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When An Evolutionary Analysis of the Volunteer`s Dilemma.

Abstract:

The volunteer’s dilemma is an asymmetric n-player binary-action game in which a public good is provided if and only if at least one player volunteers, and consequently bears some private cost. So long as the value generated for every player exceeds this private cost there are n pure-strategy Nash equilibria in each of which a single player volunteers. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between the different equilibria. A complete characterisation of long-run play as strate...

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Publisher:
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2006-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:6d4bce4b-3c6e-4d87-99ab-ee7ab87630a8
Local pid:
ora:1309
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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