The Emergence of an Economic Technocracy in Colombia, 1948-1974



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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in Area Studies (Latin America) in the School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford

December 2022

Abstract

This dissertation studies the emergence of an economic technocracy in Colombia between 1948 and 1974. It accounts for the advent of professional economists as experts and shows how they succeeded at carving their way into the state to intervene in economic decision-making. Before the mid-twentieth century, men with practical knowledge about public and private finances had generally overseen the administration of economic affairs. In the period under consideration in this dissertation, economics departments and research centres were established in universities, allowing state institutions to incorporate a new type of specialist with a more technically and scientifically grounded expertise about the economy. Based on research in Colombian and US archives as well as interviews, this dissertation explores the resulting professionalisation of economics and institutionalisation of economic expertise in the state. It shows that these processes were embedded in the redemocratisation project of the National Front (1958-1974), following a decade of political turmoil during La Violencia (1948-1957). They were also shaped by the transnational exchanges with foreign actors and institutions that the post-WWII international order made possible for governments in developing countries. Colombia became a favorite client of multilateral institutions and philanthropic foundations, which sponsored several development and technical assistance missions to this country from the late-1940s to the mid-1970s. Hence, the Colombian case provided a privileged lens to analyse more broadly how the transnational circulation of expertise about economic development in the post-WWII period triggered the educational and institutional reforms that entrenched the position of economists in government.

Acknowledgments

Many people contributed to making my doctoral experience in Oxford so pleasant and intellectually stimulating.

I would like to begin by thanking my supervisor, Eduardo Posada-Carbó, whose thoughtful insights, detailed feedback, and taste for nuance guided me through the process of writing this dissertation. His unfaltering and generous support encouraged me to take opportunities that enriched my doctoral formation in Oxford. Leading by example, Eduardo taught me the meaning of good citizenship in an academic community.

This research project has its roots in my conversations with Andrés Álvarez, Carlos Caballero and Jimena Hurtado, who stimulated my curiosity about Colombia's economic technocracy. Without the trust they placed in me, their encouragement to pursue doctoral studies, and their company throughout the journey, the completion of this thesis could hardly be imagined. I am indebted to Jimena for introducing me into this wonderful world, and for her mentorship and counsel.

In Oxford, the Latin American Centre became an intellectual home that I shared with my friends Emilie Curryova, Oliver Fletcher, Juan Gabriel Galán, André Jockyman, Jonathan Madison, Juan Neves, and Nicolás Prados. I am hugely grateful with them for their intelligent feedback and camaraderie. In the "Gin and Resentment" reading group, I found the fiercest critics of my work but also the most supportive community – thank you Luis, Emilie, Shamara Wettimuny and Christel Zunneberg. The discussions with and the comments from my peers in OSGA helped me navigate what it entails to do "interdisciplinary" research with an "area" focus. My learning experience was enhanced by countless conversations with friends and peers in my two colleges, St. Antony's and Brasenose.

This dissertation has been significantly shaped by the generosity of many people who over the past four years helped me to narrow down my research question, find my sources, refine my arguments, and polish my drafts. I would like to thank my interviewees for their time, trust, and openness to share their memories and experiences with me. I am also grateful with those friends and scholars who kindly offered spaces where I could

present my work, shared with me research insights in conferences and workshops, or commented papers or chapter drafts. Among these, I would like to mention Tim Power, Carlos Pérez-Ricart, Diego Sánchez-Ancochea, James Forder, Rowena Olegario, Chris McKenna, Valpy Fitzgerald, Victoria Gierok, Pedro García Duarte, Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak, Verena Helsmayer, Erich Pinzón-Fuchs, Juan Carlos Acosta, Camila Orozco-Espinel, Felipe Fernández, Alejandro Nuñez and Juan Camilo Medellín. I also thank the staff from libraries and archives, who patiently helped me to identify and retrieve secondary and primary sources.

This doctoral project was generously funded by the *Programa Colombia Científica, Pasaporte a la Ciencia Doctorado (Foco Sociedad)*. For my fourth year of studies, I benefited from a Global History of Capitalism Doctoral Studentship. Finally, I am grateful for the kindness and understanding of Patrick Wallis, Leigh Gardner, and Jennie Stayner in the Department of Economic History at the LSE, who gave me the flexibility I needed to finish writing this dissertation.

Above all, I would like to express to my family my deep gratitude for all their love and support. To my parents, Mauricio and Muna, and to my sister, Nicolle, for always believing in me. I would not have been able to make it to this point without your example and unconditional support. To my wife, Laura, for being my anchor. Thanks for deciding to endure patiently by my side a rocky journey that you did not choose and for keeping me afloat with your disinterested love and care.

List of Abbreviations

AfP	Alliance for Progress
AID	Agency for International Development
ANAPO	Alianza Nacional Popular
ASCUN	Asociación Colombiana de Universidades
ANDI	Asociación Nacional de Industriales de Colombia
CEDE	Centro de Estudios en Desarrollo Económico, Universidad de los Andes
Cepal	UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
CIAP	Inter American Committee on the Alliance for Progress
CID	Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo Económico, Universidad Nacional
CIDE	Centro de Investigaciones sobre Desarrollo Económico, Universidad del Valle
CONPEP	Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Planeación
CONPES	Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social
DANE	Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística
DAP	Departamento Administrativo de Planificación y Servicios Técnicos
DAS	Development Advisory Service, Harvard University
DNP	Departamento Nacional de Planeación
ENS	Escuela Normal Superior
ESAP	Escuela Superior de Administración Pública

FENALCO	Federación Nacional de Comerciantes
FCE	Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional
Fedecafé	Federación Nacional de Cafeteros
FEIC	Facultad de Economía Industrial y Comercial, Gimnasio Moderno
FONADE	Fondo Nacional de Proyectos de Desarrollo
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
HBS	Harvard Business School
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICE	Instituto de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia
IFI	Instituto de Fomento Industrial
ILO	International Labor Organization
ILPES	Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning
MRL	Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal
PEG	Programa de Economía para Graduados, Universidad de los Andes
SCE	Sociedad Colombiana de Economistas
SEAP	Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País
SPG	Specific Projects Group (Grupo de Proyectos Específicos), DNP
UNal	Universidad Nacional de Colombia
UniAndes	Universidad de los Andes
UniValle	Universidad del Valle
UN-EPTA	United Nations Extended Technical Assistance Programme

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Introduction

Between 1948 and 1974, Colombia experienced the emergence of an economic technocracy. Before the mid-twentieth century, traditional politicians and businessmen with practical knowledge about public and private finances had generally overseen economic decision-making in the country. During the post-WWII period, the Colombian state began to incorporate a new type of specialist with a more technically and scientifically grounded expertise about the economy. Local universities created economics departments and research centres to train professional economists, the state transformed its institutional architecture for intervening in the economy, and specialised economic data and analyses provided a new language for public deliberation. By the mid-1970s, technical experts with specialised training in economics had gradually displaced politicians and businessmen from key decisions-making positions in government, controlled powerful semi-autonomous institutions and influenced public opinion either as public intellectuals or through independent think-thanks. These changes occurred while Colombia underwent a process of redemocratisation during the National Front period (1958-1974) after a decade of political turmoil and democratic reversal during La Violencia (1948-1957).

This thesis studies the emergence of Colombia's economic technocracy from a historical perspective The central research question of this study is *how did economic experts achieve a position of influence in economic decision-making in the Colombian state between 1948 and 1974?* Answering this question means accounting for the advent of the professional economist as an expert and analysing the process by which they were granted decision-making power in government. It also implies explaining how economic

expertise came to frame the ways decision-makers rationalised state interventions in the economy. To address these issues from a historical perspective, this thesis examines, based on extensive archival research complemented with elite interviews, the professionalisation of economics and the institutionalisation of economic expertise in the state, considering the role that both national and foreign actors and institutions played in these processes. The central analytical question about the emergence of an economic technocracy in Colombia is thus approached through a set of concrete empirical sub-questions: How did modern departments of economics and economic research centres develop in local universities in mid-twentieth century Colombia? How did the state adapt around the same time its institutional infrastructure for economic management to incorporate economic expertise? And how did the new configurations between academia, the state and international institutions that developed during this period shape the whole process? By delineating the conditions of possibility for the emergence of Colombia's economic technocracy, this thesis provides a historically-grounded understanding of the foundations for the influence and stability that economic technocrats achieved in this country during the last quarter of the twentieth century. It also contributes to scholarly discussions about the ascendency of technocracy in Latin America, in particular, and in modern societies, more generally, by developing an in-depth case study in which the empowerment of economic experts progressed at a fast pace and occurred under relatively democratic conditions.

By focusing on Colombia, this thesis also reflects on the extent to which the incorporation of economic expertise in the state transformed the mechanisms for economic decision-making in developing countries during second half of the twentieth century. Colombia provides a good case study to address this broader question because,

as a showcase of development assistance in the post-WWII period, it was at the crossroad of variegated transnational exchanges of expertise about economic development. As this thesis shows, Colombia became a favourite client of multilateral institutions and philanthropic foundations — such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, which saw in the country's particular socio-economic and political characteristics an experimental ground to put knowledges about economic development in practice. These transnational exchanges of expertise and the effects they had on the state's ability to intervene in economic affairs acquired greater historical significance since the country simultaneously experienced a transition to democratic rule. The emergence of economic technocrats under relatively democratic conditions served as a counterpoint to the rise of professional economists under the auspices of authoritarian projects in other Latin American countries. Therefore, the Colombian experience serves to problematise standard narratives about the evolution and impact the economics profession had in the region during the second half of the twentieth century. Given the attention that Colombia received from multilateral institutions and philanthropic foundations during the post-WWII development era, the findings of this thesis are also of greater significance for understanding how both local and foreign actors at the time understood and moulded the relationship between technical expertise, state intervention and democratic governance in the developing world.

In the rest of this introduction, I provide a brief historical background, followed by a discussion of how this thesis engages with sociological studies on technocracy and expertise, the literature on the history of economics in the post-WWII period, and seminal works on economic technocrats and policymaking in Latin America. I then introduce my

methodological approach and the sources I used and present the general argument and outline of this thesis.

Historical Background

Before professional economists started to play a prominent role in decision-making, there was a long tradition of economic thought and practice in Colombia.[1]* During the nineteenth century, republican notables were as concerned with the administration of public finance as they were with the erudite construction of a public sphere.[2] The ideal of melding technique and government found place in this society of pundits, who gradually developed a practical orientation, as Frank Safford argued in his seminal study about the origins of the engineering profession.[3] While at the turn of the century the influence of positivism in the country was less pronounced than in Brazil, Chile and Mexico,[4] Colombia was not devoid of social engineers who believed that economic progress could be rationalised through modern public administration.[5] For most of the twentieth century, an "illustrated elite" of professional lawyers and engineers with practical knowledge about the economy oversaw the administration of public and private economic affairs.[6] Until the 1980s, the main institutions in charge of economic management were, as the

* *Note on references*: footnote citations throughout this dissertation follow the shortened format of the Chicago Style Guide, 17th Edition. Full references for published sources and the abbreviations used for archival collections may be found in the Bibliography.
[1] See Álvarez and Correa, *Ideas y políticas económicas*.
[2] Deas, *Del poder y la gramática*, 27–62; 63–122.
[3] Safford, *El ideal de lo práctico*.
[4] Consider Mexican *científicos*, and Chilean and Brazilian *positivistas*. Michiel Baud, "The Quest for Modernity," 13–35.
[5] Mayor Mora, *Técnica y utopía*; Murray, "Forging a Technocratic Elite."
[6] Caballero Argáez, *La economía colombiana*, 255–56.

Ministry of Finance illustrates, dominated by men who, with a few exceptions, had no specialised training in economics. How and why the educational profile of the top economic policymakers in Colombia had changed by the last quarter of the twentieth century is one of the guiding questions of this thesis.

Producing specialised analyses about economic affairs required an institutional infrastructure that began to develop in the first half of the twentieth century. To seize the opportunities that international financial markets offered in the 1920s, the state encouraged the development of technical institutional capacities in central banking and regulatory agencies. Following the recommendations of a mission headed by the "money doctor" Edwin Kemmerer, the Central Bank (Banco de la República) and the Comptroller General (Contraloria General) were founded in 1923 and became the institutional locus for producing technical knowledge about economic affairs.[7] Those institutions developed capacities to produce systematically and periodically statistics of sectoral nature to monitor economic activity.[8] Simultaneously, the creation of *gremios* (business associations), such as the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros (Fedecafé) (1927) and the Asociación Nacional de Industriales (ANDI) (1944), added a corporate dimension to the supply of specialised knowledge about economic activity in key sectors, like coffee and manufactures. Before the state developed its own technical bureaucracy, the national government was entirely dependent on the information that Fedecafé and the ANDI produced about their sectors to formulate policy.[9] Historians have highlighted the persistence of this longstanding pragmatic approach to economic decision-making, in

[7] Drake, *Money Doctor in the Andes*, 33, 123.
[8] Kalmanovitz, "Notas," 20–22.
[9] Miguel Urrutia Montoya, *Gremios*, 81.

close consultation with the private sector.[10] Acknowledging the pre-existence of non-disciplinary traditions of economic thought and practice, this thesis examines how they conditioned the ways in which state and social actors appropriated the international circulation of economic expertise in the mid-twentieth century.

In the post-WWII world order, new technologies of transnational assistance mediated the professionalisation of economics and the institutionalisation of economic expertise in the state. Echoing contemporaries' views, Miguel Urrutia identified the report of the mission the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) sent to Colombia in 1949 as the first systematic attempt to analyse the national economy as a whole, transcending the sectoral outlook of previous studies.[11] After this mission, the country became a favourite client of the IBRD,[12] a relationship that subsequent governments in the 1950s and 1960s continued nurturing. With the IBRD at the centre, multilateral lending became —in the context of financial repression of the Bretton Woods international monetary system— the government's main source of foreign finance in the 1950-1970 period.[13] The relatively strong presence of the IBRD shaped the emergence of an economic technocracy, as I will show in this thesis, both directly through its expert missions and indirectly through the effect that lender-debtor relations had on the organisation of the state. While this thesis provides evidence to support Fernando Cepeda and Timothy Mitchell's contention that the IBRD's "potential aid tended to make

[10] Deas, "La noción del subdesarrollo en Colombia;" Palacios, "Knowledge Is Power," 185–87; Thorp, *Economic Management*, 157.
[11] Miguel Urrutia, "Changing Nature of Economic Planning," 164.
[12] According to Albert Waterston, IBRD loan officer for Colombia in the 1950s, this country was then one of the bank's "best clients" and had the unrestricted attention of its Vice-president, Robert Garner. See "Transcript of interview with Albert Waterston," 14 May 1985, World Bank Oral History Project (OH-WB), 1.
[13] From representing the 7% of the government's sovereign debt in 1951, multilateral loans came to account for half of the total in 1970, peaking at 55% between 1964 and 1968. Avella-Gómez, "Acceso de Colombia al financiamiento externo," 559.

technocracy […] fashionable,"[14] it also shows that that the correlation between increased foreign lending and the "trends toward technocracy" was mediated by the agency of individual actors and contingent views about the application of technical expertise to stimulate economic development.

As statistical offices across Latin America produced the first official figures of national accounts in the 1950s, the aspiration of what contemporary actors conceptualised as sorting out the "mixed economy"[15] found a concrete application in development planning. Throughout the decade, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (Cepal in Spanish) fostered the adoption of programming tools through advisory missions and training programmes for state officials, encouraging governments in the region to rely upon planning offices for rationalising economic interventions.[16] While Cepal's views on development had a rather limited incidence on policymaking in mid-twentieth century Colombia,[17] at least in comparison with the Chilean and Brazilian experiences, the Commission's technical assistance missions were impactful from the perspective of institutional capacity building, as this thesis shows. By regional standards, Colombia stands out as a case in which the institutionalisation of economic expertise proceeded incrementally, exemplifying how the plurality of international actors and institutions involved in development assistance on the ground had to reckon with building on top of, not against, each other's programmes.

In the polarised post-WWII context, US cooperation undeniably shaped the professionalisation of economics, as the education of local economists became more

[14] Fernando Ulloa and Mitchell, "The Trend towards Technocracy," 238–46.
[15] See Offner, *Sorting Out*, 17.
[16] Arévalo Hernández, "Misiones Económicas," 15–17; Fajardo, *The World That Latin America Created*, 49.
[17] Villamizar, "Influencia de la Cepal en Colombia," 36–37.

attuned with international disciplinary trends. The US Agency for International Development (AID), and the Ford and the Rockefeller Foundation, among others, provided financial resources and technical assistance to develop economic education and research in local universities. During the 1960s, young Colombian economists obtained scholarships from these funding bodies to pursue postgraduate training abroad, mainly in the United States.[18] Juan Carlos Villamizar argued that one result of this bias was that the relative pluralism of the economics field in the local scene in the 1950s gave way to the dominance of an "epistemic community" that gravitated towards the economics mainstream in North America.[19] Jairo Estrada associated this "Americanization" of Colombian economists with the rise of the "intellectual elite" that pushed for the implementation of a "neoliberal" policy agenda in the last quarter of the twentieth century.[20] Other historians and practitioners provide a more nuanced view about the link between ideas and policies. Acknowledging that the internationalisation of economics contributed to the gradual displacement of local traditions of economic thought and practice, Salomón Kalmanovitz and Marco Palacios argued that, despite the influx of foreign economic ideas, economists continued confronting questions that were peculiar to their national reality and had to contend with longstanding traditions of consultation in policymaking.[21] This thesis does not attempt to research the complex relationship between ideas and policy and is, therefore, not a study about the international diffusion of economic doctrines, like Keynesianism or Neoliberalism. Instead, it elucidates the concrete ways in which the professionalisation and internationalisation of economics

[18] Álvarez, Guiot-Isaac, and Hurtado, "Formación de una tecnocracia pragmática."
[19] Villamizar, *Pensamiento económico en Colombia*, 328.
[20] Estrada Alvarez, "Élites intelectuales," 12.
[21] Kalmanovitz, "Notas," 52; Palacios, "Knowledge is Power," 204.

opened (and closed) channels for the circulation of economic expertise between academia and the state.

The institutionalisation of economics degrees in universities and the correlative shift in the educational profile of the economists also responded to changes in the social demand for expertise about economic affairs. From the mid-1940s onwards, the private sector began to require more specialised economic knowledge, as the case of business associations illustrates. In response to the growing intervention of the state in the economy, business associations multiplied and specialised. While in 1950 twenty-two *gremios* had been created, by 1970 there were eighty-one representing a wide range of sectoral interests. *Gremios* not only needed economic experts to defend their interests or lobby for favourable policies in consultative forums, even though this was an important reason for hiring them. According to a study about business associations that Urrutia conducted in the late 1970s, "the delegation by the state of research tasks to *gremios*" was still relatively common. Business associations continued to produce the relevant sectorial data and research that the state needed to intervene in the economy.[22] Acknowledging the importance of this private demand for experts on economic affairs,[23] I will focus primarily in this thesis on the demand for economic expertise coming from the state. The latter should be understood in the context of the accelerated enlargement that the state's administrative apparatus went through in the 1960s, when the bureaucracy also became

[22] Urrutia, *Tigres de papel*, 27, 29, 59. The role of *gremios* in producing sectoral data and research was also stressed by Roberto Junguito, an economic technocrat who also presided the Sociedad de Agricultures de Colombia (SAC) (1981-1982) and the Federación de Empresas Aseguradoras de Colombia (FASECOLDA) (2005-2013). See Roberto Junguito, "El papel de los gremios en la economía colombiana," 106.

[23] To my knowledge, there are no scholarly studies about extent of the involvement of economists in *gremios* and the private sector in Colombia. Although I give in Chapter 3 some indication of the situation for the 1950s, a systematic analysis falls beyond the scope of this research.

more centralized.[24] The growth of the state's central bureaucracy came hand in hand with the valorisation of professionalism, and the professional *ethos*, in public service.[25] In this context, economists were not the only social scientists who suddenly found new employment opportunities in the state; the sociologists hired to work in community development and agrarian reform programmes provide another example.[26] Witness testimonies suggest that the political driver for conforming technocratic cadres with professional economists came from their ability to leverage access to international donors like the IBRD, or the AID,[27] a claim that will be subjected to historical scrutiny in this dissertation.

Significantly for the purposes of this thesis, the first generation of Colombian economic technocrats were socialised in economics and incorporated into the state as experts during the National Front (1958-1974). The sixteen-year period that followed the fall of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's military dictatorship (1953-1957) received that eponym after the bipartisan coalition arrangement put in place to restore peace and democratic rule after the ten years of political turmoil known as La Violencia (1948-1958). The democratic transition brought a period of relative peace, which the architects of the National Front, like President Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962), believed could only be preserved by promoting economic development, which required the previous modernisation the state.[28] Seminal studies about the National Front by political scientists

[24] Uricochea calculated that from a mean annual growth of 2.74% between 1837 and 1961, the permanent administrative personnel of the state grew at an average annual rate of 8,52% between 1962 and 1972. In that decade, the number of state employes almost trebled, increasing from 180,000 to 445,000. This surge was pulled by the expansion central bureaucracy. Uricochea, *Estado y burocracia en Colombia*, 112-113.
[25] See López-Pedreros, *The Makers of Democracy*, 21-41.
[26] Karl, "From 'Showcase' to 'Failure'," 80-82.
[27] Urrutia, "Política económica y social en el régimen de coalición," 243-245.
[28] Karl, *La paz olvidada*, 23, 180.

sustained that the institutional rules of this arrangement, which were designed to demobilise the population and depolitise decision-making, facilitated the incorporation of expert cadres in "highly technical, functionally specific, and politically insulated autonomous agencies." Based on this argument, these authors linked the emergence of an economic technocracy to the "limited" form of democracy that the National Front regime allegedly represented.[29] Along these lines, Ana María Bejarano and Renata Segura more recently argued that the "selective strengthening of the state" during the National Front had persistent deleterious effects for Colombia's democracy because the institutions that oversaw economic development were "modernised" at the expense of bodies of political representation, like Congress.[30] These narratives about the National Front have tended to associate the ascendency of technocracy during this period with the deterioration of representative democratic institutions.

In a recent book that compares the ascent of technocrats in Colombia and Peru, Eduardo Dargent uses the case of the Colombian economists who rose to positions of influence during the National Front to argue instead that technocratic arrangements may contribute to strengthening democracy by building state capacity, triggering halted reforms and bringing public policy closer to popular needs.[31] Dargent's position is not entirely inconsistent with the critiques of the National Front surveyed above, but it aligns more closely with the revisionist historiography about the period, which stresses the democratic credentials of the National Front arrangement and highlights the development

[29] Cepeda Ulloa and Mitchell, "The Trend towards Technocracy" 237, 244; Hartlyn, The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia, 2–5.
[30] Bejarano and Segura, "Modernización selectiva del Estado," 34; González, *Poder y violencia,* 360-61.
[31] Eduardo Dargent, *Technocracy and Democracy*, 167.

of state capacities to conduct sound macroeconomic policy under this political system.[32] The latter point has often been emphasized by economists themselves in their assessments of the period.[33] In Dargent's argument about the longstanding stability of the economic technocracy in Colombia, the agency of local economists in "crafting" their "technocratic autonomy" played a central role, which he compared to the experience of economists in Peru, where after several failed attempts the technocrats managed to entrench in government under Fujimori's presidency in the 1990s, benefiting from the "window of opportunity" created by the economic crisis of the preceding decade. In analysing the Colombian experience, this thesis shares with Dargent's book his analytical proposition that technocrats should be considered as "actors" in their own right, whose expertise enables them to achieve relative autonomy from other social actors subject to some political constraints.[34]

However, the examination of Colombia's economic technocracy in this thesis differs in meaningful ways from Dargent's in its aims, method, and approach. While Dargent studied Colombian economists as part of a set of comparative cases with the objective of building a *theory* of *technocratic autonomy*, my purpose is to analyse this case in its own right to provide a *historical understanding* of the *process* by which economic technocrats were granted decision-making power in government. This difference in research aims had repercussions on the method used in both studies. Whereas Dargent's main sources for reconstructing the Colombian case were interviews with protagonists and witnesses, the historical narrative in this thesis relies primarily on

[32] Caballero Argáez, Pachón Buitrago, and Posada-Carbó, *Cincuenta años de regreso a la democracia*, 290.
[33] See, for example, Perry and López Giraldo, *Decidí Contarlo*, 19; Urrutia, "On the Absence of Economic Populism in Colombia," 384-385.
[34] Dargent, *Technocracy and* Democracy, 36-42, 77-81, 97-105.

archival research, using oral testimonies only as a supporting source of evidence to mitigate the risk of reinforcing self-referential narratives by economic technocrats (as explained in the methodology section below). Lastly, Dargent identified economic expertise as technocrats' main source of autonomy without clearly specifying what this expertise actually was. Black-boxing economists' expertise is a common limitation of political studies on technocracy, which I address in this thesis by explicitly engaging with the concrete knowledges and tools that economists mobilized during my period of study.

All in all, this thesis is in accord with Dargent's agnosticism regarding the effects of the ascendency of technocracy on democracy, a question that should be the matter of empirical investigation. Instead of adopting a normative stance *a priori* about the relationship between technocracy and democracy during my period of study, this thesis pays close attention to the views that contemporary actors held. For example, I show why in the context of the fiscal adjustment that accompanied the democratic transition, Lleras Camargo was able to mobilise the idea that the effective administration of public resources came hand in hand with the preservation and deepening of democracy. While this thesis does not aim to reconcile the tensions that democracy and technocracy entail as concepts, it sheds light on how *frentenacionalistas* like Lleras Camargo attempted to conform in practice the proliferation of politically insulated institutions staffed with experts to the democratisation project that the National Front represented *for them*.

There is a consensus in the literature that the modernising zeal of *frentenacionalistas* reached an apex during the presidency of Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970). As both technocrats and historians have documented in memoirs and books with wide public diffusion, Lleras Restrepo recruited young professional economists with international credentials to work for the state, empowered them in decision-making

bodies, and enshrined in the constitution experts' prerogatives to intervene in economic affairs.[35] Because some of the most influential economists in the last quarter of the twentieth century belonged to Lleras Restrepo's *kinder,*[36] his administration occupies a central place in the foundational myth of what his then Economic Secretary Rodrigo Botero dubbed Colombia's "high economic technocracy."[37] Economic technocrats shared foundational myths, albeit often self-referential, provide a valuable point of departure for this thesis, which nevertheless takes a critically distance from these narratives by contrasting them against the evidence available in the historical record and examining them against the broader transformations that the relationship between technical expertise and economic governance underwent both in Colombia and internationally during the third quarter of the twentieth century.

Technocracy: Experts in Government

It was allegedly the engineer and inventor William Henry Smyth who coined the term "technocracy" at the dusk of the Progressive Era in the United States.[38] Writing in the aftermath of the Great War, Smyth used the term to conceptualise the "experiment in rationalized Industrial Democracy" that, in his view, the United States underwent during

[35] Perry and López Giraldo, *Decidí Contarlo*, 26–29; Junguito, *Cien Episodios*, 343–47; Palacios, *Entre la legitimidad y la violencia*, 244; Bushnell, *Colombia*, 320.
[36] A non-exhaustive list of this *kinder* includes the following people: Rodrigo Botero, then Lleras Restrepo's Economic Secretary, later Minister of Finance (1974-1976); Miguel Urrutia, then Vice-minister of Finance, later director of the DNP (1974-1977) and Governor of the Banco de la República (1993-2004); Roberto Junguito, then chief of the agricultural unit at the DNP, later Minister of Finance (1984-1985; 2002-2003); and Guillermo Perry, then chief of the budget division at the DNP, later Minister of Finance (1994-1996).
[37] Botero, *Discreto encanto*, 191.
[38] Byé and Gurvitch, *Industrialisation et Technocratie*, 43–62.

the Great War. Referring to the coordination between the public and private sectors in industrial planning for the war effort, Smyth vowed for the constitution in peacetime of "a Supreme National Council of Scientists —supreme over all other National Institutions— to advise and instruct us how best to Live, and how most efficiently to realize our Individual and our National Purpose and Ideals."[39] In a similar vein, the institutionalist economist Thorstein Veblen, observing the growing reliance of the industrial system on the managerial skills of industrial experts, visualised the delegation of society's material welfare to a technological directorate, or a "practical soviet of technicians."[40] While utopias of social engineering were not uncommon among European writers in nineteenth century,[41] North American progressives drew practical inspiration from "scientific" views of industrial management to both reform the state and use the state as an instrument of social reform.[42]

For the emerging social sciences in the United States, supplying a technocratic rationale for economic management and welfare provision served to legitimate their authority in public affairs. The tension between advocating for reform and producing knowledge with an appearance of objectivity gave impetus to the professionalisation of economics, at the expense of delimiting political economy's broad scope of action to highly specialised areas of expert intervention.[43] In the interwar period, the provision of trustworthy and up-to-date data for economic decision-making gave economic experts leverage to bargain for scientific legitimacy. Experts' authority was institutionalised

[39] Smyth, *Technocracy*, 6, 13.
[40] Veblen, *The Engineers*, 61,138.
[41] Consider Owenism in the United Kingdom and Saint Simonism in France.
[42] Leonard, "American Economic Reform in the Progressive Era," 55.
[43] Mary O Furner, *Advocacy & Objectivity*, 8; Ross, "Changing Contours of the Social Sciences," 212.

through the creation of private research institutes and the technification of public agencies, such as the National Bureau of Economic Research and the US Bureau of Labour statistics, where economists and statisticians developed applied knowledge to monitor economic activity and address mass unemployment during the Great Depression.[44] These initiatives received financial support from philanthropic organisations, like the Rockefeller Foundation, which became major sponsors of basic economic research during this period.[45]

Hence, the genealogy of the concept *technocracy* was anchored on the configuration of concrete institutional arrangements between disciplines, the state, and society. The constitution of professions to oversee the production and delimitation of expert knowledge and its institutionalisation in the state and society provided the historical foundations for the appearance of the term. All in all, technocracy's utopic dimension persisted in public discourse thanks to its popularisation by social movements that thrived during the Great Depression, particularly in North America and France.[46]

It was not until the end of World War II that technocracy became an object of academic inquiry, when the *Centre D'études Sociologiques* made *Industrialization and Technocracy* the theme of its First Sociological Week. In May 1948, this event convened in Paris prominent sociologists from France and the United States. In the closing article of the conference proceedings, *Is technocracy an unavoidable effect of industrialization?*, Georges Gurvitch described the trend towards technocracy, or the government of *techniciens*, as one of the "effective tendencies of present social reality."[47] The reforms

[44] Alchon, *Invisible Hand of Planning*; Bernstein, *Perilous Progress*; Stapleford, *Cost of Living in* America, 145–83.
[45] Rutherford, "'Who's Afraid of Arthur Burns?'".
[46] Scott, *Introduction to Technocracy*, 37, 40.
[47] Byé and Gurvitch, *Industrialisation et technocratie*, 196.

in public administration that inaugurated the Fourth Republic in post-war France fostered the formation of a "semiautonomous class of economic specialists" within the civil service.[48] As scholars have widely documented, the use of technical expertise for economic planning and management gained saliency in industrialised societies during the post-WWII period,[49] but the specificity of the French case lay on the role that the state played in developing expert cadres within public institutions.[50] The ascending role of technical experts in public life was not uncontested. It faced opposition from popular movements representing groups in social decline, who used the term technocracy to criticise the expanding role of technically trained experts in government during the Fourth Republique.[51] Technocracy thus acquired negative undertones in public utterance after WWII, which contrasted with its relatively positive connotation in the interwar years.

Writing in the context of post-war France, political scientist Jean Meynaud defined technocracy as "the rise to power of those who possess technical knowledge or ability, to the detriment of the traditional type of politician." Technocracy, in his view, results from a process of "dispossession" by technical experts of politicians' exclusive prerogative over political decision-making.[52] While technocracy could be characterised simply as the government of experts, political theorist Giovanni Sartori warned against falling prey to the "eternal Saint-Simonism" contention that technocracy implies "the end of politics."[53] As both Meynaud and Sartori argue, expert knowledge commands power

[48] Fourcade, *Economists and Societies*, 205.
[49] Technical expertise in the early post-war period was not exclusively mobilised by professionally trained economists. About the role that natural scientists and mathematicians, physicists or economic bureaucrats played in the United States, the Netherlands and Japan see Mirowski, *Machine Dreams*, 177–90; Dekker, *Jan Tinbergen*, 222–48; Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, 35–83.
[50] Fourcade, *Economists and Societies*, 185–238.
[51] Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions*, 136; Jean Meynaud, *Technocracy*, 21.
[52] Meynaud, *Technocracy*, 31,74-87, 87-95.
[53] Giovanni Sartori, *Theory of Democracy Revisited*, 439.

over the specific domains to which that knowledge is applicable — its areas of "technocratic intervention" — not over the polity as a whole.[54] Because expert knowledge can be instrumentalised by social actors with economic and political power, technocracy requires an institutional basis that grants experts relative autonomy over areas of technocratic intervention.

Technocracy acquired a negative connotation in the mid-twentieth century partly because the perceptions about its correspondence to democracy had changed. While Smyth and Veblen did not see a contradiction between technocracy and democracy, Meynaud and his contemporaries recognised the risks that the transfer of decision-making power to non-elected experts posed to European fragile post-war democracies.[55] Ever since, the tension between technocracy and democracy has been a matter of reflection among political theorists and science and technology scholars. According to Sartori, this tension arises from the increasing "knowledge gap" between specialists and non-specialists in societies where science and technology acquire centrality in public decision-making.[56] When experts are entrusted to intervene in matters of public interest, this knowledge gap limits citizen's ability to supervise and make them accountable for their decisions.[57] Furthermore, the delegation of politically contentious issues to technocrats, who often express contempt for "political mediation" and "procedural legitimacy," weakens the legitimacy and capacities of democratic institutions, like political parties.[58]

[54] Meynaud, *Technocracy*, 95-105; Sartori, *Theory of Democracy Revisited*, 438.
[55] About how the expansion of a "depoliticized, and more technically qualified bureaucracy" was consistent with and instrumental for the democratic reconstruction in Western Europe after WWII, see Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*, 64–68.
[56] Sartori, *Theory of Democracy Revisited*, 438.
[57] Jürgen Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 233.
[58] Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti, "Populism and Technocracy;" Daniele Caramani, "Will vs. Reason."

While a democratic system "neither presupposes nor requires *competency*,"[59] experts have become central in shaping decisions in areas of public interest like the economy, the environment, and public health.[60] Recent scholarship in science and technology studies have attempted to elucidate the public dimension of expertise.[61]

Because the term technocracy has currency in both academic and public parlance and involves normative valuations about states of affairs, it defies a clear-cut conceptualisation —as the political scientist Jean Meynaud pointed out early on.[62] It is beyond the remit of this thesis to provide a new conceptual framework for studying technocracy. Instead, I will borrow Meynaud's broad definition quoted above, applied specifically to economic decision-making as an area of expert intervention. An additional difficulty for studying technocracy empirically lies in identifying and delimiting the relevant subjects of study: who are the (economic) technocrats? For this purpose, I borrow analytical insights from scholars who have contributed with heuristics to characterise technocrats as social actors.

Ever since the French intellectual Lucien Febvre encouraged sociologists to "define" and "delimit the frontiers" of "what we may call *techniciens*,"[63] scholars have developed criteria to distinguish technocrats from other social groups, based on their shared class backgrounds and interests, mentalities, and training and career patterns. While Maurice Byé argued that technocrats could be described as a social class of functionaries with a "common interest," Georges Gurvitch sustained that technocrats

[59] Sartori, *Theory of Democracy Revisited*, 430.
[60] Turnhout, Tuinstra, and Halffman, *Environmental Expertise*; Popp Berman, *Thinking like an Economist*.
[61] Collins and Evans, *Rethinking Expertise*; Jasanoff, *Science and Public Reason*; Roger A. Pielke, *The Honest Broker*.
[62] Meynaud, "Qu'est-Ce Que La Technocratie?," 497-498.
[63] Byé and Gurvitch, *Industrialisation et technocratie*, xii.

comprehended multi-interested groupings who resort to mechanisms of social differentiation to reach positions of influence.[64] Moving away from this Marxian focus on interests, other scholars have categorised technocrats in terms of their collective ethos or *sprit de corps*. In his study of European administrative elites, Robert Putnam characterised technocrats' mentality as inherently a-political and anti-democratic.[65] Similarly, Guillermo O'Donnell argued that, thanks to their common training and professional experiences, the "incumbents of technocratic roles" in South America in the early 1970s shared a modernising normative worldview.[66] Scholars in the Weberian tradition, like Daniel Bell, stressed that technocrats' authority is to be found in their "technical skill," particularly with the advent of post-industrial "information societies." In contrast to other social types, it is through (specialised) education –not inheritance, entrepreneurial ability, or partisan membership– that the technocrats have access to power.[67] Empirical works by Latin Americanist scholars have emphasised that technocrats' academic training and international credentials were key in their rise to decision-making positions.[68]

Borrowing elements from these sociological studies, I identify as economic technocrats the subset of professional economists who received formal training in the discipline, either at home or abroad, and put their expertise in practice to inform, frame or directly intervene in economic decision-making. While technocrats may influence decision-making from universities, think-tanks or international institutions, this thesis

[64] Byé and Gurvitch, 73–78, 198–99.
[65] Putnam, "Elite Transformation in Advanced Industrial Societies," 386.
[66] O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, 76–84.
[67] Bell, *Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, 436–39.
[68] Collier, "Overview," 403; Silva, *In the Name of Reason*, 15; Centeno, *Democracy within Reason*, 103–7.

will give particular attention to the emergence of state-employed economic experts. Whether economic technocrats have a shared social background, develop a common worldview, or belong to epistemic communities are questions that need to be determined empirically. The fact that prominent Colombian economists who began to work for the state during my period of study tended to identify themselves as technocrats was a useful heuristic for guiding my empirical inquiry, but self-identification or being recognised as such by others were not essential criteria. What is central to my understanding of economic technocracy is that economists used in practice their expertise to intervene in decision-making. This line of inquiry required paying closer attention to the nature, content, and applications of economic expertise in Colombia during my period of study.

Economic Technocracy and Technocratic Economics

In 1978, A. W. Coats lamented that historians of economics had largely neglected the study of "economists in government" despite their growing importance in economic management and policymaking.[69] Recruiting professionally trained economists in government was, to an extent, a recent practice — although the concrete timing and experiences varied across countries, it only became widespread after World War II. According to Coats, this new demand for economists in the state apparatus responded to the need for "skilled officials" to design and implement the interventionist economic and social programmes that governments across the political spectrum adopted during the post-war period.[70] Yet, acknowledging the functional demand for specialists in economic

[69] Coats, "Economists in government: A Research Field," 298.
[70] Coats, *Economists in Government: International Comparative Study*, 4.

affairs leaves unexplained why professional economists came to play that role of government economic experts. To address this question, this thesis engages with the scholarship about the professionalisation of economics, the institutionalisation of economic expertise, and the international circulation of economic knowledge in the post-WWII period.

Professions develop when different occupational groups compete for authority over jurisdictions of expert intervention.[71] When professional economists began to occupy positions of influence in government in the mid-twentieth century, they entered spaces that had traditionally been the remit of lawyers, engineers, statisticians, and public intellectuals. In the Anglo-American world, the constitution of economics as an academic discipline in the late nineteenth century allowed economists to gradually develop the scientific and professional authority to intervene in public affairs.[72] While by the end of the twentieth century the professionalisation of economics achieved a transnational scale,[73] one should take some critical distance from economists' own Whig interpretation of this historical process as the triumph of scientific expertise over amateurism. As Marion Fourcade showed in her comparative study of the United States, Britain, and France, national institutional logics conditioned the institutionalisation of the economics discipline in higher education and the type of engagements economists established with the state.[74] Therefore, to understand how economists achieved professional authority in Colombia it is important to analyse the concrete institutional relations the economics

[71] Abbott, *System of Professions*, 3,9.
[72] I described in the previous section the case of the United States. For the UK, see Tribe, *Constructing Economic Science*.
[73] Coats, "Post-1945 Internationalization of Economics; " Fourcade, "Construction of a Global Profession."
[74] Fourcade, *Economists and Societies*.

profession established with academe, the state and society. Tracing the professionalisation of economics sheds light on the discipline's relative influence in different institutional contexts because the economists' impact on decision-making is mediated by the profession's relative position in the organisation of society.[75]

The incorporation of professional economists in government had a close correspondence with the transformation the economics discipline went through in the mid-twentieth century. Economics developed affinities to technocratic government as the discipline evolved in response to the social demands for technical expertise arising from the inter-war economic depression, the war mobilisation efforts, and the reconstruction and development endeavours of the post-war period. Mathematical modelling, accounting techniques, and statistical inference methods became essential instruments in economists' reasoning style, which, as historian of science Mary Morgan claimed, gradually turned modern economics into a "tool-based discipline."[76] In this transformation, Morgan argued, the discipline adopted discernible modes of economic-engineering: economists developed analytical and policy tools to solve concrete problems, and designed technologies to engineer social and economic change.[77] This technical economic expertise was developed and found reception in institutional settings beyond universities, like statistical offices, planning bodies, and multilateral institutions.[78] Scholars who study the performativity of economics have argued that the tools and technologies economists developed contributed to constituting the "economy" as an object of management and

[75] Hirschman and Popp Berman, "Do Economists Make Policies," 780.
[76] Morgan, "Economics," 277.
[77] Morgan, "Technocratic Economics." Boettke and Horwitz, "The Limits of Economic Expertise."
[78] For case studies in South Asia, the Middle East and Africa see Dekker, *Jan Tinbergen*, 261-286, 309-336; Serra, "From Scattered Data to Ideological Education;" Alden Young, *Transforming Sudan*.

intervention by experts.[79] By studying the institutionalisation of technical forms of economic expertise in the Colombian state, this thesis analyses how the technical turn in the economics discipline gave impetus to the emergence of economic technocrats.

In countries from the global peripheries of scientific production like Colombia, the development of technical economic expertise was mediated by the international circulation of economic knowledge. By the end of the twentieth century, Coats claimed with confidence that the "post-1945 internationalisation of economics" proceeded in Latin America "further, more dramatically and with greater effect" than in other areas.[80] While the dissemination of Keynesian and liberal economic doctrines have been widely studied by economic and intellectual historians,[81] historians of economics have recently paid closer attention to how material tools for representing and acting upon the economy, or "artifacts," travel across boundaries.[82] Methodologically, this implies shifting the analysis from the realm of ideas, or doctrines, to that of "practices."[83] It also requires discerning the institutional arrangements that allowed local communities to appropriate, recast and adapt analytical and policy tools to understand and transform their social reality.

[79] On the performativity of economics, or how economics contributes to "enacting the realities" it describes, see Callon, "What Does It Mean to Say That Economics Is Performative?." About the "economy", see Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*.
[80] Coats, "Post-1945 Internationalization of Economics", x.
[81] See for example Hirschman, "How the Keynesian Revolution Was Exported;" Fitzgerald and Thorp, *Economic Doctrines in Latin America*.
[82] Halsmayer, "Following Artifacts;" Morgan, "'On a Mission' with Mutable Mobiles."
[83] Stapleford, "Historical Epistemology and the History of Economics."

Economists and Technocracy in Latin American Studies

In Latin American studies, the literature on technocracy has been crossed by the metanarratives that guided the scholarship in the field in the last fifty years. From the critiques to modernisation in the late 1960s and 1970s, to the literature on democratisation in the 1980s, the emergence and consolidation of economic technocrats has been theorised and studied empirically through an area lens. Technocrats' role in the design and implementation of market reforms in the last quarter of the twentieth century led to a wave of scholarship on the subject in the 1990s that ebbed in the 2000s. In the last decade, new studies have emerged that pay closer attention to expertise.

The critiques to modernisation in the context of the turn to authoritarianism during the 1960s and 1970s marked the debut for the study of technocracy in the region. In the foundational book of dependency theory, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto argued that what distinguished the military coups in Brazil (1964) and Argentina (1966) from previous forms of *caudillismo* or personalised dictatorships was the virtual "annihilation" of traditional politicians, who had connived with populist leaders in previous democratic and authoritarian developmentalist coalitions, by a "techno-bureaucratic corporation."[84] Problematizing technocracy's relationship with authoritarianism, which dependency theorists identified without theorising, became unavoidable for scholars interested in the subject after the publication in 1972 of Guillermo O'Donnell's *Modernización y Autoritarismo*. According to O'Donnell' bureaucratic-authoritarianism model, the economic volatility and political uncertainty occasioned by the exhaustion of the "easy stage" of the industrialization-by-import-

[84] Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo*, 156.

substitution developmental strategy, coupled with the mobilisation and radicalisation of popular sectors, led to an authoritarian alliance between professional militaries and "civilian technocrats" to replace the multiclass coalition that sustained populist political systems.[85] Using Argentina as case study, O'Donnell argued that professional militaries coincided with "incumbents of technocratic 'roles'" in the need to change the rules of the political game.[86] While O'Donnell counted within the latter group all professional sectors that applied "modern technology" to decision-making, such as military officers, public administrators, private managers, and economists,[87] he later insisted on the prominent role played by representatives of an "economic orthodoxy," whose "professional background has been mixed with considerable experience in the forums and corporations of world capitalism."[88] The military coups in Uruguay and notably Chile in 1973 seemed to reinforce O'Donnell's argument. Robert Kauffman argued in 1979 that authoritarian regimes across the region had in common the development of a "technocratic policy style," reflected in economists' rise to "strategic positions in the economic policy process."[89] Within the framework of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, technocracy became increasingly affiliated with the rise to power of professional economists with a bias for orthodox policy agendas.

In a revision of O'Donnell's model, several authors pointed out that one of its major setbacks was the failure to explain why "competitive regimes persist[ed] in

[85] O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, 58-75; O'Donnell, "Reflections," 9-16; Collier, "Overview," 20.
[86] O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, 79, 82, 163.
[87] O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, 30-31
[88] O'Donnell, "Reflections," 17.
[89] Kauffman referred specifically to the rise of Krieger Vasena, Delfim Neto, Jorge Cauas, and Vegh Villegas to the Ministry of Finance during the military governments in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. See Kaufman's chapter in Collier and Cardoso (eds.), The New Authoritarianism, 189.

Colombia and Venezuela." José Serra argued that the "association between internationalization of capitalist system [sic] and bureaucratic-authoritarianism fails to explain why in places such as Colombia and Venezuela it did not have place." Albert Hirschman added that Colombia managed to overcome the economic transition from industrialisation-by-import-substitution to an export-led strategy without shifting to an authoritarian regime.[90] This sense of exceptionalism, highlighted by economic historian Carlos Díaz-Alejandro,[91] is generally shared by Colombian economic technocrats and partly explains their insistence on their democratic credentials.

While the Argentinian case heavily influenced the literature on bureaucratic-authoritarianism,[92] the Chilean experience became the referent for historically oriented analysis about the emergence of national economic technocracies. Pinochet's coup not only brought to an end Allende's democratic road to socialism, but also what was considered at the time an exemplary democracy. The economists who occupied ministerial positions under Pinochet captured global attention due to their close personal connections and intellectual affinities with the so-called Chicago School of economics,[93] whose most visible figures were considered to be at the forefront of a counter-revolution against Keynesianism in the North-Atlantic and the so-called *Cepalino* "structuralism" in Latin America. The convergence between Chicago economists, local technocrats' and authoritarian rule in Chile provided a clue for unravelling how transnational networks orchestrated the transition from interventionist to market-oriented policy frameworks.[94]

[90] See Collier, Serra and Hirschman's chapters in Collier and Cardoso (eds.), *The New Authoritarianism*, 7-9, 86, 79, 100.
[91] Díaz-Alejandro, "Prefacio," 5.
[92] Hirschman in Collier and Cardoso (eds.), *The New Authoritarianism*, 70-71.
[93] Valdés, *Pinochet's Economists*, 8.
[94] Coats, "Post-1945 Internationalization of Economics", 6–10; Montecinos, "Economists in Political and Policy Elites".

Thenceforth, the Chilean *Chicago Boys* have occupied a central place in the literature about the intellectual origins of neoliberalism.[95] Although the Chilean experience is commonly considered as the archetype for the diffusion of economics in the region, the representativity of the Chilean experience has recently come under scrutiny by historians of economics.[96] The evidence that this thesis provides about how the internationalisation of economics unfolded in Colombia provides support to this revisionist view about the rather exceptional circumstances that surrounded the emergence of the Chicago Boys in Chile.

The so-called third wave of democratisation inspired a new set of questions in the 1980s. The 1988 plebiscite that preceded General Pinochet's fall led Verónica Montecinos to challenge the rigid connection between authoritarianism and economic technocrats, and to inquire about their "role in democratic reconstruction." Montecinos showed that the relationship between technocrats and the Chilean state had a long history, which could be traced back to the incorporation of engineers in government during the 1920s. The Chilean state had employed professional economists at least since Ibañez's second government (1952-1956). Technocrats, economists amongst them, had therefore participated in government under both democratic and authoritarian administrations.[97] Furthermore, the "technocratization" of the state outlived the democratic transition, as revealed the incorporation in Patricio Awlyn's government (1990-1994) of "technocratic dissidents," who had found shelter in the economics research think-thank CIEPLAN during the dictatorship.[98] Patricio Silva argued that technocrats contributed to the

[95] For example, Fischer, "The Influence of Neoliberals in Chile," 308–12.
[96] Suprinyak and García Fernández, "The 'Vanderbilt Boys'."
[97] Montecinos, *Economics and Power*, 8, 14, 20, 29.
[98] Silva, "Technocrats and Politics in Chile," 403–8.

preservation of democracy in Chile by providing administrative stability, moderating conflicts and guaranteeing state efficiency.[99] Scholars coined the expression "democratic technocracies" to denote the coexistence in post-transition societies of "formal institutions of representation" and the "effective control by [technical] elites."[100]

Alongside the democratic transition, the structural reforms that made economists infamous in the region triggered a new wave of studies about technocracy. After Mexico declared a moratorium on its sovereign debt in 1982, the region was mired in a deep economic crisis that led to the intervention of the International Monetary Fund and painful adjustment and restructuring measures. In a context of democratic opening, the debt crisis offered spaces in government hitherto inaccessible to economic experts,[101] from which they designed and implemented the ensuing market reforms.[102]

Given Mexico's centrality in the debt crisis, this country provided Miguel Angel Centeno a case study to analyse how economic technocrats achieved legitimacy and autonomy to implement market reforms. Centeno showed how President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) was able to impose socially costly measures of macroeconomic adjustment, without resorting to military or popular support. Mexican technocrats managed to work through the bureaucratic apparatus of the ruling party to assert autonomy without being isolated, while they redefined the paradigm for state legitimacy and policy agenda setting. Centeno concluded that this "technocratic revolution" had less to do with the imposition of a "specific social or economic dogma" than with a revolution of "method,"[103] the legitimation of "a way of analysing social problems, formulating

[99] Silva, *In the Name of Reason*, 17.
[100] Centeno and Silva, *Politics of Expertise in Latin America*, 11.
[101] Whitehead, *Latin America: A New Interpretation*, 129–30.
[102] Williamson, "Manual for Technopols," 11–28; Domínguez, *Technopols*.
[103] Centeno, *Democracy within Reason*, x, 211, 235.

solutions, and implementing policy that places bounds on the agenda of discussion."[104] Generalizing from the Mexican experience, Centeno and Silva argued that economic expertise had successfully neutralized politics across Latin America by legitimising the epistemological assumption "that there is a unique and universal policy reality which can be analysed through scientific methods and regarding which no debate is possible."[105] Other country studies and regional surveys reinforced this connection between the responses to the debt crisis, the ubiquitous rise of economists to positions of influence and the convergence toward a market policy agenda.[106]

Without doubt the debt crises in Latin America and the structural economic reforms that ensued provided a window of opportunity for economic technocrats across the region to consolidate their policy influence, but an exclusive focus on this critical juncture carries the risk of obscuring long-term trends in the technocratisation of Latin American states. The design and implementation of market reforms required pre-existent institutional capacities to produce data and analysis about the economy, the existence of a local economics profession and its insertion in the circuits through which technical economic expertise circulated internationally during the second half of the twentieth century. By focusing on the decades that preceded the golden years of economists' influence in the late twentieth century, when the idea that economic affairs were the remit of specialists was far from being established, this thesis will contribute to better understand how the institutional basis that made possible the market transitions in the turn of the century had its foundations on the post-WWII development era.

[104] Centeno, "New Leviathan," 11.
[105] Centeno and Silva, "Introduction," 5.
[106] Conaghan and Malloy, *Unsettling Statecraft*; Montecinos and Markoff, *Economists in the Americas*, x–xi.

Methodological Approach and Sources

The double purpose of this thesis is to study a concrete historical process —the emergence of economic technocracy in Colombia— to elucidate a broader phenomenon —the changing role of expertise in decision-making. To achieve these objectives, this thesis adopts an interdisciplinary approach. It uses historical methods to engage critically with general claims in the social sciences about the relationship between scientific and technical knowledge. The ontological point of departure of this thesis is that the emergence of economic technocracy in Colombia after WWII was an instance of a more general phenomenon —the rise of technical experts' influence in decision-making in modern societies. Hence, my main methodological claim is that the concrete examination of that case study, besides being historically relevant on its own right, is illustrative for understanding broader phenomena, such as the international circulation of economic knowledge, the professionalisation of economics and the institutionalisation of economic expertise in the state. In this section, I present the main empirical sources that underpin my historical narrative, discussing their possibilities and limitations considering the rationale behind my methodological approach.

The main empirical sources for the argument presented in this thesis are the archival collections summarised in the Bibliography. I consulted archives located in Colombia and the United States, as well as the online repositories of the *Banco de la República*, multilateral institutions, and US government agencies. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, it was not possible to realize planned archival visits to other cities in Colombia and the United States. I complemented my archival research with a comprehensive

analysis of a wide arrange of published primary sources and with oral interviews to relevant participants and witnesses.

To analyse the role of international development cooperation, I consulted the collections about the first IBRD mission to Colombia in the World Bank Group Archives and the Albert O. Hirschman Papers in the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University. I triangulated the information gathered from those sources with the relevant collections in the Archivo Lauchlin Currie, preserved in the Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango. The minutes of the Board of Governors of the Banco de la República[107] were a useful source to analyse the expectations that economic decision-makers and diplomats had about the prospects of receiving technical and financial assistance from the IBRD in the early years of this institution. To gather information about the projects funded by the IBRD and from the 1960s by the Interamerican Development Bank (IADB), I consulted the appropriations listed in the online repositories of these multilateral banks. For analysing how lender-debtor relations unfolded in the context of the Alliance for Progress, I made use of the quarterly reports produced the Harvard Development Advisory Service (DAS) in its mission to Colombia, which I discuss below.

I consulted the institutional archives of the Universidad de los Andes (UniAndes) and the Universidad Nacional (UNal) in Bogotá to study the creation of economics departments and research centres in these universities, arguably the two most relevant for the purposes of this thesis. Initially, I had planned to visit the archives of regional universities, like the Universidad de Antioquia and the Universidad del Valle (UniValle), but this was not possible due to the lockdown during the Covid-19 pandemic. Published

[107] When I embarked in this project, the minutes from 1929 to 1958 were available in the Central Bank's online repository. A batch covering the minutes from 1958 to 1974 was recently released, but these were not consulted for writing this thesis.

primary sources, such as the memoirs of the conferences organised by the Sociedad Colombiana de Economistas (SCE), allowed me to grasp how the professionalisation of economics played out at the national level, and so did the secondary literature published in Spanish.[108] Because the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations sponsored the creation of economic research centers in UniAndes and UniValle, and UNal respectively during the 1960s, the collections of these grants in the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) also contained sources for examining the institutionalisation of economics education in local universities from the perspective of the donors. These collections proved to be particularly relevant for studying the internationalisation of the profession, not only through the eyes of foundation officials, but also through the correspondence the Ford and Rockefeller received from professors, university administrators, and notably, scholarship recipients.

My main source for analysing the institutionalisation of economic expertise in the state is the archive of the National Planning Department (DNP), which was transferred in 1998 to the Colombian National General Archive (AGN). As the mediator between the Colombian government and international lenders, the DNP is widely considered the hotbed of economic experts during my period of study. Before the Ministry of Finance and the Banco de la República were staffed with professional economists, the DNP was arguably the main public employer for professional economists by the end of Lleras Restrepo's government. The DNP archive documents well the administrative evolution of this institution during the 1960s, including information about staffing, on-the-job training, and the department's overall organisation. It also has information about the work conducted by different divisions and about international technical assistance. On the latter, I consulted additional documentation from the Harvard DAS mission, which was

[108] Mayor Mora and Zambrano, *Economistas Antiguos*.

actively involved in the department from 1963 to 1971. Given that this mission was sponsored by the Ford Foundation, the quarterly reports and memoranda sent by foreign advisers and consultants are stored at the RAC. These documents provide detailed information about the day-to-day functioning of the department, from the standpoint of the foreign experts. To make sense of the political drivers behind President Lleras Restrepo's impulse to economic planning, I consulted his private archives and analysed systematically the technical documents discussed at the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES) under his administration.[109]

I complemented those archival sources with a selection of serialised published primary sources. The magazines published by the Banco de la República and the General Comptroller's Office offered good material to study the state of economic thought and practices in Colombia before 1948.[110] For my period of study, I consulted bulletins and magazines published by UniAndes, the UNal, the DNP, the Sociedad Económica Amigos del País (SEAP), and Fedesarrollo, among others. I also traced how the relevant events were followed and discussed in the literate public sphere, by looking at the weekly magazine *Semana* during the late 1940s and early 1950s and *El Tiempo* during the 1960s. In addition, I approached as primary sources relevant institutional documentation published during my period of study, such as foreign mission reports, *Memorias de Hacienda*, and the government's development plans.

Lastly, I resorted to oral testimonies to fill the gaps left by written sources and gain insight from contemporaries directly involved in the process. I conducted twenty-

[109] The CONPES documents are available online in digitized format from 1967, when the council was restructured. I also consulted in the DNP's library physical documentation from the council's first stage between 1963 and 1967.
[110] To my knowledge there are no systematic studies of these sources, although Villamizar analyses some issues in *Pensamiento Económico*.

seven semi-structured interviews with either participants or witnesses of the emergence of Colombia's economic technocracy (Table 1, Appendix A). The majority of my interviewees were professional economists who received specialised training in economics during my period of study. Most of them worked for the state at some point in their careers and some even reached top positions in government, the central bank, or multilateral institutions. My sample is inevitably biased by the access I had to economic technocrats through my personal networks, which means there were relevant voices I could not benefit from directly to inform my analysis. I mitigated this selection bias through indirect means. When possible, I interviewed family members if my potential interviewee had passed away. Additionally, economic technocrats have left their testimonies in both written and audiovisual mediums. Some of the most vocal participants of the process left detailed memoirs, a list of which can be found in the bibliographical essay of this thesis. While my interviews were designed around the educational and professional trajectories of individual economic technocrats, my purpose was not prosopographical.[111] It was rather to use witnesses' testimonies to trace processes of professionalisation, institutionalisation, and public diffusion of economic expertise. I also conducted interviews with eye-witnesses, such as other contemporary economists, politicians and scholars, to mitigate the risk of reinforcing self-referential narratives.

[111] Although a systematic account of the educational and professional trajectory of the people who occupied key economic decision-making positions in the state in the twentieth century falls beyond the scope of this thesis, I collected information of this nature during this research. The consolidation of this data in a database is an ongoing collaborative project with Juan Carlos Acosta-Macia, Jimena Hurtado, and Camila Orozco-Espinel: "A Prosopographical Database of Colombian Economic Technocracy."

Argument and Thesis Outline

This thesis argues that the institutional arrangements that allowed for the emergence of Colombia's economic technocracy began to take shape in the mid twentieth century, building on the foundations of existing traditions of economic thought and practice. It is organised in five empirical chapters in addition to this introduction and the conclusion.

Chapter 1 explores the pragmatic legacies of these traditions. It shows that since the early 19th century, policy makers, businessmen and men of letters approached the economics science from a pragmatic, as opposed to doctrinaire, lens. These pragmatic economists developed their knowledge about economic issues through their close practical experience dealing with private and public affairs. Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, men with this profile continued occupying the top decision-making positions in the institutions that controlled the levers of fiscal, monetary and trade policy, such as the Ministry of Finance and the board of governors of the central bank. While economic management gradually became the domain of experts with specialized training in the discipline, practical acumen continued to be central for this emergent economic technocracy. Pragmatic economists, as Carlos Lleras Restrepo exemplifies, had a lasting impact on the design of institutions for economic management, the formation of the first professional economists, and their incorporation in the state. Furthermore, the cohabitation between academically trained economists and other —practically-inclined— professionals in the key institutions for economic management contributed to preserve and reinforce that pragmatic legacy in Colombia's economic technocracy.

After World War II, Colombia's gradual reincorporation in global financial markets through the multilateral banking system created new needs for technical

economic expertise in government. After Bretton Woods, the opening of diplomatic channels between governments in the so-called developing world and international financial institutions was central for the legitimation of the economist as a state-employed expert in countries like Colombia. Through the mediation of economic missionaries, the Colombian state put in place from the late 1940s and through the 1950s and 1960s a new institutional infrastructure for rationalising economic interventions that revolved around the idea and practice of development planning. Inspired by the experiences of wartime planning and post-war reconstruction in the United States and Western Europe during WWII and its aftermath, the formation of a planning apparatus in Colombia responded to the developmental aim of providing a macroeconomic framework to allocate resources for public investment projects. While ultimately the direction of macroeconomic policy remained outside the direct control of planning bodies, their importance lay in being the point of contact in the state for official lenders like the IBRD, which in the post-war development became the government's main source of foreign finance to fund large-scale projects in public infrastructure and basic industries. Chapter 2 analyses how the international circulation and adaptation during the late 1940s and 1950s of quantitative tools, like national accounting and economic programming, allowed for the constitution of "the economy" as an object of expert intervention. The institutional and statistical infrastructure for economic analysis developed in these early transnational exchanges with foreign missions of technical assistance was a watershed in the emergence of an economic technocracy because it opened spaces for experts about the economy in the state, even before economics had fully institutionalised as an academic discipline in universities.

The thesis then moves to analyse the supply of professional economists and how the profile of the economist changed between the late-1940s and the early 1970. By international standards, economics departments and research centres took off relatively late in Colombia's university system. As Chapter 3 shows, the first academic programmes in economics were created in the mid-1940s and professional economists only developed a *esprit de corps* by the end of the following decade. The timing of the academic institutionalisation of economics had at least one important consequence on the subsequent evolution of the profession. In contrast to the experience of other Latin American countries, the economics profession did not split into ideological camps when the education of economists became more attuned with the disciplinary standards of US academe through the intervention of philanthropic foundations in Colombian universities in the 1960s. Chapter 4 explores how the internationalisation of economics unfolded, situating the Colombian experience within the regional scene. It shows how in the absence of a rooted national tradition of economic thought in Colombian universities, the assimilation of the prevailing academic standards of economics in the United States was less prone to conflict between communities with opposing epistemic views about the economy and society. However, this did not mean that local economics departments assimilated the academicism of mainstream economics. Responding to the state demand for government experts, internationalisation strategies yielded outcomes that conflicted with what philanthropic foundations like the Ford and the Rockefeller had initially expected. Hence, the formative years of the first generation of professional economists in Colombia were not characterized by clashes between opposing camps or schools of thought but rather by shared socialisation experiences in universities and government.

While during the period studied in this thesis professionally trained economists had little influence on the institutions that oversaw the levers of monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange policy, it was from their position of strength in planning bodies that they began to legitimise their expertise in the political sphere. Chapter 5 studies the institutionalisation of economic expertise in the state, through the lens of the experience in the DNP. Planning bodies recruited professional economists at a young age to enhance the state's "technical" capacities in an effort to signal to foreign lenders the government's commitment with a rational management of development aid. By the end of the 1960s, academically trained economists with graduate studies abroad occupied most of the top and middle-ranking positions in the DNP. Given the relative importance of multilateral and bilateral loans for Colombia's long-term investment programmes in the 1960s, the National Front governments strengthened the position of the planning department in the state's architecture for economic management using both formal and informal mechanisms. It was in this context of transnational engagements with external actors that the distinction between "technical" bodies, like the National Planning Department, and "political" bodies, like Congress took shape.

The story that follows narrates how the gradual professionalisation of economics and institutionalisation of economic expertise in the state between 1948 and 1974 allowed for the emergence of an economic technocracy in Colombia. The changes in the relationship between universities, the state and international institutions analysed below set the foundations for the rise of economists to decision-making positions in the Ministry of Finance and the Board of Governors of the Banco de la República in the last quarter of the twentieth century, a subject that falls beyond the remit of this thesis. The scope of my argument is also delimited by the dissertation's focus on the process of technocratic

ascendancy in the field of economic management and, more specifically, of development planning. This means that counter-processes of resistance to the rise of economic technocrats do not receive proportional attention in the narrative, although they are discussed in some of the chapters. I do not analyse either the role of other professional communities —like sociologists, engineers, and business managers— that evolved in parallel to the economists and participated, with or without them, in the technocratic developmental interventions of mid-twentieth century Colombia. Lastly, my concentration on planning bodies is justified by the fact that this was arguably the stronghold of technical economic experts in the state by the end of my period of study, but this institutional focus constrains my conclusions about the effects that their presence had on the policy arena The final chapter summarizes the main findings of this study and its main contributions to the academic literature presented in this introduction.

Chapter 1. Pragmatic Legacies of Economic Thought and Practice

When in 1955 the economic historian Luis Ospina Vásquez referred to the evolution of economic thought in Colombia, he argued that "there had never existed specialised studies in that science." Ospina Vásquez did not deny that Colombians —from the "man-on-the-street" to those who "write for them"— had informed opinions about their economic reality, but he contended that students of the past would struggle to find any "systematic exposition" of the principles that guided their actions. While Colombia had seen "popularisers" of economic ideas, these had generally been lawyers and engineers whose engagement with the discipline was rather "rudimentary."[112] Born in one of the most successful political and business dynasties in the republican era,[113] Ospina Vásquez viewed with scepticism that "influential men" had ever "accepted *in toto*" what was presented to them as the "'official' theory."[114] In his personal copy of *Industria y Protección en Colombia* (1955), he scribbled that the economic ideas of those in "positions of economic and political command" had generally been of such a "pitiful simplicity" that it reduced to "a certain degree of insignificance the role of that who writes the history of the ideological and economic evolution of the country."[115]

This chapter challenges Ospina Vásquez's assessment by tracing the national traditions of economic thought and practice that existed in Colombia before economics

[112] Luis Ospina Vásquez, *Industria y Protección En Colombia, 1810-1930,* 3rd ed. (Medellín: FAES, 1979), 15–17. For a similar view see Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, *Pensamiento colombiano en el siglo XIX*, and Mayor Mora and Zambrano, *Economistas Antiguos*.
[113] See Safford, "Luis Ospina Vásquez," 466–67.
[114] Ospina Vásquez, *Industria y protección*, 16.
[115] See "Anotaciones manuscritas al ejemplar personal" in Ospina Vásquez, *Industria y protección*, 1st ed., 507.

professionalised.[116] While those who debated and decided about economic affairs before the mid-twentieth century did not generally receive formal *and* specialised university training in economics, they developed some degree of expertise in the field through intellectual engagement or vocational practice. In Colombia, like in most Latin American countries, the professionalisation of economics debuted in an intellectual environment in which the common denominator had been the predominance of men of letters, who had received training in law, and became involved in the practice of *ensayismo* (essay writing).[117] It also built on a tradition of pragmatically minded men, with professional education in engineering, who saw in technical and scientific training a means to contribute to national economic progress.[118] The purpose of this chapter is to identify the historical legacies that these existing traditions of economic thought and practice subsequently had on the education of professional economists and the administration of economic affairs in the second half of the twentieth century.

Every epoch has its own "economics."[119] Men of letters and practical men in modern-day Colombia tried hard to engage with the economics of their day. Since the nineteenth century, members of the upper strata were familiar with the leading theorists in the field, some read their treatises and many others followed the evolution of their ideas in the foreign press.[120] Furthermore, the ruling classes learnt about the latest economic

[116] I build on the work of the contributors to the bicentenary collection of the *Archivo de la Economía Nacional* published by the *Banco de la República* in 2014 and to Álvarez and Correa, eds., *Ideas y políticas económicas*.
[117] Love, "Institutional Foundations," 153.
[118] See Safford, *Ideal de lo práctico*, 33.
[119] Here I use generically the word "economics" to denote, every "form of organizing ideas about the basic problem of human needs and the meeting of those needs." In this chapter, I follow what members of the upper strata of society understood as mainstream economics (or political economy) at any given moment of time. I do not address heterodox understandings of economics, nor what the man-of-the-street denoted by the term. Tribe, *Economy of the Word* , 23.
[120] Safford, "Emergence of Economic Liberalism," 42.

doctrines through what Ospina Vasquez called *popularisers*, men who travelled abroad, and translated treatises and manuals. From very early on, the teaching of political economy and other specialised subjects, as shown in this chapter, was institutionalised in faculties of law and engineering. Ruling elites followed the international evolution of economic thought and practices, primarily in Europe and the United States, to inform local debates, design institutions and educate future decision-makers. Even after the first university programmes in economics were created in the mid-1940s, the presence of lawyers and engineers in the administration of economic affairs endured until the late twentieth century, which reveals the extent to which the practice of economics continued to rely on other professional traditions.[121]

Colombian lawyers and engineers with knowledge on economic affairs were certainly not theorisers, and it would be moot to search "original" contributions to the canonical evolution of the economic science in their writings. As I argue based on an extensive bibliographical review, their approach to economics was more pragmatic than doctrinaire, or even academic. What brought these men to engage with that science was commonly a search for guiding principles to conceptualise and address issues they considered of public and national interest, or what the engineer Alejandro López dubbed "Colombian Problems."[122] These pragmatic engagements with the economics science occurred in specific institutional settings. Men of letters encountered economics "through the practical problems" they faced as "m[e]n of state," to paraphrase what the Minister of Finance and future President Lleras Restrepo wrote about Miguel Antonio Caro, a leading statesman at the end of the nineteenth-century.[123] Public finance constraints, scarce

[121] Mayor Mora and Tejeiro, "La profesión de economista en Colombia," 109–22.
[122] See López, *Problemas Colombianos*, 16-17.
[123] See the editor's preface in Caro, *Escritos sobre cuestiones económicas*, iii.

statistical data, and political acumen often impeded public officers, like Ministers of Finance, from applying dogmatically economic principles. The state was not the only institutional setting that demanded some degree of economic expertise. Colombian economists *avant la lettre* also found in the economic science conceptual and technical tools for administering private affairs. By the mid-twentieth century, the separation of public and private economic affairs was not fully clear-cut. With the creation of consultative boards where the state and business associations had representation, it was not unusual to find the same men participating in public and private decision-making bodies.[124] Therefore, this chapter also sheds light on the historical evolution of the institutional settings that mediated the appropriation, production, and application of economics before this field became the domain of professionals.

This chapter is organised in three sections following this introduction. I begin by examining the early introduction of political economy in university education and its uses in the public sphere. I then explore the formation of economic specialists in the Ministry of Finance and business associations during the first decades of the twentieth century. Finally, I analyse the development of technical forms of economic expertise in the Central Bank and the General Comptroller by focusing on the first attempts to measure business cycles. More than attempting to provide a comprehensive history of existing traditions of economic thought and practice in Colombia until the mid-twentieth century, this chapter presents an overview of exemplary cases that illustrate the pragmatic legacies of these traditions.

[124] Caballero Argáez, *Economía colombiana del siglo XX*, 243–47.

1.1. Practical Encounters with Political Economy

In the late eighteenth century, the word "economy" and its cognates went through semantic transformations that did not go unnoticed in the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Granada.[125] The conceptual detachment of economic organisation from the proper administration of the household found echo in the Spanish Crown's reforms in its American domains. Colonial administrators and members from the creole upper strata found in political economy —Adam Smith's new "science of the statesman"— a new language for deliberating about the wealth of the colonial territory and of its people.[126] Their interest in the principles of political economy grew from and responded to practical projects of reform in areas that would later attract the attention of political leaders in the republican era: fostering domestic and foreign commerce, increasing agricultural productivity and connecting the territory. When the colonial bureaucrat Francisco Antonio Moreno y Escandón voiced the need to address those issues in 1772, his plea remained constrained by the "mercantilist" desideratum of achieving a "favourable balance of trade."[127] By 1810, the language colonial subjects used to describe the obstacles and possibilities regarding wealth was changing.

The writings of Jose Ignacio de Pombo were illustrative of how locals appropriated political economy. Pombo was a local merchant and treasurer of the *Consulado de Cartagena*, which the Crown created in 1795 to promote administrative

[125] In this chapter, I use the name that contemporaries used to refer to what is today the Republic of Colombia: Viceroyalty of New Granada (before 1819), Great Colombia (1819-1831), Republic of New Granada (1832-1858), Granadine Confederation (1858-1863), United States of Colombia (1863-1886) and Republic of Colombia (1886-present).
[126] Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, 428. In Spanish, the first entry for "political economy" in the *Diccionario de autoridades* was included in 1817. " Melo, "Economistas," 7.
[127] Melo, "Economistas," 12.

efficiency and the economic development of the colony.[128] In his plan to develop agriculture and foreign commerce in that port, the idea of bureaucratic intervention was not incompatible with the limiting principles that liberal political economy imposed to the sovereign, such as respecting the freedom of labour and industry, and the pursuit of individual interest.[129] Access to treatises on political economy was not the main obstacle reformers like Pombo faced to provide general economic, or even systematic, analyses of local problems. Pombo eclectically quoted Adam Smith and Spanish Liberal reformers, and mercantilists like Necker. The specificity of local concerns impeded a dogmatic assimilation of political economy, as did the limited empirical knowledge reformers had of the land and its people.[130]

Not all discovered the principles of political economy through academic texts. Like many others after him, Jerónimo Torres, a prominent figure of the independent movements, did so empirically: by peddling, exploring the territory and experimenting with the commercial extraction of tropical products.[131] His empirical grasp of the economic problems and possibilities of the New Granada circulated in the small yet thriving public sphere in which Torres and his contemporaries participated, exchanging private correspondence, writing in scientific journals and gathering in *Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País*.[132] Reformist and experimental, the relationship that that writers in New Granada developed with political economy was more pragmatic than

[128] Run by local merchants, *Consulados* were created to resolve commercial litigations, but also raised taxes (*averias*) to finance infrastructure projects. McFarlane and Mejía, "Comerciantes y monopolio en la Nueva Granada," 52, 56. About *Consulados* in Spanish America see Paquette, "State-Civil Society Cooperation and Conflict in the Spanish Empire," 263–98.
[129] Melo, "Prólogo," in *Escritos Económicos,* 19; "Economistas," 35.
[130] Melo, "Prólogo, "18-19.
[131] Silva, *Ilustrados,* 416.
[132] Silva, *Ilustrados,* 418.

academic. Yet, Pombo recognized in 1810 the need to create a university chair in political economy in the Viceroyalty of New Granada.[133]

The teaching of political economy in universities had to wait until the resolution of the wars of independence, and the conformation of the new republic. Political economy was first introduced in the law curricula of the Colegio de San Bartolomé in 1824. In 1826, it became one of the six compulsory subjects for obtaining the degree in jurisprudence.[134] Since their creation in the seventeenth century, the Colegio de San Bartolomé and the Colegio Mayor Nuestra Señora del Rosario were responsible for training Doctors in jurisprudence, a degree that gave colonial subjects access to the bureaucracy. That title continued to be a marker of honour and status in the republican era and was for decades the most important source of social mobility.[135]

Francisco Soto held the first formal lecture on political economy in the Colegio de San Bartolomé. The course was based on the Spanish translation (1821) of the second edition of Jean Baptiste Say's *Traité d'économie politique* (1814[1803]). This was the text commonly used in the faculties of jurisprudence and schools of commerce in Spain, and perhaps the main artefact used to disseminate political economy in the early nineteenth century, canonising the definition of political economy as the study of production, distribution and consumption.[136] While students of jurisprudence studied Say, they read texts from Jeremy Bentham and Antoine Destutt de Tracy in their courses of public law and universal legislation.[137] Within this sensualist tradition, political economy

[133] Melo, "Economistas," 7.
[134] Uribe Urán, *Honorable Lives*, 113.
[135] Safford, *Ideal de lo práctico*, 128–30, 149. Uribe Urán, *Honorable Lives*, 104–7, 116.
[136] Hurtado, "Economía Política," 42; Menudo, "Say, Jean Baptiste," 106. For the transnational influence of Say's treatise in the teaching of political economy see Augello and Guidi, "The Economic Reader," 13.
[137] Uribe Urán, *Honorable Lives*, 109.

was considered a branch of the science of the statesman, or in Bentham's terms, of the legislator.[138] The study of political economy was therefore embedded in the search for a positive basis for the legal and administrative reorganization of the republican state. Rather than a specialised subject, it was taught as part of the general education of citizens.

The allegedly hedonist and materialist ethics associated to sensualist political thought introduced, according to historian Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, a "perturbation" that conflicted with the prevalent Catholic morality in New Granada. This tension between the Church's moral doctrines and Liberalism permeated the debates about post-primary education throughout the nineteenth century.[139] Diverging views on education became a major cleavage between the political factions that eventually became the Liberal and the Conservative parties. Yet, the teaching of political economy was relatively spared from those controversies. It was taught at the secondary and university level without major interruptions throughout the nineteenth century, despite the heated partisan debates around education. As historians have argued, economic doctrines were not generally a source of acrimony between Conservatives and Liberals, although there were exceptions to this regularity.[140]

The influence of French Liberalism in the teaching of political economy perdured into the twentieth century. This was partly thanks to Ezequiel Rojas, who replaced Soto as chair of political economy in San Bartolomé in 1832. Proscribed from public office after being on the losing side in the war of the Supremos (1839-1842), Rojas became one

[138] See for example Bentham, "The Philosophy of Economic Science," 81–119.
[139] Jaramillo Uribe, *Pensamiento Colombiano*, 153, 370.
[140] Uribe Urán, *Honorable Lives*, 113; Frank Safford, "Economic Liberalism," 53–54. One exception was the 1897 presidential election that confronted the Liberals and "Historical" Conservatives to the "Nationalist" Conservatives on monetary policy. See Bergquist, "Political Economy of the Colombian Presidential Election of 1897," 10, 13, 15.

of the wealthiest lawyers in Bogotá by offering legal services and lending money to merchants. He taught political economy with some interruptions until his death in 1873.[141] Rojas's study programmes followed closely the structure of Say's *Traité* and of his *Cours d´économie politique* (1821) but his lectures were not a simple reproduction of those texts; they combined eclectically different ideas from the sensualist tradition, relating them to his contemporary debates.[142] Rojas' course programme, which came out in 1844 (followed by a second edition in 1866), became the official syllabus that educated the generation of Radical liberals that ruled the country from 1863 to 1880.

Foreigners played no role in the institutionalisation of political economy in universities as happened in Chile, where the Frenchmen Jean Gustave Courcelle-Senuile held the chair of political economy at the Universidad de Chile, and Perú, where Paul Pradier-Foderé founded what later became the Faculty of Economics at the Universidad de San Marcos. Courcelle-Senuile and Pradier-Foderé were also monetary advisers for the Chilean and Peruvian governments.[143] As far as I can tell, the Colombian government did not seek economic advice from foreign experts until Edwin Kemmerer visited the country in 1923. The first foreigner hired to teach political economy I know of was the German Horst Rollitz, who taught at the Universidad Nacional (UNal) in 1933.[144] Rojas and several of his pupils held the chair of political economy in the collegial schools and in the UNal (created in 1867) until the Concordat with the Vatican was signed in 1887. Rojas' students, most of whom were staunch Liberals, were replaced for prominent figures of Conservatism. One of the new appointees was Miguel Abadía Méndez, who

[141] Uribe Urán, *Honorable Lives*, 138, 149.
[142] Hurtado, "Economía Política," 53-65.
[143] About Courcell-Senuile, see Glaser, "Chile's Monetarist Money Doctors" 166–67; for Pradier-Foderé, Gootenberg, *Imagining Development*, 66.
[144] About Kemmerer see the third section of this chapter. For Rollitz, see Chapter 3.

continued to teach political economy in 1929 while being President.[145] By then other textbooks had displaced Say's manual from reading lists, but French disseminators seem to have still been widely used to teach political economy.[146]

Notwithstanding the long presence of political economy courses in universities during the nineteenth century, the ruling classes of modern-day Colombia did not treat the subject academically. Certainly, men of letters wrote treaties of political economy, and engaged in debates about it in the press and in Congress. But like Pombo and Torres before, they approached it pragmatically, searching in that science guiding principles to decide "what suits the country."[147] For this purpose, concrete life-experiences were commonly the point of departure.

Regarding the political use of economic ideas in parliament and the public sphere, no subject has captured more the attention of scholars than the rise of laissez-faire liberalism in the 1840s and the gradual acceptance of protectionism after the 1880s. Frank Safford identified William Wills, an Oxford-educated Englishman who settled in New Granada, as one of the first who wrote a treatise of liberal political economy applied to that country. He saw in Wills' treatise an early justification of the export-led growth development model.[148] In *Observaciones sobre el comercio de la Nueva Granada* (1831),

[145] Rojas also taught political economy in the Universidad Central (1840), the UNal (1868), and the Colegio Mayor del Rosario (1866). After Rojas's death, his pupils continued teaching political economy in these institutions. After the Concordat, they moved to the universities founded by Liberals: the Universidad Externado (f. 1886) and the Universidad Republicana (f. 1990). I thank Sofía Meléndez Jiménez for sharing this information. Hurtado, "La Economía Política" 50–51, 64–65; Meléndez Jiménez, "La Economía Política como campo de batalla."
[146] By late nineteenth century, Say's treatise had been replaced in both French and Colombian universities by other textbooks, like Charles Gide's *Principes d'Économie Politique* (1886) and Leroy-Beaulieu's *Traité Théorique et Pratique* (1896). Mayor Mora and Zambrano, *Economistas Antiguos*, 55–57; Steiner, "Cours, Leçons, Manuels, Précis and Traités," 27, 84–86.
[147] Ospina Vásquez, *Industria y Protección*, 1979, 275.
[148] Safford, "Commercial Crisis," 196.

Wills contended that Neo-Grenadians could better promote public wealth if they specialised in exporting tropical products instead of protecting artificially nascent industries.[149] Yet, as Malcolm Deas has argued, Wills considerations were far from "a dogmatic application of a priori principles without foundation in the reality he observed."[150] Wills' disclaimer about the paucity of publicly available statistics for agriculture, commerce and public finance was a cautionary note about the general applicability of his propositions.[151] Commodity prices only began to appear regularly in the press after 1847, and the first comprehensive publication of official statistics had to wait until 1874.[152] Under these conditions, Wills and other writers compensated the scarcity of statistical data with direct observation. The Englishman participated in mining ventures in Mariquita, near the Magdalena River, and experimented with agricultural products in his hacienda in Cune, in Central New Granada.[153] Similarly, Miguel Samper, — the most "theoretically-minded" of the Radical Liberals who governed the country during the United States of Colombia (1863-1886) according to Ospina Vásquez, — was among the pioneers of the tobacco export bonanza in the upper Magdalena of the 1850s. In the meantime, he read Bastiat's *Economic Harmonies* (1850, translated in 1853) and lectured the Society of Artisans on the principles of political economy.[154]

The fiscal reality of the state also prevented the application of dogmatic interpretations of political economy. Wills defended the abolishment of the state

[149] The full text was reproduced in Deas, *Vida y Opiniones*, vol. 2 13-83.
[150] Deas, *Vida y Opiniones*, vol 1, 92.
[151] Deas, *Vida y Opiniones*, vol 2, 13.
[152] Frank Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise in Central Colombia," 84; Aníbal Galindo, chief of the national statistics office, argued that by 1874 it was "materially impossible to gather data about the 'general statistics of the country'." See his *Historia economica i estadistica de la hacienda nacional*, 1.
[153] Deas, *Vida y Opiniones*, vol 1, 51–52.
[154] Rivas, *Los Trabajadores de Tierra Caliente*, 155, 162; Safford, "Economic Liberalism," 57; Luis Ospina Vásquez, *Industria y Protección*, 1st ed., 297.

monopoly over the commercialization of tobacco, arguing that "the liberal principles of political economy should be brought in practice, whenever it is possible." However, he favoured its continuation under "healthy rules," acknowledging that "we should not hasten the abolition of the tobacco monopoly, since in the current circumstances, instead of producing a good, this measure could produce an evil."[155] Paul Gootemberg has demonstrated the existence of a "counterliberal tradition" during the Guano era in Perú, which revealed a fascination for "utopian industrialism." Colombia was not devoid of utopian industrialists,[156] but even staunch advocates of economic liberalism like Wills understood that an orthodox application of what they understood as the principles of political economy also had elements of utopianism.

As economic historians have documented, during its first century of existence, the finances of the Colombian state relied heavily on revenues from state monopolies and custom taxes.[157] Public finance considerations did not necessarily follow the same principles of political economy and were constantly a binding constraint for liberal reformers. Even the person responsible for the liberalisation of tobacco and the custom reforms of 1848 that initiated the era of export-led growth, the Finance Secretary (1847-8) Florentino González, acknowledged that fiscal considerations posed limits to a general application of economically liberal principles. In his treatise *Elementos de Ciencia Administrativa* [Elements of Administrative Science], published in 1847, González held, in line with contemporary liberal political economists, that he did was not a supporter in principle of government monopolies because they "are always oppressive, given that the product under state monopoly [*el género estancado*] is sold at a price that exceeds its

[155] Deas, *Vida y Opiniones*, vol. 2, 25.
[156] Gootenberg, *Imagining Development*, 205; Safford, "Commercial Crisis," 198-199. 204.
[157] Melo, "Evolución Económica," 42, 51.

costs of production". Nevertheless, even this liberal reformer recognised that in many occasions, as occurs among us, it will be necessary to keep some monopolies, due to the impossibility to abruptly substitute one source of revenue for another."[158] As González argued in his report to Congress for 1947, the same year that he presented the bill that abolished the state monopoly over tobacco production, this was the case of the revenues obtained from the exploitation of salt pans (*Salinas*). Not only were salt pans "property of the Republic," but also "the best of them have been exploited by the State and the revenue accruing from them has increased annually." There was therefore no reason for the state to the give in concession the most productive salt pans to private interests, but only those located in "depopulated areas" and which would require "big capital advances" to make their extraction profitable.[159] What this example shows is that even if political economy contributed to legitimising liberal economic doctrines in the public sphere, this discursive hegemony only translated partially into the policy arena as decision-makers had to pragmatically contend with the fiscal considerations of the state.

Furthermore, the policy shift toward protectionism after 1880 did not require the legitimation of a systematic body of knowledge. There does not seem to be evidence of the development of a proto-nationalist school of economic thought advocating for industrialisation, like in Germany and colonial India. According to Ospina Vásquez, by the beginning of the twentieth century, protectionism had "imposed itself and subsisted without major attacks, and without defence. Practically —he added— his only serious advocate was Rafael Núñez," who served two terms as president of the Estados Unidos de Colombia (1880-1882, 1884-1886) and two more as head of state of the Republic of

[158] González, *Escritos*, 415.
[159] González, *Informe del Despacho de Hacienda…de 1847*, 10.

Colombia (1887-1888, 1892-1894).[160] A livelong economic liberal, Núñez surprisingly justified raising custom duties as a protective measure in his inaugural discourse as president of Colombia in 1880. Besides highlighting the fiscal importance of custom duties, he added that "big European and North American industries have not developed and grown, in general, but through this means."[161]According to standard interpretations of this shift, Núñez suffered an intellectual transformation during his long exile in Europe as consul in Le Havre and Liverpool between 1864 and 1879.[162] While travelling to Europe was exceptional in the mid-nineteenth century (Florentino González was an early example), from the 1860s onwards it was not uncommon that Colombians of the upper strata spent some periods of their lives across the Atlantic. From the 580 Colombians that travelled to Europe between 1845 and 1890, Núñez was –according to Frédéric Martínez– the archetype of the "institutional observer," who looked to Europe as a source of institutional models for Colombia.[163]

According to Eduardo Posada-Carbó, however, Núñez's private correspondence and his press columns written during exile did not reveal a change in mind about substantive issues, such as his advocacy of economic liberalism, but rather a rejection of dogmatism and an appreciation of relative valuations.[164]According to a column published in the newspaper *El Tiempo* in Cartagena on 29 March1891, the custom reforms that Núñez initiated in 1880 had his "moderate seal":

[160] Ospina Vásquez, *Industria y Protección*, 2019, 300, 408. There is no evidence that nineteenth-century theorists of protectionism like Friedrich List had any influence, as was the case in colonial India. See Bach, "Redefining Universal Development."
[161] Nuñez, *Escritos Económicos*, 53.
[162] Liévano Aguirre, *Rafael Núñez*, 88–100; Ospina Vásquez, *Industria y protección*, 1st ed., 288–90; Cruz Santos, *Economía y hacienda pública. Tomo I*, 548.
[163] Martínez, *El nacionalismo cosmopolita*, 210, 290.
[164] Posada-Carbó, "Nuñez y Europa"; *El desafío de las ideas*, 105.

> "Mister Núñez — the article added— took distance from absolute opinions on the matter, which were the true reflection of the doctrines he was taught in lecture halls and made part of the [intellectual] environment when he was the Secretary of Finance of the Republic from 1855 to 1857. But he did not go to the opposite extreme, as could be believed. To an extent, he repudiated [Jean Baptiste] Say, but adopted the opinions of another liberal economist: John S[tuart]. Mill".[165]

To give weight to this statement, the article reproduced a fragment of a presidential address by Núñez in 1881, in which acknowledged that his customs reform was not consistent with "the economic doctrines in vogue" in the first half of the nineteenth century but defended this measure on the grounds that "sciences progress and they change as they do." Explicitly referring to Mill as one of the celebrated public writers who "withheld the convenience of a system of protection circumscribed in time and space,"[166] Núñez reappropriated the ideas of this canonical liberal political economist to champion the instrumental use of custom duties to protect domestic industries. This was a highly selective interpretation by Núñez of Mill's writings on the effects of import duties on foreign trade,[167] but that was not the point. Nuñez's argument was rather a practical application of Mill's distinction between the science of political economy, which is of general character, and the art of government, which is institutionally contingent. Also influenced by Herbert Spencer, Núñez considered that both societies and the knowledge produced about them were subject to evolutionary progress. This positivist view about the co-evolution of social scientific knowledge and social change was imbued in the

[165] Nuñez, *Escritos Económicos*, 933.
[166] Nuñez, *Escritos Económicos*, 933.
[167] While Mill considered the theoretical possibility of a case in which non-protective duties could be a source of gain to the country that imposed them (which he rejected on practical grounds due to the threat of retaliation), he identified as "purely mischievous" custom duties which had the effect of "protecting a specific branch of domestic industry." Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, Vol. II, Book V, Chapter iv, §6.

education that prominent future political leaders, like President Laureano Gómez (1950-1951), received in the turn of the century.[168]

In sum, from late colonial times, men involved in the administration of private and public affairs in modern-day Colombia were familiar with political economy. Since early on, political leaders in the republican era were taught in faculties of jurisprudence the principles of the new science of the statesmen. In contrast to the experience of other Andean countries, foreign experts did not play a role in the institutionalisation of political economy in universities, though some foreigners, like Wills contributed to the public debate on economic issues and Colombians were well acquainted with the evolution of the field by reading manuals and treatises and travelling to Europe. Indeed, the language of political economy permeated discussions in congress and the public sphere about the measures that most suited the country. However, a close analysis of some exemplary debates between laissez-faire and protectionism reveals that their encounters with political economy were, for the most part, more pragmatic than doctrinaire. Since treatise writers were often involved in commercial activities as well, their references to political economy were never too detached from their concrete life-experiences. Even those who tried to apply dogmatically liberal economic principles were constrained by the economic reality of the country, epitomized in the poverty of public finances. This pragmatic approach to political economy may partially account for why the subject was taught continuously throughout the nineteenth century and why the economic direction of the country did not generally inspire partisan struggles.

[168] James D. Henderson, *Modernization in Colombia*, 14, 31. In contrast to Porfirian Mexico's *científicos* like Justo Sierra, Francisco Cosmes or Telésforo García, Auguste Comte's views did not appear to have a major influence in Colombian social thought in that period. Hale, *Transformation of Liberalism*, 251.

1.2. Economic Specialists at the Service of the State and Business Associations

In the turn of the century, the Colombian economy and society did not provide the necessary material conditions for the professionalisation of economics. This contrasts with the institutionalisation of economics education and research in universities in the Anglo-American world,[169] in a context of rapid industrialisation and social demands for improving living conditions. While the Conservative governments that ruled the country for most of the period comprised between 1885 and 1930 promoted alternatives in technical education for the upper strata, the rigid structure of higher education thwarted the creation of degrees in economics.[170] Organised around the education in medicine, law, and engineering until 1935, the university system privileged the professional training of generalists, while allowing for some degree of specialisation within the traditional professions.

This section examines how existing faculties of law and engineering incorporated specialised courses in public finance and industrial economics and supplied the necessary expertise the state and the private sector demanded as the Colombian economy grew in complexity. It also shows how the Ministry of Finance and *gremios* (business associations) became sites of practical expertise about public finances and sectoral knowledge.

[169] See Leonard, "Progressive Era Origins"; Laughlin, "Study of Political Economy in the United States," 1-19,143-151; Fourcade, *Economists and Societies*, 132–38.
[170] About the university system during these years, and efforts of providing technical education see Silva, "La Educación En Colombia," 79; Helg, *Civiliser Le Peuple*, 26, 61-66, 75-83, 152-154; Lebot, *Educación e Ideología*, 18, 44-45.

1.2.1. The Ministry of Finance and Hacendistas, or Lawyers with Expertise in Public Finances

From early on, the fiscal precariousness of the state demanded practical acumen from those who administered public finances. The appointment of the first Secretary of Finance of the Great Colombia, Pedro Gual, illustrated this point. As ambassador of the independence cause, Gual had travelled to England and to the United States. He was familiar with the fiscal system of these countries and with the fiscal doctrines of European and North American treatise writers. His travel experiences and readings inspired Gual's reformist zeal, who as Governor of Cartagena resolved to overhaul in this province the fiscal regime inherited from colonial times, eliminating internal tariffs, excise taxes and tributes from indigenous populations. Vice-president Francisco de Paula Santander not only disagreed with Gual's resolution, but he also considered it was misguided to look for guidance in political economy to administer the public finances of a poor state:

> On this subject of political economy everyone thinks in his own manner. Necker differed from Colbert, and the economists of today will have different opinions…I don't understand all this, nor do I have reason to understand it, but I understand fourteen months of experience of being in charge of providing pecuniary aid for whatever is needed… Gual may have seen the United States, but I am carrying on the [fiscal] struggle in Cundinamarca.[171]

The President Simon Bolivar concurred with Santander on the precedence of fiscal realism, and asked Gual to call off his reformist experiment. Gual complied and Santander rewarded him by appointing him as the first (interim) Secretary of Finance of the newly independent republic. The constraint of fiscal realism would shape the pragmatic

[171] Francisco de Paula Santander to Simón Bolivar, quoted in Frank Safford, "Economic Liberalism," 42.

approach to public finances of Gual's successors in the Secretary of Finance, as I illustrated in the previous section with the case of Florentino González.

During colonial times, fiscal administration in Spanish America had been heavily centralized. The Crown exerted control over officials in key institutions such as *Cajas Reales* and *Tribunales de Cuentas* by means of free appointment, removal and rotation of personnel.[172] In the republican era, the Secretary of Finance, although appointed by the chief of state, became the mediator between the passions of the Executive and the interests represented in Congress.[173]

In the first republican century, the Secretary of Finance, one of a handful of posts in the presidential cabinet, oversaw public finances at the national level, while undergoing a series of reforms that enhanced its capacities to administer the resources of the state and to promote public wealth, within very narrow limits. In 1847, for example, a project in Congress approved the reorganization of fiscal offices across the national territory, adopted a double-entry accounting system, and created the National Direction of Budget.[174] In 1863, a new constitution split the Secretary of Finance into the Secretary of Treasury and Credit, and the Secretary of Finance and Development. This reform formalised the division of labour between monetary and fiscal authorities, which forestalled the creation of national banks (and ultimately the *Banco de la República*), and the reorganization of the former Secretary of Finance into the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit in 1923.[175] The reforms were not confined to bureaucratic structures. The

[172] Uribe Urán, *Honorable Lives*, 10.
[173] Cruz Santos, *Don Pedro Gual*, 22.
[174] Cruz Santos, *Economía y hacienda pública*, 379; Luis Fernando Molina, "Las Finanzas Públicas."
[175] The Secretary of Finance acquired ministerial status with the constitution of 1886 and was renamed Ministry of Finance in 1905.

1863 Constitution widened the remit of the Secretary of Finance: in addition to administering public finances, it then was given the task of providing stimulus to economic advancement. By renaming the office, adding the word *fomento* (development), Secretaría de Finanzas y Fomento, the Constitution signalled the aspiration that the state could play an active role in addressing what Anibal Galindo called the "material obstacles that oppose[d] the social and economic development" of the country.[176] Public expenditures in infrastructure became the Secretary's main instrument for *fomento*, after Law 68 of 1868 gave the Executive the prerogative of elaborating and presenting the annual national budget for the approval of Congress.[177]

Yet, the general poverty of the state and its restricted access to international capital markets limited the Secretary's ability to finance public goods. Public revenue relied heavily on custom duties and state monopolies and was therefore subject to the volatility of trade cycles. Furthermore, a significant part of those revenues went to service the obligations acquired with foreign creditors to finance the wars of independence, which the national government only concluded to amortise in 1931.[178] Renegotiating the country's sovereign debt with foreign creditors was an occupational activity to which Secretaries of Finance devoted their time in office in the turn of the century.

Secretaries of Finance were first and foremost men with practical knowledge of public finances, accumulated in their experiences administering local governments, deliberating in Congress, or undertaking commercial ventures. While some of them were certainly acquainted with the evolution of political economy, public finances remained

[176] Galindo, *Historia economica i estadistica*, 102.
[177] Cruz Santos, *Economía y hacienda pública*, 513–14.
[178] Deas, "Problemas fiscales," 96; Avella-Gómez, "Financiamiento externo," 27, 37; Melo, "Evolución económica," 43.

for them a relatively autonomous field of knowledge and practice. Consider the case of José María del Castillo y Rada, who has been identified as the first *hacendista* – or specialist in public finance (*hacienda pública*) in the country. Like most of his successors, Castillo y Rada was a lawyer by training. A Doctor in law educated at the Colegio Mayor del Rosario, Castillo y Rada was elected representative of the provinces of Mariquita and Tunja in Congress before holding the Secretary of Finance between 1823 and 1827. Those who later studied Castillo y Rada's noted how his approach to public finances was above all pragmatic. According to the *hacendista* and historian Abel Cruz Santos, Castillo y Rada's view of public finance was attuned with the principles of political economy because he understood that public finance had to do with the creation of public wealth and not exclusively with the extraction of revenues.[179] For Anibal Galindo, author of an early history of public finances, he was still a mercantilist, who remained subject to "the theory of the balance of trade."[180] Ospina Vásquez casted doubts about the impact that intellectual influences could have had in Casillo y Rada's actions. He argued that the measures the Secretary of Finance undertook responded to the "basic political need (…) of fighting for the unity of the country," so it would be "foolish" to assume that men like him "surrendered to theoretical elaborations related to those subjects."[181] *Hacendistas* might have made efforts to justify in their *Memorias de Hacienda* their policy choices in the scientific language of political economy, but as Malcolm Deas has argued, in practice their main concern throughout the nineteenth century was to raise revenue. Their manipulation of policy instruments, such as custom duties, was subordinate to this goal.[182]

[179] Cruz Santos, *Economía y hacienda pública*, 325–40; Cruz Santos, *Castillo y Rada*, 17–18.
[180] Galindo, *Historia economica i estadistica*, 30.
[181] Ospina Vásquez, *Industria y protección*, 3rd ed., 125, 128.
[182] Deas, "Problemas fiscales," 67.

Judging from the profiles of the Secretaries of Finance in the nineteenth century, commercial and political experience together with constitutional knowledge were more esteemed than formal education for being appointed to the post. As a general rule, postholders had previous experience in Congress; some, like Salvador Camacho Roldán and Aquileo Parra, were also prominent tradesmen; others had accumulated experience in the finances of their respective provinces. Rafael Nuñez, for example, was appointed for the first time as Secretary of Finance in 1857 due to his competent handling of public finances working for the province of Cartagena and the state of Bolivar. His electoral success in the presidential elections after concluding a second period in the Secretary of Finance (1878-1879) also illustrates the importance practical knowledge in public finances had for aspiring heads of state. Besides Nuñez, four presidents in the nineteenth century had formerly been Secretaries of Finance.[183] As an appointive position that gave access to political power, displaying competence was of course not sufficient to reach the Secretary of Finance, since Ministerial cabinets followed partisan lines – allegiance to the governing party was generally an informal requisite for aspiring postholders.

Economic and political changes at the turn of the century, however, created a demand for specialists in public finances. The *Guerra de los Mil Días* (1899-1902), the most severe civil conflict Colombia had suffered since independence, was followed by the first (and only) crisis of hyperinflation in the country's economic history,[184] the secession of Panamá in 1903, and the autocratic government of Rafael Reyes (1904-

[183] Besides Nuñez, José Ignacio Márquez (1832, 1837-1841), Manuel Murillo Toro (1864-6, 1872-4), Aquileo Parra (1876-8) and Julián Trujillo (1878-1880) were Secretaries of Finance before being elected presidents. Salvador Camacho Roldán was Secretary of Finance *after* being interim President (1868-9). About the latter, see Deas, "Problemas Fiscales," 67, 107. For Nuñez, see Roberto Junguito's prologue to Nuñez, *Escritos Económicos*, 12–14. About Parra, see Cruz Santos, *Economía y hacienda pública*, 532–33.
[184] Ocampo, "Regímenes monetarios variables," 29–41.

1909). The subsequent two decades were a period of relative peace and stability which favoured structural economic transformations in an international context favourable for the export of Colombian primary products.[185] Exports received a boost with the expansion of coffee production, and the first modern industrial plants were established in major cities, with Medellin becoming the industrial capital of the country.[186] With the reopening of capital markets and the millionaire compensation received from the United States for the loss of Panamá, the state had access to financial liquidity for the first time in a century. With more money in its coffers, public expenditure in public works increased.[187] From a purely functionalist perspective, the growing size and complexity of the economy, and the first manifestations of state intervention gave access to men with more specialised training in economics to the Ministry of Finance.

In the early twentieth century the figure of the *hacendista* became more closely associated with the science of public finances, now conceived as a proper subfield in economics. The trajectory of Esteban Jaramillo, twice Minister of Finance (1927-1929, 1931-1934), illustrated this trend toward specialisation. While his early career resembled that of nineteenth century *hacendistas*, he was more exposed to formal university training in economics than his predecessors. Born in a Abejorral, a provincial town near Medellín, Jaramillo graduated from the faculty of law of the Universidad de Antioquia in 1895. His first experiences with public finances were during the Congressional debates about the construction of the Panama Canal while he was interim Minister of Internal Affairs. As consul in Le Havre between 1904 and 1909, Jaramillo attended lectures in the Collège de

[185] Ospina Vásquez, *Industria y Protección*, 1st ed, 343.
[186] Palacios, *Coffee in Colombia*, 198-226; Ospina Vásquez, *Industria y protección*, 1st ed., 384–400.
[187] Avella-Gómez, "Financiamiento externo," 28, 32–33; Tovar Zambrano, *Intervención económica*, 158, 163, 166–68.

France with the political economist Leroy-Beaulieu, author of a textbook commonly used in Colombian universities. Upon his return, President Reyes appointed him director of the Central Bank in Bogotá, a position he held for less than a year.[188] Jaramillo then represented Antioquia in Congress for seven years, and then returned to his natal department to work as fiscal agent in the Governor's office. This was the breaking point in his professional trajectory. As I will show below, during the 1910s Antioquia was not only the epicentre of Colombia's industrial development, but also an experimental ground in technocratic government.[189] As departmental fiscal officer, Jaramillo spent a year in Columbia University to study public finance, where he had classes with Edwin A. Seligman, a leading expert in the emergent subfield.[190] During his visit to the United States, Jaramillo wrote the book that gained him recognition as an expert in fiscal policy, in which he provided a scientific basis for the introduction of a progressive income tax.[191] The Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of the Colegio del Rosario appointed him in 1921 as professor of public finances. Previously, lectures in political economy dedicated a short section to public finances but this was the first time this subject was taught in universities as a stand-alone course. Jaramillo then became Minister of Finance in the critical years of 1927-1929 and 1931-1934. He then taught public finances in different universities. His students gave testimony of the popularity of his lectures, which he published as a treaty on public finance. Through his courses, books, and professional

[188] Jaramillo, *Esteban Jaramillo*, 55, 59.
[189] See also Mayor Mora, *Técnica y Utopía*, 111, 122.
[190] Johnson, "Progressivism and Academic Public Finance," 1-2, 4, 12, 27.
[191] Junguito Bonnet, *Historia económica*, 70-71; Jaramillo, *Esteban* Jaramillo, 69, 82, 87.

practice, Jaramillo exerted a formative influence on future Ministers of Finance, including Lleras Restrepo, Hernán Jaramillo Ocampo, and Antonio Álvarez Restrepo.[192]

Jaramillo was arguably paradigmatic of the *hacendistas*, or lawyers with knowledge of public finances, who dominated the Ministry of Finance for most of the twentieth century. Only in the last two decades professional economists began to gradually displace *hacendistas*. Other *hacendistas*, like Jaramillo, were familiarised with the economics subdiscipline of public finances, but their engagement with the subject continued to be more pragmatic than academic. Academic credentials were not a marker of their expertise. Until 1958, all but three Ministers of Finance for which I found information had exclusively received professional training in law.[193] Only one of them (the engineer Carlos Sanz de Santamaría) had completed a postgraduate degree. Instead, having previous experiences in or knowledge of the leading economic sectors, particularly coffee, gained relative importance as *gremios*, or business associations, became necessary interlocutors of the national government in the coordination of economic policy as the next section shows.[194]

1.2.2. Gremios and Industrial Engineers, or Experts in Sectoral Management

While *hacendista* lawyers dominated the Ministry of Finance, the private sector's demand for sectoral economic expertise was supplied by faculties of engineering. Since the mid-nineteenth century, political leaders like Mariano Ospina Rodriguez had sought

[192] See testimonies in Jaramillo, *Estudios y Antología*, quoted in Jaramillo, *Esteban Jaramillo,* 114, 116-117, and Mayor Mora and Zambrano, *Economistas Antiguos*, 57.
[193] See fn. 103.
[194] This partially explains why Antioquia and Caldas, the heartlands of industrial and coffee production, were overrepresented in the Ministry of Finance during the twentieth century. See Meisel Roca, "¿Quién Manda Aquí?," 5, 13, 14, 16.

to provide young men career opportunities beyond the exercise of law, to put an end to what they perceived as bureaucratic careerism, or *empleomanía*.[195] Some sectors of the Colombian elites tried hard, as Frank Safford argued, to infuse "practical values" and "useful knowledges" in the context where the material conditions were unpropitious for its endogenous development.[196] Well-off families looked abroad, particularly to France and the United States, to give their children formal training in science and engineering. Although occasionally these academic incursions received government support, they were mainly driven by private initiatives.[197]

Local universities began to offer degrees in engineering in the second half of the nineteenth century. In Bogotá, the Radicals opened a Faculty of Mathematics and Engineering at the UNal, after Ospina Rodríguez's short-lived attempt to promote the teaching of mathematics and principles of engineering in the Colegio Militar (1847-1854). Engineers trained in the Escuela Militar and the UNal developed an esprit de corps and formed a professional association, the Sociedad Colombiana de Ingenieros, in 1887.[198] One year later, members of the economic elite in Antioquia headed by the Ospina family founded the Escuela Nacional de Minas de Medellín. The Escuela de Minas exhibited both Ospina Rodriguez's penchant for practical education and the managerial inclination of contemporary engineering schools in the United States. It became a hotbed for the leading industrial managers and entrepreneurs of the country during the first half

[195] Ospina Rodríguez, *Esposición*, 45. For the term *empleomanía*, see Uribe Urán, *Honorable Lives*, 142, 145.
[196] Safford, *Ideal de lo práctico*, 12–14.
[197] Safford, *Ideal de lo práctico*, 221–42.
[198] Safford, *Ideal de lo práctico*, 251-253, 294–96, 318–25.

of the twentieth century, and its graduates came to embody the myth of a distinct *Antioqueño* "mentality," with a civilizing force for Colombia.[199]

The Escuela de Minas trained a specialist in economic affairs that differed from the *hacendista* lawyer. In that school, engineers developed an expertise about economic issues based on quantitative tools rather than logical-deductive discourse. From the beginning, the school's curriculum included a course in political economy, although in 1915 it stopped offering it because according to its rector, Tulio Ospina, "external people wanted to give a political connotation to the appointment of a professor for that course."[200] This statement exemplifies an effort to mark some distance —at least rhetorically— between the technical education offered at that school and the political diatribes that fascinated students in Bogotá, even some of those who studied engineering at the UNal.[201] In 1911, when the Escuela de Minas became independent from the Universidad de Antioquia, after being six years under its umbrella, Tulio Ospina reformed the curriculum placing more emphasis on management by including a course in "industrial economics". The course's professor, Alejandro López, conceived industrial economics as a subdiscipline of political economy that studied the efficiency of human labour while considering its organisational dimension. Its core principle was the application of measurement and calculation to the rational management of organisations. It thus began with a section on statistics before addressing public finance and business administration.

[199] Graduates from the Escuela de Minas had a disproportionate representation in the list of managers of the main industrial companies registered in Colombia in the 1940s. See Mayor Mora, "Escuela Nacional de Minas," 62-67. For the Escuela de Minas' role in crafting the representation of the *Antioqueño* "mentality" see Murray, "Forging a technocratic elite," 53.
[200] Tulio Ospina Vásquez in the *Anales de la Escuela Nacional de Minas*. Quoted in Mayor Mora, "Escuela Nacional de Minas," 49, fn. 60.
[201] See Henderson, *Modernization in Colombia*, 64.

Several managers of private and public firms, and at least one Minister of Finance took this course with López between 1913 and 1916.[202]

Like the *hacendista* Jaramillo, the industrial economist López practiced what he preached. Born in a family of artisans from Medellín, López enrolled at the Escuela de Minas in 1893. When that school closed during the civil war of 1895, he moved to the Universidad de Antioquia, from where he graduated with a dissertation in which he elaborated a cost-benefit analysis of a tunnel project to connect Medellín with the Magdalena River. His thesis earned him a directive position in the Antioquia Railways Company, which sponsored him a visit to the United States. As member of the Legislative Assembly of Antioquia from 1912 to 1920, he became an early promoter of regional planning in Colombia. According to his biographer, he found inspiration in the "technocratic thought" of French "Saint-simonianism" and in the social reformist views of North American "taylorianism." While he taught the course of Industrial Economics in the Escuela de Minas, he championed the creation of Medellin's municipal statistical office and pioneered quality of life studies in Colombia, constructing the first index that measured the cost of living in his hometown.[203] With the collaboration of Jorge Rodríguez Lalinde, also an *Antioqueño* engineer, he translated what became a popular manual of statistics and published a compendium of the departmental statistics in *Estadística de Antioquia* (1914).[204] As I will show in the next section, these incursions in quantification

[202] About the course in industrial economics see Mayor Mora, "La Escuela Nacional de Minas," 52, 53–54, 59–60. For the course's syllabus and the list of students that took the course see *Ética, trabajo y productividad*, 493-495, 495-499. The Minister of Finance was José María Bernal (1947).
[203] Mayor Mora, *Técnica y utopía*, 84, 96, 112.
[204] Vidales, Díaz Granados, and Leguízamo Motta, *Historia de La Estadística*, 81; Hermbger, "Las actividades estadísticas," 25.

at the subnational level served as a model for the reorganization of national statistics two decades later.

While Antioquia was López's experimental ground for statistical analysis, travelling abroad allowed him to familiarize with the early developments of modern microeconomic analysis. In 1920 López went to England, where he lived until 1935. Without receiving formal training, he became a systematic reader of political economy, particularly of Alfred Marshall and the economists educated under his 1903 *tripos* (course) at the University of Cambridge.[205] But his interest in the Cambridge school's theories of industrial organisation was not exclusively academic. Like Nuñez before, his long sojourn abroad drove him to reflect about Colombia. In a book he intended to circulate privately, he identified agricultural production, transports, and access to financial capital as quintessentially "Colombian problems". Although his observations were based on his experiences in Antioquia, his diagnosis was framed in the language of what was only then beginning to be called "neo-classical economics."[206] According to López, the underlying cause of Colombian problems was the poor "specialization of labour"; the challenge for Colombians "to raise labour productivity." However, Lopez's assimilation of marginal analysis was embedded in his technocratic understanding of scientific management. The solution to Colombian problems, he added, required "the steering action of influential classes; productive forces are well disposed as synergies; directive [forces] are divergent and incoherent, and the future would be ours if we achieved their convergence toward our collective goal." Moreover, López contended that

[205] According to Mayor Mora, he also read writers in the German historicist and romantic economic traditions, like Friedrich List and Adolf Wagner. Mayor Mora, *Ética, Trabajo y Productividad,* 402.
[206] For the origins of the term "neo-classical economics" and its association with the Cambridge school see Aspromourgos, "On the Origins of the Term 'Neoclassical,'" 266–68.

it was the expert's role to guide influential classes in steering the country's productive forces toward a common end.[207]

From López's technocratic standpoint, the solution to Colombian problems required developing new institutional arrangements that gave representation to productive sectors in economic management. The Federación Nacional de Cafeteros (Fedecafé), the association of coffee producers, and its relationship with the Colombian state was the paradigmatic example of such arrangements.[208] Established in 1927, during the Second National Congress of Coffee-Growers, Fedecafé was an initiative of the Agricultural Society of Antioquia supported by representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture. Under the direction of a general manager elected by a National Coffee Growers Committee, Fedecafé was authorized to levy a tax on coffee exports to fund marketing activities abroad.[209] Given its relative administrative efficiency and national representativity, the government also delegated other public functions to the federation, such as providing technical assistance to growers and collecting statistics about the coffee sector.[210] Fedecafé had the institutional infrastructure the national government lacked to monitor the production and commercialisation of coffee. As a case in point, it was Fedecafé and not the National Direction of Statistics who conducted the first agricultural census in Colombia, the coffee census of 1932.[211] Fedecafé also produced specialised knowledge about the sector, which it disseminated through its own periodical journal, the *Revista Cafetera de Colombia*.[212] According to Marco Palacios, Fedecafé's

[207] López, *Problemas colombianos*, 10-12, 17.
[208] Mayor Mora, *Técnica y utopía*, 521.
[209] Koffman, "National Federation of Coffee-Growers," 82, 84.
[210] Palacios, *Coffee in Colombia*, 217.
[211] Palacios, *Coffee in Colombia*, 227.
[212] León Vargas et al. eds., *Federación Nacional de Cafeteros, 90 Años*, 72, 82.

"institutionalized" monopoly, at least until the 1970s, over the production of data and analysis about the coffee sector was one of its main sources of power.[213] To effectively play its role as *gremio* (trade guild), Fedecafé developed its own technical staff of economic specialists in the sector.

Given the centrality coffee exports gained for macroeconomic management in the first half of the twentieth century,[214] the sectoral interests of Fedecafé did not remain unchecked by state intervention. This tension became evident when in 1934 Fedecafé's general manager, Mariano Ospina Pérez, vehemently opposed the plan of the incoming President Alfonso López Pumarejo to intervene, in coordination with Brazil, international coffee markets to keep global prices high by restricting supply.[215] When Ospina Pérez resigned the direction of Fedecafé in defiance of López Pumarejo's plan, the President expanded the state's influence over the federation's decision-making body. In 1935, López Pumarejo modified the statutes of the National Coffee Growers Committee, so that the government and coffee producers were equally represented in that body. Thereafter, the President casted the decisive vote whenever differences arouse and selected Fedecafé's manager from a list of three candidates proposed by Congress. According to Caballero, the relationship Fedecafé established with the state in the 1930s marked "a first step toward corporativism in the conduction of economic affairs in the country."[216] This tendency was strengthened during the 1940s and 1950s with the foundation of other *gremios*, following the creation of the National Association of Industrialists in 1944

[213] Palacios, *Coffee in Colombia*, 249.
[214] Coffee revenues oscillated between 60% and 80% of the value of Colombian exports between 1910 and 1960. Palacios, *Coffee in Colombia*, 199.
[215] Caballero Argáez, *Economía Colombiana*, 153–78.
[216] In 1935, López Pumarejo elected Alejandro López to replace Ospina Pérez. Caballero Argáez, *Economía Colombiana*, 143, 162.

(ANDI).[217] By 1960, there were over fifty business associations in Colombia representing sectoral interests, some of which had their own divisions of economic research.[218] As corporatist arrangements of economic management gained saliency, *gremios* interventions to defend the sectoral interests of their associates created an endogenous demand for specialists in economic affairs.

Between the 1930s and 1940s, industrial engineers' understanding of scientific management also framed political parties' views of state economic intervention. Mayor Mora argued that Alejandro López's *Idearium Liberal* (1931) provided an ideological justification for the introduction of interventionist conceptions of the state in the political programme of the Liberal Party. With López Pumarejo's constitutional reform of 1936, the state was given legal instruments to intervene in the economy.[219] For some leading figures in the Conservative party, the teachings of industrial economics were consistent with the social doctrines of the Catholic Church. The most vocal advocate of this idea was Mariano Ospina Pérez, who had been Alejandro López's student at the Escuela de Minas and his successor as professor of Industrial Economics in 1920. According to Ospina Pérez , Leon XIII's *Rerum Novarum* encyclical, which expounded the Church's position in regard to the social question defending the harmonious relationship between workers and businessmen, could be applied through the scientific management of labour.[220] When Ospina Pérez became presidential candidate in 1946, he succeeded at incorporating these views in the programmatic agenda of the Conservative party.[221] For

[217] For the creation of ANDI see Sáenz Rovner, *La ofensiva empresarial*, 37–67.
[218] Urrutia Montoya, *Gremios*, 27.
[219] Tovar Zambrano, *Intervención económica*, 227.
[220] Ospina Pérez, *Economía industrial y administración*, 124.
[221]See "Las Bases"; "La Candidatura"; "El problema social" (23-45) and "El trabajo" (113-123) in Ospina Pérez, *El gobierno de unión nacional*, 3–9, 9–23, 23–45, 113–23.

all their differences, some of the leading figures in Liberal and Conservative parties shared by the mid-twentieth century the aspiration that economic and social progress could be engineered through scientific management.

In sum, during the first half of the twentieth century, the Ministry of Finance and *gremios* became institutional settings that mediated the assimilation of specialist knowledges in public finances and industrial management. *Hacendista* lawyers and industrial engineers like Esteban Jaramillo and Alejandro López actively engaged with these emerging subfields in economics, which was only then becoming an academic discipline on its own right in the Anglo-American context. This gradual specialisation of knowledge about economic affairs responded to the needs of both the public and the private sector, following the development of sectoral interests and the opening of global financial markets. By the late 1940s, the Ministry of Finance and *gremios* were two pillars of an institutional architecture for economic intervention that was supported by two technical bodies created after the Kemmerer mission of 1923, the Banco de la República and the General Comptroller, to which I now turn.

1.3. Money Doctoring and Statistical Expertise at the Banco de la República and the General Comptroller

The creation of central banking and regulatory institutions in the 1920s were a landmark for the conformation of the first technical bureaucracies that addressed economic affairs at the national level. Given their nature and mandates, the Banco de la República and the General Comptroller pioneered between the 1920s and 1940s the production of statistical knowledge to monitor economic activity. This section presents an overview of the early evolution of these institutions and examines the first attempts to

study empirically the business cycle to illustrate the forms of statistical expertise they fostered.

With the arrival of Edwin Walter Kemmerer on 10 March 1923, the Colombian government received for the first time a mission of foreign economic advisers. Although the so-called Kemmerer mission included North American specialists in fiscal and monetary policy, and a Spanish professor, it came to be remembered by the head of the advisory group. After obtaining his PhD in Economics from Cornell University in 1901, Kemmerer advised the government of the Philippines in the adoption of the gold standard, just in the aftermath of the Philippine-American war. In the United States, Kemmerer was an enthusiast supporter of the plan Nelson Aldrich presented to Congress in 1911 to create a central banking system, the immediate antecedent of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. President Woodrow Wilson regularly sought the recommendations of the Princeton professor on economic policy, who also advised the governments of México (1917) and Guatemala (1919). His visit to Colombia in 1923 was the first of a series of "full-scale independent" missions that gained him the moniker of "Money Doctor" for prescribing governments financial and institutional measures to achieve "sound money". Kemmerer and his team stayed in Colombia for six months, which they spent studying existing regulations, interviewing bankers, businessmen and public officers, as well as attending social events and playing golf with local notables. In the end, the Money Doctor and his team did not make too much effort to adapt their recommendations to their patient, since these did not differ substantially from the organisation of banking in the United States. In

less than three months, the Colombian Congress approved without previous deliberation eight out of the ten bill projects the mission proposed.[222]

For the government of Pedro Nel Ospina (1922-1926), the validation of foreign experts served the double purpose of legitimising domestically his agenda of institutional reform and improving the country's reputation and visibility abroad. The main legacy of the first Kemmerer Mission, the organization of a central bank, was based on regulations that had been discussed and approved before foreign advisers arrived. In 1918, Esteban Jaramillo, who represented the Colombian government in the mission, had submitted a project for the creation of a central bank inspired on the Federal Reserve of the United States. Based on these antecedents, Jaramillo worked together with Kemmerer and his team in the preparation of the bill that created the *Banco de la República* as a quasi-public institution. Half of the initial capital was provided by the government, while the remaining shares were distributed between private banks and the general public. The national government and other stakeholders had representation, according to their shares, in the bank's Governing Board, which thereafter became the authority that oversaw monetary policy. Although there had been national banks with the monopoly of paper emission, the Banco de la República was the first bank of emission in Colombia that was also lender of last resort.[223]

During its first years, the central bank's Governing Board played a passive role in monetary policy. Overall, it displayed a strict adherence to the gold standard, which the

[222] Drake, *Money Doctor in the Andes*, 9-10, 38; Adolfo Meisel, "Creación del Banco de la República, 243, 249," and Lopez, "Realizaciones, limitaciones y tensiones internas de la Misión Kemmerer," 266, 269, 271.

[223]For the antecedents of central banking in the nineteenth and early twentieth century see Meisel, "Creación del Banco de La República," 255; Ibáñez, "Antecedentes Legales," 194–237; Acosta, "Discusión entorno al establecimiento de un Banco Nacional," 183–221.

money doctor fervently advocated for in his world tour during the 1920s. Since the maintenance of monetary stability under the gold standard also implied a stringent fiscal discipline, it constrained the Finance Minister to guarantee balanced budgets. Hence, the Mission's recommendations also included further regulations for the elaboration of budget. For example, Law 34 of 1923 stated that forecasted expenditures must not exceed the value of revenues received in the last three years. [224] Formally, this provision limited Congress's ability to approve new expenses without the acquiescence of the Executive.[225]

Colombian decision-makers adopted what was considered the orthodox position regarding monetary and fiscal matters, but this was not the result of a passive assimilation of foreign ideas. Before the arrival of financial advisers, there was a broad political consensus about the convenience of sound money and balanced budgets due to the lingering memory of hyperinflation during the Guerra de los Mil Días. Moreover, the timing of the Mission suggests that the government was well aware that the endorsement from reputed financers in the United States would serve to attract North American investments.[226] A similar observation led Paul Drake, a leading scholar on Kemmerer, to minimise the impact the mission had in terms of institutional and technological transfer. Drake emphasised instead its role in extending the hegemonic influence of the United States in Andean countries through financial networks in what he called the "diplomacy of the dollar."[227] In the short run, these tactics proved to be effective for the governments

[224]Meisel, "Creación del Banco de la República" 246 and Tovar Zambrano, *Intervención Económica*, 145.
[225] This reform seems to have been dead letter by 1934, when Esteban Jaramillo a proposed a constitutional reform to assign the Executive the prerogative over public expenditures. According to him, existing regulations allowed Congress to claim that since "budget was a law, it could be modified by another law." Mario Jaramillo, Esteban Jaramillo: 273.
[226] Meisel, "Creación del Banco de la República," 259.
[227] Drake, *Money Doctor in the Andes*, 3, 8, 21, 22.

of both countries. From being one of the countries in Latin America with the lowest figures of foreign investment, Colombia experienced the highest growth in financial capital flowing from the United States to the region in the 1920s.[228]

Although the Banco de la República and the Minister of Finance tried to maintain the gold standard, this stance did not outlive the impact of the economic depression in the Northern Hemisphere during the early 1930s. With the gradual abandonment of the gold standard, monetary and fiscal authorities assumed a more active role in policymaking. In late 1931, the Banco de la República and the government signed a contract whereby the latter obtained a long-term credit line backed by future public revenues from salt mines, an instrument that permitted the central bank to control money supply. This financial leverage allowed the national government to run public deficits to reactivate economic activity, directing credit through the newly created agricultural bank (Caja Agraria) and mortgage bank (Banco Central Hipotecario).[229]

Despite the interruption of foreign credit for public works in 1928, municipalities and departments continued to finance infrastructure with public spending. Challenging the central government, they agreed in 1932 a collective default of the financial obligations acquired with foreign lenders during the 1920s. Ironically, thanks to this moratorium the national government was able to continue servicing its obligations with foreign lenders until 1934. Being one of the last countries in Latin America to default its sovereign debt was also a signal of "national virtue" in the handling of public finances

[228] Meisel, "Creación del Banco de la República," 257-8. While national and subnational governments had borrowed a meagre 18 million dollars overall by 1924, they received a gross inflow of 135 million dollars between 1926 and 1927. Thorp and Londoño, "Effect of the Great Depression,", 82, 87.
[229] Meisel, "Creación del Banco de La República," 317–18, 323; Tovar Zambrano, *Intervención económica*, 222; Jaramillo, *Esteban Jaramillo*, 318.

for US bankers. These unorthodox and pragmatic responses to the collapse of global trade and capital flows not only allowed decision makers to navigate the economic crisis but also taught them that economic policy could be engineered.[230]

During the 1930s, the growing battery of instruments for state intervention in the economy prompted the development of an institutional infrastructure for economic deliberation, which had hitherto been restricted to Congress and to the public sphere. The Board of Governors of the Banco de la República became the key setting for the interaction between the government and the business sectors. The Minister of Finance presided the board, which after 1931 also included a representative from Fedecafé.[231] Government and business representatives met in other spaces of economic consultation such as the Coffee Growers Committee and the boards of the agrarian and mortgage banks. During the economic crisis, the Congress approved the creation of the Consejo Nacional de Economía, with the vague objective of "unifying and managing better everything related to the problems of national production and consumption." This council had a limited role in coordinating economic policy, but provided a legal precedent for the national planning apparatus that thrived in the 1950s and 1960s.[232]

Given the absence of economic departments in universities and of independent research centres, the Banco de la República became a hub for the production and

[230] Lleras Restrepo, *Crónica*, 34–35; Thorp and Londoño, "Effect of the Great Depression" 96.
[231] The Governing Board was reformed following the recommendations of the second Kemmerer Mission, which the Colombian hired in 1930 to address the fiscal deficit resulting from the economic crisis and the reversal of capital flows. After this reform, the board was composed by 3 government representatives (presided by the Minister of Finance), 3 bankers and 5 businessmen, including the general manager of Fedecafé. Meisel and Ibáñez, "La segunda Misión Kemmerer," 347.
[232] See Law 23, 17 February 1931, consulted on August 11 2020 in http://www.suinjuriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta=Leyes/1578740; Banco de la República, "'La reorganización del Consejo de La Economía Nacional,'" 309–10. Cano Motta, "La planeación en Colombia," 30–31.

circulation of quantitative knowledge about the economy. In November 1927, the first issue of the central bank's magazine, the *Revista del Banco de la República*, was published, claiming to be the first periodical publication of "purely economic and financial nature." The following year, the central bank created an office of statistics, directed by the German Rudolf Claus. Every month, the magazine published economic and financial data together with editorial notes in which the bank's manager reflected about the "economic conjuncture." These editorial notes mirrored the format of the *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, from which the *Revista del Banco* also translated excerpts regularly.[233] In the 1930s and 1940s, the magazine provided a space for Colombian and foreign authors to comment on specific issues of general relevance. It also published data collected by the technical staff of its statistical office and, occasionally, economic studies. Hence, the magazine served both to make visible the technical activities of the bank and to create, through its readership,[234] a public literate in conjunctural economic issues. In this light, the long-term impact of the first Kemmerer Mission on the technification of the state and of economic deliberation should not be understated

Together with the Banco de la República, the General Comptroller, another Kemmerer institution, became an incubator for technical economic analysis. The creation of the General Comptroller responded to the logic that monetary stability and fiscal discipline were co-dependent under the gold standard. With the responsibility of making

[233] See "Nuestra Labor," and "Nuestros Servicios Estadísticos" in the *Revista del Banco de la República* (*R-BR*), November 1947, 1:1. The editorial notes were so popular that they appeared in a supplement published in advance. See Avella-Gómez, *Economía colombiana en la Revista del Banco*, 3–4.

[234] In its first publication, the magazine sold 1000 copies. The Banco de la República also contributed to create a broader readership by purchasing books for the central bank's library. New acquisitons were reported in the *Revista*. Gómez Arrubla, *Historia del Banco de La República : 60 Años*, 82

government spending accountable to lawmakers and to the public, the head of the office was elected by Congress for a renewable two-year period. During its first years, the General Comptroller suffered from a high rotation in personnel until the Liberal-dominated Congress of 1935 appointed Plinio Mendoza Neira to run the office. Conservatives charged Mendoza Neira of political sectarism in appointing staff, an accusation that the opposition party voiced throughout the so-called Liberal Republic (1930-1946).[235] Yet, the General Comptroller enjoyed a good reputation among Colombians, and its monthly and annual fiscal reports contributed, according to Drake, to improve "government economic knowledge, planning and management."[236]

Besides assigning the General Comptroller functions of accountancy and control, lawmakers made it responsible for organising national statistics. A foreign observer commented in the 1950s that this was a *sui generis* arrangement because it assigned the prerogative of collecting and analysing demographic and economic data to a public officer appointed by Congress, and not by the Executive.[237] Although the centralization of statistical production in the General Comptroller was conceived within the logic of the Kemmerer reforms, it only materialised during the Liberal Republic. Following the organisation of statistical offices in Antioquia during the 1910s, Congress approved a law in 1935 by which the Comptroller gained technical oversight over statistical offices across the nation. Subsequent resolutions created a National Statistical Council, a centre for statistical research (later renamed Centro de Estudios y Laboratorio de Estadística) and a permanent body in charge of the national census.[238]

[235] Lleras Restrepo, *Crónica*, 192, 218.
[236] Drake, *Money Doctor in the Andes*, 54.
[237] Jacob Perlman, *Reorganización del trabajo estadístico*, 3-4.
[238] See Lleras Restrepo, "La estadística nacional," ii; and Perlman, *Reorganización del trabajo estadístico*, 35-40.

The institutionalisation of statistics in the General Comptroller also responded to a new conception of government that resorted to quantification to make national problems legible for the state. As Renán Silva argued, public intellectuals and those who ruled the country between 1930 and 1946 endeavoured to produce knowledge about the Colombian society, its culture and its economy using modern scientific methods and techniques, and to make this knowledge accessible to the "people." President López Pumarejo expressed this willingness to know by deploring the state of ignorance in which, according to him, politicians made decisions:

> The Colombian reality has never been reduced to quantitative figures for the rulers of this country, [nor] specified in monographs or exposed in statistics. The politician is, thus, left groping in the dark, guessing the reactions that government actions will produce, or waiting for them to reveal openly in order to channel them and guide them.[239]

While the Ministry of Education led the collection and systematization of data about "popular culture," the Direction of National Statistics within the General Comptroller covered the fields of demography and economics. Between 1937 and 1950, it carried out a population census (1938) and the first ever industrial census (1945). It also organised surveys to study the cost of living for the labour classes in Bogotá and Medellín (1937-1944) and other major cities (1945-1951).[240] From 1938, the Direction of National Statistics began to disseminate socioeconomic data and analyses in the General Comptroller's periodical magazine, *Anales de Economía y Estadística* (*AEE*).[241] This magazine complemented the *Anuario General de Estadística* and the *Anuario de Comercio Exterior*, which the Comptroller published annually since 1926. Besides these periodical publications, the Comptroller commissioned regional specialists to write

[239] Quoted in Silva, *República Liberal, intelectuales y cultura popular*, 38.
[240] Bernardo Ruiz, "La Estadística Nacional," 38.
[241] The magazine run from 1938 to 1950 almost without interruption. For an index of the publications in the *AEE* see DANE, *Índice analítico*.

monographs on the "economic geography" of Colombian departments. Conceived and coordinated by Julio Ricaurte Montoya, who completed studies of economics and statistics in the Universidad de Deusto in Spain,[242] the economic geography series documented the "actual and potential wealth present in each territory." Beginning with Antioquia (1935), the series included studies about over a dozen departments and intendencies, which the Comptroller continued to publish until the 1960s.[243]

Together with those sociodemographic studies with a territorial focus, the General Comptroller developed statistics to monitor the economic conjuncture, producing the first "barometers" of economic activity in the country. What would become the first business cycle studies in Colombia started as a joint effort between *Antioqueño* engineers and European exiles, with the institutional backing of the Comptroller under Lleras Restrepo (1935-1937). During these years, the German and Basque exiles Paul Hermberg and Francisco de Abrisqueta found refuge in the National Direction of Statistics.

Hermberg obtained a PhD in Statistics under the supervision of Ferdinand Tönnies from the University of Kiel, where he was hired as research assistant at the Institute for World Economy and Shipping. After enlisting into the army in World War I, he worked for the Reich Statistical Office before obtaining a professorship in economic and social statistics in the Universities of Leipzig (1925-1929) and Jena (1929-1933). When Adolf Hitler was appointed chancellor, Hermberg resigned to his tenure and exiled in 1936 in Colombia. According to Lleras Restrepo, despite Hermberg's qualifications, the Minister of Economics did not hire him because he lacked typewriting skills and was not fluent enough in Spanish. Impressed by his technical knowledge, Lleras Restrepo recruited him

[242] Lleras Restrepo, *Crónica*, 203.
[243] This project provided an early example of the connection between experts and the state that has received scant attention. See Silva "Geografía, Estado y sociedad," 201–43, 203-214.

as statistical comptroller. Hermberg conducted the first of a dozen studies about the cost of living in major Colombian cities published in *AEA* from 1938 to 1950.[244] In the 1940s, he left Colombia to join the Federal Reserve in the United States, and the US Department of Trade and Industry later recruited him to work for the Marshall plan in his native Germany.[245] Hermberg was part of the well-documented movement of German exiles to the Americans that contributed to shape economics as a transnational discipline during the interwar period.[246]

Another European exile, de Abrisqueta, had a more prolonged impact in what became a joint programme between the two Kemmerer institutions to monitor the movement of "economic activity." Born in Bilbao, de Abrisqueta studied Economics and Statistics in the Universidad de Deusto, and worked for the department of economic research of the Banco de Vizkaya before the Spanish Civil War forced him to exile in 1936 at the age of 23.[247] Lleras Restrepo hired the young Basque to work for the Comptroller's centre of statistical research. In his memoirs, Lleras Restrepo remembered that he and "[de]Abrisqueta focused mainly and foremost in conceiving statistics that would allow us to study the economic rhythm, with particular attention to conjunctural indices."[248]

From this collaboration resulted a project for developing "totalising or synthetising" indices to measure the fluctuation of aggregate economic activity across time. The first results of this project appeared in a 105-page study published April 1939,

[244] This was published in the first number of *AEE*: Paul Hermberg, "Costo de la vida de la clase obrera,". For a list of studies by Hermberg see DANE, *Índice Analítico AEE*.
[245] Hagemann, Krohn, and Esslinger, *Biographisches Handbuch*, 253-255. Lleras Restrepo, *Crónica*, 207, 210.
[246] See Tribe, "German Emigre Economists," 740–46.
[247] Fondo Bernardo Estornés Lasa Funtsa, "Auñamendi Eusko Entziklopediara".
[248] Lleras Restrepo, *Crónica*, 210.

in which Abrisqueta estimated 119 indices (out of 134 projected) across six different categories, and measured their monthly and annual variation between 1933 (the base year) and 1937.[249] One year later, de Abrisqueta presented the results in a single table occupying two pages, preceded by a brief description of annual changes in the main variables.[250] In contrast to bulky volumes such as the *Anuario General de Estadística*, the significance of this project lay in its ability to represent synthetically the movement of economic activity while being "the most precise depiction of the country's economic situation that could be found in the present."[251] By 1942, reports on the "indices of economic movement" were published on a bimonthly basis, combining tables and graphs with short analytical interpretations of the data. These continued to appear in almost every number of *AEA* until the Comptroller stopped running the magazine in 1950.[252]

From the General Comptroller, the programme for constructing synthetic abstractions of economic activity moved to the Banco de la República in 1946 when it hired de Abrisqueta to direct its new Section of Economic Research, which replaced the old office of statistics. Upon joining the central bank, he presented a project to construct an indicator for measuring aggregate economic activity. He justified the relevance of such a study by arguing that, given the diversity of factors that "integrated the structure and the mechanism of an economy (…), [the] public feels the need of synthetical general expressions of what occurs in business life." For businessmen and industrial managers — he added — "a well pondered index is the fundamental guidance about government

[249] De Abrisqueta, "Los índices del movimiento económico".
[250] De Abrisqueta, "El movimiento económico," 83–88.
[251] AEA Editorial Note, "Los índices del movimiento económico," 4.
[252] DANE, *Índice Analítico AEE*. When De Abrisqueta left the General Comptroller, the project was overseen by German Botero de los Ríos, who moved to the Banco de la República in the 1950s, where he had a long career reaching the position of general manager between 1970 to 1978. Urrutia, "In Memoriam de Germán Botero de Los Ríos," 5–6.

measures, or about those taken in the industrial, financial or any corresponding sector." Although he identified various antecedents of aggregate indices of Colombian economic activity, there were only two efforts at a national scale that he considered worth considering: one elaborated by Alejandro López in February 1936, the first one even attempted; and another one by Paul Hermberg, which first appeared in the *Revista del Banco de la República* in November 1939.[253] Both followed a similar methodology: they constructed sub-indices for a series of categories that "described" Colombian economic activity, which they aggregated in a single index by calculating their statistical mean. While de Abrisqueta accepted without major qualms their methodology, he criticised the substance of those indices. According to him, the categories that López and Hermberg identified did not capture "the outstanding and dominant characteristics" of the "Colombian economy," so their indices failed to "perfectly characterize" it. Based on what he considered to be those characteristics, de Abrisqueta presented a list of twenty categories, which he called "economic signs," that in aggregate provided a better representation of the country's economic activity.[254] Due to his departure to Washington in 1947 to work for the statistical office of the Panamerican Union, de Abrisqueta never completed this project. But as I will show in the next chapter, it set the basis for national accounting in the Banco de la República.

From the first Kemmerer Mission to the business cycle studies in the central bank's Section of Economic Research, the Banco de la República and the General Comptroller had become hubs for the production and dissemination of quantitative data

[253] There were previous efforts to measure the business cycle at the subnational level, such as the "economic index of Antioquia." See Rodríguez Lalinde, "Indice Económico de Antioquia en 1937 y 1938," *AEE* II, no. 3 (1939): 83–84; "Índice Económico de Antioquia," *AEE* III, no. 2 (1940): 51–52.
[254] De Abrisqueta, "El índice de la actividad económica nacional," 71–72, 75, 77, 78.

and analysis about economic activity in Colombia. With the great depression of the early 1930s, the policy orthodoxy that Kemmerer and his team advocated for gave way to a more active role by economic policymakers. The growing battery of policy instruments for state intervention fostered the development of spaces of economic consultation between government and business representatives. This made it all the more relevant for public officials and businessmen to have prompt access to synthetic representations of conjunctural economic affairs, which was not yet the exclusive domain of academically trained economists. Sponsored by Lleras Restrepo, an *hacendista* lawyer with a particular sensitivity for the quantification of economic life, European statisticians contributed to upgrade to the national scale what *Antioqueño* engineers had undertaken at the local level.

1.4. Conclusion

From early on, the ruling classes in modern-day Colombia were well acquainted with the economics of their time. Since the late colonial period, the language of political economy permeated public deliberations about national wealth while the teaching of political economy in universities was institutionalised in the first republican decade. Through their university education, those who received training in law and engineering in the nineteenth century were familiar with the French tradition of political economy and, since the second decade of the twentieth century, with the subfields of public finance and industrial organisation. All in all, however, economics was not seen in universities as a specialised field of knowledge but rather as part of the overall education students received in the juridical and the engineering sciences. Formal education in local universities was complemented by reading and discussing the treatises and manuals that

circulated among men of letters, either in their original language or in translated versions. While travelling to Europe and the United States was not uncommon among aspiring members of the ruling classes, it was rare that they received specialised training in the economic sciences abroad. The case of Esteban Jaramillo, who listened to the lectures of leading professors in France and the United States, stood out precisely because of its exceptionality. Without having received specialised formal training in economics in local or foreign universities, lawyers and engineers by profession headed the institutions that oversaw economic management for most of the twentieth century. The professional trajectory of those occupying the top positions in these institutions gradually began to change after economics professionalised and internationalised in the mid-twentieth century, a as I will show in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.

While professional training in law and engineering offered men like *hacendistas*, industrial economists and statistical economists some formal education in economics, their knowledge of economic affairs stemmed mainly from practice. They engaged pragmatically with economics according to the capacities and needs of the institutional settings in which they performed their knowledge. Both endogenous and exogenous economic factors, such as the productive transformations of the coffee and industrial sectors, the opening of global financial markets, and the international economic shock of the interwar period, created in the first half of the twentieth century a demand for more specialised knowledge in economic affairs. This demand came both from the state and the private sector. As the economic liberalism of the nineteenth century gave way to the first stitches of state interventionism in the 1930s, both the battery of policy instruments and the spaces for economic consultation with private associations, like *gremios*, multiplied. By the mid-twentieth century, there was a well-established institutional

infrastructure for economic decision-making centred around the Ministry of Finance, business associations and the two Kemmerer institutions: the Banco de la República and the General Comptroller. In these institutions, men with professional training in law and engineering developed some expertise in concrete areas of intervention, such as public finances, sectoral management, and the economic cycle. Against these traditions of economic thought and practice, the economic technocracy that emerged in the mid-twentieth century would develop expertise about the economy as a whole.

Chapter 2. Quantifying the Economy for Planning Development

Although there were established traditions of economic thought and practice in Colombia, the economy became an object of expert intervention in the post-WWII period. The international institutional system that emerged from the global conflict enabled the circulation of technical expertise about the economy to places like Colombia. Against the background of mid-twentieth century decolonisation, the United Nations (UN) and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) designed technical assistance programmes to develop capacities in states across the so-called underdeveloped countries to transform their social and economic realities. Development missions and missionaries served as buffers for the diffusion of a new discursive regime about socioeconomic progress and backwardness,[255] but also for the dissemination of techniques that strengthened states' "cognitive capacity" to intervene in the economy.[256] This was the case of national accounting techniques, which enabled governments to abstract the totality of economic activity in their countries into synthetic quantitative expressions of national income that allowed for international comparisons of productive capacities and living standards.[257] The *economy* thus became an entity that could presumably be analysed with objectivity by experts, and therefore rationally managed with their advice.

[255] See Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 9.
[256] On the notion of the state's "cognitive capacity," see Whitehead, "State organization in Latin America," 47.
[257] About the history of national accounting and the role this technology played in objectifying the economy, see Lepenies, *The Power of a Single* Number, 57-96; Tribe, *Economy of the Word* , 89-107; Hirschman, "Inventing the Economy," 146-153.

The assumption that national economies were objects of knowledge and intervention by experts employed by the state underpinned the growing faith in "planning" during the post-war period, even across the emerging Cold War divide between capitalist and communist blocs.[258] From being a "dirty word," associated with central direction and the socialisation of the means of production in the USSR after the Bolshevik Revolution, the notion of planning had gained wider international acceptance by the late 1940s.[259] Since the inter-war period and more purposively during WWII, a diverse array of planning systems were proposed and adopted by governments in advanced Western economies to address the predicaments of the Great Depression and war-time economies. These planning initiatives bore some relationship to the rise of Keynesian macroeconomics but were not limited by this theoretical framework in their aims, methods, and policies.[260] There were thus multiple models of planning available for underdeveloped countries in the post-war years. It was in this context that Colombia became for international organisations and foreign experts a field of institutional experimentation in planning economic development. This chapter shows how from the very beginning development planning in this country was associated with attempts at

[258] On the historical significance of quantification for managing the economy see Desrosières, "Managing the Economy," 553–64 and Mitchell, *Rule of Experts,* 80-119. About the status of planning during the post-war period see Chapter 5 of this thesis and Morgan, "Technocratic Economics," 295, 297.

[259] This change in the mood towards planning was acknowledged by Albert Waterston, economist of the Economic Department (1948-53) and loan officer for Colombia (1953-57) at the IBRD, in his interview with Bogomir Chokel, 14 May 1984, OH-WB. By the 1950s, the idea and practice of planning in the Soviet Union had also evolved in meaningful ways from the early utopianism of "war Communism" focusing on decentralisation and taking into consideration micro-economic behaviours. See Montias, "Planning with Material Balances in Soviet-type Economies," and Nove, "The Problem of Success Indicators".

[260] For example, consider the differences within notions of macroeconomic planning in the United States, the Netherlands and France in the post-war years and between those and other understandings of planning during the interwar period. For the United States, see Balisciano, "Hope for America" and Alchon, *The Invisible Hand of Planning*. For France and the Netherlands, see Desrosières, "La commission et l'équation."

providing a macroeconomic framework for the allocation of public resources for large-scale public investment projects funded by official international lenders. In attempting to plan economic development, the Colombian state itself became an object of intervention for the foreign expert missions involved in the process.

This chapter explores how the first attempts to plan development in Colombia during the early post-war period transformed the state's institutional capacities to rationalise economic interventions. To effectively plan development within the limits of a market economy, the Colombian state needed new institutional capacities to collect up-to-date social and economic statistics, to quantify national economic activity, and to design indicative investment programmes for public and private decision-makers. In this chapter, I show how the creation of a National Statistical Office and a Planning Office in the Presidency (the precursors of the DANE and the DNP) in the early 1950s centralised statistical and planning activities under executive power, strengthening the state's cognitive capacity to intervene in the economy. Together with the Banco de la República's new Section of Economic Research, these bodies provided the institutional infrastructure that the state hitherto lacked to produce technical knowledge about the country's economy as a whole. They also became the point of contact for foreign expert missions in the government and an entry point for young professional economists to the state's bureaucracy. The early configuration of this institutional infrastructure for quantifying and managing the economy was a stepping-stone for the emergence of an economic technocracy.

Between 1949 and 1957, Colombia received several expert missions from international organisations.[261] Scholars agree that the IBRD mission headed by Lauchlin Currie in 1949 was pivotal both for the Colombian economists' understanding of the national economy and for the multilateral bank's approach to development.[262] After the 'Currie mission', the ties between Colombia and the IBRD strengthened as the bank expanded its operations in the country throughout the 1950s.[263] While Cepal had in comparison less incidence in Colombia in those years,[264] technical experts from this and other UN bodies also made presence in the country throughout the decade. One government after another sought the assistance of international organisations and foreign experts on issues relating to economic development. This chapter analyses how this persistent engagement with international organisations and foreign experts triggered the institutional reform of the Colombian state.

From the perspective of Colombian political historiography, it is significant that the state strengthened its cognitive capacities to intervene in the economy in spite of the simultaneous breakdown of democratic institutions. From 1949 to 1957, the country lived under a permanent state of siege, with limited freedoms to the press and congressional assembly. Partisan polarisation and growing levels of violence led to the first and only successful military coup Colombians experienced in the twentieth century.[265] Political

[261] The missions from the IBRD (1949), Cepal (1954) and Jacques-Louis Lebret (1955) analysed by Decsi Arévalo were only the top of the iceberg. As I show below, Colombia found itself at the crossroads of a wide network of technical assistance that included the IBRD, UN bodies and bilateral cooperation agencies. Arévalo "Misiones económicas," 7–24.
[262] See, for example, Urrutia, "Changing Nature of Economic Planning," 165; Alacevich, *Political Economy*, 12–23.
[263] For the IBRD's role in the decentralizing of state power, see Offner, *Sorting Out*, 21–49; Grandi, "World Bank's Missions in Colombia," 55–74.
[264] Villamizar, "Influencia de la Cepal en Colombia," 152-53.
[265] The political historiography about this period is extensive. My understanding of macro-political dynamics builds on the classic works of Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions*; Pécaut,

scientists like Paul Oquist went as far as to claim that the state experienced a "partial collapse" during this period.[266] This chapter portrays a different picture of the Colombian state during the 1950s, according to which it succeeded at building, under inauspicious circumstances, institutional capacities to rationalise economic interventions. The development of technical capacities within the state to make the economy legible from the centre was not a deliberate attempt to depoliticise society and reduce the violent confrontation between Liberals and Conservatives, two aims that the state was in fact unable to achieve during the period studied in this and the next chapter. Instead, it is argued in this chapter that the deterioration of democratic institutions increased the centralization of power in the executive branch of government, which to a certain degree facilitated the adoption of the institutional reforms recommended by foreign technical assistance missions.

What follows is organised in four sections. I first examine how the Colombian government actively took advantage of the technical assistance programmes that international organisations and bilateral cooperation agencies offered in the eve of the post-war era. I then show how some missions, such as the one the IBRD sent in 1949, and foreign advisers, like Currie, worked as buffers for the circulation of new approaches and techniques to represent and act upon the national economy. In the third and fourth sections, I explore how the first attempts at planning economic development using technical tools triggered reforms conducive to strengthening the state's cognitive capacity

Orden y Violencia; Braun, *The Assassination of Gaitán* . My narrative is also inspired by recent efforts to move away from violence-centred interpretations of politics in this period, as in the works of Henderson, *Modernization in Colombia* and Deas, "La vida política".

[266] See Oquist, *Violencia, política y conflicto*, 45-52. For revisionist views of narratives of state collapse, or failure see González González, *Poder y violencia*, 55-58; Henderson, *Modernización en Colombia*, 478.

to intervene in the economy, through the creation of centralised statistical and planning bodies.

2.1. The Dawn of the Development Era in Colombia

The end of WWII marked the dawn of the era in which development became an organising concept in diplomatic, academic, and policy circles in economically advanced countries for engaging with governments across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Development brought together the historical aspirations of self-determination and national progress in these regions with the opportunities for cooperation offered by the multilateral institutional system.[267] International programmes of technical assistance mobilised resources and expertise to foster the understanding and transformation of what began to be conceptualised as the underdeveloped world. This construct acquired concrete meanings in places like Colombia, where multilateral institutions, development experts and economic diplomats had to find ways to bring the aspiration of economic development into practice.

Although the expression *economic development* appeared in treatises before the mid-twentieth century, the concept acquired power for commanding technical and financial resources during the post-war period. Classical political economists like Adam Smith and Jean Baptiste Say used the expression as a synonym of material progress, a natural law that was not the result of planned human action. In the 1920s, British officials

[267] Hirschman, "Rise and Decline of Development Economics," 49–73; Sen, "Development: Which Way Now?," 745–62.

began to refer to the development of the colonies, but they limited the concept's meaning to the exploitation of natural resources in the colonial territories. It was not until the end of WWII that development began to be associated with well-being. Raising living standards in poor, or backward, areas through coordinated planning and foreign aid became an objective for diplomats and policymakers.[268]

The mobilisation of technical economic expertise during the war and its aftermath had a formative influence for the emergence of development economics as a subfield of knowledge and policymaking.[269] War-time necessities drove states in belligerent countries to recruit experts for mobilising resources at an unprecedented scale to attain strategic objectives.[270] During the war, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan published an influential article arguing that the promotion of industrialisation in Southern and Eastern-Europe through large-scale foreign aid was a pre-condition for durable peace.[271] To finance the reconstruction of war-torn Europe, General Marshall presented to the US Congress a massive investment programme in June 1947 to spend $12 billion (about 1.5% of US annual GDP)[272] over five years. The Marshall Plan provided a model for transnational expert coordination. It also set a precedent for replicating this experience in the underdeveloped world.

Against that background, Colombia became a crossroad for different programmes of development assistance, although not in the way locals expected. The announcement that General Marshall would make part of the US delegation attending the Ninth Pan-

[268] Arndt, "Economic Development: A Semantic History," 457. On planning and foreign aid see Hirschman, "The Rise and Decline of Development Economics," 54, 60. On the British Colonial Office see Tribe, "The Colonial Office," 97–113.
[269] Meier, "The Formative Period," in *Pioneers in Development*, 14–15.
[270] Bernstein, *Perilous Progress,* 89-107.
[271] Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialisation," 202–11.
[272] Westad, *The Cold War*, 94, 102.

American Conference in Bogotá in April 1948 led some to speculate that a 'Marshall Plan for Latin America' might be announced in the Colombian capital. However, as the *Revista del Banco de la República* (*Banrep*) reported before the event, this "aspiration" seemed "very difficult to fulfil" after the US Secretary of State announced, on 9 December 1947 to the Pan-American Society, that governments in the region should not expect more financial aid than that coming from private initiative.[273] One year later, US President Harry Truman famously announced his will to make "the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."[274] What came to be known as the Point Four programme was not a programme of "relief" or "financial aid" like the Marshall plan but an initiative of bilateral assistance in "elementary techniques," such as land use, public administration and public health.[275] It built upon cooperation activities the United States had unsystematically carried out in Latin America for more than one decade.[276] Throughout the 1940s, US experts visited countries like Colombia to advice the Export-Import Bank on the technical and financial viability of loans to fund public works that aligned with the commercial interests of the United States.[277] While the US delegation at the Pan-American Conference did not announce a Marshall Plan for Latin America, the representatives that gathered in Bogotá signed the foundational Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). Article 93 of the charter mandated the creation

[273] Esguerra Camargo, "El Plan Marshall y los países iberoamericanos," 980.
[274] "Inaugural Address of Harry S. Truman," 20 January 1949, *The Avalon Project*. Consulted on 21 October 2019 from: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/truman.asp
[275] "Possible Questions and Suggested Answers Concerning the President's Technical Assistance Proposal", 12 April 1949, Official files Series, The Point Four Program Collection, Harry Truman Library Museum. Consulted on 21 October 2019 from: https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/online-collections/point-four-program.
[276] Hanson, "Latin America and the Four Point Program," 66.
[277] Minute 1214, 3 June 1940, folio 3097. Minutes of the Board of Governors, Banco de la República (MBG-BR).

of an Economic and Social Council for hemispherical cooperation.[278] Two years later, in 1951, technical experts from the OAS and the Point Four programme were already working in Colombia.[279]

The United States was not the only source of financial and technical assistance for the government during the early post-war years. Colombia became a favourite client of the IBRD, at a critical juncture for the bank, as it began to shift its operations from the areas in Europe most affected by the war to the underdeveloped world. In October 1948, the Governor of Colombia at the IBRD, Emilio Toro, reported with satisfaction to the Board of Governors of the Banco de la República that the possibilities Latin American countries had for obtaining loans from that institution for the "purpose of development" had increased notably during the last year, because "the adoption of the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe has significantly alleviated the role the Bank had in this area of the global economy."[280] As a veteran of the World Bank later put it, the participation of the United States in the reconstruction of war-torn economies triggered the transformation of the IBRD into a development bank.[281] The birth of multilateral development banking gave access to governments in countries like Colombia to a new source of finance for funding investment projects.

In the early post-war period, IBRD officers monitored zealously governments' applications for development loans. As Toro described to the Board of Governors, the capital that IBRD members had contributed to the bank was "minuscule" if compared to the "magnitude of the needs that affiliate countries have." [282] The situation of

[278] See article 93 of the OAS Charter.
[279] Weekly issue of 22 April 1951, Volume XI, *Revista Semana*.
[280] Minute 1788, 29 October 1948, folios 4537-4540. MBG-BR.
[281] Easterly, *Tyranny of Experts*, 106.
[282] Minute 1788. MBG-BR.

underfunding of the IBRD by its member countries in its early years forced the bank to emit coupons in private capital markets. These funding constraints, Toro explained, made the IBRD "extremely cautious in analysing [loan] operations." Bank officers thus paid careful attention to both the "organisational" and "financial" capacities of prospect debtor countries before giving them credits.[283] After the Marshall Plan was announced, the IBRD practically suspended appropriations, granting only two small project loans to Chile and to the Netherlands before October 1948. Funding projects in underdeveloped countries, about which Bank officers knew so little, required both a careful examination of their socioeconomic conditions as well as a high degree of experimentation.[284]

Colombia became the laboratory for the first major experiment of the IBRD in development assistance.[285] With the virtual collapse of private international financial markets during the interwar period, multilateral loans offered governments an exclusive means for financing capital-intensive investment projects in countries like Colombia, where both household savings and fiscal revenue were painfully low. As direct foreign investments decreased during the 1950s, long-term loans — particularly from the IBRD — became the main source of non-compensatory finance.[286] From 1949 to 1956, the IBRD approved 10 project loans for Colombia valued in 96 million US dollars. Colombia was, after India, the country with the most individual projects approved during that period.[287]

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[283] Minute 1788. MBG-BR.
[284] Alacevich, *Political Economy*, 13.
[285] Mason and Asher, *World Bank since Bretton Woods*, 299.
[286] Avella, "Acceso de Colombia al financiamiento externo," 555.
[287] Among the ten biggest loan recipients, Colombia was also the third country that received more credit (per capita) in value from the IBRD during these years, only behind Australia and South Africa. Data extracted on 4 March 2021 from the World Bank Project list: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-list.

Multiple factors explain why Colombia secured priority access to IBRD funds. To begin with, the agency of the Colombian actors should be highlighted, particularly that of economic diplomats like Governor Toro. The leaving ambassador in Washington, Carlos Sanz de Santamaría acknowledged that Toro was not an "economist of recognised capacities," but considered that his appointment as the first Colombian Governor in the Bretton Woods institutions "hit the mark."[288] He was not mistaken. In April 1947, president Ospina Pérez informed the Bank about Toro's arrival with a loan request for the "urgent reconstruction of Colombian economy."[289] The allusion to *urgency* was calculated. As Toro informed the Board of Governors of the Central Bank one week before traveling, Latin American Governors in the IBRD were worried that if their governments did not submit loan requests quickly, the appropriations to European and Asian nations would deplete the IBRD's limited funds.[290] The use of the word *reconstruction* was as witty as it was misleading. The Colombian economy certainly felt the shock of WWII, but it had not been shattered. Exports grew steadily between 1940 and 1945 at high rates, permitting the accumulation of foreign reserves and the substitution of imports.[291] Hence, the loan requests the Colombian government submitted to the IBRD were not precisely for reactivating the economy but for stimulating production in agriculture and industry. The president had commissioned Toro to procure external funding from the IBRD, or "if needed" from the Export-Import Bank, to build a steel plant in the town of Paz de Río. Against the advice of local engineering specialists,[292] this became a flagship project for the Conservative governments of Ospina Pérez and his

[288] Minute 1620, 29 January 1947, folio 4020-4021, MBG-BR.
[289] Quoted in Alacevich, *Political Economy*, 15.
[290] Minute 1638, 23 April 1947, folio 4083, MBG-BR.
[291] Thorp, "The Latin American Economies in the 1940s," 46.
[292] Minute 1702, 17 December 1947, folio 4272; Minute 1706, 7 January 1948, folio 4825. MBG-BR.

successor Laureano Gómez. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented an official loan request in July 1948, the list of investment projects included this steel plant, a caustic soda plant, agricultural equipment, highways, railways and ports.[293] After Toro became one of the Executive Directors of the IBRD in October 1948, he deemed that this role put him in a good position to "influence the success of Colombian aspirations, within reasonable limits."[294] In December, the IBRD informed Toro that it was prepared to "consider financing the foreign exchange costs of these projects" only after determining that they were "technically feasible and economically sound." Therefore, the Bank decided to assess those projects against an "integrated development program," for which it was willing to send "an economic mission" to make an "overall economic study."[295]

To an extent, the coincidence between the social and political turmoil in Colombia in the late 1940s and the eve of the Cold War at the international stage gave reasons to the IBRD for judging the urgency of sending a mission to assess the economic conditions in the country. In April 1948 the head of the IBRD, John McCloy visited Bogotá following the invitation of President Ospina to attend the Pan-American conference. When McCloy travelled to Colombia the idea of conducting an overall study had already been suggested by a loan officer of the IBRD. McCloy met with the Executive Director of the Central Bank on 3 April, and one day later the Governors unanimously approved his suggestion to request a "technical mission."[296] Like General Marshall, McCloy was in Bogotá when the homicide of the leading Liberal politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitán on 9

[293] Minute 1755, 16 July 1948, folio 4422, MBG-BR. Alacevich, *Political Economy*, 18.
[294] Minute 1780, 1 October 1948, folio 4505, MBG-BR.
[295] Robert Garner to Emilio Toro, December 1, 1948. Quoted in Alacevich, *Political Economy*, 20.
[296] Michele Alacevich, *Political Economy,* 15; Minute 1728, April 7 1948, folio 4340, MBG-BR.

April triggered an urban uprising known as the *Bogotazo*. While Marshall equivocally interpreted the luting of the city centre by an angry mob that followed Gaitán's assassination as a Communist revolution,[297] it is not clear from the historical record how McCloy interpreted this event as he witnessed it unfolding. For a foreign observer familiar with an emerging Cold War rationale, for whom the local political context was alien, the *Bogotazo* probably gave a concrete meaning to the urgency that the President had expressed in his memorandum a year earlier. The Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quick to remind Washington about this urgency, suggesting that IBRD loans would be used to reconstruct the country after those tragic events.[298]

However, the mission was not a humanitarian response. High ranking officers in the World Bank argued that the historical regional and political fragmentation of the country justified sending a comprehensive mission to Colombia. According to the Vice-President Robert Garner, Bank officers were informally asked to sponsor such a study because "in Colombia there was a very strong provincial feeling (…) Colombian[sic] themselves could not come to an agreement on any general development plan." On those grounds, the Bank considered that "that was a worthwhile activity to experiment with."[299] Additionally, the reputation of Colombian economic institutions in Washington reassured the Bank that the risk was manageable. As Toro and former ambassador Santamaria informed, the banking system organised after the first Kemmerer mission two decades earlier was highly esteemed as "technical" and "serious." They argued that official reports presented Colombia as an "outstanding example of ordered development."[300] This

[297] Gilhodes, "El 9 de Abril y Su Contexto Internacional," 252.
[298] Alacevich, *Political Economy*, 18.
[299] "Transcript of interview with Robert Garner," 19 July 61, OH-WB.
[300] Minute 1638, 23 April 1947, folio 4083, MBG-BR.

reputation was in part the legacy of the strong commitment, by regional standards, of central bankers and economic policy makers during the interwar period to withholding the monetary and fiscal orthodoxy of the Kemmerer years. Furthermore, the Banco de la República maintained constant communication with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ever since this institution sent a mission to advice monetary authorities on the control of post-WWII inflation in July 1948, which it achieved with relative success by regional standards.[301]

In July 1949, Vice-President Robert Garner arrived with a first group of experts from the IBRD mission, who only remained in the country for three months. Yet, the bank continued supporting development planning until 1956 through a technical assistance programme. This so-called Colombian "experiment" — for its unprecedented nature — had a lasting impact on the IBRD, which replicated the practice of sending comprehensive missions to developing countries to assess project loans until the early 1970s.[302]

The IBRD Mission became the point of reference for the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations that Colombia received during the 1950s. Through its multiple Commissions and specialized agencies, the United Nations also participated in the circulation of technical economic expertise to and from underdeveloped countries. Shortly after the IBRD sent a first delegation to collect data in Colombia, there were rumours that the government had requested a similar mission from the United Nations,

[301] For the IMF mission see Minute 1751, 2 July 1948, folio 4409-4410, MBG-BR. About the success of Colombia's anti-inflationary policy see Thorp, "Latin American Economies in the 1940s," 56. The Banco de la República also received a mission in 1943 headed by Robert Triffin. Representing a new type of "money doctor," Triffin's prescriptions marked a departure from Kemmerer's orthodoxy by proposing the use of exchange controls and active monetary policies to correct payments imbalances. About the Triffin missions in Latin America see Helleiner, "Central Bankers as Good Neighbours".
[302] Currie, *The Role of Economic Advisers*, 53.

which one of the IBRD's Governors feared could generate "duplication" and even "mutual interference." The IBRD substitute Director for Colombia, Ignacio Copete, denied these rumours and argued that the confusion probably came from a bill approved in Congress in November 1948 that authorised the government to hire a mission for a "general study of the Colombian economy" with the UN Economic and Social Council. Copete reported he reassured the IBRD that the President had put on hold that study until he had received the bank's mission's report.[303] Similar concerns about the overlap between the IBRD and UN bodies were expressed, as I show below, when the Cepal sent its first delegation to Colombia in 1955. Since its foundation in December 1948, Cepal served as a counterpoint to the influence of Bretton Woods institutions in Latin America.[304] While the creation of a UN regional Commission based in Santiago arouse tensions in Washington, the physical presence and intellectual influence of *Cepalinos* in Bogotá was relatively limited least until the 1960s.[305]

The Colombian government took advantage from the proliferation of technical cooperation programmes, in a moment when the jurisdictions of different international institutions like the IBRD and UN agencies overlapped, to receive expert advice in various fields related to economic development. In December 1948, the General Assembly approved the UN Extended Program of Technical Assistance (UN-EPTA) to intensify and expand the provision of expert advice to the developing world. This

[303] Minute 4883, 27 July 1949, folio 1857. MBG-BR.
[304] Fajardo, *The World That Latin America Created,* 18–43.
[305] The Conservative governments of the early 1950s and influential figures in Liberalism, like Alberto Lleras Camargo, Executive Secretary of the OAS, favored the Pan-American system over the UN as a platform for regional technical and economic cooperation. Lleras Camargo went as far as proposing the abolition of Cepal in 1951 to avoid duplication with the CIES. See Carlos Villamizar, "Influencia de la Cepal en Colombia, 96–101. Cepal did not open a subregional office in Bogotá until 1962. See Resolution 212 (IX) in Cepal, "Annual report (30 March 1960-15 Mayo 1961)," 57.

programme contemplated the coordination of international teams of experts, the allocation of fellowships for locals to specialised abroad, and the support to training facilities within underdeveloped countries.[306] After the UN launched a pilot programme in Haiti in 1948, subsequent missions to Bolivia, México, and Pakistan followed suit. When in May 1950, the UN decided to invest an additional $20 million dollars in the UN-EPTA, Colombia was the first country to request for and obtain assistance, according to the local press. In October, the programme director of UN-EPTA, the Mexican economist and former Executive Secretary of Cepal, Gustavo Martinez Cabañas, visited Bogotá to negotiate with the government the recruitment of 20 technicians. It was expected that they would contribute to the implementation of the development plan resulting from the IBRD Mission. Both parties reached an agreement on 24 November 1950. According to the weekly magazine *Semana*, six months later only a handful of Colombians knew about this programme, which some even confused with the Point Four. Although these programmes certainly captured the attention of the Colombian public, their jurisdictions also remained unclear for learned audiences. The first nine experts in taxes, budget, statistics, railways, education, forestry, tropical agriculture, and public services arrived in March 1951. They worked directly with the ministries and the UN-EPTA director in Colombia, Raymond Etchats, a French economist, who coordinated their activities.[307] Between 1952 and 1957, envoys from the UN Technical Assistance program and other

[306] Owen, "The United Nations Program of Technical Assistance," 111–12.
[307] Weekly issues of 4 November 1950, and 16 June 1951, Volumes VIII and XI, *Revista Semana*

UN bodies, including Cepal, produced 90 official reports about socioeconomic conditions in Colombia.[308]

In sum, in the dawn of the development era, government and diplomatic officials eagerly took the opportunities that the post-war international order offered to incorporate Colombia in a transnational network of technical economic cooperation. The new architecture for development assistance built on the know-how of international financial mobilisation accumulated during WWII and the Marshall Plan, but multilateral institutions like the IBRD had very little knowledge about the socioeconomic reality of their borrowers in the developing world. Consequently, loan applications were subjected to careful scrutiny. The IBRD thus sent its first ever comprehensive development mission to Colombia, which the national government welcomed with enthusiasm, hoping it will give the country preferential access to multilateral credit. Multidisciplinary teams of experts from different institutions with overlapping jurisdictions landed in Colombia to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the elaboration of a development plan. In practice, planning economic development posed unforeseen challenges to the foreign advisers that represented multilateral institutions on the ground.

2.2. Development Missions and Foreign Advisers

In July 1949, the first experts of the IBRD mission were greeted by a head of state who had a technocratic outlook of government. President Mariano Ospina Pérez came from a traditional family of Conservative politicians who, as I showed in Chapter 1, saw the

[308] Comité Nacional de Planeación (CNP), "Informes elaborados por el Comité Nacional de Planeación y trabajos desarrollados por la asistencia técnica de las Naciones Unidas, a partir de 1952," July 1958, box 5, folder 14, JM-PR-AGN.

national reality through the lens of engineering. After graduating from the Escuela de Minas, Mariano followed the steps of his father Tulio and his uncle Pedro Nel and went to the United States to study a Masters in the State University of Lousiana, after which he spent two years visiting industrial facilities around the country. The civil engineer Ospina disguised, like his mentor Alejandro López, as an economist. When he became President in 1946, he did not interrupt his lectures on industrial economics in the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.[309] Furthermore, he was not the first president in the Ospina dynasty to receive a mission of foreign economic advisers. His uncle Pedro Nel had welcomed the Princeton economist Edwin Kemmerer two decades before the IBRD experts landed in Colombia.

In the years that elapsed between the Kemmerer and the IBRD missions, the modus operandi of foreign economic advice changed in meaningful ways. Semi-official contracts between national governments and independent consultants gave way to multilateral agreements, and the personalistic figure of the "Money doctor" was replaced by eclectic teams of multidisciplinary experts in which the economist performed as coordinator. By necessity, during the inter-war period, Kemmerer's economic orthodoxy had given way to the acceptance, albeit non uncontested, of state intervention in some economic policy areas. Going beyond Kemmerer's remit of designing an institutional infrastructure for monetary stability, the IBRD mission's focus was the rationalisation of state intervention within the limits of a market economy. Within this normative framework, development planning was the tool foreign advisors privileged for devising global programmes that considered the potential effects of investment projects on the economy as a whole. In the early post-war period, however, the notion of development

[309] Mayor Mora, "Escuela Nacional de Minas," 60.

planning was relatively new and there was no expert consensus about its concrete meaning, methodology, and objectives.[310]

To advice the Colombian government, the IBRD appointed as head of the mission Lauchlin Currie, a Canadian-born economist and New Dealer. After receiving a PhD in Economics from Harvard in the late 1920s, Currie had been a leading player in the incorporation of professional economists in the US government. During the Great Depression, Currie joined the Treasury in what came to be known as Viner's "Freshman Brain Trust." In 1935, he moved to the Federal Reserve, where, as Deputy Director of Research and Statistics, he contributed to drafting the Banking Act, which defined the Board of Governors of the Fed as the supreme monetary authority in the United States.[311] During this period, Currie became the "acknowledged leader of the spending wing of the Fed" which led prominent post-war economists, such as Paul Samuelson and John Kenneth Galbraith, to recognize him as one of the "intellectual leaders" behind the New Deal.[312] In 1939, President Roosevelt recruited Currie as his personal economic adviser, thus becoming the "first economist to hold an official post in the White House." But WWII — and its aftermath — transformed Currie's personal trajectory. Roosevelt sent him to China to advice Chiang Kai-shek's government on the control of war-time inflation. Currie also coordinated the strategic US lend-lease (military aid) programme with the Chinese government. After the fall of the Chinese nationalist party in 1949, the shadow of communist affiliation fell on Currie's back during McCarthyism. Seeing diminished his possibilities to work for the US government, he accepted the offer to lead the unprecedented mission in Colombia. In an ironic twist, falsely accused of

[310] Consider the contrast with the situation in the 1960s, as analysed in Chapter 5.
[311] Sandilands, *Life and Political Economy*, 56, 64.
[312] Sandilands, "An Archival Case Study," 3, 15, 19.

sympathising with communists,[313] Currie landed in a country ruled by an overtly anti-Communist Conservative party.

For Colombians, Currie became the public face of the IBRD mission. Following the precedent Kemmerer set before, his visit came to be known publicly as the Currie Mission.[314] This close association between the development mission and the foreign adviser not only caused Currie personal unease and professional tensions with the Bank,[315] but it also obscured the ways in which this mission differed from Kemmerer's. The objective the bank set to the team of fourteen foreign advisers that visited Colombia was "to raise the standards of living of the Colombian people." A team of fourteen experts, which included permanent staff from the IBRD and the IMF, as well as from US departments and universities, arrived in July 1949. It spent three months working in close collaboration with Colombian authorities. A member of the central bank's Governing Board, Martín del Corral, accompanied Currie and Garner in a one-week tour around Cali, Manizales and Medellín. Del Corral commented that the economic dynamism of these regions left a "favourable impression" in the visitors, who would nevertheless reserve their conclusions for "the report they were going to render in due course."[316] According to Copete, the IBRD's substitute Director for Colombia, Garner praised upon his return to Washington the "agricultural and mineral abundancy of the country and its great

[313] Sandilands, *Life and Political Economy*, 96, 143-158.
[314] See for example *El Siglo*, "El Plan Currie", 12 August 1950, RM0021, roll 1, P-ALC-BLAA.
[315] Currie criticised the tendency to associate foreign missions with one man, which belied that they were collective enterprises. See Currie, "La naturaleza de la planificación." Bank officers found the association between Currie and the Mission inacceptable because local actors used his public statements in the press to levy loan negotiations with the IBRD. See Garner to Currie, 12 December, TA2-WBGA.
[316] Minute 1856, 22 July 1949, folio 4876, MBG-BR.

possibilities."[317] Foreign advisers received an office in the central bank and the assistance of the technical staff from its new Section of Economic Research.[318]

As leader of the advisory team, Currie considered that the Mission's approach to the overarching objective of raising the standards of living in Colombia was unprecedented both for the Bank and for the country. In a speech to government authorities, he argued that international institutions and local governments had hitherto addressed the problem of poverty from a "limited objective" perspective, focusing on one problem area at a time. The IBRD Mission, on the contrary, opted for an integrated and coordinated intervention because "economic and social phenomena interact with each other and are interdependent."[319] Currie's address urged Colombian authorities to see the economic reality through a macroscopic lens. A comprehensive view of socioeconomic welfare required a coherent analytical understanding of the interrelations between the different sectors that composed the national economy. It implied an aggregate, as opposed to a sectoral, vision of the economic problems. As Currie repeatedly argued later, considering the economy as a whole did not necessarily imply endorsing Keynesianism; Currie himself was influenced by a different macroeconomics tradition.[320] His core message was that seeing the national economy as a system of interdependencies was a necessary step for providing the bases of a development plan for Colombia, which was the more practical aim of the IBRD Mission.

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[317] Minute 1857, 27 July 1949, folio 4883, MBG-BR.
[318] IBRD, *Bases de un programa*, xii–xiii. Minute No.1851, 1 June 1949, folio 4849, MBG-BR.
[319] Currie, "Algunos problemas de desarrollo económico", 5 December 1950, RM0039, WB-ALC-BLAA 1,2.
[320] Currie's view of macroeconomics emphasised the role of increasing returns resulting from the division of labour. Following his mentor Allyn Young, he called this "real demand" distinguishing it from Keynes's "effective demand". Currie and Sandilands, "Implications of an Endogenous Theory of Growth," 413.

There were some antecedents of planning in Colombia at the level of projects and sectors but not at the scale of the whole economic system. Throughout the 1940s, there were multiple instances of New-Deal style "functional planning." Through the mediation of public banks, like the Caja de Crédito Agrario, Industrial y Minero, the state identified and allocated credit, directly or indirectly, to productive investment projects within each economic sector. Multi-year sectoral plans in industry and agriculture had been discussed in Congress. In 1943, the Liberal majority in the Lower House presented a four-year plan to promote industrial development through public investments in basic industries. However, this legislative project was halted in the political crisis that followed the resignation in August 1945 of President López Pumarejo, who faced allegations of embezzlement from the assets expropriated to German expatriates during WWII. The first five year-year plan in agriculture, which the Ministry of National Economy presented to Congress, had a different fate, and was approved in 1945.[321] That same year, the interim of Alberto Lleras Camargo, who replaced López Pumarejo, set the juridical bases for economic planning in Colombia. A landmark legislative reform gave constitutional status to the elaboration by Congress of plans and programmes to which the "development [*fomento*] of the national economy should be subjected."[322] Yet, there is no evidence that the legislature ever presented a comprehensive economic plan before the arrival of the IBRD mission.

Radical proposals regarding economic planning and state intervention were restricted to academic commentaries. Writing under the pseudonym of Antonio Torres

[321] Hernández-Rodríguez, "Los departamentos administrativos y la planificación económica," 181–82.
[322] Artículo 6, Título VI, Acto legislativo 1 de 1945. Consulted on 22 February 2021 from http://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta=Acto/1824969,

Mendoza, the Marxist intellectual Luis Eduardo Nieto Arteta advocated considering Soviet-style five-year planning in the cultural magazine of the UNal. According to Nieto Arteta, full employment and peace in the post-war global order could only be achieved "thorough state regulation of the national economic life within specific plans."[323] Proposals akin to central economic planning had low chances to succeed without a major overhaul of Colombia's political system. The set of possible planning models was bound by the local institutional context. Development planning in Colombia during the early post-war period had to maintain some degree of correspondence to the institutional configuration of government consultation with business associations that took shape in the interwar years. Currie and his team were well aware that the object of their intervention was what contemporaries conceptualised as the "mixed economy."[324] Therefore, the Mission's final report made it clear that the proposed investment programme did not attempt to substitute markets but to economise scarce public resources while respecting private initiative.[325]

Without having immediate precedents in its comprehensiveness, the elaboration of a development plan for Colombia also posed technical challenges. To begin with, it demanded new statistical constructs to represent the national economy. When the foreign staff of the Mission was writing the final report in 1950, not only measurements of aggregate macroeconomic variables such as national income and net capital formation were not available, but the terms themselves were not of common currency. As I showed in the previous chapter, the Comptroller published monthly series of the "economic

[323] Torres-Mendoza, "La post-guerra y el neo-imperialismo," 174.
[324] Offner, *Sorting Out*, 17.
[325] IBRD, *Bases de un programa*, 690.

movement of Colombia" tracing changes in price and cost indices,[326] but not in aggregate production and consumption. As in most countries, Colombia's statistical office had not adopted a system of national accounting, even if the importance of consolidating a numeric expression of "national wealth" had been considered since Lleras Restrepo was General Comptroller in the late 1930s.[327] National accounting was a relatively new practice. As a case in point, governments in the United States and the United Kingdom only began using national accounts estimates to inform policy decisions during WWII. International methodological standards were not agreed before 1947.[328] One year before this, the Section of Economic Research of the Banco de la República launched a project for the first estimation of national income in Colombia, but these statistics were only available for the use of foreign advisers in 1952.[329]

Therefore, in collaboration with the technical staff of the Central Bank, the IBRD staff economist Jacques Torfs embarked upon "a tentative study" of the gross national product and its components in Colombia between 1939 and 1947. The availability of basic statistics at a sectoral scale was another obstacle for conducting this study. Although the Mission had wide access to data from multiple public and private sources, Torfs considered that statistics in Colombia "were scant and, in general, unreliable."[330] Like foreign advisers to other developing countries at the time, the IBRD mission faced the

[326] Contraloría General de la Nación, "Cifras e índices del movimiento económico," 57–70.
[327] Lleras Restrepo, *La estadistica nacional*, 158-9.
[328] Although academic research in national accounting had been ongoing at least since the early 1930s, it was only when governments recruited statisticians and economists to plan the economies of war that the first official figures of national accounts were published. In the United Kingdom, the Central Statistical Office published them in a supplement for the Budget of April 1941. In the United States the Department of Commerce did so in its Survey of Current Business of 1942. See Lepenies, *Power of a Single Number*, 93; Tribe, *Economy of the Word*, 106.
[329] See next section.
[330] Torfs, "Apendix A: National Accounts,", 1.

challenge of planning "without facts," at least of the quantitative nature experts wanted.[331] Torfs set himself to collect and, in some cases, construct rough estimates of the statistics about economic activity in Colombia. Since there was no centralised information about the agricultural sector, Torfs gathered scattered data of production and wages from different sources. Calculating reliable aggregates for agricultural products other than coffee was almost impossible, as the first national census of the rural sector was expected to take place in 1950. Given that the Comptroller's Office had conducted the first industrial census in 1946, the prospects for the measuring aggregate production in the industrial sector seemed better. But the surveys used for the industrial census were not designed for the purpose of national accounting, so calculating aggregate figures of industrial production required extrapolations based on "the better-informed guesses" of local businessmen and policymakers.[332]

Despite these difficulties, the aggregate figures Torfs estimated were the basis for both the Mission's diagnosis about Colombia's national economy and for the investment programme it included in the final report, which was divided in two parts. In the first section, the report offered a quantitative representation of the Colombian economy by 1948, moving from the general characteristics of the national economy to the analysis of specific sectors. In the second section, it presented tables with projections of national income and its components for 1953 and, based on these projections, the aggregate value and sectoral allocation of the investments required to attain seven socioeconomic goals.

[331] See Stolper, *Planning without Facts*, 6-7.
[332] Torfs, "Apendix A," 12–15. The trustworthiness of the figures estimated by Torfs came under harsh criticism by the economist Albert O. Hirschman, who the bank hired to advice Colombian authorities after the mission. Hirschman, "Economics and Investment Planning," 54; "Algunas consideraciones sobre la oficina y el trabajo de planeación", 15 May 1954, box 39, folder 4, AOHP.

The report also included specific policy recommendations such as a proposal to tax unproductive land tenure and the reversal of the steel plant project for which the government reached the IBRD in the first place.[333]

The presentation of the IBRD report was an immediate success, at least in securing publicity. Currie intended the report to be presented to the public simultaneously in English and Spanish on 14 August 1950, one week after President Laureano Gómez had taken office. Both the leaving and the elected heads of state received a copy in advance. The Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the Banco de la República to print the summary of the report on 12 August. Being under official censorship since November 1949, the press was allowed to present the main findings one day later.[334] In both Conservative and Liberal newspapers, the reception was enthusiastic but not uncritical. A headline quoting Ospina's former Minister of Finance, Hernan Jaramillo Ocampo, summarised it well: "The Currie Report Hurts Some Interests, But it's a Big Plan." Its recommendations about a land tax and, particularly, about the steel plant generated heated reactions.[335] Long-time considered a quintessentially Colombian problem, the urgency of connecting the country through modern transportation systems, treated in the fifth chapter of the report, resonated in the public and in the IBRD.[336] A Spanish version of the report circulated widely. Within a month, the Banco de la República run out of stock of the summary (at 2$ each), and

[333] IBRD, *Bases de un programa*, 689–713.
[334] Minute 1949, 26 July 1950, folio 5310; Minute 1951, 2 August 1950, folio 531, MBG-BR.
[335] A headline in the Liberal diary *El Espectador* of 18 August quoted the Conservative governor of Boyacá, the department where the steel plant was planned to be built, opposing Currie's concept on the matter: "Boyacá no acepta el concepto de Mr. Currie" (Boyacá does not accept Mr. Currie's concept), RM0021, roll 1; P-ALC- BLAA.
[336] "El más Urgente Problema Nacional es Ahora el de los Transportes" in *El Tiempo*, 20 August, 1950, P-ALC-BLAA; "Transcript of interview with Robert Garner," 19 July 61, OH-WB, 42.

within two months the second edition of the complete report was in print, after the first 2000 copies (at 10$ each) of the first edition sold out.[337]

In the press, the coverage of the report continued for months, and the influential magazine *Semana* devoted a column each week to present its proposals to the public. Currie figured in the cover of the issue of 28 October with an epigraph that transliterated a well-known religious proverb: "*el técnico propone y el gobierno dispone*" (the technical expert proposes, and the government decides).[338] This was only partly true. President Gómez accepted some of the Mission's recommendations, for example to adopt a more orthodox line in monetary policy. But he did not follow their advice on other key policy issues, such as the reversal of the steel plant project.[339]

The failure of the IBRD report to enjoy immediate and full acceptance in the policy arena should not obscure the historical significance of the first attempt to plan development in Colombia. After all, the Mission's report was designed both as a roadmap for international funders and as a pedagogical tool for Colombian policy makers. As Currie argued in the report, and reiterated in an address to the Colombian authorities, the success of the Mission did not depend on the implementation of its policy recommendations but on its ability to stimulate policymakers to "think in terms of the

[337] Minute 5360, 8 September 1950; Minute 5404, 11 October 1950, folio 1971; Minute 5420, 3 November 1950, folio 1976. MBG-BR.
[338] Originally, the proverb goes "*el hombre propone, Dios dispone*" (men proposes, god decides). For the columns about the steel plant and the land tax see the business and finance section of the issues for November 14 and 18, 1950 and March 3, 1951. Volumes IX- X, *Semana*.
[339] For a detailed account about the fate of the steel plant see Álvarez et al., "The Quarrel of Policy Advisers." On the impact of the Mission's recommendations in monetary policy, see Sáenz-Rovner, "La misión del Banco Mundial en Colombia" *Cuadernos de Economía* 20, no. 35: 245–65.

whole economy."[340] The advisory team made it clear in a memorandum submitted to the government that "the Report of the World Bank is not a blueprint to be enacted into law", but the "framework of a five year development program."[341] It was the Colombian government's responsibility to build the institutional framework and political consensus needed to translate the report into a plan of action. Planning development required reforming the state into a producer of technical knowledge about the economy.

2.3. Economic Interventionism and State Reform

Planning economic development required an institutional infrastructure that was only incipient in Colombia. While the IBRD mission facilitated the circulation of knowledges for representing and acting upon the national economy, the state did not have the technical capacities to operationalise development planning. Furthermore, IBRD officers and advisers agreed that planning efforts would not succeed if they depended exclusively on foreign expertise. Currie deemed an administrative reform of the state was urgent. His recommendations pointed at enhancing the capacities of the executive.[342] The political context that surrounded the IBRD Mission did not seem the most promising for developing technical capacities for economic management in the state, given the

[340] IBRD, *Bases de un programa*, xvi; Currie, "Algunos problemas de desarrollo económico" WB-ALC-BLAA, 1,2.
[341] n. a. "Colombia's Five Year Development Program", July 14 1950, RM0039, rolls 1-2, WB-ALC- BLAA, 1-2.
[342] IBRD, *Bases de un programa*, 678–88. The Colombian government hired Currie to advice the President in this area. He presented a report in 1952 entitled *Reorganización de la rama ejecutiva del gobierno colombiano*.

increasing levels of violence and partisan polarisation during the last two years of Ospina's presidency. For the first time in two decades, Liberals abstained to participate in the elections that brought Laureano Gómez to the Presidency.

When Gómez took office and the IBRD Mission report saw the public light in August 1950, Colombia had been experiencing two decades of growing state intervention in economic affairs. Policymakers had developed tools to intervene in foreign trade and exchange markets to respond to the demand shocks caused by the Great Depression in the United States and Europe, and the global conflict. In the post-war period, the dilemma they faced was how to promote long-term economic development while keeping domestic inflation at bay in the short run, as the foreign exchange reserves accumulated during WWII run out.[343] Under the Bretton Woods regime, domestic exchange rates were pegged to the US dollar. Exchange rates could only be modified with the prior authorisation from the IMF when there was sufficient evidence of a "fundamental disequilibrium." Other corrections to international payments imbalances were adjusted through changes in domestic prices and output, or in foreign exchange reserves.[344] As the reactivation of international trade in the early post-war years put pressure on Colombia's balance of payments account, Ospina's government introduced import restrictions to halt monetary expansion.[345] To avoid devaluating the Colombian peso, Ospina's Ministry of Finance introduced exchange controls and import deposit requirements that regulated economic actors' access to foreign currency.[346] These measures worked *de facto* as a protection of

[343] V. Bulmer-Thomas, *Economic History of Latin America*, 233.
[344] Schenk, *International Economic Relations since 1945*, 28.
[345] Bernal, *Memoria de Hacienda 1948*, 8.
[346] Jaramillo Ocampo, *1946-1950, de la unidad nacional a la hegemonía conservadora*, 265-275. The exchange control decree that Jaramillo Ocampo introduced as Minister of Finance did not impede the first devaluation of the Colombian peso under the Bretton Woods regime in 1952.

national industry.[347] More than a purposeful industrial strategy, they mainly constituted reactive responses to short-term imbalances in the payments account.[348]

In contrast, the institutional reforms of the 1950s displayed a deliberate effort to redefine the role of the state as an actor in Colombia's long-term economic development strategy. Following the recommendations of advisers from the US Federal Reserve, the reform of the Banco de la República in 1951 gave its Board of Governors instruments to both regulate monetary supply and finance economic development, marking a radical departure from the orthodoxy of the Kemmerer era. The presence of the Ministry of Finance in the governing board of the central bank gave state actors leverage in the allocation of productive credit through the allocation of rediscounting quotas.[349] Cabinet members also made part of the boards of decentralised institutions, such as the Instituto de Fomento Industrial (IFI), and public companies, like the Colombian Oil Company (ECOPETROL).[350] These reforms occurred in parallel and not as a result of the IBRD Mission's attempt to institutionalise development planning. The role of planning institutions in this institutional arrangement was to provide a global rationale for state interventions and to coordinate public and private initiative. Development planning also served to legitimate state intervention vis á vis international lenders, like the IBRD.

[347] Thorp, "Latin American Economies in the 1940s,"48.
[348] More generally, I agree with Carlos Brando's argument that it would be a mistake to infer from this *de facto* protection of national industry policymakers "autarkic aspirations" or a shifting balance of power in favour of industrialists. Brando, "The Political Economy of Financing Late Development," 148; for the opposite view see Sáenz Rovner, *La ofensiva empresarial*, 189–202.
[349] This reform followed the recommendations of a mission by Gerard Alter and Richard Grove. The developmental role of the Banco de la República during the post-war period falls beyond the scope of this thesis. See Meisel, "El Banco de la República, 1946, 1954 y la reforma de 1951, 453–58.
[350] The IFI was founded in 1940 and ECOPETROL was created in 1951. For an analysis of government's intervention on IFI's decision-making see Brando, "Political Economy of Financing Late Development," 193-195. For ECOPETROL, see Sáenz Rovner, *Colombia Años 50*, 65–80.

Overall, the state's active intervention in economic decision-making required institutional capacities for monitoring the economy, having access to up-to-date economic statistics, and coordinating economic activity. By the late 1940s, the Colombian state lacked the necessary tools, resources, and personnel to put into practice this developmental model of government.

As a professional engineer, President Gómez shared Ospina's technical ethos. Although Gómez had a more intransigent approach to politics than his predecessor, he gave continuity to planning activities and responded to Currie's calls for restructuring the executive. The swift deterioration of democratic institutions in the last two years of the Ospina government facilitated the reform of the state apparatus under Gómez's presidency. Governing under state of siege, Gómez had ample leeway for enacting those reforms by decree and speeding up their implementation without the formal checks and balances of a fully democratic system. With the technical assistance of the UN and the IBRD, statistical and planning activities were centralised under the Executive. The National Direction of Statistics (later the DANE) and the Planning Office (precursor of the DNP) became in the 1950s, together with the Banco de la República, the main institutional settings for the production of technical knowledge about the economy.

2.3.1. Quantifying the Economy: The National Accounts Project at the Section of Economic Research

In 1947, the Colombian staff of the Section of Economic Research (SER) of the central bank took over Francisco de Abrisqueta's project to measure aggregate economic

activity.[351] The National Accounts project, as it came to be known, was closely connected to the emergence of economics as a profession in Colombia. The Banco de la República staffed the SER with technical personnel in an ingenious way. It recruited students from the first cohort of graduates of the Facultad de Economía Industrial y Comercial of the Gimnasio Moderno, one of the first programmes that granted economics degrees in the country.[352] This group of young economists — Jaime F. Córdoba, Jorge Franco, Augusto Hannabergh, Leonel Torres, and Miguel Fadul — also represented the central bank in the IBRD Mission. Córdoba travelled to Washington to assist Currie and his team in the elaboration of the report.[353] Besides having a formal degree that credited them as economists, these young men spoke English. The Banco de la República sponsored SER researchers to pursue postgraduate studies in the United States. Franco was sent in 1946 to study a Master's in Public Administration at Harvard but in the end enrolled in the MBA. Torres and Fadul went in 1947, after concluding their graduate degrees, for an internship at the US Department of Commerce to learn about the "methodology of national income."[354] Therefore, the young staff at the SER were familiar with the techniques that economists were starting to use in the United States during the post-war period to quantify economic relationships, like national accounting.

The elaboration of the national accounting project was a joint effort between the central bank's Section of Economic Research and the Comptroller's office. Given the division of labour between the Kemmerer institutions, the former would not have been

[351] See Chapter 1.
[352] See Chapter 3.
[353] IBRD, *Bases de un programa*, xii; Minute 1891, 2 December 1949, folio 5049, 2 December 1949. MBG-BR.
[354] Minute 1633, 18 June 1947, folio 4135; Minute 1759, 28 July 1948, folio 4433-4434, MBG-BR.

able to access the necessary data without the latter.[355] In November 1948, Fadul and Franco met with the Comptroller Office's staff to begin the preparations for the national accounts project. One year later, Fadul presented the programme to estimate Colombia's national income for 1945. This was also his thesis for graduating as economist from the Gimnasio Moderno. In the introduction he used a metaphor to describe what he wished to accomplish, pointing out that "the National Income is a socio-economic photography of the country in a particular period."[356] Fadul's programme for developing a system of national accounting was ambitious. It attempted to produce a statistical representation summarising the economic activity in Colombia through a systematic abstraction of the relationships between its components. As Fadul later put it to the staff of a local insurance company, decision-makers needed statistical constructs like national accounts to give "objective" responses to questions about development had been hitherto addressed through direct observation ("*al ojímetro*"):

> What is the standard of living of the population? Are there differences in standards of living between people employed in different economic activities? Who live better, those employed in agriculture or in manufacture? Which activities bring better possibilities for development? Which part of the total income corresponds to employees? Are international comparisons possible?[357]

Theoretically, national accounts made possible comparisons of living standards across countries. With the collapse of formal empires, the principle of equality among nation-states in the post-war international order was a driver for the standardisation of national economic data. Yet, international consensus about how to measure national income were only reached by the time Fadul visited the US. In 1947, the US Department of Commerce published the first national income figures for the United States using the

[355] Minute 1788, 29 October 1948, folio 4540, MBG-BR.
[356] Fadul, *Programa*, 1.
[357] Fadul, "Elementos del ingreso nacional y estructura de la economía," 10.

methodology James Meade and Richard Stone had developed for the United Kingdom.[358] That same year, the now extinct League of Nations finally adopted this methodology as the international standard. According to the official report of the UN, the elaboration of comparable figures required a classification of "statistical entities" into socio-economic sectors, calculations of the transactions between them, and the aggregation of these accounts into national figures.[359]

In the early adoption of a national accounting system, Colombia followed a regional trend. The Chilean development corporation (Corfo), and the Central Banks of Mexico and Venezuela had all elaborated studies of national income before the Banco de la República did. According to a note published in the *Revista del Banco de la República*, probably by Fadul, the outcomes of these attempts had been "too global," without the degree of disaggregation that "economic studies required." A global measure of national income was useless for developmental purposes if it was not possible to establish the relations between its components. National accounting's aim was, according to the author, to allow policymakers to identify the "weak spots" in the economy so they could discern "how to reinvigorate it."[360] Because national accounting systems served specific purposes, they had to be adapted to local institutional needs. For example, Fadul included a statistical group for public enterprises, in spite that the US Department of Commerce's

[358] Before using this methodology, the Department of Commerce followed Simon Kuznets's national accounting programme in the National Bureau of Statistics, which was not explicitly grounded on Keynesian theory and differed methodologically with the methodology Meade and Stone used in the United Kingdom. Lepenies and Gaines, *Power of a Single Number*, 69, 74.
[359] Stone, "Measurement of National Income and the Construction of Social Accounts," 1.
[360] Banco de la República, "El ingreso nacional," 1969-1970.

accounting system that served as the basis for his programme did not contemplate this as a separate category.[361]

In November 1950, the National Income Group presented its first estimates of the gross national product and its components to the Board of Governors of the Banco de la República, using graphic representations that would become familiar for economic analysts, comparing the evolution of national income in Colombia to that of other countries.[362] The first official estimates by the National Income Group became available to the public in 1952, but the Central Bank socialised the final results of the project one year later. Gradually, the quantification of aggregate economic activity using national accounting methodologies became an accepted practice in state institutions. Fadul contributed to the acceptance of this practice by teaching courses about national accounts in universities and defending their usefulness for guiding government and private actors' decisions in learned journals and conferences.[363] Throughout the 1950s, the technical staff of the central bank updated these measurements as international standards changed and new statistical data became available.[364] While the trustworthiness of Colombian national accounts was still a matter of contention in the 1960s,[365] they became an unavoidable referent for talking about the *economy*.

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[361] Fadul argued that public companies were quantitatively more important in Colombia than in the United States, which justified their inclusion as a separate category. It is also probable that this was a sector for which he could find reliable data. Fadul, *Programa para la estimación del ingreso nacional*, 10.
[362] Minute 1982, 24 November 1950, folio 1982, MBG-BR.
[363] See Fadul's *Ingreso Nacional*, "Elementos Del Ingreso Nacional," and "Utilización de las cifras del ingreso y producto nacionales."
[364] By 1953 the standardisation of national accounting systems was still an ongoing process. See the report from the Statistical Office United Nations, *A System of National Accounts and Supporting Tables*. According to Avella-Gómez, Colombia did not fully adpot the UN nomenclature until 1960. See Avella-Gómez, "Economía colombiana en la Revista del Banco," 380-381.
[365] See Chapter 5.

2.3.2. Centralising the Production of Socio-economic Data: The Creation of the National Direction of Statistics

The IBRD mission and the National Accounts project lay bare that the overall organisation of national statistics was inadequate for development planning. Fadul, like Torfs, complained that reliable data for agriculture was virtually inexistent, but he acknowledged the role private, semi-official and official organisations played in the collection of periodical data about industry, commerce and government.[366] In the early 1950s the Comptroller was still the most important producer of statistics, but its technical capacities appeared to be languishing. As the demand for up-to-date information about the Colombian economy and society grew, the Comptroller lost the ability to coordinate the production of statistics nationwide.[367] It also faced problems of administrative nature. Due to understaffing, budget constraints and high personnel rotation, the Comptroller had to postpone the expected census of 1950 to 1951.[368]

In January 1950, statistical experts gathered in Bogotá for the Second Conference of the Interamerican Institute of Statistics, which de Abrisqueta directed. The purpose of the meeting was standardising statistical procedures across the hemisphere. Among other tasks, this included defining common guidelines for the census of 1950, which the press referred to as the "Census of the Americas." In the inaugural speech, President Ospina defended the importance of making statistics accessible to the broader public so the "cold and inert nature of numbers acquire warmth and spiritual sense," and celebrated that

[366] Fadul, *Programa*, 56–57.
[367] See Perlman, *Reorganización del trabajo estadístico*, 35-40.
[368] Perlman, *Reorganización del trabajo estadístico* 7.

internationalism in the post-war era opened an "illimited horizon for the science and research of statistics."[369] The Conference gathered 221 representatives from multilateral institutions and governments across the Americas. The Colombian delegation, which included Fadul, Franco, Hannabergh and Torres, accounted for more than half of the participants. Considering the need for comparability and the "urgency of economic and social problems," the congress recommended in its first resolution that "each country centralised in a unique organism the responsibility and authority necessary for the (…) collection, analysis and publication of statistics."[370] The failure to conduct the census in 1950 made this institutional reorganisation of statistics in Colombia seem more urgent.

That task fell on an expert sent by UN-EPTA, Jacob Perlman. After working for almost two decades in the Bureau of Labour Statistics, the hotbed of statistical innovation in the United States during the New Deal years,[371] Perlman arrived in Colombia in March 1951 to advice the government in the calculation of industrial prices. He collaborated with the central bank's Section of Economic Research on the elaboration of a general price index and with the director of the Comptroller's National Direction of Statistics on the compilation of statistics on industrial goods prices. The duplication of duties, and the contrast between the technical capacities of these institutions convinced Perlman that the coordination of national statistics could not remain in the Comptroller's office. He agreed with Currie and Torfs that the whole system of national statistics needed to be reorganised so the government and the public could have more reliable information about the

[369] "Discurso Mariano Ospina Pérez", 16 January 1950. Reproduced in "Segundo Congreso Interamericano de Estadística Bogotá 1950," Weekly issue of 21 January 1950, Volume VIII: 170, *Semana*.
[370] OAS, *Segundo Congreso Interamericano de Estadística*, 26.
[371] Ronall, Joachim O. "Perlman, Jacob," 778-779. About the Bureau of Labor Statistics' influence in the interwar period see Stapleford, *The Cost of Living in* America, 145–83.

country's "present and future economic development." Following Perlman's request, the coordinator of UN-EPTA in Colombia, Raymond Etchats, reached an agreement with government representatives to commission the foreign expert and the Minister of Development to draft a proposal for the reorganisation of the country's statistics.[372]

Perlman's proposal consisted in withdrawing the National Direction of Statistics from the Comptroller's office to place it under the president. According to him, the relocation of statistical responsibilities in the Executive branch had both a political and a technical justification. He argued that this change made the production of statistics less dependent on the tide of public opinion and on partisan skirmishes. Following the recommendations of the Kemmerer Mission, the Comptroller was elected every two years by Congress to keep track of government expenditure. Perlman considered that parliamentary accountability subjected the appointment of the head of national statistics to undesirable political pressures. A column that appeared in *Semana* in May 1951 echoed this concern, arguing that the difficulties for conducting the national census were not technical but "political." The "real" size of electoral constituencies at the local level had been a heated between Liberals and Conservatives for decades, but it acquired special significance in the late 1940s.[373] *Semana*'s article reported that mayors were appointing enumerators at the convenience of local political bosses, and that the staff of the Comptroller's office, "the last Liberal stronghold," was being replaced by Conservatives

[372] Perlman, *Reorganización del trabajo estadístico*, 3–4, 8. See also two memoranda Perlman sent to the government, included in this report: "Esbozo del plan de organización del trabajo estadístico en Colombia" and "Memorandum sobre la oficina central de estadística."
[373] Debates about demographic statistics were often entangled with accusations of electoral fraud. In 1947, Gómez accused the Liberals of using 1,800,000 false identification cards printed in 1936, a trope the Conservative press repeated every time voters casted their ballots. At the local level, political bosses in the 1940s artificially inflated or deflated the number and party composition of town dwellers, occasionally through violent means. Henderson, *La modernización en Colombia*, 472; Deas, *Barco*, 66–73.

to pay political favours. Just before the statistical office started collecting data in November 1950, the General Comptroller was replaced again. Shortly after, President Gómez postponed the census for six months.[374] This politicisation of statistical activities along partisan lines may have informed Perlman's views about the need of reform.

Perlman used developmental arguments to justify the reorganisation of national statistics under the Executive. Removing the production of national statistics from Congress implied a redefinition of their governmental function. Perlman noted that the association between compiling statistical information and auditing government activities, which had hitherto justified placing the direction of national statistics under the Comptroller's office, was an "illusion because both functions had fundamentally very few in common." If the state was to become an agent of economic development, the proper function of statistics could not be to control government expenditures but to provide "the basis for legislation and administration."[375] Statistics, he argued, "are not an end in themselves. They are collected with a specific purpose, which is to help the government and private interests to formulate their policies." The core of the reform proposal that Perlman submitted to Gómez in September 1951 was not merely administrative. It was to redefine the function that statistical knowledge played in government, while also recognizing that publishing up-to-date official figures was a crucial guide for private actors.

President Gómez decreed, without seeking the approval of Congress, the creation of the National Direction of Statistics as an administrative dependency of the presidency on 25 October 1951.[376] Three days later, Gómez suffered a heart attack and left the post

[374] "Los Censos de 1951," Weekly issue of 5 May 1952, Volume X: 237, *Revista Semana*. 5-7
[375] Perlman, *Reorganización del trabajo estadístico*, 12,13.
[376] Decree 2240 of 1951. A second decree complemented this one, No. 2254 in December 1951.

in the hands of his War Minister, Roberto Urdaneta. Upon his departure, Gómez presented a project of constitutional reform to transform the Senate into a corporate and technocratic body. With this proposal Gómez sought to increase the power of the executive at the expense of the legislature. In the mid-term elections of 1951, despite the abstention of Liberals, Gómez lost the control of the new Constitutional Assembly to a different coalition within his own party.[377] Although Gómez's corporatist constitutional reform ultimately failed, it revealed the tensions some political actors saw between representative democracy and state interventionism. Besides redefining the nature of statistical production, Gómez's government placed the Direction of Statistics in close connection to another institutional innovation. The decree that created the Direction of Statistics stated that its "primary" function was to cooperate with the Presidency's Planning Office to produce "information for a coherent study of the national economy."[378]

2.4 Planning Development: Institutional Organisation and Challenges

Reasserting the recommendations of the IBRD Mission report,[379] Currie insisted on the importance of institutionalising planning in the conclusions of his Mission of Public Administration, which he presented to Gómez in March 1951. He conceived the creation of a "Resource Planning Office" as a part of the broader reform of the executive.[380] One of the objectives of this reform was to bestow the presidential office with better capacities to intervene purposively on economic affairs. Currie's proposal also recommended, for

[377] Henderson, *Modernización en Colombia*, 510–17.
[378] Decree No. 2240, October 25, 1951. Reproduced in Perlman, *Reorganización del trabajo estadístico*.
[379] IBRD, *Bases de un programa*, 680.
[380] See Currie, "Reorganización de la rama ejecutiva."

example, relocating the Budget Office from the Ministry of Finance to the Presidency, arguing that the national budget was not a "simple table of expenditures" but the instrument to "determine the programs and needs of the Government."[381] While the Budget Office remained under the Ministry of Finance, Gómez created in September 1951 the Planning Office as a dependency of the Presidency. The Planning Office was exclusively an advisory body, without executive prerogatives. Its main functions were to study structural changes in economic activity, evaluate the conveniency of public investment projects, and present recommendations to the President about foreign credit considering the bases for a development plan outlined in the IBRD report.[382]

In February 1952, the government created the National Planning Council to coordinate the activities in the Planning Office and serve as consultative body to the president.[383] The members of the Council exemplify well the profile Colombian economic decision-makers had in the early post-war period. Gómez appointed to the Council Rafael Delgado Barreneche, Jesús María Marulanda, and Emilio Toro. While Toro had played a central role in reaching an agreement with the IBRD Mission as the Colombian Governor in the bank, Delgado Barreneche and Marulanda were lawyers in the *hacendista* tradition who had overseen the Ministry of Finance in multiple occasions. What brought these men together to the Council was their international experience and the practical knowledge about economic issues they developed handling private and public affairs.

The Council replaced the Committee of Economic Development that gathered twice a week from September 1950 to July 1951 to translate the recommendations of the

[381] Currie, "Reorganización de la rama ejecutiva," xix, 32, 38.
[382] Decree 128 of 1951.
[383] The Office remained under the President's dispatch until it gained administrative status in 1958. The name and functions of the Council changed multiple times between 1952 and 1958. See Chapter 5 for the next stage of development planning.

IBRD Mission report into a five-year development plan. Currie had envisaged this Committee as a "Colombian version of the Royal British Commission,"[384] which was typically appointed on an ad-hoc basis to provide the parliament independent advice on a specific issue. Considering the polarised environment that surrounded Gómez's first year of government, Currie considered the Committee's six members should have "the capacity to understand and exercise sound judgement in the most difficult national economic problems" but also "to place national ahead of party or personal interest."[385] The Colombian ambassador in the United States, Eduardo Zuleta Ángel, persuaded the IBRD that the government had chosen a group of men who guaranteed proportional bi-partisan, regional and sectoral representation in the Committee.[386] In recognition of existing traditions of economic consultation, both local and foreign actors expected the national development plan would be the product of the negotiation between representatives of conflicting interests. The Committee thus became a space for discussing policies that opposed industrialists' and agricultural exporters' interests, as well as regional interests, such as the regulation of foreign exchange controls and the construction of the steel plant in Paz de Río. To Torfs's dismay, these discussions outlasted the Committee's interest in the "experiment in overall planning," and the Committee did not deliver the promised five-year development plan.[387]

[384] "A Talk by Lauchlin Currie", 31 August 1979, RM0029, roll 1, T-ALC-BLAA, 7.
[385] "Colombia's Five-Year Development Program", 14 July 1950, RM0039, rolls 1-2, WB-ALC-BLAA, 2.
[386] Zuleta to IBRD, "Memorandum",5 September 1950, TA2-WBGA.
[387] Torfs to Leonard Rist (Director of the IBRD's Economic Department), 16 November 1950, TA2-WBGA; Torfs to Harold Larsen, 27 April 1951, TA3-WBGA. The Committee submitted eighteen reports with concrete policy advice compiled in a report presented in August 1951 in Comité de Desarrollo Económico, *Informe Final*.

To continue with the task the Committee left unfinished, Gómez created the Council as a permanent body. The government's commitment to planed development assured the continuity of IBRD technical assistance. With the support of the IBRD, the Colombian government hired Albert O. Hirschman as Economic and Financial Adviser of the Council. Hirschman's landing in Colombia, like Currie's, was possible thanks to the institutional arrangements of the post-war development era. Hirschman's decision to accept the job as foreign adviser was also an indirect consequence of the anti-communist paranoia in the United States in the eve of the Cold-War. A German-Jew with a *laurea* (PhD) in statistical economics from the University of Trieste, Hirschman had emigrated to the United States during WWII after participating in antifascist resistance in France, Spain, and Italy. Due to his knowledge about the economics of war, the Fed's Division of Research and Statistics hired him as Chief of the European–British Commonwealth Section in 1947. One year later, he moved to the Economic Cooperation Administration as the Fed's representative in the team assembled by Richard Bissell to provide the analytical bases for a recovery programme for Europe. If Currie was the economist behind the New Deal, Hirschman was "one of the invisible men behind the Marshall Plan."[388] Between the Depression and the reconstruction of Europe, the relative position of economic experts in the US government had changed. During the war, the reputation of economics as a scientific profession had increased to the extent that it was no longer uncommon to find academically trained economists like Hirschman employed by the state.

When Hirschman arrived in Colombia, he found out that the government had also hired Currie as adviser to the Council. While neither of them had fully formed views

[388] Adelman, *Worldly Philosopher*, chaps. 8–9.

about economic development at the time, their advice often clashed as did as their understanding of the role experts played in economic development.[389] The division of labour among foreign advisors illustrates the type of work conducted at the Planning Office in 1953. While Hirschman presented to the Council periodical reports about Colombia's monetary situation and conducted two studies about sovereign debt, Currie and Torfs focused on regional and sectoral planning. Currie wrote development programmes for Bogotá and the department of Atlántico, in the northern coast. With the collaboration of Roger Kalmmanoff, who the IBRD had hired to advice the Planning Council, Torfs presented plans for Boyacá and Santander in the east, and the Valle del Cauca and Medellín in the west. Torfs also coordinated the elaboration of long-term national plans in electrification, for which the IBRD had expressed its willingness to provide financial assistance, and the colonization of public lands in the agricultural frontier, among other sectoral programmes.[390]

Besides devoting time to regional and sectoral planning, the Planning Office made some progress in its mandate to plan development at the national scale. The Council's annual report for 1953 included a tentative study about the "long-term trends" in Colombia's economy. This study was a concrete application of national accounting techniques to understanding the dynamics of Colombian economic development. It presented an overview of the historical evolution of Colombia's national income merging the data on national accounts used in the IBRD mission report, the central bank's calculations for 1947-1950 and the Council's own estimates for the 1950-1953 period.[391]

[389] The clash between Hirschman and Currie goes beyond the remit of this thesis. See Álvarez, Guiot-Isaac, and Hurtado, "The Quarrel of Policy Advisers."
[390] CNP, "Informe de actividades del Consejo Nacional de Planificación, 1953," c. 1954, box 2, folder 21, folios 212-214, 223-232, A-DG-DNP-AGN.
[391] CNP, "Informe de actividades 1953," Folio 243.

Based on these series, the authors of the study presented a diagnosis about the current economic situation. According to them, the data suggested that government expenditure as a proportion of national income had fallen progressively in the post-war years until it reached the nadir in 1950. While this contraction in public expenditure served to curb inflationary pressures, the low level of investments in "essential public services like hydroelectric plants, aqueducts, sewerage networks, schools, hospitals, etc." during these years represented a "hindrance for the development of the private economy."[392] In coherence with this diagnosis, the Council endorsed the 20% increase in public investments announced in the budget for 1954 and revised upward the targets the Committee of Economic Development set for the government's investment programme. The study concluded with a rough "model" that illustrated the potential effects of increasing public investments on national income growth via changes in the "capital/output ratio." Acknowledging that further studies were needed to "progressively improve these techniques," the authors made clear that this was the type of analysis needed for the elaboration of a five-year national development plan, which was expected to be finalised in 1954.[393]

Domestic political developments interrupted the functioning of the Planning Office. In June 1953, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla overthrew Gómez after the latter reassumed the presidency attempting to push forward his constitutional reform amid growing violence in the countryside.[394] Currie resigned and retired temporarily from economic

[392] The authors of the report added that this was why the "government decided to seek foreign financing to undertake new projects and organised economic planning for the first time in Colombia." CNP, "Informe de actividades," folios 251-252.
[393] CNP, "Informe de actividades," folios 256, 261-269
[394] Henderson, *Modernización en Colombia* , 528–33; Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions*, 129–39.

counselling to devote to cattle ranching.[395] Hirschman continued working for the Office until his contract expired in June 1954. However, his tenure under General Rojas' administration was full of frustration as the relationship between the Office and the rest of the government gradually deteriorated, particularly with the Minister of Finance Carlos Villaveces.[396] When Hirschman left the Office, he opened an economic consultancy agency in Bogotá with his colleague from the IBRD, Roger Kalmmanoff.[397] After the coup, the Vice-president of the IBRD hesitated about withdrawing the technical assistance mission in Colombia, but a visit to the country left him under the impression that the undemocratic overthrow of Gómez had broad popular support.[398] The only foreign advisor who continued working in the Office was the IBRD staff economist Jacques Torfs, who remained until 1956 when Rojas's relationship with international financial institutions cooled down. During the military regime, the IBRD also funded a major regional development project in the Valle del Cauca Region modelled in the Tennessee Valley Authority.[399] For multilateral institutions in the mid-1950s, the preservation of democratic institutions was not a precondition to appropriate loans for governments' developmental projects.

Although some programmes of technical assistance had offices in Colombia, the Planning Office oversaw the coordination of foreign expert missions. Besides paying (part of) the salary for Currie, Hirschman, Torfs and Kalmmanoff, the Office's payroll in

[395] Sandilands, *Life and Political Economy*, 178-181.
[396] Albert Waterston to Burke Knapp (IBRD Director of Latin American Operations), 6 August 1953; Jacques Torfs to Burke Knapp, 17 September 1953; Grayson to Knapp, 21 February 1954; GNV-WBGA.
[397] Adelman, *Worldly Philosopher*, chap. 10.
[398] Garner to Toro, 2 July 1953, GNV-WBGA.
[399] See Offner, *Sorting Out*, 22-49.

1953 included all the experts from the UN-EPTA.[400] This explains why the Office received the group of economists Cepal sent to Bogotá in March 1954. Responding to the invitation by General Rojas,[401] Cepal's Executive Secretary visited Colombia to collect data for applying the "methodology of analysis and projections for the elaboration of programs" approved in the Vth Commission of the institution the year before. This project became the first in-depth empirical country-by-country analysis Cepal made in Latin America using a methodology that allowed for intra-regional comparisons. After a pilot trial in Chile, and its first implementation in Brazil, Colombia's was formally Cepal's second case study using programming techniques. This visit inaugurated a fruitful working relationship between the Commission and the Colombian government that would result in the elaboration of the first development plan presented to Congress in 1960.[402] Yet, the cooperation between Cepal and the Planning Office in 1955 initially "arouse misgivings" among IBRD officers, who interpreted it as an external evaluation of the planning techniques sponsored by the bank. Cepal's Executive Secretary, Raúl Prebisch, tried to reassure the Bank that the group of economists visiting Colombia was not a "development mission" but a "study group," and that the expected report would "contain

[400] "Contratos vigentes del Consejo Nacional de Planeación con técnicos extranjeros," box 5, folder 55, OJ-DNP-AGN.

[401] This was not the only mission Rojas requested while he was president. In 1955, the Planning Office received a Mission from the *Centre d' Economie et Humanisme*, led by Father Louis-Joseph Lebret. Rojas filed the report of this mission, but the government of Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962) rescued it from oblivion in 1958. See Karl, *La paz olvidada*, 41–43.

[402] Cepal's theories of industrialisation and international commerce developed and the Commission's influence on policy debates during the 1950s. have been widely documented. Less known is the role Cepal's assistance in programming techniques played in training local economists and asserting its influence in national bureaucracies, which be more fully addressed in Chapter 5. For Cepal's intellectual history see Rodríguez, *La teoría del subdesarrollo de la CEPAL* , 25–40; FitzGerald, "La CEPAL y la teoría de la industrialización;" Fajardo, *The World That Latin America Created*.

no action recommendations."[403] Although Cepal's study group presented its findings in 1955 to Rojas and his aides, these were largely ignored by the government until the report saw the public light in 1957.

Cepal's final report revealed how the institutional infrastructure for technical economic analysis in the Colombian state had changed since the IBRD mission of 1949. Prebisch acknowledged that the quality of statistical information in Colombia was above the average in Latin America.[404] The Commission's report was the first systematic analysis of the official estimates the National Income Group completed in 1953. Cepal's economists complemented this data with the preliminary results of a new industrial census, and with the first national survey on incomes and expenditures at the household level completed in 1953 by the Administrative Department of National Statistics (DANE), which had replaced earlier that year the National Direction of Statistics. While foreign advisers from the IBRD Mission had to collect data from scattered sources, the economists from the technical staff of the Commission had access to rough estimates of national accounts and a centralised system of statistical information. After five months, Cepal economists left for Santiago with the Director of the Planning Office to write the final report.

While foreign advisers acknowledged improvements in the institutional capacity of the state to produce technical knowledge about the economy, they expressed concerns about the scarcity of local experts to fill the growing technical bureaucracy. It is unclear to what extent IBRD and Cepal advisers disagreed in terms of method, but Torfs opposed the arrival of the study group because he considered that the influx of more foreign

[403] Harold Larsen to Knapp, 11 February 1954; "Incoming wire from Jacques Torfs to the IBRD", 19 February 1954, WBGA-GNV.
[404] Secretaría de la Cepal, "Análisis y proyecciones del desarrollo económico III," 44.

advisers would have prejudicial effects for the "Colombianization" of the Planning Office. He lamented that there were only "two or three people" in Colombia "whom adequately trained" could assume the role that foreign experts had played in the Planning Office. Moreover, the Office had to compete with other government branches and private organisations demanding their expertise. "In the present circumstances" —he concluded— "if the Planning Office cannot resort to foreign experts, it will simply collapse. If the IBRD does not provide the men, the U.N. will."[405] The challenges of finding and attracting local counterparts to work in planning bodies and the correlative reliance on foreign missions was a common complaint among foreign advisors until the late 1960s.

Torfs's claim about the absence of local experts was not equally shared by an emerging generation of professional economists. If Currie figured in the cover of *Semana* in 1949, the director of the National Accounts Group, Miguel Fadul, was the magazine's person of the week in April 1952. A young economist, Enrique Peñalosa, offered a counterpoint to Torf's comments in his profile of Miguel Fadul for this magazine. The title of Peñalosa's column was: "Economists, we need to plan." He argued that, while the press tended to focus on the arrival of foreign technical experts, the "exodus" of young Colombian economists, such as Fadul, who was about to leave for the OAS, went unnoticed. Peñalosa described apologetically Fadul's professional trajectory, highlighting that he had received training in economics, obtained a postgraduate degree abroad and had professional experience in US and Colombian economic institutions. The columnist

[405] In his letter to Knapp, Torfs argued that he could only think of "two or three people" with the expertise to work in the office, who nonetheless already "occupy key positions on other organisations and it might take months or years to convince the president to bring him here." Torfs to Knapp, 24 February 1954, GNV-WBGA. For the expression "Colombianization" see Knapp's response to Torfs' letter, 16 April 1954, GNVI-WBGA.

lamented that economists with Fadul's profile had no professional future in a country "that needed to progress so badly," as long as the people in charge of economic policymaking enjoyed "fame as prominent economists and finance magicians simply because they have made a fortune."[406] In the early 1950s, professionally trained economists who challenged established traditions of economic thought and practice believed they had few career opportunities in the Colombian state.

International organisations provided an exit to the few young economists with professional training because the transnational circulation of experts in the development era worked in both directions. Technical assistance missions not only drove foreign experts to Colombia, but they offered local economists training and professional opportunities in multilateral organisations. Despite Peñalosa's grim view, the administrative reforms of the early 1950s opened paths for the incorporation of technically qualified economists in the state. Córdoba and Franco, from the Section of Economic Research of the Banco de la República, prepared the technical documents discussed in the Committee of Economic Development.[407] Between 1952 and 1957, the Office had budget for two "economists" in its payroll to work as advisers for the council. For Enrique Peñalosa and Germán Gaviria, two of the staff economists at the Planning Office during the 1950s, working for the office brought them unique professional opportunities. They established close personal relationships with foreign advisers and undertook training programs in Washington and Santiago that boosted their careers.[408]

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[406] Weekly issue of 26 April 1952, Volume XII, *Semana,* It was possible to identify that Peñalosa was the author of this profile from his Memoirs. I thank Freddy Castro bringing Peñalosa's Memoirs to my attention and Enrique Peñalosa Londoño for authorizing me to quote them.

[407] SCE, *Directorio de economistas*.

[408] "Reseña histórica de contratos técnicos," box 5, folder 55, OJ-DNP-AGN. Gaviria contributed to the drafting in Chile of Cepal's report. When Gaviria returned to the Planning

Between 1952 and 1957, foreign advisers and young economists working at the Planning Office presented at least 277 reports, memoranda, and studies to the president. In 1958, the Office's archive included three annual reports (from 1952, 1953, and 1954), a series of studies in regional planning, and two comprehensive analyses of Colombia's economy and society (Cepal's and Lebret's reports). However, none of these documents contained a comprehensive development plan along the lines described in the IBRD mission report and there is no evidence that the paperwork produced at the Office had major effects in the policy arena, particularly during the military regime when the relationship between the Planning Office and the Ministry of Finance was fraught. Most of these documents never saw the public light. As the Executive Director of the National Planning Committee wrote to the General Secretary of the Military Junta that took control of government when Rojas was ousted in May 1957, the "lack of publicity of those recommendations" had been one of the major obstacles planning bodies and technical assistance missions faced in the preceding years.[409] While the state built the basic institutional infrastructure for planning development, the work done by technical experts remained for the most part out of the public eye.

2.4. Conclusion

In the early post-war period, the Colombian government was relatively effective at securing loans for development projects and technical assistance missions from

Office in 1957, he became the Secretary General and briefly directed the planning department in 1962.

[409] Comité Nacional de Planeación, "Informes elaborados por el Comité Nacional de Planeación y trabajos desarrollados por la asistencia técnica de las Naciones Unidas, a partir de 1952," July 1958; Carlos Prieto Silva to Juan B. Córdoba, 28 July, 1958, JM-PR-AGN.

multilateral and bilateral aid institutions. Thanks to the agency of Colombian economic diplomats, who built on the good reputation that institutions like the Banco de la República gained among international lenders during the interwar period, Colombia captured the attention of the IBRD for its first ever comprehensive mission in a developing country. From this moment, Colombia became a showcase in development assistance for international institutions like the IBRD, a reputation that National Front governments capitalised in the 1960s, as will be shown in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Throughout the 1950s, foreign advisers hired by the IBRD and UN bodies like Currie, Hirschman, Perlman and Torfs landed in Colombia carrying the baggage of their experiences as New Dealers and Marshall Planners to address the relatively unfamiliar problems of economic development. The frustration these foreign experts expressed in letters, memoranda and public writings revealed the challenges they faced advising governments in a country with a long tradition of economic thought and practice but without the institutional infrastructure to rationalise development interventions.

While Gómez's and Rojas' governments selectively implemented foreign advisers' recommendations or neglected them outrightly, the relevance of the development missions that arrived in Colombia during the 1950s should not be measured by their short-term policy impact. Although foreign advisers' influence in the policy arena was limited, they succeeded at introducing a new understanding of the economy as an object of expert intervention. Through the appropriation of quantitative techniques like national accounting, the state developed capacities to monitor periodically economic activity. Drawing the historical trends, sectoral composition, and projections of Colombia's national income not only became a regular state practice in the period analysed in this

chapter, but also the basis for planning development interventions, namely large-scale public infrastructural projects, while considering their effects on the economy as a whole.

By providing the state with an institutional infrastructure for quantifying the economy, the creation of the National Department of Statistics, the central bank's Section of Economic Research, and the Planning Office was a milestone in the emergence of Colombia's economic technocracy. Despite the political turmoil the country experienced between the end of Ospina's National Union coalition in 1948 to Rojas' fall in 1957, the Planning Office persisted in its attempt to produce a national development plan, but to no avail. The deterioration of democratic institutions facilitated the reform of the state by presidential decree under Gómez's administration and hence the degree of centralization of both statistics and decision-making about the economy that development planning required. But the political instability of the period had a toll on the operationality of the Planning Office and its technical capacities languished after foreign advisers resigned. In the transition to the National Front, development planning would receive a new impetus, becoming a central component of the redemocratisation project, as I will show in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

As the Colombian state developed an institutional infrastructure for rationalising economic interventions, it began to demand the expertise of a new type of specialist about the economy. When Currie landed in Colombia in 1949, economics was only beginning to professionalise in that country. Foreign advisers found few local counterparts who shared the language and skills of an increasingly technical and tool-based discipline. Although, as Torfs warned when the Planning Office received Cepal's study group, planning activities had come to rely too heavily on foreign expertise, a handful of young professional Colombian economists engaged actively with the IBRD and UN missions.

They also took advantages from their connection to the expert network through which knowledge about economic development circulated during the early post-war period. Besides working together with foreign experts, some of them travelled to Washington and Santiago and joined the technical staff of multilateral organisations. These transnational engagements familiarised them with a global understanding of the national economy and its problems.

However, Torfs was right in pointing out that in the 1950s there was a limited supply of local professional economists who could aspire to have any degree of influence in the direction of economic affairs. Indeed, pragmatic traditions of economic thought and practice still prevailed in the state institutions that controlled the levers of economic policy circles. The recruitment of young professional economists by the state was restricted to the small and incipient planning apparatus, which in the 1950s had no direct incidence on economic governance beyond contributing to nurture the relationship between the government and multilateral lenders like the IBRD. The arrival of economic technocrats to decision-making positions was a long way ahead. The first step toward the formation of a cadre of experts about the Colombian economy was the creation of the first departments of economics in local universities, to which this thesis now turns.

Chapter 3. Toward an Economics Profession: Between the Public and the Private Economy

When upon his arrival in Colombia in 1949 the head of the IBRD mission, Lauchlin Currie, asked how many economists there were in the country, he was allegedly told that there was only one, who turned out to be an engineer by profession.[410] While development missions like that of the IBRD prompted the state to build an institutional infrastructure for intervening in economic affairs, economics had only recently found its way into universities as a specialised field of knowledge. The institutionalisation of economics education in Colombian universities occurred as the standards for social scientific expertise changed at the global scale. In the politically contentious environment of the post-war period, values such as "objectivity, verifiability, and generality" became the gold standard for social scientific practice.[411] As social scientists in universities established closer links with the state, they were enticed, even more than before, to "emphasize their scientific credentials."[412] The discipline of economics, particularly but not exclusively in the United States, was at the vanguard of the formation and diffusion of this new scientific ethos, which underpinned economists' social and self-identification as experts.[413] Against this background, Colombian universities began in the mid-twentieth century to educate professional economists, defying a long tradition of pragmatic engagements with economic affairs.

[410] This person was, according to Alberto Mayor Mora and Clemencia Tejeiro's interview with Currie, Hernán Echavarría Olózaga, the first dean of the economics department at UniAndes. Mayor Mora and Zambrano, *Economistas Antiguos y Modernos*, 318.
[411] Ross, "Changing Contours of the Social Science," 231.
[412] Backhouse and Fontaine, "Toward a History of the Social Sciences," 189.
[413] Morgan and Rutherford, "American Economics," 4,12.

This chapter studies the early professionalisation of economics in Colombia. It takes one step back from the changes in the post-WWII period analysed in the previous chapter to trace the origins of the economics departments at the UNal and the Universidad de los Andes (UniAndes).[414] By studying the conditions that led to the creation in the mid-1940s of those departments, two of the first academic programmes of its kind, I examine how economics began to institutionalise as a specialised field of knowledge in the university system, removing the education of economists from the control of established professions like law and engineering. I also explore how professionally trained economists began to assert their scientific legitimacy to intervene as experts in both public and private jurisdictions under the politically torn environment of General Rojas's dictatorship (1953-1957). What brought the *economistas jóvenes* (young economists) together as an expert community, as I show in this chapter, was not their involvement in Rojas' increasingly authoritarian government but their opposition to the economic policies of the military regime. In this sense, the Rojas' episode offers a counterpoint to the alleged "selective affinity" between the rise of technocratic cadres and the turn to authoritarianism in Latin America during the following decade.[415]

Focusing on these milestones in the professionalisation of economics allows me to identify the continuities and ruptures in the transition from the pragmatic traditions of economic thought and practice analysed in Chapter 1 to the consolidation of an internationally connected profession in the 1960s and early 1970s (Chapter 4). Elucidating the road toward the professionalisation of economics also allows me to

[414] Hereafter I translate the generic name given in Spanish to "*facultad de economía/ciencias económicas*" as "economics department."
[415] For the standard argument about the selective affinity between modernizing technocratic cadres and military regimes see O'Donnell, "Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism," 83.

ponder the extent to which initial conditions had path-dependent effects on its long-term development and on the configuration of Colombia's economic technocracy.

The historiography about the development of the social sciences in Colombia has dismissed the 1940s and 1950s as a transitional period for the professionalisation of economics. Salomón Kalmanovitz argued that the first academic programmes in economics revealed in its first years a "lack of understanding of what was needed to train an economist and a researcher," because the discipline was conceived simply "as a branch of law but with a more technical character given by business management and accounting."[416] According to Jesús A. Bejarano and Marco Palacios, only the expansion of the university system in the 1960s marked the beginning of the institutionalisation of economics in higher education.[417] While these studies take the present state of economics as the point of departure to look back and trace how the profession evolved to that point, this chapter addresses professionalisation through a different historiographical lens.[418] Instead of attempting to provide a clearcut periodisation of the stages through which economics went from being the domain of non-specialists to that of specialists, this chapter treats the professionalisation of economics as an open ended process, shaped by the relationships economists established with established professional traditions, international influences, and employers and clients in the public and the private sectors.

[416] Kalmanovitz, "Notas," 30.
[417] Bejarano, "La profesionalización en economía," in 260–66; Marco Palacios, "Knowledge Is Power," 182–216.
[418] As sociologists have argued, professionalisation processes do not necessarily follow specific sequences. Professions operate within a system of "jurisdictional disputes" among different occupational communities with competing expertise claims over specific fields of intervention. Furthermore, the evolution of professions is both constrained and facilitated by the institutional arrangements they develop with the state and other organisations in society across time. See Abbott, *System of Professions*, 1-2; and Marion Fourcade, *Economists and Societies*, 245.

Colombian universities were, by regional standards, relatively late comers in offering specialised education in economics. At least since the 1930s, the main national public universities in Argentina, Chile, and México had economics departments, which developed closed links with the governments as the state in each of these countries intervened more actively in the economy during the interwar period.[419] Studying when the education of economics was institutionalised in the university system matters for understanding what, how, and whence economic ideas and approaches circulated and the extent to which they moulded the professional identity of economists. According to Villamizar, the relative absence by the 1950s of established communities of economists in universities played a part in the weak reception of Cepal's developmentalism in Colombia and the comparatively smoother appropriation of the disciplinary trends in economics in the United States.[420] To assess the specificity of the Colombian case within the region, this chapter also sheds light on the main drivers and intellectual influences behind the creation of the first economics departments in the country, setting the stage for studying in deep the internationalisation of the profession in Chapter 4.

Four sections follow this introduction. I begin by exploring the immediate antecedents for the first faculties of economics. In the second and third sections, I examine in detail the genealogy of the economics departments at the UNal and UniAndes. Lastly, I study the conformation of a professional *esprit de corps* in opposition to General Rojas's dictatorship to analyse how economists' experience during the military regime shaped the professional jurisdictions of economics in the private and the public domain.

[419] Babb, *Managing Mexico*, 46.
[420] Villamizar, "Influencia de la Cepal en Colombia," 152–53.

3.1. Immediate Antecedents: Modern Social Thought and Catholic Education

Founding a degree in economics in a university system rigidly organised around traditional professions was challenging. In 1928, President Miguel Abadía Méndez decreed the creation of the Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales in the UNal. In strict terms, this was not a proper *Facultad* because, until the organic reform of the UNal in 1935, only the Faculties of Law, Engineering and Medical Sciences were legally allowed to grant professional degrees. Other disciplines were considered auxiliary fields to the traditional professions.[421] It was rather a two-year specialisation in economics and social sciences for students in the Faculty of Law, which included further studies in public finance and political economy, as well as labour, social, and commercial legislation.[422] This specialization received students in 1928 and 1929 but the fiscal impact of the global financial crisis forced its closure in 1930.[423] In the 1930s, there were no new attempts to create departments of economics, as happened in Chile and México,[424] despite the demand for economic specialists in the Ministry of Finance, business associations, the Comptroller's Office and the Banco de la República. As showed in Chapter 1, Faculties of Law and Engineering supplied professionals with the necessary skills and knowledges in public finance, microeconomic management, and statistics. Almost two decades passed

[421] Sánchez Botero, "Ciencia y educación superior," 359–60.
[422] Decree 2137 of 1928.
[423] Mayor Mora and Zambrano, *Economistas antiguos*, 99-100
[424] The Universidad de Chile and the Universidad Autónoma Nacional (UNAM) opened their economics departments respectively in 1934 and 1935. Before that, the Universidad Católica de Chile had created an economics department in 1924. To my knowledge, the oldest department of economics in Latin America is the Facultad de Ciencias Económicas of the Universidad de Buenos Aires (f. 1913). Unless otherwise stated, I take the year of creation of economics departments from their official webpages.

before the first academic programmes exclusively devoted to the formation of economists found a place in the university system.

Before the creation of modern economics departments, the development of social science and business oriented academic programmes in public and private institutions set the foundations for training professionals in the field. From 1930 to 1946, Liberal governments implemented a series of reforms that sought to guarantee broader access to education, focusing particularly but not exclusively in primary schooling.[425] These measures included the reorganisation of higher education and the promotion of cultural outreach programmes, through which the government sought to sponsor the diffusion of secular values and practices, and the production of knowledge about "national problems."[426] During these years the UNal and the Escuela Normal Superior — a *sui generis* institution created in 1936 — became hotbeds for modern social thought.[427] Throughout the 1930s and 1940s the traditional professions and experimental programmes in the social sciences introduced new courses with socio-economic content in their curricula.

From an institutional perspective, the organic law that reorganised the UNal in 1935 made possible the creation and development of new academic units.[428] According to Sánchez, the reform responded both to pressures from student movements demanding higher university autonomy and to the desire of state reformers to intervene in the definition of national problems. That law gave relative autonomy to the UNal, creating a

[425] Helg, *Civiliser*, 58–59, 68–69, 165–67.
[426] Silva, "Política cultural e inmigración docente," 40–43.
[427] Jaramillo Uribe, "La educación durante los gobiernos liberales," 104–7; Jaramillo Jiménez, "La Escuela Normal Superior," 366–76; and Sánchez Botero, "Ciencia y educación superior," 391–96.
[428] Law 68 of December 1935.

Governing Board (*Consejo Directivo*) with representatives from the government, and the professorial and the student bodies. It also allowed for the expansion of higher education beyond the traditional professions (medicine, law, and engineering), giving way to the creation of new *Facultades*, major academic schools, or *Institutos*, minor institutes.[429]

Along with the university reform movement, critical approaches to political economy proliferated in classrooms and corridors during the 1930s. State-sponsored cultural policies created a favourable environment for the reception of academic émigrés, particularly those escaping from Nazism and fascism in Europe. In 1933, the Colombian government hired the German Horst Rollitz to organise a specialisation in economic and financial sciences in the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the UNal.[430] Foreign professors like Rollitz contributed significantly to the professionalism and disciplinary rigor of the new institutes of the UNal in the inter-war period.[431] Rollitz could be credited for introducing in the course of political economy authors in German traditions of economic thought that delimited the "national economy" as the object of study. The superposition of the German traditions to the French Liberal tradition that had hitherto dominated the teaching of political economy was consistent with the state-led efforts during the Liberal Republic to define problems in national terms.[432] Additionally, the translation to Spanish of classical authors like Friedrich List and contemporary ones like the Chilean-born Ernst Wagemann by Spanish editorial houses like *Labor* and, after 1935,

[429] Sánchez Botero, "Ciencia y educación superior," 364–67, 369, 372–73.
[430] See Decree 392 of February 1933.
[431] Silva, "La inmigración docente como posibilidad histórica," 187–92.
[432] The course included references to Freidrich List and Gustav Schmoller. Bravo, "Reforma, autonomía universitaria e interés nacional," 123–26.

by the Mexican-based Fondo de Cultura Económica contributed to the dissemination of German intellectual traditions across Spanish America.[433]

Beyond classrooms, student organisations facilitated the appropriation of critical social thought in Colombian universities. Even before Hollitz taught the course of political economy in 1933, students in the Faculty of Law were informally reading Karl Marx and his interpreters. Gonzalo Cataño credits the publications in the journal *Revista Jurídica* of the so-called "Marxist group" to be the first rigorous studies in Colombia applying historical materialism as an analytical and critical tool for understanding the national reality. Combining theoretical with political engagement, some members of the Marxist group, like Luis Eduardo Nieto Arteta, participated in the university reform movements.[434] Another student who was active at the time in these demonstrations was Antonio García Nossa, who in 1932 quit the UNal to study law in the Universidad del Cauca. In Popayán, the epicentre of an ethnically diverse region, Garcia Nossa got closely involved in local indigenist movements. His first publications on that subject suggest he read José Carlos Mariátegui, the Peruvian interpreter of Marx and Lenin, with whom Nieto Arteta was also familiarised.[435]

[433] In the 1930s and 1940s, the library of the Banco de la República acquired translations of the books written by these authors. See the bibliographical reviews of the *Revista del Banco de la República* (R-BR) and the *Revista Trimestral de Cultura Moderna* (RCM-UN). About the Fondo de Cultura Económica and the role that its translations played the dissemination of traditions of economic thought cognate to state-interventionism, see Babb, *Managing Mexico*, 58–59.

[434] The main intellectual references of the Marxist group were the Spanish translations of the Italian and Russian popularisers of Marxism, although Nieto Arteta referred in his writings to the Spanish translation of *Das Kapital*. Thanks to the transnational connections between student movements, these texts circulated across Spanish-speaking countries in the Americas during the interwar period. Cataño, *Introducción del pensamiento moderno*, 77-84, 96.

[435] Villamizar, "García Nossa," 36–37.

Scholars agree that the Escuela Normal Superior (ENS) was the hotbed for the pioneers in the social sciences in Colombia. Inspired by its Parisian homonym, this institution was created in 1936 with the double purpose of training middle school professors and scientific researchers. Notoriously, it received both male and female students. The professors of the ENS, many of them European exiles, introduced theoretical and empirical tools to produce contextual and localised knowledge about national problems, sowing the seeds for the professional development of anthropology, psychology, history, and geography. In the 1930s and 1940s, the professors and students from the specialisation in Social Sciences of the ENS formed a "proto interdisciplinary academic community" which included the key figures in the subsequent development of the programmes in the social sciences at the UNal. [436] This group included Nieto Arteta and García Nossa, who moved from the ENS to the UNal, were they taught international economy, economic history, and economic geography to students in Law. In the meantime, Nieto Arteta worked at the Ministry of Foreign Relations and García Nossa at the Comptroller's office.[437] García Nossa and Nieto Arteta resembled other contemporary intellectual figures in Spanish America, who were responsible for introducing critical social thought in universities but remained "bound up to the interventionist state," at least in the sense that they depended on its tutelage for their material subsistence and social status.[438]

[436] This specialisation had courses in Economics and the history of economic doctrines. The professorship included the Spanish historian José Ots de Capdequi, the German geographer Ernesto Guhl, and the French Anthropologist Paul Rivet. Jaramillo Jiménez, "La Escuela Normal Superior," 392, 405–6.
[437] Cataño, *Introducción del Pensamiento Moderno*, 325-335; Villamizar, "Garcia Nossa", 38; Mayor and Zambrano, *Economistas Antiguos*, 104.
[438] See Miller, *In the Shadow of the State*, 6, 44.

In a parallel process, the Catholic church reacted to the secularising agenda of Liberal reformers by adopting a more active role in higher education. In 1930, the Jesuit community reinstated in Bogotá the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana,[439] which had closed its doors in 1767 when the Bourbons ordered the expulsion of the religious order. The new Javeriana opened with a Faculty of Economic and Juridical Sciences in the emblematic Colegio de San Bartolomé. Jesuits' return to the educational scene in Colombia was an expression of the broader expansion of Catholic universities across the Americas.[440] In 1937 the Jesuits also founded the Universidad Católica Bolivariana in Medellín. This university offered a commercial specialisation that competed with the Escuela de Minas in training business managers in Colombia's industrial centre. Drawing from previous experiences in the Universidad Comercial de Deusto (f. 1916), the first business school in Spain,[441] and the Facultad de Comercio y Ciencias Económicas (f. 1924) of the Universidad Católica in Chile, economic education at the Javeriana and the Bolivariana had a marked entrepreneurial orientation. These business-oriented programmes in confessional universities offered an alternative to the type of nationalist and secular university model Liberal governments sponsored in the UNal.[442]

The Faculty of Economic and Juridical Sciences at the Javeriana merits special attention because an influential group of hybrid economist-lawyers graduated from this programme.[443] It was also pioneering because it was the first programme that granted the

[439] Helg, *Civiliser,* 136–40.
[440] Casalini, "Rise, Character, and Development of Jesuit Education," 166.
[441] See Abad, "La formación de directivos," 239–45.
[442] Jaramillo Uribe, "La educación durante los gobiernos liberales," 108; Helg, *Civiliser*, 139.
[443] This coincided temporally with the creation of economics departments at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (1963) and the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú (1964), in the context of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). How changes in the social doctrine of the church affected the education of economists in Jesuit universities falls beyond the scope of this chapter, as does a thorough analysis of the Faculty of Economics and Juridical Sciences at the Universidad Javeriana.

title "Doctor in the Economic Sciences."[444] Like other programmes in law, the curriculum offered courses in political economy and public finance in its first two years. To opt for the degree in economics sciences, students had to complete a two-year cycle which comprised specialised subjects on sectoral economic analysis.[445] Three Ministers of Finance, one of which was also governor of the Central Bank (Hugo Palacios Mejía), graduated from this programme,[446] which attests to the influence this school of economist-lawyers had in the second half of the twentieth century.

However, in line with the traditions of economic thought and practice surveyed in Chapter 1, learning economics in the programme at the Javeriana appeared to be of secondary importance to the mastery of law. Economic expertise was viewed, at most, as a complementary set of skills for lawyers with an inclination for economic affairs. Hugo Palacios Mejía, who graduated from this program just before the departments of Law and Economics split into two separate *facultades* in 1964, remembered that it only took students a few extra credits per week and writing a short dissertation to obtain the title "Doctor en Ciencias Económicas" on top of the most prestigious "Doctor en Ciencias Jurídicas." From his experience, the teaching of economic subjects was "in hindsight, rather elemental." Palacios Mejía was not impressed by the quality of his professors in economics, at least when compared to those who taught him the juridical sciences.[447] While the degree in Law and Economics offered a path for lawyers like Palacio Mejía to specialise in economics, the education that this pioneering programme at the Javeriana offered remained constrained by what Jorge Ruiz Lara, Colombia's first PhD in

[444] Montenegro, "Albores de la economía en Colombia," 318.
[445] Mayor Mora and Zambrano, *Economistas antiguos*, 85.
[446] See fn. 103
[447] Interview with Hugo Palacios Mejía, 24 September 2020.

economics, later dubbed the "French system" of "training economic lawyers."[448] Challenging this subordination of economics to the juridical sciences, the economics department at the UNal emerged from within the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of Colombia's state national university.

3.2. Understanding the *Public Economy*: The Genealogy of the Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad Nacional

Abadía Méndez's decree of 1928 might have failed to create a lasting department of economics at the UNal, but it set a precedent to provide specialised training in the economic sciences without renouncing to the prestige of law degrees. In 1945, the academic board of the university approved the creation of the Institute of Economic Sciences (ICE), with the aim of providing "intensive training for specialists" who could address "the fundamental problems of the Public economy." By emphasising the public dimension of the economy, the academic board wished to distinguish that institute from the business orientation of the Faculty of Industrial and Commercial Economics (FEIC) of the Gimnasio Moderno, which will be analysed in the next section. Training specialists with a public vocation — at a time in which the state adopted new tools for intervening in economic affairs — responded both to the cultural outreach mission of the UNal during the Liberal Republic and to a long tradition of educating public servants in the Faculty of Law. Unlike previous antecedents, the ICE was not a postgraduate route for graduates in law but a two-year (later three-year) degree in its own right. The academic board defined

[448] Jorge Ruiz Lara, "Enseñanza universitaria," 2.

the general guidelines for the curriculum but could not agree upon the title to be granted, which reveals the unprecedented nature of the degree.[449]

Achieving institutional autonomy from the Faculty of Law was essential for the disciplinary delimitation of economics because this had implications on curricular decisions and professorial appointments. After the 1935 organic law, social science departments slowly began to surge from within the Faculty of Law, which by the time the ICE was created already offered an eclectic formation in legal and social thought.[450] The ICE sat for seven years within the Faculty of Law, next to the Institute of Philosophy. Students in law, philosophy, and the economic sciences attended lectures together in the new building of the Faculty of Law in the university campus inaugurated in 1945.[451] A Faculty of Sciences comprising the *Institutos* affiliated to different *Facultades* was created in 1946 with the objective to move away from universities' traditional professionalising orientation by preparing faculty with exclusive dedication to teaching and research. Formally, the ICE was part of both the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Sciences, but the latter was the one that granted ICE graduates the title *Licenciado en Economía* (Bachelor in Economics).[452] Born as a professionalising yet academically oriented centre, the ICE had a lasting impact in the economics programme at the UNal.[453]

[449] Agreement 7, Minute 7, 13 April 1945, CA; Minute 18, 26 April 1945, CD-ACHUN. The creation of the Institute was an initiative of its first director, García Nossa. Mayor and Zambrano, *Economistas antiguos* ,45.
[450] Sánchez Botero, *Ciencia y educación*, 371.
[451] Minute 23, 12 November 1945, and minute 41, 14 November 1945. CA-ACHUN.
[452] Students could opt for the degree "Doctor of Sciences" by completing the coursework in three institutes and a thesis. See Agreement 245, Minute 44, 27 November 1946 and Agreement 158, Minute 34, 20 August 1947. AD-ACUHN.
[453] See the introduction of and the testimonies in Hernández Gamarra and Herrera, *Búsquedas y logros*.

The evolution of the institute's study plan reveals a steady process of autonomisation from the law curriculum.[454] While in 1946 the students enrolled in the Institute shared with law students one third of their courses, including statistics, the history of economic doctrines, and general and Colombian economic history, by 1950 the law curriculum had dropped these subjects. During those years, the study plan of the ICE also incorporated courses that revealed the new priorities of the *public* economy in the post-war period: advanced statistics, agrarian and industrial economics, economic planning, and economic policy.[455] Together with these lectures, the Spanish exile José María Ots Capdequi, full-time professor of the Faculty of Sciences, oversaw a seminar in "Colombian Problems" for third year students. With Ots Capdequi, students at the institute began to study Colombian economic history since colonial times.[456]

For the most part, university education in mid-twentieth century Colombia relied in lecturing, memorisation, and passive learning. Most courses in the Institute consisted in two, or three-hour weekly sessions in which teachers delivered oral lectures (*conferencias*). The university reproduced these lecture notes, usually taken by the Faculty of Law's secretary or a female student, in mimeographed copies and made them available to students at cost price. Although lecturers were expected to provide students a list of relevant bibliography, in 1954 the professor of economic geography Ernesto Guhl complained that the abuse of mimeographed copies was generalised.[457] Access to

[454] A thorough analysis of the curricular changes goes beyond the remit of this chapter. See Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, *Estudio sobre el desarrollo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas*; Villamizar, "Producción académica de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas."
[455] Agreement 15, Minute 26, 30 November 1945; Agreement 1, Minute 4, 9 February,1950, CD-ACUHN.
[456] Agreements 15 of 1946, 23 of 1947, 53 of 1949, 60 of 1951, CD-. Hoyos to the Social Science Office of the Pan American Union, 15 September 1952, CO-FCE-ACUHN.
[457] Agreement 15, Minute 12, 1940, CA-ACHUN; Minute 11, 27 October 1954, A-FCE-ACHUN.

specialised books in Spanish seems to have been limited. The ICE's library reportedly had in 1951, according to its director, a small collection of 78 titles and lacked "basic" references.[458]

Furthermore, most courses were overseen by *encargados de cátedra* (part-time professors) who lectured while holding positions in the public and the private sector. This arrangement befitted practically oriented courses, like public finances, because students could learn first-hand from experienced practitioners, such as Lleras Restrepo, General Comptroller in 1936-1937, and three-times Minister of Finance between 1938 and 1944. Lleras Restrepo's lecture notes reveal a structured reflection about the nature and practice of public finances in Colombia. His exposition included specific examples about the exercise of public finance in this country and a personal reflection summarising the main takeaways of each subject.[459] Based on the personal tone of Lleras Restrepo's lecture notes, it is highly unlikely that the lectures in public finance followed a standard script.

Until 1950, the only full-time professor at the Instituto was its Director, Antonio García Nossa, who taught political economy and international commerce. His book *Bases de economía contemporánea. Elementos de una economía de la defensa* (1948) gives a good indication of the content and the tone of his lectures in the Institute. According to his colleague from the Institute of Philosophy, Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, with the publication of that book in 1948, "Antonio García crowned his research and teaching activities in the UNal."[460] This book presented to a wider audience what García Nossa presumably taught

[458] Arango, "Informe del año 1951," 55-61.
[459] Pedro Gómez to Lleras Restrepo, 27 February 1950; "Programa del Curso de Hacienda Pública. Profesor Carlos Lleras Restrepo;" folder 1, box 2, P-ACLR; "Conferencias de Hacienda Pública Colombiana. Dictadas por el Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo," box 4a, folder 1, E-ACLR.
[460] Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, "Notas Bibliográficas."

his students in the ICE, an "organic" interpretation of the formation of the "national economy" in Colombia, tracing its historical integration into a global capitalist system. García Nossa borrowed from an eclectic arrange of intellectual traditions.[461] His views about the transition from feudalism to capitalism were informed by contemporary debates among Neo-Marxists like Maurice Dobb and Paul Sweezy.[462] The book's emphasis on the *national economy* as the unit of analysis drew inspiration from German authors like List and Wagemman, whose writings had found their way into the lecture rooms and hallways of the UNal since the 1930s thanks to the recruitment of Rollitz and the circulation of Spanish translations.[463] As one of this students remembered, García Nossa's lectures on which the book was based were not an exegesis of these intellectual traditions but a critical reinterpretation of the Colombian economic reality through their lens.[464]

The key takeaway of García Nossa's book was that a more active intervention of the state in the Colombian economy was needed, because international economic relations were essentially asymmetrical: As a "weak" nation in the international economic system, the state had to "defend" the national economy from the competition of powerful nations through protective measures, like trade and exchange controls. Garcia Nossa argued that the state must actively build defensive structures for the national economy by coordinating planning and promoting cooperatives of production.[465] In the early post-war

[461] Villamizar, "García Nossa," 43.
[462] See Sweezy and Dobb, "The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism," 134–67.
[463] List's reception in Colombia appears to have occurred later than in other Latin American countries. For the influence of List in Chile and Brazil in the early twentieth century, see Mauro Boianovsky, "Friedrich List and the Economic Fate of Tropical Countries." Born in Chile, Wagemman was an empirical economist, head of the Reich's Statistical Office during the Weimar Republic. It is probable that García Nossa got familiarised with Wagemman's texts while he worked at the General Comptroller's statistical office in the 1930s. About Wagemman see Tooze, "Weimar's Statistical Economics," 523–43.
[464] Alameda, "Una mirada histórica," 389.
[465] Villamizar, *García* Nossa¸43-47.

period, García's militaristic metaphors were topical. The editors of the bibliographical review of the Central Bank's magazine described his publication as a "rare occurrence," considering it one of the first academic contributions in the country about the post-war economic predicaments.[466] As policy makers across Latin America dealt with the impact of the global conflict on domestic economies, intellectuals like García Nossa participated in the reimagination of a new global economic order. His denunciation of the power asymmetries in the world economy found parallels in contemporary characterisations by Cepal's economists of the unequal relationship between economies in the center and the periphery. Yet, García Nossa's protectionist prescriptions to isolate the national economy as a defensive strategy differed from *Cepalinos* calls for deepening, not limiting, global trade through international cooperation.[467]

More concrete policy proposals by the Institute's professors and students found place in the *Revista Trimestral de Cultura Moderna*, a quarterly journal that circulated from October 1944 to the mid-1950. In line with the university's cultural outreach programme during Gerardo Molina's rectorship (1944-1948), the aim of this magazine was to "advise and indoctrinate the masses that did not have the privilege to access the [university's] cloisters." This magazine published in advance excerpts of García Nossa's book, as well as transcripts of lectures familiarising readers with the implications that the new post-war international institutional architecture had for Latin America.[468] The first issue of 1947 published two lectures García Nossa delivered in the National Radio

[466] "Información bibliográfica," *R-BR*, No. 21, October 1948, 252; No. 22, January 1949, 225.
[467] About Cepal's internationalism and its center-periphery model see Fajardo, *The World That Latin America Created*, 38–39.
[468] See "Presentación," October 1944, no 1 and García Nossa, "La crisis de la libertad económica;" "Introducción al estudio de los sistemas económicos," and "Construcción económica latinoamericana."

Broadcaster, as part of the Institute's cycle of conferences in Economic and Public Finances. García Nossa described how the international conferences during the post-war period intensified the debate between free trade and protectionism, making the case for an "organic protectionist policy." A year later, his pupil Jorge Child published a fragment of his dissertation, in which he criticised the way in the Exchange Controls Office introduced import restrictions between 1945 to 1947. In line with García Nossa's main claim, Child argued that this policy had not been an effective "instrument of protection" because it had lacked a coherent plan.[469] The views published in the cultural magazine of the UNal anticipated the *Plan Gaitán*, the economic programme of Liberalism under Gaitán's party leadership, which Garcia Nossa contributed drafting.[470]

The ICE sat in the Faculty of Law between 1945 and 1952, when the university created the Faculty of Economic Sciences (FCE). It is hard to tell from the record how many students enrolled in the Institute in those years. According to the alumnus Raúl Alameda, only 38 students had finished the curriculum by 1949 from the more than 300 students that had matriculated in the Institute. He also sustained that most of the graduates from the first cohort (1947) were international students who came from Colombia's neighbouring countries in the Andes and the Caribbean.[471] Based on the statistics compiled in 1952, only 43 of the students that enrolled in the Institute in 1951 continued

[469] García Nossa, "Viejas y nuevas orientaciones de la política proteccionista," 176; Child, "Regulación de pagos internacionales," 175.
[470] García Nossa was one of the minds behind the bill that lawmakers supporting Gaitán presented in Congress in 1947. This legislative initiative aimed at strengthening the state's capacities for planning economic activity. The bill included a reform to the Banco de la República to give the executive control over monetary and credit policy. Although this bill was not approved by Congress, it was an important antecedent for the 1951 reform of the Banco de la República addressed in Chapter 2. See Sharpless, *Gaitán of Colombia*, 134–36; Braun, *The Assassination of Gaitán*, 119. Meisel, "El Banco de La República: Antecedentes, Evolución y Estructura,", 453.
[471] Alameda, "Una mirada histórica," 380.

their studies in the FCE, 18 of which completed the curriculum that year. It is notable that more than half of them had obtained their secondary degrees outside of Bogotá. The only woman in that list, a law student called Rosa Suescún, was accused of cheating in an exam and dropped in 1952, although she reportedly continued to show up in classrooms to "create disorder and indiscipline."[472]

Some of the Institute's students, including Raúl Alameda and Jorge Child, were actively involved in the the Acción Popular Universitaria (APU), the student movement that organised after Gaitán's assassination in 1948. Following the steps of their professors, García Nossa and Nieto Arteta, student activists combined street demonstrations with intellectual engagement: the APU began every meeting reading aloud a "classical text" in critical political thought.[473] Throughout the 1940s, and especially with the red scare that followed the *Bogotazo*, the reading of critical thinkers in the Marxist tradition continued to be proscribed in lecture halls but found a place in student movements.

After the Liberals lost the presidency in 1946, the relationship between the government and the UNal became tense. Resorting to Cold War language, members of the Conservative party and the church unleashed criticisms to the cultural agenda of the Liberal party. The episcopate blamed the growing laicisation of society for the popular upheaval that followed the assassination of Gaitán, accusing the "Marxist" Rector Molina of being a "communist leader," and of instigating the mobs to destroy ecclesiastical properties.[474] In the Conservative newspaper *El Siglo*, Laureano Gómez blamed the

[472] "Lista de Alumnos Matriculados en el Año de 1952;" "Certificado de notas Rosa Suescún en 1950," CE-FCE-ACHUN; Minute 5, 23 April 1953; Minute 7, 2 July 1953, A-FCE-ACHUN. "Instituto de Ciencias Económica," *Anuario de la Universidad*, 1951.
[473] Alameda, "Una mirada histórica," 384-385.
[474] Helg, "Educación en Colombia, 1946-1957" 114; Braun, *Assassination of Gaitán*, 174.

"subversive danger of the social sciences." García Nossa responded to this accusation that "the economic sciences are not sciences of peace (…) in analysing this [the Colombian] reality, the economic sciences have to be subversive."[475] Molina was replaced in 1948. In 1951, the Ministry of Education decided not to renew García Nossa's contract alluding to his political views. It this context, the Institute was dismantled, and the governing board of the university created the FCE in 1952.

The political climate during Laureano Gómez's government halted García Nossa's academic programme of preparing economists with a public vocation, who had a deep historical sensitivity and a broad formation in social thought. Both the interruption of García Nossa's academic programme and the late creation of an economics department in the UNal, at least if compared to the Universidad de Chile and the UNAM in México which had economics departments since the 1930s, help to explain the relative weakness of a markedly nationalist and statist tradition of economic thought in Colombia's main public university. Marxism never became the core referent for the education of economists in the Institute, as happened in post-revolutionary Mexico.[476] The influence of German thinkers like List and Wagemann faded away after García Nossa left the department. Garcia Nossa's programme was so short-lived and interrupted so abruptly that the master's departure did not leave a school behind, although some of the Institute's graduates did follow his lead.[477] One year after García Nossa was dismissed, none of the

[475] García Nossa, "Naturaleza revolucionaria de las ciencias económicas," 326; Alameda, "Una mirada histórica," 340.
[476] Babb, *Managing Mexico*, 64–65.
[477] Consider Raúl Alameda, José Consuegra, and Jorge Child, mentioned below.

professors who taught in the Institute in 1949 remained in the FCE.[478] Two decades passed before a new generation of economists picked up on the Institute's legacy.[479]

To replace García Nossa, the university's governing board appointed as dean of the FCE Samuel Hoyos Arango, a lawyer from the Universidad del Cauca, who announced a complete overhaul of the department. Above all, he considered paramount to abandon the "shadow of the Faculty of Law." Hoyos and the new members of the Faculty's governing board believed disciplinary independence required spatial distancing. A member of the board suggested to use the government's allocation of $60,000 pesos for erecting a new building for the FCE in the university campus.[480] Sharing a physical space with the Faculty of Law, in his view, would continue to have a deleterious impact on students in economics, "due to the discursive and polemic character" of law students, and their "sweeping enthusiasm for the [public] forum." Divorcing from law also implied a redefinition of the type of education that the department's directives considered economists needed to contribute to the public economy, shifting away from the broad formation in social thought that characterized the Institute. A series of curricular reforms between 1952 and 1954 added a fourth year of studies and included tool-based and policy-oriented subjects, such as national accounts, economic cycles, economic planning, and economic policy.[481] Through these changes, the FCE attempted to instil a new professional ethos for economists that had its

[478] Villamizar, "Producción académica," 75.
[479] Villamizar, "Producción académica," 166.
[480] The FCE only moved to its own building in 1961. Until then, students attended lectures in the premises of the Faculty of Law. See Sarmiento, "La Facultad de Ciencias Económicas," 407; and Hernández Gamarra, "Alberto Corchuelo", 417.
[481]In 1952, these courses, together with banking and credit, and monetary theory, comprised a new comprehensive examination. Minute 9, 13 July 1952; Minute 3, 23 February 1953, A-FCE-ACHUN.

foundations on technical expertise, as a counterpoint to what they perceived as lawyers' penchant for rhetoric and polemics. The shift the FCE experienced in the 1950s was aligned with a broader trend toward a more technical education of economists, following collective efforts by economics departments in Colombia and Latin America to standardise their curricula.[482]

Hoyos attempted to internationalise the department by seeking the support of academic sponsors in the United States. In his first year as dean, he reached the Colombian Ambassador in the US to hire two professors from that country to teach in the FCE. He also asked the Social Sciences Office of the Pan-American Union for help to secure support from the Four Point Program to create a Department of Economic Research in the UNal. This research centre would focus, according to Hoyos, on national accounting, planning and fiscal and trade policy. In his words, Ots Capdequis's historical research corresponded to a "stage" that the FCE had already "overcome." To head the research centre, Hoyos considered hiring Hirschman, whose contract with the Planning Office was about to expire. In the end, the recruitment of US professors failed allegedly because "none of the possible candidates spoke Spanish." The idea of receiving support from the Point Four programme to create a research centre directed by Hirschman led nowhere.[483] Ironically, the latter's views about the FCE in 1957 — "The teaching staff of the University looks quite weak to me (…) [one feels] the situation is still rather

[482] Hoyos was invited to the first national congress of economic departments hosted by the Universidad de Antioquia in Medellín in 1952. That year, the Union of Latin American Universities (UULA) also asked him to submit the faculty's curricula with the objective of identifying common standards. Hoyos to dean of FCE-UA, 25 June 1952; Hoyos to Executive Secretary of the UULA, 18 March 1952. CO-FCE-ACUHN.

[483] Minute 2, 11 February 1953; Minute 9, 18 September 1953, Minute 1, 29 January 1954; A-FCE; Hoyos to Social Science Office of the Panamerican Union, 15 September 1952, C-FCE; Minute 10, 31 October 1953, CD-ACHUN.

discouraging" —dissuaded the Rockefeller Foundation from funding a research centre at the UNal.[484]

In the 1950s, the education of economists in the FCE also experienced a reorientation towards the "private economy." Dean Hoyos considered that the Faculty's graduates were well prepared to "guide the economic criteria of future state officials," but the curriculum did not include enough courses to "complement the general bases of the Economist, with specific knowledges that allow him to manage private businesses." He considered that the content of the few existent courses was disproportionally based in "Taylorism," without insufficient emphasis in "systems of planning, and coordination, and the internal economy and control" of private firms.[485] He proposed changes that complemented this theoretical training with practical classes, including visits to private businesses. By adopting Hoyos' view about the technical and practical formation of economists to intervene in both public and private affairs, the FCE moved further away from the critical orientation that García Nossa had given to the Institute grounded on history and social scientific thought. It also came closer to what had hitherto been a competing view about economists' education in the Gimnasio Moderno.

3.3. Managing the *Private Economy*: The Origins of the Facultad de Economía de la Universidad de los Andes in the Gimnasio Moderno

The origins of the economics department at UniAndes could be traced back to the Faculty of Industrial and Commercial Economics (FEIC), founded in 1943 by initiative of Carlos

[484] Hirschman, "Diary of Visit to Brazil and Colombia," 3 September and 11 September 1957, box 57, folder 10, AOHP.
[485] Minute 2, 11 February 1953, A-FCE-ACHUN.

Lleras Restrepo and Daniel Samper Ortega in the Gimnasio Moderno.[486] This private school for boys opened in Bogotá in 1914. Its founder, the Liberal Agustín Nieto Caballero, conceived it as a model of "*escuela nueva*" (new school) education in Colombia, inspired by the pedagogical debates he personally experienced in France and the United States. If traditional schooling accentuated the memorisation of facts and obedience to authorities, *new school* pedagogues emphasised experimentation and individual autonomy. Retrospectively, Nieto Caballero wrote that the objective of the Gimnasio Moderno was to "*modernizar* [modernize] without *extranjerizar* [making foreign]; to infuse in the collective a new form of life, that was at the same time our own."[487] Lleras Restrepo and Samper Ortega created the FEIC in the pragmatic and modernising, albeit elitist, spirit of new school education that the Gimnasio Moderno embodied.

In the three decades that followed the creation of the Gimnasio Moderno, the annual growth of industrial production in Colombia doubled that of the whole economy,[488] creating a demand in the private sector for a new class of business leaders. At least that argued the dean Lleras Restrepo in the inaugural discourse of the FEIC in March 1943. Although the name of this Faculty was reminiscent of the course for engineers in the Escuela de Minas, this was the first programme of its kind. Lleras Restrepo distinguished the Faculty from schools of commerce, which were "devoted to train expert personnel —such as accountants and secretaries— in the ordinary aspects of commercial activities." It also differed from the formal education offered in universities,

[486] The department was initially called the Faculty of Commercial and Industrial Business.
[487] Nieto Caballero, *Una Escuela*, 65, 75.
[488] Between 1936 and 1943 the number of industrial plants increased three-fold, while the industrial workforce grew by nearly 50%. Montenegro, "La Industria textil en Colombia: 1900-1945," 143.

where Faculties of Law taught political economy, statistics, and public finances alongside the juridical sciences, "with only a minor concern for practical applications." This school for managers would allow students, Lleras Restrepo added, to acquire "practical tools" in those courses for solving real business problems.[489] From 1943 until 1954, the FEIC remained in the Gimnasio Moderno until it merged in the Faculty of Economics at UniAndes, having a lasting impact on the direction of this program.

In the search for a practical model of higher education, the FEIC displayed the modernising aspiration of the Gimnasio Moderno by selectively adapting foreign pedagogical models to address local needs. After the outbreak of WWII, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's good neighbour policies strengthened the cultural links between Colombia and the United States. Lleras Restrepo was a central figure, as the Minister of Finance, in renegotiating the terms of Colombia's sovereign debt with bond holders, which opened new avenues for economic and cultural cooperation between both countries.[490] In this context, the Faculty received the visit of J. Anton de Haas, professor of foreign trade and author of a pedagogical booklet that systematised the "fundamentals of business administration and management."[491] De Haas arrived in Colombia as special envoy of the Office of Interamerican Affairs, in representation of the Harvard Business School (HBS). In the 1920s, this school had pioneered the use of business cases as a pedagogical tool for training business leaders. This teaching method, which prioritised practical problem-solving cases over fundamental scientific knowledge, must have been familiar to those

[489] Lleras Restrepo, "La Escuela de Administración Industrial y Comercial," 61-63.
[490] Bushnell, *Santos y la política del buen vecino,* , 86–94, 103.
[491] De Haas, *Business Organization and Administration*, i.

trained in law faculties.[492] Lleras Restrepo praised in his inaugural discourse the benefits of this method:

> After describing the cases the student has to show which are the problems therein (…) Step by step it is possible [for the student] to experience how theoretical notions come alive, acquire a precise meaning, how their utility becomes clear, how they are incorporated in practice, as they break away from the abstract pages of authors' [writings]. Statistics, accountancy, [and] economics are thereby presented as auxiliary tools[493]

This pragmatic and business-oriented philosophy at the FEIC was reflected in the courses offered to the first cohort between 1943 and 1945. From the thirty students that enrolled in the programme, twenty-five of them finished the three years of study in the curriculum.[494] The high number of matriculations (and termination) for this unconventional degree could be partially explained by the social prestige of the professorship. Dean Lleras Restrepo taught to this cohort the courses in economics (the equivalent to political economy) and economic geography in their first year, and public finances and economic interventionism in their last year.[495] Like the ICE, the FEIC did not hire full-time professors but rather recruited professionals who, like Lleras Restrepo, worked in the public and the private sector. The German Hermann Halberstäedter, professor of Costs Accountancy, was the director of the Section of Statistics and Economic Statistics of the Institute of Industrial Development; Francisco de Abrisqueta, director of the Section of Economic Research of the Banco de la República, was professor of Business Statistics; and Jorge Soto del Corral, former Minister of Finance (1934-36)

[492] This was perhaps the hey-day of the cases method. Its importance declined during the post-war period, as North American business schools moved toward scientific approaches to entrepreneurship, grounded on economics and the behavioral sciences. Augier and March, *Roots, Rituals, and Rhetorics of Change*, 152–54.
[493] Lleras Restrepo, "La Escuela de Administración Industrial y Comercial," 61–63.
[494] Estimations made based on matriculation forms, LM-GM-UADA.
[495] All the information about courses is based on students' transcripts, CA-GM-UADA and N-GM-UADA.

and manager of the Banco de Bogotá, taught Money and Banking in the third year.[496] García Nossa also joined the faculty as professor of Economic Geography, in which he taught students about the "localization of industries in Colombia."[497]

Students experienced the mixed blessing of having part-time professors. Lecturers at the Gimnasio Moderno had, as Lleras Restrepo retrospectively acknowledged, little time to prepare lessons, so they "tried to systematise [in our lectures] […] what we learnt every day from our activities in public administration or in the private sector. Therefore, what we taught, in general, came from our ordinary experience, nuanced, of course, by the theory we borrowed from books."[498] Disciplinary rigour was of secondary importance to the practical experience that the lecturers who taught in the FEIC had accumulated during their professional life. Having professors with one foot in the state and industry, and the other in the school also allowed students to join well-connected professional networks, as I will show below.

Students were expected to apply the conceptual and technical tools they acquired in their lectures in a capstone course called "Analysis of business problems", which the North American professor John G. Bradshaw oversaw based on the cases method. Although HBS provided teaching materials for this subject, the Faculty struggled to find published resources that could be adapted to the study of local problems. Lleras Restrepo thus used his personal connections to ask local industrialists and tradesmen to prepare

[496] Like Paul Hermberg, Herman Halberstäedter exiled in Colombia from Nazi Germany after Hitler seized power. He obtained a PhD in economics from the University of Kiel 1923. See Hagemann, Krohn, and Esslinger, *Biographisches*, 228–29; Perry, *Quién es quién en Colombia*, 174-75.
[497] Armando Samper to Antonio García Nossa, 18 January 1945. CO-GM-UADA
[498] "Palabras del Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo en la ceremonia de grado de la primera promoción del CESA," 6 July 1979, box 2, folder 1, E-ACLR, 3.

business cases for students.[499] The programme appears to have attracted the attention of the private sector because business associations and the leading industrial and commercial firms in Colombia provided around eighty scholarships for students between 1943 and 1953. These scholarships allowed for some degree of social diversity in the student body. Firms selected scholarship candidates among their worker's families, made open calls, or delegated that responsibility to the Faculty's dean.[500] This connection to the private sector probably explains the social composition of the student body, whose families were predominantly linked to industry and commerce. Based on the scarce information available about family backgrounds, 37% of the student registry sheets identified the father as tradesmen and industrialist, while only 17% reported his primary occupation to be in the liberal professions (law, medicine, or engineering).[501]

After some deliberation, the FEIC decided to grant the title "Industrial and Commercial Economist" to the students that finished the three-year coursework and presented a thesis.[502] Most students did not complete this last requirement. From 1945 until 1954, the records show that 208 students completed the curriculum but only 50 obtained that degree.[503] If we consider a mean desertion rate of 43%, calculated for the period for which data is available, around 500 students matriculated in the Faculty between 1943 and 1951. Less than half of them completed the courses and only the 10%

[499] "Palabras del Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo", 2.
[500] Armando Samper (vice-dean) to Luis Londoño (*Banco de Bogotá*), 30 January 1946; Samper to Martín del Corral, 6 November 1947; Samper to Hernán Montoya (*Icollantas*), 2 April 1949; LM- and CO-GM-UADA.
[501] This information is based in the matriculation forms of a subset of the students who started after 1950.
[502] Ministry of Education, Resolution No. 1151, 4 July 1946. Armando Samper (Vice-Dean) to Gonzalo Restrepo (Dean), 7 June 1946; Restrepo to Ministry of National Education, 21 June 1946. CO-GM-UADA.
[503] Ruiz Lara, "Enseñanza universitaria," 5.

graduated as Industrial and Commercial Economists. Roughly one fifth of them belonged to the first cohort. [504]

Graduates from this cohort not only were arguably the first accredited economists in the country but they also contributed to shape the profession in multiple ways. Despite the Faculty's insistence in forming future business leaders, its more prominent alumni wrote dissertations that dealt with matters of public concern during the early post-war period, using modern techniques of economic analysis. To graduate from the FEIC, Leonel Torres and Miguel Fadul, who worked for the central bank's Section of Economic Research, wrote studies that attempted to quantify the evolution and composition of the national economy. Torres calculated a general index of production in Colombia, depurating "economic progress" from monetary variations and estimating the monthly rate of growth between 1934-1946. Fadul's thesis, as showed in the previous chapter, complemented Torres', presenting the programme for the first estimation of national income in the country using national accounting techniques.[505] Jorge Franco's thesis, supervised by Lleras Restrepo, dealt with the economic consequences of WWII on the national economy. Franco contrasted "liberal" and "interventionist doctrines," and examined the juridical tools that the state used to intervene in the sectors affected by the war.[506]

Through the application of modern techniques of economic analysis to the study of the Colombian economy, young students from the FEIC like Fadul, Torres, and Franco opened spaces for professionally trained economists in the technical institutions created

[504] The archive contains information about matriculation and desertions for the classes of 1945-1952. The data for the class of 1949 is missing. LM-GM-UADA.
[505] Torres, *Actividad económica colombiana,* 6–7, 178; Fadul, *Estimación del ingreso nacional*.
[506] Franco Holguin, "Intervención del Estado."

during the post-war period. Although the economics program at the Gimnasio Moderno was oriented toward the private sector, it allowed its students to establish personal and institutional connections that brought them closer to the state. When the IBRD mission (examined in last chapter) arrived in 1949, a group of graduates from the FEIC, which included Fadul, Torres, and Franco, made part of the Colombian technical staff that helped the foreign advisers to collect data and write the report. Throughout the 1950s, two graduates from the Gimnasio Moderno, Enrique Peñalosa and Germán Gaviria, worked as staff economists for the Planning Office.[507] The nexus between the FEIC and the state's emerging institutional infrastructure for technical economic analysis changed the nature of the pedagogical program of the Faculty, which gradually drifted away from its initial focus on the private economy without entirely abandoning it.

When the FEIC alumni joined the school's faculty in the early 1950s, they introduced technical and theoretical innovations to the curriculum that mirrored the changes that occurred in the economics department of the UNal.[508] Consider Jorge Franco's course on Economic Theory, introduced in 1949 for second-year students. The differences between the courses on Economic Theory and Political Economy reveal the type of changes that the younger generation brought to the FEIC. The programme of Political Economy was organised around the canonical tripartite structure of production, consumption, and distribution of wealth, providing a detailed account of economic policy and legislation in Colombia.[509] In contrast, the lecture notes of Economic Theory presented a blend between traditionally materialist definitions of economics and Lionel

[507] See Chapter 2.
[508] Leonel Torres replaced Francisco de Abrisqueta, as professor of Statistics, and Miguel Fadul was appointed in 1950 to teach the new course on the Theory of National Income.
[509] FEIC, *Programa de Economía Política*, 3438.-3442.

Robbins' behaviouralist definition.[510] Franco defined economics as the "science that studies problems of material welfare, with the objective of satisfying them (…) which includes the concept of scarcity of means." Following Robbins' analytical ordering, Franco exposed the nature, method, and significance of economics, after which he divided the lessons in modules that resembled modern courses of micro and macroeconomics. In the first part, he introduced preference theory and marginal analysis, explained the derivation of demand and supply curves, and analysed the conditions for partial and general market equilibria under competitive and monopolistic scenarios. In the macroeconomics section, he focused on "the general application of economic theory to the economic conjuncture [and] to the general state of the economy as a whole, on a global scale." This module addressed the conceptual relationships between aggregates such as interest, national income, and employment from a Keynesian standpoint. The lecture notes even reproduced a long excerpt of Chapter 6 of Keynes' *General Theory*.[511] In the late 1940s, marginal analysis and Keynesian macroeconomics were finding their way into faculties of economics across Latin America.[512] It is significant that the circulation of these theoretical constructs in Colombia occurred through the mediation of a school for business managers.

If the return of the Faculty's first graduates to their alma matter explains the introduction of the empirical and theoretical approaches of what was only than taking

[510] This allusion to Robbin's definition of economics was, by international standards, an early reference. It would only be widely accepted as the textbook definition of economics in the 1960s. Even then its adoption was contested. Backhouse and Medema, "Defining Economics," 805–20.
[511] Franco Holguin, *Teoría Económica*, 2605, 6679.
[512] In 1949, the FEIC considered replacing Keynes' General Theory for Prebisch's *Introducción a Keynes* (1947) as the core textbook of the course on Economic Theory. A. Samper to Antonio J. Posada, 13 October 1949, CO-GM-UADA.

shape as the *mainstream* of economics in the United States, often referred to as neoclassical economics, the arrival of Jorge Méndez to the Faculty was a watershed for the inclusion of development economics in the curricula. To an extent, development economics was a post-war ramification of Keynesian doctrine, as Hirschman later argued, which approached underdeveloped economies as a special situation of underemployment of human and capital resources.[513] Méndez, who received postgraduate training in the United States and had professional experience in multinational institutions, was the ideal mobile for the diffusion of development economics in Colombian universities in the early 1950s. After studying Law and Economics at the Universidad Javeriana, Méndez obtained a postgraduate degree in economics from Princeton University in 1946. After teaching at both the ICE and the FEIC between 1947 and 1948, he worked for three years in Geneva at the International Labour Organization (ILO). He had close contact with Raúl Prebisch and acted as consultant for Cepal.[514] In 1952, he joined the Gimnasio Moderno to head the FEIC.

Upon his arrival to the FEIC, Méndez included in the curriculum courses on Economic Cycles and Economic Development. In the early 1950s, these subjects became fashionable in academic and policy circles to highlight the limitations of applying modern economic analysis to countries like Colombia. We know the content of Méndez's lectures on Economic Cycles, thanks to the notes taken by his student Maria Elvira Santos. Méndez argued that although economic cycles in "backward countries" differ in nature and intensity from those of "the more industrialized countries," Keynesian solutions to

[513] Hirschman, "How the Keynesian Revolution was Exported," 358–59.
[514] UniAndes, "Jorge Méndez," 175. Jorge Valencia claimed that Méndez obtained a doctoral degree from Princeton, but there is no evidence of Méndez's dissertation in the annual records published by the American Economic Association. See Valencia Restrepo, "Jorge Méndez Munévar in Memoriam," 2.

situations of underemployment could be applied in "less developed countries" which suffer from "the chronic and anguishing problem of sub-employment."[515] The course on Development Economics expanded on this idea. The lecture notes of the last session of this course in 1953 reproduced verbatim an address about the problems of economic development in Latin America given around 1951 in Cepal's headquarters in Santiago. Echoing one of the central tenets of *Cepalinos* in the early years of the Commission, Méndez sustained in his lecture that specialisation in agricultural activities with low productivity implied a chronic condition of subemployment of the labour force, which resulted in unfavourable terms of trade for economies in the peripheries.[516] As the lecture notes of Franco and Méndez's courses show, the international movement of people during the post-war development era and the creation of faculties of economics in countries like Colombia facilitated the circulation of concepts and techniques of competing schools of economic thought. Neither neoclassical economics, nor structuralism — two tags that contemporaries in Colombia never used — were hegemonic in the education of economists in the early 1950s.

Méndez lectures also reveal the connections the FEIC was forging with a growing community of Latin American economists with a self-conscious disciplinary identity. In June 1951, Méndez attended a roundtable organised by the economics department at the UNAM in Mexico City, which gathered delegates from fourteen countries in the region to discuss about teaching and research in economics in Latin American universities. A first conclusion of this meeting was that a solid training in economics should integrate theory and practice. Strong theoretical bases were seen as a prerequisite for applying

[515] Méndez and Santos, *Conferencias de Ciclos económicos*, 7152, 7339.
[516] Jorge Méndez, *Teoría del desarrollo económico*, 7330.

economic knowledge in particular contexts. It was also considered "imperative" to standardise the "content of academic programs, the nomenclature of the courses included in them, as well as the most adequate methodology for teaching them."[517] Méndez introduced changes in the study plan that are consistent with the conclusions of this meeting. In 1953, the curriculum of the FEIC revealed that the boundaries between the private and the public economy had blurred, just like it had happened in the UNal. The programme still placed a strong emphasis on accountancy and commercial legislation, but the so-promoted course of business cases had long disappeared and more traditional subjects such as economic geography, political economy and public finance were complemented with stitches of modern micro and macroeconomics, empirical techniques, and development economics.

Like the economics department at the UNal, the FEIC also engaged in the popularisation of economics, organising an *Outreach Course in Economic Issues* for "businessmen interested in the academic subjects of economics." Four professors of the Faculty, including Méndez and the alumnus Enrique Peñalosa, delivered ten lectures to twenty-four business owners and public servants between September and October 1953. In the introductory session, Méndez presented to his audience the short course as an experience of "practical solidarity" between the academic world and the realm of action. He argued that similar to nuclear engineers who relied on theoretical physics, and practicing doctors on the biological sciences, businessmen needed economics. In the contemporary world —he sustained— businessmen could no longer care exclusively about their own affairs but must develop an interest in the "state of the whole economy in which they are living," because a "series of infinitely complex relations" constrained

[517] Escuela Nacional de Economía, UNAM. "Memoria de la mesa redonda," 139-141.

their "ability to act." The "economic sciences," Méndez argued, had developed the tools and the techniques to guide practical businessmen in the resolution of "concrete problems." Yet, "students of economics" also needed insights from the ordinary businessman, who "on a daily basis probes an intimate mechanics that is usually beyond our domain," that is, the understanding of "how things actually happen." In this relationship of practical solidarity, the professionally trained economists provided the abstract tools and techniques to understand the economy as a whole, while businesspeople brought in their concrete life experiences. Along these lines, the conferences drifted from Méndez's lectures on methodology and theory, which resembled Franco's course on Economic Theory, to Peñalosa's exposition of the use of national accounting for economic programming. Méndez closed the series with his lecture on the theory of economic development, which suggests that, at least for pedagogical purposes, this was for him the organizing framework that englobed economic theory and practical techniques.[518]

In 1954, the FEIC formally disappeared when it merged with the economics department of UniAndes. This university was founded by a group of young men, most of whom had finished high school in the Gimnasio Moderno and pursued studies abroad. Shocked by the social upheaval that followed the assassination of Gaitán in April 1948¸ they raised funds from local businessmen and philanthropists and obtained tax benefits from the government to create a non-partisan and non-confessional institution, modelled in US universities, with the mission to build "a new country."[519] Jorge Franco and Miguel

[518] Camacho Rueda et al., *Curso de divulgación de temas económicos*, 7999, 8055-8057.
[519] See Caballero Argáez, *Testimonios*, 27; Bell Lemus et al (eds.)., *Historia de la Universidad de los Andes*. Vol 1, 54.

Fadul were part of the committee that approved the creation of the UniAndes in October 1948.

To direct the Facultad de Economía at UniAndes,[520] the governing board appointed Hernán Echavarría Olózaga. Echavarría was an *Antioqueño* with a degree in engineering from the University of Manchester. He started a postgraduate programme in economics at the LSE in 1930 but did not complete this degree because the Great Depression took a toll on his father's finances. Upon his return to Colombia, he worked for one of the country's major textile companies, Coltejer, and became a prominent industrialist after inheriting his father's crockery company, Locerías de Colombia. Juggling between private interest and public service, Echavarría's trajectory before joining UniAndes mirrored the evolution of the FEIC. At a young age he was appointed minister of public works (1943) and years later acquired the magazine *Semana* (1947) from his former colleague in the cabinet, Alberto Lleras Camargo.[521] Enjoying a good standing among businessmen, politicians, and journalists, Echavarría was also seen as the link between the university in the capital city and the business elites in Colombia's industrial centre, Medellín.[522]

Since the new department of economics at UniAndes struggled to attract students, Echavarría replicated the funding model of the Faculty at the Gimnasio Moderno. He reached his fellow industrialists to sponsor students and publicised the degree by creating an open contest for full scholarships in *Semana*. Together with the Faculty of Engineering at UniAndes, the Faculty of Economics also offered students the possibility to finish their

[520] It was initially named the Facultad de Economía y Estadística (Department of Economics and Statistics).
[521] Bernal-Uribe, "Hernán Echavarría Olózaga," 64-65, 82-84.
[522] Minute 1 "Proyecto de Fundación de la Universidad", 26 July 1948. CD-SG-UADA

studies at the University of Illinois with the condition that they returned to work for the company that had funded their studies. The first two graduates of the economics department, Jorge Ruiz Lara and Gustavo Neira, finished their degree in Illinois in 1954 sponsored by Echavarría's company Locería Colombiana and by the Compañía Colombiana de Seguros.[523] Ruiz Lara would become, as I show in the next chapters, a central figure in shaping economics as a technical profession.

Yet, what UniAndes marketed as a unique educational experience also belied the institution's inability to offer full degrees as it struggled to raise funds, recruit professors, and enrol students.[524] University directives saw an opportunity in the FEIC, an appendix that was growing beyond the capacities of its host body, which after all was not a university but an elite high school for boys. The merger occurred at close doors in a meeting held in December 1954 between the vice-chancellors of both institutions. Echavarría and Méndez co-directed the new Faculty of Economics (even though they had low opinions of each other).[525] Despite the opposition from Méndez and some students, the department at UniAndes received the professors, the students, and the teaching materials from the faculty at the Gimnasio Moderno.[526]

The Facultad de Economía at UniAndes, like the FCE at the UNal, also inherited the tension between training specialists for the public and the private domain. Although

[523] Minute 1 "Proyecto de Fundación de la Universidad", 26 July 1948; Minute 14, 1 February 1949; Minute 15, 8 February 1949; Minute 19, 8 March 1949; (unnumbered) Minute, 1 August, 1952; (unnumbered) Minute, 18 June 1953, (unnumbered) Minute, 6 October, 1953, CD-SG-UADA; Locería Colombiana to Universidad de los Andes and J. M. de la Torre Lago to Jorge Ruiz Lara, 13 February, 1954, Serie: Correspondencia enviada enero 1954- febrero 1954; CO-GM-UADA.
[524] See the Minute (unnumbered) for 19 August 1952, CD-SG-UADA.
[525] Hirschman, *Diary*¸ 9–10 September 1957, AOHP,
[526] About the merger see Arango, *Los primeros diez años de la Universidad de los Andes* , 48-51.

academic economists recognised and addressed this tension by splitting the degrees in economics and business management in the 1960s and early 1970s,[527] the hybrid nature of economics departments in their first years had long-term effects on the profession. Decades later it would still be common for economists to alternate between private and public institutions.[528] This porous boundary between both professional jurisdictions was evident since early on, as the first generation of professionally trained economists in the country faced the challenge of putting in practice their technical expertise during the military dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla.

3.4. The "Young Economists" and the Civil Opposition to the Military Regime

In its first years, the emerging economics profession was a broad church. On 26 April 1951, The National Library hosted in Bogotá the election of the governing body of a new Colombian Economists Society (SCE). Echavarría Olózaga was chosen president; Antonio García Nossa and Leopoldo Lascarro, the Director of the Budget Office, vice-presidents; and Miguel Fadul, Jorge Franco Holguin, and Leonel Torres as spokespersons.[529] The governing body of the new professional association brought together a business-minded engineer, an *hacendista* lawyer, a socialist intellectual and young technically oriented economists. While the three economic programmes created in Bogotá during the 1940s had participation in the governing body, the SCE did not have

[527] See Chapter 4.
[528] As per Thorp, this "revolving door" may have contributed to building a relationship of "mutual trust and confidence" between the state and the private sector in Colombia which is reflected in a "pragmatic" style of policymaking that contrasted with the experience in other Latin American countries, like Perú. Rosemary Thorp, *Economic Management*, 195–96.
[529] Weekly issue of 5 May 1951, Volume X, *Semana*.

national representativity. The SCE directorship did not include members from the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the Universidad de Antioquia, founded in Medellín in 1944.[530] In spite of this, the SCE's board illustrated that the emergent economics profession was diverse in terms of the educational and professional backgrounds of its members, as well as their ideological and theoretical standpoints. The coexistence of different views and approaches within the profession narrowed down when economists split into two camps during the military dictatorship of General Rojas. García Nossa, the former director of the Institute at the UNal, rose to become one of the organic intellectuals of the regime, while a group of younger economists joined the civil opposition against Rojas, under the tutelage of Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the founder of the FEIC at the Gimnasio Moderno.

Initially, the coup that brought Rojas to power in June 1953 had wide support across the political spectrum and among business leaders.[531] In his first year of government, Rojas' popularity was fuelled by economic prosperity after coffee prices reached record levels in international markets. In February 1954, Rojas's government scrapped the list of prohibited imports decreed five years before, which allowed gross fixed capital formation to grow above 20% for two consecutive years.[532]

However, Rojas' honeymoon with civil society was short-lived, as the military regime responded to dissent with repression and his economic policies began to hurt business interests. In June 1954, the military violently crashed student demonstrations in Bogotá. As criticism of his government grew, Rojas hardened censorship measures and forced the closure of the Conservative newspaper *El Siglo* and of Liberal newspapers *El*

[530] In this regional university, the economics department was first located, like the *ICE* at the UNal, in the Faculty of Law. Mayor Mora and Zambrano, *Economistas Antiguos,* 240-244.
[531] Sáenz Rovner, *Colombia años* 50, 132–35.
[532] Díaz Alejandro, *Foreign Trade Regimes*, 17–18.

Tiempo and *El Espectador*.[533] Moreover, Rojas faced resistance from the coffee sector for his management of the bonanza. Following the National Planning Council's advice, Rojas' minister of finance, Carlos Villaveces, introduced a windfall tax on coffee exports to control monetary expansion and to finance public investment in basic industries.[534] Villaveces' fiscal reform of October 1954, which added a new tax on stock dividends, was also vociferously opposed by industrialists.[535] In 1955, the representatives from Liberalism and Conservatism and from different economic sectors organised a Civil Front to oppose Rojas. In response, Rojas launched his Third Force platform, which allegedly represented the communion between the people and the armed forces "in the service of peace, justice and liberty."[536]

As Rojas concentrated executive power around a close circle of allies and the spaces for public dissent narrowed, the institutions created under the previous administration to plan economic development felt the consequences. As showed in the previous chapter, the relationship between the economic experts in the Planning Office and the government deteriorated in the first year of Rojas's rule, leading to the resignation of Hirschman and Currie. In November 1953, the three-man Council of National Planning was replaced by the Direction of Economic and Fiscal Planning, headed by Rojas's Secretary of the Economy, Alvaro Ortíz Lozano.[537] In May 1954, the chief of the agrarian mission the IBRD sent to Colombia, Albert Waterston, reported that here was a "serious morale problem with the Planning Office." According to him, both the foreign and the

[533] Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions*, 285, 289.
[534] "Plan Anti-Inflacionario: Oficina de Planeamiento Económico Propuso el Impuesto," April 2 1954, *El Tiempo*, GNVI-WBGA.
[535] Sáenz Rovner, *Colombia Años 50*, 144–145, 154–155.
[536] Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions*, 307.
[537] Torfs to Knapp, 23 December 1953, GNVI-WBGA.

local staff felt that the investment programme of 1951 had been entirely forgotten and that the Office was completely "out-of-touch with the President, the Ministers and other major Government officials."[538] The dissolution of the Council and the concentration of authority in the hands of intransigent political appointees like Ortíz Lozano began to isolate the foreign experts and local economists working for the Office.

After considering different alternatives,[539] Rojas reinstated in October 1954 the National Planning Council. To guarantee inter-ministerial coordination, the minister of development was appointed to preside that five-member body.[540] The economic plans and investment projects approved by the Council were then presented to the National Council of the Economy (NCE), which was in charge of translating them into policy. This new presidential advisory agency was composed by the Ministry of Finance, the managers of the Central Bank and Fedecafé, and four counsellors elected by the president.[541] One of the counsellors that Rojas appointed was García Nossa, who had joined the Colombian Socialist Movement after the UNal rescinded his contract in 1951.[542]

Like other socialists, García Nossa supported the military coup because, in his view, the army was the only force capable of socializing the management of the economy. Gaitan's assassination had shown, he believed, that the party system was an obstacle, not

[538] Waterston to Knapp, 21 May 1954, GNVI-WBGA.
[539] For example, Minister Villaveces proposed to subordinate the Office to the Ministry of Finance.
[540] Torfs to Knapp, 18 July 1954, GNVI-WBGA.
[541] Albert Waterston, "A Suggested Basis for Reorganizing Colombia's National Planning Organization," 10 September 1954, GNVI-WBGA. Decree 3080 of 1954. Decree 0622 of March 1955 created the position of an Executive Director, which Ortiz Lozano held until August 1957.
[542] Villamizar, *García Nossa*, 47-48.

the instrument, for the socialist revolution.[543] In a book published in 1951, García Nossa held the thesis that there was no half-way for democracy. He argued that the problem of democracy was indivisible between the fictions of a "political democracy" and an "economic democracy" because the "government of the majority" was untenable without a correlative "equality in opportunities" for that majority. In his view, democracy would only emerge in its "organic" or "total" form once the direction of economic activity was socialised by a regulatory state, which rather than been the expression of economic interests became a body at the service of the political community as a whole.[544] When the support to the military regime eroded, García Nossa materialised his ideas in a proposal to remove the representatives of sectoral interests from the NCE, reforming it into an economic military body (*Estado Mayor Económico*) directed by a technical secretariat.[545] This proposal, which echoed the philosophy of the *Plan Gaitán* mentioned above, did not appear to have come to fruition but it revealed the extent to which the practice of consultation with the private sector deteriorated in the last years of Rojas's government.

While García Nossa's socialist project found resonance in Rojas' Third Force platform, a group of young economists, most of whom graduated from the Gimnasio Moderno, distanced themselves from the military regime and eventually sided with the civil opposition. When Rojas came to power, the *técnicos* who participated in the Currie mission found refuge in international institutions, seizing the opportunities that the technical assistance programmes opened to young economists. The exodus started before

[543] Furthermore, graduates from the Escuela Superior de Guerra were familiarised with Garcia Nossa's economic views, as he taught "economics of war" in that school for over five years. Villamizar, *García Nossa*, 48.
[544] García Nossa, *La democracia en la teoría y en la práctica*, 221–28, 294, 326–27.
[545] Antonio García Nossa, "Bases de reforma del Consejo Nacional de Economía." June 1956, box 287, folder 22, SG-PR-AGN.

the coup. From 1951 to 1954, Jorge Franco worked at the ILO as staff economist for Latin America, and Miguel Fadul headed the National Accounts unit of the Panamerican Union from 1952 to 1955. Neither of them participated in Rojas government. The staff economists at the Planning Office held their positions but, after Rojas came to power, were more engaged with international institutions than with advising the military government. Gaviria, on the one hand, spent a year of leave in 1954 in Chile to attend Cepal's course on "The Problems of Economic Development."[546] Peñalosa, on the other hand, left the office in 1954 for a one-year internship in the IBRD in Washington. Upon his return to Colombia, Peñalosa advised Waterston in the IBRD's agrarian mission and David Lilienthal in the CVC, a regional development project in the Cauca Valley funded by the bank.[547]

For some of the young graduates in economics, Rojas's dictatorship eroded the appeal of working for the state to intervene in the "public economy," rendering the "private economy" a more enticing alternative. The experience with the dictatorship reinforced the *revolving door* pattern of alternating between the state and private companies. This was the case of Jaime Córdoba, former coordinator of the Colombian staff in the IBRD mission, secretary general of the Committee for Economic Development and economic secretary of the President Gómez between 1951 and 1953. During Rojas's government, he worked as executive manager of "Vidrieras de Colombia," a leading company in the glass industry. Around half of the economists who graduated between 1953 and 1957 for whom there is information reported to have found

[546] Unless I indicate otherwise, young economists' biographical information was extracted from SCE, *Directorio de Economistas*).
[547] Peñalosa Camargo, *Memorias* [Unpublished].

their first job in the industrial and the service sectors.[548] Given the business orientation of the university curricula in the 1950s, economics departments supplied economists with skills to manage private affairs. But this data also suggests the new degree found a growing demand in the private sector.

After foraying in multilateral institutions, Fadul and Peñalosa took a parallel road and opened in 1956 the economic consultancy firm, "Fadul y Peñalosa, Economistas e Ingenieros Consultores." Fadul and Peñalosa followed the example of Hirschman and Kalmmanoff who, after resigning to the Planning Office, launched the consultancy firm "Hirschman y Kalmmanoff, Consultores Económicos." From 1952 to 1954, Hirschman and Kalmmanoff produced studies about the labour market for executive managers in Colombia and wrote market research reports for foreign companies. They also conducted a study in which they estimated the demand for energy in Cali upon the request of the regional public services' provider, which was in the 1950s a private firm. There is no evidence that this office ever rendered its services to the government.[549] Meanwhile, Fadul and Peñalosa's consultancy firm focused on promoting business initiatives, following the initial objective of their *alma mater*. Although an article in *El Independiente* praised the unusual academic training of the two consultants, their personal networks were no less important. As Peñalosa recalled in his memoirs, it was the former Colombian Governor at the IBRD Emilio Toro who encouraged them to open the consultancy office and lent them the starting capital.[550]

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[548] My own calculations based on the profiles of SCE members in the *Directorio de Economistas*.

[549] Hirschman and Kalmmanoff, "La demanda para gas en Cali y en el Valle del Cauca," 20 February 1956; "The Market for Paper and Pulp in Colombia," 18 June 1956; "El nivel de remuneraciones para posiciones directivas en la empresa privada en Colombia," box 37, folders 1-4, AOHP.

[550] Enrique Peñalosa Camargo, *Memorias*, 33-35.

The Banco de la República also offered a refuge for professional economists who expressed dissent from the views about monetary management held by the military government. Rojas doubled down on the regulation of the banking sector by the state, increasing taxes on banking activities and introducing measures that forced banks to allocate cheap credit to stimulate agriculture and popular housing. He placed cronies in the governing boards of public banks and attempted to appoint a close ally as general manager of the central bank.[551] Despite Rojas' interference in the institutions that oversaw monetary management, the technical units of the central bank appeared to be out of the government's reach. The head of the Section of Economic Research gave continuity to the formation of a technical bureaucracy for economic analysis within the central bank. Young economists with experience in multilateral organisations, like Fernando Gaviria, joined the central bank in the years that Rojas was in power.[552]

A group of young professional economists participated actively in the opposition to Rojas's regime, which helped to enhance their recognition as a collective body. On 19 October 1956, Fadul and Peñalosa gathered in Lleras Restrepo's house with a "group of professionals" to discuss the creation of a society that collaborated "in the study of the problems of the country." That group also included their professor Jorge Méndez, the journalist Abdón Espinoza Valderrama, and Oscar Gómez, a young graduate from Harvard Business School.[553] For almost a year, Gómez, Fadul and Peñalosa had been meeting on a weekly basis with Virgilio Barco, an engineer who had recently obtained a

[551] Fluharty. *Dance of the Millions*, 238-9; Villaveces, *Vida, Pasión y Muerte de Alianza Nacional Popular*, 42.
[552] After returning from the IMF, Fernando Gaviria was appointed chief economist of Money and Banking.
[553] "Lista de personas que suscribieron el Acta de Constitución;" "Palabras pronunciadas por el Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo en el acto de inauguración de la 'Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País,'" October 1956, box 2, folder 1, folios 887, 933-938, CP-ACLR.

postgraduate degree in economics from the University of Boston, to hold informal conversations with ministers and other personalities about the Colombian economy.[554] Lleras Restrepo thus assembled a diverse group of young and experienced professionals — economists, architects, engineers and lawyers — who shared, in his words, the aspiration to "fulfil the duty and exercise the right to intervene in big public issues." At least that is how he framed the foundation of the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País (SEAP) in its inaugural event in 1956.[555]

By naming this centre after the scientific societies created throughout the Spanish Empire in the late eighteenth century, Lleras Restrepo wished to draw a parallel between despotism and obscurantism, and the narrowing of the public sphere during the military regime. Moreover, the choice of this historical reference also revealed Lleras Restrepo's republican conviction that reform could be achieved through enlightened debate.[556] He expressed these views in the contemporary language of scientific and technical progress:

> We firmly believe that, given the infinite complexity of contemporary problems, effective interventions must be preceded by methodical studies, careful analyses that take advantage of modern technique with complete objectivity, without prejudices of any sort. We wish to examine in detail the national reality and to search for solutions to the problems that it poses, which are at the same time scientific and practical[557]

In that spirit, SEAP organised on Friday, 9 November 1956, its first major event, a roundtable about "foreign exchange problems and the National Economy." Reportedly more than 300 people attended the roundtable at the Lawyers' Club in Bogotá, which

[554] Peñalosa Camargo, *Memorias*, 41. According to Peñalosa, this group also included Fernando Gaviria and Rodrigo Llorente, Minister of Development (1959-1960) and Minister of Finance (1971-1973) during the National Front.
[555] "Palabras pronunciadas por el Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo," folios 933.
[556] Edgar Revéiz, president of the Colombian Academy of Economic Sciences (2019-21), highlighted the influence Carlos Lleras Restrepo's "republican views" had on the first generation of professional economists, of which he made part. Interview with Edgar Revéiz, 09 January 2020.
[557] "Palabras pronunciadas por el Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo," CP-ACLR.


featured Barco, Peñalosa, Fadul, and Gómez.[558] On Saturday, the newspaper *Intermedio*, which had replaced the influential *El Tiempo* after Rojas forced its closure, published a short summary of the discussion. Introducing the speakers, Lleras Restrepo highlighted the "emergence in the country of a new intellectual class characterized by its inclination for economic studies, which hitherto only attracted a disproportionally small segment of the Colombian youth."[559] This will not be the last time that Lleras Restrepo intervened to propel young professional economists to the national stage.

The featured speakers presented to the audience the main takeaways of a report about Rojas' economic management that they had prepared as members of the SEAP's Economic Committee.[560] Barco opened the discussion with a theoretical exposition of the equilibrium conditions for the balance of payments account in the absence of quantitative restrictions and differential exchange rates. Relying on a simple supply and demand model, he showed step by step how domestic inflationary pressures, due either to fiscal deficits or to monetary expansion, produced a disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market by artificially stimulating the demand for imports. This theoretical model set the stage for Peñalosa's and Fadul's interventions, who analysed the behaviour of the balance of payments from 1945 to 1956. After Peñalosa provided a historical background, Fadul presented data that showed how the Colombian economy went from having a trade surplus in 1953 to experiencing an accelerating deficit in 1956, which "contrary to what is usually argued, could not be explained by a reduction in the supply of foreign

[558] Lleras Restrepo to Presidente Junta Directiva del Club de Abogados, 31 October 1956; "El primer aniversario de la SEAP," October 1957; "Informe del secretario del Comité Provisional de la SEAP," n.d.. box 2, folder 1, folios 789, 798-802, 1032-1033, CP-ACLR.
[559] "Mesa Redonda sobre la Economía Nacional en el Club de Abogados," *Intermedio*, 9 November 1956, box 2, folder 1, folio 1034, CP-ACLR.
[560] SEAP Economic Committee, "Los Problemas del Cambio Exterior y la Economía Nacional," n.d., box 2, folder 1, folios 1010-1023, CP-ACLR.

exchange" due to the decrease of international coffee prices after June 1954. The main reason for that disequilibrium, according to Fadul, was the "enormous expansion of the demand for foreign exchange," which — as Barco's model suggested — was caused by a considerable increase in public spending and long-term credits. Resorting to national accounts data, Fadul showed that the growth of real national income was outpaced by the annual increase rate in the means of payment, which moved in tandem with the expansion of government expenditure from 1952 to 1955. A graphic representation of these trends appeared in *Intermedio*'s Sunday supplement about "Colombian Problems" (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Nominal vs. Real National Income (above). Means of Payment vs. Government Expenditure (below) [561]



[561] "Mesa Redonda," *Intermedio,* folio 1036, CP-ACLR.

However, it was not until the Banco de la República run out of foreign exchange reserves and international lending stopped in 1956 that ordinary Colombians began to experience the effects of this disequilibrium, through food shortages and price increases in basic goods. Dollar reserves and foreign credit had worked as compensatory factors, Gómez argued, but they did not address the disequilibrium. Given that inflation resulted from a "structural imbalance in the economy," Gómez concluded, nominal and sectorial measures were insufficient, and a coherent economic policy was needed, which focused on increasing exports in the long-run and on selectively reducing the demand for imports in the short-run. Although SEAP's Economic Committee viewed the source of that structural imbalance in the whole package of trade, fiscal, and monetary policies taken since 1945 — which Gómez dubbed the "'polic*ing'* of foreign exchange," — its diagnosis of the current economic situation was also an indirect but strong critique of Rojas's economic record. Behind the technical veil of his analysis, Gómez suggested that Rojas's government mismanaged the coffee bonanza and the policies taken during his government, not external factors, were to blame for rises in the cost of living.

SEAP Economic Committee's first roundtable was followed by a second one in which the agrarian policy of the government was discussed. Apparently, these public events and their coverage in the press enraged Rojas, whose censorship office prohibited newspapers to mention the society. According to SEAP's secretary, the military government considered "technical and objective analyses" of the "economic situation" an "act of economic terrorism."[562] The publicity of SEAP's activities seems to have galvanised and brought together professional economists. An article in the magazine *Bancaria* stated that SEAP was becoming a "centre for the precursors of economics" in

[562] "El primer aniversario de la SEAP;" CP-ACLR.

Colombia. SEAP's activities had a national reach. An *ICE*'s alumnus, José Consuegra, wrote to Lleras Restrepo expressing him the intention of "Liberal economists" to open a regional office in Barranquilla. Similar requests followed from self-identified economists in Cali, Tolima, and Guajira.[563] In a critical note published in the lifestyle magazine *Cromos*, Jorge Child, the former pupil of García Nossa, analysed the impact the roundtable had on the development of a *sprit de corps* among economists:

> [SEAP] gave young economists the self-conscience of being part of a group, of a generation, and succeeded at imposing the importance of the young economist in every sector of national live. It is curious that young economists did not develop that generational conscience by their own but came to recognise it thanks to their discovery by a man of another generation: Carlos Lleras Restrepo. He is their father (…) Will the young economists be up to the challenge of calling themselves young?[564]

In a press column in *El Independiente*, Congressman Alfonso Palacio Rudas, former comptroller general (1944–1948), referred ironically to SEAP's economic committee as the "young economists," implying that their self-worth was proportionally inverse to their experience on economic matters. The epithet gained currency. Peñalosa reflected about it in his memoirs: "what happened was that we were actually economists, the first to obtain that degree in the country, and we were breaking with that tradition of prominent intellectuals, most of them lawyers, that had performed as economists without being so."[565] Although Peñalosa's conclusion captured the fact that the qualifications of economists were going through profound changes, his premise relied in a delimitation of the profession that was only taking shape in the 1950s. As Child's quote suggested,

[563] "El Doctor Carlos Lleras Restrepo y la Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País," *Bancaria*," n.d; José Consuegra to Carlos Lleras, 5 November 1957; Hernando Parra to Carlos Lleras, 27 June 1958; box 2 folder 1, folios 806-808, 811-812, 821-823 CP-ACLR.
[564] "El Doctor Carlos Lleras Restrepo y la SEAP," CP-ACLR.
[565] According to Peñalosa, Alfonso Palacio Rudas popularised this expression in an article entitled "Con permiso de los economistas" published on 27 October 1957. Peñalosa Camargo, *Memorias*, 36.

"young economists" partially owed their recognition to their more senior peers, with whom they actively collaborated in spaces like SEAP.

It would be an exaggeration to claim that SEAP and the "young economists" played a central role in the resignation of Rojas on 10 May 1957. Although they might have partially contributed to hold his government accountable for the hardships that followed five years of high uninterrupted economic growth, Rojas's failure to stop violence in rural areas and the growing repression of his regime had perhaps more to do with the generalised strikes co-ordinated by labour movements and business leaders across the country pushing for his resignation.[566] All in all, the engagement in the civil resistance of some economists — with models and data, instead of flags and pamphlets — strengthened their sense of affiliation to the profession. When the Society of Colombian Economists met again after the fall of Rojas, in June 1958 in its first conference, it had 117 affiliates, 114 male and 3 female.

Six years after the creation of the SCE, the split of economists in different camps during the dictatorship took a toll on the ideological diversity that the profession exhibited in its first years. While Echavarría was still the president of the society, García Nossa did not figure anymore. Furthermore, the SCE closed ranks against the possibility of training economists in the critical tradition of the ICE. When García Nossa founded a Faculty of Economics in the Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, the SCE asked the Ministry of National Education to withdraw the licence of this programme alluding to irregularities in the emission of degrees.[567] After Rojas's fall, García Nossa left the country and travelled across Latin America throughout the 1960s advising agrarian reform projects.

[566] Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions*, 281; Paul H Oquist, *Violencia, conflicto y política*, 265.
[567] SCE, *Primer congreso nacional de economistas*, 3.

He only returned to Colombia in 1969 to work in the campaign of the Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO), the party Rojas and his allies created to oppose the National Front, against the candidate supported by the Liberal and Conservative officialism.

Conversely, the democratic restoration in 1958 opened professional opportunities for the economists who participated in the civil opposition to Rojas. Allegedly, the diagnosis and recommendations of SEAP's first roundtable influenced the stabilisation plan that the transitional Military Junta agreed with foreign lenders to stop inflation and resume the service of sovereign debt.[568] When Alberto Lleras Camargo became the first president of the National Front (1958-1974), the young economists "became — in Peñalosa's words — the spoiled kids of the new administration."[569] As a case in point, Lleras Camargo appointed Peñalosa as manager of the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA). In turn, his associate Fadul became director of the Institute of Industrial Development (IFI) during Lleras Restrepo's government. Hence, two of the "young economists" became the heads of the most important decentralised agencies for sectoral development in the country, anticipating the rise of professionally trained economists to positions of power in the national government.[570]

By 1963, the state (including the Central Bank) was the single biggest employer of economists in the SCE directory, with 31 active members in its payroll. The Section of Economic Research of the Banco de la República (5) trailed the newly created Planning Department (6) and the INCORA (6). Economists also occupied middle-rank positions in

[568] "Cómo se fundó la Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País", *Revista Nueva Economía*, I:1, 1961, 1.
[569] Peñalosa Camargo, *Memorias*, 36.
[570] Virgilio Barco pursued a successful political career that took him to the presidency (1986-1990). During the National Front, he was Alberto Lleras Camargo's minister of public works (1958-1960) and Guillermo León's Valencia's minister of agriculture (1963-1964), spending a brief period in the ministry of finance (1962).

the Budget Office, regulatory agencies (*superintendencias*) and the ministries of agriculture, development, foreign affairs, labour, and public works. Private and semi-private firms and business associations also employed a great bulk of SCE members.[571] The existence of economic research offices in private companies and institutions reveals efforts for collecting data and producing sectorial economic analysis; a concrete materialisation of the *practical solidarity* Méndez talked about in his lectures one decade before. The placements of professional economists in the early 1960s attest to the ground they had gained in both the jurisdictions of the "private" and the "public economy" by the beginning of the National Front period.

3.5. Conclusion

During the post-war period, a professional alternative to the established pragmatic traditions of economic thought and practice appeared in Colombia. The introduction of modern social thought in state universities and the creation of hybrid programmes for economic lawyers in private confessional institutions during the interwar period were immediate antecedents for the creation of the first economics departments in the country. During the Liberal Republic, the university reform movement facilitated the circulation in hallways and lecture rooms of new intellectual referents, such as German authors like List, Wagemann, and Marx. Jesuit universities pioneered the entrepreneurial education of

[571] In twenty-nine cases the last employer reported was in the industrial sector, including the chief economic adviser of the ANDI. In agriculture, the reach of economists was lower (only 3 worked in private firms), but the directory included the chief of economic research of Fedecafé. In the financial sector the list includes directors, sub-directors, area managers and chiefs of economic and statistical research in several public commercial banks. Since the directory had only a sub-set of the graduates from faculties of economics before 1963, the reach of professionally trained economists in the private sector was probably wider both geographically and across sectors. SCE, *Directorio*.

hybrid economists-lawyers. Those innovations remained, nevertheless, bounded to the traditional hierarchy of professions, according to which teaching and learning economics was subsidiary to the education of law and to a lesser extent of engineering. Despite the recognised need for economic specialists during the 1930s, the institutional organisation of the university system in Colombia in those years did not allow for the creation of economics departments like happened in other Latin American countries like Chile and México.

Building on the legitimacy of established professions and responding to new social demands in the public and private domains, the first university degrees in economics were created almost simultaneously in the UNal and the Gimnasio Moderno during the 1940s.[572] In the foundation and early evolution of these programmes, the public function of economics was stressed and recognised; but the demands and patronage from the private sector also played an important role. Initially, the ICE at the UNal and the FEIC of the Gimnasio Moderno differed in their orientations and pedagogical objectives. However, they gradually converged toward an eclectic programme for educating specialists on what contemporary actors conceptualised as the public and the private economy. Only in the 1960s, as I will show in the next chapter, university departments began to make a clear-cut distinction between economics and business management.

In the early 1950s, the degrees at the UNal and the Gimnasio Moderno offered a combination of courses traditionally taught in faculties of law and engineering and new subjects — like national accounting, economic theory, and development economics— that revealed the assimilation of regional and global disciplinary trends. The

[572] The Universidad de Antioquia offered a third programme in economics in the 1940s, which was not analyzed here.

transformation of these programmes revealed a concerted effort to standardise nomenclatures, curricula, and syllabi across Latin America in the 1950s. Furthermore, economics departments engaged in the movement of people and technical expertise through the multilateral circuits analysed in the previous chapter. Economists with graduate studies abroad and international experience like Méndez, Fadul, and Franco introduced new subjects that transformed the education of economics in the Gimnasio Moderno. Hoyos' request to the Four Point programme to fund a research centre at the UNal directed by Hirschman, although it led nowhere, anticipated the involvement of North American sponsors in economics education and research during the 1960s. As this chapter showed, the early post-war was a period of deliberate innovation in the education of economics, not of accommodation to pre-existing patterns. From early on, professionally trained economics tried to enhance the scientific status of the discipline and its autonomy vis à vis other professional traditions even if they remained constrained by them.

The convergence in the orientation of economics education in the main state university, the UNal, and a rising private institution, UniAndes, had an important consequence for the long-term development of the profession. Firstly, the presence of an established community of economists in universities with strong nationalist views of state intervention did not occupy a predominant role in the formation economists during the development era, which makes the Colombian case stand in contrast to experiences in other countries of the region, like Chile and México. This had as much to do with the comparatively late creation of the economics department in Colombia's main state university as with the divisive political conjuncture in which it developed in the late 1940s, which resulted in the sudden interruption of García Nossa's academic programme

in the early 1950s. By the end of the decade, the economics profession exhibited less epistemological and ideological pluralism than it did one decade before.

Rojas' coup and the rapid breakdown of his honeymoon with civil society confronted the economics profession with the dilemma whether to collaborate with or resist the regime. Having directed a program that understood economics as a critical social science at the UNal in the late 1940s, García Nossa served more as an organic intellectual of Rojas' alliance between the military and the people, than the "ideational entrepreneur" whose economic ideas enabled the "regime to create a buffer against social interests", as scholars have characterised the role that the neoliberal economists played in the military dictatorships of the 1970s. Like in the comparative case studies conducted by Biglaiser about that period,[573] the characteristics of the military rulers shaped the appointment of the regime's collaborators in Colombia during the 1950s. General Rojas, who shared with other contemporary military dictators in the region a personalistic and charismatic style of leadership, resorted to intellectuals like García Nossa, whose organic interpretation of the national economic reality and ideas about "total democracy" provided the ideological basis missing in Rojas' Third Way Platform. There was less room for technocrats in this reform project, as the foreign and local economists working at the Planning Office experienced. With Rojas's fall, development strategies grounded on the alliance between the state and the people were left orphaned as their main intellectual proponent was ostracised from the economics community.

[573] Biglaiser, *Guardians of the Nation*, 8, 159-61.

On the opposite side of the spectrum, a group of "young economists" joined the civil opposition to the military regime.[574] Similarly to what Silva documented for the case of Chile under Pinochet, the involvement of economists in the resistance to Rojas military regime and its economic policies encouraged the "technocratization of the opposition."[575] The SEAP, itself a partisan organization formed by Carlos Lleras Restrepo and other notables of the Liberal Party, became the focus of the opposition to Rojas' economic policies. Young economists formed working groups with other professionals and politicians to deliberate about national economic problems. The SEAP roundtables showed how theoretical and empirical tools, such as simple supply and demand models and national accounting techniques, could be applied to intervene in matters of public interest during the dictatorship. The participation of the so-called "young economists" in the civil resistance against the military government through the critique of its economic policies gave the professional community as a whole a sense of mission and public recognition.

When General Rojas was ousted in May 1957, professionally trained economists were thus already developing an *esprit de corps* and claiming the legitimacy to intervene in public affairs, which set the stage for the rise of economic technocrats to decision-making positions during the National Front (1958-1974). As opposed to Rojas's military government, the National Front coalition would receive with open arms professional economists with a more technocratic outlook of economic governance. Fadul and

[574] The expansion of the professional jurisdictions of economics beyond the state was another unintended consequence of the military coup. Finding in Rojas' government an unreceptive environment for young, technically trained, professionals, this chapter showed how some economists seized and carved for themselves job opportunities in the private sector, which indirectly reveals that there was also a growing demand for expertise about the economy in the industry.

[575] Silva, *In the Name of Reason*, 167-171.

Peñalosa's appointments as directors of IFI and INCORA, as discussed above, exemplified the ascendency of "young economists" in the National Front. However, as sample cases of the type of economist educated in the late 1940s and 1950s, Peñalosa and Fadul represented a hybrid kind of technocrat, for whom managerial and economic expertise came hand in hand.[576] The modern profile of the economic technocrat whose authority as expert stems from belonging to an international scientific community will only take shape in the 1960s, with the incursion of US philanthropic foundations like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in Colombian universities, to which this thesis now turns.

[576] When I asked Peñalosa's son, Enrique Peñalosa Londoño, how did his father self-identify professionally, his response was that "he [Peñalosa Camargo] often emphasized that the training he had received was more that of a manager than what we would today an economist." Interview with Enrique Peñalosa Londoño, 3 September 2020. Peñalosa Camargo's managerial expertise as director of INCORA was further stressed in his unpublished *Memoirs* and analysed by Offner in "Sorting Out the Mixed Economy," 50-78.

Chapter 4. The Internationalisation of Economics under the National Front, 1958-1974

Professional economists, albeit a small community, were already in the public eye when Alberto Lleras Camargo became the first president of the National Front in August 1958. In his address to the First Congress of Economists organised by the SCE shortly before his possession, Lleras Camargo celebrated that in Colombia "economic studies had experienced a considerable increase in the previous ten years." However, he added, the military regime's disregard for economists' opinions demonstrated that "no economic science could be exercised without democratic institutional foundations."[577] The National Front's approach to democratisation, which tied the restoration of democracy to the instauration of sixteen years of bipartisan government, inaugurated a period of relative political stability in which technocratic arrangements of economic management flourished. In the early 1960s, Colombia appeared to foreign observers as a promising land for both democracy and economic progress.[578] International funding bodies flocked to the country throughout the National Front to finance development plans and projects and sponsor economic education and research in universities.

This chapter studies how the internationalisation of economics during the National Front shaped the local economics profession and economists' relationship with academe and the state. To do this, I examine the role philanthropic foundations, particularly the Rockefeller and the Ford Foundation, played as sponsors of economic education and

[577] Lleras Camargo, "La economía política," in *Primer gobierno del Frente Nacional. Tomo 1*, 49–50.
[578] I provide testimonial evidence for this claim from multiple sources in this and the next chapter.

research in three universities: the UNal, the UniAndes, and the Universidad del Valle (UniValle). By funding the creation of development research centres and providing scholarships to Colombian economists for specialising abroad, philanthropic foundations mediated the internationalisation of the economics profession in a context of university expansion and reform that the governments of the period actively supported and promoted. In parallel, professionally trained economic specialists were sought after by state institutions to serve as the interlocutors of foreign missions from international financial institutions, as argued in the next chapter. I show how the first generation of Colombian economic technocrats emerged from the resulting tension between responding to the state's demand for economic experts, and philanthropic foundations' aspirations of building academic communities in universities.

If by comparative standards the foundation of academic economics departments in Colombia occurred rather late, as argued in Chapter 3, this is less true about the valorisation of economists' expertise outside universities. Only in the mid-twentieth century governments across the world began to develop permanent staffs of economists and to rely routinely on them for external advice. While in some countries, like the United States,[579] economics departments supplied to a greater extent the expertise required to administer economic affairs, this was not necessarily the case elsewhere. Until the 1960s, the demand for economics graduates outside universities in Great Britain was rather low.[580] For decades, government positions in France were staffed by mathematicians and engineers who received on-the-job training in economics.[581] In Colombia the picture was mixed. The first professional economists recruited by the state in the 1960s found

[579] Bernstein, *Perilous Progress*, 128–32.
[580] Tribe, *Constructing Economic Science*, 372.
[581] Marion Fourcade, *Economists and* Societies, 205–7.

themselves sharing workspaces in the National Planning Department, the Central Bank, and the Ministry of Finance with other professionals, mainly engineers.[582] Given that economics was a relatively new profession, Colombian economists had to compete and even cooperate with the established pragmatic traditions of economic lawyers and engineers analysed in Chapter 1.

To distinguish their expertise from that of other professionals with practical knowledge on economic affairs, economists in Latin America used "internationalization as a strategy of professionalization."[583] While looking outwards for referents in the education of economists was certainly not a new practice among local economics departments, the arrival of philanthropic foundations based in the United States such as the Ford and the Rockefeller to Colombian universities marked a departure from the prevailing educational models studied in Chapter 3. As those foundations assumed the role of sponsors of economic education and research in universities, the channels for the circulation of normative understandings of economics as a science from academic departments in the United States to those in Colombia multiplied and the interactions between economists from both countries became more frequent. The political economy outcome of similar type of exchanges in Chile during the same period has been cited by Parmar as "the effect of a *self-conscious* American state strategy, with the sustained support of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, to transplant into Chile an economic ideology of free market competition [that] surpassed the strategists' own expectations."[584] While the same ideas about modernization that framed US foreign policy toward Latin America in reaction to the Cuban Revolution intersected the sponsorship of the

[582] Mayor Mora and Zambrano, *Economistas Antiguos*, 384.
[583] Montecinos, "Economists in Political and Policy Elites," 284.
[584] Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*, 180.

Rockefeller and the Ford of the social sciences in Colombia,[585] this chapter shows how these internationalisation strategies were not devoid of ironies and that their success at achieving their stated aims should not be taken at face value.

From a comparative standpoint, economic departments in Colombia appeared to be *a priori* more vulnerable than those in comparable Latin American countries to "mainstreaming," or the assimilation of foreign dominant disciplinary norms.[586] Firstly, the profession in Colombia, unlike in other countries in the region,[587] had developed relatively weak links in its formative years with Cepal, as showed in the previous chapters. Without a strong presence of *Cepalinos* in Colombian universities, the Ford and Rockefeller foundations were from the onset the central players in the internationalisation of economics. Furthermore, in the absence of deeply rooted statist traditions of economic thought like was the case in the main national universities of Mexico and Chile,[588] mainstreaming was more likely to become the dominant internationalisation strategy for economics departments in Colombian universities. However, the generalisability of successful instances of mainstreaming in Latin America, like the case of the Chicago Boys in the Universidad Católica de Chile, must be subjected to empirical scrutiny.[589] As

[585] For the role of the Ford Foundation in the inception of modernization theory and its introduction in foreign policy circles during the Kennedy administration (1961-63) see Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, 155-202.
[586] For the notion of "mainstreaming," see Montecinos and Markoff, *Economists in the Americas*, 17.
[587] Margarita Fajardo, *The World That Latin America Created* , 192.
[588] Babb, *Managing Mexico*, 60-67.
[589] The classical studies about the assimilation of Chicago-style economics in Chile and the role that philanthropic foundations played in this are Valdés, *Pinochet's Economists*, 127–32 and Glen Biglaiser, *Guardians of the Nation?*, 272. The Católica project and the Chilean Chicago Boys figure at the center of the histories about the transnational origins of neoliberalism. See, fn. 87. For a revisionist account that highlights how the Chicago Boys narrative obscures the relevance of other intellectual influences in Latin American economists and policymakers, see Bockman, "Democratic Socialism in Chile and Peru," 654–79.

recent comparisons with the Ford sponsorship of economics in Brazil showed,[590] similar internationalisation strategies yielded divergent results in different institutional contexts. As shown in this chapter, the Colombian experience reveals that, if anything, the Chilean case was more likely the exception than the rule.

The chapter is organized in three sections. I begin by situating the discussion in the context of the National Front and the restoration of democratic rule in 1958. The second section explores how the debates about the education of specialists in economics was caught in between the oft-contradictory objectives of developing an academic community and training policy-oriented government experts. The third and final section addresses the Rockefeller and Ford foundations' sponsorship of economic education and research in the UNal, UniAndes and UniValle, placing these internationalisation projects in relation to the broader regional experience.

4.1. Democracy and Development in the National Front

In the language of its designers, the National Front was a project of "democratic restoration."[591] This restoration implied, first and foremost, revitalising the liberal democratic tradition they believed was interrupted in November 1949, when Congress was closed by the Conservative government of Mariano Ospina Pérez: calling free and competitive elections, reinstating the freedom of the press, returning to congressional normality, and putting an end to the state of siege. As has been well documented, the

[590] Suprinyak and García Fernández, "The 'Vanderbilt Boys'."
[591] See "La restauración democrática de Colombia y el Frente Nacional" in Lleras Camargo, *Primer gobierno del Frente Nacional. Tomo 2*, 31-39.

restoration of democratic institutions took the form of a negotiated coalitional government between the leaders of the Conservative and the Liberal parties. After a series of encounters between Laureano Gómez and Alberto Lleras Camargo that began in the Spanish coastal city of Benidorm in 1955, the two party leaders agreed on a transition to democracy based on the principles of presidential alternation and partisan parity in the executive and legislative branches, at both the national and the subnational levels.[592] In the words of Lleras Camargo, "public opinion, which in its most visible and organic form, is represented by the [Liberal and Conservative] parties" was the only force "capable of initiating the restoration, and the only capable of maintaining it."[593] Thus, the leading factions of the Liberal and Conservative party formed a broad National Front coalition that assumed the role of restorer and gatekeeper of democracy.

Under General Rojas, the military forces had failed to accomplish that role, installing instead a repressive and highly personalistic regime. Rojas's government was also unable to stop rural violence, a regionally heterogeneous combination of small foci of Liberal and Communist guerrilla resistance, partisan vendettas, and banditry during coffee harvest months, especially in the boom years.[594] Furthermore, members from the political and economic elites, the church and professional cadres blamed Rojas personally for creating an unprecedented social and economic crisis. In the aftermath of the Benidorm's agreement, Lleras Camargo privately warned that Rojas governing style was antithetic to long-term economic prosperity. Echoing the conclusions of SEAP's

[592] The process leading to the National Front was described in Cobo Carrizosa, *El Frente Nacional*. For a recent examination, see Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, *Democracia pactada*, 48-97.
[593] "Circular No. 20. La declaración de Benidorm,", 28 September 1956, in Agudelo Ramírez and Montoya y Montoya, *Los guerrilleros intelectuales*, 155-156.
[594] González González, *Poder y violencia*, 300–316.

roundtables (Chapter 3), Lleras Camargo argued in his address to the Liberal National Directory about the Benidorm's agreement that the General's grip in power had relied on granting "from time to time, with his authoritarian hand, plentiful bounties to anesthetise diverse sectors of opinion, regions, groups and friends" and was therefore incompatible with "moderate budgets" and "balanced commercial accounts."[595] The bipartisan juridical commission appointed to establish the legal path for the transition to civil order received the mandate to design institutional mechanisms to restore peace and economic stability.[596] Lleras Camargo and Guillermo León Valencia, head of the National Conservative Directory, told this commission that the "chaotic and contradictory movements, the improvisation and the empiricism" of Rojas's authoritarian economic management risked "paralyzing the rhythm of national progress and destroying public prosperity." Hence, both party leaders asked their collectives to "engage in a vigorous effort to implant a serious, stable and coordinated economic policy, which facilitates and bolsters national development."[597] Given the circumstances that preceded and surrounded the instauration of the National Front, democracy and development constituted two foundations of the *frentenacionalista* project that were deeply entangled in the eyes of contemporaries.

As the first president of the coalitional arrangement, Lleras Camargo's views on how to create propitious conditions for economic development and democracy set a roadmap for the four National Front administrations. This does not mean that there were no major differences between and within the parties and factions that sustained the coalition. But Lleras Camargo's successors had to operate within the legal and

[595] Lleras Camargo, "Circular No. 20"
[596] Lleras Restrepo made part of this commission.
[597] Alberto Lleras Camargo and Guillermo León Valencia, "Comisión Jurídica de los Partidos", March 1956, in *Guerrilleros intelectuales*, 213-215.

institutional framework that he was able to introduce with a strong mandate, as the first democratically elected head of state who governed with bipartisan support in more than four decades. Subsequent administrations lacked the degree of legitimacy and governability he enjoyed in his first two years of presidency, as the Conservative-Liberal alliance was challenged in the ballots by dissident movements such as the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL) and the Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO).[598]

If there was a policy area in which there was no broad consensus within the coalition, this was the government's rural development strategy. Consider Lleras Camargo's policy of "rehabilitation" (*rehabilitación*), which included publicly subsidized credits to violent-torn regions. Initially conceived as a mechanism to prevent the resurgence of violence, it also became instrumental to promote rural economic development with some degree of popular participation. The rediscovery and reinterpretation of the report of the Mission by Father Lebret mentioned in the previous chapter was instrumental in the design of this policy because it was one of the first systematic attempts to document the low living conditions in the countryside, which came to be associated with the surge in rural violence. Despite some early successes, rehabilitation policies faced the reaction from sectors of Conservatism and did not survive the legislative elections of 1960.[599] Lleras Camargo's law of agrarian reform enjoyed a different fate. In spite of the staunch opposition from the more orthodox faction of the

[598] The 94,8% of voters (72,72% of the electoral census) endorsed the National Front agreements in the plebiscite of 1 December 1957. In the presidential elections of 1958, Lleras Camargo received 80% of the vote, although the turnout was significantly lower (50%). In the election of Lleras Restrepo eight years later, the participation of the electorate had dropped to 34% – see Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, *Democracia Pactada* and Rodrigo Losada, "Electoral Participation," in *Politics of Compromise*, 87–103.
[599] Bagley and Edel, "Popular Mobilization Programs of the National Front," 97–110; Karl, *La paz olvidada*, 140.

Conservative party, the agrarian reform became law in 1960. Both the administrations of Guillermo León Valencia (1962-1966) and Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) remained committed to land redistribution, albeit with mixed results. The agrarian reform came to a halt during Misael Pastrana's administration (1970-1974),[600] whose government's development strategy focused on absorbing the rural migrant labor force by promoting urban construction as the economy's "leading" sector.

Even if the economic and social policy agendas of the four National Front governments might have differed along party lines on key issues, like agrarian reform, the political stability of the regime facilitated some degree of continuity in the state's overall development strategy. Two pillars in this strategy created the conditions of possibility for the emergence of a technocratic arrangement of economic policymaking. The first of these pillars was the construction and consolidation of an institutional infrastructure that allowed for the introduction of technical rationality in economic governance. The creation, enlargement, and empowerment of the National Planning Department, to be analysed in the following chapter, exemplified how technical expertise became embedded in the Colombian state. The case of the planning department was not an isolated event but rather an instance of the professionalisation and technification of the whole institutional architecture that oversaw economic management, which also included the DANE, the Ministry of Finance, and monetary authorities. To recruit expert personnel, these institutions benefited from the expansion and reform of higher education

[600] In the 1960s, around half of Colombia's population lived in rural areas. Analysts at the time pointed to land concentration patterns as an obstacle for economic development and a source of violence. This problematic elicited the conformation of a community of experts about rural development, whose treatment goes beyond the scope of this thesis. About the agrarian reform see Hirschman, *Journeys Towards Progress*, and Berry, "La tragedia de la reforma agraria del Frente Nacional," 295–323.

during the 1960s. National Front governments accompanied, promoted and, to an extent, facilitated the transformation of universities into spaces where the production of scientific and technical knowledge began to occupy a central place. As will be elaborated in this chapter, establishing informal networks and collaborations between governmental institutions, professionally trained experts and research centres in universities was the second pillar that found continuity in the state's development strategy across the four National Front administrations.

The aspiration to create an institutional infrastructure for economic management and form an elite cadre of technical experts was patent in Lleras Camargo's speeches and discourses. With a long trajectory as a public writer, Lleras Camargo was not only a politician but also an opinion maker. Before leading the civil resistance against Rojas, his last official position was the rectorship of UniAndes (1954-1955), a position he used to influence public opinion. In a series of speeches in the national radio broadcaster, Lleras Camargo put forward the argument that while the Colombian economy and society were rapidly changing in what he called "our industrial revolution", the state lagged behind. He argued that the state in Colombia, like in the other Latin American countries, had developed as a "purely political organism" and therefore lacked the capacities to "stimulate" or "plan" human activity, let alone to "direct" it."[601] Loyal to his avowed Liberalism, Lleras Camargo emphasized that it was private initiative what fuelled Colombia's industrial revolution, but he also highlighted the importance of transforming the state into an efficient administrator of resources. In his words, the state had "to modernize, not in paper, but in reality, in the public offices, in the bureaucracy, in its

[601] Lleras Camargo, *Nuestra revolución industrial*, 50.

methods."[602] The creation of administrative departments, such as the National Planning Department, during his government was the institutional expression of this aspiration of modernising the state.[603]

From his standpoint as rector of UniAndes – at that time a relatively new and small institution which nevertheless offered a novel university model, Lleras Camargo also reflected on the role of education in the country's industrial revolution and the modernisation of the state. In a discourse entitled *The mechanized barbarian,* he borrowed the thriving language of development economics to relate Colombia's low living standards to the country's shortages in the human factor of production. He argued that the difference between "advanced" and "backward" countries did not lay so much in their capital stock as in the "human raw material" trained in schools, universities, and technological and scientific institutes, which was "indispensable for development in the new stages of the industrial revolution." The absence of a highly skilled local professional class also explained why the structural transformation of Colombia's economy and society was in itself an "imported revolution." For Lleras Camargo, the local educational system was not attuned with the technological requirements of a complex industrial economy, which led to both the misuse of national resources and a chaotic assimilation of imported technologies that was already perceptible in ordinary spaces of sociability. To find a way out of that "state of chaos,"[604] Lleras Camargo believed political leaders faced two "parallel routes":

> one of them consists in creating wherever possible an autochthonous industrial life, which necessarily requires the vertical elevation of creole techniques and, consequently, the [elevation] of *a critical mass of people with the ability to control the levers of the industrial revolution with*

[602] Lleras Camargo, *Nuestra revolución industrial*, 75
[603] Lleras Camargo, *Primer gobierno del Frente Nacional. Tomo 1*, 49-53, 51.
[604] Lleras Camargo, "El bárbaro mecanizado" in *Nuestra revolución industrial*, 55-59.

serenity and good judgement. The other route [is] the education of the masses, all of them, to cohabitate in the traffic, to [acquire] the discipline [sic] of an era that, without those conditions, is and will be nothing more than mechanized barbarism[605]

During the National Front, the four coalition governments devoted public attention and resources to education. In Benidorm, party leaders had agreed to spend at least 10% of the national budget per year in education to consolidate the democratic restoration.[606] Although Lleras Camargo's government failed to achieve that target, the proportion of the national budget allocated to education during the next three administrations exceeded that figure.[607] In the 1960s, universities received around one third of all national expenditures in education, even if by 1970 only 1,8% of the population over 15 years (2,9% of men and 0,8%) had attained tertiary education.[608] These figures suggest that, from the two alternative roads Lleras Camargo considered in 1955, public attention and resources were concentrated in developing a critical mass of qualified professionals rather than in educating the masses.

Overall, the increase of government expenditures in higher education allowed for an unprecedented expansion of the university system. From 1964 to 1974, the number of students enrolled in the UNal increased from 9,310 to 15,856, growing at an annual rate of 7%.[609] Even considering the large demographic expansion during the same period,

[605] My emphasis. Lleras Camargo, *Nuestra revolución industrial*, 59.
[606] This prevision became article 11 of the legislative decree No. 247 of 1957. Cámara de Representantes, *Por qué y cómo se forjó el Frente Nacional*, 41–44.
[607] The participation of education in total government expenditures increased from 6,22% in 1957 to of 9,58% by the end of Lleras Camargo's administration in 1962. From 1962 to 1971, this figure oscillated between a minimum of 12,38% (1966) and a maximum of 15,48% (1964). According to Caballero's estimates, the average for the period 1958-1974 was 14%. Lebot, "Elementos," 200. Caballero Argáez, "El desarrollo económico y la planeación," 289.
[608] Lebot, "Elementos," 200.
[609] Based on data for 1965 and 1974 from the UNal, *Boletín estadístico de la universidad*

when the population grew in average 3% per year,[610] this figure represented an annual real growth of 4% in enrolments. Beyond public establishments, private secular universities proliferated following the foundation of UniAndes in 1948, partly absorbing the growth in the student body. By 1974, little more than half of university students were enrolled in privately administered institutions, which also received state funds.[611] As will be shown below, both state-funded and private universities received financial and technical support from multilateral institutions and philanthropic foundations to stock libraries, develop its physical infrastructure and form a professorial body. In relative terms, however, the expansion of the university system had a limited scope. Universities grew in size and capacities, but they did not become spaces of mass education. The limited inclusionary nature of the university expansion, the privatisation of higher education, and the involvement of foreign actors became the target of criticism by the student movement in the second half of the 1960s,[612] which casted a shadow on the democratic credentials of the National Front governments approach to university education.

That quantitative expansion of the student body was accompanied by an equally important qualitative change. Higher education became more accessible for young men *and* women from middle-income families across the country. As a result, universities became more diverse spaces. This was particularly but not exclusively the case of public university campuses.[613] One consequence of such expansion and transformation was that

[610] Based on data from the United Nations Population Division, extracted on 16 June 2022 from Our World in Data: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/population-past-future?tab=chart&country=COL.
[611] DANE, "Educación superior 1970-1974," 78.
[612] See for example the exigencies of the *Programa Mínimo Estudiantil* of 1971, in Archila, "El movimiento estudiantil en Colombia," 82-83.
[613] In 1971, more than half of the students enrolled in the UNal in Bogotá were born outside the capital city and a quarter of the total were women. UNal, *Boletín estadístico de la universidad* (1971), 7-12. In private universities, like UniAndes, scholarships, student loans and family

the youth and their concerns came to occupy a central place in public life. The youth educated during the National Front were amongst the most disillusioned with the type of democracy the coalitional government came to represent.[614] In the most extreme cases, this disenchantment drove some university students to take the road of armed resistance.[615] Those in the middle saw in the student movement a platform to demand socioeconomic and political reform, or militated in non-armed political movements that opposed the National Front. Among these, some believed their education was the main weapon to reform Colombia's imperfect democracy.[616]

From being spaces devoted primarily to the elucidation of "national problems" (see Chapter 3), universities gradually became hubs for the internationalisation of scientific and technical knowledge. The youth of the 1960s experienced closely the shrinking distance between Colombia and the external world. Thanks to the revolution in communications, Lleras Camargo argued, younger generations were experiencing "the progressive elimination of provincialism, regionalism and the civilisation of nationalist sentiments."[617] As a life-time journalist and former deputy director of the OAS (1949-1954), and a privileged witness of how regional and global problems were interwoven, Lleras Camargo was particularly sensitive to the changing ways in which information and knowledge travelled across boundaries.[618] He was also an architect of the institutional

networks allowed some students from diverse backgrounds to access higher education. Interviews with Cecilia López Montaño, 4 November 2020, and Juan Carlos Jaramillo, 27 January 2021.

[614] Leal Buitrago, "Frustración política de una generación, 299–325.

[615] Ciro Quiroz Otero, *La Universidad Nacional de Colombia en sus pasillos*, 188–92.

[616] According to Jorge Orlando Melo, this was the case of some technocrats like Antonio Hernández Gamarra and social scientists (like himself), who disillusioned with both the political system and the alternative of armed struggle, opted to work for the state to change the system from within. Melo, "Preface."

[617] Lleras Camargo, "*Nuestra revolución industrial*, 107.

[618] Villar Borda, *Alberto Lleras*, 95, 104.

channels through which knowledge about Latin America's economic development circulated in the 1960s. In the first year of his presidency, he backed Juscelino Kubitscheck's proposal for a Pan American operation, a concerted effort to study and find solutions for the pressing problem of development in the Americas.[619] Kubitscheck's Pan American operation was the preamble for the negotiations that led to the Alliance for Progress (AfP), in which Lleras Camargo played a leadership role throughout the 1960s.[620]

In the 1960s, not only Colombia became the second largest and the most stable recipient of AfP funds but *the* "laboratory" for development aid in a relatively populous Latin American democracy.[621] In the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, the alignment of Lleras Camargo's and Kennedy's governments in issues that were of strategic importance for the United States played a part in explaining the Colombia's rapid and privileged access to the funds that the US Congress allocated through the Agency for International Development (AID) to AfP recipients. For example, Colombia sided from very early on with the United States on the "Cuban question," voting in favor of the exclusion of Cuba from the Inter-American system in 1962. Other major recipients of AfP funds, like Brazil and Chile, abstained. As Lleras Camargo stated bluntly in his

[619] This led to the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), along similar lines to what Lleras Camargo had imagined as deputy director of the OAS. For Lleras Camargo's response to Kubitscheck, see "Operación Panamericana" in *Primer gobierno del Frente Nacional. Tomo 1*, 91-97.

[620] Lleras Camargo and Kubitschek's influence over the direction of the AfP was not restricted to their involvement in the drafting of the Charter of Punta del Este, which set the roadmap for the Alliance, but continued after they left the presidencies of their respective countries. The creation of the Inter American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) resulted from a study undertaken by them in 1963 with the aim to "Latinize" the AfP. General Secretariat of the OAS, *Latin America's Development and the Alliance for Progress*, 162.

[621] Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy*, 155.

address to Congress: "What Colombia wanted, was achieved."[622] In fact, it had been the Colombian delegation who succeeded at breaking the deadlock on Cuba's position in the Inter-American System by pushing the vote at the OAS in December 1961, after a series attempts by other countries had failed repetitively since 1960. Unlike other major players in the Inter-American System, Colombia had already cut diplomatic relations with La Habana after allegedly finding evidence that Cuba was providing support to its own left-wing insurgencies.[623] The conformation of armed guerrillas inspired by the Cuban Revolution and supported by La Habana during the administration of Guillermo León Valencia (1962-1966), who succeed Lleras Camargo in the presidency, hardened the position of the National Front coalition toward left-wing insurgencies (the Communist party had already been proscribed from participating in elections).[624] Considerations of law and order, which were partly inherited from the unresolved tensions of La Violencia and partly motivated by the regionalization of the Cuban Revolution, brought Colombia closer diplomatically to the United States at the height of the Cold War in Latin America.

However, there were additional reasons besides the diplomatic alignment between Colombia and the United States in the question of Cuba that made the former attractive for donors like the AID throughout the 1960s. The National Front offered a credible commitment to a reformist path of development, as an alternative to revolutionary models, and relative political stability in a region where regime changes were becoming

[622] ESAP, *Realizaciones,* 12-13.
[623] See Harmer, "The 'Cuban Question," p. 132.
[624] There were several foci of armed insurgency in the early 1960s, which included the conformation in 1964 of Colombia's two longstanding guerrilla organizations: the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia -Ejercito del Pueblo (FARC-EP) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). See Palacios, *Entre la legitimidad y la violencia,* 261-265; González, *Poder y violencia en Colombia,* 345-356.

the norm.[625] Taken together, these reasons help to explain why Colombia became in the 1960s not only the "showcase" of the Alliance,[626] but of official development assistance more generally. Between 1961 and 1970, Colombia received more aid from official lenders —US$1978 million (in 1960 US dollars), or two fifths of the country's GDP in 1960— than any other single country in Latin America with the exception of Brazil (in absolute terms) and Chile (in per capita terms).[627] This unprecedented access to foreign finance through official channels led to a sudden surge in the demand for economic experts in the state, as I will show in the next chapter.

It was against the background of the promotion of Colombia as a showcase of official development assistance that this country captured the attention of US-based philanthropic foundations. After visiting Colombia in 1960, Ford Foundation officers concluded that:

> Since the inauguration of the parity arrangement and the election of the Liberal candidate, Alberto Lleras, Colombia has been enjoying a period of order and apparent stability. The present Government, with the backing of the Nation Front, seems determined to improve and reform the economic and social structure of the country, to hasten national growth and development, to institute a competent and dedicated public service, and to establish a firm tradition of constitutional democracy[628]

Ford officers found in the country's institutions reasons for optimism about its economic prospects. The mission's report highlighted both its "internal order" and "stable political development", only interrupted for the brief period following 1948, and its historical tradition of "responsible leadership" epitomised in the figure of Lleras Camargo. As the

[625] Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy*, 150.
[626] An assessment of the expectations and realizations of the AfP in Colombia falls beyond the scope of this thesis. About the rise and fall of Colombia as the "showcase" of the Alliance, see Karl, "From 'Showcase' to 'Failure'."
[627] The data about foreign aid and GDP taken from General Secretariat of the OAS, *Latin America's Development and the Alliance for Progress*, 40-1 and 111-2.
[628] Morse, Richard, Robert Wickham, and Alfred Wolf, "Ford Foundation Mission to Colombia." June 1960, CR-FFR-RAC, 9.

fragment above reveals, the relationship between development and democracy was framed in the language of modernisation theory, which was in vogue among the North American social scientists that philanthropic foundations hired to inform their grant programmes overseas. In its simplest formulation, modernisation theory posited that countries went through similar stages of development characterized by an identifiable set of economic, political, and social interrelations. The problematic of modernisation emerged within an epistemic community of policy makers and social scientists in North American universities, particularly in the Cambridge (Massachusetts) area. It achieved prominence in foreign policy circles during the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s, when the United States asserted itself internationally as a normative model while it underwent domestically a crisis of self-understanding. Modernisation theorists assigned a central role to "technical expertise" in engineering social change in the developing world and expressed mistrust about populist leaders and movements.[629] Under the influence of this organising worldview, the main investments philanthropic foundations like the Ford and the Rockefeller Foundations did in Colombia during the 1960s were in the fields of higher education and public administration.

To sum up, the return to democracy with the inauguration of the National Front in 1958 implied restoring the liberal and democratic institutions that stopped functioning between 1949 and 1957 but also devising institutional mechanisms to promote economic development within a democratic framework. As the first president of the National Front, Alberto Lleras Camargo set a roadmap for the sixteen years of the coalitional government. Reforming the state into an efficient administrator of resources became one pillar of the

[629] Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, 8.

state's development strategy throughout the period (Chapter 5). National Front governments also devoted considerable attention and resources to higher education. As a consequence, the university system underwent an unprecedented —albeit limited— expansion, the student body became more socially diverse, and the educated youth gained prominence in the public arena. In the aftermath of the Alliance for Progress, the aspiration to transform universities into academic institutions was also fuelled by foreign development aid. Against the newfound interest in the "modernisation" of the underdeveloped world among North American social scientists, US-based philanthropic foundations became central actors in the reform of higher education in Latin America. This was the context under which the first generation of Colombian economic technocrats were socialised in academe and the state.

4.2. Training Economic Specialists: Academic Standards and the State Demand for Experts

In June 1958, the Sociedad Colombiana de Economistas (SCE) organized its first national conference. Around two hundred participants attended three days of presentations with a marked emphasis on development planning and the education of economics. The SCE's president, Hernán Echavarría Olózaga, inaugurated the conference with a reference to the Sputnik 1 satellite[630] to convey the message that technical education was "more than a factor of economic development, it is its foundation."[631] For his audience, Echavarria Olózaga was not talking rocket science when he referred to the importance of technical

[630] The USSR launched in October 1957 the Sputnik 1 satellite, which became the first human-made artifact to orbit the earth.
[631] Echavarría Olózaga, "La educación base fundamental del desarrollo económico," 1.

education for, and about, economic development. By initiative of the SCE, the government had recently requested a technical assistance mission from Cepal.[632] For the next three years, Cepal would assist Colombia's new planning department in the elaboration of the country's first development plan. Development policy, in general, and economic planning, in particular, created in the 1960s a demand for technical expertise in state institutions, semi-autonomous departments, and the private sector, which the economics profession was expected to supply. In this context, the education of economists became a matter of constant reflection and discussion in university and professional forums, like the SCE conferences. These debates rarely revolved around disagreements on economic doctrine. Instead, local economists were more concerned with the most pressing issues of drawing frontiers for the relatively young profession and defining the standards for training specialists in the discipline.

4.2.1. Delimiting the Frontiers of the Economics Profession

By the late 1950s, economists had penetrated public life but, according to Jorge Ruiz Lara, then a young professor of the Facultad de Economía at UniAndes, economics departments were ill-prepared for training specialists in the discipline. Based on data from the seven universities that offered a degree in economics in 1957, Ruiz Lara observed that 528 students had completed their studies since 1945.[633] These graduates formed the bulk

[632] Capitán Carlos Prieto, "Información de Acuerdos de la Sesión del Comité Nacional de Planeación," 3 June 1958, box 5, folder 14, folios 66-67, JG-PR-AGN.
[633] Besides the UNal, UniAndes, and the Universidad de Antioquia, five other universities had economics departments before the first SCE conference in 1958: Universidad del Atlántico (1950), Universidad de Medellín (1950), Universidad de América (1952), Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano (1954) and Universidad Gran Colombia (195?). See Ruiz Lara "Enseñanza universitaria," 5–6.

of the SCE membership and, as shown in the previous chapter, occupied advisory and managerial positions in both the public and the private sector during the National Front. Yet, Ruiz Lara deplored that the "French system" of "training economic lawyers," as the program in Economics and Law at the Universidad Javeriana epitomised, still prevailed in most universities.[634] In the SCE conference, Ruiz Lara represented the voice of a new generation of local economists that identified themselves with a discipline that transcended national traditions of economic thought and practice. Ruiz Lara graduated in the first cohort of the economics department at UniAndes in 1954, but he took his two last years of coursework in the University of Illinois. He later completed his doctoral studies in that same university, becoming the first Colombian to obtain a PhD in economics (U. Illinois, 1961).[635] Informed by Ruiz Lara's diagnosis, the SCE appointed a commission to write recommendations to the Ministry of Education for regulating the profession. This commission resolved that economics was an "autonomous discipline, not subordinate to any other" and should therefore be taught by Faculties which had the same standing of the "traditional" ones in law and engineering.[636]

The first step in that direction was the standardisation of the curriculum by defining common academic standards. In 1960, the Asociación Colombiana de Universidades (ASCUN) organized a symposium with representatives from the economic departments across the country to discuss curricular reform. A curricula committee, led by the dean of the Facultad de Economía at the UniAndes, Oscar Gómez (MBA, Harvard, 195?), resolved that the degree's core cycle must place more emphasis on the

[634] Ruiz Lara, "Enseñanza universitaria," 2.
[635] Before Ruiz Lara, Antonio J. Posada obtained in 1952 a PhD in Agricultural Economics from the University of Wisconsin. Alvaro López Toro obtained in 1961 a PhD in Economic Demography from Princeton University.
[636] SCE, *Primer congreso nacional de economistas*, 9.

mathematical and statistical foundations of the discipline. It also recommended distinguishing between economics and "private business" by creating two different elective cycles.[637] The curricular reform of 1960 at the FCE of the UNal, for instance, reflected those changes.[638] By 1964, the dean of the Facultad de Economía at UniAndes recognised that this department "actually comprised two *Facultades: Economía y Administración*," which demanded different levels of specialisation in mathematics.[639] The growing importance of quantitative skills in the discipline and its gradual demarcation from business management served to reinforce the standing of economics as a technically oriented profession with a public vocation.

The practical need to distinguish between business management and economics had long been long discussed by foreign observers. In a confidential report prepared for the Institute for Inter-American Affairs, two professors from the University of Illinois H. K. Allen and Fred Bell commented in 1956 about the accepted practice in Colombia to "refer to those who teach in the broad field of economics and business subjects in general as Facultad de Economía." In their view, the absence of specialised economics faculty, with exclusive dedication to teaching and research, perpetuated that ambiguity. Due to the "inadequacy of salaries," they argued, nearly all professors worked part-time and were "obliged to keep their business connections." Organizing academic departments with a higher proportion of full-time faculty was, according to Allen and Bell, "the most pressing problem" for assuring minimum standards in the education of local economists.[640] For

[637] ASCUN, *Estudios para el planeamiento de la educación superior*, 483–88.
[638] Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, *Estudio sobre el desarrollo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas*, Annex 1, 4.
[639] Acta #79-64, 10 December 1964, CA-SG-UADA.
[640] H. K., Allen and J. F. Bell, "Final Report on The University of the Andes and The University of Cauca," box 78, folder 739, 2, P-RFR.

foreign observers, who like Allen and Bell found in the US higher education system a normative referent, delimiting the frontiers of the economics profession required the formation of academic economists, a new scientific subject in the Colombian scene.

Based on a survey conducted from eleven economics departments in 1959, the director of the new Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) at UniAndes,[641] John Hunter, and his research assistant James Ternent arrived at similar conclusions. According to this study, less than 10% of economics professors worked full time and the salaries they received were not competitive enough to retain local talent. Most faculties, in their view, were "actually providing training in *both* economics and business."[642] Lauchlin Currie echoed this concern when in an address to university provosts he criticised Colombian's tendency to talk about the "public" and the "private" economy, instead of referring to the economics science as a unified discipline.[643] The conflation between economics and business management and the paucity of full-time economics professors were common traits of economics departments across Latin America in the early 1960s, according to a report commissioned by the OAS.[644] By the end of that decade, however, the distinction between economics and business management had institutionalised. As cases in point, the UNal and UniAndes conferred different degrees for both professional fields.[645]

[641] About the CEDE, see the next section
[642] The authors' emphasis. Hunter and Ternent, "The Teaching of Economics in Colombia," 191–94.
[643] Currie, "La enseñanza de la economía en Colombia," 130–31.
[644] Ellis et al., "La enseñanza de la economía en la América Latina," 1–3.
[645] In the UNal, the department of business management was created within the Facultad de Ciencias Económicas in 1965. See Acta No. 2 XI, CD-UADA. In UniAndes, the Facultad de Administración was founded in 1971. See Minutes 187 and 188 of 4 and 8 October 1971, Actas del Consejo de la Facultad de Economía FE-UADA.

4.2.2. Training Specialists: The Case of the Programa de Economía para Egresados at UniAndes

Economics departments also took advantage of new opportunities to provide advanced training in the discipline. As will be shown in the next section, the involvement of philanthropic foundations played a key role in raising the academic standards and reputation of economics departments. Additionally, financial resources from the Fondo Universitario Nacional (FUN) and the Instituto Colombiano de Crédito Educativo y Estudios Técnicos (ICETEX), as well as the Fulbright commission and other international cooperation agencies were available for university professorial training programmes.[646] It was not until 1964 that UniAndes opened the first postgraduate programme in economics in the country, a two-years master degree initially called the *Escuela de Economía para Graduados* (later Programa de Economía para Graduados, PEG). By regional standards, Colombia trailed countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, where universities offered graduate degrees in economics since the 1950s.[647] Until the late 1970s, the PEG was the only alternative for receiving advanced training in economics locally, which accentuated the protagonism the economics department at UniAndes was acquiring in the profession during the 1960s.

Economists' concern for postgraduate education, as the PEG illustrates well, responded to the profession's desire to both raise its academic credentials and supply

[646] Prospective faculty of the economic departments at UniAndes and the UNal obtained loans from these funding bodies to pursue graduate degrees in the United States, Europe, and Latin America. See Acta 4-62, 4 May 1962, CD-UADA; García "Tres debates," 444.,

[647] By 1960, only six universities offered postgraduate degrees in economics in Latin America, four of them were in Brazil, one in Argentina and one in Chile. Ellis et al. "La enseñanza de la economía en la América Latina," 65–76

technically skilled employees to the state. According to the dean Eduardo Wiesner, the economics department envisioned the creation of a graduate programme in economics since 1960 as a solution to "the urgent demand that Colombia had —and still has — for a select group of well-trained economists at the graduate level."[648] With that objective in mind, UniAndes reached an agreement with the University of Minnesota to design the curriculum for the graduate programme. Four visiting Minnesota professors assisted the PEG for three years to conform a faculty "trained in the techniques of modern economic theory" and "strengthen and expand research in economics."[649] The resulting curriculum placed a strong emphasis on mathematical economics,[650] in line with contemporary disciplinary trends in the postgraduate education of economists in the United States.[651] While the Minnesota professors considered that the education of economic specialists required strong quantitative foundations, the mathematical training that local economists received in the early 1960s at the undergraduate level was deemed very basic. In the first year of the programme, George F. Hadley visited UniAndes from Minnesota to teach a preparatory course on "Mathematics for Economists," which comprised both calculus and linear algebra, and an advanced course (Mathematics II) that addressed the application of linear and non-linear programming to "the problems of industry and government."[652] The agreement with the University of Minnesota and the quantitative emphasis of the PEG's curriculum reveal the economics department's desire to give a markedly academic orientation to the programme.

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[648] Wiesner Durán, *Los estudios de posgrado en economía*, 2.
[649] "Agreement between The Universidad de los Andes and the University of Minnesota," 12 June 1963, folder 745, box 79, FF-RFR.
[650] Lauchlin Currie, "Informe del visitador Lauchlin Currie sobre la Escuela para Graduados, Universidad de los Andes," 5 April 1964, I-UADA, 12-13.
[651] See Orozco-Espinel, "How Mathematical Economics Became (Simply) Economics."
[652] Lauchlin Currie, "Informe del visitador Lauchlin Currie," 5 April 1964, I-UADA, 27-29.

Yet as Wiesner told an audience of Latin American economists, the graduate programme also aimed at educating a "governing cadre."[653] From early on, the PEG worked as a buffer between the economics department and state institutions. The Facultad de Economía signed an agreement with the planning department to provide advanced training for its technical staff. In 1968, fifty-eight employees were enrolled in the PEG taking advanced courses in mathematics, micro and macro-economics, and English.[654] The creation of the PEG therefore exemplified the Facultad de Economía's attempt to adopt international academic disciplinary standards without renouncing to its desire of training practically oriented government economists.

Some contemporaries doubted that both objectives could be achieved simultaneously. When ASCUN commissioned Currie to write a report about the new graduate degree in 1964, the head of the IBRD mission of 1949 (Chapter 2) evaluated the programme favourably but warned against the curriculum's "quantitative and mathematical approach to economics." Currie observed with concern that undergraduate programmes were taking a similar turn, not only in UniAndes, but also in the UNal and the new economics degree of the Universidad del Rosario, under the influence of its dean Alvaro Daza, MSc alumnus of the University of Vanderbilt.[655] Currie opposed giving excessive emphasis to quantitative techniques at the undergraduate level —particularly econometrics— because this came, in his view, at the expense of a solid theoretical outlook. Currie's disagreement with young Colombian economists trained in the US like Daza[656] mapped the generational break that accompanied the post-war transformation of

[653] Wiesner, *Estudios de posgrado en economía*, 2.
[654] Harvard Development Advisory Service (DAS), "Report July-September 1968," n.d., R4661, DAS-FFR.
[655] Currie, "Informe del Visitador Lauchlin Currie," 24.
[656] Chaparro, "El debate Currie-Daza", 93–115.

North American economics.[657] In Currie's report about the PEG, however, his main concern about the quantitative turn in the graduate training of economists was context specific. It had to do with the misalignment between the economist toolkit and the tasks for which they were most needed in contexts where specialists in the discipline were scarce. According to Currie, economists in developing countries like Colombia were typically called to address policy issues that required urgent solution, which needed "intuitive judgement" and left "very little margin for the use of advanced statistical techniques." In his view, students developed that intuitive judgement by learning economic theory and history. Hence, Currie proposed amending the curriculum to include compulsory courses in economic theory and the history of economic thought, and to make those in mathematical economics electives. He also emphasised the importance of appointing a professor for the courses of economic history who was able to discern the "interrelations and intersections between politics, society and the economy" which he deemed as difficult as making "accurate predictions."[658] Currie's report shows that there was some degree of resistance in Colombia to the uncritical assimilation of international disciplinary trends in the education of economists, at least among those who, like Currie, considered that the objective of graduate education was rather to train policy experts, not academic economists.

Even if the Minnesota group spent only three years at UniAndes, it left —pace Currie— its imprint on the graduate degree by both defining the orientation of the programme and leaving behind a cohort of pupils with a strong quantitative approach to economics. When former PEG students Manuel Ramírez and Eduardo Sarmiento finished

[657] Morgan and Rutherford, "American Economics."
[658] Currie, "Informe del Visitador Lauchlin Currie," 17-18.

their doctoral studies in the United States, sponsored by the US Agency for International Development (AID) under the Minnesota contract, they joined the faculty of the economics department to teach in the graduate programme. Ramirez (PhD candidate, Yale) taught "Applied Mathematical Analysis" and "Advanced Economic analysis" while Eduardo Sarmiento (PhD, U. Minnesota, 1971) oversaw "Advanced econometric analysis." However, the list of courses the PEG offered in 1970 shows that the graduate program was also aimed at government economists. Policy-oriented courses on monetary and fiscal matters, and public investments were taught by government employees who worked simultaneously at the planning department and the Monetary Board.[659]

As the economics profession enhanced its academic reputation by becoming more technical while it strengthened its bonds with the state, it attracted professionals without previous training in the discipline, particularly engineers. Before the education of economics institutionalised in universities, the engineering profession supplied the expertise for performing the most technical tasks of economic management. In the absence of professional economists, engineers filled the technical staff and directive positions of the central bank and the General Comptroller ever since these institutions were created in the 1920s (Chapter 1). By the end of the 1960s, engineers came to share with professional economists the direction of the technical divisions and sub-divisions of the planning department.[660] It was not by coincidence that most of the students that enrolled in the PEG in its first year, including Ramírez and Sarmiento, had undergraduate degrees in engineering.[661] The synergies between the economics department at UniAndes

[659] Facultad de Economía, "Segundo informe anual de la Facultad de Economía presentado a la Fundación Ford," 1970, I-UADA, 6-7.
[660] See, for example, n.a.,"Roaster of Planeación" 8 March 1967, Reel 4661, DAS-FFR.
[661] Diary Notes by Rondo Cameron, 17 November 1965, box 79, folder 746, P-RFR.

and the engineering profession dated back to the beginning of the 1960s, when Jorge Ruiz Lara and young teachers from that department were asked to deliver introductory courses in economics to students in engineering at UniAndes and the UNal, and to the members of the Colombian Society of Engineers. By the mid-1960s, the economics department's course on "Principles in Economics" had become compulsory for all engineering students at UniAndes— providing an important source of income for the Facultad de Economía, which had then a relatively small student body. These pre-existing links facilitated, according to one of the PEG's directors during the 1960s, the influx of engineers to the new postgraduate program.[662]

The PEG also offered engineers, who had arguably a stronger quantitative training than economists at the time, a career path into a profession whose expertise was on demand. In a letter to the Rockefeller Foundation, the coordinator of the Minnesota group John Buttrick explained why the influx of engineers was a good sign for the standing of economics, which was still a relatively new profession:

> Because an engineering degree carries in Colombia vastly more prestige than, for example, a degree of *economista* or *abogado*. For this reason, a great many good students (in most cases of los Andes or Nacional) take an engineering degree even though they have no intention of practicing this profession. Of the best students in our program, all but two have engineering degrees, and the two exceptions started in colleges as engineers. A program for advanced training in Colombia, should, therefore, provide an avenue for engineers to change academic careers.[663]

In a context in which economic departments were relatively new, postgraduate programs like the PEG were the entry point to the profession for many who would later be unambiguously identified as economists. The close relationship between academic departments and the state, as exemplified by the links between the PEG and the planning

[662] Interviews with Max Rodríguez Fadul, director of the PEG in the late 1960s, 14 September 2020; and Lucía Cruz de Schlessinger, professor in Economics at Uniandes, 5 December 2020.
[663] Thompson to Buttrick, 20 January 1966, box 79, folder 746, P-RFR.

department, also played an important role in these career transitions. The early trajectory of Guillermo Perry,[664] future Minister of Finance (1994-1996), is illustrative but by no means not exceptional. By 1970, students without previous training in economics still accounted for the majority of those admitted to the PEG (12/18). Most of them (8/12) had not studied at UniAndes before, which reinforces the proposition that the economics department of that university became a focal point for aspiring specialists in economics.[665]

4.3. Philanthropic Foundations and the Internationalisation of Economics

While the state's demand for technical experts shaped the orientation of economics education in the leading university department in Colombia in the 1960s, philanthropic foundations played a key role in building the institutional infrastructure that linked a hitherto national professional community to the increasingly transnational discipline of economics. Through the creation of research centres, the patronage of visiting professors, and the allocation of scholarships for pursuing graduate studies abroad, US-based philanthropic foundations, mainly the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, contributed to the assimilation of international disciplinary standards in local economics departments.

[664] An electrical engineer from UniAndes, Perry joined the infrastructural unit of the planning department shortly after graduating. As employee of the planning department, Perry enrolled in the PEG. Shortly after he received a scholarship from AID and the Ford Foundation to pursue doctoral studies in Operational Research at the MIT. Upon his return from Cambridge in 1970, Perry was appointed director of the planning department's budget coordination unit. Perry went on to have a successful career as economist. See Perry and López-Giraldo *Decidí Contarlo*; and DAS, "Progress Report of the Harvard-Colombia Advisory Group", March 1970, R4248, DAS-FFR.

[665] Facultad de Economía, "Segundo Informe Anual," 8.

Overall, the dominant trends in the education of economists in the United States became a normative referent for the leading economics departments in Colombia through the intercession of philanthropic foundations. However, a careful analysis of the grants that the Rockefeller and Ford foundations appropriated to the economics departments at UniAndes, UniValle and the UNal also reveals how apparently similar internationalisation strategies yielded dissimilar outcomes under different scenarios.

4.3.1. The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations as Sponsors of Economic Education and Research

It was not by chance that US-based philanthropic institutions became one of the main sponsors of economics in Colombia after the Rockefeller Foundation allocated its first grant for the creation of the Centro de Estudios en Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) at UniAndes in April 1958.[666] Within the Rockefeller and the Ford Foundations, the end of World War II led to a re-examination of the foundation's grant policies. After sponsoring 'basic' research in economics during the interwar period, the Rockefeller's Social Sciences Division turned its attention to the problems of less developed countries.[667] In 1957, the Rockefeller appropriated its first three grants for the development of economics departments and research centres in Latin America.[668] These grants, particularly the

[666] Álvarez, Guiot-Isaac, and Hurtado, "La formación de una tecnocracia económica," 53–56.
[667] The Ford's Foundation' program area on Economic Development and Administration, formalized in 1953, "assumed the Rockefeller mantle" in recognition of the foundation's historical leadership in the field. Geiger, *Research and Relevant Knowledge*, 99-100.
[668] The Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, and the Universidad Católica and the Universidad de Chile. See Rockefeller Foundation, "Annual Report, 1957," 193, 195, 202.

foundation's flagship program in the Universidad Católica de Chile,[669] became a referent for the projects the Rockefeller sponsored in Colombia. Yet, the influence of the Rockefeller's previous experiences was less pronounced in UniAndes than it was in UniValle, where the collaboration between the Universidad Católica and the University of Chicago provided both a model and the manpower for the creation of the Centro de Investigaciones sobre Desarrollo Económico (CIDE) in Cali (Table 2 below).

From its first incursion in Latin America in 1960, the key priority for the Ford Foundation was to change the face of higher education in the region. In an exploratory report commissioned by the Ford to survey the developmental problems in Latin America, a group of prominent social scientists based in the University of Yale identified the overall "weakness of university education" as one of the most pressing issues in the region.[670] During the 1960s, the Ford became the main sponsor of general education attempting to break with the compartmentalization of the professions that allegedly characterized the typical Latin American universities.[671] Trascending the understanding of the university as a "loose federation of schools and faculties" became the reformers' motto in the first half of that decade.[672] UniAndes and UniValle assumed the leadership of this top-down university reform project and submitted a joint proposal to the Ford for creating a basic studies programs that contributed to the integration of academic units and to counter the professionalising trend of higher education. The Ford appropriated in 1961 its first grants

[669] Between the 1960s and the 1980s, over 150 Chileans received postgraduate training in Chicago, most of them from the Universidad Católica. Valdés, *Pinochet's Economists*, 127–32 and Biglaiser, *Guardians of the Nation?*, 272

[670] James W. Fesler, Albert O. Hirschman, Sidney W. Mintz, Robert Triffin, Henry C. Wallich, Lloyd G. Reynolds, "A Report to the Ford Foundation concerning Program Possibilities in Latin America," 30 June 1958, Catalogued Report 000066, CR-FFR.

[671] See Atcon, *The Latin American University*, 29.

[672] Wickham, "University Reform in Latin America," 22.

in Colombia to both universities for the development of a "school of basic studies".[673] By promoting the integration of academic departments, these initial Ford grants had an indirect but important influence on the education of economics. At UniAndes, for instance, the resulting School of Arts and Sciences strengthened the mathematical training of economists in the economics department, exposed students in economics to subjects in the humanities like political and economic history and facilitated the cross-fertilization with students from other departments.[674]

Ford's integrationist aspiration also found an expression in the creation of the Division of Human Sciences at the UNal in 1966, which merged the department of economics with other six departments in the social sciences and the humanities, including sociology.[675] By rationalising university administration, the so-called *Reforma Patiño*, attempted to institutionalise the academic profession, or as one participant in the reform put it, to "create the profession of university professor as such."[676] Notably, it was supported by young professors and the student movement.[677] This reform offered the Ford Foundation, as Currie wrote in a report dated August 1966, a unique opportunity "to bring about a truly major reform in the largest university of the country." In his capacity of director of the division's new interdisciplinary research centre, the Centro de

[673] R. Frodin, J. L. Morrill, J. H. Rushton, "Recommendations for Aid to Higher education in Colombia", January 1961, Catalogued Report 000012, CR/FFR.
[674] The faculty from the School of Arts and Sciences taught students from the economics department general courses in calculus and linear algebra and a specific course in "calculus for economists." See, "Memorando Daniel Peñaranda a Consejo Académico de la Universidad," Acta #83-65, CA-SG-UADA; "Tentative request for a grant to the Ford Foundation for the Consolidation of the School of Arts and Sciences of the University of the Andes," 6 December 1966, I-UADA.
[675] Acuerdo Número 71, Acta no. 22, 18 May 1966, CS-ACHUN.
[676] Quoted in Briceño, "University Reform, Social Conflict, and the Intellectuals," 144.
[677] Briceño, 114–15; Archila, "El movimiento estudiantil en Colombia," 80; Hernández Gamarra, *Relatos de los oficios y los días*, 108.

Investigaciones para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (later known as CID),[678] Currie urged the foundation to support the creation of a "Graduate School or Schools in the Social sciences, forwarding integration at a more advanced level."[679] Although this idea never came to fruition, Ford appropriated in 1968 a grant to the UNal to support for three years the staffing of the economics department and the CID. Simultaneously, UniAndes received a Ford grant with funds earmarked for three fellowships to strengthen the teaching capacities of its graduate program in economics.

Table 2. Rockefeller and Ford grants to economics departments in Colombia, 1958-1971

Recipient	**Donor**	**Grant(s) duration**	**Visiting professors**	**Fellowships**
UniAndes	Rockefeller	1958-1964	2	11
	Ford	1968-1971	1	3
UniValle	Rockefeller	1963-1967	8	11
UNal	Ford	1968-1971	4	8

Sources: Rockefeller Foundation, "Annual Reports, 1957-1966, 1969"; Ford Foundation, "Annual Reports, 1968"; Facultad de Economía, "Second Report;" and Reed Hertford, "Final Report – Evaluation: National University, Faculty of Economics and CID," 8 January 1973, R3402, DAS-FFR.

Between 1958 and 1971, the Rockefeller and the Ford appropriated grants to the economics departments of UniAndes, UniValle and the UNal for strengthening education

[678] Created under Acuerdo 47, 1966, CS-ACHUN.
[679] Lauchlin Currie, "The Possibility of a Breakthrough in Higher Education in Colombia," 17 August 1966, R3402, UNal-FFR, 4.

and research in economics. Although these grants were earmarked for different purposes, such as visiting professorships, student scholarships, bibliographical resources, and research equipment, they shared two underlying assumptions. Firstly, foundation officers expected that promoting academic research through the creation of specialised centres such as the CEDE, CIDE and CID would have positive spillover effects on the education of local economists. Besides becoming hubs for producing local knowledge about economic development, research centres were considered a solution to retaining full-time faculty. Secondly, Ford and Rockefeller grants were grounded on the idea that fostering exchanges with economics departments in the United States would raise the academic standards of both economic research and education in Colombian universities. Those exchanges included prolonged stays from visiting professors and the allocation of scholarships to Colombian economists for studying abroad. During those years, (1958-1971) the Ford and Rockefeller foundations gave at least thirty-three fellowships to students from UniAndes, UniValle, and the UNal to pursue graduate studies in the United States (Table 3, Appendix B).

Foundation officials considered both disciplinary and area expertise when they brokered connections between their grantees and economic departments in the United States. The foundations, particularly the Rockefeller, relied on the networks of scholars, academic departments, and research centres they built after three decades sponsoring economic research in the United States. In the post-war period, those networks expanded to include Latin Americanist specialists based in US universities, a by-product of the area studies initiatives financed by the Ford.[680] The strong disciplinary orientation that

[680] Delpar, *Looking South*, 159–62.

characterised the collaboration between the Universidad Católica in Chile and the University of Chicago[681] was not a common characteristic of all the programs in economics that philanthropic foundations sponsored in Latin America. In some cases, such as the long-lasting cooperation between Brazilian universities and Vanderbilt University sponsored by the Ford, the "area interest" predominated over the disciplinary focus.[682] Overall, the programs that the Rockefeller and the Ford funded in Colombia offered a nuanced picture. As shown below, no single collaboration left an indelible mark in the profession comparable to that Chicago and Vanderbilt left in the Chilean and Brazilian cases.

Philanthropic foundations were not the exclusive patrons of economic research and education in Colombia during the 1960s. The Alliance for Progress not only created a state demand for economic expertise to negotiate foreign loans and coordinate public investments, but also made available financial resources for the training of economists through AID.[683] The projects that philanthropic foundations sponsored in Colombia intersected those funded by US government agencies,[684] but this does not imply they were mere instruments of US soft power, as Parmar suggested.[685] Rather the Rockefeller and Ford operated within a broader funding ecosystem that was intellectually anchored in shared assumptions about the association between technical education, modernization, and development.[686] To a certain degree, the consensus that underlaid the cooperation

[681] Valdés, *Pinochet's Economists*, 145–46.
[682] Suprinyak and Fernández, "The 'Vanderbilt Boys' and the Modernization of Brazilian Economics," 914.
[683] As shown in section 2, AID sponsored the graduate program of UniAndes.
[684] For example, Ford, US AID and the IADB supported the on-the-job training of economists in the planning department. See Chapter 5 of this thesis.
[685] See Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*.
[686] Solovey, *Shaky Foundations*, 115; Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, 16.

between different US donors in the sponsorship of economics in Colombia was that the formation of a new technocratic elite would be a catalyst for economic and social change.

4.3.2. From the 'Chicago Boys' to the 'Rover Boys': The Rockefeller at the Universidad del Valle

Created in 1958 upon the request of regional business elites,[687] the Facultad de Ciencias Economicas at UniValle was the newest of the programs sponsored by the philanthropic foundations. The dynamism of the Cauca valley in the 1950s captured the attention of the Social Sciences Division of the Rockefeller foundation, which throughout the 1960s invested heavily in the development of the public university of that region. In 1962, a Rockefeller envoy observed that the economics department at UniValle was remarkably well staffed by Latin American standards but suffered from a lack of leadership after its founder and dean, Antonio Posada, resigned in reaction to student strikes.[688] In search of guidance, the Rockefeller turned to the University of Chicago, building on its previous experiences with the Universidad Católica de Chile and the Universidad de Cuyo, a state regional university in the province of Mendoza, Argentina.[689] Between 1963 and 1968, Rockefeller sponsored three Latin American PhD candidates from the University of Chicago to teach at UniValle: Sergio de Castro (1963-1964), Luis Arturo Fuenzalida (1965-1967), and Alberto Musalem (1968).[690] Fuenzalida was also the first director

[687] Mayor Mora and Zambrano, *Economistas antiguos*, 45–46.
[688] "Report of Robert S. Smith on a visit to Cali" 3-12 October 1962", box 78, folder 720, P-RFR.
[689] For the Project Cuyo see Sjaastad "Programa Cuyo."
[690] De Castro and Fuenzalida had been Rockefeller fellows from the Universidad Católica, while Musalem participated in the Cuyo project. Alberto Núñez (PhD candidate, Chicago), from Panama, arrived with Ford support. "Allocation # 27, RF61153", 15 August 1963, box 75,

(1965-1966) of the CIDE, UniValle's economic research centre. Six students from UniValle, out of the eleven that received scholarships from the Rockefeller Foundation, pursued a PhD in the University of Chicago (Table 3, Appendix B).

The Rockefeller experience at UniValle demonstrated how similar strategies of internationalisation yielded different outcomes depending on the local institutional contexts. The collaboration between UniValle and the University of Chicago was short-lived and the scholarship program did not yield the same results of the Rockefeller projects in Chile and Argentina, despite visiting professors' active attempts to build a Chicago school in Cali. Prospective candidates were submitted to an intense training, oversaw by Fuenzalida and other visiting professors, that aimed to prepare them for graduate study in Chicago. Among other tasks, the preparation included reading Stigler's *The Theory of Price* and resolving all the problem sets in that book.[691] De Castro recognized that, given their career expectations, his students in Cali, who had diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, "suspected theory" and preferred instead to be taught "how to DO specific things which will allow them to perform something of concrete value to the economy." Yet, he expressed the conviction that with the proper training they could be persuaded that Chicago's theoretically driven approach was "'the kind of Economics'" that was right for them.[692]

In May 1965, the Rockefeller hired Arnold Harberger as short-term consultant to assist the graduate training of Colombian students in Chicago.[693] Harberger was expected

folder 712; "Allocation #71, RF64095," 2 August 1965, box 75, folder 714; Reinaldo Scarpetta to Roger Biringer, 8 February 1969, box 75, folder 715, P-RFR.

[691] Mayor Mora and Zambrano, *Economistas antiguos*, 443–44.

[692] De Castro to CMH, 17 February 1964, box 75, folder 712, P-RFR.

[693] Memorandum of Consultation Agreement- Harberger, 18 May 1965, box 74, folder 706, P-RFR.

to stop in Cali on his way to Chile and Argentina to interview candidates but cancelled his trip at the last minute and rescinded his contract.[694] Fuenzalida, Harberger's former student, personally selected four students to pursue a PhD in Chicago. The information registered in their application form indicates that they did not necessarily come from privileged backgrounds. Three of them attended state-funded high schools before enrolling in UniValle, a marker itself of social mobility at the time. Unlike other Rockefeller fellows, none of them reported having previous experiences in the United States.[695] A Rockefeller officer expressed that he had "mixed feelings about these boys,"[696] but he was reassured that the economics department at Chicago was prepared for the job: "They take inadequately trained material and turn out well-trained people and maintain the standards at the output level. This, Al [Harberger] is prepared to do for Cali."[697] Two years later, all four candidates had deserted without even qualifying for a master's degree. Harberger remarked in the graduate record of one of these students that their "English" level was a major difficulty, adding in a coldly hand-written note that their "poor background" and "inadequate intellectual capacity" were also to blame for their bad performance.[698] In the Rockefeller's reports and correspondence, the group of students from the UniValle were referred to as the "Rover Boys at Chicago" in allusion to Arthur M. Winfield's early twentieth century popular juvenile series that narrated the pranks of a group of untameable youngsters at a military boarding school.[699]

[694] Recision of Consultation Agreement- Harberger, 30 July 1965, box 74, folder 706, P-RFR.
[695] Box 123, folder 2192; Box 129, folder 248; box 139, folder 2253; box 155, folder 2434, F-RFR
[696] De Rycke to Hayes, 30 March 1965, box 129, folder 2148, F-RFR.
[697] Davidson (RKD) to DeRycke, 8 April 1965, box 133, folder 2192, F-RFR.
[698] Arnold Harberger, "Evaluation of Graduate Study," box 129, folder 2148, F-RFR.
[699] JMD's diary notes, May 1966, box 129, folder 2148, F-RFR. The allusion to the Chicago and the Rover *Boys* also reveals the gender dimension of the educational exchanges sponsored by the philanthropic foundations. Women economists with caring responsibilities were in a

These prejudiced remarks obscured how misguided had been the attempt to use the collaboration between the University of Chicago and the Universidad Católica as a model for UniValle. The case of the Rover Boys also illustrates how exceptional the experience of the Chilean Chicago Boys was. Due to their different life experiences and socioeconomic backgrounds, the students from the UniValle faced bigger challenges than the Chilean Chicago Boys in assimilating to student life in Chicago, as they experienced more difficulties surmounting the language barrier, navigating an alien academic culture, and relocating with their families to a new country.[700] The students from UniValle also expressed concerns about the type of economics education they received at Chicago and expected the Rockefeller foundation to facilitate their transfer to Harvard after the first year of studies.[701] This expectation was probably nurtured by the experience of Antonio Urdinola, later Minister of Finance (1998). Before graduating in economics from UniAndes, Urdinola had completed high school in the United States and studied one year at Harvard, which suggests that his starting position differed from that of the Rover Boys. In 1963 he received a Rockefeller fellowship in his capacity of professor at UniValle to study in Chicago. After passing his winter exams with solid marks, Urdinola requested a transfer to Harvard, arguing that there were no faculty in Chicago who specialized in his field of interest, the "dynamic aspects of economic growth."[702] As a Rockefeller officer registered, at Harvard, Urdinola would "be able to work the kind of economics that he

disadvantaged position vis-a-vis their male peers to benefit from these opportunities to acquire international credentials. Clara Elsa Villalba and Cecilia López Montaño, who graduated respectively from UNal (1967) and UniAndes (1970) cited their caring responsibilities as the main reason for rejecting scholarships to study abroad in my interviews with them (4 November 2020 and 3 December 2020). For an analysis of the internationalisation of economics during this period from a gender perspective, see Guiot-Isaac and Orozco-Espinel, "Climbing the Obelisk."

[700] Transcript of telephone interview with Greg Lewis, 5 January 1965, box 133, folder 2192, F-RFR.

[701] Excerpt from GHS diary, 9-19 August 1965, box 133, folder 2192, F-RFR.

[702] Urdinola to Compton, 2 April 1964, folder 2476, box 159, F-RFR.

believes fits the situation in Colombia much better than the work he was doing at Chicago."[703] Harvard's research program on the quantitative aspects of economic growth in the 1960s was more amenable to address the development issues that interested Colombian students than Chicago's strong mathematical emphasis on microeconomics.[704]

The Rockefeller and UniValle soon understood that Chicago-style economics was not the way to go in Cali. After 1967, the economics department at UniValle turned its attention away from a general program in economics to focus on its pioneering Ford-sponsored business management graduate degree and its program on agricultural economics, which continued receiving Rockefeller support until the early 1970s.[705] It was in shaping these fields and not precisely that of economics that philanthropic foundations had a lasting impact at UniValle.

4.3.3. Sponsoring Applied Research in Economic Development: The Rockefeller at the Universidad de los Andes

In contrast to the program at the UniValle, Rockefeller's internationalisation strategy at UniAndes appeared to be, from the foundation's perspective, more successful in achieving its goals. Nine of the eleven Colombian students from UniAndes whom Rockefeller sponsored to purse advanced studies in the United States obtained a graduate

[703] Interview with JPP, 18 June 1964, box 159, folder 2476, F-RFR.
[704] For applied research on economic development at Harvard, see Syrquin, "Quantifying Economic Development."
[705] Karsten Laursen and Lester D. Taylor, "Economics at the Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia," 30 October 1967, Reel 3395, DAS-FFR. See also Offner, *Sorting Out*, 139–42, 144–71.

degree. In explaining the difference in outcomes between the grants to UniAndes and UniValle, the nature of these institutions, one private the other public, might have played a role through their respective students' initial endowment of social and cultural capital. From the Rockefeller fellows sponsored in UniAndes, only one of them had attended a state-funded high school. The rest had completed secondary education either in renowned private high schools in Bogotá and Barranquilla, or in private academies in the United States. Jorge Ruiz Lara (U. Illinois, BA, 1954) and Miguel Urrutia (Harvard, BA, 1961)[706] had obtained their undergraduate degrees from US universities. Given their shared privileged backgrounds and previous educational experiences, UniAndes fellows were arguably better equipped to confront the language and cultural barriers that were constitutive, not merely accessory, of the academic exchanges philanthropic foundations promoted between economics departments in Colombia and the United States.[707] To smooth the transition, the Rockefeller sponsored Colombian economists to attend a summer school in the Economics Institute of the University of Colorado, in Boulder, which attempted to give foreign students an opportunity to improve their English, strengthen their theoretical foundations and meet other international students.[708]

[706] Director of the National Planning Department (1974-77) and general manager of the Banco de la República (1993-2005).

[707] The role that cultural capital endowments had on shaping student educational exchanges was not exclusive to the case of the Uniandes Rockefeller Fellows. It was relatively common among well-to-do families in the 1950s to send their children to the United States to complete the last years of high school in private academies. Having had previous educational experiences in the United States was mentioned as a factor that influenced the decision to pursue postgraduate studies in specific North American universities by Antonio Urdinola (ABD Harvard, UniValle/Rockefeller Foundation) and Roberto Junguito (ABD Princeton, UniAndes/Population Council) in my interviews with them on 28 January 2021 and 9 September 2020. Other economists pursued advanced studies in economics in the United States because they had lived for prolonged periods in this country, as was the case of Haroldo Calvo, an Uniandes graduate who funded his postgraduate studies at the University of Pennsylvania with the support of his family. Interview with Haroldo Calvo, 13 January 2020.

[708] See, for example, "Appointment to attend Economics Institute for Foreign Graduate Students," box 154, folder 2427, F-RFR.

Rockefeller fellows were expected to rejoin the economics department at UniAndes after completing two years of studies at the master's level, even if some attempted to pursue a PhD. Jorge Ruiz Lara (U. Illinois, 1961) and Miguel Urrutia (UC Berkeley, 1967) were the only fellows who succeeded at obtaining a PhD. Only exceptionally the foundation considered extensions for doctoral studies. The rejection of Eduardo Wiesner's application to extend his scholarship for pursuing a PhD in Stanford illustrates why.[709] As a Rockefeller officer explained to dean Gómez, before attempting to obtain a PhD abroad, the department should encourage students like Wiesner to "get a tour of research and teaching which is long enough to bring them to grips with the problems in their home setting."[710] This position, which considered country-specific knowledge as important as disciplinary expertise, was consistent with the focus given to the national problems of economic development at the CEDE since its creation.

To direct the CEDE in 1958, the Rockefeller hired John Hunter, who was at the time the "Latin American specialist" at the Economics department of Michigan State University. A PhD from Harvard (1949), Hunter published during the 1950s various pieces on foreign trade and investment in Latin America.[711] One of his colleagues at Michigan State considered Hunter "to be closer to Arthur Lewis than most of the American development writers."[712] Hunter and his successor at CEDE, Wallace Atherton, who specialized in labour economics,[713] had a long-term impact on that centre's applied

[709] Wiesner was Urrutia's successor as director of the National Planning Department (1978-81) and the first professionally trained economist appointed as Minister of Finance (1981-82). See fn. 103.
[710] CMH to Gómez, 7 December 1963, box 161, folder 2498, F-RFR.
[711] Curriculum Vitae, John M. Hunter, April 1959, box 78, folder 740, P-RFR.
[712] Martin Bronfenbrenner to Everett Hagen, 3 December 1957, box 78, folder 740, P- RFR.
[713] Wallace Atherton CV, 13 May 1960, box 78, folder 742, P-RFR.

and empirically oriented research on economic development.[714] From its very first research contract with the Ministry of Economic Development, CEDE made it one of its main occupations to produce "basic economic data" that both researchers and policymakers could then use for economic analysis.[715]

Upon their return from the United States, the Colombian students funded by Rockefeller built on that legacy of applied economic research. From 1962 to 1971, CEDE was directed by three former Rockefeller fellows. In a memorandum dated October 1966, the centre was portrayed as a "pioneer" in applied fields such as labour economics, demographic studies, and urban and regional planning. The first periodical city-level survey on employment in Bogotá was conducted by CEDE researchers,[716] with the support from the Rockefeller and the central bank. CEDE then expanded, in collaboration with the planning department, the coverage of this survey to six additional cities. With the data and studies produced at CEDE, the memorandum argued, the economics department at UniAndes achieved political influence, positioning unemployment as a top issue in the economic agenda of the President (then candidate) Lleras Restrepo.[717]

While Rockefeller grants helped the economics department at UniAndes build closer links with the state through the data and analysis produced at the CEDE, some external observers casted doubts about their impact on the institutionalisation of economics in universities. The professors who visited Colombia to teach at the PEG voiced their criticisms about the Rockefeller grants, which they argued had done little to

[714] See Sánchez et al., *Historia del Cede*.
[715] Wallace N. Atherton, "Third Annual Report," 5.
[716] See Franco Camacho, *Investigaciones sobre desempleo en Colombia.*.
[717] Memorandum, "The Activities of CEDE and the Rockefeller Foundation," 5 October 1966, box 69, folder 746, P-RFR.

raise the academic standards of economics education at UniAndes. Minnesota professors Buttrick and Hofmeister expressed they had "low opinions of the undergraduate program in general, and the Faculty of Economics in particular."[718] Larry Saajstad, from the University of Chicago, considered that the undergraduate program did not offer an adequate preparation for the "heavy emphasis on theory, mathematics and statistics" that the Minnesota group gave to the PEG, which also helps to explain why most of its students came from disciplines other than economics, particularly engineering.[719]

Visiting professors also took issue with Rockefeller's internationalisation strategy. According to Buttrick, the nature of UniAndes as an elite private university and the criteria Rockefeller officers used to shortlist candidates –such as students' English proficiency– combined in benefiting students from advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds to receive advanced training in the United States.[720] For these students, the prospect of becoming full-time university professors, a position that was poorly remunerated and did not enjoy public recognition, was highly unattractive. Hence, once Rockefeller-sponsored economists joined the faculty at UniAndes, they were "not highly motivated for either research or teaching" but were instead "more concerned with their social status."[721] Fellows used their international degrees and research record at CEDE to leverage positions in government, leading to a high turnover of faculty in the economics department. Dean Wiesner (1965-1968) justified this outflow arguing that "one of our responsibilities is to try to permeate the upper branches of the public sector with very

[718] Diary Notes by Rondo Cameron, 17 November 1965, box 79, folder 746, P-RFR.
[719] RKD Diary, with Larry A. Saajstad (U. Chicago), 6 May 1966, box 79, folder 746, P-RFR.
[720] Confidential Report on Los Andes-Minnesota project, 22 December 1965, box 69, folder 746, P-RFR
[721] Diary Notes by Rondo Cameron, 17 November 1965, box 79, folder 746, P-RFR.

qualified economists"[722] Instead of making big efforts to retain personnel, Wiesner reached an agreement with the Population Council to finance demographic research in the economics department and offer a new round of scholarships for prospective researchers and teachers.[723]

To an extent, the strong bonds the economics department at UniAndes developed with the state through the CEDE was a curse in disguise for developing an academic community with exclusive dedication to research and teaching, as the Rockefeller had expected. As a foundation officer put it, at a time when economic expertise was on high demand in government, the one-way flow in the rotation of personnel between universities and the state was a "constant danger" for the consolidation of an academic community at the economics department.[724] The early experience with internationalisation at UniAndes created a path dependent trajectory in the subsequent evolution of the economics department and its research centre, which were positioned from early on as hotbeds of government economic experts in Colombia.

4.3.4. University Reform and the Rebellious Youth: The Ford at the Universidad Nacional

Several factors explain the relatively late involvement of philanthropic foundations in the economics department at the UNal. While UniAndes and UniValle represented the type of "modern" universities that the Ford and the Rockefeller foundations expected to make exemplary models for the region, to their eyes the UNal suffered from the ailments of the

[722] Wiesner to Davidson, 16 February 1966, box 79, folder 746, P-RFR.
[723] "Demographic grant. Universidad de los Andes", IV3B4. 3a, S2, box 60, folder 992, PCR.
[724] JMD diary, visit to Los Andes, 01 September 1966, box 79, folder 746, P-RFR.

"traditional" Latin American university, caught in between a struggle for control between the state, and the professorial and student bodies. At first, the philanthropic foundations abstained from appropriating funds to the social sciences at the UNal, with the notable exception of Ford's grants to Fals Borda's sociology program.[725] When dean Álvaro Daza asked the Ford in 1964 to support the department's Centro de Investigaciones Económicas (CIE), the CID's immediate precursor, the foundation rejected this request, alluding to the Ford's existing obligations with the "graduate school of sociology" and the "political and economic problems which confront the University."[726] In the 1960s, the frustration of the youth with the National Front political arrangement grew steadily— particularly in state-funded universities.[727] As the decade progressed, the student movement radicalized and its leaders adhered to alternative organizations that opposed the idea and practice of bi-partisan rule.[728] Student strikes in state-funded universities, often displaying anti-imperialist banners, became more frequent, which must have led Ford officers to consider with extreme care financing further projects in the UNal.

It was not until Currie linked the staffing needs of the economics department to Ford's interest in general education and interdisciplinary research, that the foundation considered sponsoring economics at the UNal. In the field of economics, the Ford had hitherto privileged investing on the on-the-job training of economists and since 1963 sponsored a technical assistance mission from the Harvard's Development Advisory Service (DAS) in the planning department (see Chapter 5).[729] According to the testimony of former student Alcides Gómez, Currie's brief tenure as dean of the economics

[725] Rusthon et al. "Recommendations for aid to higher education", 16-18.
[726] Daza to George Schyler, 6 April 1964; Schuyler to Daza, 13 May 1964, R3402, UNal-FFR.
[727] See Leal Buitrago, "La frustración política de una generación."
[728] Mauricio Archila, "El movimiento estudiantil," 84.
[729] See Chapter 5.

department and the integration of the department in the Faculty of Human Sciences were catalysers for the education of economics at the UNal. While economics students suddenly had the opportunity to take classes with Currie and Harvard professors from the DAS mission, like Karsten Laursen and Lester Taylor, they read Neo-Marxist and French structuralists social thinkers with their peers of the Human Sciences Faculty in the student campus.[730]

Although Currie's tenure was brief, the transformation of the economics department continued under the deanship of his successor Bernardo García. García had obtained his undergraduate degree in economics from the University of Louvaine (1964) and was a PhD candidate from the École de Hautes Études in Paris. He initiated a program to staff the faculty following an internationalisation strategy that resembled the one previously adopted by the departments at UniAndes and UniValle. Yet, this faculty training programme did not rely exclusively on sending students to pursue graduate degrees in US universities: some of the brightest students went instead to European and Latin American institutions.[731] The appointment in 1967 of the economist Jorge Méndez as rector of the UNal added credibility to the university's commitment to strengthening its economics department.

Given its prolonged involvement in the planning department, the Ford appeared to be more receptive than the Rockefeller to the symbiotic relationship that developed

[730] Gómez, "El ambiente para la reforma," 435.
[731] According to García's testimony, 17 students received scholarships during his tenure to pursue graduates abroad, which presumably included the 8 Ford fellows. Alberto Corchuelo obtained a graduate degree in development economics from ESCOLATINA in the Universidad de Chile (196?), while Gabriel Misas and Alcides Gómez both obtained a master's degree in economics from the University of Louvain in 1970 and 1971. Bernardo García, "Tres debates," 441, and interview with Gabriel Misas, 13 May 2022.

during the 1960s between economics departments and state institutions. When Ford's regional officers presented to the board of trustees a grant request to fund the programs at UniAndes and the UNal, it began by recognizing that there was "already [an] important linkage among the national planning agency" and those universities. Not only the Government had "in the past five years recruited its key planning personnel by raiding the economics staff of the two universities" but it was also starting to "look to the universities as a source of basic, policy-oriented research studies."[732] By the late 1960s, the legitimacy of economics as a source of expertise for informing and formulating government policy was beginning to sediment. State institutions like the Planning Department, the Ministry of Finance and the Monetary Junta actively sought economists from the leading economics departments of the country to advise the government on key policy issues.[733] Ford's grants took as point of departure the ground covered by a decade of Rockefeller sponsorship of economics in Colombia.

To coordinate the Ford grants, the foundation hired Albert Berry (PhD, Princeton, 1963). This was Berry's second visit to Colombia, where he had been in 1962-1963 to conduct research for the Economic Growth Center at the University of Yale, of which he was assistant director when the Ford approached him. Berry and the CID's new director Roberto Arenas (1967-1970) proved to be successful community builders. Citing the "acute" need for economists in government and state institutions' growing demand for policy-oriented research, Berry advocated in favour of strengthening the research centre at the UNal. In his view, the CID had a "good chance to be, right from the start, a better economic centre than Los Andes."[734] With Ford's support the CID could, according to

[732] David E. Bell to McGeorge Bundy, Request No. ID-204, 16 July 1968, R3402, UNal-FFR.
[733] See Chapter 5.
[734] Albert Berry to William Cotter, 2 April 1968, R3402, UNal-FFR.

Berry, build a strong academic community in a relatively short period of time. Unlike the CEDE one decade before, the CID did not have to start from scratch. The CID not only built on the institutional capacities of an existing research centre (the CIE), but it did not have to rely on the expertise of foreign economists. Following Berry's advice, the Ford covered the salary supplements of five "Colombian collaborators" to work at the centre for three years.[735] It also sponsored two Latin American visiting professors, one of whom was the Argentinian Guillermo Calvo (then PhD candidate at Yale), and granted eight scholarships to pursue doctoral studies in the United States (Table 3, Appendix B). The UNal committed to provide four additional scholarships. Berry got personally involved in the centre and the economics department. He taught several courses at the department and the centre's researchers training program and interviewed prospective scholarship candidates. He also co-coordinated two pioneering research projects on the economic effects of urbanisation and the distribution of agricultural income.[736]

In 1972, Ford officers concluded that, due to both reasons relating to timing and "problems of design," the grant to the economics department at the UNal "satisfied neither party to it."[737] This grim assessment was informed by the final grant report written by Reed Hertfort, who replaced Berry as adviser and taught agricultural economics at the department. Hertford's report outlined how student demonstrations, and the "hard-handed" response of the government, affected the work at the economics department and

[735]Between 1968 and 1971, the CID used Ford funds to higher four Colombian economists who had done doctoral studies in the United States: Antonio Hernández (ABD, Rice), Humberto Camargo (ABD, Yale), Pablo Salazar (ABD, Georgetown) and Francisco Thoumi (PhD, Minnesota). Reed Hertford, "Final Report-Evaluation, PA68-759", 8 January 1973, R3402, UNal-FFR, p.6.
[736] CID, report "Ford Foundation grant No. 68-759," 17 February 1972, p. 47, R3402, UNal-FFR
[737] John C. Farrell, 19 February 1972, "Closing Grant 68-759," UNal-FFR.

the research centre.[738] While the dilemma philanthropic foundations faced in other Latin American countries during the second half of the 1960s was whether to continue sponsoring economic research in universities that were under the grip of military dictatorships, in Colombia this question was posed by the reinvigoration and radicalisation of the student movement.

From the very beginning of Lleras Restrepo's administration (1966-1970), the relations between the government and the student movement were fraught. One of the main issues of contention for mobilised students was the "imperialist" intervention of foreign powers in higher education, of which they saw an expression in the involvement of US-based philanthropic foundations in both private and state-funded universities. Shortly after Lleras Restrepo's possession, radicalised students sabotaged a ceremony that the president presided in the university premises with Nelson Rockefeller as special guest. The president responded by enacting a decree that dissolved the student directory in the UNal and removed students' representatives from the university's governing body.[739] A student demonstration in UniValle that denounced the involvement of philanthropic foundations in that institution in 1969 sparked a new wave of protests that extended to both private and state-funded universities across the country. Young professors supported the demonstrations, demanding a bigger say in university affairs.[740] Against this background, Hertford reported that teaching at the department was constantly interrupted due either to student strikes or governmental decisions, and class attendance remained low. Between 1968 and 1971, the University had seven rectors and the CID had

[738] Reed Hertford, "Final Report-Evaluation, PA68-759", 8 January 1973, R3402, p.4, UNal-FFR.
[739] Hernández Gamarra, *Relatos de los oficios y los días*, 121.
[740] Briceño, "University Reform, Social Conflict, and the Intellectuals," 205.

four directors. This administrative instability impacted the continuity of the centre's research projects. After Arenas Bonilla resigned as CID's director in June 1970, research activities at the centre stalled.

The denouement of the Ford and the Rockefeller's involvement on state-funded universities in the 1960s revealed, to both foundation officers and university administrators, the limitations of attempting to build research centres in Colombian universities on the basis of imported conceptions of academe that were not easily translatable to the local institutional context. In the 1970s, the Ford shifted its attention to the sponsorship of independent economic research centres across Latin America,[741] like Fedesarrollo in Colombia, thus closing the chapter of the big philanthropic foundations' institution-building efforts in universities.

Even if the Ford grant to the economics department of the UNal did not yield the results foundation officers anticipated, it had unexpected outcomes that helped to shape the economics profession in Colombia. The short-lived experience of the CID in the late 1960s set the foundations for the formation of an academic community mainly composed of alumni from Colombia's main state-funded university. From the eight Ford fellows, only Antonio Hernández Gamarra (ABD, Rice) and Luis Eduardo Rosas (PhD, 1973, U. Brown) carried on pursuing doctoral studies.[742] Hertford reported that, given the administrative instability at the UNal in the early 1970s, only one of the Ford fellows was able to join the faculty at the economics department upon their return.[743] Finding no

[741] See Adelman and Fajardo, "Between Capitalism and Democracy," 7-9.
[742] Decades later, Hernández was appointed General Comptroller (2002-2006). Rosas directed the planning department (1973-74) and the Latin American institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) (1974-78).
[743] Reed Hertford, "Final Report-Evaluation, PA68-759", 8 January 1973, R3402, p.16-17, UNal-FFR.

prospects for a permanent position his alma mater, Hernández Gamarra accepted an offer to direct the economics department at UniValle in 1971. He recruited former colleagues from the UNal to renew the faculty and renovate the curriculum along the Ford and Currie's integrationist approach to the education of economics as a social science,[744] but the reform faced "insurmountable difficulties" given student representatives' demands for thorough consultation with the student body. Hernández Gamarra resigned shortly after but in the mid-1970s integrated the faculty of economics departments of the Universidad Externado de Colombia, together with other Ford fellows and younger graduates from the UNal.[745] A few years later, this group returned to their alma mater and formed the basis of the professorial body of the Faculty of Economic Sciences was reestablished in 1978.[746]

Ford's grant at the UNal allowed a more diverse group of economists, both in terms of their socioeconomic backgrounds and their intellectual outlook, to penetrate some of the institutional sites where Colombian technocrats legitimised their expert authority in the last quarter of the twentieth century, like the DANE and the DNP. This led Hertford to conclude his generally negative report with an optimist note. He considered that the Ford's internationalisation strategy, despite its shortcomings, had not been an utter failure because "all [Ford fellows] are productively employed in Colombia

[744] This group included Corchuelo, Misas, Hector Melo (MA, 1970, NSSR) and the historian Jorge Orlando Melo (MA, 1967, U. North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
[745] Among them Homero Cuevas (MA, 1974, McGill), Jesús Antonio Bejarano (MA, Development Economics, 1974, U. North Carolina), and Luis Bernardo Flórez (MA Development Economics, 1977, Hague International Institute of Social Sciences), director of the National Planning Department (1989-1990).
[746] Hernández Gamarra, *Relatos de los oficios y los días*, 138–39, 148–49.

and some are making rather significant contributions to policy research and management."[747]

In 1970, Bernardo García formed an interdisciplinary research group (SEPROCOL) at the DANE to produce empirical socioeconomic analyses. This group included some of his former students at the UNal, like Alberto Corchuelo and Gabriel Misas,[748] and Salomón Kalmanovitz, a PhD candidate at the New School for Social Research who in those years was an active Trotskyite militant. Kalmanovitz had lectured in economics at the UNal since his return from the United States in 1970 but was fired in 1972 due to his links with the Colombian "Socialist Bloc," together with around seventy faculty members who joined the student movement in the demonstrations of the early 1970s. According to Kalmanovitz, whose publications at the time had dealt with highly theoretical Neo-Marxist interpretations of the Colombian "agrarian question,"[749] the empirical nature of the work conducted at SEPROCOL and the requirement to write in the "rather neutral language" of official publications were a "formative school in controlling his dogmatic instincts."[750] The case of SEPROCOL illustrates the relative capacity of Colombia's emerging economic technocracy to accommodate economists coming from different intellectual and ideological traditions.

Another group of researchers involved in the CID at the UNal joined the DNP during the administration of Misael Pastrana (1970-1974). After leaving the directorship

[747] Reed Hertford, "Final Report-Evaluation", p.17, UNal-FFR.
[748] Interview with Gabriel Misas, 13 May 2022.
[749] See for example, Kalmanovitz, "La teoría marxista de la renta del suelo."
[750] Kalmanovitz would play an important role in rising the academic standards of the Faculty of Economic Sciences at the Universidad Nacional in the 1980s and early 1990s. He was also member of the Board of Governors of the Banco de la República (1993-2005) and a widely-read economic columnist for *El Espectador*. See Table 1, Appendix A. Interview with Salomón Kalmanovitz, 13 January 2020.

of the CID, Roberto Arenas was appointed to head the DNP in replacement of Jorge Ruiz Lara, who resigned following an incident that illustrated the tensions between *técnica* and *política* and will be analysed in the next chapter. Arenas recruited former researchers from the CID at the UNal to join the technical staff of the planning department. Currie and Berry served as his personal advisers. Only months before the Ford received Hertford's report, the Ford fellow Luis Eduardo Rosas was appointed head of the planning department in replacement of Arenas. He directed the institution between 1973 and 1974. According to the testimony of a *técnico* that worked for the Human Resources unit of the DNP in those years, the arrival of the professionals trained at the UNal brought to the department a "more humanist conception of development and a more highly developed political and social consciousness,"[751] which contrasted with the technocratic outlook of the economists recruited from Uniandes throughout the 1960s.Thusly, in an ironic twist, the two main programs in economics the Ford sponsored during the 1960s converged, at the exact moment when philanthropic foundations crowded out from the sponsorship of economics in Colombian universities.

4.4. Conclusion

The internationalisation of economics in Colombia during the National Front was shaped by three parallel developments. Firstly, the impulse that National Front governments gave to the expansion and modernisation of higher education, in the context of redemocratization, favoured the gradual transformation of universities into spaces

[751] Oscar Marulanda, written response to third interview form, 2 October 2020.

devoted to the production of technical and scientific knowledge about economic development. This process was reinforced by the intervention in universities of philanthropic foundations like the Rockefeller and the Ford Foundation, which among others became the main sponsors of economic education and research in Colombia during this period. Building on their previous experiences in the United States and other Latin American countries, the Rockefeller and the Ford appropriated grants to Colombian universities to fund scholarships, visiting professorships, and the establishment of research centres, all of which strengthened the links between a hitherto national professional community and the increasingly transnational discipline of economics. Lastly, the internationalisation of economics was driven and moulded by the state's demand for technically trained economists who could serve as interlocutors of the foreign experts and international institutions that aspired to make Colombia a showcase in development planning. The next chapter will elaborate on how the international financing landscape during the 1960s prompted the incorporation of economists at a young age into the Colombian state.

While the state's demand for economic specialists was an external driver for raising the academic standards of economic education in local universities, the internationalisation strategy that foreign (mainly US-based) funding bodies pursued in Colombia facilitated the circulation and assimilation of mainstream disciplinary trends in the education of economists. The exchanges and partnerships the AID, the Rockefeller and the Ford sponsored between economics departments in Colombia and the United States contributed to this process of mainstreaming. However, some aspects of this process found resistance among influential figures in the local educational scene, like Lauchlin Currie. While the separation between the economic science and business

administration was generally accepted and implemented in Colombian universities, the assimilation of the quantitative turn in economics education was a matter of contention, as Currie's critique of the mathematical orientation of the graduate programme of UniAndes exemplify. The prevalence of compulsory courses on economic history and the history of economic thought (or political economy) in the curriculum of modern-day Colombian economics departments attests to the resilience of literary subjects that no longer make part of the education of economists in the United States.[752] The debates about the formation of economic specialists in the 1960s revealed the tension between the oft-contradictory objectives of building a local academic community of economists attuned with international disciplinary standards and forming a cadre of government experts endowed with economic intuition and sensitivity about Colombia's economic history.

From a comparative perspective, no single institutional collaboration with foreign universities left an indelible mark on the profession, at least to the extent that scholars have documented for Chile and Brazil. Economics departments in Colombia engaged with academic programmes that in the 1960s still had —as local economists were aware of— marked differences in their approaches to economics, such as Minnesota, Chicago, Vanderbilt, and Harvard. Moreover, local students pursued postgraduate degrees in an even more diverse set of institutions. What brought together this generation of Colombian economists was not a common ideological or theoretical approach to economics, but the shared social experience of navigating academic life in a foreign country, mainly but not exclusively in the United States. More than any specific school, individual actors like Lauchlin Curie, John Hunter, and Albert Berry left a bigger imprint in the formation of

[752] I thank Andrés Álvarez, associate professor at UniAndes, for raising my awareness about this point.

this generation, by leading national debates about economics education, setting the direction of research agendas, and building academic communities. The overall outcome of the internationalisation of economics during the National Front was an economics profession that, without having established strong academic communities in universities, followed more closely international disciplinary trends and had a stronger foot on key state institutions.

Prominent figures in economic education, research, and policymaking during the last quarter of the twentieth century were a product of the internationalisation of economics under the National Front. Philanthropic foundations were not the only actors involved. During the National Front years, dozens of local economists pursued graduate degrees in universities in the United States, Europe and other Latin American countries financing their studies with either family or government support, or the sponsorship of other international funding bodies.[753] This first generation of internationally-trained economists eventually formed a critical mass of full-time professors and researchers in local universities, having a lasting impact on the formation of future cohorts of economists. A select group of economists from that generation reached top decision-making positions in government. Four Ministers of Finance (Wiesner, 1981-82; Junguito, 1984-85; Perry, 1994-96; and Urdinola, 1997-98), four directors of the National Planning Department (Ruiz Lara, 1970; Rosas, 1972-74; Urrutia, 1974-78; and Wiesner, 1978-81) and two of the longest serving general managers of the central bank (Ortega, 1985-1993;

[753] Other funding bodies include AID, the Fulbright commission, and foreign embassies. A systematic survey of the Colombian economists who pursued postgraduate studies abroad falls beyond the scope of this thesis. Meisel compiled a list of the Colombians who obtained PhDs degrees in economics in the second half of the twentieth century, but this selection criterion provides a limited view of the extent and reach of internationalisation. As shown in this chapter, many economists returned to Colombia without obtaining their degrees. Meisel "¿Por qué Colombia no ha tenido hiperinflación?," 134–35.

and Urrutia, 1993-2005) were former Ford, Rockefeller, and Population Council fellows. The next chapter examines how the institutionalisation of economic expertise in the Colombian state during the National Front set the basis for the rise of economic technocrats to position of power in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Chapter 5. Technocratising the State: The Case of the National Planning Department during the National Front

When Hugo Palacios Mejía, former Governor of *Banrep* (1982-1985), attended as a young graduate in economics and law a job interview in the National Planning Department (DNP), he remembered being told: "Here, we govern the country; if you come here, you will help us to govern the country."[754] During the National Front (1958-1974), an economic technocracy emerged in Colombia. By the end of the period, the presence and influence of economic experts in government was widely recognised. From a historical perspective, this outcome was far from being evident. Traditionally, practical knowledge about economic matters and political wit, and not technical expertise, had been the necessary and sufficient qualifications for economic policymakers (Chapter 1). In the post-war, this *status quo* came under scrutiny. In the 1950s, the state began to develop an institutional and statistical basis for rationalising economic interventions (Chapter 2), while the authority of economists became gradually recognized in the public arena (Chapter 3), as the profession became increasingly connected to international

[754] Palacios Mejía, who had recently obtained a master's degree in development economics from Vanderbilt University with a Fulbright scholarship after studying Law and Economics at the Universidad Javeriana, was not persuaded by this grandiloquent statement. He declined the offer to work for the DNP and joined instead a law firm with his fellow Conservative economist-lawyer Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, future Minister of Development (2000-2002). Palacios Mejía and Ramírez Ocampo were also active at that time in the Centro de Estudios Colombianos, a partisan think-tank —analogous to the SEAP studied in Chapter 3— that gathered Conservative intellectuals and professionals to discuss about national problems. The gamble paid off as Palacios Mejía was appointed Vice-Minister of Finance (1971-1973) when the Conservative party's turn in the National Front's alternation of power brought Misael Pastrana to the presidency. Palacios Mejía's appointments to the Governorship of the Banco de la República (1982-1985) and the Ministry of Finance (1985-1986) during the subsequent Conservative government of Belisario Betancourt attests to the continued influence on economic decision-making during the second-half of the twentieth century of economist-lawyers (c.f. Chapter 1) with a more overtly partisan profile and provides a counterpoint to economic technocrats' triumphalist narratives. See Table 1 in Appendix A. Interview with Hugo Palacios Mejía, 24 September 2020.

academic networks (Chapter 4). However, economic expertise had yet to be institutionalised, that is, embedded in the ordinary practices of state actors, in the functioning of public institutions, and in the consciousness of decision-makers. Development planning was at the centre of the build-up of an institutional infrastructure for expert interventions in the economy, of which the DNP became the key node.

This chapter studies how economic expertise became institutionalised during the National Front. It examines how economic experts penetrated the state bureaucracy and achieved positions of influence in decision-making bodies, through the lens of the rise of the DNP as a key player in economic governance. In the memory of economic technocrats, the DNP became, together with *Banrep* and the Ministry of Finance, the hotbed of technical expertise within the state.[755] The significance of the DNP lies in the fact that it was the first public institution that recruited, in a relatively large scale, technically trained professionals with international credentials. It became not only a technically equipped but also a politically influential institution. Through the intragovernmental movement of its *técnicos*, the planning department exported this new culture of expertise to other state institutions. An important number of *técnicos* who worked in the DNP during the late 1960s and early 1970s later reached top decision-making positions in the Colombian state.

Although the DNP's centrality during the second half of the twentieth century is generally acknowledged,[756] the process by which economic expertise was institutionalised and the wider significance this had on governmental practices in the long

[755] Perry and López Giraldo, *Decidí Contarlo*; Urrutia et al. 25-51, *Cincuenta Años, Departamento Nacional de Planeación*, 42; Roberto Junguito, *Cien Episodios*, 343–47; Álvarez et al. "Los orígenes de la tecnocracia colombiana."
[756] For a comparative analysis about the DNP's institutional stability and influence see Mejía Guinard, "The Changing Role," 126-147.

run require further scrutiny. This chapter situates the early development of the DNP within the broader transformation of the institutional infrastructure for economic policymaking in the state during the National Front. I show how both legal and organisational reforms, and changes in routinary governmental practices contributed to the expansion of economic experts' jurisdictions in decision-making processes, moulding a new technocratic arrangement of policymaking.

This instance of *technocratisation* of the Colombian state also allows me to explore how technical tools mediated the configuration of complex institutional arrangements in which a plurality of actors converged around the idea and practice of rationalising state interventions through development planning. In the late 1950s, development planning gained traction among international lenders and reformist governments in the Global South across the Cold-War political divide.[757] This success at gaining acceptability came at the cost of ambiguity, as there was no universal consensus about the meaning and role of planning in development. Different conceptions and methodologies about planning travelled across national boundaries with expert missions sponsored by philanthropic organisations, multilateral lenders, and governments in the Global North. As a practical framework for decision-making, development planning was a malleable tool that could be adapted according to each country's technical resources, institutional organization, and political objectives. Unlike other contemporary experiences, economic planning in Colombia was neither used by charismatic leaders and military juntas to pursue a nationalist agenda, nor it was considered incompatible with

[757] Morgan, "Technocratic Economics," 297. For country studies about contemporary experiences with development planning in Nigeria, Ghana, Turkey, Argentina and Brazil see Morgan, "'On a Mission' with Mutable Mobiles"; Serra, "From Scattered Data to Ideological Education," 309–35; Dekker, "Jan Tinbergen," 309-335; Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions*, 72–121; 122–70.

individual freedoms.[758] What some contemporaries in Colombia conceptualised as "democratic planning" had more to do with transforming the state into an efficient administrator of resources, and with calling forth and providing stimuli to private initiative, than with subjecting economic affairs to a predetermined rational order.

The experimentation with economic planning during the so-called 'development decade' of the 1960s had an additional significance because Colombia was simultaneously going through a redemocratisation process in which, arguably, persistent characteristics of the state's approach to democratic governance took shape. As Martin Conway has argued for post-war Western Europe, redemocratisation projects gave way to "managed" forms of democracy, in which depoliticised, technically qualified, bureaucracies were expected to play a central role in social coordination.[759] It is widely accepted that the mode of transition to democracy in Colombia as an inter-elite pact resembled contemporary European models of consociationalism, like those of Belgium and the Netherlands.[760] However, the possibility that the National Front might have represented a similar experiment of "managed" democracy, by transferring decision-making power to experts in key policy areas, has not received adequate attention in the historiography – with a few exceptions.[761] An overarching objective of this chapter is therefore to examine how technocratic institutional arrangements emerged under what the intellectuals, professionals, and political leaders that gave shape to the National Front

[758] Consider Serra's work on Nkrumah's Ghana and Dekker's analysis on Turkey under the National Unity Committee, cited above.
[759] Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*, 64.
[760] Hartlyn, *The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia*, 8-12.
[761] For example, see López-Pedreros analysis of the Escuela Superior de Administración Pública (ESAP) and Bejarano and Segura on Lleras Restrepo's constitutional reform of 1968. The need to analyse the role of economic institutions in the democratic restoration has also been recognized. López-Pedrero, *Makers of democracy*, 50-54; Bejarano and Segura, "La modernización selectiva del Estado." Caballero Argáez et al., *Cincuenta años de regreso a la democracia*, 30.

considered a genuine project of redemocratisation. Instead of using the Colombian case to theorise about instances of technocratic success,[762] I problematise the historical process of institutionalisation of economic expertise under a relatively democratic setting through analysing the conflicts that emerged between technical experts and political actors.

This chapter is organised in four sections after this introduction. The first section looks at what contemporaries understood by "democratic planning" and the functions this appellative played in post-transition Colombia, against the background of a changing international scenario in development finance in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution. The second section analyses how the government tried to institutionalise development planning by using legal instruments and foreign missions as mechanisms of institution-building. It also shows how the success of these strategies was limited by the National Planning Department's ability to recruit local experts. It then explores in the third section how the incorporation of economic experts in the planning department and the consequent institutionalisation of economic expertise transformed the relationship between technical reasoning, administration, and politics. The last section examines different dimensions of the conflict between *técnicos* and *políticos* to show how by the 1970s economic expertise had been effectively institutionalised in the state despite these tensions.

5.1. Development Planning and Democracy

In November 1958, the Colombian legislature inaugurated the return to democracy with the approval of an administrative reform bill creating the Departamento Administrativo de Planeación y Servicios Técnicos (DAP). Although the DAP was not the first planning

[762] Dargent, *Technocracy and Democracy*, 65-95.

body in Colombia, it was the first one born from a legislative project voted in Congress. After the constitutional reform of 1945, Congress assumed the legal responsibility to subject national economic development to technically elaborated plans. Following the IBRD Mission to Colombia of 1949, experts from overlapping technical assistance programmes collaborated with their local counterparts in the elaboration of a comprehensive development plan, but to no avail. According to Edgar Gutiérrez, DAP's director (1960-1962, 1966-1970), planning antecedents had suffered from a "lack of rapport between administrations and proposed programmes; the spirit and method of programmes was absent in the intrinsic sensibility of the state, or of incumbent governments."[763] As the country grappled with violence and the breakdown of democratic institutions in the 1950s, the Planning Office created after the IBRD Mission failed to produce a national development plan (Chapter 2). The bulky reports produced by subsequent missions from the IBRD, Cepal and the Économie et Humanisme association in Paris remained largely overlooked by the Rojas's military government.

With the restoration of democracy in 1958, the reorganisation of national planning was one of the first initiatives of the National Front ruling coalition. To avoid the failures of previous antecedents, authorities bestowed planning bodies with institutional capacities to collect and analyse data and to coordinate executive agencies. While the former Planning Office was a dependency of the presidency, the DAP was created as an administrative department. To some degree, this legal arrangement shielded this technical body from the sways of electoral politics. This transformation of the planning department into an independent administrative body responded to the aspiration of National Front

[763] Edgar Gutiérrez. "Discurso pronunciado por Edgar Gutiérrez en la ANDI," 25 June 1962, box 59, folder 31, No. 305, CD-DNP-AGN.

leaders to form a modern and efficient state bureaucracy. Next to the DAP, the administrative reform bill created the *Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Planeación* (CONPEP). While the DAP was conceived as an institution of "exclusively technical" nature, the CONPEP was a decision-making body in charge of coordinating economic policy at the national level. Unlike previous antecedents, like the Consejo Nacional de Planeación, the CONPEP was not merely a consultative body. It included representatives from the government, the central bank and the coffee grower's federation, who were assisted by two permanent counsellors. Although the CONPEP's resolutions were not legally binding, Jorge Méndez, the former dean of the FEIC at the Gimnasio who was appointed as the CONPEP's first counsellor, argued that the exigencies of the new democratic setting would make it difficult for the government to neglect the "respectable guidance" of the council.[764]

The elaboration of Colombia's ten-year development plan, the *Plan Decenal*, was the DAP's major accomplishment during the first National Front administration. In his official presentation of the *Plan Decenal* in December 1961 to an audience of military, ecclesiastic, and civilian authorities, Lleras Camargo hailed the document as an example of "democratic planning." The expression was directed to both domestic and foreign audiences. At a moment when countries across the Cold War divide between capitalism and communism embraced planning methods to rationalise economic activity, a qualification was needed to distinguish programmes made for "democratic societies" from those designed by "planners who used the police."[765] In Lleras Camargo's discourse the adjective *democratic* served this role. Contrasting Colombia's first ten-year plan to

[764] Jorge Méndez, "Comentarios sobre la primera etapa del trabajo del Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Planeación," n.d. (c. first semester 1960), box 2, folder 22, folios 336-367, A-DG-DNP-AGN.
[765] CONPEP, *Colombia : Plan General de Desarrollo Económico y Social,* xvii, xix.

China's second five-year plan,[766] the president argued that unlike the latter the former was an exercise in democratic planning because it only reflected what "Colombians can do, if they want to." [767] Lleras Camargo recognised that planning economic activity in a democracy could not rely on force and its success depended on rallying societal support. Hence, he summoned business and labour representatives, as well as public officials to understand their civic "mission" in achieving the targets set in the plan. He equated the *Plan Decenal* —materially two volumes full of statistical tables and analyses written in technical jargon— to a lighthouse. The development plan ventured into the uncertain terrain of the future to illuminate, albeit imperfectly, obstacles and possibilities decision-makers could find in the pursuit of economic progress.[768]

For Lleras Camargo, the adjective *democratic* also served to oppose planning to the perceived arbitrariness of Rojas s personalistic and popular government. In his words, the ten-year development plan substituted the "improvisation" and "political magic" of Rojas' economic administration with an "ordered will of assertiveness."[769] For his Colombian audience in the late 1950s, democratic planning implied first and foremost rationalising government expenditures. In reaction to what the bipartisan governing coalition considered the erratic economic platform of Rojas's military government (Chapter 3), austerity became a central tenet of the first National Front administration.[770] Lleras Camargo's government remained committed to the stabilisation package that the

[766] By the time Colombian plan was announced, Lleras Camargo and his audience were surely aware about the extent to which China's second five-year plan, known as the Great Leap Forward, relied on the coercive power of the state. The Communist party launched this plan in 1958 but abandoned it in 1961 after the attempted industrialisation of agriculture led to China's worst famine in record. See Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine*, ch.12-13.
[767] CONPEP, *Plan General de Desarrollo*, xvii..
[768] CONPEP, *Plan General de Desarrollo*, xvii, xvi, xix.
[769] CONPEP, *Plan General de Desarrollo*, xvii, xix.
[770] See Kalmanovitz, *Economía y nación*, 426.

Military Junta that oversaw the transition had agreed with the IMF in 1957, as a condition to restore Colombia's access to foreign credit. Between 1958 and 1962, the price in international markets for coffee, the country's main source of foreign exchange, remained low. As revenues stalled and the functioning costs of an enlarged public administration increased, the government struggled to sustain balanced budgets. Consecutive Ministers of Finance walked the tight-rope of increasing public debt and investment rates to stimulate economic development while controlling inflationary pressures.[771] In his last address to Congress in 1962, Lleras Camargo used the slogan "austerity and development" to characterise his economic administration, signalling the government's commitment to non-inflationary growth.[772] Against this background, the Colombian government, like others in the region, resorted to low-interest and short-term credit from international lenders to finance development projects in infrastructure, housing, irrigation, and industrial promotion. Signalling adherence to public investment programmes became the mechanism through which the government expected to reassure taxpayers and international donors that public revenues and loans were used efficiently and responsibly.

Lleras Camargo's aspiration required building institutional capacities to plan for economic development. A consequence of the administrative reform bill was the enlargement of the state's bureaucracy at both the national and the subnational levels. Between 1951 and 1958, the former Planning Office's technical staff only included a director and two full-time economists. In contrast, the DAP received a budget to hire twenty-one *técnicos* for its planning division, distributed in five sections: Projections (5

[771] Agudelo Villa, *Memoria de Hacienda, 1961*, 185–86; Mejía Palacio, *Memoria de Hacienda, 1962*, 99–100.
[772] Alberto Lleras Camargo, "Austeridad y desarrollo," in Jorge Vélez García (ed.), *Devaluación 1962*, 29–33.

técnicos), Public Investments (5), Regional Planning (5), Actual Problems (3) and External Economy (3). By June 1959, nineteen of those posts had been filled.[773] In his first annual report to the President, DAP's first director, *FEIC* alumni Jorge Franco Holguin (1958-1960), exuded confidence about the DAP's capacities to plan economic development. He reported that the department's personnel were technically qualified and highly motivated. What remained to be done, according to him, was "to build a more solid base for its programmes within the Government and to infuse them in the consciousness of public opinion."[774] Democratic planning implied securing the trust and support of public opinion, a diffuse term used to denote both organised corporate interests and politically engaged citizens. Furthermore, because the planning department lacked executive functions, the implementation of the plan relied on the acquiescence of government ministers, decentralised agencies, and local governments.

Lleras Camargo's characterization of the *Plan Decenal* as an exercise in democratic planning was also a rhetorical device, carefully directed at a Pan-American audience. In an address to the US Congress in April 1961, he famously urged lawmakers to extend loans to Latin America, "with urgency and latitude," for the "pressing and rewarding enterprise of its economic development." Foreign aid was paramount, he argued, to avoid the spread of "disorder and anarchy" in the region.[775] In the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, Lleras Camargo's words struck a chord. *Time* magazine reported that the Colombian president, in his visit to Washington, "won a special warmth and

[773] Decree 0239, January 1959; "Organigrama del Departamento", DNP, box 3, folder 23, folio 418-421, A-DG-DNP-AGN.
[774] Jorge Franco Holguín. "Informe sobre las actividades de los organismos de Planeación a partir del 7 de agosto de 1958," 1 July 1959, box 2, folder 22, folios 383-386, A-DG-DNP-AGN.
[775] Lleras Camargo, "Discurso ante el Congreso de los Estados Unidos," 6 April 1961, in *El primer gobierno del Frente Nacional. Tomo 2*, 288.

spoke words of special weight."[776] In August 1961, nations across the Americas signed the Charter of the Alliance for Progress (AfP) in Punta del Este, Uruguay, with the backing of Kennedy's government. Lleras Camargo's government displayed a remarkable preparedness to fulfil the conditions set in that charter to access US development aid, including the elaboration of national development plans. In January 1962, Colombia had become the first Latin American country to present a ten-year development plan for the consideration of the Inter American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP).[777] Under the strictures of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, development plans became a tool of economic diplomacy for governments across the developing world that, like Lleras Camargo's, were looking for alternative sources of foreign exchange to pay for imports and to finance long-term investment projects.

Nevertheless, the instrumentalization of the ten-year development plan to access international financial markets should not obscure that its elaboration responded to a wider constellation of influences. Although the Alliance for Progress gave impetus to the presentation of a development plan, the preparation of the *Plan Decenal* was under progress before the signature of the Charter of Puna del Este. The administrative bill that created the DAP in 1958 had given this institution the mandate to elaborate a national development plan. As early as January 1960, two years before presenting the *Plan Decenal* to the CIAP, the CONPEP counsellor Jorge Méndez (1958-1964) had set a roadmap for preparing the plan.[778] This was no coincidence. In the late 1950s, planning

[776] TIME, "A Statesman Comes to Call," 18 April 1960, Vol. 75, Fascicule 16, 0040781X.
[777] Besides the quick preparation of this document, President Lleras Camargo had secured the approval from Congress of agrarian and tax reform bills in 1960-1961, two other requirements set in the Charter of Punta del Este. See the "Carta de Punta del Este," 735–64.
[778] Jorge Méndez, "Memorandum. Sobre las labores que deberá emprender el concejo de planeación," n.d. (c. January 1960), box 2, folder 22, folios, 387-408, A-DG-DNP-AGN.

techniques were gaining broad international acceptance among policymakers, development economists, and foreign lenders.

In contrast to the IBRD Mission of 1949, which Currie portrayed as unprecedented and experimental, the DAP's technical staff had access to a fragmentary but rapidly growing knowledge about development planning. An applied field in nature, development planning was situated in the middle ground between economic theory and policymaking, and involved academic economists, government planning offices and international institutions. Across Asia and Africa, governments hired foreign advisers to collaborate with local planning bodies to design five-year plans with the objective of building up the economies of former colonies and rationalising developmentalist interventions. For example, India's second five-year development plan was completed in 1958 and there is evidence that the DAP followed particularly closely the institutional organization of planning in that country.[779]

International organisations, like the IBRD and Cepal, commissioned studies to design methodologies for development planning. In 1954, Cepal published an introductory handbook about programming techniques for government officials.[780] Colombia was, as shown in Chapter 2, one of the first countries where these techniques were applied to make macroeconomic projections, but this study was shelved, and its results ignored during the military government. In 1955, the IBRD hired the Dutch economist Jean Tinbergen to prepare a manual on "development policy", a neologism of the post-war period. The former director of the Central Planning Bureau in the Netherlands, Tinbergen pioneered the use of macroeconometric models to formulate

[779] P.M. Mathew. *El proceso de la planeación en India*, 1959, box 8, No. 13, A-DG-DNP-AGN.
[780] Secretaría de la Cepal, "Análisis y proyecciones del desarollo económico I."

economic policy. Informed by his experience in the Dutch planning bureau, as well as his advisory roles in Egypt and India, Tinbergen wrote *The Design of Development* (1958), an influential methodological manual on development planning.[781] Both Cepal's programming techniques and the IBRD commissioned manual informed the elaboration of the *Plan Decenal*.

These influences notwithstanding, the DAP's approach to development planning was flexible and pragmatic. As Mary Morgan argued in her analysis about the elaboration of the first ten-year development plan in Nigeria, actors and institutions pragmatically embraced the understanding of planning that was amenable to their local context.[782] Development planning was a useful framework for decision-making in so far planners were able to adapt the technique to the institutional, technical and material resources available to them. This malleability also allowed development planning —as a concept, a set of tools, and a frame for decision-making— to travel easily across national borders. Its mutability also makes it a complex object of historical study, because a wide arrange of —often contradictory— practices, knowledges and approaches fall under the tag of 'development planning.'

CONPEP's counsellors, like Méndez, conceived the development plan as a roadmap, designed to facilitate the coordination of public and private decision-making. Quoting Tinbergen's book, Méndez argued in his memorandum that programming methods allowed technical experts to provide decision-makers "a bird's-eye view of the pattern of future development of the country, and to show the possible and most desirable development of the national product and its components."[783] More concretely, the

[781] Erwin Dekker, *Jan Tinbergen*, 290.
[782] Morgan, "'On a Mission' with Mutable Mobiles," 7.
[783] Méndez, "Sobre las labores;" Tinbergen, *Design of Development*, 9.

development plan was supposed to offer decision makers an abstract representation of feasible growth paths for the national economy. Given that economic data were available at different levels of aggregation, Colombian planners conceived, like Tinbergen, development planning as a staged process that progressed from the "macro" to the "micro" level. In the first stage, planners conducted a global, or macroeconomic, analysis to determine feasible output targets. Based on the latter, the second stage consisted in determining growth targets by economic sector. In both stages, "capital coefficients" were calculated to estimate additional investment and foreign exchange requirements. The last stage involved identifying and choosing the investment projects that better contributed to achieve the plan's growth targets according to cost-benefit analyses.[784] At each scale, the development plan also signalled to decision makers the courses of action that alternative growth scenarios required. This approach to planning rested on a novel conception of policymaking that assigned a more prominent role to experts in economic decision-making. Quantitative techniques allowed experts to translate political objectives into "policy targets" and to determine with some degree of precision the most effective "policy instrument" to achieve them.[785]

As the use of planning techniques in market-oriented economies gained broader international acceptance, the most direct influence for the *Plan Decenal* came from experts from United Nations agencies, particularly from Cepal. In 1958, the military junta that oversaw Colombia's transition to democracy began conversations with Cepal to update the report the Commission presented to Rojas in 1955 (c.f Chapter 2). With the approval of a new package of aid for technical assistance, the UN formed an advisory

[784] Tinbergen, *Design of Development*, 11–23; Dekker, *Jan Tinbergen*, 243.
[785] Dekker, *Jan Tinbergen*, 238–39.

group with experts from Cepal and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to train and advice the personnel of the new planning department.[786] Under the leadership of the economist Manuel Balboa, from Cepal, six experts began their work in the DAP in May 1959. While half of the group stayed for only four months in Colombia, the other half spent one full year assisting the local staff in the elaboration of analyses and projections of the country's economy.[787]

In 1960, Cepal organized a short course for public officers on programming techniques at the DAP. The lecture notes of Jorge Ahumada's course on the *Theory and Programming of Economic Development* (1967[1958]) give us a hint of what economists in the Cepal-FAO mission understood by development planning. Two dimensions in Ahumada's lecture on planning techniques are observable in the elaboration of the *Plan Decenal*: the emphasis on global, or macroeconomic, programming over sectoral planning and project appraisal, and the normative belief on the neutrality of development plans.

Cepal's programming techniques prioritised global over sectoral planning. According to Ahumada, planners must consider first the effects that the allocation of resources between sectors had on the stability of the economic system. By considering the interdependencies between sectors, global programming allowed technical experts to prevent decision-makers from following development strategies in which "exaggerated emphasis given to one sector produced bottlenecks in the rest." Cepal's programming techniques favoured balanced over unbalanced growth paths, on the grounds that

[786] Álvaro Ortíz Lozano to Brigadier Juan B. Córdoba, "Memorándum", 22 May 1958, box 5, folder 14, folios 56-57; Capitán Carlos Prieto, "Información de Acuerdos de la Sesión del Comité Nacional de Planeación," 3 June 1958, box 5, folder 14, folios 66-67, JM-PR-AGN.
[787] Jorge Méndez, "Comentarios;" Franco to Lleras Camargo, "Informe de labores del Departamento Administrativo de Planeación entre el 1º de julio de 1959 y el 20 de junio de 1960," 16 July 1960, box 3, folder 23, folio 448, A-DG-DNP-AGN.

bottlenecks had inflationary effects. The main objective of global programming, Ahumada concluded, was to determine the "highest rate of per capita income growth" that is "compatible with stability."[788] Being an exercise in global programming was the *Plan Decenal*'s novelty. Although the document included various sections dedicated to establishing growth targets for economic sectors and subsectors, sectoral planning was given a secondary role. Due to the scarcity of data and time constraints, the plan did not include the more detailed sectoral studies produced by UN advisors.[789] By mid-1962, the DAP had concluded plans for the industrial and transport sectors but the programmes for the energy and social sectors had not been completed.[790] As late as 1964, counsellors complained that there was no plan for the agricultural sector, which still accounted for around half of total employment.[791] Few emphases, if any, was given to individual projects in the *Plan Decenal*. As I will show below, a unit was created in the DAP to conduct cost-benefit evaluations of specific projects, but it remained isolated from the rest of the department.

The primacy of global programming in the *Plan Decenal* is already observable in its immediate antecedent, the *Plataforma Económica* (1960). Prepared by DAP staff and Cepal-FAO advisers, the *Plataforma* was as a mid-term revision of Lleras Camargo's electoral economic platform, which the CONPEP presented to Congress in 1960. DAP's chief also prepared an English version of the *Plataforma* for Lleras Camargo's

[788] Ahumada, 40, 45, 47.
[789] CONPEP, *Plan General de Desarrollo,* 4.
[790] n.a. "Resumen descriptivo de la situación económica y social del país," 1962, box 60, no. 35, CD-DNP-AGN.
[791] Luis Ospina Vásquez and Jorge Méndez, "Sugerencias de los Consejeros Nacionales de Planeación Luis Ospina Vásquez y Jorge Méndez Munevar sobre el funcionamiento de la planeación colombiana," 1962, box 3, folder 25, folios 731-821, 22, A-DG-DNP-AGN.

presidential visit to the United States in April 1960.[792] This document contained the key message of the *Plan Decenal*: The growth rate of the national economy (c. 3.5%) was then considered "insufficient" to solve the "fundamental economic problems of Colombia"[793] but a higher growth target was feasible with a combination of foreign financing and the rational planning of economic resources. According to the *Plataforma*, on "the basis of preliminary studies," the country had the potential to achieve a 5.0% annual growth in national production during the following five years (the *Plan Decenal* later recalibrated this figure to 5.6%, probably adapting it to the 3.5% per capita annual growth rate target set by the AfP). This targeted growth rate was, according to the CONPEP, "the highest that is compatible with stability."[794] To convey the concrete "meaning" of that figure, the authors of the *Plataforma* explained that the target growth rate implied an increase in the aggregate investment rate from 16 to 20% of GDP, pulled by an annual increase of 8% in public investments. It also assumed non-declining coffee prices in international markets, a confident expansion of "minor exports" and easy access to foreign credit.[795] By providing a rationale to pursue economic growth without renouncing to stability, the *Plataforma* portrayed development planning as the means to implement Lleras Camargo's electoral program of austerity and development.

The elaboration and implementation of the *Plan Decenal* was also informed by Cepal's assumption that, as a technique, development planning was normatively neutral. In his lecture notes, Ahumada characterised programming as a "technique for selecting means and ends in conformity to a norm." As a "procedure for action," he continued,

[792] Franco to Lleras Camargo, "Informe de labores;" Consuegra, *Doctrina de la planeación colombiana*, 33.
[793] CONPEP, "Economic Development and Social Welfare," 1960. Box 58, folder 15, No. 318, CD-DNP-AGN.
[794] CONPEP, "Economic Development and Social Welfare," 15.
[795] CONPEP, "Economic Development and Social Welfare," 13-20.

"efficacy," not "ethics," is the appropriate yardstick for evaluating development plans. Planning is normatively "neutral," Ahumada argued, because it is agnostic about ultimate ends: "one could plan for liberty or servitude, for richness or misery, for culture or ignorance, for free enterprise or for the centralization of economic decisions." According to this view, planners took ends as given, because these were determined by "the constellation of dominant social forces." What programming allowed technical experts to do was to show decision-makers the extent to which socially given ends were in conflict.[796]

Cepal's normative neutrality assumption had practical consequences over the positionality of experts in the planning process. According to Cepal's manual, technical experts' role in the preparatory stage was restricted to represent "with objective impartiality different alternatives, what they required and their possible effects."[797] In practice, this implied offering decision-makers elements to judge between alternative growth scenarios, under specified assumptions. As a case in point, DAP's technical staff compared in the *Plan Decenal* the proposed scenario of 5.6% annual per capita growth to one of 6.6% increase in national income.[798] The selection of this alternative scenario was arbitrary, but it offered decision-makers and the public a yardstick to evaluate the plan's implications in terms of government investments and public debt. Because development planning was a dynamic process, technical experts' role did not conclude with the preparation of the plan. Ahumada compared the development plan to the route map an explorer draws before visiting an unknown region, which needs periodical revision as the expedition progresses.[799] After concluding the plan, the DAP was in charge of monitoring

[796] Ahumada, *Teoría y programación*, 36
[797] Secretaría de la Cepal, "Análisis y proyecciones del desarrollo económico. I," 19.
[798] CONPEP, *Plan de Desarrollo*, 86-92.
[799] Ahumada, *Teoría y programación*, 50.

its realisation and recalibrating its targets as the initial assumptions changed. This was supposed to be accomplished through a periodical revision of public investment and sectoral programmes. Although the DAP's staff was not directly involved in executing the development plan, its role was to hold the government publicly accountable for its commitment to it.

Prominent critics of state dirigisme have sustained that post-war planning hid, behind the veil of the normative neutrality of technique, authoritarian undertones.[800] Some contemporaries raised concerns about the undemocratic nature of planning activities during Lleras Camargo's government. For all its rhetoric, planning techniques were not normatively neutral. Given its theoretical assumptions, the development plan did not give equal weight to the wellbeing of all citizens and prioritised capital formation over the satisfaction of needs. Using war-like rhetoric, the *Plan Decenal* framed citizens' compliance in terms of intergenerational "sacrifices". Blaming Colombian's low propensity to save for the country's economic backwardness, it exhorted citizens to sacrifice present consumption for the "wellbeing of future generations."[801] In a critical tone, a former division chief lamented that citizens had not been fully acquainted with what those sacrifices entailed because an environment of "extreme reservation" impregnated the work of the CONPEP. A democratic approach to planning, in his view, demanded instead "consultation and dialogue with the community."[802] Secondly, the development plan fell prey to criticisms of capital fundamentalism.[803] Not only the plan allocated the lion-share of public investments to the infrastructure, energy, and industry

[800] For example, Easterly, *Tyranny of Experts*; Scott, *Seeing like a State*.
[801] CONPEP, *Plan de Desarrollo*, 126.
[802] Consuegra, *Doctrina*, 56.
[803] Currie criticized the *Plan Decenal* on these grounds in *Accelerating Development*, 127. For a broader critique of capital fundamentalism in post-war development economics see Sen, "Development: Which Way Now?"

sectors, but actual "social" investments in housing, education and health grew less than projected between 1959 and 1964.[804] When the *Plataforma Económica* was discussed in Congress, the then-senator Lleras Restrepo voiced his concerns about the implications this bias against social expenditures had on plan's democratising aspirations. He complained that the document did not specify how to guarantee a "higher participation of the poorer classes in national income," nor addressed the persistency of income inequality.[805]

While the language of sacrifices, capital formation and growth targets brought development planning at the DAP closer to the type of statist planning adopted across the Eastern bloc under Soviet influence,[806] the realization of the ten-year development plan did not rely on direct government control and coercion. Colombian planners followed Tinbergen's warning that "development policy" should not displace "the powerful force of private initiative."[807] Assigning a central role to the private sector was both a matter of principle and a pragmatic choice. In an economy where, throughout the 1960s, public expenditures accounted for less than 10% of the GDP,[808] the achievement of the growth targets set in the development plan depended largely on the understanding and voluntary cooperation of private actors. An indicative approach to planning, as that associated to

[804] Stanley Nicholson. "Comparison of Planned and Actual Sectoral Allocations of Public Investment for 1962-65: Preliminary Results," 17 April 1967, box 3, folder 30, folios 192-201, CT-DG-DNP-AGN.
[805] Quoted in Consuegra, *Doctrina de la planeación*, 37.
[806] As a comparison, see the case of Hungary in Egon Kemenes, "Economists in a Socialist Planning System," 582–83.
[807] Tinbergen, *Design of Development*, 3.
[808] IMF, Fiscal Affairs Department, consulted via Our World in Data, retrieved on 8 September 2022 from https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/historical-gov-spending-gdp?tab=chart&country=~COL.

the Commissariat du Plan in post-war France,[809] was also more attuned to President Lleras Camargo's understanding of "democratic planning" than central command. The National Front governments resorted to different mechanisms to stimulate the cooperation of the private sector. One of these mechanisms was to incentivise and regulate private initiative through fiscal, monetary, credit and foreign exchange policies. However, in the early 1960s executive authorities, let alone technical experts, did not have direct control over key policy instruments. For example, government budgets and foreign exchange bills required previous congressional approval. The semi-independent board of governors of the central bank had the last say in monetary and credit policy. Because refining policy instruments under the checks and balances of a democracy was a slow process, planners and political leaders opted for alternative strategies, like alluding publicly to businessmen civic responsibilities and summoning representatives from the private sector to coordinate with the government in consultative bodies.

According to Lleras Camargo's last Minister of Finance, Misael Pastrana (1961), the ten-year plan was not the starting point, but the product of his government's attempt to create a "national consciousness for the technical planning of economic activities."[810] While the administrative reform bills had attempted to institutionalise rational planning methods in the state, the plan was the result of an active engagement between technical experts in the DAP and representatives from the private sector. The proper functioning of the DAP required a working relationship with the private sector. To begin with, the statistical requirements of development planning exceeded the government's capacities to collect and produce data. To estimate figures at a sectoral level of disaggregation, the

[809] Concertation with private actors was a key principle of French indicative planning. See Cazes, "Indicative Planning in France," 610–11; Alain Desrosières, "La commission et l'équation:," 37.
[810] ESAP, *Realizaciones del primer gobierno del Frente Nacional,* 28.

DAP depended on *gremios* and firms own statistical records and, when these were unavailable, on the informed guesses of businesspeople.[811]

Moreover, the realisation of the plan rested on the compliance of private actors. Establishing working relationships with the major *gremios* was crucial to secure business associations trust in and commitment with the plan. Therefore, the planning department approached business associations before formally submitting the ten-year plan for discussion in Congress on 26 October 1961.[812] Three weeks before, the DAP's director, two CONPEP counsellors and foreign advisers met for three days with industrialists to discuss the content of the report in the ANDI's headquarters. As the official press release that covered those meetings confirmed, this instance of prior consultation with business leaders was not an isolated event. It was rather "one of the characteristics that we want to give to our planning systems, which operate on the basis of an intensive use of the productive capacity of the private sector of the economy."[813] Under democratic planning, the private sector's responsiveness to the plan was crucial for its success. By involving business associations in the last stages of the *Plan Decenal*'s elaboration, the DAP sought to nurture a "national mystique around our long-term investment projects," as Gutiérrez put it in his address in the annual meeting of FENALCO, the national traders' association.[814] Although the DAP also organized roundtables with labour organizations

[811] José Vicente Malo. "Algunas aclaraciones acerca de la metodología empleada en la elaboración del cuadro insumo-producto 1965," n.d. (c. 1964), box 60, no. 48, CD-DNP-AGN.
[812] After this first meeting, the plan was discussed thoroughly for several weeks in the Senate's third commission. "Se inician contactos entre Planeación Nacional y el Congreso sobre el Programa General de Desarrollo," 26 October 1961, box 59, folder 20, folios 291-292, CD-DNP-AGN.
[813] "Comunicado de prensa," 9 October 1961, box 59, folder 20, folios 20-27, CD-DNP-AGN.
[814] In its first years, the planning department was directed by men with previous experience in *gremios*. Before joining the DAP, Gutierrez was FENALCO's economic adviser. His official successor, Diego Calle, had previously directed FENALCO. "Texto del discurso pronunciado por el Dr. Edgar Gutierrez Castro ante los delegados del XVII Congreso de Fenalco" 27 May 1961, box 58, folder 17, No. 309.

to explain the content and scope of the *Plan Decenal*,[815] the historical record suggests that the cooperation with *gremios* was closer and more frequent. However, the elaboration, discussion and implementation of the national development plan created new forums that reinforced existing corporatist practices of prior consultation with business associations and, to a lesser extent organised labour, in economic policymaking.

The presentation of the *Plan Decenal* to the CIAP and the World Bank in January 1961 propelled Colombia as a showcase of development assistance among international lenders. According to the *Plataforma*, Colombia needed "no less than 100 [US] million per year in foreign credit, at least until 1965" to achieve its growth targets.[816] As stated in the *Plan Decenal*, this figure corresponded to a four-fold increase in the amount Colombia received from international lenders during the whole 1950s.[817] In July 1962, the CIAP presented a favourable report of the *Plan Decenal*. Highlighting Colombia's quick elaboration of a ten-year development plan and the government's effort to organise a "permanent planning system that could invigilate and coordinate its implementation," the ad-hoc committee exhorted the international community to meet the foreign exchange requirements of the plan.[818] Shortly after, Kennedy's appointee to the AfP, Teodoro Moscoso, announced a first programme loan of 60 million dollars, presenting Colombia as a global example of a "free, democratic and responsible country" that took the road of reform instead of that of revolution.[819]

[815] n.a. "Participación de la población en el proceso de desarrollo", n.d. (c. 1962), box 60, no. 35, folio 201 CD-DNP-AGN.
[816] CONPEP, "Economic Development and Social Welfare," 17.
[817] CONPEP, *Plan General de Desarrollo,* 108.
[818] Comité de los Nueve de la Alianza para el Progreso, *Evaluación del Programa General de Desarrollo,* 6.
[819] Teodoro Moscoso, "Colombia en la Alianza para el Progreso," 24 January 1963 in García (ed.), *Devaluación 1962*, 487.

Highlighting the *Plan Decenal*'s credentials as an exemplary case of planning development in a political democracy paid off. Between July 1963 and September 1964, the Colombian government obtained from the AID the aforementioned programme loan to finance imports and six project loans for a total of 11.7 US million to explore new mining deposits, provide livestock credit, and build energy and sewerage systems in major urban centres.[820] According to government data, Colombia received between 1961 and 1970 around 772.9 million US dollars in loans from the AID (see Table 4 below), with comparatively low interest rates and long (40 years) maturity periods. AID credit lines, which included both "project" and "programme" loans, served the double purpose of financing public investments and closing the dollar gap.[821] In a decade marked by recurring balance-of-payments imbalances, the Colombian government secured a sizable and steady entry of foreign exchange through the AID. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Colombia was not only the second largest recipient of AfP loans in Latin America, but also the country for which the availability of these credit lines was less volatile.[822] I showed that Lleras Camargo's alignment with the United States in strategic diplomatic issues might have played a part in his government's quick and privileged access to AfP funds. However, an excessive emphasis on geopolitical factors obscures the role that development planning played in the negotiations between governments and lenders, like the AID, during the 1960s. In the terminology of the AID, the gap between the targets set in development plans and observed performance were an indicator of their

[820] Calle, *Memoria de Hacienda 1964.*, 21–23.
[821] In the AID's terminology, programme loans were approved to "finance general import programs in support of a comprehensive development effort or a sector thereof." They were also known as "sector" or "balance-of-payments" loans. Foreign lenders distinguished programme loans from "project loans", which financed specific capital intensive projects. AID Program Coordination Staff, *Principles of Foreign Economic Assistance*, 15.
[822] See also Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy*, 149.

clients' "self-help" efforts.[823] Hence, development planning provided lenders a tool for monitoring their clients' performance.

Table 4. Foreign lending by agency (US dollars, current), 1961-1970.

Lender	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1961-1970	
											Total	%
AID	20	89.9	26.2	65.9	65	16.5	100	87	85	72.1	772.9	32%
Ex-Im Bank	54.4	3.4	2.5	22	3.4	3.4	25.5	4.2	20.8	10	185.6	8%
IADB	12.4	35.6	24.9	8.1	27.4	27.4	35.6	100.3	102.6	49.3	496	20%
IBRD	41.5	50	73.8	45.0	41.7	41.7	25.	105.6	60.3	109.3	717.7	29%
IDA	19.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19.5	1%
Other	0	0	8.6	20.5	27.9	27.9	30.7	67.6	13.9	53.7	311	13%
Total	147.8	178.9	136	161.5	116.9	116.9	216.8	364.7	282.6	294.4	2451.6	100%

Sources: The data for 1961-68 were taken from DNP, "Financiamiento externo," 23 July 1969, *Documentos CONPES*, No. 300, 32. The data for 1969-1970 were taken from Espinosa Valderrama, *Memoria de Hacienda* 1966-1970, 319-320.[824] The aggregate data for 1961-1970 is expressed in 1961 US dollar values.

The *Plan Decenal* also received a positive appraisal from the World Bank. As shown in chapter 2, Colombia had been a major recipient of project loans from that bank in the 1950s. A temporary mission visited the country from January to March 1962 to prepare a review of the *Plan Decenal* and submitted a generally favourable report in June. By August, the textile manufacturer Coltejer secured a loan of 1.75 million dollars from six private banks through the World Bank's International Financial Corporation. One month later, the World Bank established a Resident Mission in Colombia.[825] More importantly, the development plan became the document of reference for the negotiation

[823] AID, *Principles of Foreign Economic Assistance*, 11-13.
[824] Espinosa Valderrama, *Memoria de Hacienda 1966-1970*, 319-320.
[825] IBRD, *Appraisal of the Development Program of Colombia*, 5; CONPEP, *Plan General de Desarrollo*, xxvii. IFC Press Release, "Investment in Colombia," 10 August 1962; World Bank Press Release, "Resident Mission in Colombia," 21 September 1962, DR-WB.

of project loans in international financial markets. In August 1962, the World Bank's Vice-president Burke Knapp presented a proposal to organise a "Consultative Group," which summoned donors across the Western Hemisphere to coordinate long-term international capital assistance for the Colombian plan. This opportunity to raise funds through development financial consortiums had only been previously bestowed to Pakistan and India, the paradigmatic cases of economic planning in post-colonial democracies. The first meeting of the Consultative Group took place in January 1963 and gathered representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, the IADB, and thirteen lender countries.[826] With the assistance of the DAP, the Colombian delegation prepared a list of thirty-nine investment projects from the public and the private sector with foreign exchange requirements of around 450 US million. By December 1964, the government had secured around 230 US million in loans to cover the dollar costs of at least fifteen projects included in that list. While most loans came from the World Bank, the IADB and the United States (through both the AID and the Eximbank), the catalogue of lenders also included financial consortiums from Belgium and West Germany.[827] If anything, the *Plan Decenal* proved to be a successful tool of economic diplomacy.

The notion of democratic planning performed different functions for the first National Front administration. Firstly, it provided a justification for reconciling Lleras Camargo's commitment to both austerity and development. Planning offered a solution to this apparent paradox by introducing means of monitoring and rationalising government expenditures. This was democratic, in Lleras Camargo's view, because it

[826] The meeting including representatives for Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. "Reunión del Grupo Consultivo sobre Colombia," January 1963, box 61, no. 52, CD-DNP-AGN.
[827] IADB project list, IBRD project list, "Reunión del Grupo Consultivo;" Calle, *Memoria de Hacienda 1964*, 21-26.

made decision-making less personalistic and more accountable by theoretically subjecting government action to investment programmes that aimed at attaining economically feasible targets. Secondly, the planning methods developed in the 1950s offered the government a tool for coordinating economic activity without crowding out private initiative or resorting to coercive means. Technical experts working for institutions like the DAP were assigned a key mediating role in the decision-making process, based on the problematic assumption that planning techniques were normatively neutral. Lastly, in the years that followed the Cuban Revolution, democratic planning was a successful tool of economic diplomacy. The *Plan Decenal* helped the government to position Colombia in international financial circles as the paradigmatic example of a country on a reformist path to development. These high expectations the National Front leadership placed on democratic planning were thwarted by the unexpected economic and political challenges the governing coalition faced after the first peaceful transition of power Colombians had experienced in over fifteen years.

5.2. Planning without Experts

Colombians elected the Conservative Guillermo León Valencia as the second president of the National Front (1962-1966), once Lleras Camargo's term came to an end. Under Valencia's presidency, the DAP went through an institutional crisis that revealed the limits of Lleras Camargo's notion of democratic planning. According to Guillermo Perry, the DAP suffered during Valencia's government from two main problems. Firstly, the planning department was unable to hire local qualified personnel. In consequence, the government continued relying on foreign advisory services to perform its "technical functions." Such as the Planning Office's operations in the 1950s depended on IBRD

advisers and the elaboration of the *Plan Decenal* relied on Cepal-FAO experts, the continuation of planning activities in the DAP fell on yet another group of missionaries from the Harvard's Development Advisory Service. Secondly, the DAP's institutional weakness hampered its ability to perform its "decision-making functions." According to Perry, the DAP lacked the institutional means to penetrate and influence key decision-making bodies. As a result, the "fate of the planning efforts was left to the vacillations of the president" — quite the opposite to what Lleras Camargo had expected from development planning.[828]

Perry's assessment was that of a second-hand witness who enjoyed from the benefit of hindsight. Writing from the vantage point of having been a key figure in the revitalisation of the department during Lleras Restrepo's government (1966-1970), Perry's evaluation of the DAP's performance under Valencia's administration underestimated the challenges of planning development amid an economic and political conjuncture that threatened the stability of the regime. Moreover, institutionalising economic expertise in the state meant much more than filling the planning department with professional economists and engineers. It implied building institutional capacities, instilling technical habits of reasoning, and securing public recognition for expert advice. Valencia's government introduced legal reforms that eventually strengthened the position of the planning department in economic decision-making bodies and hired a foreign mission that enhanced its national and international legitimacy.

5.2.1. A Legal Approach: The creation of the CONPES and the Monetary Junta

[828] Perry, "Desarrollo institucional de la planeación en Colombia," 28, 34.

Valencia inherited an economy in disequilibria. As short-term economic problems captured the public attention, long-term development planning lost momentum. Despite Lleras Camargo's attempt to reconcile austerity and development, he closed his government with unbalanced budgets. By the end of 1962, the fiscal deficit for that year approached one billion Colombian pesos.[829] Different interpretations about the causes of this deficit revealed fissures in the National Front coalition. While a group of dissident Conservatives condemned Lleras Camargo's administration lavishness, his allies argued that the national government lacked control over public expenditures. A member of his Liberal party compared Congress and decentralised bodies to derailed "wheels," which "perturbed" the government's austere economic management.[830] Public investments, instead of increasing as the ten-year development plan had stated, experienced a sharp decline in 1962 and did not return to pre-1961 levels until 1965.[831] This meant that, throughout Valencia's presidency, the Colombian government was unable to meet the public investments targets set in the *Plan Decenal*. By the end of Lleras Camargo's government, it appeared as if planning had neither facilitated austerity, nor stimulated development.

Chronic foreign exchange shortages posed decision-makers a dilemma between development and stability. A growing deficit in the balance of payments, in combination with the government's fiscal deficit, raised alarms about a possible overheating of the economy. This macroeconomic situation imperilled Colombia's standing among international financial institutions, and its privileged position as the showcase of development assistance in international financial circles. Valencia's government faced

[829] Espinosa Valderrama, *Memoria de Hacienda 1966-70*, 247.
[830] See Vélez García(ed.), *Devaluación 1962*, 7-26, 181-191, .
[831] Espinosa Valderrama, *Memoria de Hacienda 1966-70*, 246.

pressures from both domestic and international actors to devaluate the Colombian peso.[832] After months of public deliberation, a devaluation of 30% in the reference exchange rate was approved in Congress.[833] Despite its unpopularity among working and popular classes, the devaluation received in November 1962 wide support in both chambers of Congress. Only representatives from the Liberal Party's dissident faction, the Movimiento de Revolución Liberal (MRL), abstained from voting the proposal.[834] To appease organised labour movements, Valencia decreed wage increases for public employees in January 1963. The combined effects of the devaluation and wage increases led to an annual rise of 32% in the cost of living of blue-collar workers, whipping away the intended impact of the devaluation on the balance of payments. The traumatic experience with the devaluation of 1962 and its effects lingered for years in the collective memory of citizens and policymakers.[835]

The debate around the 1962 devaluation and its aftermath also brought to the fore how the political arrangement of the National Front constrained but also shaped the institutionalisation of economic expertise. Under the model of the National Front, based on the principles of parity and alternation, the introduction of major institutional changes depended on the government's ability to build broad political consensus. The government's abilities to secure wide majorities became increasingly difficult after the mid-term elections of 1960, when the ruling coalition lost the two-thirds majority in the

[832] For the reactions from IMF, see Junguito, *Cien Episodios*, 299–303.
[833] For first-hand accounts about the 1962 devaluation see Sanz de Santamaría, *Una época difícil*; Vélez García, *Devaluación 1962*. For a careful analysis see Díaz Alejandro, *Colombia*, 188–95.
[834] Vélez García(ed.), *Devaluación 1962*, 212.
[835] Díaz-Alejandro, *Foreign Trade Regimes*, 195. According to Rodrigo Botero, this experience had long-lasting effects by shaping Colombian technocrats' preference for gradualist and incremental policymaking. Botero, *El bejuco de tarzán*, 313-4.

Lower Chamber.[836] Due to the opposition of dissident Liberals and Conservatives, the bipartisan coalition struggled to get approval for its legislative agenda. Facing this deadlock in Congress, Valencia's government resorted to state of siege powers, using as an alibi the threat emergent guerrilla groups posed to national security. The activation of executive emergency powers in response to security threats, imagined or real, allowed Valencia and his successors to introduce institutional changes that facilitated the transfer of decision-making power to experts without subjecting these reforms to congressional deliberation.[837] However, the extensive use of executive powers gradually undermined public confidence in the system.[838]

The DAP was not immune to the problems of governability and legitimacy the National Front suffered during Valencia's presidency. In part due to the government's inability to meet its financial commitments, the *Plan Decenal* remained mostly in paper. Moreover, the planning department itself faced an existential crisis. When the first AfP loan was approved in December 1962, the DAP lacked the technical capacity and political stature to coordinate intersectoral development policies. After DAP's director Edgar Gutiérrez left for Harvard with a Public Service Fellowship in the summer of 1962, Valencia failed to fill the position, which was temporarily occupied by the young economist Germán Gaviria. Despite being the most senior *técnico* in the department, Gaviria lacked the political standing of his predecessors. When Cepal-FAO experts left the DAP shortly after the *Plan Decenal* was presented to international lenders, the

[836] While in theory the National Front was based on the alternation in power and parity of seats between the Liberal and Convservative parties, in practice government was formed by a coalition of different segments of the two parties – which were fragmented during the period.
[837] Although during the National Front the use of state of siege powers to legislate by decree on economic issues was common, these were automatically subjected to juridical control by the court of justice after the transition. Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, *Democracia Pactada*, 108–9.
[838] González, "Una democracia sin pueblo'," 4–19; Hernández Gamarra, *Relatos de los oficios y los días*, 70–71.

capacities of all technical divisions languished, exposing the department's dependency on foreign advisers to which Perry later referred.

Moreover, the work at the planning department did not even count with the support of the small professional community of economists. Currie and Ruiz Lara publicly criticised the statistical basis and the overall approach of the *Plan Decenal*. In October 1961, two months before the presentation of the ten-year plan, they launched *Operación Colombia*, a program that emphasized a more focused, less comprehensive, strategy for development.[839] Although both documents also differed in their specific recommendations, the open disagreement between economists about how to plan development revealed a lack of consensus within the expert community that hurt the public legitimacy of the DAP.

Without a direct link between the planning body, the CONPEP and the president's Cabinet, the implementation of the plan progressed slowly. In a confidential memorandum to the president, the two most senior counsellors of the CONPEP, the Liberal Jorge Méndez and the Conservative Luis Ospina Vasquez, laid bare their views about the malfunctioning of planning bodies. In their opinion, the main problem was that existing legislation did not clearly state the obligatoriness of the national plan and of the CONPEP's recommendations for executive bodies. On these grounds, Ospina Vásquez argued for a stronger linkage between planning and presidential authority:

> The desideratum would be to allow for an activity of stimulus and coordination that, instead of being partial and lenient, is continuous and mandatory, yet more ductile than authoritarian, which in practice would be exercised through adjustments, negotiations, transactions, and more or less informal arbitrations instead of operating through imposition.[840]

[839] See Currie, "Operación Colombia: un Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Económico," *La Nueva Economía* 1, no. 4 (1961).
[840] Ospina Vásquez and Méndez, "Sugerencias," folio 735.

The counsellors recommended a formal restructuring of the planning department's technical staff and offered measures to "regularise" the relationship between the government and the CONPEP. However, they advised against a complete overhaul of the legal principles that hitherto regulated planning activities. For example, Méndez dismissed the idea of merging the planning department under the Ministry of Finance because this could lead to the "hypertrophy" of this ministerial body, citing the experience in France with the Commissariat General du Plan. In his view, the independence between both institutions allowed state actors to distinguish between "direction", or the monetary control of economic activity, and "planning", which referred to the purposive action of the state over production. Instead of radical changes, Méndez proposal included reorganising the DAP into sectoral divisions so that the department could move down the ladder in the staged planning process. He deemed that paying the technical staff higher salaries was essential to attract qualified personnel for those divisions. To enhance the coordination with ministerial bodies, he suggested distinguishing between the department's technical and political functions at the top. His proposal was to create a new position for a technical secretary, which would liberate the department's director from technical duties to play the role of an "expediter" in decision-making bodies.[841] The new technical secretary would oversee the permanent revision of the ten-year development plan, which attests the central role Méndez, a staunch *cepalino*, gave to global programming in his vision of the department.

It is unclear which was President Valencia's immediate reaction to this memorandum, but Méndez and Ospina Vásquez's resignation as permanent counsellors of the CONPEP suggests their main ideas were not fully taken into consideration. The

[841] Ospina Vásquez and Méndez, "Sugerencias," folio 774.

crisis was made public when the two counsellors published their resignation letter in *El Tiempo*. Méndez and Ospina Vásquez laid open their views about the misfunctioning of the planning department in the first months of Valencia's government. In an optimist tone, the former counsellors hoped their resignation would work as a "wake-up call" and raise awareness about the importance of implementing the ten-year plan.[842] As the inability of the DAP to coordinate economic policy became publicly acknowledged, the department fell into a reputational crisis that required immediate action.

To address this crisis, Valencia appointed as DAP's director Diego Calle, former manager of the national traders' association, FENALCO. Calle presented on December 1963 a project to reorganize the DAP. In some way, Calle's institutional restructuring of the DAP mirrored Méndez's proposal. From a single planning division, the department was split into five technical divisions, four of which focused on sectoral planning. The new organisational structure gave global programming less centrality than Méndez would have considered advisable. In Calle's words, his proposal gave "less emphasis to general studies and more importance to the practical implementation of programmes."[843] The division of Global Economic Studies replaced the Projections section, which oversaw macroeconomic programming. Jorge Ruiz Lara, a staunch critic of Cepal's data and methods, was appointed chief of that section.[844] His appointment as head of this division reveals how quickly trust on the technical validity of the ten-year plan and Cepal's programming techniques faded within the DAP.

[842] "Renuncian los Consejeros Nacionales de Planeación," 3 November 1962, *El Tiempo*.
[843] "Organización para adelantar la planeación y la programación," appendix to DAS, "Report for the period May 1964- Mid-September 1964." Reel 4461, DAS-FFR.
[844] Ruiz Lara, "Aspectos cuantitativos de la operación Colombia", November 1963, box 1, folder 13, folios 191-323, A-DG-DNP-AGN.

To enhance its influence on decision-making, Valencia strengthened the DAP's position in intragovernmental and consultative bodies. On December 1963, he issued a decree under state of emergency replacing the CONPEP for the Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (CONPES). Like the CONPEP, the CONPES included Cabinet members, and the heads of the Banco de la República and Fedecafé, but the figure of the permanent counsellors was abolished. That decree also contemplated the conformation of an Economic Consultative Group, where the planning department's programmes and projects could be discussed with *gremios* and labour unions. Both the CONPES and the Economic Consultative Group would be presided by the head of DAP, which formally gave the planning department an agenda-setting role in economic decision-making bodies.

The political standing of the DAP was further strengthened by giving the director of the department a permanent seat in the newly created Junta Monetaria (Monetary Board). The creation of the Junta Monetaria in August 1963 was a landmark in the institutionalisation of economic expertise in the Colombian state. Presided by the Ministry of Finance, the Junta Monetaria was given "the management of foreign exchange, money and credit" on the grounds that these "are essential attributes of state sovereignty." In practice, this meant concentrating the state's control over key policy instruments, like deposit requirements and rediscount windows, which until then had been the jurisdiction of the central bank's board of governors.[845] The traumatic experience with the devaluation-cum-inflation row of the 1962-1963 period had stimulated debates around the question "over the control of money." As Ospina Vásquez put it in his memorandum, the issue was not if some degree of "efficient control" of "monetary levers" was

[845] Calle, *Memoria de Hacienda 1964*, 65.

necessary, but "in whose hands should that control fall."[846] The creation of the Junta Monetaria was the government's answer to this question.

As Calle described in his *Memoria de Hacienda*, the composition of the Junta Monetaria was highly contested.[847] The formula that prevailed was a board of *técnicos* and *politicos*, but no representation of the private sector. Prominent congressmen and public writers contemplated alternative arrangements, such as including in the table representatives from various economic sectors or filling the board exclusively with "*técnicos*." Calle reported that the former alternative was rejected because it would have contradicted the reform's main objective: to give the state "sovereignty," or at least some degree of autonomy, over monetary control. On a more practical level, Calle argued, the Junta Monetaria would have become a bargaining site for sectoral interests, inducing a "permanent mechanism of inflationary dynamic." The option of an autonomous board of experts, which later gained traction with the independence of central banks in the 1990s, was then rejected on the grounds that it would have led to the "disarticulation of monetary and foreign exchange policy from the overall ensemble of state actions and policies." It would have turned the Junta Monetaria, Calle argued, into a "province, an independent isle, completely autonomous from the rest of the public administration apparatus."[848] Although an ideological bias for state interventionism is evident in Calle's reasoning, his major concern was how to integrate a monetary board that was both autonomous and operational. This pragmatism might have been informed by his previous experience in the CONPEP as DAP's director.

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[846] Ospina Vásquez and Méndez, "Sugerencias," 737

[847] Representatives of the banking sector feared that the government could use its position of in the Junta Monetaria to allocate credit on a discriminatory fashion. Calle, *Memoria de Hacienda 1964*, 336–37.

[848] Calle, *Memoria de Hacienda 1964*, 67–68.

In the end, the composition of the Junta Monetaria resembled that of the new CONPES, with the important difference that the powerful Fedecafé, the association of coffee growers, was conspicuously absent in the former. By assigning a permanent seat to the ministries of Finance, Agriculture and Development, the creation of the Monetary Junta gave the national government direct control over the direction of monetary policy. However, more often than not, the ministries represented in the Junta pursued different policy targets. For example, while the Ministry of Agriculture and Development had incentives to employ discount windows as a stimulus for agriculture and industry, this approach conflicted with the Minister of Finance's preference for monetary stability.[849] To arbitrate this type of conflicts, the governor of the Central Bank and the director of the DAP also received permanent seats. According to Calle, the latter was included both to assure the presence of a "technical official" in the Junta and to guarantee that "monetary policy evolved in conformity with the development plan."[850] Besides conferring its policy decisions an allure of objectivity and legitimacy, the Junta's close relationship with technical bodies allowed board members to monitor periodically economic activity.

While the relevant data was collected and processed by the ministries, the DAP, and the central bank, particularly by the latter's Section of Economic Research, the deliberations at the Junta were based on synthetic documents prepared by two permanent counsellors, whose international academic credentials served as a signal of both their technical expertise and political independence.[851] As one of the counsellors of the Junta

[849] Economic authorities considered that the main causes of monetary expansion were the budgetary deficits of the national government and the National Coffee Fund, both of which were financed with direct credit lines from the central bank. Calle, *Memoria de Hacienda 1964*, 96–98.
[850] Calle, *Memoria de Hacineda 1964*, 68.
[851] The first two advisors of the Junta Monetaria were the economist-lawyer Hernando Gómez Otálora (1964-8), who had obtained a masters in law from Harvard University (1960), and Álvaro López Toro (1964), PhD in Economic Demography from Princeton (1960). They were

Monetaria during the 1960s put it bluntly in our interview, the "main role of the advisors was to say no to the Ministers." The technical documents that the counsellors submitted to the board were the "strategy" they found to provide "good reasons to curb the Ministers' appetite for borrowing money [from the Banco de la República] for political ends."[852] Although these counsellors did not have a right to vote, their public reputation as experts meant their opinion was generally authoritative. Counsellors used the threat of resigning as a weapon when they considered the Junta Monetaria was under undue political influence.[853] As the focal point of a decision-making architecture in which economic expertise played the central role of mediating intra-governmental conflicts and framing the deliberation, the Junta Monetaria prefigured in a small scale some of the technocratic patterns that were emerging within the Colombian state.

For the DAP, this new position of influence in high-level decision-making bodies like the CONPES and the Junta Monetaria was a curse in disguise in the short run. To begin with, it raised the political stakes of selecting a non-elected official to direct the department. Executive appointments became particularly sensitive under the parity rules of the National Front, particularly as the governing coalition began to lose its majorities. This became clear when Valencia struggled to find a successor for Calle, who in February of 1964 became his Minister of Finance. A visiting officer from the Ford Foundation put it bluntly: "The major problem is that Calle made the DAP so important that both political

replaced by Jorge Ruiz Lara (1965-1969) and Miguel Urrutia (1968-70), both of whom obtained a PhD in economics with the sponsorship of the Rockefeller Foundation (see Table 3 in Appendix B).

[852] Interview with Miguel Urrutia, 17 September 2020.

[853] Interview with Juan Carlos Jaramillo, counsellor of the Junta Monetaria (1982-4), 27 January 2021. See the episode of counsellors Jaramillo and Montes-Negret (1982-4) in Steiner et al., *Tres banqueros centrales*, 23–26.

parties are interested in having one of their men fill the post!"[854] To avoid the risk of disgruntling either of the sides that supported the fragile National Front coalition, Valencia left void the post until September 1964.

Without a visible head, the functioning of the department stalled. The DAP was unsuccessful at recruiting professionally trained personnel to head its new technical divisions.[855] Foreign advisers perceived Valencia's failure to appoint a director and to recruit technical experts as evidence of his lack of support for development planning. The Economic Consultative Group never met and the rebranded CONPES remained under the shadow of the Council of Ministries, where key inter-sectoral policy decisions continued to be taken. While the planning department was victim of the millimetric political calculations that the National Front's parity agreement incentivised, the ten-year plan failed to secure social embeddedness.

5.2.2. A Foreign Mission in Institution-building: The Harvard Development Advisory Service in Colombia

Amidst its institutional crisis, the DAP received in 1963 a mission from Harvard University's Development Advisory Service (DAS). This mission formally remained in the country until 1976, but it was more active during the administrations of Valencia (1962-1966) and Lleras Restrepo's (1966-1970). After the Cepal-FAO advisory team left the country, the deinstitutionalization of planning left laid open the drawbacks of short-term technical assistance missions. Like previous efforts in the 1950s, these missions suffered from what the former adviser to the Planning Office, Albert O. Hirschman,

[854] Robert Wickham to Verne S. Atwater. "On the idea of a supplemental grant from 1965 to 1968," 26 May 1964, Reel 4661, DAS-FFR.
[855] In December 1964, only the Global Economic Studies and the Foreign Exchange divisions had appointed chiefs.

retrospectively dubbed the "visiting economist syndrome," that is, the propensity to prescribe universal solutions to the host country's socioeconomic problems without gaining an in-depth knowledge of the local reality.[856] Conceived as a long-term project in institution building, the so-called Harvard mission was expected to overcome the short-sightedness of previous visiting expert teams. Instead of providing advice on specific economic policies or development strategies, DAS experts had the more diffuse objective of building local capacities. The Harvard group's first years in Colombia revealed the contradictions inherent to this technical assistance model. In their attempt to institutionalise economic expertise without local counterparts, the foreign experts found themselves in a position of vulnerability.

Harvard's DAS exemplified the interrelationship between the production of social scientific knowledge about development and the practice of policy advising during the post-war period. In 1954, Edward Mason, professor of Economics at Harvard University, assembled a group of advisers to "help" the government of Pakistan to "improve its capacity for national planning." Eight years later, Harvard University institutionalised Mason's consulting group by creating the DAS in its Centre for International Affairs. In a descriptive leaflet DAS shared with its clients, it described its services as a response to the "analytical needs" of governments concerned with "economic development." Grounded on "its first-hand experience in the underdeveloped countries," it offered "on-the-job and formal training" to local functionaries.[857]

Although Harvard's DAS had a small permanent corps, its operations relied mostly on advisers hired through fixed-term contracts (18-24 months). On an ad-hoc

[856] Hirschman, "A Dissenter's Confession," 93.
[857] Harvard University "Development Advisory Service," n.d., Reel 4661, DAS-FFR.

basis, the advisory service also hired consultants. Advisers and consultants were recruited from both universities and the international development intelligentsia. With one foot in academia and another in the policy arena, the DAS prided itself for drawing "insights and materials" from its direct experience in the field to "enrich" teaching and research on the "problems of economic development."[858] As the advisory service's director, Gustav Papanek, documented in the proceedings of that event, DAS was in a privileged position to bridge the gap between discipline- and problem-oriented economists by probing generalizations about development from the ground.[859]

Instead of building general theories about development, the DAS adopted an inductive approach to the production of knowledge through the comparison of case studies. After a decade-long experience advising Pakistan's Planning Commission, the Colombian DAP was the second client of the Harvard DAS. In the 1960s, the advisory service became a global enterprise. DAS sent advisers to assist planning bodies in Liberia, Malaysia, Argentina, Indonesia, and Greece. It was not uncommon for DAS advisers to move from one country mission to the next one. This movement of people facilitated the transnational circulation of planning methods, quantitative tools, and organizational knowledge about planning institutions. By contrasting their experiences with development planning in multiple geographies, DAS advisers questioned the one-size fits-all recipes that permeated development discourse in the 1950s without necessarily challenging its main assumptions. Their primary intellectual concern was practical knowledge, at least when they wrote in the condition of DAS advisers.[860]

[858] Harvard University "Development Advisory Service," n.d., Reel 4661, DAS-FFR.
[859] Papanek, *Development Policy II*, 347.
[860] Papanek, *Development Policy II*, 359.

Materially, the DAS mission to Colombia was possible thanks to a grant from the Ford Foundation, upon a request the government submitted in 1962. Ever since the Ford opened an office in Bogotá in 1960, it was committed to supporting the government's efforts to establish an "efficient and politically neutral civil service." At first, the foundation's strategy focused on training a professional body of public officials thorough ESAP.[861] In December 1962, a visiting Ford officer raised alarms about the lack of effectiveness of planning in Colombia, suggesting that its institutional organisation, the methodologies used, and the training of technical experts deserved further attention. For this purpose, the Ford turned to the Harvard DAS team, with whom the Minister of Finance had been exchanging correspondence seeking advice about the sort of legislation that would put planning on a "sounder basis." Foundation officers approached the DAS with some reticence because the Harvard team had displayed some reluctance to tie in "the training function too closely with operations" in their Pakistani experience.[862] In spite of these concerns, the Ford's board of trustees approved in September 1963 a grant of $494,000 payable to Harvard university for two-and-a-half years to provide "Training assistance in economic development planning in Colombia."[863] In consistency with the Ford's objective of building local capacities (c.f. Chapter 4), the donor made it clear to the grantee that its obligations under this grant fell under the domain of training instead of that of providing advice.

When the Harvard DAS Mission to Colombia concluded its operations in 1976, Ford officers considered this project had been a highly successful undertaking. Overall, the Ford disbursed $1.3 million dollars in the fourteen-years operation, establishing "a

[861] Morse, Wickham, and Wolf, "Ford Foundation Mission to Colombia," June 1960, CR-FFR.
[862] F.F. Hill to Edward Mason 10 December 1962 and F.F. Hill to Wickham, 26 December 1962, R4661, DAS-FFR.
[863] Grant No. 63-547, R 4660, DAS-FFR.

record for Foundation involvement in economic planning in a single country."[864] Papanek also reported in 1968 that, among all DAS projects, "particularly great progress has been made in Colombia."[865] Unlike the Cepal-FAO's advisory team, the Harvard Mission did not commit *a priori* to any specific planning method. According to Papanek, the DAS approached planning as a "process" that "begins with analysis of the long-range or structural problems of an economy and ends with the implementation of specific projects, programs, and policies."[866] Notably, global programming was not necessarily given a central role in the planning process. While DAS advisers built large econometric models in countries like Pakistan and Argentina,[867] macroeconometric planning did not play a major role in the Colombian mission.

More than two dozen advisers and short-term consultants arrived in Colombia to assist local counterparts in subjects ranging from fiscal legislation to manpower, transport, and electricity programming. Although some of the foreign experts, particularly the consultants, worked directly with the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture and Education, the DAP was the core of the DAS's operations. A field supervisor worked side-by-side with DAP's director in the general organisation of planning activities, while the remaining members of the advisory team were paired with each of the department's division chiefs.[868]

An overview of the work done by DAS advisers at the DAP reveals how malleable development planning was as an organizing framework. In the beginning, the *Plan*

[864] From 1968 onwards, the FF shared contributions with the IADB. K. N. Rao to James R. Holmes, "Formal closing of the Grant Series 63-547," n.d., R4248, DAS-FFR.
[865] Gustav Papanek to Members of DAS Advisory Committee, "Report on Colombia and Some General Remarks about DAS Projects," 4 January 1968, R4661, DAS-FFR.
[866] Gustav F. Papanek, ed., *Development Policy II*, vii.
[867] See Alfred Conrad, "Econometric Models in Development Planning," in Papanek (ed.), *Development Policy II.*, 35–52.
[868] Based on DAS quarterly reports, 1962-1971.

Decenal continued to be the basic referent for the work of the DAS. Based on the growth targets set in the plan, foreign advisers from the DAS worked with their Colombian counterparts in the preparation of the government's public investment budget for 1964.[869] Yet, the advisory team reported not being very impressed with the data, methodology and recommendations of the ten-year development plan. As the Harvard group gained ground in the planning department, the so-celebrated comprehensive plan became less binding. A few years later, the *Plan Decenal* had been completely side-lined. Under Ruiz Lara, the division of global programming moved away from the empirical methodology employed in the ten-year plan and prepared a revised economic plan for 1965-1968, based on "his own statistical study for *Operación Colombia*." Advisers from the Harvard mission were not convinced either by the global programming division's work under Ruiz Lara, which they considered placed "too much emphasis on numbers and too little focus on actions related systematically to a program."[870] The internal controversy about the *Plan Decenal*'s quantitative approach sowed mistrust about the statistical basis for macroeconomic programming, which turned the focus of the DAS's advisers to the more concrete stages of the planning process. By 1967, advisers' memoranda and interim reports focused less on macroeconomic programming and more on sectoral planning and specific project evaluations, although the construction of a general macroeconomic model of the Colombian economy was also under progress.[871]

Despite the overall positive assessment DAS and Ford reviewers gave to their operation in Colombia, this retrospective evaluation belies a more irregular process. The DAP's institutional crisis under Valencia's government had exposed the latent tension

[869] DAS, "Report Mid-September 1963- January 1962," 30 January 1964, R4461, DAS-FFR.
[870] DAS. "Report May 1964-Mid September 1964," 30 September 1964; "Report Mid-September 1964-May 1965," 19 June 1965, R4662, DAS-FFR.
[871] DAS, "Report March - May 1967," n.d., R4662, DAS-FFR.

between the advisory and the training objectives of Harvard's DAS. As stated in the Ford's grant, the expectation was that the DAS would provide on-the-job training to DAP's local staff through the close interaction between foreign advisers and the Colombian *técnicos*. However, during Valencia's administration foreign advisers spent most of their time advising the President and his Ministers on short-term policymaking. The blurred lines between building local capacities and influencing domestic policy revealed the limitations of foreign advisory services to develop well-functioning institutions in host countries.

Without a counterpart in the direction of the DAP for most of 1964, Harvard Mission's field supervisor, Harold Dunkerley became the *de facto* head of the planning department. According to the first quarterly report he submitted to the Ford Foundation, Dunkerley worked closely with Calle in the reorganization of Planeación and both men drafted together the decree that created the CONPES in December 1963. He also alluded to his "close and effective relationships with the Junta Monetaria" and claimed responsibility for the appointment of its two permanent advisers, Hernando Gómez Otálora and Jorge Ruiz Lara.[872] Dunkerley's statements did not find a good reception among Ford officers, who interpreted them as evidence that the DAS was overstepping its contractual responsibilities. Ford's field officer in Colombia warned that "the Harvard group as represented by Harold Dunkerley was and is more interested in serving as advisors to key Government officials on current economic policy issues than in the process of institution building and staff development."[873] Not only the Harvard team was failing in its mission to train a cadre of local experts, it was also putting at risk the

[872] DAS, "Report Mid-September 1963 – January 1964;" DAS, "Informal memo on the work of each adviser," 9 February 1965, R4661, DAS-FFR.
[873] Wickham, "Review of Harvard-Planeación Project," 26 May 1965, R4661, DAS-FFR.

reputation of the Ford's institution-building operations, exposing the foundation to allegations of interfering in domestic politics. In consequence, the Ford pondered the possibility of not extending its support to planning in Colombia beyond October 1965, the due date for the grant.

Ford officers' concerns found a concrete expression in the reaction of the Colombian press to Dunkerley's involvement in the negotiation round with foreign lenders in Washington of 1964. In August, Dunkerley joined Calle's negotiating team in the CIAP convention where Colombia's foreign financing needs for 1965-1967 were discussed. He also attended the meeting in December 1964 with the World Bank's Consultative Group, where the Colombian government submitted to foreign lenders a list of projects that required funding during period 1965-1966 period.[874] Albert Berry, a Ford consultant (see Chapter 4), later reported that due to these trips to Washington, Dunkerley was accused in some Colombian newspapers of attempting to represent the Colombian government with international lenders. This allegation served to entice the opposition to the National Front. As with the 1962 devaluation, nationalists charged Valencia of relinquishing the country's economic sovereignty to foreign actors.[875]

Among Ford officers and Harvard DAS advisers, the so-called "Dunkerley affair" provoked further reflections about the role foreign experts played on local institution-building. A Ford officer concluded from that incident that the Harvard DAS mission had been "more than a technocratic exercise but was indeed touching sensitivities regarding the national aspirations, goals and operational modes characteristic of Colombian society."[876] Through the detailed quarterly reports and memorandums the Harvard DAS

[874] DAS, "Report May 1964-Mid September 1964," 30 September 1964, R4661, DAS-FFR.
[875] Albert Berry to William R. Cotter, "Extension to the Development Advisory Service Group in Colombia" 13 November 1968, R4248, DAS-FFR.
[876] K.N. Rao to J. R. Holmes, "Formal closing of the Grant Series 63-547"

team submitted to the Ford, foundation officers followed the main social, economic, and political developments in the country as foreign advisers perceived them. From their reflections about the practice of giving development advice, it is possible to identify some of the reasons why the Harvard Mission deepened the DAP's crisis during Valencia's government.

Firstly, the DAS experience in Colombia reveals how local actors instrumentalised foreign experts in their domestic political battles. Richard Mallon, who replaced Dunkerley as field supervisor after leading the Harvard DAS team in Argentina, cogitated about the permanent condition of vulnerability foreign advisers experienced in countries without the "administrative and political stability" needed for advisory services to succeed. Mallon's phrasing of the problem was tainted by the technical elitism and anti-popular sentiment of modernisation theory's cognitive framework,[877] which offered Foundation officers and Harvard advisers alike interpretative keys to assess the interrelations between economic, social, and political change in underdeveloped countries. Perhaps inspired by his recent experience with the Argentinian coup, he argued that this vulnerability was imminent where "the struggle for power is carried out more or less in open competition for popular support." According to the Harvard professor, advisory services were doomed to fail in Latin American countries "in an intermediate stage of development," unless there was an "environment in which the presence of a foreign advisory group in top-level policy making agencies is not likely to become a political football."[878] While models of popular democracy had fallen in discredit among the political leadership of the Liberal and Conservative parties with General Rojas's fall

[877] Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, 18.
[878] Mallon, "Reappraisal of the Role of the Harvard Development Advisory Service in Latin America," R4661, DAS-FFR.

in 1957, during Valencia's government the National Front bipartisan coalition was losing ground to opposition movements,[879] which often used nationalistic anti-American banners to criticise the regime. Amidst these battles for political legitimacy, foreign experts were susceptible either of being used as a scapegoat, whom governments could blame for the unpopular decisions they made;[880] or as a weapon to criticise the incumbent government, as seemed to be Dunkerley's case.

Precisely because the precondition of a stable political and administrative environment was absent, Mallon considered that planning techniques must be malleable enough to be adapted to local institutional arrangements. Probably referring to Cepal's programming methods, he argued against the use of "sophisticated research techniques" in countries without a tradition of career civil service, where there was a "shortage" of "technical talent." The fate of the *Plan Decenal* revealed the limits to the transferability of sophisticated tools like Cepal's programming techniques to countries like Colombia, where the local expert community was divided even about the validity of the figures used. Furthermore, DAS advisers found in the DAP an institution that lacked the resources to translate the comprehensive programme into concrete programmes and projects. Mallon's concern about the shortage of technical talent mirrored Dunkerley's persistent complaint in his quarterly reports about the general absence of local "counterparts." In spite of their technical expertise, their status as foreigners meant DAS advisers were not well

[879] In the mid-term elections in 1964, the ANAPO, the party formed around the former dictator, Rojas Pinilla, emerged as an electoral force, though its members were nominally elected either as 'Liberals' or 'Conservatives' to fulfil the National Front's parity criteria. This was only possible as there were no regulations to control party membership. Since 1962, the governing coalition had also been losing ground in the Liberal list in both the Upper and the Lower Chambers with the rise of the MRL. See Jaramillo and Franco-Cuervo, "Colombia," 324, 332.
[880] See Bianchi, "Visiting-Economists through Hirschman's Eyes," 230.

positioned to persuade decision-makers about specific courses of action with the degree of legitimacy that Colombia's, albeit imperfect, democratic system demanded.

In the middle of an acute balance-of-payments crisis and the dwindling popular support for the National Front's project, the strategies Valencia government's pursued to reverse the deinstitutionalisation of planning bodies did not have the desired outcomes. Both his legal approach and his reliance on a foreign mission to build institutional capacities showed the limitations of planning without local experts. Political actors and foreign advisers realized that a cadre of qualified local experts was the missing link between planning bodies, decision-makers, and the international financial community. As DAS advisers reflected about the absence of local counterparts, the DAP went through a major transformation under the direction of Edgar Gutiérrez, who returned to head the department and hired a group of young professionals with graduate degrees from foreign universities (Chapter 4) to staff the technical positions. Development planning went through a new stage when the newly elected president, Lleras Restrepo, made this body of highly qualified and motivated experts at the planning department the focal point of his technocratic approach to economic governance.

5.3. Institutionalising Economic Expertise

The deinstitutionalisation of planning endangered both the continuation of the Harvard Mission and the government's access to financial markets through international development consortiums. In November 1964, Robert Wickham, Ford's field officer in Bogotá organised an urgent meeting with Valencia, Calle, and Lleras Restrepo, the National Front's candidate for the 1966 elections. Wickham warned that the Ford Foundation would not consider providing additional support unless the administration

"took steps within the next two months to fulfil the original understandings among the Colombian Government, Harvard and the Foundation."[881] In an interview with Ford officers one year later, Ken Iverson and Albert Waterston from the World Bank also expressed their discomfort about the work done in the DAP. They argued that despite the "large sums of World Bank funds" poured in the country, the government had failed to fulfil its commitments. The planning department had neither contributed to the rationalisation of public investment, nor provided to the bank adequate information about specific investment projects.[882]

These complaints reveal the extent to which the functioning of planning bodies had become a barometer of the government's credibility among foreign donors and lenders. For the government, having access to foreign credit was not only essential to finance public investments, but also to mitigate the effects of persistent imbalances in the balance of payments in the short term. In the second semester of 1965, the government pursued an import liberalisation program, which included a new devaluation of the Colombian peso.[883] The liberalisation program put pressure on the country's foreign reserves, increasing the relative importance of development loans. Harvard advisers reported that the government was at risk of defaulting its financial obligations in the last quarter of 1965, when a new round of negotiations with the Consultative Group were under way in Washington.[884] In this context, it was critical for the government to signal to foreign donors its commitment to strengthening the planning department.

[881] Wickham to Raymond Vernon, 7 November 1964, R4661, DAS-FFR.
[882] Donald Sandberg to Peter Fraenkel. "Meeting with Ken Iverson and Albert Waterston of the World Bank regarding Planeación," 15 December 1965, R4661, DAS-FFR.
[883] Díaz Alejandro, *Foreign Trade Regimes*, 196-198.
[884] DAS, "Report September - December 1965," 30 December 1965, R4661, DAS-FFR.

Institutionalising economic expertise in the planning department required redefining the boundaries between *técnica* and *administración*, and *política*.

5.3.1. *Técnica* and *Administración*

Fortunately for the negotiation team in Washington, 1965 was a pre-electoral year. While the leaving president had been an "expert sailor" of the "political ocean,"[885] foreign observers found that "Valencia had little knowledge of economic matters."[886] In contrast, the presidential candidate for the Liberal party, Lleras Restrepo had a long experience dealing with economic affairs. He exemplified well the pragmatic economists in the *hacendista* tradition analysed in Chapter 1. Trained in Law at the UNal, Lleras Restrepo had been General Comptroller and Minister of Finance. From these positions, he contributed to the development of institutional capacities for managing the economy, a role that he continued playing as congressman during the National Front, being the architect of the National Institute for the Agrarian Reform (INCORA). He also contributed to the professionalisation of economics by co-founding the degree at the Gimnasio Moderno and supporting the rise of the so-called "young economists" through the SEAP (see Chapter 3). As Colombia's representative in Bretton Woods, Lleras Restrepo had been a first-hand witness of the making of the post-war international institutional arrangement.[887] Arguably, very few Colombian statesmen had his credentials for restoring the country's reputation among international lenders.

In January 1966, a few months before he was elected president, Lleras Restrepo met personally with Dunkerley and Ford's field officer, Robert Wickham, to discuss how

[885] ESAP, *Realizaciones*, 17.
[886] DAS, "Terminal Report First Phase."
[887] Caballero Argáez, "La impronta de Carlos Lleras Restrepo," 94–95.

to strengthen planning and secure the continuity of the Harvard Mission. In this meeting, Lleras Restrepo expressed his agreement about the "seriousness" of the situation and volunteered to meet informally with President Valencia and his Ministers "to see whether overall agreement could be obtained within the Government to give planning the kind of serious attention it requires."[888] Lleras Restrepo's recognised experience with economic affairs, as well as his personal involvement, helped to reassure international lenders that the government's intention to strengthen the planning office was sincere and feasible.[889]

Hence, in January 1966 the Ford Foundation extended Harvard DAS's contract for an additional year. The Colombian government managed to obtain from foreign lenders a new package for $350 US million – "perhaps the largest ever negotiated for a country of the size of Colombia."[890] Valencia's liberalization program was rewarded by the consortium of international lenders, headed by IMF and the US government. But the government's commitment to revitalise planning activities also played a role because it worked as a signal that foreign loans would be administered with some degree of economic rationality. As Dunkerley reported in a "strictly confidential" memorandum to the Ford Foundation, the disbursement of foreign loans rested on the *bona fide* that, among other commitments, the government would devote attention and resources to strengthening planning:

> To promote economic development and social progress, and to take proper advantage of the availability of external financing, the Government will redouble its efforts to improve its planning mechanism and their utilization, thereby also accelerating the preparation of specific projects appropriate for external financing by the Members of the Consultative Group. For this purpose, the Government will very shortly take measures, already underway, to strengthen the Administrative Department of Planning through such measures as

[888] Wickham to 'The Files,' "Harvard- Planeación Project- Meeting with Carlos Lleras Restrepo," 14 January 1965, R4661, DAS-FFR.
[889] DAS, "Report September-December 1965."
[890] Dunkerley to Fraenkel. "Strictly Confidential" Memorandum. Subject: Recent Actions by the Colombian Government to Strengthen Planning, 14 January 1966, R4661, DAS-FFR.

> reorganization, improved staffing and expanded budget. In addition, the Government will provide adequate budget and staff for the existing Planning Offices and other Ministries.[891]

Valencia's government faced challenges of administrative nature to increase the planning department's budget and recruit qualified *técnicos*. As an administrative department, civil service procedures regulated hiring, remuneration and promotion decisions at the DAP. These regulations had been an obstacle for conforming a "very high-level technical team," according to Augusto Cano, whom the DAP hired in November 1964 to fill the new position of Technical Secretary. An economist trained at UniAndes (1960), Cano obtained a master's degree in economics from Michigan State University (1964), where he started working on a doctoral dissertation about the organisation of planning institutions.[892] Legal salary caps for civil servants, Cano argued retrospectively, had not allowed the DAP to offer young professionals salaries that competed with those offered in the private sector.[893] Raising the salary bands for civil servants would have been inconsistent with the government's commitment to reduce the fiscal deficit.[894] Lleras Restrepo confronted this staffing problem when he was elected president in May 1966.

While Lleras Restrepo attempted to introduce reform bills in Congress that increased the president's discretionary control over public administration and the economy, he faced a stalemate in Congress.[895] Hence, the immediate solution came through a pre-existing agreement between the government and the Banco de la República. Having its own statutes, the central bank was able to pay higher wages than the civil

[891] Dunkerley to Fraenkel. "Recent Actions."
[892] Augusto Cano, "Curriculum vitae", retrieved on 20 September 2022 from https://economia.uniandes.edu.co/profesores/augusto-cano.
[893] Augusto Cano, "La planeación en Colombia," 48.
[894] Valderrama, *Memoria de Hacienda 1966-70*, 157–58.
[895] Without having a qualified majority in the Senate and the House, Lleras Restrepo was unable to pass major legislation in Congress without the support of dissident Liberals and Conservatives. Pécaut, *Crónica de dos décadas*, 41-50.

service code allowed for to its staff. In 1961, Lleras Camargo's government had signed a contract (denominated "A-1") with the central bank whereby the latter assumed the responsibility of administering a special account through which the state could hire a group of qualified *técnicos* to work in the "Specific Projects Group" (SPG) at the planning department. Through this arrangement, Lleras Camargo had sought to give the DAP more "administrative autonomy," so it could hire permanent specialised personnel to evaluate the technical feasibility of the investment projects submitted for the consideration of the World Bank's Consultative Group.[896] This unit was partly funded in 1961 by a $500,000 US dollars loan from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).[897]

Lleras Restrepo appointed as director of the planning department Edgar Gutiérrez, who had overseen the creation of the Specific Projects Group under Lleras Camargo. Gutiérrez found in the contract with the central bank an opportunity to upgrade the technical qualifications of the whole department. Initially, the SPG was conceived for the specific purpose of hiring engineers to conduct feasibility studies for the investment projects the government presented to international lenders. The evaluation of projects at the micro level had been functioning in a relative disconnect from economic programming activities at the macro level. In 1964, Dunkerley reported that the 10 engineers employed in the SPG worked in isolation from the rest of the planning department.[898] This relative financial and operational autonomy of the SPG became a model for the functioning of the entire department under Lleras Restrepo's government.

[896] Gutiérrez to Consejero de Política Económica y Planeación, "Memorando sobre los problemas pendientes en el departamento," box 3, folder 23, folios 454-458, A-DG-DNP-AGN; Ruiz Lara to Presidente de la República. "Memorando," 10 June 1970, box 1. folder 3, folios 43-47, MO-DG-DNP-AGN.
[897] Project C0092, "Programa Global de Preinversion," approved on 6 September 1961. IADB projects repository, Colombia.
[898] DAS, "Report May 1963-April 1964," April 1964, R4661, DAS-FFR.

In February 1967, the President himself wrote in a letter to the manager of the Central Bank, Eduardo Arias Robledo that:

> In view of the uncertainty that exists about the progress of the legislation about administrative reform in Congress, we have studied the possibility of anticipating the incorporation of personnel qualified on the problems of planning through the Group of Specific Projects, which today is administered by the Bank.[899]

A subsequent memorandum Gutiérrez prepared for the President's meeting with the Central Bank manager contemplated the addition of 30 new *técnicos* in the payroll of the Specific Projects Group (in addition to the 6 currently employed by the SPG), which included the department's director (Gutiérrez) and new seven division chiefs.[900]

By enabling the DAP to circumvent civil service regulations, the SPG arrangement allowed it to recruit technically qualified professionals. The new staff received significantly higher remunerations than previous employees at the planning department. Between 1959 and 1967 the average salary of division chiefs increased by 39% in real terms, while the wages for other *técnicos* increased up to 66%.[901] Judging from Cano's testimony, the funds from the IADB that the planning department accessed through the SPG agreement made it possible to offer salaries that competed with the remunerations the private sector offered to qualified professionals. More attractive salaries made the DAP an attractive place to work for the economists and engineers who pursed postgraduate degrees during the 1960s.[902]

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[899] Lleras Restrepo to Arias Robledo, 20 February 1967, box 3, folder 26, folios 810-811. A-DG-DNP-AGN.
[900] Jefe DAP to Señor Presidente, "Reorganización en el Departamento de Planeación," 21 February 1967, box 3, folder 26, folios 812-813, A-DG-DNP-AGN
[901] I deflated nominal salaries using the central bank's consumer price index to express the increase in real terms. For the data about salaries in 1959 see Decree 0239, 31 January 1959; for salary levels in February 1967, see "Reorganización en el Departamento de Planeación," 21 February 1967, box 3, folder 26, folios 812-813, A-DG-DNP-AGN.
[902] Augusto Cano, "La planeación en Colombia," 3, 34, 54-58. Antonio Urdinola, who was hired as chief of the Division of Industrial and Agrarian Policy under this scheme supported this view in our interview on 28 January 2021.

The extension of the agreement between the government and the central bank to all divisions in the department led to a qualitative transformation of the department's staff. It gave Gutiérrez financial resources to materialise the proposal he presented to the president-elect in July 1966 to reorganise the DAP into a rebranded National Planning Department (DNP for its acronym in Spanish). In this memorandum, Gutiérrez described what he dubbed the "bureaucratic problem of planning bodies." He denounced that from the 60 employees with "eminently technical responsibilities" employed in the department, half of them did not have undergraduate degrees and only three employees had completed postgraduate studies.[903] Gutiérrez first move was thus to reduce the personnel without professional qualifications. While in January 1964 the DAP had 104 employees, in November 1967 the DNP's staff had declined to 65. The reduction of non-qualified personnel must have been significant, given that this last figure included the first group of *técnicos* hired under the SPG contract.

From there on, the staff grew steadily. It increased to 97 *técnicos* in December 1968 and to 145 in June 1970. This growth was powered by two new IADB loans for four million dollars approved in April 1968.[904] The approval of Lleras Restrepo's administrative reform bills in Congress that year enabled at least 31 functionaries to shift, "without loss of salary," from the SPG's arrangement to the civil service payroll. Around one third of the DNP's personnel (52 *técnicos*) were nevertheless employed through the *ad hoc* contract with the central bank by the end his government.[905] These figures attest

[903] Gutiérrez to Lleras Restrepo, 21 February 20 1967. "Reorganización en el Departamento de Planeación," box 3, folder 26, folios 812-813. DG-DNP, AGN.
[904] Project C00131 and C00016, "Programa Global de Preinversion," approved on 4 April 1968, IADB projects repository, Colombia.
[905] Estimations based on multiple quarterly reports from DAS and Ruiz Lara, "Memorando."

to the importance the SPG contract had on turning the staff of the rebranded DNP into a professionalised body.

Although other state institutions at the time began to recruit highly qualified professionals, the scale of what occurred in the DNP during Lleras Restrepo's administration had arguably had no parallels or precedents.[906] In the process, the self-understanding of the economist as a technically qualified expert with a public vocation took shape. Great efforts were made to distinguish *técnicos* from the Weberian ideal-type bureaucrat. Only a few years before, the possibility of coalescing technique with administration could not had been so easily dismissed. Alberto Lleras' aspiration when he created the Escuela de Administración Pública (ESAP) had been to train a competent civil service, modelled on the French's example. The Ford briefly supported ESAP's planning training programme in 1963 but the relationship quickly deteriorated, so foundation officers inclined for the Harvard Mission.[907] Mallon, who witnessed the DNP's overhaul as the DAS supervisor during Lleras Restrepo's government, advised the president against relying too heavily on the "special personnel contracting system arranged between the Planning Department and the Central Bank a year ago," arguing that an arrangement "along the lines of the elitist European [civil service] systems" could be a more permanent solution.[908] This last statement shows that contemporaries had not entirely discarded the possibility of recruiting technically trained experts from a centrally-regulated civil service.

[906] As shown in Chapter 1, the immediate antecedent were the engineers who worked for the Comptroller Office between the 1920s and 1940s.
[907] Robert Wickham to 'The Files,' "Inter-Office Memorandum.Subject: Review of Harvard-Planeación Project," 26 May 1965, R4661, DAS-FFR.
[908] Mallon, "Draft of Letter to President Lleras of Colombia to Cover Transmittal of Evaluation Report," 10 April 1968, R4661, DAS-FFR.

Instead, the planning department established close relationships with local universities —predominantly with UniAndes and to a lesser extent with the UNal. As shown in Chapter 4, the economics departments in these universities developed collaborations with philanthropic foundations and international cooperation agencies that allowed their students to obtain scholarships to pursue graduate degrees abroad, mainly in the United States. By structuring new hierarchies within the planning department, academic credentials became an organising factor of the institution's new culture of expertise. In a stark contrast with the broad generalist training of civil servants, university degrees —and particularly postgraduate degrees— became a marker of technical specialism.

Gutiérrez right-hand in the department was Antonio Urdinola, a former Rockefeller fellow from UniValle. As doctoral candidate at Harvard, Urdinola joined the DAS team in the DNP, with the intention to write his dissertation in connection to his work at the planning department, as his supervisor reported to the Ford.[909] Gutiérrez appointed Urdinola chief of the Sectoral Research Division (later called Division of Agrarian and Industrial Issues) in 1967, leaving his doctoral studies unfinished —like many others after him. Gutiérrez and Urdinola used their personal networks to recruit new staff. On one occasion, they visited the universities in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to persuade young Colombian graduates to return to the country to fill the directive technical positions in the department.[910] Antonio Barrera Carrasquilla, who had recently obtained a PhD in Engineering from MIT, fell under the spell and joined the department as head

[909] Gottfried Haberler to Jesse Perry, 8 June 1966, box 159, folder 2476, F-RFR.
[910] Interview with Antonio Urdinola, Chief of the Division of Industrial and Agrarian Studies (1966-9), 28 January 2021.

of the infrastructure section.[911] The allure of working for the DNP also compounded the brain drain from universities to the state, a long-time preoccupation of philanthropic sponsors, as shown in Chapter 4. Faculty and alumni from the main economics departments flocked to the DNP.

Why did so many young economists and engineers decide to join the DNP instead of pursuing an academic career, or working for the private sector? To begin with, as already noted, the DNP was able, thanks to the SPG contract, to match the salary expectations of young professionals who aspired to improve their material condition through the exercise of their profession. The DNP also offered young graduates the possibility to work for an institution that was strategically situated between the government, foreign academic institutions, and international financial organisations. Therefore, young aspiring professionals found in the DNP a relatively well-paid job that also had the respectability of public service and the reputation bestowed by its international connections.

Given its domestic and foreign networks, the DNP was also able to offer its recruits formal training opportunities. The Harvard DAS reached an agreement with the economics department at UniAndes whereby members of the advisory team taught part-time at the PEG if the latter allowed the middle-rank *técnicos* in the department to enrol as students.[912] DNP's director and division chiefs also shortlisted eligible candidates from the staff to receive scholarships to pursue graduate studies in the United States. Albert Berry, Ford's envoy, and DAS advisers interviewed potential candidates and screened

[911] According to the testimony of Antonio Barrera Osorio, this was how his father joined the DNP. Interview with Antonio Barrera Osorio, 18 September 2020.
[912] In September 1968, 57 *técnicos* were reported to be taking advanced courses in mathematics, economics, and English at UniAndes. The DAP also had a strong connections with the Engineering Faculty of the UNal, which owned the computer used by the department's programmers. DAS, "Report July-September 1968," n.d., R4661, DAS-FFR.

their technical skills, English proficiency, and marital status.[913] Between 1965 and 1968, at least eighteen *técnicos* in the planning department obtained scholarships from different funding bodies to pursue postgraduate degrees in economics and public administration in the US.[914] Although the Banco de la República offered its staff similar training opportunities, candidates were selected on an ad-hoc basis until the scholarship programme was formalised in 1970, when Miguel Urrutia (c.f. Chapter 4) became the bank's Technical Subdirector and Germán Botero de los Ríos (c.f. Chapter 1) its general manager. From this moment, the central bank developed organically its own technocracy with expertise on the economic and juridical aspects of banking and monetary policy.[915]

The recruitment tactics and training opportunities that allowed the DNP to maintain a cadre of well-trained and motivated economic experts shaped the work culture in the department. Besides sharing similar experiences of socialisation in academic spaces locally and abroad, the DNP *técnicos* developed in the workspace an *esprit de corps* that became constitutive of their sense of belonging to an expert community. The economists (and engineers) who worked for the DNP formed personal networks and cultivated a technocratic work culture grounded on professional values that one of them later summarised as "altruism," "dedication to work" and "intellectual and operative honesty." Having been educated when scientism was at its peak, the neutrality of "scientific techniques of analysis" and possibility of having "apolitical opinions" formed part of their

[913] Stanley A. Nicholson, "Note on the selection process for Planeación's foreign training candidates," 24 October 1968, R4661, DAS-FFR.
[914] Own calculations based on multiple DAS, Quarterly Reports, 1963-1970, DAS-FFR.
[915] Interview with Juan Carlos Jaramillo, then Economist in the Section of Economic Research of the Banco de la República and one of the first recipients of the central bank's scholarships under this scheme, 27 January 2021. From 1970 to 2017 the central bank sponsored 93 PhDs and 229 MAs in economics and financial law. Steiner Sampedro et al., *Tres Banqueros Centrales*, 22.

set of beliefs.[916] However, this professional ethos did not imply a seclusion from public life. On the contrary, DNP *técnicos* developed, like other expert communities, the conviction that their technical expertise entitled them to intervene in public matters. As a then-young *técnico* recollected in our interview, day-to-day work in the department was surrounded by "*una mística impresionante*" (an impressive mystique) cultivated by the personal encouragement that the DNP's staff received from the president himself.[917] In the DNP, economists began to perceive themselves as "trustees" of what they began to perceive as a common good: the rational administration of public resources.[918] This sense of being the trustees of good government helps to explain why some young economists saw in public service a viable career path, against the background of a general disenchantment among the youth with the political system in the late-1960s. Conspicuously, this commitment to public duty implied a rejection of *política*, both in the partisan sense of electoral politics and in the radical one of political militancy.[919]

To understand the broader significance the internal transformation of the planning department had on the Colombian state's long-term relationship with economic experts, it is necessary to examine concrete instances in which experts deployed their technical knowledge, with a deep sense of public purpose, to rationalise state economic interventions. The interplay between *técnica* and *mística* came to the fore when experts were called to inform decision-making in the political sphere.

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[916] Marulanda Gómez, *Economía política del manejo macroeconómico*, 49.
[917] Interview with Carlos Caballero Argáez, then *técnico* from the Budget section of the DNP,16 January 2020. This *mística* could be related to the "sense of mission" that Patricio Silvia identified in the engineers working for CORFO in Chile during the 1930s. However, *mística* did not necessarily imply sharing a common economic ideology, such as the faith CORFO engineers had on the social benefits of industrialization. Silva, *In the Name of Reason*, 99.
[918] Marulanda Gómez, *Economía política del manejo macroeconómico*, 49. For the notion of experts as "trustees" see Li Murray, *The Will to Improve*, 5.
[919] Melo, "Preface," 10.

5.3.2. *Técnica* and *Política*

Although the planning department managed to solve its staffing problem, it still had to demonstrate its public usefulness. When Lleras Restrepo took over the presidential office, it was not entirely clear what justified the independent existence of the DNP. While DAS advisers pondered the idea of subordinating planning bodies to the Ministry of Finance, Gutiérrez's first proposal even considered relinquishing the department's administrative independence and returning to the organizational structure of a Planning Office within the Presidency.[920] The operationality of the planning department was essential for the government to signal international lenders, such as the CIAP and the Consultative Group, its commitment to make a rational administration of development loans. But the planning bodies' failure to coordinate inter-sectoral economic policy based on the ten-year development plan, together with policymakers almost exclusive focus on correcting short-term imbalances, had rendered almost negligible the DNP's role in economic decision-making.


Given its focus on macroeconomic programming and its normative assumptions about the role of technical expertise in the planning process, the *Plan Decenal* offered decision-makers forecasts but no concrete policy guidelines. As the DNP acknowledged in its assessment of the ten-year plan, the *Plan Decenal* never "managed to become a thorough guiding handbook for government action."[921] During Lleras Restrepo's government, the DNP gradually moved, according to Cano, from a "top-down" to a "bottom-up" approach to development planning. While the top-down approach started

[920] Gutiérrez, "Reorganización de la Planeación"
[921] DNP, *Planes y Programas de Desarrollo*, 7.

from the macro level of global programming and descended gradually to the micro level of projects, the bottom-down approach began with the identification of specific projects and sectoral programmes that could then be aggregated into a global plan.[922] When the DNP presented its new development plan to Congress in 1969, it framed the document, not as the point of departure, but as the "ratification" of successfully implemented projects and programmes. The planning department used a diagram (Figure 2) to describe why development planning was not a static but a "dynamic" process.

[922] Cano, "La planeación en Colombia," 62.

Figure 2. The Planning Process[923]



[923] Reconstruction of the diagram in DNP, *Planes y Programas de Desarrollo*, 105.

According to this dynamic understanding of planning, technical experts must play an active role in the "promotion and coordination" of development policies. This stage was paramount to bridge the gap between planning and implementation, which foreign and local observers identified as the main weakness of the *Plan Decenal*. It marked a departure from the normative neutrality assumption of Cepal's programming techniques by emphasizing the centrality of persuasion in the planning process. Rather than providing alternative scenarios for policy makers, technical expertise's role in the planning process was to frame the "ordinary decisions" of public and private actors alike.[924]

The evolution from the top-down methodology of the *Plan Decenal* to the bottom-up approach of *Planes y Programas* shows how malleable the notion of planning was during the post-war period. As the Colombian case shows, the selection of planning methods responded more to the government's institutional capacities and needs, than to a breakthrough in economic techniques or a process of ideological diffusion. In the DNP's strategic decision to shift away from global programming and focus on sectoral planning and project evaluation, two factors carried special weight. On the one hand, the planning department reacted to the changing scenario the government faced in international financial markets. On the other hand, the new leadership of the DNP made deliberate choices to demonstrate Colombian decision-makers the usefulness of applying technical expertise to both rationalize the administration of public resources and provide indicative guidance to private activity.

In the late 1960s, the frustration in both the US and Latin America with the Alliance for Progress reached a point of no return. As AID lost relative importance as a source of

[924] DNP, *Planes y Programas*, 1, 7.

foreign credit to the multilateral banking system (see Table 4 above), Lleras Restrepo's government turned its attention to the project loans negotiated in the Consultative Group. For the DNP, this meant that the Division of Specific Projects gained prominence within the department. To strengthen that unit, the CONPES decided to offer the position of division chief to a *técnico* from the World Bank or the IADB. The person appointed was a Colombian engineer from the IADB, Omar Botero Páramo, who headed the division of Specific Projects for seven years without rescinding his contract with that bank. Before travelling to Bogotá, Botero Páramo drafted from his office in Washington a proposal for the creation of a financial corporation within the DNP that would fund feasibility studies for the projects submitted to international lenders.[925] The CONPES accepted Botero Páramo's proposal and, in November 1967, the president decreed the creation of the Fondo Nacional de Proyectos de Desarrollo (FONADE). With the passing of a decree-law in December 1968 that required all investment projects needing foreign financing to be approved by FONADE, the DNP consolidated its position in the state as the gatekeeper of Colombia's access to foreign development credit. Project evaluation thus became central to the functioning of the entire department. By the early 1970s, the DNP had become a regional leader in the economic evaluation of projects. Moving beyond the traditional analyses based on private cost-benefit accounting, the department pioneered the use of "shadow prices" to estimate the "net social benefit" of investment ventures in Latin America.[926]

[925] Decree 2080 de 1967, retrieved on 13 November 2021 from http://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta=Decretos/1396787; Botero Páramo, "Creación de Fonade" 286–87.
[926] "Una metodología para la evaluación de los beneficios y costos sociales de una inversión en Colombia", 1967, box 4, folder 31, folios 292-305, CT-DG-DNP-AGN. About its regional influence, see the testimony of Marulanda Gómez, *Economía Política*, 52.

The DNP's shift to what Cano described as a bottom-down approach to planning also responded to the perceived urgency of restoring public "confidence" in the department. As Gutiérrez argued in his memorandum to the president, given the reputational crisis suffered during Valencia's government, the DNP was urged to show concrete immediate results to demonstrate to stakeholders the advantages of planning development. The DNP selected three sectors as showcases: education, energy, and transport.[927] Nearly a dozen Harvard consultants flocked to Colombia to advice the department in issues relating to manpower planning, and the interconnection of transport and electric systems. The studies conducted about the transport and energy sectors were the most technically complex developed at the DNP during the 1960s. The elaboration of these sectoral studies required mastering complex mathematical models[928] and learning computational languages such as FORTRAN to run simulations in the IBM 1620 the DNP rented from the engineering department at the UNal.[929] Given the importance that project evaluation and the sectoral studies in energy and infrastructure gained within the DNP, the planning department also turned into a hotbed for a new breed of engineering experts, some of whom developed with time an interest in economics.[930]

[927] Gutiérrez, "Reorganización de la Planeación," 4-5.
[928] The Harvard Water Resources group, directed by Henry Jacoby, oversaw the electricity study. Guillermo Perry joined the departmetn as Jacoby's assistant in the department. He narrates the mathematical complexity of the models used in *Decidí Contarlo, 50-51*.
[929] The Harvard Transport Studies Group oversaw the study on transports, in collaboration with the DNPs infrastructure section, led by Antonio Barrera Carrasquilla. A PhD in engineering from MIT, Barrera Carrasquilla organised and promoted the use of computers in the DNP. His wife and sons remembered that his house was full of punched cards that Barrera Carrasquilla probably brought home from work. Interviews with Felipe and Antonio Barrera Osorio, and Rocío Osorio, 11, 18, and 29 September 2020.
[930] A few examples included Guillermo Perry, Antonio Barrera Carrasquilla, Alejandro Figueroa, Carlos Caballero Argáez, Eduardo Sarmiento, and Oscar Marulanda. Most of them either did the master's program in UniAndes, sponsored by the DNP (chapter 4), or received FF/AID scholarships to study economics abroad.

The DNP's specialisation on the microeconomic dimension of development planning did not imply that the department relinquished its role of coordinating long-term development policy at the macro level. However, global programming was no longer seen as the mechanism that would reconcile development and stability. As the balance of payments crisis of the 1962-1966 period had shown, the persistency of short-term imbalances required a constant recalibration of growth targets, which rendered comprehensive planning an impractical guidance for public and private investment decisions. Furthermore, the dispersion of policy instrument across different institutions —Congress, the Ministry of Finance, and the Central Bank— limited the national government's capacity to address short-term imbalances. A centralization of the policy making toolkit to intervene in the economy was nevertheless under way. While the transfer of the "control over money" from the central bank's board of governors to the Junta Monetaria strengthened the executive's grip over monetary and credit policy instruments, the promulgation of decree 444 (examined below) in March 1967 cemented its authority to regulate foreign exchange and capital flows.

The "444," as this legal milestone came to be known among economic technocrats,[931] was a sweeping reform of the consuetudinary procedures for macroeconomic management. In a nutshell, the 444 gave the Junta Monetaria almost total discretion to intervene in foreign exchange and capital markets.[932] This allowed the monetary board to adopt a strategy of small, periodical, and incremental devaluations of the Colombian peso to address balance-of-payments imbalances, in stark contrast to the prescriptions of the IMF, which favoured discrete, occasional, and large interventions on the exchange rate.

[931] Rodrigo Botero, *Bejuco de Tarzán*, 314-6.
[932] The decree introduced mechanisms to both address payments imbalances in the short run and facilitate the transition to an export-oriented economy in the long-run. Decree 444, 22 March 1967.

On 29 November 1966, Lleras Restrepo had famously announced in television his government's rejection of foreign creditors' demands to devalue the currency and its intention to adopt the system of controls that six months later materialized in the 444. Given the high stakes of this disagreement, the president got personally involved in economic decision making. Carlos Díaz-Alejandro commented that Lleras Restrepo degree of engagement was such that "ministers not involved with the economy could hardly see him between November 1966 and March 1967."[933] After the '444' was in place, the president personally monitored the state of the economy through the weekly memorandums that permanent counsellors of the Junta Monetaria prepared for the board's meetings.[934] Hardly ever before economic experts had attracted such degree of attention from a Colombian president.

In the late 1960s, the direct access economic experts had to the president was not restricted to deliberations about monetary and foreign exchange policy in the Junta Monetaria. Empowering economic experts in decision-making bodies became the cornerstone of the government's general approach to economic management. Under Lleras Restrepo's administration, consultative councils and boards multiplied. For each policy area, one council: that was how the "*llerista* structure of decision-making" worked, according to Roberto Junguito, then head of the agricultural section of the DNP and future Minister of Finance (1984-85, 2002-03).[935] For example, the ministries of agriculture, development, and foreign affairs presided councils where agricultural, industrial and trade policies were discussed. These councils typically included stakeholders in public and the

[933] Díaz Alejandro, *Foreign Trade Regimes*, 28. Lleras Restrepo's disagreement with the IMF is narrated in Maullin, "Colombian-IMF Disagreement."
[934] See the weekly memorandums Lleras Restrepo received from the counsellors to the Junta Monetaria. Section I, box 4, folder 9, folios 791-938, PD-ACLR.
[935] Interview with Roberto Junguito, 9 September 2020.

private sector, particularly decentralized agencies and *gremios*, the Minister of Finance, the governor of the Central Bank, and the DNP.

The "plethora of councils and boards" created during Lleras Restrepo's administration gave technical experts a platform to promote and coordinate development policies.[936] Among all consultative bodies, the president gave particular leverage to DNP's *técnico*s in the CONPES, to the dismay of his Ministers. Although the DNP's director was the only member with a permanent seat in that council, division and section chiefs attended the meetings on an ad-hoc basis upon the president's request. Informally, the counsellors of the Junta Monetaria also participated in the discussions in the CONPES upon the request of the director of the DNP.[937] As has been reported in multiple testimonies,[938] Lleras Restrepo enforced a practice at the CONPES that gave experts from the planning department the power of framing the terms of deliberations at the council. He made clear to his Ministers that each proposal emerging from the CONPES must first be discussed on the basis of technical documents prepared by the DNP. Council members were required to submit to the planning department, at least one week in advance, the issue to be discussed at the council. The technical staff of the DNP then prepared a technical document and distributed it to all board members before the meeting. At the beginning of every session, the President asked the *técnico* who led the preparation of the document to read aloud, word by word, his expert assessment of the subject. Ministers had strong

[936] DNP, *Planes y Programas de Desarrollo, 1969-72*, 9.
[937] Interview with Miguel Urrutia, then counsellor of the Junta Monetaria, 17 September 2020.
[938] See for example Perry and López Giraldo, *Decidí Contarlo*, 51–53; Roberto Junguito (chief of the Division of Agrarian and Indusrial Studies, 1970), *Cien Episodios*, 343–47. These testimonies were corroborated and contrasted in my interviews with other *técnicos* who participated in the CONPES at the time, like Edgar Reveiz, chief of the Division of Regional Studies (1968-71) and Antonio Urdinola, chief of the Division of Agrarian and Industrial Studies, 1966-9).

incentives to read the document beforehand because they did not want to appear unprepared in front of the president or their colleagues.

According to Botero Páramo, when he first suggested the adoption at the CONPES of that practice, apparently modelled on the procedure by which the IADB's Executive Directory reached executive decisions, it was received with scepticism and mockery. Allegedly Lleras Restrepo's immediate reaction was that he was very naïve if he believed it would be possible to "subject the ministers to such straitjacket," but he added laughing: "'Alright, let's try this out. But I don't want internal fights and I don't want either the Council to paralyse while these green documents are written.'"[939] These technical documents, typewritten in green sheets, became a constitutive element of the procedure through which council members deliberated and reached decisions on aid requests, specific investment projects, and broad policy guidelines.[940] Throughout Lleras Restrepo's government, the CONPES approved 573 green documents, the first of which was the creation of FONADE in September 30 1967.[941]

This elaboration, discussion, and enforcement of the CONPES green documents impacted both the operations within the DNP and the balance of power between *técnicos* and *políticos* within economic decision-making bodies. To begin with, it forced the standardisation of the structure, content and rhetorical style of the technical documents prepared by DNP's staff. According to an internal memorandum, all documents presented at the CONPES must follow "strictly" the same format. The main conclusions and recommendations of the document were summarized in the first section. As the

[939] Botero Páramo, "Creación de Fonade," 228.
[940] According to Roberto Junguito, this practice was not exclusive to the CONPES but was extended to the other consultative councils and boards. Interview with Roberto Junguito, 9 September 2020.
[941] See list of documentos CONPES, 1967-August 1970. Retrieved 11 November 2021. https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/portalDNP/CONPES/2011-02-22

memorandum emphasized, this section must be short and synthetic, prioritising those elements that are "susceptible to serve as the basis for decision-making." The second section presented a more detailed analysis of the problem, including a reflection on the methodology used, as well as relevant bibliography and historical antecedents.[942] Given that technical documents were instruments of persuasion, experts were encouraged to avoid jargon – or to expose their arguments in "*Cristiano* [vernacular language]," as Ruiz Lara, who replaced Gutiérrez as DNP director in 1970, put it in one internal memorandum to the head of the agricultural unit.[943]

The elaboration of these green documents was a collaborative effort, which often involved the cooperation between different units in the department. This coordination was enforced by the requirement that, before being presented at the CONPES, green documents must receive the approval from the "Coordinating Committee," which included the Technical Secretary of the DNP and all division chiefs and met periodically to sanction sound judgment and good communicative practices.[944] By operating as a disciplining mechanism, the procedure for elaborating green documents in the DNP encouraged the professionalization of the department. The legitimacy of economic experts in the department did not rely exclusively only on their disciplinary knowledge, credentials, and domain of technical tools, but also on their adherence to shared practices for formulating, presenting, and communicating problem diagnoses and policy recommendations.

[942] Antonio Barrera to Edgar Gutiérrez, "Formato de los documentos de planeación," 16 May 05 1969; box 1, folder 5, folios 1-3, MO-DG-DNP-AGN.
[943] Jorge Ruiz Lara to Roberto Junguito. "Memorandum. Documentos del sector agropecuario," 22 September 1970, box 1, folder 3, folio 83, MO-DG-DNP-AGN.
[944] Barrera "Formato de los documentos de planeación."

Although the green documents gave technical experts power to frame the terms of deliberation in consultative bodies, ministers were still responsible for setting the agenda and implementing the planning department's recommendations. Experts' success in influencing decision-making depended in most cases on the president's ability to discipline his cabinet. Economic technocrats later remembered Lleras Restrepo as a protective figure, who used his position of authority to shield technical experts from political influence. As Guillermo Perry, then chief of the budget division, put it:

> Lleras [Restrepo] protected us from politicking and there was no policy or investment that was not discussed in detail in the CONPES or approved there. It was the reign of technocracy with the president of the republic as its direct boss and protector.[945]

The president sided with the young economic experts at the DNP when conflicts arose with seasoned cabinet members. Consider the row between his Minister of Finance, Abdon Espinosa Valderrama, and the DNP's director, Edgar Gutiérrez, about the prerogative over the government's annual budget, which illustrates how the president's support strengthened the relative position of the planning department's economists in the state. To address the acute fiscal disequilibria inherited from the previous administrations, Lleras Restrepo presented early on in his presidency a proposal of constitutional reform which attempted to transfer the initiative on public expenditures from the legislative to the executive branch of government. This reform's aim was, as Lleras Restrepo told Congress, to make the national budget the "focal point for government [economic] policy."[946] While Minister Espinosa advocated unifying the budget under the Ministry of Finance, Gutierrez lobbied for assigning the elaboration of the investment budget to the

[945] Perry and López Giraldo, *Decidí Contarlo*, 53.
[946] Lleras Restrepo, "Mensaje al Senado sobre la reforma constitucional," in *Obras Selectas*, 41. Quoted in Caballero and Pachón, "Cambios en la institucionalidad económica."

DNP. Lleras Restrepo's constitutional reform of 1968 favoured Gutierrez's position, effectively handing to the DNP the control over the strategic allocation of public resources.[947]

By the end of Lleras Restrepo's administration, the DNP was an institution with unrivalled technical capacities and authority on economic decision-making. With direct incidence on decisions regarding investment projects (FONADE), foreign exchange and capital controls (Decree 444), intersectoral policies (CONPES and other councils) and the government's budget, the technical experts from the planning department gained recognition and achieved political influence. The president's support legitimised experts' intervention in economic decision-making during these years, leading Perry to retrospectively describe this period as noted above, the "reign of technocracy." This hyperbolic characterisation, however, obscured the tensions that this rise of economic experts to position of influence generated with other political actors, which came to the fore in the transition to the administration of Misael Pastrana (1970-1974).

5.4. Continuity amidst the Conflict between *Técnicos* and *Politicos*

The devolution of decision-making power to economic experts under Lleras Restrepo's government was not uncontested. From multiple sides, the institutionalisation of an economic technocracy became a target of critics of the National Front. Senator Alfoso Palacio Rudas warned that the empowerment of an "immense, complex and potent planning machine" had detrimental implications on "democratic praxis." In his widely read weekly column in *El Espectador*, Palacio Rudas argued that the constitutional reform of 1968 had effectively removed from popularly elected congressmen their customary

[947] Caballero and Pachón, "Cambios en la institucionalidad económica."

sovereignty over the control of public finances. "Now, the budget is not the main instrument of public finances— he argued. It was replaced by the plan." As former General Comptroller (1944-1948) and active member of the Senate's third (economic) commission, Palacio Rudas knew first-hand how the budget had been an instrument of legislative control of public finances since the Kemmerer missions (Chapter 1). Hence, the displacement of the budget by the plan implied "a colossal displacement of power to the technocratic dependencies that prepare the plans and programmes."[948] According to Palacio Rudas, the empowerment of technocratic dependencies was interrelated with the degradation of representative bodies like Congress, an argument that social scientists would later echo in their studies of the National Front.[949]

Opposition parties and movements also attempted to capitalize the tensions between *técnica* and *politica* and by doing so shaped the narrative about this conflict. The candidacy of the former military dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla for the presidency against the official National Front candidate, Misael Pastrana Borrera, posed a real threat to the bipartisan arrangement. In the presidential elections for 1970, Lleras Restrepo's top-down reformist developmentalism came under fire from Rojas' political party, ANAPO. Mobilizing the have-nots and lower-middle income classes in cities, ANAPO blamed the National Front governments for the high levels of urban unemployment in the late 1960s.[950] The statistical studies produced at the CEDE and other economic research centres made patent the quantitative dimension of the problem,[951] which was further reinforced by a damning report produced by an expert mission from the International Labor Organization. Lleras Restrepo personally commissioned this report, a draft of

[948] Entry of 14 June 1970 in Palacio Rudas, *Columnas del cofrade*, 298.
[949] Bejarano and Segura, "La modernización selectiva del Estado."
[950] Dix, "Political Opposition", 143
[951] See Chapter 4.

which was already under circulation within the DNP before the elections.[952] However, ANAPO did not appeal to economists or other experts to voice their critiques. The party displayed an explicit aversion to technocratic developmentalism. ANAPO's ideologues accused Lleras Restrepo's government of pursuing economic growth at the expense of social justice, which they associated to the government's excessive reliance on technical expertise instead of putting human beings at the center.[953] This criticism served to reinforce ANAPO's message that the leadership of the National Front was detached from the concrete life experiences of the population.

Shortly after Pastrana won the presidential race against Rojas in a tight race,[954] the conflict between *técnica* and *política* imploded within planning bodies. Economic experts' position of influence in decision-making bodies created problems of governability for the coming president for various reasons. Firstly, members of the cabinet were from the onset on the defensive about the presence of economic experts in consultative councils and boards. Secondly, Pastrana inherited from Lleras Restrepo not only a fully elaborated development program (*Planes y Programas*) but also an institution (the DNP) with an army of experts committed to its content and implementation. In consequence, the government's discretion to allocate public investments was highly conditioned by his predecessor's plan. This conditionality was not only resented by Pastrana, his ministers, and his party, but it made it harder for the president to use targeted expenditures as a means to enhance his governability. More than any other president of

[952] The report provides another example of the Colombian's government willingness to receive foreign mission. Like the Currie Mission of 1948, the so-called Seers Mission, named after its head Dudley Seers, was the first of its kind in the context of the ILO's World Employment Program. See ILO, *Towards Full Employment*. An analysis of this mission goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
[953] Dix, "Political Opposition," 160, 163.
[954] While Rojas accepted defeat, there were allegations of fraud that have hunted this election ever since.

the National Front, the legitimacy of Pastrana's authority was under question, after the bipartisan coalition won the presidential elections of 1970 by a tight margin, a victory that was marred by the low turnout and the widespread accusations of fraud.[955]

After taking possession, Pastrana delayed the ratification of Ruiz Lara as DNP director, which sowed mistrust in the department. There were also early clashes between experts and Ministers in consultative bodies. Some ministers, like that of Agriculture, even stopped convening the meetings in the councils they presided and implemented their policy agenda without coordinating with the DNP.[956] Disillusion and demoralization grew within the planning department. Some *técnicos* even felt that they were being manipulated by the president and his cabinet to achieve political objectives.[957] Without the strong support of the president, the structure of decision-making that underpinned the DNP's "bottom-up" approach to development planning was falling apart.

The final breakdown came in December 1970 when an open disagreement with Pastrana at the CONPES resulted in the resignation of Jorge Ruiz Lara and other *técnicos*, followed by a general strike at the DNP that halted the operation of the department for three months. The conflict between the experts and the President was triggered by a green document presented at the CONPES with recommendations about the conservation plan for a natural national park near the coastal city of Santa Marta (known today as 'Parque Tayrona'). The issue had been discussed and approved during the previous administration,[958] but Pastrana asked the DNP to resubmit the case for deliberation with the new cabinet. Pastrana allegedly reacted negatively to a clause that recommended the

[955] Oscar Marulanda, written response to first interview form, 24 September 2020.
[956] Roberto Junguito, Interview 9 September 2020.
[957] Perry and López Giraldo, *Decidí Contarlo*, 57.
[958] DNP, "Documento DNP-418. El plan de desarrollo del Parque Nacional de Santa Marta" 9 December 1969.

expropriation of land from private holders with properties inside the park (point 4.2), with whom the government had failed to reach an agreement about the lands' values upon which monetary compensations were determined. According to Edgar Reveis, who authored the green document for the meeting as chief of the Division of Regional Studies, these were mostly absentee owners who had close ties with politicians from the Caribbean region. Ruiz Lara stood firm with the DNP's recommendations, causing Pastrana's furious response. Reportedly the president alluded to the fact that he had almost lost the elections, suggesting that the DNP was to blame "for attacking the [Caribbean] coast."[959] According to another testimony, Ruiz Lara exposed his argument without political tact, in a direct and cold technical language, to which the President replied: "excuse me, Jorge, but I am the president."[960] One second-hand witness recollected that Ruiz Lara stood up and threw the green sheets on the table and left the room immediately after, while an eye witness remembered hearing that he pushed a chair in his way out.[961] Immediately after leaving the meeting, Ruiz Lara presented his resignation. Shortly after, he joined the IADB as technical assistant to the president of this bank.[962]

To avoid the first major crisis in Pastrana's administration, the economic secretary of the presidency reached Guillermo Perry, then technical secretary of the DNP, and offered him the direction of the department. After discussing the matter with the division chiefs, he declined and presented his resignation. So did Reveiz, Junguito, and Barrera Carrasquilla, among others. As the opportunities that former DNP *técnicos* had to find a job in government during Pastrana's presidency closed, other doors opened. Reveiz and

[959] Interview with Edgar Reveis, 9 January 2021.
[960] Interview with Fernando Cepeda, professor of political science at UniAndes and close adviser to Ruiz Lara's successor Roberto Arenas, 15 January 2021.
[961] Interview with Edgar Reveis, 9 January 2021; Oscar Marulanda, written response to first interview form, 24 September 2020
[962] Cepeda Ulloa and Mitchell, "The Trend towards Technocracy," 238.

Perry went to the CEDE at UniAndes, where they joined Cano. Junguito and Barrera Carrasquilla accepted an invitation from Rodrigo Botero, Lleras Restrepo's Economic Secretary, to join FEDESARROLLO, an independent think-thank modelled on the Brookings Institute, which he had recently founded with support from the Ford Foundation. From FEDESARROLLO, economists used their legitimacy as independent experts to make Pastrana's government accountable for its economic policies.[963] By relying on their networks in multilateral institutions, universities and independent think-tanks, economic experts were able to shield themselves from the political cycle without entirely cutting their links with the state in the long term. As a case in point, Botero and Perry joined the campaign of Pastrana's successor Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978), who rewarded them by appointing them respectively as Minister of Finance and Tax Director.

Despite the removal of the DNPs' most senior personnel, its technical capacities remained unscathed. In what appeared to be a meditated decision to avoid the complete breakdown of the department, most of the middle-ranking technical staff remained in the DNP. Yet, the *técnicos* who stayed drew a red line for government interference in the department from early on. The chief of the employment section in the Human Resources division, Oscar Marulanda, organized a "strike" that paralyzed the department for three months, as mentioned above. He was aghast that Pastrana even dared to question the "mystic of public service" of the technical experts in the DNP.[964] This remarkable episode illustrates the extent to which the economists and engineers who worked at the planning

[963] Perry and López Giraldo, *Decidí Contarlo*, 61. Gómez Buendía, ed., *Economía y Opinión*, 6–7.
[964] Oscar Marulanda, written response to first interview form, 24 September 2020

department had developed a *esprit de corps* around shared values of professional duty and integrity.

Notwithstanding the tensions between *técnicos* and *políticos*, the reliance on economic expertise to formulate development policy had been firmly institutionalised in the DNP. To replace Ruiz Lara, Pastrana appointed former CID director, Roberto Arenas, who filled the department with professionally trained economists, mainly from the UNal (see Chapter 4). Arenas and his team set themselves to prepare a new programme under the guidance of Currie, the foreign expert who landed in the country with the diffuse mandate of designing a development plan for Colombia. The frail Planning Office that Currie had worked on the 1950s and which he had contributed to create found no comparison in the planning department that he encountered in the 1970s. Besides having a large and well-funded staff of professionally qualified economists, the DNP had the legal instruments and the political legitimacy to formulate the guidelines for development policy.

5.5. Conclusion

Within a few months in the DNP, Arenas and Currie presented in December 1971 the first development plan that effectively served to frame economic interventions after two decades of infelicitous attempts.[965] Development planning offered in theory a simple technical framework for rationalising public expenditures and coordinating private initiative. In practice, the institutionalisation of planning procedures depended on a set of factors that were not in place when the DNP was created in the late 1950s. The availability

[965] The analysis of this plan falls beyond the scope of this thesis. For a thorough analysis see Páez Martínez, "Emprendimiento institucional," 113–46.

of reliable economic statistics and professionally trained experts, the state's administrative regulations for recruiting qualified personnel, the degree of support that planning bodies received from political actors, and foreign lenders' monitoring practices shaped how planning development operated on the ground during the 1960s. What actors understood for planning also changed within the period of study of this chapter and so did the role that technical experts were expected to play in the process. Cepal's global view of economic programming, which was premised on the alleged normative neutrality of technical experts, gave way to an approach to planning that assigned experts a more active role in the decision-making process by participating directly in the formulation of strategic policies and investment projects. By the time Arenas and Currie's development plan saw the public light, expert interventionism had achieved a degree of acceptance and legitimacy that the authors of the *Plan Decenal* could only have dreamt of ten years before.

In understanding the degree of influence that the DNP achieved during the National Front, its position as the gatekeeper of the government's access to foreign lending is key. Under the conditions of financial repression of the Bretton Woods era, foreign aid and low-interest loans from multilateral banks, such as the World Bank and the IADB, were the main and most reliable source of foreign exchange for financing development. As this chapter documents, creditors gave as much importance to government's institution-building efforts as they did to other indicators of sound economic policymaking, such as balanced budgets and stable currencies. In the context of this type of donor-client relationship, access to official development assistance provided a political rationale for empowering the *técnicos* at DNP, who became *de facto* the interlocutors between the state and foreign lenders. By staffing the planning

department with technically qualified experts who had international credentials (see Chapter 4) and strengthening their position in the state, the government signalled its commitment to the rational design and implementation of development policy. The presence of foreign advisers added credibility to this commitment, which also helps to explain the government's readiness to secure and maintain expert missions like that of the Harvard DAS in the DNP.

Although this chapter examined the institutionalisation of economic expertise through the lens of planning bodies, professional economists also began to assert their position in the areas of monetary and fiscal policymaking, albeit the extent to which this occurred during the period of study of this thesis varied. The creation of the Junta Monetaria (with its two permanent advisers) gave economists a seat at the table where monetary policy was discussed, while the Ministry of Finance professionalised with the work conducted for the Tax (Musgrave) Commission.[966] These three bodies, the DNP, the Junta Monetaria,[967] and the Ministry of Finance, formed the backbone of the country's economic technocracy in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The position of these bodies in the state's architecture for economic decision-making was strengthened by two trends that were identifiable across the four administrations of the National Front: the concentration of "policy instruments" in a few institutions, as opposed to their fragmentation in the preceding period;[968] and the correlative centralisation of economic-decision making power in the executive branch of government. This chapter shows that the build-up of Colombia's institutional infrastructure for technocratic economic

[966] The tax reform mission headed by Richard Musgrave during Lleras Restrepo's government falls beyond the remit of this chapter. See Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay, "Richard Musgrave in Colombia."
[967] Replaced by a Board of Governors after the independence of the Banco de la República in 1991.
[968] Díaz Alejandro, *Foreign Trade Regimes*, 23.

policymaking was initially framed within a developmentalist agenda, but also one that prioritized rationalising public finances and coordinating with corporate private interests over assigning to the state the control over economic affairs. In this sense, the emergence of an economic technocracy did not mark a substantial departure from pragmatic traditions of policymaking (see Chapter 1) but rather displayed some degree of continuity with pre-existing practices of economic management.

The emergence of an economic technocracy in Colombia did not occur in a vacuum. This process cannot be disentangled from the democratisation project envisioned by the architects of the National Front. Against the background of violence, political intransigence, and erratic economic management of the 1950s, National Front leaders sought to ground collective decision-making on a basis of dialogue, negotiation, and transaction. Lleras Camargo's semantic effort to reconcile the notion of planning with democracy in his presentation of the *Plan Decenal* is a case in point. The ten-year plan was in his view an instrument for making the government accountable of its economic decisions and for rallying broad societal support for common objectives. Planning was thus neither incompatible with individual freedoms, nor a policing mechanism. The extensive use of consultative bodies, such as the CONPES, for coordinating intersectoral policies and investment decisions during Lleras Restrepo's administration is another example of how the specificities of the Colombian democratic system at the time shaped the relations between *técnica* and *política*. While the president's ability to discipline his bipartisan cabinet partly explains why *técnicos* succeeded at framing government policy at the CONPES in contrast to what occurred during Valencia's administration, the emphasis given to the language and presentation of the technical (green) documents the DNP brought to this consultative body indicates the importance given to persuasion. For

técnicos, the form of their expert advice mattered as much as its content in so far as they considered themselves to be engaging with *politicos* in a dialogue in which the knowledge gap between the parts involved was not intractable. However, contemporary critics rightly pointed out some of the tensions that existed between these technocratic trends and the democratic aspirations of the National Front's leadership, such as the correlative degradation of representative bodies and the growing distance between decision-makers and ordinary citizens. Despite the escalation of the tensions between *técnicos* and *politicos* in the transition to the Pastrana government, the presence of economic experts in decision-making bodies remained unquestionable. Governments' reliance on economic expertise had effectively institutionalised in the Colombian state.

Conclusion

In his opening address to the third National Congress of Colombian Economists 1963, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, then Senator for the Liberal Party, issued a call for enhancing the dialogue between *técnicos* and *politicos*. Because the economy was playing an ever-greater importance in the administration of the state and in the programmatic orientation of political parties, he claimed, this dialogue was a constitutive element in the government of democratic societies. Lleras Restrepo upheld in principle the standard normative distinction between the *políticos* and the economists-as-*técnicos*. While the former were, "by definition", responsible for "the matters that concern the 'city', that is for the state's functioning and good government;" the latter were becoming the "artisans" of the state's "global [economic and social] policy in all its technical aspects." However, a narrow view of the division of labour between *técnicos* and *politicos* had been, according to Lleras Restrepo, an obstacle for the effective implementation of coherent economic and social policies. In his opinion, economists must "transcend the limits of their profession," going beyond producing detached analyses of economic problems and actively participating in the "institutional reform" of the state. "It should not come as a surprise —he then argued— how necessary it is to open channels for technique to have more influence in politics, in general, and in the functioning of the state [in particular]".[969]

Explaining how professional economists successfully carved their way into the state to intervene in economic affairs was the aim of this dissertation. Lleras Restrepo was a pivotal figure in the story told in the previous chapters. First appointed Minister of

[969] Lleras Restrepo, "Una economía humanística para Colombia," 18 September 1963, box 15, folder 3, folios 847-852, PD-ACLR.

Finance in 1938 at the age of 30, he epitomized both the tradition of *hacendista* lawyers that oversaw the administration of public finances for most of the twentieth century and the breeze of change that forestalled the advent of professional economists and their incorporation into the state at a young age. While Lleras Restrepo did not receive formal specialised training in economics —he developed, like many others before and after him (c.f. Chapter 1), practical knowledge about the economy by handling public affairs — he was a central figure in the inception and early development of the profession. He co-founded the FEIC at the Gimnasio Moderno, one of the first academic programmes that offered economics degrees in the country (c.f. Chapter 3). Even if the existence of this programme was short-lived, its alumni set the standards for the education of economists in other universities and served as interlocutors to the foreign experts who arrived with the IBRD mission (c.f. Chapter 2). Figures like Lleras Restrepo were a bridge between the practical men who had traditionally overseen the administration of economic affairs and the professional economists that began to emerge in the mid-twentieth century.

From early on, practical men like Lleras Restrepo considered important to incorporate young professional economists into political life. In a letter he sent to the members of the Liberal directory while he was in exile during Laureano Gómez's government in the early 1950s, he urged them to "form a team of economists and sociologists who know in depth the national reality and the characteristics of public problems, if the party wished to continue having a positive influence in Colombian life."[970] The foundation of the SEAP, under Lleras Restrepo's aegis, as a platform to publicly criticise the fiscal management of Rojas' dictatorship (c.f. Chapter 3) is an

[970] "Los programas económicos y sociales del liberalismo", section I, box 2, folder 3, folio 733, E-ACLR.

example of young economists' early involvement in the political sphere. This episode offers a counterpoint to the argument about the selective affinity between technocrats and authoritarian rulers,[971] because young economists did not find a place in Rojas' military regime and –as a collective body– opted to side with the civil opposition. In doing so, young economists' technocratic outlook of economic management infused how prominent figures in the civil resistance and future leaders of the National Front interpreted and reacted to the economic record of Rojas government, as Lleras Camargo's presidential allocutions illustrated (c.f. Chapters 4 and 5).[972] Thanks to the tutelage of influential politicians like Lleras Restrepo, the economics profession developed a close relationship with the National Front leadership and thus with the state throughout the period of bi-partisan government (1958-1974). As analysed in Chapter 5, the proximity of economists-as-*técnicos* to the world of *politicos* reached an apex under Lleras Restrepo's presidency. By the end of this administration, the channels that allowed technique to influence the functioning of the state had been set in place. Lleras Restrepo left office, but economic experts had arrived to stay.

People like Lleras Restrepo shaped, through the decisions they made and the networks they formed, the emergence of an economic technocracy in the country. But an exclusive emphasis on individual voluntarism would fail to capture how the

[971] O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, 83.
[972] This episode bears some resemblance with the role that economists' involvement in non-governmental think thanks would later play in transition societies in other Latin American countries, like Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. But there were important differences. The SEAP was an explicitly partisan (Liberal) association of professionals, while think-thanks like CIEPLAN in Chile, CEDES in Argentina and CEBRAP in Brazil were well-connected internationally private research centres staffed with social scientists. This speaks to the fact that the Rojas' regime in the 1950s allowed for some degree of political association that the military rulers of the 1970s and 1980s did not tolerate. It also illustrates the shifting relationship between the state and social scientists between the 1950s and 1970s. Adelman and Fajardo, "Between Capitalism and Democracy," 7; Silva, "Technocrats and Politics in Chile," 403-408.

embeddedness of technical economic expertise in government involved broader rearrangements in the interactions between universities, the state and international institutions in the mid-twentieth century. This dissertation situated the reconfiguration of these relationships in the context of the post-WWII world order, when new opportunities –and demands– for governments in the developing world to access financial and technical assistance programmes opened channels for the transnational circulation of economic expertise. Mediated by multilateral institutions and philanthropic foundations, these transnational exchanges had a direct impact on the professionalisation of economics and the institutionalisation of economic expertise in the state, as the previous chapters showed. But the actors and institutions involved in these processes had to contend with pre-existing traditions of economic thought and practice.

This dissertation thus began by tracing these traditions from the late colonial period to the mid-twentieth century in different settings, from universities to the Ministry of Finance, the *gremios,* and the banking and regulatory institutions founded in the 1920s, the Banco de la República and the General Comptroller. The general picture drawn in Chapter 1 was one of a remarkably long history of engagement with the economic science, without necessarily leading to a high degree of specialisation in the field. From the onset of the republican era, political economy was taught in universities almost uninterruptedly by faculties of law and engineering. The ruling classes in the nineteenth and early twentieth century Colombia followed the evolution in economics through the mediation of (mainly French) popularisers and, in some cases, by travelling abroad. A key insight that emerges from this chapter was that the men who oversaw the administration of public and private affairs approached economics with pragmatism, relying on their personal experience and networks to make informed decisions. While this observation is consistent

with previous findings in studies about Colombian economic policymakers and institutions,[973] this thesis contributes to this literature by locating different traditions of pragmatic engagement with economic affairs, some of which can be traced back to the nineteenth century. To an extent, pragmatic economists achieved a degree of expertise according to the area of concern of specific institutions. In the Ministry of Finance, a tradition of appointing lawyers with expertise in public finance (*hacendistas*) developed from early on in the republican era¸ while the *gremios* founded between the 1920s and 1930s specialised in producing sectoral economic knowledge, upon which the state in turn grew increasingly dependent to coordinate policy. In the General Comptroller and the Banco de la República, the business cycle studies produced by local statisticians and exiled economists during the interwar years involved the type of quantitative and tool-based expertise that professional economists would bring to state institutions in the following two decades.

What changed in the post-WWII period was the institutionalisation of a global view of the national economy that created spaces in the state for technically trained economists. Before the supply of economic expertise came from university departments, the impulse to produce knowledge about the economy as a whole was given by foreign development missions. Chapter 2 examined the impact of the advisory teams that the IBRD, the UN-EPTA and Cepal sent to Colombia in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. While most foreign experts left shortly after setting foot in the country, those who remained, like Lauchlin Currie, had a long-lasting influence in the education of economists and in economic policy debates. A central finding of Chapter 2 was that the

[973] Caballero Argáez, *La economía colombiana*, 255–56; Thorp, *Economic Management in Perú and Colombia*, 157.

main outcome of these missions was the creation of an institutional architecture to produce knowledge about, and to intervene in, the economy. The Colombian case illustrates how the post-war technical turn in economics shaped, through the mediation of development missions, the "cognitive capacities" of states in the developing world.[974] Between the late 1940s and the 1950s, the national accounting programme in the Central Bank enhanced the role of its Section of Economic Research; the construction and publication of official statistics was centralised at the DANE; and sectoral, regional, and global programming studies were conducted at the Planning Office. While these institutions had a limited influence on policy in the 1950s, this gradually changed after the DNP replaced the Planning Office during the National Front (c.f. Chapter 5). Unlike the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, which until the last quarter of the twentieth century were dominated by practical men, statistical and planning institutions were staffed with professional economists from the very beginning.

The professionalisation of economics proceeded gradually from the creation of the first economics departments in the mid-1940s to the standardisation of economic education across universities and its internationalisation in the 1960s. In a higher education system still dominated by the traditional professions, there were different pathways to constitute new departments of economics, as the origins of the Facultad de Economía at Uniandes and the FCE at the UNal illustrate. By the late-1950s the education of economists across the country was already becoming more technical, drifting away from the grounding in the social sciences that García Nossa had given to the ICE at the UNal and partially leaving behind the business inclination of the FEIC at the Gimnasio

[974] I referred to the "technical turn" in economics in the Introduction of this thesis and to the notion of "cognitive capacities" in Chapter 2. See Morgan, "Technocratic Economics," and Whitehead "Whitehead, "State organization in Latin America," 47.

Moderno. Economics education remained a subject of debate throughout the 1960s in universities and professional forums like the SCE conferences mentioned above (c.f. Chapter 4). These discussions involved issues perceived as crucial for asserting the legitimacy of the profession both locally and internationally, such as determining the relative importance of mathematical training and distinguishing economics, as a science, from practically oriented degrees like business management. While the last point was generally accepted, the assimilation of the quantitative turn in economics found more resistance on the grounds that it conflicted with the set of skills that specialists in economics required in a developing country like Colombia. By preserving subjects like economic history in the curricula, economics departments attempted to balance the provision of technical training with a contextual understanding of the national reality.

The tension between assimilating international disciplinary standards and responding to the social demands for economic expertise came to the fore in the Ford and Rockefeller Foundation sponsorship of development research centres at Uniandes, Univalle and the Unal. Chapter 4 showed how philanthropic foundations' expectation to create in these universities permanent faculties devoted to economic education and research, modelled on the normative example of economic departments in the United States, did not fully materialise. In fact, the Ford and Rockefeller grants yielded unexpected outcomes, which revealed the ironies involved in the foundations' attempts at transplanting models of academe from one institutional context to another. Between 1958 and 1971, over thirty students received scholarships from those foundations alone to pursue postgraduate studies in economics in a wide selection of US universities. The diverse outcomes that these fellowship programmes had across the three Colombian universities studied in this chapter suggests that portraying fellows exclusively as mobiles

that facilitated the diffusion of mainstream economics, as scholars have done in their analysis of the infamous case of the Chilean Chicago Boys,[975] would fail to capture the complexity of their lived experiences. Not only they were often faced to cultural and academic barriers that hindered the assimilation of foreign ideas, but also confronted critically what US universities offered them based on their own intellectual interests and career objectives. This helps to explain why most of them did not finish their postgraduate degrees or left their academic positions shortly upon their return to work for the state. Research centres like the CEDE at Uniandes and the CID at the UNal served as career platforms for these economists with international credentials precisely because they fostered relationships with the state from early on and specialised in producing applied and policy-oriented studies about topical issues. Therefore, the formation of economic expert cadres in government was an unanticipated result of philanthropic foundations' involvement in universities.

The institutionalisation of economic expertise in the DNP during the National Front analysed in Chapter 5 showcased how the interaction between the state and international organisations in the 1960s was a key political driver for the creation of channels that allowed professional economists to attain a position of influence in economic decision-making. In the context of the Alliance for Progress, bilateral and multilateral loans became an attractive and significantly important source of hard currency to address balance-of-payment imbalances and finance strategic development projects. In the 1960s, Colombia was one of the main and most consistent recipients of AfP loans. It also continued to enjoy a special relationship with the IBRD, which

[975] Valdes, *Pinochet's Economists*, 164-170; Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*, 193-199.

coordinated the international consortium of lenders that convened every two years to finance the investment projects in the government's development plan. The Colombian government's alignment with some of the strategic objectives of the United States in Latin America at the height of the Cold War, notably on the "Cuban question", played a part in this privileged access to foreign aid. However, as I showed in this chapter, the measures taken by consecutive National Front administrations to make its commitment to development planning credible served to maintain Colombia's status as a "showcase" of official development assistance throughout the decade. In this context of donor-client relations, staffing the planning department with economic experts and empowering them in consultative bodies worked as a signal for foreign lenders of the government's commitment to make a rational use of development aid. Economic experts' position as mediators between the government and international financial institutions was thus an important source of their power. This finding reinforces the conclusion by Cepeda and Mitchell that the prospect of having access to development loans tended to make "technocracy fashionable" during the National Front, but this thesis also specified in historical detail how the government's commitment to development planning worked as the missing link tying foreign aid and the empowerment of economic technocrats. While scholars have identified the financialization of international economic relations that ensued the debt crisis of the 1980s as a key driver of the ascendancy of market-oriented technocrats in Latin America,[976] the concrete role that official development assistance, in connection with development planning, played in the emergence of economic

[976] See for example Whitehead, ; Domínguez, Dezalay and Garth, *The Internationalization of Palace Wars*, 34, and Domínguez, *Technopols*.

technocracies two decades before had not been adequately accounted for in previous studies.[977]

As also shown in Chapter 5, the empowerment of the *técnicos* at the DNP was the outcome of a bumpy process that redefined the boundaries between *técnica*, *administración* and *política*. Thanks to special recruitment arrangements, on-the-job training opportunities, and a collective sense of public purpose, the DNP became a technically staffed and highly capable institution — effectively an insulated "pocket of efficiency" within the state's bureaucracy akin to what the National Development Bank (BNDE) became in Brazil. The insulation from congressional control of the DNP followed a similar process to what Geddes described for the BNDE,[978] as the position of economic experts in the political sphere was strengthened through legal means, such as the discretionary prerogatives that the 'Decree 444' or the 1968 Constitutional reform gave to *técnicos* at the DNP. This thesis also showed how these legal measures were reinforced by informal enforcement mechanisms that facilitated the embeddedness of economic expertise in the state, like the practice to restrict the deliberations at the CONPES to discuss the green policy documents prepared beforehand at the DNP. While the emergence of an economic technocracy found resistance, as will be noted below, the foundations for its consolidation had been laid by the end of the National Front.

[977] As an illustration, the two seminal country-studies about the emergence of economic technocracies in Chile and México only mention in passing planning bodies and its relationship with the international financial institutions in the 1960s, tending to focus more on the national political dynamics in each country during the period. This also holds true for Dargent's case study on Colombia, whose focus on issues of international political economy concentrated in the episode of the disagreement with the IMF in 1967 without problematising the role of long-term financing. See Centeno, *In the Name of Reason*, 81-87, Silva, *In the Name of Reason*, 115-130, and Dargent, *Technocracy and Democracy*, 68-69.
[978] See Geddes, *Politician's Dilemma*, 61-69.

The summary presented above, which is by no means comprehensive, highlighted the central findings from the previous chapters that tie together the story told in this thesis. By focusing the analysis on the actors, institutions, and landmarks commonly associated with the *emergence* of an economic technocracy in the country, other aspects received less attention. A case in point is the parallel formation of alternatives that rejected technocratic views of development, exemplified by García Nossa's project at the Unal in the 1940s (c.f. Chapter 3), the student movement in the late 1960s (c.f. Chapter 4), and ANAPO's opposition to the National Front (c.f. Chapter 5). Additionally, the narrative was skewed toward the institutions involved in development planning, which during my period of study were the main hubs for economic expertise but had a rather limited incidence on the direction of fiscal, monetary and trade policy. Focusing on planning bodies had the advantage of allowing me to trace closely the institutionalisation of economic expertise in the state but posed limitations to evaluate the effects that this process had on both the type of economic policies adopted and the performance of the Colombian economy during my period of study. Economists' rise in the last quarter of the twentieth century to the top positions in the institutions overseeing fiscal and monetary policymaking also fell beyond the scope of this thesis, as did their role as public intellectuals in think-tanks like FEDESARROLLO (c.f. Chapter 5). These are possible avenues for further research that builds on the findings of the present study.

This thesis makes valuable contributions to the scholarship on economists, technocracy, and the state in Colombia, in particular, and more generally in Latin America. An important contribution of this dissertation to the historiography about the state in Colombia was to show that governmental institution-building efforts in the domain of economic management were relatively persistent throughout the twentieth

century. From Edwin Kemmerer's visit in the 1920s (c.f. Chapter 1) to that of the Harvard DAS in the 1960s (c.f. Chapter 5), successive governments across the political spectrum actively sought the assistance of foreign expert missions, which typically went beyond policy advising and included recommendations on institutional reforms that were, more often than not, judiciously implemented. Even in the worst years of political instability during La Violencia, there was a surprising degree of continuity between the Ospina, Gómez and, to an extent, Rojas's administrations in implementing the institutional innovations suggested in the IBRD and UN-EPTA mission reports. As I argued in Chapter 2, the centralization of power in the executive branch of government that came with the deterioration of democratic institutions in the 1950s even accelerated the administrative reorganisation of the state that ultimately enhanced its capacities to act on the economy. What this shows is that the construction of state capacities can run in opposite directions depending on the domain of state action, as continued occurring during the 1960s, when the state effectively developed capacities to secure foreign finance and rationalize public investments while still being incapable of attaining the legitimate monopoly of violence. Therefore, the skewed modernisation of the state during the National Front, to which Lleras Restrepo alluded in his 1963 address to the National Congress of Economists and scholars have associated to a "selective strengthening" of the governing apparatus,"[979] was part of a longer chain of incremental institutional change.

Nevertheless, technocratic arrangements of economic policymaking did flourish under the National Front. Designed to end with partisan conflict, the National Front system privileged consensus-building mechanisms of decision-making. When consensus

[979] Bejarano and Segura, "Modernización selectiva del Estado," 34; González González, *Poder y violencia*, 360-61.

could not be reached in Congress, which became increasingly common due to the fragmentation of political parties, consultative bodies secluded from the public eye, like the CONPES, provided an alternative mechanism. In this type of settings, technical economic reasoning contributed to building consensus because it provided decision-makers a framework for deliberating about means, shifting the discussion away from intractable differences about ends. Therefore, the political rationale for empowering technocrats in consultative bodies was that which had given birth to, and allowed for the maintenance of, the National Front arrangement: the coexistence of a political culture of compromise with the regime's emphasis on the promotion of economic development.[980] Economic technocrats facilitated the dialogue and negotiation about development issues in cabinets split, through a millimetric political calculus, between the two parties that formed the governing coalition, whose factions in turn represented divergent regional and sectoral interests. In this sense, at least, technocracy succeeded at *depoliticising* economic decision-making and was consistent with the aims of the political system that sustained the National Front.

At the same time, the principles of parity and alternation of the National Front allowed economists with divergent ideological outlooks and partisan filiations to participate in government. Even if individual economists might have differed in their political or policy views, the profession did not divide across factional lines. By the 1970s, the technical staff of the DNP and the DANE was composed by economists trained in economics departments from both private and public universities, whose differences in the understanding of economics were not intractable. Access to the state should not be confused with equal representation and influence, as the disproportionate proportion of

[980] Kline, "The National Front: Historical Perspective and Overview," 79.

Uniandes graduates that rose to top decision-making positions in the last quarter of the century suggests.[981] However, the *esprit de corps* of Colombian economists socialised in the discipline during the National Front sets it further apart from the paradigmatic Chilean experience, where the growing polarization of the political system towards the end of the 1960s split the economists, and social scientists more generally, into communities with opposing ideological outlooks.[982] This comparison serves to illustrate how professional communities of economists are shaped by the socio-political systems in which they are embedded.

While this thesis focused on Colombia, its findings have wider relevance for the study of economists and the state in Latin America. The story told above shows that Cepal's presence and influence was not uniform across time and place during my period of study. Where governments established close relationships with other multilateral institutions from early on, Cepal's standing was weakened. In Colombia, the early presence and continued involvement of IBRD's advisers in planning bodies made it more difficult for Cepal to establish its position among local economists and policymakers. Moreover, presence did not necessarily imply influence. Shortly after the departure of the Cepal-FAO Mission, the *Plan Decenal's* global programming agenda was abandoned within the planning department and its implementation neglected by the government. Short-term technical assistance missions were Cepal's main instrument to shape local bureaucracies in the absence of a local *Cepalino* community, but they proved to have

[981] Based on a study by Palacios, Uniandes graduates came to represent up to one quarter of the DNP directors, one third of the Ministers of Finance and half of the members of the board of governors of the central bank between 1982 and 2000. Palacios, *De populistas, mandarines y violencias*, 129.
[982] See Silva, *In the Name of Reason*, 131-132; Valdés, *Pinochet's Economists*, 201-217; and Fajardo, *The World that Latin America Created*, 170.

limited success to institutionalise in Colombia its views about the economic development of Latin America.

Equally, this dissertation also subjects to further scrutiny the standard narratives about the swift diffusion and assimilation of mainstream economics, as practiced in the United States, in the 1960s. Through the lens of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundation's involvement in Colombia, Chapter 4 showed that the Chilean experience with the Chicago Boys was not generalised throughout Latin America. The failure to install a Chicago-type school in Univalle revealed that the conditions for establishing academic communities with cohesive epistemic values *ex nihilo* were stringent. Arguably, the educational exchanges fostered by philanthropic foundations were not the main channel through which economic knowledge and expertise circulated to Colombia. Local economists' understanding of how to *do* economics was rather shaped through the interaction with foreign experts and institutions on-the-job.

By focusing on how economics is *practiced*, the previous chapters called into question the general framework of standard approaches to the post-1945 internationalisation of economics in Latin America. I showed how the Colombian case seats uneasily in historical narratives centred around the confrontation of ideas between the structuralist "Latinocrats" influenced by Cepal and a younger generation of mainstream economists educated in the United States.[983] In doing so, this thesis opened avenues to future research agendas that pay closer attention to the circulation and appropriation of forms of economics knowledge in practice to re-examine historically the

[983] Two examples of this type of narrative are Montecinos, "Economists and Policy Elites in Latin America," 286-295, and Montecinos and Markoff, *Economists in the Americas*, 15-27.

transition from developmentalist to market-oriented paradigms in the last quarter of the twentieth century, a problematic that fell beyond the remit of this thesis.

More generally, this dissertation demonstrated the analytical insights gained from historicising the use of technical economic expertise in government through an in-depth country study. Through the lens of the Colombian experience, I showed that the transfer of decision-making power to economic experts is a recent phenomenon. It was the outcome of a gradual process that began to unravel in the mid-twentieth century. Before economists were able to assert their influence in the policy arena, they had to gain public recognition as specialists about the economy, displacing established traditions of economic thought and practice. In developing countries like Colombia, the state's demand for specialised knowledge to rationalise economic interventions gave the impetus for forming national expert cadres. International and philanthropic institutions provided the necessary incentives and material resources. It was the special concatenation of technical expertise and economic development during the post-WWII period what allowed national economic technocracies to flourish. The effects of these national technocracies in the government economies and societies outlived the historical conditions that made their emergence possible. As experts' legitimacy has come under pressure in the first decades of the new millennium, this thesis is a reminder of the historical contingency of economists' influence on decision-making.

Appendix A

Table 1. Informants and interview dates

	Name	Education	Positions	Date
1.	José Leibovich	BA Mechanical Engineering (1976), UNal MA Economics (197?), UniAndes ABD Development Economics (1985), Université Paris I	CEDE Director (1996-9) Technical Sub-Director, DNP (2004-5) Chief of Economic Research, Fedecafé (2016-2023)	19/12/2019
2.	Daniel Gómez Gaviria	BA Economics (2000), UniAndes MA Business and Finance (2003), Université de Lausanne PhD Economics (2012), University of Chicago	Technical Sub-Director, DNP (2019-2022)	17/12/2019
3.	Édgar Revéiz	BA Architecture (1961), UniValle MA Development Studies (1966), Université Paris I	Chief, Division of Regional Studies, DNP (1968-1971) Professor in Economics and Researcher at CEDE, UniAndes (1971-1987)	9/1/2020
4.	Salomón Kalmanovitz	BA Economics and Philosophy (1967), University of New Hampshire ABD Economics (1970), New School for Social Research	Researcher, DANE (1971-4) Professor in Economics, UNal (1975-1993) Board of Governors, Banco de la República (1993-2005)	13/1/2020
5.	Haroldo Calvo Stevenson	BA Economics (1967), Uniandes MA Economics (1969), Uniandes	Chief, Section of Industrial Policy (1971-2) Counsellor, Junta Monetaria [Monetary Board] (1977-8)	13/1/2020

		ABD Economics (1970), University of Pennsylvania		
6.	Carlos Caballero	BSc Civil Engineering (1970), UniAndes MA Transport Engineering (1971), U. California Berkeley MPA, Princeton University (1977)	*Técnico*, Section of Budget, DNP (1969-1970) Executive Director, FEDESARROLLO (1982-4) Counsellor, Junta Monetaria (1984-6) Minister of Mines and Energy (2000-2001) Board of Governors, Banco de la República (2001-3)	16/1/2020
7.	Fernando Cepeda	BA Philosophy (1959), UNal BA Law (1962), UniAndes MA Political Science (1962), New School for Social Research	Professor in Political Science, UniAndes (1963-8) Vice-minister of Economic Development (1972)	15/1/2020
8.	Santiago Montenegro	BA Economics (1979), UniAndes MA Economics (1982), UniAndes MSc Economics (1985), LSE PhD Economics (1991), University of Oxford	Director, DNP (2002-6) President, Asociación Colombiana de Fondos de Pensiones y Cesantias (2006-present)	15/1/2020
9.	Alberto Mayor Mora	BA Sociology (1970), UNal MA History (2001), UNal	Professor in Sociology, UNal (1975-2002)	15/1/2020
10.	Roberto Junguito Bonnet	BA Economics (1965), UniAndes	Chief, Division of Industrial and Agrarian Studies, DNP (1970)	9/9/2020

		ABD Economic Demography (1969), Princeton University	Executive director, FEDESARROLLO (1974-8) Minister of Finance (1984-5; 2002-3) Board of Governors, Banco de la República (1991-9)	
11.	Max Rodríguez	BA Economics (1961), UniAndes ABD Economic Development (1965), Vanderbilt University	Professor in Economics and CEDE Researcher, UniAndes (1965-197?)	14/9/2020
12.	Miguel Urrutia	BA Economics (1961), Harvard University PhD Economics (1967), University of California Berkeley	Director, CEDE (1966-7) General Secretary [Vice-Minister] of Finance (1967-1969) Counsellor, Junta Monetaria (1969-70) Director, DNP (1974-7) Executive Director, FEDESARROLLO(1978-82; 1989-1991) Governor, Banco de la República (1993-2004)	17/9/2020
13.	Oscar Marulanda*	BA Civil Engineering (196?), Universidad Javeriana MA Economics (196?), Georgetown University	*Técnico*, Section of Employment Policy, DNP (1969-1971) Adviser, Minister of Finance (1984-7) Board of Governors, Banco de la República (1993-97)	18/09/2020 24/09/2020 2/10/2020 26/12/2020
14.	Hugo Palacios Mejía	BA Law and Economics (1964), Universidad Javeriana	Vice-Minister of Finance (1971-3)	24/09/2020

* Interview conducted via email. The dates indicate when I received the written response from the participant to the interview form (4 in total).

		MA Economic Development, Vanderbilt University (1967)	Governor, Banco de la República (1982-5) Minister of Finance (1985-6)	
15.	Cecilia López Montaño	BA Economics (1970), Uniandes	Chief, Division of Social Development, DNP (1978-1980) Director, FONADE (1981-2) Director, DNP (1997-8) Minister of Agriculture (1996-7; 2022-3)	04/11/2020
16.	Clara Elsa Villalba	BA Economics (1967), UNal	Researcher at CID, UNal (1969-70) Chief, Section of Labour and Division of Social Development (1971-5)	03/12/2020
18.	Lucía Cruz de Schlesinger	BA Economics (1960), UniAndes MBA (1963), University of Michigan	Professor in Economics and Researcher at CEDE, UniAndes (1963-1974) Chief, Section of Agriculture, DNP (1967)	05/12/2020
19.	Martha Fernández de Lynch	BA Economics (1962), UniAndes MA International Relations (1964), John Hopkins University	Researcher at CEDE, UniAndes (1965-8) Senior Economist and Project Manager, OAS (1969-89)	16/12/2020
20.	Juan Carlos Jaramillo	BA Economics (1971), Yale University ABD Economics, Yale University (1976)	Economist, Senior Economist and Director, Section of Economic Research, Banco de la República (1971-3; 1977-8; 1980-2) Counsellor, Junta Monetaria (1982-4) Technical Executive Director, Banco de la República (1987-91)	27/01/2021

21.	Antonio José Urdinola	BA Economics (1962), UniAndes ABD Economics (1967), Harvard University	Professor Economics, UniValle (1962-3; 1967-8; 1971-3) Chief, Division of Industrial and Agrarian Studies (1966-9) Minister of Finance (1998)	28/01/2021
22.	Gabriel Misas	BA Economics (1967), UNal MA Economics (1970), Université Catholique de Louvain	Professor in Economics and Researcher at CID, UNAL (1968; 1972-5; 1986-2006) Researcher, DANE (1971-1974)	13/05/2022
Family Members				
Enrique Peñalosa Camargo				
23.	Enrique Peñalosa Londoño (son)	BA Industrial and Commercial Economics (1951), FEIC Gimnasio Moderno	Economist, Planning Office (1952-1953; 1955-6) Director, INCORA [Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform] (1962-8) Minister of Agriculture (1968-1970)	3/9/2020
Antonio Barrera Carrasquilla				
24.	Felipe Barrera Osorio (son)	BA Engineering (1961), UNal PhD Civil Engineering (1968), MIT	Chief, Section of Infrastructure, DNP (1968-70) Researcher, Fedesarrollo (1971-73) Budget Director, Minister of Finance (1976-7)	11/9/2020
25.	Antonio Barrera Osorio (son)			18/9/2020
26.	Rocío Osorio (wife)			29/09/2020
Maria Elvira Santos				
27.	Aldo Buenahora Santos (son)	BA Industrial and Commercial Economics (1954), FEIC Gimnasio Moderno	Chief, Budget Office, Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá [Water Supply and Sewerage Company of Bogotá] (196?-1969)	30/10/2020

Note on conventions: ABD stands for All but Dissertation (PhD candidates). The years in parenthesis in the second column of Table 1 indicate the date when the degree was obtained, or when the participant interrupted their studies in the case of ABDs. The third column of Table 1 includes a selection of the relevant technical, advisory, or directive positions held by the interviewees during or after the period of study of this dissertation.

Appendix B

Table 3. Fellowships recipients from the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, 1958-1972

Sponsor	Fellow	Termination date	Degree pursued	Degree obtained	University
UniAndes					
Rockefeller	Jorge Ruiz Lara	1961	PhD	PhD	U. Illinois
	Miguel Urrutia	1966	PhD	PhD	U.C. Berkeley
	Hernán Mejía	1964	PhD	ABD	U. Oregon
	Eduardo Wiesner	1962	MA	MA	Stanford
	Guillermo Franco	1962	MA	MA	U. Pennsylvania
	James A. S. Ternent	1963	MA	MA	U. Oregon
	Francisco José Ortega	1964	MA	MA	Vanderbilt
	Max Rodríguez	1965	PhD	MA	Vanderbilt
	Giovanni Ciardelli	1966	PhD	MA	U. Minnesota
	[redacted]	1964	MA		Harvard
	[redacted]	1964	MA		U. Oregon
Ford	Jorge García	1970	PhD	PhD	U. Chicago
	José Giordanelli	1972	PhD	NI	LSE
	Darío Bustamante	1972	PhD	NI	Princeton
UniValle					

Rockefeller	Antonio J. Urdinola	1966	PhD	ABD	Harvard
	Enrique Low-Murtra	1969	PhD	ABD	Harvard
	Nohra Peñaranda	1964	MA	MA	U. Pittsburgh
	[redacted]	1964	MA		Duke
	[redacted]	1965	MA		Wayne State
	[redacted]	1966	PhD		U. Chicago
	[redacted]	1967	PhD		U. Chicago
	[redacted]	1967	PhD		U. Chicago
	[redacted]	1967	PhD		U. Chicago
	[redacted]	1968	PhD		U. Chicago
	[redacted]	1970	PhD		Harvard
UNal					
Ford	Luis Eduardo Rosas	1970	PhD	PhD	Brown
	Antonio Hernández	1970	PhD	ABD	Rice
	Jaime Tenjo	1972	PhD	MA	Brown
	[redacted]	1972	PhD	-	Vanderbilt
	Hector Melo	1970	PhD	MS	NSSR
	M Neyra	1970	PhD	MS	Rice
	Gustavo Jiménez	1971	PhD	MS	Rice
	Rodrigo Manrique	1972	PhD	MS	Vanderbilt

Sources: Constructed by the author based on: Scholarship recipients' "fellowship cards", box 7, RFR-RAC; Facultad de Economía, "Second Report;" Reed Hertford, "Final Report." I crossed out the names of the fellows who did not obtain a degree to protect their identity. The completion of PhD degrees was corroborated against the existence of their doctoral dissertations in the online repositories of their respective universities' libraries.

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- Fondo Escritos (E-ACLR)
- Fondo Personal (P-ACLR)
- Fondo Presidencia (PD-ACLR)
- Fondo Cargos Públicos (CP-ACLR)

Archivo Central Histórico de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia (ACHUN)

- Actas del Consejo Académico (CA-ACHUN)
- Actas del Consejo Directivo (CD-ACUHN)
- Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Actas del Consejo de la Facultad (A-FCE-ACHUN)
- Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Correspondencia (CO-FCE-ACHUN)
- Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Certificados (CE-FCE-ACHUN)

Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá, Colombia (AGN)

- Sección Archivo Anexo II, Ministerio de Educación Nacional, Fondo Correspondencia (C-MEN-AGN)
- Sección Archivos oficiales, Fondo Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP-AGN)

        - Centro de Documentación (CD-DNP-AGN)
        - Dirección General, Serie Antecedentes e Informe de Actividades (A-DG-DNP-AGN)
        - Dirección General, Serie Memorando Oficial Despachado (MO-DG-DNP-AGN)
        - Dirección General, Serie Cooperación Técnica Internacional-Grupo Harvard (CT-DG-DNP-AGN)
        - Oficina Jurídica (OJ-DNP-AGN)
    - Sección Archivos oficiales, Fondo Presidencia de la República
        - Secretaría General (SG-PR-AGN)
        - Junta Militar de Gobierno (JM-PR-AGN)

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- Gimnasio Moderno, Calificaciones, 1943-1952; Registro de Calificaciones, 1953-1954 (CA-GM-UADA)
- Gimnasio Moderno, Notas, A-Z (N-GM-UADA)
- Secretaría General, Actas Consejo Directivo (CD-SG-UADA)

- Secretaría General, Actas del Consejo Académico (CA- SG-UADA)
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