, 21 October 1560.

wryte, or intende to prefere my judgement to others that are better hable to judge'.⁷⁰⁷ Randolph felt concerned that accusations of partisanship might taint how his reports were received and defended himself to Norfolk: 'I see no cawse whie I sholde speake in this matter affectionedly, nor I truste never so to be abused [that] untrothe shalbe founde in me'.⁷⁰⁸ To his friend Killigrew, Randolph argued that he was 'not so affectioned nor blynde that ever I wyll dyssemble with suche as have geven me credyt in this place'.⁷⁰⁹ To counter accusations of partisanship, Randolph tended to couch his reports in tentative language and acknowledge his own inexperience in matters of warfare and diplomacy. It was a difficult balance to strike: Randolph informed Norfolk that he would rather leave the report to men of more skill than 'to farre incurrage anie man in a matter wherof the issue is uncertayne, or saye so lyttle as thought in so honorably a begonne matter ther were no hope to ende the same'.⁷¹⁰ Moreover, Randolph openly underwrote his reports with the acknowledgement that 'my zeale to have this matter effectuously tayke place, is greater then my experiens, and my deyer to have this enterprise honorablye achyved passythe anie judgemente I have ^my^ self in these cases'.⁷¹¹

Randolph's presence amongst the Congregation continued to underpin the Anglo-Scottish alliance. Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Edinburgh, he worried that if he were to return to England it may cause 'suspicion in this place wher I am of anye alienation of the Quenes majesties favour towards thys country'.⁷¹² In the event, Randolph was too valuable to be recalled and he remained in Scotland.

III. Cultivating the Anglo-Scottish Alliance After the Treaty of Edinburgh

⁷⁰⁷ SP52/3, fo. 96r.

⁷⁰⁸ SP52/3, fo. 100r.

⁷⁰⁹ SP52/3, fo. 67r.

⁷¹⁰ SP52/3, fo. 91r.

⁷¹¹ Ibid.

⁷¹² SP52/5, fo. 88r, Randolph to Cecil, 7 October 1560.

Following the treaty, Throckmorton and Randolph, from their different vantage points, observed first-hand the fragility of the Anglo-Scottish alliance. In Scotland, Randolph found that the alliance with England had limited support beyond the small group of Lords that made up the Congregation. While these men worked fervently to further the alliance and have the Treaty of Berwick ratified in the Scottish Parliament, Randolph found many of the other Scottish lords to be apathetic towards it. Instead of getting ‘everie noble man in Scotland...[to] putte his hande and seale’ to the Treaty of Berwick, he found ‘not one that is wyllinge to gyve eare unto anie reason’ to subscribe to it.⁷¹³ Randolph’s account contrasts sharply with that put forth by Kellar, who saw ‘Scottish devotion to England’ writ large in the Congregation’s ability to secure Parliamentary recognition of the alliance.⁷¹⁴ Meanwhile, in France, Throckmorton saw that the French had no intention of ratifying the Treaty of Edinburgh and instead continued to usurp Elizabeth’s authority by using her arms and title; and he believed that it was only a matter of time before the Guise resumed their offensive against the Scots and the English.⁷¹⁵

To counteract England’s perennial insecurity in the face of French machinations, Throckmorton advanced a traditional method for building a broader pro-English party in Scotland: doling out pensions to politically useful Scots.⁷¹⁶ Although Cecil shared Throckmorton’s view his attempt to secure pensions for some of the most influential Scots fell on deaf ears.⁷¹⁷ Throckmorton envisaged this proposed pension scheme as a counterweight to the ‘benefices, wardships, and all offices and fees’ that the French were bestowing on the Scots, and their efforts to win Moray to their cause with financial rewards.⁷¹⁸ He worried that Elizabeth’s parsimony would encourage the Scots to ‘tourne their Cotes and fall to catche thatt

⁷¹³ Frescoln, ‘Randolph’, pp. 75-6; SP52/5, fo. 6r, Randolph to Cecil, 8-10 August 1560; SP52/5, fo. 8r, Randolph to Cecil, 15 August 1560.

⁷¹⁴ Contra Kellar, *Scotland*, pp. 205-6.

⁷¹⁵ SP70/20, fo. 21r-v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 17 November 1560; SP70/20, fo. 65r.

⁷¹⁶ SP70/25, fo. 120r.

⁷¹⁷ SP70/17, fo. 101r-v.

⁷¹⁸ SP70/19, fo. 31v.

Catche maye' and he repeatedly advised the Queen and her councillors to use 'all possible meanes [to] intertaine thamyty of your frendis of the realme of Scotlande'.⁷¹⁹ Francis II's death, in December 1560, intensified concerns and Throckmorton warned that Mary, 'desirous to return home to gither with these kinde offers of this king...will sone alter the scottes devotion towards us...unlesse they see other fruite than driving of'.⁷²⁰

With Mary's return to Scotland imminent, Throckmorton urged Elizabeth 'to retayne and wyne as manye friends ther as youe can', particularly Arran and Moray, who Throckmorton judged 'well able to serve your Majesties tourne' after meeting him in France during the spring of 1561.⁷²¹ Seeing pensions were not forthcoming, Throckmorton changed tack, suggesting that Moray be given some of Henry VIII's furs as a token of favour.⁷²² Lethington had warned Throckmorton that 'with empty hand men shold no haulkes luer', hoping that Throckmorton would help secure pensions for the Scots.⁷²³ Frustrated, Throckmorton responded with the rebuke that 'haukes of gentle kynde...will fast a meale or twoo rather then doe against their kynde' for 'Roome was not buylt all on a daye...Tout vient a point, qui peult attendre'.⁷²⁴

Lethington's correspondence with Throckmorton is emblematic of the ambassador's role in Anglo-Scottish relations at this time. Resident at the French court, he was able to provide the Scots with intelligence on Mary and the French. In August 1560, Lethington asked Cecil to find out from Throckmorton 'how our Scottishmen ar loked on there' and whether the French king or queen misliked any part of the peace.⁷²⁵ Following Francis II's death, Elizabeth officially sanctioned this intelligencing role, asking Throckmorton to relay 'any matter [that]

⁷¹⁹ SP70/21, fo. 5r; SP70/17, fo. 55v.

⁷²⁰ SP70/22, fo. 22r-v, Throckmorton to Council, 3 January 1561.

⁷²¹ SP70/25, fos. 117v-118r.

⁷²² SP70/26, fo. 28r.

⁷²³ SP70/28, fo. 32r, Lethington to Throckmorton, 10 June 1561.

⁷²⁴ All things come to him who waits; SP70/28, fo. 36r.

⁷²⁵ SP52/4, fo. 189v, Lethington to Cecil, 29 July 1560.

shall come to your knowledge mete to be participated unto the estates of Scotland'.⁷²⁶ At this moment, Lethington wrote repeatedly to Throckmorton 'desyring to know of yow the present estate of france' and his 'good advise in our proceedinges in thir partes in tymes coming'; and Arran asked him to keep them updated on 'any preparacion towards us by' the French.⁷²⁷ Throckmorton actively advised the Scots, writing lengthy letters to Lethington and sending Alexander Clarke to Scotland with 'a memorial' of advice for the Lords.⁷²⁸ Throckmorton also used Clarke's credit with Lord Seton to help garner information for Elizabeth and the Scots on 'the secrett workyngs off the french mynysters yn scotland'.⁷²⁹

While Throckmorton and Cecil attempted to secure English pensions, the Scots had their own view on how best to secure the relationship. Randolph found that some of the reticence he had encountered amongst the Scottish Lords towards the alliance came from their belief that it needed to be established more securely, through a dynastic marriage and not a treaty alone.⁷³⁰ The Congregation also wholeheartedly approved of a dynastic union, with Argyll noted to be 'verie affectioned' and Moray 'mervileus erneste'.⁷³¹ This was the genesis of the Arran marriage proposal: Randolph saw the bill pass through Parliament 'with so good a wyll' that even 'our very Ennemyes did aperre no les zelous' in their support.⁷³² As England's representative, the Scots looked to Randolph for advice on how best to instruct the Scottish embassy to England. Moray even invited him to proffer his opinion on the subject at a private, late-night consultation with some of the Congregation's leaders. Faced with overwhelming

⁷²⁶ SP70/21, fo. 69r, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 13 December 1560.

⁷²⁷ SP70/22, fo. 19r, Lethington to Throckmorton, 1 January 1561; SP70/22, fo. 24r, Arran to Throckmorton, 3 January 1561.

⁷²⁸ SP70/22, fo. 124r, Throckmorton to Lethington, 23 January 1561; SP70/20, fo. 61v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 28 November 1560.

⁷²⁹ SP70/20, fo. 59v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 28 November 1560.

⁷³⁰ SP52/5, fo. 8v.

⁷³¹ SP52/5, fo. 11r, Randolph to Cecil, 19 August 1560.

⁷³² *Ibid.*, fo. 12r; SP52/5, fo. 10v, Lethington to Cecil, 18 August 1560.

Scottish support for the marriage, Randolph worked alongside Lethington to ascertain from Cecil ‘what so mever may be knowne to be the Quenes majesties pleasure’ on the matter.⁷³³

The willingness of the Congregation to seek Randolph’s advice in their dealings with Elizabeth over the Arran marriage might suggest he had some power to shape the relationship. However, Randolph knew he could not desist without risking irreparable damage to the Anglo-Scottish alliance. Routinely ‘present at the [Congregation’s] debatinge’ of political matters, Randolph was keenly aware of the Arran marriage’s popularity, observing how it was the Scots’ ‘daylie nyghtly and howerly tawlke’.⁷³⁴ Lethington informed Cecil that the Scots saw it as ‘the onely meane to joyne us in ane indissoluble union’ and Randolph warned him ‘howe lothe men are that thys matter sholde not tayke place’.⁷³⁵ The pressure for the proposed marriage to succeed was so intense that Randolph was careful to suppress information and intelligence that might prematurely undermine it. When, as the Scots prepared to offer Arran to Elizabeth, Randolph and Lethington received intelligence from Cecil of the scandal surrounding the death of Leicester’s wife and his plans to marry Elizabeth they decided ‘to kepe your letters from all [others, for] yt ys yet no tyme to caste no suche dowtes’.⁷³⁶ A few weeks later, Randolph intervened again, suppressing the information that Sorleyboy Macdonald was openly saying that Elizabeth would not marry Arran as she was determined ‘to marrie the Sueden’, for fear of the damage that might occur to Anglo-Scottish relations if ‘thys tale sholde strayte be tolde unto my Lord of Arrane or anie other that stonde yet indowte’ of Elizabeth’s intentions.⁷³⁷ By manipulating the flow of information Randolph played a crucial role in smoothing the path of amity.

⁷³³ SP52/5, fos. 11r, 19r.

⁷³⁴ Ibid., fo 19v.

⁷³⁵ SP52/5, fos. 10r, 17v.

⁷³⁶ SP52/5, fo. 32r, Randolph to Cecil, 23 September 1560.

⁷³⁷ Ibid., fos. 33v-34r.

Randolph was also faced with another more fundamental area of tension between the two countries: religion in a general sense united the two peoples but in the particularities of their doctrinal and liturgical differences it created areas of dissonance. As Kellar has observed the Scots had no desire to procure closer doctrinal ties with the English Church.⁷³⁸ Scottish reformers were highly critical of what they perceived to be Elizabeth's 'slacke & imperfite proceedinges in religion' and the 'dregges of Papistrie' that remained in the half-reformed English church.⁷³⁹ Randolph, working alongside Lethington, attempted to mitigate the impact on the Anglo-Scottish alliance. He lamented that if 'my poore advice myght have byne harde touchyng the confession of the faythe, yt sholde not so soone have comme into the lyghte'; however, he applauded Lethington's attempts to 'myttigate the austeritie of maynie wordes and sentences' within it.⁷⁴⁰ Although personally impressed with the extent of reform in Scotland, Randolph found it increasingly difficult to reconcile it with the English church. He found that the secular lords 'lacke[d] no good wyll' thereunto and found the idea politically 'expedyent'. However, when Randolph gathered Knox, Willock and Goodman's 'opynions howe a uniformytie myght be had in religion in bothe these Realmes', he found that while they acknowledged the 'maynie commodyties' thereof they were 'so severe' in their beliefs and 'so lothe to remytte any thyng' that there was 'lyttle hope therof'. Moreover, Randolph was concerned that the Scots' plan to garner the opinions of European reformers like Calvin, Beza and Martyr on their Book of Discipline might cause offence in England, for he 'perceave[d] not ther opinion towards Englande to be suche, that theie wylbe content to stonde to their judgement herin'. As a token gesture, Randolph managed to persuade them 'not to refuse to commen with anye lerned in our nation'.⁷⁴¹

⁷³⁸ Kellar, *Scotland*, pp. 207-8.

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 208; SP52/1, fo. 231r, Goodman to Cecil, 26 October 1559; D. Laing (ed.), *Works of John Knox* (New York, 1966), VI, p. 12.

⁷⁴⁰ SP52/5, fo. 27r, Randolph to Cecil, 7 September 1560.

⁷⁴¹ SP52/5, fo. 18v.

From the moment Randolph arrived in Scotland, he used his existing relationships of long-standing with several Scots to help him establish relationships within the Congregation, finding out ‘howe to use them, and how to governe my self amongeste them’ in order to facilitate Anglo-Scottish diplomacy.⁷⁴² Kirkcaldy, in particular, proved to be a useful source of information and assistance for Randolph: he worked through Kirkcaldy to advise ‘the Lordes in some cases wherin I may not my self travaile’; and, in September 1560, Randolph relied on Kirkcaldy’s account of a meeting between Argyll, Moray and the Earl of Atholl about ‘what myght be done to brydle the Erle of huntlie, yf at anie tyme he wolde become ennemie unto thys cawse’.⁷⁴³ However, it was the close working relationships that Randolph established with Lethington and Moray that proved most formative for his diplomatic future in Scotland.

The rhetoric of cooperation and collaboration that underpinned the Anglo-Scottish relationship was particularly evident in the synergy between Randolph and Lethington. Theirs was an unusually collaborative and open relationship between a diplomat and a leading official at a foreign court. Through Lethington, Randolph gained access to intelligence of the inner counsels of the Scottish government; and when Lethington went on embassy to England Randolph kept him apprised of news from the Scottish court.⁷⁴⁴ As well as working together to mitigate the impact of the Dudley crisis on the Arran match (as discussed above) they collaborated to handle disputes on the Anglo-Scottish border.⁷⁴⁵ They also worked in unison to advise Cecil: in several letters Randolph refers Cecil to letters from Lethington, adding that ‘what so mever shalbe omitted in his letter for lacke of tyme, I wyll supplie the same in myne...by his reporte’.⁷⁴⁶ Similarly, Randolph developed a close collaborative relationship with Moray. As seen above, Moray relied on Randolph’s counsel when formulating the

⁷⁴² SP52/6, fo. 164r.

⁷⁴³ SP52/1, fo. 298r; SP52/5, fo. 27v.

⁷⁴⁴ SP52/5, fo. 40r-v.

⁷⁴⁵ SP52/5, fo. 37r, Randolph to Cecil, 11 October 1560.

⁷⁴⁶ SP52/5, fo. 9r; SP52/5, fo. 1r, Randolph to Cecil, 1 August 1560.

approach of the Scottish embassy to England in August 1560; and Randolph worked through Moray to encourage several Scottish lords to subscribe to the Treaty of Berwick.⁷⁴⁷ These were relationships supported by personal connection: Randolph dined with both men and even shared a bed on occasion with Lethington.⁷⁴⁸ Moray drew attention to the personal relationship that underpinned the political collaboration when, in 1563, he wrote of his ‘greif’ at his ‘frend’ Randolph’s return to England, adding that he had ‘found at all tymis sence his arryvall in this realme such frendship and honestye’.⁷⁴⁹ The unique circumstances of the Anglo-Scottish amity encouraged this less formal, collaborative style of operating between the English diplomat and the leading Scottish political entities. As a result, Randolph established a channel of influence at the heart of the Scottish government and was able to penetrate the intimate workings of his host government in a way other diplomats could not. It is thus no surprise that when Elizabeth officially commissioned Randolph to be her agent in Scotland in December 1560 it was not for his diplomatic prowess but for ‘his good acquayntance with the nobilite and estates of that land’: these invaluable relationships would provide the English government with key points of influence and intelligence in Scotland during the early 1560s.⁷⁵⁰

Conclusion

Throckmorton’s influence during 1559-60 is testament to the political agency of diplomats and extra-conciliar advisers. Viewed as a key policy adviser, in the winter of 1559, Throckmorton was able to use the strategic value of his position in France to persuade Elizabeth and her councillors of the immediacy of the French threat to England and encourage the Elizabethan regime to take a more interventionist approach toward Scotland. Throckmorton’s influence underlines Alford and Thiry’s suggestion that Anglo-Scottish policy was then primarily

⁷⁴⁷ SP52/5, fo. 6r-v.

⁷⁴⁸ Ibid., fo. 6r; Caligula B/X, fo. 223v, Randolph to Cecil, 18 November 1562.

⁷⁴⁹ Add. 35831, fo. 140r, Moray to Throckmorton, 20 June 1563.

⁷⁵⁰ SP52/5, fo. 61r, Elizabeth to Randolph, 29 December 1560; Frescoln, ‘Randolph’, pp. 86, 92.

reactive to events in France.⁷⁵¹ Although Throckmorton evidently felt that being physically present at court during the winter of 1559 would ensure his political influence, his actions during the summer of 1560 demonstrate that absence from court did not preclude political effectiveness.⁷⁵² Rather, from the distance of France, Throckmorton underlined the efficacy of diplomatic counsel by persuading his Queen and her advisers of England's strength in Europe and the leverage this gave them when negotiating for a peace. This episode advances our understanding of the significant influence diplomats were able to wield by virtue of their ability to provide timely, well-informed advice.

This chapter has also emphasised the tentative, mistrustful nature of the Anglo-Scottish relationship at this time contrary to current scholarly beliefs.⁷⁵³ Randolph's time in Scotland during 1559-60 proved to be a diplomatic training ground providing him with the experience to meet the challenges he would face when Mary returned to Scotland in 1561. Although Randolph's influence was more subtle than Throckmorton's forceful counsel, he was able to exert it not only through his reports but crucially by encouraging positive relations between the English and the Scots. Following the Treaty of Edinburgh, Randolph assumed a more assertive role, actively intervening to prevent derogatory information damaging the sensitive alliance. This diplomatic assertiveness would stand him in good stead when handling the sensitive relationship between Elizabeth and Mary after 1561. Moreover, his co-operative style of operating with Moray and Lethington during 1559-60 would be vital to the success of his diplomacy during Mary's personal reign.

⁷⁵¹ *EEP*, p. 63; Thiry, "Open Shew", 1405-1439.

⁷⁵² Contra Haigh, *Elizabeth*, p. 92; MacCaffrey, *Making of Policy*, pp. 425-6.

⁷⁵³ Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish', pp. 87-114; *EEP*, pp. 43-70; Kellar, *Scotland*.

Chapter 6

**A Tentative Amity?: Throckmorton and Randolph's Influence in Promoting the Anglo-
Scottish Alliance, 1561-4**

Dawson characterised the period between Mary's return to Scotland (August 1561) and the tumultuous events of 1565 as the epoch of Anglo-Scottish amity.⁷⁵⁴ More recently her sense of harmony has been displaced by an emphasis on the competing priorities of the Marian and Elizabethan regimes and the increasingly fractious nature of the relationship. The Scots, caught between their loyalty to their monarch and desire to remain allied with England, attempted to incorporate their Catholic Queen into a relationship that had previously been grounded in a shared commitment to Protestantism and opposition to Mary and France. They now sought to refocus the Anglo-Scottish alliance onto the personal relationship between the two Queens and, in particular, the interlinked issues of Mary's remarriage and her desire to be named Elizabeth's heir apparent.⁷⁵⁵ The tension that these new aims created amongst those who had been united behind the cause of Anglo-Scottish amity in 1559-60 resulted in the increasingly distant relationship between Lethington, who pushed Mary's agenda, and Cecil, who could not countenance it.⁷⁵⁶ These tensions were exacerbated and the relationship made more uncertain by the outbreak of religious war in France (1562), which saw England side with the Huguenots against Mary's Catholic Guise kin. During these years Throckmorton and, more especially, Randolph played a vital role in performing amity and maintaining the perception of friendly diplomatic relations between Elizabeth, Mary, and their respective countries.

This chapter builds on chapter two's analysis of Throckmorton and Randolph's political networks and counselling relationships within the Elizabethan regime. It shows how their English connections – supplemented by the relationships they established with Mary, her leading councillors and her court and underpinned by a diplomat's expected intermediary role – gave Throckmorton and, more particularly, Randolph influence in shaping both the English

⁷⁵⁴ J. Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Lord Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', *IHR*, 8/1 (1986), 1-3.

⁷⁵⁵ *EEP*, pp. 86-90; Loughlin, 'Maitland', pp. 118-130.

⁷⁵⁶ Allinson, 'Parables', pp. 100-105.

and Scottish regimes' perspectives on the amity. It demonstrates how they were able to influence not just the relationship between the two Queens but also that between their respective councillors. Through the work of Alford, Loughlin and Allinson the significance of Cecil and Lethington as key players in Anglo-Scottish relations has been well-considered.⁷⁵⁷ However, they did not work in isolation and the important contributions of their diplomatic colleagues have received little consideration. Randolph and Throckmorton were a vital, physical link between the two regimes: they had direct access to advise Mary and her ministers in-person; and worked in tandem with Cecil, Lethington and others, to shape the relationship between the two Queens. Highlighting their role broadens our understanding of the collaborative working relationships between the men involved in Anglo-Scottish relations at this time: on the Scottish side Lethington and Moray; and on the English, Cecil, Leicester, Throckmorton, Randolph and Bedford, who arrived in the north as warden of the east march in early 1564.

While much recent work in diplomatic history has focussed more on cultural considerations, this chapter emphasises the invaluable role ambassadors played in shaping the relationship between monarchs. First this chapter explores the relationships Throckmorton and Randolph established with Mary, her councillors and her court, emphasising the value placed on their intermediary roles and demonstrating the diplomatic agency this afforded them. It then examines how Throckmorton and Randolph used their diplomatic agency to navigate two key areas of tension in Anglo-Scottish relations at this time: England's involvement with the French Huguenots and Mary's Catholicism.

I. Throckmorton and Randolph's Relationship with Mary, her Court and Councillors

⁷⁵⁷ *EEP*; Loughlin, 'Maitland'; Allinson, 'Parables', pp. 90-114; Stedall, *Mary*.

After Francis II's death Throckmorton followed Mary's lead and began to lay the groundwork for an amicable relationship between the two Queens. Once Mary returned to Scotland, Throckmorton handled Anglo-Scottish affairs in France. He dealt with Mary's uncle, the Duke of Guise, regarding Lethington's 1561 proposal to recognise Mary's claim to the English throne and with preparations for the proposed interview between the two Queens in 1562.⁷⁵⁸ Returning to the English court in 1564, Throckmorton continued to be heavily involved in Anglo-Scottish relations, working closely with Cecil, Leicester and Elizabeth, and reaching out at times to Mary, Moray and Lethington. Throckmorton was well-informed. He acted as Leicester's secretary on Scottish affairs and helped to shape the Earl's perspective therein, with most of Randolph's, Bedford's, Moray's and Lethington's letters to Leicester passing first through Throckmorton's hands.⁷⁵⁹ And, in recognition of his role 'as a Consallor' on Anglo-Scottish matters, Randolph, Bedford and others also sent him letters directly on 'matter[s] yt is necessarie that your Lordship sholde be made previe'.⁷⁶⁰ Mary's leading advisors also looked to Throckmorton as someone who would forward their interests in England, sending letters to him alongside their letters to Cecil and Leicester.⁷⁶¹

Meanwhile, Randolph remained resident in Scotland until early 1566, with brief respites at the English court in 1563 and 1564, and occasional trips to Berwick where he liaised with Bedford.⁷⁶² At the Scottish court he established strong working relationships with Mary's leading advisers, Moray and Lethington, working alongside them to further their shared desire for an ongoing Anglo-Scottish alliance by encouraging amicable relations between the two Queens. At Mary's court Randolph experienced a high level of inclusivity. This was a product

⁷⁵⁸ SP70/31, fos. 10r-15v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 8 October 1561; SP70/35 fos. 163r-167v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 31 March 1562.

⁷⁵⁹ For example, PL 2502, p. 521.

⁷⁶⁰ Add. 35831, fo. 17r; PL 2502, p. 529, Bedford to Throckmorton, 14 February 1566.

⁷⁶¹ SP52/10, fo. 146r; SP70/28, fo. 32r.

⁷⁶² Randolph was in England June-August 1563 and June-October 1564, Bell, *Handlist*, pp. 239-240.

not only of Mary's desire to befriend Elizabeth but also of his position as the only resident diplomat there, his pre-existing collegial relationships with Mary's key advisers, and the fact that as a diplomatic agent rather than an ambassador with a large entourage he was left to work with, and take advice from, those Scots he trusted rather than his household intimates. Moreover, Mary's choice to send occasional, extraordinary ambassadors to Elizabeth rather than establish a permanent resident at the English court gave Randolph an unusual level of influence. As the only permanent Anglo-Scottish diplomatic representative both English and Scots employed his agency.

i. Mary

An ambassador's treatment at a foreign court reflected his role as the proxy of his monarch and the diplomatic relationship between his sovereign and his host court. However, monarchs also recognised the value of treating foreign diplomats well in order to cultivate their personal favour and encourage them to use their intermediary position to exert a positive, constructive influence on the political relationship between their sovereign and their host.⁷⁶³

Both Queens appreciated Throckmorton and Randolph's value as intermediaries and sought to capitalise on their physical presence with Mary to project the perception of amiable relations between themselves and their respective countries. They placed the two diplomats at the heart of their newfound friendship, making them directly responsible for cultivating and 'manteine[ing] the good opinion already conceyved of the naturall good love meant betwix us two'. Elizabeth requested that Mary communicate 'privatlie' with Randolph, so that 'oure affairs be more secretly...resolved...by ambassades'.⁷⁶⁴ This was an approach Elizabeth

⁷⁶³ W. Roosen, 'Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach', *The Journal of Modern History*, 52 (1980), 452-476.

⁷⁶⁴ SP52/6, fo. 174r, Elizabeth to Mary, 23 November 1561.

practised herself when Mary's ambassador, James Melville, came to the English court.⁷⁶⁵ Similarly, Mary appreciated that creating a façade of privacy in her official audiences with Randolph and Throckmorton lent a sense of intimacy and significance to her relationship with Elizabeth. Thus, she followed Elizabeth's request to commune 'privatlie' with Randolph, choosing to talk with him in her garden and bedchamber, where she tended to meet her closest advisers. Randolph reported gleefully the 'mervileus wonder of a greate number that stoode withowte' at the favour shown him.⁷⁶⁶ Similarly, in France, Mary used privacy to convey intimacy and favour. First, she strove to speak to Throckmorton physically apart from other people: in one audience she 'ledd me from all the company to a windowe' and in another she commanded 'all the audyence to retyre farther backe'.⁷⁶⁷ Second, using Scots in her discussions with Throckmorton allowed them privacy as the language was not common currency at the French court and therefore unlikely to be understood by observers.⁷⁶⁸ These audiences were in some respects similar to the attempts of Francis I and Henry VIII to use privacy to signify intimacy in their relationship.⁷⁶⁹

In her audiences with Throckmorton, Mary also used physical proximity and her body language to create a sense of intimacy that was designed to support her claims of kinship and political intimacy with Elizabeth. She frequently 'embracid' him, took him 'by the hande' and on one occasion 'she satte downe and made me sitte also by her' as though they spoke on a level of

⁷⁶⁵ Melville, *Memoirs*, pp. 120-5.

⁷⁶⁶ Caligula B/X, fo. 191r, Randolph to Cecil, 24 October 1561; SP52/8, fo. 80v, Randolph to Cecil, 13 June 1563; Caligula B/IX/1, fo. 225r, Randolph to Cecil, 24 January 1566; Egerton 1818, fo. 27r, Randolph to Leicester, 13 December 1563; For Mary's political use of her bedchamber see A. Johnson, 'Mary Stuart and Her Rebels-Turned-Privy Councillors: Performance of the Ritual of Counsel', in H. Matheson-Pollock, J. Paul and C. Fletcher (eds.), *Queenship and Counsel in Early Modern Europe* (2018), pp. 161-186.

⁷⁶⁷ Bodleian, Perrot MS 3, fo. 21r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 11 August 1561; SP70/28, fo. 76r, Throckmorton to Council, 26 July 1561.

⁷⁶⁸ SP70/17, fo. 45v.

⁷⁶⁹ See for instance T. Sowerby, 'Negotiating with the Material Text: Royal Correspondence between England and the Wider World', in T. Sowerby and J. Craigwood (eds.), *Cultures of Diplomacy and Literary Writing in the Early Modern World* (Oxford, 2019), p. 210; L. MacMahon, 'Courtesy and Conflict: the Experience of English Diplomatic Personnel at the Court of Francis I', in D. Grummitt (ed.), *The English Experience in France c.1450-1558* (London, 2002), pp. 186-7.

monarch to monarch.⁷⁷⁰ On her return to Scotland in 1561, Mary used similar tactics with Randolph, keeping him in close attendance, dancing, dining and hunting with him and sending her personal doctor to care for him when he fell ill.⁷⁷¹ Mary's personal attentiveness fostered an atmosphere of intimacy that was aimed at projecting her care for Elizabeth and the importance of their relationship. Through this behaviour Mary wanted to enable Randolph (and by extension Elizabeth) to 'knowe me better'.⁷⁷²

Randolph's experiences at Mary's court at this time are comparable with the experiences of English ambassadors at the court of Francis I, suggesting that it was neither entirely uncommon nor particular to the relationship between Mary and Elizabeth. However, in the case of the two Queens, it was complicated – and limited – by their genders. As men, neither Throckmorton nor Randolph could penetrate Mary's Privy Chamber in the way that Francis had encouraged Henry's ambassadors to. Moreover, Henry's representatives – men like Francis Bryan and Nicholas Carew – had also been his close companions and intimates in his Privy Chamber; Elizabeth's male diplomats could not achieve the same level of access to the monarch under a Queen Regnant that their predecessors had enjoyed under a male monarch.⁷⁷³ Thus Randolph, who was not even an honorific Gentleman of the Privy Chamber, could not offer Mary the level of acquaintance with, or access to, Elizabeth that she desired. Throckmorton was better equipped to do so by virtue of his long-standing personal relationship with the English Queen and his direct access to her both through his letters and in-person. However, Throckmorton's access to the Queen was not always unmediated as he was often left working through the auspices of the Ladies of the Privy Chamber or Elizabeth's privy councillors. Throckmorton

⁷⁷⁰ SP70/28, fos. 76r, 80r; Bodleian, Perrot MS 3, fo. 21r; For more on the use of physical proximity to confer political intimacy see T. Sowerby, 'Material Culture and the Politics of Space in Diplomacy at the Tudor Court', in B. Johannsen and K. Ottenheim (eds.), *Beyond Scylla and Charybdis: European Courts and Court Residences outside Hapsburg and Valois/Bourbon Territories 1500-1700* (Copenhagen, 2015).

⁷⁷¹ PL 2502, p. 92, Randolph to Leicester, 15 January 1564; SP52/7, fo. 86v, Randolph to Cecil, 28 October 1562; SP52/7, fo. 2r, Randolph to Cecil, 2 January 1562; SP52/7, fo. 15r.

⁷⁷² Caligula B/X, fo. 202r.

⁷⁷³ MacMahon, 'Courtesy and Conflict', pp. 183-91.

and Randolph's political value – their ability to enhance the intimacy between their Queens – depended, in part, on their own level of acquaintance with their monarch.

Mary's behaviour reflected her desire to secure Throckmorton and Randolph's favourable reports: she bluntly told Randolph that she wanted him to be her 'good frende' and 'reporte the beste'.⁷⁷⁴ Mary was well aware of the power a diplomat could wield. She knew that, as two of the few Englishmen with access to her and her court, how Throckmorton and Randolph chose to portray her in their reports would fundamentally shape Elizabeth and her councillors' perceptions of her. They had the power to confirm or denounce her protestations of goodwill towards Elizabeth, to 'helpe to keepe us...in good amytye' or, conversely, 'in discorde and warr'.⁷⁷⁵ Thus, fearful of their potential to do 'much good and harme', Mary encouraged both Throckmorton and Randolph to 'behave your self betwixt us, lyke a good mynister whose parte is rather to make thinges betwixt princes better then worse'.⁷⁷⁶ She attempted to foster a sense of openness and collaboration with them. In France Mary made Throckmorton 'pryvie to all thinges that I doe sende' to Elizabeth, so that 'my wrytinges and yours may agree together'.⁷⁷⁷ Likewise after arriving in Scotland, she made Randolph 'previe' to her correspondence with the English Queen and Cecil, so that Randolph might 'judge the better of her meanyng'.⁷⁷⁸ In this spirit of collaboration, Mary also used Throckmorton and Randolph to gauge how best to appeal to Elizabeth. In 1561 she sought Throckmorton's advice on whether she could 'doe or say any thinge' to 'content' Elizabeth, and, the following year, she asked Randolph what he thought of the prospect of the two Queens meeting in the hope of ascertaining how to manage the uncertain situation.⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷⁴ Caligula B/X, fo. 202r.

⁷⁷⁵ Bodleian, Perrot MS 3, fo. 24r.

⁷⁷⁶ SP70/27, fo. 47v; SP70/28, fo. 78r.

⁷⁷⁷ Bodleian, Perrot MS 3, fo. 23r-v.

⁷⁷⁸ Caligula B/X, fo. 202r; SP52/7, fo. 15r-v.

⁷⁷⁹ Bodleian Perrot MS 3, fo. 21v; Elizabeth used similar tactics with the Scottish Ambassador, James Melville see Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 50; SP52/7, fo. 56r-v.

Both Mary and Elizabeth placed a high value on the performative nature of Randolph and Throckmorton's roles. Their physical presence at Mary's court could be used to point to the special favour Elizabeth showed Mary and to extoll the security of the Anglo-Scottish alliance. In fact, when Randolph was ejected from Scotland in February 1566, Elizabeth took the opportunity to emphasise the nonreciprocal nature of the representation, arguing that 'our kyndness in sendyng and reteyning of a minister ther thus long with yow without any correspondency of your part' was suggestive of Mary's comparative lack of commitment to the amity.⁷⁸⁰

Mary might not have had her own diplomatic representative in England, but she accorded Randolph's presence at her court great significance. It was an important indicator of the strength of Anglo-Scottish relations and a token of the continuation of the alliance. This was never more the case than at the height of Anglo-Scottish anxiety in 1563 that England's involvement in the religious wars in France would result in the dissolution of the amity. Indeed, Randolph feared acting on his revocation for if 'I sholde departte, yt wolde incontinent be sayde that open warre wolde insue therof'.⁷⁸¹ Mary was reluctant to allow Randolph to return to England for the same reason and when he returned to Scotland she blamed 'me somewhat for my longe absence, and evle wyll to retorne'.⁷⁸² During this time Mary used Randolph's presence to reassure her courtiers and the English that she intended to continue amicable relations with Elizabeth, calling Randolph to court in January 1564 not for 'some erneste effecte, but...onlie to tayke my dynner, or to have yt appere to some ther that I was no straynger'.⁷⁸³ Since Randolph provided Mary with a direct channel of communication with Elizabeth and England, communication between the two regimes dwindled noticeably during

⁷⁸⁰ SP52/12, fo. 25v, Elizabeth to Mary, 3 March 1566.

⁷⁸¹ SP52/8, fo. 80r.

⁷⁸² SP52/9, fo. 42r, Randolph to Cecil, 8 March 1564; SP52/9, fo. 148r, Randolph to Cecil, 24 October 1564.

⁷⁸³ SP52/9, fo. 1r, Randolph to Cecil, 15 January 1564.

his absences from Scotland. Moreover, the importance of his role in clarifying and smoothing Anglo-Scottish relations is highlighted by the brief breach in Anglo-Scottish relations during Randolph's absence in London in the summer of 1564.⁷⁸⁴

Randolph's presence also enabled Mary to publicly stage demonstrations of her affection for Elizabeth and give the impression that the two Queens enjoyed a good relationship. First, she relied on Randolph to enhance her own declarations of affection by reporting her politically theatrical behaviour at court events. For instance, she expected him to recount how at one dinner Elizabeth 'was dronke unto openlye' in front of 300 people whereby Randolph was 'contented to see so manifeste tokens of love shewed to my Sovereign in the face of so maynie as dyd beholde yt'.⁷⁸⁵ Mary also expected him to relate her performatively affectionate reception of Elizabeth's letters. As Sowerby has noted, Mary tactically stage-managed her receipt of Elizabeth's letters to enhance the perception of her amiable relations with England.⁷⁸⁶ Second, Randolph, like his contemporaries, analysed 'the countenances of princes' in order to 'pycke owte...their thoughtes, or fynde howe theie are dysposed'. Mary manipulated this to support her case: Randolph reported how 'she was verie merrie and spake with suche affection as I thynke yt came from the harte'.⁷⁸⁷ However, Randolph was not unaware of Mary's ability to use dissimulation and he openly acknowledged that he couldn't be certain whether her behaviour was 'ex nature aut ex industria'.⁷⁸⁸

Similarly, Throckmorton's presence at the French court, close to Mary's Guise relations, had strategic value to both sides. Elizabeth offered that Throckmorton would 'do ony service that he can for your heines towertis your Uncles' and Mary accepted Throckmorton as a channel of

⁷⁸⁴ This was caused by a series of confused communique about Lennox's return and news that it was known in France that Elizabeth was pressing for a match between Mary and Leicester.

⁷⁸⁵ SP52/7, fo. 19v, Randolph to Cecil, 12 February 1562; SP52/9, fo. 32v, Randolph to Cecil, 21 February 1564.

⁷⁸⁶ Sowerby, 'Material Text', p. 211.

⁷⁸⁷ Caligula B/X, fo. 202r.

⁷⁸⁸ SP52/7, fo. 15r, Randolph to Cecil, 30 January 1561.

communication to them. As Cecil told Mary, Elizabeth's willingness to allow Mary the use of her ambassador symbolised 'the abundance of my soveranes luif towartis your hienes'; while Mary's acceptance aimed to showcase her amiable intentions by offering the English a transparent view of her engagements with her uncles.⁷⁸⁹ Throckmorton's intermediary value came to the fore again during the lead up to the abortive interview between the Queens. Elizabeth insisted that Throckmorton's wife accompany her to the meeting and assured her that Throckmorton 'shalbe here before wee meete'.⁷⁹⁰ Elizabeth had few individuals at the English court who were personally acquainted with the Scottish Queen or her court. Thus, the Throckmortons's value lay in their potential to act as a bridge between the two courts, smoothing the initial meeting between the Queens, by virtue of their personal acquaintance with Mary, her ladies, and key councillors.

Beyond these diplomatic norms, Mary's relationships with Throckmorton and Randolph had an added layer of complexity in that Mary was not only trying to establish friendly relations with Elizabeth through her usage of them. Rather, her treatment of Randolph and, most especially, Throckmorton also reflected her broader political strategy to cultivate favour amongst 'mynister[s]...neere abowte our soveragne' in order to build herself a party in England that favoured her succession claim.⁷⁹¹ When Throckmorton's brother-in-law, Francis Carew arrived at the French court with Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford, Mary was personally attentive, inviting them 'to comme as boldly at their choice into her chambre and use her in all thinges as theie wold do your Majestie in your court'.⁷⁹² Likewise, she sought to cultivate good relations with Throckmorton and Randolph, hoping to harness their political utility to further both her relationship with Elizabeth and her interests in England. Mary quizzed Randolph on

⁷⁸⁹ Advocates 22.2.18, p. 217, Cecil to Mary, 2 December 1561, p. 218, Mary to Cecil, 1562; SP52/7, fo. 6r, Mary to Throckmorton, 5 January 1562.

⁷⁹⁰ SP70/39, fo. 21r.

⁷⁹¹ SP52/6, fo.164v.

⁷⁹² SP70/27, fo. 48r.

his Queen's 'exercise, diet, and maynie mo questions', which Randolph found it difficult to answer as he had barely engaged with Elizabeth directly.⁷⁹³ Mary used Randolph to gather valuable intelligence on the composition of Elizabeth's court, asking 'be name almost for everie noble man that hauntethe the Courte [and] what ladies ther were'.⁷⁹⁴ Looking to build support for her position in England, she could deduce from this information who had political influence and thereby whose favour was best to court. However, it is in the somewhat unusual relationship Mary sought to cultivate with Throckmorton that her desire to build a party is most evident.

At her departure from France, Mary bid to cultivate Throckmorton's continued favour by sending him a parting gift of custom-made plate emblazoned with the Throckmorton arms, 'a remembrance' to be kept 'for love of me'. This did not conform to the usual practice of a departure gift to an ambassador at the end of his mission. Rather it was styled as a personal gift from 'your good friend Mary' to thank Throckmorton for his 'good and honest service' in her affairs and to encourage Throckmorton and his wife to continue to 'use all good offices...to breede and maintayne good amytie' between herself and Elizabeth.⁷⁹⁵ In return, and as a reminder of the potential benefits of reciprocating her goodwill, Mary promised Throckmorton that 'in all places where I have power you will not have a better friend than me'.⁷⁹⁶

As the plate had the potential to be construed as a bribe, Mary sent the gift to his wife, Anne. This strategy enabled Mary to surreptitiously court Throckmorton's favour whilst protecting him from accusations of corruption.⁷⁹⁷ Anne understood that the gift was intended for her

⁷⁹³ SP52/7, fo. 62v, Randolph to Cecil, 15 July 1562.

⁷⁹⁴ SP52/9, fo. 148r.

⁷⁹⁵ SP70/30, fo. 30r, Mary to Anne Throckmorton, 13 August 1561; for the personalisation of the plate see Anne Throckmorton's will, PROB 11/71, fo. 271r; Throckmorton relates how the duke of Guise explained Mary's intentions in sending Throckmorton the plate in SP70/30, fo. 54r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 20 September 1561.

⁷⁹⁶ SP70/30, fo. 30r.

⁷⁹⁷ Allen, 'Ambadress', 626.

husband since she openly related ‘howe her husband had receved these pottes from the F[rench] quene’.⁷⁹⁸ Throckmorton was also aware of the potential damage to his reputation: he immediately wrote to inform Elizabeth about the plate and protest that he had not even spoken to Mary’s messenger as he had been ill in bed.⁷⁹⁹ Despite Throckmorton and Mary’s best efforts, some commentators did believe the gift to be a bribe and cast aspersions on Throckmorton’s loyalty and political integrity. In 1562, one observer claimed that even Throckmorton’s nephew blamed the proposed interview between the two Queens on Throckmorton receiving ‘grete rewarde of the Scott[ish] q[ueen] in grete silver pottes and other plate’ in exchange for promising that ‘he would doe what he coulde to bring to passe that the q[ueen] of Eng[land] should make and declare the Scott[ish] q[ueen] heire apparrant to the crowne of Eng[land]’.⁸⁰⁰

From Mary’s perspective, Throckmorton was an ideal candidate with whom to cultivate favour. Not only was he influential by virtue of his position in France and his known association with Elizabeth and her leading councillors, but he was also supportive of her political goals vis-à-vis Elizabeth and England. From 1561 Throckmorton actively supported recognising Mary as Elizabeth’s heir, and, during Mary’s final months in France, he tried to forward amiable relations between the two Queens, a policy that was not in line with that being pursued by many of his English colleagues. Throckmorton found himself frustrated by Elizabeth and her advisers’ unwillingness to behave in such a way that Mary might ‘perceyve the good love and amytye...[that] I travaille what I can tassure her of’ and he strove against their decision to refuse Mary a safe conduct should she land in England on her way to Scotland believing it undermined

⁷⁹⁸ S. Adams and I. Archer (eds.), *Religion, Politics and Society in Sixteenth Century England, Camden Fifth Series*, 22 (Cambridge, 2003), p. 109.

⁷⁹⁹ SP70/30, fo. 26v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 11 September 1561.

⁸⁰⁰ Adams and Archer (eds.), *Religion*, p. 109.

any notion of amity between the two Queens.⁸⁰¹ Consequently Mary viewed Throckmorton as someone she could rely on to forward an amicable relationship with Elizabeth and protect her interests in England.

ii. Throckmorton and Randolph's Response to Mary

Guy believed that both Throckmorton and Randolph fell under the spell of Mary's personal attentiveness and her natural charisma; similarly, Frescoln argued that Randolph succumbed to Mary's charms, while Antonia Fraser portrayed Throckmorton as 'fascinated' by Mary.⁸⁰² Throckmorton was allegedly 'fobbed off' by Mary's 'charm' when he tried to secure her ratification of the Treaty of Edinburgh but, in reality, he knew she would not sign and was more concerned with 'se[ing] the state off hyr head', assessing her character, her capacity to rule and her personal intentions towards England.⁸⁰³ In fact, rather than being overcome by Mary's charm, both diplomats noted her political education and, consequently, her potential political guile.

Throckmorton's personal engagements with Mary led him to see 'a greate judgement and wisdom in her' and made him 'feare her proceedinges with the tyme, yf any meanes be left and offred her, to take advantaige by', for those that 'made no great accompt of her, do now (seing her wisdom) both honnour and pytie her'.⁸⁰⁴ Throckmorton witnessed first-hand her skill in winning over several leading Scots who 'hath hitherto no greate devocion' and was subjected to her political skill in his own encounters with her.⁸⁰⁵ Likewise, Randolph feared that the Scots and he would be outwitted by her 'for what so mever pollice is in all the cheaf

⁸⁰¹ SP70/27, fo. 70r, Throckmorton to Council, 29 June 1561; SP70/28, fos. 78r, 76v, 80r; SP70/28, fo. 82r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 26 July 1561.

⁸⁰² Guy, *My Heart*, pp. 116, 168; A. Fraser, *Mary Queen of Scots* (London, 2009), p. 161; Frescoln, 'Randolph', p. 110.

⁸⁰³ Guy, *My Heart*, p. 116; SP70/28, fo. 40r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 13 July 1561; SP70/24, fo. 78r.

⁸⁰⁴ SP70/21, fo. 134r-v.

⁸⁰⁵ SP70/26, fo. 6r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 1 May 1561.

and beste practysede heades in France...is ether freshe in thys onlie womans memorie, or she cane fette yt with a wette fynger'.⁸⁰⁶ They were not alone in their perception of Mary's political astuteness: Lethington believed she had 'a wisdom far exceeding her age'.⁸⁰⁷

Despite Guy's argument that the less experienced Randolph was overwhelmed by his inclusion in the vibrant atmosphere of Mary's court and Frescoln's suggestion that he was 'blinded by court life', it is clear that Randolph's appreciation of the 'lustie and fayer' ladies and his early presentation of Mary's affability was tempered by pragmatism at the recognised dangers of his position, for 'maynie wyser men then my self have had their eyes blynded in Courte'.⁸⁰⁸ His letters make visible his struggle between his engagement in court activities and his fear of manipulation and desire to remain an objective observer: he was perpetually anxious that he would be unable to 'answer unto the crafte of suche that I see daylie lay baytes for me ether to dyscredyt my self, or to deale falcelye with those whome I am bounde moste upryghtly and trewly to serve'.⁸⁰⁹ Randolph's engagements with Mary and her courtiers were often marked by wariness: daily confronted with Mary's attentive favour, Randolph concluded tentatively that either 'her meanyng...be good' or else 'the diepleste dissembled'.⁸¹⁰ He circumspectly recounted that those Scots who suggested that he 'tayke a quiete pencion of thys Quene...mente lyttle good'.⁸¹¹ Likewise, when Mary's uncle, the Marquis D'Elbeuf, thanked Randolph for his 'good reporte' of Mary's 'doynge', he suspiciously reported that 'I had moe caresses then I lyked for the noveltie of them, seinge that maynie oportunities had byne offerred before and nothyng done'.⁸¹²

⁸⁰⁶ SP52/6, fo. 164r.

⁸⁰⁷ SP52/6, fo. 162r, Lethington to Cecil, 25 October 1561.

⁸⁰⁸ Guy, *My Heart*, p. 149; Frescoln, 'Randolph', p. 132; SP52/7, fo. 94r, Randolph to Killigrew, 18 November 1561; Caligula B/IX/1, fo. 186r, Randolph to Cecil, 3 December 1562.

⁸⁰⁹ SP52/6, fo. 164v.

⁸¹⁰ SP52/7, fo. 15r.

⁸¹¹ SP52/6, fo. 164v.

⁸¹² Caligula B/X, fo. 201r.

Throckmorton reciprocated Mary's attempts to cultivate a good relationship with him as he saw the personal and political advantage of having the favour of the Scottish Queen and the potential heir to the English throne. His relationship with Mary was unusual: she actively sought his 'oppinioun and advise' and he capitalised on this to create an atmosphere of trust that he could use to forward English interests.⁸¹³ Rowse believed that Throckmorton always tried honestly to help Mary.⁸¹⁴ This is exactly how Throckmorton wanted it to appear. Mary seems to have perceived Throckmorton's counsel in this light: Randolph reported how 'she makethe accompte of you as her good frende'.⁸¹⁵

iii. Marian Councillors

Randolph's pre-existing collaborative working relationships with Mary's principal councillors, Moray and Lethington, proved central to the efficacy of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy between 1561 and 1565. This was an unusually close working partnership between a diplomat and the principal advisers of a foreign monarch that was underpinned by friendship and an earlier shared ideological commitment to securing a Protestant, Anglo-Scottish alliance. In 1563, Moray wrote to Throckmorton in the hope of affecting Randolph's return to Scotland for two reasons: first, 'the apparent fruicte...as tender the wealth of boyth Realmes' of having Elizabeth's 'resident heir'; and second, Moray favoured Randolph personally and missed his 'frendship'.⁸¹⁶ Working with Randolph offered Moray and Lethington further opportunities to influence the relationship between the two Queens. When Mary returned to Scotland, Randolph observed that Moray and Lethington 'alone beare the whole brute and brunte of what so mever is ether done, thought, or spoken'.⁸¹⁷ Collaborating with them enabled Randolph to make use

⁸¹³ Advocates 22.2.18, p. 217, Mary to Throckmorton, December 1561; Ch. 7, pp. 209-11.

⁸¹⁴ Rowse, *Raleigh*, p. 27.

⁸¹⁵ Add. 35831, fo. 19v.

⁸¹⁶ Add. 35831, fo. 140r.

⁸¹⁷ Caligula B/X, fo. 187, Randolph to Cecil, 24 September 1561.

of their influence with Mary and power within the Scottish government. Analysing the way these men collaborated highlights the significant influence Randolph was perceived to be able to wield by virtue of his position and his role in the broader collaborative framework that encompassed key figures within both regimes.

Randolph's *modus operandi* was to first consult with Moray or Lethington before approaching Mary.⁸¹⁸ This enabled him to gauge the best time to deliver messages and often enabled him to have one or both of Mary's chief ministers present to help ensure she took it in the best way possible such as when they collaborated on how to deliver unwelcome news to Mary in 1562.⁸¹⁹ The same year, when Lethington was in England and Moray away from court, Randolph told Cecil that until Moray's 'retorne I keape your honours newes in stoore to mayke our proffet ther of as we fynde good'.⁸²⁰ Working alongside Lethington and Moray, Randolph helped to shape Mary's perception of Elizabeth's letters. Where Mary 'was not acquainted eyther with the hande or terms' Randolph was on hand to interpret it and he was able to mould the contents of a letter to make it appear more favourable.⁸²¹ Reporting Mary's receipt of a letter from Elizabeth in 1562, Randolph noted that Mary was 'so well contented, that nether of us bothe neadede to adde anye thyng more, then she conceived her self of the contynuanse of the Quenes majesties good wyll towards her'.⁸²²

Randolph's close access to important figures who knew both Queens also put him in a unique position with Mary. Thus, in 1562 when she sent Elizabeth a heart-shaped diamond ring accompanied by a few verses, she first showed them to Randolph and asked that to enhance her professions of amity 'what so mever lackethe ther in, lette yt be reported by your

⁸¹⁸ SP52/7, fo. 58v, Randolph to Cecil, 5 July 1562; Caligula B/X, fo. 158r.

⁸¹⁹ SP52/7, fo. 47r, Randolph to Cecil, 29 May 1562.

⁸²⁰ SP52/7, fo. 59r.

⁸²¹ Caligula B/X, fo. 158r.

⁸²² SP52/7, fo. 56r.

wrytinge'.⁸²³ Similarly, when Mary sent a letter to Elizabeth in early 1564, she requested via Lethington that Randolph 'play the oratour and set it ^out^ with all the coullores off Rhetorique yow can', instructing him to 'dilate...and amplify this argument as largely as yow can' to Elizabeth that Mary loved and trusted no one better and looked for no greater friendship than from 'her goode sister'.⁸²⁴ Both Mary and Lethington believed that Randolph had the power to influence Elizabeth's perception of Mary's intentions and actions. On this occasion, having recently been rebuked by Cecil for being too trusting of Lethington and warned by several Scots that Mary was leading him along 'with fayer wordes, farre from the harte', Randolph was unwilling to use his influence to enhance Mary's message in case it proved to be untrue.⁸²⁵ Instead, he sent Mary's and Lethington's letters to Elizabeth so that she might see their arguments for herself and thus 'yf yt fawle owte or be tried at anye tyme here after other wyse, her majestie maye have whearwith to charge them bothe of other meanynges then their wrytinges importe'.⁸²⁶ Randolph also asked Elizabeth to take Lethington's letter 'as a witnes for me agaynste hym selfe, yf it be founde other wise then his letter importethe'.⁸²⁷ By casting doubt on the veracity of the message, Randolph undermined Mary's intentions.

From his position in Scotland, Randolph was able to play a key role in smoothing the relationship between the Queens: when Mary was inconsolable following the death of her uncle the Duke of Guise, Randolph and Moray requested that Elizabeth write to console Mary. As Mary claimed to now be alone in the world, they hoped that a show of affection from Elizabeth would prove otherwise and show 'how myche more the Quens majesties frendeshipe maye stonde her in steade then anye that ever boore the name of a Guyse'.⁸²⁸ The ploy worked: Mary

⁸²³ SP52/7, fo. 56v.

⁸²⁴ SP52/9, fo. 48r.

⁸²⁵ Cecil warned Randolph to be wary of the Protestants but it's clear his meaning was Lethington who, unbeknownst to Randolph, was negotiating a Spanish marriage for Mary, SP52/8, fo. 74r; SP52/9, fo. 44r, Randolph to Cecil, 12 March 1564.

⁸²⁶ SP52/9, fo. 44r-v.

⁸²⁷ SP52/9, fo. 46r.

⁸²⁸ SP52/8, fo. 32, Randolph to Cecil, 18 March 1563.

openly declared she had ‘received the beste letter’ from Elizabeth which ‘comfortethe me myche’.⁸²⁹ Randolph also ironed out tensions that arose between the Queens: when Mary was incensed that the Bishop of Ross’s letters had been seized in England, Randolph ‘tempered the matter with as good words as I coulde’ to the end that ‘she thynkethe yt rather the fawlte of the Quenes majesties ministers then anye suspicion that is in her majesties self’.⁸³⁰

Randolph’s collaboration with Moray and Lethington was part of broader attempts by Scottish and English ministers to stage-manage the relationship between Elizabeth and Mary. In late 1561, Lethington asked Leicester to ‘further the consummation’ of the Queens’ amity by persuading Elizabeth to write letters to Mary in her own hand for he knew that Mary would ‘more esteem them then a great gift’.⁸³¹ At the same time, Lethington advised his own Queen ‘to write oft onto hir as gentle and luffing letters as ye can deviss bethink your selff and your majesty were in love how ye wald wryte your letters to persuade and write to hir in this sam sort’.⁸³² Moreover, it is well-known that Lethington sought to enlist Cecil’s assistance in maintaining amiable relations between the two Queens but found cold comfort.⁸³³ Both men looked to Randolph to smooth their strained relationship: in 1561, he wrote to assure Cecil that Lethington ‘intendethe as myche as may be to followe your advice’; and, the following year, Cecil looked to Randolph to repair a break in their correspondence by assessing whether Lethington ‘doth forbear Crostnes’ and, if not, the diplomat was to entreat Lethington to write ‘by his owne hand what he thynketh of this Busy Grysye world’.⁸³⁴

iv. Mary’s Ladies and Female Agency

⁸²⁹ SP52/8, fo. 55r, Randolph to Cecil, 1 April 1563.

⁸³⁰ SP52/8, fo. 12v, Randolph to Cecil, 31 January 1563.

⁸³¹ SP52/5, fo. 59r-v, Lethington to Leicester, 26 December 1561.

⁸³² Add. 32091, fo. 194r, Lethington to Mary, 10 June 1562.

⁸³³ See Loughlin, ‘Maitland’, pp. 128-130; Allinson, ‘Parables’, pp. 90-114; CP 153, fo. 76r, Lethington to Cecil, 27 February 1562.

⁸³⁴ SP52/5, fo. 14v; Bodleian, Ballard MS 10, fo. 9r, Cecil to Randolph, 10 October 1562.

In an age when several women presided over European courts, female agency was an important tool of diplomatic success. Women were important assets in providing ambassadors with intelligence and helping them infiltrate the circle of female companions around a Queen. For their mistresses, they were a means of gathering intelligence, disbursing misinformation, and furthering their political goals.⁸³⁵ Based on their own marital statuses, Randolph and Throckmorton used different strategies to infiltrate Mary's circle of ladies but their goal was the same: to understand Mary's 'dysposition' and use this knowledge to their political advantage.⁸³⁶ It was a tried and trusted strategy, later advocated by Beale and employed by myriad other ambassadors, including the Scottish ambassador, James Melville, who used Lady Stafford and Lady Throckmorton to garner information about Elizabeth.⁸³⁷ The political utility of a Queen's ladies was such that it was not unheard of for single ambassadors, like Randolph, to develop intimate relationships with Ladies of the Privy Chamber at a foreign court. The Count of Feria, Philip II's representative at the court of Mary Tudor, eventually married one of her ladies and James Melville 'had gud intelligence' from his mistress the daughter of Elizabeth's mistress of the robes.⁸³⁸ However, as Randolph's case will demonstrate, entertaining a mistress at a foreign court was a double-edged sword, for she was a two-way channel for intelligence and a resource through which to manipulate a diplomat.⁸³⁹

Mary encouraged Randolph's dalliance with one of her closest ladies-in-waiting, Mary Beaton, leading him to believe that 'moste worthy Beton [was] to ^{be} ordered and ruit at myne owne wyll'.⁸⁴⁰ Randolph believed he had a chance to marry Beaton and continued to be teased about

⁸³⁵ See for instance Mears, 'Privy Chamber', pp. 67-82; L. Bély, 'Women in Diplomacy: The Ambadress seen by Friedrich Carl Von Moser', *IHR*, 44 (2022), 990-1003; J. Daybell, 'Gender, Politics and Diplomacy: Women, News and Intelligence Networks in Elizabethan England', in Adams and Cox (eds.), *Diplomacy*, pp. 107-14; Allen, 'Ambadress'.

⁸³⁶ SP52/7, fo.15r.

⁸³⁷ Collinson, 'Servants and Citizens', 510; Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 49.

⁸³⁸ Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 123.

⁸³⁹ For the utility of mistresses in diplomacy see Bély, 'Women in Diplomacy', 990-1003.

⁸⁴⁰ Advocates MS. 1.2.2, fo. 24v, Randolph to Sidney, 31 March 1565.

the prospect as late as 1586.⁸⁴¹ He developed a deep affection for her, writing in 1563 of his grief that 'I canne ^not^ be yet admitted unto her presens' when she was gravely ill.⁸⁴² Randolph was not the only Englishman to have a liaison with one of the Queen's four Maries: both Killigrew and Sidney allegedly found respite in the 'pleasure places and secrete corners' of Mary Fleming's 'previe chamber'. Mary, relying upon the loyalty of her Maries, was able to utilise such attachments to serve her political goals, as Randolph recognised in his analysis of Lethington's relationship with Fleming: 'his follye never more appered than in lovinge her' for 'howe myche somever he mayke of her, she wyll all wayes love an other better'.⁸⁴³ The other was Mary, who used 'the love he beareth to marrie Flemynge' to ensure Lethington's political support for her marriage to Darnley.⁸⁴⁴ Randolph shared this danger, for Beaton was no less a pawn in Mary's political games than Fleming. During the spring and summer of 1565 Mary attempted to use Beaton's relationship with Randolph for her own purposes. In April she arranged for Randolph and Beaton to play a public game of bowls against herself and Darnley. On this occasion Randolph, taken by the 'honour' done to him, did not appear to realise that this gave the impression that the English accepted Mary's relationship with Darnley.⁸⁴⁵ However, when Mary tried to lure him into attending a banquet celebrating her marriage to Darnley by promising him a dance with Beaton after two weeks of enforced separation, Randolph refused knowing that if he did so he would be implicitly recognising a marriage that Elizabeth refused to acknowledge.⁸⁴⁶

Randolph's relationship with Beaton was not just based on affection. It enabled him to access Mary's privy chamber, to gather valuable intelligence to further England's interests and to

⁸⁴¹ Harley 6994, fo. 29r, Errington to Randolph, 4 October 1586.

⁸⁴² Guy, *My Heart*, p. 207; S. Adams, 'Eliza Enthroned?', p. 38; Egerton 1818, fo. 27r.

⁸⁴³ Advocates MS. 1.2.2, fo. 25r.

⁸⁴⁴ SP52/9, fo. 149r; Guy, *My Heart*, p. 209; Loughlin, 'Maitland', p. 195.

⁸⁴⁵ SP52/10, fo. 51v, Randolph to Bedford, 7 April 1565.

⁸⁴⁶ Caligula B/IX/1, fo. 247v, Randolph to Leicester, 31 July 1565; Guy, *My Heart*, p. 216.

deliver sensitive or unpalatable information to Mary.⁸⁴⁷ In April 1563, for instance, Beaton was the first to tell Mary of her uncle's death 'as a thyng harde by my [Randolph's] report'.⁸⁴⁸ In 1562, with Mary's remarriage accorded high priority, Randolph reported to Cecil Beaton's information that the Scottish Queen had received a portrait of the Swedish King and placed it in a cabinet containing her prized possessions.⁸⁴⁹ In early 1566, Randolph relied on Beaton's private knowledge to inform Throckmorton that rumours of Mary's pregnancy seemed unfounded.⁸⁵⁰ Randolph also occasionally worked through some of Mary's other ladies, such as Lady Argyll.⁸⁵¹ Ingratiating himself with Mary's ladies was a way for Randolph to collect information not readily available by other means.

Throckmorton used his female connections for similar purposes. His wife Anne engaged with Mary and her inner circle, forming a close bond with Beaton, with whom she continued to correspond and exchange gifts once she returned to England thereby helping to maintain Throckmorton's relationship with the Scottish court.⁸⁵² In this, he followed the example of the resident Spanish Ambassador, Thomas Perrenot de Granvelle, who used his wife to access the Scottish Queen's circle of female companions from which ambassadors were excluded.⁸⁵³

II. Throckmorton and Randolph as Anglo-Scottish Intermediaries

Randolph and Throckmorton's intermediary positions allowed them ample opportunity to influence the nature of the Anglo-Scottish relationship and enabled them to play a pivotal role in tackling the difficulties inherent in the tentative amity between the Queens. This section explores how they used their influence and the relationships they established within both

⁸⁴⁷ Adams, 'Eliza Enthroned?', p. 38.

⁸⁴⁸ SP52/8, fo. 55r.

⁸⁴⁹ SP52/7, fo. 50r, Randolph to Cecil, 3 June 1562.

⁸⁵⁰ Advocates 1.2.2, fo. 42r.

⁸⁵¹ SP52/8, fo. 168v, Randolph to Cecil, 13 December 1563.

⁸⁵² SP70/30, fo. 54r; SP52/8, fo. 88r, Marie de Bethune to Anne Throckmorton, 30 June 1563.

⁸⁵³ SP70/22, fo. 42r, Throckmorton to Council, 10 January 1561; SP70/22, fo. 122v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 23 January 1561.

regimes to forward amiable relations and diffuse tensions in the relationship during the early years of Mary's personal reign. It explores this in the context of two key areas: the impact of English involvement in the French wars of religion against Mary's Guisan relatives and Mary's Catholicism.

i. French Wars of Religion

The outbreak of religious warfare in France pitted Elizabeth, who interceded on behalf of the Huguenots, directly against Mary's Guise kin thereby putting the Anglo-Scottish relationship under immense pressure. English mistrust of the Guise was extended to a mistrust of Mary's intentions while Mary was caught between her loyalty to her Guise kin and her desire to forge an amiable relationship with Elizabeth.⁸⁵⁴ The deterioration of the religious and political situation in France placed Throckmorton in a pivotal position to influence English perspectives on how to handle the impact on Anglo-Scottish relations. Meanwhile, Randolph navigated 'these suspicious and dayngerus tymes' and tried to maintain the vestige of Anglo-Scottish amity with the support of Moray and Lethington in Scotland, and intelligence from Throckmorton in France and Cecil in London.⁸⁵⁵

The impact of the situation in France on England's relationship with Scotland was felt almost immediately with the cancellation of the planned interview between Elizabeth and Mary due to take place in the summer of 1562. Throckmorton played a leading role in this. From early April, as he watched the unfolding of events first-hand in France, Throckmorton advised Elizabeth 'to waygh what may ensue and whether it be meete in this dangerous and captious tyme...to have anye entreview this somer betwixt your majestie and the Queen of Scotlande'.⁸⁵⁶ Throckmorton knew that his intelligence and the way he presented it was pivotal

⁸⁵⁴ Guy, *My Heart*, pp. 161-8.

⁸⁵⁵ SP52/9, fo. 23r, Randolph to Council, 17 February 1564.

⁸⁵⁶ SP70/36, fo. 65r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 17 April 1562.

as to whether the interview would proceed as planned: Leicester told him that it ‘holly depended upon the procedinges thear’ and Sidney made it even clearer that ‘yf any help be [to stop it] yt ys in your hand and therefore god mynystring any occacyon of stay at thys untymely journey inforce yt as much as convenyently you may’.⁸⁵⁷ Elizabeth’s Council was opposed but, during June and July, Elizabeth began preparing for the interview regardless, sending Lethington to Mary with a date for the meeting. However, once Throckmorton made it clear in July that the situation in France was escalating and no quick resolution would be forthcoming, Elizabeth deferred the interview until the following year.⁸⁵⁸ Thus, while Guy has shown that Cecil was attempting to mastermind the interview’s cancellation; it was Throckmorton’s intelligence that decisively ensured Elizabeth did not proceed.⁸⁵⁹ As Throckmorton had hinted in April, the interview had political implications for England’s role in the French situation. Thus, Elizabeth positioned her cancellation of the interview as a show of favour to the Huguenots, commissioning Throckmorton to tell Condé that ‘we have such regard of a good end towards hym, that we meane not in so doutfull a tyme to shew any such gratification to the hows of Guise, as wold be gathered by our enterview’.⁸⁶⁰

In Scotland, Randolph found himself navigating the personal and political difficulties presented by the impact of the French situation. A vociferous supporter of the Protestant cause and thus naturally supportive of the Huguenots, Randolph found himself unsure ‘howe to behave my self’: he engaged in a delicate balancing act between acting on his beliefs and carrying out his less partisan diplomatic role.⁸⁶¹ While he let Mary ‘understonde in what daynger her uncles are...and what miserable ende muste be of all those that are so cruell enemies unto Chryste’,

⁸⁵⁷ SP70/38, fo. 208r; SP70/38, fo. 105r, Sidney to Throckmorton, 14 June 1562.

⁸⁵⁸ SP70/39, fos. 67v-68r, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 16 July 1562; for Conciliar opposition see *EEP*, pp. 93-4.

⁸⁵⁹ Guy, *My Heart*, pp. 160-1.

⁸⁶⁰ SP70/38, fo. 44v, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 7 June 1562.

⁸⁶¹ SP52/9, fo. 23r.

he was restrained by his 'dieutie', lack of instructions therein and his unwillingness 'tadventure my credit with her grace wher I knowe yt coulde nothyng availe'.⁸⁶² Despite Mary's attempts to position herself as a neutral 'mediatrix' between the opposing parties, it was clear to Randolph that Mary favoured her uncles and the atmosphere at the Scottish court reflected this.⁸⁶³ For instance, he reported how 'merrie' the news that the Duke of Guise had taken Rouen from the Huguenots 'made our Courte'.⁸⁶⁴ The situation made Randolph uncomfortable but it also helped enhance his camaraderie with Lethington and Moray, who 'lawghe[d]' together when they heard of the death of the duke of Guise.⁸⁶⁵ Randolph's position in Scotland at this time was difficult: the more rumours 'of dyscorde and breache of Frenshipe' between the Queens spread the more some disliked his presence at court.⁸⁶⁶

Randolph's colleagues in England and France feared that Mary might be drawn into the French conflict. From France Smith claimed that the Guise were trying to encourage Mary 'to breake with yow & make warr out of hand' and Throckmorton reported that the Guise, with the aid of the Spanish, were attempting 'to move trouble and sedytion' in England and Ireland.⁸⁶⁷ Throckmorton connected these attempts to the planned formation of a 'Catholicque league' against Protestantism that included the Kings of Spain and Portugal, the Emperor and other papistical princes in Italy and Germany, and which Mary was allegedly being solicited to join.⁸⁶⁸ These reports were supplemented by information from Randolph that Granvelle was writing to Mary 'to worke what myscheif he cane' and that Catherine de Medici had also asked

⁸⁶² SP52/7, fo. 73r, Randolph to Cecil, 16 August 1562.

⁸⁶³ Advocates 22.2.18, p. 257, Mary to Elizabeth, 1562-3; SP52/8, fo. 18r, Randolph to Leicester, 8 February 1563.

⁸⁶⁴ SP52/7, fo. 85r, Randolph to Cecil, 12 October 1562.

⁸⁶⁵ SP52/8, fo. 54v.

⁸⁶⁶ SP52/7, fo. 90v, Randolph to Cecil, 12 December 1562.

⁸⁶⁷ SP70/43, fo. 57r, Smith to Cecil, 18 October 1562; SP70/43, fo. 28v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 15 October 1562.

⁸⁶⁸ SP70/39, fo. 188r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 29 July 1562.

Mary to join the French against the Huguenots and the English.⁸⁶⁹ These assessments encouraged the English to mistrust the Scots and supported Cecil's concerns about the potential fallout of Guise ambition. Writing to Randolph in late 1562, he prioritised 'two issues', firstly 'that the band of papistes grow not by victoryes in france to strong and hardy, as to putt us here in danger for our relligion' and secondly 'that the howse of Guise buyld not there castells so high, as to overlooke the Queens Majesty for hir estate in this Crowne'.⁸⁷⁰ Randolph was much less worried about Mary joining the Guise than his English colleagues. He had quickly deduced that, to Mary's mind, her relationship with England was a political necessity and reassured Cecil that 'her desyer was never greater to lyve in peace'.⁸⁷¹

Yet, Randolph's colleagues' fear remained. He was pressured to manage the situation in Scotland by dissociating the Anglo-Scottish amity from English intervention against Mary's Guise relatives. Thus, Randolph was instructed to 'bend your whole speche' to present English intervention in France as an act of 'very necessite...for the suerty of our contrey and people' that would not 'deminish an jot of the love that we owe to our good sistar'. Elizabeth drew 'a distinction betwixt these ii intents' to 'contynew the love intelligence and amity' with Mary and to intervene in France. Randolph was working in tandem with Elizabeth, who wrote to reassure Mary of her continued affection.⁸⁷²

Mary was also anxious to portray herself as favourable toward Elizabeth and made a show of receiving Elizabeth's letters 'to thentente that those that were abowte her sholde gather that the good will between my Mestres and her grace is so greate'.⁸⁷³ She even attempted to persuade Randolph of her uncles 'good will' towards Elizabeth but, remaining sceptical, he 'harde her

⁸⁶⁹ SP52/8, fos. 25v-26r, Randolph to Cecil, 28 February 1563; SP52/8, fo. 58r, Randolph to Cecil, 10 April 1563.

⁸⁷⁰ Harley 6990, fo. 15r, Cecil to Randolph, 21 November 1562; for Cecil's conspiratorial rendering of the situation see *EEP*, pp. 93-6.

⁸⁷¹ Caligula B/IX/1, fo. 185v.

⁸⁷² SP52/7, fo. 84r, Elizabeth to Mary, 15 October 1562.

⁸⁷³ SP52/7, fo. 47r; SP52/9, fo. 39r; SP52/7, fo. 87r, Randolph to Cecil, 2 November 1562.

with good will but replied not myche'.⁸⁷⁴ To his contentment, Randolph found that while Mary might favour her uncles, she was also 'lothe to condemne' Elizabeth or to 'myslyke' the queen's response in France that she 'wolde breake frendshipe or gyve over kyndenes, seinge we are so farre entered in Amytie'.⁸⁷⁵

In this state of high anxiety and mistrust, Randolph played a vital role in reassuring the Scots and the English and smoothing the relationship between the two. Mary required constant reassurance as everyday 'some newes or other [arrived] to put her all wayes in dowte...of the continuance of Amytie with Englande'. When Lord Hume told Mary that the English fleet was being prepared and voiced concern they might come to Scotland, Randolph laughed and ridiculed the suggestion.⁸⁷⁶ When Mary's letters were broken open at Berwick, Randolph did his best to reassure her 'yt was not our Sovereigns wyll'; but, as an incident that rocked a fragile peace, he was faced with threats of retaliation on his own 'pacquettes' and Moray's fury 'that thennemies mouthes shulde be opened to speake as theie do of yt'.⁸⁷⁷ His English colleagues were equally as paranoid and fearful. In early 1563, the English Privy Council wrote to warn Randolph that they had intelligence that two French ships laden with munitions had been sent to Scotland 'to attempte some exploite upon the frontiers'.⁸⁷⁸ Randolph, who was expected to ascertain the veracity of this intelligence, was incredulous, writing to reassure his colleagues that as 'for the arrival of anye frenche men here, nether cane I perceave yt to be the Quens mynde, nor wyll of anye of her Counsell that anye sholde come'.⁸⁷⁹ He also wrote to assure Leicester that 'I sholde see myche adoe in Scotlande, before England and yt, sholde become enemies'.⁸⁸⁰

⁸⁷⁴ SP52/8, fo. 168v.

⁸⁷⁵ SP52/7, fos. 88v-89r.

⁸⁷⁶ SP52/7, fo. 57r.

⁸⁷⁷ SP52/8, fo. 84v, Randolph to Cecil, 19 June 1563.

⁸⁷⁸ Lansdowne 6, fo. 65r, Council to Randolph, 10 February 1564.

⁸⁷⁹ SP52/9, fo. 22r-v.

⁸⁸⁰ SP52/9, fo. 24r, Randolph to Leicester, 17 February 1564.

On occasion Randolph manipulated the situation to induce fear amongst the Scottish Protestants and ensure they continued to favour an alliance with England. In early 1564 for example he spread a rumour that many French ships were coming to Scotland which suggested ‘that no good was intended to the poore Protestantes, nor Amytie to be keapte with Englande...[for] whyle we pype and dance our enemies shall lande and we have our throtes cutte’.⁸⁸¹

ii. Mary’s Catholicism

English mistrust of Mary’s intentions during the French wars of religion rested largely on her commitment to Catholicism. This enabled Throckmorton, Cecil and others to envision her joining a Catholic league against Protestantism. Mary’s Catholicism threatened both the Anglo-Scottish relationship and, by virtue of her claim to be Elizabeth’s heir, the future security of the English religious settlement. The only way to diminish this threat was to undermine Mary’s position as a Catholic figurehead, to encourage her support for Protestantism within Scotland and attempt to convince her to convert. Before Mary left France, Throckmorton sought to impress upon her that the security of her rule in Scotland depended upon her maintaining the religious *status quo*. To do so, he warned Mary to heed the example of her dead mother who had ‘kept that Realme in quietnesse, till she beganne to contrayne mens consciences’.⁸⁸² Likewise, getting Mary to ‘imbrace religion’ was one of the conditions Randolph considered key to Mary’s successful rule in Scotland.⁸⁸³

Throckmorton was quick to recognise that Mary’s toleration of Protestantism in Scotland would help to undermine her position as a Catholic figurehead. He noted that Philip II ‘myslykyd’ it and was displeased with Mary’s willingness to take the revenue of Church lands.

⁸⁸¹ SP52/9, fos. 31v-32r.

⁸⁸² SP70/27, fo. 47r.

⁸⁸³ Add. 35830, fo. 82v.

Throckmorton believed that in order to undermine the potential danger to England of Mary making a Spanish marriage and Spain's 'practyse' to 'empeache' the amity between Elizabeth and Mary it would be best if 'the world may conceave some presumption & argument that the ^sayd^ Queen off Scott wyll become an embraser off the englyshe relygion'.⁸⁸⁴ In the hope of achieving this aim, Throckmorton and Randolph worked in tandem alongside Moray and Lethington.

The two diplomats' personal engagement with Mary placed them in a strong position to assess her religious commitment and capacity to convert, and they discussed their experiences with one another to affirm their conclusion. Their synergy is apparent from the moment Mary arrived in Scotland with Randolph informing Throckmorton that 'I see no hope of other in her then when you lefte her'.⁸⁸⁵ The following year, when discussing the possibility of Mary's conversion, Randolph told Throckmorton that 'what is done all reddye ther in and how yt wyll comme to passe (or never) my other letters cane gyve your Lord my judgement'.⁸⁸⁶

Prior to 1565 both Throckmorton and Randolph believed that Mary was not an ideological Catholic and surmised that she would act out of political necessity. Randolph argued that Mary was not 'so unpollitique' nor 'so affectioned to her masse that she wyll leave a kyngdom for yt' and that 'she knowethe the necessitie of my Sovereignes Frendshipe to be greater then a preste bablinge at an Autour'.⁸⁸⁷ Randolph told Throckmorton that he believed Mary was 'rather in dowte howe she maye *Salvo honore et dignitate* leave thys, and imbrace thother'.⁸⁸⁸ Throckmorton agreed that when it came to religion Mary was primarily concerned with her credibility: just before she left France in 1561, Throckmorton tried to persuade Mary of the

⁸⁸⁴ SP70/35, fo. 149v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 24 March 1562.

⁸⁸⁵ SP52/6, fo. 131v, Randolph to Throckmorton, 26 August 1561.

⁸⁸⁶ Add. 35831, fo. 18r.

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid.; Caligula B/IX/1, fo. 185v.

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid.

veracity of Protestantism only for her to counter that she was ‘none of those that will change my religion every yere’ for, having been brought up a Catholic, ‘who might credit me in anye thinge if I should shew my self light in this case?’⁸⁸⁹ Thus, as Randolph told Throckmorton, the key consideration was ‘what waye moste to her honour and reputation thys maye be brought to passe’.⁸⁹⁰

Despite little coverage in the historiography, hope that Mary might convert was a subject of enthusiastic discussion amongst English and Scottish Protestants in the early years of her personal reign.⁸⁹¹ In 1562, Challoner wrote from Spain that ‘The Skottishe Quenis conformite I wolde rather then 6 my best gowne wold prove true’.⁸⁹² Even Cecil, encouraged by Mary’s protection of the religious *status quo* in Scotland, wrote that despite Mary continuing ‘still stiff in her Religion’ there was a ‘great hope’ in time ‘to conforme the headde’.⁸⁹³ In Scotland, Moray believed that Mary might be brought ‘hartly to imbrace’ the ‘doctrin of the evangel quhilk we professe’.⁸⁹⁴ Scottish and English Protestants concluded that, with Mary desperate to be named Elizabeth’s heir, the way to achieve Mary’s conversion while preserving her credibility was for Elizabeth to bring it about when they finally met. This was Randolph’s perception of the situation too.⁸⁹⁵ Considering the planned meeting between the two Queens in 1562, Randolph told Elizabeth that it was the hope that the Scots had ‘that your majestie shalbe the instrument to converte their Sovereigne to Chryste’ that ‘cawsethe them to wyshe above measure that your majesties maye see thone thother’.⁸⁹⁶ He also noted that the ‘papystes’ feared ‘that ther restethe nothyng but the metinge of the two Quenes, to over throwe the masse’.⁸⁹⁷

⁸⁸⁹ SP70/27, fo. 47v.

⁸⁹⁰ Add. 35831, fo. 18r.

⁸⁹¹ Mentioned briefly in R. Warnicke, *Mary Queen of Scots* (Abingdon, 2006), location 374-380.

⁸⁹² SP70/34, fo. 56r, Challoner to Throckmorton, 15 January 1562.

⁸⁹³ Add. 35830, fo. 208r, Cecil to Throckmorton, 4 November 1561.

⁸⁹⁴ SP52/6, fo. 151r, Moray to Cecil, 7 October 1561.

⁸⁹⁵ Caligula B/X, fos. 200v, 202v; Lethington said similar to Cecil, SP52/6, fo. 162r-v.

⁸⁹⁶ SP52/7, fo. 43r.

⁸⁹⁷ Caligula B/X, fo. 207r, Randolph to Cecil, 27 December 1561.

The belief that Elizabeth's example would encourage Mary's conversion meant the Scots did not react well to the English vestiarian controversy. Lethington and Moray lamented to Randolph 'that this Queen beinge over farre addicted to that kinde of superstition sholde ^by^ anye example from thens, be confirmed in that'. Similarly, Randolph fretted to Cecil that 'these thynges beinge broughte unto this Q[ueens] eare...confirmethe still some what of that which all reddie over dieplye is printed in her hearte'.⁸⁹⁸

Throckmorton and Randolph actively debated religion with Mary and worked together to ensure she had access to texts positing arguments for the veracity of Protestantism over Catholicism. Prior to her departure from France, Throckmorton attempted to persuade Mary to consider the arguments for the veracity of Protestantism, but she responded that she had heard her uncle the Cardinal of Lorraine dispute the subject and 'fownde...no greate reason to change myne opinion'. Throckmorton did not give up: he reminded Mary that 'if yow will judge well in that mater yow must be conversant in the scriptures', but she was too 'partially affected to your uncles argumentes that yow cowde not indifferently consider thother partie'. Throckmorton eventually got Mary to concede that she had heard Lorraine say that there were abuses in the church that needed rectifying.⁸⁹⁹ This admission was enough to encourage Throckmorton, working alongside Randolph, to attempt to expose Mary to the arguments in favour of the Protestant position. Throckmorton likely hoped that in Scotland, at a remove from Lorraine's influence and surrounded by her Protestant councillors, she might be more receptive. This attempt to persuade Mary was more subtle than Throckmorton's initial discussion with her, it centred on exposing her to Protestant works from France. In late 1561, Throckmorton sent to Randolph and Lethington in Scotland and Cecil in London the oration made by Theodore Beza at the Colloque of Poissy, which explained the reformed position on

⁸⁹⁸ SP52/10, fo. 47r-v, Randolph to Cecil, 30 March 1565.

⁸⁹⁹ SP70/27, fo. 47v.

the Eucharist.⁹⁰⁰ Throckmorton requested that Cecil have the oration, Lorraine's rebuttal and Beza's subsequent response 'all translatyd into englishe and pryntyd...to be sent into Scotland'. Throckmorton also sent Moray a copy of Beza's answer to Lorraine 'to thintent the Quene his suster maye reade the same in frenche wherein she delyghtethe, for I ame suer she had readde hir uncles the cardinals oration alreadye'.⁹⁰¹ In so doing, Throckmorton was attempting to create a sense of balance in the arguments presented to Mary, enabling her to consider both sides for herself as he had suggested she do prior to her departure from France. Randolph was also engaged in a careful balancing act: he used the mediation of Moray to ensure the oration he had received from Throckmorton reached Mary's hands as he feared that by presenting it himself 'I sholde seeme of purpose to tempte her...and so dash my credyte'.⁹⁰² This form of transmission was successful in that it was reported Mary read it 'to thende'; however, it did not result in any change in Mary, who told Randolph 'that she coulde not reason, but she knewe what she ought to beleve'. He was forced to conclude that it had done 'lyttle good' for 'I fynde no great lykyng in her that waye'; but fearful Elizabeth might think 'the worce', Mary left room for manoeuvre by suggesting that she was 'not resolved in conscience in those matters that are in controversie'.⁹⁰³

Mary's policy of upholding the *status quo* in Scotland, conciliating the Protestants, and appearing to rely on the advice of leading Protestants, like Moray and Lethington, was in part aimed at convincing the English of her commitment to protect Protestantism and thereby assuaging the Elizabethan regime's concerns about the potential consequences of her accession to the English throne. Her behaviour in Scotland was in essence a template for how she might

⁹⁰⁰ SP52/6, fo. 159v, Randolph to Cecil, 17 October 1561; SP70/30, fo. 69v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 20 September 1561.

⁹⁰¹ SP70/32, fos. 58v-59r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 26 November 1561.

⁹⁰² Caligula B/X, fo. 190v; SP52/7, fo. 89r.

⁹⁰³ Caligula B/X, fos. 190v, 191v.

behave if she became England's Queen.⁹⁰⁴ It was a strategy agreed before she left France: the Duke of Guise assured Throckmorton in late 1561 that 'you may plainly see by her usage in her own realm what manner of princess you shall have amongst you'.⁹⁰⁵ In 1562 Mary tried to convince Randolph of her desire to uphold the religious *status quo* by having him witness her destruction of the Catholic Earl of Huntly.⁹⁰⁶ Lethington also used this incident as an argument against those that would bar Mary on the grounds of religion: 'seeing her behaviour so close towards those that be off the Religion within her own Realm...I see no Reason why those that be zealous off Religion should suspect her'.⁹⁰⁷ Randolph was keen to be convinced. Marvelling at the strangeness of seeing a bishop 'for papistry, in the time of a Queen of his own Religion committed to prison' and the announcement of new 'proclamation[s] against the sayers or herers of mass to the great regret of the miserable papistes'.⁹⁰⁸ Yet, as time wore on, Randolph became less convinced that Mary herself would convert. In the summer of 1562, he reminded Cecil 'what little appearance there is yet that this Queen will easily alter her mind in religion' and questioned 'what assured concord may be grounded thereupon'; and the following Easter he reported that Mary 'left not one iota of her solemnities unobserved' and that he saw 'nether amendment in her religion nor hope thereof'.⁹⁰⁹

Randolph and Throckmorton were not wrong to see Mary as a politique who would use her religious policy for political gain. In 1565, with Elizabeth unwilling to make concessions on the succession, Mary exchanged her policy of toleration for a Catholic revival in the hope of attracting Catholic support for her claim to the English throne. However, Throckmorton and

⁹⁰⁴ A. White, 'Queen Mary's Northern Province', *Innes Review*, 38 (1988), 57-8

⁹⁰⁵ SP70/31, fo. 13r-v.

⁹⁰⁶ White, 'Northern Province', 60-1.

⁹⁰⁷ Caligula B/X, fo. 222r, Lethington to Cecil, 14 November 1562; M. Questier, *Dynastic Politics and the British Reformations, 1558-1630* (Oxford, 2019), p. 38; White, 'Northern Province', 63.

⁹⁰⁸ SP52/8, fo. 71r, Randolph to Cecil, 20 May 1563; SP52/7, fo. 50v.

⁹⁰⁹ SP52/7, fo. 57r; SP52/8, fo. 60r.

Randolph were misguided in their hope that Mary's political manoeuvring with religion might translate into a personal conversion to Protestantism.

Conclusion

In maintaining the delicate amity between the two Queens and their respective countries, Throckmorton and Randolph showed themselves to be powerful intermediaries and important political actors. They were not hampered by their absence from court but were made powerful because of it. By virtue of their Anglo-Scottish connections, positions abroad and at the English court, and the relationships they developed with Mary, her ladies and leading councillors, Throckmorton and Randolph had the opportunity to influence the relationships of the Queens, their ministers, and the course of Anglo-Scottish relations through their advice and actions. Having access to both Queens and their respective ministers they played a central role in enhancing the collaborative nature of Anglo-Scottish relations. Their presence and treatment were emblematic of the state of the amity. Moreover, as the only resident intermediary between England and Scotland, Randolph was the primary means of intelligence and communication between the English and Scottish regimes: both Queens and their respective ministers worked through him and looked to him to resolve any tensions in the relationship. Randolph's influence was further strengthened by the uniquely close relationships he had already established with Moray and Lethington, enabling him insight into the heart of Mary's government, and offering him different channels through which to access and persuade Mary. This chapter's consideration of Throckmorton and Randolph's approach to Mary, and their ability to use their positions to shape policy through their engagement with her and her councillors, provides a crucial backdrop for examining their perspectives on Mary's place in the succession and their roles in negotiating for Mary's remarriage in the next chapter.

Chapter 7

The English Succession and Mary's Remarriage (1561-5)

As already seen, after Mary's return to Scotland in August 1561, the focus of the Anglo-Scottish alliance shifted to the personal relationship between the two queens. Their relationship revolved around the interlinked issues of Mary's remarriage and her desire to be named Elizabeth's heir presumptive. It is well-known that the English viewed these interrelated concerns as a grave threat to their own security.⁹¹⁰ Yet, the differing perspectives amongst Elizabeth's Protestant advisers on how best to ameliorate and control the threat has attracted less scholarly attention. This chapter helps to redress this. It explores Throckmorton and Randolph's differing approaches to both these issues. First, it examines their different views

⁹¹⁰ *EEP*, pp. 88-90; Wormald, *Mary*, pp. 103-264.

on how best to handle Mary's claim to be Elizabeth's heir and consequently explores both support for and opposition to Mary. This is vital. Although there is a plethora of information on English opposition to Mary, most notably Alford's work on Cecil, much less is known about the reasoning of those Protestant courtiers who supported Mary's claim.⁹¹¹ Second, this chapter uses the insights of Throckmorton and Randolph to shed new light on the negotiations for a marriage between Mary and Leicester. Finally, it re-examines our current understanding of the reasons behind Elizabeth allowing Darnley to go to Scotland in 1565 and England's response to the resultant marriage between Darnley and Mary.

I. Succession

Scholarly considerations of the succession during the 1560s tend to focus on Parliamentary debates, the arguments expounded in favour of various candidates in the pamphlets of the time, and the depiction of the succession issue in contemporary drama.⁹¹² It is also recognised as the key factor in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, since during her personal reign (1560-7), Mary's approach to relations with Elizabeth and England was conditioned primarily by her desire to be named Elizabeth's heir. Likewise, the importance of Mary's remarriage and her religious convictions were all critical concerns to the English regime due to Mary's claim to be Elizabeth's successor. Anglo-Scottish relations centred on how to resolve this issue following Francis II's death in December 1560. That same month, Lethington suggested to Cecil that Elizabeth make Mary her heir, for the Scot judged that if the Anglo-Scottish alliance were to persist Mary would need to be 'by some meane allured to be friend to that Realme [England]'.⁹¹³ Designed to remove the 'one rote frome which ony variance cane grow', this suggestion underpinned the conduct of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy during the early years of

⁹¹¹ *EEP*.

⁹¹² See Doran and Kewes, 'Succession'; M. Levine, *The Early Elizabethan Succession Question, 1558-1568* (Stanford, 1966).

⁹¹³ CP 153, fo. 86r, Lethington to Cecil, 9 August 1561; SP52/6, fo. 49r, Lethington to Cecil, 26 February 1561.

Mary's personal reign. When visiting the English court three months prior to Mary's return, Moray broached the proposal informally and attempted to encourage support for it amongst English courtiers; and, in September 1561, Lethington came to set the proposal before Elizabeth officially.⁹¹⁴

Doran and Kewes have observed that when it came to the complexities of the succession issue during the 1560s, religious conviction did not necessarily determine an individual's political allegiance.⁹¹⁵ Throckmorton's position on the succession allows a deeper exploration of this disconnect: a committed Protestant, he was also an active supporter of Mary's claim to be Elizabeth's heir. Throckmorton's reasons for supporting Mary had nothing to do with any personal sympathy for, or attraction to, her.⁹¹⁶ Rather, they were a result of his political experience, a desire to survive the vicissitudes of a potential succession dispute, and his belief that the English could control the threat Mary represented by recognising her claim. Throckmorton knew that diverting the succession from the best claimant by bloodline to ensure a Protestant succession was a dangerous business and one likely to fail. In 1553 he had seen firsthand Mary Tudor thwart the plot to place Jane Grey on the throne. Throckmorton had survived unscathed by playing both sides, leaving his wife in the Tower with Jane while secretly informing Mary of her brother's death.⁹¹⁷ Viewed through this lens, his support for Mary, Queen of Scots' claim and the advisory relationship he attempted to establish with her during the 1560s was, at least in part, a valuable insurance policy to protect his position should she succeed Elizabeth.

⁹¹⁴ SP52/6, fo. 115r-v, Moray to Elizabeth, 6 August 1561; Egerton 1818, fo. 13r, Moray to Leicester, 7 October 1561.

⁹¹⁵ Doran and Kewes, 'Succession', p. 22.

⁹¹⁶ Contra Guy, *My Heart*, pp. 116, 202; Rowse, *Raleigh*, pp. 42-54.

⁹¹⁷ Ch. 1, pp. 45-6.

Politically, Throckmorton's newfound support for Mary stemmed from his belief that, in the changed circumstances of 1561, the best way to ensure the safety of the English regime was to use her desire to be recognised as Elizabeth's heir to restrain her from pursuing policies that threatened England's security. This strategy of using Mary's desire for recognition to control her political behaviour first came to the fore in a letter from Throckmorton to Cecil in May 1561. Having discussed the Scottish proposal to recognise Mary's claim in-person with Moray, Throckmorton told a reluctant Cecil that 'yt were yn my oppinion for bothe the Quens verie proffitable, verie honorable, & withowte danger' so long as the recognition included 'some provysions...For hyr majesties suertie: and some other circumstancis well weyd for the commoditye off the realme off Englund'.⁹¹⁸ These 'provysions' were essential to Throckmorton's support for Mary: they were a preventative measure designed to enable the English regime to control the threat Mary represented and protect their own interests. Throckmorton underscored the point, in a further letter to Cecil, after Lethington had officially broached the subject with Elizabeth. Throckmorton argued that her 'tytyll as yt ys [she] wyll attempte to come yn with force & violence lyke a conqueror; That might ether be amiably & with tolerable conditions introducyd'. As such, Throckmorton concluded 'that not to deale yn ytt att all no maner off wey ys more dangerus...for the realme: And specially yff god shuld deale so unmercifully with us as to take the Queens majestie frome us with owte issue'.⁹¹⁹ To Throckmorton's mind a conditional recognition of Mary's claim staved off a situation in which the English regime had no control over its own political and religious destiny.

Although Throckmorton was not explicit about what conditions he envisaged for 'the commoditye off the realme off Englund', it is likely that control of Mary's remarriage would be foremost for this was seen as the key to English security.⁹²⁰ If Mary were to marry a foreign

⁹¹⁸ SP70/28, fo. 83r; Add. 35830, fo. 117r, Moray to Throckmorton, 20 May 1561.

⁹¹⁹ SP70/31, fo. 29r.

⁹²⁰ SP70/28, fo. 83r.

Catholic prince it would endanger England's influence within the British Isles, the religious *status quo*, and England's future security if Mary were to attempt to secure her succession by conquest. Throckmorton was particularly alarmed by this prospect. Within months of Mary being widowed, he was stressing the importance of 'keepe[ing] the said Queene of Scotland (as much as yow maye) from maryenge anye puissant forraine prince' and looking for ways to undermine this threat: suggesting, for instance, that if England secured 'a greate partie' in Scotland foreign monarchs would be discouraged from 'seeke[ing] upon a country so entanglid; and that is so much at your Majesties devotion'.⁹²¹ The following year, as religious strife in France increased, Throckmorton emphasised the threat to English security and religion if Mary married the Prince of Spain or one of the Emperor's sons, arguing that such a match would see Scotland drawn into 'the papysticall league offencyve & defencyve' and Mary able to avail herself of foreign, Catholic resources. He linked this to the potential overthrow of Protestantism in Scotland, and 'trouble' for England on the Anglo-Scottish border and in Ireland.⁹²²

Throckmorton was also concerned that, by refusing to recognise Mary now, Elizabeth might lose the opportunity to use the succession to influence Mary's choice of a new husband and, worst still, 'ynduce some other thowghtes off marriage to the Queen off Scotland then we wold be glad off'. Mary, he advised, 'lefte desperate off the successe & hope thereof may procede yn amytye leagues & aliancis' that would immediately threaten the Anglo-Scottish partnership, the security of the Elizabethan regime and, in the long run, the religious *status quo* in England should Mary ultimately succeed.⁹²³ Throckmorton's anxiety at this prospect and his perception of the important role of the succession in controlling Mary's remarriage was intensified by a conversation he had at this time with Mary's uncle, the Duke of Guise. Bringing into question

⁹²¹ SP70/24, fo. 73r.

⁹²² SP70/43, fos. 5v-6r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 15 October 1562.

⁹²³ SP70/31, fo. 29v.

‘the lawfulness off the Queene your mistress tytyll’, Guise left Throckmorton with the impression that without a settlement of the succession the Guises would continue to forward Mary’s claims to be Queen of England in Elizabeth’s place. Although Guise favoured a settlement he also threatened that if Elizabeth did not agree to recognise Mary ‘moche trouble ys lyke to ensue’ and underscored the danger to England of Mary’s remarriage. The Duke tried to persuade Throckmorton to forward a settlement in his letters to Elizabeth, positing that if Elizabeth agreed to make Mary her heir Mary would ‘never yn marriage nor any other thyng off consequence procede...withowte the advyse off the Quene your mistress & hyr realme’.⁹²⁴ This was the sort of control that Throckmorton wanted England to attain, and Guise’s suggestion of it undoubtedly boosted Throckmorton’s belief that it was possible to achieve as he immediately wrote a further letter to Cecil recommending the necessity of a conditional succession agreement to English security.⁹²⁵

The strategy of making Mary’s recognition as Elizabeth’s heir conditional on the choice of an appropriate husband was not without recent precedent: Henry VIII resolved that if his daughters, Elizabeth and Mary, did not marry with the consent of the English Privy Council they would forfeit their right to the crown.⁹²⁶ Ensuring Mary, Queen of Scots chose an appropriate, ideally English Protestant, husband was the key to English security and would ensure the continuity of English religion and prevent foreign, Catholic interventions within the British Isles. Certainly, in 1562, Throckmorton linked the possibility of recognising Mary as Elizabeth’s heir apparent with Mary’s marriage to ‘some English Gentellman’.⁹²⁷

Throckmorton’s approach foreshadowed the strategy employed by the English regime from 1563, when Mary’s recognition as Elizabeth’s heir was made conditional on her marrying

⁹²⁴ SP70/31, fos. 11r-13r.

⁹²⁵ SP70/31, fo. 29r.

⁹²⁶ Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony*, p. 15.

⁹²⁷ Adams and Archer (eds.), *Religion*, p. 109.

Leicester. Unsurprisingly, Throckmorton was a supporter of the Leicester proposal and, when that failed, he helped ensure the Scots' preferred candidate, Darnley, made his way to Scotland. Moreover, Throckmorton used Mary's desire to marry Darnley to forward once more a conditional settlement of the succession, explaining to Elizabeth that she had two options: she could oppose the match or she could 'ende the matter more amyable with suche condycions as maye be (in my simple judgemente) to your honour, to your suertie, & to your felycylie'.⁹²⁸ Ultimately, Throckmorton's conditional support for Mary's claim, concern to secure an appropriate husband for her, and desire to dampen the threat that Mary's claim might encourage the intervention of foreign, Catholic powers within the British Isles culminated in his support for the scheme to marry Mary to Norfolk in 1569.

Throckmorton went beyond pushing Elizabeth and her councillors to consider a conditional recognition of Mary's position; he also sought to assist and advise the Queen of Scots on the subject. Fearful of the potential political fallout if Mary was not conditionally recognised as Elizabeth's heir, Throckmorton used his backing for Mary's claim to develop the advisory relationship he had begun to forge with her in the months prior to her return to Scotland: he portrayed himself as her supporter and won her trust. He also worked to actively forward and protect her claim to be Elizabeth's heir throughout the 1560s.

In January 1563, Throckmorton participated in the opening stages of Parliament. Following Elizabeth's near-death from smallpox three months earlier, the key items on the Parliamentary agenda were petitioning the Queen to marry and settle the succession. Throckmorton wrote secretly to warn Mary that Parliament intended to discuss the succession and that she ought to send someone to declare her position. He offered Mary's representative his assistance and gave her valuable insight into whom she might rely on for support in England once he had returned

⁹²⁸ SP52/10, fo. 97v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 21 May 1565.

to France. Throckmorton singled out Leicester, who had recently been appointed to the Privy Council, as someone who was favourable to Mary's claim. He could be an important ally to a Queen, who, during Elizabeth's recent near-death experience, had despaired at the lack of support for her claim within the English Privy Council. Throckmorton's warning was likely inspired by Commons debates on whether anyone who claimed the throne during Elizabeth's lifetime should be disinherited (which would apply to Mary) and Sadler's speech attacking Mary's claim.⁹²⁹ Throckmorton was probably concerned that excluding Mary at this juncture might damage the relatively stable Anglo-Scottish relationship and incite her to react aggressively in order to claim her right. Although Throckmorton's letter is no longer extant, Mary acknowledged his continued service to her in a letter to her uncle, the Cardinal of Lorraine, and took Throckmorton's warning seriously, reiterating it along with his advice and the news that Leicester potentially supported her claim.⁹³⁰

Unbeknown to Throckmorton, Lethington was already on his way to London. However, taking Throckmorton's warnings seriously, Mary sent Lethington further instructions on how to deal with Elizabeth if Parliament 'proparit, movit, or ony question or Difficulty arysse touching the succession...quhairthrow ony Danger may appeir that eyther be Misknowledge of our Talle, or Neglecting the samyn, the successioun may be Establishit in the Persoun of ony uther than us'.⁹³¹ Accepting Throckmorton's offer to assist her representative in forwarding her position, Lethington sought him out after his arrival in London. However, he was 'verie sorrie' to find that Throckmorton had already returned to France just as he had warned Mary he was charged

⁹²⁹ Hartley, *Parliaments*, pp. 87-93.

⁹³⁰ NLS, MS 6135, fos. 17v-18r, Mary to Lorraine, 24 February 1563.

⁹³¹ Advocates 22.2.18, pp. 257-8, Lethington's Instructions, 1563.

to do.⁹³² Nevertheless, Throckmorton continued to offer Mary intelligence and advice regarding her succession claim throughout the 1560s.⁹³³

As with his counsel that Elizabeth should use Mary's desire to be recognised as Elizabeth's heir to control her remarriage, Throckmorton often deliberately advised Mary to embrace policies that were in line with English interests. This situation is best exemplified in late 1565 when he suggested that Mary might better build a party to support her claim in England by 'abstean[ing] from the conclusion of any leig or confederacy with any forrene prince, that may offend England', showing moderation in her religious policies and reinstating her rebel, Protestant, Anglophile Lords, like Moray.⁹³⁴ Throckmorton posited that Mary might win English Protestants to her cause if they saw her 'wysely continow in the temperance and moderation ye have hitherto usit within your awen realm, in matters of religion, without innovation or alteration'. Likewise, Throckmorton argued that if Mary were to restore Moray all 'that ar protestantis in England, will declaire them selves a gret deall the mair effectonit in your cause'.⁹³⁵ Put forth at the height of Mary's Catholic revival and during the fallout from the Chaseabout Raid, these policies to reform religious innovations in Scotland and restore Moray were intrinsically aligned with English interests and designed to neutralise the threat posed by Mary's renewed Catholicism and exclusion of her key Protestant nobles from power.⁹³⁶ This time, Mary did not immediately take onboard Throckmorton's advice. But she was forced to embrace it a few months later, after the murder of David Rizzio and the concurrent failure of her Catholic revival necessitated the return of Moray and some other rebels.⁹³⁷

⁹³² SP70/51, fo. 107r.

⁹³³ Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 127.

⁹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 141-6.

⁹³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 143-5.

⁹³⁶ See Ch. 8.

⁹³⁷ J. Goodare, 'Queen Mary's Catholic Interlude', in M. Lynch (ed.), *Mary Stewart: Queen in Three Kingdoms* (Oxford, 1988), p. 167.

Throckmorton and Randolph held opposing views on Mary's claim to the English throne. Despite negotiating the Leicester marriage and its contingent promise of recognising Mary as Elizabeth's heir, Randolph never supported Mary's claim. At the same time as he attempted to persuade her to marry Leicester, Randolph began to sign off his letters to Elizabeth with statements such as

The Lorde everlastinge bringe yt so to passe that we may rather rejoyce in the byrthe of your Majesties boddie, before anie other (with owte the same) whom God may put in your harte to yelde after your Majesties dayes your righte unto.⁹³⁸

In this, Randolph mirrored Cecil's approach in hoping that Elizabeth might solve the contentious issue by marrying and begetting an heir.⁹³⁹

By the winter of 1565, Randolph had come to vociferously oppose Mary's claim to be Elizabeth's heir and anyone, like Throckmorton, who supported it.⁹⁴⁰ In this his views aligned with those of Cecil. Throckmorton's position was the opposite of Cecil and Randolph's but its aim to ensure English political and religious security was ultimately the same. These men differed on method not priorities. Throckmorton's interactions with Mary gave him an appreciation of her priorities and tractability, leading him to believe that an approach built on incorporating, rather than excluding, the Scottish Queen was feasible and could enable them to manage the threat she represented and secure the *status quo* in Scotland and England. While Throckmorton's support for Mary has been noted in passing by Rowse and Guy, its political genesis, conditional nature and aims have not been explored until now. It is these details that enable us to unpick the quandary posed by Alford as to how Throckmorton and Cecil could share similar perspectives on the threat Mary represented but come to very different conclusions on how best to contain and diffuse that threat.⁹⁴¹ Throckmorton believed that

⁹³⁸ SP52/9, fo. 8r.

⁹³⁹ For instance, Add. 35830, fo. 159r-v.

⁹⁴⁰ Ch. 8, pp. 249-50.

⁹⁴¹ *EEP*, p. 199.

recognising Mary as Elizabeth's heir offered the English a modicum of control and could eliminate the threat she represented. He feared that Cecil's policy of excluding Mary provided no control over her and risked encouraging her to embrace the policies that English Protestants most feared, namely allying herself with foreign, Catholic powers in pursuit of her rights to the English throne.

II. The Leicester Marriage Proposal

The Leicester marriage proposal aimed to do the same thing as Throckmorton's conditional succession proposal: take control of Mary's remarriage and, in the process, protect England from foreign, Catholic interventions. At its heart the proposal was a bid to use the authority of her husband to control and restrain Mary's political autonomy. It was designed to enhance England's immediate influence in Scotland and protect England politically and religiously if Mary were to succeed Elizabeth. Religious considerations were central to the proposal as the Scots and English alike believed that 'Leicester, beinge hym self a protestante sholde easlye inoughe bringe her to be of the same religion, or at the leaste cawse her to deale more moderatlye in those matters then yet she dothe'.⁹⁴²

The proposal was primarily a reaction to the threat represented by Mary's negotiations for a marriage with leading Catholics abroad, principally Archduke Charles of Austria and Don Carlos, Philip II's heir-apparent. Alongside proposing Leicester as a bridegroom for Mary, the English tried to further neutralise the potential threat of Mary marrying a foreign Catholic by reopening negotiations for a marriage between Archduke Charles and Elizabeth.⁹⁴³ Mary's Catholic marriage alliances threatened Anglo-Scottish amity, for, as Cecil reminded Lethington, Mary's desire 'to embrass such allyance, as may bryng trooble to this realme, can

⁹⁴² Caligula B/X, fo. 287r, Randolph to Cecil, 20 March 1565.

⁹⁴³ Warnicke, *Mary*, location 2080.

not retayne my soverayne to creditt any amyty in yours'. Not least because it was suspected that Mary would attempt to further her claim to the English throne through such an alliance.⁹⁴⁴ Mary's remarriage and her place in the English succession were thus inextricably linked in the negotiations for a Leicester marriage, with Elizabeth immediately promising that if Mary 'shew himself willing to inclyne to content us in hir mariadg, we will endeavor our selves to understand what is or can be sayd for mayntenance of hir title'.⁹⁴⁵

Elizabeth's proposal has caused historians and contemporaries alike to question her sincerity and ask whether Elizabeth would really have been willing to part with her favourite.⁹⁴⁶ Thus the Leicester proposal has at times been regarded as an attempt by Elizabeth to play for time and stall Mary's other marriage negotiations rather than a serious political proposal aimed at securing Protestantism within the British Isles, the continuity of Anglo-Scottish amity and English national security in the present and the future. However, Elizabeth and her regime viewed the proposal as a serious political proposition. A letter from Throckmorton to Leicester in May 1565 suggests that it had a broad base of support at the English court and cites Elizabeth's particular commitment to forcing Leicester to go through with the marriage.⁹⁴⁷

The notion that Elizabeth would not wish to be parted from Leicester is a moot point because she did not actually envisage the marriage resulting in their permanent separation. Instead, she proposed paying for the couple to reside at the English court.⁹⁴⁸ This was another way of extending English control over Mary and her affairs, and it echoed later proposals to have Mary's son, James, brought up in England. Such an outcome would have enabled Elizabeth a modicum of control over her potential successor and encouraged their acclimatisation to the

⁹⁴⁴ Add. 32091, fos. 199v-200r, Cecil to Lethington, 20 August 1563.

⁹⁴⁵ SP52/8, fo. 103r.

⁹⁴⁶ J. Rickman, 'Elizabeth the Matchmaker: The proposed marriage between Mary Queen of Scots and Robert Dudley', (MA, Georgia State University, 1999), pp. 4-6 summarises the views of historians well; Doran, *Circle*, p. 127 argues for Elizabeth's sincerity.

⁹⁴⁷ PL 2502, p. 395.

⁹⁴⁸ SP52/9, fos. 132v-133r, Instructions to Bedford and Randolph, 7 October 1564.

English political, religious, and cultural environment. One question that has plagued commentators is why Elizabeth chose Leicester in particular. The obvious answer is that, due to their close relationship and her innate trust in him, she probably believed that he would remain loyal to her over Mary.⁹⁴⁹ Elizabeth trusted Leicester to rule in her stead: in 1562, struck down with smallpox and unsure whether she would survive, Elizabeth requested Leicester be made Lord Protector of England. This is the role she envisaged Leicester taking on as Mary's husband; she noted in the proposal that 'if it might ly in our power, we wold mak [him] owner or heyre of our own kyngdom'.⁹⁵⁰

Despite Elizabeth's support for the proposal, Randolph encountered 'difficulty and hardness' when attempting to negotiate a successful outcome with Mary and her councillors, who, judging Elizabeth and Leicester to be 'inseparable' found it difficult to believe the plan was genuine.⁹⁵¹ Randolph did his best to counter these arguments but found it 'harde...when suche impressions are enterde into Princes hartes to weede them owte'.⁹⁵² His attempts to persuade Mary and her advisors of the veracity of Elizabeth's proposal were not helped by Leicester's opposition to the match. Randolph was left to beg for Leicester's assistance as Mary wanted 'some knowledge of your owne desyer' if she were to proceed.⁹⁵³ Admitting the truth risked undercutting his mission. So Randolph berated Leicester's behaviour, complaining in another letter that he was 'agayne charged with...your Lord grate negligens, to woe a Queen withowte labor or travaile, coste charge, message, token, no not so myche as ons signefication of your owne good wyll'.⁹⁵⁴ In fact, Leicester's opposition to the match was more of a hindrance than Randolph knew. In 1565, when discussing her reasons for not pursuing the Leicester marriage,

⁹⁴⁹ Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony*, p. 65.

⁹⁵⁰ SP52/9, fo. 131v.

⁹⁵¹ Egerton 1818, fo. 25r, Randolph to Leicester, n.d.

⁹⁵² SP52/9, fo. 28v.

⁹⁵³ Egerton 1818, fo. 25v.

⁹⁵⁴ NLS, MS 3657, fo. 11v, Randolph to Leicester, 6 February 1565.

Mary drew attention to a letter that she had received from Leicester, written in his own hand and delivered through Randolph (who was clearly unaware of its contents) that actively undermined the marriage proposal by arguing that Elizabeth had only agreed to the match under duress.⁹⁵⁵

The marriage negotiations afforded Randolph the opportunity to showcase his diplomatic acumen. He was given the role of lead negotiator at the Scottish court and at the Berwick conference on the subject in November 1564, where Bedford deferred to Randolph as one ‘better acquainted’ with the proposal and the Scottish personnel involved.⁹⁵⁶ However, fearful of his inability to secure a successful outcome, Randolph looked to Cecil to ‘assyste me with your advise’.⁹⁵⁷ He worked hard for the Leicester marriage, seeing it as the solution to concerns about Mary’s religion, the security of Protestantism within the British Isles and the longevity of an Anglo-Scottish alliance. For Randolph the negotiations represented the fulfilment of the ‘chieffiste charge I have...to contayne by all reasonable meanes, these two Realmes in Amytie, and so to travaile with thys Quene that by the waye of mariage, the good will that nowe is, maye be contynuede to our posteritie’.⁹⁵⁸ With the weight of this successful outcome resting in his hands, Randolph was cautious to avoid anything that might cause animosity between the Queens and negatively affect how Mary perceived the marriage proposal.

Careful to posit the initial proposal in the best light possible, Randolph decided to give Mary an abridged version of his instructions, leaving out several potentially inflammatory sections inveighing against Mary’s uncle, Lorraine, which Elizabeth had personally inserted.⁹⁵⁹ Instead, he attempted to enhance Mary’s sense of her personal, amiable relationship with Elizabeth by

⁹⁵⁵ Labanoff, I, p. 296.

⁹⁵⁶ SP52/8, fo. 106r, Randolph’s memorial to Mary, 20 August 1563; Caligula B/X, fo. 280v, Randolph and Bedford to Elizabeth, 23 November 1564.

⁹⁵⁷ SP52/9, fo. 56r, Randolph to Cecil, 30 March 1564.

⁹⁵⁸ SP52/9, fo. 28r.

⁹⁵⁹ SP52/8, fo. 102r compared with SP52/8, fos. 106r-109v.

inserting references to the kinship, ‘nateur and love’ between the Queens, to which Mary frequently alluded in her interactions with Elizabeth.⁹⁶⁰ Randolph argued that Elizabeth’s proposal was a testament to her friendship, and that she sought ‘your graces honour, your weale and joyfull felicitie above anie other howe careful somever theie seme to be’.⁹⁶¹ He tactfully suggested that Elizabeth was more careful of Mary’s matrimonial well-being than her uncle, who was attempting to arrange a marriage with the Archduke. Randolph further amended the proposal to suggest that if Mary accorded with Elizabeth’s wishes in her marriage the English Queen would not only investigate and uphold her succession claim but also ‘deale with your grace as a lovinge sister, or to imparte with you as to a Daughter borne of her selfe’.⁹⁶² While these sentiments had been absent from Randolph’s initial instructions, Elizabeth later employed them when answering Mary’s questions about the proposal, promising, as Randolph had, that if Mary married appropriately she would ‘procede to the denunciation of hir title, as we wold or might doo for our owne naturall dawghter’.⁹⁶³

Although the initial proposal did not mention Leicester as Elizabeth’s preferred candidate, Randolph knew and had even informed some of his closest allies at Mary’s court that this was the case.⁹⁶⁴ Therefore when Randolph broached the proposal with Mary he shaped the nature of the negotiation by offering only an English match and giving no leeway for an alternative despite being instructed to say that Elizabeth would be content if Mary married an Englishman ‘or if that shall not be, yet of some other Contrye, beinge one whom nether we nor our realm should have manifest cause to judg to be sought for the trouble of this realm’.⁹⁶⁵

⁹⁶⁰ SP52/8, fo. 108v; Allinson, *Monarchy of Letters*, pp. 73-92.

⁹⁶¹ SP52/8, fo. 107v.

⁹⁶² *Ibid.*, fo. 108v.

⁹⁶³ SP52/8, fo. 158v, Second Instructions to Randolph, 16 November 1563.

⁹⁶⁴ SP52/9, fo. 30r.

⁹⁶⁵ SP52/8, fo. 103v; SP 52/8, fo. 109r-v.

A major obstacle to the Leicester marriage was Mary's concerns about how her fellow monarchs would judge her if she 'marrie[d] in place inferiour to her self'.⁹⁶⁶ Randolph attempted to counter this by pointing out that although Mary's marriage to Francis II had been reputable it had 'byne one of the greatest inconveniences that myghte be to her estate' and almost lost her Scotland. Mary 'scharce harde these wordes with patience'.⁹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, when Randolph formally offered Leicester to Mary, he tried to counter her concerns about such a match by persuading her of 'the commodities that myghte insue to her Realme'. When Mary argued that Elizabeth could be sure of her and so need not fear her marriage, Randolph tactfully agreed but questioned whether such a peace would last to their 'posteritie'. However, when Mary drew attention to the real point of contention – how secure her succession claim would be made through such a marriage, for Elizabeth might marry and beget children – Randolph could only answer that Elizabeth would provide for that.⁹⁶⁸ Mary remained uninterested in the Leicester match albeit in late 1564 she briefly led Randolph to believe otherwise.⁹⁶⁹

Mary's unwillingness to countenance the match prevented Randolph's usual supporters amongst Mary's pro-English advisers from persuading her to accept it. Moray and Lethington argued that they would not be wise to 'advise' Mary to marry a lower born man as it was not 'honorable' for 'her that is borne a Quene, and hathe married a kynge'.⁹⁷⁰ Thus, although Randolph believed that Moray 'like[d] well of the mach' he found the Earl 'lothe to be Autour or perswader of her unto yt'.⁹⁷¹ Likewise, when Randolph pressed Lethington to forward it with Mary he 'allegethe contynuallye the daynger, the burdayne, the difficulties'.⁹⁷² Worst still, Argyll, whom Randolph attempted to use to feel out Mary's 'mynde' on the matter,

⁹⁶⁶ SP52/9, fo. 28r.

⁹⁶⁷ SP52/8, fo. 175v, Randolph to Cecil, 31 December 1563.

⁹⁶⁸ SP52/9, fo. 54r-v.

⁹⁶⁹ Labanoff, I, p. 245; CP 140/1, Burghley's Journal, November 1564.

⁹⁷⁰ SP52/9, fo. 28r-v.

⁹⁷¹ Caligula B/X, fo. 249v, Randolph's letters, November 1563-January 1564; SP52/9, fo. 1v.

⁹⁷² SP52/9, fo. 31r.

immediately drew Mary's attention to the baseness of the proposal by enquiring whether 'the Quene of Englande [had] become a man'.⁹⁷³ These advisers were once again trying to reconcile their loyalty to their monarch (and thereby the security of their own positions) with their support for Anglo-Scottish amity. Hence, they looked to find concessions that might be acceptable to both Mary and Elizabeth.

In November 1564, when Moray and Lethington met with Randolph and Bedford at Berwick to negotiate the marriage proposal, the Scots argued first that Elizabeth should allow Mary a broader choice of husband.⁹⁷⁴ Second, they wanted Elizabeth to recognise Mary as her heir by Parliamentary statute to 'satisfie the mynd of suche in other countreyis abroad' who would question why Mary had 'abassed her self' in her marriage.⁹⁷⁵ Throughout the negotiations Elizabeth's commitment to acknowledging Mary's claim was vague, as she only offered to examine its validity and 'as we shall see the justice of hir title so will we mayntean it'.⁹⁷⁶ Moreover, she had repeatedly suggested that Mary lacked support in England and that she was the lone protector of her claim.⁹⁷⁷ This approach was meant to encourage Mary's reliance on Elizabeth and induce her to see the marriage as necessary. However, Elizabeth's refusal to provide the Scots with a much-needed guarantee injected a sense of uncertainty as to whether the English would even accept Mary's claim; this was exacerbated by Bedford and Randolph, who put Moray and Lethington 'in remembrance of the uncertaynetie of her righte, and varietie of judgement for the titles'.⁹⁷⁸

Ultimately the conference at Berwick failed as Bedford and Randolph did not have authority to offer concessions on the marriage candidate or the succession. Consequently, Moray and

⁹⁷³ SP52/8, fo. 176r.

⁹⁷⁴ Caligula B/X, fo. 282v.

⁹⁷⁵ SP52/9, fos. 195v-196r, Moray and Lethington to Cecil, 25 December 1564.

⁹⁷⁶ SP52/9, fo. 132v.

⁹⁷⁷ Ibid., fo. 131v.

⁹⁷⁸ Caligula B/X, fo. 282v.

Lethington went above their heads to negotiate directly with Cecil on the key issue of Parliamentary recognition of Mary's place in the succession. It was on this issue that the proposal failed: Elizabeth was unwilling to consent to a contractual declaration of the succession. Cecil turned the issue on its head, accusing Moray and Lethington of attempting to turn a 'negociation...full of terms of frendshipp and love...[in]to a matter of a bargayn or purchass...to compass at my soveraynes hand a kyngdom and Crown'.⁹⁷⁹ The Scots were well aware that the English hoped to use the marriage to secure their influence in Scotland and maintain their own security while giving nothing of value in return and responded with the rebuke that 'it is not for frendship that yow wold mak this matche but that yow also hunt for a kingdome and go abowt under that pretence to mak an inglishman King of scotland'.⁹⁸⁰ The disparity between the English and Scottish positions meant that, despite Randolph's continued hope, the Leicester marriage was dead in the water. Randolph was understandably disappointed when the marriage negotiations failed, and he struggled to comprehend the arrival of Darnley and what he perceived to be the ultimate destruction of his principle diplomatic goal of preserving Anglo-Scottish relations.

III. The Darnley Marriage

In early February 1565, Elizabeth granted Darnley permission to join his father Matthew Stuart, Earl of Lennox in Scotland. This action precipitated the marriage of Darnley to Mary that united the Stuart claims to the English throne. The question that has confounded historians ever since is why Elizabeth allowed Darnley to go to Scotland. Several conspiracy theories have dominated the discussion. Mary has been accused of conspiring to have Darnley sent to Scotland so that through their marriage she might unite their claims to the English throne, while Elizabeth has been charged with sending Darnley into Scotland in order 'to confuse the issue'

⁹⁷⁹ SP52/9, fo. 192v, Cecil to Moray and Lethington, 16 December 1564.

⁹⁸⁰ SP52/9, fo. 197v.

of Mary's remarriage.⁹⁸¹ Following the outmoded argument that Leicester and Cecil were factional enemies it has been posited that Cecil engineered Darnley's release to prevent a marriage between Leicester and Mary.⁹⁸² And, conversely, Dawson has argued that Leicester masterminded Darnley's release as a replacement for himself for Mary's hand.⁹⁸³ More recently, Sarah Macauley has argued that Darnley's return to Scotland should be seen as the culmination of the Lennoxes battle to be restored to their Scottish titles and estates – Lennox wanted Darnley to be present and confirmed as his heir – and that Elizabeth, and her advisers, took the risk as they believed that as an English subject Elizabeth could control Darnley.⁹⁸⁴ Adams also viewed Elizabeth's allowance of Darnley's journey to Scotland as a facet of the Lennox restoration and both he and Retha Warnicke have argued that it was a misjudgement on the part of Elizabeth and her advisers, who underestimated the likelihood that Mary would marry Darnley.⁹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the risk of a potential marriage was not insubstantial and the question why take it – at a time when both the Scots and English openly acknowledged a Scottish preference for Darnley to marry Mary – remains?

The answer lies in the response of some of Elizabeth's advisers, both on the Council and outside of it, to the stark situation of the winter of 1564-5. A series of letters, hidden away in the Scottish archives and mentioned in passing by Adams several decades ago, are key.⁹⁸⁶ They show that Throckmorton and Killigrew, with Leicester's connivance, were using their Scottish contacts, particularly Lethington, to pressure Cecil, and through him Elizabeth, to reach an agreement with Mary on the issues of marriage and succession. Throckmorton was using the

⁹⁸¹ Adams, 'Darnley', 125-7; Lee, *Moray*, p. 128.

⁹⁸² Adams, 'Darnley', 128.

⁹⁸³ Dawson, 'Mary', 5-7.

⁹⁸⁴ S. Macauley, 'Matthew Stewart, Fourth Earl of Lennox and the Politics of Britain, c. 1543-1571', (PhD, Cambridge, 2005), p. 148.

⁹⁸⁵ Adams, 'Darnley'; Warnicke, *Mary*, location 2113.

⁹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 142.

Scots to convince Cecil of the need for a new solution to the security concerns presented by Mary's remarriage.⁹⁸⁷

When contextualised alongside other evidence, these letters suggest that, following the failure of the Leicester marriage negotiations, some of Elizabeth's advisers believed a Darnley marriage to be the next best thing. In December Cecil asserted that some of his colleagues hoped 'Darly might marry with the scottish quene' and that there was a 'devise to bryng the Queens Majesty not only to allow thereof, but also to move it to the Queen hir sistar'. Albeit he made no comment on his own view thereon, he noted that he found 'no disposition thereto in hir Majesty'.⁹⁸⁸ Only a few weeks later Cecil was working with Leicester to persuade Elizabeth to allow Darnley to journey to Scotland; and in April 1565, the French ambassador recorded how Cecil had convinced the Queen of the benefits of Mary marrying Darnley.⁹⁸⁹ This section demonstrates that while the Elizabethan regime worked hard to appear diametrically opposed to the Darnley marriage, this was not actually the case. In fact, archival evidence suggests that Leicester, Cecil and eventually even Elizabeth either supported the match or were not as opposed to it as they made it seem. For Leicester, Throckmorton and others who supported Mary's claim to be Elizabeth's heir a Darnley marriage would arguably strengthen her position but for Mary's opponents, like Cecil, this was clearly not the case, and therefore we need to look more broadly at the array of factors at play.

While the Darnley marriage had not been Elizabeth or her councillors' preferred option, by the winter of 1564-5 it appeared the lesser evil. Following the failed Leicester proposal and Elizabeth's intransigence on the succession, it was questionable how long Elizabeth could hold Mary's remarriage in abeyance. Mary made it clear that she desired to remarry sooner rather

⁹⁸⁷ NLS, MS 3657, fos. 8r-9r; Egerton 1818, fo. 29r.

⁹⁸⁸ Lansdowne 102, fo. 107v, Cecil to Smith, 30 December 1564.

⁹⁸⁹ SP52/10, fo. 24r, Randolph to Cecil, 12 February 1565; D. Potter (ed.), *The Letters of Paul de Foix* (Cambridge, 2020), p. 240.

than later, and the threat of a foreign, Catholic alliance remained.⁹⁹⁰ Although Mary's negotiations for a match with Don Carlos had officially stalled by mid-1564, the English continued to fear it. In August, Challoner, English ambassador to Spain, informed his colleagues that it had been mooted that if the sick Queen of Spain were 'called owte of this lyef' Philip II might replace her with Mary.⁹⁹¹ In December Moray and Lethington played upon this anxiety to attempt to coerce Elizabeth to give in to Mary's succession demands while Mary added to the anxiety by creating the illusion that she was entering into marriage negotiations with France.⁹⁹² This was taken seriously by the English. It caused division between key figures in the English and Scottish regimes – for instance Cecil and Throckmorton mistrusted Lethington and Moray's sincerity in negotiating for an Anglo-Scottish match – and Elizabeth was sufficiently concerned to attempt to counter a Franco-Scottish match by opening her own negotiations for a French marriage.⁹⁹³ Simultaneously the potential for Mary (and whoever she married) to undermine and destabilise Elizabeth's rule in Ireland by aiding her enemies was brought to the fore by the actions of Shane O'Neill, who Randolph reported was 'solicit[ing] daylie to have supporte owte of Scotlande, and offerthe greate service to thys Quene'.⁹⁹⁴

The potent combination of the failure of the Leicester marriage, the threat of Mary marrying a foreign, Catholic power, and the real danger of her intervening against the English in Ireland made a potential Darnley marriage appear to be the least threatening option left on the table. It had three key advantages: the threat of foreign intervention in Scotland or Ireland was much lower than if she matched with a foreign, Catholic prince; it also had the potential to incite division amongst the nobility of Scotland thereby keeping Mary focused on Scotland's internal

⁹⁹⁰ Potter (ed.), *de Foix*, pp. 196-7; SP52/10, fo. 17r, Randolph to Elizabeth, 5 February 1565.

⁹⁹¹ CP 154, fo. 82r, Challoner to Elizabeth, 10 August 1564.

⁹⁹² SP52/9, fo. 172r, Moray and Lethington to Cecil, 3 December 1564; SP52/9, fo. 194v; SP52/9, fo. 179v, Randolph to Cecil, 14 December 1564; Warnicke, *Mary*, location 2004; Lee, *Moray*, pp. 128-130.

⁹⁹³ SP52/9, fo. 179r; Potter (ed.), *de Foix*, pp. 186-7; SP70/77, fos. 124r-129v, Smith to Elizabeth, 15 April 1565.

⁹⁹⁴ SP52/9, fo. 200r, Randolph to Cecil, 24 December 1564.

politics; and a Darnley marriage did not come with access to financial and military resources that would enable Mary to forward her claim to the English throne, whereas a foreign match would. Randolph later hailed this latter point to be the greatest benefit of the marriage to Elizabeth.⁹⁹⁵ Elizabeth could have Mary marry an Englishman without conceding anything on the succession. It was a calculated risk: the match had its dangers, but these were perceived to be manageable threats. In June 1565, Cecil informed Smith that the principal concerns were the ‘hurt of religion’ and the ‘fortefyeng of the Queen of Scots title to this Crowne’ but he was confident that ‘those mischeefes will be douted’ due to the preventative measures taken by the English government.⁹⁹⁶

Sending Darnley to Scotland and managing the English response to the resultant marriage was a collegial affair. Leicester and Cecil worked closely with Throckmorton. While they were petitioning Elizabeth to allow Darnley’s return to Scotland, Throckmorton was gathering intelligence on what might occur ‘yf Darnelie hyt the marke’.⁹⁹⁷ At the beginning of February, just as Darnley headed north, Throckmorton received a detailed intelligence report from Cecil’s agent Thomas Bishop, who was in Scotland with Lennox.⁹⁹⁸ It was a list of those who would support a Darnley marriage, those who would oppose it, and those whom Mary might entice to support it by encouraging the belief ‘that Darnelie will imbrase religion’ or by offering lands and money. The memorandum presupposed two things: first, that Mary wanted to marry Darnley, and second, that Darnley would attempt to woo her. As such, it suggests Throckmorton and his colleagues supported not only Darnley’s journey to Scotland but also his candidacy for Mary’s hand in marriage. The memorial also refers obscurely to ‘the quenes majesteis purpose’ in allowing Darnley to venture into Scotland, suggesting thereby that this

⁹⁹⁵ SP52/10, fo. 78v, Randolph to Cecil, 3 May 1565.

⁹⁹⁶ Lansdowne 102, fo. 112r, Cecil to Smith, 12 June 1565; For preventative measures see *EEP*, pp. 130-1.

⁹⁹⁷ SP52/10, fo. 14v, Memorial on the enemies and friends of Lennox, 3 February 1565.

⁹⁹⁸ For Bishop being Cecil’s agent see Macauley, ‘Lennox’, p. 146.

was part of a broader plan. It is possible that this was to incite division and refocus Mary's attention inwards to prevent her intervening in English or Irish affairs, for Bishop concluded that if Mary could 'bring yt about, division shall follow'.⁹⁹⁹ Certainly, this was what the Scots believed the English wanted by sending Darnley into Scotland and it was allegedly Throckmorton who actively encouraged Moray to rebel with promises of English support that would not be forthcoming.¹⁰⁰⁰ The memorandum also undermines the argument put forth by various historians that Cecil and Elizabeth allowed Darnley to go to Scotland because they believed they could prevent a marriage by threatening forfeiture of his family's English lands; it states that such a move would mean nothing to the Lennoxes if they possessed the Scottish crown.¹⁰⁰¹ In fact, the memorandum's existence suggests that, for Elizabeth's leading advisers, the Darnley marriage was an expected outcome of his journey to Scotland and one whose impact they had begun to calculate before he had even set foot in the country.

The clearest evidence that some of Elizabeth's councillors and, perhaps even the Queen herself, supported the Darnley marriage comes from a letter written by Throckmorton to Cecil, when on embassy in Scotland in May 1565. Throckmorton had been sent to inform Mary of English opposition to her marriage, but he was concerned that this might be undermined by the arrival of the French ambassador, Michel de Castelnau, who would visit the English court en route. Throckmorton clearly knew that his colleagues and the Queen were not as opposed to the marriage as he was making out for he feared that Castelnau might 'geve this Quene intellygence, that her proceadynge with the Lord Dernleye is not so evell taken ther by her Majestie and her Counsell as I have made shewe of in all negocyacion'.¹⁰⁰² Elizabeth appears to have taken Throckmorton's warning onboard, albeit Castelnau was not deceived. Arriving

⁹⁹⁹ SP52/10, fos. 14r-15r.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Melville, *Memoirs*, pp. 140-1.

¹⁰⁰¹ Lee, *Moray*, p. 130; McCaffrey, *Shaping*, p. 171; Stedall, *Mary*, ch. 14; SP52/10, fo. 14v.

¹⁰⁰² SP52/10, fo. 100r.

at the English court he reported that Elizabeth ‘did not show the joy and pleasure she had in her heart to hear that this marriage was progressing well, on the contrary, she claimed not to approve of it’.¹⁰⁰³ This suggests that English opposition to the marriage was in fact a ruse.

This staged opposition was important. For the best part of two years Elizabeth had been promising to investigate Mary’s claim and uphold it if she married an Englishman. Later she linked it specifically to a Leicester marriage but, nonetheless, the initial proposal had suggested any Englishman and many of Mary’s own subjects at the time had presumed Elizabeth had intended Darnley.¹⁰⁰⁴ England’s public opposition to the marriage prevented Mary from claiming she was following Elizabeth’s wishes and ensured that Elizabeth would not be put in a position where she might be forced to make concessions on the succession.

Ten days later, Throckmorton wrote another letter to Leicester and Cecil, with the expectation that they would show it to Elizabeth. He began by reiterating that it was important that the Queen and her Council ‘make yt appear evydentlye to all folkes that the procedynges of the Quene of Scotland with the Lord Derneley is so grevouslye taken and myslyked’. He then listed suggestions ‘for the better insynuacion hereof’.¹⁰⁰⁵ This letter, and the Council’s response to it, suggest that Elizabeth carefully staged apparent opposition to the marriage. This was both a counter to the potential danger posed by uniting the two Catholic claims to the English throne and a public relations exercise aimed at justifying Elizabeth’s opposition to the marriage on the grounds that she was the victim of her recalcitrant subjects, Darnley and Lennox, and a sister Queen who coveted her throne. Mary was portrayed as the aggressor: a position used to justify Elizabeth despatching Bedford to the borders in July 1565 with authority to raise troops in the

¹⁰⁰³ ‘La Reine d’Angleterre...ne monroit pas la joye & plaisir qu’elle en avoir en son coeur d’entendre que ce mariage s’avançoit, ains au contraire faisoit semblant de ne l’approuver pas’, J. Le Laboureur (ed.), *Les Memoires de Messire Michel Castelnau* (Brussels, 1731), I, p. 183.

¹⁰⁰⁴ SP52/8, fo. 176v.

¹⁰⁰⁵ SP52/10, fo. 101r, Memorial for Leicester and Cecil, 1565.

event of a Scottish invasion.¹⁰⁰⁶ Elizabeth's councillors knew a Scottish invasion was highly unlikely at this moment, but it played into justifying Elizabeth's opposition to Mary's marriage to the rest of Europe. As Throckmorton recognised, it was important that the English 'keape your selves in good opynyon with fraunce & Spayne to thend you maye brynge your mettres the better to passe heere'. Thus, Elizabeth's response to the marriage was portrayed as 'chasten[ing] tharrogancy of her Subjectes [Darnley and Lennox], and revenge[ing] the indignytye offred by the Quene of Scotlande'.¹⁰⁰⁷

Throckmorton consistently advised that the English should cultivate the impression that they were opposed to the marriage and prevent any intelligence to the contrary reaching Scotland. He wanted Elizabeth's treatment of Darnley's mother, Margaret Lennox, to reflect her hostility to the marriage by putting her under 'greater restraynct', a move that had the added advantage of ensuring that Margaret did not 'have anye intellygence of the Quenes Majesties doynge or speach other than that severyte is entended'. However, Throckmorton also aimed to counter the threat posed by a marriage between the two Catholic claimants to the English throne. He noted that sequestering Margaret restrained her ability to confer with foreign ambassadors, in particular the Spanish ambassador whose support she was seeking for her son's marriage to Mary.¹⁰⁰⁸ As a counter to the Stuart claim, Throckmorton suggested Elizabeth show favour to the Protestant, Grey claim by allowing the dowager Duchess of Somerset 'some more gracyous enterteynmente in the Cowrte than heretofore she hathe done'. He also advised that Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, remain in London: it was feared his Catholicism and connections to Margaret might encourage him to drum up Catholic support for the match in Northern England.¹⁰⁰⁹ The inclusion of these measures is a reminder that this marriage was a

¹⁰⁰⁶ SP52/10, fo. 120r.

¹⁰⁰⁷ SP52/10, fo. 101r.

¹⁰⁰⁸ *Ibid.*; *CSPS*, I, p. 413.

¹⁰⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, fo. 101r.

risky gamble. All of Throckmorton's suggestions were endorsed by the Council and, aside from favouring the Grey claim, they were put into practice by the Queen.¹⁰¹⁰

The evidence suggests that Leicester and Cecil, alongside Throckmorton, were complicit in sending Darnley to Scotland with an eye to marrying Mary; however, Elizabeth's own position remains ambiguous. Her voice is not well-recorded. She was not unaware of the risk in sending Darnley to Scotland. By late 1564 she even made light of the fact that he was the Scots' preferred candidate.¹⁰¹¹ Perhaps there is some truth in Elizabeth's later claim that she believed that Darnley and Lennox would not act without her authorisation. It was this betrayal that she most emphasised as an affront to her dignity as a monarch, complaining that she had been 'very farr abused'.¹⁰¹² Yet, even then, for a Queen prone to angry outbursts, there is little evidence of a strong reaction in this case. Her actions were those recommended by her councillors. There is no evidence detailing her fury as there are on other occasions, such as at Mary's deposition in 1567. So, we are left with the observations of Castelnau who believed she secretly supported the marriage. However, de Foix, the French ambassador at Elizabeth's court, presents a more nuanced picture. His dispatches indicate that Elizabeth was not complicit in her councillors' design to send Darnley to Scotland and that it was only in April, and after much persuasion by Cecil, that Elizabeth came round to the marriage. This fits with the evidence. In late April, Randolph notified his colleagues of the developing relationship between Mary and Darnley. Elizabeth was affronted and immediately dispatched orders for Darnley and Lennox to return to England. According to de Foix, this was when Cecil interceded to persuade the Queen that there were benefits to a marriage between Mary and Darnley.¹⁰¹³ This explains Elizabeth's sudden, last-minute revocation of her orders for Darnley and Lennox to return, which Randolph

¹⁰¹⁰ SP52/10, fo. 120r-v.

¹⁰¹¹ Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 120.

¹⁰¹² SP52/10, fo. 63r, Instructions to Throckmorton, 24 April 1565.

¹⁰¹³ Potter (ed.), *de Foix*, p. 240.

only heard about as he was about to deliver them. Moreover, she undertook this course of action knowing, as Randolph had informed her, that ordering Darnley to return to England was the only way to negate the overwhelming ‘suspicion that is nowe almoste universall’ amongst the Scots that ‘the sendinge of the Lord Darlie home was a thyng done of purpose’.¹⁰¹⁴ These events occurred just before Throckmorton’s mission to Scotland in early May and the writing of his letter which implied that Elizabeth and some of her advisers were not as opposed to the marriage as they claimed to be.

If Elizabeth only came around to the idea in April, this raises the question of the motivations behind the declaration in March (that Jenny Wormald considered a ‘diplomatic mystery’), in which she refused to acknowledge Mary as her heir or consider naming a successor until she herself was married.¹⁰¹⁵ This declaration has sometimes been seen as a turning point that encouraged Mary to marry Darnley.¹⁰¹⁶ But, it actually represented the culmination of months of increasingly fraught negotiations about Mary’s place in the English succession. Since November 1564, the English had been under intense pressure to answer Mary’s request to be made Elizabeth’s heir and for the English Parliament to acknowledge this status.¹⁰¹⁷ Mary, openly coveting the English throne, had begun to rankle Elizabeth, who argued that for ‘all this friendship, nothyng is more mynded than how to possess that which we have’.¹⁰¹⁸ So, there was a need to give an answer on the succession and increasing resistance to give in to Mary’s demands. However, when considered in the light of Darnley’s arrival in Scotland the declaration is even more understandable. Elizabeth did not mastermind the declaration alone: her advisers, Cecil and Leicester, inevitably had a hand in it. It is possible that these men, who

¹⁰¹⁴ SP52/10, fo. 64r, Randolph to Cecil, 29 April 1565.

¹⁰¹⁵ For reference to the contents of this now lost letter see Cecil’s journal entry of 5 March, CP 140, fo. 1v; Wormald, *Mary*, Location 2742.

¹⁰¹⁶ Dawson, ‘Mary’, 8.

¹⁰¹⁷ See above, pp. 218-20.

¹⁰¹⁸ SP52/9, fo. 132r.

had knowingly sent Darnley into Scotland a month earlier, saw the declaration as a cautious preparative to the potential eventuality of a Darnley marriage. With Darnley now in Scotland, it had to be made absolutely clear to Mary that there would be no concessions on the succession were their marriage to take place. Indeed, when Throckmorton was sent north he was instructed to tell Mary that Elizabeth was only willing to ‘favor hir interest’ if Mary married Leicester and ‘we meane not nor can fynd in our hart to doo the lyk with any other’, especially not ‘with this that hath bene so indirectly sought for the Lord Darly’.¹⁰¹⁹ Mary could not be allowed to claim that she had fulfilled Elizabeth’s wishes in marrying an Englishman and therefore Elizabeth must keep her side of the bargain and name her heir.

This raises the age-old question how much of Elizabeth’s policy was determined by herself and how much by the manipulations of her advisers? The way in which Elizabeth’s advisers behaved in this case suggests that they were pushing their Queen to acquiesce to a policy that she did not immediately favour. In December, Cecil had found that Elizabeth had no appetite for Mary to marry Darnley but, by April, with Darnley in Scotland and Mary keen to marry him, Elizabeth’s hand had been, to an extent, forced. As such it appears to be a testament to Elizabeth’s advisers’ ability to manipulate her into a course of action. The evidence suggests Darnley’s journey to Scotland and the management of England’s public response to the marriage was the result of a collegial collaboration between key councillors, like Cecil and Leicester, and more informal advisers and diplomats, such as Throckmorton and Killigrew. This analysis helps to explain the contradiction, highlighted by Adams, between Elizabeth’s permission for Darnley to go to Scotland and her subsequent opposition to the marriage, which has previously undermined arguments in favour of Elizabethans masterminding the situation.¹⁰²⁰

¹⁰¹⁹ SP52/10, fos. 62r-63r.

¹⁰²⁰ Adams, ‘Darnley’, 127.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that concern about the threat Mary represented to English security lay behind individuals' different views on the succession, the political proposition of the Leicester marriage, and the machinations behind allowing Darnley to go to Scotland. It demonstrates that although individuals might have different ideas about how to control the threat of Mary – Throckmorton by incorporation; Cecil (and Randolph) by exclusion – they were all attempting to solve the same problem, and all agreed on the central principle of providing security for England by tying Mary to an English husband. Thus, it is perhaps no coincidence that Throckmorton and Cecil, with their differing perspectives on Mary's claim, could both covertly support a Darnley marriage as the least dangerous option for English security at this moment. It was the only marriage option available that would not give the powerful Catholic monarchies of France and Spain the right to intervene in British affairs and immediately enable Mary to draw on foreign, Catholic military and monetary resources in support of her claim to the English throne.

The release of Darnley and England's official reaction to his subsequent marriage to Mary highlights the collegial and collaborative machinations of Elizabeth's councillors and extra-conciliar advisers in forwarding policies outside the bounds of usual counselling practices. To an extent they forced the Queen's hand in order to pursue a policy they perceived to be best for the immediate security of their country. They may have had different perspectives on what the end result of a Darnley marriage might be: Cecil would have seen it solely as a means of preventing foreign, Catholic involvement in Scotland; whereas Throckmorton (and possibly Leicester too) might have viewed it as offering an opportunity to secure a conditional settlement of the succession, as his letter to Elizabeth suggests.¹⁰²¹ However, what is clear is

¹⁰²¹ SP52/10, fo. 97v.

that although their ultimate intentions might have differed they agreed on the basic principles behind sending Darnley to Scotland. Thus, they were all able to work together to put this policy in motion and direct England's response to the developing situation because they shared the perception that something needed to be done to protect England from the threat presented by the dangerous combination of Mary's desire to remarry and her claim to be Elizabeth's heir. The primacy of English security in directing most of Elizabeth's advisers' approaches to Mary and Anglo-Scottish relations is a central theme of the next chapter.

Chapter 8

'a Divorce in Amitve': Randolph's Approach to the Breakdown of Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565¹⁰²²

In 1565 Mary's decision to marry Darnley against Elizabeth's wishes resulted in the breakdown of the Anglo-Scottish *entente* and, for a brief moment during the autumn, ignited the possibility of war between the two kingdoms. In Scotland, Darnley's arrival and elevation had sparked a power shift amongst the ruling elite resulting in the eclipse of Mary's principal advisor, Moray, who, along with Argyll, rebelled against Mary and sought English aid in their fight. The marriage and rebellion, known as the Chaseabout Raid, marked the disintegration of Anglo-Scottish relations, or at the least a hiatus in the amiable and trusting relationship built between the leading elite of the two countries following England's intervention in support of the Protestant Lords of Scotland in 1559-60. It resulted in the eclipse of English influence at the Scottish court during the last years of Mary's personal reign and England's failure to aid their Scottish co-religionists in 1565 injected a new mistrust into the relationship that was

¹⁰²² Advocates 22.2.18, p. 283, Elizabeth to Mary, August 1565.

particularly apparent when the Scots sought English support following Mary's deposition in 1567.¹⁰²³

Randolph was caught in the middle of this situation. The pivotality of 1565 in changing the dynamic of Anglo-Scottish relations is reflected in the difficulties Randolph faced at this time and his eventual expulsion from Scotland in February 1566. As Frescoln observed, Randolph's reaction to the exclusion of Mary's Protestant, Anglophile councillors from government and the breakdown of the Anglo-Scottish accord that he had worked so hard to build emphasised his desire to ensure the ascendancy of Protestantism in Scotland and the British Isles more broadly.¹⁰²⁴ However, Frescoln did not appreciate the importance of Randolph's prioritisation of Protestant security in underpinning his position on resistance to Mary as an ungodly monarch and how this affected both his approach to the Chaseabout Raid and his attempt to justify the rebel Lords' actions. This chapter redresses this. It explores Randolph's religiously motivated approach to the breakdown of Mary's relationship with her Protestant, pro-English, advisers, like Moray; and demonstrates how Randolph's religious imperative formed the bedrock of his attempts to justify the actions of the rebel Lords. In so doing, it will highlight the impact of the ideological framework of resistance theory on his mindset. The mid-sixteenth-century is known for an explosion of theories about resistance to monarchical authority, be it religiously motivated, brought about primarily by the experience of Marian exile, or through a sense of the lawful obligation of a monarch to their subjects and vice versa.¹⁰²⁵ Exposure to these ideas naturally impacted Randolph's perspective and are explored here in considering how he brought both concepts of resistance to bear in his vindication of the Lords' actions.

¹⁰²³ Dawson, 'Mary'; Adams, 'Darnley'.

¹⁰²⁴ Frescoln, 'Randolph', p. 206.

¹⁰²⁵ Q. Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, II (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 189-348; J. Dawson, 'Trumpeting Resistance: Christopher Goodman and John Knox', in R. Mason (ed.), *John Knox and the British Reformation* (1998), pp. 131-153; F. Pirola, 'Opposing Tyranny from the Outside: The Case of the Marian Exiles', *History of Political Thought*, 40 (2019), 69-84; R. Mason and M. Smith (eds.), *A Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots* (Oxford, 2017), pp. 44-64.

Randolph's notions of godly resistance were not a good standpoint to try to persuade Elizabeth to intervene in favour of the Scottish lords and so the next section of this chapter explores the disconnect in perspective and priorities between Randolph, his Queen, and his conciliar colleagues. It considers how Randolph attempted to turn Elizabeth and her advisers' concerns about intervening in favour of the Lords into reasons to motivate them to do just that. The final section then explores how Randolph's failure to do this and his inability to reconcile himself with his government's Scottish policy combined with Mary's newfound mistrust of him set the scene for his ejection from Scotland in February 1566.

I. Religion and Resistance to Monarchical Authority

As the earlier chapters of this thesis have shown, Randolph espoused a pan-Protestant outlook that prioritised aiding and uniting co-religionists across national boundaries. Thus, he viewed his mission to Scotland through the lens of establishing a Protestant bastion within the British Isles by supporting Protestantism in Scotland and securing an Anglo-Scottish alliance that had commonality of religion at its core. The events of 1565 threatened to destroy this goal: Randolph despaired 'to see so good oportunitie, so greate lyklyhoode to unite these two Reaulms togyther to be omytted...to the greate hurte and hynderance of Chrystes trewe religion'.¹⁰²⁶ His reaction to the breakdown of Anglo-Scottish relations in 1565 and, in particular, the new division between Mary and her long-serving pro-English, Protestant advisers, like Moray, showcased the primacy of religion in his approach to Anglo-Scottish relations and highlighted the anxiety he felt about the potential repercussions for England's political and religious establishment of Mary's desire to be named Elizabeth's heir.¹⁰²⁷ The struggle between Mary and her nobles was undoubtedly more nuanced than Randolph portrayed it: the religious impetus behind Moray's rebellion and the resultant Chaseabout Raid

¹⁰²⁶ SP52/10, fo. 102r.

¹⁰²⁷ Frescoln, 'Randolph', p. 206.

has been questioned by historians, who emphasise Moray's personal ambition, the lack of clear religious division between Mary's supporters and the rebels, and Mary's own attempts to decry the religious element of the rebellion.¹⁰²⁸ Nevertheless, in accordance with the Lords' own declaration of intent, Randolph distilled the rebellion down to a battle for Scotland's religious security that, with Mary's claim to be Elizabeth's heir, also had the potential to threaten the religious *status quo* in England and 'bringe us into the lyke calametie'.¹⁰²⁹ Randolph's greatest fear was that 'the overthrowe' of 'Chrystes trewe Religion...in thone [Scotland] sholde be the wracke of yt in bothe'.¹⁰³⁰

Randolph's support for the Scottish Protestant Lords, who rebelled against Mary and subsequently fled into England to seek Elizabeth's aid, was entirely conditioned by his perception that without them Protestant Scotland would be lost.¹⁰³¹ His affiliation to the Lords was also personal, grounded in a shared religious commitment and founded on the long-standing collegial relationship he had with Moray, with whom he had worked for the previous six years to secure a Protestant Anglo-Scottish settlement. Randolph took up the rebel Lords' cause and supported the way in which they positioned themselves as standing for 'the maintenance & stabilitie of the trewe religioun' in Scotland, terms reminiscent of the religiously polarising language they had employed as Lords of the Congregation in 1559-60.¹⁰³² For Randolph, the aim of the Lords' opposition to Mary was to prevent the 'overthrowe of

¹⁰²⁸ For instance, Guy, *My Heart*, pp. 219-20, 230; R. Omansky, 'Their Nation Dishonored, the Queen Shamed, and Country Undone: Feuding, Factionalism, and Religion in the Chaseabout Raid' (MA, University of Pennsylvania, 2008), pp. 16, 82, 125.

¹⁰²⁹ SP52/10, fos. 134r-135v, Supplication to the Queen of Scots, June 1565; Advocates 1.2.2, fo. 40v.

¹⁰³⁰ SP52/11, fo. 146r, Randolph to Cecil, 19 October 1565.

¹⁰³¹ Caligula B/X, fo. 336r, 21 July 1565, Randolph to Cecil.

¹⁰³² SP52/11, fo. 57r, Lords of Scotland to Mary, 1 September 1565; SP52/11, fo. 67r, Moray to Randolph, 8 September 1565.

Religion' and secure 'the reformation of the great inormities that are used agaynste god inspeciall, and tendenge to the utter subvertion of his worde'.¹⁰³³

Viewing the rebellion in this light, Randolph interpreted the situation through the medium of a subject's responsibility to resist an ungodly monarch. Writing to Cecil he argued that monarchs were those 'we oughte to beare chief reverence unto under god, yf unto hym theie knowe their deutes'.¹⁰³⁴ The 'yf' is significant here: Randolph was suggesting not only that their first loyalty was to God but that loyalty to the monarch depended on their religious stance. In other words, Randolph was arguing that Mary's ungodliness absolved her subjects of their allegiance to her, so the Lords were justified in their resistance. Thus he praised Argyll and Moray for their 'stoutenes in defence of Religion' in resisting Mary, who Randolph portrayed as an ungodly tyrant, ruling 'withowte the feare of god'.¹⁰³⁵ Randolph's argument that Mary's right to exercise monarchical authority without resistance was dependent on her acting 'in all godlynes' was in keeping with resistance theories expressed by some of his more radical contemporaries, like Knox and Goodman, whom he engaged with in Scotland at this time.¹⁰³⁶ In their writings and sermons both men had overturned the notion, incumbent in Romans 13:1-2, that as monarchs derived their authority from God, opposing a monarch was equivalent to opposing God. Instead, they invoked the concept of legitimate resistance, arguing that it was the Christian duty of lesser magistrates, like the nobility, and even subjects to resist ungodly monarchs.¹⁰³⁷ Randolph would have been well aware of these ideas when considering his justification for the Chaseabout Raid: a year prior to the rebellion, Knox had publicly argued that it was a Christian's duty to act 'in the fear of God [and] oppone themselves to the fury and

¹⁰³³ SP52/10, fo. 114v, Randolph to Cecil, 3 June 1565; SP52/11, fo. 199r, Randolph to Cecil, 19 November 1565.

¹⁰³⁴ SP52/11, fo. 136r.

¹⁰³⁵ SP52/10, fo. 104v, Randolph to Cecil, 21 May 1565; Caligula B/X, fo. 312r, Randolph to Cecil, 2 July 1565.

¹⁰³⁶ SP52/11, fo. 198v.

¹⁰³⁷ Dawson, 'Trumpeting Resistance', pp. 131-153; Pirola, 'Opposing Tyranny', 69-84.

blind rage of princes; for so they resist not God, but the devil, who abuses the sword and authority of God'.¹⁰³⁸ During the height of the rebellion in 1565, Knox had the audacity to preach that monarchical 'power is limited by God's word'.¹⁰³⁹ Knox and Goodman had honed their ideas on the duty of Christians to resist ungodly monarchs while exiled on the continent during the reign of Mary Tudor. Randolph's position was also influenced by his experience of her reign and it impinged heavily on his approach to resisting her Scottish namesake. While clearly an exaggeration on Randolph's part, he equated Mary, Queen of Scots' alleged commitment 'to the overthrowe of Religion [and] to the subvertion of those that favour the same' with that of Mary Tudor and, as such, argued 'what ought we not do, to withstonde the same?...yf we have byne partakers of myseries of the lyke tyme, the lyke state and the lyke government'.¹⁰⁴⁰

For Randolph the Christian duty to resist Mary's 'inordinate appetites agaynste god agaynste faythe, and promes' did not only pertain to her leading Scottish subjects, like Moray. Rather, he believed that Mary should be 'brydeled' by all godly monarchs with 'power and autoritie to do the same, as at thys tyme none so greate as the Queen my Sovereign'.¹⁰⁴¹ In other words, Elizabeth had a responsibility to protect reformed religion in Scotland and aid her co-religionists there. In July Randolph told his unwilling Queen that as her 'chief care [was] to setfourthe the honour of God and maynetayne his hollie worde' she must 'supporte...and assiste' the Lords.¹⁰⁴² He also raised the issue of Elizabeth's intercession in favour of the Lords' 'godlye...action' with Cecil in the hope that 'by advise of counsell yt maye be wone of her majestie'. Randolph continued his appeal as late as November, by which time the rebellion had broken up and Moray had fled into England, arguing that if Elizabeth would intercede 'blessed

¹⁰³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 139-40; R. Mason (ed.), *Knox: On Rebellion* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 192.

¹⁰³⁹ Laing (ed.), *Knox*, VI, p. 238.

¹⁰⁴⁰ *Advocates* 1.2.2, fo. 40r-v, Randolph to Throckmorton, 10 February 1565.

¹⁰⁴¹ SP52/11, fo. 198v.

¹⁰⁴² SP52/10, fo. 147r, Randolph to Elizabeth, 23 July 1565.

shalbe her ende that in godes hollye workes hathe so imployed her tyme' and 'happie shall her majestie be called among all Nations that favoerthe god'.¹⁰⁴³ Randolph was not alone in considering this issue of Elizabeth's responsibility to act against a fellow monarch who was behaving in an ungodly manner. Cecil was also pondering the question by the time of the Council debates on Scotland in late September 1565. He commissioned Edmund Guest, Bishop of Rochester, to consider the point when answering whether intervention in Scotland 'pro defensione Relligionis' could be justified. Guest concluded, like Randolph, that monarchs had a duty to defend religion in neighbouring countries and against monarchs who oppressed it.¹⁰⁴⁴ However, with the Queen and many councillors opposed to intervention in favour of the rebel Lords it was a moot point.¹⁰⁴⁵

Unlike Knox and Goodman, Randolph's approach to resistance was not only grounded on religious considerations but on his perception of the balance of power in the relationship between Mary and her subjects.¹⁰⁴⁶ He wanted to ensure 'that thys Queen maye never have her whole wyll over them' and that her subjects, or at least the 'nobles and natyve counsellors of thys Realme', retained some authority and were able to hold their monarch to account if necessary. The importance of restraining Mary's monarchical authority in Randolph's approach to the situation was clear from the outset. Just prior to her return to Scotland in 1561, Randolph outlined a set of conditions that he believed Mary must follow to rule successfully: she must 'be content to imbrace religion, to be ruled by the Councell of her owne nobles and natyve counsellors of thys Realme...[and] marrie with the consent of her nobles'.¹⁰⁴⁷ These conditions are relatively radical, they did not just seek to restrain Mary's monarchical authority

¹⁰⁴³ SP52/11, fo. 199r.

¹⁰⁴⁴ *EEP*, pp. 133-4.

¹⁰⁴⁵ SP52/11, fo. 17r, Tamworth to Leicester, 10 August 1565.

¹⁰⁴⁶ J. Burns, *The True Law of Kingship: Concepts of Monarchy in Early Modern Scotland* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 151, 175, 178. Burns argued that Knox saw things primarily in religious terms albeit he did have some understanding of the contractual nature of the relationship between a ruler and their subjects.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Add. 35830, fo. 82v.

and ability for independent action rather they inverted the traditional authority of the monarch by insisting that Mary be ‘ruled’ by her councillors and not the other way around.

This proviso ensured that power remained squarely in the hands of the ‘Councill’ of pro-English, Protestant nobles already governing Scotland at her return. It sought to prevent a recurrence of the issues that led to the 1559-60 rebellion, namely the suppression of Protestantism and the power of Mary’s foreign, Guise relatives, and aimed to protect the newfound Anglo-Scottish alliance by ensuring the continued influence of the Protestant, Anglophile government that had been in place since the 1560 Treaty of Edinburgh. Thus, Randolph’s conditional, anti-monarchical approach to Mary’s rule was not designed to be a radical statement on limiting monarchical power in general, rather it was aimed at the specific circumstances he found himself wrangling with – the return of a Catholic Queen to rule a nominally Protestant country – and was a product of his desire to preserve Protestantism in Scotland and Anglo-Scottish concord. Randolph’s conditions were designed as protective restraints on the absolute rule of an ungodly monarch: his desire that Mary be ‘ruled’ by her councillors was aimed at preventing any attempt she might make to restore Catholicism and, in essence, forcing her to ‘imbrace religion’ as it stood in Scotland in 1561. In this he was not alone, for, at the same time, Throckmorton advocated accepting Mary as Elizabeth’s heir if she agreed to a set of conditions, which would undoubtedly have included some protection for English Protestantism.¹⁰⁴⁸ Randolph’s belief in limiting the authority of an ungodly monarch should be seen in the light of finding a solution to the new problem of how to protect the people from a monarch whose religion did not accord with their own. This is key to understanding Randolph’s approach to Mary during his tenure in Scotland: if Mary followed the advice of her Protestant councillors and upheld the religious *status quo* in Scotland, Randolph was willing

¹⁰⁴⁸ This was certainly one of the conditions put to Mary in 1569, Ch. 10, pp. 283-7.

to further her relationship with Elizabeth but if Mary did not follow these principles, as happened in 1565, Randolph would not support her.

In 1565, Mary's marriage to Darnley resulted in a governmental *volte face* that violated the conditions Randolph had laid down for her successful rule. Moray, Argyll and much of Mary's Protestant establishment, who had held the reins of government since 1560, were pushed out of positions of power. The restraints Randolph had envisaged holding Mary back from monarchical autonomy (and consequently the potential restoration of Catholicism) had been thrown off: Mary would no longer be 'ruled' by her councillors, she was now 'wedded unto her owne ^opinion^', flexing her monarchical authority and pursuing her own policies. Rather than 'marrie with the consent of her nobles', Randolph considered Mary to have married Darnley 'withowte ether advise or counsell' and in the face of opposition from her once leading adviser, Moray, and other Lords who chose to rebel with him.¹⁰⁴⁹ Worst still, instead of the Protestant, pro-English Lords that Randolph favoured Mary now chose to be 'guyded by the advise of two or iij strayngers, and [was] neglectinge the sounde counsell and good advise of her Cheif Councillers'. These 'strayngers' were Catholics like Lennox and David Rizzio, who rose to pre-eminence at this time. To Randolph, and the rebel Lords, these changes in government appeared to threaten the religious *status quo*.¹⁰⁵⁰ Their concerns were deepened by Mary's increasing ambivalence towards maintaining the religious agreement she had struck with the Protestant Lords at her return to Scotland: rather than allowing mass for only herself and her household, she was now actively encouraging other nobles and courtiers to attend; and she no longer appeared to be punishing those who used Catholic practices in the community.¹⁰⁵¹

¹⁰⁴⁹ Add. 35830, fo. 82v; SP52/11, fo.143r; SP52/10, fo. 78r; SP52/11, fo. 97v, Information to Elizabeth, 22 September 1565.

¹⁰⁵⁰ SP52/11, fos. 96r-99r.

¹⁰⁵¹ Wormald, *Mary*, pp. 137-173; *EEP*, p. 132; Caligula B/X, fo. 286r-v.

As a result, Randolph began to suggest that when a monarch failed in their duty their subjects had a right to hold them to account: concurring with Moray and the Lords, he argued that as Mary was no longer willing to follow ‘good advise and counsell’ then restraining her actions that ‘tendethe to her own destruction and overthrow of the good repose and tranquelitie of her Realme...muste be sought by sharper meanes’.¹⁰⁵² He was at pains to justify such a response on the grounds that it was not that the Lords ‘wolde that she shold ^not^ have full power to do what she lykethe in all godlynes, but that her inordinate appetites agaynste god, agaynste faythe, and promes sholde be brydeled’.¹⁰⁵³ Several times over the summer of 1565, Randolph argued (as did Moray and his confederates) that Mary had broken her ‘promes’ and neglected the ‘care that she ought to have over her subjects and countrie’.¹⁰⁵⁴ This sense of Mary defaulting on her obligation to her people and the conditionality of Randolph’s approach to Mary’s rule in general hints at Randolph’s almost contractual approach to the relationship between ruler and ruled. Mary had a responsibility to her people and, if she reneged on this, they were within their rights to hold her to account. This sense of mutual responsibility was fostered in the Scottish coronation oath and was current in discussions in Scotland more broadly at this time.¹⁰⁵⁵ A year previously, John Craig had argued at the General Assembly ‘that Princes ar nocht onlie bound to keip lawis and promiseises to thair subjectis, but also, that in caise thai fail, thay justlie may be depositeit’.¹⁰⁵⁶ The right to hold to account a culpable monarch came to fruition two years later, in the wake of Mary’s forced abdication, when

¹⁰⁵² SP52/10, fo. 78r-v.

¹⁰⁵³ SP52/11, fo. 198v.

¹⁰⁵⁴ SP52/11, fo. 118v, Randolph to Leicester, 4 October 1565; Caligula B/X, fo. 312r; SP52/11, fo. 96v; SP52/10, fo. 104v.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Mason and Smith (eds.), *Dialogue*, p. 59; R. Mason, ‘Kingship and Commonweal: Political Thought and Ideology in Reformation Scotland’ (PhD, St. Andrews, 1983), p. 398; M. Lynch, ‘Scotland’s First Protestant Coronation: Revolutionaries, Sovereignty and the Culture of Nostalgia’, in L. Houwen (ed.), *Literature and Religion in Late Medieval and Early Modern Scotland: Essays in Honour of Alasdair A. MacDonald* (Leuven, 2012), pp. 191-93.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Laing (ed.), *Knox*, II, pp. 456-9.

Randolph's close friend, George Buchanan, composed his *de Jure Regni*.¹⁰⁵⁷ Unsurprisingly, when the book finally came to be published in 1579, Randolph showed himself supportive of the work.¹⁰⁵⁸ By 1565 Randolph was already seeking Buchanan's opinion on the qualities incumbent in the ideal ruler and Buchanan's response can only have fuelled Randolph's religion-centric position: for, Buchanan suggested, that a good monarch must 'first and foremost [be] a lover of true religion'.¹⁰⁵⁹ For Randolph this was essential, for an ungodly monarch was problematic and must either be constrained by their devout councillors or, if they proved unwilling, resisted. Randolph was aware that such derogations of monarchical authority and purist religious sentiment were unlikely to sway Elizabeth, which is why, as will be seen below, he also played heavily on the personal threat Mary represented to Elizabeth and her regime.

II. Randolph's Actions in 1565

Theoretically, then, Randolph stood in support of the Lords' rebellion but in practice his support for them was limited by the confines of his diplomatic position. Yet, although not able to join with them physically, Randolph was in many ways a lynchpin to the rebellion as the Lords' success depended on their ability to secure English aid and Randolph offered them a conduit through which to entreat for English support (both monetary and military), willingly using the influence of his position to attempt to persuade both the Queen and her Council to assist the Lords.¹⁰⁶⁰ Randolph's potential to help the Lords lay solely in his ability to harness the channels of diplomatic counsel available to him in order to persuade his Queen and

¹⁰⁵⁷ For their friendship see P. Hume Brown (ed.), *Vernacular writings of George Buchanan* (Edinburgh, 1892), pp. 54-9.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Advocates 15.1.6, fo. 27r-v, Randolph to Buchanan, 15 March 1580.

¹⁰⁵⁹ P. McGinnis and A. Williamson (eds.), *George Buchanan: The Political Poetry* (Edinburgh, 1995), pp. 148-9.

¹⁰⁶⁰ SP52/10, fo. 80v.

colleagues to support them: without their agreement, he had no power or influence to help the Lords.

Randolph's task was not an easy one. He had the support of Bedford, stationed at Berwick in his position as Governor of the town and Warden of the East Marches. Like Randolph, Bedford regularly engaged with the rebel Lords and knew them well; and, like Randolph, he equated the success of the Lords with the survival of Protestantism in Scotland. In seeking Bedford's assistance in securing English support for the Lords, Randolph played on the Earl's religious duty with the argument that 'yf anye good cane be done of your Lordships parte God dothe requere yt at your handes'.¹⁰⁶¹ This resonated deeply with Bedford, who, like Randolph, possessed a strong sense of the importance of aiding co-religionists irrespective of national boundaries. Having already tackled Elizabeth on the need to support her co-religionists in Scotland during his sojourn at court during the early summer of 1565, Bedford immediately responded to Randolph's appeal, writing the next day to request aid from the Queen on the grounds that 'if god by your Majesties meanes helpe not herein...the Gospell shall be quite rooted out' in Scotland.¹⁰⁶² Together the two men attempted to obtain English monetary and military aid for the Lords with limited success.¹⁰⁶³ Their appeals largely fell on deaf ears and they struggled to get any response from the Queen or their colleagues in London.¹⁰⁶⁴ Kept in the dark about what the English government intended to do, they found it increasingly difficult to answer the Lords' requests for advice: Randolph complained that he was left 'knowinge so lyttle of the Queens mynde as I do knowe not what counsell or advise to gyve'.¹⁰⁶⁵ The difficulties Randolph and Bedford encountered in attempting to uncover what support, if any,

¹⁰⁶¹ SP52/10, fo. 150r, Randolph to Bedford, 24 July 1565.

¹⁰⁶² SP59/9, fo. 198r, Bedford to Elizabeth, 25 July 1565.

¹⁰⁶³ SP52/11, fo. 73r, Randolph to Bedford, 9 September 1565; SP52/11, fo. 62v, Randolph to Cecil, 4 September 1565; SP59/10, fo. 92r, Bedford to Cecil, 6 October 1565; SP59/10, fo. 94r, Bedford to Leicester, 6 October 1565; SP59/10, fo. 65r.

¹⁰⁶⁴ SP52/11, fo. 62v; SP59/10, fo. 194r, Bedford to Leicester, 12 November 1565.

¹⁰⁶⁵ SP52/11, fos. 69v, 62v; SP52/10, fo. 112r, Randolph to Leicester, 3 June 1565.

the English government would give the Lords reflected Elizabeth and her councillors' unwillingness to engage with the Anglo-Scottish situation.

Randolph and Bedford's religiously motivated support for the Lords was at odds with the reticence of the Queen and her Council, whose approach to the situation was tempered by broader political concerns.¹⁰⁶⁶ Even the more forward Protestants on the Council, like Leicester, were reluctant to advocate supporting the Lords.¹⁰⁶⁷ Although they accepted Randolph's arguments that Protestantism in Scotland was under threat, Cecil and others on the Council balanced their concern for the 'hurt of religion' against a wealth of other political considerations: Elizabeth's unwillingness to aid the Lords; the possibility that intervention might ignite further unrest in Ireland; fear of potential Catholic subversion in England; and concern that England's response to the Lords' request for aid was being closely observed by the leading Catholic powers, France and Spain, who would likely oppose England if Elizabeth intervened in favour of the Lords.¹⁰⁶⁸ Moreover, these issues were all the more critical as they were set against the backdrop of the continual threat of Mary's Catholic claim to the English throne whereby any wrong move by Elizabeth's government had the potential to encourage open support for Mary from Catholic dissidents within England and the powerful rulers of France and Spain. This is the context in which Elizabeth and her councillors viewed the events of 1565. It was infinitely more dangerous than when they had intervened in favour of the Congregation in 1559-60. Then they had side-stepped the issue of aiding subjects against their monarch as the Congregation had ostensibly rebelled against Mary of Guise, not Mary herself; now, however, they challenged Mary directly. Intervening in favour of the Lords in 1565 therefore risked setting a dangerous precedent: it could justify the intervention of foreign

¹⁰⁶⁶ Dawson, 'Mary', 16.

¹⁰⁶⁷ SP52/11, fo. 17r.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Lansdowne 102, fo. 112r; *EEP*, pp. 136-9; England attempted to downplay their engagement with the Lords to the French see SP70/81, fos. 10r-11v, Elizabeth to Smith, 10 November 1565.

powers aiding subjects against their monarch and open the way for someone potentially to do the same against Elizabeth.¹⁰⁶⁹ This was particularly frightening to an English Council already alarmed at the presence of a fifth column in England and, following the Bayonne conference earlier in the year, fearful of a potential international Catholic conspiracy against Protestant nations such as their own.¹⁰⁷⁰ The possible repercussions of intervention were just too great. Thus, Cecil admitted that, unlike Randolph and Bedford, whilst ‘all Counsellors here’ acknowledged the inconvenience of the ‘ruyne’ of the Scottish Lords they were willing to accept it to protect the English government from the potential political fallout.¹⁰⁷¹

Randolph shared the Council’s concerns, but he did not accept their conclusion. For him, these issues were reasons to support intervention in favour of the Lords and so he attempted to convince his colleagues, writing persuasive letters to Cecil, Leicester and the Queen.¹⁰⁷² It was Randolph’s passionate support for the Lords and their religious cause, and his belief that Mary was a serious threat to Elizabeth, her regime and the English *status quo*, that drove his most frank and forceful advice to date.

First, Randolph focused on the one issue that underpinned all his colleagues’ concerns: Mary’s claim to the English throne. Re-affirming the fears of Cecil and other councillors, Randolph portrayed Mary as Elizabeth’s ‘mortal ennemie’, arguing that ‘in the whole worlde’ there was not ‘a more malicious harte toward[es] the Queen my Sovereign then is she’.¹⁰⁷³ In perpetuating this view, he enlisted the support of John Tamworth, a Groom of the Privy Chamber, who joined him briefly in Scotland in August 1565: Tamworth used his observation that Mary ‘mortallye hatethe the Queens majestie’ in an attempt to persuade Leicester to stop opposing

¹⁰⁶⁹ *EEP*, p. 137.

¹⁰⁷⁰ SP52/10, fo. 118r; *EEP*, p. 138.

¹⁰⁷¹ Lambeth Palace Library, MS 3196, fo. 169r-v; *EEP*, p. 138.

¹⁰⁷² SP52/11, fo. 36r-v, Randolph to Elizabeth, 20 August 1565; Advocates 1.2.2, fo. 27r, Randolph to Leicester, 19 September 1565; SP52/11, fos. 143r-145v; SP52/10, fo. 147r.

¹⁰⁷³ SP52/11, fo. 191r, Randolph to Leicester, 8 November 1565; SP52/11, fos. 62v, 135r.

intervention on the Lords behalf.¹⁰⁷⁴ Mary's enmity toward Elizabeth underpinned Randolph's ultimate argument that Mary now openly coveted the English throne while Elizabeth was alive. Utilising his access to Mary, conversations with her and intelligence from her court, Randolph argued that Mary's marriage to Darnley had only served to bolster the Scottish Queen's ambitions: in August 1565, he reported how Mary had said to him that after herself Darnley had the best claim to the English throne only belatedly adding 'I meane...after my good Syster'.¹⁰⁷⁵ He argued that seizing the English throne was Mary's ultimate aim 'yf she had power to her wyll' and that Darnley 'dothe imagen to be made the greateste that ever raigned in the Ile of Britanne' for 'they thynke ^our^ whole Countrie as good as their owne'.¹⁰⁷⁶ Randolph's horror at the prospect of Mary and Darnley acceding to the English throne and his 'feare [of] the greater inconvenience that in tyme maye insue to my cuntrye' aimed to increase the apprehension of the English Council, who, in June 1565, had concluded that the marriage was representative of Mary's intent to further her right 'not onelye to succede the Queens majesty...but to occupy the Queens estate'.¹⁰⁷⁷

Second, Randolph emphasised the danger of Catholic subversion inherent in Mary's claim to the throne. He sought to bring to life his colleagues' fears of an international Catholic conspiracy against Elizabeth spearheaded by Mary and her claim to the English throne whereby foreign Catholic powers would mobilise Catholic sympathisers 'in our owne bowells' to oust Elizabeth and replace her with Mary, through whom 'the Romish relligion shuld be erected ^& increased dayly^ in this realme'.¹⁰⁷⁸ Randolph gave credence to this view, arguing that at home and abroad Mary and Darnley were building their claim on Catholic support: 'theie do beare them selves bolde of no smale number amongeste you I meane in the Queens majestie Reaulme,

¹⁰⁷⁴ SP52/11, fo. 17r.

¹⁰⁷⁵ SP52/11, fo. 44v, Randolph to Cecil, 27 August 1565.

¹⁰⁷⁶ SP52/11, fos. 144v, 231r.

¹⁰⁷⁷ SP52/10, fos. 117v-118r.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid.

and maynie abroode as are papystes in Europe'.¹⁰⁷⁹ He informed Cecil that Mary had personally acknowledged that she was marshalling foreign support for her claim, relating how she had told him that if Elizabeth 'establshe the Crowne to an other' the King of France had promised 'he wyll tayke my parte...and some other frendes I truste to fynde that wyll healpe me yf I stonde in neade'.¹⁰⁸⁰ Randolph made clear that Mary's 'other frendes' were the Spaniards: Philip II to whom she had sent a messenger seeking his 'protection' and 'to induce hym to allowe of her doynge and to tayke parte in this Action'; and Margaret of Parma, Governor of the Netherlands, whom 'she hathe daylye to do'.¹⁰⁸¹ Within England, Randolph informed Cecil that Mary assured herself 'of the frendeshipe that she shall fynde amongeste the papystes of Englande'; and Darnley openly declared that 'thys Queen sholde fynde mo frendes in England then the Queen self'.¹⁰⁸² Given that they were working on this assumption, Randolph advised Cecil that if England would not openly aid the Protestant Lords then at least 'brydle ye your papistes at home, [and] cutte of all intelligences that passe between' them and Mary.¹⁰⁸³ Meanwhile, Randolph used his interactions with Mary to undermine her faith in her English Catholic supporters, arguing that 'she hathe byne abused' by their assurances of friendship and reminding her that she could have no better friend in England than Elizabeth.¹⁰⁸⁴

Ultimately, Randolph aimed, like the Lords, to paint Mary as Elizabeth's enemy. He furthered the Lords' attempts to associate the English with their plight: the Lords had been at pains to point out that Mary threatened them both, arguing that England should 'tack head' to Charles IX's promise to aid Mary 'in all hyr necessities' and that it was not only Protestantism in Scotland that was under threat as Darnley openly said 'he will not forgo the freindschip of the

¹⁰⁷⁹ SP52/10, fo. 105v.

¹⁰⁸⁰ SP52/11, fos. 44v-45r.

¹⁰⁸¹ SP52/11, fo. 118v.

¹⁰⁸² SP52/10, fos. 105v, 114r; SP52/11, fo. 5r, Randolph to Cecil, 2 August 1565.

¹⁰⁸³ SP52/10, fo. 126v, Randolph to Cecil, 12 June 1565.

¹⁰⁸⁴ SP52/11, fos. 5r, 44v-45r; Caligula B/X, fo. 324v, Randolph to Cecil, 16 July 1565.

papistis in England for the favouris of the protestantis of both the realmes'.¹⁰⁸⁵ Randolph sought to harness this sense that Mary was opposed not only to the Lords but also to the English, hoping it would be the means to unite the two parties: she 'hathe in heade not onlye agaynste these noble men, but farre above that yf she had power to her wyll'.¹⁰⁸⁶ Thus, he emphasised Mary's aggression toward England: hitting a nerve with Cecil, Randolph related how Mary openly called the English 'our olde ennemies' and appeared 'determined to deale with [us] in all extremitie'.¹⁰⁸⁷ To Randolph's mind, Mary was simply waiting for the right opportunity to attack Elizabeth. As he told his colleagues if the tables were turned and it were Elizabeth facing the revolt of her nobility, Mary 'wolde leave nothyng unattemptede'.¹⁰⁸⁸

Considering all the evidence against Mary, Randolph was incredulous that his superiors ignored his advice and instead pursued a policy of 'bearinge and comportinge with this Queen' and by the autumn of 1565 were offering to oversee a negotiated peace between Mary and her rebel Lords. He was horrified 'to see so myche yelded unto this Queens wyll (whoe is all togyther ennemie to my Sovereign)' and questioned how they could trust Mary when she openly threatened Elizabeth's position and England's future politico-religious security.¹⁰⁸⁹ On Christmas Day 1565, Randolph quizzed Cecil on this policy: 'yf you thynke yt inoughe to have this Queens owne frendeshipe, I aske you fyrste howe you wilbe farther assured of yt then maye mayke for her owne proffyt'.¹⁰⁹⁰ To Leicester he queried if Elizabeth did not support the Lords 'her friends here beinge once taken awaye wher will her majestie fynde the lyke?'.¹⁰⁹¹ Moreover, he implored Elizabeth to have 'in mynde what injuries are done unto her self by thys Queen what contempte by...my Lord Darlie...and also what practises are nowe in hande

¹⁰⁸⁵ SP52/11, fo. 97r.

¹⁰⁸⁶ SP52/11, fo. 144v.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Caligula B/X, fo. 330v, Randolph to Cecil, 19 July 1565; SP52/11, fo. 100r-v; SP52/11, fo. 105r, Council Consultation at Westminster, 24-29 September 1565; CP 140/1, Burghley's Journal, 29 October 1565.

¹⁰⁸⁸ SP52/11, fo. 89v.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ibid., fos. 198v-199r.

¹⁰⁹⁰ SP52/11, fo. 231v.

¹⁰⁹¹ Caligula B/IX/1, fo. 227v.

in all partes agaynste her'.¹⁰⁹² Again Randolph could count on the support of Bedford in opposing his government's lacklustre policy. Like Randolph, Bedford argued that Mary 'meaneth no peace, whatsoever we do'. He was mortified that Elizabeth intended to 'winke' at Mary's 'reprochefule and despitefull wordes...[and] her practises with Foreyne Realmes', underscoring his disapproval with the remark that 'her Majesties Father I am sure wold have thought moche of' such 'practises'. Moreover, Bedford actively disassociated himself from the English position, refusing to notify the Lords of the English government's intentions 'least they should thinke that I had bene a hinderer of them in this their Action'.¹⁰⁹³ For Bedford and Randolph the English government's position felt like a betrayal of their Scottish friends and co-religionists, and a dangerous game to play when England had so few true friends.

III. Randolph's Removal from Scotland

Randolph's ejection from Scotland in February 1566 and complete removal from involvement in Anglo-Scottish affairs in June of the same year was the result of two interconnected problems that made his diplomatic position untenable. First, his government's policy of re-establishing peaceful relations with Mary's court made him increasingly belligerent toward his colleagues. The Queen and her councillors could no longer control his behaviour or rely on him executing their preferred policy. Indeed, he was more likely to sabotage it, calling into question the veracity of the intelligence he sent home, which might be designed to incite further mistrust between the two Queens. Thus, for England he was no longer an appropriate diplomatic representative. Second, Mary became increasingly aggrieved at Randolph's behaviour and, as a result, came to oppose his involvement in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy.

¹⁰⁹² SP52/11, fo. 118v.

¹⁰⁹³ SP59/10, fo. 151r-v, Bedford to Cecil, 26 October 1565.

Over the course of the winter of 1565-6, Randolph was increasingly vehement in his opposition to Mary and, despite being warned by Moray not to continue, he began to directly attack his colleagues' political views leaving himself increasingly isolated.¹⁰⁹⁴ In February, having heard that Mary was ready to offer to restore Moray and his confederates to their positions in Scotland in exchange for recognition of Mary's right to succeed Elizabeth, Randolph wrote to '[ad]vise' Cecil 'to stonde harde to your Centre' against that 'parte of the Circumference' who supported Mary as Elizabeth's heir.¹⁰⁹⁵ In this number were Leicester and Throckmorton, whom Randolph reprimanded for their support of Mary's claim. Both men had tried to convince Randolph 'to ronne a newe course' and desist in his vociferous opposition to Mary but Randolph would not obey, for 'my harte wyll never yelde unto that which I see maye procure myche more dyscontentement in tyme to my self, to my frendes to my countrie then maynie men cane see or beleve at the fyrste syghte'.¹⁰⁹⁶ He told Leicester that 'yf ever your Lordship gyve your consent that ether she or her howsbonde succed to our Soverain that ther in you shall do agaynste god and your Countrie and bringe in as greate a plague unto our Nation as cane come owte of hell'.¹⁰⁹⁷ In accusing Leicester of working against his country's best interests, Randolph was transgressing the normal bounds of patron-client advisory behaviour. He was even more frank with Throckmorton, who was a personal friend: Randolph declared that, after experiencing the reign of Mary Tudor, he would never support Mary's succession claim and neither should Throckmorton.¹⁰⁹⁸ Randolph counselled Throckmorton that his 'parte' was 'to beware...and not to hazarde so great a matter as by makinge of this Queen heir apparant to bringe bothe those Countries in perpetuall subjection & thraldom'.¹⁰⁹⁹ It was this paranoia about Catholicism that underpinned Randolph's opposition to Mary – for him, her claim was

¹⁰⁹⁴ SP52/11, fo. 191v.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Caligula B/IX/1, fo. 241r-v.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Advocates 1.2.2, fo. 40r.

¹⁰⁹⁷ NLS, MS 3657, fo. 25v, Randolph to Leicester, 14 February 1566.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Advocates 1.2.2, fo. 40r-v.

¹⁰⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, fos. 40v, 43r.

inexorably linked to Catholic conspiracy and Protestant subversion – and it was this ideological stance that encouraged his growing frustration with what he perceived to be his colleagues’ failure to prioritise religion.

As seen above, Randolph believed that England’s godly monarch and government had a duty to act in the interests of religious preservation across the whole of the British Isles. He argued that it was the responsibility of his English colleagues to ‘mayntayne the Religion [and] consent never that Idolatrie shalbe erected in nether of the nationis agayne’.¹¹⁰⁰ As a result he judged his colleagues to be failing in their duty. He accused them of being misguided and ‘careles...[at] which waye the worlde goethe’: Randolph reported that Mary made her intentions clear when she declared ‘her self to have no moe ennemes in her Realme then she hathe protestantes’ and, in early 1566, proclaimed that ‘ther was no other Queen of England but her self’.¹¹⁰¹ At this time, Randolph’s anxiety was sharpened by what Julian Goodare has called Mary’s Catholic interlude – a moment where, for a few weeks, she appeared to be leaning toward a Catholic revival – and he carefully tracked her involvement with France and Spain for fear she might join their ‘confederacy to mayntayne papystrie throughe Chrystendome’ in exchange for their support for her claim to the English throne.¹¹⁰²

Randolph’s anxieties about what he perceived to be the English government’s willingness to acquiesce to policies that might endanger the security of Protestantism within the British Isles went beyond England’s response to Mary’s machinations and Anglo-Scottish affairs. He also expressed deep concern about the religious repercussions of English negotiations for a marriage between Elizabeth and the Archduke Charles of Austria. Randolph believed that such a marriage combined with acknowledging Mary as Elizabeth’s heir would result in the inversion

¹¹⁰⁰ Ibid., fo. 43r.

¹¹⁰¹ Advocates 1.2.2, fos. 41r, 41v, 43r.

¹¹⁰² SP52/12, fo. 9r, Randolph to Cecil, 7 February 1566; Goodare, ‘Catholic Interlude’, pp. 154-70.

of his, and many reformers', dream of the British Isles becoming a bastion for Protestantism.¹¹⁰³ Randolph's ideologically purist view meant that he did not share the sense of balance that most of his colleagues in London had. At a remove from the situation in London, Randolph exhibited a level of anxiety that was not in sync with the reality of the situation: negotiations with the Archduke were designed to protect England's religious stability and there was, as the 1566 Parliament later showed, no real likelihood of Mary being officially declared Elizabeth's heir at this time.¹¹⁰⁴ While Randolph's colleagues were concerned about the security of English Protestantism they were, on the whole, rightly less fearful than he was at this juncture, for instance they would not have agreed with Randolph's assessment of Darnley as 'the moste arrant papyste that of a noble man of maynie yeres was hatched in our Counterie'.¹¹⁰⁵ The disconnect between Randolph the ideologue and his more rational colleagues was palpable.

Randolph's powerlessness, his inability to have any impact on the shaping of England's policy toward Scotland, resulted in his increasingly despairing and desperate attempts to persuade his colleagues to take a stronger stance on Mary. This behaviour served to underscore his lack of alignment with his government and their inability to control him, ultimately, leading to his removal from involvement in policy on Scotland for the rest of Mary's personal reign. In January 1566, Randolph went beyond his usual aggressive opposition to Mary, engaging in dangerous slander to vilify her character. He railed at Leicester, berating him for allegedly increasing Mary's 'faction' in England 'for that so shall you have Religion overthrowne, your countrie torne in peces and never an honeste man lefte alyve that is goode or godlye'. However, in this letter, Randolph took a dangerous step beyond his (now usual) vitriol, adding that 'woe is me for you when David sonne shalbe a kynge of Englande'.¹¹⁰⁶ Randolph was suggesting

¹¹⁰³ Advocates 1.2.2, fo. 43r.

¹¹⁰⁴ Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony*, pp. 73-98.

¹¹⁰⁵ Advocates 1.2.2, fo. 40v; Randolph's comment likely inspired by Darnley flexing his Catholic credentials at this time, see Guy, *My Heart*, pp. 237-9.

¹¹⁰⁶ SP59/11, fo. 64v, Randolph to Leicester, 29 January 1566.

that the newly-pregnant Mary's child was not that of her husband but her secretary, Rizzio. These were serious allegations that threatened Mary's personal and monarchical integrity and, as a result, would have outraged Elizabeth, who, two years later, expressed her fury at Kirkcaldy for a similar offence, complaining that he portrayed his Queen as 'worce then anye commen woman'.¹¹⁰⁷ Leicester immediately responded by warning Randolph against such 'malicieus foolyshe and unadvised' reporting and notifying him that it was 'mislyked' and he 'the worce lyked for the wrytinge'. Randolph was recalcitrant: at this moment it was clear his English colleagues had lost control of him. Thus, he ignored Leicester's advice and refused to moderate his reports, excusing himself on the grounds that what he reported was common knowledge in Scotland and that to 'gyve warninge is my parte'. He argued that 'to wryte good whear I fynde none I maye not. To beare with thynges or to helpe matters ^whear no help is good^ nether god wolde be pleased nor my Soverain [well] served'.¹¹⁰⁸ Randolph would follow his principles and go his own way.

By the beginning of 1566 Randolph's position in Scotland was barely tenable due to Mary's suspicion of his support for the Lords, his own actions, and his treatment by the English government. Understandably, Mary was opposed to any Englishman she considered to be supportive of her rebels. For instance, she publicly declared Bedford to be 'the byttereste enemie she hathe'.¹¹⁰⁹ However, Mary's opposition had more serious implications for Randolph by virtue of his position. From the outset of Moray's rebellion, Randolph was *persona non grata* at the Scottish court. Mary posited that through 'previe conferens with her evle subjectes and Rebelles' Randolph had 'encouraged [the Lords] the more obstinatlye to stonde in contempte of their duties'.¹¹¹⁰ Moreover, she accused him of abusing his diplomatic

¹¹⁰⁷ NLS, MS 3657, fo. 32r; SP52/13, fo. 40r, Kirkcaldy to Bedford, 26 April 1567.

¹¹⁰⁸ NLS, MS 3657, fos. 24r-25r, 27r.

¹¹⁰⁹ SP59/10, fo. 65r.

¹¹¹⁰ SP52/11, fo. 39r, Randolph to Cecil, 20 August 1565; SP52/11, fo. 45r.

position to make false ‘reporte of her wordes and doynges’ in order to incite Elizabeth’s mistrust and disfavour toward her.¹¹¹¹ Mary sought to restrict his ability to engage with the Lords and thereby interrupt their communications with England: she had Randolph watched, which meant that his contacts had to visit him under the cover of night, and she threatened to put him under house arrest and, when that failed, asked him to withdraw to Berwick.¹¹¹² When he refused to do so without a declaration of ‘open warre’, an attempt was made to scare him away by ‘shott[ing] into his chambre, when it was seene he was there’.¹¹¹³ Such was Mary’s suspicion of Randolph’s intentions at this time that Elizabeth was forced to intercede on his behalf, asking Mary to trust in him despite her ‘doubt of his good behaviour in your affaires’.¹¹¹⁴

Randolph, however, did little to inspire Mary’s confidence. Instead, he confronted Mary on politically contentious issues outside the remit of his commission as Elizabeth’s diplomatic representative. First, he called Mary out on her true intentions towards Elizabeth, arguing that the only way to satisfy her insatiable desire for the English throne was for Elizabeth to ‘have taken the crowne from her owne heade and put yt upon hers’. Second, he took it upon himself to tackle Mary directly on what he considered to be the fundamental solution to all the problems of her rule (her conversion to Protestantism and taking on the mantle of a godly monarch), impressing upon her the importance of ‘her deutie to god’ and her responsibility ‘to frame her wyll to godes wyll’.¹¹¹⁵ Understandably this desire to confront her on controversial issues infuriated the Scottish Queen. However, the final nail in the coffin came from Randolph’s own government. In November, Elizabeth destroyed the last vestige of Randolph’s credit by renegeing on an agreement to send an embassy to Mary to negotiate a peace treaty and, rather

¹¹¹¹ SP52/11, fo. 45r; SP52/10, fo. 102v.

¹¹¹² Caligula B/X, fo. 313v; SP52/11, fo. 127r, Randolph to Cecil, 4 October 1565.

¹¹¹³ SP52/11, fo. 39r; SP59/10, fo. 65v.

¹¹¹⁴ SP52/11, fo. 168v, Elizabeth to Mary, 25 October 1565.

¹¹¹⁵ Caligula B/X, fos. 324r-325r.

than admit to changing her mind, she asked Randolph ‘to beare the default’ by pretending that he had mistaken her original instructions.¹¹¹⁶ This seemed to confirm Mary’s suspicion that Randolph was not reporting accurately and was in fact abusing his diplomatic duty. Thus, Randolph reported, Mary ‘was well pleased that I had so farre overshotte myself’ and took the opportunity to complain of the ‘maynie evle offices contrarie to commandemente’ that he had performed in Scotland.¹¹¹⁷ Six weeks later, Randolph was ejected from Scotland on trumped up charges of lending money to Moray. However, at Bedford’s behest, he remained at Berwick and engaged in Anglo-Scottish affairs until the summer of 1566 when he was finally recalled.¹¹¹⁸ It is probably no coincidence that Mary ordered Randolph out of Scotland during what Goodare has called her ‘Catholic interlude’: when she was reangling her foreign policy in response to the arrival of Catholic emissaries from France and a messenger from the Pope.¹¹¹⁹ In this situation, Randolph’s removal would have been in line with a policy pursuing closer relations with Catholic nations and distance from Protestant England.

Randolph’s involvement in Anglo-Scottish affairs was antithetical to England’s desire to return to more cordial relations with Scotland: he had become a liability and was no longer a good fit for the job of Anglo-Scottish diplomat. He was divided from his colleagues and his portrayal of Mary would undoubtedly have incensed Elizabeth. Moreover, Mary was ‘offendit with ^his parsones^’ and publicly blamed him for her poor relationship with England. In fact, Mary told the English she would accept ‘ony ^other^ mynister’ but not Randolph.¹¹²⁰ She blamed him for the difficulties in Anglo-Scottish relations during 1565-6, branding him a ‘mover of sedition and breeder of dyscorde between princes’ and, unhappy with his continued presence on the

¹¹¹⁶ SP52/11, fo. 207r, Elizabeth to Randolph, 26 November 1565.

¹¹¹⁷ SP52/11, fo. 226r, Randolph to Cecil, 15 December 1565.

¹¹¹⁸ SP52/12, fo. 18r, Mary to Elizabeth, 20 February 1566; SP59/11, fo. 92r, Bedford to Cecil, 26 February 1566; Lansdowne 9, fo. 55r, Elizabeth to Randolph, 9 June 1566.

¹¹¹⁹ Goodare, ‘Catholic Interlude’, p. 165.

¹¹²⁰ SP52/12, fo. 43v, Robert Melville to Elizabeth, 1 April 1566; SP52/12, fo. 63r, Robert Melville to Elizabeth, 23 May 1566.

Anglo-Scottish border following his ejection from Scotland, aimed for his permanent removal from Anglo-Scottish affairs by accusing him of writing a poem that denigrated her authority.¹¹²¹ The piece was actually written by one of Randolph's associates, Thomas Jenye, and addressed to Randolph with the title 'Maister Randolphe's Phantasy'.¹¹²² Nevertheless, Randolph could not deny that the poem mirrored many of the opinions he had expressed about Mary in recent months and, thus, could only assure Cecil that 'that which I have written to your honour...was so farre from my mynde to put in a booke'.¹¹²³ Although the English government appeared sceptical about his authorship of the work, Mary's disapproval of him was the reason alleged for his recall from the border in June 1566.¹¹²⁴ Randolph's ability to retain his diplomatic position and possess diplomatic agency was dependent on the support of the Scottish Queen and required him to fundamentally realign his priorities to bring them closer to those of his own government's policy toward Scotland. Having lost the former and unwilling to do the latter, it was impossible for Randolph to retain his diplomatic position despite the Lords, whom he had supported so assiduously, being restored to power in Scotland during the spring of 1566.

Randolph's departure from the Anglo-Scottish border signalled the end of his active, diplomatic role in Anglo-Scottish relations during the 1560s and marked the end of England retaining a permanent diplomatic representative at Mary's court. Randolph maintained a relatively low profile for the rest of the decade: Elizabeth consulted him on Anglo-Scottish affairs only once, in the wake of Mary's deposition in 1567, using the meeting not only to garner his advice but also to warn him off his friendship with Kirkcaldy and remind him of Elizabeth's dislike of those who denigrated the Scottish Queen. Following Mary's deposition

¹¹²¹ SP52/12, fos. 65r-67v, Randolph to Cecil, 26 May 1566, quote at fo. 66r.

¹¹²² SP52/11, fos. 241-254v, Jenye to Randolph, 31 December 1565.

¹¹²³ SP52/12, fo. 66r.

¹¹²⁴ SP52/12, fo. 43v; Lansdowne 9, fo. 55r.

and Moray's acceptance of the regency, Throckmorton advocated Randolph return to Scotland in a diplomatic position as his close relationship with Moray might help further Anglo-Scottish relations but, with Elizabeth unwilling to support Moray's regency, this advice went unheeded; and, in 1568, when Mary arrived in England and was put on trial, Randolph, her erstwhile detractor, was sent on a diplomatic mission to far off Russia.¹¹²⁵

One of the obvious questions when examining the breakdown of Randolph's position in Scotland and relationship with his own government is why did Elizabeth and her advisers not seek to remove Randolph sooner? The main reason was almost certainly Randolph's unparalleled connections within Scottish political circles and the access to intelligence that this brought. Hence, when Randolph was expelled from Scotland, Bedford requested he remain at the border so that he might continue to extract information from his sources of intelligence in Scotland.¹¹²⁶ It was through this means that Randolph and Bedford were able to inform Cecil of the plot to murder Rizzio prior to its attempt.¹¹²⁷ That England valued Randolph's socio-political connections with the Lords is further attested to in the spring of 1566 when Elizabeth sought Randolph's help to persuade Moray to help the English dissuade Argyll from allying with O'Neill.¹¹²⁸ Another key consideration was likely that the fast-moving situation of 1565 was not a receptive environment for a new diplomatic agent to establish himself: he would not have Randolph's access to the court or key politicians, nor his deep understanding of Scottish politics, and Mary might have insisted that any new diplomat be addressed to both her and Darnley. Elizabeth's refusal to recognise Darnley as Mary's consort might then have left them unable to replace Randolph. Furthermore, until February 1566, Mary continued to engage with Randolph as Elizabeth's representative. Finally, his real vitriol toward his colleagues did not

¹¹²⁵ NLS, MS 3657, fo. 32r-v.

¹¹²⁶ SP59/11, fo. 92r.

¹¹²⁷ SP52/12 fos. 28r-29r, Bedford and Randolph to Cecil, 6 March 1566.

¹¹²⁸ Lansdowne 9, fo. 53v, Elizabeth to Randolph, 23 May 1566.

become apparent until the turn of the year when it became clear that England had abandoned the Lords for a policy of peace with Scotland and Mary became increasingly aggressive in keeping with her brief Catholic revival.

Conclusion

Randolph's approach to the situation in 1565 showcases the synergy of different ideas about the right of subjects to resist monarchical rule and the role of noble councillors to act as a check to a monarch's absolute power in government. Voiced from the Scottish court and clearly echoing the ideas of some of his Scottish contacts like Knox and Buchanan, Randolph's justification of the Chaseabout Raid on the grounds of the noble Lords' right to resist, both on religious grounds and as noble councillors holding their monarch to account, suggests that these ideas were at least rumbling in the background during the Chaseabout Raid of 1565; and it is thus perhaps no surprise that two years later these notions of resistance were taken to their fullest extent with Mary's deposition.

The difficulties Randolph faced in 1565-6 demonstrate the limits of diplomatic agency and highlight what was required to be effective. Randolph could challenge Mary personally, present the rebel Lords' case in the best possible light and highlight all the benefits to England of supporting them. He could advise the Lords and act as a channel through which to petition England for military and monetary aid. But, when his government refused to pay heed to him and, indeed, appeared to disagree wholeheartedly with his perspective there was little he could do to influence the outcome of the situation. A diplomat could not operate effectively in opposition to his own government's political strategy: Randolph's agency lay in being able to persuade his Queen and her councillors to support the Lords against Mary. Unable to achieve this, Randolph was powerless to help the Lords.

Randolph's warning that England's refusal to help the rebel Lords in 1565 would damage relations between them proved correct.¹¹²⁹ England's abandonment of the Lords made them wary of relying on English support in the future. As Mary's rule disintegrated in 1567 both Robert Melville and Kirkcaldy reminded the English how Elizabeth's 'cauld usage of the Erle of Murraye' and 'slawe[ness] in all our last troubles...lost [her] that favor we did beare unto her'.¹¹³⁰ After 1565, the relationship was more distant and strained than it had been before: it was now abundantly clear that religious sympathies were not enough to bind together the leading Scottish lords and their counterparts in Elizabeth's regime; and that England would not yet compromise its own domestic security to aid co-religionists abroad. This thinking would once again come to the fore in Anglo-Scottish relations during 1567.

¹¹²⁹ SP52/11, fo. 231v.

¹¹³⁰ SP52/13, fo. 89r, Robert Melville to Throckmorton, 5 May 1567; SP52/13, fo. 35r, Kirkcaldy to Bedford, 20 April 1567.

Chapter 9

Throckmorton's Embassy to Scotland in 1567: Manipulating the Boundaries of Diplomatic Action and Counsel

Historically, the summer of 1567 has been seen as a moment of division between Elizabeth and Cecil on Anglo-Scottish policy: the Queen wanted the Scottish Lords, who had imprisoned Mary, to release her and restore her to power, whereas Cecil favoured Mary's removal and the Scottish Lords retaining the government of Scotland.¹¹³¹ Elizabeth's priority was preserving the authority of monarchy (she feared the Lords' treatment of Mary might set a precedent that her own subjects would seek to follow); Cecil's was preserving the Protestant, Anglo-Scottish alliance that he had been carefully crafting since 1560.¹¹³² But, as this chapter will show, this was far more serious than a policy disagreement between the Queen and her principal secretary. At this moment, Elizabeth was not just at odds with Cecil, she was at odds with much of her regime as many of her councillors, informal advisers and ambassadors were, like her principal

¹¹³¹ Lynch, 'Coronation', p. 185; Guy, *My Heart*, pp. 363-4.

¹¹³² SP59/14, fo. 48r.

secretary, deeply opposed to her approach to the Scottish situation. At the English court, Cecil worked alongside Leicester and Pembroke to mitigate Elizabeth's anger toward the Scottish Lords.¹¹³³ On the Anglo-Scottish border, Bedford was 'sorie to see' Elizabeth 'no better affected to the lordes in Scotland' and reminded Cecil 'how moche it shall stande us in stead to embrace their gentle offers and goodwilles'.¹¹³⁴ Likewise, from his country retreat at Apethorpe, another privy councillor, Walter Mildmay, 'mervayle[d] what respect moveth us here to stryve against the stream', noting 'how little that is for our policie'. Out of kilter with his Queen but in line with colleagues like Cecil and Throckmorton, with whom he corresponded about Scotland during the summer of 1567, Mildmay openly prioritised the 'propagation of goddes true Religion and perpetuall amitie betwene thes twoo countries'.¹¹³⁵ The situation was further complicated by the fact that, with many councillors away from court for the summer, there is no evidence of conciliar involvement in Anglo-Scottish affairs at this time. Instead, Elizabeth was personally managing English policy toward Scotland with the assistance of Leicester and Cecil, who returned to court in August.

Throckmorton was thrust into the middle of this tense situation when Elizabeth sent him as ambassador to Scotland between July and September 1567, instructed, against his own judgement, to secure Mary's release, restoration and reconciliation with the Scottish Lords.¹¹³⁶ Uncomfortable with Elizabeth's instructions, Throckmorton detoured on his way to Scotland to seek the opinions of his colleagues, Bacon and Mildmay. This collegial consultation mattered, for finding that Bacon and Mildmay concurred with Cecil, Throckmorton was bolstered in his opinion that 'when all is donne' the confederate Lords 'wylbe better Instrumentes to worke some benefyte and quyetnes to her Majestie and her Realme, than the

¹¹³³ SP52/14, fo. 112r, Cecil to Throckmorton, 11 August 1567.

¹¹³⁴ SP59/14, fo. 1r, Bedford to Cecil, 1 August 1567.

¹¹³⁵ SP70/93, fo. 12r, Mildmay to Throckmorton, 4 August 1567; SP12/43, fo. 89r, Mildmay to Cecil, 4 August 1567.

¹¹³⁶ SP52/13, fos. 83r-85r, Throckmorton's Instructions, 30 June 1567.

Queen of Scotlande'.¹¹³⁷ Throckmorton, like his colleagues, could not agree with Elizabeth's perspective on the situation. Unlike his Queen, he was not unduly concerned about subjects deposing their monarch; indeed, he had suggested just this course of action in relation to Mary in 1560. Throckmorton's priority was ensuring that England retained good relations with the Scottish government who, in the absence of English support, was threatening to re-establish relations with France.¹¹³⁸ As such, he saw a clear contrast between Elizabeth's position and what he, and his colleagues, perceived to be beneficial 'for the servyce off the realme [of England]'.¹¹³⁹ Elizabeth was well-aware that Throckmorton did not support her position, blaming his slowness in reaching Scotland on his reticence to enact his instructions.¹¹⁴⁰

First, this chapter considers how Throckmorton attempted to navigate the situation in such a way that he did not overtly disobey his orders. Instead, he manipulated the authority incumbent in his diplomatic position and exploited his knowledge that Elizabeth's priority was Mary's safety to forward his and his colleagues' preferred approach and limit the damage of Elizabeth's persistent opposition to the Lords. It pays particular attention to Throckmorton's pivotal intervention in favour of Mary's deposition which has gone unnoticed in recent historiography. This course of action directly contravened his instructions and resulted in an outcome to which his mistress was deeply opposed; but was one that Throckmorton's ally Cecil had hinted his approval of in his own set of instructions for Throckmorton, with a cryptic reference to the biblical tyrant Queen Athalia being deposed and killed in favour of the young King Joash.¹¹⁴¹ Second, it brings to the fore England's desire to gain possession of Mary's son and heir, James, a less well-known consideration in negotiations with Scotland at this time and

¹¹³⁷ SP52/14, fo. 3r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 1 July 1567; SP70/93, fo. 12r-v; SP52/14, fo. 20r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 11 July 1567.

¹¹³⁸ SP52/13, fos. 43r-44r, Kirkcaldy to Bedford, 8 May 1567; SP52/13, fo. 240r, Robert Melville to Throckmorton, 10 May 1567; SP52/14, fos. 5r-6r, Lethington to Cecil, 1 July 1567.

¹¹³⁹ SP52/14, fo. 59r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 25 July 1567.

¹¹⁴⁰ SP59/13, fo. 206r, Leicester to Throckmorton, 8 July 1567.

¹¹⁴¹ SP52/14, fo. 2r, Cecil's memoranda, 1 July 1567.

one that Elizabeth and her advisers wholeheartedly agreed upon. This was profoundly important both for England's immediate relationship with Scotland and for the continuing problem of the English succession question.

I. Throckmorton's Exploitation of his Diplomatic Position

The most significant way in which Throckmorton manipulated his diplomatic authority was by secretly sending Mary a letter, hidden in the scabbard of Robert Melville's sword, that encouraged her to accept the impossibility of her situation and abdicate the Scottish throne.¹¹⁴² Although the letter is no longer extant its content is hinted at in Mary's reply, sent via Melville on the day of her abdication, in which she thanked Throckmorton for his message.¹¹⁴³ While it is unclear when Elizabeth became aware of Throckmorton's actions, she later acknowledged the existence of the advice, albeit she denied that Throckmorton had been acting under her 'direction'.¹¹⁴⁴ Throckmorton's success in advising Mary in this instance partly lay in his ability to exploit the grey area between his own private actions and those taken in his role as Elizabeth's representative. However, it was also the result of Mary's trust in Throckmorton's advice and the counselling relationship he had developed with her. Mary, and her leading advisers, viewed Throckmorton as someone who was sympathetic to their position, hence their preference that he be one of the envoys sent to Prince James's baptism in 1566; they trusted him and felt able to 'confer' with Throckmorton on 'mony thingis quherunto we wald be laith ony uthers suld be [sent]'.¹¹⁴⁵ Although Throckmorton was not commissioned to attend, he did send Mary further advice for which he received thanks from the Scottish Queen, Lethington

¹¹⁴² Advocates 35.4.1, fo. 13r, Bishop Leslie's Discourse of his Proceedings in England (1568-71).

¹¹⁴³ Advocates 29.2.1, fo. 32r, Mary to Throckmorton, no date but evidence within the letter shows it to have been sent via Robert Melville who visited Mary at this time, see Labanoff, II, p. 60.

¹¹⁴⁴ SP53/12, fo. 56v, Elizabeth to Mary, 6 April 1583.

¹¹⁴⁵ SP52/12, fo. 98r, Moray to Elizabeth, 13 August 1566; Advocates 22.2.18, fo. 4v, Moray to Throckmorton, 9 June 1566; SP52/12, fo. 99v, Robert Melville to Cecil, 14 August 1566.

and Moray in January 1567.¹¹⁴⁶ Mary viewed Throckmorton as a politically influential figure at the English court and sought to capitalise on this: in early June 1567, before the battle of Carberry Hill, she wrote to encourage Throckmorton to ‘continew’ his ‘gude will’ toward her; concurrently, her new husband, the Earl of Bothwell wrote to Throckmorton hoping to curry favour for his marriage to Mary and their stance against the Confederate Lords.¹¹⁴⁷ Mary rated Throckmorton’s influence highly: the only other letters she and Bothwell are known to have sent at this critical moment were to Elizabeth’s principal advisers, Leicester and Cecil, and the Queen herself.¹¹⁴⁸ Because Mary trusted Throckmorton and viewed him as an authoritative figure within the English government, it is unsurprising that she trusted his advice to abdicate and believed it was imbued with Elizabeth’s authority. His advice would have confirmed to Mary the impossibility of her situation and that help was not immediately forthcoming leaving her with little choice but to acquiesce to the Lords’ demands for her to abdicate.

While recent historians make no mention of Throckmorton’s intervention, chronicle writers at the time, contemporaries, and Mary herself ascribed it great significance and played heavily on Throckmorton’s role in convincing Mary to abdicate. At her first trial in 1568, Mary’s commissioners emphasised the significance of their Queen ‘use[ing] his counsell’.¹¹⁴⁹ One of the commissioners, John Leslie, Bishop of Ross, writing his own account of the proceedings, relayed how Mary followed Throckmorton’s advice, noting how the ambassador had encouraged Mary to sign with the argument that ‘the same would never hurt her, beinge done in prison, and for feare of her life’ and that he had promised to uphold this by ‘testifie[ng] & avowe[ng] to the Queen his Mistres’ how Mary had signed against her will.¹¹⁵⁰ Similarly, the

¹¹⁴⁶ Advocates 22.2.18, fo. 1r, Mary to Throckmorton, 4 January 1567; Advocates 22.2.18, fo. 1v, Lethington to Throckmorton, 4 January 1567; Advocates 22.2.18, fo. 2r, Moray to Throckmorton, 4 January 1567.

¹¹⁴⁷ Advocates 22.2.18, fo. 6v, Mary to Throckmorton, 5 June 1567; Library of Congress, Autographs of European Notables, box 14, folder 1019, Bothwell to Throckmorton, 5 June 1567.

¹¹⁴⁸ NLS, Acc. 10144, Mary to Leicester, 5 June 1567; SP52/13, fo. 52r, Mary to Cecil, 5 June 1567; SP52/13, fo. 50r, Bothwell to Cecil, 5 June 1567; SP52/13, fo. 51r, Bothwell to Elizabeth, 5 June 1567.

¹¹⁴⁹ Caligula C/I, fo. 269r, Mary’s Commissioners Respond to Moray, 16 October 1568.

¹¹⁵⁰ Advocates 35.4.1, fo. 13r.

author of the Scottish *Diurnal* portrayed Mary as acting on Throckmorton's advice in signing the abdication papers, noting that the ambassador had warned her if she did not sign 'it wald cost hir hir lyiff'.¹¹⁵¹ In his later chronicle, Camden reiterated the point: Mary 'had against her will subscribed to the Instrument of her Resignation, by the Advice of Throckmorton, who had persuaded her, that her Resignation exorted in Prison, which is a just Fear, was utterly void'.¹¹⁵² All these sources agree that Throckmorton advised Mary to sign the abdication papers as, if signed under duress, they would not be legally valid. That this was so is confirmed by Elizabeth's later defence of this part of Throckmorton's advice.¹¹⁵³ Moreover, at this time, Throckmorton is known to have openly expounded this argument, countering the Lords' assertion that Mary had freely abdicated her throne by questioning 'what free wyll there might be or uncompsorye consent for a Prysoner and suche a one as every daye lowked for to loose her lyffe'.¹¹⁵⁴ This legal point appears to have been key in influencing Mary's decision to sign, for she believed she could later refuse to abide by the document's terms as she had signed under duress.¹¹⁵⁵

While the sources above offer a level of ambiguity as to whether Throckmorton gave Mary this advice of his own volition or in his capacity as Elizabeth's ambassador, the accounts of Mary's secretary Claude Nau and Mary herself do not allow such ambiguity. Nau alleged that Throckmorton 'by express order of his mistress...advised Queen Mary to sign the instruments'.¹¹⁵⁶ It is unlikely that in advising Mary to abdicate, Throckmorton would have gone so far as to claim he was acting on Elizabeth's express order; after all, this would have been inferred by his position as Elizabeth's ambassador. Moreover, such explicitness does not

¹¹⁵¹ T. Thomson (ed.), *A diurnal of remarkable occurrents that have passed within the country of Scotland since the death of King James the Fourth till the year M.D.LXXV* (Edinburgh, 1883), p. 221.

¹¹⁵² Camden, *Elizabeth*, p. 96.

¹¹⁵³ SP53/12, fo. 53r-v.

¹¹⁵⁴ SP52/14, fo. 98r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 9 August 1567.

¹¹⁵⁵ Guy, *My Heart*, p. 365.

¹¹⁵⁶ C. Nau, *The History of Mary Stewart, from the murder of Riccio until her flight into England* (Edinburgh, 1883), p. 64.

fit with his style of advising Mary at this juncture: another letter from Throckmorton to Mary around the time of her abdication pressed her to ‘eschewe the present daunger towards you’, an implicit reference to the fact that abdicating would alleviate the alleged threat to her life.¹¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Throckmorton had created a situation where Mary could (and would) claim that he was acting as Elizabeth’s representative and thus with her authority, and therefore the English Queen had a responsibility to support Mary in regaining the throne that had been wrongfully taken from her. Mary ascribed the advice to Elizabeth and, during her captivity in England, repeatedly portrayed herself as the victim of it. In late 1582, she reminded Elizabeth that Throckmorton ‘advised me on your behalf to sign’ the abdication papers and, the following year, complained that ‘seinge that demission proceeded from your majesties Ambassadour and was of no force’ Elizabeth ought to ‘have more consideracion of her Estate and not... mainteyne an act thought invalide in the opinion of the whole worlde by supportinge her enemyes’.¹¹⁵⁸ Throckmorton’s advice gave Mary a platform to complain justifiably of Elizabeth’s hypocrisy: she blamed the English Queen for giving her the advice, which had resulted in her losing her throne, and was outraged that Elizabeth had accepted the abdication when Throckmorton, allegedly acting in her stead, had told Mary that taken under duress it was not legally valid.

However cryptic his intervention might have been, Throckmorton knew he was taking a dangerous path. Furthermore, he ignored Leicester’s warning to leave immediately ‘yf you fynd any resolycyon among them that is lyke to tend to the deprivatyon or dystructyon of that Queen...for you know how easily some wyll sett fourth your furtheraunce’.¹¹⁵⁹ Throckmorton tried to alleviate the danger of falling foul of Elizabeth by exploiting her concern for Mary’s safety. He positioned his intervention as securing ‘the savyng off hyr [Mary’s] lyffe’ and

¹¹⁵⁷ SP59/13, fo. 293r, Throckmorton to Mary, 28 July 1567.

¹¹⁵⁸ ‘Throgmorton me conseilla de votre part de signer ceste dimission’, SP53/12, fo. 23v, Mary to Elizabeth, 8 November 1582; SP53/12, fo. 55r, Shrewsbury and Beale to Elizabeth, 16 April 1583; SP53/8, fo. 29v, Mary’s answer to Elizabeth, 14 February 1572.

¹¹⁵⁹ SP52/14, fo.39ar, Throckmorton to Bedford, 20 July 1567; SP59/13, fo. 272r.

thereby fulfilling Elizabeth's orders in his commission, telling his mistress that he had secretly told Mary to 'save her owne lyffe and her Chylde to chewse the leste harde condycyon'.¹¹⁶⁰ Elizabeth seems to have accepted this rationale, later arguing that Mary had no reason to 'find fault' with Throckmorton's advice as he had been acting to save her life.¹¹⁶¹ In fact a letter, written two days after Mary's abdication but before knowledge of it had arrived at the English court, suggests Elizabeth's tacit acknowledgement that Mary might be forced to abdicate. In the letter Elizabeth exhibits a realism that most historians have overlooked in her furious response to Mary's forced abdication, instructing Throckmorton 'to induce her to accord to that which shalbe most to savetie of her honour & quyetenes of her realme'.¹¹⁶² Luckily for Throckmorton, this was effectively a post facto endorsement of his advice.

Throckmorton's behaviour at this juncture is testament to the power of diplomats to exploit the authority imbued in their position. In encouraging Mary's abdication, Throckmorton had helped to achieve what he and his colleagues perceived to be the best outcome for England: the installation of a government run by the Protestant, Scottish Lords. Now, to reap the benefit of this turn of events, they had to alleviate Elizabeth's ire toward the Lords in order to maintain harmonious Anglo-Scottish relations.

II. Throckmorton's Manipulative Counsel

Throckmorton's letters have often been used to emphasise the threat to Mary's life. However, historians should be wary of taking them too literally, for Throckmorton's depiction of the danger to Mary was written for a purpose.¹¹⁶³ In reality, the threat to Mary's life was not as severe as Throckmorton made out. Certainly, by the end of July any threat that might have been

¹¹⁶⁰ Caligula C/III, fo. 569r; SP52/14, fo. 79r, Throckmorton to Leicester, 31 July 1567: 'I have at thys tyme preservyd hyr lyffe'; SP52/14, fo. 36v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 18 July 1567.

¹¹⁶¹ SP53/12, fo. 53r-v.

¹¹⁶² Caligula C/I, fo. 36r, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 26 July 1567.

¹¹⁶³ MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 218-9; Warnicke, *Mary*, locations 3124-3134.

present after Mary's submission at Carberry had petered out with her forced abdication. As Michael Lynch and Clare Webb have shown, the Lords were not a united group and as their aims became more extreme they lost support, culminating in the poor turn out for James's coronation.¹¹⁶⁴ In this environment, depriving Mary of her life would have alienated even more people from the Lords' banner at a time when they needed to encourage the outliers to unite with them. By the beginning of August, Throckmorton could confidently assure Leicester that 'thys woeful Quene shall not dy any violent deathe'.¹¹⁶⁵ But this was not the impression he sought to give Elizabeth. Writing to her on the same day, he prayed that the Scottish Lords did not come to an agreement 'suche as was betwixte Herode and Pylat to put Christe to deathe'.¹¹⁶⁶ Throckmorton knew it was advantageous to continue emphasising the threat to Mary's life because Elizabeth's concern to preserve it could be exploited to control her response to the Scottish situation and mitigate the damage of her opposition to the Lords. He would use it to restrain Elizabeth from avenging the Scottish Queen by acting against the Lords and to discourage her from further intervention in Scottish affairs.¹¹⁶⁷

Throughout August, Throckmorton tried to discourage Elizabeth from taking offensive action against the Lords in support of Mary with repeated warnings that 'nothyng can be more dangerous to hasten thys Quenes deathe' than Elizabeth's threat 'to extende your power agaynste them'. Throckmorton made it clear that it would be Elizabeth's own actions against the Lords that 'put the Quene in greate Jeoperdye of her lyffe'.¹¹⁶⁸ In this he was working in concert with Cecil, who was equally busy trying to allay Elizabeth's 'offence towards theis lords' and desire 'to reveng it by war' with the same argument that 'in running this course the

¹¹⁶⁴ Lynch, 'Coronation', pp. 183-6, 188-9; C. Webb, 'The 'Gude Regent'? A Diplomatic Perspective upon the Earl of Moray, Mary, Queen of Scots and the Scottish Regency, 1567-1570', (PhD, St. Andrews, 2008), pp. 20-8.

¹¹⁶⁵ SP52/14, fo. 101v, Throckmorton to Leicester, 9 August 1567.

¹¹⁶⁶ SP52/14, fo. 99r.

¹¹⁶⁷ Webb goes further, suggesting that Throckmorton's counsel was aimed at getting Elizabeth to support the Confederate Lords, Webb, "Gude Regent", p. 46.

¹¹⁶⁸ SP52/14, fo. 90r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 5 August 1567.

Quene might fall into more perill'. In the midst of his failing attempt to mollify Elizabeth, Cecil received Throckmorton's letters, remarking on the 'good opportunity, for therein she saw my reason largely exposed and so she began to pause'.¹¹⁶⁹ Both Throckmorton and Cecil took their argument a step further by suggesting that Elizabeth's actions designed to aid Mary might actually end up being turned against the English Queen: she might be accused of intentionally provoking the Lords to kill their Queen. Throckmorton reported to Elizabeth how Lethington had argued that Elizabeth actually sought to bring about Mary's death 'what shewe soever the Queen your Mistress or you doe make to save her lyffe'.¹¹⁷⁰ While Cecil told Throckmorton how he had advised Elizabeth that 'the malice of the world wold saye that the Queens Majesty used severite towards the Lords to urge them to rydd away the Quene'.¹¹⁷¹ Their arguments appear to have convinced Elizabeth, who told the French ambassador 'that [to use] extremity & force might bring danger to her [Mary's] person'.¹¹⁷² Naturally Elizabeth would not want to threaten her own reputation by encouraging a view that turned her good intentions into a dark, self-serving narrative whereby she rid herself of the rival claimant to her throne. Wallace MacCaffrey noted in passing how Elizabeth's ministers used the idea that Elizabeth's behaviour might push the Lords to kill Mary and the resultant damage to Elizabeth's reputation to keep her fury in check, but he did not explore the nature of this manipulative counsel and how it was being deployed more broadly to control Elizabeth's approach to the Scottish situation at this time.¹¹⁷³

This was manipulative counsel at its best: Throckmorton and Cecil were exploiting their Queen's deepest fear that Mary might be killed and her desire to be perceived to be acting in Mary's best interests. They did so because it was their only option to influence the outcome of

¹¹⁶⁹ SP52/14, fo. 112r.

¹¹⁷⁰ SP52/14, fo. 98r.

¹¹⁷¹ SP52/14, fo. 112r.

¹¹⁷² Caligula C/I, fo. 50r, Elizabeth to Norris, 27 September 1567.

¹¹⁷³ MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 220-1.

the situation for they were operating in a tight framework, straddling a difficult line between their duty to advise what they considered best for the realm and their duty to obey their monarch. This was worsened as Mary's deposition had made Elizabeth anxious about the loyalty of her own subjects. Hence, those trying to persuade the English Queen to 'mitigat' her anger against the Scottish Lords found themselves in 'danger' of Elizabeth 'conceiving that we are not dutifully mynded to hir Majesty as our sovereign'.¹¹⁷⁴ Bedford fell foul of this. He wrote to Elizabeth repudiating the accusation that he favoured the Lords and protesting that he had acted within his orders.¹¹⁷⁵ In the end obedience won out, as Bedford told Cecil, 'Those that serve must be directed alwayes though oftentimes it be to their great grief to putt in execucion all that they be commaunded'.¹¹⁷⁶ Cecil agreed, telling Throckmorton that 'howsoever hir Majesty shall in this cause...be offended with my argument, I will afir my opinion declared obey hir Majesty to doo that which is my office'.¹¹⁷⁷ So, unwilling to oppose Elizabeth, her advisers could only subtly try to mitigate the effect of her opposition to the Scottish Lords.

England's rival in Scotland at this time remained the French.¹¹⁷⁸ The competition to secure an alliance with Scotland between these two European powers conditioned both their responses to the unstable political situation in Scotland during the summer of 1567. Although the French would later offer their support to Mary and refuse to recognise James as King of Scotland, at this time their main concern was resurrecting the Auld Alliance and preventing the English gaining the upper-hand in Scotland.¹¹⁷⁹ The disparity between Elizabeth's aggressive stance and the French King's 'openness to negotiate' has been highlighted by Amy Blakeway, who noted how the French ambassador tacitly acknowledged Moray's legitimacy as Regent by

¹¹⁷⁴ SP59/14, fos. 48r-49r.

¹¹⁷⁵ SP59/14, fo. 27r, Bedford to Elizabeth, 13 August 1567.

¹¹⁷⁶ SP59/13, fo. 282r, Bedford to Cecil, 25 July 1567.

¹¹⁷⁷ SP59/14, fos. 48r-49r.

¹¹⁷⁸ For example, SP59/14, fo. 33r, Mildmay to Throckmorton, 15 August 1567.

¹¹⁷⁹ See Villeroy's instructions, *Relations Politique*, II, pp. 323-5; Webb, "Gude Regent", pp. 45-6.

accepting his parting gift of plate whereas the English refused to do so.¹¹⁸⁰ Throckmorton contrasted the French and English approach to the Scottish situation to justify his attempt to persuade Elizabeth to pursue a more self-serving policy. He saw how, unlike his own Queen, the French prioritised ‘renewe[ing] theyr olde league’ over Mary’s security and argued that to secure such a league the French ‘canne be as well contentyd to take it of this lyttell Kynge’ as of Mary.¹¹⁸¹

Seizing on the Anglo-French rivalry in Scotland and the potential French threat to English influence there, Throckmorton encouraged Elizabeth to take a more moderate stance toward the Lords by emphasising the contrast between her aggressive approach and the more tolerant approach of the French King, who had declared himself ‘parcyall of no syde’ and whose ambassador was instructed, unlike Throckmorton, to ‘usethe hymselfe very myldelye and all to the contentacion of theys men’.¹¹⁸² In laying bare the reaction of her fellow monarch Throckmorton hoped to inspire Elizabeth to act similarly: ‘to deale yn her speche...more caulmely then she dothe’ and ‘not to lett them [the Lords] se that hyr majestie woll shake off all theyr frendshypps & the amite off the contre, For surely that woll bryng a dangerus issu’.¹¹⁸³ Throckmorton feared that if Elizabeth’s anger did not relent there was a real danger of pushing the Lords into the arms of the French who treated them ‘amyablye’.¹¹⁸⁴ Lethington had warned him that ‘yf yow be over busye with us yow wyll dryve us faster to france then we have desire to ronne’; and alongside Moray, he told Throckmorton that if ‘you invade us, wee are sure Fraunce wyll ayde us’.¹¹⁸⁵ There was a strong sense amongst the English that the Scots would prefer to ally with them but, faced with Elizabeth’s aggression, they might out of necessity be

¹¹⁸⁰ A. Blakeway, *Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland* (Woodbridge, 2015), p. 213.

¹¹⁸¹ SP52/14, fo. 118v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 13 August 1567; SP52/14, fo. 113r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 12 August 1567; For French intentions see Lignerolles instructions, *Relations Politique*, II, p. 327.

¹¹⁸² SP52/14, fo. 120r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 13 August 1567; SP52/14, fo. 118v.

¹¹⁸³ SP52/14, fo. 130r, Throckmorton to Leicester, 14 August 1567.

¹¹⁸⁴ SP52/14, fo. 118r.

¹¹⁸⁵ SP52/14, fo. 103r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 9 August 1567; Caligula C/I, fo. 42v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 22 August 1567.

forced to ally with France. In August, William Drury argued that ‘yff they speake not Inglysche which they seame they wold fayne doe they wyle speake french for they have neade...to be compounded with some other’.¹¹⁸⁶ Likewise, Throckmorton argued that if Elizabeth ‘refuce[d]’ the Scots they ‘wyll be come good french’.¹¹⁸⁷ To Throckmorton and his colleagues it was clear that, unless Elizabeth changed her attitude, her approach might produce the exact outcome that they feared most: the revival of the Franco-Scottish league.

Unable to persuade Elizabeth to moderate her approach, Throckmorton was left with only one option: to secure his revocation, thereby preventing Elizabeth from readily intervening in Scottish affairs. This was damage limitation.¹¹⁸⁸ It was an approach the Scots recommended, Lethington had advised Throckmorton that ‘yt is to no pourpose for you to tarye here. Yow may make matters worse then they be’.¹¹⁸⁹ Throckmorton agreed that it was better for England ‘to lett these men alon[e with the]yre owne humors withowte any negotiation [with her] majestie then to treat with them as hyr majestie ys doing’.¹¹⁹⁰ Taking advantage of Leicester’s influence, Throckmorton used the Earl as an intermediary to advise Elizabeth that his continued stay in Scotland risked the principal tenet of his commission, Mary’s survival. Throckmorton employed his old tactic of warning that Elizabeth’s continued involvement in Scotland would have an adverse effect on Mary’s position, arguing that if he was instructed to remain in Scotland it would result in ‘the certayne dystuction off thys queene with hyr dyshonor’. But he did not stop there: he used Elizabeth and her advisers anxieties about the resurrection of the Auld Alliance and, in particular, as will be seen below, their fear that James might fall into the hands of the French by arguing that the continuation of his embassy might provoke the Scots

¹¹⁸⁶ SP59/14, fo. 7r, Drury to Cecil, 3 August 1567.

¹¹⁸⁷ SP52/14, fo. 130r.

¹¹⁸⁸ SP52/14, fo. 35r, Throckmorton to Cecil, 16 July 1567.

¹¹⁸⁹ SP52/14, fo. 103r.

¹¹⁹⁰ Caligula C/III, fo. 570r.

to revive their alliance and allow James to be ‘commyttyd to the frenche’.¹¹⁹¹ When Elizabeth resisted, Throckmorton used her opposition to the Lords against her. He noted that Moray, as Regent, was asserting both his precedence over all ambassadors and his right to receive them instead of the abdicated Queen and thus if Throckmorton stayed ‘yt maye seeme your Majestie dothe allowe (by me) of hys aucthorytye and of theyre procedinges’.¹¹⁹² This had the desired effect.

III. Anglo-French Rivalry and the Importance of James in the English Approach to Scotland in 1567

Most studies of this period approach the situation from the angle of Mary rather than considering the various influences on English approaches to Scotland in 1567. Alford has taken a broader view; however, his focus is not Mary’s fall, and English behaviour surrounding this, but Cecil’s plan to deal with Mary in the context of a British settlement during the later 1560s.¹¹⁹³ Thus, the important impact on how the English approached the Scottish situation in 1567 of Anglo-French rivalry and English domestic concerns has never been fully explained.

Most historians do not take seriously the threats of the Protestant Scottish Lords to renew their alliance with Catholic France; it was, for the most part, less a serious proposition than a tool of manipulation to exert pressure on the English to support, or at least not oppose, the Lords’ actions in deposing Mary and installing their own government in the name of King James.¹¹⁹⁴

However, it is unwise to be dismissive, as the threat of a renewed Franco-Scottish league had a profound impact on how Throckmorton and his English colleagues approached the Anglo-Scottish situation during the tumultuous summer of 1567. They feared the reassertion of French

¹¹⁹¹ Ibid., fo. 569r-v.

¹¹⁹² SP52/14, fo. 140r-v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 23 August 1567; See also Blakeway, *Regency*, p. 212.

¹¹⁹³ *EEP*, pp. 158-63.

¹¹⁹⁴ Webb, “Gude Regent”, pp. 41-6.

control in Scotland which had been severed by the English in 1560 and, as Cecil put it, ‘the loss of the fructes of vij or viij yers negotiation with scotland’ and a resultant ‘divorss’ in the cordial relations that had been established between the two nations.¹¹⁹⁵ These men feared a repeat of what many of them had personally witnessed in the 1540s, when the French had stepped in to support another Scottish Regent against the English and had spirited the young Queen Mary away to France thereby securing French influence in Scotland. It seemed all too likely to them that the French would attempt to exploit the unstable situation to take control of Mary’s son and heir, James. This anxiety was not unfounded: it was enhanced by intelligence reports from the English ambassador in France, Norris, who, within a month of Darnley’s murder, began writing to Throckmorton, Leicester, Cecil and Elizabeth of France’s ‘desier...to have the Prince hether’ and thereby ‘to ^gett^ Scotlande into ther devocion’.¹¹⁹⁶ Moreover, the French King’s immediate response to Mary’s imprisonment was to call for Moray, who was in France at the time, and offer to reward him in exchange for ‘helpinge hether the Prince and his mother’.¹¹⁹⁷ Norris reminded his colleagues of the ‘danger wherof bothe to the Quenis majestie and to the Realme’.¹¹⁹⁸ A ‘danger’ that was far greater than the possible renewal of French control in Scotland. James’s removal to France could have far-reaching repercussions for England: it was much more dangerous than Mary’s had been in the 1540s because of James’s claim after his mother to be the next heir to the English throne. Throckmorton lamented ‘what an Instrument the yonge Prynce wyll prove to unquyet Englande’ if the French gained control of his person and his upbringing.¹¹⁹⁹

¹¹⁹⁵ SP59/14, fo. 48r.

¹¹⁹⁶ SP70/89, fo. 115r, Norris to Throckmorton, 5 April 1567; SP70/90, fo. 84v, Norris to Throckmorton, 23 May 1567; SP70/89, fo. 27r, Norris to Cecil, 8 March 1567; SP70/90, fo. 89v, Norris to Elizabeth, 24 May 1567.

¹¹⁹⁷ SP70/92, fo. 4r, Norris to Elizabeth, 2 July 1567.

¹¹⁹⁸ SP70/90, fo. 84v.

¹¹⁹⁹ SP52/14, fo. 53r, Throckmorton to Leicester, 24 July 1567.

The threat posed by France possessing a potential heir to the English throne and a desire to end uncertainty over the English succession are often overlooked in the Mary-centric historiography of this period but, as Throckmorton's commission demonstrates, they were key considerations in England's approach to the situation in Scotland in 1567. England, like France, wanted to secure possession of James, bring him up in England, and mould him into the Protestant English King they desired. Thus the 'necessary havynge off the prynce off scott' was a proposition everyone within the Elizabethan regime, including the Queen and the anti-Stuart Cecil, could support and consequently it was accorded high priority in England's initial approach to the Lords in 1567.¹²⁰⁰ In early July, Cecil emphasised the centrality of James to England's Scottish policy in a letter to Sidney, Lord Deputy of Ireland, informing him that 'we ar at secret contention with the french, who shall gett the prince of Scotland, they fish with hookes of gold, and we but with speche'. He told him that Throckmorton was in Scotland handling the matter.¹²⁰¹ And indeed Elizabeth had instructed Throckmorton to treat with both the Lords and Mary to secure possession of James, promising that the Scottish prince would have 'as good savetye therin...as can be devysed for any that might be our Childe borne of our owine body' and reminding Mary 'how much good may ensue to her sone to be nourished and acquainted with our countrie'. For thereby 'many other good thinges may insew to him ^of no small moment hereafter to be by hir well allowed^'.¹²⁰² This was the elusive suggestion that he might by this means attain the English crown. The proposal was a sort of adoption of James by the English, who would acculturate him to England and ensure his integration into English political and religious society thereby enabling him to take on the role of English King if necessary. It would render invalid opposition to the Stuart claim on the grounds of foreignness and Catholicism and was reminiscent of the attempt to acculturate Mary inherent in Elizabeth's

¹²⁰⁰ SP52/14, fo. 3r; Blakeway, *Regency*, p. 193; Webb, "Gude Regent", pp. 40-1.

¹²⁰¹ SP63/21, fo. 133r, Cecil to Sidney, 13 July 1567.

¹²⁰² Advocates 22.2.18, fo. 7r-v, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 14 July 1567.

abortive plan to have Mary live at the English court if she had married Leicester in 1564. Both plans had the added advantage of ensuring English influence in Scotland in the present and future English domestic security. Moreover, in offering to take James into her protection, Elizabeth was in part playing to the request Mary had made the previous year, when she had feared for her life, ‘that the speciall care of the protection of hir sone sould rest upon’ the English Queen.¹²⁰³

English possession of James was not just a golden opportunity to solve the English succession problem, which had reached a fever pitch following James’s birth the previous year and had culminated in Parliament once again petitioning the Queen for a resolution.¹²⁰⁴ If James’s claim to the English throne was recognised, it also provided a potential way forward for those enthusiasts of Anglo-Scottish union, such as Cecil and Throckmorton, who had found the path to ensuring this in perpetuity difficult to achieve with two Queens upon the throne. In July, Norris expressed this hope to Cecil ‘that havynge the prince into your custody might be an occasyon to unytt the ij Realms together for ever to the great benyfitt of bothe the contreys’ and he observed that this was what the French most ‘feare[d]’ for then there was no way for them to regain their influence in Scotland.¹²⁰⁵

In the end, the Scottish Lords, whose own fragile government hung on the person of young James, refused to give him up without Elizabeth ‘inhablynge hym to the successyon of the Crowne of Englande’.¹²⁰⁶ This Elizabeth would not do. It would have required her to overcome her aversion to naming an heir and to acknowledge Mary’s deposition and disable her right to accede the English throne ahead of her son thereby bringing into question the sanctity of hereditary monarchy. Moreover, the dual purposes of Throckmorton’s mission – to secure

¹²⁰³ Advocates 22.2.18, p. 323, Scottish Ministry to English, October 1566.

¹²⁰⁴ *EEP*, pp. 142-157; MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 211-14.

¹²⁰⁵ SP70/92, fo. 34r, Norris to Cecil, 10 July 1567.

¹²⁰⁶ SP52/14, fo. 53r.

Mary's position and possession of the prince – did not tie well together, as Elizabeth's opposition to the Scottish Lords' actions made possession of James even more unobtainable. For instance, Elizabeth insisted on approaching both Mary and the Lords on this issue, despite Throckmorton telling her 'that the power to dysposse of the Prynce dothe rest and is lyke to reste in theys Lordes handes. So as the bargain that your Majestie is to make for hym must be compassed by theys mens favoures and Capytulacyons'.¹²⁰⁷ While in principle Elizabeth agreed with her advisers on the importance of securing James's person, in practice she was not willing to sacrifice Mary and her principles to secure it; her advisers, on the other hand, would. This further exacerbated the disagreement between Elizabeth and her advisers, like Cecil and Throckmorton, about English policy in Scotland at this time. The latter saw Elizabeth's unrelenting commitment to Mary as squandering a golden opportunity to secure James's person and thereby safeguard England's future relationship with Scotland, and potentially England's domestic succession problem. So the opportunity was lost but it is important to note that for a brief moment in the summer of 1567 this was seen as a very real solution to many of England's immediate problems; and, as Alford notes, possession of James continued to be a consideration for the English during Mary's first trial in 1568 and was also a feature of negotiations for a settlement in 1569.¹²⁰⁸

Conclusion

While existing historiography tends to focus on Cecil's opposition to Elizabeth's policy toward Scotland, and in particular her commitment to securing Mary's position; this chapter has demonstrated that Cecil was not alone. It has emphasised Elizabeth's isolation in her approach to the Scottish situation for 1567 presents a moment where the Queen was at odds with most of her regime as, like Cecil, Throckmorton and many other English counsellors could not

¹²⁰⁷ Caligula C/I, fo. 29v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 19 July 1567.

¹²⁰⁸ *EEP*, p. 180.

support Elizabeth's approach to the situation and, as demonstrated by Throckmorton's behaviour, actively sought to extend the boundaries of counsel in order to limit the potentially damaging effects of her opposition to the Scottish Lords.

This analysis of Throckmorton's diplomatic mission to Scotland has highlighted that ambassadors were able to exploit the authority inherent in their positions to give the impression that their monarch supported their approach when in reality it was not actually consistent with their monarch's wishes. Throckmorton did this in letting Mary believe that his encouragement for her to abdicate met with Elizabeth's approval and in persuading Elizabeth that he had done so because Mary's life was in danger, and he had been instructed to preserve it. Throckmorton's counsel was crucial in helping to steer England's response to the evolving Scottish situation and allowing the Scottish Lords some breathing space from Elizabeth's ire. His attempts to encourage Elizabeth to take a less antagonistic approach towards the Lords emphasise the ability of diplomats to capitalise on their first-hand access to foreign intelligence (such as the threat to Mary's life) in their counsel. It also underscores the importance of manipulative counselling techniques to a diplomat attempting to persuade their monarch into a course of action that they did not favour. This episode also demonstrates that the attempt to manipulate a monarch via counsel could be a collegial affair with diplomat's working with their colleagues at court to combine their counsels to achieve the greatest effect, as Cecil and Throckmorton did here. This chapter has also shown that this sort of counsel was necessary precisely because Throckmorton and Cecil recognised the limitations of their roles as counsellors: they appreciated that the final decision on policy was ultimately the Queen's and neither man would go so far as to disobey their monarch's orders openly, so counsel was the only way they could encourage Elizabeth to take a less aggressive approach toward the Scottish Lords and manipulate the course of English policy. This supports the view of early Elizabethan counselling practices, posited by Mears and Doran, whereby while Elizabeth's advisers might

not have agreed with her approach they ultimately deferred to her authority as their monarch, respecting that their role was to counsel and hers to command.¹²⁰⁹

Beyond emphasising the power and influence a diplomat could wield, this chapter has helped to broaden our understanding of the factors behind England's approach to the Scottish situation in 1567. Historiographically this period usually takes Mary and Anglo-Scottish relations as its focus with England's reaction portrayed as a division between Elizabeth's desire to support Mary and Cecil wanting to support the Lords and secure a Protestant, Anglophile government in Scotland. However, this chapter has shown it was more complicated than this and that the English response needs to be considered within the context of Anglo-French rivalry. Downplayed by arguments about the realism of the Protestant Scottish Lords allying with their old antagonists the Catholic French, the significant effect the competition between England and France for influence in Scotland had on their respective political perspectives at this time has been overlooked. While Mary's fate and dynastic rights might have been Elizabeth's priority, her advisers and her French counterparts prioritised national interests, primarily retaining their alliance with Scotland and gaining control of James. Possession of James offered England influence in Scotland and a potential heir to end the debate on who would succeed Elizabeth, and, for France, it presented an opportunity that harked back to the ideas of empire espoused by Henry II, enabling France to exert influence within Scotland and were James to succeed Elizabeth, England.

The English preoccupation with obtaining possession of James is often overlooked in current historiography but, as this chapter has shown, it is crucial to our understanding of English strategy in Scotland at this time. It was a key objective for Elizabeth's advisers and, as such, helped to define how they reacted to the Scottish situation. Although it did not come to fruition,

¹²⁰⁹ *Queenship*, pp. 1-44, 93-4; Doran, 'Queen Elizabeth', p. 8.

England's desire to secure possession of James had the potential to solve a lot of the country's immediate concerns, both domestically and within the British Isles, and it highlights the continued centrality of issues, like the succession, the security of English influence in Scotland and the idea of Anglo-Scottish union, to the English perspective on Scotland in these years. These would continue to be key concerns. However, by the autumn of 1567 the urgency had been taken out of the Scottish situation. France was now occupied with the outbreak of their second war of religion and, with the arrival of the Duke of Alva to reassert Catholic authority in the Netherlands in August 1567, everyone's attention refocused on the continental battle between Protestantism and Catholicism. It was this struggle that would inform Throckmorton's approach to the problem of Mary during the latter years of the decade, culminating in his involvement in the conspiracy to marry Mary to Norfolk in 1569.

Chapter 10

Counsel and the ‘Court Plot’ of 1569

The 1569 ‘court plot’ to marry Mary to Norfolk used to get conflated with the narratives of the Northern Rising and Ridolfi Plot.¹²¹⁰ This was furthered by it taking place just before the Northern Rising and Norfolk’s suspected complicity in both events. Furthermore, all those involved barring Leicester were subject to arrest and interrogation. Consequently, the original aim of the proposed marriage is often lost in the mire of a Catholic conspiracy to overthrow Elizabeth and her government. Moreover, Krista Kesselring argued that the secrecy of those involved in the ‘court plot’ lent their actions an air of conspiracy.¹²¹¹ However, it was mainly Elizabeth who was kept in the dark as those counsellors involved in the ‘plot’ evidently broached the subject with some of their colleagues, who would not support it. Certainly, by the summer of 1569 Cecil knew of the marriage plan and discussed it with Hunsdon on more than one occasion.¹²¹²

Understanding the rationale behind the ‘court plot’ has also been further distorted by historians’ attempts to use outmoded notions of factional conflict against Cecil to explain the involvement of committed Protestants like Leicester and Throckmorton.¹²¹³ However, Alford reframed the initial marriage scheme forwarded by Pembroke, Leicester, Arundel, and Throckmorton, as a political proposal and this is certainly how it should be seen.¹²¹⁴ It needs to be extricated from the seditious nature of the Northern Rising and Ridolfi Plot and reset within the confines of counsel. At its heart the Norfolk-Mary marriage was a considered piece of political counsel

¹²¹⁰ K. Kesselring, *The Northern Rebellion of 1569* (Basingstoke, 2007), p. 38 suggests the link between the ‘plot’ and Northern Rising is unclear.

¹²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹²¹² *EEP*, p. 200; SP59/16, fo. 84r, Hunsdon to Cecil, 30 August 1569.

¹²¹³ MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 357-60; Webb, “Gude Regent”, p. 143.

¹²¹⁴ *EEP*, p. 182.

crafted by a set of councillors, working outside the bounds of the Privy Council, and Throckmorton, a frequent extra-conciliar adviser to both the leading Lords involved and the Queen. It was a possible political solution to England's immediate problems: Mary's position as Elizabeth's prisoner and potential heir-presumptive, Anglo-Scottish relations and England's isolation as a lone Protestant power within an increasingly militant Catholic Europe. This initial proposal did not constitute a plot: it involved councillors and counsellors working together to construct a political proposal designed to be submitted to the monarch for approval or dismissal. Those involved intended to influence Elizabeth's decision thereon but had no intention of acting without her authority. This chapter will first examine the marriage proposal as a piece of counsel and consider what motivated Leicester, Pembroke, and Throckmorton to support it. It will then go on to explore in greater depth Throckmorton's role therein.

I. Motivations for the Marriage

Alford believed that there was a fundamental difference of perspective between Cecil, who masterminded a political settlement to tackle the problem of Mary (the 'three degrees' sent to Scotland in May 1569), and those counsellors involved in the 'court plot'. For Alford it was a divide between those who favoured a dynastic solution and those supporting a political one.¹²¹⁵ This section demonstrates that this distinction is by no means so clear cut. All of Elizabeth's advisers agreed on the threat Mary represented and the need to find a 'Remedie to provide for so dangerous a Woman' but differed on how to achieve it.¹²¹⁶ The marriage proposal was put forward as one solution. However, the distinction was far more subtle than a division between those who supported a political or dynastic settlement. It was rather between those counsellors who supported the political solution alone (like Cecil) and those who sought to secure it further. As will be seen, support for the Norfolk-Mary marriage was dependent upon the fulfilment of

¹²¹⁵ *EEP*, p. 199.

¹²¹⁶ CP 156, fo. 88r, Examination of Throckmorton, 10 October 1569.

a set of widely accepted political conditions for Mary's limited restoration and the future Anglo-Scottish relationship. In effect it depended upon the fulfilment of what Alford considered to be Cecil's 'political settlement' laid out in the 'three degrees'.¹²¹⁷ Those counsellors who supported the marriage did not believe that the political solution provided enough security against the threat from Mary, and consequently they proposed the Norfolk marriage to underpin the political settlement.

When considering the state of the realm in early 1569, Cecil, who objected to the marriage proposal, worried that the likely conclusions of the religious wars in France and of Spain's war against the Turks would enable the Catholic powers to refocus their attentions on England. The insecurity of Moray's government in Scotland was also a cause for concern.¹²¹⁸ These same fears formed the basis for Throckmorton, Leicester and Pembroke's support for the marriage proposal, which they argued was a reaction to their concern about the potential significance of broader changes in European affairs on Anglo-Scottish relations and Mary's uncertain position. Like Cecil, they were particularly worried about changes in 'the Estate of Thinges...in Scotland, in France and in Spain and that the Earl of Moray stood in so tickell Terms in Scotland'.¹²¹⁹ Similarly, the counsellors' aims behind the marriage proposal were not new, radical or seditious or, indeed, out of step with many of their colleagues who would not support the match. In outlining the conditions of their support for the marriage, Pembroke, Leicester and Throckmorton agreed that Mary had to: relinquish all claims that prejudiced Elizabeth; ensure the establishment of Protestantism in Scotland and England; dissolve the 'auld alliance' with France and make a new one with England; and allow 'that the government of scotland might be to the contentment of the Queen of England'.¹²²⁰ In stating these aims they were

¹²¹⁷ *EEP*, pp. 192, 199.

¹²¹⁸ CP 157, fos. 3r-3v, 'short memoryall', before March 1569.

¹²¹⁹ CP 156, fo. 88r-v.

¹²²⁰ CP 156, fo. 75r, Pembroke's Answer, 29 September 1569; these intentions were confirmed by the Bishop of Ross, SP53/3, fo. 112r, *hedis and articulis*, 16 July 1569.

simply endorsing the Elizabethan government's official standpoint on conditions for Mary's limited restoration set out during the negotiations around Mary's first trial in 1568 and, more recently, in the 'three degrees'.¹²²¹ Leicester, in particular, emphasised that the priority when dealing with Mary was preventing her from acting against Elizabeth and forcing her to stand by any agreement she made to secure her release and partial restoration. In March he suggested to Sussex that the best course of action would be to have Parliament pass a law that 'if the Queen of Scots should go about to infringe the agreement' she would forfeit 'all such titles and claims...never to be capable of any authority in this realm'. He also emphasised the importance of forcing Mary to maintain the religious *status quo* in Scotland for this would 'hold her Majesty a strong and continual party in Scotland' and 'the two realms will be so strongly united as no foreign Prince should send a force to break it'.¹²²²

The marriage was conceived as a protective policy by anxious counsellors who sought to counteract Elizabeth's willingness 'to make such a restoration of the Queen of Scots as she could not be sure of her'.¹²²³ It was an extra layer of security, a 'means' to 'tie' Mary to fulfilling the conditions that she agreed to and ensure that, as Leicester told Sussex, 'though she would break [with us], yet may she get no advantage' from doing so.¹²²⁴ The marriage was perceived to be a way to tie Mary into the English polity, diminish her position as a Catholic figurehead and prevent her making a foreign marriage. It was a response to fears, common amongst Elizabeth's advisers, that France or Spain would seek to exploit Mary's position in order to depose Elizabeth and reinstate Catholicism in England.¹²²⁵ In March 1569, Sadler argued that 'the Reformation of Religion in England is the next mark' the Catholic continental

¹²²¹ *EEP*, pp. 168-9; SP52/16, fo. 45r-v, 'three degrees', 16 May 1569.

¹²²² *Pepys*, p. 172, Leicester to Sussex, 1569.

¹²²³ CP 156, fo. 88v.

¹²²⁴ *Pepys*, p. 172.

¹²²⁵ See *Caligula C/II*, fos. 551r-564r, Answer to a little book that was published against the marriage of the Duke of Norfolk with the Scottish Queen.

powers shoot at and that to secure this aim ‘they will try to set up in the Queen’s place a Papist, a wicked Jezebel which is here in England’.¹²²⁶ Leicester voiced similar concerns, noting that the ‘setting up of her son does not take away her title’ in the eyes of the ‘great Princes of Christendom’.¹²²⁷ Moreover, the marriage scheme was designed to prevent Mary escaping to the continent and remarrying into one of the Catholic royal houses of Europe. Cecil mused that it was likely her marriage to Bothwell would be dissolved by the Pope ‘and so hir Mariadg expectant, is a grete furderance to hir cause which she may use to allure the good wills of manny strang princes’.¹²²⁸

Constraining Mary through an English marriage was not revolutionary. The Norfolk marriage proposal was modelled on the earlier Leicester marriage proposal which had had similar aims and secured Elizabeth’s support. Moreover, an English marriage (albeit not with Norfolk *per se*) had been a subject of discussion amongst some of Elizabeth’s advisers since Mary’s arrival in England in 1568. During the conference at York in October 1568, the potential of marrying Mary to one of Elizabeth’s maternal relatives was mooted in private discussion between Knollys, Norfolk and others.¹²²⁹ Knollys later wrote to Cecil advocating such a marriage on similar grounds to Throckmorton, Leicester and Pembroke’s later reasoning for supporting the Norfolk marriage: ‘I see not howe hyr majestie can safelye make a reconciliation & sett hyr in hyr seate...unless all forayn practises may be avoided by an ynglyshe maryage’.¹²³⁰ Knollys viewed an English marriage as a way to separate Mary from her Catholic supporters both at home and abroad for ‘I know not howe she shold sooner loose hyr credite amongst the papistes than by hyr maryage with an ynglysh man that favorethe the gossell’.¹²³¹ Although Knollys

¹²²⁶ *Pepys*, pp. 151-2, Sadler to Leicester, 21 March 1569.

¹²²⁷ *Pepys*, p. 171.

¹²²⁸ *Pepys*, pp. 167-8, Mildmay, 26 October 1569; SP53/3, fos. 53r-55v, Answers of Thomas Bishop, 25 February 1569; CP 157, fo. 3v.

¹²²⁹ Caligula C/I, fo. 263v, Knollys to Norfolk, 15 October 1568.

¹²³⁰ SP53/2, fo. 23r, Knollys to Cecil, 20 October 1568.

¹²³¹ Caligula C/I, fo. 287v, Knollys to Cecil, 25 October 1568; SP53/2, fo. 24r.

was not a supporter of the Norfolk marriage plan, his perception of the situation had much in common with those of his colleagues who did.

II. Throckmorton's Role

MacCaffrey viewed Throckmorton's involvement through the lens of Camden, believing it was driven by his enmity and jealousy of Cecil.¹²³² However, as this thesis has shown, Cecil and Throckmorton on the whole shared a strong collegial relationship. As Alford noted, inspired by Catholic aggression against the Protestants 'yn Flaunders & Fraunce', Throckmorton had by 1568 come to share Cecil's conspiratorial belief that 'the general deseigne [of the Catholic powers] ys to extermynate all nations dyssentyng with them yn relygion'.¹²³³ Like Cecil, Throckmorton saw Mary as 'the instrument' by which the Catholic powers would attempt to subjugate England and Scotland.¹²³⁴ Indeed, it was their shared reading of the international situation that led Alford to view Throckmorton's support for the Norfolk-Mary marriage as problematic.¹²³⁵ However, what Alford failed to consider is that since 1561 the men's approach to neutralising the threat from Mary had been entirely different. Cecil had sought Mary's exclusion; whereas Throckmorton had been concerned that excluding her would enhance her appeal as a Catholic figurehead and result in her 'come[ing] yn with force & violence lyke a conqueror'.¹²³⁶ So, following the death of Francis II, Throckmorton advocated policies that incorporated Mary, conditionally acknowledged her succession claim and used her as a tool to solidify Anglo-Scottish relations. In line with the 1569 plan, Throckmorton had consistently aimed to limit Mary's ability for independent action through imposing conditions upon her and securing an English Protestant husband for her, thereby diminishing her ability to attract

¹²³² MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 357-360; Camden, *Elizabeth*, p. 122.

¹²³³ CP 155, fo. 117r; *EEP*, pp. 185-6, 199.

¹²³⁴ Add. 33,531, fo. 79v, Throckmorton to Moray, 20 July 1569; CP 157, fo. 2r.

¹²³⁵ *EEP*, p. 199.

¹²³⁶ SP70/31, fo. 29r.

support from Catholic Europe. Throckmorton believed that this course of action would ensure that Mary ‘may wholly depend upon our Queen and none else’.¹²³⁷ This desire to cut Mary off from foreign, Catholic influences and encourage her dependence on Elizabeth had been at the heart of Throckmorton’s conditional approach to Mary’s place in the English succession and the importance he ascribed to controlling her remarriage after the death of her first husband, Francis II.

Although Throckmorton is often noted as a long-term supporter of Mary’s succession claim during the 1560s, he was making a ‘virtue of necessity’, remarking to Lennox in 1569 that while he believed there were fewer obstacles to her claim than to the others he would not like to live under her rule.¹²³⁸ However, believing that Mary’s claim was most likely to succeed and, having experienced the reign of Mary Tudor, Throckmorton was keen to put measures in place to mitigate dangers arising from her accession. Initially, he had advocated making her recognition as Elizabeth’s heir dependent upon her agreement to a set of conditions to protect Elizabeth’s position and ‘the commoditye off the realme off Englonde’.¹²³⁹ These conditions would likely have included protection for England’s religious *status quo* and control of Mary’s remarriage. From the moment she had been widowed in 1560, Throckmorton had highlighted the danger to England of Mary remarrying a powerful European Catholic. Moreover, Throckmorton had always believed that dynastic union was the most secure way to establish a lasting Anglo-Scottish alliance. Hence he had supported the proposal to marry Leicester to Mary and the Darnley marriage. So, Throckmorton’s support for the Norfolk-Mary marriage as a dynastic solution to manage the threat of Mary and fortify the Anglo-Scottish political settlement was in character.

¹²³⁷ Camden, *Elizabeth*, p. 128.

¹²³⁸ CP 156, fo. 98r, Throckmorton’s Answers, 14 October 1569.

¹²³⁹ SP70/28, fo. 83r.

Throckmorton's role in the Norfolk-Mary marriage highlights the collaborative nature of the 'plot'. Although allegedly informed of the marriage proposal by Norfolk, Throckmorton worked closely with Leicester and Pembroke. His engagement with these men and involvement in the 'plot' in general demonstrates that these men viewed their roles as advisory and the marriage as a piece of counsel to be put to the Queen. Initially, they sought advice from one another with Leicester asking Throckmorton, whose advice he often relied on, to 'way and to consider of the Case, that he might geve the better his advise and opinion' on the matter. Leicester also wanted to utilise the ex-diplomat's influence with Elizabeth as he observed that Throckmorton was 'one whom it please the Quenes Majestie to conferre with in Matiers of Importaunce'.¹²⁴⁰ Leicester hoped to use Throckmorton's influence with Elizabeth to bolster his own counsel to the Queen in favour of the match. Leicester's role was vital to the proposal as its success rested, in part, on him using his influence with Elizabeth to win her round to the idea.¹²⁴¹

Throckmorton also sought to counsel his Scottish colleagues and took it upon himself to persuade the reluctant Moray to support the match and proposals for Mary's limited restoration that accompanied it. Since his return from Scotland in 1567 Throckmorton had continued to be actively involved in Anglo-Scottish relations: in 1568 he liaised with Moray's representative, John Wood, on behalf of Elizabeth and Leicester with whom he was working closely, and later that year he was shortlisted as a commissioner for Mary's first trial, only ill health kept him away.¹²⁴² Although he would deny it when questioned, during the course of 1569

¹²⁴⁰ CP 156, fo. 88r.

¹²⁴¹ MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 322-323.

¹²⁴² Throckmorton to Wood, 31 July 1568, <https://www.bonhams.com/auction/20752/lot/189/mary-queen-of-scots-and-the-casket-letters-letter-signed-by-sir-nicholas-throckmorton-n-throckmorton-to-john-wood-1568/> [accessed 15/05/23]; SP12/47, fos. 75r-76v, 'Memorial Generall', 8 & 17 August 1568; SP12/47, fo. 84r, Walsingham to Cecil, 18 August 1568.

Throckmorton engaged with both Lethington and Moray in an attempt to rally Scottish support for the Norfolk-Mary marriage.¹²⁴³

Lethington was a keen participant in the marriage scheme, engaging in discussions on the subject with Norfolk at York in the autumn of 1568 and acting as a go-between for the English counsellors with Moray.¹²⁴⁴ He trusted Throckmorton and, when it became apparent that Moray would not support the Norfolk-Mary match, he wrote from his prison cell in the Castle of Edinburgh to Mary, advising her to put her trust in Throckmorton whom he described as ‘a wise man and your friend’.¹²⁴⁵ Throckmorton was central to Lethington’s last-ditch plan to persuade Moray to support the marriage and Mary’s limited restoration. Lethington sought to utilise Throckmorton’s support and his ‘credit with many here’ in Scotland. He wanted Mary to solicit Elizabeth to send Throckmorton to Scotland with a commission not dissimilar to the ‘three degrees’ she had sent by Wood in May 1569. This proposal by the English government to partially restore Mary had been summarily rejected at a conference of the Scottish nobility in late July 1569, which had also refused to allow Mary to divorce Bothwell. Lethington believed that having Elizabeth send ‘one of her own’, with whom Moray was well-acquainted, would encourage the Regent to rethink. Moreover, he thought that ‘what Sir Nicolas will say will be taken here for the mind of the English nobility, and most of ours will be brought to it’.¹²⁴⁶ Whether Lethington’s view was over-optimistic is less relevant than the faith he placed in the ex-diplomat’s ability to persuade Moray and his Scottish colleagues. In turn, Throckmorton placed his trust in Lethington as the principal Scottish advocate of the marriage scheme and someone who shared his view of the benefits of a Protestant, Anglo-Scottish union. During the summer of 1569, when it became clear that Moray and Lethington, who had acted

¹²⁴³ CP 156, fo. 89r.

¹²⁴⁴ Webb, “Gude Regent”, p. 146; Loughlin, ‘Maitland’, pp. 269-272.

¹²⁴⁵ Lethington was arrested on 2 September, Webb, “Gude Regent”, p. 146; SP53/4, fo. 17v, Lethington to Mary, 20 September 1569.

¹²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, fos. 17r-18r.

as the two pillars of Anglo-Scottish relations within the Scottish government since 1561, were diverging politically, Throckmorton warned the Regent that ‘when you shall leave to be advised by him [Lethington] and to truste him, you shall procure unto your selfe greatteste peril, and to the wholle state of your Countrey the gretteste hazarde’.¹²⁴⁷ Throckmorton and his colleagues privy to the marriage plot wanted Moray to take Lethington’s advice as he was advocating the English proposal for settling Mary’s restoration and the plan to marry Mary and Norfolk.

Throckmorton did more than simply advise Moray to trust Lethington and follow his counsel; he also sought to counsel the Regent directly. Moray had been crucial to the plan to put the Norfolk-Mary marriage proposal to Elizabeth: they wanted him to suggest it to her as a way to resolve the deadlock in Anglo-Scottish negotiations for Mary’s restoration. Posited in this context the proposal, they reasoned, would carry more weight with Elizabeth.¹²⁴⁸ Lulled into a false sense of security by Lethington and their own prior dealings with Moray on the subject, the counsellors (especially Throckmorton, Leicester and Norfolk) had badly miscalculated.¹²⁴⁹ Moray may have initially allowed them to believe he supported the scheme to gain support for his Regency at the English court, but his two-month delay in responding to the ‘three degrees’ and his reticence to engage with ‘what was intended and resolvede here concernyng the quene of Scotland aswell for her restauracion as for her dispositiun in marriage’ was a cause for concern by the summer of 1569.¹²⁵⁰ In July both Norfolk and Throckmorton wrote to persuade the Regent to ‘procede herin with such Expedition’. They had not banked on Moray’s ambition being stronger than his interest in what they perceived to be for the public good of both England and Scotland. When writing to persuade Moray to support their venture Norfolk and

¹²⁴⁷ Add. 33,531, fo. 80r.

¹²⁴⁸ MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, p. 310.

¹²⁴⁹ Add. 33,531, fos. 79r- 80r; Add. 32091, fo. 218r, Leicester to Moray, 17 May 1569; Advocates 1.2.2, fo. 21r, Norfolk to Moray, 20 May 1569; Caligula C/I, fo. 426r, Norfolk to Moray, 1 July 1569.

¹²⁵⁰ Add. 33,531, fo. 79r; Webb, “Gude Regent”, p. 146.

Throckmorton both played on his perceived commitment to ‘the maintenance of Godds Glory and the advancement of the common weale of this Iland’. Norfolk voiced his concern that Moray’s delaying tactics might give their enemies the opportunity to prevent ‘this good purpose...the uniting of this Land into one Kingdome in time coming, and the Maintenance of Godd’s true Relligion’.¹²⁵¹ Throckmorton was more aggressive. He invoked a mixture of pressure to act for the public good, threatening and dissuading Moray from believing there was an alternative solution. He argued that whilst now the Protestants had the upper hand with ‘credit and meanis to assuere all things there and here’, this was not an assured state. For Moray’s ‘impugning or colde [proceeding]’ might yet result in ‘yours and ours adversaries...posses[ing] the instrument thoccasion and all other circumstances to the ruine of Religion, you, and your countrey also, and to worke the lyke effectes amongst us mooste daungerouslye’.¹²⁵² This was an allusion to the possibility that the Catholic powers of Europe might use Mary against the Protestant regimes in Scotland and England if she were allowed to remain in her current uncertain state.

Throckmorton understood that Moray might by ‘perswacons be moved to thinke’ that he would find support in England ‘to impugne this disegne’. However, like Norfolk, Throckmorton sought to counter this argument by giving Moray the impression that the proposal was well-supported at the English court. Throckmorton contended that due to the uncertainty of the political situation Moray’s English ‘frendis whiche afoir tyme wer of a contrarie minde for the wholle, were violently constrained and by great necessitie urged to condescend thairunto’. And, while Throckmorton acknowledged that some Englishmen would oppose it, he argued that most would either ‘geve the loking on’ or ‘cary twoe faces in a hoode’ and that these men would ‘haste apace not to be lefte alone, when they shall see the hablest and the gretest runne

¹²⁵¹ Ibid.; Caligula C/I, fo. 426r-v.

¹²⁵² Add. 33,531, fo. 79r-v.

and concur together in favour of the Queen of Scottes'. Finally, Throckmorton sought to undermine Moray's belief that Elizabeth would not countenance the marriage with the reminder that 'yours experience past dothe teache you, that this quene could never accord her overthrow, or be contented to see her lyve dyspossessed of her state' and Elizabeth's current approach of 'neutralitie can not stande as the worlde standethe'. He even advised Moray not to set store 'by her majesties letter written to yow at this time' or 'thereby conjecture...what affection they be in this matter which have the principall credit about her [for] I can assure your lordship there is not one no not one which are of moment, that dothe not allow of this case'.¹²⁵³

Throckmorton knew that if he were to have any chance of persuading Moray to acquiesce to a limited restoration and a Norfolk-Mary marriage he would have to posit it as in Moray's own best interests. So, in a bid to cultivate Moray's trust, Throckmorton asserted that he wrote to 'perswade you to geve place where peradventure your conscience may be combred...[or] your honor [called] in dowbte' because he was concerned about the security of Moray's position in Scotland and feared 'your owne overthrowe'.¹²⁵⁴ This was not entirely disingenuous as Moray standing 'in so tickell Terms in Scotland' was one of the reasons that inspired Throckmorton, Leicester and Pembroke to support the Norfolk-Mary marriage.¹²⁵⁵ Throckmorton closed his letter with the argument that Moray's political survival depended on him acquiescing to Mary's limited restoration and the marriage, for 'if yow desist or becom an advers party yow wilbe so incombred both from henc, from thenc and from al other your neghboures as no man can advise you what to doe'.¹²⁵⁶ The letter fell on deaf ears, arguing that Lethington's later faith in Throckmorton's ability to persuade Moray was misplaced. A week after Throckmorton sent his letter, Moray convened the convention of the Scottish nobility at Perth that refused Mary's

¹²⁵³ *Ibid.*, fos. 79r-80r.

¹²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵⁵ CP 156, fo. 88r-v.

¹²⁵⁶ Add. 33,531, fo. 80r.

request to divorce Bothwell (and thereby prevented her remarriage to Norfolk) and rejected the ‘three degrees’ proposed by the English government for Mary’s limited restoration in Scotland. Norfolk wrote angrily to Moray complaining that he had not supported them as expected and warning him that as a result he would lose friends in England.¹²⁵⁷ Again the letter fell on deaf ears, Moray would not be moved and, as a result, those counsellors (in particular Leicester, Pembroke and Throckmorton) who had supported the marriage began to distance themselves from it, foreseeing that without Moray’s support they were unlikely to get Elizabeth to acquiesce to the proposal.¹²⁵⁸ For these counsellors the marriage plan required Elizabeth’s approval and without it the proposal was dead in the water.¹²⁵⁹

Conclusion

The Norfolk marriage ‘plot’ is demonstrative of counsel happening collegially and informally amongst men with similar shared aims, who worked outside the confines of the Council chamber (thereby circumventing an arena where they knew they would receive opposition) in order to devise a plan to address key political issues. These men believed they were acting, as Arundel declared, for ‘the weale of the Quene and the Realme’.¹²⁶⁰ Their reasons for supporting the match were concerns they shared with many of their colleagues that did not support it. Moreover, the conditional way in which Leicester, Pembroke and Throckmorton approached the match, only offering to support it in exchange for Mary’s commitment to a set of political and religious guarantees, makes it clear that they viewed it as a way to secure Mary’s compliance for a political settlement already endorsed by the majority of their colleagues.

¹²⁵⁷ Caligula C/I, fo. 435r, Norfolk to Moray, 14 August 1569.

¹²⁵⁸ MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, pp. 311, 322-3.

¹²⁵⁹ Lansdowne 102, fo. 149v, Cecil to White, 8 September 1569.

¹²⁶⁰ SP53/4, fo. 31r, Arundel’s Confession, 29 September 1569; CP 156, fo. 88r.

Those who did not support the match, like Cecil, could still appreciate that the marriage scheme was an extension of the English government's formal position laid out in the 'three degrees' and that it aimed to tackle widely accepted concerns about the danger of Mary's uncertain position in England. Cecil did not view the marriage 'plot' as seditious in its original format; instead, as Sussex acknowledged, Cecil believed that the 'entent' of those involved 'was honorable and loyall' and accepted that these counsellors supported the match only 'if the Queens good will might be had, but not otherwise'.¹²⁶¹ Once it was known that Elizabeth disapproved, Cecil remarked that 'no body dare deale therin'.¹²⁶² In fact, prior to the Northern Rising, Cecil appears to have believed that Elizabeth was overreacting in her response to the counsellors' scheming, advising the Queen that 'this cause be not made so terrible as it semeth your Majesty wold have it'.¹²⁶³ What appears to have most irked Elizabeth and inspired her anxiety is the underhand way in which these men conducted themselves. They did not make Elizabeth privy to their initial plans and, in so doing, she perceived them to have exceeded the bounds of their role as counsellors.¹²⁶⁴

Throckmorton's role in the marriage 'plot' demonstrates the political utility of an extra-conciliar advisor with diplomatic links. He was expected to advise his colleagues, Leicester and Pembroke, and counsel the Queen in unison with them. Moreover, with his personal experience of Mary and his acquaintance with Moray, Lethington and other Scots, Throckmorton had a valuable role to play in liaising with the Scots about the marriage. For Throckmorton, the marriage represented an opportunity to achieve the goals he had strived for over the decade: Anglo-Scottish unity, countering the threat of Mary and her place in the English succession, and solidifying English influence in Scotland.

¹²⁶¹ Caligula C/I, fo. 443r, Sussex to Cecil, 11 September 1569.

¹²⁶² Lansdowne 102, fo. 149v.

¹²⁶³ Caligula C/I, fo. 456r, Cecil to Elizabeth, 6 October 1569.

¹²⁶⁴ CP 156, fo. 51r, Cecil to Drury, 9 September 1569.

Conclusion

Absence from court has often been equated with political impotence, as counsel has typically been defined as taking place within the parameters of the court.¹²⁶⁵ However, this thesis's examination of Randolph and Throckmorton's political agency in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy during the 1560s demonstrates that this was not the case. Counsel had a much broader remit than otherwise supposed as diplomats resident abroad were able to wield significant influence in shaping the political relationship between countries by virtue of their position as the direct intermediary between two rulers, their first-hand access to foreign intelligence, and their connections to foreign ministers. Diplomats had the advantage of being able to fashion the first-hand information they relayed to counsel a course of action, as amply demonstrated by Throckmorton's actions in the summer of 1560 as the English were negotiating with the French in Edinburgh. He was so successful at convincing Elizabeth of the strength of England's position that his advice had the unintended consequence of almost derailing the peace negotiations as Elizabeth demanded the return of Calais and even contemplated an invasion of the French mainland.¹²⁶⁶ What is key here is that Throckmorton provided this effective counsel that influenced Elizabeth's political perspective, not through informal counselling sessions with the Queen at the English court but through his diplomatic letters from the distance of the French court.

This comparative study has consistently emphasised Throckmorton's ability to wield political influence and engage politically and contrasted it with Randolph's more limited political agency. It has contrasted their political experience, engagement, and differing educational and socio-political backgrounds to highlight the variety of experience of men in similar roles and

¹²⁶⁵ Haigh, *Elizabeth*, pp. 92, 101-2; MacCaffrey, *Making of Policy*, pp. 425-6; Adams, 'Clientage', p. 18; Adams, 'Eliza Enthroned?', p. 63. Even Mears focused primarily on informal models of counsel within the confines of the court, *Queenship*, pp. 33-72.

¹²⁶⁶ Ch. 5, pp. 144-8.

explore the reason behind their varied levels of political engagement and influence. It has argued that the primary reason was their different levels of political experience and, more significantly, integration into the socio-political fabric of the early Elizabethan regime. The links – noted by Alford, Jones and others – between the personnel and political culture of the Edwardian and early Elizabethan regimes are writ large in Throckmorton’s political inclusion and ability to offer effective counsel, and Randolph’s lack thereof, during the 1560s.¹²⁶⁷ Throckmorton’s connections to Cecil, Leicester, Bedford, Northampton and Pembroke stretched back to the 1540s and 1550s, and his political perspective developed, like theirs, as a result of their political and ideological experiences during the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI and Mary. Moreover, his influence with Elizabeth and her opinion of him was established prior to her accession. As a result, Throckmorton established himself as a politically influential adviser both at court and *in absentia*. He frequently advised Elizabeth and established close working relationships with Cecil and Leicester. Such was his influence at court that he was twice mistaken for a privy councillor by foreign ambassadors during this period.¹²⁶⁸ Throckmorton’s political engagement stands testament to the involvement of diplomats, and non-conciliar counsellors more broadly, in the collaborative processes of policy-making.¹²⁶⁹ As seen, at court he worked alongside Cecil and Leicester to assess the implications of Darnley’s return to Scotland and, when resident in Scotland, he advised Leicester, Cecil and Elizabeth on how to position England’s response to Darnley’s marriage to Mary. These recommendations were endorsed by the Privy Council and put into effect by the Queen. Again during the summer of 1567 he collaborated with Cecil and Leicester to prevent Elizabeth responding aggressively to Mary’s deposition. Moreover, Throckmorton’s career at court

¹²⁶⁷ Alford, *Kingship*, pp. 175-207; Jones, ‘Cambridge Connection’; Sowerby ‘Diplomatic Corps’.

¹²⁶⁸ Which also serves to highlight the confusion about extra-conciliar counsellors. J. Teulet (ed.), *Correspondance Diplomatique de Bertrand de Salignac de la Mothe Fenelon* (London, 1838), I, p. 170; *CSPS*, I, p. 447.

¹²⁶⁹ *EEP*, pp. 30-1, 45, 98-99.

demonstrates that an ambassador's influence and advisory role could continue after their embassy had ended if they had the socio-political connections to sustain it.

On the other hand, Randolph's lack of interpersonal relationships with key figures in the regime limited his political influence at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign. He began to develop these relationships during the 1560s and, as they developed, he increasingly proffered advice. His lack of connections left him unable to work outside the remit of his diplomatic role or establish himself in a broader advisory capacity at the English court. This picture of Randolph contrasts sharply with Mears' view of him as a key non-conciliar adviser because her examples of his influence are drawn from much later in Elizabeth's reign (1580s).¹²⁷⁰ It was socio-political connections and experience that differentiated Randolph from more successful royal servants with whom he shared a legal educational background, such as Smith, who was ambassador to France and then a privy councillor, or even Cecil himself. This suggests that education was a basic requirement for a political career, but an individual's socio-political integration is what enabled them to attain political influence.

Throckmorton and Randolph's varied experiences underscore the primacy of political intimacy and socio-political connections in defining and enabling political influence and diplomatic agency. It was the crucial determinant in the level of political influence they were able to wield and the extent of their political engagement. It suggests a far broader remit for considering extra-conciliar counselling practices. While these have typically been viewed in terms of the Queen consulting on an ad-hoc, informal basis within the setting of the court, this thesis's analysis of diplomatic counsel shows that counsel was regularly transmitted from outside the remit of the court through letters and messengers. Our concept of 'access' therefore needs to be expanded to include correspondence. An ambassador's access did not disappear when

¹²⁷⁰ *Queenship*, pp. 43-4, 50, 69.

abroad as he had a direct channel to the Queen through his letters. This was a privileged channel which they could use to transmit intelligence for Elizabeth's eyes only or to counsel the Queen on sensitive issues, such as her relationship with Leicester. Moreover, Elizabeth could be possessive over letters sent directly to her, sometimes retaining sections, or whole letters, for herself.

Significantly, it was not just their relationships with Elizabeth (as is usually the focus of such studies) that were important but those with her key advisers and privy councillors. Mears briefly explored these networks between councillors and non-conciliar advisers, but more work needs to be done to fully uncover the extent of the latter's role within the collaborative counselling practices.¹²⁷¹ Throckmorton and Randolph worked in unison with Elizabeth's councillors, each other and other non-conciliar advisers, such as Killigrew, to counsel the Queen and forward Anglo-Scottish policies. Likewise, Elizabeth and her principal advisers worked with non-councillors and sought their advice on key matters of policy. This thesis has helped to broaden our understanding of how these relationships worked, how friendship, both affected and real, was key to this political inclusion. Our understanding of such socio-political relationships is currently hampered by the dearth of information on individual privy councillors – aside from Cecil – and their networks. This needs to be redressed.

In addition, further studies are needed to uncover whether the collaborative nature of policy-making and diplomats' agency as non-conciliar advisers were particular to the 1560s or practised more widely outside this decade. It may be that this kind of collegial style of counselling was a facet of the style of counselling many Elizabethans had experienced during the reign of Edward VI.

¹²⁷¹ *Queenship*, pp. 59-66.

The concept of advisers attempting to ‘bounce’ the Queen into a course of action has been well-explored and is reiterated in parts of this thesis. Rather than demonstrating weakness on Elizabeth’s part, this approach to counselling the Queen emphasises the centrality of her political role as the key decision-maker: she was the person who had to be convinced and in key moments of political crises, such as Mary’s deposition in 1567, it was Elizabeth who personally handled the English response. Counsel was the primary means by which her advisers could influence her approach thus they used it to forward their preferred strategies. However, what is less well-considered, is that this style of counselling was not just deployed with Elizabeth but with her councillors too. This thesis has shown the importance that diplomats, like Throckmorton, ascribed to counselling the Council – whom he contended with on several occasions – and Elizabeth’s key advisers. The reason behind this was, as Doran has observed, that Elizabeth was more likely to reach a decision on policy when there was consensus amongst her Council on the matter.¹²⁷² This approach is underscored by Throckmorton’s attempt to encourage the Council to unite behind a forward policy in Scotland in 1560 when Elizabeth was prevaricating.

This thesis has also showcased two less well-known strategies of counsel. It has demonstrated that the personal nature of politics was also ingrained in the strategies of persuasion employed in counsel. Throckmorton’s personal knowledge of, and shared experiences with, the Queen and her councillors enabled him to position his counsel more effectively. He was able to tailor his counsel to strike a note with the recipient, for he knew which historical examples and philosophers to draw on for best effect, which emotive memories and experiences to tap into to substantiate his point, and he was able to play on their aspirations, likes and dislikes to

¹²⁷² Doran, ‘Counsel’, p. 165.

enhance his counsel. Personal knowledge of the recipient of an individual's counsel could be a critical tool of persuasion in a counsellor's rhetorical arsenal.

Furthermore, this thesis has illustrated how individuals could exploit their colleagues' commitment to the principles of a good counsellor (the classical-humanist *vir civilis*) to hold them to account over their actions or lack thereof. Chapter three reveals how Throckmorton reminded Cecil of his duty as a councillor and lectured Pembroke and Northampton when Elizabeth was considering marriage to Leicester in 1561. Chapter eight shows Randolph using similar techniques when trying to persuade Leicester that to support Mary was to act against England's best interests. The principles of the *vir civilis* provided a basis for counsellors to hold one another to account.

Diplomats did not just need to possess strong relationships at home, they also needed to craft them at their host courts. The importance of these latter relationships in securing an individual's diplomatic influence is evident in Randolph's case. His political influence derived primarily from the close, collaborative relationships he established with Mary's leading advisers, Moray and Lethington, and other Scots. These connections were the reason he remained in Scotland after 1560 and they were what enabled him to mediate successfully between the two Queens during 1561-4. The depth of Randolph's connection to these men and the synergy they expressed was unusual. Ultimately, it was his loyalty to Moray and commitment to Protestantism that led to his opposition to Mary and the end of his diplomatic tenure in Scotland. Randolph was closer to the Scots he resided with for six years than his English colleagues, with whom he had for the most part no prior connection before 1558. Consequently, his influence was primarily limited to Anglo-Scottish affairs. This made him the perfect example for Bell and Platt's hypothesis that Elizabethan diplomats were divided into

contingents of regional advisers.¹²⁷³ However, Randolph's experience was not the norm, as evidenced by the many diplomatic agents (such as Walsingham or Smith) who also attained significant roles within Elizabeth's domestic government, often on the Privy Council. Or, as in the case of Throckmorton, were able to use their ambassadorial role as a platform to craft an informal advisory position at the English court. What enabled some individuals to become established in an informal advisory role at court was likely their level of integration within the socio-political fabric of the regime, possession of wide-ranging connections, and intimacy with the monarch and her key councillors. However, competency was of course another factor.

While Randolph relied on his connections within Mary's regime, Throckmorton's diplomatic agency in Anglo-Scottish affairs came primarily through the unique advisory relationship he established with Mary herself. He used Mary's desire to be recognised as Elizabeth's heir to counsel her to pursue policies that were favourable to English interests. The advisory relationship Throckmorton established with Mary, while self-serving, was underpinned by his desire to ameliorate the danger to England's Protestant regime if Mary succeeded the English throne. It was in step with many of his diplomatic actions during this time, and with his decision (from 1561) to support Mary's conditional recognition as the rightful heir to Elizabeth's throne.

From this thesis's exploration of Throckmorton's conditional approach to accepting Mary as Elizabeth's heir we understand better why some English Protestants decided to support Mary. Their behaviour was a response to the same concerns about containing the threat from Mary as those that sought to exclude Mary, like Cecil. The conditional nature of this support (or application of protective measures against Mary's free rule) is key to reconciling why someone like Throckmorton could support Mary's marriage to Norfolk, while wholeheartedly agreeing with Cecil on the threat she posed.¹²⁷⁴ Their methods to protect the English state from the

¹²⁷³ Bell, *Handlist*, p. 15; Platt, 'Diplomatic Service', 104.

¹²⁷⁴ *EEP*, p. 199.

potential danger of a Catholic succession were simply different: Cecil chose to exclude whereas Throckmorton sought to constrain Mary's freedom of action with conditions she had to agree to and marriage to a Protestant, English noble. Alford distilled it down to those individuals that supported Mary favouring a dynastic settlement for Anglo-Scottish relations.¹²⁷⁵ But, for Throckmorton at least, Mary's remarriage was more about providing for England's security with the Scottish Queen as heir presumptive than about establishing an Anglo-Scottish alliance.

Considering Anglo-Scottish diplomacy through the lens of Throckmorton and Randolph has revealed the tension, as much as the desire for amity, in the relationship between England and Scotland during this period contrary to the image put forth by many scholars.¹²⁷⁶ Randolph and Throckmorton's experiences demonstrate that the relationship was fragile from the start with many individuals unable to forget the trials and tribulations of the 1540s. The language of love and amity employed in 1559-60 was more often a useful foil to foster positive relations than an expression of genuine affection. My deeper exploration of the perspectives and influence of these two diplomats has highlighted that while commonality of religion was important, British perspectives tended to be primarily ruled by national priorities; and this contributed to the difficulties the Anglo-Scottish partnership faced after Mary's return to Scotland. Throckmorton, like Cecil, prioritised English national security in his conceptualisation of a British perspective. Randolph, however, was different. His desire to aid co-religionists abroad and establish a Protestant bastion in the British Isles informed his perspective. It is difficult to say whether he was unique in this or not as, other than Cecil (and now Throckmorton), there has been little investigation into the British perspectives held by Elizabethan advisers.

Throckmorton and Randolph's insights shed new light on several incidents in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy. They have, for instance, flagged English and Scottish hopes that Mary might

¹²⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁷⁶ Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish', pp. 87-114; *EEP*, pp. 43-70; Kellar, *Scotland*, pp. 170-212.

convert in the early years after her return to Scotland. They have enabled an exploration of the impact of the outbreak of the French wars of religion on Anglo-Scottish relations during 1562-3. Throckmorton's correspondence during 1564-5 has shed new light on the contentious issue of why Elizabeth risked allowing Darnley to go to Scotland in early 1565.¹²⁷⁷ This thesis also draws attention to the consensus between Elizabeth and her advisers on the need to gain possession of Mary's son and heir, James in 1567, a key issue but often overlooked in the Mary-centric analyses.¹²⁷⁸ Elizabethan counsellors saw an opportunity to potentially solve England's succession problem by taking control of James.

Examining Throckmorton and Randolph's approach to Anglo-Scottish relations and Mary's monarchical authority has enabled a broader consideration of the application of resistance theories and ideas about limited monarchy in this period. Typically, Elizabethan perspectives on these issues are considered either in relation to their Marian experience (and the publications of Knox and others resistance tracts) or in a domestic context through the notion of mixed monarchy or Collinson's monarchical republic.¹²⁷⁹ Yet, Randolph and Throckmorton engaged with these ideas and applied them in relation to Mary's rule. The set of rules that Mary should abide by that Randolph drew up at her return in 1561 are characteristic of limited monarchy. Randolph wanted to prevent her making decisions that damaged the politico-religious *status quo* and thus argued that she would only be an acceptable monarch if her Protestant nobility restrained her ability to act independently. In 1565, when Mary threw off her Protestant councillors and went her own way, Randolph, in keeping with many exponents of resistance theory, deemed her an ungodly and thus unsuitable ruler. Importantly, Randolph's advocacy of limiting Mary's monarchical autonomy and ultimately resisting her authority rested on her

¹²⁷⁷ Adams, 'Darnley', 133-44; Warnicke, *Mary*, location 2113; Dawson, 'Mary'; *EEP*, pp. 122-41.

¹²⁷⁸ The exception is a brief mention in MacCaffrey, *Shaping*, p. 219.

¹²⁷⁹ McLaren, *Political Culture*, pp. 84-113; Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays*, pp. 31-58; McDiarmid (ed.), *Monarchical Republic*.

being a Catholic ruler. Similarly, Throckmorton's desire to impose conditions on Mary succeeding Elizabeth centred on protecting England's Protestant regime from the accession of a Catholic monarch. This suggests that ideas about limiting or abrogating monarchical authority were circulating broadly within the Elizabethan regime and could be employed when politically advantageous to safeguard Protestantism and the English regime. This fits with Throckmorton and Cecil advocating Mary's deposition to the rebel Scots in 1560 for England's political benefit.

Throckmorton and Randolph's approaches suggest the broader acceptability of ideas about limiting or abrogating monarchical authority in times of emergency to protect the Protestant state. Their respect for monarchical authority appears to have been driven by what was beneficial to the security of England's Protestant regime. Theirs were not quasi-republican perspectives (à la Collinson), they were extraordinary protective measures designed to deal with the threat presented by Mary (to Protestantism in Scotland and potentially England).¹²⁸⁰ This was a politics of emergency akin to Cecil's plan to establish the succession in the event of Elizabeth's death without a named heir.¹²⁸¹ Randolph made clear that it was Mary's religion that justified action. Thus, while they could justify limiting the authority of an ungodly, Catholic monarch, it is unlikely they would have felt comfortable doing the same for a Protestant monarch, such as Elizabeth.

¹²⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹²⁸¹ Alford, 'Politics of Emergency'.

Bibliography

I. Manuscripts & Archives

Bodleian Library, Oxford:

Ballard 10
Perrot 3

British Library, London:

Add. 5,753
Add. 23109
Add. 32091
Add. 32652
Add. 33531
Add. 33591
Add. 33592
Add. 33593
Add. 35125
Add. 35830
Add. 35831
Add. 35838
Add. 39838
Add. 39866
Add. 48027
Add. 48043
Add. 48149
Cotton Caligula C/I
Cotton Caligula C/III
Cotton Caligula B/X
Cotton Caligula B/IX
Cotton Caligula B/IX/1
Cotton Caligula E/V 79
Cotton Julius F/VI
Cotton Galba C/I
Cotton Titus C/VII
Egerton 1049
Egerton 1818
Harley 416
Harley 260
Harley 398
Harley 6990
Harley 6994
Lansdowne 3
Lansdowne 4
Lansdowne 5
Lansdowne 8
Lansdowne 9
Lansdowne 12

Lansdowne 15
Lansdowne 102
Lansdowne 106
Lansdowne 155
Lansdowne 817
Sloane 1786
Sloane 3199
Stowe 142
Stowe 145
Stowe 147
Stowe 280
Royal 13 B 1

Christ Church, Oxford:

Chapter Book 1547-1619

Corpus Christi College, Cambridge:

Parker Library 102
Parker Library 543

Lambeth Palace Library:

3196

Library of Congress:

Box 14, folder 1019

The National Archives, London:

E351/541
LC 2/4/3
Longleat Misc. MS. Box no. 5, Vol. no. 17, 1531
PC 2/4
PC 2/7
PROB 11/54
PROB 11/71
SP 12/1
SP 12/2
SP 12/7
SP 12/17
SP 12/42
SP 12/46
SP 12/47
SP 15/9/2
SP 15/13
SP 15/14
SP 46/162

SP 52/1
SP 52/2
SP 52/3
SP 52/4
SP 52/5
SP 52/6
SP 52/7
SP 52/8
SP 52/9
SP 52/10
SP 52/11
SP 52/12
SP 52/13
SP 52/14
SP 52/18
SP 53/4
SP 53/8
SP 53/12
SP 59/2
SP 59/10
SP 59/11
SP 59/13
SP 59/14
SP 63/17
SP 68/7
SP 68/9
SP 68/9A
SP 69/9
SP 69/10
SP 69/13
SP 70/1
SP 70/5
SP 70/6
SP 70/7
SP 70/8
SP 70/9
SP 70/11
SP 70/12
SP 70/13
SP 70/14
SP 70/15
SP 70/16
SP 70/17
SP 70/18
SP 70/19
SP 70/20
SP 70/21
SP 70/22
SP 70/23
SP 70/24

SP 70/25
SP 70/26
SP 70/27
SP 70/28
SP 70/30
SP 70/31
SP 70/33
SP 70/34
SP 70/35
SP 70/36
SP 70/37
SP 70/38
SP 70/39
SP 70/41
SP 70/50
SP 70/51
SP 70/65
SP 70/74
SP 70/77
SP 70/90
SP 70/93
SP 70/103
SP 70/116
SP 70/119
STAC 4/7/51

Hatfield House:

CP 2
CP 140
CP 150
CP 152
CP 153
CP 154
CP 155
CP 156
CP 157

Magdalene College, Cambridge:

PL 2502

Oxford University Archives:

Reg. Cancell. GG (Hyp/A/5)

The National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh:

Acc. 10144
Advocates 1.2.2

Advocates 22.2.18
Advocates 29.2.1
Advocates 33.1.1
Advocates 35.4.1
3657
6135

II. Printed Primary Sources

Calendars:

- Clifford, Arthur (ed.), *The State Papers and Letters of Sir Ralph Sadler* (Edinburgh, 1809), I.
Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Edward VI, IV & V (London, 1926).
Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Philip & Mary, I (London, 1937).
Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Philip & Mary, IV (London, 1939).
Hume, Martin (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs Preserved Principally in the Archive of Simancas* (London, 1892).
Rigg, James (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Relating to English Affairs, Preserved Principally at Rome* (London, 1916).

Throckmorton's book collection, Magdalen College, Oxford:

- Bouchart, Alain, *Les croniques annalles des pays dangleterre et Bretaigne* (Paris, 1531).
Bouchet, Jean, *Les annales d'Aquitaine* (Poitiers, 1557)
Bourdigne, Jean, *Hystoire agregatiue des annalles et cronicques Daniou* (Angers, 1529).
Gilles, Nicole, *Les treselegantes & copieuses annales et croniques, des treschrestiens & excellens moderateurs des beliqueuses Gaulles* (Paris, 1551).
Lemaire de Belges, Jean, *Les illustrations de Gaule et singularitez de Troye* (Lyon, 1549).
Machiavelli, Niccolò, *Le Prince* (Paris, 1553).
Nagerel, Jean, *Histoire de Normendie* (Rouen, 1558).

All Souls College, Oxford:

- Galhardo, German, *Primera parte de las sentencias que hasta nuestros tiempos, para edificacion de buenos costumbres, estan por diuersos autores escriptas, en este tratado summariamente referidas, en su propio estilo* (Lisbon, 1554). [Shelfmark: nn.2.15]

Other Printed Primary Sources:

- Adams, Simon and Archer, Ian (eds.), *Religion, Politics and Society in Sixteenth Century England, Camden Fifth Series*, 22 (Cambridge, 2003).
- Anonymous, *A Treatise of Treasons against Queen Elizabeth, and the Crowne of England* (Leuven, 1572).
- Ascham, Roger, *The Schoolmaster*, ed. Henry Morley (London, 1900).
- Aylmer, John, *An Harborewe for Faithfull and Trewe Subjectes* (London, 1559).
- Ayre, John (ed.), *The Works of John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury* (Cambridge, 1850).
- Bacon, Francis, *Scrinia Ceciliania* (London, 1663).
- Bohun, Edmund, *The Character of Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1693).
- Camden, William, *History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth* (London, 1688).
- Chambers, David, *Faculty Office Registers, 1534-1549: A Calendar of the First Two Registers of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Faculty Office* (Oxford, 1966).
- Dee, John, *General and Rare Memorials Pertayning to the Perfect Arte of Navigation* (London, 1577).
- Elyot, Thomas, *The Boke Named the Governour, Deuysed by Syr Thomas Elyot* (London, 1537).
- Elyot, Thomas, *The Banket of Sapience Gathered Oute of Dyuers and Many Godlye Authoures* (London, 1539).
- Forbes, Patrick, *A Full View of the Public Transactions in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth*, 2 vols (London, 1740, 1741).
- Fuller, Thomas, *The History of the Worthies of England who for parts and learning have been eminent in the several counties: together with an historical narrative of the native commodities and rarities in each county* (London, 1662).
- Gentili, Alberico, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, II, ed. Gordon Laing (Oxford, 1924).
- Gilby, Anthony, *An Admonition to England and Scotland in John Knox, The appellation of John Knox* (Geneva, 1558).
- Guiccardini, Francesco, *Maxims and Reflections (Ricordi)*, ed. Mario Domandi and Nicolai Rubinstein (Pennsylvania, 1992).
- Hackluyt, Richard, *The Principall Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation* (1589).
- Harding, Thomas, *A Reiondre*, (Antwerp, 1566).

- Hartley, Terrence (ed.), *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I, 1558- 1581*, I (Leicester, 1981).
- Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Pepys Manuscripts Preserved at Magdalene College, Cambridge*, 70 (Hereford, 1911).
- Hoby, Thomas (ed.), *The Courtyer of Count Baldessar Castilio* (London, 1561).
- Hotman, Jean, *L'Ambassadeur* (Paris, 1603).
- Hume Brown, Peter (ed.), *Vernacular Writings of George Buchanan* (Edinburgh, 1892).
- Jewel, John, *Certaine Sermons Preached Before the Queenes Maiestie, and at Paules Crosse, by the Reuerend Father Iohn Ievvel Late Bishop of Salisburie* (London, 1583).
- Labanoff, Aleksandr (ed.), *Lettres, Instructions et Mémoires; publ. et accompagnés d'un résumé chronologique par le prince A. Labanoff*, 7 vols (London, 1844).
- Laing, David (ed.), *Works of John Knox* (New York, 1966).
- Lamb, John (ed.), *A Collection of Letters, Statutes and other documents from the MS library of Corpus Christi College* (London, 1838).
- Le Laboureur, Jean (ed.), *Les Memoires de Messire Michel Castelnau* (Brussels, 1731), I.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò, *The Prince*, ed. Harvey Mansfield (Chicago, 1998).
- MacCulloch, Diarmaid, 'The *Vita Mariae Angliae Reginae* of Robert Wingfield of Brantham', *Camden Fourth Series*, 29 (1984).
- Mason, Roger (ed.), *Knox: On Rebellion* (Cambridge, 1994).
- McGinnis, Paul and Williamson, Arthur (eds.), *George Buchanan: The Political Poetry* (Edinburgh, 1995).
- Nau, Claude, *The History of Mary Stewart, from the murder of Riccio until her flight into England* (Edinburgh, 1883).
- Neale, John, 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton's Advice to Queen Elizabeth on Her Accession to the Throne', *The English Historical Review*, 65 (1950), 91-8.
- Nichols, John (ed.), *Liber Quotidianus Contrarotulatoris Garderobae* (London, 1787).
- Nichols, John (ed.), *Literary Remains of King Edward the Sixth* (London, 1857).
- Nichols, John (ed.), *The Chronicle of Queen Jane and of Two Years of Queen Mary* (London, 1850).
- Nichols, John (ed.), *Narratives of the Days of the Reformation* (London, 1859).
- Norton, Thomas, *Orations, of Arsanes Agaynst Philip the Trecherous Kyng of Macedone* (London, 1560).

- Norton, Thomas, *The Tragedie of Gorboduc* (London, 1565).
- Parsons, Robert, *A Conference About the Next Succession to the Crown of England* (1681).
- Patterson, Annabel (ed.), *The Trial of Nicholas Throckmorton* (Toronto, 1998).
- Potter, David (ed.), *The Letters of Paul de Foix* (Cambridge, 2020).
- Powell, Edgar, (ed.), *The Travels and Life of Sir Thomas Hoby* (London, 1902).
- Rainold, Richard, *A Booke Called the Foundacion of Rhetorike* (London, 1563).
- Ramsey, John (ed.), *Sallust's Bellum Catilinae* (Oxford, 2007).
- Robinson, Hastings (ed.), *Original Letters Relative to the English Reformation* (Cambridge, 1847), I.
- Robinson, Hasting (eds), *The Zurich Letters* (Cambridge, 1845), I.
- Rodriguez-Salgado, Mia and Adams, Simon (eds.), 'The Count of Feria's Dispatch to Philip II of 14 November 1558', *Camden Fourth Series, 29: Camden Miscellany XXVIII* (1984).
- Scoble, Andrew (ed.), *The Memoirs of Philip de Commines*, II (London, 1856).
- Seymour, Edward, *An Epistle or Exhortacion, to Vnitie [and] Peace* (London, 1548).
- Smith, Thomas, *De Republica Anglorum: A Discourse on the Commonwealth of England*, ed. Leonard Alston (Cambridge, 1906).
- Strype, John, *Ecclesiastical Memorials*, II, pt. I (Oxford, 1822).
- Teulet, Alexandre (ed.), *Correspondance Diplomatique de Bertrand de Salignac de la Mothe Fenelon* (London, 1838), I.
- Teulet, Alexandre (ed.), *Relations Politiques de la France et de L'Espagne avec L'Ecosse* (Paris, 1862).
- Thomson, Thomas (ed.), *A Diurnal of Remarkable Occurrents that have passed within the country of Scotland since the death of King James the Fourth till the year M.D.LXXV* (Edinburgh, 1883).
- Thomson, Thomas (ed.), *Memoirs of his own life by Sir James Melville of Halhill. M.D.XLIX.-M.D.XCIII* (Edinburgh, 1827).
- Thynne, Francis, *The Perfect Ambassadour treating of the antiquitie, priveledges, and behaviour of men belonging to that function* (London, 1652).
- Townsend, Aubrey (ed.), *The Writings of John Bradford* (Cambridge, 1848).
- Warkentin, Germaine (ed.), *The Queen's Majesty's Passage* (Toronto, 2004).

III. Electronic Primary Sources

Christies:

Sale 7590, <https://www.christies.com/lotfinder/Lot/elizabeth-i-1533-1603-queen-of-england-and-5080773-details.aspx>

Bonhams:

Lot 189, <https://www.bonhams.com/auctions/20752/lot/189/>

Other Online Sources:

Chaucer, Geoffrey 'Wife of Bath's Prologue', *The Canterbury Tales*,
<http://www.librarius.com/cantran/wifetale/wifetale401-436.htm> [accessed 13/12/23].

Cicero, *De Officiis*, ed. W. Miller (London, 1913),
<https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Cic.+Off.+1.22&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048> [accessed 02/08/16].

Cicero, *Laelius de Amicitia*,
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/Laelius_de_Amicitia/text*.html [accessed 16/09/15].

Cicero, *Letters to his Friends*, ed. E. Shuckburgh, 4 vols (London, 1908-9),
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0022%3Atext%3DF%3Abook%3D1%3Aletter%3D7> [accessed 10/07/16].

Foxe, John, *The Actes and Monuments* (1570 and 1576 editions), <https://www.dhi.ac.uk/foxe/> [accessed 13/12/23].

Holinshed, Raphael, *Holinshed's Chronicles*,
http://www.english.ox.ac.uk/Holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_0541 [accessed 08/02/15]

Horace, *Odes*, DOI: 10.4159/DLCL.horace-odes.2004 [accessed 01/05/20].

Terence, *Heauton Timorumenos*, <https://www.thelatinlibrary.com/ter.heauton.html> [accessed 13/12/23].

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, ed. R. Crawley (London, 1910),
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0200%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D60> [accessed 01/05/16].

IV. Printed Secondary Works

Adair, Edward, 'William Thomas: A Forgotten Clerk of the Privy Council', in Robert Seton-Watson (ed.), *Tudor Studies* (New York, 1970), pp. 133-160.

- Adams, Simon, 'Eliza Enthroned? The Court and its Politics', in Christopher Haigh (ed.), *The Reign of Elizabeth I* (London, 1984), pp. 55-77.
- Adams, Simon, 'Faction, Clientage and Party: English politics, 1550 -1603', in Simon Adams (ed.), *Leicester and the Court* (Manchester, 2002), pp. 13-23.
- Adams, Simon, 'Favourites and Factions at the Elizabethan Court' in Simon Adams (ed.), *Leicester and the Court* (Manchester, 2002), pp. 46-67.
- Adams, Simon, 'The Release of Lord Darnley and the Failure of the Amity', *Innes Review*, 38 (1987), 123-53.
- Alford, Stephen, *Burghley: William Cecil at the Court of Elizabeth I* (Yale, 2011).
- Alford, Stephen, *The Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the British Succession Crisis, 1558-1569* (Cambridge, 2002).
- Alford, Stephen, 'From Estate to State, Subject to Citizen? Some Later Tudor Vocabularies', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 15 (2002), 86-88.
- Alford, Stephen, *Kingship and Politics in the Reign of Edward VI* (Cambridge, 2002).
- Alford, Stephen, 'A Politics of Emergency in the Reign of Elizabeth I', in Glenn Burgess and Matthew Festenstein (eds.), *English Radicalism, 1550-1850* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 17-36.
- Alford, Stephen, 'Some Elizabethan Spies in the Office of Sir Francis Walsingham', in R. Adams and R. Cox (eds.), *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture* (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 44-62.
- Allen, Gemma, *The Cooke Sisters: Education, Piety and Politics in Early Modern England* (Manchester, 2013).
- Allen, Gemma, 'The Rise of the Ambassador: English Ambassadorial Wives and Early Modern Diplomatic Culture', *The Historical Journal*, 62 (2018), 618-38.
- Allinson, Rayne, *A Monarchy of Letters: Royal Correspondence and English Diplomacy in the Reign of Elizabeth I* (New York, 2012).
- Allinson, Rayne, 'Parables and Dark Sentences: The Correspondence of Sir William Cecil and William Maitland (1559-1573)', in Paul Dover (ed.), *Secretaries and Statecraft in the Early Modern World* (Edinburgh, 2016), pp. 90-114.
- Anderson, Matthew, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919* (Abingdon, 1993).
- Bajetta, Carlo, Coatalen, Guillaume, and Gibson, Jonathan (eds.), *Elizabeth I's Foreign Correspondence: Letters, Rhetoric and Politics* (New York, 2014).
- Barton, James, 'The Faculty of Law', in James McConica (ed.), *The Collegiate University* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 257-83.

- Bell, Gary, 'Elizabethan Diplomatic Compensation: Its Nature and Variety', *The Journal of British Studies*, 20 (1981), 1-25.
- Bell, Gary, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution', in Malcolm Thorpe and Arthur J. Slavin (eds.), *Politics, Religion and Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Honour of De Lamar Jensen* (Kirkville, 1994), pp. 267-88.
- Bell, Gary, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives, 1509-1688* (London, 1990).
- Bell, Gary, 'John Man: The Last Elizabethan Resident Ambassador in Spain', *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 7 (1976), 75-93.
- Bély, Lucien, 'Women in Diplomacy: The Ambadress seen by Friedrich Carl Von Moser', *International History Review*, 44 (2022), 990-1003.
- Bély, Lucien, 'La polémique autour de *L'Ambassadeur* de Jean Hotman: Culture et Diplomatie au temps de la Paix de Lyon', *Cahiers d'histoire*, 46/2 (2001), 327-54.
- Berridge, Geoff, Keens-Soper, Maurice and Otte, T. (eds.), *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (Basingstoke, 2001).
- Blakeway, Amy, *Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland* (Woodbridge, 2015).
- Bonner, Elizabeth, 'The Politique of Henri II: De Facto French Rule in Scotland, 1550-1554', *Journal of the Sydney Society for Scottish History*, 7 (1998).
- Boyle, Andy, 'Hans Eworth's Portrait of the Earl of Arundel and the Politics of 1549-50', *The English Historical Review*, 117 (2002), 25-47.
- Brady, Ciaran, *The Chief Governors: The Rise and Fall of Reform Government in Tudor Ireland, 1536-1588* (Cambridge, 1994).
- Brigden, Susan, *London and the Reformation* (Oxford, 1989).
- Burns, James, *The True Law of Kingship: Concepts of Monarchy in Early Modern Scotland* (Oxford, 1996).
- Carrió-Invernizzi, Diana, 'A New Diplomatic History and the Networks of Spanish Diplomacy in the Baroque Era', *The International History Review*, 36 (2014), 603-18.
- Carroll, Stuart, *Martyrs and Murderers: The Guise Family and the Making of Europe* (Oxford, 2009).
- Challis, Christopher, *The Tudor Coinage* (Manchester, 1978).
- Chavasse, Ruth A., 'Humanism in Exile: Celio Secondo Curione's Learned Women and Friends and Exempla for Elizabeth I', *Parergon*, 14 (1996), 165-85.
- Cole, Mary Hill, *The Portable Queen: Elizabeth I and the Politics of Ceremony* (Amherst MA, 1999).
- Collinson, Patrick, *Elizabethan Essays* (London, 1994).

- Collinson, Patrick, 'Servants and Citizens: Robert Beale and other Elizabethans', *Historical Research*, 29 (2006), 488-511.
- Collinson, Patrick, 'Sir Nicholas Bacon and the Elizabethan *via media*', *The Historical Journal* (1980), 255-273.
- Collinson, Patrick, 'The Elizabethan Exclusion Crisis and the Elizabethan Polity', in Patrick Collinson (ed.), *This England: Essays on the English Nation and Commonwealth in the Sixteenth Century* (Manchester, 2011), pp. 61-97.
- Conrad, F. W., 'The Problem of Counsel Reconsidered: The Case of Sir Thomas Elyot', in Thomas Mayer and Paul Fideler (eds.), *Political Thought and the Tudor Commonwealth* (London, 1992), pp. 77-110.
- Cox-Jensen, Freya, *Reading the Roman Republic in Early Modern England* (Leiden, 2012).
- Crane, Mary T., "'Video et Taceo': Elizabeth I and the Rhetoric of Counsel", *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900*, 28 (1988), 1-15.
- Crankshaw, David, 'The Tudor Privy Council, c.1540-1603', *State Papers Online*, <https://www.gale.com/intl/essays/david-j-crankshaw-tudor-privy-council-c-1540%E2%80%931603> [accessed 02/04/15].
- Dawson, Jane, 'Anglo-Scottish Protestant Culture and Integration in Sixteenth-century Britain', in Sarah Barber and Steven Ellis (eds.), *Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State* (New York, 1995), pp. 87-114.
- Dawson, Jane, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Lord Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', *International History Review*, 8 (1986), 1-24.
- Dawson, *The Politics of Religion in the Age of Mary, Queen of Scots: The Earl of Argyll and the Struggle for Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge, 2002).
- Dawson, 'Trumpeting Resistance: Christopher Goodman and John Knox' in R. Mason (ed.), *John Knox and the British Reformation* (1998), pp. 130-155.
- Dawson, Jane, 'William Cecil and the British Dimension of early Elizabethan Foreign Policy', *History*, 74 (1989), 196-216.
- Daybell, James, 'Gender, Politics and Diplomacy: Women, News and Intelligence Networks in Elizabethan England', in Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox (eds.), *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture* (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 101-19.
- Daybell, James, *The Material Letter in Early Modern England* (Hampshire, 2012).
- DeSilva, Jennifer, 'Official and Unofficial Diplomacy between Rome and Bologna', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 14 (2010), 535-57.
- DeSilva, Jennifer and Fletcher, Catherine, 'Italian Ambassadorial Networks in Early Modern Europe', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 14 (2010), 505-12.

- De Vivo, Filippo, 'Archives of Speech: Recording Diplomatic Negotiation in Late Medieval and Early Modern Italy', *European History Quarterly*, 46 (2016), 519-44.
- Doran, Susan, *Elizabeth I & Her Circle* (Oxford, 2015).
- Doran, Susan, 'Elizabeth I and Counsel', in Jacqueline Rose (ed.), *The Politics of Counsel in England and Scotland, 1286-1707* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 151-70.
- Doran, Susan, *Monarchy and Matrimony: the courtships of Elizabeth I* (London, 1996).
- Doran, Susan, 'Queen Elizabeth I: Monarchical Leadership in Action', in Peter Kaufman, *Leadership and Elizabethan Culture* (New York, 2013), pp. 1-16.
- Drummond, Humphrey, *Our Man in Scotland: Sir Ralph Sadleir, 1507-1587* (London, 1969).
- Durkan, John, 'James, Third Earl of Arran: The Hidden Years', *Scottish Historical Review*, 65 (1986), 154-166.
- Durot, Éric, 'Le crépuscule de l'Auld Alliance: la légitimité du pouvoir en question entre Écosse, France et Angleterre (1558-1561)', *Histoire, économie & société*, 1 (2007), 3-46.
- Elton, Geoffrey, 'Tudor Government', *The Historical Journal*, 31 (1988), 425-34.
- Elton, Geoffrey, *The Tudor Revolution in Government* (Cambridge, 1953).
- Fitzmaurice, Susan, 'Diplomatic Business: Information, Power, and Persuasion in Late Modern English Diplomatic Correspondence', in Marina Dossena and Susan Fitzmaurice (eds.), *Business and Official Correspondence: Historical Investigations* (Bern, 2006), pp. 77-106.
- Franklin-Harkrider, Melissa, *Women, Reform and Community in Early Modern England: Katherine Willoughby, Duchess of Suffolk and Lincolnshire's Godly Aristocracy, 1519-1580* (Woodbridge, 2008).
- Fraser, Antonia, *Mary Queen of Scots* (London, 2009).
- Frigo, Daniela, 'Prudence and Experience: Ambassadors and Political Culture in Early Modern Italy', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 38 (2008), 15-34.
- Froude, James, *The Reign of Edward VI* (London, 1912).
- Gehring, David, *Anglo-German Relations and the Protestant Cause: Elizabethan Foreign Policy and Pan-Protestantism* (Abingdon, 2016).
- Glasgow, Tom, 'The Navy in the First Elizabethan Undeclared War, 1559-1560', *The Mariner's Mirror*, 54 (1968), 22-37.
- Graham-Matheson, Helen, 'Petticoats and Politics: Elisabeth Parr and Female Agency at the Early Elizabethan Court', in Nadine Akkerman and Birgit Houben (eds.), *The Politics of Female Households: Ladies-in-Waiting Across Early Modern Europe* (Leiden, 2014), pp. 31-50.

- Green, Ian, *Humanism and Protestantism in Early Modern English Education* (Surrey, 2009).
- Greenblatt, Stephen, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago, 2005).
- Goodare, Julian, 'Queen Mary's Catholic Interlude', in Michael Lynch (ed.), *Mary Stewart: Queen in Three Kingdoms* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 154-170.
- Guy, John (ed.) *The Tudor Monarchy* (London, 1997).
- Guy, John, 'My Heart is My Own', *The Life of Mary Queen of Scots* (St Ives, 2004).
- Guy, John, 'The 1590s: the Second Reign of Elizabeth I?', in John Guy (ed.), *The Reign of Elizabeth I, Court and Culture in the Last Decade* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 1-19.
- Guy, John, 'The Rhetoric of Counsel in Tudor England', in Dale Hoak (ed.), *Tudor Political Culture* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 292-310.
- Haigh, Christopher, *Elizabeth I* (Abingdon, 2013).
- Hammer, Paul, *Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England, 1544-1604* (Basingstoke, 2003).
- Hampton, Timothy, *Writing from History: The Rhetoric of Exemplarity in Renaissance Literature* (New York, 1990).
- Harrison, Brian, *The Tower of London Prisoner Book* (Leeds, 2004).
- Hinde, Thomas, *Imps of Promise: History of Kings School, Canterbury* (London, 1991).
- Hoak, Dale, 'The King's Privy Chamber, 1547-1553', in DeLloyd Guth and John McKenna (eds.), *Tudor Rule and Revolution: Essays from G.R. Elton from his American Friends* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 87-108.
- Hudson, Winthrop, *The Cambridge Connection and the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559* (Durham, 1980).
- Jardine, Lisa and Grafton, Anthony, "'Studied for Action": How Gabriel Harvey Read His Livy', *Past & Present*, 129 (1990), 30-78.
- Johnson, Alexandra, 'Mary Stuart and Her Rebels-Turned-Privy Councillors: Performance of the Ritual of Counsel', in Helen Matheson-Pollock, Joanne Paul and Catharine Fletcher (eds.), *Queenship and Counsel in Early Modern Europe* (Basingstoke, 2018), pp. 161-186.
- Jones, Norman, 'The Cambridge Connection and the Shaping of the Elizabethan State', in John McDiarmid and Susan Wabuda (eds.), *The Cambridge Connection in Tudor England: Humanism, Reform, Rhetoric, Politics* (Leiden, 2021), pp. 252-65.
- Jones, Norman, *Governing by Virtue: Lord Burghley and the Management of Elizabethan England* (Oxford, 2015).

- Kellar, Clare, *Scotland, England, and the Reformation, 1534-61* (Oxford, 2003).
- Kesselring, Krista, *The Northern Rebellion of 1569* (Basingstoke, 2007).
- Kewes, Paulina, “‘Jerusalem thou dydst promyse to buylde up’: Kingship, Counsel and Early Elizabethan Drama”, in Jacqueline Rose (ed.), *The Politics of Counsel in England and Scotland, 1286-1707* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 171-92.
- Kewes, Paulina, “‘Plesures in lernyng” and the Politics of Counsel in Early Elizabethan England: Royal Visits to Cambridge and Oxford’, *English Literary Renaissance*, 46 (2016), 333-75.
- Kewes, Paulina (ed.), *The Uses of History in Early Modern England* (California, 2006).
- Lake, Peter, “‘The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I’ (and the Fall of Archbishop Grindal) Revisited”, in John McDiarmid (ed.), *The Monarchical Republic of Early Modern England: Essays in Response to Patrick Collinson* (Aldershot, 2007).
- Lake, Peter, ‘The “Political Thought” of the “Monarchical Republic of Elizabeth I”, Discovered and Anatomised’, *The Journal of British Studies*, 54 (2015), 257-87.
- Lawson, Jane (ed.), *The Elizabethan New Years Gift Exchanges, 1559-1603* (Oxford, 2013).
- Lee, Maurice, *James Stewart, Earl of Moray* (New York, 1953).
- Levine, Mortimer, *The Early Elizabethan Succession Question, 1558-1568* (Stanford, 1966).
- Loades, David, *Elizabeth I: A Life* (London, 2006).
- Loades, David, *Two Tudor Conspiracies* (Cambridge, 1965).
- Loach, Jennifer, ‘Reformation Controversies’, in Trevor Aston and James McConica (eds.), *The History of the University of Oxford*, III (Oxford, 1986).
- Lucas, Scott, *A Mirror for Magistrates and the Politics of the English Reformation* (Massachusetts, 2009).
- Lynch, ‘Scotland’s First Protestant Coronation: Revolutionaries, Sovereignty and the Culture of Nostalgia in Luuk Houwen (ed.), *Literature and Religion in Late Medieval and Early Modern Scotland: Essays in Honour of Alasdair A. MacDonald* (Leuven, 2012), pp. 177-207.
- MacCaffrey, Wallace, *Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572-1588* (New Jersey, 1981).
- MacCaffrey, Wallace, *The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, 1558-1572* (Chichester, 1968).
- MacCulloch, Diarmaid, *Thomas Cranmer: A Life* (Yale, 1996).
- Mack, Peter, *Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge, 2002).

- MacMahon, Luke, 'Courtesy and Conflict: The Experience of English Diplomatic Personnel at the Court of Francis I', in David Grummitt (ed.), *The English Experience in France c.1450-1558* (London, 2002), pp. 182-99.
- Mallet, Charles, *A History of the University of Oxford* (London, 1924).
- Marshall, Peter, 'Crisis of Allegiance: George Throckmorton and Henry Tudor', in Peter Marshall and Geoffrey Scott (eds.), *Catholic Gentry in English Society: The Throckmortons of Coughton from Reformation to Emancipation* (New York, 2016), pp. 31-67.
- Mason, Roger and Smith, Martin (eds.), *A Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots* (Oxford, 2017).
- Mattingly, Garrett, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955).
- Mazon, Gabriella, 'The Pragmatics of Sir Thomas Bodley's Diplomatic Correspondence', *Journal of Early Modern Studies*, 3 (2014), 117-31.
- McCullough, Peter, *Sermons at Court: Politics and Religion in Elizabethan and Jacobean preaching* (Cambridge, 1998).
- McDiarmid, John (ed.), *The Monarchical Republic of Early Modern England: Essays in Response to Patrick Collinson* (Aldershot, 2007).
- McLaren, Anne, *Political Culture in the Reign of Elizabeth I: Queen and Commonwealth, 1558-1585* (Cambridge, 2000).
- McLaren, Anne, 'The Quest for a King: Gender, Marriage and Succession in Elizabethan England', *The Journal of British Studies*, 41 (2002), 259-290.
- Mears, Natalie, 'The Council' in Susan Doran and Norman Jones (eds.), *The Elizabethan World* (Abingdon, 2011), pp. 59-75.
- Mears, Natalie, 'Counsel, Public Debate, and Queenship John Stubbs's "The discoverie of a gaping gulf", 1579', *The Historical Journal*, 44 (2001).
- Mears, Natalie, 'Politics in the Elizabethan Privy Chamber: Lady Mary Sidney and Kat Ashley', in James Daybell (ed.), *Women and Politics in Early Modern England, 1450-1700* (Ashgate, 2004), pp. 67-82.
- Mears, Natalie, *Queenship and Political Discourse in the Elizabethan Realms*, (Cambridge, 2005).
- Merriman, Marcus, *The Rough Wooings: Mary Queen of Scots, 1542-1551* (Edinburgh, 2021).
- Miller, Amos, *Sir Henry Killigrew: Elizabethan Soldier and Diplomat* (Leicester, 1963).
- Montano, John, *The Roots of English Colonialism in Ireland* (Cambridge, 2011).
- Murphy, Beverley, *Bastard Prince: Henry VIII's Lost Son* (Sutton, 2001).

- Neale, John, *Queen Elizabeth I* (Chicago, 2014).
- Nicholls, Mark, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1529-1603* (Oxford, 1999).
- Palmer, William, *The Problem of Ireland in Tudor Foreign Policy, 1485-1603* (Woodbridge, 1994).
- Patterson, Annabel, “‘For Words Only’: From Treason Trial to Liberal Legend in Early Modern England”, *Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities*, 5 (1993), 389-416.
- Paul, Joanne, *Counsel and Command in Early Modern English Thought* (Cambridge, 2020).
- Paul, Joanne and Schutte, Valerie, ‘The Tudor Monarchy of Counsel and the Growth of Reason of State’ in Elena Woodacre, Lucinda Dean, Chris Jones, Russell Martin and Zita Rohr (eds.), *The Routledge History of Monarchy* (London, 2019), pp. 655-67.
- Peltonen, Markku, *Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570-1640* (Cambridge, 2004).
- Peltonen, Markku, *Rhetoric, Politics and Popularity in Pre-Revolutionary England* (Cambridge, 2013).
- Pirola, Francesca, ‘Opposing Tyranny from the Outside: The Case of the Marian Exiles’, *History of Political Thought*, 40 (2019), 69-84.
- Platt, Jeffrey, ‘The Elizabethan “Foreign Office”’, *The Historian*, 56 (1994), 725-40.
- Pollnitz, Aysha, *Princely Education in Early Modern Britain* (Cambridge, 2015).
- Potter, David, ‘French Intrigue in Ireland during the Reign of Henri II, 1547-1559’, *The International History Review*, 5 (1983), 159-80.
- Potter, ‘Mid-Tudor Foreign Policy and Diplomacy: 1547-63’, in Glenn Richardson and Susan Doran (eds.), *Tudor England and its Neighbours* (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 106-138.
- Questier, Michael, *Dynastic Politics and the British Reformations, 1558-1630* (Oxford, 2019).
- Read, Conyers, *Mr Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1955).
- Read, Conyers, *Mr Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth, I*, (Oxford, 1925).
- Riches, Daniel, *Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture: Brandenburg-Swedish Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (2013).
- Roosen, William, ‘Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach’, *The Journal of Modern History*, 52 (1980), 452-76.
- Rose, Jacqueline ‘The Problem of Political Counsel in Medieval and Early Modern England and Scotland’, in Jacqueline Rose (ed.), *The Politics of Counsel in England and Scotland, 1286-1707* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 1-44.

- Rowse, Alfred, *Raleigh and the Throckmortons* (London, 1962).
- Ryrie, Alec, *The Origins of the Scottish Reformation* (Manchester, 2006).
- Smith, Victoria, “‘For Ye, Young Men, Show a Womanish Soul, Yon Maiden A Man’s’”: Perspectives on Female Monarchy in Elizabeth’s First Decade’, in James Daybell and Svante Norrhem (eds.), *Gender and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe* (London, 2016), pp. 143-57.
- Sil, Narasingha, “‘My Bitter Comedie’”: The Treason Trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton and the Rule of Law in Tudor England’, in Christopher Ocker, Michael Printy, Peter Starenko and Peter Wallace (eds.), *Politics and Reformations: Communities, Polities, Nations, and Empires* (Leiden, 2007), pp. 381-405.
- Sil, Narasingha, *Tudor Placemen and Statesmen* (London, 2001).
- Skinner, Quentin, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge, 1996).
- Skinner, Quentin, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, II (Cambridge, 1978).
- Stedall, Robert, *Mary, Queen of Scots’ Secretary* (Barnsley, 2021).
- Sowerby, Tracey A., ‘The Cambridge Connection and the Early Elizabethan Diplomatic Corps’, in John McDiarmid and Susan Wabuda (eds.), *The Cambridge Connection in Tudor England* (Leiden, 2021), pp. 266-90.
- Sowerby, Tracey A., ‘Early Modern Diplomatic History’, *History Compass*, 14 (2016), 441-56.
- Sowerby, Tracey A., ‘Elizabethan Diplomatic Networks and the Spread of News’, in Joad Raymond and Noah Moxham (eds.), *News Networks in Early Modern Europe* (2016), pp. 305-27.
- Sowerby, Tracey A., ‘Francis Thynne’s Perfect Ambassador and the Construction of Diplomatic Thought in Elizabethan England’, *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 82 (2019), 539-57.
- Sowerby, Tracey A., ‘Material Culture and the Politics of Space in Diplomacy at the Tudor Court’ in B. Johannsen and K. Ottenheim (eds.), *Beyond Scylla and Charybdis: European Courts and Court Residences outside Hapsburg and Valois/Bourbon Territories 1500-1700* (Copenhagen, 2015), pp. 45-56.
- Sowerby, Tracey A., ‘Negotiating with the Material Text: Royal Correspondence between England and the Wider World’ in Tracey A. Sowerby and Joanna Craigwood (eds.), *Cultures of Diplomacy and Literary Writing in the Early Modern World* (Oxford, 2019), pp. 203-19.
- Sowerby, Tracey A., *Renaissance and Reform in Tudor England: The Careers of Sir Richard Morison, c.1513-1556* (Oxford, 2010).

- Starkey, David, 'Court and Government', in Christopher Coleman and David Starkey (eds.), *Revolution Reassessed: revisions in the History of Tudor Government and Administration* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 29-58.
- Starkey, David, 'Intimacy and Innovation: the Rise of the Privy Chamber, 1485-1547', in David Starkey (ed.), *The English Court: from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War* (New York, 1987), pp. 71-118.
- Starkey, David, 'A Reply: Tudor Government: the Facts?', *The Historical Journal*, 31 (1988), 921-31.
- Starkey, David, 'Representation through Intimacy', in John Guy (ed.), *The Tudor Monarchy* (London, 1997), pp. 187-224.
- Sutherland, Nicola, *Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-1589* (London, 1984).
- Thiry, Steven, '“In Open Shew to the World”: Mary Stuart’s Armorial Claim to the English Throne and Anglo-French Relations (1559-1561)', *The English Historical Review*, 132 (2017), 1405-39.
- Thorpe, Malcolm, 'Catholic Conspiracy in Early Elizabethan Foreign Policy', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 15:4 (1984), 431-48.
- Thorpe, S., 'Nicholas Throckmorton' in Stanley Bindoff (ed.), *The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1509-1558* (1982), <https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1509-1558/member/throckmorton-nicholas-151516-71> [accessed 30/03/20].
- Trim, David, 'Seeking a Protestant Alliance and Liberty of Conscience on the Continent, 1558-85', in Glenn Richardson and Susan Doran (eds.), *Tudor England and its Neighbours* (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 139-77.
- Tytler, Patrick, *England under the Reigns of Edward VI and Mary* (London, 1839).
- Walsh, Sebastian, 'Most Trusty and Beloved: Sir Nicholas Throckmorton', *History Today*, 55:9 (2005), 39-45.
- Warnicke, Retha, *Mary Queen of Scots* (Abingdon, 2006).
- White, Alan, 'Queen Mary’s Northern Province', *Innes Review*, 38 (1988), 53-70.
- Williamson, Elizabeth, *Elizabethan Diplomacy and Epistolary Culture* (London, 2021).
- Williamson, Elizabeth, '[Y]ou have written sometimes more largelie to some private friends, then almost to her Majesties self': Secrecy and Sociability in Sixteenth-Century Ambassadorial Correspondence', *New Directions in the Study of Early Modern Correspondence, Lives and Letters Special Edition*, 4 (2012).
- Woodruff, Charles and Cape, Harry, *Schola Regia Cantuariensis: A History of Canterbury School* (London, 1908).
- Woolf, Daniel, *Reading History in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 2000).

Wormald, Jenny, *Mary, Queen of Scots, A Study in Failure* (Edinburgh, 2017).

Wright, Pam, 'A Change in Direction: The Ramifications of a Female Household, 1558-1603', in David Starkey (ed.), *The English Court: from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War* (New York, 1987), pp. 141-72.

Zim, Rivkah, 'Religion and the Politic Counsellor: Thomas Sackville, 1536-1608', *The English Historical Review*, 122 (2007), 892-917.

V. Theses:

Bell, Gary, 'The Men and Their Rewards in Elizabethan Diplomatic Service' (PhD, University of California, 1974)

Frescoln, Katherine, 'Thomas Randolph: An Elizabethan in Scotland' (PhD, West Virginia University, 1971)

Graham-Matheson, Helen, '“All wemen in thar degree shuld to thar men subiectit be”: The Controversial Court Career of Elisabeth Parr, Marchioness of Northampton, c. 1547-1565' (PhD, University College, London, 2013).

Hamilton, Dakota, 'The Household of Queen Katharine Parr' (DPhil, University of Oxford, 1992).

Kisner, Kenneth, 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton: A Diplomatic Adviser to Queen Elizabeth' (MA, Utah State University, 2003).

Loughlin, Mark, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington c.1526-1573' (PhD, University of Edinburgh, 1991).

Macauley, Sarah, 'Matthew Stewart, fourth Earl of Lennox and the Politics of Britain, c. 1543-1571', (PhD, University of Cambridge, 2005).

Mason, Roger, 'Kingship and Commonweal: Political Thought and Ideology in Reformation Scotland' (PhD, University of St. Andrews, 1983).

Merton, Charlotte, 'Women who served Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth: Ladies, Gentlewomen and Maids of the Privy Chamber, 1553-1603' (PhD, University of Cambridge, 1992).

Omansky, Rachel, 'Their Nation Dishonored, the Queen Shamed, and Country Undone: Feuding, Factionalism, and Religion in the Chaseabout Raid' (MA, University of Pennsylvania, 2008).

Rickman, Johanna, 'Elizabeth the Matchmaker: The proposed marriage between Mary Queen of Scots and Robert Dudley', (MA, Georgia State University, 1999).

Taviner, Mark, 'Robert Beale and the Elizabethan Polity' (PhD, University of St Andrews, 2000).

Webb, Claire, “The ‘Gude Regent’? A Diplomatic Perspective upon the Earl of Moray, Mary, Queen of Scots and the Scottish Regency, 1567-1570’, (PhD, University of St. Andrews, 2008).

Welch, Deborah, ‘Thomas Randolph: English Agent in Scotland, 1559-1566’ (MA, Wake Forest University, North Carolina, 1980).