

Identity and Identities: The Metaphysics and Semantics of 'Qua'



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To my parents,
Claus and Marion Loets

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Abstract

One of the most fundamental principles in the logic of *identity* is Leibniz's Law: if *a* and *b* are identical, then any property had by *a* is also had by *b*. But this logical notion of identity would appear to be in tension with our ordinary understanding of the multifaceted *identities* of individuals. For it is quite common for a single individual to have multiple functions, roles, or identities and have different, even incompatible properties in these different roles or capacities. For instance, when a judge is also the referee of a football club, it is possible for the judge to be corrupt while the referee is uncorrupt. When a father is also a literary critic, it is possible for the father to be kind while the critic is cruel. And when, like Duchamp's piece *Fountain*, a urinal is also an artwork, it is possible for the urinal to be ordinary while the artwork is extraordinary. Cases with this structure are not uncommon, yet they would appear to provide counterexamples to Leibniz's Law. A standard response amongst philosophers is to invoke qualifications with 'as' or 'qua': The person is corrupt qua judge but uncorrupt qua referee. The person is kind as a father but cruel as a critic. *Fountain* is ordinary qua urinal, but extraordinary qua work of art. Despite the prominence of this response, there is next to no systematic literature on how such qualifications work and how precisely they help reconciling cases such as the above with Leibniz's Law. To fill this lacuna, this dissertation investigates the metaphysics, semantics, and logic of qualification. I develop and assess four initially plausible proposals for how a satisfactory solution to the puzzle cases can be reconciled with (some version of) Leibniz's Law using qualifications with 'as' or 'qua', and I argue that all but one are unsatisfactory. I go on to develop the remaining approach to qualification into a detailed theory, and I show that my theory of qualification affords an illuminating way of negotiating the tensions between *identity*, the simple well-behaved relation everything bears to itself and only itself, and *identities*, the categories we live by.

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Introduction

The topic of this dissertation is a particular kind of qualification: qualifications with ‘as’ or ‘qua’, *qua-qualifications* for short. Qua-qualifications ascribe properties to individuals, albeit in a qualified manner. Consider the following examples:

- (1) a. As a parent Jill is patient.
- b. The river *qua* river is harmless.
- c. John is corrupt as a judge.
- d. Bill cast his vote *qua* faculty member.

The most noteworthy feature of qua-qualifications is that they permit the ascription of apparently incompatible properties to what would appear to be a single individual. Thus, without loss in felicity, (1a-d) can be expanded on as in (2a-d):

- (2) a. As a parent Jill is patient, but as a manager Jill is impatient.
- b. The river *qua* river is harmless, but the river *qua* border crossing is dangerous—it’s guarded by soldiers who shoot to kill.
- c. John is corrupt as a judge but uncorrupt as a referee.
- d. Bill cast his vote *qua* faculty member, but abstained *qua* faculty chair.

But what precisely do qua-qualifications do to render possible what would be impossible without them? On the one hand, there is a question in *metaphysics*:

If one cannot be both patient and impatient, corrupt and uncorrupt, dangerous and harmless, voting and abstaining how is it possible to have such incompatible properties *as* or *qua* object of a certain kind? On the other hand, there is a question about *language*: What do qualifying phrases of the form $\ulcorner \text{as/qua } G \urcorner$ have to *mean* for (i) and (ii) not to jointly entail (iii)?

- (i) *as/qua* G , a is F
- (ii) *as/qua* H , a is not- F .
- (iii) a is F and a is not- F .

These are the questions at the heart of this dissertation. The thesis comprises four self-standing essays, each examining a different theory of qualification. I found it useful to divide the available approaches into three groups:

Object Theories: Qua-qualifications ascribe properties to special sorts of objects. For a to be F qua G is for an object closely related to a , a -qua- G , to be F .

Eventuality Theories: Qua-qualifications describe relations between eventualities (states, events, or situations). For a to be F qua G is for certain relations to obtain between a 's G -eventualities and a 's F -eventualities.

Property Theories: Qua-qualifications ascribe special sorts of properties to individuals. For a to be F qua G is for a to be F -qua- G .

Kit Fine's theory of qua-objects (Essay 1) and Donald Baxter's aspect theory (Essay 2) are object theories of qualification. Zoltán Szabó's event semantics of qualification (Essay 3) is an eventuality theory. My own theory of qualification (Essay 4) is a property theory. Before laying out the essays in more detail, it'll be worth further motivating the study of qua-qualifications as well as reflecting on the scope and limits of the investigation.

1.1 Motivation

The study of qua-qualifications is motivated by (i) their wide use in a range of different areas of philosophy, (ii) their centrality to our self-understanding as creatures with many identities, (iii) their implications for key debates in metaphysics regarding the validity of non-identity arguments by Leibniz's Law, and (iv) their bearing on important debates in the philosophy of language regarding the analysis of non-intersective adjectives.

(i) *Formulating philosophical theses.* Qua-qualifications are used in a wide variety of areas of philosophy to formulate philosophical problems and positions, not only in the history of philosophy, as in Aristotle's characterisation of metaphysics as the study of *being qua being* (see Shields, 2012) or in the distinction often attributed to Leibniz between *body qua matter* and *body qua form* (see Mercer, 2004, ch.2), but also in contemporary philosophy. To give just a few examples:

- David Lewis (2003) proposes that a person's essential properties may be more flexible than has been previously appreciated, e.g. Kripke's origins may be essential to him *as emergent from this sperm and egg* while being inessential to him *as a public figure*.
- Miranda Fricker (2007) argues that there is a distinctive kind of injustice, epistemic injustice, which consists in being disadvantaged *as a knower*.
- Kieran Setiya (2016) proposes that being practically rational consists in being *good qua rational agent* and uses this gloss to show that akrasia is irrational.
- Jessica Wilson (2014) suggests drawing a distinction between *beliefs qua physical* and *beliefs qua mental* to reconcile the claim that identity is a grounding relation with differences in fundamentality between the grounded and their grounds.
- Noël Carroll (1996) argues that moral flaws do sometimes diminish an artwork's value *qua work of art*.

- And Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 1991) argues that being discriminated against *as* a Black woman does not in general reduce to being discriminated against *as* a Black person or *as* a woman and draws on this claim to argue for the intersectionality of oppression.

In each of these projects, qua-qualifications are used to articulate and defend interesting and sometimes controversial philosophical theses. A clearer understanding of how such qualifications work, under what conditions they are true and what they entail would be desirable in scrutinising the work to which such qualifications are put in philosophical theorising.

(ii) *Identity and Identities*. It is no accident that qua-qualifications make an appearance in such a wide range of philosophical debates. Such qualifications are a tool for capturing a more general condition of creatures who, like us, live in highly structured societies and, consequently, tend to occupy a wide variety of roles, functions and identities. They are sons or daughters. Citizens of a country. Breadwinners and carers. They have professional roles like being a doctor, a nurse, a bus driver or a lawyer. And they typically have racial, gender, class or religious identities. Artefacts often have multiple functions or roles to play, too. A baseball bat can be both a piece of sports equipment and a weapon. A river can be a water source as well as a national border. And as Duchamp taught us, a urinal can be both a toilet and a piece of art. When things have several roles, functions or identities, it is possible for them to have different properties in these different capacities, a state of affairs which can be described using qua-qualifications as in (2a-d) above. However, how this is possible is less well understood and brings to the fore general questions regarding the relation between *identity*, the simple well-behaved relation everything bears to itself and only itself, and *identities*, the categories we live by. If each of us is just one thing, what relation do we bear to our identities? How can some of our properties belong to one identity, but not another? By studying qua-qualifications, we also

study these more general questions central to our self-understanding.

To illustrate, consider claims widely accepted in social philosophy and the social sciences regarding the *intersectionality* of oppression and its experience (see for instance CombaheeRiverCollective, 1977; hooks, 1981, 1984; Crenshaw, 1989, 1991; Mutua, 2013; Hill Collins, 2013). A key insight in that literature is that one can be disadvantaged relative to one of one's social identities, e.g. as a woman, while being privileged relative to another social identity, e.g. as a white person. Another crucial insight is that various "axes" of oppression sometimes interact in non-additive ways. How are we to understand such claims about the interactions of our different social identities? A better grasp of what qua-qualifications mean and what they entail will not only be helpful in formulating and scrutinising intersectionality theory more carefully, but will also contribute more directly to a better understanding of central aspects of our social lives.

(iii) *Arguments by Leibniz's Law.* There are a range of simple arguments by Leibniz's Law to controversial metaphysical conclusions, whether it is the non-identity of material things and their matter, mind-body dualism, the necessity and determinacy of identity or various forms of non-reductivism (see Magidor, 2011). Such arguments are normally of the following form (where F is a predicate constant, and a and b are individual constants):

P1. Fa

P2. $\neg Fb$

LL. $a = b \rightarrow Fa \rightarrow Fb$

C. $\neg a = b$

It has been argued that some Leibniz's Law arguments are invalid on account of the premises inducing an *opaque context*, e.g. if F is the predicate 'is believed to be bright', a is 'Hesperus' and b is 'Phosphorus'.

P1. Hesperus is believed to be bright.

P2. Phosphorus is not believed to be bright.

LL. If Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, then if Hesperus is believed to be bright, Phosphorus is believed to be bright.

C. Hesperus is not identical to Phosphorus.

The conclusion is false. ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are different names for the same planet, Venus. Yet, we can imagine conditions under which the premises are true, e.g. when it is not known or believed that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ refer to the same planet. Thus the argument would appear to be invalid.

Two accounts of the sources of opacity in arguments like the above have been distinguished in the literature. Fregeans suggest that the premises induce a *referential shift*: as used in the premises, the meaning of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ is not their standard referent, the *objects* Hesperus and Phosphorus which are one and the same, but rather a non-standard referent: the *senses* of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ respectively (see for instance Frege 1892; Kaplan 1969; Evans 1982; Forbes 1996, 2000; Yalcin 2015). On this view, the premises don’t imply that the *objects* Hesperus and Phosphorus differ as regards being believed to be bright, but only that their *senses* do. By contrast, as used in the conclusion, ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ do denote their standard referents. But then the premises don’t entail the conclusion: that the senses of Hesperus and Phosphorus differ in properties would only imply that the senses of Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct, not that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct. Opacity induces a referential shift which makes the argument invalid.

Russellians, on the other hand, suggest that the premises induce a *predicational shift*: as used in the premises, the predicate ‘believed to be bright’ is understood as the predicates ‘believed to be bright under the guise of Hesperus’ and ‘believed to be bright under the guise of Phosphorus’ respectively. On this view, the premises don’t imply that Hesperus and Phosphorus differ in properties, but only that there is an object which is believed to be bright under the guise of Hesperus which is not believed to be bright under the guise of Phosphorus. Since one and the same

object can be believed to be bright under one guise while not being believed to be bright under another guise, the premises don't entail the conclusion. Opacity induces a predicational shift which makes the argument invalid.¹

Some have appealed to opacity in order to resist other Leibniz's Law arguments, too, e.g. Leibniz's Law arguments for the non-identity of a material thing and its matter (see for instance Lewis, 1971; Gibbard, 1975; Robinson, 1985; Noonan, 1991). However, in an influential paper, Kit Fine (2003) has argued that the hypothesis that such arguments induce opaque contexts is implausible for a wide range of such Leibniz's Law arguments.

Qua-qualifications are highly relevant to this debate. For qua-qualifications would appear to be available outside of typical opaque contexts. For instance, suppose John is a judge and the referee of his football club. There is an acceptable way of speaking on which (3) and (4) may well be true, while (5) is false:

- (3) The judge is corrupt.
- (4) The referee is not corrupt.
- (5) The judge is not the referee.

On this reading, (3) and (4) are understood along the lines of (6) and (7) below:

- (6) As/qua judge, the judge is corrupt.
- (7) As/qua referee, the referee is uncorrupt.

If qualifications like (6) and (7) could be cashed out in a way which does not rely on the presence of opacity but which, nevertheless, blocks inferences from (6) and (7) to (5), qua-qualifications could form the basis of a more general

¹I'm glossing over some subtleties here. Naive Russellians claim that one of 'Hesperus is believed to be bright' and 'Phosphorus is not believed to be bright' is false (e.g. Bealer, 1982; Salmon, 1986; Soames, 1987, 1989; Saul, 1998). Contextualist Russellians (e.g. Crimmins & Perry, 1989; Schiffer, 1992; Dorr, 2014) claim that depending on context, the premises can be given the non-uniform interpretation sketched above on which the argument is invalid, or they can receive a uniform interpretation (e.g. Hesperus is believed to be bright under the guise of Hesperus and Phosphorus is not believed to be bright under the guise Hesperus) on which the argument is valid but not sound since at least one premise is false.

strategy for resisting non-identity arguments by Leibniz's Law. As we shall see, theories of qualification differ as regards this feature; many but not all block inferences like the one from (6) and (7) to (5). A better appreciation of the different forms a theory of 'qua' can take will be a helpful starting point for assessing the prospects of using qua-qualifications to block a wider range of non-identity arguments by Leibniz's Law.

(iv) *Nuances of Qualified Speech.* A key distinction in the semantics of adjectives is that between *intersective* and *non-intersective* adjectives (see Siegel, 1976; Partee, 2007).² An adjective *A* is *intersective* if, and only if, for any noun *N* the denotation of '*AN*' is the intersection of the denotations of '*A*' and '*N*', i.e. where $\llbracket \]$ is the relevant interpretation function, $\llbracket AN \rrbracket = \llbracket A \rrbracket \cap \llbracket N \rrbracket$. Accordingly, *A* is a non-intersective adjective iff for some noun *N*, the denotation of '*AN*' is not the intersection of the denotations of '*A*' and '*N*'.

However, this characterisation casts a rather wide net, including gradable adjectives like *tall*, *small*, or *expensive* (being a small elephant does not imply being small), privative attributes like *former*, *alleged*, *putative*, or *toy* (being a former senator does not imply being former) and respect relative adjectives like *good*, *skilful*, *relevant* (being a good murderer does not imply being good). Given their similarity in inferential profile, these adjectives have often been lumped together (See Geach 1956, Montague 1974, Kamp 1975, King 2006; see Siegel 1976 for a more discriminating account). Closer attention to qua-qualifications brings to the fore important lines of division between this diverse lot of expressions, divisions which are obscured if we only consider modified nominals. To illustrate, consider a sentence with a modified nominal: 'John is an intelligent boxer'. The sentence can have the *intersective* reading on which John is a boxer who

²Geach (1956) draws a similar distinction between *attributive* and *predicative* predicates, though many of Geach's non-intersective predicates like 'good' can occur in predicate position, too. This is a difference to genuine attributes like 'alleged' or 'former' which cannot occur in predicate position.

is intelligent, the *gradable* reading on which John is intelligent for a boxer, i.e. more intelligent than your average boxer, or the *qualified* reading on which John is said to be intelligent as or qua boxer, i.e. in his capacity as boxer. A better understanding of qua-qualifications will be useful in distinguishing these different readings and studying their relations.

Further, by shifting focus from modified nominals to qua-qualifications, we come to notice that not only adjectives, but also verbs can give rise to the inferential behaviour characterising non-intersective adjectives. Just as being *F* as a *G* need not imply being *F*, so ϕ -ing as a *G* need not imply ϕ -ing. For instance, as example (2d) suggests, *abstaining* from a vote qua faculty chair need not imply abstaining from the vote—one might still have voted in another capacity. Likewise earning exactly £150,000 a year as a judge need not imply earning exactly £150,000 a year since one may earn money in some other capacity. In sum, closer attention to qua-qualifications promises a more discerning perspective on the gerrymandered category of non-intersective adjectives.

1.2 Scope

The guiding question of this thesis is at the intersection of metaphysics and semantics: what do qua-qualifications have to *mean* for it to be *possible* that some *a* is *F* as or qua *G* while at the same time being not-*F* as or qua *H*. Thus, what interests me first and foremost are the conditions under which contrastive qua-qualifications like the ones in (2) are true. Which objects are said to have which properties? And how are inconsistencies avoided? This guiding question informs the focus and scope of the investigation.

To begin with, my focus will be on the truth conditions of qua-qualifications. Comparatively little attention will be paid to questions regarding their compositional implementation. This is a key point of divergence between my approach

and the one often taken in the linguistics literature on *as*-phrases (see Landman, 1989; Jäger, 2003; Szabó, 2003; Asher, 2006; Cartwright, 2018). In much of that literature it is assumed that we have a relatively clear understanding of the truth conditions of qua-qualifications and that the remaining challenge is to figure out their compositional implementation. However, a theme which runs through this thesis is that it is already a difficult task to specify accurate truth conditions for qua-qualifications, with many initially promising proposals not withstanding close scrutiny. Throughout the thesis the focus will therefore be on the underlying metaphysical question of *which properties* qua-qualifications must ascribe to *which objects* to ensure that qua-qualification is possible. This focus is reflected in my division of the different theories by their respective metaphysical outlooks, rather than by their syntactic properties as proposed by Zoltán Szabó (2003).

Of course, the compositionality of a semantic theory is a key criterion of adequacy and I don't recommend setting it aside entirely—in fact, in a short postscript to *Towards a Theory of 'Qua'*, I explore different compositional implementations of the truth conditions proposed in that essay. Nevertheless, in thinking through different theories of qualification, it is helpful getting clear on the truth-conditions of such qualifications before worrying about their compositional implementation, the former task already being a difficult one.

Secondly, since the guiding question is which theory of qualification can best account for contrastive constructions like the ones in (2), my focus will be somewhat *narrower* than that which is often pursued by linguists conducting a general investigation into the semantics of *as*-phrases (e.g. Jäger, 2003; Cartwright, 2018). In particular, I'll be setting aside uses of 'as' in which 'as' means something like 'because', 'if' or 'when' as in (8a-c) respectively:

- (8) a. As a father of small children, John sleeps very little.
 b. As a Bachelor, John would lead a different life.
 c. As a child, John didn't have a dog.

(8a) is naturally understood as saying that John sleeps very little *because he is* a father of small children, while (8b) seems to say that John would lead a different life *if he were* a Bachelor. Finally (8c) is naturally understood as saying that John didn't have a dog *when he was* a child.

Note first that it is unclear whether (8a-c) would be felicitous if we replaced 'as' with 'qua'. More importantly, however, to the extent that they permit contrastive constructions at all, such constructions receive a temporal or modal interpretation. Consider:

- (9) a. *As a father of small children, John sleeps very little, but as an uncle, John sleeps a lot.
 b. As a Bachelor, John would lead a different life, but as Bachelor employed as a nanny, John would lead the same life.
 c. As a child, John didn't have a dog, but now that he is grown-up he has a dog.

As the infelicity of (9a) demonstrates, the *because*-reading does not afford the contrastive constructions which are the starting point for my investigation.³ (9b) draws a contrast between properties John has in different possibilities, the ones in which he is merely a Bachelor and the ones in which he is a Bachelor employed as a nanny. Finally, (9c) draws a contrast between properties John has at different times. But, as we shall see, many of the cases of interest to the present project are ones where *a* is *G* and *H* at the same time and world and nevertheless, qua-qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \text{ but } a \text{ is not } F \text{ as/qua } H \urcorner$ are true. Since, as we shall see in more detail in the essays, neither temporal nor modal contrasts can capture this phenomenon, I will set aside uses of 'as' in which 'as' means something like 'because', 'if' or 'when'.

Third, the focus will mostly be on relatively simple sentences in which the qualifying phrases combine with atomic sentences. Though of great interest to

³In searching for a felicitous reading of (9a), readers may reach for a temporal reading on which John sleeps a lot when his own children are not around, but only his nieces and nephews.

the nature of abilities, obligation, knowledge and the like, qualifications with modals and other operators will mostly be set aside. Thus, I will not consider what various theories would have to say about sentences like ‘John qua person can think, but John qua body cannot think’, ‘John qua virologist ought to stay at the lab to work on the vaccine but John qua father ought to go home to take care of his children’, or ‘John qua eyewitness knows that the bus caused the accident, but John qua statistician merely believes it truly’. It is an interesting question what such sentences say and whether they can be true, albeit a question which will not be discussed in this thesis.

Finally, this dissertation focuses on the *foundations* of a theory of qualification. It’s myriad applications, briefly flagged above, will be set aside entirely. Nevertheless, the discussion will supply readers with a clearer sense of the options for how philosophical theses such as the ones mentioned above could be understood.

With this clarification of the focus and scope of the dissertation in place, let me lay out the four essays comprising this thesis.

1.3 Outline of the Essays

Chapter 2: Qua Objects and Their Limits

The first essay examines an *object theory* of qualification inspired by the work of Kit Fine (see Fine, 1982, 1999, 2006, 2008). On this view, qua-qualifications ascribe properties to distinct objects, so called *qua-objects*. For a to be F qua G is for an object distinct from a , a -qua- G , to be F . Likewise, for a to be not- F qua H is for an object distinct from a , a -qua- H , to be not- F . The theory promises a straightforward answer to the guiding question of this thesis: how is it possible to be both F qua G and not- F qua H ?—by giving rise to at least two distinct qua-objects, one of which is F , the other of which is not- F ! The essay examines the Finean

theory of qua-objects in more detail and argues that, by itself, the theory lacks the resources to explain how an individual's qua-objects could differ in the way felicitous qua-qualifications would suggest. Instead, alternative resources would be required to account for the relevant property differences, resources which, given their reliance on a property theory of qualification, would undermine the motivation for developing an object theory of qualification in the first place. The conclusion is that even if qua-objects of the kind postulated by Fine exist, they are of little help in explaining how qua-qualification is possible.

Postscript: Are qua-objects parts?

The argument in *Qua Objects and Their Limits* relies on a particular conception of qua-objects as structured wholes. In a brief postscript, I consider an alternative account on which qua-objects are proper parts of things. I argue that none of an object's parts would be suited to play the role of a qua-object, whether it is spatial, temporal, modal or property parts, or their counterpart theoretic analogues. Consequently, this alternative way of developing an object theory of qualification must be rejected, too.

Chapter 3: Aspects and the (In)discernibility of Identicals

The second essay examines a more exotic object theory of qualification. The standard view in the literature on qua-qualification is that cases like the ones described in (2) do not provide counterexamples to Leibniz's Law, with different theories proposing different reconciliations. The second essay examines a theory of qualification which discards this assumption. According to Donald Baxter (1988a,b, 1999, 2018), cases like the ones described in (2) show that identicals *do* sometimes differ in properties. Baxter claims that one and the same thing can differ from itself by having *aspects* which differ, where such aspects are nevertheless

numerically identical to that thing. While a proposal like this is easily dismissed as unintelligible, the second essay shows how, drawing on recent work by Bacon & Russell (2019), the proposal can be developed in a consistent way by combining non-classical quantification theory with a non-standard interpretation of identity. Nevertheless, it is argued that Baxter's proposed theory of qualification is highly revisionary, not only in its assumed background logic, but also in its assumptions and predictions about ordinary uses of qualified speech. I conclude that Baxter's theory may not be unintelligible, but that we can nevertheless do better in developing a theory of qualification.

Chapter 4: On Szabó On Qualification

The third essay examines an eventuality theory of qualification. Eventuality theories take qua-qualifications to describe relations between eventualities (states, events, or situations). For a to be F as or qua G is for certain relations to obtain between a 's G -eventualities and a 's F -eventualities. Since Szabó's event semantics is the most detailed eventuality-theoretic account of qualification in the literature to date, his theory is the main focus of the essay. It is argued that Szabó's specific proposal is unsatisfactory in three important ways: The linguistic evidence on which it is based is inconclusive, the semantic analysis of qualification in terms of state parthood does little work in securing correct semantic predictions, and on pain of inconsistency, the theory cannot account for a range of inferential constraints on qua-qualifications. Finally, to broaden the scope of the conclusion, it is argued that there is a *general* problem for eventuality theories of qualification: they cannot account for the possibility of cases in which an individual a is F as/qua G and a is not- F as/qua H , but where the states of a 's being G and a 's being H overlap perfectly. Since such cases are possible, I conclude that it is not just Szabó's specific proposal which should be rejected, but rather the

eventuality-theoretic approach more generally.

Chapter 5: Towards a Theory of ‘Qua’

The final essay develops and defends my own preferred theory of qualification, a property theory. On this view, qua-qualifications ascribe properties to individuals. For some a to be F as or qua G is for a to have a qualified property: being F -qua- G . On my development of the view, qualified properties are relational properties. Just as sitting next to Mary is a relational property based on the *sitting-next-to* relation, so being F -qua- G is a relational property based on the *F-qua* relation. The proposal affords a clear metaphysical analysis of how qua-qualification is possible which builds on the observation that, in general, it is possible to have incompatible properties in relation to distinct things. For instance, sitting to the right of someone precludes sitting to their left. But sitting to the right of someone doesn't preclude sitting to the left of someone else. Likewise, being patient/corrupt/harmless/voting in relation to G precludes being impatient/uncorrupt/dangerous/abstaining in relation to G ; but it need not preclude bearing these relations to a different property H , so long as G and H are sufficiently independent. The theory makes good sense of individual cases, generates adequate predictions regarding the linguistic behaviour of qua-qualifications and helps us think more clearly about their logic. Since this is more than any of the extant alternative theories can claim, I conclude that the proposal offers the best account of qua-qualification to date.

Postscript: A Note on Syntax and Semantics

Towards a Theory of ‘Qua’ proposes truth-conditions for qua-qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$ but says little about their compositional implementation. In a brief postscript, I explore two possible compositional implementations and discuss their respective merits and drawbacks.

1.4 Concluding Remarks

To conclude, let me draw out some broader lessons to be gleaned from the discussion. First, while qualifications with ‘as’ or ‘qua’ are messy, the work done in this dissertation reveals that, once suitably disentangled from other linguistic phenomena, qua-qualifications are much better behaved than one might initially have thought. There is structure to qua-qualifications, both in the conditions for their felicity and in their inferential behaviour, which deserves systematic study.

Secondly, the discussion shows that there are, perhaps surprisingly, real differences in extensional adequacy and predictive power between *object*, *property* and *eventuality* theories. Such theories are not just notational variants of one another ultimately converging on their central verdicts; rather they yield diverging verdicts regarding the possibility of certain scenarios, the felicity of qua-qualifications as well as their inferential profile.

Finally, a wider lesson to be drawn from the work done in this dissertation is that the relation between semantics and metaphysics is not a one-way street. It is not just that, as many philosophers would accept, sensitivity to the workings of language avoids naïveté in one’s metaphysical theorising. Attention to the metaphysical implications of a theory can serve as a crucial corrective to semantic theorising, revealing important extensional inadequacies of semantic theories, rather than being limited to the voicing of ontological qualms.

More work remains to be done on qua-qualifications and their application to philosophical theorising. Nevertheless, the hope is that by clarifying foundational questions regarding the metaphysics, logic and language of qua-qualification, this dissertation helps guiding the inquiry onto the right tracks as well as advancing it by a few steps.

2

Qua-Objects and Their Limits

Many philosophers are attracted to a view on which ordinary material objects such as woollen jumpers, clay statues, or bunches of flowers consist not only of some *matter*—the wool, the clay, and the flowers respectively—but are compounds of both matter and *form*, where forms are typically understood as properties or relations structuring the matter in some way.¹

Such *hylomorphist* theories of material constitution tend to be motivated against the backdrop of non-identity arguments by Leibniz's Law. Ordinary material objects appear to differ from their matter in a range of properties. A bunch of flowers, for instance, would appear to differ from the flowers from which it is made in temporal extension (the flowers existed before the bunch did), in

¹The view is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Contemporary proponents include Kit Fine (1982, 1999, 2008), Mark Johnston (2006), Kathrin Koslicki (2008), Michael Rea (2011), William Jaworski (2014), and Robert Koons (2014). Laurie Paul (2006) develops a bundle-theoretic version of hylomorphism.

persistence conditions (the flowers, but not the bunch would survive scattering), and in aesthetic properties (if poorly assembled, the bunch could be ugly even if made from beautiful flowers). By Leibniz's Law, according to which identicals have all and only the same properties, the bunch would then not be the same as the flowers from which it is made.

And yet, the bunch and the flowers *coincide materially*: they have the exact same fundamental material parts. Hylomorphism proposes a distinctive explanation of how two materially coincident things can nonetheless differ in properties. On this view, material objects differ from their underlying matter in *form*, and it is the formal differences that explain the property differences.²

It has been suggested, notably by Kit Fine (1982, 1999, 2006), that hylomorphist theories of constitution, could equally be employed to explain the puzzling relation between *persons* and their various *social roles* and *identities*.³ The puzzle is this: it's both a matter of everyday experience and a tenet of sociological theory that people occupy a wide range of social roles and identities, some of which come with incompatible properties.⁴ For instance, suppose that John is a judge but also the referee of his local football club. On one acceptable way of speaking, it is possible for the judge to be corrupt while the referee is uncorrupt. But since no single person could have such incompatible properties, it is not clear how this is possible.

Examples such as these abound, ranging from the mundane to areas of greater social significance. It seems possible for the judge to be paid £80,000 even if the referee is paid only £10,000 or for the judge to be strict while the referee is lenient. Moreover, if John is not only a referee but also the janitor of his football

²The explanatory challenge to which hylomorphists respond is discussed in the literature as 'supervenience problem' or 'grounding problem' (cf. Burke 1980, 1992; Sosa 1987, pp.78-82; Heller 1990, pp.30ff.; van Inwagen 1990, p.290, n.45; Zimmerman 1995; Levy 1997; Sider 1999, p.78-82; Bennett 2004).

³Charlotte Witt (2011) puts forth a similar proposal, though on her view it is not persons but bodies which constitute social individuals, and it is the role of gender to unify a person and their social individuals into a coherent whole. For reasons of space I cannot discuss the view here.

⁴For an overview of some of the sociological discussion see for instance Biddle (1986).

club, and each committee member has one vote, it seems possible for the referee to vote for a proposal in a committee meeting while the janitor abstains. And supposing that John is disabled, but upperclass, it seems possible for John, the disabled man, to be disadvantaged, while John, the upperclass man, is privileged. But if John is the same as the judge, the referee and the other role bearers, how can he have such incompatible properties?

Hylomorphists may respond as follows: it is *not* a single person who has incompatible properties. Rather, just as bunches of flowers are distinct from the flowers from which they are made, so the bearers of social roles are distinct from the persons which constitute them. On this view, John is not the same as the judge, the referee, and the other role bearers. Just as some flowers can provide the *base* for a *qua-object*, the flowers-*qua*-bunch, or more idiomatically, the bunch of flowers, so a person like John can serve as the base for a range of *social qua-objects* such as John-*qua*-judge, and John-*qua*-referee, or more idiomatically, the judge and the referee. John and John's social *qua-objects* all coincide materially. But they differ in form, and it is such formal differences which explain how they come to differ in properties.

A standard concern with this sort of view is its ontological extravagance. If to each of a person's roles and identities corresponded a social *qua-object* colocated with that person, then given the manifold roles and identities people typically have, each person would be colocated with a sizeable population of objects.

By contrast, this essay argues that *independently of its ontological commitment*, a hylomorphist account of the relation between a person and their social roles and identities is inadequate. In particular, it will be shown that, by itself, hylomorphism cannot explain how a person's social *qua-objects* could differ in certain properties, e.g. how John-*qua*-judge could be corrupt, while John-*qua*-referee is uncorrupt. Instead, alternative resources are required to explain the puzzle cases. But once such additional resources are available, social *qua-*

objects become superfluous in the treatment of the puzzles. The paper concludes by considering whether there remains limited work for social qua-objects in explaining differences in persistence conditions between a person and the social individuals to which they may give rise, but reaches a negative verdict. Social qua-objects, if they exist, have little work to do in our theorising about the relation between a person and their various social roles and identities. I begin by setting out the background hylomorphist theory.

2.1 The Theory

While there are a variety of different hylomorphist theories, the subtle issues on which they differ are inessential to the present argument.⁵ For illustration, I focus on Fine's development of the view.

On Fine's view, ordinary material objects are *qua-objects*, where a qua-object is simply some *matter* in some *form*.⁶ For instance, a bunch of flowers is the flowers in the form of a bunch, or, to use the qua-locution: the-flowers-qua-bunch. Likewise, a woolen jumper is some wool in the form of a jumper, a clay statue is some clay in the form of a statue, and a ham sandwich is some bread and some ham in the form of a sandwich.

Fine (1982, 1999, 2008) characterises qua-objects by a range of postulates. Let ' a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n ' be a sequence of terms, and let R be a property or relation. Where ' $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n/R$ ' represents the qua-object which is a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n in the form of R ,

⁵The main point of contention in this literature is the status of forms. According to Fine (1999, 2008) and Koslicki (2008) forms are *proper parts* of hylomorph compounds. But others deny this. According to Rea (2011) forms are non-mereological constituents and Johnston (2006) takes them to be what he calls 'principles of unity'. Since my argument is independent of this choice point, I will set the issue aside.

⁶While Fine (1982) calls hylomorph compounds 'qua-objects', Fine (1999) adopts the new term 'embodiment', and distinguishes between synchronic composition (rigid embodiment) and diachronic composition (variable embodiment). To simplify, I'm setting aside issues of diachronic composition.

the relevant clauses for our purposes are:⁷

Existence: The qua-object $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n/R$ exists at a world w iff a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n exist at w and R holds of a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n at some time at w .

Temporality: The qua-object $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n/R$ exists at a time t at a world w iff $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n/R$ exists at w , a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n exist at t at w , and R holds of a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n at t at w .

Location: If the qua-object $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n/R$ exists at a time t at a world w , then it is located at location l (at t at w) iff a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n are located at l (at t at w).

Identity: A qua-object $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n/R$ is the same as a qua-object $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n/R'$ iff $a_1 = b_1, a_2 = b_2, \dots, a_n = b_n$ and $R = R'$.

To illustrate consider a bunch of flowers. **Existence** says that the bunch exists at those worlds at which the flowers (f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n) are bunched at some time. **Temporality** says that given that the bunch exists at a world, it exists at those times at which the flowers are bunched. **Location** says that the bunch is located where the flowers are located. And **Identity** says that for bunch₁ to be the same as bunch₂ they must be the same flowers in the same form.⁸

Like other hylomorphists, Fine's key motivation in developing his theory of qua-objects is the wish to explain how a material object and its matter can differ in certain properties, e.g. temporal extension, modal properties, aesthetic properties, despite being made up of the same matter. Given the above postulates, it is easy to anticipate how such explanations will go. The possible differences in temporal extension and the differences in persistence conditions fall straight out of the

⁷Fine does not use world indices in the postulates, but he relativizes to worlds in the main body of his papers. For transparency, I have added world indices to the postulates. To simplify I'm making the fairly standard assumption of higher-order necessitism, i.e. the view that necessarily every n -ary property necessarily exists.

⁸As Fine (1999, p.66) observes, to avoid unnecessary fineness of grain in the individuation of qua-objects, a plausible theory of converse relations is required. For discussion see for instance Williamson (1985) and Fine (2000). It is also worth noting that the insistence on order which we get by using sequences rather than pluralities in position of the matter might yield odd results. If I take a ham sandwich which is bread 1, ham 1, bread 2 in the form of a sandwich and I change bread 1 and bread 2 around, have I thereby brought into existence a distinct sandwich?

above postulates. By **Existence**, a bunch of flowers exists at a world only if the flowers exist and are bunched at some time at that world. Hence there will be worlds in which the flowers exist but no bunch of flowers exists because the flowers are never bunched. Likewise by **Temporality** a bunch of flowers exists at a time t only if the flowers are bunched at t . Hence there can be times at which the flowers exist, but the bunch of flowers does not exist because the flowers are not bunched at that time. Finally, Fine suggests that in an ultimate theory, principles of *inheritance* would be given to explain differences in aesthetic properties.

It is important to note that hylomorphists need to distinguish between two ways of having a property: an object can *instantiate* a property, and it can have the property as its *form*. To illustrate, consider once more the bunch of flowers. The bunch of flowers is the flowers in the form of the bunching relation. So the bunch has the bunching relation as its form. Moreover, suppose that the bunch is in a vase. Since no hylomorphist theory would want to say that the bunch has *being in a vase* as its form (else the bunch couldn't survive being removed from the vase), hylomorphists must distinguish between instantiating a property and having it as one's form.⁹ Following Fairchild (2017), I'll call having a property as one's form *embodying* that property. Say that an object a embodies a property or relation X if, and only if, a is a qua-object of some (sequence of) things being X :

Embodiment: a embodies X iff there are x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n such that Xx_1, x_2, \dots, x_n and $a = x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n/X$.¹⁰

The distinction between instantiating and embodying a property is helpful in thinking more clearly about the properties had by a qua-object and its matter respectively. On Fine's view, both the flowers and the bunch of flowers are a

⁹On Fine's development of the view, the need to distinguish between properties that are instantiated and those that are had as forms is even more immediate. Since **Identity** implies that any qua-object has at most one (possibly complex) property or relation as its form, not every property instantiated by a qua-object could be had as its form.

¹⁰Given **Existence** it follows from $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n/X$ being something that Xx_1, x_2, \dots, x_n . Still it is helpful making this explicit.

bunch. According to **Existence**, for the bunch of flowers to exist, the flowers must be bunched, and if the flowers are bunched, they are a bunch. But the flowers merely *instantiate* being bunched, which is why the flowers could survive being scattered. By contrast, the bunch *embodies* the bunching relation, which is why the bunch could not survive being scattered. The bunched flowers are a bunch only accidentally, while the bunch of flowers is a bunch essentially.¹¹

With this overview of Fine's hylomorphism in place, let us explore how the theory could be extended to cover the relation between persons and their various social roles and identities.

2.2 Extending the Theory

Qua-objects can themselves be the bases for further qua-objects. On Fine's view a person is a qua-object, i.e. the body in the form of a person (Fine, 2008, p.115). But a person can also give rise to further qua-objects such as a mayor, a reporter, a judge, a referee etc. (Fine 1999, p.67, Fine 2006, p.1079).¹² Call such objects *social qua-objects*.

¹¹On the plausible assumption that things have at least two essential properties, **Identity** would again rule out that every essential property is embodied, unless forms were big conjunctive properties consisting of all of an object's essential properties. **Identity** is not uncontroversial though. Fairchild (2017) argues that **Existence** and **Identity** jointly give rise to a version of Russell's Paradox, and suggests that we drop **Identity**. Cotnoir & Jacinto (forthcoming) provide a detailed discussion of how Fine's theory can be stabilised and provide a formal semantics for the theory with respect to which Fine's postulates are sound.

¹²Fine motivates the existence of these qua-objects by counting arguments, not by Leibniz's Law arguments.

An airline passenger, for example, is not the same as the person who is the passenger since, in counting the passengers who pass through an airport on a given weekend, we may legitimately count the same person several times. (Fine, 1999, p.67)

Suppose Ralph holds two separate jobs as a reporter for the Times and for the News of the World. If I were to ask how many reporters there are, then surely it is in order to count the number of reporters for the Times and add it to the number of reporters for the News of the World. So again, Ralph cannot be identical to either reporter. (Fine, 2006, p.1079)

I neither share the intuitions about counting to which Fine appeals here, nor am I convinced that counting intuitions are a reliable guide to identity.

A natural suggestion for making sense of the puzzling relationship between a person and their various social roles and identities is to say that a person can simultaneously give rise to a number of distinct social qua-objects. In our initial example, for instance, John is the base to John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee. John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee share the same matter. But they differ in form, and it is such formal differences which allow us to account for property differences between John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee.

The view is then developed as one would expect. A reporter is a person in the form of a reporter, a judge is a person in the form of a judge, a referee is a person in the form of a referee and so on. Like other qua-objects, social qua-objects can be characterised by the postulates **Existence**, **Temporality**, **Location**, and **Identity**.

As before, forms will be understood as properties or relations, and it is by virtue of a person having those properties, or standing in those relations to other things, that the person constitutes the social qua-object in question. Note though that the forms of social individuals will often be complex relational properties.¹³ To constitute a judge, a reporter, or a referee it is usually not enough that one's matter be suitably arranged. Instead, it is required that one be suitably related to other persons, institutions, or events. For instance, for John to constitute a judge he must have a law degree from an adequate university, he must have been appointed and sworn in by someone, he must be recognised as a judge by others, and so on. Using the lambda-notation to express such a complex relational property we get:

John-qua-judge = *John* / λx . *x has a law degree and x has been appointed and x has been sworn in and x is recognised as a judge and ...*

As before, we can explain certain property differences between a person and their social qua-objects by making use of Fine's hylomorphist theory. John and his social qua-objects will be predicted to differ in temporal extension and persistence

¹³This will also be true of some non-social qua-objects like Socrates-qua-sat-on-a-chair. While plenitudinous hylomorphists are committed to such qua-objects, ontologically more conservative hylomorphists like Koslicki (2007, 2008) are likely to deny their existence.

conditions. By **Existence**, John-qua-judge exists at a world only if John exists at that world and instantiates the relational property required for being a judge at some time at that world. And so there will be worlds where John exists, but John-qua-judge fails to exist because John never instantiates the relevant relational property, i.e. John never is a judge at that world. Likewise by **Temporality**, John-qua-judge exists at a time t only if John is a judge at t . Hence there are times, e.g. John's childhood, youth, or old age, at which John exists, but John-qua-judge does not exist on account of John not being a judge at those times. More generally, at the times at which John-qua-judge exists, John instantiates, but does not embody the complex relational property that makes one a judge. When John is a judge, he is a judge only accidentally. John-qua-judge, by contrast, embodies the complex relational property that makes one a judge. So whenever John-qua-judge exists, he is a judge essentially. Parallel observations apply to John-qua-referee.

We have seen how Fine's hylomorphism can be extended to cover the relation between persons and their various social roles and identities. Nevertheless, as the next section argues, the theory fails to supply a satisfactory solution to the puzzle cases of interest.

2.3 The Puzzle Revisited

According to the hylomorphist, a person like John constitutes a number of distinct social qua-objects: John-qua-judge, John-qua-referee, John-qua-janitor, etc. The proposal for solving the central puzzle cases is simple: Since these qua-objects are all distinct, there is no difficulty in them differing in properties—or so the hylomorphist claims. However, I will argue that despite its ample ontology, hylomorphism still lacks the resources to explain how a person's qua-objects could differ from one another in the relevant properties, e.g. how John-qua-judge could be corrupt when John-qua-referee is uncorrupt, how John-qua-judge could

be paid exactly £80,000 when John-qua-referee is paid only £10,000, and so on.

The argument is in two steps: First I'll argue that the bodily and mental states of a person and their social qua-objects are *coordinated* in a relevant sense. Secondly, I'll argue that given such coordination, the hylomorphist theory lacks the resources to explain how a person and their social qua-objects could differ with respect to the relevant properties.

2.3.1 First Step: Coordination

Social qua-objects like John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee have a body. If John-qua-judge is a judge, then he must be able to appear in court, to sign documents or to pronounce verdicts, for all of which he needs to have a body. If John-qua-referee is a referee, he must be able to run across a pitch, to blow the whistle, or to flash a yellow card, for all of which he needs to have a body. Social qua-objects also have minds. Being judges, reporters, referees etc., they must be able to form beliefs, take decisions, be motivated to execute the decisions and so on, for all of which they must have a mind.

It might be a tricky question whether a person and their social qua-objects have a single shared body, or whether their matter gives rise to several coincident bodies. It might be an even trickier question whether a person and their social qua-objects have a single shared mind, or whether they have multiple coincident minds. For the present purposes we need not settle these questions. All that needs to be shown is that both the bodily and mental states of a person and their social qua-objects are *coordinated*: if one of them is in a certain state, so are all of them.¹⁴

Such coordination is extremely plausible on the hylomorphist theory under consideration. In broad strokes, the argument is this: hylomorphists are

¹⁴Though as I'll explain below, the assumed coordination of mental states is entirely compatible with the view that the propositional attitudes of a person and their social qua-objects may sometimes differ in content.

committed to two claims. First, a person and their social qua-objects materially coincide, i.e. they have the exact same fundamental material parts. Second, whatever differences there are between a person and their social qua-objects can be traced back to a difference in form. But, as noted above, the only formal differences between a person and their social qua-objects is that social qua-objects *embody* a property which their person merely *instantiates*. While this difference is sufficient to give a person and their social qua-objects diverging persistence conditions, it is implausible that this difference should suffice to make for a disconnect between their bodily and mental states. Let me develop the argument in more detail.

It is plausible that the bodily features of a person and their social qua-objects should be coordinated. For instance, if John is blond, six foot tall and obese, then so is John-qua-judge. For John and John-qua-judge have the same underlying material parts; they are physical duplicates. The only difference between them is that John-qua-judge embodies the complex relational property that makes one a judge, while John merely instantiates this property. John-qua-judge is a judge essentially, while John is a judge merely accidentally. But the bodily features of a person are independent of whether one is a judge essentially or only accidentally. To the extent that one's profession affects one's bodily features at all, having that profession accidentally would suffice for being so affected. And so we'd expect the bodily features of John and John-qua-judge to be coordinated. By parallel reasoning we get that the bodily features of John and John-qua-referee are coordinated, and hence that the bodily features of all three, John, John-qua-judge, and John-qua-referee are coordinated. Equally, we'd expect the bodily movements of a person and their social qua-objects to be coordinated. For instance, if John-qua-judge's right arm goes up, so do the arms of John and John-qua-referee. If John-qua-referee's lips touch the whistle, so do the lips of John and John-qua-judge and so on.¹⁵

¹⁵In fact, this much is guaranteed by the location postulate. For **Location** says that qua-objects

Parallel arguments should convince us that the mental states of a person and their social qua-objects will be coordinated, though the claim needs to be formulated with greater care. In particular, I do not claim that a person and their social qua-objects always have thoughts with the same content. Distinguish between a thought understood as an *act of thinking*, and the *contents* of such thoughts.¹⁶ Then I wish to argue that just as the (possibly numerically distinct) bodily movements of a person and their social qua-objects are coordinated, so are their (possibly distinct) acts of thinking: If one of them performs a certain act of thinking, the others perform such an act of thinking, too. For instance if John-qua-judge tokens a thought ‘the defendant is innocent’, so do John and John-qua-referee. And if John-qua-referee tokens a thought ‘this was a bad foul’, so do John and John-qua-judge. The argument is as before. John and John-qua-judge are physical duplicates. The only difference between them is that one of them embodies, while the other merely instantiates the complex relational property which makes one a judge. But it could not be solely by virtue of such a difference that John-qua-judge thinks ‘the defendant is innocent’ while John does not token such a thought. Likewise, the only difference between John and John-qua-referee is that John instantiates a property which John-qua-referee embodies, and it could not be by virtue of such differences that John-qua-referee thinks ‘this was a bad foul’ while John does not token such a thought.¹⁷ The

are colocated with their bases throughout their existence.

¹⁶Note that this distinction in no way commits me to controversial claims about so called ‘narrow content’. I am not committed to there being *any* kind of content shared by a person and their social qua-objects. All that I require is that their (possibly distinct) contents are coordinated in the way set out below.

¹⁷One might suggest that dualists have the resources to question mental coordination. After all, dualism allows for the possibility of physical duplicates differing in their mental properties. But it should be seen as a strike *against* the Finean theory if it had to adopt dualism in order to account for the puzzle cases of interest. Moreover, it is worth flagging that it would take quite a radical form of dualism to argue this point. It is one thing to suppose that there could be creatures which are physically just like human beings but which do not have consciousness, i.e. zombies. It is much more radical to suggest that three individuals which *have* consciousness could be materially coincident with one another and yet have mental lives sufficiently independent of one another to undergo different acts of thinking at the same time. It would be a big cost for Fine’s theory if it had to rely on such a radical form of dualism.

mental lives of John, John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee are coordinated, too.

It is entirely compatible with this picture that the *contents* of such coordinated thoughts may sometimes differ between a person and their social qua-objects. Suppose, for instance, that John is forced to resign as a judge, and suppose further that the night before the resignation he forms the belief 'I will survive the next day'. Given the coordination of their thinking, John-qua-judge equally comes to believe: 'I will survive the next day'. But while John believes something true in this scenario, John-qua-judge believes something false, since (by **Existence**) John-qua-judge would not survive the loss of his job.¹⁸ Indeed, the last remark illustrates that unlike differences in acts of thinking, certain differences in content *can* be traced back to a difference in form between a person and their social qua-objects, and thus have a legitimate explanation on the Finean theory. John merely instantiates the complex relational property which makes one a judge, he is a judge only accidentally. By contrast John-qua-judge embodies this property, he is a judge essentially. And it is by virtue of this difference between the two that while what John believes is true, what John-qua-judge believes is false.

On the emergent picture, a person and their associated social qua-objects are extremely intimately related. In particular, both the bodily movements and acts of thinking of a person and their social qua-objects will be coordinated: however one of them moves, the others move too. Whatever act of thinking one of them performs, the others perform such an act of thinking too, though the contents of their (possibly distinct) thoughts may differ in content. Such an intimate relation would appear to be an attractive feature of the hylomorphist theory. After all, it would help to explain why people make the mistake (by lights of

¹⁸Similar considerations apply to other propositional attitudes such as desires, intentions, hopes, and fears. Suppose John desires to quit his job. He thinks 'I'd love to resign as a judge'. Given the coordination of their thinking, John-qua-judge equally thinks 'I'd love to resign as a judge'. Does John-qua-judge desire his own demise? Just as John-qua-judge can *falsely* believe that he will survive the loss of his job, so John-qua-judge can *unreasonably* desire to quit his job. A theory of social qua-objects thus raises fascinating questions not only about reference but also about the attribution of propositional attitudes.

the hylomorphist) to think that persons are identical to bearers of social roles. However, as the next section argues, the relation between a person and their social qua-objects is too intimate to be of much use in solving the central puzzle.

2.3.2 **Second Step: One for all, and all for one**

Focus on a case in which John's career as a judge overlaps his career as a referee entirely so that John is a judge during the exact same years as he is a referee. John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee will then materially coincide with John during the exact same years. Moreover, to simplify, we'll suppose that throughout that career, there is a single occasion on which John is offered a bribe; this simplifying assumption will be relaxed later. Either John accepts the bribe, or he declines it. If he accepts the bribe, he is corrupt, if he declines the bribe, he is not.

The problem now is this: either John and his qua-objects all accept the bribe, or they all decline it. For to accept a bribe is to perform a particular action. Normally the bribed person intends to take the bribe and, as a result, brings about bodily movements which constitute the accepting of the bribe—an utterance, a nod, a handshake, or the like. But as argued above, both the bodily and mental states of a person and their social qua-objects are coordinated. If one of John, John-qua-judge, and John-qua-referee thinks 'I'll take the bribe', all of them token a thought 'I'll take the bribe'. Likewise, if one of them thinks 'I'll decline the bribe', all of them token a thought 'I'll decline the bribe'. While the three may have intentions with different contents, these intentions will be coordinated in a way such that either all of them have an accepting intention or all of them have a declining intention. Finally, since the bodily movements of John, John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee are coordinated, if one of the three moves in a way which constitutes accepting the bribe, all of them move that way. It follows that none of the three can perform the action of accepting the bribe without

the other two equally performing that action. In the simplified case, where we only have a single opportunity of being bribed, either John, John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee are all corrupt, or none of them is.

The conclusion stands even if we relax the simplifying assumption that there is only one occasion on which John is offered a bribe. For on each additional occasion, what we may call the *corruption record* of John and his qua-objects will be coordinated in the way set out above. On each additional occasion, either all of them get another entry on the corruption record, or none of them does. So even if one adopts a view on which more than one corrupt deed is required for a person to be corrupt, either John, John-qua-judge, and John-qua-referee are all corrupt, or none of them is.

In response one might suggest that John-qua-judge only exists at the times at which John is in a *judge situation* (e.g. at court with his wig on, banging his gavel etc.), while John-qua-referee only exists at the times at which John is in a *referee situation* (e.g. running across a football ground), and that consequently John-qua-referee does not accept the bribe at all since he is simply not around at the time at which the bribe is offered. But this will not always solve the problem. For we can design cases in which John accepts a bribe in a referee situation, nevertheless, intuitively it is the judge and not the referee who is corrupt. Here is one such case:

Football. John is a judge and a referee. One Sunday, while he is getting ready to referee a football game, John receives a letter from a journalist offering him a bribe in exchange for revealing whether the defence has an eyewitness in a big trial. The journalist instructs John to blow the starting whistle while standing on his right leg if the defence has an eye-witness, to blow it standing on his left leg if the defence doesn't have an eyewitness and to blow it standing on both legs in case he doesn't accept the bribe. John blows the starting whistle while standing on his right leg.

In this case it is the judge, not the referee who is corrupt. So on the Finean theory, we should say that John-qua-judge is corrupt. So John-qua-judge must exist at the

time at which the situation unfolds. Moreover, since blowing the starting whistle is a paradigmatic refereeing situation, it is hard to deny that John-qua-referee exists at the time at which the situation unfolds. So both John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee exist at this time, which requires John to exist at that time. Again we have all three John, John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee existing at the time at which the starting whistle is blown. Applying my argument from coordination we get: either all of them blow the starting whistle while standing on one leg or none of them does. So either all of them are corrupt or none of them is.

2.3.3 Additional resources?

One might object that even if John, John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee all go through the motions of accepting the bribe, not all of them in fact manage to accept the bribe. The thought is this: A random person can stand in front of two people and utter the words 'I hereby declare you husband and wife' without thereby marrying them, on account of lacking the required authority. The speech act of declaring the two people husband and wife would *misfire* in such a case; it would fail to bring about the state of affairs in which the two people are married (see Austin, 1975, p.16). One might think that similar thoughts apply in a case where one is offered a bribe in exchange for something which one has no authority to give. Even if one says 'I accept', one may not succeed in accepting on account of one's lacking the required authority.

The objection proceeds as follows: While a Finean hylomorphist cannot deny that John is a judge, they *can* (and should!) deny that John-qua-referee is a judge. But then one might think that even if John-qua-referee (along with John and John-qua-judge) thinks 'I'll accept the bribe' and even if all three perform the necessary bodily movements, shake on it, say, *only the judges succeed in accepting the bribe*. John and John-qua-judge accept, and hence are corrupt. But while

John-qua-referee tries to accept, his speech act misfires, and no acceptance comes about. So John-qua-referee is not corrupt.

Although this assumption might itself be questioned, let me grant for the sake of argument that someone who merely tries but never succeeds in accepting a bribe is not corrupt. There remains a different problem. For the above line of response to be successful, it is necessary that John-qua-referee lacks the authority to accept while John and John-qua-judge have the authority to accept. Under what conditions would that be the case? Presumably only if the services demanded in exchange for the bribe were not part of the role of a referee. For instance, in **Football** above, the journalist offers the bribe in exchange for a judging favour, i.e. disclosing insider information pertaining to a court case. The thought is then that since John-qua-referee is not a judge, he lacks the authority to grant the judging favour. By contrast, had the journalist offered a bribe in exchange for a refereeing favour, e.g. giving exactly three minutes of stoppage time, John and John-qua-referee (but not John-qua-judge) would have had the required authority to grant the refereeing favour.¹⁹

The problem with this line of response is that it makes use of resources which go beyond the hylomorphist's theory and which, once available, undermine the motivation for adopting an ontology of social qua-objects in the first place. To see this, notice that the suggested explanation of how John and John-qua-judge can be corrupt while John-qua-referee is not, relies on a distinction between two kinds of favours to be rendered: judging favours and refereeing favours. If John, John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee are presented with an opportunity to do judging favours in exchange for a bribe, and all three go through the motions

¹⁹The point needs to be formulated with care. Presumably no official of any sort has the authority to accept a bribe. While ultimately this is a problem for the objection and not for my argument, I think the problem can be avoided by saying that John and John-qua-judge succeed in accepting bribes in exchange for judging favours by virtue of having the authority to do the relevant judge things (e.g. scheduling a meeting, instructing the jury, having access to information etc.) while John-qua-referee does not succeed in accepting bribes in exchange for judging favours because he lacks the authority to do the relevant judge things.

of accepting the bribe, still only John and John-qua-judge succeed in accepting, and so only John and John-qua-judge are corrupt. If John, John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee are presented with an opportunity to do refereeing favours in exchange for a bribe, and all three through go through the motions of accepting the bribe, still only John and John-qua-referee succeed in accepting, and so only John and John-qua-referee are corrupt.

But once such a distinction is in place, there is no need at all for an ontology of social qua-objects to dissolve the puzzle. Instead of saying that John and John-qua-judge accept a judging bribe (which John-qua-referee is not in a position to accept), we can just say that John accepts a judging bribe. Instead of saying that John and John-qua-referee decline a refereeing bribe, (a bribe which John-qua-judge is not in a position to decline) we can just say that John declines a refereeing bribe. After all, John is both a judge and a referee and as such has the necessary authority to grant both judging or refereeing favours. Finally, there is no inconsistency in a single person accepting a judging bribe while declining a refereeing bribe, so long as the favours that are being asked of them are sufficiently independent.

Once we help ourselves to a distinction between judging and refereeing favours, there is a natural description of what is going on in the initial puzzle case which does not at all rely on an ontology of social qua-objects, but instead takes the shape of a property theory of qualification. There is a difference between the property of being corrupt in one capacity, as or qua judge, and the property of being corrupt in another capacity, as or qua referee. To be corrupt qua judge, one has to accept bribes in exchange for judging favours. To be corrupt qua referee, one has to accept bribes in exchange for refereeing favours. Since a single person can be a judge who has granted judging favours in exchange for a bribe while also being a referee who has never granted refereeing favours in exchange for a bribe, a single person can be corrupt qua judge and uncorrupt qua referee.

Of course, those who wish to pursue this kind of strategy to dissolve the

puzzle cases need to provide a more detailed theory of *qua-properties* such as being corrupt-qua-judge, being paid-£10,000-qua-referee, or voting-qua-janitor. And they need to explain what the relation is between a property F and a property F -qua- G for suitable F, G . I take on these tasks in Chapter 5. However independently of the details, the above considerations show that the objection from speech acts relies on additional resources which, once available, undermine the motivation for adopting an ontology of social qua-objects in the first place.

I have argued that a hylomorphist account of the relation between a person and their various social roles and identities remains inadequate since such a theory ultimately lacks the resources to explain how a person's qua-objects could differ with respect to certain properties, e.g. how one social qua-object could be corrupt, while the other is uncorrupt. To explain such cases, alternative resources are required which, once available, diminish the motivation for adopting an ontology of social qua-objects. And yet one might think that there remains limited work for social qua-objects in explaining differences in persistence conditions between a person and the bearer of a social role or identity. To conclude, the next section discusses this possibility.

2.4 Limited Work for Social qua-objects?

On the hylomorphist theory presented above, social qua-objects will often differ from their underlying person in temporal extension and persistence conditions. But if such property differences provide motivation for distinguishing between a material object and its matter, should they not equally motivate us to distinguish between a person and the bearer of a social role?

It is important to stress that all that has been shown so far is that *if there are* social qua-objects which are characterised by Fine's postulates of **Existence** and **Temporality**, then such social qua-objects will often differ from their underlying

person in temporal extension and persistence conditions. What we haven't done is motivate, independently of the theory, that a person and the bearer of a social role really differ in temporal extension and persistence conditions.

But it turns out that the kinds of Leibniz's Law arguments supporting such property differences between a material thing and its matter are not at all compelling when applied to a person and the bearer of a social role. Consider the following standard Leibniz's Law argument presented in support of the claim that a clay statue is not the same as the clay from which it is made.

- (A) A1. The clay can survive being squashed.
- A2. The statue cannot survive being squashed .
- LL. If the clay is the same as the statue, the clay can survive being squashed if, and only if, the statue can survive being squashed.
- AC. The statue is not the same as the clay.

Independently of any theory of qua-objects, the premisses (A1) and (A2) are intuitively compelling. But the same is not true of the following parallel argument to the effect that a person is not the same as bearer of some social role or identity.

- (B) B1. John can survive resigning.
- B2. The judge cannot survive resigning.
- LL. If John is the same as the judge, then John can survive resigning if, and only if, the judge can survive resigning.
- BC. John is not the same as the judge.

The second premiss (B2) seems false. Imagine watching the public resignation of a judge. In such a situation, speaking literally, could you truthfully say: 'The judge won't survive resigning'? Surely not. The second premiss seems false.

Temporal Leibniz's Law arguments are even less compelling than modal ones when applied to a person and their social roles. Start out by considering a typical temporal Leibniz's Law argument for the non-identity of statue and clay.

- (C) C1. The clay is one week old.

- C2. The statue is one day old.
- LL. If the clay is the same as the statue, the clay is one week old if, and only if, the statue is one week old.
- CC. The statue is not the same as the clay.

As before, this argument looks compelling independently of any theory of qua-objects. But the same is not true of the following argument:

- (D) D1. John is 55 years old.
- D2. The judge is 10 years old.
- DLL. If John is the same as the judge, then John is 55 years old if, and only if, the judge is 55 years old.
- DC. John is not the same as the judge.

The second premiss (D2) seems plain false, even if John has been a judge for only ten years. In all these cases, the problem is that the definite description ‘the judge’ picks out the person, and *not* a role bearer distinct from the person. We get similar verdicts for sentences like ‘The judge grew up in Cheshire’ or ‘The judge once was a little boy’. The theory of social qua-objects would predict these to be false since the judge came into existence as an adult, and so didn’t grow up anywhere and was never a little boy. And yet so long as John grew up in Cheshire, utterances of these sentences in ordinary contexts would seem true.

There is some evidence then that while definite descriptions like ‘the statue’ denote an object distinct from the clay, a social role description like ‘the judge’ instead denotes the person who is a judge. Consequently, the relevant Leibniz’s Law arguments in support of differences in temporal extension and persistence conditions will fail to convince. Fine is not unaware of these issues. In one of his first papers on qua-objects, he writes:

I would not want to be saddled with the following two claims: first that definite descriptions are used to refer to qua-objects; and second, that phrases of the form ‘*x* qua ϕ ’ are ordinarily used to refer to qua-objects. [...] The

purpose of my theory is not to provide reference for ordinary uses of qua-phrases but to account for the identity of certain other objects—chairs, tables, and the like—to which we clearly do refer. Fine (1982, p.100)

But the issue has little to do with qua-phrases. The problem is not that people don't use 'the-wood-qua-table' to talk about a table, or 'John-qua-judge' to talk about the judge. The problem is rather that there appears to be a disanalogy in how people think about objects like statues, chairs and tables on the one hand, and how they think about objects like judges, mayors, and referees on the other hand. While people use descriptions like 'the statue' to refer to what on Fine's theory is a qua-object, they would not appear to use descriptions like 'the judge' to refer to what on Fine's theory is a social qua-object. It is then doubtful that Leibniz's Law arguments will provide evidence to the effect that there are social qua-objects which differ in persistence conditions.

To be clear: the point is *not* to argue against the non-identity of a material thing and its matter, e.g. the clay and the clay statue, the wool and the woollen jumper, the flowers and the bunch of flowers. Indeed, extant non-identity arguments by Leibniz's law would appear to provide good reason to distinguish between a material thing and its matter. The crucial point is that parallel arguments fail to motivate the distinction between a person and the bearer of a social role, and hence fail to provide reasons to accept social qua-objects.²⁰

Of course there may be other, independent reasons for adopting a vast ontology of all sorts of qua-objects. Impressed by anti-arbitrariness considerations, many philosophers are attracted to a doctrine of *plenitude* according to which to (almost)

²⁰Note that I don't take my arguments to carry over to *social groups*; there would appear to be good evidence that 'the committee' does not just refer to the people constituting the committee (or their sum). There are also interesting questions about *social artefacts* which do not behave uniformly. When a river constitutes a national border, it seems true to say that the river, but not the national border would survive the neighbouring states merging. On the other hand, when a bunch of flowers constitutes a bridal bouquet, it seems true to say that both the bunch of flowers and the bridal bouquet would survive the cancelling of the wedding. Interesting future work in social ontology remains to be done in accounting for such differences.

any modal profile corresponds an object which has that modal profile.²¹ If a plenitude thesis is true, there will be social qua-objects of the kinds discussed here, and hylomorphism may offer useful resources to characterise their temporal extension and persistence conditions. Nevertheless, as the present essay shows, such qua-objects will have little work to do in our theorising about the relation between a person and their various social roles and identities.

2.5 Concluding Remarks

The aim of this essay was to scrutinise a famous *object theory* of qualification, Kit Fine's theory of qua-objects. I have argued that, by itself, the theory lacks the resources to explain how a person's qua-objects could differ in the way felicitous qua-qualifications would suggest. Instead, alternative resources are required to account for the relevant property differences. But once available, these resources undermine the motivation for adopting an ontology of qua-objects in the first place. Finally, I've explored whether there remains work for the relevant qua-objects in explaining differences in persistence conditions between things and the social individuals to which they may give rise, but have reached a negative verdict. I conclude that qua-objects, if they exist, have little work to do in a theory of qualification.

²¹See Yablo (1987), van Inwagen (1990), Fine (1999), Sosa (1999), Hawthorne (2006), Leslie (2011), Inman (2014), Jago (2016), Fairchild (2019). For discussion of plenitude in the context of hylomorphism see Koslicki (2007), Fine (2007), Fairchild (2017) and Cotnoir & Jacinto (forthcoming).

2.6 Postscript: Are Qua-Objects Parts?

I have argued that qua-objects, if they exist, have little work to do in a theory of qualification. The argument, however, relied on a particular conception of qua-objects as structured wholes. One might wonder whether there is not a natural alternative worth considering: rather than being made up of individuals and properties as on the Finean conception, qua-objects are parts of individuals. The aim of this postscript is to argue that there are no parts of an object which would be suited to play the role of qua-objects in the proposed theory of qualification, whether it is spatial, temporal, modal or property parts, or their counterpart-theoretic analogues. I conclude that this alternative way of developing an object theory of qualification must therefore be rejected, too.

1. The proposal

Like the Finean theory of qua-objects, the envisaged proposal is an *object theory* of qualification, a theory on which qua-qualifications ascribe properties to qua-objects. We'd then retain the following schematic truth conditions.

Qualification: a is F qua G iff a -qua- G is F .

However, the proposal differs in its account of the nature of qua-objects which are taken to be parts of individuals.

Qua-Objects: a -qua- G is a part of a .

The proposal is not entirely at odds with ordinary idiom. For instance, suppose John is kind as a father but cruel as a literary critic. It might be fine to say things such as the following:

- (1) a. John has a kind and a cruel side.
- b. John is not wholly cruel.

- c. In part, John is cruel, in part, he is not.

It is also worth flagging that a mereological approach to qua-qualification may be appealing on account of its continuity with mereological accounts of spatial, temporal or modal qualifications as in (2) below:

- (2) a. In London, the Thames is dirty, but in Oxford the Thames is clean.
 b. In the 12th century, the Thames was shallow in London, but now, in the 21st century, the Thames is deep in London.
 c. The Thames runs through London, but the Thames could have run through Liverpool.

For each of the dimensional qualifications in (2), mereological proposals have been explored. In the case of *spatial qualifications* such as (2a), a mereological approach is fairly uncontroversial.²² The Thames is spread out in space. Some of its proper parts are located in Oxford, others are located in London, yet other proper parts are located in the Cotswolds etc. (2a) then just says that while the proper parts of the Thames which are located in Oxford are clean, the proper parts which are located in London are dirty. Slightly more controversially, perdurantists about persistence adopt a mereological approach to *temporal qualifications* such as (2b). On this view, the Thames is not only spread out in space, but also in time.²³ Some of its temporal proper parts are located in the middle ages, others are located in the 21st century, yet others are located at other temporal regions or points. Now take the spatial proper part of the Thames which is located in London. (2b) then just says that while some temporal proper part of the London Thames is located in the 12th century and is shallow, some other temporal proper part of the London Thames is located in the 21st century and is deep. Even more controversial is a mereological approach to *modal qualification* as in (2c). On this view, the Thames is not only spread out in space and time, but also in modal space. Some of its

²²Though see Lowe (1987, 1988) for an alternative relationalist approach.

²³See Lewis (1986b, 1988, 2002) and Sider (1996, 2001). For now I am glossing over differences between a *worm theory* and a *stage theory* of perdurance. We'll come back to this difference below.

modal proper parts are located at the actual world. Others are located at other possible worlds.²⁴ (2c) then says that while the modal proper part of the Thames which is located at the actual world runs through London, there are some modal proper parts located at other possible worlds which do not run through London.

It is then natural to wonder whether qua-qualifications might not work similarly. Perhaps being *F* qua *G* is being *partially F*. In what follows, I'll argue that such a proposal is not promising.

Mereological vocabulary

To set things up, it will be useful to specify how the key mereological notions will be understood in what follows. Talk of one thing being a part of another is ubiquitous in ordinary language. To regiment the notion, we'll understand parthood as a binary relation which is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive.²⁵ That is, everything is a part of itself; if *a* and *b* are parts of each other, then they are identical; and if *a* is a part of *b*, and *b* is a part of *c* then *a* is a part of *c*, too. In symbols, where ' \leq ' represents the parthood relation:

Reflexivity: $\forall x x \leq x$

Antisymmetry: $\forall x \forall y ((x \leq y \wedge y \leq x) \rightarrow x = y)$

Transitivity: $\forall x \forall y \forall z ((x \leq y \wedge y \leq z) \rightarrow x \leq z)$

A corresponding irreflexive relation $<$, proper parthood, can be defined in terms of parthood as follows:

Proper Parthood: $\forall x \forall y (x < y \leftrightarrow x \leq y \wedge \neg x = y)$

That is, *a* is a proper part of *b* if *a* is a part of *b* which is distinct from *b*. As defined, proper parthood is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive. Finally, it will

²⁴For discussion see Quine (1976), Lewis (1986b, 4.3), Weatherson (2000) and Wallace (2019).

²⁵These formal features are assumed by *Classical Extensional Mereology*. See Varzi (2016) for a useful introduction. See Varzi (2006), Cotnoir (2010) and Kearns (2011) for critical discussion of these formal features.

be useful to define two more mereological notions: *overlap* and *fusion*. Overlap, represented by '◦,' can be defined in terms of parthood as follows:

Overlap: $\forall x \forall y (x \circ y \leftrightarrow \exists z (z \leq x \wedge z \leq y))$

That is, *a* overlaps *b* if, and only if, they share some part. To define *fusion*, it is helpful to make use of plural variables (*xx*, *yy* etc.) denoting pluralities, as well as of a relation of *being one of* represented by '▷'. For instance, the open sentence 'it is one of them' can then be expressed as follows: '*y* ▷ *xx*'. Fusion, represented by '□,' can then be defined in terms of parthood and overlap:

Fusion: $\forall x \forall yy (x \square yy \leftrightarrow \forall y ((y \triangleright yy \rightarrow y \leq x) \wedge \forall z (z \leq x \rightarrow \exists v (v \triangleright yy \wedge z \circ v))))$

That is, *a* is the fusion of the *bb* if, and only if, everything that's one of the *bb* is a part of *a* and every part of *a* overlaps one of the *bb*.

As noted above, *which* kinds of parts things have will depend on the dimensions on which they are extended. For instance, if four-dimensionalism is true and things are not only extended in space but also in time, then they don't only have spatial parts but also temporal parts.²⁶ And if things are not only extended in space and time but also in modal space, then they don't only have spatial and temporal parts but also modal parts. For the most part, I'll be operating with dimension-relative notions of parthood, e.g. spatial parthood \leq_s , temporal parthood \leq_t , or modal parthood \leq_m . One can think of a general notion of parthood as the transitive closure of the union of these specific relations.

We are now in a position to state a natural proposal for the truth-conditions of qua-qualifications on the mereological account:

M-Qualification *a* is *F* qua *G* iff $\exists x (x \leq a \wedge Gx \wedge Fx)$

²⁶I'm glossing over the possibility of extended simples here; some philosophers, e.g. Parsons (2007), have proposed to understand endurantism as four-dimensionalism without temporal parts. On this view, persisting things are temporally extended, but don't have temporal parts. The whole of the temporally extended object has the relevant properties, albeit relative to a temporal location.

For a to be F qua G is for a to have a part which is G and F . The proposal promises a clear metaphysical analysis of how qua-qualification is possible. Being both F qua G and not- F qua H consists in having two distinct parts, one of which is G and F , the other of which is H and not- F . On this view, the possibility of qua-qualification is no more mysterious than the possibility of having different parts with incompatible properties, e.g. having both warm hands and cold feet.

However, I shall argue that there are no parts of an object which could play the role of qua-objects in the envisaged theory of qualification. First, I'll argue that neither spatial, temporal or modal parts are suited, nor their counterpart-theoretic variants. Next I consider proposals on which individuals have their properties as proper parts and I'll argue that such property parts are not suited to play the role of qua-objects either. I conclude that a mereological object theory of qualification is not promising either.

2. Against dimensional parts

This section argues that neither spatial, temporal, or modal parts are suited to play the role of qua-objects in the proposed analysis. Nor are their counterpart-theoretic variants.

Spatial Parts

If qua-objects were spatial parts, we'd get the following truth-conditions for qua-qualifications.

Spatial-Qua: a is F qua G iff $\exists x(x \leq_s a \wedge Gx \wedge Fx)$

Consider again the central example from the previous essay: John is a judge and a referee, but while John-qua-judge is corrupt, John-qua-referee is uncorrupt. If

qua-objects were spatial parts, we'd get that John has a spatial part which is a judge and corrupt, as well as a spatial part which is a referee and uncorrupt.

Given that John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee have incompatible properties both cannot be identical to John. So at least one of them would have to be a *proper* spatial part of John. So John, who is a judge and a referee, would moreover have a spatial proper part which is a judge or a referee. Things like John's head or hands, upper or lower half, bowels or brains, will of course not do. For none of those spatial proper parts could be judges or referees, corrupt or uncorrupt. Only *person-like* spatial parts of John's could have such properties. Being judges and referees, these parts would have to overlap enough of John to be able to appear in court, sign documents, pronounce verdicts, run across a football ground, blow the whistle, or flash a yellow card. Moreover, they'd have to overlap enough of John to be able to form beliefs, take decisions, be motivated to execute the decisions and so on. But first, it is a controversial assumption that persons should have such person-like objects as spatial proper parts. Secondly, and more importantly, such a proposal would yield a bizarre response to the objection from coordination presented in §2.3 of *Qua-Objects and Their Limits*.

Recall the simple scenario presented there. John is a judge and a referee throughout the exact same years (we can imagine the football club being attached to the court, so that John joins the club at the time of his appointment and he leaves it on the day of his retirement). On a single occasion, John and his qua-objects are being offered a bribe. I then argued that given plausible assumptions about the bodily and mental coordination of a person and their Finean qua-objects, John-qua-judge accepts the bribe if and only if John-qua-referee accepts the bribe and that, consequently, either both John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee are corrupt, or neither is. To avoid this objection, the mereological account of qua-objects would have to make it plausible that John has spatial parts which accept the bribe and spatial parts which decline the bribe. Perhaps we can imagine a cut of

John in half which is sufficiently functional to be person-like. And perhaps we could then say that the parts of John's brain which belong to John-qua-judge but not to John-qua-referee token an intention to accept the bribe, while the parts of John's brain belonging to John-qua-referee but not to John-qua-judge token an intention to decline the bribe. In addition, the parts of John's body belonging to John-qua-judge act in such a way that they accept the bribe, while other parts of John's body, the ones belonging to John-qua-referee, act in such a way that they decline the bribe. But even if such split thought and action is possible in certain extreme cases, it should be evident that it is not *required* for a person's being corrupt as a judge and uncorrupt as a referee in the envisaged cases. But on the proposed object theory of qualification on which qua-objects are spatial parts, such extreme split thought and action would be required to account for such cases. I conclude that qua-objects are not spatial parts.

Temporal Parts

The idea that qua-objects are temporal parts is much more natural. If John is corrupt as a judge and uncorrupt as a referee, it is tempting to think that he is corrupt when he is a judge but uncorrupt when he is a referee. The thought can be sharpened as follows. Let the aa_G be those temporal parts of a which are G s, i.e. we have:

$$aa_G =_{\text{def}} \forall x(x \triangleright aa_G \leftrightarrow x \leq_t a \wedge Gx)$$

We could then fuse the aa_G to obtain a -qua- G . We could then state the truth-conditions for qua-qualifications as follows:

Temporal-Qua: a is F qua G iff $\exists x(x \sqcap_t aa_G \wedge Fy)$.

In words, a is F qua G if and only if the fusion of those temporal parts of a which are G is F .

There are going to be questions regarding what it takes for a fusion of temporal parts to have a property, e.g. is one temporal part's in the plurality having a property sufficient for the fusion of that plurality having that property? Or do most or even all have to have it? Does it depend on the predicate? But even setting such questions aside, it is easy to show that the temporal parts approach is not promising. For plausibly a person can be corrupt as a judge and uncorrupt as a referee even if they are a judge and a referee throughout the exact same years, so that every temporal part which is a judge is a referee and vice versa. As before, we'll suppose this is indeed the case for John.

Now suppose again that John is offered a bribe on a single occasion in his life and that the bribe is indeed accepted. Then the temporal part accepting the bribe is corrupt. Since John is a judge and a referee throughout the exact same years, every temporal part of John's which is a judge is also a referee and vice versa. Now either a temporal part's being corrupt is sufficient for the fusion of John's judge temporal parts being corrupt, or it isn't. If it is, it is equally sufficient for the fusion of John's referee temporal parts being corrupt. So both John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee would be corrupt. If it isn't, it would not be sufficient for the fusion of John's referee temporal parts being corrupt either, in which case neither John-qua-judge nor John-qua-referee would be corrupt. Just as on the Finean conception of qua-objects, we get the result that John-qua-judge is corrupt if and only if John-qua-referee is corrupt. Finally, as on the Finean view, the conclusion stands even if we lift the simplifying assumption that John is propositioned with a bribe only once in his life time. So long as every judge temporal part is a referee temporal part, the corruption records of John-qua-judge and John-qua-referee will remain linked on each additional occasion.

As mentioned in the previous essay, one might be tempted to offer a slightly more sophisticated temporal interpretation on which John is corrupt at the times at which he is *judging* and uncorrupt at the times at which he is *refereeing*. But

as pointed out there, this strategy does not solve the general problem. For John could do things which make him corrupt as a judge *while* refereeing, as in the **Football** case from the previous essay, repeated below for reference:

Football. John is a judge and a referee. One Sunday, while he is getting ready to referee a football game, John receives a letter from a journalist offering him a bribe in exchange for revealing whether the defence has an eyewitness in a big trial. The journalist instructs John to blow the starting whistle while standing on his right leg if the defence has an eye-witness, to blow it standing on his left leg if the defence doesn't have an eyewitness and to blow it standing on both legs in case he doesn't accept the bribe. John blows the starting whistle while standing on his right leg.

Intuitively, in this case John is corrupt as a judge, not as a referee. However, John is doing the corrupt deed while refereeing. But then on the more sophisticated proposal we'd get that John is corrupt as a referee, when intuitively he isn't. These cases suggest that being *F* as or qua *G* cannot be reduced to being *F* when or while being *G*. Consequently, temporal parts are not suited to play the role of qua-objects in the envisaged theory of qualification either.

One might think that the objections can be resisted by those favouring a *stage theory* of persistence over a *worm theory* (for discussion see Sider, 1996, 2001). Stage and worm theorists agree in ontology: on both views, there are temporally extended objects, fusions of instantaneous temporal stages. But according to stage theorists, these fusions of stages are not the things our singular terms refer to. For instance, the name 'John' does not refer to a fusion of stages—a temporal worm—but rather to a particular instantaneous stage. Moreover ascriptions of *de re* temporal properties, e.g. being such that one once was a child, do not ascribe properties to temporal parts of a temporal worm, but rather to *temporal counterparts* of an instantaneous stage.

Now following Lewis (1971), one might suggest that the sentences 'John qua judge is corrupt' and 'John qua referee is uncorrupt' are both true only if they

invoke different temporal counterpart relations. On this view, the temporal counterpart relation is *context-sensitive* in that different temporal counterpart relations are picked out in different contexts. One might then think that a judge-counterpart relation could in principle pick out different objects than a referee-counterpart relation, in which case the judge-counterparts could be corrupt while the referee counterparts are not. However, recall that in the envisaged problem case John is a judge and a referee throughout the exact same years so that every stage which is a judge is also a referee and vice versa. But then, whether we pick out counterparts by the judge-counterpart relation or the referee-counterpart relation, we'll still end up with the same counterparts. And these (or their fusions) are either corrupt or not. The additional flexibility of counterpart theory is of little use in this case, so that the distinction between *stage* and *worm* theories is immaterial here.²⁷ Neither temporal parts nor temporal counterparts are suited to play the role of qua-objects in a mereological theory of qualification.

Modal Parts

It should be relatively clear that modal parts (and their counterpart-theoretic variants) are not suited to play the role of qua-objects in a mereological theory of qualification either. When someone is *F* as or qua *G*, we don't take them to be possibly, probably or necessarily *F*. Instead we mean to express that in actuality they are *F in the capacity* of a *G*. There is nothing modal in such a claim. To see this more clearly, consider the following two schemata:

Modal-Qua 1: *a* is *F* qua *G* iff $\exists x(x \leq_m a \wedge Gx \wedge Fx)$

Modal-Qua 2: *a* is *F* qua *G* iff $\forall x(x \leq_m a \wedge Gx \rightarrow Fx)$.

²⁷This is of course different in Lewis's discussion of the relation between a person and their body, since there the whole point is that personhood and embodiment are not necessarily coextensive so that a person has body-counterparts which are not persons, person-counterparts which are not bodies etc., Lewis see 1971, p.208.

Modal-Qua 1 says that a is F qua G if, and only if, a has a modal part that is G and F . Given a mereological analysis of *de re* modality, this is tantamount to analysing being F qua G as being *possibly* F and G . Such an account would massively overgenerate. Many people who aren't even judges, such as your dentist, are nevertheless possibly a judge and corrupt. But that your dentist could be a judge and corrupt does not mean that your dentist is corrupt as a judge. Equally, that your dentist could be a football player and making millions a year does not mean that your dentist makes millions a year as a football player.

By contrast, **Modal-Qua 2** says that a is F qua G if, and only if, every modal part of a that is G is F which, on the mereological theory, is tantamount to analysing being F qua G as necessarily being F if G . Such an account would undergenerate, since we can assume that many things which are F qua G are so only contingently. For instance, even if John is corrupt qua judge, there are possibilities in which John avoids some of the wrong turns he actually took, and ends up upright and honest so that not every possibility in which John is a judge is one in which John is corrupt.²⁸

Nor is it clear what would be gained by considering the fusion of modal parts as in **Modal-Qua 3**.

Modal-Qua 3: a is F qua G iff $\exists x(x \sqcap_m aa_G \wedge Fx)$.

Here aa_G is the plurality of a 's modal parts that are G s:

$$aa_G =_{\text{def}} \forall x(x \triangleright aa_G \leftrightarrow x \leq_m a \wedge Gx)$$

Modal-Qua 3 then says that the fusion of all of a 's modal parts that are G is F . But depending on how many modal parts in the fusion have to be F for the fusion to be F , such an account can be expected to either over- or undergenerate in similar ways as the former two proposals did. The issue is not the *force* of the modal,

²⁸It is also worth flagging that for any G such that it is impossible being G , we'd get that a is F qua G by the right-to-left direction of the biconditional.

but rather the *absence* of modality in the relation between F and G in a simple qua-qualification without modal operators or auxiliaries.²⁹

It should be clear that the above arguments also carry over if we move from modal parts to modal counterparts. If, as I have argued, the relation between being F and G in a qua-qualification of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ qua } G \urcorner$ is not a modal one, neither modal parts nor modal counterparts are suited play the role of a qua-object in the envisaged theory of qualification.

I have argued that none of the familiar kinds of parts—spatial parts, temporal parts, modal parts—are suited to play the role of qua-objects in a mereological theory of qualification. However, there are theories in metaphysics on which these are not the only kinds of parts objects have. Some people have argued that objects have the *properties* which they instantiate as parts. Can such property parts be used to develop a mereological theory of qua-objects? I shall argue that they cannot.

3. Against property parts

Suppose that in addition to their spatial, temporal and perhaps modal parts, objects also had property parts. This view is held by *mereological bundle theorists* who claim that objects are fusions of properties (see Leonard & Goodman 1940, Goodman 1951, Williams 1952, Campbell 1981, and Paul 2002, 2013).³⁰

One might think that property parts can play the role of qua-objects in a mereological theory of qualification. In some places, Nicolas Asher sounds as

²⁹One might think that properties like being corrupt, kind or patient are dispositional and hence modal properties. But on such a view, the claim would be that what being F *consists in* is modal, e.g. being disposed to ϕ . One would not appeal to modality in explaining the relation between being F and G in sentences of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ qua } G \urcorner$. There is nothing modal about that relation.

³⁰Not all bundle theorists are mereological bundle theorists. Armstrong (1978a,b) claims that objects have the properties which they instantiate as "non-mereological parts" or constituents. And (Russell, 1940) develops a bundle theory using the primitive relation of *compreence*. Note that the claim that objects instantiate their properties is normally restricted to monadic properties since it is not entirely obvious how relations should be understood in bundle-theoretic terms.

though he proposes a view along these lines.³¹

'John as a judge is corrupt' . . . says that there is an aspect or metaphysical part of John—his being a judge—and that part is corrupt. (Asher, 2006, p.13)

The basic idea would be to say that a qua-object a -qua- G is a property. There are two ways of developing the view:

Property-Qua 1: a is F qua G iff $\exists Y(Y \leq_p a \wedge GY \wedge FY)$.

In words, a is F qua G if and only if a has a property as a part which instantiates both G and F . Alternatively, one might propose the following:

Property-Qua 2: a is F qua G iff $\exists Y(Y \leq_p a \wedge Y \equiv G \wedge FY)$.

In words, a is F qua G if and only if a has G as a part and G instantiates F . The first proposal is implausible since presumably no property has the property of being a judge. Only individuals can be judges. More generally, we'd expect **Property-Qua 1** to undergenerate massively since the sorts of properties slotting in for G in qua-qualifications of the form ' a is F as/qua G ' are not properties of properties, e.g. being a judge, being a parent, being a baseball bat etc. **Property-Qua 1** would then predict that the sorts of qualifications we've been considering so far are all false.

At first glance, the second proposal looks better in that respect; we'd identify the property of being a G with the relevant property part thereby avoiding the requirement that a property has the property of being a G . But still **Property-Qua 2** would undergenerate. Consider the following qua-qualifications:

- (3) a. John qua judge is corrupt, but John qua referee is uncorrupt.
- b. John qua parent is kind, but John qua critic is cruel.
- c. John qua judge makes £150,000, but John qua referee makes only £10,000.

³¹Though note that in later work Asher explicitly rejects the claim that the aspects central to his theory are parts and instead appears to endorse a view closer to the Finean one (see Asher, 2011, p.149f., p.158).

For (3a-c) to come out true on this analysis, it would have to be the case that properties like being a judge, a referee, a parent or a critic have properties such as being corrupt, kind, cruel or making money. But that's implausible. Properties have properties like being intrinsic or being identical to other properties or being instantiated. They do not have properties like being corrupt, kind, cruel or making money. But then **Property-Qua 2**, too, will undergenerate, predicting ordinary qua-qualifications like (3a-c) to be false.

Now one might think that this objection can be avoided by going for the slightly more sophisticated variant we've considered for temporal and modal parts. On this proposal, qua-objects would not be properties but fusions of properties. Let the YY be a plurality of properties. The proposal could then be stated as follows:

Property-Qua 3: a is F qua G iff $\exists YY(YY \leq_p a \wedge \exists x(x \sqcap_p YY \wedge Gx \wedge Fx))$

In words, for a to be F as or qua G is for a to have some property parts, the YY , the fusion of which instantiates being G and being F .

For this proposal to advance the discussion, the fusion of the property parts must itself not be a property, but an individual. Otherwise, the same problem as before would arise, namely that properties don't have properties like being corrupt, kind, cruel or making money. Fortunately, the assumption that certain fusions of properties are individuals is one many mereological bundle theorists should be happy to make; after all, the slogan that individuals are fusions of properties would suggest as much. And if a fusion of all of John's properties is an individual which can be corrupt, kind, patient etc. then maybe the fusion of a sufficiently large subset of those properties can be, too.

However, it is important to realise that, at this point, we are back to square one: the proposal on which qua-objects are spatial parts. For if the fusion of all of John's properties is an individual which is identical to John, then if the fusion of a subset of those properties yields an individual at all, that individual

will be a spatial part of John. But I've argued that spatial parts, whether they are made up of substances or of properties, are not suited to play the role of qua-objects in the envisaged theory of qualification.

I conclude that property parts don't advance the debate. If qua-objects are properties, the resultant mereological account of qua-qualification undergenerates since such properties don't have properties like being corrupt, kind, cruel or making money which qua-objects are assumed to have. If, by contrast, qua-objects are individuals generated by fusing property parts, qua-objects are once more understood as spatial parts of individuals. Since, as argued above, spatial parts are ill-suited to serve as qua-objects in a theory of qualifications, so are fusions of properties which are individuals.

4. Concluding Remarks

The aim of this postscript was to explore an alternative way of developing a theory of qua-objects, one on which qua-objects are parts of individuals. I have argued that neither spatial, temporal, modal or property parts are suited to play the role of qua-objects in a mereological theory of qualification. Since I cannot think of any other kind of part that might be invoked by such a theory, and since a mereological theory without suitable parts is no theory at all, I conclude that this alternative way of developing a theory of qualification in terms of qua-objects must be rejected, too.

3

Aspects and the (In)discernibility of Identicals

The neighbour's cat Kitty is both a pet and a predator. As a predator, Kitty is patient, but as a pet, Kitty is impatient. My baseball bat is both a piece of sports equipment and a weapon, and although the bat *qua* sports equipment is innocuous, the bat *qua* weapon is dangerous. Elizabeth Windsor is both a mother and a monarch, and while Elizabeth Windsor insofar as she's a mother approves of her descendants finding their own path, Elizabeth Windsor insofar as she's a monarch disapproves of her descendants finding their own path.¹ Do examples such as these provide counterexamples to Leibniz's Law, the compelling principle

¹Note that the last example may appear more controversial than the others since the qualifying expression 'insofar as' has a prominent reading along the lines of 'because' on which the sentence would entail that Elizabeth Windsor both approves and disapproves of her descendants finding their own path. As will become clear shortly, however, this is not how 'insofar as' is meant to be read here.

that nothing differs from itself?

The standard view in the literature on qualifications of this kind is that such cases do not provide counterexamples to Leibniz's Law, with different theories proposing different reconciliations (see Fine, 1982, 1999, 2008; Szabó, 2003; King, 2006; Asher, 2006). By contrast, Donald Baxter in a series of articles has suggested taking such examples at face-value, claiming that there are identicals differing in properties (Baxter 1988a, Baxter 1988b, Baxter 1999, Baxter 2018). He writes:

I am urging the discernibility of identicals. To say that identicals are *indiscernible* is to mean that for all *a* and *b* if *a* and *b* are identical then *a* and *b* have all the same properties. So when I say that identicals are discernible I mean that there exists some *a* such that *a* has and lacks a property. For *a* insofar as it is one way has the property and *a* insofar as it is another way lacks it.

Baxter (1988b, p.205)

According to Baxter, one and the same thing can differ from itself by having *aspects* which differ, where such aspects are nevertheless numerically identical to that thing.² For instance, on this view Elizabeth Windsor insofar as she is a mother is an aspect of Elizabeth Windsor and that aspect approves of her descendants finding their own path. Equally, Elizabeth Windsor insofar as she is a monarch is an aspect of Elizabeth Windsor, and that aspect disapproves of her descendants finding their own path. Since both Elizabeth Windsor insofar as she is a mother and Elizabeth Windsor insofar as she is a monarch are the same as Elizabeth Windsor, Elizabeth differs from herself.³

A proposal like this is easily dismissed as unintelligible. The aim of this chapter is to twofold: First, to show how Baxter's theory of qualification can

²Though like Baxter, Nicholas Asher (2006, 2011) gives centre stage to the notion of an *aspect*, his aspect theory differs from Baxter's in that Asher's aspects are numerically distinct from the things of which they are aspects. Asher's aspect theory will be set aside entirely here.

³Note that like Landman (1989) and Fine (1982, 1999, 2008) but unlike Szabó (2003) and myself (ch.5), Baxter assumes that expressions like 'Elizabeth as / qua / insofar as she is a monarch' are determiner phrases combining with a predicate to form a sentence. For now I'll grant Baxter this assumption, though in §3.4 below I shall argue that it is not supported by the linguistic evidence.

be developed in a consistent way. Secondly, to raise serious questions about its motivation and descriptive adequacy. Baxter's theory may not be unintelligible. But we can do better in developing a theory of qualification.

Before I begin, a caveat is in order. While in his earlier work, Baxter uses qualifiers like 'as', 'qua', 'to the extent that', 'insofar as' interchangeably to talk about the aspects of an individual (see Baxter, 1999, p.44), in his more recent work, Baxter seeks to distinguish between constructions with 'insofar as' on the one hand and constructions with 'as'/'qua' on the other hand (see Baxter, 2018, p.909). Still Baxter uses constructions with 'insofar as' to solve the precise sorts of puzzles which qualifications with 'as' or 'qua' are meant to solve. I find Baxter's reasons for distinguishing between such constructions unpersuasive (see §3.3 below) and will assume that aspect theory is one among a range of competing theories of qualification. Nevertheless, to facilitate presentation, I'll mostly follow Baxter in using constructions with 'insofar as' to talk about the aspects at the heart of this theory of qualification.

3.1 Motivation

Baxter cites a deep care for ordinary ways of speaking as the primary motivation underlying his theory of aspects. While admitting to "not being philosophically conservative", Baxter claims to be "as conservative as possible about ordinary concepts" (Baxter, 1988b, p.205). For Baxter, such accordance with ordinary ways of talking is a key desideratum for any metaphysical theory:

The metaphysician's job is to introduce complexities to explain away the apparent inconsistencies in the ordinary concepts we simple-mindedly and effectively use. [...] The goal is as much as possible to have the ordinary uses of the concept be literally true, as opposed to true only on significant reformulation.

Baxter (1988b, p.194)

On my view, to do metaphysics is to gather and systematize available and accepted ways of talking. Metaphysicians revise ordinary claims so as to make their meanings clearer. [...] Thus, I see my task as this: To resolve the apparent contradictions, I ought to work accepted paraphrases of them into a theory that explains how they really are consistent.

Baxter (1999, p.42)

A good metaphysical theory, according to Baxter, is one which offers a consistent description of the relevant phenomena while departing as little as possible from ordinary ways of talking.

To get a sense of how Baxter motivates his aspect theory on the basis of these more general methodological commitments, consider the following passage:

Theorists should take seriously the fact that people often answer a question by saying 'Yes and no'. In ordinary discourse we allow a way for an object to have and lack a property. This need not be attributed to insensitivity to contradiction.

Baxter (1999, p.39)

According to Baxter, answering 'Yes and no' is appropriate in cases like the following:

RESEMBLANCE: You talk to someone who has never tasted bittersweet chocolate. Asked whether bittersweet chocolate resembles sweet and sour sauce, you answer: 'Yes and no' (see Baxter, 1999, p.42).

MIXED FEELINGS: Jill's ex-partner is happy in their new relationship. Asked whether Jill is glad, she answers: 'Yes and no' (see Baxter, 1999, p.37).

ROLE CONFLICT: With his building company at the verge of bankruptcy, Bart asks his friend Sam, a civil servant on the city council, to get him a lucrative building contract. Sam is a good friend and a conscientious civil servant. Is Sam willing to help? Yes and no (see Baxter, 1999, p.39).

According to Baxter, the "theoretical task" for philosophers faced with examples such as these is to "preserve the propriety of answering 'Yes and no' in the envisaged cases without being committed to the propriety of a contradiction" (Baxter, 1988b, p.205). And the theory which, according to Baxter, is best suited to tackle that task is his theory of aspects.

Baxter isn't entirely clear what kind of positive evaluation *propriety* of an answer to a question is meant to track and what it is for a theory to *preserve* the propriety of an answer so understood. A relatively standard understanding of these desiderata would clearly not work. For instance, suppose one thought that to answer 'Yes and no' to the question of whether *a* is *F* were to elliptically assert 'Yes, *a* is *F* and no, *a* is not *F*'. If it is only appropriate to assert truths (as both a truth and a knowledge norm of assertion concur in), then it would *not* be possible for a theory to preserve the appropriateness of such an answer without committing to the truth of a contradiction.

Baxter's idea appears to be that there is a *paraphrase* of the contradictory answer 'Yes, *a* is *F* and no, *a* is not *F*' in terms of the proposed aspect theory which is as faithful to such an answer as consistency permits it to be. To illustrate, focus on ROLE CONFLICT.⁴ Baxter does not take the answer 'Yes and no' to the question of whether Sam is willing to help as elliptical for the contradictory (1) but rather as elliptical for (2) which he assumes is not contradictory:

(1) *Sam is willing to help and Sam is not willing to help.

(2) Sam insofar as he is a friend is willing to help and Sam insofar as he is a

⁴The case seems more probative with regard to theories of qualification than the other two. For it is questionable whether a theory of qualification is really required to account for cases like RESEMBLANCE OF MIXED FEELINGS in the first place. To handle cases like RESEMBLANCE it would appear to suffice to take note of the context-sensitivity of 'resembles'. 'Yes and no' might be available in contexts in which the context-sensitivity of 'resembles' can be dissolved in ways supporting either of the two answers but hasn't yet been resolved either way. And in MIXED FEELINGS, it would appear to be degrees of gladness which are at issue. 'Yes and no' might be available when the person is a little bit glad and a little bit sad, i.e. when they have both a non-zero degree of gladness short of one and a non-zero degree sadness short of one. Since ROLE CONFLICT is closer to the sorts of cases theories of qualification are generally meant to account for, I'll focus on this case.

civil servant is not willing to help.⁵

So far, alternative theories of qualification may concur.⁶ The crucial point of departure from philosophical mainstream concerns the interpretation of (2). According to Baxter, (2) says that Sam has an aspect which is willing to help and an aspect which is not willing to help where, crucially, Sam and his aspects are not distinct things but rather one and the same. While on this reconstruction we'd have a counterexample to Leibniz's Law, Baxter claims that the proposal is more faithful to ordinary ways of speaking than philosophically more conservative alternative interpretations of (2), and is hence to be preferred overall.

Baxter considers two alternative interpretations of (2). On the first, Sam has two aspects, Sam insofar as he is a friend and Sam insofar as he is a civil servant, though unlike on Baxter's view these aspects are distinct from Sam as well as from each other. On the second view, Sam has two properties: being willing to help insofar as he is a friend, and being unwilling to help insofar as he is a civil servant. Against the first proposal, Baxter argues that facts about whether *other things* are willing to help are irrelevant to the question of whether *Sam* is willing to help (Baxter, 1999, p.46). Against the second proposal, Baxter argues that facts about whether Sam has some *other properties* are irrelevant to the question whether Sam is *willing to help* (Baxter, 1999, p.40). But an appropriate answer to a question is one that is relevant to that question. Baxter concludes that if interpreted by one of the two philosophically more conservative alternatives, (2) would not be a reasonable candidate for the content of the elliptical 'Yes and No'.

By contrast, Baxter claims that interpreted by his aspect theory, (2) makes

⁵Note that Baxter's paraphrase would not simply be an operation on a sentence (as in standard examples of paraphrases, e.g. paraphrases of 'The average British family has 2.3 children') but rather of a sentence in context since otherwise there'd be no way of recovering (2) from (1).

⁶A bit of care needs to be taken here. As noted above, 'insofar as' has a prominent reading roughly along the lines of 'because': Sam is willing to help because he is a friend and Sam is unwilling to help because he is a civil servant. On this reading (2) would entail (1) given the factivity of 'because' so that, once more, it would not be possible to preserve the appropriateness of the 'Yes and no' answer without committing to the truth of a contradiction.

good sense of the answer ‘Yes and no’ in cases like *ROLE CONFLICT* (as well as in the other cases like *RESEMBLANCE OF MIXED FEELINGS*). Since, on this view, Sam is the very same as his aspects, facts about whether Sam’s aspects are willing to help would be immediately relevant to the question of whether Sam is willing to help.⁷ Baxter concludes that his aspect theory offers as faithful a reconstruction of the practice of answering ‘Yes and no’ as consistency permits it. Since by Baxter’s lights, a theory’s accordance with ordinary ways of speaking is the primary criterion of adequacy of a metaphysical theory, Baxter countenances counterexamples to Leibniz’s Law.

As I shall argued below, Baxter’s arguments against the two more conservative alternatives are flawed. However, the assessment of the view and its motivation will be deferred until we’ve gained a clearer understanding of how the theory is meant to work. §3.2 develops Baxter’s view in more detail showing how the proposal can be developed in a consistent way against the background of a non-classical logic of quantification and a non-standard interpretation of identity. §3.3 then scrutinises central postulates of Baxter’s aspect theory, highlighting not only internal difficulties but isolating a number of ways in which such a theory of qualification departs from ordinary uses of qualified speech. §3.4 returns to Baxter’s motivation for his aspect theory arguing that the proposal is poorly motivated and linguistically inadequate. §3.5 concludes that Baxter is wrong to presume that a tradeoff between philosophical conservativeness on the one hand and conservativeness with respect to ordinary discourse on the other hand would recommend his aspect theory over philosophically more conservative alternatives.

⁷Though notice the reasoning here would appear to rely on the very principle Baxter is disputing: Leibniz’s Law. I’ll come back to this issue in §3.4.1 below.

3.2 Aspects and Leibniz's Law

According to Baxter an individual's aspects are identical to that individual, yet they may differ in properties. Leibniz's Law violations are ubiquitous on this view, and stated informally, the view can easily appear unintelligible. For instance, Baxter claims that:

1. Everything has aspects (Baxter, 1999, p.48).
2. Individuals are identical to their aspects (Baxter 1988b, p.202, p.204, Baxter 1999, p.41, p.46, Baxter 2018, p.910).

Yet

3. Something is not an aspect (Baxter, 2018, p.906).

So although everything is identical to something which is an aspect, not everything is an aspect. Moreover,

4. Aspect terms of the form '*a* insofar as it is *F*' refer to an aspect of *a* (Baxter, 2018, p.906).
5. Any of an individual's aspects are identical to one another, e.g. *a* insofar as it is *F* is the same as *a* insofar as it is *G* (Baxter, 2018, p.907).

And yet

6. aspect terms of the form '*a* insofar as it is *F*' do not refer to aspects like *a* insofar as it is *G* (Baxter, 2018, p.908).

So aspect terms refer to things while not referring to things identical with them. As Jason Turner (2014, p.225) rightly points out, claims such as these are likely to inspire vertigo in even the most open-minded philosophical audience.

My aim in this section is to show how Baxter's aspect theory can be made intelligible by paying closer attention to Baxter's views about reference, Leibniz's Law and the concomitant commitments regarding the logic of quantification and identity. I'll then examine more carefully some of the postulates of the theory proposed in Baxter (2018).

3.2.1 Non-classical quantification

Baxter takes expressions like ‘Sam insofar as he is a civil servant’ or ‘Elizabeth Windsor insofar as she is a monarch’ to refer to aspects of Sam and Elizabeth Windsor respectively. Following Turner (2014, p.227), Baxter (2018, p.909) formalises such *aspect terms* by combining an ordinary name a with an open formula $\phi(y)$. So for instance ‘ a_yGy ’ is the formalisation of the aspect name ‘ a insofar as it is G ’ and ‘ $F(a_yGy)$ ’ formalises the sentence ‘ a insofar as it is G is F ’.

A quick note on syntax. As far as I can see from the way Turner and Baxter use such expressions, the variable ‘ y ’ which is free in the formula $\phi(y)$ ceases to be free when $\phi(y)$ combines with a regular term to form an aspect term $a_y\phi(y)$. The idea appears to be that the occurrence of ‘ y ’ in such aspect terms anaphorically refers back to a , just as the ‘it’ in ‘ a insofar as it is G ’ does. Moreover, the point of subscripting the regular term a with a variable y in expressions of the form $a_y\phi(y)$ appears to be to mark this anaphoric relation which is understood as a form of binding. Crucially then, the ‘ y ’ in an aspect term of the form $a_y\phi(y)$ is not free.⁸

Baxter’s key claim is that there are cases adequately described by the following triad, where a is an individual and F, G, H are properties.

$$\text{i. } a = a_yGy = a_yHy$$

a is the same as a insofar as it is G which is the same as a insofar as it is H

$$\text{ii. } F(a_yGy)$$

a insofar as it is G is F

$$\text{iii. } \neg F(a_yHy).^9$$

⁸Both Turner 2014, p.227 and Baxter 2018, p.909 assume that there are nevertheless open aspect terms, aspect terms with some *other* free variable: first order variables as in a_yRxy or second order variables as in a_yXy . If the open sentence Fx is pronounced as ‘it is F ’, these could be pronounced as ‘ a insofar as it is R -ed by it ’ and ‘ a insofar as it is it ’ respectively. I will mostly set aside such open aspect terms.

⁹Above, I’ve often used contradictories like ‘approves’ / ‘disapproves’ as opposed to sentential negation as in ‘ a approves’ / ‘it is not the case that a approves’. In that case, the (plausible) background assumption is that if a insofar as it is G is not- F then it is not the case that a insofar as it is G is F .

It's not the case that a insofar as it is H is F

Call 'Leibniz's Law' the following generalization:

LL: $\forall x \forall y \forall X (x = y \rightarrow (Xx \rightarrow Xy))$

The above triad is inconsistent with the following instance of **LL**:

LLA: $a_y G y = a_y H y \rightarrow (F(a_y G y) \rightarrow F(a_y H y))$

If a insofar as it is G is the same as a insofar as it is H , then if a insofar as it is G is F , a insofar as it is H is F .

Since Baxter affirms the above triad, he rejects **LLA** alongside other instances of **LL**. Nevertheless, Baxter recognises the centrality of Leibniz's Law in our reasoning with identity. He writes:

A venerable type of inference is: a has property F , a is numerically identical with b so b has property F . I do not want to dispense with this but merely circumscribe its application. It is valid of a and b considered unqualifiedly. But it is not valid if either a or b is considered qualifiedly. [...] Identicals considered unqualifiedly are indiscernible. But identicals considered qualifiedly may be discernible.

Baxter (1988b, p.205), Baxter (1999, p.49)

It is important not to be misled by the turn of phrase 'considered qualifiedly'; Baxter states explicitly that he does not take an object's aspects to be *modes of presentation* or *guises* of the object (see Baxter 1999, p.38, Baxter 2018, p.901). The important point in the passage is rather Baxter's suggestion to confine *applications* of Leibniz's Law in our reasoning with identity. This reading finds further support in Baxter's more recent work. There he writes:

I will use 'Leibniz's Law' to refer to only this conditional: For anything x and anything y if x is numerically identical with y , then for any property, x has it if and only if y has it. [...] In some cases identicals are discernible without falsifying the principle. [...] Leibniz's Law concerns only individuals and is silent about their aspects.

Baxter (2018, p.900)

These remarks suggest that Baxter does not wish to deny the principle **LL**. Rather, his position appears to be that **LL** can be true even if **LLA** is false and that, consequently, **LL** does not entail **LLA**. Of course, if expressions of the form $\ulcorner a_y Fy \urcorner$ are terms, then in classical logic, **LLA** follows from **LL** by Universal Instantiation (**UI**).

$$\text{(UI)} \quad \forall x\phi \rightarrow \phi a$$

To draw a wedge between **LLA** and **LL**, Baxter must then deny (**UI**) and, given the duality of the quantifiers, Existential Generalisation (**EG**) as well:

$$\text{(EG)} \quad \phi a \rightarrow \exists x\phi$$

His remarks therefore suggest that Baxter is operating with a non-classical theory of quantification akin to those studied in so called "free logics" (see Lambert, 1963; Church, 1965).

The suggestion finds further support in Baxter's remarks regarding quantification over aspects. Baxter claims that **LL** does not entail **LLA** because aspects are not "in the domain of quantification" of such principles (Baxter, 2018, p.906). Though informally, Baxter has been quantifying over aspects, he notes:

Apparent quantification over aspects is to be done in terms of quantification over individuals and properties. Thus 'There is an aspect' should be understood as 'Some individual has an aspect' which should be understood as 'For some individual x and some property Y , x is numerically identical with x insofar as it is Y ', where ' x insofar as it is Y ' refers to an aspect.

Baxter (2018, p.906)

Baxter assumes that aspect terms denote, but that their denotations are not in the domain of quantification, bringing to mind the treatment of empty names in positive free logics with a dual-domain semantics. There the idea is, roughly,

to interpret a language using models with two domains, an *inner* domain and an *outer* domain, where the inner domain is a subset of the outer domain. While terms can denote objects in the inner as well as the (strict) outer domain, and the extensions of predicates are sets of tuples taken from the outer domain, the *quantifiers* range over things in the inner domain only. This has the effect that even if a is an empty name like 'Zeus' or 'Pegasus', (1) will be true but (2) will be false yielding a counterexample to **(EG)**.¹⁰

$$(1) a = a$$

$$(2) \exists x(x = a)$$

Similarly in developing Baxter's view one could draw a wedge between (3) and (4) when one of a or b is an aspect name.

$$(3) a = b \wedge Fa \wedge \neg Fb.$$

$$(4) \exists x \exists y (x = y \wedge Fx \wedge \neg Fy)$$

So long as a and b denote things in the outer domain, (3) would not imply (4). In a second order language, one could equally draw a wedge between (3) and (4X) below, reconciling claims like (3) with the truth of **LL**.

$$(4X) \exists x \exists y \exists Y (x = y \wedge Xx \wedge \neg Xy)$$

Note however that the non-standard interpretation of the quantifiers alone would still not suffice to capture Baxter's view. For recall that Baxter wants to use quantification over individuals to talk about aspects. On his view, to say that a has an aspect is to say that there is an individual identical to a insofar as it is F , for some F . Hence Baxter needs at least some sentences like (5) to be true (not all since he assumes that some aspect terms are empty and sentences containing empty aspect terms are always false, see Baxter 2018, p.910).

¹⁰This point is peculiar to positive free logics. Negative free logics evaluate all sentences with empty names as false; $a = a$ is not a logical truth in such logics.

$$(5) \exists x(x = a_y Fy)$$

But since in the dual-domain semantics just considered, the quantifiers range only over things in the inner domain, (5) would be false if aspect terms invariably denoted things in the strict outer domain.

It is also worth noting that if sentences like (5) are to come out true for discernible aspects, **UI** cannot be replaced by the following principle, as is commonly done in free logics:

$$\mathbf{E!UI}: \exists x(x = \alpha) \rightarrow \forall x\phi \rightarrow \phi\alpha$$

For otherwise (**LLA**) could once more be derived from (**LL**). Instead, one should adopt the following instantiation principle:

$$\mathbf{\forall UI}: \forall y(\forall x\phi \rightarrow \phi y)$$

Here the outer quantifier ensures that universal instantiation is limited to things in the inner domain. Given the denial of **UI**, **\forall UI** does not entail **UI**.

For sentences like (5) to come out true without **LL** implying **LLA**, Baxter must combine non-classical quantification theory with a non-standard interpretation of identity. Fortunately, a view along these lines has recently been explored by Bacon & Russell (2019). This work will serve as a useful point of contact in developing Baxter's view.

3.2.2 Non-standard Identity

The project of Bacon & Russell (2019) is to reconcile a straightforward semantics of attitude reports with Millianism about proper names. On this view, there are counterexamples to Leibniz's Law. Nevertheless generalisations like **LL** are valid. As on the view sketched above, Bacon & Russell make use of a non-classical logic of quantification to drive a wedge between quantified and unquantified versions of Leibniz's Law. Although Bacon & Russell conduct a

much more general investigation of the (higher order) logic of identity in the context of opacity, their work offers helpful resources in making sense of the way Baxter is thinking about identity.¹¹

Where a stands for 'Hesperus', b stands for 'Phosphorus' and B stands for 'is believed to be bright', Bacon & Russell explore a non-classical logic of quantification in which **LL** does not entail **LL0**:

$$\mathbf{LL}: \forall x \forall y \forall X (x = y \rightarrow (Xx \rightarrow Xy))$$

$$\mathbf{LL0}: a = b \rightarrow (Ba \rightarrow Bb)$$

Nevertheless, Bacon & Russell want sentences like (6) and (7) to come out true:

$$(6) \exists x (x = a)$$

$$(7) \exists x (x = b)$$

After all, Hesperus and Phosphorus *do* exist—each just is the planet Venus.

The parallel to Baxter's project should now be evident. Where a stands for 'Sam' and G, H and F stand for 'is a friend', 'is a civil servant' and 'is willing to help' respectively, Baxter needs to block the entailment from **LL** to **LLA**:

$$\mathbf{LL}: \forall x \forall y \forall X (x = y \rightarrow (Xx \rightarrow Xy))$$

$$\mathbf{LLA}: a_y G y = a_y H y \rightarrow (F(a_y G y) \rightarrow F(a_y H y))$$

Still, Baxter wants (8) and (9) to be true:

$$(8) \exists x (x = a_y G y)$$

$$(9) \exists x (x = a_y H y)$$

After all, Sam's aspects *do* exist—each of them just is Sam himself. Given the parallel, we can look to Bacon & Russell in further developing Baxter's view.

¹¹Bacon & Russell (2019) consider not only identities between type e things (the type of individuals) but also for other types such as things of type $e \rightarrow t$ (the type of predicates), e.g. 'being a lawyer is the same as being an attorney', and more generally not only identities between things of type σ but things of all derivative types $\sigma \rightarrow \tau$.

To reconcile the truth of (6) and (7) with the background non-classical theory of quantification, Bacon & Russell (2019, p.95) propose an amended interpretation of identity statements. The basic idea is to relax the requirement that for sentences of the form $\ulcorner u = t \urcorner$ to be true in a model, u and t must denote the same element of the domain. Instead, objects in the outer domain are anchored in individuals in the inner domain by means of an equivalence relation over the outer domain (recall that the outer domain includes the inner domain).¹² For a sentence like (6) to be true when a denotes an object in the (strict) outer domain, a is required to have an anchor in the inner domain. Generalising these ideas to higher-order logic Bacon & Russell (2019, p.105-109) then show that there are models in which LL is satisfied but not LL0.¹³

To see how a construction along these lines would give Baxter much of what he wants, a little more detail will be instructive. Note that to reduce complexity, I will focus on a merely second order language.

3.2.3 Baxterian models

Syntax

Let \mathcal{L}_2 be a second order language with identity, i.e. a first-order language with identity enriched with second order variables $X^n, Y^n, Z^n \dots$. To the usual formation rules, we add that if Π is an n -ary second order variable and t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n

¹²Cotnoir (2013) uses similar tools for modelling Baxter's cross-count identity.

¹³More precisely, they show that there are models satisfying their assumed background logic as well as the (type general) principles $L(xyX)$, $L(xy)$ and $L(X)$ but not $L()$, as well as models satisfying the background logic and $L(xyX)$ and $L(xy)$ but not $L(X)$ or $L()$.

$$\mathbf{LxyX}: \forall x \forall y \forall X (x = y \rightarrow (Xx \rightarrow Xy))$$

$$\mathbf{Lxy}: \forall x \forall y (x = y \rightarrow (\phi x \rightarrow \phi y))$$

$$\mathbf{LX}: \forall X (\alpha = \beta \rightarrow (X\alpha \rightarrow X\beta))$$

$$\mathbf{L0}: \alpha = \beta \rightarrow (\phi\alpha \rightarrow \phi\beta)$$

is a sequence of terms, then $\Pi t_1 t_2 \dots t_n$ is an atomic formula. So for instance, X^3xyz is an atomic formula of \mathfrak{Q}_2 . The formation rules for the quantifiers still applies: If v is a variable (first or second order) and ϕ a formula, $\forall v\phi$ is a formula. So $\forall X\phi$ is a formula of \mathfrak{Q}_2 . Likewise for identity. Let a *term* be a variable (first or second order) or a constant (first or second order). Then if t and u are both terms of \mathfrak{Q}_2 , then $t = u$ is a formula of \mathfrak{Q}_2 . As a convention, I'll use lower case Greek letters ($\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$) as metalinguistic variables for first order terms and upper case Greek letters (Π, P, Σ, \dots) as metalinguistic variables for second order terms. Finally, we add the following formation rule for aspect terms to our language: if α is first order term, v is an individual variable and Π is a second order term, then $\alpha_v \Pi v$ is a first order term of \mathfrak{Q}_2 .

Semantics

Although Baxter assumes that some aspect terms are empty, I'll focus on a fragment of the language in which all terms denote. Since my aim here is just to show how the core claims of Baxter's theory can be understood in a consistent way, this simplifying assumption will be harmless for the present purposes.

A Baxterian model for \mathfrak{Q}_2 is a quadruple $\mathfrak{M} = \langle D_i, D_o, f, I \rangle$, where D_i and D_o are non-empty sets such that $D_i \subseteq D_o$ (intuitively the inner and outer domain respectively), f is a function from D_o into D_i subject to the constraint that for all $d \in D_i$, $f(d) = d$ (intuitively the anchoring function). We define an equivalence relation \sim in terms of f as follows: $\alpha \sim \beta$ iff $f(\alpha) = f(\beta)$; intuitively $\alpha \sim \beta$ iff they have the same anchor.¹⁴ Finally, I is a total function such that (i) $I(\alpha) \in D_o$ if α is an individual constant (ii) $I(\Pi)$ is a set of n -tuples of members of D_o if Π is an n -place predicate constant and (iii) if α is an aspect term of the form

¹⁴The right to left-direction of the definition ensures that \sim is an equivalence relation given the reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity of identity. That is, for any $x \in D_o$, we'll have $f(x) = f(x)$, so $x \sim x$. For any x and any $y \in D_o$, if $f(x) = f(y)$, then $f(y) = f(x)$, so if $x \sim y$, then $y \sim x$. And for any $x, y, z \in D_o$, if $f(x) = f(y)$ and $f(y) = f(z)$ then $f(x) = f(z)$, so if $x \sim y$ and $y \sim z$, then $x \sim z$.

$\ulcorner \beta_y \Pi y \urcorner$, then $I(\alpha) \in D_o$, $I(\alpha) \notin D_i$ and $I(\alpha) \in I(\Pi)$.

A variable assignment g for a Baxterian model $\langle D_i, D_o, f, I \rangle$ is a function such that for each first order variable v , $g(v) \in D_o$ and for every n -place second order variable V^n , $g(V^n) = X \subseteq D_o^n$.¹⁵ Let ' g_u^v ' be the assignment which is just like g except that it assigns u to v .¹⁶

Given a model $\mathfrak{M} = \langle D_i, D_o, f, I \rangle$ and variable assignment g , call $[\alpha]_{M,g}$ the *denotation* of α and let $[\alpha]_{M,g} = I(\alpha)$ if α is a constant (first or second order) and let $[\alpha]_{M,g} = g(\alpha)$ if α is a variable (first or second order). Given a model $\mathfrak{M} = \langle D_i, D_o, f, I \rangle$ and variable assignment g we define truth in a model recursively as follows:

$$\mathfrak{M}, g \models \Pi \alpha_1 \alpha_2 \dots \alpha_n \text{ iff } \langle [\alpha_1]_{\mathfrak{M},g}, [\alpha_2]_{\mathfrak{M},g}, \dots, [\alpha_n]_{\mathfrak{M},g} \rangle \in [\Pi]_{\mathfrak{M},g}$$

$$\mathfrak{M}, g \models \alpha = \beta \text{ iff } [\alpha]_{\mathfrak{M},g} \sim [\beta]_{\mathfrak{M},g}$$

$$\mathfrak{M}, g \models \Pi = \Sigma \text{ iff } [\Pi]_{\mathfrak{M},g} = [\Sigma]_{\mathfrak{M},g}$$

$$\mathfrak{M}, g \models \neg \phi \text{ iff not } \mathfrak{M}, g \models \phi$$

$$\mathfrak{M}, g \models \phi \rightarrow \psi \text{ iff } \mathfrak{M}, g \models \neg \phi \text{ or } \mathfrak{M}, g \models \psi$$

$$\mathfrak{M}, g \models \forall x \phi \text{ iff for every } u \in D_i, \mathfrak{M}, g_u^x \models \phi$$

$$\mathfrak{M}, g \models \forall X \phi \text{ iff for every } P^n \subseteq D_o^n, \mathfrak{M}, g_{P^n}^X \models \phi$$

Logical truth and logical consequence are defined in the usual way: \mathfrak{M} is a model of ϕ if $\mathfrak{M}, g \models \phi$ for every variable assignment g . ϕ is a logical truth if every model \mathfrak{M} is a model of ϕ . Finally, ϕ is a logical consequence of a set of formulas Γ just in case if $\mathfrak{M}, g \models \psi$ for every $\psi \in \Gamma$, then $\mathfrak{M}, g \models \phi$.

The two points of interest are the interpretation of the clauses for first order identity and quantification.¹⁷ Recall that $\alpha \sim \beta$ iff $f(\alpha) = f(\beta)$. We can start out

¹⁵ D_o^n abbreviates the n -fold cartesian product $D_o \times D_o \times D_o \times \dots$. So for instance, $g(X^3) = X \subseteq D_o \times D_o \times D_o$, a set of triples taken from D_o .

¹⁶To capture aspect terms with free variables, e.g. aspect terms of the form $\ulcorner x_y Rxy \urcorner$ or $\ulcorner a_y Xy \urcorner$, we'd have to extend the definition of a variable assignment over \mathfrak{M} accordingly. Since, as noted above (p.63, note 8), I'm going to set such open aspect terms aside, I'm not going to do this here.

¹⁷I'm making the simplifying assumption that *properties* do not have aspects. Consequently second order identity statements of the form $\ulcorner \Pi = \Sigma \urcorner$ are interpreted standardly (here I'm assuming an extensional second order logic, though the assumption is inessential). Accordingly,

by considering identity statements with regular names only, e.g. $a = b$. Given that ordinary names invariably denote things in the inner domain, and for all $d \in D_i$, $f(d) = d$, the sentence ' $a = b$ ' is evaluated as true in a Baxterian model just in case a and b denote the same object in the inner domain. Thus for regular names, '=' is interpreted standardly. Next consider mixed identity statements, e.g. $a = a_yGy$. Again, since $I(a) \in D_i$, $f(I(a)) = I(a)$, so ' $a = a_yGy$ ' is evaluated as true in a Baxterian model if $I(a) = f(I(a_yGy))$, i.e. if the object denoted by a_yGy is anchored in the object denoted by a . Finally, consider identity statements between aspect names, e.g. $a_yGy = b_zHz$. Since both aspect names denote things in the strict outer domain, ' $a_yGy = b_zHz$ ' is evaluated as true in a Baxterian model just in case $f(I(a_yGy)) = f(I(b_zHz))$, i.e. if a_yGy and b_zHz denote objects anchored in the same inner domain object.

Next consider the quantifiers. Notice that the first order quantifiers only range over things in the inner domain. Consequently, a generalisation like ' $\forall x\forall y\forall X(x = y \rightarrow (Xx \rightarrow Xy))$ ' will be a logical truth: every Baxterian model is a model of this generalisation. For on any assignment g of any model \mathfrak{M} which assigns x, y to things in the inner domain, ' $x = y$ ' will be evaluated as true in \mathfrak{M} relative to g just in case $g(x) = g(y)$. But then $g(x) \in [X]_{\mathfrak{M},g}$ iff $g(y) \in [X]_{\mathfrak{M},g}$, so that ' $Xx \rightarrow Xy$ ' will be evaluated as true relative to g in \mathfrak{M} . By contrast, there'll be Baxterian models in which ' $a = a_yGy \rightarrow (Fa \rightarrow Fa_yGy)$ ' is false, e.g. if the denotation of a_yGy is anchored in the denotation of a , but while the former is in the extension of F , the latter is not. Given the interpretation of the second-order quantifiers, ' $\forall X(a = a_yGy \rightarrow (Xa \rightarrow Xa_yGy))$ ' will then also be evaluated as false since not every $P^n \subseteq D_o^n$ is such that $\mathfrak{M}, g_{P^n}^X \models (a = a_yGy \rightarrow (Pa \rightarrow Pa_yGy))$. Finally, existence claims like (8) will come out true in Baxterian models even though the

the second-order quantifiers range over properties of things in the outer domain so that second-order quantification behaves classically. Readers who are interested in exploring the combination of a non-standard interpretation of identity at every type with non-classical quantification theory at every type are again referred to Bacon & Russell (2019).

aspect name a_yGy denotes an object in the outer domain. For we've defined f in such a way that every outer domain object is anchored in an inner domain object which then witnesses the truth of the existence claim.¹⁸

The construction illustrates how a theory like Baxter's can be developed in a consistent way. So long as aspect terms always denote things in the strict outer domain, while regular names always denote things in the inner domain, the non-standard interpretation of the object language identity sign will allow there to be models in which, (8) and (9) and **LL** all come out true while **LLA** comes out false, as desired.

More specifically, the following specifies a Baxterian model $\mathfrak{M} = \langle D_i, D_o, f, I \rangle$ such that (i)-(iii), (8), (9) and **LL** are all true, but **LLA** is false:

$$\begin{aligned}
 D_i &= \mathbb{N} \\
 D_o &= \mathbb{N} \cup (\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}) \\
 f(x) &= \begin{cases} x & \text{if } x \in \mathbb{N} \\ \text{the first member of } \langle n, m \rangle & \text{if } x \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \end{cases} \\
 I(F) &= \{1, \langle 1, 1 \rangle\} \\
 I(G) &= \{\langle 1, 1 \rangle\} \\
 I(H) &= \{\langle 1, 2 \rangle\} \\
 I(a) &= 1 \\
 I(a_yGy) &= \langle 1, 1 \rangle \\
 I(a_yHy) &= \langle 1, 2 \rangle
 \end{aligned}$$

Re (i): Since $f(I(a)) = I(a) = 1 = f(I(a_yGy)) = f(I(a_yHy))$, we have $I(a) \sim I(a_yGy) \sim I(a_yHy)$, so $\mathfrak{M}, g \models a = a_yGy$; $\mathfrak{M}, g \models a = a_yHy$ and $\mathfrak{M}, g \models a_yGy = a_yHy$.

¹⁸Of course, this is a feature of the simplifying assumption that all aspect names denote. This simplifying assumption can be relaxed by letting the interpretation function I of a Baxterian model $\mathfrak{M} = \langle D_i, D_o, f, I \rangle$ be a *partial* function which maps all non-empty aspect terms to elements of the strict outer domain and which is undefined for empty terms. The following two additional assumptions would then ensure that existence claims like (8) are false when a_yGy is an empty aspect name: We'd stipulate that if the interpretation of one of the terms in an atomic formula $\Pi\alpha_1\alpha_2\dots\alpha_n$ is undefined, then $\mathfrak{M}, g \models \neg\Pi\alpha_1\alpha_2\dots\alpha_n$. Moreover, we'd stipulate that if at least one of α, β is empty, $\mathfrak{M}, g \models \neg\alpha = \beta$.

Re (ii): Since $I(a_yGy) \in I(F)$, $\mathfrak{M}, g \models F(a_yGy)$.

Re (iii): Since $I(a_yHy) \notin I(F)$, $\mathfrak{M}, g \models \neg F(a_yHy)$.

Re (8/9): Let g be an arbitrary variable assignment over \mathfrak{M} . Since $1 \in D_i$ and $1 \sim I(a_yGy) \sim I(a_yHy)$, there is some $u \in D_i$ such that $\mathfrak{M}, g_u^x \models x = a_yGy$ and $\mathfrak{M}, g_u^x \models x = a_yHy$. So $\mathfrak{M}, g \models \exists x(x = a_yGy)$ and $\mathfrak{M}, g \models \exists x(x = a_yHy)$.

Re LL: Let g be an arbitrary variable assignment over \mathfrak{M} , and suppose for reductio that there were $u, w \in D_i$ such that for some $P^n \subseteq D^n$, $\mathfrak{M}, g_{uw}^{xyX} \models x = y$, yet $\mathfrak{M}, g_{uw}^{xyX} \not\models Xx \rightarrow Xy$. Then $g_{uw}^{xyX}(x) \in [X]_{g_{uw}^{xyX}}$ and $g_{uw}^{xyX}(y) \notin [X]_{g_{uw}^{xyX}}$. But $g_{uw}^{xyX}(x) = u = g_{uw}^{xyX}(y) = w$. So $w \in [X]_{g_{uw}^{xyX}}$ and $w \notin [X]_{g_{uw}^{xyX}}$.

Re LLA: As demonstrated $\mathfrak{M}, g \models a_yGy = a_yHy$ and $\mathfrak{M}, g \models F(a_yGy)$ and $\mathfrak{M}, g \models \neg F(a_yHy)$. So $\mathfrak{M}, g \not\models a_yGy = a_yHy \rightarrow (F(a_yGy) \rightarrow F(a_yHy))$.

I've shown how Baxter's key claims can be developed in consistent way by combining non-classical quantification theory with a non-standard interpretation of identity. However, consistency in the sense at issue here is still a relatively low bar since it merely requires that on some way of interpreting the object language which is in accordance with Baxter's stated commitments, the relevant sentences can all be true. Still, the reconstruction should at least have dispelled the worry that Baxter's core claims are unintelligible or that identity so understood would be entirely unconstrained. Next, I want to broaden the focus and consider a number of additional principles Baxter has put forth in an attempt to formalise his theory.

3.3 Principles of Aspect Theory

The aim of this section is to scrutinise some of the central principles proposed by Baxter (2018, p.910-912) in his attempt to formalise his aspect theory.¹⁹

However, before getting started, a caveat is in order. As a quick glance at the list of proposed principles will reveal, the models which I have proposed

¹⁹For reasons of space, I'm focusing on what I take to be the most interesting principles proposed by Baxter. Many of the remaining principles enumerated by Baxter are either not very interesting, or else consequences of others.

above are not sufficiently constrained to ensure that Baxter's principles will be true in every Baxterian model. As I have set things up, even principles of the core theory will have countermodels (e.g. the discernibility principles). Here I will not endeavour providing more sophisticated models, leaving this task to Baxter. Instead, my aim will be to assess the plausibility and interplay of relevant principles. I will bring to the fore internal difficulties which call for revision and I'll highlight the distance between a theory of qualification developed along these lines and ordinary ways of using qualified speech. Like Baxter (2018), I will rely on our understanding of English sentences with 'insofar as' in many places.

Core Theory

The following postulates give us Baxter's core theory. To facilitate cross reference, the numbers in brackets correspond to the enumeration in Baxter (2018, p.910ff.).²⁰

Aspects (2): $\forall x \exists X(x = x_y Xy)$

Every individual has an aspect.

IA-Discernibility (10): $\exists x \exists X \exists Y((x = x_y Xy \wedge Y(x_y Xy)) \wedge \neg Yx)$

Something is discernible from an aspect it has.

AA-Discernibility (9): $\exists x \exists X \exists Y \exists Z(x = x_y Xy \wedge x = x_y Yy \wedge Z(x_y Xy) \wedge \neg Z(x_y Yy))$

Something has aspects discernible from one another.

LL: $\forall x \forall y \forall X(x = y \rightarrow (Xx \rightarrow Xy))$

Identical individuals are indiscernible.

²⁰I've reformulated some of the principles in accordance with Baxter's claim that in place of the "dummy second order constants" used by Baxter there really "should be universally quantified second order variables" (Baxter, 2018, p.910). Moreover, Baxter isn't consistent in stating his principles as regards the following question: can we use the first order quantifier to bind a variable x in terms of the form $\ulcorner x_y Gy \urcorner$? His principle 6 (my **Reflexivity**) for instance is formulated as follows: $\forall x(x = x_y Fy \rightarrow F(x_y Fy))$. Here it looks as if we're making use of the above technique of using quantification over individuals in combination with identity to latch on to aspects. By contrast, his principle 9. (my **AA-Discernibility**) is formulated as follows: $\exists x \exists X \exists Y \exists Z(Z(x_y Xy) \wedge \neg Z(x_y Yy))$; here the existential quantifier must bind the x in the terms $x_y Xy$ and $x_y Yy$, unless it is vacuous. I've opted for uniformity, always using the above method of quantifying over individuals and latching onto aspects via identity. This way of doing things also has the advantage of ensuring that Baxter's assumption that there are empty aspect names doesn't automatically generate false instances of many principles.

Having discussed the core principles before, I won't dwell on these but rather focus on some of the additional principles proposed by Baxter as part of his theory. As before a formula of the form $\lceil a_y \phi(y) \rceil$ is to be read as a insofar as it ϕ s.

Principles of descriptive adequacy:

Descriptive Sufficiency (1): $\forall x \forall Y (Yx \rightarrow x = x_y Yy)$

Being Y is a sufficient condition on having a Y -aspect.²¹

Reflexivity (6): $\forall x \forall Y (x = x_y Yy \rightarrow Y(x_y Yy))$

If x insofar as it is Y is an aspect of x , x insofar as it is Y is Y .

Exclusivity (19): $\neg \exists x \exists X \exists Y (x = x_y Xy \wedge Y(x_y Xy) \wedge \neg Y(x_y Xy))$

Nothing has an aspect which both has and lacks a given property.

Exhaustivity (20): $\forall x \forall X \forall Y (x = x_y Xy \rightarrow (Y(x_y Xy) \vee \neg Y(x_y Xy)))$

Everything's aspects are such that they either have or lack a given property.²²

Closure principles:

Agglomeration (17): $\forall x \forall X \forall Y \forall Z (x = x_y Xy \rightarrow (Y(x_y Xy) \wedge Z(x_y Xy)) \rightarrow \lambda v. (Yv \wedge Zv)(x_y Xy))$

If x insofar as it is X is Y and x insofar as it is X is Z , then x insofar as it is X is such that it is Y and Z .

Monotonicity (18): $\forall x \forall X \forall Y \forall Z ((x = x_y Xy \wedge Y(x_y Xy) \wedge \forall z (Yz \rightarrow Zz)) \rightarrow Z(x_y Xy))$

If x insofar as it is X is an aspect of x which is Y and anything that's Y is Z , x insofar as it is X is Z .

²¹**Descriptive Sufficiency** entails the principle **Aspects** above on the assumption that everything has at least one property.

²²The consequent of **Exhaustivity** is simply an instance of the Law of Excluded Middle in a language with aspect terms.

Stacking principles:

Stacking (14): $\forall x \forall X \forall Y ((x = x_y X y \wedge Y(x_y X y)) \rightarrow x = [x_y X y]_k Y k)$

If x insofar as it is X is an aspect of x which is Y , then x insofar as it is X insofar as it is Y is an aspect of x .

Unstacking (15): $\forall x \forall X \forall Y (x = [x_y X y]_k Y k \rightarrow [x_y X y]_k Y k = x_y X y)$.

If x insofar as it is X insofar as it is Y is an aspect of x , x insofar as it is X insofar as it is Y is the same as x insofar as it is X .

In what follows I'll explore the plausibility and interplay of these principles in more detail.

3.3.1 Descriptive Necessity and Descriptive Sufficiency

The first postulate gives a sufficient conditions for an individual's having an aspect. We have that a 's being G is sufficient for a 's having an aspect a insofar as it is G .

Descriptive Sufficiency: $\forall x \forall Y (Yx \rightarrow x = x_y Y y)$

Baxter himself combines **Descriptive Sufficiency** with the following principle:

Descriptive Non-Necessity (11): $\neg \forall x \forall Y (x = x_y Y y \rightarrow Yx)$

Being Y is not a necessary condition on having a Y -aspect.

I've left this principle off the above list since it is a bit odd including such a negated principle as an axiom—presumably it would be enough that not every model is a model of the following principle:

Descriptive Necessity: $\forall x \forall Y (x = x_y Y x \rightarrow Yx)$

Being Y is a necessary condition on having a Y -aspect.

Be that as it may, the noteworthy observation is that Baxter accepts **Descriptive Sufficiency** while denying **Descriptive Necessity**.²³

²³According to Baxter (2018, p.909), the denial of **Descriptive Necessity** marks the key point of divergence between qualifications with 'insofar as' and qualifications with 'as' or 'qua'. While he accepts that sentences of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ as/qua } G \text{ is } F \urcorner$ entail that a is G , Baxter denies that sentences of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ insofar as it is } G \text{ is } F \urcorner$ entail that a is G . I remain unpersuaded that the two constructions differ in that regard.

This is somewhat surprising since while **Descriptive Sufficiency** seems at least somewhat controversial, **Descriptive Necessity** would appear to be hard to deny. For instance, surely only if *a* is a genius does *a* have an aspect *a* insofar as it is a genius. On the other hand, even though everything is such that they are either a genius or such that $2 + 2 = 4$, it is not immediately clear that *a* has an aspect *a* insofar as they are a genius or such that $2 + 2 = 4$. The necessary condition on having an aspect seems a lot less controversial than the sufficient condition, yet Baxter denies the former and endorses the latter.

The denial of **Descriptive Necessity** marks a clear point of contrast between Baxter's theory of qualification and ordinary uses of qualified speech. To see this, notice that utterances of sentences like (10a-b) are clearly infelicitous.

- (10) a. *Elizabeth Windsor insofar as she is a TV host is a national favourite, but of course Elizabeth Windsor is not a TV host.
 b. *Sam is not a civil servant but Sam insofar as he is a civil servant has the power to secure a building contract for his friend.

But given Baxter's denial of **Descriptive Necessity**, there is nothing in Baxter's theory which would rule them out. Since, as I argue in more detail in chapter 5, the infelicity of sentences of the form ' a is *F* qua *G* but *a* is not *G*' is robust across a range of examples, a theory which fails to make these predictions is descriptively inadequate.²⁴

According to Baxter (2018, p.909), the denial of **Descriptive Necessity** is motivated by counterexamples like the following: It could be true that Socrates insofar as he is wise is admirable, yet false that Socrates is wise on account of

²⁴A bit of care needs to be taken here. As I argue in chapter 5, there are certain linguistic environments in which such inferences don't look unimpeachable, e.g. when a book is used as a pillow it would perhaps be fine to say 'The book insofar as it is a pillow is uncomfortable' without committing to the claim that the book really is a pillow. However, what is going on there has little to do with the entailments of qua-qualifications. Suppose you and I each use a book for a pillow. 'Pass me your pillow' might be felicitous in such a context, yet such an utterance would not fully commit the speaker to the claim that the book really is a pillow. The phenomenon of diverted use is linguistically fascinating, but it doesn't offer a challenge particular to a theory of qualification.

Socrates being only a little bit wise, just wise enough to have a wise aspect. The example suggests that Baxter might be sympathetic to a restricted version of the principle, e.g. one according to which a 's having an aspect $a_y Fy$, requires that a is F to a non-zero degree. However, such a principle would not be good enough to rule out weird speeches. In particular, we'd still be bereft to explain why sentences like (11) sound odd:

- (11) ??Socrates insofar as he is wise gives good advice, but Socrates insofar as he is foolish gives bad advice.

So long as Socrates is a little bit wise and a little bit foolish, he should be able to have a wise and a foolish aspect. Yet, (11) still strikes me as infelicitous. Thus even when F is gradable, for sentences of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ insofar as it is } F \text{ is } G \urcorner$ to be felicitous, it is not sufficient for a to merely have a small degree of F -ness. As (10) and (11) demonstrate, Baxter's denial of **Descriptive Necessity** marks a serious departure from ordinary ways of using qualified speech. Given Baxter's stated aim of capturing ordinary uses of qualified speech, he would do better adopting **Descriptive Necessity** as part of his theory.

On the other hand, **Descriptive Sufficiency**, the principle endorsed by Baxter, should be considered more carefully. As will become clear in the course of this section, this principle yields odd predictions in unison with a number of other principles.

3.3.2 Reflexivity Troubles

Given certain assumptions about the object language, **Reflexivity** together with either **Monotonicity** (Mono) or **Descriptive Sufficiency** (DS) is inconsistent with **Exclusivity**. The background assumption required is just that the object language has not only predicates like 'person', 'philosopher', or 'friend', but also a predicate 'aspect', and that ' a is an aspect' is true if a is an aspect name and false if a is

a regular name. Consider the following two arguments:

- (A) A1. Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher is an aspect. [Premise]
 A2. No philosopher is an aspect. [Premise]
 A3. Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher is not a philosopher. [1,2, Mono]
 A4. Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher is a philosopher. [Reflexivity]
- (B) B1. Socrates is not an aspect. [Premise]
 B2. Socrates is such that he is not an aspect. [λ -conversion]
 B3. Socrates = Socrates insofar as he is s.t. he is not an aspect. [DS]
 B4. Socrates insofar as he is s.t. he is not an aspect is an aspect. [Premise]
 B5. Socrates insofar as he is s.t. he is not an aspect is not an aspect. [Reflexivity]

These two arguments show that a theory which, like Baxter's, is governed by **Descriptive Sufficiency**, **Monotonicity** and **Reflexivity** has certain expressive limitations. In particular, on pain of violating **Exclusivity**, there cannot be predicates in the object language which like 'is an aspect' apply to aspects of individuals but not to individuals.

But now consider a claim which, presented informally, seems true: No person is an aspect. If (alongside a predicate P for 'is a person') we had a predicate A standing for 'is an aspect', this could be expressed as follows: $\forall x(Px \rightarrow \neg Ax)$. A sentence like this is satisfiable in the above models; all we need is a model in which P only has inner domain things in its extension and A only has (strict) outer domain things in its extension. But now consider what happens when we try to mimic this sort of claim without the predicate A as follows: $\forall x \forall X(Px \rightarrow \neg x = x_y Xy)$; in words, if x is a person x is not identical to an aspect, or, to put it differently: no person has an aspect. This claim would contradict the core theory principle **Aspects** according to which every individual has an aspect. For the theory not to violate **Exclusivity**, one would have to either drop some of its principles or accept certain expressive limitations. Baxter might not be too worried about this; perhaps predicates like 'is an aspect' do not ultimately figure in the

theory but are mere elucidations belonging to what Frege called "the antechamber" of theorising (Frege, 1899, IV/3, p.36). But the point does require clarification.

3.3.3 Monotonicity and Leibniz's Law

Given his acceptance of LL, Baxter cannot adopt the monotonicity principle as stated.

Monotonicity: $\forall x \forall X \forall Y \forall Z ((x = x_y X y \wedge Y(x_y X y) \wedge \forall z (Y z \rightarrow Z z)) \rightarrow Z(x_y X y))$

The principle is meant to ensure that if having a property Y implies having a property Z , then any aspect which is Y is Z . However, to avoid quantifying directly over aspects, Baxter spells out property entailment in terms of universally quantified material implication. But recall that Baxter intends such quantifiers not to range over aspects. Unwittingly, **Monotonicity** is then a principle linking the properties of individuals to the properties of their aspects. Such a linking principle is particularly undesirable in that it would remove the wedge deliberately drawn between quantified and unquantified versions of Leibniz's Law.

To see the problem consider the following two properties, where s stands for Socrates.

- $\lambda x. x = s$ (Being identical to Socrates)
- $\lambda x. \forall X (Xs \rightarrow Xx)$ (Being indiscernible from Socrates)

Baxter would want to say that every individual which is identical to Socrates is indiscernible from Socrates, where this generalisation does not encompass aspects. But now consider the following instance of **Monotonicity**, where s stands for Socrates and $s_y G y$ stands for Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher:

$$(12) (s = s_y G y \wedge [\lambda x. x = s](s_y G y) \wedge \forall y \forall z ([\lambda x. x = z](y) \rightarrow [\lambda x. \forall X (Xx \rightarrow Xz)](y))) \rightarrow [\lambda x. \forall X (Xx \rightarrow Xs)](s_y G y)$$

If Socrates is the same as Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher and being identical to Socrates applies to Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher, and for any y, z y 's being identical to z implies y 's being indiscernible from z , then Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher is indiscernible from Socrates.

On Baxter's theory the antecedent of (12) is true: Socrates is the same as Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher, and consequently, being identical to Socrates applies to Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher. Moreover, Baxter acknowledges that any individuals are indiscernible if identical. Given **Monotonicity**, it would follow that Socrates and Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher are indiscernible. The argument generalises: As stated, **Monotonicity** would imply that every individual is indiscernible from its aspects in violation of **IA-Discernibility**.

To fix this problem, Baxter would have to reformulate the problematic main premise (MP) to avoid it ranging only over individuals. Consider for instance (MP*) as a substitute for (MP):

$$\text{MP: } \forall z \forall Y \forall Z (Yz \rightarrow Zz)$$

$$\text{MP*: } \forall z \forall X \forall Y \forall Z (z = z_y Xy \rightarrow (Y(z_y Xy) \rightarrow Z(z_y Xy)))$$

(MP) says that everything that's Y is Z . (MP*) mimics this kind of generality without officially quantifying over aspects. The idea is to require that every individual only has aspects that are such that if they are Y , then they are Z .²⁵

Baxter could then replace **Monotonicity** with the following principle:

$$\text{Monotonicity*}: \forall x \forall X \forall Y \forall Z ((x = x_y Xy \wedge Y(x_y Xy) \wedge \forall z \forall W (z = z_y Wy \rightarrow (Y(z_y Wy) \rightarrow Z(z_y Wy)))) \rightarrow Z(x_y Xy))$$

Absent a fix along these lines, the monotonicity principle sits uneasily with the rest of the theory.

²⁵Property entailment could be defined as the conjunction of (MP) and (MP)*, i.e. being F implies being G iff everything that is F is G and everything only has aspects which are G if F .

3.3.4 Proliferation through stacking

Stacking says that if an aspect $a_y Fy$ has a property G , then a has an aspect $[a_y Fy]_k Gk$, i.e. a insofar as it is F insofar as it is G . But it is unclear that ordinary qualified speech stacks in this way. Start out with a simple example. Socrates has an aspect, Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher. Suppose, as seems plausible, that Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher is Greek. Given **Stacking**, we can conclude that Socrates has an aspect, Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher insofar as he is Greek. Even such simple stacked aspect terms are not easily made sense of, and sentences including them are odd. (13) for instance is not a normal thing to say:

(13) ??Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher insofar as he is Greek is wise.

Baxter has not given us *theoretical* reasons for thinking that aspect terms should stack in this way. And it is difficult to see how appeal to ordinary thought and talk could motivate the stacking axioms—especially given their interaction with other axioms. For instance, given **Reflexivity** and **Descriptive Sufficiency**, **Stacking** predicts that if Socrates has an aspect *Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher insofar as he is Greek*, then Socrates also has an aspect *Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher insofar as he is Greek insofar as he is Greek*. And if being Greek implies being European, then given **Monotonicity*** and **Descriptive Sufficiency**, **Stacking** predicts that Socrates has an aspect *Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher insofar as he is Greek insofar as he is European*. But it should be clear that (14) and (15) are not normal things to say:

(14) Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher insofar as he is Greek insofar as he is Greek is wise.

(15) Socrates insofar as he is a philosopher insofar as he is Greek insofar as he is European is wise.

Baxter claims that his aspect theory is motivated by its conservativeness regarding ordinary uses of qualified speech. But a theory including **Stacking** alongside

Descriptive Sufficiency, Reflexivity and **Monotonicity*** misses that mark. In the absence of theoretical reasons for accepting the stacking axioms, they therefore remain unmotivated.

Let me take stock. The discussion of Baxter's aspect theory has revealed both internal difficulties of the theory as well as a non-negligible distance between aspect theory as formalised by Baxter's postulates and ordinary ways of using qualified speech. What emerges is that the picture painted by Baxter—one on which the philosophically revisionary commitments of his aspect theory are compensated by close adherence to ordinary thought and talk—starts looking less and less accurate. §3.4 presses this suspicion further, arguing that Baxter's motivation of his theory in light of the 'Yes and No' data is unconvincing and that Baxter's underlying syntactic assumption about the logical form of qualified sentences is implausible.

3.4 Faithfulness to Ordinary Discourse

3.4.1 Yes and No Revisited

Consider again the case of Sam and his friend:

ROLE CONFLICT: With his building company at the verge of bankruptcy, Bart asks his friend Sam, a civil servant on the city council, to get him a lucrative building contract. Sam is a good friend and a conscientious civil servant.

According to Baxter, asked whether Sam is willing to help his friend Bart, many people would reply with 'Yes and no' (see Baxter, 1999, p.39). However, Baxter does not take these people to commit themselves to the contradictory (1), but rather to something along the lines of (2):

- (1) *Sam is willing to help and Sam is not willing to help.

- (2) Sam insofar as he is a friend is willing to help and Sam insofar as he is a civil servant is not willing to help.

Baxter then claims that only his aspect theory affords an interpretation of (2) on which it is plausible that 'Yes and no' is short for (2). To recap, Baxter considers two philosophically more conservative alternatives. On the first, Sam has two aspects, Sam insofar as he is a friend and Sam insofar as he is a civil servant, though unlike on Baxter's view, these aspects are distinct from Sam as well as from each other. Against this proposal, Baxter argues that facts about whether *other things* are willing to help are irrelevant to the question of whether *Sam* is willing to help (Baxter, 1999, p.46). On the second view, Sam has two compatible properties: being willing to help insofar as he is a friend, and being unwilling to help insofar as he is a civil servant. Against that proposal, Baxter argues that facts about whether Sam has some *other properties* are irrelevant to the question whether Sam is *willing to help* (Baxter, 1999, p.40). On either view, (2) would be irrelevant to the question of whether Sam is willing to help and thus not a good candidate for the content of 'Yes and no.' Finally, according to Baxter, his aspect theory does not succumb to either of these problems since Sam and his aspects are one and the same and we only have a single, non-relativised property *being willing to help*.

As noted above, there are a number of issues with Baxter's arguments which I'll discuss one by one.

Proving too much

As already flagged above, if Baxter's objection from relevance were successful, it would equally affect Baxter's own view. Baxter takes his own view to be immune to the objection because Sam is identical to his aspects. The thought is that if Sam is identical to his aspects, then his aspects' willingness to help is relevant to Sam's willingness to help. But notice that this argument relies on an instance of Leibniz's Law. Where p is a particular proposition, the reasoning seems to be this:

(P1) $\lambda x.p$ is relevant as to whether x is willing to help ($a_y G y$)

(P2) $a_y G y = a \rightarrow (\lambda x.p \text{ is relevant as to whether } x \text{ is willing to help } (a_y G y) \rightarrow \lambda x.p \text{ is relevant as to whether } x \text{ is willing to help } (a))$

(C) $\lambda x.p$ is relevant as to whether x is willing to help (a)

But since Baxter does not think that all (classical) instances of Leibniz's Law are valid, he cannot rely on (P2) to reach the conclusion. That Sam is identical to his aspects does not guarantee that what is relevant to Sam's aspects is relevant to Sam. Baxter's own view would then appear to be at least as vulnerable to the objection from relevance as its competitors.²⁶ However, I shall argue that, in any case, Baxter's objections from relevance against the two more conservative alternatives are not compelling.

The relevance of distinct objects

Consider first the view on which *Sam insofar as he is a friend* and *Sam insofar as he is a civil servant* are aspects of Sam, but on which Sam and these aspects are all distinct. Baxter's objection against this view brings to mind Kripke's Humphrey objection to David Lewis's counterpart theory (see Kripke, 1972, p.45) or proper subject objections to perdurantism (see Haslanger, 2003, p.331). Baxter writes:

Why would it be proper to appeal to something's aspects to resolve apparent contradictions concerning the thing itself? Why isn't this simply changing

²⁶One might think that even if individuals and their aspects are not in general indiscernible that there are certain core properties which identity preserves, and perhaps relevance is one of them. It should be flagged though that given Baxter's wide use of aspect theory in metaphysics, such otherwise plausible constraints can easily cause havoc. Recall that Baxter (2018) proposes to make use of aspect theory to give a general account of the respect-relativity of similarity. On this view, the claim that bittersweet chocolate is similar to sweet and sour sauce in sweetness but dissimilar to sweet and sour sauce in bitterness and sourness would be captured as the claim that a piece of bittersweet chocolate and a portion of sweet and sour sauce both have sweet aspects, but that the portion of sweet and sour sauce lacks bitter aspects while the piece of bittersweet chocolate lacks sour aspects. But now suppose identity preserved relevance. Then we'd expect that the properties of any two aspects of the sweet and sour sauce are relevant to one another. But is not immediately clear that the sweetness of the sweet aspect should be relevant to the sourness of the sour aspect. It is also worth noting that since Baxter wants to employ his aspect theory in his doctrine of part-whole identity (see Baxter 1988b), he cannot have basic physical properties such as mass or location be preserved under identity.

the subject from the thing itself to things numerically distinct from itself and each other? For example, suppose a parent is both deft and clumsy. One could not resolve this apparent contradiction by saying that one of his children is deft and the other is clumsy. This is simply to change the subject.

Baxter (1999, p.46)

The worry raised here is that if an object's aspect are distinct from that thing, how could saying things about the properties of such aspects be relevant to a question about the properties of the object? For instance, how could facts about whether an aspect of Sam is *F* bear on the question whether Sam is *F* if Sam is not the same as this aspect?

A natural response is to point out that there are other cases where the properties of things distinct from an object *a* are nevertheless relevant to the properties of *a*. For instance, since objects have many of their properties by virtue of their parts having such properties, the properties of *a*'s proper parts are often relevant to *a*'s properties even though *a* and its proper parts are distinct.²⁷ Baxter brushes aside this response, arguing that it would merely exacerbate the problem. He argues as follows: either individuals inherit their properties from their aspects or they don't. If they do, we again get the contradiction we were trying to avoid (Sam is willing to help and Sam is not willing to help), if they don't, no progress has been made since we still haven't shown how the properties of distinct aspects bear on the properties of the individual in question (Baxter, 1999, p.47).

But a simple analogy suggests that there is no such dilemma. It is difficult to deny that whether a shirt is stained depends on whether parts of it are stained. So the properties had by the parts of the shirt are relevant to the properties of the whole. But of course no one should accept that, consequently, a shirt which has a part that is stained and a part that is not stained is therefore both stained

²⁷Of course, Baxter himself denies that parts and whole are distinct and recommends characterising part whole relations in terms of his aspect theory, too (see Baxter, 1988b; Turner, 2014).

and not stained. In ordinary contexts, a shirt which has a part that is stained is stained.²⁸ Things may not always be as clear-cut. For instance, whether a person with dirty hands and clean feet counts as dirty will vary greatly with context (Hanging up the freshly washed linen? Dirty! Stepping on the freshly washed floor? Not dirty!). The properties of the parts are relevant to the properties of the whole because the whole's properties depend on it. Yet Baxter's dilemma can be avoided by acknowledging that patterns of property inheritance between parts and whole are messy and highly context-sensitive. To defend the first more conservative interpretation of (2) in terms of distinct aspects, a similar line of response is open in principle.²⁹ The objection from relevance against the first alternative interpretation of (2) in terms of *distinct* aspects fails.

The relevance of distinct properties

The case against the second alternative interpretation of (2) in terms of relativised properties is no more compelling. Suppose one thought that for (2) to be true it had to be the case that Sam has the following compatible properties: being willing to help insofar as he's a friend and being unwilling to help insofar as he's a civil servant. Baxter claims that Sam's having of such relativised properties is irrelevant to the question of whether Sam is willing to help. He writes:

[Sam] is in a conflict that cannot be resolved by saying that willingness to help his friends is really not the property in question. It precisely is the property in question. The objector's relativised properties are not relevant. Sam insofar as he is a good friend and Sam insofar as he is a good civil servant are both Sam. Sam can't act until the conflict is decided. [...] Sam differs from himself about whether he is willing to help his friend.

²⁸Baxter would probably disagree. Given his recommendation to characterise part whole relations in terms of his aspect theory, he would most likely insist that the correct answer to the question of whether the shirt is stained is 'Yes and no' since it has aspects identical with it which are stained and aspects identical with it which are not stained. But in ordinary contexts that is simply not the right prediction; I'll return to this issue below.

²⁹Though more would need to be said about the relation between individuals and their aspects since, as I have argued in the postscript to Chapter 2, it is not very plausible that aspects are *parts* of individuals.

Baxter (1999, p.40)

The objection can be stated as follows. On the relativised property view, Sam has entirely compatible properties: being such that he is willing to help insofar as he is a friend and being such that he is unwilling to help insofar as he is a civil servant. There is no conflict between these properties. But Sam is in a real conflict. He has to decide whether he is going to help his friend secure the contract. The relativised properties are irrelevant to the question whether Sam is willing to help.

But it is simply not clear that this objection gets off the ground, since it is unclear why the relativised properties should *not* be relevant. As a warm-up, consider the following case. Suppose you bought your friend a nice fountain pen as a present. Worried that you might have spent too much money, your friend asks whether the gift had been expensive. You reply that it had been expensive for a pen, but inexpensive for a fountain pen. In such a situation it would surely be odd to complain that the response was irrelevant on account of it not bearing on the question whether the gift had been *expensive*.

It is natural to think that something similar is going on with relativised properties like being willing to help insofar as one is a friend / being willing to help insofar as one is a civil servant. Suppose Bart asks Sam whether he is willing to help. If Sam points out his conflict, saying that he is willing insofar as he is a friend, but unwilling insofar as he is a civil servant, Bart may ask him to make up his mind. But it would be quite odd if Bart went on to complain that the response was irrelevant to the question.

Of course, there is a real question here of how such relativised properties should be understood. What is it to be willing as a friend and unwilling as a civil servant? And how can the difficulty of being in such a state be adequately captured? But these are different questions which have little to do with whether relativised properties of this sort could have any bearing on whether Sam is

willing to help. There is no obvious reason why the relativised properties should *not* be relevant to the unrelativised ones. The objection from relevance against the second alternative interpretation of (2) in terms of relativised properties fails.

Baxter argues that adopting a philosophically revisionary theory of qualification on which there are *bona fide* counterexamples to Leibniz's Law is warranted because only such a theory can give a faithful yet consistent reconstruction of the practice of answering 'Yes and No' in cases like *ROLE CONFLICT*. I've argued that the objection from relevance presented in support of this claim would equally threaten Baxter's own account but that, in any case, the objection is not compelling. The next section takes a closer look at the supposed practice of answering 'Yes and no'.

Straight Answers and Context

Recall Baxter's insistence that theorists should "take seriously the fact that people often answer a question by saying 'Yes and no' " Baxter (1999, p.39). It is by appeal to this supposed practice of answering 'Yes and no' that Baxter motivates his aspect theory of qualification.

One can grant Baxter that in certain cases it is not inappropriate to answer 'Yes and no', though presumably such an utterance is normally expected to be followed by some elaboration. For instance, if Sam were asked whether he is willing to help his friend Bart, it would not be entirely inappropriate for him to respond with 'Yes and no', though he would be expected to elaborate along the lines of (2). I also grant Baxter that in certain cases neither a straight 'Yes' nor a straight 'No' would be entirely appropriate. For instance, if someone who has never had bittersweet chocolate asks whether bittersweet chocolate resembles sweet and sour sauce, neither answering 'Yes' nor answering 'No' would be entirely appropriate. I suspect that relatively standard appeals to context-sensitivity will be able to account for these data; the idea would be that 'Yes and No' is more appropriate than a straight 'Yes' or 'No' in a context in which

the context-sensitivity of a relevant expression can be resolved in different ways warranting different answers and hasn't yet been resolved either way.

By contrast, a failure to recognise the work of context-sensitivity in cases such as these might yield bad predictions. On a theory like Baxter's, it might be difficult to avoid the implausible conclusion that 'Yes and no' is almost always preferable to a straight 'Yes' or 'No'. The point can be developed by considering two sorts of cases.

(i) Standards. Socrates was wiser than most people. In an ordinary context, it seems fine to say that Socrates was wise. Moreover, if someone asks whether Socrates was wise, the correct answer would appear to be 'Yes'. All of this is compatible with Socrates being foolish to a non-zero degree. Perhaps Socrates insofar as he didn't realise that Alcibiades wanted to be his lover was foolish. On Baxter's theory, we'd get that Socrates had both wise and foolish aspects. Was Socrates wise? Baxter's theory would appear to recommend the answer 'Yes and no', regardless of whether we're attending to Socrates' relationship to Alcibiades or not.

(ii) Resemblance. Bart has never seen the Belgian flag. He asks Beth whether the Belgian flag resembles the German flag, and Beth says 'Yes'. He then asks Beth whether the Belgian flag resembles the Japanese flag, and she answers 'No'. These answers seem appropriate. Moreover, the answer 'Yes and No' would be uncooperative in both cases. But on Baxter's theory, we'd expect 'Yes and No' to be an entirely appropriate answer to both questions. For Baxter (1999, 2018) proposes cashing out the respect-relativity of similarity in terms of his aspect theory on which the Belgian, the German and the Japanese flag all have red aspects.³⁰ Does the Belgian flag resemble the Japanese flag? Baxter's theory

³⁰Recall that Baxter thinks of parts as aspects of the whole. Thus being partially red is understood as having a red aspect. Baxter is prepared to say things like 'The Swiss flag insofar as it is red is not white' (see Baxter, 1999, p.44). We then also expect to get: The Belgian flag insofar as it is red is red, the German flag insofar as it is red is red and the Japanese flag insofar as it is red is red. All three flags have red aspects.

would again appear to recommend 'Yes and no', independently of whether we attend to shared colours specifically.


The point here is not that we cannot get ourselves into a context in which 'Yes and no' *would be* an appropriate answer in the two cases. The point is rather that there are contexts in which a straight answer is appropriate and in which one would have to change the context for the 'Yes and no' answer to be appropriate. Baxter's theory as stated lacks the resources to capture such dynamics. Whether an individual has an aspect does not depend on what is salient in a conversation. But then if an individual's having an aspect which is F and an aspect which is not- F were *sufficient* for 'Yes and no' being an appropriate answer to the question whether a is F , the implausible result that 'Yes and no' is almost always appropriate will be difficult to avoid—especially given the proposal to understand the respect-relativity of similarity in terms of aspect theory. After all, just about any two things are similar in some respect or other, so Baxter's theory is prone to recommend 'Yes and No' as an answer to any question of the form 'Is a like b ?'. Surely not a desirable result.

Baxter could claim that having discernible aspects is necessary but not sufficient for 'Yes and no' being appropriate. But, in that case his aspect theory by itself would not do what it purports to do, i.e. explaining why it is sometimes appropriate to answer a question with 'Yes and no'.

Let me take stock. The aim of this section was to take a closer look at the 'Yes and No' data motivating Baxter's aspect theory. I've argued that an individual's being identical to discernible aspects is neither necessary nor sufficient for a theory's successfully accounting for these data. The upshot is that Baxter's aspect theory is poorly motivated. The next section highlights a final respect in which Baxter's theory misses its own target of closely according with ordinary ways of talking.

3.4.2 No Aspect Terms

Throughout this chapter I have granted Baxter the assumption that expressions of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ insofar as it is } F \urcorner$ are aspect terms, expressions referring to aspects of a and serving as the grammatical subject of sentences of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ insofar as it is } F \text{ is } G \urcorner$ as indicated in the following syntactic tree:³¹



However, syntactic evidence raises serious questions about this hypothesis. In Baxter's theory, strings of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ insofar as it is } F \urcorner$ are treated as if they were determiner phrases (DPs). But aspect terms would not appear to behave like DPs in at least three important ways.

First, as Zoltán Szabó (2003, p.391) points out, such strings do not coordinate well with other DPs. Start out by considering felicitous examples of DP-coordination:

- (16) a. The biscuits and the chocolate were served with tea.
 b. Julia and Sam donated large sums to charity.
 c. Sam and the priest are willing to help Julia move house.

As (16a-c) illustrate, different kinds of DPs (names, descriptions, plurals) coordinate well with one another. If aspect terms were DPs they, too, should coordinate well with other DPs. But as (17a-c) demonstrate they don't:

- (17) a. The biscuits and *the chocolate insofar as it is sweet were served with tea.

³¹For the sake of simplicity, I'm omitting the copula 'is'; this is common practice since the copula is probably semantically vacuous. See Heim & Kratzer (1998, ch.4) for discussion.

- b. Julia and *Sam insofar as he is feeling expansive donated large sums to charity.
- c. *Sam insofar as he is a good friend and the priest are willing to help Julia move house.

The data from (17a-c) suggest that aspect terms do not coordinate well with other DPs, which is evidence that they are not DPs.

Secondly, notice that the constituents of other complex DPs cannot undergo movement without changing the meaning of the sentence. Consider (18) and (19):

- (18) The book on the table is a novel.
 - a. On the table the book is a novel.
 - b. The book is a novel on the table.
- (19) Anna from 43 West Street called.
 - a. From 43 West Street Anna called.
 - b. Anna called from 43 West Street.

As these examples illustrate, moving a constituent of a complex DP to a different site in the sentence will often result in a change of meaning of the sentence. The same is not true of strings of the form $\lceil \text{insofar as it is } F \rceil$ in sentences of the form $\lceil a \text{ insofar as it is } F \text{ is } G \rceil$. Consider (20a-c) and (21a-b):

- (20) Sam insofar as he is a good friend is willing to help.
 - a. Insofar as he is a good friend Sam is willing to help.
 - b. Sam is willing to help insofar as he is a good friend.
- (21) The chocolate insofar as it is sweet was served with tea.
 - a. Insofar as it is sweet the chocolate was served with tea.
 - b. The chocolate was served with tea insofar as it is sweet.

Strings of the form $\lceil \text{insofar as it is } F \rceil$ can move around much more freely in sentences of the form $\lceil a \text{ insofar as it is } F \text{ is } G \rceil$ than we'd expect if they were

constituents of complex DPs. These data then provide further evidence that strings of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ insofar as it is } F \urcorner$ are not DPs, as assumed by Baxter.

Finally, if aspect terms were DPs, we'd expect them to be appropriate answers to questions with *who* or *what*. Consider again our previous two examples. Here the complex DPs are perfect answers to such questions:

(22) What is a novel? The book on the table.

(23) Who called? Anna from 43 West Street.

But as (24a-b) demonstrate this is not the case for Baxter's aspect terms like 'Sam insofar as he is a good friend' or 'the chocolate insofar as it is sweet':

(24) a. Who is willing to help Julia move house? ??Sam insofar as he is a good friend.

b. What was served with tea? ??The chocolate insofar as it is sweet.

Unlike other complex DPs, aspect terms do not make for good answers to questions with *who* or *what*.

Summing up, data from coordination, movement, and questions raise serious doubts about Baxter's assumption that strings of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ insofar as it is } F \urcorner$ function as the grammatical subjects of the sentence of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ insofar as it is } F \text{ is } G \urcorner$. Baxter's theory would then appear to diverge from ordinary uses of qualified speech in respects as fundamental as syntax.

Of course, Baxter might insist that his theory is *not* committed to any claims regarding the logical form of constructions with 'insofar as' in English. A comparison with the metaphysics of persistence will be instructive here. According to *perdurantists* about persistence, the truth of a sentence such as 'The banana is green at *t*' requires that a temporal part of the banana, the-banana-at-*t*, is green. Yet, *perdurantists* need not commit to the claim that in English, 'at *t*' is a subject modifier, a function taking the DP 'the banana' to another DP 'the

banana at *t*. Tests akin to those above would likely speak against this hypothesis. Perdurantists could even go along with the assumption that 'at *t*' is a predicate modifier taking 'green' to 'green-at-*t*'. For their claim is metaphysical; they'd still insist that *what it is* for the banana to be green-at-*t* is for it to have a temporal part, the-banana-at-*t* which is green. Likewise, it is in principle open to Baxter to go along with other syntactic hypotheses, so long as he can hold on to the claim that *what it is* for Sam to be willing to help insofar as he is a friend is for Sam to have an aspect, Sam-insofar-as-he-is-a-friend, which is willing to help.

But given the stated motivation and aims of his theory, it is less clear whether this sort of move is available to Baxter. For recall that Baxter's self-set aim is "as much as possible to have the ordinary uses of the concept be literally true, as opposed to true only on significant reformulation" (Baxter, 1988b, p.194). The syntactic evidence presented suggests that Baxter's aspect theory *does* require a significant reformulation of ordinary uses of qualified speech to get off the ground. The syntactic evidence presented here speaks against Baxter's proposal by Baxter's own lights.

Let me take stock. The aim of this section was to further examine the claim that, though philosophically revisionary, Baxter's theory is nevertheless faithful to ordinary ways of talking. I've argued that his theory does not compare favourably to philosophically more conservative alternatives in this regard and significantly diverges from ordinary discourse in its basic assumptions and predictions. Baxter is wrong to presume that a tradeoff between philosophical conservativeness on the one hand and conservativeness with respect to ordinary discourse on the other hand recommends his aspect theory over less revisionary alternatives.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

It is a common assumption in the literature on qualification that sentences of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ as/qua/insofar as it is } F \text{ is } G \text{ but } a \text{ as/qua/insofar as it is } H \text{ is not } G \urcorner$ do not provide counterexamples to Leibniz's Law. Given this assumption, the main task for a theory of qualification is to explain how such claims are to be reconciled with Leibniz's Law.

Donald Baxter, by contrast, has argued that there are discernible identicals and hence truths which, under classical assumptions, constitute counterexamples to Leibniz's Law. A view like this is easily dismissed as unintelligible. The aim of this chapter was to show that Baxter's view can be developed in a consistent way, but to insist that the proposed theory of qualification is highly revisionary not only in its assumed background logic, but also in its assumptions and predictions about ordinary discourse.

Baxter maintains that making revisionary assumptions in one's theorising is warranted so long as the resultant theory is as faithful to ordinary thought and talk as consistency permits it to be. Throughout the paper, I have argued that even accepting this tradeoff, it fails to recommend Baxter's theory over its less revisionary competitors. The upshot is that although Baxter's theory is not unintelligible, we can do better.

4

On Szabó On Qualification

Suppose John has two jobs. He is a judge, a job in which he makes £150,000 a year. And he is a referee for his local football club, a job in which he makes £10,000 a year. In this scenario, (1) is true but (2) would appear to be false.

- (1) John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.
- (2) John makes exactly £150,000.

If that's right, (1) does not entail (2). By contrast, (1) and (3) would appear to entail (4) given suitable auxiliary assumptions:¹

- (1) John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.
- (3) John makes exactly £10,000 as a referee.
- (4) John makes exactly £160,000.

¹e.g. that John has no other sources of income, and that the money he makes as a referee is not already included in the money he makes as a judge.

Finally (1) would appear to entail (5):

(5) John is a judge.

In his article *On Qualification*, Zoltán Szabó (2003) puts forth a semantic theory of qualifications with 'as' or 'qua' aimed at explaining these data. Szabó's theory is motivated on linguistic grounds, yet it provides an interesting metaphysical alternative to other theories of qualification. On Szabó's view, qua-qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$ say that certain relations obtain between a 's states of being F and a 's states of being G .²

Szabó's theory of qualification then falls into the camp of *eventuality theories* of qualification, theories which analyse being $F \text{ qua } G$ as being F in certain eventualities, whether it is events, states, situations, processes or the like. Eventuality theories of qualification can be seen as an attempt to improve on *temporal* interpretations of qualification. Instead of analysing being $F \text{ qua } G$ as being $F \text{ when}$ or while one is G , we'd analyse it as being F in a G -eventuality. If a is G and H throughout the exact same period of time, every time at which a is G is a time at which a is H . And so, on a temporal analysis a could not be $F \text{ qua } G$ and not- $F \text{ qua } H$, but that is implausible. Someone who is a judge and a referee throughout the exact same years can still be corrupt qua judge and uncorrupt qua referee. By contrast, not every G -eventuality of a 's is also a H -eventuality of a 's. The basic idea then is this: how is it possible to be both $F \text{ qua } G$ and not- $F \text{ qua } H$? By being F in one's G -eventualities and being not- F in one's H eventualities.

The aim of this essay is to assess in detail the prospects of eventuality theories of qualification. Since Szabó's is the most detailed eventuality-theoretic account in the literature to date, his theory will be the main focus of this essay. However, as we shall see, the most serious issue faced by Szabó's theory is general; it can

²Szabó follows the literature in assuming the equivalence of qualifications with 'as' and qualifications with 'qua', though he focuses on qualifications with 'as' to get clearer linguistic intuitions.

be expected to arise for any eventuality theory of qualification, whether or not they share Szabó's more specific commitments.

4.1 Szabó's Theory of Qualification

Szabó's theory of qualification is motivated by two claims regarding the syntax and semantics of qualifications with 'as'. First, the *syntactic* claim is that as-phrases are *secondary predicates*. Consider once more (1):

(1) John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.

According to Szabó (2003, p.334), sentences like (1) are syntactically relevantly alike to sentences like (6) and (7):

(6) John plays the piano drunk.

(7) John paints his house red.

Secondly, the *semantic* claim is that predication in (1), (6) and (7) is *two layered*: a predicate is "ascribed to an individual insofar as another predicate is" (Szabó, 2003, p.335).

Szabó concludes that the main task for a theory of qualification is to account for the *relation* between primary and secondary predication (ibid). His proposal is to capture the relation between primary and secondary predication using a *Neo-Davidsonian event semantics* on which all predication involves quantification over events or states (see Parsons, 1990; Higginbotham, 1983). Sentences like (1), (6) and (7) are then understood as specifying relations obtaining between different events or states.³ For instance, a standard event-semantic analysis of

³It is commonly assumed that there is no metaphysical difference between states and events, though see Ryle (1949), Kenny (1963) and more recently Skow (2018) for views that take the distinction seriously. According to Lewis (1986a), for instance, events and states are both properties of spacetime regions. For Kim (1993) both events and states are individuals instantiating properties, and situation theorists like Barwise & Perry (1983), Kratzer (2012) and Elbourne (2013) have a similar understanding of situations. As far as I can see, Szabó uses whatever label is more natural in a given case (e.g. the *event* of Brutus stabbing Caesar, but the *state* of Caesar's being taller than Brutus), but ultimately doesn't distinguish between states and events in the theory.

(6) would look as follows (R is used as placeholder for now):

(6) John plays the piano drunk.

(6_{LF}) $\exists e \exists s (\text{PIANO PLAYING}(e) \wedge \text{AGENT}(\text{John}, e) \wedge \text{DRUNK}(s) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s) \wedge eRs)$

There is an event e , and a state s such that e is a piano playing by John, s is a state of John's being drunk, and e bears R to s .

(6) says that John's being drunk is related in a particular way to John's playing the piano. Plausibly the relevant relation here is that of temporal inclusion: the piano playing is temporally included in the state of being drunk: John is drunk *while* playing the piano. Different relations will be appropriate to different kinds of secondary predication. (7) for instance, is typically understood as saying that the event of John's painting his house *causes* the state of his house being red. Following Halliday (1967), linguists call sentences like (6) *depictives* and sentences like (7) *resultatives*.

Likewise, Szabó suggests that sentences like (1) say that a certain relation obtains between two states. This relation is *parthood* according to Szabó: For a to be F as a G is for a state of a 's being F to be a part of a state of a 's being G (Szabó, 2003, p.337). I'll examine the background theory of states in more detail in §4.3, but for now just take it as given. Where ' \leq ' represents the relevant parthood relation, we then get the following translation:

(1) John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.

(1_{LF}) $\exists s_1 \exists s_2 (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-£150,000}(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \text{JUDGE}(s_2) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_2) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2)$

John is in a state s_1 of making £150,000 and John is in a state s_2 of being a judge and s_1 is a part of s_2 .

4.1.1 Persistence

A key question for Szabó's proposed semantics is whether it satisfies the core requirement on any serious theory of qualification: to offer a consistent description

of cases in which individuals have mutually incompatible properties relative to different roles or identities. At first glance, one might worry that the theory struggles in this regard.

Go back to the case of John who makes exactly £150,000 as a judge and makes exactly £10,000 as a referee. Szabó (2003, p.335) notes that, as desired, the proposed approach to the semantics of qualification captures the entailment from (1) to (5):

(1) John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.

(5) John is a judge.

Why? The reasoning is not explained in any detail but presumably the thought is that the logical forms of (1) and (5) are (1_{LF}) and (5_{LF^*}) respectively. And (5_{LF^*}) follows from (1_{LF}) by conjunction elimination.

$$(1_{LF}) \exists s_1 \exists s_2 (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-£150,000}(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \text{JUDGE}(s_2) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_2) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2)$$

$$(5_{LF^*}) \exists s_2 (\text{JUDGE}(s_2) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_2))$$

The worry now is this: (1_{LF}) not only entails (5_{LF^*}) , but also (8_{LF^*}) .

$$(8_{LF^*}) \exists s_1 (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-£150,000}(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_1))$$

But suppose again that John is not only a judge but also the referee of his local football club and that, moreover, John makes exactly £10,000 as a referee. Then on Szabo's proposal we also have:

(3) John makes exactly £10,000 as a referee.

$$(3_{LF}) \exists s_1 \exists s_2 (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-£10,000}(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \text{REFEREE}(s_2) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_2) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2)$$

And (3_{LF}) entails (9_{LF^*}) :

$$(9_{LF^*}) \exists s_1 (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-£10,000}(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_1))$$

Now (8_{LF^*}) and (9_{LF^*}) are of course not themselves inconsistent. But on a simple minded application of the Neo-Davidsonian framework, (8_{LF^*}) and (9_{LF^*}) would be the translations of two English sentences which cannot both be true at the same time.

(8) John makes exactly £150,000.

(9) John makes exactly £10,000.

Moreover, given that $10,000 \neq 150,000$, (9) entails (10):

(10) It is not the case that John makes exactly £150,000.

And (8) and (10) are jointly inconsistent. So if (8_{LF^*}) and (9_{LF^*}) were the logical forms of (8) and (9) respectively, Szabó's proposal would not afford a consistent description of the sorts of cases of interest.

Szabó's response is as follows. The default interpretation of certain predicates is *persistent*. For such predicates, to say that a is F is not merely to say that a is in *some* state of being F , but rather that a 's overall state at the time is a state of being F . By contrast, qualified predication is not in general persistent. As a result the inferences from (1) to (8) and from (3) to (9) are not in fact valid. Let me develop the point in more detail. Consider for instance (11):

(11) Mary is happy.

According to Szabó (2003, p.340), (11) does not just say that there is some state of Mary's being happy, but rather that Mary is overall happy. That is, the logical form of (11) is not given by (11_{LF^*}) , but rather by (11_{LF}) .

$(11_{LF^*}) \exists s_1(\text{HAPPY}(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{Mary}, s_1))$

There is a state of being happy and Mary is in it.

$(11_{LF}) \exists s_1(\text{HAPPY}(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{Mary}, s_1) \wedge \forall s'((\text{IN}(\text{Mary}, s') \wedge s_1 \leq s') \rightarrow (\text{HAPPY}(s'))))$.

There is a state of being happy and Mary is in it, and every state of Mary's which has Mary's being happy as a part, is a state of being happy.

The default interpretation of (11) is a persistent interpretation: (11) says that Mary is in a happy state every extension of which is also a happy state.⁴

Drawing on the distinction between persistent and a non-persistent predication, Szabó (2003, p.337) proposes the following solution to the challenge from consistency: while sentences involving *unqualified* predication have a persistence clause, sentences involving *qualified* predication do not. That is, while the logical form of (1) is given by (1_{LF}), the logical form of (8) is not given by (8_{LF*}) but rather by (8_{LF}):

- (1) John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.
- (1_{LF}) $\exists s_1 \exists s_2 (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-}\pounds 150,000 (s_1) \wedge \text{IN} (\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \text{JUDGE} (s_2) \wedge \text{IN} (\text{John}, s_2) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2)$.
- (8) John makes exactly £150,000.
- (8_{LF}) $\exists s_1 (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-}\pounds 150,000 (s_1) \wedge \text{IN} (\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \forall s' ((\text{IN} (\text{John}, s') \wedge s_1 \leq s') \rightarrow (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-}\pounds 150,000 (s'))))$.

But (8_{LF}) does not follow from (1_{LF}); that John is in a state of making exactly £150,000 does not imply that John is in a state of making exactly £150,000 every extension of which is a state of making exactly £150,000. Similarly, the logical forms of (3) and (9) are (3_{LF}) and (9_{LF}) respectively:

- (3) John makes exactly £10,000 as a referee.
- (3_{LF}) $\exists s_1 \exists s_2 (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-}\pounds 10,000 (s_1) \wedge \text{IN} (\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \text{REFEREE} (s_2) \wedge \text{IN} (\text{John}, s_2) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2)$.
- (9) John makes exactly £10,000.
- (9_{LF}) $\exists s_1 (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-}\pounds 10,000 (s_1) \wedge \text{IN} (\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \forall s' ((\text{IN} (\text{John}, s') \wedge s_1 \leq s') \rightarrow (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-}\pounds 10,000 (s'))))$.

But (9_{LF}) does not follow from (3_{LF}); that John is in some state of making exactly £10,000 does not imply that John is in some state of making exactly £10,000 every extension of which is a state of making £10,000. Szabó concludes:

⁴Presumably the requirement concerns parthood at a time. It is not required that every temporal extension of her happy state is a happy state, after all, the truth of (11) does not require that Mary always has been and always will be happy.

All we need to account for the failure of qua-sentences to entail their qualified clause is the principle that qualified predication within a qua-sentence cannot be persistent, even if the default interpretation of the qualified clause in isolation is the persistent one.

Szabó 2003, p.337

This, in a nutshell, is Szabó's theory of qua-qualification.⁵ The remainder of this chapter will submit the proposal to detailed scrutiny and consider the prospects of eventuality-theoretic approaches to qualification more generally. I start out by arguing that Szabó's specific proposal is unsatisfactory in three important ways: The linguistic evidence on which it is based is inconclusive (§4.2), the semantic analysis of qualification in terms of state parthood does little work in securing correct semantic predictions (§4.3), and on pain of inconsistency, the theory cannot account for a range of inferential constraints on qua-qualifications (§4.4). The discussion considerably diminishes the appeal of Szabó's specific theory of qualification. §4.5 goes a step further by presenting a serious problem which can be expected to arise on any eventuality-theoretic approach to qualification, i.e. any account on which being *F* as a *G* is analysed as being *F simpliciter* in some *eventuality*, whether it is a state, an event, a situation, a process or the like. I conclude that it is not just Szabó's specific proposal which should be rejected, but rather the eventuality-theoretic approach more generally.

4.2 Linguistic Evidence

According to Szabó, as-phrases are secondary predicates. That is, Szabó takes sentences like (1) to be syntactically relevantly alike to sentences like (2) and (3):

(1) John makes £150,000 as a judge.

⁵There is one more slight modification to the proposal made by Szabó which will be discussed in §4.4 below; for now we can work with the above truth-conditions.

- (6) John plays the piano drunk.
- (7) John paints his house red.

The aim of this section is to argue that the evidence presented by Szabó is inconclusive in this regard and that, moreover, there is countervailing evidence. While none of the data I'll consider settle the matter, they highlight that the syntactic hypothesis underlying Szabó's theory is not as well supported as he makes it out to be.

4.2.1 Szabó's evidence

Szabó presents three pieces of linguistic evidence in support of the claim that qualifying phrases are secondary predicates. First, he notes that the sorts of expressions which can grammatically figure in qualifying phrases of the form 'as a *G*' are the same sorts of expressions which can grammatically occur in predicate position. Consider (12)-(14)

- (12) a. John is a judge.
b. John makes £150,000 as a judge.
- (13) a. John is the referee of his football club.
b. John makes £10,000 as the referee of his football club.
- (14) a. Those people are judges.
b. Those people make £150,000 as judges.

Nominal expressions like 'a judge', 'the judge', and 'judges' can felicitously be used to form qualifying phrases. According to Szabó these are precisely the sorts of expression which are "often characterised as predicates when they are not in argument position: indefinite and definite descriptions, role-identifying nouns, and bare plurals" (Szabó, 2003, p.335).

By contrast, the sorts of expressions which *cannot* easily be used as predicates, also cannot easily be used in qualifying phrases according to Szabó, e.g. (15a-b) and (16a-b) are all marked.

- (15) a. *John is some judge.
 b. *John makes £150,000 as some judge.
- (16) a. *John is this judge.
 b. *John makes £150,000 as this judge.

I agree with the verdict about (15b) and (16b), but (15a) and (16a) strike me as acceptable in conversation, e.g.:

A: Who is John?

B: Some judge.

A: Who is John?

B: John is this judge.

But even if we agreed with Szabó's verdict that (15a-b) and (16a-b) are all marked, these data would not provide much support for the claim that the compound 'as a judge' is a secondary predicate. To see this consider expressions which are typically taken to saturate argument places in a predicate, e.g. the kinds of *for*-phrases used to specify the comparison class of a gradable adjective. Such *for*-phrases would appear to pattern the same way.⁶ Compare the following minimal pairs:

- (17) a. Bob is a basketball player.
 b. Bob is tall for a basketball player.
- (18) a. Those people are basketball players.

⁶Note that *for*-phrases, unlike *as*-phrases, do not always combine well with definite descriptions. While 'John is corrupt as the referee of his football club' sounds fine, 'John is tall for the oldest basketball player on his team' is perhaps odd. However, it is doubtful that this is a syntactic issue since depending on how well we understand what situation is being described, such sentences can improve. For instance if John is playing in the league of people aged 70+, and, moreover, people shrink rapidly with age (so that John's height is surprising), an utterance of 'John is tall for the oldest basketball player on his team' might sound fine.

- b. Those people are tall for basketball players.
- (19) a. *Bob is some basketball player.
b. *Bob is tall for some basketball player.
- (20) a. *Bob is this basketball player.
b. *Bob is tall for this basketball player.

Syntactically, *for*-phrases would appear to pattern the same way as *as*-phrases here. Yet, as far as I'm aware, there are no analyses of *for*-phrases in terms of secondary predication.⁷ This suggests that these data are not probative with respect to the question of whether qualifying phrases are secondary predicates.

The second piece of evidence presented by Szabó is that the particle 'as' would appear to indicate predication in examples like this:

- (21) I regard John as an idiot.

But the use of 'as' here is not the one central to our study. To see this, observe that we cannot felicitously substitute 'qua' for 'as a' in (21) as illustrated by (22):

- (22) *I regard John qua idiot.

But the 'as' of qualifying phrases aligns with the 'qua' of qualifying phrases, e.g. it is both fine to say 'John is corrupt as a judge' and 'John is corrupt qua judge'.⁸ Whatever sentences like (21) show, they do not bear on the question of whether genuine qualifying phrases are secondary predicates.

The third piece of evidence presented by Szabó is that qualifying phrases can give rise to an ambiguity between subject and object oriented readings which would be expected if qualifying phrases were secondary predicates. Consider (23):

⁷The point is not easily proved, especially since 'secondary predication' is usually not explicitly defined. Still, to provide some support, notice that an analysis of *for*-phrases in terms of secondary predication isn't mentioned in seminal work on gradable adjectives such as Kamp (1975), Klein (1980) or Kennedy (1999, 2007) or survey articles like Kennedy (2012). Equally, the hypothesis that secondary predication might be of use in understanding comparatives is not mentioned in survey articles on secondary predication such as Rothstein (2005).

⁸Admittedly, in substituting 'qua' for 'as' we have to drop the indefinite article 'a' to get a grammatical construction. It is worth flagging though that in languages closely related to English such as German, French or Spanish, there is no indefinite article to drop. We have 'als Richter', 'comme juge', 'como juez' respectively.

(23) John met Mary drunk.

(23) is two-way ambiguous between a reading on which John is drunk and a reading where Mary is drunk. According to Szabó, the availability is explained syntactically by the different positions ‘drunk’ can take within the verb phrase (Szabó, 2003, p.336).⁹ Szabó observes that qualifications can be similarly ambiguous. Consider (24):¹⁰

(24) John met Mary as a reporter.

(24) is ambiguous between a reading on which John met Mary in John’s capacity as reporter and one on which John met Mary in Mary’s capacity as a reporter. If qualifying phrases were secondary predicates, the ambiguity would have a natural explanation.

However, the availability of an ambiguity between a subject oriented and an object oriented reading of (24) once more fails to distinguish between secondary predicates and expressions saturating arguments in a predicate like the *for*-phrases used to specify gradable adjectives. For arguably we get the same kind of ambiguity in certain constructions with *for*-phrases. Consider (25):

(25) John admires Mary quite a bit for a doctor.

To my ear, (25) has both a reading on which John is a doctor admiring Mary more than other doctors admire Mary *and* a reading on which Mary is a doctor whom

⁹Szabó distinguishes the following two analyses of (23).

(23) John met Mary drunk.

- a. John[[met Mary]_{V'}[drunk]_{AP}]_{VP}
- b. John[[met Mary [drunk]_{AP}]_{V'}]_{VP}

It is not entirely clear to me how the different readings are secured given these different forms.

¹⁰Note that (24) also has a natural copula-reading which can be brought out by paraphrases like ‘John met Mary when he was a reporter’, or ‘John met Mary when she was a reporter’. This use is not the one of interest to this investigation. But (24) also has the intended reading on which the meeting takes place in John or Mary’s capacity as a reporter. Another good example would be: ‘John disapproves of Jack as a father’, which has a reading on which John disapproves of Jack in John’s capacity as a father, and one where John disapproves of Jack in Jack’s capacity as a father.

John admires more than John admires other doctors. This suggests that in the right sorts of constructions, *for*-phrases, too, can give rise to the sort of ambiguity highlighted by Szabó. But again, as far as I know, *for*-phrases are not analysed as secondary predicates. And so the presence of the relevant kind of ambiguity in qua-qualifications like (24) provides limited support for the hypothesis that qualifying phrases are secondary predicates.

I have argued that the three pieces of evidence presented by Szabó do not show that qualifying phrases are secondary predicates. I now want to argue that there is, in addition, countervailing evidence regarding this hypothesis.

4.2.2 Countervailing Evidence

The first disanalogy between qua-qualifications and secondary predication is that secondary predication tends to be infelicitous when the secondary predicate denotes an individual-level concept (see Rapoport 1991, McNally 1993, Kratzer 1995). Consider the contrast between (26a) and (26b):

- (26) a. John played the piano drunk.
b. *John played the piano talented.

If *as*-phrases were secondary predicates, we'd expect (27b) to sound considerably worse than (27a):

- (27) a. John is corrupt as a temporary employee.
b. John is corrupt as a person.

But that's simply not the case. Secondly, to be felicitous qualifying phrases would appear to *require* a nominal expression to combine with. While (28a) and (29a) are grammatical, (28b) and (29b) are not.¹¹

- (28) a. John is happy as a 6ft tall person.

¹¹Once more, *as*-phrases pattern with *for*-phrases here. While 'John is poor for upperclass' is ungrammatical, 'John is poor for someone upperclass' is grammatical.

- b. *John is happy as 6ft tall.
- (29) a. John is considerate as a tall person.
b. *John is considerate as tall.

By contrast, (30a-d) suggest that secondary predication is entirely felicitous when the secondary predicate is not a nominal expression:

- (30) a. John drove the car drunk.
b. We ate the soup cold.
c. John wiped the table clean.
d. Mary left the dinner party hungry.

That secondary predicates do not require the secondary predicate to be a nominal expression is an important syntactic difference from qua-qualifications.

Let me sum up. The data presented in this section raises some legitimate questions about Szabó's syntactic claim that qualifying phrases are secondary predicates. Szabó's positive evidence is entirely compatible with an alternative hypothesis on which qualifying phrases are syntactically analysed like the *for*-phrases specifying gradable adjectives.¹² Moreover, there are a number of disanalogies between secondary predication and qua-qualification which Szabó does not consider. While the discussion in this section won't settle the matter, it at least shows that the case *in favour of* an analysis in terms of secondary predication is a lot less compelling than Szabó makes it out to be.

The next two sections argue that Szabó's proposal is unsatisfactory in two other ways: the semantic analysis of qualification in terms of state parthood does little work in securing correct semantic predictions (§4.3), and on pain of inconsistency, the theory cannot account for a range of inferential constraints on qua-qualifications (§4.4).

¹²Note that I don't advocate a *semantic* analysis of *as*-phrases in terms of comparatives. Pace King (2006), to be *F as a G* does not reduce to being *F for a G*; see ch.5 for discussion.

4.3 Extensional Adequacy

As with any semantic theory, a key question concerns extensional adequacy. Does the semantics predict all and only the true sentences to be true? The aim of this section is to argue that the proposed analysis of qua-qualification in terms of state-parthood ultimately does little work in securing correct semantic predictions.

Suppose one morning in court, John asks a witness to recount the events on the night of some crime. Back home in the evening, John asks his son how school was. Intuitively, we want to say that (31) is true as uttered on the former occasion while being false as uttered on the latter occasion.

(31) John asked a question as a judge.

Or take again the case where John is both a judge and the referee of his football club, and suppose John has on occasion accepted bribes in exchange for legal favours, but has never accepted a bribe in exchange for partiality in a football game. In such a case, we'd want (32) to be true and (33) to be false:

(32) John is corrupt as a judge.

(33) John is corrupt as a referee.

Does Szabó's semantics make the correct predictions in cases such as these? It'll be helpful to start out by reminding ourselves what it would take, according to Szabó's semantic analysis, for a sentence like (31) to be *false* on a given occasion of use. Simplifying slightly by omitting tense, the proposed truth-conditions are as follows:¹³

(31) John asked a question as a judge.

(31_{LF}) $\exists s_1 \exists s_2 (\text{ASKING A QUESTION } (s_1) \wedge \text{IN } (\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \text{JUDGE } (s_2) \wedge \text{IN } (\text{John}, s_2) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2)$

¹³For discussion of tense in event semantics see Parsons (1990, chapters 9 and 11).

Consequently, for an utterance of (31) to be false on a given occasion of use one of the following would have to be the case:

- (i) John is in no state of asking a question on that occasion.
- (ii) John is in no state of being a judge on that occasion.
- (iii) John is both in a state of asking a question and in a state of being a judge on the occasion, but none of the former states are a part of any of the latter states.

To assess whether the theory makes the right predictions in a given case, one would then need a clearer sense of what it takes for an individual to be in a state of being *F* (for different *F*) and under what conditions one state is part of another.

Szabó's explicit remarks on the matter do not give us much by way of detail. There are only two passages in which he comments on how the background theory of states and state parthood is to be understood. First, commenting on structural features of the background mereology of states, Szabó (2003, p.340) writes:

I assume a mereology of events and states. (For any number of events and states there is an event or state that contains all of them as parts and is part of anything that contains all of them as parts.) Footnote: for more on the mereology of events and states I am assuming here, see Link (1987).

Secondly, commenting on the intended interpretation of the parthood relation, Szabó (2003, p.337) writes:

This is the ordinary notion [of parthood], the one we employ when we say things like 'My toothache was but a small part of my misery' or 'Danton's execution was a fateful part of the Jacobin terror'. This notion is stronger than temporal inclusion. Not everything that happened during the Jacobin terror was part of that bloodbath. Similarly, not everything that happened during John's being a judge was part of his being a judge. For example, raising a question with his son was not.

In what follows I'll unpack the assumed background theory of states to argue that ultimately it is *not* the parthood relation between states which bears the brunt of

the semantic work. Instead, to be extensionally adequate the theory must make use of a primitive notion of a state of being G . The main semantic work is done by this primitive and not by the parthood relation between states. As we will see in §4.4, this, in turn will cause problems for the project of giving purely structural explanations of the inferential profile of qua-qualifications.

4.3.1 Background Theory of States

The background theory of states assumed by Szabó is that of Godehard Link (1987).¹⁴

We let a state space \mathcal{S} be an ordered pair $\langle S, \leq \rangle$, where S is a non-empty set, intuitively the set of states, and \leq is a partial order on S , i.e. a reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric relation on S , intuitively the parthood relation. A strict partial order $<$ (proper parthood) can be defined in terms of \leq as follows: $s < s'$ iff $s \leq s'$ and $s \neq s'$.

In line with Link (1987), we impose some constraints on state spaces. An *upper bound* s of $T \subseteq S$ is a state such that for every $t \in T$, $t \leq s$. A *least upper bound* s of $T \subseteq S$ is an upper bound of T such that $s \leq s'$ for every upper bound s' of T . We require that the state space is *complete* in the sense that every subset $T \subseteq S$ has a least upper bound. Notice that the least upper bound of any $T \subseteq S$ is unique. For suppose s, s' are least upper bounds of $T \subseteq S$. Then $s \leq s'$ and $s' \leq s$, and

¹⁴I'm going to deviate from Link's presentation in three ways: First, the state space described by Link is a Boolean Algebra, so unlike the structures of classical mereology, it has a null state. Since such a null state will do no work here, the state space described here does not have one. This is a harmless simplification since a result going back to Tarski (1935, note 4) establishes that every complete Boolean Algebra is a classical mereology with the null state removed (see Hovda 2009, p.72; Varzi 2016, §4.4). Secondly, Link's is an algebra of *events*, but in line with my comments above (p.101, note 3) I'll gloss over the difference between states and events and will work with a single category: states. Finally, the frames for event semantics which Link (1987) studies are actually nine-tuples, including a set of individuals, a set of events, a set of times as well as various specifications and trace functions needed to capture the detailed "subatomic" content Neo-Davidsonians like Higginbotham (1983) or Parsons (1990) attempt to capture, e.g. the time, location and duration of the event as well as various other specifications. For our purposes focusing on the state space is sufficient.

so by the antisymmetry of parthood, $s = s'$. Call the least upper bound of a set $T \subseteq S$ the *fusion* of T , denoted by $\sqcup T$, where this abbreviates $t_1 \sqcup t_2 \sqcup \dots$ (We thus recover Szabó's assumption in the first quote that fusion is universal.) Notice that if every subset of S has a fusion, then there'll be fusions of states which are intuitively incompatible, e.g. the fusion of my sitting and my not sitting. Thus not all states in S will be possible states.¹⁵ Finally, let an atom be a state $a \in S$ such that for no $s \in S$, $s < a$. We assume that the state space is *atomistic* in the sense that every $s \in S$ is the fusion of a set of atoms.

A formal structure of this kind imposes structural constraints on the mereology of states, but doesn't tell us about more substantive assumptions, e.g. what the atoms are, and Link (1987) does not provide much detail either. However Link does refer to his earlier work on mereologies of individuals (see Link, 1983), as well as various extensions of the framework to events as proposed by Hinrichs (1985), Bach (1986), and Krifka (1987), and these writings offer a bit more guidance on such questions.

Link (1983) distinguishes between a mereology of individuals and a mereology of their underlying portions of matter (Link, 1983, §1.1). In the mereology of individuals, things like me, my arm, my left little toe etc. are all atoms. Thus my arm is *not* a part of me, though my arm *is* a part of my arm fused with my foot, my arm fused with my body or my arms (taken plurally). On the other hand, there is a mereology of matter. There is the matter making up my body and the matter making up my arm. And while my arm is not a part of my body in the mereology of individuals, the portion of matter making up my arm *is* a part of the portion of matter making up my body in the mereology of matter. Bach (1986), picking up on this idea, distinguishes between a mereology of events

¹⁵This suggests that the existential quantifiers used to state the truth-conditions must be restricted quantifiers, the restriction being to states obtaining on the occasion of use. Else the theory would predict 'John is a non-judge as a judge' to be true, given that there is the fusion of John's being a judge and John's being a non-judge which has John's being a non-judge as a part.

and a mereology of their underlying processes. Consider for instance a serve in tennis. On Bach's view, serving, raising one's arm, throwing the ball into the air, hitting the ball etc. are all atomic events. Thus someone's raising their arm for a serve is *not* a part of their serving (since raising the arm is itself an atomic event), though it *is* a part of their serving fused with their scoring a point, their serving fused with their walking off the court etc. However, there are also the underlying processes. And the process underlying one's raising one's arm is a part of the process underlying one's serving in the mereology of processes.

On this way of thinking about the mereology of individuals and events, we'd expect states such as John's asking a question, John's being a father or John's being a judge to be atomic states. Since Szabó explicitly references this body of work, it is safe to assume that Szabó shares the main outlook of the framework, though ultimately nothing will hinge on this assumption. These atomic states can then be fused together to compound states such as [John's being a father \sqcup John's asking a question] or [John's being a father \sqcup John's being a judge]. Since the state space is atomistic, all states are either atoms or derived from atoms by fusion. We can remain neutral as regards the nature of such atomic states, though a natural view familiar from situation theory would be to say that atomic states are what Armstrong (1978a) calls 'thick particulars', i.e. individuals instantiating properties.¹⁶

4.3.2 Parthood and Predictions

In view of this background theory, Szabó's semantic analysis generates commitments regarding the interpretation of some of its central notions. Consider

¹⁶See Barwise & Perry (1983), Kratzer (2012) and Elbourne (2013) for this way of thinking of atomic states/situations. To rule out that states like [a's being *F* or *G*] or [a's being if *F* then *G*] count as atomic, one might have to restrict the atomic states to the states of an individual instantiating *basic* properties in some suitable sense. Parsons (1990, p.22) says that such complex events do not exist, and Barwise & Perry (1983) would presumably say that there are no *actual* situations of this sort, only abstract situations. Overall, the issue is not discussed much by eventuality theorists.


again the proposed truth-conditions for (31):

(31) John asked a question as a judge.

(31_{LF}) $\exists s_1 \exists s_2 (\text{ASKING A QUESTION } (s_1) \wedge \text{IN } (\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \text{JUDGE } (s_2) \wedge \text{IN } (\text{John}, s_2) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2)$

We want (31) to be true as uttered on the occasion where John asks the witness about the night of the crime. And we want (31) to be false as uttered on the occasion where John asks his son about school. But on a naive way of understanding core notions such as ‘a state of being a judge’ it is hard to see how the semantic analysis is meant to secure these predictions.

To see this, start out by considering the case where John asks his son about school. Since, at the time at which he asks his son about school, John is a judge and a father and John asks a question, it is natural to assume that there exist at least the following three states: John’s asking a question, John’s being a judge and John’s being a father, abbreviated as ‘Asking’, ‘Judge’ and ‘Father’ respectively. To fix ideas, I’ll assume that these are atomic states, though ultimately my argument here does not depend on this assumption. Given the assumed universality of fusion, we also have the compound states to which the atoms fuse. Thus we get a partially ordered subset of S which can be represented in diagram form as follows (reflexive paths are omitted):



Here the atomic state of John’s asking a question is a part of the following four states:

s_a : John's asking a question.

s_{aj} : John's asking a question \sqcup John's being a judge

s_{af} : John's asking a question \sqcup John's being a father

s_{ajf} : John's asking a question \sqcup John's being a judge \sqcup John's being a father.

This much is dictated by the background mereology assumed by Szabó. But then it is unclear why (31) should come out false as uttered on the occasion where John asks his son about school. After all, since John is a judge and asks a question there is a state of John's being a judge including a state of John's asking a question. So (31) should be true on Szabó's proposed theory.

Notice that the problem would arise even if we hadn't assumed that John's asking a question, John's being a father or John's being a judge are atomic states. That is, even if these states were themselves compounds of more basic states, we'd still get their fusions. And so we'd still get that on the occasion on which John asks his son about school, there is a state of being a judge including a state of asking a question so that (31) is predicted to be true.

Indeed the issue is general. A good theory of qualification should avoid the result that being F and being G is sufficient for being F as a G . That John is a judge and a father does not make it the case that John is a judge as a father or a father as a judge. But given the background mereology, there will be states like the fusion of John's being a father and John's being a judge. If these count as states of being a judge or a father, both 'John is a judge as a father' and 'John is a father as a judge' are predicted to be true on Szabó's semantic analysis. Thus for the theory not to overgenerate massively, states like the fusion of John's being a judge and John's being a father cannot count as states of being a judge or a father respectively.

Three lines of response come to mind.

- One could deny the universality of fusion after all.
- One could deny that there are any states of John's being a judge on the occasion at which John asks his son about school.

- One could deny the generalisation that states *including* states of being a judge are *themselves* states of being a judge.

I shall argue that the first two lines of response are not promising and that for the third to work properly we must rely on a new primitive, the notion of being a *G*-state, e.g. a judge-state, a father-state etc., where this primitive bears the brunt of the semantic work.

The first line of denying the universality of fusion is not promising. To begin with, for the resultant theory of qualification not to be entirely uninformative, the denial of the universality of fusion had better be accompanied by some other principle telling us which compound states exist, a principle of *restricted fusion*. Absent such a principle, there would be no guarantee that there exist *any* states other than the atomic states. But then unless one thought that in every true qualification of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as a } G \urcorner$, a 's *F*-state = a 's *G*-state, the theory would simply not say whether a given qualification is true. Relatedly, it is doubtful that any principle of restricted fusion would rule out the existence of the states posing the problem here. The motivation for denying universality usually stems from not wanting to countenance "weird" objects, e.g. the infamous trout-turkey. Equally, in the realm of states, the idea would presumably be to deny the existence of weird states like [my being in Moscow \sqcup the Queen's having toast for breakfast]. But none of the states we're concerned with here are weird in that way. All we need for the above problem to arise is that if there is a state of John's being a judge and a state of John's asking a question, then there is the state [John's being a judge \sqcup of John's asking a question]. But it is doubtful that even a theory of restricted fusion would rule out such states. So even if one were to deny the universality of fusion, the above problem could still be expected to arise.

The second line of response is to deny that any states of being a judge exist when John is asking his son about school; it is not promising either. Suppose, in the evening after work, John finishes up some paperwork while talking to

his son. We can imagine that at the very same time as he signs the approval of a search warrant, he asks his son about school. Intuitively, in this case (31) is still false, though (34) is true:

(31) John asked a question as a judge.

(34) John approved the warrant as a judge.

But on Szabó's theory, (34) is true as uttered on this occasion only if there exists on that occasion at least one state in which John is a judge. Call it s_j . Given that John is asking a question, there is also the state of John's asking a question (s_a). Finally, there is their fusion (s_{aj}). If s_{aj} is a state of being a judge, we'd again get that (31) is true as used on this occasion, when intuitively it isn't. So the second response is no good either.

That leaves the third line of response of denying the principle that if s is a state of being F then for any s' , $s \sqcup s'$ is a state of being F . Given Szabó's earlier denial of the persistence of predication in qualified predications, this response would not be unmotivated. However, the problem with this line of response is that it would weaken the theory to such an extent that it would fail to make any predictions about (31), regardless of the occasion on which it is uttered. Both on the occasion where John asks his son about school and on the occasion where John asks the witness about the night of the crime, (31) would not be predicted to be true. Nor would it be predicted to be false. Absent a different principle for when a compound state including a state of being G is itself a state of being G , the theory would simply fail to make predictions about whether a qua-qualification like (31) is true or not.

To avoid stripping the theory of all predictive power, one would then have to say more about what it takes for a given state to be a state of being G . It is here, that Szabó is likely to need a new primitive. For none of a range of initially plausible necessary conditions for a state being a state of being G are plausible.

It cannot be that only atomic states of being *G* are states of being *G*. For atomic states only have themselves as a part. But then (31) would wrongly be predicted to be false as uttered on the occasion where John questions the witness in court. For the only judge states existing on that occasion would be atomic states of John's being a judge which do not include states of asking a question.

Neither can it be that only states in which John is *in court* are states of being a judge. For then (34) will come out false in the case in which John signs the warrant at home while talking to his son. Nor can it be that only states in which John *enacts the official role* of a judge are states of being a judge. For suppose that in a cigarette break, John gives away insider information about a trial in exchange for a bribe. Doing so is certainly not enacting the official role of a judge, so being in such a state would then not count as a state of being a judge. But presumably being in such a state would be sufficient for (32) (repeated below) to be true:

(32) John is corrupt as a judge.

But if only states in which John *enacts the official role* of a judge are states of being a judge, (32) as uttered on the envisaged occasion would be false on Szabó's analysis.

As already indicated, the best response is probably to help oneself to a primitive. Some states are judge-states, others are not. Some states are father-states, others are not. We may not be able to provide explicit necessary (and jointly sufficient) conditions for when something is a judge-state in the relevant sense. But we have the competence of distinguishing judge-states from other states. For instance, a judge's approving a warrant, a judge's questioning a witness and a judge's giving away insider information are all judge-states. But a judge's asking their son about school or a judge's fixing themselves a cup of tea are not judge-states in the relevant sense.

Helping oneself to such a primitive, one would get the right verdicts. The reason why (31) is true in the case where John asks the witness to recount the

events on the night of the crime is that in this case the fusion of John's asking a question and John's being a judge is intuitively a judge-state of John's. Since this state contains a questioning-asking state of John's, (31) is true. The reason why (31) is false in the case where John asks his son about school is that the fusion of John's asking a question and John's being a judge is intuitively not a judge-state of John's. Finally, (34) is true on the occasion where John signs the warrant while talking to his son about school. For the fusion of John's being a judge and John's signing the warrant intuitively *is* a judge-state of John's. Since this state contains a state of John's signing a warrant, (34) is true.

While this way of developing the theory reconciles the extensional adequacy of Szabó's semantic analysis with the assumed background theory of states, it also brings out that what is doing the work in the proposed semantic analysis of qualification is *not* the parthood relation. The case where John asks the witness a question and the case where John asks his son a question do *not* differ with respect to which states are parts of which, and indeed it is difficult to see how they could differ in parthood given the background theory of states. Instead, what is doing the work in securing the correct semantic predictions is the primitive of being one of *a*'s *G*-states which has us classify asking the witness about a crime but not asking the son about school as a judge-state of John's. And this in turn suggests that, *pace* Szabó (2003, p.335), the principal task for the semantics of qua-qualification is *not* exhausted by specifying the relation between qualified and qualifying clauses.

Let me take stock. The aim of this section was to argue that the proposed analysis of qua-qualification in terms of state-parthood ultimately does little work in securing correct semantic predictions. I have presented the background mereology of states assumed by Szabó, and I have argued that given this background theory, Szabó's proposed semantic analysis of qualification struggles to avoid that being *F* and *G* is sufficient for being *F* as a *G*.

To ensure that his theory makes the correct semantic predictions, Szabó must

help himself to a particular way of understanding the notion of a state of being G , where instantiating G in a state (or in a part of a state) is not sufficient for such a state being one of one's G -states in the relevant sense. The the semantic work in Szabó's analysis is then not done by the parthood relation between states, but rather by substantive assumptions about the states themselves.

This conclusion not only undermines the overall vision underlying Szabó's account according to which qua-qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$ denote relations between states in which one is F and G respectively. As the next section shows, it also diminishes the prospects of Szabó's ambition of explaining the inferential profile of qua-qualifications in purely structural terms.

4.4 Inferential Profile

According to Szabó, a key strength of his proposed semantic analysis is its ability to "account for systematic patterns of entailment at the level of logical form" (Szabó, 2003, p.335). This section argues that the theory does not in fact possess this feature. To avoid false semantic predictions and inconsistencies, Szabó has to weaken his theory in a way which makes it useless for the purpose of deriving even simple inferential constraints on qua-qualifications.

4.4.1 Blocked entailments, good and bad

Recall the goals Szabó sets for a successful theory of qualification. First, it should explain why (1) does not entail (2).

- (1) John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.
- (2) John makes exactly £150,000.

Second, it should explain why (1) and (3) (together with suitable auxiliary premises), entail (4):

- (1) John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.
- (3) John makes exactly £10,000 as a referee.
- (4) John makes exactly £160,000.

Finally, it should explain why (1) entails (5):

- (5) John is a judge.

But it can easily be shown that Szabó's claim that "qualified predication within a qua-sentence cannot be persistent" (Szabó, 2003, p.337) blocks wanted and unwanted entailments alike.

Start out with the entailment from (1) to (5). This is an instance of a principle which I call **Factivity**:

Factivity: If a is F as a G , a is G .

According to Szabó it is a feature of the account that it captures this sort of entailment in purely structural terms. If the logical forms of (1) and (5) are (1_{LF}) and (5_{LF^*}) respectively, (5) follows from (1) by conjunction elimination.

- $$(1_{LF}) \quad \exists s_1 \exists s_2 (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-}\pounds 150,000 (s_1) \wedge \text{IN} (\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \text{JUDGE} (s_2) \wedge \text{IN} (\text{John}, s_2) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2)$$
- $$(5_{LF^*}) \quad \exists s_2 (\text{JUDGE} (s_2) \wedge \text{IN} (\text{John}, s_2))$$

But now recall that according to Szabó the default interpretation of many unqualified predications is a *persistent* one. Consider again (11).

- (11) Mary is happy.

According to Szabó, to say that Mary is happy is not just say that there is *some* state of Mary's being happy, but rather that Mary is happy in her overall state. On this sort of view, we'd expect the default interpretation of the unqualified predication in (5) being a persistent interpretation, too. After all, to say that John is a judge is not just to say that John is in *some* state of being a judge, but that John

is a judge in his overall state.¹⁷ But then, the logical form of (5) is not given by (5_{LF*}) as assumed above. Instead, it would include a persistence clause as in (5_{LF}):

$$(5_{LF}) \exists s_2(\text{JUDGE}(s_2) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_2) \wedge \forall s'(\text{IN}(\text{John}, s') \wedge s_2 \leq s') \rightarrow (\text{JUDGE}(s'))))$$

But (5_{LF}) does not follow from (1_{LF}). If these are the correct logical forms of (1) and (5), we'd get that (1) does not entail (5). Szabó's strategy for blocking the bad entailment has the consequence that the good entailment is blocked as well.

It would of course be open to Szabó to build in by hand a persistence clause for the secondary predicate, thereby forcing the entailment from (1) to (5) to go through. The logical form of sentences like (1) would then look as follows:

$$(1_{LF+}) \exists s_1 \exists s_2(\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-}\pounds 150,000(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \text{JUDGE}(s_2) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_2) \wedge \forall s'(((\text{IN}(\text{John}, s') \wedge s_2 \leq s') \rightarrow (\text{JUDGE}(s')))) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2)$$

This would get the job done. Szabó could then modify his principle to say that while the *primary* predication in a qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$ is *never* persistent, the *secondary* predication in such a qualification is *always* persistent.

But the response is *ad hoc*, and amounts to stipulating rather than explaining principles like **Factivity**. It is also not clear that the generalisation on which it relies holds. To see this consider the asymmetry between on the one hand intuitively good inferences from qualified to unqualified predication, e.g. from (32) to (35), and intuitively bad inference on the other hand e.g. from (36) to (37):

(32) John is corrupt as a judge.

(35) John is corrupt.

(36) John is uncorrupt as a judge.

¹⁷Note that even if one thought that the default interpretation of the predicate 'judge' is not a persistent one, this would not yet show that **Factivity** holds in general. So long as for some instances of the schema $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as a } G \urcorner$ the default interpretation of 'is *G*' is a persistent one, the principle would have counterexamples. However, as I argue in detail in ch.5, this principle is desirable to validate for standard linguistic environments, i.e. barring opaque contexts, fictional discourse and contexts of diverted use.

(37) John is uncorrupt.

If the primary predication in a qualification were never persistent, the first inference should be just as bad as the second. But the first inference is quite reasonable. It is difficult to see how this asymmetry could be accounted for *independently of the meanings* of the respective predicates. That there should be a purely structural explanation of such an asymmetry is unlikely. For instance, the hypothesis that *negated* predicates never persist has little merit. For consider the contrast between the inferences from (38) to (39) and from (40) to (41) respectively:

(38) John is dishonest as a judge.

(39) John is dishonest.

(40) John is honest as a judge.

(41) John is honest.

The first inference strikes me as considerably better than the second. If this is right, it would be the negated predicate ('dishonest') which persists up in this case. Observations such as these bring out how difficult it is to account for the inferential profile of qua-qualifications in purely structural terms, independently of the meanings of the predicates occurring in a given instant.

Szabó's theory is pulling in two opposite directions. The Neo-Davidsonian program is to capture a range of inferences at the level of logical form. Since some of these inferences are troublesome and lead to inconsistencies, Szabó weakens the theory to block such inferences. However, by doing so he also blocks the inferences he initially set out to capture.

The same issues beset the inference from (1) and (3) to (4).

(1) John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.

(3) John makes exactly £10,000 as a referee.

(4) John makes exactly £160,000.

Given suitable auxiliary assumptions, (1) and (3) would indeed appear to entail (4). But given Szabó's ban on persistence in qua-qualifications, it is difficult to see how we'd get that result. Given the denial of persistence, Szabó's theory will have models where on a given occasion of use John is (i) in a state s_1 of making exactly £150,000 (contained in a state of being a judge s_2), (ii) in a state s_3 of making exactly £10,000 (contained in a state of being a referee s_4) but (iii) in no state of making exactly £160,000. Since (4) could be false even when (1) and (3) (and the relevant auxiliary assumptions) are true, (1) and (3) do not entail (4) (given the auxiliary assumptions). Just as before, in order to block the bad inference from (1) to (2), Szabó has to block the good inference from (1) and (3) to (4).

4.4.2 A Final Amendment

Szabó himself isn't entirely satisfied with the blanket ban on persistence in qualified predication. He points out that, as stated, his theory struggles with cases such as the following:¹⁸

Two Towns. John is judge in towns A and B and has no other jobs besides these. In town A he earns £150,000 as a judge, in town B he earns £170,000 as a judge.

Intuitively in this case (42) is true. But according to Szabó, his semantics wrongly predicts (43) to be true.

(42) John makes exactly £320,000 as a judge.

(43) John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.

Szabó observes:

In this case [(43)] is false—John earns [£320,000] as a judge. It is, however, true that John is in a state of earning [£150,000]—any of his states to which 'judge in A' applies but 'judge in B' does not will do. Such a state is of course also a state of being a judge and a part of itself. Consequently, (43) is true.

¹⁸In Szabó's example the judge makes a mere £50,000 in town A and £70,000 in town B. I have increased the numbers to be a bit more realistic.

Szabó (2003, p.337)

Szabó assumes that John's state of making £150,000 in town A, call it s_A , is one of John's judge states. This is not beyond doubt, but let's grant him the assumption. Since any state is a part of itself, s_A has a state of making £150,000 as a part, and so (43) comes out true according to Szabó.

Szabó is mainly worried about the theory making the wrong semantic prediction in this case. What he does not discuss is the fact that by parity of reasoning, we'd also get (44) come out true in this case:

(44) John makes exactly £170,000 as a judge.

For we'd then also say that John's state of making £170,000 in town B, call it s_B , is one of John's judge states. Since any state is a part of itself, s_B has a state of making £170,000 as a part, and so (44) comes out true. But given that $170,000 \neq 150,000$, we'd get (45) which contradicts (43):

(45) It is not the case that John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.

While his ban on persistence avoided the theory predicting both 'John makes exactly £150,000' and 'John does not make exactly £150,000' to be true, Szabó would now appear to face the following revenge: we have both 'John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge' and 'John does not make exactly £150,000 as a judge' come out true.

In view of **Two Towns**, Szabó proposes a final amendment to his proposed semantic analysis which does away with the blanket ban on persistence. According to Szabó some predications are *defeasibly* persistent. Such predications have what Szabó calls a *qualified persistence clause*. To say that John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge is to say that John is in a state of making exactly £150,000 which is such that: either any extension of it is a state of making exactly £150,000 or a contextually salient alternative to being G applies. Where ' $ALT_c(G)$ ' is a

function selecting contextually salient alternatives to being G relative to a context of utterance c , we get the following mouthfull:¹⁹

(46) John makes exactly £150,000 as a judge.

(46_{LF}) $\exists s_1 \exists s_2 (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-£150,000}(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_1) \wedge \text{JUDGE}(s_2) \wedge \text{IN}(\text{John}, s_2) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2 \wedge \forall s' ((\text{IN}(\text{John}, s') \wedge s_1 \leq s') \rightarrow (\text{MAKES-EXACTLY-£150,000}(s') \vee \text{ALT}_c(\text{judge})(s'))))$.

John is in a state s_1 of making £150,000 and John is in a state s_2 of being a judge such that s_1 is a part of s_2 , and every extension of s_1 is such that either it is itself a state of making exactly £150,000, or some contextually salient alternative to being a judge applies to s' .

In **Two Towns**, (43) is then meant to come out false for the following reason: when we are focused on John's being a judge, being a judge from town A/B is not a contextually relevant alternative to being a judge. So for (43) to come out true, it would have to be the case that John's overall state at the time is a state of making exactly £150,000, which is false, since the overall state is a state of making exactly £320,000. For the same reason, the amended proposal would avoid the result that (44) comes out true, blocking the revenge outlined above.

The function ALT_c is a bit of a blackbox here and it is difficult to see how one could say something more systematic about when such a function selects alternatives and when it doesn't. This, in turn, poses the risk of relegating the crucial ingredient in an explanation of the inferential profile of qualifications to the wastebasket of pragmatics, further undermining Szabó's ambition of "accounting for systematic patterns of entailments at the level of logical form" (Szabó, 2003, p.335).

It should also be flagged that the revised analysis is at least *compatible* with the primary predicate persisting up to the overall state in cases where there is a contextually salient alternative to being G in which case we'd again get

¹⁹From what Szabó says it is not clear whether $\text{ALT}_c(X)$ is a partial function, i.e. a function which is not defined for certain contexts, or whether it is a total function which maps some contexts to the empty set.

inconsistencies. For instance, it is not entirely implausible that (32) and (36) (repeated below) could be considered in a single context; imagine, for instance, a group of people assessing John's character, weighing different pieces of evidence.

(32) John is corrupt as a judge.

(36) John is uncorrupt as a referee.

Further, it is plausible that in such a context there would be a salient alternative to being a judge, namely being a referee, and that there would be a salient alternative to being a referee, namely being a judge. Since the truth of a disjunction is compatible with both disjuncts being true, the qualified persistence clause *does not rule out* that both being corrupt and being uncorrupt persist up to the overall state in such a context. But then the semantics does not rule out that 'John is corrupt and John is uncorrupt' could come out true in such a context. But a good theory of qualification should rule this out.

Finally, neither the initial nor the amended semantic analysis secures the entailment from (1) and (3) to (4) or from (43) and (44) to (42). What the revised proposal achieves is merely *making room* for (4) or (42) being true. But a good theory of qualification should be able to capture that (given suitable auxiliary assumptions) (4) is a consequence of (1) and (3) and that (40) is a consequence of (41) and (42). The revised proposal does not improve the theory in this regard; Szabó still blocks good and bad inferences alike.²⁰

²⁰My own view is that in the specific case of making money it would have been more natural to pursue a different strategy than denying the persistence of qualified predication. In this example, the problem clearly is the qualifier 'exactly'. To get the result that in his overall state, John makes exactly £160,000, we need the following predications to persist up to that state: John makes £150,000 and John makes £10,000. For then in his overall state, John makes £150,000 + £10,000 = £160,000. What we don't want to persist up are the properties of making *exactly* £80,000 and making *exactly* £10,000. But this is a general problem in situation theory (discussed for instance by Barwise & Perry 1983, p.147 and Kratzer 2012, p.113) which has to do with the interpretation of quantifiers in situation theory. To illustrate, consider the state of me being in a forest with exactly 100 trees. This state seems to have states as parts such as the following: the state consisting of me and exactly one tree, the state consisting of me and exactly two trees, ..., the state consisting of me and exactly 100 trees. Clearly, if we thought that there being exactly n trees and there being exactly k trees persisted up (for $n \neq k$), we'd get the same contradiction of there being both exactly

4.4.3 Further inferences

Szabó (2003, p.339) claims that his proposed semantic theory is able to derive inferential constraints other people in the literature (like Landman 1989, §3.4) simply stipulate for themselves.²¹ In particular, he argues that his theory validates the following principles:

- a. If John is a judge, John as a judge is John.
- b. If John is a judge, John as a judge is a judge.
- c. If John as a judge is P and John as a judge is Q then John as a judge is P and Q .
- d. If John as a judge is P and P implies Q then John as a judge is Q .
- e. It is not the case that John as a judge is both P and not- P .
- f. If John is a judge, John as a judge is either P or not- P .
- g. If John as a judge is P then John is a judge.

Given Szabó's claim that *as*-phrases are *predicates*, and not subject modifiers as assumed by Landman, a more perspicuous (and more general) way of formulating these principles would be as follows:²²

Identity: If a is G , a is such that it is identical to a as a G .

Reflexivity: If a is F , a is F as an F .

Left Agglo: If a is F as a G and a is H as a G then a is (F and H) as a G .

Left Up: If a is F as a G and F implies H then a is H as a G .

Exclusivity: It is not the case that a is F as a G and a is (not- F) as a G .

n trees and there not being exactly n trees in the overall state. To avoid problems such as these, a sophisticated situation theory needs to somehow specify a domain for each situation. Arguably, Szabó could make use of similar tools saying that making exactly £150,000 as a judge is being in a state s_1 of making £150,000 which is included in a judge-state s_2 and which is such that £150,000 is all the money in s_1 . Likewise for making £10,000 as a referee. Crucially, however, this strategy does not help with qualifications without quantifiers. For instance, to avoid that 'John is corrupt as a judge and John is uncorrupt as a referee' entails 'John is corrupt and John is uncorrupt' one would still need to deny that predicates generally persist up to each state of which they are a part.

²¹For discussion of how these and other principles in the logic of qualification play out on my own view, see ch.5.

²²I've prefaced the principles **Identity**, **Reflexivity** and **Exhaustivity** with a condition that a is F/G to avoid that these principles yield bad predictions in conjunction with **Factivity**.

Cautious Exhaustivity: If a is G , a is F as a G or a is (not- F) as a G .

Factivity: If a is F as a G , a is G .

We have already seen that, as stated, Szabó's proposal would not in fact validate **Factivity**. This section considers the remaining principles. I'll highlight a range of problems with Szabó's own way of motivating these principles which build on the discussion in §4.3 and I'll argue that the only principle which does fall out of Szabó's theory, **Reflexivity**, would appear to have counterexamples.

Start out with **Exclusivity** and **Cautious Exhaustivity**.

Exclusivity: It is not the case that [a is F as a G and a is (not- F) as a G].

Cautious Exhaustivity: If a is G , a is F as a G or a is (not- F) as a G .

Exclusivity it hard to deny. While it seems possible to be F as a G and not- F as an H , it would not seem possible to be F as a G and not- F as a G , e.g. corrupt as a judge and not-corrupt as a judge. **Cautious Exhaustivity** is more doubtful in my opinion (see ch.5 for discussion), but Szabó adopts this principle. According to Szabó, these principles

follow if we make the usual assumption that Boolean connectives take wide scope with respect to the underlying quantification over events and states. For then [...] 'John as a judge is P and not- P ' has the same logical form as 'John as a judge is P and it is not the case that John as a judge is P ' and 'John as a judge is P or not- P ' has the same logical form as 'John as a judge is P or it is not the case that John as a judge is P '.

(Szabó, 2003, p.405)

If negation takes wide scope relative to the quantification over states, **Exclusivity** and **Cautious Exhaustivity** would then simply follow from the Law of Non-Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle respectively.

The problem with this motivation of the principles is that the conjecture that negation takes wide scope in sentences of the form ' a is not- F as a G ' is simply

implausible.²³ To see this, observe that on this proposal, the logical form of such sentences would then *not* be given by (NS) but rather by (WS):

$$(NS) \exists s_1 \exists s_2 (\neg F(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(s_1, a) \wedge G(s_2) \wedge \text{IN}(s_2, a) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2)$$

$$(WS) \neg \exists s_1 \exists s_2 (F(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(s_1, a) \wedge G(s_2) \wedge \text{IN}(s_2, a) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2)$$

But the wide-scope analysis (WS) would overgenerate massively. It would have the consequence that as long as on the occasion of use (i) *a* has no *F* states or (ii) *a* has no *G* states or (iii) none of *a*'s *F*-states are included in any of *a*'s *G*-states, '*a* is not-*F* as a *G*' is true. But it clearly isn't. Suppose Carla is a reporter and incredibly happy. Carla is so happy that she is never in any unhappy states. If the wide-scope analysis of sentences of the form '*a* is not-*F* as a *G*' were correct, we'd get 'Carla is unhappy as a reporter' come out true. But that is obviously false in the envisaged scenario. Or suppose Carla is not a smoker, so that Carla never has states of being a smoker. Then 'Carla is *F* as a smoker' would be true for random *F* on any occasion of use given (WS).²⁴ But again that is obviously the wrong verdict, e.g. 'Carla is a Malboro fan as a smoker' is not true if Carla isn't a smoker.²⁵ Szabó's argument for **Exclusivity** and **Cautious Exhaustivity** relies on the wide-scope analysis of sentences of the form '*a* is not-*F* as a *G*'. Since we have seen that this analysis is incorrect, Szabó's argument for the two principles fails.

²³I'm not sure what work Szabó referring to when he suggests that it is "the usual assumption" that the Boolean connectives take wide scope with respect to the underlying quantification. Both Higginbotham (1983, p.110f.) and Parsons (1990, p.14) would appear to be saying the opposite, though Higginbotham (1983, p.8) does suggest that other *quantifiers* take wide scope with respect to the underlying quantification over states/events.

²⁴Moreover, depending on how precisely the wide-scoping claim is understood, **Cautious Exhaustivity** and **Factivity** may be jointly inconsistent. To see this, suppose for reductio that *a* is not *G*, so that *a* has no states of being *G*. Given the wide-scope analysis, we'd get that *a* is not-*F* as a *G*. By **Factivity** we'd get that *a* is *G*. Contradiction. However, this argument relies on the assumption that sentences of the form '*a* is not-*F* as a *G*, then *a* is *G*' are genuine instances of **Factivity**—something which may be denied on certain ways of understanding the claim that negation takes wide scope in qua-qualifications at the level of LF.

²⁵As I note in ch.5, qua-qualifications of the form '*a* is *F* as/qua *G*' would appear to not only entail but also presuppose that *a* is *G*. Depending on one's views of the semantic ramifications of presupposition failure, such sentences would then be either false or neither true nor false when *a* is not *G*.

In fact, it is not clear that Szabó's theory *does* predict these principles to hold. Given our discussion in §4.3, it is difficult to see how Szabó could motivate **Cautious Exhaustivity** on the basis of the Law of Excluded Middle. To see this, suppose that a is G . We have two cases: either a is F or it is not the case that a is F .

Case 1: a is F . So there is some state of a 's being F . Moreover since a is G , there is some state of a 's being G . Given the background mereology, there is their fusion: [a 's being $F \sqcup a$'s being G] which has a 's being F as a part. But as argued in §4.3, on pain of overgeneration, Szabó must deny that this state is automatically a state of a 's being G . So there is no guarantee, given our assumptions, that there is a G -state in the relevant sense having a state of being F as a part. So it does not follow from our assumptions that ' a is F as a G ' is true. So we have no guarantee that ' a is F as a G or a is not- F as a G ' is true.

Case 2: It is not the case that a is F . So there is some state of a 's being not- F . Moreover since a is G , there is some state of being G . Given the background mereology, there is their fusion: [a 's being not- $F \sqcup a$'s being G] which has a 's being not- F as a part. But again there is simply no guarantee that this state is a G -state in the relevant sense and hence no guarantee that there is a G -state having a state of being F as a part. So it does not follow from our assumptions that ' a is not- F as a G ' is true. So we have no guarantee that ' a is F as a G or a is not- F as a G ' is true.

In both cases there is no guarantee that ' a is F as a G or a is not- F as a G ' is true. This shows that, *pace* Szabó, we cannot motivate **Cautious Exhaustivity** on the basis of Szabó's theory and the Law of Excluded Middle alone.²⁶

The prospects of motivating **Exclusivity** on the basis of the Law of Non-Contradiction look no more promising. To see this, consider what a failure of the principle would look like:

Exclusivity Failure: $\exists s_1 \exists s_2 (F(s_1) \wedge \text{IN}(s_1, a) \wedge G(s_2) \wedge \text{IN}(s_2, a) \wedge s_1 \leq s_2 \wedge \forall s' ((s_1 \leq s') \rightarrow (F(s') \vee \text{ALT}_c(G)(s'))))$

²⁶While Baxter wants this principle to be derivable from his theory, my own view is that CAUTIOUS EXHAUSTIVITY is questionable. See §5.5 for discussion.

$$\wedge \\ \exists s_3 \exists s_4 (\neg F(s_3) \wedge \text{IN}(s_3, a) \wedge G(s_4) \wedge \text{IN}(s_4, a) \wedge s_3 \leq s_4 \wedge \forall s' ((s_1 \leq s' \rightarrow (\neg F(s') \vee \text{ALT}_c(G)(s')))))$$

Since a 's overall state cannot be one of being both F and not- F at the same time, failures of **Exclusivity** are not possible in cases where there are *no* contextually salient alternatives to being G . But as already flagged above, counterexamples to **Exclusivity** are not ruled out in cases where there *are* such alternatives. For in the presence of contextual alternatives to being G , the semantic analysis is *compatible* with both being F and being not- F persisting up to the overall state at the time. For predications which don't even have the qualified persistence clause, counterexamples are even easier to come by: nothing in the theory rules out that something should be in some state s_1 of being F included in a state s_2 of being G and also be in a state s_3 of being not- F included in a state s_4 of being H . **Exclusivity** seems like a minimal constraint on any reasonable theory of qualification. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the principle can be derived on Szabó's theory.

Next consider **Left Agglo** and **Left Up**, closure under conjunction and implication respectively.

Left Agglo: If a is F as a G and a is H as a G then a is (F and H) as a G .

Left Up: If a is F as a G and F implies H then a is H as a G .

Szabó's motivation of **Left Agglo** is the same as the one offered in support of **Exclusivity** and **Cautious Exhaustivity**. He takes the Boolean connectives to take wide scope with respect to the quantification over states and concludes that the antecedent and consequent of these principles have the same logical forms (see Szabó, 2003, p.405). However, as before the wide-scoping assumption is not all that plausible. First, notice that on this assumption, we'd not only get **Left Agglo** but also **Right Agglo** (as well as their converses):

Right Agglo: If a is F as a G and a is F as an H , then a is F as a $(G$ and $H)$.

But **Right Agglo** would appear to have clear counterexamples. It could be that John asked a question as a judge and that John asked a question as a father, but that John asked no question as both a judge and a father.

Secondly, it is simply not clear that **Left Agglo** can be motivated independently. That a is in a state of being F which is included in a state of being G and that a is in a state of being H which is included in a state of being G does not guarantee that a is in a state of being $(F$ and $H)$ which is included in a state of being G . Yes, there will be the state [a 's being $F \sqcup a$'s being H] which is a part of [a 's being $F \sqcup a$'s being $H \sqcup a$'s being G]. But again for the sorts of reasons outlined in §4.3, there is no guarantee that the first is a state of being $(F$ and $H)$ and that the second is a state of being G . Consequently, there is no guarantee that a is $(F$ and $H)$ as a G . Closure under conjunction looks doubtful on Szabó's theory.

Next, consider **Left Up** for which Szabó argues as follows:

Assuming 'P implies Q' means that 'Q' applies to every event or state 'P' does, (d) is also guaranteed to be true. If John is thematically related to a P event or state that is part of a state of him being a judge, he is thereby thematically related to a Q event or state that is part of the very same state.

Szabó (2003, p.339)

The first thing to note is that if Szabó's reasoning were correct, we'd also get the troublesome **Right Up**:

Right Up: If a is F as a G and G implies H then a is F as an H .

After all, by parity of reasoning, if any state to which G applies, H applies, too, then a 's being thematically related to an F event or state that is part of a state of him being G , then a is also thematically related to an F event or state which is a part of a state of him being H . However, any reasonable theory of qualification must reject **Right Up**. For suppose John is corrupt as a judge and

John is uncorrupt as a referee, and that, moreover, both being a judge and being a referee implies being a person. Then given **Right Up** we'd be able to derive: John is corrupt as a person and John is uncorrupt as a person in violation of **Exclusivity**.²⁷ Szabó's way of motivating **Left-Up** cannot be right.

But again it is doubtful that **Left-Up** can be motivated independently on Szabó's proposed theory of qualification. That a is in a state in which it instantiates H cannot in general be sufficient for such a state being one of a 's H -states, else we'd again get the troublesome **Right Up**. So even if a is in a G -state containing an F -state, and even if that G -state is also a state in which a instantiates being H , there is no guarantee that a is in a H -state (in the relevant sense) containing an F -state, and so no guarantee that ' a is F as an H ' is true. Again, **Left Up** is not derivable in any obvious way from Szabó's theory of qualification.

Finally consider **Identity** and **Reflexivity**:

Identity: If a is G , a is such that it is identical to a as a G .

Reflexivity: If a is F , a is F as an F .

According to Szabó both these principles are trivial. **Identity** is trivial, because every state is a state of being such that one is self-identical. So if a is in some state of being G , then that state is a state of being self-identical, and since G has itself as a part, ' a is self-identical as a G ' comes out true. However, notice again the slip between (i) necessarily every state s is such that ' $\lambda x.x = x$ ' applies to a in s and (ii) every state s is one of a 's self-identity states. Since, on pain of violating **Exclusivity**, we cannot in general rely on the principle that instantiating F in s is sufficient for s being one of one's F -states, the move from (i) to (ii) is not warranted. *Pace* Szabó, **Identity** is not trivial.

Finally, turn to **Reflexivity**. On Szabó's theory, this principle would indeed appear to be trivial. For suppose a is F . Then supposedly a has at least one state

²⁷If you don't think being a judge/referee implies being a person take something like *being an entity* for H . Then we get that John is corrupt as an entity and John is uncorrupt as an entity.

which is an *F*-state in the relevant sense. But that state will be a part of itself. So '*a* is *F* as *F*' comes out true. However, it seems to me that this is a bad prediction since **Reflexivity** would appear to have counterexamples. Consider Picasso. Picasso is famous. But Picasso is not famous *as* someone famous. Picasso is famous as an artist. The problem is not that one couldn't be famous as someone famous, the Kardashians clearly are. The point is rather that Picasso isn't. However, Picasso is in a state of being famous, presumably it is even the case that every extension of that state is still a state of being famous. Since that state is a part of itself, Szabó's theory would wrongly predict that Picasso is famous as someone famous. While **Reflexivity** is the only principle in the above list for which Szabó's motivation seems correct, it is not a principle with great independent support.

Let me summarize. Szabó advertises his theory as accounting for systematic patterns of entailments at the level of logical form. However, as we have seen in §4.1 and §§4.1-4.2, Szabó must deny that predication within qua-qualifications is persistent in order to block entailments from qualified to unqualified predication and avoid inconsistencies. But the denial of persistence not only blocks bad inferences. It also blocks a number of good inferences. Moreover, as we have seen in this section, the observations regarding extensional adequacy made in §4.3 considerably limit the resources of the theory when it comes to deriving plausible inferential constraints for qua-qualifications. The lesson from §§4.3-4.4 is that for Szabó's proposal to be consistent and extensionally adequate, it must sacrifice a great amount of predictive power.

The arguments I have presented diminish the appeal of the specific theory of qualification proposed Szabó considerably. The final section goes a step further. I present a serious issue which can be expected to arise on any eventuality-theoretic approach to qualification, i.e. any account on which being *F* as a *G* is being *F simpliciter* somewhere, whether it is a state, an event, a situation, a process or the like. I conclude that it is not just Szabó's specific proposal which should be

rejected, but the eventuality-theoretic approach more generally.

4.5 A General Problem

This section argues that there are cases which a good theory of qualification should be able to account for but which eventuality-theoretic approaches to qualification cannot account for. In broad outline, these are cases where an individual is both F as a G and non- F as an H at the same time and where, in addition, their states of being G and H coincide in some sense.²⁸ Since according to eventuality-theoretic approaches to qualification, being F as a G amounts to being F in certain G -states, these approaches struggle to avoid the result that in such cases, the individual is both F and non- F in the coincident states.

4.5.1 Coinciding states

Consider the following slight variation of the Football case considered in previous chapters:

Football*. John is a judge and a referee. One Sunday, while he is getting ready to referee a football game, John receives two letters. The first letter is from a journalist offering him a bribe in exchange for revealing whether the defence has an eyewitness in a big trial. The journalist instructs John to blow the full time whistle while standing on his right leg if the defence has an eyewitness, to blow it standing on his left leg if the defence doesn't have an eyewitness and to blow it standing on both legs in case he doesn't accept the bribe. The second letter is from a gambler offering John a bribe in exchange for giving nine minutes of stoppage time, and hence not ending the game before the 99th minute (the gambler has placed a bet on this outcome). The game proceeds. In the 95th minute, John blows the full time whistle to end the game while standing on his right leg.

²⁸When 'coincidence' is used as a technical term, it is usually understood as the sharing of all parts of a certain kind, e.g. for two objects to spatially coincide is for them to share all spatial parts, for them to coincide materially is for them to share all material parts and so on. For now, I'll use coincidence as a place holder here since different eventuality-theoretic approaches will make different assumptions about the nature of states, their parts and the regions which they occupy.

To simplify, let's suppose that this is the only time John ever has been and ever will be propositioned with a bribe. (32) and (34) (repeated below) would then seem true in the envisaged case.

(32) John is corrupt as a judge.

(36) John is uncorrupt as a referee.

Given Szabó's proposed analysis, there must then exist on this occasion:

(i) A state of being corrupt such that John is in it.

(ii) A state of being uncorrupt such that John is in it.

Which are the states in which John is corrupt/uncorrupt respectively? Since John *accepts a bribe* by blowing the full time whistle while standing on his right leg, John's blowing the full time whistle while standing on his right leg would appear to be a state of John's being corrupt. Likewise, since John *declines a bribe* by blowing the full time whistle at 95min, John's blowing the full time whistle at 95min would appear to be a state of John's being uncorrupt. Then we have:

(iii) John's blowing the full time whistle while standing on his right leg is a state of John's being corrupt

(iv) John's blowing the full time whistle at 95min is a state of John's being uncorrupt.

Given this set-up, Szabó's theory faces the following problem: On the proposed semantic analysis, the truth of both (32) and (34) in a case like **Football*** would require John to be in an impossible state. Since being in a case like **Football*** is evidently possible, the theory is inadequate. Let me elaborate.

Call the state of John's blowing the whistle on one leg ' s_c ' and call the state of John's blowing the whistle at 95min ' s_{uc} '. Either $s_c = s_{uc}$ or $s_c \neq s_{uc}$.

Case 1. We individuate states coarsely and assume that $s_c = s_{uc}$. There is just one state of blowing the full time whistle, though Neo-Davidsonians may wish

to further specify this state in various ways, e.g. its agent is John, its object is the whistle, it takes place in the 95th's minute of the game, it is done on one leg etc. Since s_{uc} is a state of John's being uncorrupt and $s_c = s_{uc}$, it follows (by Leibniz's Law) that s_c is a state of John's being uncorrupt. But s_c is also a state of John's being corrupt. So s_c is a state of John's being corrupt and a state of John's being uncorrupt. So $s_c = s_{uc}$ is an impossible state. For (32) and (34) to be true in **Football***, John would have to be in an impossible state.

Case 2. We individuate states more finely and insist that $s_c \neq s_{uc}$; John's blowing the full time whistle while standing on one leg and John's blowing the full time whistle at 95min are distinct states. But since at the time at which John blows the whistle, John is in s_c and John is in s_{uc} , John is also in their fusion $s_c \sqcup s_{uc}$ at that time. Since s_c is a state of John's being corrupt and s_{uc} is a state of John's being uncorrupt, their fusion is an impossible state. Even if states are individuated more finely, for (32) and (34) to be true in **Football***, John would have to be in an impossible state.

On Szabó's theory of qualification, the truth of (32) and (34) in a case like **Football*** would require one to be in an impossible state. Since it is impossible to be in an impossible state, either (32) and (34) aren't both true in this case or **Football*** is impossible. Since both options are implausible, cases like **Football*** present a serious issue for Szabó's theory of qualification.

There is little use in quibbling with the set-up. In particular, it is no use insisting that the blowing of the whistle on one leg, say, is not *itself* a state of being corrupt but merely has such a state as a *proper part*, and equally, that the state of blowing the whistle at 95min is not itself a state of being uncorrupt but merely has such a state as a proper part. For even on this set-up, as John blows the full time whistle, John would be both in a corrupt state (s_c) and in an uncorrupt state (s_{uc}) at the same time. And if John is in s_c and John is in s_{uc} , John is also in their fusion, $s_c \sqcup s_{uc}$, which would again be an impossible state.

4.5.2 Responses

Three lines of response to this argument are worth considering. The first is to deny the universality of fusion. One could then claim that although John is simultaneously in a corrupt state and an uncorrupt state, there is no fusion of these states and so there is no impossible state John is in. While Szabó himself explicitly adopts the universality of fusion, calling for restrictions on fusions which rule out the existence of impossible states wouldn't look entirely unmotivated. The trouble with this way of solving the problem, however, is that it is difficult to see why (47) and (48) could then not both be true.

(47) John is corrupt.

(48) John is uncorrupt.

We'd say that John is in a corrupt state which is such that every extension of it is a corrupt state and that moreover John is in an uncorrupt state which is such that every extension of it is an uncorrupt state. But since the corrupt state and the uncorrupt state have no fusion, there is no impossible state John is in. So (47) and (48) can both be true at the same time. A good theory of qualification needs to capture the fact that while (32) and (36) can both be true as uttered on certain occasions, (47) and (48) cannot. A theory of qualification which does not capture the difference is of no use to anyone.

The second line of response is to deny the principle on which I relied above: that if a is in s and a is in s' , then a is in $s \sqcup s'$. If we denied this principle, then although John would be in a corrupt state s_c and in a distinct uncorrupt state s_{uc} and although their fusion $s \sqcup s'$ would exist, John would not be in the fusion. But the same worry as raised in response to the first reply applies to this suggestion. Again, it is unclear why on this view (47) and (48) cannot both be true as uttered to describe **Football***. Again, there would be no problem with being in a corrupt state s every extension of which is a corrupt state while simultaneously being

in an uncorrupt state s' every extension of which is an uncorrupt state, since even though the extensions of these states would all be impossible states, John need not be in any impossible state. So my response here is the same as above: a good theory of qualification needs to capture the fact that while (32) and (34) can both be true as uttered on a given occasion, (47) and (48) cannot. A theory of qualification which does not capture the difference is of no use.

The third line of response is to deny that the fusion of two incompatible states is always an impossible state. As pointed out above (p.132, note 20), if one is in a forest with 100 trees one can simultaneously be in a state of being surrounded by exactly ten trees and in a bigger state of being surrounded by exactly fifty trees. But the fusion of these states would not be an impossible state. Depending on how precisely the details are filled in, the fusion of the state of being surrounded by exactly fifty trees and the state of being surrounded by exactly ten trees might just be the state of being surrounded by exactly fifty trees; this would be the case where the ten trees are among the fifty. Or it may be a state of being surrounded by exactly 60 trees; this would be the case where the ten trees of the first state and the fifty trees of the second state are disjoint. As also noted above, such failures of persistence are a difficult topic in situation theory, and how precisely they are to be captured is controversial.

However, it is difficult to see how *any* of the sorts of accounts one could give would get off the ground in the case under consideration. To illustrate, consider two kinds of account one could give to make sense of the forest example. On some eventuality theories, individuals are proper parts of eventualities.²⁹ If the state of being surrounded by exactly fifty trees (s_{50}) overlaps the state of being surrounded by exactly ten trees (s_{10}) at those ten trees, $s_{10} \leq s_{50}$ and so $s_{10} \sqcup s_{50} = s_{50}$. If on the other hand, there is no overlap between s_{10} and s_{50} , their

²⁹See for instance Kratzer 2012, p.115f. or Elbourne 2013, p.32 who define ' \leq ' over $A \cup S$, the union of the set of individuals and situations. This is also true for Barwise and Perry's *actual situations* (Barwise & Perry, 1983, see).

fusion has the trees in s_{10} as well as the trees in s_{50} as parts, and so has exactly 60 trees. Other theories take states like s_{10} and s_{50} as mereological atoms but take states (situations) to be or represent occurrences in the world which are spatiotemporally located.³⁰ On such a theory, the relevant relations of overlap would not be between the states themselves, but between the regions in which they obtain. If the region in which s_{50} obtains overlaps the region in which s_{10} obtains where the ten trees are located, the latter region is a proper part of the former region, and so the region occupied by $s_{10} \sqcup s_{50}$ would just be the region occupied by s_{50} , a region in which exactly fifty trees are located. If on the other hand the regions in which these states obtain are disjoint, the region in which their fusion obtains would be the fusion of the two regions, a region where exactly sixty trees are located. On both views, there cannot be both exactly n trees and exactly k trees in the relevant area of overlap (for $n \neq k$).

While these are just two ways of thinking about the forest case, they illustrate that the states in question are not ultimately *incompatible*. The fusion of two genuinely incompatible states is always an impossible state, but in the sorts of scenarios where s_{10} and s_{50} obtain at the same time, these states are not incompatible.

But the same is simply not true in a case like **Football***, for which no such account would look very convincing. The states of John's blowing the whistle on one leg and John's blowing the whistle at 95min respectively involve the exact same individuals: John and the whistle. Both occur at the same time in the spatial region occupied by John and the whistle. But then how is it meant to be possible for John to be corrupt in one and uncorrupt in the other? There would only appear to remain the desperate move of suggesting that the region in which John blows the whistle on one leg *exceeds* the region in which John blows the whistle at 95min on account of the former but not the latter including John's

³⁰This is how I understand the theory of Link (1987) which uses abstract objects to model things in the world which have spatiotemporal extension.

legs. For this point to help with the present problem, one would then have to be seriously prepared to declare that John's being corrupt obtains in the region including John's legs and John's being uncorrupt obtains in the region excluding John's legs. If that is what it takes for Szabó's theory of qualification to account for the possibility of cases like **Football***, I rest my case.

4.5.3 The problem generalises

The problem brought out by cases like **Football*** is general in that it can be expected to arise on any eventuality-theoretic approach to qualification, whether or not it follows Szabó's specific development of such an approach. Take any theory of qua-qualification on which being *F* as a *G* is analysed as being *F simpliciter* in a *G-eventuality* whether it is a state, a situation, an event, a process or the like, and however the notion of a *G-eventuality* is ultimately understood. With sufficient creativity it will be possible to come up with cases where an individual is *F* as a *G* and non-*F* as an *H* at a time but where the *G*- and the *H*-eventuality coincide in some sense appropriate to that theory. If, as I have argued, it is not possible to be both *F simpliciter* and non-*F simpliciter* in such coincident eventualities, a theory of qualification developed along these lines cannot account for cases like **Football***.

The argument is independent of the differences between various eventuality theories. While there are many interesting differences between on the one hand the Neo-Davidsonian event semantics of Higginbotham (1983) or Parsons (1990) on which Szabó relies, and the situation semantics developed by Barwise & Perry (1983), Kratzer (2012) and Elbourne (2013), brief reflection on the main differences between these theories quickly reveals that they are immaterial to the argument.

As Higginbotham (1983, p.101) notes, event semantics is meant to offer an *extensional alternative* to situation semantics; for event semanticists meaning are extensions rather than functions from possible situations to extensions.

And as Portner (1992, p.14) points out, while in situation semantics there is a direct link between situations and propositions (propositions are sets of situations), events and propositions are independent of one another in event semantics which is compatible with different views of propositions. For event semanticists events, just like individuals, are the arguments of functions denoted by predicates. There are also interesting differences within situation semantics, notably regarding the nature and confines of situations. Barwise and Perry distinguish between actual situations built up from individuals and properties and abstract situations which are set-theoretic constructions, while for Kratzer all situations are parts of Lewisian possible worlds. Relatedly, while Kratzer (2012, p.117) takes individuals to be world-bound and analyses *de re* modal claims using counterpart theory, Elbourne (2013, p.33) assumes the possibility of transworld identity as a simplifying assumption.

None of these differences would appear to matter for the present purposes. Event semanticists and situation semanticists alike make use of a space of events, states or situations in their models and let these be complete partial orders.³¹ If such a view is paired with the assumption that being *F* as a *G* is being *F simpliciter* in a *G*-event/state/situation, cases like **Football*** where an individual is both *F* as a *G* and non-*F* as an *H* at the same time and where, in addition, their events/states/situations of being *G* and *H* coincide in some sense appropriate to the theory, will pose a problem. The individual would have to be *F* and non-*F* in the coincident events/states/situations, and it is difficult to see how that could be possible.

At the heart of the problem lies the ambition of reducing *qualified* predication to *unqualified* predication *at an eventuality*, whether it is an event, a state, a situation, a process or the like. Just as qualified predication cannot be reduced

³¹Link (1987), Kratzer (2012) and Elbourne (2013) think of state spaces / situation spaces as mereological structures while Barwise & Perry (1983) employ sets as representing actual situations, where these sets are ordered in the usual way by subset inclusion.

to unqualified predication at a time since the times at which one occupies the relevant roles may overlap perfectly, so qualified predication cannot be reduced to unqualified predication at an eventuality since the eventualities at which one occupies the relevant roles may overlap perfectly.

The reason that it is possible in some cases to be *F* as a *G* while also being non-*F* as an *H* is *not* that times, states, events or situations of being *G* never overlap times, states, events or situations of being *H*. Rather, being *F* as a *G* and non-*F* as an *H* is sometimes possible because for certain *F*, *G* and *H* being *F* as a *G* amounts to having a property which is entirely compatible with the property which being non-*F* as an *H* amounts to. For instance, in **Football*** what is required for being corrupt as a judge is blowing the full time whistle while standing on one leg. And what is required for being uncorrupt as a referee is blowing the full time whistle at a time which is appropriate given the number of interruptions during the game. Since one can do the first without doing the second, **Football*** is a case in which it is possible to be corrupt as a judge while being uncorrupt as a referee.

In my view, this sort of story generalises. It is possible to be *F* as a *G* and non-*F* as an *H* in those cases in which the following two properties are compatible: being *F*-as-a-*G* and being (non-*F*)-as-a-*H*. The next essay develops a theory of qualification based on this idea.

4.6 Concluding Remarks

The aim of this essay was to examine a prominent eventuality theory of qualification, Zoltán Szabó's event semantics of 'as'. I have argued that Szabó's specific proposal is unsatisfactory in three important ways: The linguistic evidence on which it is based is inconclusive, the semantic analysis of qualification in terms of state parthood does little work in securing correct semantic predictions, and on pain of inconsistency, the theory cannot account for a range of inferential

constraints on qua-qualifications. Finally, to broaden the scope of the conclusion, I have argued that there is a *general* problem which can be expected to arise on any eventuality-theoretic approach to qua-qualification, i.e. on any account on which being *F* as a *G* is analysed as being *F simpliciter* in some *eventuality*, whether it is a state, an event, a situation, a process or the like. I've concluded that it is not just Szabó's specific proposal which should be rejected, but rather eventuality-theoretic accounts of qualification more generally.

5

Towards A Theory of ‘Qua’

Consider some observations which many people would take to be platitudes: A person can be skilful *as* a surgeon, yet inept *as* a climber. A book can be good *qua* paperweight, yet bad *qua* pillow. A person can be corrupt *as* a judge, yet uncorrupt *as* the referee of their football club.

More controversially, some philosophers have claimed that a belief can be fundamental *qua* physical state, yet non-fundamental *qua* mental state (Wilson, 2014, p.39); that a person’s origins may be essential to them *as* emergent from this sperm and egg, while not being essential to them *as* a public figure (Lewis, 2003, p.28); further that an act, such as pushing someone, can be intentional *qua* pushing even if it is unintentional *qua* killing (Anscombe 1979, p.219, Fine 1982, p.102); or that a person can have obligations *qua* parent while having other, incompatible obligations *qua* military officer (MacIntyre, 1990, p.368).

In all these examples, qualifications with ‘as’ or ‘qua’ are employed to offer

a consistent description of cases in which what would appear to be a single individual has what would appear to be incompatible properties. Presumably no single individual could be both corrupt and uncorrupt, good and bad, or skilful and inept. Still, it is widely believed that a single thing could have such incompatible properties *relative to different roles, identities, or descriptions*. That is, it is widely believed that where F and J are mutually incompatible properties, a single individual a could be F qua G , and also be J qua H . Just how precisely this is meant to be possible is poorly understood. If being both F and J is impossible, how is being F qua G while also being J qua H any better?

One response is, of course, to *deny* that in such cases there is a single individual. Kit Fine (1982, 1999, 2006), for instance, has proposed a view on which individuals give rise to a number of *qua-objects*: objects constituted by, yet distinct from, the individuals on which they are based. Since people typically have a wide range of social roles and identities, the proposal has the consequence that most of us are indeed colocated with a sizeable population of other individuals. Other extant theories of qualification are similarly revisionary; they include a state-theoretic account reliant on a non-monotonic notion of truth in a state (see Szabó, 2003, p.403), an account committed to relative identity (see Asher, 2011, p.157), or a proposal which rejects Leibniz's Law in its intended generality (see Baxter, 2018, p.906).

This chapter shows that no such baroque theory is required to handle qualifications with 'as' or 'qua'. I develop and defend a simple theory of qualification on which qualifications with 'as' or 'qua' ascribe properties to individuals. For some a to be F as or qua G is for a to have a qualified property: being F -qua- G . Call such properties *qua-properties*. Throughout the paper, I assume the equivalence of qualifications with 'as' (e.g. 'John is corrupt as a judge') and qualifications with 'qua' (e.g. 'John is corrupt qua judge'), and I'll call both *qua-qualifications*.

Qua-qualifications ascribe qua-properties. But crucially qua-properties are not a new or mysterious kind of property. We can get a first handle on qua-properties by noting that in many cases being *F*-qua-*G* just is being an *FG* on a reading where being *F* is somehow relativized to being *G*.¹ For instance, to be corrupt-qua-judge is to be a corrupt judge, to be kind-qua-father is to be a kind father, to be skilful-qua-surgeon is to be a skilful surgeon, where being corrupt, kind and skilful are somehow relativized to being a judge, a father, a surgeon respectively. Such attributive constructions won't always be suitable, e.g. although one can enter a country as or qua diplomat, attributive constructions like 'is a country-entering diplomat' do not readily convey the intended relativised interpretation. Thus qua-qualifications are slightly more versatile than the above attributive constructions.

How can qua-properties be characterised more generally? Ultimately I'll contend that qua-properties are a particular kind of relational property. Still, expectations need to be managed. At a high level of generality the proposed account of qua-properties will remain somewhat schematic. This accurately reflects a limitation of qua-qualifications. The way in which being *F* is relativized to being *G* in such qualifications is not entirely systematic. For instance, someone who is skilful-qua-surgeon is someone who performs surgical procedures skilfully, someone who is kind-qua-surgeon is someone who shows kindness in their dealings with patients, and someone who is corrupt-qua-surgeon is someone who abuses the powers of their position (e.g. over transplant waitlists) to receive certain favours. The interpretation of predicates of the form 'is *F*-qua-*G*' on

¹Adjectives which give rise to such relativized readings are called non-intersective adjectives in the semantics literature (see Siegel, 1976; Partee, 2007). An adjective *A* is *intersective* if for any noun *N* the denotation of '*AN*' is the intersection of the denotations of '*A*' and '*N*', i.e. where $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket$ is the relevant interpretation function, $\llbracket AN \rrbracket = \llbracket A \rrbracket \cap \llbracket N \rrbracket$. Geach (1956) draws a similar distinction, that between *attributive* and *predicative* adjectives, though note that many non-intersective predicates can occur in predicate position, too. Some non-intersective adjectives also have intersective readings, e.g. in the sentence 'Olga is a beautiful dancer' the adjective 'beautiful' can be interpreted either way.

the intended relativized reading is no more systematic than the interpretation of noun-noun compounds such as 'milk truck', 'fire truck' or 'steel truck' (see Partee, 2004, p.165). Being an N_1N_2 is being an N_2 somehow related to N_1 , but what the relevant relation is will differ from construction to construction and may vary with context. Ordinarily, a milk truck is a truck *carrying* milk, a fire truck is a truck *belonging* to the fire brigade, and a steel truck is a truck *made of* steel. But the interpretation may vary with context, too. At a market a milk truck may be a truck where milk is *sold*. At a construction side, a steel truck may be a truck that *carries* steel etc. A similar lack of systematicity characterises the interpretation of predicates like 'is F qua G '. Being F -qua- G is being F relative to being a G , but what precise relation is involved will vary from instance to instance and may sometimes vary with context.

Despite these limitations, an account of qua-qualifications in terms of qua-properties is genuinely illuminating. It affords a clear metaphysical analysis of how it is possible for a single thing to have apparently incompatible properties relative to different roles or identities. Moreover, the theory makes adequate predictions about the linguistic behaviour of qua-qualifications and helps us think more clearly about their logic. Since this is more than any extant competing theory could claim, the proposal offers the best account of qua-qualification to date.

The chapter is in six parts. §5.1 clarifies the target and scope of the proposed theory, §5.2 sketches the basic strategy for dissolving the central puzzle cases and works through a number of examples demonstrating in each case how the puzzle is dissolved. §5.3 characterises qua-properties more generally and explains how qua-qualification is possible. §5.4 motivates three testable predictions about the linguistic behaviour of qua-qualifications on the basis of the proposed theory of qua-properties and shows that these predictions are indeed borne out by the data. §5.5 showcases the potential of the proposed theory for advancing a more general study of the logic of qua-qualifications. §5.6 concludes.

5.1 Target and Scope

The aim of this chapter is to develop a theory of qualifications with 'as' or 'qua' in terms of qua-properties. This section clarifies the target and scope of the proposed theory.

5.1.1 Target

I take qualifications with 'as' to be equivalent to qualifications with '*qua*', and I call both simply *qua-qualifications*. However, it is important to note that not all sentences containing 'as' or 'qua' are *qua-qualifications* in the sense at issue here. In particular, there are uses of 'as' which appear to denote a copula expression akin to 'is', 'was', or the gerund 'being', and which (depending on mood and tense) are naturally read as 'because', 'if', or 'when'.² Consider the following examples:

- (1) a. As a father of small children, John sleeps very little.
 b. As a bachelor, John would lead a different life.
 c. As a child, John didn't have a dog.

(1a–c) are naturally paraphrased as follows:

- (1*) a. Because he is a father of small children, John sleeps very little.
 b. If he were a bachelor, John would lead a different life.
 c. When he was a child, John didn't have a dog.

Such copula uses of as-phrases are *not* the target of this chapter. That is because the kinds of qualifications which are the target of this chapter are unified by the following feature: predications of the form (i) and (ii) do not jointly imply predications of the form (iii):

- (i) *a is F as/qua G*

² Copula uses of 'as' are studied by Gerhard Jäger (2003). Jäger also discusses genuine as-qualifications, but in my opinion doesn't adequately distinguish between copula uses of 'as' and genuine *qua-qualifications*.

- (ii) a is non- F as/qua H
- (iii) a is F and a is non- F .

As is easily verified, copula uses lack this feature; they collapse (i) and (ii) into (iii). Suppose John is both a judge and a referee at a football club, and suppose that temporally these two careers overlap perfectly. A *qua*-qualification like (2) seems entirely consistent in this case.

- (2) As a judge, John is corrupt, but as a referee, John is uncorrupt.

But given standard assumptions, (2) would be inconsistent on readings where 'as' means *because*, *if*, or *when*. We'd have:

- (2*) a. Because John is a judge, John is corrupt, but because John is a referee, John is uncorrupt.
- b. If he is a judge, John is corrupt, but if he is a referee, John is uncorrupt.
- c. When he is a judge, John is corrupt, but when he is a referee, John is uncorrupt.

In the envisaged case, each of (2*a–c) would imply that John is both corrupt and uncorrupt. Start out with (2*a). The ordinary use of 'because' is factive: if A because B , then A .³ And so (2*a) implies that John is both corrupt and uncorrupt. The same goes for (2*b). Since John is both a judge and a referee, (2*b) implies (by *Modus Ponens*) that John is both corrupt and uncorrupt. Finally, (2*c). Since we're assuming that John has been a judge and a referee throughout the exact same years, (2*c) implies that John is both corrupt and uncorrupt during those years. On each of the copula readings of (2), the sentence is inconsistent in the envisaged case. Since (2) is not inconsistent in that case, the copula readings do not capture the meaning of (2). More generally, if 'as' is read as 'because', 'if', or 'when', sentences of the form (i) and (ii) will often jointly imply a sentence

³ Fine (2012, §5) admits as much but introduces a non-factive notion of 'because' which is useful when thinking of grounding relations as defined over a space of merely possible rather than actual states.

of the form (iii). This, in turn, shows that the copula readings do not have the signature feature of *qua*-qualifications and can hence be set aside.

One might think that the temporal qualification in (2*c) should be understood as a qualification to the times spent *judging* or to the times spent *refereeing*. But as noted in chapter 2 already, even on this construal, (2*c) would not capture what (2) says, since a single person can be corrupt as a judge *while refereeing*. Consider the following case:

Football. John is a judge and a referee. One Sunday, while he is getting ready to referee a football game, John receives two letters. The first letter is from a journalist offering him a bribe in exchange for revealing whether the defence has an eyewitness in a big trial. The journalist instructs John to blow the full time whistle while standing on his right leg if the defence has an eyewitness, to blow it standing on his left leg if the defence doesn't have an eyewitness, and to blow it standing on both legs in case he doesn't accept the bribe. The second letter is from a gambler offering John a bribe in exchange for giving at least nine minutes of stoppage time, and hence not ending the game before the 99th minute (the gambler has placed a bet on this outcome). The game proceeds. In the 95th minute, John blows the full time whistle to end the game while standing on his right leg.

Even though John commits the corrupt deed while refereeing a football game, it seems clear in this case that John is corrupt in his capacity as a judge, not in his capacity as a referee. Since the modified temporal reading wrongly predicts that John is corrupt as a referee in this case, it is not adequate either. In sum, none of the copula constructions captures what a *qua*-qualification like (2) says. There is a clear difference between being *F because, if, or when* one is a *G*, and being *F qua G*. Since our target is the latter kind of qualification, we can safely set copula-uses of 'as' aside.⁴

⁴ It's an open question whether there is a plausible unified theory of copula uses and genuine *qua*-qualifications. For instance, one might think that copula uses are a special case of genuine *qua*-qualifications in which the 'as'/'qua' contributes nothing but predication. This would explain the close connection between copula readings of '*a is F as a G*' and *intersective* readings of '*a is an FG*' on which this is tantamount to being *F and* being *G*. Moreover, together with mood or tense, it would be relatively straightforward to generate the temporal, causal, and conditional readings.

Let us further sharpen the target. *Qua*-qualifications must be contrasted with two other prominent linguistic phenomena: the *gradability* of certain expressions on the one hand, and their *opacity* on the other. First, although many predicates featuring in *qua*-qualifications are also gradable, being *F* as or qua *G* is distinct from being *F* for a *G*.⁵ One can of course be more or less corrupt, patient, skilful, good, etc. Moreover, whether one's degree of corruption, patience, skill, or goodness suffices for counting as corrupt, patient, skilful, or good in a given context may depend on what degree is required by that context. However, it seems clear that being *F* for a *G* is *not necessary* for being *F* as a *G*. For suppose that in his capacity as a judge, John is corrupt to degree *n*. If judges are on average pretty corrupt, it may well be the case that being corrupt to degree *n* is not enough to count as corrupt for a judge. Hence, one could be corrupt as a *G*, yet not corrupt for a *G*. That being *F* for a *G* is not even a necessary condition on being *F* as a *G* suffices to show that the latter does not reduce to the former.⁶

Secondly, although some predicates featuring in *qua*-qualifications are typically taken to be opacity-inducing, being *F* as or qua *G* is distinct from being *F* when

Unfortunately, I lack the space to investigate these questions here. For now, the important thing is to distinguish copula readings from genuine *qua*-qualifications.

⁵ For a view which tries to subsume as-qualifications under for-qualifications, see for instance King (2006).

⁶ Although this might be a bit more controversial, I also think that being *F* for a *G* is *not sufficient* for being *F* as a *G*. Structurally, the thought is that whether something is *F* for a *G* depends on whether they have a degree of *F*-ness exceeding that of most *G*s. But having a high degree of *F*-ness by the standards of the *G*s is compatible with one not having this high degree of *F*-ness in one's capacity as a *G*. For instance, suppose John is both a judge and a referee. The judges are incredibly corrupt, so it takes a lot of corrupt deeds to count as corrupt for a judge. The referees are incredibly honest, so it takes hardly any corrupt deeds to count as corrupt for a referee. Suppose John has accepted the occasional bribe in exchange for judging favours, but John has never accepted a bribe in exchange for refereeing favours. It would be OK to say that John is corrupt for a referee but not for a judge, where this is entirely compatible with John *not* being corrupt *as* a referee. Although these sentences are not easily processed, the situation can be described by the following three claims:

- (i) For a judge, John isn't very corrupt as a judge.
- (ii) For a referee, John is very corrupt as a judge.
- (iii) John is not at all corrupt as a referee.

But then, being corrupt for a referee cannot imply being corrupt as a referee. Being corrupt for a *G* would then not in general be sufficient for being corrupt as a *G*.

presented or described as a *G*.⁷ Of course, a person can be admired/feared/celebrated as a *G* while not being admired/feared/celebrated as an *H*. But to begin with, such *qua*-qualifications work well even when the subject presents or describes the person as both *G* and *H*. A child may present or describe their father both as parent and headmaster, and still admire the father *qua* parent, yet not admire the father *qua* headmaster. Contrast this case with typical examples of opacity. If a person admires George Orwell while failing to admire Eric Blair, it is usually because they do *not* present or describe George Orwell as Eric Blair. *Qua*-qualifications, on the other hand, don't require such different modes of presentation. Finally, notice that for many predicates *F*, one can be *F qua G* even if one is not *F* when presented as or described as a *G*. Being skilful as a surgeon clearly does not require being skilful *when presented or described as a surgeon*. If it were, people should be much more worried about getting surgery.⁸

5.1.2 Scope

This chapter focuses on simple and relatively uncontroversial *qua*-qualifications such as 'John is corrupt *qua* judge', 'Sally is skilful as a surgeon', or 'the book is good *qua* paperweight'. By contrast, the philosophically more controversial

⁷ Opacity is usually understood as a property of linguistic environments, where a linguistic environment is said to be *opaque* if and only if the substitution of expressions denoting identicals in a sentence occurring in that linguistic environment possibly affects the truth-value of that sentence. It's a non-trivial question which expressions are in fact responsible for the opacity of a particular environment. For discussion, see Dorr (2014, §8).

⁸ Elizabeth Anscombe's talk of actions being intentional *under a description* (see Anscombe, 1957) is naturally understood as invoking opacity. However, upon closer scrutiny, her position appears to be very close to the view defended here. Clarifying the notion, Anscombe (1979, p.220) writes:

The truth is that I have never published a word about Leibniz' Law. The 'rejection' consisted only in my saying such things as that an action may be intentional under one description and not intentional under another. But this is no more a rejection of Leibniz' Law than it is to say that Socrates is taller than Theaetetus and not taller than Plato.

As we will see, my own view is that *qua*-qualifications ascribe relational properties to individuals, which is in line with Anscombe's analogy here.

qualifications mentioned in the introduction will be largely set aside. The idea is to simplify our task as much as possible. It is complicated enough to unpack what it is to be *F qua G* for relatively uncontroversial *F*. There would be little hope of making progress with this task if we focused on properties such as being fundamental, intentional, essential, or obligatory, for which there is little agreement about what they consist in. For instance, without presupposing a particular theory of what it is for something to be fundamental, there is little to say about what it is for something to be fundamental-*qua-G*, let alone to decide whether it is indeed possible to be fundamental-*qua-G* and non-fundamental-*qua-H*. And likewise for the remaining more controversial examples.

Relatedly, this chapter will not consider *qua*-qualifications occurring in the context of *de re* modal predication as discussed by David Lewis (1971), Allan Gibbard (1975), Harold Noonan (1991), or Stephen Yablo (ms). Though I suspect that the proposed approach could be generalised to an account of *qua*-modalities (understood as *qua*-properties of propositions, rather than of individuals), I'll leave that task for another occasion. Given the interest *non-modal* Leibniz's Law arguments have generated in recent debates about material constitution (see Fine, 2003), non-modal *qua*-qualifications are a worthwhile topic of inquiry in their own right.

Finally, it should be noted that the project of this chapter is to investigate the metaphysics of qualification and the truth conditions of sentences of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$. What I am *not* going to do in this essay is examine in more detail the compositional implementation of these truth conditions—though see the postscript to this essay for a discussion of the main options.

With these clarifications of the target and scope of the investigation in place, let me turn to the central puzzle cases, and how the account dissolves them.

5.2 Dissolving the Puzzle

The puzzle at the heart of this dissertation is posed by cases in which a single individual would appear to have incompatible properties relative to different roles, functions, or identities. A single person can be corrupt in one capacity, as a judge, while being uncorrupt in another capacity, as a referee. A single person can do certain things (such as voting for a proposal) in one capacity, as a faculty member, while doing something incompatible (such as abstaining from voting) in another capacity, as a faculty chair. An inanimate object such as a river can be safe in one regard, qua water source, while being dangerous in another regard, qua crossing. And an artwork such as a film can be good in one capacity, as a thriller, while being bad in another capacity, as a drama. But how so? If one cannot be both *F* and *J*, how is being both *F* as a *G*, and *J* as an *H* any better?

In this chapter, I propose a clear metaphysical analysis of how *qua*-qualification is possible. *Qua*-qualifications ascribe entirely compatible relational properties to individuals. On this view, the judge is corrupt-*qua*-judge and uncorrupt-*qua*-referee, the faculty member voted-*qua*-faculty-member and abstained-*qua*-faculty-chair, the river is safe-*qua*-water-source and dangerous-*qua*-crossing, and the film is good-*qua*-thriller but bad-*qua*-drama. Of course, such a proposal only provides a solution to the puzzle cases of interest if *qua*-properties based on *incompatible* properties can nevertheless be *compatible*. To show that this is indeed the case, the remainder of this section works through some of the above examples in more detail, showing in each case how the *qua*-properties in question can be unpacked and how the puzzle is dissolved. §5.3 abstracts from the examples to offer a general theory of *qua*-qualification. I should flag that the specific proposals considered below are mainly intended to illustrate how to go about unpacking *qua*-properties rather than proposing definitive analyses.

5.2.1 Case studies

i.) Being corrupt. What do a corrupt judge, a corrupt politician, and a corrupt referee have in common? They have on occasion abused their rights and responsibilities in exchange for bribes or other kinds of favours.⁹ What sets them apart? The corrupt judge is a judge who has abused the rights and responsibilities of a judge, the corrupt politician is a politician who has abused the rights and responsibilities of a politician, and the corrupt referee is a referee who has abused the rights and responsibilities of a referee.

Being corrupt and uncorrupt are incompatible properties. One cannot both have abused one's rights and responsibilities and not have abused one's rights and responsibilities. Nevertheless, the *qua*-properties of being corrupt-*qua*-judge and being uncorrupt-*qua*-referee are compatible. After all, it is entirely possible to be a judge who has abused the rights and responsibilities of a judge while at the same time being a referee who has never abused the rights and responsibilities of a referee.

ii.) Voting. What do a voting juror, a voting citizen, and a voting committee member have in common? They exercise their right to partly determine the outcome of a decision. What sets them apart? The voting juror is a juror exercising the voting right of a juror, the voting citizen is a citizen exercising the voting right of a citizen, and the voting committee member is a committee member exercising the voting right of a committee member.

The properties of having voted and having abstained are incompatible properties. One cannot both exercise one's right to partly determine the outcome of a given decision and refrain from exercising that right. Yet, the *qua*-properties

⁹ Some people may access a *dispositional* reading of predicates like 'corrupt' more easily, on which being corrupt is having a propensity for corruption. But there is clearly also a non-dispositional reading on which merely having a disposition for corrupt behaviour does not suffice for counting as corrupt. For instance, it would be odd for a court to charge someone with charges related to corruption purely on the grounds of a disposition for such behaviour.

of having voted-*qua-G* and having abstained-*qua-H* can be compatible so long as the institutional background is hospitable. For instance, so long as a person with two offices gets two separate votes in the committee meetings, it'll be possible to be a faculty member exercising the voting right of a faculty member while also being a faculty chair not exercising the voting right of a faculty chair. The committee might have to design a particular voting method, e.g. let the right arm indicate one vote and let the left arm indicate another vote. But apart from such practical issues, there is no obstacle here, since so long as one has both rights, one can exercise one right to vote (the right of a *G*) while refraining from exercising another right to vote (the right of an *H*).

iii.) Being dangerous. What do a dangerous water source, a dangerous vehicle, and a dangerous crossing have in common? They risk harming those who use them. What sets them apart? The dangerous water source is a water source which risks harming those who drink from it, the dangerous vehicle is a vehicle that risks harming those who ride in it, and the dangerous crossing is a crossing which risks harming those who take it.

Being dangerous and being safe are incompatible properties. One cannot both risk harming things and not risk harming them. Nevertheless, the *qua*-properties of being safe-*qua-water-source* and dangerous-*qua-crossing* are compatible. After all, it is entirely possible to be a water source not at risk of harming those who drink from it while also being a crossing which risks harming those who take it.

iv.) Being good. What do a good drama, a good comedy, and a good thriller have in common? They satisfy the aesthetic conventions of their genre well. What sets them apart? The good drama is a drama that satisfies the aesthetic standards of a drama well, the good comedy is a comedy that satisfies the aesthetic standards of a comedy well, and the good thriller is a thriller that satisfies the aesthetic standards of a thriller well.

Being good and bad are incompatible properties. One cannot both satisfy some

standards well and satisfy them poorly. Still, the *qua*-properties of being good-*qua*-drama and bad-*qua*-horror are entirely compatible. There is no inconsistency in a film being both a thriller which satisfies the aesthetic conventions of a thriller well (e.g. by being very suspenseful) while also being drama which satisfies the aesthetic conventions of a drama only poorly (e.g. by being too cheesy).

The detailed discussion of examples affords two lessons. First, *qua*-properties offer a plausible and consistent way of dissolving the puzzle cases of interest. Secondly, *qua*-properties are no new or mysterious kind of property. The properties attributed to individuals in such qualifications are often perfectly ordinary properties such as abusing a privilege, exercising a right, or meeting certain standards. Having illustrated how to go about unpacking *qua*-properties on a case-by-case basis, the next task is to provide a general theory of *qua*-qualification.

5.3 Structural Features

According to the view developed in this chapter, *qua*-qualifications ascribe qualified properties to individuals. We then get the following truth conditions for *qua*-qualifications:

Qua-Qualification: A sentence of the form ‘ a is F qua G ’ is true if and only if a is F -qua- G .

For these truth conditions to be informative, more must be said about qualified properties like being F -qua- G . Above, I have shown how one can go about unpacking *qua*-properties on a case-by-case basis. Now the task is to characterise *qua*-properties more generally. Abstracting from the above examples, a natural first pass for a characterisation of *qua*-properties is this: For a to be F -qua- G is for a to be F relative to a 's being G . This section shows how this characterisation can be developed more fully, and highlights two structural features of *qua*-properties which afford a clear metaphysical analysis of how *qua*-qualification

is possible and form the basis for testable predictions about the linguistic and inferential profile of *qua*-qualifications.

5.3.1 Relational Properties

On a first pass, for something to be *F-qua-G* is for it to be *F relative* to it being *G*. But how can this characterisation be made more precise? The informal gloss has two components which I propose to take at face-value: to be *F-qua-G* is (i) to be a *G* and (ii) to bear a relation *F-qua* to *G*. Properties like being *F-qua-G*, being *F-qua-H*, or being *F-qua-J* are *relational properties* based on the *F-qua* relation. Just as sitting-next-to-Bob is a relational property based on the sitting-next-to relation, so being corrupt-*qua*-judge is a relational property based on the corrupt-*qua* relation. We get:

Qua-Properties: For *a* to be *F-qua-G* is for *a* to be a *G* which bears *F-qua* to *G*.¹⁰

The proposal affords a clear metaphysical analysis of how *qua*-qualification is possible. How is it possible for a single individual to have mutually incompatible properties relative to different properties? In the same way as it is possible for a single individual to bear mutually incompatible relations to different people. Sitting to the right of *A* precludes sitting to the left of *A*. But sitting to the right of *A* need not preclude sitting to the left of *B*, so long as *A* and *B* are sufficiently independent. Likewise, bearing a relation *F-qua* to *G* precludes bearing a contrary relation *J-qua* to *G*, but it need not preclude bearing this contrary relation *J-qua* to *H*, so long as *G* and *H* are sufficiently independent. Since being a judge and being a referee are compatible yet sufficiently independent, it is possible to be a judge that bears corrupt-*qua* to judgehood while also being a referee bearing uncorrupt-*qua* to refereehood. Likewise since being a water source and

¹⁰ For certain *G*, there will be no indefinite article 'a' here, e.g. when *G* designates a mass term, as in 'coconut oil is healthy qua skin care but unhealthy qua foodstuff'.

a crossing are compatible but sufficiently independent, it is possible to be a crossing that bears *dangerous-qua* to being a crossing while also being a water source bearing *safe-qua* to being a water source.

The additional step of analysing *qua*-properties as relational properties brings out important *structural features* of *qua*-qualifications and puts constraints on their use and logic. The point will be argued in more detail in §§5.5–5.6 but to appreciate the broad direction, notice that we'll have a principled way of telling which *qua*-properties are compatible and which are not. For instance, on the proposed theory, it follows from *general* considerations about the metaphysics of relations that one cannot be both *F-qua-G* and *J-qua-G* when *F* and *J* are incompatible. Why is that? Because, more generally, it is not possible to bear incompatible relations to one and the same entity. Equally, we can explain why one cannot be both *F-qua-G* and *F-qua-H* when *G* and *H* are incompatible. Why is that? Because being *F-qua-G* is being a *G* that bears *F-qua* to *G* and being *F qua H* is being a *H* that bears *F-qua* to *H*. Thus, if one cannot be both *G* and *H*, one cannot be *F qua G* and *F qua H*. No such general explanations would be forthcoming if we took *qua*-properties like being *F-qua-G* as primitive without any additional structure. Instead, one would have to *stipulate* that the properties *F-qua-G* and *J-qua-G* are incompatible whenever *F* and *J* are, and that the properties *F-qua-G* and *F-qua-H* are incompatible whenever *G* and *H* are. Why such properties are incompatible, the theory would not tell. The present proposal, by contrast, offers plausible explanations of these facts and, as we shall see in §5.6, of other structural constraints on *qua*-qualification.

Now, talk of relations like *corrupt-qua*, *voting-qua* or *dangerous-qua* may be a little unfamiliar. But it's important to remember that these relations are used to describe things at a relatively high level of generality. As the little unpacking exercise in §3 was meant to illustrate, *qua*-properties will ultimately bottom out in much more ordinary properties such as abusing certain rights, satisfying

particular standards, or harming things. Although for the reasons given in §2.1, the analogy must be handled with care, the situation here is not so different from the one we find ourselves in when theorising about comparative properties. At a high level of generality, we might talk of relations like being tall-for or flat-for, or expensive-for, although ultimately properties like being flat-for-a-meadow will bottom out in much more ordinary properties, in this case perhaps having a suitable proportion of bumpy bits to non-bumpy bits or the like. Similarly for *qua*-qualifications: we use talk of bearing *F*-qua to *G* to theorise about *qua*-qualifications at a high level of generality. Ultimately, these relational properties bottom out in much more ordinary properties. So although perhaps a little unfamiliar, there is no reason to be spooked by the relations *F*-qua on which *qua*-properties like being *F*-qua-*G* are based.

5.3.2 Qualified and Unqualified Properties

The view developed here is committed to there being relations *X*-qua for some properties *X*. This claim is not to be mistaken for the claim that those properties *X* are really relations. My claim is not that there are no monadic properties of being corrupt or dangerous, and that what we thought were those monadic properties are really the binary relations of being corrupt-*qua* or dangerous-*qua*. Nor is my view that the binary relation of voting-for is in fact a ternary relation voting-for...-*qua*. Instead, all I require is that in addition to such properties and relations there are also relations of a higher adicity. There are not only monadic properties of being corrupt or dangerous, there are also binary relations of being corrupt-*qua* or dangerous-*qua*. There is not only a binary relation voting-for but also a ternary relation voting-for...-*qua*, and similarly for other qualifiable properties and relations.

The view does not differ much from what is standardly assumed already.

There is a binary relation of loving y , a monadic property of being loved, a ternary relation of loving y better than z , etc.¹¹ These are all closely related properties and relations of different adicity. Similarly, we'll have a monadic property of being dangerous, a binary relation of being dangerous for y , another binary relation of being dangerous-*qua* X , a ternary relation of being dangerous for y qua X , etc. We simply add to a large stock of closely related properties and relations of different adicity.

One important feature of the view is that the relation between *qualified* and *unqualified* properties can be expected to vary from property to property. In particular, we'd expect there to be *no structural entailments* of the form: If for some X , a is F -qua- X , then a is F . In this respect, *qua*-properties behave like other relational properties. To illustrate, consider the difference between the following inferences:

- (3) a. Ann is eating an apple, so Ann is eating.
 b. Bill is amusing Beth, so Bill is amusing.
 c. Claude is loved by Clive, so Claude is loved.

The inference in (3a) seems fine. Eating an apple implies eating something, and eating something would appear to be sufficient for being such that one is eating. By contrast, the inferences in (3b) and (3c) are more tendentious. Amusing Bill implies amusing someone, but it is less clear that it is sufficient for being amusing that there is someone whom one is amusing. Likewise, being loved by Clive implies being loved by someone, but it is not clear that being loved by someone is always sufficient for being loved (just think of high-school...). Whether bearing a relation to something is sufficient for having a relevant related property varies from case to case, and may sometimes vary with context.¹²

¹¹ As flagged in note 1 above, *property* and *propositions* talk is but a convenient shorthand ultimately to be cashed out in a suitable higher-order language.

¹² Presumably, a grieving mother can truthfully write in a death notice, "He was loved", well aware that everyone but herself hated the son. And perhaps it is possible for a parent worried about their son's anorexia to truthfully say to the siblings at the dinner table, "Your brother is not eating!", even if the son is chewing on a carrot stick.

On the proposed theory of *qua*-properties, inferences from qualified to unqualified properties are similarly variant. Consider (4a–d):

- (4) a. John is corrupt as a judge, so John is corrupt.
 b. John is uncorrupt as a referee, so John is uncorrupt.
 c. John is patient as a parent, so John is patient.
 d. John is impatient as a parent, so John is impatient.

While the inference in (4a) seems fine, those in (4b–d) seem bad. Being corrupt as or *qua* judge implies being corrupt in some capacity (bearing corrupt-*qua* to some appropriate *X* one instantiates) and doing so would indeed appear to be sufficient for being corrupt. Equally, being uncorrupt as or *qua* referee implies being uncorrupt in some capacity (bearing uncorrupt-*qua* to some appropriate *X* one instantiates), but doing so would not appear to be sufficient for being uncorrupt. Finally, neither being patient in some capacity nor being impatient in some capacity would appear to be sufficient for being patient and impatient respectively.¹³

As noted at the start, it is one of the signature features of *qua*-qualification that qualified predication does not in general imply unqualified predication. On the proposed theory of 'qua', it emerges that this variability in entailments is but a special case of a much more general phenomenon: the variability in entailment patterns between relational and non-relational properties. As with other relational properties, having a qualified property is not in general sufficient for having an unqualified property, though arguably the inference schema 'If *a* is *F qua G*, then *a* is *F*' has *some* true instances.

Moreover, these observations help us sharpen the distinction between the proposed metaphysics of *qua*-properties and a natural alternative on which the relation between qualified and unqualified properties is the relation between

¹³ Of course, in line with (3a–c) we'd expect there to be some contextual variation here, too. There will probably be particularly forgiving contexts (e.g. a self-help group?) in which being corrupt in some capacity does not suffice for being corrupt and very stringent contexts (e.g. a yoga retreat?) in which being impatient in some capacity is sufficient for being impatient.

determinates and their *determinables*. Being *F*-qua-*G* is not a *way* of being *F* in the sense in which being lilac is a way of being purple or walking briskly is a way of walking. There is none of the above variability in the relation between determinates and their determinables: determinates necessitate their determinables (Wilson, 2017, §2.1). For instance, it is not possible to be lilac without being purple or to be walking briskly without walking. In fact, that determinates necessitate their determinables *explains* why it is not possible to be *F* in the *G*-way and *J* in the *H*-way when *F* and *J* are incompatible (e.g. being purple in the lilac way and yellow in the canary way) since this would require being both *F* and not-*F*. But as we've seen, it is the signature feature of *qua*-qualifications that it *is* possible to be *F*-qua-*G* and *J*-qua-*H* even when *F* and *J* are incompatible. *Qua*-properties, we can conclude, are not determinates.

This point may have been obscured in the literature because people often focus on contrastive *qua*-qualifications in which negation takes *wide scope*, as in 'John is corrupt as a judge but it is not the case that John is corrupt as a referee'. The determinable/determinate relationship may initially seem like an appropriate model to account for such constructions. For it *is* possible for a flower to be purple in the lilac way while not being yellow in the canary way simply by failing to be yellow. If the flower is not yellow, it is not yellow in the canary way. What is not possible is for the flower to be purple in the lilac way while also being non-purple in some other way (e.g. yellow in the canary way). Once constructions with narrow scope negation or constructions with contraries are on the table, it is clear that the determinable/determinate relation is a dead end.¹⁴

¹⁴ One might think that a more promising way of making use of the determinable/determinate picture is as follows: to be *F* as or qua *G* is not to be *F* in a *G*-way, but rather to be a *G* in an *F*-way, or being *G F*-ly. It is true that in some cases, *qua*-properties ultimately *bottom out* in ways of being or doing things, e.g. being beautiful qua pianist seems to consist in *playing the piano beautifully*. But first, notice that this is not the case in general; to vote *qua* judge does not reduce in any obvious way to being a judge in a voting way or doing things votingly. Secondly, such examples fail to show that being *F* qua *G* is being a *G F*-ly; even in this case, the view is *not* that to be beautiful qua pianist is to *be a pianist* beautifully, a construction verging on the ungrammatical. In fact, both the left-to-right and the right-to-left direction of the proposed equivalence are problematic. For

A final quick note. As flagged above, I'm not going to commit to a particular compositional implementation of the proposed truth-conditions. In particular, the theory is not committed to the claim that the predicates featuring in felicitous *qua*-qualifications have hidden argument places for a property to which they may be relativised. The view could of course be developed in this way, aligning the syntax of *qua*-phrases closely with certain syntactic theories of *for*-PPs used to specify gradable adjectives, as for instance in Stanley (2000). But my view is equally compatible with an alternative syntactic hypothesis on which '*qua*' is a function taking predicates to predicate modifiers, i.e. a function from things of type $\langle e, t \rangle$ to a function from things of type $\langle e, t \rangle$ to things of type $\langle e, t \rangle$. The crucial point for my theory is that in sentences of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ qua } G \urcorner$, the DP '*a*' combines with the predicate '*F-qua-G*' which denotes a *qua*-property. As I'll show in the postscript to this essay, different syntactic derivations will be compatible with this view.

5.3.3 Being G

On my view, being *F qua G* consists in being a *G* which bears a relation *F-qua* to *G*. Consequently, one could not be *F qua G* unless one were a *G*. This verdict strikes me as correct and it is supported not only by the informal gloss on which being *F qua G* is being *F* relative to being *G*, but also in light of the equivalence between being *F qua G* and being an *FG* on the intended non-intersective reading. Being an *FG* requires being a *G*, and so being *F qua G* should, too.¹⁵

instance, that one is oppressed *qua* homosexual certainly does not imply that one is a homosexual in an oppressed way. Equally, that one is a volunteer secretly does not imply that one is secret *qua* volunteer, a predication with the feel of a category mistake. A person cannot be secret. They may be *secretive*, but *being secretive as a volunteer* is plainly not the same as *being a volunteer secretly*. Since adverbs denote properties of states or events which don't usually apply to individuals, there will be many more such examples with the feel of a category mistake on the proposed approach.

¹⁵ There are of course so-called *non-subsective* adjectives like 'former', 'alleged', or 'toy' which work differently: being a former judge does not imply being a judge. However, such adjectives do not undermine the connection between being *F-qua-G* and being an *FG* since the corresponding *qua*-qualifications are not available. 'John is former as a judge', 'John is alleged as a judge', or 'John is toy as a judge' are not well-formed. My claim is that *if* both constructions ('is *F qua G*' and 'is an *FG*') are grammatical and receive the intended non-intersective reading, then being *F*

Nevertheless, one might think that there are obvious counterexamples to the claim that being *F qua G* requires being a *G*. For instance, can a book not be good *qua* pillow without really being a pillow? Can an actor not be good as a detective without really being a detective? I'm inclined to think that they can. But it would be a mistake to change one's theory of qualification to capture these verdicts. To see this, notice that the issue has nothing to do with the specifics of *qua*-qualification. To be sure, *qua*-qualifications behave non-standardly when used in non-standard linguistic environments such as (i) fictional discourse, (ii) contexts of diverted use, or (iii) opaque linguistic contexts. But so do simple predications of the form ' a is G '. Few people would be inclined to conclude that the truth of a sentence of the form ' a is G ' therefore does not require that a is G . Taking the same attitude towards *qua*-qualifications, we should not conclude from the behaviour of *qua*-qualifications in non-standard environments that the truth of a sentence of the form ' a is F qua G ' does not require that a is G .

To see this point more clearly, start out by considering a context of diverted use. Suppose we are trying to get some sleep in a library. I use my copy of *War and Peace* as a pillow. It seems that in such a context, I can felicitously and truly say, 'That copy of *War and Peace* is good as a pillow' without committing myself to the book really being a pillow. But the same seems to be true of the unqualified sentence, 'That copy of *War and Peace* is my pillow'. Although this sentence has a true reading in the context of diverted use, it would not appear to commit the speaker to the claim that their copy of *War and Peace* really is a pillow. Should we conclude that something can be my pillow without being a pillow? No. Rather, we should conclude that contexts of diverted use have relaxed standards for what is required to count as a *G*; being used as a *G* will be enough for counting as a *G*. On this view, both the unqualified sentence ('That copy of *War and Peace* is my pillow') and the qualified sentence ('That copy of *qua G* just is being an *FG*).

War and Peace is good as a pillow') imply that the book is a pillow, it's just that 'is a pillow' is interpreted in non-standard ways in the context of diverted use; roughly, we get that the thing is used as a pillow.¹⁶

Similar observations apply to *qua*-qualifications as used in other non-standard environments such as fictional discourse or opaque linguistic contexts.

To say of Sean Connery that he was brilliant as a spy is still to commit oneself to the claim that Sean Connery was a spy, it is just that *being a spy* is understood in non-standard ways given the interaction with fictional discourse; roughly we get that Sean Connery was a spy *in a particular performance* (however this talk is ultimately understood). That *being a spy* has to be interpreted in a non-standard way to get 'Sean Connery was brilliant as a spy' to sound true comes out clearly, when we consider such sentences as 'Sean Connery and Kim Philby were both brilliant as spies'. This sentence sounds really bad. This is exactly what we'd expect on the view defended here. Given that Sean Connery only played a spy in a movie while Kim Philby was a spy in real life, the predicate 'brilliant as a spy' cannot be interpreted uniformly here.¹⁷

¹⁶ But aren't there cases where an individual *a* could be *F qua G* although presently *a* neither is nor serves as a *G* in a context of diverted use? For instance, consider a restaurant where one of the waiters hasn't shown up for his shift. One of the cooks used to wait tables in college. As her boss approaches, she says, "Don't look at me, I'm terrible as a waitress". The speech seems entirely felicitous and could well be true. Still, the person is not now a waitress nor is she serving as one at the time. Does this show that being *F qua G* does not imply being *G* but merely *either* being *G or having once been G*? It does not. I cannot now be happy as a child, although I once was a child. What is going on in the example is, once again, entirely independent of *qua*-qualifications. Simple sentences of the form '*a* is *G*' give rise to similar issues. For instance, at an emergency site, a retired doctor could well say, "Let me through, I'm a doctor" and an ex-lawyer who is now a housewife could offer a friend legal advice saying, "I can help you, I'm a lawyer". Still, few people would want to conclude that sentences of the form '*a* is *G*' do not imply that *a* is *G*. Rather, we should think that what is required for being *G* varies from context to context. In some contexts, having once worked as a *G* is sufficient for counting as a *G* (e.g. on a plane: "Do we have a doctor on board?"). In others, it is not (e.g. on a tax return: "What's your profession?"). I recommend taking the same attitude towards *qua*-qualifications. The sentence 'I'm terrible as a waitress' implies that the person is a waitress but we have a context where having waited tables before is sufficient for counting as a waitress. Notice that if she had never waited tables, she could not very well have said "I am terrible as a waitress", but at best "I would be terrible as a waitress".

¹⁷ Are there genuine inter-fictional *qua*-qualifications? I think there are clear examples. Imagine an amateur actor who has just about mastered the art of playing a tough lawyer, but lacks the subtlety required to play an ambivalent husband. It seems entirely fine for his drama teacher to say, "You were brilliant as a lawyer, but awful as a husband". That can be true even of scenes were

Likewise for opaque linguistic contexts. It is well-known that the commitments incurred by speakers who utter sentences involving opacity-inducing expressions may differ from the commitments incurred by uttering sentences without such opacity-inducing expressions. For instance, an utterance of ‘The children fear a monster’ does not commit the speaker to the claim that there are monsters, but only to the claim that the children believe there to be monsters. Likewise, an utterance of ‘Oswald is famous as an assassin’ need not commit the speaker to the claim that Oswald is an assassin, but only to the claim that he is widely believed to be an assassin.¹⁸ In both examples the differences in the speakers’ commitments should be explained in terms of a more general theory of how opacity interacts with standard truth conditions, rather than by revising one’s semantics.¹⁹

There is a final point of interest in relation to the requirement of being *G*. I have advertised this chapter as offering an account of what it is for an individual to have different properties relative to different *roles* or *identities*. And indeed, the most familiar examples of *qua*-qualification are ones where being a *G* is a property which is associated with some role, function, or social identity. However, for reasons of generality, it will be useful to develop the theory in a way which does not require *G* to be associated with a role or identity. First, there are important *qua*-qualifications of the form ‘*a* is *F* qua *G*’ for which it is simply unclear whether

the two roles overlap, e.g. a scene in a courtroom, where the lawyer is meant to steal emotionally complex glances at his wife on the gallery while cruelly cross-examining a witness.

¹⁸ Note that unlike ‘Oswald is famous as an assassin’, one cannot say ‘Oswald is a famous assassin’ without committing oneself to the claim that Oswald is an assassin. Is this a counterexample to the claim that being *F* as a *G* just is being an *FG*? Not on the way in which I have previously qualified the claim. The equivalence holds only if ‘is an *FG*’ receives the *non-intersective* reading on which *F* is relativised to *G*. My sense is that ‘Oswald is a famous assassin’ has a prominent *intersective* reading on which Oswald is famous and an assassin. And of course on this reading, the sentence commits speakers to Oswald being an assassin. It is important to note though that opacity is more readily induced by the use of *qua*-qualifications than by modified nominals.

¹⁹ There is an interesting subclass of *qua*-qualifications with proper names, both for fictional discourse (‘Sean Connery was brilliant as James Bond’) and as regards opacity (‘George Orwell is famous as George Orwell, but not as Eric Blair’). One way of fitting such qualifications into the present theory is by arguing that the proper names occurring in the position of *G* here are really predicates (Burge, 1973; Fara, 2015). For reasons of space, I cannot investigate such qualifications with proper names further here.

there is a role, function, or identity associated with being *G*. For instance, one may be interested in claims like '*A* is disadvantaged as a disabled person' without wanting to commit to there being a role, function or identity associated with being a disabled person. There are of course social theories which are thus committed, but this should not already be built into a theory of qualification. Secondly, there are more general concerns with tailoring a theory to fit paradigm examples and particularly familiar cases which have been amply discussed in the metaphysics literature of the past few decades. Arguments from arbitrariness, anthropocentrism, and vagueness have put pressure on the idea that *composition* only occurs in a select number of familiar cases.²⁰ There is a worry that similar objections would await a theory of qualification which requires *G* to always be associated with a function, role, or identity since verdicts on this matter may be arbitrary, anthropocentric, and infused with vagueness. It will then be good to develop the theory in a more general way. As we will see in §§5.5–5.6, this decision still leaves room for interesting questions about which *qua*-qualifications are felicitous and what *qua*-properties exist.

Let me summarise. I have argued that *qua*-properties are relational properties: to be *F*-*qua*-*G* is to be a *G* which bears *F*-*qua* to *G*. I have shown that an account of *qua*-qualification in terms of such relational properties affords a simple metaphysical analysis of the conditions under which *qua*-qualification is possible and I have argued that the analysis sheds light on the tricky relation between qualified and unqualified properties. But this is not the only virtue of the proposed approach to *qua*-qualification. As the next two sections will demonstrate, the theory is *informative* and *adequate* in that it makes correct predictions about the linguistic behaviour of *qua*-qualifications and helps us think more clearly about their logic.

²⁰ See Korman (2015) for a good overview and critical discussion of these arguments.

5.4 Linguistic Behaviour

On my proposed theory of *qua*-qualification, to be *F*-*qua*-*G* is to be a *G* which bears a relation *F*-*qua* to *G*. On the basis of this theory, three testable predictions about the linguistic behaviour of *qua*-qualifications are well-motivated:

- (I) When it is difficult to accept that *a* is *G*, qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$ are infelicitous.
- (II) When it is difficult to see how *F* could be had in relation to other features, qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$ are infelicitous.
- (III) When, it is difficult to see how *F* could be had in relation to *G* in particular, qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$ are infelicitous.

The remainder of this section briefly motivates each of these predictions in turn and shows that they are indeed borne out by the data. Note that since I'm trying to elicit linguistic intuitions, the focus will be mostly on qualifications with 'as' rather than those with the slightly less familiar '*qua*', though sometimes it'll be helpful to consider the data for '*qua*' to ensure that we are indeed latching on to the intended interpretation instead of the copula readings of 'as' which I've set aside in §2.

5.4.1 First Prediction

- (I) When it is difficult to accept that *a* is *G*, qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$ are infelicitous.

For some *a* to have the *qua*-property *F*-*qua*-*G*, *a* must be a *G*. We'd then expect that in cases where it is difficult to accept that this condition is met, it is also difficult to accept qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as a } G \urcorner$. A natural way of testing this prediction is to consider explicit denials. In standard environments, it should not be possible to assert sentences of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as a } G \urcorner$ and then felicitously deny that *a* is a *G*. The prediction would appear to be borne out by the data. Consider for instance (5)–(7):

- (5) John is corrupt as a judge. #But John is not a judge.
- (6) The film is lacking as a drama. #But the film is not a drama.
- (7) Jerry is patient as a father. #But Jerry isn't a father.

Just as we'd predict, it is infelicitous to follow up on the first assertion in (5)–(7) with the second assertion.

Another way of testing the first prediction is to consider pairs of *qua*-qualifications of the form $\lceil a \text{ is } F \text{ qua } G \text{ but } a \text{ is } J \text{ qua } H \rceil$, where G and H are mutually incompatible. On the proposed theory, such pairings would be predicted to be infelicitous since their truth would require a to have incompatible properties. This prediction, too, would appear to be borne out. Consider (8a–c) below:

- (8) a. #John is apt as a writer but inapt as an illiterate.
- b. #Jerry is attentive as a husband but inattentive as a bachelor.
- c. #Jill is happy as a Catholic but unhappy as a Protestant.

(8a–c) are infelicitous. This is what one would expect on the present theory, since their truth would require having such incompatible properties as being both a writer and an illiterate, being both married and unmarried, and being both a Catholic and a Protestant.

You'd expect these effects to arise whether or not ' a is G ' is entailed or presupposed. Though I don't have space to develop this point in detail here, there is good reason to think that just as sentences of the form $\lceil S \text{ knows that } p \rceil$ both entail and presuppose that p , so sentences of the form $\lceil a \text{ is } F \text{ as a } G \rceil$ both entail and presuppose that a is G . Thus, the proposition that a is G would appear to project out of environments like negations (9b), questions (9c), and if-clauses (9d). Moreover, it can be filtered out by making it the antecedent of a conditional (9e):

- (9) a. John is corrupt as a judge.
- b. John isn't corrupt as a judge.
- c. Is John corrupt as a judge?

d. If John is corrupt as a judge, he belongs in prison.

e. If John is a judge, John is corrupt as a judge.

Just like the unembedded (9a), (9b–d) would be infelicitous in a context in which it is not taken for granted that John is a judge.²¹ By contrast, (9e) would be fine in such a context; the presupposition has successfully been filtered out.²² The way the proposition that John is a judge projects out of various embeddings of the *qua*-qualification is exactly what you'd expect to see if we had a presupposition.

As indicated in §4.3, things will look slightly different in non-standard linguistic environments. However, here too, everything behaves exactly as one would expect.

(i.) In cases of diverted use, individuals are used as Gs, though it may be controversial whether they really are Gs. In such cases we'd predict sentence of the form 'a is F as a G' to be infelicitous when it is not credible that a is used as a G. The prediction would appear to be borne out by the data. Imagine two visitors at the British Museum contemplating a valuable old bible locked behind glass. In the envisaged context, (10a) sounds odd to my ears. (10b), which uses the subjunctive, is much better.

(10) a. ??This bible is good as a paperweight.

b. This bible would be good as a paperweight.

While it is fine to say of a book which isn't used as a paperweight that it *would* be good in that capacity, it sounds odd to say of such a book that it *is* good as a paperweight.

(ii.) In fictional discourse, individuals are said to be Gs in pictures, stories, plays, movies, etc. In such cases, we'd predict that an utterance of a sentence of the

²¹ Some may find it a bit harder to hear the presupposition in (9d). Given the many subtleties in the ways in which presuppositions project out of conditionals, it is not too surprising that the projection data is much clearer under negation or questions. See Karttunen (1973) for discussion.

²² Though note that if it is *ruled out* in the conversation that John is a judge, (9e) would again be predicted to be infelicitous on the assumption that, as argued by von Stechow (1998), indicative conditionals presuppose that their antecedent is epistemically possible.

form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as a } G \urcorner$ cannot be felicitously followed up by a denial of the claim that a is a G in the relevant medium. This prediction would appear to be confirmed, too.

- (11) a. Sean Connery was brilliant as a spy in *Diamonds are Forever*. But Sean Connery was not a spy.
 b. Sean Connery was brilliant as a spy in *Diamonds are Forever*. #But Sean Connery was not a spy in *Diamonds are Forever*.

While the denial in (11a) is alright, the one in (11b) is infelicitous.

(iii.) Finally, in opaque environments, individuals may be considered G s by the subject of the attitude, even if they are not in fact G s. In such cases, we'd predict that an utterance of a sentence of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as a } G \urcorner$ cannot be felicitously followed up by a denial of the form a is considered to be a G . This prediction would also appear to be borne out by the data.

- (12) a. Oswald is famous as an assassin. But Oswald isn't an assassin.
 b. Oswald is famous as an assassin. #But no one thinks Oswald is an assassin.

While the denial is fine in (12a), it is infelicitous in (12b). All the above observations are in line with what the present theory would predict.

5.4.2 Second Prediction

- (II) When it is difficult to see how F could be had in relation to other features, qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$ are infelicitous.

For some individual a to have the qua-property F -qua- G , a must bear a relation F -qua to G . But in cases where it is difficult to see how F could be had relative to other features, it will be difficult to accept that there should be any such relation F -qua and hence difficult to accept the relevant *qua*-qualification. *Qua*-qualifications with such F are then predicted to be infelicitous.

To test this prediction, consider bodily features like being blond, being six feet tall, or having a knee injury. These are good examples of properties which are not usually taken to be had in relation to other features. We'd then predict *qua*-qualifications of the form 'a is F as/qua G' in which F denotes one of these properties to be infelicitous.

To reduce potential background noise resulting from a lack of relevance of G to F, it'll be good to use a G which could be relevant to the having of bodily features, e.g. being an athlete. Now consider (13a–c):

- (13) a. ??Anders is six feet tall as an athlete.
 b. ??Anders is blond as an athlete.
 c. ??Anders has a knee injury as an athlete.

(13a–c) are quite odd. To the extent that we get acceptable readings of these at all, these would appear to be the kinds of copula readings set aside in §2, e.g. readings on which Anders is blond *when* he is an athlete (he might dye his hair for competitions and tournaments) or on which Anders has a knee injury *because* he is an athlete. But as noted in §2, such copula readings must be distinguished from genuine *qua*-qualifications.

We can control for the noise from copula readings to a certain degree by using '*qua*'. In accordance with the second prediction, (14a–c) are worse still.

- (14) a. #Anders is six feet tall qua athlete.
 b. #Anders is blond qua athlete.
 c. #Anders has a knee injury qua athlete.

On the proposed theory of qualification, these data are to be expected. Since being six feet tall, being blond, or having a knee injury would not appear to be properties which one has in relation to other things, it is difficult to see what relations *blond-qua*, *six-feet-tall-qua*, *having-a-knee-injury-qua* could be. And this in turn makes it difficult to evaluate the claim that Anders bears such relations

to being an athlete, resulting in the infelicity of the examples.²³ Indeed, the observation that we reach for copula readings in interpreting (13a–c) suggests that we struggle to identify any other relation to *G* than a causal or temporal relation. The second prediction would then appear to be borne out by the data, too.

5.4.3 Third Prediction

- (III) When, it is difficult to see how *F* could be had in relation to *G* in particular, qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$ are infelicitous.

For some individual *a* to have the qua-property *F*-qua-*G*, *a* must bear a relation *F*-qua to *G*. However, for some values of *G* it is hard to see how a given *F* could be had or lacked in relation to *G* in particular. Since in such cases, it is hard for speakers to understand the corresponding *qua*-qualifications, we'd predict such *qua*-qualifications to be infelicitous. For instance, it is relatively clear how talent could be had relative to being a dancer or singer, but much less clear how talent could be had relative to being a person. We'd then predict (15b) to be significantly worse than (15a), a prediction which appears to be borne out:

- (15) a. Anders is talented as a dancer.
 b. ??Anders is talented as a person.

Likewise, it is easy to see how corrupt-*qua* can be borne to being a judge or a referee or a politician, but hard to see how it could be borne to being a cat owner. And it is easy to see how kind-*qua* can be borne to being a teacher or a parent

²³ Difficult to interpret, I say, not impossible. The more we provide details that allow speakers to understand how *F* could be had relative to *G*, the more such sentences will improve. Suppose for instance, that Anders is both a swimmer and a figure skater. His injury prevents him from executing complicated jumps, but doesn't affect his swimming. Now, suppose a journalist asks Anders' manager whether Anders has a knee injury. The following response is still not great, but I think we could make sense of it: "As a swimmer he doesn't, but as a figure skater he does". Easier to understand would be "He is injured as a figure skater, but not as a swimmer". I suspect this is because the former sentence seems to be making the weird claim that there is a physical condition such that Anders' *having that condition* is relative to a role, while the latter sentence is more readily understood as the reasonable claim that there is a physical condition Anders has where whether that conditions counts as an *injury* depends on the role.

or a friend, but difficulty to see how kind-qua could be borne to being a dancer. We'd therefore predict a clear contrast between (16a–b) and (17a–b).

- (16) a. Beth is corrupt as referee.
 b. ??Beth is corrupt as a cat owner.
- (17) a. Clive is kind as a teacher.
 b. ??Clive is kind as a dancer.

Here again, the prediction appears to be borne out. It is unclear what being talented relative to being a person, being corrupt relative to being a cat owner, or being kind relative to being a dancer would amount to. Consequently, (15b), (16b), and (17b) all sound odd. It bears emphasis that for these examples, it is also difficult to hear a *non-intersective* reading of attributive constructions of the form 'is an *FG*'.

- (18) a. Anders is a talented person.
 b. Beth is a corrupt cat owner.
 c. Clive is a kind dancer.

(18a–c) invoke the unrelativised, intersective readings: Anders is a person who is talented, Beth is a cat owner who is corrupt, and Clive is a dancer who is kind. That the non-intersective readings of (18a–c) are hard to hear is just what you'd expect given the infelicity of (15b), (16b), and (17b). After all, we've assumed that on the non-intersective reading of (18a–c) these are equivalent to (15b), (16b), and (17b) respectively. Given that the latter are infelicitous, the former encourage the more felicitous intersective reading.

Finally, we'd predict the required readings to become available if it can be made clear what it would be to be talented/corrupt/kind relative to these roles. That prediction, too, would appear to be borne out. For instance, consider the following backstory.

Cat Trade. For animal rights reasons, the breeding and selling of cats is highly regulated. Only a few certified cat owners are allowed to breed cats,

and no one is allowed to buy more than one cat every five years. Beth is a certified cat owner who takes hefty sums from people in exchange for providing them with several cats at once.

Against the background of **Cat Trade**, consider again (16b):

(16b) Beth is corrupt as a cat owner.

To my ears, the sentences improves significantly. Moreover, the non-intersective reading of (18b) becomes easier to hear, too. The infelicity of (16b) without the backstory and its acceptability given the backstory thus further supports the third prediction, as does the data concerning the availability of the non-intersective reading of constructions of the form 'is an *FG*'.

The aim of this section was to show that the proposed theory of *qua*-qualification is *informative* in that it generates testable predictions, and that it is *adequate* in that these predictions are borne out by the data. The final section shows how the present theory can help us think more clearly about the logic of *qua*-qualifications.

5.5 Logic

One of the virtues of the present theory is that it helps us think more clearly about the logic of *qua*-qualifications as well as locate interesting decision points for a formal theory of *qua*-properties. While the following are only the first steps towards a more general investigation of the logic of qualification, the discussion should be able to showcase the potential of the proposed theory for advancing such an investigation.

Note that for the purposes of this section I'll focus on *qua*-qualifications occurring in standard environments. The sorts of non-standard *qua*-qualifications mentioned earlier will be set aside entirely. For ease of reference, let me repeat the proposed truth conditions for *qua*-qualifications in terms of *qua*-properties.

Qua-qualification: A sentence of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ qua } G \urcorner$ is true if and only if a is F -qua- G .

Qua-properties: For a to be F -qua- G is for a to be a G which bears F -qua to G .

Here is a list of the principles which will be considered, as well as a preview of my verdicts. Question marks indicate that the verdict depends on how certain choice-points independent of my theory are resolved.

- (✓) **Exclusivity:** Not (a is F qua G and a is not- F qua G)
- (✗) **Exhaustivity:** Either a is F qua G or a is not- F qua G
- (✓) **Factivity:** If a is F qua G , then a is G
- (✗) **Collapse:** If a is F qua G , then a is F
- (?) **Left Ex:** If a is G , there is some X such that a is X -qua- G
- (?) **Right Ex:** If a is F , there is some X such that a is F -qua- X
- (✗) **Left Up:** If a is F qua G and being F implies being J , then a is J qua G
- (✗) **Right Up:** If a is F qua G and being G implies being H , then a is F qua H
- (?) **Left Agglo:** If a is F qua G and a is J qua G , then a is $(F$ and $J)$ qua G
- (?) **Right Agglo:** If a is F qua G and a is F qua H , then a is F qua $(G$ and $H)$

In the above schematic principles, ' a ' is intended as a constant term in English ranging over individuals, while ' F ' and ' G ' are intended as constant terms in English ranging over predicates. We'll say that a principle *holds* just in case every instance of it is true. The remainder of this section assesses the above principle in light of the proposed theory of *qua*-qualification.

5.5.1 Exclusivity and Exhaustivity

I want to argue that while **Exclusivity** holds on the proposed theory, **Exhaustivity** does not.

Exclusivity: Not (a is F qua G and a is not- F qua G)

Exhaustivity: Either a is F qua G or a is not- F qua G

To be F qua G is to be a G bearing F -qua to G . To be (not- F) qua G is to be a G bearing the contradictory relation (not- F)-qua to G . Since no single individual can bear a relation and its contradictory to the same things, **Exclusivity** must hold. Indeed, Exclusivity follows from the following highly natural principle (together with the Law of Non-Contradiction):

Neg Export: If a is (not- F) qua G , then it is not the case that a is F qua G ²⁴

By contrast, **Exhaustivity** would not appear to hold. As pointed out in §5.4, the proposed theory implies the following principle:

Factivity: If a is F qua G , then a is G

But now consider some a and G such that a is not G . Since a is not G , a is not F qua G . But equally, since a is not G , a is not (not- F) qua G . So in cases where a is not G , we'll get counterinstances to **Exhaustivity**. If one is not a parent, one is neither patient as a parent, nor impatient as a parent. These observations might recommend the following weakening:

Cautious Exhaustivity: If a is G , either a is F qua G or a is (not- F) qua G

However, on the present theory, this principle is still questionable for reasons which arise for ordinary relations, too. Consider the relation of being taller than. Is it the case that I'm bearing either taller than or not-taller than to the number 2? The problem is of course that the number 2 has no height, and that consequently my height neither exceeds the height of 2 nor is it such that it doesn't exceed the height of 2.²⁵ Given that on the proposed view, *qua*-qualifications ascribe relational properties, we'd expect there to be similar counterexamples to **Cautious**

²⁴ The converse of **Neg Export** must of course be denied.

²⁵ These observations need not require a denial of the Law of Excluded Middle, since one might still hold that 'It is not the case that I am taller than the number 2' is true, though normally not felicitously assertable (cf. Magidor, 2013, Ch.5).

Exhaustivity. Even if a is G , it might still be that neither F -qua nor not- F -qua are borne to G . Indeed we've already encountered such cases in §5.5.3. For instance, since being talented-*qua* does not appear to be a relation which can be borne to being a person, persons would appear to be neither talented-*qua*-persons nor untalented-*qua*-persons, in violation of **Cautious Exhaustivity**.

5.5.2 No Collapse

The following principle is particularly relevant to the philosophical applications of a theory of *qua*-qualification to non-identity arguments by Leibniz's Law:

Collapse: If a is F qua G , then a is F .

It is a minimal requirement on any successful theory of *qua*-qualification that **Collapse** does *not* hold. For suppose that every instance of **Collapse** were true. Then it would be impossible to be both F qua G and (not- F) qua H at the same time, since this would require being both F and not- F at the same time. Moreover, assuming **Neg Export**, we'd get the straightforward contradiction ' a is F and it is not the case that a is F '. **Collapse** cannot hold on any admissible theory of qualification.

As argued in §5.4.2, there is good reason to think that **Collapse** does not hold on the present theory. On this theory, a 's being F -qua- G implies that there is some X such that a bears F -qua to X . But I have argued that there are F for which bearing F -qua to some X is not sufficient for being F . For instance, while being corrupt relative to some of one's capacities would appear to be sufficient for being corrupt, being uncorrupt relative to some of one's capacities would not appear to be sufficient for being uncorrupt. I've also argued that this variability is in continuity with inferences involving more ordinary relations. For instance, while being such that one is eating something would appear to be sufficient for being such that one eating, being such that one is amusing someone would not appear

to be sufficient for being such that one is amusing. Though **Collapse** may have some true instances, the principle does not hold in general. It is precisely this logical feature of *qua* which makes room for the possibility of being both *F qua G* and *J qua H*, even when *G* and *H* are mutually incompatible.

5.5.3 Existence Principles

Consider the following two interesting principles about which *qua*-properties exist.

Left Ex: If *a* is *G*, there is some *X* such that *a* is *X qua G*.

Right Ex: If *a* is *F*, there is some *X* such that *a* is *F qua X*.

Now, if we had the following principle, the above would be immediate:

Reflexivity: If *a* is *F*, *a* is *F qua F*.

However, on the proposed theory, there is no reason to adopt this principle. To be *F-qua-F* would be to be an *F* which bears *F-qua* to *F*, but there is no evident reason why every *F* would meet this condition. Indeed, there appear to be good counterexamples to **Reflexivity**. For instance, both Picasso and Kim Kardashian are famous. But while Kim Kardashian is famous as (someone) famous, Picasso is not famous as (someone) famous. Picasso is famous as an artist. Reflexivity would not appear to hold, and so the above two principles would need an independent defence.²⁶

Note though that given the existence of copula uses of 'as', we expect there to be *apparent* instances of **Reflexivity** which sound trivially true. These readings are particularly salient in constructions where genuine *qua*-qualifications are difficult to access:

²⁶ Nothing in this example depends on possible opacity in the predicate 'is famous', since the case is still compelling if we assume that everyone knows who Picasso is, who the Kardashians are, that Picasso is a famous person and an artist, that the Kardashians are famous people, etc. Finally, since we may assume that Picasso and the Kardashians are similarly well-known in the wider population, the example does not rely on differences in comparative fame.

- (19) a. John is blond. So John is blond as a blond person.
 b. Sally weighs 60kg. So Sally weighs 60kg as a person weighing 60kg.
 c. John was born on a Tuesday. So John was born on a Tuesday as a person born on a Tuesday.

As argued in §5.5, when it is difficult to see how one could bear *F*-qua to *G*, *qua*-qualifications of the form '*a* is *F* as/qua *G*' will be infelicitous. In such cases, it is only natural for cooperative listeners to search for other, more felicitous interpretations. One such interpretation is offered by copula-readings of the as-phrases in (19a–c) which can be paraphrased as follows:

- (19*) a. John is blond. So being a blond person, John is blond.
 b. Sally weighs 60kg. So being a person weighing 60kg, Sally weighs 60kg.
 c. John was born on a Tuesday. So being a person born on a Tuesday, John was born on a Tuesday.

(19*a–c) are indeed trivially true. But these sentences are not instances of **Reflexivity**.

The merit of both **Left Ex** and **Right Ex** would appear to depend on substantive assumptions which are independent of the proposed theory. For **Left Ex** to hold, it would have to be the case that for every *G* there is some relation *X*-qua which is borne to *G*, and so that there are no properties which are isolated in the sense that no *qua*-relation is borne to them. This strikes me as a substantive assumption, for might there not be properties unsuited as qualifiers, e.g. being such that $2+2=4$? Likewise, for **Right Ex** to hold, it would have to be the case that for every *F* there is a relation *F*-qua borne to some *X*. But perhaps there are properties *F* (mass, perhaps?) for which there is never a corresponding relation *F*-qua which can be borne to other properties.

An interesting test ground for both principles is the question of what we should say about properties like being self-identical. One possible view would be

that an individual *a* is self-identical-qua-*G* for every *G* it instantiates (including being self-identical), in which case we'd get both **Left Ex** and **Right Ex** alongside true *qua*-qualifications such as the following (provided that John is a judge and born on a Tuesday):

- (20) a. John is self-identical *qua* judge.
 b. John is self-identical *qua* born on a Tuesday
 c. John is self-identical *qua* being either a genius or such that $2+2=4$.

Another possible view would be that an individual *a* is *F*-qua-self-identical for any *F* it instantiates (including being self-identical); again we'd get both **Left Ex** and **Right Ex**, as well as true *qua*-qualifications such as the following (provided that John is a judge and born on a Tuesday):

- (21) a. John is a judge *qua* self-identical.
 b. John is borne on a Tuesday *qua* self-identical.
 c. John is either a genius or such that $2+2=4$ *qua* self-identical.

On the proposed theory of *qua*-qualification, both proposals look questionable. The former view would require that there is not just self-identity, but also a relation of being self-identical-*qua*, a view which smacks of relative identity.²⁷ The latter faces similar issues as **Right Up** below. Given how all encompassing one's being self-identical is, we'd expect it to be incredibly difficult to bear any halfway demanding relation *F*-qua to being self-identical. Of course, neither **Left Ex** nor **Right Ex** make the claim that there is a single *X* (like being self-identical) witnessing the truth of each instance. Nevertheless fixing on a candidate for *X* helps bring out some of the issues surrounding principles like **Right Ex** and **Left Ex**. Ultimately though, both **Left Ex** and **Right Ex** are independent of the proposed theory.

²⁷ Of course, there will be entirely trivial *copula-readings* of sentences like 'John is self-identical as a judge' for which it is sufficient that John is self-identical and a judge. The question is whether there are genuine *qua*-qualifications so that there are true instances of the schema 'a is self-identical qua *G* and *a* is self-differing-qua *H*'.²⁷

5.5.4 Closure under Implication and Conjunction

Finally, let us consider some closure properties of *qua*-properties, starting with closure under implication. There are two principles to consider.

Left Up: If a is F qua G and being F implies being J , then a is J qua G

Right Up: If a is F qua G and being G implies being H , then a is F qua H

Let me briefly clarify what I mean by *implication*. I will not operate with a strict logical sense of entailment here, on which, for instance, being red implies being red or green, but on which being red fails to imply being coloured. The main reason for this decision is that, as we shall see below, there is some leeway in how to think about *qua*-qualifications involving logically complex predicates like ‘is F and G ’, ‘is F if G ’, or ‘is F or G ’, and how such choices are resolved has an impact on the relevant closure principles. Instead, we’ll say that being F implies being G just in case being F necessitates being G , i.e. just in case the strict conditional is true: $\Box\forall x(Fx \rightarrow Gx)$. We’d then get the following examples of one property implying another: being red implies being coloured, y ’s being located south of x implies x ’s being located north of y , being a woman implies being an adult. Focusing on properties necessitated by other properties somewhat simplifies the task, though a more general investigation of the logic of qualification will have to incorporate complex predicates.

Start out by considering **Left Up**. As stated, this principle would not appear to hold on the present theory. The main problem is that on our theory, being F and bearing F -qua to some X are distinct. Consequently, that F implies J does not yet settle whether bearing F -qua to some X implies bearing J -qua to X . By contrast, we get a clear verdict for the following slightly modified principle:

Left Up*: If a is F qua G and bearing F -qua to X implies bearing J -qua to X , then a is J qua G .

This principle falls straight out of the present theory. Suppose a is F qua G . Then a is a G bearing F -qua to G . Moreover, by hypothesis, bearing F -qua to G implies bearing J -qua to G . By modus ponens, a bears J -qua to G . Since a is a G bearing J -qua to G , a is J qua G . This strikes me as the right verdict. For instance, presumably bearing making-£80,000-qua to some X implies bearing making-more-than-£50,000-qua to X . **Left Up***, then correctly predicts that if John makes £80,000 as a judge, John makes more than £50,000 as a judge.²⁸

Next, consider **Right Up**. Clearly, this principle cannot hold. For suppose John is corrupt qua judge, and suppose being a judge implies being a person. Then, given **Right Up**, we'd get that John is corrupt qua person. Next, suppose John is uncorrupt qua referee, and being a referee implies being a person. Then, given **Right Up**, we'd get that John is uncorrupt qua person. But then we'd get that John is corrupt qua person and John is uncorrupt qua person, in violation of **Exclusivity**. Given **Neg Export**, we'd get the following contradiction: John is corrupt qua person and it is not the case that John is corrupt qua person. **Right Up** cannot hold.

The present theory can draw on more general considerations about relations to explain why not all instances of **Right Up** are true. For **Right Up** to hold on the present proposal, it would have to be that any relation borne to some x is also borne to any larger class including x . But that's clearly not the case. Consider the relation a beam of light bears to the area of a wall which it illuminates. There is no temptation here to think that if the beam bears the illuminating-relation to area a , it'll also bears the illuminating-relation to any larger area a' properly including a . On the present theory, **Right Up** fails for similar reasons. G is "included" in H , yet that a relation X -qua is borne to the smaller role G does not guarantee that it is also

²⁸ Note also that in contrast to **Left Up**, **Left Up*** might make it possible to avoid the consequence that someone who is F qua G has every necessary property qua G . Consider **Left Up** first. Suppose John is corrupt qua judge. Since necessarily everything is such that $2+2=4$, necessarily everything that's corrupt is such that $2+2=4$. If we had **Left Up**, we'd get that being corrupt qua judge implies being such that $2+2=4$ qua judge. By contrast, **Left Up*** only has this consequence if bearing-corrupt-qua to X implies bearing being-such-that- $2+2=4$ -qua to X , which is perhaps less clear.

borne to the wider role H . For instance, the role of a doctor is much wider than that of a surgeon. Consequently, bearing a relation like being competent-*qua* or incompetent-*qua* to being a surgeon need not imply that one bears such a relation to the wider role of being a doctor. That's why, although every surgeon is a doctor, one can be incompetent as a surgeon without necessarily being incompetent as a doctor. If the duties of a H are more comprehensive than those of a G , it'll be possible to bear a relation X -*qua* to G without bearing it to H .

Finally, consider the following two principles for conjunction closure:

Left-Agglo: If a is F *qua* G and a is J *qua* G , then a is $(F$ and $J)$ *qua* G .

Right-Agglo: If a is F *qua* G and a is F *qua* H , then a is F *qua* $(G$ and $H)$.

The present theory by itself does not deliver verdicts on these principles. The reason is that it is simply a little unclear how we should think of qualifications with logically complex predicates like ' $(F_1$ and $F_2)$ '. If being F *qua* G consists in bearing F -*qua* to G , how should we think of bearing $(F_1$ and $F_2)$ -*qua* to G ? If one thought bearing $(F_1$ and $F_2)$ -*qua* to G is the same as bearing F_1 -*qua* to G and bearing F_2 -*qua* to G , **Left-Agglo** (and its converse) would be trivial. But one might also think that we have an "emergent" relation $(F_1$ and $F_2)$ -*qua*, something which does not reduce to its conjunct relations in that way. Likewise for **Right-Agglo**. One could think that something bearing F -*qua* to $(G_1$ and $G_2)$ is the same as it bearing F -*qua* to G_1 and bearing F -*qua* to G_2 , in which case **Right-Agglo** (and its converse) would be trivial. Or one might think that the conjunctive property $(G_1$ and $G_2)$ is an "emergent" property, something which does not reduce to its conjunct properties in that way. Put differently, whether the agglomeration principles hold, depends on more general questions about the nature of conjunctive relations which are independent of the proposed theory.

This concludes my cursory discussion of the logic of *qua*-qualifications. While the above only provides the starting point to a more general investigation of the

logic of *qua*, the discussion should nonetheless have demonstrated the potential of the proposed theory for advancing such an investigation.

5.6 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I have developed and defended an account of qualifications with 'as' or 'qua' on which such qualifications ascribe relational properties to individuals. To be *F qua G* is to be *F-qua-G*, where this, in turn, consists in bearing a relation *F-qua* to *G*. While at a high level of generality, the interpretation of qua-qualifications is not as systematic as one might have hoped, I have shown that qua-qualifications can often be unpacked quite easily, and that the properties which qua-qualifications ascribe to individuals are often perfectly ordinary properties such as abusing a privilege, exercising a right, or being paid for doing some work. Next, I have argued that an account of qua-qualification in terms of relational properties affords a clear and general solution to the puzzle cases of interest, and more generally explains how qua-qualification is possible. Finally, I have shown that the proposed theory makes adequate predictions about the linguistic behaviour of qua-qualifications and helps us think more clearly about their logic. Since, taken together, this is more than any extant competing theory can claim, the proposal offers the best account of qua-qualification to date.

Little has been said in this piece about the philosophically more contentious applications of a theory of qualification mentioned in the introduction, though I hope to explore some of these applications in future work. However, at the very least the proposed theory affords the possibility of investigating interesting applications of qua-qualifications in philosophy within the bounds of a theory which does not collapse under scrutiny.

5.7 Postscript: A Note on Syntax and Semantics

In *Towards a Theory of 'Qua'*, I propose truth-conditions for qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$. By contrast, little is said there about their compositional implementation. The aim of this postscript is to explore two possible compositional implementations and discuss their respective merits and drawbacks.

1. Recap: Truth Conditions

On my view, being F as or qua G is having a qua-property: F -qua- G :

Qua-Qualification: A sentence of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ qua } G \urcorner$ is true if and only if a is F -qua- G .

Moreover, I have argued that such qua-properties are relational properties. Just as talking-to-Mary is a relational property based on the talking-to relation, so being corrupt-qua-judge is a relational property based on the corrupt-qua relation. We get:

Qua-Properties: For a to be F -qua- G is for a to bear F -qua to G .

I've argued that this account affords a clear metaphysical analysis of how qua-qualification is possible. And I have shown that the account makes adequate predictions regarding the felicity of various qua-qualifications and helps us think more clearly about their logic. What I haven't done, is specify how the proposed truth conditions are implemented compositionally. What does 'qua' mean? And how do qua-phrases compose? In what follows I'll explore two proposals each of which has their merits and costs.

To simplify I'll be working with an extensional semantics, but it should be straightforward to move to an intensional setting in the usual way: intransitive verbs are not of type $\langle e, t \rangle$ but of type $\langle s, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$, transitive verbs are not of type $\langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$ but of type $\langle s, \langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle \rangle$ Propositions are not of type t , but type $\langle s, t \rangle$ etc.


2. Composing Qua-Phrases

Proposal 1: Qua-phrases are modifiers

It is natural to assume that predicates like 'corrupt', 'kind' or 'patient' are of type $\langle e, t \rangle$. If we start out with qualifications which qualify such predicates, the following hypothesis regarding the composition of qua-phrases is extremely natural: 'qua' is a function taking predicates to predicate modifiers, i.e. a function taking predicates to a function from predicates to predicates.

Consider the sentence 'John is corrupt qua judge'. A natural hypothesis is that 'qua' (which is of type $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle \rangle$) first combines with 'judge' (which is of type $\langle e, t \rangle$) to yield 'qua-judge' (which is of type $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$). 'Qua-judge', in turn, combines with 'corrupt' (which is of type $\langle e, t \rangle$) to yield 'corrupt-qua-judge'. The predicate 'corrupt-qua-judge' (which is of type $\langle e, t \rangle$) then combines with 'John' (type e) to yield a truth-value. Simplifying slightly, we get the following syntactic tree:²⁹


(1) John is corrupt qua judge



²⁹For the sake of simplicity, I'm omitting the copula 'is'; this is common practice since the copula is probably semantically vacuous. See Heim & Kratzer (1998, ch.4) for discussion.


I've assumed that *qua*-phrases can combine with transitive verbs as well, as in 'John makes £80,000 qua judge'. The syntactic tree for such *qua*-qualifications would then be slightly more complex, since presumably 'makes' ($\langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$) combines with £80,000 (e) to yield something of type $\langle e, t \rangle$: the predicate 'makes £80,000':

(2) John makes £80,000 qua judge



Note that in English, 'as-phrases' contain the indefinite article 'a', suggesting the following structure:

(3) John is corrupt as a judge



A natural suggestion in dealing with this divergence between 'as' and 'qua' is to treat the indefinite article in the DP as semantically vacuous, as suggested by Heim & Kratzer (1998, ch.4) for predicative uses of the indefinite article, e.g. the 'a' in 'Fido is a dog'. We could then assign to 'a' an identity function, the function which takes functions of type $\langle e, t \rangle$ to themselves. On this proposal, we'd get $\llbracket a \text{ judge} \rrbracket = \llbracket \text{judge} \rrbracket$. Such a treatment does not seem implausible given that in other close languages like German, French and Spanish, there is no indefinite article in what corresponds to as-phrases, we have 'als Richter', 'comme juge' and 'como juez' respectively.³⁰

In cases where it is plausible that the predicate F in a qua-qualification of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ as/qua } G \urcorner$ is of type $\langle e, t \rangle$, the above proposal for the composition of qua-qualifications is extremely natural. However, for other predicates F , a different starting point appears more natural.

³⁰Alternatively, one could say that 'as' is of type $\langle \langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle, \langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle \rangle$ since it combines with a DP of type $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle$ to yield a function from predicates to predicates. To fix ideas and keep things simple, I'll assume that the former account is correct.

Proposal 2: Qua-phrases are arguments

According to a widely held view, sentences like (4) are such that without the contribution of context, no complete proposition is expressed by them.³¹

(4) John is tall.

On this view, there is no such property as being simply tall, no set of all tall things. Instead, there are only properties like being a tall toddler/ being tall for a toddler, being a tall woman/ being tall for a woman, being a tall basketball player/ being tall for a basketball player etc. The positive form of gradable adjectives like 'tall' is commonly taken to include, at the level of logical form, a variable for a comparison class.³² This can be indicated as in (4_{LF}):

(4_{LF}) John is tall_[X].

(4) would then resemble sentences like (5) in that it expresses a complete proposition only relative to an assignment of a value to the free variable in the sentence.

(5) John likes her.

(5_{LF}) John likes her_x.

The predicate 'tall' comes to mean 'tall *F*' or 'tall for an *F*' when being *F* is salient in conversation. For instance the linguistic or extra linguistic context could be such that 'tall' means 'tall basketball player' or 'tall for a basketball player', where the sentences 'John is a tall basketball player' and 'John is tall for a basketball player' are taken to express complete propositions.

A similarly widely held view has it that sentences like (6) do not express complete propositions without the contribution of context.³³

³¹See for instance Montague (1974), Higginbotham (1985, p.563ff.), Parsons (1990, p.42ff.), Stanley (2002, p.159), Richard (2004, p.218f.), Martí (2006, p.140)

³²This assumption is not uncontroversial in the literature though. See Kennedy (2007, §2.2) for discussion.

³³See for instance Geach (1956), Montague (1974), Thompson (1997, 2008) and more recently Almotahari & Hosein (2015).

(6) John is good.

The thought is similar. There is no such property as being simply good, not set of all good things. Instead there are only properties like being a good person / being good as a person, being a good boxer / being good as a boxer or being a good murderer / being good as a murderer etc. It might then be tempting to think that the unqualified form of the predicate 'good' has a hidden argument place for a respect or capacity relative to which the thing is said to be good, as indicated in (6_{LF}) below:


(6_{LF}) John is good_[X].

Like (5), (6) would then express a complete proposition only relative to an assignment of a value to the free variable in the sentence, where such an assignment is somehow provided by context. For instance, if being a judge is salient in the conversation, 'good' comes to mean 'good judge' or 'good as/qua judge', where the sentence 'John is good as/qua judge' is then taken to express a complete proposition.

Now it is important to remember that as argued in *Towards a Theory of 'Qua'*, the meaning of qualifications with 'as' or 'qua' differs from that of the *for*-phrases used to specify the comparison classes of gradable adjectives. Being *F* as or qua *G* must not be confused with being *F* for a *G*. Nevertheless, the example of 'good' might suggest that there is a *syntactic* parallel between *qua*-phrases and *for*-phrases. Perhaps both have the function of providing a value for a hidden variable.

This sort of view suggests a rather different account of the composition of qua-qualifications. In a sentence like (6), qua-phrases would serve to provide values for the hidden variable *X* in the predicate 'good'. The syntactic tree for a sentence like (7) would then presumably look like this:

(7) John is good qua judge




Here ‘judge’ slots into the hidden argument place in ‘good’. On this picture it is plausible to think of ‘qua’ as semantically vacuous. Just as in the case of the indefinite article in *as*-phrases, we could then assign to ‘qua’ an identity function: the function which maps each function of type $\langle e, t \rangle$ to itself. We’d then get $\llbracket \text{qua judge} \rrbracket = \llbracket \text{judge} \rrbracket$.

I’ve sketched two possible syntactic analyses of qua-qualifications. The first proposal looks plausible for cases in which the predicate F as occurring in a qua-qualification of the form ‘ a is F qua G ’ is such that the *unqualified* sentence ‘ a is F ’ expresses a complete proposition, e.g. when F is a predicate like ‘corrupt’, ‘kind’, ‘patient’, or ‘makes £80,000’. The second proposal looks plausible for cases in which F is such that the sentence ‘ a is F ’ would not appear to express a complete proposition, e.g. when F is a predicate like ‘good’, ‘skilful’ or ‘talented’. What are we to make of these observations?


3. The costs of uniformity

One reaction might be to opt for a non-uniform syntactic analysis of 'qua' on which, depending on what predicate F is, qua-phrases are analysed as either modifiers or arguments:

Modifiers: a is F qua G



Arguments: a is $F_{[X]}$ qua G




By contrast, those who favour a *uniform* syntactic analysis of 'qua', face the choice between generalising the modifier or argument analysis to all predicates F which


can felicitously feature in qua-qualifications. It is worth being clear that each of these ways of developing the uniform view comes at a cost.

If we generalise the argument approach, we get a view according to which any predicate which can felicitously be used in a qua-qualification has hidden argument places for a property. For instance, the syntactic trees for (1) and (2) would look like this:

(1) John is corrupt qua judge



(2) John makes £80,000 qua judge



Many will find this unattractive. For the pool of predicates which can felicitously be used in qua-qualifications is wide. One can be happy and one can be happy qua parent, professor or musician. One can enter the United Kingdom, and one can enter the United Kingdom qua citizen, tourist, or refugee. The argument approach then naturally leads to a view on which scores of predicates have a higher adicity than we initially thought: what we thought were one-place predicates are really two-place predicates, what we thought were two place predicates are really three place predicates and so on.

Moreover, on such a view, apparently complete sentences like (8a-d) would fail to express complete propositions without the contribution of context:


- (8) a. John is corrupt.
 b. John is happy.
 c. John is patient.
 d. John entered the United Kingdom.

Such a view is not easy to stomach. As Zoltán Szabó (2003, p.394) puts the worry: postulating hidden argument places in a wide range of predicates "would rob the proposal of much of its appeal."

It is worth flagging that the latter issue of (8a-d) not expressing complete propositions could be avoided if one were prepared to accept either of two hypotheses. On the first, we embrace a great amount of ambiguity in the language. Just as some verbs like 'eat' have transitive and intransitive forms, so there could be distinct but closely related predicates of different adicity, e.g. 'corrupt' and 'corrupt_[X]', 'kind' and 'kind_[X]'. On the second, we'd say that the predicates which can felicitously be used in qua-qualifications are variably polyadic. They can take different numbers of arguments. While these suggestions avoid the result that (8a-d) fail to express complete propositions, they still constitute a significant cost for the argument approach.

On the other hand, if we generalise the modifier approach, we face a different issue. On such a view, it would be assumed that the meanings of predicates like ‘good’, ‘skilful’ or ‘talented’ are functions of type $\langle e, t \rangle$, as indicated in the following syntactic tree:

(7) John is good qua judge



These predicates would then have extensions; there’d be such sets as the set of all good things, all skilful things and all talented things. And this in turn would suggest that sentences like (9a-d) do, after all, express complete propositions independently of contributions of the context.

- (9) a. John is good.
 b. John is skilful.
 c. John is talented.

But many people will find this implausible (though see Cappelen & Lepore 2005, ch.11). However, as with (8a-d), there is room for developing the proposal in a more congenial way.

One worry with assigning predicates like ‘good’ extensions is that we don’t know what their extensions are, i.e. what things are in the set of

good/skilful/talented things.³⁴ Presumably we don't want to say that being good relative to *some* *G* or other is sufficient for being simply good, else being good as a murderer would imply being simply good. On the flip side, we might not want to say that being simply good requires being good relative to *every* *G* either, else being simply good would require being good as a murderer. Perhaps being simply good is being good relative to every *G* one instantiates, but then the extension of properties like 'good' might well be empty.³⁵

Given that it is unclear what having properties like being simply good, simply skilful or simply talented would amount to, it is unlikely that speakers who utter sentences like (9a-c) intend to assert (or take one another to be asserting) the propositions that John is simply good, simply skilful and simply talented respectively. Instead, it is plausible that, as ordinarily used, sentences like (9a-c) have implicit content, content which "is not expressed in overt words or morphemes" but which is nevertheless "part of the asserted content" (Elbourne, 2020, p.1). For instance, in a context in which we're putting together a departmental football team, (9a-c) could be used to assert (and not just implicate) that John is good, skilful and talented as a football player. And in a context in which someone is recommending their dentist, (9a-c) could be used to assert that John is good, skilful and talented as a dentist.

One could then admit that there *are* properties like being simply good, simply

³⁴One might, of course, think that being simply good is a matter of being *morally* good. But here the claim would be that 'good' has a default reading, not that there is such a thing as being simply good. Compare: The sentence 'Dinner is ready' does not strike us as incomplete; it has a clear default interpretation on which it says that dinner is ready to be eaten. In special contexts the default can be overridden, e.g. if we're engaged in a charity project of preparing meals for the elderly and some cook the dinner while others divide it and wrap it up and yet others do the deliveries. The cooks could alert the wrappers by shouting 'Dinner is ready!', meaning that dinner is ready for being divided and wrapped up; the wrappers could alert the drivers shouting 'Dinner is ready!', meaning that dinner is ready for delivery. That there is a default reading for 'ready' in 'Dinner is ready!' does not show that there is such a thing as being simply ready. Similarly that 'good' in sentences like 'Helping others is good' has a default reading does not show that there is such a thing as being simply good.

³⁵There'd also be questions such as what it takes to be good as something self-identical or good as someone blond, and whether goodness in these respects, too, is required for being simply good.

skilful or simply talented without committing to the view that speakers use the words ‘good’, ‘skilful’ or ‘talented’ in constructions like (8a-c) to ascribe these properties to speakers. Instead, it seems likely that speakers rarely, if ever, intend to ascribe or understand each other to be ascribing such properties to things. Indeed, the need to use a word like ‘simply’ (or perhaps ‘*simpliciter*’ or Stephen Neale’s ‘punkt’) to make clear that an unrelativised reading is intended suggests that such a reading is not normally intended or understood.³⁶ Thus even if one accepts that there are properties of being simply good, skilful or talented, the intuition that (9a-c) are incomplete can be recovered by noting that, as ordinarily used, sentences like (9a-c) have implicit content.

One might worry that this way of mitigating the above issue on the modifier approach is hostage to an empirical question. Consider the following thesis due to Jason Stanley (2000, p.391):

STANLEY’S THESIS: All effects of extra-linguistic context on the truth-conditions of an assertion are traceable to elements in the actual syntactic structure of the sentence uttered.

If STANLEY’S THESIS is correct, the kind of implicit content relied upon above would have to be present in the syntactic structure of sentences like (9a-c). And one might worry that this, in turn, would lead back to the assumption that ‘good’, ‘skilful’ and ‘talented’ have variables for a property at the level of logical form.

But first, STANLEY’S THESIS is controversial. As Elbourne (2020) points out, there are important alternative hypotheses on which implicit content first appears (i) in the semantics (see Partee, 2004; Stump, 1985; Recanati, 2010) or (ii) at the conceptual level, in the language of thought (see Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Carston, 1988, 2002; Bach, 1994, 2000; Bezuidenhout, 1997). Moreover, the main

³⁶In this respect, the proposal differs from that of Cappelen & Lepore (2005) who would presumably claim that ordinary utterances of ‘John is good’ express the proposition that John is (simply) good. Though, of course, ultimately they claim that this is but one among many propositions speakers assert in uttering (9a), so that they’d probably agree that ‘John is simply good’ is not the proposition speakers intend to express or understand each other to express.

line of argument advanced by Stanley (2002) in support of his thesis, so-called *Binding Arguments*, have been found to be inconclusive in the literature (see Martí, 2006; Elbourne, 2008).

Secondly, positing *variables* is not the only way of satisfying STANLEY'S THESIS. It could be that the effects of the extra-linguistic context on the truth-conditions in these cases are traceable to an element in the actual syntactic structure of the sentences, but that this element is not an argument place but a modifier.³⁷

I've shown that generalising either the argument or the modifier approach has costs and I have sketched strategies for mitigating these costs as much as possible. Nevertheless, there is a real question as to whether a *uniform* syntactic analysis of 'qua' can be developed in a way which is less costly than adopting a *non-uniform* one.

I want to conclude by considering a final issue regarding the relation between the proposed truth conditions and the two candidate compositional implementations of these.

4. No relation *F-qua*?

One might worry that there is a mismatch between the proposed truth-conditions and their syntactic implementation on the two candidate syntactic analyses. For **Qua-Properties** says that what it is to have a qua-property *F-qua-G* is to bear a relation *F-qua* to *G*. But no such relation would appear to show up in the syntactic trees of either the modifier or the argument approaches.

However, it is important not to mistake a syntactic analysis for a metaphysical analysis. To argue this point, it'll be worth considering two examples of more ordinary relational properties. Start out by considering the truth-conditions

³⁷Though she doesn't ultimately endorse the proposal, Martí (2006, §2) explores this option for the location tacit in 'it is raining'.

of (10) and (11) respectively.


(10) John is talking to Mary.

(11) John is loved by Mary.

(10) ascribes a relational property to John: being such that one is talking to Mary ($\lambda x.x$ is talking to Mary). What is it to have such a relational property? Being such that one is talking to Mary consists in bearing the talking-to relation ($\lambda x.\lambda y.y$ is talking to x) to Mary. Likewise, (11) ascribes the relational property *being loved by Mary* ($\lambda x.x$ is loved by Mary) to John, where having this relational property consists in bearing the loved-by relation ($\lambda x.\lambda y.y$ is loved by x) to Mary.³⁸


Yet, as I'll argue next, there is good reason to think that neither 'talking to' nor 'loved by' are syntactic constituents of (10) and (11) respectively. The relevant evidence comes from common syntactic constituency tests which provide evidence that 'to Mary' and 'by Mary' are syntactic constituents of (10) and (11) as assumed in the following syntactic trees.

(10) John is talking to Mary



³⁸Depending on one's views about converse relations John's bearing *talking to* to Mary and John's bearing *being loved by* to Mary may or may not be the same as Mary's bearing *being talked to by* to John and Mary's bearing *loving* to John respectively.

(11) John is loved by Mary



As is easy to see, 'talking to' and 'loved by' would then not be syntactic constituents of (10) and (11). However, I take it that few people would take such syntactic observations as evidence against the proposed truth-conditions of (10) and (11) in terms of relational properties. I recommend a similar attitude in the case of qua-qualifications. Being *F* qua *G* consists in bearing a relation *F*-qua to *G*, but that does not mean that strings of the form 'F-qua' are syntactic constituents of qua-qualifications.

Note that using our constituency tests, we cannot directly show that 'talking to', 'loved by' and 'corrupt as' are not constituents of (10), (11), and (3) respectively. While a string's *passing* a given constituency test is evidence that the string in question is a constituent, a string's *failing* such a test need not be evidence that the string is *not* a constituent. However, by showing which strings *are* constituents, we can often gain enough information about the composition of these sentences to be able to draw the conclusion that certain other strings are not. So that'll be the strategy.

I'll consider three common constituency tests and I'll show that on all of these tests, 'to Mary', 'by Mary', and 'as a judge' are constituents of (10), (11) and (3) respectively. Since for a given sentence, a string cannot be a constituent of two different strings unless one of these two strings is a constituent of the other, 'talking

to', 'loved by' and 'corrupt as' are *not* constituents of (10), (11), and (3) respectively.

(i) *Clefting*. Can the string be embedded in 'it is/were/was . . . that/who/where/how'?

To get a feel for how this test is meant to work consider the examples in (12).

- (12) a. I like Harry.
 b. Under the bed is a good place to hide
 c. The book in the bathroom belongs to me.
 d. Julia and Jenny arrived first.

(12a-d) remain grammatical if we cleft as in (13a-d):

- (13) a. It's Harry that I like.
 b. It's under the bed that's a good place to hide
 c. It's the book in the bathroom that belongs to me.
 d. It's Julia and Jenny who arrived first.

That 'Harry', 'under the bed', 'the book in the bathroom' and 'Julia and Jenny' pass the clefting test is then evidence that these strings are constituents of (12a-d) respectively. It'll be helpful to see what a failed test would look like. (12a-d) are not grammatical if we cleft as in (14a-d):

- (14) a. *It's like that I Harry.
 b. *It's a good place that under the bed is to hide.
 c. *It's the bathroom that the book in belongs to me.
 d. *It's Julia and who arrived first Jenny.

However, as flagged above, it is important to remember that a string's *failing* the test need not show that the string is not a constituent. 'Like' and 'the bathroom', for instance, *are* constituents of (12a) and (12c) respectively.

Now consider clefted constructions of (10) and (11) respectively:

- (15) a. It's to Mary that John is talking.
 b. ?It's talking to Mary that John is.
 c. *It's talking to that John is Mary.

- (16) a. It's by Mary that John is loved.
 b. ?It's loved by Mary that John is.
 c. *It's loved by that John is Mary.

Clefting as in (15a) and (16a) is perfect, suggesting that 'to Mary' and 'by Mary' are constituents of (10) and (11) respectively. Interestingly, qua-qualifications pattern in the exact same way.

- (17) a. It's as a judge that John is corrupt.
 b. ?It's corrupt as a judge that John is.
 c. *It's corrupt as that John is a judge.

Clefting as in (17a) is perfect, suggesting that 'as a judge' is a constituent of (3).

Now, we cannot draw any direct conclusions from the less felicitous clefting in (15b-c), (16b-c) and (17b-c). Still, we've gained valuable information. For if 'to Mary' is a constituent of (10), then 'talking to' cannot be a constituent of (10). For otherwise 'to' as occurring in (10) would have to simultaneously be a constituent of two strings neither of which is a constituent of the other, which is not possible. By contrast, since 'to Mary' is plausibly a constituent of 'talking to Mary', the hypothesis that 'to Mary' is a constituent of (10) is entirely compatible with 'talking to Mary' being a constituent of (10).

Similar considerations apply to the data we get from (17). That 'as a judge' is a constituent of (3) is incompatible with 'corrupt as' being a constituent of that sentence. But the hypothesis is entirely compatible with 'corrupt as a judge' being a constituent of (3), since 'as a judge' is plausibly a constituent of 'corrupt as a judge'.

(ii) Topicalisation. *Can the string be relocated to the beginning of the sentence without changing the meaning of that sentence?* Again, it'll be helpful to consider the sentences in (12) as an example for how the test works. (18a-d) are fine and preserve the meaning of (12a-d):

- (18) a. Harry I like.

- b. A good place to hide is under the bed.
- c. To me belongs the book in the bathroom.
- d. Arrive first Julia and Jenny did.

The topicalisation test then suggests that ‘Harry’, ‘a good place to hide’, ‘to me’, and ‘arrive first’ are constituents of (12a-d) respectively. For illustration, bad topicalisations might look as follows:

- (19)
- a. *Like I Harry.
 - b. *To hide is under the bed a good place.
 - c. In the bathroom the book belongs to me.
 - d. *And Jenny Julia arrived first.

(19c) is fine, but would not preserve the meaning of (12d). The remaining sentences in (19) are not grammatical. Applying the test to (10) and (11) (repeated below for reference) we get the following data:

- (20) John is talking to Mary.
- a. To Mary John is talking.
 - b. Talking to Mary John is.
 - c. Talking to John is Mary.
- (21) John is loved by Mary.
- a. By Mary John is loved.
 - b. Loved by Mary John is.
 - c. Loved by John is Mary.

(20a) and (21a) are perfect, providing further evidence that ‘to Mary’ and ‘by Mary’ are constituents of (10) and (11) respectively. (20b) and (21b) are fine in context (e.g. ‘I told you John would be talking to Mary and talking to Mary John is!’ / ‘I told you John was loved by Mary and loved by Mary John is!’). (20c) and (21c) are fine but change the meaning of (10) and (11) by reversing the direction of the relation. The intended topicalisations ‘Talking to, John is Mary’ and ‘Loved by, John is Mary’ are awful. Once more, qua-qualifications pattern exactly that way:

- (22) a. As a judge John is corrupt.
 b. Corrupt as a judge John is.
 c. *Corrupt as John is a judge.

(22a) is perfect suggesting that 'as a judge' is a constituent of (3). (22b) is fine in context, e.g. 'I told you John would turn out to be corrupt as a judge and corrupt as a judge John is!'. (22c) is awful.

As before we cannot draw direct conclusions from the infelicity of (20c), (21c) and (22c) on the intended topicalisation. But by the reasoning sketched above, if 'to Mary', 'by Mary' and 'as a judge' are constituents of (10), (11) and (3) respectively, then 'talking to', 'loved by' and 'corrupt as' are not.

(iii) Fragmented Answers. Can the string be the answer to a question such that the question/answer pair preserves the meaning of the initial sentence? To illustrate, consider again how this test works for the examples in (12) above. The question-answer pairs in (23) are grammatical and capture the meanings of the sentences in (12):

- (23) a. Who do you like? Harry.
 b. Where is a good place to hide? Under the bed.
 c. What belongs to you? The book in the bathroom.
 d. Who arrived first? Julia and Jenny.

The fragmented answer test would then suggest that 'Harry', 'under the bed', 'the book in the bathroom' and 'Julia and Jenny' are constituents of (12a-d) respectively. Again, just to illustrate, failures of this test might look as follows:

- (24) a. What do you make of Harry? *I like.
 b. Where is a good place? *Under the bed to hide.
 c. To whom does the book belong? *Me in the bathroom.
 d. Who arrived first? *Julia and.

Applying this test to (10) and (11), we get the following data:

- (25) a. What is John doing? Talking to Mary.

- b. Who is John talking to? Mary.
 - c. Who is John talking to? To Mary.
 - d. ??What is John doing with Mary? Talking to.
- (26)
- a. What is John? Loved by Mary.
 - b. Who is John loved by? Mary.
 - c. Who is John loved by? By Mary.
 - d. ??What is John by Mary? Loved by.

(25a-b) and (26a-b) are the most natural question answer-pairs for (10) and (11) respectively, though both (25c) and (26c) are fine, too. (25d) and (26d) are quite odd. While the fragmented answers test is perhaps a little less decisive than the previous two tests in supporting the conclusion that ‘to Mary’ and ‘by Mary’ are constituents of (10) and (11) respectively, this conclusion still looks more credible than the rival hypothesis on which ‘talking to’ and ‘loved by’ are constituents. As before, (3) patterns similarly:

- (27)
- a. What is John? Corrupt as a judge.
 - b. What is John corrupt as? A judge.
 - c. How is John corrupt? As a judge.
 - d. ??How is John a judge? *Corrupt as.

All of (27a-c) are natural question-answer pairs. (27d), by contrast, is quite odd.

Taking all three tests together the data is best explained on the assumption that ‘talking to’ and ‘loved by’ are *not* constituents of (10) and (11). This, in turn, suggests that qua-qualifications like (3) pattern closely with ordinary ascriptions of relational properties like (10) and (11) in that although their *truth-conditions* make reference to relations like *talking to* and *being loved by*, strings of the form ‘talking to’ or ‘loved by’ would not appear to be constituents of (10) and (11) respectively and cannot be expected to make an appearance in the syntactic trees of (10) and (11).

The sort of mismatch between syntactic analysis and truth-conditions which we get on my proposed analysis of qua-qualification seems to be present even for

much more ordinary ascriptions of relational properties as in (10) and (11). If, as seems plausible, such mismatches are of no concern to the analysis of examples like (10) or (11), they are of no concern to the analysis of qua-qualifications either.

5. Concluding remarks

The aim of this postscript was to explore two possible compositional implementations of the truth conditions for qua-qualifications proposed in *Towards a Theory of 'Qua'*. I have distinguished a *modifier* from an *argument* analysis, and I have argued that while each of them is plausible for certain predicates F used in qualifications of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \text{ qua } G \urcorner$, each proposal faces issues when generalised to all predicates F which can be felicitously used in such qualifications. And while I have sketched ways in which these issues can be mitigated, it's not settled that overall, the benefit of giving a uniform analyses outweighs these costs. A non-uniform account is therefore still on the table. Finally, I have responded to a worry about a mismatch between syntax and semantics by arguing that such mismatches arise not only for qua-qualifications but for much more ordinary sentences ascribing relational properties to individuals, and are therefore no issue peculiar to the proposed theory of 'qua'.

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