Dissertation

Electoral System Reform in Early Democratisers

Strategic coordination under different electoral systems

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Abstract

On the basis of case studies of 19th and early 20th century Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, I address the question of how and when incumbent right elites reformed electoral systems under a rising political threat from the left. Some states adopted proportional representation (PR) earlier than others. Why did different states adopt PR at different times? One important factor was the existing electoral system before the adoption of PR. This has been missed in academic research since most scholars have assumed that the electoral system in place before the adoption of PR in most Western European states was single-member plurality (SMP). I show that the system in place prior to PR in most Western European states was not SMP but a two-round system (TRS). TRS effects are still poorly understood by political scientists. I argue that both PR and TRS were used as safeguards by the parties on the right against an electoral threat from the left, which originated from the expansion of suffrage. PR was used as a last resort after other safeguards had been exhausted. I state that in the presence of a strong left threat, countries with TRS could wait longer to implement PR than countries with SMP in place. Under TRS, the adoption of PR was considerably delayed since electoral coordination between parties could be applied more effectively than under SMP systems. This was largely due to the increase of information and time after the first round of TRS elections, which was used by right parties to coordinate votes around the most promising candidate before the second round. First round results under TRS were used as an "electoral opinion poll". Based on these results, the right could react more effectively than the left in order to improve outcomes in round two.

Keywords: electoral reform, two-round systems, proportional representation, single-member plurality, electoral systems, comparative historical analysis

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IV. List of Acronyms

ADAV	General German Workers' Association
BLP	British Labour Party
DM	Deutsche Mark
DNA	Norwegian Social Democratic Party
CVP	Swiss Christian Democratic People's Party (Swiss Catholic-Conservatives)
FDP	Swiss Radical-Democratic Party (Swiss Liberal Party)
FPTP	First-past-the-post
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GVG	Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (judicature act)
Lib-Lab	Liberal-Labour
LO	Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions
MMD	Multi-member district
MMP	Mixed-member proportional representation
MP	Member of Parliament
MSPD	Majority Social Democratic Party of Germany
NNP	Net National Product
NVV	Dutch Federation of Trade Unions
PM	Prime Minister
POB	Belgium Worker's Party
PPP	Purchasing power parity
PR	Proportional representation

PS	Swiss Social Democratic Party
PSI	Italian Socialist Party
SAF	Confederation of Swedish Employers
SAP	Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti)
SC	Strategic coordination
SD	Danish Social Democratic Party
SDAP	Social Democratic Workers' Party (in Germany and the Netherlands)
SDB	Dutch Social Democratic League
SDP	Finnish Social Democratic Party
SFIO	French Socialist Party
SMD	Single-member district
SMP	Single-member plurality
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
SV	Strategic voting
TRS	Two-round system
UK	United Kingdom
US/USA	United States of America
USD	US Dollar
USPD	Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany
VSD	Vote-seat disproportionality
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

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1. Introduction

On the basis of a medium N-comparison and in-depth case studies of 19th and early 20th century Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, I address the question of how and when incumbent right elites reformed electoral systems under a rising political threat from the left. Some states adopted proportional representation (PR) earlier than others. Why did different states adopt PR at different times? One important factor was the former electoral system. This has been missed in academic research since most scholars have assumed that the electoral system in place before the adoption of PR in most Western European states was single-member plurality (SMP). I show that the system in place prior to PR in most Western European states was not SMP but a two-round system (TRS). TRS effects are still poorly understood by political scientists. I argue that both PR and TRS were used as safeguards by right-wing parties against an electoral threat from the left, which originated from the expansion of suffrage. PR was used as a last resort after other safeguards had been exhausted. The explanatory variable of my theory is the electoral systems in place prior to PR – either SMP or TRS. The dependent variable is the point in time that PR was adopted – early or late. I state that under the scope conditions – a strong left threat and a fragmented right – countries with TRS could wait longer to implement PR than countries with SMP in place. Under TRS, the adoption of PR was considerably delayed since electoral coordination between parties could be applied more effectively than under SMP systems. This was largely due to the increase of information and time after the first round of TRS elections, which was used by right parties to coordinate votes around the most promising candidate before the second round. First round results under TRS were used as an "electoral opinion poll". Based on these results, the right could react more effectively than the left in order to improve outcomes in round two.

During the process of democratisation in the 19th and 20th centuries, many democratising countries had different electoral systems in place. Single-member plurality (SMP) was in place in the UK (the only European country that maintained SMP) and the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark and Finland), while a two-round system (TRS) was in place in the rest of Western Europe. Most states in Western Europe started to introduce PR at the beginning of the 20th century. By 1919, most states either had PR or SMP in place (only France was still using TRS). Since then, the debate has centred on what compels states and their leaders to implement different electoral systems.

In this dissertation, I reexamine the origins and reforms of electoral systems in European democracies. Based on Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010), I consider the choice and reform of electoral systems at the time of the expansion of suffrage as events that are essential elements of European democratisation. As suffrage in Europe's states expanded and the level of participation increased, electoral system change became a key measure implemented by incumbent elites to contain the loss of their political power. Incumbents used "non-electoral system methods" such as repression of the political opponents (e.g. anti-socialist legislation, etc.) and accommodation of the widened electorate (e.g. sponsoring of unions and worker clubs, etc.) to counteract inclusionary reform. Subsequently, electoral system reform, paired with exclusionary safeguards (such as indirect and estate voting, onerous voting registration and electoral fraud), were implemented for the same reason (Ahmed 2010, Ziblatt 2006). Until now, research has mainly focused on why some states moved from SMP to PR, while others maintained SMP. One argument has been that PR was implemented when left-wing parties posed an electoral threat to incumbent right-wing parties, and SMP was sustained when this threat did not exist. Another argument is that more structural factors (e.g. economic factors) led to different electoral system choices (see Section 1.1.). However, these existing concepts have empirical and conceptual limits. The complicated and at times inverse character of European democratisation (safeguards often acted contrary to democratisation) and the issues of possible reverse causality and

omitted variable bias brought forth by purely statistical studies have recently led to a quest for more serious long-term historical analysis (cf. Emmenegger, Petersen 2015). Most existing analysis has mainly focused on the interpretation of data without carefully reconstructing the historical situation of the actors (Ahmed 2010). What is lacking is an analysis that remodels the path that led to institutional choices and seeks to understand the subjective situation and circumstances that the actors were in (Capoccia, Ziblatt 2010, Rodden 2007). Scholars have highlighted the need to shed light upon the origins of electoral systems in early democratisers, emphasising the factors that have influenced institutional choices and scrutinising the motives of the critical actors (Boix 2010, Capoccia, Ziblatt 2010, Kreuzer 2010a, Rodden 2007). Gaining a better understanding of the origins of electoral systems through more in-depth historical analysis is especially beneficial since the reasons for electoral system reforms and what factors have led to the choice of a particular system are still widely debated.

The lack of historical work has led to a conceptual negligence – a misconceived starting point that has been assumed by most theories. As pointed out by Blais et al. (2005), the "starting point" (the electoral system that was in place before the adoption of PR/maintaining of SMP) of most of the 19th century early democratisers was not SMP but TRS. However, TRS has not been examined in depth by comparative political scientists. Furthermore, it has not yet been analysed whether the differences between SMP and TRS have led to different electoral system reforms. This dissertation attempts to make a contribution to fill this gap. I begin with explaining the plan of the thesis in the next section to then move on to a literature review of the existing work concerning the issue.

Plan of the thesis

The thesis is structured as follows: in the second part of this chapter, I lay out the relevant literature in regard to the origin and change of electoral systems of early democratisers in Western Europe of the 19th and early 20th century. Chapter 2 illustrates the theoretical model, hypothesis and research design. Chapter 3 gives an overview of all cases in Western Europe, which serve as a basis for the comprehensive case studies. The extensive review guides the case selection for the in-depth part of the study, directs and builds the framework for the case analyses of Chapters 4 – 6. These chapters depict the in-depth case studies of electoral system change in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands respectively, along the lines of the theoretical framework given in Chapter 2. All three case studies have a similar structure: the first part introduces the electoral and political system and the landscape of political parties in the respective country, paying particular attention to the extent of fragmentation of the political right. The second section explains the role that suffrage expansion played in the development of a left threat through the increasingly successful working class parties and their perception of the right. This is followed by the examination of the use of TRS as a safeguard for the right and the mechanisms of right-wing coordination under this particular electoral system, primarily in round two. The last section of each case study examines the adoption of PR, focusing on the early or delayed timing of it. The case studies are followed by the final Chapter 7, which offers a comparative perspective of the three cases and concludes with the broader theoretical implications of the study, its limitations and future research opportunities.

1.1. Literature review - the origins and change of electoral systems

The span of literature on the impact and results of electoral systems, electoral engineering and the theoretical accounts dealing with electoral systems is immense.[1] The debate over electoral system choice and reform is part of a broader concern about institutional design. The study of institutions gained new popularity in the 1980s with the rise of the so called "new-institutionalism" (Hall, Taylor 1996). New kinds of institutional and process-focused analysis spread to comparative politics and democratisation studies. It was a move from contextual variables and structural determinism to a more actor-and choice-centred approach. Electoral system choice is frequently described as a trade-off between representativeness (PR) and governability (majoritarian systems). PR systems are believed to represent society more precisely because multi-party systems and coalition cabinets better reflect voters' opinions. Majoritarian electoral systems on the other hand are thought to ensure a higher degree of governability since they tend to lean towards two-party systems and more stable single-party governments (Inglehart et al. 2009, Norris 1997).

Comparative research in recent years has started to focus particularly on electoral system reforms and the adoption of PR (Ahmed 2013, Benoit 2004, Boix 2003, Blais et al. 2005, Calvo 2009, Colomer 2007, Cusack et al. 2007, Cusack et al. 2010, Kreuzer 2010a). This renewed attention is partly provoked by research that focuses on certain policy outcomes of PR (Alesina, Glaeser 2004, Grofman, Lijphart 2003, Persson, Tabellini 2003). This work has been contradictory and is still unreconciled. One can generally divide the existing propositions for the adoption of PR into two groups: one that emphasises the strategic responses to the threat of a rising left and partisan engineering, where incumbent elites design electoral systems to guarantee their future electoral success as a response to this threat (based on Braunias 1932, Rokkan 1970); and one which proposes that this is based on economic conditions

[1] To name only some large scale comparative works, see Cadart 1983; Colomer 2004; Gallagher, Mitchell 2005; Lijphart 1995; 2007; 2012; Nohlen 1993; Nohlen, Krennerich 1999; Shugart, Wattenberg 2001.

(based on Cusack et al. 2007). Both theories base their hypotheses on historical narratives and quantitative methods but arrive at different explanations.

Since Braunias (1932, pp. 201) and Rokkan (1970, pp. 298), the first group of scholars have linked the majority of the moves from SMP to PR at the beginning of the 20th century to the threat of left-wing parties at the time of suffrage expansion. The adoption of PR was mostly described as part of the greater social transformation and democratisation. Rokkan (1970) characterised the adoption of PR, firstly, as an effort by the right to defend itself against a rising left and, secondly, as a consideration of the disproportionality of the translation from votes to seats. The left-wing parties are defined as the Social Democrats and Socialists, and the right-wing parties as the Conservatives and Liberals (mostly in power in Europe at the time) throughout the dissertation. Rokkan (1970) argued that majoritarian systems were only maintained where right-wing parties could join forces against the left. Whereas, when they could not build a coalition, right-wing parties moved to PR hoping that this would allow them to continue to be competitively represented in parliament. Based on Braunias (1932) and Rokkan's (1970) findings, Boix (1999) extended the "rising-left argument", focusing on two variables: the socialist threat and the right's ability to coordinate. He argues that as long as the electoral rules in place at the time led to sufficient results for the incumbent elites, they had no incentive to change the electoral system. However, if the rules weakened their parliamentary representation, the incumbents had incentives to increase the degree of proportionality. According to Boix (1999), the likelihood of an adoption of PR depended on the strength of the electoral threat (the left in the 19th and early 20th century) and the coordinating capacity of the ruling parties. If the ruling parties were fragmented (similar percentage of votes prevents coordination since the right does not know around which party to coordinate), coordination was more difficult to achieve than if one party was dominant (anti-leftist parties could coordinate around largest right party). Boix defines three different cases: Firstly, if there was no electoral threat from the left, the ruling elites (political right) had no incentive to reform the

electoral system since they won the electoral districts (under SMP and TRS). Secondly, if there was a substantial electoral threat from the left and one dominant right party, there was no shift to PR since coordination was simple, Boix argues. Thirdly, the electoral threat was substantial and the rightist elite fragmented (did not coordinate). Thus, the right had a strong incentive to shift to PR since the split of the vote led to additional risk of a left victory. Anticipating a growing left threat, the right implemented PR as a "pre-emptive strategy" to guarantee them strong representation in parliament.

The above argument has evoked substantial criticism. Scholars have pointed out several historical cases that do not match Boix's (1999) scenarios (Andrews, Jackman 2005, Cusack et al. 2007), as well as other cases where PR was introduced before the left even grew in importance (Calvo 2009). Ahmed (2013), on the other hand, argues that countries that introduced PR before the left threat was large enough mostly anticipated the strong development of the left (e.g. Finland). Furthermore, Boix's critics argue that the incumbent rightist elites within both models were either unaware of the lasting disadvantages of PR for themselves (the right) (Crepaz 1998, Iversen, Soskice 2006, Persson, Tabellini 2003, Rodden 2006, Rogowski 1987) or purely focused on their short-term election results. The most convincing criticism is that the move to PR was generally not from SMP, as suggested in the classic argument, but from some form of TRS (Blais et al. 2005). Hence, why should there have been a coordination problem in the third case (large left threat; fragmented right) if the right could have coordinated in the second round after they had split the vote in the first round (Rodden 2007)? The question has not yet been answered and no substantial empirical evidence has been shown in regard to it. I attempt to answer this question in the theoretical framework below.

The second group of research cites economic explanations for the introduction of PR. Based on work that indicates that PR is beneficial to economic interests such as relations between business, labour and trade (Katzenstein 1985, Rogowski 1987), and to the political left (see above, disadvantages for the right) using endogenous explanations, they argue that structural factors were responsible for

the change in electoral systems.[2] Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007) argue that it was economic coordination between business and labour on a national level that drove the change in electoral systems. The key structural economic conditions, according to them, are co-specific assets – investments in human capital that are jointly made by employer and workers. They dispute that PR was introduced because of the coordination of "pre-democratic" right and left parties, which realised their similar interests in creating a political framework to support reforms that would foster economic prosperity. When structural factors did not create the need for coordination, PR was not introduced. Kreuzer (2010a) on the other hand, contends that there is almost no proof of a link between economic interests and preferences for distinct electoral systems. Furthermore, Kreuzer (2010a) states that political actors did not have much knowledge about the effects of PR on economic policies. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) on the other hand, argue that it was rather the strength of the left that pushed for PR as opposed to a move by the right to safeguard their power that is responsible for the adoption of PR. They point out that left party leaders understood that PR was in their interest in the long run.

Although the debate about electoral system reform has made a prominent comeback to the forefront of comparative politics,[3] there is still a lot to be clarified.[4] To this day, scholars disagree on whether actors in the 19th and early 20th century knew enough about electoral systems to forecast results and their long-term effects. Furthermore, it is debated whether the left was in general a

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2 Focusing on the outcome of electoral systems, such as more redistribution (Iversen, Soskice 2006), less inequality (Rogowski, MacRae 2008) and higher government spending (Bawn, Rosenbluth 2006, Persson et al. 2007), they see the causes of electoral system change in the systems' consequences: the structural factors have created the institutions and the outcomes.

3 Other essential theories of electoral system origins include the historical and mainly class-centred study of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), and research that depicts electoral system reform as contingent on the zeitgeist of the period. The implementation of SMP by most previous British colonies after achieving autonomy is most often attributed to routine (Mozaffar, Vengroff 2002). Today, the attractiveness of mixed-member systems (used in today's Germany and other countries) may be based at least in part on the common opinion that they are the "wave of the future" (Shugart, Wattenberg 2001) and therefore also in part based on a "contagion effect" (Aardal 2002, Elklit 1999). Another cause of electoral system choice is the view of key actors about main beliefs of good government. Reynolds (2001) mentions cases where incumbent leaders chose systems that were not beneficial for their own party but in their opinion more favourable for the country (e.g. introduction of PR in South Africa in 1994).

4 Rodden (2007) for example mentions the risk that previous findings are epiphenomenal since institutions might be an endogenous product of earlier social choices themselves (institutional endogeneity problem).

contestant of PR or not. Besides the recent work by Ahmed (2010, 2013), in which she argues that not only PR but SMP as well, were used as "equivalent alternative safeguards" by right-wing parties, very little historical work exists that analyses the debate that took place on a political party level (intra- and inter-party level).[5] However, politicians and parties were some of the most important actors of electoral system reform. My analysis therefore focuses on political actors and intra- and inter-party debate (see Chapters 3 – 6). Now that we have laid the groundwork for the study by summarising the relevant literature, we can move on to the theoretical framework in the next chapter.

[5] Based on Capoccia and Ziblatt's (2010) work on historically grounded research methods, Ahmed (2013) shows that next to strategies of containment, the electoral system was also used as an exclusionary safeguard. Such exclusionary safeguards were often used to neutralize the inclusionary measures (suffrage expansion) at the time (Ziblatt 2006).

2. Theoretical framework

In this chapter, I lay out the theoretical framework of the study. This includes the identification of the defining characteristics relevant for the analysis of the change of electoral systems in Western Europe. In particular, the timing of the switch to PR, my hypothesis and the theoretical process. The chapter ends with an analysis of the counterarguments to my theoretical model and a description of the research design and case selection.

2.1. The theoretical framework of the thesis

PR was adopted at different times in Western Europe during the 19th and early 20th century. Why did some states adopt PR earlier and others later while being under electoral threat from the left? I claim that one important driver of the timing of the switch to PR was the existing electoral system. I distinguish between SMP and TRS as "starting points" and argue that in the presence of an important left threat, countries with TRS in place could wait longer to implement PR than countries with SMP. PR and the TRS forms were used to safeguard the position of right parties (incumbent elites – Conservatives and Liberals) against the electoral threat from the left (Social Democrats and Socialists) that originated from the expansion of suffrage in the 19th century. Based on Rokkan (1970) and Boix (1999), I contend that in countries where TRS was in place, the adoption of PR was considerably delayed since electoral coordination between parties could be achieved more easily than under SMP systems. This was primarily because of the increase of information after the first round of TRS elections, which could be used by the right to coordinate around the most promising candidate before the second round. I am attempting to contribute to the existing literature a critical assessment of the role of TRS systems in regard to the adoption of PR and electoral system change in general in early democratisers of the 19th and early 20th century.

Different starting points of electoral reform

Electoral systems are rarely designed where no precedent system exists. The existing system determines electoral outcomes and therefore defines how satisfied political parties and governments – the key actors of electoral system change – are with the current electoral system. Hence, the "point of departure" – the pre-existing electoral system – plays an important role when it comes to the adoption of a new electoral system. Before the adoption of PR, all European states had either SMP or a form of TRS in place.

SMP electoral systems, sometimes known as first-past-the-post (FPTP), are systems in which the contestant who receives more votes than any other contestant is elected. Voters cast a single ballot for one candidate in single-member districts (SMD); the candidate with the largest share of votes wins the election and the party with an overall majority forms the government. The intention of SMP systems is to create a "manufactured majority". By amplifying the share of seats for the leading party, the system constructs an effective legislative majority for the government (Norris 1997). SMP elections can lead to an essential discrepancy between the percentage of total votes and the percentage of seats a party wins in an election. This might occur because of a possible uneven geographic distribution of votes.[6] The system focuses on the formation of effective governments and not on the most exact representation of the electorate (Norris 1997).

The fundamental attribute of TRS is that elections do not consist of one ballot but take place in two rounds. The first round is essentially carried out as a single-round plurality or majority election. In all 19th and early 20th century cases, a majority election was in place in the first round. The most common form of TRS is a combination with SMDs (Reilly et al. 2005, pp. 52-53).[7]

[6] Party A might lose districts always very narrowly to its main competitor B but have major leads in the districts it wins – this would lead to significantly more votes than seats in parliament for Party A.

[7] However, it is also feasible to have multi member districts (MMD) in place (using Block Vote or Party Block Vote) (Reilly et al. 2005, pp. 52-53).

Under TRS, the candidate that obtains a specified proportion of votes in the first round is elected right away. This share was traditionally an absolute majority of votes (i.e. fifty per cent plus one). If no one obtains an absolute majority in round one, a second round is held, which then determines the winner of the election. TRS forms differ when it comes to the rules of the second round. The two most common systems are majority-plurality TRS and majority run-off TRS.[8] In majority-plurality TRS (used e.g. in national assembly elections in France today), more than two candidates are allowed to stand in round two and a plurality of votes (i.e. at least one more vote than the closest contestant) is sufficient to be elected (Reilly et al. 2005, p. 52). Some countries have implemented thresholds that have to be met in the first round in order to be able to run again in the second round (e.g. France today: 12.5 per cent of the electorate).[9] The more common system today is a majority run-off TRS (used e.g. in US primary elections today), where a run-off is held in the second round between the top two candidates of the first round.[10] By only allowing the two leading candidates to enter the second round, this system ensures a purely majoritarian result.[11] Even though there are slightly different forms of TRS, the thesis focuses on the different effects of SMP and TRS in general, so as not to dilute the overall argument.

As mentioned before, the electoral system generally in place before the adoption of PR was not SMP, as originally assumed, but TRS. However, research that analyses with scrutiny the consequences of this misconception for understanding the subsequent change of the electoral system is sparse.

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8 Other electoral systems such as the alternative vote, also known as instant run-off voting, are often confused with TRS as well. Here voters have to rank order their preferred candidates in the first and only round. Other systems have thresholds (quorums) in place that need to be achieved to qualify for the second round (e.g. Bolivia).

9 The 12.5 per cent have been in place since 19/7/1976.

10 Different first round thresholds and rules to restrict or extend the number of running candidates are applied and have been applied around the globe. The more restrictions majority-plurality TRS has after round one, the more similar the system and its outcome becomes to majority run-off TRS. For more detailed descriptions of the varieties of TRS systems, see Carstairs (1980); Cole and Campbell (1989); Cox (1997); Greenberg and Shepsle (1987); Nilson (1983); Shugart and Taagepera (1994); Vengroff (1994) and Wright and Riker (1989).

11 For a more distinct classification of run-off systems, see Grofman (2008).

Although elections with multiple ballots are probably the world's oldest electoral system, TRS effects are still "poorly understood" by political scientists (Birch 2003).

Only a few scholars have examined the effect of varieties of majoritarianism in more detail and analysed the effects on presidential elections rather than on assemblies.[12] A number of scholars, e.g. Duverger (1959), Rae (1971) and Sartori (1994) have worked on the different outcomes of absolute majority and plurality systems, but the focus of the research being on SMP and PR has led to the negligence of TRS (Birch 2003, Fauvelle-Aymar, Lewis-Beck 2008). Duverger (1954) argues that TRS leads to the formation of multi-party systems since voters vote for their preferred candidate in the first round and not strategically as they are expected to do under SMP.[13] He continues by stating that it creates a highly disproportional outcome and alliances in round two (Duverger 1954, p. 328). Blais and Indridason (2007) concur by stating that TRS incentivises electoral pacts. Sartori (1994) elaborates that voting in round one is less limited by the need of electoral survival, leading to more parties having a chance in round two, because voters will still have the opportunity to influence the result in round two, resulting in multi-party systems. Cox (1997) highlights that voters do face incentives to vote strategically under TRS but strategic voting is complicated for voters since plenty of reliable information is needed about possible first- and second-round outcomes. Fauvelle-Aymar and Lewis-Beck (2008) state that TRS and PR produce different results. Birch (2003, p. 328) contends that TRS tends to create "compromise outcomes", minimise the representation of extreme parties, and select rather moderate candidates due to their larger chances in a second round.

[12] TRS-presidential elections have empirically been associated with the fragmentation of presidential support (Jones 1995, Shugart, Carey 1992).

[13] Cox (1997) names this general rule the "M+1 rule": voters will vote for a maximum of M+1 candidates in a constituency. M refers to the number of candidates to be elected in a constituency (in round one of TRS systems it refers to the number of candidates who can qualify for the second round).

A few scholars have argued that the electoral outcomes of TRS are not very different to those of SMP.[14] Overall, the few studies that have partly addressed TRS show unsubstantial and contradicting results in regard to TRS. It is still not clear what kinds of outcomes have been produced by TRS and how the system has been exploited by leaders. Comparative studies of TRS in parliamentary elections were held up due to the fact that the number of states using TRS declined drastically at the beginning of the 20th century. Until the 1990s, it was a small category of electoral systems, with only one prominent case left that had TRS in place (France) (Birch 2003). This is different today. TRS is used to elect the national assembly in 31 countries and is the most common system used in direct presidential elections (see Table 33). Among these are many early democratisers and competitive authoritarian systems. Several of them have been historically influenced by France. This shows how widespread the electoral system is today and how important it is for us to understand how TRS has been utilised by previous early democratisers.

In general, TRS seems to encourage the formation of second round alliances in order to win the election against a common political opponent. It also encourages voters to compromise in round two if their preferred choice has not qualified for the second round (Duverger 1954, Fisichella 1984, Norris 1997). It favours both competition (in the first round) and cooperation of parties (in the second round) (Tsebelis 1990, Cox 1997).[15] In the next section, I define the variables and hypotheses of the dissertation and describe the theoretical argument in more detail.

[14] Analysing France only, Dolez and Laurent (2005) and Pierre (2006) state that French TRS generates the same outcome as SMP. Adams et al. (2005) argue that it would not make a difference if the French elections would be held with one or two rounds. Only looking at France, however, makes it hard to distinguish between general theoretical claims and French particularities (Birch 2003, p. 325).

[15] Moreover, holding two rounds of elections has some drawbacks. Two rounds are more costly than one election and voters have to vote twice (Birch 2003, p. 326), which leads to lower participation rates in the second round.

Hypothesis and operationalisation of variables

The scope conditions of the theory are an electoral threat from the left and a fragmented right (fragmented right vs. one dominant party (non-fragmented right)) in parliamentary elections of an early democratiser. The latter is vital as TRS was even more important in emerging political systems, where other sources of information on party strengths (e.g. electoral polls) were not available, and party systems were unstructured.[16] The explanatory variable is the electoral system in place – either SMP or TRS. The dependent variable is the point in time of the adoption of PR – early or late.[17] The main hypothesis (H1) is: In the presence of an important left threat, countries with a fragmented right and TRS in place can wait longer to implement PR than countries with SMP. This is the case because right parties can coordinate more effectively under TRS than under SMP. Hence, they can contain the left threat to a larger extent than under SMP and therefore prolong the adoption of PR as a safeguard against the rising left. This mechanism leads us to the following corollaries:

1. When there was a weak or no electoral threat, PR was not adopted, no matter under which electoral system.
2. When there was no fragmented right, right parties could coordinate easier no matter under which electoral system.
3. TRS was considered and applied as a safeguard.

An effective method to analyse distinct mechanisms and decisions by crucial actors within a structured qualitative study is process-tracing (George 1979, George, McKeown 1985, George, Bennett 2005). Table 1 depicts the steps that define the causal process that connects the explanatory

[16] The latter point is not exclusive to early Western European democratisers but can be true of new democracies as well as old democracies that undergo a period of crisis of the party system.

[17] Additional variables that could have an impact on the dependent variable and therefore have to be controlled for (kept in mind during the case studies) are: the willingness of actors (politicians) to coordinate/political motivations; expectations of voters (e.g. aversion of core-voters against possible coordination partner).

and dependent variables described above, together with the corresponding operationalised indicators and sources for both types of electoral systems (TRS & SMP). They build a framework and guideline for the structured empirical and historical analysis, together with the above-mentioned similar outline of the case studies and the underlying groundwork of the large-N-comparison in Chapter 3. They are used to test the above hypotheses through process-tracing within the case studies.

I argue that one large factor of the successful containment of an existing left threat was strategic coordination between right-wing parties. These parties used prior information on strength and strategies of their own and other parties to then coordinate their votes to their political advantage. Hence, the availability and reliability of information about party strengths under TRS led to a higher capacity of right-wing political coordination (high information and high coordination) than under SMP, where the margin of error was greater due to larger uncertainty about party strengths (low information and low coordination). The larger extent of coordination then led to a better containment of the left threat. The right resisted the adoption of PR until the left threat grew too strong despite coordination under TRS, causing the need to implement a safeguard to guarantee sufficient representation in parliament. Consequently, PR was adopted later when TRS was in place compared to SMP because coordination could be performed more effectively. For indicators and sources of the steps of the causal process, see Table 1 (for more detailed information about sources, see research design below in Section 2.2.).

Table 1: Causal process from existing electoral system to PR adoption

Variable	TRS (explanatory variable)		SMP (explanatory variable)		Sources (for both electoral systems)
	Value	Indicator	Value	Indicator	
1. Availability and reliability of information about own and other party strengths	High	- Use of first round information about party strengths to coordinate and form alliances	Low	- Lack of information about party strengths	- Parl. proceedings - Ministerial documents - Memoirs - Correspondence of politicians
2. Capacity of right wing coordination	High	- High number of right wing political alliances - Great extent of right coordination efforts - Willingness to use TRS as safeguard/coordinate against left	Low	- Low number of right wing political alliances - Minor degree of right coordination efforts - Willingness to adopt TRS as safeguard	- Databases including party support of candidates - Legislation to change electoral system + Sources above
3. Containment of left threat	High	- Electoral success of electoral alliances - Positive VSD for right parties - High number of right MPs winning seats through coordination - Low number of won second rounds for left - Negative VSD for left parties - Long period of sustained threat	Low	- Low electoral success of electoral alliances - Low number of right MPs winning seats through coordination - High perceveid left threat - Relatively low VSD of left compared to left in TRS states - Short period of sustained threat	- Electoral results of first and second rounds - Results of votes and seats + Sources above
4. Timing of PR adoption (dependent variable)	Late	- Late adoption of PR relative to beginning of threat	Early	- Early adoption of PR relative to beginning of threat - Early demand for PR as a safeguard	- Length of sustained threat = (Year of PR adoption - origin of left threat) + Sources above

In addition to the operationalisation of the variables in Table 1, we need to measure the left threat and the fragmentation of the right. I consider a left party as a distinct electoral threat if it gained at least 10 per cent of the vote in the first round of national parliamentary elections. In addition to the measurement of the electoral development, I have added some "soft" measures that correlate to the potential threat of the left, which will be used in the case studies: development of the membership, organisational development, opportunities for political alliances and ideological radicalism (Bartolini 2007). The fragmentation of the right is measured by the effective number of electoral right parties (incumbent non-socialist parties) based on Laakso and Taagepera (1979).[18] The existence of a

[18] N = effective number of electoral right parties. $N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2}$, where pi is the fractional share of every non-socialist party i. The idea behind the measurement is to count the parties and measure their strength (vote share in first round) at the same time. For a definition and discussion, see Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989).

dominant right party is defined by a right party that has obtained the absolute majority of seats in most of the previous elections before the adoption of PR. The temporal component of the study, the early or late adoption of PR, depends on the duration of the process between the origin of an electoral threat by the left (reference point) and the implementation of PR (year) (Bartolini 1993, Grzymala-Busse 2011). It will be refered to as "length of sustained threat" (Year of PR adoption - origin of left threat) (see bottom right of Table 1). For a more comprehensive debate of the measurements of the left threat, the fragmentation of the right and the length of sustained left threat, paired with historical data, see Chapter 3.

Delaying the adoption of PR in early democratisers

Let us now take a look at the theoretical framework (see Table 2) of the thesis. Corresponding to Boix (1999), the scenarios presuppose the initial situation that established right-wing parties were forced to accept suffrage expansion due to external circumstances. Nevertheless, they were still able to significantly influence the new electoral system since they still had a majority in parliament. Right leaders did not intend to use electoral system reform to foster greater inclusion of society but to maintain the established political order and to accompany suffrage expansion and democratisation. Incumbent elites' main interest was seat maximisation. The adoption of PR was understood as a "measure of last resort" for them against an electoral threat from the left, after coordination attempts and containment measures of the right had failed (Rodden 2007, Ahmed 2013).

There was a wide range of applied exclusionary safeguards that were used before the adoption of PR. The left part of Figure 1 lists the most common ones under "other electoral measures". They were not specific to either SMP or TRS.[19] Franchise restrictions excluded the lower class of society from elections, such as workers that did not match certain income, property or wealth requirements.

[19] Safeguards that fall into this category are discussed within the case studies. Table 32 shows an overview of the used safeguards in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, including "other electoral safeguards".

Plural and estate voting was used as a safeguard early on in many Western European states as well – usually taxpayers, house and real estate owners (estate voting) and higher education holders received more votes than other poorer citizens. Indirect voting was used to regulate for whom voters cast their vote. The electorate would vote for delegates who would then make the ultimate choice for them. It was easier for the incumbents to influence a relatively small number of delegates than a high number of voters. Electoral fraud and ballot rigging were utilised to ensure the electoral success of the right. Onerous voting registration made the registration for voters difficult in order to keep them away from the ballot boxes. Undemocratic upper chambers were in place in several Western European states at the time, they were used by the incumbent elite to control the lower houses and the legislative procedure via veto powers. Compulsory voting was also used as a conservative safeguard. In some states, the right introduced compulsory voting together with the expansion of suffrage to mobilise the "sagging rates of electoral participation among 'bourgeois' parties" against the left, which was expected to rally their electorate more effectively (Birch 2009, p. 29).[20] These safeguards were applied before right parties were making full use of the electoral system as a safeguard. As non-electoral measures such as repression (bottom of Figure 1), they were more obvious methods to contain new political groups. When the left grew despite the utilisation of these safeguards, right parties began to fully exploit the electoral systems to their advantage. The SMP states could use gerrymandering and the maintaining of badly-apportioned districts (malapportionment) to try to contain the left. TRS incorporated these safeguarding opportunities of SMP (and possible first round coordination) and additionally provided the right with the opportunity for second round coordination and possible strategic voting in round two (see Figure 1). PR was interpreted as a safeguard to maintain the right

[20] This was the case in Belgium (introduction of compulsory voting in 1893) and the Netherlands (1919). Switzerland also introduced compulsory voting in some parts of the country but never on their entire territory (Birch 2009, pp. 23-24). The provinces were left to decide if they wanted to implement it or not. For a detailed analysis of compulsory voting, see Birch (2009). Interestingly, the use of compulsory voting in today's long-term liberal democracies is expected to work in favour of the left as it is harder for them to mobilise their electoral base compared to conservative voters.

party's parliamentary representation. However, the right did not want to give way to stable proportional representation of the left before they had used all possible containment measures. They understood the benefits and the risks of PR and majoritarian systems – TRS in particular (at least in the short run and in terms of election results), and wanted to delay the move to PR for as long as possible. TRS states could do this for longer than SMP states, due to the higher degree of strategic coordination. This phenomenon is explained in more detail below.



Figure 1: Containment measures of left threat

In particular, the dominant right parties tried to utilise the effects of the majoritarian systems to the fullest before they had to adopt PR due to the left threat becoming too vast. Hence, if there was no left threat (this was only the case outside of Europe: e.g. USA, Canada), or a weak left threat (e.g. UK), the right had no incentives to change the electoral system and therefore PR was not adopted (see scenario 1 in Table 2, e.g. UK). If there was a strong threat, PR was always adopted in Western Europe. The left always grew strong enough for the right to see the need to introduce PR in order to safeguard their own position. Either electoral results had shown the immediate need for such a safeguard or the right parties had anticipated a strong left threat to evolve in the near future. It was just a question of when PR would be adopted – earlier or later?

To identify why PR was adopted earlier or later, we need to analyse the differences in coordination among parties under the two electoral systems. Before we go deeper into the theoretical process, it is important to differentiate between two mechanisms – strategic voting (SV), which is conducted by voters; and strategic coordination (SC), which is conducted by parties (parties actively coordinate, e.g. by withdrawing or supporting a certain candidate). The focus of this thesis is on the latter. Strategic voting by the voters played a large role in previous rational choice theories. Scholars expected voters to strategically vote for dominant right parties to defeat the rising left party without guidance from political parties to do so. However, recent research has shown that voters vote less strategically than previous models imply (Blais 2002, 2003) and that strategic coordination by parties is more important than often presumed (Reed 1990).[21] Voters need reliable information about party strengths to vote strategically, which they often do not have (Blais, Turgeon 2004, Clough 2007). Particularly, within early democratisers, voters are expected to vote less strategically because they are not as familiar with strategic voting as voters in longstanding democracies. They have little voting experience and no or not many previous election results they can build on. Electoral polls did not exist at the time. Information from prior elections is often misleading in early democratisers since parties are still at a stage where they merge, die or restructure their party base more often than in developed democracies (no perfect information about party strengths before elections (imperfect information). Voters also have no strong party affiliation and change their votes frequently. Additionally, during the industrialisation and/or high-industrialisation, migration drifts were very common and the electorate in districts changed drastically at times between elections. Strategic voting is also very difficult to measure compared to strategic coordination.

[21] Moreover, Cox (1997) states that voters sometimes have such intense preferences that they intentionally avoid strategic voting.

Thus, strategic voting has a smaller influence in early democratisers, where information is limited and the party system is still unconsolidated. Strategic coordination on the other hand, can be measured more easily and occurs to a larger extent than assumed in the past. Hence, this study focuses on strategic coordination between parties. In the following paragraphs, I describe the effects of different existing electoral systems (SMP vs. TRS) on the adoption of PR by analysing the strategic coordination behaviour of parties under both electoral systems.

Table 2: Adoption of PR in early democratisers[22]

Scenario	***SMP***	***TRS***
1. Weak left threat	No PR	No PR
	UK	*no case*
2. Strong left threat - one dominating right party	High SC	High SC
	Delayed PR	Delayed PR
	Denmark	*Italy, Switzerland (Belgium)*
3. Strong left threat - fragmented right parties	Low SC	High SC
	Early PR	Delayed PR
	***Sweden**, Finland*	***Germany**, France, **Netherlands**, Norway*

Three scenarios under SMP or TRS

Table 2 shows the theoretical argument in three different scenarios (different scopes of left threat and right fragmentation) under both electoral systems (SMP/TRS). The upper area in each cell shows the degree of strategic coordination (High/Low). High SC means that there were optimal conditions for strategic coordination and a high degree of strategic coordination was implemented. The grey area shows if and when PR was adopted in the specific scenario. The lower area in each cell shows the countries that belonged to the specific scenario and outcome (of SC and PR).

[22] Cases in bold are the in-depth cases of the study. For case selection, see Chapter 2.2. (p. 35). SC: strategic coordination of parties. The left in the UK was not seen as a threat. Hence, it is categorised as "no left threat". Belgium is in brackets since it is the only exception within the model.

If there is no threat or a weak threat, the right has no incentive to adopt PR. Now, consider a situation in an early democratiser in which the incumbent parties (Conservatives and Liberals) face a strong left threat under SMP during the process of suffrage expansion. Two scenarios might develop:

In scenario 2 of Table 2 (e.g. Denmark), there is one dominant right-wing party, other weaker right parties and a strong left. Due to the dominant right party, it is easier for right parties (and voters) to coordinate the vote around the stronger party to outweigh the left party (High SC).[23] Incumbent elites have no incentive to move to PR until the left grows strong enough for the dominant right party's election results to diminish. The favourable conditions for coordination efforts under SMP around the dominant right party delay the adoption of PR.

In scenario 3 under SMP (e.g. Sweden), the incumbent parties coexist in a non-Duvergerian equilibrium (coordination around strongest parties does not work).[24] The electoral system does not encourage strategic coordination between parties (Low SC). Either their electoral strength is balanced (fragmented right – no dominant party) and thus, parties (and voters) are unable to determine which candidate they should coordinate around to win against the left party; or they do not have enough information about the possible outcomes of the election (likely in early democratisers with only one round); or both cases: a fragmented right and no information. In all cases, voters do not coordinate around one party but split the vote between the incumbent parties. This is enough for the left party to win the constituency against the right parties since voters, not knowing which right party has the best chances of defeating the left, cannot coordinate around one party. Losing or anticipating losing the majority of seats in parliament compels incumbent elites to adopt PR at an early stage.

[23] Yet, in early democratisers, information about the dominant party might be very limited. Moreover, new weak right parties might still be inclined to run a candidate to sharpen their political profiles in order to build up a political base (this is possible under TRS without undermining another right candidate). Both could weaken coordination efforts in the only round under SMP. We are still considering the effect of the dominant right-wing party substantial enough to make coordination work and delay the switch to PR.

[24] Number of parties is larger than M+1.

Now let us consider the two same scenarios under TRS. In scenario 2, with a strong left threat and a dominating right party, voters are inclined to vote for their preferred candidate instead of voting strategically in the first round because they still have the option of using the second round to vote strategically (Cox, 1997). The right can coordinate around the dominant right party in round one or use the information from the first round to coordinate around the strongest right party in the second round to defeat the left (High SC). This is either done under run-off TRS, where only the two most successful candidates of round one are allowed to run (e.g. Italy); or under majority-plurality TRS, where more than two candidates are allowed to run in round two (e.g. Switzerland). A run-off in the second round facilitates the coordination process of all "anti-left" voters around the remaining candidate ("withdrawal by electoral law"). In a second round with more than two candidates, the right can coordinate around the candidate that was the strongest in round one. In both cases, active strategic coordination of the right can delay the adoption of PR. Hence, the second round and the dominant right party lead to higher coordination. The adoption of PR can be significantly delayed because the left threat can be effectively contained.[25]

In scenario 3 under TRS, the right parties are fragmented and they are facing a strong left. No right party has an incentive to withdraw before the second round. However, TRS gives them again the chance to run in round one and coordinate around the strongest right-wing party in round two. This time, the information about party strengths from round one is essential. It functions similarly to an "electoral poll" and can be used to coordinate around the strongest right party between the two rounds. This is now even more important than in scenario 2, with a dominating right party that is making coordination easier. However, the mechanism stays the same. If two parties make it into round two (run-off TRS, e.g. Germany), the electoral system simplifies coordination for parties again by

[25] This is particularly the case for TRS with more than two candidates in round two (e.g. majority-plurality TRS). If the right coordinates in round one and runs one common candidate, it naturally enhances their chances even more.

giving right voters only two parties to choose from (e.g. one right and one left party) (High SC). PR can thus be adopted later.[26] If more than two parties take part in round two (majority-plurality TRS; e.g. Norway), strategic coordination is needed to unite the right.

To recap: PR was only introduced under a strong left threat. In the presence of a strong left threat and a fragmented right, the right under TRS could wait longer to adopt PR than under SMP. The first round of TRS was used as an "election poll". The information was used to coordinate right votes in round two where needed.[27] This is mainly important for a fragmented right because there are fewer incentives to coordinate. The non-fragmented right can coordinate easier around the dominant party under both electoral systems. Once the left grows so strong that coordination efforts can no longer contain its broad success over a wide area, PR will be adopted. Effective coordination among the right leads to a delay of the adoption of PR as a safeguard.[28]

How did the coordination mechanism under TRS work? The right could either coordinate in round one or in round two. In round one, parties could limit the voter's choice by deciding on one

[26] Voters are more likely to follow a party's recommendation for coordination in round two (and campaign for another party's candidate) if they have seen in round one which candidate has better chances to win against the left instead of having to vote strategically in round one under SMP. Yet, the dominating right party outweighs this effect of the electoral system.
Furthermore, Coordination efforts might be needed even before the first round because, as Tsebelis (1990) states, the competition between right parties in round one might have negative influences on their cooperation in round two. First round coordination can be particularly necessary if there are more than three powerful parties/candidates because they could split the vote in round one, which could lead to none of the parties getting to round two, as it happened in the presidential elections of France in 2002 and in Egypt in 2012. Furthermore, if the left of a state would be fragmented, it could potentially use TRS in a similar way to the right did, which could lead to a reverse effect for the theoretical argument: the left coordinates against the right under TRS, the right therefore tries to adopt PR even earlier because the left threat now appears even stronger than without TRS. Yet, the left in Western Europe was not significantly fragmented before World War I (Bartolini 2007, p. 98).

[27] Right-wing coordination around the strongest candidate in round two does not imply that TRS necessarily leads to an absolute majority for the strongest right party on a national basis. The political landscape of the 19th century was not consolidated and constituencies had different front-runners in different regions (Caramani 2004b). Geographical diversity and smaller support bases of parties, in particular within SMD systems led to agreements on a district, regional and national basis. Thus, the right party that had the best chances to win against the left party often varied in different districts. Hence, TRS could be used as containment against the left and at the same time lead to a multi-party system on a national stage.

[28] Unless, the left party becomes so strong that its election results are in the same dimension than the sum of the incumbent right-wing parties combined. In this case the left would win the majority of seats under both systems, TRS and SMP, and the right would not have the opportunity to introduce PR as a safeguard. The left could still implement PR for proportionality reasons.

common candidate, meaning one party agreed to not run a candidate in a specified district and supported the candidate of the other party instead.[29] In round two, parties could agree to support another party's candidate either to get the other party's support in another district or to simply get the more suitable candidate elected. A party could also decide to support another party's candidate without concessions. This could occur in both rounds.

In general, coordination only in round two occurred when there was no sufficient information about party strengths or when right parties were fragmented. First-round coordination was conducted in districts where it was more obvious who the frontrunner was (more information, e.g. through regional strongholds). Often an own candidate in round one was important for weaker parties to sharpen their party profile. Hence, it was mostly in round two that the right united against the left. A more detailed version of the mechanisms of electoral coordination under TRS in Germany and the Netherlands can be found in the case studies (see sections 4.3. and 6.4.).

Why did states under TRS still adopt PR?

If TRS worked as an effective safeguard, why did the right still adopt PR eventually? As pointed out, TRS could be used to restrain the left electoral threat. However, the containment measures that TRS presented were not sufficient enough to completely eliminate the threat in the long run. Coordination was difficult to implement and these challenges explain why PR was eventually adopted despite the benefits of a second round for strategic coordination. There were two scenarios in which coordination efforts became insufficient to contain the left. First, when the left gained an absolute majority, then even coordination of the entire right under TRS was not enough to retain significant representation in parliament, which could be retrieved under PR. Secondly, when the right became too fragmented. Once fragmentation was too high, coordination became too complicated.

[29] For a detailed version of common candidates and electoral alliances under run-off TRS, see Blais and Indridason (2007).

Even with the benefits of a second round, coordination was difficult to conduct effectively in early democratisers with young party and parliamentary systems in place. In particular, when right parties had been opponents before the workers parties developed, which was not uncommon. According to Fisichella (1984), effective party alliances in elections are not easy to establish even today. Parties have to be well-organised and cohesive enough to form them and embedded robustly enough in the electorate for voters to follow their suggestion in round two. Additionally, parties and their voters need to have the "ideological flexibility" to enter into electoral coalitions (Birch 2003, p. 326). Voters are not always inclined to vote for the suggestion of their first round candidate/party after elimination in the first round (Birch 2003, p. 329, Converse, Pierce 1986, p. 391, Criddle 1975). This seems to apply particularly to emerging democracies, as one cannot expect strong party discipline and party identification within a young party system.

However, in developed democracies, Lewis-Beck and Chlarson (2002) and Grunberg (2000) state that in round two left–right political belief is more central for voters than in round one. This suggests that most voters are ready to give their votes to their group's candidate in round two if their party enters an electoral alliance. Additionally, if party identification is too high, the electorate will not vote for the alliance partner but only for their first choice. Hence, a fragmented right can lead to strong wins of the left if party identification is very high on the side of the right voters because they will not coordinate around the strongest right party. In extreme cases, this means that highly identified voters will not vote in the second round of TRS unless their party is taking part in round two.

If TRS was working as a safeguard, why did countries with SMP not adopt TRS before they moved to PR? Some right parties in SMP states indeed made the attempt to switch to TRS before PR, such as the Liberals in Sweden (see Chapter 5) and the Social Liberals in Denmark (see Section 3.2.1.). Moreover, even though actors had thorough knowledge about the different electoral systems across Western Europe, a move to TRS was not always "on the menu". As we now know, even today, TRS

is still overshadowed by the largely debated electoral systems of PR and SMP. TRS was sparsely conceptualised in the 19th century. It did not exist as a category of electoral systems even though it had been used by most of the Western European countries in the past. It was not absent in the debate on new electoral systems, but it was dominated by PR and often seen as another form of SMP.

Conditions and mechanism

The following paragraphs clarify the conditions that have to be met for the theory to work, along with the underlying theoretical mechanism.

One condition for my theoretical process to work is that the incumbent parties interpret the rising left as a potential electoral threat against the prevailing parties and their political power (see Chapter 3). If this is the case, TRS works very much to the disadvantage of the left party. If not, then the right is more inclined to split the vote. Coordination works considerably better against a common enemy. The threat of a working class party trying to change the existing power structure was conducive to strong coordination efforts on the side of right parties, which then led to a significant underrepresentation of the left in parliament (Fisichella 1984). TRS presented an effective containment measure against the uprising left in the 19th and early 20th century. It generally worked in favour of the established right parties, unless the left party was not seen as a substantial threat to the incumbent elites and as a result, they split the vote and did not coordinate properly. In Chapter 3, I illustrate the scope of the threat that the left posed against right parties throughout Western Europe.

What is the theoretical mechanism that leads to better coordination under TRS? TRS mainly provided the political right with two things: time and information for coordination. Firstly, it provided time for the right between the first- and the second round to initiate a "counterstrategy" for the districts where it faced a possible defeat. Secondly, it provided information that was otherwise not available. Opinion polls did not exist at the time and information about the viability and chances of

candidates and parties was difficult to gather. The first round was therefore often a "straw poll" to provide information about candidates (Cox 1997). They were basically a form of "government-financed opinion surveys". The system removed a certain element of uncertainty from elections as it revealed the strength of candidates after the first round before the election outcome was decided. As Birch fittingly puts it, actors had to "reveal the cards halfway through the game" (2003, p. 327). The information from the first round could then be used to bundle resources of the right and strengthen its activities in contested districts and to bargain over candidate withdrawals and alliances. The more organised parties were, the better they were able to exploit additional information and use it to their benefit. Not only were the conservative parties already established and organised while the left was still developing, the right was also backed up by the government (Carstairs 1980) and often used government resources for their coordination efforts.

Additionally, TRS presented an "exit option" after round one (Birch 2003, p. 327). When the outcomes of round one showed that a party did not accomplish what they expected, parties could claim electoral fraud or ballot rigging after the first round (Birch 2003, p. 327).[30] By and large, TRS provided a framework for the incumbent elites to retain their position in parliament as long as the left did not grow too strong.

I study the use of additional information – the key mechanism of my hypothesis – empirically within the historical cases by analysing the coordination behaviour of parties and candidates, mainly after the first round. How much did the incumbent right make use of the obtained information to succeed in round two? Sources by parties, candidates, ministries, and press articles found in archives, parliamentary debates, newspapers, diaries of the actors, and letter correspondence between key actors at the time give information on the scope and detailed process of coordination in early democratisers (see Chapters 3 – 6).

[30] This is also a common scenario in current early democratisers using TRS (Congo, Macedonia, Haiti, Algeria, etc.).

The actors in this study (individual politicians, usually belonging to their party's leadership) hold a similar definition to actors within the Rokkan/Boix framework – rational, strategic, self-interested politicians who are mainly interested in getting and retaining power (Boix 1999, Rokkan 1970). They are rational agents, focused on their short-term election results, acting according to the incentives they face as individuals, constrained by the institutional circumstances (party, coalition, political and electoral system, etc.). Every party is inclined to maximise its parliamentary seats.

Choices of voters and particularly second round choices are expected to be based on a "left – right" spectrum of political parties, with political parties being actors with somewhat consistent political views, ideologies and orientations. For example, if a conservative voter's favourite party is eliminated in the first round, he or she is more likely to vote for another right-wing liberal party in the second round, while a social democratic voter is more likely to vote for a radical liberal party, etc.

I analyse what the decision processes of key actors were that led to the initiation of electoral change, especially on an inter- and intra-party and constituency level. By doing this, I attempt to add empirical evidence of the impact of TRS to the literature and shift the focus of analysis to a lower level of empirical aggregation.

Counterarguments

What are the counter-arguments to and falsification of the TRS hypothesis? The three main counterarguments to my theory are that it was not the left threat that led to the adoption of PR but other mechanisms; that gerrymandering was containing the left threat, not coordination; or that cleavages other than the class cleavage were more important and have split Western European countries.

Instead of the left threat, some scholars argue that economic reasons (Cusack et al 2007), the left's demand for PR (Alesina and Glaeser 2004), or the multi-partism characteristic of TRS (Blais et al. 2005) led to the adoption of PR.

Even though Cusack et al.'s (2007) structural economic argument is an interesting and original argument, I have not found any significant historical evidence for it. In particular, for cross-class support for PR due to coordinated labour markets. For a more detailed dispute of their model, see Chapter 3 (pp. 55 – 57) and Chapter 7 (pp. 201 – 202) and Kreuzer (2010a, 2010b, and web appendix).[31]

As for the left pushing for the adoption of PR, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that it was the left's demand for PR that was responsible for its introduction, not the left threat. However, the SMP cases of Sweden and Denmark (and to a certain degree the Netherlands) show that the social democratic parties did not always push for PR but wanted to benefit from a majoritarian electoral system. Yet, PR was introduced in both states, even earlier than in the rest of Europe (see Chapter 3 and 5). Moreover, in my view, it is not a contradiction to have the left push for PR and at the same time have the right demanding to introduce PR as a safeguard against the left, which in some cases could lead to a consensus for PR. The left might well be pushing for PR because of their dissatisfaction with the negative vote-seat disproportionality (VSD) under TRS or the will to introduce a more proportional electoral system. Simultaneously, the right might expect the left's share of votes to increase so significantly that it has to look for electoral safeguards. This does not mean that the left would eventually obtain the absolute majority in parliament but only that the left threat was large enough to trigger a demand for safeguards on the side of the right.

[31] Furthermore, Cusack et al. (2007) argue that seven countries in 19th century Europe used majority run-off TRS. In fact, it was only Germany and Italy and the Netherlands after 1896 who had majority run-off TRS in place (see Chapter 3).

Blais et al. (2005) argue that less strategic voting under TRS led to a higher number of parties than under SMP and therefore to a larger demand for PR. Furthermore, they state that greater party fragmentation under TRS led to higher uncertainty for political parties and therefore for additional pressure for PR. In their paper, they claim that there was less strategic voting (SV) under TRS than under SMP because voters did not have the necessary information to vote strategically.[32] They assume that voters need less information under SMP than under TRS, because they would only need to determine the strength of two parties under SMP. Under run-off TRS, however, voters would need to know the strength of three parties (M+1 = 3 in round one) and how voters of unsuccessful candidates in round one would split their votes between the leading parties in round two.

The pressures for the adoption of PR in states with multi-partism might be greater than under bipartism since unsatisfied parties in parliament (and government) can increase the pressure for PR. Yet, for strategic voting and strategic coordination to work, voters and parties need reliable data under both electoral systems, which were not given in early democratisers in the 19th century. It seems that strategic voting under SMP in early democratisers has not unfolded to the extent that scholars have assumed in the past (see above, pp. 21-22).[33] SMP did not always lead to two-party systems as Duverger (1954) predicted (Raymond 2015, Shamir 1985). The main reason for this is that the conditions for Duverger's (1954) M+1 argument to hold are that voters are instrumentally rational in the short-term and very well informed about the viability of running candidates (Cox 1997).[34] These conditions do not seem to match early democratisers in the 19th century. Most voters were exposed to elections for

[32] Their work is not based on much historical work. They mainly quote Carstairs (1980).

[33] Duverger (1954) predicts that voters under SMP will only vote for the top-two candidates (Cox named this the "M+1-rule", M=district magnitude) since they do not want to "waste" their vote for candidates that have no chance to win a plurality. Under TRS, M would be the number of candidates that are allowed to enter the second round.

[34] This means, to vote strategically, voters need to have very accurate and publicly available information about candidates and their relative chances. Duverger's argument in regard to the plurality formula,has been exaggerated and is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for bipartism (Cox 1997, p. 96). Cox further states: "If little (or conflicting) information is provided, then greater numbers of sincere voting can be expected, and the tendency toward two viable candidates will be weaker." (1997, p. 97.)

the first time and information about candidates' chances was relatively restricted.[35] Information sources such as electoral opinion polls did not exist at the time (see Chapter 7.2.1, pp. 197-198, for a more comprehensive discussion of the topic).[36] Since there was less strategic voting under SMP than expected, all European systems, except the UK, developed multi-party systems in the 19th century under imperfect (limited) information, whether they had TRS or SMP (Sweden, Denmark) in place (see Chapter 3). In line with my findings, recent research (Raymond 2015) has shown that in Western Europe multi-party systems had emerged under SMP and TRS on a national basis and on a district-level basis before the adoption of PR. Since there was no significantly higher number of parties, there was also not more pressure on PR under SMP. Because party fragmentation under both majoritarian systems is high in scenarios with limited information, Blais et al's (2005) second argument that greater party fragmentation under TRS also leads to higher uncertainty and more pressure for PR does not apply either in the 19th and early 20th century setting. On the contrary, TRS would even give parties and voters more information about party strengths after round one. Hence, under limited information one would assume that TRS leads to more strategic voting and strategic coordination than under SMP, not the other way round.

Ahmed argues that SMP was used as a safeguard too. Why did SMP then not delay PR in the same way as TRS did? Were gerrymandering and malapportionment not responsible for the PR delay? SMP might work as a containment strategy. However, the right could use malapportionment or gerrymandering, which were named as the containment strategies under SMP, only if the left success was geographically concentrated (cf. Ahmed 2013, Rodden 2006). Gerrymandering and

[35] Voters in early democratisers are not familiar with voting processes and systems. They often vote for the first time because of a recent franchise expansion. They need time to develop an understanding of the impact of their vote and the different parties and candidates.

[36] Additionally, SMP districts often had more than two promising candidates (no definite favourites) or it had been unclear which candidate was going to be the runner-up (cf. Fey 1997). Fey (1997) describes in detail how important pre-electoral polls are for voters to coordinate and to reach a Duvergerian outcome (equilibrium). This is often even the case in today's SMP systems. Riker (1976) notes that if there is a sure winner in SMP districts, voters do not vote strategically either.

malapportionment contributed to weak electoral results of the left but once the left's success spread more extensively, these instruments and characteristics could not contain the threat anymore. The left was not just geographically concentrated in Western Europe. It expanded its influence throughout the states. Coordination between right parties was the last method that could be used before a change of the electoral system was necessary to ensure adequate representation of the right in parliament.

"Every vote counts" was the slogan that was heard across the continent, at the time. Was the diffusion of PR not the reason for its adoption across Western Europe? The diffusion of the PR concept from one state to another and a "PR-Zeitgeist" might have contributed to the overall level of "PR-awareness" but these were not the main triggers for the adoption of PR. The adoption of PR was additionally stimulated by PR diffusion. A PR "trend" was, with relatively strong public support, part of the larger trend of European democratisation (Blais et al. 2005). Electoral system reform was enhanced by parties in the national parliaments across Europe around the turn of the century that were broadly unsatisfied with their vote-seat disproportionalities. They were looking for ways for more accurate representation (cf. Rokkan 1970). At the same time, right-wing leaders were looking for effective safeguards and closely observed electoral reform in other European states (see Chapter 5 – 7) (Weyland 2010). This development was rather an active learning process than diffusion. Furthermore, right wing politicians were aware of PR long before they eventually adopted it. They were actively delaying the adoption. Diffusion is therefore not a valid counterargument. It was triggered by a left threat and was part of the process of PR adoption.[37]

The theoretical model of this study is based upon a right-left class cleavage that leads to a political contest between right and left, and leads to the right coordinating against the common threat represented by increasingly successful working class parties. What role did possible cross-cutting cleavages such as religion or language play in splitting the right and hindering coordination? Cross-

[37] For further diffusion literature, see Dobbin et al. (2007); Elkins (2010); Elkins & Simmons (2004); Weyland (2009).

cutting cleavages existed to a certain extent in some Western European countries. Different languages and religious identities were politicised and organised in a few states. Yet, the religion and language cleavages were not as strong of a pattern as the class cleavage (a significant division can only be observed in the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland). Recent research shows that the emergence of the class cleavage was the main cleavage of the 19th and early 20th century, letting left parties to contest against right parties across countries and helped to sustain the left movement (Raymond 2015). Societal class was mainly independent from most other identities. However, class cleavages were even deeper when pre-existing groups were not strong. Religious cross-cutting cleavages could potentially reduce the electoral potential of a left party because it could reduce the lower-class constituency (Bartolini 2007, p. 455, Kalyvas 1996). It could also lead to larger fragmentation of the right due to additional cleavages. Here, TRS was a "smoothing factor" that was conducive to coordination among a fragmented right. The additional cleavage could be slightly absorbed through TRS to a certain extent. Other cleavages might have softened its effect but did not undermine it completely.

Lib-Lab coalitions could be another reason for weaker coordination between liberal and conservative right-wing parties and therefore lead to a theoretical softening of the argument that the right coordinated against a rising left. However, in general, Lib-Lab coalitions occurred only in the UK and in Scandinavia and were relatively weak or impermanent. In all cases, the tensions within liberalism during the phase of cooperation with the left eventually split the liberals and ended Lib-Lab coalitions (Bartolini 2007, p. 416).

2.2. Research design

In this dissertation, comparative historical case studies are employed to illustrate the general theoretical account and unique variations among the cases. In line with recent quests for more multi-method methodologies in comparative politics research (Collier et al. 2010, Lieberman 2005, Møller, Skaaning 2015), specifically in regard to electoral system choice (Emmenegger, Petersen 2015), a combination of medium-N cross-sectional analysis and in-depth case studies is applied.

> "While such research designs are often challenging in practice, they have the great potential to allow researchers to overcome the limitations of medium- to large-N cross-sectional analyses without abandoning the goal of drawing meaningful inferences that can be generalized to a comparatively large population of cases (Emmenegger, Petersen 2015, p. 3)."

The nested analysis joins the in-depth analysis of three cases with a broader examination of Western Europe as a whole (see Chapter 3) to increase internal (case studies) and external validity (medium-N) of the findings. The medium-N analysis drives the case selection for the in-depth case studies, "provides direction for more focused case studies and comparisons", and builds the framework for the case-analysis (Lieberman 2005, p. 435). Small-N analyses on the other hand, are applied to evaluate the plausibility of the detected interactions between variables and to create theoretical findings from the cases (Lieberman 2005, p. 435). This approach promises to make convincing causal inferences within this cross-national comparative research. Causal analysis and the use of methodical and contextualised comparison are implemented together with accurate textual analysis of electoral reforms and their historical context. [38] Historical knowledge is used to advance systematic causal mechanisms (Bennett, Elman 2006, George, Bennett 2005, Brady, Collier 2010).

[38] For a comprehensive overview on existing comparative historical studies and research methods, see Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003).

To understand the origins of electoral systems I am building upon existing scholarship on the histories of parties and interest groups using primary and secondary literature. I am making use of the following sources: legislative texts, historical sources and press articles, election results (victory margins, first vs. second round results, vote–seat disproportionalities, the scale of the left threat – percentage of votes of left parties vs. right parties; including first and second rounds), data on voter turnout, for the voter analysis – average income of classes, size of the labour force and case studies of party campaigns. I draw on personal correspondence between party leaders and civil servants, as well as public speeches, especially in regard to party coordination. Additionally, publications of the different electoral reform societies of the 19th century and parliamentary transcripts of debates in national parliaments have been used. The work is based on travels to Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, where semi-structured interviews with experts in the field of historical electoral system change in the corresponding case study countries were conducted. These qualitative sources largely represent elite-level evidence.

Case selection

Recent scholarly work looking at the origins of electoral systems has mostly been on cases of the post-World War II period, many observing former communist countries (Bawn 1993, Shugart 1992), or Africa (Mozaffar, Vengroff 2002, Reynolds 1999). The origins of electoral systems of some early democratisers of the 19th century are still underdeveloped. Even though we have seen plenty of historical case studies of European early democratisers (19th and 20th century), including electoral system change, many aspects and cases have been left uncovered.[39] Extensive historical case studies

[39] For recent historical studies of 19th century Europe, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2000); Berman (2007); Ziblatt (2008). For studies related to electoral system change, see Ahmed (2013), Boix (2010); Cusack et al. (2007); Kreuzer (2010).

on electoral system change in Western Europe have mainly focused on larger states and on the decision between SMP and PR. They have not covered TRS. This thesis is an attempt to fill this gap.

The study focuses on three paradigmatic cases. On the basis of Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, it is attempting to illustrate the different impacts of TRS and SMP on the adoption of PR under electoral threat from the left. It also analyses the debate about the electoral system, especially between and within political parties. The cases were selected for several reasons. The typology of Table 2 highlights that the different existing electoral systems in the 12 Western European countries relevant for this study led to varying PR outcomes in three scenarios. The selected cases represent both starting points (two TRS cases vs. one SMP case) that have led to the adoption of PR. Two TRS cases were chosen, as it is TRS that is the driver of the causal process of the thesis. All three cases were chosen to be from the 3rd scenario of Table 2 (bottom cells of the table) – states with a strong left threat and a fragmented right. Under the "fragmented right" scenario, the independent variable, "existing electoral system" has to "work harder" for coordination to work as under the scenario with an existing "dominant right party". The dominant right party also leads to coordination of the right. A case from the scenario "dominant right party" could dilute the causal process and make it even more difficult to isolate variables. This selection makes the process clearer and less biased. It is therefore a theory-driven case selection that is implemented to enhance the leverage of the study. The selection was driven by an early evaluation of PR adoption, the different electoral systems in place, the left threat and the fragmentation of the right across Western Europe. Some of these cases are better suited for the phenomena studied in this thesis (scenario 3) than others and still provide us with the necessary historical data to conduct the study. Additionally, it is useful to focus on cases that have not been analysed extensively. In particular, for the Dutch and the Swedish cases, little is known outside these countries about the processes before the adoption of PR and the extent of analytical

literature in the English language is small. They have also rarely been included in broader comparative studies.[40]

The timeframe of the cases is between the first general elections for a national assembly and the introduction of PR.

- TRS: Germany (1871 – 1919)
  Netherlands (1848 – 1917)
- SMP: Sweden (1866 – 1909)

These cases are geographically, culturally, ethnically and in regards to their political system, very similar. This is necessary to make the most of the comparative scheme of the thesis, to show the institutional effects most effectively and guarantee the applicability of the findings to "most-similar" cases. The Western European cases all developed a relatively strong left that was electorally viable and achieved a significant share of votes and seats in parliament. All three core cases (Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands) were constitutional monarchies and so were almost all cases in Western Europe at the time, which are analysed in this study, except Switzerland. Yet, the governments of these "early democratisers" became increasingly more accountable to the national parliaments. Their political systems were vital enough to analyse the impact of coordination on electoral system change. Furthermore, their level of industrialisation, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, and their degree of urbanisation were relatively similar as well (Bartolini 2007). A careful re-examination of these cases promises to generate important empirical insights and theoretical development on electoral system

[40] Why are the other cases of Scenario 3 (strong left, fragmented right) less suitable for the extensive case study chapters? The SMP case Finland only gained full independence from Russia in 1917, yet, it was included in the universe as it was relatively independent as a Grand duchy. For the TRS cases, Norway only gained independence from Sweden in 1905. TRS in France is a case that has been widely discussed in the recent literature as it is the only Western European case that still has TRS in place. The study therefore focuses on the less well-known cases of Sweden, the Netherlands and imperial Germany. For a more detailed version of the universe of the study, see chapter 3, pp. 50-51.

reform and its origins. It is likely to detect influences of early democratic decision making for the larger picture of democratisation. The origins and ramifications of the different electoral systems and TRS in particular make these cases particularly interesting (Rodden 2007).

The German case has played a large role in most theories that are concerned with the move to PR (Cusack et al. 2007, Cusack et al. 2010, Kreuzer 2010a). Firstly, it is used as a paragon for the political Rokkanian (1970) thesis of the threat of the rising left as the projecting force that leads to pro-PR positions of right-wing parties (George, Bennett 2005). The German liberal parties, however, supported the introduction of PR and Rokkan's theory lacks a possible explanation for this. Secondly, Germany is also the case that motivates the economic theories of the adoption of PR (Cusack et al. 2007). Hence, the case is used for two diverging explanations and is therefore worth re-examining.

The Swedish case shows how right parties could not contain the left threat under SMP, which led to the adoption of PR as a safeguard relatively early because the right was not able to coordinate their votes. Sweden is one of the few SMP cases within Western Europe and theoretically still significantly less developed than other cases.

The Dutch case is particularly interesting because incumbent elites changed the system from majority-plurality TRS to majority run-off TRS after almost 50 years to then adopt PR around 20 years later. It is expected that large insights are to be gained from this extraordinary electoral change. In particular, in terms of the motives for the first change from one TRS form to another. Did incumbents expect to better contain the left threat under run-off TRS?

The typology of European cases does not include Luxembourg, Liechtenstein and Malta since these very small states were deemed unsuitable as role model cases and therefore not very valuable for generalisation purposes. The Western European cases Spain, Greece and Portugal adopted PR

significantly later than the discussed cases.[41] Most Central and Eastern European cases were not independent states at the time and are therefore excluded. These states were part of the larger empires Austria-Hungary, the Russian Empire and the German Empire.[42]

The remaining Eastern European cases, which were independent states (Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania) only had some quasi-democratic spells and were also not included in the universe. Bulgaria had a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system in place before the adoption of PR in 1912 (Nohlen 2010, p. 361). The first electoral system that Serbia introduced was PR right away. List PR was directly introduced with the first electoral law under the constitution in 1890. They did not have a majoritarian electoral system in place beforehand and can therefore not be used for the purposes of our SMP vs. TRS comparison.

The remaining Eastern European cases only had some quasi-democratic spells. However, they are not included in the case universe for the following reasons. Bulgaria was not included because it had SNTV in place before the adoption of PR in 1912. The first electoral system that Serbia introduced was PR right away.

Romania had several electoral systems in place before 1922 (Nohlen 2010, p. 1582), of which one was TRS and one PR (between 1918 and 1926). Yet, political participation rates were very low in

[41] Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland are not included in the analysis for the following reasons: a) The southern states of Spain, Portugal and Greece only introduced full PR significantly later and if they held elections, they had several different periods with alternating electoral systems. b) Spain only introduced PR after the Franco regime in 1977. Before this, several different electoral systems were in place: majority-plurality TRS (1836 - 1865); mixed system of SMP and MMP (1865 – 1890), limited vote (LV) (1890 – 1920), and afterwards, a mixed system of SMP, MMP and LV. c) In Greece, majority TRS with as many rounds as needed until one contestant had the absolute majority was in place from 1844 until 1864, followed by a period of SMP and MMP (1864 – 1926) and a period of alternating systems of PR (only three elections) and SMP (1926 – 1936). Full PR was only introduced in 1958. d) In Portugal, majority-plurality TRS was used between 1852 and 1884, then came a period of alternating systems between 1884 and 1926 (SMP and LV in multi-member constituencies). PR was implemented in 1975. In 1911, the revolution forced constitutional change and left-wing leaders introduced PR. However, it was not a very democratic system. e) Ireland has used a single transferable vote (STV) formula in multi-member constituencies since its independence in 1922.

[42] Central and Eastern European cases are mainly not included in the universe because most of them did not exist before World War One as they were all parts of different empires. This is the case for all Central and Eastern European states except Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania, which were all granted independence after the Russo-Turkish War at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 (before they were all part of the Ottoman Empire). Austria, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were all part of Austria-Hungary. The Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were all part of the Russian Empire. Poland was part of the German and the Russian Empire at the time.

Romania. This thesis is concerned with early democratisers and their early or late adoption of PR and how this timing is dependent on strategic coordination among right wing parties. The universe of cases is therefore limited to states (early democratisers), which fulfil a minimum criteria of democratic parliamentary elections. Dahl (1991) defines the two main dimensions of democracy as 1) political competition between parties and candidates and 2) political participation of the citizens. Most minimalist definitions of democracy focus only on popular participation and electoral democracy, such as the ones of Przeworski et al. (2000), Schmitter (1991) and O'Donnell (2007). All our cases have "contested parliamentary elections" in place and a significant level of participation. "Contested" means that more than one party is competing for representation in parliament (Przeworski et al. 2000). The level of political participation is measured by Vanhanen's (2000) participation index ("total votes/total population").

The analysis of mechanisms that are used to prolong the adoption of certain electoral systems only promises substantial findings, when competitive elections and significant participation rates exist. The exploitation of electoral systems as safeguards is less important, when a minimum of democratic criterions are not met. Furthermore, participation rates and the expansion of suffrage are an integral component of the theoretical mechanism of this thesis, and electoral system change in the 19th and early 20th century Western Europe more broadly. States without a certain degree of enfranchisement cannot be used to effectively show the coordinative process under different majoritarian systems before the adoption of PR. All countries of the universe have a relatively high degree of participation before the adoption of PR. The expansion of suffrage led to a growing left, containment efforts on the right and eventually the adoption of PR. The enfranchisement is at least double-digit in all cases in the last election before PR (electorate in per cent of the population >20 years of age), in most cases much higher.[43] The average of the "electorate in per cent of the population 20 years and older" was

[43] Except Finland, which has almost 10 per cent.

35.38 per cent (all cases; own calculations) (Bartolini 1996). The average of "voters as a percentage of the total population" was 15.44 (Vanhanen 2000). Appendix 21 shows detailed participation rates for all European countries that had a majoritarian electoral system in place at the time (all states that are part of the universe).[44]

In Romania, however, only 0.6 per cent of all citizens elected almost 80 per cent of all parliamentarians in the elections before the adoption of PR and the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1919 (also "the first fair and free elections") (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 1042) (they had a complicated estate voting system in place). The other 20 per cent were elected via delegates, not in direct elections as it was the case in all Western European states in the elections before the adoption of PR. Romania's participation rates would be by far the lowest if compared to other Western European cases at the time. In the last election before PR, 1.2 per cent of Romania's total population was allowed to vote (Vanhanen 2000). In elections for the upper chamber only 0.3 to 0.4 per cent (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 1038). In addition, PR was only adopted in parts of Romania (Bessarabia), not in the entire country (Bukovina and Transylvania still used an absolute majoritarian system). Romania is therefore also not part of the case universe.[45]

The time frame of this thesis is until around World War I. Expanding the cases after this point in time would go beyond the scope of this thesis.

Historical case studies

Why are "historical case studies" the right technique to use for this research project? Is institutional change only driven by important historical events and the consequential critical junctures, or should it rather be understood as a process of many small-scale decisions and events that lead to greater institutional changes? Focusing only on the large critical junctures of history implies a dichotomous

[44] Except Romania, which is covered in the following paragraph.
[45] For further details about these cases, see Nohlen (2010) and Sternberger, Vogel (1969).

definition of institutional development and democratisation. The long-run development of political institutions itself, however, is a consequence of the sum of historical episodes of institutional changes (Capoccia, Ziblatt 2010). Does the focus on smaller timeframes not tempt us to ignore potential insightful moments of institutionalisation and democratisation within otherwise authoritarian systems? If we define them as gradual processes, we should also analyse the stages of institutional change before suffrage expansion. This would incorporate the relevance of pre-democratic elites as precursors of democracy that have played a large role in the prehistory of democratisation and enable us to better understand the origins of the process. Shifting the analytical focus from the large critical junctures to the long-lasting process of democratisation helps to uncover "smaller" critical junctures and to avoid potential misleading conclusions, which occur if one concentrates solely on "large-scale events". Therefore, we should extend our case studies to the introduction of the first electoral systems and analyse the political situation, political ideologies and societal structures involved in previous and subsequent processes.

For years, scholars have tested the effects of electoral systems on different variables under different conditions, making use of time-series and cross-sectional data. Large samples of data over long timeframes have been used to perform advanced statistical tests. They have all faced endogeneity challenges in their search for clean instruments and control variables (Acemoglu 2005, Persson, Tabellini 2003). The focus on statistical correlations can result in neglecting the identification of the micro-foundations of decision-making mentioned above. Recent research has emphasised that comparative work should concentrate further on the decision-making process of actors and "read history forward" instead of reading backward from outcomes (Ahmed 2013, Capoccia, Kelemen 2007, Capoccia, Ziblatt 2010, Pierson 2004). "Theory-guided historical analysis" is important to construct and understand quantitative models but, further than that, it is necessary to utilise concepts of "analytical history" to progress in the field of comparative institutional research (Rodden 2007). Actors

operate and make decisions not in a vacuum. It is therefore essential to extensively analyse the background and circumstances that decisions were made in. Understanding the choices key actors have made is only possible if we examine the previous history of actors, institutionalisation and democratisation. Qualitative case studies allow us to reconstruct the ruling elite's preferences, beliefs and evaluations of alternatives, expectations, strategies and constraints and therefore understand the basis on which the actors made decisions (Bates et al. 1998). This is necessary to properly conduct a historical decision-process analysis of institutional change and as a result, identify causal mechanisms (Hall 2008, Katznelson, Weingast 2007). In regard to electoral system choice, electoral reform packages often include several political issues, such as suffrage expansion and electoral system change. Therefore, we need in-depth case studies to differentiate between the individual reforms and the corresponding preferences of political actors.

Historical case studies cope with three crucial pitfalls of democratisation studies, named by Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010): recurring empirical anomalies, misconstruing of how events unfolded and ambiguities in causal claims. The results of the quantitative cross-national analysis and case studies, which are limited to the great critical junctures, show these pitfalls. According to Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010), they lead to three methodological problems: the ignorance of causal heterogeneity, the deficient consideration of micro-foundations, and the non-accounting for reciprocal causality between the variables. Since electoral system reform can be triggered by different, often interdependent variables, for different reasons, at different times, it is almost impossible to cope with these issues while using purely quantitative statistical tests. Using cross-national analysis, one needs to assume the independence of the individual variables. Causal logics of electoral system reform are, however, not homogenous. Certain variables that have led to electoral system reform in one case might have triggered electoral system reform due to completely different effects in another case. One can overcome these issues by the use of historical case studies. In regard to the stated counterarguments

to my theoretical contribution, historical case studies are a tool that can cope with them in a sufficient manner by including factors such as religious cleavages and Lib-Lab coalitions.

Most historical case studies of institutional development focus on precise moments in history to analyse the specific events and their circumstances, typically when reforms were implemented or the system crossed a defined threshold (often suffrage expansion, the crossing of a democratic threshold or the adoption of PR) instead of focusing on a development of a longer timeframe that can better show the causal mechanisms (Capoccia, Ziblatt 2010).[46] The application of concepts with an "ahistorical" view (Capoccia, Ziblatt 2010, Ziblatt 2006) and the measurement of variables on a level of analysis that is too aggregated (Cox 1997) illustrate that the field would benefit from further analysis of longer historical passages, detecting the causal path behind actors' decision-making. Additional historical evidence on the origins of electoral system reform and TRS in particular would contribute to more robust research. This dissertation thus attempts to fill a part of this gap in comparative political research. I start by giving an overview of the electoral transformation in 12 Western European countries in the next chapter.

[46] The assumption behind this approach is that it is easier to identify which actors and circumstances were crucial for the events to happen. For comprehensive historical studies of democratisation of different cases, see Barrington Moore Jr. (1966); Collier (1999); O'Donnell (1973); Rueschemeyer et al. (1992). One of the first modern comparative historical studies was Weber (1906).

3. Electoral transformation in Western Europe in the 19th and early 20th century: An overview of the region

This chapter gives an overview of the electoral systems in Western European states. It aims to show which electoral system was place in each state, what changes were made to it and most importantly, how this change came about and why some states adopted PR earlier than others. Before we go into the analysis of these 11 countries, we look firstly at the general rise of the left, which was closely connected with the expansion of suffrage. Then, we look at the right's reaction and the containment of this threat, which culminated in the adoption of PR.

During the process of democratisation in the 19th and early 20th century, many countries had different electoral systems in place. The electoral systems at the beginning of the 19th century were variations of single and multi-member districts that were elected under majority or plurality rule. These can mainly be divided into two groups: SMP in the UK (which was the only European country that maintained SMP) and the Scandinavian countries, namely Sweden, Denmark and Finland; and TRS in the rest of continental Europe. The reform of electoral systems before the introduction of universal suffrage had not been under particular observation by academics or politicians. When more countries began to introduce democratic systems during the first wave of democratisation, the actual design of electoral systems started to attract attention. Suddenly, different facets of electoral systems began to be evaluated and promoted by various actors for numerous reasons. Many countries adopted PR in the beginning of the 20th century. The period of institutional change calmed down around the time of World War II. By then, states were either using PR or SMP. Since then, the debate has centred on what leads states to the introduction of different electoral systems. The main question has been why these countries have adopted PR and others have not.

A lack of historical knowledge in regard to the adoption of PR (Kreuzer 2010a) in Western Europe has led to a conceptual negligence – a misconceived starting point that is assumed in most theories. As pointed out in the last chapter, the "starting point" (the electoral system that was in place before the adoption of PR/the maintaining of SMP) of most of the 19th century early democratisers was not SMP but TRS. TRS, however, is until today still a somewhat blank area on the map of comparative politics research. Furthermore, the question of whether the differences between SMP and TRS have led to different electoral system reforms has not yet been analysed.

During the 19th century, across all Western European countries, labour movements emerged, followed by subsequent electoral threats of left parties against the incumbent elites, traditionally conservative and liberal parties. This was particularly the case in the context of the gradual expansion of suffrage. Eventually, the introduction of universal male suffrage led to a new segment of the electorate – the workers – most of whom did not meet the wage, property or educational restrictions that had been in place before. Since they were most likely to vote for the new workers parties of the left, the political right started to get nervous once the debate about universal male suffrage began. The industrialised workforces, with their growing degree of organisation, triggered a vast fear of marginalisation of political power within Western European right parties due to their support of the rising left parties. This led to intense debates within the right parties as to what safeguards they should adopt and which electoral system would be most effective against the rising left power. These debates were not only lively within the right spectrum, but the left discussed the different electoral systems for seat-maximisation purposes as well. After repression and accommodation efforts had been employed, PR was the last but most popular safeguard adopted by the right to accompany the expansion of suffrage. Table 3 shows that in many of the Western European countries, PR and universal male suffrage were introduced at the same time.

Table 3: Universal male suffrage and the adoption of PR[47]

Country	Universal male suffrage	Adoption of PR (law)
Germany	1867	1918
Italy	1919	1919
France	1875	1918
Netherlands	1917	1917
Belgium	1892	1899
Switzerland	1848	1918
Norway	1897	1919
Sweden	1907	1907
Denmark	1915 (w)	1915
Finland	1906	1906
UK	1918	-

Industrialisation and urbanisation were the preconditions for the strong growth of the left in the 19th century. These processes generated and deepened the social issues and complaints of the working classes. At the same time, they laid the groundwork for these issues to become drivers of working class mobilisation. The argument that there is a correlation between industrialisation, the number of industrial workers, working-class organisation, and electoral success of the political left has been present in political science and historical literature for a long time (Bartolini 2007, pp. 122ff.). The enormous growth of the working class led to a demand for political representation of the workers, which was soon met by workers' parties across Western Europe. By 1905, there was an institutionalised left party in all states. Their aim was mainly to adopt universal suffrage and stand up for better working conditions. They grew significantly in members and soon in parliamentary representation.

The incumbent right parties, mainly liberal and conservative parties, had existed as loose groups before they started to organise themselves in parties in the 1870s (Bartolini 2007, Caramani 2004b). Often the main right parties disfavoured each other and had been opponents for years. The right was

[47] "w" = women's suffrage was introduced together with universal male suffrage.

split across several cleavages depending on the country, such as centre periphery, religion or ethnicity.[48] The most common reasons were class related. Liberals often represented the middle class and the bourgeoisie; conservatives the landed upper class and the state elites. The Liberals mostly wanted to eradicate trade barriers and advocated for free trade, while conservatives were more protective.[49]

Table 4: Fragmentation of right wing parties in Western Europe before PR adoption[50]

Country	ES	Dominant right?	Number of non-socialist parties	ENEP	Last election before PR	Dominant right party
Germany	TRS	No	6	5.78	1912	
France		No	4	2.9	1914	
Netherlands		No	6	5.13	1913	
Norway		No	4	2.32	1915	
Italy		Yes	4	3.05	1913	Liberals
Switzerland		Yes	4	2.16	1917	Liberals
Belgium		Yes	3	1.91	1898	Catholics
Sweden	SMP	No	4	2	1905	
Finland		No	3	2.63	1905	
Denmark		Yes	3	2.9	1913	Liberals
UK		Yes	3	2.47	1922	Conservatives

Table 5 shows the electoral formulas of Western Europe in the 19th and early 20th century. Column 3 of the table shows the fragmentation of the right (Yes/No). It is characterised by the existence of a dominant right party, around which it is relatively simple to coordinate.[51] More than one right-wing party existed in all Western European states at the time (see Table 4); in five of them, even more than five parties. In four countries, there was one dominant right party: The Liberals dominated

[48] See Lipset and Rokkan (1967) for a comprehensive analysis of cleavages.

[49] The terms bourgeoisie, business-class and business elites are in parts used synonymously. The term bourgeoisie refers specifically to the capital holding and property owning parts of society, not the middle-class.

[50] The table shows the ENEP (effective number of electoral parties) of electoral viable non-socialist parties in the last election before the adoption of PR (own calculations based on votes in first round, not including "miscaleanous" and independents. Based on Laakso and Taagepera (1979). For details, see Footnote 18. Further notes: Sweden: not including farmers parties since the exact electoral results of the farmers parties do not exist; Finland: numbers from 1907 election used; UK: Conservative, Liberal, National Liberal parties and several small political groups.

[51] Existence of one dominating right party: No fragmented right (No); non-existence of a dominating right party: fragmented right (Yes).

the right camp in Denmark, Italy and Switzerland; the Catholics in Belgium and the Conservatives in the UK. These are the cases of the second scenario of the theoretical model (see Table 2).

Once the left grew, the incumbent rightist elites began to fear a significant loss of political power from the incumbents to the working class. The left rise could lead to a change of the status quo – a modification of power, influence and political control. Once the left started to pose a threat, some right parties that had been political antagonists for many years started to consider working together against the working class parties. Repression and containment measures were used to keep the workers' class in check before pressures for universal suffrage grew even stronger and became inevitable at some point. Often this was the moment when right parties recognised the definite need for a switch from majoritarian electoral systems to PR, since PR could guarantee them sufficient representation in parliament and accompany universal suffrage. Yet, the right opposed PR initially because they did not want to give way to a long-term ensured representation of the left if it was not truly necessary. Therefore, they tried to delay the adoption of PR.

Table 5: Electoral Formulas in Western Europe in the 19th and early 20th century[52]

1	2		3	4	5	6	7	8
Country	Electoral system in place before PR adoption (law introduced)		Frag-mented right	Adoption of PR (law)	Electoral threat of left parties (year)	**Length of sustained threat***	**Average sustained threat**	Left threat by
Germany	TRS	Majority run-off TRS (1871)	Yes	1918	1884	34		German Social Democratic Party (SPD)
France		Majority-plurality TRS (1789) (3 rounds until 1848), alternating with run-off TRS; after PR back to TRS in 1927	Yes	1918	1898	20		French Socialist Party (SFIO)
Netherlands		Majority-plurality TRS (1848); after 1896 maj. run-off TRS	Yes	1917	1901	16		Social Democratic Worker's Party (SDAP)
Norway		Majority-plurality TRS (1905)	Yes	1919	1903	16	18.4	Social Democratic Party (DNA)
Italy		Majority run-off TRS (1861)	No	1919	1900	19		Italian Socialist Party (PSI)
Switzerland		Majority-plurality TRS (1850) (3 rounds until 1900)	No	1918	1899	19		Social Democratic Party (PS)
Belgium		Majority-plurality TRS (1831)	No	1899	1894	5		Belgian Workers Party (POB)
Sweden	SMP	SMP (1866), gradually also MMD	Yes	1907	1905	2	7.0	Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP)
Finland		Diet of Estates (form of SMP) (1869)	Yes	1906	1907	-1		Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP)
Denmark		SMP (1849)	No	1915	1895	20		Danish Social Democratic Party (SD)
UK		SMP (1884); before MMP (1832)	No	-	1910	-	-	British Labour Party (BLP)

[52] Finland introduced PR in anticipation of the electoral threat of the left (Ahmed 2012). Sources: Boix (1999); Carstairs (1980); Colomer (2004); Kreuzer (2010); Nohlen (1978); Vanhanen (1976); von Beyme (1982) and own case studies,

Column 6 of Table 5 shows how long the incumbent elites were able to wait to introduce PR after the left threat emerged (see column: "length of sustained threat"). The value is calculated by subtracting the "electoral threat of left parties" (year in which the left threat became evident; column 5) from the "adoption of PR" (year of the adoption of PR by law; column 4).[53] A left party is considered an apparent electoral threat if it gained at least 10 per cent of the vote in the first round of national parliamentary elections. A 10 per cent threshold is used since the years in which the left parties reached 10 per cent were in almost all cases the ones in which they gained a very significant share of votes compared to the previous election. The historical research of this study shows that the right parties became much more aware of the left threat once their votes reached a threshold of at least 10 per cent (see below). The measure implicitly includes the right party's anticipation of the future development of the left parties. The choice of an electoral reform was dependent on the right's calculations of possible future left majorities. A left party that had obtained a double-digit result nationwide posed a serious threat to the right even if it did not come close to an actual majority at this moment in time.[54]

see Chapter 3 – 6. The average sustained threat is not distinguished between dominant and fragmented right because it is difficult to differentiate between the effect of the dominant right and the effect of the electoral system on coordination between right parties.

[53] The "length of sustained threat" measure is not a function of the earliness of the left threat under TRS. It is a relative measure that shows the timeframe between the start of a "left threat" and the "adoption of PR". The year of the emergence of the left threat in TRS and SMP cases varies significantly throughout the universe. The same is the case for the years of the adoption of PR. Not only is the "length of sustained threat" measure shorter under SMP; SMP cases also adopted PR earlier than TRS in absolute terms (year). The initial emergence of the left threat was not different under SMP or TRS. In fact, the left emerged at very different times no matter what electoral system was in place.
There was also no significant amount of strategic coordination among the entire right before the emergence of a left threat. Hence, the electoral system did not delay the emergence of the left threat in the first place. Coordination against the left only emerged once the threat became clearly evident (for a more detailed analysis of this, see the case studies in Chapter 3 – 6).
Early electoral developments of the left were mainly dependent on suffrage expansion, the size of the electorate and social mobilisation, not the electoral system itself (Bartolini 2007, pp. 225ff). Furthermore, the emergence of the left had different timing across both groups of electoral systems (TRS and SMP). Germany, Denmark, France and Switzerland, for instance, were rather early leftist movements and extended the franchise earlier, whereas Italy, Finland and Sweden could be classified as laggards in regard to enfranchisement and the emergence of the left (Bartolini 2007, p. 227). These findings are in line with my "electoral threat of left parties" measure.

[54] Election result of left party when threat became apparent to right parties (in per cent): Germany 9.7; Italy 13; Netherlands 9.5; Belgium 18.4; Norway 9.7; Sweden 10; Denmark 12.9; Finland 37; France 9.6.

The 10 per cent election result threshold is robust as shown in Table 6. It shows the calculated sustained threat for all Western European countries from 8 until 15 per cent and the corresponding average sustained threat for TRS and SMP.[55] Additionally, it depicts the values for the beginning of an "ideologically radical left" (ideol. radical), developed by Ahmed (2013, p. 62), which could have led to additional pressure on the right, the perception of the left threat and ultimately, the adoption of PR. No matter which measure we are applying, the "sustained threat" values are relatively in line with the 10 per cent threshold that we have developed from historical work. All show a distinct difference between both electoral systems: a longer period for TRS and a shorter period for SMP. For more detailed numbers and years, see Appendix 18.[56]

Table 6: Robustness of 10 per cent threshold for left threat

Country	ES	Sustained threat							Average sustained threat						
		8%	9%	10%	11%	12%	15%	Ideol. radical	8%	9%	10%	11%	12%	15%	Ideol. radical
Germany	TRS	41	41	34	28	28	28	27	19.4	19.4	18.4	16.1	15.0	11.7	19.2
France		20	20	20	20	12	4								
Netherlands		16	16	16	12	12	4	23							
Norway		16	16	16	13	13	13	28							
Italy		19	19	19	19	19	15								
Switzerland		19	19	19	16	16	13	4							
Belgium		5	5	5	5	5	5	14							
Sweden	SMP	2	2	2	-1	-1	-1	11	8.0	8.0	7.0	6.0	5.0	4.0	7.0
Finland		-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1							
Denmark		23	23	20	20	17	14	9							

I argue that it is the electoral success of political workers' parties that actually scared the incumbent right and led them to the use of electoral safeguards. The threat manifested itself in the

[55] 10 per cent threshold cannot explain everything but gives us an accurate indication of the strength of the left.

[56] Even if one subtracts the four years of WWI (1914-1918) for the countries that were involved in it (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium), in which electoral reforms were secondary to more pressing issues and therefore might have been postponed, the results are still robust (see column "10 % - WWI" in Appendix 18).

increase in votes in parliamentary elections. In the first place, political actors of the right were afraid of losing political power to the working class (class cleavage). It was secondary to them whether they lost it to a more radical or a more reformist left-wing party. The electoral threat was driven by the potential size of the left, not its distinct ideology in each country.[57] This becomes apparent when one looks at the first containment measures that were used against the left. These measures were applied when the left gained a significant number of votes in national elections, which was long before some Western European left parties became radical (see Chapter 3.1 – 3.3. and Chapters 4 – 6).[58]

The average number of years of sustained threat under TRS is very high, with an average of 18.4 years compared to an average of 7.0 years under SMP (see column 7 of Table 5). Not only did the cases with SMP in place introduce PR at an earlier time (1906; 1909; 1915) compared to the TRS cases (almost all of which introduced PR in 1918/19)[59], the average length of the sustained threat under SMP was also significantly shorter than it was under TRS. I argue that this is the case because electoral coordination of right parties could be applied more effectively under TRS than under SMP systems. Therefore, TRS states were able to contain the left threat for a longer period of time than the SMP cases were able to. I demonstrate this in the current chapter by outlining the main electoral systems of Western Europe during the 19th and early 20th century and their distinct drivers of change.[60]

The right parties faced strong left threats in all states and eventually adopted PR as a safeguard to accompany suffrage expansion. Left threats evolved at different times but in most cases, the right parties were able to engage in coordination to contain them. The UK and France were two exceptions.

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[57] Although, this measure being equal, an ideologically more radical left could increase the fear of the right, compared to a more reformist left. However, the left did not need to be radical to pose a threat.

[58] Other measures such as urbanisation and industrialisation come short in explaining the left threat. Urbanisation alone was not a distinct signal for a larger left threat before 1930 (correlation before 1930 on different levels of city sizes was mostly negative) (Bartolini 2007, p. 167). Industrialisation figures do not include how organised the political party was and the "number of union members" has to be interpreted differently for each country, since the extent of affiliations between left parties and unions varied significantly.

[59] Belgium is an exception of this.

[60] Electoral results in this chapter are based on Nohlen & Stoever (2010) and Caramani (2000a).

The left in the UK was the only left party in Western Europe that was not seen as a threat. The UK's Liberals thought they could integrate and monopolise the left and therefore did not use PR as a safeguard. France adopted PR in 1919 to deal with the growing Communist party but their attempt failed and TRS was again reintroduced in 1927.

Finland and Belgium are exceptional cases in regard to their "electoral threat of left parties" score because in both cases, the measure is somewhat misleading. With 37 per cent in their very first election in 1907, the Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP) obtained an incredible result. Likewise, the Belgium Worker's Party (POB) won 18.4 per cent in its first election in 1884 (see Chapter 3.2.2.). The left threat in these states had been evident before but neither party ran in previous elections. That is why there is a negative "length of sustained threat" score for Finland and a very low score for Belgium.[61] In both cases, PR was introduced in anticipation of a very strong left threat (cf. Ahmed 2013 and Chapter 3.2.2.).

For the TRS cases (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway and France), the termination of TRS coincided with the introduction of PR. The most common form of TRS was a combination with SMDs, but it was also possible to have multi-member districts (MMDs) in place. This was the case in Belgium and Switzerland.[62] All other states used SMDs as most states do today.

The variety and differences between the cases makes the attempt of a theoretical framework for the timing of the adoption of PR extremely difficult. For an illustration of each scenario and the corresponding countries per scenario, see Table 2 again.

[61] In Belgium, very strong religious and geographical cleavages might have led to the perception of political actors that coordination between right parties would not be possible and PR might have been adopted early.

[62] Some states had MMDs in place for only a few years. They introduced them and then changed back to SMDs. This was the case in Norway from 1905 until 1906, Italy between 1882 and 1891 and France in 1873 and 1885.

Table 7: PR support and stability of PR preferences[63]

	Country	Outcome	Conservatives/ Christian	Liberals	Social Democrats/
TRS	**Germany**	PR	No -> Yes	No -> Yes	Yes
	Italy	PR	Yes	No -> Yes	Yes
	Netherlands	PR	No -> Yes	No -> Yes	Yes -> amb.
	Belgium	PR	Yes/Div	Yes	Yes/Div*
	Switzerland	PR	Yes	No	Yes
	Norway	PR	Yes	Yes	Yes
	France	PR/TRS	No	No	Yes -> No
SMP	**Sweden**	PR	No -> Yes	Yes -> No	Yes -> No
	Denmark	PR	Yes	No	No -> Yes
	Finland	PR	Yes	Yes	Yes
	UK	SMP	No	No -> Yes	No

* See footnote.

All parties within each state had different preferences and decision making processes when it came to electoral reform and PR. Table 7 gives an overview of the preferences of PR support of all important parties in Western Europe in the years before the adoption of PR and the stability of these preferences. Kreuzer (2010a, 2010b) and Cusack et al. (2007, 2010 and web appendix) argue at length about Boix's (1999) and Cusack et al.'s (2007) theory and the appropriate coding of PR party preferences. Cusack et al. (2007) state that it was economic coordination between labour and business that drove the adoption of PR. They argue that the key structural economic conditions are investments in human capital and skill improvement that are developed by employer and workers in cooperation (non-tradable skills/co-specific assets). They claim that PR was adopted where the right and the left realised their similar interests in creating a political framework to support business and secure jobs for workers. In other words, a coordinated labour market would lead to a large degree of cross-class

[63] Insignificant parties or parts of parties are neglected. If a significant part of a party is against the majority of the party in the PR matter, the party is coded as "divided" (Div). For reasons of simplification, Christian democratic/Catholic/Protestant parties are considered "Conservatives"; varying liberal parties are considered "Liberals".
*Belgium: A small minority of the Social Democrats was uncertain about the adoption of PR, if not against it. However, this was a normal case in many of the Western European left parties. There was lively debate about the implementation of new electoral systems. Debate within parties does not necessarily imply that parties voted or acted dividedly on the PR matter.

support for PR by left and right parties. Where there was no coordinated labour market, SMP stayed in place, they argue.

Kreuzer (2010a) argues that their evaluation is flawed, he finds almost no proof of a link between economic interests of parties and their preferences for a distinct electoral systems, such as PR. He finds no labour market evidence and a distorted picture when it comes to cross-class support. I mainly agree with Kreuzer and could find almost no evidence of a connection between left groups, representing the workers, and "non-socialist groups", representing business and the bourgeoisie that was related to co-specific assets or the success of business. To my knowledge, PR was not seen as having distributive consequences on the economy at the time and actors were not focusing on economic influences of PR when implementing it. For further analysis in regard to their labour market argument, I am referring the reader to the work of Kreuzer (2010a), who has replicated all off their labour market data. Cusack et al. also claim cross-class support for PR across the board in states with coordinated labour markets (all Western European states at the time, according to Cusack et al.) However, the debate at the time was rather about workers' rights and suffrage expansion ("one man – one vote"). There was much less cross-class support than often stated in the current debate (and by Cusack et al.). It is correct that many parties (right and left) eventually voted together on PR but that was mostly only the case because PR was voted for in combination with other reforms. The other reforms were often concessions that were part of political deals that persuaded certain parties to vote for PR. There was almost always a long debate about the adoption of PR beforehand, which only reveals itself after detailed historical work.

Cusack et al.'s coding includes some misinterpretations and could be based on a larger number of references. I have therefore reclassified the PR preferences of parties based on thorough historical research on each case (see Chapter 3.1. – 3.3.). Table 7 depicts my coding. To make clearer the slight

differences between my coding and Kreuzer's (2010 amended) coding, see Appendix 19.[64] The preferences are divided into three political groups: Conservatives (including Christian Democratic and Catholic Parties), Liberals and Social Democrats/Socialists.

What are the key conclusions that can be drawn based on the party preferences? Under TRS, there were a high number of "No→Yes" classifications among the right parties, which means that these parties went from not supporting PR to supporting its adoption. This indicates that PR was indeed the last resort and was only introduced once all other containment measures had been exhausted. Coordination worked well under TRS, which induced right coordination against the left. The system was used to delay PR adoption and it was only after the left threat seemed to no longer be controllable that the right gave in and introduced PR together with the left, which had already fought for PR for some time. Yet, we see some PR support across the board. By and large, the right was afraid of the left. Coordination between right parties worked well but the growing left was still strong enough to pose major threats in the long run. Furthermore, the left was unhappy due to its unfavourable vote-seat disproportionality. Only Norway and Finland had full PR support from all three political groups throughout the entire decision making process.

Under SMP, we notice that the parties that pushed for PR were indeed mainly the losing Conservatives. SMP did not encourage alliances as much as TRS did. Hence, Liberals and Conservatives under SMP did not coordinate their votes as effectively as Liberals and Conservatives under TRS did. The left had great prospects to overtake at least one of the right parties in the short or medium-run and was therefore often inclined to keep SMP. The Conservatives suffered the most under SMP and therefore supported PR very early on. The Swedish liberal party even wanted to introduce TRS when the Conservatives started to champion PR but they did not find sufficient parliamentary support for the idea. Furthermore, the few liberal parties that strongly benefitted from

[64] I have included the changes he made in his amendment in the table.

SMP did not want to change to PR at all. This was also the case for dominant parties under TRS (Switzerland and Italy). For these parties, any plurality system would play into their hands because they would not need to coordinate as much as a fragmented right would need to. They could rely more on strategic voting by the right voters (especially in Denmark – SMP and dominating right party). They were expecting to gain further votes under SMP and already had very high vote-seat disproportionalities working in their favor. Although the beneficiaries wanted to keep SMP in place, the electoral system did not offer enough shelter against the rising left for all right parties. Due to poor coordination within the right and the shining prospects of the left, the vulnerable right party campaigned and introduced PR as a safeguard very early on.

The dominant right parties were not inclined to adopt PR since they benefitted from the majoritarian system (SMP or TRS) that was in place at the time, under which it was easier for parties to coordinate around the strongest right party. This led to very positive vote-seat disproportionalities in their favour. In the case of Italy (Liberals), the dominant right party changed its position and once the left grew too strong, it wanted to adopt PR as well. The dominant right parties in Denmark and Switzerland (both liberal parties) delayed the adoption of PR for as long as they could.[65] In Belgium (Catholics), the dominant Catholics, however, realised in advance that the left party was going to grow extensively and adopted PR very early.[66]

The aversion to PR or the appreciation of SMP was not only true for the right, but also for the left parties in Sweden, Denmark and to some degree in the Netherlands at the beginning of the PR debate. In Germany and France, although the left had publicly campaigned for PR in the past, once they started gaining majorities, they considered introducing or retaining TRS (see Section 3.3.3 and

[65] In Denmark, the Liberals delayed the adoption further by using their veto in Switzerland to campaign against the introduction of PR before the referenda. More details below.

[66] In Belgium, PR was introduced very early, even though parts of the Belgian Catholics that benefitted from TRS (rural areas) had voted against PR. More details below (see Section 3.2.2.).

Chapter 4). However, having campaigned for PR for many years, a turnaround immediately after the parties had achieved solid majorities seemed very risky (Hermens 1972). In Denmark and Sweden, the Social Democrats expected to be able to replace the other parties and become one of the two, if not the largest party under SMP in the long run. Whichever party was able to, or at least thought they would be able to coordinate the vote around itself, was sure to keep SMP or TRS in place for as long as possible (see "No"s and "No→Yes"s).

In the next three sections, I describe the electoral systems in place, the dynamics between the right and the left, and the occurrences and processes that led to PR in the Western European cases where this applies. According to the scenarios, the chapter is divided into three parts, starting with "cases with a weak left threat", followed by "cases with a strong left threat and a dominant incumbent party" and finally, "cases with a strong left threat and fragmented incumbent parties". SMP and TRS cases are grouped together within the categories.

3.1. Cases with weak left threat

3.1.1. SMP

United Kingdom

(Period of SMP (1832/1884 – today))

Since 1832, the UK had a plurality system in place with mainly two-member constituencies of unequal size in regard to geographical area and density of population. Even though there was a strong PR movement in the UK throughout the 19th century, with influential intellectual debate that spread to other European countries, SMP was introduced nationwide with the third reform bill in 1884. The left threat in the UK was not strong enough to create an urgent need for PR as a safeguard against the left.

The Liberals formed a Lib-Lab alliance with the Labour Party as early as 1870. In its early stages, the Labour party was seen as a short-lived "Labour experiment" (Ahmed 2013, p. 136). The left party was not as radical as its continental European equivalents. Liberal leaders thought they could monopolise the Labour party and bind it to the Liberal Party in the long run. This was more practical under SMP than under PR since every constituency had only one victor.[67] Liberal leaders were inclined to think they could integrate with the left, especially because early Labour Party leaders did not have a Labour party in mind that was completely independent from the Liberals (Hobsbawm 1968, McKibbon 1970). The Lib-Lab coalition was further strengthened by a formal pact between Herbert Gladstone, the chairman of the Liberals, and Ramsay MacDonald, the speaker of the Labour Party. The two parties planned to coordinate their votes and candidacies to win against the Conservatives.

[67] For a more comprehensive case study of the electoral system debate in the UK, see Ahmed (2013), who focuses on SMP and PR as safeguards.

In fact, the alliance benefited the Liberals more than Labour, since it was mostly Labour candidates who withdrew their candidacies (Hart 1992, p. 164).

Yet, in the long run the Liberals' "absorbance strategy" did not work out as well as they had expected. After World War I, the self-confidence of the Labour Party grew. "The party was no longer willing to play second fiddle to the Liberals" (Hermens 1972, p. 106). From then on, Liberals often competed against Labour candidates in districts where they had cooperated before. Consequently, these districts were won by Conservatives in the beginning. Soon, Labour would be seen as the stronger "anti-Conservative force" and voters started to vote for Labour rather than for the Liberals (Hermens 1972, p. 106). Even though there was broad support for PR among Labour's rank and file, the leadership of the party around MacDonald was confident that they would soon out-compete the Liberals. They realised that PR would then only impede further gains for Labour. Thus, MacDonald and his peers wanted to keep SMP in place (Hart 1992, p. 165).

Table 8: UK: parliamentary election results[68]

	1910 (Jan.)			1910 (Dec.)			1918			1922			1923			1924		
	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD
Conservative Party	47.0	40.5	-6.5	46.0	41.0	-5.0	35.0	54.0	19.0	39.0	56.0	17.0	38.0	42.0	4.0	47.0	67.0	20.0
Liberal Party	43.0	41.0	-2.0	44.0	40.0	-4.0	23.0	23.5	0.5	29.0	18.5	-10.5	29.5	26.0	-3.5	18.0	6.5	-11.5
Labour Party	8.0	6.0	-2.0	7.0	6.0	-1.0	15.0	10.0	-5.0	29.0	23.0	-6.0	30.5	31.0	0.5	33.0	24.5	-8.5

In 1922, Labour overtook the Liberals for the first time (Labour: 142 seats; Liberals: 115 seats, see Table 8). This trend continued in the following years and Ramsay MacDonald became the First Labour Prime Minister in 1924 and again between 1929 and 1935, forming a minority government supported by the Liberals. The Labour party truly prevailed over the Liberals from 1924 onwards (Labour: 151 seats; Liberals: 40 seats).[69] The Liberals realised too late that SMP would not serve them well in the long run. They had opposed the idea of PR in principle. Only in 1931 did the Liberal

[68] Source: own calculations based on Sternberger, Vogel (1969). All parliamentary election results throughout this thesis are first round votes per cent.

[69] Source of numbers: Sternberger, Vogel, (1969, p. 637).

Robertson state that his party had ceased "to be a healthy and vigorous body", and if SMP was maintained, the party would "simply disappear" (Robertson 1931, p. 10). Most Liberal MPs supported the adoption of PR from then on. They even backed the first Labour Prime Minister in 1924, only under the condition of a successful PR bill. The Conservatives on the other hand opposed electoral system reform. In the well-known Carlton Hotel meeting in 1922, Tory MPs – predominantly the ones with safer districts – chose not to engage in a Liberal-Conservative coalition anymore. They were confident that SMP would be conducive to them becoming the leading right party, facing Labour on the left (Butler 1963, pp. 40, Cook 1975, pp. 175, Pugh 1978). The Conservatives made use of this political turn-around of the Liberals when Sir Austen commented upon the change in liberal policies on whether to support an amendment to introduce PR:

> "Mr. Gladstone bitterly opposed this change on a similar occasion. Mr. Bright, with the strong, bold, common sense which clung to him always, repeatedly and consistently condemned all freakish schemes of this kind throughout his long career. Now the party which claims them as two of its most illustrious leaders is, I am told, invited by its present leader to go into the lobby in support of this amendment. If so, a profound change has been worked on their part…" (Horwill 1925, p. 132).

The Liberals called for PR in parliament in 1930 during the serious instant of the Trade Disputes bill. Labour then wanted to introduce the alternative vote (AV, instant run-off voting), and passed the Commons in 1931, only to be unsurprisingly vetoed by the Lords and then dumped (Carstairs 1980, pp. 195, Mowat 1955, p. 366). The Conservatives ultimately became the "focal point" of right voters (Boix 2010, p. 410). The Liberals had falsely underestimated Labour by thinking they could monopolise them. The decision to introduce PR came too late. By then, Labour, which was not bound to PR by having supported it fiercely before, had established a majority and SMP was kept in place.

Labour became the main party on the left and continues to dominate English politics together with the Conservatives until today.

The weak left threat and the underestimation of the left threat by the Liberals kept the right from adopting PR. SMP had been debated as a potential safeguard against the left. Although, it led to the Liberals being swept out of British politics for many years altogether.

3.2. Cases with strong left threat and dominant incumbent party

3.2.1. SMP

Denmark

(Period of SMP: 1849–1915; adoption of PR in 1915)

In Denmark, SMP was in place from 1849 onwards. Voting was restricted but equal suffrage for men aged 25 and over was introduced in 1855. Political parties in today's sense have only existed since the 1870s. Until the development of the Social Democratic Party (SD), as in most Western European states, it was the Liberal Party (Venstre) and the Conservative Party (Hojre) that dominated parliament. The Conservatives had the largest influence on political life in Denmark since the King would only instruct conservative politicians to form a government until 1901 (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, pp. 156). It is therefore no surprise that Denmark has been considered the "most Prussian" of all Scandinavian states (Bartolini 2007, p. 318). From 1901 onwards, the government corresponded with the majority in parliament (Sternberger, Vogel 1969) and was therefore technically accountable to parliament. The Liberals formed the government between 1901 and 1913 (except for 1909 – 1910, when the Social Liberals headed the government).

In 1905, a group of liberals left the Liberal Party to form the "Social Liberals" (Det Radikale Venstre, sometimes also called "Radical Liberals"). The "Moderate Liberals" had already broken away between 1890 and 1892. This was important to the later decision of the Liberals to support the

introduction of PR since it diminished the advantage of the Liberals relative to the left. During this time, Denmark had developed a five-party system, which became a four-party system after a merger between the Liberals and the Moderates later on. Taking Sweden's three-party system under SMP into account (see above and Chapter 5), this illustrates the issue with the generalisation of Duverger's (1954) results in regard to the outcome of SMP for the party system (SMP leads to two-party systems, see Chapter 2) (cf. Elklit 2002, p. 28).

The Social Democratic Party was founded in 1871 (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 159). It started to be electorally successful after the reforms of 1894 (more districts and redrawing of boundaries in favour of urban areas) and the introduction of the secret vote in 1901 (Elklit 1988a). From 1903 onwards, the Social Democrats were the second-largest faction in parliament after the Liberals. They grew steadily and in 1913, won 28.1 per cent of the seats.

Table 9: Denmark: parliamentary election results[70]

	1901			1903			1906			1909			1910			1913		
	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD
Conservatives (Horje)	24.0	7.0	-17.0	20.8	10.5	-10.3	22.3	10.5	-11.8	20.4	18.4	-2.0	18.6	11.4	-7.2	22.6	6.1	-16.5
Moderate Liberals (Moderat Venstre)	12.0	14.0	2.0	8.1	10.5	2.4	6.8	7.9	1.1	5.9	9.6	3.7						
Liberals (Venstre)	42.9	66.7	23.8	48.0	64.0	16.0	31.6	49.1	17.5	25.8	32.5	6.7	34.1	50.0	15.9	29.1	38.6	9.5
Radical Venstre (Social Liberals)							13.7	7.9	-5.8	18.6	13.2	-5.4	19.0	14.9	-4.1	18.7	27.2	8.5
Social Democrats	17.1	12.3	-4.8	20.4	14.0	-6.4	25.4	21.1	-4.3	28.7	21.1	-7.6	28.3	21.1	-7.2	29.6	28.1	-1.5

Denmark used the upper house to safeguard the Conservative position of political power by restricting the electorate for upper house elections. Even though the number of districts was dependent on the size of the population, and therefore increased from 102 in 1867 to 114 in 1894, malapportionment was immense (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 157). As in other Western European states, industrialisation and urbanisation increased the number of voters in urban districts, which were historically won by the Social Democratic Party. Therefore, Social Democrats needed relatively more votes to gain one seat in parliament compared to the Liberals that dominated the rural areas. The

[70] Source: own calculations based on Sternberger, Vogel (1969).

Social Democrats were willing to keep SMP in place as long as the urban districts would be divided in order to create additional seats that they would likely win. Thus, in 1905, they brought a proposal forward to redistrict constituencies in order to eradicate malapportionment, maximise their share of seats, and gain access to governmental power (Dunleavy, Margetts 1995). Additionally, the Social Democrats and Social Liberals both wanted to introduce universal suffrage.

As the majorities of Conservatives (upper house) and Liberals (lower house) both started to shrink, their party strategists watched the growing electoral threat of the left very carefully. The split-up of the Liberal Party increased the uncertainty – party leaders did not know how voters would react since opinion polls were not available at the time (Elklit 2002, p. 33). This was a distinct disadvantage of SMP compared to the TRS system in other Western European countries, as the first round of elections could not be used as an opinion poll to then act upon accordingly before the second round. The Conservatives vote-seat disproportionality got increasingly more negative due to their relatively strong results in some parts of the cities (ca. 10 per cent of seats for ca. 21 per cent of votes in 1903) and suffered the most under SMP (see Table 9). Thus, they wanted to introduce PR from very early on (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 160) and eventually proposed a PR-like system instead of the redrawing of districts during the parliamentary debate of the Social Democrats' proposal in 1905 (Särlvik 2002, p. 33). The Liberals opposed this attempt since SMP worked in their favour.

In the following years, the positions of the parties did not change drastically. The Social Democrats wanted to keep SMP since they knew it would eventually serve them best. They were the upcoming party with the highest prospect of soon overtaking the Liberals (consistently the second-largest party (in terms of seats) since 1903). They also wanted to completely abandon the upper house (Särlvik 2002, p. 34). Interestingly, the Social Liberals wanted to introduce a TRS system (majority-plurality TRS), hoping that this would allow them to form an alliance with the Social Democrats and overtake the Liberals (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 160). Denmark's Liberal Party opposed PR because

SMP allowed them to benefit from the rural concentration of their voters and the malapportionment of the districts (in a similar way to Germany's Conservatives as we will see in Chapter 4). The Conservatives wanted to introduce PR as a safeguard against the left and to ensure a representative transformation of their votes in the urban areas. Yet, they had strong representation in the upper house and therefore did not want to change the electoral system of the upper house – only the lower house. Since a change of system required the approval of both chambers (upper and lower house), this resulted in a deadlock (Elklit 1988b).

In 1915, the Social-Liberal government agreed upon some of the Conservative proposals and made room for the introduction of PR. The Social Democrats gave in to supporting PR in order to secure the expansion of suffrage, which they expected would lead to a long-term win for them. The Liberals and their leader, Christensen, only gave in because the bill also changed the electoral system of the upper house, in which they were highly under-represented. However, the Liberals tried to keep SMP as long as possible to benefit from their overrepresentation in the lower-house (Elklit 2002, p. 35). PR was adopted together with universal and equal suffrage for men and women aged 29 years and over. An MMP (Mixed-member proportional representation) system was introduced in 1915, to be superseded by a full PR system in 1920.[71]

The biggest losses under PR were suffered by the Liberals and the Social Liberals. This was mostly due to the discontinuation of disproportionality after the introduction of PR. The Conservative Party (Hojre) merged with the Free Conservatives in 1915 and almost tripled their seats under PR in 1918. The Social Democrats kept gaining seats in the subsequent elections and eventually won a majority in the Folketing (Danish parliament) in 1924. They maintained a majority until 2001.

[71] MMP is a mixed system that combines a "list PR" system with a plurality/majoritarian system. PR balances out the disproportionality of the majoritarian system (Reilly et al. 2005).
After the 1915 reforms, the first chamber, the Landsting, only used its veto right for secondary issues. The supremacy of the Folketing was obvious. From now on the first chamber exerted control functions (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, pp. 160).

By and large, SMP did not encourage alliances as much as TRS did elsewhere in Europe. However, the dominant right party in parliamentary elections were the Liberals, which made it relatively simple for right parties to coordinate around them. This delayed the adoption of PR until 1915. SMP worked in their favour until the strong rise of the left led them to reconsider their position towards PR as a safeguard. The Conservatives were pushing for PR for years because of their negative VSD under SMP. The Social Democrats only gave in to supporting PR in order to secure suffrage expansion, which they expected would lead them to long-term success even under PR. Overall, PR was introduced earlier than in all states with TRS, albeit the long containment of the left.

3.2.2. Majority-plurality TRS

Switzerland

(Period of majority-plurality TRS: 1850–1917; adoption of PR: 1918)

In 1848, universal and equal male suffrage with a minimum voting age of 20 years and over was introduced in Switzerland. Until 1900, a three-ballot system with majority-plurality was in place, with an absolute majority required at the first two ballots (majority of the eligible voters). Gerrymandering was commonly performed by the incumbent elite on a Canton basis (provinces). They were also in charge of the location and quantity of polling stations and picked the election managers and vote counters. This gave them the ability to influence the election results in their favor. In 1872, the majority requirement changed from a majority at the first two ballots to a majority of the valid votes. Secret voting was introduced and polling stations became mandatory in all municipalities (Nohlen, Stöver 2010, p. 1887). Majority-plurality TRS was implemented in 1900.

For a long time, Swiss parties were only unstructured organisations with weak leadership. They were rather loose groups that were split into several sub-groups and party discipline and identification

was low (Gruner 1977, Gruner, Andrey 1978). However, when it came to the adoption of PR, the differentiation between parliamentary groups was relatively clear (Lutz 2004, p. 292).

There was vigorous debate about the introduction of PR at an early stage. Generally, the liberal parties benefited enormously from TRS and had large positive VSDs until PR was adopted (see Table 10). The Catholic-Conservatives (Swiss Christian Democratic People's Party, CVP) was relatively well off and often won regional elections with large VSDs. The Social Democrats (Swiss Social-Democratic Party, SPS), founded in 1888, had negative VSDs throughout the entire TRS period until the first PR election in 1919. Hence, TRS had led to large frustration on the sides of the defeated parties. In particular, where the victorious party took over the entire administrative body, which happened in Tessin in 1890, where the Conservatives won 77 seats with only 617 more votes than the Liberals, who gained only 35 seats (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, pp. 1119). PR was introduced a year later in Tessin for local elections and spread to the other Cantons from there.

Table 10: Switzerland: parliamentary election results[72]

	TRS																		PR		
	1899			1902			1905			1908			1911			1917			1919		
	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD
Catholics	20.8	21.8	1.0	23.1	23.8	0.7	22.5	23.8	1.3	20.5	23.8	3.3	19.1	25.9	6.8	16.4	27.9	11.5	22.0	21.0	-1.0
Liberals*	68.7	75.5	6.8	62.7	84.4	21.7	60.3	87.8	27.5	60.4	85.0	24.6	59.4	91.8	32.4	49.0	83.0	34.0	32.0	29.0	-3.0
Social Democrats	9.6	2.7	-6.9	12.6	4.8	-7.8	14.7	1.4	-13.3	17.6	4.8	-12.8	20.0	10.2	-9.8	30.8	15.0	-15.8	22.0	23.0	1.0

*Liberals = Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei; Liberale Mitte; Demokratische Linke.

To implement a new electoral system on a national basis in Switzerland, there needed to be a successful national referendum. Starting in 1900, there were three attempts to introduce PR.[73] Yet, the first two popular votes opposed it. The adoption failed due to a lack of support from the Swiss government. The Bundesrat (Federal Council, Swiss federal government), traditionally dominated by the Liberals (Swiss Radical-Democratic Party, FDP), who were afraid to lose seats under PR (Lutz

[72] Source: Gruner (1977); Lutz (2004) and own calculations.

[73] Results of the three referendums: 1900: Yes: 40.9 per cent; No: 59.1 per cent; 1910: Yes: 47.5; No: 52.5; 1918: Yes: 66.8; No: 33.2.

2004, Natsch 1967), recommended rejecting PR due to the negative consequences it had for them in the Cantons. Furthermore, PR would neither alleviate the conflict between parties nor eradicate the shortcomings of TRS and would only lead to higher party fragmentation. A majoritarian system on the other hand, would secure a stable majority in parliament and hence, stabilise the government (Nohlen, Stöver 2010). The Catholics and the Social Democrats tried to push a PR reform forward in 1916 and 1917 respectively. Both parties campaigned for PR before all three referenda of 1900, 1910 and 1918 (Lutz 2004, pp. 285-286). The incumbent Liberals noticed them as an emerging threat when they started the large campaigns for the first referenda around the turn of the century (1899/1900). Having realised that there was an enormous left threat, the Liberals wanted to make use of TRS for as long as possible. A debate in parliament was a legal prerequisite for a referendum. The liberal-dominated parliament had postponed this debate for five years, before they were forced to hold one by a strike in 1918 (Boix 2010, p. 411). A third referendum was held on October 13th, 1918. Eventually, the unified minorities in parliament, led by the Conservatives and the Social Democrats, mobilised enough voters to win the referendum with 66.8 per cent of votes in favour of PR. Thus, PR was adopted and first used in the 1919 elections. A fundamental alteration of the composition of the parliament was the consequence. The Liberals lost their absolute majority, from 54 seats in 1917 to 29 in 1919, and the Social Democrats gained 12 seats, from 11 in 1917 to 23 in 1919 (see Table 10).

Belgium

(Period of majority-plurality TRS: 1831 – 1898; adoption of PR in 1899)

After Belgium gained independence from the Netherlands in 1830, the parliament was elected under majority-plurality TRS (1831-1898). Direct elections were held in MMDs with multiple voting and the option of cumulating votes on one candidate. The number of candidates in round two was twice as high as seats were to be allocated. The voting age for male citizens was 25 years and over, and suffrage was restricted to citizens paying a minimum tax. The secret ballot was introduced in 1877 and universal male suffrage in 1892, which increased the franchise tenfold. At the same time, Liberals and Catholics decided to introduce plural voting as a safeguard against the left (taxpayers, house and real estate owners and higher education holders received more votes), with a maximum of three votes and compulsory voting (Nohlen, Stöver 2010, p. 272).

Table 11: Belgium: parliamentary election results

	TRS									PR		
	1894			1896			1898			1900		
	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD
Catholics	56.4	68.4	12.0	49.7	73.0	23.3	38.5	73.7	35.2	48.5	56.6	8.1
Liberals	31.4	13.2	-18.2	19.5	8.6	-10.9	18.1	8.6	-9.5	22.7	20.4	-2.3
Socialists	18.4	18.4	0.0	15.2	18.4	3.2	21.8	17.8	-4.0	22.5	21.1	-1.4

The Belgium labour movement was one of the most advanced in Europe and allowed for quick mobilisation. The Belgian Labour Party (Socialists, POB) was founded in 1885 and universal suffrage in 1892 led to a rapid rise of the party. It was based on the socialist pillar organisations. The members of the trade unions, the consumer cooperatives, health insurance organisations, the press and others were automatically members of the POB. Hence, the left electoral threat in Belgium was stronger than in other countries at a very early stage.

The Catholic political movement dominated Belgian politics at the time and tried to undermine the growing left by forming Catholic trade unions and workers' societies. However, the new political

groups, plural voting and obligatory voting did not lead to the desired results. The POB still managed to achieve a large election win and had already out-competed the Liberals in their first election in 1894 (28 seats, 18.4 per cent, see Table 11). Prior to this, the Liberal's position had been weakened due to a split over the matter of suffrage expansion in 1887. The Progressives had favoured suffrage expansion for decades but the Doctrinaires were against it and split from the Liberals by forming the Liberal League (Collier 1999, p. 91, Van der Linden, Rojahn 1990, p. 269). This split significantly weakened the Liberals, and the Catholics became the major parliamentary force (forming all cabinets from 1884 until 1914). After the Liberals had lost two-thirds of their seats in 1894, they lost another third in 1896 and ended up with only 8.6 per cent (see Table 11).

The Liberals were not very strong regionally as their supporters were more widespread throughout the country, therefore they began to champion the introduction of PR very early. The Catholic and socialist supporters were more regionally segmented. Flanders was a Catholic stronghold and the Walloon industrial areas were about to be controlled by the Socialists after suffrage expansion. After the 1898 election, where the Catholics took almost three quarters of the seats, with only 50 per cent of the votes, the criticism of the system increased within the other parties as well as the public. Even though the Catholics were the strongest party under TRS, the growing left and the diminishing of the Liberals alarmed the Catholics. The party debated heavily as to whether PR was the right response to the rising left. In 1899, the Catholic government had planned to reform the electoral system in a way that would be even more beneficial to them. PR was to be adopted in the urban areas that were dominated by the left, and TRS was to be kept in the rest of the country where the Catholics were dominant. This was the same system that was introduced by the right in Germany in 1918 (see Chapter 4) and was similar to the Danish reform in 1915 (see above). However, all other parties as well as the public severely opposed the reforms and forced the government to step down (Nohlen, Stöver 2010, pp. 271).

After the Catholic government's reform attempt failed, many conservatives started to support the Liberals' wish to introduce PR in the entire country. However, the Catholics that came from secure rural constituencies opposed PR, while those from urban districts that were more competitive were pro-PR. Hence, the party's vote on the matter was split (70 for PR; 33 against) even though the party's leader, Bernaerts, was in favour of PR. The second and definitive reform bill was enforced by the urban Catholics against the will of the rural Catholics (D'Alviella 1900, Carstairs 1980). They were afraid that the Liberals would eventually become part of the Socialist party and defeat them in the long run, and concerned about the need to further coordinate with the Liberals who had recently lost ground towards the Socialists (Glissen 1980, pp. 357; Stengers 2004, pp. 258). The Socialists were divided on the topic as well because the Socialists from the urban districts preferred TRS with a large district magnitude since this worked in their favour, the rest of the party was pro PR (Barthélemy 1912, Moyne 1970). After long debates about the appropriate system, a slight majority in parliament voted for PR, and Belgium became the first Western European state to introduce PR in 1899.[74] The sizes of districts were tailored to minimise PR effects in rural districts. The reform made Belgium a frontrunner and "reference point" for many other Western European states that were experiencing left threats, which were bound to grow drastically while expanding suffrage. The "safeguarding strategy" of the Catholics and Liberals was soon called the "Belgian solution" (Kreuzer 2010a, p. 380) and later applied throughout Western Europe. Additionally, to the strong left threat that led to a larger demand for safeguards, the strong religious and geographical cleavages might have led to the perception of political actors that coordination between right parties would not be possible to a large extent. PR might have been adopted earlier than it was needed under TRS.

[74] For a more comprehensive case study of the electoral system debate in Belgium, see Ahmed (2010, 2013).

3.2.3. Majority run-off TRS

Italy

(Period of majority run-off TRS: 1861–1918; adoption of PR: 1919)

Italy unified in 1861 and completed its unification in 1870 with the annexation of Rome. It inherited the electoral system of the Piemont, where majority run-off TRS had been used from 1849 onwards. One third of the votes based on the number of entitled voters were needed to be elected. From 1849, the suffrage was restricted to men over 25 years until universal male suffrage was introduced in 1918. Additional voting qualifications differed but were always based on tax payments, property, real estate ownership and education. In 1882, the age limit was reduced to 21 years (7 per cent of population enfranchised). Together with the enlargement of the franchise, multi-member districts were introduced and put in place for three elections (1882, 1886 and 1890). The purpose of this electoral change was to strengthen the political parties by detaching politicians from their electoral districts (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p.716). However, this aim was not achieved, so from 1892 onwards, single-member districts were implemented again. Before 1900, Italy had different "quorums" in place for the first round. Contestants needed to obtain at least one third of the electorate (after 1892 one-sixth) in order to be elected right away. This led to a large number of second rounds. From 1900 onwards, the required majority was of valid votes only and not of the entire electorate. Participation now played a smaller role for the number of second rounds. In 1894, during a period of repression against the left and its labour organisations, the electorate was again restricted, which led to a decrease of the enfranchised from 9.4 to 6.7 per cent.

The Liberals (Historical Left (Sinistra Storica), later called Liberal-Democrats) were the most successful party in Italian politics until the introduction of PR in 1919. Until shortly before the turn of the century, parliamentary politics were mainly dominated by the Historical Left and the Historical

Right (liberal-conservative). Yet, the Liberals were the dominant right-wing party. It was relatively simple to coordinate right-wing votes around the Liberals.

The liberal Prime Minister Agostino Depretis introduced a political method of governing in the 1880s, which was named "trasformismo" ("transformation"). Depretis began to include moderate politicians of the right in his cabinet to secure his power base. This centrist approach of accommodation made it very difficult for radical parties to gain political power. In practice, trasformismo was authoritarian and corrupt; pressure was put on districts to vote for the government's candidates and in exchange, they received favourable concessions once Depretis was in power. Depretis and the liberals used pressure, bribery and promises under TRS to coordinate their votes in the second round and maintain political power. Politicians were more involved in deal-making than implementing policies and political discourse was pared-down to a minimum. This tactical paralysis of politics was carried on by the liberal Prime Ministers, Crispi and Giolitti, and became an "inherent" characteristic of Italian politics. TRS was the ideal electoral system to execute this type of politics, bundle liberal votes and later contain the developing left threat.

The Socialist Party emerged in 1892. Despite strong repressive measures used against the left by the incumbent elite in the 1890s, fifteen Socialist Party members got elected into national parliament in 1895 and 1897. The Socialist Party was the first Italian party with a strong organisational background and underlying ideology. They had built a solid organisational structure, with a parliamentary group, a general labour alliance, their own daily press and a related cooperative movement (Nohlen, Stöver 2010, p. 1031). The emergence of the Socialist Party as an electoral left threat against the two traditional parties became evident in 1900, when the Socialists reached 13 per cent of the votes but due to TRS, only obtained 6.5 per cent of the seats. Furthermore, trasformismo was used under TRS to coordinate votes, which resulted in a heavy underrepresentation of the Socialist Party throughout the period of TRS (see Table 12).

Table 12: Italy: parliamentary election results

	1900			1904			1909			1913		
	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD
Constitutionalists (Historical Right)	21.4	22.8	1.4	13.9	15.0	1.1	5.9	8.7	2.8	5.5	5.7	0.2
Liberals (Historical Left)	52.3	58.3	6.0	50.9	66.7	15.8	54.4	64.8	10.4	47.6	53.1	5.5
Socialist Party	13.0	6.5	-6.5	21.3	5.7	-15.6	19.0	8.1	-10.9	17.6	10.2	-7.4
Radical	7.1	6.7	-0.4	8.4	7.3	-1.1	9.9	9.4	-0.5	10.4	12.2	1.8
Republican Party	6.2	5.7	-0.5	4.9	4.7	-0.2	4.4	4.5	0.1	2.0	1.6	-0.4

Under TRS, the Liberals were able to control the Socialist uprising. Hence, they defeated a PR proposal made by the opposition in 1912 (Braunias 1932). Yet, liberal Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti extended the suffrage and Italy almost reached universal male suffrage (23.2 per cent of the population enfranchised) in the same year.[75] Giolitti thought that this would make the enfranchised citizens less inclined to join any revolutionary movements of the left. PR was again proposed in 1918 together with the introduction of full male suffrage (30.9 per cent), this time by the Liberals and their Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando instead.[76] By then, the Liberals feared the rise of the Socialists and from 1919 onwards, the advancement of the Partito Popolare as well, which was the new major Catholic party. They feared losing seats since they were under pressure from the left and the right at the same time. The adoption of PR was seen as a corrective for universal male suffrage. Especially, the liberal members of parliament from Northern and Central Italy, who feared that the Socialists and the Popolare would win all the seats in these districts (Hermens 1972, pp. 156). The Catholics and the Socialists on the other hand, saw in PR their chance to become a relevant political contestant in the long run (Gambetta, Warner 2004). Being a new party, the Partito Popolare only had strongholds in the North and Central Italy. Representation in the rest of the country was still fairly modest. The small number of MPs in 1913 therefore preferred PR because they hoped to win more seats in the rest of the country (Hermens 1972, p. 155). The Socialists particularly wanted to introduce PR because they suffered from heavy vote-seat disproportionality under TRS (see Table 12). Not only did the Socialists

[75] Source of numbers: Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 741.
[76] Source of numbers: ibid.

complain about the unfair electoral system, referring to the small share of seats they had in the elections since 1900, but they also argued that the "trasformismo" system could be undermined by the introduction of PR (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p.720). Consequently, PR was introduced by the Liberals under Prime Minister Francesco Saverio Nitti with little opposition, together with universal male suffrage (voting age of 25 years and over) and compulsory voting in August 1919.[77] This was 19 years after the first large election victory of the Socialist Party.

3.3. Cases with strong left threat and fragmented incumbent parties

3.3.1. SMP

Sweden[78]

(Period of SMP (1866–1908); adoption of PR: 1907)

Sweden in the late 19th and early 20th century was a country with a strong left threat and a fragmented right. From 1866 onwards, the electoral system in place in Sweden was SMP, with some multi-member constituencies and secret voting. Suffrage was restricted to men over 25 years of age and by property and income.

In the first years of the 20th century, a three-party system had evolved, which consisted of the Conservatives, the Liberals, and the still relatively small Social Democratic Party (SAP) (Särlvik 2002, p. 234, Nohlen, Stöver 2010, p. 1843). The pressure for universal suffrage led to a perceived significant rise of the left threat. The Social Democrats reached almost 10 per cent of the votes in the 1905 election. The cautious handling of the suffrage issue and later the safeguard debate shows how afraid the right was of a growing left. Comprehensive analyses of the consequences of universal suffrage and

[77] Nitti's electoral reform of the 15th of August 1919.
[78] For more detailed information and data, see Chapter 4.

corresponding safeguards were carried out by the incumbent elite, as well as the effects of electoral systems in other Western European countries.

The demand for universal suffrage and the consequential rise of the left led to a debate on potential safeguards within the right. PR was discussed early and mainly supported by the Liberals, who often had negative VSDs under SMP (see Appendix 9). The Conservatives resisted PR initially. The debate moved on to PR vs. majoritarian elections once the Conservatives had agreed to universal suffrage. By then, they were afraid that the growth of the left would diminish their parliamentary power base. It was apparent that the Social Democrats would become a major parliamentary force once universal suffrage was adopted. Conservative Party officials even spoke of a threat of getting "extinguished" under SMP with universal suffrage (Särlvik 2002, p. 236). Hence, they looked for electoral safeguards to prevent the party from losing the subsequent consecutive elections and PR seemed to be the most reasonable option.

SMP, which was in place until the adoption of PR, did not give the right parties enough electoral information to base their strategic decisions on because the electoral system was not as conducive to coordination as TRS. The adoption of TRS was also debated and proposed in parliament. The Liberals tried to adopt TRS several times to benefit from coordination efforts. Yet, after several unsuccessful attempts from both groups (Liberals and Conservatives) to implement the most favourable electoral system for them, the Liberal suffered a defeat in both chambers and the liberal PM Staaff resigned in 1907.

The Conservatives, under the new Prime Minister Lindman, restructured their party base, mainly with the support of the farmers, and formed a coalition of PR supporters for both chambers (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 1088). The Liberal Party was split on the matter and even though the majority of Liberals and Social Democrats voted against PR, the proposal passed with 128 to 98 in the Swedish parliament in 1907 (Carstairs 1980, p. 155, Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 1088). PR was

eventually adopted together with universal male suffrage. After Belgium, Sweden was the second state in Western Europe that had introduced PR. Due to poor coordination within the right and the shining prospects of the left, the Conservatives introduced PR as a safeguard very early. The left threat could only be sustained for four years before PR was adopted.

Finland

(Period of SMP: 1809–1906; adoption of PR in 1906)

While it belonged to Russia from 1809 to 1917, Finland (at the time "Grand Duchy of Finland")[79] was given a large degree of autonomy, including a Finnish parliament. Until 1906, the Diet of Estates was elected using a form of SMP. The diet was made up of four historical estates: nobility, clergy, burghers and peasants. The Russian revolution of 1905, which led to the introduction of a "restricted" constitutional monarchy, a parliament (Duma), a multi-party system, and a Russian Constitution, did not fail to leave its mark on the Finnish political system as well. The Tsar had to convene the parliament to reform the constitution and introduce equal, free and direct elections in 1906. Every citizen above the age of 24 was allowed to vote, including women. Hence, Finland was the second country in the world (after the British colony, New Zealand in 1893) and the first country in Europe to introduce full universal suffrage (Nohlen et al. 2001).

Table 13: Finland: parliamentary election results[80]

	PR		
	1907	1908	1909
	Votes	Votes	Votes
Social Democratic Party	37.0	38.4	39.9
Finnish Party	27.3	25.4	23.6
Young Finnish Party	13.7	14.2	14.5
Swedish People's Party	12.6	12.7	12.3

[79] Finland was an autonomous Grand Principality in the Russian Empire.
[80] Source: own calculations based on Sternberger, Vogel (1969).

In 1907, the new parliament was elected with a PR electoral system, which was implemented after the introduction of a bicameral system failed. Most parties were afraid of not being represented sufficiently. In particular, the minorities in parliament, namely the liberal Swedish People's Party of Finland (SFP, before: Swedish Party), pushed for the introduction of PR since they feared being excluded from parliament under SMP. PR was introduced in anticipation of the electoral threat of the left before the left had gained any actual electoral success (Ahmed 2013). As one can observe from the very strong election results right after the introduction of PR in Table 13 (37 per cent in their very first election in 1907), the Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP) already had a large part of the electorate behind them, more than the conservative Finnish Party and the liberal-nationalist Young Finnish Party (formed in 1894), which were both part of the fragmented political right. The Social Democratic Party was established in 1903, after industrialisation led to a drastic increase in the number of workers.[81] Even though the party had a strong foundation, it refused to run in the elections for the Diet of Estates since the involvement in an estates-based parliament was incompatible with their party manifesto. The requirement of universal suffrage and a parliamentary reform had already been an important part of the party's platform since the congress of the workers-movement in 1899. Another very prominent demand was the introduction of PR, which was already part of the "foundation-party-program" (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, pp. 415). PR was introduced very early in Finland due to an anticipated left threat and low strategic coordination among right parties.

[81] The share of municipal workers of all employees had risen from 4.9 per cent in 1860 to 10.6 per cent in 1890 (Sternberger, Vogel, 1969, p. 415).

3.3.2. Majority-plurality TRS

Norway

(Period of majority-plurality TRS: 1905–1918; adoption of PR: 1919)

In 1905, Norway gained its independence from Sweden and introduced majority-plurality TRS with SMDs nationwide. All candidates of the first round could run again in the second round (Carstairs 1980, p. 91). Universal male suffrage had been introduced in 1897. The Norwegian party system evolved in the 1880s still under indirect plurality elections.[82] The two main parties of the fragmented Norwegian right were the liberal "Left" party (Venstre/Liberals) and the conservative "Right" party (Hoire). They were the first organised parties, both founded in 1882. The right represented the incumbent conservative elite, including high civil servants and the rich bourgeoisie; the Vernstre represented the liberal opposition that had been responsible for the government's accountability to parliament. Both parties dominated the parliament until the rise of the Labour party after 1903 and had different liberal and conservative alliances with smaller parties. The Liberals formed an alliance with the Labour Democrats, while the Conservatives allied first with the Moderates and later with the Coalition Party and the Liberal Left Party.

Parliamentary elections were held in Norway from 1850 onwards. Political parties were not officially established until 1884. Before 1884, all those elected were independent. In 1896, PR was introduced for the first time on a local level as an optional electoral system (Aardal 2002, p. 181). After the Liberals won a large majority in the 1884 election (63 per cent), the right began to think about some form of PR to protect themselves from the rising Liberals. However, the Liberals heavily opposed the idea of electoral reform. The "Moderates" (Moderate Liberal Party) split off from the

[82] Direct elections were introduced together with TRS in 1905 (Aardal 2002, p. 183).

Liberal Party in 1888 and formed a new party that later joined forces with the right (Carstairs 1980, p. 90). In 1906, the Moderates became part of the Conservative party.

After national independence from Sweden in 1905 and the introduction of TRS, the Liberals lost votes since their main political agenda as the leader of the independence movement no longer resonated. The other parties had broader political platforms, which voters seemed to appreciate more by then. After the 1905 reforms, the right-wing parties (Liberals, Conservatives and Moderates) were joined by the Labour party and some other smaller parties. In the election of 1906, the first Prime Minister of independent Norway, Christian Michelsen, tried to establish a Coalition Party that would consist of all right parties (non-socialist parties); in particular, the Conservatives, the Moderates and the Liberals. However, the Liberals did not join them and the party was dissolved after the election.

The Norwegian Labour party (DNA, Det norske Arbeiderparti) was formed in 1887 but did not win a considerable number of seats until 1903, the first election after the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1898 (for all men aged 25 years and over; participation rose from 11.1 per cent of the population in 1897 to 19.7 per cent in 1900). It has been considered the most radical of the Scandinavian left parties in the early 20th century (Aardal 2002, p. 186). Until 1906, the workers still voted for the Liberals (Venstre) since it was the party that had fought for their right to vote and their independence from Sweden. Afterwards, they started to turn towards the Labour party. Industrialisation and the establishment of the unions further increased the support for the DNA.[83]

The DNA's vote-seat disproportionality under TRS was always highly negative. At the end of the period, they won 31.6 per cent of votes and only obtained 14.3 per cent of the seats (see Table 14). Although the party managed to grow steadily throughout the TRS period, their negative attitude towards TRS was very severe (Valen 1980, p. 36).

[83] The number of workers doubled between 1905 and 1915. The Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions was founded in 1899 and had 130 000 members in 1919 (Sternberger, Vogel, 1969).

Table 14: Norway: parliamentary election results[84]

	TRS															PR		
	1906			1909			1912			1915			1918			1921		
	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD
Liberals	49.9	62.6	12.7	34.1	39.0	4.9	40.0	61.8	21.8	37.3	65.0	27.7	33.0	42.9	9.9	29.6	26.0	-3.6
Conservatives	32.8	29.3	-3.5	41.5	52.0	10.5	33.2	19.5	-13.7	29.0	17.1	-11.9	30.4	39.7	9.3	33.3	38.0	4.7
Labour Party	16.0	8.1	-7.9	21.6	8.9	-12.7	26.3	18.7	-7.6	32.1	15.4	-16.7	31.6	14.3	-17.3	30.5	24.6	-5.9

Universal male suffrage in 1898 and universal suffrage in 1913 (the right to vote for women increased participation from 34.1 to 45.4 per cent) enlarged the number of Labour voters extensively. The unions broke away from the Liberals and turned towards the Labour Party as well (Luebbert 1991). In particular, the Liberal Party feared that the Labour Party would be able to win the most seats under TRS in the long run (Aardal 2002, pp. 183, Rokkan 1970, p. 158). Additionally, the radicalisation of the left contributed to the right's fears of the left. Not only did the right parties try to defeat the Labour Party by coordinating the vote in the second round, they also encouraged the "moderate" part of the Labour Party to dominate the overall party from within in order to create a non-radical majority in parliament (Danielsen 1984, pp. 57).

The huge success of the Labour Party in the first round of elections between 1906 and 1918 and the systemic pressure for electoral coordination led to an allocation of seats in parliament that was "almost an inversion of the actual electoral results" (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 903). The Liberals consistently won more seats than votes; they even managed to win 27.7 per cent more seats in 1915, whereas the Labour Party only obtained 15.4 per cent of the seats despite winning 32.1 per cent of the votes in round one (see Table 14).

The introduction of PR in Norway was a result of both the pressure of a radical Labour Party that was thriving for more representation and the fear of the traditional parties, especially the Liberals, of losing their political power to the left. The right alliance against the Labour Party was, however,

[84] Source: own calculations based on Nohlen & Stoever (2010). Results of the Liberal and the Conservative Party include their coalitional partners/electoral alliances. The Liberals joined forces with the Labour Democrats since 1903. The Conservatives allied with the Moderates between 1888/91 and 1906 when the Moderates became part of the Conservative Party. In 1906, the conservative Coalition Party ran instead of the conservative party.

impeded by political differences between the right parties, which eventually led to the introduction of PR. Ultimately, all three major parties agreed to adopt PR in 1919. Norway and Finland were the only cases where PR was consistently supported across parties (see Table 7). If the Conservatives and Liberals had been able to overcome their political differences and join into an electoral alliance that could better coordinate against the uprising Labour Party, the introduction of PR might have been delayed even further (Valen, Rokkan 1974, p. 325, Aardal 2002, p. 188). In Norway too, PR increased the number of parties in parliament and led to 20 years of unstable governments. Parties did not build coalitions and the country was governed by minority governments until 1940 (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 905). In 1921, the next election after the introduction of PR, the Liberals lost 14 seats (from 51 to 37), the Conservatives stayed almost the same and the Social Democrats gained 19 seats (from 18 to 37) (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, pp. 914).

Netherlands[85]

(Period of majority-plurality TRS: 1849–1896; majority run-off TRS: 1896 – 1917; adoption of PR: 1917)

The Netherlands in the second half of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century was a country with a strong left threat and a fragmented right. The left threat was posed by the Dutch Social Democratic Workers Party (SDAP) and the right was split into three liberal parties, two Protestant parties and a Catholic party. The electoral system in place from 1849 was majority-plurality TRS, which was changed to majority run-off TRS in 1896, before PR was eventually adopted in 1917.

Until 1878, there were no official political parties in the Netherlands. All candidates were nominally independent (Nohlen, Stöver 2010, p. 1393) but could be associated with "parliamentary groups" (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 860). In the first period of TRS, the Liberals – the strongest party

[85] For more detailed information and data, see Chapter 5.

and supporter of the constitutional rights of parliament – were only challenged by the Conservatives, who as in many Western European states, backed up the Crown and vice versa. However, the Conservative party faded after the enforcement of parliamentary powers in 1868, when the government was held accountable to the parliament after the second chamber was dissolved twice. By the end of the century, the Conservatives were not politically relevant anymore. After 1879, the landscape of political parties was dominated by five parties – the Liberals, the Catholics, the Anti-Revolutionary Party (Calvinists; ARP), the Social Democratic Workers' Party and later also by the Christian Historicals.

Coordination was used under TRS from very early on, mainly among a liberal and a clerical camp, and later also among the entire right against the rising left. Catholics and Anti-Revolutionists worked together to enforce state financing of confessional schools. The non-sectarian parties were against this proposal. The clerical group coordinated largely before round one and the liberal group after round one. Run-off TRS was introduced in 1896 to ensure more right-wing coordination, to abolish MMDs in the urban districts, which began to be won by the left, and to simplify the electoral system.

By reaching 9.5 per cent in the elections of 1901, the left was seen as a major political threat by the incumbent elite: the Liberals and the Catholics. The results of the left party increased continuously over the next five consecutive elections before the introduction of PR. However, TRS was used by the incumbent elite to coordinate votes and candidates, which enabled them to sustain the left threat for 16 years and delay the adoption of PR as an ultimate safeguard. Parts of the Catholics had been inclined to adopt PR as a safeguard against the left for several years. Yet, the ARP and the left itself had started to favour a majoritarian system once they expected better results after universal suffrage. Eventually, the strongest traditional party, the Liberals, became so overwhelmed by the strength of the left in the early 20th century that they then pushed heavily to introduce PR. The clerical parties

agreed to it because in return for PR, the Liberals decided to vote for state financing of confessional schools ("school question") (Hermens 1972, p. 339).

After years of parliamentary debate, PR was ultimately introduced in 1917 under the liberal government of Cort van der Linden, together with universal male suffrage (23 per cent) (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 716).[86] This was 16 years after the first distinct win of the Social Democrats. Without TRS to facilitate coordination among the fragmented right parties, the pressure for PR would have been much higher during those years and a deal to adopt PR could possibly have been necessary much earlier. With agricultural and industrial workers being able to vote, the largest beneficiaries of the suffrage expansion were the Social Democrats (later the Labour party) and the Catholic party. The biggest losses were suffered by the Liberals.

3.3.3. Majority run-off TRS

France

(Period of TRS: 1789 – 1918; adoption of PR in 1918 (reversed after two elections))

France has a long TRS history. The electoral system was put in place from 1789 onwards (even though three rounds were used until 1848), during the Second Empire (1852 – 1870), between 1873 and 1936 and again from 1958 until today. The elections of 1919 and 1924 were exceptions, as they were both under a mixed PR system. This mixed system was the result of an attempt to combine PR list voting with an absolute majority formula (Fisichella 1984) after the far right and the far left had pushed for PR at the turn of the century (Hermens 1972, p. 125). The implementation of PR was first discussed in 1907, based on the idea of creating less particularistic, regional representation in parliament. Once the workers movement rose significantly, the advocacy for stronger safeguards increased (Ahmed 2013, p. 140). The secular centre parties and the radicals, depended on the peasantry and were against

[86] Staatsblad No. 398, 399, 400.

the adoption of PR (Buell 1920, Stuart 1920). It was only the left threat that led to the adoption of PR and the passing of the bill by the fragmented right in 1918 (Ahmed 2013, p. 140, Kreuzer 2010a, p. 382). The system was rather complicated. Large districts were formed and if one party or a group of parties won an absolute majority in a district, it won all seats. If this was not the case, seats were allocated using PR.[87] The outcome of the system were decidedly non-proportional and produced a center-left majority. The system benefited the Communists too much, and led to further radicalization of the workers movement and fragmentation of the party system. Hence, TRS was reintroduced in 1927 (Ahmed 2013, p. 140, Hermens 1972, p. 126). The Conservatives, more able to form first round alliances, supported SMP but were unable to impose them on the other parties. As a result, TRS remained in place until 1936 (Alexander 2004).[88] After two more small PR episodes, TRS was reintroduced and is still in place today.

Table 15: France: parliamentary election results[89]

	1898			1902			1906			1910			1914		
	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD	Votes	Seats	VSD
Right	26.3	14.7	-11.6	48.8	43.7	-5.2	43.4	29.7	-13.6	28.8	25.0	-3.7	16.1	12.5	-3.6
Centre	64.0	73.8	9.9	40.1	48.2	8.1	44.4	57.6	13.2	57.6	62.4	4.8	63.3	58.1	-5.2
Left	9.8	9.7	0.0	10.4	8.0	-2.4	12.3	12.6	0.4	12.8	12.6	-0.2	20.6	21.0	0.3

87 For a detailed version of the electoral system, see Duguit, Monnier (1898, pp. 368).

88 For a case study of France's adoption of PR, see Ahmed (2013).

89 Results of parliamentary seats. Source: own calculations based on www.roi-president.com/elections_legislatives/accueil.php. Results of the Right include: Conservatives and Right, Popular Liberal Action, Monarchists, Rallies, Nationalists, Revisionists, Republican Federation; Centre: PRRRS, Radical-Socialist Party, Independent Radicals, Moderate Republicans, Moderate Radicals, Republican Union, Republicans of the Left; Left: Socialists, SFIO, PRS.

Germany[90]

(Period of majority run-off TRS: 1871–1918; adoption of PR: 1918)

After Germany's unification in 1871, secret and direct elections under majority run-off TRS were introduced nationwide. An absolute majority was needed in the first ballot and a run-off election between the top two candidates was held in the second ballot. In 1871, the country was divided into 382 single-member constituencies. The number increased to 397 in 1874 when the population of Alsace-Lorraine received voting rights for the German national parliament.

The right political powers: the Conservatives and the National Liberals, were up against a very strong left party: the Social Democrats (SPD), from relatively early on. The party had already obtained 9.1 per cent in the third election in 1877. Conservatives and liberals joined forces against the left and were able to contain the left threat until shortly before the outbreak of World War I, by which time the Social Democrats had grown very strong. Before it adopted PR in 1918, the conservative government used repression measures to contain the left threat and successfully coordinated against the left under TRS. Time and information after the first round were used to isolate the Social Democrats in the run-offs. The ongoing success of the left led to an intra- and inter-party debate about the adoption of PR. Parties that lost mandates due to the strong left (Conservatives, National Liberals and Centre) started to consider PR as a safeguard. Additionally, the parties that were disadvantaged under TRS due to their negative vote-seat disproportionality (National Liberals, Left Liberals and SPD) also pushed for the adoption of PR.

From 1913 onwards, a broad coalition formed by the SPD, the liberals and the Centre Party that controlled the majority in parliament was in favour of PR. However, as the upper house was dominated by the Conservatives, they had to wait until the "pro-PR coalition" had a majority or until the Conservatives agreed to introduce PR. Both happened in 1918. The parliamentary "balance of

[90] For more detailed information and data, see Chapter 3.

power" had changed significantly after the strong results of the left in the 1912 election and even the Conservatives now considered a change to PR. A mixed system with 361 single-member and 26 multi-member constituencies (PR in large cities) was introduced in 1918. However, World War I distracted decision-makers from domestic political change, particularly electoral reform. Hence, full PR was only implemented in 1919 by consensus in the Council of the People's Deputies led by the Social Democratic Party. Successful electoral coordination of the right enabled them to delay the adoption of PR for 34 years.

Conclusion

To recap: despite the variation between all Western European cases that we have shown in this chapter, we can observe some patterns. Often several parties that previously dominated the political realm before the development of a workers' party later worked together against the left newcomer. Generally, the right tried to contain the left threat and maximise their seats. Yet, the right was initially not willing to introduce PR straight after the first signs of a strong left movement. Instead, it attempted to delay the adoption of PR for as long as possible as it was reluctant to make way for a constant representation of the left. Under SMP, there was no considerable amount of coordination between right parties, whereas under TRS, we could observe strong coordination between right-wing parties, which led to a delay of the adoption of PR. I now turn to the in-depth case studies of Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands in the next three chapters.

4. Defeating the common threat: Coordination under TRS in imperial Germany, 1871 – 1919

(Period of run-off TRS: 1871–1918; adoption of PR: 1918)

The German "Kaiserreich" (imperial Germany or the German Empire), was proclaimed in 1871 after the North German Confederation's military victory over France. It collapsed 47 years later, at the end of World War I in 1918. It has long been of great interest to historians, political scientists and economists due to its late unification and delayed but tremendous economic development within an authoritarian political system. Its electoral reforms and process of PR adoption in 1918 have been widely debated recently as well. The German case has played a large role in most electoral reform theories concerned with the move to PR (Cusack et al. 2010, Kreuzer 2010a). Firstly, it is used as a paragon for the political Rokkanian thesis of the threat of the rising left as the projecting force that leads to pro-PR positions of right-wing parties and Boix's extension of it (Rokkan 1970, Boix 1999, George, Bennett 2005). Secondly, Germany is also the case that motivates the economic theories of the adoption of PR (Cusack et al. 2007). Hence, the case is used for two diverging explanations and is therefore worth re-examining. What were the reasons for the introduction of PR and why was it only introduced in 1918 even though the left had already started posing an electoral threat to the incumbent rightist elite shortly after German unification in 1871?[91]

The current debate regarding imperial Germany's electoral system reform is mainly about the drivers of the adoption of PR. I argue that the case of imperial Germany is an appropriate example in showing that the implementation of PR could be delayed by a fragmented right due to its ability to coordinate against a strong left, which was incentivised by TRS.

[91] The SPD started to rapidly gain votes after the unification of its two predecessor parties in 1875.

Germany's unification and simultaneous early introduction of universal male suffrage in 1871 was accompanied by a rising electoral threat of the left soon after.[92] The right used non-electoral system methods such as repression of the left and exclusionary safeguards such as plural voting to counteract the inclusionary reforms. However, this was not sufficient enough to eliminate the left threat. Strategic electoral coordination was used to prevent the left from gaining more seats in parliament. However, the overall PR diffusion in Europe and the dissatisfaction with the VSD in parliament led to more pressure for PR. PR was interpreted as a "last resort" safeguard against the left. Strategic coordination efforts of the right were so strong that they managed to delay the adoption of PR until 1918. This was 34 years after the Social Democrats had gained almost 10 per cent of the votes in national elections for the first time.

In this chapter, I analyse the political, electoral and party systems of the German Empire, examine the strong electoral threat of the left, and the coordination efforts of the fragmented right under TRS to cope with this threat. Finally, I evaluate the debate and implementation regarding the adoption of PR.

[92] The unification process and the emergence of the German Empire in 1871 were accompanied by political difficulties. Not all of the German states were completely convinced of the idea of a German Empire. Prussia's pioneering role and centralisation efforts created some mistrust between and within other German states. Hence, Bismarck had to unify discontented and anxious parties into one nation state. The task constructing a constitution that would be satisfactory for all states was therefore a difficult endeavour. He had to find a way to grant the federal states and the public access to some participation of governance, and at the same time, satisfy the historically grown elites and their former privileges. The result was a constitution that combined monarchic, democratic and federal components together with universal male suffrage.

4.1. Electoral and political system

As a constitutional monarchy, the German Empire combined monarchic, democratic and federal components. The parliament, the "Reichstag" was elected in a direct, equal, free and secret (from 1903 onwards) ballot for the first time in 1867 and again in the unified Kaiserreich in 1871.[93] It was Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's (1871 – 1890) constitution, based on the constitution of Prussia and the North German Confederation from 1867, which introduced universal male suffrage and, therefore, parliamentary control at a federal level for the first time ever in the history of Germany. Germany was one of the pioneers of suffrage expansion, compared to other European states (Anderson 2000, p. 34). Every male German who had reached the age of 25 was eligible to vote.

The electoral system put in place in 1871 was majority run-off TRS. Candidates within the SMDs had to receive an absolute majority of votes in the first round to be elected straight away. If no one won an absolute majority in the first round, a run-off was held in the second round between the top two candidates of the first round. By only allowing the two leading candidates to enter the second round, the system ensured purely majoritarian results. In 1871, only 11.8 per cent of all districts conducted second rounds. In 1890, the number had already increased to 37 per cent and culminated with run-offs in almost every second district in 1912 (47.9 per cent) (see Table 17). The members of parliament (MPs) were elected in direct elections without delegates. The system existed until 1918, when PR was adopted. In 1871, there were 382 electoral districts and an additional 15 were added in 1874, when the population of Alsace-Lorraine received voting rights for the German parliament. Every district sent one MP to the Reichstag. The classification of the electoral districts with roughly 100,000 people per district was based on the population census of 1864 and was not changed until the end of the German Empire in 1918. The movement of people over time due to the east-west

[93] It was after the turn of the century that the SPD and the Centre contended for the approval and enforcement of the secret ballot and the inviolability of elections. The law was passed and the first secret elections were held in 1903.

migration, the population movement to the cities and general urbanisation tendencies were not taken into account. This led to a representational mismatch of the population in parliament (malapportionment). Urban areas and large cities were generally disadvantaged compared to the rural-agrarian districts.[94]

The emperor, who was not only the Prussian King but the head of the protestant church as well, held political and military authority.[95] He and his government had important political competencies and accountability was not as high as in a fully-fledged democracy. However, the government needed the authorisation of the parliament in many important cases (Biefang 1998, pp. 239-259). The Reichstag was an influential legislative organ. Its competencies ranged from legislative procedures to the approval of the budget.[96] Parliament had to approve the budget of the unified state and even military spending, the latter of which amounted to 3/5th of government expenditure. The military budget, however, was approved seven years in advance, for a fixed size military (from 1881 onwards for five years).[97] Parliament could furthermore modify, deny or defer any bill it opposed. It could oblige the chancellor to explain and defend his policies and could as well decide not to work with him and his government. Even Bismarck understood that he could not govern the country without parliament within the framework of his own constitution. Mommsen (1995a, p. 199) remarks that nearly all of the important bills of Bismarck that went through parliament were changed and altered,

94 For further introductory literature, see Frie (2004); Halder (2003) and Nipperdey (1983, p. 500).

95 The emperor had the right to convene, open, defer and suspend the Reichstag and to appoint the chancellor, who was the emperor's first minister and presiding officer of the Bundesrat. The chancellor was appointed by the emperor, and the legislature could neither elect nor appoint a member of the government nor could it depose it. The monarch also had the power to appoint and dismiss empire officials, who reported directly to the chancellor. The chancellor and the government were only accountable to the emperor and not to the parliament. Hence, the elected parliament could criticise and to a certain extent control the government but could not withdraw their confidence and force the government to resign (Nipperdey 1993, pp. 85-109). By and large, the German political system appeared as if it were based on the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances. This was, however, not the case due to the non-accountability of the government and Prussia's dominant position in the Bundesrat, paired with its federal three-class voting system. In Germany, this characteristic of the political system was called dualism.

96 For further elaboration of the rights and influences of the parliament, see Article 23 of the constitution and the history of the national legislation from the 'Jesuitengesetz' in 1872 until the 'Lex Bassermann-Erzberger' in 1913.

97 Bundesgesetzblatt des Deutschen Bundes Nr. 16 (1871), pp. 63-85.

at times even so much that the original piece and intent of Bismarck and his bureaucrats were beyond recognition. He had overestimated the conservative support for the king and his policies within the population, and over time, he lost his clear majority in the Reichstag. The parliament's gain in power was systemically conditioned due to the expansion of the governmental functions accompanied by growing nationwide regulation (Wehler 1995, p. 1286). Germany was one of the pioneers of democratic institutions and elections, compared to the introduction of similar democratic elections in other European states. Only Greece (1844) and France (1852) had already introduced comprehensive suffrage similar to Germany's at the time (Anderson 2000, p. 34) (see Table 3).

In addition to the elected House of Representatives (lower house), the representatives of the 25 federal states of imperial Germany came together in the "Bundesrat", the Federal Council and upper chamber of parliament, which was closed to the public. Its members were delegated by the federal states and elected through local suffrage systems. The Bundesrat had to approve all laws, the state budget, specific official acts of the emperor and, among other things, the dissolution of parliament and declarations of war.[98] The votes of the federal states in the Bundesrat were not distributed by the number of inhabitants but by the surface area of the state. Therefore, Prussia had 17 out of 54 seats in the upper chamber, which was no absolute majority, but in crucial issues such as constitutional amendments and military affairs, it had a blocking minority (14 seats needed for a veto). The introduction of the Reichstag and Bundesrat was still the beginning of a type of constitutional balance

[98] In addition, the Federal Council was the mediator of constitutional disagreements between individual federal states and actors of the same member state. The federal states carried out the administrative legislature as a "decentralised administration". They had extensive competencies concerning the implementation of the judicial system within their state, the education system and their own tax revenues. The federal states also retained the responsibility for their own political order. The electoral system in each state was generally limited, inhomogeneous between member states, and partially disproportionate, although it was significantly more democratized in the southern states than the Prussian three-class system in the North. During the last decade before World War I, most of the German federal states reformed their electoral laws in quite a democratic way. Exceptions hereof were Luebeck, Saxony, Hamburg and, above all, Prussia. Despite the federal structure of imperial Germany, the Federal Government and the emperor held key competencies in foreign policy and military affairs, social policy, customs and foreign trade policy, economic issues and the legal system. For further elaboration, see Kuehne (1994) and Anderson (2000).

between the parliament, the emperor and his government, which terminated the arbitrary state and introduced a first small piece of democracy in Germany. The German Empire, however, like Sweden and the Netherlands, was a constitutional monarchy.

4.2. Landscape of political parties, left threat and suffrage expansion

During the period of imperial Germany, one can speak of a five-party system.[99] Conservatives, National Liberals, Left Liberals, the Centre and the Social Democrats (SPD) were the most important parties. The fragmented right was split into Conservatives (Conservatives and Free Conservatives) and Liberals (National Liberals and Left Liberals). The Centre represented the Catholic clergy, and the Social Democratic Party was the left-wing agent of the labour movement (cf. Weber 1918, p. 101).

The strongest political force at the beginning of the Empire was liberalism. However, it was weakened by its fragmentation into left liberalism and national liberalism. The liberals mainly represented the interests of the protestant bourgeoisie and the industrial upper classes, which had gained wealth during the industrial revolution. Despite common liberal beliefs (market economy, rule of law, civil rights and liberties), there were major political differences between the two camps. The Left Liberals wanted further parliamentarisation and democratisation of the political system, without questioning the constitutional monarchy. They called for more social policies by the state. Within the Left Liberals, there were several party splits and mergers (among others, the German Progress Party (Deutsche Fortschrittspartei), the Liberal People's Party (Freisinnige Volkspartei), and the German Liberal Party (Deutsche Freisinnige Partei)).[100] The National Liberals largely backed up the politics of Bismarck and his successors. In contrast to the Left Liberals, the National Liberals also concurred with the offensive foreign policy of Bismarck and his government.

[99] 90.1 per cent of the parties that participated in run-offs were these five parties (own calculations based on Table 16).

[100] Election results for the different left liberal parties are depicted within one vote for the Left Liberals since they used to form parliamentary coalitions.

The main representatives of conservatism within the parliament, close to Bismarck and his policies, were the German Conservative Party (Deutschkonservative Partei, 1876-1918) and the Free Conservative Party (Freikonservative Partei, 1867-1918) (Stalmann 2000, 2003, p. 99). Noblemen and landowners from the eastern provinces of Prussia were particularly strong in these parties and campaigned primarily for their agricultural economic interests.

The Centre Party (Zentrum) represented the political Catholics. In the first years of the unified Kaiserreich, before the rise of the left, the Centre Party was the largest threat to a right-wing government and coalition. Bismarck's response to the increasing political influence of the Catholic clergy (the Centre Party gained 18.6 per cent in the 1871 election) was the initiation of the "Kulturkampf" – the introduction of harsh measures against the Catholic Church and its clerics, enacted between 1871 and 1878. However, the repression efforts led to even more political mobilisation of the anti-liberal clergy and laity. As a result, the Centre Party received 27.9 per cent of the vote in the subsequent election in 1874 (see Table 16 and Figure 3).

In 1875, the working class parties – ADAV (General German Workers' Association, founded in 1863) and SDAP (Social Democratic Workers' Party, founded in 1869)[101] unified to become the Socialist Workers Party (SAP), renamed in 1891 to become the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The SPD was supported by the growing industrial working class and was the main supporter of parliamentarisation and contender of the introduction of PR during the German Empire. It was in fundamental opposition to the political system of the Empire and Bismarck's policies and thus posed a major threat to the incumbent rightist elite.

[101] SDAP - same name in Dutch.

Table 16: Germany: parliamentary election results[102]

	Conservatives*	National Liberals**	Left Liberals***	Centre	SPD	Voter Participation
1871	23.1	37.3	9.8	18.1	2.8	50.7
1874	14.0	30.7	9.1	30.2	6.8	60.8
1877	17.6	29.7	8.6	26.0	9.1	60.3
1878	26.6	25.8	7.8	24.1	7.6	63.1
1881	23.7	23.1	14.8	23.2	6.1	56.1
1884	21.9	18.1	18.9	22.6	9.7	60.3
1887	25.0	23.2	13.5	20.1	10.1	77.2
1890	19.0	17.0	17.9	18.6	19.7	71.2
1893	19.0	16.6	10.8	19.1	23.3	72.2
1898	15.5	16.2	8.6	18.8	27.2	67.7
1903	13.4	17.2	6.6	19.7	31.7	75.3
1907	13.6	18.4	7.8	19.4	28.9	84.3
1912	11.6	14.4	12.3	16.8	34.8	84.5

*Conservatives = Free Conservatives (Freikonservative Partei, sometimes also called "Reichspartei") + Conservatives; **National Liberals = National Liberals + LRP + Wild Liberals; ***Left Liberals = Liberale Vereinigung; Deutsche Fortschrittspartei; Deutsche Volkspartei; Freisinnige Vereinigung; Deutsch-Freisinnige Partei (these groups are used for all electoral results throughout the case study, see tables below).

Twelve national elections took place between 1871 and 1918. The legislative period was three years long in the beginning, and five years long after 1888. The voter participation following the extension of suffrage in 1871 increased continuously from 50.7 per cent in 1871 to 84.5 per cent in 1912 (see Table 16). One could conclude that the introduction of universal male suffrage was one milestone in the effective politicisation of the German population, reflected in the steady rise of political participation. Wehler (1995, p. 1286) even spoke of a political mass mobilisation. However, one has to interpret these numbers with caution since they only refer to the eligible voters (for the electorate as a percentage of the population, see Appendix 2).[103] Nevertheless, the simple fact of high

[102] First round votes and voter participation in per cent. Source: http://www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de/krtw.htm, accessed 12/1/2013. See website for further sources. 1912 was the last election before the introduction of PR. For simplification, "Others/Miscellaneous" are not included in this table. For a table of the "seats/mandates", see Appendix 1.

[103] In 2009, in one of the latest elections of today's German Federal Republic, only 70.78 per cent of eligible voters voted, less than in almost every election since 1887. However, in 2009 where 62,168,489 voters were eligible to vote, 54.44 per cent of Germany's entire population voted due to universal suffrage (Statistisches Bundesamt, Schaetzung, Wirtschaft und Statistik 8/2009, p. 744; Bundeswahlleiter: Repraesentative Wahlstatistik zur Bundestagswahl 2009; and own calculations). In 1871, where only 7,650,000 were eligible to vote, approximately 19.4 per cent of the entire population voted that is more than 35 per cent less than today (Historisch-Politisches Jahrbuch, Internet Archive, A. Phillips, 1881, accessed on 03/06/2010; and own calculations).

voter turnout is already remarkable and its rise is representative of different kinds of political participation and the mass politicisation of the German population. It shows that parliamentary elections were taken seriously and that the parliament played an important role in German politics at the time. An increasing membership in political organisations, the rising circulation of newspapers, and the assistance and active involvement in campaigning, in particular on Election Day, are just a few additional indications of the politicisation and participation in Imperial Germany (Anderson 2000, pp. 511-512, Suval 1985, pp. 17-21).



Figure 2: Occupational transformation in Germany (workers per sector in per cent)[104]

After the Social Democrats won 39 per cent of the popular vote in Berlin in 1874 and 12 seats in the national parliament in 1877, Bismarck began to arrange the repression of the Social Democratic movement (Nipperdey 1993, pp. 355-56). The police was usually omnipresent at elections and

Large participation can also lead to the legitimisation of governments, parliaments or constitutions. When the Catholics flocked to the election to vote against the government to show their protest against Bismarck's "Kulturkampf" (repression of Catholics), they only underpinned his new constitution. The Social Democrats strengthened the legitimacy of the Reichstag as well, by voting for the opposition by the score at every election. Historians call this phenomenon "negative integration" (Przeworski 1985, p. 17). However, participation legitimized the opposition of the German Empire as well. Competitive valid elections imply that every legitimate democratic election also incorporates an elected opposition. Thus, elections contribute to the creation of pluralism in societies (Harrop and Miller 1987, pp. 252-261). For further details about the effects of elections in authoritarian regimes, see Hermet et al. (1978, pp. 1-15).

[104] Source: Bartolini (2000, p. 133).

collected information about the participants of the election meetings, quoted their debates and tried to take note of any unusual behaviour (Anderson 2000, pp. 480-88). The repression culminated in the Anti-Socialist Law[105] in 1878. For the approval of the law, Bismarck needed the parliamentary support of the Centre Party. This was one of the main reasons for the termination of the Kulturkampf against the Catholic Church in 1878. The Anti-Socialist Law was meant to repress the growing importance of the SPD, which Bismarck tried to make responsible for the two assassination attempts on Kaiser Wilhelm I. Even though the law did not ban the party and its delegates from the Reichstag (they were still allowed to run for parliament), its objective was to disable the entire organisation and its mobilisation efforts. The law banned any organisation and meeting with a socialist or any person with a social democratic background, social democratic trade unions and newspapers. 127 periodical publications and 278 non-periodical publications were banned until the end of June 1879, including the SPD party organ "Vorwaerts" ("Ahead") (Nipperdey 1993, pp. 355-56).

Despite the existence of the Empire-Press-Law of 1874, the freedom of press in imperial Germany was not mentioned in the constitution and was heavily infringed upon at least until the end of the Anti-Socialist Laws.[106] The Catholics, as well as the Social Democrats, were segments of society against which Bismarck could mobilise a conservative alliance. This allowed him on the one hand, to weaken the political opponent, and on the other hand, to strengthen the supporting coalition of the government. However, his victimisation plans did not deliver the desired outcome. High-industrialisation led to a growing working class. The industrial sector showed strong growth of their labour force between 1880 and 1920, quite contrary to the agricultural business sector (see Figure 2).

[105] Official name: „Gesetz gegen die gemeingefährlichen Bestrebungen der Sozialdemokratie" (Law against the public danger of social democratic endeavours).

[106] The 'Reichspressegesetz' (empire-press-law) of 1874 was the first law in German history that regulated the freedom of press uniformly and nationwide and abolished the pre-censorship. It mentioned the freedom of press yet it did not abolish the press-control and repression methods of the state. Newspapers could be confiscated without any order of a court if there was any suspicion of an infringement of legal regulation. The confiscation-right, together with the 'honor-protection of public figures' and the regulations regarding libel and offense, could be used by the state as a press harassment method (cf. Haentzschel (1927).

These industrial workers voted increasingly for the SPD.[107] When the Anti-Socialist Law was abolished in 1890, the SPDs voting shares climbed from one record high to another, ending up with a majority of almost 35 per cent of the vote in 1912. This was more than twice as much as the Centre Party, which obtained the second best result of the election (see Table 16 and Figure 3).



Figure 3: First round election results in Germany[108]
For */**/***, see Table 16.

As the ongoing tremendous success of the SPD shows, the safeguards used by the right, such as plural voting, the undemocratic upper chamber, ballot rigging (particularly in the East-Elbian districts), and maintaining the badly-apportioned districts, were not sufficient to contain the left threat. When the SPD started to gain public support, not only did the Conservatives lose votes, but the protestant middle class started to turn away from the liberal parties as well. The Conservatives were unable to repeat their electoral success from 1878 in subsequent elections (see Table 16 and Figure 3). Urbanisation and the increasing movement of labour also diminished the power of the landed

[107] There is a clear positive correlation between the change in occupation (from agriculture to industrial occupations/workers) and the total left vote, in Western Europe between 1890 and 1910 (0.543) (Bartolini, p. 164).
[108] Source: http://www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de/krtw.htm, accessed 12/1/2013.

conservative nobility since it enhanced the independence of the labour class. The labour class began to slightly detach itself from the property owners and employers, which was mainly possible due to very low unemployment rates and an increasing demand for labour. By 1890, the parliamentary majority of the conservative parties and the National Liberals had vanished (see Table 16 and Figure 3).

Table 17: Number of run-offs and run-off outcomes in Germany[109]

Year of election	Number of run-offs	Number of districts	Percentage of total districts	Conservatives*			National Liberals**			Left Liberals***			Centre			Social Democrats		
				a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c
1871	45	382	11.8%	29	16	*55.2%*	27	17	*63.0%*	11	9	*81.8%*	8	2	*25.0%*	4	0	*0.0%*
1874	46	397	11.6%	23	10	*43.5%*	31	22	*71.0%*	12	10	*83.3%*	10	1	*10.0%*	11	2	*18.2%*
1877	70	397	17.6%	26	10	*38.5%*	46	30	*65.2%*	21	19	*90.5%*	14	3	*21.4%*	20	3	*15.0%*
1878	65	397	16.4%	38	14	*36.8%*	40	20	*50.0%*	16	13	*81.3%*	6	3	*50.0%*	16	7	*43.8%*
1881	103	397	25.9%	47	12	*25.5%*	38	18	*47.4%*	56	48	*85.7%*	22	3	*13.6%*	22	13	*59.1%*
1884	98	397	24.7%	40	15	*37.5%*	44	14	*31.8%*	57	41	*71.9%*	15	5	*33.3%*	24	15	*62.5%*
1887	61	397	15.4%	28	14	*50.0%*	33	13	*39.4%*	26	19	*73.1%*	11	8	*72.7%*	19	5	*26.3%*
1890	147	397	37.0%	48	23	*47.9%*	76	23	*30.3%*	70	54	*77.1%*	22	17	*77.3%*	58	15	*25.9%*
1893	181	397	45.6%	73	36	*49.3%*	73	37	*50.7%*	54	42	*77.8%*	31	15	*48.4%*	84	20	*23.8%*
1898	183	397	46.1%	65	27	*41.5%*	74	39	*52.7%*	55	46	*83.6%*	36	18	*50.0%*	94	23	*24.5%*
1903	179	397	45.1%	54	36	*66.7%*	67	46	*68.7%*	44	36	*81.8%*	36	12	*33.3%*	117	24	*20.5%*
1907	159	397	40.1%	49	30	*61.2%*	60	37	*61.7%*	64	51	*79.7%*	31	15	*48.4%*	90	14	*15.6%*
1912	190	397	47.9%	64	25	*39.1%*	68	41	*60.3%*	55	42	*76.4%*	29	12	*41.4%*	120	45	*37.5%*
Sum	1527			584	268	*45.9%*	677	357	*52.7%*	541	430	*79.5%*	271	114	*42.1%*	679	186	*27.4%*

For */**/***, see Table 16.

a = number of run-offs that party took part in; b = number of won run-offs; c = percentage of won run-offs.

[109] Source: Own calculations based on Ritter, Niehuss (1980); Specht, Schwabe (1908); Alexander (2000, p. 71). Additional single run-offs were won by non-established parties ("Others"). These are not included in the table.

4.3. TRS as a safeguard

What role did TRS play in inducing coordination among the right and in containing the left threat? The number of run-offs was relatively small before 1890 (see Table 17). From 1890 onwards however, the number of run-offs constantly increased until the end of the Empire. This was mainly due to the fact that the termination of the Anti-Socialist Laws in 1890 led to a strong growth of the SPD (plus 9.6 per cent, see Table 17). Figure 4 shows a positive relation between the left vote and the number of run-offs. In 1890, the SPD increased the number of run-offs it took part in from 19 to 58 (see Table 17). Additionally, it forced other parties into second rounds without taking part in them itself by becoming the 5th major party competing for votes in round one. By 1912, a second round was held in almost 50 per cent of all districts nation-wide. Where run-offs happened, they were mostly to the disadvantage of the Social Democrats. In total, the SPD took part in 679 run-offs during the Empire and only won 186 of them (27.4 per cent) (see Table 17).

Kuehne (1994, p. 419) mentioned a "fundamental anti-socialists sentiment" within right parties (in particular the Conservatives and National Liberals). The right stigmatised the SPD as "enemies of the Empire" in order to isolate it in the second rounds (Kuehne 1994, p. 211). Strategic coordination of right parties was, together with the non-renewal of district sizes/borders, the main reason for the large vote-seat disproportionality of the SPD (see Table 21). Compromise between parties was a common tool. The newspaper Germania stated in 1918:

> "…smaller parties can win against larger parties by making compromises and focusing on one candidate… One made extensive use of this method in Reichstag elections, and the success is that the number of votes of one single party is out of proportion with the actual mandates. In

particular, the social democratic movement…has suffered from this evil, and has therefore always been the most eager advocate of proportional representation."[110]

Figure 4: Left vote and run-offs[111]

When the left vote grew and therefore the number of second rounds picked up in 1890, so did strategic coordination between right-wing parties (see Table 18 and Figure 5).[112] The first round results of the SPD and the degree of coordination of parties also show a strong positive relationship (see Figure 5). Hence, the growing left threat heavily influenced the extent of strategic coordination among right parties, which was induced by TRS and the number of run-offs.

[110] Germania, 24.11.1918; Das Wahlrecht der Zukunft, Dr. Hommerich, BArch R 901 / 54959. For typologies of German alliances, see Kühne (1994), Alexander (2000) and Reibel (2007).

[111] Source: Alexander (2000, p. 71); http://www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de/krtw.htm, accessed 12/1/2013.

[112] The numbers before 1890 are not available but some electoral alliances were already in place before 1890, e.g. the Bismarck cartel. Although, some of them were rather loose and informal.

Coordination under TRS

How did coordination work in detail? The most frequently used types of coordination in Germany were so-called "platform-alliances" and "coordination across districts" (Reibel 2007, p. 26).[113]

In "platform-alliances", Party A recommended their voters to vote for a candidate of Party B after Party B had promised to fulfil specific requests from Party A, often in regard to the candidate and/or his voting behaviour (Reibel 2007, p. 26). This could be done in round one and/or two (in round two it would naturally only be about voting behaviour). The supporting Party A often only had a smaller share of votes in the district, yet a crucial share to obtain a majority. These alliances could easily adapt to local characteristics (Alexander 2000, p. 49).[114]

In "coordination across districts", Party A supported the candidate of Party B in district X and Party B supported the candidate of Party A in district Y (Reibel 2007, pp. 28-29). This could be done in round one and/or two. These alliances could comprise two or more constituencies and take differences in strength of parties in each district into account. In order to apply these alliances effectively, a party needed regional and national organisational structures to enforce electoral coordination agreements on a local basis (Alexander 2000, p. 50).[115] If it was applied in round one, it was a "candidacy trade", in which each party would only run in one of the two districts – Party A in district Y and Party B in district X. If it was applied in round two, it was a "vote trade", in which support (vote recommendation) was exchanged between parties.[116]

[113] Other alliances such as proxy-alliances and diachronic alliances existed but less markedly than the former ones. In proxy-alliances, Party A and Party B agree on candidate of Party C. In diachronic alliances, the common candidate is from Party A, and in the next election from Party B. Often one of the elections was for national parliament and one for state parliament. Diachronic long-term alliances were relatively unstable, yet could be found in Prussia, where national and state election districts were often very similar (in terms of district size).

[114] Even though there was a general right sentiment against the left, parties were still looking to derive a benefit from coordination.

[115] In some rare cases, alliances were also arranged by local politicians.

[116] For vote trades and alliances between candidates under single transferable vote electoral systems (STV), see Marsh (2000).

Another form, which was mainly used before round two, was the "alliance without concessions". Smaller Party A for example, simply asked all of its supporters/voters to vote for Party B (Reibel 2007, p. 26). This often happened in round two if Party A had lost the first round. This should not be confused with strategic voting (SV). The difference is that this was initiated by parties and their leaders (local or national), and not just executed by voters in round two. It was also exploited in so-called "Riviera districts" – districts that would certainly be won by one specific party, so that the candidate could just as well take a vacation at the Italian Riviera instead of campaigning. In these districts, the winning party would not be inclined to make concessions because they would win in any case.

In general, first round coordination was often conducted in districts where there was enough information and it was more obvious who the frontrunner was. In regionally segmented areas with a clear favourite, there was often a broader right-wing coalition around this candidate in round one because of the very small chances for other right-wing candidates. Coordinating only in round two or having more than one right-wing group coordinating in round one (e.g. a Conservative/Centre candidate and a Liberal/Left-Liberal candidate) occurred when there was no sufficient information about party strengths or when right parties were similar in strength. Often having an own candidate in round one was important for weaker parties to keep up or sharpen their party profile (cf. Nipperdey 1993, p. 46). It was therefore mostly in round two that the right united against the left by backing up the strongest right-wing candidate. The 10 to 14 days between both rounds were used to convince other party leaders to unite all supporters and the entire right electorate against the SPD (cf. Nipperdey 1993, p. 499).

Table 18: Strategic coordination between all parties in Germany[117]

Year	1890	1893	1898	1903	1907	1912
Number of districts with strategic coordination	210	248	247	258	297	299
Number of districts	397	397	397	397	397	397
Percentage of districts with coordination	53%	62%	62%	65%	75%	75%
Percentage of second round coordination of all second rounds	83%	86%	87%	85%	94%	96%

Which right parties coordinated in Imperial Germany? The National Liberals acted as a "quasi governing party" from 1867 until 1878, backing up Bismarck's policies in parliament. They identified themselves with the unification and were therefore the first natural partner of Bismarck and his government (Wehler 1995, pp. 866ff.). They were not only supported through an informal electoral coalition with the Conservatives, but also received help from the government. From 1887 onwards, the Conservatives and the National Liberals introduced a formal electoral alliance ("Bismarck-cartel"), which included common candidates in some constituencies and more importantly, agreements for run-offs (see Table 19) (Ritter 1975, pp. 249ff). The coordination efforts of the right proved to be effective. Even though the SPD grew in power and the number of second rounds it participated in increased, it did not win a substantial number of run-offs until 1912 (see Table 17). Even though strategic voting by the voters certainly also existed, particularly in round two when only one right-wing

[117] Alexander (2000, p.71), own calculations. The coordination numbers in this thesis only incorporate alliances that could be proven through mention in newspapers, official documents, letters or other sources. That is to say, hidden electoral agreements such as a "general voting release" through the party leadership were not counted as coordination. These releases could be interpreted as a hint to voters to vote for a specific candidate, which was often underpinned by some party statements in the press. Results that suggested that Party A, which did not make it to round two, had voted for Party B in the second round, were also not counted as coordination. Hence, the numbers might reflect even less coordination than there actually was.

party was left, the data shows that it was mainly deliberate coordination between parties that was at work. There was almost no second round without strategic coordination between parties (see Table 18). Hence, although strategic voting has been mentioned as a contributing factor in round two of TRS, strategic coordination seems to be the more important variable, particularly in early democratisers.



Figure 5: Left vote and coordination

The Left Liberals became part of the electoral alliance in 1907 (see Table 19) to defeat the Social Democrats, the Centre and to support the conservative Chancellor Bernhard von Buelow (1900 – 1909) (Sternberger, Vogel 1969). The "coalition" ("Buelow-bloc") was mainly implemented to make sure that the SPD would not win a large number of run-offs and gain a plurality in parliament.[118] The strategic coordination of the right in 1907 led to 47 per cent of all mandates for the coalition (Conservatives, National Liberals and Left Liberals) and only 10.8 per cent for the SPD, even though

[118] Letter from Buelow to General von Liebert, the chairman of the „National Association against the Social Democrats" in 1906, in (Mommsen 1995, pp. 233-234).

the SPD gained 28.9 per cent in the first round (see Table 16). Before 1907, the Left Liberals had the advantage of strategic voting in the second round, which they expected to win even without strategic coordination. As a heterogeneous and more centre-oriented party (right of the SPD and left of the National Liberals and Conservatives), the Left Liberals could count on the votes of the right if it ran against the SPD in the second round and on the SPD voters if it ran against a party on the further right (Alexander 2000, p. 47). In 1912, the Left Liberals won almost all its 42 mandates in run-offs (see Table 20).

The right-wing parties did not want to engage in electoral coordination with the SPD in round two (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 218). It was not up for debate for the SPD party leaders either as they feared that they could lose their revolutionary credibility by engaging in "mandate deal-making" with the "bourgeois parties".[119]

Table 19: Number of right-wing electoral alliances in Germany[120]

	1890	1893	1898	1903	1907	1912
Right alliances	138	167	136	144	202	218
Conservatives + National Liberals	115	108	90	75	67	35
Conservatives + National Liberals + Left Liberals	13	15	21	23	83	22
Conservatives + Centre	5	21	8	19	20	69
National Liberals + Left Liberals	5	23	17	27	32	92

Exceptional election successes of the "governmental" right parties were mostly associated with electoral agreements in which the state was involved as well (Zwehl 1983, p. 108). The right benefitted from electoral agitation of the government (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 218). The state used its infrastructure and organisational resources to support the right, and tried to calm down issues between two right-wing parties when the government expected a strong left and a close outcome in the second round (cf. Nipperdey 1993, p. 46). Before the Social Democrats could build and strengthen their organisational structure, the organisation and infrastructure of the state was already established and

[119] Letter from Karl Kautsky to Victor Adler at the 5th of May 1894 (Adler 1954, pp. 151-155).
[120] Source: Alexander (2000, p.71), own calculations.

provided every right candidate who was favoured by the government with a clear advantage over his fellow campaigners. The conservative government and the right parties used the information of the first rounds and the time between both rounds to coordinate the vote around the strongest right party in each district more effectively. The effort of the government to enhance results in round two was particularly high for the right parties that specifically backed the policies of the government. The National Liberals for instance, gained more seats than votes in the first elections of the Empire, when they were specifically backing Bismarck's policies. The reverse effect was the case from 1881 onwards, when they were temporarily "in the opposition" (with the exception of the election of 1887, when they entered into an alliance with the Conservatives) (see Table 21) (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 218).

In 1912, the electoral alliances changed. The Conservatives had started to form an additional electoral coalition with the Centre Party (see Table 19 and Chapter 4.4.) and the two liberal parties started coordinating more among each other than within the "old larger coalition" (Conservatives, National Liberals and Left Liberals). This split the right vote in many districts and together with the growing strength of the left, led to 28 per cent of the mandates for the SPD, even though the SPD still lost 62.5 per cent of its second rounds (see Table 17) (Nipperdey 1993, pp. 729-741, Wehler 1995, pp. 109-111). The right might have been able to contain the left threat somewhat longer if it would have kept the larger "old coalition" for further elections.

Yet, in 1898, the Prussian state ministry had issued guidelines, which highlighted that the government was mainly based on both conservative parties and the National Liberals, and that it encouraged strategic coordination between these parties. Additionally, the guidelines had already included an appeal to vote for the Centre Party in second rounds if it faced the SPD.[121] There is plenty of correspondence showing how right-wing politicians ask other right-wing politicians to coordinate

[121] Richtlinien des preussischen Staatsministeriums fuer die Reichstagswahlen von 1898, in Ritter (1975, pp. 114-115).

in round two.[122] The support for the Centre in run-offs against the Social Democrats was further encouraged by Chancellors such as Prince of Hohenlohe (Chancellor from 1894 – 1900). In 1898, for instance, he described in detail to Georg Cardinal Kopp (Prince-Bishop of Breslau, 1881–1914) how important it is for the non-socialist parties to stand together against the SPD in second rounds to contain the enormous electoral left threat. Kopp was asked to exert his influence on the Centre Party in that matter.[123] Furthermore, the government introduced centrally-steered press campaigns that were flexible enough to react to district-specific circumstances and results in the first round (Puhle 1967, p. 329).

Overall, the National Liberals, Left Liberals and Free Conservatives benefited the most from electoral alliances (see Table 20). In 1907 and 1912, the National Liberals and Left Liberals won more than 90 per cent of their seats through coordination.

Table 20: Number of MPs elected through electoral alliances in Germany[124]

	1890		1893		1898		1903		1907		1912	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%
Free Conservatives	23	31.5	30	41.7	15	26.8	22	40.7	31	51.7	23	53.5
Conservatives	12	60	25	89.3	16	72.7	17	80.9	22	91.6	12	85.7
National Liberals	20	47.6	40	75.5	36	78.3	40	78.4	51	94.4	41	97.6
Left Liberals	47	61.8	36	75	44	89.8	27	75	48	97.8	41	97.6
Centre	13	12.3	10	10.4	18	17.6	10	10	12	11.4	11	12.1
Social Democrats	8	22.9	5	11.4	5	8.9	9	11.1	5	11.6	24	21.8

"abs." = absolute numbers of MPs elected through coordination; "%" = percentage of districts that were won by coordination.

[122] E.g. KZ, No. 289, 23/06/1911; Kons. Korr., No. 55, 4/6/1911 and Hamburgische Nachrichten, No. 290, 23/6/1911.
[123] Letters between Chancellor Hohenlohe and Cardinal Kopp, in Ritter (1975, pp. 115-116).
[124] Source: Alexander (2000, p. 73).

4.4. Debating safeguards against a rising left

From the mid-nineteenth century, parties and political leaders discussed the reform of the overall electoral system and the adoption of PR on a federal level.[125] Table 21 presents the effects of vote-seat disproportionalities for the five major parties. The ratio shows the difference between per cent of vote and per cent of seats for each party. Parties that profited from the distribution of votes to seats (higher seat than vote share – positive number in Table 21) were more likely to support TRS. Parties that had a negative vote-seat disproportionality (negative numbers in Table 21), on the other hand, were rather expected to favour the adoption of PR.

The SPD had the highest VSD and therefore suffered the most under TRS. Their disproportionality ratio was always negative and worsened from -2.3 per cent in the first elections in 1871, to -18.1 per cent in 1907 (see Table 21). Industrialisation and urbanisation led to the concentration of voters in urban areas, which together with the loss in run-offs, provoked the disproportionality experienced by the SPD. Urban areas traditionally voted for the SPD, while rural areas voted for the right. The constituencies' sizes were never readjusted between 1871 and 1917 and therefore still reflected the population levels of the time of the unification. However, even though malapportionment was one trigger of the VSDs, there was a positive relationship between the "coordination of parties" and the "level of underrepresentation" (at least before 1912, when coordination did not work as well as before because the right split into two main groups) (see Figure 6). The data suggests that the main driver of the high disproportionalities after 1890 was not malapportionment but strategic coordination under TRS.

[125] PR was introduced on state levels before 1918. In 1903 for local elections in Bavaria; 1906 in Wuerttemberg and in Oldenburg in 1908 and at state elections in Wuerttemberg und Hamburg in 1906 as well.



Figure 6: Strategic coordination and the level of underrepresentation

It is not surprising that the SPD became the strongest contender of PR. PR, as it was publicised by Thomas Hare and Johann Caspar Bluntschli, was already well known in Germany in the 1880s.[126] There was inter-party debate within the SPD about which electoral system should be implemented and even though the majority of the left had preferred PR over TRS or SMP, it was only in 1891 that the SPD passed a party program that included the proposal of the introduction of PR at their Erfurt party convention.[127] SMP was not debated as a valid alternative to TRS or PR. In the years before World War I, SPD candidates regularly backed legislation that recommended the introduction of PR on a federal level and actively advanced comparable proposals in the debate on electoral reforms of state and local elections (Schmaedeke 1995). The principal supporter of PR within the SPD was Walter

[126] Ritzhaupt to Bismarck, 25/11/1881, BAB-L R43/685, pp. 28-31; Prelipper to Bismarck, 19/11/1884, ("recommends the well-known Hare system."), ibid., pp. 227-230; Bluntschli, Allgemeine Staatsrechte I, Buch 5, Chapter 7, quoted in Hofnockel to Bismarck, 15/11/1881, BAB-L R1501/14693, pp. 97-99.

[127] SPD party program, „Protokoll ueber die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der SPD", Berlin, 1891.

Liebknecht.[128] Many other Social Democratic MPs also championed PR in parliament during that time, e.g. Mueller-Meiningen, Stresemann, David, Dove, Schiffer.[129] In the years after the Erfurt convention, Friedrich Engels was still looking for a more practical version of PR.

> "(...) in our view there is indeed still a lack of a practical PR system for the large state parliaments. The proposal to turn the entire country into one large district, which would vote for hundreds of representatives, only seems simple; in fact it would lead to almost insoluble confusion (Friedrich Engels, quoted in: Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 226)."

However, Engels too advocated for PR in principle.

Table 21: Vote-seat disproportionalities in Germany in per cent[130]

	Conservatives*	National Liberals**	Left Liberals***	Centre	SPD
1871	1.5	3.3	2.5	-2.1	-2.3
1874	-0.9	9.1	3.5	-7.3	-4.5
1877	2.0	5.8	1.2	-2.6	-6.1
1878	2.4	1.7	-0.5	-0.7	-5.3
1881	-4.6	1.1	1.8	1.5	-3.1
1884	4.3	-4.5	-1.0	2.3	-3.7
1887	5.0	2.2	-5.4	4.6	-7.3
1890	3.9	-5.4	0.7	8.1	-10.9
1893	4.9	0.5	-2.2	5.1	-12.2
1898	4.4	-0.3	0.7	6.9	-13.1
1903	5.2	-1.6	0.2	5.5	-11.3
1907	7.6	-1.0	1.0	7.0	-18.1
1912	2.5	-3.1	-1.7	6.1	-7.1
Average	2.9	0.6	0.1	2.7	-8.1
PR Support (since)	No -> Yes	Yes (1890)	Yes (1890)	Yes (1913)	Yes (1891)

For */**/***, see Table 16.

[128] Carstairs (1980, p. 164).
[129] BArch R 1501 / 114478.
[130] Vote-seat disproportionality = First round votes in per cent – allocated mandates in per cent (for each party). Source: Own calculations based on http://www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de/krtw.htm, accessed 12/1/2013; Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde, Betrachtungen ueber die Einteilung der Reichstagswahlkreise, R1501/192-193.

On the political right, the losers in the allocation of votes to seats were the two liberal parties. Their disproportionality ratios varied between positive and negative. However, the Left Liberals had four and the National Liberals had six negative ratios respectively within the last eight elections of the Empire (1884-1912) (see Table 21). The National Liberals had benefited from the electoral system in the beginning when they were still one of the main parties backing the government, together with the Conservatives. Intra-party debate regarding electoral systems was common in the liberal parties until the end of the German Empire (Gagel 1958, pp. 125ff). After the election of 1890, both parties started to debate and partially support the introduction of PR. This coincided with particularly high losses of mandates proportionally to votes in 1887 (for the Left Liberals) and 1890 (for the National Liberals). The National Liberals started to debate the introduction of PR after the negative VSD of -5.4 in 1890. The party suffered mandate losses since its voters were scattered throughout the country. It did not have as many safe constituencies as the Conservatives and the Centre (Brandenburg 1917, p. 30). Leading figures of the party proposed a list PR system with MMDs. They only saw PR as its lifesaver when its electoral decline began (Gagel 1958, pp. 127-131). However, the party was afraid to put it in the party program at first because it knew that the largest beneficiary would be the SPD (Mommsen 1924, p. 99).

By and large, we can observe that parties mainly started to support PR once their VSD was negative for a period of time or they expected it to become negative (see Figure 7). The SPD and the National Liberals started to support PR once their VSD went down. The Conservatives did so as well, but significantly later. The Centre and the Conservatives benefitted from TRS and therefore only began to support PR relatively late.



Figure 7: VSD and PR support per party[131]

Leaders of the Centre Party and the Conservatives understood the benefits of TRS for them and rejected the move to PR.[132] The resistance of any electoral system reform was one of the concerns that brought these parties together, despite having been harsh opponents only years before, during the Kulturkampf. This led to the creation of the "black-blue bloc", an electoral coalition of the two parties under Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (1909 – 1917) in the 1912 election (see Table 19) (Bertram 1964, Reibel 2007).[133] PR was interpreted as a safeguard that should only be implemented if the SPD grew so strong that coordination and malapportionment were not sufficient anymore to further contain the left threat. They did not want to give way to stable proportional representation of

[131] Horizontal reference lines show a VSD of 0. A solid vertical reference indicates when a party started to support PR.

[132] Alberto Penadés, Electoral Reform in Early Democracies: The Right-wing, Presented at the Conference on Historical Political and Economic Development in Western Europe: Recent Advances in Comparative Politics, Madrid, 2011; Kuehne (1994).

[133] The conservative-liberal Buelow-bloc disintegrated in 1909, when the liberals demanded taxes on agricultural property and the reform of the three-class franchise in Prussia, which the Conservatives declined.

the SPD before they had used all possible containment measures. Table 22 shows how drastic the mandate shift would have been in 1907 in case of an adoption of PR.

Table 22: Difference in mandates: TRS vs. PR – 1907 elections in Germany[134]

Party	Mandates under TRS	Mandates under PR	Difference
Conservatives	60	39	
Free Conservatives	24	17	
Overall Conservatives	84	56	**-28**
National Liberals	54	60	**6**
Left Liberals	42	40	**-2**
Overall Liberals	96	100	**4**
Centre	105	79	**-26**
SPD	43	117	**74**
Others	69	45	

Looking at the translation of votes into seats under TRS and PR, and how these numbers affected the willingness of parties to change the electoral system, we can observe that the seat numbers and the policy positions are in line with each other. The SPD would have gained 74 seats in the 1907 election and the Liberals would have gained 4 mandates. Both camps were in favour of PR at the time. The Conservatives on the other hand, would have lost 28 seats and the Centre would have lost 26. Both of them were against the introduction of PR, at least until the SPD grew too strong and could no longer be contained.

It was the election of 1912 (last election under TRS) that depicted a caesura in how the right analysed the current electoral situation. It was a landslide victory for the SPD in which they gained 67 mandates (plus 16.9 per cent). The SPD's share of the vote had increased so significantly (plus 5.9 per cent) that they were able to win a large proportion of the districts in the first round (in 1907 they won 29 districts/mandates in round one, in 1912 they won 65 in round one) (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p.

[134] Sources: Fricke (1961, pp. 538–576); Anderson (2000, p. 343); Gagel (1958, p. 143).

220).[135] Especially in the rural areas, the SPD was able to win plenty of mandates for the very first time (see red parts in Figure 8). This was also due to the fact that the Left Liberals voted for Social Democrats in the second round in some districts for the first time (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 231).

The Conservatives lost 28 mandates; the National Liberals lost 24 and the Centre lost 14 (see Appendix 1). The right had split the vote and coordinated in two groups: one group was the Centre and the Conservatives and the second group was both liberal parties (see Table 19). The Centre started to support the idea of PR after this election (only from 1913 onwards) and even the Conservatives began to consider PR as an option. The systematic underrepresentation of the SPD through malapportionment started to fall apart due to the winnings of the left in the rural areas. Coordination did not help to contain the threat as effectively as it had before since the right had split coordination into two groups.

A report of the German Interior Ministry after the 1912 election states different success models for different parties of the right in allocating votes into seats. The report states that while the Liberals received more than three million votes in 1912, it got only four seats in the first round, while the Centre Party received more than 80 seats with only two million votes. The report further notices that the main reason for this mismatch for the Liberals was that liberal voters were not geographically clustered.[136] Similar observations were made by liberal politicians at the time, who then started to push for the implementation of PR (Brandenburg 1917, p. 30, Gagel 1958, p. 128).

[135] Own calculations based on Reibel (2007); Ritter, Niehuss (1908); Specht, Schwabe (1908); Alexander (2000, p. 71).
[136] Betrachtungen ueber die Einteilung der Reichstagswahlkreise, BArch R 1501/192-193.



Figure 8: Election results in 1907 (above) and 1912 (below)[137]

4.5. Adoption of PR

The elections of 1912 were the last ones held in the German Empire. World War I began two years later and the parties held back political disputes during the war – the consequence of an agreement between parties that was called "Burgfrieden" ("party truce"). The electoral system debate picked up again in 1917 when the right was afraid of a republican revolution as it happened in Russia in 1917 (Rauh 1977, pp. 168ff.). As a result, the Reichstag established a constitutional committee to elaborate further reforms of the electoral system. The debate was mainly about the extension of universal suffrage from the federal level to all states, most importantly Prussia (Llanque 1997, p. 197).

In May 1917, the constitutional committee had accepted a proposal from the Left Liberals: the allocation of seats in large electoral districts should be increased. Realising that the increase of seats in the urban areas would mostly benefit the SPD, the right government was afraid that the Social Democrats could get a long-term majority in parliament. Hence, the proposal included a change of the electoral system. The large cities would get more MPs but they would have to be allocated by PR.[138] In January 1918, a draft law was introduced to increase the number of MPs from 397 to 441. 361 of them would still be elected under TRS. The remaining 26 constituencies, all large cities, should from then on provide 80 MPs in total. This draft law was a masterpiece of electoral engineering. It aimed to use PR as a safeguard, but instead of taking the risk of an introduction across the entire country, the incumbent elite only wanted to introduce PR in the electoral districts where they had previously lost. The Reichstag and the Bundesrat accepted the law within a couple of months. The draft obtained a large majority in both chambers. The SPD voted for the draft even though it would give away some of the safe havens it previously had under TRS and would not gain any ground in rural areas (Rauh 1977, pp. 410ff.).

[137] Results of the decisive round; Source: http://www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de/kuKarte1903.htm & http://www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de/kuKarte1912.htm; accessed at 16/8/2013.
[138] BArch R 1501 / 114481, p. 136; BArch R 1501 / 114478/b.

The National Liberals proposed PR for the Ostmark, Oberschlesien, Berlin and the western industrial district (westlicher Industriebezirk) in May 1918.[139] In October 1918, the Conservatives in Prussia gave in and voted for an equal right to vote. Due to longer periods for amending laws, it would have taken until mid-December for the law to be implemented. The SPD wanted to speed up the process and on November 8th, together with the factions of the Centre and both liberal parties, introduced another bill in the Reichstag: Universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage for men and women aged 24 and older in elections on federal and state level should become part of the constitution. However, it never came to the vote in parliament (Huber 1988, pp. 596ff.).

With the outbreak of World War I, the government, the Supreme Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung) and the military perceived that they needed the working class for their war efforts and therefore promoted cooperation between parties. Even the working class organisations (parties and unions) joined the enthusiastic support for the war. However, this issue divided the SPD later on into two parts: the USPD (Independent SPD) and the MSPD (Majority SPD – successor of SPD) (Roth 1963, pp. 287ff.). The larger MSPD made reforms a condition for its participation.

Yet, the war did not stop the debate about the change of the electoral system. The right only wanted to introduce PR "when things were over and done with". The Conservatives and parts of the National Liberals and the Centre were still convinced that their coordination efforts and electoral alliances under TRS would enable them to obtain more seats than under PR for the time being.[140] The Conservatives were contemplating to put a bill forward that introduced a mixed system, consisting of TRS and PR.[141] At the same time, the government knew that there was a risk that once the Social Democrats obtained a majority in parliament, their willingness to introduce PR would vanish. They could acquire a preference for a majoritarian system and could then stop the right from introducing

[139] BArch R 901/55996, p. 6.
[140] BArch R 901 / 54959, Die Freiheit, 12.9.1919.
[141] BArch R 901 / 54959, Weser Zeitung, 18.1.1919.

PR.[142] Therefore, the right needed to be vigilant about when to finally adopt PR. In German ministries, many aides and advisors were busy evaluating the electoral system reports from the German consulates all over Europe. Every foreign electoral system was comprehensively analysed and then the distribution of seats in the German parliament was calculated for each and every possible new electoral system. PR was eventually seen as a "certain protection".[143]

Yet, when facing military defeat, the Supreme Command realised that cooperation with the working-class and further democratisation would significantly enhance their initial circumstances for possible peace negotiation, ceasefire and demobilisation. This way they hoped to be able to at least partially avoid shouldering the responsibilities of the war (Frotscher, Pieroth 2005, pp. 462-464, Feldman 1966, pp. 435, 514). Under pressure from US President Wilson and the Allies, the emperor appointed Prince Maximilian von Baden as new Chancellor in October 1918. Baden was supposed to form a new government and reform the political system. The new government was based on a coalition of the Centre, the Democratic Party and the MSPD. The reforms included the abolition of the three-class suffrage system in Prussia and the introduction of full accountability of the government, including military affairs. Germany had transformed itself from a constitutional monarchy to a parliamentary monarchy (Craig 1978, p. 397, Fulbrook 1990, p. 157).

Among the population, the call grew for the abdication of the Kaiser and the end of the war. When General Ludendorff suddenly performed an about-turn regarding the ceasefire and asked to resume the war, the "Wilhelmshaven mutiny" triggered insurgencies in many port cities and resulted in the "November revolution" (German Revolution of 1918-1919). Councils of workers and soldiers were created, which forced King Ludwig III of Bavaria to abdicate. Bavaria was declared a republic and the rulers of the other German federal states resigned within the next few days. On November

[142] BArch R 1501 / 114481, pp. 136.
[143] BArch R 1501 / 114478.

9th, Baden announced the abdication of the Kaiser, resigned and handed over the government to Friedrich Ebert and the MSPD (with the USPD). A democratic republic was proclaimed. Ebert formed a transitional government and secured the support of the new Supreme Command in exchange for the limitation of the revolutionary movements and the suppression of the workers' and soldiers' councils (Fulbrook 1990, p. 159).

Ebert invited Hugo Preuss, a professor of Constitutional Law and a secretary of state in the Ministry of the Interior, to draft a new constitution (Carstairs 1980, pp. 164-165). Not only did the SPD further push for PR, but Preuss himself (a left liberal) found the opportunistic tactic of coordination used in run-off systems simply "politically wrong". He had publicly argued for PR for years (Preuss 2007, p. 44). In December, the "Council of the People's Deputies" decided to hold new elections at the earliest time possible. All parties within the council had voted for PR. The USPD left the government in January 1919 after the suppression of the "Spartacist uprising". The new elections were based on universal suffrage for all men and women with a minimum age of twenty and held under PR. The MSPD won 163 of the 421 seats (39%), the Centre 91 seats (22%) and the Democratic Party 75 seats (18%).[144] The contributing parties were the same as the ones under Baden's government before the revolution. The Weimar constitution was proclaimed in August 1919 (Winkler 1993).

Conclusion

In summary, it can be stated that the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1871 contributed to the rapid electoral rise of the Social Democrats. The conservative government subsequently used repression measures to contain the left threat. After having exploited all measures to maintain power, PR was one of the last safeguards that could have been used to maintain the right's parliamentary strength. However, the right was able to successfully coordinate against the left under TRS. Time and

[144] Source: Craig (1978, pp. 412-13) and own calculations.

information after the first round were used to isolate the SPD in run-offs. The ongoing success of the SPD still led to an intra- and inter-party debate about the adoption of PR. Parties that lost mandates due to the strong left (Conservatives, National Liberals and Centre) started to consider PR as a safeguard against the SPD. Additionally, the parties that were disadvantaged under TRS due to their negative VSDs (National Liberals, Left Liberals and SPD) also pushed for the adoption of PR.

Germany's conservative governmental leaders did not intend to use electoral system reform to foster greater inclusion of society, but instead to maintain the established political order and to accompany democratisation. A broad coalition formed by the SPD, the liberals and the Centre that controlled the majority of the parliament was in favour of PR from 1913 onwards. However, with the upper house dominated by the Conservatives, they had to wait either until the "pro-PR coalition" had a majority in parliament/council or until the Conservatives agreed to introduce PR. Both of these happened in 1918. The parliamentary "balance of power" had changed significantly after the elections in 1912 and even the Conservatives considered a change to PR. Full PR was eventually implemented in 1918 by consensus in the Council of the People's Deputies. The adoption of PR was delayed by successful electoral coordination of the right under TRS. This was not the case in Sweden, as we shall see in the next chapter.

5. No coordinated right: Strong left threat under SMP in Sweden, 1866 – 1909

(Period of SMP (1866–1907); adoption of PR: 1907)

The Swedish Kingdom in the late 19th and early 20th century was a state, similarly to Germany, with a strong left threat and a fragmented right. Historical case studies of Sweden and other Scandinavian states have been rare, particularly in the English language. Yet, the Swedish case has some particularities that are worth analysing. I argue that Sweden is an appropriate example in showing that SMP in early democratisers did not incentivise coordination of the right against the left as much as TRS did in other Western European countries. The gradual expansion of suffrage had led to a left threat in 1905 due to the rise of a promising Social Democratic Party, which provoked containment measures by the political right. PR was discussed early and mainly supported by the Liberals. The Conservatives resisted PR initially. The debate moved on to PR vs. majoritarian elections once the Conservatives had agreed to universal suffrage. The right parties did not have enough electoral information to base their strategic decisions on. The left's prospects appeared very strong and without sufficient coordination among right parties, PR was introduced as a safeguard relatively early compared to other Western European states. SMP, in place until the adoption of PR, was not as conducive to coordination among right parties as TRS and was eventually abolished. The adoption of TRS was also debated and proposed in parliament. The Liberals tried to change the electoral system from SMP to TRS to benefit from coordination under TRS. However, they did not find a parliamentary majority for their proposal. Universal male suffrage was adopted in 1907 together with PR. After Belgium, Sweden was the second state in Western Europe that introduced PR. Overall, the initial political conditions were similar to Germany and the Netherlands except the electoral system was SMP not TRS. Yet, in Sweden coordination did not work successfully under SMP as the electoral system was not as conducive to coordination. Hence, PR had to be introduced as a safeguard for the

right sooner than in countries under TRS where coordination was more likely to emerge among right parties due to the second round. The left threat was only sustained for 4 years before PR was adopted. This case shows how important coordination between right-wing parties was and how SMP in an early democratiser was not conducive to a large amount of coordination and therefore to contain a major left threat.

In this chapter, I describe the political, electoral and party systems of Sweden before 1907, analyse the left threat and the interdependent debate about the expansion of suffrage, and the efforts of the right to cope with this threat. Lastly, I evaluate the debate concerning the adoption of PR.

5.1. Electoral and political system and landscape of political parties

Between the 1860s and 1910, Sweden transformed from an agrarian society to an industrial state. Modernisation and high-industrialisation led to a growing working class and more pressure on political participation around the turn of the century. Modernisation also impacted the political system. It was particularly evident in the late 19th century, when a new opposition press evolved, the guild monopolies were closed down, and taxes were reformed. Economic progress increased the number of eligible voters and universal suffrage became the main demand of the newly emerged working class. This not only had a large impact on the party system but also on Sweden's electoral system, which changed from SMP to PR in 1907.

As in most other Western European states, Sweden's political system at the time was a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. Members were appointed in national elections. The powers of Government of the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) were shared with the King, who appointed the government. Yet, the more powerful the parliament became, the more the King relied on the majorities in the Riksdag when appointing the government. The parliament, together with the emerging political parties, had been able to assert itself against the authority of the King.

Accountability rose and a de facto parliamentary system began to evolve. The influence of King Oscar II (reigning until 1907) on politics decreased with the evolvement of the party structure. The King usually asked an MP from the biggest party (of upper and lower chamber) to form a cabinet. In 1905, Christian Lundeberg's cabinet was the first to be formed from within parliament, without the King's involvement. Ultimately, in 1917, full parliamentarism was established. However, before then, similar to Germany, the First Chamber was still dominated by the Conservatives, who had put several safeguards in place to make sure they maintained control of the upper house. High property qualifications were required to be able to run for the First Chamber; plural voting (wealthier citizens had more votes than poorer ones) was utilised and initially, so was indirect voting.[145] This enabled the Conservative incumbent elite to retain control over the First Chamber until the introduction of PR. They also maintained some control over the Second Chamber, where the suffrage was restricted to men over 21 years of age and by property and income. SMP had been in place since 1866, with some MMDs and secret voting. Between 20 to 30 per cent of all men over 21 were enfranchised at the time (see Appendix 6). Prime Minister Louis De Geer, who had introduced the bicameral system in 1866, believed that limited suffrage would help to maintain social order:

> …To ensure a calm social order, it may be important to restrict the right to vote to persons with living conditions that may be regarded as leaving some time and inclination free for independent participation in political life (Lewin 2004, p. 265).

The emergence of a party system began at around the same time, with the first meeting of the new Riksdag (Swedish parliament) in 1867. In the beginning, parties in Sweden were trans-regional associations that resembled loose political interest groups rather than efficiently organised ideological

[145] Cities were traditionally overrepresented in Swedish parliament since 1866 because they were attributed more seats. By 1866, cities needed to be protected against the domination of rural interests and therefore obtained more seats. Yet, the cities grew steadily during the period of urbanisation and by the beginning of the 20th century, the rural areas rather needed to be protected from the dominating urban interests. By that time, Conservatives wanted to abolish additional seats for cities, which became a stronghold of Liberals and eventually Social Democrats.
Indirect voting disappeared gradually after 1866 and direct elections were implemented (Särlvik 2002, p. 232).

class structures. Most candidates were independent candidates until 1884 (see Table 23). At this time, MPs became more organised in political groups and parties. The first election without electors/delegates also took place at around that time, in 1887.

Table 23: Number of independent candidates in Sweden[146]

Year	Absolute figures	Percentage of total candidates
1872	256	66
1875	262	66.2
1878	229	56.1
1881	219	53.2
1884	117	27.3

By the end of the 19th century, a party system with three main political groups had evolved (see Figure 9 and Table 25), which consisted of the Liberals (emerged unofficially in 1895 and officially founded in 1899 as the Liberal Coalition Party based on the middle class), the Conservatives (officially founded in 1904 as Allmaenna Valmansfoereningen), and the still relatively small left-wing Social Democratic Party (SAP, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti, founded in 1889) (Särlvik 2002, p. 234, Nohlen, Stöver 2010, p. 1843).[147]

The fragmented political right consisted of several parties: the Conservative Party/the "Protectionists" (before the Conservative Party was founded), the Farmers' Party, the National Progressive Party (second Farmers' Party), for two elections the Moderate Liberals (right-wing liberals that split up from the Liberal Party), and the Liberals. The Conservative Party later turned into the Moderate Party (Moderate Samlingspartiet). The Liberal Party evolved from the "Free Traders" and later turned into today's People's Party Liberals (Folkspartiet Liberalerna). They were constantly pushing for the expansion of suffrage. By the end of the century, their largest demand was universal

[146] Source: Lewin et al. (1972, p. 33).
[147] For a more detailed approach of the development of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, see Tingsten (1941).

male suffrage. The official foundation of the first unified Liberal Party was even financially supported by the Universal Suffrage Association (Verney 1957, p. 139).[148] The liberal movement was divided into a more "radical" left-wing in the cities, a more centered part, and a moderate part in rural areas, called "farmer liberalism". The Conservatives tried to tranquilise the liberal demands for universal suffrage with moderate reform proposals for suffrage at first, but these were declined by the Liberals. The Social Democrats were also in favour of universal suffrage. Due to different political platforms, particularly on the suffrage issue, political lines were split between Social Democrats on the left, the Liberals in the centre (with a left and a right wing), and the Conservative parties on the right of the political spectrum at around the turn of the century.

[148] In 1902, the new Liberal Party combined Sixten von Friesen's "Liberal Coalition Party" (Liberals Samlingspartiet) and David Bergstroem's "Radical People's Party", which consisted mainly of farmers.



Figure 9: Swedish Second Chamber electoral results[149]

Once parties gained in importance, they were organised on a national basis before the introduction of PR. Decisions about coordination in Sweden were increasingly made by national party leaders and national boards rather than on a constituency level as it was previously the case with independent candidates. Parties only started to organise themselves locally between 1906 and 1914 (see Table 24). Therefore, the analysis concentrates on higher-level politicians in Sweden.

[149] Votes in per cent; Source: Lewin (2004, p. 276); Lewin (1988, p. 329); Lewin et al. (1972, p. 34) and own calculations. "Conservatives" = Conservatives, Protectionists, Farmers, Progressives, Moderate Liberals; "Liberals" = Liberals, Free Traders.

Table 24: Number of local party organisations in Sweden[150]

Year	Number of local organizations	Membership
1906	30	3855
1908	115	8600
1910	917	40548
1912	813	32699
1914	1184	48398

In the second half of the 19th century, industrialisation transformed Sweden from a rural to a developing industrial society. This caused many Swedes to immigrate to the US (1 million between 1850 and 1890) because the demand for manual labour decreased drastically. Many later came back having worked in the US industry and brought new ideas, economic stimulation and higher productivity to Sweden's economy. Modernisation and urbanisation led to a large increase in the number of workers in Swedish cities. These workers soon strived for representation in parliament. An opposition press emerged and the Social Democrats were founded to organise the campaigns of the workers' candidates for national parliament. In 1897, they won their first seat in the Swedish Riksdag. Universal suffrage soon became the most important aim of the left. As in many countries around the globe, their catch phrase was: "One man – one vote".

The electoral data from the time under SMP (before 1909) is very difficult to read. Candidates' party affiliations were not always clear and many MPs might have labelled themselves as "independent" even though some party affiliation had existed for most of the members of the Riksdag (cf. Nohlen, Stöver 2010). Yet, Table 25 shows the election result numbers of the detailed work of Lewin et al. (1972), who examined the background of every single MP and categorized them according to party affiliations. Figure 9 shows the drastic increase of the Social Democratic results in only a couple of years and that both larger parties – the Conservatives and the Liberals – lost to the left.

[150] Source: Rönblom (1952, p. 14).

Participation rates were relatively stable and average compared to other Scandinavian and Western European states before the turn of century (see Table 25).

Table 25: Swedish parliamentary election results and PR support[151]

		Conservatives (Protectionists)	Moderate Free Traders	Liberals (Free Traders)	Social Democrats	Voter Participation
1887 I		41.4		58.6		48.1
1887 II		46.9		53.6		35.9
1890		42.7		57.3		38.5
1893	S	38.7	26.1	35.2		42.4
1896	M	38.6	23.4	38.0		45.3
1899	P	53.2		46.8		40.3
1902		45.3		51.2	3.5	47.2
1905		45.3		45.2	9.5	50.4
1908		38.5		46.8	14.6	61.3
1911	P	31.2		40.2	28.5	
1914 I	R	37.7		32.2	30.1	
1914 II		36.5		26.9	36.4	
PR Support		No -> Yes		Yes -> No	Yes -> No	

[151] Votes in per cent. Source: Lewin (2004, p. 276); Lewin (1988, p. 329); Lewin et al. (1972, p. 34) and own calculations. "Conservatives" = Conservatives, Protectionists, Farmers, Progressives, Moderate Liberals; "Liberals" = Liberals, Free Traders. Voter participation of enfranchised voters only.

5.2. Left threat and suffrage expansion

As the left workers' movement grew, suffrage expansion became the dominating topic of political debate. The Swedish Conservatives resisted it entirely. They regarded wealth as the best basis for the qualification to vote. The conservative Prime Minister Louis De Geer put it as follows:

> Ownership of property may generally be assumed to indicate a more secure and independent position than that of an ordinary wage earner, even if the latter has a good income for the moment, and to result in a great interest in the improvement and welfare of society (quoted by Lewin 1988, p. 55).[152]

Before the expansion of suffrage, restricted suffrage was used to ensure the power of the conservative incumbent elite.[153] The interests of the large landowners played a major role in the political platform of the Conservatives. Their position was threatened by the expansion of suffrage. Therefore, suffrage demands were held back by a constitution committee that wanted to protect landowners' interests from the working class.[154] However, the pressure for suffrage expansion grew due to a low percentage of enfranchised citizens in comparison to other nation and franchise restrictions in regard to income and wealth not having been adjusted for many years. Furthermore, the there was an increasing amount of organisation among the disenfranchised, which made them a

[152] Proceedings from the Swedish Parliament: Prop 1862/63: 61, p. 41.

[153] On the suffrage movement in Sweden, see Vallinder (1962).

[154] KU 1902, no. 6, p. 99. Lewin (2004, p. 266) finds several statements of MPs confirming that the ruling classes were not willing to "abdicate completely" and warning landowners against "the downfall of their class". Right-wing MPs justified plural voting with various reasons such as the wealthy being entitled to more political influence because they pay more taxes (FK 1893, no. 32, p. 45 (Billing); AK 1894, no. 30, p. 51 (Boethius); AK 1899, no. 34, p. 29 (Ivar Månsson); FK 1902, no. 35, p. 18 (Billing); FK 1906, no. 48, p. 73 (Nyström) – (in brackets the corresponding MP; FK = First Chamber ("Forsta Kammaren"); AK = Second Chamber ("Andra Kammaren"); KU = Constitutional Committee ("Konstitutionsutskottet"). Some of them were quick to argue that constitutional changes were not needed since inflation and wage raises would constantly push more people over the voting threshold (property/income regulation) and increase the suffrage automatically anyway (FK 1899, no. 27, pp. 25–6 (Akerhielm); FK 1888, no. 21, p. 36 (Casparsson); FK 1893, no. 32, pp. 58–9 (Nyström); KU 1899, no. 14, p. 9; FK 1896, no. 23, pp. 45–6 (Treffenberg). However, the underlining theme of the right was that wealthy people were most capable of making the right choices and should therefore decide. They believed that a rich person was more inclined to spend time thinking about politics and could thus make a better and more educated decision than a poor person.

political force that had to be taken into account by the incumbent rightist elite (cf. Andrén pp. 205-210).

In 1884, Axel Ljungman, a moderate conservative of the Farmers' Party, requested a commission to analyse the restrictions on suffrage based on income and wealth with its varying effects on different classes.[155] Subsequently, a statistical impact analysis addressed how the composition of the electorate would change in case of an extended suffrage.[156] The report categorised the electorate into three different classes: property-owners, tenant farmers and wage workers, as well as occupational sub-groups. The most obvious conclusion was that a more inclusive suffrage would cause the property-owning "class" to lose the most, along with the right-wing parties that represented this group. Any extension of suffrage would drastically increase the number of workers within the electorate at their expense.[157]

The strategic statistical analysis, which was done at a national level, shows how sophisticated politicians already dealt with changes of the electorate and the electoral system at the time. All possible scenarios under different electoral systems were studied in the Swedish ministries and taken into account by right-wing politicians, the government and the crown. Andrén (1937b, pp. 294-296) states that the report had a significant effect on conservative farmers' attitudes towards suffrage reform.

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155 Mot AK 1884, no. 3. Axel Ljungman was a Member of Parliament for the Farmers' Party from 1882 until 1899 (without being a farmer himself by occupation). The Farmers' Party (*Lantmannapartiet*) dominated the Second Chamber until 1888, when it split up into two different groups: a more conservative group and a more liberal group. Ljungman supported the more conservative group, but was nonetheless also a supporter of the more liberal free traders. Later, he was a driving force in trying to reunite the party in 1895. Source: http://sok.riksarkivet.se/sbl/Presentation.aspx?id=9608.

156 SCB (Statistics Sweden) 1885, *Valrätt till Riksdagens Andra Kammare I-III*.

157 The suffrage extension among land and farm owners in rural areas would be marginal, since only 4 out of 100 were excluded from voting at the time. However, the extension would result in an increase of unqualified hard laborers by 17 times in rural areas. Consequently, in total, the report calculates, the property-owning class would lose their majority position in 58 out of 145 rural constituencies. They would keep the majority in the other 87 constituencies. For the remaining 7 constituencies where they were already outnumbered, they would continue to be the minority (SCB 1887-II, pp.iii, xiv-xv). Andrén (1937, p. 296) states that *Konstitutionsutskottet* (The Constitutional Committee behind the report) could not have sent a clearer message to the farmers in the Second Chamber about the threats that suffrage reform posed to them.

Besides making them more sceptical to reform suffrage and the electoral system alongside other conservatives, it raised awareness and fear of the growing left.

Before the analysis, in an effort to coordinate and unite the right against the left, the Conservatives tried to scare the farmers (generally small-scale landowners of the countryside) with the notion of the rising left. They argued that if the farmers would not coordinate with the Conservatives, they would soon lose their political influence to the left altogether. Meanwhile, the farmers used a possible alliance with the left to strengthen their negotiating position with the Conservatives. Hence, coordination between Conservatives and the farmers' parties was not to be taken for granted and from then on, the right knew for certain that the potential threat of the left had to be taken seriously.[158] The statistical study had proven the speculative notion of the rising left. From then on, suffrage expansion was always debated by the right against the backdrop of a rising left that would benefit enormously from it. By the 1890s, suffrage reform had become a widely discussed issue, with several motions in both chambers.

[158] Another statistical analysis on the expansion of suffrage was conducted in 1900, laying grounds for the upcoming years of discussions about the topic. This time, the two essential categories were "with suffrage" and "without suffrage". If the 1900 proposal for universal male suffrage was passed, including a threshold of 25 instead of 21 years of age, there would be a total number of 1,197,000 voters (950,842 in rural areas; 246,458 in urban areas). It represented 23.3 per cent of the whole population and 47.8 per cent of men. In rural areas, it represented 23.6 per cent of the whole population and 47.6 per cent of men. In urban areas, the same numbers were 22.3 per cent and 48.5 per cent respectively.



Figure 10: Occupational transformation in Sweden (workers per sector in per cent)[159]

Right-wing fear of the left threat

The changing structural conditions through industrialisation, the general rise in wage levels, and the resulting increase in the number of industrial workers entitled to vote put additional pressure on the incumbent rightist elite. Sweden's industrialisation started relatively late compared to Germany and the Netherlands. By 1870, 72.4 per cent of the entire population were still working in agriculture.[160] This changed in the following decades as more people became employed in industry and the commerce sector (see Figure 10). Due to the relatively late industrialisation, trade unions were also only established in the 1880s, mainly in the urban areas, Stockholm and southern Sweden (Scase 1977, p. 317).[161]

Before the formation of a central national trade union organisation in 1898, union activities were organised by the Social Democratic Party (Blake 1960). Union membership grew substantially in 1905, when the unions negotiated labour agreements with the Confederation of Swedish Employers (SAF).

[159] Source: Bartolini (2000, p. 133).
[160] Sveriges Officiella Statistik; Eckelberry (1964).
[161] For a debate of Swedish trade unionism, see Bäckström (1971) and Carlson (1969).

The numbers of trade union members affiliated to the national confederation (LO) rose from 37,523 in 1899 to 186,226 in 1907 and 231,000 in 1909 (ca. two-thirds of industrial labour force) (Scase 1977, p. 318). The demand for a workers' party grew with the increasing number of workers and was met by the foundation of the Social Democratic Party in 1889, which was closely connected to the trade union movement (Scase 1977, p. 324). Franzén (1985, p. 177) states that in 1899, 97 per cent of the Social Democrats were party members because of their union's affiliation with the party. Around the turn of the century, about 400 labor unions were affiliated with the party. As the number of union members grew, the right became even more afraid of a major left force in Swedish politics under universal suffrage. The Social Democratic Party's membership grew rapidly before the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1907: from 10,000 in 1895 to 133,000 in 1907 (Tomasson 1970, p. 30) (see Appendix 5). The vast majority of them were union members (Franzén 1985, pp. 226-227).

There is ample evidence of right-wing foresight of the rising left years before the left developed its actual strength, which subsequently led to PR as a safeguard for continued representation in the Second Chamber. In addition to the statistical analysis and the common sense that lower-wage voters would rather vote for a left-wing party than for the incumbent traditional elite, the growing fear of the left was driven by other factors as well. In the aftermath of the statistical report, the industrial workers became more organised in their claims for suffrage reform. This coincided with workers, mostly during the 1890's, reaching the income threshold, hence automatically gaining the right to vote. The right perceived the organisation of the left as a "radicalisation" (Andrén 1937, pp. 206-8, 294, 312). Even though this may seem like an overreaction if one compares the relatively pragmatic Social Democrats

in Sweden with radical left-wing parties such as in Norway (see Chapter 3), it still fuelled the fear of the left threat.[162]

One left-wing initiative was the so-called "Folkriksdag", the "people's parliament", an unofficial parliament in addition to the official parliament, aiming to force the incumbent conservative right to accept extended suffrage. It later became exclusively associated with the Social Democrats. They organised two elections of the Folkriksdag, in 1893 and 1896, to mobilise voters for universal suffrage. Notably, with around 150,000 participants in 1893, these elections attracted more voters than the official election of the Second Chamber in the same year, in which only 126,700 participated. The Social Democrats won the election of the People's parliament in both Stockholm and Gothenburg, which according to Andrén (1937b, pp. 307-308), became "illustrative for the fear of socialism" (see also Rönblom 1929, pp. 56-58).[163]

The fear of the left threat was obvious even though the electoral results were not yet showing the left's "real strength" as it was already the case in other Western European states at the time (see Chapter 3). The fear of the left was apparent within the entire Conservative Party.[164] The Liberal Party on the other hand, was afraid to lose the support of the workers to the Social Democrats since up to then, there had been no party on the political left of the Liberals.

When the left movement grew, the Swedish right started to arrange some repression of the left organisation to ensure their political power. Legislation affecting the organised working class was less

[162] Those friendly to reform (Liberals, Progressives), however, downplayed the "fear of socialism" in the late 1880's/early 1890's (Andrén 1937, pp. 296-297).

[163] The second election in 1896 reportedly had around 130,000 participants. The next election, which would have been held in 1899, was called off in 1897 as the Social Democrats retreated from the initiative. The Social Democrats did not want to commit themselves to the decision made by the initiative to reject strikes as a method to push for suffrage reform (Andrén 1937, p. 318, Rönblom 1929, pp. 70-74). Subsequently, in 1902, one such strike involved 116,000 workers (Andrén 1937, p. 332).

[164] FK 1896, no. 23, p. 30 (Nyström); AK 1899, no. 34, p. 30 (Ivar Mansson); AK 1899, no. 34, p. 42 (Lindblad); FK 1902, no. 35, p. 24 (Rodhe).

hostile than, for instance, in Germany. However, in the 1880s, left "political recruitment and propaganda was met with considerable police harassment" (Bartolini 2007, pp. 326-327). In the 1890s, there was still substantial official disapproval of social democratic assemblies.

5.3. Debating safeguards against a rising left

The first bill containing the proposal for the adoption of PR had already appeared in the first parliamentary debate under the new constitution in 1867.[165] The main argument in the beginning was about fairness within the parliamentary committees. When the efforts to expand the suffrage increased, discussions about combining it with the introduction of PR as a safeguard emerged. In particular, liberal politicians were proponents of this idea. Yet, a few conservatives also mentioned PR as a safeguard years before it became part of the party line. The term used by the Swedish Conservatives for safeguards at the time was "guarantees", which the Conservatives first needed to limit or minimise liberal votes and later increasingly social democratic votes (cf. Eckelberry 1964, p. 37).

PR was coupled with suffrage reform for the first time in 1892 by the conservative Bishop Gottfrid Billing (Verney 1957, pp. 138-39).[166] Billing feared the extension of voting rights to the "workers class" and its possible drastic numeral effects on the "composition of the representation" in parliament.[167] Without safeguards for a "purposeful composition of representation", the Second Chamber could be "fully replaced", he stated.[168] He presented different safeguards, such as plural voting determined by class, but little hope was attributed to guarantees in the form of restrictions

[165] S. G. von Troil put forward a motion to implement PR for strategically important committees, inspired by the Danish implementation of PR for parliamentary committees in 1866 (Mot AK 1867, no. 2). A similar initiative was taken by H. L. Rydin in 1878, also inspired by Denmark, but this time the motion suggested it for all committees (Mot AK 1878, no 157).

[166] KU 1892, no. 12, pp. 4-5; constitutional committee = Konstitutionsutskottet.

[167] Ibid, pp. 7-10.

[168] Ibid, p. 15.

based on income and wealth anymore.[169] He verbalised the fear of the left and promoted/proposed PR as a solution to this threat by saying:

> By introduction of the so-called full suffrage political influence would not only be given to them who yet miss it, all political power would be transferred from the eligible voters to those lacking the right to vote, which would become a very significant majority of the electorate. Thus, to place all the political power in the hands of what I dare to call one single class of citizens is likely neither warranted nor wise. (…) I think, granting the right to vote to those who do not yet have it should be accompanied with guarantees for preservation of the right of the minority. (…) I think, it deserves a thorough investigation whether so-called proportional elections would be an appropriate solution to adequately balance the political power between majority and minority.[170]

Billing put PR on the agenda in 1892, which then led to a great interest in PR as an efficient safeguard for the right in the following debate in the First Chamber.[171] The conservative Justice Minister Ludwig Annerstedt agreed that a guarantee was needed against the new class of voters, who with their limited education, could become "subservient pawns in the hands of agitators", and endanger the economy and state. Annerstedt had studied PR in Denmark and Switzerland, and became a strong PR supporter himself.[172] He saw PR as the main guarantee for the incumbent elite to ensure its power.[173] Billing put forward a motion in 1893 to investigate the prospects of guarantees, foremost PR.[174] Even though this did not lead to a proposition or an official report at the time, "suffrage with

169 Ibid, p. 14.
170 Ibid, p. 16.
171 Whereas before PR was mostly and sometimes after discussed in terms of fairness, the debate in the First Chamber in 1892 treated the system expressively as a "guarantee" in case of extended suffrage. According to Billing, the stronger the guarantees, the more extended suffrage should be, according to Billing. His position is further summed up by this sentence: 'it is more desirable to get strong guarantees with widely extended suffrage than less reliable guarantees with less extended suffrage (KU 1892, no. 12, p. 17).
172 Ludwig Annerstedt was later an influential advocate for PR behind the proposition in 1896 to introduce PR in cities (Prop 1896, p. 41).
173 FK 1892, no. 27, p. 30.
174 Mot FK 1893, no. 2.

guarantees" had been put on the agenda in the otherwise reform-skeptical First Chamber, instead of only suffrage expansion (Andrén pp. 305-306).

In 1896, the government announced its first suffrage reform bill. Annerstedt introduced the bill in parliament. Similar to Germany's first PR introduction, it proposed a slight expansion of suffrage together with the introduction of PR in the large cities (Eckelberry 1964, p. 36). A safeguard against the left was needed most by the right in the urban areas. However, the reform bill did not gain enough support among MPs and failed in both chambers (Vallinder 1962, pp. 168-70).[175] The Conservatives were still benefiting from SMP at the time (positive VSDs, see Appendix 9) and the left threat was not yet large enough to endanger a conservative majority.

Right resistance and PR as a key topic

Though PR had been identified as a guarantee in 1892, there was considerable conservative scepticism towards it. The right resisted PR reform initially. The most important reason was that the right did not want to make way for a constant representation of the left if they did not have to. They wanted to make use of other safeguards first. PR also seemed too risky. Sweden had a political culture centered on SMDs and some right-wing politicians argued that large PR districts and party lists would erase the personal connection between voters and local representatives. Moreover, the technical aspects of PR were thought to be complicated and unsatisfactory.[176]

During the 1890's, safeguards of the power of the right were predominantly restrictions on suffrage, while the electoral system received less attention. In 1898, Norway had implemented universal suffrage, which was a sign for the advocates of universal suffrage in Sweden to keep pushing for it as well. Universal suffrage was one of the main demands of the Liberals and the Social Democrats

[175] AK 1896, No. 21, pp. 29ff.
[176] 1904 commission report; Elvander (1961, pp. 398-401); Stjernquist, (1996, pp. 66-7).

in Sweden and both parties were still pushing for it. The labour movement became stronger and when disenfranchised citizens protested and started to strike in large numbers, the pressure for universal suffrage grew. When the social democratic advancement brought some more MPs into parliament in 1901 and the strikes for the expansion of suffrage involved 116,000 workers, the agenda of the right began to change (Andrén 1937, p. 332).

Soon, the expansion of suffrage seemed unavoidable. Both the left and the right recommended universal male suffrage in the 1902 campaign. By then, they only differed in regard to the safeguards that should be put in place (Carlsson, Rosén 1962, p. 448). Both chambers agreed about universal male suffrage but disagreed about PR as a safeguard. Between 1902 and 1906, there were three more attempts to reform suffrage, but they all failed (see Table 26).[177]

As the Conservatives had agreed upon the introduction of universal male suffrage, the debate moved on to PR versus majority elections.[178] The electoral system was suddenly on top of the agenda:

> Proportional elections became at one blow an issue of the day, whereas before it had been a matter only for the few theoretically and politically interested, not much addressed in the parliament, even less outside of it (Heidenstam 1905, p. 3).

In the earlier stages of the debate, one could observe that the Conservatives were reluctant to introduce PR as a safeguard. They would have preferred to delay the adoption for as long as possible.

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[177] In 1902, the two chambers voted on private motions that included PR. This was after a government bill in regard to a suffrage reform had not been successful (tax, income, military restrictions and a graded voting scale were proposed – PR was not included). The suffrage reform bill of Prime Minister von Otter (Rösträttsproposition, 12/03/1902) was rejected by parliament in 1902, after which Otter had to resign. Erik Gustaf Boström became PM again in July 1902, even though he had resigned from the post only two years earlier due to poor health (Eckelberry 1964, p. 44). The Second Chamber voted for a private motion of universal male suffrage accompanied by PR by Månsson i Trää. The First Chamber at the same time accepted a motion by the Bishop Billing, which suggested an analysis of the adoption of PR in the Second Chamber. Both chambers approved to instruct the government to formulate a new universal suffrage/PR bill (Rönblom 1952, pp. 112-14). Boström wanted to extend the suffrage but only consider PR in the future. He promised a comprehensive inquiry of PR. None of the reform plans had a majority in both chambers.

[178] As it was no longer possible to exclude the "raw and uneducated" masses from suffrage, the more technical issues became priority (cf. Stjernquist 1996, p. 64).

It was only when the left grew significantly stronger that PR became the last option that the Conservatives thought could ensure their future representation.

Table 26: Electoral and suffrage reform proposals, 1896 – 1907 in Sweden[179]

Introduced by	Year	Proposing (suffrage reform & elec. system)	Successful (in both chambers)
Gov (C)	Reform bill of 1896	SE & PR for cities	No
Gov (C)	Reform bill of 1902	SE	No
L	1902	SE & SPR	No
Gov (C)	Reform bill of 1904	US & SPR	No
L	1904	US & DPR	No
L	1904	US & TRS	No
L	Proposal in 1905	US & TRS	No
Gov (L)	Reform bill of 1906	US & TRS	No
C	1906	US & DPR	No
Gov (C)	Reform bill of 1907	US & DPR	Yes
L	1907	US & TRS	No

5.4. TRS as a safeguard

While PR became more popular among conservatives, there was another electoral system that was debated in liberal circles behind closed doors: TRS. TRS had already been discussed earlier, when individual Liberals campaigned for it between 1885 and 1900.[180] At the time, SMP had been criticised for not creating absolute majority results. The TRS systems of Germany and France were mentioned as inspiration to solve the issue.[181] Yet, a constitutional committee had rejected the adoption of TRS. The committee was not convinced that TRS could solve the problem. Some conservatives such as Hans Andersson (Västra Nöbbelöv) were against SMP and TRS, but argued that the latter was to be

[179] C = Conservatives; L = Liberals; S = Social Democrats; SE = suffrage expansion; US = universal suffrage; SPR = single proportional representation (only lower house); DPR = double proportional representation (both chambers) (for details of suffrage expansion and proposals in each year, see text).

[180] 1885 (SäU 1907, no. 3, pp. 345-346; (SäU = special committee ("Särskilt utskott"); 1887 (Mot AK 1887, no. 184, mot AK 1887b, no. 68; Mot AK 1887b, no. 52); 1891 (Mot FK 1891, no. 35; Mot AK 1891, no. 169) and 1900 (Mot AK 1900, no. 53).

[181] Mot AK 1885, no. 143.

preferred over the former because of the possibility for better coordination, which Andersson called a "considerable virtue" (AK 1905, no. 51, pp. 1-2).[182]

Before TRS was proposed again, the work of a PR commission that was put in place in 1902 to formulate a new universal suffrage/PR bill became part of a proposal for electoral system change in 1904, in which the government proposed PR for the Second Chamber.[183] The idea of PR for the Second Chamber and SMP for the First Chamber did not seem worrisome for the Liberals and the Social Democrats at first (Eckelberry 1964, p. 41). Yet, during the process of debating all different proposals in committees and parliament, the leader of the liberal Party, Karl Staaff, began to realise that his Liberal Party could possibly gain further seats under TRS instead of SMP or PR, especially if universal suffrage would be introduced.[184] Coordination between parties did not work efficiently under SMP even though it was needed in a Swedish party system that was relatively fragmented. Staaff had thorough knowledge of the different electoral systems across Western Europe and was expecting TRS

[182] Majority run-off TRS was criticised as potentially splitting votes in the first round. Therefore, the two candidates in the second round would not necessarily reflect the will of the majority. Instead, the committee argued that "the voters within a constituency should unite themselves as much as possible" under SMP (KU 1900, no. 3, pp. 6-8). "The purpose neither can nor should be achieved in a synthetic way – by forcing the voters to vote on others than they themselves prefer", the committee stated. The solution instead would and should come naturally in time, "as a matured fruit of the people's political upbringing" (KU 1885, no. 9, p. 8 – 9; also see: KU 1887, no. 4; KU 1891, no. 6). However, coordination under SMP did not work as well as they had hoped and soon, criticism arose again. The farmer, Simon Boëthius, for instance disagreed with their analysis. He stated that "neither of the three parties (Conservative, Liberal and Social Democratic) is so strong that their candidates can achieve an absolute majority". This would lead to an increase in candidates winning constituencies with relative majorities, whereas majority run-off TRS would force parties to coordinate and some voters to make a compromise in round two (three large parties but only two alternatives in the second round) and therefore lead to reliable absolute majority results (KU 1900, no. 3, pp. 55-56). A debate about the committee's report in the Second Chamber in 1900 started a somewhat larger discussion about TRS in general. TRS was put to a vote in the Second Chamber, resulting in a strong majority for TRS (125 votes to 56). Yet, the vote did not lead anywhere since the conservative First Chamber, not envisioning TRS's opportunities for the right to coordinate rather than just the left, did not consider it (AK 1900, no. 27, pp. 47-56).

[183] Source: „Proportionellt valsätt till riksdagens andra kammare" (1904). The commission report in 1903 proposing PR included a second appendix that described the electoral systems in Europe – among others, the French majority-plurality TRS and the German majority run-off TRS. In 1904, Professor C. L. V. Charlier wrote about the disproportionality of majority elections compared to PR, including a separate comparison to TRS based on German experiences (Charlier 1904, pp. 203-10). Though PR was found to be favourable to TRS, the article received recognition in Swedish academia and was later referred to in favour of TRS (Mot AK 1905, no. 237, p. 6).

[184] Karl Albert Staaff (1860-1915) was a private lawyer in Stockholm from 1893 until 1905 and a member of the Second Chamber from 1896 onwards. He helped to found the National Liberal Federation in 1902 and became Consultative Minister in 1905. He was one of four Swedish delegates in the negotiations that led to the dissolution of the union with Norway in 1905. He then served as Prime Minister from 1905 to 1906 and between 1911 and 1914 (Verney 1957).

to work in favour of the "centred" Liberal Party, which could gain votes from both the right and the left in round two (similarly to the Left Liberals in Germany).

On the one hand, if they would face the Conservative Party, all Social Democratic voters would rather vote for the Liberals than the Conservatives. On the other hand, if they would face the growing Social Democrats, which he rightly expected to happen more often in the future, all parties and voters on the right would unite under the Liberal Party (Verney 1957, p. 145). The left wing of the Liberal Party had tried to coordinate with the Social Democrats, but this did not lead to a lasting cooperation since the more "moderate liberals" (right wing of the Liberals) in the countryside did not participate in the cooperation and the Social Democrats seemed too revolutionary to many Liberals (Rönblom 1929, p. 66, Timelin 1928, pp. 195-201). The moderate liberals tried to coordinate with the Conservatives and had even founded their own party for two elections (see Figure 9 and Table 25).

TRS could help to encourage coordination and could well have become a game-changing factor that would benefit the Liberals the most. Staaff knew that he had to control the growing SAP to prevent losing workers and liberal voters to the new party. This control seemed more doable under TRS. The notion of TRS was not yet known as TRS at the time. It was mostly referred to as SMP with a second round. Yet, it was clearly defined as a different electoral system.

With the Liberals advocating for TRS instead of PR, there were three proposals for electoral system change on the table in 1904 (see Table 26): (1) PR only for the Second Chamber (Single-PR (SPR)) as the Swedes called it, proposed by the conservative upper chamber; (2) PR for both chambers (Double-PR (DPR)), previously proposed by the Liberals; and (3) TRS for both chambers, recently proposed by the Liberals. The Social Democrats had begun to align themselves against the idea of PR once they realised the "conservative safeguard function". They soon expected to become the strongest party after universal suffrage and therefore preferred a majoritarian electoral system (TRS). The Liberals still assumed they would be able to control the Social Democrats in the long run (similarly to

the Liberals in the UK) and attack the Conservatives in the First Chamber – they thought TRS would serve them best to do so.[185] Still, there was no majority in both chambers for any of the three proposals.[186]

The Liberals' decision to push for TRS was entirely based on strategic concerns. Notably, in response to the PR commission report, Staaff (in a speech in the Second Chamber in 1904) even used the arguments against PR that were previously used by the Conservatives (Staaff 1918, pp. 108-116). He was bold enough to ignore that his political turn-around could potentially harm his party. The fact that PR had not been made a very important campaign issue in the elections before, as it was the case in other Western European countries, facilitated his move. Until then, the political campaigns were mainly about suffrage expansion in Sweden.[187]

First liberal government tries to implement TRS

In the election of 1905, the Liberals, together with the Social Democrats, obtained a majority in parliament. The Liberal Party won 106 seats (ca. 47 per cent) and the Social Democrats increased their seats to 13 (ca. 6 per cent) (see Table 25). This made the Conservatives realise that some concessions to the Liberals were necessary in order for them to contain the left threat and that coordination among

[185] BArch R 1501 / 114478 b; BArch R 1501 / 16242.

[186] Overall, there were four reasons that could have motivated the change of the liberal position from PR to TRS in 1904. Firstly, to use coordination under TRS to strengthen the Liberals position in parliament. SPR for the Second Chamber would weaken their position in the Second Chamber, since it would guarantee the Conservatives an otherwise diminishing influence in it, while leaving the First Chamber in the hands of the Conservatives. Secondly, the Liberals wanted to reduce the large influence of the Conservatives in the First Chamber (similarly to Germany, where the Conservatives also controlled the rather plutocratic First Chamber and where there was constant debate on how to change that). Thirdly, the Liberals seemed to have realised that PR would not benefit them in urban constituencies, mainly in Stockholm and Gothenburg, where they were strongly represented (similar to the Liberals in the Netherlands before the cities were taken by the left). In the short-run, the Liberals would lose 8 seats in Stockholm (from 22 to 14). Fourthly, conservative sympathies for PR may have made Liberals suspicious, as the Conservatives were initially against the expansion of suffrage and PR and suddenly started to unite behind PR (cf. Andrén 1937, pp. 393-394). These and additional arguments against PR, such as technical difficulties and the tendency of PR to splinter parties, were proclaimed by the Liberals publicly. They also organized "anti-PR rallies", produced pamphlets, distributed them and wrote various newspaper articles. By the end of 1904, the majority of the Liberal Party favoured the complete refusal of PR.

[187] Dagens Nyheter, 14/11/1903, cited in Rönblom (1929, p. 136).

the right would be even more crucial from then on. Additionally, the Farmers' Party had split up into two parties: a more conservative Farmers' Party (protectionists) and a more liberal National Progressives Party (pro free trade), which added to the larger need of coordination (Verney 1957, pp. 142-143). Conservatives and Liberals both needed to form an electoral alliance with the farmers' parties if they wanted to be successful in the future (Hermens 1968, p. 301).

On the 7th of November, 1905, the liberal leader and lawyer Karl Staaff became the first Prime Minister after Norway's complete independence from Sweden. It was apparent that there would be continuous struggle between both chambers because even though the Liberals had constructed a majority for Staaff in the lower chamber, the upper chamber was still dominated by the Conservatives. The most important task of the new government was to present an acceptable proposal for the "suffrage/electoral system issue". Staaff was determined to use his time as PM to change the system in his way: extend the suffrage (adult males that had paid taxes should all be allowed to vote) and introduce TRS for both chambers. Hence, the slightly changed TRS proposal was reintroduced again in 1906. Staaff still hoped that universal suffrage and TRS would lead to a liberal majority in the upper house as well as the lower house.[188]

The conservative upper chamber was still inclined to only introduce PR for the lower chamber (SPR) and use the upper chamber as a safeguard against Liberals and Social Democrats. Yet, the Liberals were hoping to push through TRS. It looked as if the vote would be SPR vs. TRS.

[188] The liberals favoured majority-plurality TRS. In the 1902 elections in France, only 10 out of 165 second round elections stood between more than two candidates. Out of these 10 cases, 6 obtained an absolute majority in the second round. In conclusion, only 4 out of a total of 591 French elections in 1902 were decided by a relative majority. In this election year, majority-plurality TRS had produced mostly absolute majorities in the second round, similarly to majority run-off TRS, without only allowing two parties to run in round two. The liberals concluded that the experience in practice outweighed the legitimacy problem in theory (some had argued before that majority run-off TRS was not just since it "forced out" too many parties after round one). Thus, the French example was preferred over the German run-off systems for the time being. They did, however, realize that majority-plurality TRS could have the drawback of making coordination harder in round two due to more parties (Prop 1906, no. 55, pp. 16-8; Mot AK 1906, no. 137, p. 7).

However, Peterssen i Paboda,[189] one of the leaders of the National Progressive Party, instrumentalised the conservative fear of the left and put another bill forward which proposed DPR (proposed by Staaff only two years earlier), but not for cities and municipalities.[190] Both farmers' parties (Progressive Party and Farmers' Party) realised that under TRS, they would soon disappear from parliament.[191] They had preferred SMP initially but realised that it did not serve them well anymore. Thus, they wanted to introduce DPR to ensure their representation in parliament. Paboda also successfully collected votes for his proposal among Conservatives and Moderate Liberals. Therefore, a large majority in the upper chamber (118 votes to 26) eventually voted for DPR instead of Staaff's TRS government bill (it was defeated by 126 to 18 votes). Staaff's TRS bill won by 134 to 94 in the lower chamber (Paboda's motion lost by 132 to 96) (Verney 1957, pp. 149-150). Hence, even though the TRS bill had passed in the lower chamber, it was rejected in the upper house by the Conservatives.

Staaff had underestimated the Conservatives' willingness to accept the reformation of the upper chamber (DPR) to maintain their influence via PR (Carstairs 1980, p. 102). Staaff wanted "to start agitation amongst the public in order to obtain the moral defeat of the First Chamber, after which the mandate of the people would prevail" (Verney 1957, p. 151, quoting Timelin (1928)). He approached the King and asked to dissolve the parliament and order snap elections. King Oscar II, however, was sceptical about Staaff's plans, the future of majoritarian electoral systems that could possibly lead to a leftist majority in parliament, and the growing power of parliament overall. He turned down Staaff's request and argued that it was not conformable with parliamentary government to dissolve a chamber

[189] Farmers with common names added the locality of their farm to their name to better identify themselves (…i…).

[190] Also called the "Paboda proposal". Paboda was an influential politician in Sweden at the time. When he became Minister of Agriculture, he was the first farmer to ever hold office.

[191] When SMP was introduced in 1866, the Swedish economy was characterized by agriculture and they dominated the lower chamber at the time. In 1870, 72.4 per cent of the population was working in agriculture. In 1900, the number had increased to 55.1 per cent and continuously decreased in subsequent years (Sveriges Officiella Statistik; Eckelberry (1964) and Figure 10.

that had just voted for a "royal bill".[192] Staaff consequently resigned and the conservative Arvid Lindman became the next Prime Minister. After only seven months in office, Staaff had to go back into opposition.[193]

SMP did not encourage the right to coordinate and contain the growing common left threat. Rather, it led to a duel for office between the Conservatives and Liberals. Therefore, coordination efforts between Liberals and Conservatives, and among the fragmented conservative parties did not work very well. The attempt of the Liberals to introduce TRS to make coordination easier (in both directions – right and left) failed and the government was placed in the hands of the Conservatives. Additionally, the Conservatives were afraid that the left would grow strong enough to take over the parliamentary majority under SMP. Hence, they too looked for electoral safeguards to prevent the party from losing the next consecutive elections. Thus, PR became a reasonable option paired with universal suffrage even though they had been opposed to both for years.

Before we analyse in depth the events that led to the adoption of PR in the next sub-chapter, let us look at the VSDs of the Swedish parties and the timing of their PR support (see Figure 11). In general, one can observe that PR support started when parties had a negative VSD or were on a downswing in terms of VSD. TRS support started when parties were expecting to have a more positive VSD under TRS. The Conservatives were against PR initially but wanted to adopt it as a safeguard once their VSD went down. The Liberals wanted to adopt PR early when their VSD was negative, but advocated for TRS once their VSD became positive again and they expected to be able to benefit from TRS more than PR. The VSD of the left in Sweden was not as negative as in Germany (see

[192] Furthermore, he argued that the King must acknowledge and maintain the equal standing of the upper and lower chamber (Meeting of Council of State, 25th of May 1906).

[193] Karl Staaff became Prime Minister again after Arvid Lindman in 1911 and stayed in office until 1914. Saloman Arvid Achates Lindman (1862-1935) was a naval officer until 1892. Then the director of several iron-mining companies and later of some of the largest Swedish corporations. He was a member of the First Chamber from 1904 until 1911 and of the Second Chamber from 1912 to 1935, where he was the head of the Conservative parliamentary group. He was the Naval Minister in 1905 and Prime Minister from 1906 until 1911 and from 1928 to 1930. He was also Foreign Minister in 1917 (Verney 1957, p. 264).

Figure 7 and 11). The Social Democrats were for PR for most of the time because they were underrepresented or not represented in parliament at all. They also moved to TRS shortly before their VSD went up since they expected more positive results under TRS than PR. For a detailed version of the VSD's, see Appendix 9.



Figure 11: VSD and PR support per party[194]

5.5. Adoption of PR

Even without an institutional expansion of suffrage, economic growth would help more workers to fulfil the income requirements to vote. Higher participation rates seemed impossible for the right to avoid anymore and it was apparent which party most new voters would lean towards. The Social Democrats would become a major parliamentary force and would be difficult to control once universal

[194] Horizontal reference lines show a VSD of 0. A solid vertical reference line indicates when a party started to support PR, while a dashed vertical reference line shows when a party started to support TRS.

suffrage was adopted.[195] The conservative Arvid Lindman acknowledged this more than his conservative predecessors did when he became Prime Minister in May 1906 (Lewin 2004, p. 269). One district after another went to the Social Democrats under the existing SMP system. The Conservatives were afraid that the growth of the left would diminish their parliamentary power base. Party officials even spoke of getting "extinguished" under SMP with universal suffrage (Särlvik 2002, p. 236). Lindman, a "gifted tactician", thought of PR not only as a measure to secure representation in parliament but as an aspect to suffrage reform that would split the left and create a long-lasting advantage for the right (Lewin 2004, p. 270). He agreed that PR would ensure that the Conservatives remained sufficiently represented in parliament. It would make sure that they would not get wiped out by SMP once the left became too strong and gained a majority in most constituencies.[196] The right had the advantage of vast resources and qualified candidates and personnel to secure a fair representation under PR, but were too afraid of the left to take TRS into consideration.

Lindman and his colleagues started by counting the votes for and against PR in the upper and lower chamber. There was already a majority for PR in the upper chamber, after Paboda's DPR proposal in 1906. However, the PR proponents needed at least another 20 votes in the lower chamber to gain a majority for PR in both chambers. Hence, the amendment of the suffrage bill had to be changed in order to gain more support in the lower chamber and maintain the majority in the upper chamber (Lewin 2004, p. 271). In February 1907, the government proposed an altered PR bill to parliament. The bill pointed out that minorities were not adequately represented in parliament and suggested that this problem could be overcome by introducing PR.[197] Yet, the government was not simply hoping for some MP's to change their mind. Therefore, it had changed three distinct features

[195] At this time, they were the only party that could count on their MPs to vote together on most issues (Verney 1957, p. 143). The other parties were more heterogeneous than the SAP.

[196] For more comprehensive accounts of the Swedish suffrage reform, see Timelin (1928); Andrén (1937, pp. 450–85); Brusewitz (1964, pp. 17–32); Anderson (1956, pp. 99–110); Kihlberg (1963, pp. 104–118).

[197] Prop 1907, no. 28, p. 11.

of the bill. Firstly, the voting age was lowered by one year to 24. Secondly, PR was to be introduced at lower political levels of larger cities and municipalities, which were the electors of the upper chamber. Thirdly, plural voting was restricted to a limit of 40 votes for each person to cast. Lindman thought that the last rule especially would divide the Liberals and make at least 20 MP's change their minds and vote for PR.

Lindman knew that the small liberal farmers of the North were inclined to vote against big business from the South since they had bad experiences with some forest product companies. Hence, he expected them to be sympathetic towards the idea of restraining the influence of wealth on local parliaments and governments by introducing PR on lower levels and reducing plural voting. While the small farmers were out of sorts with big business conservatives, the left grew so strongly that it threatened to push them out of most local parliaments and the national parliament altogether. Reducing the voting rights to 40 would improve the small liberal farmer's position relative to business. Moreover, PR would make sure the left would not replace them completely (Lewin 2004, p. 271, Lewin et al. 1972, pp. 16ff.). Lindman had no qualms to highlight the interests of the farmers in the proposal. Universal suffrage combined with SMP would diminish their representation within parliaments across the country. The current proposal, however, would give the farmers a chance for further representation. Even though the farmers would not have majorities in many local parliaments anymore, a sufficient number of MP's would still be elected to the legislative chambers.[198]

The government's proposal was debated in both chambers and led to a complete change of position in both chambers. The conservative upper chamber was now against the amended bill because there were too many concessions for the liberal farmers.[199] The situation in the lower chamber was different. The majorities in the lower chamber were not as obvious as in the upper chamber. Most

[198] Prop 1907, no. 28, p. 13.
[199] FK 1907, no. 6, pp. 6–16.

MP's were reluctant to aggressively argue for or against the proposal since the situation in parliament was somewhat unclear.[200] The second alternative to the government's proposal was a liberal bill by Karl Staaff, co-sponsored by 73 MPs. It again suggested the introduction of universal male suffrage and TRS.[201]

On the 16th of April, 1907, a third bill was proposed by five MP's, the liberal farmer MP Daniel Persson i Tällberg and four of his liberal colleagues. It was considered a strategic move by most MP's.[202] They criticised the government and asked to make some additional amendments before they could vote for the bill.[203] Lindman was willing to give in. He supported Tällberg's bill and sparked a large debate within parliament (Tällberg's bill was now also the government's bill). The Liberal Party leaders around Staaff were still against the introduction of PR. However, even though the leaders of the Liberals were against the Tällberg bill, the liberal MP's became divided over the issue due to the conservative concessions of Lindman. The bill had the support of the government, the Liberals split the vote on the new bill as Lindman had planned initially and even though the majority of Liberals and Social Democrats voted against PR, the bill passed with 128 to 98 in the Swedish parliament in 1907 (Carstairs 1980, p. 155, Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 1088).

[200] AK 1907, no. 8, pp. 4–32.
[201] Mot AK 1907, no. 203.
[202] Mot AK 1907, no. 203; p. 346.
[203] Mot AK 1907, no. 252. The text started once again with criticising the Conservatives for opposing the expansion of suffrage. The Conservatives were driven by fear of the growing left and the present proposal of the Conservatives was a last resort of the right, the liberal farmers argued. However, the essential component of the proposal was that they would accept the government's bill if two points would be added to the bill. Both were concerning the upper chamber: lower wealth requirements to run for the upper chamber and a salary for the elected.

The upper chamber was not going to give in that easily. A political crisis was near.[204] The following day, Lindman announced a vote of confidence on the adopted bill.[205] Furthermore, he did what today seems to be a frequently used political gambit, but was at the time an exceptionally strategic move: threatening his fellow party members with resignation. This way, he managed to get an even more radical proposal (Tällberg bill) than the governmental one through a chamber that actually preferred a less radical proposal than the governmental one.[206] After all, the upper chamber had rejected the original governmental bill in the first place.

After the announcement of the vote of confidence, the sentiment in the upper chamber changed. One speaker after another suddenly praised Lindman as a strong leader.[207] He was approved as PM. The bill that was passed only incorporated one of the additions that the four liberals had asked for but a compromise was found.[208] The coordinated bill that included the introduction of universal suffrage and PR was then approved by both chambers. Due to the regulations of the Swedish constitution in regard to an intervening election, the bill had to be reapproved in 1909. After many years, the debates about suffrage and the electoral system came to an end in 1907 (Lewin 2004, pp. 272ff.). Universal suffrage was implemented together with PR and took effect in 1911.

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[204] FK 1907, no. 38, pp. 48ff; FK 1907, no. 39, pp. 38–9. The upper chamber had already scrapped the first proposal once before. Thus, the chances became significantly worse for a PR proposal to pass than they were before in parliament. Furthermore, Lindman had also agreed to the terms of the liberal farmers, which made it even more difficult for the Conservatives in the upper chamber to approve the bill. Lindman argued that continued conflicts between both chambers could lead to a deadlock of the system. This could bring the bicameral system short to a breakdown, Lindman stated. He was determined to give the few Liberals what they had asked for to ensure that his party would not suffer under universal suffrage and SMP later on.

[205] FK 1907, no. 40, p. 20.

[206] FK 1907, no. 40, p. 37.

[207] FK 1907, no. 40, p. 21.

[208] The bill that was passed by the upper chamber was written by a group of members of the upper chamber, led by Olof Jonsson i Hov. It contained only the introduction of a salary for the members of the chamber, but not a change in the wealth requirements to run for the upper chamber. Hence, there were two different versions of the bill. One that had been passed by parliament and one that had been passed by the upper chamber. However, they were not far apart from each other. Eventually, the chambers decided to lower the wealth requirements a little bit. To get elected to the upper chamber, the wealth requirement was set to be 50,000 Kronor and the income needed to be 3,000 Kronor.

Realising the great potential and threat of the Social Democrats under universal suffrage and the safeguarding functions of PR under an extended suffrage, Lindman had shown great strategic and political skills. He had split the left and won a large victory over the Swedish Liberals and Social Democrats. The Liberal leader Karl Staaff and the Social Democratic leader Hjalmar Branting both voted no when PR and universal suffrage were introduced in 1907 even though both parties had previously fought for universal suffrage. When the bill was voted for again in 1909, Branting and his Social Democrats voted no again. Staaff, however, voted yes. The Liberals were by then campaigning for women's suffrage and wanted to democratise local voting rights as well (Lewin 2004, p. 273). Staaff was particularly frustrated after PR was passed. He was surprised by the determined manner of Lindman in the PR issue and the political defeat bothered him for quite a while (Kihlberg 1963, p. 97). Staaff resigned in 1907. For Lindman, it was one of his greatest victories of his political life (Lewin 2004, p. 273).

Conclusion

To conclude, coordination was not only necessary between Conservatives and Liberals but among the entire fragmented right with several Conservative parties, structures and associations in both chambers before the main Conservative Party fully emerged (Hadenius 1985, p. 14). This was very difficult with only one round and a lack of electoral information for politicians and voters. Staaff had realised that TRS would help his party to coordinate votes, yet he could not find a majority for TRS in both chambers since the Conservatives were too afraid of the rising left and wanted a more comprehensive safeguard after their initial resistance against PR.

Given that the Swedish right was fragmented but often unwilling to coordinate their votes in advance, one would think that coordination would have been easier under TRS. Even though the differences between Liberals and Conservatives were large at times, the right part of the Liberals,

which cooperated with the Conservatives, the liberal voters of the political centre and the farmers' parties could have aligned against the rising left in the second round of TRS. The difficulties that the Swedish right had in coordinating can largely be attributed to SMP, and these difficulties are what caused an earlier switch to PR than if TRS had been in place.

If TRS had been in place, it most likely would have been significantly easier for the right to coordinate among right parties (especially Conservatives with Moderate Liberals and farmers' parties, but also with the Liberal Party), as it was the case in Germany. This probably would have led to better containment of the left and thus a later adoption of PR. The Social Democratic Party would have lost most second rounds against either the Conservatives or the Liberals until they would have grown strong enough to gain absolute majorities. TRS would have been especially useful for the right since they were backed up by the crown and therefore had more resources in place to better coordinate after round one. The conservative government were additionally backed by the main Swedish newspaper at the time – the Dagens Nyheter – and could have used media power in round two to coordinate votes against the left and therefore influence the election outcome as it happened in other Western European states. The first rounds of TRS could have been used as opinion polls, which would have been very useful especially because the party system was still relatively young (independent candidates were common for longer in Sweden than in other Western European states). Years later, real opinion polls came relatively early to Sweden and the Gallup method was introduced in 1941 (Holmberg 1994, p. 309). TRS would have also enhanced party organisation, communication and coordination between parties even more as parties were more aware of the fact that coordination would be needed after round one. Yet, the Swedish right did not manage to change their electoral system to TRS and therefore adopted PR early.

The early adoption of PR turned out to be a well-thought-out step by the Conservatives. The election results after the introduction of universal suffrage show exactly what Lindman had expected

– large victories of the Social Democrats. However, they became the leading force in Swedish politics anyway, even under PR. Since 1917, the SAP has won every election until today.[209] The leader of the Conservative parliamentary group, Dr. Hildebrand, stated that the adoption of PR in Sweden was undoubtedly in favour of the conservative minority since the group could not obtain more than 20 seats under SMP, whereas this number quadrupled within only 10 years under PR.[210] The Liberal Party was overtaken on both sides by the Social Democrats and the Conservatives in the years after the introduction of universal suffrage and PR.

6. A long history of coordination: TRS as a safeguard in the Netherlands, 1848 – 1917

(Period of majority-plurality TRS: 1849–1896; majority run-off TRS: 1896 – 1917; adoption of PR: 1917)

The Netherlands in the second half of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century was a country with a strong left threat and a fragmented right. The left threat was posed by the Dutch Social Democratic Workers Party (SDAP) and the right was split into three liberal parties, two Protestant parties and a Catholic party. The electoral system in place from 1849 was majority-plurality TRS, which was changed to majority run-off TRS in 1896, before PR was eventually adopted in 1917. Coordination was used under TRS from very early on, mainly among a liberal and a clerical group, and later also among the entire right against the rising left. The clerical group coordinated mainly before round one and the liberal group coordinated mostly after round one. The left was seen as a significant threat from 1901 onwards. However, TRS was used by the incumbent elite to coordinate votes and

[209] Although they were not always able to form the government, they always had the largest share of votes in national parliamentary elections.
[210] BArch R 1501 / 114478/b, 16242.

candidates, which enabled them to sustain the left threat for 16 years and delay the adoption of PR as an ultimate safeguard. Yet, the strongest traditional party, the Liberals, became so overwhelmed by the strength of the left in the early 20th century that they pushed heavily to introduce PR. Coordination was particularly strong between different liberal parties and the religious parties.

6.1. Electoral system, political system and landscape of political parties

The Netherlands' political system was a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. Members were appointed in national elections. In light of the 1848 revolutions breaking out in the neighbouring countries, France and Germany, King Willem II of the Netherlands summoned a group of liberals, headed by Johan Rudolf Thorbecke (1798 – 1872), to revise the constitution in the hope that this might spare the Netherlands a revolution of its own. The revised constitution, accepted by and implemented with the support of the King and parliament, restricted the monarch's powers and implemented a new electoral law ("Kieswet"). In 1849, majority-plurality TRS with direct elections in "double constituencies" was implemented together with secret voting and accountability of the government to the elected parliament, which indeed spared the country a revolution.

However, this created some discontent amongst the conservative and confessional parties who mistrusted the change in the electoral system (Aerts 2010, pp. 101-105, Bartolini 2007, p. 353). Accountability of Dutch governments was taken seriously. There were three minority governments in place before the introduction of PR in 1917 and governments were dismissed by parliament several times.[211] In the two-member districts, one of the two members would get elected every two years for a four-year period. Therefore, the districts in fact worked as SMDs since every district only voted for one MP at a time. One MP was elected for every 45,000 of the population. Only the city districts had

[211] The first government to step down because of electoral defeat was in 1887.

more than two MPs until 1896.[212] Thus, a growing population also meant a growing parliament. The number of MPs rose from 68 members in 1850 to 86 in 1878 (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 860, De Jong 1999, p. 12). This led to frequent changes in district boundaries, which facilitated gerrymandering to a certain degree (Daalder 1975, p. 224). SMDs were eventually introduced in many districts in 1866 and the two-member constituencies were constantly reduced over time (Carstairs 1980, p. 61).

In the first direct elections in 1848, only male citizens of at least 23 years old who had paid their taxes were allowed to vote – ca 2.5 per cent of the total population (Nohlen, Stöver 2010, p. 1384). A year later, Thorbecke became Prime Minister of the Netherlands and liberalism became the largest political group in the country. Thorbecke was re-elected three times. The liberals were dominant in academia, the newspapers and the business sector as well (Andeweg, Irwin 2002). Due to their leading position, they were not motivated to found a political party initially. There was only an informal parliamentary group and regional committees. At first, they cooperated with the Catholics, which changed a couple years later, when the Catholics teamed up with the other religious parties instead.

Until 1878, there were no official political parties in the Netherlands. All candidates were nominally independent (Nohlen, Stöver 2010, p. 1393) but could be associated with "parliamentary groups" (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 860). The Social Democrats, Calvinists and Catholics started to found political parties before the liberals. In 1885, the liberals followed the lead of the other political groups and created the Liberal Union (Liberale Unie/Liberal Party). The emergence of modern political parties, together with the gradual expansion of suffrage, led to the nationalisation of Dutch politics (Verhoef 1974).

In the first decades after the founding of the new parliamentary system in 1849, the Liberal Party – the strongest party and advocate of the constitutional rights of parliament, which was supported by

[212] From 1887 until 1896, Amsterdam had 9 representatives, Rotterdam 5, The Hague 3, Utrecht 2 and Groningen 2. All other constituencies had one representative. SMDs were introduced nationwide in 1896.

the wealthy part of the Dutch society – was only challenged by the Conservatives, who as in many Western European states, backed up the Crown and vice versa. However, the Conservative party had faded after the enforcement of parliamentary powers in 1868, when the government was held accountable to parliament after the second chamber was dissolved twice. The Liberal dominance had been strengthened in 1870, when the Conservatives lost their majority in parliament due to the split-off of the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) (Aerts 2010, p. 119).[213] By the end of the century, the Conservatives were not politically relevant anymore. Most conservative voters started voting for the ARP or the Catholics. Between 1879 and 1918, the landscape of political parties was dominated by five parties: the Liberals, the Catholics, the ARP (Calvinists), the Social Democratic Workers' Party and the Christian Historicals (CHU; also Calvinists) (see Table 27). The combined share of votes for the five parties was 82 per cent in 1913[214] and remained stable until 1963 (Carstairs 1980, p. 63). The Liberals almost always had an absolute majority of seats until 1897, as well as 10 out of 14 Prime Ministers (see Appendix 11 & 16).

Two main issues dominated the end of the 19th century: the financing of non-public schools and the expansion of suffrage. The Catholics and Protestants wanted religious schools to be funded but did not want suffrage expansion, while the liberals wanted suffrage expansion at first, but no subsidies for clerical schools. To change either, the constitution had to be revised, which required a two-third majority in parliament.

[213] Even though anti-revolutionary voting clubs had existed since the 1860s (created by the Calvinist Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer), the correct birth of the ARP as a national political organised party was 1878 (Vanden Berg, 1960, p. 96).

[214] Including smaller liberal parties (Radicals and League of Free Liberals), which were allies of the Liberal Party.

Table 27: Netherlands: parliamentary election results[215]

		Liberal Union	Radicals*	League of Free Liberals	Catholics	ARP	CHU**	Social Democrats
1888		40.7	2		20.7	31.4		0.9
1891	maj.-pl. TRS	42.2	2.1		20	29.5		1
1894		49.8	3.1		20.3	17.1	6.7	0.2
1897		30.5	3.6		20.3	26.2	10.7	3
1901		27.6	7.3		15.7	27.4	6.7	9.5
1905	run-off TRS	28.2	8.8		13.1	24.7	10.8	11.2
1909		17.8	9.1	5.6	13.9	27.9	10.6	13.9
1913		16.7	7.3	6.6	14.5	21.5	10.5	18.5
1918	PR	6.2	5.3	3.8	30	13.4	6.5	22

*Radicals: "Radical Party" before 1901; from 1901 – 1913 the "Free-thinking Democratic League (VDB)" – a party formation of Radicals and progressive Liberal Unionists; CHU = CH, **CHU, Free ARP (definition used for all data work within this thesis).

[215] First round results of the Second Chamber. For a table of the seats/mandates, see Appendix 11. Source: (Nohlen, Stoever 2010, p. 1412). The results of the 1917 election are not displayed in the tables of this chapter because all parties had agreed to leave all current MPs unopposed in 1917 to adopt universal suffrage and PR and to end the "school struggle" after the election.

The elections of 1888 and 1891 – clerical and liberal alliances and fragmentation of the right

The anti-clerical laws of the liberal government of Prime Minister Jan Kappeyne van de Coppello (1877 – 1879) in 1878, 1879 and 1883, which among other things banned financial aid to non-public schools (including clerical schools), provoked anti-liberal coordination among the different religious camps (Protestant ARP and Catholics) (Verkade 1965, p. 41). Both clerical parties were forcefully against these laws. The Catholics, who had been loosely allied with the Liberals in earlier years, started to oppose the Liberals because of the Liberals' negative position towards the Vatican and the school question. In 1887, this eventually led to an electoral alliance between both religious parties that had previously been fighting against each other. Catholics and Anti-Revolutionists started working together to enforce state financing of confessional schools, while the Liberals remained against it. The school question had led to the overcoming of the earlier cleavage between Catholics and Calvinists. It made coordination between the religious parties possible and united them for many years (Verkade 1965, pp. 41-42, Vanden Berg 1960, pp. 166-167, Vlekke 1945, p. 319).

In the election in 1888, the ARP and the Catholics joined forces, won the election and formed the first coalition government in the Netherlands under the first ARP Prime Minister Mackay (1888 – 1891) (Aerts 2010, p. 376). All districts that were won in the first round were won by coordination between both parties.[216] Coordination among confessional parties under both TRS systems led to several confessional governments until 1913 (see Appendix 16). The Liberals and the religious coalitions alternated in forming Dutch governments between 1888 and 1913.[217]

[216] Huygens ING Institute 4 database, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/verkiezingentweedekamer (accessed on 23/04/2015); Kiesraad database, www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/Voor1918/Verkiezingsuitslagen.aspx?VerkiezingsTypeId=1 (accessed on 23/04/2015).

[217] The last two liberal governments were minority governments that relied on the support of the opposition. The 1905 government was dismissed by parliament over a defence budget. It was followed by a minority government of the religious parties, since there was no absolute majority for each of the political groups due to the success of the Social Democrats. The clerical parties then obtained an absolute majority in the next election in 1909 (Daalder 1975, p. 226).

The clericals did not coordinate to a large extent in the subsequent election, which led to the Liberals becoming successful again in 1891. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the pressure for a more democratic and holistic approach to Dutch politics grew. Besides securing justice and peoples' safety, politics also became about assuring peoples' social and economic well-being.[218] The clerical parties that had just agreed to unite against the Liberals disagreed on the dimension of governmental responsibilities, which made coordination difficult between them. The Liberals were internally divided into a more conservative "old" liberal group and a progressive radical wing. This created a power vacuum – all parties were divided and no party enjoyed the support of an absolute majority of seats in parliament. The radical liberals provoked progressiveness within the Liberal Party before the 1891 elections. They knew that without adjustment to a more democratic view, they would no longer win a majority of the votes in the upcoming elections. Since the Liberal Union was the only party to adjust itself to the new democratic ideas, it defeated the divided religious parties in 1891 and once more became the governing party (Oud 1997, p. 149). The Liberals coordinated votes among the Liberal Union and the progressive branch and defeated the clerical parties (Oud 1997, p. 147).[219] The new liberal government was headed by PM Van Tienehoven.

The suffrage debate caused fragmentation of the right and the party system in the 1890s. The Liberals and the ARP were affected by party split-offs, while the Catholics preserved their unity. The Liberal Union eventually had to cope with a split-off of a progressive group that formed the Radical Party (Radicals)[220] in 1891, and a conservative group that formed the "League of Free Liberals" ("Bond van Vrije Liberalen", BVL)[221] in 1894. More progressive MPs detached from the Liberals in 1901 and

[218] www.parlement.com/id/vglrdyd9plkn/negentiende_eeuws_districtenstelsel_in (accessed on 5/11/2014).

[219] Huygens ING Institute 4 database (accessed on 23/04/2015); Kiesraad database (accessed on 23/04/2015), see links above.

[220] The Radicals had existed before as a loose political group but only institutionalised in 1891, they were already termed Radicals in the years before their founding. Sometimes also called: Liberal Democratic League. For simplification this group will be called "Radicals" throughout the thesis.

[221] The "League of Free Liberals" was only institutionalised in 1905 and had their own seats in parliament in 1909 and 1913. Before that, it was a loose group of parliamentarians.

built the "Free thinking democratic league" together with the Radical Party.[222] The most dividing issue was the question of suffrage expansion and ultimately, universal suffrage. The Radicals were pro suffrage expansion, while the old liberals were against it, being afraid of the rising working class.

The split of the Liberal Party and the expansion of suffrage would be the start of a fast decline of the Liberals. The conservative wing of the ARP, the "Free ARP", with its leader, De Savornin Lohman, left the party in 1898, and so did the "Christian Historicals" and the "Frisian-Christian Union" in 1901. Together, the three formed the "Christian Historical Union" (CHU) in 1908 (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, pp. 865, Carstairs 1980, p. 62), which later coordinated with the ARP and the Catholics in the "confessional block".[223] The fragmentation of parliament led to difficulties in forming solid majorities in parliament and governments. Coalition governments were the consequence of this.

[222] The progressive liberals were called "Radicals" ("free-minded"/"democratic" liberals) while the conservative, traditional liberals were named "old liberals" ("free Liberals").

[223] Even though the CHU was formally only established in 1908, the Calvinist parliamentary groups already existed before and are termed CHU in electoral results since 1894.



Figure 12: First round election results of the Netherlands[224]

6.2. Left threat, suffrage expansion and debated safeguards

As in the rest of Western Europe in the 19th century, the abolition of internal tariffs and guilds, a unified coinage system, and the building of railroads, better streets and canals led to a national industrialisation process and steady development of the Netherlands into a contemporary industrial civilisation. The number of people employed in agriculture declined drastically between 1880 and 1920 (see Figure 13), while the state tried hard to recreate its competitive shipping and trade business. Rotterdam became one of the major European shipping and manufacturing centres (Griffiths 1982, Mokyr 1974). Between 1849 and 1917, the period important for this case study, Dutch history was essentially one of the modernisation of the economy. This led to a growing industrial sector and working class (see Figure 13), the rise of trade unionism and the social democratic political movement

[224] Votes of first round. VrijSource: (Nohlen, Stoever 2010, p. 1412).

becoming independent of the traditional incumbent liberal and conservative elite. The left movement led to pressure for a more inclusive suffrage and for the democratisation of the political system (Kossmann 1978).



Figure 13: Occupational transformation in the Netherlands (workers per sector in per cent)[225]

Similarly to Sweden, the suffrage in the Netherlands was gradually expanded in 1887, 1896 and 1917, each time approximately doubling the electorate (see Appendix 12). The suffrage expansion in 1887 enfranchised 6.5 per cent of the overall population (11.8 per cent of the over 20 year olds, see Appendix 12 & 13).[226] As a safeguard, the Liberals fixed the number of seats in parliament at 100 (84 districts). Shortly before, the expansion of suffrage in England was accompanied by the nationwide introduction of SMDs to ensure that if the rising left won in a constituency, they would only win one seat in parliament instead of several. In the Netherlands, the Liberals were still powerful in the larger cities. Thus, they decided to increase SMDs in the rural areas but keep MMDs in the cities. This enabled the Liberals to gain additional seats in the elections before 1897. In 1891 for instance, they won all 21 seats in the five MMDs (De Jong et al. 2011, p. 40).

[225] Source: Bartolini (2000, p. 133).
[226] Decree of the 28th November, 1887, no. 14, change of the electoral law (Staatsblad no. 211).

After the expansion of the suffrage in 1887, a large debate about further expansion took place in the years before 1896. The left-liberal Tak van Poortvliet introduced a bill advocating suffrage for everyone, except the illiterate and welfare recipients. At the time, the Liberals predicted that the expansion of suffrage in cities could help them to retain power. The Anti-Revolutionists wanted the expansion of suffrage specifically in rural areas. The debate went on for 1.5 years and split up entire parties. The Liberals and the ARP in particular were divided on the matter.[227] This led to the special case of the 1894 election. The suffrage issue turned out to be so important that for one election, candidates aligned according to their suffrage reform beliefs, not their party membership. There was no coordination between parties in this election but only between suffrage contenders and suffrage opponents.[228] The universal suffrage contenders lost the election, the suffrage debate calmed down and Tak van Poortvliet lost his influence. An anti-Takkians government was formed by liberals, supported by the Catholics. This was the only coalition government with members from both camps (liberal and clerical). A compromise bill was passed in 1896 and the franchise was eventually extended to 12 per cent of the population (20.9 per cent of people older than 20 years; see Appendix 12).

The growing workers movement and the expansion of suffrage led to the rise of the Dutch "Social Democratic Workers' Party" (SDAP), which soon caused fear of deterioration among the incumbent right. The decades before the turn-of-the-century were the beginning of the success story of the SDAP. It had founded its first organisational construct, the Social Democratic League (SDB) in 1881, which later became the SDAP. The SDB was "initially committed to a classless society by parliamentary means" but became more radical when they realised their limited power under the existing electoral system and parliamentarism (Wolinetz 1977, p. 344). Yet, the successor party, the SDAP, was a reformist left-wing party without anarchist tendencies. Some radicals were even excluded

[227] 29 Liberals voted for the bill, 18 voted against it. 7 ARP members voted for it, 8 voted against it.
[228] This is the reason why there are no coordination numbers shown for 1894 in Table 29.

in 1909 and ultimately formed a communist party.[229] The SDAP was financially and theoretically supported by the German SPD. The initial Dutch party programs were copied from the German SPD's Erfurt party program of 1891.[230] The formation of Dutch trade unions on a national basis started in 1893 (Bartolini 2007, p. 246). Close ties developed between the Dutch Federation of Trade Unions (NVV) and the left party.[231] SDAP and NVV memberships were entangled. The party cooperated with unions, in particular with regard to the demand for universal suffrage (Wolinetz 1977, p. 344). By reaching 9.5 per cent in the elections of 1901, the SDAP was seen as a major political threat by the traditional elite.

The measures of the new Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper (1901 – 1905), a protestant cleric that had founded the ARP, against the left and their railroad strike, emphasise the dimension of the left threat soon after the turn of the century.[232] Strikes became illegal under Kuyper's government and the workers lost support for their strikes among the public. The growth of the left was changing political strategies to a large extent. Before the rise of the left, it was mainly the liberal parties on one side coordinating with each other, and the religious parties on the other side, trying to win against the non-religious liberals. The SDAP represented a third force in the game, which was potentially more dangerous to the existing power structure than purely religious vs. non-religious divisions. Thus, in

[229] Only in 1918, the party chairman Pieter Jelles Troelstra expected that left upheavel in Germany would make it to the Netherlands. Hence, he seized power by revolutionary means. Yet, the incumbent elite was quick to mobilize a volunteer army and calmed down the uprising and the SDAP went back to its reformist claims. This separated the left from the other parliamentary forces for years (Wolinetz 1977, pp. 344-346). For more details about this, see Cohen (1974, pp. 14-21).

[230] For further work on the origins of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, see Daalder (1966); de Jong (1951); Wansik (1939) and Cohen (1974).

[231] The NVV was not a revolutionary trade union, rather it wanted to build a solid organisation and achieve successful collective bargaining. It received competition from Catholic and Protestant unions (Daalder 1966, p. 207-211).

[232] Kuyper was one of the main figures of the vast Calvinist movement that had started in the 1870s and had founded the ARP in 1879. The ARP was the first Dutch modern political party, led by Kuyper. He had developed a party program and the party officially approved election candidates. He had also founded a daily newspaper called "De Standaard" (Daalder, 1960, p. 201), social clubs, a denominational university, sports clubs, etc. Among other publications Kuyper had used the newspaper to publish a party program in 1878, which then became the party program of the ARP in the same year. The newspaper and election clubs he had installed helped the rise of the ARP in the Protestant parts of the Netherlands.

1901, coordination between religious and liberal parties increased. The SDAP grew and organised itself similarly to the German SPD. By 1908, it was a fully fledged political organisation, with a secretariat, a youth organisation and its own newspaper (Wolinetz 1977, p. 344). The left also started to push for the reform of the electoral law (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 866). Compared to Germany's anti-socialist laws and its repression against the left, the Dutch left was able to develop in a much calmer environment than their German counterparts. It was not "outlawed, severely persecuted, or repressed" (Bartolini 2007, p. 329).

For a long time, the Liberals were reluctant to expand the suffrage. They were fully aware that universal suffrage would lead to a large gain in votes for the Social Democrats and possibly the Catholics as well (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 867). The ARP, who had been advocates of the expansion of suffrage, was suddenly less keen to expand the suffrage further. After they had been leading the governmental coalition in 1888, they became opposed to the further expansion of suffrage (Loots 2004, pp. 25-26). Hence, it was the Radicals and the Social Democrats who demanded universal male suffrage, while the traditional parties were afraid that full suffrage would cause them to lose a vast number of seats to the left. The Social Democrats expected that universal suffrage and the ongoing industrialisation would lead to a strong left majority in parliament. They did indeed win the support of urban workers, non-religious farmers and farm workers of the North even before the introduction of universal suffrage (Wolinetz 1977, p. 346). Their results increased gradually over the next five consecutive elections and the right became more nervous after the elections of 1901, when for the first time, they almost reached 10 per cent of the votes (see Figure 12 and Table 27).

Debating safeguards against a rising left

The number of MPs was adjusted for population growth every five years. Hence, the number of total seats in parliament gradually expanded. This meant that the borders of the constituencies had to be redrawn repeatedly to ensure that the number of representatives from a constituency still matched the number of inhabitants of the constituency. Gerrymandering was used to the advantage of the liberal elite in power.[233] By the end of the 1870s, the Liberals even openly admitted that "in a revision of the electoral law an increase in the number of liberal seats in parliament was pursued" (De Jong 1999, p. 20). This triggered the first critique of TRS by the Conservatives and the confessional parties. They feared that under TRS, gerrymandering by the Liberal Party would keep them from governing in the long run. Lohman, by then the ARP's right-wing leader, said in 1885: "…the electoral law leads to a distortion of the political representation in parliament; not only is it specifically formalised…to the advantage of the ruling majority, but one has engineered injustices in it with the hope of obtaining political benefits."[234]

After the introduction of SMDs and the use of gerrymandering, the Liberals needed another safeguard for suffrage expansion in 1896: coordination under run-off TRS. The Liberals had already used slight changes of the electoral system to their advantage in 1887 and had coordinated votes among liberal parties in 1891. They realised that they could use the electoral system to contain the growing left threat, which would grow further with the expansion of suffrage. PR would only be debated years later, once the pressure for universal suffrage rose.

[233] Gerrymandering was called "kieswetgeografie" (electoral law geography) by the Dutch (De Jong 1999, p. 20).
[234] 21e vergadering Tweede Kamer 18/02/1885, p. 257.

6.3. TRS as a safeguard

The adoption of run-off TRS and SMDs in 1896 were closely connected. Before 1896, the cities still consisted of double-member constituencies (see Appendix 14). In 1887, the Liberals still had a big enough voting bloc in the cities to win the urban multi-member constituencies. At that time, majority-plurality TRS worked to their advantage. MMDs were reduced gradually in the rest of the country and calls for a simpler and unambiguous electoral system were growing louder (Welderen Rengers 1948, p. 116). It was decided that the number of candidates advancing to the second round should be double the number of a constituency's representatives in parliament. Since elections for double constituencies were held every two years (as midterms in the US), the rural districts had technically already been using run-off TRS since 1887.

The liberal government, formed in 1894, consisted of more "old" liberals than progressives. Yet, not all of them were against suffrage expansion. The liberal Minister of Internal Affairs, Samuel van Houten, was responsible for the development of a new electoral law to accompany suffrage expansion. He proposed to accompany it with a nationwide change to SMDs and run-off TRS (Welderen Rengers 1948, p. 116). After the Liberal Party had split into several groups, their leaders realised that they needed more coordination to win against other growing parties. At this time, the Liberals' electorate in the cities was not as strong as it had been in the elections before and they were at risk of losing the important MMDs in the cities, which counted for 21 per cent of all seats in parliament. Thus, the liberals wanted to introduce SMDs nationwide to ensure that a possible defeat in one of the city districts would not lead to multiple seats in parliament for the opposition (Loots 2004, p. 67).

In 1896, at the same time of the expansion of suffrage, the electoral system was changed nationwide from majority-plurality TRS to majority run-off TRS.[235] Suffrage expanded to include men

[235] Law of 07/09/1896, regulating the right to vote and the nomination of delegates to the Senate and House of Representatives (Staatsblad no. 154). Law of 31/12/1896, to amend the Electoral Act (Staatsblad no. 245).

who had rented a house, had a certain amount of earnings, a savings account or had passed certain assessments (Nohlen, Stöver 2010, p. 1384). Run-off TRS was put in place in the hope that this would make coordination easier for the incumbent elite and make sure that the left would not win the urban MMDs. Reducing second-round candidates to two also made it more difficult for small emerging parties such as the left to make it to round two (Verhoef 1971, p. 268). The adoption of TRS was practically only a change to SMDs, since second rounds in all districts were already restricted to twice as many candidates as there were seats in each district. With SMDs nationwide, this meant that only run-offs were possible from then on. The districts in the urban areas were split up into several districts. A total of 100 SMDs were formed in the country. By and large, the shift from majority-plurality TRS to majority-run off TRS served a dual purpose: a better safeguard for the incumbent elite and the satisfaction of the demands for a simpler electoral law.

Even though the Liberals were the only party that was genuinely happy with run-off TRS, there was no substantial protest against its introduction, not even from the Social Democrats, because a reform of the electoral system had already been promised for 10 years. Some Social Democrats surprisingly even supported run-off TRS. They knew that a demand to change the constitution in order to implement universal suffrage would not be successful at that point in time, but realised that run-off TRS would at least expand suffrage slightly. The social democrat De Koo pleaded for his party members not to contest the new electoral law in hopes that universal suffrage would be implemented as soon as possible (Taal 1980, p. 418). For the Social Democrats, the first step towards universal suffrage was so important that the change of the electoral system tied to it was less crucial for them. At the time, the new electoral system did not change much for them since they did not have as many supporters as they would have years later (Taal 1980, p. 419). SMP only seemed a more useful option for them in 1913, when they were on the way to holding the majority of votes. The Confessionals also

agreed to run-off TRS because they had promised to support the expansion of suffrage during the 1894 elections, which became tied to the change of the electoral system (Taal 1980, p. 431).

Table 28: Number of second rounds and second round outcomes in the Netherlands[236]

Year of election	Number of run-offs	Number of districts	Percentage of total districts	Liberal Union			Radicals			League of Free Liberals			Catholics			ARP			CHU			Social Democrats		
				a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c
1888	25	84	29.8%	21	12	57.1%	1	0	0.0%	/	/	/	13	5	38.5%	14	6	42.9%	/	/	/	1	1	100.0%
1891	24	84	28.6%	21	13	61.9%	2	1	50.0%	/	/	/	9	3	33.3%	15	7	46.7%	/	/	/	1	0	0.0%
1894	25	84	29.8%	17	8	47.1%	1	0	0.0%	8	7	87.5%	8	4	50.0%	12	2	16.7%	5	3	60.0%	/	/	/
1897	50	94	53.2%	31	23	74.2%	5	3	60.0%	13	9	69.2%	14	0	0.0%	28	8	28.6%	4	3	75.0%	5	2	40.0%
1901	42	89	47.2%	19	14	73.7%	8	5	62.5%	8	5	62.5%	10	2	20.0%	22	5	22.7%	6	4	66.7%	10	7	70.0%
1905	40	94	42.6%	19	17	89.5%	5	5	100.0%	8	7	87.5%	3	1	33.3%	26	2	7.7%	7	0	0.0%	12	7	58.3%
1909	36	89	40.4%	17	14	82.4%	7	6	85.7%	6	3	50.0%	3	0	0.0%	20	3	15.0%	7	3	42.9%	12	7	58.3%
1913	47	95	49.5%	16	13	81.3%	10	5	50.0%	8	8	100.0%	5	0	0.0%	22	1	4.5%	10	0	0.0%	21	15	71.4%
Sum	289			161	114	70.8%	39	25	64.1%	51	39	76.5%	65	15	23.1%	159	34	21.4%	39	13	33.3%	62	39	62.9%

a = number of second rounds that party took part in; b = number of won second rounds; c = percentage of won second rounds.

Coordination under TRS

Electoral coalitions were a common and publicly exerted tool under TRS in the Netherlands. Parties used TRS to coordinate votes and candidates. Coordination was present mainly between two different right-wing groups, which used different methods of coordination: a clerical group and a liberal group. Coordination of both camps led to better electoral results for them and therefore a delay of the left threat.

Clerical coordination

Electoral coordination among the first group, the clerical parties, had already begun with the expansion of suffrage in 1887, when the Catholics and the ARP joined forces to win against the liberals (Loots 2004, p. 64). They had coordinated candidates in 21 out of 84 districts in the first round, ended up winning 52 per cent of the seats (ARP 27; Catholics 25, see Appendix 11), and formed the first

[236] Own calculations based on Kollman et al. (2011). The data is somewhat skewed as the "won second rounds" of the Social Democrats in two elections turned out to be higher than the actual number of seats the party won (1905, 1913). These districts were not used in the above calculations. It was difficult to allocate all MPs to one specific party in the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, therefore some MPs might have been labelled incorrectly.

coalition government.[237] This led to the resignation of Prime Minister Heemskerk (1883 – 1888), and it was the first time a Dutch government stepped down due to weak election results – a sign of the early accountability of the Dutch government. The confessional alliance and the growing left led to the reduction of the position of power of the Liberal Party. The alliance was later joined by the Christian Historicals (see Table 29), which had split off from the ARP (Hermens 1968, p. 289).

The Catholics were the most regionally concentrated party (Verhoef 1971, p. 265). The population of the southern provinces of the Netherlands (North Brabant and Limburg) was almost entirely Catholic (see Figure 14). In the northern provinces, only one quarter was Catholic. The religious division of the country and gerrymandering had led to a clear classification of districts throughout the Netherlands. Three-quarters of all districts were won by either Catholics, liberals or Protestants for all five elections under run-off TRS (1897 – 1913). 33 constituencies were won by a liberal every time, the Catholics won in 22 constituencies five times in a row, and the Protestants won in 21 constituencies in all five consecutive elections. It was coordination within the different political camps that made these stable results possible. The other 24 constituencies were fiercely contested between liberals and Protestants and later Social Democrats (the Catholics won their safe southern districts). This was the battlefield that often determined who would lead the country over the next four years. The Catholics were winning the districts in the South in the first round and were backing up the protestant parties ARP or CHU in the North. They only won 23.1 per cent of all second rounds (see Table 28), yet they had an average positive VSD of 7.3 between 1888 and 1913 (see Table 31). The strength of the Catholics in the South led to the positive VSD. Due to the majoritarian electoral system, it over-compensated the votes that they were throwing behind Protestant candidates in the North.

[237] Huygens ING Institute 4 database (accessed on 23/04/2015); Kiesraad database (accessed on 23/04/2015), see links above.



Figure 14: Religious composition and political dominance in the Netherlands[238]

[238] Source: De Jong et al. (2011, p. 63), edited.

The clerical alliance (Catholics, ARP and CHU) mainly coordinated before round one by agreeing on one common candidate. Coordination was carried out by "candidacy trades" ("coordination across districts") between parties before round one to ensure the coalescing parties' participation in round two or obtain an absolute majority in round one. A party would pass on a candidacy in one district to then expect the same from their coalition partner in another district. A study of parties' strategies in nominating candidates by Verhoef (1971) shows that by 1905, parties were coordinating very professionally, and only very few candidates of the clerical camp ran against each other.

By 1905, electoral arrangements between the religious parties were very effective (Daalder 1975, p. 225). They rarely had candidates running against each other. That is to say, when a clerical candidate ran, he mostly won in round one. In round two, coordination efforts on the clerical side seemed to have been exhausted compared to the liberal parties, as we can see particularly in the weak second round results of the ARP. The ARP only won 34 out of 159 second rounds even though it gained the most votes of all parties in round one in the years 1909 and 1913 (the Catholics won the most seats).[239] The ARP was the dominating part of the clerical alliance. The Catholics were the reliable allies of the ARP, which repeatedly carried them into government. The ARP supported the Catholics in the South, as long as they got Catholic backing in the North, and support from the general leadership of the clerical alliance. Overall, the clerical parties did not win a large portion of their second rounds (Catholics won 23.1 per cent; ARP 21.4; CHU 33.3).

[239] In 1909, both parties won 25 seats.

Table 29: Electoral alliances of the right in the Netherlands[240]

	1888	1891	1897	1901	1905	1909	1913
ARP, Catholics	64/18 (31)	54/7 (9)	29/34 (10)	40/0 (11)	11/1 (10)		
ARP, Catholics, CHU			12/3 (6)	21/27 (15)	75/31 (26)	75/27 (37)	86/34 (32)
ARP, CHU			9/0 (1)	0/5 (4)	3/0 (2)	2/0 (0)	1/0 (0)
Catholics, CHU			3/0 (2)				4/0 (3)
Liberals, League of Free Liberals				71/0 (8)	15/2 (5)	46/0 (6)	
Liberals, League of Free Liberals, Radicals				0/22 (18)	0/26 (24)	0/22 (19)	0/47 (39)
Liberals, Radicals					3/6 (7)	0/6 (5)	
Liberals, CHU			1/30 (26)				
CHU, League of Free Liberals			3/6 (6)				
Liberals, Radicals, Catholics				2/0 (0)			
Liberals, League of Free Liberals, Radicals, Catholics, CHU						0/6 (3)	
Liberals, Catholics		1/0 (1)					

Number of first round coordination/number of second round coordination (number of seats won by coordination)

Liberal coordination

The second group, the liberal alliance, which was called "liberal concentration" ("Vrijzinnige concentratie"), consisted of three parties: the Liberal Union, the League of Free Liberals and the Radicals. Informal coordination between the Liberal Party and the Radical Party had existed since 1891, when they reclaimed the government from the ARP and the Catholics. In 1894, the alliance was joined by the newly formed League of Free Liberals. In 1901, the Radical Party and several more progressive members of the Liberal Union formed the "Free-thinking Democratic League" (Oud 1997, p. 175), which remained part of the electoral coalition. At this time, coordination between the official liberal parties became "institutionalised" (see Table 29). The Liberal Union and the League of Free Liberals coordinated in round one but only became successful when they were joined by the Radicals in round two (see Table 29).

Fragmentation required the liberals to coordinate and both forms of TRS were conducive to coordination. To avoid a successful second round clerical coalition, all liberal parties united behind the strongest candidate in round two. Coordination was carried out across districts in round two after

[240] Own calculations based on Huygens Institute 4 and Kiesraad. The amount of coordination in Table 29 and the seats won by coordination in Table 30 can occasionally be slightly higher than the number of won seats as candidates were allowed to run in more than one district at the time and could therefore win in several districts at once. When this was the case, elections had to be repeated in the district in which the candidate did not take up the mandate.

they ran against each other in round one. This was either through a "vote trade" or an "alliance without concessions". In a vote trade, one party would vote for another party's candidate in round two in one district if the other party's sympathisers would vote for it in round two of another district. They traded votes "to the extent that parties could control voting of their potential sympathisers" (Daalder 1975, p. 225). In an alliance without concessions, the weaker parties simply convinced its supporters to vote for the stronger liberal party, mostly after round one.[241] They used the first round to find out which liberal party was the strongest, to then use the time before round two to coordinate party supporters to throw their votes behind the liberal frontrunner. This way the main adversary had smaller chances of winning against a member of the alliance in the second round. This enabled them to win large numbers of second rounds (see variable "c" for the liberal parties in Table 28). Coordination between liberal parties was not taken for granted because of their political differences. The Radicals were considerably more on the political left than the League of Free Liberals.[242]

Table 28 displays that the Liberal Union was able to win 114 out of 161 second rounds (70.8 per cent). Percentagewise, the results were similarly high for the Radicals and the League of Free Liberals. However, the Liberal Union took part in considerably more second rounds and gained the most from the electoral alliance. Furthermore, Table 28 shows that the number of second rounds doubled to at least 50 (6 districts are missing) in the first election after the introduction of run-off TRS in 1897.[243] This had two reasons: firstly, the abolishment of MMDs in 1896 and secondly, the weakness of clerical coordination. When MMDs were abolished, the number of districts increased from 84 to 100 in 1896. Most of the urban districts that were MMDs before needed a second round to find a

[241] Website of the Dutch parliament: (http://www.parlement.com/id/vglrdyd9plkn/negentiende_eeuws_districtenstelsel_in (accessed on 5/11/2014)).

[242] The SDAP supported the liberal alliance against the clericals in round two in some districts in the last two elections before PR.

[243] The numbers in Table 28 are not fully complete as no data can be found for certain districts between 1888 and 1913. There were 100 districts between 1897 and 1913, and we have results from 89 to 95 districts in these years. However, the numbers can still give us an approximate indication of how second rounds turned out and which parties were able to use them more to their advantage than others.

victor because the Social Democrats had started to become stronger in the cities, similarly to other Western European states. This automatically increased the number of second rounds. Additionally, in 1897, the Catholics and the ARP did not coordinate as well as they had in the years before. The weakness of clerical coordination led to more run-offs as well.

Apart from these coordination efforts among liberal groups, it was again the Liberal Party that was positioned between the right-wing Catholics and the left-wing Social Democrats (similar to Germany and Sweden), despite being more right wing than its Swedish counterpart. Beyond liberal coordination, they gained votes from both sides of the political spectrum in the second round depending on who they ran against – votes from the left when running against a right-wing party and votes from the right when running against the Social Democrats (strategic voting) (Hermens 1968, p. 287).

Yet, the liberals were not bound to one party (clerical or left) when two non-liberal parties were running against each other in round two. In particular, the Social Democrats were not ensured the liberal vote in round two against a religious party. Nevertheless, the Social Democrats won some seats with support from the liberal's left wing (e.g. in 1913). After the Liberals had realised the future strength of the Social Democrats, they even offered them cabinet seats in 1913 to engage in an extended alliance against the religious parties. However, the Social Democratic Party Congress rejected the proposal, fearing that entering a coalition with the Liberals would harm their "ideological purity", as well as their chances of finding working-class voters and allies in the religious group (Daalder 1975, pp. 225-226). There was no lib-lab coalition in the Netherlands at the time. No signs have been found for early liberal-socialist coalitions against political conservatism (Bartolini 2007, pp. 422-428).

Coordination in round two was also a sign of the liberals' organisational weakness, as well as the unwillingness of the Radicals to coordinate. The liberals had always been the least organised group of the four political camps. The Radicals were significantly more progressive than the old liberals and

were not inclined to just throw all of their votes behind the larger Liberal Union in every district as the Catholics did with the ARP in the North of the country. It was the electoral system that induced them to coordinate their votes in round two. In 1897, for instance, the liberal Van Houten pleaded for all liberals to join forces again (Taal 1980, p. 437). Although some of the progressive liberals within the Liberal Union and the Radicals were not very enthusiastic about the idea, they all saw the importance of coordination under TRS. Thus, they formed liberal alliances in all constituencies, except when there was no potentially successful confessional candidate running against them. Otherwise, they chose to work together because every liberal candidate was seen as the lesser evil compared to a confessional candidate.

The Radicals were not inclined to team up with the Liberal Union but had no other options. Their party was small, badly organised and not present in all parts of the country (Taal 1980, pp. 438; 444). Without coordination and the help of the other liberal parties, they had little chance of being represented properly (Taal 1980, p. 437). Hence, they adjusted their political platforms to match the Liberal Unions' program on some crucial points (e.g. leaving out universal suffrage) to be able to work together on a relatively common basis (Taal 1980, p. 439). They could run in round one and could then more easily convince their supporters to vote for the Liberal Union in round two.

Table 30: Number of MPs elected through electoral alliances in the Netherlands[244]

	1888		1891		1894		1897		1901		1905		1909		1913	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%
Liberal Union	0	0	1	1.8	0	0	3	8.6	18	100	16	64	21	100	13	59.1
Radicals					0	0	2	40	2	22.2	6	54.5	5	55.6	5	71.4
League of Free Liberals							6	50	8	100	8	88.9	3	75	8	80
Catholics	7	26.9	2	8	0	0	0	0	2	8	15	60	7	28	17	68
ARP	24	88.9	7	35	0	0	13	76.5	20	87	15	100	19	76	11	100
CHU					0	0	5	71.4	4	40	7	87.5	11	100	7	70

"abs" = absolute numbers of MPs elected through coordination; "%" = percentage of districts that were won by coordination.

The left was growing, taking away votes and seats from the incumbent parties. They won 15 out of the 24 districts in 1913 but always had a negative VSD under TRS (see Table 31). First round coordination of the religious camp combined with a large Liberal Union already made it very hard for the SDAP to make it into round two. If they made it into the second round, it was often the liberal concentration that made them lose it. Yet, they managed to win 62.9 per cent of their small number of second rounds, some of them with support from left-wing liberals (see Table 28).

In 1897, the CHU had joined forces with the Liberals, which led to an absolute majority of the Liberals. Hence, there was some coordination across the two camps. The two electoral blocs used both kinds of coordination, but the clericals did significantly more first round coordination, while the liberals did more second round coordination (see Table 29). These types of coordination and platform alliances were also the most commonly used types in Germany. For a more detailed description of them, see Chapter 4.3.

Overall, liberals and clerical parties coordinated against each other from 1877 onwards and against a rising left after 1901. Both TRS systems had been beneficial for the right parties for many years, mainly for the Liberals and the Catholics, who were always over-represented in parliament in relation to their votes (see Table 31). All right parties used coordination to gain more seats. In particular, the

[244] Own calculations based on Huygens Institute 4 (accessed on 23/04/15); Kiesraad (accessed on 23/04/15); Politiek Compendium http://www.politiekcompendium.nl/9351000/1f/j9vvh40co5zodus/vh4vaj5ei1ze (last seen 31-05-2015) (accessed on 23/04/15),; De Jong et al. (2011).

Liberals and the ARP needed coordination to be successful. In some years, all of their seats were won by coordination (see Table 30). The Liberals in particular used TRS to their advantage for many years. Coordination against the rising left was not as distinct as it was in Germany but the large political camps made it very difficult for the new left outsider to overcome the boundaries of a two-round majoritarian system.

Table 31: Vote-seat disproportionalities in the Netherlands in per cent[245]

		Liberal Union	Radicals	League of Free Liberals	Catholics	ARP	CHU	Social Democrats
1888		5.3	-2	0	4.3	-4.4	0	0.1
1891	maj.-pl. TRS	10.8	-1.1	0	5	-8.5	0	-1
1894		7.2	-0.1	0	4.7	-2.1	-6.7	-0.2
1897		17.5	0.4	0	1.7	-9.2	-4.7	0
1901		-1.6	1.7	0	9.3	-5.4	3.3	-2.5
1905	run-off TRS	5.8	2.2	0	11.9	-9.7	-2.8	-4.2
1909		2.2	-0.1	-1.6	11.1	-2.9	-0.6	-6.9
1913		5.3	-0.3	3.4	10.5	-10.5	-0.5	-3.5
Average*		6.6	0.1	0.9	7.3	-6.6	-2.0	-3.4
PR Support (since)		No -> Yes	Yes -> No -> Yes (1907)	No -> Yes (1913)	No -> Yes	Yes -> No (1902)	No -> Yes	Yes -> ambig.

* Average: average VSD during years when represented in parliament under TRS.

6.4. Adoption of PR

The PR debate between 1900 and 1917 was mainly characterised by strategic safeguarding. PR was not something parties wanted to implement from an ideological point of view, but from a purely strategic point of view. The pursuit of profit maximisation was the driving factor behind the choice for a certain electoral system (Loots 2004, p. 86). Parties' ideological stances were less important than their aim to obtain a position of influence and to maximise their electoral outcome (Loots 2004, pp. 10; 103). Expecting more seats and later a safeguard against the growing left, the Catholics had been the earliest pro-PR party (for all parties' PR preferences see bottom of Table 31 and Appendix 15).

[245] Source: own calculations based on Nohlen & Stoever (2010). For a more detailed version of PR support, see Appendix 15.

The Social Democrats and the ARP wanted PR at first but then imagined that they could potentially emerge victorious under a majoritarian system in the long run. The liberals were reluctant to adopt PR but were eventually convinced to implement it as a safeguard against the potential rise of the left.[246] In a compromise of the settlement of the school question and the introduction of universal suffrage, PR was adopted in 1917. In the following sections, I analyse the different parties' PR preferences and finally the adoption of PR.

Clerical parties' PR preferences

The Catholics were against the introduction of PR initially. However, they expected the Social Democrats to grow in the future and noticed the successful move to PR in their neighboring country, Belgium in 1899. As a result, PR was interpreted as a possible future safeguard against the left movement (Carstairs 1980, p. 64). It was demanded by the Catholics earlier and more rigorously than by other parties. The purpose of PR was seen as a corrective to the potential rampant influence of the left (Loots 2004, p. 96). They assumed that they would win more seats in parliament under PR despite their positive VSD (see Table 31), because of the discontinuing effect of gerrymandering and the chance of more votes in the North of the country (Loots 2004, pp. 94-95). Their positive VSD was due to their strength in the South, yet they wasted all of their potential in the North of the country by supporting the other clerical parties. Furthermore, they had argued that PR was more just form of representation than TRS, because the Liberals used gerrymandering under TRS to their advantage (Loots 2004, p. 56). This is an anomaly, as one would expect the parties with high positive VSD to prefer the electoral system in place.

[246] Nevertheless, parties hesitated to publicly advocate for PR in their party programs. The newspaper "Algemeen Handelsblad" published an article in 1915 where it discussed the political debate of PR among Dutch parties but also stated that the debate was not a large public debate. The article continued by stating that while the Social Democrats and the Catholics mentioned PR in their party programs from 1909 onwards, the Liberals only started to mention it in 1913 (National Archive The Hague: Archive Van Houten, 123. Artikelen in het "Algemeen Handelsblad" betreffende de grondwetsherziening, 8/12/1915).

The ARP was underrepresented under TRS and had therefore been discontented with the electoral system for many years (see Table 31). They had stated initially that instead of TRS, PR would be the best form of representation of the people (Loots 2004, p. 53). However, in 1901, the ARP almost won the most seats under TRS and therefore became less enthusiastic about the adoption of PR. Since 1897 they had needed clerical coordination to win most of their seats (see Table 30). Catholic support in the North was crucial for their electoral success. In addition, they were contemplating that soon a majoritarian system could benefit them in the same way that it had benefited the Liberals in the years before (Loots 2004, p. 85). This was again an anomaly, as their negative VSD would lead us to expect that they would prefer PR. Kuyper had ardently pleaded for PR in the early years of the ARP's existence but as soon as the party had acquired a strong position amongst the confessional parties and in parliament in 1900, Kuyper and the ARP turned against PR (Loots 2004, pp. 85; 87).

The CHU was against PR initially because it would lead to a more centralised, nationalised and hierarchical party administration, causing more competition between party members (Loots, 2004, p. 80). ARP and CHU were both afraid that without the clerical coordination, the Catholics would benefit more from PR than the Protestant parties. At around 1908, they looked more favourably upon PR because they then interpreted it as a safeguard against the effects of universal suffrage (Loots 2004, p. 81). However, neither one of protestant parties was fully convinced that the implementation of PR was a necessary and helpful move for them to make.

Social Democratic Party's PR preferences

The Social Democrats were always underrepresented under TRS and they initially wanted to introduce PR instead. As in Germany, they had argued that it would create chances for the political minorities to be represented in parliament (Loots 2004, pp. 58, Duverger 1959). After politicians of all political colours started anticipating the rise of the left, the SDAP became more sceptical about PR. Yet, they

were not distinctly against or in favour of it. Their main focus was on universal suffrage. There are, however, two accounts on which they contested PR.

First of all, similar to the ARP, it occurred to the Social Democrats that TRS could work to their advantage the same way it had done for the Liberals (seeing the benefits of a majoritarian system for them in the future, not coordination under TRS). Once they realised that they could be a potential beneficiary of universal suffrage, they started to doubt that PR would lead to more positive election results for them.

Secondly, they were strictly against PR being used as a safeguard against themselves by other parties. Even if they were pro-PR from an ideological point of view, they understood how PR would work to the advantage of more conservative parties. Troelstra, the SDAP's leader, made it quite clear in parliament that a Social Democrat naturally would not accept PR as a corrective to universal suffrage (Loots 2004, pp. 97-101). In conclusion, the Social Democrats were not necessarily against PR but contested it, as they realised that it could be used by more conservative parties as a safeguard against them.

Liberal parties' PR preferences

The Liberal Union was the party that opposed PR for the longest time. In the 19th century, they did not want to implement a safeguard with such long-lasting consequences for the representation of other parties in parliament. They wanted to stick to TRS. The working class was not enough of a threat yet and they could still profit from TRS and MMDs in the urban districts (Loots 2004, p. 63). Yet, once the Liberals had started to lose their prominent position in parliament due to the slight expansion of suffrage in 1896, especially in the elections of 1901 (see Table 27 and Figure 12), the Social Democrats started gaining votes and the liberal opinion towards PR changed. The more power the Liberals lost, the more they advocated for PR.

At the beginning of the century, they were looking for an insurance to keep the traditional liberal elite represented in parliament even if they would lose significant shares of votes to the new left. The left threat had already been apparent for several years but the religious parties as one group and the liberal parties as another group had been able to coordinate their votes in order to contain the threat and maximise their seats in parliament. Therefore, the introduction of PR was only widely debated when universal suffrage became a current issue again in 1905. Being resistant to universal suffrage, the liberal leadership became afraid that the Liberals would suffer the same fate as the Liberals in the UK, which diminished under a majoritarian system after the left became stronger than them (Sternberger, Vogel 1969, p. 867).

The left's potential to grow through the introduction of universal suffrage began to present a vivid threat to the entire right (Welderen Rengers 1950, p. 229). Being wiped out under a majoritarian system became a serious future scenario for the incumbent parties. An expansion of suffrage had proven to be disadvantageous for the liberals and a scientific analysis from 1909 had predicted that the liberals would together lose 13 seats in parliament if universal suffrage was to be implemented. Yet, they had realised that universal suffrage had become inevitable and it would be more favourable for them to actively participate in forming the suffrage expansion process to at least put some safeguards in place instead of fighting further expansion, which could lead to a loss in votes. Hence, they started to look for a safeguard to accompany further suffrage expansion after gerrymandering and the introduction of run-off TRS. They had noticed the successful adoption of PR by the Belgian right in 1899, which ensured the Belgium Liberal Party's representation in parliament (Daalder 1975, p. 227, Loots 2004, p. 72). PR seemed to be the only remaining safeguard to contain the left and secure sufficient long-run representation (Hermens 1968, pp. 285-86, Loots 2004, p. 103). Thus, in 1912, the liberal concentration stood up for universal male suffrage, PR, funded public education, and some other issues regarding trade policies (Oud 1997, p. 208). They wanted to delay the introduction of PR

for as long as they could but they eventually argued in favour of universal suffrage in combination with PR (Loots 2004, p. 71; 102).

The Radicals were pro-PR initially because they believed it would be a more just form of representation (Loots, 2004, p. 60). Around 1905, they were against PR for a while, only to become PR promoters again in 1907, when they wanted PR as a safeguard for the potential changes of the party system through universal suffrage (Loots 2004, p. 76). Being the right wing of the liberals, the League of Free Liberals had been against universal suffrage and PR for many years, to then become contenders of it in 1913, when they demanded that universal suffrage without safeguards would "disturb the balance of the representation of the people's interests" (Loots 2004, p. 78).

The Radicals and the League of Free Liberals also became more sympathetic to PR since they were tired of coordinating with the Liberal Union to secure liberal seats in parliament (Oud, 1997, p. 209). The liberals were only successful in elections when they posed a united coordinated front. The fragmented liberals opposed each other in between elections, to then team up again before elections because their electorate was too fragmented. This would no longer be necessary under PR. PR "allowed them to collect their sympathisers throughout the country without the need of complex interparty bargaining", which the ARP, the Catholics, and the CHU were carrying out against the liberals and Social Democrats for 30 years (Daalder 1990, p. 56). Their chances of winning under TRS separately were marginal for the different liberal groups. Thus, they then moved from an anti-PR/anti-universal suffrage position to a pro-PR/pro-universal-suffrage position (Oud, 1997, p. 209).

In sum, the two main reasons for the liberals to implement PR were that PR would pose a corrective to universal suffrage and that it would enable the fragmented liberals to pursue their own interests without being excluded from parliament.[247]

[247] Parties also realised that if PR was to be implemented, they would have to restructure and better organise themselves in order to be able to generate PR-lists on a broader basis instead of single local candidates for each constituency. A centralisation of leadership would be indispensable. Party platforms would have to become more robust and

The adoption of PR

Between 1905 and 1910, three commissions were created to analyse what kind of changes had to be made to the constitution in order for universal suffrage to be implemented, including accompanying it with the adoption of PR. The first two commissions did not present a specific solution.[248] When the liberal Cort van der Linden became Prime Minister in 1913 (until 1918), he proposed PR in the same year. He introduced a third commission, which had the task of finding out which system of PR would best fit the Netherlands.[249] The commission's work was driven by the liberal's Van der Linden and Oppenheim, the commission's chairman. Both were looking for a way to limit the growing influence of the left. It was an initiative to look at how PR could be implemented as effectively as possible.

Yet, the right was not unified on the strategic move to adopt PR and there was an intense debate about it. In particular, the most conservative parts of the parties were still against PR. Others argued against TRS and specifically criticised the second rounds of the system.[250] Eventually, the commission proposed a version of PR with several PR-list districts across the country.[251] The large districts

comprehensive because the message of each party would be more important under PR than the message of each local candidate (Loots, 2004, pp. 84; 88). This was used by opponents of PR to argue against the implementation of PR. They claimed that under PR, politics would be more about parties as opposed to the people ('Memorie van Antwoord', the attachment to parliamentary proceedings in September 1908).

[248] Huygens ING Institute 4, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/grondwetscommissies/onderzoeksgids/gids/commissie/1253166507 (accessed on 7/10/2014); 22e vergadering Tweede Kamer 16/11/1911, p. 607.

[249] Huygens ING Institute 4, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/grondwetscommissies/onderzoeksgids/gids/commissie/3524083354 (accessed on 5/11/2014).

[250] The conservative, Van Idsinga (CHU), for instance, advocated keeping TRS in place. He argued that it was only fair if a party that could get a majority of votes behind a candidate would win a seat, even if electoral coalitions were needed in order for them to do so. PM Van der Linden then argued that parties that had their supporters spread over the entire country instead of having regional strongholds could be better represented under PR than under TRS. Van Idsinga responded by stating that these political groups would find other options to be politically active and called PR the "dictation of party leaders" that had to be prevented. The Liberal's parliamentary party leader, Rink, on the other hand, backed up Van der Linden and promoted PR as the optimal representation of all intellectual movements of a nation. He used the case of the Swiss Tessin as a counterargument for TRS – where the Conservatives had only 617 more votes than the Liberals, yet they gained 42 more seats in parliament (see Chapter 3). These disproportionalities, together with forced electoral alliances, were the evil of TRS, he contended. A voter who was once forced by the electoral system to change his mind in round two to prevent a certain party from winning had already made the first step away from a life of principles, he continued (BArch R 1501 / 114478 / a).

[251] National Archive of The Hague: Archive Centraal Stembureau 1918-1951: 11. Nota van de Heer v. Gelein Vitringa over districtenindeling, 11/12/1913; 15. Overzicht der belangrijkste besluiten tot en met 16 December 1913. 16/12/1913.

("Kieskringen") were intended to keep the personal contact between the voter and the MP intact (Vesters 1917, p. 16). This helped to reassure the Catholics and many of the more conservative liberals, who were against the centralisation of Dutch party politics (Bergh 1914, p. 40).

However, it would take another four years for PR to finally be adopted in 1917. Van der Linden's government eventually implemented PR by making a deal with the confessional parties: in return for PR, the Liberals decided to vote for state financing of confessional schools ("school question") (Hermens 1972, p. 339), putting an end to the school question and the universal suffrage/PR debate.[252] Without TRS to facilitate coordination among the fragmented right parties, the pressure for PR would have been much higher during those years and a deal to adopt PR could possibly have been necessary much earlier. Despite having opposed PR before the introduction of universal suffrage, the Dutch Social Democratic Party agreed to it in the "Pacification accord of 1917", mainly because it came with the introduction of universal male suffrage.[253] PR was introduced 16 years after the SDAP had reached almost 10 per cent of the votes in 1901.

With agricultural and industrial workers being able to vote, the largest beneficiaries of the suffrage expansion were the Social Democrats (later the Labour Party) and the Catholic Party. The clerical alliance won an absolute majority, which they retained until 1967. The biggest losses were suffered by the liberals. Even though they delayed the introduction of PR, it eventually brought about the liberals' downfall. The alliance went down from 39 to 18 seats in 1918 and diminished even further after that. It took them more than 75 years to gain comparable representation in parliament again in 1994. They had coordinated well in the second round under TRS but could not use universal suffrage to their advantage. They remained a party only for the middle and upper classes and had always been the least organised of all the major parties.

[252] Staatsblad No. 398, 399, 400.
[253] After 1919, women were allowed to vote as well.

Conclusion

Overall, an ongoing trend of fragmentation of the party system could be observed. The introduction of PR further contributed to this (17 different political groups obtained seats in parliament in 1918). PR also made it more difficult for parties to build coalitions than TRS. From then on, every party fought on its own, whereas TRS had been conducive for parties to form coalitions before, during and often also in government. In the first years of PR, Dutch governmental coalitions were therefore very unstable. PR and universal suffrage did not get the Social Democrats as many seats as they and the right had expected. They did become the second largest party in 1918 with 22 seats but the Catholics and the ARP kept their lower classes under control and made sure that they would continue to vote for them.

The adoption of PR was the starting signal for the Catholics to become a strong political force in the entire country.[254] When the southern bloc was united with the various areas of Catholicism in the North, the Roman Catholic State Party (RKSP) obtained 30 per cent of the votes and seats, which was approximately the share of Catholics of the entire population. It was universal suffrage that helped them more than they had expected and with PR, they made use of this potential. They also did not have to withdraw candidates in the North anymore, which contributed to the large hike in seats. Together with PR and universal suffrage, the length of a parliamentary term was reduced from 9 to 6 years. Half of the mandates were replaced every 3 years.

The development of the Dutch class cleavage between right and left was slightly delayed, as the country was previously dominated by a liberal-clerical cleavage.[255] This made right-wing coordination more complicated. However, both political camps coordinated well enough to keep the number of

[254] Mostly also in the centre of the country and not only in the South, where they had been most dominant under TRS.

[255] The Dutch case is uncommon in regard to its religious cleavage since the dividing line was not between different religions but between religious parties and non-religious parties. Yet, the divide between a political right and a political left was evidently present as well in the Netherlands.

left seats relatively small before the introduction of PR. TRS helped to ease the cleavage between different religious parties as well as right parties in general. Without the division between the confessional parties and the liberals, the right could possibly have delayed PR even further. Although the right had moved from majority-plurality TRS to run-off TRS in order to better contain the left threat in the urban districts, in the end, the Liberals were too worried about the rising power of the Social Democratic Party. PR was viewed as their last safeguarding measure to secure sufficient representation in parliament and has stayed in place until today.

7. Comparative perspectives and conclusion

In this chapter, I want to start by taking stock and putting the three cases into comparative perspective. In the following conclusion, I emphasise the importance of electoral systems for coordination and the change of electoral systems in the future, in particular the new findings in regard to TRS. The limitations of the study, its implications for the broader field, and some suggestions for future research complete the chapter.

7.1. Comparative perspectives

All three cases took place in similar settings: Constitutional monarchies with bicameral systems, an emerging vivid party system, a fragmented right and a large left threat. Even though these Western European early democratisers were not fully-fledged democracies, their parliaments played a large role in the political system and the accountability of their governments was significant and rising with time.

The right was fragmented in all three cases. In particular, Germany and the Netherlands had a very fragmented right with at times, five to six different right-wing parties (liberal and conservative parties). Sweden was split into three to four main right parties. As in many Western European states, Liberals and Conservatives were not a natural alliance even though they were both parties of the right. They had coexisted for decades before the left became established and therefore had to deal with their historical rivalry when the left became their common enemy. Run-off TRS in Germany and the Netherlands was conducive to strategic coordination among parties and helped to align the right against the rising left. In Sweden, however, coordination among the right was not significant under SMP.

There were two different types of suffrage expansion, which were closely connected to the right's fear of a growing influence of the left; suffrage as a device to unify nations and suffrage as a device of political representation. The former was the case in Germany in 1871, where universal male suffrage

was introduced early as part of the unification process. The latter was the case in Sweden and the Netherlands, where suffrage was gradually expanded over a longer period of time, giving in to demands for more political participation. The early introduction of universal male suffrage in Germany in 1871 (between 31 and 38 per cent of the population was enfranchised under TRS) (see Appendix 2), led to a large left threat as early as 1884. In Sweden and the Netherlands, gradual suffrage expansion led to a gradual increase of the left and a later emergence of a left threat (1905 in Sweden and 1901 in the Netherlands). Up to 15 per cent of the population was enfranchised under SMP in Sweden, and this went up to 32.5 per cent when universal male suffrage was implemented together with PR in 1909 (see Appendix 6). In the Netherlands, up to almost 28 per cent of the population was enfranchised before the introduction of universal male suffrage and PR in 1917 (see Appendix 12). The right in both countries expected a large hike in left representation after the introduction of universal suffrage.

Table 32: Safeguards in comparative perspective

	Non electoral system measures	Other electoral system measures	TRS/SMP	PR
Germany	Repression (Anti-Socialist Laws)	- Plural voting - Undemocratic upper chamber dominated by Conservatives - Ballot rigging (particularly in the East-Elbian districts)	- Gerrymandering/ Malapportionment - Coordination	Late
Sweden	Some repression	- Plural voting (upper chamber) - High property qualifications to run for upper chamber - Suffrage restrictions (gradual expansion) - Initially indirect voting (until 1887)	- Gerrymandering/ Malapportionment	Early
Netherlands	Some repression (strikes illegal etc.)	- Suffrage restrictions (gradual expansion) - SMDs in urban districts - Move from maj.-pl. TRS to run-off TRS - Compulsory voting	- Gerrymandering/ Malapportionment - Coordination	Late

Once the left had won a significant number of votes on a national basis in all three cases, the right became alarmed and started to use repression, containment measures and electoral safeguards to ensure their political power (see Table 32). In Germany, to keep the left in check, they used repression (Anti-Socialist Laws), plural voting, an undemocratic upper chamber dominated by Conservatives, ballot rigging (East-Elbian districts) and maintaining the badly-apportioned districts

(malapportionment), which had a similar effect to gerrymandering. In Sweden, suffrage restrictions for Second Chamber elections were in place, there was some repression of the left, the upper chamber was kept under conservative rule by indirect voting initially, high property qualifications were in place to run for the upper chamber, paired with plural voting. The Netherlands used suffrage restrictions for parliamentary elections, some repression of the left – although less than in Germany, and gerrymandering to contain the growing left. Gerrymandering effects were stronger in the Netherlands than malapportionment was in Germany. Dutch parties were more regionally segmented than in Germany, and therefore suffered under gerrymandering, as opposed to the German left, which overcame the largest negative effects of malapportionment by becoming a nationally successful party. PR was debated very early in Sweden compared to Germany and the Netherlands. Some parts of the Swedish Conservatives were worried about potential power shifts due to the expansion of suffrage before it became a hot topic among German and Dutch right-wing politicians.

While the Swedish right did not coordinate much under SMP, the German and Dutch right made thorough use of coordination that was induced by TRS. In both countries, there was a very high degree of right-wing coordination. In Germany, coordination happened in both rounds. First-round coordination occurred where parties were better informed about party strengths and frontrunners, mostly through regional segregation (e.g. Catholics in some southern districts and Conservatives in the East-Elbian landed districts). Second-round coordination took place where electoral information was low and where emerging parties wanted to run in the first round even though they had very small chances of success. Young parties in emerging party systems needed to use elections in order to present themselves to voters and potential members, sharpen their political profiles and to broaden their party base.

There was significantly more coordination among the right in round two, when right-wing parties regularly united against the left. In the Netherlands, coordination occurred mainly within a liberal or

a confessional camp but also between both of these right-wing groups. Coordination between clerical and liberal parties but also between Protestants and Catholics was especially hard to imagine without the incentives for coordination given by the electoral system. This was also the case in Germany, where the Catholic Centre party teamed up with the Conservatives to defeat the left, only years after the Conservatives had fought the Centre Party with tough repression during the "Kulturkampf" ("culture struggle").

The use of electoral alliances was not only common, but also very sophisticated among the right in both countries. In Germany, they coordinated across districts in both rounds: they used candidacy-trades or platform alliances in round one, and vote-trades or alliances without concessions in round two. Coordination was particularly common in round two, as information about potential electoral results that could be used to coordinate around stronger candidates was scarce in early democratisers. Election polls did not exist at the time. In the Netherlands, both groups used coordination across districts. The clericals mostly coordinated before round one, mainly because they knew much better where each religious party was the frontrunner in certain districts (candidacy-trade; Catholics in the South, Protestants rather in the centre and North of the country). The liberal camp mostly coordinated in the second round (vote-trade and alliance without concessions) as they were more reluctant to coordinate and the liberal parties were widespread throughout the country.

In Sweden, the situation was very different. Coordination between the Liberals and the Conservatives was almost non-existent. The right parties had been rivals before as well, and SMP was not as conducive to forming electoral alliances as TRS was in Germany and the Netherlands. The incumbent Liberals tried to adopt TRS after the turn-of-the-century but could not attract enough support in both chambers for their proposal. Hence, SMP stayed in place and did not lead to a larger degree of electoral collaboration of the right even though the left threat was apparent. Limited

information about party strengths on a district basis and an emerging party system in an early democratising country led to reluctance for coordination.

Now that we have compared the starting position, the political right and left, and the coordination processes under TRS and SMP, we move on to the adoption of PR as a safeguard. Who benefitted the most from the majoritarian system and who wanted to introduce PR as a safeguard? Initially, the right was against PR in all three cases. In Germany, the Conservatives benefitted the most from the majoritarian system. They did not want to introduce PR but eventually did so after they had delayed the adoption for as long as they could. The entire right had benefitted from coordination under TRS until the left had grown too strong to be contained anymore.

In the Netherlands, the Liberals benefitted the most from TRS and coordination in round two even though they were the least organised party. They opposed PR for the longest time, similarly to the Conservatives in Germany. At first, they did not want to implement a safeguard with such long-lasting consequences for the representation of other parties in parliament. They wanted to stick to TRS. Yet, realising their potential demise through the gradual expansion of suffrage, they recognised the need to adopt PR as a safeguard. The position of the Catholics towards PR was similar; they were pro-PR due to the rise of the left. The Protestants wanted to keep TRS in place as well because it ensured them the support of the Catholics in all districts that were mainly Protestant. They only gave in to support PR when the Liberals offered them state financing of religious schools in exchange for PR, both attached to the universal suffrage bill. The Social Democrats were for PR at first but became more ambiguous about it once they understood that further growth (as forecasted by the right) could make them one of the main beneficiaries of a majoritarian electoral system.

The German right successfully delayed the adoption of PR and only implemented it as a safeguard relatively late, in 1918. It was first introduced in urban districts that were increasingly won by the left, then nationwide. The Dutch right also adopted PR late as a safeguard in 1917. Strategic coordination

in both countries led to a long period of sustaining the left threat before they adopted PR: Germany was able to wait 34 years after the left first gained almost 10 per cent of votes in national parliamentary elections to adopt PR; in the Netherlands, PR was adopted 16 years after the left appeared noticeably in the picture of national parliamentary politics.

In Sweden, the Conservatives benefitted from SMP at first but wanted to introduce PR as a safeguard later. The Liberals initially wanted PR, then tried to implement TRS to exploit coordination and their centre position in the political spectrum. Like the Dutch left, the Swedish Social Democrats first wanted PR, then favoured a majoritarian electoral system when they realised their vast potential and the likelihood that they would benefit the most from a majoritarian system. The Conservatives eventually prevailed and persuaded some Liberals to adopt PR. It was adopted as a safeguard very early, in 1907. The left threat was only sustained for two years under SMP.

By and large, the two TRS cases – Germany and the Netherlands, were able to wait longer to adopt PR as a safeguard because the electoral system was more conducive to coordination of the right. Information and time after round one, and the restriction to two or more candidates, led to a large amount of strategic coordination and a longer period of containment of the left threat. This was not the case in Sweden, where SMP did not facilitate electoral alliances as much as TRS. The left threat therefore could not be contained as well as it could be in Germany and the Netherlands, which led to an early adoption of PR. The less fragmented the right was, the easier it was to coordinate to sustain a left threat. Yet, even under high fragmentation, TRS successfully facilitated coordination among the right, which led to a later adoption of PR in these states.

Less organised right parties were more reliant on TRS and better organised parties were able to use TRS more to their advantage. The less organised parties were more dependent on TRS as they were in greater need of information to engage in functioning electoral alliances. Yet, the more organised the right parties were on a national basis, such as the Conservatives in Germany, the more

they could benefit from TRS by engaging in electoral coordination. They could rely on more resources to use for coordination purposes after round one, and were organised and cohesive enough to form alliances. Their party base was robustly embedded in the electorate for voters to follow their suggestions in round two. The government-backed parties also profited from TRS as they could use governmental resources to coordinate in round two (National Liberals and Conservatives in Germany and Liberal Union in the Netherlands). This also counted for good relationships with newspapers that helped to get coordinative information out to voters and politicians. It was mostly the strongest party in an electoral alliance that benefitted the most from them. Clearly visible is also the advantage of centred liberal parties to be able to gain votes from both sides of the political spectrum in the second round of TRS. They were supported depending on who they ran against – gaining votes from the left when running against a right-wing party and votes from the right when running against the left (Left Liberals in Germany, Radicals and to some extent Liberals in the Netherlands, Liberals in Sweden).

7.2. Conclusion: Coordination to contain the left

This dissertation examines an important period in the historical development of electoral systems and more broadly, democratisation. Embedded into the larger process of European democratisation, the study analyses the origins and engineering of electoral systems in the 19th and early 20th century in Western Europe. It attempts to make an empirical and theoretical contribution to the overall process of electoral system change by focusing on the adoption of PR and the relevance of TRS in this context. The thesis is extending the field of historical analysis of electoral system change to three comprehensive cases that have not been examined recently and pairs the comparative study with a qualitative medium-N-comparison.

The majority of theories of electoral system change have linked the moves from SMP to PR to the threat of left-wing parties at the time of suffrage expansion. However, a lack of historical work

has led to a conceptual negligence: a misconceived starting point that is assumed by most theories. The electoral system that was in place before the adoption of PR/maintaining of SMP of most of the 19th century early democratisers was not SMP but TRS. The medium-N-comparison in Chapter 3 has shown that 9 out of 12 Western European countries had a TRS system in place; only three were using SMP. Although elections with multiple ballots are one of the world's oldest electoral systems, TRS effects are still poorly understood by political scientists. Research that analyses with scrutiny the consequences of this misconception for the subsequent change of the electoral system is sparse. The preceding chapters have shown that there is a distinct difference between SMP and TRS: the extent to which they facilitate strategic coordination originating from the existence of a second round.

The central claim of the thesis is that coordination under TRS is more effective than under SMP due to additional information and time. Therefore, countries with TRS in place could wait longer to implement PR than countries with SMP. Not only PR, but also TRS was widely considered and used as a safeguard against the rising threat of the left that originated from the expansion of suffrage, since it eased coordination between parties of the right. PR operated as a "measure of last resort" for the incumbent elite against an electoral threat of the left after repression, other containment strategies and coordination had been exhausted and the left grew too strong. Under TRS, a fragmented right could coordinate votes more effectively against a rising left than under SMP, leading to a considerable delay of the adoption of PR under TRS. This was largely due to the increase of information and time after the first round of TRS elections, which were used by right parties to coordinate votes around the most promising candidate before the second round. First-round results under TRS were used as an "electoral opinion poll". Based on these results, the right could react in order to improve outcomes in round two.

Thus, TRS needs to be considered as an independent electoral system, not an altered version of SMP. It incorporates the safeguarding options of SMP – gerrymandering and first round coordination

– and additionally provides the right with the option of second round coordination and possible strategic voting in round two. TRS was particularly useful for right parties in early democratisers, which had restricted information. When right parties had more information about party strengths and potential right-wing frontrunners on a district basis, for instance due to distinct regional segregation of parties, they could use this knowledge to coordinate candidates before round one (e.g. the clerical alliance in the Netherlands).

7.2.1. Implications

What are the implications of the findings of this thesis? The results of the study mainly influence the recent debate about the adoption of PR and partially stretch further in regard to more general findings such as the knowledge that politicians had about electoral systems in the 19th and early 20th century.

Before we revisit the existing theoretical arguments for PR adoption and carve out the common and different features compared to our theory, I want to use the knowledge we have gained from our historical case studies to briefly highlight the reasons why coordination under SMP has not worked to the same extent that Duverger (1954) had claimed it would and what difference it makes to have a second round in place. Let us therefore turn to the conditions that were needed for coordination to work in a Duvergerian manner (M+1) and analyse whether these conditions hold under our unit of analysis – early democratisers. Cox (1997, 1999) stated that parties would coordinate in a Duvergerian way when:

1. Actors agree that only two (M+1) parties have a realistic chance of winning. If they think that an extra party has a good chance, then there will be too many candidates.
2. Actors have good information and therefore agree about which parties have the most realistic chances of winning.
3. Actors are primarily concerned with the current election.

Let us examine these assumptions with the knowledge we obtained from our historical study. The first condition does not hold in early democratisers since the right was fragmented and therefore more than M+1 parties had chances of winning. The second condition does not hold in early democratisers without electoral polls either – information is scarce and not everyone agrees about which parties have the most chances of winning. The third condition does not hold either, because many parties are concerned with sharpening their political profile for future elections and might run even if they have no objective chance of winning the current election. Hence, all three conditions do not hold in early democratisers, and coordination (and strategic voting) therefore works less under SMP.[256]

What does the second round of TRS change in order for these conditions to work in a Duvergerian manner? Under TRS, the first condition holds in round two, naturally under run-off TRS, as there are only two contestants, but also under majority-plurality TRS if the first round had two clear frontrunners. The second condition holds in round two as well because round one gives actors the information they need about which parties have the most realistic chances of winning. The third condition also holds in round two of TRS since parties that were concerned with building up their profile for the next election could run in round one to then only be concerned with the current election (by dropping out after round one and coordinating with the strongest alliance partner). Additionally, more information about the possible frontrunner in regionally segmented districts led to coordination in round one, and therefore to M+1 results in round one on a district level. This could also occur under SMP but overall, TRS induced coordination much more than SMP in early democratisers.

Now, we consider the impact of the findings on the two main existing theories of PR adoption: Rokkan (1970) and Boix's (1999) political explanation and Cusack, Iversen and Soskice's (2007) economic explanation, including the reasons why TRS has a larger impact on these theoretical

[256] For further elaboration of multi-partism under majoritarian electoral systems before the adoption of PR in Western Europe, see Raymond (2015).

accounts than presumed before. Rokkan (1970) and Boix (1999) argued that majoritarian systems were only maintained where right-wing parties could join forces against the left. Whereas, when they could not build a coalition, right-wing parties moved to PR hoping that this would allow them to continue to be competitively represented in parliament. Boix defines more precisely:

1. If there was no electoral threat by the left, the right had no incentive to reform the electoral system and there was no adoption of PR.

2. If there was a substantial electoral threat by the left and one dominant right party, there was no shift to PR since coordination was simple.

3. If the electoral threat was large and the rightist elite fragmented, the right had a strong incentive to shift to PR since the split of the vote led to additional risk of a left victory.

Although I agree with the overall theoretical argument, it needs to be modified to work for early democratisers, taking into account that TRS facilitates coordination, even for a fragmented right. First of all, in Western Europe, PR was adopted in cases both with and without a dominant right party if a large left threat was apparent. Secondly, right parties under TRS did coordinate even in cases where PR was adopted. Hence, coordination around a dominant party under TRS led to a delay of the adoption of PR. The left still grew but its rise could be contained via the electoral system. Despite the right being able to coordinate, PR was still adopted. Electoral systems can only do so much to induce a certain outcome – complete engineering of electoral outcomes is unthinkable in relatively free elections. The same is true for cases with one dominating party. The left could be contained but not eliminated and PR delayed but not completely waived.

Some critics have doubted Rokkan (1970) and Boix's (1999) claim that PR was introduced as a response by established parties to an electoral threat. They argue that actors either did not understand the long-term effects of electoral systems or that their decisions were purely focused on short-term

election results.[257] The findings of this thesis do not correspond with this criticism. I have found that PR was interpreted and adopted by the right as a safeguard against the rising left. It seemed obvious that universal suffrage would lead to a significantly stronger parliamentary representation of the left. It was difficult for actors to forecast electoral results in the long run due to the drastic change of the electorate through universal suffrage, the change of the electoral system and the landscape of political parties.

However, we have seen that parties of the right were very well informed about how different electoral systems work and what results they lead to. The electoral systems debate in Western Europe was larger than anticipated before. Governments and leading politicians in most countries knew about the different systems across Western Europe. Ministries had produced large studies and politicians travelled throughout Western Europe to examine electoral systems in other states. The analysis has shown that politicians were more sophisticated and had a higher standard of knowledge in regard to electoral systems than often assumed. Yet in the long run, PR was not always as beneficial for the parties that voted for it as they had expected (e.g. the Liberal Party in the Netherlands). Here, it is nevertheless important to trace the reasons for the decisions of actors even if they did not lead to the desired electoral results for all parties, as predictions and actual results can differ in every decision-making process.

Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007) argue that it was economic coordination between business and labour that drove the change in electoral systems. They state that the key structural economic conditions are co-specific assets – investments in human capital/skill formation that are jointly made by employer and workers. According to them, PR was introduced because of the coordination of a "pre-democratic" right and left parties, which realised their similar interests in creating a political

[257] Andrews, Jackman (2005); Crepaz (1998); Iversen, Soskice (2006); Persson, Tabellini (2003); Rodden (2006), Rogowski (1987).

framework to support reforms that foster economic prosperity and secure jobs for trained workers. Although their structural economic argument is an interesting and original argument, I have not found any evidence for a right-left coordination based on co-specific assets that would have led to the introduction of PR. No significant amount of cross-class coordination and support for PR has been found either. To my knowledge, PR was not seen as having distributive consequences on the economy at the time and actors were not focusing on economic influences of PR when implementing it.

Overall, the findings of this dissertation support the political account of the change of electoral systems in the early 20th century and offer a new explanation in regard to coordination among the right and the timing of the adoption of PR, including the effects of TRS.

Now that we have depicted how the findings of the study blend into the general existing theories of electoral system change, we shall look at two more distinct peculiarities that the study was concerned with: the use of gerrymandering and the position of the left towards PR.

Ahmed (2013) argues that in addition to PR, gerrymandering under SMP was also considered a safeguard against the left. In my in-depth cases, I found that parties that expected to obtain or maintain a majority on a nationwide level would consider SMP or TRS in order to stay in place because their majoritarian results often led to positive vote-seat disproportionalities for the larger parties (if not regionally segmented anymore). Parties that were on a downswing, triggered by the emerging left, considered the adoption of PR as a safeguard. Ahmed's observations seem convincing when looking at regionally segmented left-wing parties or left parties, which posed a relatively weak threat, which could both be contained by gerrymandering under SMP or TRS. The US and the UK are cited as examples for the consideration of SMP as a safeguard. As these are different from my in-depth case studies, they might show more proof of Ahmed's theory than my cases.

In the Netherlands, gerrymandering was indeed used by the Liberals against the Catholics long before the adoption of PR. The Catholics only became a non-regional party with the introduction of

PR and were therefore against TRS. This was different from the situation in Germany, where the right used malapportionment against the left. Yet, the German left began to win seats in the entire country in 1912 and in this way, absorbed gerrymandering. SMP can work as a safeguard by using gerrymandering. However, this is only possible if the left is geographically concentrated as it was the case in the Netherlands and other Western European states during the beginning of the workers' movement, when the left was mainly strong in the urban areas. Once the left grew beyond these limitations, it could no longer be controlled by gerrymandering.

Furthermore, it has been debated whether the left was in general a proponent of PR or not. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that it was rather the strength of the left that pushed for PR as opposed to a move by the right to safeguard their power that was responsible for the adoption of PR. They propose that left party leaders understood that PR was in their interest in the long run. However, their claim does not correspond with the findings of this thesis. I argue that the left was not always a PR supporter. In fact, in several cases, they either did not support PR (UK); became PR opponents after they had previously supported it (Sweden, the Netherlands); or were against PR but could be persuaded to vote for it in order to introduce universal suffrage (Denmark). This was because they realised that universal suffrage could make them one of the largest beneficiaries of a majoritarian electoral system and were therefore not necessarily PR supporters. In general, left parties were PR supporters until they gained the potential to become one of the largest parties in their countries under a majoritarian system. Prior to that, they were dissatisfied with the negative vote-seat disproportionality under TRS or SMP. Once the political elite across the board started to expect the skyrocketing of left electoral results with the introduction of universal suffrage, they reconsidered their position towards PR as well. However, left parties that had already taken an adamant stance as proponents of PR had difficulties changing their position without losing political credibility.

Table 33: Countries using TRS today[258]

Country	*SMD/MMD*
Albania	SMD
Azerbaijan	SMD
Bahrain	
Belarus	SMD
Bhutan	
Bulgaria	
Central African Republic	SMD
Chad	SMD and MMD
Comoros	SMD
Congo (Brazzaville)	SMD
Cuba	SMD and MMD
Egypt	MMD
France	SMD
Gabon	SMD
Georgia*	SMD
Haiti	SMD
Hungary	SMD
Iran	SMD and MMD
Iraq	MMD
Kazakhstan*	SMD
Kiribati	SMD and MMD
Kyrgyzstan	SMD
Lithuania	SMD
Macedonia	SMD
Mali	MMD
Mauritania	SMD and MMD
North Korea	SMD
Tajikistan*	SMD
Togo	SMD
Turkmenistan	SMD
Uzbekistan	SMD
Vietnam	MMD

*These states use TRS to elect district representatives as part of a mixed electoral system.

What are some possible secondary implications of these findings? Is the theory historically bound to the countries under analysis and the historical period or does it provide implications for contemporary countries? The use of coordination under TRS as a safeguard and the adoption of PR

[258] Sources: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (http://www.idea.int/esd/search.cfm); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and Developments and Inter-Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org); International Foundation for Electoral Systems (http://www.ifes.org).

as a last resort to guarantee political representation could well be applied to more modern cases as well, assuming that the underlying conditions are very similar. That is to say, it needs to be an early democratiser in an economically developing state, with a developing workers' movement, which is aiming for parliamentary representation and the lowering of thresholds of representation. These conditions are not unlikely in the developing countries of today's world. Today, TRS is in place in 31 countries for parliamentary elections (see Table 33), most of which are early democratisers. The political regimes of the case countries of this thesis and of many of today's TRS cases can be described as "electoral authoritarian regimes", or semi-authoritarian hybrid systems in the grey area between democracies and authoritarian systems (cf. Levitsky, Way 2002, Merkel 2004, Puhle 2005).[259] Being a hybrid system can be more than a phase towards a consolidated democracy or backwards to a purely authoritarian system. It can also be a stage that lasts and is relatively stable. All early democratisers in the 19th century in Western Europe showed several characteristics of competitive authoritarianism, such as competitive elections paired with limited suffrage; undemocratic upper houses; defective checks and balances or horizontal accountability, infringed political liberties and defects in the rule of law and human or civil rights (Puhle 2005).[260] The same is true for many competitive authoritarian

[259] Recent transitions from autocratic and authoritarian systems to more democratic political regimes have resulted in the spread of political systems that are neither fully democratic nor classically authoritarian. Combining the systematic misuse of democratic practice with formally democratic or partially democratic constitutions has opened a new field of democratisation research. To cope with the complicated situation of the measurement of these kinds, of political systems, scholars have recently introduced several different hybrid regimes, which try to cover this democratic grey zone: Schedler (2006) and Diamond (2002) describe them as "electoral authoritarianism", Zakaria (1997) as "illiberal democracies", Levitsky and Way (2002) as "competitive authoritarian regimes" and the scholars around Merkel (2004) and Puhle (2005) as "defective democracies." All of these concepts take either democracy or authoritarianism as the "root concept" from which they start to develop improvements or defects of the corresponding concept. The valuation of hybrid regimes with a democratic index requires a minimum of democratic conditions within the political system that is normally the institutionalization of an elected parliament.

[260] Exemplary for this is imperial Germany. The political system of imperial Germany comprised of broad suffrage, free and fair elections (to a certain extent, and in particular after the introduction of the secret ballot in 1903), solid political competition and participation, a widely accepted rule of law and judicial independence after 1879. Furthermore, it was characterised by no institutionalised horizontal accountability of the government, but a government that was heavily dependent on the parliament. Imperial Germany was also significantly influenced by East Elbian elites and largely recognised human and civil rights and political liberties after the abolishment of the Anti-Socialist Law in 1890. It can be classified as a "liberal electoral authoritarian system" with exclusive and delegative democratic defects. The unaccountability of the government, Prussia's dominant position and the exclusion of women from elections were the

states today. Voting behaviour and political systems of today's electoral authoritarian states seem to be similar to that of early democratisers in the early 20th century, even though digital communication is enhancing the conveyance of political information. The expansion of suffrage can lead to the rise of political powers that are threatening the incumbent elites position of power, nowadays just as in the 19th century. The equivalent of the rising left back then might today be a different developing political party but the mechanism can work in similar ways. Incumbent elites in electoral authoritarian regimes want to extend the lifetime of their regimes and delay the adoption of democratic characteristics, such as more proportional results through the implementation of PR. Generally, TRS is still being utilised in a similar way to a century ago. Elites in modern states are using TRS in their favour to prolong the political lifespan of their regimes. Birch (2003, p. 330) even labels TRS as the "dictator's friend".

What would happen to the thesis if the case countries would be expanded? Spain, Greece, Portugal and Iceland were not included in the analysis because they adopted PR significantly later than the 11 countries that have been analysed.[261] PR might have been adopted under very different political and economic circumstances in these cases. Therefore, they were deemed unsuitable to include in a comparative study such as this one, as this would potentially lead to biased findings. In the overseas cases of the US and Canada, no strong left threat existed and PR was never adopted. PR was also never adopted in Australia or New Zealand. In future research, one could examine if the reason why PR was never adopted in these states was actually due to the non-existence of a left threat, or if there were other reasons. Other possibilities for future research will be explored in the next section.

main defects of a "full" democratic system and corresponds to the terms of "delegative" and "exclusive" types of defective democracies.

[261] See footnote 48 for more details on why these cases were not included.

7.2.2. Limitations and future research opportunities

What are the limitations of the study and what could be the focus and scope of future research in the area? In-depth historical case studies and medium-N-comparisons require a large amount of time and knowledge and are therefore somewhat restricted in the number of cases that can be included. This study was restricted to three in-depth case studies and one chapter giving an overview of a region (Western Europe). The task of identifying critical reforms, the political and economic conditions, the actors and what guided their decisions in each country in an interval of 40 – 70 years required a very broad range of knowledge of the specific countries in question. This knowledge should be a prerequisite of every historical case study that is conducted. The realisation of a large number of small case studies while focusing on a very narrow part or specific critical junctures can lead to severe misjudgement and incorrect assessment of specific events or historical periods. Hence, studies with a large number of case studies require a tremendous amount of time and knowledge. Furthermore, the secondary implications for contemporary countries could be more comprehensive. If possible, it would be desirable to have small cases that show how coordination could lead to delayed PR adoption in TRS states today.

What could be the focus and scope of future research in the area? Future research might want to extend the study to historical case studies that could not be covered in this work. It would be particularly interesting to look more closely at three different types of cases: ones with a strong left threat and a dominant right party, ones outside of Western Europe, and finally, cases with different forms of TRS.

The first group is interesting as one could analyse to what extent the right in these states coordinated around the dominant party and to what extent coordination was induced by the electoral systems in place. This is a complicated endeavour as it is very hard to differentiate between both mechanisms merely by looking at numerical sources.

The second group is interesting because it would enlarge the study to the rest of the world, test the extent of its generalisability and increase the external validity of the theory. Since the overseas cases did not adopt PR, one could test if this was due to the non-existence of a left threat.

The third set of cases promises new findings in the broad field of TRS. Since the design of TRS systems varies and can be broad, one could for instance examine the distinct differences between majority-plurality TRS and run-off TRS. There could be different interesting mechanisms of coordination at work. I would assume that the key difference between both systems lies in the type of withdrawal or coordination for the weaker right parties: under majority run-off TRS, it is a "withdrawal by law" and under majority-plurality TRS, it is a "voluntary withdrawal" (bargain).[262]

Voters under majority-plurality TRS still have the choice between several candidates and often more than one right candidate. The right might need more coordination efforts under majority-plurality TRS to contain a left threat than under run-off TRS and the likelihood of an earlier PR introduction might be higher. In round two of majority-plurality TRS, right-wing voters might not necessarily vote for the most successful candidate of round one. They might vote for their preferred candidate rather than for the most viable one in round two. Thus, a higher number of contestants in the second round of majority-plurality TRS could increase the need for more coordination before round two (cf. Blais, Loewen 2009).

Under majority run-off TRS, with only two candidates in the final round, right-wing voters could coordinate around the most viable candidate since all others are eliminated after round one. It might be easier for voters to pick the right candidate where there are only two contesters in the second round (if the right competes against the left in round two). Voters are "forced" to vote strategically in round two. Since the right might need more coordination efforts under majority-plurality TRS than under

[262] "Withdrawal by law": under majority run-off TRS, only the two most successful parties of round one are allowed to run in round two. All other parties have to "withdraw". Under majority-plurality TRS, withdrawals after round one are part of the strategic coordination process between parties.

run-off TRS, it might be more difficult for the right to contain a left threat. Thus, the adoption of PR could only be "slightly delayed" compared to the scenarios under run-off TRS or with a dominant right party in place.

Finally, in another historical comparative study, the period of the adoption of PR in the early 20th century could be compared to the period of PR adoption in Eastern Europe after the iron curtain fell (cf. Andrews, Jackman 2005) or cases in other parts of the world, for instance Latin America (see Appendix 20).[263] Future research might also want to make use of enhancing analytic tools for the study of electoral system change such as event-history models and further focus on putting politicians as actors of change in the centre of the analysis of future comparative politics research.

[263] Here one could focus on the early adopters of PR, such as Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, Panama and Columbia (see Appendix 20) and the different electoral systems that were in place before the adoption of PR. Although most Latin American cases were using presidentialism not parliamentarism as the Western European countries. This could lead to a weakening of the overall mechanism provided in this thesis because of a smaller degree of strategic coordination between candidates. Parliamentary elections in presidential systems might be considered less important by voters and politicians since there is less accountability. Presidential elections in general are more focused on the individual candidate then parties, therefore, alliances can be formed easier in parliamentary elections, especially when there is a constant common disfavour against one party.

VI. Appendix

Appendix 1: Seats of the German national parliament (Second Chamber) in per cent[264]

	Conservatives*	National Liberals**	Left Liberals***	Centre	SPD	Misc
1871	24.6	40.6	12.3	16.0	0.5	6.0
1874	13.1	39.8	12.6	22.9	2.3	9.3
1877	19.6	35.5	9.8	23.4	3.0	8.6
1878	29.0	27.5	7.3	23.4	2.3	10.6
1881	19.1	24.2	16.6	24.7	3.0	12.3
1884	26.2	13.6	17.9	24.9	6.0	11.3
1887	30.0	25.4	8.1	24.7	2.8	9.1
1890	22.9	11.6	18.6	26.7	8.8	11.3
1893	23.9	17.1	8.6	24.2	11.1	15.1
1898	19.9	15.9	9.3	25.7	14.1	15.1
1903	18.6	15.6	6.8	25.2	20.4	13.4
1907	21.2	17.4	8.8	26.4	10.8	15.4
1912	14.1	11.3	10.6	22.9	27.7	13.4

Appendix 2: Germany's electorate as a percentage of the population twenty years of age and older

Year	Electorate
1871	31
1874	36.2
1877	36.9
1878	37.4
1881	36.2
1884	36.8
1887	37.3
1892	37.8
1898	37.8
1903	38.3
1907	38.3
1912	38.7
1919	97.9

[264] Source: Own calculations based on www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de/krtw.htm., accessed 12/1/2013. For */**/***, see above.

Appendix 3: Germany: mandates in the national parliament in per cent



Appendix 4: German chancellor during the German Empire (1871 – 1918)

Name (biographical data)	**Appointed**	**Party**	**Reason for end of tenure**
Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898)	04/05/1871	Independent (conservative)	Resignation
Leo von Caprivi (1831–1899)	20/03/1890	Independent	Discharged
Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (1819–1901)	29/10/1894	Independent	Resignation
Bernhard von Bülow (1849–1929)	17/10/1900	Independent	Resignation
Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (1856–1921)	14/07/1909	Independent (Liberal)	Resignation
Georg Michaelis (1857–1936)	14/07/1917	Independent	Resignation
Georg von Hertling(1843–1919)	1/11/1917	Centre	Discharged
Max von Baden(1867–1929)	3/10/1918	Independent (Liberal)	Handover of chancellorship to Friedrich Ebert (SPD)

Appendix 5: Social Democratic Party Members in Sweden[265]

Year	No. of Party members
1889	3,194
1890	6,922
1891	7,534
1892	5,630
1893	6,571
1894	7,625
1895	10,250
1896	15,646
1897	27,136
1898	39,476
1899	44,489
1900	44,100
1901	48,241
1902	49,190
1903	54,552
1904	64,835
1905	67,325
1906	101,929
1907	133,388

[265] Source: Scase (1977, p. 336).

Appendix 6: Sweden's electorate as a percentage of the population twenty years of age and older

Year	Electorate
1872	9.8
1875	10.2
1878	10.5
1881	10.7
1884	10.9
1887	10.1
1892	10.7
1896	10.8
1899	11.5
1902	12.7
1905	14
1908	15.8
1911	32.5
1914	32.8
1917	32.3
1920	33
1921	87.9

Appendix 7: Swedish Prime Ministers and governing parties, 1876 - 1920

Name	Appointed	Party
L. De Geer	20/03/1876	Independent
A. Posse	19/04/1880	Conservative (Lantmanna Party)
C. J. Thyselius	13/06/1883	Independent
O. Themptander	16/05/1884	Independent
G. Bildt	06/02/1888	Independent
G. Akerhielm	12/10/1889	Conservative (Protectionist Majority Party)
E. G. Boström	10/07/1891	Conservative (Lantmanna Party)
F. von Otter	12/09/1900	Independent
E. G. Boström	05/07/1902	Conservative (Lantmanna Party)
J. O. Ramstedt	13/04/1905	Independent
C. Lundeberg	02/08/1905	Conservative (Protectionist Majority Party)
K. Staaff	07/11/1905	Liberal
A. Lindman	29/05/1906	Conservative (General Eleatoral League)
K. Staaff	Oct 1911	Liberal
H. Hammarskjöld	Feb 1914	Independent
C. Swartz	March 1917	Conservative (National Party)
N. Edén	Oct 1917	Liberal
H. Branting	March 1920	Social Democratic

Appendix 8: Suffrage requirements of the Swedish Second Chamber[266]

Year	**Age**	**Sex**	**Other qualifications**
1866	21	Male	1. Own property valued at 1000 SEK or lease property valued at 6000 SEK or have yearly taxabe income of 800 SEK 2. Paid taxes to state and commune
1909	24	Male	1. Have paid taxes to state and commune for 3 years 2. Not be bancrupt 3. Not on relief rolls 4. Fullfilled military obligation

[266] Source: Carlsson (1962, p. 646).

Appendix 9: Vote-seat disproportionality of Swedish national parliament[267]

	Conservatives (Protectionists)	Moderate Free Traders	Liberals (Free Traders)	Social Democrats
1887 I	-2.9		2.9	
1887 II	6.8		-7.2	
1890	-4.1		4.1	
1893	-1.0	2.9	-1.9	
1896	4.0	1.8	-6.2	
1899	6.4		-6.8	
1902	6.5		-4.7	-1.8
1905	1.7		2.2	-3.9
1908	1.0		-1.2	0.1

Appendix 10: Seats of the Swedish national parliament in per cent[268]

	Conservatives (Protectionists)	Moderate Free Traders	Liberals (Free Traders)	Social Democrats
1887 I	38.5		61.5	
1887 II	53.6		46.4	
1890	38.6		61.4	
1893	37.7	28.9	33.3	
1896	42.6	25.2	31.7	
1899	59.6		40.0	
1902	51.7		46.5	1.7
1905	47.0		47.4	5.7
1908	39.6		45.7	14.8

[267] Numbers for votes and seats are not from the same source and might therefore be slightly skewed. Free traders include Liberals and in the years 1902 – 1908 also Social Democrats. Protectionists are the Conservatives. Seats are based on: Carlsson (1988, p. 456); Votes are based on Lewin (2004, p. 276); Lewin (1988, p. 329); Lewin et al. (1972, p. 34).

[268] Source: Carlsson (1988, p. 456). The Moderate Free Traders might have already run as an independent party in the 1890 elections. Different sources show different numbers here.

Appendix 11: Mandates of the Dutch national parliament in per cent[269]

		Liberal Union	Radicals*	League of Free Liberals	Catholics	ARP	CHU	Social Democrats
1888	maj.-pl. TRS	46	0		25	27		1
1891		53	1		25	21		0
1894		57	3		25	15	0	0
1897	run-off TRS	48	4		22	17	6	3
1901		26	9		25	22	10	7
1905		34	11		25	15	8	7
1909		20	9	4	25	25	10	7
1913		22	7	10	25	11	10	15
1918	PR	6.2	5.3	3.8	30	13	7	22

Appendix 12: Dutch electorate as a percentage of the population twenty years of age and older

Year	Electorate
1853	4.6
1870	5
1880	5.4
1886/87	5.7
1888	11.8
1891	11.5
1894	11.3
1897	20.9
1901	21.2
1904	24.4
1909	25.7
1913	27.6
1918	39.3
1922	80.7

[269] Source: Nohlen, Stoever (2010, p. 1412), own calculations.

Appendix 13: Development of suffrage in the Netherlands

Year	Age	Requirements
1815		Election by members of the provincial council (delegates)
1850	23 years	Men, payment of a minimum amount of direct taxes and full possession of civil rights
1887	25 years	Men, signs of fitness and social welfare
1896	25 years	Men, proof of income, savings or property and certain examinations
1917	25 years	Universal male suffrage

Appendix 14: Number and type of districts in the Netherlands

Year	Districts	SMDs	Double	Multiple
1850	38	10	27	1
1859	38	5	31	2
1864	39	4	33	2
1869	41	5	33	3
1878	43	6	34	3
1887	84	79	2	3
1896	100	100		

Appendix 15: Dutch parties PR support in detail[270]

Period	Movement/Party	PR support	Reason
Before 1896	ARP	Yes	Creating chances for political minorities and best form of representation of the people
	Catholics	Yes	A more just form of representation than TRS (because the Liberals used gerrymandering under TRS to their advantage)
	Social Democrats	Yes	Creating chances for political minorities.
	Radicals	Yes	A more just form of representation.
	Liberals (Liberal Union)	No	PR as a safeguard was not needed yet because: 1) no significant working class, and 2) they could still profit from TRS and MMDs in cities.
1896-1917	Liberals (Liberal Union)	Yes (1901)	Gradually realised that a safeguard was needed when universal suffrage would be implemented. This seemed inevitable after a couple years of debate. Wanted to delay the introduction of PR.
	Radicals	No (1905) → Yes (1907)	Wanted PR as a safeguard.
	League of Free Liberals	Yes (1913)	Universal suffrage without a corrective (such as PR) would disturb the balance of the representation of the people's interest.
	CHU	No → Yes	First against PR: PR would mean a national and hierarchical party administration; more competition within the party between members; PR would benefit the Catholics. Later pro PR: Safeguard against the effects of universal suffrage.
	ARP	No (1902)	TRS could soon work to their advantage

[270] Source: Based on parliamentary proceedings and Loots (2004, pp. 53-97).

	Catholics	Yes	PR would represent the differences within the Catholic parties.
	Social Democrats	Ambiguous (1903)	They were not against PR, universal suffrage was their main priority. Yet, PR should not be used as a safeguard against them. They also realised that a majoritarian system could benefit them in the long run.

Appendix 16: Prime Ministers of the Netherlands and governing party, 1849 - 1913

Name	Appointed	Party
Johan Rudolph Thorbecke	01/11/1849	Liberal
Floris Adriaan van Hall	19/04/1853	Liberal
Justinus van der Brugghen	01/07/1856	Anti Revolutionary
Jan Jacob Rochussen	18/03/1858	Conservative
Floris Adriaan van Hall	23/02/1860	Liberal
Jacob van Zuylen van Nijevelt	14/03/1861	Liberal
Schelto van Heemstra	10/11/1861	Liberal
Johan Rudolph Thorbecke	01/02/1862	Liberal
Julius van Zuylen van Nijevelt	01/06/1866	Conservative
Pieter Philip van Bosse	04/06/1868	Liberal
Johan Rudolph Thorbecke	04/01/1871	Liberal
Gerrit de Vries	04/06/1872	Liberal
Jan Heemskerk	27/08/1874	Conservative
Jan Kappeyne van de Coppello	03/11/1877	Liberal
Theo van Lynden van Sandenburg	20/08/1879	Anti Revolutionary
Jan Heemskerk	23/04/1883	Conservative
Æneas Mackay	20/04/1888	Anti Revolutionary Party (religious coalition government)
Gijsbert van Tienhoven	21/08/1891	Liberal
Joan Röell	09/05/1894	Liberal
Nicolaas Pierson	27/07/1897	Liberal Union
Abraham Kuyper	01/08/1901	Anti Revolutionary Party (religious coalition government)
Theo de Meester	17/08/1905	Liberal Union
Theo Heemskerk	12/02/1908	Anti Revolutionary Party (religious coalition government)
Pieter Cort van der Linden	29/08/1913	Liberal

Appendix 17: Members of the Dutch Social Democratic Party[271]

Year	Members Social Democrats (SDAP)
1895	700
1896	1000
1897	1500
1898	2100
1899	2500
1900	3200
1901	4000
1902	6500
1903	5600
1904	6000
1905	6816
1906	7471
1907	8423
1908	8748
1909	9504
1910	9980
1911	12582
1912	15667
1913	25708
1914	25609
1915	25642
1916	24018
1917	24893
1918	27093

[271] Source: Vorrink (1945, p. 136).

Appendix 18: Robustness of left threat measure

Country	ES	Frag-mented right	Adoption of PR (law)	Electoral threat of left parties (year)								Sustained threat								Average sustained threat							
				8%	9%	10%	11%	12%	15%	20%	Ideol. radical	8%	9%	10%	11%	12%	15%	20%	Ideol. radical	10 % - WWI	8%	9%	10%	11%	12%	15%	20%	Ideol. radical	10 % - WWI
Germany	TRS	Yes	1918	1877	1877	1884	1890	1890	1890	1890	1891	41	41	34	28	28	28	28	27	30									
France		Yes	1918	1898	1898	1898	1898	1906	1914	1914		20	20	20	20	12	4	4		16									
Netherlands		Yes	1917	1901	1901	1901	1905	1905	1913	1918	1894	16	16	16	12	12	4	-1	23	16									
Norway		Yes	1919	1903	1903	1903	1906	1906	1906	1909	1891	16	16	16	13	13	13	10	28	16	19.4	19.4	18.4	16.1	15.0	11.7	9.1	19.2	16.1
Italy		No	1919	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900	1904	1904		19	19	19	19	19	15	15		15									
Switzerland		No	1918	1899	1899	1899	1902	1902	1905	1911	1914	19	19	19	16	16	13	7	4	19									
Belgium		No	1899	1894	1894	1894	1894	1894	1894	1898	1885	5	5	5	5	5	5	1	14	1									
Sweden	SMP	Yes	1907	1905	1905	1905	1908	1908	1908	1911	1896	2	2	2	-1	-1	-1	-4	11	2	8.0	8.0	7.0	6.0	5.0	4.0	3.0	7.0	7.0
Finland		Yes	1906	1907	1907	1907	1907	1907	1907	1907	1905	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	-1									
Denmark		No	1915	1892	1892	1895	1895	1898	1901	1901	1906	23	23	20	20	17	14	14	9	20									

Appendix 19: Kreuzer's (2010 amended) PR support and stability of PR preferences

	Country	Outcome	Conservatives	Liberals	Christian Democrats	Socialists
TRS	Germany	PR	No -> Yes	Yes	No -> Yes	Yes
	Italy	PR		No -> Yes	Yes	Yes
	Netherlands	PR		Yes	Yes	Div
	Belgium	PR		No -> Yes	Div	Div
	Switzerland	PR		No	Yes	Yes
	Norway	PR	Yes	Yes		Yes
	France	PR/TRS	No	No		Yes -> No
SMP	Sweden	PR	Yes	No -> Yes		No ->Yes
	Denmark	PR	Yes	Div		Div
	Finland	PR		Yes		Yes
	UK	SMP	No	No -> Yes		Yes -> No

Appendix 20: The adoption of PR in Eastern Europe, the Baltic states and Latin America[272]

	Adoption of PR
Eastern Europe	
Hungary	1990
Bulgaria	1991
Croatia	2000
Czech Republic	1990/1992
Poland	1991
Romania	1990
Slovakia	1992
Slovenia	1990
Russia	1993
Yugoslavia	1992
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1996
Baltic States	
Estonia	1990
Latvia	1992
Lithuania	1992
Latin America	
Argentina	1963
Bolivia	1956
Brazil	1945
Chile	1925
Colombia	1931
Costa Rica	1913
Cuba	1908
Dominican Republic	1924
Ecuador	1946
El Salvador	1962
Guatemala	1945
Honduras	1957
Nicaragua	1985
Panama	1928
Paraguay	1993
Peru	1963
Uruguay	1918
Venezuela	1946

[272] Sources: Eastern Europe: Colomer (2005); Nohlen (2010); Sternberger, Vogel (1969); Baltic states: Colomer (2005); Latin America: Will-Otero (2009).

Appendix 21: Enfranchisement in the last election before the adoption of PR[273]

Country	Adoption of PR (law)	Last election before PR	Enfranchisement in last election before PR (electorate in per cent of the population >20 years)	Vanhanen measure in last election before PR (Voters as a percentage of the total population)
Germany	1918	1912	38.7	18.3
Italy	1919	1913	42.0	14.2
France	1918	1914	42.8	21.2
Netherlands	1917	1913	27.6	12.7
Belgium	1899	1896	37.3	19.5
Switzerland	1918	1917	38.6	13.3
Norway	1919	1918	80.4	25.7
Sweden	1907	1905	14.0	5.7
Denmark	1915	1913	30.1	12.9
Finland	1906	1904	9.0	n.a.
UK	-	1910	28.7	10.9

[273] Sources: For "enfranchisement": Bartolini (1996); for Vanhanen measure: Vanhanen (2000).

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