



**Mobilisational Citizenship: Identity and Collective Action in
Santiago de Chile's Underprivileged Neighbourhoods**

*Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology*

By

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
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ABSTRACT

The Chilean urban poor led crucial movements throughout most of the 20th century. Scholars argue that different factors explain the demobilisation of that sector during the democratic transition (early 1990s). Through an ethnographic comparative approach, this thesis compares two neighbourhoods. Their similitudes cannot explain why while one of them sustained contentious collective action in time, the other became demobilised as most other neighbourhoods. As in many other studies, what explains the survival of contentious collective action is a mobilisational identity. This research moves beyond those accounts to explain why mobilisational citizenship emerges in some communities and not in others. The interaction between four dimensions explains mobilisational citizenship: agentic memory, belonging, boundaries, and decentralised leadership. The sustainability of mobilisational citizenship depends on grassroots activists' capacity to transmit collective identity as political capital.

The Chilean case shows that autonomy is crucial for mobilisational citizenship. Cases in which political parties establish networks of loyalty promoting the monopoly of political capital at the grassroots level cannot develop and sustain mobilisational identity.

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INTRODUCTION

‘Occupied territories.’ This is how Ciper – the main Chilean news agency specialised in investigative journalism – portrays Chilean underprivileged neighbourhoods. Drug trafficking and criminality have taken over the urban peripheries in Chilean cities, Ciper journalists argue (Figueroa, Sullivan, & Fouillioux, 2009). Similarly, Chilean media generally portrays the urban poor as ghettos where social pathologies abound (see for example La Segunda, 2013).

Despite the importance of correctly diagnosing social issues, too often marginalised, underprivileged urban areas are represented solely as violent nests of criminality. Promoted by mainstream media, government agencies, the educational system, and even academics, the image of anomic, depoliticised impoverished areas prevails in both the U.S. and Europe (Burrell, 2010; Wacquant, 1996). This is also the case for post-dictatorial Chile, where ideas of ‘new urban poverty,’ ‘ghettos,’ and ‘segregation’ came to the forefront of local academic enquiry (Sabatini & Brain, 2008; M. Tironi, 2003). Although this thesis also focuses on these disenfranchised, marginal urban areas, it highlights residents’ capacity to build collective agency and construct novel meanings as a response to political exclusion.

With a paired comparison, this thesis looks at how active residents in Santiago’s *poblaciones* (underprivileged neighbourhoods) build informal political membership,

questioning the Chilean mainstream entrenched regime of citizenship. In the following pages I show that a collective identity that fosters contentious collective action constitutes the way in which active residents aim to shape their community and, ultimately, redefine their collective position as political agents.

For several decades (1920s to 1980s) the Chilean urban poor constructed a movement that would represent a large political force, especially in Santiago. Although once installed in the centre of national political struggles, the urban poor have become largely demobilised and criminalised throughout the democratic transition. This thesis identifies the mobilisational potential that underprivileged urban areas currently have, and explains the role that identity has in their contentious organisation.

I suggest that the survival of contentious collective action results from the persistence of mobilisational identity in *poblaciones*. Oxhorn (1995) already made this argument for the Chilean case, explaining that participation in *población* organisations during the late 1980s was not only motivated by survival and other functional needs. In fact, people participated in local organisations seeking a sense of unity, belonging, and collective protection. Oxhorn (1995) suggested that in the act of mobilising, people constructed meanings that gave sense to that same participation. In his book Oxhorn dissects *población* mobilisation's identity, making his point through a thorough description of the meanings that people attached to acting collectively. Oxhorn's approach belongs to an academic tradition in the study of social movements that conceived identity and social movements as one and the same thing. Established by several researchers during the 1980s (Laraña, Johnston, &

Gusfield, 1994), this tradition understood social movements as a reaction to an increasingly complex society. When high differentiation and the disintegration of traditional connections, loyalties, and identities characterise society, people react by seeking greater integration, belonging, and control (Melucci, 1989, p. 45). These authors advanced nuanced and complex theoretical developments. However, the examination of the meanings that bring people together was, for this tradition, enough to explain mobilisation. This notion of identity and action as one and the same imposes two problems: firstly, it leads to highly descriptive accounts of collective action; secondly, it hinders comparative research. Acknowledging these limitations, this thesis introduces an analytical framework to explain how identity translates into contentious collective action. Mobilisational identity emerges from the dynamic interaction between four dimensions: agentic memory, belonging, boundaries, and decentralised leadership.

Gould (1991, 1995) has noted the importance of analytically differentiating identity from collective action. The causal interaction between identity and mobilisation, Gould reminds us, must be thought carefully. In fact, while collective identity can promote collective action, causality also works the other way. That is, collective action also builds new networks that strengthen identity.

This thesis also aims to be a contribution to theories that re-scale the concept of citizenship, redefining it at the local level for the study of urban social movement communities (SMCs) (Day, 2005; Holston, 2008; Faranak Miraftab & Wills, 2005; Motta, 2009). These authors look at how particular urban communities subvert entrenched

regimes of citizenship from the margins. However, these theories are limited in that they do not account for the sustainability of neighbourhood activism. This thesis addresses this gap by explaining how mobilisational identity survives across time. In fact, in some *poblaciones*, radical leftist groups – such as the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) and the Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL) – as well as Communist militants, implanted a culture based on the transmission of political capital. This strategy not only installed a mobilisational identity in several neighbourhoods, but it also assured the transmission of that identity between generations.

Additionally, this thesis complements the academic explanations provided on the demobilisation process experienced by the Latin American urban poor in democratic transitions. Focusing on the Chilean case, this thesis explains how *población* organisations changed their nature during the democratic transition, becoming what authors have described as ‘creatures of the Chilean state’ (Koppelman, n.d.) or ‘agents in their own governance’ (Paley, 2001, p. 6). Throughout the 1980s – especially in supporting local initiatives, organising protests, and coordinating the first democratic campaigns (for the referendum and for presidential elections) – political parties regained leadership among grassroots organisations. The progressive construction of political loyalty, partisan networks and clientelistic relationships with many local organisations obstructed contentious initiatives of collective action. With time, local leaders obtained political socialisation from parties, adhering to an ethos of competitive electoral politics. This thesis shows that, as a result, local leaders’ restless attempt to monopolise political capital at the

grassroots level diminishes collective capacities to transfer mobilisational identity symbols from one generation to the next.

In different occasions this thesis opposes contentious collective action to the actions coordinated by political parties. This emphasis is accounting for a particular reality. Since the early 1990s grassroots initiatives and society at large have decoupled from political parties in Chilean society (Huneus, 2014: Chapter 11). In fact, while people's engagement in political matters has sharply increased in the past decade (UNDP, 2015), social movements have become increasingly disconnected from political parties (Somma & Bargsted, 2015). This thesis demonstrates that the urban poor have not been an exception.

This disconnection between the grassroots and institutional political representation has, in fact, been described as a more general trend, at least in Latin America, the United States and Europe (Torcal, 2003). Although contextually situated, this divorce between political parties and contentious collective action is not theoretically accurate. Collective actors always share a certain representation of the state.¹ Moreover, Auyero and Lapegna (2012), for example, demonstrate that mobilisation can currently occur motivated by political party interests. They show that political clientelism can lead to contentious collective action. Arguably, collective initiatives that occur in connection to political parties are more effective in providing people with access to goods and services. While acknowledging this argument, this thesis aims to highlight that contentious collective action can lead to

¹ Later, this thesis explains how representations of the state and other social actors build 'relational settings', setting a collective position that is the starting point of contentious collective action. Relational settings, in

collectively challenging historically entrenched systems of political exclusion affecting underprivileged residents. In other words, the transformative potential of this thesis' definition of contentious collective action lays in its capacity to challenge established distributions of symbolic resources (see Melucci, 1996). The notion of 'mobilisational citizenship' expresses precisely this emphasis. Theoretically, mobilisational citizenship does not necessarily require the exclusion of political institutions. However, building a sustainable sense of protagonism by which contentious collective action can create and recreate local community—central feature of mobilisational citizenship— does require the decentralisation of political capital.

Chapter one in this thesis devotes attention to the historical context of current collective action in *poblaciones*. It reviews the events and agents that have had an impact on *población* activism since the early 20th century through to present years. In this chapter I show that up until 1973 the relationship between *población* movements and political parties was intense and, occasionally, highly controversial. Political parties grew as centralised bureaucratic structures and developed faster than the local economy. Oftentimes, political parties and civil society organisations overlapped, becoming indistinguishable. While the role of the different actors has often become a matter of dispute, I highlight the undeniable tradition of mutual influence that political parties and the urban poor have historically constructed. During the dictatorship, for example, political parties – and movements such as the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) or the Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL) – played a critical role in reactivating the poor grassroots.

This chapter also suggests that the political role of the Chilean urban poor has been underplayed in the last twenty-five years.

The **second chapter** describes my methodological decisions. It provides a brief description of *poblaciones*, including the case studies I have selected. Additionally, the chapter explains the details of my fieldwork, and how I collected and analysed my data.

Chapter three provides a full theoretical framework introducing the notion of mobilisational citizenship. Here I have used a pool of different theories to analytically explain how collective identity translates into contentious collective action. This interaction results from four analytical dimensions: agentic memory, mobilising belonging, mobilising boundaries, and decentralised leadership. In providing an understanding of the mobilisational potential of collective identity, this framework also explains how a mobilisational identity can be sustainable through time.

Chapter four devotes most of its attention to my first case study: Nuevo Amanecer (NA). Based on my fieldwork carried out there, this section explains why *poblaciones* have demobilised since the 1990s. I here explain the historical roots of the survival of mobilising identities in some exceptional *poblaciones*. Following from this, I suggest that *poblaciones* have developed an acquiescent type of political membership. Networks of political loyalty and local leaders' constant efforts to monopolise political capital have curtailed the transmission of collective identity symbols. After explaining why mobilisational identity has not survived in *poblaciones*, the chapters that follow explain how that identity functions in exceptional cases. In the final four chapters I focus on Lo

Hermida (LH). I explain how identity translates into contentious collective action in Santiago's *poblaciones*, assessing each one of the dimensions theoretically defined.

Chapter five revises the narratives of the past that *población* dwellers share. It looks at how collective memory constructs a sense of community that prolongs through time, connecting past, present, and future. Additionally, this section analyses how sharing stories of the past can produce a collective position of agency in the present, building what I call agentic memory.

Chapter six claims that residents' identification with their community fosters contentious collective action. It analyses the shared meanings whereby local organisations in LH build solidarity and attribute their grievances to a broad unequal system. Additionally, the chapter argues that local residents construct a highly positive image of their community, in opposition to stigmatising definitions.

In **chapter seven** an explanation of how identity boundaries can produce mobilisation is provided. LH's organisations differentiate two symbolic realms: the formal and the informal in their production of boundaries. The conflict between these two realms refines antagonists threatening the informal world of the *población*. Reacting to this threat, residents mobilise. As a result they construct a space in which institutions and formal procedures have much less legitimacy. Instead, they are seen negatively. The disconnection from standards that do not suit their reality provides them with autonomy to create more authentic collective action.

Chapter eight suggests that decentralised leadership is largely responsible for the sustainability of mobilisational identity. Unlike in NA, LH organisations tend to transmit their mobilisational identity symbols. The chapter shows how, in doing so, local organisations disseminate political capital. As a result, organisation members build a collective and individual sense of protagonism in their daily interactions mobilising. Mobilising identity sustains in time, first as a result of leaders' dispositions to transfer identity; second, due to protagonism's enabling capacity to renew local leaders.

CHAPTER 1

THE CHILEAN URBAN POOR IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

This section provides the historical background in which this research develops. As later chapters will demonstrate, the roots of contentious collective action in *poblaciones* must be traced to the dwellers movement. In fact, later chapters will show that mobilisational identity depends on a collective sense of belonging to a community that extends over time.

The dwellers movement had its first manifestations in the 1920s with the renters' movement. In these years, the close connection with the Communist Party was already clearly evident. This interdependency between the dwellers movement and political parties granted *poblaciones* a notorious role in Chile's historical political development. *Pobladores* effectively asserted and struggled for citizenship rights.

The chapter is structured chronologically. It starts by providing a relatively thorough account of the political conditions in which the dwellers movement developed during the first half of the 20th century. Chile's very rigid economic structure, focused on mining revenues, determined the incapacity of formal structures to develop in congruence with social movements. Rural urban migration and population growth since the 1930s made

housing provision a central concern for the government. The government's systematic incapacity to provide accommodation for the poor built a historical need for urban land. In coordination with political parties the poor began invading land in cities. Thousands of squatting settlers erected dwellings in there, progressively building shantytowns, which became representative of a movement that shaped Chilean cities.

The chapter then shows the political importance of the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The MIR became a consolidated armed force with the structure of a party. Growing politically, the MIR led many urban land invasions. Both case studies used in this research were created as a result of the MIR's policy to develop political presence in *poblaciones*. Nueva la Habana (NH) was in fact the main example of what the MIR called 'the construction of popular power'. Many other shantytowns in that period developed initiatives inspired by the organisational structure and ideology used in NH.

The military dictatorship initially implied a complete disconnection between the grassroots and political parties. Political leaders were persecuted and many were killed or tortured. The economic crisis strongly hit *poblaciones*. As a reaction many subsistence organisations emerged. The beginning of the 1980s saw the creation of new movements that became important for *población* activism: the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) and the Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL). Both movements carried out activist initiatives in shantytowns during the period of national protests – starting in 1983.

Together with the Communists, these movements recruited *población* dwellers into their ranks, shaping local identity.

The chapter then draws attention to the Chilean democratic transition. Academic accounts suggest that the referendum in 1988 and the presidential election in 1989 became the last intense interaction between political parties and civil society. In collaboration with grassroots organisations, parties organised a large campaign that eventually rejected the Pinochet's continuity in power. Finally, this section explains how urban underprivileged population has been largely excluded from Chile's political arena since 1990.

POBLADORES, PARTIES AND THE STRUGGLE OVER HOUSING

The Latin American poor have seen their substantive citizenship diminished throughout history. Chile's urban underprivileged population is no exception. Although considered full citizens of the nation, the poor suffer from unequal access to rights within their own countries. Garcés (2002) cogently demonstrates how neither landlords nor the state ever provided conditions for the Chilean poor to become properly included in society. During the early twentieth century the lowest social stratum became consolidated as a growing mass of excluded population. They were treated as mere objects or passive recipients of populism, discrimination, and Catholic guilt (through charity) and became increasingly numerous.

Throughout the first half of the 20th century Chile represented an exceptional case in Latin America. Unlike most other countries in the region, Chile enjoyed a stable democracy² with a representative party system and relatively strong institutions. In fact, Valenzuela (1989, p. 21) claims that Chile had ‘internationally largely admired institutions.’ The early establishment of a civilian rule (1830-1860) was determinant for constructing strong institutions. During these years the state became highly centralised and was the arena in which all conflicts took place. In that whole century the Chilean economy was based on mineral exports. Initially nitrate, and later copper, constituted the core of national development since the second half of the 19th century³ (Meller, 1998). The centrality of mineral exports for local economy produced an important combination for the development of civil society. Whilst on the one hand, the economic structure of the country became rather stagnant, concentrated largely on minerals; on the other hand, the wealth derived from that structure facilitated the expansion of the state (Pinto, 1970). All social and political demands were directed towards the state (Garretón, 1989). Local initiatives became increasingly dependent on the highly centralised government. Simultaneously, Santiago’s growth and economic development outpaced all other cities, undisputedly becoming the geopolitical centre of the country (Greene & Soler, 2004).

² Chile does show some un-democratic interruptions in this period. Democracy was briefly interrupted during a civil war in 1891. Later, from 1924 to 1932, economic crises led to the quick resignation of four presidents in a row.

³ Chile consolidated its sovereignty over the Atacama Desert in the *Guerra del Pacífico* (Pacific War) in 1879, beating Bolivia and Perú. Rich in minerals, the desert provided Chile with nitrate first and copper later. Mineral extraction and exports have been the heart of the Chilean economy since those days. In fact, roughly 20 percent of the Chilean GDP is currently explained by copper exports.

According to Pinto (1970), due to the mineral-oriented Chilean economy, social and political changes developed at a much faster pace than the national economic structure. The years between 1924 and 1932 were of turmoil and instability. During these years, the president, Alessandri, intended to incorporate the emerging middle classes as central democratic agents. Finally, in 1925, the new Constitution eroded the power of the oligarchy, paving the development of protagonism in other social sectors. The ‘oligarchic state’ was replaced by the ‘compromise state’ (Garretón, 1989). This meant that the oligarchy had to share power with the middle classes, giving more space for the working-class to establish their demands. The Communist and Socialist parties then obtained more salience as the chosen political representatives of the lower classes. Later, in the 1930s, Chile began a process that combined a larger democratisation with industrialisation. This process intended to substitute imports to create more sustainable, inclusive development. However, the limitations of this economic development soon became evident.

As a result of such a centralised Chilean state, political parties also developed as centralised organisations. The state was the central source of resources and the main arena to carry out political struggles or alliances. In the 1930s the state grew quickly. By the beginning of the 1940s, in fact, the public sector concentrated 50 percent of internal investment, and between 1930 and 1949 employment in the public sector doubled, largely surpassing the increase in mining, agriculture, industry, or construction (Loveman, 2001).

As Valenzuela (1977) explains, the expansion of the central state diminished the power of local governments. Local politicians’ success therefore depended on their capacity to

obtain resources from the central state. Much of their work implied acting as ‘brokers’ of the party elites, constantly trying to satisfy the needs of ‘clients’ in the grassroots⁴. Progressively, political parties became highly engrained in local organisations. Consequently, Chilean civil society overlapped with political parties. Social and political engagement most generally occurred with the involvement of political parties. Parties then channelled local organisations’ demands to the state (Garretón, 1989). Garretón (1989) argues that this overlapping between political parties and civil society is a crucial trait of Chilean society during most of the 20th century.

In this context, some authors have called for avoiding exaggeration of the role of political parties in the social and political processes occurring before 1973 (Bastias Saavedra, 2013; Garcés, 2002; Salazar, 2012). However, I would argue that this overlapping between the institutional political system and the grassroots makes it very difficult – and sometimes even unnecessary – to differentiate the two parties. It is important to recognise that, during this period, parties and baseline organisations very strongly influenced each other. According to Oxhorn (1995), for example, the overdevelopment of parties limited the development of civil society in this period. However, much of the progress with regards to rights and participation firstly initiated in the grassroots to only later be addressed by institutions and legal frameworks (Garcés, 2002). Arguably, up until 1973, leftist political parties seemed partially concerned with empowering the poor, thus narrowing the gap

⁴ As clarified later, the literature on clientelism calls grassroots community members ‘clients,’ and ‘brokers’ those who serve as the connection between a client and a politician. Brokers channel resources from established politicians to the bases and build political loyalty among local residents.

between the political elite and the lower classes - something that the divide between institutions and civil society built by the dictatorship made increasingly more difficult later on. In fact, the return of party politics in the late 1980s meant a sharp (perhaps exclusive) focus on electoral objectives⁵.

With the support of the Communist Party, the labour movement – legalised in 1924 – became the central reference of popular mobilisation in Chile for the first half of the 20th century. However, their growing organisation did not truly represent all of the underprivileged. The majority of the poor were largely disenfranchised (Angell, 1972; Vicente Espinoza, 1988). Despite the increasing strength acquired by the labour movement, the largest portions of the Chilean underprivileged were not unionised. Large institutions and the mining sector enjoyed better and more stable working conditions, whilst workers in smaller firms and other non-unionised companies were at a clear disadvantage. Many other urban dwellers had no jobs or worked informally. The marginalised urban poor were ignored by Chilean institutions despite their consistent growth.

By the 1920s, cities were already swelling with poor citizens living in vulnerable conditions. In collaboration with the Communists, a renter's movement formed demanding improvements in their living conditions, a decrease in their rents, and social housing

⁵ Paley (2001) provides an interesting approach to this argument by explaining the collective subjective consequences of a democracy sustained mainly on electoral technologies (e.g. polls and other types of electoral research). She calls this a 'marketing democracy.'

provision. Obtaining socialisation from the party, a section of the movement established ‘a global questioning of the renting system, starting from a critique to property’ (Espinoza, 1988, p. 96). Partial institutional responses, a split within the movement, and the eventual withdrawal of the Communists’ support determined the deactivation of the renters’ movement (Vicente Espinoza, 1988).

During the 1930s and 1940s rural-urban migration became especially noticeable and living standards worsened in poor hovels and tenement houses. Although the new labour legislation of 1931 aimed at regulating work, integrating the working class into society and modernising the Chilean labour market, this hardly occurred. Since the government offered no decent programme for accommodating the poor in the city, in 1946 people began squatting urban lands to provide themselves with stable accommodation. They were building what was called the ‘*movimiento de pobladores*’ (shantytown dwellers movement). Invaders usually had to face confrontations with the police, resisting eviction (Castells, 1973).

Throughout the 1950s and 60s, slum areas swelled in Chilean cities, with the number of hovels, tenements and other forms of precarious poor housing massively increasing. Although numerous, the urban poor were consistently neglected, seen as intruders in the city, and deserving of no clear citizenship (Salazar, 2012). In fact, due to a rent increase in 1947, the government commanded the eviction of the poorest hovels, tenements, and slums (Espinoza, 1988). Similarly, elected in 1952, president Ibañez ordered the eviction,

displacement, and demolition of several shantytowns under false promises of a new housing programme (Castells, 1973).

The *movimiento de pobladores* emerged from difficulties faced by the poor in obtaining accommodation in Chilean cities. In 1952 the housing deficit amounted to 36 percent of the population, in Santiago alone. This meant that half a million urban dwellers in the capital lived in poor, vulnerable, and unhealthy conditions. Urban land became a national problem that the government needed to address. Additionally, the proportion of voters increased sharply throughout the years, including increasingly larger sections of the urban underprivileged. While in 1925 only 7.4 percent of the Chilean population voted, in 1958 this increased to 20.8 percent, and in 1970 to 37 percent. This meant that, between 1925 and 1970, political parties saw their national target population increase by 135 percent (Loveman, 2001, p. 199). Therefore, the problems of the urban poor became of increasing electoral interest for all political parties.

Broadly organised by what became a national movement, *pobladores* (poor residents) became famous for what have become known as '*tomas*' (land invasions). It was in 1947 when the first urban *toma* occurred in Santiago, giving birth to the shantytown *La Nueva Legua*. Ten years later, in 1957, the squatters' settlement called *La Victoria* confirmed a widespread popular reaction to the state's inefficient social housing provision. Arguably, in the early 1960s the *movimiento de pobladores* became incorporated in the central political arena of the country (Loyola, 2006). Land invasions became very common and, after 1968,

increased sharply, thus utterly transforming Chilean cities, especially Santiago (Garcés, 2005, p. 59).

Many shantytown dwellers were associated with leftist political parties. Castells (1982) even suggests that informal settlements in Santiago were very dependent on the party leaderships that founded them. The Communist Party (PC) was present and supported many of the emblematic *tomas*, especially before 1970. The Christian Democrats (DC) also started supporting squatters in the 1960s, gaining great popularity among more conservative (but still centre-left) residents. With an emphasis on service provision, the DC was in fact one of the first parties to electorally target *poblaciones* and promote support among poor residents (Espinoza, 1988).

Sections of the Christian Chilean community, as well as the Catholic Church, became involved and supported land invasions. In 1969 the newly formed *Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria* (Popular Unitary Action Movement, MAPU) also joined this political spectrum of institutional supports. As a group of more progressive politicians, the MAPU emerged from the radical sections of the Christian Democrats and became an independent party. These institutional supports, together with the lack of proper housing, were crucial factors influencing the boom in land squatting of the late 1960s.

Frei Montalva's Christian Democratic government (1964-1970) reacted by implementing the *Promoción Popular* (Popular Promotion) programme, which encompassed a set of measures to deal with marginality and poverty. The core of this programme aimed at creating a network of local organisations in *poblaciones*. Frei instituted a set of

organisations that had been functioning for many years but had no legal recognition: *juntas de vecinos* (neighbourhood councils), *centros de madres* (mothers' centres), *centros juveniles* (youth centres), and *clubes deportivos* (sports clubs) (Garcés, 2002). Additionally, he created the Ministry of Housing, and subsequently implemented a policy called *Operación Sitio* (Operation Site), which became the dominant method of providing social housing in the late 1960s (Garcés, 2005, pp. 62-63). This policy gave urbanised lots with very basic social houses to the poor, encouraging self-construction. Although it began as an emergency plan for the victims of the 1965 earthquake, Operation Site became one of the biggest Chilean housing policies in the twentieth Century, providing 51.881 lots between 1965 and 1970 in Santiago alone (Hidalgo, 2004, p. 220).

Leading the Popular Unity (UP) – i.e. a political coalition including most of the Chilean left⁶ - Salvador Allende was elected president in 1969. Upon assuming his mandate, Allende began implementing an intensive socialist reform. He nationalised large-scale companies, intensified land reform, raised minimum wages, and implemented inclusive programmes for the most marginalised sections of society, among many other things. Allende declared social housing a right for every family and backed informal settlements with the aim of upgrading them. Due to his support, *tomas* increased sharply in 1970⁷. The dwellers movement became larger and more politically salient. Parties began a fierce

⁶ The UP included the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Radical Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Independent Popular Action and the Unitary Popular Action Movement (MAPU).

⁷ Until 1968 Santiago saw a yearly average of 10 land seizures, which increased to more than 220 in 1970, alone (Ducci & Fadda, 1993).

competition to develop leadership among *pobladores* and obtain resources from the state to improve living conditions in shantytowns.

Allende, somewhat ambitiously, planned to build 83,000 new houses per year. However, those goals were not met⁸ and in the beginning of the 1970s Santiago's housing problem persisted (Arriagada, Sepúlveda, Cartier, & Gutiérrez, 2004, p. 220). In fact, the Chilean Ministry of Housing and Urban Development reports that, in 1972, there were 275 informal settlements in Santiago, housing about 83,000 families. Therefore, 1 in 6 inhabitants of Santiago was a resident in an informal settlement, i.e. 16.6 percent of the population. Settlements such as these occupied approximately 10 percent of Santiago's urban area. These percentages increased by 1973 with 17.85 percent of the city's population living in such conditions – amounting to 500,000 people (Santa María, 1973, pp. 105-6).

THE MIR AND *POBLACIÓN* MOBILISATION

Born in Santiago in 1965, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Leftist Revolutionary Movement, MIR) became of crucial importance for the dwellers movement. The MIR initially gathered several groups that, disenchanted with electoral politics and seduced by the Cuban revolution, broke off from their parties seeking new political

⁸ The amount of houses built by the UP government is disputed. Nevertheless, according to Arriagada et al. (2004) Allende's average yearly housing provision tops all other governments until 1990.

alternatives. The MIR intended to be a Marxist vanguard party that would lead a revolutionary process empowering the lower classes (J. Pinto, 2005). Seeking an armed confrontation, the MIR established as a guerrilla that challenged the pacifist, reformist traditional left (C. Pérez, 2003). In the early 1960s the Cuban Revolution had become a strong symbol for the Latin American leftist youth. It provided evidence that the revolution that many spoke about was indeed possible. They saw in Ché Guevara an example of the rigorous and committed young man who mobilised over just ideals.

In its beginnings the MIR concentrated its efforts on building adherence among students in Valparaíso, Concepción, and Santiago. The movement failed, however, to create support among Mapuche people and peasants. Additionally, their presence was weak among trade unions – a sector in which other leftist traditional parties, such as the Communists, were very strong. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, the MIR developed a greater connection with the grassroots by coordinating urban land invasions and organising shantytowns. Some of their most important land seizures were the shantytowns Nueva La Habana (NH) and Lo Hermida⁹ (LH), in 1970. Through land invasions and many other initiatives, the MIR intended to challenge the reformist government.

⁹ I refer here specifically to LH's 4th zone. This study has included all 4 zones of LH. While party leadership was different in other zones of LH (involving the Socialist, the Communist, and the Christian Democrat Parties), the invasion of the whole 4th zone was coordinated by the MIR.

The MIR coordinated small autonomous societies within their shantytowns, demonstrating the effectiveness of *poder popular* (popular power). Radical leftist militants in those years embraced popular power. Popular power indicates the development of coordinated organisation in opposition to institutional hierarchical structures and favours workers' interests (J. Pinto, 2005). NH was MIR's most prominent example of popular power. The organisational structure of *poblaciones* coordinated by the MIR was meant to prescind from the state as a guarantor of citizenship. MIR shantytowns became renowned for their rigorous organisation. In these neighbourhoods every block had a representative leader. Additionally, committees ran by *pobladores* were in charge of local welfare. In these *poblaciones*, committees locally managed transport, health, education, security, defence, provisions, and working control. A Directive Council following mainly MIR directions was the head of these organisations (Cofré, 2007).

MIR's first important land invasion occurred on 26 January 1970. Honouring the date of its creation, the *toma* was called Campamento 26 de Enero (26 January Camp/Shantytown¹⁰). Residents of this shantytown mobilised and occupied government buildings asserting their

¹⁰ It is important to understand that *campamento* and *población* have particular meanings in Chilean Spanish. *Campamento* can be directly translated into English as 'camp.' Nevertheless, before 1973 denominating an informal settlement a '*campamento*' had a political meaning. *Campamentos* were seen as politically conscious and mobilised communities that recovered lands commoditised by the bourgeoisie and the capitalistic system. Soon after, *campamentos* became a general term to name Chilean vulnerable shantytowns. A similar process occurred with the meaning of the word *población*. Although *población* always suggests a vulnerable urban area, it more often refers to already urbanised settlements. Currently, both words, *campamento* and *población*, are used in some cases to speak of vulnerable marginal areas, and in some others to refer to politically aware settlements.

housing demands. This shantytown became the first exemplary case, whereby the MIR sought to disseminate its political organisation and commitment to the *pobladores*.

During this period, the role of the MIR's *milicias populares* (popular militias) was discussed within many circles, both right and left. These militias were portrayed as military forces formed by the MIR among shantytown residents. The left saw them as the seeds to questioning the power of the state, and to instigating a larger revolutionary process (Fiori, 1973; Punto Final, 1970). The right wing and other conservative sections, however, understood these militias as a threat to democratic stability. Nonetheless, the interviews I carried out, as well as recent historical publications, suggest that both sides largely exaggerated the potential of militias. MIR militants neither formed military nor political militias. As health or housing committees, militias were merely formed by groups of residents who volunteered as guards to prevent likely attacks from external groups, or to warn about police evictions. These guards were present in many other (not MIR) shantytowns, and had a social – not military – function (Garcés, 2002, p. 414).

Nueva La Habana (NH) formed on 1st November 1970. Only a couple of months earlier, at the end of July, the MIR coordinated three land invasions in Santiago: Ranquil, Elmo Catalán, and Magalí Honorato. These *tomas* gathered approximately 1,880 families in private land from the Pontifical Catholic University (PUC), the University of Chile (UCH), and the Catholic Church. These three informal settlements would eventually move to La Florida to form NH. Cofré (2007) reports that in these early *tomas* the MIR began to

establish discipline statutes. Gender violence¹¹, theft, and constant idleness were forbidden. The MIR also created health brigades, volunteer working brigades, popular militias, and a soup kitchen.

Soon after, coordinated through the MIR's Provincial Revolutionary Council (JPR), shantytown dwellers participated in protests demanding for a solution to their informal housing situation. During the entire month of August residents carried out marches, built occupations, and even instigated a large hunger strike. By the end of August, authorities from both universities (PUC and UCH) and the Ministry of Housing negotiated a solution with local leaders to people's lack of accommodation. Eventually, the residents living in these shantytowns moved to land in the intersection between Departamental and Tobaraba Avenues. The new informal settlement was called Nueva La Habana (NH) and had around 1,700 families.

Cofré (2007) also explains that NH implemented two types of internal organisations: committees and self-government organisations.

Committees (also called fronts) were concerned with solving specific local issues. As explained earlier, committees dealt with supplies, security, culture, health, local labour, fire-fighting, green areas, and trading. Self-government organisations entailed the creation of a large assembly, gathering all committee representatives, one elected representative for each block, and a directing board. The directing board included seven elected leaders.

¹¹ More specifically, it was forbidden for a male resident to beat up a female resident.

Most of which were from the MIR and other parties. The assembly met twice a week to be informed of the progress in each area, solve all possible issues, and plan future actions. A discipline committee sanctioned undesired behaviour and educated citizens.

NH residents marched on many occasions demanding their right to housing, and even occupied government buildings. After negotiations, local leaders convinced government authorities to assign neighbouring land¹² for the construction of a new, urbanised NH. The government provided funding and the necessary materials. Local residents, together with MIR leaders, decided on the design of the houses and began the construction of the new neighbourhood.

With this autonomous, structured, and efficient organisation, the MIR intended to demonstrate that a socialist, horizontal society is possible (Garcés, 2005a). Shantytowns like NH became a demonstration of how collective action could achieve popular power. NH was the most prominent example of mobilisation and collective organisation among many other *poblaciones* that implemented similar initiatives. Other shantytowns, such as La Victoria, Herminda de la Victoria, Villa O'Higgins, Sara Gajardo, La Pincoya, La Bandera, La Legua, Ché Guevara, Violeta Parra, Cardenal José María Caro, Villa Francia, Yungay, and others, also represented similar examples (Garcés, 2002). Most of these *tomas* were, however, not coordinated by the MIR, but rather were supported by other political parties. LH was also among Santiago's mobilised and highly organised poor

¹² Although later chapters make this clearer, it may be useful to point out that the new houses to be built in 1972 were placed precisely next to the shantytown NH erected in 1970.

communities in the early 1970s. Unlike many other *poblaciones*, a large section of LH was also coordinated by the MIR.

In mid 1970 the government launched one of the biggest Operation Site development projects in Santiago, located in the intersection between Grecia and Tobalaba Avenues. Around 2,000 families were to be established in the zone of 'Lo Hermida.' The full project entailed the construction of 6,000 houses in the areas of Lo Hermida and Lo Arrieta (Garcés, 2002, p. 408). The project progressed from East to West of the land provided, and was situated next to a plantation of crops such as apples, peaches and lucerne. It accommodated families from workers in Tucmon, Implatex, Pollak and Sello Sur unions (Reyes, 2011), associated with the DC.

By mid August, however, housing committees coordinated by the Socialists, Christian Democrats, and some Communists invaded the neighbouring land toward the east of the Operation Site project. Squatters settled despite the fact that much of the land had crops. Invading housing committees arrived on various days throughout the second half of August. The houses involved in the Operation Site project became known as the 1st and 2nd zones of Lo Hermida. The sections of the neighbourhood created through the invasions which immediately followed became the 3rd zone¹³. Eventually, by the end of August, a

¹³ The different committees invading the lands gave names to their own *toma*. Each zone, therefore, includes sections (or 'villas'). The 3rd zone comprises El Duraznal, Hernán Cortéz, Los Copihues, René Schneider, and Los Lagos. The 4th zone comprises Simón Bolívar, Yungay, and La Concepción. Time has made the name of these sections less important for residents.

final set of housing committees invaded the lands coordinated by the MIR. They occupied the lands in the South of the 3rd zone, creating what was later called Lo Hermida's 4th zone.

Although not as strict and structured as NH, LH emulated the same organisation as many other *tomas* in that period. Shantytown dwellers organised into committees to deal with local welfare. Also formed by local residents, militias provided protection from external aggressions. Additionally, after consolidating the invasion, LH dwellers came together to demand housing rights. They marched and protested in front of government buildings.

In the early 1970s, both NH and LH were especially organised and mobilised examples of a large movement comprising many other urban areas.

THE DICTATORSHIP

In September 1973 Chile saw the beginning of a brutal 17 year long dictatorship that would radically transform the Chilean poor's substantive citizenship. Under the command of General Pinochet, between 1973 and 1990, Chile's dictatorship implemented a drastic plan to override and eliminate those aligned with left-wing ideologies, since they could constitute a subversive threat to the regime. Widely known – internationally and domestically – for its cruelty, the dictatorship exiled around 200,000 people, killed/made disappear another 3,527, and tortured over 28,000 of those clandestinely detained. Furthermore, through the Chicago Boys (a group of Chilean economists who had studied Milton Friedman's ideas at the University of Chicago), Pinochet's regime implemented a

strong neoliberal economic system. Any kind of popular mobilisation was seen as a threat to the regime and its political, economic, and social projects (Silva, 2004a). As a result, all instances of citizenship participation were suddenly dismantled.

The National Intelligence Agency (DINA), a secret police, was created in 1974 to find and eliminate any possible threat to the regime. The National Information Centre (CNI) later replaced the DINA in 1977. Despite working underground, the DINA's repression was highly visible. It became common knowledge that people were being detained in the street and interrogated. The majority of people knew that detention camps existed and that many of those arrested disappeared. Persecutions, arrests, and torture affected *población* residents on large scales (Moya, Videla, & Balladares, 2005). For example, Hechos Urbanos (1987) documented that 5,291 people were arrested in *poblaciones* and another 402 were victims of intimidation by governmental forces in 1984 alone. Repression also operated in other ways. The military organised coordinated large-scale raids in *poblaciones*, in which military personnel violently broke into houses searching for weapons or any subversive material. During these raids, men in the neighbourhood were taken to nearby football fields (or other open space) and kept there for hours at a time. On other occasions, residents rumoured to possess weapons were threatened with bombs, killed, or displaced to other neighbourhoods (Valdés, 1986). Neighbourhood councils and women's groups were intervened by designated mayors. Boards for these local organisations were authoritatively assigned, with local leaders loyal to the regime appointed. After these appointments, leaders of neighbourhood council boards, mothers' centres, and sometimes even at sports clubs strongly supported the dictatorship. Thus, the

military used the network of grassroots organisations built by the DC to boost control and fear among *población* residents.

Repression had two initial consequences for *población* organisations. Whilst on the one hand, it dismantled the strong relationship that parties had developed with the grassroots, on the other hand, the persecution of political parties opened the door for alternative types of organisation. Post 1983, parties regained a greater connection with *poblaciones*. Struggling to clandestinely reconstruct their bases, in the 1980s political parties tended to co-opt grassroots organisations. Indeed, Bastias Saavedra (2013, p. 285) explains that ‘the relationships between organisations and parties in the 1980s were frequently characterised by parties’ interest in capturing the networks and infrastructure developed by civil society’ (see also Oxhorn, 1995, p. 147; Oxhorn, 1991, p. 79). Party co-optation became especially powerful in the late 1980s, during the electoral campaigns for the referendum (1988) and the presidential election (1989) (Bastias Saavedra, 2013).

The dictatorship’s programme for economic reform had an important impact on the lower sections of society. Between 1973 and 1989, the Chilean economy suffered a crisis and the population became highly impoverished. Average unemployment rates were three times higher than those of the 1960s, reaching a critical 31.3 percent in 1983. In 1987, wages were only 84.7 percent of what they were in 1970 (Oxhorn, 1995), and inequality had sharply increased. On top of this, the national need for social housing kept increasing. The housing deficit in 1965 amounted to 420,000 and in 1985 reached 920,000 (Valdés, 1986, p. 12). This economic deterioration was even more rapid in *poblaciones*. In 1978, for

example, the consumption of the poorest 20 percent had decreased by more than 30 percent in comparison with 1969. A 1983 study carried out in two informal settlements located in one of the poorest boroughs, La Granja, indicated that 49.1 percent of heads of households were unemployed and a further 21.6 percent were only employed in temporary or unstable jobs (Hardy, 1986a). Other studies found that only 26 percent of active residents in some shantytowns had stable employment (Schkolnik, 1985).

The dictatorial government implemented two underemployment programmes in order to ameliorate the situation of the highly impoverished population. As an emergency programme, the PEM (Minimum Employment Programme) was implemented from 1975 through to 1988. It provided heads of households with highly unskilled employment. The POJH (Occupational Programme for Heads of Household) was implemented as an additional programme to cope with exceptionally high figures of unemployment in 1982 (Hechos Urbanos, 1983). These programs were generally not well received by the population due to the extremely low wages offered.

Although credited authors have suggested that civil society during dictatorships only re-emerges when transitional processes are already underway (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986), in urban Chile popular organisations' collective action reappeared soon after the coup (Valdés 1986). Since *poblaciones* had largely aligned with Popular Unity parties before the coup, the military conceived them as the main source of support for the extreme Left. This factor made repression especially intense in these zones (Moya et al., 2005). Despite this hostile environment, in 1976 a re-emergence of local organisations became evident.

Supported by the Catholic Church¹⁴, the first to appear were Human Rights defence organisations. Soon after, collective subsistence initiatives became the most numerous and widespread organisations in *poblaciones* (Razeto et al., 1990; Oxhorn, 1995). Examples of these subsistence organisations were: *ollas comunes* (community kitchens), *comprando juntos* (cooperative supply acquisition groups), *arpilleras* (sewing groups), and *bolsas de trabajo* (employment groups). Other groups that remained from the early 1970s had been formed to establish demands over specific needs. The most important ones were *comités de los sin casa* (housing committees), which sought to obtain accommodation from the state. There were also debtors committees, grouping people who could not afford to pay electricity or water bills.

Dictatorial repression also failed to stop people from protesting outside *poblaciones*. According to Bastias Saavedra (2013, p. 204), protests actually increased through the late 1970s to the early 1980s. While in 1977 and 1978 only 29 groups organised protests, in 1979 this number increased to 74, and in 1982 there were more than 100. The repression against protests strengthened solidarity between organisations. When the dictatorship imprisoned protesters, the population responded with more protests, hunger strikes, and occupations demanding their freedom (Bastias Saavedra 2013, p. 207). In the same period, a set of successful land invasions pushed the dictatorship to adopt quicker responses to housing demands, boosting *población* organisations' morale (Bruey, 2012). This general

¹⁴ The Vicariate of Solidarity was founded in 1976 as a progressive section of the Chilean Catholic Church (despite developing work also earlier). The Vicariate played a crucial role in supporting and funding subsistence initiatives in *poblaciones* during the dictatorship.

process legitimised demands and helped create coalitions between previously opposed sections of civil society. The continued deterioration of the critical economic situation within the dictatorship between 1981 and 1982 contributed to this constructed of solidarity.

In May 1983, the Copper Workers Confederation (CTC) called for a national strike. People flooded to the streets in one of the largest protests the country had ever seen expressing their disapproval towards the military regime. This protest was the first of a cycle seen in the years that followed. It established among Chileans the collective feeling that publicly countering the dictatorship was 'possible' (De La Maza & Garcés, 1985, p. 30). The military reacted with repression and violence. Due to the *poblaciones*' marginal and segregated position, the military were especially violent in these areas, with the aim of intimidating the population. In July 1983, parties publically (although not yet legally recognised) reappeared, taking leadership in the national protests.

In *poblaciones*, activists promoting protests used the informal networks constructed by local grassroots organisations to boost mobilisation. According to Schneider (1995), after the first national protest leaders sought to expand their contacts, found new initiatives, and developed broader identities. When parties reappeared in *poblaciones* they 'overwhelmed informal grassroots networks' (Schneider, 1995, p. 153). Residents marched in the streets beating pots and pans; prepared barricades to block nearby avenues, held hunger strikes; organised sit-ins to protest over human rights abuses; or attacked symbols of authority (such as minimum employment offices, fires stations, local supermarkets, etc.) (Schneider, 1995, p. 161). Usually, days of national protest ended with military repression in

poblaciones. *Comandos* (defence groups) of residents confronted the military covering their faces, using sticks, and throwing stones at tanks.

In this context, political parties once again became salient in the coordination of collective action. They provided protesters with a larger network, repertoires of action, and resources. Many party leaders became part of local organisations, assuming leadership positions and providing guidelines for action.

Fragmentation and *caudillismo* (charismatic leaders) were extremely common among political parties. Nonetheless, two coalitions formed representing the largest positions in the centre-left opposition. On the one hand, the Alianza Democrática (Democratic Alliance, AD) gathered parties around the Christian Democrats. AD also included Social Democrats (SD), Radicals (PR), Liberals (PL), Republicans (DDR), and some factions of the Socialist Party (PS). The opposing coalition was the Movimiento Democrático Popular (Popular Democratic Movement, MPD). The MDP, on the other hand, incorporated the MIR, Communists (PC), Christian Leftists (IC), MAPU, and a faction of the Socialists (PS Almeyda). Although both coalitions in the opposition intended to return to democracy, the AD was more concerned with respecting legal terms and paving a peaceful transition. National protests for AD were a form of expressing collective discomfort, fostering international awareness, and delegitimising the dictatorship. Alternatively, the MDP sought to weaken and ultimately overthrow the dictatorship in order to install a totally new democratic system. Following the legal procedures enabled by the dictatorial regime would necessarily assure a strong political position for the extreme right and the military in the

future. Hence the MDP's rejection of such a procedure. However, there remained strong differences among MDP parties. The Communists, for example, saw national protests as the seed to socialist revolution; the uprising of the popular masses. Consequently, they sought to lead a revolutionary process and overthrow the dictatorship. In the late 1970s the MAPU developed a more conciliatory position. The MAPU was increasingly concerned with establishing agreements between leftist forces in order to build a democratic and progressive future government.

In 1979, the MAPU agreed to create a 'military commission' that would be militarily trained in Cuba and led by G. Ossandón. The military commission, which lasted officially only until 1982, would allow the development of new forms of struggle, promoting a more violent uprising of the masses. Eventually, in 1981 and 1982, sections of this commission, together with other more radical factions of MAPU, incorporated a large number of *población* youths into their ranks. A conflict and divide developed between the more radical, revolutionary factions of the party and the directing leaders. In 1982 MAPU's central committee agreed on creating the Movimiento Juvenil Lautaro (Lautaro Youth Movement, MJL), which agglomerated the youngest and most radical sections of the party (Acevedo, 2006). The MJL was meant to contribute by leading subversive political mobilisation of the masses 'locating itself as a middle ground between the organised sections of political parties and the wide popular youth sections' (Moyano, 2010, p. 397).

The agreement in 1982 also included:

The MJL must grow to be a real referent for youth; looking after their main claims (employment, studies, recreation, social interactions, etc.) interpreting and becoming part

of the youth spirit, incorporating life and youths' claims to the more broad popular reality (or other sectors), promoting mobilisations for its struggle and defence, that includes the popular youth as a political and social force (Moyano, 2010, p. 397).

In this way the MJL officially became a force devoted to the struggle in the grassroots. In the following years the national protests only accentuated this divide within the MAPU. While the higher ranks increasingly inclined toward developing a peaceful transitional process, the MJL progressively crystallised a more radical, autonomous position. The MJL asserted the political necessity of directly and militarily confronting the dictatorship.

During national protests MJL militants developed propaganda strategies: they painted murals, made banners, and handed out pamphlets. They also blocked streets with barricades, looted shops, organised large confrontations with the police in *poblaciones*, among many other actions. MJL members went to grassroots organisations such as soup kitchens, local churches, housing committees, or employment groups in order to promote the people's uprising.

Although in many ways distinct, the process undertaken by the Communist Party during these years shares similarities with that of the MAPU. In 1976 a group of young Communists began receiving military training in Cuba. Upon their gradual return to Chile by the end of the 1970s, the Communists formed brigades that carried out small, but more radical forms of protest (Marín, 1999). They initiated sudden barricades blocking streets, and fought against the police and the military. Framing their protests as forms of 'mass rebellion,' these brigades increasingly involved non-militants in their actions (Alvarez Vallejos, 2003). In 1980 the Communist Party created the Frente Cero (Zero Front), as a

way of more formally incorporating these brigades into the party. Zero Fronts carried out sabotage actions, bombed electric towers to produce power outages, and organised protests with *población* residents. Most of these Zero Front militants would eventually become the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front, FPMR). The FPMR was founded in 1983 as the military force of the Communist Party. From then onwards its militants became increasingly autonomous and sceptical of institutional politics, asserting that the armed struggle was the only way to counter the dictatorship. Eventually, as Jorge Insunza (PC militant) later reported, when the FPMR planned to assassinate Pinochet in 1986 they did not request permission from the Party (Álvarez, 2009). The FPMR implemented what they called ‘mass popular rebellion,’ which implied a continuation of the types of protest implemented by Zero Front groups but on a larger scale and involving grassroots non-militants.

Like the MJL, the FPMR too developed increasing conflicts with its founding party, the PC. Excluded from party elites, both movements, the FPMR and the MJL, represented a rejection towards institutional political arrangements. As later chapters will demonstrate, these movements’ presence in *poblaciones* during the 1980s had a strong impact on the establishment and survival of mobilisational identity in some neighbourhoods.

While conflicts with their armed sections progressed during the 1980s, the Communists and MAPU struggled to reach agreements with the rest of the parties.

According to the constitution – created in 1980 by the dictatorial government¹⁵ - a candidate among the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces ought to be voted in a plebiscite for an eight-year presidential period. The constitutions also specified that if that candidate were to be rejected in the plebiscite, there would be a free democratic presidential election after a year (Angell & Pollack, 1990). In a crisis of legitimation – due to the 1982 economic crisis and large national protests – Pinochet agreed to negotiate the terms in which this constitutional process could be activated with AD. Simultaneously, the dictatorship excluded MPD from any dialogue.

Eventually, the AD would reach agreements with the military and the right wing elite. A plebiscite was organised to take place in October 1988. The vote would decide on whether General Pinochet was to stay for another 8 years in office or whether free elections were to be held soon after. Officially named ‘Yes’ and ‘No,’ the campaigns for this plebiscite correspondingly called for the approval and the rejection of Pinochet’s mandate. In 1987 the regime had made opposition political parties legal. In the beginning of 1988 the parties supporting the No campaign created a coalition called *Concertación de Partidos por el No*¹⁶ (Coalition of Parties for the No).

¹⁵ A plebiscite ratified the constitution in 1980. However, as Angell and Pollack (1990) explain, that election was not properly democratic: there were no electoral registers and the opposition was hardly allowed to campaign.

¹⁶ In 1988 the *Concertación* included Social Democrats (DC), most of the Socialist sections (PS), the Party for Democracy (PPD), the Socialist Popular Union (USOPO), Radicals (PR), Democratic Radical Socialists (PRSD), Social Democrats (SDCH), National Democrats (PADENA), the MAPU, the MAPU-Workers-Peasants (MAPU-OC), the Christian Left (IC), Humanists (PH), the Republican Liberal Union (ULR), and

Prior to the vote, the campaigns intensely mobilised *población* organisations and civil society in general. The challenge, then, was not only trying to capture the rival's vote, but also required the mass inscription of the population in the national electoral registry¹⁷. The work of civil society in the No campaign was crucial. Parties devoted their full efforts and resources to this campaign, involving as many non-militants and grassroots leaders as possible in the campaign work. A lack of knowledge (many people had never voted), fear, and distrust were the biggest barriers that the No campaign had to overcome in order to get their base to effectively vote on 5 October 1988. In the end, however, despite many challenges and using highly effective publicity spots that appealed to 'joy' and 'happiness,' the No won the elections with nearly 56 percent of the votes.

Later efforts focused on presidential and parliamentary campaigns for the 1989 elections. In December 1989 Chile elected the DC Patricio Aylwin to be the first democratically elected president since the coup in 1973. Following this, the *Concertación* governed the country until 2010 when Sebastián Piñera, representing the right wing coalition Alianza for Chile (Chilean Alliance), won the elections.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

the Greens (PLV) (Vásquez, 2005). Eventually this coalition would be known as Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia.

¹⁷ Up until January 2012 Chile maintained a compulsory electoral system. Inscription was necessary in order to vote. Since 2012 a modification to Chilean law made inscription automatic (every citizen over 18 years old is automatically inscribed) and voting voluntary.

Chile formally returned to a democratic regime in 1989, when democratic elections gave the presidency to Patricio Aylwin. From 1990 onwards the *Concertación* ruled the country and a coalition of right wing parties called Alianza Por Chile acted as their political opposition. Arguably, however, despite the fact that 1990 meant the beginning of a new political regime, substantive access to democratic participation became a much longer process, the limits of which are difficult to define.

Before finishing his mandate Pinochet negotiated the implementation of a set of restrictive laws. In other words, Pinochet and the right wing parties made sure to prolong a transitional process that would both reduce threats to the military and boost the economic privileges of the elite. Indeed, the so-called *leyes de amarre* (binding laws) prohibited the congress (transitorily) to call for investigations on crimes committed by any military organism; avoided replacing public servants in relevant positions within government institutions; gave significant autonomy to the Central National Bank; provided Pinochet with considerable power to elect mayors across the country just before finishing his mandate; limited the attributions of the president over the military; and created a binominal electoral system that chiefly privileged the two large political coalitions (Valenzuela, 1997). Additionally, the parliament designated life-long senators whilst also providing the military with the possibility of forming a National Security Council, and thus obtaining a substantial degree of power. On top of all of this, since 1978, an amnesty law – covering the years between 1973 and 1978 – obstructed military human rights offenders from being brought to justice. Portales (2000) called this restrictive access to rights a ‘tutelary democracy’.

Although most of these barriers have been lifted, Chile still maintains an electoral¹⁸ (binominal) and economic system that deeply undermines political protagonism for the lower classes. Additionally, the Chilean process of transitional justice, despite extensive progress, remains ongoing 25 years on with many human rights abuse perpetrators yet to be prosecuted.

Since 1990 the *Concertación* has pushed forward many social reforms, combining consistent growth with efforts to battle inequality. The country that the *Concertación* had to deal with in 1990 was one re-emerging from the great economic crises of 1982. In fact, Chile's GDP had fallen by 16 percent, unemployment shot up to 30 percent and in 1990 almost 45 percent of the population were living in poverty (Cleary, 2000; Foxley, 2004). Since then, Chile has managed to produce prosperity and stability, positively impacting its international image. From 1986 to 1997, the Chilean economy grew on average 7.6 percent annually, thus growing 4.8 percent faster than the world's mean. It is also evident that since 2003, real GDP per-capita has been above the world's average and since 1989 it has considerably exceeded that of South America. External debt was also substantially reduced, from USD \$12,250 million in 1989 to USD \$5,300 million by the end of 2000. Furthermore, by 2007 the Chilean economy was more widely opened to the international arena, especially with Asia Pacific countries (Arellano, 2006), with 56 free trade agreements signed.

¹⁸ In the past months modifications to the Chilean electoral system have been discussed in the executive power and the parliament. Therefore, it is very likely that the binominal electoral system is soon replaced for another one that provides better representation to smaller parties.

Nevertheless, the Chilean economy has developed an exporting structure principally based on primary or low elaboration products - such as minerals, fresh fruit, meats, fish, woods and cellulose (Cleary, 2007). This is particularly important considering that the percentage of GDP made up by exports has continued to increase since the 1960s. Furthermore, Chile's investment in technology and research is comparatively low to that of other OECD countries (Cleary, 2007). Although these figures present a positive economic situation, Chile's growth incites scepticism, for it seems to be sustained in dependency and inequality. Indeed, Chile is today among the most unequal countries in the World. According to Trading Economics (for 2010), while the richest 5 per cent of the population holds 61.5 percent of the country's wealth, the poorest 10 per cent only represents 1.52 percent of Chile's wealth. Chile's GINI Coefficient is thus extremely high, amounting to 0.508 by 2015¹⁹ (The World Bank, 2015).

CURRENT SITUATION: CITIZENSHIP, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND POBLACIONES

Chile's return to democracy marked an increasingly large distance between the grassroots and political parties. Political parties from both of the largest coalitions became

¹⁹ Regarding its educational system, Chile is also an example of inequality in the access to opportunities. It is a system divided into public, semi-public (subsidised), and private schools. The system is based on the use of vouchers, which keeps public education segregated and in consistent economic crisis. Additionally, the whole system's quality has been assessed as very low. According to the TIMSS (International Study on Sciences and Mathematics) Chilean students' results in mathematics and reading comprehension are alarming when compared to international standards (Beyer, 2001).

increasingly perceived as elitists and devoted to boosting privileges for the wealthy. A growing portion of the population perceives issues as arising from the Chilean implementation of democracy. In fact, while in 1990 a 48 percent of the population thought that the country was managed according to the interests of the people, in 2003 that percentage decreased to only 12 percent. Similarly, in 1990 39 percent responded that the country was driven according to the interests of a few. In 2003 this number alarmingly increased to 85 percent (Huneus, 2003, p. 157).

Analysts of the Chilean democratic transition have described civil society as apathetic, passive, disengaged, and depoliticised since 1990 (Huneus, 1998; Silva, 2004a). In this context, Silva (2010) suggests that the dictatorial repression, together with a consumerist society and sensationalist political representatives – who continue to lose prestige and credibility – have deactivated Chilean civil society. As later chapters explain in more detail, there are a number of thorough explanations for the process of public disengagement in Chile during the transition. Nonetheless, scholars are in clear agreement over the sharp disjunction between the political and the social spheres during the 1990s (Garcés, 2003; Silva, 2004a). Up until the early 2000s democracy had reached formal social structures, but was still relatively distant from the grassroots. In fact, in their 2004 report on Chilean Human Development, the UNDP stated that ‘the capacity to affect the definition of the public using collective action is not today an available capability for the whole population’ (UNDP, 2004). The assessment suggested that civil society did not have the power to have a real impact on changing national reality.

However, since 2006 there has been a noticeable shift in Chilean democratic development. In line with a global awakening of civil society (Thayer & Elizalde, 2011), Chilean social movements show a renovated, critical approach to national social issues (UNDP, 2015).

Evidently, since the early 2000s the student movement has been leading the shifts in Chilean civil society. The *Pingüinos* student movement in 2006 claimed for more egalitarian educational laws and mobilised more than 100,000 people in a number of marches. Students pioneered a more democratic organisational structure and took advantage of the political opportunities opened up by Bachelet's government (Donoso, 2013). Public schools were occupied and student leaders appeared on television publicly debating with politicians and ministers. Public opinion began to shift. Politicization among Chileans developed further when people reframed the entrenched system of inequalities as a constructed political arrangement that could be changed (UNDP, 2015, p. 148). Protagonism became more accessible.

Through protests over the Transantiago (a new public transportation system that would not reach the poorest urban areas when recently implemented) and Codelco (the biggest copper enterprise, in which workers claimed for less tartarisation and the improvement of working conditions) in 2007, Chile also saw an increase in social movements and demonstrations. According to SUR (2011a; 2011b) Santiago saw more than 130 demonstrations claiming for civil, political and social rights in 2011 alone. That same year, students mobilised again organising the largest demonstrations since Chile's return to democracy. Together with the Mapuche indigenous land movement and the Puerto Aysen struggles over de-

centralisation, students established a strongly critical perspective on the centralized neoliberal model implanted since the late 1970s. Arguably, a new scenario for Chilean citizens has come about in the last few years²⁰.

While the role of the urban poor has not remained totally unmodified, their progress has been clearly more marginal and slow. Arguably, the transitional process imposed particular challenges to the urban poor. Organising at a local level faced significant barriers in *poblaciones*.

Throughout the 1980s Santiago became increasingly more segregated. A highly neoliberal, subsidiary approach to social housing provision massified ghettos in most Chilean cities. Santiago broadly extended its borders to incorporate huge homogenous housing projects deprived of basic services. Urbanised neighbourhoods' access to credit and national economic growth after 1990 gave poor families higher consumption power (Sugranyes & Rodríguez, 2005). The type of poverty in marginal areas of Chile changed to become more similar to that found in the U.S. or Europe. This new urban poverty is no longer defined by the lack of proper housing, food scarcity, unhealthy environment or institutional indifference. Rather, the new urban poor suffer from *inter alia* violence, unemployment, school absences, youth restlessness, indebtedness, child obesity, early pregnancies, and drug abuse (M. Tironi, 2003). This ghettoization of urban Chile has not only increased the

²⁰ I have argued in favour of this idea elsewhere, suggesting that the elections held in 2013 in fact demonstrated a novel openness of Chilean democracy. I suggest that the election that year was unique because it showed that new, diverse actors had acquired power in the Chilean political scenario (Escoffier, 2013).

vulnerability of many, but it has also divided the cities, marginalising the urban underprivileged. A highly commoditised and segregated educational system has widened the distance between Chilean classes, further deepening the exclusion of the urban poor.

In addition, the transition led to a withdrawal of funding, support, and spaces for local activism. Institutions and NGOs that were crucial in the activation of grassroots organisations saw their funding redirected. This was the case for the Vicariate of Solidarity, for example, The Vicariate became a crucial ally of *población* Catholic Churches and local organisations, providing assistance, support, and funding for the struggle against the dictatorship. In 1992, however, central commands of the Catholic Church decided to decrease and redirect this funding. The Vicariate had to close its doors. The Catholic Church also reoriented its aims, becoming much more conservative and exclusively devoted to religious pastoral work (Drogus & Stewart-Gambino, 2005). Many NGOs that received international funding went through a similar process. Some NGOs redefined their strategies, while others finalised their work. Accordingly, *población* organisations saw spaces closed and funding provisions concluded. With no money to continue many *colonias urbanas* (children camps) had to stop operating altogether. Human rights organisations and many other local initiatives saw a similar development.

Additionally, many local leaders needed to redefine their social position in democracy. In consequence, many board members at local organisations abandoned their positions. Bastias Saavedra (2013) explains that many leaders engaged in electoral politics after

1988. Others were assigned to government jobs, leaving their positions at grassroots organisations.

Throughout the last 25 years the urban poor have become excluded and highly marginalised. Depicted as nests of social illnesses by the media and the government, what used to be empowered, politicised sections of society have become segregated ghettos of addiction and anomy (Cornejo, 2012; Ortega, 2014; Sabatini & Salcedo, 2007; Sperberg & Happe, 2000). In line with these trends, academic and institutional accounts have devoted special attention to the process of demobilisation undergone by *poblaciones* during the democratic transition. Later chapters explain that this demobilisation must not be understood as only the de-activation of local organisations, but also as the qualitative change of those organisations.

Despite this negative scenario, a few poor neighbourhoods in Santiago did not abandon mobilisation or lose their popular identity. One such neighbourhood, Lo Hermida (LH), exhibits all the same traits as typical disadvantaged neighbourhoods, yet its residents have consistently developed contentious organisation.

On the one hand, based on NA, a case that represents most other demobilised *poblaciones*, this project provides a contribution to the scholarly accounts of demobilisation. On the other hand, focusing on LH, it argues that it is the survival of a mobilisational identity that has sustained contentious collective action in *poblaciones*. The examination of the ways in which such collective identity fosters contentious collective action shows that participating

in *población* organisations provides members with a particular sense of political membership that I call mobilisational citizenship.

POBLACIONES TODAY

Poblaciones are underprivileged urban areas whose delimitations have been historically defined. The origin of *poblaciones*' names and boundaries vary depending on the case. However, they usually have not been institutionally defined. As explained below, municipalities and ministries use the notion of a 'neighbourhood unit,' associated with a number, to formally name subdivisions in a borough, which may or may not fit with a previously established *población*. Usually, local governments respect *poblaciones*' boundaries, making them coincide with those of neighbourhood units.

Santiago is a highly segregated city. The large majority of its underprivileged areas are located away from the wealthy zones. In fact, since the 1980s, the production of social housing has displaced the poor to the peripheries of the city (Rodríguez & Rodríguez, 2011). Despite some exemptions, Santiago's south and southwest zones are the most deprived and marginalised areas. Those zones have largely been built after 1980.

Unlike in most other Latin American countries, Chilean underprivileged urban zones have been urbanised. The overwhelming majority of houses have access to sewage. Streets are properly paved, squares usually have a mix of asphalt and grass, and one can generally find one or several futsal pitches. The width of roads and sidewalks varies considerably in

poblaciones. Because many of them were originally informal settlements, many of their streets can be quite narrow, including almost no space for sidewalks. Residents call those narrow roads *pasajes* (alleys). Most underprivileged neighbourhoods consist of small, low houses. Many times, these houses are paired. A minority of these neighbourhoods allocates residents to narrow and poor-quality apartment buildings that are three or four storeys high (Bustos, 2006).

In *poblaciones*, some residents make the entrance to their house a small grocery shop from which neighbours buy their daily needs. Stalls occupy the widest roads two or three times a week with the *feria* (local market). Being considerably cheaper than other regular alternatives, the *feria* is the place where local residents do most of their weekly grocery shopping. The *feria* provides almost every single product that one may need, from fresh seafood to carpets and school materials.

Politicised *poblaciones* usually hold an event once a year celebrating the anniversary of their creation. This is especially the case in *poblaciones* that were born out of land invasions. *Poblaciones* generally provide a sense of community that other areas may not. Some *poblaciones* are more central than others. Many, in fact, are in the urban outskirts. Others, like LH, NA, La Victoria, or La Bandera, are within a reasonable range from the urban centre. Since affordable housing alternatives are more peripheral, staying in these neighbourhoods is usually more convenient. Most of the residents in *poblaciones* created before the 1980s have lived there for the majority of their lives.

Consequently, people in *poblaciones* usually know each other. While this may sometimes function as a protective factor against crime or economic difficulties, other times it works as a source of rivalries. Housewives usually meet in the evenings while sweeping the sidewalk in front of their houses, or at the small local grocery shops. Gossips and comments about other neighbours abound in these encounters. In some areas within these neighbourhoods, public spaces can be more dangerous. Usually people know the time and the places within their neighbourhood when/where they can freely spend time. For a newcomer, finding out the dangerous zones of the *población* is crucial to keeping safe.

The tendency to stay in the neighbourhood is not only among older residents, but it extends also to the youth. Most of the youths earn low or minimum wages. These low salaries make affording rent impossible. Hence, houses frequently accommodate more than one family. As a result, the density in these areas more than triplicates that of Santiago²¹. Since families in these neighbourhoods have between five and six members on average, these circumstances can be dramatic. A study in 2009 stated that almost half of poor households (47 percent) accommodate two or more families, and more than a third of non-poor households (34 percent) in *poblaciones* live in the same situation (Bustamante and Sagredo, 2009, p. 6).

²¹ Santiago's population density reached 16,400 inhabitants per square mile (6,300 in/km²) in 2010, according to Demographia (2015, p. 21). My calculations using surveys by *Quiero Mi Barrio* for 2008 show an average density among underprivileged neighbourhoods of 56,934 inhabitants per square mile in these neighbourhoods (35,377 in/km²). Alarmingly, according to these calculations, the density of underprivileged neighbourhoods is almost 3.5 times that of Santiago.

While figures of unemployment in *poblaciones* do not seem to be higher than that of the country²², jobs are generally more precarious. Many heads of household work in rather unstable areas, such as construction, unskilled service provision, or factory jobs.

Criminality, drug abuse, and trafficking are also issues in *poblaciones*. An investigation by Ortega (2014) focused on illegal behaviour among youths in La Pintana (poverty over 15 percent). He found that youths' educational indicators are alarming. According to an assessment of 'educational backwardness', only a quarter of youths (27.9 percent) are attending the adequate grade. Instead, 72 percent of adolescents are lagging in their school educational progress (between 1 and 10 years); 23 percent of youths are more than four years behind in their education. This has been associated with the disconnection that criminality generates between adolescents and schools.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provides the historical context in which this research develops. It shows the role that the urban poor developed throughout the 20th century in Chile in order to, progressively, become an essential part of civil society. As we can see, the relationship between political parties and social movements in Chilean history has always been interdependent. Although the chapter does not focus on the historiographical views on this

²² Between 2007 and 2009, unemployment in Chile increased sharply from 7 to 9.6 percent. My calculations show that in 2007-2008, unemployment in underprivileged neighbourhoods was 8.65 percent.

matter, any revision of the literature shows the conflicted emphasis that authors have with regards to the relationship between parties and grassroots.

The chapter sought to show the foundations of this relationship during the first half of the 20th century. The *movimiento de pobladores* not only mobilised as a result of people's housing necessities. Political parties played a key role in coordinating initiatives and constructing political consciousness. In fact, in line with Garretón, the chapter suggests that the overlapping between parties and civil society was a key characteristic of Chilean political life before 1973. This context allowed *poblaciones* to progressively establish demands and play a key role in Chilean civil society. *Pobladores* managed to change their position in the national entrenched regime of citizenship. The dictatorship, however, broke this connection between parties and the grassroots, detaching people from the symbolic tools that parties provided.

Emphasising the MIR, the FPMR, and the MJL's political work, the chapter also outlines the role of the two selected case studies in the dwellers movement. Both NA and LH were highly mobilised and politicised shantytowns during the years between 1970 and 1973. They represented some of the most important examples in Chile's development of popular power (Pinto, 2005b). What we see later, however, is a very different scenario. Despite the Chilean return to democracy, the urban poor seem to be passive objects of exclusion, having been detached from their capacity to autonomously construct their political position. By examining the formation of collective action in *poblaciones*, this thesis

intends to unveil precisely the type of political belonging that urban underprivileged people are creating.

With regards to the relationship between *población* organisations and political parties, the chapter follows other authors in proposing a strong divide between these two agents since Chile's return to democracy in 1990. While this divide is apparent, the interactions between political parties and grassroots organisations did not cease to exist and must be examined in detail in order to develop a better understanding of Chile's democratic challenges.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

This thesis is concerned with examining **how collective identity constructs sustainable contentious collective action**. This chapter addresses the strategies adopted by this study in its design and implementation to achieve that goal. It provides a thorough explanation of the methodological decisions made to ensure this thesis's theoretical contribution. First, the chapter outlines the criteria for the selection of case studies. This section includes a description of the communities under investigation. Second, it explains this study's methodological approach. Finally, the chapter describes the procedures through which data were systematically collected and analysed.

CASE STUDY SELECTION

To respond to the research question, this study has selected two communities from underprivileged neighbourhoods in Santiago, Chile. These two communities have been used to carry out a paired comparison. Paired comparisons are highly common in the social sciences and several highly influential researchers have used them in order to test hypotheses, question theoretical assumptions, and build theory (see for example Hamilton, 1977; Moulder, 1977; Skocpol, 1979; Varese, 2006). In 1843, in his seminal work on

inductive reasoning and the principles of science, John Stuart Mill (1981) called these comparisons ‘Method of Difference’. This method, he explained, requires ‘two instances [or case studies] resembling one another in every other aspect, but differing in the presence or absence of the phenomenon we wish to study’ (Mill, 1981: 391). Skocpol & Somers (1980) argue that this method is particularly beneficial over using several similar cases to prove theoretical effectiveness. A set of confirming case studies does not have the inferential power to validate a theory. Cases selected in this way, Skocpol and Somers (1980: 191) argue, ‘are not used to establish controls, only to show the theory at work again and again’.

More recently, for example, Varese (2006) studied the transplantation of mafias in northern Italy using this same design. He compares very similar zones in Italy to explain why the ‘Ndrangheta’, a Calabrian mafia, succeeds in settling in the Piedmont region and not in Veneto. In his study Varese cogently argues that stronger state protection in some areas of the local economy and a tendency for exports (instead of a local trade focus) are key protective factors curtailing the transplantation of mafias.

Paired comparisons generate inferential research by selecting two cases that are either a) very different in their independent variable and ‘eschewed’ in their outcomes, or b) very similar in many ‘systemic characteristics’ but with different outcomes. In accordance with the latter (b), this study has selected two cases that despite being very similar have different levels of mobilisation. This requires unveiling inter-systemic differences to explain the variation in the outcomes (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). The benefit of paired

comparisons is that unlike common inferential comparison, they encourage tracing the processes through which different factors connect to determine the difference in outcomes (Tarrow, 2010). This design allowed the study to understand in detail the mechanisms through which contentious collective action was sustained in one case and interrupted in the other.

A paired comparison has advantages over a single case study investigation. The paired comparison has a stronger inferential power than a single cases study because the possibility of the dependent variable occurring when the independent variable has not occurred is excluded. Moreover, this comparative approach allowed me to search for causal relations, contrasting between the two case studies. It was possible for me to contrast and corroborate the hypothesis. This allowed me to build more powerful generalisations than if I had used a single case study. It also gave me the opportunity to investigate the specificities of each case in detail to compare the process through which contentious collective action was sustained. A paired comparison is also more strategic than a simple inferential comparison. While one case study shows precisely how mobilisational identity promotes contentious collective action, the other lost that mobilisational identity in the past. A paired comparison allowed me to trace the causes and mechanisms blocking collective identity development.

A drawback of this research design is that by using a small-N, its results are non-representative. As with most qualitative research, however, this study aims at unveiling

abstract relationships and dynamics that can be generalised. This goal can be achieved despite not seeking representativeness.

The first selected case study is the neighbourhood Nuevo Amanecer (NA), in the borough of La Florida, Santiago. As with most other *poblaciones* in the city, NA has been demobilised since Chile's democratic transition in 1990. The second case study selected in this research is Lo Hermida (LH), located in the borough of Peñalolén, also in Santiago (see Map 1). I select my case studies responding to the variability in the dependent variable.

Being strongly similar in most other characteristics, these two cases are comparable (see Table 1). These two communities were involved in what was known as the dwellers movement between 1970 and 1973 (see Chapter 1 for more details). They both resulted from highly coordinated land invasions in the second half of the year 1970. These land invasions were organised by leftist, contentious parties that, at the time, aimed at challenging the government's inefficient social housing provision. The Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR), usually understood as an urban guerrilla, was the main group organising these two invasions. After occupying the land, both squatting settlements developed complex and strict forms of internal organisation. During those years, these two *poblaciones* developed high levels of mobilisation. During the dictatorship, these two *poblaciones* suffered severe repression. Local leaders were persecuted and disappeared. The military carried out several raids searching for subversive organisation in these places. The military came to these neighbourhoods searching for weapons, specific people, or

insurgent material. Moya, Videla, and Balladares (2005, pp. 111, 142, 145) report how in these specific neighbourhoods, military personnel committed violent aggressions or killed residents.

At the same time, both communities had an active role in the national protests against the dictatorship from 1983 through 1986. Residents participated in marches and other initiatives against the dictatorial government. Often, organised residents in LH and NA confronted the military directly in their neighbourhoods, deploying Molotov cocktails, barricades, sticks, stones, and other rudimentary weapons. Additionally, organisations in both *poblaciones* flourished supported by the Catholic Church during the dictatorship. Residents organised human rights groups, youth groups, community kitchens, sewing groups, children camps, and so on. Most of these initiatives were not only aimed at solving pressing daily issues, they were also forms of protest against the regime.

Although these two neighbourhoods currently have different sizes (LH accommodates 56,416 inhabitants and NA only 10,909), they share a similar spatial organisation. These two neighbourhoods are as large as many other *poblaciones* in Santiago. They are both overcrowded because many households have more than one family. In addition, both *poblaciones* cover several smaller sections that local residents tend to call ‘*villas*.’ Maps 2 and 3 later in this chapter provide a visual idea of these *villas*.²³

²³ *Villas* have different origins. In LH, *villas* Arturo Pratt, El Valle, and the complete zone 1 were created through Site Operation. An explanation of what Site Operations were is provided in the section *Pobladores*,

NA and LH are located in the boroughs of La Florida and Peñalolén respectively. Both boroughs are located in the east of the city. Similar to Peñalolén, by the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, La Florida underwent a transformation, receiving a large portion of medium and high-value residential real estate projects (see Scarpaci, Infante, & Caete, 1988). The two boroughs in which these neighbourhoods are located, therefore, represent a particular type of development in Santiago. They are some of the few zones that agglomerate diverse sections of the social ladder²⁴. In fact, these two boroughs are some of the most unequal in the city (Agostini, 2010, p. 243).

Despite having *poblaciones*, these two boroughs include a large wealthy population. Sections of poverty are segregated and territorially defined. The wealthy zones improve figures of poverty and vulnerability. Consequently, poverty in these two boroughs is below the national average of 14.4 percent. In La Florida, poverty reaches only 9.2 percent and in Peñalolén it is 13.8 percent (Ministry of Social Development, 2014a). In fact, they both

parties and the struggle over housing, in Chapter 1. The *villas* in zones 3 and 4 (René Schneider, Los Lagos, El Duraznal, Yungay, La Concepción, and others) coincide with different housing committees that invaded the lands in 1970, coordinated by different leftist parties (including the MIR). The *villas* El Parral, Aquellare, and Lago Vichuquén, on the other hand, were built much later, in the early 1990s. They were funded through the housing subsidy system and brought people from other sections of the city. NA is also subdivided into zones (from 1 to 6). But its main subdivisions have been historically constructed. The area of the *campamento* corresponds to the original informal settlement called Nueva La Habana (NH). Later expansions created the rest of the *villas*. Most of the *casas nuevas* (new houses) were built by NH residents during the early 1970s and between 1974 and 1976 accommodated people from different zones of the city. The *villas* Los Húsares and Los Cerros were built later, during the 1990s, using the housing subsidy system. The *villa* Casas Chubi was installed in 2011 to accommodate people from the Toma de Peñalolén. Finally, the *villa* Rodrigo Carranza is home to residents from the *campamento* who obtained social housing in that area.

²⁴ Others, such as La Pintana or Lo Espejo, display a different reality regarding Santiago's development. During the 1980s, these boroughs experienced increasing concentrated poverty. In comparison with La Florida or Peñalolén, La Pintana and Lo Espejo are much more homogeneous sections of the urban underprivileged and poor population.

rank similarly (medium) in the Social Priority Index created by the Ministry of Social Development (2014b). Poverty in these boroughs concentrates on very specific underprivileged areas, such as NA and LH.

Socio-economic levels are also very similar in these two neighbourhoods. While urban infrastructure and services have improved drastically in the past 25 years, these neighbourhoods represent nests of vulnerability in their boroughs. In NA, for example, 47.8 percent of residents live with on less than 3.6 dollars a day (1st income quintile, according to CASEN 2011). In LH, this situation is not much improved. Between 22 and 37 percent of residents in LH live in these same conditions, depending on the zone (see Map 2). In NA, 71 percent of the population lives with on less than 183 dollars a month. The same is true for 43.8 to 83.5 percent of LH's population, depending on the zone²⁵ (see Appendix 1 for more details). Additionally, delinquency in both neighbourhoods is above the average levels of the borough, especially with regard to violent crimes²⁶ (data obtained from La Florida and Peñalolén Municipalities, 2011).

Moreover, calculations using data from the 2002 Chilean National Census reveal a very similar employment structure for both neighbourhoods²⁷ (National Statistics Institute,

²⁵ The statistics in this paragraph result from self-calculations using data provided by the municipalities of Peñalolén and La Florida. In order to include the income quintiles in which neighbors were classified, I used the classification in the survey CASEN 2011. Please see Appendix 1 for further details.

²⁶ I have obtained the levels of delinquency from the municipalities of Peñalolén and La Florida. In La Florida, data were provided directly from municipality officials, and it corresponds to details provided by the local police department.

²⁷ The last Census in 2012 has been invalidated. The most up to date census data in Chile is from 2002. I have used data of the National Census 2002 at the block level for the Metropolitan Region. I have made these

2002). In 2002 the proportion of employed population in both neighbourhoods was almost identical (38 and 37.9 percent for NA and LH respectively). Additionally, the proportions of each type of worker in these neighbourhoods were equally distributed. The majority of employed residents were unskilled workers (19.9 and 26.8 percent in NA and LH respectively). The second and third frequencies in both neighbourhoods are for 'mechanic arts' workers and for 'service and retail market vendors'. More qualified jobs and members of the armed forces have the last frequencies in both neighbourhoods (see Appendix 1 for more details). The data from 2002 also shows similar consumption patterns. Over 96 percent of houses in NA and LH were already connected to clean water supply. More than 68 percent of houses had landline, almost reaching the average of the Metropolitan Region (71.8 percent). The access to goods such as vehicles, colour TV, Refrigerator, and others was very similar for both NA and LH in 2002 (see Appendix 1 for more details).

According to the Census, NA and LH had almost the same amount of precarious housing in 2002. The amount of precarious households²⁸ in these two neighbourhoods was also very similar in 2002 (4.4 and 4.8 percent in NA and LH respectively). In both cases, precarious housing was way below the average of the Metropolitan Region (20.4 percent).

Educational levels in both, NA and LH, were also very similar according to the 2002 Census. The overwhelming majority (over 75 percent) of residents has only reached either

calculations revising the maps used by interviewers to identify the specific blocks corresponding to NA and LH.

²⁸ I have called 'precarious homes' those cases in which families lived in emergency housing, shacks, tents, or rented a room in collective housing.

primary school or has finished high school. The amount of people in these two neighbourhoods having technical or University education is way below the average for other urban areas of the Metropolitan Region.

The progressive growth of Santiago has incorporated these two neighbourhoods in the city. Map 1 shows that their distance from the city centre is not very large. They are, therefore, relatively close to the main urban services, malls, entertainment, sport facilities, and so on. In fact, Santiago's public transportation system connects both neighbourhoods very well to the rest of the city (see Maps 2 and 3). LH has two underground stations very close by and has many buses lines that go to the centre and other zones of the city. In addition, both neighbourhoods have large roads nearby that allow quick access to the rest of the city by car. Finally, both *poblaciones* include within their perimeter well-maintained public squares, a local health centre, community buildings, public schools, a firemen station, and a police station. The large majority of houses have sewage and all roads are paved.

The variation between these case studies is in the dependent variable. In other words, while one of them has sustained mobilisation since the 1990s, the other has demobilised. The idea that *poblaciones* have demobilised does not precisely mean that their collective action has decreased quantitatively²⁹ or disappeared. In fact, comparing data from the 1980s and

²⁹ Finding data to describe local participation quantitatively has not been possible. Surveys that measure neighbourhood associativity only use samples from the national population, making it impossible to account

1990s, Tironi (2003) argues that residents' participation in neighbourhood associations did not decrease. What has changed, however, is the quality of those organisations. What research consensually argues is that contentious collective action has become highly scarce since the early 1990s in many *poblaciones*, such as NA (Greaves, 2004; Koppelman, n.d.; Paley, 2001; Posner, 2004; Valdivieso, 2012). Historical data from the past twenty-five years prove this variability. Indeed, LH has been involved in actions of contentious mobilisation during the last twenty-five years and NA has not. Firstly, LH leaders and residents have been involved in the most important and successful Chilean land invasions during the democratic government after 1990, known as Toma Esperanza Andina (Figueroa, 2003) and Toma de Peñalolén (El Mercurio, 2004). Secondly, LH's schools were highly involved in the 2006 *Pinguino* student movement (El Mercurio, 2006b). Thirdly, in 2011, LH organisations (together with members of the Peñalolén Ecological Community) pushed for a referendum that would reject the new Municipal Regulatory Plan to be implemented by mayor Orrego (Herman, 2011; MPL, 2011b; Plataforma Urbana, 2011a). Fourthly, although the Movement of Dwellers in the Struggle (MPL) has become renowned among specialists and activists as a Chilean phenomenon³⁰, it has its

for specific neighbourhoods. That is the case with the National Socio-Economic Characterisation Survey (CASEN, 2011) and the National Survey on Urban Life Quality Perception (2007). In addition, the Quiero Mi Barrio programme (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development) has done surveys measuring social capital in more than two hundred vulnerable neighbourhoods, including specific sections of LH and NA. I have repeatedly insisted on requesting the data for these neighbourhoods, but that specific data is missing. Finally, it should be noted that there are no surveys on contentious initiatives in Chile, and if there were, they would likely also use a randomised sample of the national population. This would not provide data at the neighbourhood level.

³⁰ The MPL's salience emerges from *inter alia*, leading to occupations in the centre of Santiago, creating initiatives in many other cities, connecting with other social popular movements, struggling against social

origins in LH. From the far left, and mainly working on *allegados*³¹ housing provision, the MPL was originally a neighbourhood organisation that grew to a district-wide level. The MPL is now a symbol of popular contentious organisations in the country. Fifthly, LH holds a set of traditional events coordinated by local organisations, e.g. the yearly neighbourhood anniversary, which brings together most organisations, famous music bands, and artists.

In contrast, NA has had much less contentious collective action initiatives. In 2013, a group of families in NA invaded houses built by the government to accommodate former squatter settlers from Peñalolén. The invaders formed a housing called Don Bosco. The Don Bosco housing committee achieved the construction of houses in what later became known as *villa* Rodrigo Carranza, located to the east of NA. However, this initiative was highly spontaneous and almost completely disconnected from local neighbourhood organisations. Currently, the Don Bosco committee is still working to provide housing to *allegados*, but it has maintained its isolation from local organisations.

housing gentrification, creating a communitarian construction company, creating a diploma on social movements, and becoming a central movement in the creation of the newly born Equality Party (Pulgar & Mathivet, 2010).

³¹ *Allegados* is a term used to indicate families that live in another family's house: typically, a daughter who after becoming a single mother cannot afford additional rent decides to live with her parents. Some current households in Lo Hermida have two or often three families under one roof.

DESCRIBING CASE STUDIES FURTHER

Here I provide a more detailed description of how local organisations function in LH and NA. LH is an exception to the process of demobilisation mentioned in Chapter 1. During the early stages of my fieldwork in LH I decided to map local organisations in order to plan my interviews properly. After I interacted with a few organisations, this task proved to be impossible. In the months I spent there, I never stopped learning of new organisations. Not only are they very numerous, but they are constantly dying to give rise to new ones. The organisations' lifespans vary according to the reason they were founded. Residents involved in local collective action are usually members of two or more organisations. This dynamism is led largely by the youth. The local youths group and re-group constantly, implementing new initiatives. A large number of organisations are informal; in other words, they have not been inscribed at the municipality or obtained legal personality. In fact, local organisations sometimes organise fairs in which other formal and informal organisations come to show their initiatives, becoming a hub for *población* activism.

Local organisations need 'legal personality' in order to apply for state funding. Neighbourhood councils, mothers' centres, housing and development committees, and security committees are all formal organisations. Informal organisations, especially those led by youths, reject this request. Later chapters provide an in-depth analysis of this phenomenon. While there are many informal organisations in LH, in NA, the large

majority of organisations have legal personality. In fact, among NA organisations, not having legal personality seemed rather circumstantial and not a specific preference.

Despite these differences, organisations in both neighbourhoods have a general goal: improving the quality of life in their local community. While some *poblaciones* have more participation than others, local organisations usually constitute a sub-community that gathers that portion of the neighbours engaged in this objective. According to Tironi (2003b, p. 91), the proportion of engagement in *población* organisations is 25.5 percent on average³².

Similar to what Buechler (1990) called ‘social movement communities (SMC)’, local neighbourhood organisations can be seen as a structure. The notion of SMC has the advantage of incorporating informal organisations in the analysis of collective action as groups that identify their goals with a larger movement. Because Buechler's (1990) theory of SMC involves relatively vague (but still identifiable) community boundaries and flexible, informal leaderships, it is a useful tool to frame this research object in the investigation of identity and collective action.

Compared to LH, NA's organisations are more homogeneous and less numerous. In both LH and NA there are several neighbourhood councils representing small sections of the *población*. Neighbourhood councils are ‘territorial organisations’ that represent a

³² Tironi obtains this data from a survey carried out in 2001. The average participation in local organisations in 1985 was 31.2 percent, which is not significantly different from 2001 (Tironi 2003b, p. 91). Chile, Tironi (2003b) argues, has low historical levels of social capital.

‘neighbourhood unit’ in front of authorities (Law 19,418, Article 2). Neighbourhood units are formal delimitations that include a few thousand people living in the same area. Although NA corresponds to a formally defined neighbourhood unit, it accommodates several neighbourhood councils. LH comprises several smaller neighbourhood units, each having one or more neighbourhood councils³³. However, in NA, the central neighbourhood council is the one that represents the whole neighbourhood unit³⁴ in front of the municipality and other authorities.

Although every neighbourhood council is meant to manage a *sede comunitaria* (community building), in NA, a few of them do not have their own building. Neighbourhood councils issue certificates of residence and provide information to neighbours. Additionally, councils establish work with some institutions at the local level. For example, members from a few councils held meetings at the local health centre with the aim of improving the centre’s services.

The smaller councils can apply for government funding while maintaining institutional connections, with the local police department, for example. The main council manages issues that involve the whole neighbourhood unit. For example, the main council receives and distributes the Christmas gifts from the municipality to all *población* children across

³³ LH includes four of Peñalolén’s neighbourhood units: 17th, 18th, 19th, and 31st.

³⁴ Administratively, the zone that coincides with NA is the 25th neighbourhood unit. Because that neighbourhood unit is especially large, particular zones of the neighbourhood felt un-represented by the central neighbourhood council. Hence, in some areas, neighbours created new ‘territorial organisations.’

the entire zone. Additionally, neighbourhood councils should raise neighbours' concerns to authorities.

There are also development and housing committees. Neighbours use both types of organisations to collectively apply for state benefits, mainly subsidies. While *housing committees* apply for housing subsidies and manage the construction of homes, *development committees* apply for subsidies to improve the quality of homes or their neighbourhood infrastructure. For example, a group of residents used a government subsidy programme to completely refurbish the roofs of their houses.

In addition, there are a few football clubs³⁵ composed of teams from different age groups that train weekly and organise recreational championships. There are also groups of the elderly that meet once or twice a week for tea and, once every few years, they take summer trips funded by the municipality. NA also has a group of neighbours that, separate from the local Catholic Church, meet to celebrate a few religious occasions, for example, the *Mes de María* (Month of María).

Finally, the *población* holds a set of *organizaciones culturales* ('cultural organisations'). These are groups devoted to learning and developing local cultural traditions, arts, and crafts. Among them there was a group of elderly men that met to play Briscola at the main square. One of the few active young groups in NA formed an organisation called *La Casita*

³⁵ Población residents speak of *clubes deportivos* (sports clubs), but they actually always refer to football clubs.

that developed arts such as sculpture, popular dancing, and music. They generally organised activities in collaboration with the adjacent Mapuche community. Arguably, *La Casita* is the only contentious local organisation. They opened a space for the popular expression of neighbours and sometimes questioned the quiescent reaction of other local organisations to injustice and inequality. *La Casita* avoided involving party politics in their work.

However, with the exemption of *La Casita* and a handful of other youths, the bulk of local organisations do not develop critical cultural or social work. Neighbourhood councils, as well as development and housing committees, are exclusively devoted to managing neighbours' access to state benefits, and other organisations almost exclusively run entertainment activities. My interviews and observations show that NA organisations very rarely hold authorities accountable or intend to construct any social change.

Leaders in these organisations—e.g. neighbourhood council board members—occupy a position of service in the community. Board members at neighbourhood councils distribute shifts at the *sede* to serve neighbours. Obliging, each board member stayed at the council's office in the *sede* one day a week to listen to neighbours, provide information on subsidies or state programmes, issue residence certificates, schedule reservations for the use of the building, and so on. Although honourable, board members' activities hardly implied reaching out to the community. In fact, their position was that of a civil servant, providing services to the community. As a football club leader framed this: 'we have to pay 200,000 pesos [monthly] for the court, and on top of that we have to manage it and

take care of it, serve the community in a job that should be done by the municipality... but I never confront authorities regarding these things' (Interview, 9 October, 2014). This supports Paley's (2001) argument that *población* organisations after 1990 developed as an unpaid citizens labour force subsidising duties originally performed by the state. I claim, however, that this phenomenon results from the establishment of political loyalty and that local leaders are not passive, submissive victims of the state, but they have a central role in the process of demobilisation.

In LH, we find the same formal organisations: neighbourhood councils, mothers' centres, sports clubs, development and housing committees, and so forth. Simultaneously, however, two variations make a large difference: on the one hand, local organisations in LH express comparatively different meanings regarding participation and their neighbourhood, and on the other, there are many other informal organisations. Some of the formal organisations in LH, as well as the informal ones, frame their collective action as insurgent. They not only intend to improve their community, but they seek a shift in the way in which people relate to one another. Developing initiatives at the local level is, in their view, the only way of changing neoliberal relational patterns. LH's local organisations have sought to diversify sources of funding using *autogestión* (self-management). Organisations carry out *recuperaciones* (recoveries), which are meant to re-claim sections of the neighbourhood that have been occupied by institutions or private interests. Recoveries vary in their quality and capacity. A graffiti workshop that is meant to politicise the meaning of a square, usually taken over by drug dealers, is a way of 'recovering.' Building a community orchard in a square where a bank branch would be installed or demanding the

administration of local football pitches are other forms of recovery. Additionally, organisations manage a local popular library; they coordinate art workshops, theatre plays, music festivals, fairs, and carnivals. Crucially, many organisations have a special focus on children, making them the main recipients of activities.

Local organisations in LH also carry out demonstrations over relevant national issues. For example, during my stay in the *población*, I participated in a march against the repression of the Mapuche³⁶. Recently, another march was organised to build awareness and denounce political corruption.

Both *poblaciones* organise their yearly anniversary. LH's anniversary is a daylong commemoration of the neighbourhood's creation in 1970, and it has been celebrated since its beginnings. Because of the neighbourhood's heterogeneous origin (Site Operation and *toma*), residents officially celebrate two anniversaries on different dates at the end of August: one for the 1st and 2nd zones, and another one for the 3rd and 4th zones. These anniversaries involve entertainment and cultural events, include all residents, and give neighbourhood organisations the opportunity to present their work in the local community. Famous music bands are invited to perform as well. The anniversary finishes with a large party. Anniversaries necessarily include political messages and allusions to LH's history.


³⁶ During the first months of 2013, Mapuche communities in the proximities of Padre de Las Casas, in the south of Chile, underwent violent raids by the police. Intelligence policemen were after alleged Mapuche offenders that had dramatically killed an old landlord couple, burning down their house (see Publímetro, 2013).

A similar event occurs in NA. Every November 1st, NA residents celebrate their settlement of what was then called Nueva La Habana (NH). The event in this case is organised only by young residents.


Characteristics	Nuevo Amanecer	Lo Hermida
Origin	Land invasion and locally organised resettlement	Land invasion
Initial mobilisation	High	High
Location in Santiago	Eastern zone, relatively close to the city centre	Eastern zone, relatively close to the city centre
Dictatorial repression	High	High
Initial political leadership	MIR	MIR and also Socialists and Christian Democrats
Organised political resistance against the dictatorship	Yes	Yes
Spatial configuration	An agglomeration of <i>villas</i> with diverse historical origins	An agglomeration of <i>villas</i> with diverse historical origins
Income per capita	Low (up to 47.8 percent live with less than 3.6 dollars per day)	Low (up to 37 percent live with less than 3.6 dollars per day)
Educational level	75 percent either reached primary school or completed high school	75 percent either reached primary school or completed high school
Employment structure	Same	Same
Consumption patterns	Same	Same
Urbanisation and good public infrastructure	Yes	Yes
Well connected to the city centre	Yes	Yes
Borough inequality and segregation	High	High
Contentious mobilisation since 1990	Low <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Celebration of the yearly anniversary • Invasion of houses in 2011 	High <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large land invasions • Local involvement in student movement • Succeeded in rejecting borough master plan • Creation of MPL • Regular organisation of marches and protests denouncing national issues • Celebration of the yearly anniversary • Large number of informal organisations, local events and activities

Table 1. Comparison of similarities and differences between the two selected case studies.


MAPS OF CASE STUDIES



Map 1. Case studies located in Santiago.



Map 2. Lo Hermida divided by zones and villas.
 Source: Self-construction using map provided by the municipality.



Map 3. Nuevo Amanecer divided by villas.
 Source: Self-construction using map provided by the municipality.

ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH

In this project, identity has been defined as the collective process of meaning construction on the basis of a common self-definition (see next chapter for more details). This research explores how people give meaning to reality promoting contentious collective action. I have called an identity that promotes contentious collective action a ‘mobilisational identity.’ The examination of this collective construction of meaning has been done using qualitative methods.

More precisely, this study has adopted an ethnographic approach. This means that this research has engaged in the systematic examination of identity based on first-hand observations (Braithwaite, Bianchi, & Taylor, 1994, p. 409). In other words, in order to understand the meanings of mobilisational identity, I have collected data directly from the everyday lives of local organisations in Santiago’s neighbourhoods. This meant spending more than nine months living in these neighbourhoods and finding a role in the local community (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994). In line with Atkinson and Hammersley (2007), this ethnographic approach has involved gathering data using different techniques and from different sources. Consequently, I have done participant observations in different contexts in *poblaciones* (i.e. local organisations’ work, events, and meetings, as well as in their interactions with political representatives). I have also conducted interviews with a diverse range of local actors, including political representatives, mobilised residents, leaders, and non-mobilised residents. The study included revising other materials as well, such as newspapers and historical reports.

In this case, ethnography is understood as an analytical method that leads to the refinement, expansion, and/or construction of theory. In other words, this ethnographic approach aims at testing innovative conceptual propositions that advance theorisation on social mobilisation, identity, and citizenship. That is, this thesis aims at unveiling processes and dynamics that can explain empirical phenomena across multiple contexts. This is what Snow, Morrill, and Anderson (2003, p. 188) have called ‘trans-situational patterns’. Congruently, this thesis builds an innovative analytical framework to understand the construction of mobilisational citizenship.

An ethnographic approach has the advantage of providing in-depth knowledge and analysis of social dynamics. Only by immersing myself in the communities under study could I understand the nuances of identity production and social interactions. Moreover, I planned an ethnographic approach knowing that it would allow me to build trust among local neighbourhood dwellers. I predicted that in contexts of urban marginalisation and a history of institutional repression, it would be crucial to engage in trusting relationships with those under study. My continuous presence in the neighbourhoods gave me the opportunity to create closer bonds during my fieldwork. I could, for example, attend improvised meetings or initiate informal conversations at the local market.

The depth of an ethnographic approach makes it an especially demanding technique. As in this case, time and resources only allow researchers to examine a very limited number of case studies. In fact, researchers often do a deep analysis of one case study using ethnography (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994).

DATA COLLECTION

The first challenges that I faced in collecting my data was obtaining accommodation in the *poblaciones*, getting basic knowledge of the area, and establishing my first contacts with local organisations. In advance, I decided to prioritise the observation of particularly contentious local organisations in order to increase my explicative capacity. I soon understood that contentious organisations were rather hostile to external people (especially in LH), which made building something crucial. Formal and non-contentious organisations were generally more welcoming and open to sharing their experiences. Understanding contentious collective action and being able to contrast between the different types of organisations would necessarily imply making more efforts to obtain observations in the most subversive ones.

Establishing connections in LH was more difficult. Professor Mario Garcés, at Santiago University (USACH), provided me with the first contacts at MPL. Members at MPL had close contact with several local organisations in LH. MPL members showed me around and invited me to some events, where I made my first contacts. Local activists and organisation members generally know each other. After a few members of the community trusted me, it became easier to start making more contacts. The MPL connected me with the most contentious leaders in LH, which opened the door for me to progressively engage in initiatives and events. Simultaneously, I got to know a family of popular artists who ran a local *completo* (hot dog) shop. They helped me with basic details, such as knowing the

more dangerous areas and looking for accommodation, and they gave me a few more contacts.

After a few weeks in LH, I establish contact with an organisation implementing a *recuperación* (land recovery/occupation) at a square. The initiative had been initiated by a group of young residents who wanted to implement critical education workshops for *población* children. Soon, older leaders and other youth groups joined the project. The organisation decided that the *escuelita* (little school) should be located in a space that subverted neoliberal, oppressive culture. In that occupied square, I collaborated in the construction of a small community orchard and a roof and in building children games. Additionally, I contributed to the coordination of events with children and other activities to raise funds. The organisation met two or three times a week and devoted weekends to working in the orchard. I focused much of my observations on this organisation because it represented one of the most contentious in the neighbourhood.

Despite being unable to map all of LH organisations, I made a representative segmentation of the organisations. I differentiated potential interviewees at local organisations by gender, age, zone of the neighbourhood, and type of organisation. This segmentation did not have interpretative aims but ensured that I covered a different range of residents and organisations in the neighbourhood. Although I did my best to follow that segmentation, covering every single potential interviewee proved impossible. Sometimes residents rejected being interviewed. I implemented the same segmentation in NA.

In addition, I implemented different types of interviews. Interviews with participants intended to investigate the narratives, relevant life figures, and motivations of engaging in collective action. Historical interviews focused on leaders and other community members. They explored historical facts and how residents interpreted them. Institutional interviews looked at the perceptions that institutional and political representatives have of neighbourhood organisations and what kind of interaction they establish with *poblaciones*. Finally, non-participant interviews sought to understand the perceptions that non-active residents have of local organisations and explored the barriers to participating in local contentious collective action. I designed an interview guide for each one of these interview types (see Appendix 3 for more details).

Every time I carried out an interview I summarised my project to the interviewee and asked for informed consent. All interviewees in this research agreed for me to use their information as long as I respect their privacy and anonymity. In those cases in which I became involved in local organisations I introduced myself honestly. I explained my project and goals to people, requesting their approval for my participation in their organisation.

My first contact in NA was a friend of a contact in LH. He put me in touch with several other people involved in local organisations. Searching for accommodation in NA proved to be much more difficult than in LH. These neighbourhoods are overcrowded, and it is not easy to find a room in some of the secure areas. Finally, after about a month, I got in touch with a resident who rented rooms in a house and I moved there.

My contacts invited me to attend meetings about coordinating the anniversary to be celebrated on November 1st. In those meetings, I was able to engage directly in one of the few initiatives carried out in the neighbourhood. I actively assisted in the implementation of the anniversary celebration. In those meetings, I also got to know members of *La Casita*. Since they were clearly the most active and contentious organisation in the neighbourhood, I decided to deepen my interactions with them, building trust, attending their meetings, helping in their activities, and so forth.

Besides understanding why people engaged in collective action, NA provided a new challenge: explaining demobilisation. In this case, I realised that I needed to account for the problem of investigating the absence of contentious collective action. The literature on demobilisation suggested an important historical component and that it resulted from the interactions between civil society and institutions. I therefore decided to complement my institutional interviews with institutional observations. I asked my institutional interviewees to invite me to their activities with grassroots organisations and carried out observations at those events. Additionally, I included a few more historical interviews. I added interviewees who had been active during the 1980s but had abandoned *población* activism during the 1990s.

Organisations were classified into different types. Functional organisations included those whose aims were concrete and practical (neighbourhood councils, health groups, housing committees, and development committees). Functional organisations more often had a legal personality. Cultural organisations included those that developed artistic or traditional

culture initiatives (folklore groups, hip-hop organisations, art organisations, etc.). Political organisations focused their attention almost only on challenging entrenched forms of power. Church-affiliated organisations included groups that framed their activities religiously or in some connection with the Catholic or the Evangelist churches. While Catholic groups were highly independent from the institution of the church, Evangelists seemed more like an extension of it. Sports organisations corresponded with local football clubs and were devoted to the organisation, implementation, and improvement of the local league and the infrastructure associated with it. Table 2 shows the individual interviews that I did in each of these types of organisations. Among the interviews conducted with local residents, nine of them were historical. Four historical interviews were carried out with former members of local activism who had left organisations starting in the 1990s.

Interviews		LH	NA	Total
Organisations	Cultural	9	8	17
	Functional	9	14	23
	Political	10	2	12
	Church affiliated	5	1	6
	Sports	2	1	3
	Total	35	26	61
Institutional	Party (centre)	2	1	3
	Party (left)	2	4	6
	Party (right)	1	2	3
	Government	3	2	5
	Police	1	1	2
	Total	9	10	19
Non-active residents		8	17	25
Total		52	53	105

Table 2. Synthesis of interviews by type of organisation.

Political organisations in NA were highly scarce. I understood the organisation of the local anniversary as the only purely political activity in the neighbourhood. My two ‘political’

interviews were with traditional members of that organising committee who do not take part in any other local organisation.

Finding non-active residents to interview was another challenge. I realised that contacts provided by active residents were usually very close to the local activist community, which shaped their opinions. Those not involved in organisations tended to be especially cautious; they fear external unknown people. Ringing bells and knocking on doors led to many rejections. I obtained the necessary interviewees by spending time at local shops and asking the owners of those shops about contacts.

Interviews were recorded using a digital device and were downloaded to my laptop every day. My laptop was kept safe and locked with a passcode. Every week, I uploaded the interview files to an encrypted online system, which is where I stored them. In order to ensure my interviewees' anonymity and privacy, I used TLS encryption, which is the standard encryption method for online transference.

I took regular field notes, either at night or in the morning. In my field notes, I described my days and placed emphasis on situations that seemed meaningful. Ethnographers have argued that the researcher's discretion in taking notes is unavoidable but should be minimised. Every time that I took notes about my fieldwork, I made a special effort to be as descriptive as possible. My strategy was to start by making bullet points about the different events of the day. This helped me maintain a descriptive attitude and write about all the events I could remember, leaving nothing aside. To organise my notes, I used Evernote, which automatically backs up the information to an online system. Evernote also

uses TLS encryption. I additionally encrypted my notes using AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) with a 128-bit key.

In addition to my interviews and field notes, I worked on triangulating some of the information I obtained in my interviews. Since much of my investigation involved people's particular meaning construction, triangulation was necessary to contrast some of the data collected in my interviews and observations. Triangulation played two roles: it either confirmed or refuted historical data, or it provided a contrast that unveiled residents' capacity to share subjective interpretations of social reality. Many times, unfortunately, what occurs in marginal areas is not informed or systematically registered. Other times, because some of the historical facts I researched on were politically controversial, different sources contradicted each other³⁷.

My analysis sometimes requested complementing field data and academic accounts with reports and newspaper articles. My revision included Chilean news agencies such as CNN Chile, El Mercurio, Ciper Chile, Fortín Mapocho, Publimetro, La Segunda, La Tercera, The Clinic, Plataforma Urbana, Radio Cooperativa, and the magazine Punto Final. I also revised specific periodical publications and reports from agencies that carried out research during the 1980s in *poblaciones*. I examined publications from CEDIAL, FLACSO, CIDU, Hechos Urbanos, Programa de Economía del Trabajo (PET), SUR Corporación, and ECO

³⁷ A very clear example of this is the death of René Saravia in LH in 1972 and Allende's later visit to the *población*. El Mercurio, Punto Final, and public communications by the MIR offer different facts about that day.

Educación y Comunicaciones. All of these publications have been mentioned in the list of references at the end of this thesis. Notes on this complementary material were taken and incorporated in my analysis together with my interviews and observations.

DATA ANALYSIS

The first step I followed for my data analysis was homogenising all my material. I transcribed all my interviews into individual Word documents (.docx). I also put my notes into individual Word (.docx) documents. I included all the material into NVivo to code it all together.

My central tool of analysis was what Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) have described as ‘thematic analysis.’ Thematic analysis allows the researcher to combine a deductive approach with an inductive one. Using an analytical theoretical framework can therefore be combined with building emerging categories that express dynamics specific to the case studies under analysis.

I began by coding the material testing hypotheses that emerged from my theoretical framework. Within these categories, I built new emerging categories that appeared in my data. As Schutt (2015, p. 328) advises, I constantly went from one source to the other, checking other theoretical accounts. Throughout the process of analysis, categories that had an important explanatory power emerged, complementing my analytical framework. New categories were needed to explain demobilisation. Coding the interviews and field

notes from my first case study (Lo Hermida), I was able to strengthen my analytical framework. I realised, for example, that the notion of agentic memory was not at the same level as belonging and boundaries and that it should be considered at an earlier logical stage. When I incorporated the information from my second case study (NA), I confirmed the importance of agentic memory as a first step in the construction of mobilisational identity. Additionally, I reinterpreted what I had categorised to explain mobilising acts and protagonism. I realised that I needed to incorporate the notion of political capital and re-code parts of my material. Therefore, I went back to interviews and field notes in LH to identify and connect new categories that allowed me to understand how leadership worked. I could then understand that identity transmission was one of the main mechanisms by which mobilisational identity is sustained over time (see Appendix 2 for further details).

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

This chapter establishes the theoretical grounds for the exploration of what I will call ‘mobilisational citizenship’. Theories on social movements have generally kept their distance from the notion of citizenship, owing to its associations with a polity that transcends movements. In recent years, however, the field of citizenship studies has experienced a rebirth, in which many innovative definitions have critically reshaped its operationalisation, rescaling it to more local contexts (Heller & Perera, 2007; Staeheli, 2003).

In amplifying local dynamics and concentrating large inequalities, cities have become a prolific site for the emergence of these new forms of citizenship (Sassen, 2008; Smith & McQuarrie, 2012). In this context, the neighbourhood level has attracted interest as a scale at which communities can develop identity and activism (Motta, 2009). In extensive analyses by social movement theories of the role of identity in protests and mobilisation, the sense of belonging to a community has proved crucial in people’s motivation to participate in collective initiatives for social change, especially in urban settings. For that reason, in order to properly understand people’s experience of active citizenship, the

present project assigns a central role to identity (E. F. Isin & Wood, 1999; Tavares & Brosseau, 2013).

An extensive body of academic literature has sought to understand social movements, addressing questions such as why movements occur; under which conditions movements develop; and why some people join social movements. In the English-speaking world, functionalist theories of social movements have been most widely used by researchers (Rootes, 1990). By assuming the existence of a representative rational individual, many of these theories have used economic models to understand people's behaviour. They assume that activists design strategies rationally, optimising benefits and minimising costs of protests. Social movements have even been analysed by means of the framework of demand and supply (Breton & Breton, 1969). While some of these theories have a broader social perspective, others focus more on a movement's micro level. The former can be exemplified by political opportunity structure theory; an example of the latter is the theory of resource mobilisation.

Highly focused on the exogenous factors that impact social movements, political opportunity theory emphasises that protest is a political resource linked directly to the general political process within which the movement develops (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Prominent supporters of this theory, such as Tarrow (1998), claim that political opportunity structures are dimensions that emerge from the political environment and function as incentives for people to engage in collective action, determining their expectations of success and failure. Tarrow also emphasises the openness of the

institutional political system, the stability and alignment of local elites and the state's capacity for repressing movements among the factors that affect the development, tactics, and impact of social movements.

In contrast, resource mobilisation theory is more focused on social movements' internal processes and suggests that resources such as labour or money are necessary in order to engage in social conflict. According to this theory, rational actors make the best use of their resources and minimise the need for resources to which they have no access (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Resource mobilisation theory has been criticised for focusing too much on internal issues within movements—such as leadership or coordination—while neglecting more important external factors that may determine the movement's development or success (Rootes, 1990).

From a very different perspective, other theories—especially Marxist approaches—have addressed the issue of social movements from a socioeconomic standpoint. Some scholars suggest that the economic structure of a society influences the conflicts that occur within it. However, there is also evidence that structural tensions do not always evolve into social movements (Vekemans & Silva, 1976). Often, the problems of the poor do not lead to mobilisation but instead sometimes deter protest. In this context, some theories have sought to explain social movements through 'political cleavages'. According to these theories, different social groups—defined by class, faction, or national group—fight in order to protect material or political interests (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). This paradigm is specific to industrial societies, which are central to the nation state and structured market

production. In this context, collective action emerges when social groups are easily identifiable and differentiated and have created strong cohesive networks with a specific identity, enabling them to confront socioeconomic tensions.

However more contemporary theorists have suggested that the basis for industrial society's social conflicts has changed in the last 30 years. Among other things, new technologies, smaller workplaces, a reduction of practical distances, more horizontal and decentralised business organisation, and an emphasis on services rather than manufacturing industries have replaced the Fordist model (Beck, 1992; Castells, 1996). In this way, the ties that networks provided—once created through closeness at factories and neighbourhoods—were broken (Castells, 1996). Additionally, growing cities, and increasing migration and poverty have changed the way we conceive human interactions (Sassen, 2008).

Contrary to what many scholars' explanations might have predicted, these new trends did not paralyse social movements. In fact, in the last 15 years—especially after the Arab Spring and the 2008 crisis—the whole world has seen a sharp increase in protests (Behieler, 2013). In this context, new theories have emerged of global social justice and transnational informational networking (Castells, 2004; Fraser, 2008; Juris, 2004). These theories emphasise actors' construction of diversified, autonomous horizontal ties, the free and open circulation of information, the decentralisation and democratisation of decision-making, and self-managed networking. Additionally, these theories suggest that the discourses and practices circulating through those networks produce and transform them (Juris, 2004).

Despite their important contributions, none of these theories examines people's lived experience of mobilisation. Although epistemologically useful in the assessment of social movements' success, neither the actor construed as a set of rational calculations nor social relations conceived as a set of nodes connected by a network can account for the subjective significance for people of collective engagement in a movement. As this chapter will demonstrate, it is the notion of identity that captures people's construction of meaning for engagement in collective action. Additionally, the concept of identity has a particular political value, in that it facilitates the examination of local urban communities as suitable places for the construction of novel forms of citizenship (Motta, 2009).

Despite the extensive body of research stressing the relevance of identity in collective action, social movement theories do not directly address how identity translates into collective action. By constructing the notion of 'mobilisational citizenship'—that is, a community's capacity to informally construct local social belonging based on shared meaning production—this project aims at providing a clearer understanding of how identity translates into collective action. To this end, the project offers an understanding of identity as transformative rather than merely interest-based.

This chapter begins, then, by contextualising the relevance of the neighbourhood level for the study of mobilisational citizenship. After identifying a gap in the existing literature on social movements and identity, an original notion of 'mobilisational citizenship' is introduced, organised conceptually along four dimensions: memory of struggle, belonging, identity boundaries, and protagonism.

TAKING NEIGHBOURHOOD ACTIVISM SERIOUSLY

In developing the concept of mobilisational citizenship, the present project focuses on contentious collective action in underprivileged neighbourhoods. Scholars agree that cities attract high levels of capital inflows, so becoming sites where the disjunctions of global capitalism become more evident. Sassen (2008, 2011) has suggested that cities encapsulate these contradictions because they accommodate the leading sectors of the global economy as well as expanding levels of disadvantage population and social exclusion. Additionally, urban 'presence' (the consistent proximity that people experience in the city) offers the powerless an opportunity to rearticulate social relations, both vertically (with authorities) and horizontally (with each other). As a consequence, the city becomes a field in which the distributions of power established by entrenched regimes of citizenship can be challenged and where novel subjectivities can emerge.

In this context, some researchers have focused on the neighbourhood as a common site for the production of community and social identity (Hauge & Kolstad, 2007; Robertson, Smyth, & McIntosh, 2008). Others have gone further by demonstrating that neighbourhood community building can lead to innovative insurgent movements that produce novel forms of mobilisation (Holston, 2008; Martin, 2003; Faranak Miraftab & Wills, 2005). Indeed, urban residents whose position is devalued and stigmatised sometimes manage to create strong communities that construct forms of collective resistance. According to Castells (2004, p. 9), these communities create forms of identity based on history, geography, or biology, making it easier to define and essentialise identity boundaries. These communities

often use their neighbourhood to catalyse resistance (Castells, 1983; Meegan & Mitchell, 2001; Roman et al., 2012). Consequently, the neighbourhood becomes the site within which organisations of neighbours not only improve their own lives but also redefine place as something that can be constructed and contested politically (Motta, 2009).

The present thesis examines identity and citizenship in that context of *neighbourhood organisations*. Local organisations should be understood as a set of multiple diverse groups of residents and organisers, dedicated to addressing a range of issues that include social, political, economic, religious, and quality of life concerns (Martin, 2003). Organisations are systems of collective action in that they entail the coordination of individuals or groups with diverse preferences, information, interests, and knowledge (March & Simon, 1993). Accordingly, organisations are ‘socially constructed artifacts’ because they are shaped dynamically by actors in their interaction (Letiche, 2007). This definition of organisation is wide enough to include formally and informally coordinated groups at the neighbourhood level while also establishing the necessary limits distinguishing an organisation from other types of social group.

As Martin (2003, p. 732) highlights, neighbourhood activism can be said to constitute a particular form of developing contentious collective action. Neighbourhood organisations are often or generally spontaneously created and are not part of any formal institution. While some may be elected, they are not, in general, elected bodies representing large sections of the broader population. In consequence, local neighbourhood organisations are

especially well placed to challenge local policy implementation and governance structures. In rescaling mobilisation, organisations defend local collective polities.

APPROACHES TO IDENTITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

The salience that social movement theory has lent to identity emerges from tensions within the predominant conceptions that developed during the 1970s—specifically, within and between rational choice theory and Marxism. Rational choice theory conceives of movements as the outcome of cost-benefit calculation. Though more concerned with organisational strategies and locations, resource mobilisation theory also supported this functionalist perspective. Against this, Marxists explained mobilisation as a result of class-consciousness. And against these emerging theories, critical voices argued that both traditions neglected crucial phenomena in the field of social movements (Calhoun, 1991; Gamson, 1992; Laraña et al., 1994; Melucci, 1996). On the one hand, Marxism sought to understand social groups through a unifying and totalising lens, denying the diversity of ideas and values that movements can represent (Johnston, Laraña, & Gusfield, 1994). On the other hand, rational choice theory was unable to account for groups' search for recognition, the relevance of belonging, and collective acts that could not be explained through costs and benefits, such as activists' exposure to life-threatening situations (Calhoun, 1994). In this context, several theories have devoted attention to the role of identity in social movements, but I would argue that none has managed to properly explain how identity translates into collective action.

Collective action framing is one of the few theories that does address the role of identity in mobilisation. Closer to the functionalist tradition, framing theory seeks to explain how social movements' narratives attract supporters. These scholars see identity purely as a phenomenon that emerges from strategic discursive acts that reinforce the movement's efficiency in recruiting more participants. In so doing, framing theory assigns little relevance to the cultural value of identity and neglects the sense that identity makes of the experience of mobilisation.

People use frames as schemas for interpreting and reducing the social world, synthesising aspects of reality and therefore useful for organising experience and guiding action. Collective action frames are 'action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organisation (SMO)' (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). Here, culture functions as a set of standard, predefined contents, enabling the creation of frames and allowing the bystander to recognise movements' messages, defining expectations and interpretations of social reality (Donati, 1992 in Della Porta & Diani, 1999, p. 69). Constituted only by frames, identity must be 'enlarged' to extend the connections between the individual and collective spheres, so including more challengers to the movement (Gamson, 1992). However, this theory does not account for people's experience of identity and production of meaning beyond the merely strategic use of identity categories.

Assigning far greater centrality to identity, the 'new social movements' (NSM) approach sought to provide an alternative to European disillusionment through highly academic and

structural versions of Marxism. In a society shifting from industrial to post-industrial capitalism, these scholars saw the construction of new social and political identities as the source of previously unseen social movements (Touraine, 1985). According to Touraine, post-industrial society imposes novel frustrations on community building, self-realisation, and personal satisfaction. The causes of these frustrations are deindustrialisation, a failing welfare system, and new social concerns such as the environment. Suggesting that social movements express a structural shift in society, NSM's proponents devoted their energies to a thorough account of their movements' novel qualities (Hunt et al., 1994; Johnston et al., 1994; Pichardo, 1997). In so doing, they engaged in highly theoretical debates—especially in relation to whether movements should or should not be framed as 'new'—neglecting empirical analysis of the mechanisms by which identity produces collective action (Pichardo, 1997).

Taking a more culture-centred approach, identity politics theories defined identity as both a cause and a goal of social mobilisation. Seeking to escape essentialised accounts of identity, some of these theorists placed great emphasis on authenticity, the capacity of a group's inner voice to be heard and to have a legitimate role in their own life. Enmeshed with social practice, identity is, on this view, the only way of being true to oneself (Taylor, 1989). In contrast, another grouping of scholars within identity politics, inspired by the post-modernist school, defined identity as a 'simulacrum'—a superficial phenomenon that expresses only performativity and does not allude to any 'deep content' to be interpreted (Baudrillard, 1989; Clifford, 2000). In both cases, scholarly accounts of identity politics fail to properly distinguish identity from collective action. Consequently, despite giving

centrality to the notion of identity, these theories fail to explain why, among those communities with identities, not all of them engage in mobilisation.

More recently, some researchers have claimed to be studying still more innovative forms of social movement, in which identity and citizenship play an important role (Day, 2005; Karatzogianni & Robinson, 2010; Motta, 2009). These studies emphasise the autonomy of current social movements, suggesting that their novelty resides precisely in their break with hegemonic thought. In fact, the movements they describe tend to be much more critical of state agencies and other institutions than their predecessors (Day, 2005). In their reconstruction of social relations, these movements create novel places of resistance. Scholars who are interested in these movements aim to examine them ‘in their own terms’ (Motta, 2009), which means examining a movement’s strategies and narratives of action from its own perspective. However, these accounts offer only a descriptive view of a movement’s meaning and, like all the other theories mentioned, they fail to offer a clearer explanation of how identity translates into action.

Towards understanding how community engagement promotes collective action, the present project assigns central significance to identity. In so doing, it examines what will be referred to as ‘mobilisational citizenship’ to investigate the relationship between identity and mobilisation as a proxy for what active community membership means.

MOBILISATIONAL CITIZENSHIP

Over the years, citizenship has been defined in many ways, all of them with particular political consequences. The first systematic modern account of the concept was by Marshall (1973, p. 28), who defined citizenship as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community’. Back in the 1950s, Marshall saw in citizenship a way of overcoming class-based inequalities. By exercising rights, people could achieve a certain standard of equality, engaging in a free and loyal community (Marshall 1992). As citizenship status implies a set of rights, the political relevance of that status is twofold; first, it is socially invested with power insofar as it is publicly recognised and legitimised. On the other hand, while citizenship status grants rights, it also establishes the basic limits of social order, granting freedom and autonomy to each individual only within society’s constraints (Barbalet, 1988). This commonly used definition of citizenship (as a status that grants rights and establishes duties) is a reductive conception. It neglects the role of social interactions, their synergy, and the capacity to innovate beyond formal institutional limits. Additionally, Marshall’s liberal conception ignores citizens’ agency in creating and recreating their social environment.

Criticizing this liberal conception of a passive citizen, other definitions of citizenship place less emphasis on the individual as autonomous and self-governing. The stress, instead, that people’s attitudes have been socially shaped and that belonging is constantly constructed through the community. These critical views seek to challenge the liberal, de-contextualised individual. These approaches promote a socially embedded subjectivity

(Delanty, 2002). Rejecting a liberal logic of wealth production and state-oriented citizenship, this alternative perspective entails a shift that emphasises agency, participation, and identity rather than focusing on rights and duties (Isin and Wood 1999; Delanty 2002).

In line with Isin and Wood (1999), the present thesis employs a more inclusive and flexible definition of citizenship. On this view, citizenship refers to a set of practices that, being cultural and symbolic, bring people together in the act of community organisation, defining their position as members of a political community. ‘Informal citizenship’ refers to how a collective can define their social and political position within a polity. The informality of this type of citizenship follows from the collective construction of meanings that do not necessarily fit with mainstream, hegemonic understandings of social reality (Tavares & Brosseau, 2013). In consequence, informal citizenship generally emerges in the production of identities that do not relate to national belonging. Instead, repositioning political membership is a result of territorially rescaling identity (Sassen, 2005). Informal citizenship emerges from our *right* to transform ourselves by redefining the places that we inhabit (Harvey, 2008). Arguably, for example, this is what Motta (2009) sought to highlight in her research on neighbourhood-based contentious collective action in Buenos Aires. While not framing it as ‘informal citizenship’, she showed how shantytown residents engaged in collective action redefined their space and their political belonging.

James Holston is one of the leading contemporary scholars in the field of informal urban citizenship. Throughout his fieldwork, Holston (2008) stresses the relevance of entrenched and unequal regimes of citizenship at grassroots level, describing what he terms ‘insurgent

citizenship'. This insurgent citizenship is a form of neighbourhood-based mobilisation, entailing a particular relation to law, in which the illegal is closely bound with the legal, often becoming interchangeable. Participation operates like a performance that changes the status of the performers. Based on his ethnographic observation of poor mobilised Brazilian neighbourhoods, Holston (2008, 2010) makes a cogent claim for the emergence of a new subjectivity that challenges the distribution of privilege to particular categories of citizens, to be replaced by a distribution of the 'right to rights to all citizens', subverting the entrenched regime of substantive citizenship in the city.

Nevertheless, Holston (2008) is concerned only with how communities, seeking housing, build resistance and political redefinitions. His research does not account for how those political redefinitions are sustained over time, so neglecting any thorough examination of residents' experiences of social and political redefinition. An investigation of how those experiences construct collective action is crucial to understanding sustainable informal citizenship.

In light of these challenges, I have chosen the concept of *identity* as a means of accounting for communities' experience of collective action, aiming to explain how and why collective identity translates into collective action, redefining political membership.

In fact, when it leads to mobilisation, identity is rooted in a specific place because it includes an experience of community belonging (Motta, 2009). That experience of community identity and organisation must be understood at the local level. In this context, active membership leads to collective action driven by an identification with local

community traits (Castells, 2004). Congruently, identity can be defined as ‘the process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or a related set of cultural attributes, that is given priority over other sources of meaning’ (Castells 2004, p. 6). The present research explores how people build a collective identity as a result of belonging to a neighbourhood.

Collective identity appears in the shared process of meaning construction, which results from collectively interpreting social reality. Unlike social roles, identities are internalised identifications and so bring meanings to the actors’ social world (Castells, 2004). Arguably, this production of meaning occurs through what Cohen (1989) has called ‘community symbols’. Symbols work as collective interpretative tools that give us the capacity to interpret the world around us and to create meaning. In fact, members’ common conception of their community is maintained through the manipulation of its symbols, using those symbols to interpret social reality (Cohen, 1989). In some situations, this production of meaning frames social reality in a way that leads to collective action. I refer to collectively shared signs (words, objects, behaviours, or any other element that may function as a sign) as ‘mobilising symbols’ that serve mobilisational identity.

What connects identity with specific places is memory; only memory assigns to places (for example, neighbourhoods) the symbolic value that makes them sources of identity. Memory can be understood as ‘[t]he self-reflexive act of contextualizing and continuously digging for the past through place. It is a process of continually remaking and remembering the past in the present’ (Till, 2005, p. 11). The past becomes part of the present

through the shared sense of being part of a community that extends in time. For Anderson (1991), community construction does not require direct knowledge of all its members but rather the incorporation of a sense of communion in an imagined extension of the community—in other words, being able to identify with them, both territorially and historically. In brief, a community establishes with others a continuity (with those that are like us) and a discontinuity (with those that are unlike us). This imagining includes not only the present but also the past.

Memory is not knowledge of the past but a communion with an imagined community that extends in time. In other words, memory is the imaginative capacity to identify with past community members. Although we may have never met those people, we engage in a collective exercise of fictionally imagining them³⁸ (Anderson, 1991; Till, 2005). In consequence, we should expect that a discontinuity between present and past—an incapacity to build a communion with an imagined community that extends into the past—divorces place from community building and from collective identity.

It is through narratives and social practices that we can approach symbols and their production of meaning. Opposing representational narratives with a categorical, reifying approach to identity, Somers (1992) explained how *ontological narrativity* instead finds the roots of social acts in how people construct stories and explanations about their life.

³⁸ The idea of imagining other community members should be understood in Anderson's (1991) terms as the speculation that a community that we directly know extends, with similar traits, beyond the reach of our knowledge.

Established through these stories and explanations, social positions play a crucial role in ontological narrativity because they shape our expectations and interactions with the social world. Essentialising identity narratives (also called ‘representational narratives’) are concerned with categories rather than positions. Understood as internally stable concepts that make people’s actions predictable, representational narratives have been used by social scientists to describe fixed, ahistorical, and homogeneous identities. However, ontological narrativity views the purposes of the self as constantly reconstructed in the context of internal and external relations of time, place, and power (Plummer, 1995). Narratives mediate social processes and interactions, constructing people’s identities. This conception of identity supposes that a particular set of narratives in a particular time and place establishes a position enacted by individuals, determining their actions (Somers, 1994).

Positions established by narratives are political in a broad sense but become directly engaged in actors’ struggles over power when they translate into collective action. As will become clearer later, it is in the relational character of identity that collective action emerges. For Melucci (1980, p. 202), collective action in fact expresses this relational character in being strictly conflict-based: ‘a collective action implies the existence of struggle between two actors for the appropriation and orientation of social values and resources, each of the actors characterised by a specific solidarity’. What those ‘social values’ and ‘resources’ mean should be broadly understood. As Calhoun (1991) claimed, many movements work with incommensurable aims. Melucci (1980) suggested that movements’ aims tend to be identity itself, which for many movements represents the

social values at stake in the conflict with institutional agencies. Melucci (1980, p. 218) argues that conflicts very often emerge from the '[d]efense of the identity, continuity, and predictability of personal existence'. According to Calhoun, this means that many movements should not be functionally analysed as pursuing 'interests', which is a Western-centred construction that epistemologically sustains traditional accounts of social movements. Instead, social movements and organisations can be seen as devoted to asserting identity—pursuing aims (such as honour) that, unlike specific interests, are within the person or community and cannot be measured in absolute terms of success or failure.

Because mobilisational identity determines forms of understanding reality, it also determines how a group differentiates what is legitimate from what is not legitimate. Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura (2014) have characterised political legitimacy as the expression of political capital. Like all other forms of capital, political capital can be transmitted, acquired, lost, exchanged, and so on. The incorporation of political capital mobilises others because it builds trust, credibility, and social standing in a particular context (Casey, 2005). In other words, the accumulation of political capital leads to the emergence of leadership. However, while symbols of mobilisational identity provide political legitimacy, that legitimacy can also be obtained in other ways, depending on the context. Leaders, for example, develop so-called 'political skills' to acquire and accumulate political capital (Bénit-Gbaffou & Katsaura, 2014).

THE DEACTIVATION OF MOBILISATIONAL CITIZENSHIP

It is agreed that the sharp decline in protests after 1990 in Chile marked a response to the process of re-democratisation after Chileans voted in a referendum to regain democracy. The beginning of the 1990s held the promise of renewed social justice and freedom. Additionally, the concrete enemy—embodied by Pinochet and his repressive regime—had been deposed, rendering unnecessary the protests and violent confrontations with the regime of the 1980s.

For that reason, scholarly accounts of Chilean popular demobilisation since the return to democracy are not concerned to explain the disappearance of those protests. Instead, the phenomenon that caught scholars' attention was the generalised absence of contentious initiatives that might lead to a strengthening of civil society by the grassroots poor. In other words, scholars observed that the collective action initiatives that had held authorities accountable—for their political decisions, for policy implementation, and for transparency—disappeared in *poblaciones* with the return to democracy. As Paley (2001) observed, for example, the assertion of 'rights' that was so prevalent during the 1960s-1980s became quite rare in the 1990s among the poor's grassroots organisations. Since then, researchers have been interested in understanding why contentious initiatives decrease in a country in which political opportunities for deepening democracy seem to increase.

The disappearance of local organisations in *poblaciones* is not therefore the focus of demobilisation explanations; rather, the emphasis is on explaining how and why local

organisations changed qualitatively to forget about politicisation and contentious collective action. While there seems to be consensus among scholars that this phenomenon reflects a shift in the nature of popular organisations, the literature can be seen to offer two types of explanation. On the one hand, some authors argue that, while working to secure the support of the population, Chile's transitional government sought to exclude the popular masses from any real participation in governance. Some of this research suggests that consultations and meetings between authorities and local organisations afford citizens no opportunity to bring forward their own claims. In fact, when assisting organisations, municipality agents often shape their initiatives to make them more amenable to institutional aims (Valdivieso, 2012; Greaves, 2004). Greaves (2004, p. 209) explains that '[e]ncounters between municipal officials and the organised community were seen by DIDECO officials [municipal office of community development] as an arena for teaching citizenship and participation'.

In other Latin American countries, authorities block or selectively appropriate grassroots demands, demobilising civil society by co-opting and institutionalising social movements (Dinerstein et al. 2013; Prevost, Campos, and Vanden 2012). In Chile, however, decentralisation was combined with the state's monopoly of participatory resources (including funding and information) (Posner, 2004). Indeed, during the transition, most international NGOs defending human rights reallocated or withdrew their funding, and the Catholic Church reoriented its work, progressively decreasing funding for solidarity-based initiatives in *poblaciones* and closing its doors to non-religious members. Both funding and local space allocation for community organisations became exclusively state duties,

making it easier for the government to ‘transform local organisations into extensions of itself’ (Koppelman, n.d.). Paley (2001) goes still further, suggesting that the transitional government has managed to incorporate organisations into its own political project, so preventing contentious claims. Radical demands are seen as threats to democratic stability and, therefore, as an indirect path towards dictatorship. Persuaded into this belief by government officials, local organisations become agents of their own governance (6).

A second strand of explanations complements the first. Different explanations converge in the idea that demobilisation results from a deep neoliberal re-articulation of social life in *poblaciones*. Scholars claim that Chile has shifted from a society of collective values that promoted solidarity and political engagement to a fragmented society of individualism, consumerism, and competitiveness. This new culture is a barrier to collective action (Marras, 1999; Silva, 2004b; Sugranyes & Rodríguez, 2005). Although this reshaping of cultural behaviour originated in the years of dictatorial economic restructuring, the transitional government has deepened the promotion of those values (Silva, 2004a).

The dictatorship implemented a subsidiary system that reconceptualised citizenship; services and goods that were formerly consensually conceived as universal rights became matters of government assistance and private profit. This phenomenon affected the health, education, and housing systems, with a stronger impact on the grassroots poor (Rodríguez, Saborido, & Segovia, 2012). The state began to view citizens as consumers of public policies, and because access to social services was not seen as a collective right, during the 1990s, the family became the unit of application to state benefits. This atomisation in the

interaction between citizens and the state inhibited construction of collective solidarity among *población* dwellers (Hipsher, 1996).

Santiago (as well as other cities in part) was fully reorganised within a relatively short time (1978–1986), both administratively and spatially (Jorge Chateau et al., 1987). Large numbers of shanty town settlers living in central areas were displaced and reinstalled in subsidised housing in the urban periphery, destroying their informal networks. The policies implemented in 1979 to liberalise urban land provided building companies with the space they needed (Sugranyes & Rodríguez, 2005). In an effort to decentralise access to state provision and control over the population, municipalities were given more administrative and economic powers, and many boroughs' limits were redefined. In 1981, sixteen new boroughs were created in Santiago, contributing to the fragmentation and de-politicisation of grassroots organisations. The neoliberal production of the city deepened during the 1990s and 2000s, enlarging the peripheries of homogeneous underprivileged housing. In these dense ghettos, a new urban poverty developed, eroding trust and political engagement. Alienation, drug traffic, drug abuse, domestic violence, child prostitution, low educational levels, and indebtedness were among the problems that increased in these underprivileged zones (Tironi 2003a; Sugranyes and Rodríguez 2005). Greaves (2005) links the two strands of explanation by suggesting that this radical restructuring of the city fragmented organisations and served as a panoptic administration of space. Enmeshed in the development of institutional agendas and social programmes, local organisations developed projects in strict and exclusive connection with municipalities, diminishing contention and the capacity for coordination across different territories.

Scholars of Latin American political clientelism have incorporated the analysis of political parties at grassroots level to enrich explanations of institutional influence over social movements (Auyero, Lapegna, & Poma, 2009; Hicken, 2011; Montambeault, 2012; Tarlau, 2013). These scholars have argued that political clientelism impacts collective action by establishing a relationship between patrons (politicians), brokers (local leaders), and clients (neighbourhood residents). Clientelism is defined as ‘the distribution of resources (or promise of) by political office holders or political candidates in exchange for political support, primarily—although not exclusively—in the form of vote’ (Gay 1990, p. 648). Clientelism alludes to a hierarchical, reciprocal, and relatively lasting relationship between a patron and a client. The academic literature generally sees this relationship as mediated by a broker that acts as a bridge between the two parties (Hicken, 2011; Stovel & Shaw, 2012). While various authors seem to agree on the negative impact of clientelism on democracy, the consequences of clientelism for collective action are less clear (Hilgers 2012; Fox 1994; Rivadulla 2012). Arguably, however, the dependency that clientelism requires is necessarily a threat to movements that aim at reshaping their position as political members of a community (Motta, 2009).

In consequence, mobilisational citizenship depends on the construction of certain autonomy if it is to flourish. Institutional dependency must be rejected, at least to an extent, if mobilisational identity is to be sustainable.

ANALYTICAL RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

As explained above, mobilisational citizenship expresses a collective relational position. Through identity, people construct communities that resist external, historically grounded definitions and see the need to struggle against other groups or institutional agencies for power. Based on the definition of mobilisational citizenship already outlined, a framework for its analysis is now presented.

Mobilisational citizenship is constructed on four different but interrelated dimensions: agentic memory, mobilising belonging, mobilising boundaries, and decentralised leadership. Each of these dimensions demonstrates how an aspect of collective identity translates into contentious collective action. They are interconnected and depend on each other.

However, these dimensions lie on different levels. In fact, agentic memory construction is a crucial first step for the establishment of a mobilisational identity. Communities construct historical continuity when their members have the shared disposition to identify with former imagined community members. Continuity in time connects community and place. This communion with the past provides the soil to draw lessons from former community members. Collective memory builds relational settings that capture collective positions in the community's relationship with other social actors. When the lessons provided by relational settings build a position of agency narratives of the past create agentic memory.

Lessons of the past constitute shared symbols to interpret social reality. Using these symbols a community constructs a sense of unity (belonging) and differentiation from other social actors (boundaries). Belonging motivates contentious collective action by creating political consciousness and positive assertions of the community. Boundaries' mobilisational potential lies in defining antagonists and building self-determination.

According to this framework mobilisational identity is a type of political capital. In the form of symbols, identity can be transmitted, acquired, and even lost (when people stop sharing specific collective ways of interpreting social reality). The transmission of identity disperses political capital among organisation members. Decentralised leadership makes every member a locus of protagonism. Every member becomes an agent of community building. This resulting collective and individual protagonism is what I call mobilisational citizenship. Additionally, this decentralisation of leadership fosters the sustainability of mobilisational identity in time. The disposition to expand political capital in the form of mobilisational identity feeds the functioning of the rest of the system.




Figure 1. Mobilisational citizenship analytical framework.

A. Agentic memory

Analysing public urban policies, some authors have suggested that capitalism gives the market undue influence in the creation of the city. Cities become increasingly competitive, fostering logics of private property at the expense of fairness, in which alternative and innovative initiatives are marginalised (Faranak Miraftab, Silver, & Beard, 2008; Purcell, 2012).

According to Dagger (1981, p. 716), cities' population fluidity, size, and fragmentation contribute to an increasing loss of memory—'the memory which, by tying its residents to the past of a city, enables them to play a part in its present and to help shape its future'. Memory is crucial for the construction of identity and active citizenship, and capitalism is hostile to memory (E. F. Isin & Wood, 1999; Salazar, 2012).

However, some groups have found means of reacting against these trends, creating communities by resisting the individuation and atomisation imposed at local level by capitalist society (Castells, 2004, p. 64). These communities have developed through the construction of narratives that interpret history by opposing hegemonic accounts. Actors actively create narratives about the past, producing a specific form of social control that leads to collective action (Somers, 1994). Moreover, in the production of narratives, communities engage in ‘relational settings’, establishing historical positions in relation to other social actors. This relational position towards the past is what enables a community to create a particular identity. Hall and Lubiano (1997, p. 291) support this idea, suggesting that ‘as subjects [social actors] function by taking up the discourses of the present and the past (...) it is that taking up of positions that I call identities’.

Drawing on Shotter's (1993) psychological account of citizenship, I will suggest that memory can lead to two different positions concerning agency. On the one hand, people's interpretation of history may lead a community to feel empowered, with proper authorship (and authority) over their own life. In this case, the person's social practice is congruent with his/her social position. According to Shotter (1993, p. 125), authorship emerges from two sources. First, the capacity to act in relation to one's position is possible only for those who are able to ‘feel’ their position in relation to others and are therefore ‘socially competent to act in relation to their position’. Second, authorship arises when the way of talking and acting is grounded in one's feelings about one's position.

In contrast, a second possible position resulting from memory arises when people feel no authorship in life; this is a situation in which people cannot speak because belonging has been made conditional. One can only have a voice if one possesses specific credentials. Such a position is based on self-accusation of the individual when confronted with the fact of our basic equality. The basis of this feeling is an individual's self-accusatory reaction to their impotence in relation to others (Shotter, 1993).

It follows that the position emerging from memory leads to a mobilisational identity only if it implies a sense of authorship. This means, first, that the historical developments found in people's narratives must include authorship—that is, a feeling of collective power to change and influence the production of their own community. This is the theoretical basis for findings that only communities that maintain a certain memory of previous mobilisation produce a position of agency in the present (Castells, 1983; Clifford, 2000; Cooke, 1989). Even more specifically, Castells (2004, p. 64) has reported empirical evidence that only communities that have experienced a social mobilisation event in the past eventually develop resistant local identities. According to Castells, when people in a specific place engage in a social movement, they create common interests and networks of trust and construct new collective meanings, leading eventually to a mobilisational identity.

Secondly, mobilisational identity emerges from a historical memory that serves to develop a position of agency in the present. Precisely because memory can be used in the present to produce a position of authorship that is otherwise denied, 'Social memory and its outcomes

are fluid and changing with the needs of the present' (Till, 2005, p. 10). This position of agency is the starting point for the development of mobilisational identity. However, it is also possible that an urban community with a past of mobilisation may not develop a mobilisational identity because it has been unable to use its historical memory narratives to create a position of authorship in the present.

Examining how memory generates a social position of agency entails a number of considerations. First, it is important to look at community narratives on prior mobilisation and to understand what position community members deploy regarding those events. Narratives on past movements will only contribute to mobilisational identity if they express the community's power to determine their own lives. Second, communities connect the past with their locality by interpreting discontinuities and by bringing to the present a 'self' that in fact never occurred. By telling stories about their past, people construct *symbols* that are used to interpret current reality in accordance with their interpretations of the past (Till, 2005). In fact, people often establish identity assertions and citizenship claims in the present in accordance with how they interpret the past (Klumbyté, 2010).

Accordingly, the analysis of memory must also include understanding the consequences of the community's interpretation of the past for the present social position. Additionally, the analysis should examine how a community interprets past events as a specific relational position towards other social actors (Somers, 1994) such as authorities and how this give meaning to those actors' behaviour in the present. Accordingly, the community establishes

differentiation, antagonism, and/or solidarity with those other actors. In cases where current interpretations of the past lead to a sense of authorship and a relationship with other social actors that is congruent with that position of agency, communities can develop a mobilisational identity.

Third, the position created by memory is not only expressed through discourse; it should also be studied in the specific practices of mobilisation. According to Tilly (2006), the forms of action implemented by social movements (e.g. protests, or taking a hostage) can be viewed as a performative script that connects two actors: the claimant and the object of claims. Within this framework, a march is a performance that defines a particular relational setting between parties. Although they may change qualitatively, these settings repeat themselves over time, constituting what Tilly calls 'repertoires of collective action'. Repertoires in the present, then, performatively express in action a historically embedded relationship between activists and institutions, and the evolution of such repertoires is therefore a proper site for the examination of how the past is interpreted in the present. By locating the community's position in a relational setting, this contributes in turn to an examination of the community's relational position. Mobilising identity emerges from forms of action that establish a relational setting supporting a position of agency.

B. Mobilisational belonging

Rooted in a place, *belonging* connotes what Melucci (1996b, p. 23) defined more broadly as 'solidarity' in social movements: 'the ability of actors to recognise others and to be

recognised, as belonging to the same social unit'. When people construct meanings based on the place they inhabit, they become personally attached to and identified and engaged with their community. Generally grounded in the memory of prior mobilisation, belonging has two manifestations: a) through the experience of marginality and exclusion (as well as prior mobilisation), people create a particular neighbourhood culture (Castells, 2004, p. 64); and b) neighbours produce a specific mobilisation identity that leads to sustainable neighbourhood organisations and collective action (Castells, 1983, 2004). Arguably, a neighbourhood's culture should welcome and promote an identity of mobilisation if contentious collective action is to flourish.

At the core of Castells' definition of identity, *identification* is the psychological mechanism by which people internalise cultural and community attributes (Craib, 1998; Freud, 1914). In other words, through identification we appropriate collective or group attributes. In sharing, adopting, and reproducing meanings, clear boundaries between self and collective are loosened (Burke, 1969).

Scholars generally agree that identification should not be understood as constructing fixed, definite identities. Instead, identification is to be thought as a process, leading to a diverse range of identities whose connection may change throughout collective action and in the exchange with other narratives (Calhoun, 1994; Jenkins, 2008). Identifications are not fixed images but operate more generally as symbolic principles through which individuals and collectives interpret social reality, creating both commonalities and a diverse range of possible interpretations (Cohen, 1989).

Identification uses narratives about the past to explain people's position in the community's historical continuity. The community's relational position is established through memory and may lead to certain fixities that are shared by its members. Using symbols that lead to contentious collective action communities construct mobilisational belonging. I use Taylor and Whittier's (1992) theorisation to suggest that mobilising belonging results from two components of collective action-oriented identity: political consciousness and positive assertion.

Grounded in memory construction, *political consciousness* emphasises that all systems of domination produce conflicting interests. Movements can therefore create what Taylor and Whittier (1992, p. 114) called 'oppositional consciousness', which means that the group is capable of challenging dominant ways of understanding reality. In line with Shotter's idea of agency, consciousness emerges when agents attribute their grievances to a system (either structural, cultural, social, or economic) rather than to a personal or individual failure or issue. Consciousness allows groups to re-evaluate their social position, subjective experiences, opportunities, and shared interests. As Taylor and Whittier (1992, p. 114) went on to say, '[c]onsciousness not only provides socially and politically marginalised groups with an understanding of their structural position, but establishes new expectations regarding treatment appropriate to their category'.

Secondly, as adapted to how residents construct their community, *assertion* refers to the process through which organisations construct the symbolic meaning of their neighbourhood. Accordingly, organisations identify with, construct, and express a

collective vision of their neighbourhood, asserting and reaffirming it to resist negative definitions and recreate their identity.

In summary, political consciousness is seen to lead to mobilisation when the community manages to produce a strong sense of unity, attributing grievances to a broader social, political system. Through consciousness, then, people challenge hegemonic interpretations of society and history. This sense of unity means that residents identify with each other on the basis of collective attributes that facilitate mobilisation. In other words, community members produce a sense of 'we', informing the collective attributes that promote activism.

C. Mobilisational boundaries

Boundary construction complements belonging by contributing relationally to the definition of 'we' by reference to external actors. Della Porta and Diani (1999) suggested that boundaries escape essential accounts of identity and citizenship by virtue of their relational nature. Mobilisational boundaries include three elements. First, boundaries afford the community *differentiation* from other social actors; communities shape their own attributes and sense of belonging not only in accordance with their own interests but in a relational process. On the other hand, differentiation allows a movement to construct a niche from where it can oppose the dominant culture, so withdrawing from hegemonic narratives. In this way, boundaries allow a movement to develop its own identity in a somewhat protected environment (Touraine, 1981).

Secondly, boundaries define antagonists. According to Benford and Snow (2000, p. 614), the definition of adversaries is central to translating narratives into action. In fact movements often seek to demobilise or protect against antagonists triggering action. Finally, boundaries provide a sense of self-determination because groups feel they retain control over their own actions. This position of agency granted by boundaries is crucial for the promotion of collective action. Moreover, the protection of such self-determination may lead to defensive forms of mobilisation (Melucci, 1996b, pp. 72-3). Because mobilisation emerges when antagonists constitute a threat to identity, antagonists are seen as creating obstacles to differentiation and autonomy.

D. Decentralised leadership

Ganz (2009) argues that movements and organisations capable of spreading leadership among their members tend to be more sustainable in time. Morris and Staggenborg (2004, p. 171) define leaders as ‘strategic decision-makers who inspire and organise others to participate in social movements’. Leaders use various strategies to construct their legitimacy on the basis of popular consent. Building legitimacy entails the accumulation of political capital; to do so, organisation leaders ‘regularly have to justify the fact that they represent their followers’ (Bénit-Gbaffou & Katsaura, 2014, p. 1808).

While some movements have sought to avoid the need for leadership, this has been widely dismissed as a naïve approach. Arguably, it is natural for movements to spontaneously create leaders, even if they are informal leaders (Barker, Johnson, & Lavalette, 2001). Not

only is informal leadership usually unavoidable, as it emerges spontaneously, but—as Hanisch (2001) has demonstrated—the avoidance of leadership usually curtails the movement’s development. Identity symbols can mobilise only when they are shared by an organisation’s members. Members embody that identity by appropriating mobilisational identity symbols, and mobilisational identity requires an understanding of leadership as extending to all members (Barker et al., 2001; Robnett, 1996). Additionally, decentralised leadership produces relatively horizontal organisational structures (Inglis & Sarros, 2003). Specific leaders do not cease to exist in these organisational structures; rather, they are agents who concentrate exceptional amounts of political capital.

Decentralised leadership has the advantage of fostering protagonism among organisation members. This means that members see themselves as effective agents, whose decisions have consequences for their own reality (Pretty, 2003). This decentralisation of protagonism offers individual agents the potential to boost their legitimacy and so emerge as new informal leaders.

In order to examine the construction of decentralised leadership in micro-mobilisation I use Gamson's (1992) model of mobilising acts. Mobilising acts explore how face-to-face interactions in activism promote contentious collective action. Participants engage in different kinds of encounters—organising meetings and events with allies, with counter-movements, with the media, and so on—that create a space for particular processes of micro-mobilisation. In these encounters, members say or do things that may promote (or obstruct) the development of a protagonist identity. Such processes can be categorised as

specific types of mobilising act—specifically, organising acts, divesting acts, and reframing acts. Particular processes of mobilisation emerge from each of these acts.

1) *Organising acts* promote the joint action of members and are not generally conducted in public; crucially, they do not involve interaction with authorities. Instead, organising acts tend to happen in group meetings or other private situations. Organising acts promote members' protagonism when they succeed in combining the promotion of cohesion with a sense of empowerment and centrality, both individually and collectively.

2) Unlike organising acts, *divesting acts* more often occur publicly and lead to disrupting the daily norms of interaction, especially with authorities. In some cases, divesting acts bestow social prestige on certain members (either leaders or others), often entailing the reification and essentialisation of social actors. Additionally, divesting acts intensify activation through participants' consensus, and any transgression of that consensus is generally understood as a moral transgression. This means that considerate, respectful interaction is not possible unless it falls within that consensus. Accordingly, movements may often seem rude or ridiculous in their interaction with authorities. However, if they succeed in boosting members' protagonism by challenging authorities, divesting acts will contribute to a decentralised leadership.

3) *Reframing acts* are alternative interpretations of events that members collectively share. These reinterpretations imply an injustice framing that generates activism. It is not sufficient that members individually share a certain idea; they must know that everyone else plays a part in adopting the injustice framing. This process usually takes time and

often requires several encounters. Very often, reframing acts seek to unveil something wrong or unfair that authorities are doing; at other times, movements explicitly and publicly apply an injustice frame to an encounter in order to define what is wrong. To foster a protagonist identity, reframing acts need to place organisation members in a central and effective position within their community—in other words, members need to feel that the interpretive framing of injustice is a call made directly to them. Members must assume that, if they respond, they can have an impact in shaping their community, either by protecting it or by improving it.

In addition to mobilising acts, a number of other elements make it more likely that an organisation will foster decentralised leadership. First, an explicit rejection of hierarchies tends to increase members' centrality in decision-making (Brown, 1989; Karatzogianni & Robinson, 2010). Secondly, a rejection of service provision (e.g. charity) engages members in independent political activism rather than reproducing co-optation and dependency (Day, 2005; Oakley, Clayton, & Taylor, 2000) and promotes assertiveness, effective agency, and protagonism among members. Finally, decentralised leadership can be encouraged by the development of alternative forms of education, teaching individuals how to become mobilised citizens (i.e. critical pedagogy) (Ledwith, 2001).

The categories presented here outline the functioning of mobilisational identity at the grassroots level. Both the capacity of mobilisational identity to informally challenge the socially constructed disempowerment of disadvantaged urban dwellers and the

sustainability of the resulting mobilisation constitutes what has been called ‘mobilisational citizenship’.

CONCLUSION

Although central to the study of social movements, the concept of identity has so far been addressed only superficially in its relationship to mobilisation, especially in the case of research on urban social movements. This chapter builds on informal definitions of citizenship, highlighting the local production of social membership through cultural and symbolic practices, to propose the notion of *mobilisational citizenship*. The chapter outlines mobilisational citizenship as a form of community belonging defined by engagement in social agency and collective action. Mobilisational citizenship encompasses an examination of how community identity translates into action, so producing mobilisational identity. This model offers an analytical framework that explains mobilisational citizenship in terms of the role of agentic memory, mobilising belonging, mobilising boundaries, and decentralised leadership within organisations in the production of sustainable contentious collective action.

Based on how narratives interpret historical developments, memory connects past and present. More specifically, agentic memory contributes to mobilisation by providing a collective position of agency in the present. Social positioning is the first step in the emergence of mobilisational identity. Community identity expresses itself through belonging and boundaries, synthesising the practices by which a group of people identifies

itself as part of the same social unit while simultaneously differentiating itself from other groups. Mobilising belonging contributes to mobilisation when people assert positive community attributes that resist external definitions, and when they explain grievances as a result of systemic issues, resisting self-punitive explanations. Mobilising boundaries generate contentious collective action when people succeed in defining other social actors as threatening antagonists who must not only be differentiated but also defended against.

Mobilising belonging through assertion attributes and grievance explanations, as well as mobilising boundaries through definition of threatening antagonists, is rooted in relational settings created through historical memory. As an expression of belonging and boundaries in micro-mobilisation, decentralised leadership builds in organisation members a sense of protagonism and impact on the community.

The decentralisation of leadership promotes transmission of mobilising symbols, allows members to incorporate and boost political capital, and fosters horizontal organisations, all of which contribute to making mobilisational identity sustainable. Mobilising identity does not flourish when groups fail to develop an imagined community that extends in time. Additionally, co-optation, clientelism, and other forms of institutional dependency constitute a threat to mobilisational identity and to contentious collective action.

CHAPTER 4

ACQUIESCENT COLLECTIVE ACTION IN POBLACIONES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter applies a comparative approach to the understanding of mobilising citizenship. Focusing mainly on the case of Nuevo Amanecer (NA), the chapter explains why *poblaciones* changed in nature after 1990 by becoming acquiescent. The chapter argues that NA organisations have engaged in networks based on loyalty to politicians. Through these networks, local leaders have become politically socialised, developing strategies for the accumulation and monopolisation of political capital. In this context, the neighbourhood's social movement community becomes the field in which local leaders compete over political capital. This dynamic not only curtails the potential transmission of mobilisational identity but also diminishes all forms of collective initiative.

Chile's return to democracy in 1990 marked a break in time. Following many years under a repressive, authoritarian state, society began to open itself to progressive freedoms that were previously forbidden. For many of those engaged in Chile's political life, this social openness meant reimagining their future, creating new life projects. However, Chile's

democratisation did not translate into a strengthening of civil society (Philip Oxhorn, 1994), as the dictatorship enacted last-minute laws that limited institutional accountability. Within only a few years, international aid to local NGOs and social movements was withdrawn. The Catholic Church, a crucial support for civil society organisations during the dictatorship, implemented measures to depoliticise religious practice. Neoliberal policies remained in place, deepening a culture of individualism. Exceptional levels of inequality and segregation during the 1990s intensified the exclusion of underprivileged populations. These and other factors (explained in detail later in the chapter) were used to explain the disengagement of Chilean civil society after 1990. Specifically, researchers claim that in *poblaciones*, the state imposed its own logics of participation on local organisations, so shaping their initiatives. In their approach to *poblaciones*, these explanations of demobilisation viewed civil society as a unified, homogeneous block. These academic accounts conceive factors prompting demobilisation as general norms, affecting civil society as a whole—for example, in how public policies and other institutional measures were seen to impact all citizens.

Consequently, exceptions to these norms have generally been overlooked. Almost no research has been published on Esperanza Andina's successful land invasion in 1992. Similarly, scholars have largely ignored Toma de Peñalolén, the large-scale land invasion involving almost 2,000 families in 1998. Scholars of demobilisation have also neglected activism in traditionally mobilised *poblaciones* such as Lo Hermida, La Victoria, or Villa

Francia. However, these cases (among others) must be taken seriously. These exceptions demonstrate that demobilisation scholars have failed to account for all the factors involved in this phenomenon. On the other hand, they also show that the identified factors of acquiescence are not sufficient to comprehend the demobilisation phenomenon.

Additionally, this literature focuses almost exclusively on the interaction between movements and the state (including public policies as well as central and local government officials). Neglecting party politics in any analysis of Latin American social movements leads to insufficient explanations, especially in the Chilean case. While party politics has played a crucial role in shaping grassroots collective action across Latin America (Hilgers, 2012), successful Chilean contentious movements seem to have modified their relationship to parties since the return to democracy. In fact, there is evidence that successful social mobilisation in Chile has increasingly decoupled from centre-left political parties in the last 25 years (Somma & Bargsted, 2015). It seems clear, then, that the role of political parties is central to any adequate explanation of the Chilean process of demobilisation.

The literature on demobilisation has paid particular attention to the role of local governments in diminishing contentious collective action in *poblaciones*. The fact that local government agencies are partisan institutions embedded in the party electoral system, however, is largely overlooked by these researchers. Despite the strong deactivating potential of clientelism, scholars of demobilisation have neglected the fact that municipalities can be strongly influenced by political parties and that much of their strategic interaction with local organisations responds to electoral means. Greaves (2004,

p. 210) briefly mentions this issue, suggesting that while municipality officials may sometimes see neighbourhood councils as potential rivals for elective office, they may at other times create alliances with local organisations. What these authors fail to see is that these alliances are not necessarily durable and that, in constructing them, municipality officials are often competing against rival party representatives. For example, DIDECO (the internal office managing the municipality's relationship with local organisations) has strict political aims. The head of DIDECO occupies what is in fact a highly strategic political position and is usually appointed to boost electoral potential; very often, former heads of DIDECO run for mayoral office. To neglect the exchanges that sustain these alliances is to obscure the benefits that organisations gain from institutional control.

This thesis provides evidence to suggest that contentious collective action has survived in *poblaciones* that maintained a neighbourhood identity of struggle. The survival of mobilisational identity results from the purposive dissemination of mobilisational identity symbols across generations. In later chapters, it will be demonstrated that leaders in those neighbourhoods have developed political socialisation with the aim of spreading political capital rather than monopolising it. This *mobilisational identity*, as I will call it, generates a strong sense of autonomy among active *población* dwellers. In the following chapters, it will be shown that, in constructing their own norms for inclusion and collectively creating thick boundaries, *población* residents promote contentious collective action and produce a particular kind of informal citizenship. This emphasis on the autonomous self-production of community protects *población* dwellers against external political influence. In this way, mobilisational identity ensures its own sustainability. In many other *poblaciones*, however,

mobilisational identity did not survive. The following section provides a comparative analysis that explores how mobilisational identity has not survived in many of Santiago's *poblaciones*.

First, the context will be set by means of a historical account of the survival of mobilisational identity that contrasts LH and NA. This is followed by a historical, comparative examination of NA's acquiescent collective action. The next section looks at how current networks of political loyalty work to promote the deactivation of contentious collective action and investigates the strategies that local residents use in their effort to monopolise political capital. It is shown here that mobilisational identity symbols cannot be transmitted in NA. The final section shows how this pervasive strategy of competition generates the enclosure of spaces for activism in the *población*.

THE SURVIVAL OF MOBILISATIONAL IDENTITY

Complementing Schneider's (1995; 1991) research on the 1980s Chilean protests, the present comparative analysis of these two *poblaciones* provides a historical explanation for both the survival and the decline of mobilisational identity. As in other countries, it was political parties surviving underground that coordinated and supported civil society's resistance against the dictatorship during the 1980s (Garretón, 2001; Threlfall, 2008). However, some parties developed a more organic and democratic relationship with *población* residents than others. In these cases, parties transferred political capital to the grassroots that eventually transformed into sustainable mobilisational identity.

Reacting to the strong repression exercised by Gonzalez Videla's government in the late 1940s, the Chilean Communist Party decided to shift its focus from trade unions to the *poblaciones*. 'The Party emphasised the development of an alternate political culture—linking the collective identity and world view of the poor to that of the Party itself' (Schneider 1995, p. 38). In fact, Communists in shanty towns aimed to change residents' political views by shifting attention from basic necessities to the social conditions of injustice and inequality relating to those necessities (Portes, 1976). In shanty towns where land seizures were organised by Communist militants, residents demonstrated stronger politicisation and a sense of class solidarity (Schneider 1995, p. 64). With an ethos of political work traditionally embedded in the lower working class and Chilean mining unions, the Communist Party saw that it was necessary to construct more democratic interactions and organic connections with grassroots *población* organisations. To that end, Party militants introduced methodologies for more horizontal interaction with local residents. The Communist aim was to transmit their political culture to the grassroots—for example, after coordinating land invasions (in the 1950s and 1960s), Communist militants commonly organised collective discussions to debate with the community on political aims and local needs. Additionally, the Communists included *población* residents in their ranks. According to Schneider (1991, p. 97), 'These new grassroots militants acted as a bridge between the Party leadership and its mass base, shaping both the character of the community and the Party itself'.

These methods became crucial in *poblaciones* during national protests in the 1980s. Tironi (1990, pp. 180, 206) highlights the intensive campaign of political socialisation through

which the Communist Party constructed political consciousness among poor young residents. These resistance initiatives during protests were, for some young people, their first experiences of political engagement, as they had grown up with few reference points for democratic participation (Johnson, 1985). Working partly through clandestine means, the Communist Party provided guidance and political formation for those youths in *poblaciones*. In LH, for example, leaders from that era recalled this clearly: ‘[T]he Communist Party was really important here in the 1980s and continued to be present here in the 1990s’ (Interview, 4 January 2013).

Two other groups focused their efforts on the political socialisation of the grassroots in *poblaciones*: the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) and the Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL). *Frentistas*, the military wing of FPMR, aimed to defeat the dictatorship through the use of military force, and were therefore heavily persecuted by the dictatorship during those years. Despite operating covertly, the *Frentistas* became part of local organisations in *poblaciones* and also played a role in organising protests and confronting the military. Strictly undercover procedures allowed FPMR members to mingle unnoticed within the grassroots social organisations, and they were able to develop leadership in *poblaciones*, in the same way non-Frentista residents may have been able to do. In protesting and confronting the military, people in *poblaciones* used barricades, Molotov cocktails, stones, sticks, and sometimes firearms. The FPMR was a sophisticated and exclusive organisation that only admitted skilled, highly committed candidates. As one resident who was a young fighter in the 1980s for the resistance in LH explained, ‘The *Frente* (FPMR) was more exclusive... not just anyone would cross the window to get into

the *Frente*... you needed to go through tests' (Interview 25 January, 2013). My interviews imply that the FPMR followed a Communist approach to *poblaciones*. Unlike the MIR and other parties involved in resisting the dictatorship, the FPMR recruited members directly from *poblaciones*. They even created what were known as *milicias* or *semilleros rodriguistas* (FPMR seedbeds)—groups of residents in military training. The FPMR selected the best candidates from the *semilleros* to incorporate in their ranks. In its work during the 1980s, the MJL also put *población* dwellers at the centre of activism. As the historical section emphasised earlier, the MJL was founded with a specific focus on popular *youth*. This focus on working directly with the poor grassroots movements soon became evident; by 1983, radical young *población* residents comprised much of the MJL (Acevedo, 2006).

The political configuration in LH and NA during the early 1970s was relatively similar.³⁹ Arguably, therefore, the factors determining the divergent cultures of collective action—that is, the subsistence of a mobilisational identity—emerged later, during the dictatorship. The FPMR and MJL, as well as the Communist Party, came to prominence during the 1980s protests in some *poblaciones*, including LH. I argue that this constituted the main point of departure for mobilisational identity development. As will be explained in more detail later, additional factors blocked the development and subsistence of a mobilisational identity in NA. LH is evidence that the presence of radical movements and the ways in

³⁹ Such similarities could be further analysed, at which point I hypothesise that some some differences would emerge. With that said,, a more detailed comparison of the activism developed in LH and in NA before 1973 would arguably suggest a stronger and more radical politicization in NA (Fiori, 1973; Garcés, 2002).

which they installed a culture of political socialisation and cultural transmission between different generations, however, is central to explaining the continuity of a mobilisational identity.

Alonso, who was highly engaged in resistance groups during the 1980s in LH, explained to me how FPMR and MJL leaders spread across the *poblacion* in those years. During the early 1980s, Lo Hermida's 1st zone, which was known for being more quiescent during the early 1970s, began to accommodate several recognised MJL and FPMR leaders. Alonso explained that although highly selective, FPMR and MJL militants recruited local residents into their ranks (Interview, 25 January 2013).

The secrecy, exclusivity, political engagement, and noble cause of seeking the empowerment of the underprivileged meant that both the FPMR and the MJL presented an appealing image to the popular youth—even among those politicised youth who were not affiliated with the movements. Consequentially, along with the Communist Party, these movements became influential in the construction of youths' identity during the 1980s, and a few of those young people grew up to become influential leaders in today's *población* organisations.

The FPMR and the MJL embodied national political conflicts. With a strong emphasis on autonomy, *poder popular* (popular power), and defeating the dictatorship, these movements engaged in disputes within their parties as well as with sections that were willing to soften their claims in order to negotiate a peaceful democratic transition with the military. These differences polarised and widened throughout the democratic transition.

The designation of these groups (which the dictatorship had promoted) as ‘terrorist’ organisations became consolidated during the 1990s, and several *Frentistas* and *Lautaristas* were imprisoned for engaging in this so-called terrorism (H. H. Vidal, 1995).

Since the 1980s, however, LH organisations have maintained an identity that stresses popular power and political autonomy, largely because many organisation members still actively admire the *Frentistas* and *Lautaristas*. For example, a leader in LH told me the following story.

In 1987, the Lautaro [Movement] marched across the población. They were about 30, bald headed, all marching with their faces covered and a rifle in their hands: that was so impressive, so powerful! We went mental for that! We were around 17 years old, and we said ‘Now is the time!’ Then one of the girls shot into the air with her machinegun and yelled a political statement, and then they disappeared. After that we wanted more of that, ‘Where are they, where did they go? We wanted to see them again’, me and my friends here said (Interview 23 February, 2013).

My comparative analysis suggests that this emphasis on autonomy has allowed Lo Hermida organisations to distance themselves from centre-left networks of political party loyalty over the past 30 years. What I aim to show is that those networks played a central role in the political socialisation of NA’s current leaders, so shaping collective initiatives. As a consequence, these networks curtail NA’s active community capacity to activate a mobilisational identity, and NA exhibits acquiescent collective action. In Lo Hermida, in contrast, mobilisational identity has proved sustainable, determining a clearer disposition toward contentious collective action. While subsequent chapters will examine LH’s case in more detail, the next sections focus on NA to illustrate its process of demobilisation.

DEVELOPING ACQUIESCENT COLLECTIVE ACTION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Although unique, the process experienced by NA during the dictatorship is typical of general trends among Santiago's *poblaciones* during that period. I argue that three historical factors prevented the development of a mobilisational identity in NA: the relative distance of the relationship between MIR militants and *población* residents; the symbolic (historically and territorially rooted) discontinuity that damaged community construction; and the production of a loyalty network by parties from the Democratic Alliance (AD) during the 1980s, subsequently deepened by the Concertación.

The MIR's relative distance

The MIR saw itself closely connected to the proletariat's mobilisation for a new socialist order of society. After 1967, it implemented a strong policy of developing directly at grassroots level. As explained earlier, the emphasis on constructing an autonomous popular power was also central to the MIR's doctrine. In consequence, MIR-coordinated settlements were especially active and revolutionary during the early 1970s, and the group even organized autonomous socialist mini-societies in those neighbourhoods. Among these, Nueva La Habana (NH) became the most prominent (Fiori, 1973; Garcés, 2002).

Despite this commitment to the masses, the Leninist tradition that the MIR aligned with made it necessary to build a closed party that would lead and facilitate revolutionary processes. For that reason, the MIR worked as a vanguard in *poblaciones*, coordinating

initiatives, organising residents, and providing the military force to challenge the reformist leftist governments of Frei and Allende. Indeed, the MIR established a somewhat managerial approach to *poblaciones* (Leiva & Neghme, 2000; Schneider, 1995). For example, my interviews show that Mike (the main MIR leader in NH) is remembered as a charismatic, well-organised leader who demonstrated great commitment to *pobladores*, making fair decisions and maintaining order. Mike is not remembered, however, as an ideologue devoted to educating new generations; MIR militants rarely instructed *población* residents politically and did not recruit them into the Party's ranks (Schneider 1995, p. 55). As one of the first people to arrive in NH when the settlement was coordinated by the MIR for example, Carmen demonstrated a high level of engagement, working for the local health committee. She and her husband also developed a close connection with Mike and other MIR militants. With that said, Carmen recognises that the MIR militants did not provide her with a political education, and she only properly understood MIR's work at the *población* many years after: 'Now, after many years, I've come to understand popular power, what we went through... back then I never understood it' (Interview, 13 October 2014a).

Some social scientists (Cofré, 2007; Fiori, 1973; Leiva & Neghme, 2000), as well as local residents, have portrayed the MIR as a group that built leadership by organising *poblaciones* within a clear, efficient structure. However, some interviewees told a different story. On some occasions, MIR leadership was disputed within, and several initiatives implemented by the MIR in NH (usually highly regarded by historians and inhabitants as efficient and carefully planned) were apparently not well organised. For some residents,

these issues became a source of uncertainty and led to a growing distrust of the MIR leadership, contributing to the distancing of militants from the *población*. In April 1972, a man in the *población* was accused of raping a female teacher in NH. The event triggered chaos, and the structure of local popular justice was challenged by having to decide on such a serious case. While a local commission investigated the case, MIR-led militias were accused of torturing the accused man by way of revenge. Several rival political groups then questioned MIR leaders, and MIR militants fled the *población* for several days, fearing retaliation. ‘It was a mess! There were protests and counter-protests everyday here!’ explained a resident who was a block representative at the time (Interview, 29 December 2014). Soon, it became evident that other parties were using the opportunity to dispute MIR’s power in the *población*. As a symbolic demonstration of the MIR’s political aims, NH arguably represented a threat for other parties seeking to strengthen and ensure the continuity of Allende’s government. Finally, Mike was able to regain the neighbourhood’s leadership, and the accused man was delivered to the formal authorities to be tried.⁴⁰ While supportive residents maintained strong allegiance to the leaders, a few interviewees suggested that this event left others with a feeling of uncertainty, diminishing their trust in the MIR’s administration (Interview, 29 December 2014; Interview, 5 December 2014; Interview, 7 November 2014).

⁴⁰ The accused was delivered to a psychiatric institution for medical and mental assessment and was subsequently handed over to the police. While Fiori (1973) and Cofré (2007) provide more details of this incident, my interviews suggest that these authors underplay its destabilising value.

Other events further diminished people's confidence in the MIR. Local norms, for example, prohibited both the sale of alcohol and drunkenness within the settlement, yet many in the neighbourhood went unpunished despite consuming alcohol to excess. Another factor that seems to have accounted for some of the discredit of local leaders in the 1970s was the inefficiency in the construction of new houses. NH needed urbanisation, housing construction, and formal land rights to improve people's living conditions. Negotiating with government authorities, the MIR and other local leaders managed to obtain a site neighbouring the settlement, along with all the necessary materials to construct new houses. Some NH residents were hired to build their own houses, and a committee made up of local resident, controlled the work. A neighbour who was a member of one of those committees told me about how inefficiently the work was carried out: 'A lot of them [residents working at the site] hardly ever went to work, others spent the day chatting...it was so difficult for us to make them work, it was not us who paid them'. He later added, 'It was a beautiful experience, but it was not as good as people depict it (*la pinta*), and many realised that back then' (Interview 7 November, 2014).

Later, during the dictatorship (late 1970s and 1980s), the MIR turned its attention to other matters. The MIR had been seriously weakened during the first years of the dictatorship; Mike, for example, was assassinated in Valparaíso in 1975, and those who survived dictatorial persecution fled the country into exile (Calderón, 2009). In 1978, Operación Retorno (Operation Return) began, as MIR militants living abroad returned in secret to Chile to fight against the military dictatorship. During those years, the few surviving militants remaining in Chile focused almost exclusively on coordinating the re-entry of

their fellow members to the country, and activism in *poblaciones* was not the Party's main concern. In fact, Operación Retorno was not focused on *poblaciones*, but rather on initiating armed resistance in the rural area of Panguipulli, in the south of the country. Additionally, in the early 1980s, the Party devoted its efforts to obtaining resources by robbing banks and shops and fighting the military. Arguably, FPMR and MJL militants could mingle secretly in *poblaciones* because they were less recognisable by the dictatorship's intelligence system. Conversely, the MIR was not accustomed to clandestine operations, and several of its members provided information to the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (National Intelligence Office, DINA) under duress (Pérez, 2003).

For the MIR, hiding isolated militants constrained their capacity to recruit new members (H. Vidal, 1999). According to Pérez (2003, p. 37), the national protests that began in 1983 found the MIR overwhelmed and weakened by military repression. Nevertheless, residents remember that a few MIR members came to NA to help to organise protests during the early 1980s. Although the neighbourhood had grown since the mid-1970s, the militants' work was restricted to the traditional settlement originally established by the MIR (the *campamento*, formerly NH). Sometimes, they collaborated with more contentious initiatives developed by the Communists in the nearby neighbourhood of Los Copihues. However, MIR members did not develop political socialisation in NA.

The relative distance of MIR militants during the 1970s and 1980s attracted the admiration of residents, but it did not facilitate political socialisation. As residents had not adopted

MIR values and symbols, political parties from the Democratic Alliance (AD) found few barriers to the construction of political loyalty at the *población*.

Historical and territorial discontinuity

Once the dictatorship gained power, NA residents experienced several challenges to their sense of community. Some of those challenges also arose in other settlements in Santiago with similar histories. These were challenges that LH did not encounter. There were two types of challenges: firstly, a change in the name of neighbourhoods and their streets, and secondly, the allocation of external populations to new houses built by NH dwellers. Soon after taking charge, the new military authorities ordered changes to the subversive, leftist names of many poblaciones, including their street names. Along with many others, the Ché Guevara and Fidel Castro shanty towns, for example, were renamed Santa Anita and General Baquedano (Hidalgo, 2008). The same happened to Nueva La Habana (NH); after authorities demanded that the neighbourhood's name should be changed, a Socialist leader, Mr. Castillo, decided in a meeting with a few other residents on the new name: Nuevo Amanecer (New Dawn, NA).

Later in 1976, authorities would impose a new regulation, decreeing that urban public spaces should be renamed according to local functional needs, and detached from any ideological content. During the 1980s, roads, squares, and other areas were named on the basis of geography rather than after historical facts or figures; authorities assigned the names of rivers, mountains, and local flora and fauna to parts of the city (Hidalgo, 2008).

NA residents saw their streets change their names accordingly. In the early 1970s NH's roads had been named using numbers ('*Pasaje 1, Pasaje 2, 3...*') (Alley 1, Alley 2, 3...). Later, in the 1980s, when authorities recognised the settlement as a formal neighbourhood, streets changed their names to those of volcanoes (e.g. *Voclán Osorno, Descabezado Chico*) (see Map 3 in Chapter 2).

Currently, residents see the name 'Nuevo Amanecer' as a sign of a historical frustration; as one young resident told me, echoing other interviewees, 'The name is empty, sort of sad, because it was an imposition' (Interview, 27 November 2014). This sentiment is stronger among residents who are members of organisations. Older residents also explained to me that the changes in street names felt like an imposition over which they had no influence.

Since 1973, speaking of 'Nueva La Habana' is necessarily to speak of the past, the relic of a community rather than a present one. According to an activist resident, 'Nueva la Habana ceased to exist when Mike gave his farewell speech to the *población*' (Interview, 13 October 2014a). In fact, this discontinuity is so sharp that when local historian Boris Cofré (a NA dweller) wrote a book on the history of NH, he covered only the period between 1970 and 1973. Residents speak of NH as an experience that terminated in 1973.

In this context, NA residents have difficulty feeling part of an imagined community that extends in time, connecting NH and NA and building a continuity with their socialist history (see Anderson, 1991). Attempts to construct historical continuity are not entirely absent. However, they are not successful because while these attempts may successfully enact some of the symbols once promoted by the MIR, they simultaneously highlight the

challenges for community construction. One such attempt is the yearly celebration of the neighbourhood's anniversary. As a historical celebration, the *población* anniversary has become an occasion during which local youth try to construct such continuity. They organise the anniversary celebration every November 1st to commemorate the creation of NH. Banners and posters on the doors of local shops and hanging from lamp posts say '*Aniversario Nueva la Habana*' (Anniversary of NH) and invite local residents to an afternoon of music, a carnival, children's games, and other activities. In an effort to honour the MIR's legacy of popular power, the organisers have rejected funding offered by the municipality or by political parties. They consciously use the name Nueva La Habana and recreate some traditional elements of the celebration, such as copies of the banners used by the MIR in 1972.

Interviews and informal conversations with residents showed that this attempt to build historical continuity is unsuccessful, however. Both active and non-active residents explained that while the event is a good excuse for leisure time, the use of the name NH creates a sense of disconnection and dis-appropriation. For many, the use of the name NH deepens the historical discontinuity because it highlights a community that, for them, does not exist. As one resident said, 'It's strange to use that name because really Nueva La Habana existed, but it doesn't anymore; nobody says, "I live in Nueva La Habana"' (Interview, 28 October 2014).

This difficulty in identifying with the past reduces residents' capacity of using identity symbols developed by MIR militants and the local community before 1973. This sense of

discontinuity prevents NA residents from using past subversions to inspire current mobilisation. In other words, residents' past agency does not play a role in current events or initiatives. As will be shown later, NA leaders currently gain their protagonism from participation in partisan networks of political loyalty, not from relying on narratives of identity drawn from the past.

As well as changing the name of the neighbourhood and its streets, the beginning of the dictatorship also brought an expansion of the neighbourhood to the east. Authorities assigned houses that NH neighbours had been building until September 1973 to external families who were considered a priority when it came to social housing applicants. Between 1973 and 1976, families from different zones of the city were allocated to a well-urbanised extension of the neighbourhood with good quality housing. In contrast, some original residents (previously NH) were still living informally in wooden emergency housing, sharing latrines, and experiencing low living standards. To this day, the eastern extension is referred to as '*casas nuevas*' (new houses) and the original settlement as '*campamento*' (camp/shanty town).

The assignment of the *casas nuevas* created conflicts that persist to the present day. It created resentment among existing residents because they saw that their high expectations for change did not come to fruition. After years of work and struggle, others would be given the new houses that they had built. On the other hand, the newcomers viewed the people in the *campamento* with contempt: '[The *campamento*] was poorer, so you would always hear stories, if somebody got something stolen [people in the new houses would

say that] it was people from the *campamento* [that had committed the robbery]’ (Interview, 13 December 2014b). This young woman explained to me how she grew up in the new houses, hearing stories that framed informal settlement residents as more dangerous and of a lower social class. In fact, when local informants helped me find accommodation to move into the neighbourhood, they explained that I should move into one of the new houses. According to one informant, the ‘new’ zone was ‘*más tranquila*’ (more quiet)—in other words, safer.

Additionally, a few informal settlement (*campamento*) residents were given houses in the new area in the years after the coup. Apparently, unlike many others, these people had paid CORVI instalments⁴¹ that made them suitable applicants for the new houses. Again, this difference created divisions and resentment. In the 30 years that followed the coup, similar situations occurred progressively throughout Santiago’s *poblaciones*. Although yearly social housing provision was higher under previous, leftist governments (Arriagada et al., 2004), the military dictatorship became known for its disregard for community life when allocating social housing. Implementing an extensive subsidy system focused on each family, the dictatorship dismantled much of the collective spirit in underprivileged urban Chile (Sugranyes & Rodríguez, 2005). Later, the democratic government deepened these policies and accelerated the production of social housing from an average of 45,000 houses

⁴¹ In those years the families applying for social housing paid installments to the Corporación de la Vivienda (Housing Corporation, CORVI), a government agency in charge of researching, managing and funding social housing provision. NA residents explain that a few families were given houses in the *casas nuevas* because they had previously been paying their installments. Respecting those installments the military government gave houses to those families.

constructed annually between 1973 and 1989, to 117,000 houses in 2002 alone (Rubio 2006, p. 203; Arriagada et al. 2004, p. 187). In several encounters, I heard the stories of hostilities and conflicts between previous settlers and newcomers. Often, it seems, previous residents were frustrated by the distribution of houses built in their vicinity. For example, residents in Mamiña II in the borough Puente Alto were attacked with sticks by an angry mob of neighbouring residents a few days after they moved in to their new houses in the early 1980s. In El Castillo, La Pintana, residents welcomed newly relocated sections of the neighbourhood with what current residents called ‘night wars’ (nights of fights between original and newcomer residents). And in Maipú, a few weeks after new families had resettled, forming the *población* Nueva Rinconada, nearby residents built an unauthorised wall to keep the poorer newcomers away. Since the dictatorship, such relocations have become a challenge for community production all over the city.

LH was no exception. At the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, a number of new settlements accommodating people from different zones in the city, were installed in the south-east of the neighbourhood. These became known as Aquelarre, El Parral and Lago Vichuquén. Although their arrival created resentment among existing residents in need of accommodation, the new houses never threatened LH’s sense of community. In NA, new settlers arrived at a time of strong military repression, recent dislocation of leaderships, and change of neighbourhood name, promoting a larger discontinuity from past experience. In contrast, the new settlers arrived in Lo Hermida when a strong mobilisational identity had already been established, promoted by radical groups during the 1980s protests.

Community divisions and an expanded neighbourhood (after 1976, NA comprised many more houses and a larger portion of land) have historically constituted a challenge for community construction in NA. Residents' capacity to identify with the community of Nueva La Habana (NH) through mobilisational identity symbols was historically curtailed by these conflicts and divisions. By constructing historical continuity, LH residents have been able to draw on stories of successful past collective struggle to subvert historical oppressive events and apply this to contemporary conflict. In other words, they use the symbols of the past to construct agency in the present, fostering contentious collective action (see Chapter 5). Instead, what prevails in NA is historical discontinuity. NH and the stories of successful MIR-led collective initiatives lay in the past, disconnected from the present, and precluding the use of symbols constructed in that period to secure a collective position of agency in the present.

Building networks of political loyalty

In the months following the 1973 coup, most of the MIR militants fled NH. There were, however, a few party militants previously involved in local activism that survived dictatorial repression and remained in NA. They belonged to parties that would go on to form the Democratic Alliance (AD) in 1983.

From the 1980s, with the development of opposing political forces and human rights movements at the national level, centre-left political parties strengthened in NA. Simultaneously, as in many other Chilean *poblaciones*, the priests at the local chapel

emphasised their commitment to the local community, providing an open space for human rights groups, community kitchens, *colonias urbanas* (children summer camps), and other initiatives. Across Chilean cities, the Catholic Church developed initiatives around solidarity and charity, integrating the poor in churches and, progressively boosting civil society (Bastias Saavedra, 2013). In NA, religious youths created a group called *Chacón*, which provided community assistance to the *población*. Similarly, others created the *Grupo Juvenil de María* (María Youth Group, GRUJUDEMA). *Chacón*, for example, implemented a campaign to fix roofs around the neighbourhood. Later, other similar groups emerged. Formally, these groups belonged to the chapel's *Pastoral Juvenil* (Youth Ministry). They were supposed to be formed by religious youths devoted to evangelisation and social charity, but in line with a general national trend in *poblaciones*, the local chapel exercised flexibility as to those groups' admissions and aims.

Residents met regularly at the chapel, mixing in diverse ways. Although the youth led most of these initiatives, generations mingled in the daily tasks of organising activities. Human rights groups organised visits to detention centres, community kitchens served food every day (mainly to children), and *colonias urbanas* organised workshops and games for young people and children. Older participants taught younger ones; *colonias urbanas* offered charity, entertainment, and leadership skills for children. In contrast to the dictatorial restrictions and intimidations that routinely confined people to their private lives, the chapel provided a free, open, and protected space. Many residents (especially the young people) felt they could develop a public role in the church. People from many different backgrounds mixed in this space. According to one former resident who belonged to

colonias urbanas, ‘At the chapel, our differences were erased, even the bad young guys (*‘los cabros más malandras’*) were there, and we all participated together’ (Interview, 13 October 2014b).

With the emergence of national protests in 1983, the chapel became a hub for the exchange of information and for community empowerment. Party members increased in the neighbourhood and came to the chapel to coordinate initiatives with the local population. In this context, emergent local social leaders began to interact with AD Party militants. For security reasons, Party membership was generally kept secret, as anyone could be a *sapo* (snitch). However, leaders generally knew who belonged to a Party and who did not. The most influential local leaders in NA belonged to the Socialist Party (PS), the Christian Left Party (IC), and the Unitary Action Movement (MAPU). There were also Christian Democrats (DC) and a few Communists (PC). Militants—some from the neighbourhood and some from elsewhere—were in charge of implementing Party decisions at grassroots level.

Parties coordinated meetings, marches, printing and distributing pamphlets, making barricades, and other initiatives. Former local Party militants explained to me that parties worked under strict hierarchical command. Militants responded to top-down decisions made by specific Party leaders. As one former leader told me, ‘Things were coordinated by the head of the Party and then the orders went downwards’ (Interview 13 December, 2014a). Hierarchical commands and coordinating actions occurred in very brief ‘*mitins*’ (meetings). To ensure security, secrecy was crucial; working underground protected both

militants and residents, as knowledge about others' militancy was a potential danger that had the potential to deter residents from attending the chapel confidently. At the same time, gossip and stories gave residents an idea (although not necessarily validated) about who belonged to a Party. This relative secrecy allowed closer interaction between local residents and Party militants, enabling Party militants to mingle with and influence other local leaders and residents at NA.

The reputation of bravery and underground work of Party militants made them appealing figures, inspiring leadership among NA residents. 'Being from a Party back then was really dangerous... you admired those who were in parties because they were the ones taking the biggest risks' (Interview 22 October, 2014) remembered an interviewee. Party connections and experience generally ensured positions of leadership for militants in *población* organisations and in initiatives at the chapel. While Party initiatives did not always involve engaging local non-militant residents, hierarchical Party commands progressively influenced grassroots politics at NA. Local leaders realised, for example, that Party militants influenced other participants, pacifying and deactivating protests in the mid-1980s. In fact, influenced by Party militants, the chapel youth ministry board imposed a conciliatory discourse among participants. This change occurred in connection with national disputes between AD and MDP in relation to commanding national mobilisations. Since the earliest national protests, AD had faced the problem of simultaneously negotiating a democratic transition with military authorities and exercising leadership of mobilisation. While AD called for peaceful protests, the *Movimiento Democrático Popular* (Popular Democratic Movement, MDP) and other leftist factions encouraged the use of

violence to defeat the military regime. Rejecting ‘violent protests’, AD progressively distanced itself from the more radical groups (Tironi 1990).

Pablo, a former participant at the church, explained to me that before 1986, there were debates among young residents regarding the aim of national protests: ‘Some supported the idea of overthrowing the military government through insurgency... I remember that one would hear things like “we will all build an unbreakable chain and the government will fall”’ (Interview 13 October, 2014b). However, according to Pablo, the newly elected youth ministry board at the chapel established a new and much more conciliatory discourse in 1986. The new board supported the AC’s work to secure a national democratic referendum and rejected violent overthrow of the dictatorship. Another former participant at the local chapel confirmed this information (Interview, 13 October 2014c; Interview, 29 December 2014). Influenced by political parties, board members sought to contain people’s motivation to protest, asking them to ‘go for the consensus’ (Interview, 13 October 2014c). These years of national protests were therefore crucial in establishing a connection between local leaders and political Party representatives. Political parties provided nationwide coordination, enabling local leaders (and residents more generally) to become protagonists of social change during a period in which the authoritarian government precluded collective political engagement. Simultaneously, parties managed to modulate that protagonism at grassroots level. Many of the local residents that engaged in protests and developed community work at the chapel at that time are still *población* leaders today, running development committees, neighbourhood councils, football clubs, and other initiatives.

After the years of national protests, NA became one of the borough's AD strongholds for the 'No' and presidential campaigns, held in 1988 and 1989, respectively. By the end of 1988, AD parties would form a new coalition: the Concertación. In 1987, the dictatorship legalised political parties. Soon after, AD parties established a campaigning branch next to the *población's* central square. In that building, local leaders could develop political activities more openly for the first time. In contrast with the reality observed in LH, my interviews in NA categorically showed that local centre-left wing leaders were fully committed to AD's political project (as well as to the Concertación's political project later on). As a current leader recalled, 'Back then, all the youths here went to work at the 'No' branch, even the most leftist ones...we all wanted to get back to democracy' (Interview, 13 October, 2014a). In their youth, some of the current NA leftist leaders worked for the No campaign, including some of the most radical ones. In LH, however, many young leaders (who remain leaders to this day) opposed elections, rejecting negotiations with the military and asserting a revolutionary process to defeat the dictatorship and establish a socialist society.

Through activities that included meeting at the AD branch, handing out pamphlets, painting murals, and informing other people through word of mouth, residents consolidated their sense of protagonism in national politics. In NA and in many other *poblaciones*, people saw themselves as agents, shaping their citizenship. In fact, NA local leaders saw themselves as a crucial part of that AD political project. As a current leader and former No campaigner put it, 'I fell in love with the work that we were doing at the [AD] branch' (Interview 12 December, 2014).

Legal status and the opportunity provided by the referendum strengthened the position of the political parties. Since the first national protests in 1983, AD parties had increasingly consolidated their political role in *poblaciones*, especially in NA. Party presence became especially notorious at the *población*, and for the first time, residents saw parties deploying convincing national communication strategies, greater resources, and significant manpower (see Otano 1995: 64).

During these years, centre-left political parties progressively established networks of political loyalty in the *población*. In fact, many local current leaders continued to work for politicians they first met during the referendum campaign. ‘I have been working for political campaigns since the No campaign’ said Javier, a current leader at a neighbourhood council, now in his sixties. Like him, many others campaigned for politicians throughout the 1990s and 2000s. But political networks of loyalty installed by politicians do more than just serve campaigns; these networks also provide access to information, political contacts, and certain types of informal redistribution to local organisations. In the early 1990s, for example, the Socialist MP Carlos Montes created a local network called *Red de Iniciativa Ciudadana* (Network for Active Citizenship) throughout the neighbourhood of La Florida. Connecting *Concertación* politicians representing La Florida with local grassroots organisations (e.g. neighbourhood councils, sports organisations, trade unions), the *Red* consolidated a long-standing, centre-left political loyalty in NA. While local politicians and organisations recognise this, my own experience suggests that there is competition among local leaders engaged in different political loyalty networks, as will be discussed in the coming section.

POLITICAL LOYALTY NETWORKS

Several neighbourhood leaders in NA have developed a loyalty to particular politicians. Many local leaders support specific politicians, work in their campaigns, and have a strong interest in using any opportunity to boost those politicians' image in the community. During an interview, for example, one of those leaders criticised the group of youths who organised the neighbourhood's anniversary celebration for purposely rejecting municipal funding for the event (Interview 22 October, 2014). Because it attracts a large crowd, the *población* anniversary is potentially an opportunity to boost the mayor's image locally, or to increase any other politician's political capital. If the organisers had accepted the municipality's offer to fund the anniversary, they would also have had to accept the inclusion of the promotion of the mayor and his administration in the advertisements for the event. This would have boosted the political capital of the mayor and his supporters. Loyal to the mayor's interests, the leader I was interviewing expressed her dissatisfaction at being unable to profit from the event.

I argue that the strategic attitude deployed by that leader is not fortuitous and should not be seen in isolation. Instead, I suggest here that local leaders become politically socialised through sustained political loyalty. Having already discussed the historical roots of political loyalty, I develop this argument further by considering how local leaders build political loyalty through parties. My fieldwork shows that local organisations simultaneously construct political loyalty in two ways: by engaging in clientelistic networks and by assuming a false political protagonism. Revealing the processes of

political loyalty production will simultaneously show how leaders become politically socialised.

Clientelism in Nuevo Amanecer

In clientelistic relationships in NA, the expectation of relatively concrete rewards reciprocates the political loyalty of local organisations. These rewards are generally understood to involve privileged access to public services—in other words, accessing services or goods that would otherwise be unavailable, or obtaining those services faster or in an improved way. This access is privileged because it is usually granted exclusively to those loyal to a broker, politician, or the municipality, which in part explains why some neighbourhood residents had a negative image of local organisations. In fact, a few of those who did not participate in local organisations but had some knowledge of their work expressed discontent, telling me that ‘[organisations] are only for those who want to get stuff among *apitutados* (close contacts)’ (Group Interview, 17 November 2014).

In his work on Latin American clientelism, Auyero (2000; 2001) examined grassroots networks in Argentina’s shantytowns. He demonstrated that loyalty in clientelistic relationships results from the capacity of those connections to provide survival resources. The rampant poverty and large unemployment in Argentinian shantytowns by the end of the 1990s left informal networks bereft of their subsistence provision. With the exhaustion of local solidarity-based survival networks, neighbours resorted to Peronist clientelist networks to access food and medicine. Auyero describes the distribution system of goods,

food, and medicine provided by the municipality of Cospito and managed by local brokers from Villa Paraiso, a shantytown in Buenos Aires. This system constitutes a complex, yet regularly organised structure, involving patrons, brokers, and clients.

Clientelism can also be found in Chilean *poblaciones*. Although similar to Auyero's description, the type of informal redistribution in Santiago's *poblaciones* is less systematic and structured. It is also less visible and less regular than in Villa Paraiso case because it is highly mediated by opportunism. However, we can still speak of clientelism because, as the following paragraphs will demonstrate, the interaction between politicians, brokers, and clients constructs an association between political loyalty and the expectation of privileged access to benefits.

The example of Ana demonstrates how political loyalty through clientelism has managed to politically socialise local leaders. Ana grew up in NA. She is now in her thirties and has had several part-time jobs in the last few years. She also runs workshops for women who want to learn crafts, both from the *población* and from wealthier areas of the city. As she proudly told me, 'I make the posh women come all the way to the *población*' (Interview, 28 October 2014).

Ana's parents fought against the military during the 1980s; later, her mother began campaigning for local politicians during the No campaign in 1988. Since then, her family has become connected to local Party politics. Ana has always felt a great attachment to her neighbourhood. Since childhood, she has learned about communitarian life and developed close bonds with her community. Her parents and her neighbours taught her the

importance of solidarity, of helping each other, and she became embedded in the *población*'s networks. Simultaneously, Ana grew up learning the nuances about Party politics: 'All the campaign launches in this area were here in my house—presidential campaigns, major campaigns, all of them...everyone [every politician] that was running for something came to start their campaign here' (Interview, 28 October 2014). Ana explained to me that, with one of the largest populations among Chilean boroughs, La Florida, is highly regarded by politicians. Nuevo Amanecer, she said, is one of the main strongholds of the Nueva Mayoría⁴² ('New Majority') in La Florida.

As a young woman, Ana began to work in campaigns for different politicians. She learned the craft of campaigning and expanded her network of contacts, among both neighbours and politicians. Proving to be skilful, she soon became campaign manager for one of the major politicians in that zone. Ana explained that her political socialisation was facilitated by Socialist politicians working in that area: 'they [politicians] formed me politically from the Socialist side, I learned everything about how to behave, what one has to know, everything about how [electoral] politics works' (Interview 28 October, 2014). She identifies both herself and her mother, as '*maquineras*'—people who have become very skilful at imposing their will and influencing others at grassroots level with electoral political aims.

⁴² Nueva Mayoría is the coalition of centre-left wing parties that replaced the Concertación since 2013. Nueva Mayoría includes Christian Democrats (DC), Socialists (PS), Radical Social Democrats (PRSD), Democrats (PPD), Leftist Citizens (IC), Communists (PCCH), and sections of the Ample Social Movement (MAS).

A politician involved in one of the campaigns that Ana led hired her as a civil servant with the municipality. ‘That was part of my political job,’ she said, referring to her work with the municipality (Interview 28 October, 2014). Her political contacts allowed her to start hiring some of her neighbours. Additionally, Ana helped her mother to run a *comité de mejora* (infrastructure development committee) that applied to get better houses built for poor older residents who were still living in wooden dwellings. Political contacts enabled Ana and her mother to help old residents obtain new homes, as well as other benefits, either for themselves or for the community. In fact, the politician that Ana campaigned for later paid her bills for expensive medical treatments.

This brief story shows how Ana became a campaigner and broker for one of the main local politicians. Ana’s experience is a particularly good example of how political parties socialise people who have the potential to become young *población* leaders. Similarly, most other local organisation leaders were aligned with a specific local politician and had learned the ways of Party work just as Ana did. In interviews, observations, and informal conversations, local leaders revealed their allegiance to a local politician. This was regularly the case in functional organisations and sports clubs; in interviews, leaders always revealed their political connections. Proving their connections and loyalty to local politicians in front of others demonstrated their own capacity as effective brokers.

Within a few minutes of an interview with two leaders who were members of a neighbourhood council board, one mentioned her work as a political campaigner. By the end of the interview, they both had acknowledged their loyalty to different politicians from

different political coalitions. ‘We are a bit like rivals’, one of them told me (Group Interview 26 September, 2014). Divergent political loyalties did in fact make them rivals, but while these interviewees seemed to be dealing peacefully with their differences, political loyalties tended to build animosity in the remaining cases. Political loyalty encourages local leaders to learn strategies that will maximise their accumulation of political capital. As illustrated here, this political socialisation is an endless source of conflict.

Alleged protagonism

Political loyalty in NA is also reciprocated by a sense of alleged protagonism. Some *población* brokers conceive their allegiance to politicians and parties as a way of supporting the political project that best meets their needs. Leaders understand that participation in organisations is a way of playing an active role in that project. Politicians organised gatherings with supportive leaders of the borough. Most of those meetings included sessions in which local leaders could presumably voice their concerns to higher governmental authorities. These meetings usually brought ministers, MPs, or high-level executives at state agencies to the neighbourhood to listen to directly to people’s concerns. Being invited to large meetings to discuss local issues with the most important national authorities gave attendees a strong sense of privilege and importance. However, this perceived capacity to influence decisions or hold authorities to account is deceiving

By the end of 2014 La Florida's health system had been experiencing a number of issues. The service was deficient, and most health centres lacked enough doctors. One of the main foci of this problem is visible in the newly-built Hospital of La Florida, where malfunctions also included service and infrastructure issues. A few politicians from the same coalition planned an event to bring the Health Minister to the borough to discuss the issues directly with him.

On a Saturday morning in October 2014, a large tent installed next to the hospital welcomed supportive leaders from all over the borough with snacks and beverages. Young Party representatives and hired staff arranged the event and coordinated the activity; important politicians and the Minister would arrive later. Each attendee received a folder containing documents summarising the issues up for discussion. In these folders, the dysfunctions of the local health system were divided into topics, each to be assigned to a commission to discuss and voice leaders' concerns.

When community leaders came into the tent that morning, the framework of the discussion had already been set up. People formed groups according to commission, and a pre-assigned representative led each of the morning's sessions. The session in which I participated was devoted specifically to the hospital's issues. The commission representative took notes and guided the session. The hospital manager was also present to respond to questions. Attendees discussed several points regarding the hospital's service and presented a few crucial demands to the Minister. Some were especially enthusiastic and declared their intention to make the Minister accountable for any agreements reached

during the event. They spoke of demanding commitments and establishing realistic dates for improvements to the Hospital. Two ladies sitting next to me during the session seemed even more aware of the importance of accountability, saying ‘We should ask the Minister to sign a paper with the commitments’ (Field notes, 8 October 2014).

Despite the fact that attendees carried a folder in which the health system’s deficiencies had been defined in advance, they worked and discussed under the belief that their opinions would make a difference to how issues were dealt with. However, it soon became evident that the focus was not local leaders’ feedback but government production of political loyalty. After a while, the discussion shifted from a collective to an individual and personal focus. A few attendees began to recount their own particular problems with regard to the Hospital’s services. One lady began by expressing her frustration following a two-month wait for treatment. Angrily, she explained that she had been told at La Florida Hospital to seek treatment at the Sótero del Río Hospital in Puente Alto. Then, she was sent back to La Florida, where the staff again refused to provide her treatment. It was soon evident that there were other similar cases among those present, and the scene became rather heated. Confronted with this situation, the Hospital manager asked her assistant to provide solution to each of these particular cases. After the session ended, the five or six people complaining of service irregularity met the assistant, who took their details and planned specific courses of action, depending on the case (Field notes, 8 October 2014). This solution implemented by the Hospital manager not only allowed the activity to continue peacefully, but again confirmed the benefits of political loyalty for some residents. On many previous occasions, these leaders have learned that attending these

events and making informal demands about private issues offers a means of obtaining personal benefits and solutions generally denied to the masses.

The general environment at the event was positive and enthusiastic. Leaders seemed to feel that their concerns would be heard and that their views would shape the solutions applied to the local health system. 'It seems that the Minister is arriving soon' said a lady I had met at previous similar meetings, indicating the expectancy around the arrival of authority figures (Field notes, 8 October 2014); for her, the presence of the Minister at the reunion was proof that her voice would be heard. On arrival, the Minister was received warmly. After greeting the audience, he delivered a fifty-minute speech that promoted political support and acknowledged the efforts of local organisations as well as that of other politicians hosting the event. Using repetitive ideas, examples, and statistics, the speech highlighted the achievements of the current government as a great administration. Finally, the minister backtracked in order to preserve her reputation by saying that, despite their great efforts and progressive accomplishments, government officials could not solve all national problems on time. The head of the Eastern Metropolitan Health Service as well as other local politicians delivered similar messages. After several hours of discussions and speeches, the crowd seemed impatient and exhausted.

After this, commission representatives presented the feedback from each commission to the minister and other government officials. However, before the feedback session started, one of the organising politicians warned that time was almost up, and there were only a few minutes for each presentation. Only then would local leaders have the opportunity to

be heard. Commission representatives, one by one, came to the front and read a summary of their notes. Most of them simply read their notes and returned to their seat. Each time one of them stood up to make a presentation, they were encouraged to hurry by an event organiser. Most of the notes had been prepared in advance of the event, largely repeating what the distributed folder contained, and did not include the contentious demands that arose during the sessions. The feedback session lasted for about twenty minutes, after which organisers quickly closed the event. The session left no time for discussion, negotiation of priorities, or establishing commitments.

Leaving the event, I met Rafael, a neighbourhood council board member from NA, giving me an opportunity to capture his impressions as we walked together. He told me about his strong historical loyalty to the organising political coalition. 'I started working in their campaigns at the beginning of the 1990s', he said. When asked about his impressions of the event, he seemed thrilled by it. He said that it was great to be invited to speak directly with the Minister: 'It's really a privilege that we have, that our politicians invite the Minister here'. His words conveyed a sense of being honoured to have the opportunity to attend such an event commitments' (Field notes, 8 October 2014).

Despite the fact that authorities had ignored most of the discussions and the concerns voiced by local leaders that morning, Rafael felt like a protagonist whose words counted for local social improvement. Rafael saw himself as a special member of the community, as part of a network of socially engaged leaders with direct access important politicians. Several other local leaders confirmed the feelings of protagonism afforded by belonging to

political networks. As Ana told me, describing her first years as a broker, ‘I felt part of a group that was doing great social work, we were making a difference, providing services for people’ (Interview 28 October, 2014). Brokers learn this sense of belonging and protagonism, strengthening sustainable political loyalty. Other residents, on the other hand, perceived the sense of protagonism that political networks provide to brokers as senseless superiority and arrogance. As one resident who was new to the council’s work put it, some leaders ‘feel as if they were sitting in a throne when they sit at the [neighbourhood council’s] office’ (Interview 12 December, 2014).

Scholarly accounts of demobilisation blame government agencies for systematically imposing ideologically charged definitions of citizenship and participation on *población* organisations (Koppelman forthcoming; E. Greaves 2005; Paley 2004; Paley 2001). The present findings complement those conceptions in showing that grassroots organisations play a crucial role by adhering to those definitions, as well as by dismantling contentious activism in *poblaciones*.

MONOPOLISING POLITICAL CAPITAL

Political loyalty motivates local leaders to promote and mobilise political support in other residents. To this end, leaders need to boost their standing, trust, and loyalty within the community. What I intend to show here is that local leaders focus much of their energy on attempting to monopolise political capital, and in doing so, prevent its transmission to other community members.

An anecdote from my fieldwork depicts how the competition over political capital can neglect people's necessities and political engagement. This complicated and frustrating story depicts how the efforts for monopolising political capital work at the grassroots level. In addition, it shows how these dynamics of political competition disconnect people's necessities from the political work of brokers, politicians, and government authorities. In this story a group of residents in need of housing is influenced and supported by a local government official and a local broker to participate in a rally. The protest aimed at trumping a meeting organised by an opposing political coalition to that of the municipality. Residents saw the *Cabildo* (meeting) that their rally aimed at trumping as a better opportunity to establish their demands. In the *Cabildo* they could reach high-level authorities of the Ministry of Housing and Development. Later, however, new manipulations by political brokers and party officials brought them to break connections with the Ministry and seek solutions at the municipality.

A land dispute emerged in the Santa Teresa neighbourhood next to NA when a group of organised families invaded vacant land in the north west of the settlement. As members of a housing committee that brought families from other areas of the borough, the squatters seized land that authorities had previously denied to housing committees from Santa Teresa. Aware of the situation, the squatters used the occupation to protest against their recently rejected social housing application in Las Tinajas, elsewhere in La Florida. Coordinated by a local broker and supported by municipality officials, neighbours from Western Santa Teresa reacted against the occupation and decided to organise a rally as a counter-protest.

Simultaneously, in opposition to the municipality's local political network, a local MP organised a *Cabildo* (a meeting with central government officials) in Santa Teresa with the aim of finding solutions to a number of issues in the neighbourhood. The *población* of Santa Teresa is a few blocks away from NA. Problems included public transportation infrequency, poor health service, a lack of security, and insufficient housing. The meeting took place on a Saturday morning, in a tent erected in one of Santa Teresa's squares. The event was very similar to the one described above. Again, attendees formed discussion groups that served as assemblies to define each local issue. Authorities from different government offices attended, forming a panel to respond to questions and to offer solutions to residents.

Santa Teresa's housing committees scheduled their counter-protest for that same morning, with the aim of trumping or destroying the *Cabildo* at the square in order to exercise political pressure. Additionally, a municipality official had supported the protest. Being from the opposing political coalition, the municipality official sought to compete with the politician organising the *Cabildo*. The rally that started at the occupied brownfield site in Santa Teresa arrived at the square as the event was about to begin. A local leader acted as a broker, and a municipality official led the march. The crowd appeared in the square with banners and chanting 'Yes to Santa Teresa! No to external people!' Their leader began by blaming government officials and the MP organising the event for their housing provision issue. As a member of the competing political coalition, the rally leader sought to frame the *Cabildo* organisers as antagonists. Instead, *Cabildo* organisers welcomed people, saying that the meeting was coordinated precisely to solve their problems. Protesters were

initially puzzled, but soon many of them were sitting and participating in the housing commission event. Meanwhile, the rally leader called on *Cabildo* attendees to join the protest. What resulted, though, was that even more residents at the protest decided to join the event to look for solutions. Finally, the protest leader decided to join the *Cabildo*, even though it had been organised by opposing politicians; arguably, to act differently would have deprived her of her base support. Confronted with this defeat, the municipality official approached the event and repeatedly insulted the MP and his team of organisers; after a few minutes, she left. Both leader and fellow protesters joined the event. Commissions resumed their discussions, and the *Cabildo* proceeded normally.

During the meeting, housing committees expressed their concern about securing social housing in the urban peripheries, as is the case for most other housing committees in Santiago. By the end of the meeting, the head of the Regional Secretariat (SEREMI) for the Ministry of Housing had promised local housing committees that their homes would be constructed in the same borough. SEREMI scheduled a new meeting with the committees to monitor the evolution of the problem and to start drafting solutions. Soon after, however, municipality officials met Santa Teresa's housing committees and managed to break their connection with central government by promising new deals.

This anecdote describes a particularly contentious scenario to depict the extent to which competition over political capital can pervert the relationship between local organisations and political institutions. Other similar struggles were not uncommon at the *población*; many interviewees described insults, verbal aggression, and even physical aggression in

disputes with rival leaders or politicians. Aside from these particular confrontations, however, local leaders used strategies for the accumulation of political capital in interactions with their fellow residents.

Leaders defamed other leaders/residents. Hours of interviews with local leaders showed their disposition to defame each other. Very often, interviewees saw me as someone they had to convince or whose trust they had to earn. To obtain legitimacy, leaders would readily speak poorly of other organisation members, politicians, or municipality representatives. Despite their energetic accounts, more in-depth questions and my broader knowledge of the community usually revealed those defamations to be unwarranted. By talking about others as distrustful, leaders sought to show me how trustworthy and transparent they were. This strategy is designed to confer political capital on the leader while simultaneously depriving others of it. Local leaders often use this strategy in their interactions with other residents. When I asked Andrea, a social worker at the local health centre, about this behaviour, she told me: '[local leaders] are always fighting between each other... then you leave and one tells you stuff about the other, and the other tells you stuff about that one, and that's all the time' (Interview, 30 October 2014).

Self-attributions. Another strategy that leaders use for the accumulation of political capital is the attribution of accomplishments to their own personal efforts. Arguably, the participation of local residents in the improvement of local infrastructure or in the provision of government benefits is a collective endeavour. Usually, those processes entail a further set of processes involving government agencies, private companies, and local

organisations. Since budgets are always limited, residents need to come together and negotiate to collectively establish priorities as to what improvements should be implemented. That was the case with the regeneration programme called *Quiero Mi Barrio* (I Love My Neighbourhood), managed by the central government, which came to NA in 2006. The programme assesses the most vulnerable urban areas and determines a budget for their refurbishment. Local organisations have to make collective decisions to determine what should be built or refurbished. Similarly, the application that many residents do to state benefits is also a collective task. In fact, government agencies only accept applications by organisations (with legal personality). When describing their involvement in successful applications to access state funding for street paving or the construction of a new building, local leaders invariably neglected the collective nature of those accomplishments, usually attributing full responsibility to themselves. According to different leaders, ‘I was the one fighting to get roads paved back then!’ or ‘I got (*conseguí*) them to make that square’ (Interview, 22 October 2014; Interview, 9 October 2014). As a result, leaders boosted their image as effective and committed local providers.

Pasar máquina. Leaders become highly skilful at what residents call ‘*pasar máquina*’, developing the capacity to impose their will in collective decisions at the *población* to the benefit of their political network in any given situation. Leaders will use any means to obtain what they want; imposing their decisions on others provides them with political capital and benefits the residents they identify as their clients. The *Quiero Mi Barrio* programme creates new local organisations called Development Neighbourhood Councils (CVD) in each selected neighbourhood. The CVD incorporates leaders from the various

local organisations. Using institutional assistance as well as the programme's framework, local organisations must collectively decide how best to distribute limited funding to improve their neighbourhood.

NA's CVD succeeded in improving several neighbourhood areas. For example, the main square, *Plaza de los Palos*, was entirely refurbished. Additionally, a new square, a small football court, and a cultural centre were built. However, the programme became the subject of considerable local conflict, frustrating many neighbours and undermining trust among organisations. Referring to this conflict, one councilman observed that '[T]hey almost take each other's eyeballs out' (Interview 27 October, 2014). Regularly interrupted local decision processes and lengthy bureaucratic procedures delayed the implementation of the programme for several years. Leaders from different networks competed to impose their interest at every meeting, at any cost. As a young active resident who attended several of those meetings described it, 'They just said whatever, they even said [mean] personal stuff to each other' (Interview 11 November, 2014). No matter how small leaders' network may be, promoting their interest at the CVD proves their efficacy as a leader and a broker. By getting what they want, they build a record of success and can link their own name (and that of the politician in their network) to concrete achievements.

During the negotiations and disputes at the CVD, one local leader became particularly quarrelsome. After discussing the matter with a few of the neighbours involved in her network, she decided to push for the construction of a square in the south-east of the *población*, where an informal landfill was located. The leader engaged in many difficult

disputes with other CVD members and used strategies to impose her intentions (such as excluding some residents from meetings). She managed to exercise *pasar máquina*, and finally the square was built. However, her opposition and hostility to other neighbours was so problematic that she was eventually excluded from the CVD and other initiatives.

Efforts to monopolise political capital undermine attempts to transmit local identity or values to younger generations. During my stay in NA, transmission of neighbourhood mobilisational identity proved to be non-existent. The only exception I found existed in the past, as implemented by the youth organisation La Casita. A few years before, the youths of La Casita informally occupied a vacant house in NA, where they developed art and cultural activities for a few years. Opposing mainstream Party logic, the organisation managed the building, and opened the space to other local groups (including traditional religious groups), further conducting workshops with children. La Casita's young people did not have the support and involvement of older leaders that would transfer a traditional mobilisational identity, but they managed to establish valuable relationships that created role models for children.

Once the *Quiero Mi Barrio* programme came to the *población*, one of the CVD's decisions was to fully refurbish the vacant house used by La Casita. The building was demolished to make space for a new one. Young residents had the idea that the new community centre would replace their old one, creating spaces for all the community organisations, but soon after construction of the new building began, leaders became embroiled in major disputes over the control of the space. Local leaders at the CVD implemented strategies to exclude

La Casita's youth. Not only did they maintain secrecy about meetings to decide on the administration of the space, they also defamed the youth group. CVD leaders accused La Casita of wanting 'to keep the community centre for themselves' (Group Interview, 18 November 2014). Although La Casita members declined to engage in the competing logic of political capital accumulation, they will probably see this as unavoidable in the near future, as La Casita will probably have no choice but to compete if it does not want to be excluded from the space.

Disputes over political capital among local *población* leaders have nothing to offer to young people in NA. As the previous example shows, rather than providing any lessons in collective politicisation and values, political capital accumulation tends to deny youth their empowerment.

Conversely, the Mapuche community working at the *ruka* (Mapuche medical shack) installed at NA's health centre provides a contrasting example. Their work shows that local youths would be interested in receiving political socialisation. In weekly workshops on *Mapudugún*, recreational gatherings, meetings with authorities, and religious celebrations, the *Lonco* (chief) and the *Machi* (doctor) taught a diverse group of local young people alternative ways of interpreting the relation to others and to nature. A group of youths attend meetings at the *ruka* every weekend to learn about Mapuche culture. The group learned about the predictive power of dreams, the power of ancestors in current life, the differences between the Mapuche and the Huinca (non-Mapuche people). The youth

attending those meetings have obtained socialisation on a particular way of interpreting social reality (Field notes, 11 December 2014).

Additionally, this tendency to monopolise political capital constructs a negative image of local organisations. Non-active residents spoke of local organisations as an isolated sub-community immersed in a field of frustration: ‘They don’t do anything, they just spend their time fighting, but I don’t see that they do anything’, said one interviewee (Group Interview, 17 November 2014). In fact, the environment constructed by local leaders is so hostile that some interviewees declared their fear of engaging in discussions with them, inevitably discouraging some people from engaging in collective local initiatives.

The positive aspect of local organisations highlighted by non-active residents is their capacity to deliver and channel services. Residents sometimes see organisations as extensions of the state that provide services to the community, and those who are not involved in organisations therefore adopt a passive position on local issues. For example, one young woman I interviewed complained about the lack of art workshops and leisure activities in the neighbourhood, declaring emphatically that ‘Organisations should do more things and inform us better of the stuff they do, because we don’t have access to that information’. When I asked her why had she not actively sought information or initiated a workshop herself, she insisted that it was not her job. In her view, local organisations are responsible for providing those services (Interview, 13 December 2014b).

THE ENCLOSURE OF SPACES AT THE *POBLACIÓN*

The examples above demonstrate how an insistence on monopolising political capital leads to conflicts. These conflicted interactions produce a progressive destruction of inclusive collective initiatives. This dynamic constructs political loyalty while simultaneously producing distrustful interactions that undermine collaboration beyond specific networks. As a result, residents as well as leaders and local politicians learn to conceive of the neighbourhood as multiple small pockets of loyalty and disloyalty. This is what residents, both active and non-active, generally call '*color político*' (political colour), suggesting that certain organisations or buildings are branded by their allegiance to political parties. I argue that this political colour assigned to public spaces at the *población* constitutes a barrier to any collective initiatives, especially for organisations seeking to initiate autonomous, contentious activism.

Spaces for collective organisation at the *población* are often scarce. Overcrowding in households is high (Hidalgo 2004, p. 239), public spaces can feel insecure (Frühling & Sandoval, 1997), and the weather outdoors can be hostile. As many interviewees stated, both in NA and in LH, collective initiatives require suitable buildings that are open for use by local organisations. However, buildings are considered critical assets for the accumulation of political capital at the *poblacion*. Very commonly, for example, political candidates come to *sedes* to meet people and to speak of their campaigns prior to elections. In coordination with the local neighbourhood council, candidates bring cake and drinks to attract potential supporters.

These buildings therefore come to be thought of as spaces to conquer, spaces of rivalry and distrust. Controversy arose at the main neighbourhood council following allegations of electoral fraud; allegedly, the ballot box had been taken out of the building at some point during the election, to the benefit of some current board members. When I asked residents about the presumed motivation behind these deeds, they answered: 'They [neighbourhood council board members] do this because they want to use the building for themselves' (Interview, 17 November 2014) and 'They want to have the *sede* for their politics' (Interview, 12 December 2014). Buildings become 'closed to the community' (Interview 17 November, 2014) and politically labelled, and residents do not feel that they can freely use them (Field notes, 15 November 2014). Using a *sede* that is politically coloured necessarily communicates political allegiance, to the exclusion of others. In consequence, opposing local leaders, as well as local organisations that value their autonomy, will avoid using the building.

Coordinating the organisation of NA's anniversary, youths from outside the neighbourhood met with a few local youth organisations. This group decided to organise an autonomous event that would not seek funding from any external actor, and would be separate from events organized by other groups. Funds were raised through a raffle and donations, and informal networks across Santiago provided much of the necessary equipment. However, after having asked all their contacts, organisers found that they had no stage for artists' performances. A member of the group suggested using the local neighbourhood council's demountable stage. Her suggestion was followed by a brief silence and awkward looks between participants. Some explicitly opposed the idea, and a

discussion followed. The group finally requested the use of the neighbourhood council's stage as a last resort, but their rejection of the council's *coloured* infrastructure was clear. It was apparent that the youth group did not want to have any ties with the neighbourhood council, so as not to be tarred with the same brush in the eyes of residents???. This and many other examples from my fieldwork provided evidence of the exclusionary nature of politically branded public spaces.

Additionally, the formal dispositions that require community buildings to be self-sustaining (Ministry of Interior, 1997) contributes to their enclosure. As municipal funding is limited to grant applications, neighbourhood councils need to maintain their *sede* economically. To do so, neighbourhood councils charge a fee for the use of the building for local events (weddings, christenings, large parties, and others) or for-profit sessions (salsa or zumba classes, for example). The Council's regular board meetings and paid activities occupy most of the favourable weekly timetable slots, leaving limited opportunities for non-profit organisations to use the *sede*.

THE FAILURE OF MOBILISATIONAL IDENTITY

The social movement community in NA represents a case in which the sustainable development of mobilisational identity has been blocked. As a result, all four dimensions of collective identity fail at producing contentious collective action.

Agentic memory does not function because NA residents have built a disconnection with their past of activism. NA organisations conceive themselves as a different community than Nueva La Habana⁴³ (NH). As a consequence, the past does not build relational settings that may work as sources of mobilisational identity.

Although most people in NA criticised political parties' incapacity to solve social issues, I could not find the stories of historical frustration that were so prominent in LH. In fact, even the most radical leaders in NA expressed support for Chile's process of democratic transition. Due to their evolution much closer to political parties, NA organisations adhere to mainstream narratives of the past. For example, while active residents in LH strictly reject portraying the MIR, MJL and FPMR as 'terrorists', this view of radical groups is more accepted among NA organisations (especially concerning the MJL and the FPMR). This latter perception matches precisely what the broader national approach has been to these groups.

Castells (1983) observed that urban communities became resistant communities in cases in which their past showed the construction of solidarity in social struggle. In other words, he suggested that mobilisation predicted contentious collective action in the future. The case of NA, however, contradicts those claims.

⁴³ As previous chapters have explained, the military dictatorship commanded the change of Nueva La Habana's name (NH) in 1973. A few residents decided to re-baptise the neighbourhood as Nuevo Amanecer (NA).

Local organisations in NA do not construct a mobilisational belonging. As I argued earlier, the constant efforts to monopolise political capital prevent them from being effective in building unity. In fact, NA organisations do not share mobilising symbols that could act to unite them. For instance, NA organisation members never refer to each other using *hermana/o* and only very rarely do they use *compañera/o*. NA active residents use common traditional forms of referring to each other. For example, they use '*compadre*' (mate). Not using distinctive interactive symbols curtails organisations' cohesion.

The organisation of NA's anniversary is, again, a good example. The anniversary functions as a large public event that builds cohesion only among those residents organising it. A small group of youths have taken the organisation of the event in their hands. They hardly incorporate other local leaders in their coordination of the event. These organisers fear that other local leaders would attempt co-opting the event with clientelistic aims. Although perhaps reasonable, this procedure constructs divisions. Since, as I have argued, the event in NA is built on the denial of a strong collective historical discontinuity, many local leaders do not appreciate its political value. My interviews show that, instead, many of them see the event as a potential opportunity for accumulating political capital. In consequence, several important local leaders have stopped attending NA's anniversary several years ago. What should be an event fostering unity becomes an occasion to deepen conflicts and fragmentation.

The way in which active residents speak of their community in NA also expresses this lack of uniting symbols. While active residents speak of LH with enthusiasm providing very

positive meanings, this is not the case in NA. Interviews in NA show how active residents see their community as ‘one more población’, and not a unique community (Interview 18 November, 2014).

Congruently, boundaries in NA are more inconsistent than in LH. In consequence, they fail at building differentiation. NA organisations seek to assimilate aesthetically and procedurally with formal institutions. In fact, echoing institutions, they aim at providing services to the local community. The main neighbourhood council’s sede, for example, strongly resembles bureaucratic institutions. The building has been progressively renovated, making it a large, clean and well-maintained infrastructure. Tiles form an outdoor corridor that extends around a futsal pitch. Doors around this corridor lead to offices, large meeting rooms and storage rooms. Like the municipality, the building is surrounded by fences and has a twenty-four hours guard (a neighbour living in the building acts as the guard). Schedules, meetings, and opening hours also resemble institutions. The neighbourhood council’s office is open to the public every weekday between seven and ten. The neighbourhood council board holds meetings every Monday. Although youth organisations were less organised, they were also structured and consistent in their procedures. This is because, largely, they also aim at delivering service provision in the neighbourhood. This resemblance to formal institutions is a form of constructing credibility in their political networks and among local residents.

La Casita, the youth organisation in which I participated, is a good case to analyse how rejective boundaries against institutions are in NA. Identified by neighbours as the most

rebellious organisation in the neighbourhood, La Casita should account for the most rejective boundaries in NA. In spite of that, La Casita distanced itself from confrontational, rebellious activism. In order to take part in the negotiations for the management of a new community building, they, for example, obtained legal personality. Many organisations in LH have legal personality. However, because of how proximate it is from formal institutions, such a step is highly resisted there. In contrast, La Casita members carried out the process with no tensions. When I asked them about their position towards the authorities, their leader told me: ‘Organisations here are not so confrontational (*al choque*) (...) We should always take a step backwards and see what they [authorities] offer before acting’ (Interview 27 November 2014).

Later chapters will show that the symbol of ‘repression’ is central in how LH organisations build boundaries that promote mobilisation. In contrast, however, in five months engaging with NA organisations, I rarely heard residents speak of ‘repression.’ On several occasions influential leaders clarified their distance from the narratives of other, more contentious, poblaciones, such as LH. One leader said, for example, referring to a conversation in another población, ‘The guy was all paranoid (*psicopateado*) because he is the type of person who thinks we are still in a dictatorship . . . that kind of thought has no legitimacy here. . . we responded that we have nothing to hide’ (Interview 11 November 2014). The logic of conflicted worlds is not as prominent in NA because, there, the formal is not seen as threatening. Residents, therefore, tend to be much more complaisant about and cooperative with institutions. This was clearly evidenced by their peaceful interactions with police and their smooth handling of bureaucratic processes.

Congruently, leadership is hierarchical and centralised in NA organisations. NA organisations centralise decision-making power and representation among a few specific leaders. Local leaders' constant efforts of monopolising political capital require efficient decisions and hierarchical relations with the rest of the organisation. These leaders are usually formally inscribed as heads of the association in the organisation's legal personality. Leaders of development committees, for example, usually have groups of followers. These followers are local residents who benefit from the leader's work and networks. In return, the followers provide loyalty to the leader. Very rarely would a development committee member challenge his/her leader's decisions. Followers had very low or no decision power in the organisation. Neighbourhood council boards usually include a group of supporting local residents. Despite being board members, these residents have no influence over neighbourhood council decisions. They can only use withdrawal of support in the next election to manipulate the board's decision making.

In such a competitive context, even the local active youths use this hierarchical structure. La Casita members, for example, realised that such a structure is crucial if they wish to engage in local important decisions. While the youths of La Casita demonstrated a tendency towards horizontality in some respects, even they had a hierarchical leader. All members had roles and tasks, but one member was explicitly recognised as the head of the organisation. 'We use that [hierarchical leadership] here... we agreed that I would be the head... like a Lonco... if they [authorities or other neighbourhood leaders] wanna talk to us they know that they can call me,' said the leader (Interview 11 November 2014). At the time, having an efficient channel of communication with other local organisations was

crucial for La Casita. They were negotiating their participation in managing a newly built community building in the población.

Chapter 8 will demonstrate that this reality is in sharp contrast with LH organisations. While some active residents in LH saw other organisation members as being more committed, more experienced, or having larger knowledge, most of them declared complete horizontality within their organisations.

The hierarchical structure of NA organisations largely curtails members' protagonism. This hierarchical structure is meant to only allow specific leaders to achieve protagonism. That protagonism, however, does not result from any construction of autonomy. Instead, as I have argued, it develops in accordance to externally defined standards. This is what I have called 'alleged protagonism'.

ACQUIESCENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

In 1991, along with a few adolescent residents in NA, Carmen initiated literacy courses with adults, as well as workshops with local children. The initiative was intended to promote people's willingness to collective participation, and to build trust among residents. The newly democratic government offered a pretext for reestablishing a new sense of public engagement. November of that year was to mark the crowning of those initiatives, as the neighbourhood was celebrating its anniversary for the first time since 1973. Together with other local leaders, Carmen participated in the organisation of the

anniversary. On the day of the anniversary, Carmen filled the role of MC at the event. Many people attended the event, and held new feelings of openness at the *población*. However, the event was interrupted when a group of young people with covered faces and holding shotguns and pistols came on stage. They greeted the *población* on behalf of the MIR, and attendees became nervous and scared. Frustrated, Carmen saw how people left the event out of fear. The alleged MIR militants left the stage and uncovered their faces a few blocks away, at which point people nearby discovered that several of them belonged to NA. In fact, to Carmen's surprise, they were some of the youths coordinating the workshops that she was leading. Soon after, the event organisers, as well as Carmen, explained their rejection of this expression of violence to other neighbours. However, most residents began associating them with armed groups. Many residents started fearing Carmen. Out of fear, children stopped coming to workshops, and the initiatives that Carmen was developing deactivated.

This anecdote demonstrates that both NA residents and local organisations view the MIR (and other radical groups) as a threat to their security and political protagonism. In fact, the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP) promotion of insurgency to overturn the military regime was rejected by the AD during the 1980s as a call for violence. The Catholic Church and AD parties condemned violent protests, suggesting that these were not only a threat to people's lives (as they triggered military repression) but also to democratic agreements (Bastias Saavedra, 2013). During the 1980s and again in the 1990s, AD parties rejected the idea of armed confrontation and portrayed the claims of MIR, FPMR, and MJL as terrorism (H. H. Vidal, 1995). This conception that assimilated radical movements

with terrorism and the destabilisation of democracy has spread across the Chilean population. The local media as well as other official accounts have repeatedly portrayed these groups as terrorists (El Mercurio, 1999, 2006a; Kushner, 2003). Aligned with Concertación parties that were developing networks of political loyalty in the *población*, local organisations and residents align their opinions and fears to the official images of these groups. This is why residents and organisations at the 1991 anniversary reacted with fear and rejection to public acts that legitimised the use of violence. In fact, there is evidence that *población* organisations (influenced by government officials) even saw contentious actions as potential threats to democracy. Civil society's contentious initiatives, such as redistributive claims, were rejected by local organisations in *poblaciones* because of their potential to destabilise the democratic regime (Paley, 2001).

In consequence, NA organisations not only established a discontinuity with past symbols of contentious action, but also came to see those symbols as illegitimate. Identifying with past radical groups in NA does not build local legitimacy, and the stories of intense frustration that one finds in LH on referring to the democratic transition are therefore absent in NA. Other symbols connected to the legacy of past radical groups that activate collective action in LH tend to deactivate in NA. The notions of 'popular power' or 'recovering' have no motivating effect in NA, even among young, critical organisations. For example, a leader in La Casita expressed his disdain when replying to my question about the meaning of popular power: 'What's that? Man, that's old stories (*cuentos viejos*)... we don't use that here anymore' (Interview, 11 November 2014).

As a consequence of political loyalty and clientelism, NA organisations have adhered to definitions of participation that serve political parties. Local organisations are therefore governed mainly by logics of competition to monopolise political capital. In this context, collective action serves as a form of social inclusion that is highly subject to institutional commands. The political membership of NA organisations results from compliance with formal standards of social validation, historically defined by external hegemonic institutions. In contrast, building timely continuity, LH organisations appropriate past mobilisational identity symbols, assigning a central role to self-determination in building political membership. As later chapters will argue, LH has managed to construct a particular type of informal belonging. Mobilising identity in LH determines the boundaries of political membership.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has adopted a comparative perspective to explain why *poblaciones* have demobilised since the democratic transition in urban Chile. In line with the academic literature on the issue, demobilisation has not been understood in terms of the decrease or disappearance of collective initiatives. While it is true that the massive protests of the 1980s deactivated after 1988, the focus here has been to explain the shift in the nature of local organisations. Although a few *población* initiatives have established redistributive claims in the last 25 years, most local organisations remain excluded from a growing and

increasingly critical Chilean civil society. The goal of this chapter has been to reveal the current and historical processes underlying this deactivation.

Using the two case studies selected for the present study, I suggest that one represents the survival of a mobilisational identity, while the other has built a discontinuity with past mobilising symbols. Through a brief historical analysis based on interviews and academic literature, it was argued that the presence of groups affiliated to the Communist Party, the FPMR, or the MJL is the crucial factor determining the survival of mobilisational identity in *poblaciones* like LH. These groups placed strong emphasis on political socialisation, installing the idea that political capital should be transferred across generations. This political culture of transmission secured the sustainability of collective identity over the years.

In contrast, NA leaders developed political loyalty toward parties and politicians during the 1980s and 1990s. Their political socialisation came largely from party militants engaged in electoral competition. Additionally, networks of clientelism strengthened political loyalty. Local leaders learned about building protagonism and obtained benefits through those networks. As a consequence, local leaders (in the role of political brokers) focused their attention on monopolising political capital. Struggles over political capital have generated constant conflict, creating rivalries and often deactivating local initiatives. Collective action where it occurs is generally subject to party interests, discouraging the participation of non-active residents. Additionally, because efforts to monopolise political capital offer little to the youth population or to children, generational boundaries separate different

organisations. While the few active youths become isolated in artistic and cultural organisations, children are completely excluded from community construction.

NA organisations have largely aligned with a mainstream hegemonic definition of participation. Historically forged, this conception of participation assigns a submissive role to *población* organisations, excluding them from decision processes. In this context, many local leaders construct a deceiving sense of protagonism.

Most of the existing research on Chilean demobilisation has focused specifically on the processes through which the state imposes its own standards on local organisations, through either coercive or constructive power. By incorporating the role of political parties into this discussion, this chapter unveils the benefits that local organisations gain in sustaining this submissive political position.

CHAPTER 5

AGENTIC MEMORY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter analytically examines the role of memory in Lo Hermida's (LH) SMC's development of contentious collective action. First, the chapter argues that active residents of LH have built and continue to build a community that extends in time. Consequently, they produce a communion with past community members in the present. Constructing this continuity establishes the first critical difference between organisations in LH and those in Nuevo Amanecer (NA). In the previous chapter, I have explained that NA's residents regard their past mobilisation as disconnected from the present. A sense of discontinuity from the past has proven to be a major challenge in constructing a cohesive collective identity.

Second, this chapter argues that active residents subvert their own memory of exclusion and de-legitimation. This subversion provides active residents with a self-made recognition and sense of authorship over their own community. Narrating past subversions, active residents learn shared relational settings that set the grounds for constructing a mobilisational identity.

LH has been a base of contentious collective action since the early 1970s and is currently one of the most contentiously active places among Santiago's underprivileged areas. Based mainly on my fieldwork in 2012–2013, this chapter proves that this neighbourhood has maintained its contentious organisation since 1970.

This chapter argues that active residents use two categories when referring to the past. One category underlines frustrating events of exclusion that promoted demobilisation. The other category emphasises successful events of collective struggle. Using these two categories, active residents of LH manage to subvert exclusionary developments of historical memory. Consequently, by selecting and stressing certain past events and actors, active residents are able to produce a position of agency in the present. This agentic memory is the first step in collectively building a mobilisational identity. In this chapter I start by showing how these categories build relational settings. I show how these settings provide a position of agency. Finally, the chapter shows how initiatives of collective action constitute performative ways of remembering and subverting exclusionary developments of historical memory.

SUBVERTING HISTORICAL MEMORY

In LH's organisations, the past is usually transmitted through the stories that older residents tell the younger ones. Generally, the most effective occasions for transmitting mobilisational identity are events organised by local organisations, outside of meetings or

during activism. Oftentimes, informal group conversations before or after meetings are highly significant situations for the transmission of identity symbols.

My interviews reveal that usually, children learn the *población's* history from their families. In their interactions with local organisations, children learn, confirm and reinforce relational settings.

Telling stories is one of the ways in which active residents share past events. Historical narratives of exclusion are generally subverted by highlighting and idealising past events and actors that represent the neighbourhood's successful historical struggle. As this chapter demonstrates, these stories generally transmit relational settings. These settings portray local residents in a specific relation with other social actors (such as the state, political parties, drug dealers or other communities). Consequently, these narratives communicate the community's political position in time. More generally, the storytellers are older leaders who directly experienced past events of mobilisation. Some active residents have also heard these stories through their families (Group Interview, 13 February 2013b). This chapter clarifies how LH organisations subvert oppressive historical developments.

Agentic memory does not only occur when telling stories of the past. Idealising past radical groups and implementing repertoires of collective action from the past are also forms of subversive memory.

This section shows how LH's active residents, interpreting historical facts, currently use the past to produce a position of agency. The section argues that narratives about the past

are organised into two broad categories that interact to generate a sense of agency. On one hand, active residents speak of historical events that represent *frustration and demobilisation*; on the other hand, they refer to past events that signify *successful communitarian struggles*. I argue that active residents use historical events of frustration to performatively assert a context of marginalisation that they can eventually subvert. By subverting this frustration, they establish a position of agency in the present. Discursively, active residents assert historical events of successful struggle to validate their current mobilisation. Additionally, they tend to idealise some past social actors. Active residents highlight specific past events in the present to assert a particular history of collective struggle that challenges hegemonic accounts. Consequently, by using events of successful struggle, active residents manage to subvert their own historical narratives of frustration and marginalisation, producing a current collective position of agency.

A. Historical narratives of frustration

Active residents' historical narratives of frustration allude to past events and social actors that place the active neighbourhood community in a position of marginalisation, oppression, defeat and/or betrayal. Through these stories of frustration, active residents convey that history has provided lessons suggesting their need to produce a self-made informal realm in order to survive as themselves. Accordingly, active residents assert this memory of frustration as something that they can subvert by exalting their historical production of informal struggle.

The central historical event of frustration highlighted by LH residents has its roots in the 1980s. Arguably, this situation fully displayed its consequences later, after 1990, when Chile regained democracy. This specific historical development resulted in a strong divide between *población* grassroots organisations and institutions. Active residents currently suggest that the democratic transition implied institutional abandonment and marginalisation. Active residents explain that Democratic Alliance (AD) parties sought their support when mass national protests began in 1983. In their view, the AD parties would eventually withdraw their support of national protests, demonstrating that the grassroots engagement of these parties was only driven by elite interests.

Although not included in the AD or the Concertación, the Communist Party is also currently perceived as having withdrawn its support for grassroots activism. In fact, according to LH organisations, Communists also ‘sold’ their political interest in order to support negotiations with the dictatorship during the 1980s. Residents speak of the Communists with particular resentment. They claim that the Communists abandoned popular uprisings.

This distance from the Communists is not univocal. My interviews suggest that the Communists were involved and supported initiatives in LH even during the 1990s. While a few LH leaders created this distance from the Communists throughout the 1990s, others had already become distrustful of the Communists in the late 1980s. Indeed, several local leaders maintained allegiance with the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) and the Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL). As previous chapters explain, both of these movements

divorced themselves from their original parties (the Communists and the Popular Unitary Action Movement) in the 1980s, claiming these parties' disconnection from the grassroots interests.

Some active residents even suggest having been used by political parties. 'We were cannon fodder (*tontos útiles*), we fought and risked our lives for the cause, and when it was convenient for them (the parties), they arranged everything in their interest' (Interview, 23 February 2013).

Welcoming democracy also meant embracing the novel idea of isolation and marginalisation. In this new context, coordinating mobilisation would face new difficulties. Local active residents speak of a 'pact between political parties and the military in the 1980s' with great frustration and anger. In fact, even the democratic referendum is considered frustrating. According to a leader, 'The "No" winning meant a defeat for us, for my project and for all those who were more radical in their thought' (Interview, 25 January 2013).

Such statements are fairly common. To a large extent, they are correct; however, they neglect important historical facts. First, these types of comments usually fully deny that recovering democracy meant a sharply significant reduction in state repression (Bastias Saavedra, 2013). Second, they give vast protagonism to political parties from the AD, forgetting that much of the institutional procedures of the late 1980s had been legally imposed by the national Constitution since 1980 (Angell & Pollack, 1990).

Despite the changes that democracy signified, active residents dramatically portray the 1990s. My interviews reveal how the new democratic regime confronted them with abandonment, corruption, censorship, indifference and the local growth of drug trafficking/addiction. The end of the 1980s – the end of national protests and the democratic transition – is considered highly frustrating.

Residents claim that many *población* leaders – until then involved in a revolutionary project – abandoned LH organisations under the shadow of defeat. Other leaders, more sympathetic to the democratic project, left grassroots organisations to work in paid jobs for the government.⁴⁴ On top of that, many stories of corruption and co-optation confirm that party representatives increasingly detached themselves from the grassroots' interests. 'Those leaders (*dirigentes*) just decided to go and make money; they betrayed the project that we had, the project of a new society, and left us here alone, fighting' (Interview, 23 February 2013), says a local leader, highlighting her own commitment to LH's revolutionary project.

Furthermore, in line with historical accounts, active residents mention that institutions originally supporting national protests also abandoned the *población* when democracy began. Residents currently describe it as a milestone that marked a sharp detachment between the grassroots and institutions.

⁴⁴ There is a strong conceptual divide in LH between the grassroots and institutions; working for the government and simultaneously belonging to grassroots organisations in LH is generally associated with either 'working for the enemy' or corruption (especially for young residents).

The progressive priests, playing a leading role during the dictatorship, left LH to be appointed elsewhere. Whelan returned to work at Saint George School in 1988. In 1991, Lapointe was assigned to assist seasonal workers at Tierra Amarilla in the Copiapó Valley (near Atacama). André Dionne was transferred to the San Antonio de Padua Church in Putaendo (near Valparaíso) in 1992. New, more conservative priests were assigned to LH. The spaces of participation and exchange, previously opened by the Catholic Church, vanished. The few NGOs working in the area during the 1980s left in the early 1990s, adding to the active residents' frustration.

Moreover, by the late 1980s, the MJL and the FPMR had suffered social discredit outside of LH's social movement community. Although highly regarded within *población* organisations, at the national level, the FPMR and the MJL leaders lost their legitimacy in most other political circles. Deemed as terrorists, the groups within the FPMR and the MJL maintained their revolutionary claims even after the beginning of the democratic transition. They kept calling for the violent, armed uprising of the popular masses (Richard, 2004). Consequently, both movements suffered fragmentation due to the groups that would not support the armed struggle against the democratic regime. In April 1991, FPMR militants assassinated Jaime Guzmán. The state systematically persecuted extremist leaders pursuing violent objectives, labelling them as terrorists or criminals (El Mercurio, 2006a; Ordenes Hermosilla, 2007; H. H. Vidal, 1995). These developments consolidated the frustration of many *población* leaders who had solidarity with and were inspired by the struggles of the MJL and the FPMR.

Other historical developments also reinforced active residents' feelings of marginalisation and frustration, deepening their distance from political parties and other institutions. In the early 1990s, many grassroots organisations in LH were still strongly connected to and supported by the Communist Party. However, the local reality and the prevailing horizontality of the *población* organisations started clashing with the party's hierarchical top-down decisions. Throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, these differences produced conflicts that disrupted the grassroots–Communist Party coordination. A representative example was the Mass Reactivation Movement (REM) in the 4th zone. Belonging to the Communist Party, some REM members decided to work on drug addiction prevention by operating *colonias urbanas* (children's camps) – inspired by the organisations of the 1980s. They engaged not only in fun activities – such as street chalk drawings, juggling or stilt walking – but also in political formation, through talks, video streaming and workshops, to reflect on the current reality. Nevertheless, the Communist Party's command started challenging the REM's agenda, resulting in a strong conflict. This issue led to the disconnection between the organisation and the party. A former REM leader explains (Interview, 4 January 2013):

That was very frustrating, I was very disappointed with political parties, and I realised [that] my work should not be spoiled by political parties anymore. I then stopped organising for a while and resumed my work around 1998, but now we are only using self-administration and avoiding any association with parties.

From these conflicts, scepticism towards political parties grew even more, affecting residents' interactions with all institutions directly associated with the parties, such as the central and local governments. As the preceding quote demonstrates, these events work

through active residents' creation of foundational myths that promote the notion of autonomous activism's importance to the organisation without political party involvement.

The following paragraphs describe the different narratives by which LH's active residents express the past.

A.1. Background of historical oppression

This subsection provides thorough evidence of how part of history has been interpreted as oppressive and frustrating. As shown here, active residents tend to interpret past events as oppressive, placing the LH community under an unfair institutional system.

Active residents of LH insist on this distance between grassroots organisations and institutions. In different ways, they explain that such a distance has consolidated over the last 45 years, through the authorities' repressive and frustrating acts. During the early 1970s, while still under Allende's rule, LH organisations locally held events that expressed conflicting, broader national political issues. The national political divide between reformists and revolutionaries became part of the *población's* activist world (see also Farías, 2000, p. 3923).

Many leaders (especially the leaders from the Leftist Revolutionary Movement, MIR) wanted to build a revolution from the grassroots. They had little belief in Allende's reformist intentions. 'It was based on the idea of *popular power*; it meant parallel power, different from [that of] the state', clarifies a former leader, explaining the project of

developing parallel grassroots power (Interview, 25 January 2013). Documents written by MIR militants emphatically suggest that both NA and LH were at the centre of this political debate during the early 1970s (MIR, 1972, 2000a).

Depicting this divide, in mid-1972, the leader René Saravia was killed in a police raid in LH's 4th zone. This tragic event is remembered as the *Masacre de Lo Hermida* (Lo Hermida's Massacre) and chronologically constitutes the first allusion to institutional repression in the residents' historical narratives, establishing a political landmark between reformists and revolutionaries. A document published in 1972 with MIR's authorship – but representing the broader view of local activists – clearly places LH on the side of the revolutionaries (MIR, 2000b). This relational setting is consistent in time; LH organisations usually portray themselves as revolutionaries, defending the grassroots and asserting popular power. Although Allende later visited LH, thereby cleaning his image with *pobladores*, according to active residents, political parties showed their potential elite-oriented interests through this event (Interview, 23 January 2013).⁴⁵

For LH's active residents, the reference point for every future event of institutional oppression is nevertheless the dictatorship. It is therefore rather common to hear an active resident say, 'This is just like during the dictatorship' when alluding to an unfair, repressive institutional event. According to residents, after 11 September 1973, the

⁴⁵ In those years, the radical left and the MIR publicly denounced this event. They claimed that torture and persecution were practised 'in the high political posts which, between the people and its struggle on the one hand, and the stability of the capitalist system at the price of some improvements on the other hand, want[ed] to keep the latter' (MIR, 1972, p. 5).

dictatorship pointed at LH as one of the emblematic *poblaciones* that needed to be politically shut down. During its first years, the dictatorship severely repressed LH's struggle. Leftist leaders fled, and military violence spread fear around the *población*. Acting on all levels of public life, constraints curtailed the people's association. Facing the military's predominance, the people felt vulnerable, and the consciousness of how despotic the regime could be towards the *población* was widespread. Due to the authoritarian rule, its violence and the prohibition of organising, the government, for the first time, became a source of consistent political oppression and rejection. Although anecdotes and access to information may vary among active residents, the whole active community in LH shares the sense of fear, injustice and oppression associated with the dictatorship.

After 1973, living conditions worsened in LH; fear, hunger, unemployment and lack of opportunities for the youth dramatically limited people's possibilities for improving their lives. Consequently, residents currently suggest that participation disappeared and fear spread. Serrano (1988, p. 28) documented those years in LH, stating, 'Years were passing by in a dead *población*; participation was over, as well as making decisions and the open frank dialogue that we were used to having with the previous government.'

Residents think of the coup of 1973 as an imposition and a discontinuity in their lives. 'Everything we were doing in that period was interrupted; we were deciding what sort of housing we would get, and that was over' (Interview, 23 January 2013). Moreover, they regard the coup as the beginning of strong repression of both organisations and daily life:

It was awful; the first thing we had [constituted] freedom constraints. In my adolescence, I experienced almost nothing; I had to go to bed early every day because of the curfew, and sometimes it was even in the mornings. In the *población*, it [was] very difficult to respect those time limits because here, our life [happened] a lot in the streets (Interview, 30 January 2013a).

I was lucky; they never did anything to me, but I could see how brutal they were to others. Once, they stopped me at the entrance of the *población*, and right next to me, they almost killed a man [by] beating him; I [didn't] know why (Interview, 15 February 2013a).

In line with the residents' descriptions, some authors argued that national unemployment and poverty rose in those years. Chile experienced economic instability that strongly hit the most vulnerable areas. A resident remembers that 'there was no money, there was no work, there was no food for the family' (Interview, 17 January 2013). The only job opportunities are recalled as miserable – usually alluding to the programmes implemented by the dictatorial government, PEM and POJH (Hechos Urbanos, 1983).⁴⁶ 'It was a miserable job, with a very bad salary; we were actually useless' (Interview, 4 January 2013).

Despite some ambiguities, LH residents (both active and non-active) feel very close to the Allende administration. However, in their view, the dictatorship neglected them and gave no life alternatives to the poor youth. A resident who experienced the 1980s as an adolescent explains, 'I think we were deprived of many things in the 1970s because of the

⁴⁶ The PEM and the POJH referred to the Minimum Employment Programme and the Occupational Programme for Heads of Households, respectively. They were both forms of underemployment for the poor. The first one was implemented in 1975 as a way of dealing with high unemployment in the lower classes. Although initially, the PEM was thought of as an emergency programme, it lasted until 1988. The POJH began in 1982 and represented a higher effort to cope with the unemployment figures, which reached 20% in those years.

military repression; growing up then was tough, [with] almost no development possibilities [...]. You had to build your life with walls all around' (Interview, 30 January 2013a).

Residents describe living conditions in LH during those years as very deficient. For example, even at the start of the 1980s, residents had no sewage treatment facilities, roads were unpaved, and most houses were built of wood. An example of a poor shantytown, LH was highly stigmatised, not only because of its social problems but also over its tradition of insurgency and illegality. 'People thought that we [might] be extremists, that we had weapons, but we were all hard-working. Naming LH was like naming the devil; [when we applied] for job[s], they would tell [us], "No! Not from LH!" We were terribly discriminated' (Interview, 17 January 2013).

Notably, current narratives speak of a period of great fear. In contrast to many other informal settlements during that period – which experienced one or two raids in the dictatorial years – in LH, the military staged numerous raids,⁴⁷ contributing to people's sense of fear and vulnerability. Raids could be general (the whole *población*) or in specific areas or houses. Before a regular large raid, numerous military personnel gathered at different points around the shantytown. A usual point was, for example, the intersection between Grecia Avenue and Americo Vespucio. Although the arrival of tankettes and military buses announced the raid some time in advance, most of those procedures

⁴⁷ Although interviews provide different versions, it seems plausible that raids occurred once a year, on average.

occurred very early in the morning. Additionally, the military secured the entrances to the *población* in advance, preventing anyone from fleeing the neighbourhood.

During a raid, the military would break into every house, very early in the morning. They would take all the men to a set of football fields⁴⁸ located next to LH; sometimes, the military would even make the men walk naked on the streets. Once the male residents were lined up in the football fields, the military used lists to identify subversive individuals. Many men left the line, never to be seen again. The rest of the men in the football fields spent several hours on their feet or knees, in the cold or under the sun, waiting for the search to finish.

People currently speak of these events with anger and feelings of injustice. Residents even suggest that the military not only captured insurgent people in their search but also took men with police records; they were killed or tortured or simply disappeared. Simultaneously, the military broke into the houses. They often kicked and broke down humble wooden doors. Soldiers searched for weapons and any sign of leftist ideology. The *población* experienced this repression as a whole. Currently, both active and non-active residents speak about this experience with frustration. Remembering their violence, an elderly woman reports (Interview, 14 March 2013):

⁴⁸ During the 1970s and 1980s, LH used to have several football fields at the east end of the 4th zone, where now we find El Parral and Aquelarre. There are also other football fields in the border between the 3rd and 4th zones and Americo Vespucio.

They [the military] would come at six in the morning, and they cared about nothing! They would come in, breaking the door, yelling, saying they were searching for weapons. Every single time, the military broke things inside my house; once, it really made me angry because they broke a mirror I had [...]; of course, we had to fix the door afterwards.

Narratives about this period are charged with frustration and impotence. The feeling of vulnerability and the military impunity created immense fear and distrust among all residents. Moreover, the dictatorship is perceived as the force that erased the agency that people were experiencing in the early 1970s, when they felt increasingly empowered in their daily struggle and in cooperation with institutions, such as political parties and the government. Therefore, the dictatorship established a historical landmark, putting an irreducible distance between the grassroots organisations and government institutions. This period deepened the residents' relational settings. In fact, even non-active residents demonstrated a distant relationship towards authorities. On the occasions when I could ask about the source of this distance, non-active residents referred to the dictatorship.

However, active residents currently signify these experiences differently. They suggest that repression has not stopped, establishing a very clear continuity between the past and the present. Later chapters will thoroughly show how, using these symbols, active residents performatively define antagonists and convey the urgency for contentious collective action.

Much more recently, a case strongly impacted active residents, confirming their assertions of institutional repression. In August 2011, a policeman shot and killed 16-year-old Manuel Gutierrez at a demonstration in a *población* next to LH. The murder was followed by an irregular and corrupt investigation (see Pizarro, 2011). After much media coverage,

the policeman who fired the gun was not charged, nor were the other three policemen who fired their guns during that same protest (they were only reassigned to new locations) (see also The Clinic Online, 2012). This incident is still quite present in residents' minds, as evidence of police (institutional) brutality and impunity. Manuel Gutiérrez's story confirms the residents' claims about institutional repression, deepening their social resentment and sense of injustice. In the words of an active resident, 'It makes me very angry; these sorts of events make [me] want to keep on fighting' (Interview, 21 February 2013).

A.2. Imposition of oppressive social relations

Other stories told by active residents explain how the beginning of democracy also implied cultural oppression for them. These stories speak of drug dealing, corruption and distrust within grassroots organisations, which residents interpret as the prevailing culture of individualism and competition in social relations. In fact, the more radical neighbourhood organisations claim that institutions have created a system that praises competitive social relations and individual accumulation of wealth at the expense of community values and interactions of solidarity. Active residents share many different stories that confirm these conclusions. An example is the case of a youth organisation called *Nuevo Rumbo* (New Route) that emerged in the early 1990s. New Route organised guitar workshops and demountable swimming pools for kids and even created a neighbourhood festival involving the whole community. Although very inspirational for kids, New Route members were involved in a money corruption issue that had the effect of the permanent

separation of its members. This is one of the many stories currently shared by residents, arguing that the capitalist system installed by the dictatorship and the *Concertación* corrodes people's relationships – even in the case of neighbours who were once in solidarity and engaged in the community.

Besides corruption, the case of drug dealing and addiction is perhaps more hurtful and difficult to deal with for active residents. They recognise that drugs have contributed to increasing levels of violence in public spaces, as well as the deactivation of many organisations. An interviewee clearly expresses this viewpoint: 'They would take drugs and get all aggressive [...]. It became clear that organisations were losing power, and drugs were ruling' (Interview, 30 January 2013b). Perhaps even more frustrating is the fact that addictions have broken many valuable relationships within families and among friends.

'[H]e is just gone, the drugs took him away, and he was brilliant, really! He did these gigantic puppets and was a great influence for many' (Interview, 23 February 2013), says an active resident, alluding to a friend who left activism due to his addiction.

As a result of this frustration, active residents emphatically and uncritically blame the government for the pervasive spread of drugs in *poblaciones*. They consider drug dealing a result of a pervasive cultural system that only values individuality and accumulation of wealth. Arguably, drug dealing is an easy way of gaining riches and social recognition. Some active residents also claim that the dictatorship introduced hard drugs to the *poblaciones* and that later, in the mid-1990s, it was the National Intelligence Agency (ANI) – informally called *La Oficina* (The Office) – that brought and distributed cocaine

paste to shantytowns.⁴⁹ Hence, some active residents allege that hard drugs involve a strategy of the formal institutional capitalist system to tame and deactivate the popular grassroots.

None of my informants could provide clear evidence for these statements. While some recent investigations have linked several Chilean authorities to drug trafficking (El Mercurio, 2006c, 2015), no clear evidence has shown the government's introduction of drugs to *poblaciones*. We know that current intentions and feelings can shape memories (Halbwachs, 1992). Holding the dictatorship responsible for the high levels of drug consumption in the *población* is a highly subjective historical explanation of the phenomenon. Having to deal intimately with drug dependency can be quite traumatic for both drug abusers and the rest of the community. Arguably, therefore, this subjective explanation is a way of exculpating drug addicts from their own accountability. Additionally, this rationalisation serves to maintain the relational setting that increases the local residents' distance from the authorities and identifies the residents as historical victims of oppression.

Residents suggest that in contrast to the organisations in La Faena (a neighbouring *población*), those in LH remain strong enough to prevent drugs from invading all of the *población* spaces. Nevertheless, there is widespread concern regarding the expansion of

⁴⁹ Some interviewees admit that these assertions lack concrete evidence.

drug abuse, and organisations are trying to create alternatives to overcome this issue (Interview, 4 January 2013; Interview, 23 February 2013).

A.3. Controversial and frustrating neighbourhood organisations

A few organisations at the neighbourhood level exemplify this historically constructed divide between grassroots and institutions. The main example concerns neighbourhood councils. Although during the 1960s and early 1970s, neighbourhood councils were highly regarded at the *población* level – considered the central grassroots territorial organisation – over the last 35 years, they have lost their centrality and credibility in the neighbourhood. Active residents tell stories of how neighbourhood councils were used by the dictatorship to install government adherents at the grassroots level in order to control subversive popular activities in poor neighbourhoods. After 1990, most neighbourhood councils maintained leaders who were sympathetic to the authoritative government. As a dweller told Serrano (1988, p. 28) in an interview in the 1980s:

Those [who] ruled – I mean those [who] gave us orders – appointed with their own finger[s] the people [who] would lead the neighbourhood council. Those people are playing a different role from what they should; instead of representing the residents in front of the ‘authorities’, they are representing the ‘authorities’ in front of residents [...]. And our problems? [...]. Very well, thank you!⁵⁰

Gradually, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, neighbourhood councils started expressing a more critical relationship with the authorities. However, most neighbourhood

⁵⁰ This last sentence should be understood as ‘our problems do not matter’.

councils remained unrepresentative during those years. Their distance from the rest of the community stemmed from three factors, which still hold true at present. First, most of the time, committee members do not need to involve the broad community of neighbours to be elected.⁵¹ This allowed committee leaders to engage in the issues of a reduced group of residents, obtaining their consistent electoral support. Consequently, many leaders of the 1980s kept their seats during the 1990s. Second, due to legal recognition, the neighbourhood councils' function necessarily implies establishing exchanges with the local or central government and other authorities. Many mobilised residents – especially more radical ones – suggest that neighbourhood councils continue to be co-opted by institutions despite the end of the dictatorship. 'They [neighbourhood councils] work for the municipality', states a highly politicised resident, suggesting that committees have not changed their servile relationship with the authorities since the dictatorship (Interview, 30 January 2013b). However, when directly interviewed, neighbourhood council members claim to be independent from institutional interests – especially from political parties. As a neighbourhood council leader says, 'Orrego has come here; we receive him well, but we don't do everything he tells us' (Group Interview, 6 March 2013). Third, since committees deal with large amounts of money, the rest of the community tends to distrust them; many stories of corruption involve neighbourhood council leaders.

⁵¹ The population of voters constitutes those who are registered as neighbourhood council members – generally a much lower number of people than those living in the blocks affected by the committee's work. On top of this, most of the time, only a fraction of those members actually vote. Thus, only a minority of residents elects the neighbourhood councils. Among the non-voters, some are simply uninterested in the matter, while others want to organise themselves without interacting with the authorities.

Notably, some contentious young residents have made efforts to regain neighbourhood council spaces and opportunities (this is currently the case in the 1st zone). As more thoroughly explained later, despite the distrust of many organisations – especially the more radical ones – some neighbourhood councils have re-constructed their meaning. They are now opening their doors to the larger community and have become, albeit contentious, venues of struggle for some of the organisations.

In sum, active residents highlight a set of historical developments, describing consistent efforts by institutions to politically marginalise and oppress them, thus frustrating their attempts to maintain an identity of struggle grounded in the neighbourhood. The following section shows how active residents use successful past events of struggle to demonstrate that despite frustrating historical developments, they have been able to overcome oppression by subverting those historical narratives. The result of their historical narratives is therefore a position of agency based on their community's past events.

B. Successful struggle

Although politically active residents re-tell the history of their community's oppressive relationship with institutions, they underline historical events in which their grassroots movements also successfully overcame frustration. By doing so, they performatively subvert their own historical narratives. Arguably, when active residents share stories about their past frustration and marginalisation, they seem to construct the grounds that they could eventually subvert by asserting their struggle. Through these subversion narratives of

the past, they manage to produce a current position of agency for residents, fostering the formation of a mobilisational identity.

B.1. Early struggle at the *toma*

Usually, residents proudly report the neighbourhood's formation as a land invasion. It works almost as a foundational myth of their current mobilisation. For example, interpreting the take-over as the origin of the neighbourhood's consistent political activation, an active resident says, '[This] zone [the 3rd] [had] always been more organised because it was a *toma*, but the 1st zone wasn't; it was an Operation Site, so they were never as active as us' (Interview, 30 January 2013a). Although this quote is arguably biased, it shows how active residents can interpret the take-over as the origin of the neighbourhood's consistent political activation. The period of the early *toma* – when residents squatted on the land and during the Unidad Popular's (UP) brief government – is generally referenced only through positive stories, in which the community collectively struggled to improve their lives through informal means and mobilisation. Arguably, active residents currently assert this period, idealising events and social actors. The LH community is portrayed as highly cohesive, holding values of solidarity, humility and autonomy. Confirming these ideas, a resident says, 'We were all together on the same boat; everyone knew each other, and we all cared for the rest' (Interview, 17 January 2013). Institutions and authorities are generally also depicted very positively – with the specific exception of LH's slaughter. The

actions of parties and government representatives are all generally portrayed in line with grassroots interests.

Residents tell the story of how in 1970, the area of LH – which used to be rural – accommodated thousands of urban residents who either were relocated in basic social housing (1st zone and part of the 2nd zone) or squatted in the orchards, setting up tents in the middle of the crops (part of the 2nd zone, and the 3rd and 4th zones). Land invaders experienced extremely hard conditions to which residents allude as a time of survival. During this period, families – avoiding the precarious living conditions in cities, as *allegados* or others – fought to get a place to live in the city by squatting on the land.

Squatters traditionally brought along with them some sheets, sticks and a Chilean flag; these were all the items needed to declare a land grab. The first arrivals were those belonging to housing committees. Housing committees coordinated families that needed accommodations, centrally led by political party representatives. The Socialist Party (PS), the Communist Party (PC), the Christian Democrats (DC) and the MIR led the different housing committees that settled in LH. However, many other people arrived in LH once it had been taken over. For example, many settled residents started calling their extended families and friends who were seeking housing to occupy the empty slots at the *toma* (Interview, 19 February 2013b):

The family starts arriving: the brothers-in-law, the cousins, the brothers. The people [who] arrived here told others, ‘There are plots! There is a *toma*, so get some stuff and bring them there so that you can put up a tent and take your plot’. People came from everywhere,

many from the south of Chile. Suddenly, on Tuesday, the thing was filled with tents. It didn't take two weeks [to be] completely full of shacks.

Conditions were extremely harsh for people during that period. Indeed, living with no urbanisation exposed residents to extreme temperatures, mosquitoes, lack of connectivity, health issues and so on. 'Imagine, it was all countryside, with all sorts of crops; there were even snakes', a lady says, referring to the place where her family installed their tent (Interview, 23 January 2013). For months, they had neither electricity nor water nearby. Only later, when some pylons were installed, could they access water – for which people had to walk several blocks. An interviewee says, 'We were in our little tent, and we had to walk so much every time to get water; we all had jars, pots and cans' (Interview, 23 January 2013).

Referring to that period, active residents currently highlight the success of their collective struggle for survival. In fact, current residents emphasise that people quickly developed solidarity during that initial period, allowing them to survive together, as expressed by an interviewee (Interview, 25 January 2013):

The truth is that people cared little about the [political] flag raised during the *toma*; instead, what mattered to them was getting a piece of land and survival. The idea that people had a very developed consciousness [...] no! People were humble and helped each other; they were all one in that period.

Soon, basic living conditions were achieved at the *toma*, and people started seeking to improve their living standards, both individually and collectively. This period is

remembered as charged with solidarity, great coordination and the emergence of influential leaders.

Slowly after their squatting, the people were able to establish themselves and to settle down. Many people spread calcium around their plots to get rid of animals and insects; they cut high grass and crops and assembled a wooden structure to avoid living on the ground. Some were soon able to buy lumber to start building humble and very basic houses. Once the people could save money, they could build some parts of their houses, and others even bought 36-m² prefabricated structures. Accentuating the sense of community experienced during that period, an interviewee says, '[During the weekend,] one could hear the whole neighbourhood hammering; [all were] building their houses' (Interview, 19 February 2013b).

During the interviews, residents emphasise how their initiative improved their living conditions. The people managed to install lights inside the shantytown by illegally connecting electric wires to the public lighting poles. They also connected pipes that brought water to each plot, and they even informally persuaded the public transportation buses to extend their routes to cover the LH area. Enthusiastically stressing how they informally changed their conditions, a woman says, 'We just got on buses and told drivers that they had to come all the way to Tobalaba' (the avenue to the east of LH) (Interview, 20 February 2013).

Residents currently speak of this period as the beginning of their neighbourhood self-construction and as a consequence, their autonomous collective struggle for their

livelihood. This collective struggle experienced in the past is currently interpreted as a source of rights and empowerment. Emphasising the merits of their past struggle to currently demand their rights, a resident says, ‘It was us; we built this place from the beginning [...]. We fought and worked to get each of the things you see here; nobody gave these to us’ (Interview, 23 February 2013).

Accordingly, people tend to idealise these events. They only tell positive successful stories about solidarity, autonomy and informality to solve their difficulties. The actions that they narrate denounce the government’s inefficiency in providing solutions for the poor. In contrast, the grassroots are portrayed as working with great efficiency to secure their livelihood. Soon, residents’ struggles at the *toma* improved in terms of coordination, with the central aim of securing the land by demanding their property rights.

B.2. Organising the *toma*

‘The people needed houses, and they fought for what they needed’ (Group Interview, 13 February 2013a). The active residents of LH depict their struggle for their needs, not only as successful but also as highly authentic.

The first period at the *toma* was devoted to coordinating well-being and security. Additionally, the residents established their demands regarding land and housing, addressing the authorities. Despite all of their progress, the residents saw the need for mobilising to formalise what they had obtained informally. Since the people had obtained

the land through illegal squatting, the authorities had the official right to evict the residents. Simultaneously, they were reluctant to provide urban infrastructure.

Soon people elected 'block representatives'. They needed an organisational structure that would allow them to improve their living conditions in the short term. At the same time, they needed to be effective in establishing their demands.

Local organisations requested the government to give them land properties and to build social housing in each plot. Each representative responded to a broader assembly of all block representatives, and once a month, they arranged 'informative assemblies' where all residents could be informed of the procedures with which they needed to comply and of the developments of their cause. Soon, neighbourhood councils were elected, each representing several blocks. Since then, neighbourhood councils have been a strong reference to LH residents; committees were considered the main neighbourhood organisation, with a direct commitment to the people's interests. Although today, committees are not as highly regarded by neighbourhood organisations as they were back then, residents still retain their respect towards those entities – thinking that these should revert to what they once were.

There were other forms of organisation in those early stages, clearly more functional and exceptional. Some community soup kitchens started operating during those years for groups of families that needed to receive donations and share food expenses due to their poverty. A *comprando juntos* (cooperative supply acquisition group) also emerged from the black market – which prevailed largely in those years – and combined the budgets of

several families to buy wholesale supplies at low prices. These organisations would spread all over LH later during the dictatorship. However, during the UP government, these initiatives were rather exceptional; they did not have the political relevance they gained in later years.

Additionally, a group of young men and women came together in the form of *milicias* (militias). Many of them belonged to political parties and were in charge of establishing the guidelines for the residents' coordination, thus helping the shantytown become organised. Some of those militia party members exercised more leadership than others; some were from the *toma*, while others came from outside. To promote community development, the militia was divided into groups, each with a particular role; some were in charge of discipline, while others coordinated voluntary works, social necessities and health issues, among others. Generally, militias represented a connection between the shantytown and the broader national coordination movement. The parties and other political groups developed knowledge and expanded methodologies across *poblaciones*, as well as a range of leftist movements (labour, rural resident and student groups, among others). However, residents emphatically clarify that despite their political connections, militias did not prioritise party interests over the shantytown's well-being. Although the parties were helpful, a militia's central aim was the people's livelihood. In fact, an interviewee adds, '[Militias] were not truly politicised, nor would they speak [in] technical terms. They had their feet on the ground; they only cared about people's lives' (Interview, 23 January 2013).

Stressing their own role in the construction of the neighbourhood, residents insist that the collective struggle and the intention of solving practical issues prevailed over political parties' specificities and interests. One dweller clearly states, 'I was from the Socialist Party, but the *toma* did not *belong* to the party; in fact, the party leader of my area knew nothing about politics' (Interview, 30 January 2013a). On the other hand, the take-over in the 4th zone was directly organised exclusively by the MIR, whose involvement in the shantytown coordination was especially high. The MIR is generally recognised for being more directive and strict in its coordination. In any case, residents emphatically place their role above that of the MIR, insisting that the community was created from the grassroots. 'They [political parties] helped [...], but it was the people who ruled, not the party, even in the 4th zone' (Interview, 30 January 2013a).

Besides their deep sense of community, the LH residents claim that back then, they were truly represented by political leaders; until today, they see in Allende an inspiring figure. According to the residents, Allende demonstrated that he was concerned about their demands, in their own words, 'He [Allende] was from the people; he worked for the people' (Interview, 30 January 2013a). The interviewees explain that in those years, aside from Allende, the authorities were truly concerned about giving the poor what they needed. A resident admits, 'We were even a bit spoiled; in 1972, we took a year deciding on the types of houses we wanted to build' (Interview, 30 January 2013a).

In sum, the first years of the *toma* are portrayed ideally in the residents' narratives. They thoroughly explain how the community fought to survive the lack of housing opportunities

in the city, as well as the first period of the land take-over. In contrast, the narratives regarding the later periods generally include, in some way or another, allusions to oppression and frustration. Therefore, the narratives about the successful events of the struggle after the early *toma* refer to the situations in which active residents overcame oppression and frustration. Accordingly, these events of the struggle produce a subversion of historical narratives.

B.3. Struggle that survives the dictatorship

Despite the great repression that neighbourhood residents experienced during the dictatorship, they proudly explain that grassroots organisations did not give up their struggle. Active residents emphasise that through neighbourhood organisations and with the support of some institutions – for example, the Catholic Church and a few NGOs – they reactivated activism, progressively developing resistance to the military. Insisting on this idea, a young resident asserts, ‘LH has never been quiet! It has always been politicised; the people here even fought against the military!’ (Interview, 29 January 2013).

Active residents stress that methods of survival or livelihood improvement, such as community kitchens, membership in a football club, *colonias urbanas*, *comprando juntos* or even attendance at church meetings, became effective forms of political struggle. These were not only ways of surviving and denouncing what active residents would call the military’s economic boycott towards the poor, but it was also a strategy of maintaining a cohesive community.

Many active residents regard football as one of the first reactivating factors. In fact, during those years, the dictatorship installed 20 football fields in LH's southeast area (surrounded by Afluente, El Valle, Tobalaba and Los Presidentes Streets). For residents, this was a crucial fact because from the installation of those fields, football associations and championships boomed for about seven years, reshaping the people's leisure time, interests and communitarian occasions. However, the conditions for political mobilisation and resistance remained poor. The most influential and experienced leaders were gone, and those left were only secondary. As one man points out, 'Everything we were doing [was set] aside. All the big heads [were] gone, and those who were left didn't know what to do; they were mostly secondary leaders' (Interview, 25 January 2013).

According to the older active residents, around 1975, many leaders from different parts of the city gathered in LH, held meetings in different places and joined the incipient reactivation of the *población*. Approaching the 1980s, and because the MIR had been shattered by the dictatorial persecution, the Communist Party started exercising strong leadership in the shantytown, especially in the 4th zone.

The late 1970s also witnessed several grassroots organisations emerge and consolidate. After leading several initiatives since the beginning of the dictatorship, the Catholic Church gave space for a large group of young men and women who organised and underwent political formation in 1976 (see the following paragraphs for more details). Another example involves the *arpilleras* (sewing groups). Mainly composed of women, sewing groups started working in 1977, funded by the Vicariate of Solidarity. The

Vicariate of Solidarity coordinated the sale of their products in Europe at very good prices, providing economic aid for residents. Sewing groups had a political meaning. Active residents say that the sewed burlaps expressed the people's living conditions of poverty and repression. According to a woman, 'It [each burlap group] was a form of counteracting the dictatorial intervention in the *población*' (Interview, 4 January 2013).

Moreover, residents also set up community soup kitchens, which were often partially funded by the Vicariate of Solidarity. These organisations were numerous in LH, feeding people who were affected by unemployment and hunger. Neighbours complemented the Vicariate of Solidarity's contribution with other forms of solidarity by asking for leftovers at street markets, receiving donations from other neighbours, charging very low prices to diners, and a number of other useful gestures. Due to the oppressive political context, residents currently claim that the community kitchens' functionality (feeding the poor with very low budgets) – as well as all other forms of community activities during those years – was a form of political struggle. On one hand, community kitchens ameliorated the difficult living conditions of the urban poor; hence, their misery under the dictatorial regime gave rise to a communitarian survival strategy. On the other hand, these community kitchens provided a communitarian construction of independence, by which the community could survive without depending on the forces of the market and the capitalist system. By the end of the 1980s, community kitchens decreased sharply, and by 1995, the last community kitchen that fed some very poor families ceased its activities (Interview, 4 January 2013).

Active residents emphasise the organisations' significant growth during the dictatorship, as part of their political struggle. A first example is the already mentioned *colonias urbanas*. Initially, the children's camps were funded by the Vicariate of Solidarity and organised by the chapels. During the yearly three-month holiday of Chilean schools, children wandered around the neighbourhood in the heat and boredom of Santiago's summer. The Vicariate of Solidarity therefore decided to fund one-week summer camps for the kids associated with the local chapels, at church facilities at the beach. The idea was to provide leisure time and entertainment to children whose poverty did not allow holiday time away from the city. However, local organisers critically proposed modifying that plan because it excluded the rest of the community and encouraged dependence through service provision.⁵² 'So then we thought, how can the community contribute to this? How can they participate in this?' (Interview, 25 January 2013). As a result, organisers started asking neighbours for contributions (e.g., giving rice, sugar or other donations); the community became more involved, and the Vicariate of Solidarity just co-funded the camps. The children's camps included beach outings, *batucadas* (a form of samba), stilt walking, workshops, conversation sessions and other formation activities. Organisers even installed dismountable swimming pools in the shantytown squares so that the children could avoid the summer heat and have fun. A resident who lived during that period says, 'The children's camps became part of the community; they were socially recognised and

⁵²Service provision should also be understood as 'charity' and alludes to what is conceived as '*asistencialismo*' in Spanish. Generally, this construct refers to treating people as passive recipients of programmes or aid, instead of active modifiers of their context.

validated. “I contributed to the boys’ [camps]”, neighbours would say’ (Interview, 25 January 2013). In this way, the organisation of the camps was in the hands of politicised leaders who started including reflections and political formation in the children’s activities. For example, during the early 1980s, it was the *Juventudes Comunistas* (Junior Communist Party) that coordinated some camps, especially in the 4th zone. Children’s camps started in the mid-1970s and continued operating through most of the 1980s.

B.4. The Catholic Church supported resistance

For active residents, during the dictatorship, the Catholic Church demonstrated an ability to engage closely in their political struggle. Consequently, the Church’s actions during that period – as well as the leftist parties’ work before 1973 – became a reference of how institutions could potentially truly support LH’s grassroots political struggle. In fact, in the hostile dictatorial context, the Catholic Church played a crucial role in restructuring the *población* grassroots movement. Far from suggesting that the organisational revival was in the hands of the Church, active residents tend to suggest that it provided support and spaces to unify the resistance initiatives.

Nonetheless, it is not the Catholic Church as a whole that backed the leftist movements. Instead, two particular efforts had an impact on LH: first and most importantly, the work of particular priests who decided to engage personally and ideologically in the residents’ struggle, and second, the support of the Vicariate of Solidarity, which funded some of the residents’ initiatives.

In the first case, a particular priest who stands out for the residents is Gerardo Whelan, who left Saint George School in 1973 to take charge of the San Roque Chapel, located only a few blocks away from LH.⁵³ Through the Vicariate of Solidarity, he ran soup kitchens for the children of the area in the early 1970s, thus contributing to incipient forms of reorganisation. During the 1970s, he also created pastoral councils and coordinated literacy training for people over 25 years old. Highly concerned with the *población*'s youth, Whelan promoted the formation of an organisation for young people. Around 300 young men and women belonged to that group, receiving different types of training, such as job search, typing courses and others. While this youth organisation lasted until 1983, the soup kitchen for children and the literacy training ended around 1985.

Perhaps more important is the role assumed by the Catholic Church under Whelan during those years. Progressively, chapels consolidated as spaces of gathering, where political leaders and social activists could meet, in the guise of particular workshops prepared by priests or of meetings with clear – and yet secret – political aims. There were also *peñas*⁵⁴ in chapels, where people could share leisure time, such as the Pedro Pescador (4th zone) and Espíritu Santo Chapels (1st zone). ‘The chapels were where we met; [these were] protected place[s] that we knew we could trust’ (Interview, 17 January 2013), an activist

⁵³ The San Roque Chapel is located on Los Guindos Street. This is a poor neighbourhood called La Faena, which adjoins LH in Grecia Avenue.

⁵⁴ These were traditional neighbourhood parties where everyone in the *población* was invited. They were coordinated by local organisations and useful for collecting funds for future community events.

lady living in the 3rd zone explains. Supporting these ideas, an active resident asserts (Interview, 15 February 2013a):

He [Whelan] created a people–Church and a Church–people; we were all together, and we went to protest together [...]. Christ died for the people; in that period, we started understanding that the Church liberated [us] from selfishness, arrogance, pride, that there were people [who] needed us. We realised that we could be part of the creation of God's kingdom, a kingdom of equality and social justice.

The Church's work was thus not only notable for its support, but it became one more of the shantytown organisations, horizontally coordinating efforts and sharing experiences with residents. A former leader, close to the Church in those years, says, 'They [the priests] were completely integrated; they were in neighbourhood councils' meetings, with the old fellows of the football clubs. We were in all the meetings, together with a lot of organisations' (Interview, 30 January 2013a).

Around 1982, René Lapointe and André Dionne arrived at San Roque Chapel, helping Whelan in his work. The Church would support a large number of protests and demonstrations that occurred in the following years. The priests protected the people. 'They gave a voice to those who had no voice in those years' (Interview, 15 February 2013a). Furthermore, the Church received and helped people who were hurt in the protests and assisted the families traumatised by human rights violations. 'They dealt with all those families that lost [their members]; so many people disappeared here in LH, and many women were left alone with their children' (Interview, 15 February 2013a).

On the other hand, the Vicariate of Solidarity directly helped the LH residents' organisations by partially funding community kitchens and children's camps. However, this was a much broader institution that offered psychological counselling and legal advice to those victims of human rights violations across the whole country during the military regime. The Vicariate of Solidarity also handled cases from LH families searching for their disappeared relatives. Constructing an interaction of trust and direct engagement in the residents' struggles, the Catholic Church during that period consolidated as an institution that was able to totally support the poor. Today, the Catholic Church of those years serves as a reference to evaluate the relations with current institutions. As expressed by many others on different occasions, one active resident says, 'The Church has nothing to do with how it was in the 1980s; back then, the priests were really interested in the people' (Interview, 30 January 2013b).

Truly engaged in the resistance against the dictatorship and committed to residents' interests, the Catholic Church is currently a consistent reference of how institutions can potentially have a positive role in their relationship with grassroots organisations. At different opportunities, during formal interviews (Interview, 4 January 2013; Interview, 15 February 2013a) and informal communications, active residents positively highlight the Catholic Church's work during the dictatorship, in contrast with the current role of formal institutions, for example: 'What I love is to do something with others, all together, and the [Catholic] Church of the 1980s used to be like that because it transmitted another Christ, one [...] in solidarity with the oppressed, but now it's not. It closed its doors, just like every other institution' (Interview, 6 February 2013).

B.5. Role of football clubs

As suggested before, the dictatorship's installation of football fields represented one of the first instances of promoting community reactivation. Those fields made it possible for football to become central in the *población*. Football provided leisure time and recreation for the whole family. 'Playing football was the most fun we could do; we had no computers, so this was a good way of organising' (Interview, 1 March 2013). Since then, football associations have become highly territorial, assuming a central role in the socialisation of the neighbourhood. Having different divisions, football clubs train children from a very young age. Coaches are usually teenagers from the same *villa* (neighbourhood section), interested not only in playing in their age division but also in teaching the younger ones. Every football club belongs to a particular set of blocks within LH; thus, all participants live nearby.⁵⁵ Although it is traditionally a male-dominated sport, currently, there are also some female teams.

In the progression of their young lives, residents share weekly training sessions, effort, frustration and success together with neighbours from the same set of blocks. Currently, some residents give centrality to football clubs as sites where they have been able to develop a strong sense of community and interpersonal trust. Although many stop playing as adults, they have come to know directly most of the families that live nearby, building closeness in the locality. Therefore, the interviewees assert that football clubs have

⁵⁵ Generally, each villa has its football club, but some villas have more than one club.

strongly contributed to the sense of familiarity within the LH community. During the 1990s, the 20 football fields became residential areas with social housing (Villa El Parral, Villa Aquelarre and Villa Lago Vichuquén). Today, football clubs have lost many of their followers, as the youths have a wider pool of interests from which to choose, and the best players seek more competitive leagues outside of the neighbourhood.

Notwithstanding these developments, active residents praise the communitarian role that some football clubs still play. In fact, although currently weakened, football clubs represent a platform where children grow up rooted in their neighbourhood community, according to active residents.

B.6. Activism in different neighbourhood zones

Active residents agree that successful activism has set up different spatial arrangements in LH throughout the years. Most of them tend to regard their own neighbourhood zone as the most contentious and active one in history. However, it is possible to recognise particular reputations regarding activism in the different neighbourhood zones during the dictatorship. All active residents would agree that the organised 4th zone started many of the local initiatives during the national protests. On the other hand, active residents also assert that the spatial forms of political organisation in LH suffered a shift. As a leader suggests (Interview, 25 January 2013):

In the 1970s, the 4th zone was clearly more combative and extreme, and it had most of the more important leaders, but then in the 1980s, that changed; many leaders originated from

the 1st zone. Many came from La Faena. Besides, there were very *important points* located in the 1st zone.

Up until the coup in 1973, the 1st and 2nd zones had less political activities and did not comprise a majority of any of the extreme left groups. Because they did not have to go through the collective difficulties of squatting, and they were associated with the DC, the 1st and 2nd zones represented rather conservative political ideas – in comparison with the other areas of LH. Conversely, since the 4th zone's take-over had been led by the MIR, it was recognised as highly organised, with strong and extreme political values. On the other hand, the 3rd zone boasted a substantial number of political leaders from the Socialist and the Communist Parties.

According to active residents, up until the late 1970s, the 3rd and 4th zones provided leadership for LH's struggle. Afterwards, the 1st zone became a core area in the planning and intellectual development of LH's political resistance.

On one hand, the 1st zone offered spaces (mainly houses of rather discrete but trustworthy and politically engaged supporters) for leaders to secretly meet. Moreover, many of the influential leaders in those years were living in the 1st zone, where they organised marches, barricades or power outages in some parts of the city.

Active residents assert that during the 1980s, there was even a road in the 1st zone called the *pasaje combativo* (combatant alley). That alley was a place of consistent confrontation against the military forces, and it became a benchmark. 'It was an alley in which, if there was a fire, it meant that you would find fires all over Grecia Avenue; if there was no fire in

that alley, then it meant that nothing really big was about to happen' (Interview, 17 January 2013).

Leaders from the FPMR, the MIR, the MJL, Communists and Socialists gathered every week in one of the 1st-zone houses. They discussed contingent and intellectually stimulating topics. Alonso describes these workshops as rather 'intellectual'. As a 1st zone resident, he came to know closely the majority of the more radical leaders in LH. He explains that the 1st zone 'was like the head' of local activism. At the same time, in the 4th zone, the Communists and the FPMR became especially influential. They created *colonias urbanas* and mingled more directly with the youth. For this reason, Alonso describes the 4th zone as the 'place of action', remote from intellectual concerns (Interview, 25 January 2013). Arguably, it was in the 4th zone where much of LH's current mobilisational identity became transferred from the FPMR and Communist leaders to the popular youth. Some of today's main leaders in LH worked with Communist and FPMR militants in the 4th zone during the 1980s and 1990s.

B.7. San Carlos Canal flooding: overcoming difficulties and oppression

Tragically, in July 1982, the San Carlos Canal riverbed collapsed, turning several parts of the *población* into a large swamp, destroying houses and causing a sanitary emergency (see Díaz, 2013). As a historical fact, this was one incident among the general flooding calamities across Santiago, caused by heavy winter rains, which affected busy central streets, freeways and many settlements (El Mercurio, 1982). However, each time residents

explained this event, they argued that the military had bombed the canal, intending to eliminate the *población*.

The flooding of the San Carlos Canal unveiled the dramatically poor conditions in which LH was living at that time. Residents perceive it today as an event that helped consolidate the people's unity and solidarity in their struggle against the dictatorship. The flooding connected organisations with the rest of the people and provided a collective consciousness regarding the informality and lack of proper urbanisation in which neighbours were living, thus consolidating a broad sense of injustice committed by the state.

Some residents suggest that the Ñuñoa municipality's intention of displacing LH by transferring it to the urban peripheries was announced in 1978; others say that it occurred later. What is clear is that during the early 1980s, this issue mobilised residents, specifically the neighbourhood councils – supported by the Catholic Church – to hold intensive talks with the authorities to resist eviction. Eviction was likely since the LH residents had no legal right to own the land. However, in the midst of these negotiations, a tragedy occurred.

On 27 July 1982, the San Carlos canal collapsed towards the west, flooding most of LH and severely impacting the areas next to Tobalaba Avenue – destroying many 1st-zone houses. Latrines all over LH overflowed, drawing attention to the lack of sewage treatment facilities. Although until then, the 1st zone had enjoyed relatively better conditions – since it was partially urbanised through the Operation Site – the precarious situation of the whole shantytown became quite evident. 'When all the faeces came out of the fosses, we realised

that we were all the same, that we were all living in misery; [nearly everyone] had no sewage treatment' (Interview, 25 January 2013). This is now a famous incident that many residents recall or have heard about. In the words of another interviewee, 'It rained for more than a week continuously, and the canal overflowed. It collapsed, and the water surged this way. The water level was above my bed; I remember' (Interview, 19 February 2013b). Some residents blame that winter's copious rain for the disaster. However, most mobilised residents claim that the military intentionally bombed the canal, trying to harm LH's residents. People were brought to shelters, and many lost all their belongings. 'We had to re-build our house; there was mud everywhere!' (Interview, 19 February 2013b). Although it remains unclear whether or not the calamity was a result of organised sabotage, after the canal's flooding, the municipality decided to award LH residents their land rights. This eventually made it possible to properly urbanise the area.

Active residents claim that the canal's tragic event boosted LH's organisations. First, new organisations arose, and those already existing strengthened their motivation and connections. The residents all felt part of the same tragedy and reactivated their links, with the aim of overcoming their contingent troubles. Simultaneously, they felt the injustice of the state that would not grant them minimum living conditions.

Poverty showed its most bitter face. Before the canal broke, you could experience your poverty [within], with your family, your friends, maybe in your organisation; but after the canal broke, when poverty and misery became so exposed, we went through a change, and we also felt it was unfair (Interview, 25 January 2013).

Second, the interviewees say that in such a massive disaster, some of the young residents who were undergoing political formation in *colonias urbanas* and other activities could not keep their positions within the private sphere anymore. They faced the challenge of deploying leadership publicly. ‘From the organisation of children’s camps with some other guys in 1981, I suddenly had to have a discourse towards the community. I was more visible in public terms; I had to express and guide [the] people’s discontent’ (Interview, 25 January 2013).

It was then that the *Coordinadora de Organizaciones Sociales de LH* (LH’s Social Organisations’ Coordination) was born. This coordination linked around 30–40 organisations in LH, with the objective of establishing cooperation in their common struggle to resist the dictatorship. Aiming to create popular power – a power parallel to that of the state – the coordination gathered diverse organisations, from human rights committees and church organisations to cooperative supply acquisition groups, community kitchens, sewing groups and others. The LH community was then in good shape to face the national protests that would start in 1983.

B.8. National protests in the 1980s: LH’s central political role

In May 1983, a series of large national protests against the dictatorship started. According to active residents, LH had a central, protagonist role in those protests. In the words of a resident, ‘When the protests started, you have to realise that LH was the first *población* that rose in protest. I think the next one was in La Pintana’ (interview, 23 February 2013).

Therefore, LH proved to be politically conscious and active in the struggle against the dictatorship.

Schneider's (1995) classification of Santiago's *poblaciones* suggests that some engaged in national protests more intensely than others in the 1980s. In this classification, LH appears to have manifested only a medium level of activism. Based on their subjective interpretations, LH residents depict things differently. National protests are portrayed as the essence of a successful collective struggle.

The interviewees emphasise that LH became a battlefield. Its residents struggled against the military forces, and several brutal raids struck the whole shantytown. New young leaders consolidated their roles, creating a movement that expressed their disenchantment with the neoliberal model. According to several interviewees, the protests gave the youth the opportunity to unleash their frustrations (Interview, 4 January 2013; Interview, 30 January 2013a; Interview, 23 February 2013).

Active residents praise LH's Social Organisations' Coordination because they claim that it became a crucial tool to unify the diversity of the organisations and movements in those years. It was especially important in bringing together different youth groups. The marginal groups of youths who gathered in neighbourhood corners joined the movement. The same occurred with the members of football clubs and political parties.

Whenever referring to the 1980s' national protests, active residents tend to insist on how successful and influential they were in weakening the dictatorship's power. However, the

truth is that this point is fairly controversial; in fact, some scholars contest it (Garretón, 2001; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Philip Oxhorn, 1994). Oxhorn (1994, p. 58) calls the protests 'a failure', arguing that due to the protestors' violence, marches started becoming increasingly unpopular in Chile, validating the authoritative regime.

In any case, these years of protests (1983–1986) marked the current leaders, inspiring all of their future initiatives and influencing younger activists. The initiatives developed during the national protests left a mark on the leaders. Today, inspired by that experience, organisations have insisted on reproducing those forms of action. Along this line, organisations recently tried to re-create neighbourhood coordination, motivated by the Social Organisations' Coordination. However, this idea proved unsuccessful because the leaders could not yield to each other's positions (Interview, 15 February 2013b).

B.9. Overcoming the democratic transition

As already explained, for active residents, the democratic transition implied marginalisation and oppression. Notwithstanding the power of that frustration, they kept coordinating neighbourhood activism on many different fronts. Currently, active residents assert that their struggles during and after the democratic transition signified their efforts to overcome pervasive isolation and discrimination. They proudly speak of the various groups, initiatives and strategies that they had to adopt to maintain grassroots neighbourhood mobilisation. One of the first people I met at the *población* was a leader involved in an extremely politicised neighbourhood organisation. He taught me the basics

regarding LH and involved me in neighbourhood activism. He gave me many connections. A couple of hours after I had met him, the leader proudly invited me to tour the neighbourhood. He showed many of the neighbourhood sites that symbolise grassroots activism, portraying the neighbourhood – and especially his organisation – as a highly contentious community. Despite the difficult historical developments that had demobilised many other traditionally active neighbourhoods, he was showing how LH's popular activism had survived.

B.9.1. Struggle over housing

The struggle over housing did not end with the dictatorship, and the interviewees claim that the continuity of these conflicts expresses the centrality that housing still occupies in the neighbourhood. 'It's the problem of land; people need land to have a dignified life, and the whole district has a huge demand for social housing' (Interview, 30 January 2013b).

Peñalolén is the only district of Santiago in which mobilisation over land has been so consistent, massive and successful after the return to democracy. For LH residents, these movements have maintained the issue of housing at the centre of the political struggle, validating the *allegados*' (housing committees) movements in the *población* and providing some leaders with connections and lessons.

From the beginning of the 1990s, the *Concertación* government started developing subsidised social housing in the southeast of LH. The areas of El Parral, Aqualarre and Lago Vichuquen were thus established in subsequent years. People from many different parts of

Santiago were housed there, despite the claims of LH's (and Peñalolén's) *allegados* regarding social housing – according to the 2002 Chilean census, 12,000 families were *allegados* in Peñalolén. For LH residents, it became clear that the *Concertación* government was explicit in its housing policies. The idea of people receiving housing in the proximities of the neighbourhoods where they grew up and currently lived – thus fostering rootedness – was not a concern (Interview, 20 February 2013).

Following these events – and as a reaction to the *Concertación*'s housing policies – several land conflicts, attempts at squatting and proper take-overs took place in Peñalolén. However, two of them had a special resonance for LH residents: Toma Esperanza Andina and Toma de Peñalolén (on Nasur's land). Toma Esperanza Andina occurred in the winter of 1992, when 4,000 people squatted on approximately 12 hectares of land (Y. Figueroa, 2003). Although it did not particularly affect LH residents, it is recalled as a successful experience of struggle and organisation. In 1999, 1,900 families took over 16 hectares of land in the district (Alvarez Rojas, 2008), creating the Toma de Peñalolén. Although a few families are still informally living in that place, it officially came to an end in 2006.

Active residents use these land take-overs in their narratives as a way of illustrating a successful struggle. Additionally, for some young mobilised residents, Toma de Peñalolén provided political awareness and unity. 'It gave me the idea that LH [was] less divided in [its] areas; it gave me the feeling that even if it [was] diverse, we were all from the same place' (Interview, 29 January 2013).

Shortly after these *tomas*, the Movement of Residents in the Struggle (MPL) emerged in LH, becoming very influential among more radical neighbourhood organisations and establishing contacts with other organisations across the city. The MPL first emerged as an initiative to coordinate housing movements in LH. Then the MPL rapidly expanded its actions to the district level, to other poor areas of the city and even to other parts of the country. Under a radical leftist view, this movement created the *Entidades de Gestión Inmobiliaria Social* (EGIS)⁵⁶ and a communitarian construction company, with the aim of empowering the poor in obtaining social housing within their district of origin. Later, the MPL, together with other grassroots associations, founded the Igualdad Party (Equality Party). The MPL has strongly made visible the problem of *allegados* in LH, raising people's political awareness and creating a platform to struggle for a fair location in the city. Once the MPL grew and became involved in the electoral system, it lost much of its leadership within LH (Interview, 30 January 2013b). The general discontent with political parties in the *población* allowed MPL a general distance from organisations, from the least politicised to the most radical ones. However, the MPL is a crucial example of a successful organisation that overcomes historically embedded narratives of oppression and marginalisation (Field Notes, 1 March 2013).

B.9.2. Recovering a neighbourhood council

⁵⁶ The EGIS (Real Estate Social Administration Entities) are private or public institutions that provide technical and social support to poor people's applications for social housing. More specifically, EGIS establish the connection between the housing committees (grassroots) and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, helping people in the full administrative process and the construction of houses.

Radical right-wing leaders administered the 18th neighbourhood council (1st zone), both during the dictatorship and in the 1990s. According to some active residents, ‘They did not do anything [any initiative], and they would not even let you use the *sede vecinal* [community building];⁵⁷ if they allowed it, they would charge for it’ (interview, 23 February 2013). Those leaders won elections every year because the neighbourhood council had widely lost representativeness among its residents; therefore, only a small group voted every time. As suggested, neighbourhood councils’ loss of legitimacy meant frustration for neighbourhood organisations.

However, in 1998, a couple of 1st-zone politically mobilised residents decided to struggle over recovering the 18th neighbourhood council. As active residents frame it, the neighbourhood council is an important group to recover because it is traditionally recognised by the community from before the dictatorship. As expressed by a young committee leader, ‘People have respect for it, especially the older ones; people take you more seriously, you know? Because back then [in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s], it was so important!’ (Interview, 6 February 2013). In 1998, only one of the leaders was elected; hence, the group realised that obtaining votes would require involving a larger part of the community in elections. In the meantime, a group of young people belonging to *Corazones de Niños* (Children Hearts)⁵⁸ became disillusioned with the Catholic Church’s way of

⁵⁷ The *sede* is a building constructed by the municipality, open to community activities, and is the space where the committee holds assemblies and meetings, daily attends to neighbours and performs other activities. It is commonly a spacious house, some offices and a bathroom, located in the neighbourhood.

⁵⁸ It was a youth organisation associated with the Catholic Church, strong in the early 2000s.

functioning – they realised that the Church was not aiming at solving the *poblacion*'s real problems (Interview, 6 February 2013). Together with the initially motivated leftist leaders, those young residents joined the committee elections campaign.

The residents suggest that this youth group began a campaign of providing information, engaging organisations and inviting more people to vote. By 2006, they had won all the seats in the committee. Today, the 1st zone's community building has been refurbished through applications for municipality funding; it has been painted all over with colourful murals. Many local organisations regularly use this space, for which the current leaders do not charge. Since then, the 18th neighbourhood council has become an exception among its counterparts because it is now administered by young people – evolving as a place that hosts the activities of many youth groups – and involves a wider, more diverse representation of the community, bringing together different age groups.

The active residents involved in the 18th neighbourhood council proudly assert their recovery as the way in which they have overcome their frustration in losing a space that was originally theirs. Now they have established a space of relative autonomy, where many other organisations can feel comfortable (Interview, 6 February 2013; Interview, 23 February 2013).

B.9.3. Struggling over the district master plan

Active residents currently use the conflict over a new master plan as a prominent example of how neighbourhood organisations have managed to overcome institutional discrimination and marginalisation.

In 2008, a new district master plan proposal was presented to the municipality council for discussion and approval. Lautaro Guanca, an LH resident and MPL leader, was a council member by then and realised that the new master plan implied a set of urban modifications with strong impacts on the district and LH. Guanca informed his fellow MPL members, as well as several other organisations in LH (El Mercurio, 2011). According to the residents, the master plan had the following issues: 1) It restricted the offer of social housing in the district, providing lands whose regulatory conditions (density, height and type of housing) and size did not strictly comply with the district's demands. 2) Land prices would increase in LH due to the ten-story building projects next to Vespucio Avenue, thus forcing poor neighbours to pay council taxes, which would eventually expel the poor to the urban peripheries. 3) It was not a result of a citizens' initiative but a top-down decision framework. 4) Some houses had to be expropriated due to road repairs. 5) It gave opportunities for large retail companies to install shops in the area, hence threatening small shantytown shops and street markets (Plataforma Urbana, 2011⁵⁹). Many residents feared that over the long term, the area would be gentrified, and LH would disappear.

⁵⁹ Specifically, please read Alejandro Beytía's comment on 7 December 2011.

In this context, the MPL and other neighbourhood organisations sent more than 5,000 signatures to the National Electoral Service, demanding a district referendum on the issue. In a highly confrontational scenario (MPL, 2011a) in 2011, the district mayor then decided to carry out a legally binding public consultation, in which ‘yes’ supported the master plan (Si al Plan Regulador, 2011) proposal and ‘no’ rejected it (Consejo de Movimientos Sociales Peñalolén, 2011). Major campaigns followed this decision. On one hand, popular grassroots organisations (mainly from LH but also from other shantytowns in Peñalolén) started informing people and arguing against the master plan. On the other hand, the municipality promoted the plan and also informed the public about it. Tensions and conflicts were fierce in the *población*. Since the proposed plan included 61 modifications, thoroughly conveying the information and arguments was extremely difficult – especially in such a conflicted scenario.

Many organisations in LH opposed the new master plan; only a few grassroots leaders, convinced by the municipality’s arguments, as well as higher classes in the district, defended it. According to one interviewee, the process allowed little time for the voters to be properly informed and to discuss the issues involving the plan. ‘Orrego [the mayor] lost approval because there was too much misinformation, so you didn’t really know what it was about. Actually, the plan had some interesting things that could be discussed, but the process they [set up] didn’t allow that’ (Interview, 25 January 2013). Finally, on 11 December 2011, the master plan proposal was rejected (La Tercera, 2011).

At different opportunities – either through formal interviews or informal meetings – residents used the struggle against the master plan to explain how neighbourhood organisations could unite to fight against institutional threats. A resident expresses this idea: ‘At that moment, all the organisations here fought together; they were all one’ (Interview, 19 February 2013a). Other residents emphasised their sense of pride that the organisations could overcome the municipality’s plans, defending their neighbourhood. To quote one resident, ‘I feel proud that we said “no” for the first time in the history of master plans. We, the people who could be affected, sat at the same table with the authorities, with those who came here to raze and destroy these types of places’ (Interview, 13 March 2013).

B.9.4. Reacting to Manuel Gutierrez’s death

In the years following Gutierrez’s death, demonstrations demanding justice have been held in LH, in surrounding *poblaciones* and in the city centre to commemorate the event (El Mercurio, 2013). Although these demonstrations occurred after my official fieldwork period ended in LH, I managed to gather relevant information from the media. In late August 2013, these demonstrations gave way to violent attacks on public transport buses in LH. Two buses were burned in the *población*, a couple of weeks before the coup d’état’s 40th anniversary (11 September) (CNN Chile, 2013).

Every September 11th brings violent clashes between residents and police forces in LH (as well as in other *poblaciones* in Santiago). However, the authorities predicted that the

events of 2013 would be especially intense due to the national significance of the 40th year. As a result, the police reinforced their presence in LH (ADN Radio, 2013; Miranda, 2013) and in other *poblaciones*, such as Villa Francia and La Bandera – controlling access points and contacting some leaders, in an effort to avoid further unrest. Residents interpreted the massive presence of the police in the *población* as stigmatisation and repression of organisations. The residents' expressed views regarding these facts again show their intention of maintaining continuity between the dictatorship era and the present time. In fact, they say that they are reminded of the military raids during the dictatorship. In a public video posted on the Internet, residents claim, 'LH is under siege' (Fortín Mapocho, 2013) and 'This is like during the dictatorship' (Radio Cooperativa, 2013). This proves that residents see their allegations about repression confirmed by objective institutional actions. Regardless of how reasonable institutional actions are, undeniably, the large police presence stigmatises the *población*, accentuating the distance already existent between grassroots and institutions.

These events prove how active residents react to instances of stigmatisation, discrimination and marginalisation by the authorities, denouncing them. Using injustice frames and reacting to stigmatisation express active residents' position of agency. Empowered with responsibility in the construction of their community, active residents feel capable of protecting their neighbourhood and publicly denouncing the authorities.

The former and the latter sections demonstrate that active residents performatively use historical accounts to highlight events in which their community suffered oppression,

isolation and frustration, on one hand. On the other hand, they emphasise how they have been able to overcome that oppression and frustration, producing an effective movement capable of protecting and sustaining their community.

Accordingly, this section is concerned with how active residents, interpreting historical facts, currently use the past to produce a position of agency and ultimately, promote mobilisation. This section argues that narratives about the past are organised into two broad categories that interact to generate a sense of authorship. On one hand, active residents speak of historical events that represent *frustration and demobilisation*; on the other hand, they refer to past events that signify *successful communitarian struggle*. The argument suggests that active residents' narratives use historical events of frustration to assert a context of marginalisation that they can eventually subvert, gaining a position of agency in the present. Discursively, active residents assert historical events of successful struggle to validate their current mobilisation, for example, conferring efficacy to their struggle by alluding to successful past events. Additionally, regarding their stories of successful struggle, active residents tend to idealise certain former social actors and highlight specific past events in the present in order to assert a particular history of collective struggle that resists hegemonic accounts. Consequently, through the use of events involving successful struggles, active residents manage to subvert their own historical narratives on frustration and marginalisation, producing a current collective position of agency.

ADOPTING A POSITION OF AGENCY

This chapter shows how LH constitutes a crucial case for analysing the role of historical memory in mobilisational identity. Active residents' narratives in LH interpret history to formulate current citizenship claims and sustain their current struggle. This subsection argues that active residents manage to enact a subversion of their historical narratives in their acts of mobilisation by differentiating between historical events. First, active residents speak of demobilising and frustrating events. Second, they refer to incidents of successful struggles that overcome frustrating, oppressive historical developments. Using narratives of the past, residents can subvert the arrangement of citizenship in which past and current political developments situate them.

Their interpretation of history expresses how active residents feel their struggles portrayed as abject, abandoned and delegitimised by both institutions and particular individuals. However, within these historical narratives, LH's active residents share a subversion of that position. This subversion locates active residents as autonomous authors of their own community. After telling me many anecdotes, an active resident describes the local collective reaction to LH's history: 'In the end, this made us more rebellious, more combative'. He explains that these historical developments have resulted in LH organisations becoming increasingly autonomous. 'That's why we [set up] community kitchens to be self-administered' (Interview, 4 January 2013).

As I will show in the following chapters, the identity promoted by active residents subverts these historical developments because it manages to provide agency by mobilising

residents, maintain a network of solidarity among active residents, place the responsibility of organisations' exclusion outside of LH's social movement community (SMC) (mainly in institutions), emphasise autonomy and self-administration, coordinate activities inspired by past traditional activism, recognise the urban poor's historical role, praise and promote popular power, share the pride over LH's struggles and residents' achievements (e.g., building their neighbourhood) and give strong value to their own practical popular knowledge (emerging from rejecting academic forms of knowledge, activism and the *población's* marginality). All of these elements prove that their identity has enabled LH's active residents to act as a consequence of the social position in which they have been historically placed, and second, express themselves as subverting that social position. Thus, LH residents are capable, not only of being authors of their own community but also of challenging the entrenched order of conditional citizenship in which the urban poor tend to be placed in Chilean society.

IDEALISING RADICAL GROUPS

Subversion commonly occurred by idealising former radical movements, such as the FPMR or the MJL. One evening, organisation members gathered in a square after a meeting about the coordination of a future activity. With the setting sun, one of the oldest members – a current leader who had been part of the FPMR 30 years ago – told stories about their struggle against the military during the 1980s. He portrayed FPMR militants as courageous and steadfast. More importantly, these militants were impressively determined

in their actions. They would act with complete conviction, even if it meant risking their lives. In these stories, the militants never doubted or feared anything. As a young active resident says, ‘They [FPMR militants] had sense. Everything was clear for them; there were no improvisations’ (Interview, 13 February 2013). The stories explicitly portrayed an idealisation of those militants.

Mobilised residents in LH omit failures, conflicts and fragmentations in movements such as the FPMR, as well as their incapacity to generate consistent, persuasive political claims during the democratic transition (see Faure Bascur, 2006; Rosas, 2010).

A performative reading of these ideal stories suggests that they are forms of opposing mainstream historical accounts. While mainstream newspapers and state institutions depict these movements as composed of criminals and terrorists, active residents collectively express admiration for them. In promoting admiration for FPMR militants, the leaders’ stories constitute a collective performance of rebellion. The collective idealisation of the past struggle – be it through martyrs, repertoires of collective action, stories or any other medium – is a way of subverting the forms of exclusion imposed by the hegemonic Chilean democratic era. This subversive form of memory lives through LH’s current mobilisational identity.

REMEMBERING THROUGH INITIATIVES OF ACTION

Taking a particular example, this section examines in more detail the role of current initiatives of action in LH's current struggle. This discussion claims that LH organisations' initiatives of action often constitute forms of subverting an exclusionary historical memory. These organisations implement a diverse range of collective initiatives of action, directly inspired by those implemented in the 1970s and 1980s – community kitchens (providing lunch during activities), sewing workshops and children's camps, among others.

Repertoires of collective action are performative forms of claim-making that are maintained and repeated over time. Repertoires repeat the connection between two actors – the claimant and the object of claims. For example, a demonstration or an occupation must be conceived performatively. A form of action places a particular relation in a setting, a relation between the parties and to previous uses of the claim-making form (Tilly, 2006). Since these initiatives constitute structured forms of collective action that are repeated over time, they arguably represent a type of collective action repertoire.

In LH, these initiatives of contentious action are consistent over time. However, the current context is completely different. On one hand, the parties involved in the repertoire are objectively different from those that originated these forms of action. On the other hand, these forms of action do not respond to the same claims they did in the past.

During the 1980s, the LH residents' context was different; they had been living in an informal settlement for more than ten years, and the government had neglected their deficient conditions and unemployment. The lack of services kept them in desperate poverty (see Chapter 1 and Hardy, 1986, pp. 22–23). Consequently, community kitchens,

for example, had a very clear value in those years; they were not only a survival strategy, but they also demonstrated to the public the misery of *poblaciones* under Pinochet's regime. In contrast, current living conditions have radically improved, the Chilean government has been democratically elected since 1989, and there are no human rights violations as they existed in the 1980s (with some exceptions). In this context, community kitchens, for example, cannot have the same purpose they had during the 1980s.

In one activity that I attended during my fieldwork, members of one of the local organisations prepared a community kitchen. The activity was intended to provide a time of summer leisure for the *población* children. Some members arrived in the morning to set up some of the initial elements – for example, building a sunshade sail and an above-ground swimming pool, setting up the community kitchen and so on. The kitchen mainly fed organisation members and several neighbours who had joined the activity by that time. Basic but healthy ingredients for the community pot – mainly rice and vegetables – were donated by a few organisation members. This large pot was a half barrel containing the ingredients, cooked over a wood fire. Conversely, during the 1980s, the Vicariate of Solidarity (or the local Catholic Church) donated the ingredients, and the community kitchen's target beneficiaries were the poor families who had trouble accessing food – it was primarily a survival strategy (see Hardy, 1986, p. 118). The context, the necessity, the claims and the object of the claims are different in the current case; community kitchens have changed their function and performative aim. As one active resident clearly says, 'It was around 1992 that community kitchens disappeared from LH, I mean the ones

[alleviating] hunger; after that year, community kitchens sort of remember the previous ones' (Interview, 30 January 2013b).

During the activity, I noticed a certain fascination for the community kitchen. 'Look, we have a community kitchen!'⁶⁰ (Field Notes, 1 March 2013), a girl involved in preparing the common meal said excitedly to members just arriving for the activity. As several others did during that day, the newly arrived participants approached the large pot for a closer look. The scene resembled the attraction generated by old places or objects with rich histories – such as the cells in the Tower of London or the houses in the saltpetre mines from the early 20th century in the north of Chile. In those places, an observer is unavoidably compelled to imagine people's experiences in the past, inhabiting, enjoying, suffering and living daily life.

I could understand more clearly the people's experience of the current community kitchen when the food was served. The meal fed everybody as equals, regardless of age, gender or wealth. We all sat together, some on chairs, others on the curb, sharing the meal. Sharing lunch with all the members gave me a feeling of unity, friendship, trust and solidarity, which remains to this day. The community kitchen has enhanced this experience because it represents an ideal concept of the past; coming from the 1980s, community kitchens symbolise community survival, solidarity and struggle. The performative act of participating in a community kitchen dignifies LH's history of successful struggle.

⁶⁰ This sentence was not recorded and was obtained through informal communications; therefore, it cannot be referenced. However, it preserves its original meaning.

Providing a position of legitimacy and authorship, the community kitchen challenges LH's exclusionary developments of historical memory.

According to Till (2005, p. 9), people evoke ghosts when they feel haunted by a culturally engaging past. She suggests that a ghost is a social figure whereby 'something lost can be made to appear before your eyes'. She adds, '[One] way [that] people make ghosts appear is by selectively remembering particular understandings of the past through [the] place' (2005, p. 9). Accordingly, community kitchens work as ways of validating in the present LH's past of successful struggle. By bringing to the fore a particular understanding of the past, community kitchens promote a position of agency and the values of solidarity, trust, control over the territory, autonomy and others – hence providing a favourable soil for building an identity based on defending these values. These sorts of initiatives – including community kitchens, critical pedagogy workshops, children's camps, *peñas*, burlap groups and others – produce the same continuity from the past, challenging the narratives in the same manner and fostering the formation of identity.

CONCLUSION

The active residents of LH share very clear narratives of the past, building a continuity between present and past struggles. This chapter has also claimed that organisations in LH use two categories when they assert past events, producing a position of agency; one emphasises frustrating events of exclusion that lead to demobilisation, while the other stresses the successful events of collective struggle. By using these two categories when

remembering the past, LH's active residents manage to subvert the exclusionary aspects of historical memory and turn them into present-day transformative positions of agency. By stressing and idealising successful collective struggles in the past, active residents overcome their own narratives of frustrating, exclusionary historical events. Consequently, remembering events of successful struggles enables active residents to challenge the historical narratives that depict frustration and marginalisation. They use the successful experiences to question the assumption that frustrations are natural or necessary outcomes of mobilisation. They thus use memory to produce a current collective position of agency to overcome disempowerment.

Active residents also produce a subversion of collective narratives of exclusionary historical memory, performatively enacting past events and portraying actors through stories and other popular forms of expression. These forms of expression give a historically central role to the neighbourhood, idealising events and actors of past successful struggles. Additionally, active residents reproduce in the present the forms of action from the 1970s and 1980s, dignifying LH's historical memory of successful struggle. Providing a position of legitimacy and authorship, these forms of action challenge LH's historical exclusionary developments.

This subversion is based on the construction of relational settings that teach lessons to residents about forms of interaction with other social actors. For example, first few sections of this chapter show how oppressive, frustrating events represent *población* residents at the bottom or, as one of them rightly depicts the situation, 'under the boot'

(Interview, 15 February 2013b). From this representation, active residents learn that most of the other social actors have historically been oppressive agents. However, history also teaches that the masses can overcome this relational setting of oppression by acting collectively.

In contrast, despite their experiences of mobilisation in the past, the fact that the NA organisations have not developed a sustainable contentious collective action proves the importance of relational settings for agentic memory. As predicted by Castells (1983), having an origin of mobilisation does not guarantee that a community will have a mobilisational identity in the future. The case of LH proves that relational settings of the past need to build a position of agency in order to promote mobilisational identity. Logically, this works as the first step in the formation of mobilisational citizenship.

CHAPTER 6

MOBILISATIONAL BELONGING

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is concerned with understanding how residents' engagement in their community produces mobilisation. Sometimes called 'sense of we' (Ruble et al., 2004) or 'solidarity' (Melucci, 1995), *belonging* alludes to how residents recognise each other as part of a particular cohesive group. In other words, belonging entails the way in which residents identify with their community. A mobilising type of belonging is based on two analytical dimensions: political consciousness and assertion.

This chapter argues that active residents have managed to produce a political consciousness detached from self-punitive explanations of their grievances. Attributing their issues to an unfair and broad social, political and economic system, residents produce a sense of unity. Active residents construct a collective consciousness either by explicitly alluding to 'collective consciousness', or by using the notion of 'struggle.' On the other hand, active residents manage to generate assertion by emphasising positive community attributes, such as familiarity, positive values and autonomy, among others. Hence, they manage to resist external negative definitions.

Consequently, embedded in historical narratives, assertion and consciousness manage to produce not only a position of agency – reinforcing a subversion of narratives on exclusionary historical developments – but also mobilisation. This chapter claims that, by informally engaging in their neighbourhood and organising collectively, active residents produce an alternative form of community membership.

Not all *población* residents take part in neighbourhood organisations. As a resident once said, ‘Lo Hermida is many worlds in one’ (Interview, 6 February 2013). The world of organisations is only one of them. Non-active residents – usually more concerned with their private lives – were strongly disconnected from the neighbourhood organisational life and knew little about the collective initiatives carried out in the area. Others have become involved in the business of drug trafficking and consumption. Lo Hermida’s (LH) social movement community (SMC) survives among these other realities. Organisations constitute a fairly de-centralised and yet somehow cohesive group of organisations, sharing a common mobilisational identity. Self-aware of forming a community within the neighbourhood, active residents have said: ‘For me this is a special community; as someone from La Legua⁶¹ would say it: it is “us”’ (Interview, 1 March 2013). And another active resident confirms this idea: ‘We are not the majority here in the neighbourhood; actually, those who participate are the minority of people, but we all know each other’

⁶¹ La Legua is a traditional neighbourhood in the South of Santiago (San Joaquín borough). Its origin and history are similar to LH’s. La Legua is one of the first neighbourhoods to be attacked by the military during the dictatorship and became famous for its prominent grassroots resistance during the 1980s (Garcés, 2005b). Currently, La Legua seems to have reduced its mobilisation, becoming a site for a powerful drug market.

(Interview, 23 February 2013). As explained below, although there are many conflicts between organisations, and many times there is little communication between them, all organisations understand belonging as a ground that provides a mobilisational identity.

The chapter starts by explaining how political consciousness contributes to a sense of cohesive belonging and how that produces a position of agency as well as collective action. The chapter then moves on to present the contents whereby active residents assert their community and neighbourhood positively, excluding external descriptions that stigmatise their community.

POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In LH members of its SMC invariably call each other '*hermana/o*' (sister/brother) or, for those who wish to appear more political, '*compañera/o*' (companion). In their own meaning these words foster closeness and unity. Simultaneously, since they are unique to población activism, these words make a clear-cut distinction between internal and external interactions. In fact, beyond politicised popular organisations, Chilean people tend to use other terms to address each other. More commonly, for example, Chilean youths refer to each other using '*compadre*' (mate).

Active residents tend to express their grievances as a consequence of a broad economic, social and cultural system. Active residents see themselves as poor, with all the disadvantages of that condition: very low-quality education, a poor health system,

overcrowded public transportation, social marginality and discrimination, among others. In their view poverty results from a neoliberal system that imposes a set of values determining people's relationships. These are values that active residents claim not to adhere to: individualism, competition, materialism, arrogance and ambition, among others.

Simultaneously, active residents have a positive view of their neighbourhood, because they feel at home in it. Residents construct their neighbourhood and improve it, and they daily recreate their community; 'it is my place' (Interview, 11 March 2013a), a young man from an organisation told me

'Peñalolén is a special place, we have it all here', said a leader with whom I was walking along Grecia Avenue (Field notes, 29 January 2013). She explained that Peñalolén exemplifies the national unequal reality on a smaller scale. Although symbolically, economically and culturally very distant, these poblaciones and wealthy areas of the borough are, paradoxically, physically very close. The concentration of wealth in the east of the borough gives LH residents an unavoidable interaction with privilege. The borough's economic and spatial structure, suggested this leader, is an explanatory factor for LH organisations' strong, cohesive consciousness (Field notes, 4 January 2013).

Political consciousness promotes contentious collective action, because it simultaneously builds cohesion and stimulates a sense of injustice. Indeed, active residents express the idea that the awareness of their marginality and underprivileged status is necessary for them to be agents of social change. '[Participating] is about people understanding that there is a history behind their lives, that they are not poor for no reason and that this is an

unequal society' (Interview 29 January, 2013), said a young resident. Through observations, informal interactions and the various interviews with active residents, it became evident that organising is rooted in a strong feeling of injustice, which for them has a historical background. The resentment that emerges from injustice is the expression of a formal system that benefits only a particular sector of society.

Active residents are not only conscious of their social position, but they also assert this awareness explicitly. Because leaders in LH have traditionally been ideologically aware — adhering to a Marxist tradition — the explicit assertion of 'consciousness' is highly common. Active residents understand LH's SMC as a politically conscious community. This does not mean that active residents believe that everyone in LH is politically conscious. Instead it means that LH as a place is seen as having its own personality, a personality which local residents can identify with. Because of its history of struggle and political engagement, mobilised residents think of LH's identity as that of a wilful, rebellious, well-informed community. As a woman told me, 'this is a place with informed people, where people know what's fair; we won't get any pig in a poke!' (Interview, 14 March 2013b). Many non-active residents share this conception of their neighbourhood, but they do not identify with this personality. For active residents, however, this is a strong sentiment. When asked what it means to be from LH, a leader from a housing committee responded by saying (Interview, 20 February 2013), 'hostile, tough/assertive, I don't buy anyone's lies. Because I am from LH, I believe neither the humble/poor ones, nor the

arrogant ones.’⁶² A guy from a rap group also told me (Interview, 13 February 2013) that ‘LH resists tolerating injustice. I think that’s what makes us still be an emblematic *población*. It’s a bit because of the people’s obstinacy.’ Similarly, another active resident told me, ‘[LH] is a place that has politics; there are Mapuche that, escaping from the authorities, end up [hiding] here, for example. It has always had a political standing (. . .) here you experience politics. It is not a submissive *población*’ (Interview, 29 January 2013).

Active residents embody LH’s consciousness by becoming informed and adopting a rebellious attitude. The great popularity of hip-hop among young active residents is one of the ways in which this embodiment is expressed. Many of them learn graffiti painting, tattooing or rapping. I got to know a few local active rappers and witnessed the dedication they put into their art. They train each other, take hours creating poetic lyrics, invest in technology to record their songs, learn how to use computer software, etc. Their motivation is to transmit political awareness of the oppressive experiences of their daily lives. Some artists have become increasingly famous, expanding political consciousness in Chilean *poblaciones*. Examples are Subverso, Salvaje Decibel and Portavoz. Many others, less famous, sing in *peñas* and local gigs.

Here I will highlight the role of three symbols in the construction of political consciousness: ‘*población*’, ‘*poblador*’ and ‘*lucha*.’

⁶² Because this translation was especially difficult, I include here the original text in Spanish: ‘Chora, parada, no le compro a nadie las mulas, ni a los pocos ni a los choros.’

'*Población*' alludes to the place that lower classes inhabit. However, asserting it with a positive connotation communicates a political statement. Belonging to a *población* means belonging to a politicised community. Accordingly, active residents distinguish between asserting the idea of '*población*' and claiming to live in a '*villa*'. Residents generally refer to LH as a '*población*', as opposed to the way people refer to themselves in other poor areas of the city, using '*villa*.'⁶³ For LH residents (especially active residents), people who assert their neighbourhood as a '*villa*' reject the name '*población*.' The *población* is understood as a historically conscious neighbourhood, with an origin of squatting or great misery. *Poblaciones* are poor areas that developed a popular culture. Residents think of LH as a *población*, and even non-active residents (with little historical awareness) think of it as having a unique culture, with particular customs and activism (Interview, 13 March 2013b; Interview, 14 March 2013b). Instead, people calling their neighbourhood '*villa*' have accommodated their lives to the capitalist system acritically. Accordingly, '*villa*' residents seek life improvement through consumption and social mobility. Active residents see them as 'aspirational people', uninterested in political ideals and generally very ignorant of historical and current issues in Chile. Belonging to LH is to recognise and reproduce this culture of the *población*.

⁶³ It must be clarified that despite the fact that some areas in LH are officially called '*villas*' local residents use that word only descriptively. For example, if asked in which area of the *población* he lives a resident may answer 'in the *villa* René Schneider,' but he would not use that in a politicized conversation or on a banner for a march.

Pobladores are politically conscious residents who belong to *poblaciones*. LH residents recognise themselves and their neighbours as *pobladores*. In this way, the symbol, ‘*pobladores*’, acts to generate initial trust and cohesion with fellow neighbourhood residents. By calling somebody else ‘*poblador*’, active residents assume in advance common grievances and similar political aims. On the other hand, those classified as alien to *pobladores* can hardly be conceived as sharing their necessities.

The symbol of ‘*lucha*’ (struggle) is central to LH organisations’ construction of political consciousness. Interviews and many other observations suggest that this historically grounded political consciousness has also become attached to struggle as a reaction to the organisations’ perceived grievances. Consequently, active residents see their community as a symbol of contentious organisation; LH is seen as a site of historical collective struggle. Be it the *pascuas populares* (popular Christmas) — in which some residents provide food and leisure activities to alcoholics and the elderly living on the street — or a march over housing rights, all these initiatives are understood as forms of struggle against an unjust social and political system. Carrying out ‘struggle’ is a way of becoming part of LH’s community. ‘Struggling’ is how local organisations become incorporated into the neighbourhood’s tradition of activism. In consequence, organisations of different sorts within LH conceive of their work as a form of struggle. The fact that local participation is conceived as a struggle, a fight, gives organisations a disposition to become contentious in their claims and actions. For example, as one of the local football club’s leaders, Mr. Rigoberto is another active resident who sees his work as a struggle. ‘This is a place of struggle, with a lot of personal and community history. The struggle is of all types; my

particular struggle was in the field of football', he told me (Interview, 1 March 2013). Together with other local leaders, Mr. Rigoberto had seen the football league grow and improve as a result of their struggles. Several local football and futsal fields, previously made of dirt, were refurbished. They also got funding to improve the teams' T-shirts and other things. By the time of the interview, Mr. Rigoberto had spent several years struggling with the municipality to improve a football field made out of dirt, close to his house.

Struggle as a symbol expresses an attitude towards injustice; being an active resident of LH means having a hostile disposition towards others' unfair impositions and external rules; it means assertiveness in demanding rights.

The attitude of struggle in LH potentiates its effectiveness by using the local behavioural code of being '*chora/o*.' Being *chora* or *choro* is highly useful to organisations in order to establish justice and dignity claims. To be *chora/o* is to follow common behavioural code in poor Chilean urban areas, especially *poblaciones*. It means to be especially assertive, demanding aggressively — and sometimes even arrogantly — what one considers legitimate. Being *chora/o* — or even in the youth lingo, to be '*chorizo*' — usually also implies being able to defy other people, demonstrating that you have the potential capacity and bravery to defend what belongs to you. For example, a young resident taught me that spitting towards the floor demonstrates a *choro* attitude among youth; it conveys both your willingness to defend yourself from other threatening groups and a nonverbal form of defying other people publicly.

To be *chora/o* is a style of behaviour that inherently belongs to poor urban zones. It is, therefore, rather intimidating to external people. A local leader explained this to me by saying ‘[w]hen you speak at the *pobla*⁶⁴ you move your hands, like flapping with them. That is because of being *choro*, when you go [as a leader] to the municipality, people find that strange and it scares them sometimes; it’s just things from the *población*’ (Interview, 28 February 2013).

To be *chora/o* is the default attitude whereby active local residents claim their rights, in front of both the authorities and other residents. Defending some banners from other threatening residents, for example, an active young woman said (Interview, 22 February 2013), ‘I just stood there, I didn’t care! At the *pobla* you have to be *chora*!’ Arguably, through being *choros*, residents defend against external rules that contradict the community’s norms.

Having attended a school with little emphasis on political values or activism and having been raised in a middle upper-class Chilean family, I am not used to living in a world in which political struggle is so central. Organisations are ready to see struggles in almost every initiative they organise. This emphasis on ‘struggling’ provides a strong, lively political atmosphere to LH.

⁶⁴ ‘*Pobla*’ is a shorter word for ‘*población*.’ It is very commonly used at *poblaciones* in general and in LH in particular.

However, not every sort of association or initiative is considered a ‘struggle’, and there are different ways of understanding what is a struggle and what is not, depending on the organisation. Functional organisations and football clubs generally associate struggle more directly with specific claims directed towards authorities. In contrast, for political and cultural organisations, such things as initiatives, activities or even customs are involved in their struggle.⁶⁵

LH’s active residents express a defined political consciousness. They see themselves in an underprivileged social and political position and attribute their grievances to a system of social inequalities whereby a minority of the population obtains great wealth. There is also a very clear idea among active residents that injustice is historically rooted and that LH’s active community has consistently reacted, resisting that injustice. The collective action that emerges from this political consciousness is expressed in the residents’ struggle. Current residents’ active organisation hence creates a continuity in time and place, providing a sense of unity — ‘who we are.’ Residents then identify as belonging to a contentious, active neighbourhood, which accordingly promotes participation.

Building political consciousness

In spite of how mobilising political consciousness is among LH active residents, organisations are not effective in making it available to non-active residents.

⁶⁵ In fact, most organisations in LH are not concerned with establishing claims to the authorities.

Most of the *población* residents do not belong to organisations. There is an important division between the world of organisations (SMC) and the section of the community that is disaffected by public affairs. Local organisations make some efforts to overcome this division, but they seem rather ineffective.

Some functional organisations in LH – some of the neighbourhood councils, development committees and housing committees – have a managerial disposition towards their engagement in organisations. While most of them share mobilisational identity symbols, they tend to understand their goal as connecting the local population with authorities' benefits.⁶⁶ These organisations do not conceive of recruiting other residents or democratising their spaces as part of their functions. In consequence, these organisations generally do not look for alternatives to build consciousness in other residents.

Local cultural organisations usually have the capacity of reaching larger numbers of people in gigs and presentations. The *población* anniversary is usually an occasion on which these organisations display their messages to a broader local audience. In most artistic presentations, local organisations provide very clear specific messages aiming at boosting residents' political consciousness. However, no matter how direct and persuasive artistic messages are, they hardly have the capacity of shaping people's views.

⁶⁶ While in NA the work of these organisations was rather homogeneous, in LH there was much more variety. In other words, in NA all functional organisations had a service provision orientation towards non-active residents and most of them were part of political loyalty networks. Instead, as I here show, there are several exceptions to this type of work in LH.

Political organisations usually have organised activities in squares or streets, reaching a reduced number of residents. Generally, those who attend are people and children who the organisation members already know. The first reason for this is that their recruitment is highly inefficient. They tend to advertise one or two days in advance, setting up two or three banners on walls nearby their event. These banners typically convey very little information. Additionally, they invite neighbours on the same day as the event, giving people no time to schedule in advance. I, myself, invited several residents, knocking on their doors on the same day. A few of them declared that they were unable to plan their participation in the event. The second reason for reduced attendance is that political organisations have highly radical claims that do not resonate with the large majority of non-active residents. During the implementation of activities, leaders sometimes use a speaker to call nearby residents, using frames of state repression, capitalism and revolution that hardly align with the views of other *población* dwellers. A non-active resident referred to political organisations, for example, by saying, ‘They are too radical. What am I going to do there?’ Another non-active resident explained that these groups seem as dogmatic to her as evangelic parishioners.

Movement of Dwellers in the Struggle (MPL) militants are an exception among local organisations. They have been especially effective in transmitting political consciousness among residents in housing committees. The MPL provides guidance and management to local housing committees that are struggling to obtain social housing in the same area in which they originally lived. In this process, MPL activists engage in durable relationships with residents who have had no previous political socialisation. As Oxhorn (1995)

described, referring to *población* organisations during the 1980s, in this case, residents change their motivations after participating in the organisation. Housing *allegados* join the housing committee for a reason and construct a different sense for participating in the organisation. '[I]n these past months I have learned that politicians lie to us, that there is injustice, that we don't deserve to be kicked out of a place that we built [LH]', one housing committee member told me after working with MPL activists to obtain his house (Interview, 4 March 2013).

Carried out by a group of youths, the 18th neighbourhood council's democratisation (see Chapter 5) was another exception to the general difficulty that the more contentious organisations have in recruiting. However, while these youths managed to broaden the neighbourhood council's constituency, their goal was not to expand residents' political consciousness.

Instead of seeking to build political consciousness with a speech or through a few words, organisations in LH seem to be more interested in fundamentally shaping people's social relations. This is especially the case for the most contentious, politicised relations. Therefore, the organisations invest energies in producing consciousness through political socialisation. Leaders aim at transmitting mobilisational identity symbols to other residents, especially to children. Transmitting the symbols of '*lucha*', '*población*' and '*poblador*' is crucial to fostering political consciousness. Incorporating these symbols, new organisation members will themselves become part of LH's SMC.

POSITIVE ASSERTION

This subsection argues that for active residents, LH's community is a positive symbol whereby they interpret reality, both inside and outside their neighbourhood. Active residents assert their community as a sign of very positive attributes. For them, this is a neighbourhood that they have created, with values that they have fought to maintain and highlight. Some of the meanings by which active residents assert their community are a part of their political consciousness production. In the same way, parts of the meanings belonging to such assertions contribute to fostering consciousness. Assertion and consciousness are both part of constructing an active sense of 'we', which fosters collective action. In what follows, I will show how active residents assert their community through different attributes.

Comfortable and enjoyable neighbourhood

A newcomer becomes easily impressed by how comfortable the neighbourhood is; despite its poverty and marginalisation, compared to many other poor zones, LH is well connected, with decent infrastructure, and is fairly secure. According to residents, LH has improved considerably in the last 25 years. Although there are many improvements still to be implemented, infrastructure is generally in good shape; street asphalt is regularly replaced, public lighting covers most areas, a new medical centre was recently installed, most squares are refurbished and maintained, there is a decently well-equipped municipality library, all neighbourhood councils have a building to work in, there is a new police

station, some football fields have synthetic turf (and some others have been refurbished), etc. The current state of the neighbourhood is radically different from what people can remember from previous years, when most neighbours had no sewage treatment facilities and lived in wooden houses, with dirt roads and football fields made only out of earth. Consequently, most interviewees (both active and non-active residents) agree that LH is comfortable compared to other poor zones of the city. Confirming this, a long-time resident told me, ‘if you look at the *población* now, you just can’t imagine how it used to be; it has changed so much (. . .) living here is much better now’ (Interview, 14 March 2013c).

Moreover, although interviewees take precautions to protect their security against criminality, most agree that LH is a reasonably safe and peaceful place compared to other poor urban areas in Santiago. For example, a woman explained, ‘you have to be careful, like everywhere, but it is pretty safe in general; you can walk at night and you’ll be all right. In other places, it’s not like here [it is more dangerous]’ (Interview 28 February, 2013). LH is also perceived as a very well-connected neighbourhood, due to bus accessibility and underground stations nearby (Los Presidentes and Avenida Grecia metro stations).

While most interviewees positively assess the neighbourhood’s comfort, only active residents will understand this as a result of LH’s historical collective struggle. Accordingly, active residents proudly assert the neighbourhood’s improvements. For example, one of them told me, ‘it has been very tough constructing everything you see

here, but it's been us who struggled for it; nobody just gave it to us' (Interview 4 January, 2013). Another resident confirms that LH's location is the result of its people's mobilisation (Interview, 15 February 2013): 'The old people that you see here, they were the ones that fought over this land, and that's why we are here.' These ideas not only assertively express a positive trait from the community, but they also show how much of LH's symbolic value promotes political consciousness. Non-active residents do not necessarily see the neighbourhood's comfortability as a result of organisational struggle, and they assume that these have been improvements led by the municipality or the central government.

For some active residents, LH as a symbol of comfort is more prominent; they assert their community traits more through a practical, functional idea of the neighbourhood. Accordingly, those interviewees interpret social and political issues in these terms and put a lower emphasis on ideological elements. For example, when speaking about disagreements and problems with the municipality, a neighbour leading a health centre referred mainly to funding, services and infrastructure issues (Interview, 6 March 2013). Although very critical of the municipality and political parties, most neighbourhood councils also emphasise service, practical or infrastructure issues (Group Interview, 13 February 2013; Group Interview, 6 March 2013; Group Interview, 8 February 2013; Interview 23, January 2013).

Organisations which are more prone to assert these elements in LH tend to be more formal and maintain a frequent interaction with authorities. They are generally neighbourhood

councils, health centre associations and employment organisations. These organisations do not have a great ideological emphasis; although their interest in improving people's lives can be understood as political, they are less concerned with the contentious struggle over power or with broad ideas of a different society. Accordingly, their emphasis on autonomy is less intense, and they tend to have communication with authorities.

Active residents' valuing of LH's comfort expresses how residents' struggle has been successful with regard to materially developing and preserving their neighbourhood, despite economic inequalities, social injustices and institutional negligence and despite intentions of co-optation, military and police repression and drug dealers' influence, among other factors. Therefore, this valuing works in confirming political consciousness and in fostering a positive sense of 'we', whereby negative influences are attributed to external actors.

Familiarity

During an, a girl involved in different political and cultural organisations told me (Interview, 13 March 2013a), 'the *población* is like my backyard; you can see it. Here at the *población*, you live in the street and I like that (. . .) Walking around, I go everywhere here, and I feel that the *población* is like my family; LH is like a bigger family than my own family.' LH symbolises a homey place of close, familiar social bonds. Firstly, for many residents, their extended family lives in LH; secondly, since many have lived in the neighbourhood since its creation, developing a whole life in it, they recognise and know

each other; and thirdly, organisations create networks of trust and closeness that resemble the connections of family. Residents assert this homey characteristic of their neighbourhood and want to protect their community from disruptions to these forms of interaction. The neighbourhood's comfort combined with low property prices prevents residents from selling. Arguably, any alternative to LH would imply settling in the far peripheries of Santiago. These factors prevent people from leaving the *población*.

Residents (especially active ones) proudly value their close social bonds. Accordingly, a young resident told me (Group Interview, 26 February 2013), 'this is a great place, because people know each other, people help each other, you walk in the streets and you say hello to people.' Although I could find this idea also in non-active residents, they had a different approach to it: on the one hand, some were much less assertive about it, while on the other hand, some non-active residents were extremely distrustful of others.⁶⁷

In fact, the origin of this homey symbolism goes back to the period of struggle over survival and livelihood. During the land invasion, it became a common practice for the initial settlers to call other family members to join them at the *toma*. In this way, extended families obtained sites scattered around the neighbourhood in different plots. One man told me 'back then, I came with my father to settle in a plot nearby; then my father called his brother, and my mother called one of her brothers and a sister. They all established here

⁶⁷ Non-active residents were especially distrustful of other residents. I could see this on different occasions, once, for example, while a leader from one organisation was showing me around the area and we approached a shop to ask the lady at the counter about the limits of one of the zones. The lady did not want to reply to us and became hostile to us. My interviewee then said that this was common and that many people fear others even if they are from the same *población*.

with their families' (Interview, 19 February 2013). A girl also supported this idea: 'I have always lived here in Peñalolén, and almost all my family lives here in LH. A lot of people have their family living here, maybe not right next to their house like me, but in the area' (Interview, 13 March 2013a).

Organisations which especially assert this community symbolism are more commonly housing committees trying to obtain housing subsidies in the same area (neighbourhood or borough). Most often, obtaining housing subsidies entails a process of several years, coordinating efforts with leaders and going through long and tedious bureaucratic processes. Together with the Movement of Dwellers in the Struggle (MPL), several committees in LH have made great efforts to stay in the area where their relatives and friends are. The people who go through this process are generally very aware of the value of close, trustful neighbourhood relationships. As a girl in a housing committee suggested, 'this is the place of my family and my friends, this is the place my family established in, and I know everybody around (. . .) I want to get my house here and not in some other borough far away!' (Interview, 28 February 2013).

Asserting the community as a place with familiar social bonds is a way of highlighting the networks of trust that still exist in LH. As in the case of assertions of LH's comfort, the neighbourhood's networks of trust promote the protection of the place, its maintenance over time and the necessity of rejecting any external force that may want to modify it. The value of familiarity constitutes another way of subverting historical developments. Indeed, active residents proudly allude to the bonds that they have constructed in the

neighbourhood, suggesting that this particular urban community does not comply with Santiago's neoliberal developments of the past 40 years. Consequently, looking at the massive production of dangerous ghettos over the last 40 years in Santiago, active residents stress that they will not comply with social policies that provide housing to *allegados* in the distant peripheries of the city.

A space for *popular* culture

Popular culture includes traditions and art that serve as authentic forms of expression for the lower classes. According to Chateau et al. (1987, pp. 261–262), the *popular* has been historically defined by its denial; while the hegemonic national culture emerges from bourgeoisie and aristocratic life, the popular is only conceived as a degradation of that central culture. The popular flourishes in poor, subaltern areas such as poblaciones.

The popular is the proof that the lower classes are capable of order, tradition, beauty and expression. The popular is meant to foster autonomy. By questioning traditional classifications of culture and civic behaviour, the popular is in itself a form of subversion for active residents.

Local organisations see art developed in the *población* as the main expression of the popular. In consequence, many organisations embrace the production of popular art and culture as a medium to develop social struggle. In LH organisations devoted to popular art were highly numerous. Residents describe LH as a place with a great popular production of

art and culture. ‘LH is a cultural hub, and from this even more people doing cultural things appear. We have had the best puppet masters, guitar players, many folklore groups, *batucada* groups, circus groups, people doing theatre, even guys doing rap or dancing.’ In fact, the Barracón (a community building) and the 1st zone neighbourhood council’s *sede*⁶⁸ are consistently fully booked for culture and art organisations’ activities (Interview, 14 January 2013; Interview, 6 February 2013).

Local traditions are another way in which the assertion of the popular is expressed. For example, poblaciones generally celebrate their anniversaries, have communitarian parties called ‘*peñas*’ and hold street markets with cheap products.

An anniversary functions as the central yearly community event of the población. In LH, the anniversary is understood politically, because it broadens people’s access to culture and builds cohesion among community members and organisations. One of the local leaders who usually participates in organising the anniversary emphasised the political importance of the event by saying, ‘there are concerts and festivals in the centre [of the city], there in the posh areas (*barrio alto*) but they are expensive . . . so we say, why can’t we have the same here?’ (Interview, 11 March 2013a). He stressed that the anniversary brought together local cultural and artistic groups with other artists from outside of the población.

⁶⁸ *Sedes vecinales* are administered by the local neighbourhood council. In the case of neighbourhood councils that are not very involved with the community, these buildings become useful for neighbourhood council members only. Community buildings are constructed and funded by the municipality, which means that they represent a link with the authorities – a link that most mobilised residents view very sceptically. Arguably, these are some of the few spaces that neighbours have to meet in large groups or hold events.

In 2014, for, example, famous singer Chinoy was presented in LH, and in 2015, Sol y Lluvia was another one of the famous bands coming from outside of the neighbourhood.

Additionally, LH's anniversary is an opportunity for cohesion. The very organisation of the event is coordinated by several local organisations that need to come to agreements. Additionally, most local organisations attend the event. In fact, when I attended, in August 2014, I met leaders and members from many different organisations. Although many of them have had conflicts in the past, they all take part of the anniversary and most present their work there. A local group collecting historical data on the neighbourhood, for example, had set up an outdoors exhibition with photos and stories. Other local organisations participate by singing or being part of the carnival.

Welcoming all neighbours and charging very low prices, *peñas* are generally held at *sedes vecinales* (community buildings). Organisers usually charge for an entry ticket and sell soft drinks, beer, *completos* (hotdogs) or other simple food. This is also an opportunity for organisations to present their work (e.g. playing music or exhibiting paintings). *Peñas* are generally fundraising events: the money is used to coordinate larger future activities – for example, residents organise several *peñas* that provide part of the anniversary's funding. As a consequence, *peñas* play a twofold function for local organisations: first, they are part of the pool of secondary/fundraising activities that boost LH's hectic scene of community engagement. Second, they are a source of autonomy from political institutions.

Local markets are a tradition, both in LH and NA. Established in the streets of the neighbourhoods two or three times a week, markets provide most retail products for prices

below the general market average. In its centre, the neighbourhood market has a broad set of formally recognised stalls⁶⁹ offering mainstream products, from fruit to second-hand clothing. In its peripheries, however, residents set up blankets in the street and sell *cachureos*; that is, people sell anything they want, usually comprising old things they are not using but also including the reselling of a very wide range of second-hand products such as radios, building materials, clothing, mobile phones, etc. Called '*ferias*' in Chile, street markets appeared in poblaciones in the 1980s as a communitarian form of survival. Now they are still a way of providing affordable access to daily life goods for low-income residents. Street markets have become a practical way of regularly purchasing daily goods within the población. LH organisations also see the *feria* as fostering self-determination. In fact, a few active residents told me that I should always buy what I needed at the *feria*. As one resident told me (Interview, 11 March 2013a), 'you can live in LH without ever going outside of it.'

Assertions of the popular also imply a particular conception of space. Although it exceeds the realm of the local SMC, this conception shapes part of the work implemented by local organisations. In LH, residents understand the neighbourhood as a space in which they can exercise control. Arguably, they see the población as a place whose value emerges from its use and not from its market exchange value.

⁶⁹ Formal stalls belong to a street market association, and users pay a fee to the municipality.

For example, LH residents — and especially active residents — tend to walk in the middle of the road within the neighbourhood. Consequently, the most politicised organisations usually use their right to freely administer the neighbourhood spaces for events, marches, commemorations and any other public activity. ‘When you see someone walking on the sidewalk, then it means the person is not from here,’⁷⁰ said a young resident while, together with his brother, we walked in the middle of a small street, slowly followed by two cars. This conception of space clearly differs from that in other areas of the city in which the road is exclusively the realm of cars. Abiding by this concept of public space builds subversion into everyday life.

Humane values

Residents refer to LH as a place of favourable values. Active residents praise their community for being inclusive, solidaristic and humble. According to them, these values promote a more humane form of social interaction, away from neoliberal dynamics of capital.

Several interviewees — especially young residents — spoke positively about LH’s **inclusiveness**. According to them, LH welcomes diversity by having no negative judgements towards people humbly approaching organisations. As a young woman told me, ‘the población is open, open to every kind of people. Look, you can come here and

⁷⁰ Although not recorded, this quote matches closely the sense conveyed by the resident in that situation.

they will receive you well, because you come here and want to participate' (Interview, 13 March 2013a). LH's inclusiveness also works as a result of political consciousness; residents demonstrate their readiness to welcome other people who also struggle over their identity, against the state and the elite. Accordingly, a young guy told me, 'it's nice because everyone is welcome here; you have for example a lot of Mapuche people and they are very much welcome, or you even have guys coming from other parts, to learn things or to activate things, and they are all welcome' (Interview, 11 March 2013a).

Behaviourally, this assertion cannot be fully corroborated. While it is true that local organisations welcome others who share the same enemies, some of them can be quite hostile to external agents interpreted as antagonists. The more contentious organisations tend to distrust external agents. A woman I met for an interview, for example, told me, 'I was not sure whether I should meet you; you know that repression here is great (. . .) I asked about you in a couple of other organisations, some people who already know you, and I looked at stuff you had written on the Internet' (Interview, 23 February 2013).

More generally, however, organisations in LH demonstrate their inclusiveness by being welcoming to popular external organisations. Active residents also show a positive disposition towards people interested in contributing to their work and hearing their stories. In fact, some LH organisations welcome people from other poblaciones nearby and from other areas of the city who want either to work with them or to create initiatives in the neighbourhood. The great majority of active residents, for example, reacted positively to my research; they were kind and ready to help me learn about their community. In fact,

proud of their población and their work, four neighbours, on different occasions, gave me tours of the area. They helped me understand the different initiatives, the traditional zones and the safe/unsafe areas. Additionally, active residents were always ready to receive me at their homes and take considerable time for interviews.

Solidarity is also widely and positively asserted by most organisations. Solidarity is crucial for LH's SMC members. Solidarity is meant to be the heart of new, revolutionary social bonds. In consequence, defining their community as capable of building solidarity is crucial for a commonly desired future. According to active residents, the essence of the poor is solidaristic, because that is the starting point for collective struggle. In the eyes of residents, LH's history of mobilisation sealed a solidaristic heart in the community. For example, '[w]e were a *toma*; people here are used to help each other and organise' (Interview, 30 January 2013), a man told me. This essence emerges in difficult situations in which help is needed the most. This idea of solidaristic bonds aims at challenging stigmatising conceptions of the urban poor that depict them as fundamentally anomic and antisocial. Stories of solidarity in LH demonstrate a strong belief in the strength of the community, as a community capable of maintaining the great solidarity that they built in the first years of the *toma*. An active resident echoed other similar stories by telling me, 'We have solidarity, this is how it is here. Once I remember that a child didn't have shoes to wear, and people who saw this moved quickly and got new shoes for him, and they were good, new shoes!' (Group Interview, 26 February 2013).

Simultaneously, LH residents recognise that people have lost much of that solidarity. Mobilised residents suggest that a culture of individualism and competitiveness has taken over the lives of most población residents. A small portion of that solidaristic spirit seems to have been kept alive, however. Active residents claim that, in solidarity with the community, residents tend to protect their own places. For example, active residents insist on the fact that thieves do not rob within the población. According to the residents, thieves use other locations in the city to steal, thus avoiding damaging the people of the población. As exceptions, however, a few residents relativise these statements, suggesting that ‘some of them [thieves] change their routine, and end up stealing here anyway.’ Furthermore, others suggest that the incipient consumption of cocaine paste in LH has brought anomy and, with it, an increase in burglary. The fact is that active residents attribute solidarity even to thieves in the población.

Finally, many residents assert **humbleness** in local social bonds. Also historically rooted, humbleness is a central value for organisations. On the one hand, this value is based on the ideological concern over promoting equality and dignity. Arguably, only through humbleness can we achieve those ideals. On the other hand, residents suggest that humbleness has a concrete historical background. Indeed, many people who had emigrated from the countryside to the city were part of the housing committees that invaded lands in 1970. According to residents, rural people are originally brought up in a humble, quiet and more naïve environment compared to the city. A young resident aimed at contradicting stigmatising conceptions when he told me ‘[m]any are poor, but it’s clean humble people.

There is a provincial air; people say hello to each other, like in the countryside, you know?’ (Interview, 13 March 2013b).

Humbleness also serves a horizontal function among organisation members. Because leaders and members see each other as humble, they reject hierarchies. As an active rapper told me, ‘[Y]ou’ll learn/see (*cachar*), everybody is equal; the guys are humble and we respect each other, and they treat you the same way’ (Interview, 13 February 2013). ‘[H]ere, no one is more or better than others’, another man explained (Interview, 29 January 2013).

In emphasising these values, LH’s active residents are producing the idea of a community that is exceptional in comparison with the rest. As in the case of the other community assertions, the proud stress on these values places LH as a contradiction to Chilean neoliberal historical developments. Contradicting stigmatising categories, these positive assertions of values strengthen belonging.

Autonomy

A big sign at the Andean Music Festival organised in LH in late 2012 stated, ‘The people march united, without parties’⁷¹ (Interview, 25 January 2013). That message opposes a traditional motto from the 1970s and 1980s, in which parties were included in the

⁷¹ In Spanish, this quote is originally, ‘El pueblo marcha unido, sin partido.’

pobladores struggle:⁷² ‘A united people will never be defeated.’⁷³ The shift in these messages demonstrates a strong emphasis on rejecting political parties. Indeed, autonomy has become central to LH’s activism.

Most organisations are proud (especially the most radical ones) to see LH as a symbol of independent organisation. They strongly assert their autonomy from institutions — especially political parties. ‘It is in fashion today; everyone wants to be independent’ (Interview, 25 January 2013), said an interviewee. In LH, most neighbourhood councils emphatically claim to be independent from political parties and state influence — despite being the organisations more frequently relating to the local government (Group Interview, 13 February 2013; Group Interview, 8 February 2013; Interview, 23 January 2013; Interview, 6 February 2013). Something similar occurs with most other organisations.

The positive assertion that the most contentious organisations make regarding autonomy is formulated in three different ways: historical, ideological and social. Firstly, local organisations have become increasingly autonomous as a reaction to historical institutional neglect. Secondly, LH organisations praise ‘popular power.’⁷⁴ Consequently, LH’s active residents tend to attribute great value to grassroots initiatives, to the detriment of

⁷² Although there is an extended debate on the role of political parties in the *pobladores* movement, it is a fact that parties and other institutions were included in the movement. For an overview on this debate, see Castells, (1982), Garcés (2002) and Schneider (1995).

⁷³ In Spanish this quote is originally, ‘El pueblo unido, jamás será vencido.’

⁷⁴ Although previous chapters explain the meaning of ‘popular power’, I here provide a reminder. Popular power alludes to the process by which subaltern individuals exercise relatively direct power and control of their territory or institutions. Popular power is in itself a form of radical autonomy, since it opposes institutional intervention in the path towards the socialist revolution. Through participatory democracy, popular power aims at changing social relations and fostering freedom and equality (Mazzeo, 2007).

institutional actions. An active resident told me, for example, ‘LH is autonomous, because we don’t want any business with political parties. That’s how we do things now’ (Interview, 4 January 2013).

Arguably, active residents’ emphasis on popular power has its roots in movements leading *población* activism during the 1970s–1980s, which also exalted popular power as the cornerstone of the socialist revolution.⁷⁵

Additionally, active and non-active residents assert autonomy to solve social problems within the *población*. This strategy has a long-standing tradition coming from the times in which residents were completely neglected by social services. Residents easily resort to the strategy of having to deal by themselves with social problems such as water supplies, transport, security or health. This is something that even some non-active residents recognise. In reaction to police inefficiency and gang retaliations, for example, many residents maintain the policy of dealing with local conflicts on their own, never reporting criminals. This applies even in the case of burglary, drug trafficking or assaults. In the words of an interviewee, ‘Here you see a guy robbing at the corner, and the neighbours don’t call the cops. Here things are arranged within the same *población*’ (Interview, 11 March 2013a).

⁷⁵ There were many movements in Chile which, between 1960 and the 1980s, praised popular power and were represented by *población* leaders. Although diverse, these movements — which also included political party members — included mainly the Socialist Unitary Party, the MIR, the FPMR and the MJL.

Positively asserting autonomy has the subversive potential of fostering a detachment from institutionally mediated forms of social interaction. Moreover, in LH, some of these ways of positively asserting autonomy involve the larger local community. Non-active residents' positive disposition towards a relatively autonomous form of community provides a more positive environment for organisations to develop their work. Arguably, the intention of empowering the grassroots (pursued by organisations) is not completely incompatible with how many residents are used to solving local issues.

Active residents' assertion of autonomy engages directly in the historical dichotomy of 'frustration' and 'successful struggle.' In all its versions, autonomy is conceived as a reaction to either institutional abandonment or adherence to subversive ideologies. Therefore, exalting LH as an autonomous community builds dignity and pride.

CONCLUSION

Belonging to LH fosters contentious collective action through political consciousness and positive assertion. This chapter has shown that mobilisational identity in LH builds cohesiveness among local organisations while simultaneously making them aware of the social injustices causing their grievances. Additionally, by fostering an attractive image of the community, mobilisational identity boosts confidence, dignity and pride in LH's active residents. This is the formula whereby belonging constructs contentious collective action.

LH's local organisations produce political consciousness using three main mobilising symbols: *población*, *poblador* and *lucha*. These symbols serve unity. Simultaneously, they situate residents in a tradition of contentious collective action. In addition, one of the ways in which active residents positively exalt their community is by asserting their capacity of building autonomy. In doing so, they highlight the relevance of detaching from institutional definitions of democratic participation. Previous chapters teach that mobilisational identity only survives at a distance from political parties and other political institutions. The importance that LH residents give to autonomy demonstrates a crucial awareness for the survival of their contentious collective action.

Stigmatisation and exclusion of the poor is common in societies around the world. As earlier chapters have argued, this is also the case for Chilean *poblaciones*. Constructing unity and pride to autonomously build new types of social relations, LH's active residents self-construct their membership in their political community. They use identity symbols that allow them to actively belong to society but maintaining the necessary autonomy to create contentious initiatives.

Because both political consciousness and positive assertion are an expression of collective identity, they cannot easily be subjects of persuasion. One of the weaknesses of identity is that it does not recruit new adepts using convincing words. In the language of identity, recruitment requires the authentic incorporation of adepts. In other words, belonging to a community cannot be a matter of persuasion but of authentically adopting shared symbols to engage in the collective endeavour of reading reality together with others.

Identity's centrality for población's contentious mobilisation imposes large challenges on local organisations. A large division separates non-active residents from LH's SMC. Non-active residents largely do not engage in local activism because they have not had the necessary socialisation. On the one hand, most of them do not use collective engagement to obtain personal fulfilment. On the other hand, non-active residents have not incorporated mobilisational identity symbols. Persuasion is not enough for the adoption of those symbols, because it is a matter of socialisation. Consequently, from having a different socialisation, non-active residents can find action frames used by local organisations to be dogmatic and unrealistic. Non-active residents would need some specific motivation to invest the time and energy required for this socialisation process.

CHAPTER 7

MOBILISATIONAL BOUNDARIES

INTRODUCTION

While building a community orchard in a neighbourhood square, several of the youths working with me suddenly started whistling loudly—resembling farmers that herd cattle. After a few seconds, I realised that such whistling was a reaction to a police van that had just passed through the street next to us. Whistling was a demeaning and defiant way of demonstrating their rejection of police authority.⁷⁶ It was a way of expressing ‘you are not welcome here’ (Field notes, 1 March 2013). From this event, I reflected that such a sudden group reaction was a key to understanding why *población* residents come together and mobilise in the neighbourhood. Mobilising boundaries is the main concept that explains this specific situation.

Through erecting boundaries, communities produce a relational definition of who they are, as different from others. However, that is not enough to understand why, based on those boundaries, a community mobilises. As argued in the theoretical chapter, boundaries producing mobilisation define some other social actors as opponents and generate a ground

⁷⁶ Whistling in that manner is a very defiant form of conveying that policemen are like cattle: animals who act according to orders, not intelligent enough to make their own decisions.

of autonomy for collective action to occur, excluding those opponents. While belonging is concerned with the way in which active residents work together by identifying with their community, boundaries look at how they contentiously act together by distancing themselves from other social actors.

This chapter argues that, through sharing and producing identity boundaries, active *población* residents promote contentious mobilisation. Active residents base their identity boundaries on the differentiation of two separate worlds in their social experience: a formal and an informal one. Grounded in historical memory, those distinctive worlds serve as a way of subverting historical memory narratives, providing agency and promoting organisation among residents.

To express this argument, the chapter starts by revising how the formal world constitutes a threat that active residents frame as repression in their narratives. Connecting current and past (dictatorial) oppression, residents manage to produce a sense of urgency—to which their reaction is mobilising. The chapter then moves on to thoroughly define repression and show how residents' identification of antagonists clarifies mobilising as a form of defence. Finally, it proves that by defending themselves from repression, active residents create a sense of autonomy grounded in their neighbourhood. This defence reinforces active residents' agency and gives salience to protecting the neighbourhood's tradition of struggle. By sharing symbols that build mobilisational identity boundaries, LH organisations manage to question the entrenched regime of informal citizenship that residents experience.

DIFFERENTIATION

This section is devoted to explaining how active *población* residents differentiate from other social actors. In order to produce a distinctive mobilisational identity, LH organisations function with a duality that draws the line between those who are included and those who are not in LH's SMC. This duality between the formal and informal defines what is legitimised and what is not.

Although not explicitly named, in most cases residents speak of opposite worlds in their social experience. Carefully analysing interviews and observations, I have coined these worlds as 'formal' and 'informal'. Active residents express that each side of this duality constitutes a realm with particular practices, values, social relations and relevant actors. Actors and acts become legitimate as long as they meet the values in one of these specific realms.

The formal and the informal

The division between these two worlds and the centrality it has for active residents became evident to me the day on which a young active resident warned me about conducting interviews. According to him, the *truth* about why people mobilise would not become apparent through structured enquiry. Instead, he insisted, I should immerse myself in the *población's* street life. Only through *la calle* (street life) would I be able to understand the sense of mobilising in the *población*. He explained that the *población's* daily life was not

structured and could not therefore be truly investigated through specific structured questions or surveys. According to him, my formal academic structured approach would miss core issues of neighbours' political engagement. I then realised that he, like many other residents I had met, created barriers between two different worlds, each of them with different rules of engagement. These two worlds could not be experienced or understood in the same way. The world of the *población* is mainly based on learning from practical experience. In it communication is highly analogical. The academic world is based on formal institutional education, in which highly abstract concepts prevail. Accordingly, residents understand formal socialisation as a way of suppressing the poor, and the only way residents can escape that oppression is by informally learning from practical experience in the *población*. An active resident linked formal education to oppression when he explained to me, 'Schools here are awful; teachers train children only how to abide by norms and how to be a good working material for this system, nothing more' (Interview, 21 February 2013).

The formal world was also present in many interviews, in which active residents abstractly referred to 'others' or 'them', generally speaking of a set of other social actors who opposed the *población* life (Interview, 13 February 2013; Interview, 23 February 2013; Interview, 30 January 2013b; Interview, 21 February 2013; Interview, 4 March 2013; Interview, 22 February 2013). 'Others' alludes to those in power, those who successfully handle hegemonic society and produce hegemonic history: the wealthier, the institutions, the bourgeoisie, the academics, the de-politicised rappers, the cops and the military. For example, an active resident told me, 'Life is different here. The *others* have cars and go

around the city in their car, but we, the poor, have to go like sardines on the public bus' (Interview, 22 February 2013). In this way, active residents created separate worlds in their narratives: the one of the poor at the *población* and the world of 'the others', composed mainly of those in power with the capacity to oppress and discriminate against the poor.

The realm of formality refers to social relations in which actors abide by current institutional and legal norms. As they suggest, such norms have emerged through historical developments regardless of the poor's concerns. Legal norms ignore *población* organisations' historical struggle and deepen residents' marginal role in current Chilean society. 'We have no voice in the model created by the dictatorship and the Concertación' (Interview, 23 February 2013), said an active resident referring to how history shaped the *pobladores*' social position. Opposing the *población* values, the formal realm is framed as fostering a de-humanisation of people. Building individualism, the formal world creates competitiveness, greed, fear, repression, unconsciousness and amnesia. 'The human being is extirpated from their humanity, and then the system forces us into submission, in favour of the dehumanisation of people' (Interview, 31 January 2013), an active woman told me, expressing her discontent with the formal capitalist institutional system.

The formal represents a realm designed to prevent poor residents from mastering it. In consequence, residents express being alien to the formal realm's norms and standards of success. Active residents suggest that, being consistently disadvantaged in that formal world, the (non-active) poor tend to react passively to injustice, assuming that they have no successful chance of dissenting or making a difference. For example, referring to residents

in housing committees, a woman told me, ‘The ladies at committees don’t know the laws to apply at the ministry, so they [authorities] tell them whatever. We are slowly managing to exercise our rights, but it’s difficult’ (Interview, 19 February 2013b).

Active residents tend to express resentment against those who benefit from the formal system. Accordingly, those residents can make the outsider feel excluded by treating him or her as an alien to the informal world of organisations. In the residents’ eyes, I have been highly successful in my formal education. Because I came from a prominent international institution, in the *población*, I represented those who the formal institutions benefit. Hence, sometimes I was treated with hostility and exclusion. Some organisation members, for example, excluded me by keeping information from me regarding meetings, activities, or methods. When I asked, ‘Why did nobody come to the meeting a couple of days ago?’ somebody answered, ‘Because all of us went to the activity at the other square’⁷⁷ (Field notes, 26 January 2013)—an activity I was not informed about. In other opportunities, some of the members would spit on the floor in my presence. Through that gesture, a few residents meant to exclude and intimidate me—as I learned later, spitting on the floor was a sign of hostility and rejection.

Contrary to the formal world, the informal world is the *población*’s contentious organisations. Participating in the coordination of a *población* demonstration over Mapuche rights, a group met at a house. I was invited to prepare posters and large signs

⁷⁷ This sentence was not recorded, and was obtained through informal communications, therefore it cannot be referenced. However, it preserves its original meaning.

with them. Watching their skilful movements and technical conversations, it became evident to me how active residents confidently mastered the art of *población* activism. Knowing all the technical details, one resident quickly prepared the solution for sticking posters on walls. Others, after briefly discussing wording, wrote on huge plastic fabrics and avoided spilling a single drop of spray paint. That night, posters were stuck on *población* walls and hung from city highway bridges. As suggested above, this example shows how the informal is a realm that active residents master and control.

In fact, informality provides active residents with control and knowledge over their own neighbourhood and organisations. For example, at the beginning of an interview, an active resident showed how the group exercises control through informal procedures. She explained that she had done some research about me though the *población*'s informal network before accepting the interview. She added, 'We have *our ways* of finding out about these things' (Interview, 23 February 2013). Through 'our ways', the interviewee was referring to what she considers informal *población* procedures. These procedures are meant to be understood differently from what could be more standard, formal methods. Accordingly, informal procedures work as a way of controlling inclusion and legitimacy.

At the occupied square the organisations prepared an activity to be held a few days later. 'Does the word "*organización*" (organisation) have an accent mark?' asked a kid helping to write large signs that promoted the activity. The impulse to respond with a 'yes' crossed my mind. However, another active *población* resident quickly and assertively answered, 'It doesn't matter; don't put any accent mark on it'. With that confident and reassuring answer

the resident expressed that formally acquired knowledge (school grammar formation) is not required at *población* organisations, and it would consequently never determine inclusion or exclusion from that group. This example demonstrates not only the dismissal of formal knowledge but also that successful inclusion into LH's organisations rests on informal knowledge, norms and procedures.

Active residents manage to discursively establish an area that accommodates their capacities and needs. Created by residents, the informal realm is also a sort of malleable place in which they can collectively intervene and try out new things; however, in practical terms, this tends to happen within a certain framework of collective action repertoires.

Historically, the *población's* '*lucha*' (struggle) is, in essence, informal. Informality is embedded in the heart of the neighbourhood's historical memory of struggle. All stages of LH's historical struggle that residents currently value are demonstrations of informality: the land squatting in 1970, the struggle over housing at the *toma* and coordinated demonstrations with clandestine political parties against the dictatorship in the 1980s. In all of these cases, residents developed a struggle outside the realm of formal institutional procedures. Engaged in the ideals of popular power, LH's historical struggle is informal because it narrates the ways in which the poor created and told their history from the margins. In consequence, although all historical developments at the *población* are parallel to national political shifts, for active residents, they all occur away from the central formal political arena.

While the formal is mostly thought of within the legal framework, the informal cannot be assimilated with the ‘illegal’. Although it may be sometimes illegal (e.g., squatting on lands or interrupting transit), informality has a political meaning: It provides the poor with something that legitimately belongs to them through means that do not comply with formally accepted procedures but responds to logics of the popular world. As seen by the narratives’ differentiation between the informal and the illegal, a few active residents suggested that illegality is actually not alien to the informal world of organisations. Speaking of a specific active resident who was allegedly associated with criminality, an interviewee said, ‘He is harmful for our organisations; he does wrong because he promotes stuff that is *illegal*, which is not part of our activism’ (Interview, 23 February 2013).

In fact, although strongly committed to *población* activism’s informality, active residents tended to reject illegal acts. In several interviews and also in some informal communications, active residents explained this rejection through the idea of ‘marginality’. Referring to how some residents used to promote illegal activities within organisations, an active resident explained that such behaviour was a result of ‘being marginal’ (Interview, 29 January 2013). Other active residents used this same expression to refer to the same phenomena (Interview, 21 February 2013; Interview, 23 February 2013; Group Interview, 13 February 2013a). Suggesting that somebody is ‘too marginal’ implies that the person is governed by the lifestyle accustomed to marginal ghettos—in which anomy and illegal activities are common—and is disconnected from neighbours’ necessities and community life.

Worlds in conflict

The differentiation that residents make between formality and informality is far from peaceful. In fact, the mobilising potential of this differentiation strives in the conflicted relationship between those two worlds. Active residents' narratives suggest that the formal world constantly threatens the informal one. Making consistent efforts to formalise the informal, institutions (e.g., the government, the police, political parties and others) threaten the neighbourhood organisations' realm of dignity and control. In consequence, residents mobilise in order to reject those forces and to resist the formal world's intentions of formalisation. Institutions constitute the central agent in this consistent effort of formalisation. The method whereby the formal world imposes over the informal is what residents call 'repression'.

By speaking about repression, LH's active residents imply that organisations currently experience a level of oppression similar to that imposed by the dictatorship. In fact, most active residents suggest that Chile is currently in a 'dictatorship', in which their constant struggle offers the only opportunity of expression. Echoing many other communications that also spoke of current repression, a resident stated, 'There is a powerful feeling of injustice, especially during the dictatorship, on how they [the military] persecuted, repressed and killed Chile's best guys; and that is a feeling that we keep on having today, but more mildly' (Interview, 15 February 2013b). An older and more radical active resident supported this idea by telling me, 'The repression that we experienced in the dictatorship never lowered; now it's more disguised, but it never changed' (Interview, 4

January 2013). This idea of a consistent repressive dictatorship serves active residents' historical memory narratives; establishing an evident continuity with the past, it brings oppression and exclusion to current days. In consequence, by asserting that institutions repress through their consistent efforts of formalisation, exclusionary narratives applied to historical memory generate an urgent reaction to protect against that oppression. LH's active residents react to this repression by mobilising. In the act of mobilising, active residents subvert the historical memory of exclusion.

Bringing repression to the present is a way of recreating a repertoire of mobilisation; framing the current situation through repression makes it necessary and urgent to activate the neighbourhood's *lucha* (struggle), which asserts mobilisational identity on all possible fronts (see Chapter 6 for more details).

Non-active residents have not had the same political socialisation. Not all of them know local organisations' framings, but those who do tend to see many claims as disproportionate. Alonso, for example, who was highly active during the 1980s, left the world of local organisations in the 1990s. In his view, current *población* organisations idealise the time of the dictatorship too much: 'It's like they wanted to be back in the dictatorship . . . and I don't think that's necessary to mobilise over ideals today' (Interview, 25 January 2013). In fact, non-active residents do not speak about repression unless they refer to dictatorial times.

Non-active residents' views regarding conflicts between the grassroots organisations and institutions is entirely different from that of active residents. While active residents

emphatically attribute responsibility to the institutional system when talking about repression, non-active residents trust institutions more. Hence, non-active residents also tend to attribute the responsibility for conflicts to neighbourhood organisations. One non-active interviewee, for example, was especially clear about this when referring to Manuel Gutierrez, a boy killed by the police during a protest. This neighbour said, ‘Yeah, the cops acted wrongly, but what was the boy doing? He was not an angel; they had barricades!’ (Interview, 14 March 2013a). In this quote and during the interview, this resident suggested that by becoming involved in dangerous contentious acts, Manuel Gutiérrez had somehow caused his own death—thus attributing responsibility to organisations.

In how they operate and in their aesthetics, LH organisations tend to distinguish themselves from the formal world of institutions. As I explained in more detail earlier, organisations in Nuevo Amanecer (NA) do not seek differentiating from institutions. Instead, they seek to resemble institutions in their aesthetics and forms of functioning. In contrast, LH’s neighbourhood councils have a smaller infrastructure and seem to pay less attention to making refurbishments or maintaining their *sede*. Most *sedes* in LH are only one large community room, in which organisations hold activities and the board carries out its meetings. Externally, these buildings have a dirt floor. The oldest, most important *sedes* have murals and graffiti. This demonstrates the link that even the most formal grassroots organisations in LH have with the informal world.

The following section provides more detail on how repression works. The section explores how LH's active residents differentiate from other social actors by framing them as antagonists.

DEFINING ANTAGONISTS

For LH's active residents, antagonists result from the duality between the formal and the informal worlds. As argued before, the formal constantly tends to control the informal—making it comply with institutional norms, which ultimately benefit only the powerful. The relation between active residents and other social actors is a result of that tension between the formal and the informal. This tension sets the role of each actor; while some are antagonists, others simply benefit from the system's efforts towards formalisation.

Active residents in LH consider social actors antagonists when those actors actively exercise repression over organisations, becoming the central agents of formalisation. These actors comprise what residents tend to call 'institutions': *inter alia* the central and local governments, the police, political parties, the educational system, academia and NGOs. Other social actors benefit from a hegemonic formal realm: higher classes and other residents uninterested in political change. These social actors have a twofold position because, while actively producing repression, they also benefit from it: drug dealers, the

rich ⁷⁸ and—according to more radical organisations—uncritical neighbourhood organisations (mainly neighbourhood councils that comply with the municipality’s interests). According to active residents, drug dealers have chosen to access wealth by using illegal means. Being a result of a formal system that fosters accumulation, competitiveness and greed, drug dealers obtain social recognition from managing large quantities of money. Active residents argue that drug dealing is a highly lucrative business that generates substance dependency in residents and increases violence in neighbourhood public areas. Therefore, in their eyes, drug trafficking is a tool implemented by formal institutions to demobilise the urban poor

The rich also profit from the formal world’s repression. They constitute the head of the social pyramid, corruptly controlling the creation of laws and policies to their benefit.

This conflict between the formal and the informal builds a division within LH’s organisations. Organisations engaged in contentious collective action conceive of some other local organisations as accomplices of formalisation. This is the case of some neighbourhood councils, grassroots health centres and mothers’ centres. As previous chapters explain, the historical roots of this distrust go back to the dictatorship. Undemocratically appointed by the military during the dictatorship, neighbourhood

⁷⁸ For the purpose of this chapter, the rich are differentiated from the higher classes. The rich constitute a group of highly wealthy people who have a strong influence on national political matters. Although active residents think negatively of the rich, they are generally not a common topic and seem to be treated with more distance. On the other hand, active residents speak much more commonly and closely about people from the higher classes. Active residents identify people as belonging to higher classes when they come from wealthier areas of the city or hold greater access to opportunities. Generally, active residents view people from higher classes with scepticism and resentment.

councils signify grassroots control and institutional repression. As active residents have noted, some of these organisations ‘do the government’s job here in the *población*’ (Field notes, 23 February 2013).

Oswaldo Romo is a historical symbol of this divide between the formal and the informal at the grassroots level. Contentious organisations refer to Romo as the primary example of treason. After being a *población* leader in the early 1970s, Romo became one of the most prominent repressive agents of Pinochet’s dictatorship (see Chapter 4 in Payne 2009). Romo—also derogatorily called *Guatón Romo* (Fat Romo)—betrayed the informal grassroots to repress them. He became what active residents call a *sapo* (snitch). Residents currently use Romo’s story as a reference to fear unknown people, especially if they seem to exercise power over residents in any way.

Active residents’ distrust is a protection against external unknown people that may contribute to their repression. Accordingly, when I asked about why some residents did not trust me, one interviewee told me, ‘It’s somehow understandable that some people don’t trust you. Did you know that we had *Guatón Romo* here? He betrayed many people here’ (Interview 30 January, 2013a).⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Oswaldo Romo was a leader and resident of LH’s 3rd zone between 1970 and 1973. Being a very influential leader, Romo established many connections with leftist grassroots activists. After Pinochet’s coup (1973), Romo became an agent of the Chilean Intelligence National Direction (DINA), helping to capture many of his former colleagues as a *población* activist. Because of these facts, Romo is currently a historical symbol of repression; he exemplifies how a *población* colleague can be transformed into an antagonist, representing repressive formal institutions.

The main antagonists are political parties and the police. I here revise the meanings attached to them. The local government (municipality) is also a strong antagonist but only because it plays the same role as political parties.

In the eyes of LH's active residents, political parties are detached from grassroots interests. Responding only to hierarchical commands, party militants are seen as disconnected from local necessities. Instead, they intend to only accumulate power and obtain privileges. Active residents go as far as rejecting the party electoral system. The electoral system, they argue, is the method by which parties validate their monopolisation of power. 'Parties only approach organisations to use us' (Interview 6 February, 2013), an active resident told me, and another one said, 'Parties manipulate us' (Group Interview 8 February, 2013). In fact, active residents tend to reject other organisation members that simultaneously belong to parties:

People at organisations don't trust them [party members] and have resentment towards them. . . . When somebody from an organisation belongs to a party, that person ultimately ends up paying attention to party commands and not to what he/she should construct with the organisation (Interview, 30 January 2013a).

Accordingly, although once centrally involved in the neighbourhood's activist life, the Movement of Residents in the Struggle (MPL) lost much of its leadership in LH when it became associated with the Partido Igualdad (Equality Party), thereby becoming involved in the formal electoral system. Even if the MPL was born in LH and many of its members belong to the *población*, its compliance with institutional formal regulations produced

active residents' distrust and resentment (Interview, 1 March 2013; Interview, 29 January 2013).

While parties and local governments are conceived as more abstract repressing agents, the police represent the physical dimension of repression. In fact, residents in general (but especially active residents) perceive the police with hatred and fear. The police presence within the *población* is, itself, understood as repressive. Organisations immediately interpret a police presence as an intrusion that curtails their freedom. An active resident explained this distrust towards the police by saying,

There is a lot of hatred, and it goes beyond what one would want. I mean, they kill a policeman and you get happy! You tend to forget that those guys [policemen] are also human beings, who have families and all. That feeling comes from us being always under the boot; they have always fucked us, that's why we have hoarded hatred. . . . For example, they killed a young boy [Manuel Gutiérrez] last year near here (Interview, 15 February 2013).

Policemen largely represent the strongest disconnection from active residents' ideals. Because policemen only respond to higher commands, they represent the complete lack of autonomy, co-optation to the highest expression. Additionally, most active residents have had interactions with policemen, noticing their uncompromising attitude. 'The cops obey whatever they are told',⁸⁰ stated an active resident, explaining that the police embody the strictest respect for formal norms and arbitrary oppressive commands (Field notes, 7 February 2013). In fact, policemen are portrayed as arrogant, negligent and inefficient.

⁸⁰ This sentence was not recorded, and was obtained through informal communications therefore it cannot be referenced. However, it preserves its original meaning.

During my time in LH, I noticed that the most radical active residents refer to repression in almost any allusion to the police. Once, for example, I helped an organisation attaching protest signs. At some point, one of the organisation members told me, ‘Stay focused, look around, because the police may come to *repress* us’ (Field notes, 20 January 2013).

My interviews show that many non-active residents also fear the police. ‘Since that period [the dictatorship], you are helpless with the police’ (Interview, 14 March 2013b), said an older woman, demonstrating that fear and resentment towards the police can be traced back to dictatorial times in most residents.

The rejection towards the police manifests in particular derogatory expressions. For example active youths—as well as other non-active young residents—differentiate between types of policemen: the *ratis* and the *perros*—both demeaning names. *Ratis*⁸¹ corresponds to Investigation Police Forces (PDI), and they are known to be especially aggressive in their interaction with people. *Perros* (dogs) instead, derogatorily alludes to general police forces, who are more docile and respectful. A young resident told me, ‘Those are the ones we call “dogs”; those are the typical *pacos* (policemen) that check you in the street’ (Interview, 11 March 2013).

Types of repression

⁸¹ This word has no translation. It is probably a neologism that incorporated the word ‘*rata*’ (rat).

Active residents in LH use the symbol ‘repression’ to name specific institutional interventions in the informal world of organisations. I identified three main forms of repression: manipulating grassroots organisations, constraining regulation of spaces and restricting economic and cultural life.

A. Institutions utilise local organisations

This type of repression has different manifestations. In all cases, LH’s active residents refer to institutional efforts to profit from organisations’ work. In interpreting this phenomenon as repression, local organisations intuitively reject partisan intentions of accumulating political capital. ‘[T]hey [political parties] use our work with their interests, and that shouldn’t happen’, explained an active resident (Interview, 6 February 2013). Here I provide a few examples of how institutional utilisation of local organisations works.

The first example is the utilisation that political parties attempt to make of events organised by local residents. Activities such as the anniversary of some *peñas* (neighbourhood parties) have wide popularity among residents. Reaching a wide audience, these events are attractive to politicians seeking popularity. However, local organisations have systematically refused to accept funding from parties or promote any political candidate in these activities.

The second example is what local organisations deem as discretionary delivery of state funding by the municipality. They argue that the municipality only gives funding to organisations prioritising functional, a-critical projects.

The third example is the local government's directive relationship with some neighbourhood councils and other *población* organisations. Most neighbourhood councils have declared full autonomy from parties or the local government. However, the most radical local organisations insist on accusing some neighbourhood councils of having acquiescent relationships with the authorities.

Confronted with institutional utilisation of organisational work, local organisations react with contentious collective initiatives. During the second half of 2012, Chilean streets were flooded with banners, posters and signs. The elections were to be held in late October that year, and all the candidates campaigned. Facing the utilisation of their *población* to promote political campaigns, a group of LH's local organisations organised a march. They mobilised as a result of what they considered repression. The march was meant to denounce parties, and it consisted of calling on residents not to participate in elections. The protesters marched through Grecia Avenue, destroying political signs and banners. Similarly, active residents categorically reject situations in which politicians intend to use activities to promote their campaigns or boost their image.

B. Constraining regulation of spaces

Space regulation results from the residents' and government's different views of public areas. Opposing a capitalist privatising notion of property, organisations tend to think of the neighbourhood as a place they can freely use for their events, meetings, marches or any other activity. The local government instead generally sees the neighbourhood as part of

Santiago's public urban infrastructure, with roads that should not be blocked, public squares that should not be transformed into farms and many other investments that should not be used by specific local organisations. Through informal communications and interviews, I found out that many residents consider it to be repressive when authorities ask for a permit to block *población* roads for a community event (Interview, 11 March 2013).

Additionally, drug dealers constitute a crucial actor in the repression of residents' mobilisation. Bringing drugs to the *población*, drug dealers use public spaces for their business and intimidate those who may be an obstacle for their activities. Neighbourhood public areas thus become potentially violent and dangerous, restricting their use by organisations. 'Now drug dealers are all over the Victor Jara Square, and the problem is that many people even defend them because they fear them' (Interview, 26 February 2013), an active resident told me, expressing the urgency of solving the issue of drug trafficking at the *población*.

As a result, local organisations coordinate *recuperaciones* (recovering spaces). They carry out art workshops, paint graffiti or organise community events in areas taken over by drug dealers. Drug dealers are compelled to move and sell drugs on a different corner some afternoons.

Restrictive economic cultural system

Active youths in LH perceive the formal world as a broader economic and cultural system that curtails people's freedom. 'This is a system that crushes you down, it doesn't let you

be yourself' (Group Interview, 13 February 2013), a young active man told me. Young active residents speak of being determined by a repressive de-humanising system, having very few alternatives to choose from in their lives:

It's a lack of humanity; this society is like a pipe, it takes you through two different possible ways: either forced work for 10, 12 or 14 hours a day, so that you can survive, or it takes you to criminality and drugs, so you end up in jail. If you are not useful to the model, well then too bad, you are just dead (Interview, 30 January 2013b).

Accordingly, for young active residents (especially the more radical ones), the most important institution exercising this sort of repression is the educational system. Those active residents suggest that education submits people to an oppressive society, whose core values are competitiveness and individualism. Those active residents suggest that children in school do not learn how to be themselves or how to expand their ideas creatively; they learn how to obey norms in order to become useful workers who serve only capitalistic society. Accordingly, an active young female told me, 'In the end almost anyone can teach at a school. Anyone is useful, but that person is useful for the system that subjugates children; it is from teachers that all children's submission comes from' (Interview, 21 February 2013). And another one said, 'The idea would be that education gave you the tools to be who you want to be, and not that they shape you to be what society wants you to be' (Interview, 13 March 2013). In this line, the mental health system and many NGOs also constitute methods whereby the formal system exercises cultural repression. Additionally, active residents claim that the labour market discriminates against them, reducing their life opportunities:

At Cerro 18 my mother just could not find a job because we were from there. Almost everyone had to lie about their address not to be discriminated at workplaces (. . .) When you are poor . . . you just cannot choose these things; it's oppressive, you just have to follow a direction but without any freedom (Interview, 22 February 2013).

Young active residents react by organising initiatives of alternative education. For example, they coordinate workshops on critical pedagogy. Additionally, they strongly reject hierarchical relationships in organisations, with the aim of avoiding power concentrations. These are ways of assuring feelings of freedom, countering what they consider to be a highly restrictive, oppressive cultural system.

This subsection has provided an account of how the symbol of 'repression' plays a central role in promoting contentious collective action in LH. Resulting from the conflicting interaction between the formal and the informal worlds, repression builds the urgency to mobilise. Interpreting social reality as 'repressive' is meant to connect present conflicts with past confrontations between the military dictatorship and *población* grassroots organisations. As a consequence, repression has the performative value of calling for the defence of community and identity.

SELF-DETERMINATION

At the end of August, different bands played to commemorate Manuel Gutierrez's death in one of LH's squares. Killed by a police gunshot at a student protest in 2011, young *población* dweller Gutiérrez has become a highly emblematic figure for embodying repression at the highest level. A local leader, rapping on the stage, interrupted his song, as

the bass continued in the background. He gave a harangue to the audience: ‘[H]ere is where we construct our community, brother . . . with our [activist] work every day, and nobody else can come to tell us how to do this’ (Field notes, 24 August 2014). Although perhaps a little grandiose, this leader expressed the effect of mobilising boundaries.

Differentiating formal from informal, active residents in LH construct a space in which institutions, as well as formal ‘adequate’ procedures, enjoy less legitimacy in the *población*. Neighbourhood councils are a good measure of how the *poblaciones* deal with issues of autonomy and co-optation. This is because they are, by nature, linked to municipalities and other state institutions and are generally criticised by more contentious organisations for accommodating political party interests.

At LH’s 17th neighbourhood council, a conflict emerged because a section of its board decided to align their activities with political party interests. The president and a number of other board members defied that decision, claiming that the council was meant to work autonomously. As a result, the group of party associate members abandoned the council and decided to develop their neighbourhood initiatives independently. Additionally, the 18th neighbourhood council in LH has become one of the only councils in Santiago to be run exclusively by youths who strongly reject political party influence. Other youth groups in the *población* are now following this example in order to reclaim their spaces of participation. These facts, together with several stories similar to the one above, show the importance of autonomy to active residents in LH. The explanations on the process of demobilisation that I provide in Chapter 4 show a stark difference between the two

communities under study (NA and LH). This rejection toward political institutions is absent in NA, especially among neighbourhood councils.

Self-determination in LH is not only declarative. In fact, my interviews with local authorities suggest that right-wing leaders are the only ones who have established durable loyalties with a few local organisations. Most centre-left and leftist leaders declared they would not to seek help from local leaders for electoral campaigns. In fact, one politician explained that leftist politicians have become highly unsuccessful in reaching local organisations. He said that ‘even the far-left politicians do not do well in LH’. This results from the fact that most local organisations are left wing and reject party politics. The only organisations fully open to engage in party politics are those connected with right-wing politicians (Interview, 7 February 2013).

Another example of self-determination is the conflicted referendum over a new master plan, initiated by local organisations in 2011. As I explain in earlier chapters, local organisations saw the new master plan as a threat of gentrification. Ultimately, therefore, this referendum resulted in the protection of LH. This event is a clear example of organisations translating distance from institutions into relatively self-determined action. With this initiative they managed to secure a space for the sustainability of mobilisational identity.

The neighbourhood also expresses this self-determination by exhibiting numerous graffiti. These graffiti depict different aspects of mobilisational identity. Some show traditional popular artists, such as Victor Jara or Violeta Parra. Others show police repression. More

generally, however, murals and graffiti demonstrate the control that local organisations exercise in the neighbourhood. Arguably, graffiti represent informal, subaltern culture. They boost local identity and a sense of self-determination.

Additionally, self-determination manifests in the strong emphasis that local organisations put on using *autogestión* (self-management). In other words, LH's organisations conceive self-management as the ideal way of funding their initiatives. Self-administration involves organising additional activities in advance, whose revenues fund larger events. *Peñas*, *bingos*, *completadas* (hotdog parties), football tournaments and many others are usually used as forms of self-management. While a few, more radical organisations insist on using only self-management, others combine it with government funding.

Renovations

Much of the autonomy resulting from boundary production connects current local organisations with past radical movements, such as the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) and Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL). When these movements resort to mobilising symbols, it constructs a severe and rigid of boundary between the formal and the informal worlds. Using 'popular power', for example, is a way of symbolically approximating to these groups. Popular power aims at building power in complete detachment from the state. Also, '*recuperaciones*' are symbols that connect with those past radical movements. Although initially used by the MIR, the FPMR and MJL movements also named many of their initiatives '*recuperaciones*'. 'Recovering' is meant to provide

the poor with something that they had been historically dispossessed of (e.g., lands). Under this claim, the MIR robbed banks and commercial shops. In the 1980s, the FPMR and MJL became famous for hijacking food trucks, bringing them to shantytowns and distributing their contents among poor residents under the claim of ‘recovering’. Today residents use the same word as a symbol that connects them with LH’s informal past and builds self-determination.

In spite of this symbolic connection with past radical groups, the current youth have developed new forms of creating autonomy in their public engagement. Indeed, they reject the highly hierarchical structures of movements such as the MJL and FPMR.

My interviews account for a search for renovation. This search puts the individual at the centre of motivation and responsibility. Alluding to discussions that old leaders had during a meeting, for example, a young active resident told me,

In these meetings there were these people, they have years in this, each had their political discourse. They are old leaders, important today, and they were debating about things that happened many years ago, and I felt like there were conflicts that they were transmitting to us, and these things didn’t have too much sense . . . I then decided to do my own path and to become an independent worker for the revolution (Group Interview, 13 February 2013).

This renovation takes a relative distance from traditional leftist narratives, praising freedom and individual autonomy. A young resident in LH explained the centrality of building individual engagement by saying,

I don’t believe in ‘isms’, like Marxism, Leninism or any of those. I feel like we should have a spiritual knowledge, and I am not talking about being ‘hippy’. I mean something

simpler that is basic, I mean respect, and communication, and for that you need a higher level of consciousness (Interview, 15 February 2013).

Building a sense of self-determination is a complex matter, which includes both collective and individual processes. In all cases, however, what local organisations exalt is informality. In other words, LH organisations reject hierarchical and strict structures, giving prominence to authentic autonomous initiative. A sense of self-determination implies building a position in society with greater autonomy from institutional enabling and restraining forces. The case of NA proves that party engagement in grassroots politics has limited local organisations' contentious action. Keeping distance from political parties and other political institutions allows LH's active residents to build a novel position in the Chilean polity.

CONCLUSION

This chapter argues that boundary construction builds contentious collective action in LH. The chapter proves that the dynamics whereby groups differentiate from other social actors are not enough to explain mobilising boundary production. A comprehension of how these dynamics involve the identification of antagonists needs to be included to explain the mobilising potential of identity boundaries.

In their narratives and practices, active residents use the duality between formality and informality in order to produce identity boundaries. Although not explicitly, active

residents use those two categories in order to allude to two different worlds in their social experience.

The formal world includes laws, proper procedures and hegemonic interpretations of history, which benefit only the privileged. In contrast, the informal refers to the realm of popular neighbourhood organisations, responding to the necessities of the poor and constructing a counterculture of popular knowledge and procedures. While *población* residents feel distant from the formal world—being unable to understand its success codes, informality provides them with a space that accommodates their capacities and needs, a space they can master, by self-administering the codes of inclusion and success.

In LH's local organisations' eyes, the formal realm consistently threatens the informal world of popular activism. The formal not only benefits those in privileged positions but also it insists on formalising the rest of society. This constant effort of formalisation is what active residents call 'repression'. In consequence, for example, active residents spoke of repression when alluding to the local government's request to obtain legal personality (formalising) so they could apply for public funding.

The chapter shows how the idea of repression is meant to generate continuity with the human rights violations and oppressive experiences during the dictatorship. Additionally, the notion of repression produces the urgency of activating LH's struggle as a necessary reaction to such oppression, thus promoting mobilisation.

Since the main agents of repression are institutions—namely, political parties, the police, the local and central governments, the educational system, and others—active neighbours conceive of them as the antagonist to struggle against and protect from, which triggers activism. Simultaneously, a set of other social actors tends to be seen sceptically and is many times excluded from LH's activist informal world for being beneficiaries of the formal system of privileges. Using their neighbourhood as a container of the informal, active residents manage to defend against what they deem as 'repression'. They, for example, reject academic discourses and totalising ideologies as a way of protecting from cultural repression. In consequence, active residents manage to create alternative forms of inclusion, in which they can feel authors of their own community and contradict the entrenched order of citizenship.

Using mobilisational identity boundaries, LH residents have created a space in which institutions and formal procedures do not enjoy legitimacy as they do in most other areas of the city. Exalting the 'informal', LH organisations construct a realm in which belonging responds to symbols detached from regular types of citizenship across the city.

The autonomy that comes with this sense of self-determination also translates into isolation. As I have described earlier, a divide separates LH's SMC from non-residents. Mobilising boundaries requires using symbols that seem rather distant, and even unrealistic, to non-active residents.

The contrast with NA organisations is sharp. NA organisations do not use the symbol of repression, for example. In consequence, their interaction with authorities is not as defiant

as in LH. Instead, the NA organisations' relationship with institutions is more peaceful and acquiescent. In fact, some NA organisations do not seek to differentiate, but to assimilate to formal political institutions. Arguably, these organisations seek belonging in their political networks of loyalty.

CHAPTER 8

DECENTRALISED LEADERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

This chapter argues that decentralised leadership is largely responsible for the sustainability of mobilisational identity. Decentralised leadership results from a tendency among Lo Hermida (LH) organisations to transmit political capital. Conversely, Nuevo Amanecer (NA) leaders are highly concerned with monopolising political capital. It must be noted that the dispersion of leadership is a part of mobilisational identity. In other words, leadership structure is the mechanism whereby mobilisational identity secures its own survival. Drawing evidence from both case studies is critical in order to properly examine how this works. Therefore, unlike in the other chapters devoted to mobilisational citizenship, in this case I provide contrasts between LH and NA when possible.

As explained in Chapter 3, several scholars have attempted to explain grassroots urban collective action from the perspective of citizenship. None of them, however, provided a satisfactory explanation for how mobilisation can be sustained over time (Holston, 2008, 2011; Faranak Miraftab & Wills, 2005). In this chapter, the author seeks to fill this gap in the theoretical literature by examining a neighbourhood-based protagonist identity that can serve as a core contributor to the sustainability of *mobilisational citizenship*.

As explained in Chapter 2, my largest observational experience in LH was at an organisation occupying a local square. The evidence presented in this chapter is strongly rooted in my participation in that organisation. As one of the most contentious in LH, this organisation provides accurate and comprehensive insights on the processes of resistance and collective action.

The chapter starts by demonstrating that mobilisational identity transmission is effectively practiced in LH organisations. An explanation of the ways in which this transmission is executed is provided. In this chapter, I explain why mobilisational identity must be considered a form of political capital. By establishing a comparative perspective with NA, I show the commitment of leaders and active residents in LH towards dispersing political capital. While these first sections focus on the roles of specific leaders, the segments that follow focus on the ways in which decentralisation is promoted in micro-mobilisation.

Through face-to-face interactions, organisation members build a sense of protagonism. In other words, the members collectively foster their empowerment as community builders. Together, they construct their own roles within LH's community of struggle. In this chapter, I examine this production of protagonism using Gamson's mobilising acts of micro-mobilisation (namely, organising, reframing, and divesting). Finally, the chapter analyses the contributions of rejecting hierarchies, rejecting service provision, and alternative forms of education that promote decentralised leadership.

IDENTITY TRANSMISSION

As described in Chapter 2, mobilisation in LH is based only partially on stable neighbourhood organisations. The largest portion of LH's contentious activism stems from the dynamic implementation of initiatives by groups that appear or change depending on their necessity. This complex dynamic results from a twofold leadership structure. On the one hand, it is possible to identify specific individuals who act as leaders. They concentrate comparatively higher legitimacy, network connections, knowledge, and access to resources. These leaders use these resources to facilitate initiative implementation in different areas of a neighbourhood. This is what a young active resident emphasised when I asked him about LH surviving contentious collective action:

[I]n every area here, you find someone who is representative, and you can count on that person to help you or open doors for you if you want to organise something there (...) this allows us to maintain what we are doing, for example, we decided to keep on doing the *pascuas populares* (popular Christmas) (Interview, 26 February 2013).

On the other hand, leadership becomes decentralised. Leaders tend to transfer mobilisational identity symbols, making political capital accessible to other active residents. This dissemination of political capital allows active residents to acquire a sense of protagonism. Protagonism and possible assistance from leaders allow autonomous groups to design local initiatives. Furthermore, protagonism promotes the emergence and renewal of leaders.

Although this chapter's argument pushes forward the notion of decentralised leadership, the importance of specific individual leaders cannot be neglected (Barker et al., 2001). Informal leaders concentrate more knowledge, connections to informal networks, and

access to resources than other members (Bénit-Gbaffou & Katsaura, 2014; Smucker, 2013). This was true in both the communities I studied (LH and NA).

Unlike in NA, in organisations in LH there is a clear emphasis on the transmission of mobilisational identity symbols among LH leaders. The recipients of this transmission are mainly younger residents (usually children). This transmission complements previous political socialisation processes that youths and children experience with other relevant life figures (usually parents, siblings or other family members) who also provide mobilisational identity symbols. These leaders, however, contribute to confirming those symbols at the public level, thus promoting unity and mobilisation.

In fact, when I asked an older leader what the community did to keep mobilisational identity alive, he explained that it resulted from activities devoted to political socialisation of the younger generations. ‘It’s because of all the work that has been done in *colonias urbanas* (children camps) and things like that... the same work that was done in the 80s, and that we do with the youth now,’ he told me (Interview, 4 January 2013).

Older leaders are the main ambassadors of mobilisational identity, a concept developed in the 1980s. The capacity of demonstrating knowledge and applied experience on strategies used in the 1980s is highly regarded among organisations in LH. Those potentially capable of identity transmission (because of their past experiences and knowledge) enjoy higher social legitimacy. When a leader uses legitimacy in conjunction with political aims, we say that s/he has political capital (Casey, 2005). Obtaining political capital means

accumulating credibility and social standing. Standing and credibility make leaders appear influential to others (Bénit-Gbaffou & Katsaura, 2014).

In Effron and Miller's (2012) terms, decisions and actions are more likely to become legitimised by others when they are motivated by moral values. Organisation members in LH attribute noble convictions and high moral standards to residents who have led activism in the past, especially if they engaged in the *población* national protests of the 1980s. Consequently, when current leaders narrate anecdotes and display knowledge resulting from their involvement in those protests, they increase their legitimacy. In telling these stories, leaders appear as having valid knowledge to be transmitted to others. 'She [a local leader] was there [at the national protests], you know, she fought against the military (*milicos*), I don't know if she was from the FPMR (*Frente*) [Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez] or if she knows people from the MIR [Leftist Revolutionary Movement], but the woman knows!' (Group Interview, 13 February 2013) an active resident in his early twenties told me, explaining why ideas from older leaders matter to the youth.

Leaders' knowledge implies knowing people, procedures, and resource sources. However, what legitimises those leaders is having privileged access to neighbourhood identity symbols. Gonzalo, a 26-years-old active resident, explained the survival of mobilisation as follows:

[I]t's about identity, it's an identity that *emerges* from the old [residents], I think that's one of the most important things here, the identity of the older, of the workers, of those who participated in social struggle (*dieron la pelea*), the revolution that was not a dream or a

utopia here, that was reality at a moment, both with intellect and with arms (Interview, 15 February 2013).

I examine the transmission of mobilisational identity symbols, focusing mainly on my observations in the organisation I participated in, in LH. I focus on the transmission between leaders and other members. Although the age range of the organisation members was wide, I could identify one member in each age group⁸² that stood out for his/her leadership. One of these leaders was in his fifties, another in his late thirties, and another in his twenties.

My observations and interviews suggest that mobilisational identity transmission occurs in two ways: promotion of role models (especially to children) and incorporation of identity symbols in activist work.

Role models

⁸²In this case, the specific age groups that I refer to exclusively serve my description of this organisation, but I do not use them anywhere else. I use these age groups here to explain that this organisation gathered several segments, each in their particular life stage. In every one of these age groups, I could identify a member that stood out as a leader.

Members' age groups were distributed as follows. The main initiators of the organisation were in their twenties, and a few of them were University students. Moreover, a group of older residents in their early fifties came to meetings and events regularly. Another group—in their thirties—came less often; they were clearly busier dealing with family, children, and jobs. In each of these groups, I could identify a person that stood out for his/her leadership. Additionally, there were two girls, in their early thirties, interested in joining community work, who came to meetings from outside the neighbourhood, usually bringing their children with them. A few children from the neighbourhood also joined the meetings sometimes. In addition to these regular participants, there was a group of University students in their twenties that came on specific occasions to teach a workshop on critical education. This group attended a few meetings and helped during events.

Role modelling refers to a type of relationship between two individuals where one of them identifies with the traits of the other. Based on admiration, role modelling is a privileged interaction for the transmission of personality traits, values, and action frames. In other words, role modelling is very useful for the transmission of mobilisational identity symbols. My observations suggest that local organisations coordinate activities that promote this sort of interaction among residents.

Local organisations tend to coordinate initiatives aimed at attracting children of the *población*. Coordinated events include setting up entertainment activities and games for children in open *población* spaces. Organisation members install a table tennis set, demountable swimming pool, organise a stilt workshop, a face-painting workshop, and other fun activities, inviting children to spend an afternoon of entertainment. This occurs at a square or at the intersection of two roads that organisers block to keep cars away. Organisation members set up banners a couple of days in advance around the area promoting the event. A speaker recruits children on the spot, and some members knock on doors of some of the houses in the surrounding blocks to invite children. Organisation members provide snacks and coordinated games (typically fun competitions). Usually, organisation members also plan instances of collective reflection, generally via a simple, brief film. These instances are meant to boost critical thinking and political consciousness in children.

Similarly, *colonias urbanas* (children's camps) invite children to fun activities, but in a more structured fashion. Monitors and children meet a few days a week during the

summer. *Colonias urbanas* tend to be more formally organised. They are advertised well in advance and are conducted at the neighbourhood council's *sede*. Workshops with children, too, are organized in a similar manner. Usually occurring in squares, workshops provide children with the opportunity to learn a craft. In these workshops, young active residents teach *población* children how to play the guitar, paint graffiti, or make stencils, among other activities.

Organisers promote these events as opportunities for children to have a communitarian, protected experience in which they could collectively reflect on social issues and build political consciousness. However, based on observation, I am sceptical of the effectiveness of this strategy. First, I saw that instances of collective reflection do not occur in every event. Second, social issues tend to be formulated univocally by the organisers, giving little space to children to discuss said issues critically. Third, children are usually less willing to spend time thinking and discussing than expected. What I did notice more clearly is that these events are effective in building bonds between children and other active residents—usually *población* youths. I myself built relationships with the children attending these events. After participating in a couple of events, I learned a few of the children's names, and they called out to me waving, as I walked around the neighbourhood: '¡tío⁸³ Simón!' they yelled.

⁸³ Chilean children usually use the word 'tío' (literally 'uncle' in English) when respectfully referring to an adult who does not have a close relationship with them.

I witnessed how other organisation members developed closer bonds with children. Through these connections, children began admiring young *población* dwellers. Ultimately, these intergenerational relationships constructed role models for children. In the time I spent in the *población*, several children started rapping and learning a few break-dance steps, following the example of several organisation members who were hip-hop artists. This is how young active residents transmit mobilising symbols to the younger generations.

Similar intergenerational relationships are fostered in local football clubs. Traditionally, LH has been divided into areas, each comprising a few blocks and represented by a football club. Despite all sorts of differences, male neighbours of all ages unite over football clubs. Training sessions occur a few times a week, and championship matches are played during the weekend, bringing all families together. Adult footballers train teams of young residents, and young residents train children's teams. Often, when trainers are committed to their work, they construct close bonds with their teams. When young, active, politicised members of local organisations train children's teams, they often become role models and transmit mobilisational identity to the younger generations. Nevertheless, football clubs have been in sharp decline over the past ten years: children seem to be increasingly interested in technology and other activities. Additionally, new, more competitive leagues have appeared at the city level, attracting most good *población* players.

The relationship that children create with active youths usually develops further in other activities such as neighbourhood council events, random encounters in the neighbourhood, or any other occasion. Children in the *población* spend much of their time in the streets, so meeting them spontaneously is rather easy. Sometimes, active youths include children in activist work. While children get the opportunity to collaborate in the implementation of activities, young leaders teach them the basics of activism. At other times, organisation members invite some children to organisation meetings. Children play as we plan other activities or as we work on building the community orchard. Thus, intergenerational relationships develop progressively. Presumably, this mechanism has worked since the 1980s, transferring mobilisational identity symbols from the older to the younger generations.

Incorporating identity symbols during activism

In implementing initiatives in organisations, the oldest leaders transmit mobilisational identity symbols to the youth. They do so by leading in three aspects of micro-mobilisation: re-framing, suggesting forms of action, and narrating anecdotes.

Organisation members at the *población* generally share mobilisational identity. All of them have already gone through a process of political socialisation⁸⁴. Consequently, most

⁸⁴ This should not be understood as contradicting the power of identity to build contentious collective action. Most organization members have grown up learning mobilisational identity symbols. By the time these members reached their mid twenties, they were already highly familiar with the local mobilisational identity.

members tend to be active in reframing situations. However, the oldest leaders sometimes lead the process of reframing. They do so by being especially emphatic and using the flexibility granted by their high legitimacy to strengthen mobilising symbols. In situations of divestment, for example, leaders connected the present unjust situation with other cases of injustice. Thus, the leaders strengthened the mobilisational power of the reframing process. Older leaders had special authority to establish reframing connections with the past. Promoting an idea of continuity between the dictatorship and the current regime, the oldest leader often refers to oppressive situations by saying ‘This is like in the dictatorship’ (Field notes, 8 January 2013).

In meetings or any other occasion in which members decide procedures or initiatives to be implemented, leaders suggest forms of action spontaneously. For example, one of our meetings was almost over, most decisions had been made and responsibilities assigned to everyone accordingly. At this point, one of the leaders suggested hosting a community kitchen at the event to feed everyone during lunchtime. The rest agreed enthusiastically. As I explained more thoroughly in previous chapters, the community kitchen is a form of action applied predominantly in the 1980s, and its present value is purely symbolic. In other occasions, active residents request suggestions—usually from older leaders. Hence, the suggestion of implementing a community kitchen was a way of enacting identity.

The *recuperación* (land recovery) in which I participated originated from similar conditions. A group of youths decided to create a school of *educación popular* (critical pedagogy). Expressing mobilisational identity, the project was aimed at providing political

socialisation to local children. Soon, they met another small group of young *población* residents interested in implementing a similar initiative. The youth group decided to contact an old leader who could guide the implementation of their project. Together, they agreed to branch out to other local organisations to open the group. Additionally, they agreed to carry out a *recuperación* at a square. According to rumours, municipality officials had decided to give away that square for the construction of a bank's branch. In reclaiming that square for the local community, the *recuperación* was a fertile ground for popular school projects. Moreover, used during the 1960s–1980s by radical groups (MIR, FPMR, MJL⁸⁵), *recuperaciones* are currently another symbolic expression of local mobilisational identity. The idea of implementing the educational project in a recovered space resulted from a combination of the youths' previous political socialisation and the transmission of mobilising symbols by the older leader.

Leaders use anecdotes about the past to produce a micro-political effect in organisations. Later chapters supplement this argument further. It is adequate to state here that these anecdotes contribute to the transmission of mobilisational identity symbols. On the one hand, anecdotes confirm old leaders' privileged position of knowledge of past *población* activism, boosting admiration from other members and fostering the assimilation of mobilisational identity symbols. On the other hand, anecdotes promote a sense of belonging to a community that extends in time.

⁸⁵ These were political guerrillas that emerged in the mid 1960s and early 1980s. These acronyms refer to the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), and the Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL). Please see Chapter 1 for more details.

In many cases, local organisation members stayed after meetings. I spent several evenings listening to anecdotes that members shared among themselves. Sometimes, members told stories about daily life, such as parties, football matches, or job issues. Many of those story sessions involved the exchange of anecdotes on collective action experiences. Several members participated in other local organisations simultaneously, so they shared anecdotes from those organisations' activities as well. In this context, leaders (especially the oldest one) were eloquent in telling stories of activism. At various opportunities, the oldest leader spoke of the deeds and adventures of the FPMR during the 1980s. For example, he spoke of how concealed and militarised their whole structure was, even for militants within the movement. He said that on many occasions, FPMR members were asked to carry out actions—taking a package from point A to B for example—without knowing the consequences of doing so. Other times, the leader spoke of heroic confrontations against the military during the 1980s. Younger members heard these stories with admiration (Field notes, 2 February 2013). These stories not only confirmed the leader's legitimacy but also fostered identification with activists protesting in the 1980s. In assimilating identity and participating in local contentious collective action, residents feel a sense of belonging to a broader imagined community. Residents construct this sense of belonging to the resisting community of *población* dwellers in LH, a community that extends temporally.

The survival of mobilisational identity results from the purposive and effective transmission of mobilisational identity by leaders of different ages. Hence, LH's social movement community describes an exchange of political capital that promotes its decentralisation. Although there is a general tendency among leaders to concentrate

political capital, excluding others from accessing it, LH shows an effort to prevent such concentration.

DECENTRALISING LEADERSHIP: PROTAGONISM IN *POBLACIONES*

In this section I provide comparative anecdotes between LH and NA. Sharp differences between these two social movement communities are evidence to the argument that decentralised leadership plays a crucial role for mobilisational identity's sustainability.

My interviews with members of NA and observation of the organisation indicated a more hierarchical structure within NA organisations. While the youths of La Casita demonstrated a tendency towards horizontality in some respects, one hierarchically established leader strictly determined their decisions and initiative implementation. In other words, while all members had roles and tasks, one member was explicitly recognised as the head of the organisation. In LH organisations this was not the case. 'We use that [hierarchical leadership] here... we agreed that I would be the head... like a *Lonco*... if they [authorities or other neighbourhood leaders] wanna talk to us they know that they can call me,' said an organisation leader in NA (Interview, 11 November 2014). While some active residents in LH saw other organisation members as being more committed, more experienced, or having larger knowledge, most of them declared complete horizontality within LH organisations.

NA organisations centralise decision-making power and representation among a few specific leaders. After speaking to a resident participating in a local youth *batucada* organisation, I called to ask if I could interview him. He replied that he needed to obtain authorization from their leader. I had been welcomed warmly in several of their meetings and activities. Despite that, it was necessary for the leader to allow a member to contribute to my research (Field notes, 10 November 2014). Other active residents informed me that hierarchy was rather common and accepted in NA local organisations.

Older leaders in NA often act as brokers. Their relationships with other organisation members are strictly hierarchical. These leaders are usually formally inscribed as heads of the association in the organisation's legal personality. Leaders of development committees, for example, usually have groups of followers. These followers are local residents who benefit from the leader's work and networks. In return, the followers provide loyalty to the leader. Very rarely would a development committee member challenge his/her leader's decisions. Followers had very low or no decision power in the organisation. Neighbourhood council boards usually include a group of supporting local residents. Despite being board members, these residents have no influence over neighbourhood council decisions. They can only use withdrawal of support in the next election to manipulate the board's decision making.

In this section, I aim to establish a distinction between NA and LH. I argue that in contrast to NA, neighbourhood organisation members in LH decentralise leadership. Face-to-face interactions during activist work build individual and collective senses of protagonism. At

the micro-mobilisation level, identity provides feelings of power, pride, and effective agency, thus making dwellers understand themselves as *protagonist* social agents. This protagonism prevents disproportionate concentration of political capital by distributing it across the organisation. By making it easier for individuals to attain leadership positions, protagonism fosters the renewal of leaders. This dynamic makes mobilisational identity more sustainable, partly explaining its survival over time.

As my interviews demonstrate, the desire to be a leader generally stems from this sense of protagonism. A few interviewees described the process of becoming leaders. They explained that participating in organisations empowered them, making them feel that they could have a role in community building. When the organisation in which Rolando was working disbanded, for example, he decided to restore *pascuas populares* (popular Christmas), a local traditional initiative that had been lost with time. He decided to do this at a square near his house. ‘I felt like I had something to contribute to the place (...) I felt like I could have an impact in other people’s life, like I could hit them with my actions,’ Rolando said (Interview, 26 February 2013). By restoring *pascuas populares*, Rolando reconstructed a part of the community that had been lost. Other organisations supported his initiative, making *pascuas populares* a well-known local event. Now, other active local residents see Rolando as a leader who facilitates initiatives in their square.

To investigate how active residents build protagonism to promote contentious collective action, I examined a set of three mobilising acts: organising, divesting, and reframing. The following subsections define and analyse each of these acts. In each of these sections, I

include an analysis of the specific initiatives of action to deepen the understanding of how protagonism translates into contentious collective action.

Organising acts

Organising acts promote active residents' cohesive engagement in collective action, fostering mobilisation over time. In this subsection, I suggest that by working as a unit, active residents foster a sense of autonomy that ultimately promotes a sense of protagonism. This protagonism then fosters the emergence of leaders and initiatives, contributing to the sustainability of neighbourhood mobilisation.

The activation of protagonism through organising acts became evident to me during organisation meetings and informal conversations. On different occasions, members (especially leaders) hailed LH's community attributes and values as ways of fostering a sense of unity with other active residents and creating a sense of admiration among non-residents⁸⁶. In most such situations, active residents highlighted the experience of living in the *población* community. In sum, these acts made the group work cohesively.

First, organising acts foster protagonism collectively. After a meeting at the square in recovery, a young leader spoke of his childhood stories of participating in a neighbourhood football club. As a child, this resident played for his area's football club. He got to know

⁸⁶As explained above, a few of the organisation participants belonged to other poor areas close by, which had much lower contentious organisation than LH.

other neighbours closely by sharing experiences during training sessions and competing in championship matches. In his story, this young resident talked about how he got to relate closely to other neighbours, developing trust and solidarity. Consistent with this story, other active residents added stories of their rewarding experiences of playing for neighbourhood football teams. They spoke of how these teams created cohesive groups. When I asked them why those stories were important for them, one of the young residents responded 'Because it's the same that we do here: making community' (Field notes, 7 February 2013), and the rest agreed.

Very subtly, these stories expressed shared life histories, a common origin. Performatively, the act of sharing these stories fostered cohesiveness. Additionally, the stories told by these young *población* dwellers indicated that the organisation's activism was a part of the neighbourhood's tradition of community construction. In other words, their stories provided evidence that our work at the organisation was also part of that community construction. By sharing these stories, residents positioned themselves as *protagonist* builders of the local community. In other similar dynamics, active residents positioned themselves as protagonists when promoting cohesiveness. They thought of participating in activism as a form of being active builders of LH's historical community of struggle.

Second, organising acts also fostered protagonism at the individual level. As the most visible example of contentious mobilisation, the organisation in which I participated largely exalted autonomy. Autonomy among LH organisations is not only embraced collectively, but also at the individual level. Every member is seen as being responsible for

her/himself. While the organisation in which I participated strongly demonstrated the use of this concept, the same notion was apparent among other local LH organisations.

Active residents saw protagonism as a means of embracing resistance at the individual level. In fact, as different active residents explained, individual protagonism is a form of self-determination. 'It's about being *auto-gestionado* (self-administrated)... each of us should be self-administrated in life and in organizations' (Interview, 16 March 2013) said a young man at a cultural organisation. In this context, organisational cohesion is framed as the synergic result of autonomous individual decisions.

The emphasis on individual autonomy became evident in the control procedures within the organisation. In fact, the need to explicitly ask for responsiveness when members did not attend, were often late, or did not take the initiative was rather rare within the organisation. Members (usually leaders) asked for others' attendance only timidly and alluding to their own frustration in coordinating actions with unresponsive participants—intending to provoke empathy in others. Nevertheless, what seemed more common and effective in activating participants' responsiveness was encouragement for adopting autonomy at the individual level. This created a sense of responsibility, both collectively and individually, giving every participant a determinant power role within the organisation. Each member was protagonist of her/his own process of collective action.

Accordingly, participants stimulated each other's autonomous engagement in two ways. First, leaders sometimes explicitly suggested members to adopt a more autonomous position. Second, participants praised and asserted individual self-determination.

In one particular instance, I accompanied a leader to collect some materials in his car. The organisation often used the car to carry working materials around the neighbourhood. I had only been working with that organisation for two weeks. Hence, I was still hesitant to make my own decisions and reticent to assume any proactive role. Consequently, the leader surprised me when he explicitly encouraged me to take initiative by using the car without anyone's permission. He told me 'You should start taking this car on your own, you could have gone to pick up these things by yourself without telling me' (Field notes, 26 January 2013). With this sentence, the leader was setting up a very clear code of conduct: organisation members were expected to be extremely proactive. The leader showed me that every organisation member was meant to be an individual protagonist.

In other situations, participants asserted individual autonomy as a positive attribute. During a meeting at the square, for example, somebody asked about a participant who had been missing from the last two meetings. Emphatically, another member expressed the importance of ascribing self-responsibility to the missing participant quickly saying: 'This is his issue, he knows what he is doing' (Field notes, 1 March 2013). Other present members clearly agreed with this statement. In fact, organisation members asserted this notion of autonomy strongly.

I asked one of the members about this tendency to promote individual protagonism and she responded 'I think each should be responsible for him/her self, be responsible for your own life (...) I can't find another way in which you can be the owner of your own actions and be autonomous' (Interview, 21 February 2013).

Participants and leaders do not use threats or conditions when fostering members' participation in the organisation. Instead, fellow organisation members are persuaded by activating their sense of belonging to the community. Instead of using coercion, active residents use positive power to promote cohesion at the organisational level. Accordingly, fostering responsiveness and attendance at organisation activities appeals to the members' own will because it makes them embrace the community identity at the individual level.

Conceived by participants as a form of resistance, protagonism provides them a sense of becoming community builders both, individually and collectively. Hence, protagonism gives active residents the opportunity to self-determine their positions in polity. By adopting these mobilisational identity symbols, active residents can change their position from being excluded, acquiescent citizens to being agents of their own reality. As active builders of LH's community, participants use the possibility of creating initiatives of contentious collective action.

As explained on Chapter 6, active residents see LH as a centre for the development of popular art. According to local active residents, LH is one of the main venues of urban *popular* culture at the national level (Group Interview, 13 February 2013; Interview, 15 February 2013; Interview, 25 January 2013; Interview, 29 January 2013).

Popular art initiatives are an expression of protagonism. On the one hand, popular art is a form of resistance against standard, aristocratic culture. Popular art traditionally belongs to the lower classes. As a form of resistance, it is meant to build unity and political consciousness among oppressed populations. On the other hand, popular art is developed

autonomously, away from systematic hierarchical learning procedures. Popular culture is meant to emerge as a spontaneous expression of the dominated classes. People involved in art organisations conduct workshops where they teach each other how to play instruments. Most of the times, residents learn their art autonomously. Similarly, local rappers proudly claimed to be ‘self-taught’. Accordingly, rappers were highly coordinated. They organised large self-administrated shows.

When walking around LH, the sounds of drums, guitars, or flutes can be heard often as groups of residents meet in squares for rehearsing, teaching, and learning musical instruments. This is uncommon in *poblaciones*. Artistic and cultural initiatives of action are very clear expressions of how protagonism translates into contentious collective action.

The personal resistance with which active residents engage when participating in neighbourhood activism makes them feel empowered in a society that generally deprives them of power over their own lives. It is therefore a way of exercising a sustainable, self-produced, informal citizenship.

Divesting and reframing acts

This subsection shows how divesting and reframing acts work, often complementing each other (especially in the case of more contentious organisations), to produce protagonism. Oftentimes, these two mobilising acts work in tandem because breaking the interaction with authorities (divesting) might also easily involve reframing the situation as unfair—or

‘repressive’ in the case of LH’s organisations. Reframing generates the conditions for solidarity among members, and divesting produces a joint consensual reaction.

Unlike the case of LH organisations, divesting acts are rather rare in NA. In the months I lived in this *población*, I never witnessed a confrontation with authorities. On several occasions, in their interactions with local organisations, policemen were arrogant and unnecessarily authoritative, but in each of those situations, residents reacted peacefully. During a late September sunny afternoon, I joined a group of NA active residents to paint a banner. Meant to be used during the *población* anniversary on November 1, the banner was considerably large. It was characterised by the presence of a lot of black and red colours, as well as the face of Ché Guevara. We placed the banner below a shade, on a wide road, in a space between parked cars (ensuring that the road was not blocked). After about an hour of designing and painting, three policemen on motorcycles and a car approached rather abruptly and violently. The policemen requested identity cards and began asking questions about our activity. Most of these questions were irrelevant, and they demonstrated arrogance and disdain.

‘Who is he?’ – the policeman asked.

‘Ché Guevara’ – a couple of residents replied.

‘And who is that one? I don’t know that one!’ –said the policeman ironically, referring to Ché Guevara.

Eventually, the policemen left. Despite their demonstration of arrogance, the active residents hardly reacted. What would have been a collective emphatic rejection in LH was an almost completely quiescent scenario in NA. NA organisations, however, do not have mobilisational identity symbols to resort to in order to reframe the situation and react with divesting acts.

Active residents in LH usually re-frame such a scenario using the symbol of ‘repression’. When a re-framing of the relationship with the authorities occurs in collective performances, it exalts the senses of solidarity and power among organisation members, thus building protagonism.

In constructing the community orchard with the organisation I worked with, a couple of active residents brought attention to the rumour that the municipal council intended to evict us from the square. Allegedly, the municipality had planned infrastructural works in the square in which we were working. The rumour also suggested that the council would possibly send a representative to speak with the occupying organisation. In this place, we had created an orchard, built a humble roof to provide shade from the sun during meetings, established a children’s play area, and built colourful seats. Our potential eviction generated frustration among members because months of work and organisation would be lost. Confronted with this news, most members had a strongly rejective reaction. Speaking loudly among themselves, with anger and frustration, all members agreed to refuse any possible contact with the authorities. They impulsively decided to violently resist eviction, even if it was the police who came to drive them out. ‘We won’t let them in here, no matter

what we have to do!’ (Field notes, 23 February 2013), they insisted, in a situation charged with adrenalin.

Disregarding the council’s reasons or the veracity of the rumour, the organisation members broke any possible interaction with the authorities (divesting). Attending a council public meeting and explaining how our recovery of the square was a project that would eventually contribute to the local community was an alternative that crossed my mind in that moment. However, it became evident that there was no space for dissonant opinions—I feared that suggesting a different, more conciliatory alternative would have triggered an aggressive reaction. Although this example may allude to an especially critical situation, it was not completely uncommon. My observations and informal communications suggest that this combination between reframing and divesting was relatively common in the organisations’ interaction with authorities. I realised that reframing institutional actions as unfair (and consequently breaking any possible exchange with authorities) has also occurred in other cases and in other radical neighbourhood organisations.

As I have argued in earlier chapters, active residents usually portray interactions with the authorities as ‘repressive’. Similarly, the threat of eviction was reframed as unfair by using the idea of repression.

The sense of urgency produced by portraying situations as repressive places active residents in a central role of power. The performance whereby members collectively reframed this situation situated them as agents. Organisation members portrayed

themselves not as passive victims but as protagonists who can resist this oppression, either by organising themselves contentiously or through violent reaction.

Additionally, members' protagonism is augmented by how defiant the reaction is. This performative collective re-framing exalts the organisation, situating it in a rather horizontal relationship with the authorities. As a result, members place the organisation in a prominent position, one in which they would defy the authorities. Therefore, the performative collective builds a position of power, leading to a sense of protagonism.

Other more moderate organisations in LH tend to differentiate their divesting and reframing acts. A resident, for example, explained her double position toward governmental discretion in organisations' access to funding. On the one hand, she considers making organisations compete for funding a 'repressive' strategy. On the other hand, her organisation continues to apply for government funding to support its activities. She explained that her organisation would not reject any government funding because as taxpayers, the money is their right (Interview, 23 February 2013). However, despite reframing funding access as unfair, this interviewee speaks of how her organisation has decided to maintain exchange with institutions, thus separating divesting acts from reframing acts. Although less exuberant, these more moderate organisations also collectively re-frame their interaction with authorities as 'repressive'. Moreover, in this case, the urgency of repression summons organisations to be the main source of action, to be the protagonists in defying institutional oppression.

Through different initiatives, neighbourhood organisations have produced sites of memory and many historical murals. Representing repression and struggle, active residents use many of the murals and memory sites as ways of reinforcing ‘repressive’ re-framing. These sites are, therefore, an expression of protagonism. Different organisations have highlighted memories attached to neighbourhoods in those sites, for example, the Barracón, the Contentious Alley⁸⁷ (1st zone), Victor Jara square, and the Fist. Martyrs’ Square is an especially recognised example of such neighbourhood sites among residents (see Peñalolén Municipality, 2012). The square at the intersection of Ictinos and Grecia Avenue is a reference for many neighbours: residents use it to meet, gather, and hold the weekly local market. For active residents, this is a symbolic place because most marches coordinated by organisations since the 1980s have started here. A local neighbourhood organisation has created murals all around the square, showing the faces and names of neighbourhood leaders killed by the dictatorship. The 1.5-m-tall faces have a red and black background, and clearly state the association of the deceased with MIR.

In day to day life, the murals remind residents of a historically rooted repression. The huge faces painted on the walls suggest that those leaders were just like current active residents. Consequently, these murals strengthen the bond between current active residents and past leaders through the idea of ‘repression’. They, therefore, remind active residents of the great necessity of maintaining identity-related boundaries and exercising resistance to protect their informal world. Narratives suggest that those in charge of resisting repression

⁸⁷ See section ‘Activism in different neighbourhood zones’ in Chapter 5 for more details.

are active residents. The murals thus place active residents in a central protagonist position. Murals with similar characteristics are present in different areas of the neighbourhood.

Another initiative that local organisations employ is coordinating marches through neighbourhood roads. Bringing many organisations together, these marches communicate discontent pertaining to local problems, commemorate locally important facts, or highlight current national issues. For example, during my fieldwork I participated in a march through Grecia Avenue to show solidarity with the Mapuche land liberation movement in the South of Chile (see *The Telegraph*, 2013). This march was not formally authorised, and the police decided to clear the avenue that the protestors had blocked. Consequently, the march ended with physical confrontation, police violence, and the arrest of several participants, which was reminiscent of the clashes during the dictatorship. Local organisations interpreted this police action as repressive. This subsequently resulted in additional violent clashes between the police and participants of the march, with several local activists being jailed. Moreover, in this situation, the collective embracement of the symbol of ‘repression’ triggered a defiant attitude, thus building protagonism.

While re-framing is crucial for LH organisations, in NA, interpretations of potentially unjust social situations led to completely different outcomes. Reframing opportunities in NA does not often lead to frames of injustice. Instead, they promote the adoption of acquiescent positions that serve institutional interests. On December 2014, for example, a few young residents organised a meeting. They aimed at informing neighbours about delays in finishing the construction on a new community building. The building was being

constructed by the municipality. The leading architect and a project administrator came to the meeting, representing the company in charge of the project. A few organisations also attended the meeting. Members of La Casita and another relatively contentious organisation were present. During the meeting, the architect expressed concern saying, '[T]here is an issue in which we need your help'. He explained that the site had been robbed a few times and that this was delaying their work. 'They [the thieves] must be from here... maybe you know who they are', he said, requesting residents' help in looking after the site. While a few neighbours expressed scepticism towards the request, the organisation leaders took it seriously. Leaders from the relatively new contentious organisation emphatically showed their disapproval of the ill-intentioned neighbours who robbed the company. 'Those motherfuckers! We will kick their asses if we see them in here [in the building site]!' yelled one of the leaders. After some discussion and a few questions, the organisations in attendance agreed to help with watching the site (Field notes, 15 November 2014). In their reaction, however, the participants ignored the fact that responsibility for securing the site should either fall on the building company or the police. These face-to-face interactions failed to acknowledge the role of grassroots organisations in holding institutions accountable, detaching them from the neighbourhood's historical legacy of rebellious collective organisation.

In conclusion, mobilising acts not only activate collective action in LH neighbourhood organisations but also allow active residents to individually and collectively adopt a central position of power in their activism. By acquiring a central role in deciding the outcomes and engagement of collective action, active residents become empowered and feel a sense

of protagonism. Praising informal community experiences, subversively highlighting historical events and actors, and defying authorities and hegemonic values, active residents play central roles in recreating their community. They are promoting a novel form of citizenship that develops informally from their own capacities and needs.

Non-active residents expressed a very different reality. They did not express the intention to have an impact in changing their political reality, that is, they did not express the need to intervene in the socially entrenched arrangement of power. Additionally, non-active residents did not express feeling defined by a mobilisational identity. As such, their role in mobilisation was not an issue for non-active residents. Because they were more concerned with influencing their own private spheres, non-active residents were less concerned with engaging in activities with public impact and were therefore uninterested in developing social protagonism.

ADDITIONAL SUPPORTIVE ELEMENTS

Based on examinations of mobilising acts, it has been argued that active neighbourhood residents produce a protagonist identity whereby they contribute to the sustainability of their mobilisation. A protagonist identity not only contributes to the consistent creation of new leaders but also empowers the rest of the participants by giving them a central role in their activism. Although central to generating a protagonist identity, mobilising acts are not enough. As theoretically outlined in Chapter 1, a set of other elements also fosters

protagonism in organisations, including a) horizontal organisational structure, b) rejection of service provision, and c) alternative forms of education.

Rejecting hierarchies

My observations and interviews clearly suggest that throughout LH, active residents emphatically reject the use of organisational hierarchies. I suggest here that this rejection of hierarchies contributes to the building of decentralised leadership.

The most contentious organisations in LH are the most emphatic in rejecting hierarchies. Among LH organisations, hierarchies are generally associated with the formal world. Hierarchy, therefore, usually means the potential threat of repression.

‘We are not like political parties, you know, where one says something and the rest obey (...) in political parties you obey, that’s what you have to do, here at the *población* it’s not like that’ (Interview, 13 February 2013), explained a young local active resident, emphasising horizontality.

The formal world has proven to be a source of vulnerability for active residents, creating situations in which they regard hierarchies with distrust. Expressing how distrust toward hierarchies functions, another active resident explained to me that Housing Committees generally experience conflicts because members are suspicious of formal leaders who tend to concentrate power and information (Interview, 20 February 2013).

The accumulation of political capital is discouraged. 'Here we don't want to be commanding others: whoever has a post or role is the one who has to work more on that role than others, that's all. We are all volunteers and the organisation is horizontal', said a leader emphatically (Interview, 6 February 2013). In fact, this valuation of horizontality goes hand in hand with the rejection of *caudillos* (charismatic leaders). This allows more democratic access to political capital.

Nevertheless, as I have mentioned already some hierarchies do exist in neighbourhood organisations. Despite active residents' rejection of these structures, some members do accumulate more power than the others. Because organisations use informal leaders, their position is ambiguous enough to maintain a certain illusion of complete horizontality.

In summary, although leaders tend to exercise power over implemented initiatives, the stress on autonomy and the rejection of hierarchies allows residents to have more direct access to protagonism.

Rejecting service provision

Simply providing services to other *población* residents contradicts the fundamental facets of mobilisational identity. I suggest here that a rejection toward service provision promotes and supports decentralised leadership.

LH organisations strongly reject *asisitencialismo* (service provision). According to active residents, service provision opposes protagonism. Service provision, in fact, contributes to

the logics of political capital accumulation. In other words, service provision is coherent with hierarchical relationships that foster no dispersion of power. Additionally, service provision would curtail local activists' capacity to transmit mobilisational identity symbols. The rejection of service provision serves to maintain mobilisational identity. This is precisely what a young woman explained during an interview, 'we do not come to do charity, we are not *cuicos* (posh people) that come to deliver groceries to poor people, we are not charity. We are people who live here and want to maintain the spirit of this place' (Interview, 13 March 2013).

Accordingly, local organisations not only reject performing service provision but also reject being recipients of service provision. Active residents, for example, tend to reject the charity work of the Catholic and the Evangelical Churches. Organisations usually conceive of government funds as a form of service provision. Many active residents equate government funds with dependence. They claim that institutional funds threaten their construction of protagonism: active residents' experiences showed that they become acquiescent and depoliticised if they use too many institutional funds. In fact, government funds are usually associated with becoming corrupt. An active resident, for example, suggested that organisations receiving state funds became 'social mercenaries', because its members 'start absorbing money for personal use' (Interview, 4 January 2013). Therefore, many local organisations have complemented government funding with self-administrated funding. In other words, they implement activities to obtain funding from other, larger initiatives. For example, organisations organise *peñas* (neighbourhood parties) to gather funds for later events.

Alternative forms of education

Implementing alternative forms of education is, potentially, a form of political socialisation. The transmission of political capital tends to disperse leadership. For collective identity to translate into contentious collective action, alternative forms of education must aim at transmitting mobilisational symbols.

Although not a specific form of education, role modelling plays a crucial role in political socialisation. In addition, leaders in LH were aware that leadership results from training as well. They instructed children using games that aimed at building character. These strengthen children's disposition for acting publicly. For example, a group of organisation members formed a circle singing in unison. At some point during the song, one of the participants had to stand in the centre of the circle and make a funny gesture. The rest of the group repeated that gesture. Every participant came to the centre of the circle. Shy children usually were reluctant to stand in the centre of the circle. The leaders encouraged them, progressively teaching them leadership capacities. With this strategy, leaders build political capital in children, transferring public legitimacy to children.

Additionally, a few groups carry out regular workshops on critical pedagogy. My fieldwork observations suggest that those workshops aim to produce critical reflections on residents' activism, collectively defining their aims and methods. Through observation and informal communication, it has become evident that for residents, engaging in a critical pedagogy group means moving towards more authentic activism. This activism allows

participants to produce initiatives based on their practical work and to reflect on their own social reality, thus collectively defining the contradictions that justify and trigger popular mobilisation. Accordingly, active residents suggest that engaging in critical pedagogy means becoming involved in a type of activism that emerges from the groups' unique concerns and capacities. As an interviewee confirmed (Interview 25 January, 2013): 'the idea is to understand what this [organising] means for us, constructing it in the process of doing it [practically].' Participation in the fulfilment of this goal in and of itself is a source of protagonism because it provides active residents with an authentic central role in the creation of activism. In fact, referring to the workshops on critical pedagogy, an active young resident said (Interview 21 February, 2013): 'it's *bacán* (cool), because we create our own process.'

Nevertheless, after attending a few sessions in one of the few critical pedagogy groups, I observed a complete lack of systematicity. Attendance rates were low, and discussions were not written down to make knowledge transmissible. Additionally, the contents of these discussions were presented univocally. This created little opportunity for discussion or practical appropriation of the presented knowledge. While these groups encouraged protagonism, it seemed less certain whether they provided effective alternative, critical education.

Overall, these complementary supportive elements manage to bring active residents to the fore, thus highlighting their roles in the activism they develop both collectively and individually. Counteracting poor residents' position of social exclusion, decentralised

leadership manages to place them individually and as a group in central roles. In becoming protagonists of their activism, active residents develop a self-crafted, informal citizenship.

CONCLUSION

A few authors have addressed the issue of informal citizenship in mobilised, disenfranchised urban communities (Holston, 2008; Faranak Miraftab & Wills, 2005). However, they have not addressed the problem of the temporal sustainability of collective action. Neighbourhood organisations may carry out initiatives that challenge entrenched citizenship structures. Can we assume, however, that this will be a constant disposition? Can we expect collectives to be consistent agents in the construction of their communities? In this chapter, I dug directly into these issues to suggest very specific answers.

This chapter has argued that the sustainability of mobilisational identity results from the decentralisation of leadership. Leaders in LH undertake efforts and employ various strategies to transmit mobilisational identity to other members. They place special emphasis on the political socialisation of children. Identity mobilisation, therefore, survives across generations. Additionally, by constructing a sense of protagonism, mobilisational identity promotes the renewal of local leaders.

The transmission of mobilisational identity symbols gives organisation members the capacity to build a sense of protagonism, both individually and collectively, because the participation of active residents is a way for them to become agents of community

building. A decentralised leadership structure endows every participant involved in contentious collective action with the possibility of reconstructing her/his position as a political member of the community.

CONCLUSION

Most of the literature devoted to social movements in Chilean *poblaciones* argues that local organisations have demobilised. In the last twenty years, different scholars have predicted the acquiescence of popular grassroots. These accounts suggest that collective action in *poblaciones* does not challenge the Chilean regime of political exclusion. This thesis reveals why and how some communities resist this logic of demobilisation. The thesis has analysed two case studies that share many similarities, including their histories, experiences with dictatorial repression, locations in the city, and income economic levels, among others. However, while one of these case studies represents the general trend of demobilisation, the other shows how contentious collective action has been sustained in the past twenty-five years.

Scholarly accounts explain that during the democratic transition, *poblaciones* suffered a set of changes that curtailed initiatives for contentious action. Supportive institutions saw their resources withdrawn or reassigned. The Catholic Church, for example, which had backed and assisted *población* political initiatives during the dictatorship, redirected its goals, leaving local organisations. By the early 1990s, the Vicariate of Solidarity had progressively lost its funding, progressive priests in *poblaciones* were reassigned to different locations, and local chapels closed their doors to secular groups. In a few years, international funding was withdrawn from local NGOs committed to grassroots initiatives and they had to struggle to sustain their work. In addition, political parties of the

Concertación⁸⁸ abandoned leftist mobilisation in favour of governance. Many of the most politicised and intellectually prepared *población* leaders left their struggle after obtaining positions working for the government or other institutions (Bastias Saavedra, 2013).

Furthermore, segregation, exclusion, and criminality in *poblaciones* made the population increasingly disengaged from public affairs. In the 1980s and 1990s, social housing provisions intensified sharply. Chilean cities expanded, creating large, homogenous urban areas inhabited by vulnerable populations. For example, in the early 1980s, mass forced relocations placed tens of thousands of people in the urban peripheries (Jorge Chateau et al., 1987; Sugranyes & Rodríguez, 2005). Large sections of Santiago became marginalised ghettos with poor access to public services. While the government has implemented many improvements in the past twenty years, *poblaciones* have remained segregated spaces of social illness (M. Pérez, 2011; Sabatini & Salcedo, 2007). Drug consumption and trafficking grew pervasive in these neighbourhoods. Public spaces became synonymous with criminality and violence (Dammert, 2005), which deactivated initiatives and pushed local organisations away.

On top of these challenges for civil society in *poblaciones*, an increasingly individualistic culture deepened civic disengagement (Silva, 2004a). Neoliberal policies focused almost exclusively on national economic growth, emphasising individual consumption, promoting indebtedness, and increased precariousness in the labour market (Ahumada & Mayol,

⁸⁸ The Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (or Concertación) is a coalition of centre-left political parties that was in power between 1990 and 2010.

2015). Social policies reinforced these trends, atomising and depoliticising the urban poor (Hipsher, 1996).

While organisations still exist in many *poblaciones*, they have lost the capacity to demand and effect real change. In fact, since the early 2000s, several authors have sought to explain the role that institutions play in this demobilisation process. These researchers suggest that the transitional government has excluded the poor population from having real participation in political decisions. The state monopolises the access to resources for participation (including information and funding). Local organisations, therefore, have no alternative but resorting to government agencies to sustain their initiatives (Posner, 2004). Local government officials generally view their encounters and meetings with local organisations as opportunities to ‘teach’ democracy and citizenship. Government officials, therefore, tend to have a large influence in shaping local initiatives according to their own aims and interests (E. F. Greaves, 2004; Valdivieso, 2012). By suggesting that local *población* organisations have become extensions of the state (Koppelman, n.d.), these authors depict an scenario of acquiescence, in which contentious collective action seems completely blocked. Paley's (2001) in-depth analysis of the *población* La Bandera even suggests that government officials have managed to incorporate local organisations into their political project. Consequently, local organisations become agents of the state's system of social control.

These accounts describe a highly hostile scenario for contentious collective action. The ethnographic approach and paired comparison that I provide in this thesis unveils why and how some communities have overcome this fate.

The two case studies that I selected for this research share a history of high levels of mobilisation in the early 1970s. Before the dictatorship (1973-1990), both *Nuevo Amanecer* (NA) and *Lo Hermida* (LH) were created through highly organised land invasions. Both squatter settlements developed complex and highly politicised local organisation from 1970 through 1973. The Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) and other leftist parties led local organisations in these *poblaciones*. Residents established demands for housing and joined many other grassroots organisations across Santiago in marches and contentious initiatives. Both neighbourhoods experienced intense repression by the military dictatorship after 1973. Being very similar in their historical background, the boroughs in which they are located, their socio-economic levels, and their connections with the rest of the city, these variables cannot explain why one neighbourhood is highly mobilised (LH) and the other is not (NA). In attempting to explain this difference, this thesis contributes to the literature on social movements.

As in many other studies, what explains the survival of contentious collective action in *poblaciones* is the development of a mobilisational identity (Adler, 2012; Castells, 2004; Espino, Leal, & Meier, 2007; Laraña et al., 1994; Philip Oxhorn, 1995; Witteborn, 2008). Nevertheless, this research goes beyond other accounts by studying how the notion of mobilisational citizenship emerges in some urban communities and not in others. In this

thesis I have identified four factors that explain how the development and sustenance of identity successfully building mobilisation in one of the case studies, while it does not emerge in the other, explaining this neighbourhood’s low levels of mobilisation. This table briefly summarises this:

Dimensions explaining mobilisational citizenship	Nuevo Amanecer (Low contentious collective action)	Lo Hermida (High contentious collective action)
<p>(1) Agentic memory</p> <p>Collectively resorting to past experiences to build continuity and a position of agency in the present.</p>	<p>The early years of the dictatorship built a sharp discontinuity for local residents. Both active and non-active residents conceive their past of contentious mobilisation as disconnected from the present. The factors that explain this discontinuity are: 1) the change of the neighbourhood’s name and roads, and 2) the enlargement of the neighbourhood. This created a divide between the mobilised community of Nueva La Habana and Nuevo Amanecer.</p> <p>In addition, the MIR did not provide residents with political socialisation. As a result, residents do not build collective relational settings of the past that have effects in the present. Active residents do not produce a position of agency in the present that may lead them to contentious collective initiatives of action.</p> <p>In parallel to this, political parties have built networks of political loyalty in the <i>población</i>. This has deterred local leaders from building continuities with the past that could promote cohesive identity.</p>	<p>Residents involved in local organisations share a past that is intimately connected with the present. Telling stories of the past, painting murals, using specific repertoires of collective action, and more, active residents foster identification with former activist community members.</p> <p>During the 1980s movements that led national protests (Communists, FPMR, MJL, and others) transferred identity to the grassroots. This identity provided relational settings to interpret the past cohesively. These relational settings are the first step in constructing mobilising identity. They serve as background to build a sense of belonging and boundaries.</p> <p>Active residents share narratives by which they succeed in subverting oppressive events of the past. When narrating the past, they use two categories: one that characterises past events as oppressive and frustrating. Active residents subvert these narratives using a second category that encompasses successful events of collective struggle.</p> <p>By subverting the past in their narratives, active residents acquire a position of agency in the present. Additionally, they build relational settings that construct belonging and boundaries.</p>
<p>(2) Belonging</p> <p>A collective sense of unity that mobilises when it results from political consciousness and positive assertions of</p>	<p>NA’s social movement community is highly fragmented with little sense of cohesiveness.</p> <p>Local organisations do not share</p>	<p>Local organisations share a sense of unity. They use mobilising identity symbols, such as: ‘<i>pobladores/as</i>,’ ‘<i>población</i>,’ and ‘<i>lucha</i>’. Using those symbols organisations construct oppositional</p>

the community.

mobilizing identity symbols that could unify the community under common and unique meanings.

consciousness and attribute responsibility of their grievances to an unequal broader system.

Residents assert their neighbourhood positively. However, these assertions do not contribute to a subversive, unique community.

Positive assertions on the community frame LH as a unique rebellious neighbourhood. It is seen as a positive, appealing community that enhances identification. Consequently, active residents symbolically construct a place in which values, culture, and autonomy resist neoliberal culture and institutional co-optation.

In the absence of symbols that interpret relations with other social actors as conflicts, local organisations do not create an oppositional consciousness.

(3) Boundaries

A collective self-definition of a community in opposition to other social actors. Its mobilising potential emerges, building differentiation, identifying antagonists, and constructing self-determination.

There are no thick boundaries that differentiate this community from others.

Active residents construct differentiation by distinguishing between a formal and an informal realm. The informal is the realm of *población* organisations. The formal is embodied by political institutions. Active residents frame the constant intent of formalising the informal carried out by the formal realm as 'repression'.

While the very few youth organisations recognised a distinct informal world, they did not see interacting or complying with formal institutions as threatening.

The symbol of repression is a result of the relational settings constructed through agentic memory.

Most organisations look for ways of assimilating to formal institutions.

Consequences of this conception are:

1) Local organisations share a common realm of authenticity, skilfulness, and trust.

2) The defence of the informal realm and the sense of urgency that the idea of 'repression' creates are powerful motivators of contentious collective action.

The reproduction of the informal (methods and repertoires of action) builds self-determination. Self-determination and the collective identification with a community that is conceived as autonomous create the grounds for decentralising leadership.

(4) Decentralized leadership

The collective disposition to transfer mobilising identity symbols and a sense of protagonism in active residents.

Leaders are concerned with monopolising political capital. They use specific strategies with that aim, e.g. '*pasar máquina*' (manipulate circumstances and people in order to obtain any given goal).

Identity works as political capital and organisation members promote its transmission to other members of the organisation and the local community.

It is complemented with a rejection of hierarchies, a rejection of service

Hierarchical structures prevail in local organisations with a leader that works as

Organisation members establish interactions with children of the community in activities, transferring

<p>provision, and alternative forms of education.</p>	<p>the head of the organisation. The leader centralises contacts, access to resources, and decision-making. This is even the case of youth organisations.</p> <p>The efforts that local leaders make to accumulate political capital contradict any fruitful collaboration with younger, potentially active residents. In their search for identity and formation, adolescents seek figures to identify with and obtain socialisation from. Local leaders, however, do not realise protagonism by socialising the youth. Their protagonism is, in stead, realised by belonging to networks of political loyalty that give them deceiving spaces to voice their concerns.</p> <p>As a consequence, youth do not see interacting with older leaders as an opportunity to obtain socialisation. Hence the notably little inter-generational interaction in organisations.</p>	<p>mobilising identity symbols.</p> <p>In this way, local organisations construct intergenerational fruitful relationships in which local active residents, provide political socialisation to children, and local leaders transfer mobilisational symbols to other participants.</p> <p>As a consequence organisation members disperse leadership, empowering each other as a collective and individual agents of community building.</p> <p>By decentralising leadership, active residents informally build a particular type of community membership based on their contentious collective action. This what this project calls ‘mobilisational citizenship’.</p> <p>A few additional elements contribute to decentralising leadership more effectively. In LH many local organisations reject hierarchies and service provision.</p> <p>Moreover, alternative forms of education aim at building public character in children and other organisation members. This works as an additional construction of political capital.</p> <p>The transmission of mobilisational identity involved in decentralising leadership reconnects this dimension with the rest of the mobilisational citizenship framework. Leadership decentralisation feeds back to agentic memory, mobilisational belonging, and mobilisational boundaries.</p>
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Table 3. Synthesis of findings using the mobilisational citizenship framework.

This table describes how these dimensions work in each case to either create or curtail mobilisational citizenship. Each of the dimensions expresses how identity translates into contentious collective action. However, as specified in my theoretical chapter, these dimensions are interrelated and have particular roles in the construction of mobilisational citizenship. A continuity in which the community conceives itself as the same in time is

the first step in building collective identity. In fact, that continuity connects territory and collective identity. Agentic memory resorts to that continuity. Explanations of the past provide what Somers (1994) calls 'relational settings.' Relational settings are collectively learned relational lessons of other social actors that influence narratives and collective identity. Agentic memory is the use of those narratives of the past to create a collective position of agency in the present. From this sense of community embedded in time and territory, senses of belonging and boundaries develop. Belonging emerges from sharing identity symbols that foster unity. It mobilises by creating political consciousness and positive assertions of the community. Boundaries construct differentiation from other social actors. Boundaries' mobilisational potential lies in their ability to define antagonists and build self-determination.

In order to explain the sustainability of contentious collective action, this framework conceives identity as a form of political capital that can be transmitted. Identity symbols can be transferred from one generation to the next and between members. This assures that young members of the community will join or create organisations in the future and that leaders will renew with time. Decentralised leadership emerges from this dispersion of political capital. Decentralised leadership allows each member of the organisation to be a leader in her/his own process, constructing individual and collective protagonism. Mobilisational citizenship emerges from exercising the right to be agents of community construction and shaping the local habitat. Additionally, emerging from the transmission of mobilisational identity symbols, leadership decentralisation feeds the rest of the dimensions. As Chapter 8 demonstrates, the sustainability of mobilisational identity in time

results from the transmission of identity symbols that leadership decentralisation carries out. Figure 1 in my theoretical framework shows these relationships.




Figure 1: Mobilisational citizenship framework.

This framework provides a schematic account of the relationship between identity and contentious collective action. The empirical chapters in this thesis show that the relationship between the dimensions of identity and mobilisation is not unidirectional. The fact that collective action constructs and strengthens local bonds building identity is proof that this relationship is recursive.

Lo Hermida (LH) organisations are an empirical demonstration of how this framework succeeds at creating contentious collective action capable of shaping their community and neighbourhood. Organisations have, for example, successfully defended their neighbourhood against gentrification. Campaigning together against the new master plan,

in 2011 LH organisations prevented the area from being colonised by large investments that would benefit private companies and richer sections of the borough. In addition, unlike in other neighbourhoods in Santiago, LH's young organisations have worked to re-appropriate neighbourhood councils. Organisations also make efforts to re-appropriate squares and other areas invaded by drug trafficking.

As previous chapters show, autonomy is central in mobilising identity. The paired comparison that I draw on in this thesis shows that LH organisations' construction of mobilisational citizenship largely results from the strong boundaries that identity has set to political parties.

Institutional political loyalties do not necessarily oppose contentious collective action. In fact, researchers have demonstrated that violent collective initiatives can occur as a result of clientelism (Auyero & Lapegna, 2012). This is something that also occurs in Santiago's *poblaciones*, such as NA. However, what initiatives depending on political institutions or the logics of clientelism are hardly capable of achieving is to collectively redefine people's categories of political membership. In other words, while contentious collective action resulting from clientelism may be relatively effective in obtaining access to goods or services, it does not question historically entrenched systems of political exclusion affecting underprivileged residents. The transformative potential of this thesis' definition of contentious collective action lays in its capacity to challenge established distributions of symbolic resources (see Melucci, 1996).

In opposition to NA, LH has sustained contentious collective action. For example, by campaigning against the Municipality and other organisations in the borough loyal to local politicians, in 2011 Lo Hermida's local organisations managed to reject a master plan threatening with gentrifying the zone. This mobilisation allowed Lo Hermida residents to maintain a cohesive community in a relatively central zone of the city. More importantly, however, it also challenged the idea that the poor need to submit to the interests of large corporations, politicians and neoliberal urban development. While, hypothetically, this kind of mobilisation does not need to exclude political parties, the autonomy of the initiative strengthens its symbolic value.

Relational settings play a crucial role in defining how local active residents represent authorities, institutions, and organisations. In LH, for example, active residents conceive political authorities as highly threatening. In Chapter 4 I show how boundaries toward political institutions make residents react through mobilisation to institutions that they represent as antagonists. Municipality representatives, in fact, explained to me that during the years in which Claudio Orrego was Peñalolén's mayor (2004-2012) informal local organisations grew in Lo Hermida. Orrego implemented a strong programme to boost participation in local community issues. The large exceptional presence of municipality officials in the neighbourhood was local informal contentious organisations react. They started organising more events, occupied a local football field and some of the neighbourhood squares. The aim of those local organisations was to protect their *población* from the threatening influence of the municipality. Boundaries have also played a strong role in divorcing local organisations from drug traffic, consumption, and other illegal

activities. Chapter 4 has argued that local organisations in Lo Hermida conceive drug dealers as cooperating and benefitting from a formal, unjust system that ultimately excludes *población* dwellers.

The case of Nuevo Amanecer (NA) is representative of the vast majority of communities in Santiago that have demobilised since 1990. In contrast with LH, NA is evidence of how this framework fails in cases in which the past is signified with strong discontinuities and does not provide relational settings to build agency in the present. Blocking the development of agentic memory makes it impossible to produce mobilisational identity. As in many other *poblaciones*, party politics have prevailed. This is especially visible in the fact that leaders are hierarchical and concerned with monopolising political capital. In other words, NA is an example of how the absence of mobilisational identity curtails the development of the protagonism that is crucial for mobilisational citizenship.

This thesis assumes that neighbourhoods that were highly politicised in the past, that were created through collective action, and in which many neighbours suffered the consequences of grave human rights violations during the dictatorship have the potential of developing a mobilisational identity. In fact, Lo Hermida and a few other *poblaciones* did develop such an identity. To a certain extent this idea follows Castells's prediction (1983) that neighbourhood ties built through mobilisation would tend to facilitate organisation in the future. These ideas, however, must be put in perspective. Mobilisational identity cannot be thought of as a one-encompassing set of meanings that we would find in all members of the local community (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). This thesis has analysed identity rooted

in a specific neighbourhood. The pollicisation of place involved in mobilisational identity, however, needs not to function precisely in the same neighbourhood in which social connections were originally formed. Gould (1995), for example, has demonstrated that networks of solidarity can foster contentious collective action across different neighbourhoods. He showed that identity potentiated mobilisation as a result of imbricated interconnections between formal and informal networks. Examining these network structures, he questions the idea that neighbourhood identity is more effective when it connects communities to a specific place. In his analysis of the Paris commune Gould convincingly claims that identity was more effective in building contention in cases in which residents mobilised in different zones of the city, instead of together in the same one. Mobilisational identity, therefore, must not necessarily be conceived as developing in one specific neighbourhood-based community.

In fact, identities are diverse in themselves: they incorporate a set of many different narratives, representations, and values that, oftentimes, contradict each other. We must keep in mind that the notion of mobilisational identity accounts for a particular aspect of the identities found in *poblaciones*. This is why, when defining collective identity, this thesis has emphasised its relational aspect and collective processes of identification. Identity has been thought of as a set of collectively shared symbols by which local organisations members interpret reality. These symbols will always coexist with many others.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION

Mobilisational citizenship must be understood as part of its historical context. The world has witnessed an increasing disaffection with traditional politics in countries with representative democracies. This includes Europe and most countries in America and Asia. The last decades have consolidated the pre-eminence of electoral research in political parties' decisions. The distance between institutional politics and the grassroots has been progressively widening. Some researchers measuring political engagement suggest that citizens have acquired 'a sense of alienation for all things political' (Torcal, 2003, p. 1). However, scholars of social movements are examining the forms of engagement beyond traditional institutional politics. The framework provided for the study of mobilisational citizenship belongs to this effort to seek a larger plurality in re-defining forms of political engagement.

The hierarchical structures that defined political struggles in Chile and many other parts of the world during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s would not admit the mobilisational citizenship framework. The mobilisations that gave rise to the *poblaciones* analysed here were highly structured around bureaucratic, and even militarised, formal positions. Instead, mobilisational citizenship gives prominence to protagonism and the production of local community as forms of resistance.

However, this analysis of contentious collective action in Lo Hermida expresses the current Chilean culture of popular mobilisation. A few other *poblaciones* in Santiago have either maintained mobilisation or have begun mobilising in the past years using a similar

mobilising identity. That is the case of the *poblaciones* La Pincoya (Huechuraba), La Victoria (Pedro Aguirre Cerda), Robert Kennedy (Estación Central), or Juanita Aguirre (Conchalí). In these *poblaciones* local organisations use the same mobilising symbols as those in Lo Hermida. They also employ self-management to implement similar initiatives, such as *peñas* (community parties), *recuperaciones* (land or building occupations), workshops with children, community kitchens, etc. Highly popular music bands among *población* youths express the same mobilising identity that I describe in this thesis – namely Portavoz, Salvaje Decibel, F-Dren, and Subverso, among others.

The framework I provide here recognises the value of marginal urban identities that often choose to be poorly connected to institutional networks in order to authentically affect community building. Other cases in Latin America depict this reality. In the Southern Cone, countries share recent histories of urban sprawl, politicisation of the grassroots, dictatorial repression, neoliberal reforms, and demobilisation. Bravo (2013), for example, analyses an experience of mobilisational citizenship in the neighbourhood La Gloria, in Mendoza, Argentina. La Gloria is exceptional among other neighbourhoods for its high politicisation. However, parties and the local government tend to use local organisations for their interest. Bravo accounts for a local youth movement that, rejecting all sorts of institutional co-option, organise a local library, combining self-management and external, institutional resources. While members claim to have a horizontal decision structure, they still maintain specific leaderships. Bravo shows how a mobilisational identity led the local youth to develop sustainable work committed to what they conceive as authentic community building.

These experiences of collective identity and protagonism can be found in many other places. Another example, also in Argentina, is the Unemployed Workers Movement (MTD Solano). Rejecting political clientelism, the MTD Solano has mobilised to territorialise politics in a marginal neighbourhood of Buenos Aires. Sharing a mobilising identity, they re-signify their spaces and their social relations. In similitude with other cases across the world, the MTD Solano has emphasised horizontal decision-making and autonomy with the aim of re-making local community (Chatterton, 2005; Motta, 2009).

Bravo (2013), Chatterton (2005) and Motta (2009), as well as other researchers, address these movements from the perspective of identity and collective action. In doing so, they recognise the relevance that constructing mobilisational citizenship has for these movements. However, these approaches do not account for the role of memory in the construction of contentious collective action. The mobilisational citizenship framework that I provide here suggests that agentic memory construction is vital in the analysis of mobilisational identity.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Expanding this research to test this framework in other communities is necessary. While it is true that qualitative approaches do not intend to be representative, adding other case studies would allow for strategic testing of the dynamics that it proposes. One first alternative would be testing how communities construct mobilisational citizenship in other similar neighbourhoods, but with different particularities. That is, for example, the case of

poblaciones in Santiago that formed more recently, after 1990. Such case studies would allow examining how agentic memory is constructed in such disadvantaged scenarios.

Another fertile alternative would be studying mobilisational citizenship in different Latin American urban contexts. Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil provide similar histories but different political and bureaucratic structures. In Argentina, for example, the development of grassroots political clientelism seems to be stronger and more pervasive than in Chilean *poblaciones* (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013). Brazil's decentralised administrative structure, on the other hand, has promoted especially innovative initiatives carried out by the urban poor (Goldfrank, 2011). Additionally, this framework could be tested in societies that have a different history. That would be the case, for example, of Latin American countries that have not experienced dictatorial regimes in their recent past, such as Mexico and Colombia. Southern European countries that have developed clientelism and urban marginality may also provide useful case studies of mobilisational citizenship.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: COMPLEMENTARY TABLES

Individual income quintiles in Chile*

Quintiles	British pounds		US dollars		Chilean pesos	
	Lower limit	Upper limit	Lower limit	Upper limit	Lower limit	Upper limit
1	-	71.68	-	108.8	-	74,969
2	71.69	120.05	108.9	182.21	74,970	125,558
3	120.06	184.63	182.22	280.23	125,559	193,104
4	184.64	337.26	280.24	511.89	193,105	352,743
5	337.27	-	511.9	-	352,744	-

Table 4. Individual income quintiles in Chile

Source: data obtained from Universidad de Chile (2015).

* Quintiles have been defined by the 2011 national survey on socio-economic characterisation (CASEN).

Individual income quintile distribution in Nuevo Amanecer and Lo Hermida

Quintiles	NA		LH	
	UV 25	UV 17	UV 18	UV 19*
1	47.8%	37.4%	29.40%	21.90%
2	23.2%	46.10%	41.90%	21.90%
3	15.9%	15.50%	19.60%	41.40%
4	9.9%	1.10%	9.20%	14.80%
5	3.2%	0%	0%	0%

Table 5. Individual income quintile distribution in the two selected case studies

Source: the data for LH in this table has been obtained from Peñalolén Municipality (2011). The data on NA was self-calculated using datasets provided by La Florida Municipality.

*UV refers to *Unidad Vecinal* (Neighbourhood Unit).

Employment of residents in Nuevo Amanecer and Lo Hermida

Employment	NA	LH
Unskilled workers	19.9%	26.8%
Officials, workers and craftsmen in mechanic arts	15.5%	15.7%
Service and retail market vendors	14.2%	13.7%
Ignores	12.7%	11.5%
Middle range professionals and technicians	11.3%	8.8%
Office employees	9.5%	7.7%
Installations, machinery and assembling workers	8.4%	7.0%
State executive or legislative powers or public administration	3.7%	3.8%
Scientific or intellectual professionals	3.1%	2.7%
Agricultural and fishing qualified workers	1.2%	2.0%
Armed forces	0.5%	0.2%
Total employed population	38.0%	37.9%

Table 6. Employment of residents in the two selected case studies

Source: self-calculation using data from Census 2002.

Educational levels of residents in Nuevo Amanecer, Lo Hermida and the Metropolitan Region (Urban)

Educational level	NA	LH	Metrop. Region (Urban*)
University	3.7%	3.2%	11.8%
Technical institute	4.6%	3.7%	7.1%
High school	40.8%	37.0%	37.2%
Primary education	37%	42%	30.8%
No formal education	1.8%	2.2%	1.5%

Table 7. Educational level of residents in the two selected case studies and the Metropolitan Region

Source: self-calculation using data from Census 2002

* This analysis has excluded all areas of the Metropolitan Region considered non-urban.

Other socio-economic indicators of residents in Nuevo Amanecer, Lo Hermida, and the Metropolitan Region (Urban)

	NA	LH	Metrop. Region (Urban)*
Precarious homes**	4.4%	4.8%	4.1%
Connection to water supply	96.2%	96.6%	92.7%
Landline	68.8%	68.2%	71.8%
Computer at home	14.8%	13.2%	28.5%
Internet connection	4.6%	4.9%	15.6%
Vehicle at home	22.0%	23.7%	39.3%
Colour TV	92.9%	91.0%	93.3%
Laundry Machine	82.5%	81.4%	84.5%
Refrigerator	87.6%	87.6%	89.9%

Table 8. Other socio-economic indicators of residents in the two selected case studies and the Metropolitan Region

Source: self-calculation using data from Census 2002

* This analysis has excluded all areas of the Metropolitan Region considered non-urban.

** I have called 'precarious homes' those cases in which families lived in emergency housing, shacks, tents, or rented a room in collective housing.

APPENDIX 2: CODING CATEGORIES FOR QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

I here present the categories that I used to analyse interviews, field notes from my fieldwork, and notes from other documents. I did not name each category using arbitrary codes because the use of the software NVivo allowed me to directly drag text into each node/category. The table includes a description in which I have summarised the contribution that each main category had to the argument of my thesis.

Main categories	Secondary categories	Description
Understanding the process of demobilisation		
Land invasion ' <i>toma</i> '	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Confrontations with police ▪ Conflicts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Family problems ▪ Neighbours' problems ▪ MIR coordination <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Relationship with MIR leaders ▪ The committees ▪ Residents' agency <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of residents' agency in the process ▪ Residents had agency ▪ Relocation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leaders' negotiations ▪ Arrival and new neighbourhood 	<p>These specific categories show that the land invasion (or <i>toma</i>) sets an origin of mobilisation for Nuevo Amanecer (NA) (in that period called Nueva la Habana). The <i>toma</i> also establishes a relationship with the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR).</p>
Nueva La Habana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leaders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mike ▪ Organisations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Internal coordination ▪ Popular justice ▪ Norms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'Ley seca' ▪ People still drunk ▪ Disaffection with MIR ▪ Incidents <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Resident hides international militants <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Imposition by MIR militants ▪ Rape incident <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Violence by militias ▪ 'It was a mess' ▪ MIR loses legitimacy ▪ The new houses <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Expectations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Resentment ▪ Result of organisation 	<p>According to these categories Nueva La Habana (squatter settlement) deepened the community's experience of mobilisation. However, the MIR did not carry out political socialisation.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Organised hard work ▪ Inefficient work 	
Dictatorship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Coup <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fear ▪ Those supporting the coup ▪ MIR flees <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mike says goodbye ▪ Sense of discontinuity ▪ New name 'Nuevo Amanecer' <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Story of the new name ▪ Organisation dies ▪ New houses <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Finished ▪ New people come ▪ Old residents take new houses ▪ Roads names change ▪ Repression <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Aggressions ▪ Raids ▪ Disappeared ▪ 'It was a quiet/peaceful period' 	The dictatorship built a strong discontinuity. These categories show how this curtailed residents' community building and access to mobilisational symbols.
Organisation reappears	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Human rights groups <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Visiting detention centres ▪ Community kitchens <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shame of poverty ▪ Youth organisations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Grujudema ▪ Others ▪ Children camps ▪ Other organisations ▪ Local Church becomes central <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Openness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exchanging information ▪ Progressive priests ▪ Space for all youths ▪ Fear of repression <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Some people avoid mobilising 	These categories depict that, as in most other poblaciones, organisations began developing work in NA during the dictatorship with the support of the Catholic Church.
National protests in NA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Parties back to the scene <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ AC militants are leaders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Parties involved ▪ Underground <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'Mitins' ▪ Secrecy ▪ Possible 'sapos' ▪ People knew ▪ Interactions with local organisations ▪ Parties influence grassroots 	National protests marked a strong re-connection with the centre-left political parties from Democratic Alliance (AD). This was the beginning of durable relationships between AD politicians and local leaders.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Influence at the chapel <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pacify protests ▪ Attractiveness ▪ Initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ‘<i>Miguelitos</i>’ ▪ Barricades ▪ Pamphlets ▪ Banners ▪ Experience of protesting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ First political experience <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sense of protagonism ▪ Current leaders involved ▪ MIR comes to NA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Protests with Los Copihues ▪ Marginal MIR contribution 	
Referendum ‘No campaign’ in NA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Branch in NA ▪ Larger involvement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Youth ▪ Networks politicians – leaders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Connections maintain today <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political campaigning ▪ Initiatives ▪ Political protagonism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Wide local support ▪ Presidential election <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Deepens political networks 	The No campaign for the referendum consolidated the relations of political loyalty built by parties at the local level.
Democratic transition and construction of political loyalties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political networks deepen <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ‘<i>Red de iniciativa ciudadana</i>’ ▪ Local leaders involved ▪ Important for people ▪ Belonging to political networks ▪ Political socialisation ▪ Clientelism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Campaigning <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leaders ▪ Benefits for leaders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cakes ▪ Jobs ▪ Public benefits ▪ Payments ▪ Rejection from other residents ▪ Protagonism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leaders’ sense of worth <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rejection by other residents ▪ Illusion of involvement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Events <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Health/hospital meeting 	According to these categories the democratic transition saw relations of loyalty between parties and local organisations deepen in NA.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Events at neighbourhood council ▪ The illusion works! 	
Monopolising political capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Alternative transmission of symbols <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Mapuche community ▪ Anarchist groups ▪ During interviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Defamation of other leaders ▪ Self-attributions ▪ Defamation of others' methods ▪ '<i>Pasar máquina</i>' ▪ Work with children <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ La Casita ▪ In events/activities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The <i>Cabildo</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Protest ▪ Brokers ▪ Conflict ▪ Conflicts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Campamento</i>'s neighbourhood council ▪ Central neighbourhood council electoral fraud ▪ Quiero Mi Barrio ▪ New building ▪ Enclosed buildings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political colour <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Politicians campaign there ▪ Rejection to use coloured buildings ▪ Exclusion 	<p>Socialised by political parties, NA's local leaders have learned to seek the monopoly of political capital.</p> <p>These categories show that these dynamics have blocked the development and sustainability of mobilisational identity.</p>
Mobilisational identity fails	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Memory <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support for democratic transition <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Adherence to AD's political project ▪ No continuity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'Popular power' in the past ▪ Anniversary <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Intention of continuity ▪ Discontinuity ▪ Perception of radical groups <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MIR different ▪ FPMR or MJL ▪ Fear/terrorism ▪ Belonging <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Very little differentiation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Poor positive assertion ▪ Lack of neighbourhood rooted symbols ▪ Fragmented SMC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Competition between leaders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Conflicts 	<p>Using the framework constructed for mobilisational citizenship, these categories demonstrate that NA lacks an identity that could motivate contentious collective action.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of credibility ▪ Generational disconnection ▪ External communities offer symbols to youth ▪ Boundaries <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Using other external categories <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mapuche categories (La Casita) ▪ No defence of informality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No conflict with formal procedures ▪ Seeking formality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Neighbourhood councils ▪ Other organisations ▪ Peaceful relationship with authorities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Police ▪ Inversed resentment toward politicians <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contentious org have less resentment ▪ Formal leaders high resentment ▪ Leadership structure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Hierarchical <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The ‘Lonko’ ▪ Monopolising decisions/responsibility <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Formal organisations ▪ Informal organisations ▪ Followers also benefit ▪ Lack of identity transmission <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No values ▪ Distance between age groups ▪ Acquiescent reactions to injustice <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Servile ▪ Passive 	
Explaining mobilisational citizenship		
Agentic memory		
Sense of continuity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Communists keep work in the 1990s ▪ Transmission in organisations ▪ Families tell the neighbourhood history ▪ Close to FPMR and MJL ▪ ‘Repression’ ▪ Graffiti build continuity 	According to these categories of analysis LH has constructed a sense of historical continuity.
Using relational settings to subvert the past Frustration / oppression	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transition as a ‘defeat’ ▪ Abandoned by institutions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political parties ▪ The Catholic Church ▪ Political parties betray revolutionary project ▪ Neoliberal culture <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Corruption in the población 	This section shows how active residents share narratives of frustration and oppression in the past. They build relational settings.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Drugs in the población <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Blaming the government ▪ Leaders abandon organisations ▪ FPMT and MJL delegitimised ▪ Masacre de Lo Hermida ▪ Poverty in dictatorship <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PEM and POJH ▪ Bad living conditions ▪ Dictatorial repression <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fear ▪ Incapacity to organise ▪ Raids ▪ Development of youth curtailed ▪ Some organisations become repressive ▪ De-legitimation of local formal organisations ▪ Killing of Manuel Gutiérrez ▪ Motivates mobilisation 	
Successful struggle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The <i>toma</i>: positive mobilisation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Empowerment ▪ Stories of the invasion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Great effort ▪ Improving the <i>toma</i> ▪ Solidarity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Residents take over public transportation ▪ Positive political parties ▪ Organisation in the shantytown <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Representatives and assemblies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Militias ▪ Community kitchens and others ▪ Resistance to dictatorship <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Slow reactivation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leaders reconstruct mobilisation ▪ The Catholic Church <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Present reference of activism ▪ Important priests <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Whelan ▪ Lapointe ▪ Dionne ▪ Monetary support ▪ Support to protesters ▪ Autonomy and openness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Community kitchens ▪ Organisations re-emerge <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Communists are central <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MIR, FPMR and MJL also important ▪ Community kitchens 	<p>These categories show that active residents use narratives of past successful collective struggle to subvert past frustrating events. The result is a relational setting that creates a present position of agency.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sewing groups ▪ <i>Colonias urbanas</i> ▪ Denunciation ▪ Protest ▪ Survival ▪ Increase ▪ Football clubs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ New nodes of socialisation ▪ Leisure time ▪ In decline currently ▪ Canal flooding <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Municipality seeks eviction ▪ Injustice <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Canal is ‘bombed’ ▪ Tragedy ▪ New organisations ▪ New leaders ▪ The ‘Coordinadora’ ▪ 1980s protests <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The ‘Coordinadora’ is crucial <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reconstructing it later fails ▪ New leaders ▪ LH: great protagonism ▪ Idealisation ▪ Parties socialise and recruit <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PC ▪ FPMR ▪ MJL ▪ New spatial configuration of struggle <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Pasaje combativo</i> ▪ Change of the 1st zone ▪ The 4th zone ▪ Subversions continue in democracy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Housing movement ▪ New houses in the 4th zone ▪ Land is a main struggle! <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Toma Esperanza Andina ▪ Toma de Peñalolén ▪ The MPL in LH ▪ Master plan referendum campaign <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Role of the MPL ▪ The campaign ▪ Successful mobilisation ▪ ‘<i>Recuperaciones</i>’ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 18th neighbourhood council ▪ Commemorating Manuel Gutiérrez ▪ ‘Represión’ in September 2013 	
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Other forms of subversion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Historically determined ▪ Idealising radical groups <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Admiration in the present ▪ Admiration in the past ▪ Mobilising frames attributed to them <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Grassroots engagement ▪ Strictness / cold blooded ▪ Very organised ▪ Autonomy / popular power ▪ Different characteristics (FPMR, MJL, MIR) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ FPMR ▪ MJL ▪ MIR ▪ Socialist Unitary Party ▪ Current leaders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Belonged to radical movements ▪ Admire radical movements ▪ Repertoires of collective action <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Neglecting discontinuity 	Subversions also occur in other forms, e.g. idealising radical groups or using the forms of collective action from the 1980s.
Mobilisational belonging		
Political consciousness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LH's social movement community <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fragmentation and cohesion ▪ Close interaction <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ '<i>Hermano,</i>' '<i>compañero</i>' ▪ Friendships ▪ Emotional connection ▪ Consciousness of inequality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chilean society ▪ In Peñalolén ▪ '<i>Conciencia</i>' <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LH has 'consciousness' ▪ LH is rebellious ▪ Identification with LH's personality ▪ Mobilising symbols of political consciousness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ '<i>Población</i>' <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Different from assertions of '<i>villa</i>' ▪ A politicised place ▪ A particular culture ▪ A code of political belonging ▪ '<i>Poblador</i>' <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Politicised term ▪ They refer to each other as 'pobladores' ▪ Poblador as different from citizen ▪ '<i>Lucha</i>' 	In these categories active residents in LH construct a sense of unity using specific identity symbols that promote mobilisation.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A code of belonging as activist ▪ Rebel against injustice ▪ Being ‘<i>chora/o</i>’ ▪ Transferring symbols <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Non-active residents distant from symbols ▪ Main method: political socialisation ▪ Formal organisations not devoted to transmission ▪ MPL has been effective 	
Positive assertion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Positive descriptions and associations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enthusiasm ▪ Comfortable <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improvements ▪ Familiar <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Family bonds ▪ Rural spirit ▪ Space for the popular <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ‘Cultural hub’ ▪ Local traditions ▪ Popular space ▪ Humane values <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inclusiveness ▪ Solidarity ▪ Humbleness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Horizontal relationships ▪ Autonomy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ‘It is on fashion’ ▪ Non-active residents also assert autonomy ▪ Expressions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Historical ▪ Ideological/political ▪ Social 	<p>These categories explain that LH organisations build mobilisational belonging by asserting positive attributes of their community. Doing this they reject external descriptions that stigmatise the neighbourhood.</p>
Mobilisational boundaries		
Differentiation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Informal realm <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Historically embedded ▪ Procedures ▪ Experience (<i>‘la calle’</i>) ▪ Education ▪ Informal is different from illegal <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Being ‘marginal’ ▪ Control over norms of inclusion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Skilfulness ▪ Formal realm <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The ‘others’ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The powerful build it ▪ ‘Others’ discriminate ▪ Lack of skill/control 	<p>According to these categories LH organisations establish the difference between the formal and the informal realms.</p> <p>The mobilisational potential of this differentiation lays on the conflict between these two realms. Residents use ‘repression’ to express that the formal realm is constantly intending to formalise the informal one.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Resentment ▪ Realms in conflict <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Symbol '<i>represión</i>' <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Formal vs informal ▪ Builds mobilisation ▪ Continuity with dictatorship ▪ Urgency to defend ▪ To be '<i>sapo</i>' ▪ Types of repression <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Utilisation ▪ Regulating the use of space ▪ Oppressive cultural-economic system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ '<i>Una tubería</i>' ▪ Non-active residents <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Disconnection from frames ▪ Blame local organisations 	
Defining antagonists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Main antagonists <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Institutions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Examples of defiance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Police <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ '<i>Pacos,</i>' '<i>ratis,</i>' and '<i>perros</i>' ▪ Educational system ▪ Political party system ▪ Others ▪ Osvaldo Romo ▪ Accomplices <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The 'rich' ▪ 'Cuicos' ▪ Drug dealers ▪ Some formal local organisations 	Differentiation leads to define antagonists. Antagonists are those who exercise 'repression'.
Self-determination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Space in which the informal governs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Self-made ▪ Graffiti ▪ '<i>Autogestión</i>' (self-management) ▪ Rejection of parties <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The youth seeks new alternatives 	These categories demonstrate that boundaries mobilise as a result of residents' intention of protecting their informal realm. They do that by rejecting external influences.
Decentralised leadership		
The role of specific leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Specific leaders are important <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Facilitate initiatives ▪ Older leaders represent identity more ▪ Transmit identity symbols ▪ Identity transmission <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Role modelling <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Instances of transmission to children ▪ Children developed relationships with members 	These categories show that specific leaders in LH have a crucial role in facilitating contentious collective action and in transmitting mobilisational identity symbols.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Children admired members ▪ Children learned from members ▪ During activism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leaders speak of past activism ▪ Leaders strengthen reframing ▪ Leaders promote forms of action 	
Protagonism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Protagonism boosts leaders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ At football clubs ▪ In the ‘popular Christmas’ ▪ Organising acts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Collective protagonism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Community making in stories ▪ Growing in the población ▪ Individual protagonism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Explicit encouragement of autonomy ▪ Admiration of individual autonomy ▪ Being ‘autogestionado’ ▪ Avoiding coercion ▪ Reframing acts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Collective use of symbol ‘repression’ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ With the municipality ▪ With the police ▪ Boosting power and centrality ▪ Divesting acts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Occurs together with reframing ▪ Separate from reframing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Moderate leaders ▪ Expressions of protagonism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Popular art ▪ Clashes with the police ▪ Representations of repression <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Murals ▪ Sites of memory 	Simultaneously, these other categories show us that, in the form of protagonism, leadership spreads among organisation members. Accordingly, each member becomes part of the local process of community building.
Additional supportive elements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rejecting hierarchies ▪ Rejecting service provision ▪ Alternative forms of education <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political capital training 	

Table 9. Detail of categories used for qualitative analysis.

APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW GUIDES

Interview guide 1: Motivational interview for members of local organisations.

Objectives: 1) explore personal and collective motivations to local participation, and 2) explain the quality of local organisations.

Introductory explanation

- What my doctoral research is about
- Explain anonymity, privacy of information, and ask for consent
- Freedom: ask the interviewee to feel free to provide any opinion or information. Add that s/he is free not to answer a question if desired
- Ask authorisation to audio record the interview
- Thank the interviewee for his/her time

I. Personal history of activism

- **Life in the neighbourhood:** *I need you to tell me about your life here in the población.* Explore main facts and events in life.
 - Where s/he grew up, where has s/he lives in the *población*.
 - Interactions with relevant institutions (school, Church, family, political parties, local government, etc.)
 - Important influential figures in life (parents, family members, local activists, friends, politicians, priests, etc.)
- **Involvement in civic organising:** explore the different factors involved in his/her engagement in organisations.
 - **Reasons:** *why are you involved in local organisations?*
 - **Starting point:** *in what moment did you begin engaging in organisations? When did you begin working with local población organisations?*
 - **Relevant events:** *what events occurred? What happened that motivated your participation?*
 - **Other relevant people:** *who has been influential in your involvement? Where there other influential people?*
 - **Critical moment:** *what triggered your commitment with this cause? Is your motivation similar others'?*
 - **Other organisations:** *in what other organisations have you been involved? Why in those?*

II. Life and *población* identity

- **General evaluation:** *what do you think about the neighbourhood?* Explore reasons.
- **Description and differentiation:** *please describe your población. How is it similar and different from other poblaciones?* Explore reasons.
- **Personality:** *would you say that your población has a defined personality? How is it?*
- **Advantages and disadvantages:** *are there any comparative advantages in living in this población? What are the disadvantages?* Explore reasons.

III. Collective action at the *población*

- **General perception:** *how would you qualify people's participation in this población? do you think it needs something else?* Explore reasons.
- **Position in Santiago / Chile:** *what is local organisations' position in Santiago / Chile's civil society? Are there other poblaciones with similar organisations? Makes them similar and different?* Explore reasons.
- **External perception:** *How do external people view local organisations? What do they think of the población activism?* Explore reasons.
- **Local organisations:** *what organisations do you know here?* In each case explore
 - **Objectives and initiatives:** *what are the objectives of this organisation? What kind of initiatives does it implement?*
 - **Perception:** *what do you think about this organisation? Why?*
 - **The role of institutions:** *is there any link between this organisation(s) and institutions con (political parties, government, Church, NGOs, etc.)?*
 - **Funding:** *how do these organisations fund their activities?*
 - **Differentiation:** *what makes this organisation unique? How are local organisations unique in comparison with other neighbourhood or other civil society organisations?*
- **Recruiting:** *how do local organisations recruit new members? What methods do they use? Why those methods?*
- **Survival of mobilisation (LH):** *why has mobilisation survived in this place since the 1980s? Why organisations here maintain critical, contentious collective initiatives?* Explore factors.
- **Decrease of contentious mobilisation (NA):** *why has contentious mobilisation decreased in NA in comparison with the 1970-80s?* Explore factors.

IV. Perception of and relation with institutions

- **General perception:** *what do you think about institutions that interact with the población?* (Local government, central government, political parties, police, Church, NGOs, companies, etc.). Explore reasons.
- **Explore relationship organisations - institutions:** *how is the relationship between organisations and institutions? What good/bad things do institutions do? What could they improve?* Allude to the following institutions
 - Municipality / local government
 - Central government
 - Political parties
 - Police
 - Church
 - NGOs
 - Companies

IV. Focus on interviewee's specific organisation

- **General description**
 - Name
 - Objectives
 - Methods, initiatives
 - Members (ages, origin, roles)
 - Meetings (frequency, moment, place, procedures)
 - Institutional connections (political parties, Church, etc.)
 - Connections to other *población* organisations (especially local)
- **Role:** *what is the role of your organisation in this población?*
- **Creation:** *why did this organisation originate? Who were involved? Why they created it in that specific moment?*
- **Necessity:** *what necessity is this organisation responding to? Why is it necessary that this organisation exist? What problem is it answering? How is this organisation working to solve that issue?*
- **Deepening relationship with institutions:** *what does the organisation think of institutions? How is the organisation's relationship with institutions? Why is it like that?* (explore the following: local government, central government, political parties, police, Church, NGOs, companies, etc.). Explore this in depth.

- **Leadership:** *are there leaders in this organisation? What makes them leaders? Explore reasons.*
- **Background:** *what determined the creation of this organisation?*
 - **Members' origin:** *where do members come from? Are they all from the same población? Do they participate in other organisations simultaneously? Had they belonged to another local organisation before?*
 - **Deepening recruitment:** *when and why did current members join the organisation?*
 - **Previous organisations / movements:** *were members previously involved in other organisations / movements? Was this organisation born from other organisations? Which were they and why?*
 - **Influences from other organisations / movements:** *has this organisation learned from past movements / organisations / parties? Are there other organisations / movements that influenced organisation members? (its conceptions, methods, logistics, objectives, etc.)*
 - **Important figures / leadership:** *are there important, inspiring people for this organisation? Why are / were they important?*
 - **Important events:** *are there past events that inspire this organisation? Why are those events inspiring? What do(es) that / those event(s) give you?*
 - **Other influences:** *does this organisation obtain anything from the following historical / institutional events / groups? What is it?*
 - The military dictatorship
 - LH: the 'toma de Peñalolén' and others such as 'Esperanza Andina' – Peñalolén's master plan referendum – the Movement of Dwellers in the Struggle
 - NA: the 'casas Chubi' invasion
 - The government
 - Political parties
 - Radical past movements such as the MIR, FPMR and MJL.
- **Deepening in personal motivation:** *why are you engaged in local organisations? What does that give you? What benefit do you see in it? Explore meanings.*
- **Deepening collective motivation:** *why are people here engaged in organisations? What does that give them? What benefit do they see in it? Explore meanings.*
- **Role of personal participation:** *what role has mobilising had in your life? What role has this organisation had in your own life? How and why?*

- **Role of collective participation:** *what role has mobilising had in local people's life? What role do you think that this organisation has had in its members' life? How and why?*
- **Alternative participation:** *if you did not participate in this organisation, in what other local organisation would you participate? Why?*
- **Ideal organisation:** *how would the ideal local organisation be?* Explore an ideal organisation for society and for the neighbourhood.
- **Future organisation:** *do you think that you will be interested in staying in local organisations in the future after this organisations' goal is accomplished?* Explore reasons.

Finalise and thank interviewee

Interview guide 2: Historical interview for older leaders and other residents.

Objectives: 1) explore historical events in especial detail, and 2) historically explain the quality of local organisations.

Introductory explanation

- What my doctoral research is about
- Explain anonymity, privacy of information, and ask for consent
- Freedom: ask the interviewee to feel free to provide any opinion or information. Add that s/he is free not to answer a question if desired
- Ask authorisation to audio record the interview
- Thank the interviewee for his/her time

I. History and personal life

- **Life in the shantytown, the *población* and family:** *I need you to tell me about your life here in the población.* Explore main facts and events in life.
 - **Family:** *where were you born? What did your parents do? How and when did you and your family get here? How was your economic situation?*
 - **Housing:** *where did you live (zone)? How was the neighbourhood then? How was your home?* (briefly examine general conditions: materials, floor, sewage, number of inhabitants, health conditions).
 - **Community:** *how has your relationship with the local community been? What relationship with the local community did you have back then? Who did you trust, who did you not trust? Briefly explore reasons.*
- **Job:** *what jobs have you had? What do you work on now?*
- **Activism:** *have you been involved in organisations? If yes,*
 - **Motivation:** *why does s/he participate in local organisations?*
 - **Background:** *since when has s/he participated in local organisations? Have you always had the same role in local organisations? What changed? Why?*
 - **Current activism:** *what is your current engagement? In what organisation? What is your role? How did you get to that organisation? Has your involvement changed? How? Why?*
 - **Political party:** *have you ever been involved in a political party? Explore reasons.*

If not,
 - **Reasons:** *why has s/he not been involved in local organisations? Explore reasons.*

II. The land invasion and the shantytown

- **Description:** ask a description of the period in which people invaded the lands
- **Prior procedures:** *what happened before the land take-over? How did you find out there was a toma? How did you decide participating in it?*

- **Procedures:** *how were the procedures to occupy the land?*
- **Political parties:** *what was the role of political parties? What was the role of the MIR? Did the MIR have any particularity?*
- **Leaders:** *were there leaders? What did they do? Why were they leaders?*
- **The toma:** ask for what they remember (location, structure, size, streets, number of people, etc.).
- **Life conditions:** *how were people living there? How was life in that moment there? Ask for positive and negative aspects.*
 - **Infrastructure:** materials and methods used.
 - **Expectations and frustrations:** what they expected to find.
 - **Conflicts:** with neighbours, family, or authorities.
 - **Problems:** in jobs, health and others.
 - **Differences:** *were there differences between residents?* (Family members, children, people of age, women, men, other families, etc.).
- **People belonging to parties:** *what role did party militants have? How were they different / similar from other neighbours?*
 - **Relation between MIR members and residents:** *what relationship did MIR militants develop with residents?*
- **Organisation:** *how was the shantytown organised? How did you arrive to that organisation? Was it beneficial? Explore reasons.*
- **Relocation (NA):** *how did the relocation occur?* Briefly explore some details.
- **Protests and mobilisation:** *what kinds of protests were there? Why did people protest? What did protests consist of? How did you organise the protests? Who went to protests?*
- **Evolution:** *how did things evolve at the toma? Did life conditions improve? How?*

IV. Dictatorship

- **Spontaneous story telling:** ask the interviewee to freely describe events, impressions, and interpretations during and after the military coup. Include the following questions to deepen in specific topics.
- **First perceptions:** *how was life in the shantytown during the dictatorship? What do you think of the organization / participation during the dictatorship?*
- **Coup:** *how was it experienced? How did your family and neighbours experience it? What do people remember today?*
- **Evolutions post-coup:** *what happened after the coup? What did people do?*
- **Anecdotes:** *are there any anecdotes about that period? What have you been told?*
- **Activism:** *what happened with organisations in that period?* Explore details and reasons.

- **Organisations:** *what organisations kept working in that period? (e.g. sewing groups, neighbourhood councils, children camps, community kitchens, housing committees, political resistance groups, etc.). Were organisations created later? Explore details and reasons.*
- **External institutions:** *what institutions had prominence in the población? What was their relationship with organisations? Were there any institutions that would help organisations? How did they contribute?*
 - **Relationship with the government:** *how was the relationship with the central and local governments?*
- **Relationship with parties / movements:** *what was the relationship between local organisations and political movements / parties? Did the MIR maintain connection to local organisations? Were there any other parties involved here?*

1980s' national protests

- **Perceptions:** *what are your impressions on the Chilean national protests? What do you remember about them?*
- **Engagement:** *how did people experience protests here? Did they engage in local initiatives? Was there enthusiasm?*
- **Initiatives:** *what initiatives were there? How did people organise?*
- **Movements involved:** *what movements were there involved? (e.g. FPMR, MIR, MJL, PC, PS, DC, IC, MAPU, and other parties)*
- **Attack to Pinochet:** *did the murder attempt to Pinochet in September 1986 have any repercussions here?*

Transition and referendum (late 1980s)

- **First impressions:** *what is your impression of Chile's democratic transition? How do people in organisations see this? What did you think of the referendum? Explore details and reasons.*
- **Experience:** *what happened at the población by the end of the 1980s?*
- **Relationship with parties / movements:** *how did the relationship between organisations and parties develop by the end of the 1980s? how did local organisations experience the conflicts between the FPMR and the Communists ('Carrizal Bajo' for example)?*
- **Referendum:** *did local organisations and leaders become involved in the referendum? How? Which were important people in that period?*

V. Mobilisation in democracy

- **First impressions:** *what do you think about local organisations and mobilisation when Chile returns to democracy? Explore details and reasons.*

- **Life conditions:** *did local life conditions improve or worsen? How? How did they evolve during the 1990s?* Explore details.
 - Family
 - Jobs
 - Conflicts
 - Infrastructure (roads, squares, lighting, etc.)
 - Health
 - Education
 - Housing
 - Security
 - Drugs

- **Organisations:** *what happened with local organisations? Which survive, which do not? What happened with the following organisations during the 1990s?*
 - Neighbourhood councils
 - Mothers' centres
 - Community kitchens
 - Sewing groups
 - Children camps
 - Buying together
 - Political contentious organisations
 - Youth groups
 - Others

Understand quality of mobilisation

- **Survival of contentious action (LH):** *why did contentious collective action survive here in LH?* Explore factors.
 - **Opportunities:** explore the opportunities that allowed organisations to maintain contentious initiatives alive.
 - **Challenges:** explore challenges that LH's organisations needed to successfully overcome in order to maintain mobilisation.

- **Demobilisation (NA):** *why did NA's contentious collective action deactivate after 1990?*
 - **Challenges:** explore challenges that NA's organisations could not overcome.
 - **Opportunities:** explore opportunities that NA's organisations could not benefit from to maintain contentious initiatives alive.

VI. Current collective action

- **First impressions:** *what do you think about local organisations today?* Explore details and reasons.

- **Differentiations in time:** *how is current collective action from other periods? Why is it different? What has changed?*

- **Differentiations in space:** *how is current collective action from other poblaciones? Why is it different?*
- **Organisations:** *what organisations function today (or in the last few years)? How are they? What makes them particular? Explore reasons.*
- **Initiatives:** *what initiatives have been important in the last few years? Why have they been special?*
 - **Other initiatives:** explore other existing initiatives, find out details about them.
- **Relationship with other actors (focus on institutions):** *what institutions are currently involved in local organisations' work? (e.g. political parties, municipality, police, MINVU, central government, NGOs, Catholic and Evangelic Church, Universities etc.)*
 - **Perception:** *what is the impression on institutions today within organisations? What do people in organisations think about political parties? The municipality? NGOs? The police?*
 - **Relationship with the neighbourhood:** *what is the relationship between residents in organisations and the general población (not in organisations)? What is the role of institutions in this relationship? Explore details on: Catholic and Evangelic Church, municipality, police, political parties, etc.*
 - **Institutional work:** *how do institutions approach población organisations? What is the difference in their interaction with non-active residents? Explore details on: Catholic and Evangelic Church, municipality, police, political parties, etc.*
- **Relationship with other poblaciones:** *what connections are there with organisations in other neighbourhoods? Explore details.*
- **Future:** *how do you see the future of local organisations? What will happen in the following years? Explore reasons and details.*

Finalise and thank interviewee

Interview guide 3: Exploratory interview for institutional representatives.

Objectives: 1) explore relationship between political institutions and *población* local organisations, and 2) explore institutional perceptions about local organisations.

Introductory explanation

- What my doctoral research is about
- Explain anonymity, privacy of information, and ask for consent
- Freedom: ask the interviewee to feel free to provide any opinion or information. Add that s/he is free not to answer a question if desired
- Ask authorisation to audio record the interview
- Thank the interviewee for his/her time

I. Ideas about citizenship and collective action

- **Definitions:** *how would briefly you define civic participation ('participación ciudadana')?*
 - **To be encouraged / avoided:** *what should be avoided / encouraged in civic participation? Why?*
- **Ideal:** *how would ideal civic participation be in your view?*
- **Mobilisation in poblaciones:** *what do you think of mobilisation in poblaciones? Why?* Explore positive and negative aspects.
 - **Specific case studies:** *what do you evaluate participation in NA / LH? What are the strengths / weaknesses? Why?*

II. Relationship with local organisations

- **Specific interaction:** *how do you interact with población organisations?* Explore
 - **Connections:** explore loyalties in *poblaciones* and organisations
 - **Methods and initiatives**
 - **Future aims**
 - **Focus on LH / NA:** ask to characterise her/his relationship with local organisations in LH / NA.
- **General institutional relationship:** *what relationship do institutions establish with población organisations?* (e.g. political parties, Church, local and central government, police, NGOs, etc.). Explore details and reasons.
 - **Evaluation:** *what are the strengths and weaknesses in that relationship?*
 - **Potential improvements:** *how could that interaction be improved?*

III. Demobilisation / mobilisation

- **Explanation:** *how would you explain poblaciones' demobilisation since the 1980s? how would you explain that some poblaciones (LH) maintain mobilisation despite the general trend of demobilisation?*

Finalise and thank interviewee

Interview guide 4: Motivational interview for non-active residents.

Objectives: 1) explore barriers not to engage in local organisations, and 2) explore perceptions about local organisations.

Introductory explanation

- What my doctoral research is about
- Explain anonymity, privacy of information, and ask for consent
- Freedom: ask the interviewee to feel free to provide any opinion or information. Add that s/he is free not to answer a question if desired
- Ask authorisation to audio record the interview
- Thank the interviewee for his/her time

I. Personal life

- **Routine:** *how is a normal, typical day for you? What time do you get up? What do you do?*
- **Job/study:** *do you work / study? What / where are you studying? What jobs have you had? What do you work on now?*
- **Studies:** *what studies do you have? (high school, university level, or technical level)*
- **Life at the *población* and family:** *I need you to tell me about your life here in the población.*
 - **Family:** *where were you born? What is the composition of your family? How is your economic situation?*
 - **Housing:** *where have you lived (zone)? Has your house always been like this? What has changed?*
 - **Community:** *how is your relationship with the local community here? Do you interact with your neighbours? In what circumstances, why? Has it always been like this? Explore details and reasons.*

II. Perceptions of the *población*

- **Associations:** *what are the first words that come to your head when I tell you 'Nuevo Amanecer'? What are the first words that come to your head when I tell you 'Nueva La Habana'?* Explore details and reasons.
- **General evaluation:** *what do you think about the neighbourhood?* Explore reasons.
 - **Positive / negative aspects:** *what is positive / negative about it? Why?*
- **Description and differentiation:** *please describe your población. How is it similar and different from other poblaciones?* Explore reasons.
- **Advantages and disadvantages:** *are there any comparative advantages of living in this población? What are the disadvantages?* Explore reasons.

- **Personality:** *would you say that your población has a defined personality? How is it? Has this personality always been the same?*
 - **Name change (NA):** *do you see a difference between Nuevo Amanecer and Nueva La Habana? Do they have different personalities? How? Why? Explore details, reasons, and hypothetical consequences.*
- **History:** *what do you know about this neighbourhood's history? Can you tell me about it briefly?*
- **Impact of identity:** *what is the importance of living in this neighbourhood for your life? Does it make a difference living here than anywhere else? Explore details and reasons.*

III. Local organisations

- **Knowledge:** *what do you know about local organisations? Which ones do you know? What can you tell me about them? Explore details.*
- **Evaluation:** *what do you think about local organisations? Explore details.*
 - **Positive / negative aspects:** *what is positive / negative about them? Why?*
 - **Valuation:** *do you think that organisations are important? Why? Do organisations have any impact in your life? Do organisations have any impact in the local community's life? Explore details and reasons.*
 - **Impression on active residents:** *what do you think of people who participate in local organisations? Why?*
- **Differentiation:** *are local organisations different from other poblaciones? Why?*
- **Improvements:** *how could local organisations improve their work? What impact would that have in residents' lives? What impact would that have in your life?*

III. Demobilisation

- **Personal disengagement:** *why do you not participate in organisations? Have you ever declined opportunities? Why? Explore details, barriers, and reasons.*
- **Collective demobilisation:** *why do you think that local organisations have deactivated in time? Why do you think that people are not too motivated in participating in local organisations? Explore details, barriers, and reasons.*
- **Future:** *how do you think that local organisations will evolve? Why? What would be the ideal evolution? Why?*

Finalise and thank interviewee

APPENDIX 4: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND FIELD NOTES

This appendix contains the list of interviews and field notes carried out on this study's fieldwork. This material is available upon request.

List of interviews

Interview (2013, January 4). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013, January 14). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013, January 17). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013, January 23). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013, January 25). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013, January 29). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013a, January 30). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013b, January 30). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013, January 31). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013a, February 5). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013b, February 5). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013c, February 5). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013a, February 6). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013b, February 6). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013, February 7). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Group Interview (2013, February 8). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Group Interview (2013a, February 13). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Group Interview (2013b, February 13). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013a, February 13). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013b, February 13). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013, February 14). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013a, February 15). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2013b, February 15). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013, February 16). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013a, February 19). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013b, February 19). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013c, February 19). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013, February 20). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013a, February 21). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013b, February 21). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013, February 22). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013, February 23). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Group Interview (2013, February 26). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013, February 26). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013, February 28). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013, March 1). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013a, March 4). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013b, March 4). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013, March 5). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Group Interview (2013, March 6). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013a, March 6). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013b, March 6). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Group Interview (2013, March 7). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013, March 8). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013a, March 11). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013b, March 11). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013, March 12). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013a, March 13). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013b, March 13). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013a, March 14). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013b, March 14). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013c, March 14). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013d, March 14). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013a, March 16). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2013b, March 16). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, December 20). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, September 4). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, September 19). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, September 22). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, September 25). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Group Interview (2014, September 26). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, September 28). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, October 6). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, October 7). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014a, October 9). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014b, October 9). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014a, October 13). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014b, October 13). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014c, October 13). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014a, October 16). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014b, October 16). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, October 20). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, October 22). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014a, October 24). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014b, October 24). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014a, October 27). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014b, October 27). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014a, October 28). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014b, October 28). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014a, October 29). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014b, October 29). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, October 30). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, November 3). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, November 4). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014, November 7). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

Interview (2014a, November 11). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

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Group Interview (2014, November 17). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014, November 17). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Group Interview (2014, November 18). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014, November 18). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014a, November 27). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014b, November 27). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
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Interview (2014, December 1). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014, December 2). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014, December 3). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014a, December 5). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014b, December 5). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014c, December 5). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014, December 12). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014a, December 13). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014b, December 13). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014, December 29). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.
Interview (2014, December 30). *Fieldwork in Nuevo Amanecer*. Santiago de Chile.

List of field notes

Field notes (2012a, November 10). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
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Field notes (2012, November 13). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Field notes (2012, November 15). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Field notes (2012, November 16). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
Field notes (2012, November 18). *Fieldwork in Lo Hermida*. Santiago de Chile.
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