

## Alexander Morrison

### *Military-Popular Administration and its discontents in Tsarist Central Asia*

VOENNO-NARODNOE UPRAVLENIE:  
*Subordination of the administrative structure of some  
parts of the Caucasus and Turkestan, inhabited by  
uncultured peoples, to the War Ministry*<sup>1</sup>.

In 1884 «The Eastern Review» (*Vostochnoe Obozrenie*), the liberal mouthpiece of the Siberian Regionalists (*Oblastniki*)<sup>2</sup>, published an anonymous article entitled *Voenna-narodnoe upravlenie in the Turkestan region*, which would subsequently make its way into *The Turkestan Collection* (*Turkestanskii Sbornik*), an enormous assemblage of news cuttings, pamphlets and other ephemera gathered in the Turkestan Public Library in Tashkent on the orders of the region's first Governor-General, Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman. The article was an unusually frank and critical reflection on what can be awkwardly translated as 'Military-Popular Administration', the system of governance that had been employed in Turkestan since the Russian conquest some twenty years before. It began:

Does the Turkestan region need *voenna-narodnoe upravlenie* or not – this is the question which we want to discuss with the reader in these remarks. We propose that the question of the exchange of one form of rule for another is not trivial, but of the first importance.

The neighbouring province to ours, Semirechie, has already recognised in part the necessity of changing *voenna-narodnoe upravlenie* and is gradually replacing it with civil [*grazhdanskoe*] administration, existing on the same basis as for the whole of the Russian state.

*Voenna-narodnoe upravlenie* simplifies power through physical force, but not moral influence, along with which physical force and moral influence give reverse results: the acquisition of the latter will always be more durable than the former; this is such an old and well-worn thought that we will not dwell on it further<sup>3</sup>.

Though unsigned, the article was probably the work of P. M. Zenkov (1831-1915), the Turkestan correspondent of *Vostochnoe Obozrenie* from 1883-1900, based in Vernyi in Semirechie<sup>4</sup>. Zenkov

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<sup>1</sup> V. F. Novitskii (ed.) *Voennaia Entsiklopediia*, Vol.6, St. Petersburg, 1911-1915).

<sup>2</sup> Advocates of Siberian autonomy and of the idea that Siberia constituted a distinct civilization from that of Russia. See further Anatolyi Remnev, *Sibir' v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii*, Moscow, Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2007, pp.302-335.

<sup>3</sup> *Voenna-narodnoe upravlenie v Turkestanskom krae*, «Vostochnoe Obozrenie», 1884 No.8 in *Turkestanskii Sbornik* [hereafter *TS*], Vol.377 pp.1-2.

<sup>4</sup> Edited by Nikolai Iadrintsev, *Vostochnoe Obozrenie* was founded in St Petersburg in 1882 and moved to Irkutsk in 1888. It closed in 1906. It is also just possible that the article was by the well-known Military Topographer Mikhail Veniukov, who is known to have contributed to it in the 1880s. See S. I. Gol'dfarb, *Gazeta 'Vostochnoe Obozrenie' 1882 – 1906*, Irkutsk, Izd. Irkutskogo Gos. Universiteta, 1997, pp.126, 141; Pavel Matveevich Zenkov (1831 – 1915) was an architect from Tobolsk who together with the French architect Paul Gourdet helped lay out the first town plan of Vernyi, and became the city's first mayor when it acquired municipal governance in 1877. He was the father of A. P. Zenkov (1863 – 1936) the architect of Almaty's famous wooden cathedral. Although Gol'dfarb gives Zenkov the

went on to emphasise just how anomalous Turkestan's status was even by comparison with other 'backward', 'savage' Muslim areas of the empire, notably the Caucasus. Zenkov's critique of military rule would be echoed and repeated by others many times over the next thirty years, but to no avail: *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* would still be firmly in place when the Empire entered the First World War and its terminal crisis in 1914. This paper will seek to explain why, despite constant criticism of its inadequacy, a system of governance developed on the hoof half a century earlier in a different region of the empire continued to hold sway in Turkestan long after it had largely been abandoned elsewhere. I argue that while this has much to do with the official perception of Turkestan as a dangerous and volatile frontier region, it was also a product of the perennial Tsarist problems of under-governance, lack of funds and sheer institutional inertia.

## 1. Origins

As Zenkov noted, Russian military-popular administration had originated in the North Caucasus in the 1850s as a response to the challenge of administering areas in Chechnya, Daghestan, Kabardia and Circassia which had seen prolonged resistance to Russian rule from the local population<sup>5</sup>. The principal Tsarist-era historian of administration in the Caucasus wrote that *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* had emerged from a number of considerations – the supposedly high calibre of military officers available in the Caucasus, the need for military men in administrative roles who could quell rebellion and conflict among these unruly peoples, and the unsuitability of regular Russian administration, based upon the presence of serfdom, to the free-spirited mountaineers and their distinctive local forms of governance and law<sup>6</sup>. As Vladimir Bobrovnikov and others have shown, when Prince Bariatinskii codified military rule in these mountainous regions he also explicitly modelled it on the *Bureaux Arabes* which had been introduced in 1848 in French Algeria, which administered a supposedly wild and untameable desert interior in a manner quite distinct from the 'settled' regions along the Mediterranean coast, which had civilian governance<sup>7</sup>. It was thus from the outset conceived as a specifically colonial form of

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patronymic 'Mikhailovich' and different dates, this appears to be mistaken. See N. A. Buketova, *Vernenskie Istorii*, Almaty, Elnur, 2011, pp.10-11.

<sup>5</sup> O nekotorykh izmeneniakh v upravlenii prikaspiiskim kraem, *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii* (hereafter *PSZ*) 2nd Series, Vol.35 (1860) Pt.1 No.36026 18<sup>th</sup> July 1860, pp.916-918; Austin Jersild *Orientalism and Empire. North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier 1845 – 1917*, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 2002, pp.34-5; Timothy Blauvelt *Military-Civil Administration and Islam in the North Caucasus, 1858–83*, «Kritika», 11/2 (2010): pp.228-32; Dmitrii Vasil'ev *Bremia Imperii. Administrativnaia politika Rossii v Tsentral'noi Azii. Vtoraia polovina XIX v.*, Moscow, Politicheskaiia Entsiklopedia, 2018, p.89.

<sup>6</sup> Semen Esadze, *Istoricheskaia Zapiska ob upravlenii Kavkazom*, Tiflis, Tip. "Guttenberg", 1907, Vol.I, pp.165-9.

<sup>7</sup> Vladimir Bobrovnikov *Russkii Kavkaz i Frantsuzskii Alz'bir: sluchainoe skhodstvo ili obmen opytom kolonial'nogo stroitel'stvo in Imperium inter pares: rol' transferov v istorii Rossiiskoi Imperii 1700-1917* ed. Martin Aust, Ricarda Vulpius & Alexei Miller, Moscow, Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2010, pp.182-209; Alfred J. Rieber ed., *The Politics of Autocracy. Letters of Alexander II to Prince A. I. Bariatinskii, 1857-1864*, The Hague, Mouton, 1966, pp.68-71.

administration, analogous with that practised by the other European powers at the time, the product of what Bobrovnikov rightly calls a colonial ‘exchange of experience’, given that the British and French at times also drew on Russian colonial knowledge, such as the study of customary law (*‘adat*) in the North Caucasus<sup>8</sup>. Dmitrii Vasil’ev has shown how, alongside the Caucasian precedent, *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* as it emerged in Turkestan also drew on legal and administrative precedents from the steppe, notably Speranskii’s *Regulations for the Siberian Kirgiz* of 1822<sup>9</sup>. He identifies three main currents in the debates of the mid-1860s over how Turkestan should be administered, each represented by a different colonial proconsul. General Mikhail G. Cherniaev (1828-1898), the conqueror of Tashkent in 1865 and the first governor of the region, favoured as complete a preservation as possible of ‘local customs’, a stance originally forced on him by his pressing need to reach an agreement with Tashkent’s Islamic elites in the precarious days after the city fell, but which he later seems to have adopted as a point of principle<sup>10</sup>. His successor, General Dmitrii I. Romanovskii (1825-1881), who had extensive previous service in the Caucasus, favoured the wholesale importation of *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* from that region, while their superior, General Nikolai A. Kryzhanovskii (1818-1888), the Governor of Orenburg, favoured speedy assimilation of the region to all-imperial norms<sup>11</sup>. In the event the temporary Turkestan statute of 1867 was something of a compromise between the first two positions – borrowing North Caucasian precedents and adapting them to local conditions – while all-imperial administrative and legal norms were conspicuous by their absence<sup>12</sup>. Zenkov now argued that this seemed extreme even by comparison with the Caucasus:

*Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* of the region is something exceptional and hitherto unprecedented for Russia. The Caucasus was the theatre of incessant wars and uprisings over 60 years, and nevertheless was not considered an exclusive territory of the Minister of War, as the Caucasian Viceroy on the basis of general laws had relations with various ministries. At the same time the population of the Caucasus is also Muslim, like the population of Turkestan, the people of the Caucasus are more fanatical than the Bukharans, Sarts and Kirgiz, and apart from this the Caucasians are more warlike and energetic than the aborigines of Turkestan: they waged war more energetically than the people of Turkestan, such that one should sooner see *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* set up in the Caucasus, but not in Turkestan. Apart from Turkestan the Amur and the Kirgiz [Qazaq] steppes were also not under the exclusive authority of the War Minister at the time of their conquest. So only the Turkestan *kerai* presents itself as a pointed

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<sup>8</sup> V. O. Bobrovnikov *Musul'mane Severnogo Kavkaza. Pravo, Obychai, Nasilie*, Moscow, “Vostochnaia Literatura”, 2002, p.172.

<sup>9</sup> Ustav ob upravlenii inorodtsev, *PSZ* 1st Series Vol.38 No.29126 22 July 1822, pp.394-417.

<sup>10</sup> On this see Alexander Morrison *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia. A Study in Imperial Expansion, 1814 – 1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020, pp.250-2.

<sup>11</sup> Vasil’ev *Bremia Imperii*, p.106.

<sup>12</sup> Ob uchrezhdenii Turkestanskogo General-Gubernatorstva, *PSZ* 2<sup>nd</sup> Series Vol.42 Pt.1 (1867) No.44831 11<sup>th</sup> July 1867, pp.1150-1151. A more detailed description can be found in Konstantin P. fon-Kaufman *Proekt Vsepoddanneishogo Otcheta . . . Po Grazhdanskomu Upravleniiu i Ustroistvu v Oblastiakh Turkestanskogo General-Gubernatorstva. 7 Noiabria 1867–25 Marta 1881g*, St. Petersburg, Voennaia Tip., 1885, pp.42 - 129. For analysis see Vasil’ev *Bremia Imperii*, pp.126-153.

exception. It is indisputable that the region's existence under the aegis of armed power has had a serious influence on its future fate and development, and gives it the character of a military settlement<sup>13</sup>.

The immediate context in which Zenkov's article appeared was as part of the debate over a new governing statute for Turkestan, to replace that of 1867, drawn up when the conquest of the region was still ongoing. While in 1884 that conquest was still not complete – the final skirmishes with the Turkmen and Afghans in Transcaspia would come the following year, and the annexation of the Pamirs only in the 1890s – the administration of what were referred to as the 'core' provinces of Turkestan – Syr-Daria, Samarkand and Ferghana – was beginning to assume a more fixed and settled character. The death of the first Governor-General, Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman (1818-1882), and the appointment of Cherniaev, his arch-enemy, as his successor, had prompted the commissioning of a *revizīia* or inspection under the direction of Confidential Counsellor Fedor Karlovich Giers, which produced recommendations for a new statute in a report in 1884<sup>14</sup>. When the statute was eventually introduced in 1886 Zenkov's own province of Semirechie would be separated from Turkestan and become part of the Steppe Governor-Generalship until 1899, in part as a means of giving the province's long-serving Governor, General Gerasim A. Kolpakovskii (1819-1896), compensation for not having been chosen as the new Turkestan Governor-General on the death of von Kaufman. It was also a sign that the province was embarking on a slightly different legal trajectory from the rest of southern Central Asia because it was the only region of Turkestan to have seen significant levels of Russian settlement, and the prospects for its assimilation to the empire's 'core' were seen as correspondingly higher<sup>15</sup>. In Turkestan the new statute did see attempts at more intensive governance, such as the introduction of land tax commissions that gradually raised the amount of revenue collected in sedentary areas<sup>16</sup>. However a key recommendation of Giers's report – the rolling back of military rule – would not be followed. Giers had written that:

*Voенно-народное управление*, having outlived its time, and no longer fulfilling the current needs of the region, ought to be replaced with administration on general lines, with just a few adaptations to local circumstances [...] The business of military power is to conquer and pacify a conquered region; the

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<sup>13</sup> *Voенно-народное управление в Туркестанском Крае*, «Vostochnoe Obozrenie» 1884 No.8 in *TS*, Vol.377, pp.1-2.

<sup>14</sup> *Otchet, Revizīiushchago, po Vysochaishemu povelēniu, Turkestanskii Krai, Tainogo Sovetnika Girsa*, St. Petersburg, Senatskaia Tip., 1884; See further G. P. Fedorov, *Moia Sluzhba v Turkestanskom krae*, «Istoricheskii Vestnik», (1913) No.11, pp.438, 444-5. On the rivalry between von Kaufman and Cherniaev and the extent to which this affected the conclusions of the report see Alexander Morrison, *The Turkestan Generals and Russian Military History*, «War in History» 26, no.2 (2019): pp.153-84.

<sup>15</sup> *Polozhenie ob upravlenii Turkestanskogo Kraia*, PSZ 3rd Series Vol.6 No.3814 (12<sup>th</sup> June 1886), pp.318-46. Semirechie would be administered under a different statute: *Polozhenie ob upravlenii oblasti Akmolinskoi, Semipalatinskoi, Semirechenskoi, Ural'skoi i Turgaiskoi i ob izmenenii nekotorykh statei Polozhenii ob upravlenii Turkestanskogo kraia*, PSZ 3<sup>rd</sup> Series Vol.11, No.7574 (25<sup>th</sup> March 1891), pp.133-147, which made greater legal provision for the expropriation of land for Russian settlement: see Alexander Morrison *Russian Settler Colonialism, in The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*, ed. Lorenzo Veracini and Ed Cavanagh, Abingdon, Routledge, 2016, p.318.

<sup>16</sup> Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand*, p.186; Beatrice Penati *Notes on the Birth of Russian Turkestan's Fiscal System: A View from the Fergana Oblast*, «Journal of the Economic & Social History of the Orient» 53/5 (2010), pp.739-769.

further pacification, development and organisation belongs entirely to the civil power. *Voенно-народное управление* is essential only for the first period after the conquest of a country; thereafter, as the region becomes calmer, it slows the civil [*гражданское*] development of the people. The Turkestan *krai*, as is visible from the above [evidence], is so far pacified, that the time has come for its further rapprochement [*sblizhenie*] to Russia by means of such unifying of its administration with the general arrangements of the Empire as are possible<sup>17</sup>.

These conclusions – and the more pungent criticisms made by Zenkov - were ignored at the time and would continue to be ignored until the Tsarist regime in Central Asia came to an end during the First World War<sup>18</sup>. The arguments over *voенно-народное управление* in Turkestan were part of a wider debate among Russian administrators and statesmen over how the non-Russian peripheries of the empire should be governed. Advocates of ‘general civil’ (*obshchegrjazhdanskoe*) administration, and of the extension of the post-reform provincial elected assemblies (*zemstvo*) beyond European Russia argued that this would improve the efficiency and justice of administration through better-educated bureaucratic cadres, and facilitate the assimilation of these areas to the Russian core<sup>19</sup>. From the beginning of Alexander III’s reign until after the 1905 revolution their efforts were generally stymied by fear of nationalism and revolution in the western provinces of the empire, and in Asia by the stigmatisation of the local population as ‘backward’ and unfit for civilian rule, which perpetuated what was in practice a characteristically colonial ‘rule of difference’<sup>20</sup>. However even in Siberia and the Steppe some elements of civil administration had been introduced by 1914, often tied to higher levels of Russian peasant settlement, while the North Caucasus also saw the introduction of civilian courts, making Turkestan a particular outlier in its adherence to almost entirely unreformed *Voенно-народное управление*<sup>21</sup>. Before exploring why this was so, we must seek to understand how the system worked (or failed to) in practice.

## 2. Structures

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<sup>17</sup> Girs *Otchet*, pp.461-2.

<sup>18</sup> For a summarised account see Konstantin K. Pahlen, *Kraevoe Upravlenie*, pp.28-30; Tat’iana V. Kotiukova, *Okraina na osobom položenii. Turkestan v preddverii dramy*, Moscow, NPK, 2016, 17; Vasil’ev, *Bremia Imperii*, pp.422-38.

<sup>19</sup> The literature on the nature of Russian administrative practices, pre and post the great reforms, is very extensive, but see in particular P. I Savel’ev ed., *Imperskii stroi Rossii v regional’nom izmerenii (XIX - nachalo XX veka)*, Moscow, Moskovskii obshchestvennyi nauchnyi fond, 1997; Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, Anatoly Remnev (eds.), *Russian Empire. Space, People, Power 1700-1930*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2007; Kimitaka Matsuzato, *General-Gubernatorstva v Rossiiskoi Imperii in Novaia Imperskaia Istoriia Postsovetskogo Prostranstva*, eds. Il’ia Gerasimov, Sergei Glebov, Aleksandr Kaplunovskii, Marina Mogil’ner, Aleksandr Semenov, Kazan’, Tsentral’noe issledovanie Natsionalizma i Imperii, 2004, pp. 427-448.

<sup>20</sup> Tomohiko Uyama, *A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conscriptation in Central Asia* in Tomohiko Uyama, (ed.), *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia*, Sapporo, Slavic Research Centre, 2007, pp.23-63; Ian W. Campbell, *Knowledge and the Ends of Empire. Kazakh Intermediaries and Russian Rule on the Steppe, 1731-1917*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2017, pp.39-62, 69-70.

<sup>21</sup> Remnev (ed.), *Sibir’ v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii*, pp.107-133; Alberto Masoero *Territorial Colonization in Late Imperial Russia: Stages in the Development of a Concept*, «Kritika» Vol.14, No.1, (2013) pp.59-91.

There were two key elements to *Voенно-narodnoe upravlenie*, both indicated in its title. The first, 'Military', meant that all the higher executive positions were reserved to military personnel, and that the region in question fell under the direct and exclusive authority of the Ministry of War rather than the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Military Governors of provinces under this system normally had the rank at least of Major-General, and the officials were all army officers seconded from their units to perform administrative, judicial, medical and even educational duties. Whilst civilians could be clerks, surveyors and accountants, positions which involved executive or judicial power were filled by military officers. Apart from the Military Governors and those who served in the Governor-General's Chancellery and Council the most important official posts were those of District Commandant (*Uezdnyi Nachal'nik*) and their assistants, and the local police chiefs (*Uchastkovye Pristavy*). The lack of provincial elected assemblies, together with the independent civilian courts which had been created by Alexander II's reforms after 1864, placed a very heavy burden on these officers<sup>22</sup>. In civilian areas the assemblies (*zemstvo*) were responsible for education, public health and sanitation and numerous other duties, whilst there was an independent judiciary separate from the executive: here all this fell to the lot of a small group of military men, usually with no specialist training. As Senator Count Konstantin K. Pahlen wrote in his report on the administration of Turkestan in 1910:

Now the District Commandant [...] fulfils the functions of the following people and positions in the main *Oblasts* of the region: Superintendent, Policemaster, Head of the land administration (in his administrative capacity), Head of the urban administration, Urban Justice, Chairman of the land revenue board, hospital committee Chairman, Presiding Director of the prison division [...] Chairman of the District and urban committees on public health, Chairman of the District and urban sanitary works committee in charge of monthly inspections. Besides all this, he is entrusted with the supervision of the popular [*Sharia*] courts and of *Waqfs*, the control of irrigation and assists in the laying-out of areas for settlers<sup>23</sup>.

Until 1884 the District Commandants also acted as the local military commanders, presenting them with an extremely heavy workload. Pahlen's observations carried strong echoes of what Zenkov had written twenty-five years earlier, though the latter had added a strong critique of the educational, cultural and temperamental inadequacy of the officers called to undertake this bewildering variety of tasks:

Officers in the region are appointed to the position of official on special assignment to the Governor-General, officials in the diplomatic section, to various positions on the committee for construction, to the position of editor of *Turkestanskije Vedomosti*, as district commandants, assistants to the district commandants, heads of municipalities, police chiefs, architects, heads of divisions and provinces, chairmen, members and auditors of judicial committees, and finally to the position of director of irrigation.

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<sup>22</sup> See Alexander Morrison, *Metropole, Colony, and Imperial Citizenship in the Russian Empire*, «Kritika», 13/2 (2012), pp.347-50.

<sup>23</sup> Senator Gofmeister Graf Konstantin K. Pahlen, *Otchet po Revizii Turkestanskogo Kraya, proizvedennoi po Vysochaishemu Poveleniyu...*, St. Petersburg, Senatskaia Tipografiia, 1910, *Uezdnoe Upravlenie*, p.156.

Let us note that the functions that come with some of these roles which we have listed are to a high degree difficult and varied, and many of these positions bring with them wide powers.

Take for example just the role of district commandant. He will have responsibility for a territory from 2 to 2 ½ thousand square *versts*,<sup>24</sup> with a population of 200,000 souls subject to him. On the commandant falls the general supervision over all the people of the district, as well as attendant places and individuals who occupy other positions; he directs the statistics of the district, the collection of taxes, the towns – and embodies in himself the municipal council, the higher police and judicial organs; he sits in judgement on the litigation and divorce affairs of the natives, in cases where they are dissatisfied with the courts of the *Biys*;<sup>25</sup> he carries out the initial investigations for some criminal and civil cases; he is responsible for putting court decisions into effect, the registering of property, the loan office, he has oversight of the post roads and of trade. Apart from this he is expected to participate in all possible committees and commissions: on public health, trade etc. What a mass of entirely disparate specialist knowledge is needed for a district commandant!<sup>26</sup>

This was the situation in 1884, but as the preceding Pahlen quote indicates, when it came to the overwhelming responsibilities of these under-qualified men not much had changed by the eve of the First World War. As we will see, neither their educational nor their moral standing had improved markedly by then either.

The second, ‘popular’ element of *Voenna-narodnoe upravlenie* was that of ‘local self-government’ – the devolution of power to a separate ‘native administration’ (*tuzemnaia administratsiia*). This was partly modelled on peasant self-government in European Russia, where the village commune (*obshchina*) mediated between state and society, but as communes did not exist in Turkestan this produced some particular local twists. One was the grouping of different villages together for tax purposes in so-called ‘agrarian communities’ (*sel’skie obshchestva*). These were the basic units of colonial administration, but did not necessarily correspond to real communities on the ground<sup>27</sup>. Their governance was left to local elites. These comprised the ‘electors’ (*pyatidesiatniki* or *ellikbosh*) who represented a group of fifty households, who in turn elected the key members of the local administration – the elder (*aqsaqal*), canton administrator (*volostnoi upravitel*), irrigation official (*mirab*) and Islamic judge (*qazı*). Between them they had responsibility for determining the tax burden which fell on each household and then collecting it; organising the *corvée* (*hashar*) for maintaining and digging irrigation canals, and administering justice. This led amongst other things to very low tax receipts for the first forty years of Russian rule, something attributed by officials to a mixture of Russian beneficence and native corruption, but which stemmed above all from a lack of knowledge of local agricultural practices<sup>28</sup>. The

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<sup>24</sup> 1 square *verst* = 113*ha*.

<sup>25</sup> Qazaq judges using customary law. The equivalent in sedentary areas were *Qazıs* administering Islamic law.

<sup>26</sup> *Voenna-narodnoe upravlenie v Turkestanskom Krae*, «Vostochnoe Obozrenie», 1884 No.8 in *TS* Vol.377, pp.1-2.

<sup>27</sup> S. N. Abashin *Obshchina v Turkestane v otsenkakh i sporakh russkikh administratorov nachala 80-kh gg. XIX v.* «Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva», 5 (153), Moscow, Russkaia Panorama, 2002, pp.71-88.

<sup>28</sup> e.g. Lev F. Kostenko *Sredniaia Azıia i vodovrenie v nei Russkoi grazhdanstvennosti*, St. Petersburg, V. Bezobrazov, 1871, pp.328-31. Despite the title of this work Kostenko spent very little time assessing or describing the administrative system in Turkestan and its capacity for inculcating ‘Russian civic values’.

Russian administration never developed a cadastre that would indicate land ownership or use, nor was it able to monitor harvest levels accurately from year to year, meaning that the Islamic tax of a tithe of the actual harvest – *kharaj* – which had been used under Bukharan and Khoqandi rule before the conquest could not be maintained, and a fixed rate of tax for each community had to be instituted instead<sup>29</sup>. Russian officials were equally unable to understand the customary system for the distribution of water between different villages, and were forced to devolve this vital matter to native officials<sup>30</sup>. When Cherniaev drew up a list of questions to be put to members of the native administration in 1883, as part of the preparations for the creation of a permanent statute, it reflected these frustrations, asking about shifting taxation from a collective to an individual basis and giving greater Russian control over the elections to ‘native’ posts – but neither of these changes occurred<sup>31</sup>. In 1909, when *Turkestarskie Vedomosti* published a series of articles on the reform of the region’s administration, exactly the same complaints were made about ‘native’ electoral system and the corruption and factionalism that it supposedly produced<sup>32</sup>. To a very significant degree what went on at this level of *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* was a black box into which the upper, Russian-controlled levels of the administration had great difficulty seeing<sup>33</sup>.

In common with systems of colonial administration elsewhere, the division between these two levels was absolute. There was no way in which a ‘native’ (*tuzemets*) could rise up through the ranks from village elder to district commandant. Some particularly valued local collaborators, such as the famous Shabdan Batyr of the Sarybagish Kyrgyz<sup>34</sup>, might be given honorary military rank, but they were considered of value precisely because of their local connections and influence, and would never be moved to another district in Central Asia, let alone in European Russia. Some military administrators might be Muslims, but they would be Tatars or Bashkirs from European Russia, not local ‘natives’ – and even these were often viewed with considerable suspicion by the Russian colonial authorities<sup>35</sup>. Another sign of this division

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<sup>29</sup> Alexander Morrison *Amlakdars, Khwajas, and mulk land in the Zarafshan Valley after the Russian Conquest, 1868-1874* in *Explorations in the Social History of Modern Central Asia (19th-early 20th centuries)*, ed. Paolo Sartori, Leiden – Boston, Brill, 2013, pp.42-4.

<sup>30</sup> Morrison *Russian Rule in Samarkand*, pp. 225-8; Beatrice Penati "A field upstream is better than a mirab brother": who paid for water in Tsarist Turkestars? in *Hydraulic Societies Re-Visioned: Water, Power, and Control in Greater Eurasian History*, eds. Nicholas Breyfogle and Philip Brown, Cornwallis, Oregon State University Press, forthcoming.

<sup>31</sup> *Programma voprosov tuzemnomu naseleniiu dlia obsuzhdeniia v komissii po sostavleniiu novogo Polozheniia ob upravlenii Turkestarskim kraem* 03/03/1883 in *Turkestars v Imperskoii Politike Rossii. Monografiia v dokumentakh*, ed. Tat'iana V. Kotiukova, Moscow, Kuchkovo Pole, 2016, pp.149-51.

<sup>32</sup> *K voprosu o reforme upravleniia Turkestarskim Kraem*, «Turkestarskie Vedomosti» (1909) Nos.25-6, 35-43 in *TS* Vol.501, pp. 39-43.

<sup>33</sup> Penati, *Notes on the Birth of Russian Turkestars's Fiscal System*, pp.764-7.

<sup>34</sup> On Shabdan Batyr's relationship with the Russian authorities see Tetsu Akiyama *The Qirghiz Baatir and the Russian Empire. A Portrait of a Local Intermediary in Russian Central Asia*, Leiden, Brill, 2021.

<sup>35</sup> See the case of Capt. Shakhaidar Syrtlanov in Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand*, pp.143-4.

was that ‘native’ officials were not mobile and could not serve in other parts of the empire. Russian military officers by contrast might well find themselves re-assigned from one ‘colonial’ periphery to another, as in the well-known case of General Nikolai I. Grodekov, who after an active military career in the conquest of Central Asia was Military Governor of Syr-Darya Province from 1890 – 1893, then served as Governor of the Russian Far East until 1906, and ended his career as Governor-General of Russian Turkestan in 1908-9. A less well-known example is that of Al’fred I. Termen, who served as an administrator both among the Buryats in the Trans-Baikal region and in Samarkand Province, and seems to have indulged in pretty indiscriminate violence in both places<sup>36</sup>. One of the clearest indications that Georgians were to some extent members of the all-Russian imperial elite was their presence as military administrators in Central Asia, particularly in Transcaspia which fell under the Caucasian command until 1890, while the Military Governor of Samarkand from 1911 – 1914 was Il’ia Z. Odishelidze<sup>37</sup>. This kind of elite mobility was not possible for Transcaucasia’s Muslim peoples, still less so for those of Turkestan. Instead they remained rooted in their own localities and patronage networks, which Russian officials, sometimes only posted for two or three years, were generally unable to penetrate or understand.

### 3. Corruption

This was reflected in Russian rhetoric which described the ‘native administration’ as a ‘Living Wall’ cutting the Russians and their beneficial civilizing influence off from the local population in Central Asia, a sentiment voiced with particular vehemence by administrators with liberal or radical views such as Vladimir P. Nalivkin and Nil S. Lykoshin<sup>38</sup>. Writing in 1913, Nalivkin lamented that:

In this way, following our arrival in the region, between us, or, more accurately between our local ruling class and the people there grew up a wall, tightly enclosing us and cutting us off from the people, and made up of the native administration, petty bourgeois and translators. The people communicated with us through this wall, impenetrable to them, and we saw with its eyes, heard with its ears and, to our shame, thought with the crafty and rapacious mind of this living wall, allowing it gradually to grow thicker by insensible degrees<sup>39</sup>.

<sup>36</sup> He wrote separate memoirs about each experience: Al’fred I. Termen *Sredi Buriat Irkutskoi gubernii i Zabaikal’skoi Oblasti. Ocherki i vpechatleniia*, St. Petersburg, Tip. Min. Vn. Del, 1912; Id., *Vospominaniia Administratora. Opyt’ izsledovaniia printsipov upravleniia inorodtsev*, Petrograd, Tip. L. Saper, 1914.

<sup>37</sup> See the case of *Pristav* Kutateladze in Alexander Morrison *The Pahlen Commission and the restoration of rectitude in colonial Transcaspia, 1908 – 1909*, «Monde(s). Histoire, Espaces, Relations», No.4 (2013), p.59; Morrison *Russian Rule in Samarkand*, p.296.

<sup>38</sup> Vladimir P. Nalivkin *Tuzemtsy, Ran’she i Teper’*, Tashkent, A. Kirsner, 1913, pp.68-70, 73-4; Nil S. Lykoshin *Pol Zbizni v Turkeстане. Ocherki Byta Tuzemnago Naseleniya*, Petrograd, V. A. Berezovskii, 1916, pp.5-16.

<sup>39</sup> Nalivkin *Tuzemtsy, Ran’she i Teper’*, 71

While this was a form of self-exculpation, blaming ‘the natives’ for the failure of Russian rule to modernise or Russify Central Asian society to any significant extent, it did reflect a genuine despair at the gulf which still lay between Russians and Central Asians even on the eve of the First World War, as well as the failure of *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* to give Russian power a real grip on Turkestan society. Instead its effect was to entrench the power of local elites and generate factional disputes between them, often focusing on elections where the prize of office would be the ability to extort bribes, punish enemies and assist followers and patrons<sup>40</sup>. In 1899, for instance, a powerful Kazakh canton administrator in the Chimkent district called Isa Batyrbekov engineered an elaborate conspiracy involving forged letters from the Amir of Afghanistan simply in order to discredit his enemies as ‘Islamic fanatics’, which prompted almost a year of Russian investigations before they realised it was a mare’s nest – and even then they could not assemble enough evidence to prosecute him<sup>41</sup>. The Russians generally interpreted this behaviour as corruption, which was indeed rife in many cases – however this can also be understood as a form of resistance to Russian colonial power, and in any case it was certainly not confined to the lower ‘native administration’, but extended to Russian military officials as well. As Zenkov put it in the *envoi* to his article:

«*Voенно-народное управление* has yet one more disadvantageous quality. Officers who go out for service in the Turkestan region dream of ditching active military service at the first opportunity, that is they early on reject their primary obligations; and once such a young dreamer has a patron or protector, he will doubtless receive some cosy niche. Then, having been caught warming enough palms, he is forced *no lens-volens* to return to active service, even though he is quite unsuited to it»<sup>42</sup>.

This highlights the fact that switching to *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* was an attractive career move, partly because it carried higher pay, but also because of the opportunities for peculation which it afforded. A particularly notorious case was that of Baron Nol’de, the corrupt District Commandant of Khujand, accused of releasing captured Khoqandi prisoners in return for bribes in the aftermath of the Ferghana rebellion of 1875-6, and of extorting money from the inhabitants of his district with the threat that otherwise they would be accused of siding with the rebels. This singularly unpleasant individual was eventually sentenced to eight years *katorga* in Siberia<sup>43</sup>. The low moral character that Zenkov lamented would remain a feature of Turkestan’s military officials until the First World War – Transcaspia’s administration in particular was

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<sup>40</sup> Alexander Morrison “Factions” in *The Native Administration of Russian Turkestan, ca.1865 – 1916* in *Loyalties and Solidarities in Russian Culture, Society and History* ed. Philip Bullock, Andy Byford, Claudio Nun-Ingerflom, Isabelle Ohayon, Maria Rubins, Anna Winestein, London, School of Slavonic & East European Studies, 2013, pp.37 – 52.

<sup>41</sup> Alexander Morrison *Sufism, Panislamism and Information Panic. Nil Sergeevich Lykosbin and the aftermath of the Andijan Uprising*, «Past & Present», No.214 (2012), pp.255 – 304.

<sup>42</sup> *Voенно-Narodnoe Upravlenie v Turkestanskom Krae*, «Vostochnoe Obozrenie», 1884 No.8 in *TS* Vol.377, pp.1-2.

<sup>43</sup> Mikhail A. Terent’ev, *Istoriia zhivoevaniia Srednei Azii*, St. Petersburg, A.V. Komarov, 1906, vol. II, p.415.

marked by horrible abuses of power and corruption, many of which were exposed by Pahlen's report<sup>44</sup>. The abuses of Russian officials and their native counterparts were memorably (semi-)fictionalised by Nikolai Il'in, whose novel *In the New Region (V Novom Kraiu)*, though published in 1913, was based on his own experiences serving in Turkestan in the 1870s-80s<sup>45</sup>. This lack of moral qualities was compounded by a lack of education, and in particular a failure to learn Central Asian languages:<sup>46</sup>

The educational qualifications of the army officer corps are extremely low even in the area of their specialism, in addition to which the administration of the region demands many, very many forms of specialist knowledge, which can be given only by universities and other institutions of higher education. [...] Everyone knows that the army officer corps in general, and ours in Turkestan in particular, finish their education with the *Junker* exams, and do not go beyond the course of the fifth class of the Gymnasium. We have very few officers in the region, who have finished the Gymnasium course, and there are no more than ten Academicians.

But apart from all these forms of knowledge, knowledge of the native languages, customs and laws is also essential for the administrator in the region, and most important of all are their personal moral qualities, which, unfortunately, in our administrator – Turkestani [*Turkestantsy*] are very weak, and many of them lack entirely<sup>47</sup>.

Zenkov's complaints about the lack of knowledge of local languages among Russian officials remained pertinent twenty years later, when a commission was convened in Tashkent to examine this question. This concluded that such officers remained a rarity:

If, against the background of this generally sad picture, over the past half century of Russian rule in the region, bright exceptions stand out in the person of a few local Orientalists and scholars who studied folk life and customs, as well as administrators who have mastered the knowledge of local dialects well, such as the late Geins, Terent'ev, Zagriazhskii, Grebenkin, Nosovich, Kuhn, Daniil Gramenitskii, and the still living Savenkov, Aristov, Pantusov, Ostroumov, Liutsh, Nalivkin, Alexandrov, Lykoshin and others, then these brilliant exceptions, bringing the region closer and bringing the natives and Russians closer together, can serve as nothing more than an excellent example<sup>48</sup>.

Significantly of these names Aleksandr Kuhn, Nikolai Pantusov, Nikolai Ostroumov and Iakov Liutsh were not military men at all, but university-trained Orientalists, while Nalivkin's military career had been brief and he had become a severe critic of the regime. The various recommendations made by the commission to rectify this sorry state of affairs were incoherent

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<sup>44</sup> Count Konstantin K. Pahlen *Mission to Turkestan. Being the Memoirs of Count K. K. Pahlen* ed. Richard Pierce & trans. N. J. Couriss, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964, pp.123-56; Morrison, *The Pahlen Commission and the restoration of rectitude in colonial Transcaspia*.

<sup>45</sup> Il'ia Il'in *V Novom Kraiu. Roman-Khronika. Iz vremen zavoevaniia Turkestanskogo Kraia* Izd. A. L. Kirsnera, Tashkent, Tipol.-Lit. «Turk. T-va Pechatnogo Dela», 1913, 2 Vols. This remarkable work describes a world of sexual exploitation where the Principal of a Tashkent girls' boarding school pimps her charges to wealthy bourgeois, whilst native officials offer their wives to their Russian superiors. A brief account of Il'in, his Turkestani career and his novel can be found in Elena Govor *My Dark Brother. The story of the Illins: a Russian Aboriginal Family*, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 2000, pp.14-23.

<sup>46</sup> Kotiukova *Okraina na osobom polozenii*, pp.23-4.

<sup>47</sup> *Voенно-народное управление в Туркестанском Крае*, «Vostochnoe Obozrenie», 1884 No.8 in *TJ* Vol.377, pp.1-2.

<sup>48</sup> Ivan D. Iagello (ed.) *Sbornik Materialov po voprosu izucheniia tuzemnykh iazykov sluzhashchim po voенно-народному upravleniiu Turkestanskogo kraia*, Tashkent, Izd. Tip. Pri Kants. Turk. Gen-Gub., 1905, pp.12-13.

and contradictory, ranging from the need for higher salaries or specialist training in the Oriental Faculty at St. Petersburg University (neither of which was affordable) to the institution of prizes for language learning and the recommendation of particular textbooks (which the commission's members could not agree on).

The one significant change in Turkestan's governance in the last years of the empire was the introduction of a local branch of the Resettlement Administration (*Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie*) in Semirechie in 1905, which also in practice had some jurisdiction over neighbouring regions of Syr-Daria – both regions where Russian settlers were relatively numerous compared to the 'core provinces' of Turkestan. As Willard Sunderland has suggested, the Resettlement Administration and its officials had pretensions to supplant the Ministry of War as the *de facto* colonial office of the Russian Empire<sup>49</sup>. These well-educated technocrats contrasted their supposed professionalism and specialist training (mostly in agrarian science and statistics) with the incompetence and amateurism of military officials<sup>50</sup> – however as their goal was a ruthless transfer of Turkestan's land and water resources from the indigenous population to Slavic settlers, their advent did nothing to solve the region's administrative problems and instead both provoked intense bureaucratic conflict and long-lasting tensions between 'natives' and settlers that would explode into open revolt in 1916. A flavour of their attitude can be found in the memoirs of its first regional head, Sergei N. Veletskii, who referred sneeringly to local military officials as 'Kirgiz-lovers' (*Kirgizomany*) and wrote that:

The local administration, oddly enough, was extremely unfriendly towards the Russian settlers, seeing them as "uninvited guests", who in its eyes were, literally, "worse than a Tatar" [...] the local administration recognized [native] primitive land use as inviolable and did not find it possible to settle Russian peasants on these same lands, belonging entirely to the state<sup>51</sup>.

In defiance of his instructions, Pahlen would take the side of the military officials in the dispute over the wisdom of *pereselenie*. He described the Resettlement Administration's activities as 'sowing the seed of national strife' in Turkestan, and in his later memoirs also denounced Veletskii as both corrupt and a closet revolutionary<sup>52</sup>. Elsewhere in his report however he dwelt at length on the continued lack of educational qualifications of most military officials, and noted that even when they had good personal qualities this did not translate into good administration,

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<sup>49</sup> Willard Sunderland *The Ministry of Asiatic Russia: The Colonial Office That Never Was But Might Have Been*, «Slavic Review», 69/1 (2010), pp.120-150.

<sup>50</sup> Peter Holquist *"In Accord with State Interests and the People's Wishes": The Technocratic Ideology of Imperial Russia's Resettlement Administration* «Slavic Review», 69/1 (2010), pp.151-179.

<sup>51</sup> Sergei N. Veletskii *Semirechenskaia Oblast' i ee kolonizatsiia. Itogi rabot po kolonizatsii Semirech'ia za 8 let (1906 – 1913gg.)*, n.p., 1916, pp.4, 22.

<sup>52</sup> Alexander Morrison, *Sowing the seed of national strife in this alien region'. The Pahlen Report and Pereselenie in Turkestan, 1908 – 1910*, «Acta Slavica Iaponica», (2012) Vol.31, pp.6-13; Pahlen, *Mission to Turkestan*, 183-4.

because of the immense variety of burdens they were expected to sustain, combined with a stifling of individual initiative from above<sup>53</sup>. These critiques multiplied as Pahlen's commission toured the region - even the Slavophile and nationalist *Novoe Vremia* concluding that *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* had had its day:

The first pioneer of Russian statehood (*gosudarstvennost'*) in the borderlands was of course the army, which made up from its ranks the whole governing, judicial and administrative hierarchy. Temporarily there was no other way out. But the warrior period has passed into history, while "*voenno-narodnoe*" administration with a few changes has remained. This anachronism has still not disappeared even today. The partisans of this unacceptable state of affairs are deeply convinced that it is only thanks to this ruling military direction that we can keep the borderlands in subjection. In reality, given the gross inadequacy of this form of rule, the prestige of Russian government has suffered severely. The population, feeling the absurdity of this mechanism, has learnt to look on Russians as violent persecutors<sup>54</sup>.

However neither then nor later did these attacks have any effect: the same ramshackle system would stagger on until 1914, when it began to collapse under the pressures of war.

### **Conclusion – Bureaucratic Bungling and Institutional Inertia**

So what explains *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie*'s persistence in Turkestan? When Giers proposed eliminating it in 1884, Aleksei N. Kuropatkin (1848-1925), the future War Minister and at that time an influential officer on the Main Staff, invoked what he described as «the unsuccessful experience of French Algeria» (where he had been sent on a fact-finding mission in the 1870s) in weakening military rule – so other colonial precedents also continued to be important, at least in rhetorical terms<sup>55</sup>. Another point in favour of *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* was its cheapness. Though officers seconded to civilian administration were paid more than those who remained with their battalions, they were still cheaper than their more highly-qualified civilian counterparts – who were in any case in short supply. Bureaucratic infighting and inertia also played a significant role in stifling change and preserving the system. When he took over as Governor-General in 1901, the experienced Nikolaj A. Ivanov (1842-1904) initiated the complex process of drawing up a new Turkestan statute that would hand over significant authority from the War Ministry to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 'civilianising' the administration. His head of Chancery, Georgii P. Fedorov, suggested that the first draft of this proposed reform 'was, of course, safely buried in some commission, if not in the archive', partly owing once again to obstruction from Kuropatkin, who was now War Minister but did not want to see his private fiefdom of Transcaspia subsumed under an all-Turkestan framework<sup>56</sup>. When a revised version

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<sup>53</sup> Pahlen, *Otchet – Uezdnoe Upravlenie*, pp.41-2.

<sup>54</sup> Vasilii Si-lo-vich, *Voenno-Grazhdanskoe Upravlenie*, «Novoe Vremia», (1908) No.11764 in *TS* Vol.494, p.176

<sup>55</sup> Vasil'ev, *Bremia Imperii*, p.443.

<sup>56</sup> Georgii P. Fedorov, *Moia Sluzhba v Turkestanskom krae*, «Istoricheskii Vestnik», (1913) No.13, p. 872.

finally came to the consideration of the Council of Ministers in 1906, it was rejected on the advice of the new War Minister, Aleksandr F. Rediger, on the grounds that while theoretically desirable the time was not right in the aftermath of revolution, while the Ministry of Internal Affairs also showed some reluctance to take over such a large and complex region, for which it had no specialist cadres of trained officials. When Governor-General Nikolaj I. Grodekov (1843-1913) attempted to revive the idea in 1907 he met with similar resistance, and the initiative ran into the sand altogether when he was forced into resignation owing to his differences with the Ministry of State Properties over the extension of Russian colonisation in Turkestan<sup>57</sup>.

Another factor, hinted at above, was a failure of expertise and knowledge. Lacking the language skills and cultural know-how to truly penetrate local society, the Russians had little choice but to continue to devolve power in many vital areas to the 'native administration': this is seen very clearly in the debate over the role of *qazis* (renamed *narodnye sud'ya* - 'popular judges' under the 1886 statute, but still basically engaged in the same role). The Russians often talked about codifying the law they administered and bringing it more firmly under Russian control, but their half-hearted attempts at this ended in fiasco, largely because they attempted to model their proposed system on the 'Anglo-Muhammadan Law' of British India rather than consulting with local jurists<sup>58</sup>. Meanwhile abolishing the *qazis* altogether and introducing Russian courts administering all-imperial laws at the local level not only raised familiar problems of manpower and cost, but also fears of a 'fanatical' backlash from the Muslim population. This highlights a final and probably most compelling reason why *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* was never abandoned, which was that the Russians never felt entirely secure in their rule in Central Asia – any more than they did in some parts of the Caucasus, where Daghestan, Sukhumi, Kars and Batumi provinces also remained under *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* until the Tsarist collapse. While for the latter two provinces their frontier status bordering the Ottoman Empire was probably the most important factor, in the North Caucasus, as in Turkestan, it was fear of Muslim rebellion. This assumed tangible form with the 1877 uprising in Chechnya and Daghestan, and in Central Asia with the 1898 Andijan Uprising, which, whilst minor in itself, cast a very long shadow over Russian thinking and greatly strengthened the advocates of a firm military hand, for whom it was essential that all Russian administrators had military training and experience in commanding

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<sup>57</sup> Kotiukova *Okraina na osobom polozenii*, pp.36-9; Morrison *Sowing the seed of national strife*, pp. 6-13.

<sup>58</sup> Paolo Sartori, *Visions of Justice. Shari'a and Cultural Change in Russian Central Asia*, Leiden, Brill, 2016, pp.104-56; Alexander Morrison, *Creating a Colonial Shari'a for Russian Turkestan. Count Pahlen, the Hidayat, and Anglo-Muhammadan Law*, in *Imperial Co-operation and Transfer, 1870-1930 Empires and Encounters*, ed. Volker Barth, Roland Cvetkovski, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015, pp.127-49.

troops<sup>59</sup>. Even Nil Lykoshin, one of Turkestan's more liberal administrators, who had long bemoaned the lack of linguistic training of most of his brother officers, argued against any weakening of the military nature of Russian rule in a series of letters to *Turkestanskije Vedomosti* on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Andijan Uprising<sup>60</sup>. This then became a self-fulfilling prophecy: the fact that Turkestan's administrators were mostly military men with a rudimentary education and little specialist knowledge of local society, heavily reliant on native intermediaries for information and for day-to-day management of the local population, was a major factor in the miscalculations which led to the 1916 Uprising across Central Asia. As the fragile bonds between state and society in Turkestan frayed under the demands of total war, the Russians remained obsessed with the idea that opposition to their rule would be driven by 'fanatical' Islam. Instead it was resentment at the expropriation of land from the nomadic population for Russian settlement, coupled with wartime requisitioning of livestock, inflation and other economic pressures and finally an ill-timed decree conscripting local men into labour battalions which tipped much of the region into rebellion<sup>61</sup>. Turkestan's continued exclusion from civil administration meant that there were no accurate birth records, so that the process of selection for military labour service was arbitrary and mired in corruption<sup>62</sup>. The continued absence of *zemstva*, Turkestan's exclusion from representation in the Duma after 1906 and the rigid hierarchies of military rule closed potential channels of communication and with local elites, while the outbreak of war saw an outflow of younger, energetic and intelligent officers to the front, while those military administrators who remained were mainly the elderly, infirm and idiotic. The Russian colonial state in Central Asia was weak, and *voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* helped to ensure that it remained so.

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<sup>59</sup> *Vsepoddanneishii Doklad Turkestanskogo general-gubernatora ot infanterii Dukhovskogo "Islam v Turkestane"* (1899) in *Imperatorskaia Rossiia i Musul'manskii Mir*, ed. Dmitrii Iu. Arapov, Moscow, Natalis, 2006, pp.142-62; Daniel Brower *Turkestan and the fate of the Russian Empire*, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp.9-25, 105-6; Morrison, *Sufism, Panislamism and Information Panic*.

<sup>60</sup> Nil Lykoshin *K desiatiletiu Andizhanskoi revni*, «Turkestanskije Vedomosti» (1908) Nos.115 & 116.

<sup>61</sup> Oybek Mahmudov *The "Virtual Reality" of Colonial Turkestan. How Russian Officials viewed and represented the participation of the local population in the 1916 revolt in The Central Asian Revolt of 1916. A Collapsing Empire in the Age of War and Revolution* ed. Chokobaeva, Drieu and Morrison, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2019), pp.95 – 125.

<sup>62</sup> Tomohiko Uyama *Why in Central Asia, why in 1916? The revolt as an interface of the Russian colonial crisis and the World War in The Central Asian Revolt of 1916. A Collapsing Empire in the Age of War and Revolution* ed. Chokobaeva, Drieu and Morrison, pp.27-44.