The Future of the Second Sophistic

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Abstract

This thesis explores the anxieties and opportunities that attend fame and posterity in the second sophistic and how they play out in both literary and monumental expressions of cultural production. I consider how elite provincials in the Roman empire, who are competitive, bi- or even tri-cultural, status-driven, often politically active, and engaged in cultural production, attempt to construct a future presence for themselves either through the composition of literature that is aimed (at least in part) at the future or through efforts to write themselves into the landscape of their native or adopted cities. I argue that the cultural and temporal perspective of these men drives their multifarious, playful, and self-reflexive approach to the production of literature or monuments. For those men engaged in the 'second sophistic', in the narrower, Philostratean definition, there is an ever present tether on their creative efforts, in that for contemporary success they must immerse themselves in the culture of classical Athens; and the prominent practice of epideictic oratory, with its promotion of improvisation and lack of repetition, discourages the kind of literary effort that aims at eternity. At the same time, their attempts to build themselves into the hearts of cities is less restricted, in that those who possess or have access to sufficient wealth can grant elaborate benefactions which essentially stand as monuments to their financer. Nevertheless, their belated position with respect to the Greek literary canon and the heights of political and cultural prestige invested in classical Greece infuses the cultural efforts of the second sophistic with a sense of pathos that acknowledges the impossibility of creating and controlling one's future reputation regardless of how much effort is applied. At the same time, this impossible position, rather than limiting them, endows these men with a varied, self-ironizing, intertextual, intermedial, and unique approach to cultural production that actively engages with the inescapable and laudable past in order to carve a lasting impression on the literary and physical landscape of the Roman empire.

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Table of Contents

Abstract 1

Acknowledgements 2

Table of Contents 3

Abbreviations 5

Introduction 6

Thesis Structure 23

Chapter One: Belatedness, Novelty, and the Second Sophistic 27

Belatedness, Novelty, and the Future 29

Competitive Imitation: Using the past to create something new with Arrian 43

Originality & the Pitfalls of Novelty: Using the past to create something new with Lucian 63

Monuments: Using the past to create something new with Herodes Atticus 74

Conclusion 78

Chapter Two: Philostratus and Herodes Atticus 80

Sophistic Tyranny, Imperial Democracy 85

The King of Words 95

Emperor, Philosopher, Tyrant, Hero 101

Tyrant, King, Hero 107

Tyranny of Space 121

a) The Isthmus of Corinth 122

b) The Odeon of Regilla 126

Conclusion 129

Chapter Three: The Epitaphic Habit 132

Text, Monument, Speech, Fame 134

Authority and Dominion: Boundaries and Limina 155

Arrian, Alexander, and the Textual Appropriation of Cultural Memory 164

a) The Tomb of Achilles 168

b) The Tomb of Cyrus 177

Herodes Atticus and the Physical Appropriation of Cultural Memory 183

Conclusion 190

Chapter Four: Statues 192

The Place of Honorific Statues within the Empire and within the Text 194

Favorinus' *Corinthian Oration*: Textualizing fame, man, and monument. 205

Apuleius' *Florida* 16 and Polemo's *Cynegirus and Callimachus*: The dangers of representation in plastic art. 218

Lucian's *Dream*: Fame, the canon, and *epideixis*. 230

Conclusion: 'I am flesh and blood and vision'. 245

Conclusion 247

Bibliography 254

Editions 254

Main Bibliography 255

Abbreviations

- All Abbreviations follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd revised edition. Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (eds.) 2003. *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford, xxix-liv.

- Authors of single texts only are cited in the footnotes by name alone and in the body of the text where the context permits.

Introduction

> When we are young we do not look into mirrors. It is when we are old, concerned with our name, our legend, what our lives will mean to the future. We become vain with the names we own, our claims to have been the first eyes, the strongest army, the cleverest merchant. It is when he is old that Narcissus wants a graven image of himself.
>
> But we were interested in how our lives could mean something to the past. We sailed into the past. We were young. We knew power and great finance were temporary things. We all slept with Herodotus. *"For those cities that were great in earlier times must now have become small, and those that were great in my time were small in the time before... Man's good fortune never abides in the same place."*
>
> Michael Ondaatje, *The English Patient*, pp. 141-2.

Sometime during the years 114-16 CE, a funeral monument was erected on the Museon hill in Athens for Gaius Julius Antiochus Epiphanes Philopappus. This man was the grandson of the last king of Commagene, who retained for himself the honorary title of king, a Roman citizen who held a consulship and who settled in Athens where he held the archonship.[1] As Bert Smith has shown, the monument is drenched in imagery that stresses both the Greek and Roman aspects of his character, especially in his dual representations in, respectively, Greek traditional costume and seated pose, and Roman consular dress during the procession to mark his consular inauguration, which are matched by bilingual inscriptions, and the flanking of his Greek *persona* by statues of his togaed grandfather (hence representing both royal ancestry and Roman citizenship) and the Macedonian Seleucid from whom the Commagenian royal family claimed descent (both also identified with inscriptions).[2] The Latin inscription on the left pilaster records the titles which reveal his prestigious position in the Roman world, as well as his patronage owed to the emperor Trajan; the Greek on the right records his royal and Seleucid descent; finally, a central Greek inscription below his Greek representation situates him within the Athenian *polis* by

[1] On Philopappus and his monument see Kleiner (1983); Smith (1998), 70-3.
[2] Smith (1998), 71-3. See also Miles (2000), 29-36.

recording his deme.[3] The monument neatly casts Philopappus as discretely Roman, Greek, Macedonian, and Athenian all at the same time. It also stresses his citizenship of both Athens and Rome, and it dares to label him king, even though this title was generally reserved for the emperor at this time. Moreover, its prominent position on the Museon associates the man with cultural production, both in the hill's (mistaken) popular connection with the Muses and its acknowledged affinity with the poetic figure of Musaeus,[4] thus tapping into that aspect of Greek society which was most valued in Roman times. Its raised setting also makes the monument visible from important civic structures such as the Acropolis and the Areopagus, as well as other points around the city. Significantly, the tomb stands within the city walls, a privilege extended to very few and most often to those who had been great benefactors, such as Herodes Atticus.[5] This, combined with the title of *basileus* and the architectural references to the triumphal arch of Titus in Rome,[6] places the monument in competition with imperial benefactions, a practice that finds its height in the works of Herodes Atticus a generation later. Yet, at the same time, the acknowledgement of dependency on Trajan in Philopappus' Roman titles, diffuses this effect and reveals the limits of a Roman citizen's power.[7]

In this monument, Philopappus is using the past to make a statement about his own identity in the present, which he intends to be projected into the future. As an elite Greek with Roman citizenship, he demonstrates the preoccupation of the age to create a lasting image of oneself that has currency in both the 'classical' Greek world and the contemporary Roman empire. Identities which could be seen to be at odds – the anachronistic Greek, Commagenian, and Macedonian, alongside the ectopic Roman – are

[3] Smith (1998), 71-3. See Kleiner (1983), 14-15, for the inscriptions of the monument.
[4] Kleiner (1983), 12.
[5] See Arafat (1996), 192-3.
[6] See Miles (2000), 33-5.
[7] Cf. Miles (2000), 33-5.

here placed contiguously to build an illustrious whole and, importantly, placed in a position that is itself laden with significance.

Similarly, at the beginning of Arrian's *Periplus Ponti Euxini*, in justification for his initiative in remodelling the existing memorial to the emperor Hadrian at Trapezous on the Black Sea, Arrian, himself an elite Greek, Roman citizen, and governor of Cappadocia, pens the following line: τὸ γὰρ χωρίον ἐπιτηδειότατον εἰς μνήμην αἰώνιον ('since this spot is just made for an eternal memorial', *Periplus* 1.4). I will discuss this episode in detail in the first chapter of the thesis;[8] however, not only does this one phrase sum up nicely the desire of elite Greeks in the Roman empire to mark their contemporary landscape, both physical and literary, with a presence that would remain prominent in the future, but also it indicates their tendency to 'piggy-back' on the reputation of others and the cultural and historical significance of space. Essentially, Arrian claims that Trapezous is made for an eternal memorial because of its literary and historical importance, and he attaches his own name to Hadrian's fame. Philopappus' use of all of Trajan's titles including Caesar, Optimus, Augustus, Germanicus, and Dacicus, is much the same process: by celebrating Trajan's greatness, Philopappus both legitimates his own citizenship and associates himself with a superior patron. Arrian, on the other hand, places his decision to upgrade Hadrian's memorial within his own literary composition, thus staking his own claim for literary posterity (an example and process which I will discuss more fully in chapter one).[9]

[8] See p. 54.
[9] See p. 54.

Nevertheless, despite the careful structuring by Philopappus of his multifaceted identity for the appreciation of posterity, later in the same century, Pausanias describes the monument as follows:

> ἔστι δὲ ἐντὸς τοῦ περιβόλου τοῦ ἀρχαίου τὸ Μουσεῖον ἀπαντικρὺ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως λόφος, ἔνθα Μουσαῖον ᾄδειν καὶ ἀποθανόντα γήρᾳ ταφῆναι λέγουσιν· ὕστερον δὲ καὶ μνῆμα αὐτόθι ἀνδρὶ ᾠκοδομήθη Σύρῳ.
>
> The Museon is a small hill, opposite the Acropolis, inside the ancient ring-wall, where they say Musaeus used to sing and died and was buried; later a memorial was erected there for a Syrian. (Pausanias, 1.25.8)

Here, too, Pausanias structures his description according to both the past and the present, but his interest is in the hill itself and not the monument it bears nor the detailed nature of the man it represents. Pausanias' reduction of Philopappus from a man with impeccable aristocratic Greek and Roman credentials, from an Archon, King, and Consul, to an anonymous Syrian reveals an aspect of personal commemoration that greatly concerned men such as Philopappus, Arrian, and Pausanias, and to which I will return time and again in this thesis: once one has distributed cultural output, either literary or monumental, into the public eye, one can no longer control its reception.[10] The lack of control over posterity is the one thing which ultimately defeats these men: they can fashion themselves in whatever way they please at any given time, except in the future. Thus these elite Roman Greeks embody the paradox described by de Almásy and his fellow desert explorers in the epigraph to this introduction, albeit on a cultural rather than a personal level: their membership of an old, rich culture, drives them to forge a lasting memory, but the temporal and cultural perspective afforded by the Roman empire alerts them to the impossibility of this task, in that it enhances their awareness of the fickleness of fame and the mutability of fortune, especially for the deceased who can no longer actively construct reputation. As such, monumental constructions of personal identity, even more so than purely textual ones, were always points of conflict over the power to assign meaning. The

[10] See Miles (2000), 34-6, for a discussion of the problem of representation and reception with respect to this monument.

incorporation of a physical monument into a piece of literature is never neutral, and the manipulation of and anxiety over meaning as applied to a textualized monument is central to this thesis. In fact, there are very few passages that I discuss which do not include either a monument proper or, at least, a metaphoric implication of one.

Elite Greeks in the Roman empire often had dual identities, both Greek and Roman, and as such one was necessarily connected simultaneously to both the past and the present. At the same time and as argued by this thesis, the literary and monumental works of elite Greeks reveal that they were equally focused on creating a presence in the future. The awareness of vast spans of time and the ability of reputation to persist, which saw figures like Plato who were active centuries earlier remain canonical in the present, awoke in Greek authors of the second sophistic a sense of the potential to create a similarly persistent reputation. Moreover, the symbolic and beneficent building of Roman emperors showed the way to imbed one's identity into the heart of any given city through monumental constructions.[11] It is this ambiguous relationship to time, this Janus-like perspective, and desire for immortal fame as it is expressed by and relates to cultural output, combined with the ability of these men to shape themselves according to the requirements of circumstance that this thesis explores. That is, this dissertation is about the anxieties and opportunities that attend fame and posterity in the second sophistic. More specifically, it is about the relationship between the past and the future, and how this relationship intersects and is negotiated in the present by those predominantly elite Greeks who have left traces in literary or monumental form from the first three centuries of the common era. It focuses on the motivations for and the connection between writing oneself into future consciousness through creating literature aimed (at least in part) at a future

[11] See Mitchell (1987); Boatwright (2000). See also, Alcock (2002), 36-98.

audience and by marking the landscape with monumental structures intended to stand for eternity. It argues that the output of these men is driven and shaped by a perspective that is concurrently trained on the distant past and the future, and which is therefore concurrently aware of both the possibility and, equally, the apparent impossibility of creating immortal fame. Moreover, the seeming cultural homogeneity of society in both Greek and Roman perceptions of the future, adds to the sense of temporal dislocation and manipulation in their works. That is, their perception of the future is of a world essentially culturally identical to the present. This ambiguous relationship to time is manifested in the present by a self-conscious, self-reflexive, playful attitude to cultural production that is both intertextual and intermedial.

By intertextual, I mean that it is loaded with cultural baggage from the 'classical' past, but its interaction with this material is never neutral. Although imitation and emulation are prevalent, they are usually employed as elements of competition and conflict, so that the past becomes something to master and conquer all at once, with the hope that this will lead to a prominent future. Imperial Greeks of this period wish to be remembered rather like some famous person from the past, but they do not wish to have their own personality subsumed by their model; instead, these men use that model to create something new of their own. That is, authors and monumentalizers of this period, as opposed to earlier periods, make the past work for their own future commemoration, as can be seen in the examples of both Philopappus and Arrian above. By intermedial, I mean that these men play with different media of commemoration, so that the same man might make an assault on posterity through both literature and physical structures. Moreover, this intermediality need not involve discrete objects only, but can be employed in combination, so that their literary works are awash with *ecphraseis*, statues, monuments, and inscriptions, and their

monumental works are marked by literature, either in the form of epigrams or in a referencing of some past event made famous in text. In this way, the ruins of the Greek past and the glories of her literature become implements through which a literate Greek in the Roman empire can try to claim a conspicuous place in posterity. It is this aspect – the manipulation of the partnership, as well as conflict, between text and monument and the way monuments are used to muse on the construction and preservation of identity and fame by elite Greeks in the Roman empire – which forms the focus of chapters three and four of this thesis.

As should now be clear, there are three key elements at play in the issue of fame and posterity in the second sophistic: time, cultural production, and personal identity. These elements become a particular concern for the men of the second sophistic for several reasons, notably their tardy position with respect to Greek literature and the necessity of operating within the Roman political system. I will come to these issues shortly, but before that some definitions and framing: by 'second sophistic' I mean several overlapping things. Firstly, I am referring to the distinct time period of the first three centuries of the common era, from roughly 50-250 CE. Secondly, I am interested in the elements stressed by Philostratus himself, the apparent inventor of the term, particularly in the idea of improvised *epideixis*. In his *Lives of the Sophists*, he is quite specific about what he means by the second sophistic. So, he explains that there are two sophistics which differ in the following way:

> Ἡ μὲν δὴ ἀρχαία σοφιστικὴ καὶ τὰ φιλοσοφούμενα ὑποτιθεμένη διῄει αὐτὰ ἀποτάδην καὶ ἐς μῆκος, διελέγετο μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἀνδρείας, διελέγετο δὲ περὶ δικαιότητος, ἡρώων τε πέρι καὶ θεῶν καὶ ὅπη ἀπεσχημάτισται ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ κόσμου. ἡ δὲ μετ' ἐκείνην, ἣν οὐχὶ νέαν, ἀρχαία γάρ, δευτέραν δὲ μᾶλλον προσρητέον, τοὺς πένητας ὑπετυπώσατο καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους καὶ τοὺς ἀριστέας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους καὶ τὰς ἐς ὄνομα ὑποθέσεις, ἐφ' ἃς ἡ ἱστορία ἄγει.

> The ancient sophistic, even when it propounded philosophical themes, used to discuss them diffusely and at length; for it discoursed on courage, it discoursed on justice, on heroes and gods, and how the universe has been fashioned into its present shape. But that later sophistic, which must not be called 'new', for it is old, but rather 'second', sketched the types of the poor man and the rich, of heroes and tyrants, and performances in character for which history shows the way.[12] (*VS* 481)

So, for Philostratus, the inventor of the term, the second sophistic is not tied to a specific period but, rather, to a specific theatrical type of *epideixis*, in which the rhetor would deliver his speech in the guise of a historical or occasionally mythological figure. In addition, these speeches were mostly improvised, with the audience proposing the theme to the performing orator. Philostratus also claims this type of oratory was invented by Aeschines in the fourth century BCE (*VS* 481); nevertheless, the actual contents of the *Lives of the Sophists* do not sit entirely comfortably with his definition. Philostratus' sophists are learned men, who vie for recognition in the public domain, and are characterized first and foremost as teachers and performers of rhetoric; however, they are also more than this. Philostratus' sophists represent their native or adopted cities on imperial embassies, take on imperial positions in their local government, and make liberal benefactions to those cities with which they are associated.[13] Moreover, despite the lack of a specific temporal positioning of the second sophistic by Philostratus, the vast majority of his examples do come from the first three centuries CE, and he passes over the intervening period from Aeschines in the fourth century BCE by mentioning three orators whom he brings up only to reject as unworthy of comment (*VS* 510-11). When I use the term 'second sophistic' or refer to those engaged in it, I am interested in men from this era, whether or not they appear in Philostratus' *Lives*, who are elite, competitive, status driven, often bi- or even tri-

[12] For τὰς ἐς ὄνομα ὑποθέσεις meaning 'performances *in persona*', see Whitmarsh (2001), 42. For εἰς ὄνομα meaning 'in the name of', see LSJ suppl. s.v. ὄνομα. See Wright (1968) [Loeb] for 'definite and special themes'.

[13] See Bowersock (1969). Cf. the qualifications of Bowie (1982).

cultural, who may be active in Roman political or administrative life and whose cultural production, whether in the form of literature or monument, demonstrates the tension/harmony between these two media and/or between the spoken and the written word, as well as the temporal slipperiness, and playfulness with cultural history and production that I have detailed above.

Philostratus takes pains to connect his subject to Aeschines, stressing the archaic nature of his sophistic. It is important to him to ground it in classical Athens, just as the men he describes choose classical themes as the topics for their speeches, pepper them with quotation from classical authors, and for the most part employ the archaizing Attic dialect.[14] Moreover, the past is ever present and utilized in their more literary and monumental works as well. This need to connect to the classical past has been the focus of modern study of the second sophistic, which tends to classify imperial Greek literature as referential and mimetic, and ties it to a politically motivated championing of Greek identity in the face of the Roman present. Ewen Bowie and Simon Swain have both made this argument, although Swain finds that several of his imperial Greek writers are happy to identify politically, if not culturally, with Rome.[15] Glen Bowersock specifically rejects the idea of cultural 'renaissance' as a response to Roman rule, but he too focuses primarily on the political importance of Philostratus' sophists; that is, on their negotiation of and interaction with Roman rule in the present.[16] More recently, Maud Gleason, Tim Whitmarsh, Joy Connolly, and Thomas Schmitz have identified the strongly performative and competitive context of elite Greek culture during the early empire, and the ability of

[14] See Whitmarsh (2005), 4-8.
[15] See Bowie (1974); Swain (1996).
[16] See Bowersock (1969).

sophists to fashion themselves in various manners and to play with their self-identity.[17] Once again, this work focuses on the present and its relationship to the past. I, on the other hand, argue that the privileging of the past found in imperial Greek literature is symptomatic of a strong awareness of large spans of time and that it is not unidirectional, but is counterbalanced by an equal and opposite preoccupation with the future. Philostratus' sophists are steeped in the Greek canon – they live and breathe it, being embodiments of that peculiarly Greek cultural property, *paideia* – but they are also highly aware of their own relationship to the canon and the possibility of one day being part of it. As such, it is necessary for them to promote and champion the classical canon simply because it allows them to show off their virtuosity in *paideia* and makes their claims to have mastered and even surpassed the canon more believable and praiseworthy. In other words, they need the benchmark of the classical canon in order to establish themselves as worthy of canonicity. Even Philostratus' description of the 'second sophistic' explains that it is dependent on another sophistic – a first sophistic, which preceded it – but that his sophistic is different and, although being old, has only found its efflorescence in Philostratus' day. So, from its very beginnings, even though judged retrospectively, it is a movement destined to find its audience in the future. Whether such a movement actually existed or not, the temporal displacement inherent in the term is an apt way of describing the men I will be studying.[18] These elite Greeks come from a cultural background that privileges the past whilst simultaneously trying to overcome it. Both the literary works and the monumental constructions of these men are haunted by history and the canon; their challenge is to find some way of both incorporating and superseding the past in order to carve their own place in the future.

[17] See especially Gleason (1995); Schmitz (1997); Connolly (2001); Whitmarsh (2001) and (2005).
[18] On scepticism as to the existence of such a movement, see Brunt (1994).

Moreover, far from culturally resisting the Roman empire, as Roman citizens who were often active in the Roman political and administrative machine, these men found themselves with access to vast resources of wealth and privilege. This is one factor which differentiates this period, its literature and monuments, from earlier eras. Peter Brown has called this period the 'age of ambition' and the demonstration of *philotimia*, as expressed by civic benefactions or service, patronage, and sophistic virtuosity, amongst the provincial elite was regularly rewarded with citizenship, administrative office, and consequently the means for upward mobility through the Roman system.[19] This phenomenon is evinced by a dramatic increase in the number of provincial members of the senate over the first few centuries of the common era.[20] Never before had there been so many elite Greeks with such status and influence within the Roman empire. For these reasons, unlike for their literary predecessors from the classical or Hellenistic ages, the ability to construct monumental memorials and to mark the civic landscape with benefactions becomes a genuine possibility for these men. They no longer feel the need to wait for the *demos* to grant them honours but are instead constructing their own monuments of their own accord. Thus where once a man's fame, come by through artistic prowess, could by accident create a memorial to him, such as Pindar's house in Thebes that was protected by Alexander the Great during his sacking of the city out of respect for the poet's works (Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.9.10; Plutarch, *Alexander* 11.12; Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 2.33; Pliny, *Natural History* 7.109), an imperial Greek writer, sometimes backed or even coerced by Roman authority, at other times driven by his own volition or (in the case of essential civic structures) through necessity, has the option to create his own physical memorial and integrate it into the civic or sacred landscape of any given *polis*.[21] Civic infrastructure could

[19] Brown (1978), 27-53. Whitmarsh (2005), 12.
[20] Hopkins (1974), 116. On specifically Greek senators, see Halfmann (1979); Syme (1988), 1-20. See also Whitmarsh (2005), 12.
[21] See Mitchell (1987) on the complexities of imperial funding of and support for civic building throughout the empire, as well as the many reasons for which building occurred.

be imperially funded, civically funded, privately funded, or some combination thereof, a spectrum that allowed a lot of room for the wealthy elite Greek to make his beneficent monumental mark.[22] Yet this blessing for the lasting reputation of these men was often less well received in the present. The power of elite Greeks in their respective *poleis* caused friction between themselves and their *demos*, in that men with such wealth and position, who strove to control the political and economic situation, resembled greatly the figures of the tyrant and the king from both classical and Hellenistic times. This precarious balance between self-promotion and civic acceptance, self-presentation and the judgement of posterity, is a concept which I will study in detail in the second chapter of this thesis.[23]

So, Roman wealth and status are what assist the massive scale of the building activities we see at this time amongst the provincial elite, but what drives it is their eyewitness experience of the remains of monuments from the past, as well as imperial practices of imbedding ideology into civic centres through monumentalizing benefactions. Equally, the self-glorifying literary activities of these men were driven by their own literary belatedness. The imperial Greek writer was aware of the canonical Greek past and the great literary figures with whom he must compete in order to make an assault on the future. He was also aware of the great difficulty in doing so, since a sense of arriving too late on the literary scene had existed in Greek literature since Hellenistic times. Whatever these imperial Greek writers produce, they will be compared unfavourably to those writers who came before them, who have claimed a place within the canon. By definition, a new piece simply cannot be canonical. Anne Duncan, who describes this as a sense of 'belatedness',

[22] Again, see Mitchell (1987). See Smith (1998), 70-77, for a discussion of Philopappus' monument, the Library of Celsus, and the Nymphaeon of Herodes Atticus. See Burrell (2009) for a discussion of monuments in Ephesus during the Roman empire. See Alcock (2002), 51-75, for the Athenian agora.
[23] Chapter two begins on p. 80.

considers it to be present in both audience and performer,[24] since the audience itself has been raised with the classical canon. This shared knowledge entails that each time a sophist performs, there is an agonistic intellectual relationship between the audience and the orator: the audience's learning is always on trial as it is challenged to 'get' the obscure in-jokes and references; equally, the sophist is required to continually entertain and engage; he too is being tested on his knowledge and ability.[25] Naturally, the degree of audience sophistication and the orator's skill vary. In the life of Favorinus, for example, Philostratus explains that this eunuch-sophist enchanted audiences at Rome, who were unable to understand Greek, simply by his tone of voice, facial expressions, rhythms, and his habit (which Philostratus himself finds distasteful) of singing an epilogue to his speeches (*VS* 492). Philostratus also records the emperor Trajan telling Dio Chrysostom: 'I do not understand what you are saying but I love you as I love myself' (τί μὲν λέγεις, οὐκ οἶδα, φιλῶ δέ σε ὡς ἐμαυτόν, *VS* 488). So, the context of a speech also determines its reception.

As mentioned above, this sense of belatedness is not unique to the second sophistic, but Hellenistic poets and tragedians are also highly aware of the difficulty and inequality of competing with past canonical authors, as illustrated by this epigram of the fourth-century BCE tragedian Astydamas, composed for a statue base in celebration of his victory in the Great Dionysia:

> εἴθ' ἐγὼ ἐν κείνοις γενόμην ἢ κεῖνοι ἅμ' ἡμῖν
> οἳ γλώσσης τερπνῆς πρῶτα δοκοῦσι φέρειν,
> ὡς ἐπ' ἀληθείας ἐκρίθην ἀφεθεὶς παράμιλλος·
> νῦν δὲ χρόνῳ προέχουσ', οἷς φθόνος οὐχ ἕπεται.
>
> Would that I had been born with them, or they with me,
> who are esteemed for taking the prize in the pleasing word,
> so that I, as befits the truth, would have been judged an equal
> competitor, starting level with the rest,

[24] Duncan (2006), 189-90.
[25] On the relationship between audience and sophist, see Korenjak (2000).

But now they are ahead in time, pursued no more by envy.[26]

Competition with the canon is not a fair contest and, in producing the same kind of offerings in the same genres, post-classical authors will always be handicapped. Yet neither the Hellenistic poets nor the authors of the second sophistic take this belatedness lying down. Rather than just accepting their secondary inferiority, writers from both eras take on and play with the canon in inventive ways. The extended perspective of imperial Greek writers, who receive the canon in a far more concrete form than those of Hellenistic times, making the likelihood of entering it still more remote, renders their engagement with the canon more self-conscious and self-reflexive. Partially, this seems driven by a literary culture that is immersed in oral *epideixis*, unlike the Hellenistic era which was focused on and engaged with the medium of the book.[27] One of the key problems for Philostratus' sophists, which I will call the 'sophistic dilemma', is that for them contemporary fame depends on the ability to deliver the kind of one-off improvised display speeches that I discussed previously. If this medium is seen as the highest form of contemporary art, it proves very difficult to create a future presence, simply because each speech is, in theory, destined for a single hearing. For fame to accrue, one's performance must be remembered and replayed either through the recollections passed on by the initial audience or through the dissemination and consumption of a textual recording: so, through reading.[28] Although there are several moments of tension attached to attempts to textualize speech in Philostratus' *Lives*, one of which I will consider in some detail in the second chapter of this thesis,[29] writing nevertheless does overcome the difficulties of dedication to an artistic medium that demands improvisation.

[26] Page *FGE*, 33-4 = Snell *TrGF* 1, 60 T 2a. Text from Bing (2008), 60.
[27] See Bing (2008).
[28] See Thomas (2003) for the tension between *epideixis* and written publication in classical times.
[29] See p. 96.

Consequently, many of the literary works produced during this time are cast as though they are 'recordings' of a previous epideictic moment, even if that performance never occurred and the piece was actually composed in writing.[30] Thus their target audience can be considered twofold, being both those present at the initial (even if only hypothetical) performance and a future community of readers, who receive the 'script' of the performance. In the first case, the performer's fame exists only as long as his audience remembers him and passes on its experience; in the second, the reader recreates the epideictic moment in the act of reading. As such, the performer's audience becomes infinite, both through new readers and re-readers. His fame has the potential to exist forever. And, importantly, his fame also has the potential to cross traditional boundaries. In the pages of Philostratus' *Lives*, performance is the key to fame and fame is central to success as a sophist, an achievement manifested in political influence, a following of students, and in many cases rivalry with other sophists.[31] Yet, this kind of fame tends to be localized and is predominantly based in and targeted at a specific civic community. So, Polemo and Aristides spend much of their active sophistic lives in Smyrna, whereas Herodes Atticus, the man from Marathon, exhibits his talents and focuses his benefactions in Athens.[32] As a consequence, this type of fame is necessarily limited. On the other hand, transforming a performative piece, which may have originally taken place in Athens or Smyrna, into text is an attempt to transcend these limits by casting a net as wide as an educated readership extends, as much temporally as geographically.

[30] Examples include the speeches of Dio Chrysostom, Lucian, and Aelius Aristides, Apuleius' *Florida* and *Apologia*. Cf. Porter (2006), 314, on texts as 'deposits from the past' and 'deposits of *voice*'. This passage is discussed and quoted below on p. 21.
[31] The prime example from *VS* is Polemo and Favorinus (490-1, 536, 541). See Gleason (1995), xxvii-xxviii, 27-8, 46-8. Again, on the social and political status of sophists, see Bowersock (1969).
[32] Philostratus, *VS* 531 (Polemo); 581-5 (Aristides); 545-66 (Herodes). See Bowersock (1969), 17-29.

So, whether an author predominantly composes speeches, like much of the output of Aelius Aristides, Lucian or Dio Chrysostom, or whether he is a writer of another genre, like Arrian or Philostratus himself, the idea of the superior yet transitory nature of speech versus the comparatively lasting medium of writing is one which colours a lot of the literary output during the second sophistic. Thus although it is completely incongruous with the genre of improvised *epideixis* and, accordingly, elicits a kind of discomfort from its exponents, the act of writing overcomes the problem of commemoration to some extent. James Porter has even argued that, in the minds of ancient Greeks, written texts were understood to retain an aspect of their author's voice and were thus considered to be a kind of auditory recording. He explains:

> [I]n antiquity, prior to the invention of recording mechanisms that went beyond writing, texts were felt to be deposits from the past, and as such they could be thought of as preserving an original, and in some cases aboriginal, sound in their innermost recesses. They were, in fact, deposits of voice. Specifically, they contained clues to the way their authors sounded while they were alive; but, if so, then they comprised that special sort of clue which is sometimes called an index. To take an analogy, in the mind of an ancient a text stood to its author's voice as a footprint stands to the foot that caused the impression, or better yet as a photograph stands to the object it depicts: they both share the same light. In each case the communion of source and result is immediate and physical, a record of an event that is itself part of what that event was. And for that reason alone, old texts were like precious relics, virtually like old recordings that only need to be thrown on the turntable to be made to sound again. They were imagined to be voiceprints of their authors.[33]

In the third chapter of this thesis, I will consider the way this concept applies to tombs and how authors play with the phenomenon of the (potential) talking dead.[34] The sense that texts retain a voiceprint ties into the idea of affecting classicism, in that by mimicking classical authors the writers of the second sophistic revive the past greats. The desire to do so has several pay offs for elite Greeks in the Roman empire. Firstly, it privileges and

[33] Porter (2006), 314.
[34] See the discussion beginning p. 138.

enlivens a concept of Greekness that is independent of the empire; secondly, it assigns meaning and priority to specific Greek texts that create a language of cultural influence and power for the initiated; thirdly, it conflates the present and the past in order to imbue one's own works with pedigree at the same time as creating a level playing field, so that the works of past greats can seem to be defeated. Thus unlike Hellenistic poets, imperial Greek writers do not mourn their late birth, but instead make the past live again for the purpose of promoting their own supremacy, not so much in the present, but in a hypothetical future. This is the opposite notion to that usually subscribed to these men. Porter comes closest to my position, when he says:

> The paradigms of slavish subservience to a past, or melancholic nostalgia, secondariness, and inferiority are probably overstated and overly dramatic. A sounder approach is to credit the exponents of classicism with consciously adopting poses and strategic identities, so as to manipulate and negotiate with, rather than to serve, the past – always with an eye to solving a problem in specific historical and cultural circumstances.[35]

For Porter, nevertheless, the relationship between the past and the present is still his primary focus because he is interested in the idea of classicism – how it is constructed, manipulated, and maintained or changed – not the outcomes of this interaction with the past. Though the line between domination by the past and using the past to create something new is fine, the writers of the second sophistic at least attempt the latter, even should they ultimately fail. And it is the process rather than the outcome that seems important, given that these men deal with full knowledge in paradoxes: they attempt to create an eternal self-memory, whilst being conscious that it is impossible to control this memory; they imbue text with the qualities of monuments, knowing that the text is ever fragile; they mark their monuments with their identities, knowing that the desired interpretation of that monument is so context specific as to be nearly incommunicable. Their awareness of the futility of their own attempts at immortalization in the cultural

[35] Porter (2005), 42-3.

record appears to be what generates their self-reflexive, playful, creative, and multifarious approach to cultural production. And, it is this process of using the past to create something new, which I wish to examine further now in the first chapter of this thesis (after detailing its structure as a whole), since so much of the cultural output of these men is driven by their own battle with satisfying a present that is bound by the dictates of the past, whilst striving to address the future in a meaningful manner.

Thesis Structure

The thesis is divided into four thematic chapters, which follow on from one another and which are roughly described by the concepts of belatedness and novelty, the control of memory, inscriptions, and statues. The first two utilize predominantly literary material, although material culture does make an appearance in both, and the final two look at a combination of literature and material culture. Chapter one builds on this introduction. It looks at various examples of how authors of the second sophistic use the past to create works which reach out to a future audience and which in doing so claim an element of novelty for themselves. It explores further both the complex temporal dislocations associated with the literature of the second sophistic and the problem of audience reception. It expands on the issues raised in the introduction regarding contemporary audience expectation and the need for a writer to create a future reputation. It considers novelty to be one means by which the authors of the second sophistic attempt to acknowledge, revere, conquer, and use the past, particularly the classical literary past, in order to make an assault on the future. Finally, it looks at how some of the same concerns, which are discernible in the literary texts, are also revealed in the material culture of the second sophistic.

The second chapter is also devoted to predominantly literary material. It focuses on Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*, specifically on the central life of Herodes Atticus. The thematic focus of this chapter is an individual's inability to control his future reputation. I take a closer look at Philostratus' presentation of Herodes and, in particular, his juxtaposition of this Athenian sophist to Roman emperors, and what it can tell us about successful negotiation of civic and imperial identity, alongside the creation of future reputation. Philostratus' portrait of Herodes is fraught and, although it appears to be largely laudatory, there is an undercurrent of criticism and blame. The most prominent aspect of Philostratus' criticism involves the presentation of Herodes as an Athenian tyrant within the Roman empire, and it is this juxtaposition – the Athenian citizen and the Roman citizen – which Philostratus appears to be trying to negotiate for himself through the figure of Herodes, and the opposing concepts of the tyrant and the king. Through this presentation, I hope to draw out some of the anxieties faced by Philostratus' sophists with respect to posterity and the inability to control one's own reception.

Having established in the first chapters the ideological pressures exerted on these cultured men by the inexorable passing of time, namely that the past impacts on their present by acting as an impetus, model, and competitor in their attempts to create a lasting legacy in the future and that they are haunted by the impossibility of controlling the future reputation that they have worked so hard to create, as well as the various pulls on their social and cultural identification, the third chapter adds material culture and its relationship to text to the mix. In particular, chapter three considers inscriptions and inscribed monuments and how they are incorporated into text to be used as mechanisms by which to muse on the preservation of fame and its relationship to both the past and, of course, the future. The chapter studies both the desire to mark indelibly the living landscape with

one's identity and the extension of this, which is the desire to write the already marked landscape into text. As such, I discuss in detail the reuse of historical and cultural memory to both claim authority over that memory and to create a new individual memory to be projected into the future. In this, the past is revealed as a tool to be exploited in one's personal assault on the future, and the site of identity and ideological conflict that is represented by any monument becomes a means of asserting one's own authoritative view. At the same time, the awareness that one's ability to control future reputation is poor at best adds both a sense of pathos and a self-reflexive playfulness to these men's commentary on the quest for lasting fame that finds its focus in the textualized inscribed monument. At the same time, I briefly consider this same process as it is reflected in physical monuments that mark the landscape of Roman Greece.

In the final chapter, I continue to consider material culture, only this time my focus is statues in particular rather than inscribed monuments in general. My attention is turned here to statues due to their mimetic properties and their ability to replace the living individual, even though in reality they are a lifeless counterfeit. Once more, my primary interest is in the use of statues in literature, but some aspects of statues as material culture will also be addressed. Writing gives the statue a voice and life that is both separate and connected to those of the statue's subject. The statue is transformed from a static object that captures a single instant in time into a performer, once more highlighting the contemporary idealization of improvised performance, and as such attributes a certain monumentality to the medium of literature. The two art forms (sculpture and writing) are both competitive and complementary, and numerous works play out this paradox. Writing gifts the artefact with life and consciousness which allows it to dialogue with various audiences on its own terms, rather than being catalogued by the viewer's own subjectivity.

It both guards against the destruction of context – a statue can be removed, renamed, or rededicated, but the statue that speaks or appears in literature remains what the author initially claims it to be – or, like a textualized monument, its initial purpose can be reinterpreted, manipulated, claimed and used to promote the author's fame. Similarly to inscribed monuments, statues are used to muse on personal identity and fame, and the ever imperfect rendering of oneself into a lasting art form, be it statue proper or literary portrait. Moreover, the focus on the statue by authors reflects the increased interest in the individual that is a characteristic of this era.[36]

[36] See Whitmarsh (2005), 83-5.

CHAPTER ONE

Belatedness, Novelty, and the Second Sophistic

> Nostalgia, they say, is an exercise in grammar wherein you find the present tense and the past perfect.
>
> Peter Whitmer, *When the Going Gets Weird*, p. 267.

This chapter is about how authors of the second sophistic confront their literary belatedness and, in particular, about the way in which they claim for themselves an element of novelty (καινότης) through their reuse and reapplication of the past. In the introduction to this thesis, I spent some time establishing what I termed the 'sophistic dilemma' – the problem of creating lasting fame when contemporary fame depends on one-off oral improvisation. For those men engaged in what Philostratus terms the second sophistic, improvisation and imitation of the past were the ingredients to contemporary success and a sense of insurmountable belatedness infuses much of the literature of this time. However, for the great authors of the Greek past, those who had forged a lasting place in the canon of Greek literature, one key to their success was aiming their work at a more temporally expansive audience – the many hypothetical future audiences, with whom they hoped their works would come into contact. As Thucydides famously claimed about his *History of the Peloponnesian War*: κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται ('It is composed as a possession for all time rather than a declamation for the moment of hearing', 1.22.4).[1] Thucydides is here claiming a sense of timelessness for his undertaking, in that he is suggesting his work is not tied to any specific moment and is relevant to every possible moment. For Philostratus' sophists, on the other hand, the past was inescapable: it was something to be revered, something with which to engage themselves, something to be contested, and something from which to learn. Thus they could never claim the kind of eternal quality that Thucydides does, although they could and did still engage with the future. The continuing fame of figures like Homer in the first few centuries of the

[1] On Thucydides and writing for the future, see Greenwood (2006), 1-18. See also Moles (1999) on Thucydides work as a literary inscription.

common era opened the possibility of a similar measure of future fame for Philostratus' sophists.[2] Nevertheless, the task of creating such lasting fame was daunting, given the relatively stable canon of Greek literature that they had inherited and the requirements of engaging with the past for contemporary fame. This paradox is manifested in the literature of the second sophistic as a kind of temporal dislocation and displacement, in which it is difficult to ascertain in which direction the author thinks he is travelling at any given time. Writers needed to develop means of dealing with the past in order to make their own assault on the future.

In the first section of this chapter, I will take a closer look at the temporal elasticity, the problems of belatedness, and the potential for future fame, faced by the writers of the second sophistic. Following this more theoretical discussion, I will then consider the idea of competitive imitation, by which I mean the emulation of the past in order to compete with and try to supersede it whilst addressing the future. My primary example here will be Arrian of Nicomedia and how he uses his self-constructed close association with Xenophon to stress his own literary worth and to address the future. Next, I will examine the concept of novelty and the anxieties that surround it in a culture tied so strongly to the past. In this section, my focus will be on Lucian of Samosata and his introductory piece, *Zeuxis*, because of the strong sense of unease it exhibits around the ideas of novelty, literary greatness, and fame. Finally, I will consider the way in which the monuments of the second sophistic reflect some of the same concerns as the literature. My main example here, as it is throughout this thesis, will be Herodes Atticus, since he is the focus of Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*, and he was both sophist and monumentalizer on a grand scale.

[2] See Kim (2010) on Homer and imperial Greek ideas on the relationship between history and fiction. See especially the introduction (1-21), and the discussions on Dio Chrysostom, Lucian, and Philostratus (85-215).

Belatedness, Novelty, and the Future

In the *Anxiety of Influence*, Harold Bloom describes the competitive relationship between a poet and his great predecessors. He suggests that it is impossible to become great in one's own right unless one is responding to the influence of a great forerunner and that the response to that influence must be an oedipal kind of psychological tension. In this work and the later *Western Canon*, he speaks of two key points: firstly, that there is competition between past and present writers; secondly, that the element which can raise a newcomer to canonical status is novelty, but not just novelty alone, rather novelty combined with beauty.[3] Thus for Bloom, it is belatedness that drives a writer to seek novelty. Although Bloom's works, particularly the *Western Canon*, champion elitism in literature and as such sit uncomfortably within certain branches of modern literary criticism, they revive much of the sentiment present in classical literary criticism.[4] Bloom elucidates the agonistic interaction between forerunner and follower in the latter book, stating, '[t]radition is not only a handing-down or process of benign transmission; it is also a conflict between past genius and present aspiration, in which the prize is literary survival or canonical inclusion'.[5] In the earlier *Anxiety of Influence*, with respect to novelty, he describes the way poets misread each other in order to create imaginative space for themselves.[6] The *Western Canon* refines this earlier idea to describe literary greatness and 'to ask what makes the author and works canonical'.[7] Bloom continues:

> The answer, more often than not, has turned out to be strangeness, a mode of originality that either cannot be assimilated, or that so assimilates us that we cease to see it as strange... When you read a

[3] Bloom (1994), 3.
[4] See Bloom (1994), 6-8, for Bloom's own discussion of the reaction to his works by those he terms the 'School of Resentment'.
[5] Bloom (1994), 8.
[6] Bloom (1973), 5.
[7] Bloom (1994), 3.

> canonical work for the first time you encounter a stranger, an uncanny startlement rather than a fulfillment of expectations.[8]

Although Bloom is discussing the western canon and Shakespeare is his centrepiece, these ideas are also applicable to the actors on Philostratus' sophistic stage, in that they too seek to negotiate a canon and canonical forms of literature that have stood for some time before they themselves appear on the literary scene. Bloom struggles to give a clear and quantifiable definition to writing that is worthy of canonical status, stating that it is a process of 'adding strangeness to beauty'.[9] Indeed this sentiment is quite similar to that of *On the Sublime*, a work of literary criticism composed in a Roman Greek context and attributed in the manuscript tradition to one 'Longinus'. This author has sometimes been identified with the grammarian Cassius Longinus, active in the third-century CE, but the treatise is now assumed to date from the first century of the same era, although (as argued by Malcolm Heath) this dating is in no way secure.[10] Nevertheless, the work falls within the period and cultural milieu of the second sophistic. For the benefit of the reader, I will simply refer to the author as Longinus. In the following passage, the author points to the impossibility of being able to accurately quantify or qualify sublimity,[11] but also to a sense of wonder and astonishment produced in the hearer that, as Bloom has suggested, must accompany a truly great work:

> ὡς ἀκρότης καὶ ἐξοχή τις λόγων ἐστὶ τὰ ὕψη, καὶ ποιητῶν τε οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ συγγραφέων οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐνθένδε ποθὲν ἐπρώτευσαν καὶ ταῖς ἑαυτῶν περιέβαλον εὐκλείαις τὸν αἰῶνα. οὐ γὰρ εἰς πειθὼ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ἀλλ' εἰς ἔκστασιν ἄγει τὰ ὑπερφυᾶ· πάντη δέ γε σὺν ἐκπλήξει

[8] Bloom (1994), 3. Cf. Feeney (1995), 310: 'great works can or even must break the bounds of interpretive possibility, redefining the critical practice needed to read them, addressing an audience which is not (yet) there'.

[9] Bloom (1994), 3. Bloom states that this is how Walter Pater defines Romanticism, but that he believes it is applicable to all canonical writings.

[10] Heath (1999). For the first-century date and attribution see Russell (1964), xxii-xxx. See also Grube (1965), 340-2; Whitmarsh (2001), 57. See Boyd (1957) for the circumstantial suggestion that the author is a Dionysius Longinus of the 1st Century. See Porter (2001), 76-7, for the observation that Longinus is never as specific in his treatise as those trying to date him want him to be.

[11] As pointed out by Grube (1957), 355-60, Longinus' subject is 'Great Writing' not simply writing in a grand style, as τὸ ὕψος might suggest. Cf. Grube (1965), 342.

> τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν ἀεὶ κρατεῖ τὸ θαυμάσιον, εἴγε τὸ μὲν πιθανὸν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ταῦτα δὲ δυναστείαν καὶ βίαν ἄμαχον προσφέροντα παντὸς ἐπάνω τοῦ ἀκροωμένου καθίσταται.
>
> Sublimity is a kind of eminence or excellence of discourse. It is the source of the distinction of the very greatest poets and prose writers and the means by which they have given eternal life to their own fame. For grandeur produces ecstasy rather than persuasion in the hearer; and the combination of wonder and astonishment always proves superior to the merely persuasive and pleasant. This is because persuasion on the whole is something we can control, whereas amazement and wonder exert invincible power and force and get the better of every hearer.[12] (*On the Sublime* 1.3-4)

Significantly, those writers who are considered the greatest by the author and who have gained immortal fame are cast as having deliberately designed their works to have eternal life. The passage above claims a kind of superhuman quality for sublimity, in that the effects of sublimity are cast in fighting terms and attributed with the ability to both conquer the audience and grant immortality to an author's fame. At the same time, the production of ecstasy suggests a kind of possession, which renders the audience a passive victim of sublimity. Thus for both Bloom and Longinus, the future life of one's writings is privileged as the primary reason for great writers to write well, even if the exact nature of that writing well cannot be defined.[13] As noted by C. Joachim Classen, this problem of defining literary greatness is partly a function of taste, fashion, and convention,[14] all of which change over time and remain fundamentally subjective. The men whom Philostratus describes are bound by the conventions of their day to imitate the past in order to achieve contemporary fame in the practice of *epideixis*, which is the highest form of artistic expression of their time. The audience of these spectacles comes to have its expectations fulfilled not confounded, so the production of novel works or of those which break with

[12] All translations of *On the Sublime* are by Russell in Russell and Winterbottom (1989), with occasional alterations.
[13] See Segal (1959) for the importance of eternity to Longinus in *On the Sublime*. See also Innes (1995a), 120-21; Porter (2001), 79.
[14] Classen (1995), 515-6, 518-9. This article is a helpful overview on the uses and understanding of rhetoric and literary criticism in the Greek and Latin traditions.

tradition is a practice that may harm rather than enhance one's contemporary reputation. Nevertheless, as much as contemporary fame is desirable, their driving wish is for a lasting relationship with posterity, as it was also for the great writers of the past whom they imitate and, consequently, many grapple with and strive for some form of novelty in their literary productions that will make them both great and memorable.

The following passage elaborates on what makes a work memorable and the most important ingredient is its reception by a learned and experienced audience:

> ὅταν οὖν ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἔμφρονος καὶ ἐμπείρου λόγων πολλάκις ἀκουόμενόν τι πρὸς μεγαλοφροσύνην τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ συνδιατιθῇ μηδ' ἐγκαταλείπῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ πλεῖον τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ ἀναθεωρούμενον, πίπτῃ δέ, ἂν αὐτὸ συνεχὲς ἐπισκοπῇς, εἰς ἀπαύξησιν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτ' ἀληθὲς ὕψος εἴη μέχρι μόνης τῆς ἀκοῆς σῳζόμενον. τοῦτο γὰρ τῷ ὄντι μέγα, οὗ πολλὴ μὲν ἡ ἀναθεώρησις, δύσκολος δὲ μᾶλλον δ' ἀδύνατος ἡ κατεξανάστασις, ἰσχυρὰ δὲ ἡ μνήμη καὶ δυσεξάλειπτος.
>
> When a man of sense and literary experience hears something many times over, and it fails to dispose his mind to greatness or to leave him with more to reflect upon than was contained in the mere words, but comes instead to seem valueless on repeated inspection, this is not true sublimity; it endures only for the moment of hearing. Real sublimity contains much food for reflection, is difficult or rather impossible to resist, and makes a strong and ineffaceable impression on the memory. (*On the Sublime* 7.3)

Thus here the author of *On the Sublime* demonstrates the relationship between the audience and the author. A work cannot be great in a vacuum; it needs a medium through which to play. Or, in this case, on which to inscribe itself: the final clause of this extract describes the sublime work as an inscription carved into the minds of the audience.[15] According to this work, the more educated and experienced that medium is, the more likely he/she is to be a good judge of literary quality. Classen makes this point in reverse by stressing that mastery of rhetoric also requires that any writer be able to adequately judge both his

[15] I will return to the idea of memory being like inscribing a wax tablet in the mind in chapter three of this thesis. See p. 137.

audience and the circumstances in which he comes to write or speak.[16] Moreover, like Thucydides, the author of *On the Sublime* judges that something aimed at a momentary performance can never be truly great.[17] At the same time, this passage demonstrates that audiences are primed with a preconception of what a great work should contain and how it should affect their minds. Complimentary to this notion is Classen's observation that '[m]ost Greek and Roman literary criticism and almost all Greek and Roman rhetoric is closely related to and connected with educational purposes and intentions'.[18] This is evident throughout *On the Sublime*, in that Longinus attempts to explain what the sublime is and how to recognize it; in doing so, he tries to shape the way in which literature is both produced and received by constructing himself as the supreme arbiter of literary quality. Moreover, the truly sublime work removes the passivity of the auditor and unites the author and the audience into the role of composer, as 'we come to believe we have created what we have only heard' (ὡς αὐτὴ γεννήσασα ὅπερ ἤκουσεν, 7.2).

The idea of a sublime work being impossible to resist supports the second part of Bloom's claim on the strangeness of the novel work. That is, a novel work, which is destined for canonization, is either impossible to assimilate or it finds a way to assimilate its audience so that it no longer seems strange.[19] This focus on the learned audience and their expectations would seem to imply that the author of *On the Sublime* leaves no room for the novel work that is not able to be assimilated by its audience. No allowance is conceded to the piece that jars or shocks or mystifies, since (by implication) the introduction of material that is contrary to what an audience has been primed to accept would risk rejection by such an audience. However, although Longinus damns novelty and sees it as a fad (ἅπαντα μέντοι

[16] Classen (1995), 516. Cf. Perry (2002), 154.
[17] See Greenwood (2006), 10, on Thucydides.
[18] Classen (1995), 522. Cf. Clark (1951), 13, with special reference to imitation.
[19] See p. 29.

τὰ οὕτως ἄσεμνα διὰ μίαν ἐμφύεται τοῖς λόγοις αἰτίαν, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς νοήσεις καινόσπουδον, περὶ ὃ δὴ μάλιστα κορυβαντιῶσιν οἱ νῦν, 5.1), his choice of sublime fragments for discussion tend to be those that do jar, shock, or mystify.[20] Notably, in their shockingness they can become instant classics. So, for example, he recalls a moment in Demosthenes' *On the Crown* 18.208, in which the orator dismisses blame from the Athenians after the battle of Chaeronea. As Longinus explains, Demosthenes does not simply state this sentiment:

> τίς δ' ἦν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν χρῆσις αὐτῆς; «οὐχ ἡμάρτετε, ὦ τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ἀγῶνα ἀράμενοι· ἔχετε δὲ οἰκεῖα τούτου παραδείγματα· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἥμαρτον οὐδ' οἱ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι οὐδ' οἱ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς.» ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καθάπερ ἐμπνευσθεὶς ἐξαίφνης ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ οἱονεὶ φοιβόληπτος γενόμενος τὸν <κατὰ> τῶν ἀριστέων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὅρκον ἐξεφώνησεν «οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε, μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας», φαίνεται δι' ἑνὸς τοῦ…σχήματος… τοὺς μὲν προγόνους ἀποθεώσας, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς οὕτως ἀποθανόντας ὡς θεοὺς ὀμνύναι παριστάνων, τοῖς δὲ κρίνουσι τὸ τῶν ἐκεῖ προκινδυνευσάντων ἐντιθεὶς φρόνημα, τὴν δὲ τῆς ἀποδείξεως φύσιν μεθεστακὼς εἰς ὑπερβάλλον ὕψος καὶ πάθος καὶ ξένων καὶ ὑπερφυῶν ὅρκων ἀξιοπιστίαν, καὶ ἅμα παιώνειόν τινα καὶ ἀλεξιφάρμακον εἰς τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἀκουόντων καθιεὶς λόγον, ὡς κουφιζομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγκωμίων μηδὲν ἔλαττον τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Φίλιππον ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ Μαραθῶνα καὶ Σαλαμῖνα νικητηρίοις παρίστασθαι φρονεῖν· οἷς πᾶσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς διὰ τοῦ σχηματισμοῦ συναρπάσας ᾤχετο.
>
> What would have been the natural way to put it? 'You have not done wrong, you who fought for the liberty of Greece; you have examples to prove this close at home: the men of Marathon, of Salamis, of Plataea did not do wrong.' But instead of this he was suddenly inspired to give voice to the oath by the heroes of Greece: 'By those who risked their lives at Marathon, you have not done wrong!' Observe what he effects by this single figure… He deifies his audience's ancestors, suggesting that it is right to take an oath by men who fell so bravely, as though they were gods. He inspires the judges with the temper of those who risked their lives. He transforms his demonstration into an extraordinary piece of sublimity and passion, and into the convincingness of this unusual and amazing oath. At the same time he injects into his hearers' minds a healing specific, so as to lighten their hearts by these paeans of praise and make them as proud of the battle with Philip as of the triumphs of Marathon and Salamis. In short, the figure enables him to run away with his audience. (*On the Sublime* 16.2)

[20] See Porter (2001), 83. See also Hertz (1983) and Guerlac (1985).

Despite Longinus offering this example of one sentence, which both affects Demosthenes' immediate audience and transforms his speech into an instant classic, revealing such a dual effect was possible in Demosthenes' day and should be so still, the vast majority of Longinus' examples derive from authors who were active in the fourth-century BCE or earlier, and it is their unusual or powerful way of expressing themselves which has made them candidates for Longinus' treatise. Thus this contradiction within Longinus illustrates the risk that an author who aspires to future fame must take – the possibility of contemporary failure in the moment they shock, jar, or mystify. No contemporary authors appear to have managed to achieve, in Longinus' opinion, the kind of striking brilliance which Demosthenes demonstrates.

Bloom's point about competition with the past is also neatly illustrated by the author of *On the Sublime*. The following passage formulates the challenges of writing within a Greek literary tradition that already possesses a clearly formed canon. In the passage there is a strong sense of dialoguing with the past, the present, and the future. A piece of imperial Greek literature itself, it encompasses all the themes that are central to Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* and much Greek literature of the early empire, focussing as it does on competition with and reverence for the past, the performative nature of literature, the desire for future fame, the heroic nature of the author, and the notion of a literary legacy. In the section just prior to this passage, Longinus has described the way in which classical canonical authors have imitated Homer and, in this section, he advocates that his contemporaries learn from and embrace the same practice.[21] Consequently, he is advocating less an imitation of these authors' works and more an imitation of their outlook

[21] Cf. Whitmarsh (2001), 58.

and process. So, when coming to write and desiring to write well, Longinus has the following advice:

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡνίκ' ἂν διαπονῶμεν ὑψηγορίας τι καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνης δεόμενον, καλὸν ἀναπλάττεσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς πῶς ἂν εἰ τύχοι ταὐτὸ τοῦθ' Ὅμηρος εἶπεν, πῶς δ' ἂν Πλάτων ἢ Δημοσθένης ὕψωσαν ἢ ἐν ἱστορίᾳ Θουκυδίδης. προσπίπτοντα γὰρ ἡμῖν κατὰ ζῆλον ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ οἷον διαπρέποντα τὰς ψυχὰς ἀνοίσει πως πρὸς τὰ ἀνειδωλοποιούμενα μέτρα· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, εἰ κἀκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ προσυπογράφοιμεν, πῶς ἂν τόδε τι ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενον παρὼν Ὅμηρος ἤκουσεν ἢ Δημοσθένης, ἢ πῶς ἂν ἐπὶ τούτῳ διετέθησαν· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι μέγα τὸ ἀγώνισμα, τοιοῦτον ὑποτίθεσθαι τῶν ἰδίων λόγων δικαστήριον καὶ θέατρον, καὶ ἐν τηλικούτοις ἥρωσι κριταῖς τε καὶ μάρτυσιν ὑπέχειν τῶν γραφομένων εὐθύνας πεπλάσθαι. πλέον δὲ τούτων παρορμητικόν, εἰ προστιθείης, πῶς ἂν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα γράψαντος ὁ μετ' ἐμὲ πᾶς ἀκούσειεν αἰών; εἰ δέ τις αὐτόθεν φοβοῖτο, μὴ τοῦ ἰδίου βίου καὶ χρόνου φθέγξαιτό τι ὑπερήμερον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ συλλαμβανόμενα ὑπὸ τῆς τούτου ψυχῆς ἀτελῆ καὶ τυφλὰ ὥσπερ ἀμβλοῦσθαι, πρὸς τὸν τῆς ὑστεροφημίας ὅλως μὴ τελεσφορούμενα χρόνον.
>
> We too, then, whenever we are working out some passage demanding sublimity of thought and expression, should not go awry to fashion in our minds the question, 'How might Homer have said this same thing, how would Plato or Demosthenes or, in history, Thucydides have made it sublime?' Emulation will bring those men before our eyes, and their outstanding presence will raise up our thoughts to their standard of thinking. Still more will this be so, if we also try to imagine to ourselves, 'How would Homer or Demosthenes, had either been present, have listened to this passage of mine? How would that passage have affected them?' Great indeed is the test, if we suppose such a jury and an audience as this to listen to our own utterances and make believe that we are submitting our work to the scrutiny of such heroes as witnesses and judges. It would be even more stimulating to add, 'If I write this, how would all eternity receive it?' But if a man shrinks at the very thought of saying anything that is going to outlast his own life and time, then must all the conceptions of that man's mind be like some half-formed, blind embryo, all too abortive for the life of posthumous fame. (Longinus, *On the Sublime* 14.1-3)

Longinus advocates three modes of literary production in a hierarchy of increasing sublimity. The first and least desirable is emulation (ζῆλος). In this section of Longinus there is no clear distinction between emulation and imitation (μίμησις) and, as mentioned above, this passage immediately follows a paragraph dealing specifically with Homeric

imitation.[22] Moreover, the circumstance described is the kind of act performed by Philostratus' sophists when they take the stage and request a theme from the past to be proposed by their audience. They assume the *persona* of an illustrious ancient and imagine what he might have said in a given situation. The second mode changes this dynamic and subjugates μίμησις to competition. Instead of imitating these great authors of the past, one's literary achievements are rather to be judged by them. This is essentially a directive to conceive of one's work as worthy to be counted amongst canonical literature from a contemporary perspective. If Homer or Thucydides were to approve, then one might be considered as a worthy addition to their company at the pinnacle of Greek literature. The final mode overthrows the authority of this illustrious jury and replaces it with all conceivable ones of the future.[23] This is effectively a change of temporal perspective and asks the question of where I will stand in relation to the great writers of the past, present, and future from any given future moment. That is, Longinus takes the judgement of the quality of one's work out of known parameters. This kind of process – to consider the reception of the future over the present – is one which demonstrates an attitude of both reverence and arrogance towards the established canon, since simultaneously it acknowledges that, in the contemporary world, the canon cannot be altered, but also, by futuring one's work's reception, the boundaries of that canon are neatly broken down and it is rendered anachronistic in its present form. This does not mean that the canon ceases to be important – to completely oust the established canon would make one's own potential canonical position less meaningful – but, instead, this moveable perspective creates a canon that is malleable and open; it imagines many potential canons and, most importantly, it makes entering any one of these as-yet-unrealized, hypothetical canons a

[22] See Russell (1964), 113, on the conflation of ζῆλος and μίμησις. Cf. Whitmarsh (2001), 58.
[23] Cf. Russell (1981), 79: 'The dominant thought here is regard for posterity'.

genuine possibility. Playing with temporal perspective makes competition with the canon viable.[24]

In his discussion and subsequent rejection of imitation, Longinus goes further than Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who describes two kinds of imitation: one which is natural that comes through study and practice, and one which is artificial that is achieved by following the rules of the craft (ἐκ τῶν τῆς τέχνης παραγγελμάτων, *On Dinarchus* 7). Dionysius rejects the latter as inferior and says that these ideas of imitation apply to both literature and art. He then goes on to list various canonical figures and how their imitators fail to produce a similar quality (8). Nevertheless, he does champion the first kind of imitation and the imitation of many models rather than attempting to reproduce a single author.[25] Longinus, however, suggests that the true path to greatness lies in moving beyond imitation. Moreover, the generative imagery of the final lines of the above extract becomes significant when considering the focus is on posthumous fame. An author's ideas are compared to an embryo, an analogy which implies that one's writings are like one's children.[26] Clearly, children play an important part in any given individual's posthumous fame, in that they function to extend his own life both through their internal memories of him and by acting as walking memories of him through sharing in his genetic makeup. In using this metaphor, *On the Sublime* implies that literary works contain some essence of their author and their circulation in society ensures a form of continued existence. The use of the verb ἀκούειν highlights the conception that an author's writings possess some kind of

[24] Segal (1959), Hertz (1983), Guerlac (1985), and Porter (2001) all note that *On the Sublime* causes forms of dislocation and displacement, temporally or with respect to an author and his work or an author and his audience. Guerlac, Porter, and Hertz also discuss fragmentation in different ways. I will return to these concepts below.

[25] See Perry (2002), 158-63, for a discussion of the promotion of eclectic imitation in Greek and Latin rhetorical theory. See Too (1998), 210-12, for a comparison of Dionysius and Longinus on the notion of imitation.

[26] On the imagery of procreation in this work see Walsh (1988), 266, and Whitmarsh (2001), 59 n. 76.

independent life: both the great canonical writers of the past and the hypothetical future readers are conceived of as 'hearing' the work, as though it possesses a voice of its own, a concept which supports the argument of Porter about texts being 'deposits of voice' that I discussed in the introduction.[27] Consequently, if one's writings are not designed to speak to future audiences, they are, for the author of *On the Sublime*, forever unfinished (ἀτελής) and blind (τυφλός), and like a malformed embryo, they can only miscarry (ἀμβλόομαι). As Charles Segal puts it, 'what is sublime, in short, is eternal, and what aims at eternity becomes sublime'.[28] Significantly, this imagery of malformation and miscarriage harks back (forward) to Bloom's requirement for novelty to also possess beauty in order to be considered a great work – there is always the possibility that instead of a masterpiece, novelty may produce a monstrosity.[29] Yet, as we have seen, the reception of novelty is entirely in the hands of the audience: one man's monster might be another's god.

In his twenty-first oration, Dio Chrysostom approaches the problem from a different angle by complaining that, in order to fulfil the requirements of satisfying contemporary audiences, one should not break with tradition or operate outside of a set of limited options. Dio complains that a work is immediately thought of as inferior if it does not conform to a specific mode of referencing and privileging the past, and that those genres (specifically tragedy in this case) which were thought the most worthy in the past cannot be adapted to the present and accordingly have little relevance to contemporary society, yet they continue to be revered over more relevant material:

[27] Cf. Porter (2006), 314-23, on the idea that texts were deposits of voice. See the introduction of this thesis, p. 21.
[28] Segal (1959), 124.
[29] Cf. Lucian, *Prometheus in Words* 3: ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐ πάνυ ἱκανόν, εἰ καινοποιεῖν δοκοίην, μηδὲ ἔχοι τις λέγειν ἀρχαιότερόν τι τοῦ πλάσματος οὗ τοῦτο ἀπόγονόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ εἰ μὴ καὶ χαριέντα φαίνοιτο, αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν, εὖ ἴσθι, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ ξυμπατήσας ἂν ἀφανίσαιμι. οὐδ' ἂν ὠφελήσειεν αὐτό, παρὰ γοῦν ἐμοί, ἡ καινότης, μὴ οὐχὶ συντετρῖφθαι ἄμορφον ὄν. See also Lucian's *Zeuxis*, which I discuss below, beginning p. 68.

> Ἴσως γάρ μου καταφρονεῖς καὶ ἡγῇ με ληρεῖν, ὅτι οὐ περὶ Κύρου καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου λέγω, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ, ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ἀλλὰ Νέρωνος καὶ τοιούτων πραγμάτων νεωτέρων τε καὶ ἀδόξων ὧν μνημονεύω. τούτου δὲ αἴτιον τὸ μὴ πάνυ φιλεῖν τοὺς τραγῳδοὺς μηδὲ ζηλοῦν· ἐπεὶ οἶδα ὅτι αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ τοὺς νῦν ὄντας ὀνομάζειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀρχαίου τινὸς δεῖ πράγματος καὶ οὐδὲ πάνυ πιστοῦ. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ ᾐσχύνοντο τοὺς τότε ὄντας ὀνομάζειν καὶ λέγοντες καὶ γράφοντες· οἱ δὲ νῦν ἐκείνους ἐξ ἅπαντος ὀνομάζειν ζητοῦσιν.
>
> I suppose you look down on me and think that I am drivelling because I am not talking about Cyrus and Alcibiades, as the wise men do, still even now, but about Nero and subjects of that kind, more recent and inglorious, which I can remember. The reason for this is that I do not much care for the writers of tragedy nor try to emulate them; for I know that it is a disgrace to mention people of the present day in a tragedy, but that it is some ancient event which I should have touched upon and one not very credible either. Yet men of former times certainly were not ashamed to name people of their own day whether in speaking or in writing; but those of the present day strive to name the ancients on any pretext. (Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 21.11)

In this passage, Dio acknowledges that in discussing relatively recent subjects he is committing a *faux pas* in the current literary climate, but he also provides some justification for doing so.[30] His mistakes are to privilege men of the recent past over men of the remote past and to focus on a Roman subject in the emperor Nero, rather than the heroes and tyrants of fourth- and fifth-century-BCE Greece. Yet, in his defence, he questions the primacy of the (canonical) writers of tragedy and their genre, as well as the mythical and set nature of their subjects. By implication, in rejecting tragedy, Dio encourages his readers to consider the differences between his own literary practice and that of ancient tragedians. The choice of tragedy must be significant and the clearest divergence from this genre compared to oratory is the use of prose by Dio and the vast majority of writers of his time. The curiosity of using poetic themes in prose genres is underscored, although, on the hybrid nature of epideictic oratory and poetic prose as 'a deliberate and artful attempt to forge a new genre, in the agonistic struggle for literary identity in the present, out of

[30] Classen (1995), 518-9, notes that one typical feature of Greek and Roman writing is the awareness of conventions, rules, and the tradition of the genre in which they write, as well as concern for their audience.

existing literary taxonomies', see Whitmarsh.[31] Dio stresses that emulation of tragedy and its material renders the whole process of literary production during the second sophistic anachronistic and, in this way, he implicitly questions the value of such practice. Moreover, he points out that 'classical' writers aimed at a contemporary audience, whereas the writers of his day appear to be aiming at an audience of the past, since they only include individuals from former times. From this perspective, Dio's contemporary rivals appear short-sighted. How can their work achieve longevity if it aims itself at the past? In chaining prose to poetic subjects, it cements its secondariness and inferiority.[32] Dio juxtaposes his perspective, which he describes as being perceived as 'foolish' or 'delirious' (ληρεῖν), with that of 'the wise' (οἱ σοφοί), who would privilege ancient Greek poetic subjects over those of contemporary Roman Greece. The use of σοφοί recalls Longinus' talk of the need for vast literary experience in a worthy judge of a work's quality, as well as Classen's point about the way in which rhetorical treatises and literary criticism attempt to teach an audience both how to write or speak and how to receive a written piece or a speech.[33] In addition, it is perhaps a swipe at the profession of sophistry which, despite his own sophistic activities, Dio was prone to denigrate at every opportunity.[34] Admittedly, Dio is being deliberately provocative in dressing down his contemporaries in this manner and he certainly does not follow his own advice. Nevertheless, Dio's protest highlights the perception of the political nature of imperial Greek literature, with its failure to give attention or acclaim to anything other than the culture of the Greek past, whilst also acknowledging just how set this practice is: acceptance and acknowledgement by the learned audience comes only through conformity. It is significant that rhetorical treatises focus so much on imitation (μίμησις) and give much less attention to novelty (καινότης).

[31] Whitmarsh (2006), 359-61. His subject here is specifically Isocrates.
[32] Whitmarsh (2006) is a discussion of the anxieties and ideology involved in the use of prose by later Greek authors.
[33] Classen (1995), 522.
[34] For a discussion of Dio's relationship to both philosophy and sophistry, see Whitmarsh (2005), 17-9; (2001), 192-4. See also Moles (1978).

Yet, at the same time, the passage reveals how this imitation, which aims at celebrating the past, by its very mimetic nature, also denies that imitation a future. The implied question is whether the great authors of the past would have achieved literary immortality if they too had directed their works backwards. It is in this dilemma that Segal's point about eternity becomes relevant.[35] There is a difference between addressing the future and addressing eternity with a work: Thucydides states that his text is relevant to any given time (1.22.4) – this is an attempt to make his work eternal;[36] for imperial Greek writers, however, the importance laid on addressing the past pins their texts to a specific period and they can address the future, but they cannot address eternity unless they break away from the dictates of their literary milieu. Thus Dio stresses that he wishes to write about subjects that he can remember (μνημονεύω). This should indicate those of which he has personal experience or which happened in living memory, and he particularly denigrates the mythical nature of tragedy. The adage, 'write what you know' comes to mind. Thus Dio reveals tragedy to be a poor exemplar for the current literary scene, since it lacks relevance in his day. This questioning of tragic μίμησις is similar to the advice of the Longinus passage and shows that imitation, which is so valued in Dio's day, is in fact a limiting method of literary production and, in this way, it underscores the predicament of writers like Dio: for contemporary fame, the veneration and reproduction of the past is necessary, but this is inadequate for future fame. Thus in attempting to break away from this mode of literary expression and aim at the future, one risks contemporary ridicule and obscurity. It is in this intellectual environment that these men come to make their personal assaults on posterity, whilst simultaneously trying to satisfy the demands of their contemporary audience. In the following section, I will examine one strategy employed by the writers of

[35] Segal (1959), 124.
[36] See the discussion of Moles (1999).

the second sophistic. That is, the concept of competitive imitation, in which a great literary figure from the past is emulated in order to subsume his literary authority and, at the same time, an attempt is made to supersede him. My primary example in this section will be Arrian of Nicomedia and his *Periplus Ponti Euxeni*. However, before I come to Arrian, I will return to Longinus and *On the Sublime*.

Competitive Imitation: Using the past to create something new with Arrian

The aspect of imitation on which I want to focus in this section is the practice of claiming a literary *persona* that equates to a famous predecessor in order to subsume his literary authority. That is, either to claim to be the 'new' so-and-so (for example, the new Homer, the new Demosthenes, or the new Xenophon),[37] or to take over or manipulate an earlier author's identity in some other subtler manner. This seemingly simple strategy has a complex effect with several possible intentions on behalf of the author. To assume the identity of another is also to seize his fame. On the one hand, it can be a positive, symbiotic relationship that promotes a renewal or revival of the past and its great authors; on the other, it can be a rewriting of the past, an act which displaces the great forerunner and attempts to make him obsolete. Naturally, it can also be a combination of these two strategies. No matter what the intention, it must inevitably lead to a level of competition with the past, if one's intention is to forge a lasting reputation (as illustrated by the passage from Longinus above).[38] The danger with imitation is the potential for the younger author to be subsumed by his forerunner and to plagiarise rather than (re)create, a situation which would naturally limit the potential of that individual's fame; yet, as presented by the passage below, also from *On the Sublime*, there are different types of imitation (that differ

[37] See Schmitz (1997), 46-7 (especially n. 25) for references to this phenomenon, including Nicanor as the 'New Homer and the New Themistocles', Arrian as the 'New Xenophon', Heraclitus of Rhodes as 'the Homer of medical literature'. See also pp. 226-7.
[38] See p. 36.

significantly from those described by Dionysius of Halicarnassus above), which depend on the skills and ambition of the imitating author, one in which the author becomes possessed by the spirit of his predecessor and one in which he contends with that predecessor's illustrious ghost:

> Ἐνδείκνυται δ' ἡμῖν οὗτος ἀνήρ, εἰ βουλοίμεθα μὴ κατολιγωρεῖν, ὡς καὶ ἄλλη τις παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὰ ὑψηλὰ τείνει. ποία δὲ καὶ τίς αὕτη; <ἡ> τῶν ἔμπροσθεν μεγάλων συγγραφέων καὶ ποιητῶν μίμησίς τε καὶ ζήλωσις... πολλοὶ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίῳ θεοφοροῦνται πνεύματι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὃν καὶ τὴν Πυθίαν λόγος ἔχει τρίποδι πλησιάζουσαν, ἔνθα ῥῆγμά ἐστι γῆς ἀναπνέον, ὥς φασιν, ἀτμὸν ἔνθεον, αὐτόθεν ἐγκύμονα τῆς δαιμονίου καθισταμένην δυνάμεως παραυτίκα χρησμῳδεῖν κατ' ἐπίπνοιαν· οὕτως ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων μεγαλοφυΐας εἰς τὰς τῶν ζηλούντων ἐκείνους ψυχὰς ὡς ἀπὸ ἱερῶν στομίων ἀπόρροιαί τινες φέρονται... μόνος Ἡρόδοτος Ὁμηρικώτατος ἐγένετο; Στησίχορος ἔτι πρότερον ὅ τε Ἀρχίλοχος, πάντων δὲ τούτων μάλιστα ὁ Πλάτων, ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὁμηρικοῦ κείνου νάματος εἰς αὐτὸν μυρίας ὅσας παρατροπὰς ἀποχετευσάμενος... ἔστι δ' οὐ κλοπὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ καλῶν ἠθῶν ἡ πλασμάτων ἢ δημιουργημάτων ἀποτύπωσις. καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἐπακμάσαι μοι δοκεῖ τηλικαῦτά τινα τοῖς τῆς φιλοσοφίας δόγμασι καὶ εἰς ποιητικὰς ὕλας πολλαχοῦ συνεμβῆναι καὶ φράσεις, εἰ μὴ περὶ πρωτείων νὴ Δία παντὶ θυμῷ πρὸς Ὅμηρον, ὡς ἀνταγωνιστὴς νέος πρὸς ἤδη τεθαυμασμένον, ἴσως μὲν φιλονικότερον καὶ οἱονεὶ διαδορατιζόμενος, οὐκ ἀνωφελῶς δ' ὅμως διηριστεύετο· «ἀγαθὴ» γὰρ κατὰ τὸν Ἡσίοδον «ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσι». καὶ τῷ ὄντι καλὸς οὗτος καὶ ἀξιονικότατος εὐκλείας ἀγών τε καὶ στέφανος, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι τῶν προγενεστέρων οὐκ ἄδοξον.
>
> [Plato], if we will read him with attention, illustrates yet another road to sublimity, besides those we have discussed. This is the way of imitation and emulation of great writers of the past... Many are possessed by a spirit not their own. It is like what we are told of the Pythia at Delphi: she is in contact with the tripod near the cleft in the ground which (so they say) exhales divine vapour, and she is thereupon made pregnant by the supernatural power and forthwith prophesies as one inspired. Similarly, the genius of the ancients acts as a kind of oracular cavern and effluences flow from it into the minds of their imitators... Was Herodotus the only 'most Homeric' writer? Surely Stesichorus and Archilochus earned the name before him. So, more than any, did Plato, who diverted to himself countless rills from the Homeric spring... In all this process there is no plagiarism. It resembles rather the reproduction of good character in statues and works of art. Plato could not have put such a brilliant finish on his philosophical doctrines or so often risen to poetic subjects and poetic language, if he had not tried and tried wholeheartedly, to compete for the prize against Homer. To break a lance in this way may well have been a brash and contentious thing to do, but the competition proved anything but valueless. As Hesiod says, 'this strife is good for men.' Truly it is a noble contest and prize of honour, and one well worth winning, in which to be defeated by one's elders is itself no disgrace. (*On the Sublime* 13.2-4)

The imagery of this passage presents a quite different picture from the 'natural' and 'artificial' imitation described by Dionysius.[39] In the first place, μίμησις is presented as possession, as channelling the spirit and words of the past author. This metaphor is usually used to describe the inspiration a poet in particular, but later also a writer of prose, feels from the muses or other divine figure. It is not used to represent inspiration from an earlier author; in this Longinus innovates.[40] This notion of possession suggests that the essence of a writer is contained in his words, just as the essence of the god is contained in the Pythia's prophecies. In this case, the ancient author speaks through the medium of the modern author with the obvious implied result that the author loses his own identity. Though he casts it in different terms and his focus is on classicism, Jim Porter sees this channelling as an aim of the backward-looking imperial Greek perspective: '[u]tterly possessed by the classical past, in the end one simply *is* classical'.[41] The desire, in this instance, is to insert oneself firmly into the past and, at the same time, to bring the past into the present. This version of μίμησις recalls Ennius' dream of Homer, in which he is informed by the bard himself, through metempsychosis and an intermediary peacock, that he is in fact the reincarnation of the father of Greek epic.[42] In Lucian's *The Dream or the Cock*, a cobbler dialogues with his rooster (who is actually Pythagoras reincarnated) on the subject of poverty. A similar claim is made about Stesichorus being Homer reincarnate in an epigram of one of the Antipaters,[43] a notion pointed to in the above passage. The imagery of the Homeric spring is common in Hellenistic writing, as is the idea of Homer as

[39] See Whitmarsh (2001), 62-4, for a discussion of Longinus' views on the application of τέχνη to natural talent.
[40] See Russell (1964), 114-5, on the literary concept of inspiration as possession in Greek and Roman literature and Plato, *Ion* 533c-e, as an example of this phenomenon, which suggests the possibility of inspired transmission between people as though links on a chain. Nevertheless, the source is still divine.
[41] See Porter (2006), 347.
[42] See Aicher (1989) for a discussion of this dream as a technique used by Ennius to legitimize and ease his audience into his innovative style. See also Brink (1972), 556-60.
[43] See Brink (1972), 557-60

a fountain from which later authors drink.[44] The author of this passage stresses that this channelling of the spirit of Homer does not equate to theft; his comparison of the inspired work to a statue, however, suggests an immediate derivative inferiority to the original works of Homer, a kind of lifeless counterfeit. Moreover, it attributes a quality of stagnancy to the later author's work, in that statues are rooted to a particular spot and do not have the freedom to travel and announce themselves far and wide as words do.[45] Here, the long-dead Homer is the one shaping the works of his successor, not the other way around, as one might imagine such a relationship should function, and the modern author produces a monument to Homer rather than himself.

This image of the immovable, second-rate Homeric reproduction is compared to Plato, who is presented as dynamically battling with the spectre of Homer instead, metaphorically 'crossing spears' (διαδορατιζόμενος) with him as is fitting to a contest between heroes for immortal fame. Moreover, although Plato too drinks from the springs of Homer, he is the one who actively diverts and directs the flow of Homer to himself. Plato and Homer battle as Homeric heroes.[46] If Plato wins, he both displaces Homer from a position of absolute primacy and assumes a share of his fame; if he loses, he is another Homeric imitator, who fails to supersede the greatness of his predecessor. In the latter result, Plato would simply bolster Homer's already dominant fame, rather than shifting the balance more to his own reputation. Longinus points out that to fail in such a battle is in no way shameful, for the risk is worth the potential benefit of success and in this way he privileges this active kind of

[44] See Brink (1972), 553. See Guerlac (1985), 288, for Longinus borrowing Plato's own metaphor of bodily irrigation to describe his imitation of Homer. See also Russell (1964), 116.
[45] This is an important concept to which I will return in the final chapter of this thesis, which begins on p. 192.
[46] See Segal (1987) for the idea of the writer as hero in Longinus. Cf. Innes (1995b); Porter (2001), 66; Whitmarsh (2001), 60-1.

imitation over the more passive variety.[47] The battle of Homer and Plato collapses time to bring the two great authors into each other's company. Yun Lee Too has demonstrated that *On the Sublime* reveals how language (i.e. the sublime) can be used to create this kind of spatial and temporal dislocation.[48] Tim Whitmarsh elaborates on this notion and shows that this dislocation can produce a kind of communion with the past and its great authors, both dissolving the temporal gap whilst simultaneously highlighting its presence. He focuses on the political and cultural implications of this idea and the notion that only free peoples can produce great art. He suggests that Longinus is providing a commentary on the position and consequences of being a Greek (writer) in the Roman empire.[49] But, at the same time, Longinus is demonstrating that, although the temporal gap between the Roman present and the classical past is great, it is possible to recapture the perspective of past writers and, instead of reproducing their works, reproduce their approach to literary production which, whilst acknowledging the primacy of literary forbearers at the time of composition, does not set that primacy in stone. It is an approach in which anything is possible since it subjugates the past and the present to the future.

This temporal elasticity and displacement is acknowledged also by James Porter, Susan Guerlac, Charles Segal, and Neil Hertz. Guerlac casts it as a slippage between the speaker/writer and the auditor/reader, where time and distance is overcome through the virtual identification of text and audience.[50] Hertz considers the slippage between Longinus as rhetorician and the fragments he quotes, whilst acknowledging Longinus' tendency to blur the demarcation between various elements, including author/audience, author/text,

[47] See Innes (2002), 267-9, for a discussion of Longinus' view of Plato as the model for attaining sublimity through imitation. Cf. Russell (1981), 78. See also Innes (2002), 278: 'Demosthenes is the model for sublimity with emotion, Plato for sublimity without emotion, and Homer for both kinds'.
[48] Too (1998), 196-202.
[49] Whitmarsh (2001), 66-71.
[50] Guerlac (1985).

and author/characters.[51] Segal considers the way Longinus elevates and removes his subject from a perceived contemporary state of political and social decline by associating it with universal traits of divinity and eternity, rather than contemporary society (much as Thucydides claims to do).[52] As noted by Porter, Segal's reading makes the treatise eternal and, consequently, any attempt to date it essentially meaningless.[53] Porter, on the other hand, argues that Longinus' classicism ties him to a particular age, since through his examples he reaffirms the primacy of the canon. The aim of the treatise, he argues, is to teach its audience how to identify, reproduce, and respond to the sublime, how to bring the past into the present and how to project that past into the future.[54] He casts Longinus' scrutiny of canonical fragments as analogous to Pausanias' scrutiny of the ruins of classical Greece and contends that something can only be considered sublime at the moment it is threatened with oblivion.[55] All these approaches have much to recommend them and are valid readings of the text. The element that concerns me, which comes through most strongly in Porter, Segal, Too, and Whitmarsh, is the temporal collapse and concurrent potential displacement. In particular, this notion allows the achievement of the past to be tackled in the present, which not only ensures a level playing field between forerunner and imitator/emulator, but also means that one's own contemporary cultural offerings can be imagined into the future. Yet, despite Longinus' efforts to encourage authors to aim at the future, his examples and categorization of the sublime suggest that a contemporary writer can never become sublime/canonical in the present because he is inevitably tied to the past. Plato battles Homer and succeeds in slotting himself into the canon, but from a contemporary standpoint, Plato himself is a treasured cultural relic of the past, as venerable to the modern writer as Homer is. Thus only through commitment to this moveable

[51] Hertz (1983).
[52] Segal (1959).
[53] Porter (2001), 77.
[54] Porter (2001), 77-85.
[55] Porter (2001), 81-4

perspective can a writer of the second sophistic ever reach canonical heights. For Longinus, to create a lasting future identity, one must relinquish all hope of acceptance in the present. It is this necessary dilemma, which colours the cultural output of the second sophistic, as much as its reverence for the past.

So, Longinus presents both a passive and an active means of Homeric imitation and, in the context of the passage I discussed earlier (a passage that immediately follows this one in *On the Sublime*) in which writers were encouraged to aim their works at the future (14.1-3), it is clear which of the two techniques Longinus privileges.[56] Nevertheless, in that passage, the imitator/emulator was never a passive conduit for the great canonical writer, he just imagined himself in his place and attempted to shape his work as the past great would have shaped his own, rather than having the past great shape the imitator's work through the vessel of the imitator. In the passage that presents possession, representation, and a belligerent Plato (13.2-4), Longinus makes no specific distinction between the passivity of possession or the agency of the warrior Plato, but it is clear that Plato's success stems from his active competition with Homer, his risky decision to meet the past great head on and assert his own authority. Indeed, George Walsh characterizes the passive type of creative possession as a process of feminization, citing the imagery of the Pythia impregnated by the god's presence as evidence and the contrasting masculine image of the fighting Plato. Thus imitation threatens to destroy an individual's identity and, in the process, unman him. In the latter heroic image, Longinus creates a kind of imitation, which is more like emulation and clearly meant to be more admirable than the passive variety.[57]

[56] Segal (1959), 124-6, interprets Longinus as saying that μίμησις is the key to sublimity and a way of approaching the past greatness of ancient writers and achieving greatness oneself. This is similar to my argument, but does not remove the absolute primacy of the ancients, as the futuring of perspective does.
[57] Walsh (1988), 266-8. See also Whitmarsh (2001), 59, on the implicit power relationship in this reproductive metaphor.

This apparent discomfort with the potential loss of identity that seems to be associated with passive imitation, with becoming the 'new' so-and-so, can be seen in the figure of Herodes Atticus in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*. He is twice hailed as being equal to a past great and on both occasions he distances himself from the compliment or, at least, recasts it with his own spin. In the first case, in discussing Herodes' style, Philostratus says that he was inseparable from Critias and that all Greece called him one of the ten, referring to the canon of ten Attic orators (*VS* 564).[58] Herodes deflects the compliment by saying that he is, at least, better than Andocides («Ἀνδοκίδου μὲν» ἔφη «βελτίων εἰμί»). In this way, Herodes maintains a separate oratorical identity, so that he might be slotted into the canon by displacing one of its members, but he will not be subsumed by another's reputation. In the second case, Philostratus describes how, at the Olympic games, all Greece cried out to Herodes, «εἷς ὡς Δημοσθένης» ('you are like Demosthenes!' 539), and again he brushed it off by saying he would rather be like Polemo.

Material evidence suggests that there might be more to the appearance of this anecdote at this particular point in Philostratus' narrative than simply its position within the section that deals with the life of Polemo. Found in the Asclepeion at Pergamon, on a white marble statue base, the following was inscribed:[59]

> Δημοσθένην
> Δημοσθένους
> Παιανιέα
> Πολέμων
> κατὰ ὄναρ

[58] Cf. Schmitz (1997), 226-7, who suggests that Philostratus' stress that Herodes was not overwhelmed by the compliment meant that such an occurrence could be possible and that effort at self-fashioning for these rhetors was always necessary.
[59] See Puech (2002), 399 no. 210.

This inscription implies, at the very least, that Demosthenes appeared to Polemo in a dream and it is likely that it was a dream similar in consequence to Ennius' dream of Homer, since this seems to be a literary trope, particularly from the Hellenistic period onwards.[60] Thus Herodes' response to being compared to Demosthenes might have been due to Polemo's association with that orator, perhaps he was even known as the 'new Demosthenes'. If this were the case, then Herodes' stated desire to be considered instead the equal of Polemo, highlights the concern over identity: to be equated or compared closely to a literary luminary of the past risks the loss of one's own identity and, consequently, chance of a lasting future reputation. At the same time, Herodes' comment brings two modern orators into the foreground and neatly pushes the anachronistic Demosthenes off the stage. Herodes here signals his wish to strive with a contemporary rather than a past orator and makes the case for his peer, in Polemo, to be considered greater than the canonical Demosthenes, who seems to have been considered the greatest of all the Attic orators.[61] In considering both passages of Longinus, which I set out above (13.2-4; 14.1-3), although μίμησις is the means by which to engage with past greats, whether slavishly or agonistically, it is a means ultimately rejected rhetorically, if not through example, by Longinus as he urges the aspiring author to consider the audiences of the future rather than those of the past or present (14.3). Perhaps this underlies the thrust of the final section of *On the Sublime* and, not only is the Greek response to loss of political freedom being alluded to and critiqued (as maintained by Whitmarsh and, to a lesser extent, Porter and Segal),[62] but also contemporary writers' slavish imitation of past greats. For Longinus, it is the backwards-looking perspective of the Greeks which causes them to fail in the literary field. Just as a slave could never be an orator (δοῦλον δὲ μηδένα γίνεσθαι ῥήτορα, 44.4), so 'greatness of mind wanes, fades, and loses its attraction when men spend

[60] See Brink (1972), 560-5.
[61] See Rutherford (1992), 156-7, for a discussion of the canon and, in particular, Hermogenes' presentation of Demosthenes as superior to all others. See also Innes (1995a), 115; (2002), 276-81.
[62] Segal (1959); Porter (2001), 77-85; Whitmarsh (2001), 66-71.

their admiration on their mortal parts and neglect to develop the immortal' (φθίνειν δὲ καὶ καταμαραίνεσθαι τὰ ψυχικὰ μεγέθη καὶ ἄζηλα γίνεσθαι, ἡνίκα τὰ θνητὰ [καπανητα] ἑαυτῶν μέρη ἐκθαυμάζοιεν, παρέντες αὔξειν τἀθάνατα, 44.8). Longinus is here referring to physical and material desires, but given the focus on eternity throughout the treatise (1.3, 4.7, 9.3, 14.3, 36.2, 44.1, 44.9), he could equally be critiquing a preoccupation with both the present and the past that neglects one's future fame (μηκέτι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀναβλέπειν μηδ' ὑστεροφημίας εἶναί τινα λόγον, 44.8), even though Longinus' treatise has demonstrated the contemporary failure necessitated by practising his exhortation to address eternity.

Perhaps no author of the second sophistic masters the complexities of the relationship between imitation and emulation of past literary greats, and originality more so than Arrian. In the remainder of this section, I will examine how Arrian uses Xenophon for his own and the emperor Hadrian's commemoration in the *Periplus Ponti Euxini*; before I turn to that text, however, I will present Arrian's specific qualities which enable him to create novelty through emulation and imitation. Arrian is an author who is practised at fictionalizing himself and his social roles. He is a mask wearer like Lucian – socially, culturally, authorially – but he does so both within and without his literary efforts. He is a wealthy Bithynian, a Roman senator, fluent in Greek and Latin, a philosopher, a military commander, a Roman provincial governor, a historian, a friend to the emperor, a writer; he is *entre plusieurs mondes*, to paraphrase Vidal-Naquet.[63] Or, in Lucian's words, Ἀρριανὸς… ὁ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου μαθητής, ἀνὴρ Ῥωμαίων ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ παιδείᾳ παρ᾽ ὅλον τὸν βίον συγγενόμενος ('Arrian, the student of Epictetus, a man among the first Romans and devoted throughout his life to [Greek] culture', *Alexander the False Prophet* 2). In the sophistic world that Philostratus presents, Lucian's statement is remarkable, in that it places Arrian firmly in both camps, and perhaps indicates that Lucian considers the label

[63] Vidal-Naquet (1984). See also Stadter (1980), 1-18; Bosworth (1993), 226-32, for biographical information.

'Roman' as a fundamentally political one. Honorific inscriptions relating to Arrian also focus on a double-faceted Greek/Roman identification, so an inscription of an honorary statue at Athens reads: Λ. Φλ. Ἀρριανὸ[ν] / ὑπατικὸν φιλό[σο]/φο[ν] ('Lucius Flavius Arrianus, [Roman] consul and [Greek] philosopher').[64] Indeed, the majority of surviving inscriptions identify Arrian as two things: philosopher, and consul or governor of Cappadocia.[65] This socio-cultural versatility is matched by the diversity of Arrian's writing: historian, geographer, hunting enthusiast, philosopher, military strategist, Hellenistic/Roman general. In short, Arrian is an exemplary role player. In this respect, he embodies his age and uses his role-playing as the primary means he adopts to write himself into posterity. At the same time, Arrian is distinguished from Lucian in that he is more subtle in his processes and, unlike the Syrian Greek, he does not announce his intentions to his audience before carrying them out; he just writes his works and leaves the audience to decipher them itself.

In his *Lives of the Sophists*, Philostratus' subjects produce infinite variations and improvisations on archaizing themes through *epideixis*, often assuming the role of a prominent classical figure. Arrian too varies his personal presentation to fit the occasion, often emulating a famous figure from the past, and his repertoire is surprisingly diverse; he also maintains a separate identity, however, which competes with the figure whom he is emulating as much as it honours him, much as Longinus represents Plato doing with Homer. The primary example is Xenophon. In Arrian's *Cynegeticus* 1.4, he claims that his pursuits since youth have been those of Xenophon. However, Arrian also plays at being Alexander (see the *Ectaxis*), competes with Homer (*Anabasis* 1.12.1-5), and imitates

[64] Oliver (1970), 338. See also Bowersock (1967); Stadter (1980), 14; Oliver (1982); Liddle (2003), 14.
[65] See Kent (1966), 56; Bowersock (1967). There is also the biography of Cassius Dio, entitled Ἀρριανὸς ὁ φιλόσοφος; see Wirth (1963); Stadter (1967); Bowersock (1967), 280.

Herodotean ionic Greek (see the *Indica*). In doing so, Arrian carves a prominent and unique place for himself into the textual and physical landscape of the second sophistic. As an example of Arrian's use of others' fame, I will look at the opening section of the *Periplus Ponti Euxini*. This work is a description of the coast of the Black Sea during Hadrian's reign and is framed by a letter addressed to that emperor.

It begins:

> Εἰς Τραπεζοῦντα ἥκομεν, πόλιν Ἑλληνίδα, ὡς λέγει ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἐκεῖνος, ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ ᾠκισμένην, Σινωπέων ἄποικον· καὶ τὴν μὲν θάλατταν τὴν τοῦ Εὐξείνου ἄσμενοι κατείδομεν ὅθενπερ καὶ Ξενοφῶν καὶ σύ. (*Periplus* 1.1)
>
> We came to Trapezous, a Greek city, as that other Xenophon says, founded on the sea, a colony of the Sinopeans; and gladly we looked down on the Euxine Sea from the very same spot as Xenophon and you.

The addressee, cast in the familiar 'you' of a friend, is the emperor Hadrian, and ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἐκεῖνος is the classical author. This one sentence conflates centuries by drawing the three men together and situates them in a single very specific place on the limits of the Roman empire. Space and time are here made to serve Arrian's commemorative purposes. By mentioning 'that [other] Xenophon', Arrian invests the spot on which he stands with a history, and a celebrated history at that. Here Xenophon came with the retreating ten thousand, an event he immortalized in his *Anabasis of Cyrus*. And the phrase ὡς λέγει ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἐκεῖνος draws the reader's attention to the relevant passage, where the verbal echoes between Arrian's and Xenophon's accounts of their mutual arrivals are close: ἦλθον ἐπὶ θάλατταν εἰς Τραπεζοῦντα πόλιν Ἑλληνίδα οἰκουμένην ἐν τῷ Εὐξείνῳ Πόντῳ, Σινωπέων ἀποικίαν (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4.8.22). Arrian presents his arrival as almost a replay of Xenophon's and, in doing so, equates himself with the classical author, a practice he

repeats in several other works.[66] Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the two passages, which are surprising and pointed, given that ὡς λέγει ὁ Ξενοφῶν suggests a direct quotation, yet only πόλιν Ἑλληνίδα and Σινωπέων fit the bill. In this way, Arrian demonstrates the playful relationship between repetition and variation that has so concerned modern scholarship of the second sophistic. He confounds expectations and requires his audience to *know* the relevant Xenophon passage, so that they can appreciate his manipulation of it.

At the same time, Arrian reveals his own complex relationship with the classical Xenophon. Philip Stadter has argued that Xenophon was a legitimate part of Arrian's name.[67] Although this is possible, it is not certain, and Xenophon may just have been an honorary title,[68] or even purely literary posturing. The *Ectaxis*, in which Arrian both issues orders as 'Xenophon' (10, 22) and uses anachronistic Hellenistic military terminology and manoeuvres reminiscent of those he describes in the *Anabasis* with reference to Alexander,[69] lends weight to the latter suggestion. The *Ectaxis* is not an isolated case. In many of his works, Arrian refers to himself as Xenophon and carefully distinguishes that other earlier Xenophon with labels such as ἐκεῖνος (*Periplus* 1.1, 2.3; *Cynegeticus* 16.7, 21.2, 25.4) or ὁ πρεσβύτερος (*Periplus* 12.5, 25.1), although on occasion he omits the adjective (*Periplus* 13.6, for example), a strategy that must be designed to create ambiguity in the mind of the reader, especially given Xenophon's practice of referring to himself in the third person in his *Anabasis*.[70] The combination and interchangability of 'that Xenophon',

[66] On Arrian and Xenophon, see Stadter (1967) and, more fully, in Stadter (1980). On the name Xenophon see Stadter (1980), 2-3, but Stadter examines the relationship between the Athenian and the Nicomedian throughout.
[67] See Stadter (1967) and (1980), 2, for the argument that Arrian's full name was Lucius Flavius Arrianus Xenophon.
[68] See Ameling (1984).
[69] See Stadter (1980), 48.
[70] Xenophon uses his own name 250 times in the *Anabasis*.

'Xenophon the elder', and simply 'Xenophon' creates a sense of instability about Arrian's personal identification: sometimes he is distancing himself, sometimes he is claiming a kind of descent, and other times he is almost assimilating to Xenophon. James Oliver has even suggested that a double herm (*Glypta* 538) in the National Archaeology Museum at Athens, one portrait of which is securely identified as Xenophon,[71] also bears the likeness of Arrian, a suggestion accepted by Bosworth.[72] Although there is no hard evidence for this identification, it is a reasonable suggestion and Oliver presents a strong circumstantial case.

Most scholars interpret Arrian's literary and personal identification with Xenophon as emulation and honouring of the classical author, but Arrian does not aim to emulate alone; he aims to surpass.[73] Here the coupling of ἐκεῖνος with Xenophon's name is loaded. The word is the distal pronoun and contains a spatial element: it tends to denote someone who is literally or metaphorically distant in time or space. Yet, it can also stand alone to denote someone who is so famous that their name need not be mentioned.[74] In this context, Arrian turns the tables on Xenophon, in that his coupling of the word to Xenophon's name, instead of letting it stand alone, highlights that there is another Xenophon who needs to be differentiated from the classical author. The reader is meant to know that this unnamed Xenophon is Arrian himself, but the connection is not explicitly made. So, by coupling ἐκεῖνος with Xenophon, Arrian assigns him to the inferior role – the Xenophon who needs to be differentiated from me, because I am the first person whom the appellation calls to mind. So, Arrian's imitation of Xenophon, through his near quotation

[71] Minakaran-Hiesgen (1970).
[72] Oliver (1972). See also Bosworth (1993), 275.
[73] Cf. Bosworth (1993), 275: 'In many ways Arrian could be said to have eclipsed his predecessor. His public service was more impressive, his social status more distinguished, his corpus of publications (in particular his histories) more voluminous. His work also had an erudition that Xenophon could not approach'. See also Stadter (1980), 50-9, on the *Cynegeticus*.
[74] The word is used in speeches in the first four books of the *Odyssey* to refer almost exclusively to the absent Odysseus, often without any other signifier of the referent's identity.

of the *Anabasis*, can also be interpreted as a re-writing of Xenophon: a competitive act that produces a different (better) version. In addition, ἐκεῖνος serves to highlight Xenophon's absence and antiquity; he is distant in both time and space from this moment shared between Arrian and Hadrian within the letter, and Arrian and Hadrian's statue in Trapezous. He stands in the background of an intimate moment between the emperor and his provincial governor, acting almost as the glue that binds the two together in their shared knowledge of his writings and, equally, to that place, but at the same time Arrian displaces him from the continuing significance (the future history, if you will) of Trapezous.

The most striking difference between Xenophon's and Arrian's mutual descriptions of their arrivals at Trapezous is the repeated use of θάλαττα by Arrian instead of Xenophon's θάλαττα followed by πόντος. The repetition recalls the earlier passage of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, in which the Greeks first catch sight of the Black Sea and the famous cry of θάλαττα θάλαττα (4.7.24) is raised. Although, as argued by Tim Rood, the fame of this cry is a phenomenon predominantly of the last two-hundred years,[75] Arrian has gathered himself, Hadrian, and Xenophon virtually in Trapezous through his manipulated replaying of Xenophon's own arrival and the allusion depends on Hadrian's knowledge of Xenophon's text rather than Arrian's appeal to the fame of the phrase. It is a game of erudition and obscurity, as is common amongst literary elites in Arrian's age. This allusion is strengthened by Arrian's claim to have looked down on the Euxine Sea from the same place as Xenophon. It is unlikely that he means this literally. He stresses the location of Hadrian's statue as Trapezous and mentions the neighbouring temple of Hermes (*Periplus* 2), which is unlikely to be perched on a remote hilltop. In addition, a large marble block

[75] Rood (2004), 11-13.

bearing an inscription dedicated to Hadrian forms part of the Chrysocephalus Church in modern Trabzon. Its size suggests it is unlikely to have been taken from a distant site.[76] So, it seems that Arrian here collapses distance in order to invest the place he has chosen for Hadrian's statue and altars with greater history. He recasts the backdrop of Xenophon's famous scene to suit his own commemorative purpose and, essentially, repackages Xenophon's work into a neater, tighter unit which combines two significant passages, integrating them as it virtually disintegrates the distance between Mt Theches and Trapezous. In doing so, he stakes a claim for that piece of literary canon, by both assimilating the Xenophon passages and competitively displacing them. He makes Xenophon write for Hadrian and himself at the same time as superseding his namesake, which is entirely the opposite process to that which Longinus describes when talking about Homeric imitation as being like the fashioning of an accurate statue.

The third participant in this virtual gathering at Trapezous is the emperor Hadrian or, more precisely, his statue. Hadrian did make an inspection tour of the Cappadocian frontier in 123/4 or 129,[77] and the statue was probably commissioned to commemorate that visit. Nevertheless, in its current form, the statue is a poor memorial, since, according to Arrian, it does not resemble the emperor in any way. Due to the mimetic qualities of statues and the belief that they replace the person they represent,[78] the poor state of Hadrian's statue casts some doubt on his prior physical presence. And the 'you' (σύ), with whom Arrian and Xenophon gaze at the sea, could well be considered to be the statue itself rather than the emperor at an earlier time (*Periplus* 1.1). Consequently, Arrian suggests Hadrian should send a statue from Rome, one that can be carved in his true likeness. In this way, Arrian

[76] Mitford (1974), 160-3; Liddle (2003), 92-3.
[77] Liddle (2003), 92.
[78] I discuss this idea in more detail in the final chapter of this thesis, which begins p. 192.

ensures that the emperor really will stand in this historic place for all time to come. He also stresses his own intimacy with Hadrian, but, more than this, he sets himself up as the arbiter of Hadrian's form and the public representation of that form. The fringe-like quality of the place Arrian has chosen for Hadrian's statue and associated altars – that they will mark the limit of the empire where it meets the sea and that the statue is posed to point out to the sea and the region beyond absolute Roman control – recalls Alexander's practices in monumentalizing the reach of his conquests, such as the twelve altars he orders constructed on the Hyphasis in India, just before his army begins the long trek home (*Anabasis* 5.29.1: μνημεῖα τῶν αὐτοῦ πόνων; cf. Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* 2.43). Since Arrian's *Anabasis* may have been composed before the *Periplus* and with the clear allusions to Xenophon's *Anabasis* in the *Periplus* (1.1, 2.3, 11.1, 12.5, 13.6, 14.4, 16.3, 25.1), it is possible to see the shade of Alexander also lurking in the background of this opening scene. This allusion is strengthened by another famous ghost. Arrian addresses Hadrian at the beginning of the letter with his full name, including the element Τραϊανός. Alexander was an important model for Trajan and his military activity, and Hadrian adopts his predecessor's name as one of his own on becoming emperor. If a remembrance of Alexander is intended, then Arrian's efforts to re-shape the statue can be seen as a promise to Hadrian to celebrate him in literature as he already has or intends to the Macedonian king; that is to say, to give an account of the emperor that is worthy and which represents him accurately to posterity.[79]

After describing his arrival in Trapezous, Arrian then goes on to explain that the altars, which have already been set up, are as inadequate as Hadrian's statue because the stone is

[79] The dating of Arrian's works is notoriously difficult. The *Periplus* can be dated to around 132 CE, but the dating of the major works – the *Anabasis* and *Indica*, the *Parthica*, the *Events after Alexander*, and the *Bithyniaca* – remains unclear. See Stadter (1980), 179-85, for a discussion of the evidence and the opposing views of Bosworth, who dates the *Anabasis* early (cf. Bosworth (1980), 4-7, 8-11), and Wirth, who dates it later. Consequently, one cannot determine for certain whether the *Anabasis* pre- or post-dates the *Periplus*.

rough and poorly carved, so that the inscription cannot be read. The poor artwork of Hadrian's statue combined with the inaccurately carved Greek inscription, written as though by barbarians (τὸ δὲ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐπίγραμμα καὶ ἡμαρτημένως γέγραπται, οἷα δὴ ὑπὸ βαρβάρων, 1.2), belies the Greekness with which Arrian and Xenophon invest Trapezous (πόλιν Ἑλληνίδα, *Periplus* 1.1; Xenophon's *Anabasis* 4.8.22). This works both to stress the frontier nature of Trapezous and to enhance Arrian's authority over Hadrian's public image. Additionally, the πόλις Ἑλληνίς is finally Hellenized by Arrian, who marks it with both Greek objects and Roman imperial ones: the inscription, the altars, and the emperor Hadrian. The description of the rough stone (λίθος; *Periplus* 1.2) combined with the ambiguous spatial and temporal context conjures the stones (λίθοι; Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4.7.25) which the ten thousand piled up to make a cairn as a commemoration of the sight of the sea on Mt Theches. Arrian vows to replace the inferior altars with well-cut white stone (λίθος, *Periplus* 1.2) and, in doing so, lays his own claim to this celebrated spot. Not only has he re-written Xenophon, he will also reconstruct his memorial and direct it to another purpose. Moreover, the dilapidated state of the current memorial, of the statue and the altars, and Arrian's initiatives to replace them with better, newer, more accurate, and more monumental structures can be seen as a commentary on the superiority of Arrian's literary authority in comparison to Xenophon's. His replacement of the old, worn out, and unattractive monuments with his own can be seen to apply metaphorically to the literary history of Trapezous and both the *Anabasis* of Xenophon and that of Arrian. Arrian's *Anabasis* is, after all, a monument to Alexander and his conquest of the east rather than the tale of a retreat from the east by the remnants of a mercenary Greek army. Moreover, Arrian acts to commemorate the power and reach of a Roman emperor, for whom he is a general and an administrator, whereas Xenophon describes an ill-fated expedition, in which he fights for a doomed prince.

Thus Arrian reuses historical memory and the fame of Xenophon to create future commemoration for both himself and Hadrian.[80] The statue and altars that will stand in Trapezous mark the place where the famous Xenophon stood in classical times, where the contemporary emperor may have once stood, and where Arrian has come to raise a μνήμην αἰώνιον ('everlasting memorial', *Periplus* 1.4) to that emperor and, for all the reasons that Arrian has alluded to in this opening passage, it is a place ἐπιτηδειότατον ('absolutely made for', 1.4) the memorial he proposes. He invests that spot (χωρίον, 1.4) with a complex temporality that connects it back to the classical past, the recent past, the present, and that invests it with meaning for the future, a meaning that has been created (if intertextually) by Arrian himself. This is combined with a complex textuality: a monument within a literary, allusive casting of an official report within a personal letter to the emperor. I shall return to the important topic of monuments in literature in the final chapters of this thesis. Additionally, Arrian's description of the statue – ἀποδείκνυσι γὰρ τὴν θάλατταν (1.3) – the pose and the use of θάλαττα again, almost has the effect of animating it and supplying it with a voice to cry out the word.[81] So, although Arrian is the only person truly present, his text invests the site of Hadrian's statue with the power to collapse centuries and kilometres so that both Hadrian and Xenophon are brought to stand beside him and to relive a moment, which only Xenophon ever experienced, and to preserve that moment for the future. Moreover, by textualizing it, he makes that moment and the site of the statue moveable, both geographically and temporally. In this way, Arrian becomes the guardian, publisher and arbitrator of the fame of Hadrian in particular, but also that of Xenophon, as it relates to this particular place: he builds a μνήμην αἰώνιον and then textualizes it to secure it for the future and a wider audience.

[80] See Porter (2001), 75-76, on Pausanias' appeals to historical meaning.
[81] See Rood (2004), 154, who notes that neither Arrian nor Hadrian is actually recorded as crying the word out.

Arrian's control over the fame of this spot at the limits of the Roman empire, and those illustrious men he has associated with it, is fitting for the legate of the frontier province of Cappadocia – the post Arrian held whilst performing the inspection tour for Hadrian which the *Periplus* describes. Arrian's text is itself liminal, in that it marks a boundary between how Trapezous has previously been conceived in the historical memory and how Arrian proposes it should be conceived in the future. Hadrian's statue, placed by a temple of Hermes, himself the guardian of boundaries, forms the fulcrum. In this respect, if Oliver is correct, the Athenian double herm is an apt representation of Arrian's literary program: Janus-like, Xenophon looks back to the historical memory and represents that memory, and Arrian looks forward with a reinterpretation and reapplication of that memory. Moreover, Arrian is in no way passive in this passage. It might be argued that it is Hadrian alone who is being commemorated, but Arrian does not let him have the limelight. He inserts himself into the scene actively and both Hadrian and Xenophon depend on him for the commemoration which they receive. It is Arrian who is creating an official and a literary record of the moment, and it is Arrian who is marking and altering the landscape of Trapezous. Arrian's reuse of historical memory to create future commemoration; his exploitation and manipulation of Xenophon's famous account; his control and shaping of the memorial to Hadrian; and the positioning of this one complex paragraph laden with meaning at the very beginning of his work – Trabzon seems, on the basis of its geographical position, an otherwise odd place to commence the *Periplus* – reveal him to be savvy as to the vicissitudes of one's future fame. Moreover, it demonstrates the kind of μίμησις of which Longinus approves: a competitive embracing and concurrent displacement of the ancient illustrious model. In the following section, I will move away

from the idea of imitation and look more closely at the anxieties that attend the concept of originality.

Originality & the Pitfalls of Novelty: Using the past to create something new with Lucian

In the first section of this chapter I discussed a passage from Dio Chrysostom's twenty-first oration, in which he highlighted the difficulties of dealing with an audience or readership which expects one to dialogue with the past and produce anachronistic literature.[82] He noted that the reception of literature that does not conform to these expectations is likely to be negative. This claim is supported by other writers and literary examples from the second sophistic, which employ a measure of novelty that either can be described or is claimed as originality. Producing something which the author considers original always encompasses a level of anxiety about its reception. In this section, I will discuss several expressions of this anxiety of novelty, what makes something novel, and how authors deal with their contemporary and future audiences. My most extensive discussion will be on Lucian's *Zeuxis*, but I will also look briefly at some other examples. In the previous section we saw creative imitation and selective borrowing in the figure of Arrian. In this section, the focus is more on modification, adaptation, and the juxtaposition of unusual elements, which tend to be described as 'new' or 'novel'. In Ancient Greek, newness is denoted by two words: νέος and καίνος, although both can have the idea of either 'newness in time' or 'newness in kind', in the imperial period, the former is more often, though not at all exclusively, applied to time and the latter to type.[83] It is the idea of newness in kind that interests me here. For καίνος the applicable noun is καινότης and it

[82] See p. 39.
[83] D'Angour (2011), 19, 66-79. Cf. Tilg (2010), 172-3, on the usage of καίνος.

usually entails a level of strangeness, which can be either positive or negative.[84] I will begin my discussion with Philostratus and his portrait of Philagrus.

So, in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*, the Cilician Philagrus fails to impress his Athenian audience through attempting to produce a new kind of speech. Philostratus describes the episode in the following manner:

> ὡς γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἤκουον, προσέκρουσε μὲν ἡ διάλεξις νεαροηχὴς δόξασα καὶ διεσπασμένη τὰς ἐννοίας, ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ μειρακιώδης, γυναικὸς γὰρ θρῆνος ἐγκατεμέμικτο τοῖς Ἀθηναίων ἐγκωμίοις τεθνώσης αὐτῷ ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ.[85]
>
> For as I have heard from those older than myself, his introductory speech gave offence, because they thought it had a novel-sounding flow and was disconnected in its ideas; they even thought it was childish. For into his encomium of the Athenians, he inserted a lament for his wife who had died in Ionia. (*VS* 579)

This passage highlights many of the issues raised by Dio Chrysostom, which I discussed earlier. Philostratus appeals to the authority of 'those older than himself' (τῶν πρεσβυτέρων) and this word is one that always carries a sense of wisdom and command. It is οἱ πρεσβύτεροι, a group who ideologically correspond to Dio's σοφοὶ, who object to the novelty of Philagrus' sound and arrangement of ideas. So, once again, the strangeness of novel expression is critiqued by the authority of tradition. Moreover, Philagrus is judged as sounding 'youthful' (μειρακιώδης), a characteristic of style that is in no way complimentary (an issue to which I will return shortly), and particularly damning when juxtaposed to οἱ πρεσβύτεροι. Most interestingly, Philagrus is condemned for interrupting his praise of the Athenians (a topic which surely focussed on the achievements of the past, as for example did the *Panathenaic Oration* of Aelius Aristides) with a lament for his dead wife in Ionia. This topic is both personal and far removed geographically (and temporally) from the subject at

[84] D'Angour (2011), 29, 79-84 (for καίνος associated with metal working and craft), 90.
[85] See Wright (1968), 208, for διεσπασμένη instead of εσπασμένη.

hand. Why would the Athenians want the commemoration of their past glories interrupted by a personally motivated commemoration of a recently deceased foreign loved one?[86] Here, Philagrus can be seen as trying to inject his discourse with individual details, of trying to insert some personality, a trait which might differentiate his work from his peers and give his fame greater longevity. However, an audience in Athens, the centre of the sophistic world, is unlikely to listen with understanding or appreciative ears on account of the expected privileging of Athens' classical past. This detail of Philostratus' account reveals the political nature of the second sophistic and how breaking with tradition and usual practice is a dangerous thing to do for one's contemporary reputation. At the same time, Philostratus' account can be seen as subtly mocking the Athenian audience's traditional response. His appeal to οἱ πρεσβύτεροι can be seen as highlighting the anachronistic nature of the disapproval directed towards Philagrus. It is those who overly venerate and have a greater stake in the past who dislike Philagrus' innovation. Importantly, Philostratus also relates that Philiscus of Thessaly is valued for his innovative sound (καινοπρεπὴς ἦχος, *VS* 623).[87] So, once more, the attitude of the audience to a particular sophist is seen to be all important in creating a positive reputation. I will discuss this episode and Philostratus' presentation of the Athenian sophistic scene in greater detail in the next chapter.[88]

In *On the Sublime*, the quality of childishness (μειρακιώδης) is also damned and called the opposite of greatness. The author goes on to define the quality of childishness and how it comes about, which is the important element for my discussion:

> ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν οἰδοῦν ὑπεραίρειν βούλεται τὰ ὕψη, τὸ δὲ μειρακιῶδες ἄντικρυς ὑπεναντίον τοῖς μεγέθεσι · ταπεινὸν γὰρ ἐξ ὅλου καὶ μικρόψυχον

[86] Cf. Longinus, *On the Sublime* 3.5, on out-of-place emotion.
[87] Cf. Whitmarsh (2005), 55.
[88] See p. 96.

> καὶ τῷ ὄντι κακὸν ἀγεννέστατον. τί ποτ᾽ οὖν τὸ μειρακιῶδές ἐστιν; ἢ δῆλον ὡς σχολαστικὴ νόησις, ὑπὸ περιεργασίας λήγουσα εἰς ψυχρότητα, ὀλισθαίνουσι δ᾽ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ γένος ὀρεγόμενοι μὲν τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ πεποιημένου καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἡδέος, ἐξοκέλλοντες δὲ εἰς τὸ ῥωπικὸν καὶ κακόζηλον.
>
> While turgidity is an endeavour to go above the sublime, puerility is the sheer opposite of greatness;[89] it is a thoroughly low, mean, and ignoble vice. What do I mean by 'puerility'? A pedantic thought, so over-worked that it ends in frigidity. Writers slip into it through aiming at originality, artifice, and (above all) charm, and then coming to grief on the rocks of tawdriness and affectation. (*On the Sublime* 3.4)

So, that quality of childishness which plagues the novelty of Philagrus' speech in Philostratus is also considered a result of attempts at originality (among other things) by the author of *On the Sublime*. As Longinus describes it, puerility is a quality that stems from trying to produce a work that is cleverer and more innovative than the ability of the author allows and, consequently, it comes out sounding like the author is trying too hard. This fault of failing through over-trying adds weight to James Porter's suggestion that, for Longinus, the sublime only ever exists at the point of 'threatened or real loss', in particular, with the idea that the sublime is associated with heroism and freedom, but only when that heroism and freedom are imperilled.[90] So, the production of originality is risky, in that success is so closely tied to the possibility, even the necessity, of failure, a concept that we saw earlier with the example of creative competition between Homer and Plato. Longinus expresses explicitly the danger of losing the sublimity of one's compositions through the quest for novelty in another passage:

> Ἅπαντα μέντοι τὰ οὕτως ἄσεμνα διὰ μίαν ἐμφύεται τοῖς λόγοις αἰτίαν, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς νοήσεις καινόσπουδον, περὶ ὃ δὴ μάλιστα κορυβαντιῶσιν οἱ νῦν· ἀφ᾽ ὧν γὰρ ἡμῖν τάγαθά, σχεδὸν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ κακὰ γεννᾶσθαι φιλεῖ. ὅθεν, ἐπεὶ φορὸν εἰς συνταγμάτων κατόρθωσιν τά τε κάλλη τῆς ἑρμηνείας καὶ τὰ ὕψη καὶ πρὸς τούτοις αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, καθάπερ τῆς ἐπιτυχίας, οὕτως ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὑποθέσεις καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων καθίστανται.

[89] See Russell (1964), 73, for sublimity as the mean of turgidity and puerility. Cf. Aristotle, *EN* 1125a17-34.
[90] Porter (2001), 81-2. Cf. D'Angour (2011), 29: 'Innovation means change, and change means loss'.

> All such lapses from dignity arise in literature through a single cause: that desire for novelty of thought which is all the rage today. Evils often come from the same source as blessings; and so, since beauty of style, sublimity, and charm all conduce to successful writing, they are also causes and principles not only of success but of failure. (*On the Sublime* 5.1)

Donald Russell notes that there is a missing thought in Longinus' expression – along with style, sublimity, and charm, the quest for novelty too must be a cause of both successful and unsuccessful writing.[91] So, Longinus presents an overall picture that encourages the author to aim his work at the future by competing with, not just imitating, past greats, but at the same time the kind of novelty that this temporal perspective demands is as risky as it could be rewarding: to produce the sublime is a fraught activity. It is significant that all Longinus' examples of sublimity come from the fourth century BCE or earlier. His selectivity serves to reaffirm the existing canon and belies his claims that this same canon is open and can be remodelled to include an ambitious contemporary individual, an inconsistency that suggests it is not genuinely possible for his contemporaries to produce something canon-worthy, no matter how bravely they battle with the past nor how determinedly they aim their works at the future. This, at least, if one considers his treatise from a contemporary perspective. Alternatively, if one is judging the situation from the future, the perspective changes and it becomes possible that someone from post-classical times might, however unlikely, make it into the canon. As James Porter notes, 'modernity is never sublime' and 'Greek re-creators of the past' can only ever be 'secondary, diminished, and never quite canonical – and in this way [they must] "pay" for the modern fantasy of antiquity'.[92] Thus it is the requirements of contemporary success, which demand engagement with the past, that limit the future potential of these authors. It is this predicament, the impossibility of their position, which seems to make them engage with

[91] Russell (1964), 81.
[92] Porter (2001), 81, 84.

and manipulate the past so self-consciously. There is constant acknowledgement that their position is untenable, but they attempt it nonetheless, and they lament the attitudes of their audience, whilst pandering to them all the while.

I turn now to Lucian's *Zeuxis* and its characterization of contemporary audiences and their reaction to novelty. *Zeuxis* is an introductory speech in which Lucian considers the nature of his craft. At the very beginning he describes being followed by members of an audience to whom he has just performed; they praise his performance for its strangeness and its newness. He explains:

> τὸ δ' οὖν κεφάλαιον αὐτοῖς τοῦτο ἦν, καὶ πάντες ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπεσημαίνοντο, τὴν γνώμην τῶν συγγραμμάτων ξένην οὖσαν καὶ πολὺν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸν νεωτερισμόν. μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν ἄμεινον ἅπερ ἐκεῖνοι ἀπεφθέγγοντο· «Ὢ τῆς καινότητος. Ἡράκλεις, τῆς παραδοξολογίας. εὐμήχανος ἄνθρωπος. οὐδὲν ἄν τις εἴποι τῆς ἐπινοίας νεαρώτερον».
>
> The substance of their approbation, which all alike emphasized, was the strangeness of the thought in my composition and the degree of freshness it displayed. It would be better to quote verbatim: 'What novelty! What marvellous paradoxes! How inventive he is! The freshness of thought is beyond compare!' (*Zeuxis* 1)

Whilst this indicates a positive reception, it does not please the author. He goes on to suggest that the qualities of novelty (in the sense of strangeness) and freshness (newness) are the only things considered of value or appreciated in his works, and its wider skill and beauty is ignored. So, in considering the implications of the praise, he comes to express his annoyance in the following way:

> οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μόνον χάριεν τοῖς λόγοις ἔνεστιν, ὅτι μὴ συνήθη μηδὲ κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν βαδίζει τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὀνομάτων δὲ ἄρα καλῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀρχαῖον κανόνα συγκειμένων ἢ νοῦ ὀξέος ἢ περινοίας τινὸς ἢ χάριτος Ἀττικῆς ἢ ἁρμονίας ἢ τέχνης τῆς ἐφ' ἅπασι, τούτων δὲ πόρρω ἴσως τοὐμόν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν παρέντες αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἐπῄνουν μόνον τὸ καινὸν τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ ξενίζον... οὐ μὴν τοσοῦτόν γε οὔτε ὅλον τῇ καινότητι νέμειν ἠξίουν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ὥσπερ ἐν προσθήκης μοίρᾳ συνεπικοσμεῖν τι καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἔπαινον συντελεῖν καὶ αὐτήν, τὰ δὲ τῷ ὄντι ἐπαινούμενα καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκουόντων εὐφημούμενα ἐκεῖνα εἶναι. ὥστε οὐ μετρίως ἐπήρμην καὶ ἐκινδύνευον πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς ἕνα καὶ μόνον ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν λέγουσι

> καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἄνθρακες ἡμῶν ὁ θησαυρὸς ἦσαν, καὶ ὀλίγου δέω θαυματοποιοῦ τινος ἔπαινον ἐπαινεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτῶν.
>
> So this is the only attraction in my writings, that they are unconventional and keep off the beaten track, while good vocabulary, conformity to the ancient canon, penetration of intellect, power of perception, Attic grace, good construction, general competence, perhaps have no place in my work. Otherwise they would not have ignored these qualities and praised only the novel and strange element in my style... but I did not think to attribute so much – indeed all of it – to novelty, but supposed novelty to be a kind of additional ornament making some contribution indeed to the approbation of my work, the audience's real praise and commendation going to those other qualities. As a result, my elation over-stepped its bounds – to think I nearly believed them when they called me unique and in a class apart in Greece and other flatteries of this kind. In the words of the proverb, my treasures turned out ashes, and their approval is not much different from that which they would give a conjurer. (*Zeuxis* 2)

At the beginning of this chapter, I discussed Bloom's ideas on the qualities that determined whether a text were worthy of canonicity.[93] He stressed that the kind of novelty that makes a work great incorporates elements of both strangeness and beauty. Here, Lucian laments that the only thing which attracted his audience was the strangeness and not the quality and sophistication of his speech.[94] He lists all those things which he believes made the speech praiseworthy and they are those qualities which are necessary for a sophist of the second sophistic to be successful. It is these aspects that he wished the audience appreciated because novelty alone is not enough to secure future currency. That this is the thrust of this passage is revealed in the final sentence, in which he compares his work to ashes and himself to a conjurer: the ashes suggest something long dead and the conjurer a creator of momentary illusion. Thus he has his contemporary audience covered, but doubts his work can stand the test of time. He goes on to compare his predicament to that of two others: the painter Zeuxis, whose work fascinated its audience primarily on account of its curious subject matter rather than his excellent technique (3-7), and the general Antiochus, who

[93] See p. 29.
[94] Cf. Lucian's *Prometheus in Words* 3, in which Lucian stresses he would destroy a piece that exhibited only novelty and lacked beauty.

won a battle by spooking the opposing cavalry with the sight and sound of his exotic elephants (8-11).[95] In both cases, the audience fails to see the truth behind that with which they are presented. Nevertheless, there is a slightly different thrust to both examples: Antiochus' achievement does indeed smack of cheap illusory trickery that is effective only for its inherent novelty, but Zeuxis, on the other hand, blames his audience for focussing on the novelty and for failing to see the true mastery of his work. So, Antiochus' audience responded in the very way he wished them to, but Zeuxis' in a way he found so unsuitable that he withdrew the painting from view. Zeuxis' audience did not have the capacity to see his brilliance, whereas Antiochus' failed to see his trick.

At the same time, Lucian proves himself to be a skilled and worthy receiver of Zeuxis' work, by describing its beauty in detail. He notes that the painting in question no longer exists, having been looted by Sulla and dispatched to Rome on a ship that never made it, sinking along the way, but that an exact copy had been made and displayed in a painter's house in Athens (ἀντίγραφός ἐστι νῦν Ἀθήνησι πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ἀκριβεῖ τῇ στάθμῃ μετενηνεγμένη, *Zeuxis* 3). So, in reality, he describes the copy and not the original, but he attributes the work to Zeuxis rather than the copyist, whom he never names. Here, slavish imitation of the classic artist results in complete loss of identity for the copyist. This, despite the fact that clearly Lucian cannot know just how accurate a copy has actually been produced. At the same time, Lucian's *ecphrasis* of the work serves to repaint it in words, so that he too lays some claim to the painting's reproduction and, consequently, reputation. Instead of preserving the audience's (according to Zeuxis) ignorant appreciation of his picture, Lucian takes apart and then rebuilds, even monumentalizes, the picture as he sees

[95] Nesselrath (1990), 129-32, discusses this speech and sees the Zeuxis and the Antiochus stories as illustrating the possible reactions (rejection of acceptance) Lucian might have to someone who praises καινότης in his work.

it, in all its detailed skill and glory, bit by bit. In this respect, Lucian's technique corresponds nicely to Porter's argument that *On the Sublime* monumentalizes the snippets of canonicity it quotes by treating them as almost architectural ruins of a once whole construction.[96] In his description, Lucian focuses particularly on the whole composition and the emotion it brings out in him, but he also pays some attention to the technical skill, which he praises and admires with his 'amateur' (ἰδιώτης, 5) eye. In this way, he is subtly suggesting that his audience too, though they be ignorant of the parts and processes of his technique, should be able to sense still its greatness. He is explaining that he too seeks an audience that is similarly sensitive and perceptive as he himself was to the painting, though it is in a medium in which he is no expert.[97] Accordingly, to conclude his speech, he says:

> τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μάτην ἄρα τῷ Ζεύξιδι πεποίηται; ἀλλ' οὐ μάτην—γραφικοὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς καὶ μετὰ τέχνης ἕκαστα ὁρᾶτε. εἴη μόνον ἄξια τοῦ θεάτρου δεικνύειν.
>
> The rest of Zeuxis' work was wasted, I suppose. But no, not wasted – you are real artists and examine each detail with craftsmen's eyes. My only hope is that my show be worthy of its audience. (*Zeuxis* 12).

This praise is really an instruction and a lesson for his audience on how to receive his work. They too must approach it with the careful and appreciative eye that he cast over the painting. So, he effectively puts the pressure of success back onto his audience – their ability to perceive greatness is being tested rather than the author's skill. He is giving them a stake in the performance just as he himself claimed a stake in Zeuxis' painting through his *ecphrasis*. At the same time, his example of Zeuxis, who failed to be appreciated for his true quality before his contemporary audience, but who finds the perfect audience in the future personage of Lucian, intimates that his own perfect audience might also lie in the

[96] Porter (2001), 83; (2011).

[97] Romm (1990), 86-7, in contrast suggests that Lucian's description of the painting reveals that he too is overwhelmed by its novelty and is uninterested in its skill. But, although Lucian spends his time describing the painting's aesthetic qualities, he does stress that he praises Zeuxis most for showing his extraordinary skill in so many ways in one painting: ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦ Ζεύξιδος ἐκεῖνο μάλιστα ἐπῄνεσα, ὅτι ἐν μιᾷ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ὑποθέσει ποικίλως τὸ περιττὸν ἐπεδείξατο τῆς τέχνης (*Zeuxis* 5).

future and, in turn, it puts the same kind of pressure to recognize his brilliance on those who come to read this written version of the piece. Finally, this introductory speech makes claims for itself that is doesn't really fulfil – the author presents himself as a novel performer, but in fact he merely *describes* his own and others' novel moments. This aspect perhaps explains the seemingly ectopic story of Antiochus and his cheap trickery: it is a theatrical, self-conscious wink at the audience that Lucian is completely aware that he is doing precisely the same thing as the battle commander in trying to deceive his audience with trickery. He is making grand claims for himself without the substance to back it up, in this piece at least. And, indeed, he craves the acclaim that his audience grants him, even if they respond merely to its novelty and not its more sublime qualities.[98]

On other occasions, however, Lucian shows himself to be dedicated to incorporating novel notions and episodes into his works, such as the trip to the moon in *True Histories* 1.10. He presents unusual circumstances (e.g. *Philosophies for Sale*) or upends well-known literary tropes (e.g. *Menippus*) or combines genres in unexpected ways (e.g. *Twice Accused*). At the same time, other authors from the second sophistic do similar things. For example, Philostratus, in his *Heroicus*, uses the autopsy of the shade of the dead hero Protesilaus to contradict and criticize Homer. This is an innovative way of competing with the canonical great. The original bard might be the father of Greek literature, but his authority pales in comparison to the apparent lived experience of one of the Greek heroes. This technique of finding a more ancient or more trustworthy authority than Homer (or some other individual) develops into its own genre of sorts referred to as 'Pseudo-documentary Fiction' by William Hansen and Karen ní Mheallaigh.[99] Usually, this type of literature involves the invention of an ancient text that is suddenly discovered by chance and is

[98] Cf. on the last point, Romm (1990), 87.
[99] Hansen (2003); ní Mheallaigh (2008).

characterized as authentic or, more simply, it can include elements of invented literature (e.g. a letter or inscription) incorporated into a text.[100] This kind of innovation that works by playing with the expected seems to be something that developed from epideictic, the need to entertain an audience, and to differentiate oneself from other such performers.[101] The literary genre that it transfers to most clearly is the ancient novel, which is also a distinguishing genre of the period.[102] The novel, too, plays with paradoxes, unexpected elements, strange combinations, and pseudo-documentation. Moreover, it makes the same kind of claims for novelty that Lucian does, signposting with καινός, νέος, or καινότης. Stefan Tilg catalogues all the instances of καινός in the five core novels and characterizes them,[103] so there is no need to replicate that material, but one example of καινός highlighting the unusual or unexpected will suffice:

> ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἡ μήτηρ τὰ ἐντάφια τῆς θυγατρὸς ἀνεκώκυσεν «ἐπιγινώσκω πάντα· σύ, τέκνον, μόνη λείπεις. ὦ καινῶν τυμβωρύχων· τὴν ἐσθῆτα καὶ τὸν χρυσὸν φυλάξαντες μόνην ἔκλεψάν μου τὴν θυγατέρα.»
>
> When Callirhoe's mother saw her daughter's funeral offerings, she cried out in distress: 'I recognize everything – only you are missing, my child! What novel tomb robbers – they have preserved the clothing and gold, and stolen only my daughter!' (Chariton, *Chaereas and Callirhoe* 3.4.2)[104]

In his study of the concept of novelty in archaic and classical literature, Armand D'Angour specifies the ways in which novelty is manifested in Greek literature: 'creative imitation, selective borrowing, the reconfiguring of familiar stories and themes, the modification and adaptation of particular styles and tropes. These strategies involve imaginative and often

[100] See Hansen (2003) and ní Mheallaigh (2008). Examples include Antonius Diogenes' *Wonders Beyond Thule*, and *A Journal of the Trojan War* by Diktys of Crete.
[101] Cf. Whitmarsh (2005), 88, on the relationship of epideictic and the novel. Tilg (2010), 173.
[102] Whitmarsh (2005), 86. Bowie (2008) gives an introduction to the novel that situates it in its literary milieu. Tilg (2010) sees Chariton as claiming the invention of the novel, which would be a case of designating one's genre as original to the period.
[103] See Tilg (2010), 172-97.
[104] In Polemo's surviving *controversiae* on who died more gloriously at the battle of Marathon, Callimachus or Cynegirus, he too displays the same kind of novelty. For example, Cynegirus' father claims his son was 'the first human to engage in a naval battle on land' (πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἐναυμάχησεν ἐκ γῆς, *Cynegirus* 8). See p. 224 for further discussion of this text.

adventurous choices in relation to familiar conventions, often with the express intention of departing from the constraints of tradition and creating something new and original'.[105] Whilst this passage describes well the kind of processes I have been discussing, this combination of unusual or disparate elements is also similar to what happens in many of the monuments left by elite Greeks during the second sophistic and it is to this concept that I now turn.

Monuments: Using the past to create something new with Herodes Atticus

In the introduction to this thesis, I spoke about the discrete identities woven together on the funeral monument of Philopappus. The playing with identity or elements of tradition evident here, are present also in many other structures. For example, Herodes Atticus rebuilds the stadium of Lycurgus,[106] replacing and updating the fourth-century 'classical' structure and making it his own, in a monumental process that approaches the kind of borrowings and assumption of authority over a 'classical' author that we see in sophistic literary practice. Similarly, Herodes' portraiture draws on features associated with classical writers, taking elements from images of Demosthenes, Lysias, and Aeschines, and eschewing the more in vogue representations of bearded, intellectual, Roman emperors such as Hadrian or Marcus Aurelius.[107] As such, he constructs a self-representation that is Hellenic, local, and traditional, but also highly unusual for the period; as Smith notes, '[s]uch portraits represented a visual claim to be an old-style, co-operative *demos* politician, a claim that could be made more vivid by modern portrait technology' and '[i]t requires some effort of historical reconstruction and imagination to recapture the effect and novelty of Herodes' image in its time and context – it was not something obvious or predictable'.[108]

[105] D'Angour (2011), 18.
[106] See Tobin (1997), 165.
[107] See Smith (1998), 78-9. See also Tobin (1997), 74-6, for a description of Herodes' portrait type.
[108] Smith (1998), 79.

In this, Herodes uses the past to create an image that in the empire appeared novel, though in fact it revealed a strong connection to conservatism and tradition. His ability to choose this form of representation was made possible and acceptable by the change in the imperial portraiture of the Antonines from the time of Hadrian.[109]

The use of the past to create something new, however, is not always this straightforward; in the following discussion I will show how another of Herodes' constructions – the arch on his Marathon estate – uses an established form to create a very personal and novel statement of his fractured identity and place in the world that is aimed at eternity. Maud Gleason has looked at the play of identity in Herodes Atticus' commemorations for his wife Regilla, who came from a Roman patrician family.[110] As one example, she discusses his arch.[111] This monument stood on Herodes' Marathon estate and took the form of a commemorative arch. Like Hadrian's arch in Athens and Theseus' pillar at the Isthmus, Herodes' arch marks a boundary and, through the paired inscriptions designating eternal harmony and Herodes' space, and eternal harmony and Regilla's space, it intertexts with both these forerunners, the one historic and the other mythic.[112] However, Theseus' pillar marks only the territorial division between the Peloponnese and Ionia; Hadrian's arch marks the territorial and temporal division between 'his' Athens and Theseus' Athens; Herodes' arch, on the other hand, at the same time as it commemorates his marriage, it marks also the division between genders, husband and wife, the territory designated to each of them, and Greek and Roman cultural affiliation. Through the inscription denoting

[109] See Smith (1998), 91: 'The revival of this old Hellenic style had been made possible by quite independent changes in the self-image and beard-wearing practices of the Roman aristocracy in the Hadrianic and Antonine periods'.
[110] Gleason (2010).
[111] Gleason (2010), 135-42. See also Geagan (1964); Ameling (1983b), 117-20; Tobin (1997), 242-9; Galli (2002), 134-8.
[112] Herodes' arch inscription: *IG* II² 5189; *SEG* XXIII 131. Hadrian's arch inscription: *IG* II² 5185. Theseus' pillar: Strabo 3.5.5; 9.1.6-7; Plutarch, *Theseus* 25.4. See Tobin (1997), 243-4; Gleason (2010), 135-8, on the intertextual nature of the inscriptions. See also Ameling (1983b), 118-20 nos. 97 and 98.

eternal harmony, it suggests there is less division between these aspects, but rather unification. Moreover, the Greek inscription, ΟΜΟΝΟΙΑ ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ, intertexts with the Latin *concordia aeterna*, which was the propagandist slogan used to promote the marriage of Antoninus Pius and Faustina.[113] Thus this arch places Herodes in a succession of, as well as in a position of rivalry with, heroic and imperial figures.

All this becomes more complex when Regilla dies. At some point after this event, Herodes adds another inscription, turning the boundary marker honouring the marriage into a memorial for his wife and his grief. The new poetic inscription celebrates Herodes' former happiness and laments his current sorrow:[114]

> Ἆ μάκαρ ὅστις ἔδειμε νέην πόλιν, οὔν[ο]μα δ᾽αὐτὴν
> Ἠγίλλης καλέων, ζώει ἀγαλλόμενος.
> Ζώω δ᾽ἀχ[ν]ύμενος τό μοι οἰκία ταῦτα τέτυκται.
> νόσφ[ι] φίλης ἀλόχου καὶ δόμος ἡμιτελής.
> ὥς ἄρα τοι θνητοῖσι θεοὶ βιοτὴν κεράσαντ[ες],
> χά[ρ]ματα τ᾽ἠδ᾽ἀνίας γείτονας ἀμφὶς ἔχο[υν].
>
> Ah, blessed is he who has built a new city, calling it
> by Regilla's name; he lives in exultation.
> But I live in grief because my dwelling has been built
> without my beloved wife, and my home is half complete.
> For the gods, in truth, when they have mixed the cup of human life,
> pour out joys and griefs as neighbours side by side.

The poem moves from a joyous past, in which Herodes talks about himself as though he were another person, to the dismal present, in which Herodes mourns his loss with all the personal and immediate force of the first person, to eternity.[115] The poem is full of Homeric allusions and the imagery of building, which have been well discussed by Gleason

[113] Cf. Geagan (1964), 149-56, especially 152 n. 11; Tobin (1997), 243-4; Gleason (2010), 138. See also Ameling (1983b), 118-9, for the encomiastic commonplace of ὁμόνοια.
[114] *SEG* XXIII 121. Text from Geagan (1964), 151. See also Ameling (1983b), 117-8 no. 99; Tobin (1997), 247-8; Gleason (2010), 140.
[115] Gleason (2010), 141. Cf. Tobin (1997), 248.

and Geagan.[116] One of these comes through the figure of Protesilaus and the words δόμος ἡμιτελής ('house half-complete', *Iliad* 2.701), which describe the state of the home the warrior leaves to his grieving wife at the moment of his death. In Herodes' epigram, the gender roles are reversed, so that he fulfils the role of Protesilaus' wife[117] and the arch now comes to represent the division between life and death, and the ruin of the marriage it formerly upheld. Finally, the epigram is carved at eye level and is of a size that can only be read up close.[118] The arch is a strange novel structure to begin with, since it sits on private land and was clearly commissioned by Herodes to commemorate himself.[119] As Gleason explains, '[e]ven Roman emperors did not put up honorific arches to themselves'.[120] But, the highly individual placement and nature of the inscription makes the structure extremely personal as well. This monument, with its complex intertextual and intercultural nature, which initially casts Herodes as heroic, emperor-like, and bicultural, followed by womanly and grieving, appears not to be for the consumption of Herodes' contemporaries, nor indeed only for himself, since the later inscription is a very deliberate act to change the meaning of the monument for posterity and shifts its focus to preserving Herodes' fractured identity for eternity. At the same time, the inscription claiming 'eternal harmony' that remains on the arch, even after Herodes transforms it into a memorial for that harmony's destruction following Regilla's death, underscores the futility of claiming a specific identity for commemoration for all time. This will be one of the key themes of the succeeding chapter. Herodes' arch is just one example of how the same kinds of concerns about the way one might craft and preserve identity in order to address posterity are

[116] Geagon (1964), 149-56; Gleason (2010), 140-2.
[117] Gleason (2010), 142.
[118] Tobin (1997), 247; Gleason (2010), 140.
[119] See Galli (2002), 134-8, for Herodes as presenting himself as a city founder in the private domain.
[120] Gleason (2010), 135.

represented in the monumental as well as the literary record left by elite Greeks during the second sophistic.[121]

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the temporal position of elite Greek writers in the Roman empire renders their literary efforts fraught. Because of their belatedness and the set nature of the literary canon, any attempt to write oneself into the future becomes extremely difficult. Competition with the canon is impossible, particularly because the dictates of the age require any work worth the paper it is written on to engage with the classical past and imitation of past greats is highly valued in contemporary society. This kind of imitation makes it very difficult for the writers of the second sophistic to aim their works at either the future or eternity, since they can never completely escape the past. The writers of the second sophistic turn this problem to their advantage, however, and engage wholeheartedly with the idea that their ability to be commemorated as great writers is unrealistic. Consequently, they play with aspects of time, identity, canonicity and novelty in self-conscious and self-reflexive ways. They construct originality out of the building blocks of the past by collapsing temporal perspective, reshaping or even reinventing personal identity, or claiming novelty and originality for themselves. Thus they may not be able to address eternity, but they do find ways to address the future. Moreover, the same kinds of processes are seen in the monuments built by these men: they play with meaning, identity, the past and the future, intertextuality and intermediality, and push the boundaries of usual or permitted practice. I concluded this chapter with the example of Herodes Atticus and I turn now to this figure, who appears to have dominated the sophistic scene and Athens in particular, to consider his representation by Philostratus and take a closer look at the idea

[121] For some other such examples see Smith (1998), 70-77; Burrell (2009); Gleason (2010).

of shaping and control of future reputation, as well as the tensions and benefits of the contemporary reality of dealing with the Greek past and the Roman present, whilst trying to project oneself into the future.

CHAPTER TWO

Philostratus and Herodes Atticus

Negotiating Fame and Controlling Memory in the Roman Empire

Now with the drops of this most balmy time
My love looks fresh, and death to me subscribes,
Since, spite of him, I'll live in this poor rhyme,
While he insults o'er dull and speechless tribes:
And thou in this shalt find thy monument,
When tyrants' crests and tombs of brass are spent.

William Shakespeare, *Sonnets* 107.9-14.

In the initial chapter of this thesis, I discussed the Greek literary milieu of the second sophistic. I focused on sophistic competition with and reverence for the past, the performative nature of contemporary literature, the place of novelty within it, and the dilemma facing Philostratus' sophists in their conflicting desires to possess both a reputation for excellence in contemporary epideictic improvisation and future fame with a lasting literary legacy. Added to this literary dimension must be the socio-cultural milieu of the Roman empire and the need to negotiate one's identity on both a civic and imperial level. Most of these men were also Roman citizens, a fact which enhanced their prestige and increased their chances of making a name for themselves. As Roman citizens from elite Greek families, they were engaged to some extent in the *cursus honorum*, employed in administrative imperial positions, or acting as envoys between their city and Rome.[1] In this chapter, I will take up a particular strand of this complex story and discuss the way in which Philostratus presents one of his sophists, Herodes Atticus, in the context of identity, the control of future fame, and the second sophistic itself.

The *Lives of the Sophists* privileges Athens over any other city in the empire and Herodes Atticus over any other sophist. Athens is the centre of sophistic activity; Herodes is the

[1] See Bowersock (1969), 17-58.

city's most prominent citizen, and both the city and the man combine to create and reinforce each other's significance within this work to the extent that the sophistic scene comes to seem to be controlled by Herodes: the city becomes Herodes' sophistic Athens. Either the city or its citizens, as a body representative of the city, are mentioned 180 times, compared to merely 37 times for Rome or Roman and 52 times for Greeks in general (Ἕλληνες 41, ἑλληνικός 11). Additionally, Herodes' life is placed at the beginning of the second book and is longer than any other life, at 571 Olearius lines. Only the life of Polemo, which is the penultimate life of the first book, comes close to matching it at 414 lines. Moreover, since the second book is longer than the first, the life of Herodes literally occupies the centre of Philostratus' *Lives*. As Graham Anderson describes it: 'we are not dealing with a 'Second Sophistic' as such: but with little more than 'Herodes and his circle' – teachers, pupils, friends and enemies'.[2] This is something of an exaggeration but, as shown by Kendra Eshleman, the sophists described in the *Lives* do fall into three main categories: '(1) six academic generations from Nicetes through Herodes Atticus to Philostratus, (2) Polemo and his associates, linked to the first group through the mutual admiration of Polemo and Herodes ([*VS*] 536-9), and (3) Isaeus and his students, a small group with ties to Polemo. Herodes' network is by far the largest, and he stands firmly at its center, with his student Hadrian of Tyre as a secondary focal point'.[3]

Consequently, there has been a lot of scholarly attention on Herodes in recent years, especially involving issues that impact on Philostratus' presentation of him as the Greek sophistic figure *par excellence*. Maud Gleason has looked at his cultural identity and how he juggles his Roman and Greek aspects publicly against the backdrop of his inter-cultural marriage and the empire. She focuses on several of his monuments – those constructions

[2] Anderson (1986), 83.
[3] Eshleman (2008), 397; see also p. 399 and the diagram on p. 398.

which he left behind to posterity and, accordingly, which should reflect his own personal desire as to how he is remembered. Gleason concludes that these monuments were designed as fluid negotiations of biculturalism in a world where self-fashioning was the norm.[4] Jennifer Tobin, in her comprehensive study of the remains of material culture left behind by Herodes in Athens, argues that Herodes aimed to be a great *euergetes* and was concerned above all for his contemporary reputation.[5] Similarly, Joseph Rife argues that Herodes' burial at the Panathenaic stadium was an example of creating elite identity and public memory in Roman Greece, and attempts to locate Herodes' tomb definitively above the eastern side of the stadium (though he is forced to admit that the tomb and, therefore, the public memory associated with it, had a very short afterlife).[6] While these studies provide valuable insights, they focus predominantly on the material culture associated with Herodes, whilst neglecting the literary accounts. When they consult Philostratus, they use the *Lives of the Sophists* as a historical source rather than a work with its own literary agenda. Moreover, their focus on particular aspects of Herodes – his biculturalism, his elite identity, or his public benefactions – obscures the bigger picture by refracting the man through a specific lens.

The majority of our evidence for Herodes is monumental, demonstrating his desire to write himself into the landscape as prominently and vastly as possible. Like many of his contemporaries, he combines monumentalization with extensive epigraphic activity, yet on a grander scale than his sophistic peers.[7] He constructs monuments, more often than not inscribed, on both public and private land. His public benefactions are clearly aimed at his

[4] Gleason (2010), especially 156-62.
[5] Tobin (1997).
[6] Rife (2008), especially 117-21.
[7] See Ameling (1983b) and Tobin (1997) for catalogues of inscriptions relating to Herodes. See Arafat (1996), 191-2, for the grand scale of Herodes' benefactions and the notion that this activity is designed to be noticed by his contemporaries.

contemporaries as well as posterity, but that he builds so magnificently on private land, where his monuments are hidden from the public eye, is an indication of a particularly strong ambition to leave a lasting impression for future generations. In this, Herodes is manifesting the kind of attitude to eternity put forward by Charles Segal in his analysis of *On the Sublime*, which I discussed in the previous chapter, since he is aiming at no specific audience, but rather any audience at any given time.[8] It is a very Thucydidean manner of monumentalization.[9] In the third chapter of this thesis, I will take a closer look at some of Herodes' private building and the lengths he goes to protect his constructions, such as the incorporation of increasingly elaborate curse inscriptions.[10]

And yet despite all these concrete and costly efforts to shape and control his future reception, the most influential arbiter of his lasting image has been Philostratus. Walter Ameling's two volume work and Jennifer Tobin's book contain the most recent detailed biographies of the man; however, like the scholars mentioned above, they also take a too simplistic view of Philostratus' relationship to Herodes.[11] Simon Swain, Kendra Eshleman, and P. A. Brunt all consider the processes, in which Philostratus is engaging in the choice and presentation of his sophists, but their main objective is to assess the accuracy and purpose of the work as a whole and not the deeper literary currents at any given point.[12] For these reasons, in this chapter, I intend to take a closer look at Philostratus' presentation of Herodes and, in particular, his juxtaposition of this Athenian sophist to Roman emperors, and what this juxtaposition can tell us both about the successful negotiation of civic and imperial identity alongside the creation of future reputation, and also the ability of literature to manipulate the character and reception of any given

[8] Segal (1959), 123-40.
[9] On Thucydides and eternity see Moles (1999); Greenwood (2006), 1-18. Cf. p. 27 above.
[10] See the section 'Herodes Atticus and the physical appropriation of cultural memory', beginning p. 183.
[11] Ameling (1983a) and (1983b); Tobin (1997).
[12] Swain (1991); Brunt (1994); Eshleman (2008).

individual. In this, my focus is also quite honed, but it is a focus that has been missing from modern scholarly consideration. Philostratus' biography is a complex mix of praise and blame. Herodes appears as a 'larger than life' character, who is ever teetering on the edge of antisocial behaviour at the same time as he dominates sophistic society in Athens. The most prominent aspect of Philostratus' criticism involves the presentation of Herodes as an ambivalent mix of Athenian tyrant, king, and hero within the Roman empire, and it is this juxtaposition – the Athenian citizen and the Roman citizen – which Philostratus appears to be trying to negotiate for himself through the figure of Herodes, the opposing concepts of the tyrant and the king, the ambiguous figure of the hero, and the blameless figure of the philosopher, who appears as a foil to highlight Herodes' excesses. In short, Philostratus refracts the biography of Herodes through a sophistic lens. As he himself characterized the second sophistic, he sketches Herodes by playing with the types of 'the poor man and the rich, of heroes and tyrants' (τοὺς πένητας... καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους καὶ τοὺς ἀριστέας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους, *VS* 481). Through this discussion, I hope to draw out some of the anxieties faced by Philostratus' sophists with respect to constructing and controlling their identity for the consumption of posterity.

The idea of Herodes as both tyrant and king will appear throughout this chapter, but I will examine it most closely in the first section, 'Sophistic Tyranny, Imperial Democracy', below. In this section I will also consider the way Philostratus compares Herodes' tyrannical tendencies to the ruling behaviours of Marcus Aurelius, whom Philostratus paints as particularly democratic and philosophical. In the following section, 'The King of Words',[13] I look at the positive light Philostratus shines on Herodes in his role as the arbiter of the sophistic scene in Athens, which will be contrasted to the more ambiguous picture painted of Herodes in his appearances before the emperors Marcus and Hadrian

[13] This section begins on p. 95.

outside of Athens in the third section, 'Emperor, Philosopher, Tyrant, Hero'.[14] In the next section, 'Tyrant, King, Hero', I will discuss the way in which Philostratus creates a comparison between Herodes and Athens' legendary king, Theseus, and what this says about the position of elite Greeks at both a civic level and an imperial one.[15] In the final section, 'Tyranny of Space', I will examine the way specific monuments or landmarks are used by Philostratus to once more highlight the ambiguities in Herodes' character.[16]

Sophistic Tyranny, Imperial Democracy

Herodes and his contemporary elite sophists existed in a complex relationship with both their *polis* and Rome. Although a circumscribed autonomy remained, Rome had subsumed Greece and was ruled by an emperor, which limited the political and personal expression of these men. Their primary means of creating a lasting presence in public space was to grant benefactions to cities and to construct funeral monuments, which indeed had been the normal practice amongst elite Greeks since well before the principate, but the challenge of the day was rather to identify oneself with both one's Greek heritage at the same time as claiming an appropriate identity within the Roman empire.[17] Statues could be granted them by cities and, although individuals were often required to pay for these honours themselves, they did not possess complete control over the way in which that honour was expressed.[18] Nevertheless, the boundaries of personal expression were elastic and, in his building activities and political interactions, we can see Herodes Atticus distinctively rivalling and imitating imperial behaviours.[19] Although, theoretically, tyrannies should not have been able to exist within the empire, there are numerous examples of the language of

[14] This section begins on p. 101.
[15] This section begins on p. 107.
[16] This section begins on p. 121.
[17] See Smith (1998), especially 70-77, and Gleason (2010) for the incorporation of diverse cultural elements into Roman Greek monuments.
[18] See Veyne (1990), 125.
[19] See Tobin (2007) and Gleason (2010) for some examples of this practice. See also Arafat (1996), 191.

tyranny being applied to prominent citizens; so the perception existed that any individual, who came to dominate a given *polis* fiscally and politically, laid himself open to the potential accusation of tyrannical behaviour, especially from his political rivals.[20] Herodes' own grandfather had been condemned as a tyrant under Domitian, a circumstance mentioned in the first paragraphs of his Philostratean life (*VS* 548).

Nigel Kennell has made a case supporting the position that there was a genuine perception of Herodes as tyrannical by the Athenians. He has shown that an inscription (*EM* 13366)[21] – found in the Athenian agora and recording a letter from Marcus Aurelius to the Athenians[22] – deals predominantly with Herodes Atticus and his relationship to the people of Athens.[23] As Kennell explains, 'Marcus Aurelius' main and indeed probably only motive in sending this letter was to settle suits involving Herodes, either directly or indirectly, and thus end the stasis that had racked Athens for so long'.[24] The stasis to which Kennell refers is the conflict between Herodes and the *demos*, which is mentioned by Philostratus and which resulted in the Athenian assembly inviting the then proconsuls, the Quintilii brothers, to a meeting and claiming that they lived under a tyranny (*VS* 559). Kennell convincingly argues that this letter derives from the aftermath of the resulting trial of Herodes in Sirmium. Moreover, the focus in the emperor's letter on the social advancement of freedmen and their descendants is indicative of the Athenian perception that Herodes had tyrannical aspirations over their city. By flooding its institutions with freedmen loyal to himself, Herodes increased his political power.[25] In the conclusion to her book on the subject of Herodes and Athens, Jennifer Tobin also draws the connection

[20] See Kennell (1997), 351-5, for examples.
[21] *SEG* XXIX 127.
[22] See Oliver (1970), 1-40; Jones (1971); Follet (1979); Ameling (1983b), 182-205 no. 189; Tobin (1997), 41-7.
[23] Kennell (1997), 346-62, especially, 347-9.
[24] Kennell (1997), 349.
[25] See Kennell (1997).

between Herodes' building activities and tyranny, quoting sections of Dio Chrysostom's 47th Oration, in which Dio defends himself against the charge of tyranny for attempting to embellish his native city of Prusa.[26] The most salient of these, claims that certain attributes, which are regularly invoked as discerning a tyrant, may also be considered the qualities of a king, if viewed in a different light:

> ὅταν δὲ ἀκούω λέγειν τινὰ ὡς περὶ τυράννου, παράδοξον ἐμοὶ φαίνεται καὶ γελοῖον. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι τῶν τυράννων ἔργα τοιαῦτα, μοιχεύειν γυναῖκας ἀλλοτρίας καὶ διαφθείρειν παῖδας, ἀνθρώπους ἐλευθέρους τύπτειν <καὶ> αἰκίζεσθαι πάντων ὁρώντων, τοὺς δὲ καὶ στρεβλοῦν, οἷον εἰς ζέοντα λέβητα καθιέντας, ἄλλους δὲ καταπιττοῦντας· ὧν οὐδὲν ἐγὼ ποιῶ·... ὧν τί πρὸς ἐμέ ἐστιν; ἢ ὅτι τὴν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομῶ πολυτελῶς; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐῶ πίπτειν; ἢ ὅτι πορφύραν αὐτὸς ἠμφίεσμαι; ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλον τριβώνιον; ἀλλ' ὅτι κομῶ καὶ γένεια ἔχω; τοῦτο δ' ἴσως οὐ τυραννικόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ βασιλικόν. ἔφη δ' οὖν τις ὅτι καὶ τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν καλῶς ποιοῦντα καὶ τοῦτο βασιλικόν ἐστιν.
>
> Whenever I hear someone talking about me as though I were a tyrant, it seems to me a paradox and laughable. For I understand the sorts of things tyrants do – committing adultery with another man's wife, corrupting boys, beating and maltreating freemen in public, even subjecting men to torture, as for example dropping them into a boiling cauldron or covering others in pitch – none of which I do… But what does this have to do with me? Is it because I built an expensive house and don't let it fall down? Or because I wear purple and not a cheap cloak? Or is it that I grow my hair long and sport a beard? But perhaps this is not the sign of a tyrant, but of a king? Indeed someone said that to be slandered through doing good deeds is also the mark of a king. (*Oration* 47.23-25)

In this, Dio demonstrates the ambivalence in the distinction between tyranny and kingship, and hints at the rhetorical and subjective nature of both words. Athenaeus and Lucian also associate the concept of tyranny with wealthy or prominent citizens and point out the subjectivity and even arbitrariness of such a charge, with one of Lucian's characters quipping, in reference to a rich man's fears, that he need be ever vigilant 'lest the *demos* believes the sycophants when they say the rich man aspires to be a tyrant' (μὴ πιστεύσῃ τοῖς

[26] Tobin (1997), 285-94. See also Kennell (1997), 353-4.

συκοφάνταις ὁ δῆμος λέγουσι τυραννεῖν αὐτὸν ἐθέλειν, *Saturnalia* 26).[27] In his public building Herodes is criticized in a similar way to Dio. One example of this, to which I will return below in greater detail, is the backlash from his decision to reject the terms of his father's will and, instead of granting a yearly allowance to all Athenian citizens, to build rather the Panathenaic stadium (*VS* 549);[28] another example is that of the rumours claiming he built the Odeon of Regilla solely for the purpose of assuaging his alleged guilt over his wife's murder (*VS* 555-7). Again, I will discuss this episode in more detail below.[29] Herodes was a prolific builder both publicly and privately; interestingly, however, throughout his life of Herodes, Philostratus describes or mentions only Herodes' public building benefactions: the water-supply at Alexander Troas (*VS* 549), the Panathenaic Stadium (*VS* 550), the Odeon of Regilla (*VS* 551), the theatre at Corinth, statues at the Isthmus, the stadium at Delphi, an aqueduct at Olympia, bathing pools at Thermopylae (*VS* 551). He completely ignores Herodes' private monumental accomplishments, except for the statues he sets up of the τρόφιμοι (*VS* 559), for which (Philostratus notes) he is accused of extravagance by the Quintilii. This neglect of Herodes' private monumentalization is interesting given that tyrants were often identified by their excessive private constructions more so than their public ones, such as the emperor Nero and his golden house (Tacitus, *Annals* 15.41-2). The passage from Dio above references the lavish nature of his own house, which shows that private displays of wealth were particularly open to criticism by political opponents. Since Herodes certainly engaged in lavish private construction, it is curious that Philostratus ignores this. Nevertheless, given the political reality of the empire, in which local elites strove for influence over their native or adopted cities, 'tyrant' became a likely label to be applied to a wealthy elite with aspirations to

[27] See also Lucian, *Slander* 13; Athenaeus 5.54.
[28] See p. 114.
[29] See p. 126.

dominance over a given city, particularly since the difference between tyranny and kingship (at least in rhetoric) was really a matter of perspective.

It is notable that, within the *Lives of the Sophists*, the words τύραννος (including its associated verb) and βασιλεύς are used in very specific ways. So, of the 83 times βασιλεύς is used, it is applied 8 times to the Persian king, once to the king of Bosphorus, twice to Herodes with respect to his eloquence,[30] and all other times to a Roman emperor. On the other hand, τύραννος is used once in Philostratus' description of the nature of the second sophistic, as quoted above,[31] and once in an epideictic theme, eight times to denote Dionysius the tyrant of Syracuse, once to describe Critias and once the Thessalians (in relation to Critias), once to label the 400 tyrants of Athens, twice to denote Domitian (in relation to Dio Chrysostom), twice for Heliogabalus (in Aelian's opinion), once for the charge against Herodes' grandfather Hipparchus, and finally once for the similar charge against Herodes.[32] From this it can be seen that, in the *Lives of the Sophists*, the term τύραννος is far more flexible than βασιλεύς. Where βασιλεύς overwhelmingly denotes the office of emperor, τύραννος is applied to 'bad' emperors, classical tyrants, or contemporary prominent provincial elites (who also happen to be part of Herodes' family). In any case, it reveals that within this particular text βασιλεύς is essentially used to describe legitimacy and τύραννος to describe those who have overstepped their bounds or transgressed their accepted roles. So, in this particular rhetorical landscape, whatever kind of 'king' an elite Greek strove to be, he would always be juxtaposed to the greater and legitimate βασιλεύς that was the emperor. At the same time and for the same reasons, the phenomenon of the

[30] See below p. 95.
[31] See p. 84.
[32] On the second sophistic: *VS* 481; in an epideictic theme: *VS* 569; on Dionysius: *VS* 499-500; on Critias and the Thessalians: *VS* 501-2; on the 400 tyrants: 498; on Domitian: *VS* 488; on Heliogabalus: *VS* 625; on Hipparchus: *VS* 547; on Herodes: *VS* 559.

tyrant was always localized and, as Nigel Kennell has shown, in reality more so than rhetoric, the individual concerned needed to walk a fine line so as not to tread on the toes of Rome in his ambitions, as Herodes' grandfather had done, since it was ultimately the emperor who wielded the power of decision as to the validity of and punishment for any such charge.[33]

The section of Herodes' life, which describes the charge of tyranny made before the Quintilii, elucidates the situation I described of legitimate versus illegitimate kingship. Philostratus explains: τὼ ἄνδρε τούτω, ὁπότε ἄμφω τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἠρχέτην, καλέσαντες ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν Ἀθηναῖοι φωνὰς ἀφῆκαν τυραννευομένων πρὸς τὸν Ἡρώδην ἀποσημαίνοντες καὶ δεόμενοι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐς τὰ βασίλεια ὦτα παραπεμφθῆναι τὰ εἰρημένα ('when these two men were both governing Greece, the Athenians invited them to a meeting of the assembly, and launched speeches to the effect that they were oppressed by a tyrant, meaning Herodes; and finally begged that what they had said might be forwarded to the emperor's ears', *VS* 559). There are two elements of interest here. The first is the juxtaposition of βασιλεύς, referring to the emperor, with tyranny, referring to Herodes. Though τύραννος could be used neutrally for an absolute (usually non-dynastic) ruler, here, in juxtaposition with βασιλεύς and with the occurrences cited above, clearly it is signifying an illegitimate rule.[34] Moreover, Herodes' response, that the Quintilii were plotting against him and were inciting the Athenians to attack him (*VS* 559), is very much that of a man concerned for his power over the city. In stark contrast to Herodes' own position, when Philostratus describes the charge of tyranny against Herodes' grandfather, he stresses that the Athenians did not

[33] Kennell (1989) especially 356.

[34] See Parker (1998) for the development of the word, *tyrannos*. He notes that the negative associations of the word are most clear in Athenian sources and suggests that this is a development in response to the fact that Athens became democratic so early in their history. See Rosivach (1988) for the concept of the tyrant in classical Greece. See Ferrell (1978) for a discussion of *tyrannos* in Herodotus and in wider classical literature in opposition to *basileus*.

bring it (ἃς Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὐκ ἐπῆργον, *VS* 548). The second element of interest is that Philostratus reports the charge of tyranny by the Athenians in quite a contemptuous manner. The phrase φωνὰς ἀφῆκαν invokes a picture of the Athenians throwing their words at Herodes, like petty missiles. So, although he reports the incident and shows the Athenians appealing to be heard by the emperor in order to denounce the 'tyrant', Philostratus' tone suggests he is less convinced by the Athenians' complaints than the Quintilii were. He also introduces this episode merely in order to explain the bad blood that existed between Herodes and the Quintilii, which would seem to be a less important aspect of the event than the charge of tyranny itself. In this way, a quite serious charge is to no small extent trivialized.

Nevertheless, Philostratus goes on to relate that Herodes blamed the Quintilii for the disquiet of the *demos* and for inciting those whose 'public policy was opposed to Herodes' to rouse the people still further (ἐς τὸ ἀντίξοον τῷ Ἡρώδῃ πολιτεύοντες, *VS* 559). In this description it can be seen that Philostratus considers the charge to be politically motivated. In the section following the intervention of the Quintilii, Philostratus relates the escape (ὑπεξῆλθον) of these men, whom Herodes indicted with conspiracy in labelling him a tyrant and whom he tried to bring before the provincial authority, and the refuge and understanding they sought from Marcus Aurelius, who is described as being δημοτικωτέρος ('more democratic') (*VS* 560). The comparative here demands a figure of contrast, which can only be supplied by Herodes or the proconsular court. Since the Quintilii were already ill-disposed towards Herodes, it would be strange for his accusers to find fault with their potential to make a favourable judgement. Accordingly, the comparison must be with Herodes himself. Philostratus' characterization of Marcus Aurelius as more democratic than Athens' leading citizen is striking, especially since Athens

was ever the champion of democracy and prided itself on having overthrown or resisted a number of tyrannies in the past. The consistent negativity towards the idea of a tyrant in Athens, where the word is predominantly used to signify someone who seizes power illegally, is explained by Victor Parker:

> Attic speech, then, may have made a sharp semantic distinction between the terms τύραννος and βασιλεύς, a distinction which did not quite exist elsewhere and in other dialects. I think this results of the sharp political distinction between the kingship and the tyranny. In Athens the kingship had at a very early date melted away with little of the strife which accompanied its downfall elsewhere. As a consequence the tyrants were perceived as something completely different from the kings who had centuries before ceased to exist.[35]

Thus the use of the word δημοτικωτέρος in reference to Marcus Aurelius and in comparison to Herodes, essentially renders Herodes less Athenian and more monarchical than the Roman emperor. This is the rhetorical force of the word, but what Philostratus is suggesting in a practical sense is that Herodes' accusers believed Marcus would be more impartial and more open to the notional suffering of the people of Athens, to the ideological position of Rome governing for the good of all citizens and not just the wealthy few, and to the argument that Rome's authority ought not to be usurped by a local citizen who had gained too much power. This notion of the Roman empire as a democracy is key to Philostratus' presentation of Herodes in the *Lives of the Sophists* and is not an isolated instance, but recurs several times in the literature of the second sophistic, notably in Dio Cassius (52.14.3-5), Aelius Aristides (*To Rome* 60), and most significantly in Philostratus again, but this time in his *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, in which he has the hero advise Vespasian against abdication and restoration of democracy.[36] Apollonius says:

> τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀγέλην οὐκ ἀξιῶ φθείρεσθαι χήτει βουκόλου δικαίου τε καὶ σώφρονος. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἷς ἀρετῇ προῦχων μεθίστησι τὴν

[35] Parker (1998), 169.
[36] See Starr (1952) for the idea of the empire as a democracy through time; see particularly pp. 13-16 for examples from imperial Greek literature.

> δημοκρατίαν ἐς τὸ ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρχὴν φαίνεσθαι, οὕτως ἡ ἑνὸς ἀρχὴ πάντα ἐς τὸ ξυμφέρον τοῦ κοινοῦ προορῶσα δῆμος ἐστιν.
>
> I do not think the human herd should perish for lack of a just and reasonable herdsman. Just as one man of exceptional virtue changes democracy so as to make it appear the rule of one man better than the rest, so the rule of one man who is always looking out for the common good is a democracy. (*VA* 5.35.4)

This is a variation on the debate in Herodotus' *Histories* 3.80-3 on the best type of government – monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy – with the conclusion that monarchy is best, if ruled by the best man who has the interests of all at heart. Of course, such a monarchy, especially in the long run, is hard to sustain, a point stressed by Otanes to his fellow Persians in Herodotus. This definition of the rule of one man, who acts for the common good, being like a democracy well describes Philostratus' attitude to Marcus Aurelius, particularly in his life of Herodes, and contrasts sharply with his portrait of Herodes himself, whose efforts at benefaction appear predominantly selfish, in that their primary aim is to increase his own influence over the city and to preserve his own and his family's memory. Philostratus presents Herodes as attempting to dominate Athens in both the artistic and political realms. It is no accident that, in the *Life of Apollonius*, Philostratus puts the above words into the mouth of the eponymous philosophical sage. It is precisely Marcus' association with philosophy and Herodes' lack of this characteristic that colours their respective representations and interactions in the *Lives of the Sophists*.

Philostratus' presentation of Herodes is highly rhetorical and allusive. It casts him in the roles of tyrant, king, and hero, and it contrasts him to the character of the philosopher. Philostratus is not a clumsy writer, a notion that is now well accepted for both the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* and the *Heroicus*, and should be extended to the *Lives of the Sophists* as

well.[37] As such, his portrait of Herodes is both complex and ambivalent and far less laced with encomia than is usually allowed.[38] He builds Herodes up, but he also undercuts him in ways that suggest he is not quite equipped to be completely successful within his socio-political context. A likely reason for this is that Philostratus identifies to some extent with Herodes. In his dual roles – civic and imperial – Herodes is in a similar position to Philostratus himself, who most probably held a significant position in Athens as hoplite general and was active in the circle of the empress, Julia Domna, in Rome.[39] Philostratus' focus on Herodes, his failures and his triumphs, may be indicative of his own desire to negotiate successfully the conflicting elements of his own identity, in order to achieve a positive lasting reputation in both worlds. In what follows, I will elucidate the ways in which Philostratus renders Herodes' character and how his presentation serves to create an ambivalent mix of praise and blame. Strikingly, the tyrannical behaviours described by Philostratus are often connected with Herodes' attempts to construct future fame. The material is divided into sections which focus on different aspects of Herodes' characterization: firstly, his predominantly benevolent rule over sophistic Athens; secondly, his partly tyrannical and partly heroic displays before Roman emperors, as well as the same ambiguous mix of qualities that attends Philostratus' characterization of his death; and finally, the tyrannical and anti-philosophical aspects that come to the fore in Herodes' attempts to mark the landscape with his presence.

[37] See Bowie and Elsner (eds.) (2009) for a collection of essays on various aspects of Philostratus' writings. See especially Elsner (2009), 3-18, on the versatility and sophistication of Philostratus.
[38] For example, see Tobin (1997), 7: 'Philostratus tries to present the more negative events in Herodes' life… in as positive a light as possible… he could not completely hide unpleasant facts about Herodes' life. Instead, he tried to defend them or minimize them'.
[39] See Bowie (2009), 19-25.

The King of Words

Philostratus' *Lives* sets Herodes Atticus up as the greatest of his sophists whilst simultaneously establishing Athens as the centre of sophistic activity. Indeed, the *Lives* characterize Herodes as ruling the sophistic scene in Athens. He manages with great success within the city itself; when he is removed from it, however, and placed before the emperor, his sophistic performances tend to fail, an aspect of his Philostratean presentation on which I will focus in the next section.[40] Herodes is labelled τον βασιλέα τῶν λόγων ('the king of words') by Hadrian of Tyre (*VS* 586) and as δεσπότην τε αὐτὸν καλῶν καὶ Ἑλλήνων γλῶτταν καὶ λόγων βασιλέα καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ('the master and the tongue of the Greeks and king of words and many other such things', *VS* 598) by Rufus of Perinthus, both of whom were students of the great man in Athens. This use of βασιλεύς is the only time that the word does not refer to a legitimate king or the emperor of Rome. Accordingly, when used to refer to Herodes' sophistic activities, it transfers that sense of legitimacy to his artistic rule. As described by Philostratus, Herodes' negotiation of various situations within the Athenian sophistic scene validates this characterization, while his behaviour before emperors serves to undermine it. I will give two brief examples of the interactions between sophists in Herodes' sophistic Athens, which serve to highlight Herodes' sophistic rule: one involving Philagrus of Cilicia, who negotiates it poorly, and the other Alexander the Clay Plato, who negotiates it well. Then I will consider Philostratus' depiction of Herodes' own rhetorical skills, which constructs a more ambiguous character for the sophist. This discussion will serve as an introduction for the succeeding section, which will focus on Herodes' sophistic encounters with the emperors Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius.

[40] See p. 101 below.

Philagrus commits several mistakes on his visit to Herodes' Athens and, notably, these mistakes occur in relation to his attempts to further his fame, both contemporary and future. Firstly, he attempts to assert his authority over a group of Herodes' students, who roam the city like some kind of sophistic gang (*VS* 578-9), but is instead treated with disrespect. Secondly, angered by their inability to recognize him, since he believes his fame should have preceded him, he uses a word which Philostratus describes as ἔκφυλος ('outlandish'). That is, he uses a non-canonical, non-Attic word. This particular mistake highlights how seriously Philostratus' sophists take their classical Attic posturing and, indeed, in the life of Critias, Philostratus notes that Atticizing in an outlandish manner is truly barbarous (ἀττικίζοντά... οὐδὲ ἐκφύλως – τὸ γὰρ ἀπειρόκαλον ἐν τῷ ἀττικίζειν βάρβαρον, *VS* 503). However, when challenged on his poor choice of vocabulary, Philagrus counters by making a claim to canonicity: he states that the classic from which the ἐκφύλον ῥῆμα comes is actually himself. This marks Philagrus out as someone who, through an inability to control his emotions, will step outside this faux-classical sophistic world and, in the process of tarnishing his contemporary reputation in this manner, stake a claim for future reputation. At the same time, it marks him out as someone who is an outsider in the city, since ἐκφύλον ῥῆμα could also be taken to indicate that he is not from one of the tribes or φυλαί of Athens.[41] According to Philostratus' text, to be an outsider in the Athenian sophistic scene is a dire position indeed for one's contemporary reputation.

Philagrus also makes the mistake of trying to mark his own performances with idiosyncrasy and personality, and once again he transgresses by failing to toe Herodes' line. Following the incident with the students, Philagrus writes to Herodes to demand an apology. Herodes responds by admonishing the visitor instead, saying, 'It seems to me that you are not

[41] Whitmarsh (2005), 34.

performing your *prooemium* well' (δοκεῖς μοι... οὐ καλῶς προοιμιάζεσθαι, *VS* 579). Philostratus then explains that what Herodes means by this is that the true *prooemium* to any speech is attempting to win the goodwill of the intended audience. Philagrus fails to heed his advice, and his subsequent performance is hijacked and ruined by Herodes' pupils, since instead of improvising, he tries to re-perform an old published speech, for which he had previously received great acclaim. This breaks the rules of sophistic performance in Herodes' Athens, in which improvisation and variation are celebrated, and Philagrus is ridiculed. This failure on behalf of Philagrus can be viewed in two ways. Firstly, it can be seen as a failed attempt to hoodwink his audience and to falsely inflate his reputation for epideictic oratory. Secondly, it can be seen as a deliberately transgressive act that is intended both to invest his work with greater literary clout and to champion the concrete written word over the transitory spoken word. By reproducing a previously successful performance, he behaves as one might do both to try to cement one's name to a particular work and to give that work's fame increased longevity: he treats his earlier epideictic speech as a kind of literature. In this scenario, Philagrus is aiming at a future audience rather than the present. Armand D'Angour discusses this idea in relation to novelty in poetry and music, noting '[a] written text pins down the utterances of memory and creates a record of thought, allowing subsequent readers and hearers to examine, criticize, dispute and reinterpret the products of other minds with greater certainty' and 'writing meant that the old could be distinguished from the new, allowing authors scope for individuality and the confidence to take credit for novel thoughts and compositions'.[42] Of course in Philagrus' case in this particular context the scrutiny offered by the written text works against him. Nevertheless, his outrage at being ridiculed for using something that belonged to him reveals his desire to attach greater permanency to his compositions.

[42] D'Angour (2011), 167.

It is difficult to tell in this anecdote where Philostratus' sympathies lie. He is critical of Philagrus' epideictic *faux pas* but, at the same time, the act of writing the sophists and their lives essentially creates the canon of the second sophistic and, in the sense of commitment to recording events in writing, Philostratus is more greatly identified with Philagrus than Herodes.[43] And yet, as I will later demonstrate, it is this concern for future fame which also marks Herodes as a transgressive and difficult figure in Philostratus' biography.[44] Indeed the anecdote of Philagrus' visit to Athens is almost a microcosm of Herodes' existence in the empire. Hence Philagrus' primary failures are misjudging his audience and his inability to control his emotions before Herodes, Athens' king of words, a form of failure before mastery that Herodes himself ironically repeats before the emperors Hadrian and Marcus. Consequently, Philagrus fails on a second occasion in Athens due to becoming carried away with the emotion of his performance and thus literally losing the ability to speak (ἐσβέσθη τὸ φθέγμα ὑπὸ τῆς χολῆς, *VS* 580). Philostratus goes on to say that Philagrus was later appointed to the Chair of Rhetoric in Rome, the highest of such chairs and thus indicating the level of respect he attained in that city, but in Athens he received only infamy.

Alexander the Clay Plato, on the other hand, negotiates Athens and Herodes entirely successfully (*VS* 571-3), but encounters difficulties in Rome (*VS* 571). In Athens, having been forced to begin his declamation before Herodes' arrival, Alexander stops as soon as the great man appears in order to ask him which speech he would like to hear: the same one he is currently performing or a different theme. Herodes turns the question to the audience and gives them the choice that is rightfully his. The people of Athens reply that they would like to hear the current theme again. Alexander, understanding the performance

[43] On Philostratus writing the canon of the second sophistic, see Eshelman (2008), 396.
[44] See especially the section entitled 'Tyranny of Space', p. 121.

constructs of Herodes' Athens, improvises a completely different speech on the same theme by varying his vocabulary and rhythms (*VS* 573). This anecdote demonstrates just how great Herodes' sway is over the art of sophistry in Athens and how democratic he can be in this sphere. It also shows that Alexander recognizes his subservient position in Athens and that he must acknowledge Herodes' supremacy in order to succeed. Alexander's behaviour in Rome, however, fails to impress the emperor Antoninus. In contrast to his deference to Herodes, half way through his speech, he demands unceremoniously that the emperor pay more attention to him. The emperor responds by saying, «προσέχω… καὶ ξυνίημί σου· σύ γὰρ… ὁ τὴν κόμην ἀσκῶν καὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας λαμπρύνων καὶ τοὺς ὄνυχας ξέων καὶ τοῦ μύρου ἀεὶ πνέων» ('I am paying attention and I know you well. You are the fellow who is always arranging his hair, cleaning his teeth, and polishing his nails, and always smells of perfume', *VS* 571). The emperor's dismissive focus on Alexander's carefully constructed appearance rather than his rhetorical ability suggests that in his mind this sophist is all show and no substance. The different experiences and behaviours of Philagrus and Alexander in Herodes' Athens and the emperors' Rome shed light on Herodes' own oratorical performances, to which I now turn. What is clear is that Athens and Rome are not the same fora and what will stand in one does not in the other.

Oddly, within the actual life of Herodes, Philostratus focuses very little on Herodes' own oratory, devoting only one brief section at the very end to a description of his style. Yet this section paints Herodes as both tyrannical and strongly traditional. Philostratus says that Herodes' style was inseparable from that of Critias and that he acquainted the Greeks better with that writer, who had previously been overlooked (τῷ δὲ Κριτίᾳ καὶ προσετετήκει

καὶ παρήγαγεν αὐτὸν ἐς ἤθη Ἑλλήνων τέως ἀμελούμενον καὶ περιορώμενον, *VS* 564).[45] That Herodes chose to imitate the reportedly obscure (although this is clearly an exaggeration of Philostratus) Critias is typical of his presentation in the *Lives of the Sophists*. He could have chosen the more famous Demosthenes, as Polemo did, but in imitating Critias he is demonstrating his own uniqueness, discerning taste, and vast classical knowledge. At the same time, he is strengthening the canonical status of Critias himself, by increasing that orator's airplay, if only through *mimesis*. Moreover, Critias himself was a tyrannical figure being a leading member of the Thirty Tyrants. In his life of Critias, Philostratus calls the sophist in his opinion 'the worst man amongst all who are notorious for wrong-doing' (κάκιστος ἀνθρώπων ἔμοιγε φαίνεται ξυμπάντων, ὧν ἐπὶ κακίᾳ ὄνομα, *VS* 501). Although he does label Critias a tyrant, he condemns him essentially for aiding Sparta and bloodthirstiness, not for overthrowing the democracy (εἰ μὲν κατέλυσε τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον, οὔπω κακός, *VS* 501), which he considers to have been in disarray anyway. The use of the word προστήκομαι ('to cling to', 'to give oneself up to') to connect Herodes to Critias is quite evocative and gives the sense that Philostratus may mean it to refer to more than simply his oratorical style. What is more, in the sentence following the oratorical comparison of Herodes to Critias, Philostratus notes that all of Greece called Herodes one of the Ten (referring to the canon of orators). The mention of this group so close to Critias' name would naturally highlight Critias' membership of that other numbered group – the Thirty – and subtly damn Herodes by association. Philostratus mentions specifically only two speeches of Herodes, both of which are made before emperors outside Herodes' Athens: one before Hadrian in his youth (*VS* 565) and the other before Marcus Aurelius in defence of the charge of tyranny (*VS* 561). In both these situations, the greatest of orators fails and the circumstances of each failed speech bracket the brief section in which

[45] One speech survives, which has been attributed tentatively to Herodes, but which has also been identified as the work of Critias himself. See Wade-Grey (1945), 19-33 and Anderson (1986), 113.

Philostratus praises Herodes' skill. This sandwiching of praise between failures has the effect of calling into question the sincerity of Philostratus' flattery and highlighting the significant imperial circumstances of Herodes' sophistic misadventures, to which I now turn.

Emperor, Philosopher, Tyrant, Hero

Philostratus' presentation of Herodes' failure before Marcus juxtaposes the emperor and the tyrant, the philosopher and the sophist. It reveals Marcus Aurelius as fitting the paradigm of Apollonius' 'good shepherd', which I described above, and diminishes Herodes to resemble Philagrus in his excess of emotion.[46] At the trial, the rhetor is upset over the chance death of two favoured female servants and takes this out on Marcus, attacking him without any semblance of rhetorical skill before storming out. Indeed, Herodes' display of excess emotion, most often in association with death, is a recurring theme in Philostratus' life and something to which I will return below.[47] On this occasion, Herodes slanders (διαβολὴ) the emperor 'with an aggressive and unguarded tongue' (ἀπηγκωνισμένῃ τῇ γλώττῃ καὶ γυμνῇ, *VS* 561). Marcus, on the other hand, is generous and gentle, and far from becoming angry brings a penalty which he describes as being 'as mild as possible' to bear on Herodes' freedmen rather than Herodes himself (*VS* 561). This of course has the effect of reducing some of Herodes' power base without punishing Herodes directly. He also corresponds with Herodes after the trial to allay the Athenian's fears that Marcus holds a grudge and requests that Herodes initiate him into the mysteries when he next comes to Athens (*VS* 562-3). The mention of Herodes' position as priest of Eleusis is a way of Marcus legitimating Herodes' prestige in Athens, without promoting his apparent tyrannical tendencies. Philostratus describes this letter as Marcus' *apologia* and calls it both

[46] See p. 92 above for Apollonius of Tyana's characterization of the democratic ruler as a 'good shepherd'.
[47] See especially the section beginning on p. 126.

φιλάνθρωπος and ἐρρωμένη ('kindly' and 'powerful'/'formidable', *VS* 563). Significantly, φιλανθρωπία is an imperial virtue and championed by Dio Chrysostom in his *Oration* 1, on kingship. For example, he says: 'For of necessity the kindly and humane king is not only beloved but even adored by his fellow men. And… he displays a soul benignant and gentle towards all, in that he regards all as loyal and his friends' (ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὸν ἥμερον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον βασιλέα μὴ μόνον φιλεῖσθαι ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐρᾶσθαι… ἵλεων καὶ πρᾷον παρέχει τὴν ψυχὴν πᾶσιν, ἅτε πάντας ἡγούμενος εὔνους καὶ φίλους, *Orations* 1.20).[48] Moreover, the participle ἐρρωμένη seems out of place, given Philostratus' stress on the gentleness of Marcus' discourse and disposition. Consequently, perhaps Philostratus is intending a pun on the Greek word for 'Rome', Ῥώμη, which also means 'strength' or 'might', and as such he is signifying how very Roman Marcus' philanthropic and philosophical response is: authority through just kindness. Herodes' correspondence, on the other hand, is described as containing 'not a defence, but an accusation' (οὐκ ἀπολογίαν… ἀλλ᾽ ἔγκλημα, *VS* 562), wording which suggests Philostratus places him in the wrong in this particular interaction.

So, here before Marcus Aurelius, Herodes behaves as Philagrus did before him and, instead of as the one in the wrong, as the one being wronged. Marcus, however, does not admonish Herodes in the way Herodes did Philagrus, instead he apologizes graciously and gives Herodes his ground or, rather, gently defines Herodes' sphere of influence for him by acknowledging his relative importance within the confines of Athens. Still, the presumptuousness of Herodes' behaviour is emphasized by Marcus' wry command to the complainants in the case, which Philostratus marks as an exemplary philosophical moment: 'Make your defence, Athenians, though Herodes does not give you leave' («ἀπολογεῖσθε»

[48] Cf. Dio Chrysostom 1.6, 1.18.

ἔφη, «ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ καὶ μὴ ξυγχωρεῖ Ἡρώδης», *VS* 561). This one sentence highlights Herodes' imagined position over the Athenians and his actual position below the emperor Marcus. Additionally, just following his relation of this episode, Philostratus mentions a speech given against Herodes by a certain Demostratus (*VS* 563), a name which is indeed fitting to the champion of the Athenians and once more highlights the dissonance between the people and the sophist. So, despite Philostratus inserting praise of Herodes' oratorical skills and mentioning the compliments of others, when Herodes does actually speak in the *Lives*, he is less the 'king of words' and more a slave to his own emotions, much as Philagrus appeared to him in Athens. It is damning that Marcus is moved to tears by the rhetoric of Herodes' opponents rather than Herodes himself. In contrast, Marcus is praised by Philostratus as behaving ever in a manner worthy of a philosopher (ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὧδε ἐφιλοσοφεῖτο τῷ Μάρκῳ, *VS* 561), in that he fails to lose his temper and he defuses the situation in a way that is acceptable to both Herodes and the *demos* (as one might expect of the good herdsman described by Apollonius above).

This situation between Marcus and Herodes inverts the paradigm of the philosopher and the king, which I mentioned above in connection with Apollonius' advice to Vespasian.[49] Normally, the philosopher is the one who wisely counsels or challenges the ruler, whose philosophic virtue or tyrannical nature is revealed in whether he follows the sage's advice or if he rejects it out of hand.[50] Apollonius himself comes across both kinds of rulers in Vespasian, Titus, and Nerva, on the one hand, and Domitian and Nero on the other. Both Plutarch, in his treatise *The Philosopher Should Above All Discuss with Persons in Leading Positions*, and Dio Chrysostom, in his *Oration* 1, exploit this paradigm and present the way to become

[49] On the relationship between philosophers and rulers with numerous examples, see Flinterman (1995), 162-92. On the ambivalence towards philosophy in the imperial period, see Trapp (2007), 1-22.
[50] See Flinterman (1995), 162.

a good and wise ruler as a process of listening to and learning from a wise advisor.[51] Importantly, the paradigm should be a Greek philosopher advising a Roman emperor (or other foreign king). As Flinterman notes, 'the role of Greek philosophers as counsellors of Roman statesmen, later emperors, was partly seen as a confirmation of the value of Greek culture'.[52] In Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius*, the sage's Greekness is as important as his wisdom. This is demonstrated by how he is announced when he comes before Vardanes in India: 'a wise man, a Greek, and a good counsellor has arrived' (σοφός τε καὶ Ἕλλην καὶ ξύμβουλος ἀγαθός, *VA* 1.28). Dio, in his *Oration* 1, explains that, for this kind of relationship to be successful, it is essential for the ruler to have a good nature and to be willing to listen:

> μόνος δὲ ὁ τῶν φρονίμων τε καὶ σοφῶν λόγος, οἵοι γεγόνασιν [οἱ] πολλοὶ τῶν πρότερον, ἀνενδεὴς καὶ τέλειος ἡγεμὼν καὶ βοηθὸς εὐπειθοῦς καὶ ἀγαθῆς φύσεως, πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν παραμυθούμενός τε καὶ ἄγων ἐμμελῶς.
>
> It is only the spoken word of the wise and prudent man, such as were most men of earlier times, that can prove a competent and perfect guide and helper of a man endowed with an obedient and virtuous nature, and can lead it toward all excellence by appropriate encouragement and direction. (*Oration* 1.8)

At the same time as being the best advisor to the good and willing ruler, the philosopher is also the truest opponent of the tyrant. At the beginning of book seven of the *Life of Apollonius*, Philostratus compares Apollonius' performance before Domitian to that of various other philosophers before other tyrants in the past because 'tyranny is the surest test of true philosophers' (τὰς τυραννίδας, ὡς ἔστιν ἀρίστη βάσανος ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφούντων, *VA* 7.1). He lists numerous examples and stresses that the aim of the philosopher's resistance to tyranny is to make men free (7.1-3).

[51] See Flinterman (1995), 173-5.
[52] Flinterman (1995), 173. See also Crawford (1978), 197; Rawson (1989), 235.

With this in mind, the meeting of Marcus and Herodes at the latter's trial becomes laced with a complex set of meanings. Herodes is never labelled philosopher by Philostratus (unlike several other sophists, including Favorinus and Dio Chrysostom) and, indeed, his behaviour is corrected or attempted to be corrected by a philosopher on several occasions, including Peregrinus Proteus (*VS* 563-4) and a certain Lucius (*VS* 556-7), to whom I will return below.[53] Clearly, in this trial too Marcus is playing the role of the philosopher trying to correct an errant 'ruler' in Herodes and to free the Athenians from his perceived tyranny. This is a Roman emperor, who is admittedly steeped in Greek intellectual culture, trying to instruct an elite Greek on how to govern. At the same time, Herodes shows a kind of recklessness before the authority of Marcus that is reminiscent of the fearlessness of a philosopher before a tyrant. Philostratus says that it is his (very unphilosophical) emotions that drive the recklessness, but nevertheless Herodes is willing to face death by speaking his mind. Philostratus notes, 'when Bassaeus, the praetorian prefect, said that he evidently wished to die, Herodes replied, 'My dear friend, an old man fears few things!'' (Βασσαίου δὲ τοῦ πεπιστευμένου τὸ ξίφος θάνατον αὐτῷ φήσαντος ὁ Ἡρώδης «ὦ λῷστε», ἔφη «γέρων ὀλίγα φοβεῖται», *VS* 561). This type of careless audacity and excess emotion is characteristic of yet another stock rhetorical figure – the hero – and is exemplified by individuals such as Heracles and Achilles. Indeed, Herodes' uncontrollable grief and habit of stepping outside the social norm because of it are two of his most persistent characteristics.[54] In his high strung nature and fearlessness, Herodes almost comes to resemble Alexander, a king whose personal excesses tradition held the philosopher Aristotle tried to tame.[55] Thus in the Sirmium episode both Herodes and Marcus play unexpected and surprising roles, with Marcus assuming less the guise of a judge and more

[53] See p. 128. On the categories of sophist and philosopher, see Stanton (1973); Moles (1978); Bowersock (2002).
[54] On Herodes' grief, see Gleason (2010), 156-62. See also the discussion below on the Odeon of Regilla, beginning p. 126.
[55] This is represented in the traditions surrounding Alexander the Great by the letters of Aristotle to the Macedonian king as well as his position of teacher in his youth. See Plutarch, *Alexander* 7.1-8.4.

that of a philosophical mentor and Herodes resembling a ruler who must be taught how best to rule.

Herodes' failure before Hadrian, on the other hand, is used by Philostratus to introduce one of the primary concerns of his sophists: the potential mortality has to affect one's reputation. The aborted speech in Pannonia (*VS* 565) is mentioned by Philostratus immediately after his praise of Herodes' rhetorical skills (*VS* 563-5) and comes just prior to his description of the sophist's death and burial (*VS* 565-6). Philostratus states that Herodes was 'deprived of some words' (λόγου τινός... ἐκπεσεῖν) before Hadrian and then compares this to Demosthenes failing before Philip (*VS* 565), though Demosthenes still expected acclaim whereas Herodes wished to die. Philostratus explains Herodes' suicidal impulse with the following statement: 'so overwhelming was his desire to become famous as an orator, that he assessed the penalty of failure at death' (τοσοῦτον γὰρ αὐτῷ περιῆν τοῦ ἐν λόγοις βούλεσθαι ὀνομαστῷ εἶναι, ὡς θανάτου τιμᾶσθαι τὸ σφαλῆναι, *VS* 565). It is striking that Philostratus turns immediately from this statement of wished-for death to Herodes' eventual actual death: ὡς θανάτου τιμᾶσθαι τὸ σφαλῆναι. Ἐτελεύτα.... It is impossible for the reader not to connect the two trains of thought and conclude that, indeed, death silences the orator and silence for an orator is as death. Moreover, Philostratus has just connected death with failure. What that failure seems to be is an end to any control one may possess over one's own reputation. In the following section, I will examine Philostratus' presentation of Herodes' death and his comparison of the sophist to Athens' legendary king, Theseus, and what this comparison suggests about the position of elite Greeks in the Roman empire and their ability to construct and control their future reputation.

Tyrant, King, Hero

Philostratus' description of Herodes' death and burial reveals some surprising elements, given his presentation of the ill-relations between the Athenian *demos* and the great sophist:

> Ἐτελεύτα μὲν οὖν ἀμφὶ τὰ ἓξ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ξυντακὴς γενόμενος. ἀποθανόντας δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ Μαραθῶνι καὶ ἐπισκήψαντος τοῖς ἀπελευθέροις ἐκεῖ θάπτειν, Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς τῶν ἐφήβων χερσὶν ἁρπάσαντες ἐς ἄστυ ἤνεγκαν προαπαντῶντες τῷ λέχει πᾶσα ἡλικία δακρύοις ἅμα καὶ ἀνευφημοῦντες, ὅσα παῖδες χρηστοῦ πατρὸς χηρεύσαντες.
>
> He died at the age of about seventy-six, of a wasting sickness. And though he expired at Marathon and had left directions to his freedmen to bury him there, the Athenians carried him off by the hands of the ephebes and bore him into the city, and every age went out to meet the bier with tears and pious ejaculations, as would sons who were bereft of a good father. (*VS* 565-6)

In its spontaneity, processional nature, and the involvement of the entire *demos*, this scene recalls the inscription (*IG* II^2 3606) found in the village of Bey (near Marathon) which records in epic hexameter Herodes' return from the Sirmium trial as a triumphant entrance greeted by all the people of Athens and accompanied by various gods.[56] It cannot be determined who the poet was, but it is likely Herodes was involved in the composition.[57] It is impossible to say whether Philostratus knew this inscription; but if he did, given Philostratus' focus on Herodes' failure at Sirmium and the description of his death and burial coming directly after his failure before Hadrian in Pannonia, the decision to replicate the scene of Herodes' own poetic inscription of triumph to instead describe the Athenians seizing his body, taking it from Marathon to Athens, and interring it in the Panathenaic stadium against his will, would indicate two things. Firstly, that Philostratus' Herodes was only truly accepted in Athens *after* his death and, secondly, that he failed in his attempt to have the kind of fame he desired, since the Athenians take control of his commemoration against his express wishes and Philostratus himself perverts Herodes' poem of heroic triumph to stress his mortality. Furthermore, in keeping with the notion of a tyrannical

[56] Ameling (1983a), 205-211, number 190; Tobin (1997), 272-5; Skenteri (2005), 86-110.
[57] See Skenteri (2005), 108-10.

Herodes, the procession described in the Bey inscription calls to mind the similar triumphal processions of Hellenistic kings, who were themselves figures of benefaction and tyranny.[58] Of course, Herodes' funeral procession is not laden with the spoils that the triumphant processions of Hellenistic kings were; nevertheless, the similarities hold. In his *Histories*, Polybius describes the arrival of Attalus I of Pergamum in Athens and the spontaneous welcome of the Athenians on that occasion is reminiscent of both the Bey inscription and, indeed, Herodes' funeral procession (*Histories* 16.25).[59] Thus it may be that Herodes conceived of and actively promoted himself as kingly after the fashion of the Hellenistic rulers, a possibility that only adds to the subversive effect of Philostratus' funeral scene.[60]

The removal of Herodes' body from Marathon and its transference to Athens calls to mind another monarch from the past, this time Athens' mythic past, in Theseus. Theseus has two homecomings: the first one mythic following his triumph over the minotaur, which was an occasion of mixed joy and sorrow, since the hero's forgetfulness inadvertently led to the death of his father Aegeus (Plutarch, *Theseus* 22.1-6); the second one literal, when on the advice of the Delphic oracle, Cimon found and brought what he claimed to be Theseus' bones back from the island of Scyros (Plutarch, *Theseus* 36; *Cimon* 8.5-6; Thucydides 1.98.2).[61] Plutarch records the event in the following way:

> εὑρέθη δὲ θήκη τε μεγάλου σώματος αἰχμή τε παρακειμένη χαλκῆ καὶ ξίφος. κομισθέντων δὲ τούτων ὑπὸ Κίμωνος ἐπὶ τῆς τριήρους, ἡσθέντες οἱ

[58] See Polybius, *Histories* 30.25-6; Athenaeus 5.196a – 203e. See Skenteri (2005), 95-103, on this text and the procession.

[59] Polybius, *Histories* 16.25.5-6: τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον ἅμα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄρχουσιν ἀνέβαινεν εἰς ἄστυ μετὰ μεγάλης προστασίας· οὐ γὰρ μόνον οἱ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχοντες μετὰ τῶν ἱππέων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντες οἱ πολῖται μετὰ τῶν τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν ἀπήντων αὐτοῖς. ὡς δὲ συνέμιξαν, τοιαύτη παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐγένετο κατὰ τὴν ἀπάντησιν φιλανθρωπία πρός τε Ῥωμαίους καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸν Ἄτταλον ὥσθ' ὑπερβολὴν μὴ καταλιπεῖν.

[60] Note that Veyne (1990), 125, claims that this kind of procession was usual for benefactors and not just the privilege of kings. He cites no primary evidence for this, however. Cf. Tobin (1997), 275 n. 95.

[61] Thucydides does not mention Theseus' bones, but he does mention Cimon's expedition to Scyros. See Podalecki (1971) on Cimon's motivations for retrieving the bones. See also Walker (1995), 55-64, on Cimon and Theseus.

> Ἀθηναῖοι πομπαῖς τε λαμπραῖς ἐδέξαντο καὶ θυσίαις ὥσπερ αὐτὸν ἐπανερχόμενον εἰς τὸ ἄστυ. καὶ κεῖται μὲν ἐν μέσῃ τῇ πόλει παρὰ τὸ νῦν γυμνάσιον.
>
> There a coffin was found of a man of extraordinary size, a bronze spear lying by its side, and a sword. When these relics were brought home on his trireme by Cimon, the Athenians were delighted, and received them with splendid processions and sacrifices, as though Theseus himself were returning to the city. And now he lies buried in the heart of the city, near the present gymnasium. (*Theseus* 36.2)

One parallel between Theseus' interment in Athens and Herodes' that is not clear from the passages is that Theseus had gone in exile to Scyros and, although it is denied by Philostratus, Herodes was rumoured to have been exiled for a time to Oricum in Epirus after his trial at Sirmium (*VS* 562), from where he is returning in the Bey inscription. Moreover, there is the family connection between Cimon, Miltiades, and Herodes, as well as Theseus' own association with Marathon, which was shared by both Cimon, through his father Miltiades, and of course Herodes himself. Significantly, Cimon and Miltiades, of whom Philostratus says Herodes was proud, were both tyrannical figures (*VS* 546-7). Additionally, Cimon himself died far from Athens and his remains were also repatriated at a later date (Plutarch, *Cimon* 19.1-4).[62] Theseus, on the other hand, was connected to Marathon both through his killing of the Marathonian bull (Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 1.27.10) and the legend that an apparition of him appeared to the Athenians before the battle of Marathon and charged against the enemy in front of them (Ἀθηναίους ἄλλα τε παρέστησεν ὡς ἥρωα τιμᾶν Θησέα, καὶ τῶν ἐν Μαραθῶνι πρὸς Μήδους μαχομένων ἔδοξαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι φάσμα Θησέως ἐν ὅπλοις καθορᾶν πρὸ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους φερόμενον, Plutarch, *Theseus* 35.8).

[62] See also Shapiro (1992), especially 48-9.

Herodes' connection to Marathon was so strong that he wished to be buried there. Yet, like Theseus before him, he was instead interred within the city walls of Athens, above one of his benefactions to the city:

> καὶ ἔθαψαν ἐν τῷ Παναθηναικῷ ἐπιγράψαντες αὐτῷ βραχὺ καὶ πολὺ ἐπίγραμμα τόδε·
>
> Ἀττικοῦ Ἡρώδης Μαραθώνιος, οὗ τάδε πάντα,
> κεῖται τῷδε τάφῳ, πάντοθεν εὐδόκιμος
>
> τοσαύτα περὶ Ἡρώδου τοῦ Ἀθηναίου, τὰ μὲν εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ ἠγνοημένα ἑτέροις.
>
> They buried him in the Panathenaic [stadium], and inscribed over him this brief epigram: 'Here lies in this grave, Herodes, son of Atticus, of Marathon, to whom all this belongs, but his good fame is everywhere'. That is all I have to say concerning Herodes the Athenian; part of it has been told by others, but part was unknown until now. (*VS* 566)

Above is one translation of Herodes' epitaph – the one which I prefer and which is championed by Joseph Rife. However, there are two ways to read this inscription.[63] If the comma after πάντα is removed, then the epitaph reads: 'In this tomb lies all that remains of Herodes, son of Atticus, of Marathon, but his good fame is everywhere'. This is a fairly straightforward epigram that, in the οὗ τάδε πάντα, connects nicely to the idea of Theseus' (and Cimon's) bones returned to Athens. Joseph Rife, however, sets forth a good case for keeping the comma, including that the main clause lacks a verb, if κεῖται τῷδε τάφῳ becomes part of the relative clause. He also notes that, although κεῖται τῷδε τάφῳ is unique in Greek poetry, its common substitute ἐνθάδε κεῖται is always in the main clause.[64] If the comma is retained and the οὗ τάδε πάντα is taken to mean 'to whom all this belongs', the epitaph becomes more interesting. If this is what Philostratus intended, the sentiment behind it mocks the very notion that one's memory can be preserved the way one desires, since it strongly suggests that the epitaph was intended for the environs of Herodes' Marathonian estate and Philostratus wants us to think that it must have been

[63] See Rife (2008), 112-3, on the translation of the epigram.
[64] Rife (2008), 112.

transferred to Athens along with the body. Consequently, at the same time, the way Philostratus reports it also plays with Herodes' ambitions whilst still living to dominate Athens. The key is in the words Μαραθώνιος and the phrase οὗ τάδε πάντα.

The inscription identifies Herodes as belonging to Marathon, which is immediately countered by Philostratus' description of him as Athenian. This re-identification is particularly jarring for two reasons: firstly, Herodes' express wish to be buried at Marathon, a task he had entrusted to his freedmen; and, secondly, the prior scene of his corpse being welcomed into the city versus Herodes' poem of triumphant return after Sirmium, which was inscribed at Marathon and which may or may not have been invented, but was surely exaggerated given the tensions in the city before the trial. The juxtaposition of the *demos* and Herodes' freedmen only strengthens this connection. The phrase οὗ τάδε πάντα ('to whom all this belongs') claims that the dead Herodes owns his Athenian surrounds, a notion that ridicules his ambitions while still living and that again highlights his lack of acceptance within the city itself. Further, the phrase strengthens the case for this particular epithet being intended for a Marathonian burial, since much of the area around Marathon indeed did belong to him. As noted by Rife, the phrase οὗ τάδε πάντα is also an allusion to a fragment of Antimachus concerning Nemesis, whose cult at Rhamnous was frequented by Herodes and his foster son Polydeukion: ἔστι δέ τις Νέμεσις μεγάλη θεὸς, ἣ τάδε πάντα | πρὸς μακάρων ἔλαχεν ('There is a great goddess Nemesis, who has obtained all these things from the blessed ones', Strabo 13.1.13).[65] This reference serves to promote Herodes' ties to Marathon and to alienate him further from Athens, since as related by Pausanias, there was a tradition that the cult statue of Nemesis at Rhamnous was carved from the Parian marble

[65] Rife (2008), 113. See Matthews (1996), 313-21, especially 319. Matthews thinks τάδε πάντα in the Antimachus epigram means 'everything here on earth', but also cites Wyss (1936), who thought it referred to a specific region.

brought by the Persians to Greece in preparation for a victory monument, but that Nemesis fell on them at Marathon for their hubris (Pausanias 1.33.2-3). With this reading, the words πάντοθεν εὐδόκιμος ('his good fame is everywhere') must be seen as ironic, particularly since Philostratus' life of Herodes has consistently demonstrated that Herodes' reputation was mixed, being part fame and part infamy: here the εὐ- prefix of εὐδόκιμος is questionable. Yet, in the end, it is the Athenians who dominate Herodes rather than the other way round. In fact, the whole scenario sees Philostratus granting the *demos* ultimate revenge for Herodes' apparent tyranny: his trusted freedmen, who were detested by the *demos*, prove ineffectual and his final wishes for his burial and commemoration are usurped.

There are further circumstances that make Philostratus' description of Herodes' burial problematic. Firstly, it is strange that in his earlier description of the Panathenaic stadium, Philostratus fails to describe or even mention Herodes' tomb. It is possible he does this purposefully, since funeral monuments were essential to self-commemoration and, as I have shown, Philostratus is trying to downplay Herodes' success in this. Alternatively, if the sarcophagus discovered in 1904 above the eastern side of the stadium did originally belong to Herodes, perhaps the tomb had already been reused, although this is unlikely.[66] Herodes died in the late 170s and the burial discovered within the sarcophagus dates from after 250 CE.[67] Philostratus was writing the *Lives* in the late 230s or early 240s, but it is possible the tomb had three inhabitants. The clearest reason for associating this burial with Herodes is Philostratus' description and the inscribed altar, which is dedicated to 'the hero of Marathon' by parties unknown (...| ΕΡΩΙ | ΤΩΙ | ΜΑΡΑΘΩΝΙΩΙ |...) and which was

[66] See Galli (2002), 18-9, for an illustration of the stadium's layout.

[67] See Rife (2008), 107. Cf. Tobin (1993), 83-4, who believes that the sarcophagus was unlikely to have originally belonged to Herodes and then been reused, because most examples of its type date to the third century CE. Rife argues, on stylistic grounds, that the sarcophagus dates to the last quarter of the second century. The dating is based on a coin of Decius (249-51) that was found in the mouth of the skeleton. See also Galli (2002), 20-1.

discovered on the eastern slope.[68] Both the dedicator and the dedicatee have been obliterated in what must be seen as a form of *damnatio memoriae*, which in itself is fitting to Herodes' apparent tyrannical aspirations.[69] Additionally, this is a circumstance that fits well with the notion that there was animosity towards Herodes on behalf of the Athenians. This animosity is apparent in Philostratus' *Lives* whilst Herodes is alive, but (according to Philostratus at least) it appears to evaporate upon his death. The vandalized altar belies Philostratus' version of events or, at least, it shows that the animosity returned at some point following the elaborate funeral. It is important to note that the altar was most probably a private dedication since the erasure of ὁ δῆμος in the position of dedicator would be unparalleled.[70] Nevertheless, as I argued above, the episode of the Athenians' acceptance of Herodes' corpse within Philostratus' *Lives* actually works against his attempts to control his future reputation as presented in the text. It is also possible Philostratus thought a description of the location of the tomb and its form unnecessary because it was so well known. Yet even were this third option the case, it seems odd to neglect these details in a work that ostensibly celebrates the fame of its subjects. Finally, it is possible that Herodes was not buried at the Panathenaic stadium at all and that this tradition was invented by Philostratus. Philostratus does have a tendency to fictionalize and his production of anecdotal history in the *Lives of the Sophists* should not be accepted outright as completely reliable;[71] so, this final option is not beyond the realms of possibility, however unlikely. Whatever the case, the passage describing the burial sees Herodes alienated from his beloved Marathon and installed in Athens, which, if it is reminiscent of Theseus' similar return, inverts the notion of exile, in that Herodes, who is labelled Μαραθώνιος in his

[68] *IG* II² 6791. See Ameling (1983b), 212-3 no. 193; Tobin (1997), 181-3.
[69] I will discuss the concept of *damnatio memoriae* in more detail in chapter four, beginning p. 201.
[70] See Rife (2008), 105-6.
[71] Bowie (1994), 181: 'There are indeed two works where 'non-fiction' is preponderant, the *Gymnasticus* and the *Lives of the Sophists*, both works which give a historical account of two important features of contemporary Greek culture. But even in these, and especially in the latter, that account is often thick with anecdotes in which it is hard to know what is drawn from reliable tradition and what from the moulding of Philostratus' imagination'.

epitaph, is claimed as Ἀθηναίος by Philostratus, who in this case has the last word. So, Herodes is, in a way, exiled to Athens from Marathon, whereas Theseus' remains are repatriated from their place of exile on Scyros. In fact, all that remains of Herodes is the epigram reported by Philostratus, which given its focus on Marathon may well have been invented by the author as a way of stressing Herodes' eternal displacement. If the epitaph is genuine, then it may not have even been intended for an Athenian location.

The second curious element in Herodes' burial is the location itself. Within Philostratus' text, the Panathenaic stadium is the source of initial tensions between Herodes and the *demos* of Athens (*VS* 548-9) and, consequently, it would seem an odd place for the *demos* to choose for his eternal commemoration. According to Philostratus, the construction of the stadium emerged from a dispute between Herodes and the citizens of Athens over the will of his father Atticus. Atticus had bequeathed the sum of a *mina* annually to all Athenian citizens. Herodes baulked at this arrangement and offered the Athenians five *minae* as a one-off payment instead. When they came to collect the money, however, Herodes demanded payment for all the debts incurred to his family by the citizens and their families, so that very few received any money at all and many found themselves in debt anew (*VS* 549). Philostratus claims that this created a ground swell of resentment amongst the Athenians. As he describes it: οὐκ ἐπαύσαντο μισοῦντες, οὐδὲ ὁπότε τὰ μέγιστα εὐεργετεῖν ᾤετο ('they never ceased to hate him, not even when he thought he was bestowing the greatest benefits upon them', *VS* 549). One of the great benefactions that Herodes grants, which is not received in the same light as it is apparently bestowed, is the Panathenaic stadium. Philostratus explains that the choice to build the Panathenaic stadium instead of honouring Atticus' will had the opposite effect to that desired, since the Athenians τὸ οὖν στάδιον ἔφασαν εὖ ἐπωνομάσθαι Παναθηναϊκόν, κατεσκευάσθαι γὰρ αὐτὸ

ἐξ ὧν ἀπεστεροῦντο Ἀθηναῖοι πάντες ('declared the Panathenaic stadium, therefore, well named, since [Herodes] had built it with money of which all the Athenians were being deprived', *VS* 549). The important thing to note is that Herodes did not deprive the Athenians because he wished to horde his money, but rather he wished to use it in a way that would bring him lasting fame. In other words, Herodes' benefactions were not aimed at appeasing or pleasing his contemporary Athenians, but at impressing future viewers of his monuments. Moreover, his refusal to honour Atticus' will, had the effect of maintaining his fiscal control over the city, since the annual grant would certainly have strengthened the average citizen's position whilst simultaneously weakening Herodes'.[72]

Philostratus describes the decision to build the stadium as follows:

> Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐλειτούργησεν Ἀθηναίοις τήν τε ἐπώνυμον καὶ τὴν τῶν Πανελληνίων, στρεφανωθεὶς δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν Παναθηναίων «καὶ ὑμᾶς,» εἶπεν «ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ἥξοντας καὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν τοὺς ἀγωνιουμένους ὑποδέξομαι σταδίῳ λίθου λευκοῦ.» καὶ εἰπὼν ταῦτα τὸ στάδιον τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἴλισσὸν ἔσω τετάρων ἐτῶν ἀπετέλεσεν ἔργον ξυνθεὶς ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ θαύματα, οὐδὲν γὰρ θέατρον αὐτῷ ἁμιλλᾶται.
>
> Furthermore he held the office of archon eponymous at Athens and the curatorship of the Panhellenic festival; and when he was offered the crowning honour of the charge of the Panathenaic festival he made this announcement: "I shall welcome you, O Athenians, and those Hellenes that shall attend, and the athletes who are to compete, in a stadium of white marble." And, having said this, he completed within four years the stadium on the other side of the Ilissus, and thus constructed a monument that is beyond all other marvels, for there is no theatre that can rival it. (*VS* 550)

In creating the stadium, Herodes is claiming the Panathenaea as his own, since it was only relatively recently that Hadrian had promoted this particular festival to sacred iselastic status.[73] Once again, this connects Herodes to Theseus, since Plutarch informs us that the Athenian hero founded this festival (Plutarch, *Theseus* 24.3). In her study of elites and

[72] Cf. Tobin (1997), 27-9, 163-5.
[73] Boatwright (2000), 100; see also Muñiz Grijalvo (2005), 264.

religious change in Roman Athens, Elena Muñiz Grijalvo has argued that one way in which the provincial elites increased their social prestige and controlled the political landscape by public spending was the increasing oligarchization of religious power. This process suited both the Roman officials and the local elites, and is another example of Rome supporting the leading citizens of the Greek east in distinguishing themselves in their local political sphere.[74] She mentions Herodes Atticus as a specific and conspicuous example of a provincial elite who continued to show economic initiative in religious affairs when this role had mostly been adopted by the imperial family or other foreign benefactors.[75] The Panathenaic festival was closely connected to the imperial cult, a situation which produced something of a paradox, given the festivals' traditional focus on Athenian military might and democracy.[76] In building the stadium, Herodes forever attaches his name to this festival as well.

In Philostratus' account, the construction of the stadium is immediately followed by the description of another innovation to the Athenian landscape, but this time to the sacred landscape. Philostratus explains that Herodes has the Athenian ephebes' cloaks changed from black to white (*VS* 550). If independent evidence, in an inscription (*IG* II^2 2090) from Eleusis that dates the innovation to 165/6, did not exist, one would assume from Philostratus' account that the change was instigated for the Panathenaea of 143/4. This is indicative of Philostratus' playfulness and tendency to wilfully mislead. The change from black to white is clearly a dramatic divergence from tradition and, since the black cloaks symbolized mourning – either for the mythical herald Copreus or Aegeus – it is an indication of a new outlook and era. Herodes' poem from Bey indicates that the black

[74] Muñiz Grijalvo (2005).
[75] Muñiz Grijalvo (2005), 270.
[76] See Shear (2001), 634-50; Muñiz Grijalvo (2005), 264.

cloaks were worn for Aegeus (*IG* II^2 3606, ll. 19-23);[77] Philostratus, however, states that they were worn for Copreus, which appears to be the stronger of the two traditions (cf. Homer, *Iliad* 15.639; Plutarch, *Aratus* 53; Pausanias 2.3.6; Philostratus, *Heroicus* 740).[78] Herodes' innovation draws on the myth of Theseus and his failure to change the colour of his sails from black to white on his return to Athens from Crete. This act of forgetfulness led to the suicide of his father Aegeus, who assumed his son was dead (Plutarch, *Theseus* 17.4; 22). Naturally, the white also reflects the marble used to clothe the stadium, which Philostratus has Herodes trumpet as λίθου λευκοῦ (*VS* 550) and may be the reason why he chose to place the anecdote at this confusing point in his story. Moreover, the white cloaks were to replace the black cloaks at all public festivals where the ephebes appeared. Thus Herodes' innovation became the future norm and would forever remind the Athenians of his intervention on their sacred landscape. It also connects back to Philostratus' description of Herodes' death, since his body was carried off by the ephebes, whose white garb would seem to signal celebration rather than mourning.

It is interesting that Philostratus does not mention Aegeus in connection to the change of cloaks, which may be an indication that the comparisons of Herodes to Theseus that come through in the *Lives of the Sophists* are due to a program of association instigated by Herodes himself, rather than a game of literary allusion by Philostratus. Either way, the association with Theseus is significant given the political circumstances of the empire. Theseus was considered responsible for the *synoecism* of the Athenians and, although he began as a

[77] παῖδας Ἀθηναίων χαλκῷ γανάοντας ἐφήβους, | τοὺς, αὐτός λήθην πατρὸς ἀκειόμενος | Αἰγείδεω, λώβης δ<ν>οφοείμονος ἔσχεθε κούρο[υς] | ἀργυφέαις χλαίναις οἴκοθεν ἀμφιέσας, | δωρηθεὶς γ' ἐνετῇσι κατωμαδὸν ἠλέκτροιο. 'Sons of the Athenians, ephebes, gleaming in bronze, youths whom he had liberated from the black-clad disgrace, by making amends himself for Aegeus' son's forgetfulness of his father, and had clothed in shining garb at his own expense, giving them amber clasps for their shoulders'. Translated by Skenteri (2005), 87, with amendments; see her discussion of this section and its textual problem (91-3). She suggests that the text implies Herodes took over the mourning duties of the ephebes, but what that entailed is unclear.
[78] See Skenteri (2005), 99-100, on the two interpretations.

purely monarchic figure, he came to possess a democratic reputation.[79] According to Plutarch, Theseus gathered all the people of Attica into the city. The common folk were more than happy to join him, but he enticed the nobles through the promise to lay down his absolute rule and institute a kind of democracy, in which he would have only the power to command in war and be the guardian of laws (*Theseus* 24.1-2). It was at this point that he instituted the Panathenaic festival. Nevertheless, Plutarch later reports that his monarchic democracy failed, since:

> Ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ Μενεσθεὺς ὁ Πετεὼ τοῦ Ὀρνέως τοῦ Ἐρεχθέως, πρῶτος ὥς φασιν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιθέμενος τῷ δημαγωγεῖν καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὄχλῳ διαλέγεσθαι, τούς τε δυνατοὺς συνίστη καὶ παρώξυνε, πάλαι βαρυνομένους τὸν Θησέα καὶ νομίζοντας ἀρχὴν καὶ βασιλείαν ἀφῃρημένον ἑκάστου τῶν κατὰ δῆμον εὐπατριδῶν εἰς ἓν ἄστυ συνείρξαντα πάντας ὑπηκόοις χρῆσθαι καὶ δούλοις, τούς τε πολλοὺς διετάραττε καὶ διέβαλλεν, ὡς ὄναρ ἐλευθερίας ὁρῶντας, ἔργῳ δ' ἀπεστερημένους πατρίδων καὶ ἱερῶν, ὅπως ἀντὶ πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ νησίων βασιλέων πρὸς ἕνα δεσπότην ἔπηλυν καὶ ξένον ἀποβλέπωσι.
>
> At this time Menestheus, the son of Peteus, grandson of Orneus, and great-grandson of Erechtheus, the first of men, as they say, to affect popularity and ingratiate himself with the multitude, stirred up and embittered the chief men in Athens. These had long been hostile to Theseus, and thought that he had robbed each one of the country nobles of his royal office, and then shut them all up in a single city, where he treated them as subjects and slaves. The common people he also threw into commotion by his reproaches. They thought they had a vision of liberty, he said, but in reality they had been robbed of their native homes and religions in order that, in the place of many good kings of their own blood, they might look obediently to one master who was an immigrant and an alien. (*Theseus* 32.1)

Both Herodes, through his ties to Marathon which were stronger than those he held to Athens itself, and Theseus, who also came from the Attic countryside in the region around Aphidna, could be considered as outsiders in Athens.[80] Moreover, the episode described above closely matches the events surrounding the charge of tyranny brought against

[79] See Gouščhin (1999). See Walker (1995) for a discussion on the transformation of Theseus from self-centred violent hero to democratic leader and Mills (1997) for a discussion of Theseus as consistently imagined as representing Athenian core values. See Calame (1990) for the relationship of the Theseus myth to Attic cult.

[80] On Theseus' origins, see Walker (1995), 4.

Herodes by the Athenians.[81] It is after the people turn against Theseus that he exiles himself and, similarly, it is after the trial at Sirmium that 'some' (as Philostratus says) record the exile of Herodes (Plutarch, *Theseus* 35.3; Philostratus, *VS* 562). Consequently, there is a strong strain of allusion throughout Philostratus' life of Herodes to the figure of Theseus and, perhaps, the ambivalence towards the protagonist that is also present throughout the life may well be due to either Herodes' own posturing as a figure aiming to restore a Thesean-style monarchy or Philostratus' attempts to present him in this way. On the one hand, a Thesean Herodes could be the champion Athens needs to throw off the shackles of Rome; on the other, such a figure would entail the substitution of one kind of monarchy for another. Thus in the world of rhetoric Herodes (Ἡρώδης) can be presented as the hero (ἥρως) of Athens, who tries to wrest absolute control of the city from Rome, yet at the same time, he must always fail, given Athens' love of democracy and freedom, and the incongruity (even in classical times) of the civic veneration of its legendary king.[82] In tragedy, Theseus appears as both tyrant and democratic champion.[83] Or, to look at it from another point of view, like Theseus, Herodes is a tragic hero, in that the *demos* fail to see that he has their best interests at heart and that all he does is to advance the *polis*. Instead they are misled by Herodes' political opponents. If this is Philostratus' aim, the life of Herodes is a commentary on the limitations to individual greatness placed on the provincial elite in the Roman empire and it is possible Philostratus sees himself and his own cultural and political liminality in the figure of Herodes. In the *Lives*, Herodes is a heroic figure, but because of his very heroism – his larger than life, domineering, and almost antisocial behaviour – he fails to negotiate imperial society entirely successfully and,

[81] See my discussion beginning on p. 90.
[82] See Walker (1995), 3: 'Nowhere is this paradox more glaring than in the case of Athens, the most democratic and egalitarian of all the Greek republics. The masterpieces of drama and sculpture commissioned by the democracy itself glorify the highly antidemocratic deeds and attitudes of the heroic kings'.
[83] See Walker (1995), 113-69, for both these characterizations. Euripides' *Suppliant Women* is one play in which Theseus transform from tyrant to democrat.

at the same time, he also exists in tension with the Athenian *demos* itself, because a true democracy has no place for supermen.[84] Within the Roman empire, there is no longer any room for such a figure, rather the way to succeed in this environment must be to find a comfortable niche in both worlds. At the same time, the incongruity of the heroic Herodes could be a commentary on the anachronistic and misplaced nature of the second sophistic itself – the harking back to the glory days of a city that is now part of another's empire.

So, Philostratus compares Herodes to Theseus to stress the limitations of an individual's power in the Roman empire and the danger of too great an ambition. At the same time, he uses Herodes' rhetorical failures to undermine his perceived dominance of Athens and to stress the pointlessness of his obsession with fame, since one cannot control one's future reputation. The greatest of Greek sophists fails before Roman emperors and Philostratus pays very little attention to Herodes' successful speeches. He is more interested in his building works and political career. Others would not agree with this assessment, such as Rife, who speaks of Philostratus' 'bias toward intellectual achievement'.[85] However, this is an impression created by Philostratus' neglect of Herodes' private building and the interest in intellectual pursuits throughout the *Lives*. In the *Lives of the Sophists*, Philostratus uses θαῦμα and θαυμάζω to describe the performances of his sophists and their effect on the audience.[86] In these cases, the word almost always refers to speech. However, in the life of Herodes, there is only one occasion where the sophist's speech causes wonder (an instance that I will discuss in the next section and that is a response to Herodes' desire to build); on the two other occasions that the word is used in reference to Herodes, it refers respectively to a monumental achievement and to his possessions: the Panathenaic stadium, and the

[84] On the notion of the incongruity of supermen in a democratic polis, see Walker (1995), 147.
[85] Rife (2008), 122.
[86] See *VS* 510, 511, 513, 515, 517, 518-21 etc. Cf. Whitmarsh (1999), 151.

two daughters of Alcimedon, who was one of Herodes' freedmen (*VS* 560). Thus on an allusive linguistic level, Herodes is actually defined by Philostratus more as a creator and gatherer of material rather than verbal marvels. Consequently, Philostratus' focus on Herodes' failure before Hadrian and the fact that this anecdote comes just prior to the description of his death becomes significant, given that, in his later life, Hadrian is the emperor whom the real Herodes most resembles in his monumentalizing tendency. Yet, when he faced the emperor in the forum in which the sophist is supposed to be without peer, the Philostratean Herodes broke down (*VS* 565), a circumstance that underscores his inevitable inferiority to the emperor, no matter how great he may appear in the Athenian sophistic domain nor how closely he resembles a figure like Theseus. In the following section, I will examine two instances of Herodes' desire to build himself into the landscape of Athens and Greece, and how once again Philostratus implies this monumentalizing compulsion is tyrannical.

Tyranny of Space

I turn now to Philostratus' treatment of Herodes' use of space as a means of creating fame, since it is in this that Philostratus' characterization of Herodes' as tyrannical comes to the fore. According to Philostratus, Herodes' identification as the supreme sophist of his day is not one which satisfies the man: throughout his life, Herodes fears that his oratorical and literary skills will ultimately fail him in his mission to be remembered. This is evident in his obsession with construction and, particularly, the commemorative nature of many of his monuments, such as the Theatre of Regilla (now more regularly called the Odeon of Herodes Atticus), which was built as a memorial to his wife. Moreover, his regular excessive displays of mourning, such as the one which led him publicly to attack Marcus Aurelius, only add to the picture of a man who fears oblivion through death and again

bring him into conflict with philosophers. I will now consider two instances of his monumentalizing impulse – the Isthmus of Corinth, and the Odeon of Regilla – and how they fit into Philostratus' portrait of a man who is rendered tyrannical through his desire for future fame.

a) The Isthmus of Corinth

The following anecdote about the Isthmus of Corinth expresses Herodes' personal concern for his future reputation:

> ἤλαυνε μὲν τὴν ἐπὶ Κορίνθου ὁ Ἡρώδης ξυγκαθημένου τοῦ Κτησιδήμου, γενόμενος δὲ κατὰ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν «Πόσειδον,» εἶπεν «βούλομαι μέν, ξυνχωρήσει δὲ οὐδείς.» θαυμάσας οὖν ὁ Κτησίδημος τὸ εἰρημένον ἤρετο αὐτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ὁ Ἡρώδης «ἐγὼ» ἔφη «πολὺν χρόνον ἀγωνίζομαι σημεῖον ὑπολείπεσθαι τοῖς μετ' ἐμὲ ἀνθρώποις διανοίας δηλούσης ἄνδρα καὶ οὔπω δοκῶ μοι τῆς δόξης ταύτης τυγχάνειν.» ὁ μὲν Κτησίδημος ἐπαίνους διῄει τῶν τε λόγων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἔργων ὡς οὐκ ἐχόντων ὑπερβολὴν ἑτέρῳ, ὁ δὲ Ἡρώδης «φθαρτὰ» ἔφη «λέγεις ταῦτα, καὶ γάρ ἐστι χρόνῳ ἁλωτά, καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἡμῶν τοιχωρυχοῦσιν ἕτεροι ὁ μὲν τὸ μεμφόμενος, ὁ δὲ τό, ἡ δὲ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ τομὴ ἔργον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀπιστούμενον τῇ φύσει, δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τὸ ῥῆξαι τὸν Ἰσθμὸν Ποσειδῶνος δεῖσθαι ἢ ἀνδρός.»
>
> Herodes was driving to Corinth with Ctesidemus sitting by his side and, when he arrived at the Isthmus, Herodes cried: 'Poseidon, I aspire to do it, but no one will let me!' Ctesidemus was amazed at what he had said and asked him why he had made the remark. Whereupon Herodes replied: 'For a long time I have been striving to bequeath to men that come after me some sign of an intention that reveals me as a man, and I consider that I have not yet attained to this reputation.' Then Ctesidemus recited praises of his speeches and his deeds which no other man could surpass. But Herodes replied: 'All this that you speak of must decay and yield to time, and others will plunder my speeches and criticize now this, now that. But the cutting of the Isthmus is a deathless achievement and unbelievable by nature, for in my opinion to cleave through the Isthmus calls for Poseidon rather than a mere man.' (Philostratus, *VS* 552)

This passage reveals three important aspects of Herodes: his ambition to make some mark on the world that is unique and illustrative of his character; his fear of his mortality and the loss of control over his reputation which it ensures; his desire for immortal fame. The language Philostratus assigns to Herodes identifies the metaphorical framework within which we are to locate the man: he is striving (ἀγωνίζομαι) to leave behind him a sign (σημεῖον) of a purpose/intention (διανοίας) that reveals him as a man (ἀνήρ); yet, in this case, perhaps ἀνήρ is best taken as meaning the (great) man that he is. In Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, ὁ ἀνήρ is used to refer to the protagonist and seems to be a title of honour, meaning something akin to 'the great man'.[87] Clearly, the definite article is important in creating this honorific sense, but the context of the above passage implies something similar for the noun alone. So, in this instance, ἀνήρ might be an ennobling expression that Philostratus is causing Herodes to apply to himself. Note also that at the end of the passage ἀνήρ is contrasted in a diminishing way to the god, Poseidon, giving the impression that no matter how great a man one becomes, the kind of reputation reserved for the immortal gods is unassailable. The word ἀγωνίζομαι signals a contest, and, in the context of the passage, suggests that he is striving with himself, with future generations, and with the past, in that the sign he wants to leave is to be indelible and remarkable. The mark (σημεῖον) must be concrete in nature and not open to misinterpretation, unlike his words, which have brought him contemporary fame, but which are open to manipulation by future audiences once they have been spoken or recorded in writing, with the implied potential consequence of manipulating his memory. At the same time, it suggests a rivalry with the past, since carving the Isthmus places him in competition with all those men who have tried and failed at this task before him.

[87] See, for example, *Apollonius of Tyana* 1.2.1 (ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τό, ὁ δὲ τὸ ἐπαινεῖ τοῦ ἀνδρός, 'they commend only this or that of the great man's deeds'); 1.5 (καὶ ὁπόσα ὅδε ὁ ἀνὴρ, 'and all the other qualities of the great man'); 1.6 (ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ Ἀπολλωνίου ἑαυτὸν καλεῖ, 'the great man calls himself son of Apollonius').

From Homer onwards, the word σημεῖον has invoked a funeral monument or tomb marker,[88] a notion which once more ties Herodes' monumentalizing impulse to a fear of the oblivion which death can bring, as well as his desire to control the representation of his future reputation. In cutting the Isthmus, Herodes expresses the need to mark and change the land irrevocably – this is not to be a monument which can be removed. The phrase ἔργον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀπιστούμενον τῇ φύσει stresses the 'man-made' nature of the hypothetical canal, but also the enormity of the task. Thus it is fitting that Ctesidemus mentions praise of Herodes' words and deeds (τῶν τε λόγων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἔργων), two concepts that, when paired, recall both Homer and Thucydides, and which are attributes fitting to the 'hero' (ἥρως) that Herodes' name (Ἡρώδης) conjures and on which Philostratus plays. This notion of altering nature is consistent with the earlier, pre-Troy, questing generation of mythological heroes, who performed a civilizing function on the natural world. Theseus was part of this earlier generation and his civilizing acts can be detected in his destruction of the Minotaur and the Marathonian bull, as well as the *synoecism* of Athens. Theseus himself is tied to the Isthmus, in that he was said to have constructed a pillar with paired inscriptions to mark the boundary between Ionia and the Peloponnese (Plutarch, *Theseus* 25.3-4; Strabo 3.5.5; 9.1.6-7). I mentioned these inscriptions in the previous chapter in my discussion of the arch Herodes constructed on his estate at Marathon that interacted intertextually with both Theseus' pillar and Hadrian's arch in Athens.[89] Consequently, Herodes is once more being associated with the son of Aegeus. However, like heroes, tyrants also are renowned in literary sources as attempting to control and shape the natural world.

[88] See Steiner (2001), 254-9. I will discuss the connection between σῆμα and the tomb in greater detail in chapter three, beginning p. 135. For σημεῖον being equivalent to σῆμα see *LSJ* s.v. σημεῖον.
[89] See Philostratus, *VS* 551, for other offerings made by Herodes at the Isthmus. See the section of chapter one, beginning on p. 74, for Herodes' arch.

By implication, especially if Philostratus is the author of the *Nero* dialogue contained in the corpus of Lucian (as is probable), any attempt to cut the Isthmus would also associate Herodes and place him in direct rivalry with the emperor Nero, who failed in his attempt to create an Isthmian canal. Needless to say, Nero is a tyrannical figure.[90] In the *Nero,* the *Lives of the Sophists*, and *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, the cutting of the isthmus is cast as a great deed and one of heroic proportions by the men who wish to do it (*VS* 551; *Nero* 2, *Apollonius of Tyana* 4.24);[91] however, all three works mock this notion. So, for example, Nero is described in the following manner at the point at which he personally abandons the task of cutting the isthmus and heads for Corinth: τὰ Ἡρακλέους δοκῶν ὑπερβεβῆσθαι πάντα ('[he left] believing he had surpassed all the deeds of Heracles', *Nero* 3). Nero's self-belief, like that of Herodes, is raised to a heroic register and Heracles is the one hero who, in some traditions, achieved immortality. It is also in this implication that Philostratus undermines Herodes' rhetoric, since in the *Nero* the emperor's involvement in his attempt to cut the Isthmus boils down to a lot of show, little personal effort, and less effect. He turns a clod of earth with a golden fork (δίκελλα) and then he leaves the task to slaves and workers, eventually calling off the effort entirely (*Nero* 3). This image of the ineffectual Nero wielding a fork is clearly meant to contrast negatively with Poseidon and his trident and ties into Herodes' expression that the cutting of the Isthmus is a task fit only for this god, with the effect of ridiculing both Nero and Herodes. The connection between Herodes and Nero is strengthened by Philostratus' *Apollonius of Tyana* 4.24, in which the same motive that is given to Herodes in the *Lives of the Sophists* 551 – that of wishing to reduce the length of the sea voyage – is attributed also to Nero. Moreover, Herodes' statement, ξυνχωρήσει δὲ οὐδείς ('no one will allow me'), implies that permission is

[90] The following royal or tyrannical figures also dreamt of cutting an Isthmian canal, though they never commenced the project: Periander (Diogenes Laertius 1.99), Demetrius Poliorcetes (Strabo 1.3.11), Julius Caesar (Suetonius, *Julius Caesar* 44.3; Plutarch, *Caesar* 58.4), Caligula (Suetonius, *Caligula* 21). See also Tobin (1997), 314.

[91] On Nero's ambition, see also Dio Cassius 58.16-9; Suetonius, *Nero* 19; and Josephus *The Jewish War* 3.540.

withheld by the current emperor and extends that rivalry with Nero to his successors. Philostratus makes this implication clear through the following statement: οὐκ ἐθάρρει δὲ αὐτὸ αἰτεῖν ἐκ βασιλέως, ὡς μὴ διαβληθείη διανοίας δοκῶν ἅπτεσθαι, ᾗ μηδὲ Νέρων ἤρκεσεν ('he did not have the courage to ask permission from the emperor, lest he be accused of grasping at an intention, which not even Nero achieved', *VS* 551). Herodes' great ambition (that purpose or διάνοια that reveals him to posterity) is kept in check by those who have power over him and in this particular sentence he is compared even to Nero in a negative manner, a negativity that is only strengthened by the ironic tone of 'which not even Nero achieved'. Moreover, the stress Herodes places on an Isthmian canal being something by which he would be remembered, recalls Herodotus' assessment of Xerxes' creation of a canal by Mt Athos: ἐθέλων τε δύναμιν ἀποδείκνυσθαι καὶ μνημόσυνα λιπέσθαι ('he wanted to show his power and to leave something by which to be remembered', *Histories* 7.24). Xerxes' actions are invoked as tyrannical by both Herodotus and Dio Chrysostom (*Oration* 3.31-41), who labels both the cutting of Athos and the chaining of the Hellespont as examples of tyrannical obsession.[92] Both Nero and Xerxes adhere to the tyrannical topos in Greek and Roman literature and, so, once again Philostratus stresses the tyrannical nature of Herodes' quest for fame.

b) The Odeon of Regilla

Philostratus' account of the Odeon of Regilla serves once more to highlight Herodes' unphilosophical and unkingly nature. The Odeon is mentioned twice by Philostratus.[93] In the first instance, it is praised along with the Panathenaic stadium as being the greatest of monuments in the empire (*VS* 551). In the second, the circumstance surrounding its

[92] Cf. Whitmarsh (1999), 149.
[93] On the structure of the Odeon, see Tobin (1997), 185-94, and Galli (2002), 32-7.

construction is discussed: the death of Regilla (*VS* 555-7). Regilla's apparent murder is yet another connection between Nero and Herodes, in that the accusation against him claimed that he had commanded one of his freedmen to beat her when she was eight months pregnant. She died in premature childbirth brought on by a blow to her stomach.[94] This scenario is very similar to that described by Suetonius in which Nero beat his pregnant wife to death (*Lives of the Twelve Caesars* 35.3) or even the story in Herodotus about the Corinthian tyrant Periander committing a similar crime (*Histories* 3.50).[95] In Greek and Roman tradition, the murder of pregnant wives is typically tyrannical and it is quite possible that the murder charge was based less on fact and more on the desire both of the *demos* to represent Herodes as tyrannical and of Herodes himself to be compared to an emperor.[96] Yet, in Philostratus' life, Herodes manages to imitate the wrong emperors. Herodes dedicates the theatre to Regilla as part of his show of extravagant grief at her death, a circumstance which Philostratus attributes to helping him in his defence of the murder charge brought by Regilla's family (*VS* 556). Thus the Odeon stands as a memorial to Herodes' wife and, consequently, to Herodes himself, to the controversy surrounding Regilla's death, and to his tyrannical leanings, which associate him with an extravagant, tyrannical emperor like Nero rather than the philosophical Marcus, whose role as a kind of kingly exemplar I discussed above.[97]

What is particularly interesting is that Philostratus uses the Odeon to focus on Herodes' grief. Throughout his Philostratean life, Herodes is cast as emotionally volatile and the

[94] See Fronto, *To Marcus* 3.3, for the accusation that Herodes beat and murdered some of his freedmen.
[95] See Ameling (1986) on the pattern of pregnant-wife-killing tyrants (Nero, Cambyses, Periander, and Herodes) and their urges to create canals. Cf. Pomeroy (2007), 121-3. See Pomeroy (2007), 119-36, for a speculative discussion of the murder and trial.
[96] See Vout (2007), 87, for Herodes imitating Hadrian and Nero, and for Nero as tyrannical. See Connolly (2008) for the suggestion that the murder of Regilla was a rhetorical construct and that Herodes may have deliberately drawn attention to the similarity with Nero.
[97] See the sections 'Sophistic Tyranny, Imperial Democracy', beginning on p. 85 above, and 'Emperor, Philosopher, Tyrant, Hero', beginning on p. 101.

construction of the Odeon is used merely as a device to introduce a litany of episodes of excessive grieving for Regilla, his daughters, and the three τρόφιμοι (*VS* 556-9). Maud Gleason has looked at Herodes' grieving in the context of Greek and Roman cultural practices in imperial times and concludes that it is not so out of place for Greeks, but was unusual for Romans, and that Herodes' bicultural nature and the cross-gendered character of grief allowed him the leeway to express himself to the degree that he did.[98] Herodes' grief comes in epic proportions, resembling the grief of Achilles after the death of Patroclus or Heracles after he murders his own family.[99] Moreover, his grieving over Regilla, which causes him to redecorate his house entirely in black, introduces an extended anecdote about the wise man, Lucius, who was a student of the philosopher Musonius of Tyre (the same Musonius who appears as the philosophical foil in the *Nero* dialogue), and who manages to snap Herodes out of his dolour through the employment of ridicule (*VS* 556-7). So, once again, Philostratus juxtaposes Herodes in his excess emotion to a philosopher and he shows Herodes' benefactions to be motivated by self-interest and the attainment of future reputation. In this scenario, Lucius plays the role of the philosopher who counsels the king; that is, he plays the role of Apollonius or, indeed, Marcus. In fact, Lucius berates Herodes that his behaviour risks his great reputation (περὶ τῇ δόξῃ κινδυνεύων). Herodes, however, is not a man to be counselled and it is only through ridicule, which is reported to him second-hand by slaves, that he is moved to change his behaviour. So, once more, Herodes fails in learning the role of the wise king and looks only to his own interests and his future fame. On the other hand, his excessive grief parallels that exhibited by Hadrian for Antinous; so, once more it is this emperor whom Herodes appears to imitate.[100]

[98] Gleason (2010), 158-60. I will come back to Herodes grief and the way it is expressed in some of his monumental activities in the following chapter. See the section below beginning on p. 183.
[99] Cf. Gleason (2010), 157.
[100] See Gleason (2010), 158.

Conclusion

Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* presents a complex and ambivalent characterization of Herodes Atticus. He is both praised and criticized. Although Philostratus lauds Herodes and celebrates his position as the greatest of all sophists, through comparing and juxtaposing him to Roman emperors (most notably Marcus Aurelius), Philostratus actually creates a portrait that is far from flattering, in which Herodes appears as an uncomfortable mix of hero, king, and tyrant in the realms of words, politics, and physical space. It is as though Herodes is trying to be a modern day Theseus (or Philostratus is presenting him as such), uniting the Athenians beneath his guardianship, but instead he comes across as a tyrant, trying to dominate the *demos*. I suspect this ironic, counter-intuitive reading has been neglected because the *Lives of the Sophists* is the primary written source for the so-called second sophistic. Philostratus is first to use the term and to describe its practitioners, thus he has been mined for historical and cultural information about this period and a resultant scholarly blindspot has arisen to the more literary aspects of the work, leaving them inadequately elucidated. Still, the question arises, why would Philostratus wish to create an ambivalent, subversive picture of his central character, particularly since Philostratus finds himself in a very similar sociocultural position to his subject? This is not a question that one can answer definitively, but I offer the following suggestions.

Firstly, Philostratus presents us with a cautionary tale of overreaching in one's ambitions. He takes the most famous individual in his profession, who made the greatest efforts to secure immortality, and through irony shows the limits of his power, where the obsession with future reputation becomes ridiculous and consequently fails. Secondly, in his failure to compete successfully with emperors, Herodes is presented as a paradigm of the

repercussions of stepping outside the bounds of acceptable personal expression. In this way, Philostratus acknowledges the difficulty of carving a prominent position in the imperial period by demonstrating that even Herodes, with his vast wealth and high status, fails to negotiate successfully both the contemporary civic and imperial stage, whilst simultaneously trying to address a future audience. In this respect, Philostratus offers competing paradigms: the traditional Herodes, who attempts to obtain future fame by emulating the great men and tyrants of the past in a way that neglects the reality of the empire; and the more textual and innovative Philagrus, who dispenses with contemporary fame by breaking with the past and convention, two elements on which the second sophistic itself depends. As I mentioned above, Philostratus himself is creating a new canon of sorts – the canon of the second sophistic – through the act of writing the sophists, and in this sense he is very much aligned with Philagrus. Clearly, also, Philostratus' undercutting of his central figure makes the point that no one can actually control their reception by posterity and to attempt to do so is pointless. Finally, in the inherently agonistic environment of sophistic activity, by undermining Herodes, Philostratus records a virtual victory over his apparently great forerunner; he both piggybacks on and leapfrogs over the fame of his subject. There is a sort of complex relationship between Herodes and Philostratus, such as holds between Socrates and Plato. Only in the latter sophistic relationship, the ironist is the pupil/adherent and the blowhard is the master, whereas in the earlier philosophical relationship the roles are reversed. Nevertheless, in both cases, the writer (i.e. Philostratus/Plato) and his character (i.e. the literary Herodes/Socrates) come to stand for the subject himself (i.e. the historical Herodes/Socrates), who essentially disappears by being written out of the literary record (or, more precisely, written over). None of these suggestions are entirely adequate and perhaps the answer is to be found by taking a more holistic view of the *Lives of the Sophists* itself by placing it in the context of both the phenomenon it describes and the other works

of its author. This, however, is a task for another occasion. Philostratus' Herodes reveals the limitations placed on the ambitions of provincial elites in the second century and the dangers to which one's reputation is exposed should one try to exceed these limits. Having placed a strong focus in this chapter on the literary side of future fame, I will now turn to examine more closely the monumental by considering the role of inscribed monuments in the construction of fame during the second sophistic.

CHAPTER THREE

The Epitaphic Habit

Not marble, nor the gilded monuments
Of princes, shall outlive this powerful rhyme;
But you shall shine more bright in these contents
Than unswept stone besmear'd with sluttish time.
When wasteful war shall statues overturn,
And broils root out the work of masonry,
Nor Mars his sword nor war's quick fire shall burn
The living record of your memory.
'Gainst death and all-oblivious enmity
Shall you pace forth; your praise shall still find room
Even in the eyes of all posterity
That wear this world out to the ending doom.
So, till the judgment that yourself arise,
You live in this, and dwell in lover's eyes.

William Shakespeare, *Sonnets* 15.

The landscape of Roman Greece was littered with inscribed monuments and the desire to imbed one's presence into the landscape was a powerful driving force behind the building works and benefactions of elite Greeks in the Roman imperial era. This is a phenomenon which we have already seen with the example of Herodes Atticus in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I will explore the ways in which monuments and inscriptions are integrated into literary texts and how these textualized inscribed monuments are used to enhance or create future reputation. This is the extension of Herodes' monumentalizing compulsion, which we saw in the previous chapter. Instead of simply writing oneself into the landscape, the authors whom I will consider in this chapter write the already marked landscape into their texts. During the imperial period, there was an intensification of intellectual interest in inscriptions from the past which corresponded with a large increase in new inscriptional dedications throughout the empire in both languages.[1] Given the preoccupation with the past as well as the obsession with creating a lasting presence in the future that is a characteristic of the period, inscriptions seem a very apt medium to be exploited by imperial Greek authors. As Jesper Svenbro notes, an honorific inscription was 'a machine

[1] Woolf (1996), 22. See also MacMullen (1982); Meyer (1990).

designed to produce *kleos*'.[2] Moreover, the proliferation of euergetism amongst elite Greeks and the building predilection of emperors such as Hadrian, brought the relationship between word and monument to the fore in the minds of men trying to create a future presence.[3] Consequently, this association of text and monument is a prevalent theme in Greek literature during this time. In what follows below, I will consider how this relationship plays out in several texts and what it can tell us about the temporal and social positioning of the second sophistic. I will also examine some examples of real inscriptions and how they are deployed to create future commemoration.

Before turning to the texts, however, I will consider the relationship between monument and text more closely. This discussion will begin with some of the literary landmarks in the history of textualized monuments on which the writers of the second sophistic draw. I will also look at the importance of the tomb and its associated funerary inscriptions as a means of memorialization, the idea of text and monument working together to enhance future reputation and the arguments for privileging one medium over another. Finally, I will explain what is different about the way authors of this period engage with the intricate intersection of text and monument when compared to the manner in which their famous literary forbearers treated the same relation. With these elements established, I will move on to a consideration of texts which use inscriptions as markers of authority and/or dominion and how that plays into the construction of fame for the subject of the text and/or its author.[4] Thirdly, I will discuss the appropriation of cultural memory in order to create future commemoration through Arrian's presentation of tombs in his *Anabasis of*

[2] Svenbro (1993), 62, 164.
[3] On Hadrian and his civic building in the Greek east, see Boatwright (2000).
[4] This section begins on p. 155.

Alexander.[5] Finally, I will turn to an example of self-commemoration through the physical appropriation of cultural memory in Herodes Atticus' villa at Eua Kynouria.[6]

Text, Monument, Speech, Fame

Imperial Greek authors arrive at the medium of inscriptions with a significant amount of cultural baggage. An inscription is always associated with a monument of some description and, in Greek and Roman thought, there is a long history of both partnership and friction between text and physical construction. Each is recognized as a means of memorialization from the very beginnings of Greek literature – Homer's epics marry tombs and commemorative song as partners in preserving memory – and the relationship between them is never entirely neutral.[7] Sometimes they are cast as opposing media, with one being considered better than the other for personal commemoration; at other times, text and monument combine to create either a physical memorial or a textual one. Here I will focus particularly on monuments of a textual nature; nonetheless, I will also consider the ways in which physical monuments of the period can reflect the complexity of their textual counterparts. The complexity of a unique self-reflexivity and ambivalence to one's place in political, literary, and monumental history is, in fact, the key to what is interesting about the relationship between text and monument in the second sophistic. Imperial Greek writers and monumentalizers draw on the attitudes and practices of the past, but their temporal relationship to any particular influence is never unilateral or set. Consequently these authors are characterized by an exceptionally playful engagement with the interface

[5] This section begins on p. 164.
[6] This section begins on p. 183.
[7] See Steiner (2001), 252-59; see especially 253-5 for tombs in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. On 253, she says: 'Accounts of the commemoration of the dead in epic song regularly harness the two kinds of memorialization to one another, showing how frequently each depends on the other and builds on its character and claims: no artefact without the speech that disseminates its message, and no verbal renown without some monument to spark it off'. Cf. Day (1989), 27. On the interdependency of monument and text in commemoration and honouring in the Greek mindset, see Stewart (1990), 54.

between text and monument, and characteristically experiment with and mingle different modes of textuality. To illustrate these points, I will begin by looking at some of the literary and monumental influences that are assumed and manipulated by the writers of the second sophistic and then consider more specifically how those writers are different in their treatment of inscriptions from their predecessors.

The interdependency of fame, memory, text, and monument is apparent right from the beginnings of Greek literature. Not only do the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* act to perpetuate the κλέος of their respective heroes and, concurrently, that of the poet who composed them, but they are seen by later literate society as literary monuments to both hero and author, and as the primary and greatest monuments of their kind, against which all others are to be compared.[8] Further, within these poems, there is a marriage of monument and words in that tombs, which are identified by a commemorative song, stand as memorials to the κλέος of their inhabitants.[9] Significantly, the identification of the tomb is purely oral; in the largely pre-literate Homeric society, inscriptions do not aid memorialization and, so, occasionally the monument is suspect or anonymous, as at *Iliad* 23.326-33.[10] Here Nestor speculates on the significance of a tree stump, standing between two white stones and with an area cleared around it. He suggests that it may have been a tomb-marker (σῆμα) of someone long dead (and since forgotten) or, alternatively, a turning post.[11] What is important here is that no one remembers any more what the marker signifies and no

[8] For an example of this, see the section below beginning p. 169, for both Arrian and his Alexander drawing on the primary and illustrious nature of Homer, his works, and his heroes as something to be emulated and, in order to gain immortality, surpassed. See Moles (1999), 32-41, for Thucydides engaging with Homer's epics and the idea of a textual monument. Also, see the section entitled 'Belatedness, Novelty, and the Future' in chapter one of this thesis, beginning p. 29.

[9] See *Odyssey* 24.80; 4.584; *Iliad* 7.87-91 (here the tomb is considered to add to the κλέος of the slayer as well as the slain). See the discussion of Steiner (2001), 253-4.

[10] I say, 'largely' illiterate on account of the σήματα λυγρά Bellerophon is given by Proteus to take to the king of Lycia at *Iliad* 6.168.

[11] See Steiner (2001), 253; see also Sourvinou-Inwood (1995), 108-39, for a discussion of the grave monument in Homer.

inscription or celebratory song exists as an aid to identification. This is where the efficacy of a monument falls down: it gains its meaning from its context and sometimes the viewer is not capable of interpreting the clues to its signification without verbal or written prompting.[12] The same problem applies to oral or written memorialization: perhaps a song did once exist, which told the story of whoever was interred beneath the stump to which Nestor refers, but it has now faded from the collective memory. Thus both media have their limitations: all things being equal, a monument is long-lasting but its context is unstable; a text is better able to explain its own context but is more fragile.

Yet the fragility of text is the very thing that is denied by later authors and the two art forms, monuments and literature, are regularly cast as competitors in the quest for immortalization through memorialization, and literature (as one would expect) is ever the victor. The seminal expressions of this sentiment in the two languages are Horace's *Odes* 3.30.1-9 and the opening of Pindar's *Pythian* 6 (especially lines 5, 7-14, 16-8).[13] It is clear, in this case, that Horace's verses are a personal recasting of Pindar's.[14] Both authors stress the inability of time to wear away or obscure their words as it might a physical construction and, in addition, Horace arrogates the fame of his odes to himself: the literary monument he creates explicitly celebrates himself (at the same time as his patron), unlike that of Pindar whose fame depends on his artistic commemoration of another, much as Homer's does. Horace equates his work with a part of himself and, so, because his words remain after him, he claims that they will keep him alive: those who read his works will also be

[12] See Elsner (1998), 170. See also Sourvinou-Inwood (1995), 117.

[13] Horace *Odes* 3.30.1-9: Exegi monumentum aere perennius / regalique situ pyramidum altius, / quod non imber edax, non Aquilo inpotens / possit diruere aut innumerabilis / annorum series et fuga temporum. / Non omnis moriar multaque pars mei / uitabit Libitinam; usque ego postera / crescam laude recens, dum Capitolium / scandet cum tacita uirgine pontifex.
Pindar, *Pythian* 6.5, 6.7-14, 6.16-18: Πυθιόνικος... / ... / ἑτοῖμος ὕμνων / θησαυρὸς ἐν πολυχρύσῳ / Ἀπολλωνίᾳ τετείχισται νάπᾳ· / τὸν οὔτε χειμέριος ὄμβρος, ἐπακτὸς ἐλθών / ἐριβρόμου νεφέλας / στρατὸς ἀμείλιχος, οὔτ' ἄνεμος ἐς μυχούς / ἁλὸς ἄξοισι παμφόρῳ χεράδει / τυπτόμενον. φάει δὲ πρόσωπον ἐν καθαρῷ / ... / λόγοισι θνατῶν / εὔδοξον ἅρματι νίκαν / ... ἀπαγγελεῖ.

[14] Woolf (1996), 25 n. 15, notes Horace is adapting Pindar to a Roman context.

reading and resurrecting an element of him. In this way, both he and his works have the potential to live forever. And yet Horace's future gaze only extends so far: he limits his own fame by tying it to a specifically Roman context; his fame exists as long as Rome, its rituals, and institutions exist: *dum Capitolium | scandet cum tacita uirgine pontifex* ('For as long as the priest and the silent virgin climb the Capitol', *Odes* 3.30.8-9). So, either Horace's fame has far out-lasted his imagination or (more likely) the Roman empire has disappointed his expectations of its longevity. In any case, by placing his literary monument within this Roman context, Horace designates his readers as Romans and suggests that he can only truly be appreciated by a Roman audience. To remove Horace's work from this context is similar to removing a monument or statue from its original position: at least some of its meaning is lost.

Although Horace and Pindar set their words up as greater and more lasting than a physical memorial, both Roman and Greek poet draw on the image of the physical structure in casting their poems as a verbal monument. That is, the image monumentalizes the text within the reader's or listener's mind and Horace's imagery of effacement (3.30.3-5) depends on an understanding that such a monument is inscribed with the poet's words. Similarly, Pindar speaks of a treasury (θησαυρός, 6.8) that contains his songs. This creates a sense of physicality for the text and makes memory a concrete construction. Moreover, in the case of the Horatian passage above, the mental monument stands in for Horace himself – acts as a σῆμα for him – and, in recalling his words, the auditor also remembers the author. The physicality of the mental text and the replacement of the author by the mental σῆμα are notions which should have a strong presence in the consciousness of Greek authors of the first centuries of the common era. From classical times, the idea of describing how memories are created was conceived as the imprinting of a mental wax

tablet, the differing memory capabilities of various individuals being described by the depth of imprint and the quality of the wax.[15] In her discussion of ancient Greek memory, Anne Whitehead talks about the art of memory as described by Greek and Roman rhetorical theorists and here too memory creation is envisaged as occurring within an imagined physical space inside the mind: memories are attached to the superstructure of the mind, envisaged as a building with many rooms or something similar, and retrieved by wandering through this superstructure.[16] Consequently, memory is seen as marking the virtual landscape of a person's mind, much as monuments and inscriptions mark the actual civic landscape.

Moreover, Horace's image of his poetic monument subsuming his own place in the world is a development of the idea of the grave marker (σῆμα) taking the place of a dead individual amongst the living, an idea which existed in Greek thought from archaic times.[17] Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, in reference to archaic burial practices, explains that the grave mound and its marker take over the role of the body as the representation of the dead individual: 'When the remains of the deceased were sealed off and he ceased to exist in the world of the living their role as metonymic symbol for the deceased was terminated. All that remained in the world of the living was a reference to them, their index, that is the grave monument'.[18] She goes on to explain that the monument 'became the (metonymically derived) symbol for the deceased's new persona which existed in the world

[15] Whitehead (2009), 15-26. Cf. Le Goff (1992), 65; Danziger (2008), 31-4. Plato, *Thaetetus* 191c-e: [Socrates]: Θὲς δή μοι λόγου ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ' ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου, ἔστι δ' οἷς μετρίως ἔχοντος… Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν βουληθῶμεν μνημονεῦσαι ὧν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους· καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῇ, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἕως ἂν ἐνῇ τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ· ὃ δ' ἂν ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε γένηται ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπιλελῆσθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.

[16] Whitehead (2009), 27-37, with references to the primary texts. See also Le Goff (1992), 65-8. On ancient Greek understanding of memory in general, see Danziger (2008), 24-41.

[17] See Sourvinou-Inwood (1995), 108-297.

[18] Sourvinou-Inwood (1995), 120.

of the living, that is, his memory, the continued existence of his persona in the memory of the living'.[19] Thus the grave monument is the means by which the memory of the dead is kept alive in the minds of others. And, indeed, this is one of the central metaphorical functions of any monument bearing the name of an individual, no matter what its practical purpose: Herodes' Odeon of Regilla is functionally a hall for public speaking, but it was dedicated to stand as a memorial for his dead wife (and, by association, for himself as well once he too passed).

Although the grave monument renews an individual's memory in the minds of his community, death still robs that individual of speech and it is only through inscription that the dead continue to speak.[20] The monument is marked by text and the combination creates a context and a signification for the memorial. It is in no small part for this reason that graves are traditionally associated with communication, commemoration, and the development of writing.[21] The vast majority of epigrams that survive from antiquity are funerary or dedicatory.[22] Both reveal a preoccupation with naming, with leaving the sign of one's identity in a sacred or public place.[23] In archaic grave inscriptions it is usual that both the grave monument (σῆμα) and the deceased are referred to, most often in the formula 'I am the *sema* of X'.[24] When viewed in this light, in his *Lives of the Sophists*, Philostratus' anecdote about the death of Polemo (*VS* 543-44) is ironic, since he is essentially left with a

[19] Sourvinou-Inwood (1995), 120. Cf. Derderian (2001), 3-4.
[20] Cf. Sourvinou-Inwood (1995), 142.
[21] See Derderian (2001), 3: 'Death, together with the grief, mourning, and memorialization that follows it, is an essential and inevitable human event, experienced personally in the light of individual mortality, yet also taking place within larger contexts of political and social belonging; it calls forth personal, collective, and cultural responses which operate at synchronic and diachronic levels striving both to manage the immediate moment of death and to generate and preserve long-term memory. With this complex communication between individuals and groups across chronological divides, the memorialization and mourning of the dead is one of the most important locations for the study of communication, and in particular the development of written media.'
[22] Bettenworth (2007), 69.
[23] Cf. Beard (1991), 46, on votive inscriptions.
[24] Sourvinou-Inwood (1995), 147, 279-80. Cf. Day (1989), 16-17.

voice but no body, and the whereabouts of his tomb remain uncertain. Although, throughout the life, Philostratus associates Polemo with Smyrna, he denies that city his tomb, saying, τάφος δὲ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν Σμύρναν οὐδείς, εἰ καὶ πλείους λέγονται ('he has no tomb in Smyrna, though several there are said to be his', *VS* 543).[25] He then proceeds to list the various false tombs, the majority of which are marked by statues of the man. Finally, Philostratus places the tomb in Laodicea where Polemo's ancestors were buried, but states that this version is only truer (ἀληθέστερα) than the others, not that it is definitive. This uncertainty seems odd given the contemporary and posthumous fame which Philostratus assigns to Polemo, the centrality of tombs in the creation of personal commemoration in the Greek mindset, and the association of graves with epigraphy.

Perhaps Philostratus' focus on the confusion over Polemo's tomb has something to do with the manner of his burial, in that he was interred whilst still living and speaking, thus removing the requirement for an inscribed σῆμα. Philostratus places two statements in the dying man's mouth, supposedly cried out as he was already inside the tomb (ἐν τῷ σήματι) and it was being closed over, which defy the usual rituals of burial: ἔπαγε, ἔπαγε, μὴ γὰρ ἴδοι με σιωπῶντα ἥλιος and δότε μοι σῶμα καὶ μελετήσομαι ('Quickly! Quickly! Never shall the sun see me silent', and 'Give me a body and I will declaim!', *VS* 544).[26] The first statement and, indeed, the live burial remove the body from the equation – the lifeless thing that usually stands in as the σῆμα of the man, which is covered over and replaced by the grave monument. This is the very thing that Polemo claims to have lost, so that he presents

[25] Tombs that are reputed to belong to great men (or even gods) are something of a *topos*. The tomb of Ramesses VI and the temple of Amenophis III were both said to be tombs of Memnon (see Gardiner (1961), 97). For the tomb of Zeus on Crete, see Cook (1925), 940-3; (1940), 1173. Homer was also said to have a tomb on Ios. In Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* 8.31.3, Apollonius is also denied a known extant tomb.
[26] Rife (2009), 119 n. 65, following Civiletti (2002), 501-2 n. 92, suggests that ἔπαγε here means 'Close it!' instead of 'Quickly', from the sense of 'laying on', 'applying' or 'putting' of ἐπάγω. See *LSJ* s.v. ἐπάγω 7 (or the middle II.7). This suggestion would seem better than the usual rendering, since Polemo was not expecting to die imminently.

himself to the mourners as a disembodied voice. In this respect, it is the tomb itself that speaks with the voice of the (not yet) dead and it is this voice that we hear, rather than the voices of the living reading the inscription left by the dead or those responsible for him. The σῆμα cannot perform its metonymic function if its inhabitant still lives. Polemo's two commands are at odds, since he wishes to be interred whilst still speaking, yet requires a body in order to declaim. In effect, he illustrates his liminal position as not fully alive and not quite dead, since he can still speak, but he can no longer use his voice in its usual social function. Moreover, the detail that all but one of the false Smyrnian tombs are marked by a statue of Polemo – another kind of stand-in for the living/dead man – only draws attention to the lack of a body in Laodicea.[27]

Having the tomb speak is precisely the aim of grave inscriptions, although their sentiments are eternally repetitive due to their fixed nature. Nevertheless, funerary epigrams are performative in character, in that they both preserve performed speech in stone and, when read aloud, re-enact that original performance and recall both the individual for whom they speak and the rites of burial.[28] In the conception of Svenbro, the engraved epigram takes possession of the reader's voice, who loses his own.[29] Either way, the key point is that the stone needs to borrow a human voice in order for it to speak, and the mute nature of the stone itself mocks its claims to speak for the dead amongst the living.[30] Philostratus' tale of Polemo's live burial pokes fun at the idea of the talking grave and, to some extent, the

[27] For a discussion of each of Polemo's potential tombs and the function of statues on the elaborate tombs of the elite, see Rife (2009), 119-26. I will discuss the metonymic function of statues in detail in the next chapter of this thesis, which begins on p. 192. Philostratus' phrasing here is particularly interesting, in that he speaks of the body specifically lying under the statue(s) (ὑφ' ᾧ [ἀγάλματι] and ὑπὸ τοῖς χαλκοῖς ἀνδριᾶσιν), as though the statue really does replace the man.
[28] See Day (2000). Cf. Day (2007), 32, 37. Day stresses that the record of performance, which inscriptions fix in stone, need not be considered literal: 'writing symbolized performance, even became a kind of performance, so that it assumed performance's authoritative efficacy' (32).
[29] Svenbro (1993), 47.
[30] Cf. Bing (2002), 48-52. He highlights that the idea of stones speaking is self-consciously revealed as a metaphor any time it is encountered. See also Thomas (1992), 61-5, on inscriptions on inanimate objects giving them a voice.

sophistic quest for κλέος ἄφθιτον, since graves which permit their inhabitants to continue speaking with their own voice once dead are the stuff of heroic myth.[31] Elsewhere in the *Lives*, Polemo has been established as a character who sees his profession as the natural inheritor of heroic effort. So, at one point, Philostratus includes an anecdote about Polemo and a gladiator, which reveals just how closely Polemo considers the disciplines of epideictic oratory and physical combat to be aligned. Polemo is made to quip at a gladiator about to do battle and sweating with fear: 'You are in as great an agony as though you were about to declaim' (οὕτως... ἀγωνιᾷς, ὡς μελετᾶν μέλλων, *VS* 541).[32] Speaking too was an essential quality of the Homeric hero, as exemplified by Odysseus and as explained by Phoenix at *Iliad* 9.438-43 (especially 9.442-3: τοὔνεκά με προέηκε διδασκέμεναι τάδε πάντα | μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων); and, of course, in his down time from battle, even Achilles entertained himself with songs of the great deeds of men (κλέα ἀνδρῶν, *Iliad* 9.189). Nevertheless, it was a hero's deeds rather than words that truly defined him and it is telling that, of the many heroes who tried, only Heracles, whose greatness lay purely in his physical prowess, achieved immortality and then only in some versions of his story.

Consequently, in this context, the comparison of epideictic speech to heroic exploit belittles the former and, in the *Lives of the Sophists*, seems to be used to gently mock the sophists and their own quest for immortality. This is clearly shown in Polemo's live burial parodying the process of apotheosis. Moreover, it is driven home further by the ultimately anonymous fate of the sophist's tomb and yet another Philostratean anecdote. In the latter, Antoninus Pius rejects a replacement rhetor for the dead Polemo on an embassy, but

[31] For example, see Achilles ghost at his tomb in Euripides' *Hecuba* 109-15.

[32] Scopelian is another of Philostratus' sophists who is endowed with heroic characteristics. So, for instance, he is said to have declaimed 'as befitted one who was entering the lists to win glory for himself (εἰκὸς ἦν τὸν ἀγωνιῶντα μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δόξης) and was confident that he could not fail' (*VS* 519). Moreover, this sophist even has a fantastic birth: Scopelian is said to have had a twin, who was killed by a lightning strike from which Scopelian himself emerged unharmed (*VS* 516).

accepts a speech of his delivered by another, which led the Smyrnians to claim he had come back to life to aid them (τὸν Πολέμωνα αὐτοῖς ἀναβεβιωκέναι φάσκοντες, *VS* 540).[33] Here, Polemo declaims with another's body and his words transcend his own passing. In this respect, Philostratus' representation of Polemo has him outdoing Horace in that his words do not stand as a memorial to him, but rather he is cast in an almost god-like manner, supplying the members of the Smyrnian embassy with inspiration as though he were a muse. Philostratus' anecdote achieves a kind of apotheosis for Polemo, but it also places him in the role of a past great to be emulated and performed by others, essentially displacing him temporally to be associated with the canonical writers of the classical period. Interestingly, it is a Roman emperor who puts him in this position by forcing the Smyrnian delegation to ventriloquize Polemo. Surely this would not sit well with the man, whom Philostratus describes as 'being so arrogant that he conversed with cities as his inferiors, emperors as not his superiors, and the gods as his equals' (ὡς πόλεσι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ προῦχοντος, δυνασταῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ὑφειμένου, θεοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου διαλέγεσθαι, *VS* 535), were he still alive. Antoninus' request reduces Polemo to a cultural artefact of sorts, making him more quaint than immortal.

That Polemo's grave later lacks adequate identification, despite his tomb's initial ability to speak with his voice, once more highlights the plight of speech *vis-à-vis* text and of a monument without an inscription. In Philostratus' *Lives*, Polemo's death is illustrative of the dilemma facing the epideictic sophist: one's contemporary fame is all about one's ability to speak off the cuff, but one's future fame depends on leaving evidence of that speech behind, in the form of text or in a monumental commemoration of one's greatness.

[33] See Rife (2009), 126, who connects this to an earlier episode in which Polemo replaced the aged Scopelian on a similar embassy. Rife also notes that Polemo's words (δότε μοι σῶμα καὶ μελετήσομαι) recall Patroclus' to Achilles (δὸς δέ μοι ὤμοιιν τὰ σὰ τεύχεα θωρηχθῆναι | αἴ κ' ἐμὲ σοὶ ἴσκοντες ἀπόσχωνται πολέμοιο | Τρῶες, *Iliad* 16.40-2), words Polemo actually did quote when he took Scopelian's position on the embassy. Once again, this indicates Polemo's conception of the heroic nature of his profession.

In committing to the spoken word, Polemo fails in leaving a lasting mark. This in turn highlights, once more, the inability of any individual to control his reputation once dead. Although Polemo was in control of the manner of his death and interment, and even though he performed as himself to the last, animating his tomb with his own voice, still the site of his grave was unknown in Philostratus' own time because it was not recorded in a lasting medium. In seeking to never stop speaking, Polemo denies his grave its own potential voice in the form of an inscription to speak on his behalf to (and through) future generations. Given the proximity of the phrasing used in describing Polemo's interment (ἐν τῷ σήματι) and his request for a body (δότε μοι σῶμα), Philostratus may be alluding to the Pythagorean dictum σῶμα σῆμα and inviting the reader to make the substitution. If this were to occur, Polemo's command regarding declamation would be: 'Give me a tomb (σῆμα) and I will declaim!'.[34] Not only does this allude to Polemo's 'unorthodox role as funeral orator at his own tomb',[35] but also to the intense ambivalence of imperial Greek writers to the potential of lasting commemoration, which is far removed from either Pindar's or Horace's claims to certainty that their literary monument would be eternal. If given a tomb, as he has been, Polemo will in fact fall into silence and, at least on the level of possessing a definitive funerary monument, into obscurity. Yet at the same time, Philostratus' biography has preserved several tombs for him and here the text proves more effective than the monument itself.

Nevertheless, in the sophistic world presented by Philostratus, commitment to the written word is never complete, making text of any description, including epigraphy, problematic. The difficulty of self-memorialization for exponents of sophistic *epideixis* was a very real

[34] See Plato's *Cratylus* 400b-c, *Gorgias* 493a. I return to the discussion of σῆμα σῶμα below, which begins on p. 166, where Plato's *Cratylus* 400b-c is quoted.
[35] Rife (2009), 126. He notes the play on σῆμα σῶμα and connects Polemo's statements to epigrammatic phrasing and an attempt to transcend death.

problem because of its improvisational nature and, consequently, the challenge to make a speech transcend the performative moment was ever present. Philostratus no doubt exaggerates the extent of the tension between the written and spoken word, but the problem does crop up in other authors too, as Aelius Aristides explains whilst relating a dream in *The Sacred Tales* 5.52. The passage expresses the important point that perfecting written work is as necessary to a man seeking to create lasting fame as engaging in oratory, because one's audience does not need to be limited to those present at any given time, and that the most important thing to great sophists is to be able to wield words. The passage does not explicitly indicate that Aristides means both spoken and written material, but it seems to be the sense of his final statement. Nevertheless, he stresses that posterity can only be addressed by the written word, not the spoken:

> τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ ἰατρὸς, οὐκ ἐμελέτησας ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ τέως; ὅτι νὴ Δί', ἔφην ἐγὼ, σπουδαιότερόν μοί ἐστιν ἐπελθεῖν τινα τῶν γεγραμμένων· δεῖ γάρ με καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον ἀνθρώποις διαλέγεσθαι. καὶ ἅμα ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐπειγοίμην, μὴ ἄρα τι συμβαίη πρότερον. καὶ ὃς οἰωνίζετο ἔτη πολλά μοι. κἀγὼ εἶπον, βουλοίμην ἂν καὶ πολλὰ ἔτη βιῶναι, εἰ μέλλοιμι ἔσεσθαι πρὸς λόγοις.
>
> "Why then," said the doctor, "did you not declaim for us in the meantime?" "Because, by Zeus," I said, "it is more important for me to revise some things which I have written, for I must also converse with posterity." And at the same time I indicated that I was pressing myself, lest something happen first. And he augured many years for me. And I said, "I would wish to live many years, if I should be engaged in words." (*The Sacred Tales* 5.52)

Lucian's *On the Hall*, on the other hand, considers the relative benefits of visual and aural stimulation and the correct way in which to respond to visual beauty.[36] It is an introductory speech which gives two points of view on speaking within magnificent visual surroundings.[37] The key questions are whether words or objects are more attention grabbing and memorable, and whether words and images work in partnership or in

[36] See Newby (2002), 126.
[37] On Lucian's introductions, see Branham (1985); Nesselrath (1990).

competition. The author adopts both positions in turn, donning two *personae*. At the beginning, the speaker claims that beautiful surroundings urge one on to speak and, at the same time, improve one's words. From this point of view, the two media work together to produce a better product and the 'monumental' takes an auxiliary position to the verbal. The physical structure inspires and enhances the speech, but no more:

> καὶ τοίνυν καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ οἴκου τὸ κάλλος ἱκανὸν καὶ παρορμῆσαι ἐς λόγους καὶ λέγοντα ἐπεγεῖραι καὶ πάντα τρόπον εὐδοκιμῆσαι παρασκευάσαι. ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ τούτοις πείθομαι καὶ ἤδη πέπεισμαι καὶ ἐς τὸν οἶκον ἐπὶ λόγοις παρελήλυθα ὥσπερ ἀπὸ ἴυγγος ἢ Σειρῆνος τῷ κάλλει ἑλκόμενος, ἐλπίδα οὐ μικρὰν ἔχων, εἰ καὶ τέως ἡμῖν ἄμορφοι ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, καλοὺς αὐτοὺς φανεῖσθαι καθάπερ ἐσθῆτι καλῇ κεκοσμημένους.
>
> Certainly, then, the beauty of this hall has power to rouse a man to speech, to spur him on in speaking and to make him succeed in every way. I for my part am trusting in all this and have already trusted in it; in coming to the hall to speak, I was attracted by its beauty as by a magic wheel or a Siren, for I had no slight hope that even if my phrases were homely before, they would seem beautiful if adorned, so to speak, in fine clothing. (*On the Hall* 13)

When this *persona* retires, the one which replaces him takes the opposite view. He states that visual objects claim more attention and are more impressive than words. In fact he accuses the audience of not paying attention to him because they are enamoured of the fine artwork distributed around the hall (18). His main point is that words are fleeting, whereas images remain. To illustrate the point, he compares the Sirens, who only cause delay, to the Gorgon, who petrifies for eternity (19). Ultimately, he gives up trying to make his case to the audience and decides instead to follow their lead in admiring the hall. He begins to describe the paintings which adorn it in detail, to make what he calls a word-painting (ἡ γραφὴ τῶν λόγων, *On the Hall* 21). In this unfolding, the words play second fiddle to the physical structure:

> Ἀκούετε τοῦ μάρτυρος ἃ φησιν, ὡς τὰ πρῶτα τῇ ὄψει ἀπέδωκεν; εἰκότως. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔπεα πτερόεντά ἐστι καὶ οἴχεται ἅμα τῷ προελθεῖν πτερόεντά ἐστι καὶ οἴχεται ἅμα τῷ προελθεῖν ἀποπτάμενα, ἡ δὲ τῶν ὁρωμένων τέρψις ἀεὶ παρεστῶσα καὶ παραμένουσα πάντως τὸν θεατὴν ὑπάγεται.

> Do you hear what the witness says, that he gives first place to sight? With reason, for words are winged and go flying off the instant they have left the lips, while the beauty of things seen is always present and lasting and subjects the spectator to its power. (*On the Hall* 20)

Essentially, the scenario that the first *persona* presents is that of a monument incorporated into text and that of the second is more like an inscription applied to a physical structure. In both cases the two media end up working together, but the first foregrounds speech, whilst the second, which due to its position as the concluding point of view would seem to be intended as the more convincing, makes words serve the physical monument. Indeed, at the very conclusion of the piece, the speaker requests that the audience close their eyes to listen, thus removing the visual competition for their attention. Zahra Newby sees the question of which speaker is meant to be the most authoritative as ambiguous and uncertain, and it is true that the issue is not entirely clear.[38] Yet that both speakers essentially do little more than describe the hall adds weight to the second speaker's opinion. Moreover, Newby states that the second speaker's *ecphraseis* become less and less detailed and instead the speaker attempts to define them thematically by finding common links. She sees this as his effort to try to break through the captivation of the audience and intellectualize their experience.[39] At the same time, however, the decreasing detail stands as evidence of the failure of words to capture visual beauty and the programmatic intellectualization as evidence that the best service of words in such cases is as an adjunct to aid the appreciation of the visual.

In this way, Lucian's *On the Hall* suggests that the profession of sophistry is a tough one and, yet again, draws attention to the difficulty in making an impression, particularly a

[38] Newby (2002), 133.
[39] Newby (2002), 131-33.

lasting one, when one's primary occupation is speaking. Additionally, unlike Pindar and Horace, this piece dares to champion physical structures as more lasting than words; admittedly, here we are dealing with the spoken rather than the written word, and the physical could be taken to be metaphorically representative of the written word, but the point remains. Intriguingly, Lucian's claim that the visual image brings the viewer under its power suggests that in this imagining the image speaks for itself and does not require the supplementation of added words, a notion very distant from that expressed by Pindar or Horace. Although Lucian does not necessarily fit into this category himself, another important difference between the outlook of the earlier Pindar and Horace, and Philostratus' sophists is that Pindar and Horace had no realistic hope that they would be able to attach their names to a physical monument; whereas the many wealthy elite sophists whom Philostratus describes, and who populate the pages of this thesis, were more than capable of granting significant monumental benefactions to various cities that would carry their name into the future. Consequently, among these authors, there is experimentation in different modes of textuality, in both literature and physical constructions, in that they employ various media to get their commemorative message across, as I will demonstrate at length below with Arrian and Herodes Atticus.[40]

In the Roman world, monumental constructions had become increasingly concerned with ideology, as has been demonstrated by numerous studies, such as those focusing on Augustan imagery and Hadrian's prolific civic benefactions.[41] Monuments were statements of personal or community identity, or even of the relationship between an individual and his community, which the dedicator wished to project not only into contemporary but also

[40] See p. 164 and p. 183 respectively.
[41] See Zanker (1988); Elsner (1996), 35, n. 8; Boatwright (2000).

future consciousness.[42] It is the role of the inscription to give meaning to a monument and to explain its context, since the words are essential to the object itself. Because most monuments were constructed to commemorate some member of the elite, they tell us most explicitly about elite ideology. As Joseph Day explains, 'monuments and epigrams make status claims and function as sites for the negotiation of social order when they are read and viewed'.[43] It is the pairing of monument with the text which is important here because in reality the message of a monument was never stable and often depended on the words, in stone/bronze or papyrus, associated with the physical structure. So, Mary Beard refers to the 'insinuating power of the written text, its capacity to define experience, to change perceptions, to display dominance'.[44] As the second speaker in Lucian's *On the Hall* advocated, the visual artefact can be supplemented by words. Accordingly, monuments are sites of conflict, in that they strive to control memory, but because they can also be supplemented by words, their meaning can be manipulated beyond whatever inscription they may bear through their inclusion in artfully constructed literary texts. Consequently, just as the physical construction of monuments was about personal identity on a social, cultural, and political level, so the incorporation of inscribed monuments into text usually has something to do with the construction of authorial identity and personal authority that is often at odds with what would appear to be the intended meaning of the original structure. Importantly, just as one loses control over one's memory once dead, so one relinquishes control over the interpretation of a monument (even if it is inscribed) once it is placed in a public space.[45] The incorporation of an inscribed monument into text is an attempt to control or (re)shape its reception.

[42] See p. 194 for this idea in relation specifically to statues.
[43] Day (2007), 34.
[44] Beard (1991), 58.
[45] Cf. Beard (1991), 44: 'Public writing cannot control its readership. Whoever the original addressee, once written it can be read and interpreted by the scholarly, the supercilious, or the downright hostile, just as easily as by the sympathetic or the faithful'.

Naturally, this could be employed positively: two further problems which the incorporation of an inscription or monument into text overcomes are this very potential for a loss of context, should a physical monument lose its dedicatory inscription or some other mishap befall it, and the potential for one's monument to be ignored or appreciated solely for its artistic merit rather than its commemorative purpose. In the first instance, the text creates a context for the monument. Though the text does not necessarily need to match its original monument (if there even were an original physical construction rather than a purely literary invention), in that the author may manipulate the meaning of the monument for his own purposes; nevertheless, the power of text is such that, once that context has been created, it is preserved within the text and that medium makes that monument and its assigned meaning moveable.[46] In this way, the textualized monument (or statue) can be considered as similar in function to (almost the 'photographic negative' of) Augustus' *Res Gestae*, the monumentalized text of which was inscribed on or in the vicinity of temples dedicated to the imperial cult around the empire.[47] Although the text varied slightly in different contexts,[48] these inscriptions were essentially monumental textual incarnations of Augustus as *princeps*, his legacy, and both his and Rome's relationship to the empire, in his own words, that were replicated in public sacred places throughout the eastern empire (or at least in Galatia).[49] As Jaś Elsner puts it, '[l]iterally, it wrote the ideology of empire in the form of the biography of the emperor into the sacred and civic hearts of the cities of Asia Minor where it was inscribed'.[50] Moreover, these copies were self-consciously copies and made it clear that the original monumental inscription was in Rome, the centre of the

[46] I will return to this idea in more detail in the final chapter of this thesis with respect to statues. See the discussion beginning p. 203.
[47] See Cooley (2009), 6-18.
[48] Cooley (2009), 19, 22-30.
[49] See Elsner (1996). On the spread of the *Res Gestae*, see Cooley (2009), 18-22, who points out that it is quite a coincidence that all three copies discovered come from the province of Galatia and, consequently, the monumental publication of the text may have been instigated internally within this province.
[50] Elsner (1996), 49.

empire, where the man himself was too.[51] But, like a monument within a text, each copy spread a predominantly uniform message that was traceable back to the original in Rome.

In the second instance, the incorporation of an inscribed monument within a text immediately enabled the targeting of a specific and appropriate audience. There has been much discussion in the scholarship of Hellenistic and archaic epigrams about whether or not inscriptions were read by the public. Peter Bing has argued that there is very little literary evidence for any public interest in inscriptions until after antiquity, despite epigrams themselves consistently speaking directly to an imagined audience, often conceived of as passing by through chance.[52] He suggests that an audience for this style of poetry appeared only after it developed into a literary genre collected in books during the Hellenistic period.[53] However, one would imagine that the composition of literary collections of epigrams must have occurred due to some level of prior demand. Moreover, authors of literature have good reason to downplay the efficacy of inscribed monuments: the ability of text to travel both geographically and temporally, to assign and preserve context, and to withstand the elements is the very reason writers employ to claim that their medium is superior in the preservation of fame to words imprinted on stone. Contrary to Bing, Joseph Day contends that because epigrams were designed to attract and aid reading, it is likely that they were regularly read. He also asserts that even were the majority of the population illiterate, it would not decrease the potential size of an inscription's audience, since if only one person amongst those gathered around a monument was capable of deciphering the words, he would naturally read it aloud to the rest.[54] However, just because a monument is aesthetically pleasing and its inscription is set out in a manner that

[51] Elsner (1996), 38; Cooley (2009), 18.
[52] Bing (2002), 40-2.
[53] Bing (2002), 42.
[54] Day (2010), 17, 23, 26-75.

encourages and assists reading, does not mean that it succeeds in attracting readers, even should a passerby show interest in the monument itself. Plutarch's *On Oracles at Delphi* 395a gives just such a scenario, as well as evidence of both interest in inscriptions – in that it describes the typical spiel given by Delphi's trained guides that included a description and explanation of many of the inscriptions – and disinterest – in that the learned audience on this particular occasion requests they skip over this material, no matter how important it is deemed: Ἐπέραινον οἱ περιηγηταὶ τὰ συντεταγμένα μηδὲν ἡμῶν φροντίσαντες δεηθέντων ἐπιτεμεῖν τὰς ῥήσεις καὶ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἐπιγραμμάτων.[55] These same tourists then go on to discuss the colour of the bronze Nauarchs' statues at some length. So, here, an audience of scholars and writers pays more attention to the aesthetics of a monument than to its inscriptional accompaniment.

Nevertheless, Day suggests that the precise wording of an inscription did not matter so much as its symbolic value: '[i]nscriptions set up in public were meant to be noticed, but their power might lie in their symbolism more than in their role as readable documents: by impressing viewers with their monumentality and special location, for example, inscribed laws could, even if not read, convey something of the force of the occasion when they were first solemnly pronounced'.[56] Greg Woolf makes a similar point, claiming the formulaic and abbreviated nature of many inscriptions meant that the words themselves took on a level of symbolism that could have been recognized and interpreted even by the illiterate.[57] However, for the symbolism of the inscription to be effective, the viewer would still need to understand the purpose of the monument, something that could not always be

[55] Bing (2002), 61, uses this section as evidence for reader apathy towards inscriptions, whereas Day (2010), 44, uses it to show that at major religious sites, the explication of inscriptions was part and parcel of the guides' job (thus interest in inscriptions must have been substantial). On this text as representing Delphi as a site of Greek memory, see Jacquemin (1991).
[56] Day (2010), 31.
[57] Woolf (1996), 28. Modern examples he cites are R.I.P and Q.E.D, although the latter is perhaps more of a challenge for the illiterate and is never inscribed publicly. See also Thomas (1992), 65-100.

guaranteed. Incorporating those inscriptions into texts removes all concern about how one's monument will be interpreted and whether or not the inscription itself will be read. A textualized inscription finds its perfect audience in the person who is already reading that piece of literature, since it allows the author to determine the context to a large degree. Admittedly, this practice does nominally limit the audience to the literate,[58] but the ability of the textualized word to travel, opens up a potential learned audience empire-wide both in the present and the future. Moreover, the solemn purposes of actual inscriptions, such as votive dedications, funerary epigrams, inscribed laws, or Augustus' *Res Gestae*, lend gravitas to virtual inscriptions, whether they be fictional or legitimate.[59]

In all this, the differences between the sophists of the common era and their literary forebears can be seen. All these influences, literary and cultural tropes bubbling away in the awareness of imperial Greek authors and builders, are revealed in the sophisticated self-reflexivity exhibited in their literary, monumental, and literary-monumental efforts. The landscape developed in the process of negotiating the marriage of text and monument in the quest for fame is neither flat nor continuous. There are some literary-historical periods when the two media are more entwined and prominent than others, as I have indicated in the discussion above. Homer acknowledged the importance of the tomb in preserving and communicating an individual's κλέος, in the real sense of the word as something that is heard about another, at the same time as recognizing the fragility of the connection between a monument and its verbal identification. Pindar and Horace promoted the idea of a literary monument over a physical one, whilst Horace showed himself aware of the ability of a physical structure to metonymically represent an individual. He also tied his

[58] Naturally, a literate person could read a text to illiterate people, which enables greater dissemination of the text.
[59] On the difficulties of determining a real inscription from a virtual one, once it has been incorporated into book form, see Bing (1998), 29-38.

positive reception to the persistence of a Roman religious institution, thus ultimately limiting it, although this is undoubtedly not the intention of the poem (which seems to be aimed at eternity).

In addition, Hellenistic writers, who embraced the form of the epigram, infused their works with a similar sense of belatedness to that of those of the second sophistic.[60] Yet the first clear difference evinced by the subjects of this thesis is one of temporal scope – to the authors of Roman Greece, the classical age was that much further distant and the canon came to them in a format far more secure and set. Thus Imperial Greek writers have a unique outlook, in that they are always looking back and forward at the same time and their temporal gaze extends much further. Hellenistic writers engage with the past, but it is imperial Greek writers who really make the past work for their own future commemoration at the same time as revealing a sense of ambivalence as to their prospects of success. They use the same tropes as Homer, Pindar, Horace, and the Hellenistic epigrammists, but they are more playful with time and, since their contemporary circumstances dictate that they can never escape the classical canon entirely, they use the perceived greatness of earlier authors for their own benefit. They exhibit an intense interest in self-conscious textuality and intertextuality, often commemorating themselves in the guise of people from the past or exploiting a past figure for their own purposes. Much of this activity centres on monuments as symbols of memory and identity. Moreover, this Janus-like perspective meets its point of conflict in these authors' own present, with the result that their monument-infused texts are revealed as commentaries on cultural, political, social, and most importantly personal identity. At the same time, these men exhibit an intense ambivalence to both the possibility of future commemoration and the

[60] On this notion, see Bing (2008).

relative benefits of literature compared to physical memorials. On the other hand, this ambivalence encourages them to be more ironic and to experiment in different modes of both textuality and commemoration. In the following sections, I will examine these notions with respect, firstly, to the use of inscriptions to claim power and space, and secondly, to the use of cultural memory to create future commemoration through inscribed monuments.

Authority and Dominion: Boundaries and Limina

Previously, I presented Augustus' *Res Gestae* as serving an analogous function to an inscribed monument incorporated into a text.[61] However, these monumental inscriptions purportedly dotted about the eastern Roman empire and displayed in sacred civic spaces are more complex than this. They also served the important functions of not only publishing the achievements of Augustus in the east and connecting the periphery of the empire with the centre of Rome, but also of marking the reach of Augustus' (and, by extension, Rome's) power. In chapter one, we saw a similar process at work in Hadrian's statue and altars which were renovated by Arrian at Trapezous.[62] Augustus (or whoever initiated the eastern *Res Gestae* project), however, wished to mark numerous civic centres, not the sparsely populated frontiers of empire, as Hadrian had done. Thus the inscribed *Res Gestae* perform a more complicated task than Hadrian's monuments, in that they are designed to publish Augustus' achievements to as many people as possible. Nevertheless, both Hadrian's statue and altars, and Augustus' monumental text tie their accomplishments to Rome and the ideology of empire. And both, given their positioning within the empire, are tailored to the present as much as to the future, in that they are designed to address contemporary citizens as well as posterity.

[61] See p. 150.
[62] See p. 59.

This practice of marking one's territory and reach is the same kind of process that is attributed to Alexander the Great in the literary sources. He too is represented as marking the extent of his travels with altars and statues, like those, for example, by the river Hyphasis.[63] That this tradition existed, allowed later authors to add inscriptional elements to Alexander's constructions, thus manipulating the message to their own literary agenda. Unlike the imperial ideology present in the monuments of Augustus and Hadrian, in the literary sources, the inscriptional efforts attributed to Alexander tie his achievements to himself, that is, to the ambitions of the man. At the same time, Alexander's monuments mark territory that is empty and strongly foreign (at least in the context of a Greek audience). Thus Alexander's lonely monuments are aimed much more at eternity than the present.

In addition, Alexander's marking of boundaries or frontiers is symbolically aligned with the mythological heroic traditions of Heracles and Dionysus: Heracles transgressed the boundaries of the known world in his role as the hero who mediates between the mortal and the divine;[64] Dionysus both came from and ventured into the far east.[65] Moreover, in Arrian's *Anabasis*, Dionysus and Heracles are both mentioned as conquerors of India (4.28.1-5; 5.1.1-2; 6.3.4-5; cf. Plutarch, *On the Fortune of the Romans* 326b, in which Alexander's desire to go further than Dionysus and Heracles is mentioned).[66] Both the literary Alexander and the historical Augustus and Hadrian, however, are united in

[63] See Arrian, *Anabasis* 5.29.1-2; Diodorus 95.1-2; Curtius 9.3.19; Plutarch, *Alexander* 62.7-8; Justin 12.8.16; Strabo 3.5.5. See Bosworth (1995), 356-7, who states there is no doubt about their historicity.
[64] Cf. Romm (1992), 17-18, 115.
[65] On Alexander, Dionysus, and the east, see Blanshard (2007). See also Stoneman (1995) on the *Alexander Romance*, Dionysus, and Heracles. Strabo (3.5.5) interprets the altars as an emulation of Heracles and Dionysus.
[66] Plutarch, *On the Fortune of the Romans* 326b: ὁ δ' ἄγων αὐτὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους δόξης ἔρως καὶ ἡγεμονίας ζῆλον ἔσχε καὶ ἄμιλλαν ὑπερβαλέσθαι τὰ Διονύσου καὶ Ἡρακλέους πέρατα τῇ στρατηλασίᾳ.

attempting to employ the power of an inscribed monument to mark their dominion and authority over a region. In this section, I will consider some examples of inscriptions incorporated into texts which are designed to do the same things as those physical constructions of Augustus, Hadrian, and Alexander and which play on the established history, whether real or invented, of these imperial statements of power and ownership to make interesting claims on future reputation for the authors or their characters. I begin with Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius*.

At the end of book two of the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, during Apollonius and Damis' journey into India, they happen across the following:

> Ποταμὸν δὲ Ὑδραώτην ὑπερβάντες καὶ πλείω ἔθνη ἀμείψαντες ἐγένοντο πρὸς τῷ Ὑφάσιδι, στάδια δὲ ἀπέχοντες τούτου τριάκοντα βωμοῖς τε ἐνέτυχον, οἷς ἐπεγέγραπτο ΠΑΤΡΙ ΑΜΜΩΝΙ ΚΑΙ ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙ ΑΔΕΛΦΩΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΘΗΝΑΙ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΙ ΟΛΥΜΠΙΩΙ ΚΑΙ ΣΑΜΟΘΡΑΙΞΙ ΚΑΒΕΙΡΟΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΙΝΔΩΙ ΗΛΙΩΙ ΚΑΙ ΔΕΛΦΩΙ ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝΙ, φασὶ δὲ καὶ στήλην ἀνακεῖσθαι χαλκῆν, ᾗ ἐπιγεγράφθαι ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΣ ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ ΕΣΤΗ. τοὺς μὲν δὴ βωμοὺς Ἀλεξάνδρου ἡγώμεθα τὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς τέρμα τιμῶντος, τὴν δὲ στήλην τοὺς μετὰ τὸν Ὕφασιν Ἰνδοὺς ἀναθεῖναι δοκῶ μοι λαμπρυνομένους ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀλέξανδρον μὴ προελθεῖν πρόσω.
>
> When they had crossed the Hydraotes and passed several tribes, they came to the Hyphasis. About thirty stades further on they found altars with this inscription: "To my father Ammon, my brother Heracles, Athena of Forethought, Olympian Zeus, the Cabiri of Samothrace, the Sun of India, and Apollo of Delphi." They say there was also a bronze tablet dedicated there with the legend "Alexander stopped here." We must suppose that the altars were set up by Alexander to honour the limit of his empire, while the Indians across the Hyphasis dedicated the tablet, presumably in order to boast that Alexander had advanced no further. (Philostratus, *Apollonius of Tyana* 2.43)

This is what Apollonius and Damis discover when they arrive at the furthest point of Alexander's eastern journey. The Hyphasis is traditionally the boundary between the known and the unknown world and, since the travellers arrive at the very spot where

Alexander turned back, they are quite literally following in his footsteps.[67] As such, the act of going beyond these altars is loaded. That Apollonius' journey extends beyond Alexander's immediately places the sage in competition with the conqueror and it is the wise man who achieves more.[68] The motif of travel is often used to mirror a development in character in any narrative: Alexander strives to conquer the known world and, in doing so, gain immortality; his journey into India brings him closer to the limits of the earth, but also ironically closer to his death, a notion that is explicitly explained to him by a group of Indian wise men in Arrian's *Anabasis* 7.1.6.[69] Apollonius, on the other hand, seeks wisdom, which he gains through his travels and which allows him to understand the wonders at the ends of the earth and to return to the centre of the world to defeat an emperor.[70] Accordingly, Apollonius' achievement in surpassing Alexander is a triumph for philosophy over might and statesmanship.[71]

Moreover, the second inscription, the one attributed to the Indians, serves to put Alexander's achievements into perspective, a perspective that exceeds the Hellenocentric conception of the audience whom Philostratus is addressing. The simplicity and directness

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[67] See Romm (1992), 116-20, for the immediate change in the narrative of Philostratus once the Hyphasis is crossed to reflect the usual catalogue of wonders present in any description of India.

[68] See Elsner (1997), 30-31, for the parallelism between Alexander and Apollonius in Philostratus' text. See also Romm (1992), 116-20. See van Dijk (2009) for parallels between Apollonius and Odysseus.

[69] The wise men explain: βασιλεῦ Ἀλέξανδρε, ἄνθρωπος μὲν ἕκαστος τοσόνδε τῆς γῆς κατέχει ὅσονπερ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐφ' ὅτῳ βεβήκαμεν· σὺ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὢν παραπλήσιος τοῖς ἄλλοις, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι πολυπράγμων καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας τοσαύτην γῆν ἐπεξέρχῃ πράγματα ἔχων τε καὶ παρέχων ἄλλοις. καὶ οὖν καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀποθανὼν τοσοῦτον καθέξεις τῆς γῆς ὅσον ἐξαρκεῖ ἐντεθάφθαι τῷ σώματι ('King Alexander, each man possesses just so much of the earth as this on which we stand; and you being a man like other men, save that you are full of activity and relentless, are roaming over all this earth far from your home, troubled yourself and troubling others. But not so long hence you will die, and will possess just so much of the earth as is sufficient for your burial'). Cf. Arrian, *Anabasis* 7.2.2-4.

[70] See Elsner (1997), 24, on the wisdom that Apollonius learns on his travels allowing him to demonstrate his authority. See Platt (2011), 293-332, on the act of viewing sacred images in the *Life of Apollonius* and the process of gaining wisdom. See especially p. 331, where she lists instances of Apollonius being treated as though he is divine by various characters. These instances correspond to characteristics ascribed to Alexander. For example, Apollonius becomes the subject of *prokynesis* (8.15) and is considered the son of Zeus by the people of Tyana (1.6).

[71] Arrian sets up a similar comparison in the second preface of the *Anabasis*, except in this case it is more of a partnership as Arrian and Alexander both need each other in order to be masters in their respective fields. See *Anabasis* 1.12.5.

of the three words - ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΣ ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ ΕΣΤΗ – stand in contrast to the elaborate naming of Alexander's dedication, which excludes Alexander's own appellation. No doubt it is assumed that Alexander did not think he needed to specify his name, given his positioning of himself in relationship to the gods that he does identify: only one man could fulfil the familial connections he claims on the altar. Nevertheless, Philostratus feels the need to gloss the purpose of both inscriptions for his audience. On the other hand, the Indians' plaque does use Alexander's name and neglects to mention his divine associations. It is only by his name that he is identified, which in itself is a nod to his vast fame and achievement, but it also humanizes him by stripping him of the pseudo-divinity with which he had invested himself. And so his ultimate failure is highlighted over his successes. It is this failure that caps his achievements and exposes his mortality, which is certain from the moment he turns back. In this respect, the Indian bronze tablet stands almost as an epitaph to the Macedonian. It portends his death. Additionally, it manages to do this in the present of Apollonius, since he is the first Greek to see it, but it also projects this prediction into the past, to the moment when the bronze tablet was initially set up. Moreover, it underscores that Alexander exists indelibly in the past and places Apollonius in the position of providing a superior paradigm for succeeding in the Roman empire through being an exponent of philosophy rather than a man of military might. In this, it reflects the preoccupations of an elite Greek, who upholds the virtue of Greek culture in the Roman empire, as Philostratus surely was.

This is a lot to read into two brief inscriptions, yet there is a palpable depth of meaning to them, despite their brevity, since the significance of a single wise man and his companion going beyond the apogee of Alexander the Great's conquests would readily strike any man of culture in the early centuries of the common era, given the vast cultural weight applied

by Greeks to the Alexander legend.[72] Here, then, both Alexander's and the Indians' inscriptions fail in their purpose at the moment at which Apollonius transgresses the border they mark. Once the sage passes the Macedonian's altars they no longer mark the eastern-most progress of Greek knowledge and culture; once he goes beyond the Indian plaque, he defies its warning to those Greeks, written as it is in Greek lettering, who might wish to outdo Alexander and he breaches both the boundary of the known and unknown, as well as that boundary that had kept western Greek knowledge and eastern Indian knowledge separate. Thus the dominion and authority claimed by both inscriptions is rendered empty rhetoric and Apollonius is promoted in contrast. Naturally, Philostratus as his biographer also assumes some of his fame and achievement.

Lucian's *True History*, on the other hand, uses the idea of a boundary marker determining the known world in a slightly different way.[73] After the introduction, in which the narrator explains that throughout the narrative he will be lying (1.4), he sets off with his crew from the Pillars of Heracles (1.5). These are generally identified with the rocks on either side of the straits of Gibraltar; they mark the western-most point of the known world in the antique imagination and form the gateway to Ocean.[74] Immediately, the ship is thrown off course by a long-lasting storm, reminiscent of that which takes Odysseus and his crew into the unknown (Homer, *Odyssey* 9.67-83). Then, at the first place they visit, they discover the following:

> προελθόντες δὲ ὅσον σταδίους τρεῖς ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης δι' ὕλης ὁρῶμέν τινα στήλην χαλκοῦ πεποιημένην, Ἑλληνικοῖς γράμμασιν καταγεγραμμένην, ἀμυδροῖς δὲ καὶ ἐκτετριμμένοις, λέγουσαν Ἄχρι τούτων Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Διόνυσος ἀφίκοντο. ἦν δὲ καὶ ἴχνη δύο πλησίον ἐπὶ πέτρας, τὸ μὲν πλεθριαῖον, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον—ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, τὸ μὲν τοῦ Διονύσου, τὸ μικρότερον, θάτερον δὲ Ἡρακλέους. προσκυνήσαντες δ' οὖν προῆμεν·

[72] I explore this further below, see p. 164
[73] See Romm (1992), 211-14.
[74] Romm (1992), 17, 147.

> We had advanced through the woods about three stades, when we came upon a brazen pillar, inscribed with Greek characters, which however were worn and faint, that said: 'To this point came Heracles and Dionysus'. Not far off were two footprints on rock; one of which was very large, the other smaller; it seemed to me the smaller was left by Dionysus, the other by Heracles. We did obeisance and went on. (Lucian, *True History* 1.7)

If the Pillars of Heracles marked the extent of the known world, this bronze pillar and associated footprints mark the extent of mythic travel by the greatest of heroes and the 'least' of the twelve Olympians.[75] Ostensibly, the pillar serves the same purpose as the inscriptions set up by Alexander and the Indians in Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius*: it is both celebratory, a challenge, and a warning. Like Alexander's altars, it marks the achievement of Heracles and Dionysus in reaching this point and, at the same time, sets itself up as a deed that is possible to surpass, simply by going that little bit further. In this, it is significant that Lucian places this boundary at the very beginning of his story. It serves to announce just how 'far out' this adventure will be and how little it will resemble any other traveller's tale that has come before, simply because it is situated in a world outside the literary record. Equally, it presents a cautionary marker, in that it highlights that no mortal has traversed this spot, much as the Indians' plaque warned that no Greek had gone beyond the Hyphasis. Additionally, that the inscription is clearly based on those apparently set up by the likes of Alexander or other such adventurers in the historical or literary past, serves to give this self-proclaimed lie validity (at the same time as mocking the extravagant and fanciful claims of genuine historiography and geography).[76] This validation is backed up by the physical imprints of Heracles and Dionysus' feet. The hero and the god marked the land itself with their presence. The massive size of the footprints once more stresses

[75] On this passage and the associations of Dionysus and Heracles, see Georgiadou and Larmour (1998), 70-75.
[76] See Georgiadou and Larmour (1998), 28-40, on historiography and storytelling.

the super-human achievement in arriving at this point beyond the reaches known to man.[77] Finally, the narrator and his crew bow to the marks of the hero and god's presence and, having performed that acknowledgement of their divinity, they immediately move beyond this spot, thus placing their journey above and beyond that of their divine and semi-divine predecessors. So, the citing of this inscription and the associated footprints is designed to give authority to the invented tale by having an artefact to support its reality and, at the same time, it exalts the deeds of the travellers for they have superseded beings far greater than themselves and all that predominantly by the accident of a storm. In itself, if following the Odyssean paradigm, the storm suggests the intervention of a hostile god. In the case of the narrator and his companions, who go where gods and heroes feared to tread, however, the agency in this story seems to be very much human.

Lucian, however, is not finished with challenging the authority of the gods. He has another inscription to offer:

> Λουκιανὸς τάδε πάντα φίλος μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν
> εἶδέ τε καὶ πάλιν ἦλθε φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.
>
> Lucian, dear to the blessed gods, saw all these things
> And went back again to his beloved homeland. (Lucian, *True History* 2.28)

According to Lucian, this epigram is composed by Homer and inscribed by Lucian himself on a pillar of beryl at the harbour on the Isle of the Blessed.[78] Lucian asks Homer to compose it as a memorial of his visit to this realm of dead heroes. The inscribed pillar recalls Euhemerus' story of Panchaea, the island which he claimed to have visited and which possessed a pillar of gold inscribed with the deeds of Uranus, Chronus, and Zeus,

[77] Cf. Philostratus, *Heroicus* 13.3, on the footprints left by Protesilaus: 'But there are huge footprints on the walkways, which suggest that the hero is ten cubits tall' (καὶ μὴν καὶ ἴχνη μεγάλα ἐντετύπωται τοῖς δρόμοις, ἐς τὸ δεκάπηχυ μέγεθος τοῦ ἥρω).

[78] On this passage, see Georgiadou and Larmour (1998), 212-13.

whom Euhemerus identifies as great men of the past rather than immortal gods (Diodorus Siculus 6.1.4-10).[79] If Lucian is deliberately alluding to Euhemerus, then he is placing himself in a similar position to these gods and suggesting that he too should receive a similar kind of immortalization in the future. As Simon Goldhill has indicated, this is one of only four occasions in the corpus of Lucian in which he inserts his own name into his writings.[80] Only two of these instances occur in the action of the text; the others being contained in the initial salutation of a letter. As well as noting that the lines parody (poorly) the opening of the *Odyssey*, Goldhill well describes the complex play which this epigram employs, saying: 'Lucian immortalizes his name… in a third-rate epigram by a fictionalized and untrustworthy poet on a monument in an unseeable afterlife, recorded in a work which boasts of its own falsehood'.[81] Nevertheless, this deed once again plays off the boundary-marking tendencies of real and literary characters and it is one monument that cannot be outdone, since it is imaginary and in the realm of the dead. No one can disprove its existence nor surpass it. Moreover, it has an eternal captive audience in the heroes and great men who find themselves confined to the Isle of the Blessed, including Alexander himself and numerous literary luminaries. Thus no matter the achievements of these men in life, they are confronted on their arrival to the island with this inscription that claims the greatest of all achievements: the elusion of death. This pillar does not act as an epitaph for Lucian, as the Indian's inscription mentioning Alexander did, but rather as a proclamation of immortality. This brief discussion of inscribed monuments that mark boundaries, serves as an introduction to the next section that takes a closer look at the practice of playing off

[79] It also recalls the stele in the lunar episode (*VH* 1.20) and the attempt to reach out to posterity is the same idea expressed at the end of Lucian's *How to Write History* 62, in which he quotes the epigram carved into the Paros of Alexandria by its architect. He notes Sostratus carved it and then covered it over with gypsum before carving the name of the reigning king on top, knowing that eventually the plaster would fall off to reveal his own name. See also Bing (1998), 21-29, on the lighthouse, Sostratus, and epigram.
[80] Goldhill (2002), 64-5.
[81] Goldhill (2002), 65.

established historical and literary paradigms, focussing particularly on tombs and the appropriation of cultural memory for personal commemoration.

Arrian, Alexander, and the Textual Appropriation of Cultural Memory

> miremur periisse homines? monumenta fatiscunt,
> mors etiam saxis nominibusque venit. (Ausonius, *Epigram* 37.9-10)
>
> Are we surprised that men die? Monuments gape apart,
> death comes even to stones and names.

In this section I will consider two tombs in Arrian's *Anabasis of Alexander*: Achilles' in book one and Cyrus' in book six. I will focus on the way both Arrian and his Alexander appropriate cultural memory in order to leave a mark for the future and how monuments, specifically tombs, are sites used by both author and protagonist to muse on mortality, identity, and fame. Initially, however, I will discuss some of the issues that centre on monuments from the past, particularly tombs, in order to establish the anxiety over commemoration that monuments necessarily entail. In his discussion of monuments in Latin literature, Don Fowler comments on the phenomenon of literary interpretation of the physical monument from an earlier time, which applies as much to modern viewers as to the imperial Greek viewer, when inspecting a structure from the past. He says:

> [A]ll monuments become ruins, in that what they 'want' to say, the intentionality of their construction, always needs to be purified and supplemented by the modern interpreter: because in themselves they never say enough and always say too much, monuments too can only be interpreted through the codes and conventions of the modern interpreter. We can only begin from the traces, the ruins and the monuments, but the stories they tell are our own. This is the paradox of the monument: designed as a summation of memory, an omega-point in which is concentrated all the meaning that a culture wishes to preserve, it can only function for the modern interpreter as a blank slaughterhouse wall on which to project the stories back, the starting-point not for memory but for desire.[82]

[82] Fowler (2000), 201-2. Cf. Kahane (2011), 829.

A monument's purpose is to control or direct memory; in Fowler's conception, however, the monument's job is deemed to 'always already' be a failure, since it can only be interpreted at the moment it is received by any given viewer. This is a notion which Charles Martindale has applied to the reception of texts, but his sentiments are transferable to physical memorials as well. He explains that an author loses control over the interpretation of his own work as soon as it is distributed in the public eye, saying: '*Meaning... is always realized at the point of reception*' and 'a writer *can never control the reception of his or her work*'.[83] Consequently, the entire project of trying to shape and control one's memory, either written or constructed, appears pointless: whatever meaning is intended is subject to the interpretive and creative gaze of the receiver. This is an idea which I covered substantially in the previous chapter; in this section, however, I will consider it in relation specifically to the appropriation of cultural memory. It is true, as Fowler says, that a monument is open to the interpretation of its viewer, but at the same time, that viewer's interpretation depends on his or her cultural milieu; moreover, given a viewer's understanding of the meaning that his or her culture attaches to a particular landmark, by appropriating it along with its cultural baggage and incorporating it into a different setting, whether literary or physical, that individual can use, manipulate, or supplement its meaning for their own purpose. In turn, once this process has been carried out, its author loses control of his creation and it becomes subject to the inevitable interpretation of others. The writers of the second sophistic reveal themselves to be versed in this complex interplay of intention, authority, and reception that renders any given memorial a site of conflict over identity and meaning, and they exploit these notions self-consciously within their texts.

[83] Martindale (1993), 3-4 (original italics).

For the most part in this section, I will focus on tombs, which provide plenty of epigraphic material for the period. This wealth of material in turn, as Joseph Rife notes, indicates the particular enthusiasm of the age 'to communicate identity in monumental writing'.[84] In the first section of this chapter, I discussed how from archaic times onwards tombs were understood to become the σήματα of those who were interred within them: they represented and replaced the deceased individual in the world of the living and became the focus of communal memory of that individual.[85] Consequently, it is unsurprising that tombs developed into symbols of a person's status and propagators of his fame, especially in literature. Inscribed tombs are monuments which claim to speak with the voice of the dead and, whether they are inscribed or not, make a statement about that person and how they wish to be remembered: the tomb prompts and attempts to shape memory by being something substantive that stands in place of the deceased person and that has been designed to represent him in a particular manner. In this respect, tombs are associated with the body – they are receptacles designed to preserve, protect, and represent the body, which is itself constructed of organic matter that is destined to decay. As I mentioned in the discussion of Polemo's burial in the *Lives of the Sophists*, σῶμα and σῆμα are connected in Pythagorean and Orphic doctrine.[86] In Plato's *Cratylus*, Socrates explains with respect to the word σῶμα:

> Πολλαχῇ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε· ἂν μὲν καὶ σμικρόν τις παρακλίνῃ, καὶ πάνυ. καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινές φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι· καὶ διότι αὖ τούτῳ σημαίνει ἃ ἂν σημαίνῃ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ταύτῃ «σῆμα» ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι. δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σῴζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, τὸ «σῶμα», καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδ' ἓν γράμμα.
>
> I think this admits of many explanations, if a little, even very little, change is made; for some say it is the tomb (σῆμα) of the soul, their notion being that the soul is buried in the present life; and again, because

[84] Rife (2009), 102.
[85] See the discussion beginning p. 135.
[86] See p. 139.

> by its means the soul gives any signs which it gives, it is for this reason also properly called 'sign' (σῆμα). But I think it most likely that the Orphic poets gave this name, with the idea that the soul is undergoing punishment for something; they think it has the body as an enclosure to keep it safe, like a prison, and this is, as the name itself denotes, the 'safe' (σῶμα) for the soul, until the penalty is paid, and not even a letter needs to be changed. (400b-c)

Unfortunately, this function of the tomb, just as it is with the body, is not fail-safe, since, ultimately, tombs themselves are impermanent, as the lines from Ausonius at the beginning of this section elucidate. Moreover, like statues, tombs are open to appropriation and reclassification,[87] and like fame, their fate lies in the hands of others.[88] As such, tombs perfectly illustrate the inescapable truth faced by all those who strive to be remembered – at some point, inevitably, one's memory will fade and, equally horrifying, once dead, one's memory no longer belongs to oneself.[89] The tomb gives a false impression of being an eternal memorial and more lasting than the physical self. In addition, given the powerful temporal pulls on imperial Greek literature with its focus both on the past and the desire for future reputation, the graves of famous predecessors often appear as objects which allow the author to muse on mortality, the construction of personal identity, and the success or failure of great men of the past to obtain and maintain the fame after which they sought. I turn now to Arrian's *Anabasis of Alexander* and the tombs of Achilles and Cyrus, before briefly considering some monuments associated with Herodes Atticus in the following section.

[87] In the previous chapter, we saw the appropriation of Herodes Atticus' (probable) tomb above the Panathenaic stadium some decades after he died. See p. 112.
[88] See Fowler (2000), 193-217 for a discussion of the reapplicability and transience of monuments and these themes within Latin literature.
[89] See Martindale (1993), 2-4, for an insightful discussion of Shelley's *Ozymandias*.

a) The Tomb of Achilles

'We can only begin from the traces, the ruins and the monuments,' says Fowler, 'but the stories they tell are our own'.[90] Arrian, in the *Anabasis*, demonstrates this practice, retelling Alexander's story in a way which enhances Arrian's personal authority over the subject of the greatest of all Greeks. In many ways, Arrian's *Anabasis* is less a history of Alexander's campaigns and more a study of one man's desire to craft a future reputation. That desire is set against the backdrop of the reality that one cannot control how one's fame is propagated post mortem. The idea that it is what is reported about a person that matters rather than what that person achieves is a sentiment which is expressed already by Pindar (one of the authors whom Arrian sets up as a rival in the second preface, *Anabasis* 1.12.1-5) in *Pythian* 1.92-100, especially:

> ὀπιθόμβροτον αὔχημα δόξας
> οἷον ἀποιχομένων ἀνδρῶν δίαιταν μανύει
> καὶ λογίοις καὶ ἀοιδοῖς
>
> The acclaim of fame that survives a man is all that reveals the life of departed men to storytellers and singers alike. (1.92-3)

In imperial Greek writers, however, this notion is accompanied by a feeling of helplessness that is provoked by hypothetical future reception when one is so constrained by the past. Imperial Greek writers add to this despair the realization that the reception of their work is beyond their control, and Arrian's works show a keen awareness of this problem; however, imperial Greek writers do not accept their belatedness passively. Arrian, as other authors of his day, adopts the pose that he wishes to be remembered in a manner similar to a past great by assuming the literary guise of that great; yet, at the same time, he exerts his own literary *persona*, and attempts to dominate and reinterpret that very same great. It is an authorial positioning that looks both back to the illustrious history of Greek literature and forward to his potential future audience. At the beginning of the *Periplus*, which I discussed

[90] Fowler (2000), 200-01.

in the initial chapter of this thesis, Arrian revealed himself capable of manipulating and reinterpreting his namesake Xenophon in a way which both emulates and supersedes the classical author, and which claims control of the memory attached to Trapezous.[91] In the *Anabasis*, he instils into his Alexander a similar awareness of the ability of time and other people to manipulate one's fame. Arrian's Alexander demonstrates a desperate need both to honour the dictates of the past and to propagate and control his future memory, much as the individuals whom I have considered in the pages of this thesis do;[92] at the same time, the text of Arrian's *Anabasis* reveals that the fulfilment of this desire is impossible, both by investing his particular version of Alexander's history with as much authority as possible and by placing within the text various monuments to ancient or mythic men that are themselves corrupted. In doing so, Arrian reveals his own project of piggy-backing on the fame of another as itself destined to failure.

Monuments in the *Anabasis*, as they are in reality too, serve as markers of collective memory and as media through which both Alexander and Arrian muse on future fame. This is nowhere clearer than in the case of tombs. It is at the grave of Achilles that Arrian records how Alexander laments his lack of a Homer (1.12.1-2). The word used for tomb is τάφος, but as mentioned previously graves were regularly considered as memorials or signs (σήματα) of those they claimed to contain. In Homer, the σῆμα is usually something that marks the tomb rather than the tomb itself, but in later usage the two are interchangeable.[93] There is a long literary and oral history that invests Achilles' tomb at Troy with meaning and there is also a history of pilgrimage, beginning with Alexander and including Julius Caesar (Lucan, *Pharsalia* 9.1120-85), Hadrian (Philostratus, *Heroicus* 8.1), and Caracalla

[91] This discussion begins on p. 52.
[92] Indeed, it is with the literary tradition that Alexander admonishes his reluctant troops at the Hyphasis, using the following, very Homeric sentiment: καὶ ζῆν τε ξὺν ἀρετῇ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν κλέος ἀθάνατον ὑπολειπομένους ('it is sweet both to live with excellence and to die leaving behind immortal fame' 5.26.4).
[93] See *LSJ* s.v. σῆμα and τάφος. See p. 135.

(Herodian, *Roman History* 4.8.1-5; Cassius Dio, *Roman History* 78.16.7). It is Alexander's encounter with Troy that informs the visits of later pilgrims.[94] Alexander crowns Achilles' grave (*Anabasis* 1.12.1), laments his lack of a Homer (1.12.1), and switches some of his armour for some of that previously dedicated in the temple of Athena (1.11.7-8).[95] He alters the landscape in significant ways that portend his future success. The act of crowning is a reverential one, but when taken in the context of Alexander's habit of building memorials at the extent of his travels, it is also making the claim of having superseded the Homeric hero: Achilles set foot in Asia, but he did not conquer it and even died before the sack of Troy.[96] Moreover, switching the armour takes a piece of the Trojan war story and merges it with the story Alexander is about to compose through his campaigns in Asia: he both installs himself in Troy and takes Troy with him, and it is at this point that Arrian makes his claim to be Alexander's Homer (1.12.4-5).

In this way, Arrian connects both his and Homer's compositions with the grave of Achilles, indicating that his history of Alexander is the heir to the *Iliad* and that Alexander is the heir to Achilles. Moreover, the insertion of the second preface at this point suggests a change of focus and narrative: from this moment on, Arrian's Alexander 'epic' begins. That it starts from Achilles' tomb intimates that it will act as a lasting memorial and, in this

[94] Lucan's Caesar marks the landscape in a comic accidental way when he tramples unwittingly all over Hector's grave. Caracalla, on the other hand, imitates the actions of Alexander.

[95] See Bosworth (1980), 203 (loc. cit.): in the vulgate, Alexander visited all the tombs of the heroes and gave appropriate offerings (Diodorus Siculus 17.3; Justin 11.5.12). For further acts of Alexander in the *Anabasis* that show his investment in famous mythic and historic traditions, and his own desire to carve himself into the heroic landscape, see: *Anabasis* 1.9.10 (saving Pindar's house); 1.11.5 (sacrifice to Protesilaus); 1.11.6 (Alexander switches his own armour for some in the temple of Athena); 1.12.1-5 (the delayed second preface); 1.16.5 (Alexander visits the wounded and listens to their tales of glory); 2.3.7 (the Gordian knot); 2.5.9 (Alexander claims decent from the Heracleidae); 2.7.8-9 (Alexander recalls Xenophon and his ten thousand); 3.3.1-2 (Alexander must visit the oracle of Ammon to rival Perseus and Heracles); 4.11.8-9; 5.1.5 (Alexander spares Nysa because Dionysus founded it as a monument to posterity of his wanderings); 5.26.4; 6.9.3 (Alexander carried the shield he took from Troy with him into battle); 6.9.5 (Alexander's desire to perform glorious deeds and have a glorious death); 7.9.6 (Alexander lists his achievements).

[96] See Marincola (1989), 187, for the idea that Arrian's decision to refer to Xenophon's *Anabasis* is significant for the reversal of Greek fortunes as much as for the earlier historian's importance to Arrian: whereas Xenophon celebrated the Greek retreat from Asia, Arrian will celebrate Alexander's conquest of that continent.

way, is taking up the challenge thrown down by Alexander, who judges Achilles fortunate to have Homer as the herald of his future memorialization (ἐς τὴν ἔπειτα μνήμην, 1.12.1). Moreover, Arrian uses Achilles' grave to serve his own commemorative purpose, just as he did with Hadrian's statue in the *Periplus*.[97] Achilles' grave has no inscription; it has only the poem of the *Iliad*. Therefore, Arrian is able to bend the tomb's message to his own ends and use it to set both himself and Alexander up as supreme in their respective fields and, importantly, as symbiotic. It is interesting to note that in describing the same episode Plutarch follows Alexander's reverential treatment of Achilles' grave and acknowledgement of the hero's luck in having Homer to commemorate him with an anecdote about someone, who remains unnamed, asking Alexander if he wished to see also the lyre of his namesake, Paris. Alexander rejects the idea, saying he would rather see the lyre of Achilles (Plutarch, *Alexander* 15.4-5); however, the placement of the anecdote and the parallel drawn with the Trojan prince is surely meant to undermine the pretensions of Alexander to greatness on a par with Achilles. Unlike Plutarch, who is interested in the moral character of his literary subjects, Arrian is intent on presenting Alexander as the greatest of Greeks and as obsessed with his future reputation; consequently, his version would never brook such a subversive anecdote, not at least at this programmatic moment.

Arrian's use of ὁρμάομαι elucidates the parallel between Alexander setting out into Asia and Arrian embarking on his history.[98] Their two tasks match each other and depend upon each other. However, the word also conjures the idea of epic 'paths of song', as discussed by Andrew Ford.[99] Indeed, by using this particular verb, Arrian gives his history a spatial

[97] See Chapter One, p. 58.
[98] Cf. Moles (1985), 164. Much of the discussion that follows is based on the work of John Moles, who notes the metaphoric use of ὁρμάομαι and the inscriptional nature of Arrian's *Anabasis*. However, he does not consider the spatial element of the inscription or the sepulchral element of my discussion below.
[99] See Ford (1992), 42-8, with relevant bibliography. For earliest usage, see Hesiod, *Works and Days* 659; *The Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 464-5.

element, the backdrop of which is the continent of Asia, upon which Arrian's words and Alexander's deeds are written (ξυγγράφω). Ὁρμάομαι conjures epic and τὴν ξυγγραφήν conjures specifically the opening of Thucydides: Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων (*History of the Peloponnesian War* 1.1.1).[100] In addition, as John Moles points out, ὁρμάομαι parallels Herodotus as well (προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, *Histories* 1.5.3).[101] Thus in this one sentence, Arrian rivals Homer, Thucydides, and Herodotus. Arrian then goes further and solidifies the idea of Asia as the space upon which he will inscribe Alexander's story through the use of ἀναγράφω. This verb, whilst it can simply signify 'to write down', has as its primary meaning 'to engrave or inscribe' as one does on a monument.[102] 'Placing' or 'hanging up', as though in dedication, seems to be a common implication of the prefix *ana-* when combined with verbs of positioning, as in ἀνατίθημι ('to dedicate') or ἀνάκειμαι ('to be set up', 'to be dedicated'). Thus this spatial, dedicatory prefix gives the action of writing a similarly sacred and monumental flavour. Arrian chooses ὁρμάομαι over the technical μεταβαίνω, which signals a change of direction on the 'path of song'.[103] In contrast, ὁρμάομαι carries the sense of a beginning. So, he is not just signalling a change of subject, but the beginning of something that is related but new: both the move from Europe to Asia within the *Anabasis* and the move from a poetic epic Achilles to a prose historical Alexander. Additionally, as a successor to Homer's Achilles, Arrian also implies a comparison between Alexander and Odysseus – the hero who tells his own story and ensures his own κλέος. However, unlike Odysseus, Alexander sets out, but never gains his νόστος. In book 7, Arrian suggests that, had he not died, Alexander would never have been satisfied, 'but would always have searched for something unknown, in competition with himself in lieu of any other rival'

[100] See Moles (1985), 164: he notes the nod to Thucydides and mentions the 'metaphorical use' of ὁρμάομαι, by which he must mean the epic usage.
[101] Moles (1985), 164 n. 9.
[102] See Moles (1985), 166.
[103] Ford (1992), 43.

(ἀλλὰ ἔτι ἂν ἐπέκεινα ζητεῖν τι τῶν ἠγνοημένων, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ αὐτόν γε αὑτῷ ἐρίζοντα, 7.1.4). Alexander's νόστος is denied because his appetite for κλέος is unquenchable.

Furthermore, whereas Achilles' tomb is clearly marked at Troy, in Arrian's text Asia becomes a rival memorial of Alexander, inscribed with and invested with meaning by the words of Arrian. It is tradition which marks out Achilles' tomb at Troy, but it is Arrian's words which mark out Asia as an inscribed monument to Alexander. In his *Events after Alexander*, Arrian relates that Ptolemy eventually takes possession of Alexander's body and inters it in his capital (9.25; cf. Diodorus Siculus 18.3.5, 18.26-8; Strabo 17.1.8; Pausanias 1.6.3; Curtius 10.5.4). However, that the tomb, like Polemo's, is now lost, frees Arrian to create a metaphorical one. Thus the spatial element, which is created by Arrian through ὁρμάομαι and τὸ χωρίον (the space left by inadequate celebration of Alexander in literature), and the concept of a literary monument, which is created through ἀναγράφω,[104] lay Asia out as the true inscribed memorial to Alexander: τὸ χωρίον is the gap in the literary record, but it is also the landscape of Asia and the literary space on which Arrian will carve his memorial to Alexander and himself, just as he took Xenophon's literary space in the *Periplus* and raised a μνήμην αἰώνιον to Hadrian and himself to both mirror and overshadow the memorial constructed by Xenophon's ten thousand.[105] In this respect, Arrian presents himself as the author of Alexander's achievements and his fame, rather than merely their scribe.

[104] Moles (1985), 166, connects ἀναγράφω with the practice of inscription. He also notes the connection of ὁρμάομαι with progression and travel (164 n. 9). However, he does not see Asia as the place of inscription: the inscription for Moles is only the text (see Moles (1999), 66). See Moles (1999) for the argument that Thucydides and Herodotus also saw their histories as inscriptions and that subsequent historians, including Arrian, are following this lead.
[105] See p. 60.

Further to this idea, within the second preface, there is a play between what is known, what is unknown, and what has been or must be revealed. According to Arrian, Alexander's exploits πολὺ μεῖον γιγνώσκεται… ἢ τὰ φαυλότατα τῶν πάλαι ἔργων ('are far less known than the most trivial deeds of old', 1.12.2) and have not been worthily revealed (οὐδὲ ἐξηνέχθη… ἐπαξίως). On the one hand, this is a dig at previous Alexander historians; on the other, it is creating space for Arrian's own contributions. Thus it is this failure of revelation regarding Alexander that creates the great gap (τὸ χωρίον) in the literary monumental record. In book four of the *Anabasis*, Arrian reports that Callisthenes had claimed: ὅτι ὑφ' αὑτῷ εἶναι ἀπέφαινε καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ξυγγραφῇ Ἀλέξανδρόν τε καὶ τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔργα ('that Alexander and the deeds of Alexander were made clear by him and by his history', 4.10.1). So, from Callisthenes' point of view, Alexander is nothing without his words and he controls how Alexander is interpreted. It is interesting that Arrian should find this sentiment so distasteful, since he sees himself as the only writer to illuminate Alexander as he truly deserves and, because of this, should at least empathize with Callisthenes' aim. Yet Arrian finds the following statement of Callisthenes equally concerning: οὔκουν αὐτὸς ἀφῖχθαι ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου δόξαν κτησόμενος, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνον εὐκλεᾶ ἐς ἀνθρώπους ποιήσων ('he did not come to acquire fame from Alexander, but rather to make Alexander famous to men', 4.10.2).

Although Arrian does not explain why he disagrees with Callisthenes on these points, according to his own sentiments expressed in the preface and the delayed second preface, Arrian considers the historian and the hero to be in a partnership:[106] the one cannot exist

[106] Cf. Bosworth (1988), 33-5; (1995), 75.

without the other and both must strive for mutual excellence.[107] If the historian does his job correctly and well, then his fame is ensured as much as his subject's, and that subject also has a responsibility to supply worthy material. Thus, Callisthenes' statement – that he did not expect fame himself in spreading Alexander's fame – suggests he lacks any agency in his history and is completely at odds with his suggestion that Alexander's fame depends on his history. From Arrian's point of view, it cannot be a true and worthy evaluation of the subject, if the author offers no opinions or takes no responsibility for how the material is arranged and privileged. The unflattering depiction of Callisthenes, and his confusion over the control and spread of Alexander's fame, is possibly due to Callisthenes being a direct rival of Arrian: here was a man who understood the power a writer possessed over his subject's memory and the potential fame that could be accrued in interpreting that memory for posterity. Nevertheless, Callisthenes' history was represented as being highly encomiastic and playing up Alexander's claims to divinity and, consequently, was completely at odds with his personal and well-known opposition to Alexander's excesses.[108] Thus not only can the fame of the subject of a history be manipulated and controlled, but also that of the author. Arrian again places himself at the forefront of Alexander historians by reducing the fame of a rival in demonstrating that Callisthenes' literary representation of Alexander is flawed.

That Alexander's deeds are more obscure than Xenophon's ten thousand or the achievements of the Sicilian tyrants, as claimed by Arrian (1.12.2), is clearly an exaggeration. Arrian, himself, in his concluding passage states: ὡς ἔγωγε δοκῶ ὅτι οὔτε τι ἔθνος ἀνθρώπων οὔτε τις πόλις ἐν τῷ τότε ἦν οὔτε τις εἷς ἄνθρωπος εἰς ὃν οὐ πεφοιτήκει τὸ

[107] See *Anabasis* 1.12.5: καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε οὐκ ἀπαξιῶ ἐμαυτὸν τῶν πρώτων ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, εἴπερ οὖν καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ('I do not deem myself unworthy of the masters of Greek speech, if indeed Alexander is among the masters of weapons').
[108] See Bosworth (1995), 72-90. Cf. Arrian, *Anabasis* 4.10.1-11.9.

Ἀλεξάνδρου ὄνομα ('So I believe that at that time there was no race of men nor any city nor any individual whom the name of Alexander had not reached', 7.30.2).[109] Alexander's fame is (or at least was) ubiquitous. So, there must be a slightly different thrust to Arrian's claims that Alexanders deeds πολὺ μεῖον γιγνώσκεται and οὐδὲ ἐξηνέχθη... ἐπαξίως (1.12.2). Ἐκφέρω (1.12.2) as well as having the sense of 'publishing', is also commonly used of carrying some material object out into the light, especially of bringing corpses out for burial.[110] This implication, combined with the physicality of τὸ χωρίον, the setting of Achilles' tomb, and the established connection between σῆμα and σῶμα, gives Arrian's literary Alexander-memorial the flavour of a grave monument and one which has been obscured from sight prior to Arrian's unveiling. It is not the Sicilian tyrants and Xenophon's ten thousand which eclipse Alexander, but Pindar and Xenophon themselves, as literary artists, who overshadow those who have previously attempted to write Alexander. In other words, the written Alexander is less famous than the literary version of the tyrants or ten thousand. Consequently, in deeming himself not unworthy (οὐκ ἀπαξιώσας) to reveal (φανερὰ καταστήσειν) Alexander's deeds, Arrian is staking a claim to be as great a writer as Pindar or Xenophon (if not greater). He has already placed himself on the level of Homer, Thucydides, and Herodotus, now he is marking up two more canonical writers. Therefore, since he is worthy of canonicity, he does not need to inscribe (ἀναγράψαι) his own name on this literary grave stone that he is creating, because instead he is inscribing (ἀναγράφω) Alexander's history (οἵδε οἱ λόγοι),[111] which saves both the great man and himself from obscurity (οὐδὲ ἄγνωστον) (1.12.4-5). This work is to be canonical and famous from its inception. The repeated use of ἀναγράφω and its presence so close to Arrian's listing of those things which he will not mention about himself (items

[109] Moles (1985), 167 n. 39, notes that this seems to pick up Arrian's claim in the second preface that his name is not unknown to men (ὄνομα... οὐδὲ ἄγνωστον ἐς ἀνθρώπους, 1.12.5), thus comparing Arrian to Alexander again.
[110] See *LSJ* s.v. ἐκφέρω.
[111] I agree here with Moles (1985), 167, who sees οἵδε οἱ λόγοι as referring to the *Anabasis* contra Bosworth (1972), 168, who considers the phrase to refer to all Arrian's works.

of the kind that one does inscribe on monuments and includes in epitaphs)[112] drives home the sepulchral metaphor. So, Arrian is here building an inscribed grave monument on the literary landscape of Asia that memorializes Alexander (and at the same time himself) better than any physical structure and better than any previous literary attempt. Ptolemy may take possession of Alexander's body, but Arrian takes possession of his fame and inters it within the pages of his *Anabasis*. By doing so, he demonstrates his authority over the memory of Alexander and stakes his claim to being one of the great authors of Greek literature.

b) The Tomb of Cyrus

Alexander's encounter with another tomb, that of Cyrus the Great, once more highlights the failure of stone to withstand time and to commemorate successfully, and yet again reveals the inability of an individual to control his or her posthumous reputation. At the end of book 6 (6.29.4), Alexander comes to Persia and discovers the ransacking of Cyrus' tomb. In this passage, there are three competing claims staked for authority over the tomb: Arrian's, Alexander's, and Cyrus'. Here, Fowler's idea of a monument's meaning being constructed by the viewer from the 'ruins' he beholds and that the monument tells the viewer's own story comes to the fore.[113] Although the tomb is described pre-looting, it is never revealed to the reader from Cyrus' viewpoint, the one that truly matters in trying to decipher meaning from it. Even though all the participants in this passage – Arrian, Alexander, and Cyrus – attempt to claim it (even construct it) as their own interpretive space.

[112] Cf. Moles (1985), 166.
[113] See p. 164.

Arrian's description of the tomb is a commentary on his authority over both Alexander's and Cyrus' memory. He constructs his account in a way that underscores the fragility of commemoration and the inability of one to control it in the future. In the *Anabasis*, Cyrus' tomb begins as a ransacked monument. It is then 'reconstructed' by Arrian through a lengthy description of it in its prior pristine state, the evidence for which is taken from the autopsy of Aristobulus; this description is capped off by a recording of the inscription, spoken in the voice of Cyrus, recorded on the monument in Persian, but translated into the Greek of Arrian in the text. The tomb is then 'deconstructed', by which I mean that Arrian describes its interior again, this time in its looted and vandalized state, which is how it appeared to Alexander when he arrived at the monument. Finally, Alexander's orders to Aristobulus on how to restore the tomb are cited. Strabo also follows the account of Aristobulus and describes (although in less detail) the tomb's surroundings and contents, seguing straight into the description of its destruction, and ending his account with the inscription (*Geography* 15.3.7). Quintus Curtius, on the other hand, describes only the looted tomb and the persecution of the satrap Orxines (*History of Alexander* 10.1.30-8). Plutarch mentions that the tomb was rifled, identifies the culprit, and records the inscription (*Life of Alexander* 69.1-3).[114] Arrian's is by far the longest account and his arrangement of the material is significant.

Arrian's decision to detail the tomb in its pristine state before describing the inscription and then the tomb's destruction is an attempt to 'literally' possess it. Here he stresses his ownership of Alexander's experience, in that he sees the tomb in a state Alexander does not, but desperately wished to. The discrepancy in experience is stressed by the change from the past tense into the present at the moment Alexander arrives to find the tomb

[114] See Bosworth (1988), 46-55, on Arrian's and Strabo's accounts of the looted tomb. He notes the extra detail in Arrian's account and the differences in arrangement of material.

looted: Cyrus' tomb had been pristine, now it is ravaged. Although Alexander tries to put the tomb back together again, he can never equal the perfection of Arrian's description of the tomb before its looting. The Macedonian's attempt, capped off with his royal seal (a detail that exists only in Arrian), is merely an approximation. Like Arrian, Alexander leaves his mark on the tomb, but his recreation is flawed because the looters have also marked the tomb, removing objects and vandalizing parts of its structure. Arrian, on the other hand, details Cyrus' tomb in the order a visitor to it would have seen it prior to its ransacking, with one exception: the inscription is held back until just before the internal devastation is described. If a tomb is meant to speak with the voice of the dead, Arrian here silences Cyrus for as long as possible. When he does eventually allow him to speak, it is not the Persian of the original, but in Arrian's Greek translation. Even Cyrus' native voice is denied him and his message is appropriated and translated into Arrian's work. Admittedly, this is Arrian ensuring the monument is understandable to his Greek audience; nevertheless, it is an example of an inscription failing to contextualize a monument as it was intended: Cyrus' intent is filtered through Arrian's interpretive account.

Moreover, unlike the other authors who tack the inscription onto the end of their relation of this episode, he inserts the inscription immediately before he describes the ransacking of the tomb. It reads: ὦ ἄνθρωπε, ἐγὼ Κῦρός εἰμι ὁ Καμβύσου ὁ τὴν ἀρχὴν Πέρσαις καταστησάμενος καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας Βασιλεύσας. Μὴ οὖν φθονήσῃς μοι τοῦ μνήματος ('Mortal! I am Cyrus son of Cambyses, who founded the Persian empire and who was ruler of Asia. Do not begrudge me my monument!' 6.29.8). Although this is essentially the same inscription recorded by Strabo (15.3.7) and, therefore, must stem from Aristobulus,

Arrian's arrangement in this section is all important.[115] He is translating the whole episode so that its meaning to Alexander's story becomes clear to the reader. The irony in the inscription is all too apparent as it is immediately followed by a description of the destruction witnessed by Alexander. Cyrus' body, strewn in pieces around the tomb, is mocked by his own silent voice that arrogantly addresses the mortal passerby and claims a measure of immortality that is clearly belied by both his own present state and his now desecrated monument. If the tomb is considered to represent the body in a manner defying decay, the scene that meets Alexander's eyes makes a travesty of this idea, and also underscores just how easy it is to appropriate another's memorial. Cyrus, whom Pausanias records was known as 'the father of humanity' (πατὴρ ἀνθρώπων 8.43.6), is left in broken pieces about the tomb by vandals who were clearly ignorant of or unimpressed by his fame. The golden sarcophagus, on the other hand, that was intended to house his remains and keep them safe for eternity stands slightly damaged, but still unmoved where it has always been. Thus the trappings of royal burial survive, but the royal body itself is destroyed. It is Arrian's arrangement of the material that produces this pathos. And, indeed, Alexander's reconstruction of the tomb to some extent appropriates Cyrus' memorial for himself, just as Arrian's placement of Cyrus' inscription within his description makes its message intelligible for his audience in just the way he wants it to be: the desecrated tomb with its powerless inscription, which stands as the liminal element between the pristine and the looted monument, is a commentary on the mutability of fortune and the absolute nature of mortality. In Plutarch's version of the same incident, this notion is even spelt out:

[115] Strabo records: ὦ ἄνθρωπε, ἐγὼ Κῦρός εἰμι, ὁ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῖς Πέρσαις κτησάμενος καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας βασιλεύς· μὴ οὖν φθονήσῃς μοι τοῦ μνήματος. (15.3.7) Strabo also records the inscription noted by Onescritus, which was Greek but carved in Persian letters and coupled with the same inscription in Persian: ἐνθάδ' ἐγὼ κεῖμαι Κῦρος βασιλεὺς βασιλήων. The inscription recorded by Plutarch is below on p. 181. See Bosworth (1988), 50 n. 37, who explains that there is no trace of an inscription on the 'Tomb of the Mother of Solomon', which has been identified as Cyrus' tomb (47-50).

> Ἔπειτα τὸν Κύρου τάφον εὑρὼν διορωρυγμένον, ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἀδικήσαντα, καίτοι Πελλαῖος ἦν οὐ τῶν ἀσημοτάτων ὁ πλημμελήσας, ὄνομα Πουλαμάχος. τὴν δ' ἐπιγραφὴν ἀναγνούς, ἐκέλευσεν Ἑλληνικοῖς ὑποχαράξαι γράμμασιν. εἶχε δ' οὕτως· «ὦ ἄνθρωπε, ὅστις εἶ καὶ ὁπόθεν ἥκεις, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἥξεις οἶδα, ἐγὼ Κῦρός εἰμι ὁ Πέρσαις κτησάμενος τὴν ἀρχήν. μὴ οὖν τῆς ὀλίγης <μοι> ταύτης γῆς φθονήσῃς ἣ τοὐμὸν σῶμα περικαλύπτει.» ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐμπαθῆ σφόδρα τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐποίησεν, ἐν νῷ λαβόντα <τῶν πραγμάτων> τὴν ἀδηλότητα καὶ μεταβολήν.
>
> Then, having discovered that the tomb of Cyrus had been rifled, he put to death the perpetrator of the deed, although the culprit was a prominent Macedonian native of Pella, by name Polymachus. After reading the inscription upon this tomb, he ordered it to be repeated below in Greek letters. It ran thus: 'Mortal, whoever you are and from wherever you come, for I know that you will come, I am Cyrus, and I won for the Persians their empire. Do not, therefore, begrudge me this little earth which covers my body.' These words, then, deeply affected Alexander, who was reminded of the uncertainty and mutability of life. (Plutarch, *Alexander* 69.3-5)

Here, it is Alexander who translates the inscription and, in the process, makes the foreign words understandable to a Greek audience. His act of having the Greek translation inscribed is a process which identifies him with Cyrus. Indeed, that Alexander takes the side, so to speak, of Cyrus over the Macedonian vandal shows that in this instant his identity as famed king is being stressed over his cultural origins.[116] Moreover, the inscription itself is prescient: it is as though Cyrus has been waiting for Alexander himself in order to teach him this lesson on mortality and memory.[117] At the same time, that same lesson was lost on the Macedonian vandal who destroyed the tomb and, perhaps, this is part of Alexander's motivation in translating the Persian: the hope that if the vandal had understood the inscription he would have let Cyrus' memorial stand. Although Judith Mossman claims that (unlike Plutarch) Arrian is uninterested in Alexander's reaction to the destruction of Cyrus' tomb apart from noting that he wished to find those responsible,[118]

[116] Cf. Mossman (2006), 292: 'he is identifying more with the founder of the Persian empire than with a man from Pella'.
[117] Cf. Slater (2009), 72, on a similarly prescient inscription relating to Alexander in the eighth-century gamma version of the *Alexander Romance* 2.27.
[118] Mossman (2006), 291.

the same lesson is clearly implicit in Arrian's version of this incident: Alexander's distress stems from the realization that death brings the great low and makes them impotent. Alexander's need to see the tomb, directly after his return to Persia from India, highlights his obsession with memorialization and his reaction to the ransacking evinces his own personal fear of what will happen to his fame once he is dead. From Alexander's point of view, the tomb must be reconstructed as it once was, both because of Cyrus' claim on the tomb to have once ruled Asia and because of the obvious trouble Cyrus went to in order to construct an immortal monument that represented him as he wished to be represented. Alexander's own fame depends on the fame of his predecessors: the more impressive they were; the more impressive his achievement in surpassing them.

Importantly, Alexander fails to recreate the tomb as it was in one important particular: the body cannot be reconstructed; only what is salvageable can be placed back inside the sarcophagus, a circumstance that reveals Alexander's impotence in the face of mortality. In this case, the casket acts as a means of hiding the damage rather than protecting the body. In contrast to Plutarch's version, Alexander's lack of control is underscored by his inability to find and punish the culprits (6.29.11). Moreover, he changes the dynamics of the monument by securing the entrance and placing his seal upon it. This is similar to his act of switching armour at Troy: he embeds a part of himself on Cyrus' reconstructed tomb, a monument that fails to preserve memory as it was designed to do. In this way, Alexander appropriates a portion of Cyrus' fame and becomes the protector of that fame. In contrast, Arrian's description of the tomb prior to its looting stresses his achievement as a historian and guardian of future fame: he can cause the vandalism to be non-existent through the power of his description. Yet, at the same time, he also demonstrates his authority over how that monument is represented. He makes Cyrus' memory perfect, but perfect

according to Arrian, and he records the alternative in describing the vandalism and Alexander's imperfect reconstruction. In this way, Arrian highlights Alexander's own inevitable fate and, in the process, presents himself once more as the best candidate to preserve his memory, whilst at the same time acknowledging that no monument (including a literary one) is incorruptible. In the following section, I will consider two more incidences of interference with famous tombs – one reconstructive and the other deconstructive – that are designed to transfer some of the fame of the interred onto those individuals who interfere with the tombs.

Herodes Atticus and the Physical Appropriation of Cultural Memory

In this section my focus will be on Herodes Atticus' appropriation of inscriptions from the memorial for the fallen Athenians at the battle of Marathon in order to enhance his own project of personal commemoration. Before turning to this subject, however, I will make a brief detour to examine the interaction of Hadrian with the tomb of Ajax at Troy, as described by Philostratus' Vinedresser in the *Heroicus*, since it provides a neat transition between the activities of Alexander and those of Herodes Atticus. In the *Heroicus,* Philostratus' Vinedresser details an anecdote about the emperor Hadrian putting the tomb of Ajax at Troy back together after it was destroyed by a high tide. This provides a similar example of reconstructive effort as that of Alexander on Cyrus' tomb. The emperor kissed the bones, wrapped them, and then restored the tomb (Ἀδριανὸν βασιλέα περιστεῖλαι αὐτὰ ἐς Τροίαν ἐλθόντα καὶ τὸν νυνὶ τάφον περιαρμόσαι τῷ Αἴαντι ἔστιν ἃ καὶ προσπτυξάμενον τῶν ὀστῶν καὶ φιλήσαντα, *Heroicus* 8.1).[119] The inclusion of the emperor's intervention is intended to add veracity and authority to the Vinedresser's narrative about the extreme size of heroes' bones. However, depending on how the audience reads this episode – how

[119] Cf. Pausanias 1.35.4 in which the destruction of the tomb is recorded, but not Hadrian's intervention.

convinced it is by the Vinedresser's tales – it can be seen as either adding to the glory of Hadrian or mocking his gullibility. The precise literary character of this episode aside, much like Alexander, Hadrian's actions indicate his reverence for and attempt to take authority over the figure of Ajax. The hero's tomb stands due to the emperor's generosity and his name will be forever associated with this historic landmark. Moreover, his actions are consistent with the emperor who granted monumental benefactions to the cities of the Greek east, whilst simultaneously creating his own monumental legacy: Hadrian, like Herodes Atticus in Athens, built himself into the civic and sacred life of Greek cities;[120] restoring the tomb of a Homeric hero at the site of Troy is an act which writes the emperor into the history and landscape of that most important site. He appropriates cultural memory and uses it to enhance his reputation by leaving his mark at Troy as much as Alexander did in switching his armour. In Hadrian's case, however, his actions are those of a restorer and protector of Greek cultural legacy, whereas Alexander plundered the relics of Troy to make himself the inheritor of and partner in that legacy.

Herodes Atticus, on the other hand, provides a specific physical example of self-commemoration through the appropriation of earlier commemorative strategies in his removal of inscriptional elements from the tomb of the Athenians at Marathon in order to reintegrate them into his villa, situated in the Peloponnese in the area around the monastery of Loukou, which is nearby the ancient village of Eua, in the region known as Kynouria in antiquity.[121] This endeavour is absent from the literary record, but is one which reflects the self-conscious play with commemoration that I have traced in the authors of the second sophistic. The villa was begun some time during the Flavian era and the central Hypostyle Hall was completed in the time of Atticus and his son Herodes. Most

[120] See Boatwright (2000).
[121] The village is mentioned in Pausanias 2.38.7.

of the other construction was completed by these two as well.[122] In fact, the wealth of material (particularly sculptural), the elaborate buildings and gardens of the villa, and the similarities to some aspects of Hadrian's villa at Tivoli, suggest that this villa was designed as much as a museum as a country retreat for Herodes and his family.[123]

During excavations in June 2000, face down in the foundation of one of two storerooms built against the northern wall of the Hypostyle Hall, an inscribed stele was found.[124] This stele has been identified as one of ten commemorative *stelae* (one for each tribe), raised for the Athenian fallen in the Battle of Marathon in 490 BCE.[125] The inscription is headed by the name of the Erechtheis tribe (the first in the sequence), followed by an epigram, and then a list of twenty-two names.[126] The first line of the epigram is very difficult to read and no definitive version has been established.[127] For this reason translation is difficult, but the essence seems to be that report (φῆμις/φήμη)[128] of the excellence (ἀρετὴν)[129] of the dead of Marathon reaches the ends of the world, that they died fighting the Medes and crowning (ἐστεφάνωσαν)[130] Athens, a few men facing many more in battle.[131] Thus this *stele* is intended to commemorate the fame of the glorious dead. Since the *stele* is large and heavy, it is unlikely that it was moved far from its original position by the monks of Loukou, and

[122] Σπυροπούλος (2009), 12-13.
[123] On the design of the villa, see Σπυροπούλος (2009), 11-22. On the finds, see Σπυροπούλος (2009), 11-22; cf. Tobin (1997), 333-54. On the sculpture, see Spyropoulos (2001); on sculpture and mosaics, Spyropoulos and Spyropoulos (1996). On the emulation of Tivoli, see Tobin (1997), 292; Σπυροπούλος (2009), 12-19. Σπυροπούλος (2009), 19: Ταυτόχρονα αναδείκνυε κατά τον καλύτερα τρόπο το γόητρο του Ηρώδη ως κληρονόμου της εθνικής του παράδοσης και ως φιλόκαλου αριστοκράτη, ο οποίος διέθετε την περιουσία του για την προφύλαξη και προώθηση του κλασσικού πολιτισμού της Ελλάδος.
[124] Σπυροπούλος (2009), 23. Cf. Σταϊνχάουερ (2004-09), 679; (2009), 122.
[125] Σπυροπούλος (2009); Σταϊνχάουερ (2010). Cf. Σταϊνχάουερ (2004-09); (2009), 122. See Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 1.35.3.
[126] The inscription was first published as a transcription in Σταϊνχάουερ (2004-09), 680. Σπυροπούλος (2009) includes photographs of the stele. See also now Σταϊνχάουερ (2010); Ameling (2011), 11-17.
[127] See Ameling (2011), 13-14.
[128] ΦΕΜΙΣ/ΦΕΜΕ. See Ameling (2011), 13-14.
[129] APETEN. See Ameling (2011), 13-14.
[130] ΕΣΣΤΕΦΑΝΟΣΑΝ. See Ameling (2011), 13-14.
[131] For two slightly different versions of a transcription of the epigram, see Σταϊνχάουερ (2010), 100-01, and Ameling (2011), 13-14. Ameling explains that Steinhauer's version is impossible on metrical grounds (14).

the excavator, Giorgos Spyropoulos, has suggested that it was originally displayed within the Hypostyle Hall, which was the oldest and most formal of the villa's buildings.[132] Two more fragments from similar *stelae* were found within the Hall and built into the path leading to the north courtyard.[133] This would indicate that Herodes most probably had all ten of the *stelae* set up inside his villa.

Due to the autopsy of Pausanias, who reported seeing *stelae* engraved with the names of the dead for each tribe on the grave mound of the Athenians in book one of the *Description of Greece* (1.32.3), there has been speculation that Herodes' *stelae* were not original.[134] Steinhauer, however, has argued that the Loukou *stele* dates from the fifth century BCE, which has now been confirmed by Catherine Keesling.[135] Moreover, Spyropoulos argues that the memorial was moved from Marathon to Loukou after 165 CE, during or shortly following the period in which Herodes lost much of his family.[136] Consequently, it is more than possible that Herodes snatched the *stelae* after Pausanias had passed through and written about Marathon.[137] Spyropoulos bases this argument on a traceable shift in the design of the villa from a museum-like structure to a focus on honouring the dead. As well as the transferral of the Marathon *stelae*, the temple of Dionysus-Antinous was transformed into a Heroon; a series of statues of dancing figures were removed from the nymphaeum and replaced by niches filled with representations of members of Herodes' deceased family reclining on beds;[138] Herodes went on to establish games and feasts for the dead at this

[132] Σπυροπούλος (2009), 13, 24.
[133] Σπυροπούλος (2009), 23-4; Ameling (2011), 11, 21.
[134] See especially Ameling (2011), 20-3, who puts forward many possible objections to the stele being original, but also counters them with contrary arguments, saying: 'Echtheit oder Kopie – damit wird noch eine andere Frage aufgeworfen, die wohl nicht mehr zu lösen ist' (22).
[135] Σταϊνχάουερ (2004-09), 681-6; (2010); Keesling (2012).
[136] Σπυροπούλος (2009), 20.
[137] Σπυροπούλος (2009), 11, claims that the stele stems from the 'graves' of the Athenians, not from the 'tumulus' (από τους Τάφους και όχι τον Τύμβο των Αθηναίων στον Μαραθώνα). Cf. Σταϊνχάουερ (2004-09), 688-89.
[138] See Σπυροπούλος (2006), 24, for an illustration of these representations.

location; and he set up heroic and funerary reliefs, some of which also stemmed from classical period tombs. Spyropoulos explains:

> Οι αλλεπάλληλοι θάνατοι των προσφιλών του προσώπων, μεταξύ των ετών 165-170 μ.Χ., τον οδήγησαν σε υπερβολικές εκ δηλώσεις πένθους, οι οποίες αποτυπώθηκαν και στη Βίλα του στην Εύα. Στην τελευταία περίπτωση ο ιδρυτής της Βίλας μετέτρεψε ορισμένους χώρους σε κενοτάφια και καθιέρωσε αγώνες προς τιμήν των προσφιλών του νεκρών, ακολουθώντας το ηρωικό έθιμο της νεκρολατρίας. Συγκεκριμένα οι έξι κόγχες της Εξέδρας, στις οποίες είχαν στηθεί οι «Ορχούμενες Λάκαινες», αντικαταστάθηκαν με έξι «cubicula», τα οποία φιλοξενήσαν κλίνες, ο δε Ναός του Αντίνοου – Διονύσου μετατράπηκε σε Ηρώο.[139]

Although it is possible that the *stelae* are very good copies or from some memorial other than that situated at the tomb of the Athenians, the weight of evidence suggests that they are original. Therefore, it is probable that Herodes had all ten *stelae* removed from Marathon and taken to his Peloponnesian villa. Why would he do this? The incorporation of the entire honorific memorial to the fallen of Marathon would have enhanced the prestige of this monumental mausoleum and the removal of the *stelae* from Marathon, their transport to Loukou, and their re-establishment there was no small effort on Herodes' behalf and reveals his greater concern for his own renown than for the protection of one of classical Athens' most important memorials.[140] Indeed, it is probably because of the importance of the battle of Marathon to the Athenians, as well as the fact that Herodes proudly traced his line back to Miltiades and Cimon, as Philostratus points out (*VS* 546-7), that Herodes decided to resituate the *stelae* to his private estate.

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[139] Σπυροπούλος (2009), 20. Cf. Σπυροπούλος (2009), 20: Την αλλαγή στο Γλυπτό Διάκοσμο της έπαυλης δηλώνουν εύγλωττα οι επιτύμβιες στήλες, οι κλίνες, η αλλαγή της κατεύθυνσης των γλυπτών συμπλεγμάτων (Pasquino, Αχιλλέας-Πενθεσίλεια), τα ηρωικά ανάγλυφα, μεταξύ των οποίων και το ανάγλυφο με παράσταση Ιππέα και γενειοφόρου άνδρα (τέλος 5ου – αρχές 4ου αι. π. Χ. Τιμητικό ή νικητήριο ανάθημα ως ηρωικό ή ταφικό ανάγλυφο), τα «νεκρόδειπνα» από τον Ναό-Ηρώο του Αντίνοου και βεβαίως οι Στήλες των πεσόντων στη μάχη του Μαραθώνα, το ύψιστο μνημείο Ηρωολατρίας των Αθηναίων, το οποίο ο Ηρώδης μετέφερε αυτούσιο και έστησε στη Βίλα του μετά το 165 μ. Χ. Προς τιμήν των δικών του αφηρωισμένων νεκρών. See also Σπυροπούλος (2006) on the Heroon and reliefs.

[140] See Ameling (2011), 21, who notes that the sanctity of tombs was not critical to Herodes, who incorporated elements from other fifth century memorials as well.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Herodes' ties to Marathon were strong. His kidnapping of the Marathon memorial can be seen as almost the counterbalance to the Athenians' kidnapping of his body and its burial in Athens, despite his wishes to be interred in Marathon (*VS* 566). By taking the *stelae*, Herodes appropriates the significance attached to them for himself and his dead family. He essentially demonstrates his ownership of the Marathon legend. Since artefacts can never speak for themselves, they require supplementation, which for the tombs at Marathon were these commemorative *stelae*. In removing and resituating the *stelae*, Herodes displaces and appropriates this supplementation, redefining it for his own purposes. He forces the *stelae* into the role of honouring his personal dead with all the glorious tradition of the *Marathonomachoi*. This added to the transformation of the temple of Antinous-Dionysus into a Heroon and the introduction of feasts for the dead according to the requirements of hero-cult, as well as the proliferation of heroic art,[141] suggests that Herodes was constructing a kind of commemorative monumental anthology of heroic virtue for the benefit of himself and his predominantly deceased family. The resettlement of the Marathon memorial is analogous to an author inserting an inscription into his text and manipulating its meaning for his own literary ends.

In addition, the development of added clauses to many of the curse inscriptions, which were engraved on the statues of the three τρόφιμοι,[142] one example of which has been found at Loukou, indicate that Herodes was becoming more and more obsessed with safe-

[141] See Σπυροπούλος (2009), 20.
[142] See Tobin (1997), 113-60, for examples of the curse inscriptions and how they developed over time. Cf. Ameling (1983b), 23-9, nos. 147-70.

guarding the memory of his dead loved ones.[143] As though traumatized by his own vandalism of the Marathon memorial, Herodes' curse inscriptions become more and more explicit about exactly whom they are targeting. Initially, it is those who will come to own his land in the future, who might wish to move or destroy the monuments. Later, another clause is added, which precludes tampering with specific elements of the monuments. Finally, later still, a third clause is added, which curses anyone who influences anyone else to move or destroy the monuments (ὅστις ἢ προστάξειεν ἑτέρῳ ἢ γνώμης ἄρξειεν ἢ γνώμῃ συμβάλοιτο περὶ τοῦ τούτων τι κεινηθῆναι ἢ συνχυθῆναι).[144] This pedantry is ironic, given Herodes' purported act of removing the inscribed *stelae* from Marathon and suggests that, in some way, he conceived of the *stelae* as belonging to him (possibly as the descendant of Cimon and Miltiades) rather than to the *demos* of Athens. Nevertheless, both the curse inscriptions and the transposed Marathon memorial indicate the potential to redefine and redirect a monument's commemorative intention, as well as Herodes' need to communicate his and his family's virtue to the future.

Combined with this desire to secure his family's future memory with his monumental constructions and the growing paranoia of the curse inscriptions, is a complementary impulse to make the past work for Herodes' and his family's future commemoration. The Marathon inscriptions comprise one example of this, another is the arch discovered on his Marathon estate, which I discussed also in the first chapter.[145] This arch, which intertexts with both Hadrian's arch in Athens and Theseus' legendary pillar at the Isthmus, was initially designed to celebrate the marriage of Herodes and Regilla, and present the man to eternity as a bicultural, heroic, emperor-like husband. After Regilla dies, however, the

[143] See Tobin (1997), 114, for the find spots of 25 curse inscriptions.
[144] See Tobin (1997), 115, for text. The text she presents here is the curse inscription in its most complete form. Cf. *IG* II² 13188; *IG* II² 13192. Tobin notes that on many occasions the clauses were added by different hands, suggesting that they were also added at different times.
[145] See p. 75.

secondary inscription transforms the arch instead to a statement about the inevitability of death and the inability of man to control his fate, the very things that Herodes appears to have been trying to deny in his earlier monumental program.[146] According to Philostratus, Herodes' personal displays of mourning were excessive and mocked as such by his peers (*VS* 556-8), but in combination with his monumental focus on death and honouring the dead with games and feasts, they become reminiscent of the mourning displayed by Homeric heroes, such as Achilles for Patroclus. Certainly, despite the denials of Spyropoulos, there must have been a certain element of *epideixis* to this mourning.[147] If nothing else, it gave him the excuse to become more and more elaborate in his monumental building. In this way, Herodes pushed the boundaries between the adoption of a *persona* from the past and his contemporary *persona* in how he represented himself to the present and the future. It is very much the same kind of self-conscious play with temporal positioning and the preservation of memory that can be seen in the textual works of authors like Arrian, and it also displays the same desperation and helplessness in the face of inevitable oblivion. Herodes' present was preoccupied with leaving a lasting mark for future generations through the emulation and superseding of examples from the past, both distant Greek and imperial Roman.

Conclusion

In the above discussion, I have detailed the practice in this period of appropriating and employing others' reputations for one's own future commemoration. The reuse of historical memory to create future memory and the claiming of authority over the famous and their memorialization, allows an individual to piggyback on the fame of his

[146] The secondary inscription is quoted on p. 76 above.

[147] Σπυροπούλος (2009), 20: Και ο Ηρώδης Αττικός ως Ομερικός Ήρωας συμπεριφέρθηκε απέναντι στους νεκρούς του, τους οποίους θρήνησε κραυγαλέως, κήδευσε και τίμησε με δείπνα και αγώνες και τους ίδιους οίκους διαρρύθμισε και μετέτρεψε σε πένθιμη σκηνογραφία της βαρυαλγούσης ψυχής του. On Herodes' extravagant mourning, see also Tobin (1997), 248-9; Gleason (2010), 157-62.

predecessors. Nevertheless, these attempts to mark the literary and physical landscape are suffused with a sense that the project could be ultimately pointless, given the inability of anyone to control his future reputation. Yet at the same time this ambivalence does not bring about any desire to abandon the task. Imperial Greeks are not helpless in the face of their belatedness. Instead they use their authority over the past, not to imitate or even emulate it, but to create their own space in the literary or historical record, always with one eye on the future. Moreover, they learn from the examples of Roman emperors and build themselves into the physical world. Accordingly, inscriptions prove to be an important medium for their project of creating future reputation. The use of inscriptions in the physical world and the presence of famous monuments from an earlier age are reflected in the literary works of these men: imperial Greek writers make the past work for themselves and their own commemoration. They play on the tropes and with the authors of the past in a self-conscious, self-reflexive manner, showing themselves aware of the vulnerability of fame and reputation, as well as the potential for its projection into the future. This practice seems to stem from their unique temporal duality, in that they are conscious of both the great span of history behind them and the one that must surely follow their own time. Moreover, the weight of history allows them to see themselves as the equals of great literary or historical figures from the past. The evocation of Alexander or the emulation of Homer serves as a starting point for something greater. These are not individuals in whose shadows to cower, but paradigms from which to depart.

CHAPTER FOUR

Statues

I am not some stone commission,
Like a statue in a park.
I am flesh and blood and vision;
I am howling in the dark.
Joni Mitchell, *Come in from the Cold* (1991).

In the previous chapter, I considered the role of inscribed monuments in the literature of the second sophistic and how some of the literary characteristics carry over into the actual monuments of Greek elites in the Roman empire. I focused particularly on the way monuments form a point of conflict and tension between the desire to create a relationship with posterity and the knowledge that one cannot control future reputation. In this chapter, I take a closer look at one specific type of inscribed monument: the honorific statue. Although inscriptions were as integral to honorific statues as they were to all monuments, I am considering statues here separately from the generalized concept of an inscribed monument because of their mimetic qualities and their special ability to replace the individual whom they represent. It is this aspect that I am interested in, both in the sense of the statue being a physical replacement for its subject and in that of the statue representing metaphorically some facet or characteristic of the individual's identity, or some dilemma faced by that individual. Given the inanimate, fixed nature of the statue and its role as representation of a living person, in the quest to create lasting fame it becomes a focal point for all sorts of tensions between such concepts as movement and inertia, life and death, self-identity and perceived identity, communication and silence, the oral and the written, illusion and reality, the transient and the eternal.

According to Philostratus in his *Lives of the Sophists* those men who are involved in his second sophistic claim fame and attempt to reach out to posterity in a variety of ways. As

this thesis has shown, they do so with a combination of literary and monumental efforts. Philostratus devotes considerable space to non-literary methods of memorialization, including the erection of honorific statues, the granting of benefactions to specific cities, and the construction of monuments or public buildings. This chapter's primary focus is the incorporation and manipulation of honorific statues in epideictic literature, by which I mean texts that present themselves as the written recordings of epideictic speeches. I argue that statues are used textually in a variety of ways to court posterity. Although the two art forms – literature and sculpture – are always both complementary and in competition, by melding them together, it is possible for the text to assume a sense of the monumental. Unlike a genuine statue, however, which is both sedentary and whose meaning is derived necessarily from its context, the statue that is translated into text is able to travel both geographically and chronologically to spread the author or narrator's personally constructed fame. And statues are frequently employed as a means to construct identity by writers, whether it be self-identity through reflection on a representation of the self or self-identity through reflection on the representation of another. Equally, the discussion or manipulation of a statue of any individual can be used to muse on that person's individual characteristics. When a statue does appear in a literary work, it is never neutral. Honorific statues signify permanence, but as we have seen epideictic oratory is meant to be a transient and improvised genre. The difficulty of obtaining some form of memorialization for exponents of sophistic *epideixis* was a very real problem because of its improvisational nature and the challenge to make a speech transcend the performative moment was ever present. As I will demonstrate below, statues in sophistic epideictic literature often play out these concerns. Consequently, I will argue that literary statues are emblematic of the struggle for memorialization faced by those men active in Philostratus' second sophistic. For Philostratus' sophists, in their literary efforts, there is a tension between permanence and transience, performance and text, canon and innovation, reverence for the past and the

desire for immortal fame. The representation or metaphor of statuary is one means by which to imbue their speeches with the appearance of greater permanence and to try to control their own reputation, but this process is not always straightforward, and text and statue do not always mix harmoniously. Before moving onto the literary texts, however, I will say some words about the function of honorific statues in the empire and the place of a statue within text.

The Place of Honorific Statues within the Empire and within the Text

Honorific statues could be either private or public dedications; both types became increasingly frequent from the second century BCE onwards, continuing into the Roman period, and the practices of both public and private dedication influenced and encouraged each other.[1] In this chapter, my interest lies predominantly in public dedications. Public honorific statues were physical embodiments of both the reciprocity and the power relationship between a benefactor and a city.[2] John Ma even describes the inscribed honorific statue as being representative not of the person in and of him- or herself, but of the relationship between that individual and the dedicator.[3] R. R. R. Smith summarizes the public honorific statue in this way: 'As a purely symbolic reward for public-spirited benefactions, a city notable received a decree of people and council, public praise, and a statue in a public place set on an inscribed base. The sound of the praise faded quickly, but the statues remained as enduring symbols and treasured family monuments'.[4] The benefactor could be one of the city's own citizens or a foreigner, who took a particular

[1] See Ma (2007), 203-4.
[2] Martin (1996), 53. Cf. Welsh (1904-05), 35; Smith (1998), 56; Platt (2007), 250. See also Ma (2007), 203-4, on particularly Hellenistic honorific statues. See van Nijf (2000) on the collective effect of inscriptions to define identity and civic memory for the city of Termessos. See Henderson (2002), 155-71, especially 161.
[3] Ma (2007), 213-4. Cf. Smith (1998), 61.
[4] Smith (1998), 63.

interest in a given locale.[5] Indeed, statues were the most common honour given to Roman benefactors in Greece.[6] Because of their nature as symbols of the gratitude of the *demos* to a particular person, they had the potential to create discord as much as harmony. In the second chapter of this thesis, we saw the difficult relationship that existed between Herodes Atticus and the city of Athens, despite his lavish benefactions; the complexity and fragility of interaction between the elite stratum of society and the *demos* of any given city meant political rivalries had the potential to completely displace an individual from a position of pre-eminence amongst the population and visible symbols of favour or honour were possible sources of envy among the aristocracy, potentially leading to animosity and active efforts to undermine those who held the favour of the people (or, indeed, the emperor) at any given time.[7] Thus the award of an honorific statue, although in theory a great blessing, could also turn into a curse.

One factor of honorific statues, which could be considered limiting, was this very specificity. They were generally granted by and targeted at a specific community. As a result, statues (much like monumental benefactions) are public, civic-based bids for lasting fame, which signal a complex set of relationships and serve to locate the individual represented within his or her society and to preserve that position for posterity.[8] Though potentially highly visible, a statue's audience extends only to those who frequent its vicinity (or hear tell of it). In contrast, literary output is aimed at all literate and intellectual society (and through them the illiterate also), both in the present and the future. The statue or benefaction lays claim to posterity by continually reminding a specific community of the

[5] Stewart (1979), 115-6.
[6] Højte (2002), 55.
[7] See Martin (1996) for a discussion of an inscription from the tenth Augustan region of Italy that details the rise and fall of a prominent local citizen (*CIL* V 5049).
[8] See Woolf (1996), 29-34, for the use of inscriptions to fix the individual's place in society, history, and the cosmos.

debt it owes to the subject of the statue or the benefactor and, at the same time, fulfils that debt. Moreover, the static statue tended to be commissioned or granted for a single specific achievement or event, such as an athletic victory, or a series of civic services. Thus for as long as it stands or as long as its intention is remembered a statue records a single moment in time. As such, in the context of posterity, a statue represents also the tension between a specified and universal identity. It is, to some extent, a caricature of the individual it describes. Nevertheless, by its very fixity and visibility, a statue has the potential to extend one's fame well beyond the present, and to a much broader cross-section of society than a written text.

In the previous chapter, I spent some time discussing the importance of the marriage between an inscription and its monument, in that a monument gains meaning from its context and without an accompanying inscription sometimes a monument's context can be obscured, lost, or misinterpreted. As with monuments in general, writing in the form of an inscription was always an aid in preserving the original context of a statue. Statuary does have an advantage over other forms of memorialization, in that it possesses its own inherent qualities and conventions which facilitate recognition of its subject, such as the conformity of religious or imperial images, or specific types such as athletes or philosophers.[9] Yet in a world before mass media, without an inscription on the statue base, those who could identify the living model for any given statue would be limited to those who knew that individual by sight (provided that the statue's features genuinely resembled the individual represented or, at least, all his or her statues had a uniform likeness).[10] Thus

[9] See Ma (2007), 204; Platt (2007), 259. See Zanker, (1995) on the diachronic development of the image of the intellectual.

[10] Cf. Platt (2007), 259: 'The portrait gains its power by conjuring up the individual it represents before the eye of the viewer while simultaneously conferring greater beauty or dignity. Without the visual and conceptual link between the image and the individual it represents, however, the portrait loses its immediacy

the setting and dedication of a statue was essential to its interpretation and the inscription assigned political and social meaning to the image.[11] Moreover, the inscription by its conventions of expression helped to strengthen the connection between living model and statue. The majority of honorific statues placed the dedicator in the nominative and the individual represented in the accusative without mentioning the statue itself.[12] For example, 'the *demos* dedicates X', where X is the name of the individual represented. As noted by John Ma, the absence of the phrase, 'a statue of', highlights the replacement function of the statue itself for its living subject through drawing attention to their discreteness. He explains:

> 'The people has dedicated (this statue of) X'. The little phrase in parenthesis takes us insistently and pervasively to the heart of what images do: they confront the viewer with a presence which is also an absence… The city has not dedicated Patron, the flesh-and-blood, breathing, now living but one day to be deceased, human being, but (an image/this image of) Patron; the text, with its ellipsis, underlines the fact of representation: representation is itself offset and represented, and the statue, not mentioned but immediately thought of when the text is read, is both absent (in the text) and present (in indisputably physical form, bronze or marble, before the viewer-reader), like the represented person, personally absent yet present through the image.[13]

Moreover, what this dedication formulation further highlights, with its active dedicator and passive recipient of honour, is the lack of control that a benefactor has over the form of his or her representation and honouring,[14] even though it is possible that the recipient of the honour would have been required to put up the funds for the statue himself.[15] Also, the *demos* is generally the body which decides on the form the statue takes, so they have artistic as well as epigraphic control.

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and becomes another anonymous example of a type – a magistrate, general, athlete or philosopher. In normal circumstances, the inscription tightens the relationship between the image and the real person it depicts'.

[11] See Smith (1998), 56, 61; Ma (2007), 205; Platt (2007), 251.

[12] See Ma (2007), 205-15, for the grammar of honorific inscriptions and the politics of this grammar.

[13] Ma (2007), 209. See also Henderson (2002), 161.

[14] See Steiner (2001), 265-81, on the complex interaction and negotiation between *demos* and honourand with respect to honorific statues and encomia. See Ma (2007), 214, for examples of how the power of the *demos* can be stressed in the honorific image.

[15] Veyne (1990), 125.

Despite all this meaning attached to an honorific statue and its accompanying inscription, the context of a statue remained fragile. Other than the tyranny of time, which is the enemy of all attempts at commemoration, a statue could be removed, rededicated, or be separated from its intended inscription, all circumstances which irrevocably change its initial meaning. In the last case, if no inscription existed, confusion could reign over who in fact was represented, as in Philostratus' *Heroicus* 19.5, where the identity of a statue of Hector is doubted.[16] At *Heroicus* 9.6, on the other hand, in which the cult statue of Protesilaus is described as worn and altered by both time and the repeated attentions of worshippers, the value of the worn statue and its ability to stand in for the hero is implicitly questioned: περιτρίψας δὲ αὐτὸ ὁ χρόνος καὶ νὴ Δί' οἱ ἀλείφοντές τε καὶ οἱ ἐπισφραγιζόμενοι τὰς εὐχὰς ἐξηλλάχασι τοῦ εἴδους. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐδὲν τοῦτο, αὐτῷ γὰρ ξύνειμι καὶ αὐτὸν βλέπω καὶ οὐδὲν ἄν μοι γένοιτο ἄγαλμα ἐκείνου ἥδιον ('Time has worn it away and, by Zeus, those who anoint it and seal their vows here have changed its form. But to me this is nothing; for I spend time with him and I see him, and no statue could be more pleasant than that man', 9.6-7). In this passage, the stress is on seeing the true form of Protesilaus, which to the Vinedresser is the reanimated hero rather than the worn statue, since the shape of the latter – το εἶδος (literally 'that which is seen') – has been altered. So, the Vinedresser has no need of the statue, because he has the hero himself. Here, once more, as I discussed briefly in the first chapter of this thesis with respect to Odysseus (and Xenophon), the distal pronoun ἐκεῖνος is used in an honorific sense for the absent great man.[17]

[16] I will return to this episode below, p. 207.
[17] See p. 56.

So, in this case, the accuracy of the statue's appearance impacts on its ability to perform its designated job. Although in Roman thought a portrait statue was understood to be 'a mimetic representation of an individual', in practice statues became more stereotyped and generic in form so as to be largely indistinguishable within categories of type.[18] Therefore the inscription became ever more important and this generic characteristic encouraged the reuse and rededication of statues, a practice which became popular during the empire. It has been suggested that such rededication was due to its relative inexpensiveness and the economic hardship of many Greek cities;[19] the practice, however, also occurred in prosperous cities, so the explanation cannot be always as simple as poverty.[20] It is possible that the rededication of Greek statues to Roman benefactors may have been a deliberate strategy to show the honorand as both a Roman and a member of that Greek city, as a way of indicating the city had powerful friends on whom they could count.[21] The practice of rededication is condemned by Favorinus at *Corinthian Oration* 37.40 (=[Dio Chrysostom], *Oration* 37.40),[22] a speech to which I will return below, and is the subject of Dio Chrysostom's *Rhodian Oration*.[23] Both authors underscore the incongruity of having the representation of one person labelled by the name of another, whose identity is in no way comparable. This is what Favorinus refers to as statues having a 'Greek character, but Roman fortune' (τρόπον μὲν Ἑλλήνων, τύχας δὲ Ῥωμαίων, *Orations* 37.40). As an example, he cites a statue of Alcibiades that was reassigned to the emperor Nero (37.40). The phrase 'Greek character, but Roman fortune' stresses the cultural divide, but there is also a

[18] Stewart (2003), 80.
[19] See especially Platt (2007), 254-6, and Shear (2007), 223, with accompanying bibliography. Blanck (1969), 99-105, makes the case for rededication due to economic hardship. See also Kinney (1997), 134-5.
[20] Shear (2007), 223.
[21] See Shear (2007), 242-246. Her focus is a group of statue bases from the Athenian Acropolis which bear both the original Greek inscription and a second one made in Roman times. Consequently, this is a very specific circumstance, but the notion is extendable as an alternative way of conceiving statues with erased and replaced primary inscriptions.
[22] Favorinus' *Corinthian Oration* is preserved in the corpus of Dio Chrysostom as *Oration* 37. I will refer to the author as Favorinus in what follows, but the speech interchangeably as *Oration* 37 or *Corinthian Oration*.
[23] See also Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 6.1.26; Plutarch, *Antony* 60; Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 2.17.3. For my discussion of the *Corinthian Oration*, go to p. 205. See also Alcock (2002), 60.

temporal aspect given the primacy of the Greek statue. In the particular example he uses, the fame/infamy of the individuals concerned adds a sense of the ridiculous to the process: are we to see both Nero and Alcibiades in the statue and, if so, what claim is Nero making? Has he become the new Alcibiades, as Polemo was labelled the new Demosthenes,[24] or is it merely the beauty of the statue that he wishes to annex to himself rather than the character of Alcibiades?[25] It does seem that in this case the two identifications exist for Favorinus at the same time: the statue is both somehow Nero and Alcibiades.[26] Dio, on the other hand, uses more generic examples, such as statues of young men rededicated with the names of old men, and in these cases Dio seems to consider the statue to have in some way become the second individual.[27]

The application of a new inscription to a statue undermines the specificity of the statue's depiction – it ceases to be an accurate representation.[28] However, the implications extend beyond the individuality of any given statue. As Dio argues, rededicating an honorific statue completely undermines the whole honorific system:

> εἰ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἅμα καὶ συμφέρον φήσουσιν εἶναι τὸ ἑτέρους τιμᾶν, πῶς οὐχ ὑπεναντίον ἐστὶ τούτῳ τοὺς πρότερον οὕτω τετιμημένους ὑβρίζειν; ὃ γὰρ τῶν πρότερόν τις οὐκ ἂν εἵλετο λαβεῖν, εἰδὼς τοῦτο ἐσόμενον, πῶς εἰκός ἐστι τῶν νῦν τινα ἡδέως λαμβάνειν ὁρῶντα τὸ γιγνόμενον;
>
> If they will say that it is both necessary and expedient to honour men of a later time also, is it not the very reverse of this to insult the men who in the past have received these honours? For what no man of former times would have chosen to accept if he had known that this was going to happen; is it at all reasonable to suppose that any man of the present day is glad to accept when he sees what is being done? (Dio, *Oration* 31.30)

[24] See chapter one, p. 50.
[25] Cf. Platt (2007), 258: 'When one changes the 'label' or 'title' of a work of art, does one also change the very nature of the image itself…? Which element – text or image – prevails?'
[26] Cf. Shear (2007), 225: 'Favorinus seems to think of it as still representing, or perhaps being, Alcibiades in some sense'.
[27] Cf. Shear (2007), 224-5. See also Platt (2007), 258-60.
[28] Platt (2007), 260.

Dio stresses that this kind of honour, which continues to exist or is destroyed on the whim of a magistrate (31.9), is no honour at all. For a statue to reach out to posterity it must maintain its identification and, when this is uncertain, the whole purpose of the statue is undermined.[29] At the same time, this kind of rededication shares a lot in common with the Roman practice of *damnatio memoriae*, itself a complex set of practices.[30] Memory sanctions in the Roman empire took various forms, from the complete obliteration of images, the removal of inscribed names, the partial removal of an image, to the re-sculpting of an image.[31] The process, however, rarely destroyed the public memory of the victim, but rather commemorated that individual's disgrace, since the specificity of erasure or modification usually left no doubt as to the identity of the victim.[32] Indeed, in some cases the original identity was preserved in recut images either to signify the owner of the secondary portrait's association with or victory over the owner of the primary portrait.[33] Nevertheless, in the case of a less famous individual in contemporary times, the rededication of his or her statue may well eradicate the individual's commemoration entirely, since his or her identity was not so melded to the monument in the public imagination. Context, however, could be disturbed in other ways as well. Despite its semblance of fixity and durability, a statue could be removed, as in the case of Favorinus' Corinthian statue (a case to which I will return in the next section below), or simply moved. Peter Stewart explains that the moving of a statue had its benefits, in that it could draw attention back to a statue that by its very fixity had fallen out of public

[29] Cf. Platt (2007), 264, on memory sanctions: 'the practice struck at the heart of the aspirations which gave the honorific statue meaning – the principle of *memoria*, the lasting commemoration of achievement and prestige which was the aim of well-nigh every public figure in the Graeco-Roman world'.
[30] On *damnatio memoriae* (a modern name for a set of ancient practices), see Elsner (2003), 211-19; Stewart (2003), 267-83; Flower (2006), 197-275; Platt (2007), 263-66.
[31] Elsner (2003), 211-19; Platt (2007), 263-5.
[32] Elsner (2003), 211-19.
[33] Elsner (2003), 214-218; cf. Platt (2007), 264-5.

consciousness.[34] Nevertheless, for this effect to take place, the identity of and reasons for the initial dedication would need to be preserved.

So, what are the advantages of translating a statue into text, both for the text and the image? That a statue is a mimetic representation of a specific individual and, accordingly, possesses an innate specific identity lends its textualized version the ability to imbue the text with its own special personal characteristics. Deborah Steiner explains:

> Authors… embed plastic representations in their works not so much to contest or challenge the image's claim as to harness its powers to their poetry or prose. The uncanny activities of statues… reappear in this more bounded form: the object that can amaze, entrance, petrify, and generate love in its viewers, that can move, see, and even talk, lends its many dimensions to the text, transferring its affective and performative faculties to the words that describe or surround it, and granting to the more ephemeral composition something of its own material character. [35]

In Steiner's conception, the textualized statue takes over the text to a certain extent and gives the text its own personality. At the same time, it provides something solid on which to pin the words and ideas. In the world of sophistic *epideixis*, such a physicality and focal point to a speech or text aids both memorization and the oral transmission of the text – in passing on what one has read or heard. Equally, encapsulating a statue in writing overcomes many of the limitations of the monument itself and is an idea that once more extends back to Pindar:

> Οὐκ ἀνδριαντοποιός εἰμ', ὥστ' ἐλινύσοντα ἐργάζεσθαι ἀγάλματ'
> ἐπ' αὐτᾶς βαθμίδος
> ἑσταότ'· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάσας ὁλκάδος ἔν τ' ἀκάτῳ, γλυκεῖ' ἀοιδά,
> στεῖχ' ἀπ' Αἰγίνας διαγγέλλοισ', ὅτι
> Λάμπωνος υἱὸς Πυθέας εὐρυσθενής
> νίκη Νεμείοις παγκρατίου στέφανον,
>
> I am not a sculptor, to make statues that stand motionless on the same pedestal. Sweet song, go on every merchant-ship and rowboat that leaves Aegina, and announce that Lampon's powerful son Pytheas won the

[34] Stewart (2003), 149.
[35] Steiner (2001), 252.

> victory garland for the *pancration* at the Nemean games. (*Nemean Odes* 5.1-6)

Here, instead of the dedicator dictating the message of an honorific statue, the text assumes control of its subject's fame. Pindar's song takes that civic-based, single moment in time (which a statue describes) and makes it moveable, both geographically and temporally, so that the subject's fame can reach beyond its normal confines. As a text, it can travel as far as a literate, educated audience, who can both read the text and perform the text to the illiterate, extends. As an oral song, it skips the requirement for a literate intermediary and can reach any individual who understands Greek. To some extent, statuary can perform a function similar to a text's ability to travel: if there are numerous statues of an individual in several different cities, then his fame itself has travelled too. Each statue, however, remains in a specific relationship with the particular city that it graces. Consequently, the precise reason for memorialization differs between statues and depends on the individual's connection to those who erected the monument.[36] This is the case with sophists in particular, who travelled the empire and formed specific relationships with specific places. In this way the significance of their images differs markedly from statuary of the imperial family, for example, whose repeated images were a means of extending their presence physically throughout the empire as well as within the minds of their subjects.[37]

Encapsulating a statue in a piece of literature, on the other hand, allows the author to inscribe it with his own personal message: it assigns meaning to it, placing the author's

[36] See Elsner (1998), 170-2, for a discussion on how copies of statues and the Roman tendency to create private 'museums' of statuary radically altered context and, therefore, interpretation of the original.
[37] See Ando (2000), 228-45, especially 232-39. See Elsner (1998), 54, on the ubiquitous nature of imperial images. See also Severian of Gabala, *On the Creation of the World* 5.5, which explains the importance of imperial images in official places, since the emperor cannot be present everywhere at once. See Fronto, *Letters* 4.12.6.

mark and interpretation on it. Writing gives the statue a voice and life that is both separate and connected to those of the statue's subject. Rather than relying on the civic community to inscribe the statue with appropriate words, the author or narrator assumes control of how he is to be represented and, consequently, how he is to be remembered. Thus the translation of a statue into a circulating text can both extend the monument's reach, redefine its meaning entirely according to how the author wishes his fame to be propagated, and make that particular interpretation of the statue authoritative. As I discussed in the previous chapter, on account of the reach of and the authoritative nature of the way in which an author can present a textualized statue, it can function in a similar way to Augustus' *Res Gestae*, the text of which was monumentalized on inscribed stelae placed around the empire (or at least in the province of Galatia).[38] They too were designed to present an authoritative version of one man's achievements. Accordingly, like the statue within a text, each copy spread a predominantly uniform message.

The texts that I will discuss below manipulate the representation and imagery of statues in different ways, yet also explicitly deal with the tensions between written and monumental commemoration, as well as the problem of transience versus permanence in epideictic oratory. I will begin with Favorinus' *Corinthian Oration*, which reveals a sense of anxiety over the power a city has over an individual's reputation once they decide to honour him with a statue, and which also considers the question of how best to be commemorated – in text or bronze. Then I will move on to Apuleius' *Florida* 16 and the *Callimachus* and *Cynegirus* of Polemo, both of which use the frozen, death-like state of statues to discuss the limitations of such fixed commemoration. Finally, I will conclude with Lucian's *Dream*, a

[38] On the relationship of the *Res Gestae* to Galatia, see Cooley (2009), 18-22. See also Elsner (1996). For my earlier discussion, see p. 150.

text which uses the metaphor of statuary to muse on the relative benefits of attempting to accrue contemporary fame or to aim one's works at a more eternal audience.

Favorinus' *Corinthian Oration*: Textualizing fame, man, and monument.

This speech, preserved as the 37th Oration of Dio Chrysostom, is addressed to the citizens of Corinth and is in response to the removal of Favorinus' statue from the city. Exactly why the statue was removed is unclear, but it appears to have been the city's attempt to show solidarity with the emperor Hadrian when it had been reported to the citizens that Favorinus had fallen out of favour.[39] Philostratus relates two possible reasons: the first being that Favorinus was charged by a man of consular rank with adultery (*VS* 489), the second that Hadrian became angry when Favorinus tried to get out of serving as high priest in his home province (*VS* 490). The latter of these is cited by Philostratus as the reason the Athenians removed the statue that they had granted him from their city, although Philostratus claims this was an over-reaction to a frivolous whim of Hadrian (*VS* 490). This speech has been studied in depth by Maud Gleason and Jason König. Gleason argues that Favorinus uses the speech to construct personal identity; König contextualizes the speech in its Corinthian setting and considers the way Favorinus plays with both his and the city's cultural affiliations and identity.[40] Verity Platt uses the speech in a section of her wider study to consider the practice of statue rededication and the precarious nature of honours granted by cities in the imperial age.[41] My interest in the speech lies in Favorinus' concern for his contemporary and future reputation, as well as in his presentation of the written word versus the statue as means of preserving it.

[39] See Gleason (1995), 5, 146-8; Holford-Strevens (1997), 192-96; Stewart (2003), 287-8. See also Philostratus, *VS* 489-90.
[40] Gleason (1995); König (2001). See also Whitmarsh (2001), 119-21. See the commentary of Barigazzi (1966), 298-46, for a general discussion of the text.
[41] Platt (2007), 262-66.

As Gleason has noted, the award of an honorific statue to Favorinus by Corinth was a lasting symbol of his ability as a speech maker, a reminder of numerous discrete and fleeting performances.[42] Consequently, the removal of the statue threatens both his contemporary and his future fame, since it suggests that these achievements are no longer worthy of commemoration. His decision to compose this piece, which is cast as though it were delivered before the Corinthians, although there is no evidence to prove whether or not this really happened, is an act which inverts the idea of the statue representing his sophistic successes in Corinth and makes the speech instead a memorial of the statue and all that he decides to invest in it. Thus he pits text and monument against each other at the same time as toying with the audience's preconceived ideas of their respective limitations. All things being equal, a monument should be long-lasting, but its context is unstable; a text is better able to explain its own context, but is easier to destroy (in an undisseminated form anyway). In this oration, Favorinus takes the statue and its context (in that it was granted to him for his sophistic activities within Corinth) and gives them the ability to travel beyond the confines of the city. He plays with the idea of representation, by identifying himself with his statue to such an extent that he and the statue become interchangeable whilst at the same time denying the power that the statue and, more particularly, its removal has over his current and lasting reputation. Although the statue is now physically absent from Corinth, Favorinus resurrects it and animates it. He details his understanding of why it was dedicated in the first place, glosses over the reasons for its removal, explains why the Corinthians have made a mistake, and then demonstrates why he believes the statue's removal is ultimately unimportant. Moreover, although the speech is addressed to the Corinthians, once it is recorded in writing, it becomes a document that

[42] Gleason (1995), 8.

can circulate throughout the contemporary empire and the future literate world, and each time it is read, Favorinus re-performs and makes his case again.

One of the fundamental functions of statuary is to replace or assume the position of the individual upon whom the statue is modelled.[43] This is particularly seen in the case of gods, whose cult images were considered to *be* the god whom they represented: the image both housed the god and made him/her present.[44] Philostratus' *Heroicus* also reflects this belief in the story of Hector's statue at Troy. In this tale, an affront to the statue is dealt with by the apparition of the legendary hero himself (19.1-7). Favorinus also plays with this idea. He explains that the statue was erected as a substitute for himself only once the Corinthians failed to convince him to stay in their city in person; accordingly, they set up an 'image of his body' instead (τὴν εἰκὼ τοῦ σώματος ἐποιήσασθε, 37.8). And, he explains, it was positioned before the library so that he could continue to inspire the Corinthian youth to become proficient in the same exploits for which the statue had been awarded. Of course the statue does not adequately replace Favorinus because it can only remind students of his past performances; it cannot perform for them or teach them as the living man might. Thus the statue and Corinth have a reciprocal relationship, in that through it the city bestows honour and fame on Favorinus and his inclusion in the city through his statue is intended to enhance the city's reputation to make it seem a place renowned for learning and culture. The statue is symbolic of Favorinus' existence within and engagement with the city. Favorinus stresses the specificity of the statue – that it represents Favorinus' relationship with Corinth rather than the man in all his facets – by using language which marks it as a citizen rather than an ornament. He makes this clear when, in admonishing the Corinthians for removing the statue in response to rumours of his disgrace, he says:

[43] See Steiner (2001), 3-78, on statues as replacing or replicating an individual.
[44] See Spivey (1997), 452-3; Elsner (2007), 11.

αὐτοὺς τοὺς Κορινθίους ἐκβαλεῖν αὐτὸν μήτε κρίσεως προτεθείσης μήθ' ὅλως αἰτίαν ἔχοντας ἐπενεγκεῖν ('the Corinthians themselves banished it, not only without holding any trial, but also without having any charge at all to bring against it', 37.16). Favorinus speaks of the statue as though it were a citizen of Corinth who has not received the treatment that he lawfully deserves.

Obviously, the removal of a statue not only removes the honour bestowed on Favorinus by the city, but it also symbolically extracts the man from the city as well. It is a form of *damnatio memoriae*, but inflicted whilst the sophist still lives. Because statues were so strongly connected in contemporary thought to the person whom they represented, the removal of the statue would have been considered a very public attack on the sophist himself: it signifies the destruction of the relationship and reciprocity that existed between the man and the city. Where once he stood as a reminder of the heights of Greek culture and philosophy, there is instead an empty space or, even worse, an empty statue base that will stand as a continual reminder of his own disgrace: he is no longer worthy to be the role model for the youth of Corinth.[45] Favorinus recognizes this in composing this speech, which is dedicated both to illustrating the error of the Corinthians' ways and to establishing his fame as he wishes it to be remembered. In the process, he plays with the extent to which the statue can *be* him. He is very careful to construct the now-destroyed statue as representative of his successes in Corinth alone but he does his best to downplay its significance to his overall reputation and to disconnect the idea of that particular statue from the idea of himself. One way he does this is to stress that the statue is a depiction of his interaction with Corinth in the past and, therefore, whatever has happened since should

[45] Cf. Platt (2007), 263. See also Stewart (2003), 279: 'The point is not that the population should forget, but that the victim should be obviously unworthy of social existence… To this end it seems that the statue-base was often left in place, at least for some time, so that the erasure of the evil name could be displayed. That would account for the great number of mutilated inscriptions that survive'.

have no bearing on this initial honour. That is, the statue is representative only of Favorinus' relationship with Corinth prior to its erection, so that its removal in response to a perceived recent transgression is entirely unfair: 'It is not because of what is to be but rather because of what has been that you confer your honours' (οὐ γὰρ τῶν μελλόντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν παρῳχηκότων ὑμεῖς δίδοτε τὰς τιμάς, 37.31), he says. And, 'he who stands before you is in jeopardy of first being set up as the noblest amongst the Greeks and then being cast out as the worst, all in a brief span of time' (οὗτος δ' ἐν τῷ βραχεῖ κινδυνεύει τεθῆναι μὲν ὡς ἄριστος Ἑλλήνων, ἐκπεσεῖν δ' ὡς πονηρότατος, 37.22).

After describing his statue's former placement and his interpretation of its meaning, he quotes the following altered line from Homer's *Odyssey*: 'Yet Honour, like a dream, takes wing and flies away' (τιμὴ δ' ἠΰτ' ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται, *Oration* 37.9; ψυχὴ δ' ἠΰτ' ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται, *Odyssey* 11.222).[46] Favorinus replaces the original ψυχή with τιμή and, in doing so, equates the two concepts to some extent: τιμὴ replaces ψυχή as a statue replaces the person. This conflation lends something of the soul's immortality to Favorinus' honour and, through the connection to Odysseus recalls heroic κλέος ἄφθιτον. The Homeric original is spoken by Odysseus' mother in the underworld, as she explains to her son that, although he cannot grasp her in his embrace, she is not a false image (εἴδωλον) as he fears, but that as the body burns on the funeral pyre the insubstantial soul is freed (*Odyssey*, 11.204-22). As Gleason has noted, 'a statue is precisely a form of *honor* without a *soul*'.[47] In this way, Favorinus suggests that his honour is immortal and disconnected from the statue itself.[48] Thus the statue is an honour granted Favorinus, but it is something that belongs specifically in its Corinthian context and has little to do with his

[46] On this phrase see Barigazzi (1966), 320 (loc. cit).
[47] Gleason (1995), 11.
[48] Cf. Gleason (1995), 11: 'One would like to claim that both one's honor and one's soul are immortal, but one's statue clearly is not'.

lasting fame, which is not tied to this particular bronze husk. Moreover, the Corinthian statue, since its removal, has been transformed into an immortal dishonour and on this point Favorinus berates the city: 'what fine thing will you have to say to those who demand of you the reason why the honours in your city are mortal but the dishonours immortal?' (τί δὲ καλὸν ἔξετε λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπαιτοῦντας ὑμᾶς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τὰς μὲν τιμὰς εἶναι παρ' ὑμῖν θνητάς, τὰς δὲ ἀτιμίας ἀθανάτους; 37.30).

Favorinus goes on to suggest fancifully that his statue was the work of the great mythic craftsman Daedalus and, consequently, it might have possessed fantastic abilities. So, he claims, it must have run off of its own accord. He explains:

> ὥστε ἐμὲ ἐν ἀπόρῳ καθεστάναι καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ νὴ Δία ἤδη πρὸς ἕτερον, πότερ' ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐκ ἔβλεπον οὐδὲ ὕπαρ, ἀλλὰ ὄναρ ἦν τὰ γιγνόμενα, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἦν ταῦτα ταῖς πάσαις ἀκριβείαις, σπουδή τε τοῦ πλήθους καὶ κρίσις τῆς βουλῆς, ὁ δ' ἀνδριὰς τῶν Δαιδάλου ποιημάτων ἔτυχεν ὢν καὶ λαθὼν ἡμᾶς ἀπέδρα. ἀλλ' ἀφ' οὗ Δαίδαλος ἐτελεύτησεν, οὐδεὶς εἰς ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐξίκετο τῆς τέχνης μέχρι τοῦ καὶ δρασμὸν ἐμποιεῖν τῷ χαλκῷ· ἀλλὰ διαβεβηκότας μὲν εὖ καὶ καλῶς ποιοῦσι, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἵππων ὀχουμένους· μένουσι μέν τοιοῦτοι πάντες κατὰ σχῆμα καὶ κατὰ χώραν, κἂν μή τις αὐτοὺς μετακινήσῃ, τό γε ἐπ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι χαλκὸς ἄδραστος, ἂν καὶ πτερὰ ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου Περσεύς.
>
> And so I have become perplexed, not only as to my own case, but now, by Zeus, as to that of someone else as well, wondering whether I did not truly see, and what took place was not the happenings of my waking moments but merely a dream, or whether the events were really so in detail, both the enthusiasm of the people and the judgement of the council, and yet, it chanced that the statue was one of the works of Daedalus and slipped away without our notice. However, not since the death of Daedalus down to the present day has any one made such progress in the art of sculpture as to impart to bronze the power of flight; no, though they make statues of men with a fine and noble stride, and sometimes even riding on horseback, still these all maintain their pose and station and, unless someone moves them, so far as they are concerned bronze has no power to flee, not even if the statue has wings, like the Perseus of Pythagoras. (37.9-10)

As Odysseus wonders whether his mother's shade is merely a false image (Homer, *Odyssey* 210-5), Favorinus wonders whether the statue was ever raised in the first place, even

whether his recollection of his favourable reception by the people of Corinth was accurate. His assignation of his statue's creation to Daedalus, along with the Homeric quotation, serves to give Favorinus himself mythic proportions and also allows his statue to become animated with a will of its own.[49] The idea of statues coming to life and fleeing is not alien to Favorinus' audience. Nigel Spivey argues that a 'popular supposition that statues are animate, or potentially animate' existed and cites the regular chaining of statues to their pedestals, just in case the artwork felt the urge to go walkabout.[50] The animation of statues did not need to be so dramatic. In Philostratus' *Heroicus*, Hector's statue at Troy sweats in empathy as athletic games are held in his honour (19.4).[51] The sweating of statues was a common occurrence that was usually interpreted as an evil omen.[52] In Arrian's *Anabasis of Alexander*, however, a sweating statue becomes the augur of fame for both Alexander and the author. After the attack on Thebes, once Alexander has returned to Macedon, Arrian describes an incident in which a statue of Orpheus begins to sweat (*Anabasis* 1.11.2; cf. Plutarch, *Alexander* 14.8-9). [53] Arrian states that this fantastic event was variously interpreted, but he only bothers to mention one interpretation, the one he has decided is correct: δηλοῦσθαι γὰρ ὅτι ποιηταῖς ἐπῶν τε καὶ μελῶν καὶ ὅσοι ἀμφὶ ᾠδὴν ἔχουσι πολὺς πόνος ἔσται ποιεῖν τε καὶ ᾄδειν Ἀλέχανδρον καὶ τὰ Ἀλεχάνδρου ἔργα ('it was clear that makers of epics and choric songs and odes would have much toil to poetize and sing of Alexander and the deeds of Alexander', 1.11.2). The statue is meant to indicate the future fame of Alexander; yet, ironically, it is the very lack of effective commemoration which Arrian claims compels him to write the *Anabasis* (1.12.2-4). The discussion of the sweating

[49] Cf. König (2001), 163, on Favorinus using the Daedalus myth to inflate his antiquity and importance.
[50] Spivey (1997), 442-3, 446-8 (on Daedalus); cf. Steiner (2001), 138-44, for numerous examples of moving statues, and Barigazzi (1966), 320-21 (loc. cit.); Mossman (1991), 106; Gleason (1995), 13-15; Stewart (2003), 260-4; see Kassel (1983), for the tension between the idea of statues as fixed and mute in comparison to those that walk and talk. See also Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* 24.4 for the chaining of a statue of Apollo. See Homer, *Iliad* 18.417-8, 375-7, for Hephaestus' moving automata. See also Apollodorus, *Library* 1.140-2; Apollonius of Rhodes, *Argonautica* 4.1639-93; Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 8.53.5.
[51] See also Callistratus' *Descriptiones* for statues possessing life-like characteristics, especially 1.3, 2.3, 3.2, 6.3, 7.3, 9.1, 11.2.
[52] See Bosworth (1980), 97.
[53] See Mossman (1991), 116, for the event in Plutarch.

statue comes in the chapter preceding the delayed second preface, in which Arrian claims to be Alexander's Homer (1.12.1-5).[54] Consequently, Arrian uses the sweating Orpheus to highlight the failure of his literary predecessors to properly commemorate the Macedonian conqueror and sets the scene for his own literary monument and triumph. He drives his point home at the beginning of the second preface, stating that Alexander's fame οὔτ'... καταλογάδην, οὔτε τις ἐν μέτρῳ ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν μέλει ᾄσθη (1.12.2), the very things the sweating statue was meant to prophesy. So, by interpreting the statue to his own ends and then claiming the prophecy attached to it has yet to be fulfilled, Arrian makes this prodigy as much about himself and his literary ability as he does about Alexander's fame. He invests his composition with divine endorsement. Thus a statue's animation, far from a harbinger of doom, can be made the champion of a protagonist's or author's fame.

In a similar manner, Favorinus uses the animation of his statue, which he facetiously claims explains its unfortunate absence, to recreate it in words and, through it, to rehabilitate his reputation. Thus in the scenario which Favorinus is presenting his statue becomes animated by his own words and it is the statue that flees an unworthy Corinth, not Corinth which expels a representation of an unworthy man.[55] Moreover, the animation of the statue and the use of the word ἀνδριάς to describe it underscore that the statue is a representation of the *man* Favorinus, which once more highlights that its existence is in relationship to Corinth in particular: the statue is the Corinthian Favorinus. The mention of Daedalus as an animator of statues may also be a conscious allusion to Plato's *Meno* 97d (cf. *Eurythphro* 11c-d), in which Socrates compares the art of sophistry to that of Daedalus' truant

[54] I discussed this above in chapter three, p. 169.
[55] See König (2001), 163-4, on Favorinus' implication that the modern Roman Corinthians are unworthy of their ancient predecessors

statues.[56] The metaphor is also apt for both the practice of improvised epideictic oratory and the fame which it can potentially garner: like Daedalus' statues, each *epideixis* is a fine creation, but it remains only for that performance; the sophist's fame, on the other hand, can either be fleeting – existing only for as long as he continues performing – or, alternatively, it has the potential to travel. Naturally, that potential increases should the speech be recorded as a written piece and, in this way, a Daedalean statue could be understood as a metaphor for the written word.

So, having accepted that it must have been the Corinthians who removed his statue, Favorinus then instigates a mock trial – the trial his Corinthian statue (as the representative of his relationship with Corinth) deserved, but never received. Maud Gleason has noted that because Favorinus uses the masculine ἀνδριάς for the statue, the referent of the pronouns that litter his defence is ambiguous: who exactly is speaking, Favorinus or the statue, about whom at any one time is often unclear.[57] This is a speech about identity, both personal (as Gleason argues) and cultural (as König argues), but it is also a speech about fame and memorialization.[58] During the defence, at a moment when Favorinus' statue speaks on his model's behalf, it concludes that Favorinus should not only have a statue in Corinth, but in all other cities as well. Importantly, his reasons for why specific cities should raise their own bronze Favorinus differ. Since he, although a (Gallic) Roman, has made himself Greek, the statue asks the Corinthian audience:

> εἶτα τοῦτον οὐκ ἐχρῆν παρ' ὑμῖν ἑστάναι χαλκοῦν; καὶ κατὰ πόλιν γε· παρ' ὑμῖν μέν, ὅτι Ῥωμαῖος ὢν ἀφηλληνίσθη, ὥσπερ ἡ πατρὶς ἡ ὑμετέρα, παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις δέ, ὅτι ἀττικίζει τῇ φωνῇ, παρὰ Λακεδαιονίοις δέ, ὅτι φιλογυμναστεῖ, παρὰ πᾶσι δέ, ὅτι φιλοσοφεῖ καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἤδη τῶν

[56] Cf. Barigazzi (1966), 321 (loc. cit.); Spivey (1995), 446.
[57] Gleason (1995), 13-14; König (2001), 164 and 166, for the ambiguity between the man and the statue. See also Francis (2003), 581, on Lucian's use of ἀνδριάς in his *Essays in Portraiture*.
[58] Both Gleason (1995) and Platt (2007) consider the idea of fame in their discussions of this speech and Gleason makes the point that Favorinus is implying a superiority of 'verbal artefacts' over material ones (18), however, neither considers this grab for fame in the specific context of *epideixis* and the second sophistic.

> Ἑλλήνων ἐπῆρε συμφιλοσοφεῖν αὐτῷ, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπεσπάσατο. ἐπ' αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ἐδόκει ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν οἷον ἐξεπίτηδες κατεσκευάσθαι, Ἕλλησι μέν, ἵνα ἔχωσιν οἱ ἐπιχώριοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος παράδειγμα ὡς οὐδὲν τὸ παιδευθῆναι τοῦ φῦναι πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν διαφέρει· Ῥωμαίοις δέ, ἵνα μηδ' οἱ τὸ ἴδιον ἀξίωμα περιβεβλημένοι τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀξίωμα παρορῶσι· Κελτοῖς δέ, ἵνα μηδὲ τῶν βαρβάρων μηδεὶς ἀπογιγνώσκῃ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας, βλέπων εἰς τοῦτον. ἐστάθην μὲν οὖν διὰ τοιαύτας τινὰς προφάσεις.
>
> Ought he [Favorinus] not to have a bronze statue here in Corinth? Yes, and in every city – in yours because, though Roman, he has become thoroughly Hellenized, even as your own city has; in Athens because he is an Athenian in his speech; in Sparta because he is devoted to athletics; in all cities everywhere because he pursues philosophy and already has not only roused many of the Greeks to follow that pursuit with him but also attracted even many of the barbarians. Indeed it seems that he has been equipped by the gods for this express purpose – for the Greeks, so that the natives of that land may have an example before them to show that education can equal birth; for the Romans, so that not even those who are so caught up in their own renown, may disregard its enhancement through education; for Celts, so that not even barbarians may despair of attaining Hellenic culture, when they look upon this man. So, I was erected for some such reasons as these. (37.25-28)

Here, the statue details precisely why the man Favorinus is worthy of being replicated in bronze and the key qualification is his mastery and display of *paideia*, but not just *paideia* alone, rather his ability to adjust his cultural display to the context in which he finds himself.[59] In this respect, as a man, a single statue can never do him justice because his abilities are so wide-ranging. He is a worthy example to Greeks, Romans, and Gauls because he identifies with each to some degree, but it is his ability to display the various aspects of his *paideia* that are appropriate to wherever he finds himself which entitles him to be remembered. That Favorinus' statue is the one who explains this highlights how inappropriate a memorial a statue is for someone as culturally versatile as he. A real statue does not speak and, if it tells you anything, it is a story devised by those who dedicate it, not by its subject. Moreover, it is a particular story that is based on the interaction between

[59] On this passage, see Barigazzi (1966), 329-31 (loc. cit.); Gleason (1995), 16-17; König (2001), 164-7; Whitmarsh (2001), 119-21. All their discussions focus on his self-fashioning and his cultural mutability, particularly with respect to the Corinthian context he is addressing (especially König and Whitmarsh). Gleason (1995), 16: Favorinus conceives of himself as a 'universal cultural paradigm'.

the statue's subject and the dedicator: a statue is context specific. In the passage above, Favorinus has shown that his talents are also context specific, but not in any way limited to a single context. This underscores the limitations of statuary as a means of courting posterity. It is an entirely context-specific medium and that context is determined by the city which creates it. It defines its subject in one particular way for as long as that statue stands and its purpose is remembered. Favorinus goes on to say that all statues, though erected to last forever, perish, with the most common, fitting, and prescribed reason being time: τῶν ἀνδριάντων ἕκαστος ἀνατίθεται μὲν ὡς αἰώνιος ἐσόμενος, φθείρεται δὲ ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλην εἱμαρμένην, κοινοτάτην μὲν καὶ δικαιοτάτην καὶ πᾶσι πράγμασι προκειμένην τὴν τοῦ χρόνου (37.37). He then gives the example of the epigram from Midas' funeral monument, which is cast as though spoken by the bronze statue of a girl which apparently graced it (37.38). Now, however, the tomb and the statue have passed from sight and knowledge; only the words remain. Favorinus' point here, as noted by Gleason, is that in contrast to monuments 'verbal artefacts last forever'.[60]

At the beginning of the speech, Favorinus implies that the Corinthians are traffickers in fame (by stating that their ancestors were not): οὐ γὰρ ἠξίουν οἱ ὑμέτεροι πρόγονοι δόξαν ἀγοράζειν (37.7). Yet by the end of the speech Favorinus has revealed himself to be a master in trading his own reputation, in that he reclaims, re-raises, and rededicates his own statue in an eternal setting that is not dependent on the good will of any city. In this way, he separates his removed Corinthian statue, which signifies his relationship to that city, from the statue he raises verbally that is symbolic of his eternal reputation.[61] To this end, Favorinus never describes the removed statue itself in any detail, only its placement, its purpose, and that it is an image of his body (37.8). This serves to create some distance

[60] Gleason (1995), 18.
[61] See below p. 217.

between the artefact and the man, and once more stresses that the important thing about his statue is its context, which demonstrates Favorinus' connection to Corinth. Moreover, he highlights the emptiness of a statue as an honour, since it is merely an imitation of his form, and body and soul are very separate entities, he claims (37.44-6). He concludes with the tale of Aristeas, the moral of which seems to be to highlight that an individual's identity cannot be pinned down to a visual representation, but is far more evident in one's words. According to Herodotus, Aristeas died in Proconnesus but the body subsequently disappeared. He returned alive seven years later, composed a poem then disappeared again, only to reappear in Italy 240 years later to demand a statue be raised in his honour (*Histories* 4.14.1-15.4). Favorinus changes the story slightly saying:

> ὧδε γὰρ ἔσχε κἀκείνῳ, ὡς ἐμοὶ εἰκάσθη, ἀναστῆναι μὲν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Προκοννησίων, ἀφανισθῆναι δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν· λόγον δ′ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων διαδοθῆναι, ὡς οὔτε ζῶν οὔτε τεθνεὼς φαίνοιτο Ἀριστέης. ἀλλὰ καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον ἔζη Ἀριστέης.
>
> For it happened to him also, as I conjecture, to be raised up by the Proconnesians and then spirited away by his enemies, and he had this tale spread by those same men that Aristeas was not to be seen, either living or dead. However, Aristeas was alive then, lives now, and will live always. (37.46)

Gleason, no doubt because of ἀνίστημι, interprets this story as either Favorinus getting Herodotus' version wrong or of using a different version of the tale,[62] but given the conflation of statue and man that has occurred throughout the speech, Favorinus would seem to be creating the same kind of ambiguity here: perhaps it was a statue of Aristeas that was removed from Proconnesus, perhaps it was Aristeas himself. Despite the existence or non-existence of his statue and his own visibility or non-visibility, the important aspect of this tale is that Aristeas gains immortality through his fame, which needs no physical medium to exist, but which is created by his words and ideas.[63]

[62] Gleason (1995), 19.
[63] Cf. Barigazzi (1966), 344 (loc. cit.).

Favorinus, on the other hand, is not willing to abandon his statue, now that he has animated it, entirely to its fate, and so he continues:

> μνάσεσθαί τινά φαμι καὶ ἕτερον ἀμμέων.
> πάνυ γὰρ καλῶς εἶπεν ἡ Σαπφώ· καὶ πολὺ κάλλιον Ἡσίοδος,
> φήμη δ' οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥντινα λαοὶ
> πολλοὶ φημίξωσι· θεός νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή.
> ἐγώ σε ἀναστήσω παρὰ τῇ θεῷ, ὅθεν οὐδείς σε μὴ καθέλῃ, οὐ σεισμός, οὐκ ἄνεμος, οὐ νιφετός, οὐκ ὄμβρος, οὐ φθόνος, οὐκ ἐχθρός, ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν σε καταλαμβάνω ἑστηκότα. λάθα μὲν γὰρ ἤδη τινὰς καὶ ἑτέρους ἔσφηλε καὶ ἐψεύσατο, γνώμη δ' ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα, ᾗ κατ' ἄνδρα μοι ὀρθὸς ἕστηκας.
>
> 'Someone, I say, will yet remember me', as Sappho very beautifully says; and far more beautifully Hesiod: 'But fame is never utterly destroyed | Which many people voice, she is a goddess'. I myself will raise you up and place you in the precinct of the goddess, from where nothing shall tear you down – not earthquake or wind or rain or jealousy or enemy; but even now I find you in your station. Before now forgetfulness has tripped and cheated countless others too, but judgement plays no tricks on any man of worth, and it's because of this that you stand upright for me like a man. (37.47)

So, by composing this speech, Favorinus re-raises and re-dedicates his own statue. The Corinthian bronze husk may have vanished, but the speech stands in its place. In this way, Favorinus' resurrected statue becomes a metaphor for the written text. He apostrophizes it as, ὦ λόγων ἐμῶν σιγηλὸν εἴδωλον ('O silent image of my words', 37.46), which is exactly what the written text is: silent until it is read again. He is essentially employing the same idea as Horace's literary monument, which I discussed in the previous chapter,[64] but here the text does not stand as the monument, but rather recreates it and reinterprets it. The name-dropping of Sappho and Hesiod casts them as successful peers in the quest for literary immortality. And, Favorinus makes his statue spread his personally constructed fame rather than leave its physical absence to stand as a commemoration of what had been his relationship with the city of Corinth: this literary statue is like the man, not just the body. He turns it into a votive offering to the goddess Fame rather than an honorific civic

[64] See p. 136.

dedication. Indeed, earlier in the speech, he suggests that this is how the Corinthians should treat their civic dedications, saying: ὅτι ἕκαστος τούτων τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν ἀνακειμένων... ἤδη τὰ τῆς ὁσίας περίκειται, καὶ χρὴ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῦ προεστάναι ὡς ἀναθήματος ('Each of these statues which has been erected by your city… is at once invested with the attributes of sanctity, and the city should defend it as a votive offering', 37.28).[65] Favorinus takes the dishonour that Corinth has dealt him and turns it into a symbol of literary immortality.[66] At the same time, he eternally shames Corinth for its choice to eject him. As a memorial to his renown, this speech serves very well, far better in fact than the original statue raised at Corinth. This literary statue is very much like the hypothetical statue created by Daedalus: this statue can (is even encouraged to) move through space and time, taking Favorinus' fame with it. His future gaze is not as limited as that of Horace: where the latter's fame was dependent on the continuation of Roman religious institutions, Favorinus' monument stands within the imaginary precinct of Fame's temple for eternity and, importantly, that fame has been constructed by Favorinus himself. So, Favorinus uses the idea of his statue to counter dishonour and rehabilitate his reputation. Nevertheless, his speech leaves one with the impression that the granting of such an honour in the first place is always fraught, since the representation is so specific that it cannot but fail to encapsulate fully the man himself. The anxieties that attend being honoured by means of a statue come through in the works of Apuleius as well, one of which I turn to now.

Apuleius' *Florida* 16 and Polemo's *Cynegirus and Callimachus*: The dangers of representation in plastic art.

Apuleius of Madauros in north Africa was an orator, a novelist, and (like Favorinus) a philosopher. Like Favorinus as well, he came from a province in the Latin-speaking west;

[65] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 31.89: καίτοι καὶ τοὺς ἀνδριάντας οὐχ ἧττον ἀναθήματα εἴποι τις ἂν εἶναι τῶν θεῶν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς. See also Barigazzi (1966), 332 (loc. cit).
[66] Cf. Gleason (1995), 20.

however, unlike the Gaul, although he boasts of his ability in Greek, his surviving works are all in Latin, which (along with Punic or Libyac) could have been his native tongue. Nevertheless, Apuleius' literary output matches the kind of works being produced by sophists in the Greek east. Stephen Harrison, in his book entitled *Apuleius: A Latin Sophist*, explains:

> It is important for a true appreciation of Apuleius to realize that he belongs not to an African sub-culture but to the mainstream of Latin culture and literature, with his much vaunted fluency in Greek acquired as it would be by a well-educated Roman. This is the obvious but fundamental difference separating Apuleius and other Roman literary figures with sophistic interest from the contemporary Greek figures of the Second Sophistic, who otherwise appear to match Apuleius in their interests in rhetorical and philosophical performance... Apuleius was contemporary not only with the Latin writer Aulus Gellius, whom he may have known in Athens, but also with the Greek writers Galen, Lucian, and Aelius Aristides; thus his life falls at the height of the Greek intellectual revival of the Second Sophistic, when Greek writers famously sought to revive the past glories of their culture in the rich cities of the Greek Mediterranean under the protection of Roman rule… Apuleius' choices of career and literary genre are fundamentally influenced by what was happening to his contemporaries in the Greek world.[67]

Amongst his surviving works are a number of speeches, mostly fragmentary, collected under the title *Florida*, a Latin translation of the Greek *anther* and signifying an anthology.[68] In this section, I will be discussing Apuleius' *Florida* 16, the longest of the speeches in the collection and which engages with many of the same concerns found in Favorinus' *Corinthian Oration*. It, too, is a speech about a statue, only on this occasion it is in gratitude for the award of one rather than in defiance of its removal, and Apuleius also shows concern for how he is being represented to posterity; his fears that his memory will be controlled by others, however, manifest physically within this speech, in which the connection between Apuleius, his statue, his oratorical and literary art is explored. Yun Lee

[67] Harrison (2000), 2-3. Cf. Harrison (2000), 1-38; Harrison (2001), 1-2. See also Lee (2005), 20-5; Sandy (1997), 92-175.
[68] Hilton (2001), 123.

Too has argued that, in Apuleius' works, being represented in art (and especially by a statue) is a form of death, since it robs the individual of the means to create his own public image.[69] I will extend this by adding that statues in Apuleius' *Florida* 16 also deal with the problems of audience (contemporary versus future), performance versus text, and his concomitant fame. In this discussion, I will also draw on the parallel example of Polemo's *Cynegirus and Callimachus*, which helps to elucidate the processes occurring in Apuleius' speech.

Apuleius begins the speech by thanking the Carthaginian senate for the statue and then promising to explain his absence from the senate house over the past few days, where he was due to give this speech of thanks. He explains his need to inform them of his absence in the following way:

> quippe ita institui omne uitae meae tempus uobis probare, quibus me in perpetuum firmiter dedicaui: nihil tantum, nihil tantulum faciam, quin eius uos et gnaros et iudices habeam.
>
> Seeing that, in this way, I have set up the whole period of my life for you, to whom I have fixedly dedicated myself for all time, to commend. I will never do anything, anything in the least, without your knowledge and approval. (16.3)

His language turns himself into the statue with which he is being honoured: he erects (a representation of) his entire life for the citizens' approval and he dedicates himself immovably to them for all time. He has become, so to speak, an open book because he is to be placed on display amongst them. Even in this initial gambit, Apuleius follows Favorinus in suggesting that a statue replaces the individual it represents and he expresses a level of unease with being represented in bronze – he implies that through the public dedication of a statue one loses control over one's own life, in the sense that 'life' means

[69] Too (1996).

his reputation (or how he will be perceived now and in the future). Through his language, he suggests that everything he does from this point on will be controlled by Carthage.

Apuleius then gives the example of Philemo, a rival of Menander, whom he sets up as illustrative of his own predicament, in that he too experienced similar difficulties when reading his new play.[70] The performance was interrupted by rain, just as Apuleius' own earlier attempt to perform this speech was (16.19). Philemo, however, never made it back to the stage, since during the night he died. His corpse is discovered posed in a decidedly statuesque manner:

> Commodum ille anima edita obriguerat, iacebatque incumbens toro, similis cogitanti: adhuc manus volumini implexa, adhuc os recto libro impressus, sed enim iam animae vacuus, libri oblitus et auditorii securus. Stetere paulisper qui introierant, perculsi tam inopinatae rei, tam formosae mortis miraculo.
>
> He had just gone rigid after publishing his soul and lay resting on his elbow on the bed as if thinking. His hand still held his place in the scroll, his mouth still pressed against the upright text, but he was already empty of life, having forgotten his book and safe from his audience. Those who had entered stood still awhile, struck with wonder at so unexpected an event, so beautiful a death. (16.16-17)

Philemo's corpse is also described as though it were a statue and, more than this, it has become one with the text of his play.[71] Philemo's lifeless body can no longer be separated from his work and the commingling of body and text represents the two modes of future commemoration: monument (statue) and the written word (text). Benjamin Lee interprets the joined man and book as a claim for life being set equal to literature and that Apuleius offers his literature to the people of Carthage in exchange for a statue.[72] Although I agree

[70] For the extant fragments of Philemo, see Kassel and Austin (1989), 221-317.
[71] See Lee (2005), 152 (loc. cit.), on the entanglement of Philemo and the scroll. Cf. Too (1996), 140-1. See Harrison (2000), 117; Hunink (2001), 160; Lee (2005), 147, on other versions of Philemo's death.
[72] Lee (2005), 148.

that there is a claim being made here for Apuleius' literature, I think it is being set up as more in opposition to the statue than as its partner, an argument I shall clarify shortly. Apuleius' description of the body and the phrase *formosae mortis* reworks the Homeric 'beautiful death' (καλὸς θάνατος), as described by Jean-Pierre Vernant.[73] The great heroes of the *Iliad* strive to find a glorious death in the midst of the thickest fighting so that they will be immortalized in songs about the glorious deeds of men (κλὲα ἀνδρῶν, *Iliad* 9.189): they must die young in the pursuit of their life's work which, in their case, is war. As Vernant explains, 'the hero, by the fame he has acquired in pledging his life to battle, inscribes his reality as an individual subject on the collective memory of the group; the death that has given his biography its conclusion has also given it permanence',[74] and 'in the imperishable glory conferred to him by the song about his deeds, he becomes immune to aging in the same way that, as much as it is humanely possible, he escapes the destruction of death'.[75] Philemo too dies prematurely in the act of doing that which he had devoted his life to – composing comic plays – and his body stands as a monument to this, in the same way the heroes' bodies are preserved in their beauty of youth until burial.[76] This play on the Homeric death serves to imbue the poet with an element of the heroic and dangles the carrot of potential literary immortality before the writer.

Naturally, the comparison of the comic poet's death to a hero's death is meant to be humorous and Philemo's body is not protected by the gods as Hector's or Patroclus' were. His corpse is statuesque, but it is a biodegradable statue. Consequently, on this occasion, the possibility of literary immortality is brought up to highlight Philemo's actual mortality. Indeed, because of this, Philemo's death is particularly fitting. Previously, Apuleius

[73] Vernant (1991), 50-74.
[74] Vernant (1991), 57.
[75] Vernant (1991), 60.
[76] See Vernant (1991), 73-4.

suggested that Philemo was a slave to his audience.[77] This is made clearer by his earlier description of Philemo's work (16.6-10), in which he implies that he gives his contemporary audience exactly what they want. Apuleius even notes, with regret, that Philemo often defeated Menander, whose reputation in Apuleius' day far outweighs that of his rival (16.6).[78] So, Philemo achieved contemporary fame, but his plays do not stand up before the critics of Apuleius' day (cf. Quintillian 3.7.18; 10.1.72). Hence, his statuesque corpse is an apt monument, in that it is a statue that will not last long, but which is already decaying from the moment he dies. At the same time, those who discover his body are also momentarily frozen by wonder and this fleeting moment of statuesque awe is analogous to the extent of appreciation Philemo's works can expect in the future.[79] Here, Philemo's work has determined the kind of statue he receives: he had control over his own memorialization, but his desire for contemporary fame renders that fame fleeting. Indeed, those who discovered his corpse return to the auditorium where his audience awaits and instruct them:

> quoniam poeta optimus personam vitae deposuerit, recta de auditorio eius exsequias eundum, legenda eius esse nunc ossa, mox carmina.
>
> Since this excellent poet had laid aside his mask of life, everyone should go to his funeral straight from the auditorium; and that his bones should now be collected, and soon his poems. (18)

Philemo has removed the mask of life and concluded the role he played under the dictates of his audience; the funeral will be his final performance. The use of the word *persona* conjures, in this context, both the theatrical mask and the death mask, which would be kept by the family of the deceased. It is the removal of the dramatic mask and the idea of publishing his soul (*anima edita*, 16.16), which has laid him open to his audience and their

[77] Cf. Too (1996), 140.
[78] See Lee (2005), 149 (loc. cit.).
[79] Cf. Francis (2003), 581, for a separate incident of viewer and viewed becoming images in Lucian's *Essays in Portraiture*.

demands. This is a type of artistic death[80] that will not allow his fame to stand the test of time. As Too notes, the phrase *legenda… nunc ossa, mox carmina* 'identifies the gathering of the poet's bones with the reading of his poetry',[81] which implies that the lifespan of his poetry will be short-lived: the bones are being collected for burial now and his poems will shortly follow. Thus death here silences Philemo as it did Polemo following his live burial, which we saw in the previous chapter;[82] his statuesque corpse draws attention to his quest for literary fame and the extent to which his reputation is controlled by his audience.

The theme of a statuesque corpse garnering fame is central also to the two surviving *epideixeis* of Marcus Antonius Polemo, and this parallel example will shed light on Apuleius' attitude to being represented in bronze in *Florida* 16, which I will come to shortly.[83] These speeches form a pair of *controversiae* on the theme of the valour of Cynegirus and Callimachus at the battle of Marathon. According to tradition, the father of the fallen man who had shown the greatest courage was awarded the honour of delivering the funeral oration at Athens. In this scenario, the fathers of Cynegirus and Callimachus both lay claim to that right.[84] Legend had it that Cynegirus died having lost either both hands or just his right hand whilst either pursuing fleeing Persians or whilst attempting to restrain one of their ships from putting out to sea. On the other hand, Callimachus died after receiving many wounds and, in some versions, being pierced with so many arrows and spears that his body was held upright even after he died.[85] In Polemo's speech, it is the idea of both

[80] Too (1996), 140.
[81] Too (1996), 141.
[82] See the discussion on p. 139.
[83] On Polemo, his life, writings, and career, see Gleason (1995), 21-81; Reader (1996), 7-46.
[84] See Reader (1996), 33-40, for Classical and Hellenistic representations of both men and their deeds at Marathon.
[85] See Reader (1996), 36-9.

Cynegirus' hand(s) and Callimachus' body as statuesque which is developed and explored.[86] Both fathers claim the bodies of their lifeless sons as a victory monument (τρόπαιον, *Cynegirus* 10, 39; *Callimachus* 61). Naturally, with the focus on the monumental, Callimachus' father has more to work with and it is he who appears victorious in the end (*Callimachus* 65). Throughout the speech, he transforms his son into a statue in as many ways possible, at one point apostrophizing him as:

> ὦ σεμνὸν ἀνάθημα πολέμου· ὦ καλὸν Ἄρεως ἄγαλμα· ὦ πολέμαρχε πολεμάρχου θεοῦ δεινὸν εἴδωλον τῆς Ἀσίας τὰ τοξεύματα περιβεβλημένον· ὦ μόνος ἐνδὺς τὴν τοῦ πολέμου στολήν· ὦ σχῆμα ἐλευθέριον, ὦ σχῆμα Μαραθώνιον· ὦ μὴ κλίνας τὴν Ἑλλάδα· ὦ τῆς φύσεως περισσότερε·[87]
>
> O revered votive offering of war! O noble statue of Ares! O polemarch, terrible likeness of the polemarch god, enclosed all around with the missiles of Asia! O only one putting on the equipment of war! O figure of freedom, O figure of Marathon! O [figure] not making Greece lie down! O [figure] greater than nature! (*Callimachus* 51-2)

These repeated cries of address to his dead son serve to strip him of his humanity and turn him into an inanimate object. Moreover, he is also raised above the human and brought closer to the divine. The words used to describe Callimachus are varied and pointed. Firstly, σεμνὸν ἀνάθημα ('sacred offering') is that which is set up or dedicated to a deity, often after victory in war.[88] This is what Favorinus told the Corinthians they should treat their honorific statues as (*Corinthian Oration* 37.28). Next, he is called Ἄρεως ἄγαλμα ('statue of Ares'). An ἄγαλμα also often has the sense of a votive offering, but can simply mean statue too.[89] Thus this suggests that Callimachus is both an offering to Ares and a representation of Ares. Finally, he is termed δεινὸν εἴδωλον ('terrible image') of the polemarch god. Polemarch was Callimachus' rank in the Athenian army. It is not used of

[86] References to either son as statue, victory monument, fortification, or tree: *Cynegirus* 7, 10, 22-3, 30, 33, 39; *Callimachus* 3, 10, 11, 12, 51, 54, 58, 60, 61.
[87] For commentary on this passage, see Reader (1996), 362-7.
[88] Reader (1996), 363, with references.
[89] Reader (1996), 364-5, with references.

Ares elsewhere,[90] so here Ares gains dignity through his association with Callimachus (not the other way around), a process that serves to raise the Athenian still higher. This statue is surrounded by the weapons of the Persians and, as William Reader has noted, given the religious terminology and the semantic relationship between περιβάλλω and περιβόλιον/περίβολος ('the area surrounding a temple'), the implication is that the lifeless Callimachus stands in a sacred precinct and is a statue of something divine.[91] Moreover, he has been made this way by the Persians not the Athenians and at this point the language of sacred images ceases and becomes the language of freedom. So, it is as if in the minds of the Persians he has been made into the god of war; whereas to the Athenians, in being overcome by the missiles of the Persians, he is still only a man (the adjective μόνος is masculine, whereas the statue words previously describing him were neuter or feminine) actively putting on (ἐνδύω) the costume of war. So, Callimachus' glory is in his corpse being perceived as an inhuman, god-like statue, which struck fear into the Persians. Unlike Philemo, whose statuesque corpse signals the imminent decline of his literature's fame, Callimachus' draws words of praise to him.

Indeed, Callimachus' father equates his son's assumption of a monumental pose upon his death with a bid for immortality:

> πάσας δὲ αὐτῶν ὑπέμεινε τὰς προσβολὰς ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀδάμαντος ὢν πύργος ἢ τεῖχος ἄρρηκτον ἢ ἀντίτυπος πέτρα ἢ θεὸς ἀνθρώποις μαχόμενος, ἕως πάντα ἀνήλωσε τὰ τῆς Ἀσίας βέλη καὶ καμεῖν ἐποίησε τὴν πολλὴν δύναμιν τοῦ βασιλέως. πολὺν μὲν οὖν χρόνον ἐν τῷ σώματι διεκαρτέρησεν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐρίζουσα πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀδύνατον ἀνθρώποις ἀθανασίαν ἐβιάζετο· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄνθρωπος Καλλίμαχος ἦν καὶ θνητὸς ἦν καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀπελθεῖν ἠναγκάζετο τῷ πλήθει τῶν τραυμάτων, ἀπέθανε μέν, οὐκ ἔπεσε δέ, ἀλλ' ἐξιοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ βεβαίως τῷ σώματι μένειν καὶ καρτερεῖν ἐνετείλατο καὶ μάχεσθαι τὴν δυνατὴν τοῖς ἀψύχοις μάχην. τὸ δὲ ἐπείσθη καὶ βεβαίως ἔμενεν ὥσπερ ἐρριζωμένον [καὶ] διὰ τοῦ πολέμου τοιοῦτο οἷον αὐτὸ ἐξιοῦσα ἔστησεν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον τοὺς βαρβάρους

[90] Reader (1996), 365.
[91] Reader (1996), 366.

> ἐξηπάτησεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ᾤετο τεθνάναι τὸν ἑστηκότα… ὦ φρόνημα ὀρθόν· ὦ σῶμα ἔμψυχον· ὦ σῶμα νικηφόρον ὅπλοις καὶ βέλεσι κεκοσμημένον· ὦ πρῶτον Μαραθῶνος τρόπαιον… ὦ στήσας ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, οὐκ εἴασας τὰς Ἀθήνας πεσεῖν.[92]
>
> He endured all their attacks like a tower of adamant or an unbreachable wall or a rigid rock or a god fighting against men, until he consumed all the arrows of Asia and made the mighty force of the king to be exhausted. For a long time his soul, striving against nature, held out in the body and he tried to force his way into the immortality impossible for humans. But since Callimachus was human he was also mortal, and he was compelled by the multitude of wounds to depart the body. He died but did not fall; rather, as the soul was leaving it enjoined the body to remain steadfast and to persist and to keep on fighting the fight as far as possible for those without a soul. It obeyed and remained steadfast as though rooted even throughout the battle to such an extent that, although the soul had left, it made the body stand and for a long time this completely deceived the barbarians. For no one thought that the one who stood had died… O upright resolve! O animated body! O victory-bringing body adorned with weapons and arrows! O first victory trophy of Marathon… O you who by yourself made Greece to stand, you did not allow Athens to fall. (*Callimachus* 10-12)

Once more Callimachus is made more than human. He is both against nature and like nature. His lifeless body becomes one with the landscape. He has two options: to become immortal or to become a statue. In the end, his soul succumbs to nature, since ultimately he cannot escape his mortality, and leaves his body to stand as an inanimate monument. Reader notes that ἄψυχος is often used to describe statues of the gods and this,[93] combined with the phrase θεὸς ἀνθρώποις μαχόμενος, implies that in becoming a statue he manages to gain the immortality – the fame of his deeds is preserved in his father's/Polemo's words – which he nominally abandons in dying. Moreover, he is labelled as the first τρόπαιον of Marathon, raised before the battle is even concluded.[94] Although Cynegirus' father also claims his handless body as a τρόπαιον, that the Persians do not move past the point of Callimachus' stand and that he has collected all their weapons,

[92] For commentary on this passage, see Reader (1996), 264-72. Note that Hinck (1873) emends σῶμα νικηφόρον to σῆμα νικηφόρον, in which case it would refer to the tomb rather than the body. This is tempting given the great burial mound raised at Marathon for the Athenian dead, but as noted by Reader there is no manuscript support for this. See Reader (1996), 271.
[93] Reader (1996), 268.
[94] On the τρόπαιον, see Reader (1996), 200.

proves his father's claim more fitting. So, in this speech, Callimachus' corpse is constructed as a statue, which is essentially identified as a lifeless body that is fixed in an unnatural position. He finds himself in a similar predicament to Apuleius' Philemo, in that both have been petrified by words within the speeches of Polemo and Apuleius. In this way, language is shown to possess the ability to freeze moments in time, but also to give meaning to visual experience. Moreover, in designating Callimachus a τρόπαιον, Polemo turns the man into a symbol, thus dehumanizing him further and removing his individual character. This seems to be the same fear which plagues Apuleius in his speech of thanks for the granting of a physical statue. Apuleius fears being represented as a statue. That is, he is anxious about being reproduced in one specific, potentially inappropriate, and eternally inanimate manner. Yet, unlike Philemo, Cynegirus, or Callimachus, who are trapped by another's words, he considers his own words as the means by which to escape such a fate.

In *Florida* 16, Apuleius signals this anxiety over external representation by likening his living self to an inanimate statue. As soon as the decision is made to grant him a statue, he loses the ability to speak – the very skill that has won him the honour. His first attempt to make a public speech is interrupted by rain and postponed (16.10; 16.19) like Philemo's performance, and then he suffers a wrestling accident (16.20-22), which not only keeps him from the senate, but also momentarily paralyses him and causes him such pain that he fears he will expire:

> inde acerbus dolor intestinorum coortus modico ante sedatus est, quam me denique violentus exanimaret et Philemois ritu compelleret ante letum abire quam lectum, potius implere fata quam fanda, consummare potius animam quam historiam.
>
> Next an acute pain of the intestines began, which eased off just before it finished me off with its virulence, and forced me, like Philemo to be

> dead before I had read, to meet my death rather than my deadline, to come to my end rather than the end of my story.[95] (16.22)

The juxtapositions of *letum/lectum, fata/fanda, animam/historiam* ('death'/'reading', 'fate'/'speaking', 'soul'/'story') serve to offset death with literary production.[96] It is in not giving the speech that Apuleius faces 'death' and his ability to speak for himself is threatened by the statue. These two incidents – the rain and the wrestling mishap – are manifestations of Apuleius' fear that being represented in bronze will fix him in a way that does not adequately present him as the man he is, but rather as a symbolic representation of a rhetor or a philosopher or an author. The statue, which through the story of Philemo has been associated with the grave, is the kind of memorial that fixes its subject in a moment in time and in relation to a specific place, in this case Carthage. In this respect, it is a fitting memorial for a single speech, but not for a man's whole life. Favorinus used this aspect of a statue to rehabilitate his fame by assigning the removed statue to the very limited relationship he had with Corinth; Apuleius uses it to suggest that it wrests control of his reputation from his own hands and places it in those of the citizens of Carthage. In this way, Apuleius plays with the idea that statues not only represent their subject, but also are their subject to some extent, in that the statue has the power to determine how he himself is understood and received. Also, again like Favorinus, he implies that a mute and lifeless statue is not a fitting memorial for an individual whose fame comes from his ability to use words.

Interestingly, Apuleius is, in this speech, angling for two statues: one that has been proposed as a private dedication by his friend Aemilianus Strabo and accepted by the senate, and one that he urges the senate to grant publically (16.39-44). The present speech

[95] Translated by Hilton (2001).
[96] Cf. Lee (2005), 153 (loc. cit.): 'These figures of *paronomasia*… serve to conceptually intertwine life and literature'.

is in thanks for the private dedication, but he proposes to write another piece in thanks for the second hypothetical public statue, which he will publish and send throughout the empire (16.48). In the final paragraph, he promises:

> mox ad dedicationem statuae meae libro etiam conscripto, plenius gratias canam eique libro mandabo, uti per omnis provincias est totoque abhinc orbe totoque abhinc tempore laudes benefacti tui ubique gentium, semper annorum repraesentet.
>
> I will also soon intone my thanks in a book written for the dedication of my statue; and I will send that book through all the provinces to represent my praises of your benefaction in every other place throughout the whole world and to continue to do so for all time to come. (16.47-48)

So, Apuleius advertises his intention to compose a 'book' (*liber*) rather than deliver another speech that will represent his achievements on his own terms. As noted by Too, this is a pun on the idea that the written word can make Apuleius free (*liber*) from the constraints of Carthage's representation of him.[97] The book, like Favorinus' textualized statue, will be a moving self-constructed monument that will offset the city's dedication of his image.[98] In this way, he privileges his written text over the statue. By his imagery he has shown that he fears the ability of the civic monument to fix his reputation in a way that removes his control. The statue, in its fixity, resembles Philemo's corpse and, for a man whose skills lie in speaking and words, a mute monument cannot serve adequately to reveal his fame.

Lucian's *Dream*: Fame, the canon, and *epideixis*.

Lucian's *Dream*, on the other hand, is an introductory speech which pits the personified Sculpture against Paideia within an autobiographical frame.[99] It describes how the narrator

[97] Too (1996), 145.
[98] Harrison (2000), 119 n. 3, notes that Horace, *Letters* 1.20 and Ovid, *Tristia* 3.1 also use the figure of a book travelling to deliver praise. Hunink (2001), 170, notes that in both these cases the book contains praise of the author, not of other people, which is what Apuleius ostensibly promises. Clearly, however, Apuleius implies that he is using the excuse of praising the senate to praise his own achievements, much as he has done in this speech.
[99] On Lucian's introductory speeches in general, see Nesselrath (1990) and Branham (1985).

becomes a sophist after a brush with the trade of sculpture and deals with anxieties over the desire for both contemporary and lasting fame, as well as questioning the worth of the sophistic profession. No doubt because of the constant presence of the first person, an assumption has existed that the *Dream* is at least partially autobiographical and was delivered as a sophistic *epideixis* in Syria.[100] There is no internal evidence for this; although, the narrator does acknowledge his point of origin as the east (ἕω, 15), and does claim to have returned home to deliver this speech (18). All that can be said with any authority is that this formative vision is set somewhere in the east and any identification of the narrator with Lucian himself is hazardous.[101] So, after finishing his initial education, the narrator tells us that he is apprenticed to his stonemason uncle because he has shown some skill in moulding the wax scraped from writing tablets at school (2); but after breaking a stone slab on his first strike, he is beaten and flees in tears (3-4). During the night, he is visited in a dream by two women, the personifications of Sculpture and Paideia respectively, who fight over his mortal soul. Both personifications play out various tensions – Barbarian versus Greek (and, indeed, Roman), superficial versus genuine learning, innovation versus tradition, and, obviously, monument versus text as a means of procuring fame – all of which tie into each other in complex ways. I will argue that, in this speech, sculpture and *paideia* also represent the trade-off between contemporary and future fame faced by the sophistic epideictic orator. And, I would suggest it is autobiographical only in the sense that it dramatizes this dilemma.

[100] Swain (1996), 308-10. Humble and Sidwell (2006), 214-216, summarize some of the opinions on this text as autobiographical or literary invention.

[101] On *persona* theory in Roman Satire, which is transferrable to Lucianic satire, see W. Anderson (1982), 3-10; Braund (1996) and (1992), 2, 40-53; Martyn (1996), 39; Winkler (1983). See Iddeng (2000) for a lucid refutation of Anderson's position and the argument that an inconsistent satirist does not need to be a construct. Iddeng does not, however, support the extreme biographical ideas of Highet (1983), believing that 'a conception of a much more flexible speaker voice is needed' (127). Cf. Tennent (2001), 170-72. Lucian's genres and style are far more varied than that of Roman satirists and, since he constantly toys with his identity, his own opinions seem deliberately impossible to grasp. See Said (1993); Goldhill (2002), 60-107; Dubel (1994) (with reservations of Whitmarsh (2001), 253, n. 27).

So what is it that the women offer the narrator? Paideia introduces herself, saying:

> «Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ τέκνον, Παιδεία εἰμὶ ἤδη συνήθης σοι καὶ γνωρίμη, εἰ καὶ μηδέπω εἰς τέλος μου πεπείρασαι… Καὶ ὁ νῦν πένης ὁ τοῦ δεῖνος, ὁ βουλευσάμενός τι περὶ ἀγεννοῦς οὕτω τέχνης, μετ᾽ ὀλίγον ἅπασι ζηλωτὸς καὶ ἐπίφθονος ἔσῃ, τιμώμενος καὶ ἐπαινούμενος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρίστοις εὐδοκιμῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν γένει καὶ πλούτῳ προὐχόντων ἀποβλεπόμενος, ἐσθῆτα μὲν τοιαύτην ἀμπεχόμενος,» – δείξασα τὴν ἑαυτῆς· πάνυ δὲ λαμπρὰν ἐφόρει – «ἀρχῆς δὲ καὶ προεδρίας ἀξιούμενος. κἄν που ἀποδημῇς, οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλλοδαπῆς ἀγνὼς οὐδ᾽ ἀφανὴς ἔσῃ· τοιαῦτά σοι περιθήσω τὰ γνωρίσματα ὥστε τῶν ὁρώντων ἕκαστος τὸν πλησίον κινήσας δείξει σε τῷ δακτύλῳ, ᾽Οὗτος ἐκεῖνος᾽ λέγων».
>
> 'I, my child, am Paideia, who is already acquainted with and familiar to you, even if you haven't yet completed your experience of me… You, who are now a labourer son of nobody, who have been contemplating so slavish a trade, will after a short time be admired and envied by all, you will be honoured and praised, esteemed for the best qualities and admired by men pre-eminent in birth and in wealth, you will wear clothing like this' – she indicated her own, and it was indeed splendid – 'and will be considered worthy of office and precedence. If ever you go elsewhere, in foreign places you will not be unknown or unrecognized, I will attach such indicators that each person who sees you will shove his neighbour and point at you with his finger, saying, "'There he is!'" (Lucian, *Dream* 9; 11)

Sculpture, on the other hand, appeals to his familial connections, describing how she has made his grandfather and uncles famous. She promises economic comfort and hard work, a life free of jealousy and rooted in his homeland, and, the possibility of becoming a Polycleitus, Myron, or Praxiteles, who in turn will bring fame to that homeland (7-8). Despite Sculpture's promise of fame, the narrator neatly censors her at the moment she is recalling his familial sculptural forbearers, relaying her speech as: "'for your grandfather" – and she gave the name of my mother's father – "was a sculptor, and so are both your uncles, who are very famous through me'" («ὅ τε γὰρ πάππος σου» – εἰποῦσα τοὔνομα τοῦ μητροπάτορος – «λιθοξόος ἦν καὶ τὼ θείω ἀμφοτέρω καὶ μάλα εὐδοκιμεῖτον δι᾽ ἡμᾶς», 7).[102] This neatly undercuts Sculpture's claims for the ability to bestow fame. Needless to say, Paideia wins him over with her guarantees of glory, admiration, and wealth. In fact, the narrator claims barely to remember Sculpture's words at all, only that she stumbled in her

[102] See Hopkinson (2008), 98, on some reasons why the name may be withheld, such as the speech being cast as though it is given before a hometown crowd, who would already know his father's name.

Greek, an observation that highlights her lack of education and barbarian origins (διαπταίουσα καὶ βαρβαρίζουσα πάμπολλα, 8). Neil Hopkinson, however, notes that the text does not reproduce these effects and Sculpture's speech, 'though clearly briefer and less eloquent than that of her rival, just ended with a tricolon'.[103] So, having convinced the narrator to join her, Paideia whisks him away in a flying chariot for an Ebenezer-Scrooge-like tour of his future as a successful sophist (15). In the context of posterity, the most important claim made by Paideia is that of fame and respect for the *pepaideumenos* on foreign soil. This is what Greek learning will buy him throughout the empire (11). This commodification of *paideia* is a recurring theme throughout the Lucianic corpus and the *paideia* on offer is almost always superficial – a façade which can be bought for the purpose of gaining fame, cultural legitimacy and, hence, of possessing a specific value to the culture-hungry Roman elite.[104]

According to the *Dream*'s personification of Paideia, this cultural mask is to be fabricated from the past, she explains: πρῶτον μέν σοι πολλὰ ἐπιδείξω παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα καὶ πράξεις θαυμαστὰς καὶ λόγους αὐτῶν ἀπαγγελῶ, καὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔμπειρον ἀποφανῶ ('First I will show you many works of men of old, tell you their amazing deeds and words, and make you experienced to speak about everything', 10). So, basically, she offers him an understanding of canonical classical literature. In Lucian's *Dream*, the protagonist uses this knowledge (his *paideia*) to become famous, wealthy, and Roman. He returns home from his jaunt with Paideia wearing a garment 'bordered with purple' (εὐπάρυφος, 16), a design marking him out as a successful Roman citizen: as an *eques* or even a senator.[105] However, two aspects of the dream belie its positive message: firstly, it is introduced by a quotation

[103] Hopkinson (2008), 102 (loc. cit.).
[104] See, for example, *On Salaried Posts in Great Houses*, *Nigrinus*.
[105] On purple clothing and Roman elite status, see Garnsey and Saller (1987), 116-17; Stone (1994), 13-45.

from Homer's *Iliad*, which in that text prefaces Agamemnon's report of a deceptive dream (*Iliad* 2.55-56);[106] secondly, the dream is a variation on Prodicus' 'Choice of Heracles' (recounted in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 2.1.21-34), in which the personified Virtue and Vice compete for Heracles' affections.[107] In variations on Prodicus' theme, Vice is generally attractive and easy to gain, and Virtue is most often plain, or even ugly, and always difficult to obtain.[108] Similarly, in Hesiod's *Works and Days* 288-94, Virtue and Vice are cast as prizes at the end of separate paths, with the road to Vice smooth and that to Virtue laborious.[109] In Lucian's *Dream*, Paideia (like Vice) is alluringly beautiful and her counterpart, Sculpture, is manly and grotty. The narrator describes them: ἦν δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐργατικὴ καὶ ἀνδρικὴ καὶ αὐχμηρὰ τὴν κόμην, τὼ χεῖρε τύλων ἀνάπλεως, διεζωσμένη τὴν ἐσθῆτα, τιτάνου καταγέμουσα... ἡ ἑτέρα δὲ μάλα εὐπρόσωπος καὶ τὸ σχῆμα εὐπρεπὴς καὶ κόσμιος τὴν ἀναβολήν ('One was like a workman, masculine, with unkempt hair, hands covered with calluses, clothing tucked up, and a heavy layer of marble dust upon her… The other, however, was very fair of face, dignified in her appearance, and nice in her dress', 6). Moreover, Paideia (again like Vice) paints a picture of life with her as one of ease and fame in contrast to the tough (but still potentially famous) life which Sculpture offers. Paideia's words partially echo Prodicus' Virtue;[110] however, they also recall his Vice. So, the division between Sculpture and Paideia is not as black and white as that between Prodicus' antagonists,[111] and I shall argue shortly (with reference as well to Lucian's *Teacher of Rhetoric*) that this is because Lucian is also drawing on Aristophanes' *Clouds*, with the intention of undermining both Sculpture and Paideia. Nevertheless, the resemblance between Paideia

[106] Cf. Said (1993), 269; Goldhill (2002), 64; Hopkinson (2008), 101 (loc. cit.). Humble and Sidwell (2006), 221, interpret this dream and the one in the final chapter, which recalls Xenophon's *Anabasis* 3.1.11-13 in which Xenophon had a dream which caused him to make a decisive and ultimately correct decision, as signifying that 'Lucian was enticed into the right course, but he chose it for the wrong reasons'.
[107] Branham (1989), 28-29; Said (1993), 268-69; Whitmarsh (2001), 122; Goldhill (2002), 68. See Levine Gera (1995), 239-43, for variations on this theme. See also Hopkinson (2008), 94-6. For a discussion of the relationship between Prodicus' version and Xenophon's presentation of it, see Sansone (2004).
[108] Levine Gera (1995), 243, 246; Whitmarsh (2001), 123; Hopkinson (2008), 94-6.
[109] See Levine Gera (1995), 239-43.
[110] See Swain (1996), 309, with references to Xenophon.
[111] Cf. Hopkinson (2008), 96.

and Vice is far stronger than that between Paideia and Virtue.[112] So, by casting Paideia in the role of Vice and actually choosing her, Lucian's *Dream* implies that its hero, the successful sophist, has been charmed by the easy path in life, a path whose alluring appearance probably conceals something negative.

The motif of a choice between two unequal possibilities resonates with the heroic choice found in many Greek myths, most famously in Achilles' alternatives of an insignificant long or famous short life (*Iliad* 9.410-16), and Achilles, like the eastern sophist, chooses the option which leads to fame (but fame at a price). The narrator's use of Agamemnon's dream and the 'Choice of Heracles', as well as the Achillean quality of his decision, are designed to imbue him with a heroic nature.[113] Obviously, the choices of Achilles and Heracles are far tougher and more significant than our narrator's, yet by making the comparison, he is casting himself on the level of these individuals immortalized through fame. He is making the claim that his choice and subsequent success are deeds worthy of remembering. And so, Paideia flatters him, name-dropping Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Socrates, and promising him a position in the canon: 'They say that some men become immortal, I will make this happen to you; though you yourself depart from life, you will never cease associating with men of education and conversing with men of eminence' (ὃ δὲ λέγουσιν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἀθάνατοι γίγνονταί τινες ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, τοῦτό σοι περιποιήσω· καὶ γὰρ ἢν αὐτὸς ἐκ τοῦ βίου ἀπέλθῃς, οὔποτε παύσῃ συνὼν τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις καὶ προσομιλῶν τοῖς ἀρίστοις, *Dream* 12). Paideia here is clearly implying that his continued existence would be in the form of his ideas and words contained in circulating books,[114] but she is also alluding to one of the two possibilities of what awaits an individual after death as proposed

[112] Said (1993), 269: Sculpture resembles Virtue and Paideia Vice.
[113] Cf. S. Said (1993), 268.
[114] Cf. Hopkinson (2008), 105 (loc. cit.).

by Socrates at the end of Plato's *Apology*. Socrates states that there are two potential realities of death: annihilation or a change of habitation to another world where one converses forever with the best of men, including the heroes of Greek myth (*Apology* 40c-41c).[115]

This picture of the heroic narrator is enhanced by Paideia's flying chariot which is drawn by 'winged horses resembling Pegasus' (ὑποπτέρων ἵππων τινῶν τῷ Πηγάσῳ ἐοικότων, 15) and the narrator's comparison of himself to Triptolemus, Demeter's messenger of restored fertility who sowed seeds from a flying chariot.[116] However, in the eastern sophist's case, his 'seeds' (for which read 'words' or 'speeches') are instead spreading his fame across the empire.[117] Additionally, as is often the case in Lucian, εὐπάρυφος can also simply refer to 'a purple garment' (a colour associated with Romans in Lucianic texts).[118] In this case, the narrator's journey with Paideia in a chariot (15), combined with his purple outfit and the applause of his audience, cast him as a Roman *triumphator*. The *toga picta*, all-purple and decorated with gold thread, was originally worn solely by the *triumphator*. Later, and certainly by the time Lucian wrote this piece, it was worn only by the emperor.[119] In a purely Greek context, purple clothing is associated with kings and the very wealthy. In the second chapter of this thesis, I discussed the parallels between Herodes Atticus' presentation of his return to Athens from Sirmium and the processions of Hellenistic

[115] The first possibility of annihilation, Socrates likens to a dreamless sleep (*Apology* 40c-d). I will return to the significance of the figure of Socrates to this speech below (see p. 238).
[116] On Triptolemus, see Hopkinson (2008), 106-7 (loc. cit).
[117] Cf. Hopkinson (2008), 107.
[118] εὐπάρυφος: *Demonax* 15 (on a Macedonian), 41; *On Salaried Posts* 9; *Alexander* 27, *Dialogues of the Courtesans* 1.1. πορφύρα: *Demonax* 41; *Nigrinus* 4, 13, 15; *On Salaried Posts* 41. See also *LSJ*, s.v. εὐπάρυφος. Humble and Sidwell (2006), 220, note that εὐπάρυφος applies to those of 'high social status', which is true, but most of those whom it describes are Roman also.
[119] Stone (1994), 13: the *toga picta*, once worn by the *triumphator*, and *toga purpurea* came to be worn solely by the emperor. See Francis (2003), 577, who notes: 'Roman *triumphators* were made up to resemble the statue of Jupiter Optimus Maximus in the Capitoline temple'. Humble and Sidwell (2006), 221, note that Lucian may be implying that Paideia opened the opportunity to turn him into a senator or emperor and that it is a consciously absurd proposition.

kings.[120] Lucian's eastern sophist also draws on this imagery. So, this presentation of the eastern sophist suggests two things: firstly that his fame rivals that of the most famous individual in the empire, in the emperor; secondly, that with *paideia*, contemporary fame is certain and along with it comes wealth and status (the heights – ὕψος – reached in the chariot are symbolic of wealth, social standing, and sublime literary skill).[121] He has swept across the empire with Paideia and returns home triumphant. Moreover, his triumphal return, places his home town momentarily on the level of Rome, where all triumphal processions end. So, his fame and fortune, attached as it is to himself, clings also to the place where he resides.

The acknowledgement of his eastern origin and westerly triumphal movement inverts both Greek and Roman depictions of the defeated, fleeing, and mourning east, such as Aeschylus' *Persians*, book six of Herodotus' *Histories*, or even the *Cynegirus* and *Callimachus* speeches of Polemo discussed above, and the portrayals of Actium's aftermath in Virgil's *Aeneid* 8.675-707, Horace's *Odes* 1.37, and Propertius' *Elegies* 3.11.[122] However, the success which Paideia promises is based 'entirely on appearance',[123] and the sophist cannot even remember what he scattered from the chariot, only the fame that he reaped:

> ἀρθεὶς δὲ εἰς ὕψος ἐγὼ ἐπεσκόπουν ἀπὸ τῆς ἕω ἀρξάμενος ἄχρι πρὸς τὰ ἑσπέρια πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη καὶ δήμους, καθάπερ ὁ Τριπτόλεμος ἀποσπείρων τι εἰς τὴν γῆν. οὐκέτι μέντοι μέμνημαι ὅ τι τὸ σπειρόμενον ἐκεῖνο ἦν, πλὴν τοῦτο μόνον ὅτι κάτωθεν ἀφορῶντες ἄνθρωποι ἐπῄνουν καὶ μετ' εὐφημίας καθ' οὓς γενοίμην τῇ πτήσει παρέπεμπον.
>
> I was carried up into the heights and went from the East to the very West, surveying cities and nations and peoples, sowing something over the earth like Triptolemus. I don't now remember what it was that I sowed; only that men, looking up from below, applauded, and all those above whom I passed in my flight sped me on my way with words of praise. (15)

[120] See p. 107.
[121] Cf. Hopkinson (2008), 106.
[122] See Said (2003), 56-57, on the *Persians*. See p. 224 above for Polemo's *Cynegirus* and *Callimachus*.
[123] Whitmarsh (2001), 123. Cf. Said (1993), 269; Hopkinson (2008), 96.

Nevertheless, although he appears as a triumphing general or Hellenistic king, the implicit comparison with Bellerophon through Pegasus warns against excessive pride and reinforces the sense that the narrator's choice is questionable.[124] He is flaunting a showy kind of *paideia* for mass imperial consumption and contemporary fame. He is donning the accoutrements of the *pepaideumenos*, but the transformation is only skin deep and is aimed at gaining status and wealth. These are the things that Paideia promised him: knowledge of the ancients, but also a dignified appearance, honour, esteem, precedence, power, and fame (13); it is his appearance which Paideia emphasizes to his father on his return (15). Equally, this idea can be extended from his person to his speech: the words he casts from the chariot bring immediate acclaim but, although he is making an account of his life before his home audience, even he cannot now remember them.

If this is not an autobiographical piece, it is unlikely that the decision to oppose Sculpture to Paideia is arbitrary.[125] At *Dream* 12, Paideia invokes Socrates as a former sculptor, who abandoned the trade for *paideia*. This tradition is found in the early third-century-CE *Lives of the Philosophers* by Diogenes Laertius, which explains that Socrates (infamous for his unattractive appearance and shabbiness) was the son of a sculptor and may have crafted a group of Graces on the Acropolis (*VP* 2.19).[126] However, Diogenes explains, Κρίτωνα δ' ἀναστῆσαι αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργαστηρίου καὶ παιδεῦσαι τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν χάριτος ἐρασθέντα ('Criton made him leave his workshop and instruct men, out of love for his graceful soul', *VP* 2.20). So, in Socrates' case, *paideia* came to him because of his ψυχή and did not alter his appearance nor make him covetous of wealth. Diogenes Laertius specifically makes him

[124] Cf. Humble and Sidwell (2006), 220.
[125] Cf. Said (1993), 269.
[126] Cf. Pausanius *Description of Greece* 1.22.8, 9.35.7, and the *Suidas* s.v. Σωκράτης.

reject purple and silver and associate both with actors (*VP* 2.25).[127] The Athenian philosopher presents a direct contrast to the eastern sophist. The former is unattractive and uninterested in contemporary fame like the *Dream*'s Sculpture, but possesses a charming ψυχή. This characterisation of Socrates is common. In Plato's *Symposium*, Alcibiades compares him to a *silenus*: φημὶ γὰρ δὴ ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τούτοις τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἑρμογλυφείοις καθημένοις... οἳ διχάδε διοιχθέντες φαίνονται ἔνδοθεν ἀγάλματα ἔχοντες θεῶν ('They say [Socrates] is exactly like a *silenus*, the little figures you see sitting in statuaries' shops… they can be opened down the middle and folded back, and then they show images of gods inside them', 215a-b). The word used for statuary here is ἑρμογλυφεύς, the same very specific word used for the personification of sculpture in Lucian's *Dream*, which opens the possibility that Lucian is deliberately drawing on the *Symposium*. Additionally, Eunapius in the *Lives of the Sophists* asserts that the Athenians regarded Socrates as a 'walking statue of wisdom' (περιπατοῦν ἄγαλμα σοφίας) (*VS* 6.2.4). The eastern sophist, on the other hand, resembles the attractive, well-dressed Paideia and yearns for glory and wealth, and unlike Socrates, his learning is superficial. Moreover, Socrates dealt in ideas and words, but an important part of his mythology is that he refused to write anything down; yet his fame has stood the test of time (although it has been helped along by the writings of his contemporaries).

If Sculpture is intended to conjure Socrates, then Paideia's promises of immortality, which alluded to Socrates' vision of one possible afterlife (*Apology* 40c-41c), are undermined and revealed to be as illusory as the rest of her promises. Thus through the figure of Socrates, the *Dream* critiques the flaunting of a superficial brand of *paideia* to achieve wealth and fame: the ingredients which, the narrator claims, in turn entitle him to identification with,

[127] Cf. Hopkinson (2008), 96: 'Lucian is promised wealth, travel, splendid clothing and universal fame, all things despised by Socrates'.

and success in, the Roman empire. When the narrator leaves with Paideia he is a poor easterner, but he returns resembling a famous and wealthy intellectual (or even a victorious or emperor-like Roman), whose success stems from his ability to assume the role of a Greek sophist. So, the text implies this superficial *paideia* enables one to transcend cultural and social boundaries,[128] but also, through the 'Choice of Heracles' *topos* and allusion to Agamemnon's deceptive dream, that this sociocultural relocation is not necessarily a positive move. This notion is particularly stressed by the figure of Sculpture, who specifically offers the narrator an eastern identity, focusing on his familial ties to the land, saying: οὔποτε ἄπει ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλοδαπήν, τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους καταλιπών ('You will never go abroad, leaving your homeland and family', *Dream* 7). In contrast, Paideia opens the entire world to him and gives him the tools to fashion himself as he pleases (15).[129] Further, Sculpture promises collective fame for the narrator, his family and his native land that begins at home and radiates outwards – the kind of civic-based, reciprocal fame of which honorific statues are symbolic in reality – whereas Paideia offers a fame that is attached purely to the sophist, which follows him wherever he goes, and which is ephemeral (8, 11).[130] With Paideia, the sophist himself travels the empire; with Sculpture it is his works that travel (much like Favorinus' textualized statue or Apuleius' *liber*).

James Romm argues that sculpture in the Lucianic corpus expresses a tension between literary innovation and adherence to 'classical' forms, in that Lucian often depicts himself as a plastic artist, who works best with softer, re-mouldable materials, so that we see comparisons between 'clay with gold and ivory, wet clay with dry, and, finally, wax with

[128] Whitmarsh (2001), 124. Cf. Dubuisson (1984-86), 193. On *paideia* and identity see Whitmarsh (2001), 90-130.
[129] Whitmarsh (2001), 122-23.
[130] See also Lucian's *Rhetorum Praeceptor* with Levine Gera (1995). See also Said (1993), 269-70.

stone'.[131] Moreover, he explains that Lucian's attraction to innovation is driven by the acclaim which he claims to receive from the masses, but that the process is bittersweet in that it fails to impress his fellow learned elite.[132] Hence, he sees stonemasonry in Lucian, and particularly in the *Dream*, as a negative symbol of slavish adherence to literary tradition and the playing with wax, which the *Dream*'s narrator engages in as a schoolboy (2), as a positive symbol of innovation.[133] However, this desire for innovation, which brings contemporary fame, also seals his fate as a flash in the pan, as someone whose fame is as transitory and mutable as his cultural affiliation: wax images are imminently more perishable in comparison with stone.[134] It is, however, not simply tradition versus innovation that Lucian is critiquing, but also the transitory nature of the acclaim associated with sophistic epideictic oratory. The animals and creatures that the narrator moulds from his wax tablets as a child, are not just symbolic of innovation, but also of the way the same words (because, although he does not state it explicitly, that is what the tablets would be inscribed with) can be manipulated into many different incarnations: 'whenever my teachers dismissed me, I would scrape the wax from my tablets and model cattle or horses or even men' (ὁπότε γὰρ ἀφεθείην ὑπὸ τῶν διδασκάλων, ἀποξέων ἂν τὸν κηρὸν ἢ βόας ἢ ἵππους ἢ καὶ νὴ Δί' ἀνθρώπους ἀνέπλαττον, 2).[135] This is what the sophistic orator does: he uses material drawn from the classical canon to improvise speeches on common historical or mythological themes. Excellence in this activity accrues contemporary fame, but that fame, like each speech is ephemeral. And so, for this reason, the process is bittersweet. It is not professional legitimacy the author desires, but a lasting relationship with posterity. He plays with the classical canon, tearing out chunks and making them conform to his purpose, but he will never be part of it.

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131 Romm (1990), 91.
132 Romm (1990), 86-7.
133 See Romm (1990), 96-7. Cf. Hopkinson (2008), 95.
134 Romm (1990), 91-2.
135 See Hopkinson (2008), 99, for the allusion here to Aristophanes' *Clouds* 879: Pheidippides too modelled as a child.

So, in Lucian's *Dream*, Sculpture could rather be considered as symbolic of several inter-linked concepts. Firstly, Socrates' brand of *paideia*, something far more concrete than the triumphal seeds sowed by the eastern sophist, which are so insubstantial as to be entirely forgettable; secondly, canonical literature, something the narrator can plunder and play with, but not create (his one attempt ended in a broken and ruined slab after all); thirdly, the written text, a medium which sets his improvised and ephemeral performances in stone. Thus this text once more engages with the difficulty facing an epideictic orator: improvisation and impermanence are the keys to contemporary success, but are also the enemies of future fame.

In addition, the *Dream*'s eastern sophist is not entirely committed to his own transition:

> ἡ δὲ ἀπολειφθεῖσα τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠγανάκτει καὶ τὼ χεῖρε συνεκρότει καὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας συνέπριε· τέλος δέ, ὥσπερ τὴν Νιόβην ἀκούομεν, ἐπεπήγει καὶ εἰς λίθον μετεβέβλητο. εἰ δὲ παράδοξα ἔπαθεν, μὴ ἀπιστήσητε· θαυματοποιοὶ γὰρ οἱ ὄνειροι.
>
> When I abandoned Sculpture, at first she was indignant and struck her hands together and ground her teeth; but at length, like Niobe in the story, she grew rigid and turned to stone. Her fate was strange, but don't be incredulous, for dreams are great conjurers after all. (*Dream* 14)

The comparison with Niobe (who mourned her children so excessively that she petrified) suggests that Sculpture takes the loss of the eastern sophist equally hard.[136] She becomes what she represents: a permanent and immovable, but also immobile, anachronistic, and abandoned symbol of traditional Greek culture and learning. Yet the two images – the permanent sculpture and the ephemeral seeds – combine to express reservations about the superficial exploitation of *paideia* (that epideictic plundering of canonical literature) to pander to the tastes of the masses, about choosing contemporary fame and wealth over

[136] On Niobe here, see Hopkinson (2008), 106 (loc. cit.).

tradition, cultural integrity, and the production of a literary legacy. Moreover, the triumph of Paideia over Sculpture, which in fact turns Sculpture to stone, recalls Socrates' playful pun on Gorgias and gorgon in his description of the orator's ability to petrify others with words in Plato's *Symposium* 198c3-5. Significantly, Socrates presents himself as the potential victim of Gorgias' dangerous eloquence. Additionally, labelling dreams as conjurers undermines the feasibility of such a successful sociocultural repositioning as the sophist's vision promises: it self-consciously undermines the speech's message of achievement. Moreover, the narrator's claim to excellence in *epideixis* is further self-consciously questioned, as his narrative is cut short by imagined interlocutors from the audience, who complain: 'what a long and tiresome dream!' (ὡς μακρὸν τὸ ἐνύπνιον καὶ δικανικόν, 17) and 'what got into him to tell us this idle tale and to speak of a night of his childhood and dreams that are ancient and over the hill?' (τί δ' οὖν ἐπῆλθεν αὐτῷ ληρῆσαι ταῦτα πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ μνησθῆναι παιδικῆς νυκτὸς καὶ ὀνείρων παλαιῶν καὶ γεγηρακότων; 17). Additionally, the careful avoidance of naming the eastern sophist plays at contradicting the Greek tradition of κλὲος ἄφθιτον ('immortal fame'). On the surface, he is saying: if no one knows your name, how can you be remembered?[137] Yet the method of dissemination of the text negates this potential problem: if it is written down, there will be a notice of authorship; if it is delivered as a speech, the 'I' will be identified as the speaker.

It is in this ambivalence that Aristophanes' *Clouds* becomes significant. Elsewhere, Lucian claims Old Comedy as one of his biggest influences[138] and the spectre of Socrates, combined with the contest between Paideia and Sculpture, recalls the similar contest between Right and Wrong Argument in the *Clouds* (889-1104), with Paideia resembling

[137] See Goldhill (2002), 65.
[138] *Twice Accused* 33. See also Branham (1989), 11-63.

Wrong and Sculpture Right.[139] Neither of Aristophanes' educational models is without its faults and the message of the play seems to be to undermine the value of education itself. Lucian exploits a similar ambivalence in his *Teacher of Rhetoric*, in which the *Dream*'s Sculpture and Paideia are replaced by a hyper-masculine guide of a rough and long path and an effeminate guide of a short and easy path, both of which ultimately lead to Rhetoric. The value of this objective is questioned because one path takes a lifetime before the goal is reached, and the other furnishes its pilgrim with a kind of rhetoric that is all show and no substance.[140] Similarly, neither Sculpture nor Paideia fit precisely into the roles of Virtue and Vice and both have their shortcomings: Sculpture promises toil and roots her adherent's existence in the eastern backwater in which he was born; Paideia's promises of fame and wealth are merely an illusion.[141] It suggests the sophistic performer is in an impossible position: the Greek canon, represented by Sculpture, is already formed; life as an epideictic orator brings nothing more than contemporary fame. So, as much as the narrator represents *paideia* and sophistry as a ticket to fame and acceptance in the Roman world, the text can be read as suggesting the opposite instead. Although Lucian's eastern sophist presents a fantasy of himself and *paideia* conquering the empire as a triumphing general, emperor or Hellenistic king, he remains a sophistic performer whose fame is ephemeral and only as secure as his last performance.

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[139] On allusions to the *Clouds* in this speech, see Hopkinson (2008), 94, 99, 102. Sculpture is directly compared to Right Argument through the promise of 'powerful shoulders' (ὤμους ἕξεις καρτερούς) at *Dream* 7. Cf. Aristophanes' *Clouds* 1013 (ὤμους μεγάλους); Hopkinson (2008), 102 (loc. cit.). See von Möllendorf (2000), 212-15, on the *Clouds* and Lucian's *Hermotimus*. He notes that Hermotimus' conversion from philosophy to the life of the average man is aligned with Right Argument's conversion to Wrong Argument's view point and is merely a sign of mental and character weakness, since it is a conversion to the easy degenerate majority view. Importantly for the *Dream*, Hermotimus' conversion is indicated by the donning of purple clothing (τάχα δὲ καὶ πορφυρίδα μεταμφιάσομαι, *Hermotimus* 86).

[140] See Levine Gera (1995), 244-250, on Paideia and Sculpture in the *Dream* compared to the modern and old-fashioned teachers of rhetoric in the *Teacher of Rhetoric*.

[141] See Levine Gera (1995), 248: 'While the new-fangled teacher is an absolute contrast to his old-fashioned rival, and is clearly an altogether negative figure, Paideia has several positive aspects and in many ways her ambitions for Lucian are identical to those of her rival, Techne'.

Conclusion: 'I am flesh and blood and vision'.

So, in these texts, sculpture is a manifestation of the problems faced by the sophistic epideictic orator who wants to be remembered and wants his words to bring him future fame. It represents the potential for future fame that the production of literature can create, but also how inappropriate the creation of a literary monument is for an individual whose contemporary success depends on his ability to improvise. Moreover, even after the orator has committed himself to writing, he is confronted by the weight of tradition: the post-classical author is immediately at a disadvantage, since the Greek canon is already set. It provides the raw material for the sophist's craft, but the finished product will never be considered as part of it. Nevertheless, at least in Favorinus' and Apuleius' case, breaking the 'rules' of sophistic oratory and recording a speech – creating a literary statue – is the first step in reaching out to posterity. Favorinus turns the dishonour of his statue's removal on its head by creating his own rehabilitative version that will exist for all time. Apuleius consciously privileges the written text over the performed speech, since it has the ability to travel. Interestingly, sophistic epideictic oratory occupies a fairly unique position as a genre in Greek literature. It is reasonably late-developing and it is caught between the dictates of an oral and literate society. The predominant medium of Greek performance is poetry and oral repetition was always important to its memorialization, even once poetry was recorded in writing.[142] Sophistic *epideixis*, on the other hand, is a performed medium that actively seeks to avoid repetition. The way these authors use statues within their texts reveals that they are aware of this dictate, but in recording them and in trying to give their work future currency, are rejecting it.

[142] See Thomas (1992), 101-27.

At the same time, statues, as representations of the physical form of an individual, become points of tension and negotiation for personal identity within literature and stand in opposition to the physical monument. Although statues were sought after in reality as visible reflections of status and reputation, texts express anxieties over the way in which a physical statue can fix a person in time and place, thus reducing them to a very specific relationship with whomever the dedicator of the monument might be. Texts, on the other hand, give the author the ability to express himself and converse with both contemporary society and posterity in whatever manner he chooses. Consequently, a textualized statue can reflect a very personalized self-construction and helps the text stand as a literary monument to its composer – an adjunct or alternative to his 'soulless' representation in stone or bronze. So it is that Aelius Aristides suggests at the end of his *Sacred Tales* 5:

> ἀλλ' ἴσως, ἔφην, τοὺς μὲν νεὼς τοῖς θεοῖς προσήκει καθιεροῦν, τοὺς δὲ ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐλλογίμους τῇ τῶν βιβλίων ἀναθέσει τιμᾶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῶν, ἔφην, ἡμῶν τιμιώτατα ἃ φθεγγόμεθα, ὡς δὴ τοὺς μὲν ἀνδριάντας καὶ τὰ ἀγάλματα τῶν σωμάτων ὄντα ὑπομνήματα, τὰ δὲ βιβλία τῶν λόγων.
>
> 'But perhaps it is proper to consecrate temples to the gods, but to honour famous men with the offering of books, since' I said, 'our most valuable possessions are what we say. For statues and images are monuments of bodies, but books of words'. (*Sacred Tales* 5.63)

Conclusion

> There are nearly thirteen million people in the world. None of those people is an extra. They're all the leads of their own stories. They have to be given their due.
>
> Charlie Kaufmann, *Synedoche, New York* (2008).

This thesis has been an exploration of the anxieties and opportunities which attend fame and posterity in the second sophistic and their representation in the literary and monumental legacy of this period. The men who populate these pages attempt to mark the civic landscape with a lasting presence at the same time as addressing the future through literary ventures. Not all sophists build or grant benefactions and not all elite Greeks write literature; nevertheless, the traces of both enterprises are clear in the cultural production of those men who do, in that their texts are laden with representations of monuments and their monuments engage with literary history. Moreover, that cultural production is laden with the complexities of existing in a culture which is powerfully tied to the past at the same time as craving a future presence. The continuing fame of men from the distant past suggests to elite Greeks in the empire that it must be possible for them too to create such a lasting reputation; the contemporary dictates of immersion in the classical past, however, limit their potential to achieve this, since the past acts as an anchor which tethers these men to a distinct period in history. Their efforts to create timeless and eternal cultural production are hampered by this fixed temporal referencing. The knowledge of this paradox adds a sense of pathos to the futuring efforts of these men: they are concurrently aware of both the possibilities of eternal fame and the impossibility of adequately creating and controlling one's future reputation. Nevertheless, this paradox does not entirely handicap these men, but rather adds layers of complexity and playfulness to their simultaneous engagement with the past and the future.

In the literary production of the second sophistic there is continuity with the past in the language and themes used to address and construct commemoration: imperial Greek authors use the same kinds of tropes as their Hellenistic and classical predecessors. And yet their extended temporal perspective and their reception of a relatively fixed canon of Greek literature make their engagement with these tropes more self-conscious and fraught. Moreover, the changed cultural and political circumstances caused by the advent of the Roman empire open the door for the wealthy elite to write themselves into the sacred and civic landscapes of provincial cities: the excuse of benefaction allows them to construct public buildings that essentially stand as memorials to their generosity and position in the community. These dual paths to personal commemoration – literature and monuments – combine and collide in interesting and diverse ways. A complex intermediality and intertextuality exists in both the physical and the literary productions of these men. At the same time, given the privileging of the past in contemporary Greek culture and the strong engagement with the literary canon and famous individuals from classical times, their cultural production exhibits a complex relationship to time, in that these men are always concurrently looking forward and backwards.

Thus three key themes emerge as significant in giving the second sophistic its unique flavour with respect to commemorative practices: the ability to build publicly on a grand scale; the characteristic intermediality and intertextuality exhibited in the literary and monumental record; the complex temporalities that attend the kind of simultaneous engagement with both the past and the future in contemporary society. Throughout this thesis, I have given numerous and varied examples of how elite Greeks in the Roman empire demonstrate each of these themes. In the first chapter, we saw engagement with different modes of claiming and expressing novelty, particularly through the differing

approaches of Arrian and Lucian. Arrian adopted the position of arbiter, (re)creator, and (re)interpreter of the fame of both his classical namesake, Xenophon of Athens, and his contemporary, the emperor Hadrian. He used the fame of Xenophon and his account of the ten thousand to rewrite the literary history of Trapezous and to promote his own interference in the landmarks of that remote place on the Black Sea as the essential moment in its history, so that those who will engage with that place in the future will be forced to interpret its literary-historical story through Arrian and his intervention. In this way, he piggy-backs on the fame of Xenophon, Trapezous, and Hadrian to stress his own literary status. His actual success in this intention is debatable, since to this day Trapezous is more closely associated with Xenophon than Arrian in cultural consciousness, but the idea that the past can be made to serve one's own memorialization is consistently repeated in both the literature and the monuments of the period. This same process was revealed in the intermedial expression of cultural production discussed particularly in chapter three, in which the reinterpretation and reapplication of the past was used to create something new and to redirect earlier cultural wealth and commemorative strategies to a given individual and his future memorialization.

Lucian, on the other hand, demonstrates the anxiety caused by attempting to break with the expected in contemporary cultural display. He claims that his employment of novelty, which might entertain and startle the masses, would not, however, impress one's fellow *pepaideumenoi* because to no small extent it demands a rejection of the kind of privileging of the past which the second sophistic celebrates. Thus Lucian and his contemporaries are faced with an impossible decision: to toe the expected artistic line and engage wholeheartedly with the past or risk being written off as a cultural lightweight by attempting something novel, something which might fail in the present but make a

significant impression on the future. In a similar way, the example of statues in the final chapter was revealed as a focal point for concerns over personal commemoration and the relative benefits of representation in plastic or literary art, as well as the difficulty in constructing future reputation when one's contemporary reputation is based on excellence in improvised *epideixis*. In this, a loss of control over the personal construction of identity and reputation with respect to posterity was revealed as a key concern of these men.

This fear was also present in the cultural production of Herodes Atticus, who is the poster boy of Philostratus' second sophistic and who, throughout this thesis, has been shown to have tried wholeheartedly to embed himself into both the public and private landscape of Roman Greece. Indeed, the scale and extent of his monumentalization is on a practically imperial level. His example highlights two fundamental limitations in the desire to shape a future reputation: firstly, a fine balance needed to be maintained between dominating a city fiscally and culturally, and retaining good relations with the imperial administrative machine; secondly, no matter how grand one's efforts at embedding identity into the landscape, one cannot control the propagation of one's reputation once dead. Thus despite Herodes' exceptional program of personal commemoration, it is Philostratus who has most shaped the modern perception of his character and legacy. These twinned concepts of marking the landscape combined with the inevitable loss of the ability to shape one's reputation in the future come together in the intermedial expressions of cultural production in the second sophistic: in both literary and monumental efforts, the reuse and reapplication of cultural memory and wealth is a constant theme, and it is ever coupled with both the desire to control one's commemoration and the unsettling certainty that this is ultimately impossible.

It is in this tension between the creation and preservation of personal commemoration that both the primary contribution of this thesis to existing scholarship and avenues to further research are revealed. The second sophistic is about engagement with the past and this is where the majority of research in the field has focused its attention. My contribution comes in demonstrating that this is not the full story, since such engagement with the past necessarily opens up the possibility of a similar presence in the future and, as I have shown, this Janus-like perspective is ever present in the cultural production of these men. Moreover, their obsession with commemoration opens up the question of just how posterity has received them. Modern scholars of the ancient Greek and Roman worlds used to be content to try to rescue imperial literature from the charge of derivativeness; only now are we beginning to realise that the extent of its sophistication runs well beyond what was accepted even ten years ago. Nevertheless, although the second sophistic has now found an attentive and appreciative scholarly audience in our times, its reception in late antiquity and beyond is less clear. Thus there is here left a great gap in the examination of the commemorative processes of the second sophistic that begs to be filled. Just how successful were these men at writing themselves into the landscape and into the literary future? What evidence exists for their continued presence in the cultural consciousness of the Greco-Roman world? I offer one brief example from the world of material culture to show how it may be possible to trace the evolution and manipulation of their posthumous fame.

Recently, Betsey Robinson has performed a detailed study of the development and history of the Peirene fountain at Corinth, in which she discusses at length the dating of the construction of the triconch court that was for a long time assumed to be the work of

Herodes Atticus.[1] Robinson shows that it in fact most likely dates from the second half of the fourth century CE.[2] However, the statue base naming Herodes' wife Regilla, which was found within the court and which supplied the authority on which the attribution by the excavators of the construction to Herodes was made, bears an inscription that was recut in the third to fourth century.[3] This suggests that it was re-established in the court when it was constructed in the fourth century by the *boule*, most likely as an acknowledgement of some other benefaction or earlier renovative work on the fountain by Herodes or Regilla.[4] Thus here Herodes and his wife stand as examples of benefaction and as outstanding figures from the past to be emulated themselves. Indeed, the complex and varied assemblage of sculptural finds from Peirene suggests 'a nostalgic, museumlike arrangement in and near the fountain in late antiquity'.[5] The presence of Regilla in the triconch court implies that, by this time in Corinth, Herodes had become a symbol of the heights of Roman Greek culture so that his wife is found represented as an artefact in the kind of archaizing display in which he himself indulged. It is in this kind of evidence that the development of Herodes' fame can be traced, a process that would add greatly to the understanding of the position of the second sophistic as a period of transition from the high Roman empire to the beginning of late antiquity, and the reception and continuing importance of its players in the cultural consciousness of a transforming world.

Moreover, the presence of Regilla's statue reveals that the people of fourth-century Corinth cared enough about Herodes' fame to re-establish this representation of his wife.

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[1] See Robinson (2011), 252-4. Cf. Tobin (1997), 300.
[2] Robinson (2011), 252-84.
[3] The inscription reads: [N]εύματι Σισυφίης βουλῆς παρὰ χεύματι πηγῶν | Ρηγίλλαν μ'έσοπᾶ(ι)ς, εἰκόνα σωφροσύνης | ψ(ηφίσματι) β(ουλῆς) ('By the command of the Sisyphean Boule, beside the streams of the source | You see me, Regilla, an image of moderation. | By decree of the city council'). See Robinson (2011), 79.
[4] Robinson (2011), 78-80, 252-4.
[5] Robinson (2011), 281.

In this respect, he is revealed to have been successful in his program of writing himself into the landscape of Roman Greece: the museum-like sculptural assemblage of the fountain required the presence of this symbol of Herodes as benefactor (through his wife). On the other hand, it also demonstrates the validity of the fear over the inability to control reputation in the future that I demonstrated existed in the mindset of these men: since the base of the statue is recut and not original, the Corinthians source the statue of Regilla from elsewhere (even if potentially very nearby) and establish it in a context of their own choosing. In this way, Herodes' legacy as benefactor is revealed to be intact, but his ability to shape and control the way that legacy is represented has ceased to be viable. Consequently, it is in hints like these that a more accurate picture of Herodes' reputation post-mortem might be established to supplement and challenge the continuing dominance of the picture constructed by Philostratus, and a clearer picture of the cultural legacy of the second sophistic might be unveiled.

Bibliography

At the beginning of the bibliography, I have a separate section for the editions of the texts which I have quoted in the thesis. However, as a courtesy to the reader, I have also included those editions with commentary to which I refer in the body of the thesis in the main bibliography, so that one does not have to search through both lists to find a specific record.

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