Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions.

Alan Beggs; Kathryn Graddy

Abstract:

The authors study the order of sale in art auctions. The final bid relative to the auctioneer's estimated price declines throughout the course of an auction. A theoretical model shows that, in an auction ordered by declining valuation, even in the presence of risk-neutral strategic bidders, the price received relative to the estimate for later items in an auction should be less than the price relative to the estimate for earlier items. Furthermore, ordering heterogeneous items by value maximizes revenue for the auctioneer.

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APA Style

Beggs, A., & Graddy, K. (1997). Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 28(3).

MLA Style

Beggs, Alan, and Kathryn Graddy. “Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions.” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 28, no. 3, RAND Journal of Economics, 1997.

Chicago Style

Beggs, Alan, and Kathryn Graddy. 1997. “Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions.” RAND Journal of Economics 28 (3).
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Alan Beggs More by this author

Kathryn Graddy More by this author

Bibliographic Details

Journal:: RAND Journal of Economics
Volume:: 28
Issue:: 3
Publication date:: 1997
URN:: uuid:6dd278e6-516a-4146-9832-813bf08073c6
Local pid:: oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12841

Item Description

Language:: English

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License:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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