STORIES THEOLOGY LIVES BY:

A NARRATIVE AND PHRONETIC

THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION



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DEDICATION

To my Lord and Abba Father, in whom I trust

Who knew and created me with legitimacy by grace in love

To my Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ, for whom I hope

Who chose narrating radical solidarity with me in love

In embodiment, on the cross, over the grave

To my Lord and Life-giver, the Holy Spirit, whom I love

Who empowers me to know and live in love.

Be the glory, honour, wisdom, and power

Faith, hope, and love

Forever and ever

Amen.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication ..... **iii**

Table of Contents ..... **iv**

Short Abstract ..... **vii**

Long Abstract ..... **ix**

Abbreviations ..... **xvii**

Acknowledgements ..... **xix**

Introduction **1**

Motivations and Aims *1*

The Argument *6*

Methodology *7*

Chapter Outline *10*

Part I: Bourdieusien Sociological Analysis **14**

Chapter 1: Bourdieusien Analysis and the *Doxa* of Theology **15**

Doxa: What theology assumes and believes about itself *16*

Illusio: The sine qua non of theology *21*

Essential Reflexivity *25*

Reflexivity on Bourdieu: A cohesive and comprehensive relational analysis *28*

Expanding reflexivity: Problematic reductionism in an overly methodological theological epistemology *36*

The epistemological demands of the incarnation on theology's epistemic doxa *44*

Chapter 2: The Bourdieusien hermeneutic triumvirate: capitals-fields-*habitus* **49**

Capitals: Espèces de capital et formes de pouvoir *49*

Fields *60*

Habitus *73*

Habitus as phronesis 74
Habitus and Cognitive Science 79
Habitus as Love 89

Moving to application of Bourdieu's Hermeneutic *91*

Part II: A Case Study in *Doxic* Struggle – The Yale School of Theology **93**

Chapter 3: Frei and Lindbeck: Divided on Narrative, United in *Doxic* Critique.....94

The 'Yale School': A case study in navigating symbolic violence.....94

Narrative theology: a form of doxic contest.....98

What is Narrative? A Typology of Approaches.....99

Biographical backgrounds and narrativised doxic contest.....102

Testing the Purist Typology: Do Frei and Lindbeck Agree on Narrative?.....107

Collapsing the Purist-Impurist Typology: The Projecting Text of Frei and Ricoeur 110

Antagonistic Projections: Frei's Projecting Text vs. Lindbeck's Projecting Metatext 113

Does Late-Frei Move Towards Lindbeck or Ricoeur?.....119

Late-Frei's Sensus Literalis: Turning to Ricoeur over Lindbeck 126

Divided on narrative projection, united in doxic struggle.....130

Chapter 4: H.R. Niebuhr and Hauerwas: Divergent on Narrative, Convergent on *Doxic* Contest.....134

Hauerwas and Niebuhr: Complicating the Narrative of the Yale School.....136

Narrativizing Knowledge-That vs. Knowledge-Who 138

What kind of knowledge-how? For what aim?.....149

Hauerwas' theological and transformational knowledge-how.....154

The Yale School: Divergent on Narrative.....162

Wittgenstein, the Yale School, Stanley Fish, and Doxic Struggle.....165

Concluding Part II.....174

Part III: Constructing a Liberating, Narrative and Phronetic Theology of Love.....176

Chapter 5: Towards a Constructive, Narrative, and Phronetic Theology of Love.....177

Learning how to construct theology without symbolic violence.....181

Is naming the problem enough? Is Deleuze and Guattari's desiring-production a solution to symbolic violence?.....189

Love's productive inclusivity and cognitive science of narrative.....200

Chapter 6: A Dialectic and Phronetic Epistemology of Love in the Resurrection.....206

1. Finding a phronetic epistemology of love in the resurrection.....208

2. Narrating, dialectical love: subjectivising objectivity and objectivising subjectivity.....223

2.1 The Husserlian background of Bourdieu's and Balthasar's dialectic epistemology 224

2.2 Narrating the resurrection in Balthasar's Dialectic epistemology of love 227
2.3 Resurrecting a dialectic phronesis of love in habitus 235

Chapter 7: Narrating a Phronetic Solution to Symbolic Violence in Christ Incarnate and Crucified 242

Jesus: Introducing a Narrative and Phronetic Theology of Liberation through Love 244
Outlining the Chapter 246
Bourdieu on Pascal and the existential origins of symbolic violence 247
Narrating dying to violence, living to faith, hope, and love in Christ 255
Phronetic solidarity as a constructive solution to symbolic violence 268

Conclusion 271

Originality 277
Implications 278
Objections 281
A Final Invitation 286

Appendix 1: Source Texts and Original Translations 288

Introduction 288
Chapter 1 289
Chapter 2 294
Chapter 3 304
Chapter 4 308
Chapter 5 310
Chapter 6 313
Chapter 7 319

Bibliography 327

SHORT ABSTRACT

What if, far from being a centre or force of liberation, academic theology itself needs liberation? Considering this requires theological reflexivity concerning theology's purpose and praxis and sociological reflexivity concerning how the field of theology functions as a system. Pierre Bourdieu's method of sociological analysis is especially suited to facilitating this reflexivity. Employing a pioneering Bourdieusien analysis through a case study of the Yale School of Narrative Theology, this interdisciplinary thesis explores how in allowing a set of reductive and non-inclusive epistemic assumptions to control the mode theologising, the field of theology has perpetuated symbolic violence, namely a legitimation of the *status quo* of theological mode. In this analysis, those from marginalised communities suffer most, either by being forced to theologise according to the dictates of the dominant or by being disregarded in or disenfranchised from participation. However, the assumption of an abstractionist discursive mode for theological epistemology also renders it epistemically reductive: both of the modes of theological production and knowledge and of the sociological dimensions of doing theology. So, building upon our Bourdieusien analysis and synthesis of the Yale School's theological insights, we construct a truly productive narrative and phronetic theology of liberation through love that removes symbolic violence from theology without resorting to it. Through dialogue with Gustavo Gutiérrez, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Bourdieu, Cognitive Science of Narrative, and Christian Scripture we construct a dialectic and phronetic epistemology of love in which one loves in order to know. This removes symbolic violence from academic theological epistemology by embracing creative dialectical subjectivity and objectivity in knowing through love. Inseparable from this, we uncover the

fundamentally existential origins of symbolic violence and narrate an alternative to legitimation-through-power in Christ incarnate and crucified expressing a radical embodied solidarity with God and humanity in love.

LONG ABSTRACT

Is theology enslaved to itself? If it were, would it even notice? Is it even able to notice? If it was, in what way has it enslaved itself? But more importantly, who or what else would it be enslaving in the process? Moreover, would there be any way to liberate the enslaved, including theology itself? These are provocative questions, but they are also productive ones. Further, they are inseparable from a set of foundational questions to the activity of doing theology: What does it mean to do theology? Why do we do theology the way that we do? How can we do it better? At its heart, this thesis aims at the nexus of these questions in the hope that theology can become a more profoundly liberating activity, not just for people, institutions, churches, but for itself.

Sitting alongside these primary questions is a cluster of related attempts to wrestle with them, namely by narrative and liberation theologies. Yet, narrative theologies – while in vogue for a time in the theological academy – eventually seemed to stall in their actual ability to integrate narrative into the *modus operandi* of the theological academy. Interrelated to this concern for narrative in theology, cognitive science is suggesting the fundamental role of narrative and embodiment to human cognition. Thus, we explore these three primary questions in light of narrative theologies and cognitive research on narrative. These questions arise both from an interest in narrative and liberation theologies, but also an awareness that many in the world today are not legitimated contributors to theology precisely because of some of the operative assumptions in academic theology in relation to what it means to do theology and why it is done the way it is. Specifically, this thesis is concerned that what counts as 'good theology' is more an expression of participation in and access to prestigious

(or at least conventional) academic theological education in the West than with genuine theological insight. These questions also arise from an awareness that the abstractionism of academic theology creates barriers to theological access and exchange by and across cultural, socio-economic, and ethnic communities. Likewise, it presents an obstacle to translating theology from theoretical production to transformational agency. Further, by separating theory from practice, academic theology forces upon itself a reductive theological epistemology that fails to account for the epistemic contributions of action as much as the sociological nature of all academic theological production.

Thus, all these questions generate another fundamental question: how does academic theology operate as a sociological system and how has that operation itself shaped the way theology has answered these questions either explicitly or implicitly. To integrate the sociological dimension into these questions seems essential, but to do so requires integrating a suitable sociological analytic approach. This we can find in Pierre Bourdieu, who designed is heuristic for just such a situation. His analysis uncovers that it is especially the implicit answers to these questions that some of the most devastating epistemological, sociological, and theological consequences appear: arbitrary delegitimation of human beings, communities, and their ways of and needs in doing theology that appears legitimate only because everyone even those harmed by them assumes them. This Bourdieu also names *symbolic violence*.

Motivating this thesis, however, is not simply the hope of integrating a Bourdieusien sociological analysis of the field of theology, research of the cognitive sciences on narrative, or the usefulness of narrative as a subgenre within theology. In addition is the concern that academic theology limits itself epistemologically in what and how it understands God, humanity, and this world because of symbolic violence. Likewise, if narrative as theology continues to be considered ‘less theological’ by being ‘less committed to western discursive

reasoning,' it is especially the voices on the margins who come from outside the western discursive tradition (both within and beyond the West) that will suffer discrimination. This will render theology not only non-liberating to the marginalised and dominated in the social field, but precisely a perpetuator of symbolic violence. Although this thesis focuses on academic theology, the epistemic jeopardy of limiting what can be understood theologically and who is able to contribute to that understanding in the academic theological field also endangers the church, as the higher ranking of the academy over the church in the wider cultural hierarchy of society engenders the exportation of the academy's *doxic* assumptions and regulations of cultural production into the church. Further, discriminating against narrative in the field of theology through both its dominant *habitus* and distribution of capitals carries a correlative hazard, viz. the affectivity and sociality of theology that generates coordinated action and worship will likewise continue to be impinged, undermining the liberative nature and purpose of the church and theology itself, which is to know the Triune God and live individually and communally. Further motivating this thesis is a keen awareness of the existential sources of symbolic violence and its existential consequences on human beings and the resulting desire to provide a productive, liberating, and life-giving alternative. Accordingly, the deepest motivation for finding stories theology can live by and constructing a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation is an uncompromising love seeking to embody in lived narrative phronesis radical solidarity with God, humanity, the academy, and the world.

This thesis, therefore, is above all a constructive project to produce a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation that removes symbolic violence from academic theology without resorting to it. To succeed at being constructive, it develops and deploys the sociological analysis of Bourdieu on the Yale School of Theology, as a case study, to explore the operation of academic theology as a system and the Yale School's conceptual

productions. This involves understanding Bourdieu's concepts of (*epistemic*) *doxa*, *illusio*, reflexivity, and symbolic violence. Further, synthesising his triadic hermeneutic of capitals-fields-*habitus* reveals the sociological dimension of doing theology as well as the presence and operation of symbolic violence. This Bourdieusien analysis of the Yale School exposes elements of academic theology's *epistemic doxa* through and for which it enacts symbolic violence. Simultaneously, the case study develops the necessary analysis of academic theology as a sociological systemic vis-à-vis symbolic violence *as well as* cultivates from the Yale School of Narrative Theology the necessary conceptual resources for constructing a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation. With the analysis and resources in place, dialogue with Gustavo Gutiérrez, Bourdieu, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 8E cognition research, and the Christian Scriptures will produce a truly constructive narrative and phronetic theology of liberation through epistemic and active solidarity in love, which not only provides an alternative theological epistemology without symbolic violence but uncovers the existential source of symbolic violence to provide an alternative mode of life to the games of symbolic violence Bourdieu uncovers in human society. In this way, academic theology is invited into liberation from its symbolic violence through embracing a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation through love.

Where previous narrative and liberation theologies have sought to contest and subvert symbolic violence within the theological academy with narrative as well as encourage a genuine solidarity with those suffering symbolic violence, this thesis attempts to imagine a form of academic theology free from symbolic violence that is epistemologically inclusive as well as courageous enough to break with the narrative of symbolic legitimation in which it participates. Further, this thesis offers an original synthesis of Bourdieu's thought as well as a theological appraisal and deployment of his analysis. Further, no other theological work seeks to explain the Yale School in sociological terms rather than conceptual ones. Relatedly, the

analysis of Frei's relationship to Lindbeck and Ricoeur found in this thesis offers an alternative understanding to the one generally assumed in the academy today. No other engagement with Bourdieu has sought to correlate *habitus* with cognitive science's 7E cognition, much less narration as a dimension of human cognitive processing. Furthermore, integrating both Bourdieusien analysis and cognitive science to offer the 8E compatible phronetic and narrative approach to theologising found in this thesis stands out among other constructive efforts at narrative theology. Additionally, while Gutiérrez incorporated narrative theology into his liberation theology, the reverse has not been as true. This thesis' attempt at synthesising the Yale School's narrative theologies with the liberation theology of Gutiérrez is, thus, an important contribution to academic theology. Finally, while many have used Marx as an important dialogue partner with which to construct their theologies of liberation, using Bourdieu to provide the sociological frame in place of Marx moves the liberative analysis towards considering not only the capitalistic systems than can serve to oppress but the meta-capitalistic systems of symbolic power which undergird them.

The argument and constructive attempt unfold in three main stages: Parts I-III. In Part I, the focus will be on understanding, synthesising, beginning to deploy Bourdieu's sociological analysis. Part II serves as a focused case study in the role symbolic violence played in the conceptual productions of the Yale School of narrative theologians as much as the coordination of those theologians into the Yale School. It will simultaneously develop theological resources for Part III's constructive work. Finally, in Part III, the constructive theological effort will seek to be truly productive in orientation to offer a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation which invites academic theology live in dialectic and active love.

Chapter 1 introduces three foundational concepts in Bourdieu's sociological analysis: *doxa*, *illusio*, reflexivity. Turning that reflexivity towards Bourdieu, critiques of his approach

will be considered, though ultimately they will reinforce the usefulness of Bourdieu's analysis. However, this reflexivity will then extend to theology itself, to explore its turn to scientific methodological epistemic reductionism to acquire legitimation in a changing symbolic landscape. Considering critiques of this epistemic reductionism reveals a sociological dimension to academic knowledge that are dehumanising. Turning to the incarnation will set out some epistemological parameters and goals for academic theology.

Chapter 2 advances both an analysis and a synthesis of Bourdieu's hermeneutical triad: capitals-fields-*habitus*. This triad operates conjointly and simultaneously. They cannot be separated from one another in analysis but cohere always together in a continuous hermeneutical spiral that constantly adjusts to improve its analysis. The analysis of these concepts reveals a theological correspondence. Capitals operate on faith. Fields generate and orient in hope. *Habitus* expresses love. Thus, *habitus* reveals a love for the field's hope in its trusted capital. Also, Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* as practical reason (*phronesis*) finds corroboration in 7E cognitive science research, emphasising the embodied, socially-embedded, enactive, and unconscious dimension of human thought.

Chapter 3 deploys Bourdieusien analysis on the Yale School while developing the conceptual resources that undergird Part III's constructive efforts. First, the sociological biographies of the four members of the Yale School under consideration will be explored, revealing that they came from vulnerable socio-cultural backgrounds. Then Gary Comstock's typology of narrative theology will be used both to identify the Yale School as well as contrast its identification primarily on conceptual terms with this thesis' identification primarily on sociological function. Considering Hans Frei and George Lindbeck (understood to be the most closely aligned of the school), Chapter 3 reveals them to be diametrically opposed to the other's understanding and use of narrative. However, analysis also reveals that Frei and Lindbeck turn to narrative to resist symbolic violence in the epistemological

assumptions and demands of academic theology. They serve not as conceptual allies, but sociological allies against academic symbolic violence against texts and the church as a performative metatext.

In Chapter 4, analysis of the Yale School is extended to its grandfather, H.R. Niebuhr and its grandson, Stanley Hauerwas. While both turn to narrative for its epistemic value, Niebuhr is mainly interested in narrative rendering knowledge-who for theology and Christianity possible, whereas Hauerwas emphasises narrative as knowledge-in-action, namely a phronetically-inclined mode for theology. In so doing, Hauerwas reformulates the epistemology of theology as beginning with ethics. Their insights are compatible, but not identical, invalidating the possibility of the Yale School of being a school of thought. Where Niebuhr contests symbolic violence in academic theology against knowledge-who being essential to theology, Hauerwas contests symbolic violence against knowledge-in-action as essential to academic theology. Nevertheless, through this shared contest, Niebuhr and Hauerwas confirm the Yale School as sociological coordination against symbolic violence. With this, the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology have been exposed and necessary resources to a constructive reimagining of theology gained.

This thesis' constructive project first must consider what it means to be truly constructive in Chapter 5, especially since the Bourdieusien analysis is chiefly de-constructive in orientation. Considering J. Daniel Schubert's use of desiring-production to critique of Bourdieusien *habitus* for failing to solve the problem it uncovers, viz. symbolic violence, we argue theology must remove symbolic violence from academic theology without resorting to it. Gutiérrez overlaps with Schubert in seeking a liberating solution but advances towards a more productive solution of love. Intersected with cognitive science of narrative Gutiérrez reenforces both the narrative and phronetic elements of a theology of liberation motivated by and conducted in love.

Chapter 6 develops the dialectic and phronetic epistemology of love necessary to a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation from Paul's narration of the eschatological epistemic transformation at the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 13, the quintessential chapter on love. Through the narration of the world without symbolic violence, symbolic violence is revealed as epistemologically corrosive and dependent on deceptive alternative eschatologies of knowledge, in part because it collapses a necessary dialectic of simultaneous subjectivising and objectivising knowing. Integrating Hans Urs von Balthasar with Paul generates a dialectic epistemology of love and fleshes out the creative and productive process of knowing in love which subjectivises objectivity and objectivises subjectivity, while also fulfilling Bourdieu's epistemological aims at the same dialectic tension. However, this dialectic and phronetic epistemology of love in theology removes symbolic violence without resorting to it in how it can know but a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation must also remove symbolic violence at the source and continue to provide a way of living and not just knowing without being enslaved to the games of symbolic violence.

Chapter 7 builds on Bourdieu's quasi-theological analysis of symbolic violence as arising from the human need for *la justification d'exister*. Thus, to liberate from the symbolic violence of humanity's most fundamental *epistemic doxa*, the need for legitimation, we construct a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation that operates based on legitimacy by grace. It is developed from the Christ Hymn narrating Christ incarnate and crucified in a radical solidarity of love with God and humanity. This narration invites academic theology to find in the resurrection and in Christ incarnate and crucified stories it can live by and become a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation, not just for and with itself, but in radical solidarity with God, humanity, the church, and the academy.

ABBREVIATIONS

BCR	Shusterman, Richard, ed., *Bourdieu: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).
BPC	Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone, eds., *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
FoC	Pierre Bourdieu, 'Forms of Capital', *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. John G. Richardson, trans. Richard Nice (New York, 1986): 241-58) [orig. 'Ökonomisches Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital', *Soziale Ungleichheiten* (Soziale Welt, Sonderheft 2), ed. Reinhard Kreckel (Goettingen: Otto Schartz & Co., 1983): 183-98].
HA	Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1984).
HC	Stanley Hauerwas, *Hannah's Child: A Theologian's Memoir* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010).
IRS	Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
MP	Pierre Bourdieu, *Méditations Pascaliennes* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1997).
MR	H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Meaning of Revelation* (New York: Macmillan, 1941).
ND	George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* (London: SPCK, 1984).
OTP	Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
PBR	Richard Jenkins, *Pierre Bourdieu*, Rev. ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002).

PK	Stanley Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
RP	Pierre Bourdieu, *Raisons Pratiques : Sur la Théorie de l'Action* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1994).
SP	Pierre Bourdieu*, Le Sens Pratique* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1980).
TL	Gustavo Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación: Perspectivas*, Digital Edition (Lima, Peru: Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones, 2018).
WT	Stanley Hauerwas, *The Work of Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015).

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INTRODUCTION

Is theology enslaved to itself? If it were, would it even notice? Is it even able to notice? If it was, in what way has it enslaved itself? But more importantly, who or what else would it be enslaving in process? Moreover, would there be any way to liberate the enslaved, including theology itself? These are provocative questions, but they are also productive ones. Further, they are inseparable from a set of foundational questions to the activity of doing theology: What does it mean to do theology? Why do we do theology the way that we do? How can we do it better? At its heart, this thesis aims at the nexus of these questions in the hope that theology can become a more profoundly liberating activity, not just for people, institutions, churches, but for itself.

Motivations and Aims

These questions arose in the present researcher in part due to natural interest in foundational, meta-level questions. However, they also arose during the course of research into linguistics. Specifically, as I wrote my MA thesis developing and applying cognitive linguistics and narratology to interpreting and developing theology from narrative texts, it became clear to me in the process that narrative was a fundamental form of human cognition. Yet, despite there being an ever-growing body of scientific literature supporting that understanding, academic theology never fully embraced narrative as a legitimate mode of theologising. Though a movement of narrative theologies argued in favour of using narrative, and their arguments were well-received on a reputational level, the actual practice and structure of legitimated theological production never adjusted to incorporate those insights. As I studied the vast array of narrative theologians, I also noticed a recurring feature: they

often came from the margins, from a biography that involved some amount of adversity or discrimination, but especially socio-economic and cultural domination. A thesis on exactly tracing out in detail those biographies which tended to produce narrative theologians of one kind or another, would be interesting, but beyond our present interest here. Yet, it did reinforce the necessity of asking academic theology why and how it operates in the productions it offers, as well as legitimates and delegitimates. The related question of why narrative theologians so rarely used actual narratives in their theological productions piqued my curiosity. Ultimately, these recurring biographical features and the eventual failure of a narrative mode in being fully integrated into academic theology led me to conclude that as much as academic theology may involve and emphasise concepts and their acceptance based on internal coherence, there also was a definite sociological element to academic theology's actual operation.

Likewise, the more I explored the sociological dimension of academic theology and cognitive science of narrative, the more I wondered if the bifurcation of theoretical and actionable spheres is artificial. But if artificial, then the bifurcation would seem to marginalise action in favour of theory. This would have significant epistemological implications. Academic theology is keenly aware of how conceptual theories can generate epistemological resources, but if action also offers epistemological assets, then academic theology divorcing itself from action as a source and goal for theological knowledge would result in a warped set of theological concepts and theories as much as actions perennially divorced from theorisation would result in a warped set of theological actions. It would also have serious consequences in terms of who are considered to be 'theologians' and what is considered 'theology'. Thus, the sociological nature of theology continued to cement itself in my mind. Consequently, I found dialogue with a sociologist of the academy, Pierre Bourdieu, an essential element to my exploration of these questions. As it relates to the intersection of

theorisation and access to participating in the academy, Bourdieu suggests this prioritisation of theory is itself a luxury good, mainly available to those in society who can afford to develop theories rather than struggle to live in a difficult and hostile world. So, Bourdieu will ask of the academy as whole:

> Pourquoi ce rappel des conditions économiques et sociales de la posture scolastique est-il si nécessaire ? … La logique dans laquelle je me place n'est pas celle de la condamnation ou de la dénonciation politique, mais celle de l'interrogation épistémologique : interrogation épistémologique fondamentale puisqu'elle porte sur la posture épistémique elle-même, sur les présupposés inscrits dans le fait de se retirer du monde et de l'action dans le monde pour les penser. Ce qu'il s'agit de savoir c'est en quoi ce retrait, cette abstraction, cette retraite affectent la pensée qu'ils rendent possible et, par là, le contenu même de ce que nous pensons.[1]

Bourdieu himself was a theoretician, so he is not rejecting the value of theory. Rather he, as a theorist from a background dislocated from the academy and socio-cultural dominance, he was keenly aware of what was often required to participate in the production of academic knowledge.[2] Moreover, he recognised that the embodiment of that practice and the circumstances structuring and structured by it are epistemological in nature. Academic knowledge produced with all its epistemological implications and assumptions cannot be separated either from the way in which it is produced or from the people who produce it.

I would be remiss if I did not say that my motivation for asking these questions of theology did not also arise out of engagement and solidarity with many brothers and sisters on the margins, culturally and economically dislocated. I served – simultaneous with my academic formation – struggling Korean-American immigrant churches, as well as developed close relationships with Hispanic and other immigrant churches. I even lived with a few of

[1] Pierre Bourdieu, *Raisons Pratiques: Sur la Théorie de l'Action* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1994), 224.

[2] Cf. Thomas Medvetz and Jeffrey J. Sallaz, 'Introduction: Pierre Bourdieu, a Twentieth-Century Life', *The Oxford Handbook of Pierre Bourdieu*, ed. Thomas Medvetz and Jeffrey J. Sallaz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018): 1-18, esp. pp.1-3; Pierre Bourdieu, *Esquisse Pour Une Auto-Analyse*. (Paris: Raisons d'agir éditions, 2004); and Samer Frangie, 'Bourdieu's Reflexive Politics:Socio-Analysis, Biography and Self-Creation', *European Journal of Social Theory* 12.2 (2009): 213-29, https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368431009103706.

these immigrants, who had struggled learning the language and culture of a new place while also finding a way to establish themselves economically: a wonderfully generous Mexican family and genuinely compassionate Korean widower. My own background was not unfamiliar with either cultural dislocation or frugal relation to the economic system. It is from these contexts, I have seen some of the boundaries to academic theology, not simply at the level of epistemological access and method, but in its capacity to engage with the lived vicissitudes of people earnest to know and love God as well as live in the world in way that makes it better for subsequent generations. That is, I have seen the difficulties in translating academic theology beyond the academy, but also the reverse reticence of academic theology to genuinely embrace and celebrate the theological productions offered by those without the access to or a history of academic theology. But this raises a fundamentally epistemological question for academic theology: is it only its own productions that have epistemic value? Consequently, I hope to construct a way of doing theology that would be more epistemologically inclusive both of the biographies of those theologians already participating in the system and those who have not as yet been recognised as contributors.

Finally, these inquiries combined with an awareness that, for people living on the margins, theology cannot be separated from life. Theology has to be conceptually coherent as much as existentially coherent. The ideas must inspire and liberate one to live as much as be able to be lived. That is, for theology to be life-giving it must do more than talk of life, it must empower it, transform it, and embody it. For many such people doing theology is inseparable from their spiritual life and lived action in general as *phronesis*. For much of Christianity's history, the same was true for the most rigorous theological endeavours, as liberation theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez recognised.[3] And how do many Christians on the

[3] Cf. Gustavo Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación: Perspectivas*, Digital Edition (Lima, Peru: Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones, 2018), 57.

margins integrate theology with life, that is, how do they do theology in way that is liberating, that empowers both general human agency and transformative knowledge of and life with God? Among other things, especially stories. There seemed then to be a natural connection between the epistemological concerns of narrative and liberation. Academic theology has spoken much of narrative and liberation, but if narration and liberation often must be paired in the vitality of living and not merely the abstraction of theory – if theorising artificially separated from acting affects the structure of the theorisation itself – then by failing to engage with narration perhaps theology has failed also to function as a force of liberation.

Even if one did not want to expect theology be a spiritual activity or even necessarily related to liberation towards life, should not theology, more modestly, put into action what it theorises? Anything less than this would seem to be hypocrisy at worst, or ineffectual at best. Yet, as the narrative theologians rarely using *narratives as theology* together with the failure of academic theology to incorporate narrative as a *modus theologiae* despite narrative theologies' conceptual prominence suggests, there may be something about the structure and mode of academic theology that disposes us to leave unrealised in praxis even those things which we celebrate as valuable, insightful, or even helpful to the objective of doing theology. This seems to be somehow related both to the sociological dynamics at work in the system of academic theology and to the method and mode of its theological production. Bourdieu suggests as much when he remarks, '…c'est cet excès de confiance dans les pouvoirs du discours. Illusion typique de *lector*, qui peut tenir le commentaire académique pour un acte politique ou la critique des textes pour un fait de résistance, et vivre les révolutions dans l'ordre des mots comme des révolutions radicales dans l'ordre des choses.'[4] Bourdieu argues that it is the academy's epistemological abstractionism that leads it to understand its

[4] Pierre Bourdieu, *Méditations Pascaliennes* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1997), 10 (emphasis original).

theorisations or statements as the only kind of action that is a necessary consequence of its activity. Rephrased, there seems to be something about this bifurcation between theory and action that leads academic theology to mistake theory for action, or at least as the only kind of action that matters. Words and discourse are undoubtably important, better and more powerful than the sword in many cases. But Bourdieu's point is not that discursive productions have no value, rather that the sociological and conceptual conditions of academic activity has rendered academic productions chiefly about the academy. That is, academic theology finds itself precariously positioned to be self-referential, done not for the good of people or the world, but simply for itself. In which case, the only success it would know how to identify is dominance in the discursive academic system in which it participates. Bourdieu's epistemic insight forces us to ask for academic theology if its participation in that bifurcation of theory and action produces discourse understood as life, yet somehow inconsequential to living, or uninformed by and unreflective of living. This seems less than ideal. Thus, I aim to construct a way of doing theology that is more inclusive of the range of modes of theological production, especially narrative, precisely so that theology can become a force of liberation, a site of inclusion both of those people who find themselves dislocated from access to and legitimation by it, and of those modes which academic theology has praised in theory but left forgotten in action. That is, where theology has once been the site of delegitimation of types of theological modes and participants, I hope to construct a way of doing theology that does not result in this kind of symbolic violence with a more epistemologically inclusive narrative and phronetic theology of liberation.

The Argument

This thesis argues that developing and deploying the sociological analysis of Pierre Bourdieu on the Yale School of Theology simultaneously explores the operation of academic theology as a system and the Yale School's conceptual productions to develop the necessary

analysis and resources for constructing a narrative theology of liberation. With these in place, dialogue with Gustavo Gutiérrez, Bourdieu, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 8E cognition research, and the Christian Scriptures will produce a truly constructive narrative and phronetic theology of liberation through epistemic and active solidarity in love.

Methodology

A few comments on methodology are necessary. First, I will be developing a synthesis of Bourdieu's sociological analysis and applying it to the Yale School as brief case study. This will chiefly be a work of integrating Bourdieu's voluminous own output and directing the reader to relevant secondary literature. Similarly, an extensive sociological investigation of the Yale School is a massive project beyond by the space allowed and the goals of this thesis. A full sociological analysis of the field of Academic Theology would itself be a worthy project but push the boundaries of thesis space limitations on its own. Further, a sociological project of that nature would likely require involving other researchers. Moreover, this thesis aims mainly to be constructive rather than deconstructive in orientation, reimagining theology for what it could be, not merely a description of what it was. As such, we will focus narrowly on how the Yale School used conceptual productions relating to narrative to navigate and subvert symbolic violence against the communities they represent and against their more inclusive theological epistemologies.

Second, the style of argumentation is intended to be multifaceted. Thus, chapters should be read as attempting something simultaneously constructive and analytic. Likewise, often the argument proceeds simultaneously in service of an immediate focus and a larger-scale argument. Accordingly, separating what is theological and what is sociological will be difficult, in part because Bourdieusien analysis depends upon existential, theological concepts, and in part because the conceptual productions of academic theology we will consider are simultaneously sociological and theological productions. These features are

especially important to remember in those sections which are markedly analytic, viz. Part I-II. However, it is also necessary when engaging with the constructive Part III, where the narrative and phronetic theology of liberation through love involves both theological dialectic as well as a the-chicken-or-the-egg problem. That is, it must express what it is constructing before it has finished constructing it. Its intelligibility relies not only process of the constructive effort but the outcome as well, especially as it involves a break with the foundational assumptions of what it means to do theology in order to do it better.

While the cognitive science of human cognition, and narrative cognition in particular, was one of the main sources of my initial interest and research, the space constraints of the thesis delimit it from featuring as prominently in the constructive efforts as I initially hoped. Moreover, in the development of the argument, I became convinced that a previous formulation of how this argument deployed cognitive science in relation to academic theology resorted to the symbolic violence it aimed to critique. Consequently, cognitive science is still incorporated, but less prominently and extensively than originally planned. However, now it features in a way that is truly constructive, does not resort to symbolic violence, and does not fall afoul of the structurally imposed constraints on this project.

Fourth, a chief source of my constructive theological efforts is not only academic theology, but also the Christian Canon. There are a few reasons for this, which I partially explore more fully in Chapter 5. One is that the Scriptures form an essential part of my own spiritual life and theological thought as well as having shared that role in the spiritual life and theological thought of many professional theologians and everyday Christians throughout most of the centuries of the church. They have been the main cluster of texts that have both generated Christian theology and produced the core features of Christian practice. Accordingly, the Scriptures precede the bifurcation between theory and action, and so provide an epistemic and phronetic vantage point for a phronetic theology. Likewise, the

Scriptures are extensively narrative in mode, and to an extent have always offered the minority report to an overly abstractionist turn in theology. Additionally, the Scriptures are accessible, serving to make this academic project more inclusive to the reception of those even beyond the academy as much as within it. In terms of how I will read the Scriptures and develop theology from them, I will generally follow a *Ricoeurean* Frei in attempting to read the texts as they offer themselves to be read, seeking to avoid doing symbolic violence to the texts themselves (generally how I interact with all the texts under consideration). For a more extensive and cognitive linguistic justification of this approach, one will have to consider my MA thesis, *Towards a Cognitive Approach to Narrative and Theology*.[5] Further, in keeping with my phronetic epistemology of love I will develop in Part III, this engagement with Scripture will nonetheless express creative solidarity with the text and both God and humanity in love.

Finally, in keeping with seeking to engage with the texts as closely as possible and on their own terms, my interpretations of texts under consideration often involve implications, wordplays, and dialectic tensions conveyed in the original but which translate poorly. In addition to this, some of the translated options available for some texts are looser in structure and/or style than would be conducive. While the value of translations is indisputable, the original languages will always retain a semantic complexity of relations that cannot be fully reproduced in any target language. As such, except for those situations where the translation is especially viable, or dramatically more efficient to my exposition, the original texts will be retained. The other exception to this is the reality this thesis was finished during a pandemic, which rendered access to certain original resources impractical. However, several original

[5] R. Anthony Buck, 'Towards a Cognitive Approach to Narrative and Theology', M.A., Trinity International University, 2017 (ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global; ProQuest One Literature; Social Science Premium Collection), https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/towards-cognitive-approach-narrative-theology/docview/1955757566/se-2?accountid=13042.

languages are employed in this thesis, not all of which are conventional for theology and few people would have a working knowledge of all of them simultaneously. An appendix has been added to the end of the work with both the source texts and my original translations of them, organised by chapter and proceeding in the sequence of their uses in those chapters. This should make my thesis more accessible both in the academy and beyond.

With these brief comments on methodology as to how I have designed and executed the argument in the subsequent chapters, we can tun to consider an overview of the argument as will develop in those chapters.

Chapter Outline

The argument and constructive attempt unfold in three main stages: Parts I-III. In Part I, the focus will be on understanding, synthesising, and beginning to deploy Bourdieu's sociological analysis. Part II serves as a focused case study in the role symbolic violence played in the conceptual productions of the Yale School of narrative theologians as much as the coordination of those theologians into the Yale School. It will simultaneously develop theological resources for Part III's constructive project. Finally, in Part III, the constructive effort will seek to be truly productive in orientation in offering a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation which invites academic theology live in dialectic and active love.

Chapter 1 introduces three foundational concepts in Bourdieu's sociological analysis: *doxa*, *illusio*, and reflexivity. Turning that reflexivity towards Bourdieu, critiques of his approach will be considered, though, ultimately, they will reinforce the usefulness of Bourdieu's analysis. However, this reflexivity will then extend to theology itself, to explore its turn to scientific methodological epistemic reductionism to acquire legitimation in a changing symbolic landscape. Considering critiques of this epistemic reductionism reveals a sociological dimension to academic knowledge that is dehumanising. Turning to the incarnation will set out some epistemological parameters and goals for academic theology.

Chapter 2 advances both an analysis and a synthesis of Bourdieu's hermeneutical triad: capitals-fields-*habitus*. This triad operates conjointly and simultaneously. They cannot be separated from one another in analysis but cohere always together in a continuous hermeneutical spiral that constantly adjusts to improve its analysis. The analysis of these concepts reveals a theological correspondence. Capitals operate on faith. Fields generate and orient in hope. *Habitus* expresses love. Thus, *habitus* reveals a love for the field's hope in its trusted capital. Also, Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* as practical reason (*phronesis*) finds corroboration in 7E cognitive science research, emphasising the embodied, socially-embedded, enactive, and unconscious dimension of human thought.

Chapter 3 deploys Bourdieusien analysis on the Yale School while developing the conceptual resources that undergird Part III's constructive efforts. First, the sociological biographies of the four members of the Yale School under consideration will be explored, revealing that they came from vulnerable socio-cultural backgrounds. Then Gary Comstock's typology of narrative theology will be used both to identify the Yale School as well as contrast its identification primarily on conceptual terms with this thesis' identification primarily on sociological function. Considering Hans Frei and George Lindbeck (understood to be the most closely aligned of the school), Chapter 3 reveals them to be diametrically opposed to the other's understanding and use of narrative. However, analysis also reveals that Frei and Lindbeck turn to narrative to resist symbolic violence in the epistemological assumptions and demands of academic theology. They serve not as conceptual allies, but sociological allies against academic symbolic violence against texts and the church as a performative metatext.

In Chapter 4, analysis of the Yale School is extended to its grandfather, H.R. Niebuhr and its grandson, Stanley Hauerwas. While both turn to narrative for its epistemic value, Niebuhr is mainly interested in narrative rendering knowledge-who for theology and

Christianity possible, whereas Hauerwas emphasises narrative as knowledge-in-action, namely a phronetically-inclined mode for theology. In so doing, Hauerwas reformulates the epistemology of theology as beginning with ethics. Their insights are compatible, but not identical, invalidating the possibility of the Yale School of being a school of thought. Where Niebuhr contests symbolic violence in academic theology against knowledge-who being essential to theology, Hauerwas contests symbolic violence against knowledge-in-action as essential to academic theology. Nevertheless, through this shared contest, Niebuhr and Hauerwas confirm the Yale School as sociological coordination against symbolic violence. With this, the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology have been exposed and necessary resources to a constructive reimagining of theology gained.

This thesis' constructive project first must consider what it means to be truly constructive in Chapter 5, especially since the Bourdieusien analysis is chiefly de-constructive in orientation. Considering J. Daniel Schubert's use of desiring-production to critique of Bourdieusien *habitus* for failing to solve the problem it uncovers, viz. symbolic violence, we argue theology must remove symbolic violence from academic theology without resorting to it. Gutiérrez overlaps with Schubert in seeking a liberating solution but advances towards a more productive solution of love. Intersected with cognitive science of narrative Gutiérrez reenforces both the narrative and phronetic elements of a theology of liberation motivated by and conducted in love.

Chapter 6 develops the dialectic and phronetic epistemology of love necessary to a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation from Paul's narration of the eschatological epistemic transformation at the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 13, the quintessential chapter on love. Through the narration of the world without symbolic violence, symbolic violence is revealed as epistemologically corrosive and dependent on deceptive alternative eschatologies of knowledge, in part because it collapses a necessary dialectic of simultaneous subjectivising

and objectivising knowing. Integrating Hans Urs von Balthasar with Paul generates a dialectic epistemology of love and fleshes out the creative and productive process of knowing in love which subjectivises objectivity and objectivises subjectivity, while also fulfilling Bourdieu's epistemological aims at the same dialectic tension. However, this dialectic and phronetic epistemology of love in theology removes symbolic violence without resorting to it in how it can know but a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation must also remove symbolic violence at the source and continue to provide a way of living and not just knowing without being enslaved to the games of symbolic violence.

Chapter 7 builds on Bourdieu's quasi-theological analysis of symbolic violence as arising from the human need for *la justification d'exister*. Thus, to liberate from the symbolic violence of humanity's most fundamental *epistemic doxa*, the need for legitimation, we construct a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation that operates based on legitimacy by grace. It is developed from the Christ Hymn narrating Christ incarnate and crucified in a radical solidarity of love with God and humanity. This narration invites academic theology to find in the resurrection and in Christ incarnate and crucified stories it can live by and become a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation, not just for and with itself, but in radical solidarity with God, humanity, the church, and the academy. To that extended invitation, we can now turn.

Part I:

BOURDIEUSIEN SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 1:
BOURDIEUSIEN ANALYSIS AND THE *DOXA* OF THEOLOGY

In this chapter, we will introduce three major elements of Bourdieusien analysis: *doxa*, *illusio*, and reflexivity. We will begin to apply these concepts to the field of theology. We will further embrace reflexivity by considering responses and objections to Bourdieu as well as the particular advantages to deploying his analytic to social systems in general and academic theology in particular. Then we will turn our reflexivity towards the *epistemic doxa* of theology, situating and supplementing our Bourdieusien critique of theology's *doxa* within a wider reflexive tradition vis-à-vis academic epistemology. Having exposed the dehumanising risks facing an insufficiently reflexive theology, we will explore what kind of epistemology and sociology of knowledge is demanded by the nature of the incarnation.

Part I introduces an original synthesis of the essential elements of Bourdieusien analysis. It also begins to analyse Bourdieu's analytic itself. Further, we begin to deploy Bourdieu's analysis to uncover the structures and *doxa* of theology. In this chapter we develop three essential elements for understanding and employing Bourdieu's analytic: *doxa*, *illusio*, reflexivity. In the following chapter, Bourdieu's conceptual triad of capitals-fields-*habitus* will be introduced, setting the groundwork for Part 2's case study analysis and Part 3's constructive work.

***Doxa*: What theology assumes and believes about itself**

What is theology? Most theologians, academic, pastoral, or lay would all quickly offer a response, although some might ask whether the question means to address the field as a whole as practiced by many different traditions, or if a particular tradition's orientation or expression of theology was being requested. Regardless of the specific reply to this question and the specific kind of answer desired, the pause to ask what the real question is already begins to demarcate an intuitive sense in the respondent that there are rules or at least associative patterns of interaction that govern the field of theology as whole as well as the various focal perspectives on theology, or one could say, sub-fields of theology. Yet, most theologians, after receiving the initial clarification, would proceed to proffer an answer. It is precisely at the nexus of this answer that we find a whole host of assumptions, some of them explicit but many of them simply operative unconsciously, that halfway house between what is consciously apprehended and the subconsciously present. One could say they are the assumptions that must be felt, even if they are never spoken. They are not fully subconscious because they can be recognised and brought to conscious attention, nor are they fully conscious because they feature prominently in a calculous but seem so natural that they are never noticed. These unrecognised assumptions of what seems naturally constitutive of theology dramatically shape the answer to the question of 'what is theology?' and yet are not likely to be stated explicitly in full in the answer itself. These unconscious assumptions are what is called by sociologist of the academy and knowledge production, Pierre Bourdieu, the *doxa* of a field. He explains:

> Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with very different means) the naturalisation of its own arbitrariness. … [W]hen there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organisation … the natural and social world appears as self-evident. This experience we shall call *doxa*, so as to distinguish it from an orthodox or heterodox belief

> implying awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs.[1]

The nature and problem with *doxa* is that it always operates in the answers and shapes the answers, but is never recognised as a part of the answer itself. *Doxa* cannot be rejected or disproved by its holders, per se, for the simple reason that they do not even recognise that they hold the *doxa*. Bourdieu presses these implications further: 'what is essential *goes without saying because it comes without saying*: the tradition is silent, not least about itself as a tradition; …and nothing is further from the correlative notion of the *majority* than the *unanimity* of *doxa*, the aggregate of the "choices" whose subject is everyone and no one because the questions they answer cannot be explicitly asked.'[2] Consequently, in theology, as with all fields, the *doxa* presents a challenge mainly because it lies outside of conscious reflexion. Yet, this means that theology is operating with a certain set of assumptions that may or may not be conducive to theology but also to the ability of all to participate in theology. *Doxa* is not a question of orthodoxy or heterodoxy, because it represents a much broader orientation to theology as a whole, as field. Bourdieu delineates,

> [L]a délimitation entre le champ de l'opinion, c'est-à-dire de ce qui est explicitement mis en question (l'opinion, orthodoxe ou hétérodoxe, supposant la question, donc la possibilité et la légitimité d'une réponse autre, défendue par un autre group), et le champ de la *doxa*, de ce qui est hors de question et que tout agent accorde tacitement à l'état de choses actuel par le seul fait d'agir en accord avec les convenances sociales, est elle-même en enjeu fondamental de cette forme de la lutte politique entre les classes qui est la lutte pour l'imposition des systèmes de classement dominants….[3]

The difference then between an opinion and *doxa* is that *doxa* is surreptitiously imposed, while opinions are contested. Moreover, this imposition is not simply the collective modus operandi of a community, or as it relates to our present consideration, the field of theology,

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[1] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 164. *N.B.*: This thesis uses Bourdieu's French originals unless no French version exists.

[2] *OTP*, 167-68.

[3] Pierre Bourdieu, *Esquisse d'une Théorie de la Pratique, précédé de Trois Etudes d'Ethnologie Kabyle* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2000[1972]), 181.

but rather the modus operandi that is never justified because it is simultaneously the expression of the dominant figures, institutions, and cultures that due to their dominance have imposed their categories and assumptions on the field at large. Yet, these *doxic* impositions occur surreptitiously, in theology as much as in other academic fields, because 'La *doxa* est un point de vue particulier, le point de vue des dominants, qui présente et s'impose comme point de vue universel'.[4] There is no conceiving of an alternative understanding or modus operandi for the simple reason that it is presumed that not only is the point of view of the dominant (figures, institutions, and cultures) ubiquitous or even superior, per se, but that it is the only way to think, do, or approach a matter.[5] Thus, the field of theology holds a *modus theologiae* that is ultimately imposed not simply because it is widespread or better than alternatives, but because the field does not even see the need or know how to consider the *doxa* of what it means to do theology. Not only does theology generally not have the capacity to conceive of itself in *doxic* terms, but, as it stands, theology as a scholarly field structured according to the views and interests of the dominant does not have an interest in entertaining *doxic* reflections of theology. Bourdieu notes,

> Les présupposes inscrits dans cette disposition … constituent ce que j'appellerai, par un oxymore bien fait pour réveiller les philosophes [et théologiens] de leur sommeil scolastique, la *doxa épistémique*. Rien n'est plus dogmatique, paradoxalement, qu'une *doxa*, ensemble de croyances fondamentales qui n'ont même pas besoin de s'affirmer sous la forme d'un dogme explicite et conscient de lui-même.[6]

The possibility of *doxa* is contingent on widely-operative assumptions which can only be maintained because of a particular arrangement of power as it relates to the sociological structure of knowledge, of which it is the expression. Thus, for the field of theology, to

[4] Bourdieu, *RP*, 129.

[5] Here Bourdieu's concept of *doxa* draws the critique of Jeremy F. Lane, *Pierre tical Introduction* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 196 as undermining agency. For broader critiques to Bourdieu, cf. contributions to Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone, eds., *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

[6] Bourdieu, *MP*, 26. Cf also *RP*, 223.

consider its *doxa* is to push back on a reigning form of dogmatism that ironically finds its place in that institution which both interrogates and produces theological dogmas. In particular, it must be noted that as *doxa* is the expression of the dominant in the field of theology, it is precisely the *dominated* who are both most required to adhere to the *doxa* and who are most affected in practice by the *doxa* of theology itself. For this reason, 'les dominées ont intérêt à faire reculer les limites de la *doxa*, à manifester l'arbitraire du *taken for granted* ; les classes dominantes ont intérêt à défendre l'intégrité de la *doxa*, à défaut, à en restaurer le substitut, nécessairement imparfait qu'est l'orthodoxie.'[7] One of the prime contentions over the *doxa* operative in theology is that in fact it does not *have to be* as it is. Moreover, the way things are may constitute not simply the imposition of a set of assumptions but an imposition of demands on those most sensitive to them, namely the many people who are already a part of a marginalised group. As will become clear as this thesis progresses, it is precisely this concern for the field of theology in relation to the marginalised which motivates much of the present need of a consideration of the *doxa* of the field of theology, in addition to the very real question of whether by critically self-reflecting on its own *doxa*, theology might actually free itself from unnecessary bonds on its epistemological orientation to *modo theologiae*.

The threat of *doxa* negatively affecting the marginalised and the possibility of epistemological expansion for the field itself is especially problematic for theology. This is precisely because, unlike, for example, artisanal pottery production or even business, theology aims to control the question of what counts as knowledge and truth itself as well as how it is discovered/produced. Resultingly, a theological product is not merely evaluated on the basis of the quality of its outcome or internal coherence per se, but also on the manner in which it is produced. To translate the metaphor more evocatively: the field of theology at

[7] Bourdieu, *Esquisse*, 181.

present does not just aim to have quality control over its products but control over the means of production itself. Thus, the existence of alternative means of production (and with it a new range of theological products) challenges the current dominance – some might even say a near monopoly – of the current system of knowledge qualification and production. Thus, Bourdieu's more general point becomes even more salient for the *doxa* of the field of theology:

> The instruments of knowledge of the social world are in this case (objectively) political instruments which contribute to the reproduction of the social world by producing immediate adherence to the world, seen as self-evident and undisputed, of which they are the product and of which they reproduce structures in a transformed form. The political function of classifications is never more likely to pass unnoticed than in the case of relatively undifferentiated social formations, in which the prevailing classification system encounters no rival or antagonistic principle.[8]

Consequently, since theology, likely as other epistemologically obsessed fields, aims to determine what counts as knowledge, it faces a stronger internal pressure and compulsion to ensure there is no rival or antagonist principles vying for dominance within its purview. To effect an attempt at hegemonic control over the field, then, theology has often utilised adherence to an assumed or prescribed methodology to determine what counts and delegitimate rivals. Methodologies then are not neutral. Nor are they merely epistemological. They are always at least partially political. As Bourdieu teaches us to expect, the current preferred form of the field of the theology seeks to reproduce itself and do so through the schemas of classification (i.e. 'this is theology, that is not', or even 'A is an *eminent* theologian, B is a *popular* theologian'). Thus, the field of theology is not less a political field because it concentrates on knowledge, but the reverse. Political control is never more precarious for the dominant than when chiefly maintained by the influence and command over the approval for modes of thinking and specific thoughts, and by ignorance of alternatives.

[8] *OTP*, 164.

Therefore, the social conditioning of knowledge in the field of theology is perhaps one of the field's most endemic constraints. Yet, this *doxa*, as always, serves those with the most capability to both benefit from it and enforce it, though they need not be aware of their participation in either. Likewise, this *doxic* constraint operates throughout the field among the dominant, less dominant, less dominated, and more dominated alike—mostly unawares that it exists, a theme we return to as we consider *illusio*.

Illusio: The *sine qua non* of theology

Moreover, the ignorance of the *doxa* of theology is intertwined with what Bourdieu has called the *illusio* of a field. He explains the relation of *doxa* and *illusio* in relief with prejudices and presuppositions related to obvious and/or recognised sociological categories (e.g. sex, religion, political party affiliation) which are likewise easier to critique:

> Il en va autrement des distorsions liées à l'appartenance à un champ et à l'adhésion, unanime dans les limites de ce champ, à la *doxa* qui le définit en propre. L'implicite en ce cas, c'est ce qui est impliqué dans le fait d'être pris au jeu, c'est-à-dire dans l'*illusio* comme croyance fondamentale dans l'intérêt du jeu et la valeur des enjeux qui est inhérente à cette appartenance.[9]

For any field to operate, 'buy-in' for the activities and goals of the field is required, not just among *les dominants* but among *les dominées*. While it is usually in the interest of *les dominées* to resist the *doxa* of a field (which tends to contribute to their domination), often they too participate in the *illusio*, because (whether volitionally or not) they are invested in the field itself, and therefore in their own domination, though unwittingly. The same could be said, perhaps, for the more virtuous of the dominant, who likewise believe so much in the *illusio du champ* that they dominate out of sheer investment in the game and without much obsession with being the dominant, per se. Though to be sure, many dominant agents are intentionally so. The complicity in the *illusio* is unanimous, for the simple reason that the

[9] *MP*, 22.

field itself is predicated upon the *doxic* belief that being a part of the field is worthwhile and that achieving a dominant position matters. Both the dominant and dominated believe that participation in the field matters on some level. For example, in the monetary field, both the rich and the poor believe that money has value and that more of it would be generally preferential. Moreover, if this example seems overly obvious and that there would be no other way of living within the world, it is precisely because the *doxic* grip of the *illusio* is wide, and commonly recurs throughout the world. Challenging this assumption is not done so much when one questions how much money one needs or what money should be spent on – because the need of money is still assumed – as when one questions the category of money altogether. The former questions relate more to prevailing formulations of ortho/heterodoxy and the latter question relates more to the *doxa* surrounding money and the *illusio* that getting, having, and using money is worthwhile. Of course, the lines between *doxa* and contested opinions are slightly blurry at times, but generally the differentiation is between what is usually assumed and what is arguable. Again, people can argue about how people use money, how much money people should have, but few people actually question the concept of money itself, because not only is the concept of money assumed as *doxa* but the desirability of money is assumed as *illusio*.

Theology likewise has its own *doxa*, opinion (hetero/orthodoxy), and *illusio*. Theologians believe at least on some level that doing theology matters, the goal of seeking to consider, understand, and/or know God, likewise the goal of communicating the knowledge to others, etc. Greater reflection on the *illusio* of theology is beside the point, because it is displayed in lived action and participation in the field. The particular shape of an individual's or group's *illusio*, vis-à-vis theology, can vary slightly. But *that* there is buy-in is what matters. Bourdieu writes:

> Participer de l'*illusio*, scientifique, littéraire, philosophique ou autre, c'est prendre au sérieux (parfois au point d'en faire, là aussi, des questions de vie ou de mort) des

> enjeux qui, nés de la logique du jeu lui-même, en fondent le sérieux, même s'ils peuvent échapper ou paraître « désintéressés » et « gratuits » à ceux que l'on appelle parfois les « profanes », ou à ceux qui sont engagés dans d'autres champs….[10]

Thus, not only is the buy-in important, but the buy-in itself is not easily translated outside of the field itself, and depends on the nature of the field. Nevertheless, within the field, what the field produces takes on such importance that it becomes sometimes even a matter of life and death. But the *enjeux* of the game is native to the logic of the *jeu*. Simply being in the *jeu* makes one *en-jeu*, which is precisely to value and seek the *enjeux*. There is an intrinsic logic to participation in the field of theology. While this intrinsic logic of the field of theology is sometimes held in relation to other fields, ultimately it is precisely the embedded irreducibility of the *illusio* of theology that drives theology as a field and the agents participating in it. The *illusio* propels them to continue participating and advancing in the field, as well as advancing the field as a whole in relation to other fields, even if there is currently no buy-in for theology in another field. Moreover, all fields, due to the intensity of influence the *illusio* holds with respect to the field itself, will seek to expand their *illusio* to and through other fields. Despite this, not all fields are as interested in expanding the *illusio* for various reasons, depending on the field in question. More importantly, not all fields have equally intense *illusio*, such that one field's *illusio* might not compel expansion as strongly. Furthermore, not all *illusiones* offer the same ease of expansion. That is, some *illusiones* are more broadly attractive to the average human being and, therefore, maintain higher probabilities that an average person will take interest in the field.

For example, while many people have little resistance to the *illusio* of the economic field, many others have high resistance to the *illusio* of the field of academic chemistry. Few question the value of money, but the buy-in hurdle of academic chemistry involves certain educational attainments or at least possibilities. Often the *illusio* of money countermands the

[10] *MP*, 22-23.

illusio of academic chemistry, for someone can conclude either that they are not naturally good enough at chemistry to warrant the monetary investment of pursuing chemistry or that chemistry itself will not yield sufficient enough economic incentive to be worthwhile—still more true to life for many across the world, the daily exigencies of needing money to pay for the basics of life subvert the *illusio* of academic chemistry, to say nothing of all the times in which an individual within academic chemistry finds its *illusio* less compelling than the *illusio* of corporate research, etc. Thus, the *illusio* of a field is one of its most *doxic* elements. For not only must *illusio* be assumed by people in a field, but also the moment the *illusio* fails to be compelling participation in that field self-destructs, and usually a more compelling *illusio* will take its place, often being one of the contributing factors of the original *illusio*'s demise.

As it relates to the present thesis, we are not seeking to question the *illusio* of theology, but the *doxa* upon which the practice of theology operates. That is, we assume that theology is worth doing, and in that sense have strong affinities with other participants in the field of the theology. However, we do seek to question some of the most assumed tenets of what it means to do theology. For some people, these assumptions may cross their boundaries of *illusio*, such that challenging certain elements of *doxa* induces the response of wondering if theology would still be worth doing. This is unfortunate, but not necessarily surprising, especially since the *doxa* of theology mostly serve those with the most to lose in changing the reigning *doxa* of the theology. Thus, while a general *illusio* may be shared across the discipline of theology, theologians can possess an *illusio* that is shaped more or less by various elements of theology.

For example, while we will not be challenging the *doxic* value of written works of theology, *per se*, it is possible to imagine a world in which someone argued against ever writing theology at all, opting instead for oral traditions. Though I am not opposed to

theology acknowledging oral tradition, especially those oral traditions that exist in the field of theology more academically construed, I would still believe it is valuable to write theology. Of course, I myself am literate, well-educated, and with greater access to written publication and influence than someone who was unable to read, thoughtful, and with greater access to oral distribution and influence. That is to say, my buy-in to written theology is not disconnected from my relationship to a more dominant position in the field of theology, and, in fact, several fields.

Essential Reflexivity

It is worth pausing briefly to note that this turn of self-reflexivity in the author's relation to theological production is precisely an important feature of Bourdieu's own approach to sociological analysis. Such that, as even his critics note, 'Bourdieu's project, then, can be described generally as an ongoing attempt to overcome theoretically the oppositions that have characterized social theory and to formulate a reflexive approach to social life.'[11] He writes in a published interview with Loïc J.D. Wacquant:

> Indeed, I believe that *the sociology of sociology is a fundamental dimension of sociological epistemology*. Far from being a specialty among others, it is the necessary prerequisite of any rigorous sociological practice. … When we say "the sociologist is inscribed in a historical context," we generally mean the "bourgeois sociologist" and leave it at that. But objectivation of any cultural production demands more than pointing to—and bemoaning—his class background and location, his "race," or his gender.[12]

Bourdieu's point about reflexivity is that the epistemological location of the person applying an analysis to any social system or element thereof must first be considered by that person,

[11] Moishe Postone, Edward LiPuma, and Craig Calhoun, 'Introduction: Bourdieu and Social Theory', *BPC*: 1-13, quote p.4.

[12] Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 68-69 (emphasis original).

For a critical-turned-constructive engagement with Bourdieu's reflexivity, cf. Scott Lash, 'Pierre Bourdieu: Cultural Economy and Social Change', *BCP*: 193-211.

for the simple reason that the person's set of relations is a factor in the analysis itself. Yet, Bourdieu is less concerned with the 'bourgeois' location of the analysis, because he reads this as a superficial analysis. Certainly, everyone comes with a particular set of backgrounds which influence their analysis, but more important to Bourdieu is how that agent in particular also relates to the system of cultural production itself, of which theology is a type. Thus, Bourdieu is looking for not just a set of typical categories that can be tick-boxed away but the system of relations in which an agent is nexused. Rephrased, it is not simply necessary to consider the *historical* relations to certain categories an agent has but also to consider the agent's *current* relations within the field in question. Where an agent sits in relation to various elements of a field may have just as much to do—if not more—with the analysis they produce as where their historic class affiliation or ethnic background or gender sits in relation to those elements of a field. For example, a person may have come from low-class origins, but now sits as the chair of the social science department of a research university. Their personal history of being low-class may affect what they study, who they fund, how they research, what results they desire, etc. Nevertheless, their position at the top of the local field of social science production will also have an effect, perhaps the greatest one. But it is precisely this effect that is often overlooked. It is here where we will see variations with the *illusio* and its connections to various aspects of a field's *doxa*.

Furthermore, this same kind of reflexivity is important at the level of the field itself. Thus, this thesis seeks to be a reflexive consideration of the field of theology by theology. This consideration cannot be superficial but must truly consider the relations operative in theology, and especially those affecting or inhering in the *doxa*. While this theological epistemological and anthropological reflexivity risks transgressing the *illusio* and certainly the *doxa* of some members of the field of theology, the *illusio* of theology is exactly what

propels the consideration of improving the practice of theology by challenging elements of its *doxa*.

Moreover, not only does this reflexivity require engagement with theological constructions, but with tools of analysis developed to address the sociological relations that are inexorably intertwined with and around the field of theology. In other words, the first motion of theological reflexivity is to admit that the products of theology are not simply intellectual or conceptual constructions kept in a blank space of 'knowledge'. They are also expressions of sociological relations and objectives by individuals, groups, institutions, and the field of theology both within the set of relations that constitute these categories and beyond them to the sets of relations that they exhibit with other individuals, groups, institutions, and fields.

To take a brief illustration: a scholar who writes a response to a critique of their work does not just seek to make an argument (hopefully even one they believe is probably right) or defend their original insight but to defend their reputation which is intrinsically connected with the first argument. Thus it is clear that artefacts of theological production are not merely structured pieces of knowledge—even if in the best cases they are not less than that—but exactly what they appear to be, artefacts of cultural production, and therefore, exhibits of not only the *illusio* of theology but its wider set of unconscious *doxa* and publicly debated opinions. Yet, while these questions of *illusio*, *doxa*, and opinion expose the need for a sociological self-reflexivity for theology, they are insufficient on their own to fully analyse it. Helpfully, they are only part of a Bourdieusien analysis. Better, he developed his full framework, which includes his hermeneutical triad of captials-fields-*habitus*, especially to examine and critique the relations surrounding forms and structures of cultural production. To these further elements, we will turn in the subsequent chapter, after we finish partially

establishing both the focus and need of our analysis.[13] Yet, first, we must also turn Bourdieu's demand for reflexivity back towards Bourdieu himself by considering two of Bourdieu's critics. In so doing we will also discover the advantages of the highly integrated nature of Bourdieu's approach and its particular utility for analysing academic cultural production, including theology.

Reflexivity on Bourdieu: A cohesive and comprehensive relational analysis

Even those who are less than enthused with Bourdieu's approach to sociological analysis must begrudgingly admit that its power lies in how it seeks to radically reimagine assumptions and develop tools that expose sociologically significant relations within a given system.[14] John H. Goldthorpe objects to Bourdieu's approach, but also to those whose reading of Bourdieu fails to take seriously the comprehensive, theory-level framework of his analysis. He asserts two heuristic readings of Bourdieu either as conventional sociologist, i.e. 'domesticated' by the field, or a radical new paradigm, ergo 'wild' and disruptive to the operational *status quo* of the field: 'Following the wild, that is, more authentic understanding, Bourdieu is seen as aiming, through his theory of social reproduction, to forge a quite new conceptual and theoretical approach to the study of social inequality and hierarchy, and one

[13] Our two-chapter consideration of Bourdieusien analysis graphs neatly to an analysis by Simon Susen, 'Afterward: Concluding Reflections on the Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu', *The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays*, ed. Simon Susen and Bryan S. Turner (London: Anthem Press, 2011): 367-409. On p.389 he organises Bourdieu's concepts into two categories: '"superstructural" concepts – such as "interest", "illusio", and "doxa"' and '"infrastructural" concepts – such as "field", "habitus", and "capital".'

[14] Cf. esp. John H. Goldthorpe, '"Cultural Capital": Some Critical Observations', *Sociologica: Italian Journal of Sociology on line* 2.1 (2007): 0-0/1-22 (doi: 10.2383/24755); '"Cultural Capital": A Response to the Comments', *Sociologica: Italian Journal of Sociology on line* 1.2 (2007): 0-0/1-6 (doi: 10.2383/24759); and *On Sociology, Vols. 1-2*, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

For other critical engagements with Bourdieu, cf. *BCP*; Lane, *Bourdieu*; Simon Susen and Bryan S. Turner, eds., *The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays* (London: Anthem Press, 2011); Jacek Tittenbrum, *Neither Capital, nor Class: A Critical Analysis of Pierre Bourdieu's Theoretical Framework* (Wilmington, DE: Vernon Press, 2017); Richard Harker, Cheleen Mahar, Chris Wilkes, eds., *An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: The Practice of Theory* (London: MacMillan, 1990), but esp. ch.9 'Conclusion: Critique' by Harker et al., pp.195-225; and Richard Jenkins, *Pierre Bourdieu*, Rev. ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002). Cf. also Richard Shusterman, ed., *Bourdieu: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), which engages with Bourdieu from the perspective of the field of philosophy.

that has then to be judged, at paradigm level, as being either a major social scientific advance or, as here, a failure.'[15] What is important to recognise here is that Goldthorpe may object to Bourdieu, but he does so at the level of paradigm, and, until Bourdieu forced an awareness, at the level of *doxa*. Subsequently, he reifies his *doxa* as orthodox and Bourdieu as heterodox. Thus, rightly, Goldthorpe adduces that Bourdieu is not simply attempting to make slight refinement to the system as much as overhaul the system of sociology itself. As such, it is unsurprising that Goldthorpe, an Oxford don and representative of an alternative, formerly uncontested sociological paradigm, takes issue with Bourdieu's more holistic aims. Moreover, as responses published with Goldthorpe's article accuse, Goldthorpe's reading of Bourdieu, while correct in that he sees Bourdieu is promoting a new paradigm, is erroneous because it is based on a reductive, fragmentary, and straw-man level understanding of Bourdieu. Paul DiMaggio complains Goldthorpe's reading is 'narrow and ungenerous,'[16] adding 'It is not so much that Professor Goldthorpe's specific criticisms of Bourdieu are incorrect…. Rather the problem is Professor Goldthorpe's laser focus on the most vulnerable concepts in and predictions derivable from Bourdieu's work to the exclusion of its merits.'[17] Consequently, as DiMaggio exposes, Goldthorpe's failure is not in recognising Bourdieu's work as a new paradigm but rather in failing to engage with Bourdieu's framework as a paradigm, as a tightly integrated, multidimensional theory.[18]

Another critic of Bourdieu, Jeffrey C. Alexander, shares Goldthorpe's paradigmatic opposition to Bourdieu, but not from the position of a waning paradigm in sociology, but

[15] Goldthorpe, 'Cultural Capital: Some Critical Observations', 11-12.

[16] Paul DiMaggio, 'Comment on John Goldthorpe/2', *Sociologica: Italian Journal of Sociology on line* 1.2 (2007): 0-0/1-6 (doi: 10.2383/24757).

[17] DiMaggio, 'Comment'.

[18] Cf. also a similar critique from Mike Savage, Alan Warde, Fiona Devine, 'Comment on John Goldthorpe/3', *Sociologica* 1.2 (2007): 0-0/1-5 (doi: 10.2383/24758); and their earlier article which Goldthorpe critiques as emblematic of the 'wild' Bourdieu, Mike Savage, Alan Warde, and Fiona Devine, 'Capitals, assets, and resources: some critical issues', *British Journal of Sociology* 56.1 (2005): 31-47.

from the position of a competitor radical theorist offering his own novel paradigm of social structuring. Alexander calls his a 'strong program' for cultural sociology, criticising Bourdieu's as 'weak': 'Despite these [meritorious] qualities, Bourdieu's research also can best be described as a weak program dedicated to the sociology of culture rather than cultural sociology.'[19] While more charitable than Goldthorpe, Alexander recognises that Bourdieu's work constitutes an attempt at a paradigm shift, even if it is one that Alexander himself disapproves of in favour of his own model. Hence, it is worth noting that of the three commentators used to insinuate a fieldwide consensus – one which is not present in sociology by any means as even this brief discussion here implies – one is himself, certainly a reference to the chapter entitled 'The Reality of Reduction: the failed Synthesis of Pierre Bourdieu'.[20] But like Goldthorpe, Alexander's interpretation of Bourdieu likewise exhibits a simplistic, self-interested misinterpretation. Alexander's disingenuous take on Bourdieu David Gartman contests:

> Some years before his recent redefinition of the field, he undertook a careful and sustained assault on Bourdieu's cultural theory in an almost book-length essay subtitled "The Failed Synthesis of Pierre Bourdieu." It is now clear that this 1995 attack was Alexander's attempt to defeat his most powerful opponent in the cultural field in order to make way for his recent reconstruction. Although the essay rightly identifies several weak spots in Bourdieu's theory of culture, I believe that this critique is itself deeply flawed and tendentiously misinterprets its object.[21]

Again, like Goldthorpe, Alexander rightly engages with Bourdieu at the level of theory, but his representation, if not comprehension, of Bourdieu's theory is distorted and potentially at least partially self-interested.

[19] Jeffrey C. Alexander, *The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 18.

[20] Jeffrey C. Alexander, 'The Reality of Reduction: the failed Synthesis of Pierre Bourdieu' in his *Fin De Siecle Social Theory: Relativism, Reduction, and the Problem of Reason* (London: Verso, 1995): 128–217.

[21] David Gartman, 'The strength of weak programs in cultural sociology: A critique of Alexander's critique of Bourdieu', *Theory and Society* 36 (2007):381–413, quote p.382.

Now, although our present scope dictates that we avoid getting overly embroiled in the contests over theory in another field, we have exposed that these do contests exist. A genuine reflexivity consonant with a Bourdieusien analysis demands we consider critical voices. Moreover, having reflexively considered a few of his critics, we have demonstrated that even among them Bourdieu is indisputably recognised as offering an extremely helpful framework for analysing social structures.[22] Thus, we highlight these two critics of Bourdieu not simply to note oppositions to Bourdieu's theory or even to demonstrate that even his critics recognise Bourdieu constitutes an entire paradigm, but simultaneously to stress that Bourdieu's theory itself explains and predicts the opposition that he receives. In fact, Bourdieu foresees exactly this position-taking strategy in this paradigm relating to what constitutes a field and how agents navigate such a field. The contest itself, then, supports his paradigm, in that they are competing for dominance within the sociological field, but especially for dominance as it relates to being/becoming arbiters of both symbolic and institutional power. That is, Bourdieu, as a rising-dominant agent taking aim at restructuring the field as a whole, will predictably draw attention with resistance from the falling-dominant agent and antagonism from a rival rising-dominant agent. Bourdieu aptly presages this in *Homo Academicus* while explaining why its first chapter is entitled 'Livre à brûlet':

> On sait que les groupes n'aiment guère ceux qui « vendent la mèche », surtout peut-être lorsque la transgression ou la trahison peut se réclamer de leurs valeurs les plus hautes. Les mêmes qui ne manqueraient pas de saluer comme « courageux » ou

[22] For more favourable assessments or applications of Bourdieu, cf. Anthony King, 'Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A 'Practical' Critique of the Habitus', *Sociological Theory* 18.3 (2000): 417-433; Michael Burawoy, "The Roots of Domination: Beyond Bourdieu and Gramsci", *Sociology* 46.2 (2012): 187-206; Michael Grenfell and Michael Kelly, eds., *Pierre Bourdieu: Language, Culture and Education: Theory into Practice* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999); Nicholas Brown and Imre Szeman, eds., *Pierre Bourdieu: Fieldwork in Culture* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Ltd., 2000); Will Atkinson, *Beyond Bourdieu: From Genetic Structuralism to Relational Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016); and *Bourdieu and After: A Guide to Relational Phenomenology* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020).

Cf. also Thomas Medvetz and Jeffrey J. Sallaz, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Pierre Bourdieu* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), but esp. Part 5: 'Bourdieu's Concepts as Generative and Open-Ended', pp.481-654; Garth Stahl, Derron O. Wallace, Ciarán Burke, and Steven Threadgold, *International Perspectives on Theorizing Aspirations: Applying Bourdieu's Tools*, Social Theory and Methodology in Education Research Series (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019).

> « lucide » le travail d'objectivation s'il s'appliquait à des groupes étrangers et adverses seront portes à jeter le soupçon sur les déterminants de la lucidité spéciale que revendique l'analyste de son propre groupe. … Aussi serait-on tenté de reprendre le titre, *Livre à brûler*…. Non pour lancer un défi à ceux qui, pourtant si prompts à s'insurger contre tous les autodafés, voueront au bûcher toute œuvre perçue comme un attentat sacrilège contre leurs croyances propres. Mais pour dire simplement la contradiction qui est inscrite dans la divulgation des secrets de tribu et qui n'est si douloureuse que parce que la publication (même partielle) du plus privé a aussi quelque chose d'une confession publique.[23]

This internal resistance, however, does not just come from the field of sociology having its *modus operandi* and controlling interests exposed. Likely this exposure concerns it only as far as it diminishes its symbolic standing in its higher-level struggle for dominance with competing fields. Rather, this field-internal resistance comes from the fact that the agents within sociology themselves have an interest in contesting Bourdieu because he undermines their own position of dominance. Bourdieu explains:

> Si la scientificité socialement reconnue est un enjeu si important, c'est que, bien qu'il n'y ait pas de force intrinsèque de la vérité, il y a une force de la croyance dans la vérité, de la croyance que produit l'apparence de la vérité : dans la lutte des représentations, la représentation socialement reconnue comme scientifique, c'est-à-dire comme vraie, enferme une force sociale propre et, quand il s'agit du monde social, la science donne à celui qui la détient, ou qui donne les apparences de la détenir, le monopole du point de vue légitime, de la prévision autovérifiant. C'est parce qu'elle enferme la possibilité de cette force proprement sociale que la science, quand il s'agit du monde social, est *nécessairement contestée*, et que la menace de coup de force qu'elle enferme est vouée à susciter, surtout de la part des détenteurs du pouvoir temporel, et de ceux qui, dans le champ de production culturelle, sont leurs homologues et leur allies, des stratégies de défense dont la plus commune consiste à réduire à un simple point de vue doxique le point de vue épistémique, au moins partiellement affranchi des déterminismes sociaux, en le rapportant à la position du chercheur dans le champ.[24]

Thus, Bourdieu expects that he will face some hostility in the field of cultural production (of which he is a member) not simply because his framework reflexively considers what his field might wish to keep out of view but because it specifically problematises the nature of what can be considered science, or more broadly genuine, authorised knowledge. Bourdieu himself

[23] *HA*, 15-16.

[24] *HA*, 44.

is at best cynical towards the question of truth ultimately having a *force intrinsèque*. This is not so much because he denies that truth as a category exists, but because he recognises that even if something is true does not mean people will *want* to believe it, returning us to the role of *doxa* and *illusio*. It is 'la croyance que produit l'apparence de la vérité' that often counts for more than the truth itself. Yet, his overall framework assumes the existence of truth, or at least the possibility for humans to increasingly approximate the nature of reality through a more reflexive form of scientific epistemology.[25] It is that *illusio*, in part, that itself drives him to develop and deploy his sociological framework. Consequently, Bourdieu pre-empts resistance by exposing that resistance in the academic field often has far less to do with truth than with the competitive structure of the field itself. As such, objections to his theory may often be made on the basis of some supposedly superior epistemic vantage point, which those with power/influence can label 'scientific'. Yet, upon deeper reflexion these objections can be seen to be an expression of 'un simple point de vue doxique'. That is, especially the agent with connections to positions of power within the field can use their position itself to say 'this is what is believed by truly scientific researchers'. They transform an epistemic claim into a *doxic* claim by connecting it with their own, so-called, scientific position and approach. This kind of epistemic dismissal of the rival as heterodox is true especially in those cases when, like Bourdieu, a person is leading an epochal change in theory and in correlated *doxa*. Moreover, this is precisely the kind of critique that both Goldthorpe and Alexander bring against Bourdieu, that they are superior *scientifically* to Bourdieu, and thus that all those scientifically inclined will side with their assessment of Bourdieu. However, that Bourdieu's framework predicts exactly the kind of opposition that will be performed ought to count in his favour.

[25] Cf. *HA*, 44-45

Of course, Bourdieu does think that his theory contains epistemic superiority. He does so precisely because it is reflexive in orientation and wants to take into account not only empirical studies but the sociological locations of those performing them. In favour of Bourdieu's approach is the fact that even though he has been dead nearly 20 years, his approach has only continued to increase in empirical support and in its diversity of application and appliers.[26] A *prae morte* positive assessment on this basis comes from a work with a more critical tone, which writes in the introduction:

> One of the most distinctive features of Bourdieu's work, in any case, has always been his insistence on joining theoretical and empirical work in an indissoluble approach to analysis. This is yet another insistence of his effort to overcome pernicious dichotomies. It is also part of Bourdieu's emphasis on the need to reconstitute the definition of objects of analysis as a crucial part of each research effort, rather than uncritically accept the common usages of either academic discourse or other constructions of social reality.[27]

Will Atkinson's *post mortem* appraisal corroborates this analysis:

> Goldthorpe's (2007a: 19) rather blunt assessment that Bourdieu's theory has no viable future is, therefore, misplaced. Yet the underlying hostility which drives it is hardly surprising. For years now the structure of the field of UK class analysis has been shifting, with the long dominant neo-Weberian approach championed at Nuffield College waning in the face of challenge from, at first, a heterogeneous heterodoxy (as seen in Crompton *et al*., 2000) and then, latterly, by a largely Bourdieu-inspired orientation (as signalled in Devine *et al*., 2005). It is as if, its position faltering, its advocates are pursuing conservation strategies and attempting to reassert orthodoxy. But scientific fields are not just spaces of struggle like any other; they also – so long as they maintain their autonomy and encourage reflexivity – provide the social conditions for the exercise of reason and the clearing away of misconceptions (Bourdieu, 2004).[28]

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[26] Cf. Medvetz and Sallaz, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Pierre Bourdieu*, but esp. Part 5: 'Bourdieu's Concepts as Generative and Open-Ended', pp.481-654; cf. also Stahl, et al., *International Perspectives*.

[27] Calhoun, et al., *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives*, 11.

[28] Will Atkinson, '*Reproduction* revisited: comprehending complex educational trajectories', *The Sociological Review* 60 (2012): 735-53, quote from p.750. Atkinson cites Goldthorpe's first 2007 article in *Sociologia*, as well as Rosemary Crompton, Fiona Devine, Mike Savage, and John Scott, eds., *Renewing Class Analysis* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); Fiona Devine, Mike Savage, John Scott, and Rosemary Crompton, eds., *Rethinking Class: Culture, Identities and Lifestyle* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), and finally Pierre Bourdieu, *Science of Science and Reflexivity*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), orig. *Science de la science et réflexivité* (Paris: Raisons d'Agir, 2001).

It is for this reason that Bourdieusien sociology has continued to develop and increase in significance within the field of sociology and supplant other meta-sociological theories and approaches. More importantly to our present concern of considering the *doxa* of *le champ théologique*, Bourdieu specifically addresses the nature of the academy and the field of cultural production more broadly construed. Thus, he is especially useful in bringing a reflexivity to the field of theology as it functions as a sociological system. Bourdieu continually developed, refined, and expanded his analysis of cultural production (esp. the academic system) throughout his career.[29] His voluminous body of work eschews reductionism and presents a comprehensive approach to analysing social systems holding several critical elements in tension. It is important to reemphasise how Bourdieu' concepts work at a theoretical level. Bourdieu explains his conceptual tools are intentionally flexible, systemic, and relational in nature:

> [The use of open concepts] is, to be more precise, a permanent reminder that concepts have no definition other than systemic ones, and are designed to be *put to work empirically in systematic fashion*. Such notions as *habitus*, field, and capital can be defined but only within the theoretical system they constitute, not in isolation. … What is true of concepts is true of relations, which acquire their meaning only within a system of relations. … [Correspondence analysis] is a technique which "thinks" in terms of relations, as I try to do precisely with the notion of field.[30]

The epistemic superiority that Bourdieu's approach hopes to maintain then is one which pulls together into coherence all the relations within a field. The kind of empirical studies Bourdieu

[29] Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron, *Les Héritiers: les étudiants et la culture* (Paris : Éditions de Minuit, 1964); *La Reproduction: éléments pour un théorie du système d'enseignement* (Paris : Éditions de Minuit, 1970); Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron, and Monique de Saint Martin, *Rapport pédagogique et communication* (Paris: Mouton, 1965), released in English in 1994 as *Academic Discourse: Linguistic Misunderstanding and Professorial Power*, trans. Richard Teese (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994); Pierre Bourdieu, 'Champ intellectuel et projet créateur', *Les temps modernes* 246 (Nov 1966): 865-906; 'Genèse et structure du champ religieux', *Revue française de sociologie* 12.3 (1971) : 294-334 ; *Esquisse d'une théorie de la practique*; *La Distinction: Critique Sociale Du Jugement* (Paris: Éditions De Minuit, 1979); *HA*; *La Noblesse d'État : grandes écoles et esprit de corps* (Paris: Éditions De Minuit, 1989); *Les Règles de l'Art: Genèse et structure du champ littéraire* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1992); *Sur la télévision: suivi de l'emprise du journalisme* (Paris : Raisons d'agir éditions, 1996); *Méditations Pascaliennes* (1997); and posthumously *Manet: une révolution symbolique* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil/ Raisons d'agir éditions, 2013) covering lectures given at the Collège du France 1998-2000 and an unfinished manuscript with his wife, Marie-Claire Bourdieu.

[30] *IRS*, 96.

approves of take seriously the hyper-relationality of human agents, institutions, dispositions, productions, resources, etc. Consequently, a Bourdieusien approach aims to account not only for the relations of what is studied but also of those doing the studying. This systemic, relational impulse warns that a major distortion to avoid, as we have seen, in trying to understand and apply Bourdieusien analysis is trying to engage with it at the level of individual concepts, disentangling them and dichotomising them from the system of relations within and through which they operate. Thus, an objection to a particular element of Bourdieusien analysis only holds weight, if that objection takes into account the theoretical framework and analysis as a whole. This is simultaneously the greatest difficulty in describing and exploring via Bourdieusien analysis and the greatest benefit, viz. it demands the analysis look holistically-relationally while holding the various elements in tension. Bourdieu has generated a reflexively oriented theory of sociological analysis, one which has been especially attuned to the exigencies of studying the system of relations operative in fields of academic cultural production. Beyond its analytic suitability, its severe criticisms only serve to validate its approach. Consequently, turning a Bourdieusien reflexivity against Bourdieu yields only greater substantiation of using Bourdieusien analysis on *le champ théologique* to facilitate liberating theology from itself.

Expanding reflexivity: Problematic reductionism in an overly methodological theological epistemology

As we discovered at the beginning of this chapter the *doxa* of theology includes an expected and assumed *modum theologiae*. This *epistemic doxa* is demanded by the dominant agents in theology and constituted by an allegiance to their preferred methodology. Having pursued a reflexivity on our use of Bourdieu we can now proceed on to greater reflexive consideration on the *doxa* of theology's metholodogy as it arises out of a concern for academic or 'scientific' legitimacy. In the process, we will place Bourdieu's reflexivity in the

social sciences within a wider context of reflexivity directed towards methodological epistemology. A brief consideration of the historical origin of some of theology's *epistemic doxa* will draw us naturally to critiques of the naivety of narrow methodological epistemology by T.S. Kuhn and of a failure to account also for a sociology of knowledge by S. Harding and H.E. Longino. Alastair MacIntyre, then, mediates these critiques as we turn them back directly towards theology.

Much is assumed epistemologically and anthropologically in theology's adherence to a methodology to determine what counts as knowledge. Moreover, we note that modern theology tends to prefer propositional, (Western) philosophical discursive reasoning for the sake of underscoring that the question of methodology is inexorably intermixed with what counts as knowledge. This assumption and exploitation of a certain methodological mode of discourse as required has a modern historical origin. Johannes Zachhuber explores the 19th century development of theology as science, suggesting it is one effected especially to incorporate science's epistemological orientation methodologically:

> In nineteenth-century references to theology as science or *Wissenschaft*, these two traditions often coalesce. On the one hand, speaking of theology as science evokes the idea of the systematic unity of historical and systematic work that harks back to the thought of Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling and thereby defends theology's increasingly controversial claims to be recognized as an autonomous and fully-fledged academic discipline within the university. On the other hand, use of the term implies that the methods theologians employ correspond to the ideal of presuppositionless science and that their results can, therefore, be justified before a public for which the scientific ethos in this sense has increasingly become normative.[31]

This theological turn methodologically to a scientifically respectable formulation followed the general turn towards a scientific epistemology which is centred on a particular 'systematic', 'academic', and 'presuppositionless' methodology that is expected to produce

[31] Johannes Zachhuber, *Theology as Science in Nineteenth-century Germany: From F.C. Baur to Ernst Troeltsch*, Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 288.

knowledge. Consequently, it can be seen as a 19th century negotiation by the field of theology of the changing set of wider academic *doxa* of legitimacy and respectability towards a methodologically 'scientific' epistemology. Likewise, Peter Harrison highlights the infiltration of theology's methodology with the 'scientific': 'from this time on religion and religions can be understood in terms of beliefs and practices that are empirically available for comparison and analysis.'[32] Ironically presuppositional, this typifying of the propositional and abstract as 'academic' theology is precisely an attempt at scientising theology's epistemological methodology.

Yet, the probability of a viable epistemological outcome being guaranteed by scientific methods has been challenged aggressively. In 1962 Thomas S. Kuhn published *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*[33] problematising epistemological successfulness of the methodology of the natural/'hard' sciences.[34] Kuhn is quick to point out that science, for all else it might be, is a still ultimately cultural product, and a highly self-regulating one at that. He writes about the hyper-selective sources used in education concomitant with scientific methodology emblematised in the natural sciences:

> In these fields the student relies mainly on textbooks until, in his third or fourth year of graduate work, he begins his own research. … Until the very last stages in the education of a scientist, textbooks are systematically substituted for the creative scientific literature that made them possible. … Of course, it is a narrow and rigid education, probably more so than any other except perhaps in orthodox theology.[35]

Kuhn's critique is not that this kind of education is not effective and efficient at producing scientists, but that it is so, precisely because the education only teaches from its own

[32] Peter Harrison, *Territories of Science and Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 116; cf. also pp.83-116.

[33] Thomas S. Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 1st ed. 1962.

[34] Cf. also Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, *Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986 [originally Sage, 1977]).

[35] Kuhn, *Structure*, 165-66.

perspective and without an awareness of the history that made it possible. Science, like any other field, manifests its own struggle over who/what gets to decide what is true or useful knowledge. The narrowness of the education itself as well as the total monopoly of the reigning scientific theory actually leads to the winner-take-all formation of scientific 'progress' when there is a revolution and it leads to a theory shift.

> Why should progress also be the apparently universal concomitant of scientific revolutions? … Revolutions close with a total victory for one of the two opposing camps. Will that group ever say that the result of its victory has been something less than progress? … To them, at least, the outcome of revolution must be progress, and they are in an excellent position to make certain the future members of their community will see past history in the same way. … More than the practitioners of other creative fields, … he comes to see it as progress. No alternative is available to him while he remains in the field.[36]

Thus the scientific methodology, taught and reproduced generationally through a narrow educative environment, cannot guarantee that it has gained greater epistemological access to knowledge (and/or greater knowledge itself). Rather it can only guarantee that it must see all scientific revolutions as progress. Thus, as seen above, Kuhn himself recognises that a theology which holds to an orthodoxy typifies (and therefore shares) the extreme narrowness and rigidity of scientific education and expectation. So, if, in fact, modern theology shares similar orientations and assumptions towards methodology and methodological products, then it must also carry the correlative dangers.

Moreover, once we consider that orthodoxy does not need to simply refer to a historic confession, but, as Bourdieu points out, can refer to the dominant view and methodology expressed in a field, Kuhn's critique becomes even more salient for our present concern of exploring the *doxa* of theology. A methodologically controlled determination of what counts as 'good theology' – or even just theology in general – is epistemologically flawed often because it is the expression of the orthodoxy of the field, that is the will of the dominant to

[36] Kuhn, *Structure*, 166-67.

retain dominance through methodological control. Further, if this methodology has inherited a concern to be 'scientific' in a broad sense, then it especially shares the risks and entailments of scientifically inclined epistemology.

Two critiques against this kind of methodological epistemology also come on feminist grounds that science as a methodology can never be removed from the wider sociological forces, nor does what counts as knowledge in a (scientific) methodology include all that it ought. We turn to these feminist critiques of methodological epistemology, because they expose that Kuhn's critique of science continues to develop to account for the *doxa* of the scientific epistemology, especially as it relates to the sociology of knowledge. First is Sandra Harding in *The Science Question in Feminism* who asks rhetorically, 'Can we possibly still imagine science to be in fact or in principle value-free once we focus on the way the selection and definition of scientific problems escapes science's methodological controls?'[37] Harding presses further in its sequel, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women's Lives*, arguing:

> [S]cience contains both progressive and regressive tendencies, and it leaves itself open to manipulation by regressive social forces to the extent that its institutions do not acknowledge and grapple with these contradictory internal features. … [A]ll sciences do assume epistemologies (theories of what knowledge is, what makes it possible, and how to get it), and both sciences and epistemologies implicitly hold sociologies of knowledge (theories about the social characteristics of the production of knowledge). But disciplinary traditions and conventions in philosophy, the social studies of science, and the sciences themselves lead practitioners in these fields to hold primarily archaic, excessively narrow, or *suppressed* or *unconscious* epistemologies and sociologies of knowledge.[38]

Harding here illustrates how deeply held the *doxai* of fields are. Like Bourdieu, Harding realises that the *doxai* of fields exist in the conceptual structure of agents in ways that are unconscious, both known and unknown simultaneously, especially as when suppressed. A

[37] Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 68.

[38] Sandra Harding, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women's Lives* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991), 308 (emphasis added).

conscious awareness of one's *doxa* can be suppressed specifically because it is in the interest of the agent not to possess a conscious awareness of them. That is, for the dominant the unconscious nature of the *doxa* is precisely what gives them so much determinative influence, and those who wield them, control. Moreover, what is left unchallenged and merely assumed is particularly a field's epistemology, but perhaps even more importantly also the sociology of its knowledge. In theology these *doxic* assumptions surrounding knowledge are likewise present. Further, by holding loosely to a 'scientific' or overly-mechanistic methodology in theology, the field inherits the assumptions of what counts as knowledge, what makes knowledge possible, and how to get it. Yet, simultaneously it also inherits the assumption that it must be produced by specialists who control and benefit from the structure of theology as a cultural product.

A second critique comes from Helen E. Longino. While critical of Harding at points, Longino ultimately concurs that a methodological assumption that science as it stands can produce all knowledge is very problematic: 'In arguing for the social character of scientific knowledge and for the necessary involvement of social interests in the construction of the knowledge, I am rejecting epistemological reductionism. … Reductionism is both a methodological practice and a metaphysical view.'[39] Consequently, the ontological and methodological reductionism mixes in modern academia (both science and theology) and its epistemology. Moreover, this epistemological reduction of knowledge to the product of following a methodological process renders the method everything to knowledge, even if it obviously cannot guarantee it nor even claim that all knowledge that exists is only discoverable by virtue of its method. That is, it denies the existence of knowledge on the grounds that it is not the product of the method. This does not actually demonstrate that all

[39] Helen E. Longino, *Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 226.

knowledge is only available through the method but that the method itself is limited in its scope of the discovery of knowledge. Despite logic serving as the ground for this claim, it is ironically a common syllogistic error, known as denying the antecedent. The invalid syllogism is: if A (method), then B (knowledge); not A; therefore, not B. Thus, while all epistemologies involve a method or methods – or even a metamethod – that holds a determinative relationship to knowledge, not every epistemology is equally inclusive of different forms of knowledge, and following a method can never fully guarantee it is the only means of epistemological access.

Alasdair MacIntyre critiques the methodologically constituted fact-epistemology of both natural sciences and social sciences, bringing us closer in an obvious way to theology. He writes: '"Fact" is in modern culture a folk-concept with an aristocratic ancestry. … [The error was] to suppose that the observer can confront a fact face-to-face without any theoretical interpretation imposing itself. That this was an error, although a pertinacious and long-lived one, is now largely agreed upon by philosophers of science.'[40] MacIntyre continues: 'Natural science teaches us to attend to some experiences rather than to others and only to those when they have been cast into the proper form for scientific attention. … Theory is required to support observation, just as much as observation theory.'[41] Hence, there is a built-in methodological procedure to employ in order to produce 'knowledge' within mechanistic theories that operates long before any scientist gets to the lab, or theologian gets to the laptop. There is a prejudgment about what kind of experience/experimental knowledge matters to this theory. While a theory must be supported by observations, they are never fully independent of the theory. Yet, this means that the theory may not treat all forms and/or

[40] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985 [1st ed. 1981]), 79.

[41] MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 80-81.

sources of data equally; and whatever inequity of treatment there may be is in the favour of the theory itself. The theory itself then includes a nascent methodology, but one to its own support. One could say, the knowledge that a theory counts tends to be only that which it needs to count. Moreover, these theories *teach* their methodologies, but this is not just through the theory itself, but through concrete acts of cultural reproduction. Thus, not only do methodologies discriminate to a greater or lesser degree what counts as knowledge, but also this discrimination is inseparable from those with the institutional and/or reputational powers who advance this discriminatory-by-necessity theory of knowledge.

More problematic theologically, hyper-mechanistic epistemologies do not simply threaten to obfuscate certain types and/or elements of knowledge construed from the perspective of a more inclusive epistemology. They also threaten through the mechanistic epistemology itself to reduce human beings from agents to functional descriptions of clusters of related (or usefully grouped) mechanisms. MacIntyre notes: '"Man" ceases, except within theology – *and not always there* – to be what I called earlier a functional concept. The explanation of action is increasingly held to be a matter of laying bare the physiological and physical mechanisms which underline action. …at the core of the notion of mechanical explanation is a conception of [sic] invariences specified by law-like conditions.'[42] MacIntyre is right to notice this dehumanisation is endemic to an overly-mechanistic epistemology. But what is even more important to notice is that this dehumanisation serves not just the theory itself, but especially those who wield the theory to determine what counts as knowledge. Consequently, methodological, epistemological reductionism leads to dehumanisation through the mechanism not only of the epistemology proper but of the sociology of knowledge. The sociology of knowledge is to some extent inseparable from the epistemology, This is precisely because the epistemology has a nascent methodology that

[42] MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 82 (emphasis added).

serves the theory itself. Furthermore, this theory is embedded within a larger sociological structure of knowledge production, which is controlled by people who have a vested interest in both generating and maintaining that theory.

Harding and Longino critique the narrow epistemology of methodologism based on social malformations of science and the inescapable social conditioning of knowledge itself. Parallelly, Kuhn and MacIntyre forcefully argue that there is no separating the 'fact' from the theory, and thus the *doxic* assumption of methodology from the theory's 'knowledge', especially when a narrow education seeks to reify the methodology as the only or superior producer of knowledge. This methodology includes not just steps to follow but modes of epistemic product. It could be argued that neither Kuhn nor Bourdieu escape the *doxic* dominance of scientific methodology. To their credit, however, they at least attempt to consider their field's set of relations and methodology reflexively. Moreover, as much as all these voices call theology to be reflexive about itself, they also illuminate precisely those areas where theology must begin to consider its *epistemic doxa*, namely at the level of theory, methodology, and a sociology of knowledge. Further, they begin to suggest it is precisely the risk of epistemic reductionism – expressed in a naïve commitment to a methodology and mode of production and in a naïve sociology – that most threatens theology with a self-subverting dehumanisation.

The epistemological demands of the incarnation on theology's *epistemic doxa*

Nowhere does a narrow epistemology have greater risks than in the field of theology. For in theology controlling what counts as knowledge does not only have the potential to discriminate against knowledge but dehumanise the agents of knowledge in especially that field which should most uphold their humanity. A mechanistic scientific method has no internal requirement to recognise and uphold the humanity of humanity, as MacIntyre addresses. However, theology, especially Christian theology in which the value of being

human is taken to near infinite heights through the incarnation of God the Son as the God-Man Jesus Christ, must for internal coherence uphold the dignity and humanity of every human person. Moreover, an epistemological methodology that does not embrace the inclusivity of epistemological access and products that is constitutive of the incarnation itself cannot claim to be appropriate to the nature of Christian theology and therefore theologising itself. In this sense the methodology of theology is still intertwined with the question of what counts as knowledge. Yet, this methodology must be epistemologically-aware and non-reductive through being personalised much as Harding and Longino call for. It is here that the incarnation demands greater epistemological inclusivity than a reified discursive methodology, an obsession over bare structural components and order, propositional / philosophical mode of argumentation, and dehumanisingly mechanistic epistemology. The incarnation is not reducible simply to noumenal propositions or phenomenal representations, to use Kantian categories. Rather, it defies all such reductive categories. It is a real event, too thick with meaning and vitality in its *sui generis* for any abstractive analysis to suffice. It is the dynamic entrance into creation of its Creator. The transcendent and living Son of God immanently assumes an embodied human life. This vivacious reality's epistemologically enfranchising nature demands a non-reductive epistemology and sociology of knowledge which takes seriously the embodied nature of human knowledge.

Following Gregory Nazianzus insight that 'τὸ γὰρ ἀπρόσληπτον, ἀθεράπεσευτον· ὅ δὲ ἥνωται τῷ θεῷ, τοῦτο καὶ σῴζεται,'[43] the incarnation makes possible an epistemological redemption in humanity because it takes seriously human sociology of epistemology. The incarnation rejects a reductionism of theology to philosophical or mechanistic discourse and argumentation because it is impossible for God to be satisfactorily known through this mode

[43] Gregory Nazianzus, *Letter 101* §32 in *Grégoire de Nazianze: Lettres Théologiques: Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes*, trans. Paul Gallay, collab. Maurice Jourjon, Sources Chrétiennes 208, (Paris: Le Éditions du Cerf, 1974), 50.

utilised exclusively. As Jesus himself points out, 'whoever comes to the Father comes through me' (Jn 14.6). Discursive knowledge of God, while possible and extant prior to the incarnation, was deemed insufficient by God epistemologically. Consequently, it is written 'Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν' (Jn 1.14). Though λόγος can be understood as a discrete word, it often serves to represent statements, dialogues, and rationality itself. Thus, neither a proposition, nor philosophical rationality, nor a disembodied abstraction met the epistemological, non-reductive requirements of God himself for knowledge of God, and therefore the mode of theology itself. Consequently, returning to Nazianzus, the incarnation is necessary for humans to have their epistemological relationship to God healed; and this healing is not fully effective discursively. It had to occur through the embodiment of God as human, through Jesus Christ. Yet, Nazianzus also reminds us of Jesus' implication in Jn 14.6, that the relationship of the incarnation was bidirectional: not only does God assume humanity, but humanity is through the incarnation united to God. So, while there are certainly many respects in which this bidirectional relationality enables healing and salvation for humanity, one salient respect is how incarnation also engages with the sociological nature of human knowing. Thus, even though God is omniscient, there is a sociological assumption that meaningful human knowing by humans requires not merely knowledge in abstract but knowledge in embodiment within the lived exigencies of human life. We might consider this what-is-assumed side of the dialectic relates to how the incarnation makes a deeper knowledge of God possible epistemologically for humans. Simultaneously, however, the united-to-God side of the dialectic demands the incarnation, because it makes it possible for humans to believe that God's knowledge of humans—especially what they suffer—is human enough to matter.

The incarnation, then, demands a theological epistemology that embraces an inclusivity to theological methodology and mode that is not limited to the discursive or

propositional but fully embraces alternatives more expressive of embodied life. The incarnation equally demands a theological sociology of knowledge that accounts for how humans actually interact with knowledge and produce knowledge as well as how the social dynamics surrounding knowledge can themselves need to be redeemed, liberated by Christ. Therefore, the hypostatic union of the living Jesus Christ induces needed reflexivity into the field of theology. Thereby it generates precisely the rejection of an epistemological reductionism for an epistemological inclusivity compelled by the incarnation of Jesus Christ that challenges theology's reigning *doxic* orientation towards a scientifically shaped methodological epistemology. So, theological epistemological inclusivity must attain to at least as much epistemic inclusivity as the incarnation of Jesus and failure to do so, regardless of reigning theoretical desiderata, is epistemological regress – not progress – whether the theologising in view is produced inside or outside of the academy. Furthermore, the incarnation forces theology to consider the sociology of knowledge operative not just in humanity in general, but in the field of theology in particular.

Now, through Bourdieu we can synthesise Kuhn and MacIntyre's concern over the inseparability of methodology from theory and Harding and Longino's concern over the social conditioning of knowledge and methodology. According to this synthesis, the revolution to the theory of epistemological access and knowledge demanded by the incarnation would simultaneously constitute a revolution of not just of a theory that operates within the Bourdieusien spectrum of hetero/orthodoxy (what opinions are publicly considered true or acceptable) but also a revolution against theology's *doxa* of what 'knowledge' even is and what process(es) produces knowledge and who gets to control, determine, and profit from this process and production. In this case, returning to the question from which we departed: if indeed modern theological methodology does structure itself along narrow epistemological assumptions and/or criteria of methodological knowledge production which

can be 'scientifically/academically respectable', then not only does adherence to this methodology determine what counts as theology but this adherence is bound up with the field of theology's navigation of a structural hierarchy of knowledge value within the larger field of the academy, in which scientific knowledge sits at the top. Thus, to even explore an incarnational revolution to the theological field's *epistemic doxa*, we will need to be able to more fully explore and evaluate the relations that exist within and around *le champ théologique*.

Yet, analysing these multilaminate relations in an epistemically minimally reductive and maximally inclusive way requires – in addition to *doxa*, opinion, *illusio*, and reflexivity – the Bourdieusien hermeneutical triad of capitals-fields-*habitus*. Through our initial consideration of *doxa* of theology we have begun to expose a concept Bourdieu calls symbolic violence. Symbolic violence occurs especially when the dominant in a field use their power to effect *doxa* that dehumanises. But to truly grapple with the question of symbolic violence in theology we will need the full set of Bourdieusien analytic concepts, which we will acquire and begin to apply in the next chapter with the capitals-field-*habitus* hermeneutic. Indeed for this Bourdieu is especially suited, as Richard Shusterman lauds,

> By exposing the concealed social conditions, presuppositions, strategies, and *illusio* of certain elite social worlds (e.g. of art and academia), Bourdieu provides *a tool of liberation* for people laboring under their social spell of domination but who cannot, through their own experience (and especially because of their own social position) know the inner, unarticulated, workings of these dominating social worlds.[44]

Thus, as we have already begun to see in this chapter, Bourdieusien analysis commends itself for and aids us with precisely what we are aiming at in this thesis, namely the humanising and incarnationally-consistent effort of liberating theology from itself.

[44] Richard Shusterman, 'Introduction: Bourdieu as Philosopher', *BCR*: 1-13, quote p.12 (emphasis added).

CHAPTER 2:

THE BOURDIEUSIEN HERMENEUTIC TRIUMVIRATE: CAPITALS-FIELDS-*HABITUS*

In this chapter, we develop a synthesis of the three inseparable elements of Bourdieu's analysis, which together operate as a hermeneutical triad: captials-fields-*habitus*. This will provide us with the sociological insights and tools necessary for investigating the symbolic violence, *epistemic doxa*, and sociological operation of academic theology in Part II. In the process of exploring these concepts, we will uncover how each operates as a sociological formulation of a Christian virtue (faith, hope, or love). We will also discover how Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* offers a perspective on human cognition ahead of its time and later corroborated by cognitive science. Likewise, we will see Bourdieu's epistemology is dialectic and inclusive of phronesis, rendering it a resource for Part III's constructive work.

Capitals: Espèces de capital et formes de pouvoir[1]

Although it might at first seem more intuitive to start with the concept of either field or *habitus*, in fact, to understand either, first one needs to glean from Bourdieu a more provocative analogical extension of the term 'capital'. Traditionally capital is understood to refer to forms of economic power and wealth, especially following Marx who tied capital particularly to means of production. Bourdieu takes this general concept of resource and extends it to several kinds of metaphorical currencies which serve as *formes de pouvoir*.

[1] This is the title of chapter 3 of *HA*, 97.

Bourdieu writes, 'It is in fact impossible to account for the structure and functioning of the social world unless one reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solely in the one form recognised by economic theory.'[2] Specifically, Bourdieu recognises that even if everything could be reduced to an economic exchange and a requisite amassing of economic power through cash, property, the means of production, labour, etc., the way these exchanges would operate in the real world would often be unrecognisable as such. Likewise, such a view operates on the assumption that all human activities hold economic motivations and interactions as primary. But Bourdieu interrogates: 'If economics deals only with practices that have narrowly economic interest as their principle and only with goods that are directly and immediately convertible into money (which makes them quantifiable), then the universe of bourgeois production and exchange becomes an exception….'[3] This reductionistic account of human relations is obviously problematic when one realises that (in addition to the French bourgeois mentioned) Bourdieu also has in mind the whole arrangement of symbolic exchange and social dominance strategies he witnessed while among the Kabyle people in Algiers conducting anthropological research.[4] Consequently, if capital is merely an economic category, then a vast and perhaps even more essential set of human relations and structures are occluded, specifically those relations that are social or cultural in nature. For example, if someone writes a book, they could be writing it for profit, but most academic books will never make the author much money. Similarly, when a scholar gets an endorsement from another scholar for the cover of her book, she does not pay the other scholar for the endorsement, though perhaps she will get a free copy of the book. As a result, the economic nature of these two products – the academic book, and the academic endorsement – have at

[2] Pierre Bourdieu, 'Forms of Capital' (*Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. John G. Richardson, trans. Richard Nice (New York, 1986): 241-58, quote p.242.

[3] *FoC*, 242.

[4] Bourdieu, *OTP*.

best a thin relationship to material gain. Thus, Bourdieu offers three main categories of his expanded notion of capital: economic, cultural/informational,[5] and social.

> Depending on the field in which it functions, and at the cost of the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as *economic capital*, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the form of property rights; as *cultural capital*, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the form of educational qualifications; and as *social capital*, made up of social obligations ('connections'), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the form of a title of nobility.[6]

Paramount is understanding that not only are there multiple forms of capital, but that these forms are exchangeable with one another. This means that capitals interact with one another in a dynamic, if often stable, space of relations. An agent can, for example, pay for an education, but that education could then be used to make more economic capital, which itself could be converted into social capital by providing access to activities only available to people willing to pay for them. We will return to the concept of 'field' in our next section, but it is important to notice here that fields contain different distributions and orientations towards the various forms of capital. In the academy, as a field of cultural/informational production, cultural/informational capital may be worth more than economic capital, whereas in politics social capital may be more highly valued than cultural capital.

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[5] Bourdieu later prefers calling 'cultural' capital 'informational capital', cf. *RP*, 109, 114. Underlying cultural capital is some form of *information*, since cultural products are or involve a kind of knowledge or informational value.

Bourdieu's expansion of economic capital to include social and cultural capital is generally not opposed conceptually. However, *PBR*, 115-19 notes that its main critics come from the Oxford Social Mobility Project specifically in the form of A.H. Halsey, A.F. Heath, and J.M. Ridge, *Origins and Destinations: Family, Class and Education in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) and – as noted in the previous chapter – J.H. Goldthorpe with C. Llewellyn and C. Payne, *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). Cf. also Richard Harker, 'Bourdieu – Education and Reproduction', *An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: The Practice of Theory*, ed. Richard Harker, Cheleen Mahar, Chris Wilkes, (London: MacMillan, 1990): 86-108; Lash, 'Cultural Economy', 203-11, Edward LiPuma, 'Culture and the Concept of Cultural in a Theory of Practice', *BCP*: 14-44, Atkinson, 'Reproduction revisited'.

[6] *FoC*, 243

Furthermore, each of these forms of capital can express themselves along multiple dimensions of relations. Bourdieu indicates *les espèces de capital* take both institutional and non-institutional forms, graphing profitably along the individual and communal dimension of human relations. Yet, Bourdieu will also add the subcategory of objectified capital. We can understand these dimensions of expression of capital best through the lens of cultural capital.

> …in the *embodied* state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the *objectified* state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace or realisation of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.; and in the *institutionalized* state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because … it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which is presumed to guarantee.[7]

There may be more kinds of dimensions of capital expression, but these three will at least suffice for our present discussion, because they are recurring features of types of capital. They exist in each major category of capital. For the economic capital, the embodied form is human labour itself, while the objectified form is the product of that labour, such as food, cash, or property (and thus allows even for embodied labour itself to be objectified through various forms of slavery). The institutionalised expression Bourdieu offers is property rights, to which we can add workers' rights, slavery, banking, and institutionalised economic systems such as socialism and capitalism. Meanwhile, though Bourdieu does not speak to it directly in 'Forms of Capital', social capital would express itself in the embodied dimension through personality, personability, attractiveness, and as well as geographic proximity. Yet, here we can already see that the types of capital overlap with one another in various ways, in that while there may be some core features that remain regular throughout cultures for embodied social capital, most expressions will expectedly be conditioned by the particular social group in question through its cultural capital. Even something as universal as geographic proximity can be disrupted by cultural capital, such as when one person is born to

[7] *FoC*, 243.

a family on one side of a street and another is born on the other side, but where one side of the street has an enculturated social value as higher than the other. The main objectified form of social capital is in the quantity and quality of the social connections, obligations, and reputation an agent, group, or institution possesses.[8] Yet, when institutionalised, social capital takes the form of names, titles, group membership, and recognised relationships (e.g. spouse, child, sibling, boss, employee, lay, clergy, citizen, member, etc). Yet, again, these are shaped powerfully by the structure of cultural capital of the society in question. Thus, these categories and subcategories of capital are interconnected in diverse ways, with the particular relational arrangement depending on the structured set of relations constituting a particular field.

With the language of 'capital', initially it may seem Bourdieu desires for a base economic motive or relationship for all *espèces de capital*. Yet, he explicitly rejects this, writing: 'l'économie que décrit la théorie économique est un cas particulier de tout un univers d'économies.'[9] Bourdieu, here, wants to hold in dialectical tension the irreducibility of all capital as unique and the reducibility of all capital as economic. As much as *les espèces de capital* are each distinctive in function and relations, it is still an economic model that illuminates the systemic relations exhibited by the capitals. Moreover, as much as they have other meanings, and as much as those meanings themselves might be arbitrary, the types of capital are still teleologically oriented towards the world. That is, capitals are used for ends not merely performed as an end. These acts do have some eventual, if basic, relationship to economic capital, if, for no other reason, because all capital takes time and, therefore, the embodied economic capital of life and labour to both acquire, retain, and employ: 'The universal equivalent [of capital], the measure of all equivalences, is nothing other than labor-

[8] Cf. *FoC*, 248-49.

[9] Pierre Bourdieu, *Le Sens Pratique* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1980), 86. Cf. also *FoC*, 252-53.

time (in the widest sense)'.[10] But this awareness of labour/time must not be superimposed to the degree that it is only or even ultimately what is measured. In this case, the telic must take priority in our understanding of the nature of *les espèces de capital*.

Consequently, we must recognise that capital is a functional category and can be applied to each field in question, such that while there may be three major forms of capital, there are not only three, nor do all other forms of capital need to fit neatly underneath these three major categories. What then are the essential functions of capital that qualify sets of powers or assets as such?

> Le capital sous ses différentes espèces est un ensemble de droits de préemptions sur le futur ; il garantit à certains le monopole de certains possibles pourtant officiellement garantis à tous (comme le droit à l'éducation). Les droits exclusifs que consacre le droit ne sont que la forme visible, et explicitement garantie, de cet ensemble de chances appropriées et de possibles préemptes, donc convertis, pour les autres, en interdits de droit ou en impossibilités de fait, par où les rapports de force présents se projettent sur l'avenir, orientant en retour les dispositions présentes.[11]

The various forms of capital work together and have the precise function of holding determinative power over some aspect of the future. Yet, more specifically capital exists mostly for the benefit of those at the top of the hierarchy and therefore aims towards restraining the access of this power to them. Furthermore, the level of determinative control is meant to reach unilateral scope, such that those with (enough of) the capital can have full access to the range of possibilities that are or could be available, while others are excluded from many of these possibilities and outcomes and in such a way that their exclusion can be perceived as not the result of the distribution of capitals at all. Laws are a visible pathway towards this attempt at hegemonic power. Far more regular are *les impossibilités de fait* in which, even if legal or theoretically possible, the relational nexus consisting in the distribution of capitals ensures that the distribution remains fairly stable through time to the

[10] *FoC*, 253.

[11] *MP*, 267.

benefit of those who already possess it. This has a powerful shaping effect not only on the continuing structure of a given field but the dispositions of agents (individual and institutional) who exist within or in some connection with that field and those categories of capital (which for the major three capitals includes everyone). Hence, capital is an analytic tool that enables us to see the structure and inclinations of the social world. Accordingly, 'the structure of the distribution of the different types and subtypes of capital at a given moment in time represents the immanent structure of the social world, i.e., the set of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which govern its functioning in a durable way, determining the chances of success for practices.'[12] Capitals offer a means by which we can see kinds of relations between entities as well as events in a social domain. Moreover, as much as capitals enable or disable certain agents, at a theoretical level they function to mark out the constraints of the system in view. Capitals serve to focus the sociological investigation and discern the most relevant features to a particular system of relations. That is, not only does capital delimit *les dominées*, it also delimits *les dominants*. In no system, even in an authoritarian dictatorship, does one person ever possess all of the capital in a system. Likewise, capitals as much as they open realms of possibility can never overcome all extrinsic or intrinsic determinations. In holding capital, *les dominants* are themselves constrained by what capitals they hold and in what distribution. Moreover, they remain even more captive to the *illusio* of those capitals and their respective fields than *les dominées*, who have much less capital to lose by transgressing the *doxa*. Yet, it is the durability of the distribution of capital and the ability for capital to be retained, exchanged, and passed down that presents such a powerful dispositional formation in agents. Capital then must be understood at the level of the system. It does not ever exist independently of it. Instead, it is a

[12] *FoC*, 242.

constituent element that always relates to—structuring and being structured—to the other essential concepts of Bourdieusien sociological analysis.

However, while economic, cultural, and social capitals are initially the main conceptual categories that Bourdieu deploys, eventually he must recognise that there is a deficit in this system, leading him to generate the fourth major concept of *symbolic power/capital*. The conceptual, systemic need for this fourth category arises on two fronts. First, the means of transferring capital and the rate of exchange from one capital to another is ambiguous. It is not clear how one can translate any form of capital into another for any rate of exchange since these are not strictly narrow economic acts. Moreover, if rates of conversion of capital vary and the translation mechanism is obscure, then how can the conversion be set? There needs to a common way to determine value. Further, since the premise of Bourdieusien capitals is that they are multiple, then how can a trade between several different parties with different forms of capital be achieved. Essentially, the original system leads invariably to the same limitations in a barter economy, where it becomes much more difficult to exchange Good A for Good C if the holder of Good C wants Good B and not Good A. In such a case, multiple trades would need to be made and would require social capital potentially to make the conversion. Likewise, if some goods such as social capital are by nature held distributively, how can an exchange be conducted? Most of the deficiencies of barter systems apply to what would in effect be a barter system among capitals. Functionally, then, for this system of analysis not only must there exist an awareness of the different types of capital, but a shared medium through which to value and exchange them. A common currency is needed and symbolic capital/power fulfils this purpose.

Second, this need for a fourth meta-capital[13] arises from the nature of an expanded sense of capital and the nature of human interaction itself. These features ultimately are built

[13] Note that Bourdieu actually calls statist capital a kind of meta-capital, *IRS*, 114.

on trust, on a shared *illusio* of value. For any capital to serve as capital it must be considered valuable and this view must not be merely the view of one, but the view of many. Yet, for the analytic power of Bourdieusien concepts to hold these *formes de pouvoir essentielles* must generally hold some *illusio* relation with nearly everyone, however slight. It is surely true that many subgenres of capital will not be desired by all (for example not everyone wants an academic theological reputation or sports cars or friends in Tbilisi), but everyone does want food, knowledge, and belonging. Thus, there will need to be something valued that can mediate between these major categories of capital. This model (as all economic models do) eventually reduces to trust both in the capital being exchanged and in the persons or institutions with whom an exchange occurs. All must believe in the value of this fourth meta-capital as much as they must believe in each other as holders and traders of capital. The value of this meta-capital must be universally recognised and agreed. Likewise, this capital must itself exist in such a way that win-win scenarios are possible. For if the *illusio* of the fields of exchange are zero-sum, then a trade will always have a winner and a loser, and few people would choose a loss. That is, all holders of capital would not trade and players would horde capital. Yet, exchanges occur precisely because agents believe two things: that win-win trades are possible and that trading partners can be trusted with a trade to produce a net benefit to both, but perhaps especially the weaker party. Here, we can see what the final meta-capital will need to be, viz. trust, pure *illusio* itself. And the *illusio* of the game is dominance in the game, but not dominance in one area but a net value of dominance not tied to any particular capitals, but to the meta-capital of symbolic power. Symbolic power then is the only capital that can serve as meta-capital, because it is a trust that someone is dominant in the game and is therefore able to increase one's own dominance. It is the *illusio* not of a certain field but of all temporal human reality as a universal or meta-field. By the end of his life, Bourdieu concludes that all capital devolves into symbolic power.

> Toute espèce de capital (économique, cultural, social) tend (à des degrés différents) à fonctionner comme capital symbolique (en sorte qu'il vaudrait peut-être mieux parler, en toute rigueur, *d'effets symboliques du capital*) lorsqu'il obtient une reconnaissance explicite ou pratique, celle d'un *habitus* structuré selon les mêmes structures que l'espace où il s'est engendré. Autrement dit, le capital symbolique (l'honneur masculin des sociétés méditerranéennes, l'honorabilité du notable ou du mandarin chinois, le prestige de l'écrivain renommé, etc.) n'est pas une espèce particulière de capital mais ce que devient toute espèce de capital lorsqu'elle est méconnue en tant que capital, c'est-à-dire en tant que force, pouvoir ou capacité d'exploitation (actuelle ou potentielle), donc reconnue comme légitime. Plus précisément, le capital existe et agit comme capital symbolique (procurant des profits – comme dit, par exemple, le constat-précepte, *honesty is the best policy*) dans la relation à un *habitus* prédisposé à le percevoir comme signe et comme signe d'importance, c'est-à-dire à le connaître et à la reconnaître en fonction de structures cognitives aptes et inclinées à lui accorder la reconnaissance parce que accordées à ce qu'il est. Produit de la transfiguration d'un rapport de force en rapport de sens, le capital symbolique arrache à l'insignifiance, comme absence d'importance et de sens.[14]

The net effect of every *espéce de capital* produces *effets symboliques du capital*, which Bourdieu considers a capital in its own right. What 'symbolique' means here is that it operates at the meta-level, being an emergent property of the system rather than any individuated element. It is known and recognised (i.e. *trusted*) taken up into the collective *illusio*. It is not known as capital but stands behind what all *formes de pouvoir* seek and serve to effect, that is a sense of legitimacy itself. It is the power that seeks to be power not known as force or exploitation but legitimate power. Yet, more importantly, this power only works as long as agents are disposed to see a particular capital as valuable, and as making a person or institution important. It is the needed pure *illusio* we spoke of earlier. It is the conversion of the distribution and abuse of power into not simply the way things are but the way things have to be. It is the reshaping of a conceptual world around honour, around reputation, around trust. It is a world reshaped according to the logic of importance, the logic of glory, the logic of trust. Theologically, it is not hard to see how the world is built and shaped by trust. It seems fitting that trust would be the core relation in the world, given the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love. In a way, in his *Méditations Pascaliennes*, Bourdieu is

[14] *MP*, 285 (italics original).

marking out the dangers of idolatry, the dangers of when human hubris, greed, and ambition assert themselves in the world. For, although my initial picture painted symbolic capital in more positive terms, Bourdieu exposes that it also has a sinister dimension as well. Symbolic power is the power of being important, of the *illusio* of human importance itself. Thus, symbolic power can just as easily become symbolic violence. Yet, it is the kind of violence that is subversive to the collaborative process that symbolic capital actually makes possible by enabling non-zero-sum interactions. For symbolic violence seeks to convert the non-zero-sum game into a zero-sum game by circumscribing the system of interactions and relations so as to enshrine a distribution of power into the very operative logic of the imaginations of people. Importance and the belief in importance is the universal currency. However, Bourdieu exposes that the nature of capital itself is arbitrary and operates largely on the basis of a shared *illusio*. Moreover, as arbitrary, what makes a person or institution important cannot be the capital itself. But by operating with the assumption that capital denotes worth those with capital (being obviously the most disposed towards the consideration) reify the holding of capital as value-giving. Consequently, they oppress those less endowed with capital by spreading and reinforcing the *doxa* more generally and the *illusio* of symbolic power in particular. Thus, the *capital symbolique* as monetized *illusio* becomes the *violence symbolique* as mutual trust becomes co-optative power.

Nevertheless, symbolic capital, despite its dangers, still offers solutions. First, it exposes the true value and function of capital, enabling a conceptual analysis of capital, relations to capital, and exchanges of capital. Second, it exposes a serious danger to any location of power and symbolic value, that of generating a set of *doxa* that is not merely an expression of symbolic power, but violence, as our earlier concern with the *illusio* of theology has already revealed.

Fields

The notion of 'fields' we have already alluded to several times. On the one hand, the concept is so intuitive and widespread even in general academic parlance that it requires little explanation to comprehend and is frequently used without grand sociological intentions. On the other, what Bourdieu means by fields goes beyond merely descriptive or lexical value. Rather *le champ* is the second element of his triumvirate analytic.

It is a tool to expose and interpret a constellation of relations networked within and around a recognisable feature of society. These relations include agents (individual or institutional), structures (such as hierarchies, laws, alliances, projects, etc.), resources (i.e. the various forms of capital), products, and habits. Bourdieu writes,

> To think in terms of field is to *think relationally*. The relational … mode of thinking is … the hallmark of modern science…. I could twist Hegel's famous formula and say that *the real is the relational*: what exist in the social world are relations—not interactions between agents or intersubjective ties between individuals, but objective relations which exist 'independently of individual consciousness and will,' as Marx said. In analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (*situs*) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.).[15]

Fields then are a way of thinking *relationally* about the structure of some element of human society and interest. They are not simply a set of interactions, because this would potentially render them ahistorical and worse sever the interaction from the logic that makes it possible and the relations between the entities of the interaction which are the precondition for their interaction.

These relations do not need to be consciously held or desired to exist. For example, a selection bias in hiring does not have to be either consciously operative or desired by the

[15] *IRS*, 97.

agent or institution but could still exist in the set of relations operative in a field or institution, either on the part of the individual through subjective impression of quality in a candidate or the institution who canvased for applicants on a website that was frequented more by people from a certain region than others. As this brief example illustrates, these are actual relations that exist between the individuals and institutions, as well as the various distribution of advantages and disadvantages and where particular agents and institutions sit in relation to them.

These relations *are* the field. But what specifies one field from another? What delimits the extent of a field? Its constraint is the goal a field sets: 'Chaque champ se caractérise en effet par *la poursuite d'une fin spécifique*'.[16] Fields then are a set of relations viewed from the perspective of a particular teleological value. More specifically, this field-specific *telos* is integrated and expressed through its *illusio*, 'qui *constitue le champ* comme espace de jeu.'[17] Thus, what makes a field is not simply the end towards which all relations within the field are involved or oriented – though it is not less than that – but the belief in that end as good, as worthy of fighting for, investing in, and ultimately winning.

Consequently, what makes field a helpful analytic tool is that it does not delimit purely arbitrarily a set of relations as a field. Rather fields admit a *final-cause* ordering that not only filters the relations viewed as members of the set but illuminates the relations holding in the set. Otherwise any set of relations could be termed a *champ*, but that grouping would be so arbitrary as to be meaningless as much as in maths the set [3, 8, 26, 766, 4000, 91,374] have relations (they are all real numbers, 91,374 is divisible by 3, etc.) but those relations are not obviously significant, whereas the set [3, 9, 27, 81, 243, 729] have relations and those relations have an order (they are all real numbers, multiples of 3, the

[16] *MP*, 22 (emphasis added).

[17] *MP*, 163.

exponentiation of 3 by increasing exponents of n+1). Thus, the teleological structure of the concept of fields prevents fields being *merely arbitrary* sets and therefore enables the concept to render insight. Yet, the ordering *telos* of a field embedded in its *illusio* is in a sense still arbitrary. 'La disposition constituante – à la fois arbitraire, ou même déplacée et risible, du point de vue d'un autre champ, et nécessaire, donc impérativement exigée (sous peine de grossièreté, de ridicule, etc.), du point de vue de la légalité spécifique du champ considéré – est cette adhésion tacite au *nomos*, cette forme particulière de croyance, l'*illusio*….'[18] Thus, while the *telos* of a field is arbitrary from the perspective of other fields, its function is not arbitrary from the point of view of inside of the field. It exhibits an essential and determinative role within the field, so that by understanding the *telos* of a field, one can understand better the relations holding within it, but also the relations holding between a field and (an)other field(s), because that teleological frame is a structuring structure of the field and thus is itself a kind of relationality (one might even say rationality) that shapes the relations extant with respect to a specific field.

Field, then, as an analytic concept exposes why and how a set of relations relate to one another through a view the world. For *field* is a way of thinking about a relational nexus orienting towards a particular end that as a structuring structure both expresses and generates the *illusio* itself, 'au sens d'investissement dans le jeu et les enjeux, d'intérêt pour le jeu, d'adhésion aux présupposés — *doxa* — du jeu.'[19] *Le jeu qui est le champ*, therefore, does not just have an organising *telos* and an *illusio* in favour of that *telos* but the demand for certain assumptions which usually remain understood though unstated about the field. Some of these *doxa* are intrinsic to the nature of the set of relations structured by the *telos* and *illusio*, but others will be non-necessary features that nonetheless must be presupposed. Bourdieu

[18] *MP*, 122.

[19] *MP*, 111.

explains 'Le principe de vision et de division et le mode de connaissance (religieux, philosophique, juridique, scientifique, artistique, etc.) qui ont cours dans un champ, en association avec une forme spécifique d'expression, ne peuvent être connus et compris qu'en relation avec la légalité spécifique de ce champ comme microcosme social.'[20] Thus, not only are fields attuned to certain epistemic modalities but these modalities are themselves structured according to the positions and relations within a given field as they relate to both the *telos* and *illusio* of the field. Accordingly, the distributions of capitals within a field and the positions of dominance and domination present will also adjust the *doxa* manifest in a field. More importantly, these *doxic* assumptions include the field's set of *epistemic doxa*. For, as has surfaced above, 'Chaque champ est l'institutionnalisation *d'un point de vue* dans les choses et dans les *habitus*.'[21] Thus, it is impossible to separate a field from its *telos* and *illusio*, precisely because what structures the relations of a field – that is what makes a field a field – is the epistemic assumptions of both the field's telic *illusio* and a way of seeing the set of relations such that the goal and the belief in the goal co-governing the field's relationality simply *have to be*. The *telos* and *illusio* are the *sine qua non* of a field's *epistemic doxa*. It can have other *epistemic doxa* which are more malleable, but seeing the world through the *telos* must and cannot be removed.

Consequently, this point of view is not just the expression of pure *telos* celebrated in the *illusio*. Rather, it institutionalises the point of view of the dominant in a field. 'Les points de vue, au sens de prises de position structurées et structurantes sur l'espace social ou sur un champ particulier, sont par définition différents, et concurrents.'[22] Thus, there are more elements to the *epistemic doxa* that constitute a field than merely a point of view structuring

[20] *MP*, 119.

[21] *MP*, 120 (emphasis added).

[22] *MP*, 219.

and structured by its animating end. What it means to play the game (participate in a field) is not just determined by the goal of the game or even the love of the game, but by the assumptions of how to play and how to know you are playing the game expressed by especially those who are already winning at the game.

From the dominated these non-essential elements of the *epistemic doxa* can be questioned, precisely because their relationality (exposed by *field* as a tool) is fully matrixed only according to the *telos* and *illusio* as opposed the full set of *epistemic doxa*. However, from the dominated position what ought to belong to the *epistemic doxa* appears different, since they are not just ordered towards the *telos* and *illusio* of the field, but their exclusive dominance in it. Of course, only one of these points of view of the field is institutionalised as the *epistemic doxa* of the field, namely that of the dominant. Hence it is here that the idolatry of symbolic violence appears in the concept of *champ*. Seeing the relational interconnections through the lens of a field's telic *illusio* generates the possibility of recognising symbolic violence as dominating elements of the *epistemic doxa*. As a conceptual tool, then, *champ* distinguishes between those epistemic elements that illuminate and generate the field and those epistemic elements which are merely constituent elements of it.

Simultaneously, this is where the *dialectic* nature of field becomes clear. It is a conceptual tool that enables both the subjective and objective dynamics holding within a set of relations to surface.

> Produit de l'expérience du jeu, donc des structures objectives de l'espace de jeu, le sens du jeu est ce qui fait que le jeu a un sens subjectif, c'est-à-dire une signification et une raison d'être, mais aussi une direction, une orientation, un à-venir, pour ceux qui y participent et qui en reconnaissent par là même les enjeux (c'est l'*illusio* au sens d'investissement dans le jeu et les enjeux, d'intérêt pour le jeu, d'adhésion aux présupposés — *doxa* — du jeu).[23]

[23] *SP*, 111.

Fields are objective realities, in the sense of extant sets of relations holding and engendered by the *telos* and *illusio* of the fields. Yet, they are also subjective realities, ways of perceiving the world and orienting oneself within it according to a certain *telos* and *illusio*. As Bourdieu likes to repeat, they are 'structuring structures.' They both exist and are perceived to exist and that perception itself co-generates and perpetuates their existence. Implementing the concept of field exposes 'objectively' what the relations are and how they are organised while concurrently illuminating 'subjectively' why and how the relations are. In this way, *champ* at once extends towards the more 'objective' structuring structure of *capitals* and the more 'subjective' structuring structure of *habitus* (as we will soon consider), revealing both as structural features of the field and as interrelations structuring and structured by the field. The pluripotent conceptuality of field integrates both these so-called objective and subjective elements by focusing the set of relations through the *doxic telos-illusio*. If it did not perform both functions, *champ* would be of limited value, if any at all, because, in fact, these objective-subjective relations are dialectically bound.

Furthermore, it now becomes clear that field enables not just comprehending a set a relations more fully, but understanding what makes capital *capital*. Above, we avoided explaining what constitutes capital and how many types of capital there might be expressly because it is impossible to fully understand capital without also understanding what constitutes a field and the dialectical nature of field as itself subjective-objective concept. The *telos* of a field is a form of *capital*. It is so to speak the end-product of the field itself. For '*champs de luttes différant tant par les enjeux et les raretés qui s'y engendrent que par les espèces de capital qui s'y engagent*.'[24] Thus, as much as a field may have several *espèces de capital* involved in the teleologically-ordered and *illusio*-oriented set of relations that constitute it, *le champ* offers its *telos-illusio* as a form of capital, that is not simply the end

[24] *SP*, 86 (emphasis added).

and the belief in the end, but that end which is realised in some form, as we considered above. Thus, each field offers its capital, potentially in diverse forms. These may be considered subsistent forms of the major *espèces de capital*: economic, social, and cultural/informational. The major forms of capital are, therefore, really just broader fields of telic *illusio* with various subfields co-oriented towards a more grandly orchestrated end, but this is especially the case with cultural, or informational capital, as there are a multitude of types of information oriented towards their particular subfields, but which also co-ordinate towards the broader goal of cultural/informational dominance. Likewise, fields can integrate multiple forms of capital both because these diverse forms of capital exist and because these diverse forms of capital can be recruited (often through exchange into symbolic power) towards that particular field's end and hope.

Here we also see how the concept of field illumines the set of interrelations between capitals and agents, as well as discrete fields. If every field is a set of relations oriented towards a particular hope, and if that hope can incorporate other hopes so as to further the particular field's hope, then fields regularly intersect and negotiate with one another in several ways. First, one field can co-opt another field(s) to its own *telos*. Second, a field can combat another field. Third, two fields (or more) can coordinate to advance or supress a third (potentially broader) field (or set of fields). Fourth, fields can support one another. The options continue. What is important to see here is that field is a scalable concept, scaling up and down as needed.[25] Moreover, while our coming consideration of *habitus* will focus more

[25] Cf. William Earle, 'Bourdieu Nouveau', *BCR*: 175- 191, who bifurcates *champ*. Due to not noting the scalability of the concept of field, Earle is forced to split the concept into already scaled types, which themselves do not scale well and obfuscate the scalability of *champ*. Scalability also confronts Jenkin's criticism (*PBR*, 89-90) that Bourdieu fails to offer sufficient institutional analysis. However, because *champ* is a scalable concept, any absence of attention to institutions is understandable: institutions are just fields. Moreover, the subjectivising-objectivising *and* scalable nature of fields must be integrated with habitus, where the field expresses a *habitus* in action structured and structuring its continued place within the wider set of relations and orientation towards a telic-illusio. Accordingly, Jenkin even admits his critique is 'partly filled by the notion of the habitus' (*PBR*, 90). Thus, institutions are agentised fields (themselves filled with fields and agents, capitals and habitus).

on the nature of agents of various kinds (individual, communal, institutional, etc.), the telic *illusio* generating the set of relations, which we illumine through the concept of field and designate as such, results in fields taking on a quasi-agent role in relation to other fields. This is necessary to field functioning as a scalable analytic. For it must serve to illumine the relations of multiple *tele-illusiones* that can be more or less constrained in scope. The global economic field, for example, will include billions of agents, at several scales, from individuals, to families, to companies, to nation-states, to superpowers. Each operating along the broader economic *telos* and *illusio*, but also with discrete *tele* and *illusiones* pertaining to the set of relations constituting that particular field.[26]

In illustration: a car repair shop can be considered a field, because there are a set of relations that exist between the owner, managers, mechanics, clients, technology, training, economy, education, experience, etc. Within this one very narrow field, several other fields appear, themselves not even belonging exclusively to the economic field. There is also the social field between the owner, managers, mechanics, suppliers, clients, and the general public. The cousin of one of the mechanics may become a client due to his social connection. Meanwhile, while it is producing an economic product for the owner, it is also a centre of informational capital production, as the mechanics acquire technical skills through on-the-job training and experience. These skills themselves can be traded, marketed, or passed along for various forms of capital, while also contributing to the shop's culture, or vibe. This is to say nothing of other intersections like the owner who went to business school or the mechanically ignorant (i.e. deficient in a specific type of cultural capital) client who gets taken advantage

[26] *PBR*, 89, and Lane, *Bourdieu*, 198-99 question whether fields exist in reality or are mere projections onto it. However, in Bourdieu's analytic, because fields are sets of relations oriented subjectively and objectively towards tele-illusiones, fields can both identify themselves or be theorised. That is, agents can self-identify as a field, for which a telic-illusio can be explored, or theoreticians can posit a telic-illusio to identify non-self-identifying fields. Whether or not the telic-illusio is validated or negated, the result exponentialises its explanatory value in providing greater heuristic insight, either strengthening the model or demanding an alternative theorisation of the field. Thus, a purpose of the concept of field is to cycle the *model of reality* ever closer in a hermeneutical spiral towards the *reality of the model*.

of. Yet, overall, this business is just that, one that is primarily motivated and oriented towards the *telos* of economic gain and belief in that. What it means to be successful at this mechanic shop is to produce economic capital, and in particular produce more than a competitor. Yet, down the road, a competitor in the economic market might prioritise training programs to such an extent that its main product is great mechanics and the certification they facilitate. Yes, there is an economic interest and production there, but it primarily serves as a school for mechanics. It is now clear how interrelated the concept of capital is to field as well as how interconnected fields can be, because much of what is in play (*enjeu*) is bound up with the play (jeu) itself. Moreover, what is in play and what is being played is to some extent embedded within the scale of the consideration of the set relations in view. Multiple games are simultaneously possible in diverse arrangements and priorities. Ultimately, fields are ways of looking at the world through the lens of a certain goal and belief in that goal. They are sets of relations illumined and transfixed upon discrete hopes. Fields define and are defined by the capital they hope in.

At this point we return to the concern of idolatry manifest in symbolic violence and power. If all capitals are forms of tradeable trust, and symbolic capital trust in the power and value of power, then fields are the contingent relations necessary to generate and orientate towards a specific capital as a trusted value, and at the universal, meta-level towards net-dominance as value. Bourdieu calls this field that subsumes all fields *l'espace social*: 'l'espace social est défini par l'exclusion mutuelle, ou la distinction, des positions qui le constituent, c'est-à-dire comme structure de juxtaposition de positions sociales (elles-mêmes définies, on le verra, comme des positions dans la structure de la distribution des différentes espèces de capital).'[27]

[27] *MP*, 161. Cf. also *RP*, 53; *SP*, 46.

Yet, this trusted value only has value as it relates to the broader notion of hope. The capital operation of trust only holds because it is embedded within the wider network of hope. In this case, the idolatry of power is not bare nor composed only of a pantheon of locally trusted deities. Rather, the idolatry of symbolic power and the idolatry of every absolutised *illusio* must operate within a system of relations whereby there is hope in the idolatry. As Isaiah 44.13-20 describes, a חָרָשׁ (artisan, crafter) designs and makes an idol out of wood, but that idol exists as an idol only within a field of hope. Outside of that orientation of hope, the idol becomes its base property. The crafter himself is a member of the field of hope and participates in and perpetuates it by even planting and harvesting a tree (v.14). Part of the tree he uses to warm himself and bake his bread—in the field of domestic heating and cooking, a tree is just the resource in which one hopes to get warm and to warm food (vv.15-16). But when placed into a field of cultural production, a transformation occurs (v.17): וּשְׁאָרִיתוֹ לְאֵל עָשָׂה לְפִסְלוֹ יִסְגּוֹד לוֹ וְיִשְׁתַּחוּ וְיִתְפַּלֶּל אֵלָיו וְיֹאמַר הַצִּילֵנִי כִּי אֵלִי אָתָּה׃. This is the nature of each discrete capital which is a form of trust. It cannot simply exist. It only exists to the extent that it remains present within the system of relations that both produce and are produced by it. It may be ridiculous, as Isaiah[28] 44 suggests, to build an idol with your own hands, something which in another system maintains no capacity to stand as an idol because it is devoid of the network of relations that generate the hope contingent to its instrumentalised trust. However, once it is placed within this system, the irony is lost and all other uses for that discreet object are subsumed by instrumentalised faith. Thus, just as a modern archaeologist can find an ancient idol discarded and buried by the sands of time recognising it as an object of communal trust but not ever consider worshipping it, each capital only can operate as capital as long as the systematised relations of hope hold surrounding it such that it can remain the

[28] For simplicity's sake I will refer to the book's denomitive as the author, viz. Isaiah, but note Isaianic scholarship debates author/redactor compositional relations to textual sections throughout the book.

telos and *illusio* of that nexus of relations. Moreover, it is important to see how powerful the transformation of cultural production is to this chunk of wood. The crafter *will* bow to it (the modal *yiqtol* tense). The subsequent whole train of consequences (using the narratively-marked *wayyiqtol* tense) are *baked* into the system of relations of idolatry. Teleological *illusio* generating and generated by the field compel an epistemological framework that does not just make the capital as instrumentalised trust possible, but necessary, at least from the perspective inside the field. Wood as a heat source resource was endemic to the economic-cultural field of the ancient near east as much as the idol was to the cultural field of the time. Yet, neither are intrinsic to the tree or the harvested wood. Few in the modern west would rely on wood either to heat their flat or to save them, but many would use wood to build their homes and store carbon to help fight climate change. More to the point, the archaeologist may not trust in the discovered idol to solve their religious needs or their more general life woes, but they will transform the object by recruiting it into the field of archaeology, to which they are beholden and participant. That is, they will subsume the artifact into the subsystem of relations of hope that themselves coordinate with other subsystems in the broader field of academic capital.

Thus, Isaiah's critique of idolatry intersects with Bourdieu's framework. His wordplay on *illusio* always suggests it is not just the Latin for 'in-game' but for illusion,[29] for deception. *Illusiones* are always somewhat deceptive, seeking to claim the all-encompassing value, while holding only that value that they are invested with by faith. Field then is the nexus of relations that make the *illusio* possible, not just in the sense of the *telos* and investment in the game, but the deception surrounding it such that an epistemology of specified false-hope is established. Isaiah again explains (44.20) concerning the חָרָשׁ: רֹעֶה אֵפֶר לֵב הוּתַל הִשָּׁהוּ וְלֹא־יַצִּיל אֶת־נַפְשׁוֹ וְלֹא יֹאמַר הֲלוֹא שֶׁקֶר בִּימִינִי׃. Often the systems of relations within a

[29] Cf. *RP*, 151.

field are such that there is no opportunity for epistemological reflexivity, which is one of the reasons why reflexivity figures so prominently in Bourdieu's approach. Fields condition not only the desires, aims, and drives but also the epistemic operations to recognise them as either discrete or finite, let alone illusory. Moreover, the closer one gets to the *telic-illusio* and the more one has invested in the game of the field, the harder it is to even be aware of the deception of the game itself. It ceases to be a game, taking on a life of its own. The chunk of wood becomes the god of the game. And it is this danger endemic to all fields – and thus all *espèces de capital* – that Bourdieu is aware of and which coincides with Isaiah's prescient proscriptions centuries prior.

On the one hand, calling every telic *illusio* manifesting as a system of relations 'deception' seems overly hostile to the nature of the games being played. Excelling in business, politics, or academia does not feel like an *illusio*. These seem to be worthy goals to most, or at least understandable pursuits. Do fields expose an operative deafening to the epistemological conditions conditioning and being conditioned by them? Are not the various forms of economic, social, and informational capital useful? Do not all people have to play (and win) at these games?

Perhaps, but only if one has already been engendered in the wider *espace social*, the universal logic of symbolic power. In this sense, that intuitive calculation that these t*ele-illusiones* are useful and not always, if ever, deceptive—it is itself simultaneously a manifestation of the utility of the concept of *champ* and an epistemological expression of how deep into the *doxic* rationality of agents the deception permeates. Economically, even if one reduces all economic value to the expression of expended human effort and time, why should one want to dominate the way other human beings use their efforts and time? Why is quantifying and controlling as much of the objectification of that human effort and time desirable, let alone reasonable? For example, one could have had a much more reciprocitous

goal. Even if it is the bitter finitude of human existence that then confers value, this value itself belies the *telic-illusio* of the game of life. It always ends up assuming the game to play it. Christianity has long problematised attempts at construing a self-referential value to fields and forms of capital. As far back as Isaiah, there was the analysis of this self-referential hope. Human hope manufacturing itself from human struggle. In the end, the hope of each field fails to save. Moving the point of reference from one system of relations to another exposes this. Thus, every field offers only false-hope, something that is hope only insofar as the relations generating it continue to operate in hope. Each field's produced capital is an objectified trust that can be traded and has value, but only as long as it relates to broader frameworks of hope and as long as the agents (individuals, institutions, and fields) want that objectified trust to further their own telic *illusio*. Fields and capitals are deceptive to the extent that they are objectified and absolutised. The epistemic deafening they perform is constituent to their operating. Here the wordplay of Isaiah appears. The selected word for crafter חָרָשׁ maintains the same root letters and very similar sound to the verb חרשׁ 'to be deaf'. Thus, the producer of the idol themself is deaf and can only produce something that is deaf and thereby deafening. This is the epistemic effect that Bourdieu's concept of field enables us to expose. If capitals are in fact simply the discrete reified trusts generated and utilised among fields, and if symbolic violence warns us of the concomitant dangers of an idolatry of power, then fields are systems of relations that condition and are conditioned towards their respective tele-illusiones. They are systems of hope that make the trust trustable. Moreover, refracting Bourdieu's concept off Isaiah's prophecy cautions us of the epistemic danger of deception endemic to absolutizing a human hope. Such that the more this absolutizing of human-hammered hope increases the more deceptive it becomes, and the more symbolic capital becomes not simply a means of trade but an all-consuming obsession without the possibility of even being recognised as such. In this sense it reveals a double

violence first to the oppressed who fall under its weight and second to the oppressors who fall ever more under its spell.

It is here that we start to cross the lines into the realm not of types of capital or of fields, but the third major concept of Bourdieu's hermeneutical triad. The first two are, of course, neither solely objective nor solely subjective analytic concepts. They exist within a spectrum of tension. Types of capital is a subjectivity that reifies itself into functionally 'objective' resources, lying at the far end of the spectrum of tension. Fields, meanwhile, take a more centred position on the spectrum, but perhaps edging towards the 'objectivised' side of the spectrum. However, the concept of *habitus* lies still within a dialectical tension of subjectivity-objectivity, but ventures towards – indeed, as we will soon see, focuses on – the subjective end of this spectrum.

Habitus

Habitus as the third core element of Bourdieu's analytic triumvirate serves especially to illuminate how agency functions at both individual and transindividual levels within and between fields and in relation to the types of capital. Like fields, they are simultaneously structured and structuring in the set of relations. Since these categories have compounding relations with one another, we can now see more fully how *habitus* works as a structuring structure, and in particular how *habitus* functions in tandem with field.

> The relation between *habitus* and field operates in two ways. On one side, it is a relation of *conditioning:* the field structures the *habitus*, which is the product of the embodiment of the immanent necessity of a field (or a set of intersecting fields, the extent of their intersection or discrepancy being at the root of a divided or even torn *habitus*). On the other side, it is a relation of knowledge or *cognitive construction*. *Habitus* contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing one's energy.[30]

[30] *IRS*, 127.

Bourdieu is always clear that each of the elements of his heuristic triad are both structured by and structuring simultaneously all of the other elements. The field shapes the *habitus* as much as the *habitus* shapes the field. The triad as a whole illumines the way the system operates. Bourdieu here begins to highlight several essential elements to understanding what *habitus* is, which we will explore more fully below, including *habitus* as embodied, *habitus* as strategic, and *habitus* as a dialectically subjective-objective structure. [31]

Habitus as phronesis

Above Bourdieu fails to explain what it means to *have a habitus*, even if he situates it within a dialectic relationality vis-à-vis les champs. He develops this concept in *Le Sens Pratique*.

> Les conditionnements associés à une classe particulière de conditions d'existence produisent des *habitus*, systèmes de dispositions durables et transposables, structures structurées prédisposées à fonctionner comme structures structurantes, c'est-à-dire en tant que principes générateurs et organisateurs de pratiques et de représentations qui peuvent être objectivement adaptées à leur but sans supposer la visée consciente de fins et la maîtrise expresse des opérations nécessaires pour les atteindre, objectivement « réglées » et « régulières » sans être en rien le produit de l'obéissance

[31] Misunderstanding *habitus* as overly deterministic fails to retain Bourdieu's dialectical tension. For examples of this misunderstanding, cf. Lane, *Bourdieu*, 194-96; *PBR*, 80-84, esp. 96-97, 110, 175; King, 'Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu'; Alexander, 'The Reality of Reduction: the failed Synthesis of Pierre Bourdieu'; *The Meanings of Social Life*; Jeffrey C. Alexander, *La Réduction: Critique De Bourdieu*, trans. Nathalie Zaccaï-Reyners assisted by Julie Lejeune, Humanités (Paris: Cerf, 2000); Nicholas Garnham, and Raymond Williams, 'Pierre Bourdieu and the Sociology of Culture: An Introduction'. *Media, Culture & Society* 2.3 (1980): 209-23. Meanwhile, treatments of *habitus* with greater philosophical sensitivity tend to recognise *habitus* is a non-overly-deterministic 'middle way' amid the subjective-objective spectrum. Cf. Jacques Bouveresse, 'Rules, Dispositions, and the Habitus', *BCR*: 45-63, esp. 50; Earle, 'Bourdieu Nouveau', 185; Craig Calhoun, 'Habitus, Field, Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity', *BCP*: 61-88, esp. 75; Mitchell Aboulafia, 'A (neo) American in Paris: Bourdieu, Mead, and Pragmatism', *BCR*: 153-74, esp. 166-68. Likewise, accusations of determinism often occlude the nature of an analytic, that is, to expose what is there, in this case agentive, inertial, and deterministic elements present in society cf. Agoston Faber, 'From False Premises to False Conclusions: On Pierre Bourdieu's Alleged Sociological Determinism', *The American Sociologist* 48.3 (2017): 436-52; Alain Accardo, 'Un savant engagé', *Awal*, 27-28 (2003): 15–24; Aaron V. Cicourel, 'Aspects of Structural and Processual Theories of Knowledge', *BCP*: 89-115. Thus, Rogers Brubaker, 'Social Theory as Habitus', *BCP*: 212-34, praises Bourdieu for his dialectic epistemology, p.227: 'It is doubtless a major merit – perhaps the major merit – of Bourdieu's sociological habitus that it equips him to capture in a remarkably rich and subtle manner the "intrinsically dual" nature of social life, at once *objective and subjective*, external and internal, material and symbolic, patterned yet improvised, constrained yet (conditionally) free, and to *integrate* these dimensions or moments in his sociological accounts' (emphasis added).

> à des règles, et, étant tout cela, collectivement orchestrées sans être le produit de l'action organisatrice d'un chef d'orchestre.[32]

Thus, a *habitus* arises from a particular arrangement of relations within a field, including its arrangement of capitals and particular telic-*illusio*. A *habitus* is a disposition (or set of dispositions) that arises in an agent who participates in a particular field or set of fields as Bourdieu noted when discussing his hermeneutic with Wacquant above. Importantly this disposition is not temporary, but deeply integrates itself into the agent in such a way that it will continue to act as a structuring and structured structure across time and space, and in particular when it comes into contact with competing *habitus*. Moreover, *habitus* is not solely individualistic in nature, as much as it occurs in individual agents, because it is something that can be passed on not only to other synchronic agents but to diachronic agents, such as one's children or one's institutional successor. This is in part not only because *habitus* constitutes a kind of embodied or corporalised informational capital, but because the system of relations that are involved in its generation often endure in social and temporal relation to more than just one agent. That is, the dispositions necessary to being a 'successful' or 'insightful' theologian are not merely a function of the particular theologian, but have recurring features because the nature of *le jeu théologique* – that is distribution of different kinds of capital and the enduring *telic-illusio* of *le champ théologique* – remains operative across the field at any given moment in time, and to a more limited but still extensive degree across time. Every *habitus* is more or less 'adapted' to its field's *telos* and *illusio*, sharing its goal and ideally optimising the agent in question to both being successful at the goal and evermore invested therein. Most importantly, *habitus* generates and organises the expressive agency of the agent. This is achieved in two simultaneous trajectories: first and foremost actual, instantiated practices. *Habitus* is not a theoretical relation to action; it is a constitutive

[32] *SP*, 88-89.

property, or description of actions in action. That is, actions actively acting towards and according to the *telic-illusio* of the field. Second, *habitus* is kind of conceptual representation and habituation that is also largely inseparable from the performative nature of the agency in which they exist, are acquired, and are strengthened. Bourdieu explains:

> Les « sujets » sont en réalité des agents agissants et connaissants dotés d'un sens pratique…, système acquis de préférences, de principes de vision et de division…, de structures cognitives durables (qui sont pour l'essentiel le produit de l'incorporation des structures objectives) et de schèmes d'action qui orientent la perception de la situation et la réponse adaptée. L'*habitus* est cette sorte de sens pratique de ce qui est à faire dans une situation donnée – ce que l'on appelle, en sport, le sens du jeu, art d'anticiper l'avenir du jeu qui est inscrit en pointillé dans l'état présent du jeu.[33]

The agents act, and know in acting. It is through the embodied and instantialised agency that a set of dispositions take root, taking the form of preferences and ways of seeing and organising the world. Ultimately these are cognitive structures, patterns and frameworks of actual action. They are not theoretical knowledge as much as they are lived knowledge, an intuitive and not-necessarily-conscious disposition towards understanding and playing the game. Hence, as Bourdieu noted above, a *habitus* shapes the expression of agency in an agent 'sans supposer la visée consciente de fins et la maîtrise expresse des opérations nécessaires pour les atteindre'. A *habitus* might be effective at helping an agent succeed (or not as the case may be[34]) in a field's goal and invest in its *illusio*, but regardless it does so without requiring conscious awareness in the agent of exactly how or why they act as they do: it is just what the agent does, and if asked the response would likely be ad hoc: 'it's how you do it' or 'simply seemed like the right way'. *Habitus* thrives not in considering how to play the game but *in playing* it.[35]

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[33] *RP*, 45.

[34] *MP*, 190: 'L'habitus n'est ni nécessairement adapté, ni nécessairement cohérent. Il a ses degrés d'intégration – qui correspondent notamment à des degrés de « cristallisation » du statut occupé.'

[35] Cf. Charles Taylor, 'To Follow a Rule…', *BCP*: 45-60, correlates Bourdieu's habitus with Wittgenstein's location of meaning in practice as a parallel solution to the abstractionism and reductionism of mental representationalism (nor is he alone in the comparison, cf. Earle, 'Bourdieu Nouveau'). Taylor argues Bourdieu fills a 'phronetic gap' left by Wittgenstein (p.57). Indeed, Bourdieu refuses to collapse his dialectic by

For this reason, *habitus* is the expression of a kind of intuitive rationality, lived and practical, more than reflected upon, specifically the conditioned rationality organising and organised by a field.

> La logique spécifique d'un champ s'institue à l'état incorporé sous la forme d'un *habitus* spécifique, ou, plus précisément, d'un sens du jeu, ordinairement désigné comme un « esprit » ou un « sens » (« philosophique », « littéraire », « artistique », etc.), qui n'est pratiquement jamais posé ni imposé de façon explicite. Du fait qu'elle s'opère de façon insensible, c'est-à-dire graduelle, progressive et imperceptible, la conversion plus ou moins radicale (selon la distance) de l'*habitus* originaire qu'exigent l'entrée dans le jeu et l'acquisition de l'*habitus* spécifique passe pour l'essentiel inaperçue.[36]

Thus, it does not matter what the specific field is, the parallel relations remain: as each field is a kind of epistemic modality, so too is the *habitus* of that field incorporated through practice in agents. In other words, *habitus* is not just an intuitive knowledge of the game, a playing of the game become pattern, but the game simultaneously playing the agent into the game. The more an agent participates in a given field the more that field shapes the set of embodied intuitions and orientations of thought and action towards the game, so much so that fields can have radically transformative effects on agents over time, but usually in way that are not subjectively noticeable to the agent. Moreover, the field usually does not play the player explicitly, though it sometimes can, but practically and surreptitiously. It is in playing the game that the player is played.

But at the same time the *habitus* the player brings to the field can itself have shaping effects on that field, because every agent installs a new set of relations into the relationality that constitutes a field. However, these effects are highly variable and relate to the initial *habitus* (or set thereof) that agent comes with, since 'L'*habitus* spécifique, qui s'impose aux

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deploying habitus as phronesis and integrating both embodiment and social embedment. Thus, '…a wealth of untapped insight awaits those who are prepared to [read] … him *agentively*, rather than dismissing him in conformity with deterministic social forces,' John E. Joseph, 'The Agency of Habitus: Bourdieu and Language at the Conjunction of Marxism, Phenomenology and Structuralism', *Language & Communication* 71 (2020): 108-22 (quote p.120, emphasis added).

[36] *MP*, 23.

nouveaux entrants comme un droit d'entrée, n'est autre chose qu'un mode de pensée spécifique (un *eidos*), principe d'une construction spécifique de la réalité, fondé dans une croyance préréflexive dans la valeur indiscutée des instruments de construction et des objets ainsi construits (un *ethos*).'[37] Hence, the nature of agent in question, in particular one's present accumulation of various types of capital, and the other fields in which one participates, remain active shaping forces. Moreover, nature of the agent's symbolic power to influence a field is relative to the scaling of the agent in question. For while *habitus* is both structured and structuring vis-à-vis agency, this concept extends beyond the agency of an individual. Rather *habitus* is, like capitals and fields, necessarily a scalable concept, expanding to the collective or contracting from it, as needed.

> Ce principe de construction est un des éléments constitutifs de notre *habitus*, une structure mentale qui, ayant été inculquée dans tous les cerveaux socialisés d'une certaine façon, est à la fois individuelle et collective ; c'est une loi tacite (*nomos*) de la perception et de la pratique qui est au fondement du consensus sur le sens du monde social (et du mot de famille en particulier), au fondement du sens commun.[38]

Habitus operates simultaneously and dialectically at the individual and collective levels of operation, through individual cognitive patterns socialised into collectives and collectivised cognitive patterns socialised into individuals. These socialised cognitive patterns are both ways of seeing the world as sensical and living sensibly in the world. Yet, Bourdieu is clear here these are embodied inculcations not simply abstract theorems. *Habitus* exists in praxis, but not in *praxis as concept*, but in *praxis qua praxis* of embodied individual and collective agents, often without any conscious awareness, conditioning the epistemic, conceptual, habitual, and enacted frameworks operative in living and acting.

> Du fait que le social s'institue aussi dans les individus biologiques, il y a, en chaque individu socialisé, du collectif, donc des propriétés valables pour toute une classe d'agents – que la statistique permet de porter au jour. L'*habitus* entendu comme individu ou corps biologique socialisé, ou comme social biologiquement individué par

[37] *MP*, 120.

[38] *RP*, 137-38. Cf. also *SP*, 101.

> l'incarnation dans un corps, est collectif, ou transindividuel – on peut donc construire des classes d'*habitus*, statistiquement caractérisables. C'est à ce titre qu'il est en mesure d'intervenir efficacement dans un monde social ou un champ auquel il est génériquement ajusté.[39]

Thus, the incarnation of praxis cannot be reduced to individual nor collective agents. Moreover, the embodied nature of *habitus* is not diminished by its scaling to collective agents. One could even push the implications of Bourdieu just slightly to recognise that humanity is collectively a biological agent, that is, that the social is biological. Collective *habitus* is just as embodied as individual *habitus*, not just because every individual in a collective consists of a body, but also because collectivised cognition is a feature of human embodiment. Humans think, act, and live both individually and collectively.

Habitus and Cognitive Science

Here Bourdieu is prescient of coming developments in cognitive science about the nature of human cognition, particularly that an essential feature of cognition and its generation is embodiment, which also entails that it is extended, embedded, and enacted. This field-restructuring, bourgeoning theory in cognitive science is known as '4E cognition'.[40]

> Proponents of 4E cognition have argued against the assumption that cognition is an isolated and abstract, quasi-Cartesian affair in a central processing unit in a brain. … According to proponents of 4E cognition, however, the cognitive phenomena that are studied by modern cognitive science, such as spatial navigation, action, perception, and understanding other's emotions, are in some sense all dependent on the morphological, biological, and physiological details of an agent's body, an appropriately structured natural, technological, or social environment, and the agent's active and embodied interaction with this environment.[41]

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[39] *MP*, 186.

[40] Cf. Richard Menary, ed., *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 9.4 (Dec 2010): Special Issue: 4E Cognition: Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, Extended. Cf. also Newen, Albert, Leon De Bruin, and Shaun Gallagher, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition*, Oxford Handbooks Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Lawrence Shapiro, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2014); Jessica Lindblom, *Embodied Social Cognition*, Cognitive Systems Monographs 26 (Cham: Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland, 2015).

[41] Albert Newen, Shaun Gallagher, and Leon De Bruin, '4E Cognition: Historical Roots, Key Concepts, and Central Issues', *The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition*, ed. Newen Albert, Leon De Bruin, and Shaun Gallagher, Oxford Handbooks Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 3-16, quote p.5.

4E cognition is then a kind of way of thinking relationally, much as Bourdieu intends to do through his heuristic triad, but a way of thinking relationally about the body vis-à-vis cognition. Rather than trying to bifurcate cognitive processes from embodied processes and/or the highly networked set of relations that every human agent exists individually and collectively within, 4E cognition develops a highly matrixed understanding of human cognition without being arbitrarily epistemically reductionistic vis-à-vis what counts as cognition. It is not to say that abstract thought is not possible, but rather that it not the only kind of thought possible and that cognition shaping and shaped through and in individual and collective embodied praxis is just as essential to understanding human cognition and agency. Mark Johnson, one of the founders of this approach[42] explains succinctly each of the 4Es.

[42] Cf. the breakout work on language that largely initiated the 'cognitive linguistic' approach to language and eventually the broader movement of placing various humanities/social science disciplines in dialogue with cognitive science, viz. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980); and its sequel, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind & Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1987); *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1993); *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2007); *Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding from the Perspective of Cognitive Science* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2014); *The Aesthetics of Meaning and Thought: The Bodily Roots of Philosophy, Science, Morality, and Art* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2018). Cf. also George Lakoff and Mark Turner, *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Patrick Colm Hogan, *Affective Narratology: The Emotional Structure of Stories* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2011); 'Consciousness, Ethics, and Narrative: Reading Literature in an Age of Torture', *Toward a Cognitive Theory of Narrative Acts*, ed. Frederick Luis Aldama (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2010): 227–50; *How Authors' Minds Make Stories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); *The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); David Herman, ed., *Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences*, CSLI Lecture Notes 158 (Standford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2003); *Storytelling and the Sciences of the Mind* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2013); David Herman, *Narratology beyond the Human: Storytelling and Animal Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Giles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities* (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (London: Vintage, 1994); A.R. Damasio, et. al., eds., *Neurobiology of Decision-Making* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1996); George Ellis and Mark Solms, *Beyond Evolutionary Psychology: How and Why Neuropsychological Modules Arise* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 11 (Kindle Edition). Cf. Evan W. Carr, Anne Kever, and Piotr Winkielman, 'Embodiment of emotion and its situated nature', *The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 529- 552; G. Gabrielle Starr, *Feeling Beauty : The Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience* (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 2013); Giovanna Colombetti, *The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014); R. Ruard Ganzevoort, Maaike de Haardt, and Michael Scherer-Rath, eds., *Religious Stories We Live By: Narrative Approaches in Theology and Religious Studies,* Studies in Theology and Religion (STAR) 19 (Leiden: Brill, 2014); Lisa Zunshine, *Introduction to*

> In recent years, this general orientation toward the grounding of mind in organism-environment interactions has come to be known as "4E cognition," that is, cognition as *embodied, embedded, enactive,* and *extended*. Cognition is *embodied* …; it is *embedded* insofar as it arises from interactions with its environments (both physical and social); it is *enactive* in the way it creates meaning and thought in an ongoing fashion; and it is *extended* in the sense that we offload certain (p. 637) cognitive operations and contents onto (or into) aspects of our environment, such as books, computers, buildings, and signs.[43]

Thus, what it means for cognition to be embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted run parallel to Bourdieu's understanding of how *habitus* operates. Both frameworks understand that the centre of cognition arises in and through praxis, through the set of interactions that occur between an agent and the other features of their environment. The embodiment is not a supplementary feature, but an essential one in both Bourdieu and Johnson. Moreover, both highlight that this cognition is deeply embedded within a dynamic system or systems of relations that involve more than just the individual body, but also the other artefacts, conditions, agents (individual and collective). Moreover, Bourdieu demands that *habitus* is a way of enacted meaning generation, 'to constituting the field as a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value.' But he ensures that this enactive mode of cognition is never separated from either embodiment or wider sociological embedding in relations.

> *Habitus* being the social embodied, it is "at home" in the field it inhabits, it perceives it immediately as endowed with meaning and interest. This practical knowledge it procures may be described by analogy with Aristotle's *phronesis* or, better, with the *orthē doxa* of which Plato talks in *Meno:* just as the "right opinion" "falls right," in a sense, without knowing how or why, likewise the coincidence between dispositions and positions, between the "the sense of the game" and the game, explains that the agent does what he or she "has to do" without posing it explicitly as a goal, below the level of calculation and even consciousness, beneath discourse and representation.[44]

Cognitive Cultural Studies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Lisa Zunshine, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[43] Mark Johnson, 'The Embodiment of Language', *The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition*, ed. Newen Albert, Leon De Bruin, and Shaun Gallagher, Oxford Handbooks Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 623-39, quote pp.636-37.

[44] *IRS*, 128.

Bourdieu's understanding *habitus* in phronetic terms coincides with Newen, et al.'s gesture towards Aristotle as providing the historico-philosophical background to their own move towards placing embodiment prominently in relation to cognition: 'The debate about the role of the body in cognition has been ongoing since close to the beginnings of philosophy. … While Aristotle did not accept the radical view of Anaxagoras [decisions could be explained in solely physical, material, or bodily-mechanical terms], he considered that the body (with special reference to the hands) may play some role in what makes for human rationality.'[45] In this sense, not only do Bourdieu and cognitive science focusing on embodiment share similar understandings of cognition, they share similar philosophical progenitors, rendering *habitus* not merely compatible with 4E approaches to cognition but usefully cross-pollinating. While some understandings of extended cognition perhaps extend beyond the bounds of what can legitimately be called cognition, in noting that cognition can be extended through tools such that some cognitive operations are not limited to an individual human mind, the fourth 'E' acknowledges what Bourdieu argues with *habitus*, which is that it is scalable, that it can be collective. Collectivised embodied cognition through *habitus* is a form of extended cognition, and perhaps the most common form. The field as a structuring structure interacts with *habitus* such that even if it is wrong to say the field 'thinks', it does generate a thinking, and moreover it can generate a coordination of thinking across agents, but this cognition usually remains phronetic in nature, that is an intuitive *knowledge as playing*, as *habitus*.

It is here that Johnson again returns to recommend an expansion from 4E to 7E cognition, adding emotional, evolutionary, and exaptative.

> First, I have stressed the importance of emotions in our ability to grasp the meaning and significance of our situation and of what is happening at any given moment. … Second, since all meaning and thought arise through ongoing processes of organism–environment interactions, there is an evolutionary dimension to our conceptual

[45] Newen, et al., '4E Cognition: Key Concepts', 3.

> systems and languages. … The [third] technical term is exaptation, the use of evolutionarily inherited traits for new purposes.[46]

Johnson involving the centrality of emotions to cognition summarises enormous volumes of cognitive science research which reframes affect as irreducibly essential to cognition. George Ellis and Mark Solms concur: '…[T]hese basic emotion systems are the real innate brain modules that shape the brain through developmental plasticity as the individual interacts with their physical, social, and ecological environment, and thereby lead to effective modules for language and other cognitive functions.'[47] But moreover they link this affectivity of cognition to Johnson's second additional feature, viz. evolved:

> Emotional systems firstly shape our immediate reactions through the effects of neurotransmitters and neuromodulators, but secondly shape neural network connectivity and strengths through processes of Neuronal Group Selection (Edelman 1989, 1992; Ellis and Toronchuk 2005). Thus, emotions crucially shape both behaviour and development of cognition (Damasio 1994, 1999). Because of this mechanism, emotions are the lynchpin between experience and cognitive development.[48]

Thus, not only is embodied cognition emotional but it is specifically those emotional capacities that likely enable cognition to both evolve and remain dynamic as it constantly negotiates the situations and set of relations both physical and social that continue to shape it and that it continues to seek to shape. Aligned with the insights of cognitive science, *habitus* as a form of embodied cognition is not simply conceptual in an abstract, propositional, or disinterested way. Rather it especially and dynamically expresses itself and arises

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[46] Johnson, 'Embodiment', 637; cf. also Flavio A. Geisshuesler, 'The 7E Model of the Human Mind: Articulating a Plastic Self for the Cognitive Science of Religion', *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 19.5 (2019): 450-476.

[47] Ellis and Solms, *Beyond Evolutionary Psychology*, 11. Cf. Carr, et al., 'Embodiment of emotion', and Colombetti, *Feeling Body*.

[48] Ellis and Solms, *Beyond Evolutionary Psychology*, 145, referencing Gerald M. Edelman, *Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Gerald M. Edelman, *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1992); George F.R. Ellis, and Judith A. Toronchuk, 'Neural development: Affective and immune system influences', *Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, conscious choice, and selective perception*, ed. Ralph D. Ellis, and Natika Newton (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2005): 81–119; Damasio, *Descartes' Error*; and Antonio R. Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (London: Vintage, 2000).

emotionally in the constantly evolving network of relations of the fields in which it participates and/or with which it contends: 'Nous apprenons par corps. L'ordre social s'inscrit dans les corps à travers cette confrontation permanente, plus ou moins dramatique, mais qui fait toujours une grande place à l'affectivité et, plus précisément, aux transactions affectives avec l'environnement social.'[49] Indeed, then, the affectivity of *habitus* cannot be understated precisely because it is so embodied and expressive of dynamic strategies of agents in fields.

Yet, however consonant Bourdieu's *habitus* is with cognitive science's recognition of affect as central to embodied cognition, Johnson's seventh 'E', *exaptative*, reduces to saying 'evolved' twice. Consequently, it is less helpful in illumining the concept of *habitus*. Meanwhile, Flavio A. Geisshuesler has further developed an alternative 7E framework for cognition that adds a more pluripotent final 'E' to our consideration of *habitus*, viz. *exoconscious*.

> The exoconscious mind is, in many ways, connected to the earlier Es. The development of the unconscious, for example, has been directly linked to the evolution of humanity, as it was required to develop automated responses to threat and danger that operated quickly, automatically, and without too much mental resources (Bargh, 2017, p. 165). Furthermore, the appreciation for the lower-order processes of human cognition can also be found in the embodied, the embedded, the enactive, and the emotive minds as meaning making (Colombetti, 2014, pp. xiv–xv), perception (Dehaene, 2014, pp. 25–26), and affects (Johnson, 2007, pp. 14, 66) have been shown to operate largely on a [sic] immanent, pre-conceptual, and non-propositional level.[50]

Exoconscious operations are precisely one of the main features of Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*. As Geisshuesler indicates, these exoconscious cognitive processes are tightly integrated with affect and attunement to dynamic evolutionary pressures, but also to meaning

[49] *MP*, 168-69.

[50] Geisshuesler, '7E Model', 463-63, citing John A. Bargh, *Before you know it: the unconscious reasons we do what we do* (New York: Touchstone 2017); Colombetti, *Feeling Body*, Stanislas Dehaene, *Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts* (New York: Viking, 2014); and Johnson, *Meaning of the Body*.

production, perception, and emotion, much as Bourdieu develops through his concept of *habitus*. Again parallel to *habitus*, Geisshuesler notes of the exoconscious dimension to cognition, that it is embodied, strategic, embedded with systems of relations, and is most notably pre-conceptual and non-propositional. Yet, Geisshuesler demonstrates even more harmony between 7E cognition and *habitus*:

> Experimentally studying these forms of mentation in a whole range of cognitive phenomena, such as moral judgment, decision making, probabilistic reasoning, behavioral economics, social cognition, and self-esteem, scholarship has demonstrated the tremendous range of effective, well-adapted, and precise operations that take place outside of awareness. … In their rediscovery of the positive potential of implicit information processing, researchers speak of a cognitive unconscious, an adaptive unconscious, or a new unconscious….[51]

These exoconscious processes align tightly with the intuitive, embodied, and strategically adaptive nature of *habitus*, and especially Bourdieu's awareness that *habitus* chiefly operates apart from consciousness. This is not to say that it is not able to be made in some fashion consciously present through an embrace of reflexivity, but that under most circumstances how the *habitus* operates is exoconscious and intricately maxtrixed within an embodied, embedded, enactive, emotional, and evolved/ing phronetic form of cognition. Yet, as with 7E cognition Bourdieu recognises that this relational, perceptual, conceptual, and practiced form of reasoning and agency termed *habitus* offers not only a set of instinctual responses,

[51] Geisshuesler, '7E Model', 464, relying on Luís M. Augusto, 'Unconscious Knowledge: A Survey', *Advances in Cognitive Psychology* 6 (2010): 116-41; Shelly Chaiken, and Yaacov Trope, eds., *Dual-process Theories in Social Psychology* (New York: Guildford, 1999); Ap Dijksterhuis, Maarten W Bos, Loran F Nordgren, and Rick B Van Baaren, 'On Making the Right Choice: The Deliberation-without-attention Effect'. *Science* 311, no. 5763 (2006): 1005-1007; Jonathan Haidt, 'The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment', *Psychological Review* 108.4 (2001): 814-34; Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman, and John A. Bargh, eds., *The New Unconscious*, Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 1st Paperback ed. (New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013); John F. Kihlstrom, 'The Cognitive Unconscious'. *Science* 237, no. 4821 (1987): 1445-452; Arthur S. Reber, *Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge: An Essay on the Cognitive Unconscious*, Oxford Psychology Series 19 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Steven, A. Sloman, 'The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning', *Psychological Bulletin* 119.1 (Jan 1996): 3-22; Keith E. Stanovich, *Rationality and the Reflective Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Keith E. Stanovich, and Richard F. West, 'Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?', *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 23.5 (2000): 645–665; Timothy D. Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002).

strategies, and understandings, but generates and transforms even the conscious operations of agents. That is, not only does *habitus* shape what agents do and think, or even how they do and think them, but also how they might describe their conscious processes including informational production. For example, Bourdieu notes of the 1968 student revolution in France how the informational production of the scholars, that is which side they come out for and provide rational arguments for, graph to their relation to certain types of capital.[52] Thus, while consciously the scholars may have given certain arguments that were coherent and perhaps even motivated by comprehensible reasons, the phronetic, exoconscious strategies of the scholars' *habitus* had powerful predictive values of what side an agent found reasonable and gave reasons for. Accordingly, the exoconscious dimension of an agent's cognition that 7E cognition recognises Bourdieu accounts for through *habitus*, even depends upon as a core feature of the highly relational third element of his hermeneutic.

Therefore, Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* as a highly intuitive, emotive, embodied, and unconscious phronetic cognition was incredibly ahead of its time.[53] Bourdieu develops this concept years before Johnson even publishes *Metaphors We Live By* launching what would eventually develop into the field including 7E cognition. Moreover, Bourdieu develops his concept of *habitus* theoretically and in the praxis of sociological research. Nevertheless, in addition to the validation of *habitus* as a conceptual tool through sociological research conducted by Bourdieu and those who follow his approach, 7E cognition and cognitive science research further validates Bourdieu's insight of *habitus*, and by proxy provides correlative support for his wider triadic heuristic. As much as *habitus* provides an analytic

[52] *HA*, 165-67.

[53] The embedded and exoconsious dynamics come together productively in Bourdieu, as noted by Lane, *Bourdieu*, 198: 'Indeed, Bourdieu's contention that artistic or intellectual productions can neither be attributed to the workings of an individual creative genius nor simply read as the reflection of "external" historical or social conditions but need rather to be understood as the result, in part at least, of the mediating force of a field, with its own characteristic structure and specific historical genesis, is surely one of his most valuable insights.' This insight is especially relevant to the coming analysis of the Yale School.

power to sociological analysis, the research outlined above demonstrates that Bourdieu's intuition and theoretical framework of *habitus* is not just usefully generative but scientifically supported with multitudes of studies on human and animal cognition by a field with little interest in Bourdieu's theoretical schema. Thus, 7E cognition does not so much reshape *habitus* or Bourdieu's hermeneutic triumvirate as it supplements the recognition of its conceptual viability, practical suitability, and academic and symbolic legitimacy. Likewise, it furthers the capacity of the Bourdieusien approach to engage reflexively, as itself demands, with its own hermeneutic – field, capitals, and *habitus*.

Further, this cross-pollination between *habitus* and 7E cognition returns us to the dialectic theme of subjectivity-objectivity. For one of the main implications of exoconscious, embedded, enactive, and embodied cognition is that an agent's cognitive process seeks to adjust itself to the perceived objects in the world it encounters. These objects and the wider system of relations which *habitus* inhabits are in some sense objective, they are actual relations, even if the objects themselves are extensions of individual and collective subjectivity. In fact, *habitus* was intentionally developed to navigate the dialectical tension between subjectivity and objectivity in a system of relations as it relates to agents.

> Il s'agit d'échapper au *réalisme de la structure* auquel l'objectivisme, moment nécessaire de la rupture avec l'expérience première et de la construction des relations objectives, conduit nécessairement lorsqu'il hypostasie ces relations en les traitant comme des réalités déjà constituées en dehors de l'histoire de l'individu et du groupe, sans retomber pour autant dans le subjectivisme, totalement incapable de rendre compte de la nécessité du monde social : pour cela, il faut revenir à pratique, lieu de la dialectique de l'*opus operatum* et du *modus operandi*, des produits objectivés et des produits incorporés de la pratique historique, des structures et des *habitus*.[54]

Habitus relates more directly to those subjective elements of the system of relations, but ultimately both *les capitals* and *le champ* exist within the dialectic of subjective-objectivity and objective-subjectivity. Moreover, *habitus* – precisely because it refuses to collapse the

[54] *SP*, 87-88.

dialectical tension – enables the possibility of seeing agents as embodied, embedded, enactive, and not always conscious in their strategic operations and orientations.

> Une des fonctions majeures de la notion d'*habitus* est d'écarter deux erreurs complémentaires qui ont toutes les deux pour principe la vision scolastique : d'un côté, le mécanisme, qui tient que l'action est l'effet mécanique de la contrainte de causes externes ; de l'autre, le finalisme qui, notamment avec la théorie de l'action rationnelle, tient que l'agent agit de manière libre, consciente et, comme disent certains utilitaristes, *with full understanding*, l'action étant le produit d'un calcul des chances et des profits. Contre l'une et l'autre théorie, il faut poser que les agents sociaux sont dotés d'*habitus*, inscrits dans les corps par les expériences passées : ces systèmes de schèmes de perception, d'appréciation et d'action permettent d'opérer des actes de connaissance pratique, fondés sur le repérage et la reconnaissance des stimuli conditionnels et conventionnels auxquels ils sont disposés à réagir, et d'engendrer, sans position explicite de fins ni calcul rationnel des moyens, des stratégies adaptées et sans cesse renouvelées, mais dans les limites des contraintes structurales dont ils sont le produit et qui les définissent.[55]

Bourdieu here rebuts two misunderstandings of human agency and of his analytic of *habitus*, namely that it reduces the subjective to objectivity or the objective to subjectivity. In a mechanistic view of agency people do not make choices so much as simply respond to stimuli in an unavoidable causal chain. Thus, *habitus* as an analytic tool does not respond to the action of an agent by saying, 'their *habitus* forced them to do that' as if it operates in some reductionistic set of if-then scenarios that pre-determine outcomes. This would erase the subjective dimension of agency for a bare objectified set of actions. Likewise, *habitus* refuses to collapse the objective to subjectivity as expressed in *le finalisme* of rational action theory's brute utilitarianism, as if there was only a subjective element to agency. In an overly purposive understanding of action, agents rationally (passionlessly or 'objectively') make conscious choices that are weighed to be 'objectively' in their best interest. However, this suffuses the objectivity so far into subjectivity that only the subjective element remains. *Habitus* does not describe the action of an agent saying '*habitus* is just their conscious calculation of the pros/cons of a discrete action' as if *habitus* was merely a novel term for

[55] *MP*, 165-66. Cf. also *RP*, 9-10.

conscious deliberative choice/strategising. Both of these misunderstandings of *habitus* would reject the essential elements we have considered above, neutering its function as practical reasoning, the importance of embodiment, affectivity, exoconscious cognition, and the other of the 7Es. However, perhaps even more problematic for its use in Bourdieu's heuristic triad, conflating the subjective to objectivity or the objective to subjectivity severs *habitus* from its relation to the field(s) that generates it and likewise prevents it from being any longer a scalable concept. That is, not only must *habitus* remain organically interrelated to the set of relations that it generates and generates it, but it must be able to provide analysis across the scale of agents, not merely the individual. *Habitus* must be as useful to explaining and exposing the action of individual persons, but also of families, groups, communities, institutions, nations, alliances. Outside of individuals and very small communities, both mechanism and conscious finalism fail. Coordination at larger scales is not exclusively reactive to stimuli nor is it always organised towards a consciously-known aim. It, moreover, simply cannot be conscious because the agents often coordinate both without awareness of the intentions (or existence) of (all) other agents and without having had to make that particular choice or to select that strategy for that purpose in that way. In this way, though *habitus* remains balanced towards the subjectivity side of the dialectic, it always refuses to collapse it. Instead *habitus* allows that objective properties of a particular field are interacted with in conditioned but dynamic and creative ways that scale across the range of agents operative in a given field through an embodied, embedded, enactive, emotive, evolving, and often exoconscious individual and collective phronesis.

Habitus as Love

Thus far, our analysis of types of capital has revealed that a kind of faith undergirds the sets of relations that constitute the types of capital. Every form of capital ultimately operates only on faith in the *illusio* towards which a field generates hope. Conceptually, a

field illumines how a set of relations jointly orient towards and generate some *telic-illusio*. Moreover, all the capitals generated by and generating their fields translate into a meta-capital, pure *illusio* in the value of dominance. Yet, this also means that the meta-field which subsumes all other fields of human relations operates on an attunement towards the *telic-illusio* of human dominance, both generating and being generated by this faith in dominance. As Bourdieu's capitals through the concept of symbolic violence highlight the dangerous allure of trusting in human power – that is, of idolatry – and as his *champs*, in light of Isaiah 44, reveal the deceptive power of highly-matrixed relations organised around a particular *telic-illusio* though hope, so *habitus* illumines the dangers of the phronesis-controlled epistemology and agency of a love of a field's deceptive hope in the faith of its *telos-illusio* as valued capital, and, at the meta-level, love for the symbolic capital for which all fields collectively hope. Thus, if capitals offer the chance of *idolatry* and fields the possibility of *deception*, then *habitus* constitutes the opportunity for loving the deception of idolatry, that is, an epistemic *and* phronetic *apostacy*.

Consequently, *habitus* is a kind of agentive and creative embodiment, both individual and collective, that reveals the phronetic orientation of agents in a field toward the various types of capital in play. *Habitus* is the *love* of the game, if field is the hope in the game, and capitals are the trusted stakes of the game. But it is not simply a love expressed as some emotional nostalgic sentiment, but love as an embodied and enactive *sens du jeu* deeply embedded within the game in which it evolved and then extended through non-embodied technologies and other embodied agents. This *habitus*-love is so deeply situated in embodied agents that it operates exoconsciously to a great degree, though by no means can it operate only there, since it is a form of love.

Habitus is an agentive dispositional orientation in love towards the hope of the field's faith in its capital. Further, as *habitus* orients in love to the meta-field and meta-capital, not

only to the specific field that projects and is projected by it, the apostacy of every *habitus* is towards symbolic power. At the same time, every *habitus* seeks to navigate the dangerous field of agents all idolising symbolic power, some of whom have already attained more or less symbolic dominance than some particular agent in question. Therefore, *habitus* enables explanations of individual and collective agents to survive, supress, and/or impose symbolic violence, as well as explanations of coordination towards any or all of those aims.

Moving to application of Bourdieu's Hermeneutic

Conceptually and hermeneutically, capitals, fields and *habitus* are inseparable from one another. Likewise, these three elements cohere dynamically, whereby greater and greater insight is made possible as the productive yield of any one element of the hermeneutic enhances the analytic value of the other two elements. Bourdieu's analytic is a hermeneutical spiral, not a static set of tools. Capitals-fields-*habitus* must always be used together dynamically and with the reflexivity highlighted in Chapter 1.

Analysing capitals-fields-*habitus* through parallels with the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love has revealed the fundamentally theological dynamics in play in the games that Bourdieu seeks to expose and evaluate. Moreover, this interpolation with faith-hope-love has provided its own analytic resource to understanding, assessing, and applying Bourdieu's hermeneutic to the field of academic theology. It has accomplished this expressly through integrating an element of reflexivity about the Bourdieusien hermeneutic that Bourdieu himself demanded for it.

Having developed an understanding of the elements of the hermeneutic and their interrelations, in the next section we will seek to begin the process of analysing how the intuitive *habitus* of theologians has already attempted to negotiate symbolic violence in the theological academy through a case study of the Yale School of narrative theologians. Following this analysis, our constructive section will build upon the analytic Bourdieusien

case study to offer a more phronetically engaged mode of theologising through narrativation, which recentres theology from orienting towards symbolic violence to love.

PART II:

A CASE STUDY IN *DOXIC* STRUGGLE –

THE YALE SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

CHAPTER 3:
FREI AND LINDBECK: DIVIDED ON NARRATIVE, UNITED IN *DOXIC* CRITIQUE

The 'Yale School': A case study in navigating symbolic violence

Le champ theologique is not special. Academic theology is not insulated from being the scene of symbolic violence. It is a field of cultural production like any other. Rather taking God for its theme and the academy as its site of struggle has only raised the stakes for this field's expression of the game, to say nothing of the various forms of its institutionalisation and production. On a conceptual level, a quasi-ontological argument takes place: is there any greater theme of study than God and his relationship with his creation that can be conceived of in terms symbolic capital – its conceptual/philosophical importance and its related capacity to generate legitimation? On the social level, is there any site of power more concentrated among the sub-fields of cultural production than the academy? This quasi-ontological argument for legitimation and symbolic dominance is only compounded by the fact that the field of academic theology unites these two institutional and productional structures in the broader field of informational capital: the academy and the church, or even more broadly the intelligentsia and Christianity.[1] Of course, this conjoining, also involves tension, that is of semi-competing interests, of *tele-illusiones* that though broadly aligned at

[1] There are also Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, non-theistic, and other religious outlooks represented in academic theology. However, in the West, Christianity has historically gained prominence conceptually and structurally.

the aim of cultural production drive towards either the exaltation and wider-expansion of the academic *epistemic doxa* or the *epistemic doxa* of Christianity.

These two sets of *epistemic doxai* are simultaneously competitive and cooperative. For the fields that structure and are structured by them diverge in their particular faith in field-specific capital, hope in field-specific dominance, and their particular *habitus* attuned by and towards their capital and field. Each field seeks and operates by its own capital above all else. Yet, cooperation is also present for two reasons. First, all fields share interest in the meta-capital of symbolic power more broadly and the structuration of the human society according to symbolic power, in which win-win scenarios for inter-field partnerships are possible. Second, both the academy and the church as institutionalisations of their respective fields share in the broader orientation and access towards symbolic power through cultural capital production in particular (in contrast with economic or social capital). Thus, as the academic and Christian fields come together in academic theological production there is both tension within the specific *epistemic doxa* and broader alignment vis-à-vis *telic-illusio*, competition and yet profound collaboration.

As such, it is at the site of the *epistemic doxa* of *le champ theologique* where we must focus on applying the Bourdieusien heuristic to uncover how symbolic violence manifests in the way in which we do theology. For this, we will look specifically at the *objectified* expressions of cultural capital appearing within *le champ theologique*, that is, we will look at the cultural productions of theologians within the field of academic theology who themselves are focused on questioning the reigning *epistemic doxa* of the field and their inseparable *habitus* that seeks to navigate the set of relations and distribution of capitals that exist within and around the field.

In Part II, we are mainly considering the objectified products of the field, because embodied manifestations of any capital are much harder to study without at some point using

objectified or institutionalised forms of capital to cast it into relief. For example, studying the embodied form of a social capital in isolation is difficult because it remains invisible and potentially unstated until it is actioned either as a particular favour or institutionalised into a suggested or demanded practice. The embodied state is about the *habitus*, the dispositions of thought, feelings, and behaviours that make the acquisition or use or production of a given capital possible. These dispositions can be revealed in time by direct observation perhaps, but objectified forms of the capital are more static manifestations of these dispositions that can more easily be interrogated by someone removed in time and space from the actions of the agent in question. Moreover, cultural capital is especially focused on objectified capital, though it can never be cut off from the *habitus* that structured its production of objectified capital as much as it structures that *habitus*. However, the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology in particular relate to the *epistemic doxa* surrounding objectification in the fields of the academy and theology. The *doxic* contest of academic theology is expressly surrounding the symbolic violence of the production of theology. Further, we must contest that symbolic violence through the *epistemic doxa* governing that production. Of course, this contest will always involve the embodied and institutionalised forms of capital, but the objectified state will provide access to a reflexive orientation to the *epistemic doxa* as it manifests in embodied and institutional capital. Yet, as the Bourdieusien hermeneutic constantly evolves its interpretation through the progressive integration of the analysis of embodied, objectified, and institutionalised capital, our investigation of academic theology will involve analysis of the relations between all three forms of the capital. Nevertheless, the objectified state will be our point of access towards that integration.

Specifically, in Part II, we will look at the so-called ‘Yale School’ of narrative theologians as a case study. Why consider the ‘Yale School’? First, because – we will soon see – the ‘Yale School’ itself seeks to reform both the *habitus* and the *epistemic doxa* of

academic theology by turning to narrative. Second, the particular representatives of the 'Yale School' will highlight well some of the dynamics of symbolic violence, being especially suitable because of their particular histories and the *habitus* shaped by them. Third, the argument of this thesis maintains that by using Bourdieu's sociological analysis on the Yale school and attending to their theological insights we can develop an understanding of the sociological and theological dimensions of academic theology's epistemic assumptions and demands, uncovering its symbolic violence, so that we can contest that symbolic violence by constructing an improved and better legitimated narrative mode of theologising that is decentred from symbolic violence.

Through our theological analysis of their theological production, we will reveal not only their principal efforts to expose and reform symbolic violence in academic theology's *epistemic doxa*, but also that the 'Yale School' grouping as a sub-field within *le champ theologique* arises less as an alignment in their conceptual production (*i.e. objectified cultural capital*) and more as the unconscious coordination via embodied *habitus* to navigate the field of academic theology. That is, we will uncover the embodied forms of contest with the institutional forms of capital through the Yale School's objectified cultural productions (i.e. their writings) challenging *the epistemic doxa* of academic theology.

Narrative theologies represent a strong challenge to the academic *habitus* in theology, as they seek to reshape the embodied practice of doing theology by legitimating narrative in the academic-theological field. They also challenge the *epistemic doxa* manifest in institutional demands that surreptitiously legitimate the abstractionist attunement of *habitus* and delegitimate others. Academic theology effects this through the legitimation and delegitimation of forms of theologising. In effect, *epistemic doxa* – manifested in both the academy-legitimated institutional and embodied practices – controls the means and modes of the production of objectified academic-theological capital. Thus, the academic *habitus* of the

Yale School's agents intuitively coordinate to exploit the capital structures of the academy by functioning as the Yale School in order to contest the symbolic violence of the reigning theological *doxa* of production. For this, the Yale School begins to chart a more inclusive set of possibilities of cultural production within the theological academy, and by virtue of the structuration of the symbolic field, the church.

Narrative theology: a form of *doxic* contest

How then will we go about exploring the manifestation of symbolic violence in academic theology through a case study of the Yale School? First, in the present chapter, we will interrogate Gary Comstock's prevalent typology of the understandings of narrative in narrative theologies, specifically considering Hans Frei and George Lindbeck (representatives of one type) in relief with Paul Ricoeur (an exemplar of its antagonist stream). His typology and labelling of the 'Yale School' is one of the earliest records in print of an awareness of a 'Yale School.' Though we will see that the boundaries do not fall where Comstock demarcates and that his typology will collapse, it serves to introduce the assumed conceptual alignments on narrative within the School as it also testifies to the operation of Yale School as a distinguishable sociological grouping.

Following the analysis on Frei and Lindbeck, in Chapter 4, we will expand our consideration to other members of the so-called 'Yale School,' namely Hauerwas and H. Richard Niebuhr.[2] Whereby we will discover these four Yale School representatives fail to cohere into a discernible shared understanding of narrative. Whatever the Yale School is, we will see it is not a set of agents who share a theological or epistemic perspective on narrative.

[2] It is important not to confuse H. Richard Niebuhr with his brother, Reinhold Niebuhr, or his son Richard R. Niebuhr, both of whom were also theologians. Though less prolific an author than his brother, H.R. Niebuhr's works garnered acclaim as well. He is chiefly remembered for *The Meaning of Revelation* (New York: Macmillan, 1941); *Christ and Culture* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1952[1951]); *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1957[1929]); *The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy* (New York ; London: Harper & Row, 1963).

Rather they share a common need to navigate the capitals and structures of the theological academy and overthrow the symbolic violence of academic theology's *epistemic doxa* without sacrificing their own place – symbolic capital – in the field, or that of the marginalised communities they symbolically represent.

Thus, the Yale School, we will show, is best not considered as a distinct typology of narrative (as Comstock prescribes) since coherent typologies of narrative are evidently problematic, but in sociological terms as a loosely co-ordinated bloc of scholars working with narrative who maintain shared socio-political interests vis-à-vis academic theology. In other words, it is not important that the Yale School agrees on what narrative *is* but on *using* narrative to reshape the discourse of the academy and accumulating shared reputational capital for the School to contest the symbolic violence of the reigning *epistemic doxa*. For our immediate comparison of Frei and Lindbeck, we will see that while their objectified productions are adversarial on the nature of narrative projection, they are allies in contesting the *epistemic doxa* of theology.

What is Narrative? A Typology of Approaches

Having charted our course, we turn now to consider shape of academic theology's production and *doxic* contest vis-à-vis narrative theology and the diversity of its understanding of narrative as a case study deploying a Bourdieusien analysis. Initially, we will expose that the objectified productions of narrative theology bely a diversity so broad as to raise the question of whether agreement on the nature of 'narrative' is the source of narrative theologies' typological classification. That is, we will explore the conceptual divergence to expose the sociological convergence. Further, exposing the conceptual diversity of narrative theologies also sets the background for the wider structuration of academic theology and canvases the sociological rather than conceptual affinities, which also

compound to suggest why narrative theologies have stalled in successfully contesting the symbolic violence.

In 1986, Gary L. Comstock published an assessment[3] that the conceptions of narrative diverged along two streams: the pure narrativist approach and the impure narrativist approach, represented by Hans Frei[4] and Paul Ricoeur.[5]

> *Pure narrative theologians* are those tied to, or inspired by, what has gone on in New Haven: the antifoundational, cultural-linguistic, Wittgensteinian-inspired descriptivists. Frei, Lindbeck, Hauerwas, and David Kelsey believe narrative is an autonomous literary form particularly suited to the work of theology. … *Impure narrative theologians* are those with loyalties to, or sympathies with, what has gone on in the Second City: the revisionist, hermeneutical, Gadamerian-inspired correlationists. Ricoeur, [David] Tracy, [Julian] Hartt, and [Sally] McFague agree with their purist cousins that stories are a critical and neglected genre in which important religious truths and practices are communicated. But they deny narrative unique theological status.[6]

Here Comstock bifurcates the narrative theology movement into two camps, pure and impure. The pure he sees as descriptive in orientation, that is descriptive of narrative itself. The impure are correlative, recognising a cohesive relation between narrative and the outside

[3] This is laid out in a progressively refined series of articles, 'Truth or Meaning: Ricoeur versus Frei on Biblical Narrative', *Journal of Religion* 66.2 (April 1986): 117-140; 'Two Types of Narrative Theology', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 74.4 (1987): 687-717. In 1989, Comstock develops the implications of his typology of narrative theology (and his inclination to different aspects of both streams) in relief with a Jewish scholar, Max Kadushin, synthesising a set of conclusions that echo George A. Lindbeck's in *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* (London: SPCK, 1984), cf. '"Everything Depends on the Type of the Concepts that the Interpretation is Made to Convey": Max Kadushin among the Narrative Theologians', *Modern Theology* 5.3 (April 1989): 215-237. Cf. also Gary Comstock, 'The Meaning of Religious Narratives', *International Journal of Philosophy of Religion* 34.3 (1993): 131-50; *Religious Autobiographies* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworthy, 1995).

[4] Cf. esp. Hans W. Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); and *The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical Bases for Dogmatic Theology*, Updated and Expanded Edition, ed. Mark Alan Bowald, Kindle Edition (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013 [orig. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975]).

[5] Cf. esp. Paul Ricoeur, 'The Narrative Function', *Semeia* 13 (1978): 177–202; *Temps et Récit, Vol. 1-3* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1983-85); 'De l'Interprétation', *Du Texte à l'Action: Essais d'Herméneutique II* (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1986) : 11-35 [orig. 'De l'Interprétation', *Philosophy in France Today*, ed. A. Montefiore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)]; and 'Herméneutique Philosophique et Herméneutique Biblique', *Du Texte à l'Action: Essais d'Herméneutique II* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986) : 119-33 [orig. 'Herméneutique Philosophique et Herméneutique Biblique', *Exegesis: Problèmes de Méthode et Exercices de Lecture*, ed. F. Bovon and G. Rouiller (Neuchâtel: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1975): 216-228].

[6] Comstock, 'Two Types', 688 (emphasis original).

world in some way. However, before these categories are showered with confidence, we must acknowledge that even before offering them Comstock diminishes their inner coherence, writing, 'Mindful that any categories will inevitably distort the views of some, I offer my own two types as a new way to slice the pie.'[7] While Comstock obviously thinks his categories are helpful, he also tips his hand that categories are not themselves purely descriptive but forceful, that is, the categorisation is imposed more than discovered. This only further highlights the problem that his categories are meant to solve, namely the diverse nature of narrative theologies. Comstock earlier acknowledges that many other categories were presented.

> While the potential of narrative theology is widely recognized, few seem to have noticed a nasty tension in the ranks. In fact, two distinct camps are now visible, and the relations between them are anything but cordial. … Finding names for the two groups is difficult. "Chicagoans" and "Yaleys" might do, as these are the locations of the respective headquarters. But this would leave us unable to characterize the uncommitted contingent from Berkeley.[8]

Yet, Comstock seems to miss the obvious problem with his bifurcation, his assumption of there being only two options, an either-or. Rather, he prefaces his bifurcation with an awareness of a third category. Now, perhaps Comstock's use of two categories instead of three (or more) is sufficiently successful at encapsulating all the narrative theologies. However, his seemingly initial intuitive division into three categories does warn caution. This caution alone asks us to consider whether the pure/impure distinction supplies the right categories to analyse the movement. Moreover, it warrants our consideration of the internal cohesion of his groupings. That is, if his categories fail to grant coherence for the whole movement, they might also fail to cohere the sub-groupings themselves. For the moment, however, Comstock illustrates how vastly diverse narrative theologies are, for not even the

[7] Comstock, 'Two Types', 698.

[8] Comstock, 'Two Types', 687-88.

scholars trying to categorise the participants in the turn to narrative can agree about what the meaningful distinctions and associations are.

Biographical backgrounds and narrativised *doxic* contest

Considering to Comstock's proffered category of pure narrativists, initially it seems like an obvious categorisation, although whether this is because they are in fact *purely narrativistic* or because they are connected with Yale Divinity School, it remains to be seen. However, confounding Comstock's typology is the resistance of the Yale School to identify themselves with Comstock's typology.

Two years before it released in *The Journal of Religion*, Comstock sent a draft of 'Truth or Meaning: Ricoeur versus Frei on Biblical Narrative' to Frei. Frei, however, rebuffs Comstock's categorisation as a 'pure narratitivist' in a response letter.

> A "pure narrativist" I think I'm not, and I hope that will be clearer than before, but at least mildly anti-foundational I am in philosophy. Mildly? Yes: I am a Christian theologian and do not regard philosophy as ever having achieved that clearly demonstrated set of even formal certainties (and agreements) in 2,500 years that would allow it the kind of authoritative status you seem to want to accord it; and yet I believe theology cannot do without philosophy.[9]

Frei flatly rejects the label, but also positively ascribes to the 'impure narrativist' category by holding that theology should always involve philosophy. However, Frei is keenly aware of the risk philosophical symbolic violence can pose to theology. Frei's concern also expresses an awareness of the *epistemic doxa* of philosophy diverging from theology's, as much as the epistemic limitations of philosophy that subvert its own auto-legitimation of symbolic dominance. Nevertheless, Frei is not against philosophy. Rather he views theology as a practice that seeks an inclusive set of epistemologies, of which philosophy is a necessary constituent. In Frei's view, philosophy is an essential asset in theological production.

[9] Hans W. Frei, *Writings from the Archives: Theology and Hermeneutics*, Volume 1 of *Reading Faithfully*, ed. Mike Higton and Mark Alan Bowald, Kindle Edition (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015), 36-37.

Comstock published the article with Frei still categorised as a 'pure narrativist' with something of Frei's blessing: 'Well, no use starting over, so I hope this may get us into conversation one way or another.'[10] Nevertheless, Frei apparently contested the typology until his death, circulating his response letter to Comstock among his students.[11] Frei more rejects his own categorisation in Comstock's typology than the whole typology itself.

Nor was Frei alone in resisting the Comstock's typology. In fact, Hauerwas goes further than Frei to declare he never thought of the Yale School as a school of thought.

> That I was drawn into the life of the church, or at least a church, by entering the divinity school at Yale may suggest to people who know of my emphasis on the centrality of the church for Christian theology that it all began at Yale. And indeed, I am sure that the seeds of the way I do theology were sown during the education I received in the divinity school. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the way I think represents something called the "Yale School of Theology," as some people have come to call it. Yale did make all the difference for how I think, but I had no idea at the time that Yale represented a "position."[12]

Even Hauerwas then finds difficulty seeing great conceptual coherence. To some degree he wants to disassociate himself from the ideas of the other members. However, it also confirms that even Hauerwas recognises the function of the appellation to group him sociologically with the others of Yale. Despite the fact that Hauerwas was not institutionally *at* Yale when the suggestion of the Yale School is given, he has institutional relationships and reputational capital in connection with having done his PhD at Yale. Likewise, even he does not deny that the Yale School functions sociologically as a bloc, rather he provides additional confirmation they do. He will even say about academic theology predisposing theologians to write for theologians, 'The kind of theology you represented was no longer shaped by your ecclesial tradition but by where you did your Ph.D.'[13] This admits that one feature of academic

[10] Frei, *Reading Faithfully, Vol. 1*, 41.

[11] Frei, *Reading Faithfully, Vol. 1*, 36.

[12] Stanley Hauerwas, *Hannah's Child: A Theologian's Memoir* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 49.

[13] Stanley Hauerwas, *The Work of Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 95.

theology is that it must address itself, that agents must play for the field of academic theology more so than the church or other fields. Partly, this is understandable, participation in any field is to be caught up in hope for its stakes. Partly, however, Hauerwas telegraphs the broader operation of academic theology as a field. That is, association with the institutional reputation of a particular university assists in successfully navigating the larger field of academic theology. There could be overlapping methodological inclinations resulting from a particular pedagogical environment. Equally, though, collectivizing social and cultural capital through affiliation with Yale is not just what the Yale School does to navigate symbolic violence, but also what many, if not most agents, will resort to as some point in navigating their field. They do not have to agree or even be located in the same institution at the time, rather they just have to leverage the reputational capital of Yale to advance their own ideas, and by becoming a de facto bloc, they coordinate and amplify their reputation in the field of theology. The (subconscious) objective is coordinated by the *habitus* that has been structured by the broader field and by Yale in particular. The Yale School shares a locus of *habitus* structuration, so it is not surprising that in the course of their individual academic careers, they intuitively coalesced to form the Yale School.

However, there is another sociological dynamic in play. While these eminent scholars need to insulate and substantiate their reputations within the larger field—a pressure which all scholars face—one important factor appears for the formation of the Yale School as an intuitive *habitus* strategy to those pressures as well as an explanation for their shared sensitivity to the symbolic violence of the *epistemic doxa* of the theological academy. Of the four agents of the Yale School we will consider in our case study, all of them come from some position of socio-cultural dislocation and marginalisation. Starting with H.R. Niebuhr, he was the son of recent German immigrants, living in an immigrant community in rural

Missouri.[14] Hans Frei was the son of well-to-do secularised Jews in the years leading to and beginning Nazi Germany. Frei was sent to a Quaker school in England, where he converted to Christianity, before his family fled the Nazis to New York City in 1938.[15] George Lindbeck was Born in Louyang, China in 1923 to Lutheran missionaries. He grew up in China and later Korea before coming to the US at 17 for education, rendering him culturally dislocated both in China and in the US.[16] Finally, Stanley Hauerwas arrived at Yale as the son of working-class parents and with an Evangelical background.[17] In fact, after arriving at Yale, getting the required ministerial placement was difficult: 'Class issues were also involved. [John Oliver Nelson] told me that a minister from Greenwich who had interviewed me suggested that I simply "would not do."'[18] Thus, especially for these scholars hailing from the margins, their exposure to the realities of symbolic violence and the broader epistemic possibilities than academic theology legitimised no doubt was involved in the conceptual schemas they advocated to subvert that symbolic violence, especially as it related to the methodological demands of doing theology in academy. Further, though Niebuhr had died by the time of the rise of the Yale School, his position at Yale may have provided the conditions of possibility that enabled the sociological coordination as the Yale School to occur by first

[14] Cf. William Stacy Johnson, 'H. Richard Niebuhr', *The Oxford Handbook of Reinhold Niebuhr*, 1st ed., ed. Robin Lovin and Joshua Mauldin, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021): 93-110, cf. esp.94-96; and K. Healan Gaston, 'Niebuhr's Background: Family, Church, and Society', *The Oxford Handbook of Reinhold Niebuhr*, 1st ed., ed. Robin Lovin and Joshua Mauldin, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021): 3-26, cf. esp. 3-5.

[15] Cf. Ion Popa, 'Critical Edition of Hans Frei Testimony (HVT 0170)', *Yale University's Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies*, 2021, (Accessed 24 Oct 2021) https://editions.fortunoff.library.yale.edu/essay/hvt-0170#fn-4. Cf also, Ion Popa, 'Introduction to the Testimony of Hans Frei', *Yale University's Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies*, 2021, (Accessed 24 Oct 2021) https://d12q9fe14kxf9b.cloudfront.net/pdf/critical-edition-hvt-0170.pdf.

[16] Cf. Bernhard A. Eckerstorfer, 'The One Church in the Postmodern World: Reflections on the Life and Thought of George Lindbeck', *Pro Ecclesia* 13.4 (November 2004): 399–423, esp.401-03, https://doi.org/10.1177/106385120401300403.

[17] *HC*, 2-3, 36.

[18] *HC*, 48.

making space within Yale Divinity School as institution to broaden the *epistemic doxa* of theology, including becoming Frei's doctorvater.[19] Thus, because of their weaker starting capitals within the field of symbolic dominance, they had greater need to pool their reputational capital as a bloc of scholars. Further, as representatives of marginalised and socio-culturally dislocated communities, each of the scholars had more to lose than just their individual reputations. At risk were their communities' reputations among the academic and cultural elite. The phronetic value of *habitus* is that it works without the conscious strategizing that many assume necessary for effective coordination of *doxic* contest. Rather it is more effective because it is intuitive and therefore constantly in play. But this coordination of *doxic* struggle by the Yale School goes beyond just themselves. To be effective, it had to deploy cultural and social capital from the wider spectrum of both Yale and academic objectified capital.

Thus, as we explore the Yale School with a Bourdieusien and theological lens, it will be essential that we do not forget the positions and relations that the Yale School theologians started with. All of them started with reduced cultural capital, but also a heightened awareness, even reflexivity, concerning the game of academic theology itself. From these life stories, narrative theologies arose based on an epistemological insight that comes from not being dominant automatically. They had to navigate and coordinate in the field of academic theology to survive but also to attain the dominance now attached to the Yale School. Nevertheless, it is still possible that the Yale School coalesced around narrative theologies because of a shared view on narrative as Comstock argues as well as or instead of a shared need to contest symbolic violence. So, lest we impose symbolic violence by rejecting

[19] Cf. David F. Ford, 'Review of *On being Theologically Hospitable to Jesus Christ: Hans Frei's Achievement*, by Hans Frei', *The Journal of Theological Studies* 46.2 (1995): 532–46. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23966006.

Comstock's typology without consideration, we must test it on Frei and Lindbeck, and expanding that investigation in the following chapter to H.R. Niebuhr and Hauwerwas.

To test this typology, we will consider whether even Frei and Lindbeck share a definition of what narrative is. Frei and Lindbeck are often considered very closely aligned in understanding and approach.[20] So, if any of the members of Comstock's categories were to agree on the nature of what narrative is and how it relates to theology, it ought to be Frei and Lindbeck. But as we will see, Frei and Lindbeck are as divided on the nature of narrative projection as they are allied on using their takes on narrative projection to contest the reigning *epistemic doxa* of theology.

Testing the Purist Typology: Do Frei and Lindbeck Agree on Narrative?

There is no debating whether Frei and Lindbeck maintain some affinity for one another. Aside from both being on the faculty of Yale Divinity School at the same time, they also interact with one another in their respective work. Lindbeck himself expresses his dependence on Frei's *Eclipse of Biblical Narrative* for his move towards intratextuality:

> As the work of Hans Frei shows, the situation has changed radically in recent centuries, and new difficulties have arisen. … The primarily literary approaches of the past with their affinities to informal ways of reading the classics in their own terms were replaced by fundamentalist, historical-critical, and expressivist preoccupations with facticity or experience.[21]

[20] Cf. Comstock, 'Truth of Meaning', 121; 'Two Types', 688; 'Kadushin among the Narrative Theologians', 218; *ND*, 119ff.; Kevin J. Vanhoozer, *The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology*, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 10-11; Jacob L. Goodson, *Narrative Theology and the Hermeneutical Virtues: Humility, Patience, Prudence*, (Lanham, MY: Lexington Books, 2015), 39; Francesca Aran Murphy, *God is Not a Story: Realism Revisited*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), 6, 7-8, 38f.; Wentzel van Huyssteen, 'Narrative theology: An adequate paradigm for theological reflection?', *HTS Teologiese Studies* 45.4 (1989):767-77; Edward T. Oakes, 'Apologetics and the Pathos of Narrative Theology', *The Journal of Religion* 72.1 (January 1992): 37-58; Stefen Eriksson, 'Refining the Distinction between Modern and Postmodern Theologies: The Case of Lindbeck', *Studia Theologica* 56.2 (2002): 152-63; John Allan Knight, *Liberalism versus Postliberalism: The Great Divide in Twentieth-Century Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), esp. 155-224; Sam Houston, 'Narrative and Ideology: The Promises and Pitfalls of Postliberal Theology', *Religion & Theology* 23 (2016): 161–187, esp. 165, 'As such, both Lindbeck and Frei shared a conception of theology wherein the world of linguistic symbols and motifs found in the Bible is viewed as giving rise to a semiotic logic, or grammar, which comes over time to regulate the Christian community's language and practice.'

[21] *ND*, 119.

Lindbeck, moreover, seems to depend on Frei's *Identity of Jesus Christ* (although he fails to cite it), when he writes on the following page: 'This type of literary approach can be extended to cover, not simply the story of Jesus, but all of Scripture.'[22] Lindbeck's citation failure notwithstanding, the directionality of the pattern of association often tends to be construed less as to move from Frei to Lindbeck, as from Lindbeck to Frei. Nevertheless, Frei's impact on Lindbeck's work is obvious here, in that Frei provides symbolic legitimation for Lindbeck's move to intratextuality, as well as providing Jesus as the hermeneutical epicentre. That is, Lindbeck cites Frei as subverting the reigning *epistemic doxa* in academic theology, which provides him an opportunity to build on that contest his own challenge to academic theology's *epistemic doxa*. However, whether Frei and Lindbeck share a view of what narrative *is* remains unresolved.

While Frei shapes the thought of Lindbeck, likewise Lindbeck's impact on the work of Frei cannot be denied. When Hans Frei publishes 'The "Literal Reading" of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: Does it Stretch or Does it Break?,'[23] he specifically cites Lindbeck's *Nature of Doctrine* as an influence on his late-life thought manifest in the article. He writes: 'I wish to acknowledge my profound indebtedness to this book and to its author.'[24] However, lest one assume this citation should be taken as all-consuming, Jason A. Springs warns in his monograph on Frei, *Toward a Generous Orthodoxy: Prospects for Hans Frei's Postliberal Theology*:

> …[Frei's work] has stirred a comparable breadth of misunderstandings from all across the theological and philosophical spectrum. … Frei's thinking generally is unsystematic in ways that make it hard to follow. His writing style is, on occasion, positively obscure. His theology is highly eclectic, even improvisational and ad hoc. Frequently it *does not cohere* (or coheres only haphazardly) with any single or

[22] *ND*, 120.

[23] Hans Frei, 'The "Literal Reading" of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: Does it Stretch or Does it Break?', *The Bible and the Narrative Tradition*, ed. Frank McConnell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986): 36-77.

[24] Frei, 'Literal Reading', 77, n.36.

> established theological option. In addition, the association of his work with the label 'postliberal'—and, occasionally, the *outright assimilation* of his later work to George Lindbeck's—has made Frei's work a target of criticism, polemic, and occasionally caricature. More significantly in my judgment (and a primary motivation for this book) is that insufficient attention to the *thoroughly multidimensional* character of Frei's work has led to many of the persistent misunderstandings that still vex it today.[25]

Thus, as we will soon see, while Frei himself admits some borrowing and bending with Lindbeck, his thought ought not to be taken as outright systemic in agreement. Rather, Frei in acknowledging Lindbeck's influence on his thought, should be taken as only 'trying on' the Lindbeckian formula, not adopting it universally. Therefore, Frei is more likely to be applying a tension to his previous work, rather than completely overhauling it, as our subsequent discussion below will now consider as we investigate whether in fact even those figures conventionally understood to align the most in the purist stream—Frei and Lindbeck—agree on the nature of narrative.

Frei's view of what narrative *is* is expressed particularly saliently in *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative*. He writes using a narrative theme as an example:

> A great theme in literature of the novelistic type, like a pattern in a historical sequence, cannot be paraphrased by a general statement. To do so would approach reducing it to meaninglessness. It in each case the theme has meaning only to the extent that it is instantiated and hence narrated; and this meaning through instantiation is not illustrated (as though it were an intellectually presubsisting or preconceived archetype or ideal essence) but constituted through the mutual, specific determination of agents, speech, social context, and circumstances that form the indispensable narrative web. …the location of meaning in narrative of the realistic sort is the text, the narrative structure or sequence itself.[26]

For Frei narrative is a form of expression that is an integrated whole. The meaning it possesses is not separable from the form but is a function of the form. Considering a specific theme in the narrative is only artificially divorced from the narrative itself. That is, a theme

[25] Jason A. Springs, *Toward a Generous Orthodoxy: Prospects for Hans Frei's Postliberal Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 6 (emphasis added).

[26] Frei, *Eclipse*, 280.

only means within the world of the narrative. While it can be detected in the narrative, it can only be understood from the inside, as indeed it can only fully exist within the narrative. The form of expression that Frei understands narrative to be is a form that generates meaning from within, not from without. Specifically, this insight is the challenge to academic theology's *doxa* that Lindbeck recognises and seeks to capitalise upon, but not necessarily by depending substantively on the conceptual framework of Frei's insight.

Collapsing the Purist-Impurist Typology: The Projecting Text of Frei and Ricoeur

Surprisingly, despite the view popularised especially by Comstock that Frei and Ricoeur exist as dramatically antithetical to one another in understanding narrative—Frei (the purist Yaley) enmitised against Ricoeur (the impurist Chicagoan) – we can easily restate Frei's understanding in Ricoeurean terms: the narrative text *projects* a meaning, it generates the categories of understanding internally. Ricoeur writes,

> …quelle peut être la tâche première de l'herméneutique ? Elle est, selon moi, de chercher dans le texte lui-même, d'une part la dynamique interne qui préside à la structuration de l'œuvre, d'autre part la puissance de l'œuvre de se projeter hors d'elle-même et d'engendrer un monde qui serait véritablement la « chose » du texte. Dynamique interne et projection externe constituent ce que j'appelle le travail du texte. C'est la tache de l'herméneutique de reconstruire ce double travail du texte.[27]

Ricoeur views narrative as generating *un monde du texte* from within by virtue of the constitutive inter-animating structures of the language and text itself representing the narrative's own *dynamique interne*. This dynamic web of interrelationality produces the meaning as well as the constraints on interpretation when approached on its own terms from within. However, more explicitly than Frei, Ricoeur acknowledges that the *monde du récit*

[27] Paul Ricoeur, 'De l'Interprétation', 32. Cf. also Ricoeur, 'Herméneutique Philosophique et Herméneutique Biblique', esp. p.120, where Ricoeur writes on the relationship between theology and the biblical texts from which it is developed: 'Le point fondamental sur lequel je voudrais concentrer mon attention est celui-ci : la « confession de foi » qui s'exprime dans les documents bibliques est inséparable des *formes* de discours, j'entends la structure narrative, par exemple du Pentateuque et des Evangiles…' (emphasis original). Here Ricoeur demands in a way much in the vein of Frei that the form of the texts themselves, including narrative, generates the theology (or we could say the meaning) that they have.

projection is more than just an internal dynamic of signification, but one that extends into the lived reality of the reader. Ricoeur later clarifies the simultaneously-internal/external nature of the projection of the narratives in the biblical text in his essay 'Herméneutique Philosophique et Herméneutique Biblique.' He writes:

> Suivons donc la voie de la simple « application » du thème général au texte dont nous venons de souligner la structure interne. … L'implication théologique est considérable : la première tâche de l'herméneutique n'est pas de susciter une décision chez le lecteur, mais d'abord de laisser se déployer le monde d'être qui est la « chose » du texte biblique. Ainsi est placée au-dessus des sentiments, des dispositions, de la croyance ou de la non-croyance, la proposition du monde qui, dans le langage de la Bible, s'appelle monde nouveau, nouvelle alliance, royaume de Dieu, nouvelle naissance. Ce sont là des réalités déployées devant le texte, pour nous certes, mais à partir du texte. C'est là ce qu'on peut appeler l'« objectivité » de l'être nouveau projeté par le texte.[28]

What is important to see here is that the internal structure of the narrative is inescapable. Ultimately, narrative is always first about generating a world of meaning; it is not simply meaningful in itself (though this is logically necessary), but *so* meaningful that it transcends the limits of the narratives proper to enter the life of the reader(s). Afterall the narrative is *pour nous certes*. Nevertheless, it is not because the meaning of the narrative exists outside the text and has to be found and placed inside, but rather because the narrative is a pluripotent generator of meaning from within, which, when found inside the narrative, pushes its way out from the *monde du récit* into the living world of the reader. It is here that Frei and Ricoeur are seen to dramatically agree: the narrative itself is the basis of meaning, a world all its own that must be met and embraced on its own terms, even if that means our terms are transformed.

One difference that Ricoeur does have with Frei is that Ricoeur maintains a general philosophy of language that he applies likewise to narrative uses of language. Ricoeur explains the limitation in language between new uses and the structural relations of language itself, seemingly employing the metaphor of an electrical circuit:

[28] Ricoeur, 'Hermeneutique Philosophique et Heremeneutique Biblique', 126.

> Or ce que j'appelle ici projection est seulement un cas du retour de l'événement au système. … la polysémie est le pivot de la sémantique. C'est le plus intéressant, parce qu'on y surprend à merveille ce que j'ai appelé les échanges entre la structure et l'événement ; ce procès se présente comme un concours de deux facteurs distincts : un facteur d'expansion et, à la limite, de surcharge ; en effet, le mot, en vertu du procès cumulatif que je disais, tend à se charger de nouvelles valeurs d'emploi ; mais la projection de ce procès cumulatif dans le système des signes implique que la nouvelle signification trouve sa place à l'intérieur du système ; l'expansion, et éventuellement la surcharge, est arrêtée par la limitation mutuelle des signes à l'intérieur du système. On peut parler en ce sens d'une action limitative du champ, opposée à la tendance à l'expansion, qui résulte du procès cumulatif du mot. Ainsi s'explique ce qu'on pourrait appeler une polysémie réglée, qui est la loi de notre langage. Les mots ont plus d'un sens, mais n'ont pas un sens infini.[29]

Ricoeur recognises that the instances of a word in a particular context can expand the meaning of the individual word. However, it can never expand the use of the word so much that it breaks the entire linguistic system because it is itself a constituent member of the system and as such receives the pushback of the system. It can broaden its semantic range but cannot cease to be ruled by the language itself. Essentially the use of a word in this system can never short out the entire system, because the circuit through which the charge flows has innate resistance and because the other words in the circuit function specifically as resistors. This, then, extends to the semantic nature of narratives in that while the narratives themselves construct new meanings, the nature of the language used in communicated narratives is such that the narrative itself both generates the new meanings and rules them. This is true both at the individual word level, the larger sentence level, and broader textual level. Ricoeur explains the hierarchal stratification of language as a phenomenon: 'La hiérarchie des niveaux du langage comporte encore autre chose qu'une suit de systèmes articulés : phonologique, lexical, syntaxique. On change véritablement de niveau quand on passe des unités de langue à l'unité nouvelle que constitue la phrase ou l'énoncé. Cette unité n'est plus

[29] Paul Ricoeur, 'La Structure; le Mot; l'Evénement', *Le Conflit des Interprétations: Essais d'Hermeneutique*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969): 94.

de langue, mais de parole ou de discours.'[30] He states it even more concisely in a later essay: 'Si le « signe » (phonologique et lexical) est l'unité de base de la langue, la « phrase » est l'unité de base du discours.'[31] Thus, both the language and the text offer new options for meaning, while simultaneously governing them. Indeed, as Ricoeur notes, no narrative by virtue of the nature of broader semantics has an infinity of meanings or interpretations, even if it does have more than one. In this way, although their emphasis and phrasing differ, both Frei and Ricoeur explicitly agree that narrative itself *generates* and *adjudicates* its own meaning. In light of this, despite the conventional typology often placing the two at odds, Ricoeur and Frei are remarkably parallel.[32]

Antagonistic Projections: Frei's Projecting Text vs. Lindbeck's Projecting Metatext

For Frei, narrative is a form of expression that generates the categories for its own understanding, they cannot be imposed from the outside in any way. Rather, the categories of understanding are the projection and constitutive revelation generated by the narrative web itself. Hence Frei explains,

> If one asks if it is the subject matter or the verbal sense that ought to have priority in the quest for understanding, the answer would be that the question is illegitimate or redundant. For whatever the situation that may obtain in other types of texts, in narrative of the sort in which character, verbal communications, and circumstances are each determinative of the other end hence of the theme itself, the text, the verbal sense, and not a profound, buried stratum underneath constitutes or determines the subject matter itself.[33]

The text offers the categories as well as the hermeneutical power for its own interpretation. Narrative is a form of expression that borders on self-interpreting, or more accurately, as a

[30] Ricoeur, 'La Structure', 86-87.

[31] Paul Ricoeur, 'La Fonction Herméneutique de la Distanciation', *Du Texte à l'Action : Essais d'Herméneutique II* (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1986), 103.

[32] Note the parallels with Bourdieu's analysis that elements of a sociological system both structure and are structured by the system and the elements in that system. The set of relations are dynamically held in tension.

[33] Frei, *Eclipse*, 280.

form of expression that subsists in generating its own rubric for interpretation from the 'plain verbal sense.' Narrative enfolds a conceptuality that constrains the native forms of conceptualisations that it admits from itself, if met on its own terms. However, it is here at the point of the unstated *if*—which Frei spends the whole of *Eclipse* exposing and demanding that it no longer be considered an arbitrary contingency that interpreters can freely ignore—that Frei and Lindbeck strongly diverge. For while Frei demands in *Eclipse* that narrative must not be viewed *as if* it was possible to separate its meaning and interpretation from the categories generated for understanding and interpretation by the text itself, Lindbeck flatly rejects the possibility that the text can be approached as if the text itself truly generates the categories or the interpretation, although at first it might seem otherwise. Lindbeck writes,

> An intratextual reading tries to derive the interpretive framework that designates the theologically controlling sense from the literary structure of the text itself. This type of literary approach can be extended to cover, not simply the story of Jesus, but all of Scripture. What is the literary genre of the Bible as a whole in its canonical unity? … These [diverse materials] are all embraced, it would seem, in an overarching story that has the specific literary features of realistic narrative…. It is as if the Bible were a "vast, loosely-structured, non-fiction novel" ….[34]

On the surface, this seems not only to draw on Frei's approach (who Lindbeck explicitly cites on the previous page), but to expand it and even apply it not merely to particular narrative texts, such as the gospels, but to the whole of the Christian Scriptural canon. It seems that Lindbeck is arguing that narratives themselves generate their own terms, that his version of intratextuality at least is narratively structured. The narrative then generates the meanings and the rules for interpretation, which seems to fit conclusively with Lindbeck's '"regulative" or "rule" theory' of Christian doctrine, where 'The function of church doctrines that becomes most prominent in this perspective is their use, not as expressive symbols or as truth claims,

[34] *ND*, 120-21, Lindbeck quoting David Kelsey's comment on Barth's approach to Scripture, cf. David Kelsey, *The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 48.

but as communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action.'[35] However, on closer examination, Lindbeck while using the language of Frei evacuates both Frei's language and purpose of its original significance. This is because for Lindbeck a narrative is not intratextual at the *textual* level, but (by virtue of a Wittgensteinian move[36]) at the *communal* level. Just before his earlier comment, Lindbeck explains,

> The intratextual way of dealing with this problem depends heavily on literary considerations. The normative or literal meaning must be consistent with the kind of text it is taken to be *by the community* for which it is important. The meaning must not be esoteric: not something behind, beneath, or in front of the text; not something that the text reveals, discloses, implies, or suggests to those with metaphysical, historical, or experiential interests. It must rather be what the text says *in terms of the communal language* of which the text is an instantiation.[37]

The text has no self-generating literary form or intelligibility, rather it is taken *as such and such*, determined by the *communal language*. This is unsurprising because Lindbeck's 'cultural-linguistic' approach is not so much about narrative as it is about religion as narrative. Lindbeck exposes his renegotiation of the narrative to the community as cultural system explicitly:

> …compatible with a cultural-linguistic approach is what I shall call 'intratextual,' while an 'extratextual' method is natural for those whose understanding of *religion* is propositional or experiential-expressive. The latter locates meaning outside the *text* or *semiotic system* either in the objective realities to which it refers or in the experiences it symbolizes, whereas for cultural-linguists the meaning is immanent. Meaning is constituted by the uses of a specific language rather than being distinguishable from it.[38]

Here it is clear that Lindbeck is talking about religion as a narrative; narrative as a semiotic system, a cultural-linguistic phenomenon, where the meaning is not projected by a particular narrative text, but by the community onto a particular narrative text. Meaning is performative.

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[35] *ND*, 18.

[36] Cf. *ND*, 24, 33, for Wittgenstein's influence on his approach.

[37] *ND*, 120 (emphasis added).

[38] *ND*, 114.

For Lindbeck then the text of a narrative is not the text itself but the community as *meta-text*. It could be argued this effectively just moves the model of Frei up one level. While that is partially true, it simultaneously changes the nature of narrative itself. Narrative is not the text but what a community does with a text or set of texts. This is the only way in which Lindbeck's approach can be called intratextual rather than extratextual. For if particular narratives are not texts, but simply tools of performance by the community as meta-text, then it is possible for an individual narrative or even the Christian canon as Lindbeck himself argues to be seen as being approached intratextually. But if narrative has even the slightest capacity to mean in-itself, on its own terms, then moving what narrative is from text to meta-text is extremely extratexual in orientation.

Moreover, Lindbeck's understanding of narrative has narrative trapped in a cycle of endless narrativity, so that the story never truly exists as its own story, only an endless repetition of different stories generated by different individuals and by different communities, all sharing a common appellation, 'narrative,' but without any meaningful cohesion or reference to anything but narration. Essentially narrative would amount to talking about oneself talking about oneself talking about a text *ad infinitum*. It is never then a mode of communication or expression, simply a mode of being. Yet even though Lindbeck says his approach contains the virtue of possessing 'the property of reflexivity,'[39] ultimately all it delivers is a hyper-reflexivity that turns so far towards inward reference that it becomes a black hole of meaninglessness and non-narrativity, from which nothing can escape. Consequently, while Lindbeck thinks his understanding of narrative will bring communities together, it forces them all into their own individual silos, permanently severing them from one another and even from themselves, for they can never escape the endless abyss of their own narration of narration. In this sense, perhaps Lindbeck was apt to call his approach

[39] *ND*, 114.

intratextual for there is no text, not even a metatext, only perhaps a community with a vague introspective awareness of narrativity. Thus, narrative for Lindbeck is a semiotic system but one that does not exist as a text, but as a community in ongoing performance as meta-metatext.

Ironically, Lindbeck remains trapped in the experiential-expressivist framework in which doctrines are 'noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations. …religiously significant meanings can vary while doctrines remains the same, and conversely, doctrines can alter without change of meaning.'[40] Yet it is exactly this framework he seeks to leave behind, writing: 'Because this core [religious] experience is said to be common to a wide diversity of religions, it is difficult or impossible to specify its distinctive features, and yet unless this is done, the assertion of commonality becomes logically and empirically *vacuous*.'[41] Nevertheless, in Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic approach to narrative, the end result is remarkably parallel. The narratives, doctrines, language, and even the communities are all as arbitrary and 'logically and empirically vacuous' as they were in an approach where religions/doctrines were all essentially the same on the basis of generalised experience—only in Lindbeck's system it is not a common vague experience of the divine but a common vague experience of narrativity. In part this result arises because Lindbeck's approach is premised on an understanding of religion that comes out of a reductionistic and early-modern flattening of Christianity to mere propositionalism, moralism, and language, as Peter Harrison explains: 'a generic conception of religion, typically understood in terms of beliefs and practices, [emerged] during the early modern period.'[42] Likewise, the socio-historico-graphic concepts Lindbeck employs also bare the

[40] *ND*, 16-17.

[41] *ND*, 32 (emphasis added).

[42] Harrison, *Territories*, 101.

traces of such an understanding in their model of scientific inquiry into religion and culture. Harrison concludes about the early modern generification of religion: 'The point is rather that from this time on religion and religions can be understood in terms of beliefs and practices that are empirically available for comparison and analysis. Religion now exists concretely as something that can serve as an explanation for historical events and which in turn can be "explained" by various social sciences.'[43] Consequently, although Lindbeck himself is seeking to avoid a purely propositional or external approach to understanding Christianity, and religions in general,[44] by deriving his categories for Christianity from social science which themselves have received their conceptual structure for religion and culture from an abstracted understanding of Christianity and Christendom, the cultural-linguistic approach ultimately *has to* abstract the nature of Christian language and community. Lindbeck is trying to move towards narrative and to understanding Christianity from within its conceptual structure. However, because Lindbeck does not recognise how the social scientific/Wittgensteinian methodology[45] is abstracting in nature, he replaces one form of abstraction—propositions and practices—for a parallel from of abstraction—language and practices. Frei's understanding of narrative conversely is thoroughly *contra* abstraction, while Lindbeck's fails to account for the abstracting nature inherent to his approach. Thus, the community as meta-text does not *participate* in the narrative of the text but in the endless abstracted narrativity of itself as meta-text with the actual narratives essentially becoming non-narratival symbols of Sisyphean narrativity of the metatext. Hence, with Lindbeck one is *only* able to describe the meta-experience of narrativity and ritualise it. Nothing could be further from Frei's approach to narrative. While Lindbeck must see narrative as the

[43] Harrison, *Territories*, 116; cf. also pp.83-116.

[44] Cf. *ND*, 34ff.

[45] Cf. *ND*, 24.

community using a narrative text in projecting itself to itself, Frei recognises narrative as something a literary text employs to project itself towards its readers. Ultimately, the projection roles are reversed here: narrative projects itself towards a community with Frei, while the community as narrative projects itself towards texts, including narratives.

Yet, the irony of Lindbeck's position is even more profound. Specifically, Lindbeck is trying to contest exactly those elements of the *epistemic doxa* that he ultimately builds his project upon. He never fully escapes the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology. The abstractionism of academic theology is exactly what he falls prey to as he seeks to overturn the abstractionism of academic theology. In this way we can see how powerfully the embodied component of academic theology's capital manifests itself in Lindbeck's inadvertent regression to the orientation of the academic *habitus*. Lindbeck – as he has been structured by the system – seeks to restructure the system but the structured nature of his restructuring is precisely what he is most blind to. Lindbeck clearly sees that the epistemic framework of experiential-expressivism is limiting. He even seems to recognise that the propositionalism and generalising empiricism of the academic *status quo* fosters a symbolic violence on religions together with a reductionistic epistemology. Unfortunately, he cannot escape the shaping forces involved in the field to posture him towards committing his own kind of symbolic violence towards religions and their texts, by legitimising only their cultural-linguistic practices while depending upon the same *epistemic doxa* of academic abstractionism.

Does *Late*-Frei Move Towards Lindbeck or Ricoeur?

We have been pursuing whether Frei and Lindbeck truly agree or differ in their understanding of narrative, for the sake of ascertaining whether narrative theologies have a coherent and unifying understanding of narrative. Again if Frei and Lindbeck who are usually held as strongly aligned on their understanding of narrative actually disagree, then the

probability of narrative theologies sharing a coherent, unifying understanding of what narrative is becomes even more unlikely. The absence of a coherent, unifying understanding of narrative, however, could risk the long-term viability of using narrative as the site of doxic contest. Thus far, Frei and Lindbeck seem quite averse to one another's understanding of narrative. However, there is an unaddressed complication for this analysis which must be confronted. Specifically, it is possible that the disagreement we have considered already is merely *early*-Frei, while *late*-Frei ultimately sides with Lindbeck. However, for all Frei's supposed turn to Lindbeck in his later work, a closer examination of Frei shows only an accommodation to some of Lindbeck's points. Frei writes

> The descriptive context, then, for the *sensus literalis* is the religion of which it is part, understood at once as a determinate code in which beliefs, ritual, and behavior patterns, ethos as well as narrative, come together as a common semiotic system, and also as the community which is that system in use—apart from which the very term ("semiotic system") is in this case no more than a misplaced metaphor.[46]

Here Frei explicitly recognises, in interacting with Lindbeck, that the literal sense of the narrative cannot be fully separated from the tradition of reading the biblical narratives as realistic narratives, and even as having an obvious plain literary interpretation. However, earlier in the same article, Frei notes that while the literal sense cannot be separated from its communal use/license, it also is not a function of that community, but of the words and other general categories in which the literal sense also participates.

> …what we have in the sensus literalis is a reading about which one needs to say first that it governs and bends to its own ends whatever general categories it shares—as indeed it has to share—with other kinds of reading (e.g., "meaning," "truth," as well as their relation). It is a case-specific reading which may or may not find reduced analogues elsewhere. Second, it is not only case-specific but as such belongs first and foremost into the context of a sociolinguistic community, that is, of the specific religion of which it is part, rather than into a literary ambience.[47]

[46] Frei, 'Literal Reading', 70-71 (emphasis his).

[47] Frei, 'Literal Reading', 67 (emphasis added).

As much as he might place the weight of attention here on the uniqueness of the narrative in itself as understood by the religious community, and seems to insulate biblical narrative thereby from general hermeneutic techniques, such as those employed by Ricoeur, ultimately he is forced to also acknowledge that it will always participate in the general functions of reading. In fact, this so-called assimilation to Lindbeck can be better read not as an assimilation to Lindbeck but to Ricoeur, who also features prominently Frei's essay.[48] While previously Frei had maintained biblical narrative as its own category of meaning / interpretation, rather than employing outside categories like Ricoeur, he ultimately must admit he has previously assumed what Ricoeur has consciously and consistently acknowledged, viz. that there is a pre-cognition of language as a category. That is, whether or not Frei admits it or is even aware of it, he has a working understanding of how language works, of how words mean, which undergirds his approach to narrative *qua* narrative. Discussing how a text produces meaning as whole does not change how words mean. In fact, Ricoeur applies the model of lexical/linguistic/textual semantics we considered earlier to the pre-cognition involved in apprehending action, so that as narrative texts[49] presuppose a functional understanding the linguistic communication and signification through words in a

[48] Frei, in 'Literal Reading', mentions Ricoeur in the main text 6 times, quoting and referencing him 9 times in relation to five of Ricoeur's works, including in succession: *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976); 'Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation', *Essays on Biblical Interpretation,* ed. Lewis S. Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980): 73-118; 'Biblical Hermeneutics', *Semeia* 4 (1975): 29-148; 'The Narrative Function', *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. and tr. by J. B. Thompson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and 'The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text', P. Rabinow and W.M. Sullivan (eds.), *Interpretive Social Science* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

[49] Here Ricoeur intends mainly written/oral narratives. Although the application to the visual is possible, this is mainly relegated by Ricoeur to the human subjective experience more broadly. Nevertheless, Mieke Bal extends an awareness of visual narrativity specifically to art and cinema, cf. Mieke Bal, *Thinking in Film: The Politics of Video Installation According to Eija-Liisa Ahtila* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). Cf. also Mieke Bal, *Of What One Cannot Speak: Doris Salcedo's Political Art* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); and Mieke Bal, *Endless Andness: The Politics of Abstraction According to Ann Veronica Janssens* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).

language, so too do narrative texts presuppose a functional understanding of the mechanics of events, of causal relations, of action in general. Ricoeur argues:

> Quelle que puisse être la force d'innovation de la composition poétique dans le champ de notre expérience temporelle, la composition de l'intrigue est enracinée dans une pré-compréhension du monde de l'action : de ses structures intelligibles, de ses ressources symboliques et de son caractère temporel. Ces traits sont plutôt décrits que déduits. En ce sens, rien n'exige que leur liste soit close. Toutefois, leur énumération suit une progression aisée à établir. D'abord, s'il est vrai que l'intrigue est une imitation d'action, une compétence préalable est requise : la capacite d'identifier l'action *en général* par ses traits structurels ; une sémantique de l'action explicite cette première compétence. … tout récit présuppose de la part du narrateur et de son auditoire une familiarité avec des termes tels qu'agent, but, moyen, circonstance, secours, hostilité, coopération, conflit, succès, échec, etc. En ce sens, la phrase narrative minimale est une phrase d'action de la forme X fait A dans telles ou telles circonstances et en tenant compte du fait que Y fait B dans des circonstances identiques ou différentes. Les récits ont finalement pour thème agir et souffrir.[50]

Thus, for Ricoeur linguistic semantics serves as the model of textual/discourse semantics, both in the linguistic sense of sentences essentially becoming the words of texts/discourse, and in a broader approach to the intelligibility of sequences of time and action as a whole. Hence, as there is a basic meaning unit in language of the phrase/sentence built on words, there is a basic narrative meaning unit, *la phrase narrative*, built on elements of action. So for Ricoeur, and ultimately for Frei, narrative assumes not just a pre-understanding of how words/language work and of how sentences/texts work, but even a pre-understanding of what it means for any action/event to happen. These are the assumptions upon which both Ricoeur and Frei operate. Therefore, with both Ricoeur and Frei, narrative self-rules in three ways as it self-generates novel significations: 1) the relationship between words and the broader linguistic system of both the whole language in general and the language usage of the specific text in question; 2) the relationship between phrases/sentences to the structure of the narrative as a whole; and 3) the relationship between a generic understanding of action qua action and the specific instantiation of actions and action-in-sequence/emplotted action in a narrative.

[50] Ricoeur, *Temps et Récit, Vol. 1*, 87-89 (emphasis original).

This further destabilises the proffered typology of agreement between Frei and Lindbeck over and against the disagreement between Frei and Ricoeur, and demonstrates it false in both dimensions.

However, making it even clearer that while Frei assimilates insights from Lindbeck and Ricoeur, it is primarily the meta-language presuppositions of Ricoeur that he considers uncompromising to the self-generating and self-governing interpretative nature of narrative, Frei develops his line of thought in the Cadbury Lectures given at the University of Birmingham in 1987 the year prior to his death.[51] Frei there reveals his thinking on the relation of narrative to community (expressed in his continued commitment to the literal sense) had not changed as much as some understandings of his 1986 article would suggest. In the Cadbury Lecture material, Frei writes contemptuously of two types of biblical/narrative interpretation: 'Allegory there, symbol here—the first two types of theological procedure, when observed as the level of biblical interpretation, have little use for any form of the literal sense.'[52] Frei continues to discuss a fifth type of theology corresponding to those espousing a Lindbeckian framework, specifying how it likewise undermines any value for the literal sense, though in a more round-about manner than mere allegory or symbology. He writes,

> The proponents of type 5 may be described as saying that at best, understanding the Bible—and Christian language more generally—under the distinction between explication and application is very superficial. … When you say that in stating how they [concepts/language of Christianity] are so ingredient you refer neither by correlation nor by subordination to any conceptual scheme of an abstract or general kind, but only to the way they are acquired and practiced in this specific linguistic community…. They have acquired from Ludwig Wittgenstein not a theory but the skill of philosophical therapy.[53]

Frei continues his critique on Wittgensteinian formulations in light of Barthian epistemology:

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[51] David Kelsey, George Lindbeck, Gene Outka, 'Foreward', *Types of Christian Theology*, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), vii.

[52] Hans Frei, *Types of Christian Theology*, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 63.

[53] Frei, *Types*, 92-93 (emphasis original).

> …I wanted to raise the question whether this procedure and this conviction didn't mean that the theologian could do no more than repeat without conceptually redescribing the words of the doctrines or scriptural statements that had doctrinal overtones and aftereffects. … But in a strange way, that is, at a very concrete experiential level, we are back where John Locke first took us more theoretically: the rooting of specific theological discourse in general or universal criteria of meaning. It is a fascinating mixture: Hermeneutical silence concerning doctrine as explication and meditation, and appeal to general criteria in application—on the one hand, very close to Barth in insisting on the priority of Christian communal self-description and the practical character of theologizing; on the other, at a far, far remove from his insistence that our experience be understood in terms of the world of discourse in which God is identified with us in his self-identification with Jesus Christ, rather than Jesus Christ being understood in terms of our own world of general experience and discourse.[54]

Frei's central argument is that the true hazard of approaching the narratives of Scripture in a manner fully consonant with the (hyper-)Wittgensteinian vision of Lindbeck is that while at first glance it seems to enshrine the value of the *sensus literalis*, or plain reading of the text itself within the categories generated by the text—and therefore has plenty to commend it—upon further reflection a cultural-linguistic approach cuts the *sensus literalis* down to a *sensus repetitus* and in so doing the meaning of the words themselves is banished as the projection of the world of the narrative text becomes mere communal mantra. In such a case all Christian language (of which biblical narratives are a sub-type) is merely hyper-ritualised language acts specific to a particular genre of worshipping community.

Moreover, in a cultural-linguistic framework the community disrobes the narrative of its own world of meaning, asserting its use of the text without much concern for the projection of the text itself. As Frei points out for his favoured perspective: '…there can be no nonresidual reading, no complete "interpretation" of a text, not so much because interpreters' intellectual, moral, and cultural locations vary, but because a "good enough" text, to use an expression of Frank Kermode's, has the *power to resist*; it has a richness and

[54] Frei, *Types*, 93-94 (emphasis original).

complexity that act on the reader.'[55] Essentially, a cultural-linguistic approach to narrative ignores the nature of the text itself, as something that is a *quasi-agent* in the world. Frei intuitively resists symbolic violence to the texts themselves. For as the objectified forms of capital take on quasi-agentive roles within the set of relations, refusing to listen to them as such is itself a kind of delegitimation of objectified capital (i.e. symbolic violence), not only to the texts but also to the communities that produce and value those texts. In a way Lindbeck likewise recognizes this, but his concern is with symbolic violence to the community as metatextual narrativity. Thus, while acknowledging that the community does have some determinative capacity vis-à-vis the interpretation of texts, Frei rejects a view of narrative devoid of intrinsic meaning simply because a community might ritualise it in a particular(s) way(s) that has a kind of meaning in its own right.

What is worse in Frei's estimation is that this Wittgensteinian move surreptitiously inserts a general theory of meaning into the process, namely that of the so-called general experience of communities viewed from the lens of social sciences and linguistics. Resultantly, the hermeneutic of the cultural-linguistic approach is flawed, because while it claims to *centralise* meaning in the *text*, it actually centralises meaning in the *community* as metatext. This we have already seen, but Frei's additional indictment here is this: instead of generating the operative categories for the approach from within the world of the text and or *even* of the community itself, it has *snuck in its hermeneutic* surreptitiously from Wittgenstein and sociology. Ultimately, it is sociology as a discipline, not theology or more importantly the narrative world of the text itself, that rules Christian self-description. This renders Christian self-description (as well as its approach to narrative) neither *de se* nor *description*, but rather *ab extra* and *prescription* on two levels of analysis simultaneously, viz. a non-projecting text, and sociology-controlled projection as metatext.

[55] Frei, *Types*, 86-87 (emphasis added).

Late-Frei's Sensus Literalis: Turning to Ricoeur over Lindbeck

Given this examination, late-Frei—rather than assimilating completely with Lindbeck's approach—deploys Ricoeur's insights on the para-linguistic assumptions necessary for any linguistic intelligibility to guard against the flaws that he perceives in Lindbeck's Wittgensteinian and Geertzian framework while still incorporating the insights that narratives are always read by people who are part of communities with traditions of interpretations. The reader and the church have a part to play in understanding a narrative, but narratives still maintain the autonomy to continue to project their worlds of meaning on their own terms. Therefore, for Frei, as unique as any individual narrative might be, and as necessary as it is to allow it to generate its own categories for interpretation, and even as much as the primary community with which it is held in dialogue is the religious one—finally, the literal sense of a narrative is simply that. In that sense, for all Frei's accommodation to Lindbeck, he is still unwilling to go as far as Lindbeck—there is something of the literal sense of the narrative itself that is what it is—that projects itself—even if the impulse to read it literally and literarily is rather determined by Christianity (its tradition thereof) itself.[56] Even in the article in which Frei is thought to adapt himself to Lindbeck ('The 'Literal Reading' of Biblical Narrative'), he concludes about the literal sense in Christian self-description: 'It will stretch and not break.'[57] It is impossible for Frei to ever fully displace the literal sense of a text as projection for the communal performance as metatext. The community may advance and advantage a literal sense, a literary approach to

[56] Cf. also, Frei, 'Literal Reading', 72: 'The direction in the flow of intratextual interpretation is that of absorbing the extratextual universe into the text, rather than the reverse (extratextual) direction. The literal sense is the paradigmatic form of such intratextual interpretation in the Christian community's use of its scripture: The literal ascription to Jesus of Nazareth of the stories connected with him is of such far-reaching import that it serves not only as focus for inner-canonical typology but reshapes extratextual language in its manifold descriptive uses into a typological relation to these stories. The reason why the intratextual universe of this Christian symbol system is a narrative one is that a specific set of texts, which happen to be narrative, has become primary, even within scripture, and has been assigned a literal reading as their primary or "plain" sense.'

[57] Frei, 'Literal Reading', 74-75.

the biblical narratives themselves, but Frei reveals here that his ultimate loyalty is to reading narrative as it seems to demand to be read. That is, Frei refuses to submit the text to symbolic violence. Lindbeck's approach ultimately fosters symbolic violence on the text itself, neutering the quasi-agency of the biblical text. Frei refuses to wholly reverse the relationship of projection, so that instead of the literal sense of the narrative projecting towards the community, the "literal sense" is so open as to invite all projections from within/outside the community. Ultimately, the narrative must always self-generate and self-rule.

So strong is Frei's commitment to narrative producing and promoting its own categories of understanding by virtue of the *sensus literalis* that he displays an intuitive repulsion to fully embracing Lindbeck as he seeks to retrieve aspects of his own understanding of narrative. In a collection of essays published posthumously Frei writes,

> In matters of doctrinal statement, pure self-confinement to Christian self-description means no self-description. To the extent that this situation is a product of making theology purely internal to the religion, its result is a theology of total silence when one cannot simply and uncritically parrot biblical and traditional formulae. To the extent that this absence of doctrinal self-description is the result of absolutizing and rigidifying the warranted, indeed essential, distinction between religious statements and statements about religion, it is a function of the dominance of a philosophical theory or negative criteriology over theology as Christian self-description. A paradoxical result indeed. There is no need to waste time over the application of this view to the sensus literalis, there being no criteria as to what would be appropriate redescription, or, in all likelihood, permission for the employment in the first place of any "borrowed" concepts or conceptual schemes in reading Scripture. The sensus literalis here is logically equivalent to sheer repetition of the same words. That is hardly how it has functioned in the Christian interpretive tradition.[58]

Again, as we have seen elsewhere, despite conclusions that Frei's later work accommodates to Lindbeck's view of what a narrative is and how it works in the church, from this we can see that for Frei nothing could be further from his own inclinations as it relates to narrative. The cultural-linguistic model of narrative as *simply* a historical source text for contemporary language which features in the presently operative language games of various communities is

[58] Hans Frei, *Types*, 55. N.B. this section is developed from manuscripts of Frei's Shaffer Lectures given at Yale in 1983.

vacuous to Frei. He recognises the features of Lindbeck's approach that have sociological validity but refuses to reduce the meaning of a narrative to its mere recitation in a community. For Frei primarily the narrative itself, as a substance or expression all its own, *means something*, rather than it *being made to mean something* by a community. To never let the text mean *in se* would be a form of symbolic violence, a delegitimation of the text as itself by the community. Again, Frei does not mean to suggest that the use of the community does not shape a narrative's meaning, simply that as much as the use of the community can shape the text, the text can itself not only resist the shaping of the community but exert a shaping influence on the community itself—not simply on elements at play in the games, but on the kinds of games that the community plays. The biblical narratives are not the clay of the community, so much as – if met on their own terms – the biblical narratives make the community its clay, not simply behaviourally or ritually – ethically – but epistemologically, inviting any reader or community to expand and reform their *epistemic doxa* through engagement with the text without resorting to symbolic violence. In this way, the biblical narratives are their own world of meaning that shape the church in what and how it understands and what and how it acts.

Frei's motivation for opposing Lindbeck's view of narrative, aside from an obvious desire to avoid completely dismissing many of the central premises of his most influential writings, can be exposed in *Identity*, which is a quasi-Anselmian argument for the ontological existence of Christ as Lord via the projection of the Gospel narratives. Knight argues Frei believes that

> …grasping Jesus' identity not only requires *conceiving* of the Resurrection, but also requires *believing* that the Resurrection of Jesus occurred. If we think of Jesus as one who has not been raised, we are not thinking of the Jesus whose identity is described in the Gospels. "*That* he is and *who* he is … are one and the same thing. His identity is so unsubstitutable now through the event of resurrection that he can bring it to bear as the identifying clue for the community that becomes climactically focused through him." [quoting Frei, *Identity*, 181] Like the argument discovered by St. Anselm, on Frei's view this argument from Jesus' identity to his quasi-necessary presence is valid

> only in this one unique case. Nonetheless, Frei does not restate the argument in syllogistic form. It is a literary argument, and Frei seems to believe it cannot be so restated.[59]

Thus, the problem for Frei is that Lindbeck's approach not only misses the mark on how narratives actually function, but that Lindbeck's approach is missing Christ Himself. It neuters the notion of revelation from the text itself. The community can reveal itself as "Christian" but Christ cannot reveal himself *personally and presently* in and to the Christian community. Frei objects that if one fails to read the gospel narratives on their own terms, not only does one fail to gain appropriate information and understandings vis-à-vis Christ, God, humanity, and salvation, one fails to meet Christ personally and corporately as the church. It is a church without the presence of Christ, and for Frei this is the supreme hazard of hyperwittgensteinianism. In other words, Frei's opposition to fully embracing Lindbeck's perspective is not only linguistic/literary but theological.

Frei's objection to Lindbeck is that hyperwittgensteinianism constitutes symbolic violence to Christ himself. Christ's voice coming through the narratives is delegitimated, but so is his presence within the Christian community. Only the abstract performance of narrativity is legitimated in the church for Lindbeck, so that Christ is neither considered a constituent member of that community nor a source for a *habitus* that resists symbolic violence. Christ is subordinated to the voice and performance of the community, such that His voice and performance both historically and presently through the Holy Spirit is dismissed. But corporately this also means that the church suffers symbolic violence as a site for the revelation of Christ. The church as revelatory of Christ is delegitimated. Though perhaps the opposite intension of Lindbeck, Frei cannot go along with Lindbeck on narrative, because not only does it do symbolic violence to Christ, but also to the church in so far as its own *epistemic doxa* believes that the church is more than linguistic community. Lindbeck, in

[59] Knight, *Liberalism vs. Postliberalism*, 194-95 (emphasis original).

effect, delegitimates the church as church and demands that its legitimation come from Wittgensteinian philosophy and anthropology, reducing its nature to a cultural-linguistic community. While Frei would not deny that the church is a cultural-linguistic community, he opposes giving its symbolic legitimation to the academic abstractionism Lindbeck inadvertently slips back to. Rather its ultimate legitimation must come from revealing and enjoying the living presence of Christ himself.

Divided on narrative projection, united in *doxic* struggle

Through our case study of the objectified cultural productions of the Yale School, we have shown that at the conceptual level what a narrative *is* is hotly contested among narrative theologies. We have compared two narrative theologians reputed to be very closely aligned, Frei and Lindbeck, as well as two who are considered diametrically opposed to one another, Frei and Ricoeur, in order to test the typology of narrative theologies offered by Comstock. However, because of thorough examination of the conceptual interaction between Frei and Lindbeck, the typology of the agreement on the nature of narrative among even the most closely aligned exemplars has disintegrated.

Surprisingly, not only do Frei and Lindbeck possess completely incompatible understandings of narrative, but Frei and Ricoeur, who Comstock offers as exemplars of the antagonistic poles of his typology (purist and impurist respectively), actually agree more with one another on the nature of narrative than either one does with Lindbeck. Consequently, Frei and Ricoeur may disagree about the place of a general hermeneutic in understanding narrative, but they agree that the words and structures of narrative generate meaning from within because of the paralinguistic assumptions necessary for words and narratives in particular to *mean*. Both see narrative as a mode of expression in language which carries its own logic and meaning. Conversely, Lindbeck holds narrative more as a socio-cultural artefact, which might have a set of internal relationships, but these relationships are subject

to, perhaps even generated by, the projection of a community as a form of linguistic, ritual, and social (we may add "political") practice.

While at the level of their conceptual frameworks, Frei and Lindbeck are divided. At the sociological level, their works on narrative are united in contesting the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology. Frei contests the *epistemic doxa* as to what narrative is and how it works in theology, that is that narrative is only a veneer on abstraction, and that propositions and facts are the real value and intelligibility of narratives. Frei rejects the demand that narratives must be abstracted to mean something. In other words, within the field of academic theology the unstated assumption is that legitimation of any narrative cultural production occurs through a process of abstraction, extraction, historical analysis, or some other translation to a non-narrative form.

Lindbeck seeks to contest a similar set of *epistemic doxa*. More negatively, viewed in the objectification of that contest, his contest is unsuccessful in fully escaping the powerful inclinations of embodied *habitus* shaped under the constant operation of a particularised form of symbolic violence. But more positively, Lindbeck is not necessarily contesting the exact same elements of the *epistemic doxa* as either Frei or even his own explicit statements intend. Rather, looking at the broader perspective of Lindbeck's contest on the *epistemic doxa*, it is less the abstractionism that Lindbeck resists but the other hidden assumption of academic theology, one perhaps even more *doxic* than Frei's aim. Namely, Lindbeck contests who academic theology is *for*, *who* can do it, and what it means to *do* theology. Is theology about ideas and emotions, or is it about communalising and action? Lindbeck in a way agrees narratives should not be abstracted into propositions and sites for historical facts – *epistemic doxa* – but as we have seen he does want to abstract narratives from texts to performance. Yet, he still profoundly challenges the *epistemic doxa* by questioning the who, how, and why of theology. His emphasis on communities as narrative metatexts and performance ultimately

resists seeing academic theology as only or even chiefly for the academy. His challenge can even be said to question whether the academy without integration or collaboration with the church can do theology, even if one could suggest that the academy is just one additional metatext of performativity alongside the church. Lindbeck questions whether the conceptual objectification of theological capital is sufficient when cultural practices are also powerful forms of structuring and structured *habitus* and (as standardised) objectified forms of theological capital.

Both Frei and Lindbeck, then, are seeking to overturn an *instiutionalisation* of *epistemic doxa*, but Frei wants to overturn the *doxa* of production and abstraction, while Lindbeck wants to overturn the priority of textual objectification for embodied objectification, while also contesting the *telos*, legitimation of agents, and nature of production. Both are seeking to reform the *habitus* and institutionalization of symbolic violence through their objectified productions, but from opposing angles. Though neither is entirely focused on what it means to do theology (i.e. on the objectified production of theological capital), Frei and Lindbeck challenge the *doxa* that dominance in doing theology ought to remain exclusively the purview of the academy and subordinated to the *epistemic doxa* of the wider academic field. Furthermore, Lindbeck wants to legitimate embodied narrative theological capital, while Frei wants to legitimate objectified narrative theological capital– both against the institutionalized legitimation of academic capital, in the form of propositional, abstracted, and historicist legitimation, which are the institutionalised processes of legitimation which offer particular dominance to academic agents.

Both are pushing against on the institutional delegitimation of broader forms of theologizing, and seeking to make space for an expanded set of *epistemic doxa*. Frei thinks narratives as narratives are epistemically fruitful, while Lindbeck thinks communal performance as narrativity is epistemically fruitful, though academic *doxa* refuses to

acknowledge either as fully legitimate in the academic field. From within the legitimation of certain categories of the academic field both seek to expand the epistemic legitimation. In this sense they are aligned and both benefit from any expansion of *epistemic doxa*, and – if they coordinate – have greater capacity to make some room for at least themselves to operate with symbolic legitimation.

Here we have also seen how academic and theological capitals both coordinate and antagonize one another. Frei and Lindbeck share an insight that the *epistemic doxa* of theology allows greater epistemological diversity than the academy and use the legitimation structures of the academic field to integrate those insights. That is, both seek to more tightly integrate the *epistemic doxa* of theology and the church with the academic *doxa* of the academy. Frei uses history and Ricoeurean hermeneutics to legitimate his approach, while Lindbeck uses Geertz' anthropology and Wittgenstein.

Thus far, our exploration of the Yale School has served two purposes. First, it has begun to expose the set of relations as they hold in the field of academic theology. Second, it has begun to develop the conceptual resources to which we will return in Part III to construct and legitimise for academic theology a form of narrative theology that subverts symbolic violence without resorting to it. However, before the constructive section of Part III, we must test whether our initial case study of Frei and Lindbeck is truly representative of adversative conceptual diversity, but collaborative *doxic* contest with another. We must also continue to acquire the necessary conceptual resources for constructing a truly liberating form of narrative theology. For this we will extend our case study of the Yale School to Stanley Hauerwas and H. Richard Niebuhr.

CHAPTER 4:
H.R. NIEBUHR AND HAUERWAS:
DIVERGENT ON NARRATIVE,
CONVERGENT ON *DOXIC* CONTEST

Although we have already seen Comstock's initial typology of the purist/impurist streams of narrative theologies collapse, more importantly he bears witness to the fact that several of the narrative theologians in his purist stream bear some kind of relationship to Yale Divinity School. But as a case study, considering only two members of the projected school of thought – even if those two are considered the most tightly aligned among the school – is insufficient to fully explore or conclude much about their understanding surrounding the nature of narrative. Moreover, if the Yale School is less a school of thought and more an alliance for collaborative contestation against the symbolic violence imposed by the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology, then we must widen our scope to ensure that the collaborative *doxic* struggle holds across the wider set of relations which is the Yale School.

The questions then before us in Chapter 4 are simply these: first, is the disalignment between Frei and Lindbeck on narrative simply an isolated disagreement over what narrative actually is within the Yale School where the other members share an understanding? Second, does the wider Yale School coordinate to contest the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology, so that its main function is more collaboration towards surviving and subverting the symbolic violence of the field of academic theology than agreeing on how to understand and employ narrative in theology. To test this, we will look to two additional representatives of the so-

called Yale School suggested by Comstock:[1] Stanley Hauerwas and H. Richard Niebuhr. For *if* a common understanding of narrative among narrative theologies fails to be found among members of an academically acknowledged school of thought, then the probability of a cohering definition of narrative being found among narrative theologies sinks precipitously. Yet, inversely, the sociological bounding of the school increases, such that their organisational principle is less their shared views on narrative but their shared use of narrative to contest elements of the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology. Simultaneously, we will continue to develop the necessary constructive resources for Part III, recovering more of the epistemological value of narrative, both in terms of knowledge-who in Niebuhr and knowledge-in-action (*phronesis*) in Hauerwas. Further, Hauerwas will overlap with Bourdieu's *habitus* as he argues for narrative as a phronetically engaged form of theology that begins with ethics. Our consideration of the Yale School concludes it operates as a coordination of *habitus* in navigating the symbolic violence operative in the academic field, a conclusion reinforced when placed in light of the structures of legitimation in the wider-academic field vis-à-vis Wittgenstein and Reader Response Theory. The conceptual resources of the Yale School, an understanding of the sociological nature of theological production, and the role of symbolic violence thus prepare us for a truly constructive effort in Part III.

[1] Cf. Comstock, '*Two Types*', 687, places Niebuhr as the source of narrative theology: 'Narrative theology, reflection on religious claims embedded in stories, is one of the most significant currents of late twentieth century thought. H. Richard Niebuhr initiated the conversation when he wrote in 1941 of "The Story of Our Lives."' Cf. also Gary Comstock, 'Telling the Whole Story? American Narrative Theology after H. Richard Niebuhr', *Religion and Philosophy in the United States of America*, ed. Peter Freese (Essen: Verlag Die Blaue Eule): 125-152. Likewise, Hauerwas and Jones in *Why Narrative* place H.R. Niebuhr as the major institutional and conceptual source of narrative theology more generally and particularly of what would become the Yale School, even if they do not think Niebuhr delimits the conceptual boundaries of narrative theology or even the Yale School, 'Intro', 3-8, cf. esp. 6; cf. also *HC*, 58.

Cf. also Michael Root, 'What Is Postliberal Theology? Was There a Yale School? Why Care?', *Pro Ecclesia* 27.4 (2018): 399-411, https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/106385121802700404.

Chapter 4: H.R. Niebuhr and Hauerwas:
Divergent on Narrative, Convergent on Doxic Contest

Hauerwas and Niebuhr: Complicating the Narrative of the Yale School

Considering Niebuhr and Hauerwas itself is not surprising, given that, besides both having a relationship to Yale Divinity School, Hauerwas explicitly cites Niebuhr as a major shaping force to his thought. Thus, again, if any two members of the Yale School could be expected to cohere, as Frei and Lindbeck ought to have done, then it is Niebuhr and Hauerwas. However, as we will soon discover, Niebuhr and Hauerwas also tend to orient towards narrative in inverse ways. While Hauerwas will primarily look to narrative as a way of knowing *that* and as a way of *becoming* a particular kind of who, Niebuhr will conceive of narrative primarily as a way of knowing a (particular) *who* and as a way of *being* a general/particular kind of who. Ultimately, while both view narrative as being revelatory—generating meaning—and organically tied to the nature of human experience, they diverge over what narrative actually *is*. For Hauerwas narrative enables *scientia/sapientia* while for Niebuhr narrative is relational and personal, less about knowing *that* and more about knowing the *Who* who reframes every *that*.

Hauerwas opens *Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics* in a brief introduction with a section entitled 'What I Owe to Whom'.[2] In this section, he specifically mentions the poignant shaping force H. Richard Niebuhr had on his thought while he was in seminary. He writes,

> During this time I began to read much more extensively two quite different thinkers, H. Richard Niebuhr, who died the year before I went to seminary, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The former, I found, had already long been at work on the agenda I thought I had discovered. Niebuhr was a theologian who did ethics only because it provided the means to explicate the intelligibility of theological convictions in terms of their practical force. Moreover I was convinced that Niebuhr was on the right track in his attempt to provide a phenomenology of moral experience truthful both to human existence and to the Christian understanding of our relation to God, even if I disagreed with some of his more "liberal" theological presuppositions. The Niebuhr to

[2] Stanley Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), xix-xxv. Cf. *MR*.

> whom I was attracted was the Niebuhr of *The Meaning of Revelation*. In that book Niebuhr wrestled hard with Christological issues.[3]

As Hauerwas tells the story of his own intellectual development, he places his own thoughts in tension with the shaping force that Niebuhr had on him. While Hauerwas reports that he was already thinking along the lines of ethics being a way of doing theology in a way that was both practical and intelligible, he also suggests that it is Niebuhr who pushes him towards looking for a way of approaching theology that satisfies a perceived phenomenological deficit for the theologian themself. In other words, what Hauerwas gains from Niebuhr is an awareness that it is not enough for ethics/theology to be theoretically coherent at some level of supra-personal rationality, it must actually *feel* coherent with the human experience of making moral determinations and of holding Christian convictions. In this, Hauerwas finds in Niebuhr not simply an intellectual compatriot concerned with ethics and rationality, but an affective resonance as Niebuhr takes Christianity itself seriously. Thus, since Hauerwas himself admits that Niebuhr has imprinted on his work profoundly, one could expect these two Yaleys to agree on what narrative is.

Further, both Hauerwas and Niebuhr share parallel concerns in (at least portions of) their theology. For Niebuhr will ask as a central question within *The Meaning of Revelation*, 'It remains true that Christian faith cannot escape from partnership with history, however many other partners it may choose. … But though this is true the question remains, how can it be true? How can revelation mean both history and God?'[4] Likewise Hauerwas will highlight that when staring seminary, his chief query was how to relate God and history: 'In particular I wanted to concentrate on the "problem of history" (which turned out to be a tangle of "problems") as a way to understanding what it could possibly mean for God to act

[3] *PK*, xx.

[4] *MR*, 59.

in history and, in particular, in the person of Jesus.'[5] Thus, one would anticipate that the correspondence between Niebuhr and Hauerwas would be tight, given that not only has Hauerwas admitted to being influenced by Niebuhr, but starting his theological journey with essentially the same questions. Yet, though Hauerwas relates that his own initial historical focus aligns closely with Niebuhr's concern in *The Meaning of Revelation*, Hauerwas quickly moves to critique Niebuhr's division of history into narrativized perspectives: 'His distinction between inner and outer history seems to me to cause more trouble than it is worth. Nonetheless, he had his hand on the right problems.'[6] Hauerwas is careful to note that for all his appreciation of Niebuhr, he finds problematic the way Niebuhr works with narrative as external vs. internal history, even if Niebuhr's insights there are illuminating the right issues and questions. Hence, as with Frei and Lindbeck, while an initial supposition expects considerable agreement between Hauerwas and H.R. Niebuhr, at the outset that assumption is challenged by Hauerwas himself. For Hauerwas already indicates that while he finds an affinity for Niebuhr and even for the kinds of questions and approaches he values, that affinity breaks down when the specifics of their narrative theologies are compared. At the heart of this disagreement between Niebuhr and Hauerwas are two orientations towards narrative: knowledge-that vs. knowledge-who. But at the core of this divergence on narrative is their convergence on *doxic* contest against academic theology's *epistemic doxa*.

Narrativizing Knowledge-That vs. Knowledge-Who

'The right problems' involved in Niebuhr's distinction of external/internal history, according to Hauerwas' comments above, involve theological epistemology and ethics, and inseparably the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in thought and action.

[5] *PK*, xx.

[6] *PK*, xx-xxi. Cf. *HC*, 58, for his specific concerns with the division.

Indeed, Niebuhr's division easily graphs onto the epistemic questions of subjectivity and objectivity. Niebuhr argues external history is done by someone attempting to be an 'impartial spectator' while internal history concerns the 'worth for' or 'destiny of selves' with value 'only selves can apprehend.'[7] Thus, one concern with Niebuhr's typology is that the distinction of external to internal history collapses all knowledge into subjective knowledge-that. Nothing is left but the knowledge-*that* a particular someone has. So, if Niebuhr's internal-external division was chiefly a dialectic typology of knowledge, then Hauerwas would be right to say that it causes more problems than it solves. However, the external-internal division is better understood as the means by which Niebuhr intends to *pivot from* orienting theology primarily around knowledge-that *towards* including knowledge-who, that is, to expand academic theology's *epistemic doxa* from academic abstractionism only legitimising knowledge-*that* towards also legitimising knowledge-*who*, which still remained legitimised in the *epistemic doxa* of Christian theology and the church. Thus, instead of the typology offering a dialectic, it serves to move theology towards a more dialectic theological epistemology of *thats* and *whos*, of *concepts* and *lives*. Accordingly, Niebuhr's concern for knowledge-who appears throughout *Meaning of Revelation*, starting with the preface: 'the great source of evil in life is the absolutizing of the relative, which in Christianity takes the form of substituting religion, revelation, church or Christian morality for God'.[8] He continues in chapter 1:

> Theology may try to maintain the standpoint of Christian faith, that is of an interest directed as exclusively as possible to the God of Christian faith; or it may take the position of faith in some other being, that is of an interest directed more or less exclusively toward religion, or toward the moral consciousness, or toward man's own worth, or toward civilization. … And when such theology turns to the latter being from the point of view of its dominant faith in another valued entity it does not really

[7] Cf. MR, 67-68.

[8] *MR*, viii-ix.

> turn to the Christian God at all as Christian faith knows him, but rather to some instrumental value which serves its major interest.[9]

Here Niebuhr illustrates that when theology primarily orients itself to a less-relational knowledge, by virtue of the fact that it is directed towards an objectification of knowledge by a subject rather than an inter-subjective relation based on faith, it actually fails to be properly theological, even if that knowledge on the surface appears to be meaningful to an expression of faith in God, such as morality. Moreover, echoing the operation of capitals-fields-*habitus* in Bourdieu, this valued entity—whatever it is—serves an instrumental value and ultimately becomes objectified through deception as an idol-as-capital, precisely because it is not God himself. Likewise, operations of objectification fail to offer intersubjective knowledge. Rather, this object-oriented knowledge surreptitiously compels an extra-relational framework, a kind of quasi-external history. For even though the knowledge is approached by a subject, the knowledge is construed through the lens of an object, rendering theology oriented to knowledge-that, rather than knowledge-who. But then how can one do theology in a mode that permits what value knowledge-that retains without rendering knowledge-who impossible? How can the symbolic violence of objectification be subverted?

For this, Niebuhr will draw a connection between story and relational knowledge-who, in Chapter 2, writing:

> Yet what prompted Christians in the past to confess their faith by telling the story of their life was more than a need for *vivid illustration* or for *analogical reasoning*. Their story was *not* a parable which could be replaced by another; it was irreplaceable and untranslatable. An *internal* compulsion rather than free choice led them to speak of what they know by telling about Jesus Christ and their *relation* to God through him.[10]

Thus, the storifying of theology is necessary because story is the medium through which relational knowledge-who is possible. It not because stories are more engaging to an audience

[9] *MR*, 35-36.

[10] *MR*, 46.

or provide conceptual structures for analogical extensions. Rather the stories of Christians' lives with God were simply that: their lives lived in the mode of relational knowledge of God through Christ. Story is the medium of relational knowledge for Niebuhr, such that the reason to use narrative theologically is that it is only in story that knowledge-who is possible. Moreover, any theology that reduces its focus to subject-to-object from subject-to-subject loses the most salient feature of theology, namely God himself, replacing him with mere information. Such theological information, because it has been depersonalised, is irrelevant or even false in the worst way—not because knowledge-that vis-à-vis God is not important, but because it is only fully resonant with importance in the context of a storied knowledge-who of God through Christ. Niebuhr will add, '…in external history all relations are between an "I" and an "it", while in [internal history] they are relations between "I" and "Thou"; moreover the "I" in the "I-it" relation differs from the self in the "I-Thou" setting.'[11] Consequently, the external history serves as a way of pivoting towards knowledge-who which even transforms the kind of subjectivity operative in a qualitative way even from the subjectivity involved in knowledge-that. Narrative, at least as far Niebuhr is concerned vis-à-vis internal history, generates a categorically different kind of knowledge and relation to knowledge when it comes to God, one where the human-divine relation truly can be intersubjective knowledge-who. This is what is at the heart of Niebuhr's work on the meaning of revelation, not so much the dialectic of external-internal history, but the use of the concept of 'external' history as the fulcrum towards internal history, by which he means interpersonal knowledge-who of God. He states conclusively, 'The revelation of God in

[11] *MR*, 65. He will expand on this later, cf. pp. 144-45: 'In objective knowledge the self is the only active being; it does the knowing; it brings to bear upon its object the concepts and hypotheses in its mind. In experimentation it manipulates the object; in evaluation it employs its own standard of measurement. To all the intents and purposes of the knower the object is a passive and dead thing. This is true even when objective knowledge is directed toward human individuals or communities. … In all such knowledge the knower is the doer…. This knower, too, is essentially impersonal. He cannot really say of himself, "I think, therefore, I am," but must rather say, "Thinking goes on in me but that same thinking may and must go in any other brain so related to such objects."'

history is, as we shall see, the revelation of a self. To know God is to be known of him, and therefore also to know the self as it is reflected in God.'[12] Thus, narrative engenders intersubjective knowledge-who to thwart the symbolic violence of abstractionism and objectification in the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology. It subverts the reflexive symbolic violence that is inherently involved in exclusively human I-it relations, that is an unseen symbolic violence that one perpetrates against oneself. Moreover, it subverts the symbolic violence that academic theology also thrust towards God as a *who* by reducing him to a *that*. Niebuhr is contesting the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology by seeking to expand them to include knowledge-who through narrative which may even disentangle the system from its doxicly self-imposed symbolic violence. The ultimate point of theology cannot be knowledge-that, for in mere objectification idolatry arises and blinds. Rather the ultimate *telos* of any theological field, including academic theology, must be God himself.

Furthermore, for Niebuhr this knowledge-who mediated through narrative is not only the primary goal of theology and revelation, but carries with it the capacity to render intelligibility to knowledge-that. He highlights the causality relation in Chapter 3, writing:

> By revelation in our history, then, we mean that special occasion which provides us with an image by means of which all the occasions of personal and common life become intelligible. …it illuminates other events and enables us to understand them. Whatever else revelation means it does mean an event in our history which brings rationality and wholeness into the confused joys and sorrows of personal existence and allows us to discern order in the brawl of communal histories.[13]

For Niebuhr the narrative revelation of God intersubjectively first transforms the knowledge-that of one's personal experiences, especially those with particularly affective character. It renders knowledge of oneself and the meaning of one's own story possible. Yet, not only the intrapersonal realities that require intelligibility but the interpersonal, shared life-story of

[12] *MR*, 88.

[13] *MR*, 109.

one's communal realities. Knowing God as who makes knowing oneself and human others, – as well as collective-self – possible, not just in the sense of knowing oneself as a who, but in knowing the meaningfulness of the *thats* in one's life and one's community's life possible, in terms of events. For Niebuhr, knowledge-who mediates knowledge-that. It is for this reason in the final chapter, that Niebuhr will explain the importance and implicature of his use of the term 'revelation' as it relates to narrativized knowledge: 'The only word in our vocabulary which does justice to the knowledge of persons or selves is "revelation". Our knowledge of other persons differs from our knowledge of objects externally regarded not only by being directed toward different aspects of reality but also by being a relationship between different terms.'[14] What are the terms, then, of knowledge-who? He explains, 'In the knowledge of other selves both the relationship and the related terms are different. This knowledge does not run from a subject to an object but from the other to the self and back again. We cannot know here save as we are known.'[15] Consequently, Niebuhr uses the so-called dialectic of external-internal history not to apply a tension or even synthesis to theology, but to underscore the true nature of the theological enterprise made possible by story, namely the knowledge of God as a *who* rather than a *that*. He will conclude, 'When we say revelation we point to something in the historical event more fundamental and more certain than Jesus or than self. Revelation means God, God who discloses himself to us through our history as our knower, our author, our judge and our only savior.'[16] Lest he be accused here of still conceiving of this revelation of the person in knowledge-that, Niebuhr will rebuff quickly how essential the narrativity is to knowledge-who:

> What this means for us cannot be expressed in the impersonal ways of creeds or other propositions, but only in responsive acts of a personal character. We acknowledge

[14] *MR*, 143-44.

[15] *MR*, 145; note also here the allusion to 1 Cor 13.12, which we will return to with Gutiérrez in Chapter 6.

[16] *MR*, 151-52.

> revelation by no third person proposition, such as that there is a God, but only in direct confession of the heart, 'Thou art my God.' … Revelation as the self-disclosure of the infinite person is realised in us only through the faith which is a personal act of commitment, of confidence and trust, not a belief about the nature of things.[17]

It is not simply essential for the narrativity to be the mode of God's self-revelation, but also in the mode of human response to that revelation of the Divine Persons. Narrative is the mode of interpersonal relation, one in which God knows us and humans know him. The kind of knowledge that narrative makes possible for Niebuhr is not an abstracted conceptuality that there is a God—even if narratives can be mined for important statements of knowledge-that—but the dynamic relationship of faith through which mutual knowing of selves is possible. As with all genuine relationships, relation through narrative is lived not merely acknowledged. Through story the personal connection between God and individual humans as well as collective humanity is forged. Without narrative all knowledge of God devolves into simply knowledge-that, but the chief aim of theology cannot be mere propositional description. For propositional conceptualisations of God cannot be fully revelatory because they are insufficiently revolutionary. They do not fit with the nature of the subject in question in that propositions do not constitute relations; at best they can only describe them. Consequently, to know *God* rather than know *of* God only the narrativized reality of faith and mutual personal knowledge is appropriate. Genuine knowledge of God as my/our God reconfigures all lived reality. It transforms the orientation of one's personal and communal story as well as the embodied outworking of the divine-human relationship through continued narrativization. Thus, if theology is about knowing God as a *who* rather than as a *that*, then Niebuhr exposes that it must also be continuously in the narrative mode, at least at some level. For the moment that one loses the narratively constituted relationality of knowing God as who, what is lost is God himself, rendering theology *idol-ology* via objectification. This is

[17] *MR*, 153-54.

not to say that theological knowledge-that is impossible, simply that it is only possible from the 'internal history' of knowledge-who. And it is at this point that Niebuhr's quasi-dialectic serves to pivot towards knowledge-who, rather than a tensioned external-internal conceptual structure, thereby contesting the *epistemic doxa* of abstractionism and objectification in academic theology and resisting the symbolic violence to selves, both human and divine. To put it simply, the meaning of *Meaning of Revelation* is God himself, through the narrativity of revelation, known personally not propositionally.

Nevertheless, whether Hauerwas' objection to Niebuhr's theme of internal-external history is due to understanding it dialectically rather than pivotally remains unclear, not the least because his comment is brief and summative, but moreover because Hauerwas's own implementation of narrative is far less oriented towards knowledge-who than it is knowledge-that. This orientation threatens to run aground against Niebuhr's prescient warning about the recurring danger of allowing an objectified knowledge-that—even knowledge-that related to ethical life before God—to supplant the priority of intersubjective knowledge-who which is for Niebuhr at the heart of theology. Yet, Hauerwas acknowledges that theology through narrative, at some level, must include knowledge-who:

> My contention is that the narrative mode is neither incidental nor accidental to Christian belief. There is no more fundamental way to *talk of God* than in a story. The fact that *we come to know God through the recounting of the story* of Israel and the life of Jesus is decisive for our truthful understanding of the kind of God we worship as well as the world in which we exist. Put directly, the narrative character of our knowledge of God, the self, and the world is a reality-making *claim that* the world and our existence in it are God's creations….[18]

Here even as Hauerwas implies a clear relational knowledge-who element of theology in writing humans can only 'come to know God' through story, a glance at the language

[18] *PK*, 25 (emphasis added). Cf. also pp.26-27, esp. 27: 'we know ourselves truthfully only when we know ourselves in relation to God. We know who we are only when we can place ourselves – locate our stories – within God's story.' Also cf. *WT*, 221, where Hauerwas reflects: 'For when one worships the triune God, one becomes keenly aware of the inescapability of him; there is no sphere of human life that evades theological implication because we were made to worship him. I hope the range of my work exemplifies this conviction.'

surrounding that admission of relational knowledge expresses an epistemological orientation towards knowledge-that. For not only does he describe this narrativized theology as 'talk of God' he continues by reframing this God-talk that admits some relationality as 'claim that'. Even the mention of 'kind of God we worship' is ambiguous in whether it relates to an objectivised knowledge-that or a personalised knowledge-who. Hauerwas will even excoriate 'liberal' Christian theology for abstracting the person of Christ through historical inquiry and metaphysical agnosticism into mere moral model: 'And this example stood independent of any personal knowledge of, or relationship with, Jesus.'[19] Thus, the relational retains some importance, yet Hauerwas will continue by suggesting that the problem is less the loss of knowledge-who so much as the comprehensive reductionism of external projection by the community onto the Gospel accounts (paralleling Frei's objection): 'Jesus' identity is prior to the "meaning" of the story. There is no meaning that is separable from the story itself. … Put in more traditional categories, I am contending that Jesus' person cannot be separated from his work, the incarnation from the atonement.'[20] Consequently, the problem of superimposing categories onto the person of Jesus is that knowledge of him – broadly construed – is lost. If Christ is just moral or dogmatic abstraction, then the actual person of Jesus revealed in the Gospels vanishes, even assuming that the 'real' Jesus can only be found in stories of Jesus passed down to us in Christian Scriptures. Worse, such abstraction could ironically and suspiciously entail that Jesus becomes simply unimportant to being Christian. Jesus, however, must be at the heart of theology and what it means to be Christian for Hauerwas, so much so that he will categorise his life in general, including his work as theologian, by saying, 'I have, moreover, tried to live a life I hope is unintelligible if the God we Christians worship does not

[19] *PK*, 42.

[20] *PK*, 43.

exist.'[21] Thus, for Hauerwas what is at risk in abstractions of Christ is a complete breakdown of intelligibility not just for God-talk, but Christianity and thus a Christianly-lived life. Here Niebuhr and Hauerwas are remarkably convergent on their struggle to use narrative to recentre the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology on knowing God.

Nevertheless, Hauerwas exhibits a qualified commendation of the personal knowledge-who of Christ. In fact, in *The Work of Theology* Hauerwas explicitly criticizes an epistemology that makes that the relational knowledge of God overly experiential or separable from narrativized knowledge-that. He narrates an interaction he had with a colleague about the subject of experiencing the Holy Spirit.

> …she had to understand that I was raised an evangelical Methodist, which meant by the time I was twelve I had enough "experience" to last me a lifetime. I assured her that I did not want to have an experience of salvation — even one that allegedly was the work of the Spirit. …I had not only learned to distrust the staying power of such experiences, but I also thought the need "to be born again" undercut the significance of baptism.[22]

While Hauerwas' objecting to a subjective 'experience' of the Holy Spirit and prioritising baptism does not necessarily imply an orientation away from knowledge-who towards knowledge-that – and it certainly does involve him resisting performative emotionalism or even a symbolic violence of delegitimising the genuineness of his own faith for perhaps failing to feature all the marks this other person thought necessary – he continues his objection a few pages later, writing:

> I come out of the belly of the beast that bears the name "pietism." … I learned from Barth that I did not need to have an experience of God to be a Christian. Barth, moreover, helped me see how appeals to the Holy Spirit in order to ground theological claims by those identified with pietism was the breeding ground for liberal Protestant theology. …appeals to the Holy Spirit as the source of an individual's "experience" of God *structurally* can underwrite the presumption that theological claims are first and foremost about us and not God.

[21] *HC*, x.

[22] *WT*, 36 (emphasis added).

Thus, Hauerwas pivots both away from the pietism of his youth and away again from theological liberalism, dismissing an 'experience of God' as an essential part of being a Christian. He perhaps has justifiable theological motivations for this move, but consequentially the *structure* of Hauerwas' theology diminishes knowledge-who of God in favour of an epistemological orientation towards knowledge-that of God. Yet, in doing so, Hauerwas also contests what he sees as the shared epistemic basis embedded within the theological *doxa* of both the Pentecostal woman and liberal Protestantism. The experientialism that washes experiences in knowledge-who. Partially, Hauerwas can be seen as trying to protect the value for genuine knowledge-who in theology, since, ironically, the experientialism in these theologies can reframe theology in self-objectification, doing symbolic violence both to the persons and to God.

Nevertheless, Hauerwas has now raised the issue of the structural conditionings present in one's theology for his theological work, which he summarises without reference to knowledge-who: 'I have spent many years trying to say that we cannot understand the "what" of Christianity without knowing "how" to be Christian.'[23] He is concerned with the 'what' and the 'how' Christianity, which necessarily for Hauerwas involves the Christian Divine 'who' existing if it is to be intelligible, since it is through the lived life that the storied intelligibility of the Christian God appears. Nevertheless, actual knowledge-who is conspicuously absent and seemingly intentionally so, in favour of knowledge-that, whether that is a knowledge-that in terms of *what* Christianity believes, holds, or refers to, or in terms of *how* one is to live Christianly, since the how often reduces to knowledge-that Christians should do X or not do Y given situations A or B. So as much as Niebuhr and Hauerwas converge on using narrative to contest the *epistemic doxa* in academic theology surrounding knowing God, here Niebuhr and Hauerwas also diverge on narrativised knowledge-who in

[23] *HC*, xi.

theology, not so much in principle as in practice. For although the 'experience of God' Hauerwas is suspicious of does not automatically equate to *relational* knowledge of God, Niebuhr has already demonstrated that intersubjective knowledge-who even if mediated by the revelation of Jesus through the Scriptures cannot be *less than experiential* in the storied reality of life. Yet, Hauerwas' convergence with Niebuhr on *doxic* struggle is more profound when we consider how he seeks to restructure the epistemological operations of academic theology from knowledge-that to knowledge-how.

What kind of knowledge-how? For what aim?

To understand the signification of *how* for Hauerwas we must first consult the Aristotelian categories of a *techne* (procedural knowledge or a competence knowledge related to a discrete task) and *phronesis* (competence knowledge related to virtuous life). Aristotle distinguishes them in *Nicomachean Ethics*:

> Prudence (φρόνησις) would not be invariable-knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), nor technical-knowledge (τέχνη). On the one hand, it is not invariable-knowledge, because the actional (τὸ πρακτὸν) allows alternatives. On the other hand, it is not technical-knowledge, because the nature of action (πράξεως) is also different from production (ποιήσεως). Further the aim of production is different and wouldn't be that of action. For good-acting itself is the end. Therefore, it remains that it [phronesis] is a *habitus* (ἕξιν) true, rational (μετὰ λόγου), and action-oriented (πρακτικὴν) concerning the things good and bad for human beings.[24]

These Aristotelian categories are operative for Hauerwas, as Aristotle has featured prominently in his work, [25] forming one of his primary interlocutors since his PhD.[26] He

[24] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Rev. Ed., trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 336 (6.1140b.1-7). (Translation mine).

[25] Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, *Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1994 [originally Trinity University Press, 1975]), esp. 47-78; ibid., *Approaching the End: Eschatological Reflection on Church, Politics, and Life* (London: SCM, 2014), 158-75; ibid., *A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1981), esp. 122-25, 135-52.

[26] Cf. *HC*, 68, where he notes Aristotle's place in his dissertation later published as *Character and the Christian Life*: 'Mr. Gustafson was kind enough to give me a reading course in which I again read Aristotle and Aquinas on the virtues. *Character and the Christian Life* grew out of that reading course. That may not quite be

writes, 'In particular [Mark Ryan] rightly says I learned from Wittgenstein that the relation of ethical deliberation to action is not external but internal, and from Aristotle I learned to name this internal relation "character".'[27] The question is, however, whether Hauerwas' understanding of knowledge-how will graph onto *techne* or *phronesis*.

Hauerwas is concerned to expand academic theology's *epistemic doxa* to include a focus on action rather than production. He will not always use the same term for the phronetic concept he intends, but the focus on action is unmistakable. He writes, '*Practical wisdom*, therefore, seems to include among its functions the apprehension of the moral significance of particular situations through something like a moral intuition.'[28] This already begins in connection with the quote from Aristotle to illustrate the conceptual parallels with Bourdieu's *habitus*, who also drew on Aristotle. But Hauerwas will take *phronesis* in a thoroughly theological direction to challenge the academic *doxa* that delegitimise phronetic knowledge-how in informing theology, aligning simultaneously with Lindbeck's *doxic* contest surrounding the epistemic legitimacy of performance in academic theology. However, Hauerwas' emphasis on phronesis is less concerned with metatextual performance, than with moral action: 'I have argued that the question "What ought I to be ?" precedes the question "What ought I to do ?" If we begin our ethical reflection with the latter question we stand the risk of misunderstanding how *practical reason* should work as well as the moral life itself.'[29] But Hauerwas' vision places the moral life in relation with theologising through phronesis: 'I will try to make candid why I think, to the extent there is a method for doing theology, and in

true. *Character and the Christian Life* grew out of everything I had been doing, but Mr. Gustafson's course certainly helped me focus what I needed to do to write my dissertation.'

[27] *WT*, 66-68.

[28] Hauerwas, *Character*, 60 (emphasis added).

[29] *PK*, 116 (emphasis added).

particular the way I do theology, that method is best understood as an exercise in *practical reason*.'[30] Moreover, Hauerwas seeks to place phronesis in theology through narrative.

> Thus my perhaps too-simplistic claim that liberalism names the project of modernity to create people who have no story except the story they chose when they had no story. That story reflects, as I suggested above, a view of rationality that cannot help but distort the situated character of *practical reason*. I have tried to display how *practical reason* will by necessity reflect a determinative narrative by trying to show the connections between the gospel and everyday practices…. I have done so in the hope that the worship of God is seen as constitutive of a way of life that would otherwise be unintelligible if in fact the God we worship does not exist.[31]

By connecting phronesis with narrative, Hauerwas contests the reigning set of *epistemic doxa* that destories people through abstractionism and objectification, leaving them vulnerable to the symbolic violence of being restoried by the dominant surreptitiously. Consequently, knowledge-that is used often to foster an unnecessary symbolic violence on knowledge-who as much as knowledge-how specifically. This destorying enforces a set of *epistemic doxa* that delegitimise the more inclusive set of *epistemic doxa* that allows for phronesis as a mode of knowledge, which has disastrous implications for theology: 'The distinction between theology and ethics certainly makes no sense to me if, as I have argued, most of theology is an exercise in *practical reason*.'[32] Thus, *phronesis* is his clear preference,[33] though he also refers to it as 'practical wisdom' and 'practical reason'.

However, Hauerwas is by no means the only narrative theology to reorient towards phronesis. Postliberal protestant Lindbeck, perhaps unsurprisingly, seeks to move theology from knowledge-that to knowledge-how.[34] Meanwhile, postconservative protestant Kevin J. Vanhoozer, responding to Lindbeck, moves even more expressly towards phronesis:

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[30] *WT*, 18 (emphasis added).

[31] *WT*, 31 (emphasis added).

[32] *WT*, 96 (emphasis added).

[33] Cf. Hauerwas, *Community*, 123.

[34] *ND*, 35-37, esp. p.35.

'Theology is a form of practical reasoning, of knowing how to fit rightly—in accordance with the script and with the situation—into the drama of redemption. …theology as a form of canonically instructed practical reason is prosaic, phronetic, and prophetic.'[35] Nor are protestants the only ones seeking to integrate phronesis with academic theology. Roman Catholic Johann Baptist Metz writes, 'This justification at the end of time will clearly not be a purely intellectual defence of hope, but a praxis. This justification or vindication is above all a concept of practical reason.'[36] Metz uses phronesis to venture in similar directions to Niebuhr: 'We must now briefly consider … the meaning of truth within the primacy of practical reason. What, in other words, is the position of truth in a practical fundamental theology? … In such a theology, the idea of truth without reference to subjects is irrelevant and even dangerous…. In other words, in a practical fundamental theology, truth is what is relevant to all subjects….'[37] Like Niebuhr, Metz sees the dehumanising nature of a form of epistemic symbolic violence that objectifies and abstracts subjects in the name of doing theology. Like Hauerwas, though, Metz will situate theology in narrative, narrative engaged through phronetic action.

> The inviting logos of Christianity does not in any sense compel. It has a narrative structure with a practical and liberating intention. …it means that the salvation that is founded "for all men" in Christ does not become universal via an idea, but via the intelligible power of a praxis, the praxis of following Christ. This intelligibility of Christianity … can only be transmitted in narrative—as a narrative and practical Christianity.[38]

[35] Vanhoozer, *Drama*, 308-09, cf. also its section entitled 'A Phronetic Theology', pp.324-54. This work in addition to its constructive theological aims, (as its name suggests) offers an extended dialogue with and critique of Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic approach.

[36] Johann Baptist Metz, *Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology*, trans. David Smith (London: Burns & Oates, 1980), 9; cf. also p.7.

[37] Metz, *Faith in History*, 59.

[38] Metz, *Faith in History*, 165.

Hence for Metz practical reason is synonymous with a practical fundamental theology. Along a similar vein, liberation theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez writes, 'En los primeros siglos de la Iglesia, lo que ahora llamamos teología estuvo estrechamente ligado a la vida espiritual.'[39] However, what Gutiérrez means by 'spiritual life' is phronetic in nature. He explains,

> Es en este sentido que san Pablo nos dirá que la fe opera por la caridad: el amor es el sustento y la plenitud de la fe, de la entrega al otro e, inseparablemente, a los otros. Ese es el fundamento de la *praxis* del cristiano, de su presencia activa en la historia. Para la Biblia la fe es la respuesta human total a Dios que salva por amor. En esta perspectiva, la inteligencia de la fe aparece como la inteligencia no de la simple afirmación – y casi recitación – de verdades, sino de un compromiso, de una actitud global, de una postura ante la vida.[40]

For Gutiérrez, to do theology is to engage in an act of faith working through love. This phronetic orientation towards theology contests the academic *doxa* that separate the phronetic dimension of knowing from theology. Yet, Hauerwas, together with these narrative theologians, argues for a more inclusive set of epistemic defaults for the field of academic theology. More provocatively phrased, these narrative theologians demonstrate that there is no theology being done in academic theology if it is being done without love. There is a fundamental phronetic dimension to doing theology incommensurate with knowledge-that, expressed only through knowledge-in-action. Thus, Hauerwas finds support in Bourdieu's *habitus* that the epistemic value of phronesis cannot be reduced to theoretical knowledge-that. Bourdieu develops *habitus*, because approaching agents only in terms of knowledge-that is epistemically problematic. Hauerwas, for similar reasons, objects to the same set of entrenched academic *doxa* that Bourdieu seeks to reform, but in the field of academic theology rather than academic sociology.

[39] *TL*, 57.

[40] *TL*, 59.

Hauerwas' theological and transformational knowledge-how

Now, despite Hauerwas' convergence with Niebuhr to contest the reductionistic *epistemic doxa* of academic theology, it is still the case that they diverge over the prominence of intersubjective knowledge-who in Niebuhr, which is not in focus for Hauerwas' approach to theology. Likewise, for Hauerwas narrative is less about knowing-who (contra Niebuhr) than it is about knowing-in-action. Yet, the reason the intelligibility of lived life is so important for Hauerwas in relation to knowledge of God is that his epistemological model rejects both the classical and modern priorities in relating to ethics and metaphysics.

Andrew Lawless explains the classical and modern schemas, writing that in the classical era epistemology is 'a large branch on the great tree grafted off the even stouter branch of metaphysics. In fact … modernity has perhaps *reversed the order* of priority between these two great philosophical concerns. In the modern philosophy we usually date from Descartes, epistemology has tended to take precedence over metaphysics and to become, as Descartes terms it, the "first philosophy."'[41] Thus, in the classical schema metaphysics was the ground upon which one built an epistemology, while in the modern schema epistemology was the foundation for one's metaphysics. Ethics would then follow from the second-order category, whether metaphysics or epistemology. In the classical model what is true determines how and what one can know how and what one should do; in the modern model what and how you can know determines what (and how) is true and thus how and what one should do. While obviously whether metaphysics or epistemology takes (logical or procedural) priority—or even how separable the categories are—remains debated, Hauerwas rejects both metaphysics and epistemology as the priority for his theological

[41] Andrew Lawless, *Plato's Sun: An Introduction to Philosophy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 96.

approach. Instead of starting with metaphysics or epistemology, *per se*, he commissions ethics as his logical and procedural foundation. Hauerwas writes:

> The narrative nature of Christian convictions helps us see that 'ethics' is not what one does after one has gotten straight on the meaning and truth of religious beliefs; rather Christian ethics *offers the means* for exploring the meaning, relation, and truthfulness of Christian convictions. That is not to say that Christian convictions are proven meaningful or true by showing their ethical implications; rather they are both true and ethical in that they force us to a true understanding of ourselves and our existence. Christian ethics must deal with the fact that either separation or too close an identity between theology and ethics distorts the character of Christian convictions, as the beliefs that claim to provide a truthful understanding of God, self, and the world do so *only as they also transform* the self. Religious convictions, at least Christian convictions, are not primitive worldviews that must be given more sophisticated metaphysical or literal expression before they can be tested for their truth. Rather the claims they make about the way things are involve convictions about the way we should be *if we are to be able to see truthfully* the way things are. If we are to understand how Christian convictions help us to form our lives truthfully the *narrative nature of our lives* must be recognized.[42]

Thus, for Hauerwas narrative functions as the mode of theological discourse precisely because it corresponds to the nature of human life and action. It is the mode in which knowledge-how as much as knowledge-that is possible. Moreover, as ethics is embedded within narrative, it is through the storied human lives of action that access to knowledge is gained. The way that a human lives shapes what they can know and how they can know it. Hauerwas is arguing, when it comes to Christianity and especially the knowledge of God, the only way to know the truth is to live the truth, or rather to live the kind of life that makes the truthfulness of Christianity possible to know. Consequently, while there is a truth, a metaphysical reality, the epistemological capacity to know it is mediated by living the ethic offered through and as its narrative. In this sense, Hauerwas has radically changed the rules of relation between ethics and both metaphysics and epistemology, and slightly between epistemology and metaphysics to each other. To put it in Aristotelian terms, there is no *episteme* without *phronesis*. One cannot know what can be demonstrated as invariable

[42] Hauerwas, *Community*, 90 (emphasis added).

knowledge unless one becomes the right kind of person who would be able to approach knowledge-that—especially knowledge-thats of a transcendent, invariable nature such as the knowledge of God. To put it in more Hauerwasian terms, intelligibility is predicated on narrativized virtue, on living story of Christ, on transformation. The key insight that Hauerwas is developing here is that ethical transformation is not so much the consequence of knowing—whether with epistemology or metaphysics taking procedural priority—as the precondition for knowing. In this way, the narrative a person is living out and within generates the possibilities of what can be known and how. Live a narrative, do a praxis that is insufficient or even antagonistic to either knowledge-that or knowledge-how and such knowledge will be rendered either unimportant or false, even if it would be in regards to an epistemological outlook or metaphysical reality both necessary and true as well as relevant or determinative of future action(s) and/or ethical character. Hauerwas' is not ambivalent towards either metaphysics or epistemology. He thinks there is a 'way things are' and there is such a thinking as 'seeing truthfully' those things. However, what he realises is that it is only in being the kind of person who would be able to see truthfully the way things are that a consideration of metaphysics or epistemology or even their interrelationship becomes possible. There might be an ultimate reality and there might be ways of knowing, but none of that matters if a person is not the kind of person who either cares about ultimate reality or ways of knowing, or even cares to be the kind of person who can know ultimate reality or ways of knowing. Yet, Hauerwas' provocative claim here is that 'seeing truthfully' is a lived moral category. It is not merely about intellectual or informational formation being requisite for knowledge, as often considerations of knowledge and epistemology often assume in the modern and scientific period where methodology alone is held to provide access to knowledge—not that Hauerwas would want to be entirely dismissive of such methodologies. Rather for Hauerwas knowledge categorically requires more than just a good

epistemologically justified methodology, it requires virtue and character. In fact, Hauerwas is suggesting that without virtue and character formation it will always be impossible to have a fully successful epistemic approach. This constitutes as much as with Niebuhr a massive hope for reformation of the operative *epistemic doxa* in academic theology. By reorganising the priority of both epistemology and metaphysics and subordinating them to ethics, Hauerwas turns the *epistemic doxa* on its head. It questions the epistemic legitimacy of the entire academic field, including academic theology. In this sense, Hauerwas' contest against the symbolic violence is more systemic than Niebuhr's. Where Niebuhr contests the *doxa* to include knowledge-who in academic theology, Hauerwas questions whether the academic field without theologically shaped phronesis has any productive value in terms of the field's own stated *illusio* of acquiring and producing knowledge-that, the cultural capital it idolises. Moreover, Hauerwas warns all academic fields directed through the field of academic theology of their greatest danger: that without ethics shaping and conditioning one's epistemology, one's epistemological approach will leave one – and perhaps even one's community – with only the illusion of knowledge, the phantom of truth. Further, this virtuous character cannot subsist in merely intellectual habits. Hauerwas demands that this virtue be wholistic and integrated through the entire fabric of the lived story of one (and one's community's) existence. The character of the whole person – and the whole community – as they live their story in the world generates and/or removes, restricts or enfranchises the epistemic possibilities available as well as the reliability of those epistemological assets.

It is here narrative enters for Hauerwas, for in narrative the *transformative* capacity is embedded, being oriented towards an integrated understanding and transformation of being human. The advantage of narrative is that it enfolds the wholistic picture of being human: it is a mode of meaning that is not merely behavioural or intellectual or affectional or even spiritual, nor is it exclusively individualistic or communalistic. Rather because it is expressive

of human life, it can transform all dimensions of a human, and do so towards the modes of knowing and towards reality in a greater and greater way. Of course, this is preconditioned on the kind of narrative by which one lives their life, such that the particular narrative matters. Not all stories will of necessity lead to the same ending. This is why the story of Jesus is so important for Hauerwas, both because it is narrative and because it is Jesus. He writes, 'I have tried to show that if we pay attention to the narrative and self-involving character of the Gospels, as the early disciples did, there is no way to speak of Jesus' story without its forming our own. The story it forms creates a community which corresponds to the form of his life.'[43] Because narrative naturally draws the reader into its world and especially so for the story of Jesus in the Gospels, Jesus' story is transformative of the whole person and not just individually but communally. Also, this transformation takes the shape of imitating Jesus' life through lived narrativization. The more a person engages narratively with the person of Christ the more Jesus directs and cultivates a Jesus-character in the living narrative of the person in various dimensions of their life.

Yet this raises a related question, namely how do you adjudicate between stories and the renderings of Jesus' life in the life of an individual and/or community. Hauerwas insists,

> The social ethical task of the church, therefore, is to be the kind of community that tells and tells rightly the story of Jesus. … like the early Christians, [we] must learn that understanding Jesus' life is inseparable from learning how to live our own. … A truthful telling of the story cannot be guaranteed by historical investigation (though that investigation certainly can be in service to the truth), but by being the kind of people who can bear the burden of that story with joy. … I understand my own story through seeing the different ways in which others are called to be his disciples. If we so help one another, perhaps, like the early Christians when challenged about the viability of their faith, we can say, 'But see how we love one another.'[44]

Hauerwas here does not diverge from his turn towards ethics. Instead, ethics remains the centre of focus. To ensure one knows the story of Jesus one has to live the story of Jesus. The

[43] Hauerwas, *Community*, 51.

[44] Hauerwas, *Community*, 52.

living of a Christ-like life is what makes a better imitation of that life possible. The 'struggle to be faithful' to the story of Jesus in lived reality grants better access to the story of Jesus in the Gospels itself. Yet Hauerwas also is careful to expand the scope from the individual. Not only must a person embrace the story of Jesus as their own life, but they must participate in the communal expression of that life, part of which is turning towards the expressions of Jesus' life in the other members of that community to gain insight for living their own. Moreover, it is through the narrativized expression of Jesus' life as a community, especially a community that loves, that enables epistemically the adjudication of the collective ethical, epistemic, and metaphysical concerns. Why then choose the story of Jesus as the story that stories one's life? The answer is the lived story of Jesus. Why choose one version of the lived story of Jesus over another? The answer is the lived story of Jesus expressing itself in a community. Yet, this phronetic orientation means also that the answer to the question is not steeped in symbolic violence, but in possibility for epistemic inclusivity and broader social legitimation through love.

In light of this, one could argue that Hauerwas has just made ethics his epistemology, which on some level is true. However, the necessary nuance is that Hauerwas has placed *narrative* at the heart of his epistemology because its logical and procedural basis is ethics, in that ethics is about action as is narrative, so that since ethics is always narrative at heart it is impossible without it. Consequently, the lived life of ethics is always narratival, so that the narrative and lived intelligibility becomes the epistemological process in general, one oriented towards a metaphysical reality. This epistemological and/or metaphysical refinement then continues to shape one's character. This means that knowledge is always able to grow as is the capacity to know, rendering the whole structure more dynamic than static. It is a spiraling, perhaps even externally oriented mode of knowing. Yet simultaneously, it contains a potentially dooming flaw: namely that by restructuring the relations between ethics,

epistemology, and metaphysis to flow from ethics towards epistemology towards metaphysics, Hauerwas may have condemned himself to a procedural intensification of abstraction, exactly the *epistemic doxa* he sought to leave behind in the first place: practice generates an epistemology which approaches a metaphysics, even if those metaphysics then transform the nature of later practice. Each stage would seem to grow increasingly more theoretical and less actional. Does prioritising ethics destine the project to demote actual ethics as it spirals towards an ethic of abstraction? Only if it is assumed that knowing and reality itself is abstract and divorced from action. However, a far more radical possibility coheres, that all reality and knowing embraces some form of narrativity, of action. That is, to reverse the perspective, if ultimate reality subsists with some form of narrativity, then knowing and approaches to knowing must embrace it or relate to it, as must ethics. Consequently, since it is clear that ethics is narratival, then it at least fulfils the conditions necessary for which narrativity is inseparable from epistemology and metaphysics. Since this only offers for possibility rather than determination[45] of narrativity being embedded in the nature of reality, then a greater turn towards ethics may offer additional support for the hypothesis that there is a narrativity to epistemology and metaphysics. Thus, ethical transformation of character in the story of life is all the more necessary. Whether or not Hauerwas fully avoids an intensification of abstraction in his own approach, it is now clear how his turn to narratival ethics exposes the truly ethical nature of the epistemological dilemma, i.e. that the kind of person you are often determines what you can know as much as what you do know. If you are the wrong kind of person you might never be able to know the truth, but you will always be able to think that you do. No amount of being told *what* the truth is will help, nor will it help to be told *how* you can know, because you will not be the right

[45] Note that by reversing the relationship one risks the fallacy of modus tollens (if A then B; B; ergo A), unless one recognises that the argument has moved towards probabilistic reasoning rather than deductive.

kind of person to either seek or acquire the knowledge. Only being and ever increasingly becoming the right kind of person in the wholistic narrativization of life will refine *how* and *what* a person knows.

This constitutes a hermeneutical approach to knowledge and theology, but where it improves other hermeneutical frameworks is that Hauerwas recognizes that what determines the hermeneutic often has far less to do with one's epistemological assumptions, techniques, or aims, or even one's metaphysical presuppositions, ideology, or demands, even still the social expectations—as much as obviously these things can have a decisive role. Rather he sees that ethics and praxis—the lived storied lives of one's self and community—also plays a crucial role. Often what governs one's hermeneutic is more about the kind of person one is, how one has been shaped and formed—yes, by one's society and philosophical structure, but even more by one's personal history, by what has been done to a person and what that person has done themself. Consequently, the only hope of knowing is becoming the right kind of person. But how then can you become this right kind of person? Hauerwas argues through living a narrative—the technological element—but the phronetic element is living well the revelatory narratives of Christ as an individual in a community, a church.

Despite Hauerwas' attunement the wholistic lived reality of a storied life, especially one shaped by Jesus, his orientation towards knowing—where the better you are the more you know but also the more you can know of what is true and real—remains oddly impersonal, even in relation to knowing Jesus, especially given both the nature of narrative and the other-oriented quality it has. Now, probably he would want to say that the narrative enables better access to the *Who* of God not simply the *thats* of God, but the emphasis is so much on the ethical and epistemological reformation of the narrativizing human, that attention is almost exclusively devoted to the depersonalised forms and expressions of knowledge-that or -how, namely thoughts and actions. By placing all his focus on

knowledge-how and to a lesser extent on knowledge-that in his turn to ethics and narrative, Hauerwas has ultimately—at least in part—fallen prey to the danger of an abstracted moralised Christ he sought to reject. In his orientation towards narrative, Hauerwas has developed a robust hermeneutical approach towards knowledge based on ethics, but so focused on what and how people need to live that a crucial interpersonal dynamic to knowledge has been lost.

The Yale School: Divergent on Narrative

We can now answer our ultimate question on whether the Yale School in fact shares an understanding of narrative. The answer is a clear 'No'. For on narrative H.R. Niebuhr and Hauerwas clash dramatically. While Hauerwas brings in Christ to cut his gordian knot as does Niebuhr, he only brings in the abstracted person of Christ, the modelised version of himself Niebuhr warns of and Hauerwas ironically sought to avoid.[46] Yet, as insightful as Hauerwas is on how the developing character of a storied human life transformed towards Jesus' story constitutes a robust epistemology, a fundamental element to being the kind of person who can know the true and living God is personal knowledge, not simply being a moral person. There are many moral persons, after all. Consequently, these affiliates of the Yale School's radically different priorities and orientations towards knowledge truly collide on narrative. Hauerwas' mainly phronetic and impersonal orientation towards knowing Jesus in narrative contradicts firmly Nieburh's interpersonal orientation towards knowing Jesus in narrative, which is so personal so as to be phronetic. In favour of Niebuhr, even if one assumed the model Hauerwas suggests of looking to the Gospels and living Jesus' story after him in particular, the discipleship – Hauerwas recognises as necessary – offered and

[46] Note that Hauerwas' earlier comment that historical investigation does not yield a truthful telling of Jesus' story represents a parallel historicist abstraction to his practical abstraction, because it shares a fundamentally impersonalised orientation towards knowing Christ.

modelled was never depersonalized. It was only ever in being personally connected with Christ. The discipleship that makes one able to know Christ only comes through a personal knowledge of Him, as Jesus' own words reveal, 'Many will say to me on judgment day, "Lord, Lord, didn't we prophesy in your name, and didn't we cast out demons, and didn't we do many miracles in your name?" and then I will confess to them 'I never knew you. Get away from me you who practice lawlessness!"' (Mt 7.22-23). Jesus himself reveals personal knowledge cannot be lost regardless the heights of ethical activity in the Jesus-formed ethical life. An ethical life serves as the actional epistemological key Hauerwas finds in narrative, but this orientation to knowledge-who of Jesus Niebuhr maintains as just as critical to narrative. Further, in underplaying the personal and emphasising ethical, Hauerwas has also overlooked a critical practical element to the transformational narrative character of the Christian life, namely motivation towards such a life. Hauerwas turns to narrative (as a phronetic knowledge-how, or better, knowledge-in-action) as necessary to wholistic ethical transformation that enables knowledge-that. Niebuhr conversely wants to turn to narrative primarily because it allows for personal and corporate knowledge not merely of the *thats* of theology but of Who that gives rise and meaning to all of the *thats*, both in history and beyond. Thus, it is in Niebuhr that Hauerwas' necessary motivational element for virtue is found. It is love *for* Jesus as well as love *from* Jesus – love that extends by virtue of the personal knowledge of Jesus to storied personal relationships with others – that continually drives a person more deeply into assuming the not merely narrativized information about Jesus or aspects of his lifestyle as part of their own life story. Rather, taking Hauerwas' phronetic-narrative insight even more seriously than he has, interpersonal love with Jesus allows a person to assume more of Jesus himself into their life story, to have a dynamic co-narrative with Jesus. It is in engaging Jesus narratively that opens the opportunity Niebuhr emphasises to know Jesus' personally, and in knowing Jesus personally more personal

knowledge becomes available. It is this deepening of personal relation with Jesus—existing narratively—that enables both the *motivation* to live out Jesus' story faithfully as well as the *capacity* to do so: a person knows *who* Jesus is so as to know the how's of narrativizing him through their own life phronetically and the what's of Jesus and Christianity epistemically. Thus, while a synthesis of H.R. Niebuhr and Hauerwas is possible and what we would advocate as necessary, outside of some synthesis their intrinsic orientations towards narrative are conclusively and diametrically opposed. Theirs is the difference between emphasising narrative as *rational* intelligibility (Hauerwas) and as *relational* intelligibility (Niebuhr). Neither of these forms of intelligibility were compatible with academic theology's *epistemic doxa*, however. Thus, Hauerwas and Niebuhr aligned, though separated by a generation, on challenging the symbolic violence using narrative, despite their actual understanding and use of narrative extending in opposite directions.

In the Niebuhr-Hauerwas opposition the Yale School as a coherent shared understanding of narrative collapses, because it has been demonstrated that not one but two sets of scholars within the Yale School who should have much in common vis-à-vis their understandings of narrative fail to agree on what narrative is and even how it works. With the first pair, Frei sees narrative as a meaning generating and ruling text while Lindbeck sees narrative as a prop the community's performance as metatext. For the second pair, Niebuhr argues narrative is a native feature of human existence so that specifically the biblical narratives of Christ are a revelatory means of knowing God personally, while Hauerwas understands narrative as a form of wholistic epistemology rooted in lived human action and especially as an epistemology primarily oriented towards Christian knowledge-how and knowledge-that, that is, how to live Christianly and knowledge about the Christian God. Ultimately, these four understandings are not compatible with one another, at least in how they function in the actual writings of Frei, Lindbeck, Niebuhr, and Hauerwas. It is true all

four write and emphasise narrative, but they do not mean the same thing by narrative. Frei intends a literary object; Lindbeck understands a community performance; Niebuhr recognises a mode of interpersonal knowledge; while Hauerwas envisions a *habitus sapientiae*. Thus, whatever the Yale School is, it is not a cohering understanding of narrative, even if one can find some occasional overlap. The 'Yale School' is not so much a school of thought, as it is often understood. Rather it is the structural realisation of *habitus academicus* driving a coordination of cultural and social capital in the field of the theological academy. Yet, their position in the field of power as whole is fragile and requires that they not only coordinate in contesting the *epistemic doxa* of theology, but that they recruit academic capital beyond academic theology, specifically Wittgenstein's.

Wittgenstein, the Yale School, Stanley Fish, and *Doxic* Struggle

The influence of Wittgenstein vis-à-vis the Yale should not be overlooked, for he appears as a shaping force in Lindbeck and Hauerwas and has his influence explicitly rejected by Frei. It could be questioned whether the Frei vs. Lindbeck divide graphs along the New Criticism school of literary studies and Reader Response Theory of Stanley Fish. Fish summaries the two approaches, 'In the first model [New Criticism] critical activity is controlled by free-standing objects in relation to which its accounts are either adequate or inadequate; in the other model [his own] critical activity is constitutive of its object.'[47] New Critics view the text as an object with its own internal meaning. Fish redefines the text from stable artefact to the interpretive activity itself. Obviously, it would be hard to miss the conceptual parallels here to Lindbeck's narrative as metatext.

[47] Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 365

Intriguingly Lindbeck and Fish infrequently cite Wittgenstein directly. Fish does, however, allude in his model of criticism to Wittgenstein's language-game conceptuality:[48] 'The responsibilities of the critic under this model are very great indeed, for rather than being merely a player in the game, he is a maker and unmaker of its rules.'[49] This, put alongside §432 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, confirms the alignment of Fish's class activity as metatext and Lindbeck's community performance as narrative metatext arises through shared dependence on Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein writes, 'Jedes Zeichen scheint *allein* tot. *Was* gibt ihm Leben? – Im Gebrauch *lebt* es. Hat es da den lebenden Atem in sich? – Oder ist der *Gebrauch* sein Atem?'[50] Thus, there can be no mistaking that while Lindbeck and Fish rarely quote Wittgenstein, they share conceptual dependence on him.

Further, Hauerwas remarks on Fish's unstated dependence on Wittgenstein: 'Influenced by J. L. Austin (and Wittgenstein although he is not mentioned), Fish argues that language is not a handmaid to perception.'[51] Hauerwas later reaffirms Fish's dependence on Wittgenstein while simultaneously indicating his own: 'In a similar fashion Fish's argument [in *How to Write a Sentence*] concerning the logical form of a sentence can be seen as an elaboration of Wittgenstein's remark in the *Philosophical Investigations* that "[g]rammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)."'[52] That Fish depends on Wittgenstein is clear to Hauerwas. But consequently, even if here Hauerwas uses Fish to

[48] Cf. esp. §83 of Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen = Philosophical Investigations*, Revised fourth edition, ed. P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (Chichester, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 43e-44e.

[49] Fish, *Is There a Text*, 367.

[50] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 135e.

[51] *WT*, 111.

[52] *WT*, 115, commenting on Stanley Fish, *How to Write a Sentence and How to Read One* (New York: HarperCollins, 2011), and citing Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), §373.

develop a guide (one might say grammar) for ‘How to Write a Theological Sentence’, in an earlier work, he reflects that the ultimate source for his orientation lies with Wittgenstein.

> Wittgenstein's influence was of quite a different order than H. Richard Niebuhr's. He slowly cured me of the notion that philosophy was primarily a matter of positions, ideas, and/or theories. From Wittgenstein, and later David Burrell, I learned to understand and also to do philosophy in a therapeutic mode. … Moreover, Wittgenstein ended forever any attempt on my part to try to anchor theology in some general account of "human experience," for his writings taught me that the object of the theologians' work was best located in terms of the grammar of the language used by believers.[53]

Thus, while Hauerwas constructively employs Fish in this specific chapter of *Work of Theology*, his conceptual dependence, like Fish and Lindbeck, traces back to Wittgenstein, who states parenthetically ‘Theology as grammar’. Though Wittgenstein fails to unpack it in the immediate context of the statement, Hauerwas takes up the task in his own work. Moreover, Hauerwas flatly explains here that he is contesting a reigning set of academic *doxa* about the nature of philosophy and theology on two fronts. First, Hauerwas resists the propositional, abstractionist account of philosophy and theology which also diminishes philosophical objectified capital from having a practical and transformative value. Second, Hauerwas resists overgeneralising human experience, that is, the inadvertent abstractionism of Lindbeck’s metatextual performative narrativity. Instead, Hauerwas learns from Wittgenstein that the *epistemic inclusivity*, even *doxa*, specific to *theology* must not be lost in the practice of academic theology, since it would remove *theology* from *academic theology* in both concept and practice. It cedes to symbolic violence the broader set of epistemic vantage points that not only theology allows, but demands.

Therefore, viewed more broadly, while it could be suggested that Fish’s Reader Response Theory provided the conceptual resources to the Yale School’s *doxic* struggle through narrative, rather the rise to dominance in the humanities of Reader Response Theory

[53] *PK*, xxi.

likely provided some added social and cultural capital to the coordinated *doxic* struggle of the Yale School. In other words, while it would be hard to argue that the Yale School did not benefit from the turn to Reader Response Theory in the wider academy, it would also be wrong to suggest that Reader Response Theory provided the conceptual sources for those in the Yale School who incorporated some similar conceptual elements. Rather Fish, Lindbeck, and (in a slightly different vein) Hauerwas, share Wittgenstein as their source of symbolic legitimation. It is because Wittgenstein's work posthumously attained such acclaim (e.g. reputationally held cultural capital) as well as the nature of the conceptual structure of his production itself that both Reader Response Theory and the Yale School of theology use him. Wittgenstein can be used to illuminate some of the *epistemic doxa* of the humanities in the academy that Fish, Lindbeck, and Hauerwas want to contest, but perhaps even more importantly Wittgenstein already carries some level of symbolic legitimation within the academy. Thus, by leveraging Wittgenstein these three Yale-connected scholars are able to appropriate some cultural capital for themselves, which puts them in a better position within the academy to contest the *epistemic doxa*. What we see is a simultaneous alignment of goals rather than dependence of the Yale School on Fish for its own thought, though it certainly exploited the situation that Fish helped to create for their own struggle against academic symbolic violence.

Having considered these objectified expressions of cultural capital sourced from Wittgenstein, we must consider the role that social capital may have played in these intersections. For as much as all three share some conceptual dependence on Wittgenstein, they also all share the shared social environment of Yale. Lindbeck[54] and Fish[55] actually

[54] Greg Sterling, 'George Lindbeck, 1923-2018', Yale Divinity School, January 19, 2018 (Accessed 21 October 2021), https://divinity.yale.edu/news/george-lindbeck-1923-2018.

[55] Gary A. Olson, *Stanley Fish, America's Enfant Terrible: The Authorized Biography* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press , 2016), 25-37, 173.

overlapped there alongside Frei[56] and H.R. Niebuhr, though there is no indication that they crossed paths.[57] Hauerwas overlapped with Lindbeck and Frei, but missed Fish and Niebuhr.[58] Nevertheless, sharing Yale as an alma mater, but failing to share time there, Hauerwas and Fish became friends living next door to each other when both were on staff at Duke University in Durham, NC.[59] Social capital is the favours, social debts, and networks of human interaction. In fact, Hauerwas relates the role Fish played in Hauerwas' own gain of institutionalised cultural and social capital: 'I was already a member of the board [of Duke University Press] when Stanley Fish became the executive director. He asked me to serve as chair, which I was glad to do.'[60] Hauerwas, of course, is on the board already, but the social invitation from Fish is not separable from the relational capital the two Stanley's share as friends, nor from the nature of the event itself as a distribution of social and institutional capital.

Further, Hauerwas like Fish notes that the institutional dimension to the set of relations that is the academic field cannot be ignored. Hauerwas explains.

> My experience on the APT [Appointments, Promotions, and Tenure] committee and on the board of Duke Press revealed to me that the review process has had the effect of making recent scholarship, particularly in the humanities, far too conformist and conventional. It is not simply that the process encourages young academics to know more and more about less and less, but also that the "less" about which they know is overdetermined by their dissertation director. What dissertation directors know, moreover, is overdetermined by the scholarly guild to which they belong. I worry about this process, knowing that Wittgenstein would have never received tenure at Duke, nor would the *Tractatus* have been published by Duke Press.[61]

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[56] Nathan H. Price and Martha Lund Smalley, 'Guide to the Hans Wilhelm Frei Papers RG 76', Yale Divinity School Library, 1992: 4-6, (Accessed 21 October 2021) http://hdl.handle.net/10079/fa/divinity.076.

[57] Johnson, 'H.R. Niebuhr', 94.

[58] *WT*, 95.

[59] *HC*, 224-25; Olson, *Fish*, 91.

[60] *HC*, 240.

[61] *HC*, 240, referencing Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, trans. C.K. Ogden and F.P. Ramsay, intro. Bertrand Russell (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1922).

These are some of the institutionalised forms of cultural capital within the field of the academy. Hauerwas, by participating in the institution, recognises the symbolic violence that is regularly perpetrated through the academy, though certainly not in every case. He retrojects that Duke Press, had it been offered *Tractutus*, would have met it with symbolic violence because, within the humanities, the *doxic* demands are especially strong. Further, he recognises that the social capital, not only the cultural capital would have been used against Wittgenstein, in the form of refusal of tenure. This is a socially mediated decision on whether to institutionalise a perpetual favoured status to a professor, insulating them from criticism. This is an institutionalised form of social capital. Bourdieu explains,

> Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group—which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital, a "credential" which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. … It is the product of an endless effort at institution, of which institution rites—often wrongly described as rites of passage—mark the essential moments and which is necessary in order to produce and reproduce lasting, useful relationships that can secure material or symbolic profits (see Bourdieu 1982).[62]

This institutionalisation of social capital as tenure, moreover, overlaps with an institutionalisation of control over cultural capital production. Further, Hauerwas expresses concern about the symbolic violence that can result at the intersection of institutionalised social and cultural capital vis-à-vis the relationship between doctoral supervisors and their supervisees, with even greater capacity for supervisor 'overdetermination' in the US academic system, who themselves suffer some symbolic violence due to the constraints of navigating their respective academic field. Yet, Hauerwas signals that his concern for symbolic violence goes to the heart of the *doxic* processes in play in the legitimation of knowledge that the academy makes possible. Rephrasing the question more

[62] Bourdieu, *Forms of Capital*, 248-49, citing Pierre Bourdieu, 'Les rites d'institution', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 43(1982): 58–63.

epistemologically, Hauerwas wants to know what we would not know and *do* not know because the academy does not want to know it or potentially at an even deeper level of the *epistemic doxa*, does not want to be able to know it. In fact, Hauerwas himself had to flag the operation of the academic *epistemic doxa* performing symbolic violence to academic theology when he opted out of being conscripted into becoming an agent of symbolic violence by Duke science and social science faculty members disgruntled by the hiring of an English professor arranged by Fish: 'I noted that the modernist epistemological presumptions that shaped their understanding of "objectivity" were the grounds that were often used to exclude theology from university curriculums.'[63] The institutional systems of the academic field are often prejudicial to expanding the *epistemic doxa*, so much so that even new institutionalisations will be implemented to conserve them. Hauerwas rightly notes that the *epistemic doxa* of the academy are often weaponised against academic theology within the wider structure of the academic field. Simultaneously, he underscores that theology sits below the sciences and social sciences within the larger structuration of the academic field. In other words, academic theology already suffers symbolic violence and delegitimation, which is partly why academic *epistemic doxa* often take priority over theological *epistemic doxa* within academic theology. Agents within academic theology intuitively if not consciously strategise by virtue of their *habitus* that academic theology has too much legitimation to lose in the wider academic field than to risk expanding its *epistemic doxa*, or at least, that by emphasising the dominant *epistemic doxa* of the wider academic field, academic theology will avoid further symbolic violence. As much as the institutionalisations such as professorships, tenure, and titles may insulate agents from suffering as much symbolic violence as they could, institutionalisations also give agents more to lose by expanding the *epistemic doxa*. Thus, while institutionalisations often promise greater freedom in cultural

[63] *HC*, 238.

production, they often also structure the *habitus* towards greater conservation of the *status quo*, or more rarely the aim of massively restructuring the field according to their own interests. Thus, these institutional manifestations of capital and symbolic violence – because Fish and the Yale School face but also acquire them – feature in the broader contours of the Wittgenstein-reinforced *doxic* struggle of the Yale-connected agents.

Further, these prejudicial structures in the institutionalisations of academic theology incentivise the Yale School to leverage, not only individual level social and cultural capital, but social capital scaled to the university as collective agent. In this case, Yale as a university maintains a dominant position within the academic field, not only in the US but worldwide, and has done for some time, at least by reputation. And here it is reputation that matters, rather than the more easily quantifiable, e.g. how large is their endowment (economic capital), how many publications in top tier journals do their graduates and professors achieve (cultural capital)? The institutional reputation transfers its scaled social capital to those individual agents that can legitimately claim it by association. There is a deference, an assumed value, to a person connected with Yale University that is generally shared across the academic field, because the reputational co-recognition is shared across the academic field. Other dominant agents within the field will recognise Yale, because it presents the opportunity for recognition reciprocity by Yale. But the dominant institutional agents will misrecognise dominated institutional agents as less legitimately deserving of reputational and social deference.

Institutions, moreover, are the amalgamated reputational capital of their sponsored agents, so that Fish and the Yale School co-benefit from any legitimation of Yale as academically dominant. So, not only do the individual members of the Yale School benefit from coordinating their critiques under the same brand, but especially from being branded according to their association with Yale. Moreover, Fish as a Yale graduate serves only to

bolster the reputational value of the Yale School of theology. Fish as a member of a more dominant academic field benefits less directly from the Yale School's success, but indirectly as there is a conceptual and reputational link drawn between them. The *illusio* of Fish's field is able to expand beyond its field to colonise an adjacent field with its *epistemic doxa*, even if this expansion is more in appearance than the result of the Yale School of theology actually borrowing conceptual resources from him. Thus, the alignment of Reader Response Theory and the Yale School of narrative theologies presents a win-win strategy: on the one hand, lean on the conceptual legitimation of Wittgenstein in the academy, on the other, lean on the academic reputational legitimation of Yale, in order to more successfully contest the institutionalised forms of symbolic violence.

Hauerwas will even write a book, *The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge of God*,[64] to contest the institutional symbolic violence of the academy against theology, two if you count his *Work of Theology*.

> This mode of [academic] theology was given birth in Germany in the eighteenth century when universities were founded to reflect the Enlightenment understanding of knowledge. Those who formed these universities sought to free the university from what they regarded as servitude to the church. Rather than serving the church, the university would now be the agent to develop knowledge in service to the state. … The development of theology as a scientific discipline deserving inclusion in the curriculum of the new universities such as the University of Berlin was the great achievement of Schleiermacher…. These developments were slower in coming in the United States and Great Britain, but it was not long before theologians in both countries sought to imitate the way theology was done in Germany.[65]

Thus, institutional pressures reframe theology to serve the academy above the church. While these fields in the present need not operate so adversatively, that the wider cultural and institutional transformations of the university effected a symbolic violence on theology genuinely reflects the situation not only of the past, but the epistemic demands of the present.

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[64] Stanley Hauerwas, *The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge of God* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007); cf. *HC*, 240; and esp. *WT*, 94-97.

[65] *WT*, 94-95.

Theology suddenly needed legitimation, and was desperate to acquire it from the new dominant *epistemic doxa* of the modern scientifically-oriented academic field. Consequently, 'The effort to show that theology could meet the demands of being a university discipline resulted in theologians focusing on methodological issues concerning the conditions that must be met if you were to do theology.'[66] The mode of theology had to adapt in the academic field to acquire even miniscule amounts of symbolic legitimation.

It is this situation of the dominance of scientifically-oriented *epistemic doxa* that Wittgenstein, Fish, and the Yale School all find themselves in. Wittgenstein, posthumously, finds some success in contesting this symbolic violence in the modern academy. This modest success is what both Fish and the Yale School seek to build upon, all while being conscious that not only do they need conceptual resources, they also need institutionally recognised social and cultural capital to acquire the symbolic legitimacy they seek for their respective conceptual enterprises, and in the case of the Yale School especially, conceptual enterprises that will benefit the larger marginalised communities that they represent in the academic field.

Concluding Part II

The case study of the Yale School has provided not only their objectified theological productions as conceptual resources for our constructive attempt in Part III, but also a demonstration of the sociological nature of *doing theology*. Academic theology is a site of symbolic violence, as with any other field, with its own set of *epistemic doxa*. Thus, the Yale School, though they were able to co-ordinate to contest the symbolic violence of academic theology's *epistemic doxa* using narrative, they never gained a strong enough sociological position to fully change it, in part, perhaps, due to their dominated backgrounds, and in part,

[66] *WT*, 95.

perhaps, because their understandings of narrative were so disparate if not sometimes also competitive. Nevertheless, they did perhaps create the conditions of possibility for a change of the *epistemic doxa*. For the Yale School demonstrates that theology's epistemology *can* be more inclusive. It does not have to do symbolic violence to texts (Frei) or churches / communities (Lindbeck), knowledge-who (Niebuhr) or knowledge-in-action (Hauerwas). Rather by integrating narrative as a legitimate mode of theology it can take an important step towards removing symbolic violence in its operation and increasing its epistemological capacities. Moreover, narration as phronetically engaged theology offers the chance for theology to become truly life-giving and transformational, not just for itself, but perhaps also for the academy, church, and world. However, symbolic violence remains a serious challenge for theology, so Part III now moves to construct a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation in love, which removes symbolic violence without resorting to it.

PART III:

CONSTRUCTING A LIBERATING, NARRATIVE AND PHRONETIC THEOLOGY OF LOVE

CHAPTER 5:
TOWARDS A CONSTRUCTIVE, NARRATIVE, AND PHRONETIC THEOLOGY OF LOVE

Jesus was once asked, 'Teacher, what is the greatest commandment?' He responded, 'Love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your mind, with all your life, and with all your strength.' But Jesus immediately continued with, 'But the second is like it: love your neighbour as yourself.' Now the questioner immediately saw an opportunity to legitimise himself and delegitimise others from being valued as a 'neighbour'. So, he asked, 'But who is my neighbour?' Now, whether he asked genuinely or cynically, the sought effect was similar: the ability to deploy symbolic violence against another. So, Jesus responded with a story now familiar to many in the West outside academic theology and the church, or even Christianity and the intelligentsia. In fact, this story was so poignant a response that even today, those who help someone in grave distress while passing by are called 'Good Samaritans'. In that satirical story, many forms of symbolic capital and violence are on display: social rank, ethnicity, religion, wealth, busyness, physical violence, theft, avoidance, callousness, among the many others.

His parable is a story centred on the same problem that has confronted our exploration of academic theology's *epistemic doxa* at every turn thus far. Symbolic violence. We first encountered its presence in the *doxa* and *illusio* of a field, rendering a dimension of epistemic and systemic reflexivity imperative. Then, as we synthesised from Bourdieu's expansive corpus a coherent (if dialectical) understanding of Bourdieu's hermeneutic of capitals-fields-*habitus*, symbolic capital appeared as the meta-level capital of importance and dominance in

the meta-level field that includes all other fields towards which agents – individual and collective – incline and exert themselves. Moreover, in synthesising Bourdieu's hermeneutic correspondence with the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love, the analytic presages how social systems operate according to loving the deception of an idol. This called for an approach to the field of academic theology with the epistemic humility of reflexivity to consider its own *epistemic doxa* to uncover how symbolic violence may appear in it.

Applying Bourdieu's analytic to the Yale School, uncovered that that group of narrative theologians were not conceptually aligned on narrative as much as intuitively coordinated to contest the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology. Coming from marginalised socio-cultural communities, as seen in Chapter 3, these theologians were more epistemically sensitive to the symbolic violence of the abstractionist mode academic theology enforced upon the field, precisely because they suffered from it. Hans Frei contested the symbolic violence against the text, while George Lindbeck challenged symbolic violence against community performance. N. Richard Niebuhr struggled against symbolic violence against knowledge-who of God, while Stanley Hauerwas exposed symbolic violence against knowledge-how in theology, arguing knowledge-that is only possible on the basis of phronetic activity. Each of these four theologians diverge on the nature and use of narrative in theology, but each converge on identifying the symbolic violence in theology by interfacing its *epistemic doxa* with narrative. Moreover, all argue that legitimating narrative in theology would go a long way towards neutralising or diminishing symbolic violence in academic theology.

This brings us to the crux of the problem of symbolic violence in academic theology. If symbolic violence is the problem, and if it is as endemic to the operation of social systems as we have seen, how do we remove symbolic violence without resorting to symbolic violence? I will be reflexively transparent here. In an earlier draft of my argument, I think my

solution ultimately resorted to symbolic violence more than it subverted it. I had initially sought to compel academic theology towards more liberative practice by turning it back towards the hierarchal priority of the legitimation of the sciences over the humanities in the academic field. I had intended to show that if theology was to retain academic legitimation it could not delegitimise narrative as epistemically productive by turning to cognitive science to legitimise narrative as a mode of theologising. I suspect the assessment still proves valid that delegitimising narrative is out of pace with narrative's place in the wider schema of the academy and risks theology's long-term delegitimation by retaining a hostility to a narrative-inclusive epistemology. At the same time, I am confronted with the reality that what I want to construct must itself be constructive. I cannot solve the problem of symbolic violence by resorting to it. The question set before this constructive Part III, then, is how to decentre symbolic violence from theology. Narrative is an essential part of this solution, as Jesus' use of the parable of the Good Samaritan reveals. As such, we will construct a phronetic epistemology through narrative theologising, in order to liberate academic theology *from* deconstructive symbolic violence and *towards* constructive faith, hope, and love. Consequently, a phronetic epistemology of love through narrativisation will not 'know' by abstracting or instrumentalising, by subjectivising or objectivising knowing or by participating in any form of symbolic violence, but by *living* an individual and collective participation in the liberative phronesis of Christ, incarnated, crucified, and resurrected.

To begin, in this chapter, we place the Yale School in dialogue with Gustavo Gutiérrez to explain how scripture and narrative are essential components of constructive theology refraining from symbolic violence, that is a theology that is life-giving. Then we will consider J. Daniel Schubert's philosophical critique of Bourdieu's *habitus* for failing to offer a positive solution. Not only does Schubert cohere with Ch. 2's analysis, but he also highlights the need for any solution to symbolic violence in academic theology to be

positively constructive. Gustavo Gutiérrez will continue to assist in constructing the shape of a productive liberative effort with the resources of Bourdieu and the Yale School. With goals and mode set for developing a liberative phronetic epistemology of love through narrative, Chapter 6 will then begin to narrate, in reverse order, the story of love that provides us with a phronetic epistemology. It is the story of the Triune living God's redemption in love of a humanity fallen into to a vicious, idol-trusting, deception-hoping, apostacy-loving cycle of symbolic violence. In the story of the resurrection, we find a phronetic epistemology of love which removes a symbolic violence that instrumentalises all knowing through an exegetical interaction 1 Corinthians 13 which incorporates the phronetic dialectic epistemologies of Bourdieu and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Chapter 7, subsequently, in the story of Christ crucified and incarnate, presents a phronetic theology of liberation through love. This cruciform love exposes the existential complications of life embedded within games for symbolic power. These games promise to provide humanity with symbolic legitimation, but Christ crucified offers eternal life embedded within love, which simultaneously makes knowledge knowable. Finally, in the story of the incarnation, we find a phronetic theology of liberation through love, which removes symbolic violence without resorting to it through embodied, objectified, and institutionalised solidarity, following the hypostatic solidarity of Jesus Christ. All these stages of the story of redemption flow out of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit living in love and choosing redemption in love. This thread of election appears in all stages and offers in, through, and with these reverse-ordered stories the possibility of theology and life not only for theology but for the church that eschews symbolic violence and offers instead a phronetic epistemology of love and theology of liberation into grace through narrative.

Learning how to construct theology without symbolic violence

The first step of constructing theology decentred from symbolic violence is to embrace the insights of the Yale School in contesting symbolic violence. Symbolic violence can be hard to identify because it operates at the level of the assumptions. So, we would be remiss to ignore the reflexivity on symbolic violence that our case study of the Yale School has already enabled. Therefore, I intend to follow Frei in refusing to do symbolic violence to Scripture as a text by trying to let it speak for itself, on its own terms. However, even more importantly, I follow Frei in seeking to avoid symbolic violence to God who stands behind and speaks through the text. This is both the self-descriptive position of the Scriptures themselves, but also it aligns with the tradition of theology to which I authentically belong, and to that extended community of Christian theology throughout the centuries. Hauerwas shares Frei's concern but extends it to the symbolic violence that is done to the discipline of theology by delegitimising the phronetic orientation towards doing theology alongside and underneath the authority of the Christian Scriptures as the church, the community that since its inception has sought not only knowledge-that of the Scriptures but knowledge-who of God through the Scriptures and knowledge-in-action directed by the Scriptures. Hauerwas writes:

> Finally, what must be added to this bill of particulars about the relation of modern theology and the church is what I can only describe as the fragmentation of theology into autonomous disciplines. Theology classically understood is fundamentally exegetical, but now the study of the Old and New Testament is assumed to be a historical discipline. The theologian must now wait on the historian to tell her what the Bible might say about this or that. Accordingly, theologians, other than Barth, seldom try to develop their positions using arguments from scripture. In a similar manner church history becomes a discipline that makes difficult the attempt by theologians to use theologians of the past in a constructive manner.[1]

Far from undermining a constructive effort to recentre theology from symbolic violence, looking to the Scriptures is essential in that effort, because to do otherwise would not only do symbolic violence to the text but the community of the text; not only to the God who speaks

[1] *WT*, 96.

through the text, but the community to whom God speaks. In this, Hauerwas and Lindbeck share a reflexive concern surrounding the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology. Lindbeck warned of delegitimising the performance of the community as epistemically valid and valuable in academic theology. Lindbeck's aim of relegitimising the relation of the church to and of the living/lived qualities of theology in academic theology is essential to constructing an academic theology that does not resort to symbolic violence in order to remove it.

Here Frei and Niebuhr also cohere. For as Frei exposes the symbolic violence of delegitimising the voice of God in the text, Niebuhr resists and highlights the symbolic violence done to both God and the human subject by depersonalising the nature of theology through denarrativizing it. That is, Niebuhr is just as concerned as Frei that theology not reduce God to an emotion or an idea or a source for moral formation, but that theology be allowed to be the site and process of meeting and knowing the true and living God intersubjectively through revelation. Theology that refuses to consider knowledge-who as legitimately theological sterilises both God and humanity's quality of personhood. Further, it results in a theology that is abstracted from living, reducing it to mere description and conceptualisation. Not only can you not know God personally through theology, but also you cannot experience yourself being known by God through theology. If we are to construct a way of doing theology that does not resort to symbolic violence we must allow for and embrace the intersubjective dimension of doing theology.

Equally, we must avoid the delegitimation of the phronetic dimension of theology as Hauerwas argues. For in doing so, symbolic violence is done to the essential quality of agency in theology. If theology is not about action as well as conceptualisation, then a fundamental part of human life and learning is denied. This kind of passivizing abstractionism not only does symbolic violence to the living communities of theology, but also determines the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology dramatically away from ever asking

perhaps the most important epistemic question in theology: not just what can I know, or how can I know, but am I living as the kind of person for whom knowing anything – and anyone (to incorporate Niebuhr's insight here) – anyhow would matter. Hauerwas alongside Niebuhr, Frei, and Lindbeck perceives that allowing academic theology to include the narrative mode of theologising is somehow related to resisting symbolic violence and reforming the *epistemic doxa* of theology to be more inclusive, even if they do not share the same views on narrative or the elements of the *epistemic doxa* that narrative could help resist and reform.

Gutiérrez, a narrative theologian from the liberation stream, unifies the Yale School's diverse attempts at removing symbolic violence in academic theology while simultaneously illuminating why the Yale School turns to narrative as an essential part of the solution by turning to Bourdieu's dialogue partner, viz. Pascal.

> El lenguaje sobre Dios se inspira en el mensaje cristiano, pero también – e indisolublemente – en el mundo como un hecho de *vida*. … No hay teología que no tenga su dejo propio para hablar de Dios. Un *sabor*, un gusto especial, que es lo que la palabra "dejo" significa también. Las diferencias en ese hablar deben ser respectadas. No uniformidad impuesta, pero sí *fidelidad* al mensaje evangélico y *entendimiento* en la diversidad. … Pariendo de la densidad de la vida humana, un lenguaje anclado en un mundo cultural determinado debe *saber narrar* la experiencia de Jesús y de quienes acogido su testimonio. … La Biblia está formada por narraciones de tipo muy diverso. … Dios, más concretamente la humanidad de Dios, Jesús, se hace presente a aquellos que lo acogen en sus vidas a través de relatos. La palabra sobre él debe, por consiguiente, llevar esa impronta narrativa. El célebre texto de Blas Pascal que contrapone "el Dios de Abrahán, de Isaac, de Jacob y de Jesucristo" al "Dios de los filósofos" es precisamente el contraste del Dios de la narración con el Dios del concepto y la abstracción.[2]

Gutiérrez echoes the intuitions of the Yale School, but also explains why they turn to narrative. They are seeking to negotiate symbolic violence while taking account of and celebrating the diversity of "flavour" available to theology. Moreover, it is a liberative impulse that theology must be made up of "life." Christian theology, including its academic expressions, claim to speak of the God of life. But life is not a static category, nor is it merely

[2] Gustavo Gutiérrez, *La Densidad del Presente* (Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme, 2003), 62-63 (emphasis added).

conceptual or abstract. Life is narration. Theology bearing the mark of life requires narration, because narration is the only way to speak of life in any kind of concrete and particular manner. Moreover, knowing cannot be separated from the living person who knows. Narration operates in the realm of diversity but without imposing the symbolic violence of a pseudo-uniformity through abstraction. What the Yale School sought in narrative was a way to do theology from within one's textual (Frei), personal (Neibuhr), communal (Lindbeck), and ethical (Hauerwas) life without artificially bifurcating or obfuscating that dimension of doing theology. As we saw in Chapter 3, each of the Yale School just as Gutiérrez here came from a place outside of dominance within the social field, a place of cultural and personal dislocation. Yet, even this description is too abstract, they lived from within a story of being the other, being oppressed, being the recipient of symbolic violence. For Gutiérrez grew up, lived, and ministered in Peru with its great economic and political violence.[3] Hauerwas was the son of a Southern bricklayer. Frei as a Jew had to flee the Nazis. Lindbeck grew up in East Asia where being a Christian was markedly rare. Niebuhr was the son of German immigrants to the USA. To them, we could add that Ricoeur, who Frei eventually agrees with, was a Huguenot war orphan.[4] Meanwhile, Bourdieu, our sociological dialogue partner, was from humble origins in the French countryside. At least in part, narrative is the way they (Bourdieu not withstanding) want to do theology, Gutiérrez suggests, because narrative allows them to be themselves in theologising and captures a poignant element of their theology, namely how God has been part of their story as well as part of the stories of those they love. In other words, narrative has the capacity to build an inclusive kind of empathy. They advocate for using narrative to avoid symbolic violence, because it is in the living

[3] Casiano Floristán, 'Introducción: Gustavo Gutiérrez, su persona, su teología y su espiritualidad', *La Densidad del Presente* (Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme, 2003), 9-16.

[4] Cf. Edward Baring, *Converts to the Real: Catholicism and the Making of Continental Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 310.

narrative of knowing and being known by God and because they experience freedom from symbolic violence through narrative. They practice a theology that embraces the particularity and the diversity of knowledge through narrative, not only for themselves but for others.

Like Frei, Niebuhr, and Hauerwas, Gutiérrez sees that God taking human form in Jesus reveals that God has a narrative quality as much as the collective and individual dimensions of humanity do. Thus, theology must be able to involve the lived realities of those who accept Christ by faith, because faith is a dynamic narrative virtue. It is not a fixed value held in abstraction, but lived in the embodied agency of faith. If Jesus shows the nature of doing theology, then it is not merely the cognitive assent to doctrine, the philosophical derivation of divine properties, as important as those things might be. Rather it is the kind of living theology revealing God in narration, so that with Pascal Gutiérrez can offer a theology of the "God of Abraham, Isaac, Jaccob, and Jesus." It is not that concept and abstraction do not exist for academic theology. However, for Gutiérrez narration moves theology from the theoretical to the vital, from possibility to reality. Much like Niebuhr, Gutiérrez sees that theological abstraction does a symbolic violence by cutting itself off from the knowledge-who of God who can only be known in the narration of human life. But like Lindbeck, he sees that the community's performance is a necessary element to doing theology. This performance is narratival, because life is narratival. There must be a collective dimension to this narration of life.

Until this point, the above analysis has not fully explained why or how it is that narrative produces the kind of embodied understanding and in particular empathy with the oppressed, as much as it has recurringly described it. However, cognitive science has continued to apply and develop 7E approaches to cognition (which we found reflected in Bourdieu notion of *habitus* in Chapter 2) to understanding narrative. This growing body of research can explain why the Yale School and Gutiérrez are so prone to turn to narrative.

Anthony J. Sanford, and Catherine Emmott explain how narrative functions as a feature of embodied and emotional cognition:

> Another interesting thing about embodiment effects [in narrative] is that they relate closely to the idea that when reading of a character being in pain, we might 'feel their pain'. There is a big difference between simply having the knowledge (i.e., a cognitive condition) that the other person would feel uncomfortable in some situation and actually 'feeling' uncomfortable. While the evidence for a direct feeling of pain is not there, it is clear that parts of the brain involved in the reaction to actual pain are active in many such situations.[5]

Narrative does not reduce to knowledge-that but offers the possibility of embodied participation in experience narrated, even if not at the same level of actually suffering the pain-inducing action itself. This resists symbolic violence by inviting other agents to taste something of what symbolic violence imposes without resorting to symbolic violence. Narrative does not only invite knowledge-that, but knowledge-who. Niebuhr emphasises this vis-à-vis God in theology, but Sanford and Emmott expose us to the possibility that narrative does this not only between God and humanity, but laterally across human participants in theologising. Narrative is a mode of cognition that invites theology into love. It is not just knowledge and love for God, but also love for others that narrative enfranchises as much as it opens up the possibility of being known and loved by God and others. It is for this reason, among others, that both the Yale School and Gutiérrez opt for narrative as theologising.

That the Bible is chiefly narrative in mode and includes both individual and collective stories as theology draws Gutiérrez to place the Christian Scriptures, like the Yale School at the centre of his liberative approach to theology. He writes, 'En los primeros tiempos del cristianismo, la teología se limitaba a una meditación sobre la Biblia orientada – como debe ser el caso de toda teología – a enriquecer la vida cotidiana del creyente, la practica cristiana. El lenguaje teólogo se presentaba así como una sabiduría, una vez más en el sentido bíblico

[5] Anthony J. Sanford, and Catherine Emmott, *Mind, Brain and Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 268, doi:10.1017/CBO9781139084321.011.

del termino: un saber que no ha perdido su vínculo con el *sabor*, un *saber* gustoso.'[6] Here Gutiérrez seeks a *resourcement* towards the phronetic dimension of doing theology emphasised by Hauerwas without failing into the symbolic violence against the church's practice that concerns Lindbeck. Further, Gutiérrez incorporates the affective as much as the active and noetic dimensions of human embodiment, expanding theology's approach to a more inclusive typology of knowing. 'Como se sabe, el conocimiento en la Biblia es una noción muy rica que no se limita al campo intelectual, tiene también una connotación de gusto y simpatía, de amor. Se trata de un conocimiento inmediato y profundo, al que no escapa ninguna dimensión de la persona conocida y amada.'[7] Thus, theology must include 'intellectual' knowledge, but also include as Niebuhr emphasises the relational element of knowledge in revelation. But Gutiérrez also incorporates here Frei's instance that the biblical text not be subjected to symbolic violence so as to let the text be a text which we read sensitive to its and our own cultural locations. Further, it is also given its own quasi-agency, so that 'a su vez, nos lee'.[8] Moreover, Gutiérrez seeks to construct theology in dialogue with the Bible, because the Bible itself already functions in the lives of believers as a liberative encounter with God: 'precisamente porque la Biblia es en gran parte la expresión de la fe y la esperanza de los pobres, y sobre todo porque ella nos revela un Dios que ama preferencialmente a los postergados, el último acercamiento anotado encuentra un amplio y fecundo fundamento bíblico.'[9] The nature of the revelation of God is liberating for those suffering symbolic violence. For God who reveals himself in the Bible is the God who does not relate to the world according to the dictates of its games of symbolic violence. Instead,

[6] Gutiérrez, *Densidad*, 63 (emphasis added).

[7] Gustavo Gutiérrez, *El Dios de la Vida* (Lima, Peru: Instituto Bartolomé de Las Casas and Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones, 2019 [1989]), 15.

[8] Cf. Gutiérrez, *Dios de Vida*, 16-19.

[9] Gutiérrez, *Dios de Vida*, 16.

God loves the dominated of the world so dramatically that his love Gutiérrez calls 'preferential.' Yet, in saying God loves *los postergados* preferentially, he assumes exactly the mentality that he is turning to the Scriptures to find liberation from, specifically from the relative valuation of human persons. Christian Scripture repeats that 'God does not operate according to social status' especially in those contexts where human deference to toward the dominant at the expense of the dominated was in view (Acts 10.34; Rom 2.11; Gal 2.6; Eph 6.9). Thus, Gutiérrez misidentifies a love that operates according to love not games of power as preference. The liberative value of the revelation is precisely that the dominated and dominant alike can encounter the God who loves them for who they are while simultaneously glimpsing a world undistorted by symbolic violence. However, what Gutiérrez illumines is that the Yale School turns to narrative and the scriptures to liberate theology from symbolic violence, precisely because it is the mode and site of not only their own knowledge of the God of liberation, but also that of the church. Thus, to construct a theology that removes symbolic violence without resorting to it invites academic theologians include narrative and engagement with Christian Scriptures as a liberative practice. In short, theologising through narration is a radical act of inclusive liberation.

Yet, the Yale School is not the only place for theological and sociological insights on how to go about recentring power away from symbolic violence. Bourdieu, as much as he has given us sociological resources, also further identifies the fundamentally theological realities underpinning the sociological orientations towards symbolic power, especially since we have placed his hermeneutic capitals-fields-*habitus* into dialogue with the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love. Thus, it is through a theological dialogue with Bourdieu and exploring the theological dimensions of Bourdieu's framework that we can begin to construct a phronetic epistemology of love for the work of theology that seeks to remove symbolic violence from theologising without resorting to symbolic violence.

Is naming the problem enough? Is Deleuze and Guattari's desiring-production a solution to symbolic violence?

As we saw in Part 1, Bourdieu's sociological analytic develops and deploys negative forms of faith, hope, and love: idolatry, deception, apostacy. Bourdieu shows how humans live along the dimensions of faith, hope, and love, as they are caught up in the embodied dispositions, practices, and conceptualisations that are produced by and productive towards the deceptive idolatry of symbolic power. But his analytic is only *de-constructive*; it cannot offer constructive faith, genuine hope, or non-transactional love. Everything and everyone is by nature transactional and co-opted by a system attuned for acquiring symbolic capital. Bourdieu develops his heuristic to expose and undermine faith in arbitrary capitals, hope in deceptively oriented/orienting fields, love of power in *habitus*. Or we might say, to *de-faith* idols, to *de-deceive* fields, and to *de-love* apostacies. But because they can only be deconstructive, they are consumed by the games power they expose. They serve chiefly an epistemic function that at times stretches towards phronesis (especially, as we will see below, for his subjectivity-objectivity dialectic in *habitus*).

We need to do more than be deconstructive in our approach to doing theology and analysing academic theology as a field. There are two reasons for this. First, because deconstruction alone falls into either symbolic violence itself, or an ambivalence to symbolic violence. Second, because without an epistemically and phronetically generative approach, any deconstruction will be insufficiently radical to remove symbolic violence. While our analysis of Bourdieu as chiefly deconstructive in effect is more comprehensive in Chapter 2, J. Daniel Schubert has also lamented and engaged both these entailments of Bourdieu's deconstructive results. In inviting Schubert into our present dialogue, not only will we further expose the problems of a merely deconstructive approach, but he will point us towards the kind of solution that we need.

Beginning with our first concern, Schubert critiques Bourdieu for missing the appropriate response one might expect when uncovering violence: 'In everyday discussions of "real" physical violence there is usually a concern with finding ways to end such violence.'[10] He argues that Bourdieu simply did not go far enough with this own thought to destabilise symbolic violence. Sure, Bourdieu exposes it with the hope that it will be reduced somehow. But that 'somehow' leads Schubert to indict Bourdieu for being inadequately reflexive about moral agency in *habitus* as form of phronesis.

> To radicalise Bourdieusian politics, we cannot speak of merely of enlightening practical reason by incorporating reflexive theoretical reason. We can't speak only of making people – sociologists included – aware of the social fields that limit their ways of being and understanding. We can't simply speak of the misrecognition of arbitrary boundaries as natural boundaries…. In order to truly radicalise Bourdieu's contributions to sociology and philosophy it is necessary to speak … of the explosion of the *habitus* and the explosion of the field (or perhaps … the explosion of the field through the explosion of the *habitus*), it is necessary to speak of the explosion of cultural capital and symbolic capital and economic capital and linguistic capital and all other forms of as yet unnamed and unconstituted capital.[11]

In other words, it is not enough to talk about symbolic violence or the various forms it can take. There will always be more of it, unless one also seeks not only to label it, but to undo it. It is true that identifying the violence is essential. But labelling alone is not productive enough. There must be transformative action. Here Schubert is pre-empted by Gutiérrez, who wrote several years earlier of the same need in theology. "Hay que cuidarse de no caer en una autosatisfacción intelectual, en un tipo de triunfalismo hecho de eruditas y avanzadas "nuevas" visiones del cristianismo."[12] It is easy to claim a theoretical victory by merely pointing out a problem or claiming the intellectual legitimacy that academic capital affords. But Gutiérrez and Schubert agree it is only that: theoretical. Rather, Gutiérrez wants theology

[10] J. Daniel Schubert, 'Anti-Habitus: Schizophrenia and Symbolic Violence', *Pierre Bourdieu: Language, Culture and Education*, ed. Michael Grenfell and Michael Kelly (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999): 97-107 (quote p.97).

[11] Schubert, 'Anti-Habitus', 97-98.

[12] *TL*, 419.

to do more than merely point out theoretical problems by living the liberation it identifies as necessary.

> La teología de la liberación que busca partir del compromiso por abolir la actual situación de injusticia y por construir una sociedad nueva, debe ser verificada por la práctica de ese compromiso; por la participación activa y eficaz en la lucha que las clases sociales explotadas han emprendido contra sus opresores. La liberación de toda forma de explotación, la posibilidad de una vida más humana y más digna, la creación de una humanidad nueva, pasan por esa lucha.[13]

The lived out, phronetic dimension of theology is necessary to be truly constructive. Gutiérrez does not just want some of theology to operate from a commitment. This means not simply removing injustice, but *abolirla*, that is to completely abolish it as a feature of the system. But he does not separate the deconstructive dimension from the constructive, since he envisions theology also operating from a commitment to *construct* an entirely new society where life can be *more human* and *more* worthy of what it means to be human. What Schubert and Gutiérrez describe here is a complete change of the game, a complete deconstruction of the modus operandi of human society in its idolisation of symbolic power. Yet, both share a somewhat violent language of what undoing this dehumanising game of power will entail: 'explosion' for Schubert, 'lucha' for Gutiérrez.

Despite this violent language, Schubert is prudent enough to reject power role reversals as an actual solution.

> We wouldn't want merely to invert the logic of relations of power that constitute social fields. Like Foucault's panopticon, … it wouldn't make sense to merely to make prisoners into guards…. Just as it is necessary to destroy the architecture of the prison, it is imperative that the *habitus* be demolished for symbolic violence to come to an end. … This dramatic turn is necessary because, within Bourdieu's approach, it seems impossible to get outside of the culture that embodies symbolic violence.'[14]

[13] *TL*, 419.

[14] Schubert, 'Anti-Habitus', 99, alluding to Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

Symbolic violence, and a heuristic that only exposes it, in the end can only effect violence. The idolatry, deception, and apostacy are viscerally and virulently integrated into the system. But nothing can be offered in their place within Bourdieu's analytic. Moreover, these features are embodied as much as they are institutionalised. With only violence heuristically available, only violence can be offered. Yet, this means violence can never be subverted or undone. Perhaps Bourdieu has been sufficiently epistemic, but he has not been sufficiently phronetic. There must be an epistemic as well as a phronetic reform, but this reform must itself not resort to or include symbolic violence as an epistemic and phronetic orientation. This is a need Bourdieu's deconstructive heuristic exposes, but deconstructive identification will not rectify the problem. An everyday adage says, 'Don't hate the player, hate the game.' Knowing how players play the game and disapproving of it does not present the possibility of a comprehensive reformation, unless those insights are used to fix the game as a whole. Similarly, any reformation to remove symbolic violence will have to be radical in nature because of how embedded it is in human society, and embodied in *habitus*.

Unfortunately, while Schubert identifies most aptly the problem and the radicality necessary to resolve it, his solution as furnished disappoints on two fronts. First, he depends on Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*[15] for his conceptual resources. But he fails to properly unpack their dense and enigmatic terminology, worsened by their own use of medical terminology, i.e. schizophrenia. Schubert even admits this: '[Their] schizophrenia is not (and this cannot be emphasised too strongly) the pathological diagnosis of today's psychiatric industry.'[16] But that this diagnosis and those who suffer from it probably deserve not to be fetishised to accomplish one's intellectual

[15] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).

[16] Schubert, 'Anti-Habitus', 104.

project goes unrecognised, or at least uncommented upon. That Deleuze and Guattari were trying to counteract and deconstruct the then-dominant-now-defunct Freudian psychology ought to be commended. Nevertheless, using their own categorisations of the matter ironically they 'territorialise' the clinically schizophrenic into an Oedipal function, constraining desiring-production and reifying the schizophrenic. This statement is illustrative enough of the dense and enigmatic abstractionism of the work, and Schubert's by extension. Translating it to clearer Bourdieusien terms, Deleuze and Guattari commit symbolic violence against those who actually suffer from medical schizophrenia in the process of making their argument. It is not so much using schizophrenic experience as window of epistemological insight as co-opting the label of schizophrenic that delegitimises the priority of sensitivity to the serious trauma of experiencing clinical schizophrenia.[17] Put more bluntly, Delueze and Guattari seem more interested in making some abstract philosophical point and acquiring symbolic capital in the process than they do in actually showing and advocating compassion towards the clinically schizophrenic. To pre-empt briefly where we are about to go: without loving others, what's the point of making a point? So, in that sense, Schubert's approach seems to fail at the outset on its own terms.

The second reason (and related to the first) that Schubert's solution fails to move beyond deconstruction to construction coincides with Bourdieu's own failure: deconstruction is where he ends. Schubert only deconstructs the deconstruction; he never quite gets to a fully constructive solution. In addition, Schubert displays tautological reasoning arguing that Deleuze and Guattari's concepts explode symbolic violence by only reiterating that sentiment without adding sufficient detail to how. He signals that the solution to symbolic violence is 'a

[17] Cf. Eugene W. Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1999); and Ian Buchanan, *Deleuze and Guattari's 'Anti-Oedipus': A Reader's Guide* (London: Bloomsbury, 2008).

struggle against *habitus* as a positive process designed to destroy *habitus*.'[18] This is a kind of escape from the apostatising phronesis of *habitus* structured by and structuring a deceptive field of hope in a trusted symbolic good. This 'explosion' of *habitus* 'is a politics, rather than a program.'[19] According to Schubert, Deleuze and Guattari's analysis intends to uncover and then destroy delusions operative in and on the subconscious as well as the self-limiting and self-destructive interests desire directs itself towards in society. This does seem to stretch towards Bourdieu's interest in reflexivity, and potentially the aims of his triadic heuristic as a whole. Critically, identifying delusions does not necessarily destroy them. Schubert demands that the project be positive in orientation and assumes 'desiring-production' is distorted by *habitus*, but never offers any specifically positive desiring-production in its place. Desire can be productive. Schubert is right to follow Deleuze and Guattari in *that* conceptualisation.

Ironically, Schubert seems not to grasp how Bourdieu's analysis never fully allows desire – even productive desire – to get free from delusion. You could say, Schubert fails to be deconstructive enough to be constructive. Symbolic capital seeps into and through all fields and participatory agents. For Deleuze and Guattari, desiring-production must operate not on the principle of negative desire, of seeking a lack, but on positive desire, of seeking to produce (or at least desire for its own sake). But Bourdieu's perspective entails that even if desires in agents can be positive, these productions are brought into the system of relations constituting fields and other agents. As the relationally embedded nature of desiring-production is accounted for but also goes unaccounted for in the system of human relations, the positive production of those desires finds symbolic value attached to them, even if what is desired is the process of desiring as its own processive act. In fact, social and corporeal embeddedness of the desiring-production assumed in the nature of holding desiring-

[18] Schubert, 'Anti-Habitus', 104.

[19] Schubert, 'Anti-Habitus', 104.

production as the highest symbolic value renders both the desiring-production and the products of desiring-production symbolic capital. In the system of human relations, this capital is desired not only by the producer, but other producers, because the differentiation – if and as valued – results in the awareness of the exclusiveness of one's owns desiring-production as much as the exclusive means of production of everyone else's. Consequently, lack enters regardless. The positive desiring-production gives birth to the negative desire framework of lack, which then compounds. The system gives rise to symbolic violence as that positive desiring-production is commodified by self-oriented desire itself. In other words, while Schubert is right that the solution to symbolic violence must be positive and productive, rather than destructive, he fails to account for how abstracted, unanchored, unspecified, undirected, and self-oriented desiring-production necessarily leads to symbolic violence. Schubert's solution leads to this unproductive outcome because it depends upon Deleuze and Guattari, who aim to negate abstraction but ultimately (as their language demonstrates) deeply depend upon it for their project. Whatever this positive answer is it must be more than mere desire. But importantly it cannot operate on the basis of lack.

Yet, Bourdieu's analysis itself offers nothing but lack, being deconstructive rather than constructive in nature. Moreover, this deconstructive effort applies chiefly to knowledge itself, as it is relativised through instrumentalization to become not so much knowledge as attempts at grabbing power labelled 'knowledge'. This is a serious problem for overcoming symbolic violence in epistemology. If 'knowledge' is simply a label for cultural capital or the means of acquiring other forms of capital, then knowing/knowledge reduces mainly to instruments for symbolic violence. Correlatively, if one's epistemological orientation with knowledge is what one does not possess and if the idolatry of symbolic power through knowledge is one's hope, then getting knowledge is only *apparently* a methodological and epistemological problem. In reality, all methodologies are irrelevant to knowing as all

knowing is merely the means of acquiring or using symbolic power. Knowledge as knowledge vanishes. Using the categories developed with Niebuhr and Hauerwas, there is no knowledge-that of objects or knowledge-who of subjects. Even knowledge-how of processes and knowledge-in-action of agency are invalidated. This is an epistemological impasse. For the awareness that (i.e. knowledge-that) such a process of epistemological and sociological legitimation exists theoretically cannot exist, in that it has no correspondence to anything except the grasping at power. The model itself is only technique for acquiring power. Consequently, there is no knowledge of an object or process, only the activity of using an object as a means of gaining symbolic power. Thus, this systemised idolatry of symbolic power has devastating epistemological and existential implications: can anyone ever know anything? How can knowledge be a productive value and not merely an instrumental one? This problem is bound up with both the ultimately deconstructive tenor of symbolic violence and the analysis that illumes it. Only if a constructive approach to knowing (in which knowing does not have to be synonymous with dominating) is offered, can knowing-who/that/how occur without reducing to some form of symbolic violence. There is still a hope then that theology be liberated from itself, but not if all its efforts at liberation are just a mask for symbolic violence. Instead, a liberative theology must be constructive if it is to know anything, as well as develop and use knowledge in liberative ways.

Gutiérrez's early demand that a productive solution involve a fight (*lucha*) alongside the oppressed, now seems more problematic. Does not the language of 'fighting' imply symbolic violence? It might, and often it probably is practiced that way. But it does not have to. Gutiérrez immediately commends what mode that fight takes when it leaves behind ever-multiplying 'new' theoretical options that reduce to the same old games for symbolic power. He wants a *new* way of life lived, not merely theorising a 'new' title for an old game.

> Lo único realmente nuevo es acoger día a día el don del Espíritu que nos hace *amar* en nuestras opciones concretas por *construir* una verdadera fraternidad humana, en

> nuestras iniciativas históricas por subvertir un orden de injusticia, con la plenitud con que Cristo nos *amó*. Parafraseando el conocido texto de Pascal, podemos decir que todas las teologías políticas, de la esperanza, de la revolución, de la liberación, no valen un gesto auténtico de solidaridad con las clases sociales expoliadas. No valen un acto de *fe*, de *caridad* y de *esperanza* comprometido –de una manera u otra– en una participación activa por liberar al ser humano de todo lo que lo deshumaniza y le impide vivir según la voluntad del Padre.[20]

Gutiérrez may insufficiently discourage violence in the fight, but he is clear on the kind of fight he chiefly intends. It is the fight to love. It is not the fight for power, but the fight to empower people to live *según la voluntad del Padre*. It is not the fight to deconstruct but the struggle to construct a better world that does not operate by the dictates of the games of power. This is a fight to include, rather than exclude, as Gutiérrez hopes for a *verdadera fraternidad humana*. In such a collectivised community of all humans, no human would be left dehumanised. Moreover, the order of injustice is not subverted by power or compounded injustice, but by the fullness of Christ's love for us.

As the citation also demonstrates, Gutiérrez identifies another dimension of why Schubert's appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari is insufficiently constructive. Desiring-production is ultimately too individualistic in orientation. It frames the solution only in individualistic desire and relationality. It cannot make an act of solidarity with others, because it is by nature turned towards itself. It is a self-directed, and self-obsessed kind of desire. It may be facing outward, as it seeks to be creatively productive. Yet, this desire is ultimately for the benefit of the desire itself, potentially without benefit to the complex subjectivity of the one doing the desiring to say nothing of the entailments to any person, object, process, or activity desired. This deconstructs both the desiring and the desired. Thus, Gutiérrez shows that to construct a productive epistemology for a liberative theology more than undifferentiated, undirected, self-interested desire is needed. Love is needed. Love is, of course, unable to be separated from desire, but it is more productive in nature. For it is a

[20] *TL*, 419-20 (emphasis added).

phronetic activity oriented and enacted towards an other. Moreover, love does not have to rely upon only a human source for its presence. Rather Gutiérrez presents human loving that constructs a new path forward for theology as itself the loving gift of the Holy Spirit by the Father. This graced loved makes it possible for human beings to be empowered in love to love. There is a super-abundance of not merely desire, but love which seeks the best even at personal cost for not merely *an* other, but others. This already begins to direct theology towards a phronetic epistemology of love. We will continue to develop this theme in the following chapter, but we must note here that this love is sourced and sustained in the Triune God, who is love. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit live and love eternally, whose love overflows to those created to live in love. The love that God makes possible is a self-giving, embracing, and creative love enacted in and as narration, as the reference to Pascal indicates. This is not a static or merely conceptual love. It is the overflow of the love of the Living God, compelling this love to be living, narrated, and liberative as it creatively embraces the other without having to be generated by the other(s), since it receives is source and sustenance in the eternal love of Holy Trinity already received and ongoingly participated in by grace.

Nevertheless, we must commend what might lie obfuscated at this point in the positive constructive intensions of Schubert and Gutiérrez which are absolutely necessary to subvert symbolic violence without resorting to it. Specifically, desiring-production as much as love is genuinely non-exclusionary at the level of the means of production. Deleuze and Guattari's desiring-production is accessible to anyone and everyone. Anyone and everyone desires, and can do so productively. One danger, hidden perhaps by reigning *epistemic doxa* in human society, is the presumption of exclusivity to knowledge production. Knowledge production has been systematised in such a way that certain modes and forms of production process and products are legitimated and delegitimated. If theology is to be liberating, it must be able to be done by everyone. Theologically, this is a necessary entailment of a

confessional belief in the Triune God. If there is only one God for all humanity who also reveals himself to humanity, then all humanity must be able to produce knowledge about God as well as have the native capacity to know God relationally. Niebuhr, along with the rest of the Yale School, is right to place revelation of God as essential, contending that revelation comes through especially in the narrative of the Christian Scriptures. Frei, in particular, agrees. Revelation, though, does not prevent all attempts at co-opting it into an instrumentalising epistemology as a resource for symbolic power. However, it does make possible theologising in love, in that revelation is an act of love and must be met with love to be fully intelligible; and in that it comes from outside the game. Yet, as Frei comes to see through Ricoeur, that revelation is made possible because of the parameters of human cognition. That is, while revelation is particular, the human capacity to reflect upon and engage with the revelation of God is embedded within human embodiment. Thus, while not everyone may experience, acknowledge, or respond to revelation, the capacity to engage with the possibility of revelation is always entailed. For God created humanity as and for revelation, given that humanity bears the *imago Dei* and that the incarnation of God the Son was quintessentially the hypostatic revelation both God and humanity. Thus, there is no general anthropological barrier to producing theology in love just as there is no barrier to productive-desire. However, educational background and attainment often deter or delegitimise entirely those who would do theology – not because there is an intrinsic barrier to their doing theology, but because what counts as theology does not include their form production. As Gutiérrez argues, love for God and for others is radically inclusive. It is not just inclusive in its orientation, but its possibility for participation. Anyone and everyone can love, just as much as they desire. In fact, as Bourdieu identifies, everyone does *love* in the form of *habitus*. The question is just what is loved and why. Bourdieu seeks to deconstruct

the love of the deception of trusting in symbolic power, even if he has nothing to replace it with.

Love's productive inclusivity and cognitive science of narrative

At the intersection of Bourdieu's *habitus*, then, we have the reaffirmation of the need of a productive solution, one that operates in love. But we have to have a kind of mode of theology that is not dependent on symbolic power for its operation, if it is to be as inclusive of all humanity as Gutiérrez encourages and Schubert's employment of desire-production implies. Moreover, this mode must be compatible with the nature of love itself as well as being radically inclusive of the productive capacities of humanity. Just as Chapter 2 illumined the nature and operation of *habitus* by considering its parallels with the perspective of 7E cognition arising in cognitive science, so now we can build on those insights into human cognition to locate a mode of theological production that is both consistent with love as an activity and with the level of inclusivity across humanity that love demands.

In particular, the intersection of *habitus* with 7E cognition also sets the anthropological groundwork for a radically inclusive type of cognitive process. This is not just present within humanity, but is endemic to it as, namely, narrative processing. Developing out of the research into 7E cognition came an interest particularly into situating narrative as a cognitive operation. In particular, David Herman and Patrick Colm Hogan turned their attention to the universality of narrative as a form of cognitive processing that arises because cognition is embodied, physically and socio-culturally embedded, enactive, extended, emotional, evolutionary, and exoconscious.[21] In fact, sustained engagement with narrative and human cognition has resulted in possibility of adding an 8th E to 7E cognition to

[21] Cf. Hogan, *Affective Narratology*; 'Consciousness, Ethics, and Narrative'; *How Authors' Minds Make Stories*; *The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion*; Herman, *Narrative Theory* (ed.); *Storytelling*; *Narratology beyond the Human*.

describe the way human beings receive stimuli, process them, and construct understanding: enstoried cognition. That stories are endemic to humanity is indisputable, as much as metaphor and abstraction as cognitive operations can be. However, what is also becoming clear is how basic to human cognition narrativization is. Recent cognitive science research has connected narrative with what is known as the Default Mode Network (DMN). The DMN is the part of the brain that is active by default, that is in times when it is not attending to any particular task. Alan Richardson writes,

> Unfocused and left to its own devices, the human mind tends to default towards a group of mental activities—ruminating on the past, planning for the near or distant future, fantasizing about unlikely or even impossible events, dwelling on what other people "really meant" in saying or doing or not saying or not doing this or that. … For the past dozen years, neuroscientists have been calling it the brain's "default mode."[22]

But these default activities are linked to particular regions of brain activity which are remarkably consistent and coordinated in operation rather than random.

> The linked regions in question—the medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, the left and right inferior parietal lobules, and the medial temporal lobe—also show activation patterns during certain well-recognized mental activities. Not surprisingly, … these activities include recalling the past, envisioning the future, daydreaming, and "theory of mind" (gauging the intentions and mental states of other people).[23]

More importantly, because the DMN has also been connected with memory, dreams, imagination, and navigation, cognitive science has sought to find the underlying cognitive operation that gives rise to them.

> Narrative has been described as forming a common thread among various default mode activities—and neural areas involved in narrative overlap significantly with the areas known to be involved in the default network. We seem to be converging from a

[22] Alan Richardson, 'Imagination: Literary and Cognitive Intersections', *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies*, ed. Lisa Zunshine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015): 225-45, citation p.230. Richardson cites here Marcus E. Raichle, et al., 'A Default Mode of Brain Function', *PNAS* 98.2 (January 2001): 676–82. Cf. also Marcus E. Raichle and Abraham Z. Snyder, 'A Default Mode of Brain Function: A Brief History of An Evolving Idea', *NeuroImage* 37 (2007): 1083–90; Randy L. Buckner, Jessica R. Andrews-Hanna, and Daniel L. Schacter, 'The Brain's Default Network: Anatomy, Function, and Relevance to Disease', *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1124 (2008): 1–38.

[23] Richardson, 'Imagination', 231, citing Susan Whitfield-Gabrieli and Judith M. Ford, 'Default Mode Network Activity and Connectivity in Psychopathology', *Annual Review of Clinical Psychology* 8 (2012): 49-76.

> new, unexpected direction on a claim made by researchers associated with conceptual metaphor and blending theories: that the human mind could well be called a fundamentally "poetic" or "literary" mind.[24]

Thus, cognitive science is now adding narrative as a fundamental process of human cognition, so much so that we could say that human cognition is "enstoried" in addition to being embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, emotional, evolutionary, and exoconscious. Richardson depends on a growing body of research. In the 6 years since his article, narrative has continued to be connected with the DMN and take shape as a basic element of human cognition.[25] This presents theology with an additional opportunity to make itself more

[24] Richardson, 'Imagination', 231, citing Daniel L. Schacter and Donna Rose Addis, 'The Cognitive Neuroscience of Constructive Memory: Remembering the Past and Imagining the Future', *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B* 362 (2007): 773–86; Robert Stickgold, 'Memory in Sleep and Dreams: The Construction of Meaning', *The Memory Process: Neuroscientific and Humanistic Perspectives*, ed. Suzanne Nalbantian, Paul Matthews, and James L. McLelland (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011): 73–95; and R. Nathan Spreng, Raymond A. Mar, and Alice S. N. Kim, 'The Common Neural Basis of Autobiographical Memory, Prospection, Navigation, Theory of Mind, and the Default Mode: A Quantitative Meta-analysis', *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 21.3 (2008): 489–510.

Cf. also Brian Boyd, *On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Lars Bernaerts, et al., *Stories and Minds: Cognitive Approaches to Literary Narrative* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013); Marco Caracciolo, *The Experientiality of Narrative: An Enactivist Approach*, Narratologia 43 (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014); Stephen M. Wilson, Istvan Molnar-Szakacs, and Marco Iacoboni, 'Beyond Superior Temporal Cortex: Intersubject Correlations in Narrative Speech Comprehension', *Cereb Cortex* 18.1 (2007): 230-42, https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhm049.

[25] K. Tylén, et al., 'Brains Striving for Coherence: Long-Term Cumulative Plot Formation in the Default Mode Network', *Neuroimage* 121 (2015): 106-14, https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.07.047; Erez Simony, et al., 'Dynamic Reconfiguration of the Default Mode Network During Narrative Comprehension', *Nat Commun* 7.1 (2016): 12141-41, https://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ncomms12141; Renate Brosch, 'Experiencing Narratives: Default and Vivid Modes of Visualization', *Poetics today* 38.2 (2017): 255-72, https://dx.doi.org/10.1215/03335372-3868527; Yaara Yeshurun, et al., 'Same Story, Different Story: The Neural Representation of Interpretive Frameworks', *Psychological Science* 28.3 (2017): 307-19, https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616682029;, M. Dehghani, et al, 'Decoding the Neural Representation of Story Meanings across Languages', *Human Brain Mapping* 38.12 (Dec 2017): 6096-106, https://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hbm.23814; Xiaoye Zuo, et al., 'Temporal Integration of Narrative Information in a Hippocampal Amnesic Patient', *Neuroimage* 213 (2020): 116658-58, https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2020.116658; Andrea Smorti, *Telling to Understand: The Impact of Narrative on Autobiographical Memory* (Cham: Springer, 2020); Hongmi Lee, et al., 'What Can Narratives Tell Us About the Neural Bases of Human Memory?', *Current Opinion In Behavioral Sciences* 32 (2020): 111-19, https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.02.007; Nicola Sambuco, et al., 'Narrative Imagery: Emotional Modulation in the Default Mode Network', *Neuropsychologia* (2021): 108087, https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2021.108087; Yaara Yeshurun, et al., 'The Default Mode Network: Where the Idiosyncratic Self Meets the Shared Social World', *Nat Rev Neurosci* 22.3 (2021): 181-92, https://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41583-020-00420-w; Iiro P. Jääskeläinen, et al., 'Movies and Narratives as Naturalistic Stimuli in Neuroimaging', *Neuroimage* 224 (2021): 117445-45, https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2020.117445; Emma Komulainen, et al., 'Escitalopram Enhances Synchrony of Brain Responses During Emotional Narratives in Patients with Major Depressive Disorder', *Neuroimage* 237 (2021): 118110-10, https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.118110; Hayoung Song, et

liberative, namely by expanding its mode to include narratives which are accessible by virtually all human beings by virtue of being human. Incorporating narrative theologising as an accepted mode expands the accessibility of participating in theology beyond a particular cultural formation of abstract-oriented theologising of knowledge-that prominent in Western philosophical discursive method. Moreover, it opens itself up to a receptivity of learning from anyone and everyone. For this reason, cognitive science of narrative illuminates why Gutiérrez secures narrative within theology as an active mode of liberative inclusion:

> La teología debe proteger las categorías del relato y el recuerdo si desea mantenerse fiel a sus fuentes y cumplir una función liberadora de todo aquello que no permite al ser humano hacer respetar su dignidad y desplegar todas sus posibilidades. *Instintivamente* lo hace el pueblo pobre cuando a través de relatos y leyendas … retoma los grandes temas humanos y cristianos, expresando a través de ellos su fe en el Dios liberador.[26]

In this sense, then, in order to produce a constructively inclusive of academic theologising narrative theologising must be incorporated into the legitimated range of academic modes. Stories are already how many, if not most, people do theology, especially those who are dominated. And they do it that way instinctively. It is not a conscious reaction so much as an intuitive phronetic navigation of symbolic violence. Narrative not only empowers many to do theology while facing symbolic delegitimation in theology but to do so while rejecting and reforming symbolic violence. Cognitive science only reinforces why this is: because it is a human way of thinking, accessible to all, and inclusive of all, thereby it celebrates the dignity and possibility of everyone participating in theology.

Furthermore, Gutiérrez indicates that it is the accessibility of the Scriptures that has resulted in people throughout the centuries – but especially the dominated across the world in more recent times – turning to the Christians Scriptures to shape their theological discourse

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al., 'Cognitive and Neural State Dynamics of Narrative Comprehension', *The Journal of neuroscience* 41.43 (2021): 8972-90, https://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0037-21.2021.

[26] Gutiérrez, *Densidad*, 68-69.

and narration. Not only is the Bible readily intelligible as it contains so many stories, but it is relatively easy to obtain a print or digital copy. Almost anyone outside of the most repressive regimes can legally and easily acquire a translation of the Christian Scriptures in either their native tongue or a regional trade language. Primarily tying theological reflection to a book as materially accessible for free (or very cheaply) and constrained in corpus rather than the constantly expanding library of contemporary (Western) philosophy and theology, much of which would lie beyond the purchasing capacity of the poor or untranslated liberates the dominated from the symbolic violence of educational, linguistic, cultural, or economic barriers. Gutiérrez does not state this reality directly, but it is the necessary situation without which his liberation theology fails to be liberative. For encouraging Scriptural and narrative theologies fails to be accessible, unless access to the Scriptures is broadly a given as much as narrative as a basic form of human cognition is a given. It is in connection with this reality that we can also understand Gutiérrez's insistence that theology categorically protect narrative by employing narrative. For him, love inspires theology to be more liberating and Scriptural by welcoming more Scripturally-engaged and narrative-in-mode theologies. Thus, to do *constructive* theology, academic theology will have to become radically accessible and inclusive, more organically human. Reconciling the enstoried nature of human cognition with theology harmonises both productive construction and liberation.

Nevertheless, for all our constructive efforts, we are still without a complete solution. We have engaged Schubert's critique of Bourdieu together with Gutiérrez's theology of liberation to see how love offers itself as an essential component of a truly productive and liberative approach to theology. We have also seen how narrative offers itself as fully accessible for that effort. We now can better understand the kind of solution that we need construct to remove symbolic violence from theology without resorting to it. It must be more than deconstructive. It must still care about symbolic violence as a violence without resorting

to it even inadvertently. Our solution cannot be based on or obsessed with power. And it must be radical in scope and constructive in a way that does not regress into symbolic violence by virtue of being self-obsessed with its own production. Moreover, it must be narrative-inclusive. Thus, we need the kind of radical reorientation that moves from violence to vitality, from instrumentality to transformative desire for others' best. The epistemological orientation of knowledge as primarily a matter of instrumentalised lack bound up with the love of the deception of symbolic power yields only death, but we want to live.

We must seek a way of approaching knowing from beyond the apostacy of false-hope in idolised symbolic power. But where can we find such an approach to knowledge? Where can we find a place where all idolatries have been removed? It will not be in the observable past, nor in the present. Rather, it must be sourced from the eschatological vision of a restored and restoried world, brought into reality through the only One who cannot be taken by an idolatry of symbolic power. Therefore, we must consider the epistemological orientation of God which in Christ one can share in the new epoch of resurrection and into which one can proleptically participate through taking up a phronetic epistemology marked with faith, hope, and especially love. In doing so, not only will the instrumentalization of knowledge be overturned, but also by living into the story of the resurrection a phronetic epistemology of love enables the constructive and positive solution that Bourdieu hauntingly lacks, Schubert helpfully identifies, and the Yale School and Gutiérrez seeks in narrative. It is to the dialectical dimension of the phronetic epistemology of love narrated in the resurrection that we turn in Chapter 6, as we explore the phenomenological borrowings from Husserl envisaged in both Bourdieu and Balthasar in dialogue with the paradigmatic chapter on love in 1 Corinthians 13.

CHAPTER 6:
A DIALECTIC AND PHRONETIC EPISTEMOLOGY OF LOVE IN THE RESURRECTION

'A man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho,' Jesus said, taking up the question laced with symbolic violence and just posed to him: 'And just who is *my* neighbour?' Jesus continues theologising through story, 'And bumped into some robbers, who after both stripping him naked and beating him up badly went off leaving him half-dead' (Luke 10.30). Thus far, the symbolic violence of the story in question is less abstractly and conceptually symbolic than it is physical, embodied violence. Yet, it would seem they stripped the man and then beat him up. The beating of the man, now naked seems to compound a conceptual and psychological symbolic violence upon the physical symbolic violence. The man was dominated, and then dominated further, not because it was necessary, but because the dominant loved power expressed in violence.

Yet, the next scene only amplifies the dimensions of symbolic violence on display. 'And by chance a priest was coming down on that road and seeing him passed by on the opposite side. And similarly also a Levite, coming down to the spot and seeing, passed by on the opposite side' (Luke 10.31-32). Far from the dying man finding relief from symbolic violence when the priest passes, only an intensification appears. The priest was considered to represent God to the people as much as represent the people before God. Yet, the priest does not look at the man as God does. Rather he objectivises him. The priest distances himself from the violated man and keeps walking. He relates phronetically to the man, displaying an epistemology not rooted in love. Simultaneously, by the symbology of his office, the priest

imposes the symbolic violence of determining the value of the man theologically. This 'knowledge' is communicated not in speech or writing, but in action. The Levite acts no better. In fact, Jesus intensifies the Levite's epistemic objectification, saying he comes to the spot, not to the man, and that the Levite just 'sees' without giving the man even the level of intersubjective value to objectivise him. The symbolic violence imposed is the delegitimation of existence: the robbers, priest, and Levite leave the half-dead man to die. But further they impose the symbolic violence of not even knowing the man as a man or the situation as one of ethical importance. The priest and Levite, especially, fail to relate epistemologically in love. They neither sufficiently subjectivise the objectivity of the man, nor objectivise his subjectivity. They fail to demonstrate a phronetic epistemology of love. However, through them, Jesus does set the theme of the dialectic nature of a phronetic epistemology of love through the story of the Good Samaritan.

We will advance towards a phronetic epistemology of love via the story of the resurrection embedded withing the quintessential chapter on love, 1 Corinthians 13. This exegesis will reveal the devastating epistemological consequences of the games of symbolic violence where knowing is reduced to power as exposed by Bourdieu. However, it will go beyond Bourdieu to construct an alternative epistemology on love from the narration of the resurrection in which it is the phronetic transformation of love that makes knowing possible. After this stage of the constructive effort, however, we will need to illuminate how love renders knowing possible. This will refine our phronetic epistemology of love with dialectical subjectivising-objectivity and objectivising-subjectivity, gleaned from the shared phronetic and dialectic phenomenological orientation of Bourdieu and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Pausing briefly to explore their shared conceptual dependence on Husserl in developing their phronetic epistemologies will demonstrate the conceptual compatibility of Bourdieu and Balthasar for the sake of our larger constructive effort *and* more fully expose Bourdieu's

habitus as love, confirming Chapter 2's analysis. Additionally, this consideration situates Balthasar's conceptual production in the sociological system of his day and insulates the following sections from misunderstanding Bourdieu and Balthasar's dialectic epistemologies as separable from action. Furthermore, this chapter continues to incorporate the Yale School and Gutiérrez, since a phronetic epistemology of love must be narrative and liberative, and since they provide some productive tension to the abstractionism into which the dialectic epistemology of Bourdieu and Balthasar can fall. Despite this, Bourdieu and Balthasar will ultimately be seen to develop their dialectic epistemologies based on narrating love. Thus, through them, we construct a truly productive dialectic and phronetic epistemology of love for academic theology that removes symbolic violence without resorting to it.

1. Finding a phronetic epistemology of love in the resurrection

If Bourdieu offers only the negations of de-loving, de-hoping, and de-faithing – as we considered in the preceding chapter – then we can begin our constructive effort to remove symbolic violence from academic theology without resorting to it by turning to the positive theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. Thus, with the problem of instrumentalising knowledge and the need for a positive productive answer established, we seek to find a phronetic epistemology of love in the passage that sets faith, hope, and love eternally together in the eschatological reality of the resurrection, viz. 1 Corinthians 13.

We start with the brief story of the epistemological transformation that arrives in the resurrection, in part because it is a story, but also because the resurrection bears witness to a new kind of world, one where all false trusts, hopes, and loves have vanished. One barrier to a constructive proposal is limitations in our capacity to imagine a different kind of world. By starting from the end, we expand our imaginative capacities with a glimpse into the 'perfect' world to come to begin to reshape theology towards a better phronetic orientation not simply in theory but in action. Hauerwas writes,

> Yet the witness of Christians does more than carry forward from what has happened; it also carries back from what will happen. The disciples of Jesus are called to be witnesses to the reality of a new age, a new time, constituted by his life, death, and resurrection. … The story of Jesus is the story of a new creation, the telling of which cannot but challenge the reigning stories that legitimate the practices of the old age. This is present not in overcoming force or power but rather precisely in witness. Indeed, that witness is the form in which the new age is revealed indicates why what has happened requires that a people exist who exemplify the new reality. The existence of the church is itself the determinative (although not the only) witness to an alternative politics to that of the old age.[1]

The story of the resurrection intersects the present from both the past and the future. On the one hand, the future resurrection was inaugurated in Christ and witnessed to by Christ, but on the other hand it advances backwards through time both through its promise and through the participatory witness with Christ that it engenders. Christ's resurrection witness achieves this temporal dialectic movement specifically as story. Thus, Christ generates hope in resurrection not simply through passive conceptualisation, but a renewed imagination that coheres in and as stories through embodied action that orients in love towards Christ and hope towards the resurrection. The resurrection does not generate a phronetic renewal based on abstraction, but on its invitation into a different kind of story than this age can offer. That is, the resurrection does not operate based on symbolic violence. The story does not bring force or power except to witness and offer life beyond the cycles of domination and death that its witness reveals. Further, as Hauerwas notes, starting with the resurrection allows for the inclusion of both the church and the theological academy, even if the academy is not mentioned by name. For Hauerwas notes that though the church is a determinative witness it is not the only witness. Thus, academic theology can also become a witness of an alternative to the politics of the old age, especially since it shares the church's concern of doing theology. Moreover, Lindbeck argues for academic theology to become inclusive of ecclesial practice as epistemically valid and productive. Consequently, our constructive effort to participate in and witness to an

[1] Hauerwas, *Approaching the End*, 45-46.

alternative 'politics' must be inclusive of both the church and the academy if it is to be productive and liberative, especially as it relates to the phronetic and dialectic epistemology of love that I argue for in this chapter. Indeed, also, this alternative kind of politics that the resurrection affords to both the church and the academy must not be reconfigured through abstraction into a passivizing symbolic violence that reaffirms the *status quo* of the present because of the future. Gutiérrez warns, 'La muerte y la resurrección de Jesús son nuestro futuro, porque son nuestro presente riesgoso y esperanzado. La esperanza que vence la muerte debe echar sus raíces en el corazón de la praxis histórica; si no toma cuerpo en el presente para llevarlo más adelante, no será sino una evasión, un futurismo.'[2] Gutiérrez foreshadows some of our coming discussion in the next chapter on Christ crucified in connecting the risk of death with hoping in resurrection through embodiment. Resurrection cannot be separated from the lived realities and bodies of the present. Resurrection hope must *tomar cuerpo* in present-day action to be hopeful. It must not only hope for resurrection in the abstract but live the reality of the resurrection today through hope, so much so that it can risk death. The story of resurrection in which both the church and academic theology is invited to participate proleptically involves a hope for the future that endures in the face of death. But it must also bring the hoped-for future age without death and symbolic violence into the present through embodied phronesis. This means a resurrection phronesis will always involve temporal dialectic as it lives the story of the resurrection in action. Yet, as we will see, the story of resurrection also *toma cuerpo* in a phronetic approach to epistemology that integrates a subjectivity-objectivity dialectic through love.

1 Corinthians 13: Resurrection into knowing through love

Paul wrote the letter that we call 1 Corinthians to Christians in living in Corinth struggling to leave behind the games of symbolic violence they played before coming to

[2] *TL*, 293.

knowledge-who of God through Christ in the Spirit. Yet, Paul hears that they are orienting to knowing in the same instrumentalising fashion, involved with seeing knowing as a means of gaining symbolic power. The gifts of the Holy Spirit were being converted into tools for claiming symbolic power and jostling for more symbolic positioning within the church. It is into this situation Paul constructively deploys faith, hope, and love as the Christian hermeneutical triad, upon which Bourdieu's analytic capitals-fields-*habitus* depends in negation. Paul preaches the Father-sent Son, Jesus Christ crucified for and by human beings and societies consumed with symbolic power who sends the Holy Spirit who makes humans alive through faith, hope, and love. Christ is profoundly contrastive and constructive as the Cornerstone rejected by the builders. In his phronesis, He suffers symbolic violence but does not resort to it. Despite this, the gifts of the Spirit Jesus gives can be viewed through the hermeneutical lens of the idolatry of symbolic power. Approached from within these games of symbolic power, because they come from God and perhaps even allow one to speak for God, these gifts of the Holy Spirit take on an even greater symbolic value. The symbolic power they appear to offer from within this deception is too much for many in the church to resist.

But this instrumentalization of these epistemic capacities through the idolatry of symbolic power neutralises their epistemic value. Their capacity to be constructive for knowing becomes deconstructive to knowing. An epistemology suffused with symbolic violence deconstructs knowing in favour of gaining legitimation. As Paul explains, the faith, hope, and love embodied in the life of Christ that God provides through the Holy Spirit relativises all supposedly epistemic operations embedded within and co-opted by the idolatry of symbolic power.

> If I speak in human – even angelic – tongues but don't have love, I truly become a clanging brass object or clashing symbol. And if have prophecy and know all the mysteries and all the knowledge, and if I have all the faith to move mountains but

> don't have love, I am nothing. Even if I donate all my possessions and if I give up my body in order to boast but don't have love, I gain nothing. (1 Corinthians 13.1-3)

Paul incisively rejects the idolatry of symbolic power, specifically as it easily takes the form of these co-opted epistemic functions. In the Corinthian setting, two forms of idolatry of symbolic power – epistemic legitimation – were present. On the one hand, the Greeks derived epistemic legitimation from their notions of rationality; on the other hand, the Jews preferred signs and miracles. Here both these sets of *epistemic doxa* conjoin. Yet, Paul also includes a third form of idolatry of symbolic capital, namely self-sacrifice for the sake of self-aggrandisement. These were all means for social legitimation and acquiring dominance in the field of society and/or the church. Paul demands that only love enables them to be meaningful as *epistemic* operations. Without love they fail to offer any *justification d'exister*, to use the Bourdieusien phrase we will explore more in the next chapter. That is, they fail to offer the legitimation that symbolic power presumes to offer. Note that each of Paul's if-then scenarios condenses an eschatologically-oriented story, one centred on love, as 'give up my body' clarifies. Concurrently, Paul's condensed narration also illumines that the hope for symbolic power is eschatological in nature as it promises to offer a quasi-final legitimation of existence based on power. Yet, the temporally dialectic nature of Christian eschatology reveals that power's claim to offer legitimation fails as much in the present before death as it would after death. Consequently, not only *is* Paul nothing without love; he *gains* nothing. In this way, love exposes the hoped-in deception of an idolatry of power that apostacy after power seeks.

Moreover, the epistemic value of these epistemic operations is put in question. This introduces us to *love as phronesis*. Love enables epistemic operations and provides legitimation that transcends and subverts temporal dominance as love's destiny relativises symbolic power's as well as its epistemic value.

> Love never fails. But if there are prophecies, they will be made useless; or if there are tongues, they will be stopped; or if there is knowledge, it will be made useless. For we know partially, and we prophesy partially. But whenever the perfect [τέλειον] comes,

> the partial will be made useless. When I was a child, I was speaking like a child, I was relating phronetically [ἐφρόνουν] as a child, I was reasoning as a child. When I truly become a man, I truly make the childish ways useless. For we see now through a mirror with confusion [αἰνίγματι], but then we will see face to face. Now we know partially, but then we will know just as also we are known. So now faith, hope, love – these three things – endure, but the greatest of these is love. (1 Corinthians 13.8-13)

Again, through concise stories, Paul contrasts the eschatological and epistemic promises of epistemic operations without love with stories of their eschatological destinies. Prophecies, tongues, and knowledge here are being relativised as they relate to *both* epistemic functions and to gaining symbolic power. Paul subverts not only their symbolic value from the phronetic perspective of love, but also, from the perspective that their epistemic value confers their symbolic value. Epistemic operations, even supernatural gifts, are doubly worthless without love. First, because they cannot offer a symbolic capital that confers *la justification d'exister*. Second, because their epistemic values are not enduring. They are not a reliable means of securing symbolic capital, even if one wanted it, because the assumption on which they are based will render them useless in a coming radical and eschatological change, i.e. the theoretical capacity to give a person an epistemic edge over others. Meanwhile, love's eschatological and epistemic destiny is to 'never fail' and 'endure' as the greatest member of the Christian phronetic hermeneutic of faith-hope-love.

Τέλειον (v.10) presumably refers to that time when the world is set right, when God fulfils all His will and purpose for this age. It is the age of the eschaton.[3] Yet, it is also a *double entendre*, considering it also signifies reaching maturity. This is rendered clearer by the brief narration of Paul's own coming of age as Paul pivots between succinct stories of the present and the future, progressively unfolding the distinctiveness of the new age. This wordplay underscores that this eschatological shift is primarily a *phronetic* one, not an

[3] Cf. Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, trans. George W. MacRae, Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 226; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, Anchor Yale Bible 32 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 498.

epistemic one. A reader could be forgiven for missing the phronetic emphasis, as there is much about 'knowing' in this passage, as well as a kind of nascent epistemology in which knowledge as *episteme* is both quantifiable and primarily considered with a superficial glance as knowledge-that. This orientation focuses on quantifiable knowledge-that. Missing the phronetic emphasis and assuming that nascent epistemology is even more probable, if one was depending on an English rendering and on the *epistemic doxa* that we have already exposed in especially Chapters 1, 3-4 as operative within the academic field. Nevertheless, both Paul's example and his intentional use of ἐφρόνουν (the root verb from which *phronesis* is derived) reveal that the major shift here is not *epistemic* in the sense of the aforementioned nascent epistemology. That is, returning to Schubert's encouragement for our productive solution, it is not about lack, nor is it about an instrumentalised or abstracted kind of knowing. There are two reasons for this. First, it is the idolatry of epistemic capacity as a means to symbolic capital that is one of chief problems 1 Corinthians aims to address. Indeed, below the surface of this nascent epistemology one sees that also assumed is the belief that knowing *confers* symbolic capital to the knower. But it would undermine Paul's point that the Corinthians have wrongly idolised symbolic power by obsessing over *episteme* to now exalt *episteme* as worthy of exaltation removed from the wider realities of the age of the perfect. It is true that *episteme* will be more complete in the eschaton, but that eschatological epistemic reality Paul brings up specifically to relativise the *qualitative* value of epistemic *capacities* in themselves. Knowledge does seem to be more complete in the eschaton rendering the need for temporal epistemic power less relevant, but the framing of the section is *love* not epistemic access. Paul is relativising the qualitative value of a quantitative and instrumental approach to *episteme*. The well-educated apostle aims to expose worshiping *episteme* as irrational and useless from the perspective of eschatological love. Further, pairing epistemic powers with symbolic power assumes a kind of epistemology

where the problem is the epistemic dimensions of the present world in a narrowly informational, quantifiable, knowledge-that kind of sense. It assumes people have an epistemic limitation on acquiring or possessing knowledge and indeed that knowledge is power, but also that said limitation will be lifted at which point knowledge-as-power will be expanded. Some epistemic hindrance to humanity seems rather obvious from general experience. So, the prospect of a Spirit-given capacity to know the unknowable would seem to be both powerful and unique. But this still assumes it receives its *meaningfulness* from its capacity to grant *power*. Yet, this kind of epistemology fails to engage with the possibility that the epistemic hindrance of the present reality is not only with the epistemic faculties *qua faculties*, but also with epistemic faculties *as used* – with understanding epistemic operations through the symbology of power. If the issue is how *episteme* and means of access to it *are used*, then this is a problem of phronesis. In other words, we are beginning to see that there is a need to do more than simply objectify knowledge, because in so doing it reduces knowledge to power. This makes knowledge not knowing but a mode of *social domination*. Reducing knowing to domination, subjectivises knowledge into an objectified power. Knowledge can never offer itself as knowledge to the subject, for the subject can only receive it as symbolic power not as knowledge.

In contrast, love liberates humanity from this epistemological dilemma by refusing to consider knowledge primarily through categories of symbolic power. What causes the radical change of the eschaton is not that suddenly human beings know more than they did before. More knowledge received as power cannot be the answer to an epistemological impasse derived from co-opting epistemic faculties into games of symbolic power. What causes the radical change of τὸ τέλειον is a perfection of the phronetic virtue of love. Love matured, *truly perfected*, changes the way human beings can relate to both objectivised knowledge, but

also subjectivised knowledge of God and themselves. As this story of the resurrection reveals, we will know more because we will *love* more.

Loving more resulting in knowing more also makes better sense of the language of v.12: 'For we see now through a mirror with confusion [αἰνίγματι], but then we will see face to face. Now we know partially, but then we will know just as also we are known.' Initially it seems that the issue is epistemic access or capacity—that is, the problem is with the mirror as a mirror. Surely there are some limitations on our epistemic capacities; few would argue otherwise. However, the meaning of αἰνίγματι is debated: does it refer to the problem of indirect knowledge, potentially suggestive of a Platonic epistemology, or of confusing riddles?[4] However, by connecting 1 Corinthians 13.12 with Jesus' beatitude 'Blessed are the pure in heart, because they will see God' (Matthew 5.8), Gutiérrez illuminates that what makes the image seen through the mirror so puzzling is not so much that it is epistemically limited, that it is indirect knowledge, but that without the proper phronetic orientation what is seen must be distorted, specifically by the deception of symbolic power.

> Ser limpio de corazón es no tener «doble alma», no ser hipócrita. En quechua hipócrita se dice precisamente persona de dos corazones (iskay sonkko), se trata de quien pretende vivir simultáneamente dos amores que, por su globalidad y radicalidad, se excluyen el uno al otro. Ser discípulo del Señor es ser coherente como el Maestro. Por eso el limpio de corazón, la persona íntegra, verá a Dios «Cara a cara», como diría Pablo (1 Cor 13,12); esa promesa es la causa de la alegría de los seguidores de Jesús.[5]

Gutiérrez recognises that being pure in heart is not merely a conscious sincerity or innocence, but an embodied living in love towards God without allowing apostate deceptive loves to interfere. Yet, this is not merely at the level of affect, but at the level of action. Someone 'pure in heart' is *not* hypocritical, because their actions, words, and affections align. They are

[4] Cf. Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 498-500; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 226-29. Cf. also 'αἴνιγμα', *A Greek English Lexicon*, 9th ed. with supplement [LSJ], ed. Henry George Liddell et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 39; 'αἴνιγμα', *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, 4th ed. [BDAG], ed. William Arndt et al., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 27.

[5] Gutiérrez, *Dios de Vida*, 172.

la persona íntegra. This integrity of love lived, Gutiérrez identifies, as the reason such a person will see God 'face to face.' Such a life is a mirroring of the life of Christ, such that this eschatological promise holds the joy of knowing in love perfectly in the resurrection, just as Christ always knew in love perfectly. Gutiérrez perceives that at its heart idolatry is a kind of love, but a love for the deceptive. This love for an idol, as with genuine love, is not love in the abstract, but love lived. Thus, Gutiérrez signals the danger of idolatry to epistemic and eschatological possibility. For love is radical and all-encompassing by nature. The phronetic orientation of the love of power will render one impure in heart, and therefore unable to see God face to face, precisely because the face that one is trying to see in love is not the face of God but power. In part, this is the nature of hope and promise, for the idolatry of symbolic power warps the way one relates to the world. However, the story of the resurrection holds out the hope of seeing God face-to-face precisely because in loving God, His is the face one loves to see. With the hypocritical idolatries of the present order removed at the resurrection with a phronetic renewal, humanity has the possibility of knowing God perfectly face-to-face with living love as much as God already knows humanity in living love.

So, the trouble with the mirror is not just that it is a mirror, but that the person holding it does not know how to hold it or how to look at it. Furthermore, the referentiality and relationality of the mirror is intrapersonal and objectified, while the knowledge face-to-face is interpersonal and simultaneously subjectivises objectivity and objectivises subjectivity. Subjectivising objectivity and objectivising subjectivity was Bourdieu's explicit aim for *habitus*, as we saw in Chapter 2. However, as we began to see there and will explore more below, this dialectic approach to knowing only works through love. Possibly, Paul merely means to compare indirect knowledge generally to direct knowledge generally, without having much concern to keep the subjectivised perspectives of the metaphors matched. However, it is precisely the Corinthians' problem that they are obsessed with themselves in

relation to their ranking within the symbologies of power. Thus, it is equally likely, indeed more, that Paul means to critique the kind of epistemic corruption produced by the idolatry of symbolic power by referring to their self-obsessed and deceptive hope in symbolic power which, through apostacising love, functions as the phronetic filter of their epistemology. In other words, the epistemic problem they have is not just that they are unable to see things directly but that they are looking in entirely the wrong direction. Hence Christ says it is the pure in heart who will see God. As limited as the epistemic capacities might be pre-resurrection, the radical change that makes the epistemic capacities function appropriately is phronetic in nature. Purity of heart is irreducible to an epistemic category, rather it is primarily a phronetic category that renders the epistemic access possible.

As with Gutiérrez's comment above on both the 'pure in heart' and 1 Corinthians 13.12, that 'esa promesa es la causa de la *alegría* de los *seguidores* de Jesús,' the subversion of symbolic power occurs through a phronetic transformation that begins proleptically among the pure in heart – those whose hearts are not seduced into an apostacy of the deception of symbolic power. It reaches its τέλειον through resurrection. It is the paradoxical good news of Christ crucified and resurrected that liberates from enslavement to sin, death, and the devil. For these operate through the symbology of power and violence rather than the phronetic vitality of the resurrection. That is, they operate within incompatible eschatological narrations. Living the ongoing story of faith, hope, and love towards the Triune God comes at the cost of relating to knowledge so as to inflict symbolic violence, and with the possibility of acknowledging the narrativity of knowing. And this is exactly what we want to achieve for our theological epistemology.

In 1 Corinthians 13.12b, Paul says that though 'now we know partially' in the resurrection Christians 'will know as they are known'. To some this will still denote an increase in knowledge as if it was a good, a capital. However, this fails on two counts: first,

the issue of the glorification of symbolic power as discussed above; but second, on account of the *kind* of knowledge promised. If this were a statement solely about the amount of knowledge that will be possessed (note this still thinks in capitalistic terms) rather than the way of knowing or the type of knowledge that will be operative, then there is a metaphysical/theological problem. Namely, if we consider only the epistemic knowledge that God has about even one person, assuming the traditional Christian view of God as omniscient, then not only does God know all there is to know about a person, but due to his creative and non-contingent nature his knowledge is infinite. Yet, few would argue that the resurrection results in resurrected human beings knowing all there is to know about another person, or even all there is to know about the old or new creation in every dimension of its existence. Thus, reading this section through an epistemic lens, much less one corrupted by the hope of symbolic power, is problematic. Beyond this, however, it would assume that a resurrected person could know all there is to know about the Triune God who is infinite. Succinctly, it is impossible for a finite person to know the infinite God infinitely. It is not possible for Paul to be saying that when the perfect comes a resurrected person could know God as much as God knows himself. But if the transformation and the partialness of human knowledge in the present is primarily phronetic in nature, then the problem is assuaged. For then the question is not in the amount of knowledge as if it is something to be capitalized, but in the kind of knowledge, in the way of knowing.

Moreover, a phronetic epistemology reframes the important value of divine knowledge from being simply the amount of knowledge that God possesses – as important as it is that he knows infinitely – to making it just as important the way that God knows things, that is, the way that God relates to knowing. In many regards this is to remain thinking relationally as Bourdieu would want. God knows not just epistemically but phronetically. The way God relates and orients to knowledge is not one in which He is obsessed with the

symbology of power. Or we could say, God does not narrate himself with an idolatry towards power. First, because He alone is God. God cannot worship anything or anyone as a god. Second, because the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit narrate their co-eternal life as especially intra-Trinitarian love, rather than power. Of course, Christianity has long held to the omnipotence and omniscience of God, but not as abstractions separable from his love in action. If God did think of power as something to gain, then the incarnation, death, and resurrection would be impossible. But God is love, rather than knowledge or power. This means that it is primarily the phronetic dispositions of the Triune God that shape his knowing and his exercise of power. He does not know in abstract, in some solely objectified and commodified way. He knows not *for* power, but *in* love.

This resonates with how God reveals himself to Moses when Moses asks to be shown the glory of the Lord. Moses asks what seems to be an epistemic or at least aesthetic question 'Make me see your glory' but God says he cannot handle it. Moreover, what the Lord reveals are not epistemic categories or symbologies of power, but phronetic orientations toward His people and the world. No doubt Moses is asking with the assumptions of the symbologies of power, where epistemics offer legitimation for power. Yet there God reveals proleptically what is exhibited in perfect phronetic display in Christ crucified: 'Yahweh, Yahweh is a compassionate and gracious God, taking long to get angry and abundant in loyalty and truth, fulfilling loyalty for thousands, taking away iniquity, rebellion, and sin. But by no means will he leave them unpunished.' (Exodus 34.6b-7a). The Lord proclaims his glory – not in might or knowledge, as much as He is infinitely active and knowing – but in compassion, in loyalty, in love. That is, God always narrates his power and knowledge *in relation to* and *as operations of* love. The Lord reframes the question away from the symbology of power that Moses requests towards the phronetic dimensions that God celebrates about Himself. He is not the God who comes to offer power as the ultimate good, but Himself in Christ crucified

and resurrected, through whom human idolatry is undone and their phronetic powers are reformed and resurrected towards faith, hope, and love. It is true that God holds infinite epistemic capacity and power to act but both are rooted in divine phronesis, exalted in the enstoried faith, hope, and love of Christ incarnate, crucified, and alive. A phronetic epistemology of love is not just knowledge or love in abstraction or instrumentalisation. It is love in action. It is love lived. It is love that knows in its fullness because without love knowing cannot be fulfilled.

1 Corinthians 13.13 exposes the phronetic nature of transformation of the epistemic operations. For if all three – faith, hope, and love –operate when the perfect comes, then the epistemic situation will be improved through phronesis, because at the very least, faith and hope both presuppose some form of epistemic limitation. That is, what makes faith *faith* is that in bi/multi-lateral relations there is some gap between *episteme* and faith and hope (cf. Mk 5.36; Heb 11.1; Rom 8.24-25; 1 Pet 1.8-9). This is precisely what makes faith and hope susceptible to the corruption that Bourdieu exposes in capitals and fields. For capital the known value is the trusted or assumed value. There is no epistemic demand or even possibility for the capital to be known apart from faith, because its epistemic value is derived from faith. One cannot know that a type of capital is valuable; one can only know that oneself and others believe it valuable, from Bourdieu's perspective. Fields, likewise, produce *epistemic doxa* through the highly matrixed relations of the field orienting in hope towards the assumed epistemic value, but not based on *episteme*, but only on the *prospect* of *episteme*. Consequently, if the perfect brings a phronetic resurrection, then the difficulty of there being a kind of faith and/or hope that can operate within total epistemological access, capacity, and/or possession is relieved. For faith and hope can continue to operate as perfected phronesis. Resurrection will mean human beings will be able to relate to knowledge perfectly; not that they have perfect knowledge. Thus, Paul's phronetic epistemology in 1

Corinthians 13 reframes all types of knowledge from the quantitative evaluation to the qualitative. Eschatologically, humans will not know everything and have an infinite capacity to know as God does. Rather, when the perfect comes those who live by faith, hope, and love in Christ crucified will relate to knowledge as God does. What sets God's knowing apart from human knowing is the perfectness of His phronetic activities, not just the infinity of what he knows.

Accordingly, in the eschaton, only faith, hope, and love will remain. Consequently, since *episteme* always depended on faith, hope, and love, chasing after *episteme* without them could never result in a perfect knowledge, being a malformed phronesis of epistemic power. Such an overly epistemic orientation, instead of a phronetic orientation, was always especially susceptible to being co-opted by an idolatry of dominance. So much so, epistemic priority naturally leads to an instrumentalised end of knowing. But reducing knowing to power will have to cease when the phronetic virtues are perfected. In other words, 'we know partially' because our phronesis is partial. God does not reduce knowing – though infinite for him – to power, that is, knowing as a mode of instrumentalising outcomes. God's power is not reducible to knowing, that is the power that God possesses is not simply because of the amount and capacities of his knowledge. It is true God is omnipotent. However, God's power is never separable from love. God is love, which is both a personalising statement and a rebuff to placing the priority on power. Omnipotence is assumed, but always subsumed with love. For unlimited power without love would be terrifying as much as unlimited knowledge without love, but 'perfect [τελεία] love drives away fear' (1 John 4.18). Here in the larger context of noting 'God is love' (1 John 4.16) 1 John employs the feminine form of the same adjective that Paul uses for the eschaton in 1 Corinthians 13. So, since God's infinite knowledge does not reduce to power but suffuses both power and knowledge with love, becoming 'perfect' in love and knowing as God knows cannot exalt a kind of knowing that

reduces knowing to power, but which places the framework, in which both power and knowledge are understood, in love. What remains is not *episteme* instrumentalised or objectified, but faith, hope, and love – living and knowing as God does, through love. Thus, what we need is an epistemology that fully begins and ends with love: one where *whos* know and are known, and *thats* are known as God knows them, in love. For this, though our epistemology must include the abstract, it cannot be abstractionist. Rather it must involve the narratological dialectic of enstorying knowledge in love.

2. Narrating, dialectical love: subjectivising objectivity and objectivising subjectivity

While we have critiqued Bourdieu in Chapter 5 for not going far enough to a positive solution, it would be wrong to say that Bourdieu does not lay the groundwork for a phronetic epistemology. However, to illuminate Bourdieu's phronetic insights and cultivate through them a phronetic epistemology of love, we must crosspollinate Bourdieu's dialectic dimensions of *habitus* as love with Hans Urs von Balthasar, a Roman Catholic narrative theologian who shares a similar interest in building a dialectic epistemology on love. Developing their phronetic approaches out of an engagement with the phenomenology of Husserl, both seek to build an epistemology that subjectivises objectivity and objectivises subjectivity, Bourdieu through *habitus* and Balthasar through love. Understanding their engagement with Husserl will protect against severing their dialectic epistemologies from action. Thus, through refracting Bourdieu through Balthasar, we will better understand how *habitus* operates as love and construct a phronetic epistemology of love that is centred on how God knows in love and embraces the eschatological narrativity of love. In this way, we aim to remove symbolic violence from our constructive theological epistemology without resorting to it.

2.1 The Husserlian background of Bourdieu's and Balthasar's dialectic epistemology

Bourdieu intersects with Balthasar in subjectivising objectivity and objectivising subjectivity, first as both integrate a Husserlian phenomenological insight of subjectivising objectivity, but second by going beyond it. Bourdieu is explicit in *habitus*' relation to Edmund Husserl:

> It seems to me in fact that in all cases those who used the word *habitus* were inspired by a theoretical intention not far removed from mine which was: to get out from under the philosophy of consciousness without doing away with the agent, in its truth of a practical operator of object constructions: … as in Husserl, where the same concept and related notions such as the one of *Habitualität* mark the effort to move out of the philosophy of consciousness by reintroducing … a relationship of ontological complicity with the world….[6]

Here Bourdieu reveals that he is aware of the philosophical foundations of his concept, including Husserl.[7] Yet, Bourdieu is still doing something constructive with his understanding of *habitus*, explaining that he (along with all those using *habitus* or similar concepts) uses *habitus* 'to escape from under the philosophy of the subject without doing away with the agent … [and] from under the philosophy of the structure but without forgetting to take into account the effects it wields upon and through the agent.'[8] But he also protests: 'most commentators completely overlook the significant difference between my usage of this notion and the totality of previous usages … I said *habitus* so as *not* to say habit—that is, the generative (if not creative) capacity inscribed in the system of dispositions as an *art*, in the strongest sense of practical mastery, and in particular as an *ars inveniendi*.'[9]

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[6] Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Genesis of the Concepts 'Habitus' and 'Field'', *Sociocriticism* 2, no. 2 (1985), trans. Channa Newman: 11-24, quote from p.14. Cf. Lane, *Bourdieu*, 194: 'At the heart of Bourdieu's understanding of the workings of the habitus is what, *following Husserl*, he terms the "doxa" or the "doxic relation" to the world' (emphasis added).

[7] For more on the philosophical context, interaction, and implications of Bourdieu's concept of habitus, especially vis-à-vis Jean Paul Sartre, Maurice Jean Jacques Merleau-Ponty, and Michel Foucault, who feature recurringly in the Bourdieusien corpus, cf. Sung-min Hong, *Habitus, Corps, Domination: Sur certains présupposés philosophiques de la sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu*, Logiques Sociales (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999).

[8] *IRS*, 121-22.

[9] *IRS*, 122.

Ultimately, then, one issue with previous and related concepts of *habitus* is that they fail to reside sufficiently within Bourdieu's preferred relational and dialectical model of subjectivising objectivity and objectivising subjectivity, namely by ultimately reducing to the objectivization of subjectivity alone. Moreover, this dialectic in *habitus* creates through action. Understanding *habitus* without the dialectic results in misconstruing the active and creative nature of the agency it exhibits. *Habitus* is not merely a set of habits, static routines of action; rather Bourdieu develops Husserlian *Habitualität* into a truly creative engagement with the world through action, rooted in embodiment that upholds the dialectical nature of human epistemic interactions with others and the world.

Similarly for Balthasar, Victoria S. Harrison discerns a Husserlian relation to dialectic subjectivised objectivity in his introduction to *Thérèse von Lisieux: Geschichte einer Sendung*:[10] 'Von Balthasar's use [in the introduction] of the term 'phenomenology' derives from Edmund Husserl. … The aim of Husserl's programme was to re-ground 'objective' truths in the living acts 'intended' by human consciousness. Husserl judged that the method most appropriate to this was largely descriptive.'[11] Harrison juxtaposes Husserl's *Logical Investigations* to suggest a source for Balthasar's subjectivised objectivity.[12] That Balthasar should interact with and develop an approach from Husserl's phenomenology, however, should not be considered too surprising. For Husserl was very much at the centre of Catholic thought during the beginning of Balthasar's career. Edward Baring explains,

> By the end of the 1930s [Husserl's] phenomenology was passionately discussed and contested in seminaries and Catholic universities around Europe. … But the troublesome aspects propelled Husserl's work out of neo-scholastic circles and into

[10] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Thérèse von Lisieux: Geschichte einer Sendung* (Köln/Olten: Hegner-Bücherei, 1950).

[11] Victoria S. Harrison, *The Apologetic Value of Human Holiness: Von Balthasar's Christocentric Philosophical Anthropology*, Studies in Philosophy and Religion 21 (Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic, 2000), 57. Cf. also pp.50-54.

[12] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *The Logical Investigations, Vol. I*, ed. T. Honderich, trans. J. N. Findlay, International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970 [1900]).

> mainstream philosophy. For the way in which progressives sought to marry modern subjectivism with medieval realism in their reading of Husserl's work encouraged many Christian existentialists to appeal to him when figuring their own relationship to the dominant philosophy of the Church.[13]

It was in this milieu, and with similar interests, that Balthasar drew upon Husserl, even if not prominently, to construct a dialectic epistemology that married subjectivity with objectivity without conflating either, seeking to incorporate phenomenological insights with Christian realism. One might say: in the sociological structure of the theological, philosophical, and ecclesial fields some influence from Husserl in Balthasar would be expressly compatible with a *habitus* negotiating those fields. This is not to say that using Husserl was obligatory, but that he would provide Balthasar with resources for a constructive epistemology and some symbolic legitimacy for the dialectic he sought to construct in and for the Roman Catholic Church to address to the epistemological *doxa* of the wider social field. Yet, this Husserlian context – whether because it was understood at the time or because it is an expression of intuitive *habitus* – conceals itself mostly uncited in Balthasar's project.

Nevertheless, Harrison discerns the Husserlian mark on Balthasar's thought and reveals how he matures a Husserlian influenced phenomenology beyond Husserl's preferred method of description:

> Balthasar's method of spiritual phenomenology is designed to make accessible to theology and its audiences whatever it is that God is revealing in the lives of the saints. … Despite his promotion of [a Husserlian] spiritual phenomenology, Balthasar clearly believed that a theologian should be more than a mere observer of other people's holy lives. … Balthasar's most controversial claims concern his insistence that a genuine theologian must be living a holy life.[14]

In this way, vis-à-vis theology Balthasar not only subjectivises objectivity following Husserl but objectivises subjectivity. Balthasar prioritises the phronetic dimension of theology,

[13] Baring, *Converts to the Real*, 210.

[14] Victoria S. Harrison, 'Hans Urs Von Balthasar', *The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology*, ed. William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 543-44.

including its epistemic operations. He renders living a holy life central to the capacity to have knowledge. Knowing cannot be at the expense of acting. Despite the abstraction of Balthasar displayed in our consideration of his dialectic, that abstraction is not the aim of Balthasar's dialectic theology. Rather it is a conceptual exploration on the terms of abstraction in order to find a way of legitimating the phronetic dialectic he seeks to develop and defend.

Therefore, if we understand that Balthasar's theology is properly read as a phronetic theology, then the abstractionism we discover ought to be understood in three ways. First, it is understood as an inclusive theological epistemology than can embrace both the abstract and embodied dimensions of theology. Second, it is understood as an approach to theology that is lived in order to be valid and intelligible, so that the abstract inquiries are *fides quaerens intellectum*, not *intellectus quaerens fidem*. Balthasar's abstract reasoning is intended to make theology more liveable, not less. Third, it is an expression of the creative navigation of the field of academic German theology in the mid-20th century. We cannot forget what we have seen in exposed by the Yale School and others: that the abstractionist inclinations in theology especially arose in the German-speaking academic context, which Balthasar himself was both a product of and participant in. Balthasar's use of abstractionism must be understood also as a navigation of symbolic violence, as an appeal for symbolic legitimation, as much as an expression of how deeply rooted the *epistemic doxa* of theology can be. Even if conceptually Balthasar seems disinclined towards abstractionism, he intuitively embraces it, even if only to subvert it. This is the kind of creative agency that Bourdieu intends for dialectic *habitus*.

2.2 Narrating the resurrection in Balthasar's Dialectic epistemology of love

Balthasar, like Bourdieu, develops a Husserlian phenomenological approach to theology that held subjectivity and objectivity as dialectically related. Yet, our consideration of Balthasar will expose that both Bourdieu and Balthasar's dialectics need to approach

epistemology phronetically. Moreover, Balthasar will expose that this dialectic ultimately needs love to operate, and thus renders knowing a participation in the story of the resurrection through love.

Initially, love only appears gently when Balthasar refuses to collapse the subjectivity-objectivity dialectic for theology, even if he is willing to discuss each side separately.

> Die Vereinigung [des Subjekts und Objekts] selbst ist ein Drittes, Neues, in welchen der Sinn der Anlagen sich erst wahrhaft enthüllt. Das Subjekt ist bereit, in seinem Raum den Gegenstand zu empfangen; was sich aber in diesem Empfang ergeben wird, ist im voraus nicht zu berechnen. Ebenso ist das Objekt bereit, sich in dem zur Verfügung stehenden Raum zu offenbaren; was für eine Entfaltung es aber dabei erfahren wird, ist an ihm selber nicht zu erraten und abzulesen.[15]

He understands that the type of relationality that subjectivity and objectivity maintain with one another cannot ultimately be collapsed. It is not, then, an arbitrary dialectic, but one essential to understanding either type of relationality *in se*. He rejects an objectivized subjectivity that does not simultaneously subjectivise objectivity, because to embrace only one side of the dialectic neuters the subject of its subjectivity and the object of its objectivity and *vice versa*. Thus, Balthasar phenomenological orientation coheres with Bourdieu's own, as expressed in his triadic heuristic, and manifestly in *habitus*. Yet, love has yet to explicitly appear in the operation of the dialectic.

Nevertheless, at the intersection of Bourdieu and Balthasar's shared concern to subjectivise objectivity and objectivise subjectivity, love soon reveals itself. For Balthasar considers how subjectivising objectivity without failing to objectivise subjectivity involves love.

> Nur vom Subjekt kann das Objekt seinen abschließenden Sinn erfahren, der sich ja erst im überlegenen geistigen Raum des Subjekts vollendet. Im schöpferischen Spiegel des Subjekts wird ihm das Bild dessen entgegengehalten, was es ist, was es sein kann und sein soll. Diese schöpferische Tat des Subjekts hat mit einer bloßen

[15] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theologik Vol. 1: Wahrheit der Welt* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1985), 57.

> Haltung der Gerechtigkeit nichts mehr gemeinsam, sie ist vielmehr eine vom Objekt nicht erzwingbare Tat der *Liebe*.[16]

Balthasar here makes two major word plays here that underline the dialectic embrace that love makes possible. First, *überlegenen* can mean both superior as well as reflective/thought about. There is a superiority involved specifically with its consideration that enables the object to become more than it was. The object is *more itself* as much as it is *more than it was* after the dialectical interaction with the subject. The second wordplay involves *Haltung* playing with *entgegengehalten* through their shared root verb *halten*. This wordplay depends upon the nature of a *Spiegel* which picks up the same mirror metaphor and theme of love as 1 Corinthians 13.12 to understand the epistemic relations involved. In this way, Balthasar's dialectical construction may signal itself as a theological reflection on 1 Corinthians 13, vis-à-vis knowing. For Balthasar the image offered to the object by the subject is *held up* to the object, but it is more than the object can be without it, but this *holding up* does more than just *uphold* the object's objectivity or the subject's subjectivity. Rather because it is the creative engagement with the object by the subject and the object's intentional reception by the subject, the subject does not just do justice to the object but loves it for what it is in such a way that it can become more than it was without ceasing to be itself. In objectivising the subjectivising of objectivity and in subjectivising the objectivising of subjectivity only love remains, not merely a concern for doing justice to the nature of the object or the subject, but an orientation towards fulfilling both in both, less an unforcible act than a phronetic movement. It is less about there being a mirror than using the mirror correctly. For he understands that objectivation by the subject 'ist mehr al sein bloßer Abklatsch der nackten Faktizität des Objects',[17] such that it simultaneously subjectivises the objectivity and

[16] Balthasar, *Theologik 1*, 76.

[17] Balthasar, *Theologik 1*, 76.

objectivises the subjectivity, especially when one recognizes the dialect is underpinned by love. 'Auch wenn das Subjekt in seiner Erkenntnis sich möglichster Objektivität befleißt, so ist doch gerade diese Anstrengung, in der es dem Objekt zu seiner Wahrheit verhilft, etwas, was über die Gerechtigkeit hinausliegt und seine Wurzel in einer naturhaften Liebe besitzt. '[18] Balthasar is describing an ideal, *bona fides* engagement with an object. And many could critique this kind of interaction between subject and object as not always (if ever) possible. How many subjects try to pursue objectivity in knowledge as much as possible? Yet, Balthasar does suggest with *auch wenn* that this is perhaps the best-case scenario, but its function is only to expose what is always present epistemically in phronetic approaches to *Erkenntinis*: love embraces the dialectic rather than collapsing it.

Here Balthasar also demonstrates the same impulse towards knowing as Guitiérrez commends for the Christian life in general: 'Prójimo … no es aquel que yo encuentro en mi camino, sino aquel en cuyo camino yo me pongo. Aquel a quien yo me acerco y busco activamente. Los demás aspectos de la vida cristiana cobran significación si están animados por la caridad, de otro modo son simplemente, como dice Pablo, actos vacíos (cf. 1 Cor. 13).'[19] Gutiérrez, reflecting on the parable this chapter opened with and the narration of the resurrection in 1 Corinthians, reiterates that love does not just find someone in the way but occurs when the subject puts themselves in the way of the other. This is the kind of action Balthasar is describing for his dialectic of love. Such loving makes knowledge possible, as the set of relations it establishes between subject and object cannot be distanced, abstracted, or passive. Rather Gutiérres reaffirms with Balthasar that love comes close and searches actively, explaining why this dialectic is so necessary for knowledge: without love manifesting this dialectic of subjectivising objectivity and objectivising subjectivity, without

[18] Balthasar, *Theologik 1*, 76-77.

[19] *TL*, 270.

affect in action – subjects narrating objects as neighbours – love fails to be love and knowing fails to know. Rather, as with all other aspects of the Christian life, acts of knowing fail to cohere into signification if they are not *animados por la caridad*. Thus, Gutiérrez in dialogue with the Good Samaritan and Paul sharpens what Balthasar implies: knowing is unsuccessful without love, both in terms of its purpose and in terms of nature, because subjects will destroy the quasi-subjectivity and objectivity of the object. Meanwhile, subjects collapse their own subjectivity by rendering their subjective agency in vain. Thus, Balthasar's dialectic epistemology refracted through Gutiérrez reveals that knowing is generated by love and generative of even deeper love. But Gutiérrez also reminds that this move towards action for the other cannot remain only in the theoretical space. Likewise, as Balthasar intends for all knowing (but is easily lost here), theology must be the overflow of a holy life not merely the excess of abstract theorisation about knowledge. Consequently, love actively pursues a dialectic epistemology that narrates subject and object into each other's worlds.

Balthasar, therefore, intends more for his dialect epistemology of love than merely upholding the dialectic. By suffusing love through the dialectic, he also uplifts knowing into a phronetic participation with the productive action of God loving creation into being. This explains how and why a dialectic epistemology of love can and must be genuinely creative and compatible with action.

> Die schöpferische Seite der menschlichen Erkenntnis ist somit eine analoge Teilnahme des Geschöpfes an der schöpferischen Zumessung der Wahrheit durch die urbildliche, produktive Erkenntnis Gottes. Sie zieht das zu Erkennende irgendwie gnadenvoll in die eigene Sphäre des Geistes empor, um ihm hier die Möglichkeit zu geben, sich aus der Kraft und im Licht des Subjekts zu entfalten, bevor es in seiner Objektivität zum Gegenstand der Erkenntnis werden soll. Und auch noch seine Objektivität, an der das Subjekt selbst mitgearbeitet hat, wird in der vollen Erkenntnis des Objekts unversehens vollendet und emporgesteigert zu jenem wahren Maß und Bild des Objekts, wie nur die Liebe es erfindend erschauen kann. Der schöpferische Blick der Liebe allein vermag dem Gegenstand jenes Maß anzumessen und jenen Spiegel entgegenzuhalten, der seine endgültige und daher objektive Wahrheit enthält,

> weil auch der Blick, mit dem Gott seine Geschöpfe betrachtet, nicht der richtende Blick der Gerechtigkeit, sondern der Liebesblick der Barmherzigkeit ist.[20]

The object can only fulfil its objectivity in the subjectivity of the subject, because at most an object can merely *exist* without the subject, but the object can only *mean* with the subject. Likewise, subjectivity can *exist* without the object, but it can only produce *meaning* with the object. Thus, subjectivity, generating meaning as an essential and creative dimension of itself, can fulfil this subjectivity in the objectivity of the object. Here *Spiegel* appears again, echoing 1 Corinthians 13.12. The epistemic possibility depends upon the subject knowing how to hold the mirror and what to look at. Thus, as a system, subjectivity and objectivity are more than their constituent parts. In this way, the love found in the subjectivity makes the objectivity subjective and the subjectivity objective in a way that is generative and creative and that is intuitive and active. Love facilitates the epistemic dimensions of the dialectic without forcing it to collapse. For only if an object can be loved *for* what it is and *into* what it is, can it truly fulfil objectivity. Inseparably: only if a subject can love an object and love that object into a deeper resonance of itself – into a creative construction of subjectivised objectivity that also objectivises subjectivity, – can the dialectic endure without conflation or collapse. For the relationality expressed in love substantiates mutually both elements and parallels the relationality operative in *habitus*. Thus, an abstract concept can exist in a phronetic epistemology of love, but it is loved for its abstraction without entailing that it is loved abstractly.

Love produces a kind of epistemological access which is non-reductive and oriented to action. That is, love makes phronetic, and not merely conceptual, knowledge possible, while revealing that conceptual knowledge depends upon phronesis. Love ensures that knowing attends to both epistemology and the sociology of knowledge as it refuses to do less

[20] Balthasar, *Theologik 1*, 77-78 (emphasis added).

than subjectivise objectivity *and* objectivise subjectivity. Human knowing involves agency as a creative participation in love through subjectivity that negotiates objectivity without flattening it, and *vice versa*. Indeed, it is a participation in the creative agency and knowledge of God Himself, *who is love*. Of course, because metaphysically this is underpinned in God's agency expressed through creative knowing, Balthasar's deficiency (unlike Bourdieu's *habitus*) is in over-prioritising conscious knowledge in modelling all knowledge as he extends the *analoge Teilnahme* in the *produktive Erkenntnis Gottes* to both subjects and objects. Consequently, regardless of whether an object (perhaps all objects) is semi-occluded epistemically, and whether the act of knowing is always conscious knowledge, the strategic and creative relationality between the subject and the object still involves a kind of love. Despite missing this, Balthasar recognises that the imprint objectivity makes on subjectivity is dynamic and profound: 'Ein Subjekt ist … weit entfernt, eine bloße "leere Tafel" zu sein, auf der *man* nach Belieben einschreiben kann, was einem einfällt. … Jeder Eindruck, den man in ihm hinterläßt, kann *unabsehbare* Folgen in sein inneres persönliches Leben hinein haben….'[21] The object can affect the subject deep at the core of the subject, but that does not necessarily mean that the subject must be conscious of it, as Bourdieu's dialectic *habitus* maintains. However, the relationality holding between subjectivity and objectivity is reciprocally effective and sensitive to subjectivity and objectivity. This unbreakable dialectical bond consists in subjects loving the objects and objects loving subjects, both as an analogical reflection of or even participation in the creative activity of intra-Trinitarian love. Thus, through loving, subjects always shape and are shaped by objectivity as much as objects always shape and are shaped by subjectivity. So much so, that Balthasar here subjectivises the object of the subject as *man*, the pronoun used for generic personal agents whose identity qua identity is not being emphasised. In a way, this love gives the objects themselves a kind

[21] Balthasar, *Theologik 1*, 75 (emphasis added).

of agency, but one complimentary with the subjects. This quasi-agency in its own objectivised way participates in the subjectivised loving of God who knows and creates all objects and subjects in a love that is the condition of possibility for all subjects and objects to exist and to be known. That is, Balthasar places all creation in a story rooted in and reflective of divine love. He views all knowing as a love narrative with both subjects and objects as protagonists, as lover and beloved.

Such love is inseparable from action, as Balthasar's demand for holiness lived by theologians reaffirms. However, as Balthasar narrativises knowing through love, he reveals that love is also inseparable from story. Love cannot exist in abstract, in theory, love only exists in life, in loving, in embodied narration. Here Balthasar finds support in research by cognitive narratologist Patrick Colm Hogan, who argues with a perspective aligned with what we have termed 8E cognition that fundamentally all emotions are narratival and all narratives are emotional.

> …[S]tories are connected with, indeed, formed out of emotions and emotion ideas. Here we see that emotions and emotion ideas are connected with, indeed, formed out of stories as well. More exactly, we saw previously that prototype stories are in part formed out of emotion prototypes. Those emotion prototypes are in part based in actual emotions. There are facts about emotions. However, at the same time, emotions are not fixed and fully definite. Rather, emotions – specific feelings, as experienced and enacted at a particular time and place – appear to be formed in part from emotion prototypes and from the narratives these prototypes define. Moreover, to a great extent we internalize these prototypes through the stories they have shaped.[22]

Hogan, here, displays a similarly dialectic inclination towards affect's relation to stories. People feel subjectively emotions they objectively have, but they subjectively feel them in terms of stories that objectively recur through human society. Rephrased, human beings know what love is not merely as a feeling of love but through seeing and living stories of love. The nature of love is narratival. The goals, dimensions, and activities of love both generate and are generated by stories. Thus, a phronetic epistemology of love must be subjectively-

[22] Hogan, *Mind and Its Stories*, 250.

objectively dialectic, *and* inclusive of narratival expressions of knowing, because loving is enstoried. Loving is living a story of love. Narrative uniquely integrates both the subjective and objective dimensions of the dialectic without flattening them to one or the other, precisely because of participating in the eternal creativity of the Holy Trinity, who created all subjects and objects in love. Every act of knowing for Balthasar, then, is a retelling of creation in love. Moreover, because it participates in that truly creative divine love – rather than mere human love for power – every act of knowing can be a productive and proleptic participation in the resurrection, when God recreates the heavens and the earth beyond what they are today to bring them into an even more faithful expression of themselves. Through love knowing becomes not simply a lack-oriented knowing but a productive knowing. Knowing becomes a narration of subject and object together moving one step closer to the resurrection, when the human subjects will know created objects as both are known by God, viz. in love.

Balthasar's narration here may employ the language of academic abstractionism, but it is a story that Balthasar always intends to be lived more than merely thought. He may have appealed to the abstractionism of the reigning *epistemic doxa* in academic theology to gain legitimation for his project, much as the Yale School itself has done. Nevertheless, the aim was parallel: to contest that *epistemic doxa* and renarrate theology into love, so as to begin to reform the *epistemic doxa* of theology without resorting to the same level of symbolic violence that his *habitus* already had to intuitively navigate. In this way, Balthasar sharpens the dialectic nature of our phronetic epistemology of love by narrating knowing through love into the resurrection.

2.3 Resurrecting a dialectic phronesis of love in habitus

Considering Balthasar's dialectical construction of knowing in love, *habitus* as a kind of dialectic phronesis ultimately reveals itself to operate as a form of love – even if usually

love for the deception of hoping in value of symbolic power. Likewise, then, *habitus* is also a kind of embodied narration of loving symbolic power. As such, *habitus* is compatible with a phronetic epistemology of love, precisely because it both refuses to collapse the dialectic but also because it is sensitive to the subjectivity-objectivity dialectic constitutive of human agency not only as it relates to epistemology but also as it relates to action. For just as *habitus* is not demonstrated in considering the game but in *playing*, human love participating in the love of the Holy Trinity through a proleptic narration of the resurrection is achieved not in merely considering the dialectic relation of subjects and objects or in knowing about a person or thing or even in reflecting on the nature of love itself but in *loving*.

As phronesis, *habitus* allows that the conscious frameworks for activity can be dissimilar to the actual phronetic strategies operative towards capitals in the field. *Habitus* is a story of love lived both consciously and unconsciously. For example, an agent can list all sorts of motivations for writing on some theological topic but can still have phronetic objectives more fundamental to that choice. That choice can be made consciously, but in many cases remains unconsciously operative. Some can claim and even consciously think their choice to support some minority was to enfranchise or protect it, when in fact its objective phronetic strategic value, measured in terms of the consequences to the set of relations constituting the field was to colonise and recruit their symbolic capital towards allegiance with the dominant. *Habitus* is about the love of the hope that draws an agent – whether individual or collective – in the system of relations aiming towards winning the trusted *enjeux du jeu*. But what happens when an agent loves being deceived in hoping for symbolic dominance, believing it to be everything worth gaining? This is exactly what our consideration of capitals revealed: symbolic violence. The *habitus* structured by and structuring the field(s) involved can become not just a winner-take-all orientation, or even a winning-is-everything disposition; it can become a win-at-all-costs obsession that worships

only a narrow and temporary taste of human power. Such a *habitus* understands self-importance over-and-against others as all there is and all that is worth having. This necessitates the struggle, the ruthless war for not only symbolic capital, but the desire to eliminate all reflexivity and suborn a legitimation of the structure and grip on gained power through the *doxa*, but especially the *epistemic doxa*. A love for the deception of this idol of power can only lead to contestation, to the game filled with acrimonious – to a greater or lesser degree – players, individuals and collectives in love with hoping in power as the only thing they can trust. More than this, *habitus* reveals that symbolic violence is not a random fluke phenomenon of the system of human relations, but an expectable outcome of putting trust in the idol of power that the hope in power makes meaningful and the love of power makes happen. *Habitus* exposes itself as the phronetic realisation of an apostacy towards power.

Can, then, a *habitus* so corrupted by and towards symbolic violence be resurrected when it may not even be conscious of its apostacy? Returning to the eschatological 'perfect' of 1 Corinthians 13, we find hope even for a resurrection of any *habitus* apostacising itself towards symbolic power, whether it be in sociology, the church, academic theology, or anywhere else. For the resurrection narrates an epistemic revolution because of a phronetic revolution. The symbology of epistemic power is undone not by having perfect knowledge like God but having perfected phronetic orientations towards knowledge. What holds back epistemology is not so much the epistemic operations or even functions, but the phronetic dispositions and virtues upon which they depend. Bourdieu intuitively seems aware of this and seeks to offer reflexivity and his heuristic to counter it. But, as an analytic, its primary operation is to deconstruct faith in capitals, hope in fields, and love in *habitus* operative human society in the hope of relativising symbolic power. Ultimately, as analytically helpful as the heuristic is, it is nevertheless insufficient to be constructive, because it always

ultimately assumes and depends upon the idolatrous deception of lived apostacy that it seeks to dethrone. His analytic always assumes and depends upon human games for symbolic power. For all his phronetic inclinations, Bourdieu always adopts a fundamentally epistemic priority, and with it a set of *epistemic doxa* that he cannot fully recognise or replace. He is right that *habitus* is about love, about a lived phronetic activity, but the kind of phronesis that he espouses and reveals is one that can only operate towards power. However, placing Bourdieu, Balthasar, and 1 Corinthians 13 into dialogue provides the constructive resources that Bourdieu lacks by taking the lacunae he exposes and turning them towards a fully phronetic epistemology of faith, hope, and love. Without love all epistemic operations will fail. And they must do so, precisely because of what Bourdieu exposes, that they are consumed with the games of symbolic power, games that will always collapse the dialectic one way or the other.

These games are profoundly and intrinsically instrumentalizing, as we saw in the first main section of this chapter. In the exegesis of 1 Corinthians 13, we saw how Paul identifies and counteracts this tendency with love. With the dialectic dimensions of love's epistemological operations refined through our consideration of Balthasar, how love knows is known. Moreover, why the Christian virtue of love is incompatible with the games of power becomes clear: it is a creative participation not only in the story of the resurrection, a participation in bringing about elements of the new creation. It is epistemologically inclusive of knowledge-*that*, -*who*, -*how*, and -*in-action*. It makes space for both subject and object to be most truly themselves, but also creatively more than they were. Thus, the phronetic rather than epistemic priority establishes itself in 1 Corinthians 13.4-7: love is patient, *love is kind*…. All Paul's relativisations of epistemic capacity and power follow his celebration of the phronetic operations of love in those verses. The Corinthians assume *episteme* is about power, but vv.4-7 offer a way of relating to the world that is not about power, the way of

love. Following this way of love makes it obvious that the epistemic operations which the games of symbolic power instrumentalise fail to be meaningful. Moreover, pulling the epistemic gifts into human power games neuters them of their epistemic capacities, by reducing them to mere a *techne* for getting human power. Epistemology reduces not to phronesis in this schema, but merely a tool. But it is not actually a tool to know. Knowing, as we have shown above, is relatively inconsequential to the function of *episteme* within the set of relations of the human field when embedded within the games for symbolic power. The Corinthians see powers for gaining *episteme* as valuable not so much for the sake of *episteme*, but for the sake of power. But seeking knowledge for power transforms the set of relations that hold for it. If knowledge is objectified and instrumentalised by separating *episteme* from phronesis, then all that is left for any theoretical means towards epistemic power is not to serve the aim of knowing, but to serve the aim of power. Co-optation by the symbology of power reduces – if not destroys – the epistemic capacities to serve as epistemic capacities. Bourdieu aims to warn about this, that 'informational' capital is ultimately still capital. Whether it confers any epistemic value is secondary to its sociological function of offering symbolic capital. This means that what people offer as *episteme* may be *episteme*, but it may just as well be an attempt to gain symbolic power under the guise of *episteme*. This is ultimately Bourdieu's failing, as well, vis-à-vis sociology. Without the phronetic virtues of faith, hope, and love, Bourdieu's sociological analysis is just an epistemic weapon by another name, a *techne* to manufacture its own god, symbolic power chiefly in the cultural form. Yet, the promise of the resurrection for *habitus* arrives today as Hauerwas and Gutiérrez indicate. For as narratival phronesis any *habitus* can enter the story of the resurrection through choosing to know and love God and his creation, rather than symbolic power.

But participating proleptically in resurrection through a narrating phronesis, the same faith, hope, and love particularised and universalised in Christ crucified offers the

constructive resources with which to re-centre academic theology's *habitus* away from symbolic violence without resorting to it. The resurrection guarantees the possibility of a radical reformation to the games and that *habitus* that structures and is structured by them through exchanging symbolic power for love. However, participating in the perfected love of God guaranteed and granted through the resurrection refuses to demote 'love' to serve as only a symbolic rebranding for the games of power, thereby transforming love into symbolic power – that would render love a form of boasting and inflating one's symbolic value, but 'love does not boast, it does not inflate itself' (1 Cor 13.4). Rather love removes the games of symbolic violence by refusing to be anything less than love as love. It is the ἀγάπη love that resounds throughout 1 Corinthians 13, named 8 times explicitly and implied 15 times. This means to love as God loves, not love instrumentalised for gain, but love as one's fundamental narration of reality. This phronetic epistemology of love not only refuses symbolic violence but subverts it without resorting to it, precisely because it is mutually productive and oriented towards the good of the other rather than the good of oneself.

However, our constructive work is not finished. Indeed, we must continue creating this narrative and phronetic theology of liberation through love for two reasons. First, though we have now produced a theological epistemology of love, deeming the construction complete at this point would dramatically risk its phronesis being misconstrued as merely conceptual. Yet, love must operate in theology not just in terms of concepts, but also in terms of actions. There is a definitive element of embodying love that is essential. Narrative phronesis of embodied actions reinforces the possibility of the epistemological phronesis of love developed here. Second, while we have identified here the epistemological consequences of the games of power and provided an alternative epistemology to power, we have not identified why the games of symbolic violence appear. Without addressing the existential dimensions of symbolic violence, any attempts at removing symbolic violence

from academic theology will prove unsuccessful. We must construct not just an alternative epistemology to power but offer alternative to symbolic violence categorically. So, having found a dialectic phronetic epistemology of love, at the end of the story of God's redeeming grace in the resurrection, in which we can hope, we now continue towards constructing an embodied narrative and phronetic theology of liberation from symbolic violence through love in Christ incarnate and crucified, in whom we can trust.

CHAPTER 7:
NARRATING A PHRONETIC SOLUTION TO SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE IN CHRIST INCARNATE AND CRUCIFIED

'And a Samaritan going on his way came upon him and when he sees is deeply moved with compassion,' Jesus says in Luke 10.33 continuing his story about man left for dead on the side of the road, first by the robbers, then by men who share his ethnicity and religion, a priest and a Levite, men who represent God to the man. The symbolic violence is extreme. Yet, as Jesus tells the story, he subverts the symbolic violence twofold. First, he continues to undermine the symbolic violence of the original question: 'Who is my neighbour?' asked by a man seeking to legitimate himself by delegitimating others. Second, Jesus takes a man delegitimated in the ethno-religious outlook of his Jewish contemporaries and expected to enact only more symbolic violence on the left-for-dead man and narrates him living a phronetic epistemology of love. The Samaritan sees the man, and like the Levite the referent is not given. All expectation built up in the story thus far would have this Samaritan not just walk past, but perhaps spit on his way by. But instead, Jesus says ἐσπλαγχνίσθη, used earlier of Jesus in Luke 7.13, when he sees widow *en route* to bury her son. Jesus then raises the boy from the dead. This is not the kind of emotion that objectifies and abstracts the situation away from action, or even knowledge altogether. Gutiérrez notes the epistemic dimensions involved in the priest and Levite's symbolic violence: 'se mostraron indiferentes ante el

sufrimiento de un *desconocido*.'[1] Their callousness shaped their epistemic operation: the suffering man was not only someone who they did not know, but someone they actively sought not to know. Meanwhile, the Samaritan feels the kind of emotion that brings the feeler into the life-story of the one who inspires such affect – not theoretically but in action.

Not meagre but generous action then transpires in vv.34-35: 'And coming close to [him] he tightly bandages his traumatic wounds, applying oil and wine. And mounting him on his own animal he brought him into an inn and took care of him. And the next day tossing it over he gives two denarii to the innkeeper and says, "Take care of him, and whatever else you might spend beyond this I will personally repay to you when I return here."' Jesus narrates one action after another motivated by a love that knew the dying man in love. The Samaritan approaches, not in theory but in body, cleaning and bandaging the man. But the Samaritan also demonstrates a different kind of relationship to capital. He uses whatever he has and spends whatever is necessary to save the man, to know the man as a man. The economic dimensions feature prominently in the story. The word used for the Samaritan's beast of burden is not the usual word for donkey or horse, but a word that emphasises that it was bought and owned by the Samaritan: κτῆνος. He pays two days' wages to the innkeeper to care for the man, but he does not hold onto them or think of this objectified economic capital as capital worth idolising, he literally throws it out (ἐκβαλὼν). This is the same word used for expelling demons. It is a forceful refusal of idolising capital, unreserved in its pursuit of loving the man back to health. Yet, the Samaritan promises more, whatever it takes. At the beginning of the story the wine and the oil should not be overlooked for their economic value either. Yet, there is an additional unspoken cost shouldered by the Samaritan. The dying man was naked. The Samaritan must have torn his own clothes to make the bandages. This is an economic solidarity. More than that, it is an embodied solidarity expressing a productive and

[1] Gutiérrez, *Densidad*, 65 (emphasis added).

proactive love. It gives the dying man not simply a legitimation of existence but replaces the delegitimation of symbolic violence with the legitimation of love.

Jesus: Introducing a Narrative and Phronetic Theology of Liberation through Love

Moreover, Jesus narrates his solution to symbolic violence in the parable of the Good Samaritan. The abstract and categorical, the theoretical and 'precise' – these Jesus discerns as the weaponisation of epistemic pursuit when the man asked, 'Who is my neighbour?' For this reason, the answer had to be productive; it had to produce a dialectical knowing through loving rather than the instrumentalisation of knowing into symbolic violence, and it had to expose and remove symbolic violence without resorting to it. It subverted the *epistemic doxa* controlling the questions and the categories, the modes and methods of knowing, but even more profoundly the nature of the game being assumed for the theological encounter.

Accordingly, Gutiérrez emphasises that the narrative nature of Jesus' response is not arbitrary, but essential to how Jesus charts a productive path of love rather than symbolic violence. It is central to how he interrogates the *epistemic doxa* of delegitimation.

> Jesús fue un narrador. … Jesús es el narrador narrado. … La narración incorpora dentro de ella al oyente. Cuenta una experiencia y la convierte en experiencia de aquellos que la escuchan. Lo propio del relato es la invitación, no la obligación; su terreno es la libertad, no el mandato. Una teología que ponga en él sus pies, que sepa narrar la fe, será una teología humilde y respaldada en el compromiso personal. Una teología que propone y que no pretende imponer, que escucha antes de hablar.[2]

That Jesus told stories is obvious and that we meet Jesus through story should be similarly obvious. Yet, Gutiérrez here parallels Frei's theological quasi-ontological epistemology of narrative as it regards the Gospel narratives in particular. Frei writes: 'To know who he is in connection with what took place is to know that he is. This is the climax of the story and its claim. What the accounts are saying, in effect, is that the being and identity of Jesus in the

[2] Gutiérrez, *Densidad*, 66-67.

resurrection are such that his nonresurrection becomes inconceivable.'[3] Frei soon adds, 'to conceive of him as not living is to misunderstand who he is. To know who he is is to believe in his self-focused presence. This, it appears, is the testimony of the New Testament and, hence, the understanding of believers. His identity and his presence are given together in indissoluble unity.'[4] Thus, both Frei and Gutiérrez discern something unique in the narration of Jesus. Not only can one know that Jesus was a storyteller, but in the narration of Jesus one can know Jesus personally and as present, much as H.R. Niebuhr argued. Yet, the self-revelation of Jesus (simultaneously his *thatness* and *whoness*) in the Gospels' narration of Christ entails a profoundly invitational approach to theologising in general. Now, it would be too strong to say with Gutiérrez that telling a story involves no obligation, given the implications of speech-act theory.[5] Nevertheless, it is true that any obligation that it does deliver operates through being incorporated into the story itself. Jesus' narration of the parable incorporates the hearer inside of it. Indeed, it makes corporeal the narration itself when the hearer stories themself into the same story. In this way, though Frei and Gutiérrez would both say something truly unique occurs in the narration of Christ in the Gospels, Gutiérrez signals that this quasi-ontological theologising extends in a lesser way to narrative theologising in general. Narration includes and reveals; but also narration shapes the way theology can manifest itself. It is a theology that proposes more than it imposes, that listens before it talks. In particular, Gutiérrez notes narration is a fundamental part of how to make theology an act of liberation. A theology that knows through narration presents itself as a theology with the potential to be more humble not in theory, but in personal, realised commitment.

[3] Frei, *Identity*, 145.

[4] Frei, *Identity*, 148.

[5] Cf. Vanhoozer, *Drama*, 63-69.

In this way, Jesus does not just narrate the parable. As Frei writes, 'Jesus Christ, precisely because he is not only an individual but an individual in a narrated story, serves as a parable.'[6] He lives the parable of the Good Samaritan on the cross. But he also exceeds the parable, because to live it he must take up the radical solidarity with humanity of becoming human. This radical solidarity appears as the enstorying of God the Son in flesh. For as Gutiérrez explains, 'Después de todo, ¿qué es una vida humana sino un relato que desemboca permanente e inquietantemente en otro? Contar es el modo propio de hablar de Dios. … Es el lenguaje justo y apropiado para decir Dios….'[7] Human life is a form of ongoing narration, a narration that necessarily involves phronesis. Thus, through the incarnation Christ reveals that narrative is an especially fitting mode of theologising. In narration the human and divine can both be embodied, especially because embodiment necessarily involves phronesis.

Outlining the Chapter

Accordingly, the rest of this chapter will argue through the radical solidarity of incarnation towards crucifixion, Christ as God incarnate crucified radically expresses a phronesis of love as much as he exposes in lived narration the existential nature of the games of symbolic power: the human need for a *justification d'exister*. Simultaneously, Jesus narrates – through living in love – a *habitus* free from these games, a life of radical solidarity that removes symbolic violence without resorting to it. But before we turn to constructing a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation through love found in Christ incarnate and crucified, Bourdieu will expose the existential heart of the symbolic violence. Yet, though his sociological analysis uncovers and aims to minimise the violence, he can see no way out of the games. Ultimately, then, if we aim to remove the symbolic violence from academic

[6] Frei, *Identity*, 160.

[7] Gutiérrez, *Densidad*, 66.

theology, we will need to do more than identify it and theorise a phronetic epistemology of love. We must locate the existential font of the symbolic violence, as Bourdieu will assist us in doing, and then provide a constructive alternative to what symbolic violence promises but never delivers through narrating Christ incarnate and crucified.

Bourdieu on Pascal and the existential origins of symbolic violence

Our refraction of Bourdieu's triadic analytic through the three Christian virtues – faith, hope, love – constitutes a theological, phronetic hermeneutic. This is no accidental parallel meant only to structure an analysis of Bourdieu's analytic, but rather this is executed while simultaneously beginning to subvert Bourdieu's heuristic and reinvigorate it. Faith, hope, and love fertilise Bourdieu's captials-fields-*habitus* with an essential component to its powers of analysis of social systems. Specifically, it delivers a theological, more reflexively aware employment of his categories. More than that, it begins to refine Bourdieu's analytic by subverting power as the most important structuring *epistemic doxa* – that is, we are problemetising Bourdieu's *epistemic doxa* of *power* – not because power as an epistemic and sociological feature is not prominent, but because its prominence is the problem that Bourdieu highlights. Yet, ultimately, Bourdieu fails to resolve it. Everything becomes a fight for power. While this *is* always present in the meta-field of human relations, Jesus in embodied solidarity with the disempowered diagnoses the nature of the fight for power through his pinnacle manifestation of faith, hope, and love on the cross: *how* you win and live matter as much as for what stakes and for whose benefit one plays the game.

Simultaneously the embodied *habitus* of Jesus Christ living by love in hope with faith in God the Father through the Holy Spirit exposes perhaps the most salient of Bourdieu's *epistemic doxa*. This is the *doxa* that not even he seems to know that he has or recognise as *doxic*, viz. the game itself, at its highest level. Bourdieu does engage an obvious objection: 'Quel jeu plus vital, plus total, que la lutte symbolique de tous contre tous qui a pour enjeu le

pouvoir de nomination ou, si l'on préfère, de catégorisation, où chacun met en jeu son être, sa valeur, l'idée qu'il a de lui-même ? On objectera que rien n'oblige à entrer dans la course, qu'il faut se prêter au jeu pour avoir des chances d'y être pris.'[8] So, initially, it seems as though Bourdieu is aware of his *doxic* relation to the game (perhaps even his place in it near the top of sociology's field of power) in that he can pre-empt the possible exception that someone might have to his analysis that the game is all in all. However, quickly Bourdieu reveals that even if he is aware of this *doxic* value he is unwilling to break with it. 'Mais … il ne s'agit pas de faire croire que l'on puisse échapper aux jeux qui ont pour enjeu la vie et la mort symboliques.'[9] Ultimately, then, he cannot conceive of reality apart from this kind of fight among everyone for not just dominance but legitimation, that is a conferral of value and identity. Not even the sociologist who calls for a reflexivity that empowers can find in reflexivity the power to break free, to *échapper aux jeux*, precisely because these games offer the possibility of life and death. He may qualify that these goods, the life and death in view, are merely symbolic, but it is a qualification without signification. For, on the one hand, no one, not even those with the least to lose in refusing to play can do so.

> Le monde social est essentialiste, et l'on a d'autant moins de chances d'échapper à la manipulation des aspirations et des espérances subjectives que l'on est plus démuni symboliquement, moins consacré ou plus stigmatisé, donc plus mal placé dans la concurrence pour « l'estime des hommes », comme dit Pascal, et voué à l'incertitude sur son être social, présent et à venir, qui est à la mesure du pouvoir ou de l'impuissance. Avec l'investissement dans un jeu et la reconnaissance que peut apporter la compétition coopérative avec les autres, le monde social offre aux humains ce dont ils sont le plus totalement dépourvus : une justification d'exister.[10]

Further, on the other hand, he cannot and assumes no one else can escape playing because Bourdieu has absolutized the game, offering it as the transcendent and meaning-conferring operation of human society itself made transcendent and transcendentalising. In absolutising

[8] *MP*, 280-81.

[9] *MP*, 281.

[10] *MP*, 281-82.

playing the game of legitimising one's own existence, presumably living or dying are meaningless without the game. Existence is stripped of itself. Only a being-of-non-being remains. Yet, is this so? Or is this, in fact, just the view of a man so invested in the game as *the game* that he assumes that *it is* and moreover *has to be* the *only* game. That is, to use Bourdieusien analysis on Bourdieu, is he just a man so in possession of and therefore so trusting in capitals, so full of hope in the fields in which he participates, but especially in sociology, and so shaped by a *habitus* that loves hoping in sociology to generate the symbolic capital he holds dear that symbolic capital itself becomes not just the symbol of value, but value itself? Has Bourdieu invested so heavily in symbolic capital – or rather the struggle for symbolic capital – that it is the only meaning, purpose, power, and conceptualisation he knows how to see?

> Or, comme Pascal le suggère, dans cette recherche de justifications d'exister, ce qu'il appelle « le monde », ou « la société », est la seule instance capable de concurrencer le recours à Dieu. On comprend, armé de cette équivalence, que ce que Pascal décrit comme « misère de l'homme sans Dieu », c'est-à-dire sans raison d'être, soit sociologiquement attesté sous la forme de la misère proprement métaphysique des hommes et des femmes sans raison d'être sociale, abandonnés à l'insignifiance d'une existence sans nécessité, laissée à son absurdité. Et l'on comprend aussi, a contrario, le pouvoir quasi divin d'arracher à la contingence et à la gratuité que détient, qu'on le veuille ou non, le monde social, et qui s'exerce par l'intermédiaire notamment de l'institution étatique : en tant que banque centrale du capital symbolique, l'État est en mesure de décerner cette forme de capital dont la particularité est d'enfermer en elle-même sa propre justification.[11]

Ironically, Bourdieu invests a quasi-transcendence into the game itself while highlighting that the existential need for legitimation is precisely what he notes Pascal calls 'misère de l'homme sans Dieu.'[12] Pascal's main point, however, utilises 'le monde' and 'la société' as that which claims to offer a *justifications d'exister*. These are held in relief to God, to diagnose their illusory nature and their incredibly temporal and vapid dimensions. The social

[11] *MP*, 282-83.

[12] Here alluding to a section of Blasé Pascal's *Pensées* which is entitled 'Misère de l'homme sans Dieu'.

being that Bourdieu wants to build up into a transcendent value is exactly that *être au monde* in which *être social* is the only *raison d'être*. Bourdieu is right that there is a fundamentally social component to human existence. However, as we saw in Chapter 6, the games of power subvert the possibility of being known socially. Rather social knowledge is reduced to attempts at dominance. This renders the existential situation ironically self-deconstructive: one wants to be known and wants to have one's legitimacy recognised by society, but it is in the quest for that recognition based on dominance that collapses the possibility of either being known as a who and as valued. Bourdieu correctly recognises this situation as existentially troubling. Thus, Pascal decries this way of being where 'all one has is the social game' as precisely that *misère de l'homme sans Dieu*. In fact, in that same section to which Bourdieu alludes, Pascal will argue kings require a whole company of people to surround them just for the purpose of distracting them. Specifically, they must distract the king from the existential emptiness of being a person who merely plays a cadre of meaningless social games which never-end, except when death arrives. Such a person who only has and knows – one could add 'is winning' – the game, yet still lacks a *justification d'exister*. Such a seemingly existential situation necessitates distraction.

> Qu'on en fasse l'épreuve : qu'on laisse un roi tout seul, sans aucune satisfaction des sens, sans aucun soin dans l'esprit, sans compagnie, penser à lui tout à loisir ; et l'on verra qu'un roi sans divertissement est un homme plein de misères. Aussi on évite cela soigneusement, et il ne manque jamais d'y avoir auprès des personnes des rois un grand nombre de gens qui veillent à faire succéder le divertissement à leurs affaires, et qui observent tout le temps de leur loisir pour leur fournir des plaisirs et des jeux, en sorte qu'il n'y ait point de vide ; c'est-à-dire qu'ils sont environnés de personnes qui ont un soin merveilleux de prendre garde que le roi ne soit seul et en état de penser à soi, sachant bien qu'il sera misérable, tout roi qu'il est, s'il y pense.[13]

Bourdieu is right that Pascal thinks these games provide a welcome distraction from death but only to those who are so absorbed within them that they cannot see anything else but death or

[13] Blaise Pascal, *Pensées Et Opuscules: Publiés Avec Une Introduction, Des Notices, Des Notes Et Deux Fac-Similés Du Manuscrit Des Pensées*, ed. Léon Brunschvicg (Paris: Hachette, 1909), Accessed 24 April 2021, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k56034742/f420.image.r=roi#, 398.

a distraction that is barely better than death. If anything, Pascal's point is that reflection on death might break the king free from needing the distraction from death. Unfortunately, these games and distractions also distract from truly living. For in contemplating death he might recognise there could be another way. There might be a way to *live*. The meaningless social games could give way to *grace*, to glory, to knowing God. That is, contrary to Bourdieu's claims, these social games – even symbolic power of the most concentrated and statist kind, that of the king – do not actually provide what they promise. Rather they prevent someone from both seeing their need for grace and from finding it. Instead of solving what Bourdieu himself is problematising, transcendentalising or totalising society *au lieu du Dieu chrétien* only compounds the problem of locating and receiving *justification d'exister*. If society is the god Bourdieu argues people trust and it self-authenticates a kind of hopeful orientation towards itself, then it is what is left for people love it. However, it never quite reaches the point of providing *justification d'exister* only a collectively held *le divertissement de la justification d'exister*. This may offer a distorted and disoriented faith, hope, and love – and ultimately depends on the human inclinations towards them – but *power qua power* can never fully offer a genuine faith, hope, or love. In faith, hope, and love is found not the *divertissement d'exister* but the *delectation d'exister* because, as phronetic values, through them human society can be liberated from *les jeux de pouvoir* to *la joie de vivre* beyond a mere *justification d'exister*. Faith, hope, and love orient towards Jesus Christ who through crucifixion and resurrection overthrew the idolatry of power situated in a system of deception. Christ gives a chance – through being enstoried into his death and life – to renounce epistemic and phronetic apostacy towards power for eternal life with and in the one who is the faith, hope, and love of the church. He offers the invitation to the social being to be truly social – to be known as a who and that one has value apart from domination. As

Christ's own story will show, it is in embracing grace rather than power that both legitimation and life appear.

Nevertheless, Bourdieu is reflexive enough to notice on some level the theological nature and implications of his lifelong sociological project and the deification of society. He recognises more than the חָרָשׁ (deaf/idol producer) of Isaiah 44 discussed earlier in Chapter 2 that he takes from sociology something with which to deconstruct society but he also, by exalting sociology's *illusio* and epistemic operations to exclusive and ultimate dominance in existential legitimation, renders it a form of theology. In fact, sociology functions as Bourdieu's soteriology, as both Bourdieu's analytic and Isa 44.17 predicts that it must.

> Les rites d'institution donnent une image grossie, particulièrement visible, de l'effet de l'institution, être arbitraire qui a le pouvoir d'arracher à l'arbitraire, de conférer la raison d'être entre les raisons d'être, celle que constitue l'affirmation qu'un être contingent, vulnérable à la maladie, à l'infirmité et à la mort, est digne de la dignité transcendante et immortelle, comme l'ordre social, qui lui est impartie. Et les actes de nomination … conduisent, au terme d'une sorte de régression à l'infini, jusqu'à cette sorte de réalisation de Dieu sur la terre qu'est l'État qui garantit, en dernier ressort, la série infinie des actes d'autorité certifiant par délégation la validité des certificats d'existence légitime (comme malade, invalide, agrégé ou curé). Et la sociologie s'achève ainsi dans une sorte de *théologie* de la dernière instance : investi … d'un pouvoir absolu de véridiction et d'une perception créatrice, l'État, pareil à l'*intuitus originarius* divin selon Kant, fait exister en nommant, et en distinguant. Durkheim, on le voit, n'était pas aussi naïf qu'on veut le faire croire lorsqu'il disait … que « la société, c'est Dieu ».[14]

Of course, like the חָרָשׁ, Bourdieu cannot quite see the irony of the deification of the work of his own hands. He must invest society and its obsession with power with not just meaning, but – true of symbolic power's form – *legitimation*. He must find in it that which continues to haunt him, *une raison d'être*, *une justification d'exister*. In fact, this closing paragraph to one of his final works before his death may even suggest what his whole sociological project was always meant to be: not so much to be a sociology pure and for its own sake, but a sociology *qua theology*. His phrasing may just barely leave a crack open to the possibility of God,

[14] *MP*, 288 (emphasis added).

perhaps God working through the operations of society, but the crack is just wide enough to cast a ray across the heart of a shadowy deceptive hope. The hollowness of this idolatry of power cannot be escaped, but nor can it be resolved. Bourdieu deconstructs the game but lacks the confidence – the faith, hope, love in God – to deconstruct it *enough*. The echoes of transcendence, of death, of meaning, of reason resound here. In the end, the game is his god (and sociology as its apex), his everything, but he is not satisfied. The existentialism of Bourdieu's lifelong project revealed in *Méditations Pascaliennes* centres on questioning the *doxa* of human society. Yet, Bourdieu can never fully question the *doxa* of playing the game itself. He is trapped within the gravitational pull of its *illusio*, the meta-capital of symbolic power.

Moreover, this existential origin and theological nature of Bourdieu's approach also reveals that the narrativity of life demands that the games are themselves narratives. Just as phronetic approaches to theology summon narrative as an appropriate form, Bourdieu's hermeneutic must involve narration. It is not always the conscious narration of a field, but the narration of living in love towards the trusted capital in which one hopes. The capitals, as much as they are arbitrary devices of trust, take on narration in the field of hope to give them their meaning. Likewise, *habitus* is the active playing not just of a game but of a role within the story of the game. The phronetic orientation of Bourdieu's *habitus* is intuitive, but it is also scripted. It lives within the same dialectic of agency when playing any character in a script. Just as cognitive science adding the eighth E of 'enstoried' to 7E cognition suggests narration as a fundamental mode for theology as we discussed in Chapter 5, narration must be seen as a fundamental element of *habitus*. For, as we saw in Chapter 2, *habitus* overlaps with an 7E understanding of human cognition. Thus, in his own way Bourdieu has admitted not only to being a sociologist developing and deploying a sociology that is in the end a kind of theology, but of being a kind of existential narrative theologian.

Therefore, in Bourdieu's narrative theological analysis, the power of the *illusio* of symbolic power comes from the deceptive eschatological vision it promises – the story of who and what matters and why. What symbolic violence promises and what also Bourdieu recognises is the need for legitimation, for meaning, for value – all of which only exist as and within narrative. Moreover, this value is necessarily social at a fundamental level. Yet, this entails that symbolic power is not only a misdiagnosis but a misprescription. For one cannot be known as a who through symbolic violence, only objectified as an instrumentalised that. Intersubjective knowledge does not occur, only collective ascription of value as it relates to the game. The game sets the value, so living within the story of one's particular expression of the game never reaches the point of conferring value that can supersede the game. Fundamentally, it is the narrativity of one's own life that confounds the promises of the game, because in the end the story of the game will never be fully congruous with the story of one's life. A human life, even if one wins the game of symbolic power, always exceeds the game itself. This is the same subjective and objective disjunction that generates the need for legitimation and refutes the claims of success at legitimation by symbolic power. Ultimately, a human life is not about power, but about a human being as a person. It is this living story that always lurks, haunting Pascal's king and Bourdieu's deification of society – not just individually but even collectively of societies. Lindbeck would be quick to emphasise that the church collectively lives its story, as such it must be remembered that the existential angst of the individual seeking their *justification d'exister* scales, as *habitus*, to the collective need of society for its own *justification d'exister*. In such a case, at best, deifying society as a solution only moves the problem up a level. The individual need is compounded on the society, which itself has nowhere to turn for *une justification d'exister*, except perhaps to the games of symbolic power at a collective level between societies, but with no other level to seek beyond that. Consequently, a fundamental problem with symbolic power is that it excludes

knowledge-who as essential to the existential drive for legitimation. Thus, not only is narrative the mode of revelation of God, as Niebuhr argues, but in so being it is also the mode of revelation of human beings. The exclusion of narrativity's revelatory capacity of intersubjective knowledge by the promise of legitimation in the story for symbolic power is exactly why to remove symbolic violence from theology the narratological space to know *whos* and as a who and be known as a who and by *whos* is essential. Theology does not just need a better game; it needs to live a more fully narratological inclusivity of narration.

Having gleaned from Bourdieu the source of symbolic violence, we can move to provide a constructive solution. For this, we engage with Jesus' story, who reveals there is the possibility of another game, with different rewards, a different hope, a different form of love. This world, and one's *habitus*, does not have to be only about power, about human honour and societal dominance. Existence can be more than *le divertissement de la justification d'exister*. There is a game that is not concluded – or indeed *lost* - by death but *won*. But this game is itself about love, hope, and faith in Christ Jesus who himself reveals the dynamics and vitality of faith, hope, and love through his life, death, and resurrection. Further, this game is expressed as a story into which humanity is invited to join. Living in this alternative story, moreover, is the only way to break free of the games of symbolic violence, to remove symbolic violence from theology without resorting to it.

Narrating dying to violence, living to faith, hope, and love in Christ

The story of Jesus – God the Son becoming human to be crucified to save humanity from the symbolic violence imposed by sin, death, and the devil – is a story of a man who lives and dies with faith in hope and for love. It is a fundamentally existential story of phronesis. The lifestory of Christ wrestles with the same angst Bourdieu identifies as the source of symbolic violence – the need for *la justification d'exister*. His phraseology is not accidental either. Bourdieu narrates human society though deploying a subtly narratival

analytic upon it. He finds the same need for justification as Luther once did. It is even a justification by faith, though no longer in God but in the meta-capital of symbolic power. Bourdieu argues it is not enough to exist. Humans need their existence legitimated. Bourdieu analyses that functionally it is the state the provides this legitimacy, though that legitimacy is arbitrary. Worse, there is the inverse of delegitimation available. The games of power in the end are zero-sum games: some win and some lose. Power as an operative principle entails that some are put under that power. The dominated are stripped of their *justification d'exister* so the dominant can possess it. Yet, in the end this cycle of domination never confers non-contingent legitimation, or even a legitimation not based upon the possession of symbolic power. Bourdieu cannot imagine an alternative to the games of power he spent his life analysing. The *epistemic doxa* of power is too pervasive to the structure of human societies for any alternative to readily appear. Moreover, though arbitrary and inescapable, Bourdieu correctly inveighs against faith in power as but a *divertissement* from the failure of its justification of existence. However, Bourdieu does point us towards the kind of solution that is necessary to solve this existential source of symbolic violence in all its manifestations in every field: it must go beyond justifying existing to justifying living. It must not owe its powers of legitimation to violence, or even to abstract power, but to an embodied story of legitimation by grace. This we will find in Paul's narration of Christ incarnate and crucified in Philippians 2.6-11 from which we will construct our narrative and phronetic theology of liberation.

So much ink has been spilt over the Christ Hymn of Philippians 2.6-11 along manifold theological and exegetical concerns that 25 years ago in 1997, Markus Bockmuehl observed: 'We have come to the point where none but the most conceited could claim to have mastered the secondary literature, and none but the dullest would find pleasure or interest in wading through it. … A comprehensive treatment of the whole passage now seems scarcely

possible—or, dare one say it, even desirable.'[15] Consequently, a detailed reception history of Philippians 2.6-11 is neither possible within this thesis' scope nor helpful to completing our constructive effort. Accordingly, we will narrow our focus to offering here a textually sensitive exposition and phronetically sensitive narration of Christ incarnate and crucified relating to the dynamics of symbolic power and violence as well as the existential need for legitimation driving them. For this, in addition to continued interaction with Gutiérrez and modern interpretive concerns, we will consider St John Chrysostom, living much closer to – if not within – the linguistic and cultural world of Paul's letter, who gave a collection of homilies covering the whole book of Philippians. Moreover, Chrysostom's Homily 7 on Philippians remains both phronetic in orientation and perceptive of how the Christ Hymn subverts the *epistemic doxa* of symbolic violence on its own terms. With these dialogue partners and constrained interest, what we will see in Christ incarnate and crucified is how Jesus lived a different story of legitimation than the games of power offer. Specifically, we will see that reading the Christ Hymn co-opted by games of power distorts the story it tells. Rather the story told of Christ incarnate and crucified is narrated to undermine the *epistemic doxa* of symbolic power by revealing through his phronesis of faith, hope, and love the reality of legitimation without violent grabs at power.

[15] Markus Bockmuehl, '"The Form of God" (Phil. 2:6) Variations on a Theme of Jewish Mysticism', *The Journal of Theological Studies* 48.1 (1997): 1-23 [quote p.1].

For concise overviews of the most relevant bibliography and the major interpretative concerns of the passage, cf. Marvin R. Vincent, *Philippians and Philemon*, International Critical Commentary (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 1985), 57-64; Michael F. Bird and Nijay K. Gupta, *Philippians*, Ebook edition, New Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 71-86, John Reumann, *Philippians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, Ebook edition, Anchor Yale Bible 33b (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 333-77 (377-83 for a select bibliography), Richard R. Melick, *Philippians, Colossians, Philemon*, Ebook edition, New American Commentary 32 (Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1991), 78-88; and Gregory P. Fewster, 'The Philippians 'Christ Hymn': Trends in Critical Scholarship', *Currents in Biblical Research* 13.2 (2015): 191-206.

For an ancient interpretation, cf. esp. John Chrysostom, Homilies 6-8 collectively treating Phillipians 2.1-11, in St John Chrysostom, *John Chrysostom, Homilies on Paul's Letter to the Philippians*, ed. and trans. Pauline Allen, Ebook Edition, Writings from the Greco-Roman World 36 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013), 98-167, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.32037.

The narrative hymn opens with the emphatic copula ὑπάρχων in reference to Christ Jesus being in nature [ἐν μορφῇ] fully God. While Bockmuehl's article notes the diversity of interpretations concerning 'in the form of God' and advocates a mystical vision-centric interpretation, Chrysostom advocated against failing to see phrase as referencing the divine nature for its lack of the technical doctrinal term developed after its composition [φύσις]: 'Μορφὴ γὰρ θεοῦ, φησὶ, μορφὴν δούλου ἔλαβεν. Ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ δούλου ἐνέργεια δούλου ἐστὶν, ἢ φύσις δούλου; Πάντως δήπου φύσις δούλου. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ θεοῦ, θεοῦ φύσις·'[16] Chrysostom correctly identifies that the parallelism of the hymn itself should generate the signification of the terms rather than protracted and provisional lexical studies. Thus, to the extent that Jesus took the μορφὴν δούλου he also truly possessed μορφὴ θεοῦ. Any doubt allayed against Jesus being fully God carries with it a doubt against Jesus' humanity. Likewise, the parallelism between the lines relating to both Christ's divinity and humanity reaffirm the correspondences between both uses of μορφὴ. To the extent that Jesus truly was God he was equal with God; thus, he did not need to consider that equality ἁρπαγμὸν. This is where the subversion of the *epistemic doxa* of symbolic power begins. Being truly God, and therefore equal with the other two members of the Godhead, implies holding the pinnacle of legitimation, of *justification d'exister*. For by definition there is none greater in power, dominance, or importance than God. Taking the form of the inverse of the symbolic ladder – human slave – as the divine Lord is inconceivable and would be resisted violently, but only when viewed through the *epistemic doxa* wherein power and pre-eminence are ultimate. Anyone operating within the games of power would have to consider that symbolic position something to fight for and acquire or maintain by use of violence in all its forms. In fact, while there is great debate as to the theological implications of the word and precisely what lexical signification it possesses to determine them, no one debates the verb

[16] Chrysostom, *Homily 7*, 59-60 [p.116].

from which it derives: ἁρπάζω, used especially of violent acquisition.[17] Consequently, Chrysostom's treatment of the word in *Homilies 7-8* repeatedly discusses the use of violence and/or power imbalance to acquire or maintain dominance. He writes, 'Διὸ τοῦτο οὐκ εἶπεν, οὐχ ἥρπασεν, ἀλλ', «οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο.» Οὐχ ἁρπασας εἶχε τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἀλλὰ φυσικὴν, οὐ δεδομένην, καὶ μόνιμον καὶ ἀσφαλῆ. Διὸ οὐ παραιτεῖται καὶ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἀναλαβεῖν σχῆμα.'[18] Consequently, the pre-incarnate Christ lives beyond the games of power, both because he refuses to resort to violence to gain his dominance and because he possesses equality with God by nature. Furthermore, as God, Christ needs no extrinsic legitimation of existence. He lives in aseity with ontological and existential necessity. All legitimacy coheres in the Trinity *a se*. Thus, to reduce equality with God to a good that can be gained or lost would have rendered God the Son contingent, as well as deployed an understanding of legitimacy that was extrinsic to the Godhead. Rather Christ Jesus did not view his power, pre-eminence, or value as something that could be gained or lost by violence but simply *la joie de vivre* as the second person of the Godhead. Moreover, because Christ is not controlled by the *epistemic doxa* of the games of power, he could incarnate himself as what would appear to be the form of a slave from with the *epistemic doxa* that remains unable to question the supposed superiority of dominance. It is not that being human is to be a slave, but that the *epistemic doxa* (which Jesus' incarnation and crucifixion story subverts) only knows roles within the narrative of dominator and dominated, of master and slave, symbolically legitimated and symbolically delegitimated. Thus, Christ, in choosing the incarnation, refuses and removes symbolic violence without resorting to it by not seeing even the category of 'slave' as anything but the deception of a false hope in symbolic legitimation through domination. The

[17] Cf. N. T. Wright, 'Ἁρπαγμός and the Meaning of Philippians 2:5-11', *Journal of Theological Studies* 37.2 (October 1986): 321-52, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23962449.

[18] Chrysostom, *Homily 8*, 73 [p.142].

epistemic doxa of the games of power have to see μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος· καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος as ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν, not because Christ surrendered his divinity, but because from the *epistemic doxa* of domination Jesus delegitimated himself. By assuming humanity Jesus introduced an incomprehensibility to the games of power: an alternative way of orienting to reality that is not fundamentally about or legitimated by social dominance. Moreover, in assuming human nature, Christ expresses the *imago Dei* not by refraining from humility but by perfectly embodying the narrative phronesis of faith, hope, and love in a radical and active solidarity with humanity.

Thus, Gutiérrez argues, 'La encarnación es un acto de amor,'[19] but it is not solely a past act. Rather it invites participation in the present through solidarity and love. 'Amándonos como uno de nosotros, Cristo nos revela el amor del Padre. La caridad, amor de Dios por los hombres y mujeres, se da encarnada en el amor humano que liga a las personas entre ellas y lo lleva a su plenitud.'[20] While Gutiérrez depends on the concept of the incarnation of solidarity here. He does not explicitly connect the incarnation with solidarity. Nevertheless, for Gutiérrez Christ's incarnation is an act of love that commits itself not in abstract to humanity, but in the most concrete way possible, by taking human flesh. For this Gutiérrez's preferred language is that of Christ becoming poor with and for us.

> El hecho de asumir la condición servil y pecadora de la humanidad, anunciada por el segundo Isaías, es presentado por san Pablo como un gesto de empobrecimiento voluntario: 'Conocen bien la generosidad de nuestro Señor Jesucristo, el cual, siendo rico, por ustedes se hizo pobre a fin de que se enriquecieran con su pobreza' (2 Cor. 8, 9). Es el aniquilamiento, la *kenosis* de Cristo (Flp. 2, 6-11). Pero la condición pecadora, y sus consecuencias, no es asumida, evidentemente, para idealizarla, sino por *amor* y *solidaridad* con quienes la padecen y para redimirlos del pecado, para enriquecerlos con su pobreza, para luchar contra el egoísmo humano, contra todo lo que divide a las personas, contra lo que hace que haya ricos y pobres, propietarios y

[19] *TL*, 386.

[20] *TL*, 271.

> no propietarios, opresores y oprimidos. La *pobreza* es un acto de *amor* y de *liberación*.[21]

Thus, Gutiérrez sees in the incarnation an extreme expression not only of love for humanity by Christ, but love expressed as solidarity. Since humanity's fall into sin in the garden left it impoverished of life, Gutiérrez elsewhere comments on John 1 that 'La Palabra encarnada nos da la vida que hay en ella, nos comunica su plenitud haciéndonos hijas e hijos de su Padre, «la gracia y la verdad nos han llegado por Jesucristo» ([Juan 1] v. 17).'[22] It is through a proper phronetic orientation to the world that life enters back into it after the coming of death. However, on the one hand, Gutiérrez here seems to depend too much on an orientation towards the lack in humanity that Christ needed to fix, as much as there is one that only Christ could fulfil. On the other hand, Gutiérrez misses here the profound value of love and solidarity even as he holds it up. He identifies how the idolatry of symbolic capital corrupts humanity and brings it death and divisions of all kinds, including the symbolic violence of the delegitimation of being in one of the dominated positions. Thus, though his framework operates on the basis of grace, he only considers grace in terms of sin and death and the endless games of symbolic violence that immediately ensued. But we must take grace beyond that.

In the narration of Philippians 2.6-8, sin likely lies implicit in the background of the divine choice of incarnation, but not the foreground. Foregrounded is the phronetic orientation of God the Son in relating to the other Persons of the Trinity and in relating to humanity. Explicitly only the election of incarnation in humble solidarity and love appears. Thus, from this telling of the story of Christ's incarnation and crucifixion the loving choice of solidarity is the point of origin for the incarnation. Sin is not even mentioned. Thus, the

[21] *TL*, 386.

[22] Gutiérrez, *Dios de Vida*, 121.

Christ Hymn offers a narration of Christ's election to incarnate solidarity in love, especially compatible with the supralapsarian narration of election in Christ in Ephesians 1.4-6. If the incarnation is the supralapsarian expression of grace, then election in grace predates sin by infinity.[23] As such, the incarnation is chosen not simply based on foreknowledge that humanity would sin and need redemption (as much as this would also be true), but based on love, based on God wanting to be God with us, to display the glory of grace and the intersubjective love of embodied solidarity. In this supralapsarian narration, the framework of loss or lack operates in the Christ Hymn only to highlight the phronetic orientation of legitimation of humanity by grace, of faith, hope, and love. Thereby, the incarnation subverts the *epistemic doxa* of symbolic violence as Jesus chooses what it must see as auto-delegitimation as the opportunity to extend a legitimation by grace even more radically to humanity though embodied solidarity.

Moreover, from this perspective, the incarnation categorically depends not upon need, not upon a lack, but on the creative, productive, constructive love of the Triune God who lives, rendering it capable of being part of the productive solution to symbolic violence we are constructing. It does not and cannot begin with death, because He is the God of life – not life in abstract but life lived phronetically in faith, hope, and love. Even before the creation of the world, God knew humanity phronetically in love as *whos*, not reduced to *thats* or *hows*. The incarnation, then, is not just a means to the end of redemption but the proper phronesis of love lived for and towards us. It is the revelation that humanity's legitimation never rests in the games of symbolic power, but in the economy of grace. Accordingly, in entering into the narration of Christ's incarnation in grace, Gutiérrez's reframing of poverty becomes

[23] For treatments supralapsarian arguments for the incarnation, cf. esp. Edwin C. Van Driel, *Incarnation Anyway: Arguments for Supralapsarian Christology* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), who analyses Schleiermacher, Dorner, and Barth's versions of the argument; cf. also Oliver D. Crisp, 'Incarnation without the Fall', *Journal of reformed theology* 10.3 (2016): 215-33, https://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15697312-01003016.

productive. For the Peruvian priest gives us the possibility of seeing the value of poverty, not as a means of boasting, but as rebuff against the idolatry of symbolic violence.

> Si la causa última de la explotación y alienación del ser humano es el egoísmo, la razón profunda de la pobreza voluntaria es el amor al prójimo. La pobreza cristiana no puede, entonces, tener sentido sino como un compromiso de solidaridad con los pobres, con aquellos que sufren miseria e injusticia, a fin de testimoniar del mal que éstas –fruto del pecado, ruptura de comunión– representan.[24]

So, solidarity even to the extent of voluntary poverty can be a witness to the evil and to the intrinsic legitimacy of being human. As capitals work on analogy to wealth, the phronesis of Jesus in the incarnation reveals an orientation to the value of God, people, animals, and objects from outside of the games for power. Poverty is only poverty if one places faith in wealth. Thus, Christ's incarnational poverty enriches though the legitimation by grace that no trusted value in any field of the games of power could effect. The poverty that Christ embraced is the poverty that comes from not being controlled by the idolatry of power. In this sense, even Gutiérrez's own theology of God's 'preferential option for the poor'[25] comes into greater focus. For not only did Jesus 'become poor' to enrich humanity, but to enrich by inviting humanity into his own 'poverty', viz. the humble phronesis of faith, hope, and love that narrates in embodied human life solidarity with humanity by grace.

Yet, what makes Jesus' solidarity so shocking is that refusing to play these games of power can lead the whole game to turn against you. Nevertheless, a phronetic epistemology of love offers the chance not only to be freed from the games of symbolic violence, but to endure and overcome symbolic violence without resorting to it. Christ's radical solidarity which chooses both incarnation and crucifixion is unintelligible from within the *epistemic doxa* of symbolic violence. It is a radically different kind of phronesis. Even those closest to Christ, who understood Christ was the Son of God, did not relate phronetically to the

[24] *TL*, 386-87.

[25] Cf. *TL*, 27-30.

possibility of loving through both institutionalised and embodied forms of symbolic violence. Immediately after Peter confesses that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of the living God, Jesus told his disciples that it was necessary for him to suffer many things and be killed at the hands of men obsessed with the games of symbolic violence (Jesus names not only those with institutional power but primarily with cultural/informational capital, the elders, high priests, and scholars/scribes), but also resurrect on the third day. However, this does not even make sense to Peter, who takes Jesus aside to rebuke him. Jesus' response is telling about how love can conquer symbolic violence without resorting to it: 'You are not relating phronetically to [φρονεῖς] the ways of God but the ways of human beings' (Matthew 16.23). A phronetic epistemology of love expressed in living solidarity removes itself from the *epistemic doxa* of symbolic violence and orients itself to the world in the way of Christ incarnate and crucified. Consequently, precisely because he does not idolise legitimation and power and refuses to resort to symbolic violence, Christ suffers symbolic violence, dying on a cross. But in suffering violence in love rather than resorting to it, the narrative world of symbolic violence deconstructs, exposing underneath the existential drive for legitimation by dominance the possibility and necessity of legitimation by grace.

In the crucifixion, Jesus' divine solidarity with humanity is on prime display, but so is his human solidarity with God. The humility that Paul encourages through this narration, then, reveals itself as nothing less than a reflection of the divine nature, which does not play by the rules of symbolic violence, but subverts that violence in enduring it. Consequently, a host of modern interpreters recognise an oblique reference to the fall narrative with the Christ Hymn presenting as Christ as a New Adam.[26] Accordingly, then, through his solidarity with

[26] Cf. Fewster, 'Christ Hymn Trends', 198-22; and Wright, 'Ἁρπαγμός', who discusses the more prominent examples, himself advocating the position, pp.347-48. He highlights esp. C.K. Barrett, *From First Adam to Last: A Study in Pauline Theology* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1962), pp. 69 ff; and M.D. Hooker, '"Philippians 2: 6-11" in Jesus und Paulus', *Festschrift für Werner Georg Kümmel zum 70 Geburtstag*, ed. E. E. Ellis and E. Grässer (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975): 151-64. Cf. also Bockmuehl,

God, Christ reverses the primordial couple's initiation of the human games of power in seeking to seize equality with God, especially in reference to epistemic capacity as it relates to legitimation. For the deceptive *illusio* they took up from the serpent's temptation was: וְהְיִיתֶם כֵּאלֹהִים יֹדְעֵי טֹוב וָרָע (Genesis 3.5b). Thus, in Genesis' narration of the fall, the primordial couple's eating of the fruit is a rejection of both a legitimation by grace and a phronesis of faith, hope, and love in which obedience towards God serves as the corollary human act of solidarity with the Holy Trinity, and thereby a participation in *la joie de vivre trinitaire*. Where the games of power see imposition and dominance in obedience, Christ sees the opportunity to perfectly express love, for the reciprocal act of human solidarity with God that matches his divine act of solidarity with humanity. Implicit in the choice of the Fall is the assumption of an *epistemic doxa* that human beings need to acquire legitimation of existence in power and importance, in an unrestrained and undirected desiring-production. It was a rejection of solidarity with God and with humanity. What was once simply reciprocal faith, hope, and love in solidarity, became in the symbologies of power humiliation. Nevertheless, the entrance of death alongside the games of power in embodied terms entails a genuine *humbling* by Jesus in obedience to the point of death, no doubt an excruciatingly painful one, especially given the cross. He gave his actual embodied life because he chose solidarity both with humanity and with the Godhead. Therefore, seeing humility primarily as loss of legitimation and value is precisely what Jesus' incarnation and crucifixion exposes and subverts. Christ's intrinsic legitimacy of living – both human and divine – was never lost or even at risk in the incarnation or crucifixion, except for within the perspective of symbolic violence which assumes the capacity of imposing a delegitimation of existence through death. However, Christ endures the attempt at delegitimation by the games of power precisely to

'Form', 8-11, who especially cites Hooker and J.D.G. Dunn, *Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation* (London: SCM, 1980), 174-81.

reveal its impotence to accomplish the same. Jesus obeys to the point of death in order to unravel the unjust imposition of death by the games of power as the ultimate act of delegitimation to seize dominance and legitimacy for itself by violence. He operates not according to a phronesis of power and violence for the sake of auto-legitimation at the expense of others, but of faith, hope, and love that narrates embodied solidarity with both God and humanity to the utmost extreme. Moreover, he can do so because he does not suffer the existential malaise Bourdieu uncovers as intrinsic to the games of power. As to his divinity he does not consider his equality with God as something taken or takeable by violence or used for violence, while, as to his humanity, he does not consider his legitimation by grace as taken or takeable by violence or used for violence. What he considers paramount by contrast is the narration of embodied love in solidarity with God the Father, accomplishing his will, and with humanity, accomplishing their salvation.

One could object at this juncture that continuing the narration of Philippians 2 to vv.9-11 suggests that the narration ultimately operates according to the dictates of legitimation by symbolic dominance. However, it would do so only to the extent that it also relativises the games of symbolic power themselves as incapable of *la justification d'exister*. For the games delegitimated Christ by killing him, as much as they could have. Yet, they never held any legitimation for him. He never lived as if they had the power to legitimate him. Rather in delegitimating Christ they delegitimated themselves as able to fulfil the existential need for which Bourdieu exposes that people turn to them. Bourdieu theologically uses sociology to deify society's games of power as the Manichaean struggle between delegitimation and legitimation. Yet, it fails to offer either delegitimation or legitimation. Conversely, God 'superexalts' [ὑπερύψωσεν] Christ (v.9). However, this act of exaltation cannot be understood in terms of the games of power for two reasons. First, Paul's overall aim in the narration of Christ incarnate and crucified is the encouragement of a phronesis of humility,

selflessness, and love. Thus, reading Christ's exaltation as a legitimation of the games of symbolic violence that Paul is trying to remove and expose as not offering legitimation only suggests how difficult it is to overcome the *epistemic doxa* of the games of power that would necessitate that interpretation. Secondly, Jesus cannot gain a power, pre-eminence, or position which was never lost nor exceed the equality and legitimacy he already shared with the Father *a se*. Rather it is the relativisation of an evaluation of 'extreme delegitimation' by games of power in Jesus' crucifixion. God the Father refuses to acknowledge the delegitimation of the cross, instead, seeing it for what it was: the embodiment of the same phronesis of faith, hope, and love that Paul is commending through its narration: namely, solidarity with God through obedience and humanity through incarnation and crucifixion. That the Father is interacting with Jesus apart from the games of power to further subvert them is confirmed by verse nine's parallel line ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα. Paul does not employ either δίδωμι or its derivatives for repayment/reward ἀποδίδωμι or ἀνταποδίδωμι, as if the Name was either something that God possessed and Christ did not, or that was merely the reward for the act of either solidarity with the Father or with humanity. Rather Paul narrates the Father giving Christ the Name as grace [ἐχαρίσατο]. The Father graces Jesus with the Name because it was his apart from the games of symbolic legitimation. It was the name Jesus had before the incarnation and embodied in the incarnation and crucifixion. It is a reaffirmation that in his humanity Christ receives legitimation by grace and as such cannot lose or acquire it from the games of symbolic power. Consequently, Paul foretells in vv.10-11 that every knee will bow and tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord as a final rejection of the deception of the games of symbolic violence to provide existential legitimation. It is thus an invitation into living the narration of Christ incarnate and crucified as a renunciation of symbolic violence. Simultaneously, it is an invitation to receive more than *la justification d'exister*. It is an invitation into *la joie de vivre justifié par grâce* apart

from the games of symbolic power, which by phronetic necessity empowers and requires a radical solidary in faith, hope, and love with both the Holy Trinity and the rest of humanity.

Phronetic solidarity as a constructive solution to symbolic violence

Christ's embodied narration of solidarity through incarnation and crucifixion generates our productive and creative solution. The constructive alternative the games of power must operate within a nexus of relations of grace because it cannot be by power. Power as an assumed *justification d'exister* is the problem. Thus, the only way to not resort to the narration of symbolic violence is to narrate a story in which existential legitimacy cannot be gained or lost by power. Thus, the story of Christ incarnate and crucified in Philippians 2.5-11 offers a more profound and constructive alternative than legitimation through some other symbolic good not labelled power, but which would reduce to a capital *qua* symbolic domination by a different name. Instead, it narrates a story in which the struggle for legitimation is operative only because of an epistemic deception towards power. That is, Christ incarnate and crucified narrates a world where legitimation already exists by grace, but an *epistemic doxa* of power blinds human beings from the mode of life in which it can be experienced fully despite its ontological presence revealed in Christ incarnate crucified. For, as Hauerwas revealed in chapter 4, it is the phronesis that generates the epistemic conditions of knowledge. Thus, participating in Christ's phronesis in an embodied and possibly costly way is necessary to recognise legitimacy both in and for oneself and in and for others.

The existential source for the games of power is resolved, then, not with power, but the acceptance of grace and the orientation towards God and humanity in faith, hope, and love. Bourdieu uncovered the systems of relations that operate in the games of power, but then began to see in reflection on Pascal that the existential need for a *raison d'être* – a non-contingent, socially embedded *justification d'exister* – generated the games that by the necessity of their *epistemic doxa* lead to symbolic violence. However, he could not

deconstruct the game quite enough to find the phronetic solution he knew was necessary to symbolic violence. Nevertheless, he ultimately offers theology a kind of sociology *qua* theology that charts the path towards a productive solution towards reforming theology's as well as society's *epistemic doxa* without resorting to the symbolic violence we have seen it has imposed.

Likewise, it is an intersubjective and active rather than abstract and impersonal solution. As we noted above, Guttiérrez connects the Christ Hymn with 2 Corinthians 8.9, 'Christ became poor for us,' to emphasise that this solidarity for the poor cannot be abstract and merely theoretical but must narrate the same phronesis of embodied action in love which Christ displays in the incarnation. Nor is Gutiérrez the first to see this connection. Chrysostom made the same connection between the narration of the Christ Hymn and 2 Corinthians 8.9 centuries earlier in opening *Homily 7*: 'προτρέπων αὐτοὺς εἰς ταπεινοφροσύνην, τὸν Χριστὸν εἰς μέσον παρήγαγε· καὶ οὐκ ἐνταῦθα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτε περὶ φιλοπτωχίας διαλέγεται, οὕτω πώς φησι· «Γινώσκετε γὰρ τὴν χάριν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὅτι δι' ἡμᾶς ἐπτώχευσε πλούσιος ὤν.»'[27] Chrysostom explains that Paul's purpose is to move the reader 'πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐργασίαν,' but structures the letter to prevent reading the narration through the lens of symbolic power.[28] In rendering the pursuit of the humble imitation of Christ's solidarity a quest for power, the encouragement towards the love of the poor and actual doing of good becomes only theoretical, an abstracted good in a new symbology of domination. Thus, while the theoretical analysis is essential, if it does not itself exist within the narration of Christ incarnate and crucified, it will be narrated through and by games of symbolic violence. Thus, though being enstoried into the narration of Christ incarnate and crucified in such a way that one narrates that same story in one's own

[27] Chrysostom, *Homily 7*, 58 [p.113].

[28] Chrysostom, *Homily 7*, 58 [p.113].

embodied life of faith, hope, and love the solution to symbolic violence becomes possible without resorting to it. In other words, the solidarity of Christ incarnate and crucified cannot be understood or expressed apart from the embodied life of phronesis in which it consists.

Consequently, a living narration of faith, hope, and love in solidarity with both God and humanity lives within the dialectic of a phronetic epistemology of love, while also reshaping the mode of theological expression to include narrative for an integration of the conceptual and concrete, theory and action. Solidarity must take concrete forms of agency, as Christ's incarnation and crucifixion reveal. Moreover, it is driven not by the negation, but the constructive and productive efforts of faith, hope, and love towards God in solidarity with humanity. Theological solutions often take impersonalised and abstract forms, because of the mode of their construction and the *epistemic doxa* of their constraints. Including narrative as a legitimate mode of theologising opens more opportunities to avoid this. However, to truly remove symbolic violence from the field of academic theology without resorting to it will require not merely the theoretical analysis and invitational narration on display in this chapter, but also both the theoretical products the field specialises in producing and their producers expressing a phronetic solidarity of love. Further, removing symbolic violence remains impossible if this phronesis is understood exclusively in individualistic terms. Rather as Bourdieu reminds us with *habitus*: it will take both collective and individualistic phronesis of solidarity with God and humanity in concrete action in faith, hope, and love. The parable of the Good Samaritan offered us a narrative theology critique of symbolic violence and an invitation to know and act in love. In the same way, the constructive proposal developed here in dialoguing with Bourdieu and narrating Christ incarnate and crucified must be understood as much as an act of solidarity in theorising through narration as an invitation to an embodied narration of solidarity with God and humanity empowered by *la joie de vivre* legitimated by grace in a radical, if not always risky, phronesis of faith, hope, and love.

CONCLUSION

At the heart of this thesis lie three fundamental questions about theology in general, but especially academic theology: 1) what does it mean to do theology; 2) why do we do theology the way we do; 3) how can we do theology better. Sitting alongside these primary questions is a cluster of related attempts to wrestle with them, namely by narrative and liberation theologies. Yet, narrative theologies while in vogue for a time in the theological academy eventually seemed to stall in their actual ability to integrate narrative into the *modus operandi* of the theological academy. Interrelated to this concern for narrative in theology, cognitive science is suggesting the fundamental role of narrative and embodiment to human cognition. Thus, we have explored these three primary questions in light of narrative theologies and cognitive research on narrative. These questions arise both from an interest in narrative and liberation theologies, but also an awareness that many in the world today are not legitimated contributors to theology precisely because of some of the operative assumptions in academic theology in relation to what it means to do theology and why it is done the way it is. Specifically, this thesis is concerned that what counts as 'good theology' is more an expression of participation in and access to prestigious (or at least conventional) academic theological education in the West than with genuine theological insight. These questions also arise from an awareness that the abstractionism of academic theology creates barriers to theological exchange and access by and across cultural, socio-economic, and ethnic communities. Likewise, it presents an obstacle to translating theology from theoretical production to transformational agency.

To answer these questions and build towards a more inclusive and agency-empowering form of theology, we applied Pierre Bourdieu's sociological analysis on a test case of the Yale School of Theology, who themselves aimed at asking especially the first and third questions and answering them in favour of including narrative in theology. But ultimately, the first and third questions are intractable without also exploring the second. So, using Bourdieu's analysis and the Yale School's own insights, we sought to go beyond analysis of the system and the insights of previous narrative theologies to produce truly constructive answers to these three questions.

In Chapters 1-2, we developed a Bourdieusien sociological analysis for use in investigating why the theological academy does theology the way it does, while beginning our theological analysis of Bourdieu's approach. In Chapter 1, Bourdieu offered the concepts of *epistemic doxa*, *illusio*, and reflexivity to enable us to consider the field of theology from within, discerning what theology is aiming for, and asking the unquestionable. Thus, Bourdieu gave us the opportunity to incorporate aspects that before now were not considered in answering these questions, specifically the role of academic theology's *epistemic doxa* and symbolic violence in legitimating and delegitimating the answers to the first and third questions (as well as those attempts at the second). Bourdieu also directed our attention towards considering the epistemological implications of his thought: namely, why does academic theology have the *epistemic doxa* it has and what does it broadly leave out? To answer this we located the source of modern academic theology's *doxa* in a desire for legitimation in the changing structure of the academy towards being 'scientific' or 'rigorous.' Yet, this scientific methodology has its own epistemological assumptions and reductionism, critiqued by Kuhn and MacIntyre, as well as Harding and Longino as artificially and unhelpfully reductive by means of its methodology. This reductionism also involves failing to sufficiently incorporate the sociological nature of knowledge in academic epistemology,

leading us to the incarnation to set the necessary goals and features of a theological epistemology. The incarnation demands theological epistemology be inclusive of not just abstract reasoning, but embodiment and phronesis. Likewise, Christ's embodiment begins to suggest that a theological epistemology must operate from the perspective of loving grace that does not need to dominate to be legitimate.

In Chapter 2, Bourdieu demonstrates how all social fields, including theology, operate according to a belief in the symbolic value of its own capital as well as the meta-value of dominance which the capital affords access to. These capitals only exist as trusted value within the set of relations oriented towards hoping in that brand of capital as such. Yet, as much as its value is trusted only within the structure of hope in that capital, the hoping itself structures all within the set of relations towards hoping. Thus, agents navigate fields in hope towards a trusted capital with what Bourdieu calls a phronetic *habitus*, which loves to hope in what it trusts. Yet, this *habitus* does not love in abstract, but in embodied dispositions that often lie outside of consciousness but which agents creatively follow and develop to navigate the interactions of the fields so as to acquire as much of that trusted capital as possible. Thus, Bourdieusien *habitus* finds support in cognitive science that argues human cognition is fundamentally 7Es: embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, emotional, evolutionary, and exoconcious. This reinforces the validity of Bourdieu's analytic and sharpens our understanding of *habitus*, but also sets the groundwork for understanding phronesis and narration in later chapters. At a systemic level, in Bourdieu's analysis of *habitus*, loving the hope of fields is problematic, because it is ultimately deceptive. For the faith in that capital is arbitrary, existing only by virtue of social convention. Moreover, since theology is no different from other fields, it operates according to capitals-fields-*habitus*. Bourdieu's analysis predicts and exposes that theology too seeks dominance: both agents within itself and in relation to other fields. However, finding the theological virtues of faith, hope, and

love underpinning Bourdieu's analysis of how the problem of *epistemic doxa* and symbolic violence appears reveals the issue is fundamentally not only social but theological.

We were then ready to apply the Bourdieusien analytic to a test case within the larger field of academic theology in order to explore answers to our three questions. The Yale School of Theology was offered as a school of thought sharing an interest and understanding of narrative. Yet, as we examined the two figures understood to be most aligned in Chapter 3, Frei and Lindbeck, we discovered dramatically different conceptions of and applications of narrative. What unity we did find was on using narrative to navigate the threat of symbolic violence in a way that both exposed the symbolic violence done to narrative texts (Frei) and the symbolic violence done to the church as communities of performance (Lindbeck). Frei and Lindbeck both used narrative to counter the delegitimation of both text and metatext in academic theology. Thus, extending our analysis in Chapter 4 to a father of the Yale School, H.R. Niebuhr, and his last conceptual son in the Yale School, Hauerwas, we saw that while both theologians rightly saw that narrative possesses epistemic capacities, ultimately their understandings and uses of narrative diverge. Where Niebuhr sees narrative primarily as a mode of theology that makes interpersonal knowledge-who possible, Hauerwas discovers in narrative a mode of theology that makes phronesis possible, that is, knowledge-in-action. Moreover, Hauerwas uses narrative to reimagine a theological epistemology framed from ethics such that knowing is a phronetic transformative activity. Yet, despite their divergence on the kind of knowing narrative makes possible, Niebuhr and Hauerwas both turn to narrative to navigate and contest the symbolic violence imposed by the *epistemic doxa* demanding abstractionism as the form of academic theology. For Niebuhr, narrative offers interpersonal knowledge. For Hauerwas, narrative generates a phronesis enacted within and by the community of Christian theology, viz. the church. Thus, the Yale School aligns not as a school of thought but as the intuitive coordination of individuals' *habitus* to leverage

narrative and their respective institutional and reputational capitals to contest symbolic violence. So, theology operates the way that it does and defines theology the way it does, in part, because of the symbolic violence structuring the system through its *epistemic doxa*. The Yale School all intuitively turn to narrative as part of their solution to removing symbolic violence from academic theology, but crucially the reason for narrative in particular as their answer to the three foundational questions we started with remained opaque. What was clear from our case study, however, is that a sociological analysis to the operation of the field of academic theology is essential to understanding its presently assumed answers to those three questions as well as going beyond those answers to construct theology without symbolic violence.

Finally, in Chapters 5-7, we also began to reimagine with the Yale School doing theology inclusive of the narrative mode, but also with Bourdieu a way of doing theology without symbolic violence. Following from the Bourdieusien analysis of the Yale School, in Chapter, 5, theology appears enslaved by and enslaving through symbolic violence. Thus, theology needed to be liberated from itself. In fact, it was in Gutiérrez liberating approach to theology that we were able to begin to unify the important theological insights of the Yale School on narrative as well as explain their use of narrative to contest symbolic violence. To these theological resources, Bourdieu's sociological analysis provided a necessary voice in our constructive effort. Yet, Bourdieu's analysis never reached a truly constructive approach, for which he was critiqued by Daniel Schubert on the basis of desiring-production in Deleuze and Guattari. Thus, we saw that our constructive approach must be truly productive, but to be so it must be accessible and actionable. For this narrative offers itself as especially suited, because 7E cognition has become 8E cognition, such that human cognition is understood to inescapably include narration. To be human is to think and live in terms of and by means of narration. In Chapter 6, we built towards a truly constructive narrative and phronetic theology

by seeking for a theological epistemology rooted not in symbolic violence but in eschatological resurrection into love. We explored Paul's narration of the epistemological implications of the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 13, revealing that where symbolic violence destroys the possibility of knowing by rendering all knowledge a symbolic good for domination, it is the phronetic transformation of perfected love that renders knowing possible in the resurrection. Why this is the case was argued through cross-pollinating Bourdieu's dialectic aims of subjectivising objectivity and objectivising subjectivity in *habitus* with von Balthasar's epistemology love. With a dialectic and phronetic epistemology of love constructed for theology that removes symbolic violence from its epistemological process without resorting to it, we could continue to Chapter 7 where we could consider how to use such an epistemology in theology phronetically. There we argued that to remove symbolic violence from academic theology without resorting to it, we had to understand what generates the phenomenon of symbolic violence as well as offer a truly constructive approach to doing theology that did not just employ a phronetic epistemology of love in relation to knowing, but a truly narrative and phronetic mode of doing theology which was inseparable from being theologians. Bourdieu argues the origin of symbolic violence lies in every human being's existential longing for a genuine *justification d'exister*. However, ultimately there is an existential insufficiency in the games of power to offer this legitimation. Thus, to remove symbolic violence from academic theology requires living into the narration of legitimation by grace revealed in Christ incarnate and crucified in love. Christ radically expresses solidarity with God and humanity in his incarnation and crucifixion. That story stands as a continuing invitation to theology to story itself into embodied narrations of Christ's own embodied narration of a phronetic theology of liberation into grace through love. This invitation cannot be understood merely theoretically but can only truly be accepted though concrete phronetic activity expressed as holistic bodily narration.

Thus, these constructive possibilities were conjoined to produce a phronetic narrative theology of liberation through love on the basis of grace. Epistemologically love offers a phronetic epistemology to theology that does not collapse the dialectic of subjectivising objectivity and objectivising subjectivity, rendering knowledge of all kinds possible, whereas the games of power reduce knowing to dominating others, rendering knowledge only a legitimising label for intellectual forms of symbolic violence. Existentially, just as love makes knowing possible for theology, love makes action possible for theology. Love does both simultaneously because it is fundamentally phronetic and narratival in nature as revealed in the eschatological narration of knowing and in the embodied narration of Christ incarnate and crucified expressing love's radical solidarity with both God and humanity.

Originality

Where previous narrative and liberation theologies have sought to contest and subvert symbolic violence within the theological academy with narrative as well as encourage a genuine solidarity with those suffering symbolic violence, this thesis has attempted to imagine a form of academic theology free from symbolic violence that is epistemologically inclusive as well as courageous enough to break with the narrative of symbolic legitimation in which it participates. Further, this thesis has offered an original synthesis of Bourdieu's thought as well as a theological appraisal and deployment of his analysis. Further, no other theological work, I am aware of, has sought to explain the Yale School in sociological terms rather than conceptual ones. Relatedly, the analysis of Frei's relationship to Lindbeck and Ricoeur offers an alternative understanding to the one generally assumed in the academy today. No engagement with Bourdieu has sought to correlate *habitus* with cognitive science's 7E cognition, much less narration as a dimension of human cognitive processing. Furthermore, integrating both Bourdieusien analysis and cognitive science to offer an 8E-compatible phronetic and narrative approach to theologising stands out among other

constructive efforts at narrative theology. Additionally, while Gutiérrez incorporated narrative theology into his liberation theology, the reverse has not been as true. Attempting to synthesise the Yale School's narrative theologies with the liberation theology of Gutiérrez is, thus, an important contribution to academic theology. Finally, while many have used Marx as an important dialogue partner with which to construct their theologies of liberation, using Bourdieu to provide the sociological frame in place of Marx moves the liberative analysis towards considering not only the capitalistic systems than can serve to oppress but the meta-capitalistic systems of symbolic power which undergird them.

Implications

1. In brief, solidarity cannot be hypothetical or theoretical. For theology to express only a theoretical solidarity but not a praxis of solidarity in theory and beyond renders the claims of solidarity void, and the phronetic dimensions of our constructive effort of theology neither truly productive nor phronetic. Thus, solidarity must include actual relationship with and commitment to those who are suffering symbolic domination. As the incarnation of Christ narrates, solidarity involved being narrated into the lives of those with whom solidarity is being expressed. Moreover, solidarity means risking delegitimation in living by the legitimacy of grace. It requires an overhaul of the system not just at a theoretical or existential level, as this thesis has provided, but a renovation towards grace-infused faith, hope, and love at a structural level.

2. Thus, a narrative and phronetic theology of love expressed in radical solidarity with God and humanity involves, by necessity, the restructuring of academic theology's method and assessment. Narratives would need to be included as a fundamentally academic way of approaching theology. This implies allowing for assignments of students at universities to be narrative in form as well as academic journals and publishers to consider theologies

constructed in the narrative mode. This brings its own set of objections, which we will return to below.

3. Theology is not separable from the community of practice, not just because severing epistemologically academic theology from the church's performance is itself an act of symbolic violence but also because if academic theology is to remove symbolic violence without committing it, theology cannot be done apart from a participation in a phronetically oriented community that seeks to know and live in love. On the one hand, the academy can orient itself towards becoming a community centred on love: where love as active solidarity is practiced in embodied and concrete ways as much as in theoretical ways, where knowledge-who and -in-action as much as knowledge-that and -how continually express themselves in union. On the other hand, this kind of community historically was the site where theology was done and for whom it was done, viz. the church. The Yale School's broad concern that academic theology not impose symbolic violence on the church by severing itself from it is especially important to remember here. The church offers academic theology (and *vice versa*) an opportunity in which to cultivate together an increasingly more loving phronesis of solidarity with one another and with God and humanity beyond them.

4. A more inclusive mode of theologising also opens academic theology to greater inclusivity of participants. Specifically, people without access to western philosophical education by reason of socio-economic, geographic, ethnic, racial, and socio-cultural background. In fact, it is this concern that has inspired much of this present argument.

5. What counts as a "serious academic work" has to be reimagined. Not just in academic theology, but beyond. This Bourdieusien theological critique of symbolic violence centres on academic theology, but would also apply beyond it to the broader constraints of academic epistemology. Specifically, the sociological conditioning of academic knowledge must be accounted for in the rise and fall of prevailing agents and theories. While a phronetic

epistemology of love enables the possibility for a growth of knowledge-that and -how in the academy, it also cautions that conceptual and theoretical productions exist not only in service of the quest for knowledge of various foci but for the quest to dominate others or maintain dominance already gained. This is true for both the acceptance and rejection of ideas.

6. The critique of symbolic violence applied here to the theological academy also has serious implications for doing theology in and for the church. Dogmatic statements framed in abstractionist terms are problematic. Likewise, the danger of being deceived into hoping in the idol of symbolic power is just as perilous for the church, if not even more precarious due to its role in setting dogmatic parameters in terms of theories and practices for that community. Moreover, as our exposition of 1 Corinthians 13 suggests, the falling into the games for symbolic power within the church is potentially even more deceptive because of how easy it is to remove the *charis* (grace) from *charismata* by co-opting the legitimacy by grace into a narrative of capitalising the gifts as goods of legitimation.

7. More truly narrative theologies are essential to continue to develop narrative and phronetic theologies of liberation, that express solidarity in theoretical narrations as well as embodied narrations of practice. In particular, I am interested in producing a creative narration of not only an alternative to the games of symbolic violence in this world but the world reshaped in the eschatological future without any symbolic violence. This narration could explore what are the connections between symbolic violence and human mortality and weakness, as well as what implications this connection might have for the nature of resurrection bodies.

8. This thesis is a constructive attempt at a sociologically sensitive epistemology for theology, but in the process has implied a more holistic understanding for theological anthropology. In particular, it is clear that human beings cannot be understood in exclusively individualistic terms as much as their intellectual activities cannot be understood in strictly

abstractionist terms. Rather as Bourdieu argued and as 8E cognitive science continues to show, human beings are fundamentally social, embodied agents who live and think in perpetual narration. The Yale School likewise emphasised these dynamics. First, Frei, Lindbeck, Niebuhr, and Hauerwas all emphasised the fundamental importance of narration to human thought and life. Behind their turn to narrative is a theological anthropology that integrates narrative tightly into what it means to be human. Moreover, all emphasise the fundamentally social and embodied nature of humanity: Frei with texts, Lindbeck with ecclesial performance, Niebuhr with interpersonal revelation, and Hauerwas with phronesis in community. Thus, the theological epistemology developed here also has implications for theological anthropology, which is expected given that it was suggested by the incarnation in Chapters 1 and 7. Theological epistemology must account for the social, embodied, and narrative nature of human knowledge, because the knowers of that knowledge as human are irreducibly social, embodied, and narratival in orientation and being. While this thesis has begun to explore these themes, much more could and should be developed along these trajectories.

Objections

1. Returning to the objection forecasted earlier, viz. making theology more inclusive of narrative as a legitimated and accepted *modus theologiae*, some may object that academic projects cannot be narrative, because stories cannot be evaluated like the abstractionist traditions of western philosophical discourse can, nor can the evaluations be narrative in form. To this, three responses arise. First, this is merely a cultural convention, not an internal necessity to theological epistemology as this thesis has argued.

Second, people do, in fact, intuitively recognise the weakness or strength in a narrative. People know when they have seen a good movie or read a good novel, they can feel the insufficiency of the story intuitively as well as consciously. They notice plot holes, which

is the marker of narrative incoherency, logical failure, or probability failure. Such is a failure to generate a coherent knowledge-how. They notice insufficient characterisation ('Who cares so-and-so died? I don't even really know who they are.'). This is a failure to generate knowledge-who. They notice the lack of a point – 'what was that movie even about?'. Such is a knowledge-that failure. They even notice when a novel succeeds at providing knowledge-in-action: 'I feel so inspired after watching that film. I feel like I can overcome this obstacle in my life, find love, set things right.' The inverse is less noticed, because it is the failure of knowledge-in-action rather than knowledge-that. Even the success is often more subconscious, shaping the activities rather than the conscious awareness of the reader. Finally, literature studies and film criticism are thriving fields, which suggests that in fact narrative productions can be evaluated, interrogated, and compared.

Likewise, the parallel objection that theologians would not have the competency to evaluate narrative theologies proves problematic on two counts. On the one hand, the earlier point about the ability of people in general to evaluate the narrations given to them remain applicable here. Likewise, narrative evaluation is how people evaluate what people tell them about an event all the time. Moreover, even people who themselves are not good-storytellers know when they have heard a good story. The point of the cognitive science research was to emphasise the near universal availability of narrative production and evaluation to human agents. On the other, that this is an argument may be the expression of an *epistemic doxa* towards laying down an orthodoxy. If the objection may express not the practical possibilities available in the field of theology but the possibilities those in power would prefer to be practical, then the objection could suggest that the restructuring could impinge upon dominant agents' capacity to remain dominant in a more epistemologically and phronetically inclusive field. If one is 'winning' the games of power, leaving the games will seem all the more impractical.

Third, narrative responses to narratives and non-narratives are possible. As Jesus' narrative response to a non-narrative question with the parable of the Good Samaritan demonstrates, not only can a story answer non-narrative questions, but narrative can succeed more efficiently than traditional philosophical discourse. Fourth, there are many fields of narrative production that operate on the basis of the possibility of narratological dialogue. In biblical studies, all comparative studies of the Old Testament parallel accounts and the Gospels in the New Testament must presuppose not only the possibility of common sources but that in using those sources and incorporating their own sources authors/redactors are offering a narratological dialogue with the other narrations. However, where philosophical abstractionism tends requires either/or fallacies in certain circumstances, narratological dialogue opens up the possibility of collaborative and polyvalent perspectives as much as critical ones. Outside of biblical studies, an even more helpful example of narratological responses to narratological limitations or failures in particular appears, viz. fan fiction. Stories, but especially great stories, do not just satisfy the reader with the story, they also inspire more stories, especially the continuation of the narrative. When a great story concludes, the desire in many cases is to see it continue, and even expand upon the story already told. This takes the form of prequels and sequels, new adventures, new characters, and even expansions upon material in the original story. This is to say nothing of remakes or alternative versions of the original stories. For every *Odyssey* there is an *Aeneid*; for every Spiderman series, there is a reboot. Narratives often leave questions or curiosities: How did Anakin become Darth Vader? What happens to Oedipus after he blinds himself and begs for exile? How/why did Satan fall into sin? Other times stories produce plot holes that must be resolved through an additional story. The Death Star in *Star Wars Episode IV* is easily destroyed by a vulnerability many find too convenient. To answer this, *Star Wars: Rogue One* tells the story of the man forced to design it, but who builds in the vulnerability hoping

his weapon of mass destruction will be able to be destroyed. History as narrative also provides these questions, generating both the narratological constructions of folklore, biographies, and academic fields (e.g. history, sociology, etc.).

Thus, narrative responses and critiques are not just theoretical but actual and natural. It is only on the basis of an *epistemic doxa* that theology cannot include both narrative reasoning and abstract discursive reasoning, that narration as either original production, response, or evaluation cannot be integrated into the operation of academic theology. Likewise, one conclusion that Ch.7 aims to show is that some theological questions or problems can only be solved narratively. Symbolic violence arises because of the operative narratives in human agents and can only vanish when an alternative story becomes assumed in living narration as phronesis.

2. Do you actually in fact commit symbolic violence, using love as legitimation? Succinctly: No. I speak to this in Chapter 7. Love is not the pursuit of legitimation but the activity of an agent living liberatingly by being enstoried into legitimation by grace. Objectifying love as symbolic value both destroys the dialectic constructed in Chapter 6 and renders love something other than love, namely the pursuit not of the good of the other, but self-legitimation. Moreover, love acts as a legitimating force through solidarity with others. It offers itself as phronetically valuable specifically because it does not offer legitimation based on the presence of an objectified loving activity in the other, understood here as symbolic capital relabed as ‘love’. Love acts in grace, recognising the intrinsic legitimacy of all agents. If it legitimates itself, it does so based on its own loving. For just as love loves not based on the loving done by the recipient of that love, so too love is not legitimated by love given to it. Rather love reciprocally celebrates the legitimacy of the other and the self in simultaneous solidarity with both. Likewise, love does not remove the power of power to offer symbolic legitimacy. Rather it only exposes and reaffirms what power is in itself, namely not able to

offer the ultimate legitimation it is sought for by subjective agents. Thus, love loves both the subjective agents in seeking their good and power in enabling it to live outside the scope of symbolic deception towards ultimate legitimation. In love, subjects and objects, including power become creative developments beyond what they can be without it but in a way that is more fully true to who and what they are.

3. Is your project sufficiently narrative? Care was taken to expose in the constructive section the narratological nature of Bourdieusien concepts. Similarly, the case study of the Yale School is, when viewed as a whole, the story of how agents coordinated to form a collective to navigate and undermine symbolic violence in the theological academy. They used narrative to contest the symbolic violence of the field directed against not simply narrative as a mode but narrative because it was representative of broader manifestations of symbolic violence imposed by the reductionistic *epistemic doxa* of academic theology. Further, the constructive Part III is considerably narratival in both theme and mode of reasoning, as well as its invitation to loving through embodied solidarity with God and humanity in the activity of theologising. It will be admitted that the work is not as purely narratival as it could be. The constraints of the current structure of symbolic legitimation in academic theology do not allow it to be otherwise. However, in addition to this thesis' own need to navigate the symbolic violence in the structure of the field, it has sought to meet abstract philosophical discourse demanded by the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology on its own terms in love. That is, this thesis expresses a certain degree of solidarity with conventional theological method in hope that it might become more than what it was before it was met in constructive and creative love. It has aimed, therefore, to show how narration can supplement and expand academic theology if met in love by academic theology.

A Final Invitation…

It is often the case that an argument is thought to show something. Indeed, this thesis aims to argue something. Yet, it hopes to move beyond merely a demonstration of coherent analysis to something genuinely constructive. This thesis maintains that deploying a Bourdieusien analysis simultaneous with our theological consideration of the Yale School of Theology exposes the symbolic violence of the *epistemic doxa* of academic theology against narrative theologies while also generating essential epistemological, sociological and theological resources from which to construct a solution to symbolic violence without resorting to it. Thus, this thesis also argues for removing symbolic violence from theology not by imposing symbolic violence but by constructing an epistemologically inclusive and phronetically engaged way of doing theology that does not operate according to *epistemic doxa* of symbolic violence altogether. What this thesis hopefully achieves, then, is a truly constructive theology of phronetic narration that operates on the basis of grace and expresses the radical solidarity of theoretical and embodied love. This is a dialectic phronetic epistemology that participates in an eschatological narration reflecting the Holy Trinity's knowing all in love. Yet, what prevents this participation in Trinitarian love which empowers human knowing is not simply the *epistemic doxa* of knowledge as power, but the even more fundamental assumption that power provides existential legitimation. This phronetic epistemology of love, consequently, must operate on basis of grace, on the intrinsic legitimacy of individual and collective human life. Only then can theology be liberated from itself, from its own assumption of the necessity of symbolic power. Only then can theologising become a truly constructive enterprise that can resist the allure of the games of power to live phronetically in the radical embodied narration of Christ living in loving solidarity with humanity and God. Likewise, only then will academic theology love the dominated and dominant enough to risk the revolution of removing itself from the games of

symbolic violence without resorting to it to express a radical solidarity with God and humanity. Thus, this thesis invites theology into a story it can live by – indeed participating in and extending to the world through its narrative phronesis *la joie de vivre trinitaire* – to become a narrative and phronetic theology of liberation.

APPENDIX 1:
SOURCE TEXTS AND ORIGINAL TRANSLATIONS

Introduction

(p.3) Bourdieu, *Raisons Pratiques*, 224 – Pourquoi ce rappel des conditions économiques et sociales de la posture scolastique est-il si nécessaire ? … La logique dans laquelle je me place n'est pas celle de la condamnation ou de la dénonciation politique, mais celle de l'interrogation épistémologique : interrogation épistémologique fondamentale puisqu'elle porte sur la posture épistémique elle-même, sur les présupposés inscrits dans le fait de se retirer du monde et de l'action dans le monde pour les penser. Ce qu'il s'agit de savoir c'est en quoi ce retrait, cette abstraction, cette retraite affectent la pensée qu'ils rendent possible et, par là, le contenu même de ce que nous pensons.

> Why is this reminder of the economic and social conditions of the scholastic posture so necessary? … The logic in which I place myself is not that of condemnation or of political denunciation, but that of epistemological interrogation: fundamental epistemic interrogation seeing as it is about the epistemic posture itself, and about the presuppositions inscribed in the fact of removing oneself from the world and from the action in the world in order to think them. What it is about is knowing in what way this withdrawal, this abstraction, this retreat affects the though which they make possible and, thereby, the content of what we think itself.

(p.5) Bourdieu, *Méditations Pascaliennes*, 10 – …c'est cet excès de confiance dans les pouvoirs du discours. Illusion typique de lector, qui peut tenir le commentaire académique

pour un acte politique ou la critique des textes pour un fait de résistance, et vivre les révolutions dans l'ordre des mots comme des révolutions radicales dans l'ordre des choses.

> It is this excess of confidence in the powers of discourse. An illusion typical of the lector, who can take the academic commentary for a political act or the critique of texts for a fact of resistance, and living the revolutions in the order of words as radical revolutions in the order of things.

Chapter 1

(p.17) Bourdieu, *Esquisse*, 181 – [L]a délimitation entre le champ de l'opinion, c'est-à-dire de ce qui est explicitement mis en question (l'opinion, orthodoxe ou hétérodoxe, supposant la question, donc la possibilité et la légitimité d'une réponse autre, défendue par un autre group), et le champ de la *doxa*, de ce qui est hors de question et que tout agent accorde tacitement à l'état de choses actuel par le seul fait d'agir en accord avec les convenances sociales, est elle-même en enjeu fondamental de cette forme de la lutte politique entre les classes qui est la lutte pour l'imposition des systèmes de classement dominants….

> The demarcation between the field of opinion, that is to say of what is explicitly put in question (the opinion, orthodox or heterodox, supposing the question, therefore the possibility and the legitimacy of another response, defended by another group), and the field of the *doxa*, of what is out of the question and with which every agent tacitly agrees concerning the current state of affairs by sole fact of acting in agreement with social expectations, is itself at fundament stake in this form of political struggle between the classes which is the struggle for the imposition of the dominant systems of classification.

(p.18) Bourdieu, *Raisons Pratiques*, 129 – La *doxa* est un point de vue particulier, le point de vue des dominants, qui présente et s'impose comme point de vue universel.

> The *doxa*, is a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant people, which presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view.

(p.18) Bourdieu, *Méditations Pascaliennes*, 223 – Les présupposes inscrits dans cette disposition … constituent ce que j'appellerai, par un oxymore bien fait pour réveiller les philosophes [et théologiens] de leur sommeil scolastique, la *doxa* épistémique. Rien n'est plus dogmatique, paradoxalement, qu'une *doxa*, ensemble de croyances fondamentales qui n'ont même pas besoin de s'affirmer sous la forme d'un dogme explicite et conscient de lui-même.

> The presuppositions inscribed in this disposition constitute what I will call, by an oxymoron well-crafted to wake back up the philosophers [and theologians] from their scholastic slumber, the epistemic *doxa*. Nothing is more dogmatic, paradoxically, than a *doxa*, an ensemble of fundamental beliefs which do not themselves need to be affirmed under the form of an explicit dogma conscious of itself.

(p.19) Bourdieu, *Esquisse*, 181 - les dominées ont intérêt à faire reculer les limites de la *doxa*, à manifester l'arbitraire du taken for granted ; les classes dominantes ont intérêt à défendre l'intégrité de la *doxa*, à défaut, à en restaurer le substitut, nécessairement imparfait qu'est l'orthodoxie.

> The dominated have interest in making the limits of the *doxa* recede, in manifesting the arbitrary nature of the taken for granted; the dominant classes have interest in defending the integrity of the *doxa*, or failing that, in restoring the substitute, necessarily imperfect that is orthodoxy.

(p.21) Bourdieu, *Méditations Pascaliennes*, 22 – Il en va autrement des distorsions liées à l'appartenance à un champ et à l'adhésion, unanime dans les limites de ce champ, à la *doxa* qui le définit en propre. L'implicite en ce cas, c'est ce qui est impliqué dans le fait d'être pris

au jeu, c'est-à-dire dans l'*illusio* comme croyance fondamentale dans l'intérêt du jeu et la valeur des enjeux qui est inhérente à cette appartenance.

> The same is not true of the distortions connected with the participation in a field and in the adhesion, unanimous in the limits of that field, to the *doxa* which defines it in itself. The implicit in this case, this is what is implied in the fact of being put in the game, that is to say in the *illusio* as fundamental belief in the interest of the game and the value of the states which is inherent to this participation.

(pp.22-23) Bourdieu, *Méditations Pascaliennes*, 22-23 – Participer de l'*illusio*, scientifique, littéraire, philosophique ou autre, c'est prendre au sérieux (parfois au point d'en faire, là aussi, des questions de vie ou de mort) des enjeux qui, nés de la logique du jeu lui-même, en fondent le sérieux, même s'ils peuvent échapper ou paraître « désintéressés » et « gratuits » à ceux que l'on appelle parfois les « profanes », ou à ceux qui sont engagés dans d'autres champs….

> Participating in the *illusio* – whether scientific, literary, philosophical, or another – this is to take seriously (sometimes to the point of making them, there too, questions of life and death) the stakes which, born of the logic of the game itself, base on them what is taken seriously, even if they can escape or seem 'disinterested' and 'reckless' to those who one sometimes calls the 'uninitiated', or to those who are engaged in other fields.

(pp.31-32) Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, 15-16 – On sait que les groupes n'aiment guère ceux qui « vendent la mèche », surtout peut-être lorsque la transgression ou la trahison peut se réclamer de leurs valeurs les plus hautes. Les mêmes qui ne manqueraient pas de saluer comme « courageux » ou « lucide » le travail d'objectivation s'il s'appliquait à des groupes étrangers et adverses seront portes à jeter le soupçon sur les déterminants de la lucidité spéciale que revendique l'analyste de son propre groupe. … Aussi serait-on tenté de

reprendre le titre, Livre à brûler…. Non pour lancer un défi à ceux qui, pourtant si prompts à s'insurger contre tous les autodafés, voueront au bûcher toute œuvre perçue comme un attentat sacrilège contre leurs croyances propres. Mais pour dire simplement la contradiction qui est inscrite dans la divulgation des secrets de tribu et qui n'est si douloureuse que parce que la publication (même partielle) du plus privé a aussi quelque chose d'une confession publique.

> One knows that the groups hardly love those who 'give away the game,' it can especially be the case when the transgression or betrayal can makes claims against their highest values. The same people who would not miss saluting as 'courageous' or 'lucid' the work of objectivation if it would be applied to foreign groups and adversaries will be carried to casting suspicion on those deciding the special lucidity that the analyst of his own group claims. … Also one would be tempted to reclaim the title, Book for burning…. Not in order to launch a challenge to those who, though so prompt to rebel against all the book-burnings, will want to burn every work perceived as a sacrilegious attempt against their own beliefs. But to simply state the contradiction which is inscribed in the divulging of the tribe's secrets and which is only so painful because the publication (itself partial) of the most private has also some element of a public confession.

(p.32) Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, 44 – Si la scientificité socialement reconnue est un enjeu si important, c'est que, bien qu'il n'y ait pas de force intrinsèque de la vérité, il y a une force de la croyance dans la vérité, de la croyance que produit l'apparence de la vérité : dans la lutte des représentations, la représentation socialement reconnue comme scientifique, c'est-à-dire comme vraie, enferme une force sociale propre et, quand il s'agit du monde social, la science donne à celui qui la détient, ou qui donne les apparences de la détenir, le monopole du point de vue légitime, de la prévision autovérifiant. C'est parce qu'elle enferme la

possibilité de cette force proprement sociale que la science, quand il s'agit du monde social, est nécessairement contestée, et que la menace de coup de force qu'elle enferme est vouée à susciter, surtout de la part des détenteurs du pouvoir temporel, et de ceux qui, dans le champ de production culturelle, sont leurs homologues et leur allies, des stratégies de défense dont la plus commune consiste à réduire à un simple point de vue doxique le point de vue épistémique, au moins partiellement affranchi des déterminismes sociaux, en le rapportant à la position du chercheur dans le champ.

> If the scientific-ness socially understood is a game so important, it is because, although there may not be any intrinsic force from the truth, there is a force from the belief in the truth, and the belief that produces the appearance of the truth: in the struggle of representations, the representation socially understood as scientific, that is to say as true, contains its own social force and, when it is question of the social world, science gives to the one who possess it, or who gives the appearances of possessing it, the monopoly of the legitimate point of view, of the self-verifying prediction. This is because it contains the possibility of this properly social force that science, when it is a question of the social world, is necessarily contested, and that the threat of a blow of force (which it contains) is destined to provoke, especially on the part of those possessing temporal power, and of those who, in the field of cultural production, are their homologues and their allies, with respect to the strategies of defence the most common of which consists in reducing to a simple doxic point of view, the epistemic point of view, at least partially emancipated from social determinisms, by connecting it to the position of the researcher in that field.

(p.45) Gregory Nazianzus, Letter 101 §32 – τὸ γὰρ ἀπρόσληπτον, ἀθεράπεσευτον· ὅ δὲ ἥνωται τῷ θεῷ, τοῦτο καὶ σῴζεται.

> Whatever is not assumed is not healed. And what is united to God, this also is saved.

(p.46) John 1.14 – Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν.

And the Word became flesh and dwelled among us.

Chapter 2

(p.53) Bourdieu, *Sens Pratique*, 86 – l'économie que décrit la théorie économique est un cas particulier de tout un univers d'économies.

The economy that describes economic theory is one peculiar case of a whole universe of economies.

(p.54) Bourdieu, *MP*, 267 – Le capital sous ses différentes espèces est un ensemble de droits de préemptions sur le futur ; il garantit à certains le monopole de certains possibles pourtant officiellement garantis à tous (comme le droit à l'éducation). Les droits exclusifs que consacre le droit ne sont que la forme visible, et explicitement garantie, de cet ensemble de chances appropriées et de possibles préemptes, donc convertis, pour les autres, en interdits de droit ou en impossibilités de fait, par où les rapports de force présents se projettent sur l'avenir, orientant en retour les dispositions présentes.

Capital under its different species is an ensemble of rights of pre-emption on the future; it guarantees to certain people the monopoly of certain possibilities though officially guaranteed to all (such as the right to education). The exclusive rights that the law consecrates are only the visible form, and explicitly guaranteed, of that ensemble of chances appropriated and of possibilities pre-empted, therefore converted, for the others, into prohibitions of law or into impossibilities of fact, whereby the present relations of force project themselves onto the future, orienting in return the present dispositions.

(p.58) Bourdieu, MP, 285 – Toute espèce de capital (économique, cultural, social) tend (à des degrés différents) à fonctionner comme capital symbolique (en sorte qu'il vaudrait peut-être mieux parler, en toute rigueur, d'effets symboliques du capital) lorsqu'il obtient une

reconnaissance explicite ou pratique, celle d'un *habitus* structuré selon les mêmes structures que l'espace où il s'est engendré. Autrement dit, le capital symbolique (l'honneur masculin des sociétés méditerranéennes, l'honorabilité du notable ou du mandarin chinois, le prestige de l'écrivain renommé, etc.) n'est pas une espèce particulière de capital mais ce que devient toute espèce de capital lorsqu'elle est méconnue en tant que capital, c'est-à-dire en tant que force, pouvoir ou capacité d'exploitation (actuelle ou potentielle), donc reconnue comme légitime. Plus précisément, le capital existe et agit comme capital symbolique (procurant des profits – comme dit, par exemple, le constat-précepte, honesty is the best policy) dans la relation à un *habitus* prédisposé à le percevoir comme signe et comme signe d'importance, c'est-à-dire à le connaître et à la reconnaître en fonction de structures cognitives aptes et inclinées à lui accorder la reconnaissance parce que accordées à ce qu'il est. Produit de la transfiguration d'un rapport de force en rapport de sens, le capital symbolique arrache à l'insignifiance, comme absence d'importance et de sens.

> Every species of capital (economic, cultural, social) tends (to different degrees) to function as symbolic capital (in a sort that it would be worth possibly better to speak, in complete rigour, of symbolic effects of the capital) when it obtains an explicit or practical recognition, that of a *habitus*, structured according to the same structures as the space where it is engendered. Rephrased, symbolic capital (the masculine honour of Mediterranean societies, the honourability of the notable person or of the Chinese Mandarin, the prestige of the renowned writer, etc.) is not a particular species of capital but what every species of capital becomes when it is unknown as capital, that is to say as force, power, or capacity of exploitation (actual or potential), therefore recognised as legitimate. More precisely, the capital exists and it acts as symbolic capital (yielding the profits – as the observation-precept says, for example, honesty is the best policy) in relation to a *habitus* predisposed to perceive it as a sign and as a

sign of importance, that is to say to know it and to recognise it by a function of cognitive structures apt and inclined to accord to it the recognition because [it is] accorded to what it is. A product of the transfiguration of a relation of force into a relation of meaning, the symbolic capital removes insignificance, as an absence of importance and of meaning.

(p.61) Bourdieu, MP, 22 – Chaque champ se caractérise en effet par la poursuite d'une fin spécifique.

Each field is characterised in effect by the pursuit of a specific end.

(p.61) Bourdieu, MP, 163 – qui constitue le champ comme espace de jeu.

…which constitutes the field as game-space.

(p.62) Bourdieu, MP, 122 – La disposition constituante – à la fois arbitraire, ou même déplacée et risible, du point de vue d'un autre champ, et nécessaire, donc impérativement exigée (sous peine de grossièreté, de ridicule, etc.), du point de vue de la légalité spécifique du champ considéré – est cette adhésion tacite au *nomos*, cette forme particulière de croyance, l'*illusio*….

The disposition constituting – at once arbitrary, or even misplaced and laughable, from the point of view of another field, and necessary, therefore imperatively demanded (under pain of discourtesy, of ridicule, etc.), from the point of view of the specific legality of the considered field – is this tacit adhesion to the *nomos*, that particular form of belief, the *illusio*…

(p.62) Bourdieu, MP, 111 – au sens d'investissement dans le jeu et les enjeux, d'intérêt pour le jeu, d'adhésion aux présupposés — *doxa* — du jeu.

In the sense of investment in the game and the stakes, of interest towards the game, of adhesion to the presuppositions – *doxa* – of the game.

(p.63) Bourdieu, MP, 119 – Le principe de vision et de division et le mode de connaissance (religieux, philosophique, juridique, scientifique, artistique, etc.) qui ont cours dans un champ, en association avec une forme spécifique d'expression, ne peuvent être connus et compris qu'en relation avec la légalité spécifique de ce champ comme microcosme social.

> The beginning of vision and division and the mode of knowledge (religious, philosophical, juridical, scientific, artistic, etc.) which holds court in a field, in association with a specific form of expression, cannot be known and understood but in relation with the specific legislation of that field as a social microcosm.

(p.63) Bourdieu, MP, 120 – Chaque champ est l'institutionnalisation d'un point de vue dans les choses et dans les *habitus*.

> Each field is the institutionalisation *of a point of view* in the things and in the *habitus*.

(p.63) Bourdieu, MP, 219 – Les points de vue, au sens de prises de position structurées et structurantes sur l'espace social ou sur un champ particulier, sont par définition différents, et concurrents.

> The points of view, in the sense of takings of position structured and structuring in the social space or in a particular field, are by definition different, and concurrent.

(p.64) Bourdieu, SP, 111 – Produit de l'expérience du jeu, donc des structures objectives de l'espace de jeu, le sens du jeu est ce qui fait que le jeu a un sens subjectif, c'est-à-dire une signification et une raison d'être, mais aussi une direction, une orientation, un à-venir, pour ceux qui y participent et qui en reconnaissent par là même les enjeux (c'est l'*illusio* au sens d'investissement dans le jeu et les enjeux, d'intérêt pour le jeu, d'adhésion aux présupposés — *doxa* — du jeu).

> A product of the experience of the game, therefore of the objective structures of the space of the game, the sense of the game is what makes the game have a subjective sense, that is to say a meaning and a purpose, but also a direction, an orientation, a

future, for those who participate in it and who recognise in it thereby even the stakes (that is the *illusio* in the sense of investment in the game and the stakes, of interest towards the game, of adhesion to the presuppositions – *doxa* – of the game).

(p.64) Bourdieu, SP, 86 – champs de luttes différant tant par les enjeux et les raretés qui s'y engendrent que par les espèces de capital qui s'y engagent.

fields of struggles differing as much by the stakes and the rarities which are engendered in it as by the species of capital which are involved there.

(p.68) Bourdieu, *Méditations Pascaliennes*, 161 – l'espace social: 'l'espace social est défini par l'exclusion mutuelle, ou la distinction, des positions qui le constituent, c'est-à-dire comme structure de juxtaposition de positions sociales (elles-mêmes définies, on le verra, comme des positions dans la structure de la distribution des différentes espèces de capital).'

The social space is defined by the mutual exclusion, or the distinction, of the positions which constitute it, that is to say as a structure of juxtaposition of social positions (themselves defined, one could see it, as the positions in the structure of the distribution of different species of capital.

(p.69) Isaiah 44.17 – וּשְׁאֵרִיתוֹ לְאֵל עָשָׂה לְפִסְלוֹ יִסְגּוֹד לוֹ וְיִשְׁתַּחוּ וְיִתְפַּלֶּל אֵלָיו וְיֹאמַר הַצִּילֵנִי כִּי אֵלִי אָתָּה׃

And the rest of it he makes into a god, into his idol. He will bow to it. Then he worships it, and prays to his god, and says, 'Save me! For you are MY GOD!

(p.70) Isaiah 44.20 – רֹעֶה אֵפֶר לֵב הוּתַל הִטָּהוּ וְלֹא־יַצִּיל אֶת־נַפְשׁוֹ וְלֹא יֹאמַר הֲלוֹא שֶׁקֶר בִּימִינִי׃.

Grazing on ashes, with a fooled heart he has deceived himself. He cannot save his life. He cannot say, 'Isn't this a lie in my right hand?'

(pp.74-75) Bourdieu, SP, 88-89 – Les conditionnements associés à une classe particulière de conditions d'existence produisent des *habitus*, systèmes de dispositions durables et transposables, structures structurées prédisposées à fonctionner comme structures structurantes, c'est-à-dire en tant que principes générateurs et organisateurs de pratiques et de

représentations qui peuvent être objectivement adaptées à leur but sans supposer la visée consciente de fins et la maîtrise expresse des opérations nécessaires pour les atteindre, objectivement « réglées » et « régulières » sans être en rien le produit de l'obéissance à des règles, et, étant tout cela, collectivement orchestrées sans être le produit de l'action organisatrice d'un chef d'orchestre.

> The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce the *habitus*, systems of dispositions durable and transposable, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is to say as generative and organising principles of practices and of representations which can be objectively adapted to their goal without supposing the conscious vision of the ends and the express matrix of the necessary operations for attaining them, objectively 'ruled' and 'regulating' without being in any way the product of the obedience to the rules, and, being completely that, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organising action of the master of the orchestra.

(p.76) Bourdieu, *Raisons Pratiques*, 45 – Les « sujets » sont en réalité des agents agissants et connaissants dotés d'un sens pratique…, système acquis de préférences, de principes de vision et de division…, de structures cognitives durables (qui sont pour l'essentiel le produit de l'incorporation des structures objectives) et de schèmes d'action qui orientent la perception de la situation et la réponse adaptée. L'*habitus* est cette sorte de sens pratique de ce qui est à faire dans une situation donnée – ce que l'on appelle, en sport, le sens du jeu, art d'anticiper l'avenir du jeu qui est inscrit en pointillé dans l'état présent du jeu.

> The 'subjects' are in reality acting and knowing agents given by a practical reason…, an acquired system of preferences, of principles of vision and division…, of durable cognitive structures (which are essentially the product of incorporation of objective structures) and of schemes of action which orient the perception of the situation and

> the adapted response. The *habitus* is this sort of practical reason and what is to be done in a given situation – what one calls, in sport, the sense of the game, an art of anticipating the future of the game which is inscribed in the dotted array of the present state of the game.

(p.76) Bourdieu, MP, 190 – L'*habitus* n'est ni nécessairement adapté, ni nécessairement cohérent. Il a ses degrés d'intégration – qui correspondent notamment à des degrés de « cristallisation » du statut occupé.

> *Habitus* is not necessarily adapted, nor necessarily coherent. It has its degrees of integration – which correspond notably to the degrees of 'crystalisation' of the position occupied.

(p.77) Bourdieu, MP, 23 – La logique spécifique d'un champ s'institue à l'état incorporé sous la forme d'un *habitus* spécifique, ou, plus précisément, d'un sens du jeu, ordinairement désigné comme un « esprit » ou un « sens » (« philosophique », « littéraire », « artistique », etc.), qui n'est pratiquement jamais posé ni imposé de façon explicite. Du fait qu'elle s'opère de façon insensible, c'est-à-dire graduelle, progressive et imperceptible, la conversion plus ou moins radicale (selon la distance) de l'*habitus* originaire qu'exigent l'entrée dans le jeu et l'acquisition de l'*habitus* spécifique passe pour l'essentiel inaperçue.

> The specific logic of a field is situated towards the state incorporated under the form of a specific *habitus*, or, more precisely, of a sense of the game, ordinarily designed as a 'spirit' or a 'sense ('philosophical', 'literary', 'artistic', etc.), which is never practically set nor imposed in an explicit fashion. From the fact that it operates in an insensible way, that is to say gradual, progressive, and imperceptible, the conversion more or less radical (according to the distance) of the original *habitus*, which entrance into the game and the acquisition of the specific *habitus* force, passes unperceived as something essential.

(pp.77-78) Bourdieu, MP, 120 – L'*habitus* spécifique, qui s'impose aux nouveaux entrants comme un droit d'entrée, n'est autre chose qu'un mode de pensée spécifique (un eidos), principe d'une construction spécifique de la réalité, fondé dans une croyance préréflexive dans la valeur indiscutée des instruments de construction et des objets ainsi construits (un ethos).

> The specific *habitus*, which is imposed on new entrants as a right of entrance, is nothing other than a specific mode of thought (an *eidos*), a principle of a specific construction of reality, founded on the pre-reflexive belief in the undisputed value of the instruments of construction and of the objects so constructed (an *ethos*).

(p.78) Bourdieu, *Raisons Pratiques*, 137-38 – Ce principe de construction est un des éléments constitutifs de notre *habitus*, une structure mentale qui, ayant été inculquée dans tous les cerveaux socialisés d'une certaine façon, est à la fois individuelle et collective ; c'est une loi tacite (nomos) de la perception et de la pratique qui est au fondement du consensus sur le sens du monde social (et du mot de famille en particulier), au fondement du sens commun.

> This principle of construction is one of the constitutive elements of our *habitus*, a mental structure which, having been inculcated into all the brains socialised in a certain way, is simultaneously individual and collective; it is a tacit law (*nomos*) of the perception and practice which is at the base of the consensus around the sense of the social world (and of the word of family in particular), at the base of commons sense.

(p.78-79) Bourdieu, MP, 186 – Du fait que le social s'institue aussi dans les individus biologiques, il y a, en chaque individu socialisé, du collectif, donc des propriétés valables pour toute une classe d'agents – que la statistique permet de porter au jour. L'*habitus* entendu comme individu ou corps biologique socialisé, ou comme social biologiquement individué

par l'incarnation dans un corps, est collectif, ou transindividuel – on peut donc construire des classes d'*habitus*, statistiquement caractérisables. C'est à ce titre qu'il est en mesure d'intervenir efficacement dans un monde social ou un champ auquel il est génériquement ajusté.

> From the fact that the social is instituted also in the biological individuals, there is, in each socialised individual, something collective, therefore some valid properties for every class of agents – that the statistic permits to be brought to light. The *habitus*, understood as an individual or biological socialised body, or as a social thing biologically individualised by the incarnation into a body, is collective, or transindividual – one can therefore construct classes of *habitus*, statistically characterisable. It is in this way that he is in a position to intervene effectively in a social world or field to which it is generically adjusted.

(p.87) Bourdieu, *Sens Pratique*, 87-88 – Il s'agit d'échapper au réalisme de la structure auquel l'objectivisme, moment nécessaire de la rupture avec l'expérience première et de la construction des relations objectives, conduit nécessairement lorsqu'il hypostasie ces relations en les traitant comme des réalités déjà constituées en dehors de l'histoire de l'individu et du groupe, sans retomber pour autant dans le subjectivisme, totalement incapable de rendre compte de la nécessité du monde social : pour cela, il faut revenir à pratique, lieu de la dialectique de l'opus operatum et du modus operandi, des produits objectivés et des produits incorporés de la pratique historique, des structures et des *habitus*.

> It must escape the realism of the structure to which objectivism, a necessary moment of the rupture with the first experience and of the construction of objective relations, necessarily leads while it hypostatises this relation by treating them as realities already constituted by it outside of the history of the individual and of the group, without falling back all over into subjectivism, totally incapable of giving an account

> of the necessity of the social world: for that, it must return to practice, a place of the dialectic of the *opus operatum* and of the *modus operandi*, of the objective products and the products incorporated by the historical practice, of the structures and of the *habitus*.

(p.88) Bourdieu, MP, 165-66 – Une des fonctions majeures de la notion d'*habitus* est d'écarter deux erreurs complémentaires qui ont toutes les deux pour principe la vision scolastique : d'un côté, le mécanisme, qui tient que l'action est l'effet mécanique de la contrainte de causes externes ; de l'autre, le finalisme qui, notamment avec la théorie de l'action rationnelle, tient que l'agent agit de manière libre, consciente et, comme disent certains utilitaristes, *with full understanding*, l'action étant le produit d'un calcul des chances et des profits. Contre l'une et l'autre théorie, il faut poser que les agents sociaux sont dotés d'*habitus*, inscrits dans les corps par les expériences passées : ces systèmes de schèmes de perception, d'appréciation et d'action permettent d'opérer des actes de connaissance pratique, fondés sur le repérage et la reconnaissance des stimuli conditionnels et conventionnels auxquels ils sont disposés à réagir, et d'engendrer, sans position explicite de fins ni calcul rationnel des moyens, des stratégies adaptées et sans cesse renouvelées, mais dans les limites des contraintes structurales dont ils sont le produit et qui les définissent.

> One of the major functions of the notion of *habitus* is to remove two complementary errors which both have for a principle the scholastic vision: on the one hand, the mechanistic, which holds that action is the mechanistic effect of the constraint of external causes; on the other hand, finalism which, notably with rational action theory, holds that the agent acts in a free manner, conscious and, as certain utilitarians say, *with full understanding*, the action being the product of a calculus of chances and of profits. Against one or the other theory, it must be posed that the social agents are given a *habitus*, inscribed in their bodies by past experiences: these systems of

> schemes of perception, of appreciation, and of action permit the acts of practical knowledge to operate, founded on the tracking and the recognition of the conditional and conventional stimuli to which they are disposed to react, and to generate without explicit position of the ends or rational calculus of the means, the strategies adapted and ceaselessly renewed, but within the limits of the structural constraints of which they are the product and which define them.

Chapter 3

(p.110) Ricoeur, 'Interpretation', 32 – …quelle peut être la tâche première de l'herméneutique ? Elle est, selon moi, de chercher dans le texte lui-même, d'une part la dynamique interne qui préside à la structuration de l'œuvre, d'autre part la puissance de l'œuvre de se projeter hors d'elle-même et d'engendrer un monde qui serait véritablement la « chose » du texte. Dynamique interne et projection externe constituent ce que j'appelle le travail du texte. C'est la tache de l'herméneutique de reconstruire ce double travail du texte.

> What can be the first task of the hermeneutic? It is, according to me, to search in the text itself, on the one hand, the internal dynamic which presides over the structuration of the work, on the other hand, the power of the work to project itself outside of itself and to engender a world which would be truly the 'thing' of the text. Internal dynamic and external projection constitute what I am calling the work of the text. It is the task of the hermeneutic to reconstruct this double work of the text.

(p.110) Ricoeur, 'Herméneutique Philosophique et Herméneutique Biblique', 120 – Le point fondamental sur lequel je voudrais concentrer mon attention est celui-ci : la « confession de foi » qui s'exprime dans les documents bibliques est inséparable des formes de discours, j'entends la structure narrative, par exemple du Pentateuque et des Évangiles…

> The fundamental point on which I would want to concentrate my attention is this: the 'confession of faith' which is expressed in the biblical documents is inseparable from

> the forms of discourse, I mean the narrative structure, for example the Pentateuch or the Gospels.

(p.111) Ricoeur, 'Herméneutique Philosophique et Herméneutique Biblique', 126 – Suivons donc la voie de la simple « application » du thème général au texte dont nous venons de souligner la structure interne. … L'implication théologique est considérable : la première tâche de l'herméneutique n'est pas de susciter une décision chez le lecteur, mais d'abord de laisser se déployer le monde d'être qui est la « chose » du texte biblique. Ainsi est placée au-dessus des sentiments, des dispositions, de la croyance ou de la non-croyance, la proposition du monde qui, dans le langage de la Bible, s'appelle monde nouveau, nouvelle alliance, royaume de Dieu, nouvelle naissance. Ce sont là des réalités déployées devant le texte, pour nous certes, mais à partir du texte. C'est là ce qu'on peut appeler l'« objectivité » de l'être nouveau projeté par le texte.

> We therefore take the view of the simple application of the general theme to the text from which we come to underline the internal structure. … The theological implication is considerable: the premiere task of hermeneutics is not to stimulate a decision in the reader, but firstly to ally the world of being to be deployed which is the "thing" of the biblical text. Thus, it is placed above the sentiments, the dispositions, the belief or unbelief, namely the proposition of the world which, in the language of the Bible, is called a new world, a new covenant, God's Kingdom, a new birth. These are the realities deployed in front of the text, for us certainly, but based on the text. This is what one can call the "objectivity" of the new being projected by the text.

(p.112) Ricoeur, 'La Structure; le Mot; l'Evénement', 94 – Or ce que j'appelle ici projection est seulement un cas du retour de l'événement au système. … la polysémie est le pivot de la sémantique. C'est le plus intéressant, parce qu'on y surprend à merveille ce que j'ai appelé les échanges entre la structure et l'événement ; ce procès se présente comme un

concours de deux facteurs distincts : un facteur d'expansion et, à la limite, de surcharge ; en effet, le mot, en vertu du procès cumulatif que je disais, tend à se charger de nouvelles valeurs d'emploi ; mais la projection de ce procès cumulatif dans le système des signes implique que la nouvelle signification trouve sa place à l'intérieur du système ; l'expansion, et éventuellement la surcharge, est arrêtée par la limitation mutuelle des signes à l'intérieur du système. On peut parler en ce sens d'une action limitative du champ, opposée à la tendance à l'expansion, qui résulte du procès cumulatif du mot. Ainsi s'explique ce qu'on pourrait appeler une polysémie réglée, qui est la loi de notre langage. Les mots ont plus d'un sens, mais n'ont pas un sens infini.

> Yet, what I call here projection is only a case of the return of the occurrence to the system. It's the more interesting and maybe more fundamental case, if it's true, as one has said about it, that polysemy is the pivot of the semantic. It is more interesting, because one has discovered in it wonderfully what I have called the exchanges between the structure and the occurrence. This process presents itself as a competition of two distinct factors: a factor of expansion and, at the worst, of overloading. In effect, the word by virtue of the cumulative process that I have been discussing, tends to overload itself with new values from use; but the projection of this cumulative process in the system of the signs implies that the new signification finds its place in the interior of the system. The expansion, and eventually the overload, is stopped by the mutual limitation of the signs within the interior of the system. One can speak in this sense about a limiting action of the field, opposed to the tendency towards expansion, which results from the cumulative process of the word. In this way what one could call a ruled polysemy is explained, which is the law of our language. The words have more than one meaning, but not infinite meaning.

(p.112-13) Ricoeur, 'La Structure; le Mot; l'Evénement', 86-87 – La hiérarchie des niveaux du langage comporte encore autre chose qu'une suit de systèmes articulés : phonologique, lexical, syntaxique. On change véritablement de niveau quand on passe des unités de langue à l'unité nouvelle que constitue la phrase ou l'énoncé. Cette unité n'est plus de langue, mais de parole ou de discours.

> The hierarchy of the levels of the language contains still something other than a suite of articulated systems: phonological, lexical, syntactic. One truly changes levels when one passes from unites of language to a new unite that constitutes the phrase or the sentence. This is no longer a unit of grammar, but of speech and discourse.

(p.113) Ricoeur, 'La Fonction Herméneutique de la Distanciation', 103 – Si le « signe » (phonologique et lexical) est l'unité de base de la langue, la « phrase » est l'unité de base du discours.

> If the 'sign' (phonological and lexical) is the base unit of language, the 'phrase' is the base unit of discourse.

(p.122) Ricoeur, *Temps et Récit*, Vol. 1, 87-89 – Quelle que puisse être la force d'innovation de la composition poétique dans le champ de notre expérience temporelle, la composition de l'intrigue est enracinée dans une pré-compréhension du monde de l'action : de ses structures intelligibles, de ses ressources symboliques et de son caractère temporel. Ces traits sont plutôt décrits que déduits. En ce sens, rien n'exige que leur liste soit close. Toutefois, leur énumération suit une progression aisée à établir. D'abord, s'il est vrai que l'intrigue est une imitation d'action, une compétence préalable est requise : la capacite d'identifier l'action en général par ses traits structurels ; une sémantique de l'action explicite cette première compétence. … tout récit présuppose de la part du narrateur et de son auditoire une familiarité avec des termes tels qu'agent, but, moyen, circonstance, secours, hostilité, coopération, conflit, succès, échec, etc. En ce sens, la phrase narrative minimale est une

phrase d'action de la forme X fait A dans telles ou telles circonstances et en tenant compte du fait que Y fait B dans des circonstances identiques ou différentes. Les récits ont finalement pour thème agir et souffrir.

> Whatever might be able to be the power of innovation of poetic composition in the field of our temporal experience, the composition of the plot is rooted in a pre-comprehension of the world of action: of its intelligible structures, of its symbolic resources, and of its temporal character. These traits are better described than deduced. In this sense, nothing requires that their list be closed. However, their enumeration follows an easily established progression. First, if it is true that the plot is an imitation of action, a prior competence is required: the capacity to identify action in general by its structural traits; a semantics of action makes explicit this first competence.

Chapter 4

(p.149) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 336 (6.1140b.1-7) – οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ τέχνη· ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ᾽ ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος· τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά.

> Prudence (φρόνησις) would not be invariable-knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), nor technical-knowledge (τέχνη). On the one hand, it is not invariable-knowledge, because the actional (τὸ πρακτὸν) allows alternatives. On the other hand, it is not technical-knowledge, because the nature of action (πράξεως) is also different from production (ποιήσεως). Further the aim of production is different and wouldn't be that of action. For good-acting itself is the end. Therefore, it remains that it [phronesis] is a *habitus*

(ἕξιν) true, rational (μετὰ λόγου), and action-oriented (πρακτικὴν) concerning the things good and bad for human beings.

(p.153) Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación*, 57 – En los primeros siglos de la Iglesia, lo que ahora llamamos teología estuvo estrechamente ligado a la vida espiritual.

In the first centuries of the Church, what we now call theology was tightly connected with the spiritual life.

(p.153) Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación*, 59 – Es en este sentido que san Pablo nos dirá que la fe opera por la caridad: el amor es el sustento y la plenitud de la fe, de la entrega al otro e, inseparablemente, a los otros. Ese es el fundamento de la praxis del cristiano, de su presencia activa en la historia. Para la Biblia la fe es la respuesta human total a Dios que salva por amor. En esta perspectiva, la inteligencia de la fe aparece como la inteligencia no de la simple afirmación – y casi recitación – de verdades, sino de un compromiso, de una actitud global, de una postura ante la vida.

It is in this sense that St Paul told us that faith works through love: love is the support and abundance of faith, of the dedication to the other and, inseparably, to the others. This is the foundation of the *praxis* of the Christian, of their active presence in history. For the Bible faith is the total human response to God who saves by love. In this perspective, the intelligence of faith appears as the intelligence not of the simple affirmation – and almost recitation – of truths, but of a commitment, of a complete attitude, and of a posture before life.

(p.166) Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, §432 (p.135-135e) - 432. Jedes Zeichen scheint allein tot. Was gibt ihm Leben? – Im Gebrauch lebt es. Hat es da den lebenden Atem in sich? – Oder ist der Gebrauch sein Atem?

432. Every sign alone seems dead. What gives it life? – In use it lives. Does it have there the living breath within it? – Or is the use its breath?

Chapter 5

(p.183) Gutiérrez, *La Densidad del Presente*, 62-63 – El lenguaje sobre Dios se inspira en el mensaje cristiano, pero también – e indisolublemente – en el mundo como un hecho de vida. … No hay teología que no tenga su dejo propio para hablar de Dios. Un sabor, un gusto especial, que es lo que la palabra "dejo" significa también. Las diferencias en ese hablar deben ser respectadas. No uniformidad impuesta, pero sí fidelidad al mensaje evangélico y entendimiento en la diversidad. … Pariendo de la densidad de la vida humana, un lenguaje anclado en un mundo cultural determinado debe saber narrar la experiencia de Jesús y de quienes acogido su testimonio. … La Biblia está formada por narraciones de tipo muy diverso. … Dios, más concretamente la humanidad de Dios, Jesús, se hace presente a aquellos que lo acogen en sus vidas a través de relatos. La palabra sobre él debe, por consiguiente, llevar esa impronta narrativa. El célebre texto de Blas Pascal que contrapone "el Dios de Abrahán, de Isaac, de Jacob y de Jesucristo" al "Dios de los filósofos" es precisamente el contraste del Dios de la narración con el Dios del concepto y la abstracción.

> Language about God is inspired by the Christian message, but also – and inseparably – by the world as a fact of life. … There is no theology that does not have its own taste/accent for talking of God. A flavour, a special taste, that is what the word "taste" also means. The difference in this talking must be respected. No imposed uniformity, but indeed faithfulness to the gospel message and understanding in the diversity. … Originating from the density of human life, a language anchored in a determined cultural world must know how to narrate the experience of Jesus and of those who have welcomed his testimony. … The Bible is formed by narrations of very diverse types. More by stories than by a story. … God, more concretely the humanity of God, Jesus, makes himself present to those who welcome him into their lives through those stories. The word about him must, consequently, take on this narrative character. The

famous text of Blaise Pascal that sets "The God of Abraham, of Isaac, of Jacob and of Jesus Christ" against the "God of the philosophers" is precisely the contrast between the God of narration and the God of concept and abstraction.

(pp.186-87) Gutiérrez, *La Densidad del Presente*, 62-63 – En los primeros tiempos del cristianismo, la teología se limitaba a una meditación sobre la Biblia orientada – como debe ser el caso de toda teología – a enriquecer la vida cotidiana del creyente, la practica cristiana. El lenguaje teólogo se presentaba así como una sabiduría, una vez más en el sentido bíblico del termino: un saber que no ha perdido su vínculo con el sabor, un saber gustoso.

In the early period of Christianity, theology was limited to a meditation on the Bible oriented – as should be the case for all theology – towards enriching the daily life of the believer, Christian practice. Theological language was presented in this way as a wisdom, once more in biblical terminology: a knowing that did not lose its connection with taste, a tasty taste.

(p.186) Gutiérrez, *El Dios de la Vida*, 15 – Como se sabe, el conocimiento en la Biblia es una noción muy rica que no se limita al campo intelectual, tiene también una connotación de gusto y simpatía, de amor. Se trata de un conocimiento inmediato y profundo, al que no escapa ninguna dimensión de la persona conocida y amada.

As it is known, knowledge in the Bible is a very rich notion that is not limited to the intellectual field, it has also a connotation of affinity and affection, of love. It is treated as a knowledge immediate and profound, in which no dimension of the known and loved person escapes.

(p.186) Gutiérrez, *El Dios de la Vida*, 16 – precisamente porque la Biblia es en gran parte la expresión de la fe y la esperanza de los pobres, y sobre todo porque ella nos revela un Dios que ama preferencialmente a los postergados, el último acercamiento anotado encuentra un amplio y fecundo fundamento bíblico.

> Precisely because the Bible is in great part the expression of the faith and the hope of the poor, and above all because it reveals to us a God who loves the poor preferentially, the ultimate act of coming close written down finds a full and deep biblical foundation.

(p.191) Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación*, 419 – La teología de la liberación que busca partir del compromiso por abolir la actual situación de injusticia y por construir una sociedad nueva, debe ser verificada por la práctica de ese compromiso; por la participación activa y eficaz en la lucha que las clases sociales explotadas han emprendido contra sus opresores. La liberación de toda forma de explotación, la posibilidad de una vida más humana y más digna, la creación de una humanidad nueva, pasan por esa lucha.

> A theology of liberation, which seeks to depart from a commitment to abolishing the present situation of injustice and to constructing a new society, ought to be verified by the practice of that commitment, by the active and effective participation in the fight that the exploited social classes have begun against their oppressors. The liberation from every form of exploitation, the possibility of a life more human and more dignified, the creation of a new humanity advance by that fight.

(pp.196-97) Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación*, 419-20 – Lo único realmente nuevo es acoger día a día el don del Espíritu que nos hace amar en nuestras opciones concretas por construir una verdadera fraternidad humana, en nuestras iniciativas históricas por subvertir un orden de injusticia, con la plenitud con que Cristo nos amó. Parafraseando el conocido texto de Pascal, podemos decir que todas las teologías políticas, de la esperanza, de la revolución, de la liberación, no valen un gesto auténtico de solidaridad con las clases sociales expoliadas. No valen un acto de fe, de caridad y de esperanza comprometido –de una manera u otra– en una participación activa por liberar al ser humano de todo lo que lo deshumaniza y le impide vivir según la voluntad del Padre.

> The only truly new thing is receiving day by day the gift of the Spirit who makes us love in our concrete choices by constructing a true human brotherhood, in our historical initiatives by subverting an order of injustice, with the fullness with which Christ loves us. Paraphrasing the well-known text of Pascal, we can say that all political theologies, of hope, of revolution, of liberation, are not worth one authentic gesture of solidarity with the exploited social classes. They are not worth one act of faith, of love, and of hope committed – in one way or another – in an active participation towards freeing the human being from everything that dehumanises and impedes them from living the will of the Father.

(p.203) Gutiérrez, *La Densidad del Presente*, 68-69 – La teología debe proteger las categorías del relato y el recuerdo si desea mantenerse fiel a sus fuentes y cumplir una función liberadora de todo aquello que no permite al ser humano hacer respetar su dignidad y desplegar todas sus posibilidades. Instintivamente lo hace el pueblo pobre cuando a través de relatos y leyendas … retoma los grandes temas humanos y cristianos, expresando a través de ellos su fe en el Dios liberador.

> Theology must protect the categories of story and memory if it desires to remain faithful to its sources y fulfil a liberating function from all that does not allow a human being to have their dignity respected and to display all their possibilities. Instinctively, poor people enact this when through stories and legends … they take up anew the great human and Christian themes, expressing through them their faith in the liberating God.

Chapter 6

(p.210) Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación*, 293 – La muerte y la resurrección de Jesús son nuestro futuro, porque son nuestro presente riesgoso y esperanzado. La esperanza que

vence la muerte debe echar sus raíces en el corazón de la praxis histórica; si no toma cuerpo en el presente para llevarlo más adelante, no será sino una evasión, un futurismo.

> The death and resurrection of Jesus are our future, because they are our present risk and hope. The hope that conquers death should sink its roots into the heart of historical practice; if it does not take a body in the present in order to bring it closer, it will not be anything but an evasion, a futurism.

(pp.211-12) I Corinthians 13.1-3 – Ἐὰν ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαλῶ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, γέγονα χαλκὸς ἠχῶν ἢ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον. καὶ ἐὰν ἔχω προφητείαν καὶ εἰδῶ τὰ μυστήρια πάντα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γνῶσιν καὶ ἐὰν ἔχω πᾶσαν τὴν πίστιν ὥστε ὄρη μεθιστάναι, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, οὐθέν εἰμι. κἂν ψωμίσω πάντα τὰ ὑπάρχοντά μου καὶ ἐὰν παραδῶ τὸ σῶμά μου ἵνα καυχήσωμαι, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι.

> If I speak in human – even angelic – tongues but don't have love, I truly become a clanging brass object or clashing symbol. And if have prophecy and know all the mysteries and all the knowledge, and if I have all the faith to move mountains but don't have love, I am nothing. Even if I donate all my possessions and if I give up my body in order to boast but don't have love, I gain nothing.

(pp.212-13) I Corinthians 13.1-3 – Ἡ ἀγάπη οὐδέποτε πίπτει· εἴτε δὲ προφητεῖαι, καταργηθήσονται· εἴτε γλῶσσαι, παύσονται· εἴτε γνῶσις, καταργηθήσεται. ἐκ μέρους γὰρ γινώσκομεν καὶ ἐκ μέρους προφητεύομεν· ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ τὸ τέλειον, τὸ ἐκ μέρους καταργηθήσεται. ὅτε ἤμην νήπιος, ἐλάλουν ὡς νήπιος, ἐφρόνουν ὡς νήπιος, ἐλογιζόμην ὡς νήπιος· ὅτε γέγονα ἀνήρ, κατήργηκα τὰ τοῦ νηπίου. βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον· ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην. Νυνὶ δὲ μένει πίστις, ἐλπίς, ἀγάπη, τὰ τρία ταῦτα· μείζων δὲ τούτων ἡ ἀγάπη.

> Love never fails. But if there are prophecies, they will be made useless; or if there are tongues, they will be stopped; or if there is knowledge, it will be made useless. For we know partially, and we prophesy partially. But whenever the perfect [τέλειον] comes, the partial will be made useless. When I was a child, I was speaking like a child, I was relating phronetically [ἐφρόνουν] as a child, I was reasoning as a child. When I truly become a man, I truly make the childish ways useless. For we see now through a mirror with confusion [αἰνίγματι], but then we will see face to face. Now we know partially, but then we will know just as also we are known. So now faith, hope, love – these three things – endure, but the greatest of these is love.

(p.216) Gutiérrez, *El Dios de la Vida*, 172 – Ser limpio de corazón es no tener «doble alma», no ser hipócrita. En quechua hipócrita se dice precisamente persona de dos corazones (iskay sonkko), se trata de quien pretende vivir simultáneamente dos amores que, por su globalidad y radicalidad, se excluyen el uno al otro. Ser discípulo del Señor es ser coherente como el Maestro. Por eso el limpio de corazón, la persona íntegra, verá a Dios «Cara a cara», como diría Pablo (1 Cor 13,12); esa promesa es la causa de la alegría de los seguidores de Jesús.

> To be pure in heart is not to have a "double soul", to not be a hypocrite. In Quechua hypocrite is translated precisely a person of two hearts (iskay sonkko). It is used of someone who tries to live simultaneously two loves that, because of its globality and radicality, the one or the other is excluded. To be a disciple of the Lord is to be coherent like the Master. Because of this, the pure of heart, the person with integrity, will see God "face to face", as Paul would say (1 Cor 13.12); that promise is the cause of the happiness of the followers of Jesus.

(p.228) Balthasar, *Theologik, Vol. 1*, 57 – Die Vereinigung [des Subjekts und Objekts] selbst ist ein Drittes, Neues, in welchen der Sinn der Anlagen sich erst wahrhaft enthüllt. Das

Subjekt ist bereit, in seinem Raum den Gegenstand zu empfangen; was sich aber in diesem Empfang ergeben wird, ist im voraus nicht zu berechnen. Ebenso ist das Objekt bereit, sich in dem zur Verfügung stehenden Raum zu offenbaren; was für eine Entfaltung es aber dabei erfahren wird, ist an ihm selber nicht zu erraten und abzulesen.

> The union [of subject and object] itself is a third, new thing, in which the meaning of the designs first truly reveals itself. The subject is ready, in its space to welcome the object; yet, what will produce itself in this welcoming is not for calculating in advance. Similarly, the object is ready to reveal itself in the space standing available; yet, what in terms of a development it will experience in the process is not for guessing and reading by the [object] itself.

(pp.228-29) Balthasar, *Theologik, Vol. 1*, 76 – Nur vom Subjekt kann das Objekt seinen abschließenden Sinn erfahren, der sich ja erst im überlegenen geistigen Raum des Subjekts vollendet. Im schöpferischen Spiegel des Subjekts wird ihm das Bild dessen entgegengehalten, was es ist, was es sein kann und sein soll. Diese schöpferische Tat des Subjekts hat mit einer bloßen Haltung der Gerechtigkeit nichts mehr gemeinsam, sie ist vielmehr eine vom Objekt nicht erzwingbare Tat der Liebe.

> Only from the subject can the object learn its finalised meaning, which only completes itself in the superior/reflective mental space of the subject. In the creative mirror of the subject the image is held up before it to this, what it is, what it can be and should be. The creative act of the subject has not so much in common with a bare attitude of [doing] justice [to the object]. It is much more an act of *love* which cannot be forced by the object.

(p.229) Balthasar, *Theologik, Vol. 1*, 76 – ist mehr al sein bloßer Abklatsch der nackten Faktizität des Objects.

> is more than a bare rip off copy of the naked facticity of the object.

(p.230) Balthasar, *Theologik, Vol. 1*, 76-77 – Auch wenn das Subjekt in seiner Erkenntnis sich möglichster Objektivität befleißt, so ist doch gerade diese Anstrengung, in der es dem Objekt zu seiner Wahrheit verhilft, etwas, was über die Gerechtigkeit hinausliegt und seine Wurzel in einer naturhaften Liebe besitzt.

> Even when the subject attends itself as diligently as possible to objectivity in its knowledge, in this way indeed just this effort, in which it helps the object to its truth, is something which transcends beyond doing justice and sets its roots in a natural love.

(p.230) Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación*, 270 – Prójimo … no es aquel que yo encuentro en mi camino, sino aquel en cuyo camino yo me pongo. Aquel a quien yo me acerco y busco activamente. Los demás aspectos de la vida cristiana cobran significación si están animados por la caridad, de otro modo son simplemente, como dice Pablo, actos vacíos (cf. 1 Cor. 13).

> A neighbour … is not that person who I find in my way, but that person in whose way I put myself. That person whom I get close to and actively search for. The other aspects of the Christian life take meaning if they are animated by love, any other way they are simply, as Paul says, empty acts.

(pp.231-32) Balthasar, *Theologik, Vol. 1*, 77-78 – Die schöpferische Seite der menschlichen Erkenntnis ist somit eine analoge Teilnahme des Geschöpfes an der schöpferischen Zumessung der Wahrheit durch die urbildliche, produktive Erkenntnis Gottes. Sie zieht das zu Erkennende irgendwie gnadenvoll in die eigene Sphäre des Geistes empor, um ihm hier die Möglichkeit zu geben, sich aus der Kraft und im Licht des Subjekts zu entfalten, bevor es in seiner Objektivität zum Gegenstand der Erkenntnis werden soll. Und auch noch seine Objektivität, an der das Subjekt selbst mitgearbeitet hat, wird in der vollen Erkenntnis des Objekts unversehens vollendet und emporgesteigert zu jenem wahren Maß und Bild des

Objekts, wie nur die Liebe es erfindend erschauen kann. Der schöpferische Blick der Liebe allein vermag dem Gegenstand jenes Maß anzumessen und jenen Spiegel entgegenzuhalten, der seine endgültige und daher objektive Wahrheit enthält, weil auch der Blick, mit dem Gott seine Geschöpfe betrachtet, nicht der richtende Blick der Gerechtigkeit, sondern der Liebesblick der Barmherzigkeit ist.

> The creative side of human knowledge is, therefore, an analogous participation of creation in the creative apportioning of the truth through the archetypal, productive knowledge of God. Somehow in a grace-filled way, it [knowledge] draws what is to be known into its own sphere of cognition, in order to give it here the possibility to unfold itself from the power and in the light of the subject, before it in its objectivity has to become the target of knowledge. But still also its objectivity, on which the subject has itself collaborated, becomes in the full knowledge of the object suddenly complete and ascended to that true measure and image of the object, as only the love can inventing see it. The creative vision of love alone is able to measure the target with that measure and to hold it up before that mirror, which its definitive and therefore objective truth holds up, because also the vision, with which God views his creation, is not the judging vision of justice but the love-vision of compassion.

(p.233) Balthasar, *Theologik, Vol. 1*, 75 – Ein Subjekt ist … weit entfernt, eine bloße "leere Tafel" zu sein, auf der man nach Belieben einschreiben kann, was einem einfällt. … Jeder Eindruck, den man in ihm hinterläßt, kann unabsehbare Folgen in sein inneres persönliches Leben hinein haben….

> A subject is very far from being a mere "blank slate", on which one can inscribe what crosses their mind whenever they want. … Each impression, which one leaves behind on [the subject], can have incalculable effects inside their inner personal life….

Chapter 7

(p.243) Gutiérrez, *La Densidad del Presente*, 65 – se mostraron indiferentes ante el sufrimiento de un desconocido.

They showed themselves indifferent before suffering of an unknown person.

(p.244) Gutiérrez, *La Densidad del Presente*, 66-67 – Jesús fue un narrador. … Jesús es el narrador narrado. … La narración incorpora dentro de ella al oyente. Cuenta una experiencia y la convierte en experiencia de aquellos que la escuchan. Lo propio del relato es la invitación, no la obligación; su terreno es la libertad, no el mandato. Una teología que ponga en él sus pies, que sepa narrar la fe, será una teología humilde y respaldada en el compromiso personal. Una teología que propone y que no pretende imponer, que escucha antes de hablar.

> Jesus was a storyteller. … Jesus is the storyteller storied. … Narration incorporates the hearer inside of it. It recounts an experience and converts it into the experience of those who listen to it. The nature of story is the invitation, not the obligation; its terrain is freedom, not command. A theology that puts in feet in it, that knows how to narrate the faith, will be a theology humble and supported in personal commitment. A theology that proposes and does not try to impose, that hears before speaking.

(p.246) Gutiérrez, *La Densidad del Presente*, 66 – Después de todo, ¿qué es una vida humana sino un relato que desemboca permanente e inquietantemente en otro? Contar es el modo propio de hablar de Dios. … Es el lenguaje justo y apropiado para decir Dios….

> After everything, what is a human life but a story that permanently and troublingly results in another? Telling a story is the proper mode for speaking of God. … It is the right and appropriate language to say God.

(pp.247-48) Bourdieu, MP, 280-81 – Quel jeu plus vital, plus total, que la lutte symbolique de tous contre tous qui a pour enjeu le pouvoir de nomination ou, si l'on préfère, de catégorisation, où chacun met en jeu son être, sa valeur, l'idée qu'il a de lui-même ? On

objectera que rien n'oblige à entrer dans la course, qu'il faut se prêter au jeu pour avoir des chances d'y être pris.

> What game is more vital, more total, than the symbolic struggle of all against all which has for stakes the power of nomination or, if one prefers, of categorisation, where everyone puts in the game their being, their value, the idea that they have of themself? One will object that nothing forces entering into the contest, that it is necessary to go along with the game to have changes of being put there.

(p.248) Bourdieu, MP, 281 – Mais … il ne s'agit pas de faire croire que l'on puisse échapper aux jeux qui ont pour enjeu la vie et la mort symboliques.

> But … it is not a question of making believe that one is able to escape the games which have for stakes symbolic life and death.

(p.248) Bourdieu, MP, 281-82 – Le monde social est essentialiste, et l'on a d'autant moins de chances d'échapper à la manipulation des aspirations et des espérances subjectives que l'on est plus démuni symboliquement, moins consacré ou plus stigmatisé, donc plus mal placé dans la concurrence pour « l'estime des hommes », comme dit Pascal, et voué à l'incertitude sur son être social, présent et à venir, qui est à la mesure du pouvoir ou de l'impuissance. Avec l'investissement dans un jeu et la reconnaissance que peut apporter la compétition coopérative avec les autres, le monde social offre aux humains ce dont ils sont le plus totalement dépourvus : une justification d'exister.

> The social world is essentialist, and one has equally poor chances of escaping the manipulation of the subjective aspirations and hopes the more one is symbolically penniless, less consecrated or more stigmatised, therefore more ill-placed in the competition for 'the esteem of men', as Pascal said, and destined to the incertitude surrounding their social being, present and future, which is connected to the measure of power or weakness. With the investment in the game and the recognition that the

> co-operative competition with the others can bring, the social world offers to human beings that of which they are the most totally deprived: a justification of existing.

(p.249) Bourdieu, MP, 282-83 – Or, comme Pascal le suggère, dans cette recherche de justifications d'exister, ce qu'il appelle « le monde », ou « la société », est la seule instance capable de concurrencer le recours à Dieu. On comprend, armé de cette équivalence, que ce que Pascal décrit comme « misère de l'homme sans Dieu », c'est-à-dire sans raison d'être, soit sociologiquement attesté sous la forme de la misère proprement métaphysique des hommes et des femmes sans raison d'être sociale, abandonnés à l'insignifiance d'une existence sans nécessité, laissée à son absurdité. Et l'on comprend aussi, a contrario, le pouvoir quasi divin d'arracher à la contingence et à la gratuité que détient, qu'on le veuille ou non, le monde social, et qui s'exerce par l'intermédiaire notamment de l'institution étatique : en tant que banque centrale du capital symbolique, l'État est en mesure de décerner cette forme de capital dont la particularité est d'enfermer en elle-même sa propre justification.

> Now, as Pascal suggested, in this search for a justification of existing, what he calls 'the world', or 'the society', is the only instance capable of competing with the recourse to God. One understands, armed with this equivalence, that what Pascal describes as the 'misery of the man without God', that is to say, without a reason of being, would be sociologically attested under the form of the properly metaphysical misery of men and women without a reason of social being, abandoned to the insignificance of an existence without necessity, left to its absurdity. And one understands as well, on the contrary, the quasi-diving power of removing the contingence and unrestraint that the social world possesses, whether one wants it or not, and which is exercised by the notable intermediate of the state institution: as the central bank of symbolic capital, the State is in the position to award this form of capital whose particularity is containing in its self its own justification.

(p.250) Pascal, *Pensées*, 398 – Qu'on en fasse l'épreuve: qu'on laisse un roi tout seul, sans aucune satisfaction des sens, sans aucun soin dans l'esprit, sans compagnie, penser à lui tout à loisir; et l'on verra qu'un roi sans divertissement est un homme plein de misères. Aussi on évite cela soigneusement, et il ne manque jamais d'y avoir auprès des personnes des rois un grand nombre de gens qui veillent à faire succéder le divertissement à leurs affaires, et qui observent tout le temps de leur loisir pour leur fournir des plaisirs et des jeux, en sorte qu'il n'y ait point de vide; c'est-à-dire qu'ils sont environnés de personnes qui ont un soin merveilleux de prendre garde que le roi ne soit seul et en état de penser à soi, sachant bien qu'il sera misérable, tout roi qu'il est, s'il y pense.

> Let someone want to make a proof of it: let someone leave a king totally alone, without any satisfaction of the senses, without any task on the mind, without company, to think to himself completely at leisure; and one will see that a king without distraction is a man full of miseries. One also carefully avoids that, and he never misses having there nearby the persons of the kings a grand number of people who watch closely to provide distraction to their affairs, and who observe all the time of their leisure in order to furnish them with pleasures and games, whenever there might be any empty moment; that is to say that they are surrounded by people who have one marvellous task of taking care that the king is not alone and in a state of thinking to himself, knowing well that he will be miserable, completely king though he is, if he thinks about it.

(p.252) Bourdieu, MP, 288 – Les rites d'institution donnent une image grossie, particulièrement visible, de l'effet de l'institution, être arbitraire qui a le pouvoir d'arracher à l'arbitraire, de conférer la raison d'être entre les raisons d'être, celle que constitue l'affirmation qu'un être contingent, vulnérable à la maladie, à l'infirmité et à la mort, est digne de la dignité transcendante et immortelle, comme l'ordre social, qui lui est impartie. Et

les actes de nomination … conduisent, au terme d'une sorte de régression à l'infini, jusqu'à cette sorte de réalisation de Dieu sur la terre qu'est l'État qui garantit, en dernier ressort, la série infinie des actes d'autorité certifiant par délégation la validité des certificats d'existence légitime (comme malade, invalide, agrégé ou curé). Et la sociologie s'achève ainsi dans une sorte de théologie de la dernière instance : investi … d'un pouvoir absolu de véridiction et d'une perception créatrice, l'État, pareil à *l'intuitus originarius* divin selon Kant, fait exister en nommant, et en distinguant. Durkheim, on le voit, n'était pas aussi naïf qu'on veut le faire croire lorsqu'il disait … que « la société, c'est Dieu ».

> The rites of institution give a magnified image, particularly visible, of the effect of the institution, an arbitrary being which has the power to remove the arbitrary, to confer the reason of being among the reasons of being, that which constitutes the affirmation that a contingent being, vulnerable to disease, to disability, and to death, is worthy of transcendent and immortal value, like the social order, which is imparted to them. And the acts of nomination … lead, at the end of a sort of regression to infinity, to this sort of realisation of God on earth that is the State, who guarantees, as a last resort, the infinite series of the acts of authority certifying by delegation the validity of the certificates of legitimate existence (as sick, disabled, agrégé [educational title] or priest). And sociology ends in this way in a sort of theology of the last instance: invested … with an absolute power of veridiction and creative perception, the State, similar to the divine *intuitus originarius* according to Kant, causes existing by naming, and by distinguishing. Durkheim, one sees, was not as naïve as one wants to make believe when he said … that 'society, this is God'.

(p.258) Chrysostom, *Homily 7*, 59-60 (p.116) – Μορφὴ γὰρ θεοῦ, φησὶ, μορφὴν δούλου ἔλαβεν. Ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ δούλου ἐνέργεια δούλου ἐστὶν, ἢ φύσις δούλου; Πάντως δήπου φύσις δούλου. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ θεοῦ, θεοῦ φύσις·

> For the form of God, it says, took the form of a slave. Is the form of the slave the activity of a slave or the nature of a slave? Definitely it is the nature of a slave. Then surely, the form of God is the nature of God.

(p.259) Chrysostom, Homily 8, 73 (p.142) – Διὸ τοῦτο οὐκ εἶπεν, οὐχ ἡρπασεν, ἀλλ', «οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγὴσατο.» Οὐχ ἁρπασας εἶχε τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἀλλὰ φυσικὴν, οὐ δεδομένην, καὶ μόνιμον καὶ ἀσφαλῆ. Διὸ οὐ παραιτεῖται καὶ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἀναλαβεῖν σχῆμα.

> Therefore, this does not say, 'he did not seize,' but rather 'He did not consider the seizing.' Not by seizing was he holding the rule, rather the rule was on the basis of nature, not given, both stable and secure. Therefore he did not avoid even taking up the form of the attendants.

(p.260) Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación*, 386 – La encarnación es un acto de amor.

> The incarnation is an act of love.

(p.260) Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación*, 271 – Amándonos como uno de nosotros, Cristo nos revela el amor del Padre. La caridad, amor de Dios por los hombres y mujeres, se da encarnada en el amor humano que liga a las personas entre ellas y lo lleva a su plenitud.

> Loving us as one of us, Christ reveals to us the love of the Father. The love, love of God for men and women, gives itself incarnated in the human love that binds persons with one another, and takes it to its fullness.

(pp.260-61) Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación*, 386 – El hecho de asumir la condición servil y pecadora de la humanidad, anunciada por el segundo Isaías, es presentado por san Pablo como un gesto de empobrecimiento voluntario: 'Conocen bien la generosidad de nuestro Señor Jesucristo, el cual, siendo rico, por ustedes se hizo pobre a fin de que se enriquecieran con su pobreza' (2 Cor. 8, 9). Es el aniquilamiento, la *kenosis* de Cristo (Flp. 2, 6-11). Pero la condición pecadora, y sus consecuencias, no es asumida, evidentemente, para idealizarla, sino por amor y solidaridad con quienes la padecen y para redimirlos del pecado,

para enriquecerlos con su pobreza, para luchar contra el egoísmo humano, contra todo lo que divide a las personas, contra lo que hace que haya ricos y pobres, propietarios y no propietarios, opresores y oprimidos. La pobreza es un acto de amor y de liberación.

> The act of assuming the servile and sinful condition of humanity … is presented by St Paul as a gesture of voluntary impoverishment: "You know well the generosity of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, though being rich, for you made himself poor so that you might be enriched with his poverty (2 Corinthians 8.9)." It is the annihilation, the *kenosis* of Christ (Phil. 2.6-11). But the sinful condition, and its consequences is not assumed, evidently, in order to glamourise it, but out of love and solidarity with the humans who suffer it and in order to redeem them from sin, in order to enrich them with his poverty, in order to struggle against human selfishness, against all that divides humans, against what causes there to be rich and poor, owners and not-owners, oppressors and oppressed. Poverty is an act of love and of liberation.

(p.261) Gutiérrez, *El Dios de la Vida*, 121 – La Palabra encarnada nos da la vida que hay en ella, nos comunica su plenitud haciéndonos hijas e hijos de su Padre, «la gracia y la verdad nos han llegado por Jesucristo» ([Juan 1] v. 17).

> The incarnated Word gives us the life that there is in it, He communicates to us his fulness making us daughters and sons of His Father, 'Grace and truth have reached us by Jesus Christ ([John 1] v.17).

(p.263) Gutiérrez, *Teología de la Liberación*, 386-87 – Si la causa última de la explotación y alienación del ser humano es el egoísmo, la razón profunda de la pobreza voluntaria es el amor al prójimo. La pobreza cristiana no puede, entonces, tener sentido sino como un compromiso de solidaridad con los pobres, con aquellos que sufren miseria e injusticia, a fin de testimoniar del mal que éstas –fruto del pecado, ruptura de comunión– representan.

If the ultimate cause of the exploitation and alienation of humanity is selfishness, the profound reason of voluntary poverty is the love of the neighbour. Christian poverty cannot, then, make sense but as a commitment of solidarity with the poor, with those who suffer misery and injustice, for the purpose of testifying against the evil that these – the fruit of sin, rupture of communion – represent.

(p.265) Genesis 3.5b – וְהְיִיתֶם כֵּאלֹהִים יֹדְעֵי טֹוב וָרָע

And you will be like God, knowing good and evil.

(p.269) Chrysostom, *Homily 7*, 58 (p.113) – προτρέπων αὐτοὺς εἰς ταπεινοφροσύνην, τὸν Χριστὸν εἰς μέσον παρήγαγε· καὶ οὐκ ἐνταῦθα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτε περὶ φιλοπτωχίας διαλέγεται, οὕτω πώς φησι· «Γινώσκετε γὰρ τὴν χάριν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὅτι δι᾽ ἡμᾶς ἐπτώχευσε πλούσιος ὤν.»

Encouraging them towards phronetic humility, he brings Christ into the centre. And not here only, but also when he discusses about love for the poor, thus how he says ‘For you know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that because of us he became poor though being rich.

(p.269) Chrysostom, *Homily 7*, 58 (p.113) – πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐργασίαν.

For the purpose of the activity of good works.

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