Journal article
Disagreements in moral intuition as defeaters
- Abstract:
-
People may disagree about moral issues because they have fundamentally different intuitions. I argue that we ought to suspend judgement in such cases. Since we trust our own moral intuitions without positive evidence of their reliability, we must necessarily extend this trust to the moral intuitions of others: a fundamental self-other asymmetry in moral epistemology is untenable. This ensures that disagreements in moral intuition are defeating. In addition, I argue that brute conflicts in mor...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Philosophical Quarterly Journal website
- Volume:
- 67
- Issue:
- 267
- Pages:
- 282–302
- Publication date:
- 2016-08-13
- Acceptance date:
- 2016-05-20
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1467-9213
- ISSN:
-
0031-8094
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:625185
- UUID:
-
uuid:6cd0fa61-45fa-4048-8ea4-5981f84722a5
- Local pid:
- pubs:625185
- Source identifiers:
-
625185
- Deposit date:
- 2016-06-03
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- AL Morgensen
- Copyright date:
- 2016
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2016 The Author. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Oxford University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqw053
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