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Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism

Abstract:

In this paper I argue that Modal Realism, the thesis that there exist non-actual possible individuals and worlds, can be made compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that it is possible that nothing concrete exists. Modal Realism as developed by Lewis rules out the possibility of a world where nothing concrete exists and so conflicts with Metaphysical Nihilism. In the paper I argue that Modal Realism can be modified so as to be compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism. Such a modificat...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher copy:
10.1093/mind/113.452.683

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, HUM, Philosophy, Philosophy Postholders
Journal:
MIND
Volume:
113
Issue:
452
Pages:
683-704
Publication date:
2004-10-05
DOI:
EISSN:
1460-2113
ISSN:
0026-4423
URN:
uuid:6ce78fb9-bd0f-4eba-84b2-1a3c16c64344
Source identifiers:
143859
Local pid:
pubs:143859
Language:
English

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