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Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently.

Abstract:

Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset. The valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. The authors characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such...

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Journal:
Econometrica
Volume:
55
Publication date:
1987-01-01
URN:
uuid:6c516d05-6022-4b16-90e7-b0c4b17d5630
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10428
Language:
English

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