


Understanding social policy as a tool of foreign policy



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Trinity Term 2018

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
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ABSTRACT

Adopting an exploratory approach, this thesis seeks to understand social policy as a tool of foreign policy by addressing the following two research questions: 'What explains the relationship between social policy and foreign policy post-WWII?'; and 'Is there a relationship between welfare state type and the social sector foreign aid of donors?'. The thesis argues that social policy has not only a substantial, but also a relational foundation; therefore, the exercise of social policy is context specific. Through quantitative exploratory analysis and the construction of historical narratives examining this relationship in the cases of the British Empire and the United States, this thesis finds that the relationship between social policy and foreign policy is neither mechanical nor deterministic. Together, these cases illustrate the importance of understanding foreign aid in the social sector not only in relation to domestic politics and policy, but also within the geopolitical relationships underpinning the use of this instrument. These findings contribute to broader efforts to understand welfare state regimes in global context and to understand social policymaking in transnational relief, with implications for global social governance.

UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL POLICY AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY

AMANDA M SHRIWISE

To my grandfather, Rocky Krsnich.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CEO	Chief executive officer
CIESIN	Columbia Center for International Earth Science Information Network
CRS	Credit Reporting System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DoD	US Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
EU	European Union
FY	Fiscal year
G8	Group of Eight
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HHS	US Department of Health and Human Services
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IIAA	Institute for Inter-American Affairs
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International relations
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LIC	Low-Income Country
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PEPFAR	President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WGI	World Governance Indicators (World Bank and Brookings Institute)
WHO	World Health Organisation
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War
YCLEP	Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy

1 UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL POLICY IN A FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT

“The welfare state has been a favoured topic of research for many years now. This is not very surprising when we consider its fantastic pace of growth in most countries during the 1960s and 1970s. What once were night-watchman states, law-and-order states, militarist states, or even repressive organs of totalitarian rule, are now institutions predominantly preoccupied with the production and distribution of social well-being. To study the welfare state is therefore a means to understand a novel phenomenon in the history of capitalist societies.”

- Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds of Welfare State Capitalism* (1990, ix)

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen one of the largest declines in extreme poverty in human history. After 1990, the number of people living in extreme poverty more than halved, and the number of people living on under \$1.25 per day in the developing world dropped from nearly 50 per cent to under 14 per cent by 2015.¹ This progress has been attributed to a number of factors: a dissatisfaction with the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s; the elevation of development as a foreign policy priority in the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and elsewhere in response to terrorism and other transnational threats; a renewed commitment to development assistance targets from the European Union (EU) and the Group of Eight (G8); the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals; the emergence of new technologies (e.g. anti-retroviral drugs) and new policy instruments (e.g. social cash transfers) with which to deliver development assistance; an increase in remittances sent to the global south, largely from migrant workers, which now outstrip official development assistance (ODA) by a substantial

¹ As of 2015, 80 per cent of those experiencing extreme poverty reside within Southern Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2015, 1).

margin; and in particular, the swift rate of poverty reduction in China, resulting in a reduction in extreme poverty in Eastern Asia from 61 per cent in 1990 to only 4 per cent in 2015 (UNDP, 2015, 1).

Despite these gains, the eradication of global poverty remains a challenge. The number of poor people in low-income countries (LICs)² has increased by over 100 million between 1980 and 2010 (Olinto et al., 2013, 2). More than one third of those classified as extremely poor are children, and half of all children in LICs grow up in extreme poverty (Olinto et al., 2013, 2). As of 2012, child mortality for children under five was over 18 times higher and life expectancy 21 years shorter for individuals born in countries with low, as opposed to very high, levels of human development³ (UNDP, 2013, 24-25). Whether ‘development’ is defined in terms of economic growth, national self-determination, or poverty reduction and regardless of whether it is justified on the grounds of national security, sovereignty, or human rights, ensuring the provision of a ‘modicum of economic welfare and security’ (Marshall, 1950) is essential to achieving global development goals and targets. Five of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)⁴ and at least 13 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)⁵ recently

² A low-income country (LIC) is defined here according to the World Bank’s 1 July 2013 definition, which classifies a country as low-income if its gross national income (GNI) per capita in 2012 was below \$1,035 per year (Olinto et al., 2013, 6).

³ Human development is defined here according to the human development index (HDI), which utilises indicators on life expectancy, educational attainment, and income to rank the development of countries relative to one another. For more information on the calculation of the index and its useful variations, please see the 2013 Human Development Report’s Statistical Annex.

⁴ The five MDGs referenced here are as follows: 1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) Achieve universal primary education; 4) Reduce child mortality; 5) Improve maternal health; and 6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. For more information on the MDGs, please see the UN’s MDG website at <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>.

⁵ The 13 SDGs referenced here are as follows: 1) End poverty in all its forms everywhere; 2) End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture; 3) Ensure healthy lives

established by the United Nations (UN) focus on improving welfare outcomes, illustrating the inextricable link between welfare and development.

Technically speaking, we know how to eliminate poverty; the very existence of welfare state regimes⁶ within rich countries demonstrates that the systematic provision of basic needs - from education to basic income to health care - for large social groups is possible. As demonstrated in many poor countries throughout the Global South, demand for welfare provision is not enough to ensure and sustain its supply. Instead, the persistence of poverty – both within and outside of rich countries – is best explained by power and politics. Whether categorized as ‘three worlds’ (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990)

and promote well-being for all at all ages; 4) Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all; 5) Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; 6) Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all; 8) Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all; 10) Reduce inequality within and among countries; 11) Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable; 12) Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns; 13) Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts; 16) Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels; 17) Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. For more on the SDGs, please see the UN’s SDG website at <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/>.

⁶ Drawing from Wood and Gough (2006) and Young (2012), welfare state regimes are understood here as a set of rules, institutions and structured interests governing the welfare provision of a nation state. In line with Wood and Gough (2006), multiple welfare regimes may be reflected in a single social formation, particularly when external actors have been influential in shaping these formations. Such effects are particularly pronounced in eastern European and post-Soviet countries (Obinger and Schmitt, 2011) as well as in former colonies throughout the global south. Furthermore, this thesis recognises the spectrum of views on regime analysis – ranging from conceptualising regimes as path dependent to viewing them as intervening variables to arguing that they are simply epiphenomena of broader configurations of power (e.g. Krasner, 1982). This work is less concerned with arguments for or against each of these ways of seeing than it is with determining which of these lenses offers the greatest amount of explanatory power vis-à-vis the empirical evidence available, as well as minding the evidence that is unavailable, vis-à-vis a given time period, issue area, or moment. In other words, it sets out not to ‘test’ these different ways of seeing against one another, but to identify possible determinants of conceptual ‘fit’ in order to enable nimbler, more informed, and appropriate shifts between ways of seeing to better support policymakers operating in increasingly complex and fast-paced environments. Please see chapter 2 of this thesis for further elaboration on this point.

or conceptualised as ‘varieties’ (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001), comparative work on welfare state capitalism has illuminated the different ways in which rich countries have resolved the tension between capitalism’s technical project of creating liberal market economies and its stated political goal of improving social welfare within the frame of the nation-state. However, the methodological nationalism inherent in these studies has come at a cost. Specifically, it has masked: (i) the degree to which welfare state regimes are not simply independent containers in which welfare is produced and distributed but also a product of a number of interdependencies; and (ii) the fact that welfare state regimes have played a role in welfare provision and influenced welfare outcomes beyond their geopolitical borders for some time.

In 1995, Noël and Thérien drew attention to these links in their examination of the relationship between the welfare state and foreign aid. Through regression analysis, they demonstrate a correlation between the strength of the socialist attributes of a welfare state and foreign aid generosity, but do not identify causal mechanisms relating the two (Lundsgaarde, 2013). I was intrigued by the causal, ontological, and conceptual underpinnings of this study. First, in the absence of historical evidence confirming that one formed before the other, how are we to know that the welfare state should be the ‘independent’ variable and foreign aid the ‘dependent’ variable in this analysis? Second, while the study uses regression analysis, it also uses scatterplots to identify deviant cases within ‘sets’ when examining the relationship between social spending and foreign aid (Noël and Thérien, 1995, 533), suggesting an unusual blend of positivist and interpretivist approaches. Third, the study extends the concepts of the welfare state and foreign aid through the use of the index scores for liberalism, conservatism, and socialism as developed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and through the measure of Official

Development Assistance (ODA), respectively. How is one to know if these are the appropriate equivalents in their respective contexts?

Furthermore, separating the welfare state and foreign aid into 'independent' and 'dependent' variables occludes examination of connections between the two – a critical first step in characterising the relationship between them and identifying causal mechanisms. When brainstorming possible causal mechanisms, it became clear that there are many possibilities and perhaps more importantly, that one's ability to explore and map out this field of possibilities is shaped and constrained by ontological and conceptual assumptions. In other words, it is a function of sociological imagination⁷, or "the capacity to shift from one perspective to another" (Mills (2000 [1959], 10). This ability, as well as an accurate and precise understanding of its implications, is critical for both scientific production and discovery. In scientific production, the capacity to shift between perspectives is critical for designing and correctly interpreting studies; in scientific discovery, it limits what we are able to see and consider. Further still, unlike in scientific production, such exploration requires researchers to develop not only positive, but also negative capabilities, or the ability to approach the unknown with an openness of mind, a heightened sense of receptivity, and an effective negotiation on one's own ego (Cornish, 2011, 138 quoting Jackson Bate's (1963, 208) biography of John Keats).

This thesis begins this exploration where Noël and Thérien (1995) left off by addressing the following two research questions: 'what explains the relationship

⁷ Post-colonial sociologists have cited a lack or failure of sociological imagination as one reason "... the West has remained sociologically 'untouched' by the presence of Africans, Asians, and Native Americans..." Magubane (2005, 93) argues instead for more 'connected sociologies', "...through an acknowledgment of other histories and experiences as well as to enable a reconsideration of the relations between disciplines," the absence of which will "... continue to constrain our ability to imagine different futures" (Bhambra, 2014, 3).

between social policy and foreign policy post-WWII?'; and 'is there a relationship between welfare state type and the social sector foreign aid of donors?'. In what follows, I argue that social policy has not only a substantial, but also a relational foundation; therefore, the exercise of social policy is context specific. In other words, to understand why and how welfare state regimes use social policy as a tool beyond the domestic realm, one must first re-embed these regimes within the geopolitical relations that underpin them. Using mixed methods and focusing on the development of institutions overseeing the use of social policy in a foreign policy context, I find that while welfare state regime type bears some relationship to the social sector foreign aid policies of donors, this relationship is neither mechanical nor deterministic. Though the institutions guiding the use of social policy beyond domestic borders exhibit some signs of path dependence, they are neither the sole nor the primary determinant of the exercise of social policy in a foreign policy context nor of the way in which institutions shaping social policy in domestic and foreign policy contexts are joined up. In other words, rarely are welfare state regimes able to simply 'scale up' domestic approaches to welfare – if this is even desirable in the first place – not least because when, where, why and how these policies are carried out depends largely on the unique nature of the relationship between countries, on the transnational actor constellations shaping them, and on the broader foreign policy and global context in which welfare is being delivered.

This thesis contributes in particular to sharpening the concepts used to distinguish between the use of social policy in domestic and foreign policy contexts. In particular, it employs functional equivalents of social policy in domestic and foreign contexts and corrects for conceptual slipping between positivist and interpretivist approaches in Noël and Thérien (1995). In so doing, the thesis clarifies what is known

and unknown about the relationship between welfare state type and the social sector foreign aid of donors. Through further exploration of the relationship between social policy and foreign policy in the cases of the British Empire and the United States, the thesis makes a substantial contribution to mapping the way in which social policy has been used as a tool of foreign policy over nearly 150 years in these hegemonic regimes. In both cases, it finds that social policy is used as a tool to promote nation interests in line with either broader defense or development objectives and identifies an increasing trend towards steering and implementing foreign aid dedicated toward welfare in recipient countries through decentralized, transnational actor constellations.

The remainder of this chapter further contextualises these research questions, first by shedding light on social policy within a foreign policy context by understanding what has led to its oversight and neglect within the literature. Then, in the third section, factors that distinguish social policymaking within a foreign, as opposed to a domestic, policy context are discussed. The fourth section outlines the ways in which social policy may be used as a tool of foreign policy. Finally, the chapter closes with an overview of the chapters of the thesis that follow.

SHEDDING LIGHT ON SOCIAL POLICY IN A FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT

Explanations of the development and variation in welfare state regimes (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990) have focused almost exclusively on their internal dynamics, with little, if any attention to the global context in which they emerged. In line with the notion of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1982), the liberal international order formed after World War II (WWII) was designed to create stability in the global economy, which in turn allowed for state intervention to achieve social objectives on a country-by-country basis. From this view, the external environment in which welfare states emerged was

considered to be 'constant', and the domestic policy arena was thought to contain the change and variation that led to the emergence of social policy and welfare state regimes in the Global North (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983).

However, scholars from across disciplines – including history, political science, sociology, and international relations – have drawn increased attention to the way in which today's welfare state regimes have played a role in welfare provision beyond their national boundaries for many years, dating back to colonial period (Schmitt, 2015; Helleiner, 2014; Midgley and Piachaud, 2011). Furthermore, it is commonly established amongst scholars in examinations of social policy arrangements in the Global South to acknowledge the degree to which external actors and factors may drive, and even determine, social policy arrangements. However, the literature has yet to bring an understanding of the asymmetries and interdependencies between the welfare state regimes of the Global North and the informal and insecurity regimes (Wood and Gough, 2006) of the Global South full circle.

To address this gap, this thesis seeks to better understand the relationship between social policy and foreign policy in welfare state regimes with respect to the instrument of foreign aid. Theoretically, this is important for at least two reasons. First, understanding social policy in a foreign policy context is a necessary first step towards better understanding the development of welfare state regimes in global context. Illustrating the ways in which welfare state regimes have impacted social policy beyond their borders is critical for a comprehensive understanding of their national character. Second, it contributes to understanding the determinants of foreign aid dedicated toward welfare for informal and insecurity regimes in the Global South. As suggested in this chapter's opening paragraphs, this is of critical and immediate policy importance to poor

countries, yet has received far less attention in the literature on development in general and on aid specifically (Viterna and Robertson, 2015; Noël and Thérien, 1995). For this reason, the thesis privileges exploring the ways in which foreign aid in the social sector both shapes and is shaped by interdependencies and asymmetries between states in the Global North and South over understanding how social policy in a domestic policy context might impact approaches toward foreign aid in the social sector in a given welfare state regime.

At least three factors have contributed to the occlusion of the relationship between social policy and foreign policy in welfare state regimes: (i) methodological nationalism (and the related problem of reification)⁸; (ii) a failure to recognize the ‘state’ apparatus of welfare state regimes as not only national but also imperial; and (iii) substantialism. First, methodological nationalism has resulted in the treatment of countries as independent and mutually exclusive units of analysis within literature on the welfare state. In the context of embedded liberalism, the particular type of nationalism inherent in welfare state regime typologies reinforced the bifurcation of national policymaking into the categories of ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’, thereby occluding the relationship between social policy and foreign policy. A number of global historical sociologists⁹ and

⁸ Drawing from Chernilo (2010), I use the term ‘methodological nationalism’ in reference to the following three assumptions about the nation state: (i) that it is the necessary container of modern social relations (Martins, 1974); (ii) that it is the natural representation of modern ‘society’ (Giddens, 1985), or in this case, of the production, distribution, and reproduction of social welfare; and (iii) that it reifies the nation, thereby neglecting nationalism as a modern political ideology (Smith, 1983). This final point explains why welfare state regimes are not usually thought to be ‘nationalistic’, despite being studied primarily within national/domestic frames.

⁹ This group consists of scholars who have branched off from the more central line of ‘historical sociology’ and of international relations (IR) scholars moving to historically ground IR from both sociological and economic perspectives. The London School of Economics (LSE) is one hub for this group of scholars (<http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/globalhistoricalsociologygroup.aspx>),

international relations (IR) scholars highlight the conceptual and methodological problems inherent in this kind of reification. Jahn (2018) argues that such bifurcations¹⁰ are inherent in liberalism itself, and Go (2013) illustrates the extent to which they pervade Western models of domination (Go, 2013). Bhambra (2016; 2010) illustrates how the very use of 'ideal types' (as in Esping-Andersen's (1990) welfare state regime typology and the countless revisions suggested by his critics) are reifying in problematic ways, including an abstraction of national welfare state regimes from their geopolitical relations.¹¹

Global social policy scholars (e.g. Yeates, 2008; Deacon, 2007) have challenged the methodological nationalism inherent in mainstream accounts of social policy by highlighting the influential role of external actors in social policymaking in the Global South, with a particular focus on intergovernmental organizations (e.g. the Bretton Woods institutions as well as the UN and its specialized agencies). For example, the formation of the International Labour Organization (ILO) at the end of the First World War (WWI) represents a critical starting point for discussions on social policy on an

and the first 2010 issue of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs contains a selection of articles on the relationship between sociology and IR that I have found particularly helpful. In particular, I am referring here to the recent work of Gurminder Bhambra (Warwick), George Lawson (LSE), Julian Go (Boston University), and Robbie Shilliam (Queen Mary).

¹⁰ These bifurcations were not only territorial (metropolises and colonies) and geographic (West and East as articulated by Said (1979)) but also racial (white and black) and gendered (men and women) as well as along the lines of civil or savage, modern or primitive, and legal, formal, Christian or not to name a few.

¹¹ This group consists of scholars who have branched off from the more central line of 'historical sociology' and of international relations (IR) scholars moving to historically ground IR from both sociological and economic perspectives. The London School of Economics (LSE) is one hub for this group of scholars (<http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/globalhistoricalsociologygroup.aspx>), and the first 2010 issue of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs contains a selection of articles on the relationship between sociology and IR that I have found particularly helpful. In particular, I am referring here to the recent work of Gurminder Bhambra (Warwick), George Lawson (LSE), Julian Go (Boston University), and Robbie Shilliam (Queen Mary).

international scale. As an alternative to Bolshevism, the ILO was designed to “dignify labour and create a socially peaceful capitalism” (Deacon, 2015, 46). As championed by the ILO, social protection has emerged repeatedly at critical international policy junctures – both post-WWII (Helleiner, 2014) and after the 2008 financial crisis (Deacon, 2013) – as a cornerstone of global social policy, however intermittently neglected. Also, Deacon’s (e.g. 1995) pioneering work on the social policies of transitioning economies in eastern Europe during the 1990s highlights the degree to which external actors ranging from the World Bank to other European states to a variety of non-governmental organizations played an influential role in social policymaking post-Cold War. While these insights have been seamlessly carried over into work on social policy in developing countries and transitioning economies, histories and current understandings of established welfare state regimes have yet to fully consider the development of national welfare state regimes in global context.¹²

Second, Bhambra (2016) illustrates the way in which the state at the heart of today’s welfare state regimes was not only a nation state but an *imperial* state, drawing attention to the way in which external projection and action was a constituent part of the state apparatus. In reference to the work of Weber and Marx, she highlights that:

“In both... there was little to no consideration of how the already existing historical connections between parts of the world might be implicated in developments that otherwise were perceived as endogenous and independent processes originating in Europe... The failure to recognize prior global connections, or to regard them as substantively significant for modernity, is bound up with an elision of colonialism and empire as constitutive aspects of modernity’s development... Weber’s definition of the state... is one of the most

¹² While re-writing the history of welfare state regimes from a global/transnational perspective is not focus of this thesis, I have privileged and documented events and ideas that impact state involvement in welfare both ‘internally’ and ‘externally’ to contribute to this broader project. I am also grateful to Professor Julian Go for conversation about this gap within the literature.

commonly accepted... notwithstanding that in all cases used for illustration the state in question was a colonial and imperial state" (Bhambra, 2016, 336).

Revising conceptual and analytic frames in line with these findings is critical for not only 're-making', but for transforming the literature on welfare state regimes.

Third, examining social policy in a foreign policy context also requires an ontological shift from a substantialist to a relational approach, where social policies are understood to be a product of their power *relations* as much as their power resources. As articulated by Mohr (2013, 101-102), "a substantialist approach privileges things rather than relations and, as such, has a tendency to reify the social order, to essentialize social phenomena, and to embody a positivist orientation to social research". Alternatively, in a relational approach, "meaningfulness is determined not by the characteristic properties, attributes, or essences of the thing itself, but rather with reference to the field of objects, practices, or activities in which they are embedded".

Adopting a relational view is particularly important for conceptual and analytic reasons when seeking to understand social policy in a foreign policy context. While methodological nationalism has its problems, IR scholars of a sociological persuasion highlight the importance of not falling victim to the 'domestic analogy', whereby relationships between states are likened to those between states and individuals and to those between individuals themselves (Chernilo, 2010; Lawrence, 1990; Bull, 1969). This insight is critical when examining foreign aid, serving as a reminder that: (i) there is good reason to distinguish the use of social policy in a domestic policy context from its use in a foreign policy context; and (ii) of the way in which the relationship between 'donor' and

'recipient' countries is both constitutive of and constituted by foreign aid in a unique way¹³.

SOCIAL POLICYMAKING IN A FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID

Different political and institutional structures, policy tools, and mechanisms shape the way that welfare policies and programmes are developed, implemented, and exercised as political tools in a foreign policy context. Both a 'democratic deficit' (Woods and Narlikar, 2001) and an increasingly complex 'welfare mix' distinguish the political and institutional environment in which foreign welfare policies and programs are created and implemented. Unlike domestic welfare policies, foreign welfare policies are not developed against the backdrop of an international democracy but against one of 'good governance'. In light of this 'deficit'¹⁴ both the sovereignty of countries receiving aid and the legitimacy, transparency, and accountability of the international organisations delivering it have been called into question (Woods and Narlikar, 2001). Additionally, the traditional 'state-market-family' institutional triad has been further complicated by the addition of 'community' (such as local non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) and 'supranational' (such as the EU) institutional categories, and both governmental and non-governmental organizations are part of this welfare mix (Wood and Gough, 2006). Additionally, the rise of 'emerging donors' (Manning, 2006) and South-South cooperation has increased the number of actors who are developing welfare policies and shaping welfare outcomes in the Global South.

¹³ This is not unlike Esping-Andersen's (1990) point that welfare states are used both to ameliorate social problems while also serving as systems of stratification in and of themselves.

¹⁴ While it has been argued that there has never been a famine in a democracy (Sen, 2001), establishing a democracy does not necessarily eliminate poverty. As Mkandawire (2006) points out, many authoritarian regimes have out performed democracies in alleviating poverty.

Within this context, the foreign policy tools and mechanisms used by states generally fall into one of three categories: defence, diplomacy, and development. Foreign aid is comprised of defence and development initiatives and includes a combination of military, economic, and development aid in the form of grants, loans, and technical assistance. As the principal tool for promoting welfare and development, foreign aid is an important instrument of foreign policy (Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005). It can be used to pursue a range of foreign policy objectives (Lundsgaarde, 2013, 4; Tarnoff and Lawson, 2011, 1), and it can be delivered through bilateral (between one donor and its recipients) or multilateral (between many donors and their recipients) mechanisms.

From its inception, foreign aid was recognized as more than a tool for economic development, and scholars have been interested in the extent to which this tool can be used to achieve a variety of foreign policy goals (Milner and Tingley, 2013, xii). Understanding the purpose of foreign welfare policies and their effects is complicated by the fact that foreign aid "... can act as both carrot and stick," (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2011, 1) and that it can serve multiple purposes within the foreign policy arena (Tarnoff, and Lawson, 2011, 3). A number of scholars have confirmed donor interest, rather than recipient need, to be the determinant of aid allocations during and after the Cold War studies (McKinlay, 1978, 1979; McKinlay and Little, 1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Milner and Tingley, 2013). As outlined by Alesina and Dollar (2000), geopolitical and strategic considerations such as colonial history, UN voting patterns, and economic policies of recipient countries are stronger determinants of foreign aid than the poverty rates and levels of democratic governance in recipient countries.


Foreign aid has also been integral to financing welfare provision in many of the world's poorest countries for some time. The OECD tracks and reports the flows of ODA between 'donor' countries, the majority of which are on the Development Assistance Committee (Appendix 1), and 'recipient' countries, or countries that are recognized as recipients of foreign aid by the DAC. ODA includes both bilateral¹⁵ and multilateral foreign aid that is: (i) undertaken by the official sector; (ii) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; and (iii) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent¹⁶). Furthermore, ODA can be divided into a number of sectors, including the social, economic, and productive sectors as outlined in Appendix 2. ODA's Social Infrastructure and Services sector, which most closely mirrors the policies and programmes generally considered to be part of the welfare state in a domestic context, includes foreign aid in the areas of health, education, population planning and reproductive health, water and sanitation, and civil society and government as outlined in greater detail in Appendix 3. While the spending categories within these sub-sectors do not exactly replicate the areas most examined in the domestic sphere of welfare state regimes, social sector ODA is used here as a measure of welfare spending in a foreign policy context for two reasons: (i) data from the OECD is comparative across donors; and (ii) broadly speaking, this measure is the best functional equivalent available given the state of welfare provision in most developing country contexts.

¹⁵ The OECD only collects data on bilateral foreign aid given to recipient countries that are recognized by the OECD's DAC, which includes the vast majority of recipients.

¹⁶ This is calculated against a national reference rate of 10 per cent per annum. Many long-term interest rates have lowered in recent years making this easier for countries to attain, but the loans still must be made at concessional rates (i.e. below market interest rates) to qualify as ODA. (OECD, 2003, III-8).

The world's largest foreign aid donors ¹⁷ (Appendix 1) are spending an increasingly large amount on development assistance in the social sector, which now accounts for the largest portion of ODA¹⁸. Spending in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector¹⁹ increased substantially from 2002²⁰ to 2008 and has remained at a high-level since (Figure 1.1).

FIGURE 1.1: ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS OF DAC DONORS BY SECTOR, 2002-2014 (IN 2014 USD, IN MILLIONS)



Source: OECD CRS Database

¹⁷ This is measured by the 27 countries on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) DAC. For a list of these 27 countries and the state date of their DAC membership, please see Appendix 1.


¹⁸ ODA is a subset of foreign aid that is offered on concessional financial terms in order to promote economic development and welfare (Appendix 2).

¹⁹ Spending in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector of ODA includes spending in the sub-sectors of education, health, population policies and programmes and reproductive health, water supply and sanitation, government and civil society, and others areas, such as employment and housing policy (Appendix 3).

²⁰ The data begins at 2002 because this is the earliest year for which the OECD has released the most accurate and detailed set of comparative aid statistics through its Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

In 2002, ODA in the social sector accounted for 27 per cent of total ODA from DAC donors; by 2014, it accounted for nearly 40 per cent (Figure 1.2).

FIGURE 1.2: PER CENT OF ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS FROM DAC DONORS BY SECTOR, 2014



Source: OECD CRS Database

As in a domestic context, increased spending in the social sector of ODA is not necessarily indicative of improved social or developmental outcomes. Yet when understood as a political tool exercised *between* countries, overall spending becomes an important factor to consider. The power and influence of a country's foreign aid programme is best understood when compared to the spending capacity of its *recipient* countries - not to foreign aid spending of other *donor* countries. At its most basic level, the bigger the differential between a donor and recipient's ability to finance aid programmes, the more powerful foreign aid becomes as a political tool. Several recipient countries remain heavily reliant on ODA from donors. As of 2007, 15 of 48 developing

countries²¹ evaluated by the World Bank relied on ODA to finance over 20 per cent of their central government expenditure (UNDP, 2011). Furthermore, seven of these 15 countries are classified as Least Developed Countries (LDC)²² by the UN and most of these seven would also be classified as ‘insecurity regimes’²³ within the global welfare regime literature (Wood and Gough, 2006).


On a more complex level, foreign aid balances the interests and needs of donor and recipient countries in a much more dynamic fashion, where the exercise of aid as a political tool depends on a number of factors besides spending alone. First, both the number and relative strength of other donors affects the choice of partners and types of assistance available to recipient countries (Figure 1.3). The US, Japan, Germany, the UK, and France have remained the strongest donors in terms of ODA spending since 2002; these five countries alone account for approximately two-thirds of ODA. However by

²¹ The fifteen countries are listed here in descending order of aid dependence: Afghanistan, Niger, Madagascar, Mali, Lao PDR, Nicaragua, Zambia, Kyrgyzstan, Togo, Ghana, Kenya, Mongolia, Armenia, El Salvador, and Bangladesh (UNDP, 2011, 159).

²² The UN identifies LDCs by their GNI, the Human Assets Index, and the Economic Vulnerability Index. The Human Assets Index is meant to estimate the level of human capital across the country and utilises data on the nourishment of the population, the under-five mortality rate, secondary school enrolment, and the adult literacy. The Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) is meant to reflect the risk of exogenous economic shocks to a given country’s development, and it incorporates a number of indicators into both an exposure and a shock index, which are then averaged to produce the EVI. For more information, please see the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ website: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_criteria.shtml.

²³ The term insecurity regime refers to, “... institutional arrangements which generate gross insecurity and block the emergence of stable informal mechanisms to mitigate, let alone rectify, these. These regimes arise in areas of the world where powerful external players interact with weak internal actors to generate conflict and political instability. Insecurity regimes are rarely confined within national boundaries. The unpredictable environment undermines stable patterns of clientelism and informal rights within communities and can destroy household coping mechanisms... The result is a vicious circle of insecurity, vulnerability and suffering for all but a small elite and their enforcers and clients” (Wood and Gough, 2006, 1699-1700).

FIGURE 1.3: PER CENT OF ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS FROM DONOR COUNTRIES, 2014



Source: OECD CRS Database

2014, non-DAC countries led by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey have grown to account for five per cent of ODA to developing countries (OECD Stat).^{24, 25}

Second, whether or not an aid programme is deemed to be ‘effective’ may also affect its viability, as this label often serves as a signal to donors as to whether or not a given programme is worth financing.²⁶ Finally, other factors to consider include the type and quality of technical assistance donors are positioned to offer, the degree to which

²⁴ This data does not include China, which currently is not reporting its foreign aid to the OECD, or The Russian Federation, which has postponed its accession to the OECD as of 12 March 2014. For more on China’s approach to development, please see Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender (2013; 2012). For more information on The Russian Federation’s ODA, please see <http://www.oecd.org/russia/russias-official-development-assistance.htm>.

²⁵ For more insight into how an increase in the number of donors may affect the degree to which foreign aid can influence international politics, see Crumm (1995).

²⁶ ‘Aid effectiveness’ has been the primary focus of policymakers since the OECD’s Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, and most academic research on foreign aid has focused on the technical elements of aid interventions (e.g. Duflo’s Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at MIT - <https://www.povertyactionlab.org>). For more on the OECD’s approach to aid effectiveness, please see <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/>.

recipient countries are able to absorb development assistance, and the extent to which donor norms and interests differ from or align with those of fellow donors via regional or global institutions, such as EU or UN agencies.

Yet on the grounds of fairness, donors are most often compared according to how much 'effort' they put into providing ODA relative to the size of their economy rather than by how forcefully they use development assistance as a political tool. Here, effort is captured by the measure of ODA as a per cent of a donor country's gross national income (GNI). In 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted a target for economically advanced countries of dedicating 0.7 per cent of GNI to ODA²⁷, and all DAC countries - except for the US and Switzerland - have accepted this target at some point (OECD, 2010, 2). Social democratic countries including Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands²⁸ were the first to meet, and even exceed the 0.7 target.²⁹ despite the absence of a strong colonial legacy. To date, they have continued this trend, with some dedicating over one per cent of their GNI to ODA. In light of this finding, Noël and Thérien (1995; 2000) argue that countries with generous welfare states and a strong tradition of social rights at home are more likely to be generous foreign aid donors abroad. However as aforementioned, this explanation has been criticised for failing to explain how exactly, "... the legacy of egalitarian institutions locks in foreign policy choices" (Lundsgaarde, 2013, 5).

²⁷ It should be noted that this target was actually measured by Gross National Product (GNP) when it was introduced in 1970. However, the units of measure changed from GNP to GNI with the instillation of the new System of National Accounts in 1993. Since 1993, the ODA of DAC members have been reported as a per cent of GNI, and the presentation of ODA statistics in the past 20 years reflects this change.

²⁸ As explained by Noël and Thérien (1995), Finland exhibits different patterns of ODA spending relative to other countries with strong socialist attributes as a result of its proximity to Russia during the Cold War.

²⁹ This is particularly interesting given the lack of a strong colonial legacy in these countries, which equally could have fuelled a desire to provide aid as a means of gaining influence.

SOCIAL POLICY AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY

As a conceptual framework, I suggest that social policy is used as a tool of foreign policy in three ways: as a form of 'hard power', 'soft power', or an instrument of social change.³⁰

I illustrate each of these uses of social policy in turn, with special attention to the use of these tools in post-conflict environments.

WELFARE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF HARD POWER

First, welfare can be used as a 'hard', or coercive, form of power³¹ as first illustrated by Otto von Bismarck in late 19th century Germany. In one of the first examples of modern social policy, Bismarck introduced sickness insurance in part to extend universal health coverage, but primarily to repress Germany's Social Democratic Party and to prevent the type of class warfare that broke out during the Paris Commune of 1871 (Briggs, 1961; Lidtke, 1964). Bismarck used both the Anti-Socialist Law of 1878³² and the extension of social health insurance (SHI) through the Health Insurance Bill of 1883, the Accident Insurance Bill of 1884, and the Old Age and Disability Insurance Bill of 1889 both to

³⁰ Drawing from Nye (2011, 12), "A policy-oriented concept of power depends upon a specified context to tell us *who* gets *what*, *how*, *where* and *when* (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950)".

³¹ As discussed in greater depth by Nye (2011, 10-11) "... power is a contested concept... Some define power as the ability to make or resist change. Others say it is the ability to get what we want (Boulding, 1989, 15). This broad definition includes power over nature as well as over other people. For an interest in actions and policies, a common-sense place to start is the dictionary which tells us that power is the capacity to do things, but more specifically in social situations we are interested in the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants." Nye (2011, 11) goes on to specify the structure-agent nature of power relationships, including the scope (who is involved in the power relationship) and domain (what topics are involved) in which power can be shaped and exercised.

³² The Anti-Socialist Law of 1878, "... gave the government the authority to suppress all independent labor organizations, all political and economic associations of the Socialists, and all their newspapers, periodicals and printing presses. Socialist meetings were forbidden; the police were empowered to expel "Socialist agitators", and states could declare a state of siege in any areas of the country for periods of up to one year. While socialist electoral activity was not forbidden, any efforts to make this right meaningful were severely hampered. The Anti-Socialist Law was renewed at its expiration in 1880, and every two years thereafter until 1890. During this period, many leaders of the party were arrested, imprisoned or exiled. Hundreds of Socialist periodicals, associations and unions were suppressed by the police, and their assets confiscated" (Foner, 1976, 32).

suppress political organization of the working class and to co-op their support. By tying individual wellbeing to the state, Bismarck aimed to pre-empt political rebellion and prevent the instillation of social democracy (Lidtke, 1964). The creation of Germany's SHI system also serves as an example of how welfare programmes can be used simultaneously as both a carrot and a stick. As explained in the quote below, the extension of SHI:

"...posed a painful dilemma for the Social Democrats. A number of the leaders were sufficiently impressed by the insurance scheme so that they were tempted to approve it openly, and possibly to even vote for it... It was impossible, however, for Social Democrats simply to accept opposition to the Iron Chancellor [Bismarck]. It was equally impossible for the working class, simply to reject a program for social welfare because of their political opposition to Bismarck without facing a serious charge of hypocrisy" (Lidtke, 1964, 212).

WELFARE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOFT POWER

Welfare as 'soft power' is, "... the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies" (Nye, 2004, x). As illustrated by Midgley and Piachaud (2011), welfare, both as a provision and an ideology, was used by the British Empire to strengthen the economy, gain political support, and to reward the loyalty and sacrifices of those sustaining its base for power and influence, demonstrating the way in which the provision of welfare can serve multiple purposes simultaneously:

"Getting people to work for the empire often required the fulfillment of something deeper. Similarly, support for empire at home was needed to accept a diversion of resources overseas. So a galvanizing ideology is crucial. The basic ideology of the British Empire was built around spreading Victorian notions of betterment, improvement, progress, prosperity and civilization where there was perceived to be savagery, chaos, despotism, poverty and slavery. In this sense, the British Empire was always a Victorian, empire with an umbrella of broad welfare benefits at the heart of its self-promoting ideology" (Lewis, 2011, 26).

More concretely, welfare formally became a part of British foreign policy in 1929 with the passage of the Colonial Development Act, which was designed to stimulate demand in the colonies during the Great Depression. This act was built upon and extended in 1940 with the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act³³, which was designed to reward those who made sacrifices on behalf of the Empire during WWII.

WELFARE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL CHANGE, DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSFORMATION

Finally, social policy can be used as a tool to affect social change, development, and even transformation. Two views, underpinned by distinct ontologies³⁴, have emerged on the way in which social policy can be used in this capacity: reductionist and holistic (Yi, 2015). Reductionist approaches understand welfare narrowly as poverty alleviation. Social policies in line with this approach target welfare to individuals most in need and are often referred to as 'pro-poor'. Compatible with neo-liberalism and aligned with the mandates of key international organisations such as the World Bank, this approach has dominated policy discourse and practice on welfare provision in a development context since the 1980s. By reducing complex social realities into abstract concepts and heuristic devices, this approach enables policymakers to surgically intervene to 'solve' social problems. Scientific terms – functionalist, materialist, positivist, mechanical, and even 'Newtonian' (Duffield, 2001) – are often used to describe policies and interventions in this vein. Development strategies utilising this approach are universal, fair, equitable, and

³³ The 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act was extended yet again in 1945.

³⁴ Examining the ontological differences in approaches to social development is particularly important as neoliberal, growth-driven development strategies are increasingly challenged, if not outright dismissed. As explained by Lawson (2013, 5), examining the ontological underpinnings of different approaches to social policy in a development context aids in identifying inconsistencies and inadequacies in development theories and strategies. Ultimately, such examination can strengthen our theoretical and conceptual understanding of social policymaking in developing countries in addition to bringing clarity and direction to policy practice that is empirically informed and context specific.

inclusive in so far as they uniformly and indiscriminately apply rules, concepts, and policies across a wide-range of cultural, economic, political, and social environments.

Reductionist approaches have been criticised for oversimplifying the social reality in which policymakers operate, for failing to adapt and implement policies in a way that is context specific, and also for reifying the concepts and heuristic devices on which they depend, often objectifying the very individuals they aim to support and humanise. These tendencies are perhaps most clearly exemplified in the structural adjustment policies promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank during the 1980s and 1990s.³⁵ Calls to end these policies as a result of their negative effect on human and social welfare have been met with an instance that it was not the policies themselves, but their interpretation and implementation that is to blame (e.g. IMF, 1999).³⁶ Other international organisations, particularly those with rights-based mandates such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), drew attention to the consequences of these policies, famously claiming that structural adjustment lacked a 'human face' (Jolly, 1991; Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart, 1987).

Alternatively, holistic approaches understand welfare broadly as a state of well-being. Social policies in line with this approach are comprehensive in terms of the individuals covered and the range of basic needs addressed, and they are most often egalitarian in nature, emphasising the importance of rights-based provision and of ensuring welfare receipt without stigma. The approach tends to be 'universal' in so far as

³⁵ While the behaviour and policy orientation of the IMF and World Bank is often characterised in response to this history, Vetterlein (2007) offers a detailed account of change within the World Bank, focusing in particular on the recent ascendance of social development in responses to both internal and external pressures.

³⁶ For an overview of these debates, please see Summers and Pritchett (1993).

it promotes equal access to welfare transfers, and policies in this vein are financed by contributions in proportion to one's ability to pay and benefits and services are received according to need. While a number of intergovernmental organisations have promoted holistic conceptual frameworks of the role of social policy in developing countries, the "... social policy programmes recommended, prescribed and actually implemented by the aid agencies have been in most cases residual welfare programmes based on targeting approaches that focus on the poor" (Yi, 2015, 3).

The different ways in which social policy is approached and utilised as a means of promoting social change become particularly apparent in post-conflict societies, where the destruction and re-shuffling of pre-existing welfare arrangements coupled with extreme level of need and instability create policy windows for change. In these environments, 'change' can take many forms, ranging from the restoration of welfare systems to their previous state to a more general form of reconstruction combining new and old approaches to welfare provision to the use of welfare to promote wholesale transformation of post-conflict societies. Promoting social change in these environments may also involve working with actors and policy problems that are not typically associated with social policy, namely military institutions and personnel and security concerns – highlighting important gaps in the theory and practice of social policy.³⁷ Through the case of South Sudan, Duffield (2001) illustrates the grey area between the development and security sectors in conflict and post-conflict environments in the Global

³⁷ Yi (2015) identifies both conflict and climate change as major developmental concerns with which social policy is not sufficiently engaging. I do not engage with the issue of climate change in this thesis, but environmental concerns are central to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development currently framing global development policy, which is discussed. The importance of understanding the relationship between social policy and conflict, however, emerges repeatedly throughout.

South.³⁸ He describes how, “... through circular forms of reinforcement and mutuality, achieving one is now regarded as essential for the other. Development is ultimately impossible without stability and, at the same time, security is not sustainable without development” (Duffield, 2001, 16).

A better understanding the relationship between social policy and conflict is critical not only for promoting welfare and development in practice, but also for understanding the development of welfare regimes. Several scholars have challenged the bifurcation between ‘welfare’ and ‘warfare’ in social policy scholarship (Seeleib-Kaiser, 1996; Obinger and Schmitt, 2011; Obinger, Petersen, and Starke, 2018). Obinger, Petersen, and Starke (2018) highlight the ways in which cycles of welfare and warfare can be mutually reinforcing, with warfare leading to the development of state capabilities (e.g. increasing tax revenues) that may also enable welfare provision and welfare being critical to reproduction and the fitness of troops and labour forces needed to support conflicts. For example, in the case of US, Seeleib-Kaiser (1996) illustrates the way in which ‘warfare’ policies could be interpreted as functional equivalents of social policy in the case of the US, and Skocpol (1995) highlights how the US Civil War paved the way for the social protection of soldiers and mothers.

Foreign aid has played a particularly important role in post-conflict transitions and reconstruction projects in both developed and developing country contexts. In a developed country context, the Marshall Plan serves as a prime example. Setting aside arguments about whether or not the Marshall Plan was instrumental in Europe’s post-

³⁸ Wood and Gough (2006) also acknowledge the breakdown of the dichotomy between ‘warfare’ and ‘welfare’ in their description of insecurity regimes as environments where violence/physical harm or the threat thereof affects the welfare individuals to such an extent that it is nearly impossible to distinguish between the two.

war economic recovery (c.f. Milward, 1984) and the degree to which these funds underwrote welfare state development (as suggested by Yeates, 2007, 636), the US left each country to determine the way in which funds from the Marshall Plan were used to support social welfare provision as a means of restoring the legitimacy of the nation-state as a political unit amid pursuit of its predominant foreign policy goal in Europe – regional economic integration (Milward, 1992). The primacy of this goal appears to be a key determinant of the lack of US intervention in the (re-)construction of European social welfare systems, for the US did intervene in their (re-)construction in US-occupied Germany and Japan as part of broader liberalization projects, with variable success (Seeleib-Kaiser, 1995)³⁹, and it made no secret of the fact that it was keen to reconstruct Europe within its own image (Hogan, 1987). Nevertheless, in line with arguments of liberal internationalists, the US deemed social welfare to be a national competency throughout Europe – a decision affected by the broader foreign policy context in which it was taken – and social welfare remains a national competency within the European Union (EU) to date. In sum, it appears that the emergence of welfare state regimes in Europe was enabled not only by the presence of a number of critical domestic factors, but also in part by the absence of obstruction and/or the ability to resist interference from the US in the immediate post-War era – conditions that differ vastly from those of other non-liberal states with extensive colonial histories.

³⁹ To be more specific, Germany returned largely to social assistance and unemployment systems it had before the conflict started, despite US attempts at reform. However, Japan, which had a much less developed welfare state system before WWII, was more heavily influenced by the US occupation in this regard, manifesting in the introduction of social rights into the Japanese constitution, backed by US influence (Seeleib-Kaiser, 1995). Again, despite a comparatively residual approach to welfare at home, these findings support the notion that the US was indeed in favour of promoting social protection during the post-WWII era, as suggested by Helleiner (2014).

The relationship between social policy and conflict remains key to promoting welfare within developing countries as well. As summarised by Yi (2015):

“More than 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by violent conflict. Estimated poverty rates in these countries are about 20 per cent higher than countries with similar conditions but without violent conflict. About 32 per cent of the world’s poor, half of all child deaths, a third of people who lack access to clean water, a third of children who do not complete primary school, and a third of deaths from HIV/AIDS in poor countries are estimated to take place in those countries affected by violent conflicts (World Bank, 2011)” (Yi, 2015, 11).

Furthermore, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that foreign aid is more effective at enhancing economic growth in post-conflict environments than in others and that social policies have a larger impact on economic growth than macroeconomic policies in post-conflict settings. Lending support to this view, in 2005 the OECD DAC Committee decided to count spending toward Conflict, Peace and Security as ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector despite a strong history of excluding defense/military spending from ODA figures (Pachon, 2012, 6).

While the dichotomy between ‘warfare’ and ‘welfare’ breaks down in conflict and post-conflict environments, the ontological presuppositions of actors involved in social development in these environments are often more easily discerned. Through the lens of conflict in Kosovo, Cocozzelli (2006; 2009) articulates why a holistic view of social policy is “... central to repair and reconfiguration of the social fabric” (Cocozzelli, 2006, 51) in post-conflict societies. He argues that, “... social policy lays a normative and economic foundation for post-conflict reconstruction,” (Cocozzelli, 2006, 51) and that social policies are a critical part of reconstruction because they determine the level of social inclusion, which serves as a proxy for justice because it “... functions as a mechanism for human security which in turn supports re-engagement with the economic system” (Cocozzelli, 2006, 51). However, he goes on to critique the reductionist ‘social project’

approach that predominates in practice, as opposed to the more holistic 'social policy reform' approach, arguing that:

"... social 'policy' formation in the project-oriented context becomes a process dominated by a limited number of elites, often led by expatriate advisors. The process specifically excludes traditional determinants of social policy such as popular movements, labour, and progressive political parties. As a result, this process has little local input and may be at odds with efforts to build democratic mechanisms for social inclusion" (Cocozzelli, 2006, 51).

Drawing from his work in South Sudan, Duffield (2001) offers a similar critique, arguing that externally driven social interventions in conflict and post-conflict environments have led to a "... radicalization of the politics of development: the commitment, in policy terms at least, to transform societies as a whole, including the attitudes and beliefs of their members" (Duffield, 2001, 17).

Calls for radical, transformative approaches to social change in development policy have become increasingly loud in recent years. Most recently, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) released a flagship report on the need for transformative change in order to implement the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieve the SDGs. The report views transformative change as part of an 'eco-social' turn, or "a normative and policy shift toward greater consideration of ecological and social objectives in development strategies" (UNRISD, 2016, 3). Furthermore, it defines transformative change as involving change across the economic, environmental, and social dimensions, and "most importantly, it requires changes in social structures and relations, including addressing the growing economic and political power of elites and patterns of stratification related to class, gender, ethnicity, religion or location that can lock people (including future generations) into disadvantage and constrain their choices and agency" (UNRISD, 2016, 3). While perhaps a proportional response to the decline of neo-liberalism, calls for wholesale change to

regime structures within developing countries represents a normalisation if this radical approach in the name of welfare promotion.

OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS

The remainder of the thesis is as follows. To complete Part I, Chapter two outlines the research design and key concepts employed throughout the thesis. It focuses in particular on the way in which this chapter builds on the work of Noël and Thérien, 1995 to ensure conceptual clarity and maximize the contribution of the exploratory work performed later within the case studies.

Part II situates social policy in a foreign policy context theoretically and empirically over two chapters. Chapter three theoretically situates the working hypothesis – that the end of the Cold War bears some relationship to the rise in foreign aid in the social in the 1990s into the 2000s (Figure 1.1). Chapter four empirically situates the relationship between welfare state regime type and foreign aid spending in the social sector through a quantitative exploratory analysis approached from an interpretivist perspective. The findings demonstrate the array of necessary and sufficient conditions underpinning this relationship. The findings of this chapter were also used to guide the case selection of the British Empire and the US.

Part III historicises the intersection of social policy and foreign policy in three empirical chapters. Chapters five and six examine the origins of foreign aid dedicated towards welfare in two liberal, global, and also hegemonic powers of their time – the British Empire and the US. Chapter seven then examines US approaches to foreign aid dedicated toward welfare post-Cold War, looking specifically to understand what might explain the rise in foreign aid in the social sector in the 1990s after the Cold War. In Part IV, Chapter eight summarises these findings and their main contributions, explores their

policy implications and outlines directions for future research at the intersection of social policy and foreign policy.

2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND KEY CONCEPTS

“Seeing comes before words... The relation between what we see and what we know is never settled..”

- John Berger, *Ways of Seeing* (1972)

INTRODUCTION

Branching off from Noël and Thérien’s (1995) work examining the relationship between the welfare state and foreign aid as discussed in Chapter one, this chapter outlines the methodological approach, research design, and key concepts employed to address the following primary research questions:

- What explains the relationship between social policy and foreign policy post-WWII?; and
- Is there a relationship between welfare state type and the social sector foreign aid of donors?

This thesis takes an exploratory, historical, and interpretivist approach to answering these questions. The methodological approach and research design were guided by the following objectives: (i) to clearly identify and describe how social policy is used as a tool in a foreign policy context; and (ii) to support theoretical advances at the intersection of social policy and foreign policy. To do this, mixed methods were utilized drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data, with a focus both on conceptual clarity in order to appropriately illuminate and interpret the use of social policy within a foreign policy context and on placing spending on foreign aid in the social sector in context to better understand the exercise of social policy as a tool of foreign policy overtime.

These two research questions also presented a number of challenges, particularly in terms of scope and the availability of both data and appropriate conceptual and analytic tools needed to bring the intersection of social policy and foreign policy into focus. These

challenges were addressed in the research design by defining key terms and strategically narrowing the object of study in a way that maximized the academic contribution whilst being mindful of constraints and available resources. Given the iterative nature of exploratory research, decisions on how to overcome these challenges were made throughout the research process, the limitations of which are acknowledged and discussed in context throughout this Chapter.

The chapter consists of two parts. The first focuses on the research design, and it contains four sections. It begins by clarifying how the two primary research questions were interpreted and addressed. Then, it discusses causality and the decision to adopt an interpretivist approach throughout the thesis. The third section outlines the methodological approach, and the fourth section describes the three phase process through which the research was conducted. The second part of the chapter clarifies key definitions and concepts referred to throughout the thesis before concluding.

RESEARCH DESIGN

INTERPRETING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OVERCOMING BARRIERS

The first research question – ‘What explains the relationship between social policy and foreign policy post-WWII?’ – is very broad. The ‘what explains’ portion of the question suggests the need for description with attention to causality, and to multiple causation in particular. The ‘relationship between social policy and foreign policy’ portion of the question suggests the need both to define social policy in a foreign policy context and to uncover connections between the two, with a lesser focus on understanding the determinants of this relationship. Here, ‘social policy in a foreign policy context’ is defined as deliberate interventions by the state to redistribute resources to achieve a welfare

objective beyond its geopolitical boundaries.^{1, 2} The ‘post-WWII’ portion of this question was shaped by wide-spread recognition that the ‘golden age’ of the modern welfare state took form post-WWII, as did the liberal international order in which these regimes emerged. In other words, addressing this question is meant to further understanding of the relationship between social policy and foreign policy overtime - from when key structural determinants of both were established onwards - with an eye towards understanding how this legacy affects policymaking and global social governance today.

The second research question – ‘Is there a relationship between welfare state type and the social sector foreign aid of donors?’ – is more specific in nature, draws attention to the nature of this relationship in a cross-section of time, and is a much more direct offshoot from the work of Noël and Thérien (1995). As more thoroughly examined in Chapter four, this question was first addressed by exploring the relationship between welfare state type and the social sector foreign aid policies of donors in order to determine what is known and unknown about this relationship.

Furthermore, in line with the title of this thesis, it was decided that foreign aid would be the instrument or tool of focus throughout for a number of reasons. First, whilst trade policies and agreements also affect the welfare of both domestic and foreign populations, trade is not a central focus in this thesis for the following reasons: (i) trade is a sizeable area of policy in and of itself, and whilst sometimes coordinated with aid

¹ This definition was adapted from Baldock, Manning, and Vickerstaff (2007, xxii), who define social policy as “... deliberate interventions by the state to redistribute resources amongst its citizens so as to achieve a welfare objective”.

² The term ‘boundaries’ was selected instead of ‘borders’, to accommodate instances in which nationals may be located beyond the geopolitical borders of a nation state yet subject primarily to domestic social policy arrangements. For example, while civil servants posted at national embassies around the world are located beyond the borders of a given nation state, they remain within the boundaries of the administrative state more broadly and are customarily given diplomatic immunity in host countries by extension. Therefore, these individuals are best conceptualised as subject to domestic, rather than foreign, social policy arrangements despite their location beyond the geopolitical borders of a given nation welfare state regime.

policies³, it was deemed to be too large and complex to take on in addition to aid; (ii) comparatively speaking, aid is arguably a more surgical and precise instrument or tool that can be used to achieve a welfare objective (in line with the title of this thesis), whereas trade policies affect welfare outcomes in a much more indirect fashion; and (iii) the OECD has collected data on aid allocations from the world's most advanced economies as far back as the 1960s, including a coding scheme for aid in the social sector specifically, making this a strong entry point for understanding the relationship between social policy and foreign policy, as recognised in previous work (e.g. Noël and Thérien, 1995, among others).

Preliminary consideration of the nature of the research questions made clear that traditional conceptual and analytic frameworks for analysing social policy, such as regime types, might be insufficient when seeking to understand, or to interpret and assign meaning, to the way in which states utilise social policy in a foreign policy context. As highlighted by Bhambra (2016; 2010), the very nature of the notion of ideal types may be actively contributing to occlusion and neglect of the very phenomena under observation. In a fashion reminiscent to critiques of the welfare state from feminist scholars, she convincingly argues that “The failure to reconstruct ideal types in light of new evidence suggests not only a commitment to the theoretical construct separate from its relation to the empirical, but also a commitment to the evaluative scheme associated with it” (Bhambra, 2016, 338).

Further still, the process through which such reconstructions are undertaken matters. The emphasis here is not on forgetting or destroying old concepts and constructs, not least because the utility of these ideational tools depends on the context and research

³ It should be noted that ‘aid for trade’ includes initiatives where aid is invested for the purpose of facilitating trade, explicitly linking these two instruments to one another.

question at hand. Rather, both the component parts and the logic underlying their assembly needs to be understood as originally intended through careful deconstruction. Only then can we learn from the past and engineer reconstructions that are fit for purpose, thereby remaking both our analytical tools, and by extension, modern understandings of welfare state regimes.

Two barriers seemed to affect deeper understandings of the exercise of social policy in a foreign policy context in particular. The first barrier appeared to be a lack of clarity on the actors, institutions and mechanisms that systematically affect social policymaking in this context. In other words, constituent elements of social policymaking in this context need to be more clearly identified and described. As mentioned previously in Chapter one, a number of new actors and institutions are involved in the exercise of social policy as a tool of foreign policy. Furthermore, in recent years, political scientists (e.g. Milner and Tingley, 2013) have drawn attention to the domestic determinants of foreign aid, but the findings have rarely mentioned: (i) welfare in particular; and (ii) the way in which domestic politics might affect the stated objectives of aid policies and the distribution of aid across sectors. As a result, it is possible, if not highly likely, that social policy operates relatively autonomously in the domestic and foreign policy realms. It follows that new actor constellations, logics and processes may underpin the exercise of social policy in a foreign, as opposed to a domestic, policy context though the specifics of these logics and processes remain largely unknown. In light of this gap, this thesis focuses in particular on illuminating the 'foreign facet' of welfare state regimes within selected cases.

The second barrier appeared to be a lack of clarity on how the relational underpinnings of social policy in a foreign policy context differed when compared to a domestic policy context. Bringing in relational, as opposed to strictly material, ontological

approaches is critical to the promotion of more holistic understandings of the use of social policy as a tool in a foreign policy context that are neither reified nor oversimplified. While reference to social policy as a 'tool' suggests a degree of objectification from the outset, informing the development of theories that can explain 'why' and 'how' social policy is used as a tool of foreign policy also requires an understanding of these tools (in this case, foreign aid) as constitutive of and constituted by a number of key international and transnational relationships. In other words, social policy and the instruments used to achieve welfare objectives in a foreign policy context must be embedded in the relationships that underpin them to be fully understood, which requires attention to the context in which foreign aid is received and delivered.

From a relational standpoint, one key methodological challenge of this thesis was to establish a foundation that allowed for examination of: (i) the links between social policy in both domestic and foreign policy contexts; and (ii) the distinct relational underpinnings of foreign aid in the social sector, which are also international and transnational in nature. To do this, the thesis took the state as the entry point for understanding the relations (domestic, international, and transnational) underpinning the foreign facet of welfare state regimes and sought to define and describe the exercise of social policy through the lens of functional equivalencies *before* interpreting or assigning meaning to the use of social policy in a foreign policy context. While understanding the relational underpinnings of foreign aid in the social sector were privileged throughout, consideration of the appropriate way to conceptualize social policy in a foreign policy context in relation to social policy in a domestic context was minded by incorporating the notion of functional equivalencies from the outset (Particularly in Chapter Four).

It is important to be explicit about the focus on functional equivalencies, or the identification of likeness rather than sameness, in this line of research for two reasons. First, the domestic and foreign policy environments in which national welfare objectives are sought differ in a number of respects, namely in their governance structures and in the scales on which they seek to operate. Defining 'social policy' in functionally equivalent terms across these contexts provides, "... an analytical background against which it then becomes possible to decipher differences in a controlled way" (Buchholz, 2016, 35). In other words, one can then "*... systematically identify differences against the background of equivalencies*" (Buchholz, 2016, 35). In addition to the relational turn, conceptually this advance is also important from a substantive point of view, as it can help to prevent conceptual stretching when trying to compare social phenomena across contexts as well as conceptual slippage when understanding data through different ontological lenses (Arham, 2011). It then becomes possible to make a number of advances in articulating what distinguishes social policymaking in domestic and foreign policy contexts and enables a more precise and accurate interpretation of the way in which social policy is used as a tool within a foreign policy context.

Second, the background established by a focus on functional equivalents also allows for closer examination of how foreign policy environments both shape and are shaped by global institutions and processes. Over the time period examined in this thesis, international organizations - both governmental and non-governmental - have changed in a number of respects, both in practice and in the way they are conceptualized, as reflected in the shift to characterising them as purposive (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004), as opposed to passive (e.g. Krasner, 1982), actors. Furthermore, as recognized by Sassen (2006, 1), "... the epochal transformation we call globalization is taking place inside the national to a far larger extent than is usually recognized" and that "A good part of

globalization consists of an enormous variety of micro-processes that begin to denationalize what had been constructed as national,” in ways that can, but do not always, “... allow, enable or push the construction of new types of global scalings of dynamics and institutions”. Buchholz (2016) identifies three mechanisms through which global processes that are relatively autonomous from national processes are constructed: (i) the formation of global institutions that support cross-border exchange; (ii) the rise and institutionalisation of distinct discourse on similar functional topics; and (iii) the development of global evaluation mechanisms. While the focus of this thesis is not on the emergence of global social institutions and processes, the interplay between the foreign policy of states and the emergence of global social governance arrangements is indeed relevant to understanding social policy in a foreign policy context, particularly when examining and contextualizing this relationship overtime.

CAUSALITY

As mentioned in Chapter One, Noël and Thérien (1995) adopt both positivist and interpretivist perspectives in their assessment of the relationship between the welfare state and foreign aid. While multiple ways of seeing can be helpful, it is important that they are kept distinct; unstable or incomplete shifts between points of view can cloud and/or confuse, thereby undermining the overarching goal of achieving a greater degree of clarity and more comprehensive understanding through the consideration of multiple ways of seeing.

From the outset, an interpretivist approach was adopted for both conceptual reasons and in response to the current state of the literature. First, examining Noël and Thérien’s (1995) findings from the perspective of Hume’s two definitions of causality presents substantial challenges to their research design and the interpretation of their findings. Hume’s first definition of causality, the constant conjunction, states that a cause

should precede an effect. However, by Noël and Thérien's (1995, 529) own admission, the timing of welfare state consolidation and the common use of foreign aid across what are now considered to be welfare state regimes does not ensure that one came before the other. "Indeed, both the welfare state and the foreign aid regime became mature in the 1970s. In terms of expenditures, Göran Therborn and Joop Roebroek, the contemporary welfare state is not 'an elderly institution' but rather a product of the 1960s and 1970s. As for the aid regime, it was only in 1970 that the international community adopted a specific target, which was set at 0.7 percent of the donors' GMP and meant to be reached by the middle of the decade." Therefore, it is hard to determine whether the welfare state is the independent or dependent variable, and the same for foreign aid. Hume's second definition of causality, the counterfactual, also appears problematic. From a causal perspective, is it plausible that the absence of a welfare state regime results in the absence of foreign aid? Recent scholarship from across disciplines suggests that this is not the case (Schmitt, 2015; Helleiner, 2014; Midgley and Piachaud, 2011). Furthermore, a number of middle income countries are now foreign aid donors as well as recipients, suggesting that achieving the status of a welfare state regime is not a necessary condition for delivering foreign aid. However, it seems even more unlikely that approaches to foreign aid caused the emergence of welfare state regimes, even if they prove to be a necessary factor to consider in their constitution. For this reason, welfare state regimes remain the independent variable and foreign aid remains the dependent variable throughout the thesis, though it remains important to retain an open mind to other possibilities in light of this uncertainty.

While Noël and Thérien (1995) identify a significant correlation between the socialist attributes of welfare state regimes and foreign aid in line with their theoretically-derived hypothesis, a lack of attention to these more fundamental causal principles in

their research design is concerning. As highlighted by Goertz and Mahoney (2012), quantitative regression analysis is best placed to assess the 'effects-of-cases', or the impact of a particular independent variable on a given dependent variable. While the socialist attributes of welfare state regimes may be a good indicator of foreign aid spending as a percentage of GNI, a more in depth understanding of the causal mechanisms will be critical, both for confirming this hypothesis and also for addressing the more fundamental causal problems in the model as highlighted above.

Furthermore, the lack of causal clarity may be a result of conceptual slippage. Conceptual slippage occurs "... when qualitatively and quantitatively construed concepts use incompatible nominal, ordinal, or radial scales" (Ahram, 2011, 1). Noël and Thérien (1995) suggest that values (or perhaps 'ideas', though this is not clear) are the critical mediator between the state institutions affecting both domestic and foreign policy, and they treat socialist attributes as an ordinal variable and assume these attributes are able to manifest through welfare state institutions to the same extent regardless of regime type. However, Esping-Andersen (1990) conceptualizes differentiation among welfare state regimes according to their attributes as a form of *nominal*, not ordinal, classification. Understanding the implications of this conceptual disposition requires a set-theoretic, as opposed to a statistical-linear, mathematical foundation, as found in interpretivist, as opposed to positivist, approaches (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). In this case, if the institutions of liberal or conservative welfare state regimes are shaped predominantly by liberal and conservative 'values' (to adopt the language of Noël and Thérien (1995)), respectively, are socialist attributes equally as likely to be expressed through them? Perhaps unsurprisingly, this is precisely what Noël and Thérien (1995) suggest in their conclusion.

However, Esping-Andersen's (1990) nominal classification of these regimes seems at odds with this interpretation, where welfare state regimes – and the variation in social outcomes and cleavages that they produce – are thought to be a result of the disproportionate influence of some attributes over others in a non-linear fashion. From this view, variation in the presence of socialist attributes across welfare state regimes may hold little, if any meaning, in liberal or conservative welfare state regimes. In other words, it may be that foreign aid corresponds most closely with the presence of social attributes in welfare state regimes that are themselves shaped by these attributes, with a much less strong relationship between these two in the other liberal and conservative sets. In literature on multi-methods research, this is known as an INUS condition, or an instance where individual variables are “neither individually necessary nor individually sufficient for an outcome of interest. Instead, they are essential (i.e. non-redundant) components of an overall configuration of variable values that is sufficient for the outcome. Thus, when a combination of variable values is sufficient to produce an outcome, the individual variable values are either necessary conditions or INUS conditions” (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012, 25).

For this reason, this thesis takes an interpretivist approach to understanding the relationship between welfare state regime type and foreign aid in order to more thoroughly understand the necessary and sufficient relationships underpinning the relationship between the two. Furthermore, if indeed it appears that socialist attributes are an INUS condition, the relationship between the welfare state and foreign aid in the context of liberal and conservative welfare state regimes remains unclear. Given that Noël and Thérien (1995) did not find a significant relationship between liberal or conservative attributes and foreign aid through statistical exploratory analysis of a more positivist nature, adopting an interpretivist approach with mathematical foundations in set-theory


is more likely to illuminate key necessary and sufficient relationships affecting social policy across domestic and foreign policy contexts that, at present, remain unseen.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

In line with the nature of the research questions, the methodological approach is meant to support theory-building and revision, rather than theory testing, through illumination and discovery at the intersection of social policy and foreign policy. In other words, this research was largely exploratory. Multiple methods were used to collect and analyse both quantitative and qualitative data, including quantitative exploratory analysis, semi-structured interviews, and the reconstruction of historically grounded narratives to contextualize, and therefore better understand, why and how social policy has been used as a tool of foreign policy.

Privilege was given to the exploratory routes thought to have the most promise in illustrating the intersection of social policy and foreign policy. This logic informed both the interpretivist approach as outlined in the previous section, the case selection of the hegemonic powers of the UK and the US as well as the time frames in which they were considered (as discussed in greater detail below), the investment in data collection in the case of the British Empire, as well as the focus on the recent rise in spending on foreign aid in the social sector across donor countries since 1997 as illustrated in Figure 2.1. In addition making a sizable contribution to mapping the unknown at the intersection of social policy and foreign policy, the case studies of the UK and the US have two additional advantages. First, as hegemonic powers, these two countries played a disproportionate role in shaping the liberal international order and its institutions, which are also key to understanding social policy in a foreign policy context. Second, while the relationship between the welfare state and foreign aid has been most clearly identified and explored in the case of countries with strong socialist attributes (Noël and Thérien, 1995; Stokke,

FIGURE 2.1: TOTAL ODA FROM DAC DONORS BY SECTOR, 1967-2016 (IN 2016 USD, IN BILLIONS)



Source: OECD CRS Database

1989; Kusima, 2007), surprisingly less is known about what this intersection looks like within liberal welfare state regimes. Together, these two cases illuminate what is thought to be the strongest expression of this relationship with respect to foreign aid within liberal welfare state regimes across nearly 150 years, from 1868 to 2015.

Furthermore, the recent and dramatic rise in spending on foreign aid in the social sector (Figure 2.1) coupled with the insight that the power behind foreign aid lies in its spending leverage in relation to recipient countries, suggests that this relationship is becoming increasingly important to consider. From a policy perspective, a better understanding of why and how donor countries use foreign aid in the social sector as a tool is most critical for the well-being of populations located outside of donor countries,

rather than for those within them. For this reason, preference is given to understanding social policy as a tool of foreign policy in relation to recipient countries and former colonies over understanding the relationship between domestic and foreign approaches to social policy within donor countries alone. However, attention to functional equivalencies, or the use of ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector specifically rather than ODA en masse, was held constant throughout the thesis so as to appropriately mind the broader national and domestic context surrounding the use of social policy as a tool of foreign policy.

Finally, the cases of the UK and the US were constructed primarily by fleshing out historical narratives surrounding the quantitative data available on ODA spending in the social sector. Whilst often criticised for being “... engaged in something less than theory building,” and “... ‘merely telling stories’” (Thelen, 1999, 372), historical narratives are more than simple timelines. As articulated by Thelen (1999, 309), what these accounts share “... is a perspective that examines political and economic development in historical context and in terms of processes unfolding overtime and in relation to each other, within a broader context in which developments in one realm impinge on and shape developments in another... and perhaps even more importantly, as different processes at the domestic level or at the international and domestic levels unfold in relation to one another”. In other words, historical narratives are devices used to construct causal chains by placing chronologies in context, which then enables the identification of causal relationships and mechanisms (Nullmeier, 2018).⁴ The degree to which these narratives inform theory building depends on whether or not key determinants are considered in

⁴ I am grateful to Dr Johanna Kuhlmann for her sharp insights here.

the construction of the historical narrative from the outset and on the strength of the empirical grounding supporting these narrative accounts.

One key methodological gap at the intersection of social policy and foreign policy with respect to foreign aid in the social sector is the absence of appropriate contextualisation of the quantitative data available in a way that places welfare objectives at the centre. Accounts that do contextualise foreign aid as an instrument more broadly place economic development objectives at the centre, thereby pushing social objectives to the periphery. However, the dramatic rise in foreign aid spending in the social sector suggests a need to reframe this narrative and consider alternatives. Whilst being mindful of the development and foreign policy context in which foreign aid is delivered, this thesis places foreign aid spending in the social sector and the welfare objectives it is meant to achieve at the centre and then seeks to understand this spending in the historical and institutional context in which it emerged.

Blending quantitative data with qualitative, historical accounts proved fruitful, as qualitative accounts sometime suggested large amounts of political conflict but with little apparent change in spending patterns; at other points such as with 1997, qualitative accounts have highlighted few critical political upheavals at this time despite somewhat drastic changes in spending. While not of the process tracing variety, these accounts aimed to illuminate the intersection between social policy and foreign policy in both cases and to draw attention to the actors, institutions, processes and logics guiding the use of social policy as a tool of foreign policy. Perhaps the largest short coming of this work is that, in the absence of strong theoretical explanations for the relationship between social policy and foreign policy, the case selection of the UK and the US (the justification for which is described below) was more empirically-driven than theoretically derived. In other words, the primary concern was illuminating the use of foreign aid in the social

sector – or the phenomena itself – and then seeking to understand it in the context of country cases accounting for the bulk of its expression overtime, rather than on understanding this relationship comparatively across country cases. Whilst this limits the generalisability of the results, it is arguably a necessary first step to bringing the phenomena itself into view and to informing future work at this intersection.⁵

RESEARCH PROCESS

This research took place in three phases. The first phase involved two exploratory exercises aimed at informing the more in depth empirical work that took place in the second phase. The third phase focused on theoretically situating the working hypothesis and empirical findings. The first phase of work was highly iterative in nature and was focused on taking stock of the information available in order to: (i) identify a working hypothesis; and (ii) construct a basic scaffolding from which to identify key gaps at the intersection of social policy and foreign policy where more intensive data collection and analysis could make the greatest contribution. The initial working hypothesis was that the end of the Cold War bears some relationship to the rise in foreign aid in the social sector beginning in 1997, in line with the underlying assertion throughout this thesis that the exercise of social policy is indeed context specific.

In the first phase, two exploratory exercises were undertaken. Building on the work of Noël and Thérien (1995), the first exercise was a quantitative exploratory analysis, undertaken from an interpretivist perspective, the results of which are presented in Chapter four. This exercise focused on taking stock of the quantitative data available from the OECD in relation to the second research question to better understand the necessary and sufficient relationships between welfare state regimes (Esping-

⁵ Not least because, as is made clear in Chapter four, donors only spend about 1% of what they spend on social policy in a domestic policy content on foreign aid in the social sector.

Andersen, 1990) and foreign aid in the social sector. The employment of functional equivalents meant that the dependent variable drew from data in ODA's Social Infrastructure and Services sector, as opposed to total ODA as in the work of Noël and Thérien (1995). It also conceptualized the relationship between welfare state type and foreign aid in four ways – in terms of channelling, effort, preference, and force – and extended measures of the dependent variable to capture these effects.

Specifically, this chapter tests four hypotheses about the relationship between welfare state type and foreign aid in the social sector: (i) that countries with welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes favor distributing aid through multilateral channels; (ii) that countries with welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes put forth more effort toward ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector, where effort is measured relative to GNI; (iii) that countries with welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes display a preference for using ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector as a tool, where a country's preference is measured relative to ODA in other sectors; and (iv) that countries with welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes use ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector more forcefully, where force is measured by absolute spending.

To ensure that larger donor countries were not given more weight than others (Ebbinghaus, 2005), the data used when testing hypotheses two and three were processed first with respect to the country before being taken as an average across countries with similar welfare state attributes. For example, ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector was calculated relative to GNI for each country, before averages were taken according to each welfare state regime type. Finally, it should be noted that the OECD's statistics on ODA are self-reported by country. While data collection and reporting across countries has become more thorough and comprehensive overtime,

placing this data in context contributes to more reliable accounts of development assistance, particularly in cases where the data is less reliable or 'fuzzy'.

The second exploratory exercise consisted of 25 qualitative interviews undertaken in Washington, D.C. during the summer of 2014. In line with the findings of the quantitative exploratory analysis – that the increase in spending on foreign aid in the social sector since 1997 was driven predominantly by the US – these interviews were designed with the expressed aim of better understanding the politics behind key policy processes resulting in the use of US foreign aid in the social sector as a tool in developing countries as well as to ensure an efficient search for additional data to consider when contextualising these policies and the processes behind them. The sample of respondents was accessed according to convenience and identified via snowballing, and respondents were sought from a wide range of organizations beyond the US government alone, including individuals working in media, consulting firms, corporations, advocacy and lobbyist organizations, third sector and civil society organizations, and universities. Several of the respondents contributed to initial, informal discussions before either contributing in the form of a semi-structured interview themselves or identifying names of other potential key informants. The interviews ranged from broadly informative to much more semi-structured in nature, depending on how central the respondent was to the policymaking processes of interest. As with most qualitative interviews, data collection was constrained by a number of factors, including available contacts, finance, and time.

Eight of the individuals interviewed had direct connections to the development and implementation of policies of interests with affiliations across ten institutions. These individuals were formally interviewed, and the topic guide outlined in Appendix 4 was used explicitly in these cases. While the respondents are not referred to by name in this

thesis, a list of institutional affiliations of all of the individuals interviewed and of the key informants in particular can be found in Appendix 5. The topic guide consisted of 15 questions and focused on achieving four objectives: (i) clarifying the relationship between 'development' and 'welfare' in US foreign aid policies; (ii) determining why the US has taken an interest in financing foreign aid policies/programmes aimed at improving the welfare of individuals who would otherwise fall outside of the reach of the state; (iii) identifying what accounts for the US's recent increase in spending within the Social Infrastructure and Services Sector of ODA; and (iv) clarifying how policies falling under the heading of Social Infrastructure and Services ODA are made, how the funding is allocated (by sub-sector, implementing agency, and region/country), and how they are implemented. The questions focused on clarifying the policy experience of the respondent, understanding and characterizing changes in US foreign aid and development policies post-Cold War, understanding the processes behind the financing, allocation, and implementation of the policies of interest, followed by sector specific questions as well as questions related to aid co-ordination mechanisms and predicted future trends. A list of potential prompt and secondary questions also accompanied each question in order to avoid letting the interview drift into more of a discussion and to avoid posing leading questions to the respondent.

The interviews were conducted on the basis of confidentiality and consent. All respondents who engaged in a more structured interview were given an introductory letter in addition to signing a consent form in advance of the interview in order to inform the respondent about the aims of the study and to assure them that their contribution would be kept anonymous and confidential. The decision of whether or not to record the interview was made after meeting the respondent, and the interviews were not recorded without either written or verbal permission from the respondent. In line with the

University of Oxford's guidelines on conducting research, both the information and consent letter and topic guide were approved by the Departmental Research Ethics Committee before this work was undertaken as indicated in Appendix 6. The qualitative data gathered throughout this process was used to inform further data collection efforts and the narratives constructions of the US case, particularly in Chapter seven.

In the second phase, the iterative nature of this work slowed, strategic decisions were made to guide the empirical work moving forward, cases were selected, and secondary research questions were identified. Whilst the objective in the empirical portions of this work was to contextualise foreign aid spending in the social sector this needed to be done with respect to specific country cases. First, to understand the intersection of social policy and foreign policy post-WWII (as called for in the first research question), it seemed wise to examine this intersection before WWII as well to get a sense for how foreign aid in the social sector started and what, if any, relationship it bears to social policy in a domestic and international context.⁶ To this end, foreign aid in the social sector was examined in the case of the British Empire to address the following secondary research question: 'What role did foreign aid in the social sector play in British colonial development policy?'

The case selection of the British Empire was determined by two factors. First, it was hypothesized that foreign aid in the social sector was most likely to emerge in the most globalised capitalist economies, and therefore, the British Empire was selected as the best case before WWII given its hegemonic status during colonial times. Second, quantitative data from UK Parliamentary Papers was available to support this exercise, presenting an opportunity to make an sizable empirical contribution to understandings

⁶ This also appeared to be critical given questions around Hume's principle of constant conjunction, as previously discussed.

both of the role of social policy in Britain's imperial endeavours and of British colonial development policy more broadly. Spending data both on foreign aid in general and on foreign aid in the social sector specifically was collected from these papers between the years 1868 and 1940, with 1868 serving as the first year that 'grant-in-aid' is recorded in these papers and 1940 serving as a somewhat natural cut-off point before the onset of WWII. The spending data collected was then coded according to the principle of functional equivalencies in a format analogous to the way in which the OECD codes ODA to date in order to promote continuity in understandings of foreign aid overtime. The data was then analysed and contextualised in historical accounts of British colonial development policy from a variety of sources. The findings of this case, and a more in depth description of the methods utilised for this case, are presented in Chapter five.

Second, the US was selected as a second case study for several reasons. First, as aforementioned, the US alone appeared to be driving the increase in foreign aid in the social sector from 1997 onwards. Second, selecting the US as a case also aligned nicely with the argument for looking at foreign aid in the social sector in the context of a global hegemonic power, where it was hypothesized that the phenomena sought to be identified would be most fully expressed. Finally, it offered continuity over the time period of interest, as the balance of power in the Anglosphere shifted from the United Kingdom to the United States in the early- to mid-20th century (Go, 2008). Furthermore, while the primary objective was to identify the fullest expression of the phenomena of interest over the time period examined, the focus on functional equivalents also allows for comparison both within cases over a cross-section of time and between cases overtime. This allows for some generalisations to be made about the role of social policy in a foreign policy context of recent hegemonic powers, which have also played a disproportionate role in shaping the liberal international order, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter three.

The results of the US case study took form in Chapters six and seven. Chapter six focused on addressing the following secondary research question: 'What does the 'foreign facet' of the US welfare state look like?'. In so doing, this chapter aims to clarify the origins and development of the institutions comprising the foreign facet of the US welfare state that guide the use of social policy as a tool of foreign policy in order to contextualise US foreign aid allocations across sectors and regions through the end of the Cold War. To do this, the chapter traces the development of the institutions overseeing US foreign assistance in the social sector and a series of organisational charts appear throughout this chapter to illustrate key changes and reforms to this architecture. To trace the institutional development of the foreign facet of the welfare state in the US, both primary and secondary sources along with government reports and grey literature were used to identify key sequences at this interface. The structure of was shaped by key foreign policy events and objectives, and the content of the narrative was determined by triangulating between the institutional architecture identified, data on ODA allocations, and also accounts from primary and secondary sources reviewed as well as historical accounts from secondary literature.

The time period examined in Chapter six begins in 1940, when the US first began to use foreign aid in the social sector systematically in order to achieve foreign policy objectives; in line with the working hypothesis, this chapter traces this institutional development to the end of the Cold War. As in Chapter five in the case of the UK, data collection efforts were focused where the greatest contribution could be made. The OECD provides some data on ODA allocations going back as early as the late 1950s, with the data quality increasing over time. As a result, the focus in this chapter was on evaluating and synthesizing qualitative information that helped to more appropriately weight historical accounts and contextualise this quantitative data.

Chapter seven is focused on the time period after the Cold War, and sought to address the following secondary research question: ‘what explains the increase in US foreign aid in the social sector from 1997 onwards?’. Mindful of the nature of the foreign facet of the US welfare state as outlined in Chapter 6, this chapter uses ODA data as well as primary and secondary sources, policy reports, grey literature, and interview data to construct an historical narrative account of this increase. The volume and quality of data available to inform this chapter was much higher compared to Chapter six; the challenge was in analysing it with care by triangulating between the institutional context, quantitative data and additional accounts from qualitative sources.

In the third phase, the empirical findings from phase two were used to inform a theoretical situation of the working hypothesis – that the end of the Cold War bears some relationship to the rise in foreign aid in the social sector beginning in 1997 – within the literature, the findings of which are presented in Chapter three. While now located towards the beginning of the thesis as a more comprehensive scaffolding within which readers can situate the findings of later empirical chapters, the empirical findings were used to selectively draw from sets of literature that seemed to best capture the dynamics of social policy in a foreign policy context in both the British Empire and the United States. Furthermore, as highlighted in Chapter eight, moving this chapter upfront allows for the identification of contradictions and gaps in theory building at this intersection, which can then be articulated and hopefully clarified in future research.

KEY DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

Both welfare state regimes and their ‘types’ as well as foreign aid channelling are central concepts references several times throughout the course of this thesis. The following two sub-sections outline a general understanding of both for clarification and reference.

WELFARE STATE REGIMES

In line with the work of Noël and Thérien (1995), Table 2.1 outlines the classification of welfare state regime type used throughout the thesis, particularly in the exploratory analysis in Chapter four, drawing from the work of Esping-Andersen (1990). Whilst there have been many ongoing conversations in the literature about the best way to ‘type’ welfare state regimes, this classification was adopted from the outset for two reasons: (i) to connect to pre-existing literature on this topic, thereby contributing to a more coherent academic discussion; and (ii) to retain a focus squarely on foreign aid in the social sector specifically, rather than risk devolving into debates about domestic welfare state regime type at this stage. However, the findings of this thesis and of future work at the intersection of social policy and foreign policy may help to resolve or further inform ongoing debates on welfare state type, though at present, this contribution falls beyond the scope of this thesis.


TABLE 2.1: WELFARE STATE REGIME TYPE OF 18 DAC COUNTRIES (ESPING-ANDERSEN, 1990, 74)

Strong Liberalism	Strong Conservatism	Strong Socialism
Australia	Austria	Denmark
Canada	Belgium	Finland
Japan	France	Netherlands
Switzerland	Germany	Norway
United States	Italy	Sweden
* NOTE: Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are included in the exploratory analysis preformed in Chapter four but omitted from classification as a single ‘type’ by Esping-Andersen (1990)		

MULTILATERAL, BILATERAL, AND MULTI-BILATERAL CHANNELLING OF FOREIGN AID

As illustrated in Figure 2.2, donor countries deliver foreign aid through either bilateral or multilateral channels. Intergovernmental organisations, including the many agencies of United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank both constitute and are constituted largely by the channeling of multilateral development assistance. These institutions operate with a degree of relative autonomy (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004)

FIGURE 2.2: FOREIGN AID CHANNELING BETWEEN DONOR AND RECIPIENT COUNTRIES



according to their respective mandates and their unique sets of ideational, technical, and monetary resources and also play a key role in setting global norms and standards that affect the foreign policy context (Halliday and Carruthers, 2007; Halliday and Carruthers, 2009). Whilst these organisations conduct technical operations transnationally, their politics are international in nature, embedded within the member states they represent (Cronin, 2002). Donor countries often exercise a disproportionate amount of influence through the monetary and technical resources they provide to these organisations. Nevertheless, the collective channeling and pooling of development assistance delivered through multilateral institutions do a better job of catering to the needs of recipient countries as opposed to the interests of donor countries when compared to bilateral channeling (Maizels and Nissanke 1984).

Within this global context, bilateral channeling is facilitated primarily by each donor country’s flagship development agency, such as the United States Agency for

International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) to name a few. Numerous studies conducted both during and after the Cold War have found the political interests of donor countries, rather than the needs of recipient countries, to be the primary determinant of development assistance allocations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; McKinlay and Little, 1979; McKinlay, 1978; McKinlay and Little, 1978a, 1978b; McKinlay and Little, 1977). Furthermore, national development agencies are funded by national legislatures and are therefore subject to a host of domestic political influences (Noël and Thérien, 1995; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Milner and Tingley, 2010; Lundsgaarde, 2013), in addition to international political pressures. At present, little is known about how bilateral development institutions make decisions/trade-offs between the domestic and foreign policy considerations, as the examination of development institutions themselves has been a somewhat neglected area of development studies (Viterna and Robertson, 2015).

Institutions channelling both multilateral and bilateral development assistance often work through third parties, such as third sector organizations (including non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, and faith-based organizations) and public-private partnerships. They also engage in what has come to be known as 'multi-bilateral' channeling, where bilateral aid agencies effectively contract, or provide 'voluntary contributions', to multilateral aid agencies that then deliver development assistance on their behalf. This kind of one-off, contracting has, in some cases, come to account for a substantial portion of the budget of development agencies. For instance, such 'multi-bilateral' channelling accounted for 80 per cent of the budget of the World Health Organization (WHO) in its 2016-17 biennium (WHO, 2018).

CONCLUSION

Having introduced the topic and discussed the methods used to answer the primary research questions, Part II focuses on situating social policy in a foreign policy context, first with a focus on theoretically situating the working hypothesis that the rise in spending on foreign aid in the social sector since 1997 (Figure 2.1) may bear some relationship to the end of the Cold War.

3 WELFARE WITHIN AND BEYOND THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The welfare state emerged as a way to pacify and domesticate global capitalism in line with broader nation- and state-building strategies. How, then, has welfare been understood within and beyond the liberal international order that emerged post-WWII? Drawing from literature on welfare state regimes, global social policy, and international relations, this chapter theoretically situates the working hypothesis underlying this thesis: that the end of the Cold War bears some relationship to the rise in foreign aid in the social sector seen from 1997 onwards. When contextualised within the literature, this hypothesis is derived from literature suggesting that the end of Cold War forced a re-orientation of foreign policy agendas within the liberal order, creating policy space in which to address social issues on a global scale and to use foreign aid as a tool to achieve social, rather than strictly geopolitical, 'ends'.

This chapter selects liberal internationalism, as opposed to but not to the exclusion of realism, as an entry point for a couple of reasons. First, as suggested by Nye (1988, 238), these two approaches can be seen as complementary, with realism having an advantage in understanding interactions and liberalism in understanding interests. Given the focus in this thesis on the historical development of institutions overseeing foreign aid allocations with a particular focus on welfare, the interest-based discussions of liberal internationalists serve as an apt starting point. Second, liberal internationalism also seeks to address, "... the manner in which interactions among states and the development of international norms interact with domestic politics of the states in an international system so as to transform the way in which states define their interests" (Nye, 1988, 328). In so doing, this approach also creates space in which to explore if, how, and in what ways

the use of social policy as a tool of foreign policy might relate to welfare provision in a domestic context – a line of research to which this thesis aims to contribute.

The chapter begins by defining the ‘liberal international order’, drawing from a cumulative understanding of this term within the literature, with special attention to the role of welfare. Then, it situates national welfare state regimes within this context, drawing from Ruggie’s (1982) notion of ‘embedded liberalism’ and discusses the relationship between the liberal international order and non-liberal states. Next, it examines welfare provision in the context of the Cold War, with attention to conflict and regime competition. Then, the chapter examines the effect of neoliberalism within and beyond the liberal international order. Finally, the chapter explores understandings of welfare in a foreign policy context post-Cold War, with a focus on foreign aid.

THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND THE ROLE OF WELFARE IN ITS FORMATION

As recently described by Ikenberry (2018, 8-9), “Liberal internationalism is essentially an artefact of the rapidly receding Anglo-American era” offering, “... a vision of open and loosely rules-based order”. Broadly speaking, it arose as “... a way of thinking about and responding to modernity – its opportunities and dangers” (Ikenberry, 2018, 9), and from this view, is inextricably linked with global capitalism and management of the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1998). For Ikenberry (2018, 11), this ‘order’ has five signature characteristics: (i) openness; (ii) a loosely rules-based set of relations; (iii) security cooperation; (iv) the potential for reform; and (v) a progressive orientation.

While liberal internationalism has been recognized for its seemingly unique ability to sustain peace amongst its own kind, the presence of a liberal hegemon (in this case, the United States, preceded by the United Kingdom) able and willing to lead like-minded states and to make the necessary concessions to gain followers (Stein, 1984) enabled the

projection of this order beyond its borders (Doyle, 1983a, 232). The actions taken and institutions developed to support this order and its projection of power are widely recognized to have taken root post-WWII. Key among them are: (i) several one-off measures directed toward particular countries, including a substantial post-war loan to the United Kingdom and the liberalization of Germany and Japan; (ii) measures to firm up the liberal order itself, such as the Marshall Plan (the antecedent of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, or the OECD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (the antecedent of the World Trade Organization, or the WTO); and (iii) the establishment of a set of institutions within which to incubate and project the order itself beyond its borders, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its sister institution, the World Bank, as well as the founding of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

Like the colonial governance models that preceded it, this particular form of global governance is neither 'flat' nor the equivalent of a national government operating on a global scale; in other words, it is not a supranational order, but a multilateral and intergovernmental one, created largely by and for the most dominant countries of the liberal order itself. Furthermore, as discussed in the following two sub-sections, welfare and social protection were integral to the establishment of this order, including within the institutions developed to project and extend it.

WELFARE WITHIN THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER: 'EMBEDDED LIBERALISM' AND THE WELFARE STATE

First, the political authority channeled by the liberal international order is defined by a fusion of power and social purpose (Ruggie, 1982, 382). During the colonial era, Britain's hegemonic position was buttressed by a form of economic liberalism embedded within

its own global Empire, the stated social purpose of which was to advance welfare at home whilst civilizing populations abroad (e.g. Midgely and Piachaud, 2011). However, given Britain's economic dominance, this forced other advanced economies to respond to the standards it set within the international market place – which was of course contentious.

The reformed liberal international order institutionalized post-WWII aimed to avoid economic nationalism by anchoring economic liberalism in a multilateral governance structure focused on ensuring peace, free trade, and a stable balance of payments system. The stated social purpose of this order was to ensure that states could more effectively intervene in their domestic economies through a combination of capital controls, taxes, regulations, and social policies, with the aim of producing full employment. By regulating the international political economy through multilateral institutions and enabling nation-states to provide social welfare, the liberal international order '(re-)embedded' liberalism within nation-states. In so doing, countries arrived at a (presumably optimal) trade-off between labour productivity and social stability, and created an international system designed to conform to domestic policy environments, as opposed to the other way round (Ruggie, 1982, 390; Nurkse, 1944, 230).

The result was a common understanding that welfare was a 'domestic' matter. Subsequently, historical narratives of welfare state development focus predominantly on the role of national actors, with far less attention to the global context in which these regimes arose (Yeates, 2006). This thinking was pervasive, in both academia and policy practice, and also continues to date. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the US considered welfare to be a domestic matter for each country to address as it saw fit when administering the Marshall Plan. As a result, European welfare state regimes were able to re-emerge post-WWII in a more or less self-determined form, and national actors did

indeed play a decisive role in shaping these regimes.¹ When situated in this context, social policy's tendency toward methodological nationalism makes a certain amount of sense and brings the seminal nature of Esping-Andersen's (1990) *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* into stark relief. Furthermore, welfare remains a national competency within the European Union (EU) to date, despite the complications that arise when national welfare systems collide, as mobile EU citizens (predominantly workers and their families) move throughout the region in line with the right to freedom of movement.

Within academia, calls for seeing social policy and the welfare state in transnational relief have increased (Yeates and Irving, 2005), driven largely by a need to better understand both transnational social questions (Faist, 2009) and welfare in the context of international migration (Levitt, 2001; Levitt and Schiller, 2004; Faist et al, 2015; Levitt et al, 2017). However, these accounts are not mainstream within the discipline (e.g. Kettunen and Petersen, 2011), in part because this literature "... does not suggest that this focus should eclipse attention to 'national' institutional arrangements and their various manifestations" (Yeates and Irving, 2005, 403), when seeking to understand welfare arrangements, particularly in the Global North.

WELFARE BEYOND THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER: SOCIAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The liberal international order has been far less successful in transforming the societies lying beyond it. As summarized by Doyle (1983b, 324), "In relations with weak states of a nonliberal character, liberal policy has succumbed to imperial interventions that it has been unable to sustain or to profit from. Its interventions, designed to create liberal societies by promoting economic development and political stability of nonliberal societies, have frequently failed to achieve their objectives". Furthermore, the

¹ Again, this holds true even in the case of Germany, despite US attempts to re-orient aspects of its welfare regime whilst occupying the country post-WWII (Seeleib-Kaiser, 1995).

combination of a lack of trust and fewer, and often asymmetrical, commercial ties result in delicate international relations in which a single conflict could be definitive rather than incidental (Doyle, 1983b, 326). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this has led to a number of diplomatic failures, ranging from miscommunication and missed opportunities to humanitarian disasters. It has also led to inconsistencies in the foreign policies pursued by liberal regimes, ranging from incoherence to more organized forms of hypocrisy (Brunson, 2002 and 2007; Weaver, 2008).

Traditionally, welfare has been far from central in historical accounts detailing the establishment of institutions designed to project and extend the liberal international order. However, recent historical scholarship suggests that welfare and social protection were more central to their creation than mainstream literature suggests. As outlined by Borgwardt (2005, 3-4), the 1941 Atlantic Conference, the crucible for the Atlantic Charter and the beginning of international welfare state activity (Kaufmann, 2012, 96), represented a "... bold attempt... to internationalize the New Deal" by linking "... anti-fascist policies to economic well-being". The focus on social protection survived, and was perhaps even enabled by state capabilities developed during the conflict (Obinger, Petersen, and Starke, 2018), and it went on to play a central role in the creation of the international institutions designed to project the liberal international order beyond its bounds (Helleiner, 2014a; 2014b). As described by Helleiner (2014a, 312):

"Many misconceptions have emerged in the secondary literature about the Bretton Woods negotiations. One of the most striking has been the idea that the Bretton Woods negotiators were largely uninterested in international development goals and the ideals expressed in the Atlantic Charter to promote 'freedom of want' and 'social security' worldwide. The opposite is true. From the very start... these goals and ideals were prioritized by British and American policymakers for a combination of ideational, strategic and economic reasons".

However, when it came time to utilize these institutions beyond the international order, the focus on social protection was largely diminished. Helleiner (2014a, 312) suggests that “...the death of Roosevelt in 1945, the waning of wartime idealism, and the emergence of the Cold War all played a role in this process”.

Instead, building on colonial legacies, the liberal international order focused on promoting economic development in non-liberal states, largely under the assumption that such development would inevitably lead to the introduction of social policies and improved welfare outcomes that had taken hold in advanced economies. In line with modernization theory, these developmental strategies ranged from attempts to replicate forms of industrialization and modernization that took hold in the Global North (Rostow, 1960; Prebisch, 1950, 1959; Singer, 1950) to more nuanced approaches oriented toward the same end, such as import substitution industrialization (e.g. Hirschman, 1968 and more recently Chorev and Shadlen, 2015).

However, the welfarist orientation of ‘economic development as modernization’ was soon called into question. First, the relationship between economic development and welfare as suggested by Wilensky (1975) among others, was challenged by Collier and Messick (1975), who demonstrated that social security schemes were introduced at earlier stages of development in countries throughout the Global South. Furthermore, Flora and Alber (1981) showed both socioeconomic development and political mobilization to have weak explanatory power when related to the introduction of individual social programmes. Together, these findings suggest that economic development alone does not explain the introduction of basic social protection and that additional factors such as chronological order, geographic proximity, and mechanisms of

policy diffusion may also have explanatory power. In sum, modernization and economic development are not necessarily 'pro-welfare'.

Furthermore, dependency theorists (e.g. Baran, 1957; Frank, 1967; Rodney, 1972) highlighted the degree to which political independence did not result in national self-determination and autonomy within the international system overnight. In so doing, these accounts drew attention to external influences that continued to deeply affect these new countries to the extent of 'dependency'. In an historical and economic development context fraught with powerful external actors, the "...nexus of state and market in the distribution system" (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 4) at the heart of welfare provision in non-liberal states is particularly complicated and complex. Furthermore, the primary locus of this intersection may not even lie within the domestic boundaries of these newly formed countries, particularly in the case of former colonies.

Therefore, transnational, rather than predominantly national, understandings of welfare serve as a stronger the point of departure for understanding welfare provision in the Global South. In the absence of such frameworks, theoretical development has lagged compared to understandings of welfare state development in the Global North (as has data availability). For example, surprisingly little is known about how colonial legacies have systematically affected welfare and social policy in the majority of the world's countries (Migdely and Piachaud, 2011; Schmitt, 2015), despite wide-spread recognition that a number of former colonies remain poor and heavily aid-dependent and that colonial legacies continue to impact foreign aid allocations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Fusch, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp, 2014).²

² I have already begun postdoctoral work on colonial legacies and social protection with Prof. Dr. Carina Schmitt at the University of Bremen. I am grateful for the degree to which Prof Dr Schmitt, as well as Dr Bastian Becker and Judith Ebeling have furthered my thinking at this intersection. While there is inevitably some overlap in thinking in both directions as this work advances, I have tried to distinguish the academic

In sum, the welfare state regimes that emerged within the liberal international order did not emerge in the newly independent countries lying beyond them at the end of colonialism. Despite the attempts of development policy, the benefits of the liberal international order did not extend far beyond it nor did they lead to wide-spread liberal transformation. Factors contributing to this outcome include: (i) the majority of these countries did not play a strong role in the formation of this order as they were not yet politically independent; (ii) until these new countries were able to enter into reciprocal relationships guaranteeing liberal rights (Doyle, 1983b, 331) they were considered 'non-liberal' by the core despite their independent status; and (iii) a separate set of ideas, institutions, and instruments were developed to address economic development (and any related social policy matters) in non-liberal states, thereby stratifying the 'world system' (Wallerstein, 1974, 1980; Meyer et al, 1997³).

Within this foreign policy context, foreign aid – whether explicitly used for the purposes of social welfare or not – is often thought of as a residual form of social assistance or charity distributed by liberal regimes amongst poor countries as a 'gift' (Hattori, 2003). This generosity then re-enforces the moral superiority and power asymmetries that have come to define and reproduce the liberal international order – or, in other words, results in the delivery of foreign aid in line with 'donor interests' (McKinlay and Little, 1979; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Noël and Théiren, 1995; Lumsdaine, 1993).

contributions on both fronts, largely by tailoring them to the specific contributions each project seeks to make.

³ I am aware that the world systems literature quickly branches off into world society and world polity variations. I have deliberately not ventured into the intricacies of these debates as I feel this level of detail would further obscure, rather than clarify, the theoretical and geopolitical context in which social policy is used as a tool of foreign policy.

LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM AND WELFARE DURING THE COLD WAR

As highlighted by Ikenberry (2018, 9), "... the postwar liberal order was originally not a global order. It was build 'inside' one half of the bipolar Cold War system.... built around bargains, institutions and social purposes that were tied to the West, American leadership and the global struggle against Soviet communism". The development strategies promoted by the liberal international order within non-liberal state were also impacted by this context. In a number of countries, competition took the form of conflict in several proxy wars throughout the Third World. This section reviews literature relevant to understanding how this foreign policy context affected social policymaking in non-liberal states, with a focus on welfare in the context of conflict and regime competition.

WELFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT AND WARFARE

First, Doyle (1983b) asserts that "...outside the pacific union, liberal regimes, like all other states, are caught in the international state of war Hobbes and realists describe". As a result, a greater degree of chaos, confusion, and uncertainty pervades these international relations compared to relations between liberal states. Furthermore, while liberal regimes have engaged, and continue to engage, in conflict with non-liberal states (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan most recently), countries that are part of the liberal international order as it stands, have yet to engage in conflict with one another (Doyle, 1983a, 213). Coupled with the presence of welfare state regimes within the liberal order, this re-enforces the perception at face value of liberal states as the home of 'welfare' and non-liberal states as the home of 'warfare'.

However, not only have liberal regimes engaged, and in many cases have arguably driven, initiated, perpetuated, or even caused, conflict in non-liberal societies, the liberal international order itself grew out of two world wars, and the welfare state regimes that emerged from them were deeply affected by this conflict (Obinger, Petersen, and Starke,

2018; Titmuss, 1958). Two features appear to distinguish the relationship between welfare and warfare with the welfare regimes of liberal, as opposed to non-liberal, states: (i) their treatment of welfare not only as a 'means', or functional necessity underpinning labour markets and biological reproduction, but also as a normative goal or 'end'; and (ii) very different historical experiences of conflict and the exercise of state power.

Regarding the first, welfare state regimes are a powerful symbol of the liberal international order's success in fusing anti-fascist policies with well-being not only in rhetoric, but in deed (however imperfect and incomplete). Both Esping-Andersen (1990) and Wood and Gough (2006) recognize the normative element of this project, as espoused in the quote introducing this thesis, and in Wood and Gough's (2006, 1698) collective characterization of welfare state regimes as "capitalist societies that have been transformed into welfare states, that is, not countries that happen to engage in a bit of social policy on the side, but societies so deeply affected by their non-residual pervasive social policies that they are best defines as welfare states".

Moreover, Obinger, Petersen, and Starke (2018) outline the way in which warfare and welfare appear to have impacted the emergence of welfare state regimes. They suggest first, that war affects social policy by increasing the demand for it as well as giving rise to enhanced state capacities, fiscal powers and spending increases (Obinger and Schmitt, 2018), and centralization of government that left the state well-placed to fill this demand (Obinger, Petersen, and Starke, 2018, 8-9). Together, this suggests that a combination of war-related and welfare-related causes ushered in the 'golden age' of the welfare state post-WWII (Obinger, Petersen, and Starke, 2018, 9).

However, unlike in welfare state regimes of the Global North, historical accounts suggest that the asymmetrical nature of conflict and different experiences with state

power have again led to a fundamentally different relationship between warfare and welfare across countries in the Global South. Wood and Gough (2006, 1708) address these tensions systematically in their development of a comparative welfare regime approach to global social policy by: (i) replacing Esping-Andersen's (1990) concept of 'de-commodification' with 'de-clientelisation', or "... the process of de-linking client dependents from their personalized, arbitrary and discretionary entrapment to persons with intimate power over them"; and (ii) introducing two new regime types - informal and insecurity regimes - that sit alongside welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). They define insecurity regimes as:

"... institutional arrangements which generate gross insecurity and block the emergence of stable informal mechanisms to mitigate, let alone rectify, these. These regimes arise in areas of the world where powerful external players interact with weak internal actors to generate conflict and political instability. Insecurity regimes are rarely confined within national boundaries. The unpredictable environment undermines stable patterns of clientelism and informal rights within communities and can destroy household coping mechanisms. In the face of local warlords and other actors, governments cannot play even a vestigial governance and security-enhancing role. The result is a vicious circle of insecurity, vulnerability and suffering for all but a small elite and their enforcers and clients" (Wood and Gough (2006, 1699-1700).

In sum, the Weberian assumption that the state has a monopoly on violence simply does not hold in many of these contexts. Even if non-liberal states have a monopoly on violence within their geopolitical borders, this may provide little protection in the face of powerful external aggressors, to say nothing of the technological differential and military aid that define the security and defense apparatuses of these states. Moreover, the relationship between the state and its citizens in an insecurity context is likely to be complicated, at best, and rife with abuse of power, mistrust, and human rights violations at worst. As articulated at length by Wood and Gough (2006, 1706-1707):

“Here the very essence of the nation-state is itself contested, partly as a result of colonial history and post-colonial settlements which transgressed other, competing, primordial loyalties and identities. But these are also zones which are not articulated into the global political economy as national economies, and which thereby experience highly unregulated market conditions and collusions with foreign capital, mediated by patron, warlord and comprador economic agents. Weak states are therefore open to powerful external forces ranging from the world powers, through external governmental organizations, transnational corporations, international NGOs, to criminal networks. These interact with local patrons to reinforce patronage relationships, resulting either in precarious adverse incorporation and dependence of the population, or the exclusion of groups from any form of livelihood and welfare and their consequent destruction. The result is a combination of predatory capitalism; variegated forms of oppression; inadequate, insecure livelihoods; shadow, collapsed and/or criminal states; diffuse and fluid forms of political mobilization reproducing adverse incorporation and exclusion; and political fluidity if not outright chaos. The outcomes have been deteriorating health, denial of education and rising poverty in any areas....”.

In sum, despite analytic frames emphasizing the importance of the role of the state in welfare provision – for example, in creating monopsony and quasi-market structures in order to contain health care costs or to create savings, insurance, and investment mechanisms that help to manage risk and smooth incomes both across populations and over the life course as in the case of unemployment and pensions - there may be little appetite for advancing state power in countries across the Global South, even for welfare. Furthermore, in the absence of the state playing a strong role in both warfare and welfare, it appears difficult to convert gains from one into a benefit for the other as in the case in the Global North. This is also due, at least in part, to the presence of strong external actors; indeed, colonial administrations (later turned into states) had often been designed to perpetuate this kind of division and fragmentation (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman, 2016).

WELFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIME COMPETITION

However, regime competition between the US and USSR did not always lead to proxy wars and conflict. In fact, a demonstrated commitment to welfare and social protection were

key to asserting the moral and economic superiority of the liberal international order, grounded in a rights-based approach to achieving full employment (Obinger and Schmitt, 2011; Mishra, 1993; Hobsbawm, 1990).

The development of welfare state regimes was also fueled by the need to demonstrate domestic support and legitimacy, which a welfare orientation helps to further:

“At its core, the idea of a warfare-induced welfare state expansion assumes that the rivalry between the West and the Soviet bloc... was not solely rooted in military tensions and conflicting political ideologies... The resulting ambition to outcompete the rival bloc in terms of economic performance and welfare provision and to flaunt the achievements of one’s own political and economic regime was strongly driven by the vested interests of political elites. Since domestic political stability was a prerequisite for succeeding in this conflict, governments of all kinds sought to achieve mass compliance among their populations and gain political legitimacy... A classic instrument to enhance output legitimacy is the public provision of welfare benefits. Comparative welfare state research has convincingly demonstrated that the lack of political legitimacy in authoritarian regimes along with a growing working class were strong motivating factors in the welfare state formation of the late nineteenth century” (Obinger and Schmitt, 2011, 250).

In the cases examined by Obinger and Schmitt (2011), the pressure to ensure welfare advances ran both from East-West and from West-East. In the wake of WWII, the Soviet model propagated the notion that capitalism caused unemployment and presented an alternative grounded in the provision of basic needs and life-long job guarantees (Obinger and Schmitt, 2011, 251-252). Alternatively, the liberal order experienced more economic prosperity, forcing the Soviet bloc to resort to domestic welfare provision both to garnering support in the absence of democracy and to prevent westward migration (Obinger and Schmitt, 2011, 253). In so doing, they also demonstrate that “... regime competition was relevant for welfare state development on both sides of the Iron Curtain”, particularly in the 1970s. However, they also suggest that in the absence of economic

growth, the combination of state military and social expenditures placed ample strain on Eastern economies, which ultimately may have contributed to the breakdown of these regimes (Obinger and Schmitt, 2011, 264-265).

NEOLIBERALISM WITHIN AND BEYOND THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

In many respects, neoliberalism is inextricably linked with the second wave of globalization, which gained momentum in the 1980s and led to a "... recognition that globalization has thrown up structures for contestation, resistance and opposition and that states and other interests act both domestically and outwardly through their own 'multi-tiered', 'multisphered' strategies to determine the pace, course, timing and effects of globalization... the outcomes of these struggles are never certain in advance, but depend, crucially, on the context in which they are negotiated (Yeates, 2002, 70).

With this in mind, this section first outlines shifts in the liberal international order in response to neoliberalism, first, with attention to the way in which changes in the national and global are mutually constitutive. By extension, this section then briefly addresses changes in how international organizations are conceptualized within this order. Finally, this section addressed the effects of neoliberalism in non-liberal states, namely through the lens of structural adjustment programmes.

NEOLIBERALISM WITHIN THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER: GLOBALIZATION AND 'DE-NATIONALISATION'

Much of the literature on neoliberalism on social policy examines this intersection from a domestic policy perspective, often suggesting that globalization may lead to a 'race to the bottom' and to attempts at 'rolling back the state'. Alternatively, Sassen (2006, 1) examines globalisation the other way round, examining the way in which, "The epochal transformation we call globalization is taking place inside the national to a far larger extent than is usually recognized".

Specifically, Sassen (2006, 1-3) argues that globalization consists of:

“... an enormous variety of micro-processes that begin to denationalize what had been constructed as national – whether policies, capital, political subjectivities urban spaces, temporal frames, or any other of a variety of dynamics and domains,” that, “... reorient particular components of institutions and specific practices – both public and private – toward global logics and away from historically shaped national logics... Both (self-evidently) global and denationalizing dynamics destabilize existing meanings and systems. This raises questions about the future of crucial frameworks through which modern societies, economies and polities (under the rule of law) have operated: the social contract of liberal states, social democracy as we have come to understand it, modern citizenship, and the formal mechanisms that render some claims legitimate and others illegitimate in liberal democracies.”

Sassen (2006) goes on to recognise the positive and negative effects of this destabilization and to examine the processes behind de-nationalization and globalisation. Examining key historical junctures on a world scale, she argues that while new global orders are distinct from the old, “... some of the old capabilities are critical in the constituting of the new order, but that does not mean that their valence is the same; the relational systems or organizing logics within which they then come to function may be radically difference” (Sassen, 2006, 8). In other words, when functional capabilities ‘jump tracks’ – in the context of this thesis, from a domestic to foreign policy context or vice versa – they have the ability to catalyse transformation (for better or worse), specifically because of the way in which the shift in context forces a change in the relational systems underpinning these functional capabilities.

‘COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE’: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND AUTONOMY

The combination of de-nationalization in rich countries as well as the end of colonialism throughout the Third World led to substantial changes in the global political sphere. Whilst originally designed to protect and stabilize the global environment in which national economies operated, a number of public and social problems entered the global sphere as the de-nationalising processes that enabled globalisation took hold. Coupled

with increased support from a growing number of recognised Member States in the Global South, this shift was characterised largely by a recognition that international organizations are not only passive instruments (e.g. Krasner, 1982), but autonomous entities that are able to exercise power and act purposively (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) to address social problems in line with their mandates and resources.

As outlined by Barnett and Finnemore (2004), international organisations begin to have autonomy when they are recognised as having authority, and they are conferred authority, “... because they pursue social goals that are widely viewed as desirable and legitimate” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, 162). It is important to state that recognizing the authority of international organisations does not negate the authority of nation states in international policymaking nor does it necessarily suggest a hierarchical relationship between the national and the global. However, it does suggesting that policymaking between states is best conceptualized in transnational relief in order to capture the way in which non-state actors, including international organisations, transnational private actors, such as multinational corporations, and international non-governmental organisations, all affect the development and implementation of social policy in a foreign policy context.

NEOLIBERALISM BEYOND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

As stated in Chapter 1, in classic models of liberalism, domestic approaches to welfare were tasked with finding ways to marry capitalism’s technical project of creating liberal market economics with its stated political goal of improving social welfare. However, neoliberalism subtly reverses these two; instead, the stated political goal is the expansion of market economies on a global scale and dealing with those left behind becomes a technical matter related to poverty alleviation and eradication.

Generally, speaking, structural adjustment programmes supported by the World Bank and IMF often required indebted Third World countries to reduce social welfare spending in order to service international debt and continue receiving financial support from the international community, which presented serious challenges to the sovereignty and autonomy of these countries. The effects of these policies on Third World countries were particularly pronounced and curtailed the ability of many states to substantiate the human and social rights of their populations. As illustrated by Stewart (1988, 19):

“Low-income households have been squeezed from three sides: first, their incomes have fallen with cutbacks in employment and restrictions on wages; second, food prices have tended to rise rapidly partly as a consequence of devaluation and price reform; third, there have been cutbacks in government expenditure, which have hit expenditure on health and education. Expenditure per head on health fell in 40% of the countries in Africa and 60% of the countries in Latin America in the early 1980s, sometimes by very substantial amounts. (For example, in Jamaica, between 1980 and 1985, expenditure per head on health fell by 40%)”

BEYOND CONTAINMENT: UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL POLICY IN A FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT POST-COLD WAR

The notion of ‘containment’, or the situation of borders and boundaries in ways that promoted Western notions of civilization and betterment, seemed to become irrelevant overnight at the end of the Cold War. Many of the roots of the growing field of global social policy lie in illustrations of how external actors affected the welfare regimes of transitioning economies in the Eastern bloc during the post-Cold War era (Deacon and Hulse, 1997). Research on the political economy of health has illuminated the impact of this collective history on health and well-being (Stuckler, King, and McKee, 2009), where an East-West gradient in health outcomes continues to date. For example, life expectancy for male children born in 2010 ranges from 63 years in the Russian Federation to 80 years in Switzerland; for women, it ranges from 74 years in the Republic of Moldova to 85 years in Spain” (Shriwise and Stuckler, 2015, 138).

More broadly, “... the ‘inside’ order became the ‘outside’ order” (Ikenberry, 2018, 9) in what seemed like an instant, triggering a ‘crisis of authority’ and a ‘crisis of social purpose’ (Ikenberry, 2018, 10) for liberal internationalism at the end of the Cold War. This effect was particularly noticeable in decision-making regarding foreign aid allocations. In the absence of the Cold War, policymakers went back to the drawing board to formulate justifications for foreign aid as the axis for foreign policy concerns shifted from East-West to North-South (Nye, 1988, 237). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the search for moral authority and social purpose resulted in linking foreign aid to the promotion of human rights, which in historical context was very much a return to the principles at the heart of the institutions designed to facilitate the reach and engagement of the liberal order with non-liberal states. This also aligned with movements drawing attention to the ‘human faces’ (Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart, 1987; Jolly, 1991) most affected by structural adjustment, as called for both by UN agencies themselves (namely, the United Nations Children’s Fund, or UNICEF) as well as from those experience the devastating effect of these policies throughout the Global South.

The increased focus on human rights also fueled the liberal international order’s tendency towards interventionism and desire to transform non-liberal states – which could generously be described as having mixed success, at best. As outlined by Mandelbaum (1996, 16), the Clinton Administration encountered three failed interventions within the first nine months: a failure to lift the arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims and bomb Bosnian Serbs, the death of 18 soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu, and the continuation of a Bush Administration policy to refuse Haitian refugees seeking asylum. Furthermore, these failures also arguably led to the delay of US intervention in the Rwandan genocide (Powers, 2002; Dallaire, 2004; Straus and Waldorf,

2011). In an article titled 'Foreign Policy as Social Work,' Mandelbaum (1996, 17-18) argues that:

"... the [Clinton] administration was preoccupied not with relations with neighboring countries, the usual subject of foreign policies, but rather with the social, political and economic conditions within borders. It aimed to relieve the suffering caused by ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, starvation in Somalia, and oppression in Haiti. Historically the foreign policy of the United States has centered on American interests, defined as developments that could affect the lives of American citizens. Nothing that occurred in these three countries fit that criterion. Instead, the Clinton interventions were intended to promote American values... They tried, and failed, to turn American foreign policy into a branch of social work. While Mother Teresa is an admirable person and social work a noble profession, conducting American foreign policy by her example is an expensive proposition."

Apart from a rather astounding lack of empathy and flip reference to social work (n.b. Cohn, 1987), Mandelbaum (1996) illustrates the intersection of interests and values highlighted by both Noël and Théiren (1995) and Lumsdaine (1993) in their efforts to understand foreign aid not only in the context of foreign policy, but also in relation to domestic policy.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the way in which global capitalism has been domesticated within the liberal international order is thoroughly Western in ways that are glossed over all too often. While a thorough examination of this lies beyond the scope of this thesis, it is widely recognised that welfare systems throughout Western countries have been designed to benefit white male bread winners (Lewis, 1992; Orloff, 1993; Williams, 1987), and their structures and narratives have often institutionalized misogyny, racism, and additional forms of 'othering' that have long been constituent elements of Western civilization both within and beyond its borders. In other words, ways of thinking about and engaging with welfare are *cultured*. While legal and political institutions have managed to extend the ideational frames that govern our material reality, the relational foundation and its

divisions along the lines of age, gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, (dis-)ability among others remain deeply embedded in logics of the state and welfare provision in ways that continue to be relevant.

Furthermore, with respect to the two cases examined later in Part III of this thesis, it is plausible that British and American approaches to welfare in a foreign policy context have gone more or less unnoticed since the 'golden age' of the welfare state in the 1950s because they were so closely aligned with the organizing principles of *the* liberal international order itself. In other words, by playing a dominant role in the development of the international system as it stands, national actors in both the UK and US were able to operate within an international 'shell' or 'container' (Ikenberry, 2018) that not only buttressed national approaches to welfare at home but also rendered the 'liberal' aspects of the international system, and tacit assumptions about welfare provision within it, invisible to the individuals housed in the nation states most responsible for them (Doyle, 1983a).

Finally, the shifts brought on in the 1980s by neoliberalism and the second wave of globalisation highlight the importance of analysing social policy in a foreign policy context through a transnational lens. Processes where the capabilities of nation states 'jump tracks' from one policy arena to another, the purposive action of international organisations, and the way in which powerful external actors had substantial, and often negative, impacts on the welfare of individuals throughout the non-liberal countries of the Third World all suggest the need for a transnational approach to understanding social policy development and implementation. Better understanding the intersection between social policy and foreign policy from the view of the state and in global context is a critical first step in this direction.

Having theoretically situated the working hypothesis and drawn out a number of additional factors to consider in the post-Cold War era, the next chapter shifts to empirically examining the relationship between welfare state regime type and foreign aid in the social sector in the wake of the dramatic increase in foreign aid observed from 1997 onwards. In so doing, it aims to sharpen the concepts underlying the examination of this relationship so as to better understand where the predominant gaps in understanding lie before further exploration of the intersection between social policy and foreign policy in specific cases.

4 FOREIGN AID IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR FROM POST-WWII TO PRESENT: AN EXPLORATORY QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

Several scholars have suggested a relationship between social spending in domestic and foreign policy contexts, with some IR scholars arguing that ODA is the foreign policy equivalent to social spending in a domestic policy context since it is meant to capture the portion of foreign aid dedicated toward 'welfare' as opposed to 'warfare' promoting activities (Thérien and Noël, 2000; Noël and Thérien, 1995; Lumsdaine, 1993; Pratt, 1989; Stokke, 1989). In particular, Noël and Thérien (1995, 524) extend this rationale to generate the hypothesis that 'A state more generous with its own citizens..., as evidenced by high levels of solidarity, welfare spending, and redistribution '... would tend naturally to be generous as well with people in developing countries,' as measured by the effort, or per cent of their GNI dedicated to ODA. Further, Noël and Thérien (1995) suggest that the values and principles underlying the political preferences of the polity explain the degree of welfare generosity in both domestic and foreign policy contexts.

However, this explanation has been criticized for failing to identify or explain the mechanism(s) through which social spending in domestic and foreign policy context are related, or in the words of Lundsgaarde (2013, 5) "... how the legacy of egalitarian institutions locks in foreign policy choices". A recent survey of the determinants of donor generosity found that "...conclusive evidence on the relationship between domestic transfers and social spending on aid budgets does not exist" (Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp, 2014, 177). Furthermore, current policy trends suggest that approaches to welfare generosity in domestic and foreign policy contexts are more complicated than Noël and Thérien's (1995) hypothesis suggests. For instance in Finland, the centre-right

government elected in 2015 decided to cut ODA spending by 43 per cent (Guardian, 2015), whilst the United Kingdom's (UK's) 2010 coalition government ring fenced development spending despite the implementation of domestic austerity measures in order to meet the 0.7 per cent target. Not only did the UK meet the 0.7 per cent target in 2013, but Britain later enshrined the 0.7 target into law in 2015 (Shriwise, 2015).

To better understand the relationship between social spending in the domestic and foreign policy contexts, this chapter re-frames empirical exploration of the question 'is there a relationship between welfare state 'type' and the social sector foreign aid of donors?' employing measures of social policy in domestic and foreign policy contexts that are functional equivalents rather than simply 'scaling up' the bifurcation between 'welfare' and 'warfare' that is commonplace in a domestic policy context.¹ While the values and principles underpinning state behaviour may be consistent across the domestic and foreign policy realms as Noël and Thérien (1995) suggest, the chapter begins instead with the assumption that state behavior is context specific and driven primarily by national interests. The findings of this analysis are organized around the following four hypotheses, each of which explores a different dimension of why welfare state regimes may display a preference for using foreign aid in the social sector as a tool of foreign policy:

¹ Buchholz's (2016) insights on how best to understand the extension and modification of theoretical and conceptual tools used to understand social phenomena (e.g. welfare provision) within national fields can best be extended to global fields have been critical in helping me to articulate why this re-framing matters. In the context of this study, reframing the measures employed is critical for more accurately capturing and depicting the trends that characterise the relationship between social spending in domestic and foreign policy contexts, which I then use to focus qualitative research on how social spending in a foreign policy context began in the first place.

1. A welfare state regime with strong socialist attributes will deliver more aid through multilateral channels than one with strong conservative or liberal attributes;
2. A welfare state regime with strong socialist attributes will put forth more effort toward ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector than one with strong conservative or liberal attributes, where effort is measured relative to GNI;
3. A welfare state regime with strong socialist attributes will display a preference for using ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector as a tool relative to those with strong conservative or liberal attributes, where a country's preference is measured relative to ODA allocated to other sectors; and
4. A welfare state regime with strong socialist attributes will use ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector more forcefully than countries with strong conservative and liberal attributes, where force is measured by absolute spending.

Finally, the analysis assesses changes in the relationship between social spending in domestic and foreign policy contexts from 1980 to 1990 according to welfare state regime type.

The results show that while welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes do put forth more effort in the social sector relative to others, they are not more likely to channel funds through multilateral institutions (which have been found to do a better job of meeting the needs of recipient countries), they do not necessarily use aid in the social sector as a tool more than others, and they do not use it more forcefully than others.

Yet, the presence of a welfare state regime underpinned by strong socialist attributes is sufficient to ensure a preference for using aid in the social sector as a tool, particularly in the Government and Civil Society sub-sector, supporting theories that welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes use aid in the social sector to promote the social democratic model (Kusima, 2007). Alternatively, welfare state regimes with strong conservative attributes display a preference for channeling aid in the social sector through multilateral institutions, including those of the European Union (EU). Regarding welfare state regimes with strong liberal attributes, the United States (US) in particular proved to use aid in the social sector very forcefully, both to combat HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa and to support re-reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, when examining social spending in domestic and foreign policy contexts, it appears that the *combination* of strong effort toward social spending in a welfare state regime shaped by socialist attributes is sufficient to ensure strong effort toward foreign aid in the social sector in a foreign policy context.

The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the theoretical implications of the starting assumption that welfare generosity is context specific, illustrating how this starting place creates space for exploring the possibility that welfare generosity driven by national interest more than national values or recipient needs. Then, in the following four sections, the literature supporting each of the hypotheses is summarized along with the findings of the supporting exploratory analysis. Next, the relationship between social spending in domestic and foreign policy contexts is briefly explored from 1980 to 2009 before the chapter concludes.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ASSUMPTION THAT WELFARE GENEROSITY IS CONTEXT SPECIFIC

The assumption that state behavior is both relational and context specific has both normative and empirical implications. First, the same state capability can be used as a means to achieve different normative ends, depending on the context. For example as suggested by Korpi (1983, 1989), universal health coverage may be best conceptualized as an equalising 'power resource' for the working class in the context of a welfare state regime. However in the context of an informal or insecurity regime (Wood and Gough, 2006), the extension of universal health coverage may be best conceptualized as a tool used by autocrats and/or foreign aid donors to exert social control over workers and prevent social unrest, thereby stabilising and re-enforcing, rather than redressing, structural inequities and power differentials.


Regarding the empirical implications, discerning the difference between these two possibilities requires the consistent application of functional equivalents in each context and for re-embedding empirical findings within their normative, political, and institutional context *before* assigning meaning to these context specific functions. In other words, assuming that the exercise of state capabilities employed first in a domestic policy context will be used to the same ends in a foreign policy context leads to misinterpretation. Returning to the example of universal health coverage, transforming this policy objective into an end goal obscures the fact that its blind pursuit may indeed empower rights violators more than rights protectors which could do more harm than good. A more thorough, nuanced, and context-specific examination of the use of social policy as a tool of foreign policy enables one to more reliably assign meaning to actions in a way that is empirically grounded and falsifiable in order to discern the difference between donors that *seem* generous and that actually *are* generous.

Recognition of these context specific properties raises new questions about the intent behind the exercise of state capabilities and about how these capabilities *should* be used in each context. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the same action carried out by the same regime may be indicative of generous behavior in one context and indicative of behavior motivated primarily by self/national-interest in another. Therefore, while social policy in a domestic context resulting from a political preference for socialist attributes may best be described as ‘generous’ (Noël and Thérien, 1995), the provision of development assistance in the same form, by the same regime may or may not have anything to do with generosity at all. In a domestic context, the generous behavior of countries with strong socialist attributes is the product of complex, historical political settlements that are embedded in the institutions comprising social democratic welfare state regimes; the comparatively simple, functional, one-off use of welfare provision in a foreign policy context is unlikely to achieve or represent a similar constitutive balance. Therefore, while a state may be ‘naturally’ inclined to utilize its functional capabilities in both the domestic and foreign realm, this paper critically engages with the suggestion that a state is ‘naturally’ inclined to use these capabilities to the same ends in both contexts.

Indeed, several studies have confirmed donor interest, rather than recipient need, to be the primary determinant of aid allocations (McKinlay, 1978, 1979; McKinlay and Little, 1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Milner and Tingley, 2013; Fusch, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp, 2014). However, more specific and conclusive evidence on what type of donor interests affect aid budgets and

by how much remains somewhat elusive (Fusch, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp, 2014²). The donor preference for bilateral, rather than multilateral aid also offers support for the idea that donors utilize aid primarily to further their own interests, enlightened or otherwise (Figure 4.1). Modeling both recipient need and donor interest, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) found bilateral aid to be best explained by donor interest, while multilateral aid was best explained by their recipient need model. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, approximately 70 per cent of ODA from DAC countries has come in the form of bilateral assistance since the mid-1970s.³

FIGURE 4.1: BILATERAL ODA DISBURSEMENTS OF DAC COUNTRIES (AS PER CENT OF ODA), 1960-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database

² Fusch, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp (2014) found aid budgets to evolve with inertia, that donor generosity to very modestly increases along with rises in income per capita, that donors with politically independent aid agencies tend to be significantly more generous, and that donors view aid primarily as an international public good, rather than a national public good, and therefore have a tendency to free-ride off of the aid efforts of other donors.

³ However, a number of DAC countries comprised mostly of new and smaller donors have shown signs of an increasing preference for multilateral ODA in recent years. This list of countries includes Austria, Spain, Slovenia, Greece, the Czech Republic, Poland, Italy, and the Slovak Republic. In the case of Italy, Spain, and Austria – historically the largest donors of the eight listed here - the decline in bilateral ODA coupled with an overall decline in ODA spending.

Building on Noël and Thérien (1995), the remainder of the chapter examines whether or not countries with social democratic welfare state regimes display the strongest contribution of ODA dedicated to improving welfare in developing countries by testing four hypothesis: (i) that countries with social democratic welfare state regimes favor distributing aid through multilateral channels; (ii) that countries with social democratic welfare state regimes put forth more effort toward ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector, where effort is measured relative to GNI; (iii) that countries with social democratic welfare state regimes display a preference for using ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector as a tool, where a country's preference is measured relative to ODA in other sectors; and (iv) that countries with social democratic welfare state regimes use ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector more forcefully, where force is measured by absolute spending.

HYPOTHESIS 1: A WELFARE STATE REGIME WITH STRONG SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES WILL DELIVER MORE AID THROUGH MULTILATERAL CHANNELS THAN ONE WITH STRONG CONSERVATIVE OR LIBERAL ATTRIBUTES.


Maizels and Nissanke (1984) found recipient need to be the model that best explains the distribution of multilateral aid from international organizations and donor interest to be the model that best explains the distribution of bilateral aid from national governments. Therefore, if Noël and Thérien's (1995) hypothesis that countries who are generous with aid at home are more likely to be generous with aid abroad is taken to mean that countries with higher rates of social spending at home are more likely to be interested in contributing toward aid efforts focused on poverty relief and the actualization of human and social rights⁴ abroad on the grounds that they are "... somewhat equivalent to the

⁴ For me, Harris's (2010) paper on the oddly independent yet contemporary emergence of notions of human and social rights in the post-WWII era is also representative of the analogical reasoning and thinking Bucholz (2016) identifies as necessary for appropriately extending and modifying concepts

safety net provided by domestic welfare policies” (Noël and Thérien 1995, 523), then one would expect these countries to channel a higher portion of their ODA through multilateral channels.

However as displayed in Figure 4.2, this hypothesis proves false. Figure 4.2 presents a graph of bilateral ODA as a per cent of total ODA for countries grouped according to Esping-Andersen’s classification of welfare state regime types (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 74). While countries with strong socialist attributes displayed an early preference for multilateral ODA, they have since shifted toward a preference for bilateral ODA on par with that of other DAC countries. As of the early 1990s, countries with strong conservative traits are sending the largest portion of ODA through multilateral channels, with an approximate 50/50 bi/multilateral split in recent years.

FIGURE 4.2: BILATERAL ODA DISBURSEMENTS OF 18 DAC COUNTRIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO STRONG LIBERAL, CONSERVATIVE, AND SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES (AS PER CENT OF ODA), 1960-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database

underpinning the production and reproduction of social functions that first began in national fields to global fields. Another broad example of this would be the distinction made between 'social welfare' in domestic policy context and the focus on extending 'social protection' through development assistance on a global scale.

This finding makes more sense when interpreted in the context of EU development policy (Fargion and Mayer, 2009). In the same way that European integration is both a foreign policy objective and crystallised in a set of institutions, the EU serves both as a coordinator of Member States' development policy and as a multilateral donor (and also as a member of the Development Assistance Committee) in its own right (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014). While the terms 'bilateral' and 'multilateral' refer specifically to different sets of institutional mechanisms used to channel aid, these terms also correspond with the respective national and international political systems governing these institutions. While the EU is technically a multilateral channel of development assistance, EU development policy is perhaps more likely to align with the political preferences of its Member States given its supranational, rather than international governance structure. As a result, the unique relationship between the EU and its Member States calls into question whether this particular form of multilateral organization is more likely to distribute aid in a way that fits with the 'donor interest' or 'recipient need' models of Maizels and Nissanke (1984).

Full consideration of the 'donor interest' and 'recipient need' question in the case of supranational aid organizations exceeds the scope of this chapter. However, if one assumes the political priorities of the organization(s) governing development assistance to be a stronger determinant of aid distribution than the institutional structure itself, then one could argue that EU development assistance is likely to exhibit a distribution based more on 'donor interest' rather than 'recipient need'. It follows that the discrepancy in multilateral funding preference between countries with strong socialist and strong conservative attributes may have more to do with their respective preferences for channeling 'donor interested' development assistance through national

or supranational institutions than with their preference for the distribution of aid through bilateral or multilateral channels. To evaluate this possibility, the next paragraph provides a very brief overview of EU Development Policy, followed by an analysis of the portion of ODA channeled through EU Institutions by countries with strong conservative and socialist attributes.

Taken together, EU DAC members are the world's largest bloc of aid donors.⁵ Funding for EU development policy comes from the EU budget and also from the European Development Fund (EDF). According to the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014-2020, approximately 6.1 per cent of the EU's budget will be spent on development assistance, an increase from 5.7 per cent in 2007-2013. Unlike the mandatory contributions to the EU budget, member states contribute to the EDF voluntarily, and the EDF does not receive funds from the EU budget. Between 2006 and 2013, contributions to EU Institutions, including contributions to the European Development Fund (EDF), have accounted for approximately 32 per cent of multilateral funding in countries with strong socialist attributes⁶ and 57 per cent of multilateral funding in countries with strong conservative attributes. Using these figures to adjust the 2013 bi/multilateral aid split to reflect not only national, but also supranational political affiliation, countries with strong conservative and socialist attributes gave approximately 78 and 79 per cent of their ODA through bilateral+EU multilateral channels, respectively, which is the same as the percentage of bilateral funding given by countries with strong liberal attributes (79 per cent). This suggests that that divergent preferences in

⁵ For an overview of EU Aid, please see <https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/AidOverview.do>.

⁶ This calculation excludes Norway, as it is neither a member of the EU or a contributor to the European Development Fund.

channeling aid according to regime type are found not at the point of deciding between bi/multilateral assistance, but at the point of deciding between channeling national funding through bilateral/national or EU/supranational institutions, with countries with strong conservative attributes displaying a greater preference for channeling national funding through EU/supranational institutions.

However, this finding could be distorted by the fact that three of the EU's largest economies (Germany, France, and Italy) are all classified as countries with strong conservative traits, with the affect that their disproportionately large contribution toward EU development policy is more a residual affect of the size of their contribution to the EU budget, rather than a reflection of their commitment to EU development policy. Therefore, it is important to consider the behavior of countries with strong conservative and socialist attributes according to their voluntary contribution to the EDF. From 2011 to 2013, countries with strong conservative attributes channeled nearly twice as much funding through the EDF (18.3 per cent) as countries with strong socialist attributes (9.5 per cent). Using these figures to adjust the 2013 bi/multilateral aid split for EU political affiliation, countries with strong conservative attributes continue to deliver more aid through multilateral channels than those with strong socialist attributes, sending approximately 59 and 72 per cent of their ODA through bilateral+EDF multilateral channels, respectively.

The case of Norway offers further support for rejecting the hypothesis that countries with strong socialist attributes will deliver more aid through multilateral channels than countries with strong conservative or liberal attributes. Despite the fact that Norway is not a member of the EU, it averaged a bi/multilateral split in aid delivery of 75/25 per cent over the last ten years, where the highest percentage of aid sent

through multilateral channels was approximately 30 per cent in 2004. This finding supports the suggestion that differences in channeling aid according to regime type are found first at the point of deciding between channeling national funding through bilateral/national or EU/supranational institutions.

Together, these findings suggest that welfare state regime type is not a determinant of bilateral/national and multilateral/international funding allocations. However, it does suggest that regime type may be a determinant of a country's preference for channeling 'national' aid through traditional bilateral or multilateral/supranational institutions. The findings also suggest that being a country with a welfare state regime based predominantly on strong conservative or socialist attributes, and also a member of a supranational organization (i.e. an EU member state) are necessary, but not sufficient⁷ conditions for displaying a preference for channeling 'national' aid through multilateral channels. Within this sample of countries, strong conservative attributes appear to be a sufficient condition⁸ for an increased preference for channeling aid through multilateral institutions, as all five countries with conservative welfare state regimes displayed a distinct preference for channeling national development funds through EU/multilateral institutions. On these grounds, the hypothesis that welfare state regimes based on strong

⁷ The case of Norway, a country with a welfare state regime with strong socialist attributes does not display a notable preference for multilateral aid, proves that this condition is only necessary, but not sufficient. Similarly, the presence of other 'non-liberal' welfare state regimes that are also EU member states that do not display a strong preference for multilateral funding further confirms that neither of these conditions is sufficient.

⁸ In this sample, countries with welfare state regimes distinguished by strong conservative attributes proved to be sufficient and also necessary condition for displaying a preference for channelling aid through multilateral institutions, as there were no countries of other welfare state regime types displaying such a preference. However in theory, it remains possible for any EU country to develop a preference for channelling national assistance through supranational/multilateral channels. In light of this fact and given the small sample of countries, it does not seem appropriate to claim that conservative attributes are the determining factor of a preference delivering aid through multilateral channels without further research on the politics determinants of this emergent trend.

socialist attributes are more likely than those with strong conservative or liberal attributes to provide development assistance through multilateral channels can be rejected.

However, this does not fully answer the question of whether or not countries that are more generous at home are also more generous abroad for a couple of reasons. First, when placed in the historical context of both the traditional split between bilateral/national and multilateral/ international aid from the mid-1970s to the 1990s and the end of the Cold War and subsequent push for EU integration in the 1990s, the fact that countries with strong socialist attributes do not appear to channel the majority of their aid through multilateral institutions does not necessarily mean that they are less committed to generosity, or more specifically to the 'safety net' provided by ODA. As Kuisma (2007, 16) points out, "the 'Nordic model' is linked to a specific theory of justice and its development is tied to the processes of nation-state building and identity formation. This was clearly reflected in the national debates on EU membership..." which were,"... seen not only as a potential challenge to the Nordic welfare states but also to national identity in broader terms" (Kuisma, 2007, 16). The decision of countries with strong social democratic foundations not to integrate as closely with EU development policy may stem more from a desire to protect what many consider to be a "... superior way of organizing social, political and economic life" (Kuisma 2007, 22) and to retain their position as, "... an interesting alternative for (the largely neo-liberal) politics that currently prevail in Europe and the wider world" (Kuisma 2007, 9). In this sense, countries with strong socialist attributes may be more interested both in self-preservation against the threats posed to the 'Nordic model' by continued European


integration and globalization and in exporting the social democratic political model to the developing world than they are in providing poverty relief directly on a global scale.

HYPOTHESIS 2: A WELFARE STATE REGIME WITH STRONG SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES WILL PUT FORTH MORE EFFORT TOWARD ODA IN THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES SECTOR THAN ONE WITH STRONG CONSERVATIVE OR LIBERAL ATTRIBUTES, WHERE EFFORT IS MEASURED RELATIVE TO GNI.

Some international relations scholars have argued that ODA is an appropriate measure of social policy in a foreign policy context in a metaphorical sense, as it is meant to capture the portion of foreign aid dedicated toward economic development and welfare, excluding military aid or 'warfare' promoting activities, as suggested by Noël and Thérien (1995). However, this definition has limitations; namely, it focuses more on the symbolic, rather than the instrumental use of aid. This chapter adopts the view that aid is primarily and instrument of foreign policy and employs functionally equivalent measures of social spending in a domestic and foreign policy context to determine whether or not Noël and Thérien's (1995) findings still hold, for reasons articulated at greater length in Chapter 2. As indicated in Appendix 2, ODA includes spending for programs and projects that fall outside of those traditionally considered to be a part of the welfare state. Broadly speaking, the welfare state is generally understood to include policies and programs in the areas of pensions, health care, unemployment insurance, social assistance, family benefits, housing, and education. The policies and programs in ODA's Social Infrastructure and Services sector (Appendix 3), which includes spending in the education, health, population policies/programs and reproductive health, water supply and sanitation, government and civil society, and other social infrastructure and services sub-sectors, corresponds most closely to those traditionally considered to be part of the welfare state, and this is the measure used here.

To this end, Figure 4.3 displays ODA Gross Disbursements in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector as a per cent of GNI according to the strong liberal, conservative, and socialist attributes of welfare states from 2002 to 2013. According to

FIGURE 4.3: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS OF 18 DAC COUNTRIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO STRONG LIBERAL, CONSERVATIVE, AND SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES (AS PER CENT OF GNI), 2002-2013




Source: OECD CRS Database

graph, countries with strong socialist attributes clearly put forth more effort toward ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector when compared with countries with strong liberal or conservative attributes. The graph also shows that countries with strong conservative and liberal attributes have consistently exhibited similar levels of effort in this sector and that countries in all three of these categories have increased their effort in this sector overtime.

Taking this line of reasoning two steps further, it has been argued that humanitarian assistance is often the first step in a longer trend toward increased social assistance, particularly after crisis situations as a result of natural disasters or conflict (Cocozzelli,

2006). As shown in Figure 4.4, these findings also hold in the Humanitarian Aid sector, where countries with strong socialist attributes are shown to dedicate a larger portion of GNI toward humanitarian assistance, with countries with liberal attributes rising to outpace countries with strong conservative attributes since before 2002. However as illustrated in Figure 4.5, it seems that the presence of a welfare state regime with strong socialist attributes is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for increased effort toward ODA, with Finland serving as an example of a country with a social democratic welfare state putting forth a level of effort toward ODA in the social sector that is below the average of the countries sampled here.⁹


FIGURE 4.4: HUMANITARIAN AID ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS OF 18 DAC COUNTRIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO STRONG LIBERAL, CONSERVATIVE, AND SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES (AS PER CENT OF GNI), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database

⁹ For an explanation of why Finland seems to behave differently than other Scandinavian countries with regard to foreign welfare policies and programs, please see Noël & Thérien (1995).


FIGURE 4.5: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS OF COUNTRIES WITH STRONG SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES (AS PER CENT OF GNI), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database


Figure 4.6 provides an overview of the Social Infrastructure and Services sector by sub-sector as a per cent of GNI, which reveals that the increase in effort is driven primarily by increased effort in the Government and Civil Society sub-sector in recent years. As demonstrated in Figure 4.7, this increase has been driven by countries with strong socialist attributes. Pointing again to Norway as an example in Figure 4.8, the Norwegian government has put forth the majority of effort within this sub-sector toward efforts of civilian peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution, democratic participation in civil society, and human rights, with the sharp increase in funding for civilian peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution corresponding with the OECD's decision to include funding dedicated toward conflict, peace, and security as ODA in 2005.

FIGURE 4.6: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS OF 18 DAC COUNTRIES BY SUB-SECTOR (AS PER CENT OF GNI), 2002-2013




Source: OECD CRS Database

FIGURE 4.7: GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY SUB-SECTOR ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS OF 18 DAC COUNTRIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO STRONG LIBERAL, CONSERVATIVE, AND SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES (AS PER CENT OF GNI), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database

FIGURE 4.8: TOP THREE CATEGORIES OF EFFORT BY NORWAY IN THE GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS BY SUB-SECTOR (AS PER CENT OF GNI), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database

Together, these findings support the hypothesis that countries with welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes put forth more effort toward the Social Infrastructure and Services sector than those with strong liberal or conservative attributes. Further examination of the data suggests that welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for putting forth a distinct amount of effort toward ODA in the social sector. The examination also revealed that the majority of effort in this sector of ODA in recent years has been focused on the Government and Civil Society sub-sector. While strong socialist attributes do seem to guide funding allocations within this sub-sector, as suggested by Norway's support for peace-building, democratic participation, and human rights, these findings offer support for the causal narrative that such support is carried out indirectly through the promotion

of the social democratic model more than in the direct provision of welfare through funding in the education or health sub-sectors.


HYPOTHESIS 3: A WELFARE STATE REGIME WITH STRONG SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES WILL DISPLAY A PREFERENCE FOR USING ODA IN THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES SECTOR AS A TOOL RELATIVE TO THOSE WITH STRONG CONSERVATIVE OR LIBERAL ATTRIBUTES, WHERE A COUNTRY'S PREFERENCE IS MEASURED RELATIVE TO ODA ALLOCATED TO OTHER SECTORS/SUB-SECTORS.

Both a state's normative stance and its skill and capacity for exercising a given set of capabilities (Sassen, 2006) may influence the type of foreign aid it provides. Operating under this assumption, one could hypothesize that countries with strong state involvement in welfare provision in a domestic context, as in countries with strong socialist attributes, may be more likely to become involved in welfare provision in a foreign policy context.

As displayed in Figure 4.9, countries with strong socialist and liberal attributes have dedicated similar portions of ODA toward aid in the social sector from 2002-2013, with countries with strong conservative attributes consistently joining them since 2009. Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 each display ODA preferences by sector for countries with strong liberal, conservative, and socialist attributes from 2002-2013. Countries with strong liberal and strong socialist attributes display a clear preference for aid in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector since 2002 to nearly identical degrees, whereas countries with strong conservative attributes have displayed an additional preference for providing ODA in the form of debt relief from 2004 to 2008.¹⁰


¹⁰ The peak in Action Related to Debt in countries with strong conservative attributes coincides with the 2005 introduction of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative as part of broader efforts to provide debt relief to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), which allows for 100 per cent relief on international development loans provided by the IMF, World Bank and the African Development Fund for countries that complete the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. 44 per cent of the funding comes from the IMF and other multilaterals, with the remaining 56 per cent coming from bilateral creditors. To date, 36

FIGURE 4.9: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS IN 18 DAC COUNTRIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO LIBERAL, CONSERVATIVE, AND SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES (AS PER CENT OF ODA), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database


FIGURE 4.10: ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS OF COUNTRIES WITH STRONG LIBERAL ATTRIBUTES BY SECTOR (AS PER CENT OF ODA), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database


out of 39 eligible countries have received debt relief via HIPC. While the Inter-American Development Bank implemented a similar programme for debt relief in the Western Hemisphere in 2007, it included only five countries. For more information, please see IMF (2017).

FIGURE 4.11: ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS OF COUNTRIES WITH STRONG CONSERVATIVE ATTRIBUTES BY SECTOR (AS PER CENT OF ODA), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database


FIGURE 4.12: ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS OF COUNTRIES WITH STRONG SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES BY SECTOR (AS PER CENT OF ODA), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database


Disaggregating aid allocations within the Social Infrastructure and Services sector provides further insight into the preferences for using aid as a tool in regimes with strong liberal and socialist attributes. Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 each display ODA preferences within the Social Infrastructure and Services sector for countries with strong liberal and socialist attributes from 2002-2013. Again, countries with strong liberal and strong socialist traits display a preference for aid in the Government and Civil Society sub-sector, but with different trends. Countries with strong liberal attributes show a small, steady rise from 10.2 to 15.5 per cent of ODA between 2002 and 2007 followed by a similarly small and steady decline to 11.7 per cent by 2013. Countries with strong socialist attributes show a continued increase in preference for ODA in this sub-sector, accounting for 11.6 per cent of ODA in 2003 to 20.7 per cent in 2013. In contrast, Figure 4.15 shows that countries with strong conservative attributes

FIGURE 4.13: ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS IN THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES SECTOR OF COUNTRIES WITH STRONG LIBERAL ATTRIBUTES BY SUB-SECTOR (AS PER CENT OF ODA), 2002-2013




Source: OECD CRS Database

FIGURE 4.14: ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS IN THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES SECTOR OF COUNTRIES WITH STRONG SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES BY SUB-SECTOR (AS PER CENT OF ODA), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database

FIGURE 4.15: ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS IN THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES SECTOR OF COUNTRIES WITH STRONG CONSERVATIVE ATTRIBUTES BY SUB-SECTOR (AS PER CENT OF ODA), 2002-2013




Source: OECD CRS Database

display a clear preference for aid in the Education sub-sector, dedicating an average of about 14 per cent of ODA to this sub-sector between 2002 and 2013.

Looking within the Government and Civil Society sub-sector reveals more about the distinct trends and aid preferences of countries with strong liberal and strong socialist attributes. As illustrated in Figure 4.16, countries with strong liberal attributes show a preference, albeit a declining one, for aid dedicated toward Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management and an increasing preference for aid dedicated toward improving Legal and Judicial Development. Examining the cases of Australia and the United States (US) (Table 4.1) in these sub-sectors¹¹ reveals more about the aid preferences in countries with strong liberal attributes. In the case of both Australia and the US, a large portion of the funding in both the Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management and Legal and Judicial Development sub-sectors went to a small number of recipient countries. Further, according to the most recent OECD DAC Peer Review Reports on the Australian and US aid programs, the top recipient countries in these sub-sectors correspond with the overall top recipient countries according to total ODA. Case studies of these donor-recipient country relationships may offer insight into the drivers behind this type of development assistance in the social sector. While further qualitative work is required to fully understand the causal mechanism behind these types of assistance, it appears at first glance that geo-strategic considerations (related to proximity in the case of Australia and conflict in the case of the US) and approaches to state/nation-building may play a role in directing this type of assistance. These findings

¹¹ Regarding case selection, Australia was chosen because it dedicated the largest portion of its ODA toward this sub-sector relative to the four other countries with strong liberal attributes, and the US was chosen as a compliment given the frequency with which it is referred to as the closest 'real' representation of the 'ideal' liberal welfare state regime type.

FIGURE 4.16: ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY SUB-SECTOR OF COUNTRIES WITH STRONG LIBERAL ATTRIBUTES BY SUB-SECTOR (AS PER CENT OF ODA), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database

TABLE 4.1: OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY SUB-SECTORS OF DISTINCT PERFORMANCE IN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 2002-2013


Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management ODA sub-sector			
	Per cent of total ODA	Number of recipient countries	Top countries: per cent of sub-sector funding
Australia	8.30	81	Solomon Islands: 25.35
			Papua New Guinea: 18.17
			Indonesia: 10.18
			TOTAL: 53.7
United States	3.37	127	Iraq: 30.52
			Afghanistan: 25.15
			TOTAL: 55.64
Legal and Judicial Development ODA sub-sector			
	Per cent of total ODA	Number of recipient countries	Top countries: per cent of sub-sector funding
Australia	4.38	44	Solomon Islands: 33.03
			Papua New Guinea: 27.79
			TOTAL: 60.82
United States	2.50	123	Iraq: 29.56
			Afghanistan: 16.41
			TOTAL: 45.97

Source: OECD CRS Database

also point to the importance of taking the broader foreign policy context into account when analyzing development assistance in the social sector.

As illustrated in Figure 4.17, countries with strong socialist attributes display a strong preference in recent years for aid in the Democratic Participation and Civil Society sub-Sector and a growing, if slightly less dramatic preference for aid in the Civilian Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention, and Resolution sub-Sector. Countries with strong socialist

FIGURE 4.17: ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY SUB-SECTOR OF COUNTRIES WITH STRONG SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES BY SUB-SECTOR (AS PER CENT OF ODA), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database

attributes also displayed a distinct interest in the Human Rights and Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management sub-Sectors. Looking at the cases of Sweden and Norway¹² (Table 4.2) in depth reveals that funding within these sub-sectors is

¹² Norway was selected because of its aforementioned non-EU status and because it stood out as having given the highest per cent of ODA in the Civilian Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention, and Resolution sub-Sector. Sweden was selected because it has given the largest portion of ODA to this sector and to the Democratic Participation and Civil Society and Human Rights sub-Sectors relative to the four other

TABLE 4.2: OVERVIEW OF GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY SUB-SECTORS OF DISTINCT PERFORMANCE IN NORWAY AND SWEDEN, 2002-2013

Democratic Participation and Civil Society ODA sub-sector			
	Per cent of total ODA	Number of recipient countries	Top countries: per cent of sub-sector funding
Norway	3.50	84	West Bank and Gaza Strip: 5.29
			Nepal: 4.55
			Tanzania: 4.56
			South Sudan: 4.33
			Angola: 4.17
			TOTAL: 22.9
Sweden	5.12	116	Afghanistan: 4.32
			Guatemala: 3.41
			Colombia: 5.26
			TOTAL: 12.99

Civilian Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution ODA sub-sector			
	Per cent of total ODA	Number of recipient countries	Top countries: per cent of sub-sector funding
Norway	3.48	78	Sudan: 6.66
			Sri Lanka: 4.72
			Colombia: 4.04
			TOTAL: 15.42
Sweden	2.12	111	Colombia: 10.23
			South Sudan: 10.01
			Democratic Republic of Congo: 6.82
			West Bank and Gaza Strip: 6.73
			TOTAL: 33.79

Human Rights ODA sub-sector			
	Per cent of total ODA	Number of recipient countries	Top countries: per cent of sub-sector funding
Norway	2.61	87	States Ex-Yugoslav: 6.51
			West Bank and Gaza Strip: 4.04
			Colombia: 3.28
			TOTAL: 13.83
Sweden	4.72	83	Kenya: 5.19
			Guatemala: 4.13
			Mozambique: 3.91
			TOTAL: 13.23

Source: OECD CRS Database

countries with strong socialist attributes. It is also frequently cited as the closest 'real' representation of the 'ideal' socialist regime type. The Netherlands also displayed distinct behaviour in the Democratic Participation and Civil Society sub-sector in recent years, but the analysis revealed that its increased preference for aid in this sub-sector was a result of substantial increases in aid coded as 'unspecified', or aid which is unable to be attributed to one country or regional organization and therefore excluded from this analysis.

more diffuse; the top recipients of ODA within these sub-sectors received much smaller portions of total assistance with the sub-sector and shared little overlap with the overall top ODA recipient countries of each country. These findings are consistent with suggestions that countries with strong socialist attributes are keen to support the development of social democracies and the promotion of peace.

Together, these findings suggest that we can reject the hypothesis that countries with strong socialist attributes display a stronger preference for using aid in the social sector as a tool relative to countries with strong conservative and liberal attributes. The data reveals that countries with both strong social *and* liberal attributes display a similar and distinct preference for aid in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector at the aggregate level. Disaggregating this data reveals qualitative differences in their preference for aid in the Government and Civil Society sub-sector, with countries with strong liberal attributes displaying a declining preference for aid in the Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management sub-sector and an increasing preference for aid in the Legal and Judicial Development sub-sector in countries of broader geo-strategic interest, while countries with strong socialist attributes showing an increased preference for aid in the Democratic Participation and Civil Society and Civilian Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution sub-sectors and a steady preference for aid in the Human Rights sub-sector.

However, it does appear that the presence of a welfare state regime with strong socialist attributes is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for a country to display a strong preference for aid in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector overall and in the Government and Civil Society sub-sector specifically. At the aggregate level, the same appears true of countries with welfare state regimes with strong liberal attributes, but


this finding does not hold when the data is disaggregated by country. Both Switzerland and Japan provide support below the average of the countries sampled here in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector, and Japan provides a below average level of support within the Government and Civil Society sub-sector. Despite country-level differences, similar behavior in aggregate of countries with strong socialist and strong liberal attributes provides support for treating welfare state type as not only an ordinal, but also as a nominal variable when seeking to better understand the relationship between welfare state type and ODA.

HYPOTHESIS 4: A WELFARE STATE REGIME WITH STRONG SOCIALIST ATTRIBUTES WILL USE ODA IN THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES SECTOR MORE FORCEFULLY THAN COUNTRIES WITH STRONG CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL ATTRIBUTES, WHERE FORCE IS MEASURED BY ABSOLUTE SPENDING.

As in a domestic context, increased spending in the social sector of ODA is not necessarily indicative of improved social or developmental outcomes or of advances in aid effectiveness. However, overall spending is an important factor to consider when understanding foreign aid as a political tool. The power and influence of foreign aid is best understood when compared not to the total spending of other *donor* countries, but when compared to the spending capacities of *recipient* countries. At the most basic level, the bigger the differential between a donor's potential to finance foreign aid programs and a recipient's ability to finance domestic aid programs of the same kind, the more powerful foreign aid becomes as a political tool.

While at the aggregate level it appears that countries with welfare state regimes with strong liberal attributes use aid in the social sector most forcefully, disaggregating the data at the country-level reveals that this effect is a result of spending by the United States alone. As displayed in Figure 4.18, the US is by far the most forceful donor in the

FIGURE 4.18: ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS IN THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES SECTOR OF 18 DAC COUNTRIES (IN 2013 USD, IN MILLIONS), 2002-2013




Source: OECD CRS Database

sector, and the majority of its funding is dedicated to the Population Policies and Reproductive Health and Government and Civil Society sub-sectors. As shown in Figure 4.19, the US has rather drastically increased its funding in both of these sectors since 2002. In the Population Policies and Reproductive Health sub-sector, funding for STD Control has driven the increase, which includes funding for HIV/AIDS. More specifically, disaggregating and analyzing funding in this sub-sector at the country- and project-level indicates that the increase was targeted toward a number of sub-Saharan African countries¹³ as part of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). In the Government and Civil Society sub-sector, the funding for Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management and Legal and Judicial Development has driven the increase.

¹³ Namely South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana.

FIGURE 4.19: ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS IN THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES (IN 2013 USD), 2002-2013



Source: OECD CRS Database

Disaggregating and analyzing the increase in Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management sub-sector reveals that the majority of funding in this sub sector when toward Iraq and Afghanistan in response to conflict. In Iraq, the largest portion of funding went toward the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (36 per cent), followed by funding for Democratic Governance (15 per cent) and funding for Security and Law Enforcement (12 per cent). In Afghanistan, the largest portion of funding went toward Democratic Governance (67 per cent) and the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (15 per cent). Funding in the Legal and Judicial Development sub-sector is slightly more diffuse, with Iraq and Afghanistan receiving the largest portion of funds, followed by Mexico, Colombia, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of funding was dedicated toward improving Justice, Public Safety and Infrastructure and


toward the US State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs.

Together, these findings suggest that the size of that national economy plays a fundamental role in determining the extent to which a country is able to use aid in the social sector forcefully. The results indicate that the hypothesis can comfortably be rejected and that welfare state regime type proves to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for a more forceful use of aid in the social sector.

DEPICTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WELFARE SPENDING IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXTS

As previously mentioned, foreign welfare policies comprise a rather small portion of welfare spending when compared to spending on domestic welfare policies. Figure 4.20 illustrates the public and private mandatory social expenditure of DAC countries as a per cent of GNI, which includes social expenditure in nine policy areas: old-age, survivors,

FIGURE 4.20: PUBLIC AND MANDATORY PRIVATE SOCIAL EXPENDITURE OF 18 DAC COUNTRIES (AS PER CENT OF GNI), 1980-2009




Source: OECD Social Protection and Well-being Database

incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labor market policies, unemployment, housing, and other socially-related cash benefits or benefits-in-kind. Overall, this graph suggests a relatively steady growth rate in social expenditure among the 18 DAC countries with some evidence of convergence in spending, though the range of social expenditure as a percentage of GNI remains fairly wide, from 19.3 per cent of GNI in the United States to 31.8 per cent of GNI in France.


Mirroring Noël and Thérien's (1995) form of analysis, Figure 4.21 and Figure 4.22 present scatterplots mapping the placement of the 18 DAC countries according to their domestic welfare policy effort relative both to ODA disbursements in more recent years and ODA commitments since 1980. Country placement within the scatterplot is determined by domestic welfare policy effort, as measured by public and private mandatory social expenditure as a per cent of GNI, and foreign welfare policy effort, as measured by data on spending within ODA's Social Infrastructure and Services sector as a per cent of GNI. Together, these figures suggest that, on average, welfare state regimes are behaving in distinct ways according to their domestic and foreign welfare policies. An examination of the data presented in Figure 4.22 in five-year increments shows that welfare state regimes types are becoming more distinct in their behavior overtime. Further, the concentration of countries in the bottom right quadrant suggest that high levels of effort in the social sector in a domestic context may be necessary, but not sufficient for high levels of effort in the social sector in a foreign policy context. This finding further supports the results found when examining hypothesis 2.

FIGURE 4.21: AVERAGE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MANDATORY SOCIAL EXPENDITURE VS. AVERAGE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES ODA DISBURSEMENTS OF 18 DAC COUNTRIES (AS PER CENT OF GNI), 2002-2009



Source: OECD CRS and Social Protection and Well-being Databases

FIGURE 4.22: AVERAGE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MANDATORY SOCIAL EXPENDITURE VS. AVERAGE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES ODA COMMITMENTS OF 18 DAC COUNTRIES (AS PER CENT OF GNI), 1980-2009



Source: OECD CRS and Social Protection and Well-being Databases

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, support for foreign welfare policies has grown in recent years as evidenced by the increase in spending on policies and programs in ODA's Social Infrastructure and Services Sector. As suggested by Noël and Thérien (1995), countries with welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes display more effort (as measured relative to GNI) toward the social sector relative to the other countries in the sample. However, countries with welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes do not channel more aid through multilateral institutions, do not necessarily use aid in the social sector as a tool more than countries with welfare state regimes with strong conservative or liberal attributes, and they do not use aid more forcefully than others. And yet, the presence of a welfare state regime underpinned by strong socialist attributes is sufficient to ensure a preference for using aid in the social sector as a tool, particularly in the Government and Civil Society sub-sector. When placed within the broader foreign policy context, these findings support the causal narrative that countries with welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes use social policy as means of promoting the social democratic model as suggested by Kusima (2007), or primarily as a form of soft power and as a tool for social development and reconstruction.

However, the findings of countries with welfare state regimes underpinned by strong conservative and liberal attributes were perhaps more intriguing. The presence of welfare state regimes underpinned by strong conservative attributes was found to be sufficient to ensure a preference for channeling national aid through multilateral channels, which may explain their distinct amount of effort in Education sub-sector, which in turn may have the effect of reducing poverty as multilateral channels have been found to do. Qualitative studies are needed to determine whether the decision to exert

increased effort in the Education sub-sector is made at the national level, with the funding channeled through supranational institutions with the understanding that education will be a priority, or at the supranational level, where the politics of the institution(s) channeling these funds allow for a greater focus on the direct provision of welfare in the form of education. Together, these findings suggest that countries with welfare state regimes with strong conservative attributes use ODA in the social sector as a form of soft power, but also as a tool for promoting and strengthening the EU. In this sense, countries with strong conservative attributes may not be using ODA in the social sector as a tool for social (re-)construction in recipient countries as much as using it as a tool to promote the social construction and regional integration in Europe.

Countries with welfare state regimes with strong liberal attributes were found to be less likely to channel national aid through multilateral institutions and to exert less effort in the social sector. However, on average, they were found to prefer the use of ODA in the social sector as a tool as much as countries with strong socialist attributes, and the US in particular was found to use aid in the social sector very forcefully, both in combatting HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, during conflict as part of the Commander Emergency Response Programs (CERPs) (as discussed in greater depth in Chapter 7), and in re-constructing Iraq and Afghanistan. In this sense, the US uses aid in the social sector as a tool in all three of the ways suggested: as a form of soft power, as PEPFAR has been shown to enhance global public opinion of the US (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Wood 2014), as a form of hard power when choosing to withhold or provide needed resources in both conflict and post-conflict environments, and also as a tool for social reconstruction in the state-building projects underway in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This analysis also found evidence to support Noël and Thérien's (1995) claim that there is a relationship between a country's domestic welfare state regime type and its foreign welfare policies and programs when measured by effort. However, treating welfare state type as a nominal, rather than an ordinal, independent variable suggests that the causal mechanisms behind this relationship are more complicated than a preference for generosity as Noël and Thérien (1995) suggest. Overall, the data suggest that strong social policy effort in a domestic policy context is necessary but not sufficient for strong effort toward foreign welfare policies and programmes. However, the *combination* of strong social policy effort as measured by spending with welfare state institutions shaped by strong socialist attributes appears to be sufficient to ensure strong effort toward foreign welfare policies and programmes.

These findings re-enforce the importance of conceptual clarity in order to prevent slippage when moving between ontological perspectives. It also demonstrates the importance of evaluating foreign welfare policies and programs within the broader foreign policy context and in relation to the particular constellation of interests, institutions, and political histories of a given donor country's welfare state regime. While the values and views on generosity that are embodied in the institutions and ethos behind domestic welfare provision may affect how a welfare state regime approaches foreign welfare policies and programs, qualitative work must be done to understand how these ideas, preferences, and values impact the decision-making process behind the allocation of foreign aid dedicated toward welfare.

While there appears to be some consensus of a strong expression of socialist attributes in both the domestic and foreign approaches to social policy in social democratic welfare state regimes, it remains unclear how this relationship is expressed

in liberal and conservative welfare state regime types. To shed some light on this unexplored terrain, Part III examines the use of social policy in a foreign policy context in two liberal welfare state regimes that were also global hegemonic powers of their time: the British Empire and the US.

5 FOREIGN AID IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR BEFORE WWII: THE CASE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

“It is certain that in many cases progress has been delayed, and in some cases absolutely stayed, because the only methods by which improvement could be carried out were beyond the scope of private resources... In Dominica, in British Honduras, and in British Guiana for instance, there are untold possibilities of natural wealth in the shape of gold and other minerals, dye woods and timber, and all tropical productions, which neither the colonies themselves nor individual adventurers are in a position to open up. Crown estates of immense extent and undoubted intrinsic value are waiting a purchaser because there are no proper means of access. Individual enterprise will till the fields and cut the timber, and work the mines; but Government and Government alone can make the roads and the railways. This is the true province of Government in new countries, and until it is recognised by Great Britain, she will not have fulfilled her obligations to the dependencies which she holds under her rule.”

- Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 8 January 1896 memorandum to the Cabinet (Havinden and Meredith 2002, 87 as cited from Garvin 1934, 176-7)

INTRODUCTION

Recent scholarship on the welfare state has drawn attention to the way in which states have played a role in welfare provision beyond their national boundaries for many years, dating back to colonial period (Schmitt, 2015; Helleiner, 2014; Midgley and Piachaud, 2011). In both domestic and foreign policy contexts, social policy has been introduced and developed as part of broader nation-/state-building projects (Leisering 2013; Midgley & Piachaud 2011), yet we know little about why and how welfare state regimes may utilise social policy with in a foreign policy context.

To address this gap in the literature, the following chapter presents a historical account of role that social policy played in the foreign policy of the British Empire from 1868 to 1940. Through the analysis of foreign aid in the social sector from Britain to her colonies, the chapter focuses on answering the following secondary research question: ‘What role did foreign aid in the social sector play in British colonial development policy?’

The chapter argues that social policy was used in a foreign context primarily to protect and promote British interests. As in the preceding Chapter, employing functional equivalencies illustrates the way in which development assistance in the social sector was delivered in colonies in a residual, functionalist fashion to support the achievement of higher order foreign policy objectives, such as conflict and trade. The chapter finds that ensuring the stability and security of colonial territories was key to this aim, and improving the welfare of colonial subjects was a secondary matter.

By way of outline, the chapter begins with a brief history of British colonial development policy, an outline of the methods utilised, followed by summary of spending on colonial development assistance with a focus on the social sector in particular, an examination of the relationship between social policy and conflict in the cases of South Africa and the West Indies, before concluding.

BRITISH COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY BEFORE 1945

While the Marshall Plan is often cited as the beginning of foreign aid as we know it, the British Empire began using foreign aid as a tool to promote development and welfare within its colonies long before the mid-20th century. In the British Empire, the term 'welfare' was used primarily in relation to Victorian notions of betterment, referring to welfare as a policy tool in a secondary sense (Midgley & Piachaud 2011; Lewis 2011). However as the Empire continued to expand its geo-political and economic boundaries, colonial development and welfare began to occupy space on the foreign policy agenda of the UK, particularly during the first wave of globalisation in the late 19th and early 20th century (O'Rourke & Williamson 2000). Recognition of the social effects of both economic expansion and conflict led to a renewed focus on British colonial development in the

aftermath of World War I (WWI), culminating in the passage of the Colonial Development Act in 1929 and the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940.

Before British colonial development policy was fully formed, the British Empire was comprised of many different types of ‘colonies’¹, or territories with varying degrees of independence from the UK. Regardless of their degree of independence, Britain’s colonies had much in common: each colony was overseen by a Governor or High Commissioner appointed by the Monarch; each was considered to be a separate, self-contained administrative unit; and perhaps most importantly, each was expected to generate its own revenue and to remain financially self-sufficient. Generally speaking, direct financial assistance to a colony from the British government was rare and occurred only when the dependent territory was deemed to lack a ‘responsible government’. When a colony lacked ‘responsible government’, which usually meant that its government was unable to meet its financial obligations, Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury provided the colony with financial assistance in the form of ‘grant-in-aid’² on the condition that it assumed control of the territory’s finances (ODI 1964, 9). For HM Treasury, assuming financial control was key to justifying financial assistance to the colonies for two reasons: first, it implied that Britain was financially responsible for the colony; and second, it ensured that Britain could account for the use of such funds. Colonial governors made every effort to avoid receiving ‘grant-in-aid’ from the Treasury, not least because of the potential

¹ The British Empire was at its largest in the years after WWI, when its reach extended over approximately one-fifth of the world’s population and one-fourth of the world’s territory. Further, the Empire consisted of several different types of overseas territories, including dominions, Crown colonies, protectorates, and mandates. Here, the term ‘colonies’ is used loosely to refer collectively to these various types of overseas territories, as the policies and legislation designed to impact the development and welfare of these territories made few, if any, distinctions between them.

² According to ODI’s 1964 report, ‘grant-in-aid’ assistance was first introduced in 1878, however this work finds that grant-in-aid was first recorded in Parliament’s Appropriation Accounts in 1868. Grant-in-aid in the form of loans was made possible by the Colonial Stocks Act of 1877-1900, which enabled colonial governments to borrow money from British financial markets at preferential interest rates (ODI 1964, 10; Jessop 1976).

damage it may do to their political ambitions. Failure to demonstrate the ability to 'responsibly govern' could leave the impression that a governor was incompetent and/or incapable of governing, thereby hindering his political advancement within the Empire. Further, the local elite was often not keen on the idea of relinquishing control of the colony's finances to the metropole. HM Treasury often coupled financial assistance to the colonies with the imposition of severe financial constraints and restrictions on government spending, often with negative effects on the colony's development and welfare (ODI 1964, 9).

However, there were exceptions to the rule that financial independence was key to maintaining some sense of territorial integrity whilst under British rule. The argument for funding colonial development was articulated most notably by Joseph Chamberlain, who served as Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1895 to 1903 and whose ideas laid the groundwork for Britain's colonial development policy. Chamberlain recognised that the financial and territorial expanse of the Empire required, "... prosperous, and contented subjects within all parts of the empire... which were capable of raising revenues, both to contribute to the defence of their territories, and to generate sufficient investment capital to set their domestic economies on a path of self-continuing growth. Thus Chamberlain's policies, whilst designed primarily to serve Britain's interest, had the potential merit of also being beneficial to the colonies" (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 87). Further, Chamberlain argued beyond the grounds of stability, self-sufficiency, and economic growth to suggest that Britain had a duty to develop her territories, that the state had a unique role to play in spearheading development, and that private interests may be able to benefit off of the back of such financial investments as cited in the quote opening this chapter.

Despite opposition from HM Treasury, Chamberlain advocated tirelessly for the creation of financial avenues for colonial development. The Colonial Stocks Act of 1900 effectively allowed British trustees to invest in colonial governments (but not colonial municipalities, provinces, or industries) with the guarantee of the UK government; however outside of strong, self-sufficient dominions such as Canada, the interest rates on these loans remained so high that most colonial governments would have been unable to service the debt. Therefore, this allowance made little, if any, immediate impact on colonial development (Jessop 1976; Havinden & Meredith 2002, 89-90). In the end, Chamberlain was able only to encourage 'grants-in-aid' from Britain to her colonies, which made relatively small developmental contributions in the short-run. However, Chamberlain is credited with placing the development of Britain's colonies back on the political agenda, and his ideas proved to have long-lasting impact on colonial development policy.

The Second Boer War, a lengthy and very costly conflict between the British Empire and the independent Boer republics of the Orange Free State and Transvaal Republic (both part of present-day South Africa) from 1899 to 1902, also curtailed Chamberlain's efforts to encourage colonial development. Tensions in the region stemmed from the abundance of gold (in the Transvaal) and diamonds (near the border of the Orange Free State) and a large imbalance between the ethnic Boers, who were small in number but controlled most of the resources, and the 'uitlanders', who were large in numbers, mostly British, and who worked in the mines. Lord Milner, British High Commissioner to South Africa, led negotiations to ease tensions in 1899, which ultimately failed. Shortly thereafter, Chamberlain demanded franchise and representation for the uitlanders in the Transvaal. After failing to withdraw troops at the close of the negotiations, the Transvaal and Orange Free State declared war on Britain. After the

initial battles, the conflict descended into guerrilla warfare for a number of years, culminating in Lord Kitchener's 'scorched earth' policy and the removal of remaining civilians to concentration camps. The conflict ended in the annexation of both territories by Britain, with high costs for both the conflict itself and the necessary re-construction. The Second Boer War also led to a renewed focus on welfare at home, where it was discovered that as many as 40 to 60 per cent of British men were physically unfit to fight. This finding directed attention toward improving the health and wellbeing of those in the metropole, offering support for the Liberal reforms proposed in the early 20th century, such as the National Insurance Act of 1911.³

The period between the end of the Second Boer War and the outbreak of WWI saw impressive growth in trade between Britain and her colonies, even as the United States and Germany began to compete with British exports. The external trade of Britain's colonies is estimated to have doubled in value between 1901 and 1913, and the growth in trade between Britain and her colonies was rising approximately two per cent faster than the growth in trade worldwide (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 115). In colonies where customs duties were the primary source of government revenue, government expenditure grew substantially, though per capita spending remained very modest. In the absence of a comprehensive, comparative study on how increases in government expenditure translated into welfare spending in the colonies, a few examples are given here. In Ghana, health and education expenditure grew to account for 9.7 and 2.4 per cent of government spending, respectively by 1919. Roughly, this translated into less than one per cent of the population having access to hospital facilities and only one in over 200

³ It is also worth noting that as Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (1905-1908), Winston Churchill was charged with shaping the constitution of the Transvaal, which advocated for 'responsible' rather than representative government in the territory, which can be thought of as somewhat similar to present day arguments for 'good governance' as opposed to full-fledged (democratic) government in the international arena.

children being enrolled in formal education (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 104 as cited from Kay & Hymer 1972, 334). In Uganda, the expansion of the cotton industry and accompanying railways for transportation, led to better nutrition, clothing and housing for individuals along with some amount of increased access to education (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 105 as cited from Ehrlich 1965, 474). In Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka), officials became increasingly aware of the need for improved health and education services, as recorded in the autobiography of the writer and civil servant Leonard Woolf (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 107 in reference to Woolf 1961). In Malaya, the expansion of modern healthcare and education corresponded with a rise in exports, rubber in particular, and accompanying infrastructure developments. As early as 1904, 17 per cent of the population was able to access health services and 13,000 children had been enrolled in school (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 110).

As international trade continued to grow, Britain underwent substantial welfare reforms at home as Liberal Governments came to power. Connections between the changes occurring in Britain's domestic and foreign domains were perhaps most clearly embodied in the political career of David Lloyd George. As Chancellor of the Exchequer (1908-1915), Lloyd George went from overseeing substantial domestic welfare reforms, namely the extension of health and unemployment insurance with the passage of the National Insurance Act of 1911, before becoming Prime Minister (1916-1922) of the Wartime Coalition Government. However, the onset of WWI brought Britain's welfare expansion at home and economic expansion abroad to a close. It also greatly affected the economic outlook of her colonies and ultimately imperial geographies as well. Britain's shift from civilian to military economic priorities resulted in a decline in terms of trade throughout the Empire. A number of factors contributed to this decline: an increase in the cost of shipping as transport routes became less secure; price fluctuations and distortion

in demand for goods; and changes in the composition and supply of labour as many working age males left to contribute to the war effort (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 115-125).

As a result of these changes, colonial governments faced increasing amounts of financial pressure. First, government revenue declined as trade slowed and income from customs duties decreased. Second, Britain's colonies were informed in December of 1914 that they would not be able to borrow money from London markets throughout the War. In addition to removing a source of financial flexibility, smoothing, and security for colonial governments, this also halted public works projects and the further development of transport routes in the colonies. Third, Britain increased import duties throughout the colonies in an effort to raise her own government revenue, and in some colonies there was also, "... an extension of head tax, income tax and export duties. Most of the burden of these tax increases fell on the indigenous producer and wage-earner" (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 123). Lastly, the size of colonial governments decreased by as much as half, as British administrators returned home to join the war effort (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 125). Whilst colonial governments struggled to make ends meet and some political unrest occurred as a result, the economic damage caused by the War was far less in the colonies than in Britain and Europe, with the possible exception of parts of East and Central Africa (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 125).

Despite declining terms of trade, it is argued that the links between Britain and her colonies strengthened during the conflict and that colonial development was given stronger consideration in post-War economic planning as a result. As illustrated by Havinden and Meredith (2002), three perspectives emerged in debates on Britain's colonial development policy after the War. The first was most clearly articulated by the Empire Resources Development Committee (ERDC), which furthered an imperial

narrative that "... encouraged and perpetuated the myth that the tropical colonies contained immense potential wealth which required only a small input of capital by the state to unlock" (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 137). Further, the ERDC promoted and supported the notion that the government should be run first and foremost like a business and, "... proposed that certain of the empire's assets should be taken over and exploited on a large scale by the British government, and the profits so made be used to pay off Britain's war debts" (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 134-5). Both the Cabinet and the political heads of the Colonial Office offered support for this perspective (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 138).

However, this business-oriented developmental ethos was challenged by those promoting the concept of trusteeship as an alternative normative and conceptual framework with which to approach colonial development. Those in the trustee camp agreed that Britain should develop its 'great estate', but hesitated, if not outright dismissed policies that promoted British progress through the exploitation of its colonies and their resources on the grounds of noblesse oblige. This perspective was clearly articulated by Leopold Amery, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies at a meeting in the House of Commons on 13 February 1919 that was convened in order to evaluate the ERDC's proposals where he stated:

"A word like 'exploitation' has its legitimate and its dangerous sense. Members of the House know that the bedrock of our Colonial administration all over the world is that we govern the natives of those countries which we control as trustees for their interest, and that the whole policy of Government in any of our colonies... is directed solely and singly to the point of view of the welfare of the natives. We have to be very careful – and I just utter this one word of warning – that we should not put ourselves in a position where there would be any conflict of interests between the Government of this country, which has the Colonial administration under its thumb, and the interests of the natives, or where our Government would be tempted in the direction of making a profit for the taxpayer here as

against the interest of the natives for whom we are trustees. I do not think that there is necessarily any conflict between the two conceptions of utilising the development of the vast resources of the Empire in order to help forward trade in this country, and at the same time to help these peoples. But... we have to watch very carefully... to see that we should not be put... in a false position as between our interests as representing the taxpayers of this country and our interests as trustees for millions of people on a lower plane of political development, who look to us for their welfare and their elevation."

Under-Secretary Amery's view was in line with that of most colonial administrators and some, though not all, colonial governors (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 138).

The third perspective came from HM Treasury, which took a pragmatic view that colonies should be self-supporting and noted that those that were not, and that subsequently fell under the Treasury's purview, were not in a position to cover the most basic expenses let alone extend welfare to the masses. HM Treasury was inclined to view many of the colonies as potential financial drains, rather than as profitable investments. As a result, it advocated to keep spending on the maintenance of these territories to a minimum. In the end, "... controversies arising from the British colonial question at the Paris Peace Conference and the creation of the mandates system, strengthened the concept of 'trusteeship' as constituting the proper basis of British colonial rule" (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 138). As Britain's representative to the League of Nation's Permanent Mandates Commission, Sir Frederick Lugard was influential in shaping the notion of 'trusteeship' that took hold at the League of Nations, the groundwork for which was outlined in his 1922 book, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*. In the book, Lugard outlines the concept and practice of trusteeship in his chapter on 'Principles of Governing Control in the Tropics', stating that the world's powers must:

"... frankly recognise that 'the tutelage of nations not yet able to stand by themselves must be intrusted to advanced nations who are best able to undertake it... The principle that 'the wellbeing and development of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves forms a

sacred trust of civilisation' though referring in its context to the territories which before the war were under enemy control, must obviously in future be regarded as no less applicable to territories under the control of the Allies... The responsibility is one which the advantages of an inherited civilisation and a superior intellectual culture, no less than the physical superiority conferred by the monopoly of firearms, imposes upon the controlling Power. To the backward races civilisation must be made to mean something higher than the methods of the development syndicate, or the assiduous cultivation of new wants. Where these principles have been neglected, history has taught us that failure has been the result... It has been said that a nation, like an individual, must have some task higher than the pursuit of material gain, if it is to escape the numbing influence of parochialism and to fulfil its higher destiny... The white man's prestige must stand high when a few score are responsible for the control and guidance of millions. His courage must be undoubted, his word and pledge absolutely inviolate, his sincerity transparent. There is no room for 'mean whites' in tropical Africa. Nor is there room for those who, however high their motives, are content to place themselves on the same level as the uncivilised races. They lower the prestige by which alone the white races can hope to govern and to guide" (Lugard 1922, 57-59).

Despite the dominance of the 'trustee' perspective, competition between the 'development' and 'trustee' schools of thought continued throughout the 1920s. Coupled with a sluggish post-War economic recovery, British colonial development policy emerged as weak and fragmented, consisting of a number of committees with minimal impact. However, several important qualitative changes in the debates on colonial development policy took place. In 1921, Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, first made the case that colonial development could help to alleviate unemployment at home by stimulating demand for British goods abroad. It was determined that rising levels of unemployment in Britain were not only a function of transitioning back to civilian-, rather than military-oriented economy, but a more fundamental economic problem stemming largely from a lack of demand for British goods. As described by Lugard, colonial development was thought to be a part of the solution to this problem:

“It is, moreover, also of great moment that the British democracy, faced with problems which portend great changes in our social organisation, should understand the relation which our overseas dependencies bear to the economic wellbeing of this country – how vital to our industrial life are the products of the tropics, and its markets for our manufacturers. It is indeed essential that democracy should take an intelligent and well-informed interest in questions which affect the Empire of which it is the inheritor and trustee” (Lugard 1922, 8).

Also, several institutes, studies, and reports were created with an eye toward colonial development, leading to the beginning of what we now refer to as ‘technical assistance’ from Britain to her colonies. During this time, two events are relevant to policies in the areas of development and welfare: the installation of the Empire Marketing Board in 1926, which “... might be regarded as the first approach to a policy of centrally guided economic development for the Dominions, Colonies and the United Kingdom itself” (ODI 1964, 11); and the passage of the Palestine and East Africa Loans Act of 1926, which “... was in some respects a precursor of the Colonial Development Act of 1929” (ODI 1964, 14).

The Empire Marketing Board was charged with enhancing the development of Britain’s great estate by promoting research, market intelligence, economic investigations and publicity to encourage “... the consumption of empire foodstuffs and raw materials in the United Kingdom” (Havinden and Meredith 2002, 150). In line with these aims, the Board was responsible for overseeing the Empire Marketing Fund. Ultimately, the Board proved to have little success in enhancing trade and increasing economic growth in Britain, and it was abolished in 1933 as the UK reverted from a policy of free trade to one of imperial preference. However, the Empire Marketing Fund remained, presumably under the control of HM Treasury.

The Palestine and East Africa Loans Act of 1926, “... provided that the Treasury might guarantee the principal and interest of loans raised by the Government of Palestine

(up to £4.5m), or by the Governments of Kenya, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi), or Tanganyika (Tanzania) (up to £10m), for certain specified purposes of capital expenditure” (ODI 1964, 14). The legislation also created the East Africa Loans Committee, which was tasked with advising the government on which projects were suitable for such a loan guarantee. The Committee remained committed to ensuring that colonial governments could service the debt they took on. However, the Colonial Development Act of 1929 revised this to allow for advances to be made from Britain to colonial governments to cover the interest charges of the loans made under the 1926 Act for the first ten years. Further, the functions of the East Africa Loans Committee were later transferred to the Colonial Development Advisory Committee with the passage of the 1929 Act.

The Colonial Development Act of 1929 represents the first time, “... that the British government accepted any legal responsibility for providing financial assistance to the colonies” (Barder 2007, 3). The Act created the Colonial Development Fund (CDF) “... for the purpose of aiding and developing agriculture and industry in the colony or territory, and thereby promoting commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom” (Colonial Development Act, 1929). There is some dispute within the literature as to what extent the Act was passed in order to alleviate unemployment at home. From a review of parliamentary debates, Morgan (1980) argues that colonial development, not relieving unemployment at home, was the main driver behind the Act because it was widely known that the predicted increase in the export of raw materials from the colonies would lead to the creation of a relatively small number of jobs in Britain. Given the detailed nature of Morgan’s account, I am inclined to preference it. However on the whole, I find choosing an account to preference to be an exercise in splitting hairs. Colonial development was justified on the grounds that it would further economic growth within the Empire by

providing the raw materials necessary to increase the output of industry at home, which was thought to lead to some job creation even if it would not be enough to single-handedly solve Britain's unemployment problem. In other words, the Act catered to the, "... political necessity of offering some solution to the unemployment problem" (Constantine 1984, 191). The question of how successful the Act would be in achieving its aims, however defined, was a secondary matter. Further, as with many foreign aid programs, the fact that the legislation could be thought to achieve a number of aims provided reasons to rally around it, not to vote against it (Tarnoff & Lawson 2011, 3). Colonial development could be seen as both a mechanism for alleviating Britain's unemployment problems and as a worthy end in and of itself, which helped to build consensus around the Act.

As established under the Act, the Colonial Development Advisory Committee (CDAC) administered the CDF. Like the East Africa Loans Committee, the CDAC allocated funds after reviewing development proposals submitted. As reported by Havinden and Meredith (2002, 160), 617 out of 822, or 75 per cent of colonial proposals that were both funded by the CDAC from 1929 to 1939 and seen to completion were still in operation by 1939. On average, proposals received approximately half of the funding they sought, encouraging colonial administrators to find additional funding from either colonial revenues or private investment to match that of the CDAC. In this sense, projects financed by the CDAC/CDF are not entirely unlike present-day public-private partnerships in the development arena.

During the onset of World War II (WWII), social tensions within some colonies furthered to unrest, and "The Colonial Office became convinced that the rapid succession of disturbances in Trinidad, Barbados, and Jamaica were the result of low wages, high unemployment, and poor housing and sanitary conditions, and feared similar

disturbances in other colonies that had similar problems” (Barder 2007, 3). This consensus helped to amass support for the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. According to Havinden and Meredith (2002), “The addition of the term ‘welfare’ was both a recognition of the extent of poverty in the tropical colonies... and an acceptance of the large ‘welfare’ element in expenditure under the 1929 Colonial Development Act” (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 218). The Act increased the annual expenditure of the Colonial Development Fund from £1 million to £5 million per year for ten years. However, wartime shortages led to decreased funding for these initiatives unless they were deemed, “... to bear direct relation to the war effort,” or, “...unless the scheme was of such urgency and importance as to justify the expenditure of United Kingdom funds in present circumstances” (Havinden & Meredith 2002, 218).

METHODS

Both qualitative and quantitative data was used to evaluate Britain’s ‘grant-in-aid’, or the historical equivalent of what we now refer to as foreign aid, and both primary and secondary data was used. Primary data was collected from Estimates, Supplementary Estimates, and Appropriation Accounts for Civil Services in the House of Common’s Parliamentary Papers. The Papers were accessed both online and at the British Library. Cross-sectional data was gathered for each year from 1868 to 1940. 1868 was selected as a lower bound for data collection, as this was the first year that funds dedicated toward grant-in-aid were recorded in the Appropriation Accounts (Appropriation Accounts 1868-69, 243). 1940 is a somewhat arbitrary upper bound, but equally, it serves as a natural break given the onset of WWII, introduction of the Marshall Plan and end of colonialism that followed this time period.

The data from the Parliamentary Papers was collected systematically and placed within one of two data bases: one for aid issued to the colony itself (known as COLAID) and a second for aid issued for specific projects and endeavours (known as COLDEV), particularly those that spanned across more than one colony, such as funding for many transportation and communication systems. First, the table of contents of the Estimates and Appropriation Accounts for the Civil Services for a given year were scanned to ensure that funding qualifying as grant-in-aid was not added on to the documents as a separate class of funding at the end. The addition of new classes of funding occasionally occurred during conflicts or other episodic events. If these events proved to require more systemic, long-term financial support, they were often later incorporated into a pre-existing class of funding. Each class of funding consists of a group of votes, with each vote representing a certain type of endeavour to be financed and consisting of individual countries or projects to be funded via grants or loans. Class V, relating to the Foreign and Colonial Services, and any other relevant classes were then examined to identify votes that included funding for activities that were determined to be the colonial equivalent of ODA, or what is referred to here as Colonial Development Assistance (CDA). Funding within these votes was examined, and when funds were allocated toward specific countries or development projects that qualified as CDA, data from the Estimates and the Appropriation Accounts for the item were evaluated and compared. In determining whether or not grant-in-aid qualified as CDA, the OECD's current standards for classifying foreign aid as ODA were used (OECD 2008; OECD-DAC 2013).

The comparison of funding allocations in the Estimates and Appropriation Accounts was time consuming but useful for a number of reasons. First, the Estimates include a justification for the funding, which helps to determine whether or not the funds should be considered to be the past equivalent of ODA. The Estimates also indicate

whether or not the funds were given as a grant or a loan, and if as a loan, they often also included the terms, helping to determine whether or not the loan was offered on concessional terms (i.e. whether or not it should be classified as CDA). In earlier years, it appears that many of the loans granted were actually an advance (i.e. a loan without interest), however charging interest on such loans was more commonplace in later years. Second, the Appropriation Accounts are a measure of the funds that were not only committed during the budget process, but also actually disbursed. If items appeared within votes in the Appropriation Accounts that were not included in the Estimates, a Supplementary Estimate was located to understand the justification for the additional spending. Further, the Appropriation Accounts also included a record of the repayment of loans, making it possible to calculate net disbursements of funds in many cases.

The primary data was then compared to the data reported by Constantine (1984) for the years 1914-1940 to double check that significant pieces of data were not omitted from the account, and the data gathered was then adjusted for inflation. The data was then coded by sector according to the most recent Credit Reporting System guidance and purpose codes of the OECD's DAC Committee (OECD-DAC 2013). Funds classified as falling within the Social Infrastructure and Services Sector were coded according to sub-sector as well. For a summary of the sectors and sub-sector classifications, please see Appendices 2 and 3. As outlined by the OECD-DAC's guidance, it is important to note that ODA is classified first by the (sub-)sector it intends to foster and not by the type of goods or services rendered. For instance, funding for HIV/AIDS awareness and education programs would be coded as falling within the Population Policies/Programmes and Reproductive Health sub-sector rather than falling within the Education sub-sector of the Social Infrastructure and Services Sector.

Finally, with regard to using spending as a rubric of analysis, it is important to reiterate that just as in domestic context, spending is not necessarily an indicator of 'better' (i.e. more effective and/or larger scale) social policy in a foreign policy context. However, spending is an important indicator in so far as it represents the leverage and influence of the donor over the recipient, thereby enhancing the power of foreign aid as a political tool by the donor. The lack of alternative sources of foreign aid further supports this conceptualisation of aid in the case of colonies. However it should be noted that, the private sector also played a role in financing development projects. Constantine (1984) goes some way in examining privately financed development projects, but these are not examined here.

The data was then placed within its broader political and historical context as outlined in the previous section, which was constructed from a variety of secondary sources. While much has been written on the colonial experiences of individual British colonies, I found far fewer accounts examining British Colonial Development Policy as a whole. Even so, the triangulation of the primary data gathered here with the histories of the political context surrounding Britain's colonial development policy from secondary sources was performed wherever possible. When useful, Parliamentary Debates cited within secondary sources were reviewed first hand if thought to be helpful in resolving discrepancies in the historical accounts, and a list of the Parliamentary Papers, debates, and legislation used to inform this paper can be found in the Reference Section at the end of the thesis. D.J. Morgan's (1980) five-volume account of *The Origins of British Aid Policy* is seen to be the authoritative source on Britain's colonial development policy. However, Morgan's account begins in 1924, excluding both the first era of globalization and WWI, which is of particular interest here. Additionally, the Overseas Development Institute's

(ODI's) five reports on British Aid were frequently drawn from as well.⁴ The fourth report in this series on 'Colonial Development' and was also written by D.J. Morgan. Given the age of these reports, they were treated as both primary and as meta-data. Like Morgan's previous account, ODI's reports also do not include a significant evaluation or written account of the extension of grant-in-aid to British colonies in advance of WWI. Both Michael Havinden and David Meredith's *Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960* and Stephen Constantine's *The Making of Colonial Development Policy, 1914-40* were used to piece together an understanding of the history and politics behind aid during this period and the years to follow.

RESULTS

The results are presented in two parts, with the first addressing the drivers and determinants of CDA overall and the second addressing the drivers and determinants of CDA in the social sector specifically. Figure 5.1 presents British CDA as a per cent of GDP, Figure 5.2 presents total spending on British CDA, and Figure 5.3 shows total spending on British CDA disaggregated by sector. The figures reveal a number of episodic peaks, and some long term spending patterns as well. Regarding peaks in CDA spending, there was a slight increase in spending shortly after 1880, a much larger jump

⁴ Shortly after its founding in 1961, the ODI was asked to survey "... the changing needs of the newly independent countries and the differing methods of the richer countries in trying to meet those needs". The survey was financed by a three-year grant from the Nuffield Foundation, and a complimentary survey was conducted by the Brookings Institution in the US. ODI's survey culminated in the 5 reports on British Aid referenced here.

FIGURE 5.1: BRITISH COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (AS PER CENT OF GDP), 1868-1940




FIGURE 5.2: BRITISH CDA AS MEASURED BY GROSS DISBURSEMENTS (IN 2013 GBP, IN MILLIONS), 1868-1940





FIGURE 5.3: BRITISH CDA BY SECTOR AS MEASURED BY GROSS DISBURSEMENTS (IN 2013 GBP, IN MILLIONS), 1868-1940



in spending at the beginning of the 20th century, and an additional large and slightly longer episodic peak around 1920. All three of these peaks are in response to conflicts in which the Empire was embroiled. The increase after 1880 was in response to three conflicts of the time: the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80), the Anglo-Egyptian War (1882), and the First Boer War (1880-81). The Second Boer War (1889-1902) sparked the notably large increase in spending seen at the turn of the century between the years 1900-04. As a result of this conflict, the British Empire transferred approximately £15.3 million to the Transvaal Territory, of which almost £12 million was spent in the social sector on rebuilding the government and restoring civil society, £2.8 million went toward economic development through the repair and extension of railways, and £500,000 went toward humanitarian relief and the resettlement of refugees. The slightly more extended jump in CDA spending from 1919-24 is the result of the funding increases for

humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction in the wake of WWI. The increase in spending totalled just over £12 million and included humanitarian aid for the 'relief and reconstruction' of a number of European countries, refugee resettlement after the conflict, and an increase in grant-in-aid for a number of Middle Eastern and African countries in response to territorial shifts instituted by the League of Nation's Permanent Mandates Commission. Several territories newly under British control, either via the Mandates Commission or other means including present-day Tanzania, Iraq, and Iran received a one-off transfer of substantial amounts of aid.

Regarding long term spending patterns, Figure 5.4 reports CDA by sector without the outlier of the Second Boer War, and Figure 5.5 reports the proportion of total CDA spending in each sector over the time period examined. First, aid in the Economic Infrastructure and Services sector, followed by general budget support in the Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance sector, showed the largest increase during the first wave of globalization. However after WWI, aid in the Productive Sectors outpaced aid in the Economic Infrastructure and Services sector, with even smaller increases in the Social Infrastructure and Services and Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting sectors in response to aid from the CDF. Over the course of the time period examined, 40 per cent of all CDA spending was in the Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance sector, which includes all general budget support, or 'grant-in-aid' to colonies struggling to make ends meet. Approximately 23 per cent of CDA was spent in the Economic Infrastructure and Services sector, followed by just over 21 per cent in the Social Infrastructure and Service sector. Further, almost 85 per cent of the funding in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector went toward reconstruction and peacekeeping in present day South Africa in response to the Second Boer War.

FIGURE 5.4: BRITISH CDA BY SECTOR AS MEASURED BY GROSS DISBURSEMENTS (SANS OUTLIERS), 1868-1940 (IN 2013 GBP, IN MILLIONS)






FIGURE 5.5: BRITISH CDA BY SECTOR AS MEASURED BY GROSS DISBURSEMENTS, 1868-1940 (IN 2013 GBP)



As indicated in the graphs above, spending in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector was overshadowed by other sectors more often than not, with the exception of spending in present day South Africa at the end of the Second Boer War. Excluding this outlier (which will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter), Figure 5.6 displays total CDA spending in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector by sub-sector. Few patterns are easily identified from this graph, but Parliamentary Papers offer insight into the budget justification for each spending peak. The sustained spending from the 1860s to mid-1890s in the Other sub-sector was in response to British efforts to suppress slave trade throughout the Empire⁵, the peak in 1907-08 was a result of labour market shifts in South Africa that involved the repatriation of Chinese workers formerly employed in gold mines, and the peak from 1929-34 was in response

FIGURE 5.6: BRITISH CDA IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR AS MEASURED BY GROSS DISBURSEMENTS (SANS OUTLIERS), 1868-1940 (IN 2013 GBP, IN MILLIONS)



⁵ The British Empire outlawed slavery in 1833.

to unrest and the subsequent provision of unemployment relief grants to the West Indies. In the Government and Civil Society sub-sector, the peak in 1897-98 can be attributed to peacekeeping forces in South Africa in advance of the Second Boer War, the peak in 1914-15 can be attributed to general budget support for Persia, or present day Iran, in order to maintain law and order, and the peak in 1921-22 is a result of funding allocated to newly mandated British territories, consisting mostly of present-day Middle Eastern countries, at the end of WWI. Both the Health and Water Supply and Sanitation sub-sectors display peaks from 1929-34 that are attributable to the institution of the CDF. And finally, a peak in the education sub-sector is seen from 1939-40, where the British government allocated aid toward Makerere College in East Africa.

Together, these peaks show that before the Colonial Development Act of 1929, social policy was used as a tool in a largely reactive fashion to facilitate labour market adjustments, peacekeeping, and general budget support for territories of strategic interest. While improving the welfare of British subjects in these territories was not the driving concern, it was of course a welcome secondary effect, and welfare was referred to notionally as part of the rationale for social spending in these regions.

The Colonial Development Act of 1929 was the first example of coordinated policy to affect development within Britain's colonies. Figure 5.7 displays the CDF's disbursements by sector, and Table 5.1 further breaks down the allocation of these funds. The Economic Infrastructure and Services sector accounted for 40 per cent of the CDF, followed by 24 and 25 per cent of the CDF going toward the Social Infrastructure and Services and Productive sectors respectively, and the final 11 per cent allocated to projects cutting across multiple sectors. In the Social Infrastructure and Services sector, approximately 13 of the 24 per cent went toward the Health sub-sector, with the remaining 11 per cent dedicated toward the Water Supply and Sanitation sub-sector. As

FIGURE 5.7: COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR, 1929-39




TABLE 5.1: COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND ALLOCATIONS BY SECTOR, 1929-30

ODA Sector	Type of Development Project	Per cent of Colonial Development Fund, 1929-39
Social Infrastructure & Services	Medical and public health (13.1%) Water supply and sanitation (11.3%)	24.4%
Economic Infrastructure & Services	Transport and communications (33.2%) Harbours (5.7%) Electricity supply (0.8%)	39.7%
Production	Agriculture (4.9%) Fisheries (2.1%) Forestry (1%) Land reclamation and irrigation (4.5%) Mineral resources (8.9%) Geological surveys (3.1%)	24.5%
Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting	Research (7%) Miscellaneous (4.4%)	11.4%


indicated by the CDF, it is not until the 1930s that more traditional areas of social spending, including Health, Water Supply and Sanitation, and Education begin to peak. However, it is worth noting that a number of research initiatives in the Health sub-sector aimed at better understanding and curing tropical disease emerged before and during

WWI, which played a role in founding institutions in existence to date, such as the London School for Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. While only very modest levels of funding were dedicated to these initiatives (usually around £1,000 to 1,500 per annum), their funding held steady during WWI and continued after the conflict ended, leading to the development of new capabilities that played a role in treating and containing tropical diseases in future years.

It is also worth noting that while the Colonial Development Act of 1929 was certainly a milestone, the data evaluated here suggests that the Act was not a paradigm shift in British colonial development policy. As outlined by Hall (1993, 279), a paradigm shift is “...marked by the radical changes in the overarching terms of the policy discourse...” and “... a more disjunctive process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy”. Both the funding allocations by sector and political drivers buttressing the CDAC and the CDF were more representative of a crystallisation of British colonial development policy than of a dramatic shift in the ideas or desired ends of these policies. By Hall’s (1993) standards, the Act seems best classified as a ‘second-order’ policy change, or one that altered the instruments of policy-making through the creation of the CDAC and the CDF but not the hierarchy of goals behind the policies.

Peaks in spending aside, it is important to consider long-term spending patterns as well. Figure 5.8 displays the proportion of spending within the Social Infrastructure and Services sub-sectors over the time period examined. Over 96 per cent of CDA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector is evenly split between the Government and Civil Society and Other sub-sectors, with the remaining 4 per cent split evenly between the Health and Water Supply and Sanitation sub-sectors. Further, over 90 per cent of the funding in the Government and Civil Society sub-sector and over 85 per cent of the

FIGURE 5.8: BRITISH CDA IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR BY SUB-SECTOR AS MEASURED BY GROSS DISBURSEMENTS, 1868-1940



funding in the Other sub-sector went toward relief and reconstruction in present day South Africa in the wake of the Second Boer War.

SOCIAL POLICY AND CONFLICT: THE CASES OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WEST INDIES

To better understand the role and drivers behind foreign aid in the social sector, this section explores the cases of present-day South Africa after the Second Boer War and also the West Indies after an increase in unemployment in the early 1930s. These two cases were selected for their differences, in order to enhance the relevance of the findings to other colonial cases, and also for the magnitude of social spending involved in each case. The cases differ according to the type of social unrest driving the social spending, their geographic location, and also their economic place within the British Empire. Regarding social spending, the Second Boer War accounts for the largest portion of spending in the

social sector in response to any one event during the time period examined, and the West Indies accounts for the largest portion of social spending in a single colony post-World War I, during the global depression no less.

SOUTH AFRICA

After the Second Boer War, the British Empire identified and pursued at least three foreign policy objectives in the Transvaal and Orange Free State colonies (formerly known as the 'Boer republics'): to restore the economy, to enhance the British presence within the territories, and to create a unified South Africa. After serving as the Governor of the Cape Colony, Lord Alfred Milner was appointed Governor of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State in 1901. Together with Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain and the mining magnates, they laid the groundwork for the development of the territory post-conflict and the eventual unification of the Transvaal, Orange Free State, Cape Colony, and Natal into the Union of South Africa in 1910. Development policy was central to debates on how to revive the former Boer republics, and the debate centred on who should finance the post-conflict reconstruction and how the labour market would be structured within the territories. It was widely agreed that restoring the economy was key to financing both Britain's war debts and the reconstruction and development of the territory and that the mining magnates were key players in the pursuit of this aim.

Chamberlain was keen to "make imperialism pay" by pressing the Transvaal, and subsequently, its mine owners, for a large war indemnity (Kesner, 1978, 41-42). However, Milner's first priority was unification of the territories, coupled with a strong desire to protect and further his autonomy as a governor. Unlike Chamberlain, Milner thought that economic prosperity should be restored "... before any significant burden was placed on colonial revenues," and he argued that the war indemnity should be a debt

owed directly to the British Treasury (thereby circumventing the oversight of the colonial office) and requested an immediate and large imperial loan for reconstruction (Kesner, 1978, 42-45). After traveling to South Africa to meet with the mining community in the Transvaal, Chamberlain's position softened, and they came to an agreement on the structure of a large development loan for the territory.

The Development Loan totalled £65 million, and it had two components. The first was a £35 million loan for the Boer republics, which was backed by an Imperial Guarantee under the Colonial Stock Acts and secured by the Common Fund of the former Boer republics in the first instance and by the Transvaal government in the second.⁶ Payments on the principle of the loan were charged against the revenue and assets of the Transvaal, and the Common Fund paid the interest. £25.5 million of this fund was meant to cover existing liabilities, with only £9.5 million going toward new development projects, including railways, land settlement, and public works projects. The second component was a £30 million war contribution loan, arriving in three annual instalments of £10 million. This loan was to be raised by the Transvaal government, and therefore financed by the owners of its gold mines, and secured by the revenue and assets of the Transvaal.

While Chamberlain, Milner, and the mining community had settled on a financial arrangement, the development strategy employed to revive the economy and ensure that the payments on these loans would be met was debated extensively, and the central question was one of labour. There were several sources of pressure on the territory's labour market. First, the mining community knew their industry was seen as the lynchpin to economic prosperity, and they used their position to lobby for preferential access to cheap labour. Second, Milner was keen to promote agriculture and extend the railways

⁶ It was widely recognised that the Orange Free State was not in a position to raise or secure either of these loans.

not only to promote economic growth, but also to expand Britain's presence throughout the territories. Third, basic resettlement and rebuilding of homes and towns was needed after Kitchener's 'scorched earth policy'. While all of these aims were understandable, there was question as to whether there was enough labour to support them simultaneously; labour was already in shorter supply as a result of losses from the conflict, and it seemed unlikely that large number of British settlers would come to the territory without a level of subsidy that was deemed unaffordable.

The mining community claimed that they could not restore the industry needed to repay the loans without bringing in labour from Asia, which they could pay a lesser wage than the indigenous, Boer, or British workers. This proposal raised many tensions as captured in the comments of Sir William Harcourt, a former leader of the Liberal opposition and former Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the second reading of the South African Loan and War Contribution Bill:

"One of the most formidable things, to my mind, is that the mining industry... has made what I may call a declaration of industrial insolvency, and has stated that with the resources which they can command they cannot conduct that industry unless they are allowed to conduct it upon the basis of Asiatic labour... It is a question which does not and cannot affect only the mining interest, but every other interest. Every other interest is just as much entitled to cheap labour as the mining interest. When is the whole of the rest of the community to be told that they must employ dear labour in order that the mines may have cheap labour so that they may pay greater dividends? That is a situation that will never be accepted, and ought never to be accepted.

"I saw the other day an extraordinary paragraph describing what had taken place in the Transvaal at a meeting of what is called the Inter-Colonial Council. The paragraph stated that the Council had determined that the railway constructors should employ white labour – a thing which the mines had absolutely refused to employ because it was so dear – and that the railroads should be restrained to employ only 10,000 Kaffirs⁷, and in order that the Kaffirs now

⁷ It should be noted that this is a derogatory term for indigenous South Africans and is used here only to remain faithful to the text.

employed on the railways should be compelled to go to the mines... But by what right have the Inter-Colonial Council to determine that industry which is for the service of the whole community should be called upon to employ white labour because white labour is too dear to suit the mining interest. The mining interest go to the Stock Exchange and say that they are the wealthiest people in the world; but when they come to deal with other people they... say 'We cannot afford to employ labour at the same price that other industries do in the colonies.' I do not understand that language, nor have I ever been able to understand why in other parts of the world the gold-mining interest can be conducted by white labour and not there. If they are right, it is quite plain that the gold-mining industry on which the colony depends is impossible except on the basis of Asiatic labour. Then what we have to determine is, whether these new colonies, which we have purchased at such a vast expenditure of life and treasure, are to be a white man's country of a yellow man's country. That is really the decision that is to be taken by the British Government and the British Parliament. We are responsible. They are not self-governing colonies but Crown colonies, and the action which has to be taken in this matter has to be taken on the responsibility of those who express the policy and carry out and originate the policy of the British nation."

Though quoted at length, Harcourt's remarks illustrate the many tensions embedded in the territory's development policy: mine owners aggressively pursuing an increase in profits despite holding immense wealth; members of the political elite working to ensure that industry has equal access to both 'cheap' and 'dear' labour on the grounds of fairness while reserving comment on whether race should be categorical determinant of a worker's place within the labour market in the first place; politicians contemplating the degree to which increasing the number of white settlers ensures that the territory is 'British' while simultaneously recognising that the British government bears the sole responsibility for governance of the territory.

In the end, the mining interests were successful in convincing the British government to allow Chinese workers to be imported to work in the gold mines on a temporary basis and then repatriated between 1906 and 1909. Within this context, £6.5

million⁸ of development assistance was issued to the territory in 1901-02, with £4 million going toward the Social Infrastructure and Services Sector, £2 million going toward the construction of railways in the Economic Infrastructure and Services Sector, and £0.5 million going toward Humanitarian Aid. In the Social Infrastructure and Services sector, £1.5 million went toward civil administration of the government, and £2.5 million went toward the South African Constabulary, a police and peacekeeping force in the territory. In 1902-03, £8.8 million⁹ of development assistance was issued to the territory, with £8 million going toward the Social Infrastructure and Services sector and £0.8 million going toward the construction of railways in the Economic Infrastructure and Services Sector. In the Social Infrastructure and Services sector, £2 million went toward the maintenance and equipment of the South African Constabulary, £3 million went toward the restoration of homes and return to occupation of residence, and £3 million went toward general government revenues so that they could manage normal operations while servicing loan debt. £85,183 of this funding was reserved for future expenses incurred when repatriating Chinese workers in later years.

Overall, the funding spent in the social sector was used to rebuild and extend basic government services and civil administration, to enhance security and peacekeeping efforts in the territory, and to support labour market adjustments deemed necessary for post-conflict reconstruction. This is not to say that broader welfare concerns were not present, but according to this review they were not part of the CDA in the social sector that was extended to the former Boer republics post-conflict. Areas overcrowded with refugees often had problems with the spread of infectious disease, leading to ‘reconstructionist planning’ of towns and settlements, as part of Milner’s desire to “...

⁸ This is roughly the equivalent of \$650 million in 2013.

⁹ This is roughly the equivalent of \$880 million in 2013.

rehabilitate and anglicise the previous Boer republics” (Harrison, 2010, 163), thereby laying the groundwork for the apartheid system (Parnell, 1993; Coovadia et al, 2009). Humanitarian aid was extended in 1901-02 to addressing these problems. However, ‘reconstructionist planning’ was the systemic strategy used to contain these welfare problems, and there were few, if any calls for the creation of stronger welfare systems throughout the colony in response to these problems, with the possible exception of public works projects addressing water and sanitation issues throughout towns and settlements (Harrison, 2010).

WEST INDIES

The ‘West Indies’ refers to what are now four British Overseas Territories (Anguilla, Montserrat, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands) and nine independent sovereign states (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saints Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago). A combination of factors contributed to unrest throughout these territories in the late 1920s and early 1930s: economic decline as a result of the global depression in the 1930s, repeated natural disasters ranging from plant disease to hurricanes, and also an oversupply of labour and reduction in remittances when labourers returned home and/or were repatriated from working on the Panama Canal and in other parts of Central America in response to nationalist sentiments during the depression (Platt, 1940). These problems were exacerbated by the fact that the majority of the food supply for these territories was imported, leaving workers unable to resort to small holder farming for food. Somewhat similar to the case of present-day South Africa, policies designed to address unrest in the West Indies were made within the context of a broader foreign policy objective of the British Empire to unite these territories into a single federation. However unlike in the South African case, a strong contingent of white merchants and

planners viewed such a federation as a challenge to their power and organised against this plan; they promoted the view that such governance would be oppressive to British subjects within these territories (Poddar and Johnson, 2005, 483). Alternatively, other groups such as the West Indian Standing Conference, first held in 1926, viewed federation as a step toward independence and promoted it accordingly.

The discussion of how to solve the social problems of the West Indies centred largely on how best to manage and stabilise the sugar industry. After WWI, the price of sugar reached what was then an all-time high in 1920, however this price increase was short-lived, as it continued to decline throughout the 1930s (Abbott, 1963, 54). Perhaps most importantly, the opportunity to make systemic welfare improvements amid the increase in revenue in these territories was missed (Platt, 1940, 672), which became increasingly apparent as the price of sugar dropped throughout the 1920s. Furthermore, while sugar played a large role in the economy of the West Indies, it accounted for less than three per cent of the world's sugar production, leaving the economy of these territories in a very vulnerable position in relative to the global market. To prevent estates from going bankrupt and unemployment from rising, the British government instituted both a price floor and Imperial Preference for the sugar, but this was not enough to stop the decline and the situation continued to worsen (Abbott, 1963, 54-55). Buying and holding sugar stock as a buffer was also not an option, as subsistence farmers in these territories could not manage without income, proper storage facilities were not available, and the British government was not prepared to underwrite the project (Abbott, 1963, 55).

As the price of sugar approached what was then an all-time low, the West Indian Standing Conference of 1929 drew "...attention to the fact that large production made possible the admission into England of foreign sugar at a cost lower than that at which it

could be produced in British Colonies and thus imperilled the existence of the sugar industry in the West Indies and British Guiana” and ask “... that assistance be given by increasing the amount of preference in Import Duty now allowed on entry into England” (House of Lords Debate, 1930, vol 76, cc 789-802). In response, the British government established a Royal Commission in 1929 to examine the sugar industry, which accounted for as much as 90 per cent of exports in some of these territories. Lord Sydney Olivier, former governor of Jamaica, led the Commission and its findings were discussed in Parliament, and again reviewed at a second Royal Commission established in 1938.

Debates held after the Commission’s report was published highlighted a number of tensions. First, the Commission’s report determined that over production of sugar was contributing to the fall in sugar prices worldwide, and therefore, market expansion was not likely to be an effective solution to the problem at hand. Second, it was also deemed unlikely that production costs could be substantially lowered in these territories in the short-run. Third, if the sugar industry was to be subsidised in the West Indies, there was question as to why the subsidy should apply to only the West Indian colonies and not others. Fourth, there was question as to whether the Colonial Development Advisory Committee (which oversaw the disbursement of the Colonial Development Fund) should be handling this case, or whether it should be considered and addressed separately by the Parliament.

In the end, the West Indies did apply for and receive funds from the Colonial Development Fund, however given that the sugar industry was not viewed as a particularly good investment, these funds were not directed toward relief of the sugar industry or toward alleviating unemployment in the territories. Instead, the matter of unemployment was dealt with separately by Parliament. Several ideas were floated, including speaking with Banks to see if they would provide advances to planters whilst

splitting the risk with HM Government, increasing subsidies, and providing colonial governments with grant-in-aid to manage the problem themselves. In the end, £254,882¹⁰ of unemployment relief grants were issued to the West Indies between 1930 and 1933.

While the unemployment grant provided some relief, it did not solve the more systemic problems of the sugar industry. A second Commission was created in 1938, but with the onset of WWII, Britain's policy toward the sugar industry changed dramatically. After deciding to rely primarily on Empire supplies in support of the war effort, the British government agreed to purchase all 'exportable surplus' of sugar throughout the colonies at a set price (subject only to the cost of production and transportation) (Abbott, 1963, 55).

DISCUSSION

Overall, British CDA can be characterised as episodic and experimental. The results reveal a strong relationship between CDA and conflict, which explains the largest peaks in CDA spending in colonial Britain during the time period examined. However, it would be incorrect to assume that all British colonial military engagements resulted in large amounts of CDA spending. The intensity of the spending peaks in CDA seem to relate to a number of factors unique to each conflict, and the causal mechanisms and relationships between these factors remain unclear. Broadly speaking, national interest and moral obligation shaped both the post-conflict environment itself and Britain's role within it. Factors such as the underlying cause of the conflict, who 'started' it, who 'won/lost', the degree of human and material devastation, the length and geographic scale of the conflict, and also the state of the territory before the conflict played a role in shaping the CDA delivered to a post-conflict colonies. Given that Britain is only one case study with a

¹⁰ This is roughly the equivalent of £14.4 million in 2013.

relatively small number of conflicts to analyse, few firm conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between CDA/ODA and conflict. A better understanding of the determinants of aid in post-conflict environments will require more research.

Further, spending in the social sector of CDA also bares a relationship to conflict. The largest peaks in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector were a result of spending in the Government and Civil Society and Other sub-sectors in response to the Second Boer War. Outside of conflict alone, colonial labour market adjustments, such as the repatriation of workers and efforts to suppress unrest through the provision of unemployment relief as in the case of the West Indies, peacekeeping within the colonies, and support for governments and civil societies in territories of strategic interest to the Empire drove the majority of CDA in the social sector. Spending in the Health sub-sector was minimal, and the little funding that was allocated went toward research and the development of new technologies and capabilities with which to fight tropical disease. Spending in the Education sub-sector was also minimal and only began to peak in the late 1930s.

Together, these findings indicate that Britain's CDA in the social sector was shaped not only by its development policy, but also largely by its defence/military policy. This raises several issues for consideration when analysing social policy in a foreign policy context. First, modern social policy in the domestic realm has been made and studied predominantly in environments where the state has a monopoly on violence. However, this is often not the case in conflict and post-conflict territories, or in what has been referred to in the welfare regime literature as 'insecurity regimes' (Wood & Gough 2006). More recently, Duffield (2001) argues that within these regimes the 'development-security' nexus has grown to the point that, "The focus of new security concerns is not the threat of traditional interstate wars but the fear of underdevelopment as a source of

conflict, criminalized activity and international instability” (Duffield 2001, 7). In the same way that globalization is not ‘new’ per se, this chapter serves as a reminder that the relationship between development and security pre-dates current times and that social policy has been utilised at this intersection before. Further historical research could be particularly useful in gaining insight into the determinants of the use of social policy at the development-security nexus, in understanding how its use in previous times compares to its use today, and in how it can be effectively employed to promote peace and security.

Moreover, different spending patterns for social policy emerge depending on whether social policy is part of broader development or defence objectives. When a part of development objectives, social policy spending exhibits more consistent and predictable patterns with far lower levels of spending. For the purposes of development, social policy was employed by Britain primarily in the name of enlightened self-interest as originally envisioned by Chamberlain. For example, spending in the Health sector was accepted as a priority because tropical diseases, particularly malaria but also typhoid, cholera, and others often had devastating effects on both local labour within the colonies and on British colonial administrators and their families. In the words of Chamberlain, tropical disease was seen as, “...a major natural enemy to the creation of a strong economy”, and Patrick Manson, a widely recognised founder of the study of tropical medicine, argued that curing tropical disease was essential for improving the efficiency of colonial governments and enterprises in addition to helping “... conciliate and foster the native” (Kennedy 2011, 3 as cited in Manson-Bahr & Alcock 1927, 217).

Increased political will for expanding colonial development resulted in policies and administrative capabilities 'jumping tracks' (Sassen, 2006) for use in a foreign policy context, such as Chamberlain’s tireless arguments for extending ‘grant-in-aid’ in the name

of market expansion abroad along with the development financial mechanisms and instruments to do so. For example, as illustrated by Jessop (1976), the Colonial Stock Act of 1900, "... empowered trustees in Great Britain to invest in colonial inscribed stocks even when they were not otherwise permitted to do so by the terms of their trust deeds" (Jessop 1976, 154). Jessop (1976, 154) goes on to suggest that this happened despite opposition from HM Treasury because, "... the (Second) Boer War placed the mother country in such material and moral debt to the colonies that the latter's stocks by 1900 could no longer be denied the supposed advantages of inclusion in the Trustee List" (Jessop 1976, 154). This perspective also highlights the way in which changes in the legal framework at home may affect both the development of territories abroad and the relationship between states and markets in the development process.

However, when used in response to conflict and in line with broader defence objectives, social policy spending is much more volatile and seemingly unpredictable. In post-conflict situations, social policy is used primarily to keep the peace, instil and/or maintain law and order, and to rebuild the basic structures and functions of government. The Second Boer War exemplifies just how costly such a project can be, and history shows this to be a fairly risky endeavour. In evaluating the more recent case of Kosovo, Cocozzelli (2006, 49) makes an apt observation that despite large amounts of spending in the social sector, "... social rights rarely rise to the top of the agenda in post-conflict reconstruction". He argues that this is problematic on a theoretical level because "... social policy validates or disqualifies a society's claims toward justice," and that, "Reconstruction is a normative political enterprise with the goal of creating new political, economic and social contexts that address issues that were at the core of the conflict" (Cocozzelli 2006, 49-50). The absence of a focus on social rights may occur in part because peace may be viewed as a product of certain political and economic structures.

As a result, post-conflict settlements may focus less on carving out space for processes similar to those that have led to the development of peaceful structures in 'developed' countries (as advocated for by many Nordic countries) and more on simply arranging post-conflict societies to 'look' more like those of peaceful countries – a phenomenon organizational sociologists refer to as isomorphic mimicry (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Krause, 2013). As a result, peaceful settlements, including those utilising social policy as a tool in the process, may not be sustainable, which calls into question the degree to which these projects achieves the desired ends.

Duffield (2001) refers to the preferred societal arrangement of developed countries as structures of 'liberal peace'. When applied to post-conflict developing countries, 'liberal peace' aims, "... to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and especially, stable entities" (2001, 11). He goes on to argue that, "... aid policy, both generally and in relation to the new wars, continues to exhibit a Newtonian or mechanical view of the world," and that instead, an approach emphasizing, "... complex holistic systems in which interconnection, mutation and self-transformation are key characteristics," should be taken (Duffield 2001, 10). Similarly, Cocozzelli "... critiques the current emphasis on social projects, as opposed to broader efforts at social policy reform," on the grounds that it, "... specifically excludes traditional determinants of social policy such as popular movements, labour, and progressive political parties," resulting in a process which, "... has little local input and may be at odds with efforts to build democratic mechanisms for social inclusion" (Cocozzelli 2006, 51). Together, Duffield and Cocozzelli's arguments for a more dynamic, complex, and thorough approach to policymaking in conflict and post-conflict situations draws attention to the need for a better understanding of the

'development-security' nexus and to the normative and functional roles that social policy can and should play in ensuring the sustainable development of post-conflict countries.

Sassen (2006) would refer to the attempt to instil 'liberal peace' in post-conflict societies as a rather dramatic shift in the organising logic of the state, and as both Duffield (2001) and Cocozzelli (2006, 2009) point out, such shifts are often externally driven. Cocozzelli (2006, 51) highlights that the policy-making process in post-conflict countries, "... becomes a process dominated by a limited number of elites, often led by expatriate advisors," which again, encourages little input from local actors and further marginalises any discussion of social rights. Duffield views this externally driven process as a, "... radical developmental agenda of social transformation," that reflects, "... the existing consensus that conflict... is best approached through a number of connected, ameliorative, harmonizing and, especially transformational measures" (Duffield 2001, 11). This transformation is thought to be the structural solution to humanitarian problems, replacing agendas focused more squarely on providing immediate humanitarian relief and longer-term efforts at alleviating poverty. While presenting somewhat differently than in recent times, a similar theme of transformation in Britain's colonial development policy is identified by Lewis (2011), who observes that, "Industrial growth based on coal fired energy and the mass production of material goods, helped foster powerful ideologies of superiority that supported expansion, that explained away inequality through race, accepted a degree of violence, and fundamentally sold imperialism as a form of social transformation" (Lewis 2011, 18). From this perspective, the 'development' of Britain's 'great estate' may be seen by Duffield as just as 'radical' and perhaps more similar than not to today's agenda of 'liberal peace'.

It is also important to acknowledge that social policy in a foreign policy context is not as much an agenda, as much as it is an instrument. In this sense, it is not traditionally

seen as a policy area in its own right within the foreign policy context, but as a set of tools available for use under the broader headings of defence, diplomacy, and development. As a result, spending on foreign aid in the social sector may be employed as part of larger agendas and in order to achieve a variety of ends. One example would be social sector CDA from both the Empire Marketing Fund and the Colonial Development Fund, each of which provided aid for colonial development in the social sector and in a number of other sectors as well. Further, regardless of whether social policy was used to address development or the aftermath of conflict, the Colonial Office and respective colonial administrators oversaw the spending and delivery of all CDA. The centralised institutional structure and single donor process guiding the use and employment of CDA encouraged clarity of purpose and coordination in aid delivery, as defence, diplomacy, and development aims were jointly considered when Parliament approved estimates of aid allocations each year.

However during the time period studied, this does not seem to have resulted in a more dynamic approach to the 'development-security' nexus for two reasons. First, as pointed out by Midgley and Piachaud (2011) colonialism, "... is often used as a synonym for imperialism, which technically refers to the exercise of political and military power over other nations..." and that this power, "...may be used to subjugate without being accompanied by colonial settlement" (Midgley & Piachaud 2011, 4). Annexing territory was first in the order of operations of imperialists before moving on to developmental policies, if in fact this final step was taken. Under this system, underdevelopment was not seen to cause conflict, as has been suggested in more recent times. Instead, underdevelopment was one of a number of rationales for continued imperial control and market expansion under the auspice that it would spread "...Victorian notions of

betterment, improvement, progress, prosperity and civilization where there was perceived to be savagery, chaos, despotism, poverty and slavery” (Lewis 2011, 26).

Lastly, while the expansion of the British Empire, “Simultaneously created, and was created by, an unprecedented global marketplace for goods, ideas and the movement of people” (Lewis 2011, 19), Sassen (2006) argues that the world scale during the time period of British colonialism examined here was, “...a world scale geared toward building national states and national capitalism” (Sassen 2006, 91). One indicator of this is, “...that the growth of this world scale brought with it intensified national rivalries to the point of enormous war” (Sassen 2006, 91). As European powers vied for influence and authority over the world’s territory and resources, particularly during the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the mid to late 1800s, the boundaries of the British Empire changed. In territories annexed by the Empire, the upheaval of pre-existing relational systems disrupted the balance of power, and conflict was often the result. From this perspective, the continued globalization of the British Empire, both in terms of increases in its geographic scale and the extent of its economic integration was the force uniting its defence and development policies, both of which shaped the use of social policy in a foreign policy context in colonial Britain. When geographic expansion was being pursued, social policy was often shaped by the aims and objectives of defence policy and used in response to conflict; when economic integration was sought, social policy was shaped instead by the aims and objectives of development policy in order to promote the expansion of markets in the colonies for the economic benefit of the Empire.

CONCLUSION

Foreign aid in the social sector played a number of roles in Britain’s colonial development policy. Globalization in the form of continued geographic expansion and economic

growth of the Empire was the driving force behind aid in the social sector. In this context, social policy was used primarily to protect and promote British interests. Ensuring the stability and security of colonial territories was key to this aim, and improving the welfare of colonial subjects was a secondary matter. However, patterns in spending differ according to whether aid was issued in response to conflict and broader goals of defence policy or provided in order to expand colonial markets and develop Britain's 'great estate'. Arguments for advancing Britain's colonial development policy were heavily influenced by Joseph Chamberlain during the late 19th century, as confirmed in the 1920s. After the first wave of globalization and the end of WWI, Chamberlain's policies and their normative justifications continued to be furthered despite economic decline, particularly in an effort to alleviate domestic unemployment.

Overall, the majority of CDA was spent on unspecified 'grant-in-aid' or general budget support for colonies, with increases in the Economic Infrastructure and Services sector around the turn of the century until the outbreak of WWI and increases in the Production sector in the 1930s. The dominance of spending in these sectors over the Social Infrastructure and Services sector supports the finding that social policy in a foreign policy context in the British Empire was used in a more residual fashion in support of broader foreign policy aims. Spending on CDA in the social sector can be characterised as ad hoc, experimental, and reactive to broader defence and development policy objectives. When responding to defence policy, the majority of CDA spending in the social sector was episodic and went toward peacekeeping and rebuilding the basic elements of government and civil society; when responding to development policy objectives, aid in the social sector was more predictable and incremental and went toward shaping the Empire's labour market and curing topical disease. To examine the relationship between social policy and foreign policy post-WWII, the next chapter turns

to the case of the US, which had superseded Britain as the hegemon of the liberal international order.

6 FOREIGN AID IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR FROM WWII THRU THE COLD WAR IN THE UNITED STATES

“With the necessity of adjusting ourselves to spreading disorder in a shrinking world, we have now come to identify the welfare of our own people – spiritual, cultural, economic, or political – with the welfare of peoples everywhere. The thinking of other nations has followed a similar course, so that this development is one which we share with all the other nations that represent our common civilization. If there is a difference, it is simply that our stake and our responsibility are greater by virtue of our resources and our position.”

- Louis J. Halle, Jr., 1948, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs and member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for Inter-American Affairs

INTRODUCTION

US preference for free trade and support for national self-determination in response to its own colonial and revolutionary past ensured that the liberal international order it ushered in post-WWII would be distinct, however liberal and imperial. As a first step to better understanding the intersection of social policy and foreign policy in the case of the US, this chapter addresses the following secondary research question: ‘What does the ‘foreign facet’ of the US welfare state look like?’. To do this, the chapter aims to clarify the origins of the institutions that guide the use of social policy as a tool of foreign policy and on contextualizing US foreign aid allocations across sectors and regions, as appropriate, up until the end of the Cold War. The chapter begins with a section on methodology before presenting the historical narrative constructed to illuminate the emergence of the foreign facet of the US welfare state, beginning in the 1940s.

METHODS

To better understand and bring into focus the foreign facet of the US welfare state regime, the origins and development of the institutions guiding the use of foreign aid in the social sector were traced from their germination before and during WWII thru the end of the Cold War. It is important to note that the focus on institutions was also meant to also

draw attention to, rather than detract from, the ideas, instruments, processes and mechanisms affecting the use of foreign aid in the social sector as a tool of foreign policy. In other words, institutions are understood here as dynamic crystallizations of norms and ideas, rules, interests, and instruments that shape the exercise of social policy in a foreign policy context in a systematic, patterned way.

In addition to the quantitative data available from the OECD, primary and secondary data sources along with government reports and other grey literature were used to piece together a sequence of events and an understanding of the role that welfare has played in US foreign assistance. Documents from the archives housed at the Harry S. Truman Library were particularly helpful in this regard. The data relevant to social policy was first identified and ordered sequentially before being used to construct an historical narrative in the context of overarching foreign policy objectives of the time. This explains why, for instance, post-WWII planning is discussed after the section outlining US foreign assistance to Latin America during WWII, despite the fact that it started well-before this time. Two types of data were privileged in the analysis: (i) data indicating a link between 'domestic' and 'foreign' approaches toward welfare in the US; and (ii) data outlining ideas, interests, and processes that played a role in shaping the institutions overseeing US foreign aid in the social sector.

US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BEFORE WWII: THE ATLANTIC CHARTER, THE INSTITUTE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AND LEND LEASE

As part of a renewed interest in international development among historians (Helleiner, 2014; Borgwardt, 2005), it has become clear that preoccupation with the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine has largely occluded the institutional antecedents of US bilateral foreign/development assistance located in US engagement with Latin America both before and during World War II. Foreign assistance to Latin America was extended

through what became known as the Institute for Inter-American Affairs (IIAA), and it was used as a tool primarily to contain the influence of Axis Powers and to ensure the allegiance of countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, welfare provision - usually in the health sector but also in education - was the primary tool the IIAA used to achieve its aims. US foreign assistance in support of the war effort outside of the Western Hemisphere was delivered through 'Lend-Lease', a legal instrument that allowed the United States to provide supplies and arms to allies in exchange for the 'considered' use of their military bases. When imagining the post-war world in the Atlantic Charter, President Roosevelt's idea of extending the 'New Deal' not only to Latin America but to the world was coupled with the British notion of 'social security', or basic income for all across the life course. These ideas were easily married in the Charter, for increasing basic income was central to the rise in living standards that the New Deal championed. As outlined by Borgwardt (2005, p. 78 as quoted in Helleiner, 2014, p. 35), the New Deal focused primarily on "'security for individuals' and the 'connection between individual security and the stability and security of the wider polity'". During a time of worldwide conflict, this rationale served one of the clearest arguments for state involvement in welfare provision beyond national boundaries.

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

In August of 1941, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met in Newfoundland, where Churchill aimed to convince Roosevelt to enter WWII. However, the US did not engage in the conflict until months later when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Instead, the immediate output of this encounter was the so-called 'Atlantic Charter'. Published simultaneously in both countries, the Charter (Appendix 7) listed eight mutually agreed upon principles that were to guide the post-war settlement. The Charter's fifth and sixth principles (Box 6.1) focus explicitly on social

welfare, symbolising “... the start to international welfare state activity, which reached its programmatic peak in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948¹” (Kaufmann, 2012, p. 96).² While Kaufmann (2012, p. 96) claims that the Charter “was intended as little more than a brief public explanation primarily for propaganda purposes,” of the meeting between the two heads of state, Borgwardt (2005) argues that in fact, “...Roosevelt himself saw the Charter in very ambitious terms, comparing its aspirations ‘to those of the US Constitution, the British Magna Carta, and even the Ten Commandments’” (Helleiner, 2014, p. 299 quoting Borgwardt, 2005, p.5).

BOX 6.1: SOCIAL WELFARE PRINCIPLES OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER (SOURCE: AVALON PROJECT, YALE LAW SCHOOL)

Fifth principle: “... they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security”.

Sixth Principle: “... they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want”.

Indeed, the Charter proved to be influential, serving as the framework guiding Anglo-American relations during and after the conflict, in addition to being referenced specifically in the Declaration of the United Nations that was formulated less than a year later.

The Charter’s focus on social welfare reflects an attempt by the British to align British and American interest in the war effort and an attempt by the Americans to ‘internationalize the New Deal’ (Helleiner, 2014, p. 300 as quoted from Borgwardt, 2005,

¹ Interestingly, “As José Harris points out, it is also curious that in a series of lectures about rights, Marshall makes no mention of the discussions about human rights which were taking place in Europe at exactly the time that he was writing, and which would lead in the following year to the European Convention of Human Rights. Perhaps, as Harris suggests, this is attributable to pressure from the British occupation authorities in Germany, for whom Marshall was working at the time; perhaps it is further evidence of Marshall’s Anglocentric outlook. In either case, it is an omission which, with hindsight, appears strange” (Connell, 2012, p. 552; Harris, 2010).

² The Charter’s first principles reflect Churchill’s desire to identify a number of ‘shared principles’ and Roosevelt’s aim of getting Churchill to commit to free trade, or an effective end to preferential trade throughout the British Commonwealth (Kaufmann, 2012, p. 101).

p. 4). 'Social security' was added to the fifth principle at the encouragement and drafting of Ernest Bevin, with approval from the British Cabinet (Helleiner, 2014, p. 301).³ At the time, Bevin was the Minister of Labour and National Service in the wartime coalition government under Churchill, and he later served as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under Clement Attlee, where he also took part in discussions on the design of the European Recovery Act, or the 'Marshall Plan'. Further in a high profile speech in May of 1941, just months before the Atlantic Charter was drafted, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden outlined Britain's postwar goals stating, "... social security must be the first objective of our domestic policy after the war, and social security will be our policy abroad no less than at home" (Helleiner, 2014, p. 301 in reference to Board, 1955, p. 154). Eden had also, "... gone out of his way to emphasize that the goals he outlined were similar to the ones Roosevelt had outlined in his four freedoms speech," as British officials were "... working very hard at this time to cultivate greater American support for the war effort". In March 1941, Eden had privately noted that, "... it is imperative that we should start now dispelling the widespread suspicions that we do not honestly intend to work for the same sort of better economic order as the Americans conceive themselves to be fighting for" (Helleiner, 2014, p. 301 from National Archives of the United Kingdom, Treasury Records [UKT] 247/115).

The notion of 'freedom from fear and want' espoused in the Charter's sixth principle was drawn from Roosevelt's 'Four Freedoms' speech, given on 6 January 1941 after winning a third term in office. "As Borgwardt highlights, Roosevelt's commitment to this idea stemmed from his desire to 'internationalize the New Deal' at this time... the 'dominant motif' of the New Deal was its focus on security for individuals and 'connection

³ For more detail on what Bevan understood as 'social security', please see Helleiner (2014, p. 301) and Bullock (1967).

between individual security and the stability and security of the wider polity” (Helleiner, 2014, p. 300 as quoted from Borgwardt, 2005, p. 4 and 78). Furthermore, when writing the speech, Roosevelt was asked, “... whether he really wanted ‘freedom of want’ to apply ‘everywhere’ since Americans might not be interested in the people of Java. Roosevelt is said to have responded: ‘I’m afraid they’ll have to be someday. ... The world is getting so small that even the people in Java are getting to be our neighbors now” (Helleiner, 2014, p. 300 as referenced from Rosenman, 1952, p. 264). British thinking on the post-war world order also influenced Roosevelt. As highlighted by Helleiner (2014, p. 302 in reference to Rosenmann, 1952, p. 265), “... when drafting his four freedoms speech, Roosevelt had been following closely some discussions in the British press in the fall of 1940 about the need to defeat Hitlerism in the world with an economic bill of rights that established minimum standards for housing, food, education, and medical care as well as free speech, free press, and free worship”.

THE INSTITUTE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

In the US, the Atlantic Charter was preceded by the emergence of an institution – later known as the Institute for Inter-American Affairs - and an instrument – Lend-Lease (discussed in the next section) - that shaped US development policy both during and after the conflict. Before entering WWII, the US was focused on the dual aims of strengthening its ties in Latin America and diminishing the influence of Axis powers in the Western Hemisphere. “Due to war-related disruptions of international trade and capital flows, many Latin American countries appeared to be headed toward a severe economic downturn,” and such disruptions were, “... expected to produce political destabilization that, in turn, was feared to provide a fertile ground for... political, cultural, and economic penetration, or even invasion, by Nazi Germany and her allies” (Cramer and Prutsch, 2006, p. 785-6). To halt economic downturn and win favour in Latin America, the US was

keen to bring the 'New Deal' to Latin America. As stated at a meeting of foreign ministers from across the Western Hemisphere in Havana in July 1940, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull,

"If the standards of living of the American peoples are to be maintained at levels already achieved, and particularly if they are to be raised in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of these peoples, production and distribution must expand, not only in this hemisphere but throughout the world. This same condition is essential to the well-being of all other areas. For no nation or group of nations can hope to become or to remain prosperous when growing poverty stalks the rest of the earth" (Hull, as quoted in Helleiner, 2014, p. 47-8 and in Gantenbein 1950, p. 208).

Furthermore, this rationale was also coordinated with US defense policy, for "It was believed that by coordinating the Latin American and the national defense programs, substantial savings of time and money could be effected" (Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1947, p. 7).

In line with the previously established 'Good Neighbor' policy⁴ toward Latin America, which was more or less a revised version of the Monroe Doctrine emphasizing the principles of non-interference and reciprocal exchange, the US created what later became known as the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA). The IIAA's institutional antecedent, the Office for the Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics (OCCCRAR)⁵, was created by order of the Council of National Defense on 16 August 1940 (Box 6.2). The Coordinator of the office was third generation philanthrocapitalist Nelson Rockefeller⁶. The organisation was Rockefeller's 'brainchild'

⁴ For more on the 'Good Neighbor' policy, please see Gellman (1979) and Green (1971).

⁵ The Office for the Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics was terminated by Executive Order 8840, on 30 July 1941, and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) was created in its place under the Office for Emergency Management in the Executive Office of the President. The name of the office was changed again to the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) by Executive Order 9532 on 23 March 1945 (Anthony, 1973, p. 1).

⁶ As Erb (1985, p. 253) notes, John D. Rockefeller, Sr., Nelson Rockefeller's grandfather and the owner of Standard Oil, both expanded and secularised the charity work traditionally carried out by Christian missionaries abroad with the formation of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1913. The Foundation was "... the first significant private nonsectarian institution to provide assistance in medicine and public health to developing nations" (Erb, 1985, p. 253), and it served as a resource of experience and personnel from which

(Erb, 1985, p. 249)⁷, which he saw as a means of “... carrying the spirit of the New Deal to Latin America” (Erb, 1985, p. 253).

Three aspects of the OCCRAR/IAA are of particular importance. First, Rockefeller knew that the creation of the Office was supported largely because it aligned with and furthered US national security interests. In particular, he “... believed Congress accepted his plan primarily because it presumably would help the war effort by protecting the health of U. S. troops stationed abroad and by increasing the production of strategic materials” (Erb, 1985, p. 253). As a result, he did not expect the organisation

BOX 6.2: ABOUT THE OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS (OCCRAR)

Purpose: “... to further the general welfare of, and to strengthen friendship and understanding among, the peoples of the American Republics through collaboration with other governments and governmental agencies of the American Republics in planning, initiative, assisting, financing, administering, and executing technical programs and projects, especially in the fields of public health, sanitation, agriculture and education” (Halle, 1948, p. 3).

Role of the Coordinator: “... to establish and maintain liaison between the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, the several departments and establishments of the Government and such other agencies, public or private, as he might deem necessary or desirable, to insure proper coordination of, with economy and efficiency, the activities of the Government with respect to Hemisphere defense, with particular reference to the commercial and cultural aspects of the problem” (Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1947, p. 7). The Coordination was originally instructed to cooperate with the Department of State, but reported directly to the President (Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1947, p. 8).

Functions: “... to (1) coordinate activities of Government and private agencies in Latin America, (2) recommend programs to other Government agencies to supplement existing programs where needed, and (3) direct operations of programs in the event no other agency was in a position to do so. These functions were carried out through membership on and/or chairmanship of various committees, boards, and commissions; personal liaison with officials of departments and agencies interested in Latin America; sponsorship of studies and surveys; and project operations” (Anthony, 1973, p. 1).

to draw for Nelson Rockefeller. Further, Nelson Rockefeller later served as the first Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs under President Roosevelt from December 1944 to August 1945, as the first Under Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under President Eisenhower from June 1953 to December 1954, as the 49th Governor of New York from 1959 thru 1973, and as the 41st Vice-President of the United States under President Gerald Ford from 1974 to 1977.

⁷ For further details of the formulation of Rockefeller’s plan for the organisation, please see Chapter 1 in the Office of Inter-American Affairs’ (1947) ‘History of the Office of the Coordination of Inter-American Affairs’.

to survive once the war had ended. Beginning in March of 1942, Rockefeller formed five subsidiary corporations – the IIAA⁸ (Box 6.3) was the first and the Inter-American Education Foundation (IAEF) (Box 6.4) was the last – to handle the operation and disbursement of funds allocated to the OCCCRAR/IIAA (Figure 6.1).⁹ The corporations

BOX 6.3: ABOUT THE INSTITUTE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS (SOURCE: OFFICE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, 1947, 232-233)

Purpose: “... to aid and improve the health and general welfare of the people of the Western Hemisphere in collaboration with their governments”.

Governance: “... was placed in the hands of a Board of Directors of not less than three in number, all of whom were to be members of the corporation. The by-laws of the Institute provided that the directors appoint from among their number an Executive Committee for the transaction of such business of the corporation as required attention between meetings of the Board of Directors. Officers of the corporation were a President, Vice-President, Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer, and Assistant Treasurer... all members of the corporation were to be designated by the Coordinator in his official capacity and might be removed at any time at his discretion”.

Powers: “... the corporation was granted wide powers to acquire property, to purchase and deal in foodstuffs and other supplies, to promote programs for not only the control of disease but also for the production of nutritive foodstuffs, to education nurses, doctors, and other persons, and to cause additional corporations to be organized when necessary. It was allowed to collaborate with any type of organization or with an individual in carrying out this program, to enter into and perform contracts of all kinds, to borrow or raise money for the purposes of the corporation, and to have offices anywhere in the United States or in any political subdivision of the Western Hemisphere... [it] was to have perpetual existence. It was felt essential to clothe the corporation with every possible power because at that time it was impossible to foretell the effect of the war in the other American republics and the detailed nature of the operations which the agency might have to carry out”.

Organisation: “The work... was carried out by three divisions. A major division of the corporation was organized to handle health and sanitation, another dealt with food supply, which a third was set up to carry out emergency rehabilitation. The last named division, which dealt with only two major projects during its existence, was abolished January 7, 1944... A third division was again added when the Training Division was established July 4, 1944; this part of the organization handled the training of persons selected in the other American republics and brought to the United States for a period of instruction in connection with the programs of the two other divisions of the Institute”.

⁸ To avoid confusion, from here forward the acronym ‘OCCCRAR/IIAA’ is used to refer to the activities of the OCCCRAR which are later merged and re-named as the IIAA. The acronym ‘IIAA’ will be used in reference to this particular corporation of the OCCCRAR.

⁹ The other three corporations created are as follows: the Inter-American Navigation Corporation, Prencinradio, Inc. (a contraction of *prensa*, or ‘press’, *cinema*, and *radio*), and the Institute of Inter-American Transportation.

were created primarily because “Funds appropriated to regular departments and agencies generally reverted to the Treasury if not spent or obligated by the end of the fiscal year, but money received by a government corporation was good until expended.” (Erb, 1985, p. 253). As illustrated at length by examiners from the Bureau of the Budget¹⁰, these corporate devices also, “... encouraged to some extent private financial contribution, both domestic and foreign... provided for a more flexible operation in foreign countries since it was not bound by government regulations and procedures... permitted an easy withdrawal from foreign enterprises... permitted the cushioning of any sudden failure on the part of the government to allow additional funds for the continuance of projects... [and] allowed continued operation by private enterprise”; however, they also “... precluded budgetary and congressional review at periodic

BOX 6.4: ABOUT THE INTER-AMERICAN EDUCATION FOUNDATION (SOURCE: OFFICE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, 1947, 241)

Purpose: “... to further the general welfare and strengthen the bonds between the peoples of the Western Hemisphere by undertaking and carrying out an inter-American educational program by means of modern educational techniques and teaching aids”.


Governance: “... was carried out in the usual way by a Board of Directors, which itself established an Executive Committee to handle the affairs of the corporation between meetings of the Board. Officers of the Educational Foundation included President and Vice President, Secretary and Assistant Secretary, Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer”.

Powers: “... like the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, the Foundation was granted perpetual existence under the certificate of incorporation. The by-laws provided that the members of the Foundation were designated, and could be removed, by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in his official capacity. Through the conditions in the grant of funds by the Coordinator he was in full control of its entire program.... Wide powers were granted to carry out the program through acquisition of property, materials, copyrights, scripts, motion pictures, and other similar items dealing with these activities. The Foundation could cause corporations to be organized if necessary and could accept money and funds of every kind. It was allowed to have offices in any part of the United States or in any country of the Western Hemisphere”.

Organisation: “The divisions developed by the Foundation were a Field Operations and Planning Section, and a Publication and Materials section”.

¹⁰ The Bureau of the Budget was the precursor to the current Office of Management and Budget, more commonly referred to as the ‘OMB’.

FIGURE 6.1: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1943-1946



intervals, removed the operations concerned from the usual fiscal and administrative controls, tended to disturb rather than coordinate activities [between US government agencies], precluded clear evaluation of programs, confused all the administrative service functions, and greatly complicated the fiscal job of the agency and the Bureau of the Budget” (Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1947, p. 240).

Second, while Rockefeller’s agency occasionally ruffled feathers within both the Bureau of the Budget and the US Department of State¹¹, it adopted an inclusive and cooperative approach within Latin American countries. All country-level operations

¹¹ While initially the Rockefeller reported directly to the President, on 22 April 1942 President Roosevelt clarified in communication to Rockefeller that all OCCCRAR/IAAA activities “... shall be discussed fully with, and approved by, the Department of State and a full meeting of minds obtained before action is undertaken or commitments are made” (Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1947, p. 281). For more on the OCCCRAR/IAAA’s relationship with the Department of State, please see Chapter XV on ‘Relations of CIAA with the Department of State’ in the Office of Inter-American Affairs’ (1947) ‘History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs’.

falling under the OCCCRAR/IIAA were guided by the input of a coordinating committee, which was "... an autonomous unit serving under the direction of the local Embassy" (Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1947, p. 252). These committees were usually composed of representative from the local branch of the US Chamber of Commerce and from large private industries, including General Electric, Standard Oil, Federal Express, and Pan American Airways. Committee members served without pay on a voluntary basis, but they were usually allocated funds for an executive secretary to handle the committee's administrative work. The coordinating committees were also formed on a confidential basis to avoid any perception of organised interference in the region, however most of them were known to their respective foreign national governments by the end of the War.¹²

Finally, in addition to having local US nationals inform the OCCCRAR/IIAA's activities, the OCCCRAR/IIAA also worked closely with both national and local governments and institutions in Latin America, creating a unique model of engagement and implementation that remains a hallmark of US foreign assistance programmes to date. Engagement at the national level began with a bilateral agreement between the Ambassador of the United States and a Latin American country's minister of Foreign Affairs, which was facilitated by the OCCCRAR/IIAA. Most often, the US committed a fixed sum of money toward a project to be carried out over a number of years, with "... the total to be spent in diminishing expenditures over the lifetime of the agreement. The first U.S. installment typically would cover well over 50 percent of the initial expense of the program. In succeeding years, the Latin American government would assume a larger

¹² In many ways, the coordinating committees served as the local intelligence wing of the OCCCRAR/IIAA, and they may have been involved with more formal intelligence work for the US Government as well. Goldstone (2001, p. 30) discusses this rather casually, stating that part of the IIAA's functions were "... swallowed up into... what became the CIA after the war."

share, until its contribution reached 100 percent” (Erb, 1985, p. 253-4). The structure of these financial arrangements was meant to facilitate a smooth transition when the conflict ended and to encourage Latin American governments to carry on with the programmes once the period of cooperation had come to a close (Erb, 1985, p. 254).

Once these broader agreements were in place, detailed arrangements were made between the IIAA, ministries (most often in ministries of health and sometimes agriculture), and local governments in Latin America outlining services to be provided and sources of funding (Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1947, p. 235). These arrangements were carried out through joint field units called *Servicios*, which were modeled to some extent on the health programmes of the Rockefeller Foundation (Cramer and Prutsch, 2006, p. 793). *Servicios* (Figure 6.2) were special cooperative service units created by law by local governments in Latin America (Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1947, p. 235). They functioned as a “... semi-autonomous bureau

FIGURE 6.2: SERVICIO SCHEMA (SOURCE: OFFICE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, 1947, 234)

The image of the *servicios* originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

within the host nation's appropriate department, most often the Ministry of Health. They were jointly funded by the United States and the local government and [were] staffed by personnel from both countries (Erb, 1985, p. 254). The *Servicio* model was also used by the IAEF when it came into existence in 1943 (Appendix 8).

In 1942, President Roosevelt allocated \$25 million to the IIAA for its Cooperative Health Program from the Emergency Fund of the President; in later years, funding for the OCCCRAR/IIAA's corporations was obtained from Congressional appropriations, and occasionally from transfers from the State Department (Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1947, p. 261). Rockefeller sought advice on how best to use these funds from Brigadier General George Dunham¹³ and a few other public health experts. At the time, public health was a relatively new field of medicine, but Dunham brought together experts in the area who "... looked beyond the immediate sanitization of certain strategic areas and hoped to effect permanent and enduring improvements in the public health of the neighboring republics", which Rockefeller "... may have had... in mind as a secondary objective from the outset" (Erb, 1985, p. 252). Further, Dunham viewed the lack of local expertise on matters of public health and shortage of medical professionals as problematic and advocated for the education and training of local personnel in these areas (Erb, 1985, p. 254-5) - a mission that was later furthered by the IAEF.

While IIAA and IAEF staff had the "... genuine desire to promote permanent improvements in the health and welfare of Latin American peoples," these objectives had to be achieved in line with the "... overriding concern for U.S. national security" (Erb, 1985, p. 255). Most often the OCCCRAR/IIAA's health and welfare projects took place in

¹³ Dunham was a member of the US Army Medical Corps, and General Marshall transferred him to the IIAA at Rockefeller's request. He had extensive experience in Panama and had also served for five years as the public health adviser to the governor general of the Philippines. He received his Doctorate degree in Public Health from Johns Hopkins University and had also studied at the London School of Tropical Medicine (Erb, 1985, p. 252).

locations of strategic interest to the US, usually near military bases or in areas with natural resources that were critical to the war effort, such as the rubber-producing areas in the Amazon in Brazil (De Campos, 1998) (Figure 6.3). However, domestic political concerns in Latin American countries often presented the justification for the expansion of these programs outside of areas directly related to the US interests, particularly in urban areas. The receipt of aid from the US served as a means of improving domestic public opinion of leaders in Latin American countries with favourable views of the US, thereby preventing them from being ousted from


FIGURE 6.3: INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATIVE HEALTH AND EDUCATION PROGRAMMES (SOURCE: OFFICE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, 1947, 118)

The images of the Inter-American cooperative health and Education programmes originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

government and also incentivising them to break off diplomatic relations with Axis powers (Erb, 1985).

In the end, approximately \$156 million ¹⁴ in funding was allocated to the OCCCRAR/IIAA, \$65 million on which went toward the IIAA and \$5 million of which went toward the IAEF (Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1947, p. 268) before the OCCCRAR/IIAA was officially terminated by President Harry S. Truman by Executive Order 9710 on 10 April 1946. The OCCCRAR/IIAA's corporations were transferred to the State Department, where many expected for the remaining commitments to be finished without further renewal (Figure 6.4).¹⁵ By this time, Rockefeller had left his position as Coordinator in 1944 to serve

FIGURE 6.4: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1946



¹⁴ This is equivalent to approximately \$2 billion USD in 2015.

¹⁵ All functions of the OCCCRAR/IIAA's Information gathering branches, along with those of the US Office of War Information, had been previously transferred to an Interim International Information Service in the Department of State in 1945 (Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1947, p. 274).

as the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs at the State Department, where he drafted a memorandum proposing “‘long-term cooperation’ in the fields of ‘public health, nutrition, and food supply, education, science, culture, information, transportation, economic development including industrialization and modernization of agriculture’” (Erb, 1985, p. 266). However, President Roosevelt died a few months after approving it. Leadership at the State Department changed with President Truman, and Rockefeller’s successor, Spruille Braden, was not keen to sustain Rockefeller’s plans. Nevertheless, Braden sought the opinion of US ambassadors in Latin American to determine whether or not to terminate the OCCCRAR/IIAA’s operations. All of the cooperating governments requested that the programmes continued (Erb, 1985, p. 267). Therefore, the State Department put forward legislation to consolidate the IIAA and the IAEF into what became known as the ‘Institute for Inter-American Affairs’ (Figure 6.5).

FIGURE 6.5: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1947



Reluctantly, Congress passed the legislation in 1947, though it "... reduced the extension to three years" and "Many congressmen viewed the extension as little more than a period of gradual liquidation" (Erb, 1985, p. 267).

LEND-LEASE

The Atlantic Charter was also preceded by the emergence of an important instrument of US foreign assistance known as 'lend-lease'. Signed into law on 11 March 1941, the Lend-Lease Act allowed for supplies to be lent, at the President's discretion, to any nation to "... promote the defense of the United States" (The Lend-Lease Act of 1941). The Act was passed because Roosevelt was keen to offer much needed support to Britain's war efforts, however he was constrained by a number of domestic political factors. First, "The Johnson Act of 1934 prohibited the extension of credit to countries that had not repaid US loans made to them during World War I – which at the time, included Great Britain." (US Department of State, Office of the Historian). Second, the Neutrality Act of 1939 allowed for the US to sell supplies, including arms, to countries engaged in the conflict, but only on a 'cash and carry' basis (i.e. the items could not be loaned, had to be paid for immediately, and were required to be carried on non-American ships). Third, the military was against sending supplies or arms to the Allies, because they feared they would be lost to the Germans upon occupation/surrender. As a result, then Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, among others, argued that "... U.S. national security would be better served by reserving military supplies for the defense of the Western Hemisphere" (US Department of State, Office of the Historian).

To overcome domestic barriers to supporting the British and other Allies and also to avoid the tensions and instability related to the payment of war debts seen during the Inter-War Period, The Lend-Lease Act of 1941 allowed the US to 'lend' supplies to Allies in

exchange for payment in the form of a 'consideration', which usually meant the complementary 'lease' of the respective Allies' army and naval bases to the US. In the case of Britain the 'consideration' also equated to a commitment "... to joint action towards the creation of a liberalized international economic order in the postwar world" (US Department of State, Office of the Historian). The US contracted Lend-Lease agreements with over 30 countries¹⁶ (US Department of State, Office of the Historian), including, "...the Soviet Union, China, Australia, New Zealand, and the governments-in-exile of Poland, the Netherlands, Norway... the Free French Movement under Charles de Gaulle... [and] a host of new Latin American allies including Paraguay, Brazil, and Peru. These supplies took every conceivable form. They included military hardware... clothing and foodstuffs... [and] unfinished commodities including wool and leather for uniforms" (Seidl, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum). In the end, this 'most unsordid act' totaled over \$50 billion in assistance (US Department of State, Office of the Historian). As pointed out by Lancaster (2007, p. 25-6), the Lend-Lease Act did not offer 'concessional' development assistance in the spirit of today's ODA, since it was offered primarily to achieve military aims. Nevertheless, it introduced legislation with a justification for offering services and supplies to other countries on an 'as needed' basis in a way that aligned with US national interest.¹⁷

SUMMARY

With the OCCRRAR/IIAA bringing the 'New Deal' to Latin America and 'Lend-Lease' serving as a mechanism for sending supplies abroad, the Atlantic Charter served not only as a

¹⁶ The Lend-Lease agreement signed with the UK in February 1942 also referenced the Atlantic Charter, stating that "... return benefits to the United States 'shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations'" (Coyle, 1957, p.3).

¹⁷ According to Cardozo (1953, p. 161), this legislation served as the statutory 'prototype' for foreign aid legislation in the years to come.

platform for aligning Anglo-American interests in the war effort but as a space in which to imagine and begin to construct a post-conflict world order. Reaching to the familiar as Borgwardt (2005) suggests, the US envisioned extending the 'New Deal' to the world after WWII through the promotion of multilateralism and free trade. During the conflict, it remained focus on containing Axis Powers in the Western Hemisphere, utilizing lend-lease to distribute supplies to Allied Powers, and on military engagement from the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 until the conflict ended in April and the beginning of May 1945. In the immediate aftermath of WWII, operations were focused on providing immediate relief in the form of humanitarian assistance, largely through the provision of foodstuffs. While of utmost importance and often serving as the building blocks of longer-term recovery efforts, a full examination of US bilateral humanitarian relief during this time falls outside the scope of this study. However, US engagement and financing toward multilateral relief arrangements are outlined briefly below.

FROM RELIEF TO RECOVERY TO DEVELOPMENT POST-WWII: HOW THE US WENT FROM A PREFERENCE FOR MULTILATERALISM TO FOUNDING USAID

This section outlines the post-war institutional development of US bilateral foreign assistance programmes to do with welfare preceding the formation of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1961. The US began to research post-war economic problems as early as 1939 (Coyle, 1957, p.1), and it pursued two aims in the post-war era: to promote peace by encouraging better cooperation between states, primarily through the development of international organisations; and to promote European economic recovery and integration as a means of creating "... a balance of power in the West sufficient to contain Soviet power in the East" (Hogan, 1987, p. 27). While the US pursued a strategy of bilateral engagement in Latin America, it was keen to establish multilateral institutions to

address problems outside the Western Hemisphere, particularly for the purposes of providing relief and promoting economic recovery in Europe post-conflict. The preference for multilateralism was part of a broader logic that the nationalism inherent in the organisation of Europe was both politically and economically inefficient, leading to a preference for federalised and multilateral forms of organisation and integration on the grounds that such systems would promote both free trade and peace. Nevertheless, the US eventually institutionalised bilateral foreign assistance programmes, both to Europe and to the ‘Third World’. The following section outlines these developments and documents the institutional changes that eventually led to the creation of USAID in 1961.

MULTILATERAL RELIEF AND RECOVERY EFFORTS IN EUROPE

The US took what has been described as a ‘piecemeal’ approach toward European recovery (Hogan, 1987, p. 29) by providing relief through the United Nations and ensuring economic stability and finance for reconstruction through the Bretton Woods institutions (now known as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank). Through these multilateral institutions, the US aimed to catalyse economic recovery and integration in Europe with only limited use of bilateral institutions and financing.

On 1 January 1942, less than a year after the Atlantic Charter was signed, the US, the UK, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), and China all signed the United Nations Declaration, which “... pledged the signatory governments to the maximum war effort and bound them against making a separate peace” and “The complete alliance thus effected was in light of the principles of the Atlantic Charter” (UN History of the United Nations (1)).¹⁸

¹⁸ 22 other countries signed the next day: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia.

Governments that had declared war on Germany and Japan and that had also signed the United Nations Declaration before 1945 were later invited to San Francisco, along with four other nations¹⁹, to draft and sign a Charter for the United Nations, which came into existence on 24 October 1945 (UN History of the United Nations (2)).

However, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was created after the signing of the UN Declaration but before the UN was formally created. On 9 November 1943, a 44-nation conference at the White House led to the creation of UNRRA, whose purpose was to “plan, co-ordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical and other essential services (Agreement, Articles 1 and 2)” (United Nations).²⁰ The organisation consisted of a council with a representative from each member government, a central committee that included representatives from China, the USSR, the UK, and the US (mirroring the Allied Powers that were later to serve as permanent members of the UN Security Council with the exception of France, whose government was in exile), and also a Director-General with accompanying administrative staff (United Nations). The US contributed over 70 percent of the funds comprising the UNRRA’s budget, and the US Congress mandated that the funding be used to meet immediate, basic needs and *not* for reconstruction or development (Coley, 1957, p. 5).

¹⁹ The four other nations were Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, newly-liberated Denmark and Argentina.

²⁰ Approximately one year earlier on 21 November 1942, the US Department of State had created the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO), and its efforts were transferred to UNRRA upon its creation. Further, Herbert H. Lehman, who was the head of OFRRO, became the head of UNRRA (Lupkin, 2003). The organisation also built upon the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements that was established in London in September 1941 (United Nations).

The establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions also preceded the formal creation of the UN. In July 1944, the leaders of 43 countries met in the US in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to bring these institutions to life. The IMF was created to stabilize currencies, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (the first of two sister banks comprising the World Bank) was created first to aid in financing the reconstruction of Europe and also to aid in financing development projects throughout what soon became known as the ‘Third World’. As elucidated by Helleiner (2014, p. 258), US policymakers aimed to design the Bretton Woods institutions to be “... supportive, rather than neglectful, of international development goals”. While the abrupt shift from the Roosevelt to the Truman Administration and the change in US foreign policy priorities after WWII resulted in the Bretton Woods institutions falling far short of the role they were envisioned to play in international development, a number of countries in the global south played a significant role in their creation. Furthermore, the origins of the Bretton Woods institutions themselves can be found in early calls for an Inter-American Bank and currency stabilization in Latin America (Helleiner, 2014). While neither came to fruition at the time, they laid the intellectual foundation for what later became the IMF and the IBRD.

THE CASE FOR US BILATERAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

In the immediate post-War period, the US, “...continued to fund UNRRA’s relief operations, won congressional approval for American membership in the Bretton Woods institutions, increased the lending capacity of the Export-Import Bank²¹, and negotiated a \$3.75 billion

²¹ Established in 1934, the Export-Import Bank is an independent government agency that facilitates the export of US goods and services by providing financing and insurance to importers when private sector lenders are unwilling or unable to do so. Given the agency’s role in supporting American industries and stabilising employment, it plays a key role in US social policy; its external orientation makes it an actor within foreign policy as well. However, the agency deals far more with ‘trade’ than ‘aid’, and therefore I do not focus on it in this review. For more information, on the role of the Export-Import Bank and its evolution, please see Becker and McClenahan (2003).

loan to Great Britain” (Hogan, 1987, p. 29)”. However by 1949, at least three events illustrated the continued need for US bilateral foreign assistance: concerns with the use of multilateral relief funds channeled through the UNRRA in eastern Europe; the need to deliver ad hoc assistance to countries of strategic interest to the US, in particular Greece and Turkey; and US national interest in the regional economic integration of (western) Europe as part of a strategy to contain the influence of the Soviet Union.

First, the US allowed the mandate for UNRRA to expire in 1947 following concerns about how its funding was being spent in a number of Soviet satellites²² and also increased concerns at home about the volume of post-war spending (Coley, 1957, p. 5; Lupkin, 2003). The functions of the UNRRA were then split up between what is now the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Lupkin, 2003).

Second, in early 1947, the UK announced that it could no longer afford to provide aid to Greece and Turkey, creating an opportunity for the Soviets to extend their influence into the Eastern Mediterranean. In response, the US announced a new foreign policy doctrine – the Truman Doctrine - and extended bilateral assistance to both countries. In contrast to Monroe Doctrine, a more or less non-interventionist approach to foreign policy in place since the 19th century, President Truman announced to a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947 that “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I

²² “In the immediate postwar period, from 1945-1947, the United States disbursed more than \$12 billion in aid to countries in both the U.S. and Soviet Camps. However, with the breakdown of U.S. – Soviet relations in 1947 and the establishment of the European Recovery Program (the so-called Marshall Plan) in 1948, the United States opted to narrow its aid focus to concentrate on the reconstruction of pro-Western economies, primarily in Western Europe and Asia” (Evans, 1984, p. 243).

believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political process” (US Diplomatic Mission to Germany). Shortly thereafter, President Truman asked Congress to grant \$400 million in assistance to both Greece and Turkey and to support the dispatch of civilian and military personnel to the region in the following fiscal year. As in Latin America during WWII, aid was extended to buy allegiance and as a part an effort to contain the influence of a regime considered to be a threat to the US. Furthermore, while neither Greece nor Turkey were former colonies, the extension of bilateral assistance to Greece and Turkey was perhaps more similar than not to the way in which the US extended bilateral assistance to former colonies / newly independent states as colonialism ended in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Third, the US saw European recovery as critical to achieving several of its foreign policy goals. By strengthening and integrating the economy of western Europe, the US aimed to create a stable and peaceful political unit strong enough to “... absorb the Germans and contain the Soviets” (Hogan, 1987, p. 21). To accomplish this, the US passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 on 3 April 1948, Title I of which consisted of the Economic Cooperation Act outlining the European Recovery Program, more commonly known as the ‘Marshall Plan’. While promoting multilateral engagement within Europe was a part of this strategy (i.e. see the paragraph on the OEEC below), the Marshall Plan was ultimately a bilateral assistance programme; both the degree of national interests at stake and the fact that the US was the sole financier of the plan made it hard to view multilateral organisations as the right instrument for delivering this particular type of assistance (particularly in light of recent concerns with the UNRRA), and to my knowledge, this option was never considered

by US officials.²³ Furthermore, the Marshall Plan was strictly a recovery programme and was “... not concerned with development” (North and North, 1984, p. 269). Between 1948 and 1952, the US delivered over \$13 billion dollars in assistance to western Europe (Evans, 1984, p. 243) through the Marshall Plan.²⁴

Two other points about the Marshall Plan are important: the first for understanding the relationship between US social policy and foreign policy; and the second for the institutional development of US foreign assistance. First, as explained in depth by Hogan (1987), the Marshall Plan was more than a foreign policy strategy; it was also an extension of the logic behind the social transformation of the New Deal, a period that ushered in some of the largest welfare reforms in US history.²⁵ To quote Hogan (1987, p. 18) at length, the New Deal:

“... blended government action and institutional coordinators with private enterprise and free-market regulators and then tried to harmonize these two lines of policy by carefully delineating the government’s role and building new networks of group action and public-private power sharing. Behind these components of the New Deal’s foreign policy formulation united the leadership of a powerful multilateral bloc. Great investment banks and capital-intensive firms headed this coalition, which also included allies in the trade unions, in organized agriculture, in liberal academic circles, and in private foundations and business associations. Included as well, at least in the immediate postwar years, were labor-intensive firms that enjoyed comparative advantage at a time when European industry was being rebuilt. Together these groups would throw their weight behind the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, the Bretton Woods institutions, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the other instruments of a postwar world system founded on full convertibility and multilateral trade.

“The political realignment of the 1930s thus made it possible for American policymakers to eliminate some of the contradictions that had

²³ For a more detailed account of the troubled politics and execution of initial US efforts to stimulate economic recovery in Europe, please see Hogan (1987, p.p. 32-35).

²⁴ Opinions are still divided over whether or not the Marshall Plan actually played a role in stimulating economic recovery in Europe, with US economic historians such as Maier (1991) arguing that it did and British economic historian Alan Milward (1984) arguing strongly that it did not.

²⁵ For a comprehensive overview of New Deal reforms and their implications, please see Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol (1988).

characterized Republican economic diplomacy in the 1920s. The New Deal coalition was able to launch initiatives that ushered in a prolonged period of international economic growth, a goal that had not been attained after the First World War. Yet this success should not obscure the important contribution Republican leaders made to a foreign-policy formulation that essentially added new dimensions to the corporative design that Hoover and others had started to draft in the 1920s. Out of this synthesis of New Era designs and New Deal inventions came the Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe.”

Second, the Marshall Plan also led to the creation of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) (Figure 6.6) in the US and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) (which later became the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, or the ‘OECD’) in Europe, both of which were to oversee and coordinate the administration of the Marshall Plan. Like its predecessor the OCCRRAR/IIAA, the ECA reported directly to the President, had a quasi-cabinet-level status, offered advice as needed on matters of national security brought before the newly formed National Security Council²⁶ ²⁷, and was also meant to coordinate activities with the Secretary of State. However unlike the OCCRRAR/IIAA, the Marshall Plan aimed to encourage regional economic integration in Europe, which required regional-, as opposed to strictly national- and local-level engagement and coordination²⁸. Approximately two weeks after the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, the OEEC was created to fill this role on 16 April 1948.²⁹


²⁶ The US National Security Council was created on 26 July 1947 with the passage of the National Security Act in order to better coordinate foreign and defense policy. For further details, please see the US Department of State’s (1997) ‘History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997’.

²⁷ For instance, in a letter to Executive Secretary James Lay, President Truman asked that the ECA be included in the ad hoc group considering NSC-68, one of the most influential documents of the Cold War era (President’s Secretary File, Truman Papers; National Security File; Truman Papers).

²⁸ Presumably, despite the need for reconstruction and further recovery, European countries likely had stronger state capacity than those in Latin America, which may have also played a role in the ability to opt for a more centralised, regional- and national-level style of coordination and engagement.

²⁹ For more details on the formation of the OEEC, please see Hogan (1987, p. 119-28).

FIGURE 6.6: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1948



Despite the use of bilateral assistance to achieve US foreign policy goals both in Europe and elsewhere, it was not clear that bilateral foreign assistance was to become a permanent instrument of US foreign policy. It had also never been used primarily to achieve developmental, rather than defense/military objectives. By the end of 1948, funding for the UNRRA had ended, the IIAA was seen to be near extinction, aid to Europe, Greece, and Turkey was viewed as a temporary measure to contain the influence of the Soviet Union, and the Marshall Plan specifically was only a five year recovery program. However in a somewhat serendipitous move, US foreign assistance became institutionalised as a tool for development within US foreign policy when it was introduced as 'Point Four' of President

Truman's 'Four Point Plan'³⁰ in his second inaugural address on 20 January 1949³¹. In his address, President Truman stated that the US, "... must embark on a bold, new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas... I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life" (as cited in Butterfield, 2004, p. 1). As illustrated below, 'Point Four' initiated the institutionalisation of bilateral foreign assistance in the US, culminating with the founding of USAID.

INSTITUTIONALISING US BILATERAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE


In the end, it took over 10 year for a stable institutional structure in which to house US bilateral foreign assistance to emerge. Through a series of splits, mergers, and reorganisations, USAID was finally created in 1961. While 'Point Four' made the somewhat radical suggestion that the US should engage in helping people in developing countries 'realize their aspirations for a better life', bilateral foreign assistance was not accepted as a permanent feature of US foreign policy until the mid-1950s, and it remained unclear whether US would engage in 'development' independent of broader national security concerns or whether it was simply a new label for the same containment strategies.

³⁰ Truman's Four Point Plan encouraged all branches of the US Government to: 1) Support the UN; 2) put their full weight behind the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction; 3) support partnership in a new 'defense arrangement' among freedom-loving nations of the North Atlantic (which later became the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or 'NATO'); and 4) a bold, new program for the improvement and growth of the world's underdeveloped areas (Butterfield, 2004, p. 2).

³¹ It should be noted that 'Point Four' made it into the speech due to the efforts of Benjamin Hardy, a rather brave staff officer at the US Department of State who had formerly served as a press officer for the IIAA in Brazil. Hardy wrote the proposal for Point Four, which was then sent to Francis Russell, director of the Office of Public Affairs at the US Department of State. Russell supported the proposal, however Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett, who was then the acting Secretary of State, did not. Taking a risk, Hardy put the proposal directly to the White House, with the generous confidence of a few of the president's advisers. Both George Elsey, who was drafting the inaugural address, and Clark Clifford, President Truman's counsel, liked the proposal and agreed to take it to the President, who agreed it should be included as a fourth point in the speech. For more details of this account, please see Butterfield (2004), Chapter 1.

To implement 'Point Four', Congress authorized the creation of both the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) and the International Development Advisory Board with the passage of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950 on 5 June 1950. Later that year on 8 September, President Truman directed the Secretary of State to oversee the administration of the TCA (Figure 6.7) and outlined the form and function of the International Development Advisory Board (Executive Order 10159); on 24 November 1950, President Truman appointed Nelson Rockefeller chair of the Board. Its first task was

FIGURE 6.7: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1950



to review ‘The Gray Report’³² – a government report taking stock of all US foreign economic relations³³ – and to “... consider Mr. Gray’s proposals concerning our policy toward the underdeveloped areas in the context of the full report”. On 7 March 1951, the Board transmitted a report on this topic entitled ‘Partners in Progress’ (International Development Advisory Board, 1951) to President Truman. In the meantime, the TCA expanded rather rapidly and was operating in 28 countries by mid-1951, focusing on agriculture, health, and education provision (Butterfield, 2004, p. 19); by the end of 1952, the TCA was operating in 35 countries, and its budget had increased four-fold from \$35 million in 1950 to \$135 million in 1952^{34,35}

Overshadowed largely by the outbreak of the Korean War, ‘Partners in Progress’ reported that, “... strengthening the economies of the underdeveloped regions and an improvement in their living levels must be considered a vital part of our own defense mobilization” and recommended “... the speedy centralization and unification of major foreign economic activities of the United States Government into one overall-agency headed by a single administrator reporting directly to the President” which might be called the Overseas Economic Administration (International Development Advisory Board, 1951, p.p.

³² Mr. Gordon Gray was formerly the Secretary of the Army. After resigning from this post, President Truman asked him to write this report.

³³ As highlighted by President Truman, Mr. Gray summarised the objective of US foreign economic policy as meant to “... encourage among the nations of the free world those economic conditions and relationships essential for the development of stable democratic societies willing and able to defend themselves and raise the living standards of their peoples. These objectives are to the benefit of all peoples; their national interests are bound up with our national interests; our security and well-being are clearly connected with their security and well-being. Neither we nor they can lie alone or defend ourselves alone. This fundamental unity of interest underlies our efforts both to achieve long-term progress and also to meet the immediate necessities presented by Soviet aggressive designs” (Statement by the President in Response to the Gray Report on Foreign Economic Policy, Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 12 November 1950).

³⁴ This amount equates to approximately \$348.2 million and \$1.196 billion in 2015 USD, respectively.

³⁵ As ‘technical assistance’ continued to be delivered to ‘developing’ countries, class-based tensions arose between the traditional Foreign Service Officers of the State Department and the civil servants of the TCA, who were often viewed as a lesser, strictly ‘technical’ subset of FSOs (Butterfield, 2004, p. 24-5).

1, 16-7). The report lays out detailed recommendations for the organization of what became the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) with the passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 later that year on 10 October. Specifically, it recommended that the ECA, TCA, and IIAA should be moved to a new centralized agency (Figure 6.8), along with functions to do with military aid, that the head of the semi-autonomous agency should report directly to the President and should sit on the National Security Council, and that the agency should

FIGURE 6.8: 'PARTNERS IN PROGRESS' RECOMMENDATION FOR A NEW CENTRALISED FOREIGN ECONOMIC AGENCY (SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY ADVISORY BOARD, 1951, 19)

The image of the partners in progress recommendation for a new centralised foreign economic agency originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

adopt a regional approach to development assistance (International Development Advisory Board, 1951). Furthermore, with regard to welfare, the Board again asserted the *Servicio* model for the coordination of agriculture, education, and health programs in underdeveloped regions (Figure 6.9).


FIGURE 6.9: BILATERAL ORGANISATION OF US AID SERVICES VIA *SERVICIOS* (SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY BOARD, 1951, 67)

*The image of the bilateral organisation of the aid services via *servicios* originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.*

However, Rockefeller's vision for the organization of US foreign aid did not come to fruition until the creation of the Foreign Operations Administration in 1953³⁶; the creation of the MSA in 1951 took on many, but not all of the Board's recommendations. As the Marshall Plan began to come to a close, the Mutual Security program was focused on rearming Europe and persuading countries near the Soviet Union and China to enter into alliance with the United States (Lancaster, 2007, p. 65). Therefore in the short-run, the functions of the ECA were transferred to the new Mutual Security Agency, along with those of military assistance (Figure 6.10). While the MSA was indeed a semi-autonomous agency

³⁶ The House Foreign Affairs Committee also proposed organizational models for US foreign economic assistance that were similar to the Board's/Rockefeller's (Butterfield, 2004, p. 36).

FIGURE 6.10: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1951




that reported to the President and participated in the NSC, both the TCA and IIAA remained housed in the Department of State. Also, the MSA took a new interest in the Asia/the Far East³⁷ region in addition to Europe, but it did not take on a regional form of organisation that included all regions as Rockefeller envisioned (United States Government Organizational Manual, 1952-53, p. 592).

On 29 January 1953, President Eisenhower established the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization (Executive Order 10432), which was chaired by Nelson Rockefeller. On 7 April 1953, the Committee sent a memo to President Eisenhower on the subject of 'Foreign Affairs Organization' that called for the centralization of all foreign

³⁷ Interest in Asia and the Far East was linked to the Korean War, which began in 1950, and the onset of conflict in Vietnam beginning in the mid-1950s and continuing into the 1960s.

assistance and economic operations (Memorandum for the President by the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, 1953). On 20 June 1953, Rockefeller's reorganization plan was approved, leading to the creation of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) on 1 August 1953 (Figure 6.11). Finally, the TCA and IIAA were transferred to the FOA along with the former functions of the MSA, resulting in the consolidation of US military, economic, and technical assistance in one semi-autonomous agency that reported to the President, in coordination with the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

FIGURE 6.11: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1953



While pleasing to the eye, the FOA's centralised form proved to be very unstable. The next year in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, Congress called for an end to 'development assistance' on the grounds that such assistance should only be short-term, (and therefore

not housed in a permanent, semi-autonomous agency) and for longer-term technical assistance programmes to be transferred back to the Department of State (Butterfield, 2004, p. 38). The following year, President Eisenhower made changes along these lines; the FOA's military assistance functions were transferred back to the Department of Defense, and its economic and technical assistance programs were transferred to the Department of State and re-named the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) (Figure 6.12). Despite this instability, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported in 1955 that "... this year, for the first time since the beginning of the foreign assistance program, the committee did not feel it necessary to reevaluate the fundamental premises on which the mutual security program is based, or to question whether... it was worthwhile to authorize the continuation of the program" (US House of Representatives, Mutual Security Act of 1955, as cited in Butterfield, 2004, p. 39). After 15 years, US foreign assistance has finally become a regular instrument of foreign policy.


FIGURE 6.12: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1955



Not only had US foreign assistance become accepted as a regular, if not permanent, instrument of US foreign policy, but in 1957, it also took on a new form and function – ‘soft’ loans. While the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development latter took on the mission of economic development and lending to low-income countries, it was focused first on rebuilding Europe post-WWII. To do this, it issued ‘hard’ loans, or loans with a relatively short life span that required repayment in the currency in which they were issued. While this type of lending instrument worked for reconstruction in ‘developed’ countries that often bought or sold goods either to the US or on the international market, it was far less suited for lending to poorer, developing countries. As the number of former colonies becoming independent nations grew, so too did the need for a new lending instrument. Furthermore, the USSR had already begun extending ‘soft’ loans, or loans repayable in local currencies and that were offered at concessional terms, to a number of countries including East Germany, Romania, and communist countries throughout Asia to calm unrest and enhance stability after the death of Joseph Stalin on 5 March 1953, (Goldman, 1967, p. 31-2). Developing countries had raised this issue at the United Nations before, but the United States had previously opposed the creation of such a lending device. However, several prominent members of the Eisenhower Administration, including then Vice-President Richard Nixon, Nelson Rockefeller (then a foreign policy assistant to the President), and Harold Stassen (former head of both the MSA and the FOA) supported the increase of transfers of financial capital to the developing world via soft loans (Butterfield, 2004, p. 53). Now convinced that such an instrument was needed and keen to avoid such a fund being developed in a United Nations agency (which was governed by a one-country, one-vote policy, thereby giving the US far less influence), Congress created the Development Loan Fund (DLF) with the passage

of the Mutual Security Act of 1957 on 14 August 1957 (Figure 6.13). Moreover, under the same logic, Congress also then supported the creation of the International Development Association (the concessional lending arm and sister bank of the World Bank) in 1960 (Lancaster, 2007, p. 67-8).

FIGURE 6.13: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1957



Two final institutional creations in US foreign aid and development assistance at the end of the Eisenhower administration became key to the approach to foreign aid in the Kennedy Administration. The first was the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The IADB was created by the Organization for American States (OAS)³⁸ in 1959 to

³⁸ The antecedents of the Organization of American States are found in the International Conference of American States, the first of which was held in 1889-90 in Washington, DC. President Roosevelt referred to these somewhat sporadic conferences as the 'League of Nations of the Americas'. The group formed a charter and formally became the Organization for American States (OAS) at its 9th international conference chaired by then US Secretary of State George C. Marshall in 1948.

promote the extension of hard loans for development in Latin American. While the IADB is financed by a number of countries, including a number of European countries and also Canada and Japan, the US is the only substantial donor country that was also a voting member of the OAS; therefore, US support for the creation of the Bank was critical. While Latin American countries had advocated for the creation of a development bank for sometime³⁹, it took both Vice-President Richard Nixon's encounter with an angry urban mob in Caracas, Venezuela and also Fidel Castro's rise to power in Cuba before the US was willing to act on the proposal (Butterfield, 2004, p. 66-7). President Eisenhower also proposed the Act of Bogotá, which was adopted by the OAS Council on 13 September 1960. The Act included a US commitment of \$500 million to the creation of a special social development fund (i.e. 'soft loans') making the multilateral IADB, rather than the bilateral DLF, the primary channel of 'soft loans' to Latin America (Melanson and Mayers, 1989, p. 179-80).

The second event was the creation of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). At a meeting on 13 January 1960, the OEEC, a precursor of today's Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)⁴⁰, formed the Development Assistance Group (DAG)⁴¹ "as a forum for consultations among aid donors on assistance to less-developed countries," (Führer, 1996, p. 8). The Group had a particular interest in improving the

³⁹ Up until this time, what we now call the 'World Bank' still only consisted of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which had been created primarily to aid in the reconstruction of countries in Europe post-WWII— hence calls from Latin American countries for a functional equivalent focused on development.

⁴⁰ The OEEC was created in 1948 to coordinate the reconstruction of Europe in the framework of the Marshall Plan, with the long-term aim of promoting free trade in Europe.

⁴¹ The original members of the DAG were: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Commission of the European Economic Community. Japan was 'immediately' invited to participate, and the Netherlands joined by July of the same year (Führer, 1996, p. 8). With the addition of Australia, this mirrors the original membership of the newly formed DAC in 1961, with Norway joining in 1962, Denmark joining in 1963, Sweden joining in 1965, and other countries joining in the years to follow (see Appendix 1).

information available on financial transfers to these countries, many of which were formerly under colonial administration. On 23 July 1960, the Group decided to change its name to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) when the OEEC became the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) the following year. The DAG held its final meeting in July 1961. The OEEC officially made the transition to the OECD in September of that year, and the DAC met for the first time on 5 October 1961. The new OECD Secretariat was to house a 'Development Department' focusing both on development finance and technical assistance (Führer, 1996, p. 9).

As in the US, interest in the formation of the DAC from European countries was preceded by internal struggles throughout the 1950s over whether or not foreign assistance was to become a permanent instrument of foreign policy. Originally, both Britain and France took the position that colonial independence would end their obligation to provide developmental assistance to these territories. However, both countries reversed this position in the late 1950s. France quickly realised that aid was an important mechanism for maintaining influence within its former colonies after independence. In Britain, both increasing economic problems in India (which was of great symbolic importance as both the first country to achieve independence post-WWII and the largest non-communist developing country⁴²) and its desire to "... disengage from significant postcolonial responsibilities with its reputation intact, without major claims on the budget, and without a massive influx of British settlers, especially from Kenya, fleeing postcolonial chaos" resulted in the

⁴² It should also be noted that the then Senator John F. Kennedy (D-MA) worked to pass bipartisan legislation in favour of foreign aid for India with Senator John Sherman Cooper (R - KY), a former US Ambassador to India from 1955-56 (Rostow, 1985). The US also offered support for the World Bank's Aid India Consortium in 1958, which was held to increase Europe's support for India's development and to help coordinate international assistance in the country (Butterfield, 2004, p. 73).

continuation of development assistance (Lancaster, 2007, p. 29). As early as 1953, Germany began providing technical assistance to importers of German goods (Lancaster, 2007, p. 30). Japan's assistance programmes emerged from its reparation payments to Asia and also its need to import raw materials and to cultivate export markets for Japanese goods (Lancaster, 2007, p. 30). In Scandinavian countries, including Norway, Sweden, and Denmark a mix of concerns over the Cold War, intricate domestic politics, and the cycle of 'supply feeding demand' for development assistance within poor countries led to the creation and perpetuation of development assistance programmes (Lancaster, 2007, p. 30-1). The US welcomed these developments and encouraged countries to develop their own aid programmes, viewing them as a means of 'sharing the burden' of containing Soviet power once their own post-war recovery was on track (Lancaster, 2007, p. 28-31).

The upward surge of attention toward the 'development' of the 'Third World' continued with the start of the Kennedy Administration in 1961, culminating with the UN's call in December of that year for the 1960s to be a 'Development Decade' (United Nations Development Decade, 1961). In his inaugural address on 20 January, President Kennedy suggested that economic and social development be established as an alternative to war (Butterfield, 2004, p. 58). To accomplish this, President Kennedy called for the Mutual Security Act to be replaced by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. President Kennedy suggested the following changes to US foreign assistance: the separation of military and development assistance so as to send a clear message that US promotion of international development was about primarily about welfare, not warfare; the availability of long-term, soft loans for countries that were 'serious' about development, as indicated by the presence of a 'well-reasoned' national development plan; and finally, a single new agency to unify US

development assistance operations (Butterfield, 1961, p. 58). On 4 September 1961, Congress passed the FAA, authorizing the creation of a new aid agency; the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) came into being when President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10973 on 3 November 1961. USAID effectively merged the ICA and the DFL into one agency under the direction of an Administrator with the rank of an Under Secretary who reported to the Secretary of State (Figure 6.14).

FIGURE 6.14: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1961



While President Kennedy was successful in convincing Congress of the need for both a new development agency and a focus on long-term development in addition to relief and recovery efforts, he did have to make concessions. Key among these was Congress's insistence that USAID adhere to the usual annual appropriation cycle common to US government agencies, which made it difficult to provide long-term financial guarantees to

developing countries. Congress did grant USAID the ability to extend development loans for up to five years out, and the agency could make 'commitments' of other types of funding beyond one year (Butterfield, 2004, p. 59). However, these commitments did not become formal 'obligations' of the US government until Congress appropriated the funds each year. Also, as with nearly all US government agencies, funds not spent in the fiscal year in which they were appropriated had to be returned to the US government (Butterfield, 2004, p. 59) – a trap that Rockefeller managed to avoid through the use of corporate devices. USAID did adopt the regional focus recommended by the boards and government (re-)organizational committees Rockefeller chaired; USAID divided itself into the following four regions: Europe and Africa; the Near East and South Asia; the Far East; and Latin America (Butterfield, 2004, p. 60). Technical experts were to be housed within each of these regions who could then identify promising development endeavours in consultation with local government officials and other development partners that could then be matched with the appropriate financial instruments and support. Furthermore, building on the *Servicios* units begun under Rockefeller, the US maintained a strong in-country presence for the promotion of development assistance that continues to set it apart from other donors to date. By 1962, USAID directly employed approximately 15,000 individuals, 13,000 of whom were directly employed at overseas missions and 2,000 of whom were indirectly employed through agency contracts (Butterfield, 2004, p. 60).

FROM THE UN'S 'DEVELOPMENT DECADE' TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Amid decolonisation and the fight against communism, the US was focused largely on ensuring that development assistance supported the creation of US-sanctioned socioeconomic orders. Even with a skeptical Congress, the US effectively used 'double-edged'

diplomacy to encourage European countries to support Third World development and simultaneously convince Congress that these efforts were worthy of increased US support. Continuing Kennedy's legacy, President Johnson pursued his vision of a 'Great Society' not only through a 'War on Poverty' (which led to the creation Medicare and Medicaid, or health care for the elderly and poor Americans, respectively), but also through a 'War on Hunger' in the Third World and a focus on the 'Other War' in Vietnam. To pursue 'development', USAID focused primarily on supporting capitalist development projects in line with modernization theories of development, and also on ensuring that food production kept pace with population growth. Emphasizing social development, or 'welfare capitalism' in areas that had yet to 'modernize' was prioritized most where geopolitical pressures forced the US to demonstrate the value of a strong, viable alternative to communism. For example, the Cuban Revolution in 1959 led to a greater focus on social justice in US development policies in Latin America couched in the language of 'peaceful revolution', and USAID played an integral role in supporting rural development programmes as part of US counterinsurgency strategies used to fight the 'Other War' of winning the 'hearts and minds' of local populations thereby 'pacifying' their communist sympathies.

In this section, quantitative data is used to provide a more nuanced account – beyond discourse alone - of how much aid across countries and within sectors was prioritised by the US. One function taken on by the newly formed OECD in the 1960s was to monitor and collect data in a number of areas across OECD countries, including overseas development assistance. From the time of its formation (approximately 1960-61) onwards, the OECD has been the primary source of comparable data statistics across donor countries. Data on aid disbursements from the United States is available by region and recipient country from 1960

forward and by sector from 1967 forward. To fill remaining gaps, data from US government reports is also used. As mentioned in the methods section, the OECD's statistics on Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) are self-reported by country, and data collection and reporting across countries has become more thorough and comprehensive overtime; therefore, the data shown here, while useful, should be taken with a grain of salt.

THE FIRST 'DECADE OF DEVELOPMENT'

THE FLEDGLING POLITICS OF US DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Despite being hailed the 'Development Decade' by the UN and Kennedy's success in creating USAID, many were still hesitant to prioritise 'development' on the US foreign policy agenda in the 1960s. Several questions were on the mind of policymakers and academics alike: many questioned what exactly development 'is' and how best to go about it, in addition to having only a vague understanding the position and interests of a number of actors with a stake in the design of development assistance programmes.

Walt Whitman Rostow⁴³ was particularly influential in shaping academic and policy debates on US foreign assistance in the late 1950s and 1960s (Ish-Shalom, 2006), and he was also the author of a memorandum offering an analysis of US foreign aid, which laid the foundation for President Kennedy's argument for the creation of USAID (Nowels, 2006, p. 3). With Max Millikan, he coauthored *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* in 1957,

⁴³ Along with his bother and wife, Rostow had an extensive career in public service as a policymaker and academic specializing in US foreign policy. During World War II, he worked for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (a precursor to the CIA) where he met his wife Elspeth Vaughan Davies. After WWII, he worked for the State Department, served as a professor of American History at both Oxford (where he was previously a Rhodes Scholar) and then Cambridge, and was involved in the design the Marshall Plan. He served as an economic and foreign policy advisor to President Eisenhower, as the first Deputy National Security Assistant to President Kennedy, and the Director of Policy and Planning at the State Department under President Kennedy, and as the National Security Assistant to President Johnson. During WWII Rostow's older brother Eugene served as assistant general counsel to the Lend-Lease Administration and as a liaison to Lend-Lease at the State Department. He also later served as an Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department under President Johnson. At the end of the Johnson Administration, Rostow and his wife retired to Austin, Texas, where she later became the Dean of the LBJ School of Public Affairs.

which argued that the US needed to present a consistent and persuasive alternative to communism in the emerging Third World, with the chief aim of not of gaining allegiance, but of creating stable societies that were capable of large degrees of social change without resorting to violence (Rostow, 1985, p. 43-9). Yet, Rostow is perhaps best known for his book *Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto*. Published in 1960, the book is a classic in the cannon of modernisation theory in development economics; it argues that countries move through five phases of development: the traditional, subsistence society, acquiring the pre-conditions for 'take-off', the 'take-off' itself (often defined by a shift from agriculture to industry), the drive to 'maturity' (where economic growth becomes self-sustaining), and a final transition into a high output, mass consumption national economy. Somewhat ironically, welfare does not play a central role in modernization theories of development; as in accounts of the development of the welfare state based on modernization theories (e.g. Wilensky, 1975, 2002), social welfare systems are thought to emerge from an economic surplus generated by strong economic growth in industrialised societies, thereby serving as an example of 'convergence' toward such systems. Coupled with the availability of a soft lending instrument, the majority of aid policy and research in the early 1960s was focused on investing in capital to improve agricultural output and on moving societies from subsistence living to more modern, industrialised economies; it was not until the Johnson Administration that the notion of 'development' began to engage more fundamentally with welfare issues and meeting basic needs (with the exception again of Latin America, and to some extent, Viet Nam – see below). Foreign assistance to do with welfare had become synonymous with technical assistance programs under the former ICA, however the

aggregate power of this half of USAID was lessened when technical experts were dispersed across USAID's regional offices.

While Rostow's conceptualisation of 'development' was most influential and favoured by those with more 'liberal' views⁴⁴, two other political positions on development spending were also articulated. The first was from those who wished to return to the 'classic liberalism' in place before World War I, where the US strongly supported free trade and maintained a more or less non-interventionist foreign policy. More conservative members of Congress often held this view and also questioned the effectiveness of US foreign aid programmes (see below). For this group, development assistance was justifiable only in so far as it promoted national security interests, as it had during WWII. However as Rostow successfully argued, this perspective did not solve the pressing political problem of presenting an alternative to communism. The other position was that of the US Treasury, which viewed development assistance as potentially wasteful spending and as an unnecessary strain on the government's budget (Rostow, 1985, p. 105).

Furthermore, the structure of the relationship between USAID and the Department of State led to a number of complications overtime. The FAA of 1961 continues to serve as the authorizing legislation for US foreign assistance, despite the fact that it has not been substantially updated since 1973 (see below) and a revised version has not been passed through Congress since 1985 (also see below) (Epstein and Weed, 2009, p. 3). Instead, foreign aid appropriation legislation has circumvented the authorizing legislation through legal mechanisms that allow the appropriation of funds for foreign aid in the absence of

⁴⁴ It is important to note that perhaps unlike today's political climate, 'liberal' was not synonymous with 'Democrat' and 'conservative' was not synonymous with 'Republican' in the US during this time period.

authorizing legislation (Rennack and Chesser, 2011; Epstein and Weed, 2009). Furthermore, the FAA allows the President to decide which agencies shall implement the legislation, thereby decoupling the Congressional budget process from the advice of implementing institution. In several cases, there is also a distinction between the allocation (mostly between countries, but sometimes between programmes) and implementation of foreign aid programmes; oftentimes, the Department of State determines the country allocation of funds and USAID is responsible for implementing the programmes. All too often, confusion and/or dissatisfaction with the decision making process or lines of authority in allocating and implementing aid have led to tensions between USAID and the Department of State as illustrated below.

Furthermore, many in Congress remained skeptical, if not overtly critical of the increase in aid spending during this time. In particular, Otto Passman (D – LA)⁴⁵ Chairman of the Foreign Operation Appropriations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee commented that foreign aid programmes were “... ill conceived, badly executed, unrealistic, wasteful, and expensive” (Congressman Passman as quoted in Lancaster, 2007, p. 71). In addition to the usual spending critiques, Congress felt that European countries also had an obligation to provide aid, particularly to their former territories in Africa; ultimately, this manifested in ‘double-edged diplomacy’ (Lancaster, 2007, p. 70), whereby the US encouraged other countries to contribute their fair share to the costs of containment by increasing ODA while arguing to Congress that the US must hold steady if not increase its aid commitments in line with other countries. Nevertheless, opposition to aid programs

⁴⁵ Congressman Passman’s fiery speeches against foreign aid even earned him the nickname ‘Otto the Terrible’ (Lueck, 1988).

manifested in a decrease in US ODA in 1963 (Lancaster, 2007, p. 70) – despite the presence of a Democratic president and Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate in Congress⁴⁶. While aid may have become a permanent fixture of US foreign policy, it remained highly controversial (Lancaster, 2007, p. 71).

ASIA

US ODA to Asia⁴⁷ far surpassed ODA in both Africa and Latin America combined throughout the 1960s (Figure 6.15). Within Asia, countries of geopolitical interest to the US, including India, Viet Nam, Pakistan, and South Korea, were the top recipients of US ODA (OECD Stat; Milner and Tingley, 2013). Furthermore, the US was the most dominant donor in Asia, particularly during the early 1960s, where it accounted for as much as 70 per cent of ODA in the region (Figure 6.16). Unfortunately, the data does not allow for a comparative evaluation of the role that aid in the social sector played in each of these countries of strategic interest.⁴⁸ It seems unlikely that it played a large role given that US aid was dominated primarily by food aid in the late 1960s⁴⁹; US ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector only began to rise from the 1970s onwards (Figure 6.17). However, aid in the social sector did play a critical role in US counterinsurgency strategies in Viet Nam.


⁴⁶ For further explanation, please see footnote 44 of this chapter.

⁴⁷ Here, 'Asia' includes the Far East, South and Central Asia, and the Middle East.

⁴⁸ The OECD's ODA dataset only allows for a disaggregation of aid that has been disbursed (as opposed to aid that has only been committed) according to the recipient country/region from 1960 onward and according to sector from 1967 onward. Furthermore, disaggregation of ODA disbursed by both sector and donor within a given recipient country has only recently been made possible from 1995 onward with the introduction of the OECD DAC's Credit Reporting System.


⁴⁹ Food aid is included in the Commodity Aid / General Program Assistance Sector, and in this case, all of the aid in this sector went toward food aid as opposed to general budget support.

FIGURE 6.15: US ODA DISBURSEMENTS BY REGION, 1960-1972




Source: OECD CRS Database

FIGURE 6.16: US ODA DISBURSEMENTS TO ASIA RELATIVE TO OTHER DAC DONORS, 1960-1972



Source: OECD CRS Database

FIGURE 6.17: US ODA DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR, 1967-1972



Source: OECD CRS Database

Viet Nam: Aid in the Social Sector and the 'Other War'

While the marriage of USAID and the Department of State signified the separation of military and development assistance, the relationship between the two continued. In response to Soviet support for what they considered to be wars of national liberation, the US positioned itself as helping “... free world nations save themselves from communism by a series of sequential actions that dealt with the symptoms of social revolution (the insurgency) as well as its causes (the frustration of expectations for social justice)” (Department of Defense, US-Vietnam Relations, p. ii). Viet Nam was such a case, where communist/nationalist forces had fought against occupation by both the Japanese during WWII and the French during the First Indochina War shortly thereafter. Once a ceasefire was reached and the French had begun to withdraw in 1954, the US-backed, anti-communist South Viet Nam worked to avoid national

elections to unify the country, which would have been won by the Soviet and Chinese-backed communist North. Ultimately, this led to the Second Indochina War, more commonly known as 'the Vietnam War', a proxy war in which communist forces fought to unify Viet Nam and anti-communist forces fought to retain independence and prevent the spread of communism as part of a broader US containment policies.

As far as the US Department of Defense was concerned, "... physical security from the acts of insurgents was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for success" (Department of Defense, US-Vietnam Relations, p. ii) in the fight against communism in Viet Nam. As part of a broader 'pacification' strategy (commonly referred to as 'winning hearts and minds') designed to gain allegiance to the liberal international order, the US integrated aid for social development into its counterinsurgency tactics in Viet Nam, first by supporting the Government of Viet Nam's Strategic Hamlet Program and later through the US Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program, known as 'CORDS'.

Formed in 1967, CORDS was "...essentially a nation building endeavor that sought to promote pacification of the countryside through rural development programs coordinated with military operations" (Schoux, n.d., p. 1). After the fall of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, the US re-evaluated its approach toward counterinsurgency in Viet Nam. By 1966, all US civilian operations in Viet Nam were consolidated under the Office of Civil Operations under the US Deputy Ambassador William Porter (USAID, 1975). In 1967, a second re-organisation placed all civilian and military personnel under the command of General Westmoreland, who was supported by a civilian Deputy Ambassador, Robert Komer. Under this new arrangement, all civilian and military personnel engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Viet Nam fell under a single chain of command, where the military was

identified as the agency to be supported and USAID was identified as the supporting agency. As a general rule, once a territory was secure, USAID personnel worked with the Government of Viet Nam (GVN) to restore self-government at all levels (from its 44 provinces through its 10,000+ hamlets) and to promote economic development (Komer, 1970).

Data from USAID reveals that the majority of development assistance delivered through CORDS between 1968 and 1970 was dedicated to the social sector (Figure 6.18). Within the social sector (Figure 6.19), nearly 60 percent of this assistance went toward the Government and Civil Society sub-sector for activities including public administration, security, and public works projects. After that, just over 30 percent of these funds were

FIGURE 6.18: CORDS FUNDING BY SECTOR, 1968-1970





FIGURE 6.19: CORDS FUNDING IN THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES SECTOR BY SUB-SECTOR, 1968-1970




spent in the Health sub-sector, which include the construction of health centres, provision of general health services, and malaria eradication programmes (USAID, 1975). The vast majority of the remaining funds were spent on education, including primary through tertiary education, technical/vocational training, adult literacy programs, and textbook development (USAID, 1975). Furthermore, CORDS' efforts to effectively link military and development efforts as part of counterinsurgency were later drawn upon when providing guidance to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan as explained in Chapter 7 (e.g. Honn et al., 2011; Westerman, 2008).

AFRICA

As in Asia, much of Africa was undergoing decolonisation in the early 1960s, which encouraged a re-assessment of US interest in the region. US ODA to Africa increased from \$296 million in 1960 to \$491 million in 1964 (or \$1.80 billion in 1960 to nearly \$2.85 billion in 1964 in 2013 USD) (OECD Stats) – but again, this pales in comparison to increases in US

ODA in Asia (Figure 6.15). In addition to the usual spending critiques, Congress felt that European countries had a greater obligation to provide aid to their former territories in Africa (Lancaster, 2007, p. 70). Furthermore, OECD DAC data reveals that unlike in Asia, the US was neither the only nor the strongest aid donor in Africa; France gave the largest portion of ODA to Africa during the 1960s, and the UK also gave substantial amounts, often on par with US ODA which at most, accounted for 25 per cent of ODA to the region (Figure 6.20).⁵⁰ Overall, US ODA to Africa increased by approximately one-third during the 1960s (Lancaster, 2007, p. 70; OECD Stat) in the 1960s.

FIGURE 6.20: US ODA DISBURSEMENTS TO AFRICA RELATIVE TO OTHER DAC DONORS, 1960-1972



Source: OECD CRS Database

⁵⁰ As aforementioned, we cannot be sure of the extent to which ODA dedicated toward welfare played a role in the cases of France or the UK. Nevertheless, an examination of their respective ODA spending by sector from 1967 to 1972 (Appendix 9) reveals that even more than in the US, aid in the social sector appears to play an increasingly influential role in the aid portfolios of these two countries from the 1970s onward.

Carrying on engagement with Latin American initiated toward the end of the Eisenhower Administration, President Kennedy announced the ‘Alliance for Progress’ (*Alianza para Progreso*) at the White House on 13 March 1961, which aimed to put in place a 10-year development plan for the Americas “... to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and school” (President Kennedy, as quoted in Butterfield, 2004, p. 63). He stressed that this was not a handout to Latin America and would require the mobilization of resources in Latin America in equal measure. In line with this call for progress, President Kennedy sent a message to Congress requesting the appropriation of \$500 million for the Inter-American Fund for Social Progress – a continuation of President Eisenhower’s promise to create a special social fund at the OAS summit the previous September (see above) (Butterfield, 2004, p. 63).

In August 1961, the OAS convened a special meeting in Punta del Este in Uruguay to officially establish the Alliance for Progress and to agree on a 10-year development plan, which resulted in the passage of the ‘Charter of Punta del Este’. Though a non-binding treaty, the charter was created primarily by Latin American states with the support of the US, and it articulated over 90 development objectives. After USAID was created in the following months, President Kennedy appointed Teodoro Moscoso, the USAID Assistant Administrator for Latin America to oversee the coordination of the Alliance for Progress and the Charter’s implementation. In a document describing the programme’s goals, Mr. Moscoso re-iterated President Kennedy’s point that the aid given was not a handout and that Latin American elites were expected to play a strong role in promoting redistributive policies – including land reform and progressive tax reforms - if progress was to be made (Moscoso, USAID document). He also describes the distinct welfare and social justice focus of the Alliance for

Progress in strong contrast to modernization theories guiding most development assistance at the time stating:

"I am aware of the fact that there are many well-meaning people, particularly in business circles in Latin America and in the United States, who feel that the economic development phase of the Alianza must come first and that, in good time, social reforms, education and health will follow. In my opinion, this is not only politically untenable in a time of social ferment, but is also economically fallacious.

"One fundamental fact emerges from any profound study of economic development programs. Their success depends, in the final analysis, on human resources. If the people of a country are healthy, educated and purposeful, development programs usually work well, even where natural resources are severely limited. But where the people are diseased, illiterate and inert, a development program has little hope for success unless these human resources are developed along with the economic resources. In other words, improving the education and health of the greatest bulk of the people is not just the fruit of development but is also an essential means of development. People must be developed, if industries and agriculture are to be developed.

"The big job in Latin America, one calling for all the talents of the democratic leaders, will be to advance economic development and social justice tandem, without allowing either to get far ahead of the other. Without social justice, which will win the support of the masses, economic development cannot go far, and without economic development, social justice can only mean sharing poverty. The two must be closely allied and interdependent." (Moscoso, USAID document, p. 10-11).

Building on the economic planning and country engagement style of the Marshall Plan⁵¹ and on the developmental programs started by the IIAA, the OAS created the Inter-America Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) in 1963 (Butterfield, 2004, p. 65). Much like the OEEC, the CIAP was meant to coordinate regional development. It oversaw each country's national development plan by holding annual, week-long peer reviews of each country's development progress to assess each country's need for outside assistance.⁵² The

⁵¹ To date, the Office of the Historian of the US Department of State still refers to the Alliance for Progress as the 'Marshall Plan for Latin America' (Department of State, 2016).

⁵² This is not unlike the current OECD DAC peer review mechanism, where two members of the DAC review the aid progress of a fellow committee member every 4-5 years and publish a report in cooperation with the country's lead aid agency.

review program was said to be particularly helpful for smaller, less well-resourced states, as it gave them an opportunity to receive feedback on their development plans and offered an opportunity to connect them with donors, which larger, better-resources countries were able to manage alone (Butterfield, 2004, p. 65). While a number of other events (e.g. military coups in Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador, to name a few) interrupted progress on the development goals set by the Alliance for Progress, its institutional underpinnings are representative of the US' preferred style of multilateral engagement, and also led to a substantial increase in US ODA to Latin America, which went from \$184 million in 1960 to \$457 million in 1964 (or \$1.12 billion in 1960 to \$2.65 billion in 1964 in 2013 USD) (OECD Stats).

While building on previous models of US regional engagement, three factors set aid to Latin America apart in the 1960s. First, demonstrating allegiance to the US/capitalist cause was conditioned on rejecting not only communism but all forms of totalitarianism. While the US ultimately relaxed this policy⁵³, the Department of State made it clear in 1965 that:

"Our policy in Latin America is not one of sterile anti-Communism, or preservation of the status quo. We are actively supporting the expansion of democracy in Latin America on the basis of political, economic, and social reforms. It is our hope and intention that, with adequate defense against totalitarian intervention, Latin America will achieve further significant progress on the path of modern democracy. This is not only one of the major aims of the Alliance for Progress; it is one of the fundamental objectives of our entire Latin American policy" (US Department of State, 1965; Ford, 1968, p.23-4).

⁵³ In large part, this change was in response to the democratic election of leftist leaders whose interests did not align with those of the US government. Furthermore, overtly meddling in the political affairs of Latin American countries would have violated the norms of the US' long-standing 'Good Neighbour' policy in the region. Instead, the US turned to more covert means - including CIA-sponsored assassinations - to 'catalyze' political change within Latin American countries that the US considered both inevitable and more immediately palatable.

Second, US interests did not necessarily align with those of the political class in Latin American countries. Decentralising political power through the instillation of democracies and the promotion of redistributive policies – social policies, but also land and tax reform – were simply not in the political or economic interest of the elite. Third, the policy discourse on aid to Latin America was framed in terms of ‘peaceful revolution’ as opposed to ‘containment’. As illustrated by Ford, the US was keen to present an alternative to the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and welfare was a critical element of this strategy. In a speech given on 20 April 1959 at Princeton University, Fidel Castro explained what, in his mind, set Cuba’s Revolution apart:

“Our revolution was made without hate of classes... Our revolution was a revolution for social justice, for the poor people and, of course, too, for the middle classes... Our revolution has proved three new things to the world: 1) revolution is possible when people were not starving; 2) revolution was possible against the army; 3) revolution was possible against modern weapons... In the world there are two ideas: capitalism and communism. One sacrifices freedom and the other, many times, the needs of the people. We feel that there is a system that combines both, which we call humanism. We must satisfy material needs and serve other purposes. But to satisfy man’s material needs we are satisfying man’s material needs without sacrificing freedoms... Our goal of welfare is not in any sense in opposition to your economy... The United States has a lot of responsibility for what happens in this hemisphere for it is the stronger (nation) of the hemisphere. Your government ought to think of more than a few millions, a few interests” (Castro, 1959)

Social policy was a central element of the reforms undertaken in post-revolutionary Cuba, and the normative frameworks of the social medicine movement⁵⁴, driven by doctors and leaders throughout Latin America such as Salvador Allende, served as a touchstone for these policies (Waitzkin et al., 2001). With support from the Soviet Union, Cuba pursued economic

⁵⁴ It is important to note that this movement was critical of the Rockefeller Foundation’s public health initiatives, “... which emphasized the productivity of labor in enhancing the ventures of US-based multinational corporations” (Waitzkin et al., 2001, p. 1594). For more detail on the nature of their critique, please see Birn and Solórzano (1999), Brown (1979), Cueto (1994), and Franco-Agudelo (1983).

growth and development through land reform and improvements in housing provision, a literacy campaign, enhancing the availability of electricity and safe drinking water, improving working conditions, and the introduction of 12 weeks of pregnancy/maternity leave for women – all of which contributed to improved health outcomes despite the loss of approximately half of the country's 6,000 doctors, many of whom fled to the US immediately after the revolution (De Vos, 2005). With no direct support or intervention from either the World Bank or the IMF, Cuba's health outcomes are among the best in the world (De Vos, 2005, p. 190).

Given the integral nature of development assistance to US foreign policy in Latin America, the Bureaus for Latin America at both USAID and the Department of State were merged in 1964 (Ford, 1968, p. 33). However, this bureaucratic re-organisation was not enough to combat the sizable political barriers and constraints to the successful implementation of the Alliance for Progress. First, administrators within the Latin American bureau had a large amount of responsibility yet wielded a comparatively small amount of power. Parties ranging from Congress to US multinational and local commercial interest in Latin America proved to be more powerful in dictating the terms of aid programmes that may or may not have been feasible to implement (Ford, 1968). Second, State and USAID officials continued to argue over whether the primary objective of development assistance was to achieve political/diplomatic or technical aims (Ford, 1968). Third, both USAID and the field of development itself were very young and the agency lacked substantial expertise - which was only exacerbated by USAID's regional (re-)organisation, where technical experts who were previously housed in the ICA (Figure 12; Figure 13) were split up and assigned to one of USAID's regional bureaus.

In sum, the foreign policy and institutional context in which development assistance was being delivered to Latin America was vastly more complicated when compared to the WWII era. The US was attempting simultaneously: (i) to present a viable alternative to the model of social change offered by communism; (ii) to promote political liberalisation and economic development in line with modernization theory; and (iii) to ensure that this agenda was financed at least in part, if not largely by the Latin American elite – all on what could generously be described as a modest budget. With fickle support from an ever-skeptical Congress, relatively powerless USAID administrators, and a shortage of qualified personnel, it is perhaps unsurprising that the outcomes of the ‘Alliance for Progress’ fell short of expectations.

THE ‘GREEN REVOLUTION’ AND THE ‘WAR ON HUNGER’

While modernization theory offered a road map for enhancing economic production, the relationship between reproduction and development received increased attention in the 1960s as well. As early as the late 1940s, a number of social scientists raised concerns about food security in the developing world (Butterfield, 2004, p. 99). With advances in public health, the death rate in developing countries was decreasing. However in the absence of increased economic development, the birth rate was not decreasing at a corresponding rate, resulting in population growth. In light of this trend, scientists were concerned that food supply would not keep up with demand and many feared a ‘Malthusian catastrophe’. Drought and subsequent crop failures in India and Pakistan in the mid-1960s brought a sense of urgency to this issue, and the Johnson Administration formulated a policy response.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ It should be noted that in addition to protectionist agricultural policies (which remain contentious), the US also used food aid to expand its agricultural markets abroad and as a sort of insurance for US farmers, many of whom would have been living at or near the poverty line themselves without government support. However the US was compelled to encourage better agricultural practices in other countries when the famines in India

In a special message to Congress on 10 February 1966, President Johnson declared a 'War on Hunger', stating that, "Hunger poisons the mind. It saps the body. It destroys hope. It is the natural enemy of every man on earth. I propose that the United States lead the world in a war against hunger" (Johnson, 1966). President Johnson's War on Hunger was the foreign policy equivalent of his domestic 'War on Poverty' (Butterfield, 2004, p. 101). The War on Hunger consisted of a two-pronged strategy that was coordinated by the newly formed War on Hunger Office at USAID (Butterfield, 2004, p. 101). First, increased effort would be put into innovations aimed at enhancing crop yields, such as the creation of new seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides and also improved irrigation practices. To ensure take up, the US then conditioned the receipt of food aid on the adoption of practices shown to increase crop yields (Department of State, A Short History of U.S. International Food Assistance). Together, US-sponsored research efforts in Mexico and the Philippines led to the creation of improved wheat crops and rice crops, respectively, in what has come to be known as the 'Green Revolution', which more or less eliminated the fear of impending famine in the developing world.⁵⁶ Funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and developed and developing country governments supported these efforts, which were led by biologist Norman Borlaug⁵⁷ (Butterfield, 2004, p. 85).

and Pakistan took up such a large amount of US grain surpluses that concerns for food security outstripped fear of competition for US agricultural producers.

⁵⁶ It is also important to note that only the *fear* of an impending famine was averted, not the occurrence of famines themselves, as food production and food distribution are of course two separate matters. In other words, adequate food production is necessary, but not sufficient for preventing famines. Furthermore, critics of Borlaug's work point out that the genetically-modified seeds he produced reduced soil fertility, required expensive pesticides, and also required additional water to grow – all of which in the end actually increased the costs of farming, thereby making small-holder farmers worse off than before.

⁵⁷ Borlaug earned a Nobel Peace Prize for his work in 1970 (Butterfield, 2004, p. 85).

The second, and more politically controversial prong to this strategy consisted of efforts to control population growth by financing access to family planning in the developing world. In 1965, Congress began earmarking USAID appropriations for population assistance, and in 1967, Congress formally added Title X, Programs Relating to Population Growth to the FAA authorizing legislation (Kasun, 1999, p. 219). The Population Service staff under USAID's War on Hunger Office was expanded, and it eventually became its own office within USAID (Butterfield, 2004, p. 101-3). USAID's Office of Population, "... vigorously pushed family-planning projects, exported contraceptives at optimistic levels, and granted large amounts of money to nongovernment family-planning organizations, all with little deference to USAID's usually dominant regional bureaus or often skeptical country missions" (Butterfield, 2004, p. 103). While Congress supported these policies, several interest groups opposed them on moral and ethical grounds, they were controversial among USAID staff, and recipient countries were not always interested in these interventions (Butterfield, 2004, p. 101-3). Therefore in the short-run, the 'reproductive revolution' had only a modest effect relative to the 'Green Revolution' (Butterfield, 2004, p. 103), but in the long run, contraception use among couples of reproductive age increased from approximately 10 per cent of the population in the mid-1960s to 50 per cent by the 1990s – making a significant contribution to stabilising population growth.

THE SECOND DECADE OF DEVELOPMENT: 'NEW DIRECTIONS'

CHANGING POLITICS OF US DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: DEPENDENCY THEORY AND THE EROSION OF SUPPORT FROM THE LEFT

By the end of the first 'Decade of Development', US development assistance was at crossroads. The \$1.9 billion in FAA appropriations passed in 1969 were the lowest in the

history of US foreign aid (Congressional Quarterly, 1971). Enthusiasm for aid was stalling, as fear of communist regimes taking hold across Latin America and Africa as part of a 'domino effect' had lessened, democracy had proved difficult to instill in these regions, the Viet Nam War was growing more controversial by the day, and the results of development assistance had been modest at best, with the 'Green Revolution' serving as the main success story (Asher, 1971). Even in developing countries where economic growth had occurred, gains sparked or supported in part by development assistance had often done more to improve the position of those at the top than those at the bottom.

These results and sentiments also offered support for critiques of modernization theories of development – namely, dependency theory. Dependency theorists (e.g. Frank, 1966; Dos Santos, 1970; Palma, 1978) argued that the lack of development in the 'Third World' was not to do with a lack of Western economic development, but instead was a function of the exploitative nature of centre-periphery relationships - both colonial and now 'neo-colonial' - between the First and Third Worlds. Therefore, dependency theorists argued that the best way for the Third World to 'develop' was to lessen their ties to the First World (including development assistance) and to focus instead on their internal development through policies such as import substitution industrialization. With a new theoretical footing and disappointed by the results of development assistance from much of the first 'Decade of Development', aid was now struggling to retain support not only from the Right but also from the Left.

Furthermore, amid ideological and ontological changes in development theory and policy, multilateral and bilateral institutions outside the US had continued to evolve throughout the 1960s, further complicating aid's institutional architecture. Several UN

agencies were created to coordinate national and international responses to development problems, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)⁵⁸ and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (now the UN Population Fund) (UNFPA)⁵⁹. Membership of the OECD DAC continued to grow, and the DAC worked to set common standards for development assistance and to encourage more effective development cooperation both between donors and between donors and recipients by: standardizing country reporting of development statistics through creation of the Credit Reporting System (CRS) in 1966; delineating 'Overseas Development Assistance' (ODA) relative to other types of transfers in 1969; and working to 'untie' procurement of both multilateral and bilateral aid (Führer, 1996). Finally in 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted the '0.7 target', formally recommending that members of the DAC dedicate at least 0.7 per cent of their Gross National Product toward ODA by 1975 (OECD, 2016).

In light of these many changes and with a keen awareness of eroding political support for development assistance in the US, several reports were released in the late 1960s and early 1970s to take stock of the aid industry and develop a new approach for the second 'decade of development' (Box 6.5). Reports were commissioned for each of the US

⁵⁸ The UNDP was created in 1966 through a merger of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the UN Special Fund. In its blend of technical assistance and financial instruments for development, it was not entirely dissimilar from the founding of USAID. Furthermore, Paul Hoffman, former head of the Economic Cooperation Agency, which oversaw the implementation of the Marshall Plan, was the first UNDP Administrator.

⁵⁹ UNFPA was created as a trust fund in 1967 and established as a subsidiary of the UN General Assembly in 1969. For a more detailed history of UNFPA, please see Robinson (2010)

Box 6.5: SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT REPORTS RELEASED AT THE END OF THE FIRST 'DECADE OF DEVELOPMENT'

Jackson Report (UNDP / UN System): Sir Robert Jackson (Australia) assess: (i) the capacity of the UNDP to use its current resources in partnership with the rest of the UN system and (ii) whether or not it could effectively absorb twice as much funding. In this 400+ page report, Jackson outlines problems with development cooperation within the UN 'system' (arguing primarily that 'system' is more of a 'non-system' (Asher, 1971)), offers suggestions for how best to improve it, makes the case for why these reforms would be better than allowing IBRD to take over many aspects of the development process, and finally, outlines why these suggestions are unlikely to be implemented (Jackson, 1969; Kaufmann, 1971).


Pearson Committee Report (World Bank – IBRD & IDA): Led by Lester B. Pearson (Canada) and entitled 'Partners in Development', the 400+ page Pearson Report "... proposes a new basis for international development co-operation and spells out the responsibilities of both donor and recipient countries" (Pearson, 1970, p. 4). The report recommends doubling the amount of aid channeled through multilateral institutions from 10 per cent to 20 percent during the 1970s by channeling at least one-third of proposed aid increases through the World Bank and other multilaterals and also calls for donor countries to meet the '0.7 target' by 1975 (Pearson, 1970).

Perkins/Peterson Commission Report (USAID / DFL): Toward the end of President Johnson's Administration in 1968, Congress called for a review of US foreign aid programmes, which was conducted by the President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs (chaired by James A. Perkins). Their report, *Development Assistance in the New Administration*, was released in January 1969, and it recommended that a larger portion of US development assistance be channeled through multilateral institutions (Lancaster, 2007, p. 75). President Nixon reviewed this report, and in his first message to Congress, he promised to form the Presidential Task Force on International Development. Created in 1969 and chaired by Rudolph Peterson, the task force presented President Nixon with a report in March 1970 entitled *US Foreign Assistance in the 1970s: A New Approach*, which called for multilateral institutions to become the 'major channel' for US development assistance and for a dramatic re-organization of US development assistance into: a US International Development Bank; a US International Development Institute; an Overseas Private Investment Corporation; and a US International Development Council. The extensive re-organisation suggested by the task force was not adopted by Congress, which was already working on a separate set of plans (Lancaster, 2007, p. 76; Nowels, 2006, p. 3).

Prebisch Report (IADB): In this report for the Inter-American Development Bank, Raúl Prebisch (Argentina) argues for the acceleration of an inwardly-oriented, yet externally supported development plan for Latin America. With a focus on increased growth rates and ISI, the plan aims to increase aid and support for economic growth through a process designed to better distribute the fruits of such growth, particularly between rural and urban areas (Prebisch, 1970).

bilateral and multilateral institutions overseeing development financing (Figure 6.21) including: the Jackson Report on the UN; the Pearson Committee report on the World Bank, focusing largely on IBRD; the Perkins and Peterson Committees, which evaluated US development assistance; and the Prebisch Report on the IADB. Support for multilateralism is a common theme throughout these reports, along with agreement that: (i) Western powers have made an ‘unambiguous commitment’ to the long-term task of development to ensure the emergence of “...responsible and independent states in the low-income world”; (ii) despite modest gains in absolute terms, conditions in low-income countries have improved at a faster rate than ever before; (iii) external assistance has done more to

FIGURE 6.21: US MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCING ARCHITECTURE



enable, rather than hinder these improvements; and (iv) that political will, not financial capability, is the only barrier to rich countries increasing their development assistance contributions (Asher, 1971, p. 102-3).

However by 1971, the findings of these reports and the efforts to reform development assistance proved too little, too late. Caught in the crossfire between the executive and legislative branches regarding the ongoing conflict in Viet Nam and increased intervention in Cambodia, Congress refused to authorize foreign aid legislation for the first time in 24 years (Congressional Quarterly, 1971).⁶⁰ “The defeat was the product of opposition from both conservative and liberal Senators, some of whom had previously supported foreign aid. Conservatives argued that the billions poured by the United States into foreign aid had failed to gain international support for U.S. policies. On the other hand liberals contended that the aid mechanism had been taken over by military considerations, that it was not effective in its humanitarian efforts and should be funneled through international organizations” (Congressional Quarterly, 1971). Subsequently, proposals to restructure US development assistance inline with the Perkins and Peterson Reports were also rejected. “Supporters of foreign aid were left little choice but to redesign the program or watch it die. The House Foreign Affairs Committee led attempts to salvage the program” (Congressional Quarterly, 1973a). By 1973, US ODA hit what was then an all-time low in ODA giving in both absolute and relative terms, with only 0.2 per cent of GNI toward ODA – a far cry from the ‘0.7 target’ set by the UN.

⁶⁰ Instead, funding for foreign aid was passed through a substitute measure cleared by Congress in the next session and through continuing resolution the following year based on the last authorization of foreign aid legislation in 1969 (Congressional Quarterly, 1973a).


In line with the UN strategy for the second 'Decade of Development' (United Nations, 1970), Congress approved the 1973 FAA authorization, which came to be known as 'New Directions'. "Branded as cosmetic by critics, and as a fundamentally new approach by supporters," the legislation adopted a focus on 'basic human needs' by "replacing the old categories of technical assistance and development loans and grants with new functional categories aimed at specific problems such as nutrition, population planning, health, and education" (Congressional Quarterly, 1973a; Nowels, 2006; Epstein and Weed, 2009).⁶¹ Funding for the Alliance for Progress in Latin America was also integrated into these new functional categories (Congressional Quarterly, 1973a), thereby ending a decades long tradition of treating bilateral assistance to Latin America as a special matter within US development assistance (though its unique multilateral infrastructure remained). By focusing on 'basic human needs', the legislation accomplished two important aims: (i) it regained support from the Left; and (ii) it sharpened the rationale and purpose of bilateral, as opposed to multilateral ODA. In line with recommendations from the many reports evaluating the first Decade of Development, 'top down' capital development projects (the benefits of which had shown little propensity to 'trickle down' to the poor) should be managed primarily by multilateral organizations (i.e. World Bank / IBRD), while bilateral programs should work to deliver assistance directly to those in need.

However, it appears that 'New Directions' did more to solve the political problems within the US Congress regarding development assistance than it did to change the degree

⁶¹ For greater detail on how this bipartisan legislation was created, please see Butterfield, 2004, p. 178-9.

to which basic needs were emphasized in its allocation. As displayed in Figure 6.22, US multilateral aid increased as a percentage of ODA after ‘New Directions’ as expected; US

FIGURE 6.22: US MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ODA, 1960-1980




Source: OECD CRS Database

bilateral ODA greatly reduced its rate of decline, and finally started to increase substantially again by 1978. However the portion of US bilateral ODA going toward the social sector as a result of ‘New Directions’ was relatively small. As shown in Figure 6.23, New Directions’ budget lines in the social sector (namely population policies, health, and education) accounted for just over 10 per cent of US bilateral ODA from 1974 through 1980. However, New Directions was by far the most substantial portion of the funding that was dedicated to the social sector, accounting for approximately 73 per cent of the sector’s funding from 1974-

1980.⁶² Beyond the social sector alone, New Directions also included funding for ‘Food and Nutrition’ (included in the blue line in Figure 6.23), and the majority

FIGURE 6.23: NEW DIRECTIONS BUDGET LINES AS A PER CENT OF US BILATERAL ODA, 1974-1980



Source: OECD CRS Database


of New Directions’ funding was allocated here. Finally, New Directions seems to have had little effect on the allocation of aid both within and between regions. Baring the large increase in aid to Israel and Egypt after the Yom Kippur War from 1975 onwards⁶³, the only change in the regional allocation of aid was a steady decline in aid to Asia, led by a reduction in development assistance to Viet Nam and India, and also to Pakistan, Indonesia, South

⁶² The OECD does not have data for US spending in the social sector in 1974 or 1980, so this average is based on figures from 1975-76, and 1977-80.

⁶³ The Yom Kippur War took place in October of 1973 when Soviet-backed Egyptians and Syrians attacked Israeli positions within the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, respectively. The Israeli Army fought back, at which point the UN stepped in to broker a ceasefire. Both Egypt and Israel received drastic increases in aid from the US beginning in 1975, and the two countries signed the Camp David Peace Accords in 1978.

Korea, and Cambodia (Figure 6.24). Further Gang and Lehman (1990) show that within Latin America, the extent of basic needs did not affect a change in the distribution of development assistance within the region.

FIGURE 6.24: US BILATERAL ODA BY REGION, 1970-1980




Source: OECD CRS Database

After a few relatively calm years of foreign aid authorizations and appropriations in Congress after 'New Directions', the Carter administration sought to elevate development as a priority within US foreign policy and to better coordinate US development assistance under the umbrella of the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) (Nowels, 2006, p. 4). Led by Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN)⁶⁴, the original legislation recommended

⁶⁴ Hubert Humphrey was formerly the Vice-President under Lyndon B. Johnson and was the Democratic Presidential Nominee in 1968.

replacing USAID with the IDCA, which would coordinate all parts of non-military related assistance (concessional or otherwise), ranging from contributions to multilateral development banks to the Peace Corps to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (Lancaster, 2007, p. 80-1). Though there is no official record of this, Lancaster (2007) suggests that the push to elevate development policy may have been in reaction to an attempt by the Department of State to exert greater control over USAID’s budget process, which was usually managed independently in consultation with the White House.⁶⁵ Ultimately, this legislation was not successful,⁶⁶ however President Carter moved forward with the creation of the IDCA via Executive Order on 29 September 1979 (Figure 6.25).

FIGURE 6.25: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, 1979



⁶⁵ Lancaster (2007, p. 246) discloses that she was the State Department official who called for this review.

⁶⁶ Senator Humphrey also died on 13 January 1978, before the IDCA was created.

The reform attempted to change the process through which foreign aid was coordinated through the creation of two committees – the Development Loan Committee and the Development Coordination Committee – that would be chaired by the IDCA Director. However in practice, the IDCA had very little impact. On 19 July 1979, President Carter nominated Thomas Ehrlich as the first Director of the IDCA. During his tenure, the agency “... showed signs of moving the aid program away from the policy dominance traditionally asserted by the State and Treasury departments and becoming an important independent force in U.S. foreign policy” (Goshko, 1984). During Ehrlich’s tenure, the IDCA worked with USAID to streamline the structure of the organization, preparing it to efficiently and effectively make use of additional development assistance funds in years to come (IDCA, 1979). However, these efforts were curtailed after President Carter lost his bid for a second term in office to Ronald Reagan. According to one official:

*“the Reagan people have always regarded IDCA as an unnecessary extra layer of bureaucracy that they can do without. That’s particularly so of an administration that tends to put a high premium on military aid as opposed to development aid and that would rather have the State and Treasury in a position where they can use aid as a political and strategic policy tool without having to contend with an independent-minded, separate agency...
“To abolish IDCA would involve a lot of bureaucratic and legislative problems. So the simplest thing for the administration is to leave it there on paper and just ignore it” (Washington Post, 1984).*

In line with the strategy outlined above, President Reagan appointed Peter McPherson as both Director of the IDCA and USAID Administrator, and the IDCA itself was gutted, leaving it with no staff and no budget line (Lippman, 1997).

THE 1980S: NEOLIBERALISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN THE ‘THIRD WORLD’

The onset of neoliberalism was characterised by a shift in capitalism’s expressed social aim – namely, to improve welfare – to an agenda much more explicitly focused on market promotion and expansion. Capitalism was seen less as a project pursued jointly by states and

markets, but one in which private enterprise, free trade, and markets took the lead and were to be credited, individuals were free to engage with the market as they saw fit, and welfare served as an indicator of the extent to which this system has been correctly and fully implemented. Furthermore, to unleash market potential, it was argued that the state should be 'rolled back', both domestically and elsewhere. Before Third World countries could receive financial assistance, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF often called for a number of conditions to be put into place, such as fiscal austerity measures, trade and capital account liberalisation, public sector layoffs and other structural reforms (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, King, 2016)

Coupled with efforts by the Reagan administration to promote private enterprise more than fuel state-driven development programmes, there were little changes to US foreign aid in the social sector during the 1980s. Furthermore, two attempts at structural reform were made, though neither was successful (Epstein and Weed, 2009). First, the Carlucci Commission, led by Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, examined security aid in relation to development assistance as well as the dissatisfaction and distrust between the executive branch and Congress with respect to foreign aid. While the Committee did release recommendations, no further action was taken. Second, the House Foreign Affairs Committee appointed Representatives Lee Hamilton and Ben Gilman to lead a task force with the aim of revising and updating the foreign aid legislation, and in so doing, improve governmental cooperation on the topic of foreign aid. Like previous efforts, the Task Force issued a number of recommendations, and again, no reforms were made. However, the lack of change to the foreign facet of the US welfare state, was also a sign of stability and longevity;

while foreign aid in the social sector was not expanded during this time, neither was it retrenched.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of colonial engagement, the US found new ways of working beyond its borders, particularly in Latin America. Coordinating arrangements such as *Servicios* enhanced international coordination between donors and recipients, in addition to ensuring that development assistance was anchored in legal agreements within recipient countries. Furthermore, transnational actors, such as foundations and firms, played a key role in coordinating committees and in the implementation of foreign aid programmes in recipient countries. It was also clear that the US's geopolitical position relative to other colonial and former colonial powers affect the geographies of development assistance at the regional, national, and sub-national levels. In other words, the multilateral system affecting welfare on a global scale is not 'flat', but both multidimensional and asymmetrical.

Welfare was very much at the heart of US foreign aid policies and programmes, both in rhetoric and deed, across defense and development policy. With regards to defense, the US fully integrated social policy into its counter-insurgency operations in Viet Nam, again, as part of broader containment strategies. However interestingly, in Latin America, social policy was used as a tool not only to contain and promote alternatives to communism, but also as a means of pacification through the promotion of 'peaceful revolutions'. Furthermore, a number of political- and/or problem-based trends, such as the 'reproductive' and 'agricultural' revolutions seem to ebb and flow through the policymaking space, not least because there is not one party or actor that appears to be responsible for global problems or problems in countries with a limited capacity to address them.

Moreover, as the foreign facet of the welfare state developed in the US, it appears that the many relations (domestic, international, transnational) that it sits between can create a great deal of tension, to the point of paralysis. Ultimately, this has led to a lack of reform in the US case, and further comparative work is needed to identify the determinants of these dynamics across country cases. However lacking in dynamism, the foreign facet also serves as a channel for the exchange of ideas about social policy and welfare, which are often operationalised in new and different ways given the change in context. In other words, when ideas and instruments related to the promotion of social policy in a domestic context 'jump tracks' (Sassen, 2006) for use in a foreign policy context (and vice versa), it appears this has the potential to catalyse changes, and even transformations, at the intersection of social policy and foreign policy.

The final chapter of Part III continues with further examination of the US, with a particular focus on what may have driven the sharp increase in ODA seen since 1997 in the wake of the Cold War era.

7 FOREIGN AID IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR POST-COLD WAR IN THE UNITED STATES

"In World War II we fought to make the world safer, then worked to rebuild it. As we wage war today to keep the world safe from terror, we must also work to make the world a better place for all its citizens."


- President George W. Bush, 14 March 2002 in Washington DC at the Inter-American Development Bank as quoted in the 2002 US National Security Strategy

INTRODUCTION

Despite the creation of USAID and its focus on basic needs from the 'New Directions' reforms in 1973, US foreign aid dedicated toward welfare remained a residual portion of US development assistance by the end of the Cold War. As illustrated in Chapter six, neither the creation of the IDCA in 1979 nor the turn toward neo-liberalism in the 1980s seemed to affect the degree to which social policy was used as a tool of foreign policy. Continuing this trend into the early 1990s, US ODA in the social sector appeared to be unaffected by both the end of Cold War and increased criticism of the negative impact of the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s.


However, by 1997, ODA in the social sector began to increase dramatically (Figure 7.1). This chapter explores what might explain this increase, with a working hypothesis that it may bare some relationship to the end of the Cold War. As shown in Figure 7.2, this increase took place predominantly within the bilateral portion of US ODA in the social sector. Therefore, this chapter focuses specifically on US bilateral development assistance in the social sector. While not directly focused on multilateral development assistance, the chapter continues to trace changes in architecture of the foreign facet of the welfare state in addition to using data from the OECD DAC Credit Reporting System to focus more in depth on specific policy areas that had a disproportionately affected this increase.

FIGURE 7.1: US ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR, 2002-2014



Source: OECD CRS Database

FIGURE 7.2: US ODA IN THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES SECTOR BY CHANNELLING, 2002-2014



Source: OECD CRS Database

METHODS

As in Chapter 6, an historical narrative was constructed to gain insight into what might explain the dramatic increase in foreign aid in the social sector from the United States. Both quantitative data from the OECD, as well as OECD Peer Review reports, CRS reports, Congressional Quarterly accounts of key debates in the US Congress, data from early exploratory interviews as well as secondary and grey literature were all used to uncover the drivers behind this increase and to place them in context.


FINDINGS

CREATING A 'SEMI-AUTONOMOUS' USAID AND THE ELEVATION OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY AS A 'THIRD PILLAR' OF US FOREIGN POLICY

During the Clinton Administration, US development assistance was finally restructured under the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998¹ – nearly 20 years since its last reform (Figure 7.3). In an effort to consolidate foreign assistance, the reform abolished the IDCA and transferred its oversight functions – including those to do with USAID - to the Department of State. However, the budget and legislative processes of USAID and the Department of State would remain independent. To achieve its current 'semi-autonomous' status, the Secretary of State then delegated authority for development assistance to the USAID Administrator via State Department Delegation of Authority 145 (USAID, 1999).

¹ Technically speaking, this act was vetoed by President Clinton on 21 October 1998 because “the Congress has included unacceptable restrictions on international family planning programs and threatened our leadership in the world community by tying our payment of dues to the United Nations and other international organizations to these unrelated family planning issues” (Congressional Quarterly, 1998b). Instead, the foreign affairs reorganization was included an omnibus spending bill (Congressional Quarterly, 1999a).

FIGURE 7.3: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1998



From a legal and institutional perspective, these arrangements were more or less functional equivalents, however the lines of authority over US development policymaking had changed. Previously, the ICDA/USAID Administrator was delegated authority from the President; now the administrator received it from the Secretary of State, with hardly any legal difference between the two. Regarding institutional change, the IDCA had had little, if any effect on the relationship between USAID and the State Department, not least because the IDCA was not funded under President Reagan and was also run by the USAID Administrator. In practice, this meant that the relationship between USAID and the Department of State had not changed since USAID's founding in 1961, where it was created as a subsidiary of the State Department with its Administrator holding the rank of an undersecretary. Effectively, the independent budget process of the two entities was what had kept them distinct overtime. However in delegating authority to the USAID Administrator, the Secretary of State was forced to recognise USAID's control over not


only its budget process, but also over the policies that guided development assistance, which was a substantial departure from the previous arrangement. Under these new terms, USAID became the 'semi-autonomous' agency it is known as today. However this was perhaps a case of 'out of the frying pan and into the fire' for USAID, which has struggled just as much if not more with Congress in trying to maintain independence and authority over US development policy. Congressional earmarks have severely constrained USAID's autonomy, and as discussed later in the chapter, attempts from the Department of State to direct US development assistance remain alive and well.

From a political perspective, this reform struck a very delicate balance. During the Clinton administration, Vice-President Al Gore led efforts to 'reinvent government', exploring ways both to reduce costs and to streamline government administration. In 1994, Secretary of State Warren Christopher proposed that Vice-President Gore lead a study to explore the possibility of merging USAID into the Department of State (Lancaster, 2007, p. 87). According to Lancaster (2007, p. 87 and 247), this prospect was attractive to the State Department's Global Affairs Bureau, which is responsible for managing diplomacy on a number of global issues but was poorly resourced. Furthermore, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC,) who was then Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (and a vocal critic of foreign aid) was also keen on the merger. In the end, abolishing the IDCA and transferring USAID to the Department of State placated Republicans while the transfer of authority from the Secretary of State to the USAID Administrator satisfied Democrats and helped to ensure that development policy was not dictated entirely by the political/diplomatic concerns of the State Department, enabling it to retain some glow of enlightened self-interest.

By the year 2000, global development was receiving increasing amounts of attention, in conjunction both with the endorsement of the new Millennium Development Goals and the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1308, which unanimously recognised HIV/AIDS as a security threat – the first time the Security Council had ever addressed a global health issue. In the US, this trend was only reinforced in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks. As described by the non-partisan Congressional Research Service (CRS), “Especially since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, foreign aid has taken on a more strategic sense of importance, cast frequently in terms of contributing to the global war on terrorism. In September 2002, President Bush released his Administrations’ National Security Strategy that established global development, for the first time, as the third ‘pillar’ of U.S. national security, along with defense and diplomacy. However critically, this was not coupled with any intension of making USAID a cabinet-level agency. Also in 2002, executive branch foreign assistance budget justifications began to underscore the war on terrorism as the top foreign aid priority, highlighting amounts of U.S. assistance to about 30 ‘front-line’ states in the terrorism war” (Tarnoff and Nowels, 2005, p. CRS-1).

From this point forward, data from the OECD DAC’s Credit Reporting System from 2002 to 2012 reveals that this increase was driven by two sub-sectors in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector: (i) the Population Policies/Programmes and Reproductive Health sub-sector; and (ii) the Government and Civil Society sub-sector (Figure 7.4). The remainder of this chapter focuses on changes in each of these sub-sectors, contextualising the genesis of these spending increase at the end of the Clinton Administration and the beginning of the Bush Administration within US development policy and foreign policy more broadly to understand the drivers behind this increase.

FIGURE 7.4: US BILATERAL ODA IN THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES SECTOR BY SUB-SECTOR, 2002-2012




Source: OECD CRS Database

POPULATION POLICIES/PROGRAMMES AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SUB-SECTOR – THE PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF (PEPFAR)


Within the Population Policies/Programmes and Reproductive Health sub-sector, the increase has occurred almost solely within the ‘STD control including HIV/AIDS’ subsector (Figure 7.5). Within this subsector, the money has been allocated primarily to sub-Saharan Africa and to ‘unspecified’ developing countries (Figure 7.6). In sub-Saharan Africa, this funding increase was driven primarily by the implementation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, more commonly known as ‘PEPFAR’. PEPFAR’s authorizing legislation was signed by President George W. Bush in May 2003, and Congress appropriated its funds in January 2004 – after which point ODA in this sub-sector begins to increase substantially. Funding allocated to eight sub-Saharan African countries in particular – South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia,

FIGURE 7.5: US BILATERAL ODA IN THE POPULATION POLICIES/PROGRAMMES AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SUB-SECTOR, 2002-2012



Source: OECD CRS Database


FIGURE 7.6: US BILATERAL ODA IN THE POPULATION POLICIES/PROGRAMMES AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SUB-SECTOR BY REGION, 2002-2012



Source: OECD CRS Database


Mozambique, and Botswana - drove this regional increase (Figure 7.7); by 2012, funding from PEPFAR was responsible for nearly all US ODA in this subsector in all eight of these countries (Figure 7.8). Funding allocated to 'Developing Countries unspecified' as shown in Figure 7.6 also came largely from PEPFAR and was dedicated towards projects and activities such as conferences, health surveillance systems, technical assistance to multilateral organisations and broader initiatives of third sector organisations that were HIV/AIDS related, but not targeted to any one recipient country per se.

FIGURE 7.7: US ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS FOR STDs AND HIV/AIDS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA BY COUNTRY, 2002-2012



Source: OECD CRS Database

FIGURE 7.8: PEPFAR FUNDING AS PER CENT OF US ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS FOR STDs AND HIV/AIDS



Source: OECD CRS Database

Several factors played a role in the dramatic increase in US funding to address HIV/AIDS on a global scale, the groundwork for which was laid over the course of several years spanning the end of the Clinton Administration and the early years of the Bush Administration. First, the UN Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 1308 regarding the effect of HIV/AIDS on international peace and security on 17 July 2000 was the culmination of the efforts of a range of actors, from policymakers to third sector organisations to activists, who worked to raise awareness of the epidemic and to mobilise a response. Of course AIDS – both the disease itself and the US government’s awareness of the grave nature of its health and social repercussions - was not ‘new’, but before the

early 2000s, the US had made only minimal efforts to address it on a global scale.² With much controversy, the US first authorized funding to address HIV/AIDS both within and outside its borders at the end of President Reagan's administration in 1988 through the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education line of funding appropriations (Congressional Quarterly, 1988a). The focus was primarily on research for the development of vaccines and treatments; the US government also supported training for health professionals and occasionally funded other forms of social support for those affected. Two agencies of the US Department of Health and Human Services - the National Institutes of Health and the US Centers for Disease Control - played a leading role in these efforts. By 1996, the US also "supported the creation of a UN program to coordinate global AIDS efforts," (Dietrich, 2007, 278) which became the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). However, UNAIDS was created primarily to increase coordination of existing efforts more than to mobilise funds (Knight, 2008). Even after the founding of UNAIDS³, the HIV/AIDS epidemic continued to spread - particularly in sub-Saharan Africa - and in their final years in Office, the Clinton Administration pushed for a stronger response to the epidemic.

As explained by Dietrich (2007, 281), "By 1999⁴, key members of the Clinton administration were committed to putting AIDS on the security agenda. Their efforts led to unprecedented discussion of the issue in the UN Security Council in January 2000. There and elsewhere supporters made the case that the epidemic's impact on social systems, economies, governing capacities, militaries, and peacekeeping operations meant

² For a thorough, if heart wrenching account of the struggles of those dying of AIDS in the US during the early years of the epidemic, please see Shilts (1987). I am grateful to Matt Rogers for this recommendation.

³ For a history of UNAIDS, please see Knight (2008).

⁴ I should also note that include that, "The origins of the concept of an independent funding mechanism to fight AIDS and other diseases lie partly in a French proposal made in 1998.... France proposed an international fund to provide AIDS treatment in the developing world at the 1998 G-8 summit, held in Birmingham, England..." (Cooper and Salaam, 2005, n.p. - summary and CRS-2).

that it posed a real threat to both citizens and institutions.” As outlined by Elbe (2006), the decision to ‘securitize’ the response to HIV/AIDS has a number of pros and cons. On the one hand, ‘elevating’ HIV/AIDS to the ‘high politics’ arena of security issues raised awareness of the problem and may have increased the resource base available to address it; on the other hand, it encouraged a more militant response to the ‘threat’ posed by HIV/AIDS, which ran the risk of disregarding civil liberties, fueling stigmatization of those suffering from the disease, and of increasing the likelihood that the state (e.g. civil servants and politicians) and its key supporters (e.g. military personnel and the elite) would be more likely to receive treatment before other individuals (Elbe, 2006). Regardless, evidence suggesting that substantial numbers of military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa had contracted the disease was enough to cause alarm; a presentation from a UNAIDS official in 2001 suggests that HIV prevalence was as high as 60-70 per cent among South Africa’s military, 30 per cent among Namibia’s National Defence Force, and 25-50 per cent in Malawi’s army (Mathiot, 2001).⁵ Running independent of , but nevertheless in parallel to, arguments that foreign aid was a principle instrument of the US-proclaimed ‘War on Terror’, these statistics went some way toward shattering the veneer of the ‘welfare’ / ‘warfare’ dichotomy that had characterised US development policy since the founding of USAID in the 1960s; in so doing, it was unclear – normatively, conceptually, and institutionally – what role, if any, USAID was to play in addressing the AIDS crisis.

Repeating a well-established pattern, the US first supported the creation of a multilateral mechanism through which to channel funds to address the HIV/AIDS crisis –

⁵ In retrospect, many have questioned the degree to which AIDS would have affected security and stability in sub-Saharan Africa; Poku (2013) argues that “... far from overstating the case, the evidence that led to Resolution 1308 accurately reflected the plight of African communities.

the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (or the 'Global Fund'). Just days after the passage of the UN's Security Council resolution, HIV/AIDS was on the agenda of the Group of Eight (G8) meeting in Japan from 21-23 July 2000, where the creation of a fund was discussed (Global Fund, 2016). Less than a month later on 19 August 2000, Congress passed the 'Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000' (HR 3519, Public Law 106-264), which authorized the establishment of a trust fund via the World Bank (through either IBRD or IDA) to combat the AIDS epidemic. The legislation directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the USAID Administrator, to negotiate with the World Bank to create a trust fund in line with the requirements set by Congress in the legislation. Over the next year, support for the Fund was gathered from a number of sources: the African Union (Global Fund, 2016), UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (Schocken, n.d.; Copson and Salaam, 2005), and in May 2001, President George W. Bush pledged \$200 million toward the Fund as a starting contribution. In June 2001, the UN Special Session on AIDS formally called for the creation of the Global Fund (Schocken, n.d.); by July 2001, the G8 had also shown support for the Fund and a transitional working group was established to determine the Fund's governance and organizational structure (Global Fund, 2016). In January 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was formally constituted as a private Swiss foundation, for which the World Bank served as the Trustee and which was hosted by the WHO Secretariat (Global Fund, 2016).

Several elements of the Global Fund's design appear familiar despite clear differences when compared to past US-led development efforts. First as in previous years, the US was for the establishment of a multilateral financing mechanism to encourage as many other entities as possible to financially contribute to addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis. Second, somewhat like Rockefeller's *Servicos* in Latin America, the Global Fund served as a mechanism through which to blend support from the public and private

sectors; however, the Global Fund was embedded within a *donor* country (in this case, Switzerland) and financially managed at the global level (by the World Bank) rather than embedded and managed at the national or local level within each recipient country. Disembedding the blend of public and private assistance from the recipient country government had several knock-on effects; most notably, the main stage for competition over the policies guiding the use of the Global Fund's resources took place between the US and other donors - not between the US, other donors, and recipient countries on a country-by-country basis. This disembedding created greater distance between the multilateral financing mechanism and recipient country government, with the added complication that governmental institutions at not only the national, but also the global level needed to be considered in the Fund's policymaking activities.

Second, the separation of the financial and policymaking aspects of multilateral efforts to address the AIDS crisis also created challenges for the Global Fund. On the one hand, it claimed to be nothing more than a financing mechanism designed to enhance the resource base for HIV/AIDS; on the other, its secretariat was saddled with the responsibility of distributing the funds, which required some in-house expertise, and at various points the Fund did draw from personnel at pre-existing UN agencies (namely the WHO and UNAIDS). Furthermore, disembedding the mechanism for pooling funds also led to more complicated and hierarchical negotiations for funding; the Global Fund's 'county coordinating mechanism' (CCM) vets and submits proposals when the Fund announces a call and if successful, the CCM is also responsible for distributing funds within the country⁶. To ensure accountability, the Global Fund hires auditing firms⁷ to

⁶ According to Schocken (n.d.), on average government agencies receive 60 per cent of the funds, third sector organisations receive 20 per cent and multilateral institutions (usually the UNDP) receive 20 per cent.

⁷ Oftentimes PriceWaterhouseCoopers or KPMG, but sometime smaller, in-country firms (Schocken, n.d.).

examine the use of these funds (Schocken, n.d.) – the downside being that this may crowd out the development of social and political accountability mechanism within the polity of the recipient country.

Third, the combination of disembedding the multilateral financing mechanism from the national/local level and reports of the misuse of funds awarded directly to recipient country governments further fueled the Fund's reliance on the third sector⁸ (e.g. US GAO, 2005, 38). Finally in somewhat of a reverse of Nelson Rockefeller's trajectory, who went from founding the IIAA to leading the government re-organization that created today's US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and serving as its first Deputy Secretary⁹, Tommy Thompson went from serving as Secretary of HHS to serving as the first Chair of the Global Fund's Board of Directors, presumably in part, because HHS was the lead agency in addressing the AIDS crisis domestically, before its inclusion in the Foreign Operations legislation, beginning in 2001.

While keen on multilateral efforts in theory, the Republican-controlled US Congress ultimately proved more inclined to finance bilateral efforts to address the HIV/AIDS crisis. In debates over the first multi-year package of authorizing legislation for the Global Fund and PEPFAR (H.R. 1298, P.L. 108-25) - which authorized \$15 billion to be spent on HIV/AIDS over five years - House Democrats "... wanted a significant portion of the \$15 billion disbursed through the Geneva-based Global Fund¹⁰... but they settled for

⁸ The relatively nimble nature of non-governmental compared to governmental organisations enables them to tailor their expertise to the needs of both large granting agencies and the populations they serve, depending both on the degree to which these activities align with their mission and the degree to which they are dependent on external funds. However, a reliance on the third sector runs the risk perpetuating inefficiencies in the long-run through the creation of parallel provision structures, along with the opportunity cost of failing to enhance state capacity and accountability mechanisms within the polity.

⁹ At the time, this position was entitled 'Under Secretary' but was changed to its current title of 'Deputy Secretary' in 1990.


¹⁰ While House Democrats on the International Relations Committee expressed that they would fight for at least \$200 million in earmarks for the Global Fund, but they did not raise the issue when the bill came to the floor (Congressional Quarterly, 2003b).

language authorizing up to \$1 billion a year for the fund. Republicans questioned the wisdom of contributing money to the group, since the U.S. government had little oversight over the fund or its operations” (Congressional Quarterly, 2003). In the Senate, a bipartisan coalition of senators “... continued to insist that more go to the Global Fund, and they were prepared in the spring to propose a two-year, \$6 billion measure that would have directed at least \$500 million a year to the fund” (Congressional Quarterly, 2003). Ultimately, the White House stressed the immediate nature of the HIV/AIDS crisis to break the political logjam; as emphasized in reports of congressional debates and in the words of one respondent, “It was an *emergency*” (interview, Congress). On April 29th, President Bush stated “In the three months since I announced the emergency plan an estimated 760,000 have died from AIDS, 1.2 million people have been infected, more than 175,000 babies have been born with the virus. Time is not on our side” (Congressional Quarterly, 2003). Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ultimately agreed to set their Committee’s concerns aside and to approve the House’s version of the bill so that the authorizing legislation would be passed before President Bush attended the G8 summit in June 2003; the only amendment they requested - which the House approved - was a recommendation for debt relief for the nations hardest hit by AIDS (Congressional Quarterly, 2003).

The authorizing legislation also created a new position now known as the ‘US Global AIDS Coordinator and Special Representative for Global Health Diplomacy’¹¹ within the Department of State to oversee and coordinate all international AIDS programs (Figure 7.9). To some extent, housing the US Global AIDS Coordinator within the State Department made sense; USAID was not a cabinet-level agency, making it difficult for it

¹¹ At the time, the position was titled ‘HIV/AIDS Response Coordinator’ (Congressional Quarterly, 2003b).


FIGURE 7.9: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, 2003



to exert influence over the Department of Defense, which was necessary to fully address the security aspects of the AIDS crisis. However equally, USAID lost considerable policy autonomy over what was arguably the most critical development issue of the day, and instead the State Department gained control over the use of a substantial portion of foreign aid funding dedicated to welfare.

Not only did USAID incur a substantial loss over the direction of US development policy when PEPFAR became housed in the Department of State, but the omnibus appropriation bill (H.R. 2673; Public Law 108-199) that first funded PEPFAR in 2004 also authorized and appropriated funding for a new development entity - the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (Figure 7.10). On 14 March 2002 - before the release of the 2002 National Security Strategy that elevated US development assistance as a 'third pillar' alongside defense and diplomacy (OECD, 2006) - President Bush gave a speech at

FIGURE 7.10: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, 2004



the IADB that “... outlined a proposal for the United States to increase foreign economic assistance beginning in FY 2004 so that by FY 2006 American aid would be \$5 billion higher than three years earlier” (Nowels, 2003, CRS-1). Only a few days later from 18-22 March 2002, the International Conference on Financing for Development was held in Monterrey, Mexico, where donor countries - including the US - reiterated their commitment to achieving the ‘0.7 target’ for development assistance in order to achieve the targets outlined in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (United Nations, 2003).¹² The confluence of the ‘War on Terror’, the endorsement of the MDGs, and now the consensus to revive efforts to increase financial support for development assistance all created a sort of vacuum for enhancing US development efforts. As illustrated in Figure

¹² A World Bank report released early in 2002 suggested that aid funding needed to be increased by \$40-60 billion per year in order to achieve the MDGs (Nowels, 2004, CRS 5-6).

7.10, the Republican-controlled White House and Congress managed both to fill this void and to circumvent USAID by creating the MCC.

As described by CRS, the MCC “... arose out of widespread frustration with then-existing foreign aid programs and represented a significant change in the way the United States delivered economic assistance” (Tarnoff, 2016, 1). CRS also reported that “Past failures of economic aid provided by the United States and other international donors, some argue, have been caused to a large extent by a lack of attention to performance and the requirement for measurable results,” noting also that “Others will argue, however, that of equal or perhaps more importance has been the close ties of U.S. foreign assistance with more strategic and geopolitical goals where development results have been of secondary importance for policymakers charged with aid allocations and policy formulations” (Nowels, 2004, CRS-3).

The MCC was designed to address both of these concerns. First, to ensure greater success at reducing poverty, MCC funds may only be allocated to eligible countries as determined by: (i) being classified as of low- or low-middle income status according to the IDA’s income classification system; and (ii) their overall performance according to three ‘baskets’ of economic and political indicators - ruling justly, investing in people, and economic freedom. The eligibility criteria were meant to ensure that countries had already undertaken successful reforms rather than conditioning the receipt of aid on policy changes (Nowels, 2004). Eligible countries may then apply for assistance from the MCC if they so choose. The process is meant to be ‘country-driven’, meaning that eligible countries may submit proposals (usually in line with their national development plans) and that recipient countries are also party to the agreement/compact signed, even if the

funding provided is directed toward a non-governmental, civil society, or other private organisation.

Second, there was originally question as to where the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) should be housed, with the Department of State and USAID serving as the two most obvious options. It was clear from the start that the MCA should not be housed within the Department of State if it was to avoid being subject to geopolitical and diplomatic concerns; equally, “One analysis, after weighing both the merits and disadvantages of placing the MCA within USAID, concluded that if the Administration wants the MCA to operate differently than USAID, it should create a new agency to manage it” (Nowels, 2004, p. CRS-21; Lancaster, 2002). Ultimately, taking a play out of Rockefeller’s handbook, a new, independent corporation – the MCC – was created to house the MCA. To ensure that the MCC is integrated and coordinated with other foreign policy areas, it is governed by a board of directors chaired by the Secretary of State and that also includes the Secretary of the Treasury, the US Trade Representative, the USAID Administrator, the CEO of the MCC, and four other individuals as determined from a short list provided by Congress from which the President selects appointments (Figure 7.10).

However, Professor Carol Lancaster¹³ (2002) suggests that the creation of the MCC represented much more than a ‘major vote of no confidence’ for USAID (Lancaster, 2002, 7). Instead, it was a product not only of tensions within US development policy, but also of the broader foreign policy concerns of its time. As laid out in a policy brief for the

¹³ Carol Lancaster is a well-known public servant and academic in Washington, D.C. and was arguably the foremost knowledgeable person on US foreign assistance. I was unable to interview her during the summer of 2014; she had been recently diagnosed with a brain tumor and sadly died shortly thereafter on 22 October 2014.

Center for Global Development, Lancaster (2002, 7-8) outlines several possible futures for US development assistance, which are worth quoting at length:

“Let us take the future from a second angle. If there is a war with Iraq... there will be major demands on US aid resources. Some will be needed to help rebuild the country (though these should be more limited than what is needed for Afghanistan and hopefully more quickly mobilized). Others will likely be needed to secure friends and allies in the region and beyond as the US launches what is likely to be an unpopular war....

“Where will these funds come from? It is hard to imagine Congress putting up significant additional aid monies if it appropriates new funding for the MCA... So the needed funds will have to come from existing resources. If the MCA resources are to be used exclusively for good performers, they would not be available for reconstruction and certainly not for geopolitical purposes where favored allies do not fit the MCA criteria... So the probability is that those resources will be drawn from existing development aid programs managed by USAID with the deficit in development spending possibly ‘replaced’ by MCA resources.

“If the MCA is part of USAID, its resources may also become vulnerable to these demands, whatever the criteria on which their allocation is based... If the MCA is protected from such pressure by being a separate organization, drawing them from USAID’s resources will reduce USAID’s development functions and may eventually create momentum to move USAID into the Department of State so its resources will be close at hand and easily deployed.”

As illustrated by Lancaster, the recognition that US ODA was about far more than ‘development and welfare’ may have also spurred support for a new agency that was truly ‘independent’, focused on development, and more protected from broader political and diplomatic concerns than USAID. However as we shall see, none of this changes the fact that similar kinds of technical expertise are required to exercise social policy as a tool, regardless of the broader aims it is meant to serve; from this angle, the fragmentation of US development assistance – which was only furthered with the creation of the MCC – has only led to more inefficiencies.

Finally, as Lancaster somewhat prophetically suggested, the instinct to merge USAID into the Department of State was indeed galvanized after continued conflict in

both Afghanistan and Iraq. On 18 January 2006 in a speech at George Washington University, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice laid out her vision for ‘Transformational Diplomacy’¹⁴, an initiative designed to ensure that the US diplomatic corps meets the needs of the 21st century – with implications for the structure of US foreign assistance. The next day, Secretary Rice announced the creation of a new position within the Department of State – Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) who was to oversee a new Bureau of Foreign Assistance (or the ‘F’ Bureau) (Figure 7.11).¹⁵ The DFA holds the rank of a Deputy Secretary¹⁶ and is filled concurrently by the USAID Administrator (Nakamura and Epstein, 2007, CRS-6). Randall Tobias¹⁷, who served previously as the first Global AIDS Coordinator in the Department of State, was appointed to fill the dual position of DFA/USAID Administrator shortly thereafter.

As outlined by CRS, “The DFA, with offices and staff at both the State Department and USAID, has authority over most but not all State Department and USAID foreign assistance funding¹⁸ and is to provide improved organizational structure and

¹⁴ CRS highlights that “A 2004 USAID White Paper defined transformational development as going beyond a traditional focus on raising living standards and reducing poverty. It would ‘transform countries, through far-reaching, fundamental changes in institutions of governance, human capacity, and economic structure that enable a country to sustain further economic and social progress without depending on foreign aid” (Nowels, 2006; USAID, 2004)


¹⁵ Since these changes only altered the institutional structure behind the administration of foreign assistance programs, and not their funding, these changes were able to be made with little input from Congress.

¹⁶ The rank denotes the importance of the position, but as clarified by CRS, it “does not confer any legal power or increased salary, according to the State’s Office of Legal Affairs” (Nakamura and Epstein, 2007, CRS-6).

¹⁷ Before being appointed U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator in 2003, Randal Tobias was the CEO of Eli Lilly and Company, a global pharmaceutical company. Tobias himself commented that “... my experience in the pharmaceutical industry might enable me to get a better deal”. While Eli Lilly does not produce anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) used in HIV treatment, it does produce two drugs used to treat tuberculosis, which some saw as a clear conflict of interest (KHN, 2003). Tobias later resigned from this post in 2007 rather abruptly after his connections with a D.C. escort service were revealed by federal investigators (Wald, 2007)

¹⁸ At the beginning, this was thought to include the MCC but not the Office of US Global AIDS Coordinator nor the Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State (Nowels, 2006, summary pg). However it appears that in the end, the DFA did not exercise authority over the MCC either (Tarnoff, 2015, 54). Therefore, the DFA coordinates all other foreign assistance programs falling under State and USAID and encourages coordination between these programmes and the domestic agencies overseeing foreign

FIGURE 7.11: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, 2006



coordination of more than 18 federal foreign assistance funding programs to bring this assistance into alignment with U.S. foreign policy objectives” (Nakamura and Epstein, 2007, CRS-6). To do this, the DFA developed a foreign assistance framework “to help policy makers with strategic choices on the distribution of funds and to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance advances the Administration’s foreign policy objectives” (Nakamura and Epstein, 2007, CRS-6). Furthermore, “Since the creation of the DFA position, the relevant FY2008, FY2009 and FY2010 budget requests were developed jointly by State Department and USAID teams in an attempt to provide better coordination and coherence at the program level” (Lawson and Epstein, 2009, 12), and it is estimated that

aid, such as HHS, and other larger, independent foreign aid programs (e.g. the MCC, PEPFAR, and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq).

DFA oversees approximately 55 per cent of all US foreign assistance.¹⁹ The loss of independence over its budget process dealt yet another substantial blow to USAID. Furthermore, whilst perhaps presenting a more coordinated view of foreign assistance from Washington's perspective, field missions felt that the new focus on U.S. foreign policy objectives had reduced both the responsiveness of US foreign assistance to the needs and views of recipient countries, and "... reduced their [the field mission's] role in policy formulation and priority setting" (Lawson and Epstein, 2009, 12).

In sum, a wide-ranging political coalition – longtime supporters of development assistance from the left, the military, international development actors, and even the Christian right – all came together to support the creation of PEPFAR and the US global response to HIV/AIDS more broadly at a time when the structure of US development assistance was undergoing the largest changes it has seen since the founding of USAID in 1961. The following section examines the second set of policies responsible for this increase related to conflict and post-conflict challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan.


GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY SUB-SECTOR – COUNTERINSURGENCY AND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Within the Government and Civil Society sub-sector, the 'Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management' and the 'Legal and Judicial Development' subsectors have been responsible for the majority of the increase (Figure 7.12). In both of these subsectors, Afghanistan and Iraq were the highest-ranking recipient countries (Figure 7.13; Figure 7.14), and in both of these countries, this assistance was part of counterinsurgency and reconstruction efforts. In the Public Sector Policy and

¹⁹ In a 2008 article in *Foreign Affairs*, former USAID Administrators J. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios indicate that the State Department took over USAID's direct communication with the OMB in budget preparations and negotiations beginning in 2001. However, my understanding is that whilst the Secretary of State did have to sign off on the budget USAID presented to the OMB, this was more of a formality than an oversight function until the instillation of the 'F' process in 2006.


Administrative Management sub-sector from 2002 to 2014, Afghanistan received 17 per cent of the funding, and Iraq received 38 per cent. In the Legal and Judicial Development subsector, Afghanistan and Iraq both received 19 percent of the funding during the same time period. The following section provides an overview of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by an overview of Commander Emergency Response Programs (CERPs) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in each country case, followed by a more specific examination of how social policy was used as a tool of foreign policy in each country case.

FIGURE 7.12: US BILATERAL ODA IN THE GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY SUB-SECTOR, 2002-2014




Source: OECD CRS Database

FIGURE 7.13: US ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT BY COUNTRY, 2002-2014



Source: OECD CRS Database

FIGURE 7.13: US ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT BY COUNTRY, 2002-2014



Source: OECD CRS Database

First, it is important to recognise the ways in which the US-led conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq differed. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US by al Qaeda in 2001, President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban regime cooperate with the US government by handing over terrorists that had trained and operated under their protection in Afghanistan. When they did not comply, the US “...launched military operations in Afghanistan, with the stated purpose of disrupting the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and of attacking the military capability of the Taliban regime” (Dale, 2011, 9) beginning on 7 October 2001. With support from United Kingdom, Australia, and others, the Taliban regime was forced to retreat from Kabul and Kandahar, and “It is generally understood that in December 2001, key al Qaeda and Taliban leaders fled across the border into Pakistan” (Dale, 2011, 10).

In Iraq, the US led a ‘coalition of the willing’ that differed from the campaign in Afghanistan in a number of ways. First, whilst the Bush Administration’s concerns about Iraq’s alleged harbouring of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (or ‘WMDs’) increased in the wake of 9/11, when it became clear that UN support for the invasion was unlikely on the grounds that Iraq had not complied with disarmament mandates, the US government “... again stressed regime change as a specific goal of a U.S.-led war, and some argue that the President’s ultimatum that Saddam [Hussein] and his sons leave Iraq was an indication that the regime change goal was always paramount, and WMD concerns secondary” (Cooper, 2003, CRS 6-7). CRS also highlights that “Press reports suggest that Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, among others, were consistently skeptical that [weapons] inspections could significantly reduce the long-term threat from Iraq and reportedly have long been in favor of U.S. military action against Iraq. These and other U.S. officials reportedly believe that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would pave

the way for democracy not only in Iraq but in the broader Middle East, and reduce support for terrorism. In a speech before the American Enterprise Institute on February 26, 2003, President Bush said that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States could lead to the spread of democracy in the Middle East and a settlement of the Israeli Palestinian dispute” (Cooper, 2003, CRS 7). Together, these lines of thinking were used to justify the invasion of Iraq to the public, which began on 19 March 2003 – long after the start of US military operations in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11. Also, unlike in Afghanistan, where “an international authority exercised sovereignty on behalf of the Afghans” (Dale, 2011, 5), the US occupation of Iraq “... marks the first time since the post-WWII occupations of Germany and Japan that the United States has officially assumed the status and responsibilities of an occupying power under international law” (Martins, 2004, 1). As illustrated below, this key difference affected US policy after the initial invasion in each country case.

Furthermore, the need to stabilise and rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan post-conflict led to somewhat of a ‘face-off’ between the Department of Defense and the Department of State over the resources and policy direction of USAID as predicted by Lancaster (2002). To some extent, Congress served as the mediator between the two, albeit a passive one. As explained in reports by the CRS and as publicised by a number of journalists, the appropriation of funds to cover the cost of US engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan was handled largely through Emergency and Supplemental Congressional Appropriations as opposed to being integrated into the usual budget, authorization, and appropriation processes (Belasco, 2014). Many took issues with the use of emergency and supplemental appropriations as a means of financing the conflicts on the grounds that they kept the conflict ‘off the books’. Such an effect was made possible because “Current budgetary law provides that any funding *designated by* [Belasco’s emphasis]

Congress in statute or by the President in writing as ‘emergency’ or as ‘Overseas Contingency Operations²⁰’ (OCO) does not count against budget caps” (Belasco, 2014, 23). In effect, this meant that whether appropriated through the usual process or through another avenue, funding designated as ‘emergency’ or ‘OCO’ as part of the ‘Global War on Terror’ would not be subject to existing budget limits, and as such, would not be included in reports of US government surpluses or deficits.²¹ As suggested in name, Commander’s Emergency Response Programs (CERPs) (discussed below) were one such ‘emergency’ programme (Belasco, 2014, 26).

Moreover, the CRS reports that on 25 October 2006, “... Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England issued revised guidance for requesting war funds to the services that significantly changed these criteria [for ‘emergency’ or ‘OCO’ budget items]. New requests were to be submitted within two weeks that reflected the ‘longer war on terror’ rather than strictly the requirements for war operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other counter-terror operations... Presumably, this change reflected presidential policy. Since the longer war on terror was an integral part of DOD’s national strategy, some might argue that these types of expenses would more appropriately be included in DOD’s regular base budget, where they would compete with other defense needs” (Belasco, 2014, 27). Ultimately, this had the effect of “... doubling war-funded procurement from \$22.9 billion in FY 2006 to \$49.5 billion in FY 2007, with a peak of \$65.9 billion in FY

²⁰ The exempt category of ‘Overseas Contingency Operations’ was added in the Budget Control Act (S. 365, Public Law 112-25) in 2011, as ‘emergency’ funds for Iraq and Afghanistan “... no longer seemed appropriate after ten years of wars” (Belasco, 2014, 23). Furthermore, unlike the ‘emergency’ designation, “There are no criteria for the OCO designation nor is there a similar point of order to challenge it” (Belasco, 2014, 23). The designation of ‘emergency’ can be challenged in the Senate if sustained by 60 votes, which “... has seldom happened” (Belasco, 2014, 23).

²¹ For instance, as explained by CRS, “The Congressional Budget Office estimated that Sections 2 and 3 of H.R. 4231 would increase spending by about \$33 billion and decrease revenues by about \$900 million, resulting in an increase in the budget deficit by \$33.9 billion, over the FY2010-FY2020 period. However, as designated as an emergency requirement, the projected increase in spending, decrease in revenues, and increase in the deficit resulting from this act were not counted for purposes of the existing budget enforcement procedures” (Heniff, 2011, 2).

2009... Overall, between FY2001 and FY2014, DOD's war-designated procurement added almost \$300 billion, or about 25%, to the \$1.2 trillion in procurement funds appropriated to the base budget" (Belasco, 2014, 29).

Changes in the designation of war-related funds effectively left the development assistance budget hamstrung between the Department of Defense and the Department of State. On the one hand, lobbyists often encouraged clients to pitch development projects through a security lens in light of the relaxed definitions of war-related defense spending (interview – Congressb). On the other hand, the State Department was keen to assert the need for civilian support, diplomatic engagement, and a longer-term view of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq (interview – MCC). When seen from this perspective, the introduction of the 'F' Bureau at the Department of State in 2006 may also have been an attempt to shore up and unify the civilian side of engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq vis-à-vis the strong and well-funded military engagement as much as an attempt simply to co-opt USAID for its own political/diplomatic purposes – which, in the past, had proved an insufficient justification to complete such a take-over. The subordinate status of USAID to these two powerful cabinet-level agencies meant that development often ended up institutionally and discursively aligned with the Department of State, whilst both the geographical targeting of development assistance and an increasingly large amount of its spending originated from the Department of Defense.

[AN OVERVIEW OF CERPs AND PRTs IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN](#)

CERPs and PRTs were part of counterinsurgency and post-conflict development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and these programmes served as my starting point for deeper

inquiry into the role of social policy in the US-led campaigns in both countries.²² CERPs are essentially flexible pots of money available to commanders in the field that can be used to support the clichéd mission of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the polity in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of broader counterinsurgency strategies. PRTs are civil military organizations that serve as “... a transitional structure to provide improved security and to facilitate reconstruction and economic development” (Abbaszadeh et al, 2008, 5). CERPs began in Iraq, and after proving to be a useful tool for commanders in the field, they were introduced in Afghanistan shortly thereafter (interview NDUb). PRTs were first introduced in Afghanistan in 2002 before being incorporated into the strategy for the 2007 ‘surge’ in Iraq. CERP funds were sometimes, but not always, used in coordination with the broader PRT strategies, not least because there were often a more flexible source of funding compared to other streams.

PRTs also serve as a way to geographically divvy up re-construction responsibilities. Given the US occupation in Iraq, the US led 22 of the country’s 25 PRTs; in Afghanistan, a much larger international coalition under NATO came together to take charge of PRTs, and here the US leads 12 of the country’s 25 PRTs (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008, 4). Particularly in Afghanistan where a number of donors/coalition partners lead PRTs, there is often little communication or coordination between them, and each PRT differs according to structure, size, and mission (interview – NDUa, NDUb; Abbaszadeh et al, 2008, 5). These coordination problems are only furthered by the rotation of both military and civilian staff, whose missions in country usually last no more than one year at a time, (interview – NDUb). Also, incentives for civilian staff in terms of career progression were

²² Early exploratory interviews in Washington D.C. proved helpful in quickly ascertaining the context in which this spending occurred and in identifying the drivers outside of the Social Infrastructure and Services Sector that may have affected this spending.

not offered for serving in Iraq and Afghanistan; therefore, the in-country civilian staff was often either relatively junior compared to military personnel, underperforming in Washington relative to other colleagues and therefore assigned elsewhere, and/or had volunteered for a mission in-country, oftentimes to escape other personal problems (e.g. after a divorce or death in the family) (interview – NDUB; USAID, 2006).

In particular, US PRTs have been criticised for having too strong a military influence and not enough emphasis on long-term, sustainable development. In Iraq, US PRTs are led by the Department of State; in Afghanistan, US PRTs are led by the Department of Defense. In both countries, the US has two primary interests in PRTs: (i) to stabilise territories; and (ii) to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the public whilst marginalizing insurgents and extremists. In particular, the Department of Defense is most interested in high-impact, small-scale, short-term projects that ‘pacify’ local populations and build trust (Abbaszadeh et al, 2008, 48).

Several additional factors explain the more militant approach of US PRTs. First, whilst multiple coalition partners lead PRTs, this does not necessarily mean that the burden of addressing ongoing conflict and reconstruction has been equally distributed, and the US led PRTs in the most volatile regions of Afghanistan (and also of Iraq) (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008, 46). Second, as in other counterinsurgency cases such as Vietnam, security is paramount; without a secure environment, the use of CERP and other funds for improving conditions on the ground is wasteful at best and dangerous for both military and civilian personnel at worst. As a result, PRTs may or may not be ‘embedded’ within military brigades or regiments (commonly referred to as ‘ePRTs’) depending on the security environment, and the US leads several such units. Finally, public opinion in the US was weary of taking on long-term ‘nation-building’ tasks in both countries, and

therefore a focus on 'stability' and 'reconstruction' up to and possibly slightly surpassing the level of development before the US-led campaigns began hit political centre – as opposed to a longer term investment in sustainable development

Whilst security concerns were paramount, respondents from the US – including those from the military/defense perspective - were often in agreement that the US military played too strong a role in CERPs and PRTs. Many military commanders felt that they were being asked to take on tasks falling outside the purview of the military and for which they were not trained, and also that USAID or other experts should be playing a stronger role in allocating CERP funds and advising on PRT operations (interview – NDUa). Partly in response to this feedback, USAID did play a stronger role in distributing development assistance in Afghanistan (interview – NDUa; OECD Stats). To win the 'hearts and minds' of the local populations, commanders were told to do things like 'reduce unemployment' or 'alleviate poverty' within a given territory – a task that even trained development experts may have found impossible to achieve under the conditions. Oftentimes, commanders then relied on contractors and infrastructure projects as a means of disbursing CERP funds, leading to what one respondent referred to as 'monuments of failure' – or buildings such as hospitals and schools that were constructed, but left without an operating budget or trained staff/personnel and that were therefore, simply not functional (interview – NDUa). Eventually, some commanders tried to use CERP funds to finance the construction of power plants, but these large-scale projects often became targets for the insurgents (interview – NDUa) –hence, the focus on 'small-scale' projects embedded within communities, and roadbuilding was particularly successful in this regard.

Furthermore, the assumptions underlying these mission objectives were also problematic. For instance, by reducing unemployment (and also poverty, by extension), it was hoped that young men would have alternative ways to use their time and an alternative means for generating household income beyond engaging with insurgents and extremists, thereby making territories more stable and secure. However, reports suggest that even if jobs were created, families sympathizing with insurgents and extremists would simply hedge, sending one son to formal sector employment and another to the insurgency/extremists (Interview – NDUa). It is also important to note that the problems and ‘unintended consequences’ resulting from CERPs and PRTs proved difficult to address overtime, not least because relatively little research, monitoring, or evaluation was built into these programs relative to other types of development assistance. In hindsight, some respondents suggested that CERPs and PRTs could have benefited greatly from randomized control trials (RCTs) (interview – NDUb), and presumably also from studies exploiting any ‘natural experiments’ in their implementation. As highlighted in a publication from National Defense University, “The difficulty is that, as of yet, there is no proven link that aid leads to goodwill or that job creation reduces insurgency. Current strategies are built on the assumption that poverty is a key driver of insecurity; economic development will stabilize a region; and aid will help legitimize the government. These assumptions need to be recognized as such” (Johnson, Ramachandran, and Walz, 2012, 87).²³

The blending of military and civilian personnel within PRTs hints toward two of the most overlooked factors driving the use and implementation of CERP and PRT funds:

²³ Again like studies looking for a relationship between welfare state type and foreign aid, Burgoon (2006) offers another example of a study abstracting the relationship between welfare and terrorism, with insufficient attention to the mechanisms that might relate the two.

(i) competition between the US/coalition forces and local insurgents and extremists to be the primary welfare provider; and (ii) that strategies for 'stabilizing' and 'developing' a territory may, at times, run counter to each other – with important implications for the way in which social policy is used as a tool. First, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the scenario “... (which most closely reflects the reality in Afghanistan) is running aid programs in a counterinsurgency environment, where there is a threat of terrorist activity as well as an organized enemy that is running its own development and political programs. Professionals are confronted not only with carrying out development activities in a high-risk environment, but also with competition for the delivery of public services. The target population has a choice between our efforts and services and those of the enemy” (Johnson, Ramachandran, and Walz, 2012, 85). Several groups recognised as terrorist organizations (e.g. al Qaeda, Hamas²⁴), present themselves as alternatives to the state and often promoting what many consider to be 'anti-welfare states', have nevertheless sought to control the provision of public services - including welfare provision - as a means not so much of winning the 'hearts and minds' of the local population, but as a means of exercising social control and weakening/marginalising opposition (Weber, n.d.).²⁵ Not unlike the way in which 'securitising' the HIV/AIDS crisis helped, on the one hand, to enhance the resource base with which to address the problem, and yet on the other ran the risk of disregarding civil liberties and the promotion of an unequal distribution of resources, 'securitising' welfare provision as part of both insurgency and counterinsurgency strategies has resulted in similar tradeoffs. Furthermore, an emphasis on control is one of, if not the fundamental difference between the use of welfare as a tool

²⁴ For more on the case of Hamas, please see Emiliani (2006).

²⁵ One terribly extreme and unfortunate example of this currently is in Syria, where it has been reported that the Assad regime has explicitly targeted hospitals in attacks and tortured and killed several civilian doctors caring for the wounded (Taub, 2016).

to promote stability and as a tool to promote development. “... the authors of U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine make the argument that the fundamental requirement for a successful counterinsurgency is control” (Johnson, Ramachandran, and Walz, 2012, 87) – an aim from which welfare provision under CERPs and PRTs is not exempt. As further explored below, the instinct for social control is also reflected in the increased emphasis on legal and judicial development in the latter stages of rebuilding.

In the sections that follow, I will examine the rise in funding within the 'Government and Civil Society' sub-sector of the Social Infrastructure and Services sector of ODA in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In this analysis, I place the funding within the Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management and Legal and Judicial Development subsectors within the broader context of conflict within these countries. I also trace the changes in institutional structure that they catalyzed. In so doing, I consider both the sequence of events and the institutional sources of funding in order to understand how these programmes affected both the use of social policy as a tool and the shape of the externally-oriented face of US state institutions structuring the exercise of social policy in a foreign policy context.

THE USE OF SOCIAL POLICY AS A TOOL BY THE US IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

In Iraq, the vast majority of projects counting as ODA in these subsectors were led not by USAID but by the Department of Defense. The US government also created a large funding stream – the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund²⁶ – and dedicated slightly more ODA toward 'Security and Law Enforcement' and 'Improving the Efficiency and Accountability of Government' relative to the case of Afghanistan in the early stages of reconstruction.

²⁶ The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) was established by Congress in 2003. The Fund was placed under the direct control of the President and totaled as much as \$21 billion (Tarnoff, 2009, 1).


In the later stages from about 2008 onwards, USAID played a stronger role supporting projects focused on 'Democratic Governance

Alternatively, USAID led the vast majority of projects in Afghanistan. Again, the US government supported the creation of a financial mechanism – the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) – to support reconstruction efforts. Unlike the IRRF, the ARTF is a multilateral funding mechanism. The Fund is supported by over 34 countries, managed by the World Bank, and is the largest single-country, multi-donor trust fund of its kind (World Bank, 2016; Government of Afghanistan, 2016). From 2005-2008, 'Economic Development Policy/Planning' and 'Government Administration' were the primary focus of US funds. From 2008 onwards, 'Democratic Governance' became the focus, again with the support of USAID.

IRAQ

US planning for post-conflict Iraq began in early 2002 (SIGIR, 2009, 3), and by 20 January 2003, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was created in the Department of Defense by National Security Presidential Directive 24 – a document that as of 6 June 2005 had not yet been released to the public (Halchin, 2005, CRS-2). The Office was created to serve as a 'Post-war planning office' and expected to coordinate efforts of the Departments of State, AID, Treasury, Energy, the CIA, Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Justice and the OMB (NSPD 24, 3), and was run by Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, who reported both to US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Halchin, 2005, CRS-3) (Figure 7.14). However

FIGURE 7.14: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, 2003



approximately five months later on 13 May 2003, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III was appointed head of the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) in Iraq²⁷, and via memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense just over a month later on 16 June 2003, ORHA was dissolved and its "... functions, responsibilities, and legal obligations" were shifted to the CPA (Halchin, 2005, CRS-3).

After the initial invasion, CERPs began as a means of legally distributing the spoils of war and of effectively managing Iraq whilst under US-occupation. The seed money for what became known as CERPs was recovered soon after the US had invaded Iraq. After securing Bagdad, US soldiers recovered as much as \$762 million in cash in addition to

²⁷ As of 2005, it was still unclear how and by whom the CPA was established. For a discussion of possibilities, please see Halchin (2005, CRS-5-13).

other regime assets (Martins, 2004, 3). For political and legal reasons (interview NDUa)²⁸, it was decided that the Department of Defense should use these funds to fill the vacuum of basic government services in the wake of the invasion, including “Clearing streets of destroyed vehicles, bulldozing mountains of garbage, distributing rations, repairing damaged roofs, wells, sewers, rehabilitating broken-down jails and police stations, and tending to a variety of urgent medical needs” (Martins, 2004, 3). Legal counsel for the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the Fourth Geneva Convention provided further support for such use of these funds: “To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate” (Martins, 2004, 4). In addition to adhering to international law, this use of recovered funds and assets was also expedient; once obtained, these funds did not need to be (re-)appropriated by Congress and were ready for immediate use.²⁹

In June 2003, the CPA formally named this distribution of funds the ‘Commander’s Emergency Response Program’, which “... formally linked it to governing law and authorities relating to Iraqi property, and articulated its central purpose. Ambassador Bremer, having been delegated authority by the Deputy Secretary of Defense over ‘Certain State-or Regime-Owned Property in Iraq,’ signed a memo on 16 June 2003, re-

²⁸ As outlined by Martins (2003, 3), “... field commanders and senior policymakers ensured that seizure, control, and disposition of former regime property complied with international law relating to armed conflict and occupation. Specifically, USCENTCOM announced that in seizing the funds, coalition forces were taking possession of and safeguarding moveable property of the State of Iraq, rather than personal property of its citizens. Evidence that many of the assets had been obtained from illicit skimming of profits from oil sales in violation of United Nations sanctions caused coalition leaders to reject the notion that individual senior Ba’athists were rightful owners”.

²⁹ While the use of recovered funds did not require Congressional (re-)appropriation for use, Congress did opt to provide additional funding for CERPs once they were deemed to be a useful and necessary funding stream. This also means that the CERP funding classified as ODA is an underestimate of the funds that US-occupation directed toward development assistance like activities.

delegating some of that authority to the Commander of Coalition Forces. The memo authorized the Commander 'to take all actions necessary to operate a Commanders' Emergency Response Program.' It elaborated that '[t]his Program will enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of Iraq'" (Martins, 2004, 5-6). Under the program, it specified the following as permissible uses of CERP funds:

"the building, repair, reconstruction, and reestablishment of the social and material infrastructure of Iraq. This includes but is not limited to: water and sanitation infrastructure, food production and distribution, healthcare, education, telecommunications, projects in furtherance of economic, financial, management improvements, transportation, and initiatives which further restore of [sic] the rule of law and effective governance, irrigation systems instillation or restoration, day laborers to perform civic cleaning, purchase or repair of civic support vehicles, and repairs to civic or cultural facilities" (FRAGO 89; Martins, 2004, 6)

However, CERPs were far from the only funds used to finance post-war reconstruction in Iraq. It was "... widely assumed that Iraq's vast oil reserves... will be used to fund reconstruction... The remaining problems for the United States and Britain are to get Iraqi oil workers to return to work and to establish a successor government with legal authority to contract for sales of Iraq's oil to international buyers" (Cooper, 2003, CRS-24). In line with this aim, UN Security Council Resolution 1483 "... permitted the occupying coalition to use oil reserves for more long-term reconstruction purposes" and "... shifted responsibility for oil profits and their disbursal from the U.N. to the United States and its allies by establishing a Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) held by the Central Bank of Iraq and into which oil profits and other Iraqi assets would be deposited" on 22 May 2003 (Tarnoff, 2006, CRS-6). Just over a year later on 8 June 2004, Iraq's transitional government obtained control of this fund under UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (Tarnoff, 2006, CRS-6). While oil production suffered setbacks and often failed to meet


targets, it still accounts for over 90 percent of the revenue for the Government of Iraq (Tarnoff, 2006, CRS-6). Interestingly, these funds were used primarily to cover both the “... operating budget expenses and a variety of government social programs”, including fuel and food subsidies, and support for state-owned enterprises (Tarnoff, 2006, CRS-7).³⁰

With oil revenues covering Iraq’s basic operating expenses and indirectly tending to basic social welfare, the US focused primarily on improving security and infrastructure in Iraq from 2004 onwards. Iraq formally regained its sovereignty on 28 June 2004, which also resulted in the CPA being dissolved and the Department of State taking over from the Department of Defense as the lead agency for US assistance programs – with the exception of security-related assistance to Iraq’s Ministries of Interior and Defense (Tarnoff, 2009, 8-9). To finance reconstruction and security needs beyond both the scope of CERPS and the Government of Iraq’s oil revenues, the US created the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) in April 2003, the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) in May 2005, and also increased funding for the pre-existing Economic Support Fund (ESF) at the Department of State as of Fiscal Year (FY) 2006. Together with CERPs, these funding streams accounted for 88% of US foreign assistance in Iraq from FY 2003 thru FY 2016 (Katzman and Humud, 2016, 39) (Figure 7.15; Appendix 10).

While all of this funding was in the form of grants (as opposed to loans), ‘development and welfare’ was not the primary purpose for the assistance in all cases and therefore, some but far from all of this funding was classified as ODA. The portion of this funding that was classified as ODA and that contributed to the dramatic increase in the

³⁰ This CRS report also highlights that corruption and mismanagement of the DFI has further reduced funds available for reconstruction.

FIGURE 7.15: US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ, 2003-2016




Government and Civil Society sub-sector of the Social Infrastructure and Services sector came in two distinct phases: (i) from Department of Defense-led projects from 2005-2008 in the Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management sub-sector; and (ii) from Department of State-led projects from 2008 to present in the Legal and Judicial Development sub-sector (Figure 7.16; Figure 7.17).

In the first phase, ODA for Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management transitioned from being delivered primarily by the Department of Defense to being delivered primarily by USAID amid an overall decline in funding for this subsector since 2005. In the peak year of 2005, over two-thirds of the funding went toward security and law enforcement development, which included funds for border enforcement and police training and technical assistance, and these efforts were financed largely by the IRRF. The


Department of Defense was responsible for the use of almost two-thirds of the funds allocated to this area, and the Department of State was responsible for the final third, which went toward developing Iraq’s Civilian Police Force. In addition to the focus on security and law enforcement, USAID received more funding to ‘Improve the Efficiency and Accountability of Government’ in 2006, and the Department of Defense also increased funding for ‘Justice, Public Safety, and Civil Society’, which included repairing facilities, the reconstruction and modernization of detention/penal facilities, improving public safety, and funding fire services. While some of these funds went toward overhead and construction costs, most of the funding went toward non-construction efforts, including technical assistance, personnel, and personnel training.

FIGURE 7.16: US ODA GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR FUNDING IN IRAQ, 2002-2014



Source: OECD CRS Database

FIGURE 7.17: US ODA GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR FUNDING IN IRAQ BY DEPARTMENT, 2002-2014



Source: OECD CRS Database

In 2007, the US decided to increase its presence in Iraq (known as the ‘Surge’), and PRTs were a central element of both counter-insurgency and stabilization strategies. 2007 was also the first year that funding for projects implemented by the Department of State and USAID outpaced funding for projects implemented by the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense increased its funding for CERPs, which were often used to support the broader strategies executed by PRTs, and also increased its support for ‘government administration’, which included a portfolio of activities similar to those falling under the heading of ‘Justice, Public Safety, and Civil Society’ in addition to: ministerial capacity building; investigation of crimes against humanity; a witness protection program; improving water and sanitation; and public building construction. The Department of State continued to focus on training Iraq’s civilian police force and also on the operation of PRTs; USAID diversified its focus on ‘improving efficiency and

accountability of government’ to include a focus on ‘democratic governance’, ‘local government decentralization’, and ‘government administration’. The focus on ‘government administration’ by both the Department of Defense and USAID exemplifies both the lack of coordination between these agencies and also the diverse needs and nature of PRTs across the country, depending largely on the security environment.

Finally in 2008, USAID’s funding allocation outpaced both the Department of Defense and the Department of State combined within this subsector. Most of this funding went toward ‘local government decentralization’ and ‘public sector executive function’, which focused largely on training local level politicians and civil servants on the basics of public administration, such as keeping accounts and managing budgets.

In the second phase of Department of State-led projects in the Legal and Judicial Development sub-sector from 2008 to present, the Department of State accounted for as much as 97 per cent of the funding within this subsector, nearly all of which went toward programs to address ‘International Narcotics and Law Enforcement’. These funds were allocated as ‘Overseas Contingency Operations (OCOs)’ for budget purposes and were dedicated toward the Department of State’s Iraq Criminal Justice Program. The objective of the program is to “... develop the capacities of all elements of the Iraqi criminal justice system (police, justice, and corrections) to support fair, efficient, and legitimate Iraqi Government institutions, to promote peace and security, resolve disputes, and promote respect for the rule of law” (DoS / BINLEA, 2012, 219). The vast majority of this funding again went toward the creation of Iraq’s civilian police force, which has been a joint effort between the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

Traditionally, the Department of State has overseen the development of civilian police forces; however, in transferring oversight responsibilities – including those related

to security in cooperation with Iraq's Ministry of Interior – to the Department of Defense shortly after the CPA dissolved in 2004. The Department of Defense continued to oversee these operations until Fiscal Year 2012, at which point full responsibility was transferred to the Department of State (DoS / BINLEA, 2012, 220). The overarching strategic goal of the State Department's Police Development Program, "... is to help the GOI [Government of Iraq] and its MOI [Ministry of Interior] by assisting in the development of capabilities needed to manage and sustain the full range of internal security operations and support the rule of law... Most importantly, the PDP [Police Development Program] will shift the overall U.S. mission of Iraqi police development from counter-insurgency, with a focus on producing large numbers of basic recruits to support the Iraqi army with skills such as live-fire enemy engagement and patrolling, to a civilian model focusing on community policing, which promotes law enforcement, detection and prevention of crime through presence in, and partnership with the community".

In sum, even when shifting away from a militaristic and toward a civilian approach, US development assistance in this subsector has focused very much on the promotion and development of security-related state capabilities of the 'hard power' variety. Furthermore, unlike the development of institutions overseeing social policy in a domestic context, more than one of the institutions created to manage social policy in this environment – the ORHA in the Department of Defense and the CPA – dissolved, calling into question the degree to which the use of social policy by donor countries is institutionally 'path dependent' in conflict environments. In the case of Iraq, this has led to incoherence in the way in which the US uses social policy as a tool. On the one hand, the US' overarching aim is to withdraw from Iraq, but in order to do so, it has to 'stabilize' the country. However 'stability' has largely been 'securitized', resulting in a situation where the US is required to exert more force and control and to build more structures of

force and control to hand over to a select group of Iraqi leaders as part of efforts to ‘free’ the country. Whilst far from and almost devoid of traditions understandings of ‘welfare’, this is very much a particular type of ‘social’ model, where internal state/social structures are being created for the purposes of stability and control as a result of being ‘securitized’ and in a fashion that suit the needs of external powers – a far cry from stories of social policy being internally developed from the political mobilization of the working class under left-leaning parties (Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1990). In other words, the very absence of a traditional ‘welfare’ focus despite a rise in the spending in the ‘social sector’ of ODA is indicative of the degree to which social policy is being used primarily as a tool to ensure social stability rather than a means of substantiating rights.

AFGHANISTAN

A report based on a project of the US Institute of Peace and the RAND corporation outlines the origins of PRTs in Afghanistan after the displacement of the Taliban, stating that,

“In April 2002, President Bush addressed the U.S. commitment to help the Afghan people recover from the Taliban rule. He referenced the success of George C. Marshall’s vision to rebuild Europe and Japan after World War II, referring to a ‘Marshall Plan for Afghanistan’... In Washington, the Departments of Defense and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) developed a concept to employ interagency civil-military field teams throughout Afghanistan... From the outset in December 2002, Hamid Karzai, the interim president of the Afghan Transitional Authority, was an enthusiastic supporter of the concept. At his request, the name was changed from JRTs [Joint Regional Teams] to “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” to indicate the purpose as providing support to the government (as opposed to regional power brokers or ‘warlords’) and to denote reconstruction as the principal activity of the teams” (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005, 3).

However, it should also be noted that CRS reports that “During his presidency, Karzai consistently criticized the PRTs as holding back Afghan capacity-building and repeatedly called them ‘parallel governing structures.’ USAID observers backed some of the

criticism, saying that there was little Afghan input into PRT development project decisionmaking. To address this criticism, during 2008-2012 some donor countries, including the United States, enhanced the civilian diplomatic and development component of the PRTs to try to change their image from military to civilian institutions.

Even before PRTs were incorporated into the strategy for the 2007 'surge' in Iraq, this report makes it clear that "When military units in combat provide 'humanitarian-type' relief, it is typically associated with political objectives. For military forces confronting an insurgency, it may be a matter of military necessity to ensure that assistance is provided to displaced civilians and that civic action projects are undertaken to cultivate popular support and increase force protection. When the focus shifts from humanitarian assistance to reconstruction, the salient concerns that arise are the blurring of civil and military roles and interference with each other's efforts" (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005, 2). With this in mind, the location of the first PRTs in Afghanistan were chosen "... to provide a U.S. military and central government presence among key locations, including Afghanistan's four primary ethnic groups, the former Taliban headquarters, and the base of the country's most difficult warlord, Ishmael Khan. The primary purpose of creating these outposts was political, but PRTs were also seen as a means for dealing with the causes of Afghanistan's instability: terrorism, warlords, unemployment, and grinding poverty" (Perito, 2005, 2)

Shortly thereafter, CERPs were introduced as a financial tool that commanders could use to buy or rent allegiance from the local population (with varying results), often in coordination with the broader aims of the PRTs that pre-dated them. In this context, CERPs sought more explicitly to "... improve the security environment in which U.S. combat troops operate by offering small grants to local villages... CERP often performs a


development function, on the surface, indistinguishable from the activities of USAID and is a major assistance tool of the U.S.-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams” (Tarnoff, 2010, 8). According to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Department of Defense used CERP funds to:

“support urgent humanitarian and reconstructive projects; transportation; education; agriculture/irrigation; healthcare; water and sanitation; and economic, financial, and management improvements. However according to data provided by the DOD, the largest group of completed CERP projects lacked specific categorization and remain unknown. Finally current financial and project management systems used by DOD in tracking CERP projects do not contain sufficient data relating to obligations and disbursements or comprehensive information relating to the actual costs of projects” (SIGAR, 2015, 3)

As this report suggests, project-level data from the OECD regarding the use of DOD-CERP funds qualifying as ODA is rather unspecific.

Finally, to better coordinate these efforts, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability was created in July 2004 (OCRS, n.d.) (Figure 7.18). National Security Presidential Directive 44 was issued by President George W. Bush almost a year and a half later on 8 December 2005 in part “... to resolve chain-of-command issues between the Departments of State and Defense that clouded our earlier efforts in Iraq, i.e., LTG (Ret) Jay Garner’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and those of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer who led the Coalition Provisional Authority” (Carrig, 2007, 5-6). CRS reports that “Among other tasks, S/CRS developed plans for the creation of a civilian ‘surge’ capability that could respond rapidly to S&R emergencies” (Serafino, 2012, 1).

FIGURE 7.18: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, 2004




Unlike in Iraq, where the US post-conflict strategy consisted of little more than regime change and restoring oil production to finance reconstruction and general government operations, US involvement in Afghanistan was more intimately tied to nation-building as a means of extinguishing 'safe havens', or alternatives sites of social organization presenting themselves as an alternative to the state by offering protection in exchange for support of terrorists networks and other forms of organized crime, including drug and human trafficking. To address the threats posed by these 'safe havens', Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice "outlined a new U.S. foreign policy strategy focusing on the 'intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security' and involving extensive changes in government to carry that strategy

out.³¹ State-building (or nation-building as it is often called) was at the center of this strategy. Both initiatives [NSPD-44 and ‘transformational diplomacy’] reinforced the important role that the Bush Administration gave S/CRS [the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (O CRS)] in policymaking and implementation dealing with conflict transitions and weak and fragile states” (Serafino, 2012, 3). Secretary Rice’s ‘transformational diplomacy’ agenda also sparked the aforementioned reorganization of foreign assistance known as the ‘F-process’ in 2006. Furthermore, it also included HIV/AIDS within its narrative. As outlined by CRS, the argument was that “Weak states also are unprepared to handle major public health issues, such as HIV/AIDS, that can generate political and economic instability” (Serafino, 2012, 5).

Together, the focus on state/nation-building, the presence of an international coalition, rather than strictly DoD led-military operations, and lessons learned in Iraq about the need for development expertise in conjunction with the use of CERP funds gave USAID a more prominent place in re-construction efforts in post-conflict Afghanistan with regards to ODA. Nevertheless as shown in Figure 7.19 (Appendix 11), the majority of US foreign assistance in Afghanistan from 2002 to present has gone toward the Department of Defense’s Afghan Security Forces Fund (62 per cent) followed by funding allocated to the Economic Support Fund, which is managed by the Department of State (19 per cent). Following this, both the Department of State’s International Narcotic and Law Enforcement program and CERPs each received 4 per cent of the \$104.5 billion of foreign assistance allocated during this time period.

³¹ Quoted from a speech given by Secretary Rice at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service on 18 January 2006 (Serafino, 2012, 3)

FIGURE 7.19: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF US DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, 2002-2016



Regarding ODA in the Government and Civil Society sub-sectors in Afghanistan, the increase in the ‘Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management’ and ‘Legal and Judicial Development’ sub-sectors took place largely from 2006 to 2013 (Figure 7.20) with the former led by USAID and the latter led by the Department of State (Figure 7.21). In the ‘Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management’ sub-sector, all of the funding from the Department of Defense during these years was for CERPs. USAID’s funding in this sub-sector changed overtime as re-construction progressed (Table 3). From 2007 to 2008, USAID funds were directed toward ‘Local Government and Decentralization’ and ‘Public Sector Executive Function,’ which was supported with funding from the multilateral Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund; by 2009, the focus was on ‘Public Sector Executive Function’ entirely. In 2010 and 2011, there was an additional focus on ‘Capacity Development’ programs. By 2013, USAID was focused

FIGURE 7.20: US ODA GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR FUNDING IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002-2014





FIGURE 7.21: US ODA GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR FUNDING IN AFGHANISTAN BY DEPARTMENT, 2002-2014



largely on technical assistance and providing support to key urban municipalities in Afghanistan and tracking the use of project funds in country.

CONCLUSION

While the US has indeed been using aid forcefully by spending more on aid in the social sector, it has done so with respect to very strategic and specific interests, both of which have been framed predominantly as security matters. In the case of HIV/AIDS and PEPFAR, the economic and security threat posed by HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa was deemed too great to go unaddressed bilaterally. Also, as in the mid-20th century, the US again displayed a preference for multilateralism in its global response to the epidemic, yet ended up spending far more on bilateral assistance. In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, both counter-insurgency and reconstruction efforts utilized social policy as a tool to gain allegiance as well as reconstruct and even transform these territories.

Two other factors uncovered in this study played key roles in driving the spending increase in a way that affected the foreign facet of the US welfare state as well. First, the removal of spending caps on defence spending in light of conflict fueled spending at the intersection of social policy and defense policy. However, in the absence of strong technical work on the ground, it proved difficult to utilize and absorb these funds effectively. Second, this draws attention to the 'development-security' nexus more broadly and further research is needed to understand how social policy can best contribute to stabilization and peacekeeping efforts in a way that is embedded within and helps to repair conflict ridden societies.

To conclude, Part IV, 'Moving forward', reflects on the main findings of Parts II and III, discusses the policy implications of these findings, and outlines promising areas for future research at the intersection of social policy and foreign policy.

8 SOCIAL POLICY IN A FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT: A POSTCOLONIAL TURN?

INTRODUCTION

To better understand how social policy is used as a tool in a foreign policy context, this thesis set out to address the following two research questions: ‘What explains the relationship between social policy and foreign policy post-WWII?’; and ‘Is there a relationship between welfare state type and the social sector foreign aid of donors?’. The thesis argues that social policy has not only a substantial, but also a relational foundation; therefore, the exercise of social policy is context specific. To examine this in greater depth, an exploratory, qualitative, and historical approach was adopted, centred on examining functional equivalents of social policy in domestic and foreign policy contexts in order to identify differences between these two realms. In particular, the intersection of social policy and foreign policy was examined in two hegemonic powers of their time – the UK and the US – through the lens of foreign aid.

Together, the findings suggest that while there is indeed a relationship between welfare state type and social sector foreign aid of donors, the complex set of domestic, transnational, and international relationships underpinning the exercise of social policy as a tool of foreign policy suggests that this relationship is neither mechanical nor deterministic. Furthermore, rarely are domestic approaches to social policy directly ‘scaled up’ to the global level. Instead, when, where, why and how these policies are developed and implemented depends largely on the unique nature of the relationship between countries, on the transnational actor constellations shaping them, and on the broader foreign policy and global context in which social policy is being utilised.

To elaborate on these conclusions in greater detail, the first section summarizes the main findings and contributions from the empirical chapters. Then, in the third section, the policy implications of these findings are discussed. The final section outlines discuss potential areas for future research at the intersection of social policy and foreign policy.

MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

While there are certainly gaps in the quantity and quality of data at the intersection of social policy and foreign policy, the first main contributions of this thesis lie in the degree to which research design along with ontological and conceptual clarity are critical for drawing the right conclusions from available data. Utilizing equivalencies across time and space, rather than looking for exact replicas, is critical for creating a standardized background against which to recognize meaningful differences across contexts; ultimately this is equally, if not more, important than data availability. The second main contribution is in mapping out the use of social policy in a foreign policy context in liberal welfare state regimes, where few, if any studies have examined this space when compared to social democratic welfare state regimes.

Through quantitative exploratory analysis, Chapter 4 illustrated these effects most directly by building on the work of Noël and Thérien (1995). By taking an interpretivist stance, this chapter was able to correct for conceptual slippage in understandings of welfare state regimes. The analysis reveals that it is the *combination* of the presence of strong socialist attributes in the form of strong social spending and a social democratic welfare state regime, rather than the presence of the socialist attributes alone, that appears to be sufficient to ensure strong effort towards social policy in a foreign policy context. This chapter also found welfare state regimes with strong conservative attributes display a preference for

multilateralism that may stem, at least in part, from a desire to promote and strengthen the EU. Welfare state regimes with strong liberal attributes were found to use foreign aid in the social sector as much as welfare state regimes with strong socialist attributes and also to use it very forcefully, particularly in the case of the US.

Chapters five, six, and seven focused on mapping out the intersection of social policy and foreign policy with respect to foreign aid in the cases of two global hegemonic powers of their time: the British Empire and the US. One commonality across these two cases that appears to distinguish social policy in a foreign policy context from social policy in a domestic policy context in liberal welfare state regimes is the use of social policy in response to conflict. In the British Empire, the Second Boer War proved to be an incredibly costly conflict, with spending on ODA in the social sector well-above regular levels. In the US, the same pattern emerges, with substantial amounts of spending on ODA in the social sector directed toward Iraq and Afghanistan in conjunction with the so-called War on Terror. Furthermore, even when substantial amounts of US development assistance in the social sector were directed toward alleviating HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa through PEPFAR, this was cloaked in the language of security, justified in terms of conflict prevention, and funded on the grounds that it was a crisis, illustrating the extent to which the 'high politics' of foreign policy have affected the discourse on social policy in a foreign policy context. In these instances, social policy is used predominantly as an instrument of hard power and also as a tool for social transformation.

The use of social policy as a tool in relation to conflict in a foreign policy context has several caveats and implications. First, while social policy was used as a tool in response to

a number of conflicts, the methods used here did not capture all conflicts in either case; therefore, it is not possible to discern when or why social policy is used as a tool in response to some conflicts and not others. Second, the findings in both cases suggest that the social needs generated by the devastation and destruction inherent in conflict bear some relationship to the use of social policy as a tool of foreign policy in line with the recent findings of Obinger, Petersen, and Starke (2018). However, unlike in the welfare state regimes of the Global North, states in conflict ridden aid recipient countries in the Global South do not appear to come away with increased capacity to address the social needs and problems generated by conflicts, such as an expanded, progressive tax-base, as in the Global North. The resulting vacuum is one critical difference and asymmetry affecting insecurity regimes in the Global South. Additional research will be needed to understand the ways in which the relationship between welfare and warfare differ in the context of the Global South compared to the Global North.

The second commonality across the cases of the British Empire and the US was the use of social policy as a tool of foreign policy at a residual, yet sustained level in the context of development policy. In both cases, health received a disproportionate focus, in part because of the indiscriminate nature of infectious disease and the need to control it to preserve both armies and labour forces, particularly in cities with capital accumulation and in rural areas with precious natural resources. In these instances, social policy is used both as an instrument of soft power in order to enhance public opinion both at home and abroad and also as a form of hard power given the extent to which livelihoods depend on lifesaving medical interventions.

Together, these two commonalities suggest two causal pathways – one in line with defense/military objectives and one in line with economic development objectives – shape the relationship between social policy and foreign policy in liberal welfare state regimes. Now that these pathways have been illuminated, additional research from both positivist and interpretivist perspectives can help to further specify the causal effects and mechanisms at play in these pathways. Furthermore, while national values may play a role in linking social policy in domestic and foreign policy contexts in liberal welfare state regimes as initially hypothesised by Noël and Thérien (1995), these results suggest that social policy in a foreign policy context is equally, if not more, likely to be exercised in line with national interests in these regimes. One explanation for this that would sit well with both Noël and Thérien's (1995) findings and the findings presented here would be that the national values of these two hegemonic liberal welfare state regimes are already embedded in the global context in which they operate (e.g., Ikenberry, 2018). Therefore, the use of social policy in a foreign policy context in these regimes appears to be strictly interest-based and functional because of the seamless integration of liberal attributes and values across both contexts.

Finally, these two pathways also illuminate two conceptual distinctions of critical importance when examining social policy in a foreign policy context across welfare state regimes: (i) that 'welfare' and 'warfare' have both normative and functional dimensions; and (ii) that welfare and warfare are not opposites. Despite being juxtaposed regularly for rhetorical purposes, the conceptual opposite of welfare as conceived in Esping-Andersen (1990) is predatory, or socially unregulated, capitalism. This is also in line with the findings of Wood and Gough (2006), who suggest that 'de-clientelism' is analogous to the goal of 'de-commodification' within Esping-Andersen's (1990) welfare state regimes. Transferring this

insight over to the domestic context helps to highlight the relation between domestic security institutions, ranging from police forces to legal systems to organized crime, and welfare. Breaking down false dichotomies between ‘welfare’ and ‘warfare’ within the domestic context of welfare state regimes also sheds light on actors that have played a critical role in the emergence of domestic policy arrangements, such as the police with regards to enforcement and also militaries that require healthy personnel and count as some of the world’s largest employers.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

While there are many specific policy implications related to the findings conveyed in the empirical chapters, I focus here on three broader implications of this work. First, the continuity seen between the cases of the British Empire and the US begs the question of whether or not social policy in a development context has undergone a postcolonial turn in the wake of nationalist independence movements throughout the Global South in the 1970s. Postcolonial sociologists clearly suggest that much remains to be done to promote multiple accounts, narratives, and ways of seeing that postcolonial lenses encourage and require and also appear hopeful that the occlusion of injustices that have remained post-independence can be uncovered and overcome “by incorporating *relational* social theories to give new accounts of modernity” (Go, 2013, 25). Critically, this ‘cultural turn’ has the potential to foster a more ‘connected sociology’ (Bhambra, 2015) of the welfare state, where the welfare outcomes of citizens and non-citizen, both within and outside the geopolitical boundaries of welfare state regimes are understood to be interdependent. Moreover, this branch of historical sociology is more concerned with “finding the most compelling conceptual lens to mediate between meaningful happenings in the past and the concerns of present-day

audiences than... in showing the repeated applicability of a single theoretical model or searching for causal regularities by using a hypothesis testing approach” (Magubane, 2005, p. 105). In so doing, this work goes beyond promoting ‘simple pluralism’ in understandings of the welfare state; instead, it is meant to encourage “appropriate consideration of new evidence enabling us to rethink the adequacy of concepts associated with narratives that have now been superseded” (Bhambra, 2015, p. 3).

Second, continuing to revise and further our understanding of the modern welfare state by considering its development in transnational and historical relief is necessary not only for furthering academic research, but also for uncovering and developing the most appropriate concepts and heuristic devices through which to understand and address present day policy problems. For example, there is a strong and growing demand to address the challenges that mobility and migration bring to welfare state regimes in both Europe and America (Levitt et al, 2015), in addition to the ongoing problems of poverty, inequality, and social injustice that persist throughout developing countries, and increasingly, in pockets within developed countries as well. While this thesis adopted the state as an entry point for discussing social policy in domestic and foreign policy contexts, non-state actors, including multinational corporations, international non-governmental organizations, foundations and philanthropic organizations, as well as churches and missionaries have been integral to the delivery of welfare provision in both the Global North and Global South. This is important not least because the volume of remittances moving from the Global North to the Global South has outpaced ODA for a number of years, suggesting that non-state actors, including individuals and families (Deacon, 2013), are critical drivers and determinants of development.

Third, the use of functional equivalencies illustrated the way in which conceptual clarity, or the intension behind variable construction, is critical to ensuring the appropriate extension of these concepts into quantitative indicators and measures. Academics, development practitioners, and members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee will need to continue to mind standards for inclusion and exclusion within the OECD's Creditor Reporting System data set and the discursive practices around it to ensure clarity. The ability to view data at the project level since 2002, as well as the addition of new donors to the data set – both non-DAC donors as well as private donors – have all helped make critical advances to assist both researchers and practitioners in their ability to understand development assistance. No matter how improved the data, it is only as powerful as our ability to interpret it.

Furthermore, appropriately extending concepts overtime is also critical to understanding long term trends in development assistance, the legacies of which are still relevant today. The colonial development assistance dataset constructed to support the analysis of the relationship between social policy and foreign policy in the British Empire took some time, and it was not clear from the outset how long this would take nor how fruitful it would be. In the end, this exploration was successful as a result of clear concepts and frameworks for understanding development assistance today that could then be used as lenses through which to understand UK government spending in previous eras along with the availability of reliable sources of documentation from which to draw over an extended time period. However, as with all exploratory and historical work, it requires both good preparation and a bit of luck.

POTENTIAL AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH

While much remains to be explored, three avenues of future research strike me as both promising and particularly interesting. First, while this contribution makes a contribution to understanding the relationship between social policy and foreign policy for liberal welfare state regimes, it would be helpful to undertake a similar exercise in a welfare state regime shaped predominantly by conservative attributes. From an exploratory standpoint, France may be a particularly strong case, not least because of its strong colonial legacy in Africa and parts of Asia. Contributions in this area would help to confirm and uncover patterns in possible causal patterns that relate the welfare state and foreign aid to one another across the Global North

Second, from the perspective of social policymakers in the Global South, a better understanding the transnational actor constellations that affect social policy appears to be crucial to devising strategies to advance welfare in informal and insecurity regimes. The welfare state regimes of the Global North are often key players in these constellations, and they may play both direct or indirect roles in these policy environments by channelling development assistance through intergovernmental and international non-governmental organizations or through their support of employers operating with these countries. From the cases of the British Empire and the US, it became clear that these constellations contained an increasingly diverse range of actors overtime (e.g., the US's *Servicios* in Latin America in the 1940s), with the inclusion of private actors giving them a truly transnational flavour. Furthermore, these constellations include a sense not only of the mechanisms that may be at play in social policymaking, but also of the way in which particular arrangements and combinations of actors and factors may affect social policy outcomes. Knowing more about

how these constellations shape and are shaped by foreign aid may be key to creating development financing arrangements that not only help countries to balance budgets and payments but that place them on a sustainable path to self-determination.

Finally, while internationalism and transnationalism clearly matter when considering the organization of foreign aid, China serves as a reminder of the salience of the nation state within the international system. A substantial portion of the poverty reduction achieved during the UN's previous Millennium Development Goals was attributed to a reduction of poverty rates in China. Furthermore, the global financial crisis of 2008, rise of far-right parties, increased migration from the Global South to the Global North, environmental degradation, and the rise of China has led many to question whether or not the end of (neo-)liberalism has come and gone. If China continues to rise and contend for a hegemonic position, it will be interesting to see if it does so through the international system as it has been designed, whether it situates itself as an alternative to the West, or a third way in between. With regards to foreign aid, China's 'New Silk Road', also referred to as the 'Belt and Road Initiative' strikes me as powerful not only for its economic framework but because of the historical narrative it invokes. A recent report suggests that 65 countries are along the 'Belt and Road' stretching from Asia into Europe and now reaching into Africa, accounting for approximately 60 per cent of the world population, 30 per cent of the world gross product, and 40 per cent of world trade. As more information on China's development assistance spending patterns becomes readily available, it will be interesting to see how it approaches and shapes the intersection of social policy and foreign policy compared to the West.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: MEMBERS OF THE OECD'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE (DAC)

As listed on the OECD's website, the DAC has 27 members. Countries wishing to join the DAC are assessed according to the following criteria: the existence of appropriate strategies, policies and institutional frameworks that ensure capacity to deliver a development co-operation program; an accepted measure of effort; and the existence of a system of performance monitoring and evaluation.

DAC Country	DAC Member Since...
Australia	1961
Austria	1966
Belgium	1961
Canada	1961
Czech Republic	2013
Denmark	1963
European Union	1961
Finland	1975
France	1961
Germany	1961
Greece	1999
Iceland	2013
Ireland	1985
Italy	1961
Japan	1961
Korea	2010
Luxembourg	1992
The Netherlands	1961
New Zealand	1973
Norway	1962
Portugal	1961 (withdrew in 1974; re-joined in 1991)
Slovak Republic	2013
Spain	1991
Sweden	1965
Switzerland	1968
United Kingdom	1961
United States	1961

APPENDIX 2: ODA BY SECTOR AND SUB-SECTOR

- I. Social Infrastructure & Services
 - 1. Education
 - 2. Health
 - 3. Population Policy/Programmes & Reproductive Health
 - 4. Water Supply & Sanitation
 - 5. Government & Civil Society
 - 6. Other Social Infrastructure & Services
- II. Economic Infrastructure & Services
 - 1. Transport & Storage
 - 2. Communications
 - 3. Energy
 - 4. Banking & Financial Services
 - 5. Business & Other Services
- III. Production Sectors
 - 1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
 - 2. Industry, Mining Construction
 - 3. Trade & Tourism
- IV. Multi-Sector/Cross-Cutting
 - 1. General Environmental Protection
 - 2. Other Multi-Sector
- V. Total Sector Allocable (I+II+III+IV)
- VI. Commodity Aid/General Programme Assistance
 - 1. General Budget Support
 - 2. Development Food Aid/Food Security Assistance
 - 3. Other Commodity Assistance
- VII. Action Relating to Debt
- VIII. Humanitarian Aid
 - 1. Emergency Response
 - 2. Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation
 - 3. Disaster Prevention & Preparedness
- IX. Unallocated/Unspecified
- X. Total (V+VI+VII+VIII+IX)

APPENDIX 3: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES ODA SECTOR

- I. Social Infrastructure & Services
 1. Education
 - a. Education, Level Unspecified
 1. Education policy & administration management
 2. Education facilities and training
 3. Teacher training
 4. Educational research
 - b. Basic Education
 1. Primary education
 2. Basic life skills for youth & adults
 3. Early childhood education
 - c. Secondary Education
 1. Secondary education
 2. Vocational training
 - d. Post-Secondary Education
 1. Higher education
 2. Advanced technical & managerial training
 2. Health
 - a. Health, General
 1. Health policy & administration management
 2. Medical education/training
 3. Medical research
 4. Medical services
 - b. Basic Health
 1. Basic health care
 2. Basic health infrastructure
 3. Basic nutrition
 4. Infectious disease control
 5. Health education
 6. Malaria control
 7. Tuberculosis control
 8. Health personnel development
 3. Population Policy/Programmes & Reproductive Health
 - a. Population policy & administrative management
 - b. Reproductive health care
 - c. Family planning
 - d. STD control including HIV/AIDS
 - e. Personnel development: population & reproductive health
 4. Water Supply & Sanitation
 - a. Water resources policy & administrative management
 - b. Water resources protection
 - c. Water supply & sanitation – large systems
 - d. Water supply – large systems
 - e. Sanitation – large systems
 - f. Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation
 - g. Basic drinking water supply
 - h. Basic sanitation
 - i. River basins' development

- j. Waste management disposal
 - k. Education & training: water supply & management
- 5. Government & Civil Society
 - a. Government & Civil Society – general
 - 1. Public sector policy and administrative management
 - 2. Public finance management
 - 3. Decentralisation and support to subnational government
 - 4. Anti-corruption organisations and institutions
 - 5. Legal and judicial development
 - 6. Democratic participation and civil society
 - 7. Elections
 - 8. Legislatures and political parties
 - 9. Media and free flow of information
 - 10. Human rights
 - 11. Women’s equality organisations and institutions
 - b. Conflict, Peace & Security
 - 1. Security system management and reform
 - 2. Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
 - 3. Participation in international peacekeeping operations
 - 4. Reintegration and SALW control
 - 5. Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war
 - 6. Child soldiers (prevention and demobilization)
- 6. Other Social Infrastructure & Services
 - a. Social/welfare services
 - b. Employment policy and administrative management
 - c. Housing policy and administrative management
 - d. Low-cost housing
 - e. Multi-sector aid for basic social services
 - f. Culture and recreation
 - g. Statistical capacity building
 - h. Narcotics control
 - i. Social mitigation of HIV/AIDS

US FOREIGN AID DEDICATED TOWARD WELFARE

SEMI-STRUCTURED ELITE INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE

Outline

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BASIC INFORMATION

Title and name of respondent: _____

Current position and relevant previous positions: _____

Date: _____

Time: _____

Place: _____

Contact information on site: _____

Contact information in the future: _____

Means of connection: _____

AIM

- To better understand the politics behind US foreign aid and development policies aimed at improving social/human welfare in developing countries.

OBJECTIVES

- Clarify the relationship between 'development' and 'welfare' in US foreign aid policies.
- Determine why the US has taken an interest in financing foreign aid policies/programmes aimed at improving the welfare of individuals who would otherwise fall outside of the reach of the state.
- Identify what accounts for the US's recent increase in spending within the Social Infrastructure and Services Sector of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), with a focus on the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the reconstruction of basic government services in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the development of legal and judicial systems in Iraq, Afghanistan, Mexico, Columbia, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- Clarify how policies falling under the heading of Social Infrastructure and Services ODA are made, how the funding is allocated (by sub-sector, implementing agency, and region/country), and how they are implemented with attention to PEPFAR, the reconstruction of basic government services in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the development of legal and judicial systems in Iraq, Afghanistan, Mexico, Columbia, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

INTERVIEW STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION: PROFESSIONAL HISTORY OF THE RESPONDENT (~5 MIN.)

- *Cover the basics of the interview process.*
- *Set the tone for the interview and get to know the respondent.*
- *Obtain a general outline of the respondent's professional history.*

Introduce self

Primary research for DPhil in Social Policy in DSPI at Oxford

Recorded interview about why the US has spent an increasingly large proportion of ODA within the Social Infrastructure and Services Sector in recent years

Study is confidential and anonymous

S/he may opt out of answering questions at anytime

If s/he has questions, either during the interview or sometime after, please do not hesitate to let me know

Lastly, **MAKE SURE CONSENT FORM IS SIGNED**

1) “Could you please tell me about how you have come to be familiar with the US’s foreign aid policies and programmes, particularly those dedicated toward improving social and human welfare in developing countries and also about your work experience in the foreign aid sector more generally?”

Prompts:

Current & Past Positions

Type of position (ex. policy making, implementation, project manager, research & evaluation, etc.)

Number of years in the position

Responsibilities of the position

Sector-specific expertise (ex. health systems, education, legal and judicial development, etc.)

Regional/country-specific expertise (ex. Sub-Saharan Africa, Iraq, etc).

CHANGES IN US FOREIGN AID/DEVELOPMENT POLICIES POST-1980s (~15 MIN.)

- *Shift the focus of the interview to US foreign aid policies, particularly those focused on development and welfare.*
- *Gather the participant's perspective on whether or not the US's approach to foreign aid has changed since the 1980s, focusing in particular on changes in the politics of these policies and related programmes.*
- *Explore whether/to what extent US foreign aid is oriented toward 'development' and/or improving social and human welfare and determine what explains this type of policy orientation.*

2) "In your opinion, has the US's approach toward foreign aid and development changed since the 1980s and if so, why, how, and in what ways?"

[LISTEN for whether a renewed focus on POVERTY ALLEVIATION has been a part of this change. FOLLOW-UP on these threads in second questions, and PROBE to understand the POLITICS behind why changes have occurred.]

Prompts:

The end of the 1980s corresponded with several changes in the foreign policy domain, including both:

- The end of the Cold War, which created a need to re-define and justify foreign aid policies and spending; and
- An increasingly voluminous and well-substantiated criticism of the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), leading to an emerging consensus on the need to change the approach, content, and policymaking process underpinning Western development policies.

General questions:

Nod or audible "mm"

Repeat phrases used by the respondent in a questioning tone of voice

"Could you say something more about ____?"

"Could you give me other examples of ____?"

"Could you describe more fully how ____?"

"What do you mean by ____?"

"What do you think about ____?"

"So you mean that ____?"

"Because of ____?"

"What explains ____ change?"

3) “What role, if any, has social/human welfare played, both as a concept and as a desired outcome, in US foreign aid and development policy during this time?”

*[LISTEN for any **DISTINCTIONS** between WELFARE AS A CONCEPT and as an OUTCOME and for how a focus on welfare in either sense has impacted foreign aid and development policy from the 1990s onward. Also, try to get a general sense of HOW STRONG OF A ROLE it welfare as a concept plays in the policy making process. FOLLOW-UP on these threads in second questions.]*

Prompts/second questions:

- Regarding the conceptualization: the justification for foreign aid and development policies/programmes is often underpinned by a number of ideas about the role that aid plays in fostering economic growth and supporting national interests, and I would like to know what role, if any, notions of social/human welfare play in shaping the ideas, justifications and policies in this area. Put another way, is social/human welfare an organising concept in this policy area, and if so, when and why is it useful, and when and why is it invoked?
- Regarding the policy outputs and outcomes: Foreign aid and development policies/programmes are often designed with a number of aims and desired outcomes in mind, ranging from enhancing national security to alleviating poverty. To what extent does the rhetorical emphasis on welfare provision and poverty alleviation match resource allocation and support given to policies (at the policy output level) aimed at improving social/human welfare in the developing world? Further, when measuring the ‘effectiveness’ (at the policy outcome level) of such policies/programmes, which of the many possible desired outcomes from these programmes are considered and what explains which policy outcomes are measured and which are not?

General questions:

Nod or audible “mm”

Repeat phrases used by the respondent in a questioning tone of voice

“Could you say something more about ____?”

“Could you give me some other examples of ____?”

“Could you describe in more detail how ____?”

“What do you mean by ____?”

“What do you think about ____?”

“So you mean that ____?”

“Because of ____?”

“Why do you think that is the case?”

“Is there evidence to support that idea?”

4) “Since the year 2000, what has come to characterise or distinguish US foreign aid and development policies, and programmes from those of other countries, international institutions, and other actors in the area of social/human welfare?”

[LISTEN for mention of PEPFAR and other USAID flagship programmes. Also listen for how the US relates to other entities/actors in the field and for comments on its reputation. FOLLOW-UP on these threads in second questions, particularly ideological and technical areas.]

Prompts/second questions:

- Which areas of social/human welfare has the US chosen to focus on the most and why?
- In the area of policies and programmes dedicated toward social/human welfare, what characterises the US's relationship with other multilateral and bilateral donors?
- Compared to the US, which aid agencies/organisations conceive of and implement aid policies/programmes dedicated toward welfare in a most similar/most different fashion? What accounts for these similarities and differences?
- Of the policies/programmes pursued by the US in this area, which would you consider to be most successful and why? Which would you consider to be the most unsuccessful and why?

General questions:

Nod or audible “mm”

Repeat phrases used by the respondent in a questioning tone of voice

“Could you say something more about ____?”

“Could you give me some other examples of ____?”

“Could you describe more fully how ____?”

“What do you mean by ____?”

“What do you think about ____?”

“You then mean that ____?”

“Because of ____?”

“Are you sure that is the case?”

“Why do you think that is?”

UNDERSTANDING THE US FOREIGN AID AND DEVELOPMENT POLICYMAKING PROCESS, METHODS OF FUNDING ALLOCATION, AND IMPLEMENTATION (~10 MIN.)

- *Understand the process by which foreign aid and development policies dedicated toward welfare are made and financed, identify contextual factors that may affect this process, and clarify how these policies are seen to support broader foreign policy objectives.*
- *Understand how funding set aside for such policies and programmes is allocated (by sub-sector, agency/organisation, and region/country).*
- *Clarify how various government agencies and other organizational entities (e.g. contractors, NGOs, recipient governments, etc.) relate to each other in this process and what role they are meant to play.*
- *Keep in mind that many of these variables and contextual factors (motivations, roles, responsibilities, funding, etc.) may change depending on the policy/project and its aims.*

5) “I understand that the majority of funding dedicated toward foreign aid and development policies/programmes is approved by Congress through the International Affairs Budget, also known as ‘Function 150’. Could you please describe to me in detail how foreign aid policies/programmes, particularly those dedicated toward social/human welfare, are developed and outline the role that various actors/agencies/institutions play in this process?”

[LISTEN CLOSELY as the respondent answers and PUSH them to talk about this process in relation to policies/programmes specifically targeted at SOCIAL/HUMAN WELFARE. LISTEN for which agencies play a role in the process and when/how/if/to what extent they communicate and coordinate their efforts.]

Prompts/second questions:

- In your view, how could this process be improved?
- If you could recommend one change to this process, what would it be?

General questions:

“Could you tell me more about ____?”

“What do you think about that?”

“In your view, why does that happen?”

“Why do you believe that to be the case?”

6) “Did the introduction of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 affect US foreign aid priorities? If so, how, in what ways, and to what extent?”

[LISTEN for HOW this may have happened and if it has, probe for whether a shift in priorities has translated into changes in funding allocation. Also, be prepared for the possibility that the US instead played more of an active role in shaping the MDGs, rather than the other way around. Follow up on these threads in second questions.]

General questions:

“Could you tell me more about ____?”

“Could you give me a more detailed description of what happened?”

“How do you feel about that?”

“What do you think about that?”

“In your view, why did that happen?”

“Why do you believe that to be the case?”

“Is there further evidence to support that view?”

7) “How has the relatively recent elevation and integration of development as a ‘twin pillar of American civilian power’¹ in the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (2010) and continued emphasis in the 2010 National Security Strategy affected US foreign aid and development policy making? Further, where are policies/programmes aimed at improving social/human welfare seen to fit within this strategy?”

[LISTEN for connections between the BROADER FOREIGN POLICY ENVIRONMENT and the pursuit of policies/programmes aimed at improving social/human welfare and PROBE to understand the RATIONALES that link the two. Also, listen for whether/to what extent social/human welfare is conceptualised as a matter of national security. FOLLOW-UP on these threads in second questions.]

Prompts/second questions:

For instance, it has been suggested that the ‘human security’ of individuals abroad is a matter of US national security, particularly in relation to the AIDS epidemic. It has also been suggested that conflicts, terrorism, and other national security threats may be reduced through increasing development and poverty alleviation efforts. How is the provision of social/human welfare in developing countries seen to be connected to broader foreign policy and security objectives and what evidence is most commonly cited in support of these views?

Second questions:

“Could you tell me more about ____?”

“Could you give me a more detailed description of how that has happened?”

“How do you feel about that?”

“What do you think about that?”

“In your view, why did that happen?”

“Why do you believe that to be the case?”

¹ Quoted from the Executive Summary of the US Department of State’s 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), p.9.

SECTOR-SPECIFIC QUESTIONS (~10 MIN.)

- Probe for a further understanding of the causes and justifications for increased spending on PEPFAR, the reconstruction of basic government services in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the development of legal and judicial systems in Iraq, Afghanistan, Mexico, Columbia, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- Understand more fully how resources dedicated toward these areas are seen to support national interests and to foster improvements in social/human welfare in recipient countries, with a strong focus on identifying the mechanism thought to underpin these relationships.
- Identify how country aid packages are constructed, the types of trade-offs that are encountered in this process, and the patterns/determining factors in selecting a particular type of aid for a given country and vice versa.

PEPFAR

8) “What were the primary motivations behind the development of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and who were its strongest supporters? Further, as PEPFAR has transitioned to become part of a broader US Global Health Initiative (GHI) during the Obama Administration, have the aims, justification, supporters, and structure of PEPFAR and the US’s global health strategy more broadly changed? If so, why, how, and in what ways?”

[LISTEN in particular for changes in the aims and support for GIH and for WHAT CAUSED these changes. Aim to understand the POLITICS behind PEPFAR/GHI and to understand the justification for its overall SPENDING and funding allocation within the programme(s). Follow up on these threads in second questions.]

Prompts/second questions:

- Who/What caused this shift in focus and who has come out as for/against these changes?
- What have been the effects of broadening the US’s involvement in global health beyond PEPFAR and its contribution to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria?
- How is PEPFAR funding allocated and has this changed during the transition to the GIH? If funding allocation has changed, how, in what ways, and to what extent?
- Has funding for PEPFAR/GHI been contested, and if so, on what grounds?

General questions [NOTE: Only probe in areas related to the overall objectives]:

“Could you describe more fully why/how ____?”

“In your view, why did that happen?”

“How was that decision made?”

“Who made that decision?”

“What other factors impacted that decision?”

“Because of ____?”

“How do you feel about these changes?”

9) “I understand that public sector policy and administrative management is a sub-sector of ODA that has received an increased amount of funding in recent years, largely due to reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Why was the Department of Defense the lead agency on these types of projects in Iraq and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the lead agency on similar projects in Afghanistan?”

[LISTEN for instances of policy learning between Iraq and Afghanistan and for information about IF/HOW AGENCIES WORK TOGETHER, both in the short- and long-term, in post-conflict/crisis countries. FOLLOW-UP on these threads in second questions.]

Prompt/second questions:

- More generally speaking, how is the lead agency determined in development efforts, particularly in post-conflict settings?
- What marks the transition between more immediate post-conflict/crisis response/reconstruction initiatives and longer-term development strategies? Further, how does the mix of institutions/agencies/actors involved in this process change over time and what determines the pace of these transitions?
- Has social policy been prioritized in reconstruction efforts, and if so, in what ways and to what extent?

General questions [NOTE: Only probe in areas related to the overall objectives]:

“Could you describe more fully why/how ____?”

“In your view, why did that happen?”

“How was that decision made?”

“Who made that decision?”

“What other factors impacted that decision?”

“Because of ____?”

“How do you feel about these changes?”

10) “I understand that legal and judicial development is a sub-sector of ODA that has also received an increased amount of funding in recent years particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Mexico, Colombia, and West Bank and the Gaza Strip. I have several questions related to this sector: what is this type of aid meant to achieve?; why, as opposed to other options, is it selected as a policy tool ?; how is increased legal and judicial development seen to translate into improved development outcomes on the whole?; and what explains the increased spending on the use of this policy tool in the countries listed above?”

[LISTEN in particular for how legal and judicial development is seen to be related to development, and also PROBE for information about how these policies are carried out. FOLLOW-UP on any threads related to welfare if they emerge.]

Prompt/second questions:

- Is legal and judicial development thought to have a broader social impact in developing countries, and if so, how and in what ways?
- What are the tradeoffs between targeting aid toward legal and judicial development instead of health/education for example?

General questions [NOTE: Only probe in areas related to the overall objectives]:

“Could you describe more fully how that choice is made?”

“In your view, why did that happen?”

“How was that decision made?”

“Who made that decision?”

“What other factors impacted that decision?”

“Because of ____?”

“How do you feel about these decisions/that tradeoff?”

UNDERSTANDING AND IDENTIFYING CO-ORDINATION MECHANISMS (~15 MIN)

- *Uncover if/how/ to what extent domestic welfare policy is coordinated with or related to foreign welfare policy, with a strong focus on the mechanisms underpinning this relationship.*
- *Identify what role, if any, public opinion, both domestically and in countries abroad, plays in shaping foreign aid policies, particularly those related to welfare.*
- *Feel free to elaborate where believed to be necessary.*

11) “Increasingly, it appears that a number of US institutions and agencies play a role in foreign aid policies/programmes, including those directed toward welfare. Could you please explain more about why agencies outside of USAID and the Department of State (such as the Department of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Justice among others) have become involved in foreign aid efforts, how a lead agency manages to be established for a given policy/programme, and how foreign aid policies/programmes involving several organizational entities are co-ordinated?”

[LISTEN to the response and be prepared to PROBE for how CO-ORDINATION occurs with AGENCIES OTHER THAN DOD. Try to establish whether co-ordination happens sort of AD HOC, OR whether it is a STANDARD part of the process during both policy development and implementation. Also, if it appears that TENSION exists between institutions/agencies, probe with second questions where necessary, but be conscious of time.]

Prompts/second questions:

- In your view, how could this process be improved?
- If you could recommend one change to this process, what would it be?

General questions:

“Could you describe more fully how ____?”

“In your view, why has (this/that) happened?”

“What do you think about ____?”

“Because of ____?”

“What other factors impacted that development?”

“Could you talk more about ____?”

“Could you give me a more detailed description of what happened?”

“How do you feel about that?”

“Are you sure that is the case?”

12) “To what extent are agencies that have traditionally been focused on welfare in a domestic context, such as the Department of Health and Human Services, involved in welfare matters in a foreign policy context? Why and how have such institutions come to be involved in welfare in a foreign policy context? Does this lead to any tensions or conflicts of interest within these institutions and what do you expect for their involvement in a foreign policy context to look like in the future?”

[LISTEN to the response and try to ascertain the drivers behind an increased focus in the foreign policy domain. PROBE to find out as much as possible about what has caused institutions/agencies to become involved in this domain, to understand if/how/when/to what extent they have shifted their focus to this space, and when/whether or not these institutions/agencies are acting/able to act independently (i.e. without permission/ co-ordination with the Department of State and other institutions/agencies/branches of government) in this realm.]

General questions:

“Could you describe more fully how ____?”

“In your view, why has (this/that) happened?”

“What do you think about ____?”

“Because of ____?”

“What other factors impacted that development?”

“Could you talk more about ____?”

“Could you give me a more detailed description of what/why this/that happened?”

“How do you feel about that?”

“Why do you expect that to be the case?”

13) “Recent studies display a somewhat unclear picture of public opinion on foreign aid, with the majority of Americans believing that we should spend less on foreign aid but also assuming that we spend more on foreign aid than we actually do. There is also evidence to suggest that PEPFAR has improved perceptions of the US abroad. Does public opinion, both at home and abroad, play a role in foreign aid policy making process, particularly in relation to aid dedicated toward welfare? If so, how and at what point does it affect the process, and if possible, could you please cite examples of instances where this has occurred?”

[LISTEN to the response and PROBE for the degree to which WELFARE as a political tool is thought to have a unique ability to improve perceptions of the US abroad and a unique ability to resist retrenchment at home. FOLLOW-UP on relevant threads in second questions.]

Prompt/second questions:

- Is welfare thought to be unique in its ability to improve perceptions of the US abroad, and if so, in what ways and why is this the case?
- Do you think welfare is used differently as a political tool in a domestic and foreign context, and if so, why, how, and in what ways?
- In what ways, if at all, do the justifications for providing welfare differ in domestic and foreign contexts? What do you think explains these differences?
- Has US support for the provision of welfare in the foreign realm been called overtly called into question on the grounds of whether or not it supports national interests? If so, when has this happened, what actors were involved, and what were the arguments cited for/against each position?

General questions:

“Could you describe more fully how ____?”

“In your view, why has (this/that) happened?”

“What do you think about (that)?”

“Because of ____?”

“Could you talk more about (that)?”

“Could you give me a more detailed description of what/why ____ matters?”

“How do you feel about that?”

“Why do you expect that to be the case?”

“Are you sure that is the case?”

CONCLUSION: FUTURE TRENDS IN FOREIGN AID DEDICATED TOWARD SOCIAL/HUMAN WELFARE (~5 MIN)

- *Gather the participant's perspective on the future of foreign aid policies dedicated toward welfare.*
- *Wrap up the interview and leave the respondent feeling comfortable.*

14) “In future years, what role do you expect foreign aid programmes aimed at improving social/human welfare to play within the broader foreign policy and development strategy of the US and why do you expect this to be the case?”

[LISTEN to the respondent's answer, and follow up on any interesting and RELEVANT points.]

15) “Do you have any other information or opinions about the role that welfare plays in US foreign aid programmes that you would like to convey and/or do you have any questions for me?”

[LISTEN to the respondent's answer, and answer any questions that s/he may have.]

***** THANK THE RESPONDENT*****

Be sure to exchange contact information with the respondent

Gather contact details of other individuals I could potentially interview

Double check that the consent form has been signed

APPENDIX 5: LIST OF INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATIONS OF RESPONDENTS (* INDICATES A FORMAL, SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED)

Association of American Medical Colleges

*British Embassy in Washington

The Council of State Governments

Caerus Associates

Daily Mail

*Georgetown University

*Global Witness

International Business Machines Corporation (or 'IBM')

*Millennium Challenge Corporation

*National Defense University

National Institutes of Health

Pew Environment Group

Pew Research Centre

PATH (formerly Program for Appropriate Technology in Health)

*United States Agency for International Development

*United States Congress

United States Department of Defense

*United States Department of Health and Human Services

*United States Department of State

*World Bank

World Learning

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY AND INTERVENTION

Barnett House, 32 Wellington Square,
Oxford, OX1 2ER, United Kingdom
www.spi.ox.ac.uk



Amanda Shriwise,
Department of Social Policy and Intervention
Oxford

Ref: 2013-14_60

16 June 2014

Dear Amanda,

Understanding Social Policy as a Tool of Foreign Policy: an examination of the foreign welfare policies of welfare state regimes

Your application for research ethics approval in connection with your thesis has been considered by the Departmental Research Ethics Committee (DREC) in accordance with the procedures laid down by the University for Ethical Approval.

I am pleased to inform you that, on the basis of the information provided, the proposed research has been judged as meeting appropriate ethical standards and DREC approval has been granted.

If any revisions to your research methodology are made subsequent to this approval, these must be detailed in writing and submitted to DREC immediately.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Lucie Cluver'.

Dr Lucie Cluver
Chair of DREC

APPENDIX 7: TEXT OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER (SOURCE: THE AVALON PROJECT, YALE LAW SCHOOL)

AUGUST 14, 1941

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measure which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.



Franklin D. Roosevelt

Winston S. Churchill

APPENDIX 8: INTER-AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION ORGANISATIONAL CHART (SOURCE: OFFICE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, 1947, 99)

The image of the Inter-American Educational Foundation Organisational chart originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

APPENDIX 9: ODA DISBURSEMENTS OF FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1967-1972



APPENDIX 10: US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ, 2003-2016 (IN USD, IN MILLIONS) (SOURCE: KATZMAN AND HUMUD, 2016, 39)²

	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017 (requested)	TOTAL FY 2003 - FY 2016
IRRF	2475	18389		10												20874
ESF				1535.4	1677	429	541.5	382.5	325.7	250	72.3	72.3	54	72.5	332.5	5412.2
Democracy Fund					250	75										325
IFTA (Treasury Dept. Asst.)				13	2.8											15.8
NADR			3.6		18.4	20.4	35.5	30.3	29.8	32	31.1	31.1	23.86		26.86	256.06
Refugee Accounts (MRA and ERMA)	39.6	0.1			78.3	278	260	316	280							1252
IDA	22		7.1	0.3	45	85	51	42	17							269.4
Other USAID Funds	470					23.8										493.8
INCLE				91.4	170	85	20	702	114.6	137	13.5	13.5	1	11	0	1359
FMF										850	471.3	471.3	150	250	150	2192.6
IMET		1.2			1.1		2	2	1.7	2	1.1	1.7	0.902	1	1	14.702
DOD-ISFF			5391	3007	5542	3000	1000	1000	1155				1618	715	620	22428
DOD - Iraq Army	51.2		210													261.2
DOD-CERP		140	718	708	750	996	339	263	44							3958
DOD - Oil Repair	802															802
DOD - Business Support					50	50	74									174
TOTAL	3859.8	18530.3	6329.7	5365.1	8584.6	5042.2	2323	2737.8	1967.8	1271	589.3	589.9	1847.762	1049.5	1130.36	60087.762

² IRRF = Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund; ESF = Economic Support Fund; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related; MRA = Migration and Refugee Assistance; ERMA = Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund; IDA = International Disaster Assistance; INCLE = International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education and Training; ISFF = Iraq Security Force Funding

APPENDIX 11: US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN, 2002-2016 (IN USD, IN MILLIONS) (SOURCE: KATZMAN, 2016, 72; PREPARED BY TARNOFF)³

	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017 (requested)	TOTAL FY 2003 - FY 2016
ESF	117	239	894	1280	473	1211	1400	2088	3346	2168	1837	1850	851	1225	1200	1000	20179
DA	18.3	42.5	153	170	185	167	149	0.4	0.3	0	0	0					885.5
GHCS	7.5	49.7	33.4	38	41.5	101	63	58	92	70	0	0					554.1
Refugee Accounts	160	61	63	47	42	54	44	77	82	65	99	13					807
Food Aid	206	74	99	97	108	70	231	82	32	19	0.6	0					1018.6
IDA	197	86	11	4	0	0	17	27	30	66	61	14					513
INCLE	60	0	220	709	216	252	308	484	589	400	324	6.1	225	325	250	185	4368.1
NADR	44	34.7	67	38	18.2	37	27	49	58	69	65	54		43.5	38	37.6	642.4
IMET	0.2	0.4	0.7	1	1	1.2	1.7	1.3	1.8	1.6	2	0.8	0.51	1.4	1.2	0.8	16.81
FMF	57	191	414	397	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					1059
Other	33	23	36	18	0.2	0.1	21	5	5.8	7.4	8	0					157.5
DOD - ASSF	0	0	0	995	1908	7406	2750	5607	9167	10619	9200	5124	4727	4109	3652	3448	65264
DOD - CERP	0	0	40	136	215	209	488	551	1000	400	400	200	30	15			3684
Infrastructure Fund	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	299	400	325	199	0			1223
Business Task Force	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	59	239	242	179	64	5			802
DOD - CN	0	0	72	225	108	291	193	230	392	376	421	372					2680
DOD - Other	7.5	165	285	540	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					997.5
DEA Counternarcotic	0.6	2.9	3.7	17	23.7	20	41	19	0	0	0	0					127.9
TOTAL	909	970	2392	4712	3339	9818	5732	9292	14854	14800	13058	8084	6097	5725	5165	4672	104947

³ 'Other' = Office of Transition Initiatives, Treasury Assistance, and Peacekeeping; ESF = Economic Support Funds; DA = Development Assistance; GHCS = Global Health/Child Survival; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining, and Related; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; ASSF = Afghan Security Forces Funding; IDA = International Disaster Assistance

