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Journal article

Hostile stakes and the role of banks in German corporate governance

Abstract:

This article uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly fragmented (but not dispersed) ownership in non-majority controlled firms. We document how the accumulation of hostile stakes can be used to gain control of target companies given these ownership patter...

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Publication date:
2001-01-01
UUID:
uuid:6d0d8307-a1a5-4bf4-a481-adf3cd1db14a
Local pid:
oai:eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk:1377
Deposit date:
2012-01-04

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